DOE/EIS-0028 Final Environmental Impact Statement Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories — Livermore Sites Livermore, California U.S. Department of Energy July 1982 DEPOSITORY JUL 6 Wd UNlVtKollY Or ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN :■:■::•"■- s& The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the Latest Date stamped below. Theft, mutilation, and underlining of book, are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dism.s.al from the University. To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN \.fD2 4c^W M. i£ -; ^WP OF '.AFtt ylP/MQN This repoi Available Virginia 2'. >le copy. U. S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, L161— O-1096 A99 A01 Codes are used for pricing all publications. The code is determined by the number of pages in the publication. Information pertaining to the pricing codes can be found in the current issues of the following publications, which are generally available in most libraries: Energy Research Abstracts, (ERA); Government Reports Announcements and Index (GRA and I); Scientific and Technical Abstract Reports (STAR); and publication, NTIS-PR-360 available from (NTIS) at the above address. DOE/EIS-0028 UC-2. 1 1 Final Environmental Impact Statement Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National ore Sites Laboratories Livermore, California U.S. Department of Energy Washington. D.C. 20545 July 1982 MFffn UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIQN B00K5TACKS This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy. AvaUable from the National Technical Information Service, U. S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22161. Price: Printed Copy A99 Microfiche A01 Codes are used for pricing all publications. The code is determined by the number of pages in the pub a nTnformaL pertaining to the pricing codes can be found in the current issues ,o to , fcDowing publications which are generally available in most libraries: Energy Research Abstracts, (ERA) ^eZeni Reports Announce mints and Index (GRA and I); Scientific and Technical Abstract Reports (STAR); and publication, NTIS-PR-360 available from (NTIS) at the above address. DOE/EIS-0028 UC-2. 11 Final Environmental Impact Statement Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories - Livermore Sites Livermore, California U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 July 1982 «■»«• m DO** COVER SHEET FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT DOE/EIS-0028 (a) Lead Agency: The Department of Energy. (c) Office of the A«utft n ', ACt1 ? 9 Dl>ector - 0ffice of Environments Com^nce Energe e „cy Preparedness ^ Env1 ™ mental Protection, Safety, a'nd ' For Copies of the F1S Contact: Mr. Gordon C. Facer at the addres above. s noted (d) Designation: Final EIS. current t oDeratiIn e nf t ?h»T t ""^P the ^*™ *»pacts associated with NamnaVSor r Is " i ttEET adSt'sUe^^Thif ^°7 ^ ^ (I) total or Jart al rew^- ^JS?" J) shutdown a " d decon».1ss"on1ng, greatest Impart and f! ^1^' (3 > sc !l in 9 down those operations having Impact P ' (4) Wld6r USe of alter "ate technologies having reduced sss •'■■.'•■'■*' Foreword This environmental lmpact 8tat _ nl „ ^ prepated io fgtther ^^ wrposea ^ ^^ ^^ **_*! Pon cy « of x,,,, as . Mnded . « ,. lnten6ea that tMa aocument ^ ujea ^ assi>><•■' \..:X 5s& V,'.,' CONTENTS Foreword iii 1 . Summary .... 1-1 1.1. Background 1-1 1.2. Environmental Impact . 1-3 1.3. Unavoidable Adverse Environmental impacts 1-6 1.4. Alternatives 1-6 1.5. Relationship between Short-Term Uses and Long-Term Productivity x . ? 1.6. Relationship of the Livermore Operation to Land use Plans, Policies, and Controls 1-7 1.7. irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 1.8. Environmental Trade-off Analysis 1-7 !. Background .... 2-1 2.1. Detailed Description 2-1 2.1.1. Location .... 2-1 2.1.2. Prior Land use 2-3 2.1.3. History 2-3 2.1.3.1. Establishment of LLNL 2-3 2.1.3.2. Objectives 2-6 2.1.4. Significant Accomplishments . 2-7 2.1.5. Operations and Facility Descriptions 2-7 2.1.5.1. LLNL 2-7 2.1.5.2. Site 300 .. . 2-8 2.1.5.3. SNLL . . . 2-11 2.1.6. Facilities Having Environmental Impact Significance 2.1.6.1. LLNL Building 194-Electron Positron Accelerator 2 _ n 2.1.6.2. LLNL Building 212— Accelerator Building 2.1.6.3. LLNL Building 231— LLNL Central vault 2.1.6.4. LLNL Building 251-Nuclear chemistry Operations 2 _ 13 2.1.6.5. LLNL Building 281— Pool -Type Reactor 2.1.6.6. LLNL Building 331-Tritium Research Facility 2 _ 2 2.1.6.7. LLNL Building 332— Plutonium Facility ... 2-14 2.1.6.8. LLNL Building- 419— Decontamination 2-15 2.1.6.9. LLNL Building 514-Liquid Waste Treatment Plant 2 _ 15 2—16 2.1.6.10. LLNL Building 612— Waste Disposal . . . . 2-16 2.1.6.11. Site 300 Operations 2-16 2.1.6.12. SNLL Vaults . . • • 2-17 2.1.6.13. SNLL Tritium Research Laboratory 2-17 2.1.7. Current and Future planning and land use . . • 2-17 2.1.7.1. tivermore Site Development Plan 2.1.7.2. New Facilities: Proposed Major Facilities 2.1.7.2.1. LLNL— Bioenvironmental Office and Laboratory 2-19 Building (BOLB) ■* 2-19 2.1.7.2.2. LLNL— Laser Fusion Facility Addition 2.1.7.2.3. LLNL— Fusion Target Development Facility (FTDF) . • 2-19 2-19 2.1.7.2.4. LLNL— Laser Fusion Office Building 2.1.7.2.5. LLNL— Laser isotope Separation Facility 2-19 2-19 2.1.7.2.6. LLNL— Materials R S. D Facility 2.1.7.2.7. LLNL-Management Support Center, Core II (MSC-II) • • 2.1.7.2.8. LLNL— Mirror Fusion Test Facility-B (MFTF-B) . • . 2-20 2.1.7.2.9. LLNL-High-Explosives Application Facility (HEAF) . . 2-20 20 2.1.7.2.10. LLNL— Earth Sciences Facility (ESF) 2.1.7.2.11. LLNL— National Atmospheric Release 2-20 Advisory Center (NARAC) 2.1.7.2.12. LLNL— Nuclear Test Technology Complex (NTTC) ... 2.1.7.2.13. LLNL— Weapons Technology Complex, Phase 1 . . . 2.1.7.2.14. LLNL— Non-Destructive Evaluation Facility 2-21 Addition (NDEF) 2.1.7.2.15. LLNL— Large Optics Diamond Turning Machine . . . 2-21 Facility (LODTMF) 2.1.7.2.16. Site 300— Flash Radiography Facility (FXR) .... 2.1.7.2.17. Site 300-Weaponization Facilities Project (WFP) . • 2-21 2.1.7.2.18. Site 300-Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA) Project . 2-22 2.1.7.2.19. Site 300-High-Explosives Machining Facility (HEMF) . 2-22 2-22 2.1.7.2.20. SNLL— Computer Facilities Addition . . • • 2-22 2.1.7.3. Long-Range Site Development Plan 2-25 2.1.8. Environmental Monitoring 2-25 2.1.8.1. General vi 2.1.8.2. Air Sampling .' . . "' 2-26 2.1.8.3. Water Sampling .... 2-26 2.1.8.4. Sewer Effluent Sampling 2.1.8.5. Soil Sampling . . . 2-27 2.1.8.6. Vegetation and Milk Sampling ... , 00 2.1.8.7. Background Radiation Measurements .... *••••••• z — 28 2.2. Purpose and Need 2-28 2.2.1. National Defense . 2-28 2.2.2. Other Activities . . . 2-29 2.2.2.1. Energy — Long-Term Purpose and Need 2.2.2.1.1. Magnetic Fusion Energy 2 _ 29 2.2.2.1.2. Laser Technologies 2.2.2.2. Energy— Near -Term Purpose and Need .... 2.2.2.2.1. Underground coal Gasification 2 _ 30 2.2.2.2.2. Underground Oil Shale Retorting 2 _ 30 2.2.2.2.3. Solar Energy . 2-31 2.2/2.2.4. Metal-Air power Cells for Automobiles 2-31 2.2.2.3. Biomedical and Environmental Research 2.2.2.4. Computer Science 2-32 2.2.2.5. Graduate Center for Applied Science 2.2.2.6. Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) 2-33 2.2.2.7. Visitors Center . • 2-33 2.3. Characteristics of Existing Environment . . 2-34 2.3.1. Population Distribution and Land Use . **"* 2-34 2.3.1.1. On-site Population of LLNL and SNLL 2 -34 2.3.1.2. Population Within 16 Kilometers of Facilities 2 -34 2.3.1.3. Extended Regional Population 2.3.1.4. Population Projections 2.3.1.5. Land Use . 2-40 2.3.1.6. Transportation Routes . 2-40 2.3.2. Natural Surface Features 2-42 2.3.3. Geology and Seismicity . 2-42 2.3.3.1. Summary 2-43 2.3.3.2. Regional Setting 2-43 VII O A A 2.3.3.3. Geology in Vicinity of LLNL and SNLL 2-44 2.3.3.3.1. Rocks 2.3.3.3.2. Faults 2 " 48 2.3.3.3.3. Evidence for Active Faults 2.3.3.3.4. Other Geologic Hazards 2 " 51 2-52 2.3.3.4. Seismicity 2.3.3.4.1. Design-Basis Earthquake 2.3.3.4.2. Interpretations of the Seismic Hazard 2-54 2.3.3.4.3. Critical Facility Earthquake Response 2-60 M , 2-61 2.3.4. Surface Water Hydrology 2—62 2.3.5. Groundwater Hydrology 2-63 2.3.6. Site 300 Hydrology . . . . 2-63 2.3.7. Meteorology 2-63 2.3.7.1. General Climate 2-64 2.3.7.2. Severe Weather 2.3.7.3. Air Pollution Potential . . 2-64 2.3.7.4. Local Meteorology 2.3.7.4.1. Station Summary f*& 2.3.7.4.2. Wind Direction and Speed 2—67 2.3.7.4.3. Atmospheric Stability 2—67 2.3.7.4.4. Humidity and Fog 2.3.7.5. On-Site Meteorological Measurements Program 2-71 2.3.7.6. Meteorology at Site 300 . . 2-71 2.3.8. Biotic Species at SNLL and LLNL 2-71 2.3.9. Biotic Species at Site 300 . . . 2-72 2.3.10. Archaeological and Historical Sites 2-72 2.3.11. Radiological Background Characteristics . . 2-75 2.3.12. Aerial Radiation Survey 3-1 Environmental Impact 3-1 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Past, Current, and Future Land Use 3-2 3.3. Resources and Energy 3-2 3.3.1. Water Use 3-4 3.3.2. Electrical Energy Use viii 3.3.3. Fuel Use .... 3-4 3.3.3.1. Natural Gas . . . 3-4 3.3.3.2. Propane gas . 3-6 3.3.3.3. Oil ... 3-6 3.3.3.4. Gasoline . . . 3-6 3.3.3.5. Jet Fuel . 3-6 3.4. Construction Activities . 3-6 3.4.1. Environmental Impact 3-6 3.4.2. Land Use . . J-9 3.4.3. Community Effects 3-9 3.4.4. Commitment of Resources 3-10 3.5. Waste Management 3-10 3.5.1. Radioactive Waste Management . 3-10 3.5.1.1. Summary of Radioactive-Waste-Producing Operations 3 _ 12 3.5.1.2. Major Sources of Radioactive Wastes 3.5.1.3. 100-MeV Linear Accelerator (LINAC) --Building 194 3 _ 12 3.5.1.3.1. Solid Waste . 3-12 3.5.J..3.2. Liquid Waste .... 3.5.1.3.3. Airborne Effluents 3.5.1.4. Nuclear Chemistry Operations— Building 251 .... 3 _ 13 3.5.1.4.1. Solid Waste . 3-13 3.5.1.4.2. Liquid Waste .... 3.5.1.4.3. Airborne Effluents . . , ,, ••••••••■ 3-14 3.5.1.5. Plutonium Facility—Building 332 **** •• 3-14 3.5.1.5.1. Solid Waste .... ••••••«... 3-14 3.5.1.5.2. Liquid Waste *•••••••••• 3—14 3.5.1.5.3. Airborne Effluents . . ••••«•••. 3—14 3.5.1.6. Tritium Technology — Building 331 3.5.1.6.1. Solid Waste .... 3.5.1.6.2. Liquid Waste .... 3.5.1.6.3. Airborne Effluents 3.5.1.7. Waste Management Facilities 3.5.1.8. Liquid Waste Treatment Plant Description 3 _ 16 3.5.1.9. Solid Waste Disposal . 3-17 ix 3-17 3.5.1.10. Waste Storage 3-17 3.5.1.11. Effluent Control Systems 3—18 3.5.1.12. Site Administrative Limits on Effluents i 1 — 1 8 3.5.1.13. Radioactive Waste Releases 3-20 3.5.2. Sanitary Waste Management . . . • 3-20 3.5.2.1. General . . . • 3-21 3.5.2.2. Sewer System 3—21 3.5.2.3. Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP) 3-24 3.5.2.4. Sewage Monitoring 3-24 3.5.2.4.1. Collection of Sample 3-24 3.5.2.4.2. Discharge Limits 3-25 3.5.2.5. Sewer Release Incidents 3-25 3.5.3. Chemical Waste Management 3.5.4. Excess Properties, Salvage, and Reclamation Operation . . . 3-26 3.5.4.1. General j cut t . • • 3—26 3.5.4.2. Excess Property at LLNL and bNLL 3.5.4.3. Reclamation and Salvage 3.5.4.4. Space Used for Excess Properties, Salvage, and Reclamation . . . 3-28 . . . 3-28 3.5.4.5. Decontamination 3-29 3.5.5. Nonhazardous Waste Landfill 3-29 3.5.6. Waste Management at Site 300 3-29 3.5.6.1. Solid Radioactive or Chemical Wastes . . . . 3-31 3.5.6.2. Liquid Chemical Wastes 3-31 3.5.6.3. Sanitary Wastes 3-32 3.6. Site 300 Operations . . . . 3-33 3.7. Health and Safety Impacts of Livermore Operations 3-33 3.7.1. Radiological Impact . . • 3-36 3.7.2. impacts of Laboratory Operations on Employees . . . 3-37 3.7.2.1. The LLNL Melanoma Study 3-40 3.8. Sociological and Economic Impact 3-40 3.8.1. Employment and Population . . . . 3-42 3.8.2. Equal Opportunity and Training Programs 3-42 3.8.3. Community Participation 3-42 3.8.4. Technological Impact 3.8.5. Traffic and Transportation . 3-42 3.8.6. Economic Impact . 3-44 3.9. Accident Analysis . 3-44 3.9.1. Accident Experience 3-44 3.9.2. Analysis of Postulated Accidents 3-48 3.9.2.1. HTO Release . . 3-48 3.9.2.2. Magnitude of Postulated Criticality Accident 3 _ 50 3.9.2.2.1. Effects of Fission-Product Release to the Environment 3-53 3.9.2.2.2. Effects of Rainfall on Doses . . , co ••••••• J— 63 3.9.2.3. Maximum Credible Spill 3-65 3.9.2.4. Explosions 3-67 3.9.2.5. Fires 3-67 3.9.2.6. Release of Chlorine . . 3-67 3.9.2.7. Transportation of Radioactive Materials *••••••• 3—69 3.9.2.7.1. Transportation Accidents 3.9.3. Emergency Preparedness 3-73 3.10. Safeguards and Security . 3-76 4. Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Impacts . 4-1 4.1. Land Use .... 4-1 4.2. Natural Resources and Energy 4-1 4.2.1. Water 4-1 4.2.2. Electrical Power 4-2 4.2.3. Natural Gas .... 4-2 4.3. Laboratory-Generated Traffic on East Avenue 4-4. Operational Releases of Radioactive and Nonradioactive Effluents ' 4 _ 2 4.4.1. Radioactive Releases . 4-2 4.4.2. Nonradioactive Releases 4-3 4.5. Radiation Dose to the Public . 4-3 »• Alternatives .... 5-1 3.1. Introduction 5-1 5.2. Plant Shutdown and Site Decommissioning 5-1 5.3. Total or Partial Plant Relocation 5-1 5.3.1. Partial Relocation . . 5-2 xi 5.3.2. Relocation Within the Livermore Site 5.4. Operational Modification 5.5. Use of Alternate Technologies 6. Relationships Between Short-Term Uses and Long-Term Productivity 7. Relationships of the Livermore Operations to Land Use Plans, Policies, and Controls 8. Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources 9. Environmental Trade-off Analysis 9.1. Introduction 9.2. Alternatives 9.3. Conclusion 10. Comments Appendix 1A. Glossary of Terms Appendix IB. List of Preparers Appendix 2A. Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 1980 Annual Report Appendix 2B. Site Seismic Safety Program Appendix 2C. Surface Water Hydrology Appendix 2D. Groundwater Hydrology Appendix 2E. Ecology. (1) Flora and Fauna of the Livermore Site; (2) Occurrence and Status of Endangered Species, San Joaquin Kit Fox and Large-Flowered Fiddleneck, on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Site 300, California Appendix 2F. A Cultural Resource Inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300, Alameda and San Joaquin Counties, California . . Appendix 3A. Accident Experience at the DOE Livermore Laboratories Appendix 3B. Disaster Control Plan 5-3 5-3 5-5 6-1 7-1 8-1 9-1 9-1 9-2 9-3 10-1 1A-1 1B-1 2A-1 2B-1 2C-1 2D-1 2E-1 2F-1 3A-1 3B-1 xii LIST OF FIGURES 2-1. DOE Livermore site (looking west toward Livermore, 1981) 2 _ 2-2. Location of LLNL, SNLL, and Site 300 with respect to Livermore and surrounding communities 2-4 2-3. Livermore Naval Air Station (1944) 2-5 2-4. Layout of LLNL site . . 2-9 2-5. Layout of Site 300 2-10 2-6. Layout of SNLL site 2-12 2-7. Programmatic use of LLNL site 2-18 2-8. Immediate environs of the DOE Livermore laboratories 2-9. Estimated population distribution within 16 km of LLNL and SNLL . ••••••• 2—36 2-10. Estimated population distribution within 80 km of LLNL and SNLL . •••♦•• *™j8 2-11. Estimated population distribution by sectors within 80 km of LLNL and SNLL 2 . 39 2-12. Major fault zones of the San Francisco Bay Area 2-46 2-13. Folding and faulting as mapped by Blume (1972) *••••••••• 2—47 2-14. Geology and faulting as mapped by Herd (1977) 2-15. Acceleration vs time as recorded at Pacoima Dam during the San Fernando earthquake of February 9, 1971 2-57 2-16. Design-basis response spectrum recommended by Blume * Associates after their major investigation of faulting at the LLNL site 2-57 2-17. Annual wind rose for LLNL and SNLL 2-68 2-18. Locations of on-site soil samplinq 2-73 3-1. Seasonal water consumption by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL 3 _ : 3-2. Seasonal use of electrical power by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL 3 _ 3 3-3. Seasonal use of natural gas by LLNL and SNLL 3-4. Seasonal use of propane by LLNL 3-5 3-5. Seasonal use of fuel oil by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL 3-6. Seasonal use of diesel fuel by LLNL and Site 300 for owned equipment 3 . 7 3-7. Seasonal use of gasoline by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL 3-8 3-8. Seasonal use of jet fuel by LLNL . 3-8 3-9. LLNL site sanitary sewer system 3-22 3-10. SNLL site sanitary sewer system 3-23 3-11. Disposal of excess material . 3-27 xiii 3-12. Site 300 disposal areas 3-13. Populations of the city of Livermore and the DOE Livermore laboratories 3-14. Economic profile of the city of Livermore 3-15. Impact of the DOE Livermore laboratories on the Livermore school system 3-16. Chlorine-concentration isopleth resulting from a 60-g/s release . . . 3-30 3-41 3-46 3-47 3-68 L[ST OF TABLES 2-1 2-2, 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2-6. 2-7. 2-8. 2-9. 2-10. 3-1. 3-2. 3-3. 3-4. 3-5. 3-6. 3-7. 3-8. 3-9. 3-10. 3-11. 3-12. 3-13. 3-14. 3-15. LLNL environmental monitoring sampling and analysis schedule 2-23 Projected populations of counties lying all or partly within 80 km of LLNL 2 _ 41 Seismic hazard data for major regional faults Climatological temperature summary for Livermore . 2-65 Climatological precipitation summary for Livermore 2 — 6 5 1969-1971 Summary of temperature and precipitation observations at County Fire Department, Livermore, California ... n rc Summary of wind frequency tables by stability categories 2 _ 69 Naturally occurring radionuclides in LLNL soils . 2-74 Plutonium content of soils collected at locations shown in Fig. 2-18 2-76 Identification of sources of radiation detected by the ARMS flyover at LLNL-SNLL . . . 2-78 Airborne and liquid radioactive effluents released in 1980 at the Livermore site . . . 3-19 Airborne and liquid effluents released at Livermore during 1976-1980 3-34 Airborne ' Pu and HTO concentrations at the LLNL site boundary 3 _ 34 Annual radiation doses at the LLNL south site boundary Occupational radiation dose distribution for LLNL employees ...... 3 _ 38 Impact of DOE Livermore laboratories' payrolls on Livermore 3 _ 45 Values of x/Q at various distances west of the tritium research facilities 3 _ 49 Estimated concentrations and doses downwind (east wind) from a 1.2 MCi/10 min HTO release from the tritium research facilities Population dose to 1.2 x 10* persons downwind of the tritium research facilities following a 1.2-MCi HTO release in an east wind . . , _ „ 3-5 i. Volatile isotopes from 10 -fissions accident 3-54 Values of x/Q at various distances west of Building 332 3 _ 55 Nuclides of importance released during a maximum credible accident 3 _ 56 Concentrations of nuclides of importance at various distances west of Building 332, based on the annual east wind meteorological summary 3 _ 57 Estimated downwind doses from nuclides of importance, based on the annual east wind meteorological summary 3-58 Downwind concentrations of nuclides of importance, based on the wet-season east wind meteorological summary 3-59 3-16. Estimated downwind doses from nuclides of importance, based on the wet-season east wind meteorological summary 3-17. Downwind concentrations of nuclides of importance, based on the dry-season east wind meteorological summary 3-18. Estimated downwind doses from nuclides of importance, based on the dry-season east wind meteorological summary 3-19. Doses at the west site boundary, estimated for three meteorological summaries of east winds 3-20. Population doses in the sector west of the Laboratory, for three meteorological summaries of east winds 3-21. Number of shipments of nuclear materials and other radionuclides to and from LLNL, by mode of transportation 3-22. Average large-quantity shipments of radioactive materials to and from LLNL, 1977 . . 3-23. Radiological consequences from potential accidents involving transportation of radioactive materials — inbound 3-24. Radiological consequences from potential accidents involving transportation of radioactive materials — outbound 3-60 3-61 3-62 3-64 3-64 3-70 3-72 3-74 3-75 ;&'^;' ; V "k%- SUMMARY 1.1. BACKGROUND The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories-^ vermore (SNLL, are located on adjacent sites about 65 km east of San Francisco in the Livermore Valley in southern Alameda County, approximately 5 km east of the City of Livermore. The sites occupy a combined area of 3.29 km 2 . Open agricultural areas surround the Livermore site. Site 300, located about 19 km southeast of Livermore, is operated by LLNL as a nonnuclear high-explosives site. Hypodynamia tests are conducted here in support of nuclear weapons development. Prior to world War II, the Livermore site was farmland and was used for grain production and cattle grazing. m 1942, the Navy established the Livermore Naval Air Station on the property. This Property was transferred to the Atomic Energy Commission [now the Department of Energy (DOE,, in 1951 as a site for the Material Test Accelerator. The present LLNL was established in 1952 and SNLL was established in 1956. A brief description is presented of LLNL and SNLL facilities which have programmatic operations with a potential for environmental impacts. Plans for future land use in accordance with the Livermore Site Development Plan are described. A description of new facilities planned is presented. Nuclear weapons research and development has always been the primary mission of the Livermore operations. However, today's programs include magnetic fusion research, biomedical studies, and laser fusion and laser isotope separation research. Most recently, programs to develop nonnuclear energy technologies have been established at Livermore. Activities undertaken at Livermore include the nuclear weapons development program; energy Programs in geothermal development, coal gasification, combustion research, and solar energy; and magnetic and laser fusion energy research. Other Livermore operations include: 1) a large, high-speed computer facility which, in addition to application in weapons development, magnetic fusion, laser and energy research calculations, has been used for a variety of nonenergy projects such as developing predictive computer models of atmospheric pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area; 2) on-site facilities for the Graduate Center for Applied Science, a unit of the College of Engineering, University of California at Davis; and 3) an atmospheric release advisory capability for forecasting cloud trajectories, concentrations, and population doses resulting from a nuclear accident within the United States. Population distributions are given for the public within 1.6 km, 16 km, and 80 km. These distributions are given to illustrate the number of people who might be affected by accidental release 1-1 of either radioactive or otherwise hazardous material. The nearest urban residential area is 0.8 km from the west perimeter of the DOE property. Total present population within 80 km of the Livermore operations is approximately 5 million. The DOE Livermore National Laboratories are located in a technically active region. Within the Livermore Valley and. adjacent areas there is evidence of recent seismic activity along the Calaveras, Las Positas, and Greenville Faults as well as Quaternary movements of several other faults. Recent geologic studies have located a strand of the Las Positas Fault within SNLL. Three other faults have been postulated to cross the LLNL site. However, recent trenching showed no evidence of these three faults . Major active faults in the vicinity of LLNL and SNLL are the San Andreas Fault, with a maximum credible earthquake (MCE) of 8.5 as measured on the Richter scale, which passes within 58 km; the Hayward Fault, with an MCE of 7.0 and at a distance of 32 km; and the Calaveras Fault, with an MCE of 7.3 and a closest distance of 17 km. The Greenville and Las Positas Faults have been investigated and found to be active. The Las Positas Fault has been mapped as passing through SNLL about 1 km south of LLNL. A strand of the Greenville Fault has been mapped about 1 km northeast of LLNL. Permanent buildings were designed in accordance with the seismic design requirements of the Uniform Building Code (OBC) in force at the time of construction. However, the seismic resistance of critical facilities at LLNL were evaluated using a more conservative design-basis earthquake having a horizontal ground acceleration of 0.8 g. Because of the location of the Las Positas Fault, SNLL engaged the engineering and consulting firm of URS/John A. Blume & Associates, Engineers, to perform a geological investigation of the SNLL site and a structural investigation of the Tritium Research Laboratory (TRL) . Remedial measures for seismic upgrade for the TRL recommended in the Blume report were performed. Some additional geological studies have been deemed necessary as part of the review and improvement of the design-basis earthquake for LLNL facilities. These investigations include geologic mapping along the Greenville and Las Positas Fault zones and in other selected areas, in addition to subsurface exploration within LLNL. This work is being integrated with ongoing seismological , hydrological, and geophysical investigations as part of an LLNL Site Seismic Safety Program. The climate of the Livermore Valley is characterized by mild, rainy winters and warm, dry summers. Severe weather is rare. Tornados do not pose a local threat as severe as extreme winds. Extreme wind has been defined as 49 m/s , based upon a mean recurrence interval of 10,000 years. For Site 300, the criterion is increased to 54 m/s because of possible channeling through the site. All critical facilities at Livermore and Site 300 will withstand the extreme wind. 1-2 An archaeological reconnaissance of the Livermore site, conducted by Archaeological Consulting and Research Services of Mill valley, California, indicated no evidence of archaeological resources. An intensive archaeological survey was conducted at Site 300 which located several sites of aboriginal and historical activity. The radiological background of the Livermore site is predominately determined by the activity levels of naturally occurring uranium, thorium, and potassium in local soils. Accordingly, on-site measurements of radiation exposure rates do not differ significantly from those made immediately off-site or within the Livermore Valley. Several minor incidents involving releases of radioactivity have occurred at LLNL during the past 25 years that have resulted in local surface contamination. These areas have been paved to eliminate possible spread of contamination. The total area so treats 2 was about 300 m and involved less than 0.1 uCi of plutonium. Environmental monitoring surveys detected low-level plutonium and americium contamination in an on-site area east of the LLNL waste treatment area. The source of this contamination is proabably due to local radioactivity releases connected with the solar evaporators used in volume reduction of intermediate-level liquid waste. These evaporators are no longer used for volume reduction of radioactive waste. Although levels above normal background radioactivity have occasionally been detected at perimeter air filter samples during solar evaporator operations, these filters now show typical global fallout levels of airborne Plutonium. This would indicate that the contaminated soil is not being resuspended to an extent which influences site perimeter concentrations. 1.2. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT Most of the property occupied by the Livermore laboratories has been diverted from its original agricultural land use for 40 years. Neither the present operations nor those planned for the immediate future impact on prime or unique farmland, mne of the land immediately surrounding the Livermore laboratories is prime or unique farmland. Requirements for consumption of natural resources and energy include water, natural gas, and electrical power. In 1979, water usage was 9.5 x 10 5 m 3 ; natural gas usage was 1.5 x 10 ? m 3 ; and electrical power consumption was 870 TJ. Acquisition of additional property around LLNL is under consideration. Recently SNLL acquired approximately 0.1 km 2 of agricultural land joining the eastern boundary to provide for future expansion. All construction activities take place on land controlled by LLNL and SNLL. Consequently, with the exception of increased traffic on East Avenue (the main entrance to either site,, the environmental impact of these activities on the community (such as noise and dust, is negligible. 1-3 Waste management at Livermore includes the categories of radioactive waste, sanitary waste, chemical (nonradioactive) waste, excess property, salvage and reclamation, and land fill operations. Section 3.5 describes radioactive waste management procedures at LLNL. Some radioactive wastes generated by SNLL are also processed at LLNL. Liquid radioactive wastes are treated at LLNL's Building 514 facility to reduce activity levels to as low as practicable below standards set in DOE Order 5480. 1A. Following this treatment, the material is released to the sanitary sewer system. Concentrations of radioactivity in the sewage effluent, which is discharged to the City of Livermore >. sewer system, is continuously monitored. In 1980 a total of 5 Ci of tritium were released to the sewer. During this same period 2.8 x 10" 4 Ci of 239 Pu were released. Liquid waste not amenable to further treatment is transferred to a vacuum evaporator for volume reduction. Solar evaporation used for these reductions prior to 1974 has been discontinued, because of the possible release of activity during the transfer of dry radioactive residues. Dry solid waste is transferred to Department of Transportation (DOT) -approved shipping containers and released to a contractor who ships it to a OOE-approved burial or storage facility. During 1979, approximately 376 m 3 of radioactive waste was shipped from LLNL. While no radioactive waste is permanently stored or buried at the Livermore sites, land burials of solid wastes containing depleted uranium are made at Site 300 using 10 CFR 20.304 as guidance. Sanitary waste from DOE's Livermore laboratories is treated at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. This is a 220-liter/s tertiary sewage treatment plant serving the residential, commercial, and industrial users in Livermore. The sanitary effluent from DOE operations contributes about 7% of the total sewage treated. There have been several accidental releases of toxic and radioactive materials to the sanitary sewer from the Livermore laboratories. (These releases and their impact are listed in Appendix 3A.) For each such incident, corrective measures were instituted to prevent a recurrence. Some of these were chemical releases from the plating shops, or were P H excursions due to discharges from a variety of sources at LLNL or SNLL. A neutralization/ion-exchange facility to process the plating shop wastes is now in service. The Livermore Site sewage effluent is continuously monitored for pH as well as radioactivity. The largest radiological impact from Livermore operations is from LLNL's 14-MeV neutron generator in Building 212. In 1980 the maximum annual fence line dose from this source was 166 mrem. A survey of potential exposures, including those to motorists and bicyclists on East Avenue and users of the Sandia parking lot, indicates that no one is exposed to more than 10 mrem per year from these operations. Radioactive airborne effluents include 41 Ar, from the LLNL reactor, Building 281; 13 N _" from LLNL . S linear accelerator, Building 194; and 3 « 2 principally from LLNL's Building 331. 22 * 41 » 13 m 15 n and 3 H were 1.3, 2.1, and During 1980 the estimated maximum annual fence line doses from Ar, N- O, and 1-4 0.4 «„, respectively. t „ 19e „ lh . LLNL reaetoc „„ , huta<>% , n ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ Airborne p. rtf .cul.t. r.dio.«i.it, is re.oved fro. .„ lMnt .,, U3l „, hlgh _ em(;lencv pac[iculate , lr (HEPA, mt.r.. ■„ „„ 3 „ci o« » 9pu was t#lMMd ( _ tiM llnl ^^^ ^^ ^ ^ ^^ mounting of a HEPA filter. A stud, of th . .ociologlc.l lw , ct Qf ME opecaUons ^ ^ cot pre _ t _ ^ a resuu _ ^ ^ ^ e.ployee, living in Mver.ore oreated stto „ g demand3 ^ ^.^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^^ Uc^se, i„ ,c„„ol enrolments ,„a local easiness. Since 1„7, the majority of th. City, growth ha, been dee to th. trend of living i„ subutbia a „ a mkUq „ succou „ aing ^ ^ ^ ^^ tUL and not employees and their families account for approxi.ately 30, of the City, population. Section 3., includes an analysis of naxi.u. credible accidents that could occur at Livermore. These are postulated to occur under worst-case conditions. The,. .axi.u. credible accidents include a t.itiu. release, a nuclear criticality accident. . "«„. , plll , , buUalng „„, ^ , ^^ ^ chlorine. All critical f.cilities hay. been evaluated for th.it .baity to withstand n.tural accidents-such .. earthguakes, flooding, and high wl „d s . Tne C o„,e q „e„ c e, of , uch natutal ^^ are not greater than the ones described. The postulated tritiu. accident involve, ... „ci of tritiu. rel.as.d fro. .ith.r Tritiu. Pacility. all of which i, in the for. of „T0 (tritiated water,. The .axi.u. sit. boundary do,, of 5., „. occur, fro. this postulated rel.as. fro. SNU funding „. at th. SNU northeast perimeter. Thi, is within th. 10 CFR 100 guideline of 25 re. for a „«!.„ whole body accid.nt.l do... The .axi.u. credible nucl.ar criticality accident is postulate to involve pl.to.au. in u»L Building 332 and would result in a fission yi.ld of l." ei ., lon .. The „ axlmum ^^ ^^ ^ •t the uLNL's west site boundary would be 0.08 re. whol. body ,sub.er,ion, and 0.50 r.. thyroid (inhalation,. These doses are well below the guideline of 25 re. .hole body and 300 ra. to the thyroid as a result of an accident. The M xi„»„ credible spill is postulated to involve 15 g of »*c dispersed through a wor.roo. in U».. Building 251. The total integrated dose to th. pul.onary region of a person standing in th. center line of the cloud during it, passage « the west sit. boundary would be 5.6 re.. This dose is within the guidelines of 10 CFR 100. A large building fire having severe environmental confluences. ,u=h a, destroying th. contains feature, in f.cilitie, containing radioactivity, is not likely because of auto.atic fire protection (sprinklers, and/or fire-resistant building construction. Fire, are mo,t likely to oocur in the wooden 1-5 buildings used a, offices. The m aj or off-site consideration of such a fire would be a smoke cloud and the possibility of sparks and burning brands. Most of the toxic chemicals at Livermore are used in such small quantities that their accidental release would have no credible off-site environmental impact. The largest container of toxic material in use at LLNL is the standard 68-kg chlorine cylinder used to chlorinate the LLNL swimming pool. Release of a full cylinder of this material to the atmosphere would not produce acute health effects off-site. Accidental releases of toxic chemicals to the sanitary sewer have occurred from "bright dip" tanks (a chromic acid solution containing copper), which are located in shop areas throughout the laboratory. Similar toxic chemical releases have also originated from LLNL^s Plating Shop. Some of these releases temporarily reduced the treatment capability at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. The frequency of these releases has now been minimis by engineering and administrative controls. The sewage effluent is now continuously monitored for pH, and provisions are available for the temporary diversion of sewage at the treatment plant in the event of an accidental release. Radioactive materials that are transported by DOE contractors are handled in two ways. If transportation is intra-site, radioactive materials are double-contained (two contamination barriers). Oepartment of Transportation regulations are followed if radioactive materials are moved off-site, such as a transfer of materials from the Livermore Site to Site 300. In either case the containers are capable of withstanding the maximum credible transportation accident. Appendix 3B describes the LLNL Disaster Control Plan, which contains procedures to mitigate the consequences of accidents. 1.3. UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS »s of ongoing operations include Environmental impacts which are considered unavoidable consequence. 4. =«, o\ utilization of natural resources and energy, 3) 1) continued commitment of land to government use, 2) utilization of radioactive and nonradioactive Laboratory traffic on Eas effluents. t Avenue, and 4) operational release 1.4. ALTERNATIVES Alternatives considered to DOE Liver^re operations have been 1) "no action," which for ongoing ,, 2) total or partial plant relocation, 3) scaling down \ wider use of alternate technologies having reduced those operations having the greatest impact, and 4) wider use or operations is plant shutdown and decommissioning, impact , 1-6 1.5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES AND LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY Historically, the lands now occupied by the Livermore Laboratories was used for agriculture. At Site 300 the commitment of land is principally as undeveloped buffer zone. Thus, the present use allows for easy conversion back to agricultural use. The Livermore Valley sites (LLNL and SNLL) are extensively built up, precluding return to agriculture. However, much of the surrounding land is zoned for industry, indicating that local governments feel the most appropriate long-term use of these lands is not agricultural but industrial. 1.6. RELATIONSHIPS OF THE LIVERMORE OPERATIONS TO LAND USE PLANS, POLICIES, AND CONTROLS The Livermore operations are in agreement with the City of Livermore's General Plan for land use. These operations are also not in conflict with any known land use plans, policies, or controls of the State of California or Alameda County. 1.7. IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources include those resources consumed during DOE operations and those that cannot be expected to revert to a natural state if DOE-owned structures were removed. Although not anticipated in the foreseeable future, these facilities could be decommissioned and much of the equipment recovered for use elsewhere. Small areas of the LLNL site exhibit radiation levels slightly above background. These areas would require decontamination as part of decommissioning. 1.8. ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS A qualitative environmental trade-off analysis is performed in Section 9, which balances the costs and benefits of each of the alternatives considered in Section 5. Based on the discussion of the general alternatives available and the information presented in the other sections of this assessment, it is concluded that DOE operations at Livermore should continue in the present manner in research and development. Such action provides the capability 1) to use any new technologies that are developed through the present programs, and 2) to continually review and upgrade DOE programs to minimize any possible adverse environmental impacts. 1-7 ft** m • ::>:•:•;■:• •50 BACKGROUND Chapter 2 of the DEIS has been updated and revised in response to review and consent by federal, state, and municipal agencies and by private citizens. Major changes are as follows: • Section 2.1.8 on Environmental Monitoring has been expanded to give greater emphasis on water and soil sampling and analysis. The 1980 annual environmental monitoring report for the Livernvore site has been included as Appendix 2A to provide the reader with outlines of the procedures used and typical data obtained. • Section 2.3.1, Population Distribution and Land Use, has been updated using data supplied by the Association of Bay Area Governments and Alameda County. • By far the most significant change has been in Section 2.3.3, Geology and Seismicity. This section has been completely rewritten. The results of the Livermore site seismic study, which is being carried out to better define the seismic safety of critical facilities at Livermore, will be published as a separate report which is scheduled to be completed in 1982. 2.1. DETAILED DESCRIPTION 2.1.1. Locati ion The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the Sandia National Labor atories-Livermore (SNLL) are located about 65 km east of San Francisco at the southeast end of the Livermore Valley in southern Alameda County. The City of Livermore is located about 5 k m to the west. LLNL occupies essentially all (2.54 km 2 , of Section 12, T3S, R2E of the USGS Altamont Quadrangle, California, while Sandia occupies 0.75 km 2 of the north half of Section 13 of the same quadrangle. The LLNL property also has an open storm drain right-of-way extending northward from the northwest corner of the site to the Western Pacific tracks, a distance of 317 m, covering an area of 5700 m 2 of land. Figure 2-1 shows the location of these laboratories with respect to the City of Livermore. Lands to the north, west and south are zoned industrial, although present usage is mostly agricultural. Land immediately to the east is zoned agricultural and is currently used as pasture. Site 300, located about 19 km southeast of Livermore in the sparsely populated hills of the Diablo Range, is operated by LLNL as a high-explosives test facility. This site, covering an area of about 27 km , is roughly rectangular in shape with its southern boundary being adjacent to Corral Hollow 2-1 '■/•'•■ ' ••••■ Figure 2-1. DOE Live rroore site (looking west toward Livermore, 1981) 2-2 Road. About one-sixth of the Site lies in Alameda County. The remainder is in San Joaquin County. Figure 2-2 shows the location of Site 300 with reference to Livermore. 2.1.2. Prior Land Use Prior to World War II the land now occupied by the two laboratories was used for light agriculture and cattle grazing. m March of 1942 the Navy purchased the property as a site for establishing a training base, subsequently known as the Livermore Naval Air Station. (See Fig. 2-3.) Part of the area now occupied by SNLL contained a Navy landfill disposal site. Prior land use at Site 300 was limited to sheep and cattle grazing, due to the rugged terrain. Most of the area at Site 300 is characterized by steep, smooth hills and deep ravines, with elevations ranging from 150 . at the southwest corner along the Corral Hollow valley floor to over 500 . in the northwest sector. SNLL began operations on a 0.3-km 2 site. One parcel was part of the Naval Air Station property and the other parcel was purchased dry farmland. In 1970, two additional parcels (0.35 km 2 ) of agricultural land were purchased for SNLL development. An additional purchase of approximately 0.1 km was made during 1979. 2.1.3. History 2-1.3.1. Establishment of U.N L. The first Russian nuclear test in 1949 led to the establishment of LLNL. Plans were then being made at the Los Alamos National Laboratory to construct a fusion bomb. These plans and the Russians' first detonation of a fission device emphasized the need for a continuing supply of fissionable material. Large uranium deposits had not yet been found in the United States and this country was reluctant to depend on foreign sources. In January of 1950, construction of the fusion bomb was ordered. Shortly thereafter, Or. E. O. Lawrence was authorized to construct an accelerator to demonstrate the feasibility of using high-energy neutrons to produce nuclear materials such as tritium and plutonium. This was the mission of the Materials Test Accelerator (MTA) . The search for a suitable location for this accelerator was soon narrowed to the Livermore Valley. Since, no such plans existed for the use of the naval air station, the Department of Defense volunteered to transfer the site to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) . Although this transfer was dated January 5, 1951, the California Research and Development Corporation (a subsidiary of Standard Oil of California) moved onto the Livermore site in June of 1950 and began construction of the MTA, 2-3 Figure 2-2. Loca surrounding communities tion of llnl, SNLL, and Site 300 with respect to Livermore and 2-4 Figure 2-3. Livermore Naval Air Station (1944). 2-5 ■■■■:■■ ► 1*1, ,-he AEC However, due to changes in technology this accelerator was never under a contract with the AEC. However, operated for its intended purpose. In 1,51, ». university of all*** «Uti- Laboratory ,OCKL, .t Be rk e!e y began using some of t he «UU. in support of the U» Alamos National Labor.-, <-. — > • m February of „„. U«-» »a= selectea as , secona nuclear weapons 1,-r.tory. The Site -as activate in auiy 1,52 .V an eight-man staff from Berkeley. soo „ afta. UMU -as estabUsaea. it was recogni,ea that an aaaitional site wouia be reguirea « hlg h explosives tests in conneotion with the nuclear weapons programs at bivermore. Such a site shouia b e in a remote are,. « as neat „- aa possible. *ccoraingly, in auly 1,53 — —*«- a ptoposai for Sit. 300 ^igin.U, iaentinea as tae Corral Hollo, site, to be locatea - IS - — - ti ™. The ordinal site coverea an area of approximate^ . ^- -P" .it, high • ic^n Tt was enlarged in 1957 to its present, area of explosives were conducted there beginning in 1955. It was eniarg , 2 27 km . engineering research a„a aevelopment asscciatea .it, nuclear oranance originatea at W a Memos. Oranance engineering was separatea «« nuclear aesign activities at bos Ma.os .hen s,„ai. national • tq^q ci n , P then Sandia has been operated through a Laboratories was established at Albuquerque in 1949. Since a ^a n s Department of Energy (DOE) , formerly the contract between the Western Electric Company and the U. S. Departme Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA, , and before that the AEC. In i 956 Sandia established a branch at Livermore, Sandia National Laborator ies-Livermore («*> . to proviae a closet working relationship with LLNL. 2122 Otje^tiv^. .»•. P-mary mission is the aesign of nuclear weapons. However, other programs have heen aaaea when the technical expertise a„a facilities at Liver.ore seemea appropriate £ot their enaertaUng. These aaaitional programs incluae controllea ther.onaclear research, bro.eaic.l staaies. ana laser fusion a„a laser isotope separation research, in aaaition, the Laboratory now has , program to investigate nonnuclear energy technologies ana another involving environmental stna.es. Present funaing tor these latter two programs comes fro. DOE ana other sources. „.. principal elective is research, aevelopment, a„a aesign of nuclear weapons systems, „ Maior activities incite tritium research; arming, fusing, ana excluaing the nuclear components. Major activitr £itl „, systems, ana aercaynamic ana structural elements usea in .... nuclear bombs a„a warheaas. components i„ these systems inolua. power supplies, timing mechanisms, r.aars. switches, ana other cl assifi.a elements which make up the intricate actuating ana controi mechanisms. E „.rgy-relate activities are conauctea in comhustion ana solar research. Sanai-s respcnsihilities are carriea cut jointly between its Livermore ana Albuguerque locations. 2-6 2.1.4. Signifi cant Accomplishments m the fie.d of „ucl«r explosives development, . xtelMl „ LLNL c , ntrIbutl , ns beqan vUh a fundamental btMkthrouqh ln the late 19M , that petmitted ^ deveiwt ^ ^^ ^^ ^ —» to fit into .issues, since that time. lUn . ,„a SNht. have heen responsible *, the develop of the warheads for the present strategic .issile,, „,t,h ly PoUris, Poseidon, ,„a „i„utem,„. «.llarly. their contributions to the understands, of nuciear weapons enahiea toel ^„ o£ the Spartan warhead (tested at Amcbitx,,, a„a .* marked improvements in the surviv,bility o£ ofte „ s i„ a missile s» SM! . snl, has become i„cre,si„ g ly involved in the d,si,„ ana development of co.m,„d. control, ana security systems for nuclear weapons. ■a magnetic confinement fusion research. UML ae„ el opea a new technioue for st,bili,i„ g , mirror plas»a. This enahiea demonstration of a principle cruciai to the mirror prooram. nameiy. that piasm, confinement time increases with piasm, temperature. Coupiea with other recent u*. hioh-density experiments, this research ienas credence t, the heiief that the scientific feasihiiity of the mirror approach to fusion could he demonstrated in the eariy l 98 0s. b^s ias.r fusion program passed a major miiestone hy obtaining experiment,! evidence that thermonuclear neutrons ,re producea in laser-driven impiosions. advances in solid-state iaser materials and other improvements promise , four-to-ei,htfola incre.se in laser p»er per dollar invested, compared with what has heen ,v,il,hle **». In „„ the User program increased its t,r,et irradiation facilities hy puttin, in citation the half-terawatt JANUS laser and the one-ter.watt CyctOPS laser. ML has made extensive innovations in new computer la„,u„es. software concepts. ,„d detailed Ptcrams tyin, together varied computer eouipment into , total system. A nuclear physics effort has produced extensive new information and refinements relatin, t, nuclear ener,y states and processes relevant to eneruy neneration. T he theory, which provides the hasis for hop, that laser fusion M y he achieved ,t practical l,ser-e„.r,y levels, provides major motivation to the expandin, experiment,! Pcooram. entirely new technics in machi„i„ g . especially to previously unattained tolerances ana accuracies, have been developed. 2 ' 1 ' 5 ' O£erations and Facility Descrip tions 2.1.5.1. jjffi. LLNL lE otgani2ed alo „ g ptogra „„ at . c Unes m ^.^ baisnced ^^ ^ ^ concurrent presets. PunctionaUy. the staff is divided into scientific, support, and administrative cteoories. Kesponsibility for each of the m aj or programs is assigned to an associate director 2-7 spending on - nature of b* «— -. division .Ul obt.in technic.l assist from support department, such as engineering, computations, and chemistry. Each o« the programs has been provided ending, to house assigned personnel as -U as to provide orator, and shop facilities. Ho.eve, in man, cases support departments .ill .or, on programmatic assignments in their o.n f.cilitie. since their activities may be common to sever., programs or the „ec.ssary -*- — « * "~ — "" " * < ~"-""' ^"^ "" "" "" ' machines in the mechanical Shops, cannot he profitably duplicated. Flg ur. M shows the current layout or the UM. site. In X,,.. a long-range development plan , ^. AEC The Plan is currently being implemented on the site and adopted by the Laboratory and the AEC. The plan , „ .„,, .ffective use of the remaining -open* area. provides for an orderly development and effective u 2 , 5 2 slle 300 . S1M 300 is divided into a general-service are, located in the southeastern corner „; ; h ; ^ ^ - «». ^ - - - — — — — ib - a tht ° u9hout the Site (see Fig. 2-5). ^^S^^-This are. contains nine _*, buildings „hich house aU administrative and supp ort functions, such as Site .ministration. Policed it, Pits bepartment. Medical Crafts and w • i »nd Electrical Engineering, cafeteria, and Service station. Plant Engineering, Stores, Mechanical and Electrical mng PES P.cilities-The Six be.ic progr.mm.tic oper.tions include: . High explosives „ for.ul.tion .nd manuf.cture. This „orx is performed in three f.c.liti.s comprising six maior buildings ,nd five utility/support buildings .nd magazines. k «ui ,„rt 29 utility/support buildings and magazines are used • HE processing. Eight major buildings and 29 utility/s PP in these operations. , hnnkprs) three explosive storage magazines, and 17 . Dynamic testing. Seven HE firing sites (bunkers), support/storage buildings are used for this function. . Env ironmental testing. Ten buildings house eguipment for static and dynamic tests. These tests may involve Plutonium and mock explosives, but Plutonium and live explosives are not permitted within a test assembly or concurrently within a facility. . Expe riments not involving HE. Erom time to time experiments are performed at the Site which do more isolation or have other special retirements such that cannot be met at ^ . occasionally, Site 300 is used to perform experiments or provide space for outside groups. Figure 2-5 is a map of Site 300. 2-8 1 km Figure 2-4. Layout of LLNL site. 2-9 :■■'■:•'••■• 8 70 877 873 Figure 2-5. Layout of Site 300. 1 km 2-10 2.1.5.3. SNLL. The SNLL site is essentially divided into two different work areas as shown in Fig. 2-6. The Office and Laboratory Area is used to provide office, shop, laboratory, and support space. This area is the most heavily populated at SNLL. The Office and Laboratory Area includes a vault for the storage of classified and unclassified radioactive materials. The laboratories in this area are: laboratories for electronics, telemetry, nucleonics, optical electronics, powder metallurgy, hydrogen effects, microelectronics, glass, and joining . The Maintenance Shops and Storage Area are used for plant maintenance offices and shops, support facilities, raw stock storage, and a hold area for storing equipment. A small hold area used for the temporary storage of solid radioactive wastes is also located in this area. The carpentry and sheet metal shops were recently moved into this area from the Office and Laboratory Area. 2 - 1,6 - Facilities Having Environmental Impact Significance Operations within most facilities at LLNL and SNLL have no significant environmental impact. During normal operations several facilities release effluents having small but measurable levels of radioactive or nonradioactive contaminants. Other facilities handle radioactive materials in sufficient quantity that special containment features and operating procedures are required to assure that the radioactivity is not released to the environment. Listed below are brief descriptions of these facilities. Where applicable, actions taken or planned for reducing the effects of effluents are noted. A detailed analysis of maximum credible accidents is given in Section 3.9. Normal impacts are described in Section 3.5.1. 2 - 1,6 ' 1 ' LLNL Building 194— Electron Posit r on Accelerator . The Electron-Positron Linear Accelerator (LINAC) located in the northwest quarter of LLNL is a significant tool in the continuing neutron physics research effort and in the Laboratory's work involving photo nuclear cross-section and activation measurements. The 100-MeV LINAC produces the world's highest positron intensity and the world's highest variable-energy monochromatic gamma-ray flux. Shielding and personnel barriers control on-site exposure from the accelerator's beam. Gaseous radioactive effluents ( 15 2 and 13 N 2 ) are released through a 30-m stack. 2 - 1 - 6 ' 2 - LLNL Building 212— Accelerator Building . A number of medium-energy accelerators are housed in Building 212 at LLNL, which borders East Avenue. One of these units has off-site environmental implications— the Insulating Core Transformer Accelerator (ICT). The ICT is an air-insulated 2-11 ■••-•..■•'' ■:■■■:./■■ YA \ Figure 2-6. Layout of SNLL site 2-12 variable-energy machine designed to accelerate protons and deuterons up to 500 keV. The machine is used mainly to generate 14-MeV neutrons by means of the 3 H(d,n) 3 He reaction. Beam currents in excess of 9-mA average current are obtainable. Pulsed modes of operation in the microsecond and nanosecond ranges are also available for neutron time-of-f light measurements. The ICT is housed in a concrete enclosure with 460-mm-thick concrete walls and roof. The entrance is a 460-nun-thick interlocked power-operated door. The ICT has been used in radiation-damage studies in support of the Magnetic Fusion Energy (MFE) program. Flux rates at which the 14-MeV generator was operated for these studies have been responsible for above-background neutron and gamma exposure rates at the LLNL south boundary fence. Most of these high-flux operations are now conducted at Building 292, the Rotating Target Neutron Source (RTNS) , located in the northwest quadrant of LLNL. Because of this, fenceline radiation dose at Building 212 was reduced from a maximum of 1020 mrem in 1975 to 166 in 1980. 2 - 1,6 - 3 ' LLNL Bu ilding 231— LLNL Central Vault . Building 231, in the southwest quadrant of LLNL, is the Laboratory's Central Vault. Activities in the building include receiving, shipping, and storage of Plutonium, uranium and certain isotopes, and degreasing and oxidation of uranium. The vault is air- conditioned. Ventilation is a once-through system which maintains a negative pressure differential between the vault and the outside environment. All supply air ducts have fire dampers. The exhaust air is filtered through two high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters in series. The facility is equipped with smoke detectors, a sprinkler system, and radiation and criticality alarms. Administrative controls and the safety design features within the vault make a nuclear criticality accident or radioactivity spill affecting the off-site environment extremely improbable. 2 - 1,6 - 4, LLNL Building 251— Nuclear Chem istry Operations . This facility in the southwest quadrant of LLNL primarily handles, processes, and stores multicurie quantities of the actinides. Operations within the building are conducted in specialized enclosures governed by strict administrative procedures . Activities in Building 251 vary according to programmatic requirements but, in general, fall into two major categories. The first relates to the diagnostic activities associated with the underground testing of nuclear devices. The second category involves basic research devoted to a better understanding of the nuclear behavior of the heavy elements. Such activities as preparation of accelerator targets, providing ultrapure isotopic standards, and understanding the early characteristics of fission are examples of the research function of this facility. Although normal operations within Building 251 have no off-site environmental impacts, the scenario for a maximum 2-13 credible r.dio.etive spill discussed in Section 3.9 involves this facility. Modifications have recently been co.pl.ted to opot.de ventilation and exhaust syste.s and Incorporate structural .edifications to i.prove seismic resistance. These changes reduce the possible impact on off-site environment fro. operations in Building 251 far below the spill described in Section 3.9. ^.,.5. ,,„,. Building 281-^1-Tvoe Reactor . Building 281 in the northwest quadrant of LLNb housed the Liver.ore Pool-Type He.ctor ,LPTB, . Due to Uct of projected need, the reactor was shutdown in 1,80 and the fuel ele.ents re.oved. The principal environmental i.p.ct fro. the reactor was the site boundary radiation dose fro. "nr. which was produced in nor.,1 operation by activation of argon in the ..bient air within the reactor containment building. The 1980 "*r release corresponded to ,n esti.ated sit, perimeter radiation dose of 1.3 .re.. DOE Order 5,80.1* .Hows . ...i.e. .nnu.l dose off-site of 500 .r... With the re.ctor shutdown, there is no 41 Ar produced or rele.s.d. 2 .X.,.«. ■-,.,. BuUdiaa 331-T ■ -ese.rch P.cility. Building 331. the Tritium Research F.cllity locted in the southwest gu.dr.nt of UML. is . f.cility designed for experi.ent.l wort with r.dio.ctive ,.ses .nd their co.pounds. The pri.ary radioactive g,s is tritiu.. Nor.al operations involve the use of .ultigra. quantities of tritiu. in a variety of for.s. Building ventilation is designed to ..intain air flow toward sones of higher hazard. The building was constructed in two i„cre..nts, each incre.ent is .onitored by . separate set of roo. air .onitors. monitors, ventil,tio„-loss detectors, and associated al,r. panels. Bach incre.ent has its own 30-. .«... Tritiu. released through these .tacts under nor.sl operating condition, during 1980 accounted for .n esti..ted .nnu.l site bound.ry r.di.tion dose of less than 1 .re.-le.s than 0.2* of the DOB 5.80.1A .fnd.ro. Due to . ch.nge in P rogr,«..tic funding. . «*. portion of the Building 331 facility h,s been decommissioned. Those oper.tions remaining were consolid.t.d in the north end (increment ,„ of the building. D.co.missioned ubor.fr, sp.ee in Incre.ent 1 will b. used by other U« pr„r.ms. Also being pl.nn.d is . m.jor upgr.de of the building ventil.tion system that will provide for collection .nd retention of the s.,11 qu.ntities of tritiu. currently released during routine oper.tions. A second system is being designed to retain nonroutine releases of tritiu. that m.y occur in the event of f.ilure of part of the handling system. These innov.tions will further reduce potential releases of tritium from this facility. 2.1.6.7. LLNL Building 332— Pi ntonium Facility the southwest quadrant of LLNL just eas Bui ilding 332, the Plutonium Facility, is located in t of Building 331. The building is a two-story concrete it ructure, with laboratory work areas, a change room, and a storage va ult on the first floor and a fan 2-14 loft on the second. Operations within the buildinq vary accordinq to nuclear weapons proqrammatic requirements, but in qeneral include testinq of plutonium-bear inq enqineerinq assemblies, development of plutonium fabrication techniques, and basic and applied plutonium metallurqy. Buildinq 332 activities include investiqations involvinq americium and curium. The americium and curium are in the form of metals and oxides. The quantity of these isotopes is limited by the dose to personnel in the buildinq under normal conditions and not environmental concerns. Safety procedures for the handlinq of these materials are similar to those developed for plutonium thouqh more strinqent. A one-story increment with basement has been added on the east side of Buildinq 332. In this increment all exhaust air is filtered throuqh multiple HEPA filters. The older portion of the buildinq, has been upqraded by installinq additional HEPA filters and temperature-activated water sprinklers in all room exhaust ducts. These modifications will reduce further any possible impact on the environment from operations in this facility. 2 ' 1 ' 6 - 8 - LLNL Buildinq 419— D econtamination . Buildinq 419, which is located in the southeast quadrant of LLNL, contains facilities for removinq radioactive or otherwise hazardous contaminants from assorted equipment. Soak tanks, steam quns, mechanical abrasives, ultrasonics and a vapor deqreaser use mechanical, chemical, and heat enerqy to effect decontamination. Liquid wastes qenerated in these operations are transferred to Buildinq 514 (Liquid Waste Treatment). Equipment that cannot be decontaminated is transferred to Buildinq 612 (Solid Waste) for disposal. Process air from Buildinq 419 is filtered throuqh HEPA filters before release to the atmosphere. 2 ' 1 - 6 - 9 * LLNL Buildinq 514— L iquid Waste Treatment Plant . Buildinq 514 in the southeast quadrant of LLNL receives retention tank waste that may contain either radioactive or hazardous chemicals at concentrations which cannot be released directly to the sanitary sewer. This larqe-volume, low-level radioactive liquid waste is treated by a coaqulation-f luocculation method that uses a diatomaceous- earth rotary-drum filter to remove the radioactivity and heavy metals from the liquid. The used diatomaceous earth is packaqed as solid radioactive waste. A wiped-film evaporator is beinq installed to handle the somewhat hiqher-level radioactive liquid waste that is collected in carboys. The radioactive residue from the evaporator is packaqed as solid radioactive waste. Release of untreated liquid waste to the sewer throuqh equipment failure or human error is potentially present in this plant. However, administrative controls and safety features have minimized this potential for environmental impact. Section 3.5 provides more detailed information on Buildinq 514 operations. 2-15 2.L6.10. r.T.NL Building 612-Waste Disposal . Radioactive solid waste and nonradioactive chemical waste are packaged and held for shipment at Buildinq 612 on the LLNL site northeast of Building 514. Bagged radioactive waste contained in steel drums is delivered to Building 612 from a number of facilities at LLNL and SNLL. Using a hydraul ically operated compactor the transuranium-contaminated waste is reduced in volume by a 3:1 ratio, while all other wastes are reduced 4:1. Compacting is done, with local ventilation, exhausted through a HEPA filter. The stack exhaust and the work area atmosphere are monitored continuously. The packaged radioactive waste is presently being transported to the Nevada Test Site for burial. The nonradioactive chemicals are pumped into drums that are trucked by a commercial waste handler to an approved Class I landfill disposal site. This waste-handling facility has had no measurable environmental impact on the off-site environment. 2.1.6.11 Site 300 Operations . At Site 300 there has been no evidence of off-site contamination due to oarticulate debris from operations at the high explosive bunkers. In 1972 a special study was made to determine to what extent the natural 235 U/ 238 U ratio in soil was perturbed by the use of depleted uranium in experiments at Site 300. 2 " 1 Based on isotopic uranium analyses of soils collected throughout the Site it was found that perturbation of the normal 235 U/ 238 U ratio was essentially restricted to areas adjacent to the firing bunkers. Indeed, samples collected more than about 500 m from these bunkers showed no measurable impact from depleted uranium usage. Depending on meteorological conditions, off-site impacts from annoying noises or overpressures can occur. To minimize these impacts meteorological measurements are made twice daily to set a limit on the weight of high explosives that can be detonated without impact on populated areas. To monitor the correctness of these limits, four a ■ „, n *r Trarv (see Fig. 2-2). The probability of overpressure microbarograph sensors are maintained in or near Tracy (see 'iq. is greatest in this area because of the direction of the prevailing winds. 2.1.6.12. SNLLJ/aults. Security vaults are provided at SNLL for the receipt and storage of radioactive or special nuclear material. One has been established in the warehouse (Building 927, and a small one within the Tritium Research Laboratory (Building 968). Contents of the 927 Vault vary because of changing needs of the work. They include depleted uranium-containing mock-ups of weapons (weapon-like configurations without the explosives or fissile materials needed to produce nuclear yield), and small, sealed radioactive sources not presently being used. On rare occasions, weapon mock-ups containing fissile materials are stored for short periods of time (up to 1 week) in the Building 927 Vault. These units never contain high explosives and are therefore incapable of producing nuclear yield. Tritium is not stored in the 927 Vault. Presently, the small quantities of tritium at SNLL are kept in the labs where they are used or in the Building 968 Vault. 2-16 2.1.6.13. SNLL Tritium Resear ch Laboratory . Building 968, the SNLL Tritium Research Laboratory, is a 25-m x 55-m single-story concrete laboratory building designed for tritium research experiments involving more than 0.1 gram of tritium. The maximum quantity of tritium allowed in an experiment is 120 g (1.2 MCi). These experiments are performed in sealed glove boxes. Automatic decontamination systems remove tritium from glove boxes and vacuum pumps. Tritium detectors and alarm systems monitor room air, glove boxes, and the stack effluent. These data are collected, displayed, and stored in a computer in the control room. This computer provides for a "stand alone" overview and control of the safety systems. A once-through high-flow ventilation system moves air from clean areas to areas of increasing contamination potential and discharges the building exhaust through a 30-m stack. Tritium released through this stack during 1980 accounted for an estimated annual site boundary radiation dose of less than 1 mrem— less than 0.2% of the DOE 5480. 1A standard. Building 968 is scheduled for seismic upgrading which will consist of installing roof ties and external buttresses for lateral bracing. A hardened vault for tritium storage will also be added. 2.1.7. Current and Future Planning and Land Use 2.1.7.1. Livermore Site Devel opment Plan . The Livermore Site Development Plan is a guide for the orderly development of LLNL as it experiences growth or replacement of its temporary and outdated facilities with new, permanent ones. The current allocation of land for programmatic use at the LLNL site is shown in Fig. 2-7. The World War II buildings that remain on the site have outlived their expected life (30 years). These facilities are expensive to maintain, are generally not properly located to provide the housing where it is needed, and do not always adequately fulfill programmatic requirements. Plans include replacing these buildings with new facilities. In addition to the World War II buildings, there are many trailers on site. These trailers can generally be located to provide the space where it is needed, but they are expensive to maintain. Where possible, they will be replaced with permanent facilities. Future building sites are provided for in the Site Development Plan to allow for potential expansion. A new northwest entrance to LLNL is under consideration, augmenting the west entrance at Mesquite, to provide better access from Interstate 580 and the northern and eastern parts of Livermore. It is estimated that this entrance would require the purchase of a strip of farmland 335 m long by 37 m wide. 2a - 7 - 2 - N ew Facilities: Proposed Major Facilities . The following paragraphs describe proposed major new facilities at LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL. With the exception of those effects typical of 2-17 8552 fXS#. WtescMteWay Weapons •'•,;•: ° Magnetic Fusion Energy Biomedical s\\\> Lasers V//// Energy 1 km I Figure 2-7. Programmatic use of LLNL site 2-18 construction, it is anticipated that none of these will have significant environmental impact. Each proposed project will be examined, analyzed, and evaluated in relation to the policies, objectives, and requirements of CEQ (40CFR, 1500-1508) and DOE Guidelines for Compliance with NEPA (PR 45, No. 62, pp. 20695-20710, March 28, 1980). 2 ' 1 ' 7 * 2 ' 1 LLNL --Bi°enviro n mental Office and Labor a tory Building ( BOr.Ri . The proposed Bioenvironmental Building will be located on the east side of the main laboratory/office building (B-361). The project consists of a separate 3960-m 2 two-story laboratory/office building, and a single-story 418-m 2 library/office addition to the existing building. These facilities will provide for the consolidation of programs and relieve overcrowding. 2 " 1,7 * 2 - 2 ' LLNL " LaSer FUSi ° n Facilit V Addition. Building 391, which currently houses the laser fusion test facility SHIVA, will be expanded to accept the SHIVA upgrade called NOVA. The addition will be approximately 10,700 m 2 gross floor area and the facility will be used to further investigate inertial confinement fusion techniques. 2 " 1 * 7 ' 2 ' 3 - LLNL --F"sion Target Development Facility fFTnr) . Building 298, which will be programmatically associated with Building 391, will house the Fusion Target Development facility. The facility will consist of a single-story building with approximately 5400 n, 2 gross area located northwest of Building 391. This facility will be used as a central location for fusion target fabrication, characterization, and assembly. 2 ' 1,7 - 2 - 4 - LLNL "" LaSer FUSi ° n ° £Cice Bull dlna. This two-story structure, Building 481, will have a gross floor area of 5100 m 2 and will house 200 scientific and other personnel associated with laser fusion research. Many of these workers are presently housed in temporary buildings directly south of Building 381. Building 481 will be east of Building 381 and an upper-level enclosed corridor connecting the two is planned. 2 ' 1 ' 7 - 2 ' 5 - ^ "^er isotope . Separation Facility . This facility, Building 482, will provide multistory structure totaling approximately 8400 m 2 of gross area to be located east of Building 3, (Laser Fusion Office Building). Work in this facility will permit the investigation of ne uranium-enrichment processes. Lng 381 2,1 * ? - 2 ' 6 ' ^JL-- M *terials R & D Facility fMROF) . The Materials Research and Development Facility (MRDF), Building 235, is proposed in order to expand and consolidate R S D efforts in the 2-19 5 tics, and inorganic materials. The project includes a new weapons related areas of metallurgy, plast lt of existing Building 231 and north of Building 239. The MRDF has a gross facility to be located east area of 6800 m 2 and will prov ide laboratory and office space for 179 people. 21121 . ^-M^^ent Support Cente^or^QMSC^I) . The KSC-U will be a T-shaped suture of 10,220 m 2 and will house Data Processing, Business Services, Procurement, Accounting, •vho fa^ilitv will have three floors, and will Forms and Records, and Mail Services for the Laboratory. The facility be located north of Building 551 (Core I) . 2 ! 7 2 s. - Mto *-■' "-""-» ""->• Thls pro)ect Ptovid " £ ° t: '" deSi9 "' miction, ana U.t.ll.tio. of aaaea -lor component, to comprise a large t.naem -«« teat epparatu, „ -.«-**- « — — <° *°"" «* ">"" ' "^ "'"" ^ ^ aevice, ,3, conduction of a light l.hor.tor, hmiiain, of approxim.tely 1« . a„a ,4, conduction • . ,„ una m 2 These ptoposea changes ate an extension of the original of an office wing of approximately 3200 » . These prop MFTF concept scheaulea for FY 1978-1981. 21729 . „..,-...h-...l..l W - .r r"^"- *-""" """> °- 351 - ™" PtOP ° Sed "' Buiiaing 351. .1U m.Ke it possihle to integrate, centralise. a„a extena .any high explosives ,„F, sctivitie. crrmntly conauctea at . The ne. facility .ill contain approximately 88.0 . . of which 5 600 m 2 .ill he anaergroana. HKAF facilities located unaergrou.a include sp.ces for HF storage, precision shot ...emhly a„a instrumentation, contact ana remote control of KB operations in support of test firings, enclosea firing ch.mhers. ana a high-velocity gas gun. The rem.inaer of the £ac iUty .ill he ahove gr.ae ana .ill contain office, araftihg. lihrary. aata reauction. ana conference cfaff The HEAF W iii be located north of Building 341. space for the HE program staff. The HtA* win ue * into fESPl The proposed Earth Sciences Facility will be a 2 i 7 2 10. r.LNL— Earth Sciences Facility (ESF) . me P ro F r.o-story structure .ith a floor are, of shout ,400 m 2 . ft .ill proviae office space ana light iahoratory space for 2 ,S people, inching conference a„a auaitorlum areas, lihrary. computer centers. « r . aress. sna other support areas. The huiiaihg .ill he sitea .est of Buiiaing 151. 2ll2 n. MM^MI „ 1 - -T-- ° ""-" ""*" "'" ttC| - ThlS Pr ° JeCt WU1 consist of approximately .300 m 2 of office space for SO .aaition.l Personnel, ana space for computer, ana assoclatea support eguipment. »»C .. a real-time regional scale system for Piloting the transport, aiffuslon. ana aepo.ition of r.aiohucliae. relessea to the atmosphere. The proposea facility will be north of Building 151. 2-20 2.1.7.2.12. LUjL^-Nuclear_Test Technology Complex^NTTCj. The NTTC will bo .a multistory structure with laboratories and related offices located on the first floor and basement levels. The majority of the office facilities will be located on the second floor. The proposed new facility will have approximately 16,000 m 2 of floor space, and will be located west of Building 111. The project Provides part of the facilities which are required to meet the objectives of future test programs . 2 ' 1 ' 7 ' 2 ' 13 ' LLNL --Wea P ons Technology Comp ly Ph.s. I. This project will provide a seven-story addition to the east side of existing Building 111. It will contain approximately 4200 m 2 and will house 150 scientists and engineers. The building addition will support the future test program. 2 - 1 ' 7 ' 2 - 14 ' LLNL --Non-Destructive Evaluati on Facility Addition ,„nPP, This project prQvides fQf a three-story laboratory/office addition to Building 239 with basement levels which tie into the existing floor levels. The addition will have approximately 4800 m 2 of floor area. The basement and first-floor levels will provide space for radiographic applications and advanced studies in ultrasonics, laser holography, and radiation gaging. The second- and third-floor levels will be devoted to computer operations and offices. 2 ' 1,7 ' 2,15 " LLNL " L *rqe Optics Diamond Turning Machine F a cility (lodtmfi . The LODTMF will be a single-story structure with a total floor area of 1500 m 2 . The majority of the floor space (1020 m 2 ) will be used for the Large Optics Diamond Turning Machine (LODTM) , a new 75,000-pound lathe which will be able to machine laser optics weighing up to one metric ton with an average accuracy of one-millionth of an inch. The remainder of the building will be used for offices, restroo.s, supply room, colters, and conference areas. 2 ' 1,7 * 2,16 - — 300 " Flash biography FaciTity (FXP) . The Flash Radiography Facility at Site 300 will meet present and future needs to gather m ore definitive information on the implosion behavior of modern nuclear weapons in order to optimize their design. The proposed FXK will be a two-story reinforced concrete building housing a 15-MeV linear induction accelerator and related electrical equips. Sufficient flux will be provided by the accelerator to penetrate any of the presently contemplated weapon designs which require high-density materials. The proposed facility will be coupled to Building 801A, but structurally separate to facilitate construction and to minimize operational conflicts. 2 ' 1 ' 7 * 2 - 17, Site 300-Weaponization Faculties Project i OTPf . The proposed WFP will provide increased capability to test, record, and evaluate new weapon configurations and support items, and 2-21 will correct e.uipment and facility Citations which have b een noted over the past several years. The proposed actions inc.ae the construction of five new support buildings near existing facilities and modifications to Building 823B. The new buildings are: • Building 823A, Office and Control Building. • Building 832E, Test Specimen Inspection Building. • Building 834M, Thermal Test Building. • Building 836D, Electrodynamic Exciter Building. • Building 854J, Dynamic Shock Test Building. 2ll2l S site_3J 1 0^MY^^ ^ ^ Pr ° JeCt WlU COnSlSt ° f 3 Control and Support Building, a Beam Tube Building having three sections (accelerator, beam transport, experimental tank,, and an accent building housing the power supplies and associated cables, diagnostic e^pment, etc. . cooling tower will be constructed in the vicinity of the Control and Support Building. Electrical power will be supplied from the North Power Station. Cooling water will be supplied to the ATA from on-site wells. Th e m is a Linear charged-particle (electron, accelerator ana -ill Oe nsed to investigate particle beam theory and operating parameters. 21 . 7 . 2 .19. si tJL _3 J K)^H^^ This facility will be located B i„c area and will provide approximately 1500 m 2 of space. It will have in the explosives processing area ana win f^v a I cnprHon cells with four adjacent control rooms, a double magazine, eight explosives machining and inspection cells and a storage, handling, and support building. 217220 . SNLI != Co^^ This project is to provide 1200 m 2 of additional computer facilities space contiguous to the existing 1338-m 2 underground computer facility. The increasingly sophisticated weapon development responsibilities as well as newer u\ .,; 1 1 niar-p increasing demands on activities (e.g., safeguards, solar energy, combustion research) will place ■a f„r an orrterlv qrowth in computer capabilities Sandia computing capabilities. The SNLL plans provide for an orderly gro to match this demand. llU v^^Si^J*^^^. I" »«., a grange aeveiop.ent pi.n was prepared tor „«. T „is pian aaaressea tne overaU aeveiop.ent pattern, on-site ,o„i„ 9 . tf. reor,ani,.tion ot t„ rho „p ar «; since its adoption the plan has existing areas, and the function of future areas. In the years c *t, , orai i s of the plan have been altered to reflect continued to provide basic guidelines. Many of the details P u - i-ho h^ir criteria have remained unchanged, the changing needs of the Laboratory, but the basic criteria 2-22 Table 2-1. LLNL environmental monitoring sampling and analysis schedule Sample Location Analysis Collection frequency Number collected Analysis frequency Air LLNL perimeter Gross alpha Weekly 6 Weekly Gross beta n 6 i* Gamma scan 238 Pu, 239 Pu N It 6 6 Monthly composite n 137 CS n 6 ■ 235 u, 238 u n 6 n Be ■ 6 it HTO Monthly 6 o Liv. Valley Gross alpha Weekly 10 Weekly Gross beta if 10 n 238„ 239 Pu, JJ Pu « 1 it Site 300 Gross alpha n 10 n Gross beta n 10 it Gamma scan n 10 it 238 n 239 Pu, pu it 10 it 137 cs n 10 it 235 u, 238 u it 10 it Be it 10 n til Liv. Valley Gamma scan Annually 20 Annually 238 n 239„ Pu, Pu H 20 n Site 300 Gamma scan If 11 it 238,, 239 Pu, Pu it 11 n Sewage LLNL effluent Gross alpha Daily Gross beta Daily HTO it 137 CS it 239 Pu n Cu, Cr n F it 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Daily Daily Monthly composite 2-23 Table 2-1. (Continued) Sample Location Site 300 Analysis BOD, COD, N, Hg, Se, CN, B BOD, COD, N Hg, Se, CN, B, etc. Collection frequency Quarterly Number Analysis collected frequency Quarterly Liv. Water Reclamation Plant effluent Gross alpha Gross beta HTO 137 239 Cs Pu Daily Daily 1 1 1 1 1 ater Liv. Valley Gross alpha Quarterly 8 Quarterly Gross beta n 8 n HTO n 8 ■ Site 300 Gross alpha H 3 M Gross beta N 3 n HTO R 3 n Hells Gross alpha H 5 n Gross beta II 5 it HTO ■ 5 H Wells Gross alpha Monthly 2 Monthly Gross beta ■ 2 « HTO ■ 2 i* Vege- Livermore ■ 10 ■ tation Valley HTO Site 300 HTO ■ 8 n Milk Livermore Valley Gamma scan N 1 n HTO H 1 n TLDs LLNL perim. Quarterly 12 Quarterly Livermore ■ 41 ■ Valley __ . — 2-24 4 H The long-range Site Development Plan introduced the curing, loop road pattern. Within the pattern established by these roads, the LLNL site was zoned according to population and function. The core of the Site, enclosed by the inner loop road, was zoned for general Laboratory-support functions such as the Business Office, Technical Information, Plant Engineering, and the unclassified Computer Center. Between the inner and outer loop roads were sites for the various programmatic offices and laboratories. Prior to 1968 existing buildings were often surrounded by a sea of asphalt. Reorganization usually involved establishing a service yard that was common to all facilities in the block. Portions of each block were zoned for limited automobile parking and for pedestrian access. Landscaped green belts that ran through several of the blocks contained pedestrian/ bicycle pathways. Formal landscaping was limited to main entrances to buildings. The Laser Program area is the first new programmatic area developed in accordance with the function unit concept of the long-range plan. The Laser Fusion Research Facility (Building 381) and the High-Energy Laser Laboratory (Building 391) were the first two installations. Building 381 in particular was designed for additional buildings toward the east. Long-range plans at SNLL include a laboratory building adjacent to the combustion research facility on the east side of Building 912. The construction site selected for this facility follows the general plan of locating offices and laboratories in a grouping near the front of the property, while the test facilities are located at a greater distance from the street. 2.1.8. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 2.1.8.1. General. Contamination control efforts at LLNL and SNLL place maximum emphasis on controlling effluents at the source. Because of the proximity of the two laboratories, the environmental monitoring program maintained by LLNL serves to determine the effectiveness of control measures at both sites. The LLNL monitoring program uses analytical techniques capable of detecting the activity of numerous radionuclides in the environment at natural background levels. At present, the radionuclides of concern include the transuranic elements, products of neutron activation, fission Products, and tritium. Table 2-1 shows a sampling schedule indicating the frequency and number of the various samples collected. The results of this monitoring program are reported to DOE on an annual basis. 2 ' 1 The 1980 Annual Report is included as Appendix 2A. The program includes the analysis of various types of environmental samples that have been collected within the Livermore Valley and Site 300. The following is a summary of the current program to indicate its breadth and scope. Changes are expected as knowledge in specific areas increases and as the specific operations are changed. 2-25 mmmmfA 21 . 8 . 2 . bi ^ s ^. ^^u .1. s.mpUn, U conaact.a with » c_ ly op— air „ ^1— » .— — • » - - - ~ -*■ m ~ ata " y ;j sjbj _ „ _ _. _ ... - _. :rr > —- • - - - — - 238 D 239_ 137 Cs 235^ and 238 u> undergo radiochemical analyses for Pu, ™, a* »t LLNL perimeter locations and east and west Tritiated water (HTO) in air measurements are made at LLNL perxme „ 1(>rc The wa ter collected is recovered by of the TRL. Water vapor is collectea in silica <,el sabers. M^ota - - - is — "- by UqUid soi " tllUtl °" C,0ntl " 9 - «a county Flood _ - — «—*- — « - ' - ™ - ^ "'J :: 1 -, - «— - — - - -- <•- & ~ - 7 " au £iaias ;:;; _ _ _ atiUe , ^ . . _ from — — -u "' - — - ^ tl „._. „..«- -*. - ^ »- — -"- — 8mpim a - ai : i t l 7 weUs »-.«.«,« - VaU.V. —active „..*«,« maae on thase -*- «--«-, * Zone 7 Llvet more valley. The »»x»a» d. UntMC. sita ha, no «.,s„r.bl. i»<-ct - drm.m, ,. « as of the concentration quiaes foona in DOE Order ta aio,ctivity founa in any of these sa^es »»s 6.8, oent tes „,ts ^ P«r 1QR0 contains the most recent results 5460.1.. appendix 2», the environmental monitor in, report for 1980, of these measurements. «,_«,-,a» . the Livermore valley flows «.».rd in several arroyos that feed Al.»ed, Surface drainage from the Livermore vai „„„,, Co ontv Ml .hich discharges into the San Erancisco Bay. lifers in the »i,es Cone area of * - cl ty of Fremont. K«. «.*-». led at the City of hiver^re's Water defamation Plant The Livermore site's sanitary waste is treated at the City , . .h.t serves residential, commercial, and 1IMr | , 200-llter/s tertiary saw.,, treatment plant that serves i: .., ..... ,. ......... - -» -»• •■ - - •"-;";••:;;::: „.. ,.„. ,„...., ....... - .... - ;;:r;:;.r. ::.::.«. Liv ermore-Amador Valley Wastewater Management program, a pipeline 2-26 wastewater out of the valley with discharge into the San Francisco Bay. The Livermore sewage plant was connected to this pipeline on February 8, 1980. Prior to the pipeline the LWRP effluent was used for irrigation of municipal property; any excess was discharged to the nearby Arroyo Las Positas. Because this effluent contains low levels of tritium arising from normal Livermore Site operational releases to the sanitary sewer system, tritium measurements have been made on well-water samples collected near the LWRP. The average concentration was less than .07% of the DOE 5480. 1A concentration guide. All concentrations were well below the guide. Results of the most recent measurements are contained in Appendix 2A. Although the LWRP effluent is still used for summer irrigation of municipal property, it is no longer discharged to the arroyo, thus eliminating the principal means of tritium movement to nearby ground water. 2 - 1,8 ' 4 * SSWer EfflU6nt S ™P "" T - Sewer effluents from SNLL and LLNL are combined and the combined flows are continuously monitored for P H and radioactivity before leaving the Livermore site at the northwest corner of LLNL. Daily samples are collected of the combined effluent and the treated effluent from the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. These samples are analyzed for gross alpha and beta radioactivity and 3 H, 238 Pu , 23 ' Pu , "7^ and ^ ^^ .^^ ^^ ^ ^ on a monthly composite of these samples. In 1977, SNLL also installed an effluent monitoring system that has the capability to continuously record its P H. During 1979, LLNL installed an on-line monitoring system for detecting metals in the sewer effluent using x-ray fluorescence. 2-2 2.1.8.5. Soil sampl ing. The environmental monitoring program includes an annual soil sampling schedule to measure the concentration of various radionuclides that have been deposited within the Livermore Valley or Site 300, either as a result of global fallout from past atmospheric tests or Possibly from Livermore site operations. Analyses include those for Plutonium, uranium, and fission Products, collected annually since 1972, these analyses are part of a surveillance program to document any changes in environmental levels of radioactivity that may have occurred, and to evaluate any increase that may have resulted from site operations. Appendix 2A contains a description of the Procedures and the data obtained in 1980 as well as an independent check by the California Department of Health. When the program was begun, one of the objectives was to establish a data base for the concentration of those radionuclides near the Livermore Site and Site 300. Data for manmade radionuclides were expressed in deposition units (concentration per unit area), so that the data could be compared with that of Hardy and Krey. 2 " 3 Soil samples were collected to a depth of 25 cm, because it is implied when using deposition units that the sample has been collected to sufficient depth to account for essentially all the activity. Since 1972, when the objective has been to document changes 2-27 „ «ne»«.ti-», more -."<- =«*»»* has b«n employea. Sampling to , aepth of 1 =. -as fir.t attemptea, but it ... founa to be diffica.t to reprodace a MM .-*• — «" — «""» « SOU conditions encountetea in the fi.ld. Accoraingly. in recent years aU samples have been collected to a aepth o£ 5 cm to reauce the ertot in sampling aepth. The Vitam P-caaute now nsea at the Livermore site is typical of procedures asea at many nacle.r facilities. The process is the procedure oatHn.a by the Nuclear Kegulatory mission's Regulatory Guide 4.5. Although tesasp^naea respirable particles of Plutonium in the air ate the -St significant environmental impact, the Plates «_ aetermining the airborne respirable particle concentration fro. resuspension of respirable particles in the soil is difficult ana uncertain. There has been consiaerable interest in aetermining Plutonic, in the testable aast fraction of soil accoraing to the method aevelopea by Johnson. Johnson, methoa. which consists of sweeping the soil satface. has been criticised becaase the technigu. is not reducible with respect to the aepth of the sampling, ana b.caase the physical and ohemical treatment following collection materially alters the particle si,e distinction from that ., 2-5 found in the soil. Airborne platonia. is measurea ,t nine locations in the Livermore valley -^ " W" impl osio„s. «- »» — - ■ — - — '"— " "^ *» -"™" ^ _ ana * on.™" «OOPS Oeca^e O^.Uoo.X. » "- « •«■ ~>** *»" b eca.e ««« in WT ana — . a 2 00-300- W aevice. is una.r construction. „ iaset isotope sedation. „- ae„onsttatea *. «,- »acrosco P ic i.set en, W o, «^-. „.e W e„ t, ««. «- — — - — •— — ""HI tecn„i,oes otUUin, economic io„i,ation so.ces soc, as inftatea iasets ana eXe^c «„».. e «U— tecnni.es aiso a PP i y to tne isoto P es o £ « — —- as „eU. X, is — -« *• .oohniaues will result in more efficient processes and continued developments in these separation techniques processes applicable to a wider range of elements. 2.2.2.2. Energ y—Near -Term Purpose and Need fl Coal Gasification. When coal is heated in the presence of oxygen and 2 2.2.2.1. Underground Coa l GasnicaixiMj. IU1 „ acee! that are m uch cleaner-burning and much easier to steam, it gives off a mixture of combustible gases that are mucn „ • . erieS of field experiments at its Hoe Creek, Wyoming, transport than coal. LLNL has been engaged in a series of test site to evaluate methods of gasifying thick seams of coal in situ (underground,. After plication, these gases could be introduced into existing pipelines and used as a substitute for natural gas. rv heating oil shale underground to about 400°C 2 2 2 2 2 nn ^cround Oil Shale _getor_ting,. By heating oi _„, l:« — * - - ~ — • — shaie *■ ■ ~~~2 T, .e -« — . — - - - * - — — * * — ■*-; n: « b a.in confine «. oii e.W.i.nt - «~* »~ *- <* — * ™ °' m «U «. y* is ex Pl o,in, ways of MM *. *~ — «f—- 2-30 2.2.2.2.3. Solar Energy . American industry burns the equivalent of 30 million barrels of oil annually just to heat water for chemical and manufacturing processes. Considerable oil can be saved by using solar energy to heat water. LLNL has designed two inexpensive solar water heaters for industrial use. The first type of solar heater to produce hot water is the shallow solar pond. Essentially, this is a large, flat, water-filled plastic bag with a black bottom and a clear top. The bag, 4 m wide and 60 m long, is filled to a depth of 5 to 10 cm of water each morning. During the day, the water absorbs heat and reaches temperatures as high as 60°C (140°F) and is drained into an insulating tank at night. LLNL is also developing and testing a simple concentrating solar collector. It is an inflated cylinder of thin-film plastic with a clear upper half and an aluminized lower half, which serves as a reflector. This collector surrounds a horizontal pipe that is coated and insulated. Solar energy is concentrated into the pipe by the reflector. Water passing through the pipe is heated to 170°C and is used either as hot water or flashed into steam. 2.2.2.2.4. Metal-Air Power Cells for Automobiles . In the United States, about 25% of our national energy budget goes for transportation, with virtually all this energy coming from petroleum. Battery power for automobiles is being studied again because these batteries could be recharged by power plants operating on domestic coal or uranium rather than petroleum. The difficulty with conventional batteries is that they do not offer performance comparable to that of an internal combustion engine. A metal-air power cell converts chemical energy to electrical energy by oxidizing a replaceable negative metal electrode. Tests have shown that experimental aluminum-air cells offer high energy and power densities and suggest that they might provide the range, speed, and acceleration of conventional internal combustion engines now used in compact cars. LLNL is doing basic electrochemistry research developing an aluminum-air power cell and evaluating the potential of other metal-air cells in automotive propulsion systems. 2 - 2 ' 2 ' 3 - Biomedica l and Environmental Research . The biomedical phase of this program, which began in 1963, deals with the biophysics, genetics, and molecular biology of cellular toxicology. Chromosome aberrations, genetic mutation, reproductive biology, and cellular kinetics are the main emphases, with a heavy commitment to instrumentation development in biophysical cell studies. Benefits from biomedical and environmental research have resulted from a comprehensive study of the implications to man of radioactivity and other energy-related effluents in the biosphere. 2-31 Laboratory and field investigations are being conducted in marine biology, terrestrial ecology, and atmospheric sciences. Specific benefits derived from biomedical and environmental research at Livermore include the following: . The discovery that the high-speed, laser-based flow systems could be applied effectively to chromosome analysis and sorting has created a powerful new analytical tool. . A complementary image-analysis system for chromosome measurement, the locally developed CYDAC, reached the point of initial clinical applications-a prenatal diagnosis for a possible birth defect, and quantitative confirmation of a microscopic chromosome defect in leukemia. . A research project established the extreme sensitivity of mouse germ cells to radiation damage caused by low levels of tritium; the effort is now being extended to similar studies of the effects of energy-related environmental chemicals. . A substantial study was initiated using mammalian cell systems to develop new methods of identifying environmental chemicals which are mutagenic or carcinogenic. . A new project was begun to use fluorescent chemical tags for cellular enzymes which might serve as indicators of the transformation of cells from the normal to the malignant state. The application of such indicators would be in cancer diagnosis and the detection of environmental carcinogens. . Analysis of crops, litter, soil and groundwater to determine cycling mechanisms for radionuclides in the environment and to formulate models for predicting the dose to people returning to Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands. These studies represent DOE's program to determine rehabilitation plans and long-term use for the Atoll. . Significant progress was made in the ability to understand and model such complex systems as man's potential influence on the climate, the effects of chemicals on stratospheric ozone, rainout, and fallout, and the transport of toxic materials through the atmosphere. In particular, this last project prompted a decision to establish the ARAC (see Section 2.2.2.6) computer network, based at Livermore and connected to other DOE laboratories, for real-time prediction of the movement of such materials in the event of a release. • A sophisticated, user-oriented air quality model was made available to the Bay Area Air Quality Management District for that agency's use in making land-use decisions based on environmental impact. 2.2.2.4. Computer Science . LLNL operates one of the largest high-speed computer facilities in the world. This facility is in continuous use, with nearly 500 terminals available for essentially simultaneous computations by Laboratory employees under an LLNL timesharing system. 2-32 In addition to classified computations, these computers have been used in such proqrams as generating computer models of atmospheric pollution in the San Francisco Bay Area, studies of national transportation systems, and metropolitan traffic movements. 2 - 2 - 2 ' 5 - Graduate Center for Applied Science . This graduate center, established at Livermore in 1963, is a unit of the College of Engineering of the University of California at Davis. A total of 346 graduate degrees (including both Masters and PhDs) have been awarded under the Department of Applied Science (DAS). Approximately 25 LLNL staff members currently serve as DAS faculty members or lecturers. The school was initially located in classrooms on East Avenue near the southeast corner of the 2 LLNL site. However, a new 1000-m building is now in service in the northeast quadrant of LLNL adjacent to Greenville Road. Funding for the construction of this permanent facility was shared by the University of California and the Hertz Foundation. 2 - 2 - 2 - 6 ' Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) . The Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (ARAC) service directed by LLNL has three main functions: (1) to provide support to designated DOE facilities during an accidental release of radionuclides; (2) to support the DOE Emergency Response Team in the event of potential or actual releases of radionuclides; and (3) to provide the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with dose assessments whenever aircraft could possibly intercept nuclear debris clouds from foreign atmospheric nuclear tests. The ARAC central facility receives meteorological data from the Air Force Global Weather Central (AFGWC). In an accident situation the meteorological data collected nearest the accident site are used to predict cloud trajectories, concentrations, and population doses. At present, ARAC has two-way communications with AFGWC, the LLNL computer center, four DOE installations, the DOE Emergency Response Team and the FAA. Following the Three Mile Island accident in March of 1979, ARAC assisted by generating predictions of radioactive isotope distribution. This assistance was of paramount importance in the effective deployment of ground and aerial monitoring teams, and in estimating the time dependent source term by comparing close-in measurements with these predictions. 2 - 2,2 - 7 * Visitors Center. A 232-m Visitors Center and badge service to unclassified LLNL areas was opened at the east (Greenville Road) entrance on July 31, 1976. Facilities include a theater and an exhibit hall. Approximately 15,000 people visit the Center each year. 2-33 W. •■•'■:■■' ' ■■ .-■ ■'"'.■: ■'• • •■■■ : ■ . '■ IheH 83 2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF EXISTING ENVIRONMENT 2.3.1. population Distribution and Land Use This discussion of population distribution in relation to the DOE Livermore laboratories is intended to clarify the existing patterns of population density and chan.es in these patterns which are lively to occur in the Livermore Valley. The population density is described to a distance of 80 *. However, the description of the land use here is limited to the more immediate surroundings of the Laboratories where either the existing land use might be impacted by DOE operations or where changes in land use might affect these operations. The immediate area probably does not extend beyond 16 k m and becomes increasingly important as the boundaries of LLNL and SNLL are approached. „* ttmt ,nH SNLL At the present time the on-site population of LLNL, 2 3ii On-Site Population of LL NL and bNLL. «t <-ne &•■*=* C^Uti., of employees, ^tractors, outside a,ency personnel, .no visitors, is between 7000 ana 8000 persons. SNLL has .ppro.i-t.ly 1000 persons on site. The total number of persons on site varies accordin, to the ti*e of day ana the nun-ber away fro* their normal work areas ,on sic. leave, vacation. travel, etc. ) . 2.3.1.2. Emulation Within 1 6 Kilometers of Facilities . The DOE Livermore laboratories are abutted on all sides by agricultural land with low residential density. The nearest urban residential area is 0.8 k m fro. the west perimeters. There are a few ho.es at the laboratory's boundaries. The city ..i „ fo „^ * n t-he west side of these Laboratories, and future limits of Livermore, however, presently extend to the west siae o k • n rh*n densities closer. The Livermore General Plan, 1976-2000, envisions development may bring urban densities ciosei . j ,o* onri a residential population of approximately continued industrial development to the north and east, and a residential pop 2 t . . „ f TTMT Th«a foothill areas to the east and south 9500 in the 2.6-km 2 area immediately to the west of LLNL. The rootnm of the Laboratories will remain agricultural. ~f i-ho nr>F Tivermore laboratories and residences within Figure 2-8 shows the immediate environs of the DOE Livermore isoo 1.6 k . of the approbate center of the properties. . similar t.M. »■>!» -uia incloae only „ricultural ia„a e-c.Pt for the portions of Liver„re urban ana Ma.ed, County unineorpor.tea residential aeveiop.ent to the west, ana an are, of li,ht inaustriai aevelo^ent to the northwest alon, North vasco Ro,a. The region north of the Southern Pacific -ailroaa is part of the City of Li.e^re ana is presents ,oned for future co»ercial/inaustri,l development. Estimated populations hy sectors of airection ana distance to a aistanc. of 16 » fro. the OOE Liver»ore l.horatories are ,iven in „,. 2-,. This ficur. is based on the 1S70 census. The present population is about 15, higher. 2-34 H viL>& Winn mos. wmur £ „ nnBBftt ■ HOLLOt RO I" 1 km Figure 2-8. Immediate environs of the DOE Livermore laboratories. Large circle represents a 1.6-km radius from the center of the laboratories. Small circles represent dwellings within or near the 1.6-km radius. 2-35 ■■'■■■ ■ y -' / - WNW WSW SSW 1.6-km arcs are shown to 8 km. Figure 2-9. Estimated population distribution within 16 km of LLNL and SNLL (1970 census data) . 2-36 2-3.1.3. Extended Regional Population . The regions to the west of LLNL and SNLL are the most heavily populated, with the City of Livermore (50,000)* extending from 3 to 10 km west and partly to the north. Pleasanton (36,000),* Dublin (15,000),* and San Ramon (21,000)* are the only other urban concentrations in the Livermore-Amador Valley, but just over the low ridges to the west are the densely populated San Francisco-Oakland and San Jose urbanized areas. Other urban concentrations at similar extended distances are Concord-Walnut Creek and Pittsburg-Antioch to the north, and the cities of Tracy, Stockton, and Manteca in the predominantly agricultural Central Valley to the east. The hills ringing the Livermore Valley from the north toward Mt. Diablo through the east toward Altamont Pass and the south toward Mt. Hamilton are very sparsely populated. Figure 2-10 shows estimated populations by 22.5-degree sectors with 16-km radius increments to a distance of 80 km from the Livermore site. This distribution was derived by plotting data from the Association of Bay Area Government's "Projection 79" (April 1979) in which 1975 data were projected to 1980. In making this projection, estimates of city census divisions in their respective geographical locations were utilized. Figure 2-11 shows a summary of these data. The total population within 80 km of the site is approximately 5 million. 2 - 3>1 ' 4 - Population Projections. Population growth in the Bay Area, along with the rest of the state, has been at a greater rate than for the nation as a whole, at least since 1900. Before the 1940s, the major growth was in the close-in, or bayshore, parts of San Francisco, Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, and San Mateo counties. Since that time, the increase in number of places to work in new centers and an improved highway and rapid transit systems have led to the spread of medium- or low-density residential developments (tract homes) to virtually all remaining areas where development and sales are economically feasible. Efforts by local and regional agencies to limit this growth through control of its rate or through planning for alternate land uses such as "open space" or continued agricultural use have not so far modified this trend in any large sense. A recent Alameda County zoning ordinance limits the construction of new homes in the unincorporated areas of the eastern part of the county to 2 sites of 0.4 km or more. There are a number of pre-existing smaller homesteads along Mines and Tesla Roads; here a 0.02 km limitation applies. This should tend to reduce change in the population of these areas, as long as they do not become part of an incorporated city. While the DOE Livermore Laboratories brought some growth to the Livermore area when they began operations, an accelerated growth occurred during the 1960s when the area increasingly became a home for commuters to the large cities to the west. The most rapid growth in the Livermore-Amador Valley * These population figures are from the Livermore, Dublin, Pleasanton, and San Ramon Chambers of Commerce, 1979. 