THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 305 iL V-ll,cob-2 Latest Date stamped below. Sife* UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. XI September-December, 1923 Nos. 3 and 4 BOARD OF EDITORS ERNEST L. BOGART JOHN A. FAIRLIE LAURENCE M. LARSON PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL URBANA, ILLINOIS COPYRIGHT, 1924 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, 1832-1841 BY FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS URBANA CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE Introduction 9 I. The Three Great Powers and the Problem of the Near East in 1832-1833 13 II. Evolution in Near Eastern Relations, 1834-1838 36 III. The Question of Constantinople versus the Question of Alexandria 75 IV. The Negotiation of the Treaty of July 15, 1840 120 V. The Isolation of France 164 VI. The Turco-Egyptian Question Concluded: France and the Four Powers Reconciled 195 Appendix A. The French Bourse, January, 1840, to August, 1841 233 Appendix B. France and the Eastern Question: An Ex- tract from an Article which was Published in The Examiner, August 23, 1840 234 Appendix C. Extracts from the Conclusions drawn by Commodore Napier in his War in Syria 236 Appendix D. Extracts from the Information and Opin- ions of American Diplomatic Agents Relative to the Turco-Egyptian Question 237 Appendix E. Bibliographical Notes 255 PREFACE A number of special works, in addition to general histories, which treat more or less extensively certain phases of the Turco- Egyptian question during the period 1832-1841, have been pub- lished heretofore, and a few of these perhaps deserve special mention. Sergi Goriainow's valuable little volume on Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, based almost exclusively upon archival ma- terial found at Petrograd, touches upon the question briefly, from the Russian point of view, in so far as it concerned the status of the Straits. Major John Hall's England and the Orleans Monarchy, based largely upon similar material found at London and Paris, deals with the question primarily from the point of view of the relations of England and France. Adolf Hasenclever's careful study on Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841, which has been based to a considerable extent upon official records found at Berlin and Vienna, but also to some extent upon numerous published sources, treats the question during the most critical part of the period from the point of view of the relations of all the great European Powers. Furthermore, Vicomte de Guichen's La Crise de Orient de 1839 a 1841 et V Europe, which like Hall's work has been based largely upon archival material found at Paris and London, treats, as does Hasenclever's, the question during its later critical stage primarily from the point of view of the rela- tions of the Powers. However, no work has heretofore appeared which deals exclusively with the Turco-Egyptian question in its entirety. It has been with the idea that the question to be best understood must be so presented at least in its entirety so far as it affected the three great Powers most vitally concerned that this monograph has been prepared. The author is indebted to several members of the History De- partment of the University of Illinois for valuable suggestions and criticisms. He is indebted particularly to Professor A. H. Lybyer at whose suggestion the study was undertaken and under whose careful guidance and direction the whole of it has been carried to completion. The author, himself, is of course responsible for all errors, both in presentation and in interpretation of the facts. FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY INTRODUCTION During the past century the question of the Near East, which has been primarily that of the disposition of the territories form- erly belonging to the Turkish Empire, has proved particularly troublesome to European statesmen. It has been so first, because of the ambitions of certain Powers to gain control of the whole or of part of Turkey, while other Powers have worked to preserve its independence and its integrity; and secondly, because of the existence throughout the Ottoman dominions of what has been one of the most complex racial situations which has ever existed anywhere. Undoubtedly no question in European diplomacy in recent times has been more directly and more continuously at the root of the rivalries of the great Powers than this one of the Near East. On two occasions, notably in 1854 and again in 1914 it certainly played a major role in bringing about conflicts most disastrous in their consequences, the last of which today even threatens the existence of European civilization. On other occasions, while not bringing on actual hostilities, it has come dangerously near to doing so and has at least profoundly affected the great Powers in their diplomatic relations with each other. Such was the case in the period between 1832 and 1841, when, perhaps, the question as we understand it today had its origin. In the period just preceding 1832 the three Powers, England, France, and Russia, were in alliance to further the cause of Greek independence. Their general policies in regard to Near Eastern affairs, however, were by no means identical. Russia, since the time of Peter the Great, had been the traditional enemy of Turkey. Her rulers had acquired extensive territories and special political privileges at the expense of the Ottoman Porte, and it was well known that they entertained the hope of falling heir some day to the whole region of the Straits. France, on the other hand, since the time of Francis I had been the traditional friend of Turkey. She had quite uniformly shown sympathy and had on some occasions given active aid to the latter in her struggles with Russia and Austria. But, it must be remembered, she too had her own ambitions in the Mediterranean by 1832. Her occupation of Algiers was under way and her interest in Egypt, where the noted [9] IO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [336 Albanian, Mehemet Ali, with the aid of French experts 1 had made himself virtually independent of the Sultan, dated back to the time of Napoleon. Many Frenchmen, it may be ventured, were be- ginning to look forward to the day when France would become "mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea." 2 England, like France, had at times befriended Turkey. However, her inter- ests in the Near East had never been paramount. It was before the day when oil counted for much in the diplomatic affairs of nations, and the commercial route to India was still by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The period between 1832 and 1841 saw many important de- velopments both in the direct affairs of the Near East itself and in the resulting relations of the great Powers. It was the period when the forces of Mehemet Ali on two occasions threatened to *A number of French experts were in the employ of Mehemet Ali. Note the following extract from a footnote found in Vicomte de Guichen, La crise d'Orient de 1839 a 184.1 et I'Europe, pp. 3-4: "Parmi les Frangais qui etaient alors a son service, nous citerons le colonel Varin, directeur de 1'Ecole de cavalerie, Bruneau, sous-directeur de 1'Ecole d'artillerie, d'Armagnac, chef d'escadrons du regiment de cuirassiers, Mary, chef d'etat-major de 1'armee d'Arabie, le commandant Haragly, chef de la comptabilite du ministere de la Guerre. Dans les autres services du gouvernement egyptien, on remarquait Monget, ingenieur des Ponts- et-Chaussees, Henry, directeur des Constructions maritimes, Houssard, capitaine de vaisseau, Koenig, directeur de 1'Ecole des Princes, Em-Bey, directeur des Fabriques de produits chimiques, Linant, ingenieur en chef pour les travaux de canalisation, Lambert, sous-directeur de 1'Ecole Polytechnique, le Dr. Clot-Bey, fondateur de 1'Ecole de me~decine, inspecteur general du service medical, le Dr. Perron, directeur de 1'Ecole de medecine veterinaire, Hamont, directeur des Haras, Prince, directeur de 1'Ecole de medecine veterinaire, Chedufan, medecin en chef de 1'armee d'Arabie, Bonfort administrates des immenses proprietes d'lbra- him Pacha, 1'ingenieur de Cerisy, crateur de 1'arsenal d'Alexandrie; enfin Besson- Bey, vice-amiral de la marine eegyptienne et Jumel qui avait enrichi 1'Egypte de la culture du coton." Other Frenchmen in the employ of Mehemet Ali were: Colonel Seves (Suleiman Pasha), chief military adviser of the Pasha, Leroux, de Toron, and Baladin, under-officers in the Syrian army, and Galise and Mimaust, engineers. Other Europeans in the employ of Mehemet Ali were: Cherubini, probably an Italian, physician to the Pasha, Colonel Schultz, a Polish officer in command of St. Jean d'Acre, and Pacysci, another Polish officer in the employ of the Pasha. See Marshal Marmont, The Present State of the Turkish Empire, p. 265. The Times, Dec. I, 1840, Feb. 6, March 4, April 9, 1841. "See Appendix B. 33?] INTRODUCTION 11 destroy completely the Ottoman Empire; when Russia modified temporarily her policy with regard to Turkey from one of open hostility to one of professed friendship and peaceful penetration; when France continued to oppose Russia and to reveal more markedly her favoritism for Mehemet Ali; and finally, when England, awakening to a realization that through the development of steam navigation the Near East might furnish half-way stations on the road to India, stepped forward to oppose actively both the designs of Russia at Constantinople and those of France at Alexandria. Indeed, it was the period during which for the first time there was serious danger of a general European war as a result solely of the rivalries of the great Powers in the Near East. CHAPTER I THE THREE GREAT POWERS AND THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 The Sultan Mahmoud II, from the beginning of his reign (1808), directed his policy toward "crushing the various forces within the [Ottoman] empire, whether the Janissaries or too powerful Vice- roys, which hampered the omnipotence of the central power.'' 1 One of the greatest obstacles to the success of such a policy was to be found in the rapidly increasing strength of Mehemet AH, Pasha of Egypt. Under the circumstances a clash between the Porte and its powerful vassal was inevitable. Mehemet Ali, well aware of the feelings of his overlord, 2 and dissatisfied with the meager reward 3 he had received in return for the important role played by his army and navy which had assisted the Ottoman forces in their attempts to subdue the Greek insurgents, 4 de- termined to strike the first blow. Consequently, in November, 1831, after a period of deliberate and formidable preparation, 5 a com- bined land and naval force under the command of Ibrahim Pasha was sent forth to lay siege to the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. Mehemet was anxious to conceal his real motives, and to the commissioner of the Porte who remonstrated with him for thus invading a neighboring pashalic, without the permission of the Sultan, he loudly protested the loyalty of his intentions, declaring that the presumptuous Governor of Acre, Abdallah Pasha, had " 'insulted his beard whitened in the service of his sovereign,' and, in the interest of the Porte, he now proposed to chastise his ar- rogance." The Sultan and his ministers placed little faith in these ^Cambridge Modern History, X, p. 548. 3 C. C. Frankland, Travels to and from Constantinople, in the Years 1827 and 1828, II, pp. 146-149. The governorship of the Island of Crete. According to the Sultan's original promises, "The reward of his [Mehemet Ali's] assistance was to be the Pashalik of Crete, while his stepson Ibrahim was to govern, in the Sultan's name, the reconquered Morea." J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, p. 188. 4 A. Cahuet, La question d'Orient dans I'histoire contem-poraine, p. 78. "Barker to Abbott, Alexandria, June 2, 1831: "'There is now no manner of doubt that the formidable expeditions in Alexandria and Cairo are destined to besiege Acre.' " J. Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey, II, p. 176. [13] 14 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [340 assurances. They had no doubts that the Pasha was launched upon a career of conquest. 6 Significant of this belief on the part of the Ottoman authorities is the fact that repeated advances were made by them to the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, 7 both before and after the fall of Acre, to secure a close and in- timate connection between Turkey and England. 8 Furthermore, M. Maurojeni, the Turkish charge d'affaires at Vienna, was or- dered to proceed to London to sound out the British government upon the subject. 9 When it became known in Constantinople that practically every important position south of the Taurus moun- tains had fallen before the victorious Egyptians, the alarm of the Sultan and his ministers became so great that Namic Pasha, a major-general of the Imperial Guard, was despatched to England "with a letter from His Highness to King William IV, praying for naval assistance on the coast of Syria." 10 His Britannic Majesty's government, preoccupied with other affairs and underestimating the seriousness of the situation in the Orient, refused to grant the assistance desired. 11 It will be remembered that at that time the T. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Jan. 26, 1832, cited by J. Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, p. 150. 7 In Nov., 1831, Canning had been sent to Constantinople on a special mission to secure the consent of the Porte to the conditions under which it was proposed that Greece should be separated from Turkey. 8 F. O. Turkey 211, 212, Canning to Palmerston, May 17, Aug. 7, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 153. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164. Canning gave Mahmoud to understand that Great Britain might support the Sultan, and at the same time urged Palmerston to send a naval force to the Levant. Ibid, [footnote]. See also a "Memorandum on the Turkish Question sent by Stratford Canning to Lord Palmerston." F. O. Turkey 211, Dec. 19, 1832, quoted in ibid., p. 638. 'Hall, op. cit., p. 153. Parliamentary Debates, XXII, pp. 320-321. 10 F. O. Turkey 213, Mandeville to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1832, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 153. A similar unsuccessful appeal was made to France at about the same time. See P. Thureau-Dangin, Histoire de la monarchie de juillet, II, p. 364. Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, II, p. 164. "On July n, 1833, Lord Palmerston admitted in the House of Commons that the British government had not thought it fit to afford assistance to the Porte at the particular time when it had been requested. "No doubt," he added, "if England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been stopped, . . . ; but although it was easy to say, after events had happened, that they were to be expected, yet certainly no one could anticipate the rapidity with which they had succeeded each other in the East." Parl. Deb., XIX, p. 579. See also ibid., XXII, p. 320. 34 1 ] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 15 question of Parliamentary reform was still of major importance in British politics. Moreover, as Lord Palmerston pointed out upon a later occasion, when the English "were embarking in naval operations in the North Sea, and on the coast of Holland, and were under the necessity of keeping up another naval force on the coast of Portugal, it would have been impossible to have sent to the Mediterranean such a squadron as would have served the pur- pose of the Porte, and at the same time have comported with the naval dignity" of Great Britain. 12 Likewise in France where, it is true, public opinion was sympa- thetic to Mehemet Ali, almost no alarm seems to have been occasioned by the advance of the Egyptian forces through Syria. 13 Even as late as January 15, 1833, the Journal des Debats, leading organ of the Doctrinaires, argued that it would probably be im- possible for Ibrahim to make a successful advance into Asia Minor. After pointing out the difficulties to be encountered in such an undertaking, it concluded with the remark that the question was still far from appearing to be decided in favor of Egypt. 14 Of a far different character, however, was the attitude of Russia. At St. Petersburg the developments in the Near East were re- garded in a serious light. " 'The Emperor,' " Nesselrode declared on November 9, 1832, in a despatch to Boutenieff, the Minister of Russia at the Porte, " ' s'est penetre de I'idee of putting an end to the insurrection in the Orient; with this in view he has re- solved to exert all of his moral influence upon the Viceroy of Egypt.' " 15 In order to promote a reconciliation between the contending forces Lieutenant General Muravieff was sent im- mediately on a special mission to Constantinople and Alexandria. Parl. Deb., XX, p. 900. 13 "To judge from the absence of French and British Ambassadors at the Porte, and from the official silence maintained on the subject by the Govern- ments connected with the Mediterranean, one would have supposed that the de- cisive battle of Koniah was the first event of the war, and that this denouement of an extraordinary drama came upon Western Europe with all the surprise of novelty." The Times, May 7, 1833. This comment, found in the most prom- inent journal of the opposition party in England, is possibly overdrawn, but it is nevertheless significant. See another editorial in The Times, April 30, 1833. "Journal des Debats, Jan. 15, 1833. 18 S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles, p. 29. l6 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [342 The Russian government, guided by the theory that no Power can have a better neighbor than a weak state, 16 wished to main- tain without strengthening the Turkish dominion. 17 If Mehemet Ali should succeed in destroying the feeble regime of the Porte, he would most certainly build up in its place a strong and vigorous government of his own. Moreover, it was believed that the tri- umph of the Viceroy of Egypt would carry with it an augmenta- tion of the influence of France. 18 Accordingly, Russia regarded the situation as one of real and immediate concern. Unwilling to rely entirely upon the remonstrances which her representatives had been directed to make to Mehemet and Ibrahim, she de- termined that steps should be taken in preparation for an active intervention. With this in view Admiral Greigh was ordered to equip the Black Sea fleet and to place it in readiness to sail to Constantinople upon the first appeal of the Sultan. 18 The Russian Cabinet must have realized that the execution of such a policy as it had adopted would occasion jealousy and alarm on the part of certain other great Powers especially England and France. It is not at all improbable that the explanatory note, 19 forwarded on November 15, 1832, by Nesselrode to the Prince de Lieven, Russian Ambassador at London, was prepared with the deliberate intention of counteracting such feelings at the Court of St. James. In that document the Emperor's chief Minister, after pointing out that the seriousness of the insurrection of Egypt had led his august master to tender the moral aid of Russia to the support of the Grand Seignior, and after explaining the motives back of the Muravieff mission, hinted that the Tsar's government would favor the granting by England of naval assistance upon the coast of Syria as requested by the Porte. Meanwhile, affairs were undergoing a rapid development in the Near East. The Turks, many of whom had lost all hopes of suc- cess even before the battle of Koniah, 20 were panic stricken when "Ibid., IX, pp. 25-27, 47-50. "Guizot, Memoires pour servir a I'lristoire de mon temps, IV, pp. 43-44. 18 Goriainow, op. at., p. 30. "G. F. Martens, Nouveau supplement au recueil de traites, III, pp. 642-643. See statement made by Palmerston in the House of Commons, Aug. 29, 1833. Parl. Deb., XX, p. 900. ""Letter from Constantinople, Dec. 10, 1832, Journal des Debats, Jan. io : 1833- 343] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 \J the results of that decisive engagement became known. Nothing, it seemed, could prevent the victorious Egyptians from marching directly upon Constantinople. 21 It was at this critical moment that General Muravieff, the Russian Envoy Extraordinary, arrived in the Ottoman capital. Mandeville and Varennes, the British and French charges d'affaires, were soon convinced that he brought from his court an offer of military assis'tance to the Porte. 22 In fact M. de Varennes became so alarmed at the possibility of a Russian armed intervention that with the aid of some of the mem- bers of the Divan, he proceeded to exert his influence to prevent it. 23 The suspicions of the British and French representatives un- doubtedly were correct. It is certain that on December 23, only three days after the arrival of Muravieff, the Tsar's Ambassador, M. de Boutenieff, definitely offered in the presence of both the Seraskier and the Reis Effendi 24 to place the Black Sea fleet at the disposal of the Sultan. This generous offer was received with profuse expressions of gratitude. 25 Nevertheless the Porte hesi- tated when it came to accepting the aid of its traditional enemy. After a brief delay the Ottoman authorities determined upon an attempt at a direct agreement with Mehemet Ali. As a result, early in the month of January, 1833. the former Capitan-Pasha, Halil, and the Ametchi Effendi, Reschid, were despatched to Egypt empowered to conclude an arrangement with the rebellious M P. Mouriez, Histoire de Mehemet-Ali, III, p. 213. "F. 0. Turkey 212, 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Dec. 31, 1832, Jan. 8, 1833. F. 0. France 463, Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 28, 1833, cited by Hall, op cit., pp. I54-I55- **Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 219. L. Blanc, Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840, IV, pp. 145-146. Commodore Porter, the American representative in Turkey, wrote to Secretary of State Livingston, March 25, 1833: "There appears to be two parties in the Government, one for, the other against accepting of the aid of the Russians. At the head of this latter, it is said, is the Seraskier Pacha, whose hostility to Mohamed Alii has caused all the troubles between him and the Sultan. The Ulemas and most of the officers of the Divan are said to be of his party. The mass of the people are in favor of Mohamed Alii, and if it depended on them the Capital would be delivered to him without opposition." U. S. Department of State Archives, Turkey, Vol. II, Porter to Livingston, No. 100, March 25, 1833. "The Seraskier was the Minister of War and the Commander in Chief of the armies. The Reis Effendi was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 30-31. l8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [344 vassal. 26 General Muravieff, who must have realized that much would depend upon the success of the projected negotiations, set out immediately upon his mission to Mehemet AH. 27 Though the chief center of diplomatic activity was thus trans- ferred from the Bosphorus to the Nile, at Constantinople, Mande- ville and Varennes continued their endeavors to secure peace and prevent an armed intervention from the north. On January 9, 1833, M. de Varennes forwarded a letter to Ibrahim urging him not to persist in the march of his army upon Constantinople. 28 Later, when it became evident that his first appeal had gone un- heeded, 29 a second was prepared and despatched to the Viceroy himself, as well as to the Commander in Chief of the army in Asia Minor. 30 Meanwhile, the Egyptian army had broken up camp at Koniah and had begun to advance in the direction of Constantinople. That movement, added to the uncompromising attitude of Ibra- him, 29 so alarmed the Sultan that he lost hope in the pending negotiations and determined to avail himself of the aid which had been offered by the representative of Russia. Consequently, a direct application for the assistance of both land and naval forces was made to M. de Boutenieff by the Reis Effendi. 31 oth Mande- ville and Varennes, who opposed such a move on the part of the Porte, exerted themselves in vain to induce it to withdraw its de- mand. " 'A drowning man'," the Ottoman Minister of Foreign *E. de Cadalvene et E. Barrault, Histoire de la guerre de Mehemed-Ali contre la Porte Ottomane, pp. 343-344. Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 220. The Turkish representatives arriving in Egypt on Jan. 21, were received by the Viceroy "with the greatest marks of distinction." However, as they were instructed to offer him only the districts of Acre, Naplous, Jerusalem, and Tripoli, he was un- willing to conclude a definite settlement with them. See Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 193-195- "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. "Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 343-344. "F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Jan. 13, 26, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 157. *Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 348-349. Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 221. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. According to press reports, this application for aid was made on Feb. 2. See Journal des Debats, April 22, 1833. Letter from St. Petersburg, The Times, March 30, 1833. 345] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 19 Affairs informed them, " 'will clutch at a serpent.' " 32 Nevertheless they did not abandon all hope immediately. A few days after the Sultan's request for aid had been communicated to the Russian Ambassador, Muravieff returned from Egypt announcing that Mehemet AH had promised to refrain from further hostilities against his overlord. 33 Also, Varennes received assurances from Ibrahim Pasha dated February 3, to the effect that the Egyp- tian forces would not advance, for the present at least, beyond the positions they had just occupied at Kutayah. 34 Thereupon the British and French charges d'affaires renewed their activities, again endeavoring to persuade the Porte to ask that the despatch of the Russian succor might be delayed. 35 On this occasion it seems their efforts were rewarded by a slight degree of success. At any rate, at a conference between the Russian and Ottoman min- isters in Constantinople on February 8, the Reis Effendi, sup- ported by certain other members of the Sultan's Cabinet, suggested that since the immediate danger which threatened the Turkish capital had disappeared, the arrival of the Tsar's fleet should be countermanded. Boutenieff replied that such a step could be taken only when the Sultan was willing to make a formal declar- ation in writing to that effect, and after he had placed at the 12 F. 0. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 4, 15, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 157. Porter, the American representative, wrote on January 2, 1833: "Great consternation prevails among the higher authorities of this Govern- ment. Their days are employed in labors to avert the impending evils which threaten the Empire, and their nights in consultations, discontents prevail in the Army, the Navy and among the Mass of the people, great indeed must be their terror when they can be induced to resort to the expedient of introducing foreign troops to quell their domestic enemies, and those troops Russians, the future appears not to be thought of in the danger which now threatens." State Dept. Turkey, II, Porter to Livingston, No. 85, Jan. 2, 1833. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 31. Muravieff arrived at Constantinople on Feb. 6. Note Most of the dates given by Goriainow are taken from the Russian calendar. Twelve days must be added to his dates to avoid confusion. "Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., p. 352. 35 F. O. Turkey 222, Mandeville to Palmerston, Feb. II, 23, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 158. See also Metternich to Apponyi, Feb. 21, 1833, Aus Met- ternich's Nachgelassenen Papieren, V, p. 444. 2O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [346 disposal of the Russian legation a steamboat or a "batiment leger" to convey his counter request to the proper authorities. 36 Meanwhile, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Due de Broglie, had learned that offers of assistance had been made to the Sultan by Boutenieff, and, on January 21, forwarded to M. de Talleyrand, the representative of France in London, a despatch directing that the question of joint intervention in the Near East should be proposed to the British government. 37 It was soon apparent that the Court of St. James refused to entertain such a suggestion and therefore Broglie, who was not willing to act alone, was forced to abandon the project. At the same time, in order to protect French influence in Ottoman affairs, he sent Admiral Roussin with the rank of an ambassador to Constan- tinople. 87 It so happened that on February 17, the precise date when Admiral Roussin arrived at his destination, the Ottoman authori- ties presented a memorandum to M. de Boutenieff requesting that if possible the sailing of the Tsar's squadron should be pre- vented. 38 Just why the request was made at that particular time has never been clearly demonstrated. According to an account written by a correspondent of the Journal des Debats, it was due to the prompt and energetic remonstrances of the new French Ambassador. 39 However, as it is difficult to believe that Roussin could have exercised so great and immediate an influence with the Porte, such an explanation cannot be accepted without reserve. In answer to the French assertions the Journal de Saint Peters- bourg contended that the Sultan's request was no more than the natural result of the stand taken by Boutenieff at the conference held on February 8, between the Russian and Turkish diplomats. 38 Regardless of what may have been the true explanation of the origin of the Sultan's memorandum, it is certain that it was issued too late to accomplish its purpose. For, on February 20, after the lapse of only eighteen days from the time that the 3G Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Debats, April 22, 1833. Goriainow, op. cit., p. 32. "Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, p. 366. See also Hall, op. cit., p. 156. ""Extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Debats, April 22, 1833. ^Letter from Constantinople, Feb. 25, 1833, Journal des Debats, March 17, 1833. A translation of this letter appeared in The Times, March 19, 1833. 34?] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 21 Turkish request for assistance had been made, a Muscovite squad- ron under command of Rear-Admiral Lazareff made its appear- ance in the Bosphorus and anchored before Bujukdere. When Roussin learned of the arrival of the Russians he immediately instructed his dragoman to warn the Porte that, in case Admiral Lazareff was not promptly requested to depart he would consider his mission at an end. 40 At the same time he attempted to induce the British Minister to make a similar representation. This Mandeville refused to do. The English Cabinet, its charge d'affaires declared, had given him no authority " 'to hold language of so high and energetic a character.' " 41 After having had time for reflection Admiral Roussin must have realized that a withdrawal would not secure the result which he wished to attain. At any rate he decided to modify his tactics and on February 21 con- cluded with the Ministers of the Sultan an arrangement which made him responsible for the return of the Egyptian army and the conclusion of peace on the conditions already offered to Mehmet AH by Halil Pasha. When the French Ambassador had thus bound himself to secure a settlement the Ottoman repre- sentatives in turn promised to make a request that the Russian fleet should depart from the Bosphorus. 42 Yet Mahmoud, it ap- pears, was still unwilling to depend entirely upon the efforts of Roussin to conclude for him a satisfactory peace with his re- bellious vassal. According to the Journal des Debats, he did actually present a note to the Russian legation, February 23, 1833, requesting that their ships of war "should return with the first favorable wind." 43 Nevertheless, his attitude was vacillating and uncertain. Lazareff's fleet withdrew as far as the harbor of Sizopol, a little to the north of Constantinople, but the repre- sentatives of the Tsar never gave serious consideration to the question of quitting the Bosphorus. 44 "Ibid., Hall, op. cit., p. 158. "Ibid. * 2 "La sublime Porte, de son cote, s'engage a declarer et annoncer qu'elle renonce a toute espece d'assistance etrangere qu'elle se trouverait avoir demandee en raison des circonstances." Journal des Debats, April 30, 1833. Annual Regis- ter, 1833, p. [290]. Bitter rivalry resulted between the French and Russian rep- resentatives at the Porte. See accounts from Constantinople, March 7, 8, 1833, The Times, April 6, 1833, and Journal des Debats, April 4, 1833. ** Journal des Debats, April 30, 1833. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 32. 22 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [348 On the day after the conclusion of the arrangement with the Sultan, Admiral Roussin despatched an officer, Monsieur Olivier, to the Viceroy to warn him that in case he did not consent immediately to terms on the basis of the four pashalics of Syria he would most certainly incur the hostility of France. 45 Mehemet AH, however, was too shrewd to allow himself to be frightened thus. He had taken considerable care to keep himself informed as to the attitude of the Powers, 46 and must have known that there was little danger of any one of them attempting by force of arms to compel him to withdraw from the territories already occupied by his troops. As a result he remained unshaken in his resolve to extend his rule over the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli, includ- ing the seaports of Selefkeh and Alaya, as well as the whole of Syria. 47 In answer to the representations of Roussin he returned a prompt and scornful rejection. 48 At the same time he sent word "Note the following extract from a letter written by Roussin to Mehemet Ali, Feb. 22, 1833: ". . . Persister dans les pretentions que vous avez soulevees, ce serait appeler sur votre tete des consequences desastreuses, qui, je n'en doute pas, eveilleront vos craintes. . . . II ne me reste plus qu'a esperer que vous ne nous forcerez pas a la cruelle necessite d'attaquer une puissance, en partie, notre ouvrage, et de ternir une gloire dont je suis 1'admirateur sincere, c'est mon premier aide-de-camp qui aura 1'honneur de remettre ces depeches a Votre Hautesse." Journal des Debats, April 19, 1833. See also, Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 372-373, and Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 46. ""The Viceroy had given commissions to merchants at Leghorn and at Mar- seilles to charter vessels for the sole purpose of conveying to him at Alexandria any declaration in his favour by England and France (which he awaited with the greatest anxiety; the instant it could be known in those ports." Barker, op. cit., II, p. I9S- "Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, British and Foreign State Papers, XXII, p. 145. "Mehemet Ali to Roussin, March 8, 1833, quoted by Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 375-377. Annual Register, 1833, pp. [29o]-[29i]. Gliddon, the American consular agent at Alexandria, wrote to Porter, March 8: "His High- ness [Mehemet Ali] is said to have given a direct negative to the demands; and to have expressed surprise, that the French Government had changed its tone, adding that he was 'not a plaything.' "Much solicitude appears to be felt for the arrival of the new English Diplomatic Agent, Col. Campbell; as it seems to be expected, that the British Cabinet will conduct its mediation with more steadiness and candor than have been displayed by the Power hitherto the most prominent in His Highnesse's favor. It is even said that Mon. Mimaut (to whose ill judged complaisence is ascribed much of the Pasha's now baffled expectations of support from France) was this morning refused an audience." State Dept. Turkey II, Gliddon to Porter, March 8, 1833. 349] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 23 to the Sultan that he had directed his son Ibrahim, into whose hands he had put the negotiations, that if what he had asked was not granted immediately, the Egyptian army should be marched upon Constantinople. 49 This intelligence, arriving at the Turkish capital on March 23, 50 so alarmed the Sublime Porte that the Reis Effendi was directed to confer with the representatives of the three great Powers, "in order to ascertain from them their private opinions with respect to the best means of averting the dangers" which threatened with ruin the Ottoman Empire. 51 On its part the Porte announced, through its Minister of Foreign Affairs, that it was willing to add to the concessions already granted to the Viceroy the governments of Aleppo and Damascus. It appears that the foreign envoys were so perplexed by the situation of affairs that they were not able to suggest a better alternative. After a brief delay it was decided that a Turkish plenipotentiary should proceed to the Egyptian headquarters in Asia Minor with authority to offer the additional concession which had been de- termined upon by the Porte. 52 In order to facilitate the step about to be taken, Admiral Roussin directed M. de Varennes to accompany the Ottoman representative on his mission, and to inform Ibrahim Pasha that he could never expect France to acquiesce in the cession of the pashalics of Adana and Itcheli. 52 Also with the aim of inducing Ibrahim to conclude peace upon the new conditions offered by the Sultan, Mandeville forwarded a letter to His Highness in which he pointed out that with respect to Great Britain, the sentiments of His Majesty's government were already too well known to leave any doubt of the sensation which a refusal of the Ottoman terms would cause to the British govern- ment, "and of the consequences which would inevitably ensue from it." 53 Regardless of the pressure which was thus brought to bear upon him, Ibrahim refused to entertain the idea of a settlement unless it embraced the cession of Adana as well as that of all Syria. Finding their efforts to be in vain, Varennes and the ^Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 145. ""Mouriez, op. cit., Ill, p. 231. "Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 144. "Mandeville to Palmerston, March 31, 1833, ibid., pp. 146-147. "Mandeville to Ibrahim, March 29, 1833, ibid., p. 147. 24 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [350 Forte's representative at length determined to yield and to promise the granting of the Egyptian terms. 54 Accordingly, on that basis, the well-known preliminaries of Kutayah were agreed upon, April 8, 1833. Ibrahim Pasha, having added a diplomatic triumph to his string of military successes, was then ready to prepare for the retreat of his army to Syria. 55 However, when the Sultan's list, 56 designating the different persons on whom the governments of the Empire were to be bestowed for the following year, was published on April 15, it was seen that Mahmoud had omitted the Pashalic of Adana when he named the territories to be held by Mehemet and Ibrahim. Thereupon the retrograde movement of the Egyptian forces was promptly arrested. 57 It is possible that the Sultan did intend to ignore the arrangement which had just been concluded. Be that as it may, the situation at Constantinople was too serious to permit him to delay a settle- ment for any considerable length of time. 57 Finally on May 3, he decided to take notice of his former omission and graciously to concede the administration of the pashalic in question to Ibrahim Pasha. 58 In the meantime the Tsar Nicholas, becoming alarmed at the activities of the French representatives in Turkey, had despatched Count Orloff on a special mission to Constantinople. M. de Boutenieff was too moderate and of "too weak a character" to please the Tsar who was eager to be represented by an ambas- sador who would act with energy and resolution. 59 The instruc- "Mandeville to Palmerston, April 14, 1833, ibid., p. 148. Hall's story of the conclusion of the preliminaries of Kutayeh (see Hall, op. cit., p. 160) would lead one to believe that the Sultan himself decided to yield and that he gave his approval before the step was taken. Some evidence which has been found tends to indicate that that was not the case. See Journal des Debats, May i, 5, 7, 10, 1833- "Mandeville to Palmerston, April 15, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 148. M G. F. Martens, Nouveau recueil de traites, XVI, pp. 18-20. The list given in Staff Papers, XXII, pp. 148-149, is not complete. W F. O. Turkey 223, Mandeville to Palmerston, April 23, May 4, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 161. ^Mandeville to Palmerston, May 4, 1833, State Papers, XXII, p. 149. This appears to be an extract of one of the despatches cited by Hall. See above, note 57. The firman granting Adana to Ibrahim was not proclaimed until May 6, 1833. For a copy of it see Journal des Debats, May 28, 1833. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 33. 35 I ] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 25 tions given to Orloff, drawn up in that spirit, directed him to in- duce the Porte to confide absolutely in the support of Russia, to keep the Russian forces at Constantinople 60 until the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Mehemet Ali, and, above all, to con- vince Mahmoud that in the support of the Tsar's government lay his only hope of salvation. 61 Upon the arrival of Count Orloff at the Turkish capital, May 5, 1833, Russian influence with the Sultqn and his ministers seems to have become supreme. The British Ambassador to Turkey, Lord Ponsonby, who had arrived at his post on May I, was not long in coming to that conclusion. 62 Admiral Roussin, true to his former policy, exerted himself in vain to destroy it. It was at this time that he tried every means to se- cure for the French military flag access to the Dardanelles. After he found that the Porte persisted in its refusal to permit such a movement, an attempt was actually made by the warship Mesange, 63 to force a passage through the narrows leading to Constantinople. Although a few cannon shots from the forts lo- cated at the mouth of the Straits were enough to induce the French to abandon the project, Count Orloff was sufficiently alarmed by the incident to declare that if foreign ships of war entered the Dardanelles, he would be obliged to take every possible measure to defend the capital. 64 In fact the rivalry at Constantinople between the representatives of Louis Philippe and the Emperor Nicholas soon became so acute that those repre- ""In order to reenforce the squadron under Admiral Lazareff, two additional detachments of the Russian Black Sea fleet had arrived in the Bosphorus on April 6 and 22 respectively. A camp was formed on the Asiatic shore at Unkiar Skelessi and several detachments of Muscovite troops were landed. For a contemporary explanation of the reasons for this move see extracts from the Journal de Saint-Petersbourg, copied in the Journal des Debats, April 22, May 14, 1833. "See extracts from OrlofPs instructions and from a letter written by the Tsar to the Sultan quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 33-35. "Hall, op. cit., p. 162. In addition see an article copied from the Austrian Observer, and editorial comment thereon, in The Times, May 24, 1833. "This incident occurred on May 14, 1833. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 36. Letter from Constantinople, May 23, 1833, Journal des Debats, June 16, 1833. 26 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [352 sentatives would undoubtedly have welcomed a resort to bel- ligerent measures. 65 As might be expected, when relations of such a marked char- acter were developing in the Near East, lively reactions were oc- casioned elsewhere. It has already been noted that when Broglie, alarmed by Boutenieff's offer of Russian aid to the Sultan, sug- gested a joint Anglo-French intervention in the Turco-Egyptian question, his proposal had been rejected by the British govern- ment. Although the English Cabinet thus appeared to commit itself to inactivity, and although Lord Palmerston later declared in the House of Commons that "Great Britain did not complain of the assistance which Russia had afforded to Turkey, but on the contrary, was glad that Turkey had been able to obtain effectual relief from any quarter," 66 it is obvious that the British ministers viewed the advances of Russia in the Orient with considerable ap- prehension. A glance at Palmerston's private correspondence will reveal that his attitude was not always in strict harmony with some of the arguments he advanced in the halls of Parliament when he was defending the past policy of the administration. Significant in this respect is the following extract from a letter written on March 21, 1833, by the Foreign Secretary to his brother, Sir William Temple : " 'Roussin has settled capitally the Turkish dispute with the Egyptian, and has done well in sending back the Russian admiral with a flea in his ear. 67 The Russians 65 0rloff to Nicholas, May 25/June 6, 1833. "Nous n'avons qu'un seul regret ici, c'est de partir sans nous mesurer avec la flotte franchise;" quoted by T. Schiemann, Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I., Ill, p. 432. See also, an extract copied from a despatch, Orloff to Nesselrode, May 17/29, 1833, in Goriainow, op. cit., p. 137, and letters from Constantinople May 25, 1833, The Times, June 22, 1833, and May 23, 1833, Journal des Debats, June 15, 1833. "Talmerston continued: ". . . . Our government reposed perfect confidence in the assurances it had received from the Russian Government, that when the force so sent had effected the object for which it was despatched ... it would retire to the Russian dominions." These statements were made on March 17, 1834. Parl. Deb., XXII, p. 322. See also similar statements made on other oc- casions. Pad. Deb., XIX, p. 578; XX, p. 875. 67 It appears to have been believed in London at that date that the Russian fleet which had arrived at Constantinople on Feb. 20 would be forced to return immediately to Sevastopol. See T. Raikes, Journal, I, p. 168; also The Times, March 19, 1833. 353] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 27 will no doubt be very angry, but that will not signify.' " 68 Also worthy of note is the fact that the British Cabinet was at last ready to send a considerable fleet to the Near East. Early in May, 1833, Palmerston announced that they were going to send Sir Pulteney Malcolm to the Mediterranean with " 'two three-deckers, two large 74*5, and two 5O-gun frigates, equal to 74/8, and be- sides a large armed steam-vessel' " carrying " 'four heavy 32- pounders.' " 69 At the same time, the French government did not fail to retain its interest in Turco-Egyptian affairs. Regardless of the vigorous protests made by Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Tsar's Ambassador in Paris, who was warmly supported by his colleagues from Austria and Prussia, the conduct of Admiral Roussin at Constan- tinople received the approval of his government. 70 The alarm against Russian aggression in the Near East was proclaimed in the Chamber of Deputies, 71 and even by the Doctrinaire press. 72 In fact, for a brief period a war between Russia and France was considered by some observers to be altogether possible. 73 How- ever, it was soon apparent that neither the Cabinet of Louis Philippe nor that of the Emperor Nicholas had any desire to "Palmerston to Temple, March 21, 1833, H. L. Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston, II, p. 144. "Palmerston to Temple, May 7, 1833, ibid., p. 158. A French fleet also, under Admiral Hugon, had been sent to the Mediterranean. The two fleets were in each other's company for a considerable part of the summer of 1833. See The Times, June 17, July 25, Aug. 5, 1833. Journal des Debats, June 16, 1833. F. 0. France 464, Granville to Palmerston, March 18, 22, 29, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 160. Raikes, Journal, I, p. 173. Letter from Constantinople, April 16, 1833, Journal des Debats, May 10, 1833. Archives Parlementaires de 1787 a, 1860. Second Series, LXXXIV, pp. 31- 33> 36-37, 95-98. Similar sentiments were expressed in the Chamber of Peers. See ibid., p. 676. "Journal des Debats, March 23, 1833. "Letters from Paris, March 23, April 28, 1833, in The Times, March 25, May 3, 1833. According to Thureau-Dangin, the Emperor Nicholas would undoubtedly have welcomed an opportunity to lead a crusade of the European Powers against the new regime in France. Nevertheless he was not willing that Russia alone should undertake such a project. See Thureau-Dangin. op. cit., II, pp. 373 ff- 28 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [354 provoke an immediate outbreak of hostilities. 74 When the French King's message at the closing of the legislative Chambers ap- peared on April 25, it was found to be of a very peaceful char- acter, 75 and promptly thereafter it was reported from Paris that M. Pozzo di Borgo had lately held frequent conferences with the Due de Broglie, "the alleged object of which was to convince the French Government of the disinterestedness of the motives of his court in sending an expedition to Constantinople." 76 Although it is obvious that the Russian government was not eager to enter into an armed conflict, it is equally apparent that it was determined to profit by the situation in the Near East and to make its influence predominant in Turkey. Having received reports from both Count Orloff and M. de Boutenieff to the effect that the Grand Seignior was anxious to enter into an intimate agreement with the Emperor Nicholas, 77 Nesselrode, on May 20, 1833, forwarded to Orloff a despatch in which he instructed the Tsar's representatives at the Porte to conclude a defensive alliance to protect Turkey and the southern coast of Russia. 78 Mention was made at that early date of a secret clause which should specify the part to be fulfilled by the Porte in consideration of Russia's promised services. At first, some of the Ottoman Ministers, who were unaware that advances had been made to the Russians by the Sultan, objected to the acceptance of such an arrangement with the traditional enemy of their native land. Nevertheless, when the English fleet suddenly appeared at the isle of Tenedos, and it was feared that it might attempt to force a passage through the Dardanelles, their opposition faded away. 79 A message was sent promptly to Orloff inviting him to join in a conference for the discussion of the proposed alliance, and an agreement as to terms was reached at a meeting between the Russian and Turkish 74 See editorial comment in The Times, April 30, May 7, 1833, and C. C. Greville, The Greville Memoirs; (Stoddard edition), p. 256. Archives Pad., LXXXIII, p. 131. "The Times, May 6, 1833. "See extracts from Orloff to Nesselrode, May 17/29, 1833, and Boutenieff to Nesselrode, April 12/25, 1833, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 37-38. "See ibid., pp. 38-40. 79 See ibid., pp. 40-41. 355] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 29 plenipotentiaries which resulted on June 26. 80 Almost immediately thereafter the Tsar's Ambassador was able to declare: " ... la presque conclusion of the defensive treaty ... is a reponse sans replique to Russian influence at Constantinople." 81 The terms of an arrangement having thus been agreed upon, were promptly embodied into a definite convention which was signed on July 8, i833. 82 This Convention of Unkiar Skelessi, as it was popularly called, was destined to play "a great part in the political vicis- situdes of the Eastern Question." 83 Its first public article pro- claimed the existence of peace and friendship between the two Emperors and provided that their Majesties engaged to come to an unreserved understanding with each other upon all the mat- ters which concerned their respective tranquillity and safety. They would "afford to each other mutually for this purpose substantial aid, and the most efficacious assistance." The real significance of the treaty, however, was contained in a secret article which released the Sultan from any obligation to render such assistance to the Tsar and provided that Turkey should "confine its action in favor of the Imperial Court of Russia to closing the Strait of the Dardanelles, that is to say, to not allowing any Foreign Vessels of War to enter therein under any pretext whatsoever." 84 As the Egyptian forces had, in the meantime, finally completed their evacuation of Asia Minor, the Russian troops in Turkey were re-embarked and on the second day following the conclusion m lbid., op. cit., p. 41. 81 Orloff to Nicholas I, June 19/July I, 1833, quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, p. 433. 82 G. Noradounghian, Recueil d'actes internationaux de I'Empire Ottoman, II, pp. 229-231. E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, II, pp. 925-927. Martens, N. R., pp. 655 ff. State Papers, XX, pp. 1176 ff. 83 C. Phillipson and N. Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus and Dar- danelles, p. 62. "Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 926, 928. The precise meaning of the stipulation in the secret article has been the subject of repeated controversy. As it was interpreted by Nesselrode it "legalized the armed intervention of Russia" in Turkey. According to a recent historian it did more. "It guaranteed to Russia a free passage for her warships through the straits, and it closed the door into the Black Sea to every other Power." Marriott, op. cit., p. 210. See also, Marmont, op. cit., p. 53. 3O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [356 of the famous treaty of alliance, sailed out of the Bosphorus on their way to Sevastopol. 85 During the course of the Russo-Turkish negotiations, especially when the results began to be foreseen, the French Ambassador at Constantinople was tempted to announce to the Porte that, if it thus delivered itself into the hands of Russia, it would inevitably incur the hostility of France. It was only through the efforts of his colleague, Lord Ponsonby, it appears, that he was finally dis- suaded from taking such a decided stand. 86 The latter was in- tensely hostile to Russia but he believed the policy suggested by Roussin would only provoke a contest which they were not then in a position to sustain. 87 When the terms of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi became known in western Europe, the French and English Cabinets resolved to instruct their representatives to urge the Sultan not to ratify the treaty. If the latter should disregard their advice and confirm the signatures of his plenipotentiaries, they were to warn him that France and Great Britain were resolved, in the event of an armed intervention of Russia in the internal affairs of Turkey, to act as the circumstances might appear to require, " 'equally as if the treaty above mentioned were not in existence.' " 88 Great Britain, it seems, was particularly aroused by the famous arrangement. The Times, in commenting on the subject, declared that it was quite evident, that such a convention could never be sanctioned by the great Powers of Europe. The mutual guarantee of the tranquillity and possessions of the respective parties was a mere pretext for the invasion of Turkey "whenever the Autocrat should deem the season favorable." "Both this article," the editorial writer of the journal pointed out in conclusion, "and the supplementary provision for shutting the Dardanelles contain such barefaced and impudent pretensions that they must be scouted with contempt, or resisted with vigour, or be ordered to be M E. Driault, La question d'Orient depuis ses ongvn.es jusqu'A nos jours, p. 143. Cadalvene et Barrault, op. cit., pp. 405-406. "Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 49-50. "Ibid., p. 50. 88 F. O. Turkey 221, Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 27, 1833, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 165. 35?] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 3! formally cancelled." 89 Although Palmerston, upon being ques- tioned about the treaty in the House of Commons, had refused to make any statements divulging the attitude of the British Cabinet upon the subject, 90 the King's speech, when it was read at the closing of Parliament on August 29, 1833, was found to contain the following significant declaration: "The hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey have been terminated; and you may be assured that my attention will be carefully directed to any events which may affect the present state or the future independ- ence of that Empire." 91 Moreover, Palmerston in a letter written to his brother, William, five days after the final message had been delivered to the two Houses declared that " 'The King spoke the passage about Turkey with emphasis, and looked round at Lieven to see how he took it.' " 92 Then turning to the question of the attitude of Austria upon the Eastern question the Minister for Foreign Affairs continued, " 'Metternich is delighted with the Rus- sian treaty with the Sultan: He is easily pleased!'" 93 At the same time, events destined to have an important in- fluence upon the attitude of England and France were develop- ing in another part of Europe. Early in August the crowned heads of Austria and Prussia had held, near Teplitz in northern Bo- hemia, a meeting which was regarded with considerable suspicion by both of the western Powers. 94 It was only a month later when the famous Miinchengratz conference between the Tsar of Russia, the Emperor of Austria, and the Crown Prince of Prussia was assembled. The chief outcome of the latter meeting was the sign- ing of a convention the aim of which was to provide for effective **The Times, Oct. 16, 1833. The editorial quoted is typical of the attitude this journal had been maintaining for some time. See ibid., Jan. 26, 29, July 12, Sept. 5, 1833. See also, The Poor Man's Guardian, Aug. 31, 1833, in A very Rare and Valuable Collection of Radical, Revolutionary, and Seditious Publications, pp. 279-280. The reference is to Palmerston's reply to questions asked on Aug. 24, 1833. Pad. Deb., XX, p. 875. " 1 'bid., p. 903. B2 Lieven was Russia's Ambassador to England. "Palmerston to Temple, Sept. 3, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 165. "Metternich to Hugel, Aug. 16, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 458. See also, ibid., p. 429. 32 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [358 opposition to the principle of non-intervention. 95 That agreement, signed on September 18, 1833, included secret articles touching upon the question of the Near East. Thereby the contracting parties mutually pledged themselves to maintain the existence of the Ottoman Empire under the reigning dynasty; to oppose any combination which should menace the independence of the sovereign authority in Turkey, whether by the establishment of a temporary regency, or a complete change of dynasty; and finally, should their efforts to prevent dissolution fail, they would them- selves act in accord in everything concerning the establishment of the new order of things. 96 Such an arrangement was of particular value to Austria. Alarmed by the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe, the Cabinet of the Emperor Francis was eager to maintain a close alliance with the Court of St. Petersburg. At the same time it was also eager to preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. According to a statement made by Palmerston on October 8, 1833, Metternich had even gone so far, six months before, as to declare to him through the medium of a charge d'affaires, " 'that if Russia attempted to appropriate to herself one inch of Turkish territory, it would be war with Austria.' " 9T Indeed, the positions of England and Austria on the Turco-Egyp- tian question were in many respects identical. 98 As a prominent statesman of the period has pointed out, they had a simple and fixed idea; they were anxious only to support the Ottoman Empire, and to defend it against its enemies. 99 The fact that they ''The convention drawn up on Sept. 18, 1833, did not receive the sig- nature of Prussia. After the conference of Miinchengratz had broken up, Counts Nesselrode and Ficquelmont received instructions from their respective Emperors to proceed to Berlin with the aim of persuading King Frederick William III to join in the said arrangement. According to Metternich, it was only after the most arduous labors, extending over more than three weeks, that they finally succeeded in effecting their object. By the resulting Treaty of Berlin, signed on Oct. 15, 1833, the Prussian Cabinet accepted with a slight change in form the convention which had originated at Miinchengratz. See Metternich to Hiigel, Oct. 22, 1833, ibid., pp. 520-526. Also a copy of the treaty of Berlin, ibid., pp. 526-528. "Ibid., p. 526, [footnote]. Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 51-52. "Palmerston to Temple, Oct. 8, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 170. ''Metternich to Neumann, Feb. 15, 1833, Metternich, op. cit., V, p. 476. "Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 43. 359] THE PROBLEM OF THE NEAR EAST IN 1832-1833 33 did not agree in their respective stands taken towards the develop- ments in the Orient in 1833 was due, to a large extent at least, to their differing attitudes concerning Russia. Austria was willing to accept at their face value the explanations offered by her Imperial neighbor; 100 England was not. With respect to Russia, the latter in 1833 was following a policy similar to that of France. Hence it is natural that the secret deliberations at Miinchen- gratz tended only to increase the apprehensions of the British gov- ernment. Palmerston believed even that an eventual partition of Turkey between Austria and Russia had probably been one of the topics of discussion. " 'It is needless to say,' " he declared in com- menting upon the question, " 'that England and France would oppose this to the utmost of their means.' " 101 In order to support the British position, it was determined immediately that the protest which had been made at Constantinople should be re- peated at St. Petersburg and that re-enforcements should be sent to the fleet of Admiral Malcolm in the Mediterranean. 102 Although no authorization was given to the commander of the fleet to pass the Dardanelles, Palmerston announced it as his opinion that if Turkey were again threatened by Russian intervention, the com- bined English and French squadrons ought to proceed to Con- stantinople and defend the Bosphorus. " 'I think,' " he con- cluded, " 'that when we have seven liners and the French six, the eleven or twelve Russians will never venture to face us, with a host of transports besides in their train; indeed, the English fleet alone would be enough to stop them.' " 103 The government of France was also aroused by the proceedings at Teplitz' and Miinchengratz 104 and, although it was anxious not to take a step that might lead to war, 105 was quite willing to join with England in repeating to the Russian Cabinet the protest which the two Powers had recently made to the Sublime Porte. 100 See Metternich, op. cit., V, pp. 455-447, 477, 486-494. See also, Mtmoires inedits de M. de Sainte-Aulaire, quoted by Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, pp. 372- 373 [footnote], and, Raikes, Journal, I, pp. 176-177. 101 Palmerston to Temple, Oct. 8, 1833, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 169. Ibid., p. 170. Ibid., p. 171. lM Thureau-Dangin, op. cit., II, pp. 380-382. See also comment in Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct. i, 1833, XII, p. 108. 1M Driault, op. cit., p. 143. 34 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [360 Accordingly, in the month of October, 1833, the British and French charges d'affaires at St. Petersburg, Mr. Bligh and M. de Lagrene, were instructed from their respective capitals to com- municate to Count Nesselrode notes almost identical in language to those presented at Constantinople by Roussin and Ponsonby to the Reis Effendi. 106 In reply to the representations of the western Powers, the Russian Chancellor professed that he could not understand the deep regret which the conclusion of the treaty of July 8, 1833, had caused the British and French governments. That arrange- ment was purely defensive. It had been concluded between two independent Powers, exercising the plenitude of their rights, and it did no prejudice to the interests of any state whatever. It did, he admitted, change the nature of the relations between Russia and the Porte. It established relations of intimacy and confidence wherein the Turkish government would henceforth find a guar- antee of stability, and, if need be, means of defense calculated to ensure its preservation. In concluding his remarks, Nesselrode warned the western Powers that the Emperor was resolved on faithfully fulfilling, should the occasion present itself, the obliga- tions which the treaty of July 8, imposed upon him: "acting as if the declaration contained in the note of M. Lagrene [and Mr. Bligh] did not exist." 107 Regardless of the fact that her chief Minister dared to use such highsounding terms in answer to the equally bold communi- cations made to him by the representatives of England and France, Russia was not eager to engage in a test of armed strength with her rivals in the Orient. A famine which existed in the southern provinces of the Tsar's Empire rendered the pos- sibility of successful campaigning in those parts very doubtful. 108 **State Papers, XXIV, pp. 1290, 1292. 1 Parl. Papers, 1839, XL, Correspondence relating to Aden, p. 96. Note also, the following extract from a "Minute by the Governor of Bombay, to which Mr. Parish subscribed," March 26, 1838: "Undoubtedly the advantage of occupying Aden as a station convenient for the purposes of steam navigation, entered largely into the views of the Bombay Government;. . ." Ibid., p. 38. l lbid., 1840, XXI. Bowring's Reports covered a great variety of subjects. The author was anxious to reveal the true state of the resources of the terri- tories under Mehemet Ali's rule. See D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 173-175. **Parl. Papers, 184.0, XXI, Report on Egypt, p. 4. 62 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [388 less bulky articles will, in the progress of time, naturally be con- veyed by the most direct and rapid channel. Already articles of jewelry, precious stones, some rich shawls, and bullion are con- veyed from and to India by the English steamers." 103 Bowring did not fail to realize the importance of rinding an improved method of transit across the Isthmus of Suez. "Steam navigation will gradually alter the character of our intercourse [with India] ," he remarked significantly; "the shortest and the cheapest channel will be reverted to; the difficulties which the monsoon presented to sailing vessels in the Indian Seas will certainly be mastered by the boundless powers of steam . . . The question still remains to be decided whether or not a canal is practicable from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea . . . improved as are the arts of labor and of navigation, and increased as is the importance of the question by the relative positions of India and Europe, it is to be desired that serious and detailed investigation should examine the extent of the impediments, and the means, if means there be of vanquishing them." 104 Mehemet Ali must have perceived that the Red Sea route was destined to become of great importance in the future, for he exerted himself greatly in order to aid those who were endeavoring 1 l %39> almost as soon as it was known at Paris that the Turkish troops had entered Egyptian territory, 45 M. Duperre, the Minister of Marine, presented in the Chamber of Deputies a project of a law which provided for a grant of 10,000,000 francs to the government. With this amount, Duperre proposed to aug- ment the French naval forces in the Mediterranean. 46 Also, Soult, on whom the chief responsibility for the French foreign policy rested, moved to secure a definite understanding with the British Ministers relative to the alarming situation which was developing in the Levant. He professed to Lord Granville that he concurred in the opinions of Palmerston on the subject 47 and he ordered Baron de Bourqueney, the French charge d'affaires at the Court of St. James, "to communicate to the English Cabinet aH the in- formation which reached Paris, all the ideas which sprang up, and all the measures which were preparing in consequence of the new position, and to establish between the two governments the most frank and intimate cooperation." 48 " 'In thus exposing to the Cabinet of London the entirety of our point of view upon the important circumstances of the moment,' the Duke of Dalmatia wrote, 'we tender to it an unequivocal pledge of our confidence, and of our desire to act with it in the most perfect accord.' " 49 Palmerston was quite willing to cooperate with the French, but be it remembered, he was determined that such cooperation must be on the basis of British terms. Soult must have been well aware of what those terms were, but as it has been suggested before, instead of admitting that they differed from the terms which M. Cochelet was ... so glad that he had prevailed so far on the Pasha with- out the aid of his Colleagues, that he hastened to accept the Pasha's offer [to instruct Ibrahim to halt his advance], in order that he might be able to say that France had done everything, and that her voice was all-powerful." Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 145-146. "Granville to Palmerston, May 23, 1839, ibid., p. 19. "Archives Parl, CXXIV, p. 666. 4T Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1838, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24. ^Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 335. "Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, quoted by ibid., pp. 335-336. 88 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [4 T 4 France favored, he attempted to hide the fact that there were any real differences between them and the latter. "The necessity of con- ceding toMehemet Ali the hereditary investiture of at least a part of his actual possessions seems now to be almost unanimously ad- mitted," he wrote on June 17, 1839, to Bourqueney. "...[but] we cannot flatter ourselves with a hope that the Porte will con- sent to yield to him this increase of moral force unless, by way of compensation, some advantage is granted to itself which may furnish a material guarantee against the eventual enterprises of an enemy whose power it has thus augmented. The nature and the extent of this advantage are surely not easy to determine. Lord Palmerston thinks that it should not fall short of the entire restitution of Syria. "At Berlin, they seem to admit that the Sultan should content himself with merely a portion of that province. For ourselves, Monsieur, we acknowledge that the Porte has a claim to a sub- stantial compensation, but we think that the moment for fixing the exact proportion has not yet arrived, that such a question cannot be decided until after much important and complicated data has been considered, the appreciation of which cannot be the work of a moment .... "You should wish, Monsieur, to permit Lord Palmerston to read the present despatch." 50 Since Soult did not attempt to oppose the British position, Palmerston assumed that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs was willing to take a stand similar to it. " 'We understand each other upon all points;'" he declared after reading the Marshal's despatch, " 'our accord will be complete. Principle, end, means of execution, all is full of reason, simplicity, and clearness. This is not the communication of one government to another; call it rather an understanding between colleagues, between members of the same Cabinet.' " 51 In truth, during the early stages of the negotiations upon Turco- Egyptian affairs in 1839, England and France did succeed quite well in reaching an agreement relative to the important problems which were at stake. One of the first of those problems which M Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 488-489. Levant Corres- pondence, I, pp. 77-79. Note The translation follows Guizot. "Bourqueney to Soult, June 20, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 494. 415] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 89 confronted the two western Powers after Marshal Soult entered office was that of agreeing upon joint instructions to the naval forces which they were sending to the Mediterranean. Late in May, Granville suggested to Soult that a combined Anglo-French fleet, the commanders of which would have "identical" orders, should proceed to the East and that the object of such fleet should be "to arrest the progress of hostilities." 52 The Duke of Dalmatia concurred readily in the idea and he even became im- patient when Palmerston delayed following up immediately the suggestion made by the British Ambassador at Paris. Granville reported, June 17, 1839, that Soult was disappointed because he had received no official communication from the British foreign office. The French had seven sail of the line off Smyrna already. Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs was going to send three more, and according to Granville, he was confident of the moral effect which the two allied fleets would have in the Near East if they would only cooperate. 53 Marshal Soult, in a letter written on the same date, declared to Bourqueney: "We anxiously await an answer . . . upon the proposed instructions to Stopford." 54 Two days later Palmerston complied with the wishes of the Marshal by forwarding to Paris a copy of the directions which he believed the Admiral of the British Levant fleet should follow. He suggested therein that the outbreak of war, or the continuance of it if it had already broken out, should be prevented. He was un- willing that any means other than those of persuasion should be employed in order to procure the consent of the Sultan to a suspension of hostilities, but he proposed that if the Viceroy should refuse to refrain from fighting, "the [British] Admiral should then employ such means of pressure, gradually increasing in their stringency," as he might find necessary, or might think "best calculated to accomplish the desired result." 