2-37 M • . •■ N£ N WNW NNE W WSW ENE ESE SSW Figure 2-10. Estimated population distribution (in thousands) within 80 km of LLNL and SNLL (1975 population data projected to 1980). 2-38 I* I > '.' QmHH. Sacramento ® Figure 2-11. Estimated population distribution by sectors (in thousands) within 80 km of LLNL and SNLL. 2-39 has been in residential dwellings, mostly of single-family type, but with some concentrations of two-story apartment houses. At present, light industrial development is occurring in the Pleasanton and Dublin areas to the west. Such development has proceeded at a slower pace in the Livermore area. The voters of the Valley passed an initiative measure requiring future building permits to be issued only when assurance could be given that the new construction would not overburden the capacities of water, sewage, or school services. Table 2-2 gives the 1970 U.S. Census populations of counties lying all or partly within 80 km of the Laboratory, with projections for every decade to the year 2000. >£"*< 2.3.1.5. Land Use . The rural areas of the Livermore-Amador Valley are occupied by vineyards, orchards, irrigated pasture, many small farms, and larger tracts devoted to grains and hay. The hilly terrain surrounding the valley is used for cattle and sheep pasture. Dairying is not intensive in the Livermore-Amador Valley, but is prominent in the San Joaquin Valley to the east. During 1979, 1,900,000 chickens (broilers and fryers) were commercially grown in the Livermore Valley. There is a large complex of gravel quarries just east of Pleasanton. Numerous mines in the surrounding hills are no longer active, but there are several producing oil wells located about 0.8 km east of LLNL on Patterson Pass Road. The California Aqueduct and its facilities are important in the area. A branch, the South Bay Aqueduct, carries water destined for the San Jose area around the east and south margins of the valley, passing very close to the southeast corner of LLNL and adjacent to the east boundary. The Del Valle and San Antonio Reservoirs to the south and southwest serve this aqueduct as reserve storage and watershed contributors. 2.3.1.6. Transportation Routes . The major artery through the Livermore-Amador Valley is Interstate 580, which feeds traffic from the Bay Area to the Central Valley. With its connection to Interstate 5, it forms the major route between the Bay Area and Los Angeles. The average daily vehicle flow is 48,500.* The interchanges at Vasco Road and Greenville Road about 1.6 km north of LLNL serve as the maj or routes from most points, other than Livermore, to the Laboratories. Interstate 680 connects the San Jose Area with Interstate 80 at Cordelia, passing through Pleasanton and Dublin at the west end of the valley. traffic count for one year divided by 365. There are, w wu " ' especially due to the importance of this route for recreational travel. 2-40 Table 2-2. Projected populations of counties lying all or partly within 80 km of LLNL. County Area (km 2 ) % Urban Popt (the 1970 ilation iusands) , census % Change, 1960-1970 1980 a 1990 a 2000 a Alameda 1898 99.0 1074 6.5 1116 1182 1263 Contra Costa 1901 93.6 558 17.0 642 751 845 Marin 1347 92.4 208 12.4 229 266 294 Merced 5133 50.0 106 19.7 126 b 154 177 Napa 1963 58.0 80 27.5 99 110 118 Sacramento 2544 95.1 638 18.2 745 b 877 976 San Francisco 117 100.0 714 -7.4 657 640 648 San Joaquin 3649 76.9 292 13.0 317 b 363 415 San Mateo 1176 98.2 557 6.4 584 615 658 Santa Clara 3372 97.5 1074 25.0 1249 1390 1513 Santa Cruz 1137 75.2 124 42.8 176 b 248 310 Solano 2141 93.0 174 14.3 223 322 379 Sonoma 4090 58.7 205 46.4 270 342 426 Stanislaus 1295 70.1 195 20.5 250 b 309 364 Totals 31,765 S2.5 5999 14.2 6683 7569 8386 These projections are based on data in "Projections 79," published by Association of Bay Area Governments, April 1979. From State of California Department of Finance, "Population Estimates of California Cities and Counties," January 1979. 2-41 The Livermore area is served by main lines of the Southern Pacific and Western Pacific Railroads. As shown in Fig. 2-8, these lines pass just north of LLNL, but neither LLNL nor SNLL has spur tracks. Both lines carry freight only, with some 15 trains a day passing through the Valley. The Livermore Municipal Airport, 10 km west of the Laboratories, is the nearest public airport. It has a 1200-m paved runway with clear approach zones and runway lights. The Laboratory operates flight service with a Fairchild F-27 turbo-prop transport aircraft to the Nevada Test Site and other locations from here. Nearby airports with scheduled airline service are Oakland, San .ose, San Francisco, and Stockton. 2.3.2. Natural Surface Features « arroyos (Arroyo Seco and Arroyo U . Positas, traverse these properties. Arroyo seoo flows to the west aoross the Sandi, site sooth of the offic. ana laboratory area, northwest .Ion, th. western eage Of the property, and then crosses the southwest oorner of LLKL. Prior to the construction of the um. Building 113 Colter Cb„Plex In 1,66, this arroyo crossea Bast Avenue a„a turnea westward to a point new occupied hy the nulti-story portion of the building. To permit the present construction, the arroyo channel was aiyert.a to the south. It now runs along East Avenue to , point west of the construction where it meets the original channel. Arroyo Las Positas originates in the Livernore hills east of LLNL. It is nor.ally dry nont of th, year. Originally, this arroyo crossed the northwest section of the CUL site, entering fro. , point on Greenville „o,d between Patterson Pass Po.d and Lupin Way (formerly foutherty Lane,. In IMS. as part Of ,n erosion controi program the arroyo was routed to the corner of the project and then west ,!,„, the north perimeter to ,„ outUt at the northwest corner. This outlet, which constitutes the principal pathway for urn.-, surface drainage, runs north to the Western Pacific tracKs, then westward where it joins Arroyo Seco. T he Um. ««ster Site Plan (discussed in 2.1.7.3, calls for the construction of a -11 la*e in the center of the site. The principal B. of the Arroyo Las Positas (originating east of th, site and t n, a c ^ =o described above) will be then rerouted presently channeled north to the northeast corner of the site as described to feed this lake during the rainy season. 2.3.3. Geology and Seismicity Pollo-ing th, April 1,7, h,arin,s on th, draft Mm. th, sections of the BIS dealing with geology and seisMcity were consiaerahly expanded in recognition of the public interest in th, seismic setting 2-42 of the Livermore sites. A site seismic safety program (Appendix 2B) was initiated in January 1979 to identify and characterize geologic hazards at LLNL. The final report of that program and a public information meeting are scheduled for October 1982. 2.3.3.1. Summary . locations in the Livermore Valley are subject to ground motions from large seismic events on the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras Faults, which are the major known active faults in the San Francisco Bay area. The San Andreas Fault is capable of very strong earthquakes of which the best known example was the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, of magnitude 8.3. Activities on the Hayward (passing through Hayward in a NW-SE direction) Fault have probably produced seismic magnitudes of up to 7.5. Along the east side of the Livermore Valley closer to the Livermore sites is the active Greenville fault. The largest recorded (or remembered) earthquake in the eastern Livermore Valley area occurred during a sequence of earthquakes on the Greenville fault in January and February 1980. This earthquake had a magnitude of 5.5 to 5.9. Several smaller faults have been observed in the Livermore Valley. The closest of these is the Las Positas fault, which passes through the Sandia Livermore site from southwest to northeast. This fault shows evidence of some late Pleistocene and possibly Holocene activity. Several other faults have been identified but they are believed to be inactive. Seismic hazards have been estimated during past investigations of regional and local seismicity. John A. Blume and Associates, a professional engineering firm, concluded that the maximum hazard would be from a magnitude 5.7 earthquake on a nearby strand of the Tesla fault at a location about 2.5 miles from the site. Other engineers concluded that a somewhat larger magnitude 6.5 earthquake on the Tesla fault would constitute the maximum hazard. Seismic hazards associated with the Greenville and Las Positas faults are currently being investigated. Future earthquakes would cause damage mainly through the ground acceleration forces they create, with the most serious damage resulting from accelerations at frequencies to which structures are resonant. High-frequency instrumental peak accelerations perhaps as high as 1.25g would have minor effect. The maximum horizontal sustained accelerations would cause the greatest damage. The estimates of these maximum accelerations range from 0.5g to 0.8g. The critical facilities at LLNL and SNLL have been examined and strengthened (or are being strengthened) so that accelerations as large as 0.8g would not destroy the confinement integrity even though the operational capabilities might be damaged. 2 ' 3 ' 3 ' 2 - Re 9io"al Setting. LLNL and SNLL are located in the southeastern portion of the Livermore Valley. The Livermore Valley is an east-west trending topographic and structural depression cutting across the structural grain of the Central California Diablo Range. 2-43 The Diablo Range consists predominantly of highly deformed metamorphic and igneous rocks of the Lassie-Cretaceous Franciscan assemblage. The range is generally bounded on the west by the active San Andreas Fault system and on the east by the ancient Coast Range Thrust Fault system as shown in Fig. 2-12. 2 ~ 6 ' 2 " ? The San Andreas Fault is a right-lateral strike-slip fault system along which slip is occurring between the oceanic Pacific Plate of the earth's crust and the continental North American Crustal Plate. The Coast Range Thrust Fault system marks the location of an extinct subduction zone along which rocks of the Franciscan Assemblage and marine sedimentary rocks of Cretaceous through late Tertiary age are now juxtaposed. 2 ' 7 These marine sedimentary rocks are exposed in the Altamont Hills east of LLNL and SNLL where they consist do.in.nt* of sandstone, shale, and claystone with minor amounts of conglomerate, tuff, and coal-bearing strata. 2 " western Central California is a technically active region as demonstrated by historic seismicity 2 " 9 and active deformation. 2 " 10 Major active faults in the region include the San Andreas Fault and two of its major branches, the Hayward Fault zone and the Calaveras Fault zone. The locations of these faults with respect to LLNL and SNLL are shown in Figure 2-12. Data concerning the extent of these faults, maximum credible earthquakes, and anticipated resulting bedrock accelerations for the LLNL and SNLL sites have been compiled and are presented in Table 2-3. 2.3.3.3. Geology in Vicinity of LLNL and SNLL 2 3.3.3.1. Bo<*s. "«r~t. valley Itself is und.rl.in by up to 4000 ft of presently continent,! alluvial deposits of late Tertiary ana Ouaternary a,.. 2 " 12 These sedi.ents consist of Ufr.tr.tUi-. lentical.r and locally cemented, clay. silt, sand and ,ravel. _ tuff beds occur near the base of the section. Hydrocarbon exploratory -ell P-l. located about 1000 ft west of S»L.L as Shown in Pi,. MS. penetrated approximately 2,20 ft of these materials before reachin, -basest- 2 " 13 rocks of the Franciscan assemblage. The California Department of Water Pesources (CPWR, recognized some .real variations in the composition of the alluvial deposits beneath Uver.ore valley darin, their studies of the ground water resources of the valley are.. 2 " 12 - 2 "" Beneath the eastern portion of the valley, near LU* and «, weil lo,s Show that the alluvia, is highly heterogeneous, the result of deposition fro. .any -11 stream In the soathern portion of the Valley, accent to present-day major strea. channels, the alluvial deposit, consist do.inantly of sand and ,ravel. This portion of the Valley is a -J- ,round water recharge area. 2 " 15 In the western portion of the -alley, these g r.vel bed. alternate with thicK deposits of lacastrine clay, while the alluvial dep.^t, .Ion, the northern m.r,in of the 2-44 Table 2-3. Seismic hazard data for major regional faults Fault Length 3 (km) San Andreas 1200 Hayward 72 Calaveras 115 From Ref. 2-9. From Ref. 2-11, Maximum 3 earthquake (M) 8.5 7.0 7.3 Closest approach distance (km) 58 32 17 Eedrock b acceleration (9) 0.4 0.35 0.5 2-45 ' Figure 2-12. Major fault zones of the San Francisco Bay area. The great San Andreas zone, lying to the west of the Bay, is one of the chief tectonic features of the earth. It is capable of very strong earthquakes-for example, the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, of magnitude 8.3. The Hayward and Calaveras zones, lying between the Livermore Valley and the Bay, are parts of the San Andreas system, branching off from the main fault some distance south of the Bay. These faults, too, are active and have produced strong earthquakes, probably up to .nagnitude 7.5. The Greenville, Tesla and Ortigalita Faults, located to the east of LLNL, may be the remnants of the Coast Range Thrust Fault. The Livermore Valley earthquake sequence that began on January 24, 1980 gives evidence that these faults are periodically active. The Verona, Livermore, and Las Posxtas Faults are additional elements in Livermore Valley geology, although their tectonic significance is uncertain. 2-46 •A UNITED STATES \i DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR ^ GEOLOGICAL SURVEY STATE OF CALIFORNIA OtP»BTMfNT OF witeh ftflouMCf* ALTAMONT OUADRANOL6 CALirOftNIA- ALAMIDA CO *J '5 MtNUTB tCftlCt ( TOPOO»»PMIC| *' s v, r.i* -K. Ei / •' t ^CO*?* % ; ~ w - HCI > **. V/ia., j.v » Figure 2-13. Folding and faulting as mapped by Blume (1972). 2-13 2-47 Valley are predominantly fine-gained and represent deposition from small streams draining from the 2-12, 2-14 hills north and east of the Valley. Huey 2 ' 8 subdivided these Late Tertiary and Quaternary sediments into an older unit, the ,2-16 Livermore Formation, and younger Quaternary terrace deposits and undifferentiated alluvium. Herd- remapped the eastern two-thirds of the Livern^re Valley and proposed additional subdivisions. He maP ped the older, frequently deformed, alluvial deposits as the Livermore Formation and recognized four subdivisions of the Late Quaternary alluvium based on soil series, soil profile development, and correlations of terrace surfaces. Herd regarded recent floodplain alluvium and stream gravels as Holocene materials based on their deposition by the modern stream regimen. LLNL and the northerly portions of SNLL have been constructed on a gently northwest-sloping land surface. The surface is underlain by alluvial deposits mapped by Herd as Holocene and late Quaternary in age. Logs of exploratory holes drilled for building foundation studies and drillers' logs from cathodic protection and water wells on the LLNL site reveal a heterogeneous assemblage of alluvial 2-12, 2-14 deposits consistent with the regional findings of the CEWR. The southern portion of the SNLL site is hilly; mapping by Herd interprets this area as underlain by older alluvial terrace deposits and deformed beds of the Livermore Formation. 2 " 16 These two areas of contrasting physiography and stratigraphy are separated by a prominent break in slope that extends northeast-southwest across SNLL and adjacent areas. 2.3.3.3.2. Faults . The active Calaveras Fault bounds the western margin of the Livermore Valley 2 " 13 and the Greenville Fault zone, whose activity was clearly established by the earthquake on January 24, 1980, bounds the eastern margin of the Valley 2-17 In addition to these principal i .-„^ ~r- ^-K.iai-pd 14 additional named and numerous geologic structures, various investigators have located or postulated 14 2-8, 2-12, 2-13, 2-16 pauU unnamed minor faults beneath Livermore Valley and ad : acent areas. locations have generally been based on surface mapping, interpretations of air photos and well logs, and recognition of presumed ground water barriers. Some geophysical studies have been performed but field work has generally not included exploratory trenches or boreholes except in the western Livermore valley, where the Calaveras Fault has been extensively studied as a result of the mandate of the State of California's Alguist-Pr iolo Act. 2 " 18 A study by URS/Blume and Associates 2 ' 19 included the excavation of ten trenches within SNLL across locations of the Las Positas Fault as mapped by Herd 2 ' 16 and the second strand of the Tesla Fault as mapped by Blume and Associates. 2 Because of ambiguities in available indirect data and poor exposures in important areas, differing interpretations of the Valley fault pattern have been offered by past investigators. Two examples of these differences are shown in the fault maps of Blume and Associates and Herd, presented as Figs. 2-13 and 2-14, respectively. 2-48 2-49 > In order to resolve these ambiguities and obtain a more precise understanding of the geology of the valley, LLNL geoscience personnel have reviewed all available geologic literature pertinent to valley geology and tectonics, performed regional field reconnaissance studies, and conducted an extensive program of exploratory trenching and detailed mapping of Key exposures within and near LLNL and SNLL. 2 " 20 As a result of these reviews and detailed studies, the following summary of geologic hazards has been developed for the area surrounding LLNL and SNLL. 2 .3.3.3.3. ^n.e for Active Faults. As previously stated, historic seismicity and geologic evidence for displacement of Holocene materials demonstrate the activity of the Calaveras and Greenville Pault zones. Discontinuous surface faulting occurred during the January 24, 1980, earthquake on the C.eenville Pault zone and additional surface effects were noted following a strong aftershock on January 26, 1980. As documented by Bonilla and others, 2 " 21 the zone of surface rupture extended from the vicinity of the intersection of Greenville Road and 1-580 2.6 km north of LLNL northwest for approximately 6.4 km to a point west of North Vasco Road near the Mameda-Contra Costa County line. Movements along the main Greenville Pault and several of its branches were observed within the zone. Th e sense of relative movement varied from place to place and the maximum offset observed was about _* a ^,w 2-22 have estimated the ground acceleration at LLNL during the January 24, 70 mm. Tokarz and Shaw nave estiino<-cu «. -^ 1980 earthquake as . 2-0 . 3g . Geologic evidence developed during LL N L field investigation, indicates late Quaternary and possibly Holocene displacement .Ion, a portion of the Las Positas Fault zone mapped by Hetd 2-16, 2-20 obUque ^ ^^ ^ ^ fault system as inactive. S.rnr.ut.r and T oxarx d.riv.d ..xi.u. ac « leratlons fot th . Li „ e „ o[e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ -Jor fault zones to the „„ .„a for „,. faull systm ^ „ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ summarized below. on the b..i. of p.. t seis.ic actlvity „ d , tatutlcal oorrelatlons (sl>ilat m those ^ ^ Blu.e in .,„,. the, assi g „ed .ax™ Bichter ., g „itud.s of 8.3 to the Sa„ Andreas fault (equivalent to the sen Prancisco earth g ua k , of l,. 6) ana 7.5 to the „, y .,rd , nd calav.ras. TO ^ ^ .axi.u» g rou„d accelerations at LL„L d». to .,rth g ua*.s o„ these distant faults. the y used thre. different ..thoas ,„a r.co.,.„a.a the l,r g .st acceleration value d.veioped fro. each fault, o., g fro. the San Anareas and Ha y „ard faults and 0.5, fro. the Calaveras. The p„ y sical picture of faultin, at the site usea bv B.rnreut.r and Tcxars ™ . as that drawn b, Biu.e on the basis of the 1,71 field i„v.sti g ,tio» fot the proposed plutoniu. l,borator y . An essential feature of this picture was the projection o, both the T .sla and corral Hollow faults as transectin, the LL„L site. Aitho„ g h Blu.e h.d found no evidence of f,„lti„ g onto the LL„L site, the projections resulted fro. co„„.cti„ g features. pr.viou.lv reportea b y others, which are su gg .stiv. of f.ulti„ g southeast a„a northwest of the sit.. Por the purpose of pr.dictin, .axi.u. possible g rou„a •otions aue to potential earth g „a k .s on those fauUs. Bernreuter ana Toxarz felt that the „ sit. ■net be considered as bei„ g at the earthouaxe epicenter and not at so.e .iti g ,ti„ g distance fro. it. For the less well-characterized local fault s y ste.. the historic seis.ic recoras are brief ana sparse. Careful review inaicatea that these faults were capable of producin, e.rth g „a k .s with Hicht.r na g „itud.s in the ranoe of 5 to 7. within this r.„ g .. Bernreuter and To.arz observed, -clos.-in the actua! „a g „it„de ... of the e,rth g u,xe is not so i.portant fro. the e„ g i„eeri„ g aspect since the .axi.u. grou „d acceleration and response spectra win be .uoh the sa.e. T he duration win be aifferent. T h. iar g er the earth g u,xe .a g „ituae. the l„„ g er its duration, certain* it see.s hi g hl y unlixeiv that the fault s y ste. near th, Laboratories site woula h.ve , ., g „it„ae 7 .artho.ua*.. however, since the site is at the epicenter, if the .a g „it„ae is in the r.„ g e of 5 to 7 it .axes little aifferenoe except on auration. An upper li.it of .a g „it„de 6.5 is esti.ated as the l.r g .st .arthouax. that win occur on the fault s y ste. under the Laboratories site.- TO esti.,te the .axi.u. g rou»a acceleration that ,i gh t occur ,t th. LLNL site at the .pic.nt.r of an ..rth g u,x. on on. of th. locai faults. B.rnr.ut.r ana TO x,rs us.d a statistic.! tr..t..nt of dat, for peax .cc.l.r,tion vs .pic.ntral distance recorded for about 20 e.rth g u.xes. Their analysis inaicatea that , g rou„a .otion si.il.r to that recorded at the P.ooi.a Da. duri„ g the 1,71 San Bernando eartb g uax. couid r.,so„.bl y b. oonsid.r.a r.pr.s.nt.tiv. of g rou„a .otion in epicentre! 2-55 ■•/■••■•' regions. Their statistics indicated that "the peak g level of 1.25, from the Pacoima Da. is not treasonable for a maximum peak g level fro* an earthquake." However, .ore important fro, the structural viewpoint "are the number of oscillations at 0.8,. For earthquakes located on the local faults it is estimated that the peak g level will be 0.8-1.25,. Certainly one could expect that 0.8-g level would create considerable energy, while the higher spikes would not greatly influence the spectra." Their recommended spectrum for the response of structures on the LLNL site to shaking due to an earthquake on a local fault was one derived from the Pacoim, Dam record, with the peak over lg reduced to 0.8g. To illustrate this, Fig. 2-15 shows the trace of acceleration versus time that was re corded at Pacoim, Dam during the San Fernando earthquake of February 9, 1971. In the acceleration record, note that there is an extreme peak that stands out far beyond the level of sustained acceleration. Such high load applied very briefly and only once is not the kind of load that tests the structural quality of a building, since the building does not have time to respond to it. Farthquake damage in a structure is a cumulative effect, developing over a period of several seconds; lt does not occur instantaneously. Therefore, as far as structural response and damage are concerned, the "effective acceleration" which can cause damage is not the single spike but rather the highest le vel attained repeatedly during the whole period of strong shaking. This effective peak acceleration is the ground shaking level that has been considered in the LLNL DBF. Although Bernreuter and Tokarz concluded that the intensity of ground shaking at the LLNL site would be greatest for earthquakes on the local faults, and therefore recommended a DBFwith a maximum ground acceleration of 0.8,, they stressed that earthquakes on the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras faults were also important "because first, the duration of maximum shaking is much longer than that of earthquakes on the local faults and second, they are more likely to occur." Mume 2 " 13 : The recommendations developed in this investigation established the seismic d esign criteria to which Xncrement 3 of the Plutonium facility was designed~sp«cifically , a maximum horizontal ground acceleration of 0.5g and the response spectrum shown in Fig. 2-16. Faulting in the vicinity of the Laboratory site was investigated. Figure 2-13 reflects the critical findings of this investigation. Blume concluded that the earlier described Tesla fault svstem was composed of three strands-called Tesla fault No. 1, Tesla fault No. 2, and Tesla fault » 3-and represented the largest fault system near LLNL. Based on his judgments of its surface expressions in the hills to the southeast, Blume concluded that this local fault system was probably also the most recently active, even though the evidence from wells N-l and N-2 (Fig. 2-13) suggested that, nearer the LLNL site, the Tesla fault ». 1 had long been inactive. Hence, their DBF for LLNL was defined as the largest earthquake the Tesla fault could produce. 2-56 CD c o *-> CO k- _ a> u u < ecorded at Pacoima Dam during the San Fernando earthy of Penary 9, 1971 . Damage to buUdings is caused by strong ■kin, over a period of several seconds, not by one or two very brief high lerations. acce 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 Period - seconds Figure 2-16. Design-basis response spectrum recommended by Blume & Associates after their major investigation of faulting at the LLNL site. 2-57 .la- . ..social basea ft* M ti«« of earthquake .aqnituae on estates of the total !.„,«, a„a rupture U*. Of the Tesla Mult *. 2. »», chose as fte southe.sterly e„a of this inaepenaently actin, se,»ent the point where it intersects the Mill. «-» ib.t U »iles southwest *. the „ sue TO estimate the total length of this branch, not knowin, its northwesterly extent, they conservatively .ssu.ea that it continaea oat unaer the L iver.ore Valley another 5 .iles . of the site, for a total length of 16 miles. » estate the rupture lenqth. Blu.. eppliea a theoretical factor of 1/3 (j uaq»ents of this £ actor vary, as .ention.a .hove,, te.perea by an e.piric.l observation that, since a 4-.ile stretch of S rroyo Seco appear.a to be . sarface li„....nt of M U faalt m. 2. 4 .lies was representative of , rvpic.l rupture lenqth on the faalt. . be .ore conservative, they chose 5 .iles ,.b,at .» », as the rupture lenqth on the Tesl. f.ult for the purpose of esti.atinq the .aqnituae of the earthquake. F ro. an e.pirical relationship between sarface raptare lenqth ana .a,nituae. Bla.e selectea 5.7 as the .a,nituae of the earthquake that the l.r,est. nearest fault coaia proaace. Bro. the obs.rvea dip of the Tesl. fault ,na a„'esti.,tea foci aeptb of 5 .ilea, they calcalatea that the nearest epicenter of an e.rthqu.ke on Tesl. fault i. , wouia be 2-1/2 .ilea fro. the center of the site. Fi „,lly, fro. , co.Pil.tion of acceleration a.t. observea ne.r the epicenters of earthquakes. Blu.e a ft ssociates arriv.a at 0.5, as a conservative esti.ate of the .a*i.u. ,rouna acceleration to which a structure like Buiiain, 332 on the LLNL site couia be subiect.a by ,n earthquake. .„ salary, as the result of this investiqation. Blu.e inaicatea an aqree.ent with Bernreater ana Tokar: that the Tesl. faalt is the l.rqest active fault ne.r the Moratory. However, he assiqnea an I. a. of 5 7 as the larqest possible earthquake for the Tesla. Further, basea on earthquake magnitude of 5.7 as tne j.diy« t~ publishea aat, by Boore ana „"» rel.tin, to .cceler.tion levels ne.r faults that have .ovea aurin, ^aer,te-si,ea earthquakes. Blu.e esti»atea a peak qrou„a acceleration of 0.5,. These estates of earthquake .aqnituae ,na BBB acceleration are l»er than the Bernreuter ana Tok.rs esti.ates of .aqnituae ,., ana .aki.u. acceleration value of ... , ana ««« «■ — - ^ ^ esti.at. Of 0.4, for the DBB. Tbe DBB for the plutoniu. facility was therefore .oaifiea to 0.5,. Fi „,lly, Blu.e still founa no eviaence for potential surface faultin, at the site of the plutoniu. facility. | , l9ht i-U, Tb, purpose of this report, publishea by bbNL two years after Blu.e s investiq.tion.'- w.s to a.fine the seis.ic h.,ara at » in a .anner consistent with the «,.ic E „er,y Mission. require.e„ts for the for.at ana content of safety analysis reports for nuclear power Plants. Tb. »BC baa requestea that such reports be preparea as well for other structures whose inteqrity was essential to the health ana safety of the public. 2-58 For the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras faults, Wight estimated magnitudes by means of statistical correlations of magnitude with fracture length, taking the fracture length to be half the total length of the fault. This led to magnitudes of 8.3, 7.5, and 7.5, respectively. To estimate ground accelerations at the LLNL site, he followed the method of first estimating bedrock accelerations on the basis of acceleration-distance-magnitude relationships and then calculating a surface acceleration by means of a mathematical model of the soil layers. By this procedure Wight arrived at values of 0.5g for the maximum acceleration in the bedrock and 0.32g for the maximum acceleration on the surface at the LLNL site due to earthquakes on the distant major faults to the west . In examining the local fault system, Wight 2 " 11 used the mapping of Blume 2 " 13 as shown in Fig. 2-13. As Blume 6 Associates had, Wight chose the Tesla fault as the one potentially capable of producing the maximum seismic effects at the LLNL site. However, Wight judged the total active length of the Tesla fault to be 34 km, or about 21 miles, as compared with Blume's 16 miles. In estimating earthquake magnitude, Wight applied the same relationship of magnitude to fracture length as he had used for the more distant faults, taking the fracture length to be half the total length, rather than one third as Blume had. As a result of these differences, Wight's fracture length for the Tesla fault was 17 km, or about 10-1/2 miles, whereas Blume's had been only 6 miles. This led to an estimated maximum earthquake magnitude on the Tesla fault of 6.5, which agreed with the estimate of Bernreuter and Tokarz but was greater than Blume's 5.7. Wight's approach to estimating maximum surface accelerations due to this local earthquake was also similar to Bernreuter and Tokarz's, in that the magnitude of the earthquake is considered to be less important than the proximity of the site to the epicenter. Wight noted that close in "the dependence of peak acceleration on magnitude is weak," that "the correlation of peak acceleration with site geology is low," and that recent "data, calculations, and observations clearly indicate that accelerations approaching l.Og are possible in near-epicentral regions for earthquakes of all magnitudes." Emphasizing the evidence of the Pacoima dam record, Wight estimated, as Bernreuter and Tokarz had done, that the peak acceleration at the LLNL site due to an earthquake on the local fault system could be 0.8g. Impact of the Las Positas Fault. Both Blume 2 " 13 and Wight 2 " 11 considered the Tesla fault, as mapped in Fig. 2-13, to be the local fault on which to place the design basis earthquake. However, if Herd's mapping of the Las Positas and Tesla systems, as shown in Fig. 2-14, is correct, the Las Positas zone truncates Tesla fault No. 1, and eliminates Tesla fault No. 2 altogether, since, except for the presence of the arroyo, postulated evidence for strand 2 of the Tesla fault zone can be accounted for by the presence of Las Positas fault. Also, the Las Positas itself would become the 2-59 largest, nearest fault, and so by that criterion would be the one on which to base the DBE for the LLNL site. If this is the case, the DBE ground motion levels generated by the Las Positas fault should not exceed those previously established. The rupture length (and hence the potential earthquake magnitude) of the Las Positas fault is constrained by the 20-km distance between the Calaveras system on the west and the Greenville fault on the east, and the Las Positas is no closer to the LLNL site than the postulated Tesla fault No. 2. Therefore, these DBE ground motion levels would be about the same. Additional studies (Appendix 2B) are underway to improve the DBE determination for the LLNL site. 2.3.3.4.3. Critical Facility Earthquake Response. All critical facilities at LLNL have been evaluated for seismic integrity using the Blume response spectrum anchored at 0.5g peak ground acceleration (PGA). Additionally, these critical facilities have been reviewed for a 0.8g PGA by an extrapolation of the analysis results of the 0.5g PGA review. The objective of these reviews is to insure confinement of radioactive and toxic materials contained within these structures. With this objective in mind, the assessment of these facilities was done using allowable stresses and element capacity levels higher than those specified in the Uniform Building Code (UBC) . Stress levels and material capacities used were based on test data, ultimate strength concrete values and steel yield values. The objective was to make a realistic assessment of the actual building capacities could be made. As a result of this approach, yielding and damage of building elements is permitted as long as this does not lead to structural collapse or a loss of safety related functions. It is anticipated that repair will be required following a 0.5g or 0.8g PGA event before the facility is returned to routine operation. Safety reviews of all critical facilities has been completed. The results of seismic analysis for these reviews at LLNL are summarized below: Building 231 Vault . Analysis indicates no modifications required for this structure to insure confinement at the 0.5g and 0.8g PGA levels. Building 251 . Analysis of this structure indicated insufficient capacity in roof-to-wall connections, roof chord stresses, shear wall stresses and out-of -plane bending of shear walls. As a result of these findings, design modifications have been implemented to "harden" a portion of the building so that radioactive and toxic materials may be stored and handled safely. Furthermore, changes were made in Building 251 operations to limit the amount of radioactivity that might be released in a major earthquake before construction of the "hardened" portion of the facility was completed. Building 281 . The analysis of this facility indicated some yielding of reinforcing steel in the reactor shield could be expected, but no structural collapse was predicted. Also, the 2-60 heat-exchanqe support and bridqe-crane support were found to be deficient. Modifications to both of these structures have since been made, additionally, this pool-type reactor was decommissioned in 1980 Building 331 . Evaluation of this facility at the 0.5g and 0.8g PGA levels indicated deficiencies in the stack supports and roof-to-wall and wall-to-foundation connections. Additionally, shear transfer through the wall pilasters was questionable. Modifications to the stacks (addition of support guys) were made and design modifications have been proposed to upgrade the roof-to-wall, wall-to-floor connections and pilaster shear transfer capacity. Building 332 . The evaluation of this structure to the 0.5g and 0.8g PGA earthquake levels indicated deficiencies in the Increment I loft structure and the mechanical equipment room. Modifications were made to upgrade the loft to the 0.5g PGA level; however, a re-evaluation of this portion of the facility still indicates some local yielding with anchor bolt and connection failures occurring as well as problems with the connection capacities of the precast tilt-up exterior wall panels. Additional modifications are still required in this area, although no collapse of the loft structure is anticipated. Modifications to the mechanical equipment room have recently been completed, significantly increasing its seismic capacity. As a result of safety concerns regarding this building following the January 1980 Greenville earthquake sequence, the DOE has insituted an independent review of Building 332. Results of this review will soon be available. Work is currently underway to provide an extensive seismic instrumentation system for this facility. This will enable us to better determine the response of the building and potential force levels experienced in the event of future earthquakes. Recent modifications to portions of the ventilation system and optical pipes, and airlocks have been designed and constructed to withstand the DBE. 2-3.4. Surface Water Hydrology The three water systems considered as having a potential hydrological effect on the Livermore site are: • Storm water . • South Bay Aqueduct. • Del Valle Reservoir. Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-6 show the location of the Site and local natural drainage channels. Some of the arroyos and creeks in the Livermore Valley area have only minimal flow from October to 2-61 April, the area's typical rainy season. Storm water is channeled through storm sewers and open ditches designed to accommodate a maximum flow expected in a ten-year interval. Storm water is directed north. to the nearby Arroyo Las Positas via an open storm-drain right-of-way from the northwest corner of the site to the Western Pacific tracks, a distance of 317 m. A much smaller percentage of the stormwater flows southwest to the Arroyo Seco. However, SNLL storm drainage water is all channeled to the Arroyo Seco. The South Bay Aqueduct transfers water from Byron, California, to Santa Clara County through a system of pipelines and aqueducts. The aqueduct is an open channel as it traverses the eastern edge of Livermore Valley about 1.6 km southeast of the LLNL site and adjacent to the SNLL east boundary. Demand for this water includes local domestic and agricultural users plus surrounding counties. 7_ 3 Del Valle Reservoir is located about 11 km southwest of the site. This 9.5-x-lO m reservoir provides water conservation, flood control, and supply to surrounding counties. The Livermore site is outside the floodplain of the Del Valle dam. A detailed discussion of local surface hydrology is included in Appendix 2C. 2.3.5. Groundwater Hydrology The Livermore Valley is a major groundwater source area. 2 " 14 ' 2 " 15 Sandy-gravelly aquifer horizons alternate with fine-grained, relatively impermeable beds and groundwater occurs both under confined and unconfined conditions. Both the Quaternary alluvial sequence and the Livermore Formation are sources of water supplies sufficient for urban, industrial, and agricultural use. Quality of Livermore Valley groundwater varies, but is generally suitable for most uses. Groundwater in the central and southern portions of the Livermore Valley is replenished by percolation from Arroyo Valle and Arroyo Mocho and is of good quality. Groundwater in the northern and eastern Livermore Valley contains substantially higher mineral concentrations than that found in other portions of the Valley. For example, areas of high boron and fluoride concentrations occur in ground 2-14 waters in the northeastern Livermore Valley, north of LLNL and SNLL. The CDWR 2 " 14 subdivided the Livermore Valley groundwater basin into 12 sub-basins based on variations in groundwater occurrence, movement, and quality. The sub-basins appeared to be separated by partial ground water barriers, most of which were believed to be faults. Difficulties in assessing characteristics of the groundwater basin were described together with the uncertainties that 2-14 exist . The eastern Livermore Valley is underlain by water-bearing strata, mostly of alluvial origin. Faults and stratigraphic variations affect the movement of ground water and divide the Livermore 2-62 ■ Valley ground water basin into sub-basins. Ground water recharge occurs in uplands east and southeast of the LLNL-SNLL site. The flow of this groundwater is inferred to be to the northwest, in two fault-defined sub-basins; one of these sub-basins is beneath LLNL. Some of this groundwater ultimately is discharged by seepage at the surface some 3.5 km northwest of the site. The remaining groundwater moves an undetermined distance west of the discharge site. It is not known if this groundwater is ultimately contained in the eastern Livermore Valley or if it flows west into other groundwater sub-basins of the Livermore Valley. Additional details regarding the occurrence and movement of groundwater near the DOE Livermore laboratories are included in Appendix 2D and plans for an additional hydrogeologic study are outlined in Appendix 2B. 2.3.6. Site 300 Hydrology The drainage divide for the coastal ranges in this area is the Diablo Range. Since Site 300 lies on the eastern flank of this range, all of the runoff from the Site flows to the San Joaquin Valley. Most of the Site runoff flows into Corral Hollow Creek. Corral Hollow Creek is an intermittent stream carrying water only in the rainy season, and it flows toward the San Joaquin River. 2.3.7. Meteorol 22Y. 2.3.7.1. General Climate . The Livermore Valley is flat and roughly bowl-shaped, about 21 km long and 7 to 11 km wide, and surrounded by hills that are 300 to 600 m high. The general area has a "Mediterranean scrub woodland" climate 2 " 13 that is characterized by mild, rainy winters (about 380 mm of rain) from October to April and warm, dry summers. Sunshine is abundant throughout the year since the winter rains are of a showery nature. Snow is very rare. Winter storms are a result of migratory low-pressure systems that become detached from the semi -permanent Aleutian Low and move over or north of the area. Following the passage of the migratory low, skies typically clear as the Eastern Pacific High builds inland. Occasionally, under these conditions, strong northerly surface winds with gusts up to 30 m/s are observed for a day or two. The summer is consistently warm and dry. A sea breeze typically develops during the afternoon when modified ocean air moves through the Passes to the west; although the effect upon maximum temperatures is slight, the breeze persists into the early evening and brings cool night-time temperatures. The strength of this sea breeze rarely exceeds 13 m/s in Livermore. The spring and autumn seasons are typically transitional periods when no exceptional meteorological phenomena occur. 2-63 2.3.7.2. Severe Weather . The Livermore Valley rarely experiences severe weather. The greatest recorded daily rainfall is about 90 nun. Thunderstorms occur less than 5 days per year and are not intense; hail occurs even less frequently. Strong winds with gusts to about 30 m/s occur a few times each fall and winter, usually following the passage of a low pressure system. in a study conducted by Smith and Mirabella 2-30 the tornado recurrence interval was estimated to be about 1 per 292,000 yrs or 3 x lO -6 per year. A more recent study by McDonald, Minor, and Mehta 2-31 indicates that extreme winds pose a more significant threat of structural damage in the central California area than do tornados. Since extreme wind probability distributions are based on data from widely scattered weather stations, and because Livermore and Site 300 are less than 32 km apart, the same data were used to develop extreme wind criteria for the two locations. For the Livermore site, McDonald, Minor, and Mehta 2 " 31 defined the extreme wind as 49 m/s based on a mean recurrence interval of 10,000 years. For Site 300, the windspeed criterion is increased by 10 percent to 54 m/s because of the possibility of channeling of the wind through the Site. 2.3.7.3. Air Pollution Potential . Because of its location, surrounded by hills, the Livermore Valley has more days of high photochemical smog levels (oxidant) than most of the other air pollution sampling stations in the San Francisco Bay Area. Such smog is generated from automobile emissions; it is estimated that about one-third of the ambient Livermore smog is imported into the Valley from upwind metropolitan areas. 2.3.7.4. Local Meteorology 2.3.7.4.1. Station Summary . Tables 2-4 and 2-5 are taken from the National Weather Service compilation for Livermore and are based on data observed from 1931 to 1960. As a check on these normals, temperature and precipitation data observed at the County Fire Department about 5.6 km to the west-southwest of the DOE site were tabulated and are shown for 1969-1971 in Table 2-6. The data source was the Climatological Data for California, published monthly by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). It is apparent that these two tables are similar enough that no significant climatic change is obvious. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is similar to the NOAA sub-station in topography, soil type, etc., so that the values in Tables 2-4 and 2-5 may be considered representative of the site. 2.3.7.4.2. wind Direction and Speed . Winds have not been measured at NOAA- s climatological sub-station in Livermore. Wind observations were taken at LLNL for several years by instruments 2-64 SKI MS ■ Table 2-4. Clirnatological temperature summary for Livermore (1931-1960 normal ■ ) No. years Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Auq Sept Oct Nov Dec Annual 30 24 25 27 34 39 43 44 44 46 39 32 26 46 13.6 15.6 17.9 21.4 24.7 28.2 32.0 31.3 30.6 25.6 19.5 14.6 22.9 Mean daily maximum, °C 30 Mean daily, °C 30 7.8 9.4 11.3 13.8 16.6 19.4 22.0 21.6 20.8 17.0 11.9 Mean daily minimum, °C 30 8.6 15.0 2 ' 1 3 ' 3 4 - 7 6 - 3 8.6 10.7 12.1 11.6 11.0 8.4 4.3 2.7 7.2 Lowest, °C 30 -7-5-4-10 4 5 5 Degree days 30 326 249 217 137 74 18 12 -2 -4 -7 -7 7 50 193 302 1572 Number days above 32°C 19 + l Number days below 0°C 19 15 9 4 + 8 17 14 12 58 23 55 a Elevation 166 m (545 ft), latitude 37°39'N, longitude 181°47'W. b + = More than but less than 1. Wind: Calm 24%, W 19%, SW 16%, Table 2-5. Clirnatological precipitation s ummary (nun) for Livermore (1931-1960 normals) .a No. years Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Annual Greatest monthly 30 207 172 129 95 70 15 6 .1 4.1 48 47 151 258 258 Mean monthly 30 77 68 49 29 12 2.5 0, .3 0.5 3.0 15 37 73 31 Greatest daily 30 88 37 51 46 18 10 4. .1 3.8 39 21 78 83 88 No. days 0.3-2.5 mm 30 11 10 9 5 3 + b + + 1 3 6 10 58 No. days 2.5 mm or more No . days 12.7 mm or 7 7 6 4 4 2 + + 1 2 5 31 more 10 2 2 1 1 + + + 1 3 10 Snowfall 30 2.5 TC T T T 2.5 NW 7% E ! e N E at l2% 1 . 166 m (545 "^ l3titUde 37 ° 39 ' N ' l0ngltUdS 181 ° 47 ' W - «-i Cain, 24%, W 19%, SW 16%, + = more than but less than 1, T = trace. 2-65 Table 2-6. 1969-1971 Summary of temperature and precipitation observations at County Fire Department, Livermore, California. Temperature ( °C) Mean maximum Mean minimum Average Absolute maximum Absolute minimum Precipitation (mm) Jan Feb 14.2 16.0 3.0 3.1 8.6 9.6 21 24 -6 -3 Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Annual 19.3 20.4 25.8 27.4 33.4 33.7 32.4 24.8 19.7 14.2 23.4 3.4 4.0 8.4 10.8 11.9 11.4 10.7 6.5 4.3 2.3 6.7 11.4 12.3 17.2 19.1 22.7 22.6 21.6 15.7 12.0 8.3 15.0 42 42 43 37 29 21 43 7 7 3 -2-4-4 -6 28 -6 32 -2 38 2 37 4 108.7 53.1 31.5 25.4 5.8 2.8 0.0 0.0 1.0 13.2 52.3 92.2 388.6 2-66 mounted atop a telephone pole. No maintenance records nor calibration reports of these instruments are available. Furthermore, trees gradually grew up around the pole during the past ten years. Consequently, these measurements are not deemed to be reliable for obtaining a representative wind summary. In 1971, an instrumented 40-m telescoping tower was installed in an open area in the northwest section of the Laboratory. The predominant wind direction throughout the year and especially during the dry season is from the southwest through west. During the wet season, post-frontal anti-cyclonic flow occurs often enough to cause north-northeast and northeast winds of comparable frequency to the southwest through west directions. The most common windspeeds during all seasons are 5 to 7 m/s from the southwest through west. This relatively high speed is caused by channeling of the winds through passes in hills to the west. The wet season winds from the north-northeast and northeast are most common in the 2 to 3 m/s range, but winds of 11 to 16 m/s occur with nearly half that frequency. In general, the strongest winds blow during the wet season from the north-northeast and northeast. Figure 2-17 shows the typical annual average wind pattern for LLNL and SNLL. 2 - 3,7 - 4 - 3 ' atmospheric Stability . The wind records mentioned above were used to estimate Pasquill-Gifford stability categories using the method described by Slade. 2 " 32 In the dry season D and E stabilities are of nearly equal prominence (about 70% combined frequency); during the wet season E stability is observed nearly 40% of the time. A summary of the dry and wet season tables is given in Table 2-7. 2.3.7.4.4. Humidity and Fo g.. Long-term records of humidity and fog are not available in the Livermore Valley. Data summarized by the Weather Bureau 2 ' 33 indicate that heavy fog (visibility less than 0.4 km) occurs on some 27 days per year. The monthly frequency is rather uniform at 2 or 3 days per month, except for 4 days in January and 1 day in March. Radiation fogs are more prevalent in late fall and early winter. High fog (coastal fog that is lifted in passing over the western hills) is prevalent on many spring and summer mornings but rarely reaches the ground in the vicinity of the LLNL site. 2 ' 3,7 ' 5 ' °"- Si te Meteorological Measurements Program . The Livermore site maintains a meteorological program for rapidly assessing critical meteorological parameters that may be used to estimate potential doses to individuals in the off-site environment in the event of an accidental release of hazardous materials into the atmosphere. (The meteorological measurements program provides input to the ARAC system described in paragraph 2.2.2.6). The program includes meteorological instrumentation 2-67 Metres/sec %\ 0.2-3 7.1-11 icalms/ > 16 3.1-7 11.1-16 5 1 . . l 1 1 10 ± 15 20 Percent frequency Figure 2-17. Annual wind rose for LLNL and SNLL. Length of line shows percent frequency (4.4% calm). 2-68 Table 2-7. Summary of wind frequency tables by stability categories. a Category Dry season Most frequent direction Frequency (%) Speed (m/s) Least frequent direction Frequency (%) Speed (m/s) Highest avg speed (m/s) Direction Frequency Lowest avg speed (m/s) Direction Frequency Wet season wsw, w WSW, i W WSW, W SW, WSW SW, WSW SW ~34 3 -48 3 ~55 4 -62 5 -57 5 29 5 ESE,SE, SSE SE, SSE ESE, SE SE,NW SE SSE 5 2 ~3 1-2 ~2 2 -2 3-4 <1 4 3 3 WNW,NW 7-9 4 WNW 7 5 N 4 8 NNW 2 10 NNW 3 8 NNW 10 2 s 7 2 SSE 2 2 SE 1 2 S 1 2 E 1 SSE Most frequent direction N Frequency (%) 9 Speed (m/s) 2 Least frequent direction ESE Frequency (%) 3 Speed (m/s) 2 Highest avg speed (m/s) 3 Direction NW Frequency (%) 5 Lowest avg speed (m/s) 2 Direction ESE Frequency (%) 3 E 11 3 WSW, -25 4 ,W WSW,W -28 5 WSW, -32 5-6 ,W E 15 6 ssw 4 3 N 2 4 NNW 2 3 NNW 1 4 NW <1 2 -3 WSW, ~28 W,WNW 4 WSW 12 5 WSW 14 7 NNE 4 12 NNE 9 2 SE,SSE -9 3 SSW, 3-4 NNW 3 SSE 2 3 ESE, 8 SE 2 NNW 1 a Values rounded to nearest whole number. A = Extremely unstable conditions. B = Moderately unstable conditions. C = Slightly unstable conditions. D = Neutral conditions (applicable to heavy overcast, day or night) conditions. F = Moderately stable conditions. E = Slightly stable 2-69 „e,r the H»*. north p.rfa»ter and . the southwest corner of the SNU. property, where the measurements accurately »pc M «n« the overall .net.orolopy .nd are not influenced by buildin, ltnctttB . The fa.tn-.tt are attached tc ,0- telescoping towers, .easurements cf wind direction and speed and temperature ate recorded at both 1. and ,0 .. « LLNL teiperatures ate also measured at 2 . and the temperature differential between 2 . and 40 . is recorded. The sensors consist of a Litf.t-1** Cli.et bivane for measuring horizontal and vertical wind direction fluctuations within accuracies of ♦*> and ±1° respectively, and a cup anenometer for measuring the wind speed to an accuracy of 67 -/. above the 220 »/s threshold speed. fa, addition. . thermistor temperature sensor is placed in a wind-aspirated shield to prevent exposure of the sensor t, direct solar radiation and to prevent air from stagnating about the thermistor. Ambient .^- n ,°^ „i.h t-hi. tvre of sensor. The associated electronics temperatures may be measured to within 0.2 C with this type for processing the data from LLHL. Site 300 ,2.3.7.6,. and SNL.L are located in a building near the UML tower. Both standard chart records and digital (magnetic ttpe) data are currently used for recording. The sensors are replaced with serviced and recalibrated units every si, months to ensure reliable operation. 2 , 7.6. ^t^losx^iteJOO. LL»L has operated , cytologic,! observation station at Site 200 for many years. « the present time, this station measures and records surface temperature, pressure, humidity, and precipitation. Wind speed and direction and temperature data for Site 300 are collected , ► a a <- this station The tower is instrumented at a height of 20 m from a meteorological tower located at this station. with sensors described in 2.3.7.5. The mean annual precipitation is about 200 -. although wide variation occurs f.» year to year. „ost of the precipitation falls between the months of etcher and April in the form of rain, although a light dusting Of snow can occur on the coldest days. Localized thunderstorms with the threat of lightning are influent. Maximum temperatures in the winter months, November to February, average around 13°C. During these months, the minimum temperatures are never much below the freezrng U..1. relative humidity is about OS to 00, at night, decreasing t, 60 or 70, during the afternoon. Winds are predominantly from the west and average about 5 to 7 m/s in the winter months. The dry season extends frc «ay through Septemh.r. uptime temperatures in the high ,.-. and low „.. are common in the middle of the summer. The relative humidity ranges from about 30 to 50. in the driest part of the year in the fall, persistent westerly winds are characteristic of this are, fro. moderately stron, winds in the afternoon and evening. 2-70 2.3.8. Biotic Species at SNLL and LLNL The biological features of the area occupied by SNLL and LLNL have been examined at length. The plants, mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, arachnids, and crustaceans identified on the site are listed in Appendix 2E. 2.3.9. Biotic Species at Site 300 The Site 300 area is primarily a grassland community. The topography of the Site consists of moderate to steep hillside slopes covered with various annual grasses. Many biotic species favor this community. Insects such as spiders, beetles, grasshoppers, and crickets abound in the area. Mammals in the community are represented by many species of rodents such as mice, gophers, and squirrels which feed on the plants of the qrassland and on the insects. Rabbits feed exclusively on the plant vegetation and deer browse throughout the area. Several varieties of lizards inhabit the area, feeding primarily on insects. Several types of snakes are also common, feeding on small mammals, birds and their eggs, lizards, and other snakes. Other predatory species such as the badger, fox, and coyote search for prey in this community. A listing of plants and animals observed at Site 300 is shown in Appendix 2E. The grassland habitat shows a limited resident bird population due to the lack of shelter from predators. However, the area is important to many species of birds which, though roosting and nesting elsewhere, are dependent on the abundant supply of seeds and insects. The grassland also provides a suitable hunting ground for birds of the Raptores Order which include rodents and small birds in their diet. In 1975 approximately 100 acres of land on the east side of Site 300 was released as surplus property and deeded to the California Department of Fish and Game for use as a wildlife preserve. Site 300 is thought to be the only natural location for a rare species of wildflower, Amsinckia grandiflora . The plant, which grows to a height of about 25 cm, was first discovered in the 1880s and was thought to be extinct until a patch was discovered at the Corral Hollow site in 1938. The area is presently roped off. The plant appears to meet the criteria to place it on the endangered species list according to the Endangered Species Act of 1973. As required by the Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is considering establishing an area at Site 300 as Critical Habitat for this plant. A survey was conducted by an independent consultant (EG&G) to investigate the occurrence and status of endangered plants and animals (such as the San Joaquin Kit Fox) at Site 300. This study showed no new populations of Amsinckia grandiflora and no evidence that LLNL activities were impacting adversely on the known population of the species. There was also no evidence that the San Joaquin Kit Fox is present at Site 300. A report of this investigation is contained in Appendix 2E. 2-71 2.3.10. Archaeological and Histori cal Sites „ archaeological reconnaissance of the Liver.ore site .as conducted by tb. Archaeological Consulting .». Research Services of Mill Valley. California. It indicated no evidence of archaeological resources on either d. LL„L - the S„LL properties. Inspection of the arch.eologica! records on file .UK th. Archaeological Research Facility of the Oniversity of California at Berkeley, and the records on file with the Laboratory of Archaeological Research at San Francisco State University, revealed no previously recorded archaeological sites in the are, occupied by the Laboratories. w -i~,i,-=i eitoe has ever been noted at LLNL or SNLL, While no surface visible evidence of archaeological sites and none ... found during excavation, the possibility of buried or otherwise obscured re.ain. is always present. If any future land .edification should show any such evidence. Federal law ,the fl „ti q uities Act of 1,06. as ..ended, rehires that it be reported to the Secretary of the Interior so that appropriate steps can be taken to preserve the values so encountered. , Class III cultural resources inventory was performed at Site 300 (appendix «. Twenty-four cultural resource properties and twenty-five site types were located and recorded. Of the properties three are prehistoric. 2 historic, and one is both prehistoric and historic, sistoric petroglyphs and structures are the most frequent site types. T he .aiority of the sites are of low significance. Four of the sites are potential resources for ,„ n( fi„„ n f motoric Preservation is currently the National Register of Historic Places. The California Office of Historic evaluating these sites. 2.3.11. Radiological Backgrou nd Characteristics The radiological backhand at the Liver.ore site is predominately deter.ined by the activity lev ,ls of naturally occurrin, uraniu.. thoriu.. and potassiu. in the soil. Table « shows the natural radionuclide content o, soils collected in a relatively undisturbed section of open land in the northeast portion of the LLHL site. Sa.ple locations are shown in ,i 9 . ,-18. Terrestrial ,— p-^™ « r-n 7 uR/h. with a median of 5.8 radiation exposure rates derived from the analyses vary fro. 5 to 7 UR/h. „ R/h . An exposure rate range of 3 to 7 UR/h was observed in a survey in the off-site vicinity. 2 "" »t present, the exposure rate fro. l "», the principal global fallout natural terrestrial sources. The inferred local radiation exposure rate fro. cos.ic rays is esti.ated to be 3.8 UR/h, based on an average site elevation of 1.2 . and usin, the data of Lowder and 2-72 s Drainage ditch 468 456 444 432 355 467 455 443 431 ; rw • • 356 359 475 J I 466 454 442 430 365 441 429 / *— Compsite sand-blasting pad sample 362 Figure 2-18. Locations of on-site soil sampling. 2-73 Table 2-8. Naturally occurring radionuclides in LLNL soils. Activity (pCi/g) Location 238 Uranium 232 Tnc ir ium 40 Potassium 436 0.52 0.69 12.7 437 0.57 0.71 13.6 438 0.55 0.67 11.9 439 0.65 0.68 14.3 440 0.41 0.71 13.6 448 0.85 0.77 15.2 449 0.60 1.07 12.5 450 0.79 0.99 13.3 451 0.73 1.00 12.6 452 0.65 0.80 11.8 Average 0.63 0.81 13.2 Maximum 0.85 1.07 15.2 Minimum 0.41 0.67 11.8 a Exoosure rates in uR/h at 1 m above the ground can be calculi) J from these activities using the conversion factor derived by Beck 2-34 : 238 + daughters 1.82 (yR/h)/(pCi/g) 232 Tn + daughters 2.82 (yR/h)/ (pCi/g) 40 K 0.179 (yR/h)/(pCi/g) 2-74 2-36 Beck, who relate cosmic radiation with elevation. The median total exposure rate (terrestrial plus cosmic) thus is 9.7 P R/h, comparable to a median value of 9.4 pR/h observed in a survey of environmental radiation backgrounds in the Unit&d States. 2 " 37 With few exceptions, contributions of DOE operations to radiological soil contamination are below the limit of detection of field survey instrumentation. However, at LLNL a number of minor incidents involving radioactivity have occurred during the past 25 years that have resulted in local on-site surface contamination. Contaminated material in these areas, either pavement or exposed soil, was usually dug up, packaged in steel drums, and disposed of as contaminated waste. Since the areas were either known or suspected to contain traces of residual contamination, the locations were paved to eliminate the possible spread of contamination. The total area so treated was about 300 m 2 and involved less than 0.1 M Ci of plutonium. These areas are also identified in Fig. 2-18. Plutonium and americium contamination has been found in a few soil samples collected on-site east of the LLNL waste disposal area. The locations are shown in Fig. 2-18 and the activity levels for the respective samples are shown in Tables 2-8 and 2-9. The source of contamination is probably due to local radiation incidents connected with the solar evaporators used in volume reduction of intermediate-level liquid waste. These evaporators are no longer used for radioactive waste. 2.3.12. Aerial Radiation Surv ex During the summer of 1975 an aerial radiation survey was conducted over the LLNL and SNLL sites and at Site 300. This survey was performed for DOE by EG & G, Inc., 2 " 38 utilizing the EG*G Aerial Radiological Measuring System (ARMS). The survey employed an array of 40 Nal(Tl) scintillation detectors, 127 mm in diameter by 51 mm thick, mounted externally on a helicopter platform. Surveys were conducted at an elevation of 45 m at air speeds of approximately 30 m/s. Flight lines were flown visually with the aid of aerial photographs taken just prior to the radiation survey. The results of the survey were presented in the form of radiation isopleths plotted over photographs of the respective areas. Eleven areas within the LLNL and SNLL Complex were found to have radiation levels above background. The source of elevated radioactivity in each of these locations is shown in Table 2-10. None of these represent a radiation hazard to workers in the area. At Site 300 elevated activity levels were detected in the vicinity of three of the high-explosive firing tables. These levels are due to depleted uranium (a byproduct of 235 u enrichment) used in experiments at the Site. Data obtained from the fly-over confirm the results of annual soil sampling, namely, that shot debris is restricted to within 500 . of the bunkers. The levels ranged from the normal background of 0.1 pR/hr to 0.5 pR/hr. 2-75 Table 2-9. Plutonium content of soils collected at locations shown in Fig. 2-18. Sample No. Activity (yCi/g) 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 No sample at this location 9.18 x 10 8.65 x 10' + 27% + 24% No sample at this location 1.13 x 10~ 7 + 23% 2.05 x 10~ 7 + 13% 2.86 x 10" 8 + 12% 6.12 x 10~ 8 + 12% 3.00 x 10~ 8 + 17% 1.15 x 10 -8 + 19% 5.36 x 10~ 9 + 26% 1.22 x 10~ 8 + 18% 5.32 x 10" 9 + 24% 1.29 x 10 -8 + 13% 1.09 x 10 + 14% 1.17 x 10~ 7 + 13% 3.26 x 10" 8 + 23% 1.12 x 10~ 7 + 16% 1.56 x 10~ 8 + 15% 1.93 x 10" 8 + 7% 1.67 x 10" 8 ± 16% 1.04 x 10" 8 + 21% 2.16 x 10" 8 + 16% 3.28 x 10~ 9 + 40% 1.26 x 10" 8 + 20% 9.19 x 10~ 9 + 24% 3.73 x 10" 8 + 12% 4.41 x 10" 8 + 16% 1.74 x 10 -7 + 12% 1.30 x 10" 7 + 12% 1.96 x 10" 8 + 13% b 1.18 x 10 -8 + 13% 1.91 x 10" 8 + 32% 1.05 x 10" 8 + 32% 1.22 x 10 -9 + 42% 5.59 x 10" 9 + 33% 6.13 x 10" 9 + 24% 4.03 x 10" 8 + 11% 3.92 x 10" 7 + 10% 1.17 x 10" 6 + 6.4% 1.38 x 10" 8 + 16% 2-76 ':: 2-2, 2-3. 2-4. 2-5. 2-6. 2-7 2-8 2-9 2-10 2-11 2-12. =„* t h White, rmrirnnmrn'-^ 1 gfonitoring at the W J. Silver, C. L. Lindeken, A. Conover , and J. B. White r- ore Laborator^l^i^nnoaL^ort, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermor e Laboratory — l*±2 Livermore, CA, gCRL-50027-78 (1979). , L cate, „.. «• -Von,, ana 0. w. -PP.., ,^^^^^^Ii^^^^ SB ^ $sii ^ ill ^S^^. -rence Livermore »tW -.oratory. Livermore. ». UCRL-81954 (1979). E . P. B.ray ana P. «. Krey. -Determining the ^cumul.tea — * - «— «~ * — c,m.pv«,.mi. held at Los A lamos Scientific Samplin, ana Analysis,- Proceedln ag ^_the Plutgug . W» -— ^^^,^^71. los U— ««— — ■ - — ' "• "-" M U971) - C ». ao h „son. P. P. —11. - «■ C ~ ^^ " 8 ,1 " 6, • ». A. Bayaen. -Si,e Praotlonatlon Hetboas-Measur in, Plutonium in BespiraBle .St,- S_^a 202, 753 (1978). 7. «.. — - - «ast »„,. or California.- in -^0-*^^' * . Bailey. Ed.. California Division of »in.s ana Colony. Bulletin 190 W. E ' „ fciIw . „. C. BlaKe. «.. ana 0. L. aones. "Character ana Significance of the politic crest that Porms the Basis of the Cre.t valiey Seance in western California.- in «- • , w «l 2 No 2 (Geological Society of America, 1970), pp. wm ^rograms (Cocdi Ueran_SectiotO, Vol. 2, No. 2 (^ C Q__ g Q «» California Division of Mines, Bulletin A . s. Huey, c.oAogy^tJie^^ California 140 (1948). nA r M wentworth, "Faults and Future Earthquakes, d t Hellev. K. R. Lauoie, and C. M. nenwoiun . R. L. Wesson, B. J. He l ley, r. «• j • ~ n=,w R^aion R. D. Borcherdt, Ed., u. S. in § tuaie^or_j*is J! c^on^^ Geological Survey Prof. Paper Ml-* (1975). PP. 5-30. ' County. California.- in A^tr^t^i^^^a^^-^, -logical Society of Africa 75th Annual Meeting, San Jose. CA (1979). pp. 65-66. L „. «,«. 5Jis ^^a^H-o^^^^ Site. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Livedo. CA. DCBL-5159, ,1974, . "ornia Department of Water Pesoarces. (^r^u^i^-^^^ ^^ COWP Bulletin 11»-, Appenai, A, Ceolooy (State of Californra, Phe Besources Agency, Sacramento, CA, 1966). 2-80 2-13 2-14. 2-15. 2-16. 2-17. 2-18. 2-19. 2-20. 2-21. 2-22. 2-23. 2-24. John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., Investigation of Faulting at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory , report to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., San Francisco, CA (1972). California Department of Water Resources, Evaluation of Ground Water Resources. Livermore and Sunol Valleys , CDWR Bulletin 118-2, Geology (State of California, The Resources Agency, Sacramento, CA, 1974) . Alameda County Planning Department, Draft Environmental Impact Report, Livermore-Amador Valley Quarry Reclamation plan (Alameda County Planning Department, Hayward, CA, 1979) . D ' G * Herd ' Geologic Map of the Las Positas, Greenville and Verona Faults, Eastern Alameda County, CA, u. S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 77-689 (1977). R. S. Cockerham, F. w. Lester, and W. L. Ellsworth, A Preliminary Report on the Livermore Valley Earthquake Sequen ce, Januar y 24-Februarv 26. 1980 . u. S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 80-714 (1980) . J. E. Slosson, State of California Spe cial Studies Zones, Dublin Quadrangle . California Division of Mines and Geology, unnumbered map, scale 1:24,000 (1974). URS/John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., Seismic and Geologic Investigations of the Sandia Livermore Laboratory Site and Structural Investigations of the Tritium Research Facility . report to Sandia Laboratories-Livermore by URS/John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., San Francisco, CA (1978) . D. W. Carpenter, K. R. Puchlik, A. L. Ramirez, J. L. Wagoner, K. D. Knouss, and P. w. Kasameyer, Status Report on the Ge ology of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site and Adjacent Areas , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-53065 (1980). M. G. Bonilla, J. J. Lienkaemper, and J. c. Tinsley, Surface Faulting near Livermore. California, Associated wi th th e January 1980 Earthquakes , u. S. Geological Survey Open-File Report 80-523 (1980). F. J. Tokarz and G. Shaw, Seismic Saf ety of the LLL Plutonium Facility (Bldg . 332) . Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-52786 (1980). S. Rice, E. Stephens, and C. Real, Geologic Evaluation of the General Electric Test Reactor Site f Vallecitos, Alameda County, Californi a, California Division of Mines and Geology, Special Publication 56 (1979) . California Department of Water Resources, Reevaluate of Seismic Hazards for Clifton Court Forebay, Bethany Dams and R eservoir, Patterson Reservoir, Del Valle Dam and Lake Del Valle (State of California, The Resources Agency, Sacramento, CA, 1979). 2-81 2-25. 2-26. 2-27 . 2-28. 2-29. 2-30. 2-31. 2-32. 2-33. 2-34. 2-35 2-36 2-37. 2-38 T. L. Youd and S. N. Hoose, Historic Groun d Failures in Northern California Triggered by Earthquakes , U. S. Geological Survey Prof. Paper 993 (1978). D. L. Bernreuter and F. J. Tokarz, Design Basis Earthquakes for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-51193 (1972). John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., Plutonium Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory-Geologic. Seismolooic and Foundation Investiga tion, report to Maker and Martens, Architects, by John A. Blume and Associates, Inc., San Francisco, CA (1971). N. M. Newmark, J. A. Blume, and K. K. Kaput, "Seismic Design Spectra for Nuclear Power Plants," J. Power Division. Proc. ASCE 99 (P02) , pp. 287-303 (1973). D. M. Boore and R. A. Page, Accelerations N e ar Faults That Have Moved Through Moderate-Sized Earthquakes , U. S. Geological Survey Open-File Report (1972). T. B. Smith and V. A. Mirabella, characteristics of California Tornadoes, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-13533 (1972). j. R. McDonald, J. E. Minor, and K. C. Mehta, Development of a Design Basis Tornado and structural Design Criteria for La w rence Livermore Laboratory's Site 300, California , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-13667 (1975). D. H. Slade, Ed., Meteorology and Atomic Energy (U.S. Atomic Energy Commission/Division of Technical Information, 1968). Also available as TID-24190 from Clearing House for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, National Bureau of Standards, U. S. Dent, of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22151. U. S. weather Bureau, Expected Meteorol o gical Conditions for the Livermore Research Laboratory of th e AEC (U. S. Weather Bureau Scientific Service Division, Washington, D. C. , 1952). H. L. Beck, J. Decamp, and C. Gogolak, Tn-Situ Ge(Li) and Nal(TL) Gamma-Ray Spectrometry , U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, HASL-258 (1972). C. L. Lindeken, P. H. Gudiksen, J. W. Meadows, K. O. Hamby, and L. R. Anspaugh, Environmental Levels of Radioactivity in Livermore Valley Soils , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-74424 (1973). W. M. Lowder and H. L. Beck, "Cosmic-Ray Ionization in the Lower Atmosphere," J. Geo. Phys. Res. 71 , 4611 (1966). C. L. Lindeken, K. R. Peterson, D. E. Jones, and R. E. McMillen, Geogra phical Variations in Environmental Radiation Background in the Uni ted States, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-73822 (1972). »n SarUl Radiologic^ ^v of the Lawrence T.ivernor e Laboratory, EG.G, EGC-1182-1693 (1975) 2-82 liMV; ^p 3. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 3.1. INTRODUCTION Chapter 3 of the DEIS has been updated and revised in response to review and comment by federal, state, and municipal agencies and by private citizens. Major changes are: • Section 3.5.3, Chemical Waste Management, has been expanded to include more information regarding the disposal of environmentally hazardous chemical wastes. • Section 3.7, Health and Safety Aspects of Livermore Operations, now contains information on the radiological impact of Livermore site operations on employees, on local water supplies, and on agricultural crops. A 5-year data base has been included to provide the reader with a means for evaluating past radioactive effluent releases. • Section 3.9, Accident Analysis, contains added information on the number and mode of radioactive shipments in and out of the Livermore site. The methodology employed in estimating radiation dose is also outlined. 3.2. PAST, CURRENT, AND FUTURE LAND USE The major environmental impact to the Livermore property occurred during World War II when this general farming and cattle-grazing property was converted to a Naval air station (see 2.1.2). Construction of landing strips and the addition of streets and buildings completely altered the property so that it was no longer suitable for farming or cattle grazing. The past, current, and future land use for the Livermore site is described in sections 2.1.6 and 2.1.7. The use of the land is about the same as for the air base in that buildings, concrete, and asphalt will continue to prevent its use for general farming and cattle grazing. The major present environmental impact of the DOE Livermore laboratories is from the approximate total of 8000 employees and their utilization of natural resources, energy and effects on the nearby community. This is discussed in section 4. At Site 300, prior land use was sheep and cattle grazing since the land was generally too hilly for cultivation. Because of the size of the Site and the distance between high explosive test areas, DOE's impact due to construction and land use is small. Operations at Site 300 in terms of future land use depend on requirements of the weapons program. In 1973 approximately 100 acres on the east side of Site 300 was declared excess property. This property was subsequently transferred to the California Department of Fish and Game for use as an 3-1 ^^ res.rve. K iOb - — ■ . -— — »as - - — '- « -— *. «— - -. » — -~ — ' - - at a no " in ; e^ii Qamoles were also collected , „„ r f a hiP S nrvev instrument. Soil samples were meter above the soil surfaces using a portable survey a „ d ^ *>, — . - — — — ' ~~ " hl ° h v " led £r °" ^ t0 " „ R/ h were ^ of n.t«.l »**— -i*«- — -"" '" thU — Llke "' Se ^ uR/h, were ty P observed in northern California. 3.3. RESOURCES AND ENERGY 3.3.1. Water Use , of potable water fez the Li.errore site-both LLNL and SHL^-i. obtained fro. The primary supply of potable water th . clty o£ B „ ^noisco. B .tch- H .tchy ..be, ««. - — - - - «— * ^ purposes, a. fo, fit. protection. « U Pb-Pe- oat of the B .tch- H etchy Coast „ tanne at hi^i. it is delivered under gravity flow via a 25-cm, Mocho Shaft into two standpipe tanks, from which it , v,,ii ar- the south end of tne banaia 10-km-long pipeline to three water storage tanks located on a hill ov.matelv 4 92 m 3 per minute. Water storage capacity in Livermore site. Delivery capacity is approximately 4.92 P ,„3 3 the three tanks is 4.6 x 10 m . „ 8t er is dieted fro. the .bob.,, banbs by --I* and «*— "< * "» - s „ ala _ via . ^^ ^ ,b» .ate. wibh .ains on .ost streets within the — .„.. o£ the two aitea. .stribubion .ains ate ,0-3, - * «— . - — " ^ ^ at .oat intentions. *- «• -ate. throat th. syst.. ab a „ ^. " ";„ addition to the ,tch-,tchy -at.r .^, an „cy supply U — - - ' - * R l»eda County „-. 0— - — —«— — « - — - —~ "^ . , ■ .„ n,. alba water distribution syste. by a pu.pind water fro. the zone 7 syste. can be delivered into the pl a„t which is connected to the zona , .ain at th. north boundary of the biver»re Site. P „ater consumption has always shown a wide seasonal variation. „. ..nibude of th.se Chan,, a , ,. 3 ■ creates! waber use occurs in duly or Au,ust (irrigation, and the lowest us. December, January, and February. me peak of near 125,000 m 3 per month during the summer. , of water increased with the growth at the Livermore site until 1969, The total annual use of water increase 3-2 4.0 E o 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 - 1.5 1.0 J_ J0JAJ0JAJ0JAJ0J 1973 1974 1975 1976 AJOJAJOJAJOJ 1977 1978- 1979 Figure 3-1. Seasonal water consumption by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL. 230 220 1 210 J- 200 —> ~ 190 tu 3 180 0) I 170 3 160 £ 150 LU 140f- 130 L 1 JOJAJOJAJOJAJ OJAJOJAJOJAJOJ 1973 197 4 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Figure 3-2. Seasonal use of electrical power by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL. 3-3 LI x 10 6 m\ 0.3% of the average Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct annual flow) even though the population less, in recent years, water use has s ,„6 3 tabilized at about 1.0 x 10 m , 3.3.2. Electrical Energy Use Power .t 115 » is delivered to u. by Pacific G.s .„d Electric Comp.ny through two overhe.d tr.nsmission lines. Power at U.I » U delivered to SHI* f» ^ through - ai stribution lines. The electrical power consumption of th. biver.ore site ,re. e.ch ye.r between ig 64 and L„a. T„e use of electrical power .ore than tripled over that .-year span even though the sustained population growth .as less than 10,. The sur g , of increased power consumption is partly ...ributed to bringing on-.ine new buildings and adding increments to existing bui.dings. « the s.me ,_. signified power increases occurred due to the magnes.ic Fusion Power and laser progr.ms. Poilo.in, the energy conservation progr.ms inititat.d by OOP in t„. U.t „.!< of ,«,. eiectric.l power u se decreased in 1,7. (see «,. 3-2). Conservation efforts nave continued to act as , damper on power consumption, however, the addition of new building areas and the electrical energy retirements of new and existing programs increased the electrical power in 1978. 3.3.3. Fuel Use 3 3 3 1 S£S!! r S l_g S .. -rural gas, supplied by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company, is used to heat «„st of the fundings at u. and SILL as well as supplying fuel for shop eguipment and special research operations. K.tur.l gas use at W and mU. has generally followed , pattern of growth year by year as the sumber of fundings and sguare feet of occupancy have increased. Xn 1,7,. a decrease in natural gas usage was accomplished as , direct result of energy conservation measures and mild winter weather ,see „,. 3-3,. installation of automatic controls on building heating, ventilation, and air conditioning o „„,riv offset the additional heating load of new systems and continued energy conservation measures nearly offset building areas occupied in 1979. « HHb .tout 7, of the natural gas usage ,for the computer facilities and advent buildings, is proved by Pacific Gas and Electric on a noninterrupt.hle basis. The balance of lb»E and .11 of SE.u .re sublet to natural gas curtailment during periods of high demand, proximately IS, ,16 of 1... of the g.s fired boilers .t UML .nd S„bL have been eguipped for burning either propane or ». 2 fuel oil during periods of interrupted gas service. T o provide heating during periods of interrupted service for n.tur.l gas, some of the boilers at both VM. and S„l, have been eguipped for burning either propane or No. 2 fuel oil. 3-4 5.0 . curtailment of natural gas during unusually coal weather. 3-5 3.3.3.2. Propane Gas . At LLNL a propane-air plant delivers propane-air mixed gas into the site gas distribution system during natural gas curtailment periods. The existing plant capacity of 1.6 m 3 /s of mixed gas is adequate for supplying those buildings where dual fuel capability is impractical. The total propane storage capacity of 220 m 3 at Building 622 and 680 m 3 at Camp Parks will take care of the LLNL site for about 25 days on a curtailment basis. (See Fig. 3-4 for propane use by LLNL.) The LLNL propane-air supply does not extend to SNLL. 3.3.3.3. Oil. Approximately 600 m 3 of heating oil can be stored by LLNL (including 223 m 3 at Site 300) and about 640 m 3 by SNLL. At present, most of the storage capacity is in above-ground tankage. The largest tank, with a capacity of about 570 m\ is located at SNLL. An earth berm surrounds this tank to contain unexpected oil spills. Use is being made of mobile tankers for fuel oil storage at several buildings at LLNL.. Future plans call for installation of underground tanks at these locations and for new construction. Figures 3-5 and 3-6 show the amounts of fuel oil used for building heat and for equipment usage respectively. 3.3.3.4. Gasoline . Figure 3-7 shows the use of gasoline at DOE's Livermore site for the period 1973 through 1979. The use of increased gasoline can relate to the increased number of employees; more employees will use more taxi service, outside travel, and more trucks for equipment movement. Although the amount of gasoline used has increased, the energy conservation program has proved effective in minimizing this increase. The motor pool has planned the use of small nonhighway type electric and gasoline vehicles, reserving the larger sedans for off-site trips whenever possible. In addition, the large on-site use of bicycles conserves gasoline. 3.3.3.5. jet Fuel . Jet fuel is used by the turbo-prop plane leased by LLNL for flights to the Nevada Test Site (NTS). The plane makes two flights a day; however, if there is a special project at NTS, additional flights might be made. The fuel usage is shown in Fig. 3-8. The fluctuations occur as a function of activity at NTS, the weather, and the downtime of the aircraft. 3.4. CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES 3.4.1. Environmental Impact The environmental impact of construction is considered from the standpoint of land use, community effects, and commitment of resources. Several major construction projects have been completed at the 3-6 650 600 400* tu 350 <0 J 3" 300 ) E 0) en ID to 3 250 5 200 i i r 150 100 Sanciia began use of fuel oil ^r JOJAJOJAJ 0JAJ0JAJ0J AJOJAJOJ 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Figure 3-5. Seasonal use of fuel oil by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL. High oil consumption in the first quarter of 1977 was due to Pacific Gas & Electric' s curtailment of natural gas during unusually cold weather. 50 40 30 - 20 Q 10 i i r JOJAJOJAJOJAJOJAJOJAJOJAJOJ 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Figure 3-6. Seasonal use of diesel fuel by LLNL and Site 300 for owned equipment 3-7 400 r 390 - i i i i i i r i i i i i I m i i > i I I ' 1 1 1 380 - 370 - 360 350 340 -C 330 S 320 - "0 E 310 - CD — £ 300 £ 290 — o J 280 - ~| 270 — 260 - 250 - 240 jO AJOJAJ JAJOJAJOJAJOJA 1S 73 19 74 1£ 175 19 76 1977 1978 1979 Figure 3-7. Seasonal use of gasoline by LLNL, Site 300, and SNLL. 220 200 180 160 140 |" 120 100 80 OJAJOJAJOJAJOJ JOJAJOJAJOJAJ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1973 1974 1975 Figure 3-8. Seasonal use of jet fuel by LLNL. 3-8 Livermore site in recent years. Accordingly, it is possible to evaluate these activities in the light of present-day concern on the part of the public. 3.4.2. Land Use At LLNL the construction now underway, or planned for the future, uses the present site, which has been committed to government use for over 30 years. Sandia's purchase of land in 1970 and 1979 may be repeated in the future as operational requirements dictate. In new construction at either LLNL or SNLL, siting is carefully considered to assure that such construction does not result in destruction of trees or native plants. Consideration is given to erosion control and site drainage. All construction includes funds for landscaping. As a result of grading for the air field by the Navy in World War II, the LLNL site is reasonably level. Consequently, there are no natural hills that must be cut down in preparation for construction. Certain buildings require substantial excavation to provide for either underground earth shielding or basement facilities. Soil that is not required for backfill is moved to one of several soil stockpile areas on site. A survey (section 2.3.10) showed no evidence of archaeological resources on the Livermore site that might be destroyed by construction. 3.4.3. Community Effects The construction activities at the DOE Livermore laboratories take place in secured areas not used by the public. Excavated soil is used on site so the community is not exposed to the noise and dust caused by trucking this soil to off-site disposal areas. At LLNL, the trees along the western perimeter act as a sight barrier. Also, the agricultural lands on the west and north act as space barriers. Since construction is all on site, all residents in the vicinity have full access to their properties. Construction at the Livermore site causes heavier traffic on city streets, particularly East Avenue. On any given day of the work week, there may be up to 200 construction contractor personnel on the site. Since there are about 2500 DOE operating contractor employee cars in the parking lots on any work day, construction employees account for less than a 10% maximum increase in traffic. Major construction jobs are awarded through open bid; however, most of the subcontractors are from the Bay Area with approximately 20% coming directly from the Livermore Valley area. 3-9 3.4.4. Commitment of Resources Materials used in construction represent irretrievable commitment of resources (see Section 8). Competition for materials used in new construction has little local impact on residential construction. Lumber, which is the prime material in residential construction, is not used to a great extent in DOE construction. Construction projects are competing for concrete and steel, but no construction at Livermore enjoys any priority in material procurement. 3.5. WASTE MANAGEMENT Waste management at the DOE Livermore laboratories includes the following categories: • Radioactivt waste. • Sanitary waste. • Chemical waste. • Excess properties, salvage, and reclamation. • Nonhazardous waste landfill. 3.5.1. Radioactive Waste Management Unlike a production facility, the varied research programs at LLNL and SNLL produce a continually changing amount and type of radioactive waste. Compaction and packaging of SNLL radioactive wastes are performed in Building 969. Radioactive wastes are shipped to NTS for disposal and chemical wastes are collected by a commercial waste disposal firm. The subparagraphs that follow describe LLNL procedures, but apply equally to SNLL with respect to material collection. Collection of Radioactive Solid Waste . Operations in a glove box produce contaminated articles such as laboratory glassware, transfer containers, small equipment, absorbent paper, rubber gloves, etc. These items are placed in an uncontaminated secondary container within the box. All such containers are removed from the box by bagging the container in plastic (bagging out). The plastic-bagged items are placed in covered, metal containers (garbage cans), which are lined with a plastic bag and a paper inner bag. Radioactive solid waste generated in areas other than glove boxes is placed directly in the metal waste containers: . When a contaminated waste collector is full, the plastic bag is sealed and placed in a covered metal drum. 3-10 • The filled drums are transferred to the solid waste disposal facility (Building 612) where the contaminated waste is compacted in drums using a hydraulic press. • Drums containing quantities of transuranium nuclides in which the specific activity of the drum contents exceed 10 nCi/g are accumulated for transfer to NTS for long-term retrievable (above-ground) storage. Drums containing waste in the nonretrievable category (<10 nCi/g) are transferred periodically to a land burial site at NTS. Radioactive, Liquid Waste in a Building with a Retention-Tank System . Paths for these liquid wastes are as follows: • Laboratory sinks, lavatories, janitors' sinks, and floor sumps drain to retention tanks outside the building. This system helps prevent the inadvertent release of radioactivity to the sanitary sewer. • When a tank is full, drainage from the building is switched to another tank and a sample is withdrawn from the filled tank and analyzed for radioactivity. • If the activity is below standards set by DOE Order 5480. 1A and is considered to be as low as practicable, the liquid waste is released to the sanitary sewer. • If the activity exceeds these criteria, the liquid waste is transferred to a portable tank and moved to the waste treatment area. The liquid waste is either added to a holding tank to await normal decontamination treatment, or it is segregated and decontaminated individually by a method appropriate for the radionuclides present. Radioactive Liquid Waste in Carboys . Paths for these liquid wastes are as follows: • Dilutions, rinses, excess solution, etc. are collected in a glass or plastic carboy protected by a metal secondary container, located in the work area. • When a carboy is nearly full, it is loosely capped and moved outside the building to a designated collection area. The carboys are periodically collected and moved to the waste treatment area where they are evaluated for treatment procedure, and scheduled for the treatment indicated. Radioactive wastes originate in over 20 buildings in which many different operations are performed. However, five of these facilities are responsible for producing the bulk of all radioactive waste. Radioactive wastes are products of: • Chemical laboratory research and analytical processes. • Accelerator operations. • Mechanical operations. 3-11 Radioactive Airborne Effluents . At the Livermore site, and typically at all DOE contractor facilities, HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) filters are used in exhaust air systems to assure that hazardous particulate matter is not released to the environment. All facilities handling Plutonium, uranium, and beryllium are equipped with these filters. In buildings such as Nuclear Chemistry Operations (Section 2.1.6.4) and the Plutonium Facility (Section 2.1.6.7), exhaust air from the glove boxes is double-filtered. Following this filtration the air enters a manifold system and is filtered a third time before being exhausted to the outside atmosphere. Before being installed, every HEPA filter is tested for efficiency using a monodispersed 0.3-ym aerosol of dioctylphthalate (DOP) . To be acceptable, the efficiency for removing 0.3^m particles m ust be 99.97%. As this size is the most difficult size to remove, particles larger or smaller than 0.3 ym will be removed with efficiencies greater than 99.97%. After installation, the HEPA filters are tested in-place to assure that filter damage has not occurred during installation and that the filters are properly gasketed. Spent filters are disposed of as solid radioactive waste. 3.5.1.1. snnunarv of Radio^Mve-Waste-Prod ucino Operations. Chemical laboratory research and analytical processes primarily involve analyses or studies of radionuclides, which produce contaminated liquid and solid waste. A few operations involve separation of high-level material for diagnostics and for transplutonic-element studies. Chemical engineering research and development operations contribute low-level liquid and solid waste. 3.5.1.2. Ma jor sources of Radioactive Wastes . The four major producers of radioactive waste at LLNL are: • 100-MeV Linear Accelerator — Building 194. • Heavy Element Chemistry—Building 251. • Metallurgy Chemistry — Building 332. • Light Isotope Chemistry—Building 331. The types of waste material and the method of generation at each of these facilities are described in sections 3.5.1.3 through 3.5.1.7. 3.5.L 3. 100-MeV Linear Accelerator (LINAC) —Building 194. 3.5.1.3.1. solid Waste . Solid waste is ge nerated primarily by the activation of various components and equ.pment around the 100-MeV L!NAC. When removed from the facility, these items are normally packaged and sent to Building 612 for disposal. 3-12 3.5.1.3.2. Liquid Waste . There is very little liquid waste generated at the 100-MeV LINAC. There are two cooling-water loops used to cool various components and targets at the accelerator; however, these are essentially closed-loop systems and the generated activation products are retained within the systems. 3.5.1.3.3. Airborne Effluents . The primary gaseous effluents at the 100-MeV LINAC are 13 and N 2 , which are produced by (y , n) reactions on these elements in the air. The remainder of the airborne effluent is generated primarily by the activation of dust particles in the air. The effluent air stream passes through high-efficiency filters before it is discharged to the stack. The 2 and N 2 pass through the filters; however, only a trace amount of the activated dust appears on the downstream side of the filters. The effluent stream is continuously monitored for particulate radioactivity. A flow-through ation chamber is used to measure the and N activity. Ir this facility resulted in a dose of 2.1 mrem/yr at the site boundary, ionization chamber is used to measure the 2 and N 2 activity. In 1980 the releases from 3.5.1.4. Nuclear Chemistry Operations — Building 251 . 3.5.1.4.1. Solid Waste . Transuranic-contaminated solid waste material is normally generated during hot-cell or glove-box operations. In either case, the material is transferred out of the enclosure into a primary container free of contamination on the outer surface. Following an estimate of the identity and quantity of radionuclides present, the material is placed in a secondary container usually consisting of a heavy paper sack, plus a heavy plastic bag. This bag, when full, is sealed in a metal 210-liter drum and sent to the solid-waste handling area (Building 612) for final disposal. Larger items, such as pumps, manipulators, or enclosures, also are packaged and sent to Building 612 for disposal. 3.5.1.4.2. Liquid Waste . Highly contaminated liquid waste is processed within the building. Processing consists of transferring the liquid from its point of origin to a central waste block through double-walled polyethylene lines. The liquid is then solidified by addition of a cement-vermiculite mixture. When filled, the waste block is capped off and turned over to Waste Management (Building 612) for final disposal. Moderately contaminated liquids are placed in polyethylene waste jugs and sent to Building 514 for treatment and disposal. All water discharged from Building 251 is held in retention tanks until it is analyzed for radioactivity. This is achieved by a central collection system that directs all water, except sanitary sewage, to two 4-m 3 retention 3-13 tanks. Water flow to the tanks is continuously monitored for gross contamination by a scintillation detection system. The detector is set to alarm at twice background. All water in the tanks is held until laboratory analyses show that contamination levels are within acceptable discharge limits. If the water exceeds discharge limits, it is transferred via tank truck to Building 514 for treatment prior to disposal. 3.5.1.4.3. Airborne Effluents . Airborne particulate waste generated by work performed in the various glove boxes and hot cells consists of alpha-contaminated particulates. Air from the glove boxes passes through double HEPA filters at the glove box and then is exhausted through manifolds to stacks on the roof top, where the air is again filtered through HEPA filters. Continuous particulate sampling is done on all Building 251 exhausts. Gaseous waste from the several hot cells is treated similarly except that continuous monitoring is provided at the discharge point to provide gross release detection capability. Detection is provided by in-line proportional detectors for alpha contaminants and Nal detectors for gamma emitters. Room air is continuously sampled for particulate contamination and is discharged through exhaust ducts to the roof where it is filtered through filters rated at 95% by NBS stain test (60-65% by 0.3-M DOP smoke). These filters are being replaced with aouble HEPA filtration as part of the planned upgrading of this facility (see 2.1.6.4). 3.5.1.5. Plutonium Facility — Building 332 . 3.5.1.5.1. Solid Waste . Plutonium-contaminated solid waste is generated and handled by methods similar to those described for Building 251. All waste barrels are assayed for plutonium content (by means of a rotating-drum scanner) before leaving the building. The scanner consists of a 76 x 76-mm NaKTl ) detector connected to a multi-channel analyzer and recorder. Details of the system are 3-1,3-2 described in Hazards Control Progress Reports. 3.5.1.5.2. Liquid Waste . All recoverable highly and moderately contaminated liquid waste is sent to Building 514 for treatment and disposal. Water from within the facility is retained in two 4-rn 3 tanks until analysis indicates that contamination levels are within sanitary sewage discharge limits. Water is then released to the sanitary sewer. If contam ination levels exceed the limits, the water is tra nsferred to Waste Disposal for treatment prior to disposal. 3.5.1.5.3. Airborne Effluents. Alpha-contami inated particulate waste is generated by operations in the glove boxes used for continuing processes and experimental work. The glove box exhaust is 3-14 passed through double HEPA filters. The exhaust air is again passed through a HEPA filter before being discharged to the atmosphere. All exhaust air is continuously monitored for particulate radioactivity. Room air exhaust is filtered through double HEPA filters and temperature-activated water spray nozzles are installed in room exhaust ducts. These features reduce further any possible impact on the environment (see 2.1.6.7). 3 - 5 - 1 ' 6 - Tritium Technology — Building 331 . Tritium waste is generated within Building 331 by the various experimental operations performed there and takes the form of tritiated hydrogen gas (HT) , tritiated water (HTO) , or solids or liquids contaminated with HT or HTO. 3 ' 5 - 1 ' 6 - 1 - Solid ^ste . Solid waste is generally doubly contained, placed in metal drums, and sent to the Solid Waste Disposal facility (Building 612) for disposal. 3,5 - 1 ' 6 - 2 - Liquid Waste. There is no liquid waste retention tank system in Building 331. The majority of low-level liquid waste (less than 5 Ci/y) is released to the sanitary sewer. The majority of intermediate-level (1 to 10 Ci/liter) liquid waste is vacuum pump oil (approximately 400 liters/y). This oil is placed in 4-liter metal cans and packed in a sorbent inside 210-liter drums (limited to 200 Ci/drum), which are disposed of as solid waste. Some other liquids are placed in small plastic bottles, which are then placed in 4-liter metal cans, and the void volume filled with a sorbent. The metal cans are then disposed of as solid waste. Contamination levels of the liquid waste in the metal cans normally vary from 100 mCi/liter to 10 Ci/liter. The remaining radioactive liquid waste (less than 5000 Ci/y) is collected in 20-liter bottles and sent to the waste treatment facility. 3,5 - 1 ' 6 - 3 - ^borne Effluents. Stack effluents from the facility are continuously monitored for possible tritium release by drawing aliquots of the total flow through ion chambers. Both analog and digital integrator ion chamber output are provided. In addition, the relative concentration of HTO and HT in the effluent are measured using a molecular sieve method. In 1980, 2218 Ci of tritium (65% as HTO) were released. 3 ' 5 - 1 - 7 ' Waste Management Facilities. The waste management facilities consist of: • Retention-tank systems located in buildings where significant quantities of liquid waste could become contaminated. All effluent from sinks and floor drains is retained in 4- to 40-m 3 tanks until the radioactivity status is determined. If the radioactivity is not as low as 3-15 practicable, the liquid is transferred to a portable tank and sent to the liquid decontamination facility at Building 514. Each retention system has at least two tanks so that operations can proceed while the radioactivity of the filled tank is being determined. . carboy or small tank accumulations of intermediate-level (1 to 1 6 yCi/liter) liquid waste at any location and of low-level (< 1 |l Ci/liter) liquid waste at buildings without retention tank systems. These wastes are sent to the Solid Waste Disposal Facility and stored there prior to treatment. . a collection and decontamination plant at Building 514 for treatment of low-level radioactive liquid waste. t »,*>= «-h=.i- iH 2 41 A r 13 N _ 15 Unidentified S-a 2305 165 1656 5.1 x 10 -5 Liquid ; HTO 239 pu 2.8 x 10 -4 3-19 3.5.2. Sanitary Waste Management 3.5.2.1. General . Sanitary sewage from SNLL flows into the LLNL sewer system and the effluent of both laboratories is treated at the LWRP. The sewage is continuously monitored for P H and radioactivity as it leaves the LLNL site to detect any potentially hazardous release soon enough to permit the sewage to be diverted into holding ponds at the treatment plant. Any diverted sewage is held until analyses show what, if any, special treatment is needed before the sewage can be treated in the municipal plant. In addition to the continuous sampling, composite sewage samples are collected daily and analyzed for radioactive materials and toxic metals. The term "sanitary sewage" includes all liquid wastes except: radioactive wastes, toxic chemical wastes, and process wastes from the plating shop and printed-circuit-etching facility. Radioactive and toxic wastes are collected either in suitable small containers or in larger waste retention tanks, and disposed of by the Toxic Waste Control Group. Plating shop and printed-circuit-facility process wastes are now treated in a neutralization/ion-exchange facility. This purification system produces "reclaimed" water suitable for reuse in plating shop processes. Administrative controls are used to minimize the release of radioactive and toxic wastes to the sanitary sewage system. These controls include: • Notice labels attached to sinks connected to the sanitary sewer advising personnel to contact Hazards Control for disposal of hazardous wastes. • instructions for proper disposal of wastes discussed in building Operational Safety Procedures and in the LLNL Health and Safety Manual . • Periodic review of waste disposal techniques by Hazards Control technicians assigned to the area. • investigation of releases into the sewer system that are detected by the continuous monitoring system, employee reports, or other means. Formal incident reports are prepared for potentially serious releases and steps are taken to prevent recurrence. . use of the LLNL Safety-Wise publication (a leaflet which is distributed throughout the Laboratory) and Industrial Hygiene briefings to LLNL employees regarding proper disposal of wastes, details of past releases, and the importance of keeping potentially hazardous materials out of the sanitary sewer. Rainwater and irrigation runoff water are not connected to the sanitary sewers. Runoff is collected in open ditches that flow to the northwest corner of the LLNL site. After leaving LLNL, the water flows through other ditches until it reaches the Arroyo Las Positas. Effluent blow-down water from LLNL cooling towers was formerly discharged into the storm water ditches. However, starting in 3-20 1975, these discharges were connected to the sanitary sewer system and are treated at LWRP. The following is a brief description of the sewer system, the municipal treatment plant, analytical tests performed, and significant releases that have occurred in the past. 3.5.2.2. Sewer System . The sanitary sewer system network has three primary elements (see Figs. 3-9 and 3-10) . The portion of the southern half of the LLNL site that was built by the Navy, including SNLL, has sewer lines that flow by gravity westward along East Avenue to the southwest corner of the LLNL site. The rest of the southern half of LLNL has gravity flow lines running northwestward to the west end of 5th Street. Sewage from the northern half of LLNL flows by gravity to the northwest corner of LLNL. The combined sewage from the southwest, 5th Street, and northwest flows by gravity through a new line to the City of Livermore's 525-mm industrial park sewer line about 2 km to the northwest. 3 >5. 2. 3. Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP). The LWRP is a 200-liter/s tertiary sewage plant serving the residential, commercial, and industrial users in Livermore. Sanitary sewage from the DOE site contributes 7%, about 15 liters/s, of the total sewage treated at the plant. Sewage entering the plant flows into the "primary settling tanks" where most solids drop out and grease floats to the surface. Next, the sewage is pumped over two "trickling filter" units where aerobic bacteria growing on filter rock oxidize dissolved organic matter in the sewage. The sewage then enters an "activated sludge" aeration tank where microbes suspended in the sewage further oxidize organics to purify the waste. After aeration, the sewage flows to the "final -sedimentation tank" where the suspended microbes settle out. The treated sewage is filtered through charcoal filters, and chlorinated and dechlorinated before being released from the plant. Treated water is used as required for irrigation on the golf course, airport, and nearby agricultural land. Treated water is also supplied to the California Department of Transportation for irrigation of landscaping on 1-580. The balance is discharged into a pipeline and transported to San Francisco Bay (see 2.1.8.3). Solids from the settling tanks are pumped to anaerobic digesters where bacteria break down the organics to yield "stabilized sludge," plus methane and C0 2 . This sludge is dried in open beds, and buried in a local landfill. The methane is used for in-plant heating as required, or burned as waste. The plant also has two emergency holding basins with a total capacity of 1.5 x 10 5 m 3 or about six days of average flow for retention of sewage in case of plant malfunctions, a potentially harmful release into the sewer system, or other problems. Additionally, the basins are used to equalize the treatment load, storing sewage during peak production periods for release into the system during periods of low flow. Since the ponds are located at the treatment plant, any releases into the 3-21 Monitoring station From 'Sandia 1 km Figure 3-9. LLNL site sanitary sewer system. 