65 Palmerston also took into consideration, in the instructions proposed, the pos- sibility of a Russian force entering "the ports and territory of Turkey with the professed object of protecting the sultan, and of "Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 24. "Granville to Palmerston, June 17, 1839, ibid., pp. 76-77. "Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 79. "Proposed Instructions to Stopford, ibid., p. 83 ff. Annual Register, 1840, PP- 453-457- 9O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [416 repelling the Egyptian invaders." "In such a case," he ventured, "and after the Admiral had obtained from the Pasha the order for the retreat of his troops, and after he had received certain information that such order had been obeyed, it would be ex- tremely desirable that the British squadron should proceed to Constantinople, and should remain there, or in the Black Sea, until the Russian forces had evacuated the Turkish territory." 86 After Soult had become acquainted with this document he in- timated unofficially to Granville that he was satisfied with the "general statement" of it and he made remarks which led the latter to believe that he would send similar instructions to the French Admiral in the Levant. 57 The British Ambassador reported those facts to Palmerston in a despatch written on June 22, and on the third day following that date the British Minister of For- eign Affairs, stirred to action by fresh reports of an alarming character from the Orient, directed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send the instructions, which had been prepared, to Stopford. 58 If further communications between the English and French governments should lead to a modification in them, he wrote to Granville, that modification could easily be provided for later. 59 This, however, was not necessary for the instructions to the French naval forces which were prepared promptly by Soult were quite similar to those drawn up by Palmerston. The Admirals of the two fleets, the French Minister declared, "should act towards each other with all the confidence and frankness requisite to introduce into their operations the same unanimity" which subsisted between the two governments. 60 "Ibid., p. 456. "Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 89. See also, Granville to Palmerston, June 24, 1839, ibid., pp. 94-95. "Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, June 25, 1839, ibid., PP- 90-93, 93-94- "Palmerston to Granville, June 25, 1839, ibid., p. 94. ""Instructions to French Admiral in Levant, June 26, 1839, ibid., pp. 101- 102. Granville, in a despatch written to Palmerston on June 28, 1839, pointed out that the French proposed, in their instructions to Lalande, to cut off all communication by sea to the theatre of war. Palmerston, it will be recalled, had suggested that only those communications which were carried on between Syria and Egypt should be stopped. See ibid., pp. 104-105. 4I/] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 9! A more difficult problem for the diplomats of England and France was that of negotiating a settlement between the rival parties in the Near East. Palmerston and Granville, it will be recalled, had made it clear to the French Ministers that the British government believed Egypt should become hereditary in the fam- ily of Mehemet Ali under the sovereignty of the Sultan but that the Pasha should withdraw his troops from, and give up all his claims to, the other territories which were under his control. 61 Soult, being unwilling to oppose openly the British position was in favor of leaving the question of terms to the decision of a joint conference at Vienna between representatives of the Powers. He believed, he declared in the latter part of May, 1839, that though a collision should be averted in the Levant for the time being, it would be necessary for the five great nations of Europe to concert together as to the means of definitely set- tling the future relations between the Sultan and the Viceroy. 62 A few days later he again referred to the question in a conversa- tion with Granville and he expressed a desire that if a conference should take place the instructions issued to the English and French representatives should be identical. 63 He hoped, un- doubtedly, that at such a conference the accord between England and France would be maintained easily because of the danger of a Russian intervention in Turkey. "In the event of our resolutions and the attitude of our squadrons not being able to prevent the two contending parties [in the East] from having recourse to arms, the necessity of a common action would become evident;" he wrote on June 17, 1839, "and there is no reason to expect that we should then be able to induce Russia to abstain from material interference in a question in which her interests would be so directly engaged. What we ought to insist on, is that her action should be determined and limited, in concert with the other courts; that she should confine herself to the course adopted by France w See, in addition to statements made above, Granville to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, ibid., p. 31. "Granville to Palmerston, May 31, 1839, ibid., p. 24. "Granville to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, ibid., p. 31. 92 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [418 and England; and, in fact, that a European convention should replace the stipulation of Unkiar-Skelessi." 64 When Metternich learned of the French suggestion he imme- diately objected to the idea of a formal conference and suggested instead that each of the Cabinets should send its opinion to its representative at Vienna.* 55 A certain latitude for discussion should be permitted so that through a compromise of the five opinions one in which all could agree might be discovered. Such an opinion, when found, should form the basis of identical communi- cations from the Powers to the Sultan and to the Pasha. 66 Marshal Soult consented readily to this modification of his suggestion. 67 Palmerston, while discussing the French and Austrian proposals, declared that the latter was open to fewer objections but that it also held out "less advantages." He was willing to accede to it provided that Prussia and Russia did likewise. Consequently, he forwarded to Lord Beauvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna, a detailed statement of his own position upon Turco-Egyptian affairs. 68 The outstanding feature of that statement was the emphasis placed therein upon the contention that Mehemet Ali should give up all Syria, retaining only Egypt in hereditary pos- session. He despatched a copy of the said statement to Granville on June 29, 1839, and in a note which accompanied it he em- phasized that it seemed to the British government that the affairs of Turkey could never be secure until Mehemet Ali had evacuated "Soult to Bourqueney, June 17, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 488. Note also the following explanation of the French desire for a conference of the Powers: "Dans un congres, tout 1'avantage, pensait-on alors, serait pour nous [the French]. Appuyes sur la Prusse et 1'Autriche nous pouvions faire successivement tete a 1'Angleterre et a la Russie. Nous etions comme assures d'avance de nous trouver presque toujours quatre contre un, et, dans la plus facheuse hypothese, tout au moins trois contre deux." Haussonville, op. cit., I, p. 150. "Metternich explained that the protocol of Aix-la-chapelle, signed by rep- resentatives of the Powers in 1818, read that no question relative to the rights of any state should be resolved upon unless the said state was invited to be represented in the conference. Turkey could not be invited, he believed, be- cause she would not send a representative empowered sufficiently to allow affairs to advance. See Metternich to Apponyi, June 14, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 347-348. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 120-121. "Beauvale to Palmerston, June 14, 1839, ibid., p. 88. "Granville to Palmerston, June 22, 1839, ibid., p. 89. ^Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839, ibid., pp. 117-119. 419] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 93 Syria and recalled his troops to Egypt. 69 If Marshal Soult still had doubts relative to the attitude of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs they must have been removed when Granville revealed to him the contents of this document. He declined at that time to assent to Palmerston's proposition that no settlement would be satisfactory which did not restore the whole of Syria to the direct authority of the Sultan but, as before, he refrained from adopting a stand in opposition to the British contentions. Instead of doing so he continued to evade the issue. The Court of Berlin, he claimed, had suggested that the Egyptians should give up in Syria, only the Pashalics of Tripoli and Aleppo, thus leaving to them those of Acre and Damascus. Soult said he was not aware what the Austrian attitude was, and "the French Gov- ernment had not yet formed any opinion" upon the question of a settlement between Mehemet and Mahmoud. 70 He even con- tended to Granville, according to a report made on July 2, 1839, by the latter, that his hesitation to accept Palmerston's proposal arose from his doubt of the possibility of obtaining Mehemet Ali's acquiescence in it, rather than from any objection to the arrange- ment itself. 70 Hence, it was only natural that Palmerston should become optimistic and look forward to the maintenance of a state of complete harmony in Anglo-French relations. " 'Soult is a jewel,' " he wrote on July 19, 1839; " 'nothing can be more satis- factory than his course with regard to us, and the union of England and France upon these Turkish affairs will embolden Metternich and save Europe.' " 71 Nevertheless, the accord between England and France was more apparent than real. Radical differences existed between the senti- ments relative to Turco-Egyptian affairs entertained by the masses within the two countries. This fact is revealed very clearly by articles which appeared in the contemporary English and French newspapers. "There is one way of settling the question attended with little immediate difficulty,. . .by laying it down as a funda- "Palmerston to Granville, June 29, 1839, ibid., pp. 119-120. "Granville to Palmerston, July 2, 1839, ibid., p. 153. "Palmerston to Granville, July 19, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 295. Lord Palmerston declared on July 9, in the House of Commons "that the English and French governments perfectly understood each other, and were acting in concert with regard to these important matters [Turco-Egyptian affairs]." Parl. Deb., XLIX, p. 81. 94 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [420 mental law that the conflict shall not have a beginning," an editorial writer stated in The Times. 12 The views expressed in the Morning Chronicle, Palmerston's organ, were of a more pro- nounced character. The abandonment of Syria by Mehemet AH, according to one of those views, was the "sine qua non" of the final solution of the Eastern question. 73 The French press, on the other hand, warmly supported the cause of the Viceroy and re- vealed an attitude of suspicion in regard to the increased interest of Great Britain in the Levant. 74 "Whether France declare in favor of England or of Russia, 75 it must be on condition of obtain- ing in return her Rhenish frontier and the cession of her former province of Egypt, and perhaps something more," a correspond- ent of the National declared. 76 Even the editors of the conserva- tive Journal des Debats maintained that the hereditary right should be conceded to the family of Mehemet AH, and one of them remarked in an article published on June I, 1839, that while n The Times, July 5, 1839. "Extract from the Morning Chronicle copied into the Journal des Debats, June 27, 1839. T4 Note the following extract from an article signed by Saint-Marc Girardin which appeared in the Journal des Debats on May 23, 1839: "Depuis qu'elle est maitresse de 1'Inde, 1'Angleterre a toujours eu les yeux ouverts sur 1'Egypte et sur la mer Rouge. L'Egypte est, en effet, la route naturelle de 1'Inde; .... A 1'aide de ses bateaux a vapeur, 1'Angleterre semble en ce moment commencer, pour ainsi dire, une nouvelle conquete de 1'Asie. ... La pris d'Aden et celle de Khareck, nous le repetons, . . . indiquent les plans de 1'Angleterre, et comment elle cherche a se fortifier et a s'etendre pour resister a son adversaire [Russia]. La pris d'Aden et de Khareck fait encore partie de la question d'Orient a un autre titre; car, par cette conquete, 1'Angleterre a un pris de plus centre 1'vice- roi d'Egypte. D'Aden, elle le menace a 1'entree de la mer Rouge, et de Khareck elle survielle le progres de ses armes en Arabic, et protege Bagdad et Bassora." Those Frenchmen who were alarmed at Britain's Levant policy were not all newspaper writers and correspondents. See, Campbell's report upon the attitude of Cochelet. Campbell to Palmerston, July 13, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 221. "Many Frenchmen believed that a war between England and Russia was inevitable. Some, at least, favored a union with the latter for the partitioning of Turkey Russia taking Constantinople and France Alexandria. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 45-46. "Extract from the National, copied in The Times, June 7, 1839. 42 1 ] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 95 France had an interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, she also had an interest "a la grandeur de I'Egypte," 77 The views relative to Near-Eastern affairs which were enter- tained by the various factions existing within the Chamber of Deputies are also worthy of notice. They were revealed very clearly when Duperre's request for a credit of 10,000,000 francs was up for consideration, for that was the occasion of a great and solemn debate, in which the question of the Orient was examined, not only in its relations to the immediate quarrel between the governor of Egypt and his suzerain but also under its most general aspects. 78 One of the first speakers who took part in the debates was the legitimist orator, Valmy. After criticizing the government sharply for attempting to defend Mehemet AH and bolster up Turkey at the same time, and after warning against the danger of an Anglo-Russian accord, he let it be understood he was willing that the Pasha of Egypt should be sacrificed to the Sultan. 79 However, the limited applause it came from the right only it seems by which his remarks were received indicates that a majority of the deputies were not willing to support him in the ^Journal des Debats, June i, 1839. See other articles in ibid., May 17, June 8, 17, 24, 25, 28, July i, 1839. See also an extract from the Siecle of June 14, 1839, copied in Guichen, op. cit., p. 44. 78 0dilon Barrot, Memoires Posthumes, I, p. 343. ""Note the following: "1'orateur legitimiste aurait voulu, en haine des revolu- tions, qu'on immolat le pacha d'Egypte au sultan." Blanc, op. cit., V, p. 427. See also The Times, July 4, 1839. Valmy must be given credit, however, for seeing clearly that the Soult Administration was assuming a false position. In commenting on its policy he declared: "II en resulte que nous divisons les elements musulmans qu'il faudrait reunir, que nous detruisons a Alexandrie ce que nous faisons a Constantinople, que nous mecontentons le sultan et le vice- roi en voulant les epargner tous deux, et que nous n'avons de credit ni sur 1'un ni sur 1'autre." " . . . je 1'avoue," he stated later in conclusion, "rien dans le langage du ministere ne me fait croire qu'il ait adopte une politique qui le mette en mesure de regler serieusement le statu quo dans lequel s'engloutit 1'Empire ottoman et 1'equilibre de 1'Europe. "Je le repete done, je ne veux pas exposer un seul homme ni un seul vaisseau pour de perilleuses et impuissantes manifestations." Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 631, 636. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 76-78. 96 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [422 position which he had taken. 80 M. de Carne, the next speaker to ascend the tribune, declared in a speech which was received by "marques nombreuses d' approbation" that modern Egypt was a French creation. France had important commercial and political interests at stake there which would be benefited by a recognition of the independence of the Viceroy. The Chamber of Deputies, therefore, ought to declare itself in favor of such recognition, and diplomatic Europe ought to recognize French influence in Egypt as being on a par with English influence in Portugal and the in- fluence of Austria in Italy. 81 Later in the day M. de Lamartine, who had traveled extensively in the Orient, 82 revealed that he had little faith either in the suggestions made by Carne or in those advanced by Valmy. France, he maintained, should withhold her support from both the Viceroy and the Sultan. She should favor, instead, a partition of the territories which were held by Mehemet and Mahmoud between the four great European Powers Eng- 80 * Archives Parl., CXXVI, pp. 632-636. Vicomte de Guichen maintains in his Crise d'Orient et I'Europe, [p. 78] that "La Chambre, presque unanime- ment, applaudit Valmy," but the editors of the Archives Parlementaire have described the applause given Valmy as follows: "Foix a droite: Tres bien! tres bien! (Une legere agitation succede a ce discours, et la seance reste quelques instants interrompue.)" See ibid., p. 636. For Valmy's attitude towards England, note the following extract from his speech: "De son cote, 1'Angleterre, fatiguee de tant d'impuissance, a cesse d'agir franchement de concert avec nous. Elle a songe a prendre sa part du statu quo; c'est 1'Egypte qu'elle convoite et que le sultan est appele aujourd'hui a conquerir pour elle." Ibid., p. 634. Other deputies accused England of having designs against Egypt. See, in par- ticular, the statements attributed to M. Denis and M. de Tocqueville, in ibid., pp. 643-649, 705-708. K Ibid., pp. 637-638. Carne also stated: "je dis qu'en face de 1'avenir qui peut se produire. il est de Pinteret de la France d'agir immediatement, d'agir seule, se declarer qu'elle protege 1'Egypte; qu'elle est la dans son role legitime, dans son role naturel; qu'elle prend sous son abri une nationalite qui n'est menagante pour personne, une nationalite qui importe a Pequilibre europeen; qu'elle la protege contre le despotisme maritime, tout aussi bien que centre le despotisme militaire." Ibid., p. 639. M See A. de- Lamartine, Souvenirs, impressions, pensees, et paysages pendant un voyage en Orient, (1832-1833). 423 ] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA f)J land, France, Austria, and Russia. 83 His statements, like those of Valmy, did not receive the general approval of the deputies. In- deed, they were even followed by "Sensation," "Murmures," "Violent* mur mures" and "Vive agitation" The most significant speech which was delivered on this occasion in defense of the Levantine policies of the Ministry was, undoubtedly, the one delivered by M. Guizot. 84 According to him, Mehemet Ali's success in Egypt was due largely to French in- fluence and cooperation. " 'We have protected it [Egypt] from its origin...'" he explained. "'We beheld there a natural dis- location of the Ottoman Empire, and perhaps a rising power des- tined at some future day to become independent and to play its part in the affairs of the world.' " 85 In calling attention to the policy which he thought France should follow he declared: "'To main- tain the Ottoman Empire for the maintenance of the equilibrium of Europe, and when, by the force of events, by the natural progress of facts, some dismemberment takes place, some province detaches itself from that Empire in decadence, to favor the trans- formation of that province into a new and independent sovereignty which may take its place in the family of nations, and assist at a future day in the new European equilibrium, destined to replace that whose elements will exist no longer; such is the policy suit- ** Archives Pad., CXXVI, pp. 649-653. Note in particular the following extract from Lamartine's speech: "La politique de la France doit etre tout autre; elle doit etre francaise, elle doit etre europeenne. Son systeme, c'est le systeme europeen; c'est Pequilibre maintenu par PAutriche et par elle dans 1'Orient comme dans 1'Occident; non pas ce chancelant et faux equilibre qui repose aujourd'hui sur cette section d'empire a Constantinople, equilibre que n'est au fond que la domination russe en Orient, sous le nom de Mahmoud, sans com- pensation, sans surete, sans avenir pour nous, mais un equilibre fonde sur une part egale d'influence et de territoires attribute des aujourd'hui en Orient aux quatre grandes puissances qui y ont droit et interet, la Russie, FAutriche, la France, et 1'Angleterre. Voila le systeme qui s'appelle le systeme occidental." Ibid., p. 652. See also, Odilon Barrot, op. cit., I, pp. 343-344. 84 Guizot, although not a member of the Cabinet, was on the best of terms with those who did belong to it. See Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 314. Ibid., p. 330. Archives Part., CXXVI, p. 713. Note: The phraseology of the two sources is not exactly the same. The translation follows that of the Mtmoirts. 98 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [424 able to France; to this she has been naturally led, and in this, according to my opinion, she will do well to persevere.' " 88 In other words, the policy which M. Guizot advocated was that of the status quo ante helium in 1839, and it was, he later claimed in his Memoires, the policy which the Ministry and the great majority of the members of the Chamber of Deputies favored. 87 Meanwhile, as the Cabinets of England and France appeared to be in accord upon Turco-Egyptian affairs, "the Court of Rus- sia looked on in silence and remained in suspense, visibly dis- turbed by the impending future and [doubtful] of the attitude it would have to assume." 88 The Emperor Nicholas had no desire for war, and realizing that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi furnished a constant source of danger to the peace of his Empire, longed for the day to arrive when the term of that arrangement should expire. 89 Nevertheless, he was resolved that he would not permit other Powers to violate the rules denned therein, nor would he consent to the merging of the said treaty into some more general compact of the same nature by which all of the great European nations would become obliged to defend the Porte. 90 Hence when it was suggested that a conference of representatives from the latter should be assembled at Vienna to negotiate with the aim of discovering a policy upon which all could agree, Nicholas and his "*Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 330-331. Archives Parl, CXXVI, p. 713. Note the following contemporary comment upon Guizot's speech: "M. Guizot a noble- ment defendu ce qu'il appelle la politique seculaire de la France; il a felicite le ministere du 12 Mai de s'etre rallie a cette politique; il a protest^ avec energie centre ces chimeriques partages que Ton nous fait toucher au doigt, et contre ces alliances non moins chimeriques qui nous feraient payer 1'abandon de 1'empire ottoman en un agrandissement territorial sur nos frontieres du nord. La politique de M. Guizot, c'est le maintien de 1'independance de la Turquie, c'est le statu quo." Journal des Debats, July 2, 1839. 8T The debates were closed on the day following, July 3, 1839, and a ballot was taken to determine whether the credit asked for by Duperre should be granted. The measure was passed, 287 to 26. Archives Parl., CXXVII, p. 4. For a more detailed discussion of the French debates see Guichen, op. cit., pp. 71-84. 88 Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 339. ''Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53. *Lord Palmerston, as well as Marshal Soult, had favored concluding such a compact. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 13, 1838, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 282. 425] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 99 ministers opposed the idea. They probably would have agreed to it if they had been assured that at the proposed conference the concluding of a settlement between the Sultan and the Viceroy would be the only matter which would be considered. 91 However, it was believed at St. Petersburg that the maritime Powers would insist upon the admission of their fleets into the Sea of Marmora and that they would demand the signing of a joint-convention to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. 92 " 'In any affair/ " Nesselrode wrote to Struve, the Russian charge d'affaires at Vienna, " 'it is necessary first of all to know to whom one ought to speak. In the present situation we ought to speak to the Pacha of Egypt. Therefore, the allied war vessels ought to be sent to Alexandria. They [England and France] wish to send them into the Sea of Marmora. They would speak to the Ottoman Porte and I fear very much that they would then speak to it for the last time, car ell e n'est plus de force a se tenir longtemps debout, si I' on en venait au point de tirer le canon devant les tnurs du serail' " 93 The Tsar's government preferred that instead of taking a part in a conference at Vienna, Russia and Austria should hold strictly to the stipulations of the con- M See Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 168. "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53. Note also the following extract of a letter written on July 24, 1839, by Count Nesselrode to Meyendorff, the Russian representative at Berlin: "Vous verrez, mon cher Meyendorff, que 1'idee d'une conference a Vienne, sur les affaires turco-egyptiennes, n'est pas de notre gout. Nous devons cette conception qui, certes, n'est pas une conception bienveillante pour la Russie, a notre bon prince Metternich qui, de gaiete de coeur, a em- brouille une affaire devenue tres simple et placee sur le meilleur terrain, par la raison que tous les cabinets sont tombes d'accord, aussi bien sur les mesures a prendre pour preserver le trone du Sultan d'une chute inevitable dans cette crise, que sur les bases de 1'arrangement a conclure entre la Porte et le pacha d'Egypte. Ce qu'il y avait a faire a etc fait sans conference et peut-etre tout juste parce qu'il n'y a pas eu de conference. Je ne sais, en verite, ce que Ton pourrait faire de plus a Vienne, a moins qu'on ne veuille s'occuper des futurs contingents et Her les mains a la Russie, ce qui ne saurait nous convenir d'aucune maniere. Notre refus de participer a cette conference fera beaucoup de bruit dans le monde et excitera de nouvelles mefiances en Angleterre. II m'a paru utile que vous fussiez informe des motifs qui nous 1'ont dicte." Nesselrode, op. cit., VII, pp. 285-287. ""Quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 54-55. IOO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [426 vention of Miinchengratz. 94 The thing to do, according to Count Nesselrode, was to take steps by diplomacy to prevent Ibrahim from marching upon Constantinople. If that was done it would not be necessary again for the Emperor to send a Russian fleet into the Bosphorus to protect the throne of the Sultan. The two rivals in the Levant could under such circumstances even be per- mitted to settle their difficulties without the aid of foreigners and, consequently, the danger of a break resulting between the European Powers because of conflicting views upon the Eastern question would be removed. 95 At the same time the Russian statesmen desired to avoid antagonizing England and France. The hereditary Grand Duke, who later became Emperor Alexander II, and Count OrlofT were then at London. " 'Whenever I have met Count Orloflf during the last five days,' Bourqueney wrote on May 29 to Soult, 'he has denied with emotion the authenticity of the news of the resump- tion of hostilities between the Turks and the Egyptians. He founds his assertion on the last letters of the Emperor. ... He has held the same language to nearly all the members of the diplomatic body.' " 96 Some days later the French envoy con- tinued: "The Russian Embassy listens, watches, but hesitates both in action and language. There have been many Russians in London during the last month . . . and [amongst them] some enjoying the highest confidence of the Emperor. I venture with timidity an opinion hastily formed; but it appears evident to me that . . . they [the Russians] are not prepared for extreme **Ibid., p. 53. Metternich in some of his despatches defended Russia's policy in the Near East. See Metternich op. cit., VI, pp. 345-351. Barante to Soult, July 13, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 256. However, in the words of M. Goriainow, "Quoique le prince Metternich ne manquat pas de protester de sa fidelite a 1'alliance avec la Russie, il n'etait pas etranger a l'ide de restreindre la trop grande influence que 1'empereur Nicolas avait acquise sur la Turquie depuis le traite d'Unkiar-Iskelessi. Outre cela, il lui souriait de convoquer a Vienne une conference de tous les representants des puissances europeenes, au milieu desquels il occuperait la premiere place." Goriainow, op. cit., p. 53. "See extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Struve, July 4, 1839, quoted by ibid., p. 54. "Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 339-340. 427] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA IOI measures." 97 This despatch was written on June 17, 1839, and just ten days later M. de Kisseleff, the Russian charge d'affaires at the British Court, transmitted to Lord Palmerston a significant note which Nesselrode had addressed on June 15, 1839, to Count Pozzo di Borgo. In that note the Russian position relative to Turco-Egyptian affairs was explained carefully. Undoubtedly the Tsar's Chancellor hoped thereby to gain the confidence and co- operation of the British ministers. "The last despatches from Con- stantinople . . . and from Alexandria . . . apprize us that the Otto- man and Egyptian troops had approached so near to each other that a conflict between them appeared imminent," he declared. "... There remains but one task to us to fulfil, that is, to con- fine this struggle within the narrowest possible bounds, so that it may not compromise the maintenance of the general repose of Europe . . . "The real danger for Europe at large is not in a combat carried on in Syria between the troops of the Sultan and those of the Pasha of Egypt . . . The danger would not begin to become serious until in the event of the fate of arms, declaring against the Sultan, the Pasha of Egypt should profit by this advantage to place the safety of Constantinople and the existence of the Otto- man Empire in peril. . . . " . . . it has appeared to us essential to come to an understand- ing, frankly, with the Great Powers of Europe, who, equally with us, have at heart to prevent the danger which we have just pointed out. Among those Powers Great Britain is incontestably the one that can exercise the greatest influence over the fate of this question, and can cooperate in the most decisive manner in realizing the pacific intentions of our august Master. "With this conviction his majesty desires you, Sir, to come to an explanation with the British Cabinet on this subject, without the least reserve. Have the goodness to submit to that Cabinet, that it is as much for its interest as for ours, to take care that the struggle between the Porte and Egypt shall not assume so 97 Bourqueney to Soult, June 17, 1839, ibid., p. 493. Guichen quotes despatches to prove that the Russians were working even before that early date to destroy the Anglo-French entente. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 51 ff., 68 IO2 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [428 serious a character as may ever place the safety of the capital of the Ottoman Empire in danger; "That in order ... to set due bounds to the action of the Pasha of Egypt ... it would be necessary to declare to him in the most formal manner, 'That as long as he shall confine himself to the defence of the territories which have been assigned to him by the arrangement of Kutaya; as long as he shall not extend his military operations beyond the district of Diarbekir and Orfa, ... so long will Great Britain in conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, remain a passive spectator of the struggle which is going on in Syria; but that from the instant . . . that he shall extend the theatre of war beyond the defiles of the Taurus in order to carry it into the centre of Asia Minor, from that moment England would consider such act of hostility as if it were directed against herself, and would thenceforward act as if she were at open war with the Pasha of Egypt;' . . . "If England came [sic] to an agreement with us to issue a declaration couched in these terms, the Emperor will authorize his Representative at Alexandria to hold precisely the same language. . . . "For the moment," Nesselrode pointed out in conclusion, "we must confine ourselves to what is most pressing, that is to say, to guard against the ill-advised policy of the Sultan dragging us into a complication of a nature to bring on a chance of a European conflict ... it is with this view that we have thought it indis- pensable to come to a frank explanation with England, by taking in London the step of which by the Emperor's orders, I have pointed out to you the plan and the object. It will prove to the British Ministry that, far from wishing to bring about a complica- tion in the Levant, we are using all our care to prevent one; and that, instead of greedily availing ourselves of the stipulations of our Treaty of Alliance with the Porte, we are ourselves the first to desire to prevent the recurrence of a crisis which would compel us in spite of ourselves, again to take up a military attitude on the shores of the Bosphorus." 98 Lord Palmerston must have been puzzled when he received the despatch from which the above extract has been quoted. The ^Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 96-98. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 457-460. 429] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA IO3 communication from Kisseleff, he wrote to Beauvale on the day after it was handed to him, was "generally speaking" satisfactory but the British could not agree with the Russian government when it stated that the Powers might remain passive spectators if the contest between the two rivals in the Levant was confined to Syria. Austria, France, and England seemed agreed that the existing relative positions of the Pasha and the Sultan were incompatible with the safety of the Ottoman Empire and therefore some differ- ent arrangement must be concluded. Some parts of Nesselrode's despatch, according to the views expressed by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, might perhaps be construed to imply that Rus- sia, instead of being of this opinion, was satisfied with the status quo. Other parts of the despatch, though, he admitted, indicated that Russia was "not disinclined" to take into consideration the possibility of making some more permanent settlement." While the advance made by Count Nesselrode to the British government must have had some influence upon the attitude of Lord Palmerston, it is certain that the latter did not abandon immediately all of his apprehensions in regard to the intentions of Russia. "I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte," he wrote to Lord Ponsonby on July 5, 1839, "that if the course of events should lead the Porte to ask or to accept military or naval aid from any European Power, in the contest with Mehemet Ali, Her Majesty's Government trusts that the Porte will at the same time address itself to Great Britain to the same effect." 100 Some days later, after having learned that the Sultan's health was in a critical condition, Palmerston wrote again to Ponsonby advising that if Mahmoud died and if consequently the presence of the British squadron at Constantinople should appear useful, he should in concert with the French Ambassador Roussin offer its assistance to the Turkish government. 101 Furthermore, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs issued instructions to Admiral Stopford, dated July 18, 1839, directing that if a Russian "Palmerston to Beauvale, June 28, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 117-119. Palmerston was less critical in a despatch in which he directed Clanri- carde to reply to the Russian proposals. See, Palmerston to Clanricarde, July 9, ibid., pp. 156-158. 100 Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 5, 1839, ibid., pp. 124-125. 101 Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 13, 1839, ibid., p. 166. See also, Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, July 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 166-167. IO4 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [430 fleet entered the Bosphorus he should apply for the admission of his vessels through the Dardanelles. 102 While the representatives of the great Powers were negotiating and corresponding thus, events destined to alter the situation materially were occurring in the Near East. The Viceroy, in June, 1839, it will be remembered, had sent instructions to Ibrahim to avoid hostilities. The measure which he then adopted was too tardy to accomplish its object. On June 21, several days before the arrival at the Egyptian camp of M. Caille, who carried the pacific instructions which Mehemet Ali had prepared, a decisive battle was fought between the forces of Ibrahim and those of Hafiz Pasha near the village of Nezib. The Ottoman army was routed, and when Caille arrived on the scene it was only with difficulty that he was able to persuade the Egyptian commander to refrain from following up his victory by a vigorous offensive. 103 Fate was merciful on this occasion to the aged Mahmoud, for on June 30, 1839, before the news of the engagement at Nezib had reached Constantinople, he expired. After his death, Abd-ul- Mejid, his sixteen year old son, was proclaimed Sultan and a new group of ministers, headed by Reouf and Kosrew Pashas, took charge of the government. Nouri Eifendi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced on July 3, 1839, that his young sovereign, willing to offer Mehemet Ali a full pardon for the past, was ready to concede to him Egypt in hereditary possession if he would agree to evacuate Syria, Adana, the Holy Cities, and the Island of Crete. 104 In addition, Kosrew Pasha, the Grand Vizier, sent orders to Hafiz Pasha to suspend hostilities, and he directed Achmet Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman fleet, to retain his vessels within the Dardanelles. 105 Achmet, however, dissatisfied with the new government, put to sea at once. Off the Island of Tenedos, ^Instructions to Stopford, July 18, 1839; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 18, 1839, ibid., pp. 167-168. 103 Mouriez, op. cit., IV, pp. 38-4.1. Annual Register, 1839, p. [411]. For a contemporary account of the battle of Nezib see von Moltke, op. cit., pp. 378, ff. 104 Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 183. See also Granville to Palmerston, July 22, 1839, ibid., p. 186. On July 5, 1839, Kosrew Pasha sent such an offer to Mehemet Ali. See Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, July 5, 1839, ibid., p. 227. 105 Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 3, 1839, ibid., p. 183. Annual Register, 1839, p. [43- 43 I ] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA IO5 July 5, 1839, he feU m with the French fleet commanded by Admiral Lalande. Osman Bey, the second in command of the Turkish squadron, who had formed an acquaintance with Lalande while he was in Tunis, obtained an interview with him on this oc- casion and declared at that meeting that Mahmoud had not died a natural death but had been murdered by Kosrew and Halil Pashas. 106 The former, who had assumed the leadership of the government, he claimed was at the head of a Russian party which intended to surrender the country into the hands of the Musco- vites. In order to prevent this from happening, his superior officer, Achmet, had resolved to sail to Crete in order that he might come to terms with Mehemet Ali. After that had been accomplished the fleet would return and in cooperation with the army of the Taurus under command of Hafiz Pasha would overthrow the pro- Russian Kosrew and his associates. Lalande, refusing to cooperate with Achmet Pasha and Osman Bey in their projects, advised that they should proceed to Rhodes rather than to Crete. Nevertheless, he took no steps to prevent them from executing their intentions. 107 Instead of stopping at either. Rhodes or Crete they sailed direct to Alexandria where they delivered up their squadron unconditionally into the hands of the Pasha. 108 News about these alarming developments in the Near East began to arrive at Paris about the middle of July. Soult, who must have been aroused greatly by the gravity of the situation, 10 *Halil Pasha was the Seraskier in the new government. See Annual Register, 1839, p. [411]. 197 Affaires etrangeres. Turquie 278, fol. 44, Lalande to Roussin, July 5, 1839, quoted by A. Stern, in Revue Historique, CVII, pp. 325-326. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 8, 1839, Roussin to Ponsonby, July 7, 1839, Levant Corres- pondence, I, p. 188. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 138-141. See also an article written by the Prince de Joinville, who was with Lalande during the interview with Osman Bey, published in Revue des deux Mondes, Aug. I, 1852, LXXXVII, pp. 425-482. 108 The indifference with which Lalande acted on this occasion did not fail to attract attention. Marshal Soult, who had been particularly anxious that the status quo should be maintained, despatched a sharp reprimand to him and in discussing the surrender of the Turkish fleet with Lord Granville, admitted that the Admiral's conduct appeared inexplicable. See Affaires etrangeres. Turquie 278, fol. 182, Instructions to Lalande, July 27, 1839, quoted by Stern in Revue Historique, CVII, pp. 327-328. F. O. France, 584, Granville to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 244. IO6 THE TURCO-EGYPTrAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [432 became active immediately. On July 17, 1839, having learned already that the Sultan was dead, he wrote to Bourqueney: "Although it is at present extremely difficult to anticipate the nature of the influence which this change of reign may exercise upon the destinies of the Orient, it is evident that a crisis has arisen which calls for the most serious and loyal concurrence of all the Cabinets to secure the continuance of peace. It seems to me that the moment -has arrived to act upon the idea already suggested by M. de Metternich, of guaranteeing, by means of an interchange of diplomatic declarations, the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, and in order to prevent any delay, I have resolved to assume the initiative myself in the necessary steps to be taken for that object. . . . Lord Palmerston will no doubt reply to the communication which you will make to him in terms sufficiently precise to attain the end we have in view." 109 Nine days later, after he had received addi- tional information from the Levant, Soult continued: "I think . . . that it will be desirable to continue the course adopted up to this time, . . . which consists in subordinating as much as pos- sible to an intimate and sustained concert between the Cabinets, the action which some amongst them are prepared to exercise in the Eastern question. As regards 'England and France, includ- ing also Austria, although she does not as openly proclaim her views, the principal, the veritable object of this concert, is to restrain Russia and to accustom her to treat in common on Oriental affairs. It is enough to say that under existing conjunc- tions there is more reason than ever for our strict unanimity, . . . " 110 On the same day Lord Granville reported in a despatch written to Palmerston that the French government was of the opinion that neither the disastrous overthrow of the Turkish army, nor the traitorous conduct of the Capitan Pasha, nor the pros- trate attitude of the Divan ought to affect the course which the 10 "Soult to Bourqueney, July 17, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 513-514. Palmerston replied favorably to Souk's proposal. See Palmerston to Bourqueney, July 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 175. Soult was always anxious to make it appear that the most important question at issue was that of protecting Turkey against Russia. The question of the terms which should be enforced upon the two rivals in the Levant, he wished to have it believed, was a matter of only secondary importance. See Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. 22, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 545. "Soult to Bourqueney, July 26, 1839, ibid., p. 519. 433] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA IO/ great Powers of Europe should pursue. A declaration to that effect, Soult believed, should be made to Mehemet AH. He would write to Vienna to let Metternich know the French opinion and he would urge him to adopt a similar one. 111 In the meantime some progress in the direction of securing an understanding between the eastern Powers and Great Britain relative to a settlement of Turco-Egyptian affairs was being made by means of informal discussions which were promoted at Vienna by the Austrian Chancellor. ."Upon all the details," Lord Beauvale wrote to Palmerston, July n, 1839, "Prince Metternich agrees to your Lordship's ideas without reserve, and is sure of their adop- tion by Russia: so that, according to him, England, Austria and Russia are placed exactly upon the same line, and there only remains to induce France to relinquish her deviations from it." 112 "The outline of the terms is already sketched," he stated in another despatch written the same day, "and may be considered as adopted by England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. . . . Prince Metternich requests the British government to persuade France." The only points which remained to be agreed on by the repre- sentatives of the four Powers, according to the British Ambas- sador, were those relative to the possession of the east coast of the Red Sea, the amount of tribute to be levied upon Egypt by the Sultan, the "obligation of [Mehemet Ali to accept Ottoman] treaties," and the extent of disarmament to be required of the Viceroy. He admitted that these points would yet occasion many difficulties, but he maintained: "It is clear that Vienna in its relations with that place [Constantinople] is nearly a month ahead of London and Petersburg." 113 The activities at the Austrian capital were intensified when it became known there that the Sultan was dead and that the new Ottoman government proposed to offer its pardon to Mehemet Ali. Beauvale reported to Palmerston on July 19, 1839, that events had totally changed the state of things, and it might be felt lu Granville to Palmerston, July 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 195. lu Beauvale to Palmerston, July II, 1839, ibid., p. 180. U8 Beauvale to Palmerston, July II, 1839. Ibid., pp. 178-179. According to Beauvale, Metternich was applied to by the Porte for advice and this, with the proximity of Vienna to Constantinople, threw the negotiation very much into his hands. "... nor," Beauvale commented, "considering the identity of his objects with our own, can it be better placed." See ibid. IO8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [434 by Her Majesty's government to require an alteration in their determinations. It was probable, he thought, that the Sultan and the Pasha would come to an agreement, for the latter would prefer closing at once rather than waiting for the interposition of the five Powers. 114 Metternich's views were of a similar character. 115 Alarmed lest a direct settlement should actually be concluded between the two rivals in the Orient, he immediately despatched, probably with the consent of the Vienna representatives of the Powers, 116 instructions to Constantinople for the Internuncio and his colleagues to adopt measures to dissuade, if possible, the Sultan from prostrating himself before Mehemet Ali, and to engage him to rely upon the European Powers for protection. 117 These instructions sent from Vienna on July 16, arrived in the Ottoman capital on the 27th, and before the day of their arrival was spent the European representatives Sturmer, Ponsonby, Roussin, Bou- tenieff, and Koenigsmarck had signed the famous collective note of July 27, i839, 118 framed in the following terms: "The undersigned U4 Beauvale to Palmerston, July 19, 1839, ibid., p. 192. ""See an extract of a despatch, Metternich to Roller, Austrian representa- tive in Berlin, July 26, 1839, Berlin Archives, vol. 3, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 54 [footnote 115]. "'See an extract of a despatch, Sturmer to Metternich, July 29, 1839, Vienna Archives, Turkey 50, quoted by ibid., p. 55 [footnote 118]. Metternich's fear was well founded. Note the following extract of a despatch, Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839: "It [the collective note] was . . . most fortunately well-timed, for the Ottoman Ministers had actually resolved upon concessions to the Egyptian Pasha, which would have been at this moment on their way to Alexandria, and which would have mischievously complicated the affairs of this country." Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. Annual Register, 1840, p. 467. "'Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 50-52. Granville to Palmerston, July 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 186. See also the diary of the Princess Metternich, [Fiirstin Melanie] under date of Aug. 2, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 309-310. ^Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 53. Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 292-293. The issuance of the collective note, as Hasenclever points out, was provoked by Metternich alone, and it was perhaps the only outward result of the negotiations for the Vienna conference plan. Metternich's chief interest was not in saving Turkey but in securing the unity of the Powers and their domination of the situation in the Near East. Hasen- clever credits Maltzan with claiming that Metternich hoped to crown his career's accomplishments with the settlement of the Near Eastern question. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 47, 50-55. 435] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA IO9 have received, this morning, from their respective Governments instructions, in virtue whereof they have the honor to inform the Sublime Porte, that agreement among the Five Great Powers on the Question of the East is secured, and to invite it to suspend any definitive resolution without their concurrence, waiting for the effect of the interest which these Powers feel for it." 119 Regardless of the profession which was made in the text of the collective note, it is evident that on that occasion the Russian government was still anxious to avoid entering into a conference for the settlement of the Near Eastern question. 120 On the same day that Sturmer and the other European representatives at Con- stantinople signed the note quoted above, after he had learned that the Porte had offered to make peace with the Viceroy, the Russian Chancellor wrote to M. de Kisseleff: "These determina- tions [of the Porte to make peace], dictated by a genuine spirit of conciliation and wisdom, simplify greatly the question, the solution of which the Allied Cabinets have at heart. The Porte, induced by a just appreciation of its true interests, has anticipated the propositions which the Five Powers were on the point of making to it. ... It has resolved to offer to Mehemet AH the inheritance of Egypt in return for the cession of Syria. . . . "The basis of negotiation has thus been laid down by the Porte itself. It has of its own accord opened the deliberation, and has virtually fixed its locality at Constantinople, the only place where it was fitting that interests, having direct reference to the future fate of the Ottoman Empire, should be discussed." 121 It is quite apparent that the cause for the persistent refusal on the part of Russia to join in a conference with the other Powers was the Cabinet of St. Petersburg's time-worn fear that at such a confer- *State Papers, XXVIII, pp. 408-409. Levant Correspondence, I, p. 293. Annual Register, 1840, p. 468. Martens, N. S., Ill, p. 875. 1JO See an extract of a despatch, Nesselrode to Strove, July 18/30, 1839, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 55-58. Nesselrode complained to the foreign Ambassadors at St. Petersburg but evidently was not greatly dissatisfied when he learned that the collective note had been signed. The note, it can be seen readily, did not in any way bind Russia to enter into a formal conference between the Powers. See Barante to Soult, Aug. 10, 1839, Barante, op. cit., p. 296. Hasenclever, op. cit,, p. 55. '"Nesselrode to Kisseleff, July 15/27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 2 57- 2 59- Annual Register, 1840, pp. 463-466. IIO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [436 ence England and France especially the latter would insist on the conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. 122 On July 25, 1839, Baron Meyendorff, the Russian representative at Berlin, declared to Sir George Hamilton, the British charge d'affaires, that the Musco- vite Cabinet would be willing to sign at once a declaration of the independence of the Turkish Empire and that it would promise, along with the rest of the European Cabinets, not to seek to profit by the existing state of things, but guaranteeing the in- tegrity of the Empire was something entirely different. 123 The persistent hesitation of Russia to unite in a conference with the other Powers for the settlement of the affairs of the East pleased the French most highly. "M. de Metternich has forwarded an answer in conformity with our declaration in favor of the inde- pendence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire," Marshal Soult wrote on August i, 1839. "According to what M. de Sainte- Aulaire [the French Ambassador at Vienna] writes to me, the Chancellor of Austria, who recently appeared to be quite satisfied with the intentions manifested by Russia, is now extremely uneasy on that point. It appears that the Cabinet of St. Petersburg, far from continuing the assurances, otherwise sufficiently vague, which it had at first proffered of its desire to act in concert with the other Powers, 124 now recedes, under frivolous pretexts, from all that might substantiate or reduce them to formal acts. I am sur- prised at the astonishment which M. de Metternich evinces at this proceeding. I never imagined that, in the actual question, Russia would be brought to associate herself frankly with the other Cabinets whose policy is so opposed to hers; ... It is ^See an extract from Nesselrode's report to Nicholas, Aug. 3/15, 1839, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., pp. 58-60. 123 Hamilton to Palmerston, July 31, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 236-237. "'Note the following comment made by M. de Barante at a later date: "II [the Tsar] en fut mecontent et presque irrite. Toute fois apres quelque delai, apres plus d'une conversation avec 1'ambassadeur d'Autriche, il lui dit qu'un plenipotentiaires russe se rendrait a la conference de Vienne. Quelques heures apres cette determination, qui n'etait encore ni officielle ni ecrite, la mort du Sultan fut soudainement annoncee." quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 46, [footnote 90]. See also Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 261, 265. Russell to Palmer- ston, July 6, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, July 12, 1839, Levant Correspond- ence, I, pp. 162, 168. 43?] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA III necessary . . . that the Powers, particularly France and England, should hold an absolutely uniform language towards the Cabinet of St. Petersburg and to address it only by measures identical in character." 125 On another occasion he professed that he personally was disposed to think that the ground on which the Powers should propose to negotiate with Mehemet Ali should be the latter's ob- taining the hereditary possession of Egypt and his giving up the other pashalics which he was then holding; "but," he continued, "... some latitude must be given to our Representatives at Vienna, to accede to terms more favourable to Mehemet AH." 126 Although the Marshal did follow a cautious policy, the apparent accord between England and France was destined to be short- lived. When it became known at London that the Turkish fleet had been treacherously surrendered to the Pasha, Palmerston was aroused to action, and accordingly on August 3, and 5 and 7, he forwarded to Bourqueney and to Granville, respectively, for the approval of the French government sets of proposed instructions of a drastic character for the two Admirals in the Mediter- ranean. 127 Palmerston's plan was for the fleets of Stopford and Lalande to sail direct to Alexandria and demand the release of the Turkish vessels. If the Viceroy should refuse to do promptly as he was ordered, the allied squadron should then secure their ends by resorting to force. Such measures, however, were entirely too drastic to secure the endorsement of Marshal Soult. "The hostilities in the East are evidently terminated," he reflected in a despatch written on August 6, 1839. "Neither by land nor by sea have we any announcement of an intention to continue, or rather to resume them. ... In this state of things, the defection of the Ottoman fleet is an unfortunate and much to be regetted event, for which we must endeavor to provide a remedy; but it scarcely constitutes one of those cases of imminent danger which justifies such extreme measures as are " 5 Soult to Bourqueney, Aug. I, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 527-528. ^Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 2, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 235. m See Palmerston's proposed instructions to the two Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839; Supplementary instructions to the Admirals, Aug. 3, 1839; Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 5, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 5, 1839, ibid., pp. 233, 234, 238-239, 240. See also, Palmerston to Lords Commis- sioners of Admiralty, Aug. 7, 1839; Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 7, 1839, ibid., pp. 255-256. 112 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [438 now proposed to us ... an act of hostility against Mehemet AH would not facilitate the plan proposed by England and France in concert. In destroying the Egyptian fleet we would not only add no strength to the Porte, but also we would not induce the Viceroy to abate his pretensions in the slightest degree ... I do not hesitate to say that in ruining the Pasha of Egypt we shall bring about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Our policy today, as from the commencement of the crisis, ought to be to take care above all other considerations that Constantinople receive no for- eign protection without our common consent." 128 Only a few days before the above quoted despatch was written, Soult received information from Cochelet which, it appears, in- fluenced him to be more outspoken than he had been formerly in his favoritism for Mehemet Ali. 129 As Palmerston, influenced by news of the events which were taking place in the Levant, was at the same time becoming more determined in his hostility towards the Viceroy, it soon became apparent that England and France would very probably be unable to reach an agreement upon all that appertained to the question of the Near East. On August 13, 1839, Soult directed the French Minister of Marine, Duperre, to instruct Admiral Lalande that if the Captain Pasha's fleet was still outside of the harbor of Alexandria he should com- municate with the captains of the vessels and try to induce them to return to Constantinople. No force should be used, though, un- less it was necessary for self-defense. In case the Ottoman squadron had already entered Egyptian waters, and in case Mehemet Ali refused to give it up, the French Admiral should be satisfied with leaving a few warships to observe it and return with the remainder of his armament to his station off the coast of Asia Minor. Furthermore, when he first went to Egypt he to Bourqueney, Aug. 6, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 532-535. m Cochelet had reported that the Viceroy, conscious of the power he possessed, could not be induced to recede in any essential point from the condi- tions of a reconciliation which he had put forward in communication with the Consuls-General at Alexandria on July 14 and 15, 1839. At that time, the Pasha declared he would not be satisfied unless he received the hereditary possession of all the provinces and all the Sandjaks which he held. According to Cochelet he had more than 60 war vessels and an army of 200,000 men with which to enforce his demands. See, Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 1839, Levant Cor- respondence, I, pp. 256-257. See also, Brief Summary of two Interviews between Pasha of Egypt and Consuls-General, July 14 and 15, 1839; Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, July 16, 1839, ibid., pp. 244-246, 296. 439] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 113 should leave behind an adequate portion of his fleet to be ready to act if the Russians should appear at Constantinople or if an allied squadron should be summoned by the Porte to sail into the Sea of Marmora. "It must not be forgotten," Soult declared in con- clusion, "that this [the latter], after all, is the principal question, and that consequently, watchfulness on this point should be in- cessant." 130 The instructions which Palmerston at length prepared for Stop- ford were of an entirely different character. "I am to acquaint your Lordships," he wrote on August 24 to the Lords Commis- sioners of the Admiralty, "that it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Admiral Sir Robert Stopford should not be precluded from execut- ing any instructions given to him by Lord Beauvale, and arising out of the negotiations at Vienna, provided the measures to be taken shall be such as Sir Robert Stopford may think himself to have adequate means to execute, even though the French Admiral should not receive corresponding instructions from his own Government or from the French Ambassador at Vienna." 131 The divergence between the respective positions taken by Eng- land and France became most obvious after it was known in the west that the European representatives at Constantinople had issued a "collective note" to the Porte enjoining it "to suspend any definitive resolution" without the concurrence of the Powers, for the immediate danger of Russian intervention in Turkey, which had tended to hold the two western Cabinets together, was thereby removed. 132 On August 20, 1839, the day after Palmer- 130 Soult to Duperre, Aug. 13, 1839, ibid., pp. 288-289. 131 Palmerston to the Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Aug. 24, 1839, ibid., p. 314. ""Lord Ponsonby was elated after the note of July 27, 1839, had been signed. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, July 29, 1839, ibid., pp. 292-293. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 467-468. Palmerston was also well pleased. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, Aug. 21, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 311. Note also the following extract of a despatch, Bourqueney to Soult, Aug. 18, 1839, which was written after Palmerston had learned from Austrian sources about the signing of the note of July 27, 1839: "Votre Excellence jugera, par ce qui precede, du changement qui s'est opere depuis trente-huit heures dans 1'esprit des membres du cabinet anglais. "On n'admettait pas la possibilite du concours de la Russie: aujourd'hui, on 1'espere. "On esperait le concours de 1'Autriche jusqu'au bout: on n'en doute plus." Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 542-543. 114 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [440 ston had received from Lord Ponsonby a copy of the collective note, he wrote to Henry Bulwer, the British charge d'affaires at Paris in the absence of Lord Granville, stating that the five Powers were the friends and the allies of the Sultan. They, in fact, had declared spontaneously in the note of July 27, 1839, their inten- tion to uphold the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. The British government felt, therefore, that they were bound to compel Mehemet Ali to return the Ottoman fleet. More- over, because of the fact that the government of Great Britain be- lieved that all future steps ought to be taken, if possible, col- lectively by the five and that a decision concerning such steps ought to emanate from Vienna, which was the central point of negotiations, it was about to send instructions to Beauvale to take up with the representatives of the Powers at the Court of the Emperor Ferdinand the question of insisting on the restoration of the fleet as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation what- ever upon any other point. The consular agents at Alexandria, according to Palmerston's view, should be instructed by the dip- lomats at Vienna to demand of Mehemet Ali the restoration of the Turkish vessels, and if he should refuse to obey, then they [the consular agents] should all withdraw. If that did not bring the Pasha to terms, Syria and Egypt should be blockaded, Egyptian merchant ships should be seized on the high seas and in Syrian ports, Candia should be occupied and restored to the direct authority of the Sultan, and finally, Mehemet Ali should be notified that the allied fleet would defend the Turkish Empire "against any attack on his part, as effectually as if it were a Turkish fleet." 133 "Her Majesty's government," Palmerston de- clared "will give instructions to Sir Robert Stopford to take any, or all, of these steps, if he shall be directed so to do by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Vienna . . . and you are instructed to invite the French Government to send similar instructions and authority to their Ambassador at Vienna, and to their Admiral in the Mediterranean." 133 The British Minister of Foreign Affairs must have realized, however, that there was not much chance that the French Min- isters would send such instructions to their representatives, for "'Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 20, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 309- 310. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 472-475. 441 ] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA 115 in his despatch to Bulwer, which, by the way, the latter was directed to communicate to Soult, he warned that Stopford might act "either with, or without the co-operation of any one of the other squadrons," and, on August 25, 1839, J ust fi ye days after he had written thus to Bulwer, he wrote as follows to Beauvale: "Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to proceed ... in concert with the other Four Powers and are ready to make some sacrifice of opinion in order to arrive at unanimous action. But if your Excellency should find it impossible to obtain an unanimous assent of your colleagues to any course of proceeding on this mat- ter which would be consistent with the principles upon which the British government is acting, or which could be likely to attain the objects in view, your Excellency is authorized to act in concert with a less number than the Four, if you shall find that any reasonable and effectual course of proceeding is assented to by such a proportion of the Five as may give to that course adequate moral weight and sufficient physical means." 134 It soon became apparent that what Palmerston must have at least suspicioned in regard to the intentions of the French govern- ment was based on excellent grounds. Bulwer reported on August 26, 1839, that from a conversation he had had with Soult that same morning he was induced to apprehend that the government of France was resolved to throw obstacles in the way of the se- lection of Vienna as the place for settling and agreeing upon the affairs of the East. The cause for that resolution, Bulwer believed, was to be sought in the difference which really existed between the views of the French government and those entertained by the other governments relative to the manner in which they should deal with Mehemet Ali. "I fear," he added, "that no decided measures of a coercive character will be employed by France for "'Palmerston to Beauvale, Aug. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 315- 317. In another despatch written on the same date to Beauvale, Palmerston pointed out that up to that time nothing had happened to alter the opinion of the British government as to the nature of the final settlement which it would be desirable for the five Powers to effect between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, nor to change its belief that if the five should agree to press any given arrange- ment upon the Viceroy, their union would carry sufficient moral weight to ob- tain from him his acquiescence in their decision. Ibid., pp. 317-319. See also Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 296. Il6 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [442 limiting the ambition of the Viceroy, or for restoring the [Turkish] fleet to the Sultan." 135 Meanwhile the Court of St. Petersburg, which from an early date, it will be remembered, had attempted to satisfy the other European Courts, and in particular the Court of St. James, that Russia was not desirous of effecting an armed intervention in Turkey under the provisions of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, realized that the seeming accord between England and France in regard to Eastern affairs was likely to disappear. Nesselrode had repeated more than once, Lord Clanricarde, the British Ambas- sador at the Tsar's capital, wrote to Palmerston, July 18, 1839, that the Russian government was ready to accede to any proposal which was favorable to the Sultan. In addition, he had expressed great doubts whether the Powers could prevail upon Mehemet Ali to resign Syria immediately and he asked the British Ambas- sador if he believed France would press, "or even propose" to the Viceroy that he should make such a sacrifice. 136 Again, on July 27, 1839, Clanricarde reported that Nesselrode had discussed with him the "probability" that France would desire better terms than those which were favored by the other Powers for Mehemet Ali and whether she would not insist especially that the Egyptian should retain the Pashalic of Acre. Of still more significance was the statement within this despatch which revealed that Nesselrode had told the representative of Great Britain that the precise terms of the final settlement to be imposed upon the hostile parties in the Levant "would virtually depend upon Her Majesty's Govern- ment." 137 While Russia's chief Minister was making advances thus to the 135 Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 321. 13 *Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 18, 1839, ibid., p. 201. Metternich, also, became suspicious at an early date in regard to the intentions of France. See Metternich to Apponyi, July 14, 1839, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 351. ^Clanricarde to Palmerston, July 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 237. Nesselrode perceived very early that France was placing more emphasis upon the conclusion of a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire than England was. Aug. 3, 1839, Barante quoted Nesselrode as follows: " 'Je doute qu'il convienne a PAngleterre,' me repondit M. de Nesselrode, 'de voir 1'etat de I'Orient sous la garantie commune de 1'Europe.' " Barante to Soult, Aug. 3, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 276. See also, Barante to Soult, July 20, 1839, ibid., pp. 265-266. 443] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA I IJ British through their Ambassador at the Muscovite capital he was, on the other hand, becoming less friendly with the French, object- ing in particular against the attitude which Louis Philippe's gov- ernment had assumed on the question of sending its fleet through the Dardanelles. "If, unfortunately, the hope which the Emperor has reason to found upon the moderation of the French Govern- ment," he wrote to Count Medem, the Tsar's representative at Paris, "should not be realized; if the appearance of a foreign fleet in the Sea of Marmora should come to aggravate the state of affairs at Constantinople, the course which Russia would have to pursue would not be doubtful. In the presence of a foreign fleet the Emperor's Minister [at Constantinople] would formally pro- test against the flagrant violation of the principle of the closing of the Dardanelles; a principle which the Porte has at all times considered as a fundamental rule of its policy, and which it has engaged itself to us invariably to maintain; he would declare that he regarded this violation as contrary to the independence of the Porte; he would immediately suspend his functions, and quit Con- stantinople. Then it would only remain for the Emperor to take such measures as he might consider necessary to re-establish the Porte in its entire independence, and to enable it to fulfil its en- gagements towards us, free from all foreign constraint." 1 ? 8 As time advanced, the anxiety of Russia to come to an under- standing with Great Britain increased. Clanricarde stated in a despatch written to Palmerston August 10, 1839, that Nesselrode had repeated to him the same assurances which he had formerly made that the Russian government was most desirous of avoiding any military demonstration, or any necessity for carrying into execution the main clause of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. 