3-22 To LLNL main for disposal to Livermore Water Reclamation Plant 1 km Figure 3-10. SNLL site sanitary sewer system 3-23 sewer are diluted by the total city flow by the time they are diverted. Based on the experience in dealing with past incidents requiring diversions, the LWRP has had little difficulty dealing with the treatment of most releases from the Laboratories. Radioactivity, other than tritium, is usually retained in the sludge. For the DOE site to duplicate the retention and treatment capability now provided by the LWRP does not appear to be cost effective, considering the low frequency with which need for diversion occurs. 3.5.2.4. sewage Monitoring . For rapid identification of potentially harmful releases into the sewer, a continuous stream of 40 liters/min is pumped to a small building at LLNL housing detection instrumentation. Inside this building, the sewage is piped through a 26-liter lead-shielded tan* that contains a recording P H meter, a low-energy N.I (Tl) detector, and a higher energy Nal ■ (Tl) detector. 3 ' 3 Output of these radiation detectors provides a capability for detection of radionuclides conunonly used at the Laboratory. The sewage stream also flows through an x-ray fluorescence monitor capable of detecting transition metals such as copper and chromium. A udio alarms from the P H meter, the two radiation detectors and the x-ray fluorescence monitor are received in the LLNL firehouse, which is continuously manned. The flow time between LLNL and the U.RP permxts ample time to investigate the source of alarm and to evaluate the problem. Based on past experience, the LWRP plant can be notified in time to divert sewage into holding ponds for subsequent treatment if required. 3.5.2.4.1. collection of Sample . A small sewage sample is picked up every 4-5 min by a revolving scoop (a Trebler sampler) and collected for later analysis. These composite samples are collected daily and analyzed as indicated in Table 2-1. 3.5.2.4.2. Discharge Limrts . Limitations on discharges of industrial wastes are contained in L.vermore Ordinance No. 586. Th.s ordnance prohibits discharge of any material that interferes with operation or maintenance of the sewer system or treatment plant, or that causes the City to discharge treated effluent that violates established standards. It also contains the specific discharge limitations listed below: • Any liquid or vapor having a temperature higher than 66°C. . Any waste containing more than 200 PP m of fat, oil, or grease that is petroleum-ether soluble, . Any gasoline, oenzene, naphtha, fuel oil, or other flammable or explosive liquid, solid, or gas. . Any garbage, except if properly ground wxth a mechanical garbage grinder. 3-24 • Any ashes, cinders, sand, or other solid viscous substance capable of causing obstruction to the flow in sewers or other interferences with the operation of the sewage works. • Any waste or water with a pH lower than 6.8 or higher than 8.0. • Any water or waste containing an increase of total dissolved solids greater than 325 ppm or chloride greater than 75 ppm during a single-cycle use of the water supply. • Any water or waste having a Biochemical Oxygen Demand (BOD) greater than 300 ppm. • Any water or waste containing more than 300 ppm of suspended solids. • Any radioactive wastes except where: - The waste is discharged in strict conformity with current DOE recommendations for safe disposal of radioactive wastes. - The discharging of radioactive waste will not cause injury to personnel or damage to the sewage works. • Any waters intended to be used to dilute waste discharge to avoid violation of the above limits. Discharges from LLNL and SNLL meet the requirements of Ordinance 586 except for intermittent variation of P H above or below the 6.8 to 8.0 permitted range. Serious variations cause the pH monitor at LLNL to alarm so that the LWRP operators can be notified to take corrective action to divert the potentially harmful sewage. In the six years since the existing monitoring/alarm system has been operating, no damage to the treatment plant or receiving waters has occurred' due to releases from the DOE Livermore laboratories. 3 ' 5 ' 2 - 5 ' Sewer Release Incidents . There have been several incidents of toxic or radioactive material releases into the sanitary sewer. These incidents are listed in Appendix 3A. For each incident, corrective measures were recommended to prevent a recurrence. Because most of the releases were from the plating shop, the special process waste treatment system described earlier (see 3.5.2.1) was installed. This unit significantly reduced the incidence rate of low- or high-pH discharges. However, the rapid warning provided by the continuous monitoring station provides the time needed to evaluate other possible sources of pH excursion and to recommend diversion if necessary. 3-5.3. Chemical Waste Management Research quantities of liquid, solid, and gaseous nonradioactive chemicals are used at the Livermore site. Because of the diversity in the variety of chemicals handled it has not been practical to establish treatment facilities for these materials. At present, areas generating larger 3-25 ,,^ in t?? and 325 (pr inted-circuit facility, quantities o£ chMlcl waste Include LLKL Buildings 131. 322. plating sbop a„a ion change, respectively, end -»■. Buiiaing ,13 .pUtln, shop, en, pt.ntea cirMlt ^illtU... Between 10.000 an, 20.000 ,.1 or eel, rinse.ater waste containing copper. 1— . »na „i.el , generatea at the U— -_ - »nt, ^ S000 .1 - a .line . me ta g .„.r,t,a p.. — ■". regenerating io„-e,ch.„ge colu„s need « Pacing low-con— „ itel in !„. -out 30.000 gal .« «- acias. bases, ana solvent waste were generatea. Or la tter about 30. was nitric aoia. about ». — -a. a„a the balance was »,cella„eous che.ic.ls. lBel< * l0 , the research quantities notea above. «iese che.ical wastes ate pactagea in state a„a A transported by licensed contractors to Class I chemical waste federally approved containers and transported by disposal sites. 3. 5 .,. Beg. Pretties n„„.ae. ana Redaction Operation , , 4 .. oeneral. H.t-Ll not neeaea tor use by U*. petsonnel -, be aispasea o £ in a _.' .bT^arisea in «,. 3-11., * - 1- " ^ re.ovea ■» a raaio.cti.e »«,„ ,, M .*-h Hie tvpe of radiation, level, and «... it t first be .onitotea by Baaaras Control a»a taggea with type _ If lt „ .te^inea tbat tbe Ue. is oonta.inatea. it is sent to tbe decontamination ,^» m aeco„ta B inat,a. It tbe taaiation level cannot be brought aown to meet applicable standi, tbe item is disposed of as radioactive waste. IteM Mt «. a taaiation ate. ana ite.s tbat have been aetet.in.a by *— Control not e .nta.in.tea, or have been —~ . can be sent to one ot two places. Capital equi^ust b a aent to tbe .aeploy..nt Center, ana all otber ite.s .ay be sent to tbe — ""t ~y,ent Center evaluates its cation a„a tbe labcratotys neea tor a particular it.. I£ u , aeter.inea to be ot potential value to - or otber goverb.nt agencies. ,t is sent to Reclamation and Salvage. ,,,,. .^-wu— — —- — - ;: nrrr ,. for 30 days If no need is found, the materials are reported on a list on the LLNL site for 30 days. nffteta i„ S an needed by other federal agencies, they are then reclassify Lays to aonation to state eaucation agencies or otber organisations specified by feaer.l surplus 3-26 Item no longer needed by group "D re k. E o From radiation area I Item is monitored by Hazards Control and tagged with type of radiation, level, and date Not contaminated Non-capital equipment Contaminated t Sent to Decon and decontaminated for specified disposal Capital equipment Sent to materials control group warehouse, reclamation and salvage section Scrap 1 No value Stock Non-useable, non-repairable items sent to scrap and sold on contract Surplus Cannot be decontaminated and sent to rad waste disposal Reported to redeployment center and evaluated for LLNLneed If stock item in good condition, return it to stores Potential value It may have potential value and is put in surplus yard or shelved for 6 mo After 6 mo Excess properties z\ Various operational procedures Figure 3-11. Disposal of excess material 3-27 91lU .U-. Tb. materials ,-lain, tbrou,^ *i. ».,s .t. taVen to the coneota sit. ot t* »u— Dee— Pt-tti.. oi.P-1 ««- -t. tbe y - - sola ot .tot*. « -L. a B Uix,t pt oeea u te U «!=»-. « It- - b. —* «• U*- «— ». Sanai. Ptopett, CoottoX Division at Albuquerque. , 5 , , M^la^^l^. --eapit.l -t.ti.1. at. ev.laatea * P-X-tlo. - ..X— E ot oonaition ana neea. it tbe it- is a stoe* It- <-t-t» — * «- —* —— « - " ln g ooa coition, it is tetataea to atoc. Cot teissoe. « It- - be »»t tot cp.lt b.tote [etutn i„ g to stoot. H.t.tl.1. that ate act in stoot ooaaition out still may bave some tatate valae to , LNL „. beia i„ ». satpius vata ot satpias skives in the M.teti.ls Conttoi wateboase. tft.t . ►« th* Excess Property Section and processed as described months, the surplus items are turned over to the Excess Prope above. trials that at. non-tepaitatie ana noa-as.bXe ate titst aisassembXea ,. saleable p.tts, then sent to scrap. Setap mateti.Xs ate soia by «. Ket.U ate se 9 te g atea Oy type ot metal Uertoos. ooppet. etc., ,„a soia „ »» »ei,bt on 3-montb conttacts. ,„e e.oeption is -touty. — - — - . « ,„ t LLNL tease. Solvents ana oils ate stotea in 210-lit.t atoms ana teaistillea (by outsiae oonttaot) fot LLNL teuse. soia on a ye.tly eoattaet. T ites ate eolleetea a„a sola on coattaot as aceumolat.a. P.p., aoa u „ol,ssi £ iea 1B„ oatas ate sola on , yeatly oonttaot. Sotap Xamber is .aae available to « personnel on Saturday mornings. 3 5 4 , s^oeJsMJo^J^-Ei"!^^^^ ** " CU ™ t10 " ^ SalVa9e opetation oses .ppt~l-t.lv „ .' ot insiae stota.e spaoe a„a 1,00 J ot oatsiae .tot.,. «.. .- i. Tin m 2 of inside storage area and 460 m of The excess properties operation uses approximately 110 m of outside storage area. o MH^na 419 is LLNL' s decontamination center for the removal of 3.5.4.5. dp contamination . Building 419 is hwu ^t fanks steam guns, mechanical abrasives, radioactive and toxic contaminants from equipment. Soak tanks, u • -t =nri hpat enerqv to remove undesirable ultrasonics, and a vapor degreaser use mechanical, chemical, and heat energy ,,« t-vancfprred to Waste Management, contaminants. All wastes generated in the cleaning operation are transferred •*.^v«a^ Ad reauired, SNLL equipment can Discharged air is passed through double HEPA filters and monitored. As requir also be decontaminated at this facility. 3-28 3-5. 5. Nonhazardous Waste Landfill LLNL generates approximately 44 m 3 of waste per work day which is transported to the Alameda County sanitary landfill site. This debris consists primarily of 8 m 3 of shredded computer printout paper, 24 m of waste paper and garbage, and 12 m 3 of wood and other construction rubble. All such waste is covered immediately with several feet of clean earth. Compaction is performed by large dirt-moving equipment. Burning is not permitted. No radioactive or toxic materials are sent to the landfill. SNLL generates approximately 6 m 3 of waste per day, consisting of about 2.5 m 3 of computer printout paper, waste paper, and garbage, 2.5 m 3 of cardboard, and the balance wood and rubble. SNLL waste is also transported to the Alameda County sanitary landfill site. 3.5.6. Waste Management at Site 300 3 - 5 ' 6 ' 1 - S 01 ^ Radioactive or Chemical Wastes . Solid wastes resulting from detonation of test assemblies constitute the principal source of radioactive or chemical wastes at Site 300. Most of these assemblies contain depleted uranium and beryllium, although a few have contained natural uranium or thorium. A limited number of experiments involving tritium have also been conducted at the Site. Solid waste consisting of contaminated rubble is collected from the gravel-covered firing table after each shot. It is estimated that most of the uranium in the test assembly is associated either with this debris, or remains in the gravel. That uranium debris is limited to areas adjacent to the firing bunkers was confirmed by the EG&G aerial radiological survey in 1975 (described in section 2.3.12) and soil analyses (described in Appendix 2A) . Firing table gravel and the associated debris are buried in designated disposal areas within Site 300. These burials are made in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 20, Paragraph 20.304, which permits land burials of radioactivity equivalent to 300 kg of depleted uranium per year. Each firing bunker maintains records of the uranium and beryllium in the test assemblies expended on its firing table. Based on these records the firing table gravel is removed to the disposal pit when an estimated total of 300 kg of uranium is contained in this gravel and in the contaminated rubble previously trucked to the pit. The pits are in the form of a trench. Gravel and rubble containing the estimated 300 kg of uranium are covered with 1.2 m of soil and a soil barrier 1.8 m wide is established between trenches. Disposal areas are surveyed and located on the Site map as indicated by the circles in Fig. 3-12. Depleted uranium is a byproduct in the process by which enriched uranium (enriched in 235 U) is produced from natural uranium, in a preliminary step of this process, uranium decay products 3-29 o PISTOL RANGE :~ "# B99 . . 1 km Figure 3-12. Site 300 disposal areas. 3-30 including radium are chemically separated from the uranium. Because the radiological hazard from uranium is predominantly due to radium and its decay products there is essentially no radiation hazard associated with the land burial of depleted uranium at Site 300. Starting with radium-free uranium, it takes over a million years for the 226 Ra activity to grow back into equilibrium with the parent 238 U, as shown by the following tabulation. Time after separation (years) 1 x 10 4 1 x 10 5 1 x 10 6 3 x 10 6 % Equilibrium 0.072 7.9 90.6 100.0 High-explosive wastes generated in formulation and processing are collected from the firing tables and periodically burned in a remote burn area on the Site. At one time solid waste from Livermore, consisting largely of bulky items from radiation ' workplaces at LLNL and from large animal experiments conducted at LLNL and LBL, were buried at Site 300. Approximately 100,000 ft 3 of waste was buried at the Site 300 Pistol Range Pit between 1964 and 1973. Animal wastes and carcasses contaminated with short-lived radionuclides accounted for 23,000 ft of the total volume. The animal burial practice was stopped in 1973 when large animal experiments were discontinued. The remaining 77,000 ft 3 of waste buried consisted of compressed drums, capacitors, glove boxes, beryllium-contaminated filters and equipment, gas bottles, assorted waste chemicals, and other scrap metal primarily from the Taxi Strip and Salvage storage areas. Burial of this type of waste was discontinued in 1970 as a result of an LLNL policy change. 3.5.6.2, Liquid Chemical Wastes . Liquid wastes from high-explosive processing are passed through clarifiers (settling tanks). Clarified liquid is then pumped to holding ponds where it is evaporated. Solids are treated as solid high-explosive waste. 3 ' 5 ' 6 ' 3 - Sanitarv Wastes . In all areas except the General Service Area (GSA) , sanitary wastes are handled by individual septic tanks or chemical toilets. All septic tanks are equipped with leach fields. A sanitary sewer system is provided in the GSA area with the sewage piped to an asphalt lined, oxidation pond at the southeast corner of the Site. This pond has a surface area of about 4000 m 2 . It was designed to accommodate a population of approximately 200. At present, the personnel assigned to the GSA area number about 100. The depth of the liquid is maintained between 1 and 1.5 m. During 3-31 the summer months, water must be added to the pond to maintain the minimum level. A smaller overflow pond was constructed to provide additional capacity during the winter when evaporation is minimal. Samples of the oxidation pond are analyzed on a quarterly basis as part of the environmental monitoring program for Site 300. 3.6. SITE 300 OPERATIONS LLNL's nonnuclear explosive tests are conducted at Site 300. The handling of radioactive and toxic material and the detonation of high-explosive assemblies containing these materials are the principal sources of possible environmental impact. There are no tests at Site 300 involving high-explosive assemblies that contain fissile material. However, as noted in section 2.1.5.2, static (e.g. temperature cycling) and dynamic (e.g., vibration and impulse) tests are performed at Site 300 that do involve plutonium. Two sealed barriers are required for static tests and three such barriers are required for dynamic tests, and the ventilating exhaust air from these test facilities is passed through HEPA filters. No breach of any barriers are expected in any of these tests involving fissile material. All such tests are verification design tests and are not tests to failure. The shipment or transfer of explosives and radioactive material other than depleted or natural uranium and thorium in the same container or to the same facility at Site 300 is prohibited. An environmental monitoring program is maintained to ensure that the LLNL controls are indeed restricting effluent releases to levels well below appropriate standards. Because of the remoteness of this site, these experiments can be performed with minimal off-site impact from annoying noises or damaging overpressures (667 pascals or 0.1 psi for a tightly-fitted window glass.) Based on meteorological measurements made twice daily, a limit is set on the weight of high explosives that can be detonated without impact in populated areas. The Laboratory uses an offsite, overpressure limit of 40 pascals (0.006 psi) for areas 4.8 km (3.0 mi) beyond the detonation point. To monitor the correctness of these limits, four microbarograph sensors are maintained in or near Tracy. The probability of overpressure is greatest in this area due to the direction of the prevailing winds. In 1976, there was one incident involving a noticeable overpressure which was caused by an unexpected change in the direction of the upper winds. There were no complaints of damage. An ecology study was made at Site 300 in 1974 to determine if LLNL operations have had a measurable impact on plants and animals native to the area. The ecosystem is dominated by perennial grasslands. Small rodents abound which are preyed upon by snakes, raptors, and a variety of carnivorous mammals. The study involved collection of plants and animals in the vicinity of the 3-32 high-explosive firing bunkers. Similar sample groups were also collected during this period about 10 km west of the Site. This direction (normally upwind) and distance gave reasonable assurance that the latter samples would represent background conditions unaffected by LLNL operations. Analysis of the data showed that while tritium, beryllium, and uranium were present in some plants and animals, in general the levels measured in the biota on Site 300 were not significantly different from those found in the control samples collected about 10 km west of Site 300. As noted in 2.3.9, in 1975 approximately 100 acres on the east side at Site 300 was transferred to the California Department of Fish and Game for use as a wildlife preserve. A radiological survey of this property was made in 1973 prior to the release and in compliance with AEC requirements for disposal of land. A terrestrial survey was made using a sensitive gamma detector (sodium iodide) with readings made at a nominal height of one meter above the soil surface. Soil samples were also collected for uranium analyses. The terrestrial radiation exposure rates, which vary from 4.0 to 6.5UR/h, are typical for natural background for soils in this area. Likewise, the variation of one to three parts per million in the total uranium is within the range observed in northern California. Other impacts such as noise pollution from DOE high-explosive testing are negligible due to the distance of the firing bunkers from the eastern site perimeter. The closest bunker, Bunker 812, which is located in a deep ravine, is nearly three quarters of a mile from the perimeter. Concentrations of airborne beryllium at sampling points between this bunker and the east site boundary are less than 1% of that specified as the permissible standard. It was concluded from these measurements that Site 300 operations had no measurable impact on the area up to 1973. Since that time, annual surveys near the .site perimeters have not indicated off-site impact. No construction is presently planned along the east perimeter. 3.7. HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPACTS OF LIVERMORE OPERATIONS 3.7.1. Radiological Impact The radiological impact of the DOE Livermore laboratories is being assessed, on a continuing basis, by LLNL's Hazards Control Department. An annual environmental monitoring report documents the levels of radioactive materials observed in air, water, soil and vegetation samples collected in the vicinity of the Livermore Site. Radiation dose rate measurements using thermoluminescent dosimeters are also made both at the site perimeter and in the off-site vicinity. Appendix 2A contains results of the Livermore environmental monitoring program for 1980. Table 3-2 shows annual airborne and liquid effluents released during the 5-year period 1976 through 1980. These data serve as a data base 3-33 Table 3-2. Airborne and liquid radioactive effluents 1976-1980. released at Livermore during the 5-year period 1976 1977 Annual releases (Ci) 1978 1979 1980 5-year av Airborne radioactive effluents ; 4l Ar 470 3h 2 3990 13 N _ 15 1035 Liquid radioactive effluents ; HTO 10 239 PU 1.5 x lO" 4 3.6 x 378 766 383 165 432 5200 5361 4505 2305 4272 987 1444 829 1656 1190 13 8 7 5 8 10-4 8 . 6 x 10-4 9 .8 x 10~ 4 2.8 x 10~ 4 5.3 x 10 -4 Table 3-3. A irborne 239 Pu and HTO concentrations at the LLNL s ite boundary: a 5-year data base. — 239 Pu (10 ' 17 uCi/ml) -11 HTO (10 uCi/n il) h Location 3 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 Av b 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 AV D 1 1.0 2.2 2.8 1.1 0.6 1.5 6.0 4.2 3.5 3.8 2.7 4.0 2 0.7 2.4 2.7 0.9 0.5 1.4 7.7 5.4 5.6 4.6 5.6 5.6 12 0.9 2.4 3.0 1.7 0.5 1.7 14.2 11.9 10.1 6.1 9.6 9.6 13 0.7 1.8 2.3 1.1 0.4 1.3 4.1 2.7 2.7 3.8 3.2 3.2 14 2.8 4.2 5.3 2.3 1.4 3.2 10.1 7.2 5.3 4.8 6.4 6.4 15 1.3 1.8 2.4 1.0 0.5 1.4 6.7 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.4 4.3 Av 1.2 2.5 3.1 1.4 0.6 1.8 8.1 6.0 5.7 4.4 5.9 5.6 a see Appendix 2A for sampling l° cat i° ns - , tl as well as ( i as t entry) the 5-year average of b This column shows the 5-year average by location as wen a all locations. Table 3-4. Annual radiation doses a Dose t the LLNL south site boundary (mrem) 1976 893 1977 877 1978 230 1979 176 1980 148 ?-34 to better evaluate the radiologic-! impact of current Livermore operations. The increase in 41 Ar in 1978 compared with 1977 is due to additional running time of the pool-type reactor (Building 281) connected with LLNL work in the National Uranium Resource Evaluation (NURE) program. The decrease in Ar in 1979 reflects the termination of LLNL participation in NURE. Likewise, increase in the L3 N - 15 levels in 1978 and 1980 resulted from physics experiments requiring extended accelerator running times at Building 194. In 1979 the accelerator was shut down for about 3 months, explaining the decrease in 13 N - 15 o. Table 3-3 shows a 5-year tabulation of airborne Plutonium and tritium concentrations measured at the LLNL site boundary. The concentrations of plutonium are within the range attributable to global fallout and less than 0.1% of the guideline standard (DOE Order 5480. 1A). The highest annual average tritium-in-air concentration is also less than 0.1% of the DOE guideline. The largest potential for radiological impact due to DOE operations at Livermore has been from LLNL's 14-Mev neutron generator in Building 212. In past years, this facility has been used in high-flux radiation damage studies in support of the magnetic fusion energy program. These experiments resulted in elevated gamma and neutron dose rates at the south perimeter of LLNL (East Avenue) . Many of these high-flux experiments are now performed at the rotating target neutron source (RTNS) in Building 292 located in the northwest quadrant of LLNL. Table 3-4 shows the decrease in radiation dose rates at the south site boundary since 1977. Since the maximum allowable dose to any member of the public is 500 mrem per year, the potential for radiation exposure from operations at Building 212 was evaluated, when the generator is operating, the dose rate is about 0.1 mrem/h in the SNLL parking lot opposite Building 212. Assuming that an individual spent 45 minutes a day in this parking lot, and the high-flux runs were made 125 days a year (both conservative estimates), the estimated parking lot annual dose would be 9.4 mrem. Other potential exposures might have involved motorists and bicyclists on East Avenue and personnel in the credit union building on the Sandia parking lot. However, radiation measurements show that none of these exposures could have resulted in an annual dose exceeding the parking lot example. The ICT is located at the east end of Building 212. A radiation monitoring station has been maintained for several years at the fence line on East Avenue opposite this accelerator. Another accelerator, the Cyclograff, located in the center of the building, may also contribute to elevated site boundary radiation. A.C. Transit now has a bus stop on East Avenue adjacent to Building 212. This bus stop is closer to the Cyclograff than it is to the ICT. Radiation measurements made at the bus stop using hand-held instruments varied depending on the experiments performed at the Cyclograff. To better document possible exposures, a duplicate of the radiation monitoring station at the ICT has been established at the bus stop. 3-35 Concern has t*en expressea over th. potential tor Laboratory r.aioactive effluent. contending the drinking «f. supply to the City of biver.ore. Biver.ore obtains .bet 1/3 of its «-l do.estic „t„ supply «r» groundwater .ells ,„a purchases the balance fro. the Ma.eda Count, Bleed Control DUttlct Zone 7. Zone , diverts water ft- the South Bay _-t to fill the Patterson Reservoir, water fro. the Patterson Reservoir is sa.pled at quarterly intervals ana analysed tor gross alpha, gross beta, ana tritiu. activities. Typical results of these analyses ate shown in appendix » as nation 15 in Tables 14. 16. ana 13. Sa.ples fron Biver.ore city water ate iaenti.iea in the sa.e tables as action 1,. Both locations show radioactivity levels in the range of natural background ana well bole, standaras set by EPX. floating that tb. biver.ore laboratories have no aiscernable effect on local arinking water supplies. concern has also been expressed over the potential of accidental releases of Plutonian conta.inating the South Bay Agueauct. Bven under tbe worst-case coitions, which inoluae the loss of the Buiiain, 33, RBP. filters, the plutoniun concentration^ tbe water of tbe , q ueduct would be 0.3, of the per.issible levels in drinking water, or 9.74 x 10" 8 pCi/.l. LLN B sanples wells belonging to the Ma.ed. County Plood Control District Zone 7 in order to „„itor ground water ...11s, in tbe Biver.ore Valley. This progra. is designed to determine the extent tritiun in tbe treated effluent fron th. BWBP nigr.tes into grouna water. Tritiun activities in all sanples colleotea were below the BOB guide for water in uncontrolled areas ,0OB Order S4...1*. S s , .eans of evaluating tbe possible i.p.ct of laboratory effluents on locally grown foodstuff. lhe tritiun content of Biver.ore valley wines has been co.pared with otber wines fron California and witb Rurope.n wines. Tb, tritiun levels of local wines bave been fou„a to be within the range of both ,„« and surface waters througbout the world, and sonewh.t higher than in those the European wines and suriace wcn-eio a California wines produced fro. grapes grown outside the valley. (See Appendix 2A., Honey produced fron vegetation grown in the Biver.ore valley has also bsen analysed for tritiun. T be tritiun content of locally produced honey was found to be si.ilar to honey produced elsewhere. (See Appendix 2A.) 3.7.2. im pacts of Lavatory Operations o n Employees « hivernore. experts representing .11 safety disciplines provide safety guidance to both e.ployees and ..nage.ent in planning, establishing, ana naintaining a low-risk work environnent. safety leans .onitor all hivernore operations to aetect a„a evaluate h.s.rde. Bnergency response personnel are train, to control accidents or other energencies. Bese.rch is conducted in such areas „ fire safety, radiation detection ana protection, chenic.l hax.rds. ana respiratory protection. 3-36 During the history of the Livermore site, there have been nine fatal job-related injuries. All of these resulted from transportation accidents (auto, helicopter, airplane). Falls or falling objects striking personnel are the most frequent cause of lost-time accidents. Less than one percent of the lost-time injuries are caused by toxic materials or radiation. The beryllium-monitoring program is typical of the Livermore site's attention to possible exposure to hazardous chemicals. Continuously operating air samplers provide filter samples from which the atmospheric working environment of all areas handling beryllium is evaluated. Swipe samples are also periodically collected from these areas. Livermore programs involve the use of a wide variety of radioactive and radiation-producing equipment. Radiation dosimeters are issued to all employees and to visitors who may enter specified buildings. These dosimeters record both natural background and any occupational radiation to which the employee was exposed. Subtractions are made for average exposures received from natural sources. Table 3-5 shows the radiation dose distribution for LLNL employees covering the period from 1975 through 1979. The maximum permissible whole-body dose for radiation workers is 5000 mrem/year (DOE Order 5480. 1A). m the Livermore area, the natural background radiation dose from cosmic rays, terrestrial radiation, and radiation from radionuclide in the body is about 80 mrem/year. The table shows that few LLNL employees receive occupational radiation doses in excess of that received from natural sources. 3 ' 7 - 2 - 1 ' The LLNL Melanoma Study . In late 1976 medical doctors specializing in the treatment of malignant melanoma reported to the Resource for Cancer Epidemiology (RCE) of the California Department of Health Services that an unusual number of their patients were employees of LLNL. Concurrently but independently the LLNL Medical Department began gathering information to determine whether or not employees of LLNL were experiencing an unusual risk of melanoma. It was soon apparent that the RCE was better equipped to conduct a meaningful study and by July of 1977 initial planning for the investigation and negotiations for the necessary employee data file were completed. The RCE study was completed in 1980. An LLNL committee was formed in 1980 to study detailed aspects of the problem. The California Legislative Audit Committee and a DOE committee have reviewed the RCE study. The DOE committee summarizes the problem and makes conclusions and recommendations as follows: "The number of cases of malignant melanoma of the skin in employees of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory reported during the period 1972-1977 exceeds the reported incidence rate in the surrounding two county general population by a factor of between three and four. The incidence rate in the immediately surrounding communities was not elevated during this time period. 3-37 Table 3-5. Occupational radiation dose distribution for LLNL employees (%) . Whole-body dose (mcem) {jot detectable over background 100 100-499 500-2000 2000-5000 1975 1976 86 86 86 1978 88 1979 90.2 11 11 12 10 8.5 2.4 2.5 1.5 1.7 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 <0.1 3-38 -Preliminary efforts to explain the excess have not succeeded so far in implicating any specific cause. The possibility cannot be excluded that the excess may ultimately prove to reflect the influence of socioeconomic factors and lifestyle, rather than exposure to a cancer-causing agent in the workplace. It should be noted that the incidence of malignant melanoma has been rising rapidly in fair-skinned people throughout the world. "The occupational safety, industrial hygiene, and medical programs in the Laboratory appear to be well conceived and well conducted. Unless a causative factor is identified in the Laboratory environment, no protective health measures above and beyond the existing industrial hygiene, safety, and medical surveillance programs appear to be warranted at this time. "The Laboratory should be encouraged in its efforts to investigate the important problems associated with the observed incidence of malignant melanoma. it should be requested to submit a formal plan, which should include provision for more complete record systems for identifying employees who may be exposed to potentially carcinogenic chemical and physical agents. Also the Laboratory's Plan should be coordinated with the research activities of the Resource for Cancer Epidemiology Section of the California State Department of Health Services and contain a target timetable for issuing periodic progress reports. "The Department of Energy should support the further epidemiological investigations of the Resource for Cancer Epidemiology. A proposal should be solicited from the Resource which avoids duplication with the efforts of the Laboratory but which addresses collaborative arrangements. "The above recommendations for research proposals are contingent on appropriate peer review. m addition, ongoing studies of the incidence of malignant melanoma in Laboratory employees should receive continuing review by outside experts." Presently the DOE is funding a case control study being conducted by the RCE. This study assumes that the causative factor is an occupational exposure and uses extensive interviews and questionnaires to determine any significant historical differences between melanoma victims and matched controls. LLNL is also funding four studies by the LLNL Biomedical and Environmental Research Division: 1. A death-certificate survey of all LLNL employees from 1963 to present to compare LLNL and California mortality rates. 2. A melanoma-incidence study of former LLNL employees using the mail questionnaire and the California Cancer Registry. 3. An expanded study of LLNL records to examine possible associations between melanoma and such factors as job classification, length of employment, radiation exposure, project assignment, work locations, and physical characteristics of the employee. 3-39 4 . A collaboration with the Kaiser Foundation Research Institute to compare melanoma incidence and melanoma-associated factors in LLNL employees and non-LLNL employees who use the same prepaid medical plan. The RCE study and the fit., three LLNL studies are scheduled for completion by January 1983. The fourth um study is scheduled for co.pletion by January 1,84. The results of .11 these studies .ill be published in the open literature. 3.8. SOCIOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 3.8.1. Employment and population The Lawrence Liver.ore National Laboratory of the University of California began operations in 1,52 with a staff of approximately 320 people and has grown to over 8000 employees. Sandia L.boratories-Liver.cre be g an operations in 1,56 with a staff of 15 and has grown to approximately 1000 employees. The City of Livermore has also grown considerably fro. a small town of 4000 in 1,50 to result of the growth of the OOE Livermore laboratories. The late 1,50s and early 1,60s show the 9 reatest effect of these laboratories on the City of Livermore population, while fro. 1..7 the maiority of the citys growth is due to the trend of living in suburbia and working in the urban areas (such as Oakland. Berkeley, Hayward, and San Francisco). The growth of the OOE Liver.ore laboratories and the City of Liver.ore can be seen in Fig. 3-13. T „e city ha, had a constant growth while the Laboratories, population began fluctuating in 1,67. These variations reflect budgetary and programing changes, which in particular were responsible for ,,„, The effect of the DOE Livermore laboratories can be seen by the decreases in 1970, 1,71, and 1,73. The ettect or -.*-.,#.= wimire 3-13 shows that in cecent years the the proportion of employees to Livermore residents. Figure 3 Laboratories, population has remained guite steady. The Liver.ore population continued to increase, indicating that the trend to suburban living and costing to urban areas was the ..ior contribution input to this increase. i .««.,.«.« are expected from the new construction planned for ' only minimum sociological and economic impacts are expected the laboratories. These impacts are expected to be similar to those fro. other recent construction programs, and no ma,or effect, are anticipated. Each new construction project is ev.lu.ted for these impacts and appropriate documentation prepared. 3-40 50 i i — r 00 C o CO CO o 1950 1955 1970 1975 1960 1965 Calendar year Figure 3-13. Populations of the city of Livermore and the DOE Livermore laboratories. 3-41 3.8.2. E qual Opportunity and Training Programs « i. the policy of the 00, l.bor.torl,. to provide applicants end employees the ri.ht to egual ^pU^nt opportunities and not to engage in discriminatory practices against any person employed or s.exin, employment because of race, color, religion, ..ltd states, sex, or age. It is the intents of the respective laboratories' management to measure perforce of this policy against specific effectives and to move affirmatively towards fail and egu.l participation of ,11 employees in the opportunity available. The programs of *»».l Opportunity Employment are offered to assist in the recruiting, training, and educating of minority and female employees. 3.8.3. Community Participation The 1.LKL Fire oepartment participates in the Twin Valley (Liver.ore and Amador valleys, Mutual nid Agreement, under which LL.HL. equipment and personnel are dispatched as reguired within the are,. . similar hut less for.al agreement exists for mutual assistance throughout Alameda county. 3.8.4. Technological Impact The DOE Livet„ore laboratories, through research and development program , have made and are continuing to maxe technological advances in areas of impact to society. The «t significant impacts have heen fro. the weapons development program. This is described in detail in section 2.1.3. The other significant program are energy resources develop^ and environmental modeling. ,n the energy devel,p.ent program, laser fusion and controlled thermonuclear reactions (fusion power, are be.ng .tudi.d in order to develop a workable fusion power plant for the production of electricity. Other are,, of energy research are in situ coal gasification, recovery of natural gas following massive hydraulic fracturing, the in situ processing of oil shale, use of shallow ponds as solar heat v, , onrra i solar receiver project, and magnetic fusion studies, collectors, combustion research, central solar receiver y j 3.8.5. Traffic and Transportation The transportation modes used by employees of the baboratories varies but consists primarily of automobiles. Eeeogni.ng that continued increase in auto use contributes to the local potential for air pollution, car pooling and busing have been encouraged for several years. Following the 1 979 fue .hortage and the accompanying rise in the price of gasoline there has been increased employee interest 3-42 in alternatives to the single-occupancy automobile. Introducing the owner -ope rated van pool concept at Liverraore has been highly successful, particularly for those riders who live at a considerable distance from the site. Based on August 1979 data, employees regularly using transportation other than single-occupancy auto are distributed as follows: 1667 607 294 180 625 car pooling van pooling bus fleet transit riders bicycles total 3373 There were 8050 employees at Livermore at the time, so those using alternatives to the single-occupancy auto account for approximately 42% of the overall staff. The Road Department of the Alameda County Public Works Agency estimates current full-volume (two-way) average vehicles per day traffic on East Avenue, Vasco Road, and Greenville Road as follows: East Avenue East of vasco Road* West of Vasco Road South Vasco Road North of East Avenue South of East Avenue Greenville Road North of East Avenue South of East Avenue 10,500 vehicles per day 12,500 vehicles per day 6,500 1,800 1,500 800 Based on a 1976 survey by the California Department of Transportation, the DOE Livermore laboratories contribute about 80% of the total vehicular count on East Avenue east of Vasco Road. Laboratory traffic on Vasco Road is included either in the East Avenue count or the Mesquite Way counts. A typical 24-hour both-way total count on Mesquite is 1650 vehicles. Peak period counts (7:00-8:30 am and 4:00-5:30 pm) indicate that less than 300 vehicles arrive from or depart toward the East Avenue/Greenville Road intersection. ^Location of the traffic counter on East Avenue/Vasco Road intersection. 3-43 3.8.6. Economic Impact The economic impact of the Laboratories on the City of Livermore is very strong, although the influence of the Laboratories is decreasing due to the increase in population and the number of other industries in Livermore. The economic profile of Livermore shows an average increase of 6.6% per year in the money received from business licenses. In 1971 the base for determining the business license fee was changed and the figures for 1971-75 fiscal years have been adjusted to the average increase (see Fig. 3-14). The actual dollar volume of taxable transactions has an average annual increase of 12.2%. The impact of the Laboratories may be seen in Table 3-6. This table shows the annual payroll of the DOE Livermore laboratories from 1960 through 1979. The dollar value of this payroll spent in Livermore has been estimated, assuming 1) a direct relation between payroll and the percentage of Laboratory employees living in Livermore, and 2) that 30% of the employees' income is available to be spent on retail taxable sales. With these assumptions, Table 3-6 shows in the early and mid-sixties the Laboratories accounted for approximately 30 to 35% of the total taxable sales, but as the city has continued to grow and the Laboratories stabilized this percentage has dropped to about 22%. The economic impact of the Laboratories is still very important to the Public School System in Livermore since the city is granted impact aid for students whose parents work on federal installations. The Livermore School District includes students from 39 federal installations with the iargest percentage (approximately 65%) being related to the Laboratories. The percentage of the enrolled students related to the Laboratories in the school district has decreased since 1966. The proportion of impact aid relative to the total expenditures has also decreased as shown in Fig. 3-15. 3.9. ACCIDENT ANALYSIS The following paragraphs discuss the environmental impact of accidents at the Livermore laboratories. Section 3.9.1 deals with the accidents that have occurred. Section 3.9.2 treats some Larger generic accidents that might occur (although the probability is extremely remote) and estimates their maximum off-site consequence. Section 3.9.3 summarizes any accident. efforts to mitigate the consequences of 3.9.1. Accident Experience Each accident that occurs at LLNL or SNLL is documented and investigated to determine its cause. Based upon these investigations, corrective action is taken to minimize their recurrence. Some of 3-44 Table 3-6. Impact of DOE Livermore laboratories' payrolls on Livei Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 (A) Total payroll xlO 3 34,672 40,744 44,074 48,996 55,861 59,260 63,570 68,125 73,414 79,947 87,015 86,335 88,674 96,570 98,504 112,604 131,000 148,336 169,400 199,911 (B) Total employees (C) Employees residing in Livermore (D) a Payroll to (C) xlO 3 4,767 5,507 5,884 6,332 6,404 6,431 6,731 6,724 6,895 7,053 6,513 6,272 6,550 6,097 6,329 6,516 6,896 7,511 7,940 8,178 2,643 (2,001) c (2,102) (2,144) (2,621) (2,759) 3,674 (3,006) 3,939 4,052 3,756 3,593 3,742 3,530 3,767 3,814 3,951 4,214 4,360 4,268 19,223 (15,227) (15,856) (17,270) (22,290) (25,619) 35,899 (31,040) 41,940 45,930 50,181 49,458 50,659 55,916 58,629 65,982 80,848 86,213 92,995 104,331 (E) Taxable transactions xlO 3 (F) 1 14,415 15,107 17,653 22,225 24,914 28,834 30,590 34,034 41,852 46,196 46,245 52,673 58,199 64,594 71,524 80,825 93,415 114,626 129,060 141,265 40.0 (30.2) (26.9) (23.9) (26.8) (26.6) 35.2 (27.4) 30.0 29 32 28 26 26.0 24.6 24, 26, 22. 21, 22. » D - (A/B) x C. This assumes a direct proportion of payroll to proportion of employees residing in Livermore. F = (D x 30%)/E. This shows the percentage of taxable transactions resulting from Livermore residents who are employees of the DOE Livermore laboratories, it is assumed that 30% of the payroll to these employees is available for spending in Livermore, including all categories of retail stores and consumer services. c Numbers in parentheses are based on LLNL data only. 3-45 150 300 260 CO CO =5 220 -a CO O co CD CO C CD o CO 3 .Q E o D C > — Uses left scale O Uses right scale 180 s 140 100 60 20 L 1950 =o^ Business license fee became business license tax jj L_ CO _co "5 ■o CO o CO C g "•P o CD CO C CO CO CO CD _c 'co D -Q E o CO CD 3 C CD 3 cc 10 1955 1960 1965 Calendar year 1970 1975 Figure 3-14. Economic profile of the city of Livermore. 3-46 25 16 14 12 c o CD 10 CO O 6 - 2 - School attendance Laboratory- related enrollment 1966 1968 1970 1972 Calendar year 1974 1976 o -a CO o 8 L. / .2 o 6 "O UD 5 O 4 1978 Figure 3-15. Impact of the DOE Livermore laboratories on the Livermore school system. (Arrows indicate the appropriate scale for each line.) 3-47 these accents resulted in th. release of «dl«ctl» or toxic mat«l.l. to th. «rt«_t. Bon. of th. accidents involv.d exposure to the public in excess of the appropriate radiation or concentration guides ,DOE Order 5480.1A). A listing OE these accidents is given in Appendix 3A. 3.9.2. Analysis of Postulated Ac cidents Ol critical facilities have been evaluated for their capacity to withstand natural pheno.en. (earthquake, wind, and maintain confinement for their inventory of radioactive materials. As a result of these analyses and subsequent facility .edifications, natural pheno.en, accidents should not have neater environmental effects than the human error accidents discussed here. Although highly unlikely, it is possible that hu.an error .ill result in the release of so.e fraction of that inventory. The postulated accidents described below involve the ■»!». amounts handled in one operation and ,r. assumed to occur in conditions that maximize offsite effect in order to estimate an upper bound of the consequences of accidents at the hiver.ot. site. ,...2.1. HTOJ^elease- This paragraph analyzes a hypothetical 1.2-HCi HT= release following rupture of a vessel and oxidation of th. T, gas from Building 331 at LLBL or Building 968 at BBLL. Historically. 1.2 HC1 represents the largest quantity of tritium ever handled at one time and is the maximum authorized for a single operation. The release and its consequences are considered unlikely for the following reasons: . currently, there are no operations planned involving this amount of tritium in one container or a single glove box. . The release of this much tritium would require the simultaneous failure of the primary vessel. a glove box. and the decontamination system ,see Sections 2.1.6.6 and 2.1.6.13,. . Previous experience with large tritium releases has shown that most of the material remains as tritium gas. which is 400 times less hazardous than tritiated water vapor (s.e BOB Order 5480. 1A) . . A n east wind maximize, the population dose and nearest-neighbor dose, but is not the most prevalent wind direction. However, this analysis does place an upper limit on the consequences of a tritium release at either LLNL or SNLL. T , ble 3-7 give, the ratio of concentration to release rate CX /Q. for various distances west of Building 331 or Building 868. The X/Q- were derived fro. wind speed, direction, and variability measurement, using Gaussian diffusion equation.. 3 - 5 These measurements were made at 30-»in 3-48 •••-v, x% m -C (0 a) .-) w ro u n V IS 4J 4-1 4J a> in X OS 1*" a5 O H O r-l X X in o CO VO vo in I I o o X X OS (N in in o o X X o in -i ro VO rH in in in in in in o o o o 1 1 o o X X X X X X fj. in o\ vo o t^ in in l l o o c a 10 •H SZ TJ 4J 10 j= 4-1 c id 3 CX X .c (0 -C J-l in o\ o w .Q i 10 ID U 3 ID C -r4 D CO ID aO a vu jC 4-> W c ID s 3-49 intervals for one yea. at a 40-, penological tower at the Evermore site. Table 3-8 gives downwind concentrations assuming that the 1.2 MCi are released uniformly over a 10-min interval. Table 3-8 also gives the estimated doses to persons standing directly under the centerline of^the cloud during its entire passage. The conversion constant from concentration to dose, 3.7 x 10 (rem/m 3 )/(pCi/s) was derived by assuming: • A biological half-life of 8.5 days 3-6 • An average energy per decay of 5.7 keV 3-7 3-7 • The critical receptor is body water (43 kg) 3-8 • The breathing rate is 20 liters/min. . Absorption of HTO through bare skin is at 1/2 the inhalation rate. • clothing cuts the absorption to 3/10 the inhalation rate. 3-8 All the HTO inhaled is absorbed by the lungs. 3-9 • The quality factor for tritium betas is one. k a rfo«* of 5 3 rem occurs at the SNLL northeast perimeter. For comparison, A maximum site boundary dose of 5.3 rem occur* Tlflp 10 chapter 100 uses an accidental whole body exposure dose of the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 25 rem at the site boundary as a power-reactor siting criterion. The maximum dose to an off-site resident is 3.8 rem. The EPA has drafted criteria for planning protective actions following radiological accidents that could present a hazard to the public. In these criteria, EPA recommends that protective action be considered if the actions could reduce wh ole body doses 1 to 5 rem. The higher guide (5 rem, is a mandatory level at which effective actions anticipated dose. T h. laboM ton, S are considering protective actions for nearby residents. However, the conscience - tnis postdate* accident is not serious, even without protective action since the dose Th-v »ssu.e that the individual, or population in estimates for the tritiu. release are conservative. They assu.e each sector, stood outside under the cloud centerline and that .11 of the tritiu. is in the for. of „ TO . Table J-. gives the population doe. in the downwind sector, even the ..,!«» doses ere only about 1/4 of the population dose fro. natural radiation background. 3922 . n^^^^^^^^^S^LJ^S^M^- It is Postulated that the critic.lity ^ accident occurs at *»-. Building ,32 «the Plutoniu. facility, and involves a fission yield of 10 fls si,„s. Building 333 was chosen because .est of the biver.ore site, .or* with fissile ..terials is done there. 3-50 *-. H f M tt co ^r tt • I II II o o o o o o XX XX XX " W VO CM O O MH in tt m oo CO CM CM CM CN CM o o o o o o *-• —* •-> — < — I rH XX XX XX in in cm co oo oo t~ co H o\ ^i ^ l*)CI CO CM tj> co !-, L ' ' > i o o o o o o CM IN CM r-t CM CM II II II o o o o o o a' tj c •H 3 c 5 o TJ co a> CO o TJ tj c ID co c c •H 4-> « u c o> o c o o TJ a> 4J <0 e «," w 00 o I -I-H CO 4J •H o> ^ ■2 ° <0 ID Eh <|_, 6 ID X tj xx XX XX •""* f f^ CN kC CN CO CO CO CM CO CO o o — 1 -4 o o —1 —1 o o X X X X X X TT VO 00 TT CM O rM co CO CM cm in CO CM CO CM CO CM II II II o o o o o o i-H i-l H ~4 H -4 XX XX XX 00 O CM 00 CM O in cm co f m i-i CM CM CM CM II II o o o o <0 C c o CO U 0> Q CO CM CM I I O O XX XX XX in vo tji cm co Ta- rn, co cm r- him' ■M CM CM CM CM CM O O i-l i-l o o O O .-I .-I X X X X X X CM O 00 CM o Tf cm in CO CM CM CO CM CM CM CM CM CO 1 I II II o o o o o o •-* -t -~\ -4 r* ,-1 XX XX XX <* CN O VO CM VO CM in T* CO CM tji c o ■u 4-> 4-> c c c 4J 01 CJ 01 o c o u u c a (0 •h x: u C & TJ 4-> aj m 0> in 0> in g S CM S co S cm •H u c o CO 4-> ID 0) 01 2 W xx xx xx CO 00 00 VO r-l CM CM CM CO CM CM TJ- CN -H CN 00 in rj. ,-h 1 o I-H 1 o l-l 1 o i-i 1 o i-H 1 O — H X X X X X CO tt o r-4 i-H ro i-H v CM i-H i-H CM O O o ■H i-l ,-H XX X CM O CO VO co oo in i-h X CO rH •V i-H X CO CM c a ■H £ TJ 4J 0) in S Co c o CO >i (0 u 0) Q co I I o o X X OO CO cm in o o o X XX i* o ■» m oo cm tj« r-- o o o >H .-4 rH X XX co oo cm oo 00 CO Tf r-- c o> CJ u 01 c a ID •H JC TJ 4J 0) in S CM C 0) u 0) c a TJ •rH -C •0 4J 0) in £ CM c o CO 4-1 ID 0) 0> 2 co ID J3 c 10 x: 01 CD o T3 CU -c ID .c 4-> O CO .a ID • -Q >i id a TJ c a> 2 •= 4J CO o> c 4J ID •H SJ W £ io .rj 3-51 Table 3-9. Population dose to 1.2 x 10 6 persons downwind of the tritium research facilities following a 1.2-MCi HTO release in an east wind. Meteorological data base Annual Dry season Wet season Condition Median 95th percentile 3 Median 95th percentile Median 95th percentile Population dose (man-rent) 11,000 46,000 33,000 126,000 10,000 31,000 a Means the probability is 0.95 that the estimated dose will be less than that stated. 3-52 Aspinall, 3 " X woodcock, 3 " 12 and Stratton 3 " 13 have analyzed theoretical and actual yield data for criticality accidents. Actual accidents involving solid Plutonium, as handled in 332, have yields lower than the l 18 -fission accident analyzed here. Woodcock 3 " 12 estimates the maximum potential magnitude of a criticality accident involving solid plutonium as 10 18 fissions.. To place an upper bound on the effects of a criticality accident, we have used Woodcock's 3 " 12 theoretical estimate. At t ♦ 1 „»!„, the total quantity of fission products remaining after a 10 18 -f issions accident is approximately 2.5 x 10 5 Ci . At t + 10 min, the total activity will have decayed to 1.5 x 10 Ci. By far the largest portion of the fission products will be in the nonvolatile form. The volatile isotopes which are the most significant when considering possible release to the environment are given in Table 3-10. 3 ' 9 * 2 ' 2 ' 1 ' Eff ects of Fission-Product Release to the Environment . As indicated in 3.9.2.2, about 1.5 x 10 4 Ci of fission-product activity would be present at t + 10 min after the postulated 10 -fission criticality accident. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has suggested 3 " 14 that for Plutonium criticality accidents involving solutions of plutonium, the following release fractions be used: 100% for noble gases, 25% for halogens, and 1% for all remaining fission products. Solid Plutonium criticalities will release a smaller percentage of fission products so that the assumed release fractions are conservative. Air exhausted from facilities most likely to suffer a criticality accident passes through HEPA filters to ensure minimum release of particulates to the environment. By assuming that a release occurs uniformly over a 10 min period and by using the median and 95%-probability X /Q values given in Table 3-11 one can calculate the concentrations and possible doses to persons downwind. Possible dose pathways that should be considered include submersion, inhalation, and forage-cow-milk. Important nuclides and appropriate dose conversion constants are given in Table 3-12. The dose conversion constants were obtained from various sources, but primarily 3-15 from Ng. The doses are calculated for an east wind and thus demonstrate the maximum environmental effect. The most probable wind direction is west to southwest. The hills near the site, north, east, and south, will reduce ground-level concentrations on their far sides. Population densities are highest in the sectors west of LLNL (see Figs. 2-9 and 2-10). To determine the concentration of these isotopes at various distances downwind along the line of release and the resulting integrated dose, three sets of tables are provided to cover annual (Tables 3-13 and 3-14), we^eason (Tables 3-15 and 3-16), and dry season (Tables 3-17 and 3-18) conditions. The radioiodine and cesium (from xenon decay) tend to attach themselves to particulates 3-53 ::•-:■•'•■, Table 3-10. Volatile isotopes from lO^-f issions accident Activity released isotope (half life) (Ci at t = 0) 131 I (8.05 d) 0.75 132 I (2.4 h) 3.3 133 I (20.5 h) 18 134 I (52.5 m) 450 135 I (6.68 h) 48 135m xe (15 m) 395 138 xe (17 m) 1050 87 Kr (1.3 h) 112 83m Rr (1.86 h) 13.5 88 Kr (2.8 h) 69.5 8 %r (4.4 h) 18.5 135 xe (9.2 h) 36.4 133m x< • (2.3 d) 0.2 133 xe (5.27 d) 2.7 13lm Xe (12.0 d) 0.06 85 Kr (10.4 y) 0.002 3-54 ■ 10 Ol V. X 01 rH -Q n Eh 5-1 rr O r- I o cm i" .— i r-» cm in vo in vo in vo in II II II o o o o o o rH rH rH rH ,-H rH XX XX XX ■3* VO O c <0 x: 4-1 tO 10 IV X • 4J — O CN (0 in *sj. in f in •*>• ro I l o o 1 o i o l o 1 o CO 0) X! rH rH ■-H t-\ f-\ rH IT 4J X X X X X X c •H 4J "D 10 o t- vo in vo rH £ •H 4J r-» cn r~ •«)• vo CN 3 CQ in e • O O o u vV 0) 0) <*-> to rH rH rH •H •H •H •H E 4J 4J 4-> .X >i C C c 4-1 01 0> 01 VTl -H o o vo f-\ V-l 14 u • -H c 8, c 01 a c 0> a B O jQ "■~ (0 10 10 10 ro j0 •H X! •H x; •H A g >i o ■D 4-1 ■o 4-> •D 4-1 \ u u 4i in S VTl 0) in 0) in to >o a s w s cn "D 01 C 0) u 3 XI (0 O 4J c c XI o w to tO CO 4-> 01 c 10 rH 01 01 c •H 4) <0 3 to to D CO £ C C >1 u 4J 01 10 jQ O < a s 3-55 Table 3-12. Nuclides of importance released during a maximum credible accident IdUltr J * Half-life (h) Source strength 3 (pCi/s) Dose conversion cons tant Pathway Organ Nuclide rem/m 2 rem/m 2 affected pCi/s pCi _ Submersion 87 K r 1.27 1.8 x 10 11 2.6 x 10 -13 Whole body 88 Kr 2.8 1.2 x 10 11 5.0 x 10 -13 Submersion Whole body I3ij 194. 3.2 x 10 8 3.4 x lO" 10 Inhalation Thyroid 2.7 x 10-5 For age -cow -mi Ik Thyroid 133 x 21. 7.5 x 10 9 9.2 x 10~ U Inhalation Thyroid 6.0 x io-7 Forage-cow-m: Ik Thyroid 134 jb 0.87 1.8 x 10 11 5.8 x 10 -12 Inhalation Thyroid 135jb 6.7 2.0 x 10 10 2.8 x 10 -11 inhalation Thyroid 135 Xe 9.2 6.0 x 10 10 7.5 x 10 -14 Submersion Whole body 135m Xe 0.26 6.5 x 10 11 1.3 x 10 -13 Submersion Whole body 138 Xe 0.28 1.7 x 10 12 7.2 x 10 -14 7.2 x 10 -14 Submersion Submersion Whole body Whole body 138 Cs 0.53 c I E£i£t£ 251 » of stance In >»|M-^ P««-»- • 5fe£. *. decay of "»x e ana Is not leased at ti». of accident. 3-56 °i^ 01 IV w 10 .0 en C O a e •i-i c 1-1 01 ■fH F 4J R <0 3 u (A 4J c rH 01 <0 u c •H rn u H u co O H 0> 1 4J no (1) £= 0) rH Tl -U r TI H H 3 CM CM O O <-l r-t co co o o ■H rH X X X X CM Cn O VO ^H rH CM CM O o X X m co H rH X X «9- VO On rH f rr o o r-t rH X X co cn rH CN o p» CN o rH X CN rH rn co O o "H rH X X in co r-l CN o o rH rH X X a* oo T>" oo co no o o rH r-l X X T O CO in o o rH rH X X r-t VO •H rH CN CO O o rH rH X X oo in rH -t CN co O o r-< rH X X ro ^« r- in ■*»■ •«r o o rH rH X X O CN r-t CM *t in o o t in o o XX XX 00 r-l 00 rH in rH in rH mm in in o o o o -I -t r-i rH XX XX m ci ro o r-l CN o o X X VO CN ro p» o o X X rH O ^ ^ mm o o o o XX XX •*" cn in »r CO CM rH ro CN CO O o rH rH O O rH rH m in o o r-t r-l o o rH r-t m in o o rH rH m in o o rH rH m vo o o r-t rH vo vo o o r-l r-\ X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X CM cn p* vo m vo CN ■» 00 CM CM 00 co r» oo p~ <* r-l r-l CO (N in CO CM r-l CM cm m VO rH r^ CM VO vo o o X X m o vo vo o o rH r-l CO CO o o r-l rH *r in o o rH rH vo vo o o r-l rH m in o o rH rH m vo o o rH rH vo vo o o r-l r-l X X X X X X X X X X X X X X rH a\ O CO o o T vo 00 o m vo O 00 r-l CM CO 00 r-» cm r-t CO rH in m rH co r~ vo p» o o vo p- o o XX XX CI CN CM •«* 00 CM ON CM io r» o o •H rH vo p~ o o ■H rH co *r o o rH rH m in o o rH rH vo P~ o o rH rH m vo o o rH rH X X X X X X X X X X X X o vo VO CM 0\ CN co m o m CM o m rH CO rH er> co cm r- m r-l VO CM vo vo X X ) o X X •v oo r-l CO p~ oo o o p^ oo o o XX XX r~ o vo o CO rH CO rH P~ P- o o rH rH vo p~ O O r-t r-l o o r-t rH m vo o o rH rH o o rH r-t X X X X X X X X X X CM rH CM o CM VO CO o CM O rH TT oo co CM 00 m cm r-l *r X X T -■ rH CO rH CM CM 00 CM ai 4-1 c a> u u a c V o hi •H jC •O 4J 0) m X en c a> o 01 c a (0 •H jC •V 4J 0) m £ cn c 01 o u 01 c a ro •H jC •U JJ 0) m SE en c 0i u u a> c a ro •H £ •a -u oi m X cn c a <0 ■H jC TJ 4J 01 in S cn C Q, ro -H jC 73 4J oi m X cn 01 X s m •H jC •O 4J at m S cn o> X 00 co c ai o u 0) c a ro ■H sz ■a 4J 0) m S cn 00 o> c j3 (0 j<: >, 4J cn -rH vo rH • •H o J3 — ' ro 10 >i u u ra a 13 C 0) 3 JC 4J JO W Oi c jj o 0) in CO X) a H o> >h o •a c o •a 0> U ro E c •H 3 C s 0> C (0 CO 03 CO vo in in in II l I o o o o X X o r» en H c o U CO X X o o o o XX XX o\ co oo in co ov vo rH m in I I o o rH rH X X co in •«r oo I I o o X X TT CM ^ CO CM CM I I O O rH rH X X •cr r~ CO VO o o rH r-l X X rH in rH CM I I o o r-l rH X X VO 1" cm in o o rH r-l X X co o 00 CM CM CM I I o o rH rH X X r~ in CM rH I I o o rH rH X X •* co I l o o X X ■«*• oo Tj" co I I o o .-I rH X X in en t- r-l I I o o X X 0"\ o rH ■* o o r-l rH X X *t in vo *— I vo vo I I o o X X VO CM r-l CO vo in I I o o r-l r-l X X «* CO in rH I— VO I I o o X X vo co 00 CM in in I I o o rH r-l X X oo «r r-l T VO VO I I O O vo in o o XX XX vo co r- in Ht VO rH in in in i" II II o o o o rH r-l rH rH XX XX 0-i cm co co cm r- in *h l i o o I I o a XX XX ro cm cm vo eg vo ro oo rH CO CM rH rH CO CM CO CO in in 1 | 1 l 1 1 *t CO 1 1 1 1 o o rH rH X X 1 o rH X Cn CO 1 1 o o rH rH X X en <-f I 1 o o rH rH X X in o o o rH ^ X X 00 CO o o rH rH X X rH T o o rH i-i X X in o o o rH rH X X CO rH o o rH rH X X vo in o o rH rH X X O O VO r-\ *r rH CO rH cm r» >* rH CO 00 cm r~ CM VO co a\ T rH I I o o X X co co I I o o X X rH in m co I I o o X X o m cm vo ro co ro ro CO CM 1 1 o o o o o o X X X X X X en in TT O vo oo rH VO cm er. 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The concentrations given have not accounted for reduction due to upwind deposition and are therefore conservative values. Doses from dry deposition of these nuclides are considered to be negligible due to the short half-lives of the nuclides and to the smaller dose conversion constants for surface deposition compared to inhalation and submersion. It should be noted that the Livermore Valley is not a milk-producing area, and very few milk cows exist within a few kilometers of the site. At any rate, protective measures (replacing milk) could be taken in the event of an accident. Pasture meat doses were not considered because of short half-lives. Table 3-19 gives doses at the LLNL west site boundary. The importance of eliminating the forage-cow-milk pathway dose by milk replacement is obvious. (At present, no milk cows are pastured near the west perimeter.) The maximum doses of 0.08 rem whole body (submersion, and 0.58 rem thyroid (inhalation) are well below power-reactor siting criteria of 25 rem for a maximum whole body dose and 300 rem for a thyroid dose in an accident (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Chapter 100). Also, these maximum doses are below those recommended by the Environmental Protection Agency for considering protective action of populations at risk. 3 " 9 Table 3-20 gives the population dose over the 1,209,000 people in the sector west of the site (see Fig. 2-10). The numbers are conservative since the calculation assumed that every person stood on the centerline of the cloud during its passage. The forage-cow-milk pathway is not considered to add to population exposure west of the site since the milk supply is almost entirely produced elsewhere. Even the maximum estimates are less than 1% of the man-rem dose of approximately 124,000 from natural background. 3 - 9 ' 2 ' 2 ' 2 ' Eff6Ct ° f Rainfa11 °" "™" - T "e radioiodines and 138 Cs atoms attach themselves to Particulates in the atmosphere and are subject to washout during rainfall. The effect of such washout has been evaluated for the wet season (November-April). The following assumptions have been made: • A rain rate of 3 mm/h. • A deposition velocity of 1 cm/s. • Stability category "D" during rainfall. Rainfall will decrease the air concentrations (submersion and inhalation doses) of particulate-bound nuclides; there will then be a corresponding increase in the surface deposition. The following conclusions were reached: • The rainfall-induced external gamma doses, integrated to infinite time, are less than the inhalation doses at all distances to 50 km for all radioiodines. This result is primarily due to the lower dose conversion constants for external gamma. 3-63 , , at the we8 t site boundary, estimated for three meteorological Table 3-19. Doses (rem) at the west summaries of east winds. Pathway Annual — i^dia^ 95lh~ Median percentile nrv season wt season — ur Y s £|— — g^; Median 95th . -i^ percentile percentile b* 5 Submersion 0.015 0.048 inhalation 0.098 0.36 Forage-cow-milk 5.5 0.015 0.099 5.4 0.048 0.31 20.0 0.015 0.10 6.0 0.076 0.58 35.0 M4* c o 95 that the actual meteorology will provide better a Means the probability is 0.95 that tne a diffusion and higher winds than those used here. Table 3- 2 0. Population doses (man-rem)^ - sector^st^of -^oratory, for three meteorological summaries or 1,209,000 people. ,f east winds. Populat Pathway Annual Median 95th percentile Wet season Median 95th percentile Dry season Median 95th percentile Submersion Inhalation 4 53 9 110 4 58 19 130 2 37 11 150 .ility is 0.95 that the actua a Means the probability is « ™£ "£ less than shown better diffusion so that the doses win 1 meteorology will provide 3-64 ••'■'>. £tf ■■h • The forage-cow-milk pathway doses for 131 I and 133 l are increased by precipitation- scavenging by factors which increase with distance downwind. The maximum enhancement factor is about .1 at the site boundary and about 6 at 50 km. 138 138 xe decays to Cs; the latter becomes attached to particulates and is available for scavenging. For the 95th-percentile meteorology, the dose enhancement of 138 Cs from rainfall is less than a factor of 2 as far out as 50 km. • Submersion doses are enhanced by attachment of 138 Cs particles to fog droplets; the enhancement factor for the 5% probability level is about 1 near the site boundary, increasing to about 2 at 50 km downwind. Radioiodine inhalation doses increased by a factor of 2. Although the droplets, which typically have diameters of 8 to 20 ym, 3 " 16 are too large to be readily inhaled, They are absorbed in the GI tract after being swallowed. 3 " 17 3 - 9 ' 2 - 3 ' Maximum Credible Spill . The maximum credible spill at Livermore is postulated to involve the accidental release of transuranic elements, since large quantities of these materials are handled in Buildings 251 and 332 at LLNL. 244 For purposes of analyzing this spill, it is assumed that 15 g of Cm, as curium oxide, are dispersed throughout a work room in Building 251 (possibly the result of a fire and/or explosion). Fifteen grams, or 1250 Ci, is the largest amount of alpha activity ever expected to be in a single room. Even then, it is within a single glove box for a very short time, until it can be divided into smaller amounts and distributed to other locations within the facility. Again, it is extremely unlikely that this much activity could be involved in a spill. The worst past spills in Building 251 have involved curie amounts approximately 1000 times smaller than this. Present building procedures limit operations to 30 Ci of material at one time, except for rare instances where greater quantities are necessary. Although more transuranic material is usually present in Building 332, resulting in a greater potential hazard, the containment features of this building are superior to those of Building 251. As noted in Section 2.1.6.4, Building 251 is being upgraded. 244 The amount of Cm spilled on the floor of the room that becomes airborne and a respiratory hazard will depend primarily on particle size. The material used in Building 251 is a powdered oxide of curium. No direct measurements concerning what fraction of this material would become airborne have been made; however, the oxide is nominally 400-mesh and it has been estimated that not more than 10% of the particles have a median diameter less than 2 pm. For purposes of this analysis it is assumed that 1.5 grams of the oxide is in the particle-size range of 0.5 um to 2 ym and therefore respirable. With respect to the fraction that becomes airborne Mishima and Schwendiman 3-18 conclude that for plutonium oxide 0.05% is a satisfactory, safe value for estimating the fraction of material 3-65 th.t becomes airborne and conseguently . respirator, hasard. We ball.™ that thi. percentage of airborne material represents a coaaarvativa estimate for a Building 25! spill also. ^Correcting for airborne ana respirable fractions, -a ,.t a total gu.ntity of r.spirable airborne Cm of 0.0008 ,. which is 61 mCi. The prasant building filters are of a type th.t ret.ia 95, (that ia. they pass 5„ of the particulates when tested by the National Bureau of Standards stain test. This is eguiv.lent to a retention of 60-65, hy the dioct.lphth.lat. 239 Pu, 3-70 (A) The following DOE air shipments of plutonium are considered as being made for the purposes of national security within the meaning of Section 502(2) of Public Law 94-187: (1) Shipments made in support of the development, production testing, sampling, maintenance, repair modification or retirement of atomic weapons or devices; (2) Shipments made pursuant to international agreements for cooperation for mutual defense purposes; (3) Shipments necessary to respond to an emergency situation involving a possible threat to the national security. (B) The managers of doe's Albuquerque, San Francisco, Oak Ridge, Savannah River, and Nevada Operations Offices may authorize air shipments within Subsection (A)(1), on a case by case basis, provided that matter falls within their respective scope of responsibility and that they determine that such shipment is required by air either because: (1) The delay resulting from using ground transportation methods would have serious adverse impact upon a national security requirement (2) Safeguards or safety considerations dictate the use of air transportation; (3) The nature of the item to be shipped necessitates the use of air transportation in order to avoid possible damage which may be expected from other available transportation environments; or (4) The nature of the items being shipped necessitates rapid shipment by air in order to preserve the chemical, physical, or isotopic properties of the item." 3 ' 9 - 2 ' 7 ' 1 ' Transportation Accidents . Packages used to transport materials in support of LLNL operations are designed to prevent the loss or dispersal of their contents under both hypothetical accident and normal transport conditions. These packages include shipments of enriched, depleted, and natural uranium, plutonium, americium, tritium, and other radionuclides. Although most of the shipments shown in Table 3-21 involve yCi quantities of radioactivity, some involve larger quantities. Table 3-22 summarizes these larger-quantity shipments. The data are from 1977 but quantities are not markedly different at present. In order to estimate conservatively the risks of transportation accidents, all transuranics (TRU) were assumed to be 239 Pu . Since almost all large- quantity uranium shipments are 238 u, all isotopes of uranium are combined and expressed as 23 V Under certain abnormal conditions, releases of radionuclides to the environment could occur. The NRC provides guidance on various accident severity categories, their probability of occurrence, and the means to assess these accidents through the RADTRAN computer code developed by Sandia Corporation. The resulting radiation doses will be overestimated because it is assumed that all 3-71 Table 3-22. Ave rage large-quantity shipments of radioactive materials to and from LLNL, 1977. Outbound Curies per Miles per Number of Material shipment shipment shipments Inbound Curies per Miles per Number of shipment shipment shipments u 0. 47 1760 129 0. 023 810 264 TRU 120 1350 75 92 1530 89 3 H 1400 1660 11 850 2500 9 192 Ir 57 1050 14 84 2010 20 3-72 the shipments were transported by truck, through suburban areas. In reality, over half the shipments were sent by air transport, which has a lower accident probability. The shipments sent by truck are driven through rural areas, which have lower population density, and therefore less population at risk. Maximum doses for each of the four types of large-quantity shipment are listed in Tables 3-23 and 3-24, by three of eight accident severity categories. Accident severity categories run from the most probable accident which is least likely to release radioactive material (Category III) to a very severe, highly improbable accident (Category VIII) which would release material from most types of containers. The table is limited to three categories to prevent overlap of somewhat redundant information but yet provides the range of possible maximum doses from various accidents. Category III was chosen because Categories I and II are assumed to release no material. Category VI was chosen as an intermediate category and Category VIII was chosen to give maximum possible doses. (Categories I-IV include 99.6% of all possible accidents in an overall accident rate of 1.06 x 10~ 6 accidents per km under normal circumstances. ) Maximum individual doses in category VIII are probably overestimated by RADTRAN because it assumes (for meteorological dispersion) a line source extending to 10 m above the surface. However, a true Category VIII accident 3-22 includes a sustained fire (in addition to a high crush force) which would cause the effluent plume to rise considerably, thus ensuring significant dilution before the maximum dose to an individual is given. Included in Tables 3-23 and 3-24 is an annual radiological risk value. This takes into account the total expected population dose from each accident and multiplies that value by the probability of that accident occurring to give an annual expected man-rem value from accidental releases caused by transportation accidents. As illustrated by the data, maximum doses from the accidents in Category III for incoming and outgoing shipments lead to small maximum individual and population doses. Much larger doses are encountered in Category VI and VIII accidents. When multiplied by the risk probabilities, however, Category VIII risks are less than Category VI risks. The annual radiological risk (man-rem) in Tables 3-23 and 3-24 is much less than the population doses (man-rem) that might occur due to a maximum credible accident (Table 3-9), or the annual population dose to the sector west of the Livermore site (Table 3-20) . The highest annual radiological risk of 0.027 man-rem is a small proportion of the approximately 124,000 man-rem due to natural radiation. 3.9.3. Emergency Preparedness The consequences of almost all emergencies are altered by emergency response action. Health and Safety Technicians, safety professionals, a full-time Fire Department, a Medical Department, and/or a 3-73 Table 3-23. Radiological consequences from potential accidents involving transportation of radioactive materials — inbound. Accident category Critical organ population dose (man-rem) u Category III Max. individual dose (rem) Critical organ population dose (man-rem) Annual radiological risk (man-rem) 1.6 x 10 Category VI Max. individual dose (rem) Critical organ Population dose (man-rem) Annual radiological risk (man-rem) 1.3 x 10 Category VIII Max. individual dose (rem) 0.021 Lung 0.16 TRU 229 Bone 430 0.1 Whole body 0.14 An nual radiological risk (man-rem) 4.3 x 10" 1 x 10~ 4 4.1 x 10" 192 Ir 2.1 x 10 -4 2.8 0.001 0.004 Lung Bone Whole body Whole body 0.02 1.3 0.001 0.007 1.6 x 10" 5 0.028 1.5 x 10" 6 3.1 x 10~ 6 0.021 279 0.1 3.5 Lung Bone Whole body Whole body 0.16 430 0.14 0.7 1.3 x 1 o- 5 0.022 1.2 x 10" 6 1 x 10" 5 3.5 Whole body 0.68 3.5 x 10~ 8 3-74 pun Table 3-24. Radiological consequences from potential accidents involving transportation of radioactive mater ials--outbound. Accident category TRU Category III Max. individual dose (rem) Critical organ Population dose (man-rem) Annual radiological risk (man-rem) Category VI Max. individual dose (rem) Critical organ Population dose (man-rem) Annual radiological risk (man-rem) 3 x 10 -4 Category VIII Max. individual dose (rem) 0.4 Critical organ Lung Population dose (man-rem) 3.2 Annual radiological risk (man-rem) 9.3 x 10 -7 7.3 x 10~ 6 192 Ir 0.004 3.6 0.002 0.002 Lung Bone Whole body Whole body 0.033 5.6 0.002 0.005 4 x 10' -4 0.027 2 x 10~ 6 3.2 x 10" 6 0.4 360 0.017 2.4 Lung Bone Whole Body Whole body 3.2 56 0.23 0.46 3 x 10 -4 0.002 1.6 x 10" 6 2.5 x 10" 6 360 0.017 2.4 Bone Whole body Whole body 56 0.23 0.46 7.3 x 10" -6 5.3 x 10 -9 8.7 x 10 -9 3-75 Disaster Control Organization are prepared to respond at any time to mitigate the consequences of any accident at the Laboratories. The LLNL Disaster Control Plan, Appendix 3B, summarizes the response to any accident, shows how the Disaster Control Organization is composed and how it is mobilized, and outlines some of the emergency equipment used to cope with and alter the course of an accident. SNLL has a similar emergency plan with sections covering organization and control, warning signals, national emergencies, local emergencies, nuclear weapons or materials incidents/accidents, shutdown and restoration of operations, evacuation, shelter, and defense. Limiting the emergency preparedness discussion to on-site procedures does not imply that DOE plans are not coordinated with those of local or state agencies for incidents having the potential for off-site consequences. None of the credible accidents described in section 3.9.2 is considered to require off-site action other than notification and monitoring. DOE assesses potential incidents at the Livermore site that might affect the public and coodinates its planning with appropriate agencies having the authority for the protection of public health and safety. Under the DOE Radiological Assistance Plan, DOE makes available its resources, such as personnel, equipment, facilities, data acquisition network, etc., to such state and local authorities. DOE is in agreement with the State Health Department, Radiologic Health Section, relative to the notification and response procedures concerning radiological incidents occurring in California. Accordingly, in the event of a radiological incident that may affect the off-site public, DOE will notify the State Radiologic Health Section via the State Office of Emergency Services' 24-hour telephone station in Sacramento. DOE will coordinate the deployment of its resources at the incident scene in support to the local agency in charge. DOE's radiological assistance does not in any way abridge state or local authority, but works in cooperation with state/local officials in radiological emergency operations. LLNL has mutual aid agreements with the cities of Livermore and Pleasanton, and with Alameda County. A mutual aid agreement also exists between the Livermore Site and Valley Memorial Hospital. Laboratory emergency forces are prepared to notify local and county officials if an emergency requires off-site actions. The LLNL emergency dispatch center has a number of communication modes connecting it with local emergency centers. These include the Radio Mutual Aid Frequency with Livermore and Pleasanton fire departments and Alameda County emergency control center and the microwave telephone which connects LLNL with all other emergency dispatch centers in the area. 3.10. SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY The objectives of the Department of Energy's integrated Safeguards and Security plan are to: 1. Prevent successful malevolent acts involving nuclear materials or facilities, so as to protect the public against risk of death, injury, and property damage that could arise from such acts; 3-76 2. Protect classified information from unauthorized disclosures; and 3. Protect government property from theft or malevolence. In order to carry out these objectives, DOE has developed a capability to characterize and assess current threats with the purpose of obtaining an in-depth understanding of the attributes of potential adversaries, and to apply that understanding to identifying the spectrum of adversaries to be addressed. Various forms of potential actions against nuclear facilities are then evaluated for attractiveness to these potential adversaries. The knowledge gained is directed to (1) developing conceptual approaches which optimize the mix of safeguards and security features into cost-effective safeguards systems, and (2) adapting techniques for modeling and evaluating the effectiveness of these potential systems at selected facilities. The data derived is then used to focus development, test, and evaluation of safeguards equipment and modular systems to meet identified safeguards and security requirements. The developed technology is evaluated in the laboratory and in prototypic operating environments to ensure proper performance prior to installation in an operating facility. As further assurance of adequate protection, the DOE also maintains a strong independent assessment capability to inspect and evaluate safeguards and security systems to assure that they are meeting current requirements and to determine if existing requirements are adequate under current threat conditions. The objectives of the safeguards and security system at the Livermore site are (1) to assure that government-owned source and nuclear materials are not diverted to unauthorized uses, and (2) to protect DOE facilities against malevolent acts consistent with environmental, health, and safety standards. These objectives are accomplished within an integrated safeguards and security system which includes the elements of physical security, material control, and material accountability. In their systems role, physical protection procedures and measures provide for immediate detection of special nuclear material misappropriation along with a redundant capability for such immediate detection in the material control procedures. Accountability systems provide primarily for a final evidence that the other two systems have achieved their purpose and, in the event they have not, the accountability systems provide data to facilitate tracking events and isolating the location where the other systems failed. Physical protection follows the guidelines in DOE Interim Management Directive (IMD) 6102, Physical Protection of Classified Matter and Information . This IMD provides guidance for areas such as access control, detection of intrusion, protective personnel, and protection of classified matter in use, in storage, and in transit. The access controls at Livermore include personnel identification and physical barriers. The physical barriers consist of cyclone fencing topped with barbed wire. Security guards are at each entrance and at the accesses to restricted areas. Personnel identification is by photo-identification 3-77 badge which each employee must present to a guard for verification on entering or exiting from any area. Authorized escorts are required when a visitor requests access to a security area. The security personnel also reserve the right to examine packages and briefcases upon entrance or exit to ensure that prohibited materials are not brought into controlled areas nor classified matter removed. Patrols are made on off-working hours to provide security at all times. intrusion-detection equipment is used to increase efficiency, reduce guard-force costs, and to complement the other physical barriers. Protective-personnel requirements listed in detail in the DOE [KD 6102 are size and ability to use firearms, tear gas, communications systems, and other protective equipment. Classified material is maintained in security areas while in use; in security containers while in storage; or under protective services while in transit. Unauthorized entry to any area of LLNL or SNLL is forbidden, and warning signs are posted to alert the public of the consequences thereof. Material control and accounting include process design, material control accounting, measurement of physical inventories, auditing, and statistical programs designed to provide an accurate knowledge of the quantities, location, and disposition of material. Material control begins with the receiving, on-site transportation, and shipment of special nuclear material. It includes operations of vaults for the storage of material and the physical inventories of such vaults. Special nuclear material must also be under observation when in use, in open storage, or in its container, by at least two cleared and authorized persons who may be doing other work but who can give an alarm in time to prevent unauthorized removal. Annual inventories are conducted in those areas outside the vaults where materials are being processed. Accountability systems are composed of those systems which evolve bookkeeping data on the location of special nuclear material inventories, and those procedures used to verify, through measurements, the physical inventory of special nuclear material as compared with bookkeeping records. 3-78 References 3-1 3-2 3-3 3-4 3-5 3-6 3-7, 3-8. 3-9. 3-10. 3-11, 3-12. 3-13. 3-14. 3-15. 3-16. Hazards Control Progress Report No. 35 , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-50007-69-3 (1969). Hazards Centrel ine s Report No. 36 , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-50007-70-1 (1970). . J. L. Cate and T. O. Hoeger, "A Radioisotope Monitoring System for Sewage Effluent," American Ind. Hyq. Journal . October 1972, p. 693. • J- L. Cate Jr., M. Auyong, and D. W. Rueppel, A Prototype On-Line »-,. y gluorgBCence An,lv~r for Detecting Metals in Sewag e, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-81954 (1979). ' H ' SladG ' Ed " M eterology and Atomic Energy (U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1968), p. 97. K. F. Wylie, W. A. Bigler, and G. R. Grove, "Biological Half-life of Tritium in Man," Health Physics 9, 911 (1963) . K. Z. Morgan and J. E . Turner, Principles of Radiation Protection (John Wiley S Sons, New York, 1967), pp. 335-336. ^^^^ internal Radiation, International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 2 (Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1967). Basic^Radiat ion Protection Crit eria (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, P.O. Box 30175, Washington, DC, 20014, 1971), p. 83. U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Manual of Protective Action Guides and Prote - Action^fo r Nuclear Incidents , U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation Programs, Washington DC 20460, EPA 520/1-75-001 (1975). K. J. Aspinall and j. T . Daniels, Review of UKAEA Criticalitv Detection and Alar. Svstegg AHSB (S) , R92 (1965) . E. R. woodcock, Potential Magnitude of CrlH^ uty Accidents . AHSB, rpri 4 (1966). W. R. Stratton, A Re view of Criticality Acrid.n^, la-3611 (1967). U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Assumptions Used for Evaluating the Potential ^ MM .. <±-*^l^^ a Plutonium Processina and *ull Fabrication giant, NRC Regulatory Guide 3.35 (May 1977). Y ' °' N9 St al " ^ dictio " of the Maxi mum Dos age to Man from the Fallout of mn^.r Devices, !£J'andb S oj L J^ Xnternal D ose from Radionuclides R p1 ., sed to th<( Rl - nfiphoro Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-50163 (1968). E. a. Mack, W. J. E adie, C. W. Rogers, W. C. Kochmond, and R. J. Pilie , A_ Fl e^d_^nv^i S ^tip^ SSOume^^^ calspan Corporation/ CJ _ 5fl55 _ M _ 1; NTIS NQ> N73 _ 18648> 3-79 3-17. Limits for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers , international Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 30, Part I (Pergamon Press, 1979). 3-18. J. Mishima and L. C. Schwendiman, The Amount and Charact eris tics of Plutonium Made Airborne Under Thermal Stress , Battelle Northwest Laboratories, Richland, WA, BNWL-SA-3379 (1970). 3-19. Threshold Limit values for Chemi cal Substances and Physical Agents in the Workroom Environment (American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1977), p. 12. 3-20. F. A. Patty, industrial Hygiene and Toxicology, Vol. II (Interscience Publishers, New York, 1963) , p. 847. 3-21. J. M. Taylor and S. L. Daniel, RADTRAN: A Re v ised Computer Code to Analyze Transportation of 3 _22. Radioactive Material , Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (to be published). U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Final Environmental Statem ent on Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes , NUREG-0170, Vol. 1 & 2 (1977). 3-80 4. UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS Environmental impacts described in Section 3 which are unavoidable consequences of on-going operations at DOE Livermore laboratories are: • Land use. • Utilization of natural resources and energy. • Laboratory-generated traffic on East Avenue. • Impact of operational releases of radioactive and nonradioactive effluents. • Radiation doses to the public. 4.1. LAND USE Land use discussed in Section 3.2 involves the commitment of approximately 30 km (including Site 300) to government use. Such a commitment curtails for an indefinite period diversity and range of potential uses of the property. As noted, the present use of the land at Livermore was not the initial commitment to government use; when the Atomic Energy Commission took over the property it was an "abandoned airfield" held by the Department of Defense. Since LLNL began operations in 1952, site improvements in buildings and landscaping have converted much of the area to a campus environment. SNLL has made similar improvements since 1956. Accordingly, if diversion from its pre-World War II use as an agricultural area is to be considered adverse, DOE's Livermore site improvements are balancing mitigating factors which should be considered beneficial. New construction is anticipated to have only minimal environmental effects. These will be similar to other recent programs which have had no major environmental effect (see section 2.1.7.2). 4.2. NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY 4.2.1. Water 5 3 During 1979, LLNL and SNLL used 9.6 x 10 m of domestic water, essentially unchanged from the 9.5 x 10 m used in 1978, and only slightly higher than the 8.5 x 10 m 3 used in 1977 during the California drought. As described in section 2, this supply comes from the Hetch Hetchy line serving San Francisco. The above quantity is about 0.25% of that used by San Francisco during the same period. 4-1 4.2.2. Electrical Power H During 1979, LLNL and SNLL consumed 870 TJ of electricity, up from the 830 TJ used in 1978. Increased usage of electric power is due to additional staff and the requirements of the resulting programmatic effort. 4. 2. 3. Natural Gas .7 3 During 1979, LLNL and SNLL consumed 1.5 x 10 ni of natural gas. The consumption was unchanged from the quantity used in 1978. 4.3. LABORATORY-GENERATED TRAFFIC ON EAST AVENUE Although vehicular traffic may enter LLNL from either Vasco Road on the west or Greenville Road on the east, the greatest traffic is on East Avenue. Most of this traffic is due to LLNL and SNLL personnel; on an average work day there are more than 2500 automobiles in the parking lots. Truck traffic also uses East Avenue, since most of these obtain access permits to LLNL at the South Main Gate Pass Office and must enter through this gate. During morning and evening peak periods such traffic is an adverse impact to residents living on East Avenue. Cost of maintaining the roadbed is increased due to DOE laboratories' traffic. 4.4. OPERATIONAL RELEASES OF RADIOACTIVE AND NONRADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS Accidental releases of both radioactive and nonradioactive effluents were discussed in section 3.9. Accidents due to human error (including inadequate engineering controls) can be minimized. This section addresses those releases that, although technologically reduced to the lowest practicable level, occur as a consequence of normal programmatic activities. 4.4.1. Radioa ctive Rele ases Radioactive airborne and liquid releases from the Livermore site in 1980 are listed in Table 3-1. 4-2 ,*. M CZmD *j 7. RELATIONSHIPS OF THE LIVERMORE OPERATIONS TO LAND USE PLANS, POLICIES, AND CONTROLS Land usage at these sites does not appear to be in conflict with any known state, county, or city land use plans, policies, or controls. The Livermore General Plan has been recently revised. Citizen's committees have participated in formulating goals for the new General Plan, which include • A Livermore area growth rate near the national average of 1.8%. • Preserving the rural and native character of the Livermore area. • Planning a feeling of openness in urban areas. The growth rate of the laboratories and the implementation of their long-range plans are in balance with provisions of this Livermore General Plan. The proposed new entrance to LLNL from Vasco Road (section 2.1.7.3) has been reviewed by Alameda County and the City of Livermore and is consistent with their plans. Since some of the land surrounding the Livermore laboratories has been judged to be prime or unique farmland, the impact of the new entrance was reviewed using the Council of Environmental Quality guidance. 7-1 The land needed for the new access road, which is privately owned, is not now being farmed and there are no plans to use it as such. The Alameda County Planning Commission has determined that the land's highest value can be realized by industry and has zoned the area for industrial development. Accordingly, plans for the road construction are proceeding. There are no known potential conflicts with plans of any other agency in continuing operation of Site 300. The Association of Bay Area Governments Regional Plan 1970-1990 proposed public ownership of a permanent open-space area for recreational and scenic value to the public; areas west and south of Site 300 may be designated for this purpose. The Alameda County General Plan proposes major park and recreation uses along Tesla Road west of the Site. The San Joaquin General Plan for open space uses designates Corral Hollow Road as a recreational route. There does not appear to be any conflict with the Site if any or all of these plans mature. In summary, although the DOE laboratories, located on federal property, are surrounded by land that is undergoing change with respect to local use planning, the LLNL and SNLL sites do not conflict with and are integrated into local land use master plans. 7-1 Reference 7-1. Executive Office of the President, Counc il on Environmental Quality, Analysis of Impacts on Prime and Unique Farmland in Environmental Impact Statements, Memora 30, 1976. ndum for Heads of Agencies, August 7-2 ■ Ml r ■• 8. IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES Irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources include those consumed by LLNL and SNLL operations and those that cannot be reasonably expected to revert to a natural state if the DOE structures were removed. Total investment in plant and equipment at the DOE Livermore laboratories is currently estimated at about $1.5 billion. This represents the current replacement cost of each facility constructed and equipped during the period from 1952 through September 30, 1979 (1956 to September 30, 1979 for Sandia). Although not anticipated in the foreseeable future, these facilities could be demolished and much of the equipment recovered for use, and the land returned to its pre-World War II use. As discussed in section 2.3.11, small areas within LLNL exhibit radiation levels slightly above background; these would require decontamination in event the site were decommissioned. Decontamination costs could not be predicted accurately until such time as specific decommissioning requirements become known. Resources consumed or used by DOE's Livermore operations are discussed in section 3.3. In summary, use during 1979 was as follows: • Manpower • Water • Natural gas • Fuel oil • Electricity • Gasoline • Diesel • Jet fuel 6906 man-years 9.6 x 10 5 m 3 1.5 x 10 7 m 3 988 m 870 TJ 1528 m" 118 m 3 761 m 3 8-1 wResA ftSX m ■ 9"V 9. ENVIRONMENTAL TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS 9.1. INTRODUCTION The economic and environmental costs associated with the continuing and future operation of the DOE laboratories at Livermore must be weighed against the national security and the technical, environmental, and socioeconomic cultural benefits to be derived from this proposed action. The projected costs for LLNL and SNLL operations are considered to be commensurate with the magnitude of the effort involved. As previously demonstrated in this BIS, the environmental impacts resulting from these operations are limited. As discussed in sections 3 and 4, these costs include the following items: • The temporary use is required of approximately 30 km 2 of land originally used for grazing and now occupied by the Laboratory facilities and testing area. • There will be the continued impact of over 8000 employees and their families on the neighboring community. • A slight continued potential for accidents is inherent with research and development operations. • Contamination with radioactive materials will be minimized as much as is possible, but the potential will continue for possible small radiation dosage. • There will be continued resource utilization including manpower, water, electrical power, and fossil fuels, as summarized in section 8. Conversely, the benefits of continued operation of the Laboratories as discussed in section 2 include: • Increased national security from nuclear weapons development. • Energy-systems development programs are directed toward systems to produce power. These include studies of fusion systems of both the magnetic and inertial (laser) containment types and fossil fuel, geothermal, and solar development programs. • Other technological development programs of value to the nation are those of laser isotope separation, electronic systems, and improved chemical explosives. • Biomedical, radiobiological, and radioecological studies and innovations in computer languages indicate future benefits. These benefits clearly substantiate the need for continued operation in the light of national defense and energy requirements. A qualitative comparison of the costs and benefits of the alternatives discussed in section 5 can be made as follows. The analysis balances the costs and benefits of the present operations as 9-1 described in sections 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 different alternative actions described in section 5 (which is the alternative of taking no action) against the 9.2. ALTERNATIVES . Plant Shutdown and Site Decommissioning . This alternative would result in the termination of operations in weapons development and energy research at Livermore and the elimination of any potential environmental damage. The cost of this alternative would involve facility decontamination and disposal of radioactive materials. Benefits from this action would be elimination of both radioactive and nonradioactive effluents to the Livermore Valley environment. Penalties of this alternative would be a downshift in the national defense and energy research efforts, and the termination of the missions of DOE's Livermore Laboratories. Such an alternative would also result in an economic impact due to the loss of about 8000 jobs in the area. # Total or Partial Relocation . The cost of relocation would be extremely high since new construction of facilities would be necessary and personnel changes would involve much time and effort. The cost of maintaining the programs at another site would be at least comparable to those at the present site. Since the environmental impact from the Livermore operations is minimal, relocation is not a cost-effective alternative. . QEgratlonal Modification. This alternative would involve modifying those operations with the greatest potential for adverse environmental impacts. Benefits would be the reduction of some environmental impact; however, the penalty would be programmatic interruption during such modifications and the cost of such modifications. . use of Alternate Technologies . This alternative would result in continuing the present operations of the DOE laboratories in research and development with the capability to use the technologies developed through these operations. Benefits of this alternative are an optimization of the programmatic effort at Livermore, and the protection of the population and the environment by emphasizing those technologies which minimize the adverse environmental impacts. 9-2 ii'i 'n'lli'i "' vM\\fti$mib 9.3. CONCLUSION Based on the discussion of the general alternatives available and the information presented in the other sections of this assessment, it is concluded that DOE operations at Livermore should continue in the present manner in research and development. Such action provides the capability to use any new technologies that are developed through the present programs, and continually review and upgrade the programs to minimize any possible adverse environmental impacts. 9-3 fflh I ^ SoBs ■ " ; :">k 10. COMMENTS The Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) on the Livermore Site in September 1978. That DEIS (DOE/EIS-0028-D) assessed the environmental impact associated with current and continuing operation of both the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and the Sandia National Laboratories-Livermore (SNLL) . Public review and comment on the DEIS were invited with the closing date for receiving comments being December 22, 1978. A total of 26 comment letters were received from government agencies, organizations and individuals, to provide further opportunity for public comment, a public hearing on the DEIS was held in Livermore on April 12, 1979. Major substantive issues raised through letters received and at the public hearing concerned: (1) earthquake safety of continued operations of the laboratories on the Livermore site, (2) employee health effects associated with Livermore operations, (3) the maximum credible accident, (4) cost- benefit analysis of Livermore operations, (5) emergency response plans, and (6) the transportation of radioactive materials in and out of the Livermore site. This section contains the comment letters and the response to each. 10-1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION BOCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20857 VXs\ M/i. W. H. Pmvungton division oh VnoQ>iam Review; and Coordination Oii^cz oh NEPA kifruXJ* VzpaAtmznt oh EmAgy Workington, V.C. 20545 Vaax Ma. Vznnlngton: o^eA. Chapto ^l. Station 2. US EnvVio nmantxil Monitoring eKiv^iAcmmen,. Chg E te^_Sec ^£> ! 3-U *«di£2£*i»i Uaitz UaM S eme ^- d M c*ibed fctwirtj'hn mail S4a+ion C?M Grn 1 -**=r iii' ' /W ^?- , 'f'^ r ty'&Z7 fib* W-H* t*v\- £v ■ ■$£& £m flKfc Ssf>j *£# c%^4* VUR 3vjjCfj *b~Lk d%5 KSSd G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 3 received on the subject draft statement from Ms Cecilie Hoffman, Santa Cruz, California, dated November 27, 1978 / 4 L ■M / W. H. Pennington / Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-10 Response to Letter 3 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MS. CECILIE HOFFMAN As discussed in the DEIS, geographical separation of any of the research projects from Livermore would lose the benefit of proximity to highly unique support activities that is essential for smooth programmatic progress. Consequently, your suggestion of moving plutonium operations to an underground storage area is not practical at this time. 10-11 United States Department of the Interior OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20240 In Reply Refer To ER 78/929 DEC 8 1978 :>.v"a' Mr. W. H. Pennington Director Division of Program Review and Coordination Office of NEPA Affairs Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Dear Mr. Pennington: Thank you for your letter of September 18, 1978, requesting our views and comments on the draft environmental impact statement for continued operation of the Livermore Site, Alameda County, California. We have the fol lowing _ comments arranged by areas of jurisdiction and special expertise. General Neither the '•summary" nor the "background" chapters seem to give a clear description of the proposed action other than that it is a continuation of current activities. When the reader reaches page 2-20 the concept of future planning is introduced with reference to the Livermore Site Development Plan. What seems to be unclear is whether "continuation of current activities means at the present level or at an incrementally higher level. The list of alternatives does not shed any further light on this problem. If th cont i to be to as Liver con ce that propo exp an po s s i e pu nuin gen ses s more rnin this sed ding bili rpose of g presen eral ly a the imp Site De g the ad apparen act ion , the lis ty o f a the statement is to assess only the impacts of t operations at Livermore, then analysis appears dequate. However, if the statement is intended acts of enlarged operations according to the velopment Plan, then we have serious reservations equacy of the environmental analysis. We suggest t problem be eliminated by clarifying the reassessing the analysis in Chapter 3, and t of alternatives to include the residual higher level of operation (if this is valid). 10-12 -2- Cu ltural R e sources Cultural resources are not adequately addressed. Archeo logi cal Consulting and Research Services, under contract to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, conducted a preliminary ar cheological reconnaissance of Site 300 which documented seven ar cheologi cal sites. However, there is no evidence of further efforts by the Department of Energy to follow up on this discovery by evaluating the sites for their significance and potential inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. The Federal cultural resource protection guidelines (36 CFR 800) set forth Federal agency responsibilities to identify historic and archeological sites within the area of impact of Livermore Site operations, evaluate them against the National Register Criteria (36 CFR 800.10), and request a determination of eligibility. The agency must coordinate these activities with the appropriate State Historic Preservation Officer. Apparently damage to archeological sites on Site 300 has already occurred. Continued high explosive testing, as well as planned construction of a 15 MeV linear accelerator on the site, will undoubtedly increase the loss of cultural information. DOE should contact the SHPO immediately to evaluate the significance of the sites known on Site 300, and to develop a mitigation plan incorporating measures recommended by the SHPO and the consulting ar cheologis t s . Fish and Wildlife Resources Our records show that in December 1975 the GSA deeded approximately 100 acres of surplus AEC property on the east side of Site 300 to the California Department of Fish and Game for use as a wildlife preserve. The statement should discuss any potential effects of continued testing and future construction on the wildlife at the Corral Hollow Ecological Preserve. Appendix 2D lists the biota found on the Lawrence and Sandia Laboratory sites near Livermore. A similar listing for site 300 would be desirable. The bald eagle is listed in this appendix, but no treatment is given in the text of the statement concerning the effects, if any, of project activities on this endangered species . The draft statement indicates that an area containing the rare plant ams inckia grandi flora has been roped off. The statement should also explain any existing or planned project activities in or near the area, particularly upgrade from these plants. 10-13 -3- ■ ■B9_ WKKm. ■ Seismi city The discussion of geology and seismicity (p. 2-47 and 48 sec. 2.3.3) should mention that the Las Positas fault could involve the Livermore site in addition to the Sandia site. Further, the Verona fault could be a continuation of the Las Positas fault and this greater length of fault would have significant implications for the extent of potential displacement The environmental statement should clearly indicate whether there are critical structures at the Livermore site, and if so, should give their location with respect to faults. We must disagree with the assertion (p. 2-48, lines 7-8) that "there is no evidence of faulting that would produce surface ground ruptures in close proximity to the TRL." The Las Positas and Verona faults have demonstrated geologically recent relative movement of young deposits and soil of probable Holocene age. We suggest that a note should be added to the geologic and seismic data in appendix 2A referring to the discussion of more recent information in section 2.3.3. (p. 2-48) based on mapping by the U. S. Geological Survey (reference 2-3). Groundwater The sec . o f p grou cont pre c tami The wate dis p rele s ewe of e disc 2.1 ubli ndwa amin auti nati stat r o c os al as ed r sp xfil us s io 8.3) c sup ter , ation onary on be ement curs f aci to s eci f i trati n of the needs cl plies in thus lac Furth ons ite fore it should downgrad lit ies . ani tary cations , on . groundwater moni arification. It volves a mixture king the capabili er, the discussio monitoring of gro reaches public or also indicate whe ient from waste h Because low-leve sewers , the s tate particularly tho toring program (p. 2-31, appears that monitoring of surface water and ty to detect sources of n does not indicate undwater to detect con- domestic supply wells, ther monitoring of ground- olding, treatment, and 1 radioactive wastes are ment should comment on se related to control We hope these comments will be, of assistance in preparing the final statement. Deputy i ? s 1st ant ""^"^inco^e Larr iy. Larry E. Meier otto SECRETARY 10-14 ■i Department of Energy Wash : ngton. D.C. 20545 ':..■ '■:> G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 4 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Larry E. Meierotto, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of the Interior, dated December 8, 1978. c^- kL/ff. 'Pennington |n vis ion of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-15 Response to Letter 4 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR The purpose of the DEIS was to assess the environmental impacts associated with current and continuing activities at the Livermore site. Neither the introduction of new programs nor the need to increase the number of employees is expected to raise the level of environmental impact significantly above that discussed. With respect to cultural resources at Site 300, we have conducted a cultural resource survey in accordance with 36 CFR 64. You will be informed of items qualifying for inclusion in the National Register. The Staff Statement in Response to Comments Received on the DEIS, which is included in the Hearing Record of the Public Hearing on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site, L ivermore, California , discusses the impact of Site 300 operations on the approximately 100 acres on the eastern side of the site that were recessed to the State as a wildlife reserve. Appendix 2E of the FEIS contains lists of plants and animals found at Site 300. There are no plans at present for any facility construction in the immediate up-grade area of the rare plant Amsinckia grandiflora. No changes in activities are anticipated that would change our present impact on the bald eagle. Section 2.3.3, Geology and Seismicity, has been completely written to better address the points raised in your letter. Appendix 2A of the FEIS describes the Livermore site's environmental monitoring of local groundwater down gradient from the point of release of treated sewage effluent from the City of Livermore 's Water Reclamation Plant. 10-16 'PL- ¥,/ 0^Cs o ^tlzt p G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 7 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Charles Q. Forester, Director of Planning, Association of Bay Area Governments, dated December 11, 1978 ^7 y Wv H. Pennington y ^Division of NEPA^Af fairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment Note: The enclosures to comment letter only to C. Lindeken, LLL. No. 7 are being transmitted 10-25 Response to Letter 7 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF BAY AREA GOVERNMENTS (ABAC) Section 3.8.5 of the DEIS has been expanded to include a description of steps taken to reduce costing by single occupant or auto. Extension of Fig. 3-13 shows that Laboratory growth is similar to town growth. Future population estimates in the FEIS are based in part on the use of data in "Projections 79." 10-26 .••■■■• I g£ll /v\ December 8, 1978 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE The Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Washington, DC. 20230 (202) 377-3HX 4335 Mr. W.H. Pennington, Director Division of Program Review and Coordination Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Dear Mr. Pennington : This is in reference to your draft environmental impact statement entitled » Livermore Site, Livermore, California " The enclosed comment from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is forwarded for your consid- eration. Thank you for giving us an opportunity to provide this comment, which we hope will be of assistance to you. We would appreciate receiving 10 copies of the final statement . Sincerely, > i / 'Sidney 'r. Galler' Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Affairs Enclosure Memo from: Mr. Douglas LeComte Environmental Data Service N0AA 10-27 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ENVIRONMENTAL DATA SERVICE Washington. D.C. 20235 October 30, 1978 •## ■ A/PP - William Aroir , Li^ r Aro yy t> fi - 0A/Dx61 - Douglas^LeComte TO: FROM: SUBJECT: DEIS 7809.18 - Livermore Site, CA Specific Comments Page 2-58, 1st sentence : It is extremely unlikely that annual rain- fall at Site 300 is just 70mm. The precipitation data should be checked. 10-28 ■ Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 1978 Li brary, Room 1223, G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV 20 Mass Avenue G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 8 received on the subject draft statement from Dr Sidney R. Galler, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental Affairs, Department of Commerce, dated December 8, 1978 H. Pennington; 'Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-29 Response to Letter 8 ■ DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE The typographical error regarding annua number is 290 mm. 1 rainfall at Site 300 has been corrected. The correct 10-30 December 10, 1978 Mr. W. H. Pennington Mail Station E-201, GTN Department of Energy- Washington, D. C. 205U5 Dear Mr. Pennington: I have read the Draft Environmental Impact State ment on Lawrence Livermore Labs. -"—" ~~ The meager attention given to the Seismologic Evaluation (3 pages) was inadequate in view of the twelve active earthquake faults in the area. The report's assurance that protection is provided and all contingencies covered makes little sense in light of the danger of air, water, and food- chain contamination to nearby large urban areas with a total population of 4,276,000 within 80 km. of the site (your figures). I was puzzled because so many pages (lk) were devoted to the Flora and Fauna of the area and to justifying the taking of agricultural land back in the '50 's. I was delighted that there are jackrabbits (lots of them), and gophers, and red-breasted nuthatches, and sowbugs, but that is not addressing the issue. Then I learned that the Statement was written by (or supervised by) the LLL officials. That explained much of its "glossing over of hazards and the "padding 1 ' with all the inconsequential stuff. I urgently request: 1. An answer to why the report took the "phoney" form it did. What information are you hiding? 2. An adequate public hearing in the Bay Area with time allotted for local citizens to ask questions and receive answers. This necessitates ample public notice of the meeting in an accessible place and an impartial moderator in charge. I trust I will receive an answer to this letter since public comment was requested. Yours sincerely, G> ■*>-^JL^>> C V^wwo^w/ 10-31 Evelyn E. Johnson Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 ■v. m G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 9 received on the subject draft statement from Mrs Evelyn E. Johnson, El Cerrito, California, dated December 10, 1978 /"w^ K: Pen n i n g t o£/ c ^"division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-32 Response to Letter 9 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MS. EVELYN JOHNSON Based on public review and comment on the Livermore DEIS the seismic and geology section was rewritten and greatly expanded. In addition, a comprehensive field investigation was undertaken to evaluate on-site, and pertinent regional, geologic conditions that might affect the safety of the Livermore site. Results of this study will be reviewed by USGS and an independent geologic consulting company. This company will also impanel a committee of seismic experts to review the adequacy of the study. A public hearing on the DEIS was held in Livermore on April 12, 19 79. 10-33 vJSfo^ ■ 11 -fs-78^ Mall S--l«J?i* E^l W&dfi-jjoh; DC, 2 0S-9S- J).^ir Mr, pe^ini^fo^, public- fae*,Y\n$ J &* ^-«W °h 1 ^ -& or r*-K<*h*)\ (s. hnr/n^( 10-34 i,V- A \y\ *\k My v^iry fajh'+Sr Concern )S /u^i^^ j } 'fa Q__ l*ik haye &m\e v-ery 10-35 ■■-■ Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 ■ G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No 10 received on the subject draft statement from Mr Andy Baltzo, Pleasant Hill, California, dated December 15, 1978. ington jf NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV D4V Attachment 10-36 Response to Letter 10 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MR. ANDY BALTZO A public hearing on the Livermore DEIS was held on April 12, 1979. The americium waste accidently taken to the Eastern Alameda County Disposal Site occurred on August 25, 1978. The material was recovered without incident and no member of the public received a radiation exposure from the material. The reason the incident was not contained in the DEIS was that the DEIS was being printed during that time. The EIS is restricted to the specific impacts of the Livermore sites. The larger questions of defense posture are national policy issues formulated at the national level. 10-37 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANCELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720 December 15, 1978 W.H. Pennington Mail Station E-201, GTN Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 205^5 Dear Mr. Pennington; I an writing in regard to the recently issued Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Livermore Site (D0E/EIS-0028-D, Livermore oite, September 1978.) Having read' this document I now wish to make some critical comments, raise some questions, and call for public hearings. In addition to my work as a physics teacher and researcher on this campus I have, for a number of years, concerned myself with the activities of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory: its connection with my university, its use of scientific people and knowledge and, most of all, its contributions to the nuclear arms race which threatens the very survival of humanity. I had not anticipated that the process of drafting and approving an EIS for this laboratory would involve issues as broad as these; but I was mistaken. The DEIS clearly and repeatedly asserts that the main benefit coming from the operation of this Laboratory is its contribution to the National Defense through its primary mission of nuclear weapons research and development. What is totally lacking, however, is any word about the costs or adverse inpacts that are likely to follow from this activity. Thus, in a very SSStaE. manner, the present DEIS is far out of balance and cannot be considered in compliance with the requirements of the law. There is a lar^e body of opinion and published literature, encompassing both technical and lay people, which holds that the continued development of nuclear weapons is actually increasing the likelihood of nuclear war, thus decreasing the security of the nation and threat ^.^^f^^ ^ to the human and natural environment. This risk side of the risk-benefit analysis has been totally ignored in the DEIS. Here are a few of x,he questions which the DOE should answer in order to provide a reasonable beginning for the necessary public review and evaluation of these hazards. 1) What is the probability of nuclear wars, of various sizes, occurring . 2) What are the likely adverse consequences of such wars, to the population generally and to the LLL area in particular ? 3) How do the above mentioned risks compare with other types of nuclear accident risks that have been much debated - from nuclear power plant accidents, from earthquakes, from sabottage and terrorism, etc. . I reouest that, in addition to providing authoritative government assessments of the questions I have raised, the Department of Energy hold adequate public hearings on this DEIS so that full public input to and scrutiny of such evaluations can be provided, io-38 Sincerely yours, s'^g>f$£J&&&^ Charles Schwartz, Professor of Physics (2^ Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Dj fi B7B G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 11 received on the subject draft statement from Professor Charles Schwartz, Physics, University of California, dated December 15, 1978. W/H.^Pennington / /DiAHsion of NEPA 'Affairs uffice of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-39 Response to Letter 11 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MR. CHARLES SCHWARTZ A public hearing on the Livermore DEIS was held on April 12, 1979. The scope of the DEIS was limited to addressing site-specific environmental impacts of Livermore operations. The scope did not include (1) probabilities of nuclear war, (2) adverse consequences of such wars, or (3) comparison of risks of nuclear war with other types of nuclear accidents. 10-40 ^^H Friends ov The Ear in 124SPKAK San I-'rancisco Cautornia 94105 415*) 495-4770 December 18, 1978 W.H. Pennington Office of NEPA Coordination Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Dear Mr. Pennington, We have carefully reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Draft Environ- mental Impact Statement (DEIS) on the Lawrence Livermore Lab (LLL) and the Sandia Livermore Lab (SLL) published by DOE in September, 1978. The DOE version of this DEIS is essentially, almost verbatim, the same as the DEIS produced by the LLL staff which was first published in October, 1976 by LLL. We have reviewed that document and a companion, the Omnibus Environmental Assessment of the Sandia Livermore Labs (SAND 75-0268) which was printed in October, 1975. Although it is apparently DOE policy not to reveal the names of individuals who work on these DEIS's, we can safely assume that the DOE-DEIS-0028-D published by DOE in September, 1978, was actually written and produced almost entirely by people who work at the labs in Livermore rather than by any DOE staff in Washington. This obvious conflict of interest towards protecting their jobs and workplace has caused the authors of the DEIS to bias the report by underestimating the maximum credible accidents and environmental impacts that could result from operations of these nuclear weapons labs Based on .a thorough analysis of the DEIS on the Livermore Site, we hereby request the DOE to conduct public hearings on this DEIS because it is inadequate, incomplete, and misleading, from cover to cover, for the reasons explained below. A major inade- quacy of the DEIS is that it does not even mention numerous environmental impacts of the operations of the labs, and the ones it does mention are incompletely analyzed, The text of this DEIS is invalidated because it fails to integrate an appendix that is so significant that every section of the DEIS needs to be reevaluated and revised in detail because of the information presented. That information is in Appendix 2A, "A Geological and Seismological Investigation of the LLL Site." Although the maps in Appendix 2A (enclosed with these comments) show that there are at least thirteen active earthquake faults that could damage the labs, the DEIS does not analyze the consequences of earthquake damage. It apparently assumes that there will be no damage. Or perhaps the authors of the DEIS realized that earthquake damages could be so devastating to the labs that they should not mention the possibi- lity and in that way suppress discussion. The DEIS should be revised and resubmitted for comments to allow adequate ventilation and discussion of the issues. There are many critical components in the labs that could be damaged in a quake which would result in the release of radioactive liquids, gases, and solids into the local environment. Several buildings contain hot cells, glove boxes, pipes, filter systems, and radioactive waste retention tanks that are particularly susceptible to earthquake damage. The DEIS must be revised to include an analysis of each of these, including their original design criteria, any modifications made or proposed, and the potential environmental impact if they were damaged during an earthquake. Most of these facilities were built many years before the existence and locations of the nearby faults were known. 10-41 19180 p In the section of the DEIS on Accidents, the document is supposed to analyze maximum credible accidents, according to NEPA guidelines. However, the handful of accidents analyzed in this DEIS are caused by fires, human errors, and explosions. None are caused by earthquakes. The DEIS should be revised to consider the cumulative effects of an' earthquake that damaged several buildings at once or that damaged several glove boxes, hot cells, and filter systems in each building. The fact that the DEIS omits such considerations invalidates the document and makes imperative its reassessment through public hearings. (NOTE: The earthquake hazards to the labs are discussed in more detail in other sections of these comments.) The DEIS is incomplete because it fails to analyze the environmental impact of routine and accidental releases of radiation being deposited in the reservoirs ard aqueducts that border the Livermore Valley. The Hetch Hetchy and South Bay Aqueduct Systems supply drinking water to millions of people in the San Francisco and South Bay areas, and these water supply systems could be contaminated by releases from the labs. The California Aqueduct, which supplies water to people in central and southern California passes east of the labs within range of contamination from radioactive releases. The most vulnerable of these water supply systems is the South Bay Aqueduct which passes within a few hundred feet east of both labs in an open-air concrete lined canal. It is on the eastern border of the labs and is thus downwind most of the time from routine emissions and accidental releases of radioactivity. Associated with this aqueduct are the Patterson Reservoir and the Del Valle reservoir, both within easy contamination distance of the labs. The DEIS fails to analyze the impact of routine and accidental releases of radiation on the water quality in these reservoirs and aqueducts. The DEIS should be revised and resubmitted for comments on these potential environmental impacts. Water quality is a very important issue and it is inexcusable for the DEIS to ignore the impacts of the labs on drinking water and agricultural irragation water. The considerations of accidents in the DEIS are totally misleading. For example, although the DEIS mentions (in the very last section of the last appendix) that there have been at least 17 serious accidents at the lab since 1960, it only describes these accidents in a brief perfunctory fashion. The accounts of these accidents are so short and incomplete that they do not analyze whether or nor water supplies were contaminated, or if agricultural lands downwind in the central valley were affected or even sampled, and it does not describe any methods that may have been used to determine the environ- mental impacts of these accidents. This list includes releases of 650,000 curies of tritium and spills of various amounts of plutonium into the Livermore sewage system and into soils east of the LLL lab (very near the South Bay Aqueduct). The DEIS does not say what happened to the soils that were contaminated with plutonium (of f site) . Ihe DEIS fails to analyze whether or not any attempt was made to determine if the nearby South Bay Aqueduct and Patterson Reservoir were affected or contaminated by the April 1973 Plutonium leaks, or by the large releases of tritium in 1965 and 1970. The DEIS fails to mention an important piece of relevant research on tritium which was done by L. Dobson, a LLL employee on contract with the EPA. Dobson's research was published in the April-June 1974 issue of Radiation Research and was reprinted in the November 1974 issue of the LLL Newsline. Dobson discovered that surprisingly low levels of tritium in drinking water can kill 90 percent or more of the immature eggs developing in the ovaries of young female mice. Dobson said, -Tritium ... has a strong tendency to form water... Once in the form of tritiated water, the compound gets to human beings just as does any water, primarily as drinking water and as water taken up by crops. ™\ said that his results suggest that for tritium there is no threshold dose below which the mice totally escape the effects. Dobson said subsequent work designed to test his on ginal observations have confirmed them. (A reprint of the report attached to these comments) 10-42 tvss 1 ^^H Although LLL reprinted this tritium research report in LtS Newsline, and althoi 'li the DEIS mentions the fact that huge amounts of tritium could be released from elthei of the labs in Livermore, and the fact that routine release;, of tritium occur, the DEIS fails to mention that there might be adverse health effects from routine or accidental releases of tritium. The DEIS fails to mention the Dobson report or any of the dozens of other scientific research reports available on the health effects ol exposure to tritium. The DEIS seems to imply that tritium releases are harmless. This demonstrates how the DEIS is a coverup of realistic environmental impacts. The most astonishing example of a historic accident listed in the Appendix (3C) , states that on March 26, 1963, there was a nuclear excursion during a criticality experiment in the Plutonium Metallurgical Chemistry Building that released 4 X 10 ]7 fissions. The descriptions of the environmental impacts of this accident are totally inadequate, and limited to one sentence which conclude there was nothing to worry about. The releases of radioactivity from this accident may have caused temporary or permanent contamination of agricultural lands and crops in the San Joaquin and Livermore Valleys, but apparently this potential environmental impact was not even considered. This accident description (and its 16 companions) needs to be revised and expanded to include a complete list of any samples or studies that were done to test for contamination, or reasons to explain why such research was not done. Another inadequacy in the DEIS is its failure to report the facts that fourteen of its employees have contracted multiple melanoma, a rare skin cancer, (at least two of these employees died), and that at least two young children in the Livermore Valley recently died of melanoma. It is almost unheard of in medical history for children under 15 to contract melanoma. Another local child is being treated for a rare tumor called Ewing's sarcoma, and all of these facts have generated significant media coverage (see enclosed articles from the S.F. Chronicle). The newspaper reports say that the rate of increase of malignant melanoma in the Bay Area is 5 to 10 times higher than the national average between 1970 and 1975, and that the overall Bay Area cancer rate rose by about ten percent in those five years. These newspaper reports imply that the increasing cancer rates and deaths in the Bay Area, and especially in the Livermore Valley, may be caused by the operations of the nuclear weapons labs in Livermore. But you would never suspect this kind of environmental impact from reading the DEIS coverup. The DEIS does not mention that its employees are dying of rare cancers that may be caused by exposure to radiation, or that the head of the LLL Biomedical Division, Dr. Bernard Shore, died of malignant melanoma. The DEIS is inadequate and misleading in analyzing the public health impacts of its routine emissions and accidental leaks and emissions. Also it does not analyze the cumu- lative effects of emissions since 1951. The DEIS should be revised to include data on cancer incidence and ill health among past and present workers and their families. The discussion should include analysis of cancer rates in the Livermore Valley and in the Bay Area populations whose drinking water quality and air quality and food chains can be affected by the environmental impact of the labs in Livermore. The revision of the DEIS should include discussions of long-term health effects and genetic effects from exposure to various kinds of radioactive materials. It is generally accepted that exposure to radiation can increase the incidence of cancers and leukemias and other health problems including genetic mutations and miscarriages. But there is no mention of this information in the DEIS. The major problems caused by exposure to radiation can be delayed for ten to forty years after exposures. This fact allows nuclear weapons labs to cover up the real environmental impacts that they have on their employees and neighbors in nearby communities. The DEIS should be revised to include any suggestions of epidemilogical studies on long term effects of exposure to radiation. In the revision, the staff should take care to explain how the health effects from radiation can be delayed for years after exposure. The revision should clarify whether or not any attempt is being 10-43 made by the labs in Livermore to analyze the long term effects of radiation releases into the surrounding regions. Considering the Livermore labs 'role in the creation of enormous amounts of radioactive wastes, it is surprising that the DEIS reports no serious biomedical research on the long term health effects. The DEIS fails to mention pending proposals by the EPA to revise and lower the (1) allowable doses from routine emissions of radioactivity, (2) the allowable occupa- tional exposures to workers in the nuclear industries (including weapons labs), and (3) the allowable exposures to the public from accidental releases of transuranics into the environment. The guideline proposed by EPA in the Federal Register on November 30, 1977, states that the dose to persons off site from existing or possible future accidental releases of transuranics should not exceed 1 millirad per year to the pulmonary lung or 3 millirad per year to the bone. If contamination of the soils east of the labs from the 1973 accidental releases of plutonium exceed those levels, then that area should be decontaminated if that is possible. The overriding question, however, is did the South Bay Aqueduct and the Patterson Reservoir receive contamina- tion from that and other incidents? Did people in San Jose and elsewhere receive doses of radiation from accidents affecting their water supply? Can the "soil east of the lab contain plutonium that gets resuspended and deposited in the water supplies? Does the vegeta ble garden at the lab which used plutonium contaminated sludge allow resuspension of plutonium particles which could deposit in the nearby reservoirs and aqueducts? None of these questions are addressed in the inadequate DEIS. In its proposal, the EPA stated that "Radiation induced risks can be estimated based on a number of different assumptions, but the most prudent is that there is some finite risk to humans no matter how small the amount of absorbed radiation might be, and that the risk at any given low dose level is directly proportional to the damage actually observed at much higher dose levels... On this basis, there is no level of radiation exposure which is absolutely safe and any radiation dose carries with it some degree of risk." The DEIS on the Livermore site does not reflect the EPA's analysis. The DEIS i's inadequate because it does not document the methodologies used to calculate doses from accidents at J routine emissions, and it does not describe ade- quately the postulated pathways used to determine maximum individual dose commitments. Also the dose calculations should be re-examined in terms of source terms, and uptake and transfer coefficients; and all input data should be published with the calculations. Rather than just giving annual doses from routine emissions or one time doses from accidents or potential accidents, the DEIS should be revised to discuss dose commit- ments over a lifetime. Many of the isotopes released from the labs will be in the biosphere longer than the lifetimes of any person alive today, and for many generations to come. What will the doses be to future generations? What will be the cumulative environmental impacts on them of routine emissions and accidents? The DEIS should be revised, recalculating doses into the future, and thoroughly documenting the calculations of source terms, pathways, assumptions, and equations. Lifetime cumulative dose commit- ments should be added to the discussion. For tritium pathways, the skin and lung absorption pathways, and the drinking-water ovary pathway should be calculated for routine and accidental emissions. For emissions of Krypton-85, discussions should be added to the revised DEIS concerning recent research which indicates that rising levels of Krypton-85 (from routine emissions from nuclear facilities such as those at Livermore) are reacting in the presence of the sun s ultraviolet rays and causing an increase in skin cancers. Another inadequacy of the DEIS is that the Emergency Planning and Disaster Control Plan merely deal with on site procedures. There is a general guideline that nuclear facilities are responsible for on site evacuations and planning and that the state and county officials are responsible for dealing with the offsite consequences and evacuation: But the DEIS does not state or clarify that guideline in a site-specific manner. 10-44 .•"V •<•'**» ■ The guidelines do not excuse Lhe Livermore labs from not Lfying appropriate county and state officials of the potential for offsite releases of radiation and the potential need for evacuations in case of an emergency. The DEIS is entirely deficient in this regard. No mention is made of communications with state and county officials to plan for emergency responses. Apparently the labs can (and do) have disastrous accidnets such as are listed in the Appendix 3C history, without even notifying the county or the state. What about the contamination of land, water and people downwind following those accidents? Was anyone notified? If such an accident occured in the future, would the victims be notified? By whom? Remember that radiation is invisible, and not sensed by humans, so contaminations and exposures could easily be concealed, as they apparently have been in the past at Livermore. Many times in the DEIS, future accidental exposures are calculated in such a question- able manner that they fall within a range that can be interpreted as not requiring evacuations. It seems that the DEIS deliberately manipulates numbers and data to avoid any credible accident that would require evacuations. They just never admit that an accident could occur requiring evacuations. This kind of coverup is used so frequently and pervasively in the DEIS that it avoids entirely the realistic need to evacuate nearby populations in case of maximum credible accidents which are not ana- lyzed. Thus the DEIS in inadequate and misleading and needs to be revised to include the realistic maximum credible accidents, and the realistic emergency responses which would include notifying state and county officials to evacuate people and to declare agricultural lands and crops contaminated. The new DEIS should discuss how long the contamination of soils in the agricultural valleys could last; what types of decontamina- tion procedures exist (describe in detail) or whether large scale decontamination of the central valley would even be remotely possible; and estimates of the economic and sociological impacts of such accidents. It must be noted that the NRC (DOE's sister agency and formerly the same entity in the AEC) commissioned the Rasmussen Report, WASH 1400. Although this report has been criticized by many scientific organizations as being a weak whitewash and coverup of the true potential of nuclear accidents, the Rasmussen' Report does give us some guidelines about evacuations and decontamination. It says that following a serious nuclear facility accident, it would be necessary to evacuate the surrounding population within 25 miles downwind, immediately or before the cloud of radiation passed over them. Beyond the 25 mile radius, the radiation might be diluted, but Rasmussen admitted that radioactive contamination of up to 300,000 square miles could result from a single nuclear accident. How would you(DOE) decontaminate that much land in the fertile Central Valley of California which is directly downwind from the labs in Livermore? The DEIS does not deal with this. The revised DEIS should specify in detail who would be notified following a serious accident at LLL or SLL. At what level of release would notification begin? How many counties downwind would be notified? Who would implement necessary evacuations? Who would be financially responsible for contaminated agricultural lands? Who would be financially responsible for contamination of residential property? Who would be financially responsible for contamination of people exposed to the passing cloud? Does the Price-Anderson Act preclude government or DOE responsibility in these situations The DEIS is extremely misleading because it devotes many pages to glorifying the bene icial financial, economic, and sociological impacts it has on surrounding communities, but it fails' to analyze the impacts it would have on the economy and the people if a serious accidents contaminated their property and destroyed their health. Where would all the benefits go after that happened? Are the current benefits worth the risk of future catastrophes? Who decides the risks versus benefits questions? The DOE staff should require the LLL staff to analyze these questions in a realistic manner. And the analysis should be done also by independent objective persons such as insurance agencies and scientific researchers from nearby universities. The DEIS as it now stands is too self-serving and misleading. The DEIS revision should include reports by independent experts whose jobs are not at stake if they admit the truth. 10-45 The DEIS is inadequate because it does not even mention or consider the environ- mental impact of projects designed at LLL butconducted offsite. In other publica- tions bv LLL (Newsline, 20th anniversary issue, 25th anniversary issue, annual state of the lab reports) the Lab employees glorify these offsite projects as their most important achievements. These projects were designed and directed by lab employees and should be considered as environmental impacts of lab operations. These offsite projects include over 100 atmospheric nuclear explosions in the South Pacific, 84 atmospheric nuclear explosions in Nevada, hundreds of underground tests in Nevada, and the Plowshare programs in which nuclear explosions were conducted underground in New Mexico, Colorado, and Mississippi. Another relevant project was the tests of the Spartan warhead at Amchitka Alaska in 1971. Another project was the series of enormous megaton range nuclear explosions conducted underground in Nevada in 1975 and 1976 to beat the deadline for the Threshhold Treaty. The DEIS does not even mention most of these projects and operations. Even though a separate FEIS has been done on the NTS, that is not adequate to analyze the effort put into NTS operations by the LLL staff, and that FEIS does not include bomb tests at other sites. Are DOE and LLL trying to coverup the environmental impact of nuclear explosion tests? In other publications by LLL (see enclosed reprint "Nuclear Weapons Research") the Labs explain their involvement in these projects much better than they do m the DOE DEIS. A few quotes from the Lab press release will illustrate this point: "Nuclear explosives design remains the largest single program at LLL... Nuclear weapons research and development ... has two general goals: (1) to study nuclear explosives... (2) to design explosives for military weapons ... includes advising appropriate agencies on the feasibility and effects of new weapons. The Lab brags that it has designed warheads for most of the nation's strategic nuclear weapons (Polaris, Poseidon, Minuteman, MIRV , Spartan, Trident, and Lance) The most relevant statement to our comments follows: "Evolution of nuclear explosives. A significant change in the design of a nuclear explosive may take ten or more years and ... may include some 10,000 hours on Livermore computers, which make up one of the world's most powerful research computer facilities. Twenty or more underground detonations of different designs may be required; each such experiment typically verifies some predictions, demonstrates something new and raises one or two major questions. _A_single underground nuclear experiment is apt to require nearly twenty man-years of preparation at Livermore. . . . Thus we have to look elsewhere to find information about LLL projects that have significant environmental impacts. The DEIS does not give us this informa- tion and thus it is inadequate, incomplete and misleading. If a single underground nuclear experiment requires 20 man-years of Prepara- tion at Livermore, and the design of each new weapon or a change in the design o! an explosive takes ten or more years, twenty underground explosions and some 10 000 hours on Livermore computers, then these activities should definitely be considered in the DEIS on the labs in Livermore. The employees of the Livermore labs shuttle back and forth between Livermore and NTS during the design and implementation of nuclear weapons explosions. Essentially, the Nevada Test Site is a laboratory for the programs developed in research at Livermore. 10-46 The DEIS on the labs at Livermore should be revised to reflect and to consldei in detail the enormous investment of time and energy (man-years) devoted exclusive] to nuclear explosions by the lab staff. If a single underground nuclear explosion requires at least twenty man-years oC preparation at Livermore, and there have been over 600 announced (non-classified) explosions, then there have been over 12,000 man-years devoted to exploding nuclear weapons in the environment. It seems that NEPA guidelines would consider these projects by lab staff to be appropriate subjects of an environmental impact assessment to be incorporated in this DEIS or the FEIS. Why does the DEIS not even mention that bombs designed at Livermore have been exploded in Nevada, the South Pacific, Alaska, New Mexico, Mississippi and Colorado? Why does this DEIS not analyze the environmental and health Impacts of fallout and long-term contamination from these explosions? Enclosed is an exerpt from a Scientific American article on the hazards of fallout from nuclear explosions, with a diagram showing the total dose in rems from a single bomb test on Bikini Atoll in 1954. Several thousand rems of radiation were delivered to the islands of Bikini and Rongelap. Hundreds of rems to other islands. Yet, no EIS has been done on the long-term effects of these atmospheric tests in the South Pacific. It is a current issue in American media and in the Congressional Records because some of those South Pacific Islanders would like to return to their original homelands but cannot because the islands are still intense- ly radioactive and their food chains are contaminated. But the DEIS fails to mention the role of the Livermore labs in these tests and their current role (very evident in other laboratory literature) in assessing the current hazards. Although the atmospheric tests conducted before 1963 caused the dispersal of over five tons of plutonium, LLL ' s DEIS does not mention that or consider that the plutonium fallout that it created might have some environmental impact. The only reference to these tests in the Livermore DEIS is the constant comparisons of past or future plutonium releases, spills, and accidents to the "background" levels of plutonium deposited in soils from global fallout. The DEIS implies that the reader should accept the presence of fallout as normal and natural, and that because the fallout levels are so high (in terms of soil contamination) that a little more spilled plutonium would not have much environmental impact. Studies by LLL have shown that certain vegetable crops take up plutonium from the soil more readily than other crops (although the DEIS does not mention this); and other studies have shown that wheat and grain crops take up plutonium from soil contamination. A recent report in Science magazine ( a copy is enclosed with these comments) shows that plutonium can easily contaminate drinking water supplies and that it can be readily absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract into other parts of the human body where it can create cancers. These characteristics of plutonium were downplayed and denied for many years by nuclear labs people in such a way that led utilities to tell the public that it is safe to ingest plutonium because it can only hurt you if you breathe aerosol particles of it. The DEIS does not explain why the labs in Livermore have not led the world in researching the short term and long term health effects of human exposure to fallout from nuclear explosions. Such research should concentrate on the long lived isotopes such as Strontium-90, Cesium-137, tritium and plutonium. These isotopes are now so widespread from Livermore 's bomb tests that almost every human on earth and every food chain on earth contains residues of radioactive fallout. THAT IS THE TRUE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE LIVERMORE LABS THAT THE DEIS IGNORES. The DEIS should be revised to correct this deficiency. 10-47 It is unfortunate from the point of view of public health and safety concerns that the Livermore labs did not create an Environmental and Biomedical Division until 1963, after all of the atmospheric explosions had been stopped by a treaty. Perhaps, if they had understood the long-term health effects of fallout, they would have never conducted any atmospheric explosions. Unfortunately they contaminated the entire planet, and today (in the DEIS) they act like ostriches with their heads covered up with sand, ignoring reality. From 1963 to 1969, the first Director of the LLL Biomedical Division was Dr. John Gofman, Professor Emeritus of Medical Physics from the University of Califor- nia at Berkeley. Dr. Gofman lost his contract and position at the lab because his research showed that their would be large increases in cancer rates as a result of exposure to radioactive materials. The AEC did not want to hear such heresy, and when Dr. Gofman told the Congress and the media of his findings, the AEC tried unsuccessfully to discredit him and his research. Dr. Gofman' s research has been published in various books and articles, including an enclosed article from the Journal of the American Medical Association, dated July 19, 1976. Dr. Gofman explains that plutonium is extremely carcinogenic when inhaled and that the hazard is much worse for people who smoke cigarettes. He also notes that 400 kilograms of Plutonium was deposited on the Upited States from weapons fallout. He has calculated that, as a result of weapons-testing fallout, 116,000 lung cancer deaths will occur in the United States and one million deaths in the Northern Hemisphere will result from radiation-induced cancers. It seems appropriate that the DEIS on Livermore should concern itself with this type of environmental impact analysis, even if the current management of LLL and DOE might disagree with Dr. Gofman s statistics. The DEIS should be revised to address the questions raised by the published research of the first, and most famous, Director of the Biomedical Division of LLL. When you consider that another Director of the Biomedical Division, Dr. Bernard Shore recently died of a rare skin cancer, and when you consider the statistics published in a' recent DOE-contracted study by Thomas Mancuso on the incidence of cancers in workers at DOE nuclear weapons labs, it becomes apparent that the DEIS on Livermore labs is deficient and incomplete because it omits so much important information on the health impact of operations of the labs. Another health impact that is omitted from the DEIS is the studies of fallout effects on the populations of Nevada, Utah, and Arizona, from atmospheric weapons tests at NTS. Although reports have shown children with thyroid tumors in the downwind communities, and numerous instances of cancer deaths in people of all ages, there is no discussion of these environmental impacts Ln this inadequate DEIS. The fallout from those tests spread all across the U.S.A., a fact that was detected by college researchers in New York after an atmospheric test in the fifties. But you would never know that from reading this DEIS. Another fact omitted by this DEIS is that Livermore's tests in Nevada left 250,000 square miles of land perma- nently contaminated with plutonium dust, and left Nevada with one of the highest cancer rates in the world. However, by far the most dramatic environmental impact of the Livermore lab projects is the fact (see enclosed news reports from recent California papers) over 400,000 military personnel and civilian workers were exposed to di rect radia tion during the nuclear weapons explosions designed and conducted by lab employee*. During one test, "Operation Smokey" on August 31, 1957, over a thousand men were forced to stand just eight miles away from a 44-kiloton atomic explosion So me of these men were forced to watch the test from 3000 yards away. Unrortuna tely or perhaps on purpose, the military lost the records of the names of the J soldier wh o witnessed "Smokey" and other explosions. Now it is hard to race them o necessary epidemi.l ogical studios, but at least eight cases of leukemia have been discovered among the survivors of "Smokey". Other victims have already died. 10-48 It is difficult for Che thousands of Americans who were exposed to radial Lon dui ig atomic explosions designed by the Livermore Lab to receive compensation or benefits for their illnesses, cancers and Imminent deaths because the governmeni will not admit that such health effects can be delayed for more than twenty years alter the initial exposures. The Livermore lab has failed in its analysis of environmental impacts of its projects. The lab has failed in its duty to our nation because it has not been honest about the pi ential long-term health hazards from exposure to radiation. The DEIS should be revised to reflect these current, ongoing concerns that the American people have about the nuclear weapons explosions designed and conducted by the Livermore labs. Another enclosed news article shows that the Livermore lab (LLL) has been sued for $1.52 million in damages for the death of a man who was exposed to radiation exposure at NTS in 1970 during an underground t explosion that resulted in leakage or venting of radioactive gases. This Baneberrv test exposed over 900 people to radiation before they were evacuated. A cloud of radioactive gases passed over them. The suit charges that LLL officials failed to exercise due caution to guard against radioactive leakage, and that they failed to provide adequate evacuations. This incident and consequent lawsuit is not even mentioned as a consequence of the environmental impact in the DEIS. The DEIS on LLL and SLL needs to be revised and expanded to include analysis of the issues raised in the past few pages of these comments. However, it seems inappropriate for the Livermore employees to do the revision and expansion. They probably feel so much guilt and shame about the environmental and health impacts that their nuclear explosions have created, that they would not be able to honestly admit the full impacts. The DOE should hire independent consultants to undertake this revision. And the DOE staff should take responsibility to see that the DEIS revision is done with integrity and thoroughness. Another disturbing inadequacy of this DEIS is the way in which it deals with radioactive wastes created by the operations of the labs. The attitude seems to be one of "out of sight, out of mind". Although the DEIS states on page 3-19 that there is "no waste storage" at LLL, it should distinguish between temporary and permanent waste storage because it admits that over 120 cubic meters of solid (compacted) rad-wastes are created annually at the labs, and are shipped out twice a year to DOE burial grounds. Thus radioactive wastes are stored at LLL while they are awaiting the twice annual shipments. Temporary storage of liquid rad- wastes has resulted in accidental spills into the sewers and storm (runoff) pipes, and in plutonium leaks from solar evaporators where liquid wastes were treated. One important aspect of wastes generated by LLL is the radioactive wastes burial trenches at Site 300. On page 3-33, the DEIS notes that Site 300 explosions result in environmental contamination with depleted uranium, beryllium, some natural uranium, thorium, and tritium. 25% of the depleted uranium is in debris after an explosion, 25 % is in the nearby gravels, and 50 % is dispersed beyond the firing range. The gravel and debris that are contaminated after explosions are buried at Site 300 in disposal pits or trenches. These trenches are each filled with up to 150 kilograms of depleted uranium, covered with 1.2 meters of soil, and spaced 1.8 meters from the next trench. Some wastes are incinerated, although they are not identified as radioactive or non-radioactive. The DEIS does not analyze the long-term effects or potential future environmental impacts of burying hundreds of kilograms of uranium in trenches at Site 300. This section should be expanded to consider such impact analyses. The DEIS is also inadequate here because it does not indicate the quantity and types of wastes that have been buried at Site 300 nor does it estimate the future amounts of wastes to be buried there, nor the total amounts of wastes planned for burial at this site (cumulative) 10-49 The DEIS states (3-34) that in past years, solid radioactive wastes from LLL were buried at Site 300 in what is now a fenced-off area. The DEIS describes the wastes as contaminated equipment and contaminated lab animals, but it does not detail the types or amounts of radioactive materials buried in those trenches. The DEIS should be revised to include an environmental impact analysis of the radioactive waste burial trenches located at Site 300. Another omission from the DEIS has been described elsewhere in another Lab publication, the Annual Environmnetal Monitoring Reports where it was admitted that sampling showed that detectable levels of depleted uranium werediscovered in the soils in the Central Valley near Tracy. Thus it is demonstrated that the 50 % of the depleted uranium that is dispered beyond the explosion areas at Site 300° can be dispersed into the Central Valley which is downwind (prevailing westerlies) from the site. The DEIS is inadequate because it does not discuss the environmental impact of this dispersal on valuable agricultural lands. Another important omission from this DEIS involves the radioactive wastes from Livermore labs that were dumped offshore from San Francisco near the Farallon Islands until the practice was stopped in 1966. An enclosed document from the AEC describes the containers (55 gallon barrels and concrete blocks) that were used. The accompanying document notes that "Sea disposal's a con venient method for disposing of certain types of radioactive wastes. Most of these wastes were from laboratory experiments, and were not considered dangerous. Mosts of the barrels used were recycled from prior uses, and many of the drums were without tops. Accurate accounts of numbers of barrels and amounts of radioactivity were not kept. Recently the EPA has discovered Approximately 60,000 barrels of low-level radioactive wastes were dumped onto the ocean floor, twenty miles west of San Francisco. Hundreds of concrete blocks containing cesium were dumped there also. The EPA recently conducted a special investigation of the environmental impact of these rad-wastes. 25 A ot the barrels were broken and leaking. Samples of sediments nearby contained Plutonium levels 25 times higher than fallout levels. Since then, the State Department of Health has discovered fish in local markets with high levels of radioactive cesium. And this year, fishermen from Marin pulled up a barrel ot radioactive wastes in their nets full of fish. The DEIS is inadequate because it does not discuss the Livermore labs participation in the dumping of radioactive wastes offshore from San Francisco. It does not take responsibility for the environmental impact of past activities. Again, the DEIS fails to meet credible standards of integrity, perhaps because once again the lab employees are embarrassed to admit mistakes that they have made The DEIS needs to be revised to include an analysis of rad-wastes from the labs that are offshore leaking and contaminating local fish food chains. The DEIS should also analyze the hazard Xo these wastes from an ear thquake on the San Andreas fault which passes offshore at that point, very close to the wastes. A final inadequacy concerning radioactive wastes is the DEIS's failure to assess the environmental impact of the rad-wastes that have been created by the labs, and by their projects at other sites, including the mass production of nuclear weapons designed by the LLL. An important question to be considered is why did the Livermore labs spend 25 years creating rad-wastes and designing bombs whose production created more rad-wastes, and yet they never solved the problem of what to do with those wastes for the thousands of years that they will remain radioactive. Cesium and Strontium will endanger global food chains for a 1000 years. Plutonium will be carcinogenic for a half a million years. The Problems associated with storing and guarding these wastes have environmental . impacts that are not considered by the Livermore DEIS even though Livermore is responsible C» c the creation of these wastes in huge quantities. 10-50 The fact that no solution has been discovered for the problems associated with storing rad-wastes for thousands of years is now a serious national security problem that endangers our nation's future public health and safety. The environ- mental impact of the enormous quantity of rad-wastes currently existing from the nuclear weapons program could result in the contamination of all the land and waters in the USA. Although LLL often describes extensively in its publications how it has been responsible for the design and development of the nation's nuclear weapons arsenal, LLL never discusses its equal responsibility for creating millions of gallons of high level radioactive wastes that must be guarded and kept out of the environment for many centuries. The DEIS is inadequate because it does not describe any efforts by LLL or SLL to research and solve this problem that they have helped to create. The environmental impact of LLL projects is enormous, extending beyond the boundaries of the fences at the site. The fact that the rad-wastes from LLL are shipped off to some storage site (e.g. Hanford) is no excuse for the DEIS to ignore the problems and environmental impacts of those wastes. The DEIS should be revised to discuss the waste problems and impacts. Obviously Hanford and other sites are discussed in other DOE DEIS's, but the Farallon Islands and Site 300 rad-waste disposal sites are not discussed in any DEIS's and must be included in the Livermore DEIS revision. Another dramatic inadequacy of this DEIS is the fact that it discusses what are supposed to be maximum credible accidents for single components in certain buildings at LLL. This analysis is limited to accident scenarios involving three facilities at LLL, even though the rest of the DEIS text indicates that there are dozens of locations on the site where extremely serious accidents could occur in which various types of radioactive materials and gases would be released. The DEIS does not even begin to present accident scenarios for these other parts of the facility. The DEIS should be revised to include all credible accident scenarios, especially in light of the earthquake hazards outlined in Appendix 2 A. 1 of the 3 accident scenarios involves a nuclear criticality accident in the Plutonium Metallurgical Chemistry Building // 332. It says that this accident could involve a fission yield of 10 18 fissions. The DEIS then calculates the dose for the 1,209,000 people in the sector west of LLL. This includes people in. the East Bay and Peninsula communities, in densely populated neighborhoods. This accidnet would release over a thousand curies of xenon 138 which decays (half life 17 minutes) into cesium 137 which remains dangerous for hundreds of years and easily enters the food chain (NOTE: the DEIS does not give or analyze this environmental impact potential) . And the accident could release over 500 cureies of radioiodine gases which can be inhaled from the passing cloud, or which can be taken up by the food chain from forage to cows to milk to humans. To calculate the dose from these radioactive gases which would be blown by the winds to distant communities, the DEIS diveids the total amounts of radiation by the total number of people downwind, and derives a dose. This methodology has problems but is generally accepted, although other methodologies exist that could be used for comparison. On page 3-64, the DEIS says that the accident in Building 332 could release between 50 and 150 man-rems of gaseous radiation. It dose not say how these numbers were calculated. Doses were calculated for the west site boundary to be between 5.5 rems and 35 rems (from the f orage-co\.-milk food chain). The DEIS comments that protective measures would have to be taken to replace the milk from cows downwind of the acci- dent. It does not say how this would be carried out or who would do it. Presumably since federal facilities are only responsible for onsite response, this condemnation and confiscation of milk products would be up to local county and state officilas. The DEIS does not explain whether or ncrf these people and the farmers who would be affected have been notified of the possibility of an accident requiring evacuations or the condemnation of agricultural products. 10-51 HI The DEIS does not discuss the longterm contamination of agricultural lands that would be an environmental impact of the release of xenon and cesium^ The ^ DEIS does say (page 3-65) that "The forage-cow-milk pathway doses for I and I are increased by precipitaion scavenging by factors which increase with distance downwind... Xe 13 ^ decays to cesium 137; the latter becomes attached to particulates and is available for scavenging. . .Submersion doses are enhanced by attachment of cesium 137 particles to fog droplets." Although indications are given, the DEIS is incomplete in this accident scenario because it does not calculate damages downwind in the eastern direction in the central San Joaquin Valley. The winds at LLL are often from west to east and an accident could seriously contaminate the most fertile agricultural lands in the nation Although this would be a significant environmental impact, the DEIS does not analyze or mention the possibility. What would be the impact of a cloud of radioactive gases passing over the central valley and into the tule fogs which enhanced the deposition of cesium and iodine into the food chain of the valley. Who would estimate the impact on the farmers and ranchers whose land was. affected . What would that impact be? What would be the economic losses sustained. Another accident scenario is for damage to one glove box in Building 251, which in th< 1976 version of the DEIS spilled 1600 curies (with only 1.6 curies escaping, thus giving a downwind dose of 9.5 rems) . In the 1978 version, the DEIS says that 1251 curies are spilled from a glove box as a result of fire or explosion, but only 006 curies of respirable particles are airborne and released into the room and this amount has to pass through the 95% efficient filters. This accident would give a dose of 5.6 rems to the person breathing while the cloud of gases passed over The DEIS says that the EPA reccommen ds evacuations be considered if the dose'ranges from 1 to 5 rems, but the DEIS says that the DOE guideline (DOE IMD 0524) allows doses to specific organs 3 times higher than whole body doses. Thus evacuations are not considered necessary by these calculations. DOE should explain its use of these guidelines which avoid the need to evacuate The third accidnet scenario involves ajrelea se of 1.2 M Curies ^ f__t£itium follow- ing the rupture of a pressure vessel in Building 331 at LLL dose of 3.8 rems to an offsite resident This results in a This scenario and dose calculation should UUbL' i> i -i . w i SHIS «-w«"~--~— -- . ir .___ ,. be~c^ntrastejwlth a Tritium release scenario that was given in the 19/5 banoia document (page 64) in which the new Sandia Tritium Research Lab had an accident releasing 12 M curies of tritium. The document says that LLL calculated that a dose from a release ai_l . 2 M Curies would be 18 rems , and from 0.12 MC would be 1 8 rems. The maximum quantity at Sandia' s research lab can be up to 3 MCuries and giving a dose of 45 rems. These calculations seem to indicate that the 1978 version is minimizing the dose according to some arbitrary assumptions. A question to consider in these accident scenarios is what would happen if all of the glove boxes in Building 251 or all of the tritium vessels at LLL or SLL were damaged or destroyed by a severe earthquake on the nearby Tesla Fault with a 5.5 Richter magnitude quake yielding in excess of a 1.0 g ground acceleration. The quake would totally destroy the filters so that all of the curium and tritium spilled would be available for dispersion. The buildings have only been proposed to be modified to a 0.5 g, so what does that earthquake do to the curium oxide powder and the tritium. The aftershocks would resuspend the oxide powder and it would be repeatedly available for dispersion into the environment during aftershocks. All accident scenarios in the DEIS need to be reevaluated in terms of more severe ground motions during earthquakes. Equally important is the fact that the DEIS omits considerations of many likely accident scenarios, and is thus incomplete in the Accident Analysis section. 10-52 The most serious problem in this DEIS as mentioned at the beginning ol these comments is its failure to realisticly analyze the earthquake hazards to all components and systems at the lahs in light of the information presented in Appendix 2A. There are ten active faults quite near to the labs. Nine of these nearby faults could produce above a 6.1 on the Richter scale The Livermore, Mocho, Tesla and Las Positas faults could produce a 6.5 on the Richter scale. The Greenville fault could produce a 6.7 on that scale. This data places the potential quakes from these faults in the range of the San Fernando quake of 1971 in Los Angeles. That quake has been significant in the reanalysis of the Vallecitos Nuclear Center which is located about 10 miles from the Livermore Labs. The largest reactor at Vallecitos was shutdown in October 1977 by the NRG because of the earthquake hazard there. Now the continued operations of the plutonium labs there are in question because of these same hazards. In the Vallecitos case (in which Friends of the Earth is legal Intervenors) , the NRG Geosciences Branch has conducted a detailed review of the geology and seismology of the region which should be included in the Livermore Site DEIS because of the proximity of the two nuclear research labs and the similarities in seismic potential. The NRC Geosciences Branch published a Safety Evaluation Report Input on August 17, 1978, that should be reviewed by the DOE for the Livermore DEIS revision. That document concludes that the Vallecitos site could experience ground accelerations in excess of 1.0 g from the Verona fault, a thrust fault that was considered inactive at the time Vallecitos was built. This predicted ground motion is based on observations during the San Fernando quake of 1971, in which data was obtained showing sevei ll instances of ground accelerations in excess of 1.0 g. Several of the faults near the Livermore site could experience ground accelerations in excess of a 1.0 g. This is based on comparison of their length and potential magnitudes with the San Fernando quake which was a 6.5 magnitude quake on a short thrust fault. Trenching and other geologic investigations should be carried out at the Livermore Site to determine the exact locations and historic motions on the faults near the site. Serious The DOE should seriously reevaluate the LLL management's choice of 0.5 g as the ground acceleration level chosen for modifications to the LLL facilities. The 1974 report by Wight in the DEIS Appendix 2 A suggests that a more appropriate value for ground motions would be 0.8 g, but the LLL management chose not to accept their advice, perhaps because it would be more difficult, but safer to modify to that level. Because the Livermore Valley and the lab site were created by tectonic forces related to the San Andreas and Calaveras fault zones, it is necessary to realize that the Livermore labs are located in one of the most seismicly active regions of the world. The geologic history of the region is appropriately detailed in Appendix 2 A and the information there should be. taken more seriously by the DOE. When the AEC originally chose the site in 1951, there was little or no seismic evaluation performed. It was just a location conveniently near the Radiation labs in Berkeley where many nuclear physicists were available to work as researchers in AEC programs. It was not until 1974 that a thorough seismic report was completed and by then, most of the buildings had been in operation for many years and it was difficult to change the structural designs. However the environmental impact potential of earthquake damages requires that all of the structures, systems and components at LLL and SLL be reevaluated for ground motions between a 0.8 g and a 1.0 g. A new DEIS needs to be done using these values as input in structural analyses. For this review, the DOE should hire consultants from independent structural engineering firms who do not have a bias or a conflict of interest that would create predetermined outcomes. 10-53 Because the Tesla fault passes within 200 feet of crucial structures at LLL, and because the Ramp Thrust fault and the Corral Hollow fault appear to pass beneath the site and near lab structures, DOE needs to carefully analyze the potential structural damages to lab facilities that could result from surface ruptures, ground shearing, and lateral or vertical offset directly beneath the holdings This type of- analysis has not been done. If these types of ground .no motions can take palce beneath the structures, they could be simultaneous with and in addition to the g values previously described, and the structural damage would be increased tremendously. Structural engineers in California generally recognize that it is difficult to ^e a structure "earthquake proof if it is within a zone of possxble surface rupture and offset or shearing. For example, the following quotes are from a book titled ^cc LJ1 f_J1ii 1 d^^ written by Peter Yanev an employee of URS/Blume~^ssociates who have done studies of Livermore and Sandia labs. "Buildings located in fault zones are exposed to the highest possible earth- quake risks. This is unequivocally a fact of life in earthquake country, and no measures-whether the most earthquake-resistant bracing and building materials nor the latests and soundest principles of reinforcement-can guarantee or eyen t tentatively propose that any property astride a fault would survive a moderate quake without severe or total damage... The greatest hazard to structures m fault zones is that they are subject to ground-surface ruptures and displacements during an earthquake, and no building can withstand this faulting beneath it. A ground shift of only a few inches (vertically, horizontally or , most : c ,™nonly f both) is sufficient to cause severe structural damage to buildings. A large quake, with its typical displacements in the fault zone of from severances to several feet, could demolish the most well-engineered building. (page 49) That quote is sound advise to the DOE in its evaluation the Livermore DEIS. Peter Yanev' s employer, URS/ Blume and Associates developed the Seismic Design Criteria for Nuclear REactors in 1973. Unfortunately, most of the structures at Livermore were designed long before any criteria were available and before the information about locations and potential magnitudes of nearby ^a was Wn. Although Blume has done a study of the site, he admits that it does no fulfill the necessary criteria and that if there was the possibility of surface rupture, then a complete reevaluation would be necessary. In its review of this matter, the DOE should consult with the USGS geologist, Darrell Herd (in the Menlo Park office of USGS) who has remapped the area near the si e including the Las Positas fault which passes through the Sandia Lab site Hero' s report (USGS Open file report 77-689) should be used in the review. Friends of the Earth would like the opportunity to present a more detailed analysis of potential ground motions and consequent structural damages to the Tab Y in fu u P re olmunications on this subject. Earthquake hazards to nuc ear facilities can cause serious damages that could create the maximum credible accidents in all buildings at Livermore. Because over ive mi Iron P e P le live within the evacuation and contamination zone radius from the livermore site this is a public health and safety question of significant importance. We ask you to please conduct public hearings on this subject of earthquake hazards at the Livermore site. 10-54 mm Enclosed are additional pages of comments on the Livermore DEIS which were written about the original version (virtually a verbatim copy of the current one) which was published by LLL in October, 1976. We believe that these comments are still valid and appropriate. Therefore we submit them to the DOE staff along with the preceeding updated comments. Also included are some Geological and Seismic Interpretations of the hazards existing in the Livermore Valley region which were submitted as part of our research on the Vallecitos Nuclear Center. Also included are various clippings, reports, and reproductions that were referred to in the text of the comments. 10-55 LLL and nearby Earthquake Faults The Lawrence Livermore Lab is located in a very active earthquake zone. There are thirteen active faults that could potentially damage the structures at the lab. Attached to this report are maps and tables that detail the names, locations, and Richter magnitude potential of these thirteen earthquake faults. Twelve of the thirteen faults could have quakes measuring 6 . 1 end higher on the Richter Scale. Several of the faults actually intersect the lab property. The potentially most dangerous fault is the Tesla-Fault which has at least three branches near the lab. Many critical structures on the lab site are within 200 feet or less from the Tesla Fault. A significant earthquake occurred in the summer of 1977 on the Tesla Fault, According to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for LLL and Sandia Lab, published in October, 1976, future quakes could be a hazard to the Labs 'operations. The structures at LLL have been designed and upgraded to withstand a quake that would produce a peak ground acceleration of 0.5 g. That DEIS contains an Appendix 2A entitled "A Geological and Seismological Investigation of the LLL Site" published on June 3, 1974. This report discusses the definition of the "Safe Shutdown Earth- quake" (SSE) for LLL; "For earthquakes on the nearby Tesla Fault, we calculate that the peak acceleration at the site will be 0.8 g" . The report indicates that a 0.5 g peak acceleration would correspond to a 5.5 Richter Magnitude quake, and that the Tesla Fault could have up to a 6 . 5 Richter Magnitude quake. But the report states that the LLL management thought that a SSE based on 0.0 g was excessively conservative, even though 2 out of 3 earthquake studies on LLL said that the SSE should be approximately 0.R g. The Lab management intervened in the definition of SSE and selected the SSE published in a 1972 report entitled "Investigation of Faulting at the LLL" , which is also included in the Appendix of the DEIS, That report defines the SSE at LLL as a 5.7 Richter magnitude quake causing a peak qround acceleration of 0.5g. The LLL management reccommended that all Safety Analysis Reports for LLL use that as the SSE. Consequently, since 1974, most of the structures at LLL have been upgraded to withstand a peak ground acceleration of 0.5g. When most of the structures were originally built, the estimated ground acceleration was lower 10-56 It is significant to note that there are many different kinds of buildings, labs, and facilities at LLL that could be damaged by earthquakes. Most of these were built years before the existence and locations of the nearby earthquake faults were known. and now, with the new information, some upgrading and modifications are being undertaken but are not completed. One problem with this process is that because the property legally belongs to the federal government, the AEC and ERDA have tradi- tionally maintained federal preemption over state, local, and regional government agencies concerning inspections of the facilities at LLL. Thus, the state and county Duilding code inspectors and structural engineers investigating earthquake resistance standards have never been allowed onto the property for investigations to satisfy the state and county standards. This is a serious mistake that should be corrected, ^he University of California should demand that ERDA (now the DOE) allow the state ind county inspectors to enter the premises to conduct structural engineering analyses »n all the facilities at ILL, The health and safety of the people of California ire at stake, because of the serious potential for radioactive contamination. There are many critical components at LLL that could be damaged in a quake which ould result in the release of radioactive liquids, gases, and solids into the local nvironment. Several buildings contain hot cells, glove boxes, pipes, filter systems, nd retention tanks that are particularly susceptible to earthquake damage and are xtremely difficult to make earthquake proof. The DEIS recognizes that some of the uildings still need "Funding requested to upgrade ventilation and exhaust systems, nd (funding) to incorporate structural modifications to improve seismic resistance." Several buildings at LLL are involved in the processing, handling, and storing f all levels of radioactive wastes. These buildings often have large quantities of ighly dangerous materials in containers that are not earthquake proof. Especially alnerable are the liquid radioactive wastes when they are being transported in tanks id when they are being processed . The DEIS says that , in Building 514, the Radioactive Lquid Waste Treatment Plant, "Equipment failures, could release untreated, highly idioactive wastes into the Livermore sewage system. 10-57 I recconmend that anyone interested in Understanding the full environmental impact of the LLL, should read the DEIS, and the Annual Environmental. Monitoring Reports prepared by LLL. It is interesting to note that LLL is on a Self -Monitoring Program and that no government agency, local, state or federal, conducts independent^monitoring of routing emissions from LLL stacks operations. These routine emissions come from certain facilities at LLL that have been improved during the past few years to reduce the amounts of air and water pollution. However, in 1975, L1L released 3,400 Curies of Tritium into the air, 38 curies of tritium into the sewage system, 600 curies of argon gas into the air, trace amounts of plutonium, Iodine-131, Strontium-90, and Radium-226 into the Livermore sewage system. In the pat* significant-leaks of plutonium into the sewer caused lab scientists to use the sludge for experiments to discover which vegetables take up plutonium from the soil most rapidly. LLL and Site 300 together have generated over 100,000 pounds of depleted uranium. A* Site 50% of the uranium in test explosions is dispersed info the environment and studies of moni toring in the Sa n Joaquin Valley have indicate d widespread dispers al j n I^H The Sandia Lab, next door to LLL, has 170,000 curies of radioactive cesium which is ^ biologically active and could enter the Central Valley food chain, if dispersed. The Sandia Lab has a special earthquake problems in that the recently published USGS study by D. Herd shows that the newlv discovered Las Positas Fault passes through the Sandia Property. That Fault could endanger weapons test facilities at Sandia. . MAXIMUM CREDIBLE ACCIDENTS The DEIS discusses maximum credible accidents for single components in certain ! buildings at LLL. For example, if one glove box in Building 251, was damaged by a fire or explosion, then 1600 curies of curium 244 oxide could be released. If 1.6 curies of this escaped (assuming that filters were not damaged and worked properly) then a person downwidd could receive 9.5 rems of radiations. The DEIS does not say what would happen if more than one glove box was damaged or if the filters were damaged. 10-58 Another accident analysis in the DEIS postulated a tritium gas release of 1,200,000 curies caused by the rupture of one pressure vessel. The analysis does not consider the rupture of more than one vessel at a time. The postulated tritium release would be from Building 331. Another postulated accident in the DEIS takes place in Building 332, the Metallurgical Chemistry Building where plutonium is handled in signifi- cant quantities. That accident could release 250,000 curies of fission products, including 300 curies of radioactive iodine gases that can produce thyroid cancers. The DP, IS does not discuss the evacuations that would be neces- sary if iodine gas was released. The same accident could release over 1000 curies of xenon that decays into cesium which can contaminate the food chain for 1000 years. In these postulated accidents, the cause is usually fire, human error or explosions. The_Di U5 does not con sider the cu mulative effects of an earthquak e that jiamaged^^^^jnindjaag s at once o r that damaged several glove boxes, h ot cells, filter systems and other components all at the same time. The DEIS also assumes that the filter systems will always work well enought to filter out 95 per cent of the radioactive materials before release to the environment. These assumptions make the DEIS inadequate, incomplete and misleading. Radioactive Wastes originate in 25 buildings at LLL within over 100 dif- ferent operations. Five buildings that produce the bulk of the wastes are the Pool Type Reactor, the 100 MeV Linear Accelerator, the Heavy Element Chemistry Building 251, the Metallurgical Chemistry Building 332, and the Light Isotope Chemistry Building 331. Some of these have hot cells and glove boxes that, are vulnerable to earthquake damages. If the filler systems are damaged in a quake, serious contamination of the surrounding areas could occur. If the wind was blowing towards the east or northeast, as is typical during the dry summer season, then the fertile agricultural lands of the San Joaquin Valley would be seriously contaminated and the nation's food supply would be endangered. 10-59 If the wind was blowing towards the west or southwest, as is typical, during the wtt winter season, then San Jose and Palo Alto could be endangered from clouds of radioactive isotopes, Evacuation of metropolitan communities might be necessary, even tho such evacuations have never been rehearsed, and even tho the evacuations might be impossible after a serious earthquake in the area. An accidental release of radiation from LLL could contaminate several reservoirs and aqueducts that border the Livermore Valley and supply drinking water to millions of people in San Francisco and the South Bay cities. The Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct and the South Bay Aqueduct pass near the Lab site. T^.5 t^ ^o:^^4 ,,v^or \ 5 hot ^— H"^ '^ ^ ^ )i ,5 ' A nuclear weapons facility at Rocky Flats, Colorado, has spilled and leaked Plutonium and other isotopes into the surrounding area, About 11.000 avtes aave been contaminated with more plutonium than considered safe by the Colorado Health Department. Rocky Flats opeaations involve routine emissions of small amounts of radioactive materials leading to measurable doses to people in Denver and Boulder. 500 shipments of radioactive cargo are trucked to and from Rocky Flats each year, leaving measurable amounts of radiation along the roads. ERDA and the Colorado Health Dept. disagree as to how many citizens will suffer health effects from Rocky Flats. The Contamination that has already happened at Rocky Flats represents a f » a J*j° n of the potential possible at LLL. The GAO has called for an analysis of similar E«DA weapons facilities. The University of Cal. should request that the GAO, EPA, and OES conduct ■ studies of potential contamination at LLL, Sandia, and l/5s Alamos. In 1977 it was discovered that Plutonium was being flow* in and out of Rocky Flats and Livermore in small turbo prop transport planes, in containers that were not crash proof. The flights had been going on secretly for 25 years or more. When the Congressman from Livermore discovered this he hell hearings and pressured ERDA to stop the flights. A crash of one of those planes could have caused serious widespread contamination. 10-60 Further information on the Farralon Islands waste sites is contained in the attached report entitled "Radiation and Earthquakes :The Ominous Potential in the Bay Area". The EPA is continuing its investigation and will be issuing further reports in the future. The University's labs currently use two different methods of disposing of their wastes (1) High level and recyclable wastes are turned over to ERDA, now DOE, for shipment to one of eight federal waste storage sites. These federal radioacitvo wastes facilities have a terrible record of leaks and spills that have contaminated the environment. In fact, today a Serious national security problems exists because there has been no adequate solution developed for the radioactive waste disposal problem. Most of the rad wastes are from nuclear weapons facilities. (2) Low level wastes and non-retrievable wastes are shipped by contract carrier to a privately owned waste storage site near Beatty, Nevada. In 1975, ERDA discovered that the operator there had been illegally recycling radioactive tools and equipment to various local -citizens who were found to be inppossession of the items. The Livermore lab used to bury some radioactive wastes in trenches at Site 300, located 15 miles from the lab in Alameda County, California. That practice has been stopped but the Lab does continue to dump large quantities of radioactive rubble, mostly depleted uranium from Site 300 explosions, into trenches there for burial. Large quantities of radioactive wastes pass through the Livermore Lab each year. These wastes are transported away from the Lab by contract or common couriers, in containers approved by ERDA. These wastes pass across the fertile Central Valley and through many California communities, without any advance notice to local officials that trucks carrying rad-wastes are passing their wa?. Earthquakes, accidents, and terrorist attacks or sabotage could cause large-scale contamination of California. Why has the University of California not reccommended to the weapons labs that they try to soltfe the rad-wastes disposal problem before they continue to create longlived radioactive isotopes that will have to be guarded and kept out of the biosphere and food chains for centuries f Plutonium remains hazardous for up to 500,000 years. 10-61 Another potential impact to be considered is the fact that the location of the nuclear weapons complex at 11L makes the site a number one target in case of a nuclear or conventianal attack on the U.S. by enem ? forces. LLL has provided fallout shelters for its employees, with a couple weeks rations of foods, but LLL has not provided for the other 4 or 5 million neighbors who would be affected. Strategic targeting of LLL by enemy missiles is one good reason to remove the LLL to a remote location like NTS. Tn its DEIS, LLL recognizes that certain buildings on the site pose extreme hazards potential to the local environment. On page 5-3 of the DEIS, LLL describes the alter- native that relacation of these facilities to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) would be feasible and"attractive because NTS is in an area geographically remote from population centers and is owned and operated by ERDA (DOE). Furthermore, many areas within NTS have been exposed to the impact of previous nuclear testing. As a result, the additional radiation impact of the operations listed would be minimal." (DETS, page 5-3) The facilities thus categorized as having the most "potential for adverse impact" are the Neutron accelerator in Building 212, the Diagnostic Chemistry Building 251, the Livermore Pool Type Reactor, the Gaseous Chemistry Building R331, and the Plutonium Metallurgy Building 332. The University of California should make continued operation of LLL contingent on the relocation of these five dangerous facilities to the NTS. This partial relocation would minimize the potential contamination from earthquake damage to the LLL. The Controversy over structural engineer!-..,, Design Basis Earthquakes and SSL's at LLL. make it nocessarv for new seismic studies to be done independently of LLL management. The use of several hundred pounds per year of pl uto„i» at LLL creates an enormous and unacceptable health hazard, in light of the dangers of Plutonium and the potential guake damages. All Plutonium facilities at LLL should be relocated to NTS, before the Livermore and San Joaquin Valleys become contaminated the way the Rocky Flats area has been contaminated already. 10-62 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONS BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABORATORIES AT LIVERMORE BY GLENN BARLOW, The environmental impact J of the nuclear weapons labs extend far beyond the boundaries of the labs themselves. Scientists employed by LLL the University of California have conducted over 600 nuclear weapons tests since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions. Over 100 of these tests were in the South Pacific and the other 500 nuclear weapons were exploded in the continental United States. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, all of these tests have been underground, but before that treaty 84 atmospheric tests w ere conducted at the Nevada Test Site, fifty miles from the California border. Radioactive fallout from those tests has contaminated a large area in Nevada with plutonium and other sources of radiation. Thyroid tumors have been discovered in children in Nevada and Utah where clouds of radioactivity passed over communities. The plutonium contamination of soils in Nevada could last for hundreds of thousands of years. Th< * >s erW.V»*me**ta£ i v mf«to1- I The radioactive fallout from the "»00 atmospheric tests in the South Pacific resulted in contamination of the entire planet earth with long-lasting sources of radiation such as strontium-90 and cesium- l 37 which enter the food chain and deposit in human bones and tissues where they can produce cancers and leukemia. Unfortunately, tha nuclear weapons labs did not begin to study the effects of fallout until after the Test Ban Treaty of 1963. In 1963, the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory established its Biomedical Division to study the health effects of nuclear weapons development. The chief of that Division from 1963 to 1969 was Dr. John Gofman, who in 1969 reported to Congress and the Atomic Energy Commission 10-63 that previously established radiation standards were inadequate to protect public health, and that the health effects of nuclear weapons development were more serious than previously believed. Dr. Gofman lost his job at Livermore Lab because of his reports. Recently, Dr. Gofman has published a report that indicates that over a million people in the northern hemisphere will die of cancers produced by fallout from atmospheric tests, and that plutonium is much more carcinogenic than what the laboratories have been assuming for many years. Since the cancers produced by exposure to plutonium do not show up until thirty to forty years after exposure, and since most of the plutonium involved in the nuclear weapons labs work has been produced in the past 25 years, the major health impacts may begin to appear in the next 5 to 15 years. A question that we all should ask is, who should be held responsible for the cancers and deaths that are results of nuclear tests? Are the Regents of the University responsible? Are the lab employees responsible? Or Should the world's citizens conduct Nuremburg-type trials of the employees to punish them for killing so many people? And if there ever is a nuclear war in the future, would the University of California be held responsible for developing the bombs that caused the death and destruction? The 400 underground nuclear weapons tests that the has conducted in the U.S. raiae another problem that is of special interest to citizens of California. According to a report prepared^ -the La*renco Livermore Lab and published by the AEC in April, 1969, "there is concern on the part of some earthquake experts that ... serious earthquakes might be induced by 'larger yield nuclear tests. This is an area in which further study is necessary," Another Lab report explains that "When the Boxcar event (with a yield of 1.2 megatons), conducted in April, 1968, resulted in thousands of small aftershocks (ensuing earth tremors) . , . great scientific interest was created and an ad hoc panel of seismic consultants to the Nevada Operations Office was recruited among the foremost seismologists of the U.S. Boxcar was the first U.S. underground test designed for a megaton yield or more." 10-64 Because of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, agreed to by Nixon and Breshnev in 1974, and signed by Ford and Breshnev at Vladivostok that same year, all underground nuclear tests were to be limited to 150 kilotons ater March 20, 1976. Because of this impending limitation, both countries increased the size and frequency of underground explosions up to the deadline. During the ten months between May 1975 and March 17, 1976, the U\ S, conducted twelve megaton range (a megaton is equivalent to one million tons of TNT) nuclear weapons test and sic smaller ones at the Nevada Test Site. Thus the administrators of the University's nuclear weapons labs ignored the advice of the Panel of foremost seismologists who wrote a report published by the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, on November 27, 1968, entitled "Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on the Safety of Underground Testing". That report was reprinted in a September, 1969 publication by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) entitled "Underground Nuclear Testing". Consider the following quatations from that report: "The Panel is seriously concerned with the problem of earthquakes resulting from large-yield nuclear tests... new and significant evidence demonstrates that small earthquakes do actually occur both immediately after a large-yield test explosion and in the following weeks... a large test explosion might induce, either immediately or after a period of time, a severe earthquake of sufficiently large magnitude to cause serious damage well beyond the limits of the test site. . .Consideration should also be given to the possibility of establishing a new test site in a non-seismic area... The hazard connected with the triggering of earthquakes is a more serious question because of the potentiality of releasing tectonic energy comparable to, or very much larger than, the energy of the (nuclear) explosion itself... We are now dealing with underground explosions with equivalent earthquake magnitudes in the range 6 to 7... We also know that seismic events in the magnitude range 6 to 7 have been associated in the past as foreshocks to large earthquakes or as components of large earthquakes. 10-65 In view of these observations, a risk mast be associated with conducting large- yield tests in seismic regions... There is no question that the larger nuclear explosions in Nevada have actually triggered small earthquakes..." The Nevada Test Site is in a moderately active earthquake zone that joins the Circum-Pacific Seismic Belt which passes through California, and includes the San Andreas Fault System. This belt of fault systems surrounding the Pacific Ocean is responsible for about 30% of the world's earthquakes. During the megaton range weapons tests, in February, 1976, a major earthquake (measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale) with nearly a hundred aftershocks tremors, struck Central America, inflicting severe damage upon Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Latin American newspapers accused the U.S. military of causing the disastrous quake by exploding enormous nuclear weapons underground in Nevada. The same reports said that nuclear tests were also responsible for other earthquakes in Mexico and Costa *ica. It is also possible that the San Fernando Quake in Los Angeles in 1971 , (measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale) could have been stimulated by nuclear weapons tests 300 miles away at the Nevada Test Site. All of the above locations are in the Circum-Pacif ic Seismic Belt and earthquake waves can travel deep beneath the surface, causing tremors long distances away from the epicenter. The nuclear tests in Nevada are carried out under the direction of the University of California's Laboratories. Can the University be held responsible for the damages caused by underground nuclear tests? The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1974 has not been ratified by the U.S. Senate. During hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 8. 1977, concerning ratification of the Treaty, the Directors of the University of California's Laboratories at Livermore and Los Alamos, testified against ratification of the treaties because the Labs want to continue to test megaton-range bombs in Nevada, regardless of the hazard of stimulating more earthquakes. Why does the University of California not require its employees to present both sides of an issue when they lobby Congress? 10-66 December 19, 1978 Mr. W. H. Pennington: Enclosed you will find additional documents, reports, clippings, and other materials that are referred to in the main text of Friends of the Earth's comments on the Livermore Site DEIS. The main text was sent postal express so as to arrive on or before the deadline for comments. These appendices and addenda are being sent under separate cover, please attach them to the main set of commenns. Thank you Glenn Barlow "W u 10-67 FURTHER DOCUMENTATION OF EARTHQUAKE HAZARDS TO THE VALLECITOS NUCLEAR CENTER PLUTONIUM LABS FOR THE DECEMBER 14, 1978, REQUEST FOR ACTION TO THE NRC PREPARED BY GLENN BARLOW GEOLOGY AND SEISMOLOGY In the course of the Vallecitos GETR reactor Show Cause Proceedings (Docket No. 50-70), the NRC Staff published a Preliminary Safety Evaluation Report Input (PSER-GETR), prepared by the Geosciences Branch of the Staff on the geologic and seismic hazards to the site. Although the PSER-GETR was dated August 17, 1978, it was not released to Intervenors until early October, 1978. In the PSER-GETR, the NRC Geosciences Branch makes the following statements: "The seismic design hazards for the GETR site include vibratory ground motion, fault offset at the surface beneath the unit and vibratory ground motion combined with surface offset caused by postulated movement on the Verona JauU. The licensee (GE) has provided an evaluation of these design hazards in reports by EDAC (1976, 977) and has provided additional supporting discussion in a report by Earth Sciences Associates (ESA, 1978d). The staff has reviewed these reports and has taken account of ?he analyses and conclusions contained in them in the preparation of this testi- mony This testimony is concerned with an evaluation of the nature and magnitude of the hazard! of fainting and ground motion at the site... The GETR site is located in a complex fault environment 2.3 kilometers east of the Calaveras fault, directly over the projected surface trace of the postulated Verona fault, and within 3 kilo- meters of the Las Positas fault... Maximum earthquakes for these faults would have maanitudes of 7 to 7 h, 6 to 6 h, and 6 to 6*. respectively... the proposed Verona au t can be p re umed to exist beyond the bounds of the area mapped by Herd and to merge with the Calaveras fault... it must be presumed that the Verona fault s str uctu rally connected to larger faults, and that a major portion and poss bly all o the 12 kilometers length could rupture during a single eart quake It is our conclusion therefore, that the San Fernando earthquake of 1971 could be consiaereo Tan earthquake similar in size to a potential event on the proposed Verona fault. (Seismology section) ^.^ „ Cu s ff p UJ „ says: "Geolonic data are indicative of a fault (the Verona fault) passing through the GE?R site, and this fault should be assumed to exist The Verona fault should be assumed to be capable within the meaning of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 and, therefore to pose a potential tor surface faulting near or beneath the reactor therefore to pose [ ^ ^^ result1ng from reverse-oblique m ement along a fault plane which could.vary in dip angle from 10 to 60 degrees provides a reasonably conservative description of surface slip on the postulated Verona fault during a single event... 10-68 "Maximum vibratory ground motion at the GETR site would result from a magnitude 7 to 7 »2 earthquake centered on the sector of the Calaveras fault nearest the site. Acceleration peaks at the free-field surface could be slightly in excess of 1.0 g... The horizontal vibratory ground motion at the GETR site resulting from an earthquake of magnitude 6 to 6 ' 2 on the Verona fault could contain acceleration peaks as high as 1.0 g." The following quotes are from the section entitled "Geology": "The GETR site is located in a highly active tectonic environment (Bolt and others, 1977; Lee and others, 1971)... within the Livermore syncline and the central pert of the Coast Ranges structurally related to the San Andreas fault system, a trans- form fault which forms a major sector of the boundary between the North American and Pacific lithospheric plates ... (Anderson, 1971)... We consider the Livermore syncline and the major structural elements therein, including faults, to owe their existence to movement across the Calaveras fault. The faults significant to our review which we consider genetically related to the Calaveras are the Las Positas fault... and the Verona fault which as interpreted is a low angle thrust within the southern flank of the syncline." "The existence of a landslide near the site does not in any way preclude the exi- stence of faulting there. As discussed below, evidence for faulting exists in areas away from the landslide are. In fact, landsliding often results from over- steepening of slopes due to fault movement and seismic shaking... (1)... Areas to the northwest of the GETR show, both in the field and on aerial photographs, the presence of geologic features which are indicative of the exi- stence of faulting. Steeply dipping Livermore gravel beds are truncated along a linear to curvilinear topographic escarpment. Along the base of this escarpment are a number of seeps and springs. (2)To the southeast of the GETR the geologic log of the La Costa tunnel (California Department of Water Resources, 1966) suggests low angle faulting and folding in an area through which the postulated Verona fault would pass if projected eastward... (3)The relationship between the Verona fault and the Las Positas fault has not been investigated and the area of the William's fault (Hall, 1958) -La Costa tunnel inter- section has not been investigated sufficiently... AREAS OF INTERSECTION OR MERGING OF FAULTS CAN BE IN A TRANSITIONAL STRESS STATE WHICH USUALLY LEADS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAULT PATTERNS WHICH ARE GEOLOGICALLY COMPLEX SUCH AS EN ECHELON FAULTS RATHER THAN A SINGLE PLANAR FAULT SURFACE. SUCH COMPLEX PATTERNS ARE DIFFICULT TO INTERPRET WITHOUT EXTENSIVE FIELD INVESTIGATIONS. (Emphasis added) (4)A prominent south-facing scarp and topographic break does exist in the site area. (5)Existing geologic maps and texts of Vickery (1925), Hall (1958), Prince (1957), URS/Blume Associates (1973) and more recently Herd (1977) support the existence of the Verona fault and other faults in the GETR site area and vicinity. In addition, to the northwest of the GETR site and along the general northwesterly projection of the Verona fault is the northwest trending Pleasanton fault which is identified as a potentially active fault on the California Division of Mines and Geology Special Studies Zones Map, Dublin Quadrangle (Slosson, 1974). Several authors (Burkland, 1975; Judd Hall Associates, 1977; Carpenter, 1977) have assigned various locations to Pleasanton fault. At the present time, it is reasonable to conclude that the Pleasan- ton fault is a possible continuation of the Verona fault. 10-69 (5) Recent seismological studies of earthquake fault plane solutions indicate that the Livermore Valley region is in northeast-southwest compression (Si mi 1 a and Somerville, 1978) and not extension as argued by the licensee (GE-EDAC, 1978). Moreover, this indirect observation of the stress direction is consistent with the highly active regional tectonic framework. Northeast-southwest compression would support development of, 'and continued movement along, a northeast-dipping thrust fault such as the Verona. (8)... The more recent geologic mapping provided by GE contains substantially more'geoloaic structures than the earlier versions, indicating more post-Li vermore tectonic deformation than would have been ascertained from GE ' s earlier mapping. (9) Photolinears and the cause of seeps and ponds to the south of and in close proximity to the GETR site area have not been trenched or explained. In tectonic- ally active areas photolinears are often due to groundwater barriers or differen- tial erosion due to the presence of a fault." FRIENDS OF THE EARTH'S COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS Although the NRC's PSER-GETR report presents interesting information, it is incomplete in analyzing the complex tectonic setting of the Vallecitos Valley and the surrounding fault systems. Several faults that may intersect with the Verona fault are not analyzed. All of these faults seem to intersect with or parallel the Calaveras fault and possibly intersect with the Las Positas fault. These faults include the Pleasanton fault, the Williams fault, the Maguire Peaks fault, and other parallel branches of the Calaveras fault. Also not analyzed by the NRC are 'the sequence of interactions during an earthquake on the Verona, Las Positas, and Calaveras faults in terms of ground motions and durations, and pos- sible surface ruptures, and how these would affect the operating plutonium labs. All of the above mentioned faults could be branches or subsidiaries of the power- ful Calaveras fault which is a branch of the San Andreas. If any of these faults experienced seismic activity simultaneously with the Calaveras, what would be the effects on the reactors and labs at Vallecitos? The NRC seems to have forgotten a memo from one of its geophysicists in the Geosciences Branch concerning the timing of earthquakes on the Calaveras. In his memo to Carl Stepp, John Kelleher states: "The Calaveras fault zone is a capabTe fault within the meaning of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100 and, at its closest point, is within one or two miles of the GETR site. It is reasonable, in my opinion, to assume that an earthquake of magnitude about 7 to 7.5 could occur at any time on this fault and at any location along the fault. Such an earthquake, therefore, could occur at a ny time within one or two miles of the plant site. The resulting ground motion generated at the plant site by the postulated earthquake would almost certainly be severe and peak ground accelerations would be am ong the high e r observ at ions to date , (emphasis added) IT is unlikely that extensive future investigations will modify this assessment in any significant manner." 