139 August 22, 1839, less than two weeks later, the British Am- bassador continued: "Count Nesselrode told me yesterday, that he had that morning received a courier from London; that the English Government took the same view of the affairs of Turkey "'Nesselrode to Medem, July 25/Aug. 6, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 304-306. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 469-472. See also, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 353, [footnote]. Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 7, 1839, ibid., pp. 352-354. Barante to Soult, July 13, Aug. 3, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., pp. 105-107. 139 Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 299-300. Il8 THE TURCO-EGYPTI AN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [444 as that of Russia; that the French Government, in reply to a proposition made by your Lordship, had refused to be a party to coerce Mehemet Ali, who had become more and more insolent, and positive in his demands upon the Sultan." 140 Finally, on August 27, 1839, the Russian Chancellor informed Clanricarde that the Emperor, having reason to believe that the British government was better disposed toward Russia and that it entertained a more favorable and just opinion of his views and policy than theretofore, was desirous of improving that disposition to the utmost and of strengthening the good understanding which "so happily existed" between the two Powers. Hence, His Majesty had resolved on sending Baron de Brunnow, one of his most favored diplomats, upon a special mission to London. 141 The Emperor Nicholas and his ministers perceived, undoubtedly, that the most strategic posi- tion in the whole affair was that occupied by Lord Palmerston. If the latter agreed to unite with the Russians upon a definite pro- gram, it was practically certain that Austria and Prussia would do likewise 142 and France would be forced either to conform with "Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 22, 1839, ibid., p. 375. 141 Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 27, 1839, ibid., p. 375. On the same date, according to Clanricarde, Nesselrode told him that the French government would "on no account" join in coercing the Pasha of Egypt by force of arms. It deemed it better that the Sultan should accede to Mehemet Ali's demands than that armed interference should be effected to prevent the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In answer, Clanricarde claimed, he said that he was sure that, even if the British government were to be alone in such a course, it would support the just rights and interests of the Sultan. Nesselrode replied "in a manner that showed it was a decision which had been maturely formed. 'You may be sure that we shall not desert you in such a case.' " See Clanricarde to Palmerston, Aug. 28, 1839, ibid., p. 376. In the same despatch Clanricarde remarked: "On the whole, I found Count Nesselrode yesterday more at his ease upon the state of the Turco-Egyptian Question, than he had been, because, although it appeared more difficult than ever to settle without some act or demonstration of armed intervention, there appeared a chance of Russia and England acting in concert." Note also the following statement which Barante reported Nesselrode had made to him: " 'Nous profitons du moment ou lord Palmerston est aimable pour nous!'" Barante to Soult, Aug. 28, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, p. 311. See also, Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, p. 383 [footnote]. 142 Austria and Prussia, it should be remembered, were inclined to favor the position taken by Palmerston. See Russell to Palmerston, June 26, 1839; Beauvale to Palmerston, July n, 19, Aug. I, 2, 1839; Hamilton to Palmerston, July 24, Aug. 14, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 122, 178-181, 192-193, 269-271, 272, 202-203, 302. 445] THE QUESTION OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND OF ALEXANDRIA I 19 the wishes of the other Powers or permit herself to be isolated. However, if the British Minister of Foreign Affairs remained hostile to Russia, he would beyond question agree to some sort of union with the French. Under such circumstances Russia could not even count upon the active support of her eastern neighbors Austria and Prussia. Hence her position would be one in which there would be real and immediate peril. Thus at the close of the month of August, 1839, the diplomatic stage for the solution of the Turco-Egyptian question was almost set. The actors had been chosen and each was assuming his proper role. France, in her desire to alienate Russia from the Concert of Europe and to wind up the whole affair by a joint con- vention guaranteeing the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire, was well on the road to failure, and Russia, anx- ious to avoid what France desired, was about to succeed. The destruction of the Turkish army and the surrender of the Capitan Pasha's fleet had caused the European Powers, excepting France apparently, to look with alarm upon the threatening position of Mehemet Ali, while on the other hand the engagement which M. Boutenieff had taken on July 27, 1839, binding his Court to act in cooperation with the other great Courts of Europe, had removed the fears which those Courts entertained lest Russia should at- tempt an independent intervention in Turkey under the pro- visions of the treaty of 1833. In other words, the triumph of the cause of those who wished to see the crisis in the Near East settled on the basis of the "Question of Alexandria" over that of those who wished to see it settled on the basis of the "Question of Constantinople" was imminent. CHAPTER IV THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 When the Russian Cabinet ordered Brunnow, the Tsar's Minis- ter at Stuttgart, to go on a special mission to London, it gave him instructions defining the limits within which his superiors were willing that he should negotiate. The courts of the maritime Powers, it directed therein, should be requested to abandon the idea of concluding a convention to guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. They should also be asked to renounce the project of having their fleets enter the Sea of Marmora if Russian forces should appear there to defend Constantinople against the army of Ibrahim Pasha. If they so agreed, Brunnow should, in turn, announce that the Emperor was ready to consider as a permanent European principle that the Bosphorus and the Dar- danelles should be closed to the warships of all nations both in times of peace and in times of war. Furthermore he should then declare that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi would not be renewed, 1 and that if it should be necessary to send a Russian detachment to the aid of the Porte it would be done not by reason of the said treaty, but because of engagements about to be contracted between the Powers of EUCOJDC. and the Sultan. 2 The Russian Envoy Extraordinary arrived at London on Sep- tember 15, 1839, and immediately began negotiating with Lord Palmerston. His Emperor, he was careful to explain to the British Minister, agreed entirely with the British views concerning the affairs of Turkey and Egypt, and would join in whatever measures 'During an Interview at London, Brunnow declared to Palmerston : " 'Si vous consentez a reconnaitre et a sanctionner formellement le principe que je viens de poser, je suis pret a vous annoncer que sa majeste ne tient nullement a renouveler le traite d'Unkiar-Iskelessi. Cette transaction a toujours etc mal comprise chez vous. L'empereur ne 1'a jamais conclue dans 1'interet exclusif de la Russie. Sa majeste a daigne la signer parce qu'elle 1'a envisagee comme un moyen de salut pour la Porte . . . sa majeste est decidee a ne point faire durer ce traite, si nous parvenons a nous concerter entre nous et a nous entendre sur les moyens necessaires pour assurer a 1'avenir 1'existence et le repos de 1'empire ottoman.' " See Brunnow's report, Sept. 12/24, 1839, quoted by Goriainow, op. cit., p. 67. 'Ibid., p. 63. [ 120] 44/] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 121 might be necessary to carry those views into effect. Nicholas would unite with England, Austria, and Prussia, either with France or without her. Though politically speaking, he saw the advantage of having France one of the party, personally he would be better pleased if she should be left out. 3 He felt that he de- served to be trusted and he hoped that the British government, trusting him unreservedly, would agree that if Mehemet AH by belligerent measures should place Constantinople in danger and render any military or naval operations in the Bosphorus or Asia Minor necessary it would leave that to him, and that it would on its part undertake whatever was to be done in the Mediterranean and on the coasts of Syria and Egypt. 4 Palmerston must have foreseen that the French Ministers would be alarmed when they learned of the advances which were being made by the Russian representative to Great Britain and it is probable that he believed they would then be more inclined to make concessions in order to come to an understanding with Great Britain in regard to the Turco-Egyptian question. At any rate, he revealed the principal facts about the negotiations, " 'ex- cept the preference of the Emperor to leave France out,' " to Count Sebastiani, the French Ambassador, who early in September had returned to the British capital after a leave of absence. 5 He let Sebastiani believe that he personally favored the Russian over- tures. 6 It seemed to him, he contended, that there was no wise medium between confidence and distrust. If England and France should tie up Russia by a treaty, they could trust her, and trusting her, they had better mix no evidence of suspicion with their confidence. 7 Sebastiani reported promptly to his own gov- ernment the opinions of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. "It is evident to me, Monsieur the Marshal," he declared, "that the English Cabinet regards the abolition of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi as an ample success for its policy in the East. Now this success it does not consider as too dearly purchased by its previous assent to the appearance of Russian forces in the Bosphorus; . . . 'See also, Barante to Soult, Oct. 23, 1839, Barante, op. cit., VI, pp. 345-347- Guichen, op, cit., pp. 133-137. 4 Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 300. *Ibid. "Sebastian! to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 551. 'Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 24, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 301. 122 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [448 "I told Lord Palmerston that the convention [that Brunnow proposed], the basis of which he had just explained to me, would be looked upon in Europe as an act of weakness and of pusillanim- ite towards Russia. Lord Palmerston considers it as an able measure; the action of Russia, even at Constantinople, regulated, denned in advance by the concurrence of the other Powers, seems to him to be the action of the five courts and an abdication of the exclusive protectorate of Russia." 8 When Marshal Soult received notification of what was going on at the British capital he was aroused indeed. , It was not without feelings of painful astonishment, he replied to Sebastiani, that he perceived a man of such "enlightened judgment" as Lord Palmer- ston entertain with so much complacency a project like the one proposed to him by M. Brunnow. After criticising bitterly the Russian advances and, after charging that the Tsar's government entertained most aggressive designs, he continued: "Whatever may be the consequences of a deplorable difference of opinion, should it effect the accomplishment of the favorite project of Russia, that of separating us from our Allies, we shall not have incurred the responsibility of it. We will keep our ground. It will not be our fault if we no longer find there those who at first placed themselves side by side with us." 9 Regardless of the attitude which the head of the French Cabinet assumed, Palmerston undoubtedly would have accepted the Russian proposal had the decision rested with him alone. 10 Several 8 Sebastiani to Soult, Sept. 23, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 552-553. Sebas- tiani concluded his despatch as follows: "Lord Palmerston, a qui j'ai demande ou aurait lieu la signature de la convention qu'il venait de m'analyser, m'a repondu: 'J e n V avais pas songe, mais a Londres si Ton veut.' " 'Soult to Sebastiani, Sept. 26, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 406-408. See also extracts from a despatch, Soult to Sebastiani, Sept. 10, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., pp. 129-132. 10 On Oct. 25, 1839, Palmerston wrote to Clanricarde: "... he [Brunnow] had several long conversations with myself, and with other members of Her Majesty's Government, upon various matters connected with the relations be- tween Great Britain and Russia. "The substance of all his communications on these different matters was extremely satisfactory; and nothing could be more conciliatory than his manner upon every occasion. He was frank and unreserved in his conversations; and his mission, whatever may be its results, as to the main point upon which it bore, cannot fail to produce beneficial effects upon the relations between the two Gov- ernments." Levant Correspondence, I, p. 438, Annual Register, 1840, p. 475. 449] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 1 23 members of the British Ministry, however, were unwilling to agree to his views, and at an important Cabinet meeting, held on October i, 1839, at Windsor, they gained the upper hand. 11 " 'Ac- cording to the unanimous opinion of the Council,' " Palmerston informed Brunnow on the following day, " 'the military interven- tion of Russia, if it should become necessary for the protection and defence of Constantinople, ought to take place in such a manner as that it might be combined with a certain degree of cooperation and assistance on the part of the naval forces of England. " 'This co-operation,' " he explained, " 'might be settled so as not to blend and not to bring in contact the forces of one Power with those of the other. . . . Each of the two Straits would be placed under the protection of the respective Powers, whose forces would in this manner remain separated, and would not find themselves in [the] presence of each other. You on one side, we on the other, would be there to prevent the Egyptian Army from crossing the canal of Constantinople. ... All that would be necessary for us, would be to prove to the nation, that we have not consented to allow ourselves to be excluded from a common operation, having for its object to preserve the Capital of the Ottoman Empire; that we have not formally agreed to a principle by which Russia would be empowered to exercise that protectorate alone.' " Brunnow, be- lieving that his instructions were too precise to admit of any deviation therefrom, answered, "That the will of the Emperor," being for him the sole rule of his conduct, it was necessary for him to stop at the point at which they had arrived. He would report faithfully to his court the observations which had just been im- parted to him and would "wholly reserve to the Emperor to pronounce upon them a decision which rested with himself alone." 12 While Brunnow and Palmerston were negotiating thus the gap between the positions taken by the British and French govern- ments in regard to the affairs of the Near East was widening rapidly. On August 30, 1839, Bulwer reported from Paris that he believed the French government would endeavor seriously to "Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp. 363-364. Brunnow to Nesselrode, Sept. 26/Oct. 8, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 442, Annual Register, 1840, p. 481. "Brunnow to Nesselrode, Sept. 26/Oct. 8, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 442-446. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 482-483. 124 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [450 get the Pasha to abandon a portion of his demands, but that he feared it would be unwilling to resort to any other means than those of persuasion to accomplish that purpose. 13 Five days later Palmerston had a long conversation with Sebastian! from which he gathered that France was disinclined to be a party to any active measures of coercion which might be employed against Mehemet Ali. The steps which the five Powers would be able to take for such a purpose, Louis Phillipe's representative claimed, would be unsatisfactory. Some of them would be insufficient; oth- ers were likely to overshoot their mark. The withdrawal of the con- suls might be resorted to if it were done by the five jointly, but he doubted very much that it would produce any effect. A block- ade would be ineffectual. Mehemet Ali, he believed, had very few merchant vessels which could be seized, and Ibrahim, even though his communications by sea with Egypt were cut off, could secure supplies by advancing. 14 September 27, 1839, Palmerston con- versed again on the subject of the affairs of the Levant with the French Ambassador. At that time the latter presented a plan of settlement which he declared his government was willing to accept. 15 According to that plan Mehemet Ali would evacuate Adana and he would hold Crete in tenure for life only, but all the other territories which he occupied would be given to him in full hereditary possession. Mehemet Ali was becoming very strong and it was necessary to secure peace immediately, Sebastian! ex- plained. The settlement proposed by the French, he argued, would "Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 354- 356. Soult, it appears, did urge the Pasha to abandon part of his demands. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 140-141. "Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 10, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 366-370. "At an earlier date Sebastiani had suggested to Palmerston, on his own responsibility and without Soult's knowing of it, that Syria should be divided between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. The line of division, he suggested, should be drawn from the coast at Beyrout through Damascus. When Soult learned of the French Ambassador's suggestion he refused to agree to it. See, Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 23, 1839, Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 27, Oct. 4, 1839, ibid., pp. 395-397, 398-400, 412-414. 45 I ] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 125 strengthen the Sultan, for Mehemet AH would be satisfied and would always be ready to defend his overlord. 16 The British Minister of Foreign Affairs, as the French should have foreseen, was not in a mood even to consider such a proposal as the one which was made to him by Sebastiani on September 27. On September I, almost as soon as he perceived that France was unwilling to take steps of coercion against the Viceroy, he wrote to Bulwer: " ' . . . anxious as we are to continue to go on with them [the French], we are not at all prepared to stand still with them. . . . " 'They must therefore take their choice between three courses : either to go forward with us, and honestly redeem the pledges they have given to us and to Europe; or to stand aloof and shrink from a fulfilment of their own spontaneous declarations; or, lastly, to go right about and league themselves with Mehemet Ali, and em- ploy force to prevent us and those other Powers who may join us from doing that which France herself is bound by every principle of honour, and every enlightened consideration of her real interests, to assist us in doing, . . . ' " 17 Instead of adopting the plan which Sebastiani suggested to him, Palmerston replied with a counter project. The British government was willing, he an- nounced to the Frenchman, to add to the hereditary investiture of Egypt in favor of the Viceroy, the possession equally hereditary of the Pashalic of Acre, exclusive of the fortress. But, he added, it must be on condition that the King's government will accept "its share of action in constraining Mehemet Ali should he refuse the conditions offered." 18 Unfortunately, Sebastiani forwarded to Soult the facts concern- ing the proposal Palmerston had made to him in the same des- patch in which he revealed that the British Cabinet had rejected the plan suggested by the Imperial Court of Russia. The Mar- "Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 28, 1839, ibid., pp. 404-406. The French hoped to win the support of Austria to their views. See Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 30, Sept. 13, 1839; Beauvale to Palmerston, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., pp. 354-356, 380-381, 424. Undoubtedly the French Ministers were led to believe by their reports from Cochelet that Mehemet Ali would not accept less favorable terms. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 143-144. 17 Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. I, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 297. See also, Sebastiani to Soult, Sept. 5, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp. 546-550. "Sebastiani to Soult, Oct. 3, 1839, ibid., p. 554. 126 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [452 shal, whose belief that the English government would never go to the extreme of allying itself in the Levant with Russia 19 was thereby strengthened, and who was urged on constantly by the French press to defend Mehemet Ali, 20 replied to Sebastiani, Oc- tober 14, 1839: "'The King's government, after having weighed maturely the objections of the Cabinet of London [to the French proposal], feels bound to persist in the views which I have already communicated to you on the basis of a settlement of the affairs of the East. If our own interests alone were concerned, we might make concessions in favor of our desire to bind more closely our alliance with England; but the question is not of that nature; it consists solely in determining conditions which, while combining in just measure the rights of the Sultan and the future security of his throne with the pretensions of Mehemet Ali, may tend to the pacification of the Ottoman Empire. We feel convinced that the proposals of the British Cabinet could not attain this end, and that, rather than submit to them, Mehemet Ali, who would see in them his ruin, would plunge into the chances of a resistance less dangerous to himself but more embarrassing and compromis- ing for Europe. . . . We should decline driving him to this course, even though we felt absolutely certain that our refusal would be the signal for a close alliance between England and Russia. For- tunately this certainty is far from existing; the reasons which have once already caused the failure of such a strange combination subsist in all their strength. I do not believe they can escape the penetration of Lord Palmerston, and I know positively that some of his colleagues are very deeply impressed by them. Finally, if, contrary to all appearances, this combination should be realized, without doubt we should lament it as the rupture of an alliance to which we attach much value; but we should apprehend little from its immediate effects, because a coalition contrary to the nature of things, and condemned beforehand, even in England, by public "Ibid., p. 365. ""Note the following: "The desperate fidelity with which the French press clings to its ancient possession Egypt, should not be lost sight of in the arrangement of the dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali." The Times, Oct. 21, 1839. See also ibid., Sept. 19, Oct. 23, 1839. 453] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 127 opinion, 21 would necessarily be tainted with impotence.' " 22 Palmerston listened with the " 'most earnest attention' " when Sebastiani revealed to him the contents of this despatch and after the latter had finished speaking he replied: " 'I announce to you, in the name of the Council, that the concession which we had agreed to of a "portion of the Pashalic of Acre is withdrawn.' " 23 It is evident that when Soult and his colleagues decided to favor openly the cause of Mehemet Ali they realized that such a course would tend to occasion suspicion at the other European courts in regard to their intentions. A report drawn up by Granville, October 25, 1839, soon after his return to Paris, is significant in- deed in this connection. The French government, he wrote, stated that if it were supposed that it had any desire to aggrandize the Pasha of Egypt such supposition was groundless. France would be willing even, if it were possible, to restore "Egypt itself" to the Sultan. 24 The question, however, was not what was desirable but what was feasible. France did not see "the means of driving Mehemet Ali out of Syria." She could not furnish a military force "See, in this connection, editorials in ibid., Oct. 25, Nov. 14, 1839. 22 Soult to Sebastiani, Oct. 14, 1839, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 365-366. See also, Bulwer to Palmerston, Oct. 7, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 417-419. It was significant of the divergent courses upon which the two governments were embarked that, almost at the same time, Admiral Roussin was recalled from Constantinople, and Colonel Campbell from Alexandria the Frenchman because of his hostility to, and the Englishman because of his sympathy with Mehemet Ali. The former was succeeded by Admiral Pontois and the latter by Colonel Hodges. See, Hall, op. cit., p. 257. Palmerston to Hodges, Sept. 27, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 401. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 162-164. "Sebastiani to Soult, Oct. 18, 1839, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 366-367. See also Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 29, 1839. Levant Correspond- ence, I, pp. 458-462. At the same time when England and France were failing to agree upon a plan of solution for the Turco-Egyptian question, Mehemet Ali was being encouraged by Cochelet's activities to persist in all of his de- mands, and the Ottoman ministers were being directly encouraged by the representatives of England, Austria, and Russia to persist in refusing to carry on any negotiations whatsoever with the Viceroy. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 167, 169 ff. "Soult, it seems, was always anxious to make it appear that his govern- ment entertained no partiality in favor of Mehemet Ali. See ibid., pp. 102- 103, 176. 128 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [454 for that purpose; England was not prepared to send an army to the Levant; nor were Austria and Prussia able to do so. There- fore, measures of coercion could be undertaken by Russia only, and the moral power of the Sultan would be far more seriously impaired by having his Empire and his capital protected by the Muscovites than by the undue aggrandizement of his vassal. 25 After the total rout of the Turkish army and the surrender of the fleet by the Capitan Pasha, Marshal Soult explained upon- a later occasion, the position of affairs was entirely changed. ". . . we had to consider," he declared, "what it was possible to do, as well as what arrangement it was desirable to effect. The French Gov- ernment is not disposed to deny, that the arrangement proposed by the British Government, if it could be carried into effect, affords a better security to the Turkish Empire than the arrangement proposed by France; but we have not the means of compelling Mehemet Ali to evacuate Syria, and we must not vouloir Vimpos- sible." A naval blockade, he emphasized, could not effect that object. Russia alone could send troops, and her occupation of Constantinople and Asia Minor would be a "far more irrecover- able blow" to the independence of the Sultan than if all the terri- tories occupied by the Egyptians were conceded to the administra- tion of Mehemet Ali. 26 Lord Palmerston, it appears, was unmoved by the French contentions. Influenced by the reports which he received relative to discontent existing within the domains of the Viceroy, 27 he re- "Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 457. On Oct. 21, 1839, Granville wrote to Palmerston: "[At the French foreign office] I found with regret, that the language of the Marshal manifested a less anxious desire to act in union and concert with Her Majesty's Government, than appeared in his communications with me on his first undertaking the duties of Minister for Foreign Affairs." Soult spoke, Granville reported, of Mehemet Ali as having an army 150,000 strong and a fleet of 20 sail of the line. Ibid., pp. 436-437- "Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 18, 1839, ibid., pp. 489-490. "Note the following extract from a despatch, Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct. 16, 1839: "The reports from the Consuls in Syria, which go home, and other information I have received all show how little solid power the Egyptians have; and a report from the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria to the Inter- nuncio, which I have read, . . . , gives an account from Alexandria of a similar state of things." Ibid., p. 473. See also Young to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1839; Werry to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1839; Ponsonby to Rechid, Oct. 25, 1839: 455] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 129 fused to believe that the latter could offer any serious resistance to a European force. On November 22, 1839, he wrote to Gran- ville: "With respect to the notion, that the Five Powers acting in union with the Sultan, have not the means of compelling the Pasha of Egypt to evacuate Syria, that opinion is one which it can scarcely be worth while seriously to argue; the disparity of forces between the two parties . . . being so infinitely great, that resistance on the part of the Pasha must necessarily be vain." Furthermore, Great Britain could not agree, he continued, that Russian assist- ance to the Sultan, if given in pursuance of a concert between the five allied Powers, would necessarily occasion favors or concessions from Turkey to Russia that would be injurious to the former's independence. 28 In the meantime Baron Brunnow had returned to his former post at Stuttgart and had communicated to the Court of St. Petersburg the full particulars concerning his mission to the Court of St. James. 29 The Tsar and his Cabinet received Brunnow's reports with real satisfaction. "The Emperor has been well pleased," Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff, October 8, 1839, "... If the plan of Lord Palmerston is adopted the Anglo- French alliance is ipso-facto dissolved and is replaced, in the affairs of the Orient, by an accord between the two Imperial Courts and England. . . . For myself, I avow to you that I should like very much the plan of Lord Palmerston." 30 The letter from which this extract has been copied was written after Nicholas and his Chancellor had read the first despatch which Brunnow had forwarded to them after his arrival in England. When they re- ceived his final reports they were still far from being dissatisfied. They were aware that the kind of a settlement which the French Laurin to Stunner, Oct. 15, 1839, ibid., pp. 414-415, 415-416, 484-485, 486. The reports which the French government received from the East were contradictory to these. See, Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 25, Dec. 6, 1839, ibid., pp. 500, 514. "Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 22, 1839, ibid., pp. 490-491. "While Baron Brunnow was returning to Stuttgart, he met Metternich at Johannisberg, on the Rhine, and succeeded, it seems, in convincing him that the Russian plan for the settlement of the question of the Near East was sound. Goriainow, op. cit., p. 73. Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 102. King of Belgians to Victoria, Oct. 24, 1839, Queen Victoria's Letters, I, pp. 189-191. *Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Oct. 8, 1839, Nesselrode, op.cit.,\ll, pp. 288-289. I3O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [456 government wished was not in conformity with their own desires. 31 Seeing in the proposals of Lord Palmerston the means of realizing the essential parts of their program as well as an opportunity for the destruction of the troublesome Anglo-French alliance, they determined immediately to agree to them. Accordingly they so instructed Brunnow and ordered him to return to. Great Britain where he should negotiate with the view of concluding a conven- tion on the basis of the English conditions. 32 It would have been very difficult for the Cabinet of St. Peters- burg to adopt a policy which would have been more satisfactory to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. " ' . . . The Russian government agrees,' " he stated on December 6, 1839, " 'to our proposal about the Dardanelles, and is willing that if a Russian force shall enter the Bosphorus, ships of war of all the other co- operating Powers shall enter the Dardanelles. . . . This will give us a pull upon France, and will enable us to carry our own views into execution about Turkey and Egypt; for Austria and Prussia will side with us and Russia; and France if she stands aloof, will be left to herself.' " 33 The French Cabinet, on the other hand, was both surprised and disturbed. Marshal Soult and his colleagues had not expected to see Russia abandon her privileged position in regard to Turkey by admitting that French, English, and Austrian ships of war might appear simultaneously with her own in the waters before Con- M The Brunnow missions have often been explained as having been occasioned by Russia's desire to separate England and France. At the time Nesselrode claimed that his advances to England were made because of the similarity in British and Russian views upon Levant affairs. It is probable that some truth lies with each of these contentions. See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 19, Dec. 20, 1839, ibid., pp. 292, 297. Clanricarde to Palmerston, Oct. 18, Nov. 5, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 458, 482. According to Hasenclever, Nesselrode maintained in a report to the Tsar that the Brunnow mission was prompted by fear lest France, England, and Austria should unite in an alliance to guarantee the integrity and the independence of the Ottoman Empire. It is Hasenclever's contention that Brunnow was sent on his first mission to London merely to feel out the British position. If his mission was directed against anyone it was against Metternich. See Hasenclever, op. c\t., pp. 82-85. "Clanricarde to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839; Nesselrode to Kisseleff, Nov. 10/22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 503, 504-505. "Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 6, 1839, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 305-307. 45?] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 Ijl stantinople. 34 Less than two weeks before it became known in western Europe that Russia was ready to concede all that Lord Palmerston demanded, Marshal Soult had declared in a despatch written to Sebastiani that France had had in view principally the European side of the question. England, he complained, had been too much engrossed with considerations relative to the respective positions of the Porte and of the Viceroy. France had aimed, above all, to abolish the exclusive and predominant protectorship which Russia was beginning to impose upon the Porte, or at least to prevent that protectorship from finding in the current crisis a new occasion for its exercise and its legalization. England had at first appeared to pursue the same object, but, he feared, she had since "somewhat lost sight of these views." 36 The news which soon arrived unexpectedly from the Muscovite capital seemed to prove that Soult's suspicions in regard to the intentions of Russia were without foundation. The French Cabinet thereby lost its leading argument against the ideas and plan of Lord Palmerston. 36 The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, adopting the only logical course which remained open to him, instructed Sebastiani, De- cember 9, 1839, to convey to the English Ministers his satisfaction at the unlocked for concessions on the part of Russia. "We may now," he said, "at last hope for a return to the true path; . . . if the overtures of Russia are such as they have been described to you, if they contain nothing more, nothing at least that can change their bearing, I am ready to authorize you to accede to them formally. I even go farther; the King's government, acknowledg- ing with its accustomed loyalty, that a convention entered into on such a basis would change materially the aspect of affairs, would find in it a sufficient motive to reconsider the whole of the Eastern question, even with regard to the points on which each of the Powers seemed to have formed its opinion so absolutely that pro- "Guizot, op. clt., IV, p. 369. * 5 Soult to Sebastiani, Nov. 25, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 507-510. The Russian government protested loudly when it learned about this despatch. See Nesselrode to Brunnow, Dec. 20, i839/Jan. i, 1840; Nesselrode to Medem, Dec. 26, 1839, ibid., pp. 545-547, 549-55 1. V "Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 369. 132 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [458 longed debate appeared impossible." 37 The French, nevertheless, continued their extensive naval preparations in the Mediterran- ean, 38 and "some days" after the despatch, a part of which has been quoted above, was written, the Marshal returned to the position of suspicion in regard to Russia which he had taken often before "to repulse the urgencies of the English Cabinet." " 'I repeat it,' " he wrote to Sebastiani, " 'all these tactics resolve themselves into two words: They [the Russians] seek to break up the Anglo-French alliance to which Europe has owed for ten years the preservation of peace. It is impossible that the Cabinet of London cannot fail to see this as clearly as we do; and as I am certain it would deplore such a result equally with ourselves . . . I feel no hesitation in calling the most serious attention of Lord Palmerston and his colleagues to this state of things.' " 39 In due course of time, Brunnow arrived at the British capital on his second mission, bringing with him an elaborately worked out plan of an arrangement, which was in harmony with British views, for the settlement of the Eastern question. The quarrel between the Porte and the Pasha, he proposed therein, should be settled definitely under the guarantee of Europe. Mehemet AH "Soult to Sebastiani, Dec. 9, 1839, ibid., p. 557. See also, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, Jan. 1903, XVIII, p. 126. "Palmerston objected strongly to the French naval preparations. See Palmerston to Granville, Dec. 10, 13, 1839; Granville to Palmerston, Dec. 9, 13, 1839, Jan. 13, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 520-521, 523, 521-522, 523-524, 554-555. Soult to Sebastiani, Dec. 9, 1839, Guizot, op. cit., IV., pp. 558-559- ^Ibid., pp. 369-370. Barante accused Prussia and Austria, as well as Russia, of desiring to see the Anglo-French alliance destroyed. See Barante to Soult, Dec. 14, 1839, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 180. It is certain that Metternich, at least, had no love for France. On April 27, 1840, he wrote to King Leopold of Belgium: "Your Majesty calls France a dangerous neighbour, and you add that what is happening there displeases you, and deserves general attention. I quite agree; but I extend the principle beyond the present to the past. France is a lost land (as far as lands can be) and a ceaseless source of misfortune for the whole of Europe. When the foundations of order are shattered in any empire, it will take more than a lifetime to restore it to equilibrium in itself and with its neighbours. . . . Yet this State continues its baleful propaganda, based upon the impulse to communicate its own misery to others in order to have equality." Quoted by E. C. Corti, Leopold I of Belgium, P- 125. 459] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 133 should receive Egypt and Syria to the fortress of Acre, 40 in hered- itary possession. All the other territories which he held he should restore to the Sultan immediately. If he refused to accept such an arrangement, measures of coercion denned by the representa- tives of the Powers at London should be employed against him. In the event of Ibrahim Pasha advancing into Asia Minor, Russia would pass the Bosphorus with troops for disembarkation and would undertake the defense of Constantinople in the name of the concert. The other Powers might then pass the Dardanelles, each with two or three ships of war, to cruise in the waters of the Sea of Marmora "between Gallipoli and the Gulf of Moudania." As soon as the object proposed was attained by the submission of Mehemet Ali, the Porte would resume full and immutable posses- sion of the right of closing the two Straits against all the flags of Europe. 41 Brunnow revealed his proposals to the British govern- ment early in January, 1840, and on the fifth day of the month Palmerston declared to Sebastian!: "'Brunnow is empowered to negotiate with the object of bringing about a permanent and defin- ite solution of the Turkish and Egyptian question, in order to en- sure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Baron Neumann has arrived from Vienna and has expressed to us that Austria is entirely with us and Russia in this important affair. I think I can say for certain that Prussia will look at matters in the same light. It only remains for us, therefore, to secure a European accord on a question which is incontestably the most important that we have had to deal with these last years. We sincerely hope that the co-operation of France will not be refused. . '" 42 40 When Palmerston discussed Brunnow's proposals with Sebastiani, Jan. 4, 1840, he declared: " 'J'ai vivement combattu cette idee [the cession of Syria to the fortress of Acre to Mehemet Ali] dans mes entretiens avec M. de Brunnow; elle compromettrait le principe: I'Egypte seule et le desert pour frontiere, voila le vrai. J'ai ramene M. de Brunnow et je suis sur de 1'adhesion des deux autres.' " Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 562. "Measures suggested by Brunnow for Settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques- tion, Jan. 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 529-531. Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840, *Guizot, op. cit., IV, pp. 559-561. "Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 5, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 258. 134 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [460 Matters, nevertheless, proceeded very slowly. The representa- tives of England, Austria, and Russia were able to agree upon the main points at issue, 43 but the plenipotentiary of Prussia was without instructions, 44 and the Ambassador of France was unable to announce what attitude his court would assume in case the other Powers resolved to employ coercive measures against the Viceroy. 45 Furthermore, before the negotiations had proceeded very far it was resolved that the final arrangement which should be concluded should be in the form of a convention between the Powers on the one hand and the Porte on the other. 46 Hence it was necessary to await the arrival of a representative from Turkey. This delay of affairs was intensely gratifying to Marshal Soult who believed that the Emperor of Russia would not author- "Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Jan. 31, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 8-9. Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 25, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 560. Beauvale reported to Palmerston, Jan. 12, 1840, that Metternich was willing even to go on without France if France refused "to go along" with the other Powers. Ibid., pp. 559-560. From April until June, 1840, the Austrians, nevertheless, did hesitate to go on without France. This was occasioned perhaps by Austrian suspicion of Russian intentions. On January n, 1840, Muhlenberg, the American representative at Vienna, wrote: "Under these circumstances [the physical weakness of Metternich] little business of any consequence can be expected to be transacted for sometime here, the Prince [Metternich] being the center from which alone light, heat and activity emanate. . . . "The Austrian Government, as you are no doubt aware, does not like the French people or the Government but there is no little jealousy entertained on the other hand towards Russia, a jealousy which is certainly not on the decline having been newly awakened by some rather imprudent publications in regard to Germany evidently emanating from Russian Agents." State Dept. Austria, I, Muhlenberg to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. n, 1840. ""On Jan. 25, 1840, Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby that the Prussian envoy expected to receive instructions soon similar to those which had been received by the plenipotentiaries of Austria and Russia. See, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 560. "Soult maintained continually that the means of coercion which the Powers proposed to employ against Mehemet would be inadequate. He wrote to Sebastiani, Jan. 26, 1840: "A moins d'abandonner le sultan a sa faiblesse, ne seraient-elles pas forcees de souffrir qu'une armee imperiale traversal 1'Asie Mineure et la Syrie pour refouler jusqu'en Egypte les soldats du vice-roi? Je ne pense pas que cette extremite put convenir a 1'Angleterre plus qu'elle ne nous conviendrait a nous-memes." Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 569. 48 The idea of having the Porte become a party to the convention was suggested by Palmerston. See Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 20, 1840, ibid., pp. 564- 568. Guichen, op. cit., p. 208. 461] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 135 ize Brunnow to bind his court by a treaty to which the Porte was a party. 47 He calculated that it would be two months before an envoy of the Sultan could arrive in London, and he seemed to re- joice, Granville reported on January 31, 1840, that the French government would not be under the immediate necessity of refus- ing or assenting to sign a convention of the five Powers in regard to the affairs of the Levant. 48 Although Louis Philippe's Minister of Foreign Affairs did not expect that the negotiators at the British capital would attain important results in the near future, he realized that the situation was a dangerous one for France. 49 The position which Palmerston had taken "disturbed and wearied" him and his colleagues. They began to fear that their cause was not being defended properly at the Court of St. James. Because of Sebastiani's "antecedents" they looked upon him as "too favorable to Turkey," and so nearly in accord with the opinions of Lord Palmerston as to be ill fitted "for the vigorous support of opposite views." He appeared to them to be neither a true representative of the French govern- ment, nor an effective interpreter of the policy for which the debates [of June and July, 1839] in the Chamber of Deputies "had established a precedent." 50 Therefore, they resolved to recall "Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 564. The French Ministers continued to believe that an alliance between England and Russia was not practicable. See an extract taken from a speech delivered by M. Villemain, the Minister of Public Instruction, in the Chamber of Deputies early in Jan., 1840. The Examiner, Jan. 12, 1840, p. 19. For addi- tional remarks made by Villemain concerning Near Eastern affairs see Journal des Debats, Jan. 12, 1840. ^Granville to Palmerston, Jan. 31, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 573-574- ^It should be noted that on Jan. 27, 1840, Sebastiani reported that Palmer- ston had replied in the affirmative to Neumann's official inquiry as to whether, in the event of the four Powers arriving at an agreement, and France with- holding her consent, the clauses of the treaty would be acted upon in spite of her abstention. See Affaires etrangeres, 654 Angleterre, Sebastiani to Soult, Jan. 27, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., pp. 258-259. 50 Guizot, op. cit., IV, p. 370. Note the following extract from a letter, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843: "... it did so happen that Sebastiani was sincerely anxious to maintain the integrity and independence of Turkey, and did not care a straw for Mehemet Ali; and that Guizot was heart and soul for Mehemet Ali, and did not care much about the dignity and inde- pendence of the Turkish empire." English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 127. 136 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [462 him, and they chose as his successor, Frangois Pierre Guillaume Guizot, who, it will be remembered, had argued eloquently on July 2, 1839, for the maintenance of the status quo in the Near East. Before Guizot departed from Paris he received instructions from Marshal Soult which revealed clearly that the main object of his mission should be to obtain from the government of England great concessions to the advantage of the Egyptian Pasha. "The King's government," Soult explained in those instructions, "has believed and still believes that, in the condition in which Mehemet Ali finds himself, to offer him less than the hereditary possession of Egypt and Syria as far as Mount Taurus, would be to expose ourselves to a refusal ... on his part which in case of need he would sus- tain by a desperate resistance the rebound of which would shake and perhaps subvert the Ottoman Empire; . . . ." 51 Before Guizot had an opportunity to attempt negotiations on the basis of the Marshal's instructions, the Soult Ministry, having sustained a parliamentary defeat on the question of granting a donation of 500,000 livres per annum to the Due de Nemours, resigned. 52 Soult and his colleagues went out of office on February 29, 1840, and their places were taken directly by a cabinet formed under the leadership of M. Thiers. In the Chamber of Deputies, January 13, 1840, Thiers had delivered a noteworthy address de- fending the Anglo-French alliance. 53 His remarks on that occasion "Instructions given by Soult to Guizot, Feb. 19, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 416. "Ibid., IV, pp. 374-375- "Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 1840. The Times, Jan. 15, 1840. Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. XVI. Blanc, op. cit., V, pp. 454-456. Concerning the Anglo-French alliance, Thiers said: "... pour moi je ne puis pas encore renoncer a cette belle et noble alliance, qui est fondee, non seulement sur la puissance matrielle mais sur la force morale des principes. Car quand nous sommes avec PAngleterre, nous ne sommes pas obliges de cacher notre drapeau, tandis que telle autre alliance qu'on nous conseille nous forcera a le cacher. Mais, d'accord avec PAngleterre, nous pouvons clever nos deux drapeaux; ils portent pour devise: Libertt modernee et Paix du monde. . . . "Eh bien! je le dis avec confiance, tous le torts ne sont pas du cote de PAngleterre, il y a eu des malentendus des deux cotes, et je suis convaincu qu'il serait facile d'aplanir les difficultes en eclair cissant quelques parties de la question, et ce serait la un grand avantage." Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 1840. See also, Boudin, Histoire de Louis Philippe, II, pp. 418-420. 463] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 137 attracted much attention and were commented upon extensively throughout both England and France. 54 An English press corres- pondent who heard the speech went so far as to declare: "It [Thiers' speech] . . . had as powerful an effect as any burst of eloquence that I ever witnessed. Thiers rose to warmth and eloquence only when treating of the English alliance. He had certainly for the moment the sentiments of the chamber against him, so much so that once or twice he raised an incipient murmur. He braved all, and overcame all, however, and none dared to lift up a voice against him. This speech is more than an effort of eloquence, it is a great and good act tending strongly to re-knit those bonds between the countries which foolish hands were daily loosening." 55 Consequently, when Thiers entered office many ex- pected that the two western Powers would come promptly to an understanding in regard to Turco-Egyptian affairs. 56 Lord Palmerston even remarked that he did not despair of finding that the opinions of the new French Ministers would "approximate more "The Constitutionnel, a. Paris paper, declared that Thier's speech was a " disco urs-ministrf." "Et, en realite, M. Thiers venait de poser sa candidature du haut de la tribune." Blanc, op. cit., V, p. 457. See also, Boudin, op. cit., II, p. 420. "The Examiner, Jan. 19, 1840, p. 35. Lamartine, who spoke in the Cham- ber of Deputies on Jan. n, 1840, favored partitioning the Turkish territories, giving Constantinople to Russia, Egypt to England, Asia Minor to France, and the coast of the Adriatic to Austria. According to his opinion, Mehemet AH was only an "ephemeral adventurer." "The high road from Asia to Europe, since the perfection of steam," he declared, "lay through Egypt and the Red Sea. Mehemet AH posted himself as the gaoler of that sea, the obstacle to prevent the communication between East and West, which England would never suffer, if it took her a century's war to put it down. By supporting Egypt, France made herself the rival of England, whilst she might remain England's friend, with more advantage." Ibid., J. Irving, The Annals of Our Time, p. 22. Journal des Debats, Jan. 12, 1840. Lamartine's ideas were condemned both by the Ministry and by the press in France. See a speech delivered by Villemain in answer to Lamartine and editorial comment thereon. Ibid., Jan. 12, 13, 1840. M See a letter from Paris, March 25, 1840. The Times, March 27, 1840. 138 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [4^4 nearly than those of their predecessors, to the views of the Four Powers." 57 Time soon revealed, however, that Thiers was no more anxious than Marshal Soult had been to defy the wrath of public opinion in France by joining those who wished to coerce the Viceroy. In instructions which he sent to Guizot he declared that it was essen- tial to gain time, to say that the French Cabinet had formed no absolute opinion or resolution, to discuss the various lines of policy, to demonstrate the inconveniences of that which Lord Palmerston was anxious to see adopted, and thus to retard a final decision. It was necessary also to hold no official relations whatever except with the English Ministers, and in this way to disengage the French government from the ties imposed on it by the note of July 27, 1839. He did not mean that France should re- cede from the obligation which she had contracted when Roussin signed the collective note, but he hoped that in the presence of incessant difficulties attending a concert between the five Powers, the Sultan and the Pasha would come finally to an agreement between themselves, 58 or rather, that from being tired of the question, the Powers would accept and guarantee to the Porte and its vassal, "the maintenance of the status quo; which, according to his [Thiers'] opinion, was the best of the combinations." 59 "Palmerston to Beauvale, March 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 600-603. Annual Register, 1840, p. 491. On March 9, 1840, Granville had written to Palmerston: "M. Thiers then proceeded to say, that whatever turn affairs might take in the East, there was no danger of firing of cannon between our fleets; he hoped that the. two Governments might arrive at a concordance of opinion in the Turco-Egyptian Question, but even should they not agree upon the measures to be pursued, such disagreement would not affect the friendly relations between the two countries." Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 598-599. See also, Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 128. ra At a later date, June, 1840, the British suspicioned rightly that Thiers was secretly encouraging the Sultan and the Pasha to come to an agreement be- tween themselves. See, Hall, op. cit., pp. 269-272. Letters from Constantinople, June 27, 1840, The Times, July 20, 30, 1840. M Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 64. On April 25, 1840, Thiers wrote to Barante: " 'En resume le gouvernement du Roi est pret a negocier. II ne consentira, il est vrai, a entrer dans aucune conference, dans aucune deliberation commune et formelle, parce qu'il croit qu'il pourrait en sortir de nouvelles complications. II ne fait aucune proposition, il ne prend aucune initiative, mais si le project de transaction qui avait etc mis en avant, et qui consistait a donner a Mehemed AH, 465] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 139 It did not take long for Lord Palmerston to perceive that the hopes which he had entertained in regard to the policies of Louis Philippe's new ministers would not be realized. 60 They continued the naval preparations in the Mediterranean which had been begun while Marshal Soult was in office and that was particularly distasteful to the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. 61 " 'The truth is,' " the latter wrote on April 16, 1840, " 'however reluctant one may [be to] avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe 62 is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed. However, there he is, and we call him our ally; only we ought to be enlightened by experience and not to attach to his assertions or professions any greater value than really belongs to them; more especially when, as in the case of Egypt, 63 his words are not only at variance with moyennant la retrocession d'Adana, de Candia et des villes Saintes 1'investiture hereditaire de la Syrie et de 1'Egypte, si ce project qu'il croit reunir, plus qu'aucun autre, les conditions de succes, etait agree par les cours alliees, il n'hesiterait pas d'user de toute son influence pour decider Mehemed AH a 1'accepter.' " Quoted by Schiemann, op. cit., Ill, p. 396, [footnote]. *In a conversation with Granville, March 13, 1840, Thiers took up the same line of argument which Soult had pursued. It was a matter of indiffer- ence to the French government, he claimed, whether or not Mehemet Ali re- tained Syria, but he was persuaded that the coercive measures which the Powers proposed to use against the Pasha would fail and that the attempt would entail evils of far greater magnitude than any that could be apprehended from Egyptian occupation of the disputed territory. At the same time he declared also that no ministry in France, however composed, could act hostilely against Egypt for the purpose of restoring the pashalic to the direct authority of the Porte. Granville to Palmerston, March 13, 20, April 3, 1840, Levant Corres- pondence, I, pp. 603-604, 605-606, 617. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 128. "Palmerston to Granville, March 5, May 5, 1840; Granville to Palmerston, March 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 597-598, 644-646, 598-599. "By the name "Louis Philippe," Palmerston probably meant the French government. It is true, however, that he was particularly hostile to the French King. See Palmerston to Granville, April 23, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 311-312. "See also, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 42-43. The attitude of France in regard to Egypt disturbed other Englishmen besides Lord Palmerston. The following is an extract from a letter published in The Examiner: "England holds rank as a first rate power by her Eastern empire, and quick and sure communication and connection with that empire has become an object of vital necessity. If France would deny us this, France is our enemy, our gratuitous and self-made enemy. War with her becomes inevitable, sooner or later, and it comes better when all the powers are leagued against her, than when she shall have had time to detach one of them from the group." The Examiner, April 5, 1840, p. 212. I4O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [466 his conduct, but even inconsistent with each other. The Cabinet have determined that we must without delay bring the French to a clear and definite arrangement about their fleet; unless they will reduce their ships in commission to ten the number which Soult stated to you in July last as the intended amount of the French active force, we must go down to Parliament and ask for an additional vote upon the specific ground of the unexplained armament of France.' " 64 During the month of March, 1840, Guizot had conferences frequently with Palmerston and other members of the British Cabinet. 65 The question of the Near East was often the subject of conversation at those conferences and, although some of Palmer- ston's colleagues were very anxious to avoid measures which might occasion a break between England and France, Guizot realized, ere long, that it would be difficult to induce the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs to modify his plans. " 'I am now convinced,' " he reported to Thiers, March 12, " 'that Lord Palmerston has no intention of doing or deciding anything until the arrival of the Turkish plenipotentiary. We have therefore time [before us]. But I must even now observe to your Excellency that this advan- tage would become a danger perhaps should we suffer ourselves to suppose that, because he does nothing now, he will do nothing later, and that we shall be definitely released from taking a resolu- "Palmerston to Granville, April 16, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 310-311. Two days before Palmerston wrote this letter, Thiers declared in the Chamber of Peers: "La France croit que les provinces conquises par le pacha sont plus utilement, placees dans ses mains que dans celles du Sultan. Car la Syrie, par exemple, exposerait le Sultan a depenser beaucoup d'hommes et d'argent pour administrer une province qui finirait par lui echapper, tandis que, laissee dans les mains du Pacha, celui-ci en tirera assez d'argent et d'hommes pour la bien gouverner." Journal des Debats, April 15, 1840. See also Parl. Debates, LIV, p. 782. Granville to Palmerston, April 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 628. *Guizot, in his Memoires has described at length his early proceedings at London. See, Guizot, op. cit., V, chapters XVII and XVIII. Guizot learned at one of his early conferences with Palmerston about two drafts already prepared for an arrangement to conclude the Turco-Egyptian question. These two drafts, one of British and the other of Continental perhaps Austrian origin, according to Guizot, were similar except that the latter was to be signed by the repre- sentatives of the great Powers alone while the former was to be signed by the representatives of the Porte as well as by those of the Powers. In both, Mehemet Ali was to be denied the possession of Syria. See ibid., pp. 44-45. 467] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 14! tion because we are not pressed to do so immediately. The more I observe, the more I satisfy myself that the British Cabinet considers the circumstances as favorable for settling the affairs of the East, and wishes seriously to take advantage of them. It would much prefer to act in concert with us; [and] it is disposed to make concessions to establish that concert. Nevertheless, if, on our part, we do not decide on something positive, if we appear to desire only to adjourn and convert all difficulties into impossibil- ities, a moment may arrive, I think, when, . . . the British Cabinet would act without us and with others rather than not act at all.' " 66 Meanwhile, the Porte, conforming with the suggestion which Palmerston, in his despatch of January 25, 1840, had directed Ponsonby to make to it, ordered Nouri Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, to proceed to London. It was not the inten- tion of the Porte that Nouri should be its permanent agent at the conference of the Powers, for it was anxious to be represented by an abler person who, "coming direct from Constantinople, would be better informed as to the state of affairs in the East and more capable of enlightening the western diplomats as to the chances of success" which various proposals might have. The mission of the Turkish Ambassador residing in France was to continue only until such a personage could be sent to succeed him. 67 April 7, 1840, soon after his arrival at the British capital, Nouri forwarded to the representatives of the five great Powers notes similar in character, informing them that he had power to con- clude a convention for the settlement of the Turco-Egyptian question. 68 The Sultan expected, he intimated, that such a con- vention would be drawn up on the basis of his [the Sultan's] offer to grant the hereditary possession of Egypt to Mehemet Ali provided that the Viceroy would restore to him the Ottoman fleet and evacuate all of the other provinces which he [the Viceroy] "Ibid., pp. 59-60. King Louis Philippe believed that Guizot's fears were groundless. See an extract of a letter, Baudrand to Guizot, March 30, 1840, quoted by ibid., pp. 61-62. "Ibid., pp. 87-88. w lt is doubtful if Nouri Effendi had been granted as much power as he claimed. See ibid., p. 75. Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 137-138. 142 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [468 was then holding. 69 Guizot replied the following day by a brief acknowledgment in which he stated to the Ottoman plenipoten- tiary that he would lay the note before his home government. 70 Lord Palmerston and the envoys of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, on the other hand, answered the notes which Nouri had written to them by statements almost identical, expressing a willingness to concert with His Excellency in order to discover the best means of realizing the "friendly intentions" which the representatives of the five Powers had manifested in the name of their respective courts, by the collective note of July 27, iSjQ. 71 In the interval which had elapsed while the negotiations were being delayed because of the absence of a Turkish envoy, the government of Berlin had finally sent instructions to von Biilow, its minister at Queen Victoria's Court, ordering him to follow a policy in conformity with the one which had been adopted by Austria. 72 Consequently, when Nouri Effendi arrived in London and announced that he was empowered to negotiate on the basis favored by Palmerston and Brunnow, it appeared as though France was the only Power which stood in the way of an im- mediate settlement. "' ... all the world is at the feet of England,' " Guizot wrote to the Due de Broglie, April 7, 1840; " 'all the world offers to do what she pleases; we alone say no, we who call ourselves her par- ticular friends. And it is in the name of our friendship, to main- tain our alliance that we ask her not to accept what all the others offer. We are in the right, but we are not accommodating.' " 73 Thiers also, it appears, perceived that the four Powers were *"Nouri Effendi to Palmerston, April 7, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 624-625. Nouri Effendi to Guizot, April 7, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 420-423. Ibid., p. 76. M Guizot to Nouri Effendi, April 8, 1840, ibid., p. 424. At first Thiers was so dissatisfied with Noun's note that he ordered Guizot to make no additional reply. Later he permitted him to make an evasive one. See ibid., pp. 76-78. Guizot to Nouri Effendi, ibid., p. 425. n lbid., pp. 77, 424-425. Palmerston to Nouri Effendi, April n, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 627. M See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Feb. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 605. "An extract from a letter quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 52-53. See also, Guizot to Dumon, April 7, 1840, De Witt, Lettres de M. Guizot a sa Famille et a ses amis, pp. 186-188. 469] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 143 united upon the principles involved in regard to the Turco- Egyptian question and that France was in danger of being iso- lated, for about the middle of April, when it was proposed to him that there should be established in London a formal conference of the five Powers to consider and determine what measures should be adopted to settle the Eastern affair, he refused to be a party to such a conference, stating that if it should be decided there to drive Mehemet Ali out of Syria, France would refuse to assist in carrying out such measures, and her refusal to join in them after she had been a party to the conference would render her separation from the other Powers a more marked step than it would be if no conference of the five were to take place. 74 Many writers have criticised Thiers for adopting such an un- compromising attitude. Those criticisms are, to a large extent at least, unjust. The policy followed by the administration of Mar- shal Soult, to which Thiers fell heir, and the temper of the French people placed him in a position from which there was no other safe nor creditable escape. 75 Because of the existing circumstances it was imperative that he should refuse to cooperate with the other Cabinets of Europe if they should attempt to coerce Mehemet Ali. It is certain that if he had joined with Lord Palmerston and his allies on the basis of the Anglo-Russian terms his official career would have ended immediately. He maintained always that the amount of territory which the Pasha should receive would matter little to him if the latter would accept it willingly, and it is prob- able that he was sincere in this contention. While he was declar- ing to the representatives of the Powers that France would not join them in coercing the Pasha, he was at the same time writing to Cochelet directing him to warn Mehemet Ali to be more moderate in his demands. 76 Indeed, in one of his despatches to the French Consul-General at Alexandria he even enjoined him "to make it clearly understood by Mehemet Ali," that France "Granville to Palmerston, April 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 628-629. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English Historical Review, XVIII, pp. 128-129. 75 See Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 313. 7a Granville to Palmerston, April 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 630. 144 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [470 would not "sacrifice its alliance with England to the interests of the Pasha." 77 Although in April, 1840, the governments of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were agreed upon the main principles which were involved in the question of the Near East, they were not ready to sign a convention to which France would not be a party. Austria and Prussia particularly were anxious that the concert of Europe should be complete. " 'All we desire,' " von Billow de- clared to Guizot, early in April, 1840, "... 'is that France should not separate from the other Powers in this matter; this is nearly the only instruction I have received from my sovereign. Can we not find some middle course which may preserve to all parties their old engagements and personal situations, and form the basis of a pacific settlement between the Sultan and the Pasha? It is necessary to seek for varied combinations, for some trifling concessions on all sides, some modifications in the form or quality of the Pasha's dominion, in a word, a ground somewhat new on which we may unite.' " 78 The attitude which Baron Neumann, the Austrian representative, assumed in his conversations with Guizot was of a similar character. On April 15, some days after von Biilow made the statement quoted above, he intimated to the Frenchman that even all Syria might be given to Mehemet AH for life if France would join with the other Powers. 79 When Guizot replied that the King's government, on its own account, attached little importance to the distribution of territory between the two parties; that it earnestly desired that the transaction should be acceptable to both; but that nothing authorized it to believe that the Pasha would be disposed to give way on the heirship of Syria, 80 the Austrian continued: "'My government is as anxious as yours for the maintenance of peace in the East; . . . what "Granville to Palmerston, May i, 1840, ibid., p. 644. At a later date, Tillers, while speaking to Bulwer of the attitude which he maintained in regard to Mehemet AH, declared: "'In short,' ... 'to you I speak in his favour, but to himself I argue in favour of Turkey.' " Bulwer to Palmerston, July 17, 1840, ibid., II, p. 7. "Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 78-79. This statement was made by von Billow during an interview which he had with Guizot "Des qu'on avait su Nouri- Effendi arrive a Londres, et avant la remise de sa note." See ibid., p. 78. "Two days earlier, April 13, von Billow had likewise intimated that Syria might be left to Mehemet Ali for life. See ibid., pp. 79-81. "Ibid., pp. 81-82. a00,, 47l] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 145 we consider important is, that there should be a really effective settlement, and this cannot take place unless we all fall into the same view. The Emperor, my master, and the King of Prussia equally, desire this.' " 81 In truth, the government of Austria was alarmed considerably by the situation of affairs. On April 25, 1840, Prince Metternich forwarded to Neumann a memoir in which he discussed the means that the four Powers would have at their disposal to coerce Mehemet AH in case France refused to cooperate with them. He had no intention, he let it be known, of allowing Aus- trian troops to be employed in the East; Prussia was not inter- ested sufficiently in the terms of the settlement to be enforced upon the Pasha to cause her to do so; and England, he believed, had no land forces which would be available for such an under- taking. Russia had both an army and a navy in the region of the Black Sea. The Emperor Nicholas might be willing to send them against Mehemet AH and England and Austria could be counted upon to furnish their fleets, but it would be necessary to detach from these a naval force of considerable strength to watch the French squadron. Therefore, he concluded, it would be extremely difficult for the four courts to succeed without the cooperation of the fifth. 