10-70 That internal NRC Staff memo was written in late October, 1977, and now in December, 1978, the plutonium labs at Vallecitos are still in operation, even though the NRC PSER-GETR admits that the Calaveras could cause in excess of a one g at the site, and GE's structural analysis indicates that a one g could total 1/ destroy the plutonium labs. This situation illustrates the risks that the NRC is willing to take with public health and safety. Actually it is possible that an earthquake on either the Verona or the Cala- veras faults could easily exceed one g. Calculations by a seismologist from Scripps Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics (J.N. Brune, Journal of Geophysical Research, 1970, 1978) and by Y. Ida (Bulletin of Seismological Society of America, 1973) indicate that peak acceleration near a surface rupture can easily exceed one g. Also, field evidence from near-epicenter damage studies (N.N. Ambraseys, 1969; C.F. Richter, Elementary Sei smology, 1958) indicates that accelerations greater than one g have already been experienced. Furthermore, according to L.H.Wight, there are "data, calculations, and observations (which) clearly indicate that accelerations approaching one g are possible in near-epicentral regions for earth- quakes of all magnitudes. The NRC's PSER-GETR says that the Verona fault could experience an earthquake similar in size to the San Fernando quake of 1971. That quake changed the entire set of seismological theories on relationships between Richter magnitudes and ground acceleration potential. That quake was the first time in history that accurate near-field ground acceleration data was collected. Based on previous records, the maximum ground acceleration possible at San Fernando in 1971 would have been pre- dicted to be 0.1 g to 0.3 g. Instead, the 1971 quake, measuring 6.6 magnitude, caused various ground acceleration measurements in excess of one g including the Pacoima Dam record of 1.25 g, recorded at a distance of 4.4 kilometers from the epicenter. The Vallecitos plutonium labs are less than 1 kilometer from the Verona fault, and less than 3 kilometers from the Las Positas fault, either of which could cause a 6.5 magnitude quake. Thus, it is possible that either of those faults could cause accelerations at Vallecitos in excess of 1 g. The Calaveras fault can cause a 7.5 magnitude quake with an epicenter one or two miles from the plutonium labs. The way the Richter scale is measured, a quake of magnitude 7.5 could release more than thirty times more destructive energy than a quake of magnitude 6.5. Thus, it is very possible that a Calaveras quake with its epicenter near Vallecitos could cause severe ground accelerations in excess of 2 g. Another relevant quote from the NRC PSER -GETR will help to explain this: 10-71 "Numerous complexities are involved in estimating earthquake ground motions at a site. At distances areater than about 20 kilometers from the earthquake source, a fairly large set of observational data exists. At distances closer to the source, however, the observational data set is relatively small. There is, in fact, a virtual absence of records of strong ground motion for locations close to large earthquake sources. Any estimate of free-field ground motion at the GETR site must, therefore, be considered an extrapolation of data rather than supported by direct observations. Simple source theory indicates that peak acceleration near the causative fault may be proportional to the stress conditions and rock physical properties at the source, possibly independent of earthquake magnitude (see for example, Brune, 1970). Limited observational data tend to support these theoreti- cal results (Hanks and Johnson, 1976)." Following the above statement in the PSER-GETR, the NRC Staff stated that: "Duration of motion, including duration of high peaks is, however, a function of earthquake magnitude or source size... based on the available data by Page and others (1972)... peak horizontal near-source acceleration for a magnitude 7 to 7 \ earthquake could exceed 1 g and that the total duration of strong motion could be between 25 and 40 seconds." Apparently, the NRC may have underestimated the duration, based on recent data from the November 29, 1978 earthquake in Mexico where a quake with its epi- center offshore some 400 miles from Mexico City, had a duration of two minutes and 53 seconds, with a 7.8 magnitude quake. That quake was followed by five more strong aftershocks within twenty four hours. Although that quake had its epicenter about 400 mi-les from Mexico City, the structural damages in that city were large. This indicates that the Vallecitos site should be reevaluated for damages from quakes on the San Andreas fault system. The November 29 quake and aftershocks were followed on December 7 by another major quake of magnitude. 6 to 7 with two large aftershocks, that shook 3 Latin American countries. And then on December 10, 1978, another quakn with a 5.9 magnitude shook the Acapulco area. That quake could have been an aftershock of the November 29th quake. These quakes illustrate the problems that would be experienced at the Vallecitos plutonium labs if a major quake and associated aftershocks damaged the labs, spilled Plutonium, and left radioactive materials exposed to resuspension from aftershocks. Another consideration that the NRC Staff has failed to analyze is the fact that the Calaveras fault zone near Vallecitos is a seismic gap which is defined as any region along an active plate boundary that has not experienced a large thrust or strike slip earthquake for more than 30 years. A seismic gap has the potential to produce a large earthquake in the near future. This is especially relevant now because the earthquake in Mexico last month was predicted by geologists because the area was in a state of seismic gap. When will the next big quake strike the Calaveras fault zone? 10-72 The NRC PSER-GETR (August, 1978) failed to analyze in detail the possi- bility of an en echelon series of branch faults in the Livermore and Vallecitos Valleys. En erh elon faults are very common in northern California because of lateral stresses. If three main faults are located near each other (such as the Verona, Las Positas, and Calaveras) then there will likely be branches, spurs, or parallel offshoots between them. It is probable that several new faults will be discovered if more trenching is done in the Vallecitos Valley. When discussing potential earthquakes on postulated faults, it is essen- tial to understand that faults are not limited to narrow lines on a map, but are found in zones that range from 100 feet wide to several miles wide. Severe ground motions can occur several miles from the main fault trace, because the actual ground motion originates deep within the earth, not on the surface. The Calaveras and its branches are part of the San Andreas fault system, which is experiencing enormous tectonic stress. According to the plate tectonics theory, the San Andreas is a transform fault that is the dividing line between the North American plate and the Pacific plate, and these two plates are sliding past each other in a right lateral strike slip motion. The San Andreas has had two major quakes in the past 120 years that each ca.used surface ruptures along 320 kilometers of the fault, with offsets measuring in many meters. The horizontal displacement along that fault system has been over 500 kilometers since Jurassic time (CDMG, 1966). Some of the stress is transferred to the Calaveras branch which is 120 miles long. Hall (1958) estimated a vertical displacement of at least 2,000 feet on the Calaveras fault zone and a right lateral horizontal displacement of at least 3 miles. The Calaveras has had several major earthquakes in historic times; especially notable are the quakes on June 10, 1836 (Intensity IX to X); July 3, 1861 (Intensity IX); May 19, 1889, (Intensity VIII); June 20, 1897 (Intensity IX); March 30, 1898 (VIII), and June 11, 1903 (VIII). Many historic quakes of smaller magnitudes or less intensity have been recorded in the Livermore and Vallecitos Valleys (see epicenters maps in the report by Darrell Herd, USGS Open-file report 77-689). Some of those epicenters seemed to have been located on the Verona fault, especially during the swarm of quakes in 1943. Other epicenters were on the Las Positas fault zone. It is important to remember that in the San Andreas fault system, surface ruptures usually occur discontinuously across en echelon faults. Local stress concentrations can cause a newly created en echelon fault to appear (usually parallel to a known fault zone) and to form a subsidiary fault. The tectonic stresses in the San Francisco Bay Area are particularly conducive to this type of 10-73 branching. Two branches of the San Andreas, the Hayward and the Calaveras, are among the longest faults in the state, and they each have subsidiary branches. Block faulting between and beside the Hayward and Calaveras faults have created the Sunol Ridge (within sight of the Vallecitos plutonium labs) and the Livermore Valley. The Vallecitos and Livermore Valleys are located adjacent to the Diablo Antiform and the Coastal Range Thrust fault system which is parallel to the San Andreas system. The Diablo Antiform is dissected by many active faults and is seismicly active. Literally hundreds of earthquakes with magnitudes in the 4 to 5 range have been recorded there in recent years. These fault systems have been active for millions of years and tehy will continue to be active long into the future. The Vallecitos Nuclear Center was constructed in one of the most seismicly active regions in the United States. 10-74 In the GETR Show Cause Proceedings, GE's structural consultants (CDAC) and the NRC (PSER-GETR) have admitted that the Verona fault could cause surface ruptures, ground shearing, and vertical or lateral offsets directly beneath the GETR reactor. The Verona fault is a thrust fault. Because thrust faults angle diagonally to the surface from deep beneath the surface, they can have a surface rupture zone of up to a half mile wide. The plutonium labs are less than a half mile from the Verona fault. Because two other "apparent thrust faults" have been discovered near the plutonium labs (the Lake Lee and Plutonium faults in trenches B-2 and H), it is necessary and urgent for the NRC and GE to analyze the potential structural dama ge to t he la bs from_ s_urf_ace rupture, ground_ shearin g, and la_teral or vertical offset directly ben eath the labs. This type of analysis has not been done. If these types of ground motions can take place beneath the labs, they could be simultaneous with and in addition to the g values previously described, and the structural damage previously analyzed would be increased tremendously. Structural engineers in California generally recognize that it is virtually impossible to make a structure "earthquake proof" if it is within a zone of possible surface rupture and offset or shearing. For example, the following quotes arc from a book titled Peace of Mind in _Ear_thqua_ke__Cou_ntry_ by Peter Yanev. "Buildings located in fault zones are exposed to the highest possible earthquake risk. This is unequivocally a fact of life in earthquake country, and no measures—whether the most earthquake-resistant bracing and building materials nor the latest and soundest principles of reinforcement--can guarantee or even tentatively propose that any property astride a fault would survive a moderate quake without severe or total damage... The greatest hazard to structures in fault zone zones is that they are subject to ground-surface ruptures and displacements during an earthquake, and no building can withstand this faulting beneath it. A ground shift of only a few inches (vertically, horizontally, or, most commonly, both) is sufficient to cause severe structural damage to buildings. A large quake, with its typical displacements in the fault zone of from several inches to several feet. could demolish the most well -engineered building." (page 49) Yanev's employer is URS/ Blume and Associates who developed the AEC's Seismic Design Criteria for Nuclear Reactors in 1973. Unfortunately, the AEC had inadequate criteria for seismic hazards prior to 1973 (for reactors), and neither the AEC nor the NRC have developed any seismic criteria for the structural design of plutonium labs. 10-75 Table 5. Relation of rupture length and magnitude for faults surround- ing the LLL site. Fault Rupture length Magnitude (km) (Richter) 8.3 7.5 7.5 6.5 6.5 6.5 6.2 6.4 5.8 6.4 6.1 6.7 most current and comprehensive compila- tion of data has recently been presented 33 by Schnabel and Seed ; their interpreta- tion of the data is summarized in Fig. 12. The accelerations were recorded on rock, and the distance is the shortest distance to the fault rupture. In Table 6, we summarize the applica- tion of these curves to the San Andreas, Hayward, and Calaveras faults. Because the bedrock accelerations at the site are so similar, we will not continue to exam- ine each fault individually, but instead we represent earthquakes on the San San Andreas 670 Hayward 125 Calaveras 125 Livermore 17 Mocho 17 Tesla 17 Ramp Thrust 8.5 Corral Hollow 12.5 Doutherty 4.25 Carnegie 12.5 Patterson Pass 6.75 Greenville - Riggs Canyon 21 2 4 6 10 20 40 60 100 Distance from causative fault — miles Fig. 12. Earthquake acceleration atten- uation, (from Ref. 33). 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 Time — sec Fig. 13. Taft N21°E accelerogram, scaled to 0.5 g. Table 6. Relation of attenuation of peak bedrock acceleration to distance as a function of magnitude on three faults. Fault San Andreas Hayward Calaveras Magnitude (Richter) 8.3 7.5 7.5 Distance (km) 58 42 17 Peak bedrock acceleration at site (g) 0.4 0.35 0.5 10-76 The taults can be conveniently grouped in terms of their proximity to the site; those in the western part of the valley, in the central part and in the eastern part. In the west is the Calaveras fault; the properties and seismicity of this fault were discussed earlier. Crossing the center of the valley are the Livermore and the Mocho faults. ' tiNTk 3 94 wells." It is the northernmost segment of the Tesla-Ortigalita fault system. This system, composed of many faults of varying ages, runs along the eastern flank of the Diablo Range from the Livermore Valley to Panoche Valley. The northernmost extent of the fault is not known, but it certainly crosses the Livermore Valley, and may connect with the Stony Creek Fault north of the Delta 4,5 region. Ramp Thrust Fault Evidence concerning this fault is scanty, but conclusive. Deep well drilling has revealed displacements on this fault, and there is evidence for surface faulting 3 along its trace. The fault is certainly active although, as far as can be deter- mined, a minor structure. There is no evidence that this fault extends under the •♦ 3 site. Corral Hollow Fault This fault branches from the Tesla fault 16 km southeast of the site. It has been located by infrared imagery, by gravitv surveys, magnetic anomalies, deep drilling, and surface morphology. From the nature of the gravity survey, it has been concluded that the fault does not extend to the west beyond Greenville Road. It does not appear to be an active fault. 3,20. The gravity data indicate that the block north of the fault is displaced upward relative to the south block. .All evidence indicates that the fault ls a minor struc- ture which could be significant only in terms of surface faulting. Carnegie Fault This fault has been carefully delineated because of its proximity to the Livermore 20 syncline and the oil production. Huey mapped it as a high-angle thrust fault on the basis of surface morphology. It was subsequently better mapped by strong magnetic anomalies, deep well drilling 3 and gravimetric anomalies. Displace- ment locally on the fault is in the same sense as on the Doutherty. This may represent sympathetic faulting on the relatively minor Doutherty fault. To the southeast, the fault truncates the Tesla fault where the motion ls strike slip. This fault may be responding to the same tectonic stresses as the San Andreas system. Patterson Pass Fault This fault, which was first recognized by Huey, has many characteristics in common with the Greenville fault. The two faults apparently merge to the north- west, although the Patterson Pass fault appears more like a branch of the Tesla fault. Douthertv Fault This is another fault that was located by the comprehensive effort of J. A. 3 Blume and Associates. It was located by infrared imagery, gravimetric and mag- netic surveys, geodetic and water table data, and seismic refraction experiments. Greenville- Rig gs Canyon Fault — — M 19 This fault was considered by Clark 9 c and Vickery to be a major structural feature of the area. The connection between the Greenville fault on the south and the Riggs Canyon fault on the west flank of Mt. Diablo is not conclusive, but 10-78 -J. I ^. x IB r < s fev A>. >■ \ v : •■ 'K V >^J >v N. f^ i K N fOQ^rA^lO^ A« . f 6 f H v v, X ■s 7 ' 2i 7?r- \: I «i i rv»*.cr »/*n it f 5'o;f v ?f.i j'-*»- civtaj*e*t iCt't, ?«CT 9.V J** : HA-f ^*_ : .,..- „--+.»J,1l'l • >. «*c. SCAtf *ffr Fig. 9. (b) Faults in the Livermore area (from Ref. 3), Tesla Fault - 2nd Strand This fault was located by gravimetric anomalies, breaks in seismic refraction arrival times, and observed soil displace- 3 ments in trenches. The latter evidence is most persuasive in showing that the fault is still active. The trace of the fault out under the valley is not known, but it probably parallels the Tesla fault for some distance. Tesla Fault This well-defined fault is probably a remnant of the ancient Coast Range Thrust fault, although it may have modified during 1 fi the upper Miocene. It separates Jurassic Franciscan rocks on the west from Cretaceous rocks on the east and has been located by surface morphology, magnetic anomalies, water table data, and logs from deep oil and gas 10-79 \ »,'•. £25.* di^^^^T^^ht Observ/'ng nuclear blast eight miles away, these C/'s were among 1T04 whose reactions were being tested in "Opera- tion Smokey" on Aug. >7, 7957. Two men have contracted leukemia, and U.S. wants to check health of all at the blast. 10-80 37°45' 37054' 37°37 , 3d' Figure 3. -Epicenters of earthquakes in Livermore Valley, 1942-68 (compiled from University of California, Berke.i ,y, Bulletin of the Seismographic Stations, v. 12, no. 1, 1950— v. 38, no. 2, 1970) £ Magnitude 3.5 and greater First or largest shock • Magnitude 2.5 to 3.5 at any specific locality • Magnitude 1.5 to 2.5 is shown _ All faults in map area are shown. 10-81 Livermore oil field In 1958 a snail producing oil iield was discovered (California Division Oil and Gas, 1973) in the southeast corner of Livermore Valley. During drilling of the oil field, the Las Positas and Greenville fault zones were found to intersect there, and the precise location of the Greenville-Las Positas fault intersection was established. A number of northeast-trending faults that lie between the Las Positas and Greenville faults were discovered. The blocks north of the northeast-trending faults are predominantly down thrown. SEISMICITY Epicenters and magnitudes of eastern Alameda County earthquakes from 1942 through 1968 (fig. 3) were recorded by the University of California, Berkeley Seisnographic Station. Since 1969, the area has been monitored by the U.S. Geological Survey seismic network. Microseismicity in eastern Alameda County from 1969 through 1971 recorded during the first 3 years of operation of the Ceological Survey seismic network is shown in figure 4. Very few of the earthquakes have been located ins trunentally on either the Las Positas, Greenville, or Verona faults. Epicenters occur near the faults, and several at least are astride the faults. Sone earthquakes may be associated with the faults, but are yet mislocated as a result of the number and distribution of seismograph stations and the constraints on our ability to correct for the complexities of wave propagation in the earth's crust. A sequence of earthquakes (five with magnitudes 4.0 or greater) that occurred in Livermore Valley between March 27, 1943, and June 28, 1943 (table 2) may, however, have been generated by movement along the Las Positas fault zone. The sequence was initiated by an earthquake of magnitude 2.8 that occurred shortly before 10 p.m. on the evening of March 27, approximately 3.1 km south of Pleasanton. The earthquake was followed 2 days later by one of the two strongest recorded earthquakes in Livermore Valley (both magnitude 4.2), located at the site of the earthquake of March 27. During the next 3 months, 18 additional earthquakes ranging in magnitude from 2.2 to 4.2 were recorded in Livermore Valley. Although these earthquakes are not well located (the epicenters were determined to within only the nearest minute of latitude and longitude), the epicenters form a northeast-trending band parallel to and about 5 kn north of the Las Positas fault zone (fig. 5). The epicenters extend fron south of Pleasanton northeastward to the east end of Livermore Valley, roughly approximating the entire length of the Las Positas fault zone. The epicenters could reflect sympathetic motion on a series of unmapped parallel northwest-trending faults in Livermore Valley, but an epicenter pattern wider than the narrow one recorded would have been expected. The areal grouping of the earthquakes and their occurrence in sequence suggests that the quakes were caused by movement along a northeast-trending fault zone like the Las Positas. 10-82 °' WtNLO PA** High Kadioacfivity Levels Found In Water By ANDREW McGALL Tests of groundwater and Vallecitos '"reek water near the Vallecitos Nuclear ■actor Center have shown levels of • lioactive tritium to be much higher . ian previously reported. Apparently, the Valelcitos Nuclear Center, which monitors its own radioac- tive water discharges, has no way of telling how much tritium is getting into downstream waters because its test points are either upstream or near the point of discharge. It has for years reported almost non-existent tritium levels. Tritium is a low level radioactive parti- cle which occurs naturally and in nuclear reactor cooling waters. It is routinely released into Vallecitos Creek by the Gen- eral Electric facility and also into the air by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. According to Regional Water Qaullty Control Board staff member Junes Levine, hU tests of Vallecitos Creek and well water near the Vallecitos plant showed tritium levels which In one case exceeded the level found downstream from a mili- tary tritium production plant on Georgia's Savannah River, previously thought to have the highest level In the nation. The Environmental Protection Agency tritium standard for drinking water is three million picocuries per liter. However the standard for drinking water' will be lowered to 20,000 picocuries in July, 1979. IN a Vallecitos Creek pond downstream from the Vallecitos Nuclear Center cooling water discharge point, Levine found levels of 10,000 and 11,000 picocuries. In a well supplying water to a ranch in Vallecitos Valley, he found a level of, 7000 picocuries. (A picocurie is an extremeley small amount representing approximately 2.2 radioactive disintegrations per minute.) Levine took the water s&niplea while be was a member of the California Public interest Research Group (CalPLRG) last December. The anarysb of tfc . samples was made by the state health depart- ment and the EPA and reported back to him. Levine reported his findings to the Re- gional Water Quality Control Board which, he said, then hired him to evaluate radiation sampling programs. He said his intitial report on the Valle- citos sampling program is being reviewed by water board engineers and may soon be reviewed by the board itself. The tritium levels he found were con- siderably higher than those reported by Vallecitos, which routinely tests its cool- ing water discharges. Vallecitos' tests" of its own wells showed tritium levels were so low they couldn't be detected, a Vallecitos official reported. Levine charged that VaUedtos tests wells which are upstream from its dis- charge point and thus are not an accurate measure of how much tritium Is geting into the area's groundwater supply. In fact, according to Chuck Cain, Valle- citos' environmental quality manager, the cooling water tritium level is measured In retention ponds before the water is discharged. "For the fourth qu ler of 1977, our discharge level was 11,600 picocuries per liter," he reported. He said this was .4% of the maximum permissable concentra- tion for tritium. Cain was using the federal and state standard of three million picocuries per liter - the standard for non-drinking water supplies. Levine was using the new drinking water standard of 20,000 pico- curies. Valelcitos Creek flows into Alameda Creek which is the source, of Hayward's domestic water supply. Cain said Vallecitos tests four weDs, , three of them oh the Vallecitos property northerly of the discharge point and on across the street. There are no teats of Vallecitos creek or of Alameda Creek water. Ley'ine said the underground water flows in a southwesterlydirection, which (See RADIOACTIVE, page 2) 10-83 w Radioactive • . • (conllnaed from page one) means that tests for tritium in north. fly wells will not reflect tritium levels. Cain also noted that the well across the street had not been tested in the past year because Vallecitos has been unable to obtain access to the private property. Levine said this well was added to the three GE was already sampling when state water authorities several years ago learned of the southerly flow of the ground water. But even this well, about 1000 feet due east of the Vallecitos discharge point is Inadequate for testing purposes because of the southwest direction of the water; flow, Levine maintained. Tritium has been classed as one of the less harmful radioactive materials because of Its low level of radioactivity and be- cause it cannot penetrate materials such as the hu jan skin. However, It does en- ter the body in water and tends to remain there. Research at Lawrence Livermore Labor- atory has shown that even low levels of tritium damage mice ovaries and increas- ing levels can destroy their reproductive capacity. Dobson maintains that human ovaries are less sensitive to radioactivity than those of mice. Other reserachers. notably former LLL medical reseracher Dr. John Goffman have maintained government radiation standards are much top loose and do not reflect the actual dangers of environmen- tal radiation contamination. 10-84 m l_AWRENCE LIVERMORE l_ABORATORY NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY (Operated for the Energy Research and Development Administration by the University of California) Lawrence Livermore Laboratory was founded in 1952 for the primary purpose of improving the nation's deterrent posture by providing a competitive base for nuclear weapons development. (The other nuclear weapons design facility is Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, also operated for ERDA by the University of California.) Nuclear explosives de- sign remains the largest single program at LLL, accounting for about 54 per cent of the Laboratory's budget during the 1977 fiscal year. NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT This program has two general goals: (1) to study nuclear explosives, the uses that can be made of them by the U.S. or any other country, and the impact of broadly advancing tech- nologies on potential applications of nuclear explosions; (2) to design explosives for military weapons when responsible agencies of the government decide to deploy a new system or to modify an existing one. This responsibility includes ad- vising appropriate agencies on the feasibility and effects of new weapons. Both nuclear and non-nuclear experiments are required for this program, as are theoretical calculations utilizing a very powerful computer facility. Part of the weapons effort is necessarily devoted to un- classified research in i number of fields where further basic and applied knowledge is needed to understand the behavior of nuclear explosives. In addition, research and development capabilities developed under the weapons program have proved invaluable in a number of other efforts at Livermore, such as the search for new energy alternatives. SOME LLL DEFENSE CONTRIBUTIONS LLL has designed the warheads for the modern U.S. strategic deterrent missile forces. LLL's leadership in this field began 10-85 University of California PO.Box808 Livermore, California 94550 D Telephone (415) 447 1100 D Twx910 386 8339 AEC LLL LVMR 2- with fundamental advances in nuclear weapons technology at the Laboratory in the 1950s that permitted miniaturi- zation of strategic warheads small enough to fit into missiles. The Laboratory's designs range from the original warheads for the Polaris submarine and the land-based Minuteman I to today's Poseidon and the Minuteman III. LLL achievements made the Multiple, Independently Target- able Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) possible and provided a foundation for efforts by the U.S. to achieve international arms limitation agreements. The Laboratory has also provided leadership in the conception and design of ballistic missile defense and tactical warheads. For example, LLL designed the war- heads for the Spartan ABM and the LANCE, the Army's most modern missile system. EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES A significant change in the design of a nuclear ex- plosive may take 10 or more years and involve coordinated efforts by tens of thousands of people around the country. The effort may include some 10,000 hours on Livermore com- puters, which make up one of the world's most powerful research computer facilities. Twenty or more underground nuclear detonations of different designs may be required; each su,ch experiment typically verifies some predictions, demonstrates something new and raises one or two major questions. A single underground nuclear experiment is apt to require nearly 20 man-years of preparation at Liver- more and 20 to 100 man-years of work at the Nevada Test bite. When an underground test is to be conducted, necessary coir, ponents are shipped from around the country to the N< Test Site; only there are they assembled into a nucl explosive. Complete nuclear explosives are never at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory or at its Site below ) . Nevada ear assembled 300 (see To test Livermore-designed nuclear ex- plosives7~the"Laboratory maintains a smal permanent staf Nevada Test Site. at the Energy Research and Development Administration's Nevada Test Site north of Las Vegas. All nuclear explosives testing has been performed underground since 1963. Site 300 Site 300, now occupying about 7,000 acres in the C"o77al~Hollow area about 15 miles east of Livermore, was established as a major chemical explosives and high pressure research facility of the Livermore Laboratory in 19j5. Re search there has made major contributions to the nuclear de- sign capability. 10-86 Discoveries in the East Bay Quake Faults Near Nuclear Facilities liy Daviii Pcrfman Scitnea Corrt'«/x>nrf<'nl Governniont geologists report ed yesterday they have mapped a group of previously undetected "young" earthquake faults running through the Livermore valley it) the East Bay and passing close to three nuclear research facilities Traces of the faults lie close to the University of California's Lawr- ence Livermore Laboratory and the adjacent Sandia Corp. plant, where atomic weapons and their hard- ware are designed and developed, and to the General Electric Co s Vallecitos nuclear research labora- tory. But government atomic energy- officials say they have already studied the new evidence of earth- quake activity in the area and are confident none of the faults poses any health or safety problems to people in the region. The most recently discovered /one of quake activity is called the Las Positas Fault, and it has been mapped for about nine miles by Darrell G. Herd of the U.S. Geologi- cal Survey in Menlo Park. It runs northeastward from the San Antonio reservoir past the city of Livermore. the Lawrence labora- tory and the Sandia laboratory to the Livermore oil field. According to Herd the fault zone is highly complex, with three or four parallel strands. It has been active ithin the last 40.000 years, and perhaps much more recently' Herd said. In considering evidence of earthquakes for the siting of atomic power plants, movement within the past 500,000 years is considered active'' by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. For dam-building sites a fault that has moved within the past 100,000 years is considered active by the U.S. Bureau of Recla- mation. Plutonium, the radioactive component of many nuclear weap- on and advanced reacton^. is used Maps of the location of the fault* - and the nuclear laboratories and stored both at Vallecitos and at the Livermore Laboratory. The G.E. plant, which includes two small reactors and a plutonium laboratory, is licensed by the gov- ernment to handle up to 330 pounds of plutonium and 1000 pounds of fissionable uranium. The quantity of plutonium used and stored at the Livermore laboratory site is classified, but a recent publication of the environ- mental organization Friends of the Earth put the figure at 600 to 800 pounds. Nuclear scientists and engi- neers, however, do not consider that an earthquake of even signifi- cant magnitude would so disrupt the atomic facilities in the Liver- more valley that hazardous radioac- tivity would be released into the atmosphere. In recent years, according to Herd, several dozen small earth- quakes have been recorded in the Livermore area, andji five have registaered 4 on the Richter scale. They may have struck along the Las Positas fault, Herd said, but the evidence is still uncertain. Quakes of up to 6.5 have been recorded on other faults similar in structure to the Las Positas zone, Herd said, and temblors of that size are "not inconceivable'' in the Livermore area. But he emphasized that Geological Survey scientists have not tried to calculate what the "maximum credible" quake might be In the area. There is no evidence that any quakes all are imminent, Herd said. Herd has also mapped in great detail two fault regions that were previously known: One is the Ve- rona fault, about six miles south- west of Livermore, which passes the Vallecitos atomic laboratory. The other is the Greenville fault zone, which forms the eastern boundary of the Livermore valley. The Verona fault is geological- ly young, Herd said, but there is^io evidence that It has mov. least the past 40,000 ye Greenville zone shows no of movement for at lea years, Herd said. Officials at Llvermon Energy Research & Dev Administration said they h studying earthquake faul area since 1975. "We do not anticip ERDA operations would health and safety proble significantly affected by information" in the geol< port, a government staterr The officials did say Livermore laboratory has dergolng a "seismic ur program since 1974, and th protection improvements ready been completed at ti laboratory. No further changes in design at Livermore are necessary, officials said. 10-87 ■ ■ '.Sea a/ S t- — -a 2 ~ E 2? CCBj a in Ma, 13 ° £ c fc £■£ c »» F c ■- > -o O .:: •£ •£ o <-> ^ i— — 10-88 Reports Plutonium in Drinking Water: Effects of Chlorination on Its Maximum Permissible Concentration Abstract. Soluble pfutoniuin is oxidized to the Pu(VI) oxidation state by chlorine during water treatment. Under certain conditions Pn(Vl) is readily absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract. It appears that due consideration has not been given to the cfject that the presence of phi ton i urn in this oxidation state may have on the maxi- mum permissible concentration of plntoniitm in drinkine water. We have established that Pu(IV) is oxidized to Pu(VI) by chlorine in water treatment plants and distribution sys- tems. The consequence of this observa- tion is that the present values for the We prepared the synthetic drinking wa- ter by adding sufficient potassium bi- carbonate to distilled water to make the bicarbonate ion concentration and the pH the same as they are in Chicago maximum permis s ible concentr ation drinking water. The plutonium stock (4) (MPQot Pl uton i um in drink in g water (5 was a dilute potassium bicarbonate solu- pQmjjorjh e gen eral public) (/ ) appear tion with more than 99 percent of the plu- to bejoo high by several orde7s~oTmag- tonium in the Put IV) state. The chlorine nitude. The gastrointestinal absorption stock was a dilute sodium hypochlorite factor used to calculate the MPC is based solution. Portions of the plutonium and on the results of experiments in which chlorine stock solutions were added to solutions of Pu(lll) or Pu(VI). or both, were led or administered intragastrically to animals. It is our view that, in deriving this factor, ilwc consideration was not given to evidence in the literature that the absorption of Pu(VI) is higher by three orders of magnitude than that for Pu(lV) or to the possibility the Put VI) could be formed during water treat- ment (2). The experiments were carried out un- der the conditions that exist in the water treatment plants and distribution system for the city of Chicago. The water chlorination process begins immediately after intake from Lake Michigan, and the chlorine concentration is maintained at about I part per million (ppm) through- out the treatment plant and in the distri- bution system. The average elapsed time liom initial chlorination to consumption is 24 hours. (In other water treatment Table I. Oxidation of Put IV) to Pu(VI) by plants, ihe average chlorine concentra- chlorine in two types of drinking water. the waters, and these solutions were ana- lyzed for Pu(IV) and Pu(VI) (see below) immediately and after 24 hours. The • :i: 'Pu concentrations were 2.0 and 0.002 pCi/ml. the chlorine concentrations were 1.0 and 9..S ppm. and the/>H of the solu- tions was 8.6. We used the classical lanthanum fluo- ride method to determine the amount of plutonium in each oxidation state (5, p. 12). In this method. Put IV) is coprecipi- tated with lanthanum fluoride whereas Pu(VI) is not. From measurements of the amount of plutonium in the precipitate and in the supernatant solution, the per- centage of plutonium in each oxidation state can be calculated. We confirmed the results by analyzing some of the wa- ter samples by a method in which Put IV) tion during treatment is frequently high- er. b> as much as a factor of 10, and the elapsed time is generally longer.) We used two kinds of water in the ex- periments: Chicago drinking water (J) and a synthetic Chicago drinkinu water. Chlorine con- centration (ppml Time (days) Percentage* of PutIV) Pu(V|) Sc.irrhimrJ for H,f exceeded the num- her published and publication delay has increased 10 about 4 monihs. lor ihe next few months our acceptance rate will he about I? percent, or ten Kep.>iis per week. C hicago drinking water 10 0.01 98 1.0 1.0 28 9.8 1.0 4 Synthetic Chicago drinkinu water 10 0.01 97 10 |.0 25 I f>9 92 I 72 I0t)8 •The uncertainty in each of these values is 0O3n-BO7.V78.09l5-l0O8SO0.5U0 Copyright C 1978 AAAS 10-89 is separated from Puivij by ion ex- change (5. p. 84); in strong nitric acid. Pu(IV) is strongly absorbed onto Dowex-I anion resin whereas Pu(VI) is not. From the results obtained with the lan- thanum fluoride method for those sam- ples in which the M "Pu concentration was 0.002 pCi/ml (Table I) it can be seen that the chlorination of drinking water results in the oxidation of Pud V) to Put VI). The results obtained from the analysis of the water samples in which the " ,J Pu concen- tration was 2.0 pCi/ml were not signifi- cantly different from those given in Table I, that is, the oxidation rate is indepen- dent of the plutonium concentration in this concentration range. The use of chlorine in water treatment plants to destroy harmful bacteria, and in water distribution systems to prevent bacterial growth, is standard practice; hence, the effect of chlorine on the oxi- dation state of plutonium must be con- sidered. Hamaker (6) has shown that in acetate-buffered solutions (pH 4.5 to 8.4) Pu(IV) is completely oxidized to Pu(VI) by chlorine in 15 minutes at 80°C. How- ever, his data could not be extrapolated to a water treatment and distribution sys- tem. The concentrations of plutonium and chlorine in his experiments were higher by orders of magnitude, and the temperature was 80°C rather than 10° to 20°C. These factors are offset by the in- crease in reaction time, from minutes to days. (In the absence of experimental evidence, oxidation would be predicted from the standard oxidation potentials. In acidic solution the CKO)-CI(-I) and Pu(VJ)-PudV) couples are -1.36 and -1.04 V, respectively, whereas in basic solution they are -0.89 and -0.51 V. re- spectively.) In 1965, Committee 2 of the Inter- national Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) established a task group on the metabolism of plutonium and related elements. One of the con- clusions drawn by this task group was that the current value for the gastrointes- tinal absorption factor, 3 x 10"^ appears to be reasonable for soluble plutonium compounds (7. p. 49). In drawing this conclusion, the task group either did not consider the possibility that Pu(VI) would be formed during water treatment or, if they did, they concluded either that the data obtained by Weeks et at. (2) on the absorption of Pu(Vl) were invalid or that Pu(VI) would be rapidly reduced to Pu(III) or Pu(IV). or both, in the gastro- intestinal tract. Weeks et al. (2) studied the effect of oxidation state on the absorption and re- tention of plutonium by rats after intra- gastric administration. When all the plu- SCIENCE. VOL. :0I. 15 SEPTEMBER 1978 ■ . V, Be* ionium in the administered solution was in th c I'l.dll) stale, the retention tthe pcrcentace of the administered dose) in ,hc skeleton and liver after 4 days was DOOn percent, in the PutlV) state 0.001 percent, and in the PutV!) state 1.75 per- cent. After SO days (lie retentions were 0.010. 0.001. and 1.57 percent, respec- tively. Each value is the average for six rats. The results they obtained for Put 111 I and Put I VI were in close agree- ment with those of many other investiga- tors. For those experiments in which the plutonium administered was a mixture of PudV) and Put VI). the correlation be- tween the percent PulVI) and the per- cent plutonium absorbed was high. The authors o\ the task group's report were aware of the work by Weeks el al. L?). as thev refer to it in the section on gastrointestinal absorption (7, p. 10). However, the nature of their statement suggests that there was doubt in their minds about the validity of the data: "Al- though the evidence is meager. Pu(VI) appears to be absorbed more readily than Put IV).- As published, the study that Weeks ct al. earned out appears to be quite definitive. The Gastrointestinal absorptions of NplVDby the rat and of L'(VI) by man substantiate the absorption of Pu(VI) found by Weeks etui. (2). [Both Np(VI) and UlVI) are very close chemical ana- logs of Pu(VI). The compounds formed when each is precipitated from solution i . a particular reagent are isomorphous. the', form complexes with the same lig- aruls and to a comparable degree, and they are extremely difficult to separate from each other when they are all in the VI stale.) Ballon el al. M found that the gastrointestinal absorption of Np(VI) by ihe rat was 2 percent. From measure- ments of uranium in man and his diet, Mnrsh and Spoiir \')\ estimated that the gastrointestinal absorption ol U(VI) is between 10 and 30 percent The absorp- tion o\ Pll(VI) m man should not differ significantly, that is. by more than a lac- tor o\ 10. from that of L'(V1). I he fact that conditions within the gas- trointestinal Had are reducing in nature ma> lead In the .eduction of Put VI) to PutlVl shortly aftei water has been con- sumed I" this case, the gastrointestinal absorption factoi for Put IV) rather than foi Pu(Vl) should be used to calculate MPt \ In reviewing the paper of Weeks , i ul \2 ) w ith one of its authors [10), we learned ih.it in then experiments til the rats were food deprived both before and .iftei Ihe administration of ihe plutonium and lii) the solutions that contained PihVIi vsere ahoul t) 01 \/ in dichromate. Ilms. al the lime ol administration, the S( !i N( i vol. ;oi n SF.PTt'.MHRR 197* gastrointestinal tracts of the animals may have been devoid of those constituents that could reduce Put VI) or. if these con- stituents were present, they may have reacted with the dichromate and this forestalled plutonium reduction. At this time we know_of no information about the reduction of Put VI) to P u tlV) during t he" pe riod when dj gj^stjv e processes ar e_ occurr ing. Our study shows that pl utonium in d rinking water^ ilTj^IIl 1 ,ho Pu|V ' ' sia"t77blitiue _mains to be shown w h ethe r o r "nTjn^uTvTiTvill be reduced t o_P u (J . V ) immTITiatcTv after ingestion. In estab- lishing this, moderation mu st he given tolheTact that water and food consu mp- tion arc not ne cessarily rela ted tempo- rally; Pu(Vl) ma y be ra pidly reTluced when food'Is being djgesteiTbut not when thediuestive tract is empty. R. P. LvKst.s K. 1). ()i nil \m Radiological and Environmental Research Division. Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois 60439 References and Notes I Standards for Radiation Protection (Energy Re- March and Development Administration Ma* ual Washington. DC. April 1975). chap 05:4. 2. Mil. Weeksem/.. Rudhu. Res. 4,339«l?56>. 3. The major cationic impurities in Lake Michigan are calcium (30 ppml and magnesium ( 10 ppml. the major anionic constituent is bicarbonate COO ppm). thc p H is about R.3. and thc water is satu- rated with atmospheric oxygen. The composi- tion of Lake Michigan is quite similar to that of the resources for other metropolitan water sys- tems rm.n. ,\- If 4 The plutonium used was a mixture of Pu (halt- life 24 0(H) years) and : "Pu (46 days) in which the' atom ratio of "Pu to : "Pu was about 100. Plutonium measurements were based on the de- tection of the neptunium K vray* that are emit- ted in the decay of :1T Pu. 5 G H.Co\cm*n.lheRutl nght C 1978 AAAS Reprinted from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JlilXJS, lili. Volume 236 Copyright 1976, American Medical Association The Plutonium Controversy John W. Gofman, MD IF Till'] world chooses to seek a solu- tion to the energy dilemma through nuclear energy, the element pluto- nium will become an article of com- merce to lie handled in quantities of I In isanils of tonnes annually. Pluto- nium is a uniquely potent inhalation carcinogen, the potential induction of lung cancer dwarfing other possible toxic ell'ects. For reasons to be pre- sented here, it is my opinion that plu- tonium's carcinogenicity has been eery seriously underestimated. If one couples the corrected carcinogenicity with the probable degree of industrial containment of the plutonium, it ap- pears that the commercialization of a plutonium-based energy economy is not an acceptable option for society. Sagan's statement 1 that "the expe- rience of 30 years supports the con- tention that plutonium can be used safely" is manifestly indefensible. No meaningful epidemiological study of plutonium-exposed workers for that 30-year period has ever been done. Since thousands of those possibly ex- posed have left the industry and are not even available to follow-up, it is doubtful that any meaningful study of "the experience of 30 years" will ever be accomplished. Lung Cancer The important forms of plutonium undergo decay by the emission of « From the Division of Medical Physics. Univer- sity ol California, Berkeley Reprint requests to Division of Medical Phys- ics. Donner Laboratory, University of California Berkeley, CA 94720 (Dr Gofman) 284 JAMA, July 19, 1976-Vol 236, No 3 particles. That <» particles produce bronchogenic cancer in man is now an established medical fact, from the tragic experiences of the US uranium miners.; Since the n particles from plutonium are approximately of the same energy as those from the radon daughter products that provoked lung cancer in the miners, it follows that plutonium o particles must neces- sarily be capable of provoking lung cancer. The key determinant of how ninny lung cancers will be produced per unit of plutonium deposited will be the length of residence of particles bear- ing plutonium in or on the cells of the bronchial epithelial lining. In com- mercial situations, plutonium will be encountered as the extremely insol- uble compound plutonium dioxide. As Sagan has pointed out, evidence indi- cates that plutonium, once deposited, has a residence time in the lung of some few years. During such long residence times, the « particles emitted deliver potentially carcino- genic levels of radiation. Estimation of the expected number of human lung cancers becomes a problem of knowing how much pluto- nium will bo retained in pulmonary tissues, since this determines ,ie «- particle radiation level. There are some crucial voids in our under- standing of the behavior of plutonium particulates in the lung, particularly in the lungs of humans who smoke. This makes radiation dose-estimation difficult. As a supplementary ap- proach to estimation of carcinogen it- potential, we can first consider the experimental animal evidence. 10-91 Cancer In Beagles Bair and Thomson' have induced lung cancer in beagles with pluto- nium 239. From those experiments, it is possible to estimate only the min- imum hazard, because the carcinogen- icity of plutonium was initially un- derestimated, with the result that lung cancer developed in essentially 100% of the beagles, even at the low- est plutonium dose tested. In the beagles, a dose of 0.049/xg of pluto- nium 239 deposited per gram of bloodless lung produced lung cancers in 100% of the dogs. Assuming man to be equally sensi- tive, 27.9/xg or less of plutonium 239 is a dose sufficient to cause fatal lung cancer. In a nuclear reactor, the plu- tonium 239 is admixed with several shorter-lived nuclides, so the « radio- activity will be approximately 5.4 times greater than that of pure pluto- nium 239. Therefore, the carcinogen- icity will be enhanced 5.4 times. Thus, based on the saturation experiments in beagles, the extrapolated human dose of 5.2/xg or less of reactor-type plutonium will produce one lung can- cer. No matter what the distribution of this much plutonium is in people, 5.2jtg equates to one lung cancer. Thus, for a specific lung cancer type, 5.2/ig deposited into one human causes one lung cancer, 5.2/ig dis- tributed into ten people causes lung cancer in one out of ten people, and 5.2/ig distributed into 100 people causes lung cancer in one of 100 people. Because of the saturation fea- ture of the beagle experiment, the true required dose is not more than 5.2/xg per lung cancer produced, and it Plutonium— Gofman mar may Ih> several times smaller, a result l hat must await the conclusion of on- going experiments. Whether one can extrapolate directly from dog to man is a moot point. The human may be more or less snsitivc Conservatism argues for assumption of at least equal sensi- tivilv. A crucial point is that the beagle lung cancers are almost all bronchioloalveolar in origin, not bron- chial. Thus, extrapolating to human from dog, we can only predict the oc- currence of bronchioloalveolar carci- noma in man. The important question we must now address is whether fac- tors operate in man to supplement such cancers by the far more common human variety, namely, bronchogenic carcinoma. Bronchogenic Cancer The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) sug- gested a model' for the physiologic clearance of plutonium particulates from bronchopulmonary tissues. That model essentially assumes no long- term retention of plutonium in the bronchial epithelium, with all long- term retention occurring in the ter- minal bronchioles 'and alveoli. The reasoning presented by the ICRP is that the combination of mucus secre- tion and ciliary action will propel any plutonium deposited in the bronchi hack up to the nasopharynx within a day, with subsequent gastrointestinal excretion. Analogous reasoning sug- gested to the ICRP that the long resi- dence time (half excretion in 500 days) for the bronchioloalveolar re- gion is caused by the absence of cili- ated cells there. All of this may well be applicable for the nonsmoking beagle and be consistent with the oc- currence of bronchioloalveolar carci- noma rather than bronchogenic carci- noma in the beagle. This set of assumptions may be se- riously in error for the human, partic- ularly for the approximately 50% of humans who smoke cigarettes. As a result, the occurrence of bronchogenic cancer in man would be seriously un- derestimated. Numerous studies'" have demonstrated that serious cili- ary injury exists in the cigarette- smoker. Indeed, Ide and co-workers showed 307. of ciliated cells to be de- nuded of their cilia among smokers. Thus, in the cigarette-smoker, the JAMA, July 19. 1976-Vol 236. No 3 bronchi will have sizable regions free of cilia, which may result in clearance times for plutonium particulates com- parable to the very long times ob- served for the bronchioloalveolar re- gions. In the absence of experimental data, this is the most reasonable as- sumption consistent with the ICRP model. A given quantity of plutonium retained in the bronchial epithelium, rather than being distributed into the entire bronchioloalveolar region, will give approximately 500 times as high a radiation dose, simply because the mass of the bronchial epithelium is so small compared with the entire lung mass. Moreover, the radiation dose is being delivered to the more carci- noma-prone bronchial cells rather than to the less carcinoma-prone bronchioloalveolar cells. Based on such estimates of im- paired clearance of plutonium from the bronchi of smokers and thus its much longer residence time there, I have previously estimated that the cigarette-smoking human would be approximately 125 times more suscep- tible to bronchogenic cancer induced by plutonium than the nonsmoker. Such susceptibility to bronchogenic cancers would be over and above any occurrence of bronchiolo-alveolar car- cinomas predicted from thi beagle data. The final calculations of those studies 7 - provide the following esti- mates for bronchogenic carcinoma in- duction in the human by reactor- grade plutonium in humans: For ciga- rette smokers, 0,011/xg of reactor- grade plutonium produces one lung cancer. For nonsmokers, 1.4/tg of re- actor-grade plutonium produces one lung cancer. Implications Workers in (he Plutonium Industry. - Currently "permissible" levels of plu- tonium 239 lung depositions (derived before the current considerations of the cigarette-smoker problem) are 0.26>ig. The lung cancer incidence mentioned previously would indicate that 4.5 lung cancers per lifetime will develop in cigarette-smoking workers exposed to the permissible levels. Lung cancer will develop in one of 30 nonsmoking workers, at this level. Obviously, such "permissible" levels of plutonium 239 are not acceptable. The Population-at-Larjje.-For the public-at-large the "permissible" av- 10-92 erage lung burden is 0.008/xg of plu- tonium 239. My estimate, assuming half of the adult population to be cigarette smokers, is that exposure to the "permissible" level would provoke 235,000 extra lung cancers annually just among the men in the popu- lation. This is four times the 1975 fa- tality rate (63,000 deaths) from lung cancer in men in the United States. Major revisions of acceptable pluto- nium exposure levels are obviously in order. The Relevant Human Expericnce.- One often hears cited as evidence of a lesser carcinogenicity of plutonium the fact that 400 kg of pl utonium 23 9 has been deposited on the United States from weapons fallout" and that this has not provoked a lung cancer epw de'mic. That statement will not stand up under critical examination. Ben- nett" has measured average air con- centrations of plutonium from such weapons-test fallout, from which the lung depositions in humans of the United States and the Northern Hemisphere are readily estimated. These estimates, coupled with the lung cancer doses, lead to the fol- lowing estimates:" Approximately 116,000 lung cancer deaths will occur in the United States and 1 million in the Northern Hemisphere as a result of weapons-testing plutonium fallout. Civen the uncertainties in the lung- clearance model, it is probable that these numbers could be low or high by a factor of two or three. Since the ex- pected cancer fatalities will occur over about 30 years, the average an- nual rate in the United States would be of the order of 4,000 per year. These would be occurring against a background of 81,000 fatalities per year. Obviously, it would be difficult to directly attribute the 4,000 addi- tional fatalities to exposure to pluto- nium 239 against such a background, but this is a very different matter from the totally unjustified assump- tion that the 4,000 additional fatali- ties are not occurring. The only mean- ingful way to address this question is by calculation. It is public health ir- responsibility to equate "no effect observed" with "no meaningful epi- demiological study." Plutonium was inhaled by 25 Man- hattan Project workers and, to quote Sagan, "they have shown no signifi- cant effects." I have considered the Plutonium— Gofman 285 Lung Cnn< ers poi Yoai With Pluto mum Di! n Containment Perfection, °'o Plutonium Dispersed, kg Lung Cancers per Year 99 9 000 13.9U0.000 900 1,390.000 139.000 99 99 90 999 9 1 l 000 9999 0.9 1,390 99.99999 09 139 _ 'Nine hundred tonnes of plutonium is processed annually doses lo those workers in detail, and based on that analysis, the estimate is that 0.2 of a lung cancer should have occurred by now for this expo- sure. The occurrence of zero cancers hy this time is in accord with this es- timate and in no way mitigates the lung carcinogenicity of plutonium. In another group, approximately 25 workers at the Rocky Flats plutonium plant received more than the permis- sible dose in a 19(55 accident. Because of the long latency period for lung- cancer induction, it is really too early to assess the impact in these workers. In another ten years an appreciable yield of lung cancers would be ex- pected in these men (assuming that about half of them were smokers). Safe Plutonium Energy? It is self-evident that if plutonium is perfectly contained in a nuclear energy economy, then there is no haz- ard of plutonium-indueed lung cancer. Since industrial human endeavor is never perfect, it behooves us to con- sider the consequences of less-than- perfection in such an endeavor, es- pecially when we consider not only human and machine fallibility, but also acts of God and malevolent hu- man actions. A fully developed nuclear energy economy would mean 1,000 or more large nuclear power plants of the breeder variety, based on plutonium. An average breeder reactor would have about three tonnes of plutonium in it, and at least one third of this must be reprocessed and handled an- nually. The annual handling of one tonne of plutonium per plant means a total annual handling of some 900 tonnes of reactor-grade plutonium in the United States alone. Since we have estimated that 116,000 lung cancers have developed by inhalation of plutonium from 400 kg of plutonium fallout over the 286 JAMA, July 19, 1976-Vol 236, No. 3 United States, we can estimate the number of cancers that will develop annually for various degrees of con- tainment of this 900 tonnes of pluto- nium to be handled annually. Pre- sumably, the inhaled plutonium per kilogram dispersed will be compa- rable to that for weapons fallout. In fact, it may turn out to be equal to, greater, or less than the case for weapons fallout. The real hazard of plutonium releases is not at the nu- clear reactor, InU rather at the fuel- reprocessing_a nd fuel-fabrica t ion fa- cilit ies and in the transport b etween th ese two fa cilities. In these steps, plutonium is handled as approxi- mately l/i particles of plutonium diox- ide, the form and size of ultimate tox- icity for lung cancer to develop. In the estimates in the Table, the toxicity of reactor-grade plutonium is taken as 5.4 times that for plutonium 239 because of the 5.4 times greater o radiation from such reactor-grade plutonium, compared with the almost pure plutonium 239 of weapons-grade plutonium. Proponents of nuclear power argue that planned releases of plutonium will not exceed one part in a billion. In such a technological paradise, of 6 nly "p lanned" releases, plutonium- indueed lungj^ancer~would nojThtTa serious hazard (about one case per year). ButfuT the real world, with all the fallibilities involved, containment perfection to one partjn 10,000 would be a fortunate experience indeed. There is no evidence thai jven this has been achieved in our 30. years of experience. And yet such contain- ment in a plutonium energy economy would lead to an expectancy of 139,000 additional lung cancer fatali- ties per year in the United States,/ which no society should accept. The problem does not end with the initial inhalation of plutonium par- ticulates released from a nuclear! 10-93 facility Such pai i iculati! ullli the ground and are then repeati susceptible to becoming airborne by winds and being inhaled, producing additional cancer... One often hears the assertion that such plutonium will rapidly be incorporated into the soil and not be subject to rcsuspension by the winds. At the Rocky Flats in- stallation, careful air monitoring of a region near the careless spill of about 100 gi n of plutonium Jfrom leaky drums) into soil has shown air levels of resuspen ded plutonium no t declining even jifjaj -Tive years . 111 The rcsuspension contribution to" addi- tional lung cancers is anticipated to be substantial. The essence of the concern must center about the expectation of the level of containment perfection. In view of the gross mishandling of plutonium to date," Ldo notjind it credible to expect better than~99i99% con tai nmen t oT pl utoniu m, and such co ntainment is far from acceptab le. ForThis rea son, I b elieve that society sTiouTrTTv oXIac cept a energy economy. References 1. Sagan LA: The plutonium controversy. JAMA 234:1267-1268, 1975. 2. LunHin FEJr, Wagoner J K, Archer VE: Ra- don daughter exposure and respiratory cancer: Quantitative and temporal aspects. Report from the/tpidemiological Study of United States Ura- im Miners. NIOSH-NIEHS Joint Monograph Jo. 1. US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1971. 3. Bair WJ, Thomson RC: Plutonium: Biomed- ical research. Science 183:715-722, 1974. 4. Task Group on Lung Dynamics (for Com- mittee II of IRCP): Deposition and retention models for internal dosimetry of the human res- piratory tract. Health Phys 12:1973-2007, 1966. 5. Ide G, Suntzeff V, Cowdry EV: A compari- son of the histopathology of tracheal and bron- chial epithelium in smokers and non-smokers. Cancer 12:473-484, 1959. 6. Auerbach O, Stout AP, Hammond EC, et al: Changes in the bronchial epithelium in relation to cigarette smoking and in relation to lung can- cer. N Engl J Med 265:253-267, 1961. 7. Gofman J: The cancer hazard from inhaled plutonium. Conyressimuil Record 12LS14610- S14616, 1975. 8. Gofman J: Estimated production of human lung cancers by plutonium from worldwide fall- out. Congressional Record 121:S14616-S14619 1975. 9^?ennett BG: Fallout ; "Pu dose to man. FaXmtt Program Q Summary Rep, Health and Safety Laboratory, USAEC Report HSAL-278 4974, pp 41-66. 10. US ARC Rocky Flats Plant Surveillance, monthly reports. Denver, Colorado Department of Health, 1970-1975. 11. Gofman J: Nuclear power, no. Congres- ional Record 122:S3319-S3322, 1976. Plutonium— Gofman Printed and Published in the United States ot Americ .-v. H ra %f. vSj m I .'y V Hi FALLOUT ARRIVAL TIM! (HOURS Af Tt R [)( fONATIOf I 15 ifi -I »- 19 20 I 1 GROUND ZERO 20 40 AILINGINAE I 70 N -'220 RONGELAP RONGERIK 60 SO 100 120 140~ 160^ 180 200 220 24C B0 140 160 180 200 220 DISTANCE FROM GROUND ZERO (MILES) 260 TAKA -+■ tf UTIRIK 200 300 —I 1 320 JIO HAZARDS OF LOCAL FALLOUT downwind from a thermo- nuclear explosion were dramatized by the U.S. test of a tS-mcgaton fission-fuslon-fission bomb on Bikini Atoll on March 1, I9S4. The measurements (black numbers) give the total dose, in rems, Hut had accumulated 96 hours after the explosion. Contour lines calcu- lated on the basis of those mrasuremeiiLs outline the fallout pattern. triggers a fusion explosion involving, for example, the hydrogen isotopes deu- terium and tritium. The high-energy neutrons emitted by the fusion reactions then fission the nuclei of a large amount of the non-chain-reacting isotope urani- um 23X, releasing more fission energy [see illustration on opposite page]. In the Defense Department calculations 50 percent of the energy release was as- sumed to be due to fission, and that is a representative fraction. The biological consequences of gam- ma radiation depend on the total dose received and the lime period over which it is delivered The median lethal radia- tion dose was taken by Defense Depart- ment analysts to be 450 rems for doses received within a few days. (The rem. standing for "roentgen equivalent man." is a unit of the biological effect of radia- tion.) For doses delivered over a longer time the lethal dose was taken to be somewhat higher because, given time, a biological system can repair a consider- able amount of radiation damage. The effective dose suffered by the exposed population when the rate of repair just balances the rate of damage being done by the decaying ambient field of radia- tion would be the "maximum biological dose" and would determine the lethality of th e exposure. _— — - — Death from radiation sickness would be neither quick nor painless. As de- scribed in the Glasstonc book, "the ini- tial symptoms are ... nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of appetite and malaise." Beginning two or three weeks after the exposure "there is a tendency to bleed into various organs, and small hemor- rhages under the skin ... are observed." Spontaneous bleeding from the mouth and intestinal tract is common. "Loss of hair, also starts after about two weeks. ... Ulceration about the lips may . . spread from the mouth through the entire gastrointestinal tract." Even- tually "the decrease in the white cells of the blood and injury to other immune mechanisms of the body... allow an overwhelming infection to develop" One has only to multiply that descrip- tion by the millions to get a partial pic- ture of the possible consequences of "limited" nuclear attacks on the US and the USSR Tf the fresh fission products from one J- megaton of fission were spread uni- formly over a perfectly flat area of 1.000 square miles, the gamma-ray dose rate one meter above the ground would be about 250 rems per hour after 10 hours. For human beings the median lethal dose at such a high dose rate is about 450 rems. The gamma-ray dose rate would decrease about sixtecnfold for every tenfold increase in time for the first six months after the explosion and more rapidly thereafter. In our example the radiation intensity would be down to about 15 rems per hour after four days and about one rem per hour after 40 days. For a person remaining in the ra- diation zone, however, the cumulative dose would continue to rise significantly for quite a long time. Consider the local fallout beginning about 10 hours after an explosion, which is a typical time for the fallout to reach ground level. A full 40 percent of the dose accumulating af- ter that time would remain to be deliv- ered after four days, and 25 percent of it would still remain to be delivered after 40 days. The height of burst of the warheads, which has an important influence on the 10-95 amount of fallout deposited downwind, would be affected by the choice of tar- get. In the countcrforce attacks envi- sioned by the Defense Department most of the megatonnage would be directed .against underground Minuteman silos The Department reported that the Min- utcman-killing effectiveness of surface bursts and of airbursts at the "optimum height of burst" would be about eq ul (The optimum height of burst is the height that, for a given yield, provides a blast pressure exceeding a certain value over the largest area, for a one-megaton yield and an overpressure of 1.000 pounds per square inch it would be- about 1.000 feet ) The attacker would thus be faced with a trade-off On the one hand a surface burst does not have to be as precisely placed as an airburst (an important consideration, since at- tacks on hardened targets put a high pri- ority on accuracy). On the other hand. Defense Department calculations show that, other things being equal, for an at- tack on the U.S. ICHM's fallout fatali- ties could be four times higher for sur- face bursts than for airbursts. The fireball from a one-megaton nu- clear explosion and the fission products it contains rise rapidly until the top of the cooling fireball cloud enters the stratosphere, about six miles above sea level at middle latitudes. At a height of about eight miles the cloud stabilizes, with its fission products spread over an area about four miles in diameter. An average settling time for the local fall- out from a one-megaton explosion might be about eight hours. The settling time and the average speed of the winds between the top of the fireball cloud and the ground determine how far the parti- cles drift downwind. For a typical aver- /6i//f76 — /< &"/ iDR&LL 4 ^'^>H)i>peL. Assignment Bay Area The Cancer 'Cluster' In the Suburbs H\ Knurr K«p«fN>rl "Our doctor here in Livermore wouldn't believe me when I came back from San Francisco and told him little Jimmy had malignant melanoma," says Billie Long with a faml trace of her native Texas drawl. "He told me little kids just don't get melanoma. He thought the UC Medical Center lab had made a mistake." Mrs. Long is sitting in the Mediterranean style living room of her Cinnabar Court ranch home just a few steps away from a handsome family portrait taken shortly before Jimmy's death last November. Nothing in the picture hints at the pain of those final days for Billie, her husband Stan, and their four children Even Jimmy, who spent the last four months of his life commut- ing back and forth to Moffitt Hospital where fluid was painfully suctioned from his lungs, looks happy in the photograph. The spitting image of his blonde moth er. the seven-year-old sported a healthy tan thanks to endless fish- ing trips with his father - between visits to the cancer ward. Stan Long, a mustachioed Pa eific Telephone man who brought his family to Livet mores vineyard country ten years ago for the healthy climate, tried during the month following Jimmy's death 10 think of factors lhat might have contributed to his sous one in a million case Talks wiih doctors indicated medical experts simply don't know what's behind this cancer which typically appear* as a dark mole and spreads from the pigmented skin cells to other portions of the body. The Longs debated over the kitchen table about the X rays Billie had reluctantly agreed to during her pregnancy with Jimmy They also considered the potentially harmful effects of food additives and the hateful smog that frequent |y blows In from cities to the west. Bui it wasn't until late January. when the nearby Lawrence Liver more Laboratory announced that 14 employees had contracted rim It i |ilr melanoma, that they began worrying about the nuclear weap- ons design facility. DR. DONALD AUSTIN He's looking for answer* community began swarming in to local surgeons' offices to have moles removed. Predictably, most of ihe tissue removed proved non- malignant. However within weeks a new wave of anxiety was moving through the Livermore Amador valley's 150.000 residents. First came a news report on Jimmy's case. Then it was revealed that a l.'J- yearold Dublin child, whose par- ents did not want his name made public, was also being treated for the same disease. In Berkeley, Dr. Donald Austin, head of the state health department's tumor regis try. voiced concern. Two cases in that age bracket for an area of this size is certainly more than you would expect by chance. Over the past five years a Bay Area study of 15 million person years showed only 7 cases of malignant melanoma under 15. We've never heard of prepubertal clusters like this. ' This new development has nat- urally impelled many Livermore parents to begin poring over their children's bodies searching for moles that might be cause for alarm A number of these residents have also been directing inquiries to the health department's Dr Austin number worth looking into because of a peculiar situation that devel- oped in the Bay Area between 1970 and 1975. "You see, malignant melanoma has been Increasing around the nation by one to two percent a year. But in Alameda, Contra Costa, San Mateo and Marin counties the rate has been going up five to ten percent a year. At the same time the Incidence In San Francisco has remained un- changed. The only obvious differ- ence between the city and the suburbs is the amount of sunlight. We wonder if San Francisco's fog screens out enough sunlight to have some effect." While this data hardly reas- sures those who abandoned the "polluted" city environment for the relative environmental purity of the suburbs, it does not mean one can expect to avoid multiple melan- oma by staying indoors with the blinds closed. Dr. Austin points out that office workers who experience short, Intense exposure to sunlight are considered to be running a higher risk than those who regular- ly work outdoors. That's because regular exposure reduces the risk of sunburn, which may add to the chance of getting the disease. A few miles away, inside the fenced perimeter of the laboratory that Ernest 0. Lawrence and Ed- ward Teller built to help America break into the nuclear age, employ- ees sound philosophical about the problem. At the biomedical divi- sion Dr Virgie Shore, whose hus- band Bernard became the labs second victim of malignant melan- oma last January, doubts the suggestion that nuclear materials were a factor "We never worked with large quantities of radioactive isotopes," says the slim biochemist with short gray hair. Still surrounded by parts of the vast array of technical literature that they consulted during the two and a half years of her biophysiclst husband's illness, Vlrgle Shore has no qualms about continuing her own work here. "As a scientist you accept the fact that there are certain risks that go with your work. I don't feel In any particular danger." 10-96 01 course, cancel dusters are nol unheard of in various lommuti Itics throughout the world And the lab was (|utck to poinl out that the odds ttiat 14 out of (Win) employees would ucvelop the same type of rancor were unusual hut nol si^nif- irantly hlgn. liul this was hardly reassuring to many residents of the town of 42.WK). As state health officiate moved in to study a cancer incidence that appeared to he more than double the Bay Area rate for malignant melanoma, adults in the I'eopl.' out there arc \.r\ anxious to tun,' this thing re solved," Austin sa\s "We've also gotten some lips from technical people out there One scientist ( ailed and told me about a Journal article which su^^csted that risit.v levels of radioactive Krypton a") reacting In the presence of the suns ultraviolet rays could be causing an increase in skin cancer Melanoma, of course, is the most serious type of skin cancer. And the Krypton theory is one of a A team throughout their pro- lissiiiiial lives, the Shores worked together for the Llvermore lab on a variety of projects ranging from blood plasma lipoproteins to the impact of radioactive materials In fallout. After Shore's cancer was diag- nosed in 1975 he and his wife began contacting friends throughout the nation for leads on promising thera- pies. Among those recommended was a new immunotherapy tech- nique being tried at a San Francis- Jimmy Long (left) and Dr. Bernard Shore both died of melanoma. Dr. Shore was a biophyiicist at Lawrence Uvermore Laboratory co hospital. Unfortunately, the only way to qualify was by agreeing to enter a "nliitd" studyjShore signed up hoping he would be one of the lucky ones to receive the potential- ly valuable drug. But when his case worsened Vlrgie analyzed the medi- cine in her lab, and determined Bernard was receiving dummy pills — placebos — instead of the real thing. He dropped out of immuno- therapy. From there the Shores visited doctors In Walnut Creek, Napa, Los Angeles and other cities in search of the right therapy. But opera- tions, chemotherapy, and other treatments failed to slow the dis- ease. The 49-year-old scientist was hospitalized on Christmas Day 1977 and died last January 16. "The thing that was so terribly hard for him," says Dr. Shore looking up from a diary she has kept of the nightmare, "was to be familiar with the literature and know exactly what was happening. We thought we were doing every- thing, but in the end the treatment didn't make any difference. Now you sit and wonder If he would still be alive had the doctor been quicker about operating, process- ing lab tests and putting him on chemotherapy." But like most other relatives of melanoma victims In the Uvermore Valley, Vlrgie Shore suspects that the only long term answer to the problem is identifying whatever environmental pollutants may* he responsible. For its part, the state health department Is now planning to publicize the sudden upsurge of cases In suburban Bay Area coun- ties. They will make urgept recom- mendations about the value of early detection and reduced expo- sure to intense sunlight Over on Cinnabar Court In Uvermore, families such as the Longs are interested In this Idea. They and their neighbors have become extremely sensitive to new cancer cases such as a local 7-year- old now being treated at Stanford for another rare tumor called Ewlng's sarcoma. Although this disease is not related to melanoma, that fact does little to reassure those who originally moved to Llvermore for their health. "My husband and 1 are think- ing about moving to Sacramento now," says the Longs' neighbor, Anita Redding, who was like a grandmother to Jimmy. "We came here from South San Francisco to 10-97 :> 3 0*5 O 00 el u X o .3 E « E C T3 •— sj T3 3 c 3 i/i .5 c > 'oil E ^ 2 X B ■o "ft 2 <- r o _ oo .1 C S.I x 3 u - X 3 2 = •- c 4) x u O "1 o c . c > 0) a. u = ? o # X ac Q0 3 C ll ~ u 1- T3 a -a "> t > •a .= u * 4> *0 £ 4> M § C -3 3 00 O •- Si o 4> 4> 4> j3 <" u jz t: 8-5 . o ?. 00 * .s O o 03 4> (Ll OC t- 03 *" c o o o o u * o X 4> o ■- 'Z Mi B u a- ~ ■5 -a c 3 03 X c = £ 4> x 3 J£ *" c ° u > .3 OO 00 4/ 03 O a, o x c .2P| x d. 2 X O O .it,Q X) 3 -3 ^ *"' 03 > _ 53 S x c P X — OC t> M X) ^•§ 3 73 ^ -3 OC •a ^ -5 O u . E S P m u r. « « _£-; - 1 - im 1A O 3 5t= ' 3 O 1/5 X x -a 5 3 c ° <« o o - 1> ti X 3 ^ -IB > *- o <-• C '35 T3 2 c 3 > o u •a T3 00 3 3 u - B ^ •*"■ ^^ _c e ^ .3 7) 1/5 CTJ 3 O X 00 o c a ■£ . o ■a »3 o ra at 5 2- X on 1) cs on U u 3 ■a c — ; "a > O Xl 3 -^ 3 V O • — oo O 00 0) o 'C x oj o H x 00 r c 3 O ? x Mj O S Q 3 "C 3 Oj oo X _ w ■- OO 3 C8 3 e a •a o. 3 oo E E o 2 g c - c * - « B < ••5 x on 3 ~ i- 00 00 03 2 E >"• p o oo o rt cd *n "O u o c .^- x: ' oo O *"• X <- O 3 cd oo — X c cr3 4) _>, J o S ^ oo i> -:• ' J X (3 41 ^ V5 aj Z E 03 4) 41 oo 3 C E 4> " X 1 ^ 3 „j •a c *-a u on u o 3 4i SB 4> I- O t P 4> 3 O i3 O 3 i_ r- • — ^ rrt 1 E E 03 00 c • - E 03 oo */ - - 1 : * 3 .2 u .11 a> .g 8. ^ £ - 1 - X D W5 > 'C § S 4> 3^ oo a. S 3 X CU 4) 41 i-< oo 00 UJ 4/ ^ oo O T3 3 3 (— ■ i~ 4> +£ X U x B is ^ 3^ QQ I- - 41 * s 3 > C 03 E -2 SI 03 oJ 4) -- « > O- I « O I X CX o 10- c ,8 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 • t.. 1 . lb i b G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 12 received on the subject draft statement from Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, California, dated December 18, 1978. ?66€44Z «M.. ington of NE PA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-99 Response to Letter 12 f'm* I ■ DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Appendix IB in 'the FEIS contains a list of the principal preparers of the document. A public hearing on the DEIS was held on April 12, 1979. Based on public review and comment on the DEIS the geology and seismology section was rewritten and greatly expanded. In addition, a comprehensive field investigation was undertaken to evaluate on-site and pertinent regional geological conditions that might affect the safety of the Livermore site. Results of this study will be reviewed by USGS and an independent geological consulting company. This company will also impanel a committee of seismic experts to review the adequacy of the study. Following these reviews, the report of the seismic study will be made public as a separate document, which is scheduled for publication in 1982. Maximum credible accidents discussed in the DEIS were selected because of their potential impact on the off-site environment. When such an accident involves the release of radioactivity, by definition the release occurs under the worst-case conditions. Accordingly, whether an earthquake or nre destroyed the integrity of a glove box, the environmental impact of the radioactivity released would be the same. Damaging several glove boxes simultaneously would likewise have little additional impact, because the hypothetical accident utilizes the maximum credible amount of material to be handled at LLNL. In the case of Building 968, the tritium involved in the release is the entire building inventory. The results of the California Department of Health Services epidemiological study concerning the incidence of melanoma among Livermore employees, completed in April 1980, are discussed in section 3.7.2.1. The MM— ttl Protection agency |»| has Bt.tutocy authority to set radiation guidelines and standard* to assure protection of the public. This authority extends to federal operations, and tne Depart.ent of Energy -ill adopt these EPA standards as they beco.e effective. Methodologies used to calculate radiation doses fro. releases of radioactivity at the liver.ore sit. are included as an appendix to the 1980 annual environmental .onltorin, report. This report is included as Appendix 2A in the FEIS. A s noted in the Staff Statement in Response to Comments Received on the DEIS (included in the H.^J^d^^ ,^ ofe . California), DOE assesses potential incidents at the Livermore site that might affect the public and coordinates its emergency planning with appropriate agencies having the authority for the protection of the public. The Livermore site has mutual aid agreements with the cities of Livermore, 10-100 Pleasanton and Alameda County. Laboratory emergency forces are prepared to notify local and county officials if an emergency requires off-site action. There are no facilities for long-term storage of radioactive waste at Livermore. The FEIS states that these wastes may be temporarily stored in the waste treatment area until they can be treated. In addition, packaged treated wastes are frequently stored until a shipment is accumulated for movement to a designated DOE waste-storage site. Somewhat elevated concentrations of uranium have been detected in San Joaquin Valley agricultural soils. However, analysis showed that this uranium had the 235 u/ 238 U isotopic ratio typical of naturally occurring uranium and not the depleted (depleted in 235 U) form used in Site 300 operations. Further investigation demonstrated that the source of the uranium was the phosphate fertilizer applied to these soils. This matter was not discussed in the FEIS because the impact is minimal and not one related to Livermore operations. Section 3.9.2.3 has been revised to read "the range of 1 to 5 rem (whole body) suggested by the EPA for considering protective action can be increased to 3 to 15 rem by applying the guidance of DOE 0524. Since this latter guidance specifies that allowable doses to specific organs are three times higher than those for the whole body, evacuation is not considered necessary." Protective action does not necessarily mean an action as drastic as evacuation. Protective action can be any action to reduce exposure or the chance of exposure. The question of multiple glove box damage was discussed in the second paragraph of this response. Simultaneous loss of "all the glove boxes in Building 251" is not believed to be a credible accident. 10-101 ■ ■ /6o5" pltlm St MA Berkeley , O 9f?0? Tl D e>^y S /r I respect £>t(y rarest fW( ^Wc A«3r*i«g o z-7 0* iAe, XVsft &*Viro»i*iewte/ r Impact $t3t«*,etft ^ -#>ey tatfe -R>^ #// rac/toac*tiv/e leaks "A*** "^ , S ,'*e -^<* ^e *» ^ are*/ /I/50 J c**. 1 * beAeve ^3* ; as ^_ Z)£7S 5 ec^5 ^o ^c ^ai: a ^ajor- eart^^k^ Jo /a^ bottdinjs > includ- /M . tM6 ,r T „xer-i*tj <=^<^ wevi'i-ioriwj systems j Bunker 3L2 fired n beryllium-! ail«?n nhoL which blew out a camera port and blew dust into the camera room and the nd,)oining areao of the "bunker. Eecause it was after l »-:30, Bob Anderson and the crew merely closed up shop and went home. The following Monday morning Lee Frahm came to our office and requested Hazards Control assistance in cleaning up the potentially contaminated dust. However, upon arrival at 312 it was found that the custodians had cleaned up the area, without the benefit of being aware of the potential hazard. Leroy Haverty took some swipes at that time. * ^ ///fS H/tb X.UAJ6- As it turned out the custodians, George Saabye and Henry Brewer, did not receive an appreciable beryllium exposure. Analysis of the swipes revealed no beryllium, the custodians noted ho excessive amounts of aunt, and proper cleanup methods were used. However, this does not negate the fact that the 312 personnel were remiss in not notifying anyone of a condition which must be assumed to be dangerous. Procedure 301 states that any dust "blow-in" should be reported to Hazards Control (which they did at first opportunity). k But they should have either posted the area with signs or notified either the " >olice patrol or the C & M office. c\4Ec^ei> BuilO/pIo B>ePof?e Cleanup mao SPLeed Rs/^'Oed J-Atr '/£-*,?_ )^-j <, ■X It is fortunate that this slip-up did not expose anyone to hazardous condi- tions. I trust that you will remind your men that part of their responsibility is to "think safety". (r Stanley L. Drydeiy Hazards Control, Site 300 SLD: jras cc: Bunker Supervisors Vera Johnson — .,~^» Joe Lipera File JU-a^u.JL Jb^sJ/UAs ojf IQ'. 2 ,^ ?"\ 10-114 LRL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT FACTS RELATING TO THE ACCIDENT Type A. Accident Classification .Type B Typo C 2L Type D. Location of Accident Firing Didg. 851 Room Table Af£ itc of Accident 6 November 1970 Tlme_093p_ Department Involved B. Div. and P.E. Oner. ituro of Accident : 1 include as appropriate: description of injury, what caused the Injury, what caused the dama 8 e. what ha^rdouD I material or condition woo eseociatod with tho accident. No injury, no property damage incident. Some internal radioactive contamination to personnel not exceeding guide values. i-uaownina^ioa :tlon taken to care fo person affected. Rad. Safety dirVcted that nose swipes be taken, whole body counts be made, and urine samples collected. ' tion taken to prevent further injuries Area isolated until decontamination complete, rsons Affected Name lbert T. Harris irvin Foster Function In Area Facility Supervisor (B-Division) Facility Laborer (P.E. Oper) Injury Possible radioactive contamination 10-115 'IVscripttttn of the ruxiclnnt an i-slnbltshcd tlironish Intrrrormtlon of Uoku involved. mtii wllnoHso.n; ob.sorvnUon of Iho offoctH nnd any pcjrtlncnt mcanuromciits: JW attached nltiUimont from A. T. Harris dated Nov. 9 which describes ho-// the incident took place. The 1IC Area Rep received the call from A. Harris about 9: HO AM on 11-6-70 and requested the Hazards Control Monitor (R. Decker) to respond to the buildinc to examine the situation. After size-up, the Monitor notified Radiation Safety and the HC Area Teem Office of the situation. Ccntrol and clean-up procedures were initiated. About 10 lbs of D-38 was found (frcm the original 8U lbs). It was properly packaged and sent to Livermore for handling by the HC decontamination section as programmatic personnel wanted the metal back if possible. Harris and Foster were sent to the whole body counter about 2:30 P.M. (ll/6) . R. Kloepping (Rad Safety) notified the Area Rep about ^:30 that: (a) Foster showed a nose swipe count of **5 d/m beta and 15 d/m alpha while Harris showed a nose swipe count of zero. (b) The whole body count results were, negative for both men. The limit of sensitivity was 2 rag or 6.6 X 10" 4 MCi. One MPB whole body is 0.4 /iCi. One MPB for the critical organ (kidney) is 5X10"^ /aCi. On Monday morning (11-9) > Rad Safety called and requested urine samples be taken from both men. The HC Monitor made arrangements to procure the samples and they were submitted to Medical for analysis. Urinalysis results were negative for boch people. itigatlng Committee Distribution: Director's Office -Ass't for Tech. H.C. Dcpt. Head (2) 0p8. All Area Representatives (1 each) Indlvlducl(s) Involved (1) Individual's Supervisor (1) (R. Anderson& Field support supervisor (l) C. Humphrey) Discipline Leaders (1 each) F- S. Eby Released fU-2374 («F.V.3/70). .. r ..^i..;f 4N4"- — (/-n-te Hazards Contro AreaTeam 5> Monitor Hazards Control^Area Team 5, Health Fhy. rU6ctZT/6 J //-,,s'si**tn B. Div. Senior Supervisor ii-n-io _ // - / 3 - 76 HP&SupOrp. ^SQrp. Flold fcl^ct. 'ArcalhU). 10-116 November 9, 1970 On November 5 in the early evening, Shot 651-AN was fired at Building 851. The ramrod on the shot was Robert Poor. On November 6 at about 9:30 A.M., M. Foster and I were attempting to locate any pieces of metal from the shot by searching the firing table. Rain was falling at intervals during the night and in the morning. The table was muddy. We noticed a U" hole in the bank indicating a metal fragment could possibly be buried there. After Foster cleared some of the dirt away we could see a piece of metal. Foster moved it using gloves and we noticed sparks come off the material. Foster stated the metal felt hot when he touched it and he noticed a peculiar cdor. At this point we left the table and I called Hazards Control to report scne burning uranium'on the table. A. T. Harris, B-Division Facility Supervisor, Building 851 10-117 LIU, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ,oca'.lon of Accident: Bldg. 831 Ro- om Firing Table Arca late of Accident November 6, 1970 Time QQ~Q Classification-Type ature of Accident: No injury, no property damage incident. Seas internal radioactive contamination to 'cerscnnel not exceeding guide values. .'onclusions: Was equipment suitable and appropriate? Were operating Instructions adequate? — Yes Yes Did employee fall to follow an established procedure or violate safety regulations? No Based on the facts established during the investigation of this accident, the conclusions reached regard! the cause are: By disturbing the wet earth cover, a piece of burning depleted uranium was exposed to the atmosphere. The movement of D-38 caused a release of the oxide previously formed and initiated sparking and further burning and additional oxide release. 10-118 RECOMMENDATIONS: The changes recommended to prevent a rocurrenco of thin accident an Half-mask respirator q kV>/->h-i^ -u~ , , .shot involves D-11 Z°?,llV£Zt& ZHTJ 1 *T« r — ^ *«*i« after ,hen the physical condition of the^aterial tl ?' The "^^tors should be vorn inhalation. Site 300 Jtocedure ™ b rev^'T "! * here is P°«ibllity o? cad Hazards Control) ^ ^^ ba revi8ed to reflect this change. (S-DiCle'cn rlbullon: ccfcor'o Office (Ann- t. for Tech. •• DujH. HcftiJ (2) Opu . ) *fca FtcproacntQtives (1 each) "duai-s .supervisor (i)( R . Anderson & a support supervisor (i) c. Humphrey) iPilne Leaders (1 each) S. Eby Released H.CJ) JM-1 " .& ■■■*■■. ^v -v.- •_■*.-. — — ' •;! / The valves had been installod in Livermora, tha squibo removed » and tho cysta laak checked prior to filling. This work was dono by mechanical technicians undar the supervision of the project ongineer* The assembly was then sent t o t o be fillod with the Xenon. During this operation, tho holea from which tha squibs had been previously removed wara erronoualy fitted with pipe plugs, Tha valvoa consist of a otainloaa otool body with inlet and outlet ports (narked on valve body); a oaat # which conaioto of a solid portion of the valve bod 10-120 plug, Tho xonon and annociatod gear woo chipped to tha Sito for tho r.hot, When tho tino orrivod to ro-inctall tho cquiba in thoir propor location, tho on^ir.ocr began to remove on of tho plugo in ordor to inntoll tho cquib. Ho tniatakonly removed the wrong plug, eo that tho opening vented tha pronGurizod goo to atnoDphora» Sinco tho oquib had boon removed ond roplncod by o plug idontical to that on tha other side, tha propor location of tha cquib woo net obviouo. Tho onginoar nsdo tho wrong choice. Ao ooon as thay hoard gas ruohing out, all psraonnol moved away frcra tho *olvo and proceeded immediately into tho bunkor* All bunkor parnonnol were must- ered inside and tha blaot dnraporo closed to oosure that tho goo would not bo drawn into the bunkor ventillotlng cyotcra. Hazards Control, 8 Division (L. Erickson), Control Point, and Folico wero notified, ond oil traffic to ond frca tho building was stopped. Hazards Control began monitoring tho area downwind from tho container. At the ond of about three minute s the activity was found to b« about two mr/hr. Frca those measurements, we concluded that there would be no danger to other on-sito personnel, and certainly no danger at off site locations. By 1200 hours the activity noar tha gas valves was measured at 1.5 R. Va decided (Hazards, Mayors, and Erickson) to leave the bunker secured until after lunch to allow the activity to decrease further during the lunch period. The area was released for general traffic, but the firing table of Bunkor 351 wa3 left sec- ured • At 1300, J. Hayhew and L. Erickson arrived at the bunkar» Armed with suitable Boters, we proceeded to the firing tabla with W. Mayers and H. Bruanond. The activity near the valve waa loss than 1 R/hr, The plug tightened and tho gas assembly was moved to tha border of the firing tabic area ond marked with o"rsdio- octivo material" aign» t: The firing table was then releaoad for normal activity. }i^% 7 ****} ^<- (Page 2) 10-121 > C V'- — ~ .-'S "J /ft eye* k >\ , incident iiurorvr 1, DATE: 9 - 5 - 62 .TIME: Hsl5 2. EXPERIMENT NO. -99HP3. Data Q-S-ft? Y« LOCATION: 3S1 Time _li:2Q. " .11: ?Q. .11:22 3. NOTIFIED: [SD Hazardo Control E3 B Divioion/W. Division (XI Control Point ix~) Police O Medical D Maintenance Machiniot U. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT (What Happened) : Shot used hiflh pressure vessel of Xenon 133. Two squibs were installed on vessel (as per photo). Project engineer remov ed wrong plug from valve body allowing the gas to escape. Th< five persons involved in this operation immediately proceeded to the bunker, All personnel in the bunker were mustered inside, bla ^t danpers closed av.<\ above groups notified » »____^ — ■ ,—-.—.-- -.«——., Project engineer was uncertain as to what plug to 5. WHY DID INCIDENT OCCUR? , ri J ° — - remove from va lve assembly. Bunker supervisor did not have thorough knowledge of the valve. ___ — SUPERVISOR Diotrlbution: B Divinlon/W. Divio ion Rep. Hnzardo Control, Site 3C0 Project Phyaiciato/Engineer FIRING POIW OPERATOR 10-122 TO: Jim Dlttlg FrtGMi Willi flai Qrotcfcuth GUIVJBCTi Accidental Xenon 133 Role ceo While cotting up for Shot 984-D3 at 351 cm Ete}»t6sfl»r 12, 1962 the vroajs pla-v vAo nssuvud, ivlcaoinc 25 curi*'u of Xo 1 33. The cilm bad,~e ia>fi.din~s ran-cd frora 30 to ?0 or., prvrt of vhiah cay to attributed to the eettinV u^ of ttvs enot. ' The InMeV.nt o-currcd duo to a confusion over vhlvh of tvo ;»lu?8 to *■©- bovo for tlu attachment of a Cqulb (oxplonlvo) valva. normally trie ona of th'j tvo t'lu^a la removed an I aovorai vita taro 30 that the probl*a of ronovin-3 ft vronn; pl\i£ hann't exiotod la the pact. The plugs in quaotlon aro In n four outlet Junction block vhicb has a dluphratra ooparaticg the outlets into pairo. (When connected, th« "hot" nido has a plug and tha inlet tubing; tho cold eida hoc tha outlet tub> and tha Squib valvo.) The plug had an "0" ring seal vhich didn't leak until removed anl then thu gaa rolcaod with a 'whoosh". Upon hearing the nolu* tho engineer hollered •"run" aad all did. To avoid a repetition of thie la:la„-nt it would "be vies to consider Bark- ing th> Junction block in pairo as A - K, and B - B no that th^n* is nn external visual indication as to tho internal configuration of th:j indivi. dual block; or Bill Brumond suggooted cenvsntins to* hot plug; in to prevent accidental 'removal. It alco haa teca EU^^sted that tha vholo thin^ bo hooked up (in-:ludiiis the Squib and 25 foot of outlet tubing) bo for* filling tho cylinder vita gaa. Thin vculd also prevent cxyoauroo vhiio adding thaea thia/ca to tha hot cylinder en tho tcblo at 300 • WO icy cc) Vally Me vera Lo Roy Erlokcoa Dill Drumond John ttaldooa John Balanda tifr HI Hi am Grotosuta 10-123 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN \3i G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 14 received on the subject draft statement from Messrs. William Riggan and Steve Ladd, Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project, dated December 18, 1978. U). H. ' aah W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-124 Response to Letter 14 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE UC NUCLEAR WEAPONS LABS CONVERSION PROJECT In a letter of April 16, 1979, from W. Riggan to R. A. Du Val several questions not addressed in the Staff Statement were restated. Responses to these questions were as follows: IB Maximum Credible Spill We do not believe that the spill of 15 g of Cm and the failure of the filter system, regardless of the cause, are credible simultaneous events. However, the present building filters in Building 251 reduce airborne releases by a factor of about 2.5. Procedures now in effect for this facility limit the quantity of material removed from storage to 30 Ci (0.36 g Cm), a quantity that is only about 2% as much as postulated in the maximum credible accident. Due to this operating restriction, even loss of the filters and the release of 30 Ci of 4 Cm would not result in radiation doses exceeding those in the DEIS. 1C Soil Sampling As noted in the Staff Statement, it is difficult to relate respirable particles in the soil to respirable particles in the air. Consequently, we believe the respirable dust hazard is best evaluated by air sampling. It is our opinion that air sampling combined with whole soil sampling provides a better assessment of possible risk to plutonium exposure than measurements of respirable plutonium in the soil. ID Federal Guidelines Guidelines for exposure to americium, californium, thorium and radon are found in the Code of Federal Regulation 1J3, Part 20, "Standards for Protection Against Radiation" and DOE 5480. lA Ch. 11. 3A Radiation Exposure to Personnel The Staff Statement contained a summary of the 1978 radiation exposure data for LLNL personnel. Additional annual summary data are provided in the FEIS to give the reader a basis for comparison. These data are as follows: 10-125 Whole Body Doses * Not detectable above background <100 mrem 100 to 499 mrem 500 to 2000 mrem over 2000 mrem 1978 1977 1976 1975 1974 1973 88% 86% 86% 86% 87% 85% 10% 12% 11.3% 11% 10% 11% 1.7% 1.5% 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 3.2% 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 3B(1) ARMS Flyover All employees wear radiation dosimeters. None of the personnel working in the areas identified in the ARMS flyover showed elevated exposures. 3B(2) Site 300 The best evidence for the statement that firing table debris is "confined to a radius of 500 meters" is the ARMS aerial survey at Site 300, in which the gamma ray isopleths due to depleted uranium show a maximum diameter of about 200 meters (reference EGG-1183-1693, October 1977). Thus the statement is quite conservative. The ground survey was based upon the dissolution and analysis of whole soil samples and not segregated debris or particle size separations. Consequently, all particle sizes were included. Samples collected in the vicinity of the firing tables showed uranium levels from 10 to over 100 ug/g. At the site perimeter the uranium content of samples is 1-2 ug/g, which is typical of the uranium background in northern California soils. This is the basis for the statement that the areas affected are "well within site boundaries." As noted in the Staff Statement, providing for the health and safety of employees is an important requirement specified in all contracts for operation of DOE facilities. However, the scope of the DEIS was limited to assessing the site-specific impacts of Livermore operations on the surrounding environment. Accordingly, on-site employee safety was considered to be outside the scope of the DEIS. ♦The maximum permissible annual whole body dose for radiation workers is 5000 mrem/y. 10-126 3C Laboratory Employees Please see last sentence of 3B(2). 3H Suspending Operations Based on the analysis of the maximum credible accidents for these facilities, we see no justification for suspending operations in Buildings 251 and 332 while the scheduled upgradings are being completed. As noted in IB restrictions have been imposed on operations in Building 251. 4D Listing Of All Radionuclides The varied research work at the Livermore site, which is typical of most university research facilities, employs a wide range of radionuclides and toxic chemicals. Because the majority of these are stocked in such small quantities that they constitute no credible off-site hazard, we believe it would be impractical to attempt to list them all. The maximum credible accidents are based on quantities of those materials that could have significant potential for impact if appropriate controls were not maintained. These quantities often represent the current building inventory. 4E Radionuclides Unaccounted For The Department of Energy has specified accounting requirements as part of its safeguards system for the protection of special nuclear materials. These involve procedures that provide explanations for the generally small differences between the amount of nuclear material charged to DOE facilities and the amounts that could be physically inventoried. inventory differences, previously called Materials Unaccounted For (MUF) , are now publicly released semiannually. Reporting periods every 6 months are fiscal (FY) rather than calendar years. The data for FY 76, 77 and 78 are shown below. FY 76 covers a period of 15 months owing to a change from July 1 to October 1 as the FY start date: 10-127 Period FY 76 (July 1, 75 - Sept. 30, 76) Material 239 Pu 235 U (enriched) 233, FY 77 (Oct. 1, 76 - Sept. 30, 77) 239 Pu 235 U (enriched) 233 r FY 78 (Oct. 1, 77 - Sept. 30, 78) 239 Pu 235 U (enriched) 233 T Inventory difference 0.3 kg gain Difference less than 0.1 kg 0.1 kg gain 0.2 kg loss None Difference less than 0.1 kg 0.4 kg loss None None The losses in Pu in FY 77 and 78 were found to be due to cumulative differences between measurement uncertainty, recategorizatlon of waste to normal operating loss, and a shipper receiver difference. The gain in Pu shown for FY 76 was due to cumulating differences resulting from material recovered after equipment cleanup. These inventory difference reports, which include data from a number of DOE contractors, including LLNL, are entitled Semiannual Report on Strategic Special Nuclear Material Inventory Differences and are available from: National Technical Information Service U.S. Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 4F Summary of Releases of Radionuclides The FEIS contains summaries of annual atmospheric releases of Ar, H and N - and liquid releases to the sewer of tritium and plutonium. 10-128 4J Radioactive Shipments As noted in the Staff Statement, radioactive shipments must conform to DOT regulations, which specify that containers for large quantities of radioactive materials must be able to withstand credible highway accidents. There is no requirement to notify each county through which shipments are made. Neither DOE nor the Laboratory is in a position to determine the adequacy of local emergency plans. However, the Laboratory will support any efforts by local communities to develop such plans. 5C Sewer Effluent To clarify the question, it should be pointed out that diversion of sewage occurs at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant, not at the Laboratories. There is sufficient capacity to divert for about six days under average sewage flow. Cooling-tower blowdown occurs intermittently and neither it nor the use of cooling water is affected by sewage diversion. We cannot see any credible circumstance that would require evacuation of the LWRP personnel. 10-129 5D LLNL Sewer Effluent Monitoring System The initial continuous-operating sewer-effluent monitoring system was installed in 1968. Prior to having on-line continuous readout capability, much of our sewage monitoring was done by collecting samples to be analyzed in the laboratory. In the event an earthquake destroyed the monitoring station we would rely on these earlier procedures. 5E Le ngth of Time to Detect and Report Off-site Contamination The length of time required to detect a contaminating incident depends on whether monitoring for the contaminant can be performed with continuous readout as is the case with pH and gamma radiation monitoring, or whether reliance must be placed on analysis subsequent to sample collection as presently needed for tritium detection. If it is possible to employ continuous readout, detection can be essentially instantaneous. Longer periods are, of course, required if detection is based on the analysis of a previously collected sample. With respect to the time required for reporting, DOE and the State of California regulations require that appropriate notification be made for different classes of accidents. Notification periods vary depending on the seriousness or expected consequences, from immediate notification to quarterly. In such cases as excursions in the pH of the Livermore site sewage effluent, notification is often limited to authorities at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. 7A Discharge Limits to Sewer Systems Liquid radioactive and toxic waste are treated to reduce the concentration of these materials as low as practicable and well below standards set by DOE IMD 0524 and City of Livermore for discharge to the sanitary sewer systems. 7B Options in Event of Large Release The options available will depend on the nature of the release. However, one option that has been employed following an acid release was to for subsequent treatment as chemical waste transfer the material in the diversion pond to tank trucks 10-130 7D Nuclear Weapons Testing Program As noted in the Staff Statement, the scope of the Livermore DEIS was limited to addressing the site-specific environmental impacts of Livermore operations. 9 Transmutation At present, there are no plans to undertake transmutation of heavy radionuclides at Livermore. 10 Other Laboratory Activities The FEIS contains updating for several programmatic facilities at the Livermore site. Treatment of these facilities will be in balance with that appearing in the DEIS. 11 Nuclear Policy Topics raised in this question are not within the scope of the DEIS. 13 Alternatives Based on comments received on the DEIS, the alternatives represented those that were reasonably available and applicable to the Livermore site. The brevity of treatment was not generally an issue. 14F Agency Checking the Livermore Site Throughout the year DOE specialists visit the Livermore site to review and evaluate contractor (LLNL and SNLL) performance in such areas as general management and technical program operations, nuclear material controls, waste management, security, health and safety, fire protection, and environmental protection. Several independent safety audits have been performed at LLNL under outside contracts. Operations having a potential for air pollution are covered by permits issued by the Bay Area Air Quality Management District. In addition, the annual reports of environmental monitoring at the Livermore site, which are prepared for DOE, are also sent to Alameda County, the California Department of Health, and the Environmental Protection Agency for review and comment. 10-131 Our responses to the five additional questions in your letter are as follows: 1. Accidents Before 1960 Appendix 3A lists the documented accidents at the Livermore site having off-site impact. The Hazards Control Department whose records were reviewed to compile this list was formed in 1959. Search of available records prior to 1959 did not indicate accidents having off-site significance. 2. Burial Site The Farallones and Site 300— The Farallones were used as an oceanic radioactive disposal site between 1946 and 1965. Starting in 1963, radioactive wastes from the Livermore site were disposed by land burial in Nevada. 3 thru 5; Cancer Incidence Rates 3. We are responding by letter to Dr. Johnson. 4,5. As you know, Dr. Austin of the California State Health Department has studied data on LLNL employees to determine if the incidence of melanoma experienced by LLNL workers is statistically different from that observed in similar age groups in surrounding counties. A discussion of melanoma at LLNL is included in section 3.7.2.1 of the FEIS. 10-132 Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project TlfiO mJ h «!"*" !™ 8lCV S ' Ude,m "" Pe8Ce Ecmenrcal Peace Inttltut. 1360 Howard Street 608 Eshleman Hall. UC Berkeley 944 Market Street. Rnv 509 lIT^ ° Berkeley. CA 94720 San France. CA 94,07 1415)626-6976 (4151642 4136 1415) 391 5215 ADDENDUM: Enclosed are petitions containing approximately 700 signatures from students at UC Santa Cruz. Another 400 signatures are being sent in a separate envelope. Dec. 20, 1978 10-133 DOE Form AD-1 A (12-77) DATE: JW< 1 5 1373 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY memorandum REPLY TO ATTN OF: SUBJECT: TO: Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/EIS-0028-D, Livermore Site, Livermore, California, September 19 78 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Public Reading Room G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T . Bauman , RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection are copies of petitions for public hearings on the subject statement that are supplemental to comment letter #14 from the Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project. The complete petitions which include approximately 1100 signatures are on file in this office. ^^ Pennington •ting Deputy Director Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview Attachment 10-134 Tuesday December 19, 1978 To: W.H. Pennington Mail Station E-201 U.S. Department of Energy- Washington, D.C. 20545 Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement Livermore Site Livermore, California D0E/EIS-0028-D U.S. Department of Energy From: Peter Lumsdaine People for a Nuclear Free Future 870 Linden Lane Davis, California 95616 Section of DEIS 2.1.3» 2.1.4* and 2.1.5: Although research with high explosives in connection with the nuclear weapons development program (at Site 300 ) is mentioned, there is no mention of LLL/Sandia/Site 300 development of non-nuclear "conventional" weapons. Yet a former employee of LLL has informed me that the Livermore labs complex has played a significant role in the development of "conventional" weapons such as high explosive cluster bombs. Why has this been omitted from the DEIS? 2 # 1,4» 2.1,7«2.4tand 2.2,2.1.2: In discussing laser fusion and laser isotope seperation no mention is made by the DEIS of the potential military applications of these technologies. They are put under the non-weapons energy programs heading, yet laser fusion can be (or may be) used to covertly conduct miniture nuclear bomb tests, and enrichment of uranium by laser isotope seperation can clearly be used to produce bomb-grade uranium. Development of laser isotope separation technologies could signif- icantly increase nuclear weapons proliferation. WwfWrw 2.1 .6. 5» and 2.3*11: The DEIS indicates that plutonium from the labs has been recorded on and off LLL property in the Livermore Valley. However, the Department of Energy*s method of testing (taking whole soil samples from to 50 mm depths) has been frequently critiqued and deemed inappropriate. For example, the Health Commissioner of Jefferson County, Colorado (where the Rocky Flats nuclear weapons facility is located) found that testing respirable dust samples showed plutonium levels up to 285 times higher than those indicated by whole soil sampling. This seriously calls into question the DEIS assertion that plutonium contamination of the area (using the whole soil sample method of determination) is not at hazardous levels. Yet this significant, serious controversy and doubt is not even mentioned in the DEIS. (continued) 10-135 Continuation of Lumsdaine, PBFF-Davis comments on Livermore DEIS December 19, 1978 -page 2- 2.2.1: It is assumed in this section and in section 9*1 that the development of new nuclear weapons systems is necessarily "beneficial . In fact many people, including many distinguished scientists, as well as a substantial number of strategic analysts and public officials, regard the development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, espec- ially new systems which escalate the arms race, as massively detrimental to national security, to the health, welfare and security of the American people and the entire population of the Earth. It has been clearly documented that LLL has not only developed many new nuclear weapons but has done so in a manner which jtfb clearly has accelerated and is accelerating the international nuclear arms race, and that the LLL officials have agressively lobbied in Washington, D.C. and attempted (quite effectively) to influence national policy, rather than staying in the role of technicians. Thus the DEIS again, in this crucial matter, presents a narrow and biased analysis, assuming that all nuclear weapons development by LLL is, implicitly almost by definition, beneficial, and totally neglecting to even mention other respected analyses. (See also comments later on sec- tion 9.1) 2.2.2: No programs for the development of solar- thermal, wind, tidal, photovoltaic, or biomass conversion energy technologies are even mentioned. There are two or three problems with this. First, there _is a solar energy program at the Livermore site(s) and so the DEIS is innaccurate in this regard. Also section 9*1 claims solar development programs as a benefit of the labs 1 continued operation, which is inconsistent with section 2.2,2. Further, the absence of substantial programs in the various promising renewable (and clean - which geothermal generally is not) energy technologies mentioned above shows an extreme negligence and bias in the area of energy source development. 2.2 2.7: The strong and clear implication of the inclusion of the Visitors Center in the list of benefits from the labs, is that it will be an open educational facility for the general public. However i and several people who were with me observed on March 16, 1977 that this is not the case. We were excluded from the Visitors Center because of our personal and political beliefs about nuclear weapons, and our lawful exercise of our Constitutional First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly. Earlier in the day we had participated in a peaceful, legal, and quiet demonstration concerning the work on the labs, on the occasion of Hertz Hall's dedication. Somewhat later in the day we went over to look through the Visitors Center. There were about eight of us. The Visitors Center was open , but we were prevented from entering by LLL security officer Robert D. Robertson who informed us that his superiors had ordered him to "disinvite" us from the Center and make sure that we did not go in. We had no picket signs, literature* (continued) 10-136 ."vs-y ■*■>'"■ Continuation of Lunisdaine, PNFF- Davis comments on Livermore DEIS December 19, 1970 -page 3- or any similar material. Our peaceful and lawful demonstration was over, our signs were packed in our automobiles, and we wished, as concerned and interested members of the public, to see the Visitors Center, but we were prevented by LLL officials. They clearly did not consider us at all prone to violence, since we had been allowed to mingle freely with Dr. Edward Teller and other nuclear luminaries at the reception in Hertz Hall. Yet we were not allowed in the Visitors Center. Why? Because , security officer Robertson explained, the LLL officials were afraid that wo would talk with the other visitors in the Center and criticize the activities of LLL. A public "Visitors Center" which claims to be a center of public education about the labs, but which bars people from entry on the sole grounds that they peacefully and quietly express their dissent about the activities of the labs is no benefit . A Visitors Center whose officials are that scared of and det- ermined to exclude dissenting views and open discussion, is a center of propaganda, not education. The Visitors Center, operated in such a manner, far from being beneficial, sets a dangerous precedent of vicariously negating the First Amendment and the public's right of access to nonclassified information, under the hypocritical pretense of public education. 3.5.1.8: In the DEIS discussion of radioactive wajte management and disposal (sections 3.5.1.8, 3.5.1.12, and 3.5.1.15) referjence is made to "commercial underground storage site(s)" and "an off site, DOE-approved storage facility" to which the"120 m of packaged solid waste (1976)" was presumably shipped. Such references do not adaquately address the severe environmental impacts and hazards which radioactive wastes pose. The Livermore labs are responsible for the radioactive wastes they produce, but there is no demonstrated method of radioactive waste (especially high level radioactive waste) disposal or even long term storage in the United States or anywhere else in the world. This fact is acknow- ledged by the California state government and the United States government. In light of the extreme toxicity and longevity of these wastes, and in light of the perilous failures at Lyons, Kansas, at Hanford, Washington, and at the Farallones Islands, California to prevent massive leakage into the soil, rivers, and ocean; any further production of such wastes (including by LLL) must be regarded as an unacceptable advferse environmental impact, an unacceptable danger to human life and health in this and future generations and to the biosphere of our planet. Until such time as there is a demonstrated, workable, safe disposal system for radioactive wastes, further production must be regarded as adding to a highly dangerous and unsolved problem. 3.5.3, 3.5.6.1, 3.5 6.2, and 3.6: The DEIS description of toxic chemical waste man- agement and disposal is so general and vague as to be nearly meaningless. There is no information on what toxic chemicals are released into the soil, water, air, and foodchain , .10-137 (continued; Continuation of Lumsdaine, PNFF-Davis comments on Livermoro DEIS December 19, 1978 -page 4- nor in what quantities. There is no explanation of what "remote and shielded conditions" are (3.5.3), or what containment systems and criteria are used. There is only the most abbreviated and cursory description of "unstable compounds and reagents that have lost their identity". There is no discussion of combustion products 4to» released into the air from the burning of Site 300 chemical wastes (3«5o6.1). In the last several dec- ades thousands of synthetic chemicals which have not, as far as is known, previously existed in the biosphere of Earth, have been produced and released in very substantial quantities into the air, water, and soil. While some of these substances are relatively harmless, many of them are extremely potent carcinogens, mutagens, and teratogens, or have other highly toxic properties. The vast majority of these chemicals, however, have never been adaquately tested, and most have not undergone even elementary testing. Recent chemical waste disasters (such as that in Niagra, New York) and the rising rates of envir- onmental cancer have given the general public some idea of this enormously hazardous situation. Against the background of this chemical Russian Roulette with the biosphere, the nearly total lack of information in the DEIS on what toxic chemicals are released by the operations of the labs is an indefensable ommission. 3.7: The radiological impact section fails to consider on-site radiation levels, the effect of these levels on lab workers who may be exposed to them for eight hours per day, or the genetic effect on the general population via the children of lab workers or former lab workers. Since some on-site areas^iave radiation levels higher 893 mrem per year (page 3-37 of the DEIS) , a 2000 hour work year (40 hours per week, and 50 weeks per year) would suggest that some workers might receive over 200 mrem/year, well in excess of the NRC's 170mrem/year safety limit for the general public. 3.8.6: The economic analysis fails to consider at least two important factors. First, there is no discussion of jobs produced per dollar invested in the labs complex versus other sorts of economic development in which DOE (previously ERDA and AEC) might reson- ably invest. Further, there is no adaquate treatment of whether the workers at the labs came into the area when LLL did, or whether local residents were actually hired in significant numbers. Second, there is no mention of what, if any, property taxes the labs pay to the local government which must pay for the^roads, municipal sewer system, etc. that the labs use. Also, what percentage of the increased public school costs does the Federal "impact aid" pay for? 3.9.2.3: Assuming that the radioactive release from a spill at LLL would not be significantly larger than the one postulated in the DEIS, this section still has two major problems. First it once more neglects the radiation levels to which workers and visitors on-site would be exposed, and the genetic consequences of this exposure for members of the general public whose parents, as workers, were or may be exposed before the birth of their non-worker decendents. 10-138 END OF COMMENTS. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAr. G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 15 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Peter Lumsdaine, People for a Nuclear Free Future, dated December 19, 1978. 00, H< Pj^u^fa W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-139 Response to Letter 15 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PEOPLE FOR A NUCLEAR FREE FUTURE 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15 Nonnuclear weapons program There is a small nonnuclear weapons development program at the Livermore site, which is here because of local facilities for high-explosive research and access to Livermore computers. 2.1.4, 2.1.7.2.4, and 2.2.2.1.2 Laser fusion and laser isotope separation Laser fusion and laser isotope separation research at Livermore are presently considered as large-scale physics experiments to demonstrate the feasibility of physics and engineering concepts. Laser applications will depend on the progress of these experiments. 2.1.8.5 and 2.3.11 The Environmental Protection Agency has the responsibility for establishing the maximum permissible concentration of plutonium in soil in off-site areas. The soil sampling method used at the Livermore site is the same as that recommended by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 4.5. Section 2.1.8.5 has been revised to discuss some reservations concerning Dr. Johnson's respirable dust sampling. 2.2.1 The scope of the DEIS is limited to discussing site-specific impacts of continued operation of the Livermore site. It does not include assessing the environmental impacts of U.S. policy to produce or test nuclear weapons. 2.2.2 The FEIS contains a description of solar and other nonnuclear energy development work at the Livermore site. 10-140 2.2.2.7 We regret that you were unable to see the LLNL Visitors Center. Should you and your group wish to return, arrangements will be made for you to spend as much time as you wish in the Center during regular visiting hours, which on weekends is 9:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. 3.5.1.8 As noted, the scope of the DEIS was limited to addressing the site-specific environmental impacts of Livermore operations. The methods for radioactive waste disposal employed at Livermore meet all present environmental and safety requirements. There is a need for research and development efforts in the field of waste disposal, but this need applies to the nuclear industry nationwide and is not one specifically required for Livermore operations. 3.5.3 The FEIS contains additional information concerning toxic chemical management at the Livermore site. 3.7 In the FEIS Section 3.7 has been expanded to present data for on-site radiation exposures to Laboratory employees. 3.8.6 Comparing the economies of the Livermore site's mission with alternate DOE investments is beyond the scope of this EIS. When LLNL was established in 1952 many key personnel were transferred to Livermore from the Radiation Laboratory at Berkeley. Similarly, when Sandia was established at Livermore, personnel were transferred from Albuquerque, New Mexico. As need for staff with specialized training continued, these personnel were necessarily recruited nationwide. Clerical and support personnel were hired locally whenever possible. 10-141 Federal property, such as the Livermore site, is not subject to state or local property taxes. DOE pays the City of Livermore an annual fee for maintaining that portion of the sewer line originally installed by the Navy during World War II. DOE also pays the City of Livermore for treating Livermore site sewage. Even though the percentages of employees living in Livermore has remained fairly constant at about 50%, the Livermore site related school enrollment has been decreasing for the past several years. As a result the Federal funds have decreased. This information is shown graphically in Figure 3-15 in the FEIS. 3.9.2.3 The purpose of the maximum credible accident scenarios was to evaluate the off-site environmental impacts. For these evaluations the environment begins at the site boundary. 10-142 December 15, 1978 TOiW.H. Pennington Departnw nt of Energy PROKi rent Stuart Environmental News Service 2207 Shattuck Ave. Berkeley, CA 9k70k The Department of Energy's Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site(EIS-0028-D) is totally incomplete and inadequate.. Never has such lengthy research produced so little information aiid analysis with so little exposure for scrutiny(nine years for preparation, two months for comment.) The DoE is like a horse with blinders, unable to see but for straight ahead . Any view outside the blinders mighlfc question the present course. The DEIS is the blinder itself, a jus- tification of the current path. It does not explore the environmental impact of Livermore operations. The path, meanwhile, leads to an ever- increasing probability of an unparalled environmental catastrophe. Of course the actual environmental impact of the AEC-ERDA-DOE weapon's complex began in the 19^0s and has already committed millions in the Northern Hemisphere to cancer deaths. But tips of icebergs and cancer epidemics in Nevada, Utah, Colorado, South Carolina, ^ Washsjgton, the Pacific and Livermore are surfacing elsewhere, in the press and scientific li terature ( including articles by Livermore and other DoE scientists.) Radioactive materials generated by LLL and the DoE are the causes of the cancer. The Department of Energy lives in a world of safe fence-line doses, standards for radioactive releases, waste disposal and national defense that ignores available data, critical experiments and natural laws* The basic information is missing from the Livermore DEIS. Nowhere is there an index of chemicals, elements, their ranges of amounts and locations. National security is an unacceptable reason for the exclusion of this information that is necessary to determine "maximum credible accidents." Lawrence Livermore Laboratory has written an argument of positive influences and legality that is a gross distortion of the spirit if not the letter of NEPA that in the least demands an investigation by the Enviromental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality. History will show an entirely different environmental impact of the Livermore site and the DoE weapons complex. copiesi W.H. Pennington, DoE Ruth Clusen, DoE Charles Warren, CEQ EPA 10-143 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN 1979 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Feltoni OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 16 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Brent Stuart, Environmental News Service, dated December 15, 1978, li), H, r^/Mwn W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-144 Response to Letter 16 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MR. BRENT STUART The quantities of chemical and radionuclides specified in the maximum credible accident section reflect local inventories, and the rationale in developing these accidents is typical of that used in nuclear reprocessing plants, nuclear power plants and similar nuclear installations. 10-145 553 / i / KLAA^uuroc4 } &"**-' /hail S7&//S& B ^JD/ 6taJ &b*Ht At c^vt^UrTvr^^^/ /lay* Jo X tyfa /a^^^^A^^^O-U^ d^M^^L, ,taj~bn< Uo /not kct *"*&(? uJ;//m«. Jl £A&*fxnG*f k^u^r^u^ UM< / 1*- U/34M Cr\ ^LO^ t&LnaJbk CicuytZ snxJ rococo faj^d^jf**** 10-146 - 2- yUx OBIS jototld $rf UmG Ml ^l*S/C f^Uin / /4i JcUttto' 6A^ /x. - T/uAzlfs / <^ 06 1^4 &. wfrU - f"^ &S3*J«~ ■^Qm/j-6og A&tw^flO 10-147 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN v ib;^ G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 17 received on the subject draft statement from Ms. Susan Dembowski, Oakland, California, dated December 15, 1978. ^j ^ P^ioii^^o^J / Q oh W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-148 Response to Letter 17 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MS. SUSAN DEMBOWSKI All shipments of radioactive material from the Livermore site are in containers meeting or exceeding the safety design requirements set by the U.S. Department of Transportation. State and county officials are aware that shipments of radioactive material are being made from Livermore, but no system of notification for each shipment has been considered necessary. DOE and the State are organized to respond to any local accident involving radioactivity. We are not aware of any "leakage" from trucks hauling radioactivity. We have no plans for making routine shipments of plutonium via air. The only nonroutine air shipment of plutonium involved several small plutonium sources totaling less than 40 UCi, which were shipped to England to calibrate medical equipment. Approval for this shipment was obtained from DOE-Headquarters. The environmental report for 1980 is included as Appendix 2A of the FEIS. The relations of measured concentrations to concentration guidelines are given in that Appendix. The usefulness of any soil-sampling method to indicate the potential inhalation hazard is questionable because the correlation of air and soil concentrations is subject to considerable uncertainty. It should be recognized that soil concentration measurements are a secondary method for estimating airborne hazards. Respirable dust measurements are preferably made by air sampling done in the area of interest. Seismic evaluation discussed in section 2.3.3 shows that large displacements from earthquakes are not a factor at the Livermore site. The monitoring station is not designated a critical facility, so it is possible that it will not function without repairs following a severe earthquake. Since the publication of the DEIS, the sewage discharge point and the monitoring station have been moved to the northwest corner of the LLNL site. The scope of the DEIS was limited to evaluating the site-specific impacts on the environment. Providing for the health and safety of employees is a requirement specified in contracts for operation of all DOE facilities. The Staff Statement in Response to Comments Received on the DEIS (included in the Hearing Record of the Public Hearing on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site, Livermore, California ) contains information specifically related to Livermore employee safety. 10-149 Mr. W. Herbert Pennington mil Station E-201, GTN U.S. Jepartment of Energy Washington, D.C. 205^5 i860 Sharpe Avenue Walnut Creek, Ca. 9^596 December 20,19?8 Dear Mr. Pennington, I am writing you in regard to the DOE's DEIS on its Livermore site (D0 r /EI3-C028-D) . As a concerned resident of Contra Costa County, I am hoping to receive some answers to questions I have after luckily obtained and read the report. I will make my questions brief in hope that they will be understood just by referring to points and, for the sake of spe>ed, will be dealt with soon. The first question deals with the fact that plutonium and other toxic substances are present at the lab. Recently the question of waste has gained public attention. After reading the report, I found lacking specific information as to how much waste is generated yearly from the lab. The larger qustion is that of storage. Since no safe storage areas have been found, that it remains radioactive for many lifetimes, and that presently some is being stored in Livermore, I feel that the report is lacking in analizing this situation. Transportation of these substances also can have an influence in my community, since I found no discussion of consultation with county officials, of the actual transportation that goes on through or above my county, or of radioactivity that is emitted during this transportation. Two recent news items concern me with regards to this question of radioactive substances. Last spring, some Americium was misplaced, later to be found in the Livermore dumps. Not only doesn't the report fail to Tiention how the lab governs the use of this substance, it also fails to analize the fact that there are no federal guidelines governing exposure to Americium and that the Livermore community may have been affected by such accidents as the one I just mentioned. The other news item was con- cerning Contra Costa's inatiquate preparation for dealing with toxic mat- erials. Tf the lab is transporting radioactive materials around my com- munity, I would like to see this report analize the possibility for con- tamination in light of this inability to deal with accidents in this and other communities. The second area of concern I feel was not presented suficiently is that of the lab's influence on this report and the influence the general public has. T would like to know who wrote it, especially if lab personnel had major influence. I am concerned that the lab has basically total control of information regarding monitoring of itself, setting standards, and constantly fighting any independent agency from investigating public safety as it is related to the lab. With this concern in mind, I am wondering who will have a chance to respond to this report, or possibly get a chance to hear opinions of those who may have additional information. I would hope that public hearings be held that would be publicized well throughout the area effected by the presence of the lab in Livermore. I would like to know how such a decision is made, and by whom. With just the few questions I have about the report, I am sure there must be others. I feel there exists a need to not only publicize this report, but also to hear a broader response to it. The final question I have is actually the most important to me. I would like to know why there was no discussion about the environmental effects of the kind of work that goes on there. I am referring to the weapons research that the lab is primarily in existance for. The lab is responsible for continually developing new ways of using nuclear science in making weapons. This policy should be analized in relation to the possiblity of nuclear war, or the actual use of these weapons. I would appreciate a response to .these* questions . Thank you. 10 te to .these* questions. -150 Q^\ '{ • l)*h Gary Dobs on Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 18 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Gary Dobson, Walnut Creek, California, dated December 20, 1978. (/J r li. /^^l^fc' W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-151 Response to Letter 18 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MR. GARY DOBSON At the Livermore si.te radioactive liquid wastes are treated to reduce the activity as far below permissible discharge levels as achievable before release to the sanitary sewer. All solid radioactive wastes are packaged in Department of Transportation approved containers and shipped to DOE approved disposal sites. In 1979, 376 m 3 of radioactive solid waste was shipped from Livermore (Section 3.5.1.15 of FEIS) . Section 3.9.2.7 of the FEIS has been rewritten to include more details on radioactive material shipments and their impacts. Standards for radiation protection against americium are contained in Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 20 and DOE Order 5480. 1A, Chapter XI. Permissible concentrations in air and water are contained in Appendix B of these regulations. Radioactive wastes in the waste treatment areas are either waiting for treatment, or if packaged for shipment these materials are being held for a scheduled shipment. State and local officials are aware that shipments of radioactive materials (including packaged wastes) are made from the Livermore site, but specific notification of each shipment has not been considered necessary. Appendix IB in the FEIS contains an alphabetical list of the principal preparers of material for ne Livermore EIS. The annual Environmental Monitoring Report (Appendix 2A of the FEIS) is sent to evecal federal, state, and local agencies. The laboratories do not set their own standards, but comply with national, state and local standards. The scope of the DEIS was limited to evaluating the site-specific impacts on the environment of Livermore operations. It is outside the scope of this document to discuss the testing, use or national policy relating to nuclear weapons. 10-15? ?9 Advisory Council On Historic Preservation 1522 K Street NW. Washington D.C. 20005 December 29, 1978 Mr. W. H. Pennington, Director Division of Program Review and Coordination Office of NEPA Affairs U.S. Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 205^5 Dear Mr. Pennington: This is to acknowledge receipt of the draft environmental statement for the Livermore Site, Livermore, California on September 28, 1978. We regret that we will be unable to review and comment on this document in a timely manner pursuant to Section 102(2) (c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Nevertheless, the Department of Energy is reminded that, if the proposed undertaking will affect properties included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places, it is required by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (16 U.S.C. U70f, as amended, 90 Stat. 1320) to afford the Council an opportunity to comment on the undertaking prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds or prior to the issuance of any license. The "Procedures for the Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties" (36 CFR Part 800.U) detail the steps an agency is to follow in requesting Council comment. Generally, the Council considers environmental evaluations to be adequate when they contain evidence of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, as amended. The environmental documentation must demonstrate that either of the following conditions exists: 1. No properties included in or that may be eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places are located within the area of environmental impact, and the 10-153 Page 2 Mr. W. H. Pennington Livermore Site December 29, 1978 undertaking will not affect any such property, this determination, the Council requires: In making — evidence that the agency has consulted the latest edition of the National Register (Federal Register , February 7, 1978, and its monthly supplements); evidence of an effort to ensure the identification of properties eligible for inclusion in the National Register, including evidence of contact with the State Historic Preservation Officer, whose comments should be included in the final environmental statement. 2. Properties included in or that may be eligible for inclusion in the National Register are located within the area of environmental impact, and the undertaking will or will not affect any such property. In cases where there will be an effect, the final environmental statement should contain evidence of compliance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act through the Council's "Procedures for the Protection of Historic and Cultural Properties" . Should you have any questions, please call Michael C. Quinn at (303) 23H-U9H6, an FTS number. Sincerely, (T^^s' Louis^f. LouislS. Wall Assistant Director Office of Review and Compliance, Denver 10-154 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN 1 5 1979 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 19 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Louis S. Wall, Assistant Director, Office of Review and Compliance, Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, dated December 29, 1978. Pennington^ ^ vision of NEI*A Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-155 Response to Letter 19 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORICAL PRESERVATION Since publication of the DEIS, a cultural survey of Livermore's Site 300 has been performed in accordance with 36 CFR Part 64. Section 2.3.10 of the FEIS has been revised to reflect this. 10-156 JAN 1* 1979 Comments on Draft Environmental Impact Statement, DOE/BIS-0028-D, Livermore Site, Livermore, California, September 1979 0. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Svinebroad, BV R. Stern, BV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAM Public Reading Room G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Black ledge, ID J. Pel ton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. COOk, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV Attached for your Information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of a petition, containing 102 signatures, for public hearings on the subject statement received from P.A,N.P., 944 Market Street, Room 808, San Francisco, California 94102. This is being distributed as comment CJ20^> /*/ W. H. Pennington Acting Deputy Director Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview Attachment FILE: DOE/EIS-0028-D DOE/EIS-0028-D Comment Letter #20 DD/OECO WHPennington : gab 1/15/79 10-157 Letter 20 Letter 20 was a list of names petitioning for a public hearing on the DEIS. This hearing was held in Livermore on April 12, 1979. 10-158 .** ;\fcO ST A "^ ;SEZ a *l PRO^ & UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY WASHINGTON. DC. 20460 1 2 JAN 1979 Mr. W. H. Pennington Mail Station E-201 GTN Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 Dear Mr. Pennington: Enclosed are the EPA review comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, D0E/EIS-0028-D, entitled, "Liverraore Site, Livermore, California". Our major concerns with this environmental impact statement (EIS) are the lack of environmental data, the question of whether certain effluents are as low as reasonally achieveable (ALARA) and the incomplete dose assessment presented. There are several areas in the EIS where the data presented is not sufficient to allow independent analyses of the radiation impact of the facility. EPA believes that this data should be incorporated into the final statement. The question of achieving ALARA levels for effluents from several specific facilities are detailed in the enclosed comments. Finally, the failure to present population doses, health effects estimates, food and water pathways considerations, radionuclides considered, and the methods and assumptions employed result in an unacceptably incomplete picture of the laboratory's environmental impact. In light of our review and in accordance with EPA procedures, we have rated the proposed action LO (Lack of Objectives) and classified the statement as Category 2 (Insufficient Information). If you or your staff have any questions concerning our rating or comments, please do not hesitate to call on us. "^*" Peter Cook Acting Director Office of Federal Activities (A-104) Enclosure 10-159 EPA COMMENTS ON DOE/EIS-0028-D THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT ON THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY SITE AT LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA ■ General Comments 1 This draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) relies heavily on referencing other reports, probably in order to minimize the size of the document. However, in some cases there is not enough information to enable a reviewer who does not have access to the references -to determine the effect of site operations on the environment. The most significant omissions are in describing the environmental monitoring program and in summarizing data collected over the years to show whether any trend is apparent. There is also a need for better maps of both the site and the surrounding area. More detail is included in specific comments below. The final EIS (FEIS) should address these items. 2 EPA understands that the description of current and Proposed activities is not up to date and that current plans are different in some cases. The FEIS should be current in all significant ongoing and proposed activities. 3 More information and discussion are needed to assure that the radioactive effluents that may affect persons off-site are at a level considered to be as low as reasonably achieveable (ALARA). The most significant of these are: (a) The 14 Mev neutron generator which is projected to deliver a fence line dose of 900 mrem per year. This is a high level of radiation for an unrestricted area and there is a need to more explicitly discuss whether this level is ALARA. Also needing discussion are when (and if) the relocation to ^^J^lS^^ ^ and what the expected fence-line doses from the new facility will be, (b) The procedure which is relied upon for the Livermore sewage treatment plant to divert contaminated effluent at the plant rather than providing hold-up capability at the site; (c) The reasons why tritium releases to air and water cannot be further reduced needs to be explained; and, (d) The expected radiation exposure to passenger traffic from the LINAC, reactor, and relocated neutron generator operations if the new northwest entrance is still planned. 10-160 4. There is a deficiency within the DEIS in the description of the data produced by the off-site environmental sampling program. Although detailed information on the sampling locations, the types of samples (i.e., sewer sludge, water, air), and the radionuclide concentrations are provided in the annual reports, from all we believe the FEIS should include a summary of much of the information contained in these reports to allow a complete, independent assessment of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) impact on the local environment. It would be particularly helpful to have a summary of average annual radionuclide concentratons in effluents and in all media for the past five years to aid in relating the annual effluent releases to present radionuclide concentrations in the immediate environs. The use of several years' data would also reflect the apparent variability of site operations over time and would better indicate the full range of possible environmental effects than could be obtained by choosing a single year. Further, all radionuclide releases from Sandia Laboratories - Livermore (SLL), including liquid tritum releases, should be included in the annual release data (Table 3-1). 5. More discussion is needed on the environmental effects of site operation as determined from summarized trend data. Two areas of special interest are groundwater contamination at both the Livermore site and Site 300 and the effects of discharge from the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP). The Livermore-Amador Valley Wastewater Management Authority Project (presently under construction) will result in LWRP effluent being transported out of the valley and discharged into San Francisco Bay. This will significantly change the fate of future LLL liquid discharges; it should be addressed in the FEIS. 6. EPA questions the procedure of comparing effects from accidents at LLL with the 10 CFR 100 regulatory limits for accidents, this was done in several places in the DEIS. 10 CFR 100 applies strictly to accidents at reactor sites. If the accident doses from various LLL sources are to be compared with it, there needs to be an explanation of how these regulations relate to the accidents being analyzed. On a related subject, it is stated that DOE guidance may be used to triple the levels provided in the EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) before evacuation needs to be considered. This is an inappropriate extrapolation of the PAGs. Currently the PAGs are only Agency guidance and provide action ranges for only the whole body (1-5 rem) and the thyroid (5-25 rem). There is no provision made for further extending these ranges. Further, protective action does not necessarily mean an action as drastic as evacuation. Protective action can be action that will reduce exposure or the chance of exposure. 10-161 Specific Comments 1. p. 2-18, section 2.1.6.5, last sentence: Please identify the "accepted standard." 2. p. 3-1 to 3-2: Will the run-off from the area drained by Arroyo Las Positas and the other areas feeding the man-made lake cause any significant accumulations of radionuclides in the lake? 3 p 3-15: At what frequency are the pre-HEPA filters (glove box filters) changed in building 251? Are they disposed of as transuramc waste (i.e., above 10 nanocuries per gram)? 4 p 3-17: There is a conspicuous absence of a building drain retention system for building 331. This building is the major source of gaseous tritium releases and it is understood that typical tritium liquid effluents originate from equipment contamination in building _ 419 The FEIS should clarify the relationship between decontamination of building 331 equipment and building 419. The liquid effluents from building 419 should also be addressed. In the future it is possible that a water fire-protection system would be installed in building 331. The FEIS should discuss briefly the mitigating measures that would accompany this decision. 5 p 3-36 to 3-37: The radiological impact section on these pages is lacking much significant information. EPA believes that the additional information requested in the following items is necessary for a proper and thorough evaluation of the facility's radiological impacts: a With the exception of the few maximum individual dose results reported there is no mention of what radionuclides were considered in the assessment. It is necessary to know the significant impacts from the other radionuclides, along with the definition of what is considered significant, to provide a complete picture of the impact. b It is necessary to assess population doses as well as the individual doses discussed in "a" above. From this should come health effects estimates in the form of morbidities, mortalities, and genetic effects. c There needs to be a presentation of the assumptions and methods used in preparing the dose assessment. The methods, i.e. , models, presentation could simply be a reference to the available literature, if appropriate. 10-162 d. From this presentation it appears that only direct and airborne pathways were considered. Food and water pathways must also be considered or adequate reasons given for not considering them. The data associated with them should also be presented to the extent that a reviewer could independently evaluate them. e. There is currently proposed Federal Radiation Guidance from EPA concerning levels of transuranics in the general environment (EPA/4-77-018). While this Guidance has not yet been signed by the President, DOE should consider presenting a comparison of the expected doses to individuals from alpha radiation from transuranics released from LLL/SLL with the levels provided in the Guidance, viz. , one millirad per year to the pulmonary lung or three millirad per year to the bone. 6. Section 3-9: The analysis of both historical and postulated accidents and effects was generally well done. The following items would further strengthen this portion of the EIS: (a) Provide the X/Q values for specific locations such as the nearest residence, nearest cow and pasture, and nearest school; (b) Provide estimates of individual doses, population doses, and health effects received from historical accidents, if available; (c) Provide the age groups being assessed; and, (d) Provide health effects estimates for postulated accidents. 7. p. 3-47, Section 3.9.1: Specify the "appropriate radiation or concentration guides. Comments not related to radiation 1. p. 2-59: It is noted that DOE believes that Site 300 is the only known natural location for the wildflower known as Amsinckia grandiflora. The DEIS does not cite this flower as being endangered or threatened; however, EPA expects DOE to consult with the Department of the Interior to ascertain the flower's status and what measures need to be taken to protect its critical habitat. 10-163 2 p 3-71 to p. 3-73: EPA understands the sensitivity regarding the discussion of safeguards and security systems. However, heavy reliance upon electronic detection equipment may leave such systems vulnerable in case of a power failure. The assumption is that LLL has contingency plans for this circumstance but a confirmatory mention of this fact in the FEIS would assure that this possibility has not been overlooked. 3. p. 2A-14, Geologic History section, 23rd line: The term "clay" is incorrect, it should be "alluvium" or "siltstones and sandstones." 10-164 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN JAN 2 2 1979 Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 21 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. Peter Cook, Acting Director, Office of Federal Activities, Environmental Protection Agency, dated January 12, 1979. t) Penningto; Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-165 Response to Letter 21 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY Response to general comments: 1. Description of Livermore's environmental monitoring program Appendix 2A in the FEIS contains a copy of the 1980 annual environmental monitoring report. This latter report also contains a description of the sampling procedures and analytical methods employed by the monitoring program together with more detailed maps showing the location of monitoring points. Section 3.7 of the FEIS contains a 5-year summary of radioactive effluents from the Livermore site. 2. Description of activities should be current Every attempt is made to have the FEIS reflect the status of all environmentally significant activities and exposures up to and including 1980. 3. Assurance that Effluent Levels and Expo s ures are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) (a) 14-MeV neutron generator The projected fenceline radiation dose of 900 mrem (1976) has been reduced to about 166 mrem in 1980. These exposures include a natural background of about 60 mrem. The reduction has been achieved by transferring many of the high-flux experiments to the more centrally located Building 292. Site perimeter dosimeters closest to Building 292 show annual increases within about 10 mrem of natural background. b) Diverting procedures at Livermore sewage treatment plant After detecting an accidental release at the sewage effluent monitoring station, Livermore site personnel have about 3 hrs to evaluate the magnitude of the release, since this is the approximate time required for sewage to flow to the Livermore sewage treatment plant. 10-166 If this evaluation appears to justify diversion, the Livermore sewage plant is notified. The decision to divert is made by the sewage plant. Diversion can be placed in two holding basins with a combined capacity of 1.5 x 10 m . Based on the experience of past releases requiring diversion, the treatment plant has had little difficulty dealing with treatment of these releases. To duplicate the retention and treatment capability now provided by the Livermore plant does not appear to be cost effective, considering the low frequency with which need for diversion occurs. (c) Reduction of tritium releases to air and sewer Funding has been requested for upgrading the ventilation system of Building 331 to provide for collection and retention of the small amounts of tritium released to the atmosphere under routine operations. A second system is planned to retain nonroutine releases, which may occur in event of failure of part of the effluent-handling equipment (Section 2.1.6.6 of FEIS) . Tritium releases to the sanitary sewer have been reduced to less than 10 Ci per year. These releases have had detectable impacts on groundwater in the vicinity of the Livermore sewage plant. During the wet season the treated sewage effluent was discharged to Arroyo Las Positas, which served to recharge downstream aquifers supplying local groundwater. As part of the Livermore-Amador Valley Wastewater Management program, a pipeline was constructed to transport wastewater out of the valley and into the San Francisco Bay. The Livermore sewage plant was connected to this pipeline in February 1980. Although the effluent will still be used for irrigation, it will no longer be discharged into the Arroyo, thus eliminating the principal means of tritium migration to local and downstream groundwater. (d) Northwest entrance Traffic on the planned northwest entrance to LLNL will not be exposed to excessive radiation from either the Linac (Building 194) or the 14-MeV neutron generator (Building 292) . The reactor (Building 281) is no longer in operation. During 1979, the annual radiation exposure dose rate at a perimeter location closer to these facilities than this planned entrance was within 10 mrem of the natural background. 4. Need for a multi-year summary of annual effluent releases Section 3.7 of the FEIS contains a 5-year summary of annual airborne and liquid radioactive effluents. Table 3-1 of the FEIS includes the airborne and liquid effluents from SNLL. 10-167 5. Groundwater contamination and effects of discharge from the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant At the Livermore site, there is no surface discharge of radioactive liquids. At Site 300, tritium-contaminated waste in a land burial area has been detected in a nearby spring. However, an adjacent well shows tritium levels typical of background. Neither well is used as a drinking water source. As noted in 3(c) above in February of 1980 the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant was connected to the pipeline that transports treated sewage effluent out of the valley. Although about 10% of the effluent is still used for irrigation, it no longer is discharged into Arroyo Las Positas, thus eliminating the principal means of impacting on local and downstream groundwater via recharge. 6. Reference to 10 CFR 100 and protective action guides in the DEIS In the Accident Analysis section, calculated radiation doses from postulated maximum credible accidents were compared with 10 CFR 100 because these regulatory limits for accidents appeared to be appropriate for purposes of perspective. The DEIS also uses the EPA draft protective action guides to provide perspective. Although EPA has no guidance for protective action against lung exposure, it is the Laboratories' intention to use the extension described for emergency response planning. Response to specific comments: 1. Section 2.1.6.5 — The "accepted standard" is DOE Order 5480. 1A. 2. Run-off from the area drained by Arroyo Las Positas will not cause accumulations of radionuclides in the man-made lake. It is not expected that the use of runoff water from the east of the Livermore site will result in any measurable accumulation of radioactivity in the man-made lake. 3. Frequency of HEPA filter changing in Bldg. 251 — The changing of HEPA filters in Bldg. 251 is based on measured flow rate as sensed by individual Pitot tubes. When the dust load on the filter reduces the flow below a predetermined rate, the filter is replaced. The frequency of filter change depends on work activity in the glove box. All used filters from Bldg. 251 are disposed of as transuranic waste (retrievable storage). At Livermore, the prefilter & HEPA filter for glove boxes are enclosed together so the prefilter cannot be changed separately. 10-168 4. Building 419 operations and Building 331 liquid effluent handling — Through an oversight the description of operation at Building 419 (decontamination) was omitted from the DEIS. The FEIS contains this information and addresses its relationship with Building 331. 5. Section 3.7 — Appendix 2A of the FEIS contains a copy of the Annual Environmental Monitoring Report for 1980. This report discusses the monitoring of additional radionuclides to those described in Section 3.7. Estimated population doses are presented for significant radioactive effluents and the methodology of dose assessments is described. The monitoring of foodstuff originating in the area is also included in the annual report. 6. Section 3.9 — (a) X/Q values for specific locations were addressed in the Staff Statement in Response to Comments on the DEIS (included in the Hearing Record of the Public Hearing on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site, Livermore, California ) . (b) Off-site concentrations of radionuclides following accidental releases have been too small to warrant individual or population dose estimates. (c) and (d) Age groups and health effects for postulated accidents: estimates of these effects can be obtained from the data presented and standard health-effect conversion terms. 7. Appropriate radiation or concentration guide refers to DOE Order 5480. 1A. Response to comments not related to radiation: 1. Amsinckia grandif lora — The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior is proposing Endangered Species status for this plant and that 160 acres of Site 300 be declared its critical habitat. 2. Both LLNL and SNLL have contingency plans for dealing with safeguard and security problems. 3. The reference quoted in Appendix 2A in the DEIS is a LLNL published report, which is widely distributed. It is therefore impractical to make the correction suggested. 10-169 ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER j.iv. Directors: George Booms™ R.D. #1 . Peach Bottom. Pa. 17563 7175482836 jud.th Johnsrud 433 Orlondo Avenue .State College. Pa 16801 814-237-3900 119 E. Aaron Dr. State College, Pa. 16601 31 December 1973 Mr. W.H. Pennington Mail Station E-201 U.S. Department of Energy- Washington, D.C., 20545 Dear Mr D ennin£ton: In its draft "Environmental Imnact Statement, Livermore Site, Livermore, California" (D0E/EIS-0026-D) the department of Energy claims to assess the continued oneration of the Lawrence Livermore and Sandia laboratories at Livermore Cal., for environmental imoact as renuired by the National Environmental D olicy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The draft report also orooorts to compare the costs and benefits of continued ooeration. The draft renort does not fulfill this NEPA reouirement. The very long term health conseouences of continued or nast onerations is completely ignored. In particular, in 1976 Pohl ("Health Bffects of Radon-222 from Uranium Mining" in Search, 7(5) 345-350 , August 1976) nointed out that the thorium - 230 in uranium mill tailings decays to radium -226 and then to radon-222, with a time scale determined by the 60,000 year half life of thorium - 330. Keoford ( testimony in Three Mile Island Unit 2 oneratinp license hearings before NRC ASLP) has Dointed out that uranium - 236 in mill tailings and enrichment tailings (deoleted uranium) decays by several steps thru thorium -230 to radon - 222, and should also be considered. This nosition has been sun^orted by the 21 Sent. 1977 memorandum of Dr. 'alter H. Jordan of the NRC ASLB D to James R. Yore, ASLBP Chairman. These matters have also bpen reviewed by Dr. R.L. Gotchy of the NRC Staff. The NRC is currently trying to deal with this radon issue. It is stated in section 3.5.1.12 that no radioactive waste remains on site. However, section 3.5.6.1 describes the burial of denleted uranium in nits each of which contains the eauivalent of 150 kg of uranium. This IS radioactive waste on site. The total ouantity of this deoleted uraniu# at present should be stated, 10-170 LLL P. 2 along with the amounts expected to be added during future operations. This uranium - 23# will decay to radon -222. Since the uranium is buried under a few feet of soil, erowion is certain to occur, and exnose it at some future time. All radon emissions - covered or exposed, - should be considered for their very serious health conseouences. The total burden of such conseouences lies with the operation of this facility. In particular, consider just one such pit containing 150 kg of uranium - 23#. The ultimate decay of this material will produce 2.15 x 10 10 curies of radon - 222. In light of the E p A estimate I shall suggest that l/20 of this escapes to the air ( "Environmental analysis of the uranium fuel Cycle, Part I - Fuel Supply" E P A , 1973). The NRC estimate ( R.L. Gotcfcy, NRC Staff in Three Kile Island Unit 2 operating license hearings.) of the conseouences of release of one curie of radon - 222 from a western state with a U.S. population of 300 million to be 0.56 Person - rem to the bronchial epithelium. This estimate used in this case results in total of 6xl0 8 person - rem. The NRC estimate of cancer resk ( Same reference) is 22.2 deaths per million person-rem. This leads to a total of 13,000 deaths from a single burial pit containing 150 kg of uranium. Such long - term impacts should not be ignored in the final EIS. D lutonium and americium levels are discussed in section 2.3 .11. These are given as concentrations. It would be useful to have estimates of the total Quantities. Radioactive solid waste is discussed in section 3.5.1. Again, it would be useful to have a measure of the total auantities of radioactivity, by isotope, contained therein. The draft EIS takes no impact from the disposal of this material, therefore assuming perfect management, which is not the case. The environmental impact of the Livermore operation includes the impacts from all the wsstes generated there. To ignore these impacts would not be entirely candid. NEPA reouires that this be considered. In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. USAEC, UU9 F. 2nd 1109 (D.C. Cir.,1971) the court stated: We conclude, then, that Section 102 of NEPA mandates a narticular sort of careful and informed decision-making nrocess and creates {Judicially enforcable duties .... But if the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration ano 1 balancing of environmental factors — conducted fully and in good faith — it is the responsibility of the courts to reverse, (emnhasis added) Thus, all environmental costs must be considered fully. Furthermore, 10-171 LLL P. 3 the radioactive materials must be a considered for the full period of their radioactive decay, as footnote 12 of NRDC v. USNRC, 5U7 F. 2nd 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976) states in part: TT e note at the outset that this standard is misleading because the toxic life of the wastes under discussion far exceeds the life of the plant being licensed. The environmental effects to be considered are those flowing from the reprocessing and passive storage for the full detoxification period. Thus the estimates of health consenuences must be expended over several half lives of the species under consideration. The accomplishments of LLL are considered in section 2.1.3.2, including the testing of the Soartan warhead at Amchitka. It ach should be noted that there are other environmental costs associated with these operations including production of the warhead materials, and the impacts of the Amchitka test whtch are not discussed. Similarly, section 9.1 discusses the benefits of continued ap ooerationsx, including increased national security from nuclear weapons development. It should be noted that the security arises if the weapons are in fact manufactured, and this process has 1 large envirommental costs associated with materials production, and other activities. These other costs are associated with this benefit which is listed here as if that benefit were solely due to LLL operations. This may be difficult to address, but must not be ignoped. I hone these concerns can be addressed in the final EIS. Sincerely, '' T m. A. Lochstet 10-172 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN 2 4 1979 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 22 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. William A. Lochstet, Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power, dated December 31, 1978. yo.M, fawn. W. H. Pennington Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-173 Response to Letter 22 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER Waste storage Section 3.5.1.12 of the DEIS refers to the Livermore site, while 3.5.6.1 refers to Site 300 operations. Depleted uranium debris from high-explosives tests at Site 300 has been buried there in accordance with land burial regulations contained in 10CFR20.304. Radon hazard from depleted uranium Prior to isotopic separation of 235 U from 3 u by gaseous diffusion, the uranium is chemically separated from its radioactive decay products. As a result, the depleted uranium used at Site 300 is essentially free of radium-226, the parent of radon 222. Testing the Spartan Warhead at Amchitka The scope of the DEIS was limited to assessing the site-specific environmental impacts of Livermore operations. The scope does not include environmental impacts of nuclear weapons testing or the impacts associated with nuclear weapons production. 10-174 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY RESOURCES BUILDING 1416 NINTH STREET 95814 (916) 445-5656 Department of Conservation Department of Fish and Game Department of Forestry Department of Navigation and Ocean Development Department of Parks and Recreation Department of Water Resources EDMUND G. BROWN JR. GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA Air Resources Board California Coastal Commission California Conservation Corps Colorado River Board Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission Regional Water Quality Control Boards San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission Solid Waste Management Board State Coastal Conservancy State Lands Commission State Reclamation Board State Water Resources Control Board >JAN 1 7 1979 U. S. Department of Energy- Washington, D. C. 20545 Gentlemen: The State of California has reviewed the "Draft Environmental Impact State- ment Livermore Site" which was submitted to the Office of Planning and Research in the Governor's Office. The State's review was coordinated with the Departments of Water Resources, Fish and Game, Food and Agriculture, Health Services, Conservation and Transportation; the Air Resources and State Water Resources Control Boards; and the Public Utilities and Energy Commissions. The DEIS has been reviewed by the Department of Health Services with particular emphasis on the radiological impacts. It was concluded, based on information provided in the DEIS, that the existence and continuing operation of the Livermore Site does not present a radiological health hazard to members of the public in the vicinity of the facility. However, the state- ment itself does not provide sufficient information for an independent assess- ment to be made regarding the adequacy of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) Environmental Radiological Program. Similarly, essentially no informa- tion is provided regarding LLL emergency procedures in the event of accidental release of radioactive material that could potentially affect members of the public. The document should provide a comprehensive summary of information relating to the conduct of operations at the laboratory in order that the public and health protection specialists can be adequately informed about the impact of the laboratory and the implications of the laboratory's existence in areas of their purview. Obviously, there is a trade-off between providing excessive detail and the manageability of the document. The DEIS could be improved in the area of radiological impact assessment through the strengthening of reference documentation and with the addition of some discussion. Specific comments on these points follow, with references to the sections in the document . 10-175 U. S. Department of Energy Page 2 Section 2.1.8 Environmental Monitoring The presentation of the LLL Environmental Monitoring Program could be strengthened by the addition of a discussion of the legal, administrative and technical bases for the program. For example, the legal-administrative requirements should be summarized with reference to appropriate DOE manual chapters. Docu- ments should be cited which explain the technical design of the environmental monitoring program; i.e., sampling and measurement frequency and location specification and criteria. Documentation should be provided for sampling, analysis and quality assurance procedures. Additional information should be provided on results of the radiological monitoring program, including those data that support the conclusion that no environmental buildup of radioactivity has occurred as a result of the laboratory's continuing operation. Information provided in this DEIS is inadequate, as it stands, to provide support for independent conclusions to be made by public health professionals in other agencies concerning the environmental effects of the laboratory. The additional information requested should be provided to assist in develop- ing this independent assessment. Section 3.5.1.7 Light Isotopes Chemistry - Building 331 Sojne discussion would be desirable in Section 3.5.1.7.3 concerning stack effluent monitor alarm trip points and associated emergency control actions. This should include a summary of LLL internal notification and response pro- cedures in the event of a monitoring alarm trip, similar to the information provided regarding liquid effluent monitoring in Section 3.5.1.13 (pg. 3-20). Section 3.5.1.15 Radioactive Waste Releases This section states that "During 1976, 120 m^ of packaged solid waste was shipped from Livermore". Does this include both transuranium contaminated waste and waste which does not contain transuranium isotopes? It would be desirable to have a summary of waste volumes and the number of shipments in terms of category and disposal site designation. That is, identification in terms of shipments to DOE facilities and to commercial burial sites. Table 3-1 (pg. 3-22) This table should include the identification of release points if possible, to aid in the assessment of potential impacts. For example, are the tritium and argon each released from a single stack or vent? Are all the isotopes in liquid effluents released to the sanitary sewer? 10-176 U. S. Department of Energy Page 3 Section 3.5.2.2 Sewer System It is observed that the combined outflow from the Sandia and Livermore Laboratories leaves the site through a vitrified clay sewer line built by the Navy in 1942. Are regular tests for the continuing integrity of this line performed in the offsite monitoring program? If so what are the results? Section 3.5.2.3 Livermore Water Reclamation Plant It would be appropriate in this discussion to have included in this section a discussi of waste water. The DEIS should note that Management Agency Project currently schedul will intercept most of the Livermore treate it out of the valley for ultimate disposal East Bay Discharge Authority System's outfal we understand, still continue to "reclaim" via local irrigation. Section 3.5.6 Waste Management at Site 300 of environmental effects of LLL, on of plans for ultimate disposal the Livermore-Amador Valley Water ed for completion late in 1979, d waste discharge and transport into San Francisco Bay via the 1. The city of Livermore will, about 20 percent of its effluent The surface and ground water monitoring program in the environment of the 300 site should be described in better detail, particularly in view of the proximity of the State Water Project California Aqueduct. It is not apparent whether a program exists to measure potential movement of nuclides from radioactive waste buried on the site. This could occur through overland and near-surface flow into intermittent streams, or through down gradient flow into the regional groundwater systems, for example. The relation between sampling points, points of water use (if any) in this vicinity, and the burial sites, in the context of the 300 site vicinity hydrology should be discussed. If this analysis has been conducted elsewhere, the findings should be summarized and referenced. Section 3.7 Radiological Impact This section summarizes estimated annual individual offsite radiation exposures attributable to LLL routine radioactivity releases. It would be desirable to provide a reference to the actual analyses performed, which would include a more detailed discussion of the assumptions used in the development of the model. A statement should be made about the population dose, in addition to the data presented for individual members of the public in the area potentially affected by LLL operations. Section 3.9 Accident Analysis This section is deficient in that essentially no information is provided re- garding emergency procedures and planning activities in the event of potential offsite impacts. This section and Appendix 3-B (Disaster Control Plan) tend to project the view of LLL as a self-contained and essentially self-sufficient organization. 10-177 U. S. Department of Energy Page 4 No mention is made of procedures for notifying responsible individuals offsite in the event of an incident. Certainly, local, state, and various Federal agencies may play a part in the event of an accident having offsite consequences at LLL as they did in the August 6, 1970 tritium incident. Existing notification procedures should be summarized for the organizations with whom emergency action agreements exist. This should include police, fire, medical, public health, and transportation agencies and other organizations as appropriate. In particular, notification and emergency procedures involving radioactive material releases and spills which could concernably affect members of the public should be summarized. This should include incidents involving radioactive materials shipments to and from LLL. The public notification criteria should be documented. Section 3.9.2 Analysis of Postulated Accidents The potential offsite effects of fault movement at the Sandia Laboratory is not discussed in the maximum credible accident analysis listed in this section. Is the inventory of tritium in Building 331 in fact the maximum that can occur at this site, and do larger quantities ever exist at Sandia? The following brief questions or comments are arranged by page number appearing in the DEIS. The document discusses possible site expansions and a new entrance (page 1-3, Section 1.2. third paragraph), yet the impact of these is not discussed in Sec. 3.8.5, Traffic and Transportation. Figure 2.10 shows the new entrance schematic oriented toward Vasco Road. The last sentence in Sec. 3.8.5 states that additional use of the Greenville Road entrance should be encouraged. The two appear to be in conflict. If traffic is to be encouraged to use Greenville Road, such added use of this street may impact the operations of the Greenville Road/Interstate 580 Interchange. This should be discussed, as should the impact, if the proposed Vasco Road entrance is built. Page 2-27, Line 17 Does this mean that there are no offsite tritium monitors at the Sandia Research Laboratory, so that that facility depends upon LLL's ambient tritium monitoring capability? If any action level exists based on environmental monitoring results, then they should be published in the DEIS. If not, please explain. Page 2-29, Table 2-1 The inference is that grab samples are obtained daily. If samples are collected continuously out of the waste streams, then this should be indicated. Page 2-58 The value of 70 mm for average annual rainfall at site 300 appears to be in error, as does the reference to San Francisco University on the next page. 10-178 U. S. Department of Energy- Page 5 Pages 2-60 and 2-62 The reference citations are apparently in error, should be rechecked. Page 3-20, Line 1 Is any attempt to make the alarm system, which activates when a tank is full, redundant or otherwise fail-safe? If so, it should be described. Page 3-20, Line 15 Are the drinking water standards referred to the ones promulgated by the Public Health Service in 1962, or the current EPA standards? Page 3-21 The fate of the solid waste which collects as sludge in the cooling towers is not discussed in the DEIS, and should be if any leaves the site. Page 3-27 Line 28 The sewage monitoring system referred to does not include analysis for tritium. The monitoring program in existence for this radionuclide should be described separately. Page 3-65, Lines 22 and 23 A reference to the basis for this conclusion should be given. In general, review of the DEIS was hampered by the fact that maps and photographs were not always provided with a compass direction, that building numbers were not provided on layout maps, and that a map showing the relative locations of LLL, Sandia, and Site 300 in somewhat better detail was not provided. Thank you for the opportunity to review this document. Sincerely, L. Frank Goodson son Assistant Secretary for Resources cc: Director of Management Systems Office of Planning and Research 1400 Tenth Street Sacramento, CA 95814 10-179 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 JAN 2 9 1973 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 23 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. L. Frank Goodson, Assistant Secretary for Resources, The Resources Agency of California, dated January 19, 1979. 00. //. PjevmvnMo/gab W. H. Pennington V Division of NEPA Affairs Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview/EV Attachment 10-180 Response to Letter 23 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA Section 2.1.8, Environmental Monitoring Appendix 2A of the FEIS contains a copy of the 1980 annual environmental monitoring report. An appendix of the annual report contains a description of sampling methods and analytical procedures used in the Livermore environmental monitoring program. These appendices will provide the detailed information requested. Section 3.5.1.7 The Building 331 stack effluent monitoring system monitoring alarm settings are primarily intended for alerting building personnel, who investigate any such alarm and take corrective action. Although site management are informed, action by outside agencies is not required. In contrast, release of radioactivity or toxic chemicals to the Livermore sanitary sewer system may require flow division at the treatment plant. Here the action of an outside agency is required and this is the reason why the notification procedure was mentioned in the DEIS. Section 3.5.1.15, Radioactive Wastes During 1979 376 m 3 of packaged radioactive solid waste was shipped from Livermore. Of this total 33 m 3 was transuranic (TRU) waste. Three shipments of TRU waste were made to NTS during 1979. Table 3-1 The identification of effluent release points are clarified in the FEIS. Appendix 2A of the FEIS contains a table (Table 32), which identifies the source of the radioactive effluents released to the atmosphere. The Livermore reactor (Building 281) was shut down in 1930, so this release point no longer exists. All radioactive liquid effluents released at Livermore are released to the Livermore sanitary sewer. 10-181 3.5.2.2 Two wells along and adjacent to the section of the sewer line built by the Navy have been monitored annually for tritium activity as a means of assuring the integrity of this line. In 1980 use of the line was discontinued. The Livermore sewage effluent is now discharged at the northwest corner of LLNL into a new section of sewer that runs north to the Western Pacific Railroad on DOE-owned land and then west along the railroad's right-of-way crossing Vasco Road to the City of Livermore 's industrial sewer line. 3.5.2.3 The Livermore-Amador Valley Water Management Agency pipeline is discussed in Appendix 2A and section 2.1.8.3 of the FEIS. 3.5.6 The surface and groundwater monitoring program at Site 300 is described in Appendix 2A. 3.7 Appendix E of the 1980 annual environmental monitoring report (Appendix 2A of the FEIS) describes the methodology used for calculating off-site radiation doses due to routine radioactive releases. These methods are based on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory Guide 1.1.09. 3.9 The Staff Statement in Response to Comments on the DEIS (included in the Hearing Record of the Public He a ring on the Draft Envi r onmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site, Livermore, California ) discusses the DOE role in emergency planning in the public sector as well as the notification channels that have been established. 10-182 3.9.2 The discussion of seismic movement on the Livermore site appears in Section 2.3.3 of the FEIS. In the FEIS the maximum credible accident involving tritium is based on a hypothetical accident at SNLL's Tritium Research Facility (Building 968). Here the accident does involve the entire building inventory. A separate environmental assessment is being written to address the environmental impact of the new entrance to LLNL. Page 2-27 Line 17 LLNL has established and maintains 2 tritiated-water-vapor samplers in the off-site vicinity of SNLL. The approximate locations for these samplers are shown in Figure 4 of Appendix 2A in the FEIS. These are historical samples and not real-time tritium monitors. Typical concentrations observed are 10 yCi/m compared with the Concentration Guide of 2 x 10 uCi/m for uncontrolled areas. Page 2-29 Table 2-1 Samples of sewage effluent are collected continuously by an automatic sampler. Daily aliquots are collected from this sampler for certain analyses. For some analyses these aliquots are composited for monthly analyses. Page 2-58 The errors in Sections 2.3.7.6 and 2.3.10 have been corrected in the FEIS. Page 2-60 - 2-62 The reference to Beck et al. has been corrected in the FEIS. Page 3-20 Radioactive liquid effluents discharged to the sanitary sewer are treated to reduce radioactivity to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) and well below the standards of DOE Order 5480. 1A. 10-183 Page 3-21 Cooling tower blowdown is discharged to the Livermore sanitary sewer. Sludge is handled as hazardous waste according to the provisions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Page 3-27 Line 28 An aliquot of the daily sewage sample is analyzed for tritium. The results for 1980 are discussed in Appendix 2A of the PEIS. Page 3-65 Lines 22 and 23 In the FEIS these lines have been changed to read "Radioiodine inhalation doses are not increased by the presence of fog since the droplets, which typically have diameters of 8 to 20 ym, are too large to be readily inhaled." References are given for both the size range of fog droplets and their inability to be inhaled. Your comments have been considered in upgrading the figures in the FEIS. 10-184 ALAMEDA COUNTY PLANNING DEPARTMENT 399 Elmhurst Street, Hayward, California 94544 (415) 881-6401 April 2, 1 979 Mr. Calvin Jackson United States Department of Energy 1 333 Broadway Oakland, CA 946 1 2 Dear Mr. Jackson: The Alameda County Planning Commission has the responsibility of planning for lands in Alameda County which may be impacted by the operation of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The Commission considered a staff report on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement Livermore Site, Livermore, California, September, 1 978, prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy at their meeting of Monday, March 1 9, 1 979 to become familiar with potential impacts. The comments which follow are submitted to you for review and response in the Final Environmental Impact Statement. 1. The distribution of the DEIS to this Commission did not occur with sufficient time available to respond under the original schedule. This did not permit the time necessary to review the total document fully. The Commission had only one copy of the DEIS for its use. 2. The summary contained in the DEIS is brief to the point of being inadequate, and seemed to treat the substance of the report rather superficially. 3. There appears to be minimal correlation of the County General Plan and its elements with the evaluation made in the DEIS. It is questionable whether the County planning elements were reviewed as part of the preparation of the base document. 4. The DEIS appears deficient in its consideration of the impacts on the water resources in the Valley to the extent that the DEIS is judged to be inadequate for use in assessing the impacts the Lab may have on the surrounding community. This is particularly evident in the apparent lack of attention given to the impacts of any accident on the surface and ground water resources. The volume of liquid containing radio nuclides located at the laboratories is not identified nor is the direction of accidential spill addressed. In addition, air borne contamination that may be deposited on the surrounding properties with subsequent surface water runoff directly affecting the health and safety of the public and ultimately carrying the material back into the surface and underground water system has not been addressed. 5. The impacts of a potential nuclear contamination entering the municipal waste disposal system should be assessed. 10-185 Mr. Calvin Jackson April 2, 1979 Page 2 6 There is lack of agreement by geological authorities regarding the location and potential effects of the Las Positas fault. Additional geologic studies should be made and included in the final DEIS to resolve all questions on this matter. It is requested that the additional studies suggested above to bring the report into conformance with the Federal Guidelines for the preparation of a DEIS be completed and that the new information be distributed to those receiving this DEIS so that comments on the new information may be included in the final DEIS to be certified by the Department of Energy. Thank you for your assistance and attention. Very truly yours, William H. Fraley Secretary WHF:rr cc: Board of Supervisors Director of Public Works 10-186 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 APR 2 6 1979 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 24 received on the subject draft statement from Mr. William H. Fraley, Secretary, Alameda County Planning Department, Hayward, California, dated April 2, 1979. 00. M- fhmmdh^/^Jr W. H. Pennington Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview, EV Attachment 10-187 Response to Comment Letter 24 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE ALAMEDA COUNTY PLANNING DEPARTMENT 1. Distribution of DEIS Notice of the publication of the Livermore DEIS in September 1979 was contained in the Federal Register. Copies were distributed to State and local government organizations and private citizens indicating an interest in Livermore Site operations. We regret that your copies were delivered too late to prepare comments during the specified comment period. 2 . Brev ity of DEIS summary The DEIS summary was prepared in the format of a linear abstract using, wherever possible, topical sentences. An attempt was made to avoid including details that could better be obtained by reading the body of the statement. 3 . Alameda County General Plan The DEIS has been revised so as to more clearly reflect the objectives of such local plans as the Alameda County General Plan (Section 2.1.8 of the FEIS) . In addition, the Alameda County Planning Department was contacted for information on land-use plans for property west of the LLNL site and the Alameda County Road Department was contacted for traffic data at the East Avenue and Vasco Road intersection. 4. W ater Resources An adjunct of the Site Seismic Safety Program's effort to evaluate geologic hazards at the LLNL site is the site hydrogeologic study. The goal of this study is to determine the likelihood of a potentially hazardous liquid spill on site traveling through the unsaturated zone and reaching the groundwater. Acquiring data for a detailed characterization of the LLNL subsurface geology and hydrology, together with laboratory and field experimentation and flow modeling, is necessary for evaluating this potential groundwater contamination. This study will detemine whether there are any groundwater barriers to such contamination. The results of this study will be published as a separate 10-183 report and will be used in evaluating the potential for contamination of groundwater in the LLNL, environs. 5. Municipal Waste Disposal System Radionuclides entering the municipal waste disposal system are typically removed in the waste treatment process and retained in the sewage sludge. With the continuous monitoring capability now in use at the LLNL point of effluent release, an accident of the magnitude discussed in Section 3.9 was not considered credible. 6. Las Positas Fault Based on the letters received during the comment period for the Livermore DEIS and the questions raised at the Public Hearing on the DEIS, an extensive Livermore Geologic and Seismic field test program was undertaken. Questions raised concerning the Las Positas fault are being addressed in this study. Results of this work will be reported as a separate report scheduled for publication in 1982. 10-189 OUR SAN FRANCISCO BA1] CHAPTER WE M0VED - SIERRA CLUB -^COLLEGE AVENUE / OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94618 / (415)658-7470 April 12, 1979 NEW ADDRESS IS 6014 College Ave. Oakland, Ca. 9^618 Mr. W.H. Pennington Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 205^5 Re: Draft EIS Livermore Site, California Mr. Pennington, The Sierra Club San Francisco Bay Chapter area includes the Livermore Valley in its coverage of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin and San Francisco Counties. Sierra Club members in the valley and bay area communities have an ongoing interest in and commitment to a policy on nuclear research which reflects a concern over public health and safety questions involving exposure to radiation and contingency planning. In discussion of the Livermore Site and review of the Environmental Impact Statement with other local citizens groups, the Bay Chapter found the EIS lacking information on several important points. We believe the public has a vital interest in solid information on the risks of exposure to radioactive materials. Therefore, we lay particular stress on the value of completing the epidemio- logical study begun at the Livermore Lab, including study of sufpopulations of employees working at Site 300 and those with a record of exposure to radiation. The study should be completed and its results made public. Also, the Environmental Statement should contain an outline of a through emergency response plan for the Labs and surrounding communities . Again, along that same line of public information/public assurne'we would wish to see-in the EIS a complete presentation of information on the amounts of plutonium handled at the Labs and its transport and disposal. Recognizing Jhat certain information is sensitive and may be classified, we suggest that s statement could be made about limits of maximum amounts of plutonium used. Finally, the seismic information published in the Draft EIS appears unfiAished, unquantified, and spotted wJ.th unanswerea questions. We would like to see the seismic analysis complete soon by an independent agency such as the US Goelogical Survey. Thank you for this opportunity to express our concerns. 10-190 Conservation Committee Chair O^dVfec^ Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN APR 2 6 1979 Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 25 received on the subject draft statement from the San Francisco Bay Chapter Sierra Club, dated April 12, 1979. (Jd. M /hm^i^n W. H. Pennington Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview, EV Attachment 10-191 Response to Comment Letter 25 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM THE SIERRA CLUB Epidemiological Stud^ Section 3.7.2.1 of the FEI S addresses the status of epidemiological studies. Emergency Response Sect ion 3.4.3 of the FEIS discusses emergency response plans. P 1 u toniuro As you suggest actual movement of plutonium within the site is sensitive information due to safeguards and security considerations. The quantity of plutonium permitted in Building 332 at , time is limited to 225 kg. Transportation impacts are discussed in section 3.9.2.7. Geology and Seismicity B.saa on t „i« a„a cogent in th. LW.r-r. DEIS. th. seis.ic ana ,.olC, Potion of the aocu.ent „. ,„itt- and ,r..tl» e-p.naea. in addition. . co.pt.hensive ,.olouic investigation .hi* 111 Include tevie. by the USOS ana independent consulting groups was undettaten to evaluate on-site a„a pertinent regional geologic eonaition, that .l,ht influence th. safety of th. UM. aite. Tha final*. Of thi, study .11! be ™de public -a a separate publication, scheduled for publication in 1M2. 10-192 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANCELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED SCIENCE DAVtS-LIVERMORE HERTZ HALL POST OFFICE BOX 808. L-794 I.IVERMORE, CALIFORNIA 94550 April 13, 1979 Mr. W. H. Pennington Department of Energy Washington, D. C. 20545 Dear Mr. Pennington: Re: Draft EIS, Livermore Site September 1978 The Draft EIS is obviously of a different character than the majority of EIS's: it reports on a program that has a quarter- century history. ThUs the program stands on its history of protecting the public health and welfare. One result of this is that the report can be much briefer than a document which must speculate about future environmental impacts. Nevertheless, there are some omissions. The first is that there is no discussion of the effect of an earthquake on the LPTR. Is there no chance of loss of water from the pool? If such an event occurs, what will be the result? The second concerns the LLL program in in-situ gasification. If successful, will the coal-gas be free of the ring-compounds known to be carcinogenic? Is the program even considering the variety of secondary reactions that can take place in-situ? The third is an omission which could assist the public in evaluating the effectiveness of the perimeter and off-site monitoring program — the employee monitoring program. I recognize the law and tradition focuses EIS's "outward." However, the previously uninformed reader of the EIS is left with the impression that monitoring takes place at the permeter outward. In fact, there are 7000 mobile monitoring stations constantly sampling the environment within the perimeter. This may seem a trivial point, but such internal systems could have prevented several recent industrial tragedies. The one with which I'm most familiar is the Kepone episode in Hopewell, Virginia. There the employees brought the neutrotoxin into their homes, exposing their families. Such a situation could have been prevented had an internal monitoring program been in effect. That LLL has such a program should be part of the EIS. 10-193 - 2 - Finally, two nit-picks: The Department of Applied Science building is closer to 1000 m2 than the 30,000 m 2 listed. Your entymologists missed vespus occidentalis , the common yellowjacket. Sincerely, Wilson K. Talley,\ Professor Department of Applied Science WKT:khs Att: 10-194 Department of Energy Washington, D.C. 20545 APR 2 6 1979 G. Facer, DP A. Schoen, EV J. Swinebroad, EV R. Stern, EV S. Miller, OGC D. Smith, AD R. Miller, AL C. Lindeken, LLL (2) J. Jeutten, SAN Library, Room 1223, 20 Mass Avenue G. Dennis, AL G. Pitchford, CH (2) R. Blackledge, ID J. Felton, OR T. Bauman, RL D. Cook, SAN D. Peek, SR D. Jackson, NV COMMENTS ON DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, D0E/EIS-0028-D, LIVERMORE SITE, LIVERMORE, CALIFORNIA, SEPTEMBER 1978 Attached for your information or placement in your respective public document room for public inspection is a copy of comment letter No. 26 received on the subject draft statement from Professor Wilson K. Talley, University of California, dated April 13, 1979. IX). A/, fyftsnvnqk}^ W. H. Pennington Office of Environmental Compliance and Overview, EV Attachment 10-195 Response to Comment Letter 26 DOE RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM MR. WILSON TALLEY Sei ismic Safety of the Livermore Pool-Type Trainin g Re actor (LPTR) According to the analyses made in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for the LPTR, the reactor was capable of withstanding a peak horizontal acceleration of 0.5 g. This SAR also states that even with loss of coolant core meltdown would not occur. The LPTR was shut down in 1980 and the fuel elements have been removed. In-situ gasification The scope of the in-situ gasification program is limited to determining the engineering feasibility of fuel recovery by in-situ processing. Employee monitoring Section 3.7 of the FEIS describes "employee monitoring- which is conducted as part of the program designed to prov ide for the health and safety of employees at the Livermore site. Department of Applied Science The error in listing the area of this building has been corrected in the FEIS. We have included the yellowjacket in our list of insects under the heading of wasps. 10-196 APPENDIX 1A GLOSSARY OF TERMS The definitions of terms used in the LLNL and SNLL Environmental Impact Statement follow the usages developed during operations on the Livermore site and are in general agreement with established standards. accelerator: an apparatus for imparting high velocities to charged particles. activation: the induction of radioactivity in material by irradiation with neutrons, radioactive material, a radiation generating machine, or a nuclear reactor, activity: a measure of the rate at which a material is emitting nuclear radiations, usually given in terms of the number of nuclear disintegrations occurring in a given quantity of material over a unit of time. The standard unit of activity is the curie (Ci). alpha radiation: an emission of particles (helium nuclei) from a material undergoing nuclear transformation; the particles have a nuclear mass number of four and a charge of plus two. aquifer: a subsurface formation containing sufficient saturated permeable material to yield significant quantities of water. AEC: Atomic Energy Commission, established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and succeeded in 1975 by the Energy Research and Development Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In accordance with the Department of Energy Organization Act, the Energy Research and Development Administration became part of the Department of Energy on October 1, 1977. atomic number: the number of protons in the nucleus of a chemical element. background radiation: the level of radioactivity in an area, which is produced by sources other than the one of specific interest; the natural background radiation is produced by naturally occurring radioactive materials in the crust of the earth, cosmic radiations, and the fallout from nuclear weapons tests. beta radiation: essentially weightless charged particles (electrons and positrons) emitted from the nucleus of an atom undergoing nuclear transformation. biological oxygen demand (BOD) : a measure of the organic pollution of water determined by the extent to which bacteria and other organisms in a water sample will use dissolved oxygen in a given period of time; therefore, a measure of the residual oxygen in the water available for use by other organisms such as fish. 1A-1 biota: the plant and animal life of a region, biotic: caused by living organisms. chemical oxygen demand (COD): a measure of the extent to which all chemicals in a water sample use dissolved oxygen in a given period of time, coliform (count, number): a measure of the bacterial content of water. (A high coliform count may indicate contamination of a water supply by human waste.) concentration guide: the average concentration of a radionuclide in air or water to which a worker or member of the general population may be continuously exposed without exceeding acceptable radiation dose standards (see maximum permissible concentration ), confined aquifer: a subsurface water-bearing region having defined, relatively impermeable, upper and lower boundaries and a pressure that is significantly greater than atmospheric throughout, contamination (contaminated material): the deposition, solvation, or infiltration of radionuclides on or into an object, material, or area, which is then considered to be "contaminated. ■ counts per minute (cpm) : the number of events per unit time recorded by an instrument designed to detect radioactive particles; often used to indicate the relative amount of radioactive contamination, critical: the condition of a material that is undergoing nuclear fission at a rate that is self-sustaining. The critical mass of a material is the amount that will sustain nuclear fission when the material in its present form is placed in a specified arrangement. The minimum critical mass is the amount of a fissile isotope that will just sustain nuclear fission when placed under optimum conditions, critical facilities: Those facilities containing sufficient quantities of radioactive or toxic material such that a failure of containment could result in significant distribution of the material to onsite personnel, the public, or the environment. CTR: Controlled thermonuclear research, curie (Ci): a unit of radioactivity defined as the amount of a radioactive material that has an activity of 3.7 x 10 10 disintegrations per second (dis/s) . Millicurie (mCi) = 10 curie; -9 microcurie (uci) - 10 _6 curie; nanocurie (nCi) - 10" curie; picocurie (pCi) - 10 curie; femtocurie (fCi) - 10 curie. -12 1A-2 daughter products: the nuclides formed in the radioactive disintegration of a first nuclide (parent) decay chain: the sequence of radioactive disintegrations from one nuclide to another until a stable daughter is reached, decontamination: the removal of radioactive or toxic material from a surface or from within another material, decommissioning: the execution of a planned and orderly program of complete or partial decontamination, dismantling, demolition, or entombment of excess radioactively contaminated facilities, disintegrations per minute (dpm): the number of radioactive decay events occurring per minute, disposal: the planned release or placement of waste in a manner that precludes recovery, dose: a general term indicating the amount of energy absorbed from incident radiation by a specified mass, dose commitment: the integrated dose that results from an intake of radioactive material, evaluated from the beginning of intake to a later time (usually 50 years) ; also used for a longer term integrated dose to which people are considered committed because radioactive material has been released to the environment. ecology: the branch of biological science that deals with the relationships between organisms and their environment, ecosystem: a habitat and its biota, electron-volt: the energy acquired by any charged particle carrying unit electronic charge when it moves through a potential difference of 1 volt, environmental surveillance: a program to monitor the impact on the surrounding region of the discharges from industrial operations, excursion: a sudden, rapid increase of power produced when a reactor or other system of fissile material undergoes a sudden increase in reactivity, exposure: the condition of being made subject to the action of radiation. 1A-3 fallout: the radioactive materials that descend through the atmosphere and are deposited on the earth's surface following the detonation of nuclear weapons. FIDLER: an" acronym for Field Instrument for the Detection of Low Energy Radiation, fissile material: material capable of undergoing fission by any process, fission (nuclear): the division of a nucleus into two or more nuclides of lower mass, usually accompanied by the expulsion of gamma rays and neutrons, fission products: the nuclides formed by the division of a heavier nucleus, usually in a nuclear reactor . food-chain: a linear sequence of successive utilizations of nutrient energy by a series of species, food-web: the concept of nutrient energy transfers (including decomposition) between species in an ecosystem, fusion: combination of two lighter nuclei with the accompanying release of binding energy. gamma radiation: electromagnetic energy emitted during a nuclear transition, groundwater: water that exists or flows below the surface (within the zone of saturation) habitat: the characteristics of the place where biota live. half-life: the time required for the activity of a radionuclide to decay to half its value. It is used as a measure of the persistence of radioactive materials. Each radionuclide has a characteristic constant half-life. HEPA: high-efficiency particulate air filter. Hetch Hetchy: The San Francisco Water Department's system of aqueducts extending from reservoirs in the Sierra Nevada mountains to the San Francisco peninsula. The system provides water to San Francisco, the Peninsula, and certain East Bay communities, high-efficiency particulate air filter (HEPA): an air filter capable of removing at least 99.97% of a test aerosol composed of 0.3-ym-diam di-octylphthalate (DOP) . hood: a canopy and exhaust duct used to confine hazardous materials and thus reduce the exposure of industrial workers. 