82 "Ibid., pp. 82-83. ^Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 429-439. Hasenclever points out that in a secret note which accompanied this memoir, or memorandum, Metternich explained that Austria was not opposed to the use of forceful means, but the latter must take the Russian standpoint strictly into account. An agreement regarding everything must be reached first to assure final success. He sharply rejected a notion advanced by Palmerston that all might be left to chance. Undoubtedly Metternich was determined to take no chances of permitting further Russian aggression against Turkey. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 144-147. See also Metternich to Apponyi, May I, 6, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 404-408. Note in particular the following extract from the despatch of May 6: ''Lord Palmerston a un travers dans 1'esprit qui 1'empeche toujours d'avoir completement raison dans une affaire quelconque. La ou son esprit marche droit dans le principe, il oublie de scruter les moyens d'execution, tandis que la ou son attitude peche par la base, il est fertile en expedients. Dans le conflit turco-egyptien, il est place droit sur la base des principes, mais ses idees sur les moyens comminatoires n'ont pas le sens commun. Je crois le lui avoir demontre par ma derniere expedition." The attitude which Austria assumed worried both Palmerston and Nesselrode. See, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 13, 1840. Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22. Palmerston to Beauvale, March 28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 610-611. 146 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [472 With the aim of winning the assistance of France, the Austrian Chancellor promptly instructed Neumann to suggest that Syria should be divided into two portions. The southern portion com- prising all of the territory south and west of a line beginning at Beyrout and extending to the northern point of Lake Tiberias; that is to say, the greater part of the Pashalic of Acre, including the fortress, should be retained by Mehemet Ali, while the re- mainder of Syria, forming the second or northern portion should be surrendered to the Sultan. The Austrian envoy at London explained this proposal to Guizot, May 5, 1840, and remarked that if Mehemet Ali rejected it, Austria, though unwilling to fur- nish troops, would be disposed to unite her flag to those of England and Russia in the employment of means of maritime constraint. . . . Lord Palmerston, whom he had interviewed on the preceding evening, appeared to be determined, he declared, to push matters to that end, even though the execution should be left to England alone. 83 Three days later when Guizot himself conversed with Palmerston, he found him willing to agree to the Austrian proposal. "The surrender of the fortress of St. Jean d'Acre," Guizot wrote in his Memoires, "he [Palmerston] evi- dently considered a painful sacrifice; for which he consoled him- self by telling me, what I knew already, that, to effect this arrange- ment and in case of the Pasha's refusal, Austria agreed to partici- pate in coercive measures by joining her flag to those of England and Russia. He then detailed his plan of compulsion, which con- sisted in a triple blockade of Alexandria, of the coasts of Syria and of the Red Sea. He seemed satisfied that such a blockade, obstinately prolonged, if requisite, would force the Pasha to sub- mit, without any necessity of a campaign by land or of employing Russian troops. 84 He was, he said to me, quite determined to follow up this plan rigorously if the new bases for an arrangement 83 Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 85-86. Palmerston to Granville, July 21, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 8-10. "Palmerston's opinion probably was based on the reports he had received from the British agents in the East. On Dec. 29, 1839, Ponsonby had written: "I have long believed that a British maritime force, acting in conjunction with the Sultan's flag on the coast of Syria, cutting off the communication with Alexandria, and closing that port, would paralyse the whole body of Mehemet Ali's power." Ibid., I, p. 557. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 3, 1840; Moore to Ponsonby, Feb. 21, 1840, ibid., pp. 609, 610. 473] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 147 were not accepted. ... I confined myself to persevering in the system which I had previously advocated, saying that I already had transmitted these new overtures to the King's government, that I waited its answer, and that, under all circumstances, it would require time in order to consider whether the success of such an arrangement could be brought about by pacific measures, the only course of proceeding it considered practicable and effectual." 85 The government of France was destined to have ample time for debate as to the resolution which it should take in answer to the proposal just mentioned, for the approaching arrival of Chekib Effendi, the representative whom the Porte was sending from Constantinople, was announced directly at the British capital and as a result the deliberations upon Eastern affairs were suspended until his appearance. While the diplomats waited thus, other affairs, much less weighty, but still of considerable momentary interest, became the principal objects of attention and negotiation between Paris and London. 86 One of these was the so-called "sulphur dispute" be- tween England and the Kingdom of Naples. In the month of March, 1840, the British government had protested against the monopoly of the trade in the sulphur products of Sicily which King Ferdinand was attempting to establish. 87 Instead of complying with Great Britain's demands, Ferdinand began to make elaborate preparations for the defense of his realm. A camp was formed near Reggio, a general levy of the reserves was decreed, an army of over 10,000 men was ordered to be embarked for Sicily, and the King himself, it was said, was on the point of assuming per- sonally the defense of that island. 88 When the British government learned of the defiant attitude of the Italian Prince, it directed Admiral Stopford to blockade the coast and to seize and send to Malta such Neapolitan merchant vessels as he could capture. 89 Thiers, seeing in this situation an opportunity to better the feel- ings which existed between England and France, resolved to "Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 86-87. "Ibid., pp. 87-88. "'Hall, op. at., p. 264. **The Times, April 15, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 89-90. "Ibid., p. 93. 148 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [474 suggest to the two parties that he should act as mediator between them. On April 12, 1840, he communicated his offer to do so to M. Guizot, whp in turn presented it to Lord Palmerston. The lat- ter accepted the interposition of the French without delay. 90 King Ferdinand did likewise but approximately two and a half months elapsed before the affair was settled completely. 91 The question of the restoration to France of Napoleon's body was another matter which attracted the attention of diplomats at London and Paris in May, 1840. " The King consents to trans- port the remains of Napoleon from St. Helena to the Invalides, in Paris,' " Thiers wrote to Guizot, May 4. " 'He is as anxious on this point as I am, and that is not speaking lightly. The consent of the English Cabinet must be obtained. I do not know how it can be honorably withheld. ... If England gives us what we require, she will set the seal of her reconciliation with France; the entire past of fifty years will be abolished; the effect, in her favor, in France will be enormous. It is under this point of view that the matter must be proposed. A refusal on the contrary would produce an injurious impression. I do not, and I cannot expect it; . . .' " 2 Thiers was not destined to be disappointed on this occasion for when Guizot brought the matter to the attention of Lord Palmerston, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs granted his consent immediately. 93 While the attention of the diplomats in western Europe was being directed momentarily from Turco-Egyptian affairs, an event which was destined to have important consequences occurred at Constantinople. That event was the dismissal of the Grand Vizier, Kosrew Pasha. Kosrew always had been an uncompromising opponent of Mehemet AH. When the latter, who had declared per- "Ibid., pp. 97-98. The Times, April 23, 24, 30, 1840. M See, Thiers to Granville, July 5, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, July 7, 1840; Palmerston to Guizot, July 7, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 426-429. "Ibid., pp. 106-108. K Ibid., pp. HI-II2, Irving, op. cit., p. 25. On May 13, Palmerston wrote to his brother William: "'The French Government have asked us for leave to bring over from St. Helena the remains of Bonaparte, and we have given them permission to do so. This is a thoroughly French request, but it would have been foolish in us not to have granted it; and we have therefore made a merit of doing so readily and with a good grace.'" Palmerston to Temple, May 13, 1840. Bulwer, op. cit., Ill, p. 39. See also Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 265, 267. 475] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 149 sistently that he would not be satisfied unless he received Egypt, Syria, and Adana in hereditary possession 9 * and who must have foreseen that he would not attain his ends if he placed his trust in the mediatory efforts of the Concert of Europe, 95 had exerted himself to persuade the Ottoman government to enter into direct negotiations, 90 the Grand Vizier, seconded ably by Halil and Reschid Pashas, had refused to listen to his proposals. There was, however, a faction at Constantinople, headed by the mother of the Sultan, which advised that the Viceroy's advances should be received favorably, 97 and as the anxiety of the Porte to come to terms with its vassal had increased with the passing of time, the influence of this faction had increased in a corresponding manner. Consequently, many who were familiar with the situation at the Turkish capital looked upon the downfall of Kosrew as having been occasioned by the insidious intrigues of the Sultana Mother and her friends who were accused of being in alliance with the Pasha. 98 Those suspicions may have been false 99 but it should "See, The Times, Oct. 24, 1839. Campbell to Palmerston, Sept. 26, 1839, Werther to Palmerston, Nov. 22, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 434-435, 491. Adana, Mehemet AH maintained, was "the door to his house" which he never could be willing to surrender. Campbell to Ponsonby, Oct. 19, 1839; Medem to Nesselrode, Oct. 8/20, 1839, ibid., pp. 479-480, 503. "Col. Hodges, the British Consul-General, took special care to impress upon the Pasha that the Powers would not tolerate his pretensions. See Hodges to Palmerston, Dec. 30, 1839, Jan. 4, 6, 13, 14, 16, 23, 24, 1840, ibid., pp. 574-576, 585-589. Paton, op. cit., II, pp. 167-173. Mehemet AH was aroused greatly by the attitude which the British Consul-General assumed and he accused England of desiring to occupy Egypt in order "to make of it a station on the road to India." See, a letter from Alexandria, Jan. 17, 1840, The Examiner, Feb. 16, 1840, p. 105. Letter from Alexandria, Jan. 16, 1840, published in The Augsburg Gazette, Feb. 14, 1840, and copied in The Times, Feb. 20, 1840, and The Examiner, Feb. 23, 1840. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 219 ff. M See, Mehemet AH to Grand Vizier [no date given. Rec'd. at Constanti- nople, Sept. 24, 1839], Feb. 23, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, March II, 1840, and an Inclosure, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 431-432, 611-613, 615. Letter from Alexandria, Oct. 17, 1839, The Times, Nov. 8, 1839. 97 Ponsonby to Palmerston, Oct. I, 1839, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 434. Guichen, op. cit., p. 298. Hall, op. cit., p. 272. 98 F. 0. Turkey 405, Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 1840, cited by ibid., p. 272, Annual Register, 1840, p. [189]. M See an extract from a despatch written by Pontois to the French Cabinet, May 17, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 204. I5O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [476 be noted, nevertheless, that when Mehemet AH learned of the fall of his old enemy he declared at once to Cochelet, who had brought the first news of it to him, that the last obstacle to a satisfactory conclusion of his quarrel with the Sultan had been removed. He would, he announced, forthwith send back to his sovereign the Turkish fleet, and Sami Bey, his confidential Secretary, would pro- ceed without delay to Constantinople to make the necessary arrangements. 100 Before the news of the overthrow of Kosrew Pasha reached western Europe Chekib Effendi arrived at London. While Chekib did not know that the Grand Vizier had been dismissed, he did know that the unsettled state of affairs in the Near East was very embarrassing to the Ottoman government. He had hoped, he wrote to the representatives of the five Courts on May 31, 1840, promptly after his arrival, to find the Turco-Egyptian question solved. It was with the deepest regret that he discovered it was not, for the Turkish Empire was in a very critical position and the necessity for a solution of this question was becoming daily more urgent. The Powers, he pleaded, should redouble their "generous efforts" in order to put an end to an evil which was increasing continually and which threatened the peace of the East. 101 The diplomats at London, it appears, were convinced by Chekib's note that there was real danger in further delay. Guizot, on transmitting a copy of it to Thiers, stated : " 'If your Excel- lency . . . judges it [Chekib's note] of a nature to require new instructions, I beg you to forward them at once . . . evidently the matter is about to receive an impulse which, without perhaps leading to a definite result, will for some days at least, be strong 100 See an extract from a despatch, Cochelet to Thiers, May 26, 1840, quoted by ibid., pp. 205-206. No one perhaps was more alarmed by these developments in the Near East than Lord Ponsonby. He even threatened to resign if his advice regarding the coercion of Mehemet AH was not followed, and he sent his Dragoman, Pisani, to London to make an oral report to Palmerston upon the extremely serious situation in Turkey. See Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 153. See also F. 0. Turkey, 394, Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840, quoted in Cambridge Hist, of Br. For. Policy, II, pp. 639-640. 10I Chekib Effendi to Palmerston, May 31, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 658-660. Chekib Effendi to Guizot, May 31, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 441-443. See also, ibid., pp. 190-191. 47?] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 15! and pressing. Everyone is now convinced that there is, for the Ottoman Empire, danger in delay; . . .' " 102 Thiers, however, who even hoped that the Sultan, because of his increasing embarrassments, at length would agree to conclude a settlement direct with the Viceroy, was not alarmed by the situation of affairs in the Levant and did not believe that the French government should alter its policy. " 'I see but one course to follow,' " he wrote in reply to Guizot, " 'it is to answer this [Chekib's] note as [you did] that of Nouri Effendi. Acknowledge its reception by saying that France is ready, as ever, to listen to the proposals for settlement that may be made, and to take the part in them to which she is in some measure compelled by the friendly interest she has ever evinced towards the Porte. We must not seem to abjure the note of July 27, 1839; . . . But say nothing whatever of that deplorable engagement to terminate the Eastern question [by a concerted action] between the five [Powers].'" 103 Although the government of France did hold firmly to the position which it had maintained previously, the representatives of the four Powers did not abandon at once their hope of finding some plan of procedure in regard to Eastern affairs by which all of the five great nations of Europe might be united. Neumann and von Billow, true to the policies which they had followed in April and May, 1840, were particularly active in their search for such a plan. The former had not received, as yet, an answer to the proposal he had made to Guizot on May 5, but he must have perceived that that proposal was doomed to be rejected. At any rate he was willing to make additional concessions. " 'If Mehemet Ali must have Syria, let him have it,' " he declared to the French Ambassador, June 12, 1840, " 'not hereditarily, no, that cannot be; it would be too much opposed to the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Besides, Mehemet Ali must give up the district of Adana; the Porte requires it for its safety. But let us finish this business. I suspect that Lord Palmerston wishes to wait, to delay, that he expects that, at some later period, Ibid., p. 191. 103 Ibid., p. 208. See also, Thiers to Guizot, June II, 1840, quoted by ibid., pp. 194-195. Guizot's reply to Chekib, June 21, 1840, conformed with Thiers' instructions. See a copy of it in ibid., p. 443-444. 152 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [4/8 ... he will conclude the affair in a manner more conformable to his views. Meanwhile the mischief increases, the danger presses; it is now clear that prolonged doubt injures the Sultan more than the Pasha, and all threatens a crisis which nobody desires.' " 104 The Prussian Envoy adopted an attitude similar to that of his Austrian colleague. " 'M. de Neumann and M. de Billow/ " Guizot wrote to Thiers, June 15, 1840, "are again ready to leave to the Pasha Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life, provided that he restores Adana and Candia.' " 105 Baron Brunnow, even, Guizot believed, being anxious that the affairs of the Near East should be regulated by the Powers in concert, was ready to be more con- ciliatory in his attitude towards France. 106 Thiers hestitated. The willingness of the German diplomats to make additional concessions and the conciliatory attitude of Brunnow seemed to prove to him that ultimately he would carry his point. 107 " 'Certainly,' " he replied to Louis Philippe's Ambas- sador at London, June 19, 1840, " 'if it were agreed to yield Syria, (comma) and Egypt hereditarily to the Pasha, the five Powers would then act reasonably, and we should make great efforts to succeed. But the Pasha's head is inflated, 108 and we are sure of nothing with him.' " 109 lot lbid., p. 198. lm lbid., p. 201. 106 See an account of an interview between Brunnow and Guizot, June II, 1840, ibid., pp. 196-197. Brunnow, it seems, had received instructions from St. Petersburg urging him to speed up the negotiations. See Hasenclever, op. cit., P- 154- 107 Thiers was interested particularly in Brunnow's attitude, " 'which could only be ascribed to disasters in Circassia.' " " 'It was clear,' " he declared, " 'that Russia was not ready to embark upon serious operations elsewhere.' " Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., pp. 267-268. Thiers was probably influenced by the reports which he had received from Barante. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 290292. 108 The Viceroy, determined that his demands should be conceded, was preparing actively for war. See, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 682-683. 109 Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 201. Guizot was troubled by the comma which Thiers inserted after the word "Syria" and wrote to him asking an explanation. Thiers replied, June 30, 1840: "'Ma virgule ne signifiait rien . . . je voulais parler de 1'Egypte hereditaire et de la Syrie hereditaire.' " Ibid., p. 203. Thiers undoubtedly was led by his reports from Cochelet to believe that the Pasha would not accept less favorable terms. See Guichen, op. cit., p. 297. 479] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 153 Regardless of the fact that Baron Brunnow maintained a con- ciliatory attitude towards France while he was conversing with M. Guizot, he was determined that the final arrangement which the Powers should enter into for the settlement of the Turco- Egyptian question should be on the basis of the Anglo-Russian terms. It was preferable even, according to his opinion, to do nothing at all rather than to conclude a bad arrangement like the one which was advocated by France. 110 Palmerston's views were similar to those of the Russian Envoy Extraordinary. When the Austrian and Prussian diplomats, alarmed by the reports which they had received concerning affairs in Turkey, had talked about further concessions, he had talked about delaying and had persisted in the belief that time was " 'pour le Sultan? " 11X On June 12, 1840, after it was known at London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and after Brunnow had re- ceived instructions from St. Petersburg ordering him to speed up the negotiations, Palmerston, who then must also have been willing that matters should be hurried to a conclusion, informed Guizot that he wished to know the " 'positive opinion of the French government' " upon Neumann's proposal of May 5 to which he (Palmerston) had given his consent. 112 Guizot, hesitating to reply on his own responsibility, transmitted this request to his superiors at Paris. 113 Thiers, answering on June 16, declared: " 'We could not suggest it [Neumann's proposal] to Mehemet AH; he would refuse it, and we could not refute his arguments which we should ourselves consider to be sound and well founded.' " 114 Palmerston, undoubtedly, was not surprised to learn that the French government rejected the Austrian proposition. On June 15 he had received a despatch written by Granville on the I2th which revealed that Thiers continued to insist upon a settlement ""Vienna Archives, England 295, Neumann to Metternich, June 26, 1840, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 157, [footnote]. lu Berlin Archives, vol. II, Billow to Frederick William III, June 5, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 152, [footnote]. See also, Palmerston to Neumann, June II, 1840, quoted by Treitschke, op. cit., V. p. 74. "'Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 199-200. lbid., p. 200. U4 Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot, June 16, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., pp. 267-268. 154 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [480 which Mehemet AH would accept willingly. 115 "The arrangement which M. Thiers holds out," he remarked dryly, in his reply to Granville, . . . "is the very arrangement which has actually been in existence for the last six years." 118 At the same time when it was becoming apparent that France would not abandon her demand for a settlement which would be acceptable to the Viceroy, news from the East which aided in bringing matters to a climax, arrived at London. The announce- ment of the downfall of Kosrew Pasha was made at the British capital early in June. 117 About the middle of the month Count Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, learned from French sources that the Viceroy had declared to Cochelet, when the latter announced the dismissal of Kosrew to him, that, he would return the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan and that he would send Sami Bey upon a special mission to Constantinople. Apponyi reported this intelligence to Neumann on June 16, the same day on which Thiers forwarded to London his refusal to accept the Austrian proposal to divide Syria between Mehemet AH and the Sultan. 118 Its effect was immediate. Lord Palmerston and the three other plenipotentiaries, according to Guizot, saw in it nothing more, or at least they were determined that they had a right to see in it nothing more than an act long concerted between the Pasha and France. They looked upon the step which Mehemet AH had taken, and its success, first, as threatening the ruin of the note of July 27, 1839, and of the common action of the five Powers; and secondly, as the complete and personal triumph of France at Alexandria and Constantinople. 119 " ' . . . those who, in the hope of obtaining the common action of the five Powers,' " he wrote to U5 Granville to Palmerston, June 12, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, p. 665. "'Palmerston to Granville, June 26, 1840, ibid., pp. 666-667. "The Russians were alarmed greatly by the fall of Kosrew. See, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, June 27, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, p. 29. At London Brunnow declared to Neumann and Billow: " 'qu'a la verite, le moment pour- rait prochainement arriver, ou il aurait a annoncer que le cabinet Imperial voyant que la negociation de Londres ne mene a aucun resultat et que la crise augmente en Orient se reserve la faculte d'agir a elle seule, selon les circon- stances.' " Berlin Archives, vol. n, Billow to Frederick William III, June 19, 1840, quoted by Hasenclever, op. cit., p. 154, [footnote]. 118 Guizot to Thiers, July n, 1840, Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 212. Ibid., pp. 211-218. 481] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 155 Thiers, " 'promoted a settlement founded on the concession of Egypt in hereditary sovereignty, and Syria for life [to Mehemet AH], have paused in their endeavors, and seem to have renounced them entirely.' " 12 The despatch from which this extract has been copied was written on July n, 1840. It was not the first warning which Guizot had given to his government. As early as June 24, he had stated that " 'Lord Palmerston, profiting by the disappointed hopes and discontent of his colleagues and the other plenipotentiaries, might suddenly reengage them in his sys- tem, and induce them to adopt, all four together, his project for withdrawing Syria from the Pasha, and the employment, if neces- sary, of coercive measures.' " 121 Thiers, however, believed that his hope of seeing a direct ar- rangement concluded between the Sultan and the Pasha was about to be realized. On June 30, 1840, after he received a telegraphic despatch from Cochelet 122 which announced that Mehemet AH, true to his former promises, had ordered Sami Bey to repair to Constantinople " 'to offer to the Sultan the homage of his de- votion, and to request his orders for the return of the Turkish fleet,'" the President of the French Cabinet wrote to Guizot: " 'We must [appear to] infer from this intelligence, without too much zeal and without drawing too much attention to it, that a spontaneous arrangement . . . , between the sovereign and the vassal, would be the best of all solutions. The Pasha thinks that the impulse of feeling to which he yields will be reciprocated, and that a treaty will follow immediately. He believes . . . that the hereditary rule over Egypt and Syria will be granted to him; he says nothing with respect to Candia, Adana, [and] the Holy Cities, and when told he must make sacrifices in order to obtain an immediate [and] direct settlement, he replies: "Be at your ease, everything will be arranged." ... at Constantinople, it was thought, at the date of the latest news, that the restoration of the fleet would produce a great effect upon the Divan, and that liberal concessions might ensue . . . Such a state of affairs ought to sug- "Ibid., p. 213. 121 Guizot to Thiers, June 24, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 202. ^A telegraphic despatch from Cochelet, June 16, 1840, quoted by ibid., p. 208. 156 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [482 gest many arguments against any conclusive decision at London.' " 123 Nevertheless, Thiers did realize that it was necessary to act with caution. " 'I have written to Alexandria and to Constantinople recommending moderation on both sides/ " he mentioned in his despatch to Guizot; " 'but I have given advice only, and have been careful to restrain our agents from any participation on their own responsibility, and as a French undertaking, in a treaty hav- ing for its object this direct arrangement. Should such an attempt be imputed to us, you may deny it. Young Eugene Perier has been sent to Alexandria to remonstrate most urgently with the Pasha, if he should incline to pause, and if, after having offered the fleet, he should retract his word, and become unaccommodating in the general conditions of the treaty. I have even counseled him [Mehemet Ali] to accept Egypt hereditarily and Syria for life.' " 124 In another despatch written on June 30, 1840, Thiers remarked hesitatingly: "'I have consulted the Cabinet; they deliberate, they incline a little towards a concession. Meanwhile we shall see. Delay explaining yourself. We must wait for a short time. Noth- ing is decided.' " 125 While Thiers and Guizot were corresponding thus the repre- sentatives of the four Powers, being alarmed by the reports con- cerning developments in the Levant, and, in addition, being dis- satisfied because they believed Thiers had submitted Neumann's proposal of May 5 to Mehemet Ali before he had answered it, 126 were preparing for action. On June 21 and 28, two successive Sundays, they met secretly at Palmerston's home and came to terms about the elements of a treaty, for the rescue of the Sultan, Ibid., pp. 208-209. *Ibid., p. 210. See also, Granville to Palmerston, July 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 7. Perier arrived in Egypt July 15, 1840. Mehemet Ali refused to be influenced by his representations. See, Hodges to Palmerston, July 1 6, 23, 26, 1840, ibid., pp. 70-72, 76-77. The Times, Aug. 15, 20, 1840. m Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 203. ""On July 21, 1840, Palmerston wrote a long despatch to Granville in which he defended the policy followed by the four Powers. In that despatch he pointed out: "They [Neumann, Billow, and Brunnow] said that this [the fact referred to above] seemed to them to render any further negotiation with France on these matters impossible, because it turned out that it was not France, but Mehemet Ali, with whom the negotiation was to be carried on." Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 8-10. 483] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 157 to which France would not be a party. 127 Still, a formal decision was postponed. Before the British Minister of Foreign Affairs could sign a treaty it was necessary that he should secure the consent to it of his colleagues in the Cabinet. Many of those colleagues were un- willing that England should enter into any arrangement which might occasion a break in the Anglo-French alliance. A close understanding with the government of Louis Philippe, they be- lieved, was an essential element of Britain's foreign policy. 128 Consequently, they balked when Palmerston proposed to the Cabinet that England should join with the three Eastern Courts without France to conclude with the Porte a convention for the pacification of the Levant. Palmerston, exasperated because of the objections of his col- leagues, determined that he either would carry his point or that he would resign. " 'The difference of opinion which seems to exist between myself and some members of the Cabinet upon the Tur- kish question, and the extreme importance which I attach to that question,'" he stated to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, "'have led me, upon full consideration, to the conviction that it is a duty which I owe to myself and to my colleagues to relieve you and others from the necessity of deciding between my views and those of other members of the Cabinet on these matters, by placing, as I now do, my office at your disposal."' 129 The British Minister recapitulated, in his letter, the history of the Turco-Egyptian ques- tion, and furthermore explained why he was determined that his " 7 Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 156-160. Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 75. ^Note the following extract from Guizot's Memoires: "Parmi les collegues de lord Palmerston, lord Holland, lord Lansdowne, lord John Russell et lord Minto etaient ceux avec qui j'avais les relations les plus frequentes et les plus libres. Lord Holland, d'un esprit charmant, d'un coeur genereux et d'un caractere aussi aimable que son esprit, etait 1'ami declare de la France, 1'hote bienveillant des visiteurs frangais en Angleterre, le partisan perseverant de 1'alliance des deux pays, et il se plaisait a manifester, en toute occasion, ses sentiments . . . ce fut a Holland-House que j'allai chercher et que je trouvai les plus nobles plaisirs de la conversation et de la vie sociale. Lord Lansdowne et lord John Russell etaient moins expansifs, mais egalement sinceres dans leurs liberates et bien- villantes dispositions envers la France:" Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 50-51. See also, ibid., pp. 67-68, 191-193. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, April 13, June 27, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 19-22, 29. ""Palmerston to Melbourne, July 5, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 356 ff. 158 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [484 policy should triumph. " 'The immediate result of our declining to go on with the three Powers because France does not join us/ " he declared, " 'will be, that Russia will withdraw her offers to unite herself with the other Powers for a settlement of the affairs of Turkey, and she will again resiime her separate and isolated position with respect to those affairs; and you will have the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi renewed under some still more objection- able form. We shall thus lose the advantages on this point which it has required long-continued and complicated efforts on our part to gain, and England will, by her own voluntary and deliberate act, re-establish that separate protectorship of Russia over Turkey, the existence of which has long been the object of well-founded jealousy and apprehension to the other Powers of Europe. " 'The ultimate results of such a decision will be the practical division of the Turkish empire into two separate and independent states, whereof one will be the dependency of France, and the other a satellite of Russia; and in both of which our political in- fluence will be annulled, and our commercial interests will be sacrificed', . . .' " 13 Fortunately for the success of Palmerston's policy, several despatches from Colonel Hodges were received at London, July 5, 1840, the same day the letter, a part of which has just been quoted, was written, announcing that a revolt against the author- Ibid., pp. 359-360. See also Appendix B, and Palmerston to Melbourne, July 6, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 361-363. It is interesting, at least, that, a few days before Palmerston wrote these letters to Melbourne, an article appeared in the Morning Chronicle, Palmerston's organ, describing a project for the estab- lishment of extensive steamship communications through Egypt to India. The following is an extract from a French translation of it which appeared in the Journal des Debats, July 4, 1840: " 'On parle de la prochaine formation d'une compagnie autorise'e par une charte royale pour etablir une communication, au moyen de navires a vapeur, entre 1'Angleterre et Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan. Les experiences faites par la compagnie des Indes a Bombay ne laissent aucun doute sur la reussite du plan propose qui serait d'une importance immense pour notre commerce avec 1'Inde. ... la compagnie de navigation a la vapeur avec PInde propose d'etablir une ligne complete de communication a travers PEgypte, de 1'Angleterre a Calcutta, Madras et Ceylan; . . . Cette nouvelle compagnie se propose d'avoir un surintendant et des agens qui resideront en Egypte, pour expediar les passagers a travers PEgypte.' " 485] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 159 ity of Mehemet AH had broken out in Syria. 131 The "Maronites, the Druses, and the Mutualis" of Mount Lebanon all had taken up arms. 132 The Pasha had adopted measures to quell the dis- turbances. He was ready to offer concessions. The Maronites, Hodges believed, might be calmed for the moment, but the others "were still full of dissatisfaction." This news arriving at a most opportune time seemed to prove that Mehemet Ali would not be able to resist seriously the fulfillment of the terms which the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers proposed to enforce upon him. Ibrahim Pasha, the dissenting members of the British Cab- inet must have foreseen, would not dare to march upon Constan- tinople, for with Syria in revolt and the Mediterranean dominated by an Anglo-Austrian fleet it would be impossible for him to ad- vance and at the same time keep open his necessary communica- tions with Egypt. At any rate, all excepting Lord Holland and Lord Clarendon, the two who were opposed most violently to risking a break with France, 133 consented finally to agree to the conclusion of a treaty 134 as outlined by Palmerston and the repre- sentatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 135 Guizot, it will be recalled, had realized, when it became known at London that Kosrew Pasha had fallen and that Mehemet Ali was preparing to carry on negotiations direct with the Porte, that 131 Hodges to Palmerston, June 17, 19, 20, 1840. Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 674-677, 678-679, 680-681, 681-682. See also, Guizot to Mme. Guizot, July 22, 1840, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 199. ""These revolts, it appears, were occasioned by the attempt of the Egyp- tians to enforce conscription upon the Syrians and by the intrigues of British agents. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 680-681. Armagnac, Nezib et Beyrouth, souvenirs d" Orient, de 1833 a 1841, pp. 223-269. A. Laurent, Relation historique des affaires de Syrie, depuis 1840 jusqu'en 184.2, I, pp. 18-42. Letter from Constantinople, June 28, 1840, The Times, July 18, 1840. m Greville, Memoirs (Series 2), I, pp. 258-259, 261-262, 268. M4 Much credit for influencing the members of the Cabinet to agree to Palm- erston's proposal was due to Lord John Russell. See, Palmerston to Russell, Dec. 4, 1840, S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, I, p. 362. J. Russell, Recollections and Suggestions, pp. 223-224. 135 On July 8, 1840, Palmerston announced to the plenipotentiaries of Aus- tria, Prussia, and Russia that he had won the consent of the Cabinet to the plan of concluding a treaty without the concurrence of France. See, Hasen- clever, op. cit., pp. 160-163. Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 276-277. l6o THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [486 the envoys of the four Powers might abandon all hope of coming to an understanding with France and that they might agree to act without her. He saw that the affair was " 'in a state of crisis,' " 18e but he did not see that it was nearing a conclusion. " 'Extreme re- serve has been practiced for some days/ " he reported to Thiers, July 14, " '. . . I know that Chekib Effendi has had several long interviews with Lord Palmerston, particularly one on Sunday. Propositions are preparing, both as to the settlement of the affair and the mode of action, which will be communicated to us when all is arranged (should all be arranged) to obtain either our ad- hesion or refusal.' " 137 It is evident that he was imbued with the erroneous belief that time was not pressing, that France ran no risk in further delay, and that if the four Powers did agree upon some course of action they at least would go through the form of presenting their plans to France for her " 'adhesion or refusal' " before they entered into them formally. 138 While Guizot was consoling himself with a false impression con- cerning the situation of affairs, the plenipotentiaries of England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, influenced by fresh news from the Levant 139 and encouraged by the victory which Palmerston had won over his dissenting colleagues in the Cabinet, were pushing forward energetically their secret negotiations. 140 Finally, on July ""Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 216. Ibid., pp. 219-220. 138 It appears that Guizot's friend, the Princess de Lieven, who had arrived in England June 22 on a mission "de vendre ses diamants et de voir ses amis" was misled in a conversation which she had with von Billow to believe that there was no danger of a convention being concluded by the four Powers immediately, and that "a day or two before July 15," she passed this mistaken belief on to Guizot. See, DeWitt, op. cit., p. 195. E. Daudet, Une vie d ' ambassadrice au sitclf dernier, pp. 305-314. Palmerston to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, English His- torical Review, XVIII, p. 129. Duchesse de Dino, Chronique de 1831-1862, II, PP- 347, 35I-352- 138 On July 7, 10, 12, 1840, additional information about the revolt in Syria was received at London. See, Hodges to Palmerston, June 6, 16, 1840; Chekib to Palmerston, July 7, 1840; Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 23, 1840; Moore to Ponsonby, June 10, 1840; Levant Correspondence, I, pp. 671-674, 683-684, 686-687. "The following was Palmerston's explanation to Hobhouse, July 27, 1843, for having kept these negotiations secret: "... when at last we found it cer- tain that she [France] would not act with us [the four Powers] we did not think it prudent to let her into our counsels, for fear she should thwart us by 487] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 l6l 15, 1840, their deliberations having proved successful, they signed, without consulting the representative of France, a conven- tion for the pacification of the Levant. That convention, which in form was concluded between the representatives of the four Pow- ers on the one part and the envoy of the Sublime Porte on the other, consisted of five articles and a "Separate Act," and it was accompanied by a "Protocol" and a "Reserved Protocol." The conditions which the Powers proposed to force upon the Viceroy were named in the separate act. "His Highness [the Sultan]," it was provided therein, "promises to grant to Mehemet Ali, for him- self and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt; and ... to grant to Mehemet Ali for his life, with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of the fortress of St. John of Acre, the administration of the southern part of Syria, . . . "The Sultan, however, in making these offers, attaches thereto the condition, that Mehemet Ali shall accept them within the space of 10 days after communication thereof shall have been made to him at Alexandria, by an agent of His Highness; . . . "If within the space of 10 days, fixed as above, Mehemet Ali should not accept the above-mentioned arrangement, the Sultan will then withdraw the offer of the life administration of the Pash- alic of Acre; but His Highness will still consent to grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descendants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalic of Egypt, provided such offer be accepted within the space of the 10 days next following, . . . "If, at the expiration of 20 days after the communication shall have been made to him . . . Mehemet Ali shall not accede to the proposed arrangement, and shall not accept the hereditary Pashalic of Egypt, the Sultan will consider himself at liberty to withdraw that offer, and to follow, in consequence, such ulterior course as his own interests and the counsels of his Allies may suggest to him." The separate act provided also that the Pasha should surrender at once the Turkish fleet; that he should pay to his overlord tribute annually proportionate to the greater or less amount of territory intriguing in Europe and by sending information to Egypt." English Historical Review, XVIII, p. 130. See also, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 4, 1840, Metter- nich, op. cit., VI, pp. 410-411. For an account of the final negotiations see Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 163-170. 1 62 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [488 over which he might obtain the administration, according as he accepted "the first or the second alternative;" that all treaties and all laws of his sovereign should be applicable to the pashalics under his control; and that his military and naval forces, forming part of the forces of the Ottoman Empire, should "always be considered as maintained for the service of the State." 141 By Articles I, II, and III, of the convention of July 15, 1840, the Powers undertook to assist the Porte actively to reduce the Pasha to submission in case he should refuse to accept the terms which were to be communicated to him by the Sultan. Great Britain and Austria would, in the meantime, order the commanders of their fleets to assist the latter in cutting off the communication by sea between Syria and Egypt and to afford, "in the name of the al- liance, all the support and assistance in their power to those subjects" of his in Syria who might "manifest their fidelity and allegiance to their sovereign." Furthermore, if Mehemet AH "should direct his land or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the Sultan, addressed to their representatives at Constantinople," would "pro- vide for the defense of his Throne by means of a cooperation agreed upon by mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, as well as the capi- tal of the Ottoman Empire, in security against all aggression." Finally, by Article IV of the convention, the Powers agreed that, although in the existing emergency it might be necessary to send military and naval forces to defend Constantinople, in the future they would conform to "the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire," in virtue of which it had "in all times been prohibited for Ships of War of Foreign Powers to enter the Straits of the Dar- danelles and of the Bosphorus." 142 Thus, almost a year after the European diplomats at Constantinople had issued their famous 141 Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1012-1015. Staff Papers, XXVIII, pp. 345 ff. Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 307 ff. Martens, Nouveau recueil general, I, pp. 1 60 ff. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 448 ff. 142 Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1008-1012. State Papers, XXVIII, pp. 342 ff. Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 303 ff. Martens, N. R. G., I, pp. 156 ff. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 446 ff. In the protocol of July 15, 1840 it was explained that the Porte reserved to itself, as theretofore, to deliver passes to light vessels under flag of war, which might be employed according to custom "for the service of the correspondence of the legations of friendly Powers." State 489] THE NEGOTIATION OF THE TREATY OF JULY 15, 1840 163 collective note to the Porte, an arrangement for the solution of the Turco-Egyptian question was concluded. France, however, was not a party to that arrangement, nor was she aware even of its existence. Hence it still remained to be seen, not only whether Mehemet Ali would accept the conditions imposed upon him by the separate act of the convention of July 15, 1840, and whether the four Powers would be able to coerce him effectively in case he did not, but also what course the government of France would follow when it became aware of what had been done. Papers, XXVIII, p. 347. Martens, N. R. G., I, p. 162. Annual Register, 1840, p. 450. In the reserved protocol it was laid down that inasmuch as the "state of affairs in Syria, the interests of humanity," and the grave considerations of European policy made it imperious that as far as possible all delay should be avoided in the accomplishment of the pacification which the convention was intended to effect, the "preliminary measures" to be taken by Austria and Great Britain should be carried into execution at once "without waiting for the exchange of ratifications." State Papers, XXVIII, p. 347. Martens, N. R. G. I, p. 163. Annual Register, 1840, p. 451. CHAPTER V THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE On July 17, 1840, Palmerston invited Guizot to call at the British foreign office, where he read to him a memorandum ac- quainting him with the convention which had been concluded. Palmerston claimed in that memorandum that the Courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia had given to the gov- ernment of France throughout the whole course of the negotia- tions which had commenced in the autumn of the preceding year, "the most reiterated, manifest, and indisputable proofs," not only of their desire to arrive at a perfect understanding with it in regard to the arrangements necessary to effect the pacification of the Levant, but also of the great importance which they never had failed to attach to the moral effect accruing from the union and concurrence of the five Powers in a matter of such serious interest and so intimately connected with the maintenance of peace in Europe. They had seen, with the deepest regret, that all their efforts to obtain the desired end had proved fruitless. Conse- quently they had adopted the resolution of proceeding onward without the cooperation of France and had concluded with the Sultan a convention intended to solve in a satisfactory manner the existing complications in the Levant. 1 After Palmerston had finished reading, Guizot immediately objected to the arguments advanced in the memorandum in de- fense of the course followed by the concert of the four Powers. In reply to the Frenchman's objections the British Minister contended that the plan of the arrangement which the plenipotentiaries had signed was based on ideas suggested by Count Sebastiani in September, 1839. 2 ^ Sebastiani had made such suggestions, Guizot maintained, he had done so in his own "individual capacity" with- out instructions or authority from his superiors at Paris, for no trace of them could be found in the records of the French em- bassy. They were made in a formal manner, Palmerston insisted. ^Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 1-2. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 221 ff. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 495 S. ^Sebastiani had suggested on his own responsibility, it will be remembered, that Syria should be divided between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan. See above, footnote 15, Chapter IV. [I6 4 ] 49 1 ] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 165 The mere absence of evidence concerning them in the published records of the embassy did not afford conclusive proof that the Count had had no authority for making them. Moreover, he argued that it was impossible to separate the individual and the public character of an ambassador in the manner implied by M. Guizot, especially when that ambassador was speaking to a secre- tary of state in an official interview, and in a conversation arising over despatches which he had come to communicate from his court. 3 The French Cabinet, on receiving intelligence concerning the Treaty of London, felt not only "discontented and vexed" but also "surprised and wounded." 4 Thiers, in particular, was aroused be- cause of the famous arrangement and on July 20, 1840, in answer to a question that Henry Bulwer asked him concerning the French fleet which had just sailed for Tunis, he declared: "'This is not the time to ask or to give explanations: the alliance between England and France is at an end. M. Guizot has received the official intelligence, that an agreement has been come to by the Four Powers, to which we have not even been asked to accede . . . I cannot understand an alliance on small questions, and a differ- ence on great ones. Should England separate from us on the Eastern Question, such a separation will be a general one. France will, as I have already said, isolate herself: she is confident in her strength, and the more so as the Government has on this subject the whole population of France behind it. Should an occasion, therefore, arise on which the dignity or the interests of my country call upon me to act, I will do so without fear and with decision. I regret it deeply; but I cannot but see in the state of affairs, as now announced to me, eventualities which may disturb the peace of Europe.' " 5 A day later Thiers wrote to Guizot admitting that "Palmerston to Bulwer, July 22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 10-13. 4 Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 228. 5 Bulwer to Palmerston, July 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 7-8. Annual Register, 1840, p. 498. On July 26, 1840, Bulwer conferred again with Thiers. Thiers asked the British charge d'affaires on that occasion if England wished anything for herself in the Levant. In Syria, he declared, she "might have points to desire" for the "sake of the communication with the East Indies," and therefore the suspicion of the French people concerning the inten- tions of Great Britain, though possibly erroneous, were more justifiable [than those which the English people entertained in regard to France]. Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 37-40. l66 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [492 he was surprised greatly because of the turn which affairs had taken. The government, he stated, had expected that the agitation which for several days had manifested itself in the English Cabinet would end in a proposition, similar to the one which Neumann had suggested on June 12, leaving to France the choice of associating herself or not with the four Powers for the execution of that pro- position. 6 On the same date he forwarded to the French Ambas- sador a formal note in reply to Palmerston's memorandum of July 17, 1840. He enumerated in that note problems which he believed would arise when the four Powers attempted to carry out the provisions of the treaty of July 15, and he gave warning that henceforth France could not be influenced save by what she owed "to peace" and "to herself." The conduct which she would maintain in the serious circumstances in which the four Powers had just placed Europe would depend upon the solution which would "be given to all the questions which she had pointed out." 7 When it became known publicly in France that the four Powers had concluded a convention which they had kept secret from the Ministers of Louis Philippe a wave of indignation swept through- out the country. 8 The excitement was intense particularly in the capital. "Anger and surprise run mountain high in Paris," a cor- respondent of an English journal wrote at the time. "That Eng- land should join hands with Russia, though but for a special pur- pose, and in a direct defiance of France, was an event that, from M. Thiers down to the shoe black at the corner of the street, no Frenchman could have believed." 9 The Bourse was panic stricken 10 and almost the whole of the public press, led by the *Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 230. See also Affaires etrangeres 655 Angleterre, Thiers to Guizot (undated) quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 282. ''Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 18-19. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 231-235. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 498-500. 8 0n Aug. 10, 1840, the Duchesse de Dino wrote in her Chronique: "Toutes mes correspondances sont a la guerre, d'une fagon qui me desole." Dino, op. cit., II, p. 347. See also an extract from a letter, Lavergne to Guizot, July 30, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 250. Bulwer to Palmerston, July 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 41-42. Raikes to Wellington, July 31, 1840, T. Raikes, Private Correspondence, p. 142. Leopold to Metternich, Aug., 1840, quoted by Corti, op. cit., p. 127. *The Examiner, Aug. 2, 1840, p. 483. 10 The rise and fall of the French Bourse were significant for those variations were due largely to the changes in public sentiment in France. See Appendix A. 493] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE l6/ Constitutionnel and the Courrier Fran$ais, both ministerial organs, maintained that the Treaty of London was an insult and an outrage put upon their nation, and they called loudly for war "war to the knife" with "perfidious Albion." 11 Even the conservative Journal des Debats spoke defiantly. Although it did not despair for the maintenance of peace, it did not shrink back from the possibility of war. The French singlehanded, it believed, could carry on hos- tilities to advantage. If war did break out it would be terrible, but France, who had not provoked it, who had done "all that her honor would permit her to do to prevent it," would throw herself into the struggle "tout entiere." 12 Thiers and Louis Philippe, 13 who must have been encouraged by the bellicose clamor which was raised in Prance, determined directly not only that they would follow a policy of isolation but also that they would make extensive preparations for war. " '. . . it will be necessary to choose the moment to act in order to throw ourselves into a cleft and to break up the coalition,' " Thiers informed Guizot, July 21, 1840, " '. . . we must assume our position and watch events with coolness. The King is perfectly calm; we [the Cabinet] too are the same. Without any stir, we intend to make preparations solid rather than apparent. We shall make them apparent if the situation requires it and if respect for public opinion renders it desirable.' " 14 Soon thereafter an officer was ap- pointed to draw up detailed plans for the fortification of Paris, 15 an extraordinary credit of 8,120,000 francs for the marine was decreed 16 and the men belonging to the classes of 1836 and 1839 were called into military service. 17 Furthermore, steps were taken u The Times, July 31, Aug. i, 3, 10, 12, 13, 17, 1840. Annual Register, 1840, p. [172]. u Journal des Debats, July 29, 1840. See extracts from other French journals quoted in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 342-343. "Note the following statement which was written Aug. 8, 1840: "On dit que, dans cette question [of the attitude of France to the Treaty of London], le Roi des Frangais est absolument d'accord avec M. Thiers, et qu'il a dit qu'il preferait la guerre a la revolution." Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345. "Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 251. K Ibid., VI, pp. 25-26. "Royal Ordinance, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, J. B. Duvergier, Collection complete des lois, decrets, etc., XL, pp. 263-264. "Royal Ordinances, July 29-Aug. 5, 1840, ibid., p. 264. Granville to Palmerston, Aug. I, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 60. l68 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [494 in diplomacy to persuade Austria and Prussia to refuse to ratify the treaty of July 15, i84o; 18 Admiral Pontois, the French Am- bassador at Constantinople, was instructed to make energetic re- presentations to the Porte in order to influence it to grant to the Viceroy terms more liberal than those agreed upon by the repre- sentatives of the four Powers; 19 and Count Walewski, a natural son of Napoleon, was sent on a special mission to Alexandria with the aim of inducing the Pasha, on his part, either to accept terms which it was thought Pontois would succeed in persuading the Porte to grant or to give to the government of France power to negotiate in his behalf with the concert of the four Powers. 20 Neither the threatening attitude of the French government nor the blustering of the Paris press had any noticeable influence upon Lord Palmerston. The warlike measures which the former had adopted were entirely uncalled for, he stated in a despatch to Granville, August 4, 1840. They could be looked upon only as a gratuitous affront to the four Powers. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's government did not intend to take any notice of them. It would not ask for explanations; nor would it apply to Parliament for any additional vote of credit. To do either one or the other would be to give to the strange proceedings of the French government an importance which it did not deserve. The British naval forces in the Mediterranean, Palmerston believed, would be quite strong enough to do everything which could be required of them in pur- suance of the engagements of the treaty of July 15, 1840. The "Bloomfield to Palmerston, Aug. 15, 1840, ibid., p. 89. See also No. 16, Appendix D. "The representations which Pontois actually made to the Porte were later the subject of a controversy between the French and allied diplomats. Ponsonby and the Austrian envoy Sturmer accused Pontois of having directly threatened the Porte that, in case the treaty of July 15 was carried into execution through armed intervention against the Pasha, France would "join its efforts" with Mehemet AH to raise the populations of Asia and Europe against the existing administration of Turkey, of which the French government proclaimed itself "the enemy." Pontois later denied that he had indulged in such threats, and both Guizot and Thiers, when questioned by British and Austrian Ministers, denied that he had been instructed to do so. See Sturmer to Metternich, Aug. 17, 1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, Sept. 4, 1840; Palmerston to Guizot, Sept. 9, 1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 7, 1840; Guizot to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 116-117, 125-126, 130, 131, 192-193. ^See Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, ibid., p. 198. 495] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 169 force of the fleet also would be "abundantly sufficient" to secure it against molestation or insult from any squadron which France might think proper to send to the Levant. 21 Count Nesselrode and the Emperor Nicholas, who were pleased greatly when they learned of the conclusion, by the plenipotenti- aries of the four Powers, of the famous Convention of London, 22 entertained opinions very similar to those of the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former, in a letter to Meyendorff, written August 8, 1840, in which he announced that the convention had been signed, explained that it was only when she was supported by England that France was able to be truly formidable upon the continent. In the existing circumstances, he believed, once that she was convinced that she could not succeed in promoting division within the ranks of the allies, she would submit. It was his opin- ion, he declared, that she would hesitate when it came to declar- ing war upon four of the great Powers. 23 "Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 4, 1840, ibid., pp. 62-63. See also, Palmerston to Hodges, July 16, 18, 1840; Palmerston to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., pp. 3-5, 22. "See an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Aug. 23, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 292-293. Note also the following extract from a despatch, Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Sept. 25, 1840: "Dans mes depeches, j'ai en plus particulierement soin de faire resortir les avantages immenses que nous offre, pour 1'avenir, la rupture de cette funeste alliance anglo-frangaise, avantages qui ne me paraissent pas encore assez sentis et apprecies a Berlin . . . C'est un grand service que nous avons rendu a 1'Europe; on le comprendra avec le temps; on 1'acceptera comme on accepte avec avidit nos secours dans les grandes crises sociales." Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 39-40. Note also the following extract from Raikes' Journal, Aug. 12, 1840: "Kisseleff, the first Russian secre- tary, held high language to me about the treaty; he said, We must have the letter of the bond, and no tergiversation, else we shall march/ " Raikes, Journal, IV, p. 42. Lord Broughton, describing a cabinet meeting of Aug. 9, 1840, wrote: "Palmerston also informed us that Brunnow had told him the Emperor of Russia would not only send a squadron from the Black Sea to help us, but had offered to come in person, commanding his Baltic fleet, to defend the shores of England. At this we all laughed, and Palmerston added that he had only given civil thanks for this magnificent offer." Broughton, op. cit., V, p. 290. "Ne'sselrode to Meyendorff, Aug. 8, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 35-37. Nesselrode, like Palmerston, did not believe it would be necessary for Russia to send forces to the defense of Constantinople. See, Nesselrode to Titow, July, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 112-113. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 331-337- I7O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [496 At Vienna and at Berlin, on the other hand, the news of the warlike activities of the French occasioned alarm. Prince Metter- nich talked about the danger of a revolution in France 24 and the new King of Prussia, Frederick William IV, who was determined that his country would not take part in a general European war if one should break out, had a definite declaration sent to all the Powers that he adhered firmly to his father's pacific policy and "demanded that the neutrality of his state should be guaranteed formally." 25 Moreover, in Great Britain, although the public remained calm and refused to believe that Thiers would recommend war "to support the tyrannical and rebellious pasha of Egypt," 26 there were many who doubted if it would be wise to ignore the French protests entirely. Even Lord John Russell who a few weeks before had exerted himself to persuade his colleagues to accept the policy advocated by the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Lord Melbourne, the Prime Minister, were disturbed by the situation and appeared to be inclined to make concessions. " 'England has no wish to quarrel with France or to unsettle Europe,' " the latter stated to Guizot, July 28, 1840. " 'Austria too has no such desire. This affair is unfortunate and might become extremely serious; but we can arrest it, and wish to do so. And France who has re- "Note the following extract from a letter, Metternich to Apponyi, Aug. 20, 1840: "Le mal de la France, c'est la Revolution, et c'est parce que M. Thiers la represente que seul il est fort . . . le parti conservateur et celui du progres ont, depuis 1'avenement de M. Thiers, chacun un chef [the King and Thiers]; la lutte entre ses deux partis a done pris un caractere qu'elle n'avait pas anterieure- ment aux evenements du i er Mars, et la question qui reste a resoudre est de savoir auquel d'entre eux restera la victoire!" Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 412-413. "Treitschke, op. cit., V, p. 79. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 326-331, 348-349- M The Times, Aug. I, 3, 1840. Note the following extract from an editorial in The Times, Sept. 24, 1840: "With very rare exceptions, the English journals have treated the whole Eastern question in a mild and conciliatory spirit. The petulance of French presumption and asperity has been met throughout Great Britain by calm forbearance . . . They have threatened us without retort, and as yet with impunity; and their press has borne down upon us, almost in line of battle, without even a signal being hoisted in any part of the British empire that there was an enemy in sight." Many Englishmen, it seems, believed Louis Philippe would not dare to begin a foreign war because of the danger of revolu- tion at home. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 339-340. 497] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE I/I fused to advance with the four Powers, may aid them to halt.' " 2T The government of France being aware that such sentiments were entertained in Great Britain and in Germany 28 refused to despair for the success of its policy because of the obstinacy of Palmerston and the Russians. July 31, 1840, Guizot was summoned to the Chateau d'Eu for a conference with Louis Philippe and M. Thiers. At that meet- ing, he has reported in his Memoires, he found the King "ani- mated in words," but promising himself that, in the end, the peace of Europe would not be disturbed, and Thiers "also desiring the maintenance of peace, [but] much preoccupied with the chance of war and the means of meeting it," if events should drive France to that alternative. 29 When Guizot departed from Eu on his return to London he carried with him two distinct projects for the settlement of the question of the Near East which would bring about the reconcilia- tion of France with the concert of the four Powers. Both of these projects assumed the willingness of the latter to tear up the docu- ments which they had mutually agreed upon July 15, 1840. The first provided for the guaranteeing of the status quo. According to that plan the five Powers would guarantee the existing state of the Ottoman possessions on the basis of the arrangement of Kutayah. The Pasha would have no hereditary rights and if he " 'or anyone else' " should invade the states of the Sultan the five, including France, would employ their forces against the invader. The second project provided for the mediation of France, on behalf of Mehemet Ali, with the Concert of Europe. If that pro- posal should be accepted France would insist that her ally should receive the hereditary tenure of Egypt and the government for life of Syria. It, however, was not to be proposed unless there was a strong probability of its being accepted, for it had the inconven- ience of depending upon the willingness of the Pasha to request that France should negotiate for him. 30 * T Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 254. Many Englishmen, undoubtedly, questioned the advisability of exchanging a French for a Russian alliance. See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 344-346. ^Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 254-255, 266-267. "Ibid., pp. 255-256, 264-266. M Ibid., pp. 270-271. IJ2 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [498 In addition to these two proposals Guizot carried back to Lon- don a letter from Louis Philippe to King Leopold of Belgium, who at that time was at Windsor Castle, greatly alarmed by the thought of a war being declared between his niece and his father- in-law. " 'The situation in which France finds herself,' " the King wrote, " 'is neither of her choice nor of her creation. . . . The situation is particularly painful for me who have always scouted the notion that England could ever enter into an alliance without France. I find I am wrong. For the present we can only wait and see. But there is one thing we must do and that is to arm, and we are doing so vigorously. Our role must be one of expectation. We must see what England means to do, before deciding what France shall do, either in the way of restoring or preserving the balance of power.' " 31 The French Ambassador, very soon after his arrival in England, proceeded to Windsor, where he delivered Louis Philippe's letter and at the same time explained to Leopold the French project for the maintenance of the status quo. The latter, who previously had advocated that a " 'great European measure' " a treaty be- tween the five Powers " 'to guarantee against all enemies and dangers the existing state of the possessions of the Porte' " should be concluded to supersede the Convention of London, 32 readily sanctioned Guizot's suggestions and promised that he would urge them upon Lord Palmerston. 33 There were many at the British Court, including Melbourne, Neumann, and Biilow, who were willing to consider favorably the Belgian King's proposals. 34 Palmerston, however, was not one of that number. " 'King Leopold has mentioned his idea to me,' " he informed Guizot, August 21, 1840; " 'a treaty between the five Powers which might guarantee the status quo of the Ottoman Empire . . . [That is] impossible at present. A treaty has been concluded between four Powers, not with a general and permanent aim, as would be that of which we are speaking, but with a special "Affaires etrangeres, 655 Angleterre, Louis Philippe to the King of the Belgians, Aug. 13, 1840, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 285. "It is probable that the idea of a " 'great European measure' " was sug- gested first by Wellington. See Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 278-279. "Ibid., pp. 278-282. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 350-354. **Melbourne to Russell, Aug. 21, 26, 1840, Sanders, Melbourne Papers, pp. 462-464, 467-469- 499] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 173 and momentary view. This incidental treaty must follow its course, and when accomplished, the general treaty may well take its place. Today we must await events.' " 35 Instead of agreeing to concessions which might have conciliated the French, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs prepared a note, in answer to Thiers' memorandum of July 21, 1840, in which he defended in a most elaborate manner the course which he had followed during the entire period of the negotiations preceding the conclusion of the Treaty of London. No one but the French gov- ernment itself was to blame for the isolated position of France, he declared. France had no right to expect that when four out of the five Powers found themselves agreed upon one course and when the fifth had determined to pursue a course entirely different "that the Four should, in deference to the Fifth, give up opinions in which they were daily more and more confirmed, and which related to a matter of vital importance to the great and permanent inter- ests of Europe." It was only in one of the concluding paragraphs that a vague hope was held out that, when the four should have brought about such an arrangement between the Porte and its subject as might be compatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and with the future peace of Europe, there could then be nothing to prevent France from concurring with them in such further engagements for the future as might appear to be neces- sary "in order to give due stability to the good effects of the inter- position of the four Powers in favor of the sultan; and to secure the Ottoman empire from a recurrence of danger." 36 It is evident that the British Minister's determination to make no concessions was due to the fact that he was convinced that the French would not dare to intervene in behalf of the Viceroy and that the policy which the four Powers had adopted would tri- * 5 Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 287-288. Guizot did not present his second pro- ject to the British government. However, on Aug. 10, 1840, Granville reported to Palmerston that Thiers had suggested that the Pasha might request the inter- vention of France. Four days later Palmerston replied that it was needless for him to point out that in the situation in which affairs then stood it would be impossible for the five Powers to accept the interposition of France between them and Mehemet AH. See Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 10, 1840, Palmerston to Granville, Aug. 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 76, 80-8 1. s Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 31, 1840, ibid., pp. 102-110. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 500-510. 174 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [500 umph speedily. He persisted in his opinions even in spite of the reports which his agents at Paris forwarded to him announcing that the French were continuing actively their preparations for war. 37 " 'I am more than ever confirmed/ " he wrote to Bulwer, August 23, 1840, " 'in my belief that for the present at least the French will remain quiet, and that there will be no war. However inconsiderate the French nation may be, the French interests grow- ing up every day will make them pause before they begin an un- provoked and aggressive war against the four Powers. " 'Thiers, therefore, sooner or later will give the order to "cease firing;" the smoke will soon blow away from the eyes of the French people, and they will see more clearly the objects which have caused their false alarm; and both Thiers and Louis Philippe will take care to keep out of a quarrel which nobody means to force upon them.' " 38 In the meantime news of the conclusion of the Convention of London had arrived in the Near East. The Ottoman Ministers who received this intelligence on August 3, 1840, proceeded with- out loss of time to carry out their part of the agreement. 39 Rifaat Bey, accompanied by a Mr. Allison, of the British embassy, was despatched to Alexandria with the Sultan's ultimatum and measures were taken promptly for the sending of arms, ammuni- tion, and troops to the aid of the discontented inhabitants of Syria. 40 Rifaat Bey arrived at his destination on August n, just one day in advance of Count Walewski, the agent whom Thiers had "Granville to Palmerston, Aug. 7, 10, 1840; Bulwer to Palmerston, Aug. 21, 28, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 73-74, 76, 88, 93. Talmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 23, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 320. See also, Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 258-259. Greville to Reeve, Sept. 10, 1840, A. H. Johnson (editor), The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve, pp. 6-7. "Ponsonby to Palmerston, Aug. 5, 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 91, 100. 40 The revolts of June, 1840, had been put down ruthlessly. Nevertheless, the spirit of the rebels was not broken. On July 25, 1840, a British consul wrote: "Lebanon is a sleeping volcano, and its oppressed and exasperated inhabitants are only waiting a favourable moment to try once more the fortune of arms." Moore to Ponsonby, July 25, 1840, ibid., p. 96. See also, Paton, op. cit., II, p. 179. 5Ol] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 175 sent to persuade the Pasha to be moderate in his demands. 41 Five days later, on the i6th, he informed the latter officially of the terms of the convention of July 15, i84O. 42 During the twenty days that followed immediately thereafter the Egyptian metropolis rivaled even London and Paris as a center of diplomatic activity. At first the Viceroy was defiant. He had at an earlier date, after having received unofficial information concerning what had oc- curred at the British capital, taken steps to withdraw all of his regular troops from Arabia and had ordered that the preparations for war in Egypt and in Syria should be pushed forward vigor- ously. 43 Being convinced that these measures would be adequate for the defense of the territories under his control, he announced forthwith that he had decided to resist the execution of the terms of the famous convention and that all efforts to induce him to change his opinion would be in vain. 44 The Consuls-General of the four Powers, in reply, remonstrated with him, warning him that, if he did not accept the terms which Rifaat had offered, the allies 41 Hodges to Ponsonby, Aug. 16, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 147-148. ^Report of Interview between Rifat Bey and Mehemet AH, ibid., pp. 149-152. ^Letters from Alexandria, Aug. 7, 1840, The Times, Aug. 25, Aug. 26, 1840 Mehemet Ali was acting in accord with the advice of Thiers. Note the following extract from a despatch, Thiers to Cochelet, July 29, 1840, quoted by Guichen, op. cit., p. 359: " 'Le but que le Vice-roi et le gouvernment frangais doivent se proposer, disait notre ministre, est d'annuler les effets que les quatre Cours attendent de la convention qu'elles ont con clue. Le moyen le plus propre a faire atteindre ce but est la soumission de la Syrie. . . La France, obligee de veiller a son honneur et de pourvoir a ses interets, chercherait un champ de bataille moins eloigne d'elle que 1'Orient. Le Vice-roi qui est sur le premier plan de la politique, cesserait d'y etre. A cote des grands interets qu'elle serait appe!6e a defendre et a faire triompher, celui de Mehemet Ali deviendrait bien secondaire. Elle se trouverait reduite a 1'abandonner a lui-meme. Livre a ses propres forces, serait-il en etat de resister a toute la puissance anglaise, engagee serieusement dans une guerre qui aneantirait en Orient et en Occident tout ce qui est faible et qui lui offrirait 1'attrait d'une si belle et si utile conquete?' " Cochelet even went so far as to urge Mehemet Ali to stir up a holy war throughout the Near East. See ibid., p. 360. "Minute of Interview between the Consuls-General and Mehemet Ali, Aug. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 154-155. Letter from Alexandria, Aug. 20, 1840, The Times, Sept. 8, 1840. The Examiner, Sept. 13, 1840, p. 583. 1/6 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [502 certainly would coerce him into submission. 45 Count Walewski, on the other hand, refusing to advise Mehemet to surrender com- pletely because of the demands of the Porte, urged all of the parties concerned to be moderate. 46 At the end of the first period of ten days the Viceroy was still defiant. " 'I repeat,' " he declared on the same day that he announced that he was determined to continue upon the course which he had been following," 'that I am only responsible to Providence.' " 47 However, before the close of a second period of equal length he consented to follow the advice of the French. 48 Although he persisted in refusing to comply with the provisions of the Sultan's ultimatum, he had it announced to Rifaat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers that he would be satisfied if he received the hereditary possession of Egypt and the tenure for life of Syria. 49 "Memoir addressed by Consuls-General to Mehemet Ali, Aug. 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 161-163. See also, ibid., pp. 174-180. ^Walewski urged Col. Hodges to use his endeavors to prevent hostile operations against Egypt and Syria on the part of the British naval forces. He was instructed, he declared, that in case his request was not granted he should go on board the English flag ship and present it direct to Admiral Stopford. Hodges to Palmerston, Aug. 19, 1840, ibid., p. 157. "Minute of Interview, Aug. 26, 1840, ibid., p. 185-186. "On Aug. 24, 1840, Hodges reported that the Viceroy had made a formal application to France for its protection and mediation. That report, however, was probably incorrect. On the same day, Mehemet Ali declared to the Russian Consul-General that he had never reckoned on the assistance of France. " 'It is true,' " he stated, " 'that she offered it me three times, but I never trusted it; and I swear to you that my decision has in no wise been influenced by the declarations of the newspapers and the language of M. Thiers. M. Perier told me plainly that France would not interfere in my favour.' " Hodges to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1840; Minute of Conversation, Aug. 24, 1840; ibid., pp. 173, 178-180. 48 Mehemet Ali announced his willingness to make concessions on Aug. 28, 1840. See a letter from Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1840, The Times, Sept. 19, 1840; ibid., Sept. 28, 1840. It is said that on Sept. 5, 1840, the twentieth day after the terms of the Treaty of London had been communicated formally to the Pasha, Sami Bey delivered the latter's final answer to Rifaat Bey and the Consuls-General of the four Powers in the following language: "His Highness, my master, accepts the treaty of the i$th of July to the letter. He accepts the hereditary title of Egypt, and with regard to Syria, he is about to petition the Sultan that that administration may be granted him in his old age, to cease at the expiration of his life. The fleet shall be restored, Arabia has been evacuated, and therefore all will depend on the Sultan's orders." Letter from "on board 503] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 177 At the same time that the papers relating to the Treaty of London were sent to Constantinople, instructions were forwarded to Admiral Stopford, the commander of the British naval forces in the Levant, to the effect that all communications by sea be- tween Egypt and Syria should be cut off. 80 In order to execute these instructions Stopford divided his fleet into two divisions, sending one portion under command of Sir Charles Napier to operate along the coast of Syria 51 and taking the other under his own direct control to cruise off the harbor of Alexandria. As long as it was doubtful whether Mehemet Ali would agree to accept the terms outlined in the separate act of the Convention of Lon- don the Admiral and the Commodore refrained from beginning actual hostilities, but after it became known that he had rejected them they at once adopted an aggressive policy. The two divisions of the fleet were reunited September 9, 1840, and on the following night a landing of troops was effected a few miles to the north of Beyrout in D'Jounie Bay. 52 Two days later Admiral Stopford, in cooperation with Admiral Bandeira, who with two Austrian frigates had joined the British fleet, sent a flag of truce into Beyrout with a summons to Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Seves), the commander of an army of 15,000 men stationed there, to withdraw his troops. Finding the latter's reply unsatisfactory, the Anglo- Austrian squadron promptly opened fire upon the Egyptian forti- fications within the town. 53 No attempt was made immediately to occupy the place but other military and naval operations followed Turkish Steamer Tairi Bahri," Sept. 5, 1840, ibid., Sept. 30, 1840. See also a copy of a letter, Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Sept. 5, 1840, ibid., Journal des Debats, Oct. 3, 1840. Minute of Interview, Sept. 5, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 246, Guichen, op. cit., pp. 367-368. ""Admiralty (in letters) 5503 Syria, Palmerston to Admiralty, July 16, 17, 23, 1840, cited by Hall, op. cit., p. 289. A. Jochmus, The Syrian War and the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, p. XXIX. "Napier not only intercepted communications between Syria and Egypt but also cooperated with British agents who were encouraging the peoples of Mt. Lebanon to attempt a new revolt. See Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 200-207, 214-215. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 15 ff. E. Napier, Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier, II, pp. 6 ff. E2 Napier to Stopford, Sept. 16, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp. 540-541. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 48-54. Napier, Correspondence, II, p. 26-28. 63 Ibid., pp. 37-38. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 55-60. Stopford to O'Ferrall, Sept. 20, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp. 537-539. 1/8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [504 in rapid succession and it became apparent very soon that the allied forces were determined to compel the Viceroy to submit. 54 Reports concerning developments which resulted in the Near East after the terms of the Treaty of London became known there began to arrive in France late in August, 1840. The first of these reports, serving merely to confirm the belief which the French en- tertained in regard to the attitude of Mehemet AH, did not oc- casion much alarm. Indeed for a time it even appeared as though that in spite of them the warlike feelings of the French were "dying away." 55 The Bourse rallied a point and the tone of the Paris press became remarkably moderate. 56 This period of com- parative quiet, however, was only the calm before a storm. When it was announced early in September that the Anglo-Austrian fleet had cut off communications between Egypt and Syria and that it was preparing to engage in actual hostilities in case Mehemet Ali should not submit at the end of his twenty days of grace, a new wave of excitement swept throughout the country. 57 The French government, as well as its subjects, was alarmed, and ordinances providing for the fortification of Paris, 58 and for calling the classes of 1834 and 1835 to the colors were decreed in rapid succession. 59 "From the base at D'Jounie arms were distributed among the mountaineers and raids were made into the interior. On Sept. 26, 1840, Sidon was taken by storm and on Oct. n Beyrout was occupied; see Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 61 ff. Napier, Correspondence, II, pp. 38 ff. Jochmus, op. cit., p. 17. "Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 4, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 128-129. "See comment upon the attitude of the French journals, The Times, Aug. 22, 25, 26, 27, Sept. 2, 1840. Guizot to Mme. Guizot, Aug. 13, 1840, De Witt, op. cit., p. 209. "Faucher to Reeve, Sept. 13, 1840, Faucher, op. cit., I, pp. 97-98. See also, comment upon the attitude of the French journals, The Times, Sept. 12, 15, 17, 19, 21, 29, 1840. Between September i and September 15 the French 3%'s dropped from 80.10 to 73. See Appendix A. ""Louis Philippe and the Due d'Orleans were strongly in favor of the idea of fortifying Paris. It was said at the time that their attitude on this question was due to their fear of a revolution. See Due d'Orleans to Marie-Amelie [his mother] Aug. 18, 1840, Flers, Le Roi Louis Philippe vie anecdotique, pp. 378- 380. Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 390. *Royal Ordinances, Aug. 12-Sept. 16, 1840, Sept. 2-16, 1840, Sept. 10-16, 1840, Duvergier, op. cit., XL, pp. 354-356. 505] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 1/9 On September 18, 1840, Bulwer, who for several days past had been suspicious concerning the intentions of Louis Philippe and his ministers, 60 called upon Thiers at his residence in Auteuil. He found the latter "walking up and down in a long room or gallery" evidently much disturbed. The President of the Council, it soon developed, had received despatches from Walewski announcing that Mehemet AH, through Walewski's mediation, had consented to accept a settlement on the basis of his receiving Egypt heredi- tarily and Syria for life. 61 " Trance,' " Thiers declared after ex- plaining this news to Bulwer, " 'thinks these conditions reasonable and just. If your Government will act with us in persuading the Sultan and the other Powers to accept them, there is once more a cordiale entente between us. If not, after the concessions obtained through our influence from Mehemet Ali, we are bound to sup- port him.' . . . 'Vous comprenez, mon cher, la gravite de ce que je viens de dire!' " " 'You know,' " the Frenchman added later, however, " 'what I have been saying to you' ... 'is said as M. Thiers, not as President of the Council. I have to consult my colleagues, the King also. But I wish you to understand clearly the tendency of my own personal opinions.' " 62 The same day Bulwer reported to Palmerston that he was convinced, that M. Thiers had wished him to understand that he was anxious that peace should be maintained; that with that in view he had done all in his power to persuade Mehemet Ali to be reasonable in his conditions; that he thought that the terms which the latter had agreed to accept were reasonable; and that if they were granted the impending struggle would be avoided. But if they were re- fused, and the execution of the treaty rigorously insisted upon, he, for his own part, without giving any pledge to the Pasha, still felt in a certain degree pledged towards him; and "that hewascon- *Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. n, 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 188-189. "See a copy of a despatch Walewski to Thiers, Aug. 29, 1840, quoted by Haussonville, op. cit., I, pp. 303-307. This despatch must have been one of those which Thiers had received. "Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 324-325. On Sept. 25, 1840, Thiers declared to Lord Granville: "'II n'a pas de extremite que je ne braverai plutot que la France soit humiliee;' " Granville to Palmerston, Sept. 25, 1840, Levant Corres- pondence, II, p. 226. iSO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [506 vinced, putting himself out of the question, that it would be diffi- cult, if not impossible, to form any Government which would re- main a perfectly passive and disinterested spectator of the measures to be pursued. Consequently, that without any decided act of immediate hostility, or any positive declaration of war, such a state of things would ensue, as must, ere long, disturb the peace of the world." 63 The " 'mysterious threatening' " in which Thiers had indulged failed to intimidate the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. " '. . .if Thiers should again hold to you the language of menace, however indistinctly and vaguely shadowed out'," he replied to Bulwer, September 22, 1840, " 'pray retort upon him to the full extent of what he may say to you,., .convey to him in the most friendly and unoffensive manner possible, that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and com- merce before she sees the end of it;. . .we should very soon have nearly three times the number of ships that France could put to sea, and must, therefore, have the command of all their interests beyond sea; .... These considerations perhaps might weigh more with Louis Philippe than with Thiers, but I am inclined to think that they will weigh with somebody or other at Paris. However, I may' be mistaken, and the French may either make war, in spite of their assurances, or commit some violent and outrageous act of aggression against the Sultan, which the four Powers will be obliged to resent; in that case France must take the consequences, and her Government bear the responsibility'." 64 "Bulwer to Palmerston, Sept. 18, 1840, ibid., pp. 196-197. Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 428-430. See also, an extract of a despatch, Thiers to Guizot, Sept. 17, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 311 ff. Bulwer wrote several other despatches to Palmerston on Sept. 18, 1840. In one of these he mentioned that he had received "two or three visits from a French gentleman" who was anxious to arrive at some settlement of the Eastern question. "He came to me today," Bulwer declared, "and said he had seen M. Thiers, and that he was convinced that the French Government would agree, moyennant some slight concession, to enter into the Treaty of the I5th of July, and to coerce the Pasha, if he did not accede to the terms proposed to him. ... As I know that he has seen many of the Ministers, and M. Thiers twice within these few days, I think it desir- able to give your Lordship the substance of what has been passed between us." Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 197-198. See also, ibid., pp. 199-200. "Palmerston to Bulwer, Sept. 22, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 327-331. 507] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE l8l Many of Palmerston's countrymen, including even some of his colleagues in the Cabinet, did not agree with him. In the latter part of July, 1840, it will be remembered, many had doubted if it would be wise to ignore entirely the French protests against 'the Treaty of London. Their doubts increased with the passing of time, and when the excitement of the French became intense in September, 1840, they became so alarmed that they* demanded that the British government should make some concession in order to conciliate its former ally. 65 "The more we consider the propositions which Mehemet Ali, by the advice of France, has been induced to make to the Porte," an editorial writer stated in The Times, "the more we are convinced not only that it would be madness to reject them, but that they would effect a more advantageous settlement of the Eastern question, even for Turkey herself, than could be obtained by the most complete success to the military operations of the allies, and the utter discomfiture of the Pasha. . . . What the real interests of Turkey require are security for her European provinces against Russia, and for her Asiatic [provinces] against Mehemet Ali, and none can be so complete as the solemn guarantee of all the other Powers, France included, and their united determination to defend her from all aggression. . . . No settlement which does not include France can be safe, satisfactory, or lasting. Despite the miserable insolence of the French press and of 'Young France:' accept the mediation of her Government, meet her half way, show a disposition, not to succumb to menace or defer to unreasonable pretensions, but to act in a fair spirit of compromise, with a frank and friendly con- sideration of the feelings of the French nation and we may once more return to those relations of amity, the cordiality of which 8S Note the following extract from an editorial published in The Times, Aug. 31, 1840: "While we are awaiting the events in the East which may give a decided turn to the policy of England, Russia, or France, it can neither be denied nor concealed that this country is placed in the most unaccountable and ambiguous situation which was ever occupied by a Power of first rate magnitude. ... in reality England has been placed by Lord Palmerston's acquiescence in M. de Brunnow's contrivance in the position of a second rate Power. ... An accidental collision between a French and English brig in the Levant may suddenly bring down on us a declaration of war from France; or the slightest indication of a movement on the part of Russia may require the most decided and rapid measures to prevent the occupation of Constantinople." See also, similar editorials in ibid., Aug. 29, Sept. 8, 9, 1840. l82 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [508 ought never to have been interrupted, and on the continuation of which depend the peace of Europe and the happiness of man- kind." 66 Lord John Russell, who entertained similar opinions, wrote to Lord Melbourne, September 26, 1840, that the whole aspect of affairs was changed "by the language of Thiers on the 1 8th." "We have now to deal," he stated, "not with the Pasha, but with the Pasha and France. ... I have told Palmerston I think we ought in conference to tell our allies we are ready to accept Walewski's conditions, provided they (the allies) agree, and the Syrian insurgents have security against vengeance. "If you and Palmerston are against this I had much better retire." 67 Those who worked to secure a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London were aided greatly in their efforts by the attitude "'Ibid., Sept. 29, 1840. At an earlier date Guizot had induced Charles Greville to use his influence in getting Barnes, the editor of The Times, to adopt a pro-French attitude. See Greville to Reeve, Sept. 10, 1840, Johnson, op. cit., pp. 5-7. "Russell to Melbourne, Sept. 26, 1840, Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 351. The opposition which Palmerston encountered in his "own camp" was formidable indeed. Note the following extract from a letter, Palmerston to Bulwer, March 14, 1846: ..." We had indeed great difficulties to surmount in accomplishing our purpose [in 1840-1841]; but although that purpose was to rescue Europe from a perpetually-recurring danger of war, and to protect British interests from injury by the scarcely disguised encroachments of two great foreign Powers, yet, nevertheless, the greatest difficulties which I had to encounter in the whole transaction arose from the unprincipled intrigues in our own camp.' " Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 323 [footnote]. Palmerston blamed in particular Ellice, Holland, and Clarendon. On July 27, 1840, he wrote: " 'Thiers and Guizot are very angry, of course, because they had persuaded themselves that the English Cabinet never would be induced to separate itself from France on this question. Ellice had misled Thiers; and Guizot had been deceived by the foolish language held out by Holland and Clarendon, who went talking away in favour of Mehemet Ali. However, the French had some foundation for their mistake; for when it came to the point, I found such resistance on the part of Holland and Clarendon, and such lukewarmness on the part of some of the other members of the Cabinet, that I sent in my resignation, . . . The dissidents upon this with- drew their opposition, and the waverers came round to my views.' " Palmerston to Temple, July 27, 1840, ibid., Ill, pp. 42-43. See also Broughton, op. cit., V, pp. 297-298. 509] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 183 which the Courts of Vienna and Berlin maintained. Prince Met- ternich, alarmed at the possibility of a European war, 68 had for- warded to Paris on August 31, 1840, a note suggesting a plan whereby France might become reunited with the concert of the four Powers. According to that plan, France would declare anew her adhesion to the principles of the collective note of July 27, 1839; she would continue her refusal to agree to the measures of coercion which the other Powers had decided upon, explaining that she could not see in them the means of attaining with safety the desired object [the preservation of the Ottoman Empire] ; and she would announce that in case of the failure of those means she then would be ready to join the four Powers and the Sultan in considering "the most fitting means" for assisting the Porte and that she would be willing to aid in carrying the latter means into execution "according to the circumstances of the moment." 69 Met- ternich followed up this communication to the government of France by sending to it others which were also very conciliatory in character. 70 Baron Werther, the Prussian Prime Minister, "Thiers, who must have known of Metternich's alarm, and probably wished to encourage it, was particularly vivacious in his attitude towards Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris. See Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 390. ""Substance of a communication stated to have been made by Prince Metternich to the French government; Beauvale to Palmerston, Aug. 30, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 24.3, 126-127. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 282 [footnote]. Thiers did not reply to Metternich's suggestion. See Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 275-276. Metternich was in a most difficult position it seems. His prestige both abroad and at home was damaged. Within the Hapsburg monarchy Count Kolowrat, Minister of the Interior, influenced probably by the sharp drop in the Austrian exchange and the bad financial situation in general, was leading the opposition to Metternich and the treaty of July 15. According to Hasenclever, Metternich spent his time in making violent tirades against Thiers, in warning against Russian land greed, and in defending conservative principles. See Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 206-208. See also Metternich to Leopold, Dec. 5, 1840, quoted by Corti, op. cit., pp. 135-136. "Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 266, 273, 281. Granville to Palmerston, Sept. 25, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 227. 184 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [5IO maintained a similar policy. 71 He even appeared to be much pleased, as William Russell, the British envoy at Berlin, reported on September 23, 1840, by the news of the concessions which Walewski had persuaded Mehemet Ali to make, and seemed to think that a basis was laid thereby on which a final and satisfac- tory settlement of the Oriental question might be formed. 72 At a Cabinet meeting held on October i, 1840, the members of the British ministry who were opposed to the complete execution of the July treaty, encouraged by the willingness of the Austrian and Prussian governments to make some concessions in order to conciliate the French, forced matters to a crisis, and it was only through the efforts of Lord Melbourne that a compromise between them and Palmerston was secured. 73 In that compromise the latter consented to state to the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia that it appeared to Her Majesty's government to be expedient that the four Powers should propose to the government of France such a course as was sketched out in Metternich's note of August 31, 1840. Although Palmerston did agree to take the step suggested by Melbourne it is certain that he still was determined to carry his policy into execution. It is probable, as Henry Reeve has stated, that he was aware at the very time when he consented to make "Although the Prussian government was anxious to preserve peace it became so alarmed at the belligerent activities of Thiers that it also began preparing for war. Furthermore a distinct reaction to the warlike clamor in France took place throughout Germany. It was at this time that Schneckenburger composed the famous Die Wacht am Rhein and that Niklas Becker wrote the popular song: "Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein, Ob sie wie gier'ge Raben sich heiser darnach schrei'n, So lang er ruhig wallend sein grimes Kleid noch tragt, So laflg ein Ruder schallend in seine Wagen schlagt." See Treitschke, op. cit., V, pp. 80 ff. Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 465 ff. Guichen, op. cit., pp. 405-410, 413 ff. "Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 23, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 229. "Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 354. For additional information concerning the opposition to Palmerston's policy which was offered in Sept., 1840, by certain members of the British Cabinet, see ibid., pp. 348-349, 352-353; Sanders, Melbourne Papers, pp. 474 ff; Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 231-232; Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 343-344; The Times, Oct. 2, Dec. 7, 1840; Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 261, 263, 265, 267, 271-273, 276, 278-283. 5ll] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 185 such a proposal to the representatives of the three Powers that at least Brunnow and the Emperor of Russia would not concur in it, and that he agreed to it merely for the purpose of gaining time. 74 It is significant in this connection that on October 2, the very next day after the compromise in the Cabinet had been arranged, the Morning Chronicle, a journal under Palmerston's influence, published an extremely violent article against the French. 75 Fur- thermore, it is also worthy of note that on October 3, 1840, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs declared in a letter which he wrote to Bulwer that " 'If the four Powers were to give way to the menaces of France, they would soon be compelled to go to war with her to resist her further encroachments, or they must be prepared to submit patiently to a succession of aggressions and insults.' " " 'In short,' " he stated in the same letter, " 'without further argument, the thing [a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London] is impossible, unless, indeed (which I cannot suppose), Mehemet Ali was to turn out to be such a wonder of the world as to be able to beat the four Powers and the Sultan united.' " 76 It was known as early as the second day of October that the Russian and Prussian plenipotentiaries would refuse to make a communication to France in conformity with the British Cabinet's suggestion "without reference to their Courts and authority from them." 77 Nevertheless, on October 8, 1840, Palmerston sent to the Ibid., p. 284 [footnote]. "Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 354. See a French translation of the article which was published in the Morning Chronicle on Oct. 2, 1840, in Journal des Debats, Oct. 5, 1840. The Morning Chronicle rendered invaluable services to Palmerston. Note the following extract of a letter, Melbourne to Victoria, Jan. 17, 1842: "Your Majesty knows very well that Palmerston has long had much communi- cation with the Morning Chronicle . . . and has made great use of it for the purpose of maintaining and defending his own policy. ... if Palmerston in the Syrian affair had not had as devoted an assistant as the Morning Chronicle, he would hardly have been able to maintain his course or carry through his measures." Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 374-375. See also, extracts copied from the Morning Chronicle, in The Examiner, Sept. 6, 20, Oct. n, 25, 1840, pp. 564, 595, 641-645, 673; and in the Journal des Debats, Aug. I, 16, Oct. 9, Nov. 20, 22, 1840. See also, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 122. "Palmerston to Bulwer, Oct. 3, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 332. See also, Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 5, 7, 1840, ibid., pp. 333-334, 337-338. "Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 2, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 232-233. l86 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [512 three envoys of Austria, Russia, and Prussia formal notes iden- tical in character in which he repeated the proposal he had agreed to make to them. 78 Schleinitz, the Prussian representative, replied on the following day, and Neumann, the Austrian, returned his answer three days later. 79 Both announced that they were without instructions concerning such a question, and both promised to bring it to the attention of their governments. Baron Brunnow, who also replied on October 12, promised likewise that he would refer the matter to his government, but the language which he used revealed very clearly that he was convinced that it would not be received favorably. 80 While these developments were taking place in London re- ports from the Levant were causing the excitement in France to increase. A telegraphic despatch which arrived at Paris on Octo- ber 2 stated that "after a bombardment of nine days, which had reduced the town [of Beyrout] to ashes, the Egyptians had evacuated it at night and the allies had taken possession." 81 Soon thereafter it became known that the Porte, dissatisfied with Mehemet Ali's answer to the Sultan's ultimatum and disregarding the representations of the French agents at Constantinople, had issued a firman, September 14, 1840, decreeing the deposition of his rebellious vassal and the placing of the ports of Syria and Egypt in a state of blockade. 82 The Bourse thereupon experienced "Palmerston to Neumann, Schleinitz, and Brunnow, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 268. "Schleinitz to Palmerston, Oct. 9, 1840; Neumann to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, ibid., pp. 293-294, 296. ^Brunnow to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, ibid., pp. 294-295. See also, Rauch to Nicholas, I, Oct. 13, 1840; Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Oct. 24, 1840, Nessel- rode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 51-53, 55-60. Nesselrode was uneasy about the attitude of Austria. On Oct. 10, he wrote to Meyendorff: "La nouvelle de la destitution de Mehemet Ali a etc un coup de foudre pour Metternich; II a commence 1 a faiblir et il n'a tenu qu'a un cheveu que 1'Austriche ne nous echappat com- pletement. "Les efforts de lord Beauvale et du comte Maltzahn 1'ont, grace a Dieu, maintenue dans nos rangs, n'est-ce pas curieux que ce soit le ministre de Prusse qui donne du courage au chancelier d'Austriche?" Ibid., p. 49. ^Journal des Debats, Oct. 3, 1840. This report, of course, was exaggerated. "'Ibid., Oct. 4, 6, 1840. Lord Ponsonby probably encouraged the Porte to adopt such a policy. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Sept. 10, 14, 1840; Ponsonby to Stopford, Sept. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 230-232, 235-236, 265. Soon after Palmerston learned of the action taken by the Porte on Sept. 513] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 1 87 a terrible panic, during which the 3%s sank as low as 65.25; enthusiastic crowds in the theaters sang the Marseillaise, 83 and the "lower orders" exclaimed in the streets : " 'Guerre aux Anglais, Us ont pris notre Beyrout' which, from the rage expressed on the subject by the journals, they concluded must be some town in Normandy on the coast." 84 The French government, on its part, was aroused particularly because of the deposition of Mehemet Ali. A royal ordinance was issued at once convoking the Chambers to meet October 28, i84O, 85 and on October 8, Thiers forwarded to Guizot a note in which he declared: "In the opinion of France, the Viceroy of Egypt, for [par} the provinces which he governs, for the seas over which his influence extends, is necessary to secure the balance of power . . . existing between the different states of the world. "Impressed with this conviction, France, equally disinterested, with respect to the Eastern Question, as the four Powers who signed the protocol of September I/, 86 considers herself called upon to declare, that the deprivation of the Viceroy, if actually 14, 1840, he sent instructions to Stopford explaining that the British ships of war should not enforce a commercial blockade of the ports of Egypt and Syria, and he wrote to Granville stating that the British government regarded the deposition of Mehemet Ali only as a measure of coercion which might be with- drawn if Mehemet should at an early date accept the conditions offered him. See Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Oct. 6, 1840; Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 2, 1840, ibid., pp. 242, 238. "Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. XLIX, Mile. D'Henin to Mrs. Trollope, Oct. 8, 1840, T. A. Trollope, What I Remember, II, p. 48. See also, Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 5, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 267-268. Saint-Arnaud, Lettres, I, pp. 284-285. "Raikes, op. cit., I, p. XLIX. See also, Follett to Croker, Oct. 6, 1840, L. J. Jennings, The Correspondence and Diaries of the Late . . . John Wilson Croker, II, pp. 367-368. See also extracts from various French papers quoted in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 382-383, 395-396. 85 Royal Ordinance, Oct. 7-10, 1840, Duvergier, op. cit., XL, p. 405. ""On Sept. 17, 1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a pro- tocol announcing that they, after having exchanged the ratifications of the con- vention concluded on July 15, had resolved "to declare formally "That in the execution of the engagements resulting to the contracting Powers from the above mentioned convention, those Powers" would "seek no augmentation of territory, no exclusive influence, no commercial advantage for their subjects, which those of every other nation" might not equally obtain. Martens, N. R. G., XV, p. 488. State Papers, XXVIII, p. 348. Annual Register, 1840, p. 452. l88 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! carried into execution, would in her eyes be a blow to the general balance of power. The question respecting the limits which should separate in Syria the possessions of the Sultan and those of the Viceroy of Egypt might be left to the chances of the war actually begun; but France could not abandon to such chances the exist- ence of Mehemet Ali as a vassal Prince of the Empire. Whatever may be the territorial limit which, in consequence of the events of the war, shall ultimately separate them, their two-fold existence is necessary to Europe; and France cannot allow the suppression of either one or the other. Disposed as she is to be a party to any acceptable arrangement, founded on the twofold guarantee of the existence of the Sultan and of the Viceroy of Egypt, she confines herself at present to declaring, that, for her part, she could not consent to the act of deprivation decreed at Constantinople, being carried into execution." 87 Guizot communicated Thiers' famous casus belli note to Lord Palmerston on October 10, 1840. For the latter that communica- tion was most opportune. "The Cabinet met this afternoon," Charles Greville wrote on the date mentioned above. "Lord John Russell was to have taken the lead and developed his conciliatory notions, but a new turn was given to affairs by a note which Guizot placed in Palmerston's hands . . . Palmerston brought it to the Cabinet, where it was read, and, to the extreme surprise of every- body, it was to the last degree moderate, and evincing a disposition to be very easily satisfied. ... It would now appear that the French government would be well enough satisfied if the original terms offered to Mehemet Ali were still held out to him, . . . Palmerston began talking of leaving him Egypt for his life, which was, however, instantly put down by the majority. ... On the whole the result was satisfactory; . . . " 88 to Guizot, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 270-272. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 514-516. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 505-509. Thiers also forwarded to Guizot on Oct. 8, an elaborate answer to Palmerston's note of Aug. 31, 1840. See Thiers to Guizot, Oct. 3, 1840, ibid., pp. 487-505, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 276-284. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 517-529. ^Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 291-292. See also, Melbourne to Victoria, Oct. 10, II, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 237-239. Lord John Russell was at that time on the point of forcing a new crisis in the Cabinet. See Walpole, op. cit., I, pp. 354-357- Palmerston's position then also was strengthened by the publication of his note of Aug. 31, 1840. See The Times, Oct. 7, 10, 1840. 515] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 189 Thiers' note was copied promptly by the press and in both England and France the public interpreted it as signifying identi- cally what the members of the British Cabinet had taken it to mean. 89 "[It] indirectly announces," The Times stated on October 17, 1840, "that the final requisition of France in favour of the Pasha will be limited to that of which none but the shallow brain of Lord Ponsonby would deprive him viz., the possession of Egypt in hereditary sovereignty." 90 It soon became apparent, however, that the President of the French Council was imbued with far less pacific intentions than his note had led the British Cabinet and the public in the two countries to believe. 91 If negotiations were reopened at once be- tween France and the other Powers, he informed Lord Granville on October 15, 1840, he would ask of the 'Chambers when they met only their sanction of the expense which had been theretofore incurred in putting France into a state of defense, but if no such negotiations were entered into he would then request the granting of supplies sufficient for an additional increase of the army and for the putting the national guards "into activity;" he would recall a considerable portion of the forces in Africa; and he would assemble "several armies" ready to act on the frontiers. These statements Granville reported immediately to Palmerston, com- menting that they evidently were intended to persuade him that war was inevitable if the four Powers should persist in refusing "to enter into negotiation with France relative to the conditions of peace between the Sultan and Mehemet AH, and refuse to make 89 The radicals in France were highly dissatisfied with the apparent modera- tion of M. Thiers. See comment upon articles which had appeared in the Com- merce, the National, and the Capitole in ibid., Oct. 16, 1840. Raikes, France since 1830, I, pp. LIV-LV. w The Times, Oct. 17, 1840. See ibid., Oct. 20, 1840. "In the Chamber of Deputies o'n Nov. 28, 1840, Thiers explained the mean- ing of his note of Oct. 8, as follows: "La note ne s'est nullement expliquee sur la limite territoriale. C'est avec intention qu'elle a garde a cet egard le silence; et en vous 1'addressant, je vous ai positivement dit que le cabinet, pour son compte, n'admettait pas les limites du traite du 15 juillet. Je ne pretends pas que cela doive determiner aujourd'hui une autre conduite; mais il ne faut pas attribuer a la Note un autre sens que celui que je lui attribuais le 8 octobre." Journal des Debats, Nov. 29, 1840. See also, accounts of speeches made by Thiers before the Deputies, Nov. 10, 25, 1840, in ibid., Nov. n, 26, 1840. Thiers declared on the 25th that if he had remained in office he would not have permitted the execution of the terms of the treaty of July 15, 1840. I9O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [516 concessions to obtain the concurrence of the French Government in a pacific arrangement." 92 Palmerston, as on former occasions, was not alarmed by Thiers' threats. It is true that on October 15, 1840, he wrote to Ponsonby stating that it was the opinion of the British government that the representatives at Constantinople of the four Powers should state to the Sultan that their respective courts recommended strongly "that if Mehemet Ali should at an early period make his submis- sion to the Sultan, and should agree to restore the Turkish fleet, and to withdraw his troops from the whole of Syria, from Adana, Candia, and the Holy Cities, the Sultan should not only reinstate Mehemet Ali as Pasha of Egypt, but should also give him an hereditary tenure in that Pashalic." 93 That step, though, probably was taken merely to satisfy the members of the Cabinet who en- tertained opinions different from those of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in regard to the danger of war with France. 94 At any rate * 2 Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 313-314. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 529-530. See also, Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 19, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, p. 319. On Oct. 12, Granville had reported that Admiral Hugon's fleet had been recalled from the Levant for the purpose of seizing one or more of the Balearic Isles. France would explain to Spain, he believed, that war with England appeared imminent and as Spain was not strong enough to protect the Isles, it was necessary that a French fleet should do so. See Granville to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840; Palmerston to Aston, Oct. 15, 1840, ibid., p. 298; Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 339-343. In pursuance of his plans Thiers attempted to draw the chief Italian states into an alliance with France. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 310-311. * s Palmerston to Ponsonby, Oct. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 311-312. Martens, N. R. G., I, p. 205. "Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 16, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 242. Walpole, op. cit., I, p. 358. Melbourne wrote to the Queen on Oct. 12, 1840: "The worst is that Palmerston, and John Russell, with now the greater part of the Cabinet, proceed upon principles, opinions, and expectations which are entirely different from one another, and which therefore necessarily lead to a different course of action. We are anxious to finish the business speedily because we fear that there is danger of the Government of France being forced into violent measures by popular outcry. Palmerston, on the contrary, thinks that there is no danger of war, . . . "We should be too glad to see the matter settled, leaving Mehemet Ali in possession of Egypt. "Palmerston has both the wish and the hope of getting him out of Egypt as well as Syria." Victoria, op. cit., I, p. 240. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer, Oct. 3, 1840. Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 333. 5I/] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE 19! on October 20 when Palmerston replied to Granville he was careful to make no statement in which hope that the allies would consent to grant Thiers' demands could be founded. M. Thiers himself, he declared, could not but see that the threatening arma- ment, which France without any apparent cause had already made, had caused the difficulties to be solved to increase instead of to diminish; "and if the course indicated by M. Thiers should be pursued, and if still more extensive armaments should be made by France," it would "be impossible that Europe should not be- lieve, that . . . the real intentions and designs of France" were similar to those which, during the Republic and the Empire, had arrayed Europe in resistance to her aggressions; and thence would follow a conviction that it would be necessary to meet those de- signs by the same combination of defensive means which was "then employed to protect the liberties of Europe." 95 Fortunately for the preservation of peace among the great Powers the exchange of warlike sentiments between Palmerston and Thiers was not destined to be continued further. King Louis Philippe, it will be remembered, had revealed to Guizot at the conference held in August, 1840, at the Chateau d'Eu that he was anxious to avoid war. During the early stages of the agitation in France he sanctioned the military and naval preparations advocated by his Cabinet, 96 but he did so believing that the four Powers would be baffled by effectual resistance on the part of Mehemet AH, that an arrangement between the con- tending parties in the Levant would be concluded, and conse- quently that the peace of Europe would not be disturbed. 97 Fur- thermore he feared that if he should attempt to oppose the clamor for war he would thereby take the risk of stirring up a revolution. 98 w Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 314-315. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 530-531. See also, Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 268-270. "Odilon Barrot, op. cit., I, p. 351. Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 384. Although the King seemed to be in accord with the war party in France, Palmerston and many others realized that he would hesitate long before he would consent to engage in a war with the four Powers. See Palmerston to Bulwer, July 21, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 318. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 260-261. Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 122. ""Greville, op. cit., I, p. 384. Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 349-350. "Dino, op. cit., II, p. 345. 192 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! As time passed it became apparent that the allies were deter- mined to see their policy succeed and it also became apparent that revolutionary ideas were spreading in proportion as the pop- ulace was becoming more and more aroused. The latter fact became particularly obvious early in October after it was known in France that the Anglo-Austrian fleet in the Levant had bom- barded Beyrout. It was at that time that one of the radical Paris journals, the National, realizing that the King was opposed to war, stated: "Old men and babblers are the great scourges of a gov- ernment. Old men wish everything to be stationary; babblers prevent everything from moving on. This double scourge has particularly afflicted France. . . . Elective governments are not subject to these grave evils. When a man has served out his time, or age has frozen or impaired his faculties, he is left in repose, which is for him at once a necessity and a duty." 99 Moreover, in another column of the same issue, "in direct juxtaposition with this article," the editor of the National took care to point out: "King Louis Philippe this day entered his 69th year." 99 A few days later, on October 15, 1840, an attempt to assassinate the King was made by a revolutionist named Darmes. 100 Louis Philippe, believing that it was "la paix qu'on a voulu tuer' in him, 101 became alarmed thoroughly and resolved that the warlike policy of the government should be abandoned. 102 Accordingly, when Thiers suggested to him, October 20, 1840, that he should deliver at the opening session of the legislative chambers an ad- dress breathing defiance and calling for additional means for pre- "An extract from an article published in the National and copied in The Examiner, Oct. n, 1840, p. 648. See also, Guizot, op. cit., pp. 391-392. On Oct. 7, 1840, Thos. Raikes wrote from Paris to Wellington: "The party of the National have now begun their usual mode of attack, as prelude to Revolu- tion. The Marseillaise is sung in the theatres, emeutes are predicted, and the United Societies are busy in sowing sedition. With external war on one hand, and internal war on the other, the chances are that we shall be involved in both." Raikes, Correspondence, p. 159. w The Times, Oct. 19, 27, 1840. Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 399-400. 101 Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Oct. 18, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 132. 102 Dino, op. cit., II, p. 406. The attempt of Darmes to assassinate the King, which aroused others in France beside the latter, was followed by a reaction in favor of peace. See an extract of a letter, Duchatel to Guizot, Oct. 19, 1840, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., V, pp. 402-404. 519] THE ISOLATION OF FRANCE IQ3 paredness, 103 he refused to grant his consent. 104 Thiers and his colleagues, who for some time had been on the verge of retiring from office, 105 resigned immediately. The King, anxious to secure a ministry which would be willing to adopt a pacific policy in regard to foreign affairs, appealed again to Marshal Soult. The Marshal was not willing to resume full responsibility for the con- duct of governmental affairs, but he did consent to become the nominal President of the Council of a new administration, the real head of which was to be M. Guizot, into whose hands Louis Philippe confided the portfolio of foreign affairs. With the fall of Thiers and the rise of Guizot it became apparent that the government of France was resolved to make a serious effort to avoid an outbreak of hostilities between itself and the governments of the other four great Powers of Europe over the question of the enforcement of the Treaty of London. At the same time, all danger of war was not removed. The French and German peoples still were greatly excited; the Soult-Guizot Min- 1M See a copy of the address proposed by Thiers, in ibid., pp. 510512. 10 *Louis Philippe may have been influenced to some extent at that time by a threatening remonstrance which Lord Melbourne sent to him through King Leopold of Belgium. See Sanders, Melbourne Papers, p. 487. At various times during the crisis of 1840, attempts were made by the Courts of both England and France to influence each other by means of communications carried on through the Court of Belgium. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Oct. 10, Nov. 6, 1840, Taschereau, op. cit., pp. 363-365. Leopold to Victoria, Oct. 2, 6, 17, 20, 1840; Victoria to Leopold, Oct. 13, 16, 23, 1840; Victoria to Palmerston, Oct. 12, 1840, Victoria, op. cit., I, pp. 233-234, 235, 243-245, 241-243, 245, 239. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 295. Corti, op. cit., pp. 117 ff. King Leopold was very much alarmed by the Near Eastern crisis. On Nov. 5, 1840, he wrote to Metternich: " 'In view of the condition of social sickliness from which Europe suffers, the Communists regarding the bourgeois as an intolerable burden, quite trivial things, alterations in the Treaty itself, might bring on a great war, which would turn into a war of opinions. To confine it to Mehemed would be impossible. I do not say it in order to strengthen my own proposals, but, as far as I know Europe, I believe that its entire social form and organization would be trans- formed and shattered by such a struggle.' " Quoted by ibid., p. 137. Two days later he wrote even more alarmingly to Billow. See ibid., pp. 133-134. 105 Guizot, op. cit., V, p. 383. Follett to Croker, Oct. 6, 1840, Jennings, op. cit., II, p. 368. Dino, op. cit., II, p. 391, 396. Raikes, France since 1830, I, p. LII. Reeve to Landsdowne, Oct. 5, 1840. Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 123. Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 125-126. 194 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [520 istry's tenure of office was insecure; 106 and it remained to be seen what terms, if any, the Porte and its four allies would ultimately consent to grant to Mehemet AH. 10 *The Austrian Count von Beust was in Paris at the time of the formation of the Soult-Guizot Ministry. At a later date he stated, concerning the ' situa- tion in the French capital on that occasion, that "the political excitement then prevalent in Paris was great; the French felt keenly the humiliation they had brought upon themselves, and Guizot . . . did not lie on a bed of roses." "I remember," he continued, "having heard it said more than once: // en a pour trois semaines. But the three weeks became seven years." Beust, Memoirs of Frederick Ferdinand Count von Beust, I, p. 33. For additional information on public opinion in France, and England also, in October, 1840, see Johnson, op. cit., pp. 8 ff. CHAPTER VI THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED: FRANCE AND THE FOUR POWERS RECONCILED The new Ministers in France did not abandon immediately all hope of being able to secure a modification of the terms of the Treaty of London. The Powers ought to modify those terms, Guizot intimated to Palmerston on the day of his departure from London, in order to satisfy French amour-propre and in order to assist the French government to maintain peace. 1 Later, after he had entered upon his ministerial duties, he made a similar ad- vance to Lord Granville. He suggested then that the four Powers and France should agree to a suspension of hostilities in the Levant on a certain date. According to his plan the status quo in Syria at that particular time would be the basis of the arrange- ment which would be made between the Sultan and the Viceroy, and if the latter should be required to give up any Syrian terri- tory which he still retained he would be compensated for it else- where in Crete for example. 2 Palmerston, however, was no more inclined to grant what M. Guizot pleaded for than he had been to grant that which M. Thiers had attempted to secure by threat of armed intervention. " 'We withstood the threats of Thiers,' " he wrote, October 29, 1840, "'because what he asked could not be granted without great injury to the interests of Europe; and we cannot expose those interests to injury out of complaisance to Louis Philippe Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 336-337- "Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 6, 1840, Parl. Papers, 1841, Session 2, VIII, Correspondence relative to the Levant, III, pp. 1-2. See also, Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 1840, ibid., pp. 24-25. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 305, 309. King Louis Philippe made similar suggestions to King Leopold of Belgium. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Nov. 6, 16, 1840, Taschereau, op. cit., pp. 364-366. The King was alarmed greatly by the situation of affairs. Note the following extract from a letter, Raikes to Wellington, Nov. 7, 1840; "His Majesty [Louis Philippe] is become such an ardent admirer of peace, that, if he were not with- held by certain cogent apprehensions, I believe he would now not only sacrifice Egypt and the Pasha, but even Toulon and Marseilles, if necessary to accom- plish his desired object." Raikes, Correspondence, p. 183. See also Raikes, Journal, IV, pp. 85-86. [195] 196 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [522 or Guizot any more than out of fear for Thiers; ... if we were to give way, the French nation would believe that we gave way to their menaces, and not to the entreaties of Louis Philippe.' " 3 Four days later Palmerston forwarded to Paris a reply to the famous casus belli note of October 8, 1840. In that reply he went so far as to deny that the Pasha of Egypt was an essential element of the balance of power in Europe. It was the opinion of the Turkish government, he pointed out, that the continuance of Mehemet All in his existing state of military power and with his hostile intentions towards the Sultan was "incompatible with the internal peace and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and de- structive of the independence of the Sultan as regards his rela- tions with foreign Powers :...." The extent of the limits within which it might be necessary to confine the delegated authority of Mehemet AH, in order to make it probable that for the future he would be an obedient subject, was a point on which opinion might differ. Her Majesty's government believed that whatever might be the views entertained on the subject by foreign Powers, such views could only serve to regulate the advice which those Powers might tender to the Sultan. It remained with the latter, as sovereign of the Turkish Empire, to decide which of his sub- jects should be appointed by him to govern particular portions of his own dominions, and no foreign state had a right to control him "in the discretionary exercise of one of the inherent and essential attributes of independent sovereignty." 4 M. Guizot, who hoped that the British government would "do or say something to assist him" in his struggle against the war party in France, was greatly disappointed by Palmerston's note of November 2, 1840. The new administration's tenure of office, it should be remembered, was by no means secure, and among the Deputies who were finally convened on November 4, just one day before Granville delivered the British Minister's note to the government of France, 5 the effect produced by that commu- 'Palmerston to Granville, Oct. 29, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, p. 347. *Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 2, 1840, Levant Correspondence, II, pp. 338-340. Annual Register, 1840, pp. 531-533. The first real test of the parlimentary strength of the Soult-Guizot Ministry came on Nov. 6, 1840, when its candidate, M. Sauzet, was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Sauzet received 220 votes while M. Odilon Barrot, his chief opponent, received 154. See Journal des Debats, Nov. 7, 1840. 523] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 197 nication was "markedly favorable to M. Thiers," the leader of the opposition. 6 "The note of November 2nd," Guizot wrote to Henry Reeve, "has seriously injured my position and increased the difficulties which surround me. ... I am engaged in a great struggle for the cause of peace, of civilization, of a straightfor- ward and moderate policy. I am striving for the general good. Nothing shall discourage me. I do not know if I shall succeed, but if I do, I shall owe no gratitude to anyone; at least I have the right to say so, at present." 7 Even the Conservatives in England believed that the position taken by Palmerston in his famous note was too uncompromising. "It is ... a subject of great regret," The Times stated, Novem- ber 13, 1840, "that in Lord Palmerston's first despatch to be laid before M.- Guizot, his Lordship could put forward no more conciliatory and more straightforward principles for future agree- ment, . . . the publication of this document is certainly rather calculated to strengthen the suspicions we have already expressed of Lord Palmerston's wilful opposition to every species of con- cession than to encourage those hopes of an amicable arrangement, which are so warmly and generally entertained in this country." 8 'Letter from Paris, Nov. 13, 1840, The Times, Nov. 16, 1840. Note also the following extract from the Journal of Thos. Raikes, who was then residing in France: "Nov. 14, 1840 ... I am very much afraid that this unfortunate note of the 2nd, in the papers, will undo all the good that we had hoped to gain by the change of Ministry." Raikes, Journal, IV, p. 90. 'Guizot to Reeve, Nov. 20, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 138. See also, Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 44. *The Times, Nov. 13, 1840. In the House of Commons Palmerston explained in the following terms why he sent to Guizot his reply to Thiers' note of Oct. 8, 1840: "All I can say is that circumstances prevented me from writ- ing that answer sooner; and it did not appear to me that the fact of a change of Government in France was any reason for preventing me from putting an answer on record to arguments which I could not admit, and to which it was extremely important that there should be a recorded reply." Parl. Deb., LVI, p. 113. See also, Palmerston to Bulwer, Aug. 17, 1841, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 380-381. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 414-415. Guizot objected particularly because Palmerston permitted his note to be published by the public press. It is prob- able that Palmerston's purpose in so doing was to combat the ideas advanced by the "Friends of Peace" who were holding meetings in Manchester and other important British cities. See Palmerston to Fox Maule, Oct. 31, 1840, G. Douglas and G. Ramsay, The Panmure Papers, I, pp. 19-20. 198 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [524 Palmerston's note caused many to doubt if the allies would really attempt to induce the Porte to reinstate Mehemet Ali in the governorship of Egypt. 9 Those doubts, however, were not destined to be realized. On November 9, 1840, despatches from Vienna arrived at London, and in them it was intimated that Prince Metternich was in favor of leaving Egypt in hereditary possession to Mehemet Ali on condition that the latter should agree promptly to submit to his overlord. 10 A day later Palmerston received a note from Bloomfield, the British charge d'affaires at St. Peters- burg, announcing that Count Nesselrode had decided to send to Titow, the Tsar's representative at Constantinople, instructions similar to those which the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs had forwarded to Ponsonby, October 15, I84O. 11 Soon after these communications reached the English capital, on November 14, 1840, the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers signed a memoran- dum in which they declared that their courts would advise the Porte to grant its pardon to Mehemet Ali and to reinstate him in the Pashalic of Egypt provided that he, on his part, should first offer his submission to the Sultan. 12 Furthermore, on the same date that the memorandum was signed, Palmerston instructed the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that they should order Admiral Stopford to send a "competent officer" to Alexandria to demand from the Pasha the restoration of the Turkish fleet and the evacuation of Syria, Adana, Candia, Arabia, and the Holy Cities. The officer, he directed, should give the Viceroy three days in which to answer those demands, promising him that in case he submitted to them the four Powers would advise the Porte to reinstate him in Egypt. If the Viceroy should do as he was ordered and write an unsealed engagement to the Porte to that effect, the former should immediately carry it to Constantinople and present it to the Ministers of the Sultan, but he should decline to carry any message in which Mehemet did not comply with the above named conditions. 13 *Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 13, 184.0, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 25. 10 Beauvale to Palmerston, Oct. 28, 1840, ibid., pp. 14-15, 15. "Bloomfield to Palmerston, Oct. 31, 1840, ibid., p. 17. "Ibid., pp. 21-22. Documents Diplomatique -s relatifs a la question d'Orient. "Palmerston to Lords Commissioners of Admiralty, Nov. 14, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 23. On the same date Palmerston forwarded two other communications to the Lords Commissioners. In one he explained that, in case 525] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 199 At the time when Palmerston and the representatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia were outlining conditions which they intended to enforce upon Mehemet Ali the allied military and naval opera- tions were being carried forward rapidly in the Levant. "I believe history does not record such unexampled successes gained in so short a time by so small a force," Sir Charles Napier has stated with, evident pride in his War in Syria. "We landed on the loth of September at D'Jounie, with 5300 Turks, 1500 marines, and about 100 Austrians; by the loth of October we had managed to storm and take Sidon, defeat the Egyptians at Ornagacuan, Ibrahim Pacha at Boharsof, and . . . between prisoners and de- serters, get possession of 10,000 men, had freed all Lebanon, and forced Ibrahim to withdraw his troops from Tripoli and Latakia, abandon the passes of the Taurus, and concentrate the whole of his army at Zachle and Damascus [jic]." 14 Soon after the successes in upper Syria, which Napier men- tioned, had been achieved, Admiral Stopford received orders from England to the effect that the allied fleet should attack the famous fortress of St. Jean d'Acre. 15 Accordingly on the afternoon of November 3, 1840, a heavy bombardment of the place was begun. The firing of the British, Austrian, and Turkish gunners must have been very effective indeed. Great confusion resulted immediately among the defenders; at about 4 p. m., the fort's magazine blew up, and before nightfall practically all of the shore batteries were silenced. The Egyptians, realizing that they would not be able to continue successfully the defense of their positions, withdrew forth- with under cover of darkness, and on the morning of November 4, forces from the fleet took possession both of the fortress and of the town. 16 Mehemet Ali, in his written engagement to the Porte, should express a desire that he should be given the hereditary possession of Egypt, the officer should not on that account refuse to carry it to Constantinople. In the other he ordered that Stopford should push forward with vigor the military and naval operations on the coasts of Syria and Egypt until he heard from Constantinople that an arrangement had been made with Mehemet Ali. See ibid., p. 24. "Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 173. "Ibid., p. 1 86. "Stopford to O'Ferrall, Oct. 31, Nov. 4, 8, 1840, Annual Register, 1840, pp. 546-549. Ibid., pp. [i92]-[i93]. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 197 ff. Napier, Correspondence, II, pp. 93 ff. Barker, op. cit., II, pp. 238-239. Paton, op. cit., II, p. 196. 2OO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [526 The victory of the allies at Acre was in reality the most impor- tant event of all the military and naval operations in the Levant during the war of 1840. Before the date of that victory Mehemet AH had declared persistently that he would not submit unless his overlord granted to him, in tenure for life at least, the whole of Syria as well as the hereditary possession of Egypt. 17 But, on November n, 1840, two days after the fall of Acre had been announced at Alexandria, 18 he wrote to the King of the French stating that he would "be satisfied" if he were granted, in addition to Egypt, only the Pashalic of Acre. 19 Ten days later a British fleet of six sail of the line under command of Commodore Napier took up a position off the harbor of the Egyptian metropolis. 20 This threatening move on the part of his opponents added to what had taken place previously must have convinced the Pasha thor- oughly that any further resistance on his part would be useless, for when Napier suggested to him that he should agree to accept terms which would be in harmony with the ideas advanced by Lord Palmerston, in his note of October 15, 1840, to Ponsonby, he did not object to following such a course. 21 In fact on Novem- ber 27, 1840, he even signed with the British Commodore a con- vention in which he engaged to order his son Ibrahim to proceed at once to the evacuation of Syria and promised to restore the Ottoman fleet to the Sultan as soon as he should receive official notification that the Sublime Porte had granted to him the hered- itary government of Egypt, which concession was to be and remain "Letter from Alexandria, Oct. 28, 29, 1840, The Times, Nov. 12, n, 1840. "Letters from Alexandria, Nov. 9, 1840, ibid., Dec. I, 1840. ^Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 92-93. According to an Austrian report from Alexandria, Nov. 15, 1840, Mehemet AH was ready to offer his complete submission, but Cochelet and Walewski, who had returned to Egypt after his failure to induce the Porte to accept the Viceroy's terms, had influenced him to refrain from doing so. See ibid., pp. 98-100. See also Letter from Alexandria, Nov. u, 1840, The Times, Dec. I, 1840. *Napier, Correspondence, II, p. 103. Napier, War in Syria, I, p. 249. A smaller British squadron had been stationed off Alexandria for some time. See The Times, Nov. 2, II, 17, 1840. "Napier received a copy of Palmerston's note of Oct. 15, 1840, on the day that he arrived off Alexandria. See Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 249-252. His correspondence with Mehemet AH began on Nov. 22, 1840. For the letters which were interchanged see ibid., pp. 254 ff. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 72-81. The Times, Dec. 15, 1840. 527] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 2OI " 'guaranteed by the Powers.' " Napier, in turn, engaged " 'to suspend hostilities on the part of the British forces against Alex- andria, or any other portion of the Egyptian territory/ " and promised that the Egyptian army should " 'have the liberty of retiring from Syria with its artillery, arms, horses, ammunition, baggage, and in general everything' " that constituted " 'the stores of an army.' " 22 It is true that Commodore Napier and Mehemet Ali were able thus to agree upon an arrangement which seemed to settle the most important problems at issue in the Levant. But Napier in his negotiations with the Viceroy had acted without instructions either from the British Cabinet or from Admiral Stopford, his superior in command. 23 When Stopford learned of the existence of the convention of November 27, 1840, he was, to say the least, greatly dissatisfied. " 'I am sorry'," he stated in a letter to the Commodore, December 2, 1840, " 'to say that I cannot ratify, or approve of this measure: setting aside the unauthorized manner and the unnecessary haste with which so important a document was executed, with the Commander-in-Chief within two days' sail of you, the articles of that Convention, if carried into execution, in the present state of affairs in Syria, would be productive of much more evil than good, and occasion much embarrassment.' " 24 On the same date when Stopford wrote to Napier disapproving of the arrangement of November 27 he also wrote similarly to Mehemet Ali. 25 Soon thereafter, however, he received from Lon- don copies of the memorandum of November 14, 1840, and the instructions which Palmerston had directed the Lords Commis- sioners of the Admiralty to forward to him. The admiralty instruc- tions, it will be remembered, provided for the sending of an officer to Alexandria with the purpose of persuading the Pasha to consent to accept terms which resembled, in some respects at least, those defined in the Napier convention. Hence it was necessary for Stopford to adopt a policy similar to the one which he had just condemned. "Ibid., Martens, A'. R. G., XV, p. 489. Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 282- 283. Laurent, op. cit., I, pp. 202-205. ^For Napier's explanation of his conduct, see Napier, War in Syria, I, pp. 253-254. "Ibid., II, pp. 3-4. K Ibid., pp. H-I2. 2O2 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [528 Captain Fanshawe, the officer whom the Admiral chose to carry out his instructions, set out on his mission December 6, i84o, 26 and arrived at Alexandria two days later. He found the Viceroy dissatisfied because of Stopford's refusal to ratify the convention of November 27, but unwilling, nevertheless, to refuse to comply with the modified British demands. 27 Accordingly, on December II, 1840, after a very brief period of negotiation, the Captain received from His Highness an unsealed letter to the Porte in which Mehemet AH announced his "most humble submission" to his overlord and declared that on the receipt of a firman, making known in what manner it should please His Imperial Majesty that the fleet should "be delivered up and despatched" from Alexan- dria, he would hasten to conform to the sovereign will by carrying that firman into execution. Furthermore, as he was ready to withdraw all of the Egyptian authorities who were "in the Island of Candia, in the Hedjaz, and in the two Holy Cities, on the arrival of His Imperial Majesty's firman in that respect," the above mentioned places would be evacuated without delay. 28 Fanshawe, believing that this letter met the demands outlined in the instructions which Stopford had passed on to him, returned immediately to the fleet, and "after delivering the Pacha's reply Z6 See Instructions for Fanshawe on his Mission to Alexandria, Dec. 6, 1840, ibid., pp. 316-317. The most important difference between the terms which Napier had promised to the Pasha and those which Fanshawe was about to suggest lay in the fact that in the latter terms it was not guaranteed that the Sultan would grant to Mehemet AH the hereditary possession of Egypt. 27 For accounts of Fanshawe's negotiations at Alexandria, see Fanshawe to Stopford, Dec. 12, 1840, ibid., pp. 21-27. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 124- 126. Larking to Palmerston, Dec. 22, 1840, ibid., pp. 128-129. Letters from Alexandria, Dec. 9, 12, 1840. The Times, Dec. 29, 1840. It appears that in Nov., 1840, Guizot sent a despatch to Cochelet ordering him to advise the Viceroy to submit to the terms outlined in the memorandum of Nov. 14, 1840, and that that despatch reached Alexandria before the date of the negotia- tions between Fanshawe and Mehemet Ali. See Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 20, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 35. Metternich to Sainte-Aulaire, Dec. 30, 1840, Metternich, op. cit., VI, p. 428. ^Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Dec. n, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 148-149. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 29-31. See also, Mehemet Ali to Muhafiz of Candia, Dec. n, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 150-151. 529] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 2C>3 to the Admiral," proceeded with Mehemet Ali's submissive com- munication to Constantinople. 29 On December 18, 1840, soon after the British Captain arrived at the Ottoman capital, he had an interview with the Grand Vizier during which he narrated the chief events of his mission to the Egyptian metropolis, and delivered up Mehemet Ali's letter of December n. In his reply the Turkish Minister avoided prom- ising that the Viceroy would be pardoned and reinstated in the governorship of Egypt. The question at issue, he declared, was one of foreign policy, belonging entirely to the department of foreign affairs. The Porte would take it into consideration with the representatives of the allied Courts, and His Excellency the Minister of Foreign Affairs would make known the intentions of the Porte. At the same time he did not hesitate to reveal the sentiments which he personally entertained. When Fanshawe spoke about the conclusion of peace he exclaimed: "'Peace is made between two Governments, and not between a Soverign and one of his rebel subjects.' " " 'The fleet is ours;' " he declared on another occasion during the interview, " 'Alexandria is our coun- try; we are perfectly sure of having the fleet sooner or later.'" 30 Although the Ministers of the Sultan, encouraged by Lord Pon- sonby, probably did hope to secure the complete ruin of the Pasha 31 they hesitated to take any further action without being assured of the cooperation of their sovereign's allies. Therefore, on December 20, 1840, in accordance with the Grand Vizier's promise to Captain Fanshawe, Reschid Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, called together the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, and after mentioning that the Porte had received copies of Mehemet Ali's letter dated December u, "Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 28. See also, Mehemet AH to Stopford [no date given], ibid., pp. 20-21. Levant Correspondence, III, p. 130. 30 Pisani to Ponsonby, Dec. 18, 1840; Fanshawe to Stopford, Dec. 18, 1840, ibid., pp. 136-137, 168. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 33-35. 31 See a copy of a despatch which the Porte forwarded to Chekib Effendi, Dec. 8, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 115-116. Both Lord Ponsonby and the Ottoman Ministers condemned Napier's convention. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, Dec. 8, 15, 1840, ibid., pp. 112, 134-135. Ponsonby to Napier, Dec. 7, 1840, Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 7-8, 12. 2O4 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [530 1840, and the memorandum dated November 14, 1840, asked them if the Pasha by his letter had complied with the spirit of the memorandum and if his submission ought to be considered as real. Lord Ponsonby replied evasively that it belonged to the Sultan alone to decide this point. "I have precise orders," he declared, "to advise the Porte to grant [the] hereditary succession to, Mehemet Ali, so soon as it shall apprize us that the Sultan is satisfied with the submission of Mehemet Ali; but such advice can only be conditional; I have not the right to judge of the reality of the submission, and I must wait, before giving it, for the Sultan to pronounce himself on the fact of the submission." "I declare," he continued later, "that, in my opinion, Mehemet Ali has now no right; that the Sultan is master to take the course which he shall consider fitting, and that we can only afford him our ad- vice." The representatives of the three eastern Powers, taking a different stand concerning the question, intimated that the Porte should trust Mehemet Ali and act with moderation towards him. "The letter is a commencement of submission," the Internuncio of Austria stated. "If the Sublime Porte demands the delivery of the fleet, if Mehemet Ali restores it, and if he evacuates the coun- tries specified in the Memorandum, his submission will certainly be then complete." 32 The difference of opinion existing between Ponsonby and the other allied diplomats, which was revealed at the conference held on December 20, must have encouraged Reschid Pasha and his colleagues, who wished to enforce severe terms upon the Viceroy, to hope for ultimate success. Nevertheless, they were careful to make it appear that the Porte was ready to act in accord with the policy outlined in the memorandum of November 14, 1840. "His Imperial Majesty," Reschid Pasha informed Ponsonby, December 27, "wishing to prove by a fresh act the moderation of his sentiments, is disposed to accept the submission of Mehemet Ali, and only awaits the fulfilment of the conditions imposed upon "Protocol of the Conference held at the House of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sublime Porte, the 20th of December, 1840, between the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on one part, and the representatives of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on the other, ibid., pp. 318-329. Levant Corres- pondence, III, pp. 140-144. N. Bordeano, L'Egypte d'apres les traites de 1840- 1841, pp. 47-55. 53 I ] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 2O5 him by the Memorandum of the I4th of November, to consider that submission as complete, and to confirm Mehemet Ali in the Pashalic of Egypt. "With the view of hastening that fulfilment, and of thus prov- ing more clearly his desire to lend himself, as far as is in his power, to the views of his august Allies, the Sultan has decided that Yaver Pacha (Admiral Walker) and Mazloum Bey shall proceed immediately to Egypt as his Commissioners to receive the Ottoman fleet, and to ascertain that the places described in the Memorandum of the I4th of November are evacuated by the troops of Mehemet Ali." 33 In the meantime the danger of a war breaking out between France and the four Powers because of the execution of the treaty of July 15, 1840, had practically disappeared. It is true that the situation in France remained uncertain for some time after the resignation of Thiers and his colleagues. 34 The press, with very few exceptions, continued its demand for the adoption of an aggressive policy, 35 and in the Chamber of Deputies the radicals were able to carry on a formidable struggle with those who de- fended the policy of the Soult-Guizot administration. 36 Never- theless, it became apparent before the close of the month of "Rechid Pasha to Ponsonby, Dec. 27, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 156. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 39-40. Bordeano, op. cit., pp. 56-57. Guichen, op. cit., p. 461. **On Nov. 6, 1840, Henry Reeve, who was familiar with conditions in France, wrote to Lansdowne: 'The French Government is on the slope of revolution; the silence, the morne attitude of the populace yesterday at the opening of the Chambers, is the most frightful of all symptoms in France; it accompanied Louis XVI from Versailles and from Varennes; it followed Charles X to Cherbourg." Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 135. See also Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Nov. 7, 1840, ibid., pp. 136-137. "See extracts copied from the National and Univers, in The Times, Nov. 2, 1840. See also ibid., Nov. 5, 6, Dec. 9, 1840. On Nov. 3 The Times stated: "... up to the present moment the Journal des Debats is the only newspaper published in Paris that defends the new Ministry." "For summaries of the exciting debates in the French Chambers during the latter part of November and the early part of December, see Journal des Debats, Nov. 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, Dec. i, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1840. On Dec. 5, 1840, a pacific address to the King was adopted by the Deputies by a vote of 247-161. Sum- maries of the French debates will also be found in The Times. A discussion of them will be found in Guichen, op. cit., pp. 451 ff. 2O6 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [532 November that Louis Philippe's new Cabinet, supported mainly by elements determined to avoid war, was gaining ground. 37 After news of the decisive engagement fought at Acre on November 3, 1840, reached western Europe, 38 Palmerston's British critics even recognized that fact and admitted that the policy which the Queen's Secretary of Foreign Affairs and his allies had adopted, and which he and the Russian Ministers had refused obstinately to abandon, 39 was sure to triumph. "From all that has now been said and published," Henry Reeve wrote to Charles Greville, November 24, 1840, "it results that I, for one, have been in great part mistaken; mistaken as to the danger of Russian interference, mistaken as to the result of the operations in Syria, and mistaken as to the real policy and feeling of France." 40 Greville, who enter- tained opinions similar to those of Reeve, wrote in his journal, December 4, 1840: "In the course of the last three weeks, . . . a mighty change has taken place; we have had the capture of St. Jean d'Acre and the debate in the French Chambers. Palm- erston is triumphant; everything has turned out well for him. . . . His colleagues have nothing more to say; and as Guizot makes a sort of common cause with him in the Chamber [of Deputies], and Thiers makes out a case for himself by declaring objects and designs which justify Palmerston's policy and acts, and as the Pasha is now reduced to the necessity of submission, the contest is at an end." 41 37 See Reeve to Mrs. Reeve, Nov. 13, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 137. The decline in the strength of the French war party became still more obvious in Dec., 1840. That party hoped to be able to make a great demonstration when Napoleon's body was brought to Paris. But their efforts to do so, when the event occurred, Dec. 15, 1840, failed miserably. See Journal des Debats, Dec. 16, 1840, The Times, Dec. 18, 1840. The Examiner, Dec. 27, 1840. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 19. Malmesbury, op. cit., I, p. 128. 38 See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 47. Disraeli to Disraeli, Nov. 21, 1840, W. F. Monypenny, The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, II, p. 96. 39 Palmerston to Bloomfield, Nov. 26, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 35. 40 Laughton, op. cit., I, p. 140. See also Reeve to Greville, Nov. 29, 1840, Johnson, op. cit., p. 48. "Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 308-309. On Nov. 15, 1840, Palmerston wrote to Granville: " 'Remusat has let the cat out of the bag by declaring that France, in protecting Mehemet Ali, meant to establish a new second-rate maritime Power in the Mediterranean, whose fleet might unite with that of France for 533] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 2O7 The dangerous stages of the crisis of 1840, in fact, had been passed by. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, was not satisfied merely to prevent war from breaking out between his country and the four Powers which had signed the convention of July 15, 1840. In addition, he was anxious to discover some means by which France might escape from her isolated position and secure a reestablishment of the concert of the five Powers. When he entered office, be it remembered, he had hoped to secure this end through a modification of the terms which the four Powers had taken steps to enforce upon the Viceroy. He clung to that idea for some time even after Granville had communicated to him Palmerston's note of November 2. 42 Late in November, with that idea still in view, he sent Baron Mounier upon an unofficial mission to England to observe "la disposition des esprits," to talk freely with men of affairs, and to estimate thus without prejudice "the chances for the future." 43 At London the Baron found "the most sincere partisans of peace" convinced that it would be neces- sary for Mehemet Ali to submit to the terms of the treaty of July 15." After Guizot had received from Mounier reports concerning the attitude of the British and after he had learned of the fall of Acre, he finally gave up all hope of securing a modification in the terms the purpose of serving as a counterpoise to that of England. That is plain- spoken, at all events. " 'If the French scheme for the Levant had succeeded, we should infallibly have had war before long, and growing out of those very affairs on which we should have made concessions in order to preserve peace. The moral and diplo- matic contest we have had with France now will probably tend to keep the two nations without war for some years to come.' " Twelve days later he wrote: " 'This is indeed glorious news from Syria; and our fleet has maintained its old reputation. This exploit [the capture of Acre] must settle the Eastern question, . . . " This result will also render Guizot's task more easy; for nobody can think in France of going to war now to revive a dead man.' " Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 15, 27, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 351, 365. "Guizot to Reeve, Nov. 20, 1840, Laughton, op. cit., II, p. 138. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 302-306, 309. Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 30, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 365-366. Faucher to Reeve, Nov. 12, 1840, Faucher, op. cit., I, p. 100. 43 Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 49. Letter from Paris, Nov. 20, 1840, The Times, Nov. 24, 1840. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 310. "Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 50. The Examiner, Jan. 10, 1841, p. 19. 2O8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [534 of the Treaty of London. He did not give up, though, his hope of finding means whereby France might reenter the Concert of Europe. The French government, he maintained December 18, 1840, in a letter to Bourqueney, who was still Louis Philippe's charge d'af- faires at London, had remained foreign to the treaty of July 15, 1840, that is to say it had taken no part in the adjustment of the relations of the Sultan and of the Pasha through the intervention of Europe, because it had not been pleased either by the territorial basis of that adjustment or by the methods of coercion employed to secure its success. It would not offer opposition " c au fait'," but at the same time it would not associate itself with the four Powers in order " 'to render homage' " to the arrangement which they were enforcing in the Levant nor would it guarantee the stability of that arrangement. It would remain therefore, " 'en dehors du treaty of July 15 and of the coalition which had signed it.' " Nevertheless, after the purpose of that treaty had been secured there would remain " 'the great question, the question of the relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe.' " The relations of the Sultan and the Pasha formed, for the Ottoman Empire, an " 'internal question' " upon which France and " 'her allies' " had separated from each other. The relations of the Ottoman Empire with Europe formed an " 'external question,' " general and per- manent in character, which it would be impossible to regulate effectively or definitely without the cooperation of France with the other Powers. Besides this great question exterieure there would remain also the question of giving guarantees against op- pression to the Syrians, especially the Christians of Mt. Lebanon, over whom the direct authority of the Porte was being reestab- lished. 45 " 'Far . . . from desiring to persist in our isolation,' " Guizot declared, " 'we have always in view the reestablishment of the 4S Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 54-55. On Dec. 13, 1840, Guizot wrote to Barante: "Nous n'avons nul dessein de raster etrangers aux affaires generates de 1'Europe. Nous croyons qu'il nous est bon d'en etre, qu'il est bon pour tous que nous y ren- trerons. La France est trap grande pour qu'on ne sente pas bientot le vide de son absence. Nous attendons qu'on le sente en effet, et qu'on nous le dise. J'ai un degout immense de la fanfaronnade, mais la tranquillite de 1'attente et la liberte du choix nous conviennent bien." De Witt, op. cit., p. 217. 535] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 2CX) Concert of Europe, and we know by what openings, great and small, we are able to return to it. " 'We know also that many desire us to return, and we believe that they are right. Our isolation does nothing for anyone. We are obliged, both for our safety and for the satisfying of the spirit [prevailing] in France, to maintain our present armaments. We have stopped those armaments at the limit which they had attained when the Cabinet was formed. The Cabinet precedent wished to push them further; we have declared that we will not do so; . . . When a door conveniently opens before us for an escape from this situation, we shall not stubbornly insist on remaining [where we are].'" 46 The course followed by Guizot pleased the Austrian and Prus- sian governments greatly. They had been alarmed, it will be recalled, by the situation of affairs in France and they were ex- tremely anxious to escape from the critical position into which they had been drawn through their having signed the convention of July 15, i84o. 47 After the fall of Acre had been announced at Vienna, it is true, Metternich wrote to Neumann instructing him to prevent the French from being under illusions about Syria. " 'Syria is lost irrevocably, lost tout entiere,' " he declared. " '. . . there is not a moment to be sacrificed in persuading Mehemet All to submit.' " 48 But soon thereafter he took care to let Count Sainte-Aulaire, the French Ambassador at the Court of the Emperor Francis, understand that Austria would abstain from an attack upon Egypt and that she would do so because of her regard for the feelings of France. " 'If M. Guizot'," he stated on that occasion, " 'should find some advantage in making this truth known in the [Legislative] Chambers, he may proclaim it [there] with the assurance that it will not be denied by me.' " 49 Further- "Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 55-56. * 7 Granville to Palmerston, Nov. 2, 16, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. i, 31. Greville, op. cit., I, p. 304. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 40 if. **Ibid., p. 47. See also Greville, op. cit., VI, pp. 305, 307. Chreptowitch to Nesselrode, Nov. 17, 1840, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 73-76. Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 484-485. "Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 51. See also, Metternich to Apponyi, Dec. 21, 30, 1840; Metternich to Sainte-Aulaire, Dec. 24, 30, 1840. Metternich, op. cit., VI, pp. 425-429- 2IO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [536 more, when he learned that the Porte, encouraged by Lord Pon- sonby, 50 had rejected the Napier convention, he became so aroused that he requested Beauvale, the British Ambassador at Vienna, to inform Palmerston that if the Porte hesitated to accept the recom- mendation of the allied Powers who had urged it to grant the hereditary government of Egypt to Mehemet Ali the Austrian Court could not admit that the allied Powers should allow them- selves to be compromised by such hesitation. 51 No less concil- iatory were the utterances of Baron Werther, the Prussian Chief Minister. Indeed, he even maintained that "Upon no account would Prussia participate in the destruction of Mehemet Ali; [for] her aim must be to preserve the Osmanli Empire with the cooperation of France." 82 Although Lord Palmerston was less disturbed by the situation in the Levant than were the Austrian and Prussian statesmen, he did not intend, it appears, to adopt a policy which would prevent a reconciliation between France and the four Powers or an imme- diate termination of the Turco-Egyptian question. "It has been reported," he wrote to Ponsonby, December 17, 1840, "but upon what authority is not known, that the Porte was, towards the end "Note the following extract from the diary of the Princess Metternich, Jan. 6, 1841: "Clemens erhielt Depeschen aus Constantinopel. Ponsonby will dur- chaus nicht, dass man sich mit Mehemed Ali verstandigt, und steigert hiedurch die Verwirrung immer mehr." Ibid., pp. 486-487. Others were irritated by Ponsonby's conduct. Reeve wrote to Greville, Oct. 27, 1840: "Admiral Roussin told me such things of Ponsonby's behaviour to him, especially before the battle of Nezib, that my hair stood on end. Even now if one could but get him recalled all might go well: but Lord Alvanley is, or has been, at Constantinople writing the warmest letters to everybody in his favour." Johnson, op. cit., p. 44. "Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 3, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 151. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 60. Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 115-116. 52 Treitschke, op. cit., V. p. ill. See also Guichen, op. cit., pp. 427-428, 449- 450, 462, 465-466. Wheaton, the American, wrote from Berlin, Feb. 3, 1841: "The successful military execution of the quintuple treaty has left so many points of oriental policy unsettled, that the great German Powers probably begin to regret having supported the views of Great Britain, in becoming parties to the arrangement, which has brought upon them unforseen perils without adequate equivalent advantages. Russia has also been disappointed in her expectation of being called on to assist in the consummation of the work; but she has at least the satisfaction of having produced a breach between Franch and Great Britain which leaves her more free to act in pursuing her own exclusive ends." State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 169, Feb. 3, 1841. 53?] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 211 of November, but before it had heard of the submission of Mehemet Ali, disinclined to revoke the decree which had deprived him of the Government of Egypt. It is not unnatural that such a feeling should have existed at that time in the mind of the Turkish Government, but Her Majesty's Government hopes that subsequent events, and the unanimous advice of the Four Powers, will have removed these objections on the part of the Porte, and will have led the Porte to accept the settlement effected by Com- modore Napier's arrangement, or by the subsequent more ample submission of Mehemet Ali." 53 It is true that as long as Guizot had attempted to secure a reestablishment of the concert of the five Powers on the basis of a modification in the terms of the Treaty of London, Palmerston had opposed his effort. 54 But, when it became apparent to the British Secretary that the Frenchman had abandoned those attempts, he assumed a more friendly atti- tude in regard to the question at issue. On January 5, 1841, he received a despatch from Granville which revealed that Guizot on January i, had made to the Queen's Ambassador at Paris statements almost identical in meaning to those which he had written to Bourqueney, December 18, i84O, 65 and, two days later, the French charge d'affaires at London was able to write that, in his opinion, Palmerston " 'was really anxious to discover some way of bringing back France into the concert, although he was still undecided as to the manner in which it should be effected.' " 60 "Palmerston to Ponsonby, Dec. 17, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 88-89. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 51-53. It should also be noted that on Dec. 15, 1840, Palmerston informed the Lords of the Admiralty that they should convey to Commodore Napier the approval by Her Majesty's government of the steps taken by him on Nov. 27. The four Powers, he stated, could not guarantee to the Viceroy, as it was promised in Article I of the Napier Conven- tion, the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt, but, he assured, they would "recommend to the Porte to make the concession specified in the com- munication" which Stopford had been instructed on Nov. 14, 1840, "to convey to Mehemet Ali." Palmerston to Lords of Admiralty, Dec. 15, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 87-88. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 49-51. "Palmerston to Bloomfield, Dec. 2, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 54. Palmerston to Granville, Nov. 30, 1840, Bulwer, op. cit., II, pp. 365-366. "Granville to Palmerston, Jan. I, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 120. " Affaires etrangeres, 657 Angleterre, Bourqueney to Guizot, Jan. 7, 1841, quoted by Hall, op. cit., p. 322. 212 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [538 Even the Court of St. Petersburg seemed willing to enter into an arrangement if it was drawn up in accord with Russian views whereby France and the four Powers would be reconciled. Such an arrangement, in which the principle of the closure of the Straits would be set forth, Brunnow pointed out in one of his despatches, would have the " ''advantage indubitable' " of inducing France to recognize explicitly that principle which, by Article IV of the Convention of London, the four Powers had agreed to accept. 57 Nesselrode, like Brunnow, was willing that the concert of the five Powers should be reestablished on the basis of the closure of the Straits. 58 At the same time, however, believing that Russia had won a great triumph through the conclusion of the treaty of July 15, 1840, he was particularly anxious both to render permanent the friendship which had been established between England and the three absolute Courts, 59 and to prevent the resur- rection of the detested Anglo-French alliance. 60 On January 13, 1841, Guizot, encouraged by the willingness of the four Powers to enter into an arrangement to which France would be a party, wrote to Count Saint-Aulaire stating that while France remained foreign " l apres comme avant' " to the treaty of July 15, 1840, she was ready to resume in Levantine affairs, which were of general interest for Europe, the place which be- longed to her, and also to reenter, through some convenient open- "Goriainow, op. cit., p. 83. "Clanricarde to Palmerston, Dec. 22, 1840; Nesselrode to Brunnow, Dec. 10/22, 1840, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 121, 121-122. w Hall, op. cit., pp. 319-320. *On Dec. 28, 1840, Nesselrode wrote to Meyendorff: "Tout ce que nous demandons a ces deux cours [Prussia and Austria], c'est de ne pas rapprocher de nouveau 1'Angleterre et la France, ce qui est bien plus encore dans leur interet que dans le notre. Au reste, je ne sais, en verite, ce qu'il faudra atten- dre ou craindre dans 1'avenir de la Prusse." Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 102-106. On Jan. 27, 1841, Cambreling, the American representative at St. Petersburg, wrote: "It is understood here, altho I have no official information on the subject, that Prince Metternich has proposed to the late Min[ister] of Turkey, another conference to which it was proposed to invite France for the purpose of deciding upon 'eventualities' or the position and destiny of Turkey, Syria and Egypt, to which the Emperor has replied in his laconic style, 'Pourquoi c'est tres bien faite et vite c'est finie' and that, not perceiving the neces- sity for any further interference, he has declined the proposition." State Dept. Russia, XIV, Cambreling to Forsyth, No. 10, Jan. 27, 1841. 539] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 213 ing, into the Concert of Europe. 61 In the same communication he outlined a series of five " 'points' " which he believed should form the basis of a " 'general act' " which the five Powers should sign " 'in order to terminate in common the affairs of the Orient/ " 62 Those five points in substance were as follows: (1) The declaration of the closure of the two Straits. (2) The recognition of the status quo of the Ottoman Empire, " 'in its independence and its integrity.' " (3) The securing of guarantees from the Porte for the Christian population of Syria. (4) " 'Certain stipulations in favor of Jerusalem.' " 63 (5) Stipulations for the " 'general freedom, and perhaps for the positive neutrality' " of the commercial routes both between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, across the Isthmus of Suez, and between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf by way of Syria and the Euphrates river." 64 The plenipotentiaries of the four Powers at London reassembled soon but they were not willing to state their views as clearly as had Guizot. 65 Consequently negotiations for securing the return of France to the Concert of Europe progressed very slowly. " 'I firmly believe that they [the four Powers] will join with us upon the general question,' " Bourqueney wrote to his superior at "Guizot, op clt., VI, p. 72. "Ibid., p. 74- ""Concerning this point Guizot stated: " 'Cette idee s'est elevee et commence a preoccuper assez vivement les esprits chretiens. Je ne sais ce qui est possible, ni sous quelles formes et dans quelles limites 1'intervention europeenne serait en mesure de procurer a Jerusalem un peu de securite et de dignite ; mais les gouv- ernements, qui se plaignent avec raison de 1'affaiblissement des croyances des peuples, devraient bien, quand 1'occasion s'en presente, donner eux-memes a croyances quelque marque eclatante d'adhesion et d'interet. Que 1'Europe et la politique de 1'Europe reprennent la figure chretienne; personne ne peut mesurer aujourd'hui tout ce que 1'ordre et le pouvoir ont a y gagner.' " Ibid., pp. 73-74. "Guizot spoke of those two routes, " 'qui sont pour toute 1'Europe d'un grand interet, et qui poseraient, pour les relations si rapidement croissantes de 1'Europe avec 1'Asie, des principes excellents que jamais peut-etre on ne trou- vera une si bonne occasion de faire prevaloir.' " Ibid., p. 74. The "road to India" was becoming a source of keen rivalry between England and France. See Guichen op. cit., pp. 490-491. "Guizot, op. cit., p. 74. 214 THB TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [S4 Paris, " 'but will they join upon ground as extensive as we desire? I am a little uncertain about this matter.' " 66 At the time when the negotiations at London were progressing slowly, the situation in the Near East was improving with vary- ing degrees of rapidity. Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker, whom, according to Reschid Pasha's communication to Ponsonby, December 27, 1840, were to "proceed immediately to Egypt . . . to receive the Ottoman fleet and to ascertain that the places de- scribed in the memorandum of the I4th of November" were evacuated by Mehemet Ali, did not depart from the Ottoman capital until January 6, i84i, 67 and even then they were not em- powered to promise to the Pasha that he would receive Egypt in hereditary tenure, nor were they authorized to order a suspension of hostilities in Syria. Instead, they carried with them instructions for General Jochmus, the commander of the allied forces, to de- mand the surrender of the arms and guns of Ibrahim Pasha's army. 68 Baron Sturmer, who probably had received instructions from Vienna similar in meaning to the language which Beauvale re- ported on January 3, 1841, that Metternich had used in a conver- sation with him, discovered directly that the Turkish commis- sioners had not been authorized to assure Mehemet Ali of his receiving the hereditary title to Egypt, and at once called the attention of the other diplomatic agents at Constantinople to the matter. 69 Also, he wrote to Reschid Pasha "earnestly" proposing M Ibid., pp. 74-75. The hesitation of the allied diplomats may have been due partially to the refusal of the French to disarm. The French Chambers, it should be noted, voted, 237 to 162 and 147 to 85, on Feb. i, and April i, 1841, respectively, for the building of extensive fortifications around Paris. See Journal des Debats, Jan. 14, 22, Feb. 2, March 17, 24, April 2, 1841. The Times, Jan. 9, 15, 16, Feb. 13, 1841. Gentleman's Magazine, March, 1841, Series 3, XIV, p. 308. Beust, op. cit., I, p. 34. Odilon-Barrot. op. tit., I, pp. 360-362. Guizot, op. tit., VI, pp. 28 ff. Broughton, op. tit., VI, p. I. "Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44. Palmerston claimed on Jan. 26, 1841, that the delay of the Turkish commissioners had been due to their failure to get a boat for passage. See Palmerston to Beauvale, Jan. 26, 1841, Levant Cor- respondence, III, pp. 160-161. See also, a copy of a letter which the commis- sioners carried from the Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, ibid., p. 182. ""Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 44. "Ibid., pp. 44-45. Sturmer to Ponsonby, Jan. 7, 1841, Levant Corres- pondence, III, pp. 183-184. 54 1 ] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 21$ that he devise, as soon as possible, means to arrest the conse- quences which would surely result from, the policy that the Porte had adopted and suggesting that a steamboat should be sent to Alexandria with additional instructions on this point to Mazloum Bey. 70 Koenigsmarck and Titow, the Prussian and Russian rep- resentatives, supported Sturmer in his contentions. 71 At first, Ponsonby refused to do likewise. 72 When he heard that the Porte was fully satisfied with the submission of Mehemet AH (as he repeated to Reschid, January 9, 1841) he would, acting in accord- ance with his instructions, recommend the granting of the heredi- tary possession of Egypt to the Pasha, but not before then. 73 A day later, however, he received Palmerston's instructions of December 17, 1840, and thereupon he too consented to advise formally in the name of his court that the Porte should grant Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali. 74 Reschid Pasha, in a "message" which he gave on January 9, 1841, "late in the day," to M. Pisani, the British dragoman, stated that if the Porte did grant Egypt in perpetuity to the Viceroy and his descendants it would be done only "conditionally" and not in "simple form." 75 But on January 12 after he was aware that Ponsonby had joined with the representatives of the absolute Courts, he forwarded to the four a Hatti-Sheriff announcing the definite intention of the Porte to confer the hereditary right to Egypt upon Mehemet Ali when his submission should be com- plete. 76 Although the Porte was not aware of the fact, the Viceroy had already adopted measures to make his submission complete. Two TO Sturmer to Rechid, Jan. 7, 1841, ibid., p. 184. 71 Titow to Ponsonby, Dec. 27, i84O/Jan. 8, 1841; Konigsmarck to Pon- sonby, Jan. 8, 1841, ibid., pp. 186-187, J 9 2 - Th instructions which Nesselrode sent to Titow, Jan. 4, 1841, were similar to those which Palmerston sent to Ponsonby Dec. 17, 1840. See Nesselrode to Titow, Dec. 23, i84O/Jan. 4, 1841, ibid., pp. 152-154. "Ponsonby to Sturmer, Jan. 7, 1841; Ponsonby to Titow, Jan. 7, 8, 1841, Ponsonby to Konigsmarck, Jan. 8, 1841, ibid., pp. 185-186, 188-189, I 9 2 - "Ponsonby to Rechid, Jan. 9, 1841, ibid., p. 193. "Ponsonby to Titow, Sturmer, and Konigsmarck, Jan. 10, 1841, Ponsonby to Pisani, Jan. 10, 1841, ibid., p. 194. "IMf, p. 193. 78 Hatti-Sheriff of Jan. 12, 1841, ibid., p. 195. See also, Grand Vizier to Mazloum Bey, Jan. 12, 1841, ibid., p. 196. 2l6 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [542 days before the above mentioned Hatti-Sheriff had been issued Mazloum Bey and Admiral Walker arrived at their destination. 77 Even before that date Mehemet AH had arranged for the surren- der of the Ottoman fleet and for ordering the evacuation of Syria. He made those arrangements with Admiral Napier, who had been sent to Egypt on a mission similar to that of the Sultan's com- missioners and who had preceded the latter to Alexandria by approximately forty-eight hours. 78 After the arrival of the commissioners at the Egyptian metrop- olis the arrangements for the Pasha's formal submission were put into execution immediately. In fact, on the very day of their arrival, January 10, 1841, Hamid Bey, one of Mehemet Ali's officers, and Lieutenant Loring, one of Napier's subordinates, departed from Alexandria for Syria carrying with them instruc- tions addressed to Ibrahim Pasha directing him to retreat with his army to Egypt. 79 Hamid Bey and Lieutenant Loring, it is true, failed to locate Ibrahim Pasha. 80 The Egyptian forces, never- theless, were in full retreat even before those agents started on their mission. 81 Moreover, on January 20, 1841, Admiral Walker, in command of the Ottoman war vessels, which he had received formally from Mehemet Ali, January u, 82 sailed for Marma- rice, a "beautiful landlocked anchorage on the coast of Cara- mana," 83 and three days later, after the provisions of the Hatti- Sheriff of January 12 were known at Alexandria, the Viceroy "Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 71. m lbid., pp. 61 ff. During his stay in Egypt Napier secured from the Vice- roy his promise that in the future he would put in force in the territory under his control the terms of the Anglo-Turkish commercial treaty of Aug. 16, 1838. See ibid., pp. 74-75. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 199-200. In 1838, after that treaty had been signed, Mehemet Ali had declared that he would not object to its provisions. It seems, nevertheless, that he did not carry them into execution. See Larking to Palmerston, Jan. 21, 1841; Palmerston to Larking, Feb. n, 1841, ibid., pp. 179-180, 181. "Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 68. *Jochmus to Stopford, Jan. 30, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 298. "Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 97 ff. On Jan. 31, 1841, Ibrahim Pasha ar- rived, with the major part of his army, at Gaza. Before the end of Feb., 1841, the evacuation of Syria by the Egyptians was completed. See ibid., pp. 141, 191 ff. "Ibid., p. 71. Taton, op. cit., II, p. 215. 543] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 217 himself wrote to the Grand Vizier announcing that he had executed "to the letter" the conditions required of him. "I wait," he de- clared, "for the accomplishment of his [the Sultan's] sovereign promise." 84 Meanwhile, reports concerning the hesitation, late in December, 1840, of the Sultan's Ministers to grant to Mehemet Ali the hered- itary possession of Egypt had reached Vienna, whereupon Prince Metternich, becoming greatly aroused, declared that Austria would remain firm in her pledge to obtain the hereditary title for the Viceroy and that the refusal of the Sultan to grant it would cause her to withdraw her moral and material support from him. 85 Also, he wrote to Sturmer ordering him to make known to his colleagues the attitude of the Austrian Cabinet and to urge them to concur in measures calculated to give effect to the steps taken at Lon- don as stated in Palmerston's note of December 17, 1840, to Ponsonby. If those colleagues did not all agree to concur in such measures he (the Internuncio) should make independently a statement to the Divan explaining the determinations of Austria, leaving it open to the other ministers, should they think it fit, to do likewise. 86 On or very near the same date when Metternich wrote thus to Sturmer, he complained, according to a report which Beauvale forwarded to Palmerston, January 17, 1841, that the British gov- ernment had not used the means in its power to induce the Sultan to confer Egypt hereditarily upon Mehemet Ali. 87 Palmerston, replying to Beauvale, January 26, 1841, claimed that the Prince's charges in regard to the policy followed by the Queen's govern- ment in the past were unjust. 88 Be that as it may, it is certain that soon after the latter date the English Secretary of Foreign Affairs intimated in a despatch written to Ponsonby that if the Porte insisted on refusing to grant to the Pasha the hereditary possession of Egypt, the four Powers would in turn refuse to "Mehemet Ali to Grand Vizier, Jan. 23, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 230-231. Bordeano, op. cit., pp. 64-65. Letter from Alexandria, Jan. 22, 1841, The Times, Feb. 6, 1841. "Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 159. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 60. "Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 160. "Beauvale to Palmerston, Jan. 17, 1841, ibid., p. 160. ^Palmerston to Beauvale, Jan. 26, 1841, ibid., pp. 161-162. 2l8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [544 support its demands, thus forcing it to yield "with a bad grace." 89 It is certain, also, that on January 30 Palmerston joined with the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Russia in presenting to Chekib EfFendi a note announcing it as the opinion of the four Powers that the Sultan should manifest clemency and generosity towards the Viceroy by revoking the "Act of deprivation" which had been decreed against him and by confirming him in the hereditary control of Egypt. ". . . his [Mehemet Ali's] descend- ants in the direct line," it was stated in the note, "shall be suc- cessively named by the Sultan to the Pashalic of Egypt, every time that that post shall become vacant by the death of the pre- ceding Pasha." 90 At Constantinople, even before the date when the collective note addressed to Chekib Effendi was signed, plans were being laid by the Porte, in consultation with the representatives of its allies, 91 to name conditions on which the hereditary right to Egypt would be conferred upon Mehemet Ali. Those plans, after being completed, were embodied in the famous firman of investiture which was proclaimed on February 13, 1841, and which provided: (1) That Mehemet Ali should receive the coveted right to Egypt but that the Sultan should retain permanently the privilege of choosing the successors to the governorship from among the viceroy's descendants in any of the direct male lines. (2) That the person so chosen must repair to Constantinople to receive in person the investiture. (3) That the viceroys of Egypt should be permitted to use no ceremonials, titles, etc., other than those which were permitted to the "other Viziers" of the Sublime Porte. (4) That the provisions of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane, 92 as **Palmerston to Ponsonby, Jan. 29, 1841, ibid., pp. 169-170. "Ibid., pp. 171-172. Documents Diplomatiques. w Lord Ponsonby was accused by his contemporaries of being responsible for the policy adopted by the Porte early in February, 1841. See Dino, op. cit., Ill, p. 47. The Examiner, March 14, 1841. The Times, March n, 12, 13, 15, 19, 1841. It is obvious that Ponsonby did exert his influence at Constantinople to secure the enactment of harsh conditions to be enforced upon Mehemet Ali. See a series of letters and other documents which Ponsonby forwarded to Palmer- ston, Feb. I, 4, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 207-229. * 2 For a copy of the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane and a discussion of its terms see Ed. Englehardt, La Turquie et le tanzimat ou histoire des reformes dans I'empire Ottoman, I, pp. 257-261, 35 ff. 545] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED well as all laws and treaties, either past, present, or future, of the Ottoman Empire should be executed "en entier" in Egypt. (5) That all imposts and revenues should be levied in the Sultan's name, and that the "tenths, duties [droits], and other imposts" should be in conformity with the principles in force in the other provinces of the empire. (6) That a quarter part of the gross revenue should be paid to the Porte. (7) That coinage should be struck only with the permission of the Sultan, and that it should be identical [pareilles] "to that of Constantinople." (8) That the Egyptian army in times of peace should be lim- ited to 18,000 men. (9) That the governors of Egypt should appoint military offi- cers up to and including the rank of kol aghassi (major), but that the superior ranks should be conferred by the Sultan, "sur la proposition des dits Gouverneurs" And, (10) That ships of war were to be built by the said governors only with the express permission of the Sublime Porte. 93 On the same day that the firman of investiture was issued the Porte addressed to the French Ambassador, Admiral Pontois, and to the representatives at Constantinople of the four allied Powers a circular announcing, prematurely it is true, "the final settlement" of the Turco-Egyptian question. 94 When Mehemet Ali learned of the terms which his overlord proposed to grant to him he protested loudly and called attention to important parts of those terms which he declared that it would be impossible for him to accept. " 'The first article [of the firman],'" Commodore Napier wrote from Alexandria, February 23, 1841, " 'he [the Viceroy] considers quite inadmissible, as it would not be acceded to by Ibrahim Pacha, would cause discord ^Levant Correspondence, III, p. 247. Bulwer, op. at., II, 431-434. On the same day that the firman of investiture was issued, a second was addressed to Mehemet Ali "conferring upon him the Government of Nubia, Darfour, Kordufan, and Senaar, and enjoining him to abolish the Negro-hunts, etc." See ibid., pp. 435-436. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 250-251. See also, Grand Vizier to Mehemet Ali, Feb. 13, 1841, ibid., p. 252. "Ibid., p. 254. Also on Feb. 13, 1841, the Porte forwarded to the Inter- nuncio of Austria a request for the aid of the Powers in case Mehemet Ali rejected the terms offered him in the firman of investiture. See ibid., pp. 253-254. 22O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [546 in his family, and a civil war at his death. He also objects to the part of Article 6 which relates to the appointment of officers; hitherto they have all been appointed by him, with the exception of General of Division, and a sudden deviation from that system would disorganize the army, and bring his authority into con- tempt/ " 95 In addition, there were two other parts of the firman which Mehemet AH declared that he could not accept. The sen- tence in which it was stated that one-fourth of the gross revenue of Egypt should be paid to the Porte constituted one of those parts and the portion of an article providing that the Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane and all treaties of the Ottoman Empire should be executed in Egypt constituted the other. 96 The news of the refusal of Mehemet AH to accept all of the terms of the firman of investiture reached Constantinople about the middle of March, 1841, and gave occasion there for a renewal of negotiations between the Ministers of the Porte and the envoys of the four Powers. Reschid Pasha, who had always favored the enforcement of severe terms upon the Viceroy, took the initiative in those negotiations, writing to Lord Ponsonby, March 15: "The hesitation of Mehemet AH Pasha to accept these moderate conditions [named in the firman] is scarcely compatible with the character of a subject, and it is no less clear that to grant the demands as made by him, is a thing as injurious as it is opposed to the rights of the Sultan's sovereignty." 97 Lord Ponsonby in his reply to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that his opinion coincided entirely with the opinion expressed by the latter. The Porte, he advised, should remain inactive and consult its . "Napier to Palmerston, Feb. 23, 1841, quoted by Napier, War in Syria, II, p. 236. See also ibid., pp. 233-234. Napier agreed with the Pasha that some of the provisions of the firman were unjust. See ibid., pp. 234-235. Napier, Correspondence, II, pp. 142-143. **Mehemet AH to Grand Vizier, March 7, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 341-344. The Viceroy talked about renewing the war with his overlord and did actually adopt measures to improve his means of defense. See Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 27, 1841, ibid., p. 376. Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 92-97. Letters from Alexandria, March i, 16, 25, May 22, 26, 1841, The Times, March 29, April 9, June 4, 23, 1841. Gentleman's Magazine, April, May, 1841, Series 3, XV, pp. 420, 530. "Rechid to Ponsonby, March 15, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 352. 54?] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 221 "faithful friend and Ally [Great Britain]." 98 Sturmer, Koenigs- marck and Titow, to whom Reschid forwarded communications similar to the one which he sent to Ponsonby, were more cautious in their replies. The Internuncio announced that he could not reply in his "own name" to the note which he had received," the Prussian claimed that he was not authorized to offer advice to the Porte, 100 and the Russian also found means of excusing him- self. 101 At the same time all three promised that the matter would be brought to the attention of their "august courts." While the Viceroy, the Porte, and the representatives at Con- stantinople of the four Powers were debating and corresponding in regard to the conditions which the Sultan should attach to his grant to Mehemet Ali, of the hereditary title to Egypt, the diplo- mats in western Europe were continuing their negotiations for the conclusion of an arrangement whereby the Concert of Europe could be reestablished. In January, 1841, it will be remembered, nego- tiations to secure such an arrangement had been initiated by the French but no appreciable results had been attained. The progress made during the following month was more satisfactory, for it was known in the west at that time that the Viceroy had surren- dered the Turkish fleet and that the Porte had announced it would grant Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali as soon as his submission was complete. 102 But even then it was impossible to secure an agreement upon the basis of the points which Guizot had sug- gested in his despatch to Sainte-Aulaire, January 13, 1841. Guizot's proposal relative to the Isthmus of Suez, Lord Palmerston claimed, was " 'not a suitable subject for a provision in a treaty.' " The Brit- ish Minister of Foreign Affairs objected also to the idea of including in the arrangement to be signed by the five Powers, a stipulation for the protection of the Christian subjects of Syria. This matter, he declared, could be taken care of better in a special note urging ^Ponsonby to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 371-372. See also Ponsonby to Palmerston, March 27, 1841, ibid., p. 371. "Sturmer to Rechid, March 18, 1841, ibid., pp. 372-373. 100 Konigsmarck to Rechid, March 17, 1841, ibid., p. 374. 101 Titow to Rechid, March 7/19, 1841, ibid., pp. 374-375. 102 Both King Louis Philippe and Guizot were very anxious at that time to secure the return of France to the Concert of Europe. See Louis Philippe to Leopold, Feb. 4, 1841, Taschereau, op. cit., p. 366. 222 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [548 the Sultan to declare for religious toleration. Furthermore, both he (Palmerston) and Brunnow were opposed to the Frenchman's suggestion in regard to guaranteeing the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 103 In fact, the only point con- cerning which the diplomats were able to agree was the one pro- viding for a declaration of the closure of the Straits. 104 At length, late in February, 1841, a plan of an arrangement, which, it appeared, each of the five great Powers would accept immediately was perfected. According to that plan the representa- tives of the four Powers and the Porte would sign a protocol "de cloture" announcing that the Turco-Egyptian question had been solved, and inviting France to return to the Concert of Europe. After that had been done, the representatives of the allied Powers and the charge d'affaires of France would in turn sign a conven- tion proclaiming the closure of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations. 105 At this time, however, a new difficulty arose. Chekib Effendi declared that he could not affix his signature to the protocol de cloture until after he had been notified officially that Mehemet Ali had accepted the firman of investiture, and Guizot, on the other hand, refused to permit Bourqueney to accept the convention while the protocol de cloture remained unsigned. 106 Through the influence of the envoys of Austria and Prussia, who were extremely anxious to secure a final settlement of the question at issue, 107 an attempt was made to secure a compromise. On March 5, 1841, the representatives of the four Powers signed a protocol listing the "desired events" which had occurred in the Near East and announcing that their consuls-general would at once return to Alexandria, thus implying that the Turco-Egyptian difficulties had been terminated. 108 They offered, in addition, to 10I Rohan-Chabot's report to Guizot (no date given); Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 21, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 75-78, 84-87. See also Guichen, op cit., pp. 468-472. 10 *On Feb. 12, 1841, Bourqueney was very much discouraged because of the situation of affairs. See Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 12, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op cit., VI, pp. 79-80. 105 Bourqueney to Guizot, Feb. 26, 1841, quoted by ibid., p. 89. Ibid., pp. 89-90. 107 Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 328, 329, 333. Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 269-270. 108 Guizot, op. cit., p. 91. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 235-236. 549] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 223 sign a second protocol by which France would be invited to return to the European concert but in which no mention of the "question de cloture" would be made. 109 Baron Bourqueney was in favor of accepting this proposed arrangement and he wrote to Guizot urging that he [Bourqueney] should be authorized to enter into it. 110 Guizot, however, although he was anxious that France should escape from her isolated position, believed that his country should avoid a union with the four Powers until after the alliance of those Powers with the Porte had been dissolved through their having declared that the purposes of the treaty of July 15, 1840, had been realized, and hence refused to grant the powers which Bourqueney requested. 111 It is true that soon after Guizot refused to accept the compro- mise plan he authorized the French charge d'affaires at London to "initial" a copy of the convention in which the closure of the Straits was declared. 112 The German plenipotentiaries, it is also true, continued their search for a mode of procedure, by which the return of France to the Concert of Europe could be secured directly. 113 Nevertheless, as Guizot persisted in his refusal to permit Bourqueney to enter formally into an arrangement with the representatives of the allied Powers before those representa- tives had announced that the Turco-Egyptian question was solved, 114 and as Chekib Effendi, supported by Lord Palmerston, 115 "Guizot, op. dt., VI, p. 91. 110 Bourqueney to Guizot (no date given), quoted by ibid., p. 91. 1VL Ibid., pp. 91-93. "'Both the protocol de cloture and the convention for the closure of the straits were "initialed" on March 15, 1841. See Levant Correspondence, III, p. 321-323. m Guizot, op. cit., pp. 103-104. " 4 Granville to Palmerston, March 15, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 328. On April 16, 1841, Bulwer reported to Palmerston that Guizot had made the following statement to him: "I do not wish to be mixed up in it [the settle- ment to be arranged between the Porte and Mehemet AH], or to appear in any way in it. I have no conditions to make for Mehemet Ali; I have nothing to do with him or the conditions he may accept. I only say, that until the affairs in the East shall have been settled, I cannot sign a document which begins by declaring that they are so." Ibid., pp. 382-384. Guizot, however, did intimate to Bulwer that he thought some of the Viceroy's objections to the firman of investiture were reasonable. See ibid. U5 Bourqueney to Guizot, March I, 1841, quoted by Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 89. Greville, op. cit., I, pp. 332-333. 224 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [550 persisted in his refusal to sign a protocol de cloture, a delay in the securing of a final settlement was inevitable. Although Palmerston supported Chekib in regard to the "ques- tion de cloture" especially after it was announced in western Europe that Mehemet Ali had rejected parts of the firman of in- vestiture he did not intend to aid the Porte in securing from the Viceroy his acceptance of all of the conditions which it wished to impose upon him. On March 13, 1841, he joined with the repre- sentatives of Austria, Prussia, and Russia for the purpose of issu- ing to Chekib Effendi a formal communication. In that commu- nication it was admitted that the new difficulty which had arisen between the Sultan and his vassal was one of internal administra- tion, but at the same time care was taken to call the attention of the Ottoman Ambassador to the principles which had been set forth in the collective note of January 30, i84i. 116 Three days later Palmerston wrote to Ponsonby stating that the Sultan should make it clear that in the appointment of the governors of Egypt the rule of primogeniture would always be followed unless in case of infancy or physical incapacity. 117 Again on April 10, 1841, in a similar despatch to the British Ambassador at Constantinople he explained that it was extremely important that the matters in dispute between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali should be settled "as soon as possible." Furthermore, admitting that on some of the points at issue the Viceroy was in the right, he went so far as to instruct Ponsonby definitely to urge the Porte to modify such parts of the firman of investiture as were "open to reasonable objections." 118 The chief Ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia were like- wise unwilling to support all of the demands of the Porte. Count ""Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to Chekib Effendi, March 13, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 263-264. The Times, April 15, 1841. " T Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 16, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 326-327. See also, Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 2, 1841, ibid., p. 350. "^Palmerston to Ponsonby, April 10, ibid., pp. 364-365. Palmerston did not defend all of Mehemet Ali's demands. The Hatti-Sheriff of Gulhane and the treaties of the Porte, he declared, must necessarily be carried into effect. See Palmerston to Ponsonby, March 30, 1841; Palmerston to Beauvale, April 2, 1841, ibid., pp. 337, 346-349. 55 I ] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 225 Nesselrode, as usual, "highly" approved of the attitude taken by the British Minister of Foreign Affairs. 119 Prince Metternich, ex- asperated because of the delay occasioned by the dispute over the conditions which the Ottoman Ministers wished to attach to the grant of Egypt in hereditary possession to Mehemet Ali, assumed an attitude more aggressive than that of the British and Russian statesmen. In a despatch which he wrote to Sturmer, April 2, 1840, it should be noted, he ordered the latter to warn the Porte that if it did not adopt the modifications to the firman of investi- ture recommended by the Congress of London, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor would consider himself released from the obligation which he had contracted on July 15, i84O. 120 Baron Werther's attitude was similar to that of the Austrian Chancellor. Since King Frederick William IV's Minister at Queen Victoria's Court had initialed the convention for the closure of the Straits, he informed William Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, that "the Government [of Prussia] looked upon the Treaty of July as terminated." 121 The fact that the four Powers favored a modification of some of the terms which the Porte had offered to Mehemet Ali, Feb- ruary 13, 1841, became known at Constantinople late in March, and so strong an impression was produced immediately among the Turks that Reschid Pasha and Achmed Fethi Pacha, two mem- bers of the Ottoman Cabinet who were extremely hostile to Mehemet Ali and who probably had had much to do with the lu Clanricarde to Palmerston, April 6, 1841, ibid., p. 381. Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 102. ""Metternich to Sturmer, April 2, 1841; Beauvale to Palmerston, April 9, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 378-380, 378. See also, Guizot, of. cit., VI, p. 101. The Times, April 13, 1841. ^Russell to Palmerston, April 14, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382. On April 21, 1841, Palmerston, in reply to Russell, denied that a question could really be "finished" by merely declaring it so. Prussia, he stated, was bound by the treaty of July "to determine" Mehemet Ali to accept the ar- rangement specified in that treaty. By the last letter which Mehemet Ali had written to the Grand Vizier, he continued, it appeared that the Viceroy ob- jected to some of the fundamental points specified in the treaty of July. See- Palmerston to Russell. April 21, 1841, ibid., pp. 384-385. 226 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [552 preparation of the famous firman of February 13, were obliged to resign from their official positions. 122 However, even after the fall of Reschid Pasha and Achmed Fethi Pasha, the Porte hesitated to modify the terms of the firman of investiture. Reschid's place at the Sultan's foreign office was taken by Rifaat Pasha, a statesman who, indeed, was more in- clined than his predecessor had been to make concessions in favor of the Viceroy. 123 But on April i, 1841, soon after Rifaat had been vested with ministerial power, instructions were forwarded in the name of the Porte to Chekib Effendi, directing him to lay before the British Cabinet arguments defending the parts of the famous firman which Mehemet Ali had declared he would not accept, and ordering him to forward to his home government "as soon as possible" the "official communications which the British Government" would make to him in reply. 124 Nineteen days later, before those instructions had reached London, the Porte an- nounced in a memorandum which was presented to the repre- sentatives of the four Powers at Constantinople, that it had decided that the succession to the governorship of Egypt should be regulated in accordance with the principle of primogeniture, that Mehemet Ali should have the right to appoint officers to any rank below that of general of brigade, and that the tribute should m Guizot, op. cit., p. 105. The Times, April 23, 1841. Brown, the U. S. Dragoman, referring to the dismissal of the two Turkish officials, wrote in a letter to Porter that it was ''conveyed in very moderate expressions." "Rechid Pacha," he stated, "paid a visit a day or two after his dismissal to Rifaat Bey, now Pacha, and it is said that the Sultan has written him a letter of thanks for his services with his own hand. Report says that he is soon to be appointed Grand Vizier." State Dept. Turkey, IX. Brown to Porter, April 7, 1841. Wheaton wrote from Berlin, May 5: "The ascendancy of Reschid Pasha in the councils of the Divan has been overthrown by Austrian influence in order to compel the Sultan to accord such conditions to the Pacha of Egypt as the latter would be willing to accept." State Dept. Prussia, II, Wheaton to Webster, No. 180, May 5, 1841. ""Note the following extract from a letter "from the Turkish Frontiers," April 12, 1841: "Ever since the dismissal of Reschid Pasha from his post, the state of feeling in the Divan has been very favorable to Mehemet Ali." The Times, April 28, 1841. ^Instructions transmitted by Sublime Porte to Chekib Effendi, April I, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 389-390. 553] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 22/ be settled at a fixed amount. 125 These concessions, however, were not at once embodied in a new firman. The Porte on that occa- sion, it appears, had resolved to await an answer from Chekib EfFendi before carrying its promises into execution. 126 It was not until the month of May, 1841, that events moved rapidly towards a final settlement of the Turco-Egyptian ques- tion. Chekib EfFendi transmitted a copy of his instructions, dated April i, 1841, to Lord Palmerston on April 27. 127 The British government did not reply independently in "official communica- tions," but the plenipotentiaries of the four Powers forwarded to Chekib, May 10, 1841, a formal note advising the Porte to make modifications, in the terms of the firman of investiture, almost identically the same as those which the Porte had itself suggested on April i9. 128 Even before time sufficient for the advice of the allied diplomats to reach Constantinople had elapsed, the repre- sentatives of the four Powers at the Court of the Grand Seignior had succeeded in persuading the Ottoman authorities to agree to make the modifications, in the terms to be granted to the Pasha, which were favored by the allied diplomats, 129 and finally on June i, 1841, a new firman which embodied those modifications and which took precedence over the arrangement of February 13, 1841, "'Memorandum from Sublime Porte to Representatives of Four Powers, April 19, 1841, ibid., pp. 419-420. See also, Ponsonby to Palmerston, April 14, 1841, ibid., p. 419. It seems that the action taken by the Porte on April 19 was due, to a large extent at least, to the influence of Austria at Constanti- nople. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 108-110. Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 267 ff. "*Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 433. It is said that the Porte hoped to secure, in return for concessions in regard to the terms of the firman of investiture, an official guarantee from Europe of its independence and integrity. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 108. Not only Palmerston and the Russians, but also Prince Metternich was opposed to giving such a guarantee to the Porte. See Metternich to Sturmer, April 20, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 400-401. "'Chekib to Palmerston, April 27, 1841, ibid., p. 388. "^Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia to Chekib, May 10, 1841, ibid., pp. 404-406. See also, Palmerston to Ponsonby, May n, 1841, ibid., p. 409. ""Ponsonby to Palmerston, May 12, 22, 1841, ibid., pp. 433, 435. See also ibid., pp. 435-440. 228 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [554 was promulgated. "Henceforth," it was declared in the new docu- ment, "Egypt shall descend in a direct line, from the elder to the elder, in the male race among the sons and grandsons. As re- gards their nomination, that shall be made by my sublime Porte." 130 The fact that the Porte was ready to make the desired modifi- cations in the firman of investiture was known at London on June I2. 131 On the 8th of the following month it was announced officially at the British capital that Mehemet Ali had accepted the hereditary title to Egypt upon the revised conditions offered by his overlord. 132 Consequently, as there was no occasion for further delay, the representatives of the allied Powers including the Am- bassador of Turkey attached their signatures, July 10, 1841, to the protocol de cloture thereby acknowledging formally that the "difficulties in which His Highness the Sultan [had] found him- self placed" had "been smoothed," and stating that the British Minister of Foreign Affairs "in agreement with the Plenipoten- tiaries of the four Powers" undertook to invite the government of France "to share in the Act by which the Sultan, on the one part," would declare his firm resolution to maintain in the future the Parl. Papers, 1879, Egypt, No. 4, p. 36. T. E. Holland, The European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 110-113. In the firman of June I, 1841, it was provided that the governor of Egypt should appoint "the officers of the land and sea forces up to the rank of Colonel." Officers of higher rank were to be appointed by the Porte. A firman issued late in May, 1841, fixed the amount of the annual tribute at 80,000 purses (ca. 363,635). See ibid., p. 114. Martens, N. R. G., XV, p. 490. Levant Correspondence, III, pp. 444, 459-461, 463-464. Ibid., pp. 435-440. In May and June, 1841, after the term of the Forte's memorandum of April 19 were known in western Europe the French, supported by the Austrians and Prussians, advocated that the protocol and the conven- tion should be signed immediately. The British and the Russians, however, opposed such a move, contending that the Turco-Egyptian question could not be declared closed until after Mehemet Ali had announced that he would accept the new terms offered by the Sultan. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 108 ff. Nesselrode to Meyendorff, June, 1841, Nesselrode. op. cit., VIII, pp. 142-144. Bloomfield to Palmerston, June 19, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 471. " 2 Ponsonby to Palmerston, June 21, 1841; Chasseaud to Ponsonby, June IO, 1841, ibid., p. 472. See also, Rohan-Chabot to Guizot, June 12, 1841, Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 120-121. Unofficial news of the willingness of Mehemet Ali to accept the terms offered him in the firman of June I, 1841, reached London June 30, 1841. See The Times, June 30, 1841. See also, ibid., June 28, July 5, 1841. 555] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 229 principle of the closure of the Straits "and the five Powers, on the other part, would announce their unanimous determination to respect this principle and to conform themselves to it." 133 Three days later the French charge d'affaires at the Court of St. James joined with the representatives of the allied Powers in signing the above mentioned "act," which has come to be known as the Straits Convention. 134 Thereupon, the reconciliation of France with the Concert of Europe, as well as the termination of the Turco-Egyp- tian question, was complete. The termination of the Turco-Egyptian question and the re- establishment of the concert of the five Powers were events of great immediate significance in European diplomatic relations. The government of Louis Philippe had been taught a lesson, so to speak. In his Memoires Guizot consoled himself by declaring that "Mehemet Ali, driven from Syria, [and] menaced even in Egypt, was established there [in Egypt] with the hereditary title and on equitable conditions, not because of his own strength, but through consideration for France and because the Powers which had signed the treaty of July 15, did not wish to run the risk either of being disunited or of seeing new complications arise." 135 At the same time he admitted that after what he had seen and learned during his mission to England he had "reentered into affairs de- termined never to subject the foreign policy of France to the whims, and to the mistaken ideas of the day." 136 " 'Evade nothing and seek nothing,' " he wrote to Count Sainte-Aulaire a few weeks after the signing of the Straits Convention. " 'It has been our cus- tom to be confident, vainglorious, [and] insistent. We have in- toxicated ourselves by our desires as if they were always our right and our power; we have been fond of the appearance rather than of the reality. I am convinced that, in order to reestablish and to extend our influence in Europe, it is necessary to follow the oppo- site method. I am determined everywhere and on all occasions to ^Levant Correspondence, III, p. 473. Holland, op. cit., p. 99. Noradoungh- ian, op. cit., II, pp. 341-342. Martens, N. R. G., II, p. 126. 134 Noradounghian, op. cit., II, pp. 342-344. State Papers, XXIX, pp. 703 ff. Holland, op. cit., pp. 100 ff. Hertslet, op. cit., II, pp. 1024 ff. Martens, N. R. G., II, pp. 128 ff. The documents which were signed on July 10, 13, 1841, were practically identical to those which were "initialed" on March 15, 1841. " 5 Guizot, op. cit., VI, p. 128. Ibid., p. 129. 23O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [556 sacrifice le bruit au fait, the appearance to the reality, the first moment to the last. We shall risk less and we shall gain more. And besides, il n'y a de dignite que la,' " 13T Russia, on the other hand, was for the moment triumphant. 138 It is true, she had given up the rights confirmed to her by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. But, according to Nesselrode, she be- lieved she had lost nothing which was of any real value to her. She had secured from France, through the settlement of 1841, the latter's recognition of the principle of the closure of the Straits, she had avoided entering into an arrangement guaranteeing the independence and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and she had the satisfaction of knowing that the Anglo-French alliance, as it had existed formerly at least, had not been reestablished. 139 lbid., p. 129. Sainte-Aulaire had just received appointment as French Ambassador to England. ^Note the following extract from a memorial concerning the foreign policy of Russia during the years from 1825 to 1850, issued by Count Nesselrode to Nicholas I, Nov. 20 (old style), 1850: "Deux fois a six ans d'intervalle, assailli par Pambition d'un vassal revoke, 1'Empire Ottoman s'est vu menace d'une dissolution presque inevitable. Deux fois il a du son salut a 1'intervention decisive de V. M. La premiere de ces deux crises a donne au monde un spectacle inou'i dans 1'histoire: ... La seconde, moins brillante peut-etre, a produit des resultats plus solides. Elle a expulse de la Syrie, pour la confinir desormais dans les limites restreintes de 1'Egypte, cette nouvelle puissance Arabe que les ennemis de la Russie avaient un moment songe a substituer sur le Bosphore au pouvoir dechu de la Porte Ottomane, pour en faire dans 1'avenir un tete de pont centre nous. Le traite d'Unkiar-Skelessi, centre lequel avaient en vain pro- teste la France et 1'Angleterre, annule en apparence, a etc perpetue reelement sous une autre forme. En interdisant 1'entree des Dardanelles aux vaisseaux de guerre etrangers, le nouvel acte qui 1'a remplace, reconnu par toutes les Puissances, nous assure dorenavant centre toute attaque maritime. Enfin, un re"sultat des plus importants pour nous a cette epoque est sorti de cette complica- tion d'Orient. C'est la dissolution de cette Alliance Anglo-Frangaise, si hostile a nos interets politiques, si fatale pour la situation des gouvernements conserva- teurs. Rompue sous les Whigs en 1840, renouee plus tard avec effort par le Ministere Tory, elle n'a plus traine des lorsqu'une vie precaire et inoffensive et n'a vegete quelque temps sous le nom specieux d'entente cordiale, que pour se briser de nouveau avec plus d'eclat encore, centre la question des mariages Espagnols." Quoted by Treitschke, op. cit., V, pp. 758-759. ""See Nesselrode to Meyendorff, Nov. 10, 1841, Nesselrode, op. cit., VIII, pp. 147-150. Note also the following extract from a letter, Dmitri de Nesselrode [Chancellor Nesselrode's son] to Meyendorff, Nov. 29, 1841: "La politique etrangere continue a etre dans un etat satisfaisant; tous les jours on se felicite 55?] THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION CONCLUDED 23 I England also, it appeared, had triumphed, and indeed her pres- tige in Europe was great. A famous British statesman has even gone so far as to declare, concerning the Near Eastern policy fol- lowed by the Queen's Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period 1839-1841, that, ". . . it is difficult to fix upon a page in the history of this country [England] which records a superior instance of moral intrepidity. The bold conception and the bril- liant performance were worthy of Chatham; but the domestic difficulties with which Lord Palmerston had to struggle place the exploit far beyond the happiest achievement of the elder Pitt." 140 Furthermore, a recent writer of history has stated that Palmerston's "rare skill and determination" in carrying out his plans "must command universal admiration." 141 Palmerston, it davantage des heureuses consequences du traite du 15 juillet, et mon pere compte beaucoup sur votre eloquence pour faire revenir les Prussians de leur antipathic centre les Anglais. Medem sera appele a s'acquitter de la meme tache aupres du prince Metternich." Ibid., pp. 150-151. A marked coolness existed between England and France as long as Palmerston remained in office. See Guizot, op. cit., VI, pp. 112-113, 116-117, 124-125, 130 ff., 412-417. Bulwer, op. cit., VI, pp. 375-383. 140 B. Disraeli, Tancred, III, Chap. 6, quoted by Monypenny, op. cit., II, P- 95- 141 Hall, op. cit., p. 329. Hasenclever was also enthusiastic about the triumph of Palmerston. In his conclusions he declared in part: "Wenn wir jedoch die englische Politik als Ganzes iiberschauen, wenn wir die damals allerdings kaum geweckten imperialistischen Gedanken mit in Rechnung setzen, so miissen wir bekennen, das Palmerston die Bahn zur Grosse Englands richtig empfunden, vorausgeahnt hat. Den kiirzesten Weg nach Indien hat er vor plotzlichen Uberfallen durch die russische Flotte vom Schwarzen Meer aus freigehalten; durch die Verdrangung Frankreichs aus Agypten, durch die Beschrankuug Mehemed Alis auf das Pharaonenland hat er auch diese wichtigste Etappe auf der grossen, die Volker verbindenden Strasse nach Indien und dem fernen Osten dem englischen Einfluss offen gehalten. "Palmerston's diplomatische Kunst mag hie und da wegen der vonihm angewandten Mittel anfechtbar sein; seine Politik war jedoch trotz scheinbarger Schwankungen durchaus folgerichtig; sie entsfrach in jeder Hinsicht den Bediirf- nissen und den Interessen seines Landes. . . . Was ihn vorwarts trieb, was all sein Handeln einzig und allein bestimmte und leitete, war das Interesse Englands, die Grosse seines Vaterlandes: der unbezahmbare Drang, als Staatsmann in der auswartigen Politik sich geltend zu machen und ungeachtet aller Widerstande sich durchzusetzen, iiber wiegt in ihm bei weitem die Freude an einer fur das grosse Ganze oft nurzu unfruchtbaren inneren parteipolitischen Betatigung." Hasenclever, op. cit., pp. 311-312. Guichen, as one might expect, has not been so 232 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [558 must be admitted, had contributed greatly to the defeat of Russia's policy of peaceful penetration in Turkey and he had contributed likewise to the defeat of French peaceful penetration in Egypt. In other words, he had defended Constantinople from the Tsar and Alexandria from Louis Philippe. From the British Imperialist point of mew, it is true, he had accomplished much. While the termination of the Turco-Egyptian question was of immediate significance, it by no means implied a permanent solu- tion of the general question of the Near East. In less than a decade France was destined to return to an aggressive foreign policy in the Levant; in less than a decade and a half Russia was destined, not only to witness the reunion of England and France, but also to experience their open hostility and to lose much of what she had gained previously at the expense of the Porte; and within three-quarters of a century England, despairing perhaps of ever finding a permanent solution of the question of the Near East, was destined to abandon her attempts to preserve the inde- pendence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire and instead, in order to protect the route across the Isthmus of Suez to India, to secure under her own control, either directly or indirectly, Egypt, Arabia, and Palestine the major part of the territory claimed by Mehemet AH in i839. 142 Indeed the termination of the Turco- Egyptian dispute of 1832-1841 marked only the end of the first phase of a question which was destined and may still be today long to play a major role in the rivalries of the great Powers. impressed by the triumph of Lord Palmerston. According to him one of the chief consequences of the crisis of 1839 to 1841, and particularly of the excite- ment which accompanied it in France, was the accentuation of the movement for German unity which was "pour le plus grand malheur de la France, de 1'Europe et du monde." See Guichen, op. cit., pp. 533-539. "There were Englishmen who advocated a similar policy in 1841. Note the following extract from a letter, Napier to Minto, Feb. 5, 1841: "'I dined with the Pasha yesterday; . . . He looks to England to protect him, and if we do, he will become our vassal if we wish it; in fact, there is nothing we can ask in reason that he will not do. Next to Egypt being a colony of England, it is best that it should be an independent power, paying tribute to the Porte. Our commerce to India will become very extensive; and the facility of traveling become easier every day. He intends putting a lock from the canal into the Nile, to enable passengers to go from hence to Cairo without moving from the steam-boats that are to be established, and I have no doubt ere long a rail- road will be made from Cairo to Suez;" ' Quoted by Napier, War in Syria, II, pp. 179-180. See also Appendix C. APPENDIX A THE FRENCH BOURSE, JANUARY, 1840, to AUGUST, 1841 The figures given below, which are the closing quotations for the particular days cited, have been taken from the Journal des Debats. 3% F in courant 5% F in courant Jan. 2, 1840 Mch. i, 1840 May 2, 1840 July i, 1840 July 15, 1840 80.70 111.90 82.40 "3-95 8445 114.40 8545 118.30 86.10 1 1 8.80 July 25, 1840 . Aug. i, 1840 Aug. 14, 1840 Sept. i, 1840 Sept. 15, 1840 85.70 1 1 8.60 82.00 1 14.00 79-35 112.95 80.10 113-70 73-oo 104.80 Oct. i, 1840 Oct. 6, 1840 Oct. 15, 1840 Nov. i, 1840 Nov. 14, 1840 70.95 104.50 65-25 100.50 72.00 106.00 75-75 108.85 78.70 110.50 Dec. i, 1840 Jan. 2, 1841 Mch. i, 1841 June i, 1841 Aug. 2, 1841 79.60 in. 20 76.80 110.60 77-50 11340 78.80 H4-7S 77.25 116.75 233 APPENDIX B FRANCE AND THE EASTERN QUESTION: AN EXTRACT FROM AN ARTICLE WHICH WAS PUBLISHED IN THE EXAMINER, AUGUST 23, 1840, P. 531. (From our own Correspondent.} ". . . Whichever country, France or England, really desires to have an open quarrel, there is cause and pretext enough. There has been a deviation from the alliance on both sides; and the true reason is, that the interests of the countries are diametrically oppo- site. France feels herself oppressed by the superior maritime force of Great Britain, and she is making a bold effort to be mistress of the whole south and east coast of the Mediterranean, from Ceuta to where the Taurus dips into the sea. . She may talk of Mehemet being independent, of his making part and parcel of the Ottoman empire, and supporting its integrity; but this is all nonsense, and she knows it. The new joint empire of Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, exists by French support, and cannot refuse a French command. Note. The charges against the French made by the writer of this article were perhaps overdrawn. Nevertheless it appears that there was some founda- tion for them. Note, in this connection, the following extract from a summary of a speech delivered by Thiers in the Chamber of Deputies, April 13, 1841: " . . . Un Ministre etranger, meilleur juge que nous-memes de nos interets, disait a 1'ambassadeur de France: " 'Nous voyons bien au fond quelle est la politique de la France dans la question d'Orient; cette politique n'est pas europeene. La France possede le nord de 1'Afrique; elle y a une armde de 70,000 hommes. Tout pres d'elle se trouvent le pacha de Tunis et le pacha de Tripoli; qu'est-ce? presque rien: de malhereux princes musulmans qui tremblent devant la France. Mais un peu au dela il y a le pacha d'Egypte, qui possede la mer Rouge et 1'Euphrate. Ainsi, directement par le nord de 1'Afrique, indirectement par son alliance \s\c\ avec le pacha d'Egypte, la France domine depuis 1'entree la Mediterranee et du detroit de Gibraltar jusqu'a la mer Rouge et 1'Euphrate; cela ne peut pas nous convenir.' "Voila ce que disait un ministre etranger, parlant a un ambassadeur de France; et assurement vous m'accorderez bien que ces deux personnages etaient fort competens, que ces deux personages n'auraient pas echange entre eux des idees pueriles. "Ainsi, a 1'etranger, nos interets en Orient etaient apprci6s comme des interets considerables." Journal des Debats, Apr. 14, 1841. See also, Bulwer to Palmerston, Apr. 16, 1841, Levant Correspondence, III, p. 382. [234] 561] APPENDIX 235 And this empire stands astride the Red Sea and the Euphrates, now the only modes of communication with the East. M. Lamar- tine said in January last, in the debate of the French Chamber, 'England will wage a war of a hundred years, and spend her last shilling, rather than suffer this.' M. Lamartine knows both Eng- land and the Levant. For my part, long as I have cherished the idea of a French and English alliance, I believe this alliance im- possible as long as France holds the pretensions and the views she does in the Levant. As for the views of England, she cannot waive them, for they are identical with her very existence. And France not abandoning those views, then a war, and a fierce war, with a full trial of the maritime strength of the two countries, becomes inevitable, sooner or later. French Statesmen are fully aware of this, and no doubt regret it. They would willingly content themselves with preventing England or any Power from monopo- lizing the shores of the Mediterranean, without seeking to seize influence there for France, directly or indirectly. But public opinion in France has espoused the Pasha, seeing nothing less than a Frenchman in him; and Ministers and Chambers, in obedience to a general opinion so vaguely founded, have not only renounced the English alliance, but converted England into a foe." APPENDIX C EXTRACTS FROM THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY COM- MODORE NAPIER IN HIS WAR IN SYRIA, II, PP. 277, 278-279, 280. ". . . No power in Europe is so much interested in keeping well with Mehemet Ali as Great Britain, and no power is more aware of that than France; . . . France had opened a consider- able trade with Egypt, and she entertained great fears that English enterprise would supplant her; no wonder, then, that she should have befriended the Pacha in every possible way. France is as well aware as we are, that steam navigation having got to such perfection, Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the half-way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony. Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in the event of the breakup of the Turkish empire, which is not far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, we were perfectly right in our policy; or even, had we not looked so far ahead, it might, perhaps, have been politic to have confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his stopping the road to India by Suez, we might have the road of the Euphrates open, one remaining in the possession of the Ottoman empire, and the other in that of the Pacha of Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel with their own interests, and it is so decidedly the advantage of the Pacha of Egypt to facilitate by every possible means, the passage across the Isthmus of Suez, that on the whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain would have been to have supported Mehemet Ali, and I have not the smallest doubt that when France saw we were committed against him, she seized that opportunity of quitting the alliance in order to make the Pacha her firm friend. . . . ". . . By raising Mehemet Ali the Porte would have been strengthened; and indeed, the Pacha, in possession of Syria and Egypt, would have been as much interested in controlling the power of Russia as the Sultan himself. Who then was to gain by reducing the power of Mehemet Ali? Russia! and Russia alone." Note. France as well as England was interested in the establishment of steam communication through Egypt to the East. See an account of plans for the establishment of a steam line from Marseilles through Alexandria and Suez to the Isle of Bourbon, in the Journal des Debats, April 20, 1841. [2 3 6] APPENDIX D EXTRACTS FROM THE INFORMATION AND OPINIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC AGENTS RELATIVE TO THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION i. Vail to Livingston, No. 52, Jan. 30, 1833, U. S. Department of State Archives, England, Vol. XL. ''The great motive for the hostile array of the absolute Monarchies of Europe will never cease to exist as long as liberal principles and the constitu- tional forms of Government shall occupy, in France, the place of divine rights and legitimacy; but, within a short time, various causes have transpired to post- pone the execution of military designs upon that country, and to draw the attention of the Powers by whom they were entertained to other matters more nearly affecting them. The cordial co-operation of England in effecting the organ- ization of the new kingdom of Belgium: the little prospect of neutralizing the former so long as that object is not accomplished: the triumph of the liberal, over the Aristocratic party in Great Britain, as exhibited in the late elections: the strength acquired by the French Administration through the harmony which subsists between it and the Chambers: the failure of the Duchess of Bern, and other Carlists to excite internal disturbances, and the restoration of order, con- fidence and business throughout the Kingdom, have opened the eyes of the Northern Allies upon the ability of their intended prey to struggle for life, while they began to feel that their own weapons were too heavy to be borne much longer without using them. On the other hand, each of the three Powers has felt that there were causes at home likely to paralyze its energies. Prussia has to keep down liberalism among the German States: Austria has never been easy since the French have held, at Ancona, the brand which may set her Italian Provinces in a blaze; and Russia, though daily loading the Poles with new chains, needs her best army to curb the indignant spirit of that heroic people. But another cause seems to be growing out of very recent occurrences in the East, more powerful than all these together, to break that tyrannical influence which has been so perniciously extended over the communities of inferior rank: and that is, Discord among the members of the alliance. ''The rapid advance of the Egyptian Pacha to the conquest of Turkey and Constantinople seems to have opened the eyes of Russia to the danger, for her southern Provinces, of allowing an ambitious and powerful chief to substitute himself in the place of the humble and weak Sultan; and, if appearances are not misunderstood, Russian diplomacy has been busy in preparing the European Governments for the intervention of Russian arms in preventing the completion of the conquest of Turkey. Hence, perhaps, the visit of Pozzo di Borgo to London to confront the Turkish Ambassador Namik Pacha, whose mission cannot be supposed to have had any other object than that of craving British aid to super- sede the necessity of Russian intervention, which is said to be unpopular at Constantinople, and the ultimate object of which is suspected, at Vienna, to be the possession of Moldavia and Wallachia, perhaps of Greece; and, at London, [237] 2j8 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [564 the establishment of naval stations and supremacy in the Mediterranean. These suspicions are authorized by the efforts known to be making to increase the Russian Navy, and by the organization of a military expedition at Sebastopol under General Mouravieff, who is said to have discretionary orders to move forwards. If these suppositions be correct and many see in impending events, confirmation of their correctness the consequences must be a separation of, per- haps Prussia, but certainly Austria, who, once before, arrested the conquering army of Diebitsch at the gates of Constantinople, from their great ally, and a combination of interests between them, France and England, and Bavaria who has lately undertaken to give independence and a Sovereign to Greece. Whether these speculations have any foundation in reality or not, it would be hazardous to affirm; but it is certain that they are the subject of much conjecture here and in the other Capitals of Europe; and it is equally certain that, although much time is devoted, in Downing Street, to the still and ever pending Belgian ques- tion, the Ministers hold frequent Cabinet Councils at which the domestic affairs of the Kingdom are understood not to be the exclusive subject of deliberation." 2. Vail to Livingston, No. 58, March 22, 1833, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, England, Vol. XL. "I enclose, by desire of Mr. Buchanan, an extract from the Journal of St. Petersburg containing an article upon the Russian interference in the affairs of Turkey. The papers have given news from Constantinople of a more recent date, from which it appears that the Russian fleet had actually anchored in the Bosphorus. The new French Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, who arrived about the same time, had persuaded the Sultan to decline the further aid of the Emperor, and engaged to arrest the advance of the Egyptian troops. But, in the meantime, the fleet remained, and the Russian Army of thirty thousand men was on its way from the banks of the Danube to Constantinople. Whether the Sultan will, in reality, place more confidence in the diplomacy of Admiral Roussin, un- supported as it is by any semblance of phisical [sic] power immediately at command, than in the combined naval and military force of Russia to save his crown, and perhaps his head, is, with reason, I think, doubted here: And, besides that the Czar and the Grand Turk have some pecuniary accounts, growing out of the peace of Adrianople, still left unsettled, many accidental causes may arise to afford a pretext for not immediately withdrawing the imperial protection from the Turkish Capital. In that case, conjecture will set itself at work to divine the effects of the delay upon the general politics of Europe, and reports are already afloat of a coolness between Russia and France, whose jealousy of each other in that quarter is now beginning to show itself more openly than it has hitherto done, in this seeming eagerness to save the tottering empire of the Ottomans from impending ruin. From the apparent inaction of Great Britain on this occasion it would appear that her diplomacy was caught asleep at Constantinople. Perhaps it may have been lulled into security, as to events abroad, by the presence at the Court of St. James, of Namik Pacha, who, during his stay here, seemed to divide his time between Downing Street and the Russian Embassy. That minister, who, as Prince Lieven informed me, was merely the bearer of a letter from the Porte to the British Government, with orders to take back the answer, . 565] APPENDIX 239 left England a few days ago, on his way home, leaving, as Resident here, Mr. Maurojeni, a Greek long employed in the diplomatic service of Turkey." 3. Livingston to McLane, No. 15, Dec. 2, 1833, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, France, Vol. XXVII. "I have lately in confidence been suffered to peruse the notes which were presented by the Ministers of France and England at St. Petersburg, to the Emperor. . . . The answer to these two notes expresses surprise. . . . When the notes were transmitted from St. Petersburg to this place, a conference was had by the Ambassador with one of the Ministers here on the subject, when the latter to excuse the peremptory language of the note, said it had not been so worded at first, but that it had been altered by the counsel as he supposed of the English Cabinet. This last circumstance shows the ascendancy of England, and the avowal produced the natural but not very courteous reply, 'You ought not, Sir, to have made such a confession.' Although this was given to me in confidence, I had leave to communicate it to you in the same manner, and I pray you Sir, to take particular care that nothing contained in my despatches of this nature be made public, or what is the same thing, shall either confidentially or otherwise, be communicated to Congress." 4. Livingston to McLane, No. 16, Dec. u, 1833, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, France, Vol. XXVII. "By my last, No. 15 I informed you of the contents of a correspondance which had been confidently communicated to me with leave to inform you of its tenour. I have now the honour to give you some of the results communicated from the same source, and on the same condition. It appears that the answer excited much higher feelings in one of the parties than in the other. France seems to consider the concluding phrase of the answer as a fair reply to the same phrase in the note, and is inclined to let the matter rest until Russia shall commit some act hostile to her interest in the East. Great Britain on the contrary takes the matter in high dudgeon, and it is believed, is now fitting out a strong re- enforcement for her Mediterranean fleet. Talleyrand will leave this on Sunday for London: his object will be to allay the spirit that animates the English Cabinet, and prevent any measure that may lead to an immediate rupture. In the meantime another note is preparing here to be presented to the Emperor, asking for the explanation of his intentions, but in a more moderate form. Whether England will assent to this measure is considered as doubtful. If she should, the answer of the Emperor will be substantially the same; that his object is to defend the Sultan, and that none of the other powers have a right to make any objections to it, more especially those who profess to have the same object. If, however, the explanation should be demanded in the tone which the present feeling of the British Cabinet seems to indicate, I [have] been given to under- stand that no concession will be made, and that any event less 'untoward' even than the attack on the Turkish fleet at Navarino may bring about a war, which in the present state of Europe cannot fail to be a general one. If on the other hand the Emperor should find that he is not ready for the struggle, and amicable explanations should procrastinate the crisis, it cannot be for a long period. The 240 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [566 policy of Russia is apparent; She is extending her possessions on the Caspian, and approaching in that direction to India, not probably with any serious inten- tion of undertaking so hazardous an attempt, but for the same purpose that Napoleon threatened the invasion of England. In the meantime she is creating a naval force on the Black Sea, which the late treaty with the Porte defends against the entrance of any other power who might interrupt them. All the terri- tory of Turkey in Europe is within their grasp; and although it is not their inten- tion to take any violent measure at present to secure this prize; yet the moment insurrection, assassination, or any other event shall take off their Good Ally, the Ottoman Empire is at an end. The powers whose interest it would be to prevent this aggrandizement, and whose united power might enable them to do it, will be bought off. Austria by an increase of dominion in Italy and in the East. Prussia by procuring its aggrandizement in Germany. Sardinia has been long subservient to Russian policy; Bavaria will be kept in check by its family interest in Greece, and the rest of Germany are distinctly powerless. The only powers then to stop these great strides to uncontrolable power are England and France. The debt of the one and the unsettled dynasty of the other may incline both to tempori[z]e. But still the ease with which England may shut up the entrance to the Black Sea and the Baltic may induce them to meet the contingency with their accustomed energy. I have thought it my duty to give you as well my impressions, as the facts which produced them, and to suggest the propriety of being prepared with a naval force to make our neutrality respected, if events should occur which are by no means impossible that may produce a general European war. It will be quite as necessary in such a conflict as it ever has been, and perhaps more so. In the discussions which have taken place on this subject, (and they have been very warm) the answer to an observation that the Russian commerce would be destroyed by the blockade I have mentioned; was, 'Tht Americans will carry on our trade.' " 5. Vail to McLane, No. 104, Dec. 30, 1833, U. S. Department of State Archives, England, Vol. XLI. "Looking now towards the East, it must be confessed that the political horizon there exhibits dark specks which, either accident or the jealousies and antipathies, for the indulgence of which that quarter of the Globe affords so wide a field, may blow into a tempest which would shake Europe to its foundation. The Pacha of Egypt, though induced to pause in his career of conquests, is not subdued, and has just shown, by his refusal to pay a stipulated tribute to the Sultan that his submission was but a measure of policy, his allegiance a mere matter of form, and that his independence from the Porte is absolute. The possessions he retains in Syria still open to him the road to all the Asiatic provinces of the Sultan, if not to Constantinople; and he does not relax in his warlike spirit or preparations. On the other hand, the Emperor of Russia, still holding the European districts of Turkey, and maintaining a large fleet on the Euxine, is equally ready, at, or even without, the call of the Sultan who is utterly powerless, for assistance under the late Treaty between them, to march to Constantinople on the least appearance, either real or pretended, of danger, overrun all the Turkish Provinces on both shores of the Euxine, line the Bosphorus with his 567] APPENDIX 241 troops and fleets, garrison the forts along the Dardanelles, and, carrying into effect the secret stipulations of the Treaty which, under such a contingency forbid the entrance of foreign ships, make himself as completely master of all the strong points in the Ottoman Empire as if it were a Russian province. These are all events brought within the pale of possibility by the occurrences of this year, to which it might be practical, by some further partition of Poland, or other expedients to be discussed at Vienna, to reconcile Prussia and Austria, hitherto hostile to any Russian aggrandizement in that quarter; and if there be truth in the imputation of ambitious projects attaching to the Czar, the oppor- tunity would seem a fit one for their easy and final accomplishment, were it not for the decided opposition they would have to encounter on the part of England and France who unite in watching the course of events with a determination not to allow them to add to the territorial or political power of the Russian Empire. That some apprehension of an attempt to effect this is entertained at Paris and London, is evident from the activity which prevails in the French and English .arsenals and dock-yards. At Toulon, a fleet capable of carrying an army of thirty thousand men is nearly equipped, destined, it is said, for new conquests on the African coast; and orders have been issued to the different naval stations in Great Britain to put in commission a number of large ships which are now fitting out with great expedition. That the latter is intended to re-inforce the British fleet now collected in the Levant is not attempted to be concealed; nor can it be doubted that the French expedition may, on any emergency, be diverted from its original purpose and likewise sent up the Mediterranean. These, which are matters of fact, leave but little room for conjecture, and may serve to give confirmation to the reports, that Russia having, notwithstanding the representations of the British and French cabinets, avowed her determina- tion to execute her Treaty with Turkey, in the event of the latter being menaced from without, has been given to understand that the stipulations of that Treaty shall, in no event be regarded, and their execution opposed by force. If all this be true, the peace of Europe would hang upon the contingency of the march of a few Egyptian regiments, which a word from any Power desirous to bring on the commencement of hostilities might easily set in motion. But this is not the first time, since the French revolution of 1830, that peace would have been preserved by a display of warlike preparations; and convinced that England and France are as anxious as ever that the repose of Europe should not be disturbed, I believe that it is with the same view that the expedient is resorted to on this occasion. The question, therefore, would, under this hypothesis, be, whether the Czar, even supposing him assisted by his German allies, would feel strong enough to meet the combined naval and military force of Great Britain and France. Their decided superiority by sea, and the ease with which France might, by flinging her tricolored flag amidst the discontented masses in Germany, Italy, and perhaps Russia, revolutionize the whole Continent of Europe, are obstacles which the Russian Monarch cannot but appreciate, and which, I would incline to think, would prevent his doing anything to provoke a contest likely to endanger the stability of his throne, and the existence of the domestic institutions of his own Empire and those of his allies. Reasoning thus, un- prejudiced observers of events still withhold their belief of the immediate 242 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [568 approach of war, as inevitably to grow out of the state of things here alluded to; but there is always the chapter of accidents which no foresight can reach; and it should ever be borne in mind that, with so many elements of discord and strife, and so ready to be put in motion the general peace stands in constant danger of being interrupted. It is no doubt with a view to be prepared for such an event, as well as to avert, by showing themselves ready to meet, it, that most nations in Europe at all likely to be called upon to take an active part, preserve their military resources unimpaired, and, in some instances, are consid- erably adding to them." 6. Porter to McLane, No. 235, Aug. 12, 1834, U. S. Depart- ment of State, Turkey, Vol. IV. "The communications of a later date from Alexandria and Syria show a different state of things from that communicated by Boghos Bey to the foreign Consuls, and from the measures taken here to profit by the reverses which Ibra- him has met with, there can scarcely be a doubt that Syria ere long will be in the hands of its legitimate master, the Grand Seignor. 'We have information that the French force in the Levant is to be increased, and if this is the case it is hard to determine what will be the policy of France in this crisis, but as all her measures are directed towards the maintainance of her ascendency in the Levant she will no doubt do that which is most likely to secure it. If it should be to her interest that Syria and Egypt should return under the Dominion of the Grand Seignor she will do all in her power to pro- mote their subjection, but if not Mehemed Alii will receive the assistance of France, and as heretofore be excited to resist the efforts of the Grand Seignor to conquer them. "The commerce of France with Egypt, as may be seen by the returns ol our Consular Agent is immense. She has scarcely a competitor, and nearly the same may be said of other places within the limits of Mehemet Alli's govern- ment, from which I have been able to obtain returns, and as this state of things, it is most likely, would not exist if Egypt and Syria were to return to their former master, there can scarcely be a doubt that every means will be resorted to by the French Government to prevent their return and thus secure to herself a commerce so very lucrative. Every article that France can produce from her soil, and manufactures, is imported in large quantities into Egypt, and every article produced in Egypt, and coming through it from other countries is im- ported into France, to the exclusion of almost all other nations from a participa- tion in the commerce." 7. Clay to Forsythe, No. 34, Sept. 3, 1834, U. S. Department of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XII. "The news received here in the month of July, of the arrival of an English squadron at Napoli and a report, that France was also fitting out a fleet for the same destination excited the suspicion of the Imperial Cabinet so much, as to induce Count Nesselrode to demand explanations thereon from Mareschal Maison. The Ambassador replied, that his Government had no intention of sending a fleet to that part of the Mediterranean, and, that he supposed the 569] APPENDIX 243 British squadron was placed there, more for the purpose of supporting the Whig Ministry in Parliament, than for any other motive. Sometime afterwards the Vice Chancellor asked for further explanations, when the Mareschal, after repeat- ing what he had said before, assured him, that France considered the Turkish question as settled for the present, and, that if the Cabinet of St. James should create any difficulties, which he very much doubted since the commercial interests of Great Britain would be injured thereby, the French Ministry would certainly take no part in the affair. "On the I4th of August, a Courier arrived from Constantinople, bringing the news, that the Sultan, having heard that all Syria was in open revolt and that Ibrahim Pacha had been defeated, determined to take advantage of the circum- stances to diminish the power of the Pacha of Egypt. Orders were accordingly issued for the Turkish fleet to hold itself ready to put to sea. I am informed that the English and French Ambassadors at Constantinople protested separately against the resolution of the Sultan and declared, that if it were carried into execution, their governments, as the protectors, of the Pacha of Egypt, would consider it equivalent to a declaration of war. "The report which had reached Constantinople, that Ibrahim had been made prisoner, only confirmed the Sultan in his design of recovering some of his lost provinces, notwithstanding the representations of the English and French Ambassadors. ''The Russian charge d'affaires also used his influence to induce the Sultan to abandon this hazardous enterprise and finally made a formal protest against the measures. I am told, that Baron Ruchmann stated to the Divan, that, by the Treaty of Alliance of the 8 July 1833, the Imperial government had stipulated to support the Porte in case of an attack made upon it by a third Power; but that if the Sultan should seek to bring about a war by unreasonable conduct, Russia could not consider herself obliged to interfere and afford armed assistance. Count Nesselrode, it is said, not only approved of Mr. de Ruckmann's protest, but charged the Ambassador Mr. Boutenieff, who has returned to his post, to reiterate the declaration. "The last news from Constantinople is, that Ibrahim Pacha has been obliged to shut himself up in Jerusalem to await the arrival of the troops sent to his assistance by Mehemet Alii. "It appears from Mr. de Ruckmann's despatches of the 2nd August, that Lord Ponsonby and Admiral Roussin have altered their tone, and, instead of protesting against the expedition of the Turkish fleet, have told the Sublime Porte, that their Governments would not interfere if it succeeded in conquering the revolted provinces of the Pacha in a short time, (it is said one month was the period mentioned). Nevertheless, the Russian charge d'affaires did not change his language, but renewed the declaration that the present was not a 'casus foederis,' and, that, consequently, Russia would not be bound to come to the assistance of the Porte, in case it involved itself in difficulties of its own seeking. These observations had not induced the Sultan to abandon his project; however his fleet remained at Constantinople at the last dates. "It is thought, that France and England abandoned their policy in regard to the protests so suddenly, with the hopes that the Sultan might easily reconquer 244 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 his lost provinces and thus place his Empire in a condition to act independently of the Russian Cabinet." 8. Vail to Forsyth, No. 168, Jan. 22, 1835, U. S. Department of State, England, Vol. XLII. "In the East, likewise, where events have, more than once, conducted the most powerful nations of Europe to the brink of violent contention, present appearances are of a more pacific character than they had been for some time before. Although the relative positions of the parties are not materially altered, some approximation is stated to have been made if not towards a final adjust- ment of causes of dispute, at least, towards an understanding of each other's views. Private accounts of recent date, and well entitled to credit, have been communicated to me, and announce the removal of the difficulties which had hitherto stood in the way of an arrangement between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt, as the result of a Turkish Embassy to Cairo. The Pacha had agreed to evacuate those territories which had not been ceded to him, and to pay to the Sultan the stipulated tribute. Should this agreement prove a pledge of lasting friendship between the two rivals, it will remove all pretexts for the hostile attitude assumed and still preserved by England, France and Russia, and greatly diminish the chances of war in that quarter. It is confidently reported that the British Ambassador had addressed to the Porte a note requiring a categorical answer to the question, whether, in the event of a war between England and Russia, the Porte would allow the free passage of the Dardanelles to the fleets of both Powers, or confine that privilige to Russian ships, alone; declaring, at the same time, that, in the latter case, England would, if deemed necessary, enforce the extension of the privilege to herself, also. This declaration the first so distinctly expressed by Great Britain, has created considerable alarm in the Turkish capital." 9. Porter to Forsyth, No. 293, March 20, 1835, U. S. Depart- ment of State, Turkey, Vol. V. "The events of the most importance, are, that the Sultan is collecting in Anatolia, near Syria, a most formidable army, it is supposed and cannot be doubted for the invasion of Syria; Troops are drawn from every part of the Empire to reinforce it, and artillery and munitions of war are collected there in large quantities. The militia is organizing for the protection of the Capital during the absence of the regular troops; the entire fleet of the Sultan is ready for sea at a moment's warning; that the Emperor of Russia, with a large body of troops, on the Black Sea, are ready for whatever may be intended by him. On the other hand the fleet of Mehemet Alii, his main reliance, with him on board, is ready for sea, the advance squadron has arrived at Candia, and he has said publicly that he intends to command in person, and if he can bring that of the Grand Signer to action, he intends to attempt to carry it by boarding with his Arabs. Egypt is exhausted of its resources, and means of supplying troops, and Syria is in a state of great discontent from the cruel and violent measures pursued against the population by Ibrahim Pacha; the same discontent prevails in Yemen, where the army of Mehemet Alii, sent to subject the Arabs, has been destroyed by sickness, fatigue and frequent skirmishing. 57 1 ] APPENDIX 245 "The avarice of France to engross all the advantages of the commerce of Egypt, and the desire of England to secure the advantages of a communication with India across the Isthmus of Suez, induce them to give support to Mehemet Alii against the Sultan, by furnishing him with the means of keeping up his fleet, while the desire of Russia to deprive France of these advantages and cut of[f] the communication between England and her East India possession, induces Russia to keep a large fleet in the Black Sea, which both England and France wish to prevent passing the Dardanelles, but which with the Army assembled there, is ready to act in any emergency to assist the Sultan or further the views of the Emperor of Russia. "England and France it would appear have no views hostile to the Sultan, or otherwise friendly to Mehemet Alii, than their respective interests are con- cerned, and the same may be said in regard to the Emperor of Russia in his relations with the Sultan and feelings towards Mehemet Alii, but the apparent, and indeed, undoubted design of Russia to extend her Empire far East, excites the apprehension of England for her India possessions, and the aid given by Russia, which may enable the Sultan to recover Egypt, and deprive France of her lucrative commerce, thence causes her to act in unison with England in all the affaires of the Levant. Russia in the meantime protected in the Black Sea by the strong castles of Dardanelles, from which she has free egress, is encreasing in strength without pledging herself to any party, and holds herself in readiness to act as her interest may prompt; a course which compels England and France to keep up large and expensive fleets in the Levant which the interests they have to protect will scarcely justify. "These contending interests serve greatly to retard and embarrass the Grand Signor in executing his design of reannexing Egypt and Syria to his Empire, from which they have been separated by Mehemet Alii. A great effort is now about being made to recover these possessions, and a few months will determine whether Mehemet Alii and his son Ibrahim Pacha are to continue to rule in Egypt and Syria, which have been scourged so long by their cruelties and extortions." 10. Vail to Forsyth, No. 209, October 22, 1835, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, England, Vol. XLIII. "The mission of Lord Durham, the lately appointed Ambassador to the Court of the Czar, has supplied matter for endless speculation; .... "As the political scenes enacting in the East are those which, at present, chiefly attract attention, and the only ones in which any germ of disturbance remote as it be can now be discerned, the circumstances to which I have alluded [regarding the Durham mission to Russia] appeared to me to possess sufficient interest to justify my seeking, for your Department, information respecting them on the correctness of which some reliance might be placed. With that view, I called upon Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian Ambassador here, who, on my mentioning the subject, expressed a desire that my Government should be possessed of the means of forming a correct estimate of the real state of the case. He said that no credit was to be given to the statements that had been put forth, either as to the pretended designs of Great Britain in sending Lord Durham to 246 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [S7 2 St. Petersburg and Constantinople, or as to the jealousy with which the Russian Government is said to look upon that appointment: That, on the contrary, Lord Durham had, before his departure, freely conversed with him regarding his mission, the principal object of which was to secure a continuance of peace and harmony between the leading European Powers; particularly with reference to the affairs of the East; and that, under this conviction, the Emperor looked upon it with the most ^ favorable eye, and had given orders that all facilities should be given it by his agents abroad. To show me that those dispositions had been properly seconded, the Count submitted for my perusal a despatch he had received a few days before from Mr. Butinieff, the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, from which it appeared that the visit of Lord Durham there was anticipated in the most friendly spirit; and that all measures to facilitate its object had been taken at the Russian Embassy. With reference to the addresses exchanged by Lord Durham and the Sultan, Count Pozzo said that both their spirit and language had been misrepresented: that they were a mere interchange of the civilities shown on all such occasions: that they contained nothing that could give the least umbrage to the Imperial Court; and that the Sultan, instead of inviting Lord Durham to become a mediator between him and the Czar, had merely expressed, in the usual diplomatic language, a desire that he might be, at St. Petersburg, the interpreter of the friendly sentiments of the Porte. He stated further that Lord Durham would be received at St. Petersburg with no other than friendly dispositions, and that nothing was anticipated from his mission but the means of consolidating the peace of Europe and mutual good understanding and confidence between its leading Powers. ' At the Count's request, I promised that I would communicate to you an account of our conversation. "Whatever may be the secret or ultimate designs of Russia upon the Otto- man dominions, the times do not favor their execution; and her rulers cannot but see it. She is suspected of striving, by covert diplomatic approaches, to prepare the way for ulterior movements; and the suspicion is probably not altogether unfounded, notwithstanding the earnest disclaimer of all views of aggrandisement so often put forth by her Agents. But Russia is too well aware of the eager- ness with which her conduct is watched, and of the determination formed to counteract all such views not only by England, but by other Powers in closer friendship with her to attempt anything calculated to justify the suspicions entertained of her designs. Her representative here does not conceal the solicitude with which the Emperor regards the condition of the Porte, nor his determina- tion that she shall not become a prey to conquest, nor fall under influences inimical to his interests in the shores of the Black Sea. He says that with that view, alone, the invasion of the Pacha of Egypt was prevented; and that the Emperor proved the honesty of his intentions by withdrawing his forces after that object had been accomplished and the Sultan again placed in a situation to maintain his independence. In a word, that he had no desire of becoming the possessor of the Bosphorus; but that, at the same time, he could not consent to its falling into the hands of any Power by any means capable of controlling his establishments on the Black Sea. There are, perhaps, in that determination sufficient motives for the late Russian interference in behalf of the Sultan; and 573] APPENDIX 247 if the other Powers could be convinced that the Emperor's policy stops there, they could have but little reason to object to it. The fact, however, cannot be concealed that every fresh instance of active friendship on his part towards Turkey has extended his influence in that quarter; and hence the jealous fear entertained by all the nations of Europe that the Porte is doomed to become a Russian Province. The no longer secret treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, by which the Sultan bound himself to close the Dardanelles against the ships of foreign nations when- ever Russia should deem such a measure necessary to give effect to her protectorship of the Ottoman dominions, could not but give umbrage to Great Britain; and a remonstrance against the provisions of that compact is believed to be one of the objects of Lord Durham's embassy. The Turkish question, as between Great Britain and Russia resolves itself, at present, into a common desire to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, with a view, on the part of the former, to prevent the Emperor from possessing himself of the means of opening the Mediterranean to his naval forces, and of disputing with her the supremacy 'in that sea; and, on the part of Russia, for the purpose of preventing the establish- ment at Constantinople of a Power which might prove a barrier to her views of aggrandisement beyond her present territorial limits, both in Europe and Asia. A permanence of the statu quo is probably all that either party seeks for the present. It is possible that the diplomacy of Lord Durham may prove successful in attaining such an object; but it cannot be disguised that the more efficient negotiator on the side of Great Britain is the large naval force kept up by her on the Mediterranean station." ii. Clay to Forsyth, No. 10, Aug. i, 1836, U. S. Department of State Archives, Russia, Vol. XIII. "Whenever an editor of a newspaper in Paris or London writes an article in which the name of the Emperor of Russia appears, or his policy is considered, it is generally to present him to the reader personally as a heartless Despot and politically as a grasping and crafty Sovereign, whose only aim, with regard to the Sultan, is to appropriate to himself as large a portion of Turkey as he can with- out disturbing the peace of Europe by an overt act of hostility; and who is constantly setting traps to catch his unfortunate neighbor [Turkey] the exertions of France and England to the contrary notwithstanding. "In my opinion injustice is done not only to the character of the Emperor Nicholas, but also to his views. There is no good reason to believe that his conduct towards Mahmoud is influenced by any hope of adding more territory to the Russian Empire, for the Tsar must be aware that his dominions are now as extensive as they can be for all the purposes of good government and that any increase of them would only create embarrassments internal and external without being productive of any corresponding advantages. What then are the intentions of Russia with regards to the Porte and what interest has the Emperor to endeavour to exercise an exclusive influence over the Turkish Cabinet? The answer is simple and would probably suggest itself to many could they but divest themselves of the idea that the policy of Nicholas I must naturally be the same as that of Catherine II. In the first place, Russia, under existing treaties enjoys particular commercial privileges in the Turkish dominions. Her commerce is 248 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [574 daily increasing and must continue to do so unless interrupted by a war between the two countries. This reason alone, would be sufficient to justify a wish to have a predominant weight in the Ottoman councils; at the same time, the knowledge of such a design cannot authorize the feelings of jealousy it has engendered in the West of Europe. Secondly The relative positions of Russia and Turkey, bordering on each other, and the local interests which grow out of this continguity must give birth to many transactions between them, that do not necessarily concern other states and which, surely, may be carried on without third Powers having the right, on any ground, of demanding explana- tions respecting the different measures that may be resolved on to promote the prosperity of the two Empires. Again, as the Bosphorus is the only outlet of the Black Sea, it is apparent that, unless Turkey be friendly, not only the com- mercial, but every other interest of the southern provinces of Russia must suffer. The agricultural especially, for the grain of the Tauride and the adjoining govern- ments only find vent through that channel. "The conduct of the Emperor therefore, in reference to Turkey, is founded on considerations of convenience, carried on with motives purely national and designed to redound to the prosperity of his Empire; not by encroaching upon the political rights of other Powers, or abstracting from them any commercial privileges, or lawful claims they may have in the eyes of the Divan: but by entering fairly into competition with them for such advantages as international transactions may yield. "The residence of Lord Durham, the British Ambassador, in St. Petersburg has enabled him to appreciate the policy of the Emperor towards Turkey, and to see that His Majesty, so far from endeavoring to sow dissention, is desirous of peace and aware that the maintenance of it is necessary to the improvement of his Empire and to recruit the Imperial treasury. The efforts of Lord Durham to convey those ideas to Lord Palmerston and the success which has, up to the present time, attended his negotiations to bring about a good understanding between England and Russia have rendered him very popular at court, and no foreign representative is treated with as much favour as he is. Nevertheless, it seems as if his representations have not entirely convinced Lord Palmerston, that the designs of Russia are not hostile to British interests in Turkey, for Lord Ponsonby's acts at Constantinople betray a jealousy of the influence enjoyed by the Russian Minister in that capital, and it is more than probable that the case of Mr. Churchill was seized upon by his Lordship, rather as a pretext to obtain the dismission of Akif-Effendi and thus to get rid of a Minister of Foreign Affairs unfavorably inclined towards England, than as an amends for injuries sustained by a British subject. This view of the matter, I may add, is taken by other Diplomatic Representatives in St. Petersburg." 12. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 87, Dec. 5, 1838, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. I. "As the Eastern question still continues to attract the attention of the Governments and People of the old world as that on which its future destinies depend (although its solution seems to be momentarily suspended by the advan- tages obtained by British diplomacy over the Russian, and by the energetic 575] APPENDIX 249 demonstrations of British naval and military power in the Levant and on the frontiers of India), I beg leave to communicate the following authentic informa- tion relating to that subject. . . . ''Some intimation received by the British from the Russian Government that in case Mahomet Ali should openly throw off his allegiance to the Porte, Russia might think it necessary to intervene by force of arms, induced Lord Palmerston, some time since, to propose to the Russian cabinet a conference of the five great European powers in order to concert the measures they would jointly adopt in case the Pasha of Egypt should declare himself independent. Count Nesselrode returned an answer to this proposition, during the stay of the emperor at this Capital in September last, declining to accede to it upon the ground that the joint action of the five Powers to prevent Mahomet Ali from taking such a step was already secured by their actual correspondent conduct, and that the remonstrances of their agents having hitherto proved sufficient for that object, it was unnecessary to provide for a hypothetical case which might, and probably never would occur. Count Pozzo de Borgo communicated this reply to Lord Palmerston, who after reading it, observed that the necessity for such a mutual understanding among the five Powers was not obviated by the reasons stated by Count Nesselrode since the want of it would leave anyone of them force to act according to its own views of its own interests in the case supposed, which the others could not passively suffer as it might involve the undue aggrandisement of that one which should interefere by force of arms between the Sultan and his revolted vassal. Experience had already shown that a Power might enter upon such an intervention with the most sincere desire to avoid acquiring any selfish advantages for itself, and yet might be tempted by circumstances to accept of such advantages when in the course of events they presented themselves to view. Thus Russia had declared on the breaking out of the war between that Empire and Turkey in 1828, that she did not seek and would not accept any increase of territory as the object of the war. Yet it was notorious that the treaty of peace by which it was terminated embraced cessions of valuable territory by which the limits of the Russian empire were extended in Asia. So also when Russia came to the assistance of the Porte against Mahomet Ali in 1833, she professed the most disinterested views, yet her armed intervention ended by the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi the object of which was to shut the entrance of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus against the enemies of Russia. It therefore became necessary for those Powers which had a common interest in maintaining the independence of the Porte and the integrity of its territory to declare prospectively that they would not see with indifference any future separate intervention which might again lead to the aggrandisement of any one Power at the expense of Turkey and to the manifest injury of all the others. That Great Britain, above all, had the deepest interest in preventing any such intervention, but desired to prevent it by pacific means and had there- fore proposed the intended conference. "It is not stated what reply Count Pozzo de Borgo made to this declaration, but it may fairly be inferred from it that the British Government considers itself at liberty to concert separately with its allies who are interested in maintaining the national existence of Turkey the measures which may become necessary for 25O THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [576 that purpose. Among these allies she may safely reckon on the cooperation of Austria, and I think even of France as any approximation between Russia and France for the purpose of dismembering the Turkish empire seems to be rendered nearly impossible by the invincible repugnance of the Sovereign of the one country and the People of the other to any close connection. We have recently seen in the adhesion of France to the commercial Treaty concluded by England with the Porte, an arrangement admirably adopted to develop the natural resources of Turkey, that whatever desire the French Government may feel to countenance the usurpation of Mahomet Ali with the ultimate view of extending its own establishments in Africa further east, it is inevitably compelled by the force of circumstances to unite in a measure adopted to give increased political strength to the Turkish Government, to enable it to grapple with its natural enemy, and at the same time entirely inconsistent with the notion of the independance of Egypt and Syria." 13. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 117, June 26, 1839, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II. "Since my last Despatch on the Oriental Question, (No. 114,) I have had an opportunity of seeing a communication made on the 24th April to Lord Ponsonby by Nourri Effendi, which, although of a date much older than the other French and English Despatches which I have seen, throws considerable light upon the causes which have so suddenly disturbed the status quo in the East. "In this communication Nourri Effendi recites at some length the answers which he had already given, by order of the Sultan, to the Austrian internuncio, remarking upon an insinuation of Prince Meternich that the Sublime Porte ought to endeavor to find out some mezzo termino, in its relations with the Pacha of Egypt, in order to avoid the certain evils and uncertain result of war. This answer stated that the Sultan did not desire war, nor was such a result to be apprehended unless from the continued encroachments of the person 'styling him- self the Pacha of Egypt,' whose audacious pretentions the great Christian powers ought to unite in endeavoring to restrain. That Prince Metternich was doubtless a very wise and benevolent man, but (intimating in pretty intelligable terms) that Austria would better manifest her friendship for the Porte by discounten- ancing the pretentions of Mehemet Ali who refused to perform the duties he owed to his lawful sovereign. That all the Turkish provinces, which he had seized and which had been secured to him by the treaty of Kuteyah, upon the express conditions that he should pay tribute, and confine himself strictly within the limits marked out by that treaty, had been inherited by the Sultan from his forefathers; and, Mehemet Ali having failed to perform these conditions, these countries might justly be considered as reverting from the vassal to his liege lord; but that the Sublime Porte was willing to leave him in the possession of Egypt, provided he would evacuate Syria, the continued possession of which by him endangered the security of the other Turkish provinces in Asia Minor, Mehemet Ali having fortified the passes of the Taurus chain of mountains in such a manner as to keep the way always open preparatory to a fresh invasion of Anatolia, whilst the Porte had only recently thought of creating defensive works, which it had established far from the frontier at Koniah. 57?] APPENDIX 251 "The note from Nourri Effendi to Lord Ponsonby closed with a distinct proposition to the British government to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Porte, the object of which should be to compel Mehemet AH to evacuate all the Pashalics of Syria and, in other respects, to perform his. duties as a faithful vassal and tributary of the Ottoman Empire." 14. Clay to Forsyth, (Without number) Oct. i, 1839, U. S. Department of State Archives, Austria, Vol. I. ''The departure of Prince Metternich has produced no perceptible effect upon the affairs of the Empire and but little impression on the public mind; it is possible, therefore, that even his death would affect the condition of Austria and its relations with the other states of Europe only so far as to cause a slight fall in the Government stocks. The complicate question of arranging the matters in dispute between the Sultan and the Pacha of Egypt occupies the attention of the Austrian Cabinet almost to the exclusion of every other subject and the interest taken in it by the Ministry has been communicated to the public. It is astonishing to see the eagerness to learn the last news from Constantinople shewn by persons, of all classes except the lowest, who have no voice in the Government, who have not even a vote at the municipal elections and whose opinions would have not the least weight with any member of the Cabinet. "The decisions made in the conference of the Representatives of the five Powers at Constantinople are probably communicated regularly to the Depart- ment by the Minister of the United States at the Sublime Porte. Those decisions, however, are influenced, in a great degree, by the negotiations which take place at Vienna, between the Austrian Cabinet, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia and France and the Prussian minister under instructions received from their different Governments. Austria, in fact, appears to act the part of a mediator in the whole business and to use her influence to calm the jealousies and suspicion known to exist, in all matters relating to Turkey, between the English, French, and Russian Governments. It is this character which gives to Austria the great weight she possesses in the conferences and which has enabled her to make the Powers less distrustful of each other and to induce them to act with a certain degree of unity in the important and over-agitated question. That Austria will succeed in the endeavor to maintain the peace of Europe appears to me evident from two facts which have come to my knowledge. The first is that the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has received instructions from St. Petersburg to act more in concert with the other Representatives and to consent to coerce the Pacha of Egypt if a resort to forcible means should become necessary. The second circumstance is that, after a conference held in this city a few days since, despatches were sent from the Department of Foreign Affairs to the Austrian Internuncio and by the Representatives of Great Britain, Russia, France and Prussia at this Court each writing separately to their colleagues at Constantinople instructing them to inform the Pacha, through the Consuls of their respective Governments at Alexandria, that unless he consented to the arbitrement of the questions, between the Sultan and himself, by the five Powers they were determined to compel him to come to terms and, if obliged by his refusal to resort to force, the guarantees which they had offered to give him 252 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [578 would be withdrawn and he would be left to contend with them single handed. Much will depend upon the answer of Mehemet Ali to these menaces. That able and wily Prince can scarcely be brought to believe that there will be any concord in the actions of Powers whose interests are so opposite and who have little confidence in each other. Under different circumstances the Pacha would be right in his conjecture but, at present, it would seem to be erroneous for reasons which may be briefly referred to. The acquisitions of territory, from Turkey, made by Russia under different pretenses during the last half century have excited the suspicion of the other European Cabinets with regard to the ulterior objects of Russia and induced them to watch more closely her policy in connection with the Turkish Empire. They have at length discovered, that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and the occupation of the island of Soulima, give to Russia the complete control of the Commerce of the Black Sea and the navigation of the Danube at any moment she may choose to exercise it. Being unable, therefore, to remedy their past errors the other Powers of Europe seem for the moment resolved to prevent any further encroachments on the part of Russia. Her statesmen are aware that this feeling exists to a greater degree than at any former time and Russia is more- over occupied just now with the subjugation of Circassia which, together with the dissatisfaction prevailing among the Cossacks would render it dangerous for her to risk the chances of a war. She will consequently, rather than embroil herself with England and France, assent to the measures proposed in the con- ferences at Constantinople and make a merit of what in fact is the necessity of yielding to circumstances which she cannot evade. Whatever she consents to will, I am convinced, extend no further than is requisite to arrange the question between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali; Russia will make no treaty stipulations which will be binding on her for the future or which she cannot find a plausible pretext, at any time, to annul. She may cease apparently her machinations against Turkish independence for the moment and claim credit for her forbear- ance, but let other events take place in Europe to draw off the attention of the great Powers, or let war be declared between any of them and Russia remain neutral, the powerful machinery which is destined, in all probability, one day to overthrow the Ottoman Empire will be again set in motion and the nations most interest in upholding the 'integrity' of Turkey will be unable to arrest it. "The Pacha of Egypt has little to hope for form dissensions among the five Powers and, if he refuse to submit to their arbitrement, they will force him to do so. But, although Russia may consent to such compulsion, the active part the brunt will be borne by England and France; not a Russian ship will be engaged, nor a Russian subject be injured in the contest. The settlement of the affairs of Turkey will not be final it will not probably last more than five years. Such at least is my impression and it is founded on the fact that the policy of Russia is directed to the future whereas that of England and France is shaped to suit the present. "The measures taken by England in relation to the Turkish question where not energetic until lately; the British Ministry appears to have relied, for some years, upon the moral power given by the rememberance of former greatness and to have left unheeded the important fact that the glory of past achievements is 579] APPENDIX 253 fast fading whilst the Countries she once subsidized, some of which she even saved from destruction, have acquired strength sufficient to render them power- ful rivals and dangerous enemies." 