1A-4 inversion: a condition existing when temperature increases with height in the atmosphere. ion exchange: process by which ions of a given species are displaced from an insoluble exchange material by ions of a different species in solution. In water softening, sodium ions from a resin are exchanged for calcium ions from the water, irradiation: exposure to radiation by material placed near a radioactive source usually in an operating nuclear reactor, isotope: nuclides with the same atomic number (i.e., the same chemical element) but with different atomic masses. Although chemical properties are the same, radioactive and nuclear properties may be quite different for each isotope of an element. long-lived isotope: a radioactive nuclide that decays at such a slow rate that a quantity of it will exist for an extended period. man-rem: a unit of population dose, calculated by adding together the individual doses (expressed in rems) of a given population., maximum permissible concentration (MPC) : the average concentration of a radionuclide in air or water to which a worker or member of the general population may be continuously exposed without exceeding an established standard of radiation dose limitation. neutron: a particle existing in or emitted from the atomic nucleus; it is electrically neutral and has a mass approximately equal to that of a stable hydrogen atom, neutron activation: the process of irradiating a material with neutrons so that the material itself is transformed into a radioactive nuclide, nuclear fission: see fission , nuclear radiation: particles and electromagnetic energy given off during transformations occurring in the nucleus of an atom. 1A-5 nuclear reactor: an apparatus in which a chain reaction of fissionable material is initiated and controlled . nucleon: particles within the atomic nucleus. nuclide: a species of atom having a specific mass, atomic number, and nuclear energy state, nucleus: the positively charged center of an atom. penetrating radiation: forms of radiant energy capable of passing through significant thicknesses of solid material; these usually include gamma rays, x rays, and neutrons. permissible dose: the dose of ionizing radiation that, in the light of present knowledge, carries negligible probability of causing somatic injury or genetic effect. pH: a measure of the relative acidity or alkalinity of a solution. A neutral solution has a pH of 7, acids have pH's less than 7, and bases have pH's greater than 7. population dose (population exposure) : the summation of individual radiation doses received by all those exposed to the source or event being considered (see man-rem) . power reactor: a nuclear reactor designed to produce heat for conversion to electrical energy or mechanical propulsion, proton: a particle existing in or emitted from the atomic nucleus; it is electrically positive and has a mass approximately equal to that of a hydrogen atom. rad: a unit of measure for the absorbed dose of radiation; one rad equals 100 ergs absorbed per gram of material, radiation (ionizing): particles and electromagnetic energy emitted by atomic and nuclear transitions which are capable of producing ions on interacting with matter. Gamma rays and alpha and beta particles are primary examples, radiation survey: evaluation of an area or object with instruments in order to detect, identify, and quantify radioactive materials and radiation fields, radioactive (decay) : property of undergoing spontaneous nuclear transformation in which nuclear particles or electromagnetic energy are emitted, radioiodines : radioactive isotopes of iodine, radionuclide: a radioactive nuclide. 1A-6 radiotoxicity : the property that allows a material to adversely affect biological organisms through nuclear radiation, radwaste: radioactive waste materials, reactor: a nuclear reactor, release limit (release guide): a control number that regulates the concentration or amount of radioactive material released to the environment in an industrial situation, rem: a unit of measure for the dose of ionizing radiation that has the same biological effect as one rad of x rays. One rem is approximately equal to one rad for gamma or beta radiation, roentgen: a unit of measure of ionizing electromagnetic radiation (x and gamma). One roentgen corresponds to the release by ionization of 86.9 ergs of energy per gram of air. sanitary sewage: human wastes and other nonradioactive material that must be disposed of to preserve public health, scintillation (count): light flashes produced in crystalline material by ionizing radiation; measurement of the level of activity of the source, seismicity: the relative frequency and distribution of earthquakes. shielding: material used to absorb radiation and thus protect personnel or equipment, short-lived isotope: a radioactive nuclide that decays so rapidly that a given quantity is transformed into its daughter products within a short period (usually one with a half-life of days or less) . skyshine: radiation scattered back to the earth by the atmosphere, solid wastes (radioactive): either solid radioactive material or solid objects that contain radioactive material or bear radioactive surface contamination, source term: the quantity of radioactive material, released in an accident or during operation, that subsequently causes exposure after being subjected to some mechanisms of transmission or deposition, stability (atmospheric): a description of the effect of atmospheric forces on a parcel of air following vertical displacement in an atmosphere otherwise in hydrostatic equilibrium. If the forces tend to return the parcel to its original level, the atmosphere is stable; if the forces tend to move the parcel further in the direction of displacement, the atmosphere is unstable; and if the air parcel tends to remain at its new level the atmosphere has neutral stability, swipe: a means of measuring loose surface contamination on an object by wiping it with paper, gauze, etc., and then measuring the amount of contaminant on the wipe with an instrument. 1A-7 1 ? 6 TJ: Terajoule (10 joule) 1 TJ = 3.6 x 10 kWh. tracer: a radionuclide (s) or chemical introduced in minute quantities into a system or process. Radiation or chemical detection techniques are then used to follow the behavior of the process or system, transuranium: nuclides having an atomic number greater than that of uranium (i.e., greater than 92). turbidity: a measure of the degree to which sediments and other foreign matter are suspended in water (cloudiness). unconfined aquifer: an aquifer that has a water table or surface at atmospheric pressure. water table: upper boundary of an unconfined aquifer surface below which saturated groundwater occurs, wind rose: a diagram showing the distribution of prevailing wind directions at a given location; some variations include wind speed groupings by direction. 1A-8 APPENDIX IB LIST OF PREPARERS The principal preparers of the Livermore EIS are listed alphabetically together with a brief tabulation of their qualifications as follows: Marjorie Auyong, M.S., 4 years' experience in environmental engineering David W. Carpenter, M.S., Registered Geologist, Certified Engineering Geologist, 20 years' experience in field and geologic hazards investigations Donald O. Emerson, Ph.D., Registered Geologist, 24 years' teaching and resource geology experience Thomas A. Gibson, Jr., M.S., Certified Health Physicist, 30 years' experience in safety engineering and environmental science Carl L. Lindeken, B.S., 28 years' experience in environmental science Perry K. Lovell, B.S., 26 years' experience in health, physics David R. Mclntyre, M.S., 18 years' experience in biological sciences David S. Myers, M.S., Certified Health Physicist, 15 years' experience in health physics Byron N. Odell, B.S., 6 years' experience in safety and environmental science Kendall R. Peterson, M.S., 26 years' experience in meteorology Ha rold E. Pfeifer, M.S., 5 years' experience in engineering and environmental science Rus sell S. Roberts, M.S., 3 years' experience in health physics and waste management James F. Scheimer, Ph.D., 7 years' experience in seismology, investigating earthquake sources and wave front propagation 1B-1 William J. Silver, M.S., Certified Health Physicist, 24 years' experience in safety, health physics and environmental science Randolph Stone, Ph.D., Registered Geologist, 12 years' experience in petroleum and ground water geology Frank J. Tokarz, Ph.D., 20 years' experience in structural engineering Arthur J. Toy, Ph.D., 18 years' experience in safety, health physics and environmental science Joel H. White, M.S., 7 years' experience in environmental science Donn A. Wright, M.S., 5 years' experience in health physics 1B-2 APPENDIX 2A UCRL-50027-80 Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 1980 Annual Report A. J. Toy C. L. Lindeken K. S. Griggs R. W. Buddemeier April 15, 1981 2A-1 UCRL-50027-80 Distribution Category UC-11 Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 1980 Annual Report A. J. Toy C. L. Lindeken K. S. Griggs R. W. Buddemeier Manuscript date: April 15, 1981 LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY University of California • Livermore, California • 94550 l Available from: National Technical Information Service • U.S. Department of Commerce 5285 Port Royal Road • Springfield, VA 22161* $7.00 per copy • (Microfiche $3.50) 2A-2 FOREWORD This report is prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy by the Environmental Evaluations Group of the Hazards Control Department, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Data are obtained through the combined efforts of the Nuclear Chemistry Division and the Hazards Control Department. In addition to the authors listed, the following personnel made significant contributions to this report. V. H. Arganbright M. Auyong J. M. Bazan H. C. Capwell A. Conover K. J. Davidson R. J. Dupzyk A. L. Gazlay D. W. Hosmer Y. M. Kwok M. A. Loquist J. D. Lum F. M. McMillen K R. Peterson 1) E. Reed N. H. Rogers M R Ruggieri G. L. Seibel C. W. Sundbeck R. D. Szidon C. R. Veith M . A. Waterman 2 A- 3 CONTENTS Introduction 2A-6 Summary 2A-10 Monitoring Data — Collection, Analysis, and Evaluation 2A-11 Radioactive Monitoring 2A-11 Airborne Radioactivity 2A-11 Radioactivity in Soil 2A-13 Radioactivity in Sewage 2A-15 Radioactivity in Water 2A-17 Radioactivity in Vegetation and Foodstuffs 2A-19 Radioactivity in Milk 2A-20 Environmental Radiation Measurements 2A-20 Nonradioactive Monitoring 2A-22 Airborne Beryllium 2A-22 Heavy Metals Released to Livermore Sanitary Sewer 2A-22 Physical and Chemical Analysis of LLNL Sewage 2A-22 Noise Pollution 2A-22 Pesticide Monitoring 2A-23 Environmental Impact of LLNL Operations 2A-23 Radioactive Airborne Effluents 2A-23 Radioactive Liquid Effluents 2A-24 Quality Assurance 2A-24 References 2A-25 Appendix A. Tables 2A-26 Appendix B. Environmental Activity Concentration — Guide Levels 2A-47 Appendix C. Method of Dose Calculations 2A-48 Appendix D. Discharge Limits to the Sanitary Sewer System of Livermore 2A-51 Appendix E. Sampling and Analytical Procedures for Environmental Monitoring 2A-52 2A-4 Frontispiece. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (view from southeast). © LLNL (2) Sandia (3) South Bay Aqueduct (4) Arroyo Seco (5) Arroyo Las Positas (6) Nearest residential area © Vasco Road (q) East Avenue (?) Greenville Road @ Lupin Way (fl) Interstate 580 2 A- 5 Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory: 1980 Annual Report INTRODUCTION The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is located about 64 km east of San Fran- cisco, California, in the Livermore Valley of southern Alameda County, approximately 5 km east of the city of Livermore. The site, which oc- cupies an area of 2.54 km , is surrounded by open agricultural areas on the north, east, west, and part of the south side. Sandia Laboratories, Livermore, occupies a portion of the adjoining property on the south, and the nearest residential area is 0.8 km from the Laboratory's west perimeter. Of the nearly 4.8 million people who live within 80 km of the Laboratory (Fig. 1), 50,000 live in Livermore. Established in 1952, the Laboratory is operated for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) by the University of California and currently employs ap- proximately 7400 people. Although nuclear weapons research and development has always been the primary mission of LLNL, additional programs include biomedical, magnetic fusion, nonnuclear energy, and laser-fusion research. Much of the Laboratory's materials testing and high-explosives diagnostic work is conducted at Site 300, 16 km southeast of Livermore. Located in the sparsely populated hills of the Diablo Range, Site 300 covers an area of 27 km 2 . Figure 2 shows the location of LLNL and Site 300 with respect to the city of Livermore and surrounding areas. The Livermore Valley has a climate charac- terized by mild, rainy winters and warm, dry sum- mers. Annual rainfall averages about 360 mm, and rains occur predominantly between November and April, usually in connection with Pacific storms. Rainfall for the 1979-80 season (July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1980) was 378 mm. By com- parison, during two drought periods, 1975-76 and 1976-77, rainfall totals were 138 and 196 mm, respectively. Surface water drainage from the Valley is from east to west through various arroyos, with the outfall near Sunol in the southwest corner of the Valley. Prevailing winds are from the west and southwest during April through September. During the remainder of the year, wind directions are variable, as shown by the wind rose in Fig. 3. The Livermore site is on a northwest-sloping alluvial flood plain bordering the low hills of the Livermore Uplands to the south. The lithology of the area consists of a series of unconsolidated marine and continental sedimentary units such as sandstones, gravels, silts, and clays overlying the in- terbedded sandstones of the Franciscan Formation. The hilly terrain surrounding the Valley is used for cattle and sheep pasture, and the principal agricultural products in the vicinity of LLNL are grapes and wine, cattle, and poultry. Water bodies adjacent to the Laboratory in- clude the South Bay Aqueduct, which runs from northeast to southwest, 1.8 km to the southeast; the Patterson Pass water treatment facility, about 2 km east of LLNL; and Frick Lake, 4 km north of LLNL, a sag pond that is dry most of the year. Aquatic recreation (boating, fishing, and swim- ming) is available at Lake Del Valle, about 8 km south of LLNL, and at the Shadow Cliffs Recrea- tion Area, 1 1 km to the west. The Laboratory normally receives all its treated water from the Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct (which supplies San Francisco) located 1 1 km southwest of Livermore. Laboratory storm water is channeled through storm sewers designed to accom- modate a 10-year flow. Open ditches are used in un- developed areas of the site. Arroyo Seco crosses LLNL at the southwest corner. Arroyo Las Positas originally crossed the northeast section of the site. However, in 1965, as part of an erosion control program, Arroyo Las Positas was channeled north to the northeast corner of the site, and then west along the north perimeter to an outlet at the northwest corner. This outlet, which also con- stitutes the main pathway for the Laboratory's sur- face drainage (storm and irrigation), runs north to the Western Pacific tracks, then west where it joins 2A-6 -V FIG. 1. Estimated population distribution (X1000) within 80 km of Livermore, by sectors. 2 A- 7 Pacific Ocean FIC. 2. Locations of LLNL and Site 300. Arroyo Seco. The LLNL Master Site Plan calls for a small lake to be established in the center of the project. Provisions have been made for rerouting on-site water drainage and the Arroyo Las Positas to fill this lake during the rainy season. Groundwater is found at depths of 15 to 30 m below the LLNL site with a gradient indicating a generally westward flow. Because stream runoff may be a significant source of groundwater recharge, considerable attention is given to radiological monitoring of the arroyos draining the valley and to the groundwater wells west of the Laboratory. Laboratory sewage is discharged into the City of Livermore's sanitary sewer system and processed at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant (LWRP). As part of the Livermore-Amador Valley Wastewater Management program, treated sanitary wastewater is now transported out of the valley via a pipeline and discharged into the San Francisco Bay. The LWRP was connected to this pipeline on February 8, 1980. While the LWRP effluent is still used for summer irrigation of nearby Livermore City property, it is no longer discharged to Arroyo Las Positas, as was done during the wet season before construction of the pipeline. A strict effluent-control program that emphasizes controlling effluents at the source has been in effect since the Laboratory began operation. The environmental monitoring program is main- tained to evaluate the effectiveness of these control measures, to document whether effluents from the 2A-8 E Average annual percent frequency of wind direction vs wind speed Speed (nr i/s) Direction 0-2 2-3 3-5 5-7 7-9 9-11 11-16 16-20 >20 Total Av. speed N 2.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 3.6 3.8 NNE 1.9 0.7 1.2 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 5.5 4.2 NE 1.5 0.7 2.4 1.0 0.2 5.9 3.6 ENE 1.2 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.4 4.8 3.8 E 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.1 2.8 2.5 ESE 1.2 0.2 0.2 1.7 1.8 SE 1.0 0.1 1.2 1.5 SSE 1.0 0.2 0.1 1.3 1.5 S 1.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 2.1 2.0 SSW 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.1 3.4 2.9 SW 2.4 2.2 3.8 2.4 1.1 0.5 0.2 12.7 4.4 WSW 3.2 4.1 6.6 4.1 1.5 0.7 0.1 20.4 4.2 W 2.6 3.5 5.4 2.7 0.9 0.3 0.1 15.6 4.0 WNW 1.5 1.0 3.1 3.1 1.1 0.2 10.0 4.6 NW 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 2.1 2.5 NNW 1.3 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.9 Calm 5.1 Total 26.4 16.1 26.8 16.0 6.2 2.3 1.2 100.0 3.7 FIG. 3. Average annual wind direction and speed pattern at Livermore during 1980. (Measurements are made at 40 m above ground.) 2 A- 9 Laboratory and Site 300 operations are within ap- plicable standards, and to estimate the impact of these operations on the environment. Sensitive monitoring equipment is used that can detect radioactive and nonradioactive pollutants at well below environmental background levels. The program includes the collection and analysis of air, soil, water, sewer effluent, vegetation, foodstuff, and milk samples. Environmental background radiation is measured at numerous locations in the vicinity of the Laboratory using gamma and neutron dosimeters. Each spring, the Laboratory reports the results of environmental monitoring for the previous year. This report is prepared in compliance with ERDA Manual 0513, Effluent and Environmental Monitor- ing and Reporting. Significant changes in either the scope of the program or the levels of effluents are noted. Appendix A is a tabulation of 1980 environ- mental monitoring data. Graphics have been used in the body of the report to aid in interpretation. When appropriate, the tabulated data contain max- imum, minimum, and average values. Radioactivity values are tabulated with the associated counting uncertainties at the 2• [., :orr d (J I c*. ■TJ« i ..♦ H II" \ 1 Water sampling points \_) Vegetation sampling areas I r V^_ .■P." Site 300 * J I B© Sri i f*^ ••- Ho«o*, □ u«* FKi. 7. Site 300 off-site environmental sampling locations. The data in Table 11 are in the range of those reported in previous years. Samples collected near the east perimeter of the Laboratory reflect the in- fluence of the solar evaporators, which are no longer in use. 'There was close agreement between plutonium measurements made by LLNL and the State laboratories. 6 Figure 10 is a distribution plot of these activities. The three lowest data points in Fig. 10 do not fit the plot as drawn; we have com- pared these results with analyses of previous sam- ples from the same location. The previous samples showed plutonium levels in the usual range and we can find no reason to expect such a decrease. Therefore, the samples are treated as statistical outliers. Table 12 shows the plutonium and l37 Cs ac- tivities in the Site 300 samples. There were negligible changes from activities observed in previous sam- ples collected in the same locations. 2 High-explosive tests at Site 300 often involve the use of depleted uranium. Accordingly, soil sam- ples are taken annually to determine how these tests perturb the 235 U/ 238 U ratio of the soil. Isotopic uranium measurements were made with isotopic- dilution mass spectrometry. As in the past, the analyses indicated that isotopic perturbation is es- sentially limited to areas adjacent to the firing bunkers. 7 The isotopic uranium data shown in Table 12 are comparable to those observed during 1979. Radioactivity in Sewage Liquid radioactive wastes are treated to reduce activity levels to the lowest levels practicable and to well below the standards in ERDA Manual 0524. After treatment and analysis, the liquid wastes are released into the City of Livermore's sanitary sewer system at the LLNL outfall shown in Fig. 4. The ef- fluent is continuously monitored at the outfall for pH, radioactivity, and transition metals, such as copper and chromium. 8 Liquid wastes from Livermore's sanitary sewer system are treated at the LWRP, a 200-liter/s ter- tiary sewage-treatment plant that serves residential, commercial, and industrial water users in Liver- more. The salt content of the LWRP effluent 2A-15 QO 6* 00 E « en on ;>-> c 0> * S3 > c o — «9 *■ 0* -J £ in © 35 £ <~- en -n c ■*■* JB O 0> -1 a o 00 u U 0» 0> u. * 2A-16 FIG. 9. Locations of soil samples collected inside the Site 300 boundary. presented a problem for groundwater quality locally and in the Niles Cone aquifers. Accordingly, as part of the Livermore-Amador Valley Wastewater Management program, a pipeline was constructed to transport wastewater out of the valley for dis- charge into the San Francisco Bay. The LWRP was connected to this pipeline on February, 8, 1980. Although the effluent will still be used for irrigation of municipal property, it will no longer be dis- charged into the arroyo, thus eliminating the primary means of tritium migration to local and downstream groundwater. Representative San Francisco Bay water sam- ples were collected before and after connection to the pipeline. Preliminary results of tritium analysis of these samples indicate no significant difference between the two sample sets. The final results of this study will appear in a separate report. Samples of the LLNL and LWRP liquid ef- fluents are collected daily. Table 13 compares the monthly composite activity levels of certain radionuclides in the LLNL effluent with those in the effluent from the LWRP. All concentrations are well below DOE standards for discharge into the sanitary sewer system. Radioactivity in Water Water samples are collected from the various Livermore Valley and Site 300 locations shown in 2A-17 10 1 r 5 20 50 80 95 99 Cumulative frequency-less than (%) FIG. 10. Distribution plot of 239 Pu in soil samples collected in the Livermore Valley during 1980. Figs. 4 through 7. These samples are analyzed for gross alpha and gross beta activity. Tables 14 and 15 show the gross alpha activities in Livermore Valley and Site 300 samples, respectively. Gross beta ac- tivities for Livermore and Site 300 samples are shown in Tables 16 and 17. Livermore sampling locations 11, 16, and 24 (Fig. 5) are surface water sources (ponds, creeks, and reservoirs), and Location 20 (Fig. 4) is the collection site of Livermore rainfall. The other loca- tions are domestic water sources. Gross alpha and beta activities in Livermore water samples collected in 1980 were below EPA standards for drinking 9 water. Site 300 water samples are collected from on- site wells (Fig. 6, Locations 1-6), an off-site creek (Fig. 7, Location 14), and off-site wells (Fig. 7, Locations 7 and 11). Location 20 is Site 300 rainwater, and Location 21 is a spring-fed pond near Bunker 812. Location 4, a well near the Site 300 entrance, had a high gross alpha level (see Table 15). Specific analyses were performed which identified the source of the radioactivity as naturally occurring urani- um. 2 Neither the EPA 9 nor the State of California 10 specifies a limit for natural uranium in drinking water. In their limits for gross alpha activity, uranium is specifically excluded from the total. The uranium concentration was well within that specified in ERDA Manual 0524 (2 X 10~ 5 M Ci/ml). A 226 Ra measurement based on radon emanation showed the 226 Ra concentration to be less than 3 X 10- 10 ^Ci/ml. The low 226 Ra activity probably results from the relatively high pH of this well water. Under this condition radium would be ex- pected to coprecipitate with calcium in caliche, coating the grain surfaces within the aquifer. The water samples from the Livermore Valley and Site 300 are also analyzed for tritium activity. Because of the low tritium activities, it is necessary to distill and electrolytically enrich the samples before liquid-scintillation counting. Tables 18 and 19 show the data for the Livermore and Site 300 samples, respectively. The samples have concentra- tions that are well below recommended CG values. Tables 18 and 19 also include an estimate of the an- nual dose that may be delivered to an adult who consumes water containing the listed tritium con- centrations. These doses, which are all less than 0.1 mrem, are based on a water consumption of 2 liters/d and the dose conversion factors contained in NRC Reg. Guide 1 .109' ' (see Appendix C). As noted previously, treated effluent from the LWRP is used to irrigate nearby municipal property. This effluent contains low levels of tritium which come from normal LLNL operational releases to the sanitary sewer system. As part of a study begun in 1977, 12 tritium measurements are now made annually on water samples collected from neighboring wells to determine the extent of tritium migration into groundwater. Many of the wells were in the immediate vicinity of the LWRP; however, additional samples were also collected from areas at some distance. Locations sampled during 1980 are indicated in Fig. 1 1, and the tritium data are shown in Table 20. The highest tritium values appear in wells west of the LWRP. Tritium activities in all samples were well below the guidelines for water in uncontrolled areas as stated in ERDA Manual 0524. The tritium levels in these wells are also lower than those observed in the 1979 samples, which is to be expected with diversion of effluent to the pipeline. 2A-18 Basic map reproduced by permission of the California State Automobile Association, copyright owner FIG. 11. Locations of groundwater samples collected in the Livermore Valley during 1980. Radioactivity in Vegetation and Foodstuffs Each month, vegetation samples (usually native grasses) are collected at locations in the Livermore Valley, at Site 300, and at off-site loca- tions near Site 300, as shown in Figs. 5 through 7. These samples are freeze-dried, and the tritium ac- tivity in the recovered water is determined by liquid- scintillation counting. Table 21 shows the tritium data for vegetation collected in the Livermore Valley. The whole-body radiation doses shown in Table 21 were derived using the dose conversion factors in NRC Reg. Guide 1.109, n conservatively assuming that all vegetables consumed by an adult have the tritium concentrations found in these un- irrigated grasses. These potential doses are all less than 1 mrem/y. Table 22 shows the 1980 tritium data for Site 300 vegetation. Location 6 is adjacent to an area that contains tritium-contaminated debris from a firing table. As a result of the seasonal rains, the tritium apparently entered an aquifer whose out- flow is in the area where Location 13 samples are routinely collected. Beginning in 1977, as a means of evaluating the possible impact of Laboratory effluents on locally grown foodstuff, the tritium content of Livermore 2A-19 Valley wines was measured and compared with that found in other California wines and European wines. 12 Wine samples collected in 1980 were catalytically oxidized to carbon dioxide and water, and the tritium content of the recovered water was measured by gas-proportional counting. The data in Table 23 represent the analysis of 11 samples purchased from retail outlets in 1980. As found in 1977, the tritium levels of the Valley wines were somewhat higher than those California wines produced from grapes grown outside the Valley, but lower than that of the European wine sampled. The same European wine source has been sampled in previous years. Samples of honey produced from a variety of flower sources both in and outside the Livermore Valley were analyzed for tritium content. Following the oxidation of the samples in a Parr oxygen bomb, the tritium content of the water produced was deter- mined by gas-proportional counting. The data in Table 24 show that the tritium content of Livermore Valley honey samples is comparable to that of honey from neighboring areas. Radioactivity in Milk During 1980, goat milk samples were obtained from several farms within about 5 km of the Laboratory. A portion of each sample was vacuum- distilled and then analyzed for tritium activity by liquid-scintillation counting. The samples were then oven-dried, and the resultant solid matter was ground and gamma-counted in a Ge(Li) system. The activities of the l37 Cs, 40 K, and HTO in the samples are shown in Table 25. Also shown are the calculated annual whole-body or critical-organ radiation doses that could be received from con- suming this milk. These calculations are based on a milk intake of 310 liters/y and on the models previously referenced. The only dose above 1 mrem to an individual is from naturally occurring 40 K. Environmental Radiation Measurements Quarterly, environmental gamma radiation is measured at 12 LLNL perimeter locations (Fig. 4) and at 41 off-site locations (Fig. 12). These measurements are obtained with thermolumi- nescence dosimeters (TLD's) using a previously published procedure. 13 Based on past measure- ments, 14 environmental terrestrial exposure rates in the Livermore Valley vary from 30 to 60 mR/y. Cosmic radiation, calculated from the local eleva- tion and geomagnetic latitude according to the data of Lowder and Beck, 15 is approximately 35 mR/y. Table 26 shows quarterly and annual radiation doses (in millirem) derived from measurements at perimeter locations. The operation of a 14-MeV neutron generator adjacent to the south boundary fence was responsible for the elevated doses at Location 5 on the south site boundary directly op- posite this facility. However, these doses are lower than those observed during 1979 because many high-flux experiments normally performed at this location are now being performed in Bldg. 292 in the northwest quadrant of the Laboratory. The median annual off-site dose of 59 mrem is identical to that observed in 1979. Although the me- dian annual perimeter dose of 63 mrem is slightly higher than the 61 mrem of 1979, this difference is not statistically significant. The 4-mrem difference between perimeter and off-site median doses is con- sistent with the difference seen in previous years. Perimeter locations 10, 11, and 12 are near a linear accelerator facility. Figure 13 shows the 1980 an- nual frequency distribution of environmental dose rates observed at the 41 off-site locations. The dosimeter that recorded the highest dose (140 mrem) was near an off-site industrial plant where radiography is frequently performed. The second highest off-site exposure (92 mrem) was due to a 52- mrem third-quarter response from a dosimeter located about 2 km southeast of LLNL. Prior measurements and the fourth-quarter measurement were somewhat below the average for the Livermore Valley. No explanation is presently available for this anomaly. Figure 14 is a dose-distribution plot combining Laboratory perimeter and off-site measurements. The three doses above those typical of environmental background have been identified above and in the previous paragraph. Environmental neutron dose rate measure- ments are also made at eight locations on the LLNL site perimeter using 235 U track-etch detectors (Fig. 4). A detailed description of the detector and the spark-counting procedure has been published. The 1980 quarterly measurements are shown in Table 27. With the exception of Locations 3 and 5, which monitor the 14-MeV neutron generator in Bldg. 212, all levels are within the range typical of natural background. 2A-20 \ i u.;V I I » "H FIG. 12. Locations of TLD's in the vicinity of LLNL. 2A-21 50 Ar V/ssA A J tezzz 60 70 v 90 95 Annual radiation dose (mrem A. t???n M40 145 FIG. 13. Annual off-site gamma radiation back- ground for 1980. E CD k_ E 200 CD io O T3 100 C o 70 ■M CD 50 fD i— "(U 30 3 C C 20 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ! loocP- o-^x^ ^ o 01 £XX> - - • - , 1 , 1 . . 1 . . 1 iii i 1 5 20 50 80 99 Cumulative frequency— less than (%) FIG. 14. TLD dose-distribution plot for the LLNL perimeter and Livermore Valley during 1980. NONRADIOACTIVE MONITORING Airborne Beryllium Beryllium monitoring of air, both in-plant and at or near LLNL property boundaries, has always been a part of the Laboratory's safety program. Monthly, half of every filter from the LLNL perimeter and Site 300 is composited by sampling location and wet-digested. Then the beryllium con- tent of the solutions is determined by atomic ab- sorption analysis. Tables 28 and 29 show average monthly con- centrations of airborne beryllium for LLNL perimeter and Site 300 sampling locations, respec- tively. There appear to be no differences between the levels at Site 300, where beryllium is frequently expended in high-explosive experiments, and those observed at Livermore. The concentrations, which are two to three orders of magnitude below the emission standard, can be accounted for by resuspension of surface soil containing naturally oc- curring beryllium. Local soils contain approx- imately 1 ppm of beryllium, and Livermore's air typically contains 10-100 ng of particulates per cubic meter. By using a value of 50 Mg/m 3 for an average dust load and 1 ppm for beryllium content of this dust an airborne beryllium concentration of 5.0 X 10 -5 Mg/m 3 can be calculated. This value is in good agreement with the data in Tables 28 and 29. These concentrations are plotted in Figs. 15 and 16. Average annual concentrations are less than 1% of the appropriate standard. Heavy Metals Released to Livermore Sanitary Sewer As noted previously, sanitary sewage from the Laboratory is treated at the LWRP, a 200-liter/s tertiary sewage-treatment plant serving residential, commercial, and industrial users in Livermore. This effluent is continuously monitored for pH, radioac- tivity, and transition metals before it enters the Livermore sewer system. 8 Sewage samples represen- tative of daily flow are collected and composited monthly, and the composites are analyzed for the metals shown in Table 30. Physical and Chemical Analysis of LLNL Sewage Samples of Laboratory sewage effluent are collected quarterly. These samples are subjected to a variety of analyses, including biochemical oxygen demand, ammonia, nitrate, total nitrogen content, alkalinity, and total solids. Table 31 shows the data for 1980. All data demonstrate compliance with the City of Livermore's discharge limits (listed in Ap- pendix D). Noise Pollution As noted earlier, the Laboratory's high- explosive diagnostic work is conducted at Site 300. Because Site 300 is so remote, these experiments can be performed with minimal off-site impact from an- noying noises or damaging overpressures. On the basis of meteorological measurements made twice 2A-22 10" ro 01 a. c o c O c o u 03 C o 10 -5 ^w> 10' J F J J A S N D 1980 FIG. 15. Beryllium concentration in LLNL perim- eter air filters during 1980. 00 c o c 0J u c o o a> CO 0J O) 03 l_ 0J > 03 C o 10- J FMAMJJASOND 1980 FIG. 16. Beryllium concentration in Site 300 air filters during 1980. each day, a limit is set on the weight of high ex- plosives that can be detonated without impact in populated areas. To monitor these limits, four microbarograph sensors are maintained in or near the city of Tracy. The probability of overpressure is greatest in the Tracy area because of the direction of the prevailing winds. The Laboratory received no complaints regarding possible overpressures associated with Site 300 operations during 1980. Pesticide Monitoring Beginning in 1975, the Laboratory's environ- mental surveillance program was expanded to in- clude pesticide monitoring. Pesticides used at LLNL include herbicides, fungicides, and insec- ticides. The most probable way pesticides used at LLNL could be transported to the off-site environ- ment is by entrainment in surface runoff water. Most of this surface drainage leaves the Laboratory via a ditch at the northwest corner of the property. A sample was collected from the ditch following the first major storm. This sample was extracted with organic sol- vents, and the extracts were analyzed by gas-liquid chromatography (GLC) using a variety of detectors. Data obtained from these analyses were compared with the pesticides listed in Title 22 of the California Health and Safety Code. 10 No materials were de- tected in the samples at concentrations exceeding the State-adopted standards for these organic chemicals. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF LLNL OPERATIONS Radioactive Airborne Effluents In 1980 (see Table 32), radioactive airborne ef- fluents consisted of an estimated 165 Ci of 4l Ar from Bldg. 281 (reactor), a total of 2305 Ci of tritium from Bldg. 212 (14-MeV neutron generator) and Bldg. 331 (tritium facility), and 1656 Ci of 15 0- 13 N from Bldg. 194 (electron-positron linear accelerator). All radionuclides, with the exception of tritium, are short-lived. Comparative releases of radioactive effluents at Livermore during the 5-year period from 1976 through 1980 are shown in Table 33. The Livermore reactor was shut down on 2A-23 March 31, 1980, due to a lack of programmatic need. Closure of this facility removes the local source of 41 Ar and eliminates a major contributor to the site's radiation dose to the public. Decom- missioning of a major portion of the LLNL tritium facility and reduced activity of the 14-MeV neutron generator in Bldg. 212 are responsible for a nearly 50% reduction in the quantity of tritium released to the atmosphere in 1980. The quantity of 15 0- 13 N released from Bldg. 194 in 1980 is higher than that released in 1979, since this facility was shut down for major maintenance and modification during 1979; activity released during 1980 was comparable to that released in 1978. Table 32 also contains estimated radiation doses to the public from these radioactive airborne effluents. Three dose-reference points were used: (1) the "fence-post" dose at that location on the site boundary where maximum exposure rates exist, (2) the dose to the nearest resident, and (3) the man- rem dose within a radius of 80 km. Dose calculations were made using a continuous-point-source computer code based on the Gaussian plume model. 17 This code provides ratios of concentration to release rate (x/Q) through 16, 22.5° compass sectors, and distances from 0.1 to 100 km from potential release points. The average annual x/Q values have been calculated using local meteorological data from an instrumented tower. This tower, located near the Laboratory's north site boundary, is equipped with sensors mounted at 10- and 40-m levels that measure wind direction, wind speed, and tem- perature. From records of these data, wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability estimates were tabulated at 1/4-h intervals over the calendar year. Variance in the horizontal wind direction was used to estimate Pasquill-Gifford stability cate- gories based on the method described by Slade. 18 Lateral and vertical standard deviations, a y and a v are entered in the computer code as functions of these stability categories and the respective dis- tances. From annual effluent data the release rate Q (in Curies per second) was calculated for each of the principal radionuclides released to the atmosphere, and the concentrations at the site boundary and for the nearest resident were calculated from ap- propriate x/Q values. (The nearest resident means that resident receiving the highest dose from each radioactivity release point, not necessarily the resi- dent nearest to the site boundary.) Dose estimates were based on the dose conversion factor in the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109. 11 The results in- dicate that the maximum estimated dose to the nearest resident was less than 1 mrem. Table 32 shows a combined population dose of less than 2 man-rem from 41 Ar, 3 H, and neutron ac- tivation products in Laboratory airborne effluents. This dose is based on a population of 4.8 X 10 within 80 km of the Laboratory. Using 100 mrem/y as a typical average radiation dose from natural sources, the comparable natural radiation dose received by the same group is 4.8 X 10 5 man-rem. By comparison, the population dose from Laboratory operations is negligible. Radioactive Liquid Effluents Low-level radioactive liquid wastes are treated to reduce their radioactivity to levels as low as reasonably achievable and are well within ap- plicable health and safety standards. These wastes are then discharged into Livermore's sanitary sewer system. During 1980, the principal radionuclides released into the sewer system were 2.8 X 10 -4 Ci of 239 Pu and 5 Ci of HTO. Table 13 shows that the average annual concentrations of these radio- nuclides represent 9.3 X 10" 4 % and 2.4 X 10~ 2 % of the relevant standards, respectively. Quality Assurance During 1980, the Laboratory participated in the Environmental Protection Agency's in- terlaboratory Cross Check program and DOE's Sample Analysis Intercomparison program con- ducted for DOE by the Environmental Measure- ments Laboratory (EML). The Laboratory also participated in the 5th International Intercom- parison of Environmental Dosimeters and con- tinued its quarterly intercomparison of ther- moluminescence dosimetry measurements with EML. A statistical summary published annually by EML compares the analytical performance of par- ticipating DOE contractors with measurements made by EML. 19 Table 34 shows the comparison of LLNL's and EML's analyses, indicating the ratio of LLNL's data to EML's and the ratio of LLNL's data to the respective mean of all analyses reported. A description of the sampling and analytical procedures used at LLNL is included as Appendix E in this report. 2A-24 REFERENCES 3. 4. 5. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. C. L. Lindeken, R. L. Morgan, and K. F. Pet rock, "Collection Efficiency of Whatman 41 l-ilter Paper for Submicron Aerosols," Health Phys. 9, 305 (1963). W. J. Silver, C. L. Lindeken, J. H. White, and R. W. Buddemeier, Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. 1979 Annual Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Liver- more, CA, UCRL- 50027-79 (1980). "Radiochemical Determination of Plutonium in Soil by Leaching," HASL Procedure Manual, Procedure E-Pu-06, Energy Research and Development Administration, HASL- 300 (1972). W. J. Silver, C. L. Lindeken, J. W. Meadows, W. H. Hutchin, and D. R. Mclntyre, Environmental Levels of Radioactivity in the Vicinity of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 1973 Annual Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-51574 (1974). P. H. Gudiksen, C. L. Lindeken, J. W. Meadows, and K. O. Hamby, Environmental Levels of Radioac- tivity in the Vicinity of the LLL, 1972 Annual Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Liver- more, CA, UCRL-51333 (1973). B. R. Tamplin, California Department of Health Services, private communication (1980). W. J. Tipton, An Aerial Radiological Survey of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, EG&G, Las Vegas, NV, EGG-1183-1693 (1975). M. Auyong, J. L. Cate, Jr., and D. W. Rueppel, On-Line Monitoring of Toxic Materials in Sewage at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL- 83664 (1980). National Interim Primary Drinking Water Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-570/9- 76-003 (June 24, 1977). California Domestic Water Quality and Monitoring Regulations, California Administrative Title Code 22, State of California (1977). Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluent for the Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10CFR Part 50, Appendix 1, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Regulatory Guide 1.109 (October 1977). W. J. Silver, C. L. Lindeken, K. M. Wong, E. H. Willes, and J. H. White, Environmental Monitoring at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, 1977 Annual Report, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-50027-77 (1978). C. L. Lindeken, J. H. White, A. J. Toy, and C. W. Sundbeck, Ambient Environmental Radiation Monitor- ing at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, UCRL-77106 (1975). C. L. Lindeken, P. H. Gudiksen, J. W. Meadows, K. O. Hamby, and L. R. Anspaugh, Environmental Levels of Radioactivity in Livermore Valley Soils, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-74414 (1973). W. M. Lowder and H. L. Beck, "Cosmic Ray Ionization in the Lower Atmosphere," J. Geo. Phys. Rev. 71, 4611 (1966). J. C. Fisher, Jr., "Calibration of Anderson-Braun Remmeters with Track Etch Detectors," in Hazards Control Progress Report No. 52, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL- 50007-76-1 (1976), p. 37. K. R. Peterson, T. W. Crawford, and L. A. Lawson, CPS: A Continuous- Point-Source Computer Code for Plume Dispersion and Deposition Calculations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Liver- more, CA, UCRL-52049 (1976). D. H. Slade, Ed., Meteorology and Atomic Energy (U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1968). G. A. Welford, I. M. Fisenne, and C. Sanderson, Summary Report of the Department of Energy, Division of Operational and Environmental Safety — Quality Assurance Programs 9 through 12, Environmental Measurements Laboratory, New York, NY, EML-369 (February 1, 1980). CJT/jp 2A-25 APPENDIX A. TABLES The statistical values (2a estimates) that accompany individual measurements of radioactivity in the following tables are the result of counting statistics. The minimum detection limit is assumed reached when the 2a estimate is ±100%. Statistical values for groups of data like annual averages are calculated standard deviations of the mean (average). Standard deviations of the mean are reported at the 95% confidence level. Valley TABLE I. Gross alpha activity on air filters — LLNL perimeter and Livermore Valley. 10 -»v Ci/ml % SDM b Location 8 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average % CG C Perimeter 01 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.6 1.7 0.7 57 3.5 02 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.5 1.0 2.0 0.8 63 4.0 12 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.3 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.7 3.3 0.8 100 4.0 13 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.6 67 3.0 14 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 2.9 0.8 88 4.0 15 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.9 0.7 57 3.5 03 0.8 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.9 0.9 37 4.0 04 1.4 1.3 3.1 1.7 0.9 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.4 50 7.0 05 1.6 0.8 1.6 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 36 5.0 06 2.0 — 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.1 41 5.5 07 1.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.8 0.9 35 4.5 08 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.6 1.0 26 5.0 09 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.2 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.0 32 5.0 10 — 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.9 0.6 33 3.0 11 1.2 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.7 1.1 25 5.5 16 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.6 0.8 78 4.0 17 1.9 1.1 1.8 1.6 28 8.0 Annual average 0.9 29 4.5 See Figs. 4 and 5 for sampling locations. % SDM = % standard deviation of mean at la. Concentration guide (CG) = 2.0 X I0~ 14 /iCi/ml. 2A-26 TABLE 2. Gross beta activity on air filters— LLNL perimeter and Livermore Valley. 10 '•V i/ml % SI)M location" Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average % CG fc Perimeter 01 1.8 1.8 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 1.6 5.8 10.2 2.4 117 2.4 02 2.3 2.6 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.4 1.6 3.0 7.4 11.9 3.0 110 3.0 12 2.0 2.2 0.8 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.2 2.9 7.1 11.1 2.6 123 2.6 13 1.8 1.7 0.8 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 2.4 5.2 10.2 2.3 122 2.3 14 2.3 2.6 0.9 1.2 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.7 7.0 20.5 3.6 156 3.6 15 1.7 1.8 0.8 1.2 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.2 2.2 7.0 9.9 2.5 116 2.5 Valley 03 3.1 2.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 1.9 2.1 1.9 2.1 3.0 6.0 8.2 2.9 73 2.9 04 6.0 4.9 2.2 3.0 1.9 0.8 1.2 1.1 2.0 5.4 6.1 11.5 3.8 81 3.8 05 4.0 3.0 2.3 2.6 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.5 1.6 2.2 3.9 4.9 2.7 38 2.7 06 4.6 — 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 1.8 2.2 1.9 3.0 5.7 9.5 3.4 70 3.4 07 3.4 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.0 5.4 12.6 3.5 86 3.5 08 3.2 3.8 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.1 2.1 2.2 3.0 5.6 9.2 3.3 65 3.3 09 2.0 3.4 2.2 2.6 2.5 2.0 2.6 2.6 2.5 3.7 7.7 10.7 3.7 73 3.7 10 — 1.0 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.0 3.9 6.4 1.4 133 1.4 11 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 4.1 8.1 11.2 3.9 73 3.9 16 2.9 2.3 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.6 1.1 1.6 1.4 1.9 4.0 8.2 2.2 94 2.2 Annual average 3.0 24 3.0 a See Figs. 4 and 5 for sampling locations b CG = 1.0 X 10" 12 MCi/ml. 2A-27 TABLE 3. Gross alpha activity on air filters— Site 300. 10 15 (iCi/m\ % SDM Location 8 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average % CG b 01 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.6 — 1.3 1.3 0.8 38 4.0 02 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 17 3.0 03 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.7 29 3.5 04 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.7 29 3.5 05 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.5 4.5 1.1 100 5.5 06 — — — 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.7 2.2 — 1.7 2.6 3.0 1.6 56 8.0 07 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.7 29 3.5 08 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 14 3.7 09 0.5 0.6 2.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.9 67 4.5 10 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.2 0.8 38 4.0 11 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.7 1.6 0.8 38 4.0 Annual average 0.9 33 4.5 a See Fig. 6 for sampling locations b CG = 2.0 X I0 14 M Ci/ml. TABLE 4. Gross beta activity on air filters— Site 300. 10 -14 Ci/ml % SDM Location 8 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average % CG b 01 1.8 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 2.4 1.8 — 4.5 12.1 2.8 114 2.8 02 1.8 2.3 1.3 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 2.1 1.7 3.1 5.5 12.1 3.0 103 3.0 03 1.9 2.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.3 2.7 2.0 2.7 7.5 10.6 3.0 100 3.0 04 1.9 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.6 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.4 2.7 6.3 10.5 2.7 107 2.7 05 1.5 2.5 1.0 0.9 1.5 1.0 1.3 1.9 1.7 3.2 8.6 28.3 4.5 173 4.5 06 — — — 1.3 1.4 0.8 1.0 1.7 — 5.4 7.7 20.1 4.9 135 4.9 07 1.5 1.8 0.9 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.6 2.2 1.7 2.1 6.9 9.3 2.7 96 2.7 08 1.7 1.9 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.7 2.0 1.7 2.3 5.8 9.5 2.6 100 2.6 09 1.4 2.0 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.5 2.9 1.9 3.8 9.7 15.5 3.7 119 3.7 10 1.5 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.1 2.0 2.8 2.1 2.6 10.1 12.0 3.4 106 3.4 II 1.9 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.3 2.7 1.9 2.2 6.1 12.8 3.0 113 3.0 Annual avers ige 3.3 23 3.3 See Fig. 6 for sampling locations. b CG = 1.0 x It) 12 pCI/ml. 2A-28 TABLE 5. Gamma activity on air filters— LLNL perimeter. Month Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 10~ L %Ci/ml ± 2 5.7 ± 5 5.8 ± 6 3.9 ± X 4.6 ± 4 2.9 ± 9 2.1 ± II 1.7 ± II 1.9 ± 20 4.1 ± 12 3.5 X 10 16 40 5.0 X 10 7.0 X 10" 10 144 (e 3.8 ± 20 6.0 ± 23 5.1 ± 33 7.4 ± 14 6.5 ± 26 3.9 ± 34 5.0 ± 12 2.5 ± 31 2.0 ± 55 1.7 ± 45 16. ± 21 75. ± 100 11.2 X 10 16 182 2.0 X 10 5.6 X 10" 4 -10 TABLE 6. Gamma activity on air filters— Site 300. 10" 13 MCi/ml±2ff(%) 10" 16 MCi/ml ± la(%) Month 7 Be 40 K 106 Ru 125 Sb 137 Cs 144 Ce Jan. 0.8 ± 2 3.1 ± 33 4.5 ± 20 1.0 ± 24 2.2 ± 7 3.9 ± 16 Feb. 0.8 ± 2 3.9 ± 22 5.5 ± 27 1.2 ± 20 3.1 ± 7 0.5 ± 11 Mar. 0.9 ± 2 3.8 ± 23 6.6 ± 24 2.0 ± 11 4.2 ± 4 7.8 ± 18 Apr. 1.1 ± 2 0.9 ± 100 10. ± 32 2.9 ± 12 6.0 ± 5 8.5 ± 12 May 1.0 ± 2 0.9 ± 100 9.4 ± 13 2.8 ± 22 6.9 ± 5 8.4 ± 34 June 0.7 ± 2 0.3 ± 100 0.5 ± 100 1.5 ± 65 5.3 ± 5 7.5 ± 27 July 1.1 ± 2 4.8 ± 46 7.5 ± 13 2.0 ± 17 6.6 ± 3 7.8 ± 20 Aug. 1.5 ± 2 5:8 ± 54 5.9 ± 17 2.1 ± 18 6.3 ± 4 6.8 ± 16 Sept. 1.2 ± 3 3.7 ± 57 3.5 ± 32 1.1 ± 26 3.2 ± 5 2.5 ± 18 Oct. 1.3 ± 3 4.4 ± 63 2.2 ± 27 0.9 ± 34 2.0 ± 7 1.9 ± 26 Nov. 0.9 ± 2 6.5 ± 40 6.7 ± 23 0.6 ± 154 1.8 ± 12 13. ± 30 Dec. 1.2 ± 2 2.4 ± 106 35. ± 9 3.3 ± 28 4.9 ± 9 86. ± 5 Annual average 1.0 X 10~ 13 3.4 X 10" 16 8.1 X 10" 16 1.8 X 10" 16 4.4 X 10" 16 12.9 X 10" 16 % SDM 23 58 110 49 43 181 CG 4.0 X 10~ 8 4.0 X 10" 9 2.0 X 10" 10 9.0 X 10" 10 5.0 X 10" 10 2.0 X 10" 10 % CG 2.5 X 10" 4 8.5 X 10" 6 4.1 X 10" 4 2.0 X 10" 5 8.8 X 10 -5 6.5 X 10~ 4 2A-29 — _ I e o r- - - CQ < X X S» 37 Cs 239 pu/ .37 Cs 235.J 238,, 235 IV 238 L Jan. 0.8 ± 4 3 0.3 ± 2 2.7 2.3 ± 3 8.6 ± 2 2.8 Feb. 2.3 ± 3 3 0.4 ± 2 5.8 11.6 ± 4 55.6 ± 4 2.1 Mar. 1.8 ± 4 3 0.5 ± 2 3.6 1.7 ± 1 4.7 ± 1 3.6 Apr. 1.0 ± 6 4 0.6 ± 1 1.7 3.2 ± 1 6.7 ± 2 4.9 May 1.3 ± 4 2 0.9 ± 2 1.4 3.2 ± 1 6.5 ± 1 5.1 June 1.4 ± 5 3 0.7 ± 1 2.0 4.4 ± 1 7.6 ± 1 5.9 July 1.3 ± 7 4 0.6 ± 2 2.2 4.0 ± 4 6.4 ± 4 6.4 Aug. 1.0 ± 8 4 0.5 ± 2 2.0 7.6 ± 1 15.2 ± 2 5.1 Sept. 0.5 ± 8 3 0.3 ± 2 1.7 5.9 ± 3 9.4 ± 3 6.4 Oct. 0.4 ± 11 4 0.2 ± 5 2.0 6.9 ± 3 13.2 ± 3 5.2 Nov. 0.5 ± 8 4 0.2 ± 3 2.5 5.6 ± 12 8.4 ± 11 6.7 Dec. 0.8 ± 8 3 0.5 ± 3 1.6 3.4 ± 3 10.1 ± 2 3.4 Annual average 1.1 X 10" 17 0.5 X 10" 15 5.0 X 10" 7 12.7 X 10" 5 % SDM 56 44 55 109 CG 6.0 X 10~ 14 5.0 X 10" 10 1.9 15 % CG 1.8 X 10 -2 1.0 X 10" 4 2.6 X 10" 5 8.5 X 10" 4 TABLE 10. Tritium (HTO) in air— LLNL perimeter and Livermore Valley. Calculated 10 -11 MCi/ml %SDM % CG b adult whole body dose, mrem Location" Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Average Perimeter 01 4.2 1.7 2.5 2.8 2.4 1.6 2.7 — 1.6 2.3 3.5 4.2 2.7 35 1.4 X lO" 2 3.6 X 10" 2 02 3.8 3.8 3.0 3.1 1.5 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.9 12.7 11.5 11.0 4.7 94 2.4 X 10" 2 6.1 X 10" 2 12 5.9 4.6 4.3 5.9 3.6 2.4 5.6 7.5 4.6 8.9 6.8 6.3 5.5 32 2.8 X 10" 2 7.1 X 10" 2 13 3.5 2.2 3.1 2.1 2.3 1.0 0.7 1.3 1.4 3.7 4.5 4.5 2.5 52 1.3 X lO" 2 3.3 X 10" 2 14 4.3 2.5 3.1 5.9 4.9 4.3 8.5 6.7 5.2 3.3 3.7 3.9 4.7 36 2.4 X 10" 2 6.1 X 10" 2 15 6.1 3.0 2.9 4.1 3.2 3.4 4.9 ~3.3 2.3 2.3 2.4 3.4 3.4 33 1.7 X lO" 2 4.3 X 10~ 2 Valley lO" 2 3.0 X 10" 2 SI 2.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.8 1.9 4.8 4.6 2.4 47 1.2 X S2 2.8 2.6 1.6 — 1.2 0.9 1.7 0.5 0.8 3.3 2.5 2.5 1.9 51 1.0 X lO" 2 2.5 X 10" 2 "See Figs. 4 and 5 for sampling locations. b CG = 2.0 X 10~ 7 MCi/ml for tritium (HTO) in air. c Doses are calculated using the methods in U.S. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 unless otherwise stated. 2A-33 TABLE 11. Various radionuclides in soil — Livermore Valley. Sampling depth, cm MCi/dry g ± 2 /g/drv g i lo(%) 238 1.2 ± 63 0.7 ± 28 1.3 ± 22 0.04 ± 64 1.5 ± 16 1.8 ± 24 1.4 ± 35 73. ± 6 1.9 ± 14 1.4 ± 48 4.8 ± 4 1.7 ± 23 *Replicate of 805. TABLE 13. Various radionuclides in effluents— LLNL and Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. Month 10~ 6 /uCi/ml ± 2<7(%) HTO LLNL Jan. 12.0 ± 49 Feb. 4.7 ± 59 Mar. 2.2 ± 72 Apr. 31.8 ± 20 May 6.1 ± 44 June 5.8 ± 64 July 42.1 ± 39 Aug. 53.8 ± 24 Sept. 23.2 ± 40 Oct. 101. ± 20 Nov. 4.8 ± 50 Dec. 5.3 ± 41 Annual average 24.4 X 10" 6 % SDM 121 CG 0.1 % CG 2.4 X 10 2 LWRP 3.9 ± 70 1.0 ± 61 5.9 ± 25 21.2 ± 18 1.7 ± 62 0.7 ± 62 3.82 ± 30 3.7 ± 42 1.7 ± 51 4.2 ± 50 4.9 ± 50 1.1 ± 74 4.5 X 10 -6 123 3.0 X 10" 3 15 X 10" 2 10"' ' MCi/ml ± 2a(% 137 Cs LLNL 40.7 ± 7 66. ± 5 30. ± 9 76.9 ± 4 20. ± 11 91. ± 4 67.6 ± 5 65.7 ± 5 123. ± 3 253. ± 3 26.1 ± 8 29. ± 8 74.0 X 10 II 86 4.0 X 10" 1.9 X 10" LWRP 5.3 ± 26 4.5 ± 36 5.6 ± 30 4.9 ± 39 5.6 ± 42 4.3 ± 36 4.0 ± 37 5.2 ± 30 4.2 ± 42 7.2 ± 39 5.6 ± 46 20. ± II 6.4 X10 69 2.0 X 10" 3.2 X 10" -II 10" 12 MCi/ml ± 2a(%) 239 Pu LLNL 250 ± 4 217 ± 6 139 ± 6 700 ± 4 74 ± 4 2.3 ± 46 1.3 ± 46 376 ± 8 93 ± 8 6470 ± 6 1010 ± 7 1810 ± 7 929 X 10 196 1.0 X 10" 9.3 X 10" 12 LWRP 1.3 ± 30 1.4 ± 34 1.4 ± 34 1.1 ± 24 1.2 ± 30 1.2 ± 22 1.5 ± 58 2.8 ± 38 0.2 ± 124 1.1 ± 62 1.7 ± 46 1.4 ± 34 1.4 X 10 12 43 5.0 X 10" 2.8 X 10" 2A-35 TABLE 14. Gross alpha activity in water — Livermore Valley. Location 8 Number \0~ y MCi/ml of samples Maximum Minimum Average % SDM % CG 1 4 <3.3 <2.6 «2.9 10 <10 4 <2.4 <1.8 <2.1 13 <7 3 15.0 ± 16.7 2.6 ± 2.4 <7.3 91 <24 3 <3.4 <2.4 <2.8 18 <9 7 <2.5 <0.9 «1.8 32 <6 4 <3.8 <2.9 <3.4 11 u Soil 1 2 0.510 0.950 0.563 0.900 0.529 0.984 0.91 1.06 0.96 0.97 3 H Water 1 2 0.946 0.132 1.03 0.149 1.04 0.147 0.92 0.89 0.91 0.90 239 pu Water 0.410 0.577 0.417 0.71 0.98 238 pu Water 0.680 0.830 0.689 0.82 0.99 Non-radioactive elements 0.600 0.600 0.564 1.00 Co Air 1.06 Zn Air 0.605 0.600 0.611 1.01 0.99 MS Air 0.263 0.240 0.255 1.09 1.03 (u Water 0.120 0.120 0.123 1.00 0.98 Zn Water 0.120 0.120 0.122 1.00 0.98 Mg Water 0.210 0.200 0.199 1.05 1.06 "All of the values shown are relative; i.e., the exponents are not included, and therefore do not indicate total activity or concentration levels. b Sampling frequency decreased from quarterly to semiannually during 1980. ^Analytical results for second set of non-radioactive elements were lost. 2A-46 APPENDIX B. ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITY CONCENTRATION— GUIDE LEVELS The standards for Radiation Protection (ERDA Manual Chapter 0524, issued March 3, 1977) state that the average activity of a mixture of radionuclides (whose identities and concentrations are unknown) in air and water should not exceed the following values: 1. Air (controlled area) 2. Air (uncontrolled area) 3. Water (controlled area) 4. Water (uncontrolled area) 6X IO- |2 M Ci/ml 2X 10- |4 M Ci/ml 4X 10- 7 M Ci/ml 3X lQ- 8 M Ci/ml If alpha emitters and 227 Ac are definitely not present, the following values may be used to determine permissible average activity: 5. Air (controlled area) 6. Air (uncontrolled area) 3X 10- n MCi/ml 1 X lCH 2 MCi/ml If ,29 I, 226 Ra, and 228 Ra are definitely not present, the following values may be used: 7. Water (controlled area) 3X 10- 6 MCi/ml 8. Water (uncontrolled area) 1 X 10- 7 /uCi/ml Both air and water samples are subjected to gross alpha and gross beta measurements. The average annual alpha activities of samples may not exceed the activity values listed as 1-4 above. Since the alpha emit- ters have been accounted for in the gross alpha measurements and the assumption is made that l29 I, 227 Ac, 226 Ra, and 228 Ra are not present in the samples, the average annual gross beta activities of the samples may not exceed the activities listed as 5-8 above. The assumption that l29 I, 227 Ac, 226 Ra, and 228 Ra are not present in air and water samples is reasonable in view of the minute quantities of these radionuclides available at the Laboratory. Chapter 0524 of the ERDA Manual also states that average tritium activities in off-site water samples may not exceed 3 X 10~ 3 /uCi/ml. The external whole-body radiation dose to workers in controlled areas may not exceed 5 rem/y, and the dose to an individual in an uncontrolled area may not exceed 500 mrem/y. Also, a group of individuals in an uncontrolled area may not receive an average annual dose of more than 170 mrem. 2A-47 APPENDIX C. METHOD OF DOSE CALCULATIONS The doses shown in this report have been calculated using the models and methods in the Nuclear Regu- latory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.109, "Calculating Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluent." Examples of these calculations and assumptions are shown in this appendix. ANNUAL DOSE FROM POTABLE WATER Assuming that all water sampled is available as drinking water, the annual whole body dose for tritium has been calculated using the following equation: ^totalbody ^w^w^w (1) where C w = concentration in pCi/1, U w = intake rate, 1/yr, = 730 1/yr for maximum exposed individual, D w = dose factor, mrem/pCi, = 1 .05 X 10~ 7 mrem/pCi for the whole body ingestion pathway for an adult. R totalbody = annual dose in mrem to the total body from ingestion of 730 litres of potable water with concentration C w . ANNUAL DOSE FROM FORAGE -COW -MILK PATHWAY FOR TRITIUM IN VEGETATION Assuming that all the feed for the cattle was pasture grass, the annual whole body dose per juCi/ml HTO for the maximum exposed individual has been calculated using the following equation: Dtotalbody ~ ^veg + ^meat + ^milk D veg (leafy vegetables) - U veg X C veg X D HT0 (2) (2a) where U veg -veg intake rate, kg/yr, = 64 kg/yr, for maximum exposed individual, pCi/kg = concentration in pCi/kg - X C VPl , uCi/ml (measured), /iCi/ml 8 D HTO dose factor, mrem/pCi = 1 .05 X 10 -17 mrem/pCi for 3 H for the adult whole body ingestion pathway. 2A-48 D meat U meat X ^meat X ^HIO (2b) where meal HTO meat = NO kg/yr, = 1.05 X 10" 7 mrem/pCi, ^ (Ff)(Qt)(Cveg)«P(-Vs). F, •■ fraction of daily intake of nuclide per kg of animal/ fish, days/kg, 0,' = amount of feed consumed, kg/day, meat - kg / \ day/ V juCi/ml/ X exp[-4.5X 10-3(20)] , = 1 .8 X 10 9 i^i J juCi/ml veg ;uCi ~mT (measured) , veg same as above Xj - radiological decay constant, day -1 , t s = time between slaughter to consumption, days. 1) milk " Umilk X C mi|k X D HTO (2c) where Umiik = 3101/yr, d hto = 1-05 X 10~ 7 mrem/pCi, C milk = F m^f C veg ex P(-^t0, F m = fraction of daily intake of nuclide per litre of milk, day/litre) , Q t = amount of feed consumed, kg/day , C ve = same as above, Xj = radiological decay constant, days -1 , transport time from the feed to milk receptor , kg\ A o pCi/kg C milk )-2^ ^ 3X10 9 juCi/ml X exp [-4.5 X 103(2)1 = 1 .5 X 10 9 J*^- X C ve , ^ (measured] juCi/ml *~ ml D total = 2.04 X 104 ^ re ^ Ueg + (2.07X104 juCi/ml/ mrem £ at ■*- o (J — 2B-5 acquired whenever possible. A site reference library of this work will be established and maintained at LLNL. Re-evaluation and re-interpretation of available original data are being conducted and will be reported on at the conclusion of Phase I. Additionally, existing hydrogeologic information compiled by the Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Zone 7 will be gathered and evaluated (e.g., driller's logs, well-monitoring records, and hydrographs) . Local private wells, in addition to county observation wells, will be considered. Wells involved with the Hazards Control Water Quality Monitoring Program will receive special attention to enable further interpretation of later LLNL well-monitoring results. Evaluation will result in the construction of geologic cross-sections and potentiometric surface maps in areas of concern. TasK 2: Initial Data Collection Relating to Surface Rupture Potential A first priority in the site survey is the determination of the possible hazard due to surface rupture on the Laboratory site. Therefore, the first stage of surface geological and geophysical exploration will be investigation of faults which prior researchers have postulated and/or extrapolated onto the LLNL site. Surface and near-surface geologic investigations will include trenching of projected traces of the Las Positas, the Corral Hollow, the Doutherty, and Tesla faults. Geophysical investigations will include the evaluation of a possible intersection of Las Positas and Tesla faults using resistivity, self-potential (SP) , small-scale-seismic refraction, and magnetic methods. This Task will also include the completion and joint interpretations of LLNL and prior investigators' magnetic data, and the evaluation of the diagnostic capability of various geophysical tools for on-site faults and for regional mapping. Upon completion of this work, a report will be prepared. Task 3: Development of Seismological Database Tnis task requires the establishment of a seismic observatory capable of accurate, rapid location and analysis of earthquakes within 20-30 km of LLNL. During Phase I we are installing 3-component seismic stations in the Livermore Valley and augmenting this with data from nearby U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) single-component stations. Initially, 7 stations are being installed by the USGS under contract to LLNL. In exchange for access to data from these stations, the USGS will provide LLNL with telemetered links to 12 of their nearby stations. Both sets of telemetered data (LLNL and USGS) will 2B-6 be digitized in real time, and seismic events will be recorded directly onto digital tapes allowing for sophisticated post-event processing. Combining the data from both LLNL and USGS stations with the digital analysis capabilities of the seismic monitoring group will allow us to determine the locations and mechanisms of local earthquakes with significantly higher accuracy than has heretofore been obtained. Location accuracy in critical areas should be on the order of +0.5 km as opposed to + 2-5 km before the establishment of the observatory. This will allow us to assign the activity to specific fault traces and thus delineate them and determine their status. Following the installation of all stations, a number of high-explosive calibration shots will be conducted to determine the time corrections for each station. The execution of the calibration shots will be handled by the USGS under contract to LLNL. These calibration results will be applied to Task 8, relocation of USGS-determined epicenters for the time period 1969 to the present. Task 4: Regional Investigations Upon completion of initial on-site geological and geophysical investigations, field work will be extended to include interpretation of remote-sensing and aerial photo imagery, field reconnaissance, and analysis of existing geophysical data on a regional scale. The existing geodetic data will be evaluated and extended to help determine strain rates in the local area. Another major element of these investigations will be establishing age relationships of the Quaternary units. This work will be limited to the areas that are necessary to characterize the geologic hazards to LLNL operations and will be coordinated with the initial analyses of the seismic data. Studies necessary to accomplish these tasks are: (1) Detailed field mapping will be carried out in areas south and east of the laboratory where relatively good control of the locations of the Greenville, Carnegie, Tesla, Las Positas, Corral Hollow, and other faults can be obtained. Mapping will include documentation of outcrop locations, structural information, and inferences based upon remote sensing and aerial photo imagery. Preliminary fault locations will be determined based upon these data. (2) Existing geophysical data will be compiled and analyzed to evaluate the potential of various geophysical methods for identifying fault locations. Pertinent methods will be employed to extend fault locations defined in 1, beneath the valley alluvium. (3) Other available regional data, including drilling data and hydrologic data, will be incorporated with 1 and 2 to help formulate the regional tectonic characterization. 2B-7 (4) Data acquired in i, 2, and 3 will be compared with seismic evidence to identify locations of active faults. Task 5: On-Site Geologic Drilling The on-site drilling portion of the geological field investigations is an exploratory program and will be integrated with the drilling for the site hydrogeological investigations. The drilling program will seek possible marker horizons which might be used to trace subsurface structures across the Laboratory site and obtain geotechnical data bearing on the potential for ground failure at LLNL during a major earthquake. Task 6: Hydrogeologic Data Assembly and Evaluation An important part of the task is the determination of a hazardous spill potential from the evaluation of data on (1) credible accident estimates, (2) annual environmental monitoring at LLNL, (3) actual release occurrences, (4) past, present, and future locations of contaminated waste-holding tanks, pipelines, and transportation routes, and (5) chemical and radiochemical characteristics of liquid wastes and experimental materials. The data, to be obtained from the Hazards Control Department, should establish the possible locations, estimated volumes, times of release, and chemical makeup of potential contaminating liquid spills. In addition, hydrologic characteristics of local soils, including ion-retardation factors and solute-migration characteristics for radionuclides or contaminants, will be reviewed. Locations of natural, enhanced (arroyo or storm sewer), and retarded (paved or otherwise protected) recharge areas will be determined. Task 7: Site Hydrogeologic Drilling Program In conjunction with Task 5, on-site geologic drilling, wells will be completed on site to a depth of about 25 feet below the water table (estimated to be between 55 and 90 feet). Drilling locations will be selected to represent enhanced as well as natural recharge areas. Locations will also reflect probable spill sites determined as outlined in Task 6. At appropriate intervals samples will be taken for subsequent testing, stratigraphic control, and soil moisture and tritium analyses. Geophysical logs of the wells will complement stratigraphic analysis. Hydraulic head fluctuations in selected wells will be monitored for several years. Water table configurations will be drawn from resulting data. 2B-8 To investigate the saturated zone one or more water wells, approximately 300 feet deep, will be completed on site and tested to determine the effective porosity, hydraulic conductivity, and dispersivity . Water-quality monitoring of these wells will be added to the study of the shallower wells. All water-quality monitoring will eventually be incorporated into Hazard Control's continuing environmental monitoring program. Due to the time necessary for these measurements, this task will continue beyond Phase I. If it is determined that movement of contaminants to the saturated zone is likely, a simulation of contaminant transport would be undertaken. Task 8: Preliminary Seismotectonic Model By the end of Phase I, a preliminary velocity structure for the Valley will be determined, daily seismicity will be recorded and located using this model, and a preliminary seismicity map will be prepared for the period 1969 to the present. Focal mechanisms will be determined for selected events and will be combined with preliminary results of the regional field investigations to produce a preliminary seismotectonic model. Task 9; Strong Motion Instrumentation Phase I will also include the planning, procurement, and installation of equipment for a strong-motion accelerograph network. This accelerograph network is intended to augment the seismic network to provide site-specific free-field and building acceleration response information that can be used in engineering studies. The proposed system is a digital recording system with a "pre-event memory" to provide complete acceleration records that include the first arrivals. The combination of such acceleration records with information on seismic activity from the Seismic Network should provide as complete a basis as is possible for predicting future ground motion at the LLNL site. Task 10: Classification of Fault Activity To complete Phase I, all features that have been identified as being tectonic faults must also be classified according to their degree of potential activity. This classification is only intended to provide guidelines for setting priorities for further studies in Phase II. For the purposes of setting Phase II priorities, we have defined three activity classes for faults. In Phase II, faults in the different classes will require different levels of field investigation as input for the complete characterization of potentially damaging earthquakes. The 2B-9 three classes are active, indeterminate, and inactive. The indeterminate classification is further divided into potentially active and uncertain activity subclassif ications. The activity classifications, their definitions, and projected further studies for Phase II are outlined in Table 2. Two criteria dominate the classification scheme. For rupture, only faults crossing the site need detailed study; for shaking, only the most hazardous faults or fault zones need be investigated in detail. Figure 1 outlines a decision tree for determining whether or not a feature requires further study in the assessment of ground-shaking potential; and, if so, what observables are needed. This tree is based on the classifications and criteria in Table 2. Task 11: Phase II Program Plan During the completion of Phase I studies for each of the tasks, a program plan will be developed for Phase II. This plan will outline the specific investigative tasks needed for characterization of the faults classified in Task 10. Task 12: Independent and Peer Review During the completion of each of the above tasks, informal independent review will be obtained by conducting the work in an open manner and inviting qualified representatives of local, state, and federal agencies to inspect field sites such as exploratory trenches. Formal peer review is provided for by contractual arrangement with Woodward-Clyde Consultants (WCC) . In addition to inspection of field sites, WCC will formally review all LLNL Phase I studies and document these inspections and reviews. In order to establish an additional independent review, WCC will prepare a list of possible members of a broad-based independent review panel. This list will be submitted by WCC to the California State Seismic Safety Commission (CSSSC) . The CSSSC will be requested to make additions and deletions and return to WCC a list of approved independent reviewers. 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V * 0>« « « O'O «- >■ 3 — UOU >- C L l c «(fc*U XC w - d l n uogo o ; — ** * * w C -i C * O fe; c: . w 4. — < 3 % 2B-11 1 o «2 -c 3 Ol ro C 1- c < o E O 0) O) re O .c O ■ ~ en o o Q ? o c > n Q u TJ 0) IM 0) a> *-* o 6 re re re .c +-» u re c >- Ol *-» c a> 0) Q u £ 3 u 3 en >■ ai a re *-" *j c O ,- o -a + a -o Z re "O II >- c re z u> (li re > U o re o re ■♦-» 0) re -1 T) r-. c c > o c a. re £ »♦- c *-■ VI v> 0) >■ o 1 2» 8 SL r- c re Ol Q IA % J V 5 *. o o j* Si TJ 3 O £ n 0) -Q Ol re .c re c * 3 8 — <-• 3 re >-— 0) ■ -••3 c 3 CD c here efc and S3 o o re •* n re w fll | .£ A 0) I „ U re o "O o 2B-12 PHASE II: HAZARD CHARACTERIZATION AND PARAMETERIZATION Deliverables Phase II is intended to supplement Phase I data as needed to determine the seismic hazard exposure at the LLNL site. The products of this Phase are the final data base and analyses needed for the characterization of potential ground failure and rupture, and the characterization of potential ground shaking as a function of earthquake magnitude on the most significant faults. Each of these characterizations proceeds from a set of observable quantities or directly inferred characteristics (such as fault length or recurrence rate) through a characterization methodology to the final parameterization of the hazard. These procedures are outlined below. Task 1: Characterization of Potential Ground Rupture The characterization of potential ground rupture involves investigations which are confined to an area on the LLNL site or very nearby. This is the area in which the occurrence of such an event could affect LLNL facilities either as a result of ground displacement or permanent changes in ground level. The methodology is outlined below. Observables: Geomorphic features associated with active faults; e.g., disrupted drainages; enclosed depressions; spring lines; mole tracks; "lineaments"; disruption of young strata as revealed by trenching, mapping, or geophysical surveys; historic surface faulting or creep; associated seismicity; changes in geodetic measurements. Seismic Source: Amount and sense of movement. Characterization of Possible Potential Ground Rupture: Locations of possible rupture, offsets, recurrence intervals. Although in favorable circumstances it may be possible to estimate recurrence intervals for a given fault segment, success cannot be assumed. Therefore, probabilities will most likely only be determined in general terms, such as high, moderate, or low. 2B-13 Scope of Work . At the end of Phase I, mapped faults will have been classified according to their probable activity and will have been prioritized for further study under this task. Any faults identified in Phase I that cross the site will be evaluated in more detail by the examination of young geologic strata for evidence of faulting. This examination may include additional trenching, drilling, surface mapping, or geophysical surveys. T ask 2: Characterization of Ground Shaking The flow chart in Fig. 1 highlights the methodology used in characterizing strong ground shaking at the site. Observables: Some or all of the following: time and size of last motion, recurrence rate, slip rate, fault length, seismicity, location. Seismic Source: Magnitude, moment, radiation pattern. Path Effects/Site Response: Soil damping, attenuation. Characterization of Ground Shaking: Amplitude, duration, frequency content. Scope of Work . The input needed for the characterization of the DBE depends upon the choice of tne specific methodology used to assess the earthquake ground-motron parameters. The parameters that are generally construed to be of engineering significance include peak values of ground motion (acceleration, velocity or displacement), spectral content, and duration of strong ground shaking. However, it is generally agreed that earthquake ground motion parameters are affected by source factors, path effects and local conditions as outlined above. Thus, the observables are, in the main, similar for all methodologies. To evaluate the characterization of the DBE, we will initially use a deterministic, empirical attenuation approach, which is suitably site-specific. Determination of empirical attenuation approaches involve the estimation of the maximum credible earthquake via the use of observed rupture-length (L max ) versus Magnitude (M) relations. The ground motion at the site is then determined using the maximum magnitude (M^) , the distance (R) of the causative fault, and typical observed attenuation relations which estimate peak ground motion values depending on M max and R. For conservatism, the maximum credible ground motion is taken to be the mean value of this 2B-14 relation plus one standard deviation. This approach has been the traditional means of determining DBE's and is the approach reported on in the EIS. This approach will be used for consistency, both to assess the relative significance of sources and as an element of the final design process. However, new "near-source" observations have prompted a rapid evolution in the state of the art with respect to estimating strong-ground-motion parameters. Considerable controversy surrounds the determination of L and its relation to M . Probablistic analyses of both the probable source max max characteristics and the probable ground motions are gaining wider acceptance, and will be incorporated into the determination of the DBE. The completion of Phase II will require both empirical and computational estimates of the strong-motion parameters of the DBE. PHASE III: SEISMIC HAZARD EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT Deliverables The deliverables for the final seismic hazard exposure assessment will be: (1) report on assessment of surface rupture and ground failure potential on site, (2) report on assessment of DBE parameters, (3) report on assessment of seismic exposure, and (4) geologic, seismologic and hydrogeologic reports. Scope of Work Phase II is essentially an interactive process and may require the acquisition of data beyond that developed during Phase I. When the characterization is deemed sufficient, the hazard assessments can be made. Phase III will consist of the completion and documentation of these final assessments, the final review, and the preparation of the reports. Surface Rupture Potential The evaluation of surface rupture potential will be reported on in Phase III. This evaluation will be assessed by the review panel and their critique will be included in the final project report. An initial assessment of existing geotechnical data for alluvial deposits underlying LLNL indicates that the ground-failure potential is low to negligible. However, the final program report will include an assessment of the potential for liquefaction and related ground failures at LLNL based on criteria such as those developed by the USGS. With the exceptions of landscaping areas, the banks of open drainage ditches, and the Arroyo Seco stream channel, slopes within the LLNL site do not exceed 2B-15 three percent. Slope-stability problems have not been experienced at LLNL. The final program report will include a brief assessment of any potential hazard of on-site slope stability. Determination of Design-Basis Earthquake Parameters The final determination of the parameters describing the DBE will be reported on in Phase III. This determination will also be submitted to the review panel and their critique will be included in the final program report. Seismic Exposure Analysis Based on the parameters obtained, a Seismic Exposure Analysis will be undertaken and reported on in Phase III. Reviews Phase III will also include the final technical review by WCC of the overall program, and a comprehensive technical review of the program by the Independent Review Panel. The content of these reviews will be included in the final program report. Preparation and Publication of Reports Following the review procedures mentioned above, the pertinent results and interpretations of the SSSP will be published as a separate report. 2B-16 APPENDIX 2C SURFACE WATER HYDROLOGY 1. INTRODUCTION The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory occupies 2.6 km 2 at the eastern end of the Livermore Valley. The site slopes southeast to northwest from an elevation of 200 to 170 m MSL. Figure 1 shows the location of the Site, plus the topography and local natural drainage channels. 2. HYDROLOGIC DESCRIPTION Four water systems should be considered because of their potential hydrological effect on the Laboratory site. These are: (1) treated water, (2) storm water, (3) the South Bay aqueduct, and (4) the Del Valle Reservoir. 2.1. TREATED WATER The Zone 7 water treatment plant, which provides water for the City of Livermore, is located just east of the Laboratory. The 0.68-m pipeline (welded steel pipe) from the treatment plant crosses the northern boundary of the Laboratory and runs parallel to the Arroyo Las Positas on its way to Livermore. A 0.3-m water line has been tapped into the Zone 7 pipeline to provide an emergency water supply. The Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, which provides treated water for the City of San Francisco, is located approximately 11 km southwest of the Laboratory. LLNL receives all of its treated water from this source. Water is pumped from the aqueduct (elevation 110 m) to two steel holding tanks (elevation 373 m) that each have a storage capacity of 79.5 m 3 . Water from the storage tanks then flows 11 km down the Arroyo Mocho Canyon to storage tanks at the LLNL site. The first 9.6 km of pipeline are 0.25-m, class 250 cast iron pipe, while the last mile is 0.4-m ductile steel pipe. 2.2. STORM WATER Laboratory storm water is channeled through storm sewers and open ditches that are designed to accommodate a 10-yr flow. Open ditu.es are used in undeveloped areas of the Laboratory site. Most of 2C-1 Figure 1. DOE Livermore site topography. 2C-2 the storm water is directed north to the Arroyo Las Positas, with a very small percentage flowing to the southwest corner into Arroyo Seco. 2.3. SOUTH BAY AQUEDUCT The South Bay Aqueduct begins at the Bethany Reservoir near Byron, California. Water is pumped from Bethany Reservoir to an elevation of about 240 m MSL. From there, the water flows through the aqueduct by gravity to Santa Clara County through a series of pipelines and open canals. The aqueduct is an open channel as it crosses the eastern edge of the Livermore Valley at just about the 210-m contour line. Maximum flow in the aqueduct is 8.5 m /s with the average running 7.1 m /s . Siphons were used in crossing the major streams in the Valley, i.e., Arroyo Seco and Arroyo Mocho. Users of the South Bay Aqueduct include the Alameda County portion of Zone 7, Alameda County, and Santa Clara County. Zone 7 is the only user of the water in the Livermore Valley. The water is used to recharge groundwater by releasing it directly from the canal to the Altamont Creek, from v/here it flows into the Arroyo Las Positas. Groundwater recharging is also obtained by releasing water from the Del Valle Reservoir to the Arroyo Del Valle. Water is also used to supply the Zone 7 treatment plant located northeast of the Laboratory. 2.4. DEL VALLE RESERVOIR Del Valle Reservoir i -- located on the Arroyo Del Valle just above and southeast of the U.S. Veterans Administration Hospital, and is approximately 600 m upstream from the South Bay Aqueduct. The dam is an earthfill embankment rising 68 m above the stream bed. Total capacity of the reservoir 7 3 oehind the dam is approximately 9.5 x 10 m . The reservoir is a multipurpose facility providing water conservation, flood control, and recreation. Normally, Del Valle Reservoir has about 2.5 x 7 3 7 3 10 m of water in the winter and 4.9 x 10 m in the summer, leaving room for at least an 7 3 2 additional 4.6 x 10 m for flood control. Drainage area above the dam is about 381 km . Surface areas of the reservoir for two different volumes are: Volume Surface Area 7 3 9.5 x 10 m 7 3 4.9 x 10 m 4.3 km 2.9 km A 1.5-m pipeline carries water from the aqueduct to the pump house at the bottom of the dam. Water is then pumped into the reservoir and held until needed. Tunnels through the dam are used to release water for conservation and flood control. The conservation tunnel is also used to pump water into the 2C-3 reservoir. Five valves are located at varying elevations on the dam to release water. The flood control tunnel has two gates and a morning-glory spillway. 3. HYDROSPHERE Alameda Creek drains a portion of the coastal mountains, located on the eastern side of the 2 southern arm of the San Francisco Bay, for a total watershed area of 1800 km . The two main tributaries to Alameda Creek are Arroyo de la Laguna and Calaveras Creek which drain approximately 2 2 1100 Km and 260 km , respectively. The main drainage streams for the Livermore Valley are Arroyo del Valle, Arroyo Las Positas, Arroyo Mocho, Arroyo Seco, Cottonwood Creek, and Tassajara Creek. All streams flow west with the exception of Cottonwood and Tassajara Creeks, which drain the hills north of the Valley and flow south. Cottonwood Creek and Arroyo Seco converge with Arroyo Las Positas which flows into Arroyo Mocho at the western end of the Valley along with Tassajara Creek. Arroyo del Valle and Arroyo Mocho converge with Arroyo de la Laguna at the extreme western end of the Valley. Until recent geological times, all drainage from the Valley flowed north through San Ramon Valley to Suisun Bay. Now the drainage flows through Niles Canyon via Alameda Creek. All the arroyos and creeks in Livermore Valley are dry during most of the year and have water flow in them from October to April, which constitutes the typical rainy season. Arroyo del Valle and Arroyo Mocho have the largest drainage basins in the Valley and have caused more flooding than have other streams. Consequently, more data exists on these two streams than on others. However, since only Arroyo Las Positas and Arroyo Seco could directly affect the Laboratory, comments will be directed at these two arroyos. 3.1. ARROYO LAS POSITAS The Arroyo Las Positas watershed is in the northeastern and eastern hills above the Valley floor. The only part of this basin that directly affects the Laboratory is the hills directly to the 2 east. This basin is about 13 km in area and 5.6 km long. Several smaller streams converge in the hills and on the flood plain east of the Laboratory. All semblance of streams is lost until a channel is formed along the eastern and northern boundary of the Laboratory. In December 1971, the USGS installed a gauging station at the northwest corner of the Laboratory. This is the first to be installed on Arroyo Las Positas. 2C-4 3.2. ARROYO SECO The hills southwest of the Laboratory form the basin for the Arroyo Seco. This basin is about 41 km in area and 19 km long. The channel is well defined, and cuts across Sandia Laboratory just to the south of the Laboratory. Arroyo Seco then cuts across the southwest corner of the Laboratory on its way to Arroyo Las Positas. FLOODS 4.1. HISTORY Numerous floods have occurred on Alameda Creek since records of stream flow were started in the 1890s. Flood years with the associated peak discharges as measured on Alameda Creek near Niles are listed below. The flood of 1955 would have been the largest in recorded history, surpassing the flood of 1911, had not Calaveras Reservoir impounded all the flood water from Calaveras Creek. Date Peak Discharge m /s November - 1892 January - 1895 March - 1907 January - 1909 March - 1911 January - 1914 February - 1938 November - 1950 January - 1952 December - 1955 April - 1958 382 419 462 354 807 208 297 428 580 657 558 Since the floods of 1955 and 1958 were so completely documented by the Corps of Engineers, data on these two floods were used in developing much of the material for this section. During the 1955 and 1958 floods, damage in the Livermore-Amador Valley was mostly at the western end where the Arroyo de la Laguna went over its banks and caused extensive agricultural damage. Water depth in the flooded area was 0.3 to 1 m. Damage at the upper end of the Valley was due primarily to the Arroyo del 2C-5 Valle cutting into an existing road alongside the stream. The Corps of Engineers makes no mention in their documents of either the Arroyo Las Positas or Arroyo Seco leaving their banks. 4.2. FLOOD DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS Since the floods of the fifties, much of the Valley has changed from agriculture to residential. During this time, the stream channels have been enlarged to handle flood water at the lower end of the 7 3 Valley. A reservoir with a capacity of 9.5 x 10 m was built during the sixties to control flooding caused by the Arroyo del Valle in the western end of the Valley. Of the 9.5 x 10 m holding capacity, 4.6 x 10 m is for flood control. 4.3. FLOODING AT THE SITE Flooding of the Laboratory site could occur only if the Arroyo Las Positas and Arroyo Seco overflowed during a severe storm. For this study, this is assumed to be caused by the probable maximum precipitation for the two basins that is developed below. Actually, Arroyo Las Positas flow and overflow would have no effect on the Site, affecting only the eastern corner and northern portion of LLNL. However, assuming the Arroyo Seco left its banks south of the Laboratory during the postulated storm, this would give the overflow water an elevation of 189 to 198 m. The flooding would be a sheet flow moving north across the Laboratory, using the existing streets as channels. Water depth would not exceed 15 mm, and would flow fairly fast. This would last only until the peak of the storm had passed. Since there is about an 18-m drop from south to north across the Laboratory, the water would not pond until it met the Western Pacific Railroad bank, where it would then flow to the west. 5. PROBABLE MAXIMUM PRECIPITATION This section presents data and assumptions used in developing the probable maximum precipitation (PMP) for the Arroyo Las Positas and Arroyo Seco. The PMP for the Arroyo del Valle can be taken directly from data used by the Corps of Engineers in their study of Alameda Creek. This is found to be 0.612 m over a 72-h rainfall period for the area above the dam which has a drainage area of 386 2 km . The data were prepared by the Hydrometeorological Section of the U.S. Weather Bureau for the Corps of Engineers during 1957. 2C-6 5.1. PRECIPITATION STATION AND RECORDS There are two U.S. Weather Bureau precipitation stations in the vicinity of Livermore Valley. These include the one on Mt. Hamilton (Lick Observatory) and the one in the City of Livermore. Continuous records have been kept at these two sites since 1870 (Mt. Hamilton) and 1881 (Livermore). Rainfall extremes for the two areas vary from 1.47 m at Mt. Hamilton in 1883-1884 to 138 mm at Livermore during 1975-1976. 5.2. MAJOR STORMS The U.S. Weather Bureau indicates that for this area effective rainfall contribution to a flood during a storm occurs within a 72-h period. The three most severe storms on record listed in Table 1 illustrate the maximum rainfall that has occurred during approximate 72-h periods. 5.3. PROBABLE MAXIMUM STORM Probable maximum precipitation was developed for the Arroyo Las Positas and Arroyo Seco above the Laboratory using "Hydrometerological Report No. 36" which presents criteria for estimating PMP over basins above prospective flood control structures in the Pacific drainage of California. The PMP was prepared for orographic and restricted convergence storms separately and then combined for comparison with an unrestricted convergence storm. Because of the small area of the basins and small amount of rainfall resulting from the orographic storm, PMP was also prepared for an unrestricted convergence storm (see Tables 2 and 3 and Figs. 2 and 3). Snow melt would have no effect on PMP for this area. 6. FACTORS AFFECTING PRECIPITATION LOSS 6.1. ANTECEDENT PRECIPITATION Since PMP was developed for the wet season, antecedent precipitation would be high. Before the storm of April 1958, the antecedent preciptiation at the Laboratory site was 114 mm during March. Total precipitation at the U.S. Weather Bureau Station in Livermore five days before the December storm of 1955 was 33 mm. 2C-7 -r-t W O (U m rO J >i o u o u O J2 o u CM (1) U 3 •H s 7 w — 86jdl|osjq 2C-8 CM CO O CM 00 O -o o CO £ o MO CO o o •H b -<* CM o o CM O S / Ol — 96jDl]0S|(] 2C-9 Table 1. Major storms. Station Rainfall per day (mm) Date Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Total 11-14 January Mt. Hamilton 58.2 65.5 33.0 36.1 192.8 1911 Livermore 17.8 63.5 45.5 65.8 191.3 21-24 December Mt. Hamilton 5.3 104.1 174.5 6.6 290.6 1955 Livermore 0.8 19.0 82.8 49.0 151.6 1-3 April Mt. Hamilton 25.4 38.1 30.5 0.0 94.5 1958 Livermore 17.8 3.0 45.7 0.0 66.5 LLNL Site 3 19.3 2.3 42.9 0.0 64.5 The LLNL site rain gauge was installed on February 28, 1958. 2C-10 HI to o PL, (A hJ o >■> o u c o o 01 )-l p. e 3 e ■H B 03 .a o U P-, H vO vO CM vO CO IT) co vD O CO ■J- co CSl CM in os u o Cfi r-~ 00 CO O O O o -* ~* <■ O G ,o o a) n) o 0) 1-1 c s p-l P* •H .G P. « 00 o u o XI 0) c •H "I o id H o CO CO t-l n o m 00 CO o CO CO i-l OS o o r- o m o o oo o a x> u o (U nl -} Pn S vO CO CO o 1-1 1-1 CM CM p. 2C-11 co o >n o u u < c o •H U o- § § X CO 1 « x. o H & XI H 3 a o 00 CO o 00 "1 00 vO -3- co co on on o O o co •tf -3- a c o o 01 m o z Q >-) 00 vO o o co oo >3- VD CO 00 CO O I/O CO co On CO ON CO o in co iH m co O co m m m O o CO CO >* CO CO O CO CO H co co CO co CO co VD CO CO m in On ON ON <• CO 00 H CO vO CO On O CO O iH CO o I-l co CO r-\ CO 00 >-l co I** On O in m t-H -3- o o CO in On CM 00 CM vO CO CM vO 00 CM ON oo CM m ON CM ON ON u a. < o c 0) CO u > c CJ eg cu u -a a CO p-. o •H ■C a crj U 60 O M O 13 a •H XI I O CO CD iH XI (0 H vO co o CO ~3- CM O CO m ON o -3- -3- iH 00 m u o (U o S3 a vO m in oo co m uo VD U0 o -3- o CO 00 o -3- iH iH l-H ^r 3- <* co VD ON VD 00 -3- co CM CO ON vO CM ON m CM O VO CM CM m CM On m CM 00 m CM m CM iH CM H VO VO rH iH On CM CM CM CM CM CO CM O .-H CM O .-1 CM rH iH CM CM H CM CM o -* CO CO oo VO -3- i-H VO O m -3- -3- -3- -3- ON C XI u u n) ai cd a >7 to £ < 2C-12 6.2. INFILTRATION RATE The soils in both basins have been classified as to type by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. 2 Since they are either type C or D, infiltration rates would be very slow. Ground cover in the area is annual grass with about 1% of perennial grass. In the Arroyo Seco basin at the higher elevations, there is brush and California Live Oak. 7. POTENTIAL DAM FAILURE (SEISMICALLY. INDUCED) If it is assumed that the Del Valle Dam failed due to an earthquake and that at the same time Arroyo de la Laguna Canyon was closed by a seismically induced landslide, water would flow to and collect in the west end of the Valley. This is due to the difference in elevation between the Valley entrance point of Arroyo Del Valle (122 m MSL) and the elevation at the lower end of the Valley floor 2 (98 m MSL). Total surface area of the Valley below the 122-m contour line is 65 km , more than adequate to collect the maximum assumed storage in Del Valle Reservoir of 4.9 x 10 m . Also, in prehistory, all water from the Valley flowed north through San Ramon Valley. Elevation at the head end of San Ramon Valley is currently 140 m MSL. Since the elevation of the Laboratory is between 150 and 180 m MSL, there would be no danger to the Laboratory from failure of the Del Valle Dam. REFERENCES 1. Interim Report, Probable Maximum Precipitation in California , prepared by Hydrometeorology Branch Office of Hydrology (rev. October 1969). 2. Soil Survey - Alameda Area, California , prepared by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (March 1966). 2C-13 Kfl;' APPENDIX 2D GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 1. INTRODUCTION The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is located about 40 km east of San Francisco Bay at the east end of the Livermore Valley. The Laboratory property occupies all of Section 12, T 3S , r 2E. This report is designed to provide a concise description of the occurrence and movement of groundwater near LLNL in the eastern Livermore Valley. The hydrogeologic description is based principally on the results of previous investigations, from which information has been freely 1,2 arawn . 2. PHYSIOGRAPHY AND DRAINAGE The Livermore Valley is a prominent east-west structural depression within the California Coast Range. At the surface, the Valley forms an irregularly shaped lowland area about 5 km wide and 22 km long. The floor of the Valley slopes to the west at about 4 mm/m from an elevation of 182 m on the eastern end to about 91 m near the southwestern corner. The Diablo Range and foothills border the Valley on the south. Elevations of this fairly rugged mountain range average 1 km and from it issue the intermittent flows of Arroyo del Valle, Arroyo Mocho, and Arroyo Seco (see Fig. 1). The hills east of the Valley reach to elevations of about 500 m and give rise to the intermittent flows of Arroyo Las Positas and Altamont Creek. Mount Diablo and its foothills provide the northern boundary of the Livermore Valley, and from them a number of intermittent streams drain. The intermittent streams that flow into the eastern Livermore Valley from the surrounding uplands ultimately merge on the valley floor and drain to the west where they flow into Arroyo de la Laguna. Arroyo de la Laguna empties through the southwestern outlet of Livermore Valley into Alameda Creek which finally finds its way to San Francisco Bay. The streams draining into the Livermore Valley have been transporting debris into it since late Pliocene time, and have deposited a complex body of sediment in the depression including alluvial fan, terrace, and floodplain morphologies. 2D-1 DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES SAN FRANCISCO BAY DISTRICT EVALUATION OF GROUND WATER RESOURC IN LIVERMORE- SUNOL VALLEYS Figure 1. Location of sub-basin u within the Livermore and Sunol Valley groundwater basin (from Ref . 2) . SCALE OF FEET 4OO0 4000 8000 12000 2D-2 CLIMATE The climate of Livermore valley is characterized by a marked seasonal rainfall distribution. Most of the precipitation falls between the months of October and April; very little falls during the warmer months of the year. Most rainfall occurs during general winter storms that move inland from the coast. The average annual precipitation at Livermore is 367 mm. The actual annual evapotranspiration calculated by soil scientists of the U.S. Department of Agriculture for the same station is 293 mm. Therefore, on the average, an excess of precipitation exists to form surface runoff and to infiltrate the soils of the region. In some areas, this infiltration apparently proceeds to the extent that groundwater recharge is affected. 4. BASIN WATFR BALANCE Before 1962, the water needs of Livermore valley were supplied almost entirely from groundwater. Since 1945, recharge of groundwater has been less than total withdrawals, resulting in a general 2 decline in groundwater levels. The water level in a 214-m well on the LLNL site has dropped about 10 m since 1942. The lowered water levels have caused cessation of subsurface outflow from the southwestern outlet of the Livermore valley groundwater basin. This condition, coupled with reuse of water, has served to increase the salt content of groundwater, particularly in the central portion of 2 the Livermore Valley. In 1962, the first deliveries of imported water were made to the Valley through the South Bay Aqueduct. This water importation continues as part of the effort to balance groundwater withdrawal with recharge. The Laboratory originally derived its water supply from two 4 wells on the Laboratory site. The water for the Laboratory now comes from the Sierra Nevada via the Hetch Hetchy Aqueduct, built in 1934 by the City of San Francisco. A standby water supply is provided through the South Bay Aqueduct. Groundwater is no longer withdrawn by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. 5. STRATIGRAPHY: GEOLOGIC FORMATIONS AND THEIR WATER-BEARING PROPERTIES The Livermore Valley has two major sources of groundwater: the alluvial deposits that lie immediately beneath the valley floor, and the older Livermore Formation that generally is found 2 beneath the alluvium. The Livermore Valley groundwater basin, as it is defined by Finlayson et al , encompasses the surface exposure of the alluvium and the Livermore Formation, and is shown in part in 2D-3 Fig. 1. It is suggested that a better definition of the Livermore Valley groundwater basin would be based on topographic considerations and could include all the area with surface drainage to the Valley. A third water-producing material, the Tassajara Formation, underlies the northern portion of the Livermore Valley and has a large area of surface exposure in the hills immediately north of the valley. The Tassajara Formation is substantially less important as a source of groundwater because of its lower transmissivities relative to those of the alluvium and the Livermore Formation. The stratigraphy of the eastern Livermore Valley area will be discussed in order of decreasing age of formations. The units are classified as being either water-bearing or nonwater-bearing. The nonwater-bearing group includes formations that yield water to wells in quantities so low as to be useful only for stock watering and limited domestic supplies. Figure 2 portrays the surface exposures of some of the formations in the eastern Livermore Valley. 6. NONWATER-BEARING FORMATIONS Descriptions of these strata are primarily from Ref. 6. Rocks of the nonwater-bearing group crop out on all sides of the Livermore Valley. They also underlie the Valley and form the effective hydrologic basement at depths of as much as 300 m near the axis of the Valley. The rocks of this group were all deposited under marine conditions. 6.1. FRANCISCAN GROUP (JURA-CRETACEOUS) The geologic basement in the area is composed everywhere of rocks of the Franciscan assemblage. These rocks are exposed throughout the entire Diablo range south of Livermore Valley, and at Mount Diablo to the north. The Livermore Formation laps onto the Franciscan rocks about 5 km southeast of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory site. The Franciscan surface dips about 20 degrees to the northwest beneath Livermore Valley. The Franciscan Group is composed primarily of sandstone with smaller amounts of inter bedded siltstone and shale. Minor rock types include conglomerate, various colored chert, altered igneous rocks, and small bodies of serpentine. 6.2. PANOCHE FORMATION (UPPER CRETACEOUS) The Panoche Formation overlies the Franciscan and is widely exposed in the Altamont anticline northeast of the Valley. The Panoche, which attains a thickness of about 3000 m, consists of a series 2D- 4 i deep, tapping only JTHKAM CHAIWEL UtPOBITB Highly CrnwiMc dtpotltf 4 nooBMlltetad aa/»d, gravel, and lx,ulders. Fo^avl alonjr a 400 661 Carbonate (CO.) - — Free carbon dioxide (CO ) 16 53 Total Hardness (CaCO ) 217 275 Silica (SiO ) 16 20 iron (Fe) 0.17 0.28 Manganese (Mn) Total solids (on evaporation) 623 902 PH 7.6 7.3 Dissolved oxygen 2D-8 1955. Water from both wells exhibited faint iron and noticeable saline taste. Water from Well 1 had a definite sulfide odor, and water from both wells had substantial amounts of methane gas entrained. The important aspects of the chemical character of the groundwater from the Livermore Formation are the predominance of sodium and potassium over other cations, the predominance of bicarbonate over other anions, and the substantial chloride concentration. 7.3. ALLUVIUM AND LACUSTRINE DEPOSITS (PLFISTOCENE-RECENT) 2 Alluvium and lacustrine deposits of pleistocene to Recent age are grouped together, for the purpose at hand, as Quaternary alluvium. The Quaternary alluvium consists of stream and lake sediments including various mixtures of gravel, sand, silt, and clay. The alluvium is largely unconsolidated, and overlies the Livermore Formation in most of the Livermore valley and the Tassajara Formation in the northern portion of the Valley. The exact thickness of the Quaternary alluvium is difficult to determine because of its similarity to underlying formations, especially the Livermore Formation. Some well logs vaguely suggest a decrease in grain size within intervals known to contain both Quaternary alluvium and the Livermore Formation. The decrease is apparently gradational, and may describe the contact between the two formations. The thickness of the alluvium in Livermore Valley increases gradually from east to west. It reaches thicknesses of about 60 m in the vicinity of the City of Livermore. Elongated zones of high sand and gravel content in alluvium closely follow the present courses of Arroyo Mocho and Arroyo del Valle (see Fig. 3). The alluvium along the north side of Livermore valley is thinner than elsewhere, and is much finer-grained than that along the southern portion of the valley. In the east portion of the Livermore valley, the alluvium is revealed in well logs to be composed of overlapping, interfingering lenses and sheets of gravel, sand, silt, and clay. Individual layers are not extensive enough to be traced between well logs, because they change in physical nature over very short distances. The Quaternary alluvium, especially in the western half of Livermore valley, is the most prolific aquifer in the area. Water yields to properly designed wells are sufficient for any type of use. 2 1 Transmissivities of the alluvium range from 930 to 4650 m /d. Groundwater quality ranges from poor to excellent. 