15. Wheaton to [Forsyth], No. 153, July i, 1840, Confidential, U. S. Department of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II. "Since my last on that subject the question of the East, and the East itself remain in statu quo. The Ottoman Empire is crumbling to pieces. The great Christian Powers after arresting the direct negotiation between the Porte and the Pacha of Egypt, have not been able to agree on any plan of settlement. The British Cabinet itself is divided on the question. Various projects of partitioning Syria by a line to be drawn between St. Jean d' Arce or Beyrout and the Persian gulf, leaving to the Pacha Egypt and Arabia with the southern part of Syria, have been suggested between Austria, Great Britain and Russia. But Mehemet AH laughs at these plans, being certain of the neutrality, if not the support of France in case of any attempt to coerce him. Russia is very much weakened by her recent defeat in Circassia, and the demoralized state of her army Austria by the deficit in her finances; and the Porte itself has nearly exhausted all its resources in men and money. The conclusion would seem to be that this problem must at last be solved by time and the death of Mehemet AH alone, unless indeed he should be unwilling to wait leaving such a precarious inheritance to his children. In that case he may at any time bring on the necessity of Russian intervention, and perhaps a general conflagration by ordering Ibrahim Pacha to march on Constantinople." 16. Wheaton to Forsyth, No. 158, Aug. 5, 1840, U. S. Depart- ment of State Archives, Prussia, Vol. II. "Count Bresson, the French Minister at this court, has remonstrated in the strongest manner against the ratification of the Convention [of July 15, 1840] by the Prussian Government. He has stated that Prussia was putting all at stake, as she had no direct interest in the question at issue, could gain nothing in the scramble for the spoils of the East which must ultimately arise between G. Britain and Russia (as it could not be supposed that these two powers would remain permanently united in policy and councils,) whilst Prussia might lose her newly acquainted Provinces of the Rhine where France must necessarily seek her indemnity for the further aggrandizement of the other Powers. He has urged the danger of kindling anew the passion for military glory and conquest which is characteristic of the French nation; and the honor which would redound to the Prussian monarch, at the commencement of his reign, from arresting the progress of this new source of discord among the Great Powers of Europe, by suspending his ratification in order to give further time for consultation on a matter on which the peace of the world might be said to depend. He has added that the King of the French perfectly concurs with his present ministry in resenting the course of the Plenipotentiaries of the four Powers in London as equally derogatory to the interests and honor of France, and that the nation would be ready to second its Government in arming upon an extensive scale in order to be prepared for any and every eventuality. 254 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [580 "The Prussian Cabinet has replied to these energetic remonstrances that how- ever much Prussia regretted to see France separate herself from the other great Christian Powers on this question, she (Prussia) could not separate herself from her allies by refusing her assent to the decision of the Conference of London, although the King had given no special instructions to his minister authorizing him to sign this particular convention." APPENDIX E BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES I. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND GENERAL HISTORIES I. Bibliographies BENGESCO, GEORGES: Essai d'une notice Bibliographiqut sur la question d'Orient . . . 1821-1897. Bruxelles et Paris, 1897. An extensive list of French works dealing with the question of the Near East. It contains the titles of a number of contemporary French books and pamphlets not listed in this biblio- graphy. IBRAHIM-HILMY, PRINCE: Literature of Egypt and the Soudan. A bibliography from the earliest times to the year 1885, inclusive. 2 vols. London, 1 886. 2. General Histories ACTON, LORD (Editor): Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X. Cambridge, 1907. BLANC, Louis: Histoire de dix ans, 1830-1840. 5 vols. Paris, 1849. BLED, VICTOR DU: Histoire de la monarchic de jut/let de 1830 a 184.8. 2 vols. Paris, 1877-1879. BOUDIN, M. AMEDEE: Histoire de Louis-Philippe rot des Fran fats. 2 vols. Paris, f 1847- BREHIER, Louis: L'Egypte de 1708 a /poo. Paris, 1900. CAMERON, D. A.: Egypt in the Nineteenth Century, or Mehemet Ali and his suc- cessors until the British occupation in 1882. London, 1898. CHARLETY, S.: La monarchic de juillet. (Vol. V in Histoire de France contem- poraine.) Paris, 1921. CREHANGE, GASTON: Histoire de la Russie depuis la mart de Paul i" jusqu'a ravtnement de Nicolas II, (1801-1804). Paris, 1896. DEBIDOUR, ANTONIN: Histoire diplomatique de /'Europe depuis Fouverture du con- gres de Vienne jusqu'a lafermeture du congres de Berlin, (1814-1878). 2 vols. Paris, 1891. GOUIN, EDOUARD: L'Egypte au XIX* siecle. Histoire militarie et politique, anec- dotique et pittoresque de Mehemet- Ali, Ibrahim, Pacha, Soliman Pacha. Paris, 1847. HAMONT, P. N.: L'Egypte sous Mehemet-Ali. 2 vols. Paris, 1843. HILLEBRAND, KARL: Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis Philipp's bis zum Falle Napoleon's HI. 2 vols. Gotha, 1879-1881. JOCHMUS, BARON AUGUSTUS: The Syrian War and the Decline oj the Ottoman Em- pire, 1840-1848. Berlin, 1883. JORGA, N.: Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches. Nach den Quellen Dargestellt. 5 vols. Gotha, 1908-1913. JUCHEREAU DE SAINT-DENIS: Histoire de r empire ottoman depuis 1702 jusqu'en 1844. 4 vols. Paris, 1844. LAVALLEE, THEOPHILE: Histoire de /'empire ottoman depuis les temps anciens jusqu'a nos jours. Paris, 1855. LAVISSE, ERNEST, ET RAMBAUD, ALFRED: Histoire gentrale du IV* sihle a nos jours. Vol. X. Paris, 1909. MCCARTHY, JUSTIN: A History of our own Times from the Accession of Queen Victoria to the Berlin Congress. 4 vols. London, 1 879. [2551 256 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [582 ENGELHARDT, ED.: La Turquie et le Tanzimat ou histoire des reformes dans r empire Ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu a nos jours. 2 vols. Paris, 1882. MENGIN, F.: Histoire sommaire de I'Egypte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed Aly, ou recit des principaux evenements qui ont eu lieu de fan 1823 a fan 1836. Paris, 1839. MERRUAU, PAUL: L'Egypte contemporaine de Mehemet-Ali a Said Pacha. Paris, 1864. MILLER, WILLIAM: The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913. Cambridge, 1913. MOURIEZ, PAUL: Histoire de Mehemet-Ali, vice-rot d'Egypte. 4 vols. Paris, 1858. A detailed work but one which must be read very critically. NOLTE, FREDERICK.: L'Europe militaire et diplomatique au dix-neuvieme siecle, 1815-1884. 4 vols. Paris, 1884. NOUVION, VICTOR DE: Histoire du regne de Louis Philippe I er rot des Fran fats, 1830-1848. 4 vols. Paris, 1857-1861. The views set forth by M. Nouvion in this work are very strongly "pro-French." PATON, A. A.: A History of the Egyptian Revolution, from the Period of the Memelukes to the death of Mohammed Ali. 2 vols. London, 1870. Paton was private secretary to Col. Hodges while the latter was British Consul-General at Alex- andria in 1839-1840. His account of the events which occurred in the Levant during that period is of value. RAIKES, THOMAS: France, since 1830. 2 vols. London, 1841. RANKE, LEOPOLD VON: Serbien und die Turkei im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert. In Sdmmtliche Werke. Dritte Gesammtausgabe. Leipzig, 1879. REGNAULT, ELIAS: Histoire de huit ans, 1840-1848. 3 vols. Paris, 1878. SCHIEMANN, THEODOR: Geschichte Russlands unter Kaiser Nikolaus I. 4 vols. Berlin, 1904-1919. Vols. Ill and IV cover the period 1830-1840. STERN, ALFRED: Geschichte Europas sett den Vertrdgen von 1815 bis zum Frankfurter Frieden von 1871. Vol. V. Stuttgart and Berlin, 1911. THUREAU-DANGIN, PAUL: Histoire de la monarchic de juillet. 7 vols. Paris, 1888- 1892. Thureau-Dangin has drawn conclusions in this work which are somewhat prejudiced in favor of the French. Nevertheless the work is both detailed and valuable. TREITSCHKE, H. VON: Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert. 5 vols. Leipzig. VAULABELLE, A. DE: Histoire moderne de I'Egypte, 1801 a 1833. 2 vols. Paris, 1830-1836. WARD, SIR A. W., AND GOOCH, G. P. (Editors): The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1910. Vol. II. New York, 1923. WEIGALL, ARTHUR E. P. BROME: A History of Events in Egypt from 1708 to 1914. New York, 1915. II. SPECIAL SECONDARY STUDIES BEER, ADOLF: Die Orientalische Politik Oesterreichs seit 1774. Prag, 1883. BORDEANO, N.: L'Egypte d'apres les trait es de 1840-1841. Constantinople, 1869. 'CAHUET, ALBERIC: La question d'Orient dans fhistoire contemporaine, 1821-1005. Paris, 1905. 583] APPENDIX 257 DASCOVICI, N.: La question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles, Geneve, 1915. DRIAULT, E.: La question d' Orient depuis ses origines jusqu & nos jours. Paris, 1898. DUGGAN, STEPHEN PIERCE HAYDEN: The Eastern Question. A Study in Diplomacy. New York, 1902. English Historical Review. January, 1903; April, 1912. Vols. XVIII, XXVII. London, 1903. FREYCINET, C. DE: La question d'Egypt. Paris, 1905. GORIAINOW, SERGI: Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles. Paris, 1910. An excellent mono- graph which has been based, almost entirely, upon Russian sources. GUICHEN, VICOMTE DE: La crise d'Orient de 1839 A 1841 et I' Europe. Paris, 1922. A study, strongly pro-French in its sympathy, but based almost entirely upon materials found in the archives of various European capitals especially Paris and London. HALL, MAJOR JOHN: England and the Orleans Monarchy. New York. 1912. Hall bases his work, to a large extent, upon material found among the records of the British foreign office. HASENCLEVER, ADOLF: Die Orientalische Frage in den Jahren 1838-1841. Leipzig, 1914. This is an excellent study which is based, to a large extent, upon the results of research carried on in the Berlin and Vienna record offices. HAUSSONVILLE, M. O. D': Histoire de la politique exterieure du gouvernement /ran fats, 2830-1848. 2 vols. Paris, 1850. HOLLAND, THOMAS ERSKINE: The European Concert in the Eastern Question. Ox- ford, 1885. KUNTZE, HEINRICH: Die Dardanellenfrage. Ein volkerrechtliche Studie. Rostock, 1909. LATIMER, ELIZABETH WORMELEY: Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century. Chicago, 1895. MARRIOTT, J. A. R.: The Eastern Question. An historical study in European Di- plomacy. Oxford, 1917. MISCHEF, P. H.: La mer noire et les detroits de Constantinople. Paris, 1899. MORPURGO, VICTOR: Politique de la Russie en Orient, etc. Paris, 1854. PHILLIPSON, COLEMAN, and BUXTON, NOEL: The Question of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. London, 1917. RAWLINSON, SIR HENRY: England and Russia in the East. London, 1875. Revue Historique. May-Aug., 1911. Vol. CVII. Paris. WURM, CHRISTIAN FRIEDRICH: Die Orientalische Frage in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwickelung. Leipzig, 1856. : Diplomatische Geschichte der Orientalischen Frage. Leipzig, 1858. III. BIOGRAPHIES, MEMOIRS, RECOLLECTIONS, DIARIES, AND PRIVATE LETTERS ARMAGNAC, BARON D': Nezib et Beyrouth, souvenirs d'Orient, de 1833 h 1841. Paris, 1844. BARANTE, BARON DE: Souvenirs du Baron de Barante, 1782-1866. Public's par Claude de Barante. 8 vols. Paris, 1890-1901. Vols. V and VI cover the period 1832-1841. Barante was for a considerable period of time French Ambassador to Russia. Many of his letters throw light upon the policies followed by the Tsar Nicholas I and his chief ministers. 258 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [584 BARKER, J.: Syria and Egypt under the last five Sultans of Turkey. Experiences, during fifty years, of Mr. Consul-Genera/ Barker. Edited by his son Edward B. B. Barker. 2 vols. London, 1876. Barker was the British Consul-General at Alexandria in 1833. Later he held a similar position at Aleppo. His account reveals many interesting facts concerning Mehemet Ali's regime in both Egypt and Syria. BEUST, COUNT VON: Memoirs of Frederick Ferdinand Count von Beust. Written by himself, with an introduction by Baron Henry de Worms. 2 vols. London, 1887. BROUOHTON, LORD (John Cam Hobhouse): Recollections of a Long Life, 1786-1852. Edited by his daughter, Lady Dorchester. 6 vols. London, 1909-1911. BULWER, SIR HENRY LYTTON E. (Lord Bailing): The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston; with Selections from his Diaries and Correspondence. 3 vols. London, 1870-1874. Bulwer quotes extensively from Palmerston's private correspondence, CAMPBELL, JOHN G. E. H. D. S.: Viscount Palmerston. London, 1892. CHESNEY, FRANCIS RAWDON: Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition. . . . carried on by order of the British government in 1835, 1836, 1837. London, 1868. CHESNEY, L. F. AND O'DONNELL, J. C.: The Life of the Late General F. R. Chesney, by his Wife and Daughter. Edited by Stanley Lane-Poole. London, 1885. CORTI, DR. EGON CAESAR: Leopold I of Belgium Secret Pages of European History .Translated by Joseph McCabe. London, 1923. CROZALS, J. DE: Guizot. Paris, 1901. DAUDET, ERNEST: Une vie d' ambassadrice au siecle dernier; la princesse de Lieven. Paris, 1904. DEWITT, MME. NEE GUIZOT: Monsieur Guizot dans sa famille et avec ses amis. Paris, 1880. : Lettres de M. Guizot a sa famille et & ses amis. Paris, 1884. DINO, DUCHESSE DE: Chronique de 1831-1862, public^ par la princesse Radziwill, ne'e Castellane. 4 vols. Paris, 1909-1910. DOUGLAS, SIR GEORGE, AND RAMSAY, SIR GEORGE DALHOUSIE: The Panmure Papers, being a Selection from the Correspondence of Fox Maule, Second Baron Panmure, afterwards Eleventh Earl of Dalhousie. i vols. London, 1908. FAUCHER, LEON: Biographie et c orrespondance. Vol.1. Paris, 1888. Faucher was a French journalist who corresponded frequently with Henry Reeve and other members of the "pro-French" party in England. His letters for the period between July, 1840, and December, 1840, reveal sentiments entertained in France at that time. FLERS, LE MARQUIS DE: Le Roi Louis-Philippe, vie anecdotique, 1773-1850. Paris, 1891. GREVILLE, CHARLES CAVENDISH FULKE: The Greville Memoirs. A "Journal of the Reigns of King George IV and King William IV. Edited by Henry Reeve. 3 vols. London, 1875. : The Greville Memoirs; A Journal of the Reigns of King George IV and King William IV. Edited by Richard Henry Stoddard. New York, 1875. 585] APPENDIX 259 : The Greville Memoirs; A Journal of the Reign of Queen Victoria from 1837 to 1852. Edited by Henry Reeve. 2 vols. New York, 1885. These memoirs constitute a valuable source but they must be read critically. Greville was strongly opposed to Palmerston's Levantine policy and at times he per- mitted his prejudices to influence his writing. GUIZOT, FRANCOIS PIERRE GUILLAUME: Memoires pour servir a I'histoire de mon temps. 8 vols. Paris, 1858-1867. Vols. IV-VI cover the period 1832-1842. Guizot quotes extensively from letters and despatches which have not been published elsewhere. HEINE, HEINRICH: French Affairs; Letters from Paris. (In the Works of Heinrich Heine translated by Charles Godfrey Leland. Vols. VII and VIII.) London, 1893. JENNINGS, Louis J.: The Correspondence and Diaries of the late Right Honorable John Wilson Croker. 3 vols. London, 1884. JOHNSON, REV. A. H. (Editor): The Letters of Charles Greville and Henry Reeve. 1836-1865. London, 1924. LANGEL, AUGUSTE: Lord Palmer ston et Lord Russell. Paris, 1877. LAUGHTON, JOHN KNOX: Memoirs of the Life and Correspondence of Henry Reeve. 2 vols. London, 1898. MALMESBURY, EARL OF: Memoirs of an Ex-Minister. An Autobiography. 2 vols. London, 1884. MAXWELL, SIR HERBERT (Editor): The Creevey Papers. A selection from the Cor- respondence and Diaries of the late Thomas Creevey. London, 1904. METTERNICH, PRINCE CLEMENS: Aus Metternictis nachgelassenen Papieren. Herausgegeben von dem Sohne des Staatskanzlers Fursten Richard Metter- nich-Winneburg. Etc. 8 vols. Vienna, 1880-1884. A source revealing the attitude of the government of Austria. MOLTKE, HELMUTH C. B. VON: Briefe iiber Zustdnde und Begebenheiten in der Tiirkei aus den Jahren 1835 ^is 1839. Berlin, 1841. MONYPENNY, WILLIAM FLAVELLE: The Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beacons- field. Vol. II. New York, 1913. MULLER, F. MAX (Editor): Memoirs of Baron Stockmar, by his Son Baron E. von Stockmar. 2 vols. London, 1872. NAPIER, MAJOR-GENERAL ELERS: The Life and Correspondence of Admiral Sir Charles Napier. 2 vols. London, 1862. NESSELRODE, COMTE CHARLES DE: Lettres et papiers du chancelier comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1856. Public's par le comte A. de Nesselrode. n vols. Paris, 1904-1912. Vols. VII and VIII cover the period 1829-1846. Nesselrode's letters to Meyendorff, which are published herein, reveal clearly the attitude of Russia, especially during the period 1839-1841. ODILON, BARROT: Memoires posthumes de Odilon Bairot. 4 vols. Paris, 1875-1876. Vol. I covers the period 1791-1848. PARIS, COMTE DE, ET CHARTRES, Due DE: Due d'Orltans. Lettres 1825-1842. Paris, 1889. PROKESCH-OSTEN, ANTON VON: Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fursten Metternich. Edited by Count Anton Prokesch-Osten, the Younger. 2 vols. Vienna, 1881. 260 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [586 PROK.ESCH-OSTEN, GRAFEN VON: Mehmed-Ali Vize-Kbnig von Aegypten. Aus meinem Tagebuche, 1826-1841. Wien, 1877. PuCKLER-MusKAU, HERMANN VON: Aus Mehemed All's Reich. Stuttgart, 1844. RAIK.ES, THOMAS: A Portion of the Journal kept by Thomas Rat kes from 1831 to 1847. 4 vols. London, 1856-1858. Raikes spent much time in France during the period 1833-1841, and in his journal he comments frequently concerning the political situation there. : Private Correspondence with the Duke of Wellington and ether distin- guished Contemporaries. Edited by his daughter, Harriet Raikes. London, 1 86 1. REID, STUART j.: Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durham, 1792-1840. 2 vols. London, 1906. Reid quotes extracts from a number of letters which were exchanged between Palmerston and Durham while the latter was British Minis- ter to Russia. ROBINSON, GERTRUDE: David Urquhart. Some Chapters in the Life of a Victorian Knight-Errant of Justice and Liberty. Oxford, 1920. RUSSELL, JOHN EARL: Recollections and Suggestions, 1813-1873. London, 1875. RUSSELL, ROLLO: Early Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1805-1840. 2 vols. London, 1913. SAINT-ARNAUD, MARECHAL DE: Lettres du martchal de Saint-Arnaud. 2 vols. Paris, 1855. SANDERS, LLOYD CHARLES: Life of discount Palmerston. Philadelphia, 1888. : Lord Melbourne's Papers. London, 1889. The extracts which San- ders quotes from Melbourne's private letters particularly for the period Aug.-Nov., 1840 are valuable. SENIOR, NASSAU: Conversations and Journals in Egypt and Malta. Edited by Mrs. M. C. M. Senior Simpson. 2 vols. London, 1882. TASCHEREAU, J. (Editor) : Revue retrospective ou archives secretes du dernier pouverne- ment, 1830-1848. Recueil non periodique. Paris, 1848. A collection of some of Louis Philippe's private letters and other papers. His letters to King Leopold of Belgium, which are published in this collection, are of particular value for this study. TOCQUEVILLE, ALEXIS DE: Memoirs, Letters, and Remains. Translated from the French by the translator of Napoleon's correspondence with King Joseph. Vol. II. Boston, 1862. TROLLOPE, THOMAS ADOLPHUS: What I Remember. Vol.11. London, 1887. VERON, LE DR. Louis: Mtmoires d'un bourgeois de Paris. 5 vols. Paris, 1856. VICTORIA, QUEEN OF ENGLAND: The Letters of ^ue e n Victoria. A selection from Her Majesty's Correspondence between the years 1837 and 1861. Edited by A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher. 3 vols. London, 1908. VINTRINIER, A.: Soliman Pacha colonel S eve gtneralissimedesarmeesEgyptiennes, ou, histoire des guerre s de I'Egypte de 1820 a 1860. Paris, 1 886. WALPOLE, SPENCER: The Life of Lord John Russell. 2 vols. London, 1889. In this work Walpole has quoted extensively from the letters of Lord John Russell. WALSH, REV. R.: A Residence at Constantinople, during a period including the Com- mencement, Progress, and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions, i vols. London, 1836. WILLIAMS, H. NOEL: The Life and Letters of Sir Charles Napier. London, 1917. 587] APPENDIX 26l IV. CONTEMPORARY PUBLICATIONS I. Newspapers, Periodicals and Annals The Annual Register, or a View of History, Politics, and Literature. 1832-1841. London, 1833-1842. Many of the important despatches published in the Levant Correspondence have been copied in the volume of the Annual Register for 1840. The Athenaeum Journal of Literature, Science and the Fine Arts. 1833-1841. London. Biackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, 1833-1841. Edinburgh and London. The Examiner, A Sunday Paper, on Politics, Literature, and the Fine Arts. London. The volumes for 1838, 1840, and 1841 have been consulted. The Examiner was a Whig paper but it did not always support the policies of Lord Palmerston. The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle. 1832-1841. Series 2, Vols. XXV-XXVI; Series 3, Vols. I XVI. London. IRVING, JOSEPH: The Annals of our Time, London, 1869. Journal des Debats, politiques et litteraires, 1832-1841. Paris. This was the leading organ of the Doctrinaires. LESUR, C. L.: Annuaire Historique, ann6es 1830-1840. Paris. The Monthly Review, 1833-1844. Vols. CCXI-CCXLV. London. This source con- tains numerous reviews of current books and pamphlets. Many of these reviews are excellent. The Poor Man's Guardian. A weekly Paper for the People. 1833-1835. Revue des deux Mondes. Paris. The issues for the years 1832 to 1841, and for Aug. i, 1852, Nov. i, 15, 1891, and June i, 1895, have been examined. The Spectator. A weekly journal of News, Politics, Literature, and Science, 1832- 1841. London. Tail's Edinburgh Magazine. 1832-1841. Edinburgh. The Times. 1832-1841. London. The Times has three features valuable for the present study: its editorials, its letters from correspondents in fore gn coun- tries particularly France and Turkey and its extracts copied from foreign journals. The Westminster Review. 1832-1842. London. 2. Contemporary Books and Pamphlets AUBIGNOSC, L. P. B. D': La Turquie nouvelle jugee au point ou Pont amenee Its r /formes du Sultan Mahmoud. 2 vols. Paris, 1 839. CADALVENE, E. DE, ET BARRAULT, E.: Deux annees de I'histoire d'Orient, 1839- 1840. Paris, 1840. : Histoire de la guerre de Mehemed-Ali contre la Porte Ottomane, en Syrie et en Asie-Mineure, 1831-1833. Paris, 1837. CARGILL, WILLIAM: Mehemet Alt, Lord Palmerston, Russia, and France. London, 1840. CLOT, A. B. (Clot Bey): Aper(u general sur I 'Egypte. Paris, 1840. COBDEN, RICHARD: Russia. "By a Manchester Manufacturer." Edinburgh, 1836. EDWARDS, RICHARD: La Syrie, 1840-1862. Paris, 1862. ELLIOTT, C. B. Travels in the Three Great Empires of Austria, Russia, and Turkey. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1839. 262 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [588 FOURCADE, RAYMOND HENRI: Notice sur la question d'Orient et sur la possession d'Alger. Paris, 1836. FRANKLAND, CAPTAIN CHARLES COLVILLE: Travels to and from Constantinople, in in the Years 1827 and 1828. i vols. London, 1829. GILSON, ADRIAN : The Czar and the Sultan: or, Nicholas and Abdul Medjid. London, 1852. JOMARD, EDME FRANCOIS : Coup-d'Oeil impartial sur I'etat present de I'Egypte, com- pare a sa situation anterieure. Paris, 1 836. LAGROIX, FREDERIC: Question a" Orient. Paris, 1839. LAMARTINE, ALPHONSE: Souvenirs, impressions, pensees et paysages, pendant un voyage en Orient, 1832-1833. 4 vols. Paris, 1835. LAURENT, ACHILLE: Relation historique des affaires de Syrie, depuis 1840 jusquen 1842. 2 vols. Paris, 1846. MALORTIE, BARON DE: Egypt: Native Rulers and Foreign Interference. London, 1833. MARMONT, MARSHAL (Due de Raguse): The Present State of the Turkish Empire. Translated with notes and observations on the relations of England with Turkey and Russia by Lt.-Col. Sir Frederic Smith, London, 1839. MICHELSEN, EDWARD H.: The Ottoman Empire and its Resources. London, 1853. NAPIER, COMMODORE SIR CHARLES: The War in Syria. 1 vols. London, 1842. Napier wrote his work evidently for the purpose of justifying his conduct in the Near East in 1840 and 1841. Nevertheless, it contains much valuable material. NUGENT, LORD: Lands, Classical and Sacred. 2 vols. London, 1845. POUJOULAT, M. BAPTISTIN: Voyage dans I'Asie Mineure. 2 vols. Paris, 1841. QUIN, MICHAEL J.: A Steam Voyage down the Danube. 2 vols. London, 1836. REID, JOHN: Turkey and the Turks: Being the Present State of the Ottoman Empire. London, 1840. Ross, DAVID. Opinion of the European Press on the Eastern Question. London, 1836. ST. JOHN, JAMES AUGUSTUS: Egypt and Nubia. London, 1845. : Egypt, and Mohammed Ali; or, Travels in the Valley of the Nile. 2 vols. London, 1834. SCHOTT, FRIEDRICH: Die Orientalische Frage und ihre Losung aus dem Gesicht- spunkte der Civilization. Leipzig, ^839. SCOTT, C. R.: Rambles in Egypt and Candia: etc. 2 vols. London, 1837. STEPHENS, JOHN LLOYD: Incidents of Travel in the Russian and Turkish Empires. 2 vols. London, 1839. Turkey and Russia; or Observations on their Political and Commercial Relations with England. By a Merchant. London, 1835. URO.UHART, DAVID. Diplomatic Transactions in Central Asia, from 1834-1839. London, 1841. : Le sultan et le pacha d'Egypte. Paris, 1839. : La crise. La France devant les quatre puissances. Paris, 1840. : The Mystery of the Danube. Showing how through secret Diplomacy, that River has been closed, etc. London, 1851. (Editor): The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers, etc. Series !. 5 vols. London, 1836-1837. 589] APPENDIX 263 V. PUBLISHED GOVERNMENTAL DOCUMENTS I. State Papers, Treaties, Reports, Etc. British and Foreign State Papers. Vols. XX-XXX. 1832-1 842. London, 1 836- 1 8 5 8. British Parliamentary Papers. 1833-1841. London. One of the chief sources for this study. The Correspondence relative to the Affairs of the Levant, pub- lished in Par!. Papers 1841, XXIX, and 1841, Session 2, VIII, was found to be particularly valuable. CHESNEY, FRANCIS RAWDON: The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris. ... 4 vols. London, 1850. Documents diplomatiques relatifs a la question d 'Orient. Du 8 octobre 1840 au 13 juillet 1841. Paris, 1842. DUVERGIER, J. B.: Collection complete des lois, decrets, ordonnances, reglemens et avis du conseil-d" etat, . . . Annee 1840. Vol. XL. Paris, 1841. HERTS LET, EDWARD: The Map of Europe by Treaty; etc. 4 vols. London, 1875- 1891. Vol. II covers the period 1828-1863. MARTENS, GEO. FRED: Nouoeau recueil de traitts, etc. 1808-1839. 16 vols. Goettingue, 1817-1842. : Nouveau supplemens au recueil de traites, etc. 1761-1839. 3 vols. Goettingue, 1843-1875. : Nouveau recueil general de traites, etc. 1840-1874. 20 vols. Goettin- gue, 1843-1875. NORADOUNGHIAN, GABRIEL: Recueil d'actes intemationaux de fEmpire Ottoman. 4 vols. Paris, 1897-1903. 2. Parliamentary Speeches Archives Parlementaires de 1789 a 1860. Recueil complet des debats Idgislatifs et politiques des chambres francaises. Paris, 1862-1913. Vols. LXXIX-CXXVII cover the period i833-July 17, 1839. GUIZOT, FRANC/OIS PIERRE GUILLAUME: Histoire parlementaire de France. Recueil complet des discours prononces dans les chambres de 1819 a 1848. 5 vols. Paris, 1863-1864. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates: Forming a continuation of "The Parliamentary History of England, from the earliest Period to the Year 1803." London. Third series, Vols. XV to LXV cover the period from 1833 to 1842. VI. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS United States Department of State Archives. (i). Austria, Vol. I. (2). England, Vols. XL XLVIII. Aaron Vail frequently commented upon European affairs in his despatches for the period 1833-1835. (3). France, Vols. XXVI XXIX. (4). Prussia, Vols. I II. Henry Wheaton followed very closely and quite ac- curately the development of the Turco-Egyptian Question, 1838-1841. (5). Russia, Vols. XII XIV. (6). Turkey, Vols. II IX. These volumes contain extensive material relative to the commercial affairs of the Near East. (7). Consular Letters, Constantinople, Vol. II. INDEX A jew Remarks on Our Foreign Policy, English pamphlet, on foreign policy, 70 n. Abdallah Pasha, Turkish governor of Acre, 13. Abd-ul-Mejid, Sultan, 104; firman of deposing Mehemet Ali (1840), 186. Achmed Fethi Pasha, Turkish diplo- matist and Minister of Commerce, 76, 225-226. Achmet Pasha, Turkish naval com- mander, 42, 104-105. Acre, English capture of (1840), 199. Adana, Turkish pashalic, 22, 23-24. Aden, occupied by English (1838), 60, 60 n. Adrianopole, Treaty of modified (1834), 42, 42 n. Akif Effendi, Turkish Minister of For- eign Affairs* 248. Aleppo, government of granted to Me- hemet Ali (1833), 23. Alexander, Grand Duke (later Tsar Alexander II), 100. Alexandria, question of, 79 ff, 79 n. Algiers, French in, 36 n, 64. Allison, English agent at Constantino- ple, 174. Apponyi, Count Anton, Austrian Am- bassador to France, 154. Austria, Near Eastern policy of (1833), 27, 32-33; (1839), 80, 80 n, 118-119, 118 n; interest of in steam naviga- tion on Danube, 74 n; public of in- terested in Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 251; appears to act as me- diator, 251; financial conditions in (1840), 253; representatives of eager to secure settlement of Turco-Egyp- tian question (1841), 222-223, 228 n; influence of at Constantinople, 227 n. Bandiera, Baron Franz, Austrian naval commander in Levant, 177. Barante, Baron William Prosper de, French Ambassador to Russia, 71; on Tsar's attitude regarding Vienna conference (1839), no n; claimed Prussia and Austria were hostile to Anglo-French alliance, 132 n. Barnes, Thomas, editor of The Times, 182 n. Barton, Thomas P., U. S. diplomatic agent at Paris, on French policy (1835), 65 n. Beauvale, Frederick Lamb, Lord, Eng- lish Ambassador to Austria, on dip- lomatic conferences at Vienna (1839), 107-108, 107 n; report of on attitude of Metternich (1841), 217. Becker, Niklas, German poet, 184 n. Bentinck, Lord William, Governor- General of India, 50 n, 58 n; on steam communication between Europe and India (1835), 39. Berlin, Treaty of (1833), 32 n. Beust, Count Frederick Ferdinand von, Saxon (later Austro-Hungarian) statesman, on political situation in France (1840), 194 n. Beyrout, bombardment of reported at Paris (1840), 186. Bligh, English charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 34. Bloomfield, Lord John A., English charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 198. Bourqueney, Baron Adolf, French charge d'affaires at London, on Rus- sian policy at London (1839), 100- 10 1 ; on attitude of Palmerston towards France (1841), 211; on diplomatic situation at London, 213- 214; discouraged by diplomatic sit- uation, 222 n; favored signing of Straits Convention in March, 1841, 223. Bourse, Paris exchange, 166, 178, 186- 187, 233. Boutenieff, Russian Ambassador to Turkey, 17, 19, 28, 52. Bowring, Sir John, English diplomatic agent, report of on Egypt, etc. (1838), 61-62, 61 n. Bresson, Count Charles, French Min- ister to Prussia, representations of to Prussian government (1840), 253. Broglie, Due Achille Charles de French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20, 28, 64; on policy of France in Turkey (1833), 37-38. Broughton, John Cam Hobhouse, Lord, President of the Board of Commis- sioners for the Affairs of India, on policy of Mehemet Ali (1838), 58 n; on obstacles to steam communi- cation with India, 59. Brown, U. S. Dragoman at Constan- tinople, on dismissal of Reschid Pasha (1841), 226 n. 265 266 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [592 Brunnow, Baron Philip de, Russian diplomatist, mission of to England announced (1839), 118; instructions to on first mission to London, 120; negotiates with Palmerston, 120- 121, 1 20 n, 123; reports to Russian government results of mission, 129; wins support of Metternich, 129 n; ordered to return to England, 130; plan of for settlement of Turco- Egyptian question (1840), 132-133; attitude of towards France and Near Eastern settlement, 152-153, 152 n; threatens Russian withdrawal from London conference, 154 n; opposed to modification of treaty of July 15, 1840, 185-186; favors return of Fance to Concert of Europe, 212; opposed to proposal made by Guizot (1841), 222. Billow, Freiherr Heinrich von, Prus- sian Minister to England, instruc- tions sent to (1840), 142; advances of to Guizot, 144, 144 n, 151-152; attitude of during crisis of 1840, 172. Bulwer, Sir Henry, English diplomatic agent at Constantinople and later at Paris, 68; on Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt (1838), 70; reports of on atti- tude of French government (1839), 115-116, 123-124; negotiations of with Thiers (1840), 165, 165 n, 179- 180, 180 n. Caille, Captain, French diplomatic agent, 84, 86, 104. Cambreling, C. C., U. S. diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg, on Austro-Russian relations (1841), 212 n. Campbell, Colonel Colin, English Con- sul-General at Alexandria, 22 n, 38, 86-87 n, 127 n. Canning, Sir Stratford, English Am- bassador to Turkey, 14, 14 n, 41. Came, Count de, French deputy, 96, 96 n. Chamber of Deputies, sentiments ex- pressed in favorable to Mehemet AH (1833), 37-38; debates in (1839), 95 ff; (1840), 189 n. Chateau d'Eu, conference of (1840), 171. Chekib Effendi, Turkish Minister to England, 147, 150, 227; delays sig- nature of protocol de cloture (1841), 222, 223-224. Chesney, Lieut-Colonel Francis Ra\v- don, English officer, 39; Euphrates expedition of (i835-'36), 49-50. Chrzanowski, General Adalbert, Polish officer in English employ in Turkey, 63- Churchill, English resident of Constan- tinople, 248. Clanricarde, Marquis of, English Am- bassador to Russia, on attitude of Russia relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 116 ff, 118 n. Clarendon, George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of, English Lord Privy Seal, opposition of to Palmerston's Near Eastern policy (1840), 157 n, 159, 182 n. Clay, John Randolph, U. S. diplomatic representative at St. Petersburg and later at Vienna, on situation in southern Russia (1833), 34-35 n; on situation in Near East (1834), 242- 244; on character and policy of Tsar (1836), 247-248; on policies of Pow- ers relative to the Near East (1839), 25I-253- Cochelet, Adrien Louis, French Con- sul-General at Alexandria, attempts of to prevent war in Near East (1839), 85-86, 86-87 n; on attitude of Mehemet Ali, 112 n; encourages Mehemet Ali to persist in his de- mands, 127 n; urges Mehemet Ali to stir up holy war (1840), 175 n; in- fluence of with Mehemet Ali, 200 n. Collective note of July 27, 1839, 108- 109. Commerce and navigation, Anglo-Tur- kish treaty of (1838), 67-68; Franco- Turkish treaty of, 68 n. Constantine, Bey of, 64. Constantinople, question of, 79 ff. Constitutionnel, Paris journal, 167. Courrier Franqais, Paris journal, 167. D'Abbadie, on prospect for a canal across Isthmus of Suez (1839), 62 n. Damascus, government of granted to Mehemet Ali (1833), 23. Darmes, regicide, 192. Dolgorouki, Prince, Russian nobleman, 34-35 n. Don Carlos, Spanish pretender, 66. Duchatel, Count Charles Marie Tan- neguy, French Minister of the Inte- rior, 82. Duperre, French Minister of Marine, 87, 95- Durham, John George Lambton, Earl of, English Ambassador to Russia, 47, 245-246, 247; on Russia's Near Eastern policy (1836), 48; handi- capped in efforts to improve Anglo- 593] INDEX 267 Russian relations, 53, 53 n; success of at St. Petersburg, 53 n, 56-57, 248; on Anglo-Russian relations, 56. East India Company, 59. Ellice, Edward, English politician, 182 n. England, France, Russia, and Turkey, English pamphlet, on Russian pol- icy (1834), 55. England, general policy of in Near East, ion; Turco-Egyptian policy of in 1833, 32-33, 41-42; suspicion of French relations with Egypt in, 41; attitude of to Russian policy in Near East, 239-240, 241; suspicion of Me- hemet Ali's policies in (i833-'38), 38, 57-58, 58 n; hostility to Russia in (i834-'36), 53 ff, 54 n, 56 n; in- terest of in Egypt (1835), 245; gains influence at Constantinople ( 1836- '38), 66-67; Near Eastern policy of (1838), 249-250; (1839), 252-253; opinion in on Turco-Egyptian ques- tion, 93-94; rejects proposals of Brunnow, 1221-123; public opinion in during crisis of 1840, 170, 170 n, 181-182, 181 n, 182 n; prestige of in 1841, 231; views on Near Eastern policy of, 232 n, 234-235, 236. Euphrates route to India, 39-40, 213, 213 n. See also Chesney, and Steam communication with India. expedition. See Chesney. The Examiner, London Sunday paper, on Anglo-French rivalry over route to India (1840), 139 n, 234-235. Fanshawe, Captain, English naval of- ficer, mission of to Alexandria and Constantinople (1840), 202-203, 202 n. Ferdinand I, Emperor of Austria, 73 n. Ferdinand II, King of Naples, 147-148. Ficquelmont, Count Ludwig, Austrian statesman, 32 n. Firman of investiture, Feb. 13, 1841, 218-219, 219 n; modified by firmans of May-June, 1841, 228 n. Foltz, French diplomatic agent, 84. France, general policy of in Near East, 9, n; Near Eastern policy of (1833), 36-37, 36-37 n, 41-42, 41 n, 42 n, 239-240, 241; speculations on the Near Eastern policy of (1834), 242; policy of in Egypt (1835), 245; loses influence at Constantinople (1836), 66-67, 67 n; favoritism for Mehemet Ali in (1838), 68-69, 69 n; Near Eastern policy of (1839), 80 ff, 80 n, 119; opposition of to Vienna confer- ence plan, 115; opposed to coercion of Mehemet Ali, 115-116, 124; plan of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 124-125, 124 n, 125 n; press opinion in favorable to Mehemet Ali, 126 n; government of disclaims fa- voritism for Mehemet Ali, 127-128, 127 n; naval preparations of, 132; (1840), 139; government of surprised by treaty of July 15, 1840, 165; in- dignation in against same, 166-167, 166 n; policy of during crisis of 1840, 167-168, 171, 187; revival of excite- ment in, 178, 186-187, 192 n; reaction in favoring peace, 192 n; public opinion in when Guizot became Min- ister of Foreign Affairs, 194 n; de- cline of warlike sentiment in, 205- 206, 206 n; move for building of fortifications in (1841), 214 n; for- eign policy of influenced by Turco- Egyptian question, 229; accused of having imperialist ambitions in Med- iterranean, 234-235; interest of in steam communication with East, 236 n. Francis II, Emperor of Austria, 73 n. Frederick William III, King of Prussia, 32 n; on policy of Louis Philippe, 65 n. Frederick William IV, King of Prussia, 170. Galloway, English railway projector in Egypt, 59 n. Gentleman's Magazine, English month- ly publication, on development of steam communication with East (1838), 60. Germany, reaction in against France during crisis of 1840, 184 n. Gliddon, U. S. consular agent at Alex- andria, on diplomatic affairs at Alex- andria (1833), 22 n. Granville, Granville George Leveson- Gower, Earl of, English Ambassador to France, on attitude of French Ministers relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 82, 89-90, 106-107; reports French arguments against coercion of Mehemet Ali, 127-128, 128 n; on views of Thiers relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1840), 138 n; reports suggestion of Thiers, 173 n; on Thiers' attitude during crisis of 1840, 189-190; fears French attempt to seize Balearic Isles, 190 n; reports desire of Guizot to end isolation of France (1841), 211. 268 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [594 Greigh, Admiral, commander of Rus- sian Black Sea fleet, 16. Greville, Charles, English politician and writer, 182 n; on triumph of Palm- erston in English Cabinet (1840), 1 88; on outcome of crisis of 1840, 206. Guizot, Frangois Pierre Guillaume, French statesman, on Anglo-French relations (1833), 4 1 ! speech of on Levantine policy of French govern- ment (1839), 97-98, 98 n; appointed Ambassador to England (1840), I 35" I 36; conferences of with Palm- erston, 140, 140 n; on diplomatic situation at London, 140-141, 142, 150-151, 152, 154-155, 160; com- ments of on views of Palmerston, 146-147; on opposition to Palmerston's policies in British Cabinet, 157 n; objects to Palmerston's defense of treaty of July 15, 1840, 164; nego- tiations of for modification of July treaty, 171-172, 173 n, 182 n; com- municates casus belli note to Palm- erston, 188; appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in France, 193; plan of for modification of July treaty, 195; disappointed by attitude of Palmerston, 196-197, 197 n; advice of for Mehemet Ali, 202 n; eager for France to escape from isolated posi- tion, 207 ff, 208 n; abandons hope of securing modification of July treaty, 207-208, proposal of to secure return of France to Concert of Europe (1841), 212-213, 2I 3 n ; delays signing of Straits Convention, 222-223; author- izes Bourqueney to "initial" same, 223; comment of on outcome of Turco-Egyptian question, 229-230. Hafiz Pasha, Commander of Turkish forces in Asia Minor, 75, 75 n, 83. Haines, Captain, English naval officer, 60 n; on strategic position of Aden, 60-61. Halil Pasha, Turkish statesman, 17, 149. Hamid Bey, Egyptian officer, 216. Hodges, Colonel, English Consul-Gen- eral at Alexandria, 127 n, 149 n, 158- 159, 176 n. Hodgson, W. H., U. S. diplomatic agent, on policies of great Powers in Near East (1835), 44 n. Holland, Henry Richard Fox, Lord, English Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, opposition of to Palmer- ston's Near Eastern policy (1840), 157 n, 159, 182 n. Hugon, Admiral, French naval com- mander in Mediterranean, 65. Ibrahim Pasha, Egyptian commander, 13, 13 n, 18, 19, 49, 104, 243, 244. India. See steam communication with, Suez route to, and Euphrates route to. Isabella II, Queen of Spain, 66. Itcheli, Turkish pachalic, 22, 23. Jochmus, General, Baron August von, German officer in Turkish employ, instructions for (1841), 214. Journal de Saint Petersbourg, French language journal of St. Petersburg, on diplomatic affairs at Constanti- nople (1833), 20. Journal des Debats, Paris daily paper, on situation in Near East (1833), 15, 20, 21 ; on French interest in Mediterranean (1838), 69; on Tur- co-Egyptian question (1839), 94- 95, 94 n; bellicose statements in (1840), 167. Kisseleff, Count Nicholai von, Russian charge d'affaires at London, 101. Koenigsmarck, Count Hans Carl, Prus- sian Ambassador to Turkey, 215, 221. Kolowrat, Count Franz Anton, Austrian Minister of the Interior, 183 n. Koniah, battle of (1832), 16. Konigsmarck, (spelling copied in notes from some of the sources). See Koenigsmarck. Kosrew, Pasha, Turkish Grand Vizier, 104, 104 n; dismissal of (1840), 148- 149; dismissal of announced at Lon- don, 154. Kourchid Bey, Egyptian governor of Jeddah, 57-58. Kutayah, occupied by Egyptians (1833), 19; preliminaries of, 24, 24 n. Lagrene, French charge d'affaires at St. Petersburg, 34. Lalande, Admiral, French naval com- mander in Levant, 105, 105 n. Lamartine, Alphonse de, French dep- uty, favors partition of Turkey (1839), 96-97, 97 n; (1840), 137 n. Lazareff, Rear Admiral, commander of Russian fleet sent to Constantino- ple (1833), 21. Leopold I, King of the Belgians, alarmed by crisis of 1840, 172; ef- 595] INDEX 269 forts of to secure compromise set- tlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 172; fears revolution in Europe, 193 n. Lieven, Christophe Andreievich, Prince, 238. Princes (Countess), 160 n. Livingston, Edward, U. S. Minister to France, on the relations of England, France, and Russia (1833), 239- 240. London, Treaty of, July 15, 1840, 161- 162, 162-163 n. Loring, Lieutenant, English naval of- ficer, 216. Louis Philippe, King of the French, 141 n; favors Habsburg marriage alliance, (1836), 65, 65 n; favors preparations for war (1840), 167, 167 n, 178 n; eager to preserve peace, 171, 191 ff, 193 n, 195 n; ap- peal of to King Leopold of Belgium, 172; forces Thiers to resign, 192-193. Mahmoud II, Sultan, general policy of, 13; warlike policy of (1834), 44, 243; grants permission for Euphrates expedition (1835), 49; issues firman to Mehemet Ali, 51-52; preparations of for war, 244; desire of to renew war with Egypt (1836), 67; hostile to Mehemet Ali (1838), 68; pre- pares to renew war with Mehemet Ali (i8 3 8-'3 9 ), 75-76, 79, 82-83; death of, 104. Maison, Marshal Marquis, French Minister to Russia, on French policy in Near East (1834), 242-243. Malcolm, Admiral, Sir Pulteney, com- mander of English fleet in Mediter- ranean, 27, 33. Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of, English politician, on French opinion (1837), 66 n. Maltzan, Count Mortimer, Prussian Ambassador to Austria, 108 n. Mandeville, English charge d'affaires at Constantinople, 17, 41; peace en- deavors at Constantinople (1833), 18-19. Maurojeni. Turkish charge d'affaires at Vienna and diplomatic agent to London, 14, 239. Mazloum Bey, Turkish diplomatic agent, 205, 214, 216. Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, foreign experts in the employ of, 10 n; pre- pares for war with Sultan (1831- '32), 13, 13 n; rejects Roussin's peace proposal (1833), 22, 22 n; designs of, 38; policy of (1834), 43; French sympathy for, 44 n; sends troops to Syria, 243; policy of in Arabia (i834-'35), 57-58; policy of relative to Euphrates expedition (1835), 49; discontent in the territories of, 244; aids development of Suez route to India, 62-63, 63 n; moves to gain independence (1838), 64; promises of to ConsulsXjeneral at Alexan- dria (1839), 83; orders of to Ibra- him Pasha, 84, 84 n, 86, 104; defiant attitude of, 112 n, 127 n; (1840), 148-149, 149 n, 152 n, 175-176, 253; attempts of at direct negotiations with Turkish Ministers, 149-150, 155; revolts against the authority of, X 59> I S9 n ; follows advice of French, 176, 176 n, 179; abandons defiant atti- tude and agrees to evacuate Syria, 200 ff, 200 n; final submission of to Porte (1841), 216-217; objections of to firman of investiture, 219-220, 220 n. Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount, English Prime Minister, attitude of during crisis of 1840, 170-171, 172, 184, 193 n; on services of Morning Chronicle to Palmerston, 185 n; on disagreement within British Cabinet, 190 n. Memorandum of Nov. 14, 1840, 198. Mesange, French warship, 25. Metternich-Winneburg, Clement W. N. L., Prince of, Austrian Chancellor, 31, 32, 32 n; on French and English interests in Egypt (1833), 40-41; eager to preserve peace in Near East ( T 839), 78, 250; claims Ponsonby responsible for Sultan's policy, 86; opposes formal conference at Vienna, 92, 92 n; attitude of towards Russia, 100 n; promotes informal discussions on Turco-Egyptian question, 107, 107 n; initiates collective note of July 27, 1839, 108, 108 n; effect of his departure from Vienna, 251; opin- ion of relative to France (1840), 132 n; attitude of on Turco-Egyp- tian question, 134 n, 145, 145 n; proposal of for settlement of Turco- Egyptian question, 146; alarmed by bellicose French attitude, 170, 170 n, 183 n; suggests plan for reunion of France and four Powers, 183; favors leaving Egypt to Mehemet Ali, 198, 209; irritated by Ponson- by's conduct, 2IO, 210 n; threatens to withdraw Austrian support from 270 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [596 Porte (1841), 217, 225; complains about English policy, 217; opposed to guaranteeing independence and integrity of Turkey, 227 n. Meyendorff, Baron Peter, Russian Am- bassador to Prussia, no. Miniaut, French Consul-General at Alexandria, 22 n, 37. Minto, Gilbert Elliot, Lord, English First Lord of Admiralty, 157 n. Mole, Count Louis Mathieu, French statesman, 66, 66 n, 68; admits "shades of difference" between Eng- lish and French policies in Near East (1839), 81-82, 82 n. Moltke, Major Helmuth von, Prussian officer in Turkish employ, 76. Monthly Review, London Magazine, on Russia (1835), 55; on steam communication with India (1839), 62 n. Morning Chronicle, London journal, on Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 94; on establishment of steam com- munication with India (1840), 158 n; article in hostile to France, 185; service of to Palmerston in "Syrian affair," 185 n. Mounier, Baron, French diplomatic agent, unofficial mission of to Lon- don (1840), 207. Miinchengratz, conference of (1833), 31-32, 32 n; apprehensions aroused by in England and France, 33. Muravieff, Lieut.-General, Russian diplomatist, on mission in Near East (i832-'33), 15, 17, 18, 19, 19 n, 238. Muhlenberg, H. A., U. S. diplomatic representative at Vienna, on situa- tion in Austria (1840), 134 n. Namic Pasha, Turkish major-general, 14, 237, 238. Napier, Commodore, Sir Charles, Eng- lish naval officer in Levant, 177, 177 n; on allied military and naval operations in Levant (1840), 199; negotiates convention of Nov. 27, 1840, with Mehemet Ali, 200-201, 200 n; arranges with Mehemet Ali for evacuation of Syria, etc. (1841) 216, 216 n; on attitude of Mehemet Ali regarding firman of investiture, 219-220, 220 n; ideas of on English Near Eastern policy, 232 n, 236. Naples, Kingdom of, in dispute with England (1840), 147. National, Paris journal, on French policy (1838), 69-70; (1839), 94; threatening comment in against Louis Philippe (1840), 192. Near East question of denned, 9. Nesselrode, Count Charles Robert von, Russian Chancellor, on Tsar's Near Eastern policy (1833), JS- 1 ^; pro- poses treaty of alliance with Tur- key, 28; mission of to Berlin, 32 n; reply of to English and French pro- tests, 34; negotiates with Achmet Pasha (1834), 42; demands explana- tions relative to French policy, 242- 243; opposition of to English Euphrates expedition (i835-'36), 52; friendly to England (1838), 72-73; opposes European conference on Egyptian question, 249; on Rus- sian policy and Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 99-100, 99 n, 101- 102, 109, 109 n; favors agreement with England, 116 ff, 116 n, 118 n; protests vigorously against French policy in Near East, 117; on results of first Brunnow mission to London, 129; claims of regarding Brunnow missions, 130 n; pleased with treaty of July 15, 1840; 169, 169 n; uneasy about attitude of Austria, 186 n; favors leaving Me- hemet Ali in control of Egypt, 198; favors return of France to Concert of Europe, 212; eager to prevent re- storation of Anglo-French alliance, 212 n; approved attitude of Palmer- ston (1841), 225; comment of on outcome of Turco-Egyptian question, 230 n. Dimitri de, son of Russian Chancellor, on outcome of Turco- Egyptian question (1841), 230- 231 n. Neumann, Baron Philip, Austrian Min- ister to England, proposals of for settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques- tion (1840), 144-145, 151-152; ne- gotiations of with Guizot and Palm- erston, 146; attitude of during crisis of 1840, 172; without instructions, 1 86. Nezib, battle of (1839), 104. Nicholas I, Ts*ar of Russia, sends Or- loff to Constantinople (1833), 2 4; hostile to France, 27 n; character and policy of defended (1836), 247- 248; on Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt (1839), 71; views of regard- ing Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 98; Near Eastern policy of, 77 n, 118; 597] INDEX 2 7 I pleased with results of first Brun- now mission to London, 129-130; pleased with treaty of July 15, 1840, 169, 169 n; opposed to concessions to France, 185. Nouri Effendi, Turkish diplomatist and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 77, 86, 104, 250-251; mission of to London (1840), 141-142. Odilon Barrot, French deputy, 196 n. Olivier, French diplomatic agent, 22. Orleans, Ferdinand Philippe Louis, Due d', eldest son of Louis Philippe, 178 n. Orloff, Count Alexis, Russian diplomat- ist, mission of to Constantinople (1833), 24-25, 28; attitude of in London (1839), 100. Osman Bey, Turkish naval officer, 105. Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis- count, English Minister of Foreign Affairs, on English policy in Near East (1833), 14 n, 15, 26-27, 26 n, 31; opposition of to Russian policy in Near East, 31, 33; on Near East- ern situation, 35; on designs of Me- hemet Ali, 38; interested in Eu- phrates expedition project, 39; on Anglo-Russian relations (1834), 43; did not fear Russia (1835), 57 n; on Russian policy (1836), 53, 53 n; on improvement in Anglo-Russian rela- tions, 57; eager to strengthen Tur- key, 63; dislikes French policy, 66; (1837), 66 n; position of on Vixen affair, 54; on Durham's success in Russia, 56; determined to defend Turkey against Egyptian attack (1838), 63-64, 63 n, 70; on Anglo- Turkish commercial treaty, 68; pro- poses Anglo-French treaty to sup- port Turkey, 71, 72 n; fears Franco- Russian combination in Near East, 71-72; protests against Russian in- trigues in Persia and India, 72; ac- cepts Russian explanations, 73; fa- vors Turkish reforms, 76; opposed to independence of Mehemet Ali, 80; proposal of for European con- ference on Egyptian questions, 249; eager to preserve peace in Near East (i838-'39), 77, 79; Near East- ern policy of (1839), 87 ff; on An- glo-French entente, 88, 93, 93 n; instructions of for English Levan- tine fleet, 89-90, 103-104, 113; fa- vors return of Syria to Turkey, 92- 93; uncertain about Russian ad- vances to England, 103; proposes plan for naval cooperation against Egypt, in; becomes more hostile to Mehemet Ali, 112; favors coercion, 114-115; receives Brunnow's propos- als favorably, 121, 122 n; makes counter-proposals, 123; criticizes French position on Turco-Egyptian question, 125; proposal of relative to Pashalic of Acre, 125, 127; not influenced by French contentions, 128-129; announces Russian accept- ance of English counter-proposals to Brunnow, 130; on outlook for set- tlement of Turco-Egyptian question (1840), 133; on sympathies of Se- bastiani and Guizot, 135 n; expecta- tions of relative to Thiers, 137-138; hostile to Louis Philippe and French naval preparations, 139-140, 139 n; plans of for settlement of Turco- Egyptian question, 146-147; favora- ble to return of Napoleon's body to France, 148, 148 n; requests answer of France to Neumann's proposal, 153; conferences at the home of, 156; on reasons for keeping negotiations secret, 156 n, 160-161 n; threatens to resign, 157-158; wins support of English Cabinet, 159 n; defends treaty of July 15, 1840, 164-165; unmoved by threatening French at- titude, 168-169, J 74. J 8o; opposed to modification of July treaty, 172 ff, 173 n, 185, 195-196; comments of on opposition in English Cabinet, 182 n; attitude of on deposition of Mehemet Ali, 186-187 n, 190, 190 n; quiets opposition in English Cabinet, 1 88; answer of to Thiers' casus belli note, 196, 197 n; orders negotiations to be opened with Mehemet Ali, 198, 198-199 n; comments of on French policy, 206-207 n; favors re- turn of France to Concert of Europe, 21 1; opinion of on Napier's conven- tion with Mehemet Ali, 211 n; moves to influence policy of Porte relative to Mehemet Ali, 210-211; (1841), 217-218; reply of to Metter- nich's criticism, 217; opposed to pro- posals made by Guizot, 221-222; supports Chekib in refusal to sign protocol de cloture, 223-224; agrees to formal communication to Chekib, 224; views of relative to final set- tlement of Turco-Egyptian question, 224, 224 n, 225 n; estimates on Near Eastern policy of from 1839 to 1841, 231-232, 231-232 n. 2/2 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-184! [598 Parliament, resolutions of, relative to steam communication with India (1834), 39-40; committee action in on same (1837), 58-59 n. Peel, Sir Robert, English statesman, 45-46. Pisani, English Dragoman at Constan- tinople, 150 n. Ponsonby, Viscount John, English Am- bassador to Turkey, 25, 30; attitude of on Turco-Egyptian relations (1834), 243; hostile to Russian in- fluence in Turkey (i835-'36), 51, 51 n, 248; influence of at Constan- tinople, 66-67; hostile to Mehemet AH, 51; (1839), 85-86, 86 n; on French policy at Constantinople, 84- 85; on collective note of July 27, 1839, 108 n; reports unrest in do- mains of Mehemet AH, 128 n; alarmed by situation in Near East (1840), 150 n; accuses Pontois of attempting to intimidate Porte, 168 n; advice of to Porte relative to Me- hemet Ali's reinstatement in Egypt, 204; (1841), 215, 218 n, 220-221; conduct of criticized, 86 n, 210 n. Pontois, Admiral Edward, French Am- bassador to Turkey, 127 n; repre- sentations of to Porte against treaty of July 15, 1840, 168, 168 n. Porter, David, U. S. Minister to Tur- key, on situation in Near East (1833), 17 n, 19 n; (1834), 242, 244-245; on Turkish character (1836), 76 n. Pozzo di Borgo, Count, Russian Am- bassador to France and later to Eng- land, 27, 28, 56, 237, 249; on Anglo- Russian relations (1833), 46, 46 n; views of on Durham mission to Rus- sia (1835), 245-246. Press, of Europe hostile to Russia (i835-'36), 55-56, 56 n. Protocol de cloture, of July 10, 1841, 228-229. of Sept. 17, 1840, 187 n. Prussia, supports Russian protests to France (1833), 27; Near Eastern policy of (1839), 80, 118-119, 118' n; (1840), 254; London representa- tive of without instructions, 134; preparations of for war during crisis of 1840, 184 n; eager to secure Turco- Egyptian settlement (1841), 222- 223, 228 n. Raikes, Thomas, English politician, 46, 46 n; on danger of revolution in France (1840), 192 n; on attitude of Louis Philippe, 195 n; on public opinion in France, 197 n. Rechid Pasha, (spelling copied in notes from some of the sources). See Reschid. Red Sea route to India. See Suez route to India. Reeve, Henry, English politician and newspaper correspondent, 184; on danger of revolution in France (1840), 205 n; on outcome of crisis of 1840, 206. Reouf Pasha, Turkish statesman, 104. Reschid, Mustafa, Pasha, Turkish dip- lomatist and Minister of Foreign Af- - fairs, 17, 44, 149; mission of to Lon- don (1839), 75-76; negotiates relative to fate of Mehemet AH (i84O-'4i), 203-204, 220-221; announces willing- ness to reinstate Mehemet Ali in Egypt, 204-205, 215; resignation of (1841), 225-226, 226 n. Rifaat, Bey and later Pasha, Turkish diplomatist and Minister of Foreign Affairs, mission of to Alexandria (1840), 174 ff; appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs (1841), 226. Roussin, Admiral, Baron Albin, French Ambassador to Turkey and later Minister of Marine, opposes Russian policy in Turkey (1833), 20-21, 21 n, 25; moves to end Turco-Egyptian struggle, 21-22, 22 n, 23, 238; friendly to Mehemet Ali, 36-37, 36-37 n; (1834), 243; (1838), 67; attempts to prevent war in Near East (1839), 85-86; complains of Ponsonby's be- havior, 85 n; (1840), 210 n. Ruckmann, Baron, Russian charge d'affaires at Constantinople, protests against Turkish threat to renew war with Egypt (1834), 45, 243. Russell, Lord John, English Secretary of State for the Colonies, 157 n, 159 n; favored concessions to France in crisis of 1840, 170, 182, 188, 188 n, 190 n. Russia, general policy of in Near East, 9, n; influence of supreme in Turkey (1833), 25; famine in southern pro- vinces of, 34, 34-35 n; Near Eastern policy of (i832-'33), 16, 237-238, 240-241; (1834), 42, 45; (1835), 245, 246-247; (1836), 57; not pre- pared for war (1835), 47; alarmed at English interest in Near East (i835-'36), 52, 52 n; eager to pre- 599] INDEX 273 vent war in Near East (1839), 77- 78, 77 n; difficulties confronting the government of, 78 n; policy of rela- tive to Turco-Egyptian question, 98 ff, 118-119; opposes conference of Powers to settle same, 109-110; not anxious to intervene in Turkey, 116 ff; views on the aims and policy of, 252; favorable to ending isola- tion of France (1840), 212; condi- tions in, 253; triumphant in 1841, 230. Sami Bey, confidential secretary to Mehemet AH, 150, 155. Sauzet, President of French Chamber of Deputies, 196 n. Schleinitz, Freiherr von, Prussian charge d'affaires at London, 186. Schneckenburger, German poet, 184 n. Schneider, General, French Minister of War, 82. Sebastiani, Count Horace Frangois, French Ambassador to England, on reception of Brunnow's proposals by English Ministers (1839), 121-122, 122 n; explains French opposition to coercion of Mehemet AH, 124; presents plans for settlement of Tur- co-Egyptian question, 124-125, 124 n; unable to announce attitude of France (1840), 134; recall of from London, 135, 135 n. Simonitch, Count, Russian envoy to Persia, 72. Soult, Marshal Victor, Due de Dal- matie, French statesman, Near Eastern policy of (1839), 82, 84- 85, 87 ff, 106-107, 106 n, in ff; on Near Eastern policies of Powers, 88; proposes conference at Vienna, 91- 92; on Russian opposition to Vienna conference, iio-m; criticizes Rus- sian proposals, 122; rejects proposals for division of Syria, 124 n, 126; argues against employment of force in settlement of Turco-Egyptian ques- tion, 128, 128 n, 134 n; attitude of after Russian acceptance of English counter-proposals, 130 ff; pleased by delay (1840), 134-135; instructions of to Guizot, 136; withdraws from office, 136; return of to office, 193. Steam communication with India, 38 ff, 44 n, 50 n, 58-59 n, 61-62, 61 n, 62 n, 82 n, 139 n, 158 n, 165 n, 232 n, 236. Stopford, Admiral, Sir Robert, English naval commander in Levant, naval operations of (1840), 177; attack of on Acre, 199; disapproves of Na- pier's convention with Mehemet AH, 201. Straits Convention of 1841, 222-223, 229, 229 n. Sturmer, Baron Bartholomaus. Austrian Internuncio at Constantinople, ac- cuses Pontois of attempting to in- timidate Porte (1840), 168 n; ad- vice of to Turkish Ministers, 204; urges Reschid Pasha to concede hereditary title to Mehemet Ali (1841), 214-215; unable to reply to Turkish note, 221. Suez route to India, 39-40, 40 n, 59 ff, 59-63 ns, 213, 213 n. See also Steam communication with India. Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Seves), French officer in employ of Mehemet AH, 177. Syria, revolts in (1834), 43-44, 243; (1840), 174 n, 177 n; reports con- cerning revolts in reach London, T S9) T S9 n > J 6o n; naval operations on coast of, 177-178, 178 n, 199. Talleyrand-Perigord, Chajes Maurice de, Prince of Benevento, French statesman, 239. Teplitz, meeting at (1833), 31. Thiers, Louis Adolphe, French states- man, on French policy in Near East ( J 833), 38 n; Near Eastern policy of (1836), 64-65; resignation of, 66; forms ministry (1840), 136; speech of defending Anglo-French alliance, 136-137, 136 n, 137 n; instructions of to Guizot, 138; Turco-Egyptian policy of, 138-139 n, 140 n, 143- 144, 144 n, 151 ff, 152 n; opposed to formal conference of Powers, 142- 143; request of for return of Na- poleon's body, 148; rejects Neu- mann's proposal for Turco-Egyptian settlement, 153; favors delay, 155- 156; aroused by treaty of July 15, 1840, 165-166; questions England's policy, 165 n; policy of during crisis of 1840, 167-168, 171, 175 n; threat- ening attitude of, 179-180, 179 n, 183 n; casus belli note of, 187-188, 189 n; plan of for additional mili- tary preparations, 189-190, 192-193; resignation of in Oct. 1840, 193; comments of on French policy (1841), 234 n. The Times, London daily paper, on French and English policies in Near East (1833), 15 n; hostile to Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, 30-31; on Russia 274 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION, 1832-1841 [600 (1836), 55-56; on Turco-Egyptian question (1839), 93-94; on spirit of English and French journals during crisis of 1840, 170 n, 205 n; favors modification of treaty of July 15, 1840, 181-182, 181 n; on meaning of Thiers casus belli note, 189; crit- icizes Palmerston for being uncom- promising, 197. Titow, Wladimir, Russian charge d'affaires at Constantinople, 215,221. Tunis, French fleet sent to (1836), 65. Turkey, public opinion in (i832-'33), 16, 17 n, 19 n; negotiations of with Russia for military aid (1833), 18- 19; opposition in to alliance with Russia quieted, 28; authorities of refuse to suspend hostilities (1839), 86, 86 n; same encouraged to refuse negotiations with Mehemet Ali, 127 n; Ministers of unwilling to pardon Mehemet Ali (1840), 203; views upon conditions in, 253; settlement of Turco-Egyptian question an- nounced in (1841), 219; request of for support of Powers, 219 n; gov- ernment of agrees to modify firman of investiture, 226-227, 227-228, 228 n. Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 29; English and French opposition to, 3; 33-34; Nesselrode's defense of, 34- Urquhart, David, English political writer, 55, 55 n. Vail, Aaron, U. S. diplomatic repre- sentative at London, on interna- tional situation in Europe (1833), 2 37- 2 39 240-242; on effect of im- provement of navigation on Danube ( J 835), 74 n; on situation in Near East, 244; on Durham's mission to Russia, 245-246; on Russian policy in Near East, 246-247; on hostility of European press to Russia (1836), 56 n. Valmy, French deputy, 95, 95 n, 96 n. Varennes, French charge d'affaires at Constantinople, 17; peace endeavors of at Constantinople (1833), 18-19; mission of to Kutayah, 23-24. Vienna conference plan (1839), 91- 92, 92 n, 107-108, 108 n, 251. Villemain, Abel Francois, French Min- ister of Public Instruction, 135 n. Vixen, affair of (i836-'37), 54. Walewski, Count Alexander, French diplomatic agent, mission of to Egypt (1840), 1 68, 174, 176, 176 n, 179, 200 n. Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, English statesman, 172 n; sug- gests closure of Straits to all nations, 46-47. Werther, Baron Wilhelm von, Prus- sian Minister, Near Eastern policy of (1839), 79; (1840), 183-184, 210; (1841), 225. Wheaton, Henry, U. S. Diplomatic representative at Berlin, on Turco- Egyptian question in relations of Powers (1838), 248-250; (1839), 250-251; on difficulties confronting Russia, 78 n; on situation in Near East (1840), 253; on Franco-Prus- sian relations, 253-254; on views of three eastern Powers relative to Turco-Egyptian question (1841), 210 n; on Austrian influence at Con- stantinople, 226 n. William IV, King of England, 39 n. Yaver Pasha (Admiral Walker), Eng- lish naval officer in Turkish em- ploy, 205, 214, 216. 15 L UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. XI DECEMBER, 1923 No. 4 THE TURCO-EGYPTIAN QUESTION IN THE RELATIONS OF ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA, 1832-1841 325 PART II BY FREDERICK STANLEY RODKEY A.B., University of Kansas, 1917 A.M., University of Kansas, 1918 PRICE $1.00 PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS URBANA [Entered as second-class matter, July 27, 1915, at the post office at Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized July 31, 1918.] (Copyright. 1021; by The University of Illinois) UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. I, 1912 Nos. I and 2. Financial history of Ohio. By E. L. Bogart. $1.80. No. 3. Sources of municipal revenues in Illinois. By L. D. Upson.* No. 4. Friedrich Gentz: an opponent of the French Revolution and Napoleon. By P. E. Reiff. 80 cents. Vol. II, 1913 No. I. Taxation of corporations in Illinois, other than railroads, since 1872. By J. R. Moore. 55 cents. Nos. 2 and 3. The West in the diplomatic negotiations of the American Revolution. By P. C. Phillips* No. 4. The development of banking in Illinois, 1817-1863. By G. W. Dowrie.* Vol. Ill, 1914 Nos. : and 2. The history of the general property tax in Illinois. By R. M. Haig. $1.25. No. 3. The Scandinavian element in the United States. By K. C. Babcock.* No. 4. Church and state in Massachusetts, 1691-1740. By Susan M. Reed.* Vol. IV, 1915 No. i. The Illinois Whigs before 1846. By C. M. Thompson.* No. 2. The defeat of Varus and the German frontier policy of Augustus. By W. A. Oldfather and H. V. Canter.* Nos. 3 and 4. The history of the Illinois Central railroad to 1870. By H. G. Brown- son. $1.25. Vol. V, 1916 No. I. The enforcement of international law through municipal law in the United States. By Philip Quincy Wright.* No. 2. The life of Jesse W. Fell. By Frances M. Morehouse. 60 cents. No. 3. Land tenure in the United States with special reference to Illinois. By Charles L. Stewart* No. 4. .V : :.e tax s United States. By L. E. Young. $1.50. Vol. VI, 1917 power of the governor of Illinois. By Niels H. Debel. 1.00. No. 3. Wage Lai t ai:nng on the vessels of the Great Lakes. By H. E. Hoagland. $1.50. No. 4. The household of a Tudor nobleman. By P. V. B. Jones. #1.50. Vol. VII, 1918 Nos. I and 2. Legislative regulation of railway finance in England. By C. C. Wang.* No. 3. The American municipal executive. By R. M. Story.* No 4. The Journeymen Tailors' Union of America. A study in trade union policy. By Cha.les J. Stowell* Vol. VIII, 1919 ,\'j. i nd other organized methods of marketing California horticul- il products. By J. W. Lloyd.* No. 2. Cumulative voting and minority representation in Illinois. By B. F. Moore. Revised edition.* Nos. 3 and 4. Labor problems and labor administration in the United States during the World War. By Gordon Watkins.* Vol. IX, 1920 Nos. i and 2. War powers of the executive in the United States. By C. A. Berdahl. 2.25. No. 3. English government finance, 1485-1558. By F. C. Di'-;x.* No. 4. The economic policies of Richelieu. By F. C. Palm.* *0ut of print. ILLINOIS BIOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS Vol. Ill Xo. i. Studies on the factors controlling the rate of regeneration. By Charles Zelenv $1.25. Xo. 2. The head-capsule and mouth-parts of Diptera. With 25 plates. By Alvah Peterson. $2.00. Xo. 3. Studies on North American Polystomidae, Aspidogastridae, and Param- phistomidae. With n plates. By Horace W. Stunkard. $1.25. Xo. 4. Color and color-pattern mechanism of tiger beetles. With 29 black and 3 colored plates. By Victor E. Shelford. 2.00. Vol. IV Xo. I. Life history studies on Montana trematodes. With 9 plates. By E. C. Faust $2.00. Xo. 2. The goldfish (Carassius carassius) as a test animal in the study of toxicity. By E. B. Powers. $1.00. Xo. 3. Morphology and biology of some Turbellaria from the Mississippi Basin. With 3 plates. By Ruth Higley. 1.25. Xo. 4. Xorth American Pseudophyllidean cestodes from fishes. With 13 plates. By A. R. Cooper. $2.00. Vol. V No. i. The skull of Amiurus. With 8 plates. By J. E. Kindred. $1.25. No. 2. Contributions to the life histories of Gordius robustus Leidy and Paragordius i:arius (Leidy). By Henry Gustav May. With 21 plates. 1.50. Xos. 3 and 4. Studies on Myxosporidia. A synopsis of genera and species of Myxos- iia. By Roksabro Kudo. With 25 plates and 2 text figures. $3.00. Vol VI ! organ in Amphibia. By G. M. Higgins. With 10 plates, gi.oo. z anu 3. Revision of the Xorth American and West Indian species of Cuscuta. With 13 plates. By Truman George Yuncker. $2.00. No. 4. The larvae of the Coccinellidae. With 6 plates. By J. Howard Gage. 75 cents. Vol. N.i. Studies on gregarines. II: a. A synopsis of the polycysted gregarines of the world, excluding those from the Myriapoda, Orthoptera, and \d b. An annotated list of the new gregarines described n 1911-1920. By M. W. Kamm. 1.00. \'o. 2. The mollusk fauna of the Big Vermilion River, Illinois, with special refer- ences to_the Naiades or fresh water mussels. By F. C. Baker. $1.25. Xo. 3. Xorth American monostomes, primarily from fresh water hosts. With 9 plates. By E. C. Harrah. $1.25. No. 4. A classification of the larvae of the Tenthredinoidea. By Hachiro Yuasa. With 14 plates. $2.00. Vol. VIII Xo. i. The head capsuie of Coleoptera. By F. S. Stickney. $2.00. Xo. 2. Comparative studies on certain features of nernatodes and their significance. By D. C. Hetherington. $1.00. Xo. 3. Parasitic fungi from British Guiana and Trinidad. By F. L. Stevens. 31.25. Xo. 4. The external Morphology and Postembryology of Xoctuid Larvae. Fy L. B. Ripley. $1.25. Vol. IX Xo. i. The calciferous glands of Lumbricidae and Diplocardia. By Frank Smith. $1.25. Xos. 2 and 3. A biologic and taxonomic study of the Microsporidia. By Roksabro Kudo. $3.00. Xo. 4. Animal ecology of an Illinois elm-maple forest. By A. 0. Weese. $1.25. Vol. X Xo. i. Studies on the Avian Species of the Cestode Family Hymenolepidae. By R. L. Mayhew. (In press) UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE Vol. IV No. i. Madame De StaeTs literary reputation in England. By R. C. Whitford. 750. Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Index verborum quae in Senecae fabulis necnon in Octavia prae- texta reperiuntur. By W. A. Oldfather, A. S. Pease, and H. V. Canter. Part I, 2.00. Parts II and III, $1.50 each. . Y L V Nos. I and 2. The influence of Christianity on the vocabulary of Old English poetry. By A. Keiser. $1.50. No. 3. Spenser's defense of Lord Grey, By H. S. V. Jones. $1.00. No. 4. Ysopet-Avionnet: The Latin and French texts. By K. McKenzie and W. A. Oldfather. $1.50. y ol< VI No. i. La Coleccion Cervantina de la Sociedad Hispanica de America. Edicbnes de Don Quijote. By Homero Seris. $1.50. Nos. 2 and 3. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Divinatione. Liber primus. With commentary. By A. S. Pease. Part I, $1.50. Part II, $1.50. No. 4. De Fragmenti Suetoniani de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus Codicum Nexu et Fide. By R. P. Robinson. $2.00. Vol. VII No. i. Sir Robert Howard's comedy, "The committee." With introduction and notes. By C. N. Thurber. 1.50. No. 2. The sepulchre of Christ in art and liturgy. By N. C. Brooks. $1.50. No. 3. The language of Konungs Skuggsja. By G. T. Flom. Part I. $1.50. No. 4. The significant name in Terence. By J. C. .Austin. $2.00. Vol. VIII No. i. Emerson's theories of literary expression. By E. G. Sutcliffe. $1.50. Nos. 2 and 3. M. Tulli Cicerone De Divinatione. Liber secundus. With commentary. By A. S. Pease. Parts I and II. Part I, $1.50. Part II, $1.50. No. 4. The language of the Konungs Skuggsja. By G. T. Flom. Part II. $1.50. Vol. IX No. I. Studies in the narrative methods of Defoe. By A. W. Secord. $1.50. No. 2. The Ms. tradition of Plutarch's Aetia Graeca and Aetia Romana. By J. B. Titchener. $1.00. No. 3. Girolamo Fracastoro Naugerius, she de poetica dialogus. With translation by Ruth Kelso and introduction by Murry W. Bundy. $1.00. No. 4. The text-tradition of Pseudo-Plutarch's Fitae Decent Oratorum. By C. G. Lowe. i.oc. Vol. X No. i. Rhetorical Elements in the Tragedies of Seneca. By H. V. Canter. (In press) No. 2. Oriental affinities of Di Lilgend von Sanct Johanne Chrysostomo. By C. A. Williams. (In press) UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Vol. X, 1922 No. i. Monarchical tendencies in the United States, 1776-1801. By Louise B. Dunbar. $2.25. No. 2. Open price associations. By M. N. Nelson. $1.50. Nos. 3 and 4. Workmen's representation in industrial government. By E. J. Miller. J52.0O. Vol. XI, 1923 Nos. i and 2. Economic aspects of southern sectionalism, 1840-1861. By R. R. Russel. $2.00. Nos. 3 and 4. The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France, and Russia, 1832-1841. By F. S. Rodkey. $2.00. Requests for exchange for the Studies in the Social Sciences, the Biological Monographs, and the Studies in Language and Literature should be addressed to the Exchange Editor, Library, University of Illinois, Urbana, 111. All communications concerning sale or subscriptions, or of an et'itoria! nature, should be ad_dresscd to the Editor of the University Studies, University of Illinois, Urbana, 111. The subscription price of each scries is three dollars a year. The prices of in-'lividnil monographs arc shown in the lists given above. M 30112084204384 jt v -