2D-9 „i, \ _ - 1- 1 \ o \ s V J3 (0 0) c o o CO o 4J hi a> 4J c •H a> J3 -u C •H x: 4J •H 3 (0 hi o> >M •■-t 3 D 1 (0 M-l 0) o> • CO *^ ■P Ol c M O 1 W» 0) >1 > c •H a) J M e • u fO V > 0) •H u J 3 o> 4) 2D-10 8. STRUCTURES AFFECTING GROUNDWATER MOVEMENT Faults within the Livermore Valley are the major structural features known to have marked effect on the movement of groundwater. Faults in the Valley tend to act as barriers to groundwater flow. This barrier effect is commonly manifest in differences in hydraulic head, as measured in wells, across faults. The Livermore Valley is cut by six major faults. These faults compartmentalize the Livermore Valley groundwater basin into a number of sub-basins. Study of groundwater flow in any one sub-basin is obviously made easier by knowledge of the extent of the sub-basin, which is defined in part by its fault borders. Determining the flow pattern in the whole groundwater basin then becomes a matter of linking the flow between sub-basins. Much work remains to be done in determining the nature of the flow linkage between sub-basins in the Livermore Valley groundwater basin. Of the six major faults in the Livermore Valley, only those in the eastern portion of the valley will be discussed here. The locations of the faults are shown in Fig. 4. 8.1. CARNEGIE FAULT The Carnegie fault runs along the eastern edge of the Livermore Valley. South of the Valley it brings Cretaceous rocks into juxtaposition with beds of the Livermore Formation. Recent oil exploration drilling in the eastern part of the Valley has shown that beneath the valley floor the Carnegie fault is a reverse fault, with older rocks from the east being moved over younger rocks on the west. Water level data along a portion of the length of the Carnegie fault indicate that it acts as a barrier to westward movement of groundwater. The water table drops some 45 m in step-wise fashion across the fault, with higher water table position on its northeast side. The Carnegie fault appears to affect a contribution of fluoride to groundwater. Six wells located along the fault yield water with 1 part per million or more of fluoride. 8.2. TESLA FAULT The Tesla fault enters the Livermore Valley along the canyon of Arroyo Seco. Movement on the Tesla fault appears to be primarily strike-slip with left-lateral sense. The Tesla fault presents a barrier to the flow of groundwater through much of its length in the Valley. Water levels in wells are about 9 m lower on the northeastern side of the fault than on the southwestern side. Groundwater is probably unimpeded in its southerly movement across the Tesla fault in the thin alluvium along Altamont and Cayetano Creeks. 2D-11 2D-12 The Tesla fault is a minor contributor of fluoride to groundwater. Three wells near the fault yield water containing fluoride in excess of 0.5 part per million. 8.3. MOCHO FAULT The Mocho fault is part of one of the major zones of crustal weakness of the Diablo Range. The direction and magnitude of movement along the Mocho fault in the Livermore Valley is uncertain. The fault has an effect on groundwater flow through much of its length in the Livermore Valley as evidenced by well water levels that are depressed by 9 to 15 m on the northeast side. 9. GROUNDWATER MOVEMENT NEAR LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY Groundwater flow patterns are influenced by the configuration of the water table surface, and by variations in permeability of the saturated media. Permeability contrasts are found that result from original sedimentary processes and subsequent structural deformation. Some of these contrasts in the Pliocene to Recent materials of Livermore Valley have been described. The configuration of the water table surface in the eastern Livermore Valley has not been defined. Potentiometric maps of hydraulic head distribution in confined aquifers of the eastern Livermore Valley are unavailable. It is known, however, that the water table is located at depths of from 20 to 30 m beneath the surface in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory area. The experience of groundwater hydrology has shown that the water table surface generally follows surface topography in alluvial materials. Using this premise and knowledge of the topography, structure, and stratigraphy of the eastern Livermore Valley, a description of the most likely general groundwater flow pattern can be assembled. The effective lower boundary of the groundwater flow system in most of the Livermore Valley is found at the base of the Livermore Formation. Groundwater recharged to the Livermore Formation on the slopes south and southeast of the Valley moves northward under the younger alluvium of the Valley. Groundwater that enters the Quaternary alluvium along the northern and southern edges of the Valley 2 moves generally toward the course of Arroyo Las Positas, and thence westward. This westward movement is postulated on the basis of the surface gradient to the west and on the fact that the lowest groundwater levels occur in the western Livermore Valley, near the City of Pleasanton, where the heaviest groundwater withdrawals take place. 2D-13 Hydraulic head potential is generally a decreasing function of depth in the eastern Livermore Valley. 2 Therefore, a substantial vertical downward component of groundwater flow from surface recharge in permeable soils and arroyo beds is inferred for much of the area. Groundwater in the two compartments of the eastern Livermore Valley defined by the Mocho, Tesla, and Carnegie faults is thought to move from recharge areas along the margins of the Valley in the southeastern and northwestern ends of the compartments, down the topographic gradient, parallel to the faults, toward the low areas of the compartments along the courses of Arroyo Las Positas and Altamont Creek. Some recharge to the groundwater system within the compartments probably occurs along the 2 course of the upper reaches of Arroyo Las Positas, along Arroyo Seco, and along Cayetano Creek. Recharge from Arroyo Mocho certainly occurs along the southeastern portion of the Mocho fault in the Valley. 2 Some groundwater flow from the northeastern side of the Carnegie fault must occur because water levels are higher on the northeast side of the fault. Movement of groundwater from the Carnegie-Tesla fault compartment certainly occurs in the alluvium of Altamont Creek. Other flow-linkage between these compartments or sub-basins is possible, but difficult to predict without mapping the water table and other potential surfaces. Water levels along the southwest side of a large portion of the length of the Mocho fault in the Valley are higher than on the northeast side of the fault. It would seem, therefore, that flow into the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment comes along from the southwest. This contradicts the generalization that groundwater flow in the Valley is from east to west. A major question that must presently go unanswered is whether or not the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment is outflowing to the southwest or receiving groundwater inflow from that direction. Groundwater withdrawals in the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment may be great enough to cause flow across the Mocho fault to be from the southwest. Section A-A 1 in Fig. 5 illustrates the relation between land surface topography and the hydraulic head potential surface of the shallow aquifers in the Carnegie-Tesla fault compartment. Groundwater flow from the uplands near Cayetano Creek in the northwest, and from near Greenville Road in the southeast, moves toward the course of Altamont Creek, where the hydraulic head is least. The quality of groundwater in the compartment near Altamont Creek is poor, with total dissolved solids content averaging 2150 parts per million. The groundwater is a sodium chlor ide-sulfate type, high in >il in the area near Altamont Creek is rich in sodium sulfate and sodium chloride area coincides with a low topographic basin, inefficiently drained by Altamont Creek. Finlayson et al . 2 state in discussing the area that "the high groundwater levels, salt-rich soil, and poor groundwater quality all suggest that groundwater in most of the northern unit does not readily move into the southeastern unit." The northern unit refers to an area generally north of Highway 50. The southeastern unit is south of Highway 50. Finlayson et al. recognized all the boron. The surface soi 2 2D-14 Figure 5. Geologic sections (from Ref . 1) 2D-15 characteristics of the area along Altamont Creek that identify it as a groundwater discharge area, yet never quite came to that conclusion. All of the characteristics of the area can be explained by the movement of groundwater towards the surface along Altamont Creek in the compartment. Topographic influences and the thinning of water-bearing rocks beneath Altamont Creek, cause the vertical upward movement of groundwater, and force its discharge as diffuse seepage. Groundwater probably does not -readily move into "the southeastern unit" because the gradient for flow is in the opposite direction. The overall pattern of groundwater flow in the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment is likely similar to that in the Carnegie-Tesla fault compartment. More complex topography in the Tesla-Mocho compartment and greater groundwater withdrawal from it complicate its hydrology enough that generalizations concerning the groundwater flow pattern will be fraught with errors of detail. Again, water table and hydraulic head maps are needed for accurate flow description. Section B-B' of Fig. 5 shows that a northerly slope of the shallow aquifer potential surface exists in the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment. Section C-C of Fig. 6 indicates the same slope. Section D-D' of Fig. 7 illustrates a southerly water table gradient from the north toward Arroyo Las Positas. Groundwater recharge takes place by infiltration of precipitation in the low hills of the Livermore Formation east and southeast of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory site. Recharge is affected by flow losses during the rainy season from the channels of Arroyo Seco and Arroyo Las Positas above the mouth of Arroyo Seco. Water thus input to the underground system moves between the Mocho and Carnegie faults toward the northwest where a part of it is discharged as diffuse seepage in the low areas near Altamont Creek and Arroyo Las Positas below Altamont Creek. The remainder of groundwater flow moves an undetermined distance west by flow-linkage between sub-basins (fault compartments). A major question that remains to be answered revolves about the groundwater balance in the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment. It is not known that groundwater flow to the southwest out of the compartment occurs. There is some reason to believe that it does not. Hydraulic head potential mapping and other studies will be necessary to resolve the question. 10. SUMMARY OF GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY The eastern Livermore Valley, including the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory site, is underlain by water-bearing strata, mostly of alluvial origin, that contain and transport groundwater. The Pliocene to Recent water-bearing materials are underlain by nonwater-bear ing rocks of Miocene and older age. The water-bearing rocks contain aquifers at various depths that are used as groundwater supply sources. Most wells in the eastern Livermore Valley tap aq many wells in the area produced from depths of 115 to 215 m. .fers at depths of at least 30 m; 2D-16 or OL l e o u c o ■H 4J O 0» (0 o 5 3 •H 2D-17 br § u M-l c o •H -p o fl (I) u a ■H fa 2D-18 Faults are the major structural features known to have a marked effect on the movement of groundwater in the eastern Livermore Valley. They tend to act as barriers to groundwater flow and divide the Livermore Valley groundwater basin into sub-basins or compartments. The configuration of the water table surface in the eastern Livermore Valley has not been defined. Potentiometr ic maps of hydraulic head distribution in confined aquifers of the eastern Livermore Valley are unavailable. The water table is known to be located at depths from 9 to 30 m beneath the surface in the area of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The general pattern of groundwater flow near Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is inferred using topographic considerations and hydrologic profiles prepared by the California Department of Water Resources. The pattern inferred shows groundwater recharge entering the two compartments, formed by the Carnegie, Tesla, and Mocho faults, in areas southeast and east of the Laboratory site. Flow in the compartments is to the northwest, beneath the Site. Some of the groundwater ultimately is discharged by diffuse seepage to Altamont Creek and Arroyo Las Positas some 3.5 km northwest of the Laboratory site. The remaining groundwater moves an undetermined distance west, generally along Arroyo Las Positas. The direction of net groundwater flow across the Mocho fault has not been demonstrated. The surface gradient of Arroyo Las Positas is to the west, across the Mocho fault. On the other hand, groundwater pumpage from the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment may make it a closed groundwater sub-basin. Water levels in wells stand 9 to 15 m higher along much of the Mocho fault, on its southwest side. The determination of the nature of the groundwater flow-linkage between the Tesla-Mocho fault compartment and the next compartment to the southwest awaits further study. 2D-19 REFERENCES 1. California Department of Water Resources, Evaluation of Ground Water Resources: Livertnore and Sunol Valleys , Bulletin 118-2 (1974). 2. D. J. Finlayson, W. R. Hansen, and J. V. Vantine, Livermore and Sunol Valleys, Evaluation of Ground Water Resources, Appendix A: Geology , California Department of Water Resources Bulletin 118-2 (1966). 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Soil Survey — Alameda Area, California , Series 1961, No. 41 (1966). 4. K. W. Brown and B. P. Haskell, Water Supply Survey — Livermore Radiation Laboratory, Report , Brown and Caldwell, Civil and Chemical Engineers, San Francisco (1955). 5. D. L. Bernreuter and F. J. Tokarz, Design-Basis Earthquakes for the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Site , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Rept. UCRL-51193 (1972) . 6. J. A. Blume and Associates, Engineers, Investigation of Faulting at the Lawren ce Livermore Laboratory , Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Rept. UCRL-13568 (1972) . 7. Andrei M. Sarna-Wojcicki, Correlation of Late Cenozoic Pyroclastic Deposits in the Central Coast Ranges of California , thesis, University of California, Berkeley, California (1971). 2D-20 APPENDIX 2E ECOLOGY FLORA AND FAUNA OF THE LIVERMORE SITE The biological features of the area occupied by DOE's Livermore sites have been examined at length. Plants and animals identified are listed in the following tables. At least one example of each listing has been observed. The plants identified are shown in Table 1; plants considered to be native to the area are accompanied by an asterisk. Mammals identified are listed in Table 2. Of the mammals present, jackrabbits are the most numerous. Gophers, snakes, and field mice are observed in the undeveloped portions of the sites. Birds, which are quite numerous, are listed in Table 3. Table 4 shows two reptiles and five amphibians observed on the Livermore sites. Although not observed, it is probable that there are more than one species of lizard and one species of snake on the Livermore sites. Tables 5 and 6 list the insects, arachnids, and crustaceans on the Livermore sites. Altogether these listings include 114 species of vascular plants; 16 mammals, including man; 43 birds; 2 reptiles; 5 amphibians; 45 insects; 5 arachnids; and 3 others. Tables 7, 8, and 9 list species observed at Site 300. This essentially grassland community is discussed in section 2.3.9. Site 300 is thought to be the only natural location for a rare and endangered species of wildf lower, Amsinckia grandiflora ; a report on its status there is included as the second part of this Appendix. 2E-1 Table 1. Plants of the LLNL and SNLL sites. Cupressaceae (Cypress Family) Juniper Golden cypress Salicaceae (Willow Family) Golden weeping willow Sandbar willow" Moraceae (Mulberry Family) Fruitless mulberry Ulmaceae (Elm Family) Chinese elm Z elk ova Polygonaceae (Buckwheat Family) Curly dock * Chenopodiaceae (Goosefoot Family) Nettleleaf goosefoot Lambsquarters Russian thistle (tumbleweed) Portulacaceae (Purselane Family) Miner's-lettuce * Common purslane Rhamnaceae (Buckthorn Family) Ceanothus Cruciferaceae (Mustard Family) Shepherd's purse * Black mustard* Wild radish Wild turnip Juglandaceae (Walnut Family) English walnut Juniperus sp. Chamaecyparis obtusa Salix babalonia Salix exigua Morus alba Ulmus pumila Zelkova sp. Rumex crispus Chenopodium murale Chenopodium album Salsola kali Montia perfoliate Portulaca oleraceae Ceanothus sp. Capsella bursa-pastoris Brassica nigra Raphanus sativus Brassica campestris Juglans sp. 2E-2 Table 1. (continued) Leguminosaceae (Pea Family) Vetch Lupine * Alfalfa California burclover Locust (black) Geraniaceae (Geranium Family) Filaree (Heronbill) * Zygophyllaceae (Caltrop Family) Puncture -vine Malvaceae (Mallow Family) Cheeseweed Rose of sharon Hypericaceae (St. Johnswort Family) St. Johnswort Hydrophyllaceae (Waterleaf Family) Great valley phacelia- Labiataceae (Mint Family) White Horehound Purple sage* Rosemary Compositaceae (Thistle Family) Prickly lettuce Common groundsel" Annual sowthistle Milk thistle Smooth cats-ear Pineapple weed Yellow starthistle Mayweed Dandelion Coyote bush* Spiny clotbur Vicia americana Lupinus sp. Medicago sativa Medicago polymorpha Robinia sp. Erodium cicutarium Tribulus terrestris Malva parviflora Althaea sp. Hypericum perforatum Phacelia ciliata Marrubium vulgare Salvia dirrii Rosmarinus officinalis Lactuca serriola Senecio vulgaris Sonchus oleraceus Silybum marianum Hypochoeris glabra Matricarica matricarioides Centaurea solstitialis Anthemis cotula Taraxacum officinale Baccharis pilularis Xanthium spinosum 2E-3 Table 1. (continued) Boraginaceae (Borage Family) Common fiddleneck* Polygonaceae (Buckwheat Family) Common knotweed Onagraceae (Evening-Primrose Family) Panicled willow-herb Evening primrose * Proteacea (Protea Family) Silk oak Liliaceae (Lily Family) Grass nut* Amoryllidaceae (Amaryllis Family) Lily of the Nile Urticaceae (Nettle Family) Burning nettle Typhaceae (Cattail Family) Cattail- Graminaceae (Grass Family) Large crabgrass Rye Barnyardgrass Littleseed canary grass Wild barley Squirrel tail grass (Foxtail barley) Wild oats Rabbitfoot grass Annual bluegrass Italian ryegrass Ripgut brome Bermuda grass Bluegrass Perla grass (Timothy) Wheat grass Field oats Barley 2E _ 4 Amsinckia intermedia Polygonum aviculare Epilobium paniculatum Oenothera sp. Grevillea robusta Brodiaea laxa Agapanthus africanus Urtica urens Typha latifolia Digitaria sanguinalis Secale cereale Echinochloa crusgalli Phalaris minor Hordeum californicum Hordeum jubatum Avena barbata Polypogon monspeliensis Poa annua Lolium multiflorum Bromus rigidus Cynodon dactylon Poa sp. Phleum pratense Agropyron sp. Avena sp. Hordeum sp. Table 1. (continued) Primulaceae (Primrose Family) Scarlet Pimpernel Amaranthaceae (Amaranth Family) Redroot pigweed (Green amaranth) Tumble pigweed Euphorbiaeae (Spurge Family) Turkey mullein Convolvulaceae (Morning-Glory Family) Field bindweed Hopseed bush Rosaceae (Rose Family) Tea rose Firethorn India hawthorn Toy on* Stone fruits Apricot Green-gage plum Pear Quince Apple Hawthorn Punicaceae (Pomegranate Family) Pomegranate Anacardiaceae (Cashew Family) Pistachio Anagallis aryensis Amaranthus retroflexus Amaranthus albus Eremocarpus setigerus Convolvulus arvensis Dodonea sp. Rosa sp. Pyracantha sp. Phaphiolepsis indica Heteromeles arbutifolia Prunus sp. Prunus sp. Pyrus sp. Chaenomeles sp. Malus sp. Crataegus sp. Punic a sp. Pistacia sp. Pinaceae (Pine Family) Aleppo pine Monterey pine Mugho pine Fagaceae (Beech Family) Black oak Cork oak Pinus halepensis Pinus radiata Pinus sp. Quercus sp. Quercus sp. 2E-5 Table 1. (continued) Oleaceae (Olive Family) Ash Taxodiaceae (Taxodium Family) Coast redwood Giant redwood Casuarinaceae (Casuarina Family) Beef wood or she -oak Myrtaceae (Myrtle Family) Gum-tree Bottle brush Apocynaceae (Dogbane Family) Oleander Gory lac eae (Hazelnut Family) Alder * Hamamelidaceae (Witch- Hazel Family) Liquidambar sweet-gun Platanaceae (Plane-Tree Family) Sycamore * Iridiaceae (Iris Family) Blue eyed grass * Araliaceae (Ginseng Family) Ground ivy Acanthaceae (Acanthus Family) Bears-breech Leguminosaceae (Pea Family) Mimosa Red Bud * Elaeagnaceae (Oleaster Family) Russian olive Fraxinus sp. Sequoia sempervirens Sequoia gigantea Casuarina stricta Eucalyptus sp. Calistemon sp. Nerium oleander Alnus sp. Liquidambar sp. Platanus sp. Sisyrinchium bellum Hedera sp. Acanthus latifolius Albizzia sp. Cercis occidentalis Elaeagnus angustifolia 2E-6 Table 1. (continued) Cyperaceae (Sedge Family) Yellow Nutgrass Scrophulariaceae (Figwort Family) Owl clover * Ericaceae (Heath Family) Strawberry tree Papaveraceae (Poppy Family) California poppy * Solanaceae (Nightshade Family) False tobacco Cyperus esculentus Orthocarpus purpurascens Arbutus unedo Eschscholzia californica Nicotiana glauca 2E -7 Table 2. Mammals of the LLNL and SNLL sites. Marsupialia (pouched) Opossum Chiroptera (Bats) Little brown bat Carnivora (Meat-eaters) Spotted skunk Rodentia (Gnawing) Muskrat Pocket gopher Deer mouse House mouse Meadow vole Norway rat Lagomorpha Black-tailed jackrabbit Brush rabbit Domestic Animals Cows Goats Sheep Cats Dogs Horses Chickens Didelphis marsupialis Myotis lucifugus Spilogale putorius Ondatra zibethica Thomomys bottae Peromyscus maniculatus Mus musculus Microtus californicus Rattus norvegicus Lepus californicus Sylvilagus auduboni Bos sp. Capra sp. Ovis sp. Felis domestica Canis familiaris Equus caballus Gallus gallus 2E-8 Table 3. Birds of the LLNL and SNLL sites Turkey vulture White-tail kite Red-tailed hawk Sparrow hawk (American kestrel) Golden eagle Bald eagle California quail Ring-necked pheasant Chukar Killdeer Ring -billed gull California gull Rock dove (Domestic pigeon) Mourning dove Barn owl White -throated swift Anna's hummingbird Red- shafted flicker Western kingbird Cliff swallow Scrub jay Yellow-billed magpie Raven Crow Red-breasted nuthatch Mockingbird Robin Cedar waxwing Loggerhead shrike Starling Yellow warbler House sparrow (English sparrow) Western meadowlark Redwinged blackbird Bullock's oriole Brewer's blackbird Cathartes aura Elanus leucurus Buteo jamaicensis Falco sparverius Aquila chrysaetos Haliaeetus leucocephalus Lophortyx californicus Phasianus colchicus Alectoris graeca Charadrius vociferus Larus delawarensis Larus californicus Columba livia Zenaidura macroura Tyto alba Aeronautes saxatalis Calypte anna Colaptes cafer Tyrannus verticalis Petrochelidon pyrrhonota Aphelocoma coerulescens Pica nuttalli Corvus corax Corvus brachyrhynchos Sitta canadensis Mimus polyglottos Turdus migratorius Bombycilla cedrorum La nius ludovicianus Sturnus vulgaris Dendroica petechia Passer domesticus Sturnella neglecta Agelaius phoeniceus Icterus bullockii Euphagus cyanocephalus 2E-9 Table 3. (continued) L. and SLL sites, (continued) House finch (Linnet) Pine siskin American goldfinch (Common goldfinch) Lesser goldfinch Savannah sparrow White-crowned sparrow Golden-crowned sparrow Carpodacus mexicanus Spinus pinus Spinus tristis Spinus psaltria Passerculus sandwichensis Zonotrichia leucophrys Zonotrichia atricapilla 2E-10 Table 4. Amphibians and reptiles of the LLNL and SNLL sites Toad and Frog Pacific treefrog Western toad Hyla regilla Bufo boreas Lizard Western fence lizard Sceloporus occidentalis Salamanders Eschscholtz's salamander California slender salamander Pacific giant salamander Ensatina eschscholtzii Batrachoseps attenuatus Dicamptodon ensatus Snake Gopher snake Pituophis catenifer 2E-11 Table 5. Insects of the LLNL and SNLL sites. Diptera House fly Syrphid fly Mosquito Crane fly Horse fly Horse bot fly Vinegar flies Sun fly Green bottle fly Musca domestica Syrphus ribesii Culex Tipula Tabanus Gasterophilus intestinalis Drosophila melanogaster Pseudoleria Lucilia Thysanura Machilids Silverfish Machilis Thermobia Ephemeroptera May fly Caenis Odonata Dragon fly Dragon fly Damsel fly Anax Libellula Argia £ Orthoptera Katydids Field crickets Grasshoppers Microcentrum Gryllus Melanoplus Dermaptera Earwig Forficula auricularia Coleoptera Whirligig beetles Grain beetles Click beetles Lady beetle Dineutes Tenebroides Monocerpidius Hippodamia convergens 2E-12 Table 5. (continued) Hemiptera Stink bug Water strider Squash bug Back swimmers Chlorochroa Gerris Anasa Notonecta Homoptera Cicadas Leaf-hoppers San Jose scale Whiteflies Plant lice Ants Magicicada Platymetopius Asphidiotus perniciosus Trialeurodes Aph: is Formica Neuroptera Snakeflies Aphis lions Lepidoptera Swallowtail butterfly Cabbageworm Monarch butterfly Fritillary Tobacco hornworm (Sphinx) Measuring worms Mantisapa Chrysopa oculata Pieris rapae Danaus plexippus Euptoieta Protoparce sexta Cleora Hymenoptera Wasps Mud-dauber wasp Bumble bee Honey bee Polistes Sceliphron Bombus Apis mellifera 2E-13 Table 6. Arachnids and crustaceans of the LLNL and SNLL sites Arachnida Spiders and mites Red Spider mite Garden spider Black widow Scorpion Harvestman spider Paratetranychus pilosus Argiope Latrodectus mactans Chilopoda Centipede Crustacea Sow-bug Cylisticus convexus Diplopoda Millipede Spirobolus 2E-14 Table 7. Plants of Site 300. a Common name (blossom color, if noted) Annual bluegrass Ash Blue dick B luegum Burr clover California pepper California poppy Cattai 1 Coast beefwood Common groundsel (yellow) Coyote bush Cream cup Deer weed Deodar cedar Fiddleneck (orange) Fill aree (blue) Firethorn Forget-me-not (white) Goldfield (yellow) Grape Grass nut Great valley phacelia Hollywood juniper Juniper tam La rkspur Lovegrass sunflower (white) Lupine (blue), perennial Scientific nar Poa annua Fraxinus velutina Brodiaea pulchella Eucalyptus globulus Medicago polymorpha Schinus molle Eschscholtzia californica Typha latifol ia Casuarina st ric t a Senecio vulgaris Baccharis pi 1 u 1 a r i s P latystemr n californicus Lotus rigidus Cedrus deodara Amsinckia intermedia Amsinckia grandiflora Erodium cicutarium Pyrocantha fortuncana Myosotis sylvatica Baeria chrysostoma Vitis vinifera Brediaca laxa Phacel ia ciliat a Juniperus chinersis Juniper sabina Delphinium decorum Eragrostis diffusa Lupinus arboreus 2E-15 Table 7. (continued) Common name (blossom color, if noted) Scientific name Lupine (white) Lupine (blue and white) Lupine (blue), annual Manzanita Milkthistle Miner's lettuce (light yellow) Monterey pine Mulberry Oleander Owl clover (white) Owl clover (blue) Panicled willow-herb Plane-tree Red ironbark Ripgut brome Rosemary Ryegrass Sagebrush Shepherd's purse Shooting star (dark blue) Soap plant (white) Tidytip (yellow center, white tips) Turkey mullein Valley oak White ironbark Wild barley Wild cucumber Wild heliotrope Lupinus densiflorus Lupinus nanus Lupinus polyphyllus Arctostaphylos glauca Silybum marianum Montia perfoliata Pinus radiata Morus alba Nerium oleander Orthocarpus Orthocarpus purparascens Epilobium paniculatum Platanus acerifolia Eucalyptus sideroxylon Bromus rigidus Rosmarinus officinalis Lolium multiflorum Artemisia tridentata Capsella bursa-pastori s Dodecatheon Chlorogalum pomeridianum Layia platyglossa Eremocarpus setigerus Quercus lobata Eucalyptus leucoxylon Hordeum leporinum Marah fabaceus Heliotropium 2E-16 Table 7. (continued) Common name (blossom color, if noted) Wild oat Yarrow (white) Yellow starthistle Scientific name Avena fatua Achillea borealis Centaurea solstitialis This list is as complete as possible for areas around Buildings 850 and 851 and the east power station and includes plants introduced as weeds and landscaping. Other areas of Site 300 were not as extensively surveyed. 2E-17 Table 8. Mammals of Site 300.' Common name Scientific name Audubon cottontail Badger Big brown bat Black-tailed deer Bobcat Brush mouse Brush rabbit California ground squirrel California jackrabbit California meadow mouse Coyote Deer mouse Feral cat Feral dog Grey fox Heermann kangaroo rat Kit fox Long-tailed weasel Man Mountain lion Opossum Pinyon mouse Pocket gopher Raccoon San Joaquin pocket mouse Spotted skunk Striped skunk Western harvest mouse Sylvi lagus audubon 1 Taxidea taxus Eptesicus fuscus Odocoileus hemionus Lynx rufus Peromyscus boylei Sylvilagus bachmani Citellus beecheyi Lepus californicus Mycrotus californicus Canis latrans Peromyscus maniculatus Felis domesticus Canis domesticus Urocyon cinereoargenteus Dipodomys heermanni Vulpes macrotis Mustela frenata Homo sapien Felis concolor Didelphis marsupialis Peromyscus truei Thomomys bottae Procyon lotor Perognathus inornatus Spilogale putoris Mephitis mephitis Rei throdontomys megalotis a Most mammals were positively identified. Observations were substantiated by duplicate sightings and by checking the range of various animals. 2E-18 Table 9. Crustacea, spiders, and insects of Site 300, Common name Scientific name Ant Black widow spider Bumblebee Cent i pede Dragon fly Earwig Field cricket Garden spider Grasshopper Honeybee House fly Jerusalem cricket Lady beetle Leaf-hopper Mill ipede Scorpion Snakef ly Sow bug Sulfur butterfly Tarantula Tarantula hawk Formica Latrodecius mactans Bombus Solopendra morsitans Libellula Forficula auricularia Gryllus Argiope Me lanoplus Apis mellifera Musca domestica Stenopelmatus Hippodamia convergens Platymetopius Spribolus Centruroide s Mant isapa Cylisticus convexus Euremia Tarantula Pepsis 2E-19 K^HH ^^■■^^^H <^ EGG 1183-2425 Energy Measurements Group OCCURRENCE AND STATUS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES, SAN JOAQUIN KIT FOX, Vulpes macrotis mutica, AND LARGE-FLOWERED FIDDLENECK, Amsinckia grandiflora, ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, CALIFORNIA APRIL 1981 PREPARED FOR THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY THROUGH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE UNDER CONTRACT NO. DE-AC08-76NVO1183 2E-21 SANTA BARBARA OPERATIONS EG&GINC 130 ROBIN HILL HO.GOLETA. CALIF 93017 NOTICE This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. Neither the United States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately-owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof. 2E-22 <5^ Energy Measurements Group EGG 1183-2425 S-715-R OCCURRENCE AND STATUS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES, SAN JOAQUIN KIT FOX, Vulpes macrotis mutica, AND LARGE-FLOWERED FIDDLENECK, Amsinckia grandiflora, ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, CALIFORNIA by William A. Rhoads, Thomas P. O'Farrell, and Mary L. Sauls APRIL 1981 This report is unclassified: _4v^vt_A^ Vh . /&"2*X^_ Classification Officer PREPARED FOR THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY THROUGH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, NEVADA OPERATIONS OFFICE UNDER CONTRACT NO. DE-AC08-76NVO1183 2E-23 SANTA BARBARA OPERATIONS EG&GINC 130 ROBIN HILL RO.GOLETA. CALIF 93017 SUMMARY The purpose of this project was to provide Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) with information to assist it in complying with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) . Field work was conducted at Site 300 between 17 March and 22 August 1980 in a search to determine whether the endangered San Joaquin kit fox, Vulpes maorotis mutioa, occurred there, to survey the Site for additional populations of the rare plant species Amsinckia grandiflora, and to determine whether LLNL activities might be impacting on that plant species. No evidence was found to suggest that the San Joaquin kit fox is present on Site 300. No new populations of A. grandiflora were found. The known population of A. grandiflora below Drop Tower 858 consisted of 28 individuals. Evidence of a recent burn on a part of the knoll where A. grandiflora occurs was the only indication of habitat disturbance. There was no evidence that LLNL activities are impacting adversely on the species. It is likely that A. grandiflora will be listed as endangered (it is now listed under Category 1 in a candidacy package). If so, a consultation with Fish and Wildlife Service is required, and an impact assessment statement will be needed. This study should satisfy most of the requirements for the impact statement . 2E-24 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Our thanks to our colleague, Patrick McCue, who assisted during ground and aerial surveys for the kit fox. We most gratefully acknowledge the cooper- ation and assistance of the many Site 300 personnel who provided escort, infor- mation, and in many cases, extra eyes during the surveys. Without these people, the field work would have been difficult. Roy Mullins, Site 300 Manager, and Owen Van Dyke provided us with much of the information necessary to coordinate our work on Site 300, as well as personnel, office space, and vehicles. We are especially thankful for the warm and gracious assistance of Dr. Carl Lindeken, whose personal interest in our work and in the welfare of the animals and plants of Site 300, made this project possible. 2E-25 CONTENTS Section Title Page SUMMARY 2E-24 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2E-25 INTRODUCTION 2E-29 1.1 Background 2E-29 1.2 Objectives 2E-29 METHODS 2E-30 2.1 San Joaquin Kit Fox 2E-30 2.1.1 Field Surveys 2E-30 2.1.2 Spotlight Surveys 2E-30 2.1.3 Aerial Surveys 2E-31 2.1.4 Live-Trapping 2E-31 2.1.5 Interviews 2E-31 2.2 Amsinokia grandiflora 2E-31 2.2.1 Drop Tower 858 2E-32 2.2.2 Other Site 300 Surveys 2E-32 RESULTS 2E-33 3.1 San Joaquin Kit Fox 2E-33 3.1.1 Field Surveys 2E-33 3.1.2 Spotlight Surveys 2E-33 3.1.3 Aerial Surveys 2E-33 3.1.4 Live-Trapping 2E-37 3.1.5 Interviews 2E-37 3.2 Amsinokia grandiflora 2E-38 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 2E-43 4.1 Endangered Species on Site 300 and the Endangered Species Act of 1973 2E-45 4.1.1 San Joaquin Kit Fox 2E-45 4.1.2 Amsinokia grandiflora 2E-45 RECOMMENDATIONS 2E-48 LITERATURE CITED 2E-49 2E-26 CONTENTS (continued) Section Title Page APPENDIX A: PLANTS OBSERVED ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, 1980 2E-50 APPENDIX B: VERTEBRATES OBSERVED ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, 1980 2E-52 2E-27 LLUSTRATIONS Figure 1 Title Page Location of 1980 field surveys for San Joaquin kit fox and Amsinckia grandi flora , LLNL, Site 300, 1980 9 Locations of ground surveys for San Joaquin kit fox on private land adjacent to LLNL, Site 300, 1980 10 Location of Amsinckia grandiflora population below Drop Tower 858 on LLNL, Site 300, showing area of proposed critical habitat for this species 14 Locations of individual Amsinckia grandiflora at population site below Drop Tower 858 15 TABLES Table Title Page 1 San Joaquin kit fox survey, LLNL, Site 300, 1980 8 2 Vertebrates observed during night spotlight surveys on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 11 3 Dates and results of live-trapping on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 at locations shown in Figure 1 12 4 Field surveys for Amsinckia grandiflora on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 13 2E-28 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND This investigation was undertaken to provide the managers of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) with information to assist it in complying with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, as amended in 1978 and 1979. Section 2 of the Act states the policy that ... all federal departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. Further, the purpose of the Act is to conserve the ecosystems upon which the species depend and, when needed, to provide a program for recovery of such . species. Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to determine the distribution and status of any federally listed or candidate endangered or threatened species which occur on lands under their jurisdiction; and in consul- tation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to determine whether any of the agency's actions will jeopardize the continued existence of the species or adversely impact the habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary of the Interior to be critical. The presence of two species, one animal and one plant, on or adjacent to Site 300 has led LLNL to investigate its responsibilities under the terms of the Act. The San Joaquin kit fox, Vulpes maorotis mutica, is a federally listed endangered species whose range is reported to extend along the western foothills of the San Joaquin Valley north to Contra Costa County (Laughrin, 1970; Morrell, 1975; Swick, 1973). Kit fox have been observed denning 3 to 4 miles north and east of Site 300 (Swick, 1973), and unverified sightings of kit fox have been reported for Site 300 (Mclntyre and Johnson, 1980). The last known population of a rare plant, Amsinckia grandiflora Kleeberger (Boragmaceae), the large-flowered fiddleneck, occurs on Site 300 (Ornduff, 1977; Hanson, 1978). The FWS is preparing to list this plant as a candidate endangered species. With this announcement the ESA requires that the species be treated as endangered, and requires LLNL to determine whether its activities will negatively impact the species or its essential habitat, and to develop reasonable management plans to conserve both. 1.2 OBJECTIVES The primary goal of this project was to provide LLNL with additional information to assist it in complying with the Act. Specific objectives were to: 1) determine whether Site 300 is being used for denning or hunting by the San Joaquin kit fox, 2) search for additional populations of Amsinakia grandi flora, 3) determine abundance and distribution of the known population in 1980, and " 4) suggest protective measures for the plant and its habitat if appropriate. 2E-29 2. METHODS 2.1 SAN JOAQUIN KIT FOX Kit fox are primarily nocturnal but night spotlight surveys to observe them may not be effective in areas with low population densities. Therefore, a combination of survey methods was employed. Daytime surveys to find dens, tracks, and scats were combined with night spotlight surveys and live-trapping to determine whether the kit fox was present on Site 300. 2.1.1 Field Surveys Road surveys were used to observe as much of Site 300 as possible to determine presence of kit fox dens. Numerous roads and fire trails were driven slowly to allow observers to scan terrain for possible signs of kit fox. Frequent stops were made to allow observations of areas not visible from the vehicle. Potential den sites were investigated to determine whether they were made by kit fox. Most dens can be positively identified by a combination of characteristics, including size and shape of entrances, presence of fox tracks, scats, or prey remains . Personnel also walked portions of almost every drainage on Site 300 looking for less obvious kit fox sign, such as tracks and scats along game trails. Animal tracks, scats, prey remains, and game trails were observed in areas that would normally be frequented by kit fox duirng hunting or territorial wanderings. Special efforts were made to look for evidence of fox at major game trail crossings, along fire roads, in drainages, along ridgelines, and adjacent to springs and other water sources. Scats were collected for later identification. Ground searches were also conducted on private lands in two areas near Site 300: west of Corral Hollow Road and south of where it intersects Highway 580 on lands where dens were observed from the air; and on land southeast of the junc- tion of Corral Hollow Road and Highway 580, at the end of Jefferson Road where kit fox and their dens had been observed previously (Swick, 1973). 2.1.2 Spotlight Surveys Night spotlight surveys were conducted along the roads and fire trails on Site 300 to obtain information on presence of nocturnal animals, including kit fox. A vehicle was driven 5 to 8 mph with high beams on, while observers used spotlights to observe animals in areas perpendicular to the path. When eye- shines were observed the vehicle was stopped; the animal was identified; and records of species, time, and mileage were made. A flashlight was used to approach unknown animals to obtain positive identification, but when this failed the approximate size of the animal and color of eye shine were recorded. 2E-30 2.1.3 Aerial Surveys Aerial surveys were flown to find kit fox dens in ureas remote from road systems. High-wing aircraft were used because 1) their configuration permitted an unobstructed view of the ground, 2) they could carry at least two passengers which increased effectiveness of search patterns, 3) their speed permitted rapid coverage of long transects, and 4) their maneuverability allowed safe searches along steep ridges and canyons. Surveys were flown at an altitude of 200 to 400 ft above ground level and an airspeed of 70 to 90 mph. Observations were made out of both sides of the aircraft along transects. When a possible den site was noted, the aircraft circled to allow further observations with binoculars to insure that the den probably was a kit fox den and warranted ground searching. Potential locations were plotted on topographic maps . 2.1.4 Live-Trapping* Live-traps were operated in an attempt to capture kit fox that might have been hunting on the area without leaving conspicuous signs along our field survey routes. Collapsible, double-door, National live-traps measuring 15 by 15 by 40 inches were placed in locations normally expected to be frequented by fox, such as along game trails, ridge lines, and in washes. Each trap was opened in late afternoon and baited with chicken parts. Traps were checked for captured animals the following morning shortly after sunrise. Traps were shut during the heat of the day to prevent accidental captures. 2.1.5 Interviews People familiar with Site 300 and the surrounding lands and animals were interviewed to obtain information on presence of kit fox over past years. We were particularly interested in interviewing night security personnel who have driven around Site 300 for several years, firefighters stationed at the nearby Castle Rock State Forestry Station, neighboring sheep ranchers, and highway patrolmen. 2.2 Amsinckia grandiflora Field methods used to search for additional populations of Amsinckia grandiflora were limited by the rugged terrain and the need to verify species identifications in the field. Walking surveys were conducted with priority for areas near the known location for the species, and to habitats elsewhere that appeared to be similar to that around Drop Tower 858. Six species of Amsinokia occur on Site 300. Some resemble each other superficially, but the most common, widely distributed species, A. tessellata, *Permission to live-trap this endangered species was granted by the State of California in a 9 April 1980 Memorandum of Understanding between the Depart- ment of Fish and Game and EG§G, and by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service through permit PRT. 2-4573. 2E-31 is not distinguishable from A. gvandiflova at more than a few meters. Thus positive identification of the species required examination of floral parts of each prospective clump of plants, and scanning large areas for likely habitats from a distance had to be supplemented by close examination of each suspected population. 2.2.1 Drop Tower 858 During April, observations were made of the known population of A. gvandiflova near Drop Tower 858. Plants were counted, examined for seed set, observed for evidence of disease or predation, and the number of both floral morphs were counted. Plants growing in association with A. gvandiflova were collected for identification. Observations were made of its site characteristics such as aspect, slope angle, soil type, elevation, density, and height of vegeta- tion. Locations of individual A. gvandiflova were drawn on a map. Evidence of erosion, surface disturbances, or signs of recent burning that might be related to Site 300 activities were noted. 2.2.2 Other Site 500 Surveys Road surveys were used to locate both the occurrence of A. gvandiflova and habitats resembling that below Drop Tower 858. Graded fire trails provided access to most of the ridges and drainages. We drove slowly along them while observating plants and potential suitable habitats. Frequent stops allowed us to walk across slopes to observe areas not visible from roads and trails. Promising areas seen during road surveys were observed more closely on foot. Generally, these were locations having west to northwest-facing slopes, loose soils on gully banks, and plant species known to occur with A. gvandiflova. The entire drainage around Drop Tower 858 was surveyed intensively on foot. Barren, rocky, south-facing slopes with shallow soils or exposed rock outcrops, and slopes covered by a dense sward of wild oats, Avena bavbata , are not considered to be likely habitats for A. gvandiflova and were not surveyed on foot. 2E-32 3. RESULTS 3.1 SAN JOAQUIN KIT FOX 3.1.1 Field Surveys Field surveys to find evidence of San Joaquin kit fox on Site 300 were conducted in March and April (during the survey for Amsinokia grandi flora) and in June and July, 1980 (Table 1). Intensively searched areas are indicated in Figure 1. No kit fox dens, tracks, or scats were observed. A fresh lagomorph gastrointestinal tract, often evidence of kit fox predation, was found on the bare ground in the eastern-perimeter fire break, but this was not unequivocal evidence of the presence of kit fox since other carnivores and raptorial birds also leave this portion of their prey. Ground surveys of private lands near Site 300 were conducted on 17 July and 19 August. Those areas surveyed off Site 300 are shown in Figure 2. No kit fox dens, tracks, scats, or remains of prey were observed. Appendix B list the vertebrates observed during these surveys. 3.1.2 Spotlight Surveys Seven spotlight surveys were conducted during the periods 2-4 June, 14-15 July, and 20 August, a total of 12 hours of observations for nocturnal animals along a 55-mile transect on Site 300 roads and trails. Although a number of mammals and birds were observed (Table 2) , no San Joaquin kit fox were seen. 3.1.3 Aerial Surveys On 16 July a 2-hour aerial survey was conducted along the northern boundary of Site 300 over the gentle foothills and valley floor from the north perimeter of Site 300 to Highway 580, and from the area of Patterson Pass to just east of Corral Hollow Road. Although kit fox and their dens had been reported from these areas in the past (Swick, 1973), none were seen during these aerial searches. Many large burrow systems were visible in pastures north of the Site, but numerous California ground squirrels, Spermophilus beecheyi , were observed on them, and the burrows were tentatively identified as ground squirrel colonies Subsequent ground surveys confirmed the aerial identification. The similarity in appearance between aerial observations of San Joaquin kit fox natal dens and large California ground squirrel colonies convinced us that aerial surveys to find kit fox dens were ineffective around Site 300. 2E-33 Table 1. San Joaquin kit fox survey, LLNL, Site 300, 1980 Date Type of Survey Locat ion* 17 March- 18 April 2 June 3 June 4 June 5 June 6 June 14 July 15 July 16 July 17 July 18 July 18 August 19 August 20 August 21 August Observations made for kit fox sign during driving and walking surveys for Amsinckia qrandi flora Night spotlight survey Driving/walking survey Night spotlight survey (Interviews with night security personnel) Walking survey Driving/walking survey Night spotlight survey Walking survey Driving/walking survey Walking survey Driving/walking survey Driving survey Night spotlight survey Walking survey Driving/walking survey (Interviews with personnel, Division of Forestry) Live-traps set Night spotlight survey Aerial survey Live-traps set Night spotlight survey Walking survey (Interview with ranch owner) Live-traps set Driving/walking survey Driving survey Live-traps set Walking survey Live-traps set Live-traps set Night spotlight survey Live-traps set See Table 4 NW, N, NE, E sectors NW, N sectors NW, N sectors Near Facility 831 E, NE sectors and near 852 NW, N, Cent sectors NW sector SW sector SE sector SE, S, SW, NW, N, NE, E sectors S, SW, W, N, NW sectors SE, E, N, NW, W sectors East perimeter of SE sector E, NE, N sectors Castle Rock Fire Station Trap locations 1-10 (Figure 1) NW, W, SW, Cent sectors North of Site 300 to Hwy 580, from Patterson Pass east to 2 mi E of Corral Hollow Rd . Trap locations 1-10 E, Cent, N, NW sectors Private land, ranch NW of Corral Hollow Rd. , E of Site 300 (Figure 2) Trap locations 1-10 NW, W, Cent sectors E, NE, N sectors Trap locations 1, 3-7, 10-13 Private land S of Jefferson Rd . , ca. 2 mi SE of jn Corral Hollow Rd. and Hwy 580 (Figure 2) Trap locations 1, 3-7, 10-13 Trap locations 1, 3-5, 10, 12-16 NW, Cent, N, NE sectors Trap locations 1, 5-5, 10,12-16 Mieneral locations, "sectors" referred to in this table, correspond to areas of Site 300 as shown here: NW in w Cud 1 •M S s I \ 2E-34 8 o I C a3 X O 4-i +J ■H M C •H 3 cr cc o •"5 c ni O 4-1 (/) X a) > u 3 0) o •H 00 4H a> o 00 o c o •H •M aJ o o o o CD ■H 00 — 1 a> 3 60 •H 2E-35 s -^; i \ o 4-> c •H Ph c o X o <4H c 3 a* rt h o 3 •"3 o ■M e c 3 o u en o > U o T3 oo d cti 3 i-t o *H * GOO o <4-l to o (/) -M C -H o co •H ■P •> 03 J o 2 O .-J J .-J cm 4> u 3 U> •H U-, 2E-36 lab] Table 2. Vertebrates observed during night spotlight surveys on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 Date Length (mi ) Duration (hr/min) MAMMALS Lepus cali formicus Black-tailed Jackrabbit Sylvilagus audubonii Audubon's Cottontail Dipodomys heermanni Heermann's Kangaroo Rat Peromysous sp. Deer Mouse and allies Taxidea taxa Badger Odocoileus hemionus Mule Deer Canis latrans Coyote BIRDS Athene auniaularia Burrowing Owl Tyto alba Barn Owl Bubo virginianus Great Horned Owl Asio flammeus Short -eared Owl Eremophila alpestris Horned Lark REPTILES ! June 7.5 2/35 Pituophis melanoleuous Gopher Snake 3.1.4 Live-Trapping l -20 2 3 3 June 4.8 1/20 4 June 12.8 1/20 16 17 7 14 July 9.2 2/0 27 18 30 2 1 28 15 July (. . 1 1/40 24 10 16 July 6.9 1/30 27 21 15 20 August 7 . 9 1/30 32 Between 15 July and 21 August, 70 trap nights (one live-trap set for one night) of effort were expended trapping for kit fox at trap locations 1-16 (Figure 1). No kit fox were live-trapped; however, four desert cottontails, Sylvilagus audubonii, a raccoon,, Prooyon lotor 3 and a striped skunk. Mephitis mephitis, were captured and released unharmed (Table 3). 3.1.5 Interviews Several guards insisted that two "families" of kit fox had been observed, one recently and often in a culvert below Facility 831, and another on a hill 2E-37 Table 3 Dates and results of live-trapping on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 at locations shown in Figure 1 Table 3 Date Trap Location 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 15 July 16 July 17 July 19 August 20 August 21 August 22 August S Syau Syau Syau Syau Prlo Meme Number of Trap-Nights 7 3 7 7 7 5 5 3 3 7 2 4 4 2 2 2 = 70 * S = trap sprung = trap open Syau = Sylvilagus audubonii Prlo = Procyon lotor Meme = Mephitis mephitis near Facility 852. Their descriptions did not mention key characteristics of the species which might have helped us to verify their identifications. Our doubts were substantiated when we visited the culvert and areas around the facilities, because no kit fox dens, scats, tracks, or prey remains were found. We did find holes dug by foraging badgers near 831. A sheep rancher claimed to have seen a kit fox denning on his property east of Site 300 several years ago, but he had not seen any this year. None of the other persons interviewed had seen San Joaquin kit fox on or near Site 300. 3.2 Amsinakia grandiflora Of the March, April, and June surveys (Table 4) only on the April survey were flowering plants observed, and these were at the site of the previously known location at Drop Tower 858. Although a large proportion of Site 300 was searched (Figure 1), no additional populations of A. grandiflora were found. The single population was distributed along the north- and northwest- facing slopes of a knoll at an average elevation of 960 ft (293 m) (Figure 3 and 4). Aspect ranged between 265° and 320°; slope varied between 10° and 40°. Soils supporting A. grandiflora appeared lighter in color and texture than the heavy-textured, dark gray soils typical of much of Site 300. Cole, et al (1943), classified soils of that drainage as "Linne clay loam, rock- outcrop phase," but this classification may be too general to allow application to that particular hillside where A. grandiflora was found. 2E-38 Table 4. Field surveys for Amsinakia gvandiflova on LLNL, Site 300, 1980 Table 4 Hate 17 March 18 March 3 April 4 April 16 April 17 April 18 April 5 June Type of Survey Observations at A . gvandiflova population (plant collections) Driving survey Walking survey (plant collections) Observations at A . gvandiflova population (plant collections) Walking survey (plant collections) Walking survey (plant collections) Driving/walking survey Walking survey Observations at A . gvandiflova population Driving/walking surveys (plant collections) Driving/walking survey (plant collections) Observations at A . gvandiflova population, drawing of schematic diagram (Figure 4) Driving/walking surveys Observations at A . gvandiflova population during kit fox survey Locat ion* Drop Tower 858 Drop Tower 858 Fire trails, SW sector Drainage 1 mi N of 858, W sector Drainage 1 mi N of 858, W sector Drop Tower 858 Drop Tower 858 Drainage S of 858 to Corral Hollow Rd. Drainage S of 858 to Corral Hollow Rd . Drainage 1 mi N of 858 through W sector Drainage 1 mi N of 858 through W sector SW sector Slopes east of Tower 858, S sector Drop Tower 858 SW, W sectors SW, W sectors S sector S sector Drop Tower 85* E and N sectors ■Drop Tower 858 Observation of Amsinakia gvandiflova A . gvandiflova; not in bloom. A. gvandiflova; starting to bloom, 21 counted 28 individuals of A. gvandiflova counted in peak bloom A. gvandiflova dead and dried, nutlets still attached 'General locations, "sectors'" referred to in this table, correspond to areas of Site 300 shown here: 2E-39 SCALE IN MILES Contour interval Figure 3. Location of Amsinokia grandiflora population below Drop Tower 858 on LLNL, Site 300, showing area of proposed critical habitat for this species Vegetation on the knoll was typical of that on steep north-facing slopes in the southwestern portion of Site 300. Annual grasses, Festuca megalura 3 Bromus rubens y Bromus tectorum s were dominant, but there were diverse annuals and perennials including Achillea borealis s Silene antirrhina, Stylomeaon heterophy lla, Tri folium variegatum, Montia perfoliate*, and Allium amplectans. These and others (Appendix A) were searched for as "indicator species" during surveys to find other populations of A. grandiflora. Grasses, notably Festuca, growing to a height of 2 decimeters (dm) were dominant on north-facing slope where the larger individuals of A. grandiflora grew in 1980. On the west and northwest-facing slopes with smaller A. grandiflora there was a sparse grass cover, and the soil was looser and lighter in color than on the north. Western and southern slopes supported dense stands of Mondlopia, Phacelia 3 Streptanthus 3 and A. tessellata. 2E-40 o 1— I 0) c o •H ■M rt H 3 D. o p« ■M o 00 8 o 6, tt V o o R o •t» ^ CO ll 4-> •H 1— 1 co 03 3 •V 13 -J •H 2 > J ■H -J -o c •v •H 00 LO <+H 00 o ^1 tfl 03 Ph o o o fH J Q 3 bO ■H [X. 2E-41 On 3 April, 21 plants were counted, including 12 "pins" (plants whose flowers have exserted styles) , "thrums" (plants whose flowers have exserted anthers), and two immature plants still in bud stage. On 17 April, 28 A. grandiflora were counted. Twenty individuals germinated outside the roped enclosure presumably delineating distribution of the population in earlier years. Five individuals were large plants about 7 dm in height, having branching stems and 5 to 10 inflorescences. The remaining individuals were smaller, 3 to 4 dm tall, and had only one or two inflorescences. All A. grandiflora appeared to be free of disease, and there was no evidence they were being eaten by animals. A cursory examination to determine seed set was made on 2 June when plants had dried. Most flowers had only 1 to 2 nutlets (maximum is four), a proportion observed previously (Ornduff , 1976) . Charred stumps of shrubs south of Drop Tower 858 and also west of A. grandiflora (Figure 4) indicated a recent burn, but the north and northwest faces of the knoll were free of charred material. No evidence of either recent surface disturbances or excessive erosion was observed. 2E-42 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS No evidence was found that the San Joaquin kit fox either visits or makes dens on Site 300, even though it has been observed in the past within three to five miles of the area. Based on this information, it is reasonable to conclude that Site 300 activities do not impact on the kit fox. No populations of Amsinakia grandiflora other than that one already known at Drop Tower 858 were found. Searches outside Site 300 in Contra Costa County have also been unsuccessful (Hanson, 1978). All available information suggests that the small population on Site 300 is the only one in existence. Because of this and the species' recent history, to be discussed subsequently, there is little doubt that A. grandiflora fulfills the legal description of an endangered species: "... any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range ..." Historical records suggest that A. grandiflora has always been a rare plant and that it has become rarer in this century. It was first described by Gray in 1876 and was known only from locations in the vicinity of Antioch, Contra Costa County (Ornduff, 1977). There is a collection from 1889 by O.L. Green "collected in Livermore Valley" as A. speatabilis and subsequently annotated as A. grandiflora by W.N. Suksdorf in 1931. In the California Academy of Sciences Herbarium there are numerous sheets of A. grandiflora from a locality "one mile north of Corral Hollow near Alameda County line, San Joaquin County," also several labelled "Corral Hollow, Alameda County," and one "central part of Corral Hollow, Alameda County." All of the latter were dated in the 1930's (Alva Day, Associate Curator, personal communication). Ornduff (1976) has reported on the population at Drop Tower 858. There were several thousand plants present in a dense population at the tower in 1966 and also in 1967. In 1974 the same area contained a relatively few individuals that occurred in small, widely scattered groups. In 1980 we counted 28 plants in the Drop Tower 858 population. Because the area adjacent to Drop Tower 858 now appears to be the sole site known for A. grandiflora, some history of the area and conditions around it seem appropriate. The drop tower was built in 1958, and its control room in 1978, which required no additional clearing (Roy K. Mullins, Jr., personal communication) . A heavy chain link fence surrounds the tower facility and associated parking area. A gate leading to Amsinakia population is kept locked. There is little evidence of human disturbances outside the chain fence with two exceptions . 1. On the outh side of the drop tower (the side away from the Amsinakia popula' ion) , heavy concrete blocks have been left near the bottom of the drainage channel . 2. East of the population, we noted some erosion below a drain pipe from the fenced enclosure. 2E-43 Some time in the last few years, steel posts and ropes were used to show the location of A. grandi flora . Although the stakes were in place in the spring of 1980, only a portion of area is still enclosed behind the deteriorated ropes. If there were overburdens of soil taken from the top of the knoll when the drop tower was constructed, no evidence remained in 1980. All slopes in the immediate vicinity of the A. grandiflora population are richly vegetated, as noted earlier. We observed no evidence of other conditions that might have affected A. grandiflora, but there is little natural history and no certain knowledge of specific requirements against which causes could be identified. Traditional causes to which loss of species might be attributed were not present: recent construction of roads or buildings, vehicle traffic, foot traffic, field collec- tion of plants, grazing by live stock, or land clearing for agriculture. Absence of obvious physical causes for the decline of A. grandiflora has been indirectly acknowledged by others by the introduction of hypotheses citing other possible causes. Ray and Chisaki (1957) suggested a hypothesis based on evolutionary principles. They pointed out that A. tessellata, a homostylic species, (abundant on Site 300) probably evolved from A. grandiflora, a heterostylic species. They suggested that when homostylic populations arise from heterostylic, the latter may be crowded out and thereby replaced. Ornduff (1976) followed this same reasoning and suggested "It is possible that the greater reproductive success of these weedy species has allowed them to displace A. grandiflora over much of the latter's former range." He suggests that the restricted distribution is perhaps associated with its "archaic and relatively inefficient reproductive system." As a speculation of how A. grandiflora persists on Site 300 after its disappearance elsewhere, two conditions are evident. First, grazing by livestock is absent. Second, the area is still subject to controlled burning, whereas fires on agriculturally developed lands are strongly suppressed. That the burning on Site 300 is a factor in altering species composition was apparent in the spring of 1980. On many hills, especially on the north end of Site 300, there were herbaceous annual species that produced massive displays of color, unlike similar slopes and exposures on the agricultural lands surrounding Site 300 where flowering annuals were relatively rare. The report by Ornduff (1976) concerning numbers of plants from year to year suggested another possible unknown concerning the occurrence of A. grandiflora, viz., year-to-year oscillations in population size and area extent. Many annual populations of herbaceous species are known to fluctuate, generally attributed to particular environmental conditions such as temperature regimes, times and amounts of precipitation, and other factors. But little is known about these fluctuations except that they occur. It is also possible that the Ray and Chisaki hypothesis is correct; that we are witnessing the final stages of an evolutionary process by which A. grandi- flora is being displayed by its descendants, abetted by competition from introduc- tions of exotic species of grasses. 2E-44 It is apparent that broader studies are needed to assist in understanding not only what has occurred but also for assistance in maintaining Amsinakia grandiflora in its present habitat, or establishing it elsewhere. 1 ENDANGERED SPECIES ON SITE 300 AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 4.1.1 San Joaquin Kit Fox This study appears to fulfill LLNL obligation under terms of the ESA. Since the kit fox does not occur on Site 300, LLNL activities obviously do not impact on the species, and LLNL has no further responsibilities under implementing regulations of the Act. An informal consultation with U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) in Sacramento would appear to be in order to report this conclusion This report might be submitted to support this position. 4.1.2 Amsinokia grandiflora We already noted that this species appears to qualify as endangered under ESA. On 15 December 1980, the Department of the Interior published a list of native plant taxa being considered for listing as Endangered or Threatened under ESA (Federal Register, 45(242) :82480-82569) . Amsinokia grandiflora was listed under Category 1, "Taxa for which the Service presently has sufficient informa- tion on hand to support the biological appropriateness of their being listed as Endangered or Threatened species." The FWS in Sacramento has compiled a candidacy package, including designation of a proposed critical habitat, required for a formal proposal for listing the species as Endangered (Monty Knudsen, FWS, Sacramento, 1980, personal communication), and publication of its candidacy appears imminent. Once candidacy intent is published, ESA amendments require that A. grandiflora be given the same protection as if it were already listed. ESA then requires a review of possible impacts of nonconstruction projects to determine whether those actions may affect the species or its designated critical habitat — tentatively proposed as the western quarter of Section 28, T3S; R4E. If LLNL activities are considered to have a negative impact, then LLNL is required to request a conference with FWS, while A. grandiflora is a candidate, or a formal consultation after it is formally listed. The purpose of either meeting is to allow the Department of Interior to evaluate the seriousness of impact of the proposed activities and to resolve potential conflicts through mitigation. For construction in the area, ESA regulations stipulate informing the Regional Director, FWS, of the proposed activities prior to initiation. LLNL is responsible for providing both the biological information needed to conduct either a consultation or conference, and the preparation of a Biological Assessment before formal consultations are initiated. Information needed includes: 1) on-site inspection to determine presence of the species, 2) reviews of scientific literature and data, 3) interviews with recognized experts, 4) a review and analysis of the effects of the proposed activities on the species and its habitat, including cumulative effects, and 5) an analysis of how possible impacts might be mitigated. With this study, LLNL has completed items 1) and 2). Information for assessment of impacts will of course be specific to the actions contemplated, and item 5) will depend in part on the action contemplated, or may not be possible considering the state of knowledge about the species. 2E-45 If A, gvandiflova becomes a candidate for endangerment or is declared Endangered, regardless of the reason for its decline and because it occurs on Site 300, LLNL, with the assistance of the Secretary of the Interior, must carry out a program to conserve the species. In anticipating FWS questions, we have speculated as to Site 300 activities that might be considered as impacting on the species based on Appendix 3B, Environ- mental Assessment, Site 300, originally included in the draft Environmental Impact Statement for LLNL (DOE EIS-0028-D) . These impacts may be harmful or beneficial, or both, with the balance lying somewhere between. Activities include explosives testing, controlled burning, application of herbicides, grading and maintaining fire trails, and construction or modification of drop tower facilities. High explosive tests may produce 1) blast, 2) shrapnel and fires from the hot frag- ments, 3) low-level radioactive debris, and 4) possibly toxic or beneficial nitrogenous materials or gases. Cumulative effects are even more speculative. Since FWS already has informally expressed concern about possible negative effects of burning (Monty Knudsen, FWS, Sacramento, 1980, personal communication), LLNL can expect the FWS will request information in an attempt to determine whether controlled burning poses a threat to species or habitat. We note that current management calls for avoidance of burning on the knoll supporting A. gvandiflova (RoyMullins, 1980, personal communication). Although use of herbicides has been curtailed since preparation of the Draft EIS, LLNL can expect to be questioned about the use of herbicides for weed control along roads, telephone poles, parking lots, or firing tables in the area. Grading of fire trails and construction activities for parking facilities that might affect runoff into the critical habitat will be questioned. We note that Ornduff (1977) speculated that changes in the local runoff due to construc- tion of Drop Tower 858 might have contributed to the decline of A. grandiflova. In discussions with FWS, LLNL might note that despite the possibility of adverse impacts of LLNL activities, A. gvandiflova probably exists only because of the protection within a security area, even though the factors responsible for its disappearance elsewhere are speculative. As mentioned above, Ornduff (1977) linked its extirpation to the introduction of domestic livestock. He also suggested that introduction of alien winter annual grasses (principally of Bvomus on Site 300) may affect the welfare of A. gvandiflova. Once the species is listed, LLNL can expect that FWS will likely suggest adopting a management plan, like they did at Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve. Successful application of such a plan implies an understanding of the species' life cycles, ecological requirements, and habitat interactions. Much of this information does not exist, but other investigations ought to produce sufficient information for a management plan that will conserve and benefit A. gvandiflova without interfering with Site 300 activities. Objectives of such investigations might include the following: 1. Determination of the ecological or life history characteristics responsible for its past and present distribution pattern 2. Assessment of the species reproductive capacity with regard to the following parameters: a. With chronic burning 2E-46 b. In the presence of dense winter annual grasses c. In competition with other species of Amsinekia d. In the absence of domestic herbivores or with grazing by them e. On soils containing products of explosive testing 3. Development of management strategies that would contribute to conservation of the species might include: a. Curtailment of testing at Drop Tower 858 if information develops that A. grandiflora might be vulnerable to impacts of testing b. Implementation of controlled burning that might have proven useful in 2a above c. Provide supplemental irrigation in dry years, if evidence indicates that reproduction would be aided 4. Exploration of ways in which A. grandiflora might be established or re-established in other, more remote areas of Site 300, or to portions of its former range Such studies should be based on cul and Chisaki (1957) raised this spec to be the best way to accumulate se planting elsewhere. Subjecting the very unwise, since the risk of exti great. Some of these suggested act be possible. The highest priority population in its present habitat, priority. tivated populations of A. grandiflora. Ray ies under glass at Berkeley, and this appears ed for experimentation or particularly for wild population to manipulation would be net ion to such a small population is too ivities are certainly idealized and may not appears to be increasing the numbers of the and research can be planned around that 2E-47 5. RECOMMENDATIONS An informal consultation with FWS will satisfy LLNL obligations under ESA for the San Joaquin kit fox, since LLNL activities do not impact on that endangered species. An informal consultation with FWS, as a continuation of those already held, should be initiated in anticipation of the probability that Amsinokia grandiflora is likely to be listed as Endangered. Since a conservation and management plan for execution by LLNL management to protect Amsinckia grandiflora appears likely, LLNL might consider what such a plan might entail, perhaps with the following priorities: 1. It should provide for an annual survey of the population on Site 300 and elsewhere, based on joint funding with FWS, or their cooperation. 2. Its primary objective should be to increase the size of the present population. 3. If the population increases or remains stable, emphasis in the management plan should turn to other objectives, such as: a. Investigation of its natural history, its development, pollinators, and seed production b. Understanding the following effects: (1) Competition from exotic grasses (2) Competition from other Amsinokia (3) Grazing by livestock (4) Burning (5) Other effects, possibly those from test activities 4. Until the population can be increased, or if it cannot be increased, it should not be manipulated, with the possible exception of removal of a small number of seeds for the purpose of growing elsewhere, possibly under glass or in a lath house. (We note that Prof. Robert Ornduff , University of California, Berkeley offered a seed supply in the spring of 1980.) 2E-48 LITERATURE CITED Anonymous. 1978. Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Livermore Site, Livermore, California. U.S. Department of Energy DOE/EIS 0028-D. Anonymous. 1974. (unpublished) Appendix 3B: Environmental Assessment, Site 300, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. Revised August, 1974. 37 pp. Cole, R.C., L.F. Koehler, F.C. Eggers, and A.M. Goff. 1943. Soil survey of the Tracy Area, California. U.S. Department of Agriculture and University of California Experiment Station, Soil Survey Series 1938, No. 5. Gray. A. 1876. Botany of California 1:525 in California Geological Survey. University of California Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hanson, L. 1978. Status report for Amsinckia grandiflora. Unpublished document, Endangered Plant Program, California Department of Fish and Game, Sacramento. 4 pp. Laughrin, L. 1970. San Joaquin kit fox, its distribution and abundance. Wildlife Management Branch Administrative Report No. 70-2, California Depart- ment of Fish and Game, Sacramento. 20 pp. Mclntyre, D.R. and J.S. Johnson. 1980. A naturalist's view of Site 300 in Corral Hollow Valley. Unpublished LLNL Pre-print, UCRL-84300. 34 pp. Morrell, S.H. 1975. San Joaquin kit fox distribution and abundance in 1975. Wildlife Management Branch Administrative Report No. 75-3, California Depart- ment of Fish and Game, Sacramento. 27 pp. Ornduff, R. 1976. The reproductive system of Amsinckia grandiflora, a distylous species. Systematic Botany, 1:57-66. Ornduff, R. 1977. Rare plant status report, Amsinckia grandiflora. Unpublished document compiled for the California Native Plant Society, Sacramento. 4 pp. Ray, P.M. and H.F. Chisaki. Studies on Amsinckia. I: A Synopsis of the genus with a study of heterostyly in it. American Journal of Botany } 44:529-536 . Swick, CD. 1973. Determination of San Joaquin kit fox range in Contra Costs, Alameda, San Joaquin and Tulare Counties, 1973. Special Wildlife Investigations Report, Project W-54-R-4, California Department of Fish and Game, Sacramento. 15 pp. 2E-49 APPENDIX A: PLANTS OBSERVED ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, 1980 Cupressaceae Juniperus ealifornioa Amaranthaceae Amaranthus sp. Asteraceae Achillea borealis ssp. ealifornioa Artemisia ealifornioa Baeria ehrysostoma ssp. gracilis Coreopsis oallipsida Evax sp. Gutierrezia braeteate Haplopappus sp. Eemizonia kelloggii Eemizonia ssp. Holooarpha oboonioa Layia platyglossa Monolopia lanoeolata Boraginaceae Amsinokia grandiflora Amsinokia intermedia Amsinokia lyoopsoides Amsinokia menziesii Amsinokia tessellata Amsinokia vemieosa Cryptantha intermedia Plagiobothrys sp. Brassicaceae Streptanthus sp . Thysanooarpus ourvipes *C *c *c c c *c c *c c *c c Campanulaceae Downingia bella Caprifoliaceae Sambuous mexioana Caryophyllaceae Silene antirrhina Cucurbitaceae Murah maorooarpus Ericaceae Arotostaphylos sp. Fabaceae Lotus subpinnatus Lupinus albifrons Lupinus bioolor Lupinus densiflorus Tri folium variegatum Fagaceae Querous douglasii Geraniaceae Erodium oioutarium Hippocastanaceae Aesoulus ealifornioa Hydrophyllaceae Eriodiotyon sp. Phaoelia tanaoeti folia *C *C *c *c *c Plant species that occur with Amsinokia grandiflora on the slope below Drop Tower 858, used as indicator species in our searches for potential A. grandiflora habitat. Plant species that were collected during the course of the 1980 field surveys . 2E-50 Lamiaceae Marrubium vulgar e Salvia mellifera Loasaceae Mentzelia a f finis *C Onagraceae Camissonia hoothii ssp. deoortioans Camissonia micrantha Camissonia strigulosa Clarkia purpurea Clarkia unguiculata * Papaveraceae Eschscholzia calif ornica Platystemon calif ornicus Stylomecon heterophylla *c *c Polemoniaceae Gilia capitata ssp. staminea Gilia clivorum Gilia tricolor c c c Polygonaceae Eriogonum fasciculatum Eriogonum sp. Portulacaceae Calandrinia ciliata var. menziesii Montia perfoliata c *c Ranunculaceae Delphinium hesperium Delphinium sp. Ranunculus canus c c Rosaceae Prunus sp . Rubiaceae Galium aparine C Salicaceae Populus fremontii Salix sp. Saxifragaceae Ribes sp. Scrophulariaceae Castilleja foliolosa C Collinsia heterophylla c Mimulus sp. Orthocarpus purpurascens *c Scrophularia calif ornica Urticaceae Urtica holoseriacea Eesperocnide tenella Amaryllidaceae Allium amplectans *c Dichelostemma pulchella *c Tritelia laxa *c Poaceae Bromus mollis *c Bromus rubens *c Bromus tectorum *c Festuca megalura *c Mellica calif ornica c Poa scabrella *c Sitanion sp. * Stipa cernua c Plant species that occur with Amsinckia grandi flora on the slope below Drop Tower 858, used as indicator species in our searches for potential A. grandi flora habitat. Plant species that were collected during the course of the 1980 field survey. 2E-51 APPENDIX B: VERTEBRATES OBSERVED ON LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY, SITE 300, 1980 MAMMALS Didelphis marsupialis Opossum Lepus calif amicus Black-tailed Jackrabbit Sylvilagus audubonii Desert Cottontail Spermophilus beeoheyi California Ground Squirrel Thomomys bottae Southern Pocket Gopher Perognathus calif ornicus California Pocket Mouse Dipodomys heevmanni Heermann's Kangaroo Rat Pevomyscus maniculatus Deer Mouse Neotoma fuscipes Dusky-footed Wood Rat Mus musculus House Mouse Canis latrans Coyote Procyon lotov Raccoon Taxidea taxus Badger Mephitis mephitis Striped Skunk Lynx rufus Bobcat Odocoileus hemionus Mule Deer T T T T T T - Live-trapped 1980 2E-52 APPENDIX 2F A Cultural Resource Inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300, Alameda and San Joaquin Counties, California Purchase Order No. 2628801 May, 1981 2P-1 A Cultural Resource Inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300, Alameda and San Joaquin Counties, California University of California Purchase Order No. 2628801 For Contract No. W-7405-ENG. 48 With the Department of Energy PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR Colin I. Busby BY Colin I. Busby, Donna M. Garaventa and Larry S. Kobori With the Technical Assistance of P.E. Endzweig, D.J. Fee, R.M. Harmon, A.C. Oetting and F.M. Oglesby BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC. 31162 San Clemente Street Suite 110 Hayward, California 94544 May, 1981 2F-2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A Class III cultural resources inventory was undertaken of ca. 7000 acres of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 property. Twenty- four cultural resource properties and twenty-five site types were located and recorded. Of the properties, three are prehistoric, twenty historic and one is a multicomponent site. Historic cultural resources comprise 83% of the total site assemblage. In terms of defined site types, historic petroglyphs and structures are the most representative of the recorded cultural resources. A brief site locale analysis, utilizing the inventory data, indicates that cultural resources occurrence is associated more strongly with the canyon-gully landforms than the foothills. Based on this analysis, it is probable that there is a greater probability of impacting cultural resources when projects occur in and around canyon-gully areas. The majority of the sites are either of CRES S3 or S4 significance ("low significance") and while they merit consideration by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, that consideration should be mostly of a defensive nature. Only four of the cultural resource properties are either potential or eligible resources for the National Register of Historic Places and merit a high degree of consideration by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. No Native American or other ethnic cultural locales were noted during the inventory. Management recommendations for both general and specific cultural resources indicate a variety of options ranging from patrolling/surveillance to their designation as "Spec.'l Management Areas." Several sites are recommended for selective subsurface testing to fuTly evaluate their National Register significance. One site, the habitation/residence area of the former town of Carnegie, is recommended for nomination to the National Register after a limited testing/archival research program. 2F-3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents i 2F-4 List of Figures 2F-5 List of Tables . . ' 2F-6 Acknowledgements 2F-7 INTRODUCTION 2F-8 NATURAL SETTING 2F-11 PREHISTORY 2F-16 ETHNOGRAPHY 2F-20 Costanoans 2F-20 Northern Valley Yokuts 2F-25 HISTORIC OVERVIEW 2F-28 Introduction 2F-28 Compilation Sources 2F-29 Hispanic Period 2F-29 American Period 2F-32 FIELD RECONNAISSANCE ' 2F-55 Field Methodology 2F-55 Inventory Results 2F-57 SITE LOCALE ANALYSIS 2F-79 SITE SIGNIFICANCE 2F-84 SITE PROTECTION MEASURES 2F-86 CULTURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS 2F-88 REFERENCES CITED 2F-92 APPENDICES - Correspondence, Site Types, CRES System, Site Forms, Sample Unit Forms and Photographic Records ATTACHED 2F-4 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 - Figure 2 - Figure 3 - Figure 4 - Figure 5 - Figure 6 - Figure 7 - Figure 8 - Figures 9 Figure 13 Figure 14 Figure 15 Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18 LLNL Site 300 Location Map 2F-9 Project Area 2F If) Costanoan Ethnic Groups and Tribelets 2F-21 Boundaries of the Plains Miwok and their Neighbors 2F-26 San Joaquin County (1870) 2F 50 Alameda County (1878) 2F 51 San Joaquin County (1878) ?F 5? Alameda County (1896) 2F-53 - 12 - Historic Maps 2F-54 - Cultural Resources Inventory Record 2F 61 - Historic Site Survey Form 2F-65 - Short Form, Cultural Resources Inventory Record 2F-66 - Rock Art Recording Form .... ~r , -, 3 2F-67 - Sample Unit Recording Form .... or -, r 3 2F-75 - Site Inventory Map 2F-78 2F-5 LIST OF TABLES Table 1 - Observed Common Forbs of the Project Area 2F-14 Table 2 - Generalized Central California Prehistoric Culture Sequence . . . 2F-19 Table 3 - Transect Orientation 2F-55 Table 4 - Non-Surveyed Areas 2F-57 Table 5 - General Site Inventory Results 2F-58 Table 6 - LLNL Site 300 - Site Types 2F-58 Table 7 - Summary of Survey Units with Cultural Resources Present 2F-81 Table 8 - Summary - Cultural Resource Occurrence 2F-81 Table 9 - Chi-Square Test - Landform and Cultural Resource Occurrence . . . 2F-82 Table 10 - Fisher's Exact Probability Test - Landform and Cultural Resource Occurrence 2F-83 Table 11 - Site Significance Ratings 2F-85 Table 12 - Selected Types of Impacts Applicable to Site 300 2F-86 Table 13 - Protection Measures 2F-86 Table 14 - Passive Protection Measures 2F-88 2F-6 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The cultural resources inventory of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 were contracted for by the University of California and the Department of Energy. To Ms. Violet Churchill, Mr. Carl Lindekin, Mr. Art Toy, Mr. Roy K. Mull ins, Mr. Owen Van Dyke and the Security Officers of Site 300 we express our thanks for their field assistance and advice. Numerous people contributed their support and expertise to the project and helped make it a success. To those who we have not mentioned below, please accept our apologies and thanks. The authors are indebted to our dedicated field crew who worked under extremely trying conditions and tolerated all of the hardships of an early spring field project: Pamela Endzweig, David Fee, Bob Harmon, Chip Oetting and Fred Oglesby. A special note of thanks is due to the members of Basin Research Associates Technical Staff for their assistance in preparing the report: Chip Oetting, forms processing and site summaries; Pamela Endzweig, vegetation, climate and fauna research; Fred Oglesby, geology and geomorphology; Pat Ogrey and Melody Tannam, maps and report production; Bob Harmon, photography; and, Melissa Eizenberg, graphics. A note of thanks is due to the staffs of the Bancroft Library and the Stockton San Joaquin County Public Library for their generous assistance. Dr. James C. Bard, Basin Research Associates is thanked for his general advice and comments on the report. 2F-7 INTRODUCTION This report presents the results of a literature/archive search and a Class III cultural resource field inventory of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300. This study was commissioned for inclusion in a Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory environmental impact statement and is specifically directed towards determining the eligibility of specific sites or areas for inclusion as historical properties on the National Register of Historic Places. The intent of this study, completed during the months of April and May, is to provide Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory with a brief overview and synthesis of the existing cultural record, including historic, prehistoric, and ethnographic data available for the project area as well detail the results of an intensive cultural resources field inventory of the LLNL Site 300 area. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in cooperation with the United States Department of Energy, is mandated by the Antiquities Act of 1906, the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960 (as amended by Public Law 93-291), the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (as amended), the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Executive Order 11593, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, the Archaeological Protection Act of 1979 (among other Federal legislation) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to identify, evaluate and protect prehistoric, historic and ethnic cultural resources on lands under its jurisdiction. The purpose of this study is to provide data on the cultural resources within the project boundaries and in the immediate vicinity that can contribute material for informed management decisions that will minimize any present or future impacts to the resources and encourage long-term planning that may result in the conservation and protection of a non-renewable portion of America's heritage. The area of this investigation is the present Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 located in the region north of Corral Hollow, approx- imately 8.5 miles northwest of Tracy, San Joaquin County, California (Fig. 1). The project area is included within Township 3 South, Range 4 East (Mount Diablo Meridian), and Sections 15-17, 20-22, 26-29, and portions of 8-10, 25, 33-35 of the Tracy and Midway USGS 7.5 minute topographic quadrangles (1968 edition) (Fig. 2). The majority of the approximate 7000 acres of the project lies within San Joaquin County with a small portion of the western area within Alameda County (Fig. 2). 2F-8 LOCATION MAP LLNL SITE 300 ,-w—' SAN JOAQUIN 'Tracy *San Jose SANTA CLARA -3? \.> * 10 II Figure 1 2F-9 / « '-.. 4,. ". I. - .v. ■.*-*"...- .:^ r v r*-* V: « < s- r ^- *.v. ''•' 4 3' '^. ~~ ~/ -j*- - ■"-'- -.— tr - — ** ■ : - 1 .•• ° /■ r - n ; ~i / • ° * % '- > -/ ,iM:j a. ' If!: . =£»■ " T y-..y ■: • -. 4 Sr - *-£ s e a ."*. • . n • , - -^.^ -:i>- r . ...; - /•<■,- ~ ■ few- k» '"-.'-. -^-^^z B § I *& W'r : '*J ' V'.' I'.-V* "2/-": ^~ Jf'.J v >- 2*-r?'-~ 5 ^', ,i lr -^v r/5a A*" / 7 / ~ -. ?• 1 '4 jfi^^jaS , ./.>>»*K*i Figure 2 - Project Area 2F-10 NATURAL SETTING The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 is located in an area of rolling hills immediately to the north of Corral Hollow, a pass in the Diablo Range of central California. The hill slopes vary from gentle to extremely steep with elevations ranging from 600 feet on the floodplain of Corral Hollow Creek to approximately 1722 feet at the West Observation Point within the site. Drainages separate the larger hills with deep, near vertical walled canyons. The drainages have no floodplains or terraces present. The specific regional geology has been described by Huey (1948) who has noted a three formation geologic sequence ranging in age from upper Cretaceous to Mio-Pliocene. The upper Cretaceous Panoche formation is the oldest present on Site 300. This formation is divided into two general groups: (1) sands and sand- stones; and, (2) conglomerate. The massive sandstones, grey weathering to tan or buff and with fine to medium grains, characterize 60% of this formation. The grains are angular and the sorting is fair (Huey 1948). Conglomerates are wery uncommon among rocks of upper Cretaceous age in the area and are only prominent on Rocky Ridge (Huey 1948). No conglomerates of the Panoche formation were observed during the survey of LLNL Site 300. The Cierbo formation is a transgressive formation of upper Miocene age. 'Several different types of lithologies, including beds of quartzose sand and conglomerate, are present. Beds of quartzose sand are \/ery common in the mapping unit (cf. Huey 1948) and can be seen in the canyons south of the West Observation Point. The sands are poorly sorted, coarse grained, massive and cross-bedded, friable, steaked with limonite and carry round pebbles of quartz and black chert (Huey 1948). The black chert was not observed at Site 300. The conglomerate carries rounded pebbles and cobbles of quartz, vari- colored chert, lavendar quartzite and sandstone. Northwest of this area the conglomerate carries angular pebbles and cobbles of Franciscan chert and sandstone characteristic of the base of the Cierbo formation (Huey 1948). The Neroly formation is of transitional Mio-Pliocene age and like the Panoche and Cierbo formations has sandstones and conglomerates present. The sandstones of this formation are a distinctive blue color. Neroly conglomer- ates consist of round andesitic pebbles and cobbles, 5 to 13 cm in diameter, set in a matrix of blue sandstone (Huey 1948). This formation is found throughout the Site 300 area and a number of rockshelters have been formed 2F-11 in the sandstone by wind and water. The depositional history of the area is that of a shallow sea and coast line. The Panoche formation was deposited in a shallow sea during the upper Cretaceous. This deposition was followed by a period of folding and erosion until the upper Miocene. During this period, the Cierbo formation was formed during a sea expansion. It rests with angular unconformity upon Panoche rock. Environmental change marked the transition from the Miocene to Pliocene and the formation of the Neroly group. In most places the Neroly overlies the Cierbo unconformably and there are slight angular discordances between the attitudes of bedding in the two formations. This break marks a change from a marine environment to a broad floodplain or coastal plain as a local site of deposition for the Neroly (Huey 1948). Folding took place after the deposition of the Neroly formation. Two major synclines and one anticline are present within the boundaries of Site 300 (cf. Huey 1948). Faulting occurred concurrent with this folding with the combination creating the ridge which traverses Site 300. Stream down cutting and modern soil formation began with the faulting and folding actions. The streams drain into two major drainages both of which follow synclines and faults. Elk Ravine follows the Patterson Pass syncline and fault while Corral Hollow Creek follows the Corral Hollow syncline and fault. Elk Ravine drains the northernmost portion of Site 300 and south to the ridge top. Corral Hollow Creek drains the remainder south of the ridge top. Small alluvial fans have developed in the southern part of Site 300 just north of Corral Hollow Road and Corral Hollow Creek has a well developed flood plain and terrace on the northside just south of Site 300. No flood- plain or terraces are present for Elk Ravine. Soil creep and slumping were observed in the field only on the steepest slopes. The soils for Site 300 and vicinity have been mapped and described by Welch et al . (1966). All of the soils are either clay or clay loam on moderate to steep slopes (cf. Welch et al . 1966). The soils formed under a mesothermal climate of cool, moist winters and hot, dry summers. They contain relatively large amounts of organic matter and are suggestive of thick stands of perennial grasses and scattered oak woodland. The parent material was weathered, fine-grained sandstone with environmental conditions similar to the present. Floristically the project area is transitional between a Coastal Prairie 2F-12 ecotype and the somewhat more arid Valley Grassland of interior California (Munz and Keck 1959, Plant Communities 24 and 25). Annual grasses such as wild oats ( Avena fatua ), rye ( Secale sp . ) , soft chess and foxtail brome ( Bromus mollis ; B. rubens ) and fescue ( Festuca spp .; e.g., foxtail fescue, F_. megal ura ) predominate with overgrazing having reduced the native cover of perennial bunchgrasses such as threeawn ( Aristida spp .), needlegrasses ( Stipa spp. ) and bluegrasses ( Poa spp .). During the first three weeks of the survey, large numbers of blooming forbs could be identified (Table 1) most of which had died by mid-May when the field work was completed. Trees and shrubs are iso- lated and infrequent and generally confined to the better soil and moisture conditions provided by springs and the lower slopes of ephemeral drainage channels. They include valley oak ( Quercus lobata ), Fremont cottonwood ( Populus fremontii ), California buckeye ( Aesculus cal i fornica ) , poison oak ( Rhus diversiloba ) , willow ( Sal i x sp .), and chamise ( Adenostoma fasciculatum ) . A number of scattered arborescent shrubs with small scale-like leaves were observed, probably representing a species of juniper ( Juniperus californica ?). Spring areas of shallow sub-surface water exhibit marshy vegetation including cattail ( Typha sp.), tule ( Scirpus sp.) and sedges ( Carex spp . ). Jimsonweed ( Datura meteloides ) was noted in close proximity to and possibly associated with Site 26.1. As the project area is situated well to the north of the biogeographical range of this plant (cf. Jaeger 1941:229), its presence may suggest introduction during historic times. Additional detailed information on the Corral Hollow region may be found in Sharsmith (1965), Smith (1959), Crampton (1974), Bakker (1971) and Ornduff (1974). Wildlife is abundant and could be observed frequently during the survey. Most numerous are small rodents, of which ground squirrels ( Ci tell us beecheyi ) were particularly visible. Other members of the Rodentia order present include chipmunk ( Eutamias sp. ) , California vole ( Microtus cal ifornicus ) , mouse ( Peromyscus spp .), pack rat ( Neotoma fuscipes ), pocket mouse ( Perognathus inornatus ) among others. Rabbits are common with black-tailed rabbit ( Lepus cal ifornicus ) somewhat more visible than the brush rabbit ( Sylvilagus auduboni ) The availability of this large population of small mammals and the protected nature of the Site 300 area have allowed for the establishment of numerous predator species. Observed carnivores included coyote (Cam's latrans) , 2F-13 bobcat ( Lynx rufus ) , skunk ( Mephites mephites or Spilogale putoris ), badger ( Taxidea taxus ) , buteos, turkey vultures and several owl species). Lizards and snakes were observed (cf. Stebbins 1959 for additional information). Adult and juvenile mule deer ( Odocoileus hemionus ) were spotted through- out the duration of the project. Detailed information on the local fauna can be found in Berry and Berry (1959). Table 1 Observed Common Forbs of the Project Area Lupine Purple sanicle, snake root Fiddleneck Morning glory Tidy tips Buckwheat Soap plant Yarrow Wild cucumber Filaree Owl ' s clover Indian paintbrush California poppy Grass nut Blue dick White mariposa lily Cal i fornia mustard Miner's lettuce Iris Blue-eyed grass Wild onion Black sage Lupinus sp . Sanicula b ipinnatifida Amsi nckia sjpj). Convolvulus sp . Layia pla tyglossa Eriogonum sp . Chloragal urn pomeridianum Achillea mil lefolium Ma rah f abace us E rod i urn sp . Orthocarpus densiflorus Castil leja affinis Eschscholzia cal ifornica Brodiaea laxa B. pulchella Calochortus venus tus Thely podium lasioph yllum Montia perfol iata Iris sp . Sisyrinchium bel Turn A1 1 i urn sp. Salvia mellifera With regard to climate, California exhibits the Mediterranean pattern of summer drought and winter rainfall caused by the seasonal north-south migration of a high pressure center over the Pacific Northwest. Situated within the eastern ridges and canyons of the Diablo Range, the project area itself is subject to a rainshadow effect that inhibit the precipitation of coastally derived moisture over this region. These conditions result in the low average annual precipitation of 14.4 inches for the Town of Livermore (El ford 1970) and even less for the more sheltered project area. While the interior location of Site 300 accounts for lower precipitation figures, it is at the same time responsible for the more continental aspect of its seasonal temperature variation. Though snow is infrequent, the area does 2F-14 experience a short frost-free period, with 100-150 frost-free days for the Livermore area. Seasonal temperatures average 71.7 F in July and 46.1 F in January, spanning a broader range than in the coastal region to the west (El ford 1970). Greater detail on the general area is available in Gilliam (1962). 2F-15 PREHISTORY Direct archaeological data for the inland project area are sorely lacking although basic comparative information for the greater Bay Area and central California in general is available. The San Francisco Bay Area was first regarded as an archeological unit by N.C. Nelson in 1909 who observed that: "... enough is known to warrant the statement that a general similarity in culture obtains for the entire region; but the differences, if any, remain to be brought clearly (to light) (Nelson 1909:327)." Uhle (1907) and Nelson (1909, 1910) contributed to the earliest studies of the regional prehistory. In specific, Uhle (1907) was responsible for the first published report on a Bay Area shellmound in Emeryville. Using stratigraphy for chronological control, he reported change through time in burial customs, in the frequency of certain artifact forms, and in the relative proportions of oyster and clam shells in the midden. Nelson (1909) later suggested a general similarity in culture among Bay Area shellmounds. He reported on his excavation at the Ellis Landing site and argued for the general cultural unity of all inhabitants of the site. Nelson did note a change from a preponderance of mussel shell in lower levels to that of clam in higher levels and suggested that this was an involuntary adaptation to environmental change on the Bay bottom. Kroeber (1925) believed that the San Francisco Bay region was a culture zone that remained spatially and temporally homogenous. Bickel (1976:10) notes that Kroeber based his early summary of California prehistory on archeological data from the Bay Area. Based on his analysis, Kroeber (1925: 926) concluded that: "... the upshot of the correlation of the findings of archaeology and ethnology is that not only the general California culture area, but even its subdivisions or provinces, were determined a long time ago and have ever since maintained themselves with relatively little change. " By 1929, local and regional sequences of culture change were developed elsewhere in the state. Theodoratus et al . (1979:35) have suggested that studies by Schenck and Dawson (1929), M.J. Rogers (1929) and D.B. Rogers (1929) established chronologies in the Lodi area of the San Joaquin Valley, the Yuman area of southern California and along the Santa Barbara Coast, respectively. 2F-16 Lillard, Heizer and Fenenga (1939) proposed the first significant chronological sequence to document cultural change in prehistoric Central California. Evidence from mortuary practices and decorative artifacts indicated that variation in modes of burial of the dead and differences in the relative abundances of associated artifacts were the result of cultural change. A three part classification scheme was developed and was comprised of an Early, Transitional and Late Horizon. Beardsley (1948, 1954) later refined this sequence into what is now known as the Central California Taxonomic System with his Transitional Horizon being named the Middle Horizon (Table 2 ). Heizer and Fenenga's (1939) Delta scheme provided an example of cultural change which typified the prehistory of California and suggested a similar and parallel development in the Bay Area. However, there are difficulties in the extension of one regional sequence to another area (cf. Bickel 1976). Wallace (1978) and Elsasser (1978) provide the most current synthesis of post-Pleistocene archaeology and later prehistoric cultures in California. While a great deal is now known regarding central California cultural chronology, there are still unresolved problems with respect to the Middle Horizon, Transitional Phase and the Late Horizon (cf. Table 2 ). with respect to the Middle Horizon, its terminal dates are estimated to be between A.D. 700 and A.D. 900 (cf. Fredrickson 1974a, b), yet Bennyhoff (1977) places the inception of the Early Phase I of the Late Horizon at A.D. 300 - well within the Late Phase or Terminal Phase of the Middle Horizon as noted by Fredrickson (1974a, b). The term "Transitional Phase" (A.D. 700 - A.D. 900) has been used by some archaeologists for this disputed time period. Archaeologists do agree that the Early Horizon is the most poorly known of the periods after 2000 B.C. Intersite comparison is complicated by apparent widespread variations. Gerow with Force (1968) note that great cultural divergence was present during Early Horizon times and that diagnostic traits utilized to characterize the Early Horizon from the Windmiller Facies are limited in how they can be applied to other regions of central California. Archaeologists are agreed that basic Early Horizon traits include dolicho- cephalic and platyrrhine physical types, hunting and fishing for subsistence and the presence of mil 1 ingstones for vegetal food processing. Other traits are the use of the atlatl, a relative absence of fire-altered rock, greasy midden, organic soil, charcoal and ash in the middens. Early Horizon cultures practiced elaborate burial rituals and placed a wealth of grave goods 2F-17 with the dead. Well developed trade networks with other areas of the Pacific Coast and the Sierra were also developed by this time. Archaeologists are also in agreement that Middle Horizon sites are more common and are relatively better known. These sites usually have deep deposits containing large quantities of ash and charcoal, fire-altered rock, faunal remains of fish, bird and mammal species, and evidence suggestive of a growing reliance upon plant foods as opposed to hunted animal foods. The aboriginal populations were generally dolichocephalic and platyrrhine. The Late Horizon emerges from the Middle Horizon with many earlier traits continuing and the introduction of new traits. Late Horizon sites are the most numerous and are composed of rich, greasy midden with bone and fire- altered rock. The use of the bow and arrow, flexed interments, "killed" grave offerings, and occasional cremation of the dead were known traits. A dietary emphasis on acorn and seed gathering is evident for this horizon. Physical types change to mostly brachycephal ic, mesorrhine types who were short in stature with a finer bone structure than the earlier peoples. Bay Area archaeologists of the 1970s have recognized and attempted to address a number of crucial questions regarding archaeological site location, the nature of subsistence and settlement systems, the driving or motivating forces which may have influenced the direction of prehistoric economies and the kinds of cultural adaptations necessary to cope with long-term changes in the productivity of past ecosystems. It is hoped that the inventory data gathered during the LLNL Site 300 survey may provide additional material for the current data bases and future analyses with a view towards answering some of the still current questions of contemporary archaeology. Notes 1. An archival site record search was performed by the State of California Regional Site Survey Offices located at CSU-Stanislaus and CSU-Sonoma for the LLNL Site 300 area. No prehistoric or historic sites are on file at these two institutions for the project area (Appendix I). 2F-18 Table 2 GENERALIZED CENTRAL CALIFORNIA PREHISTORIC CULTURE SEQUENCE San Francisco Bay, Delta, and Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys (after Bennyhoff 1977, Elsasser 1978, Fredrickson 1974a and Wallace 1978) pr RTnn t 9000 B.C. - 6000 B.C. Paleolndian. Hunting/Fluted KLK1UU x Point (?) PFRTnD tt 6000 B.C. - 3000 B.C. Lower Archaic. Collecting/ ptKluu Xi Millingstone prRTnn ITT 3000 B.C. - 2000 B.C. Middle Archaic-Windmil ler- PER1UU 1U West Berkeley. Hunting/Fishing/ Collecting EARLY HORIZON 2000 B.C. - 1000 B.C Windmil ler-West Berkeley. MIDDLE HORIZON 1000 B.C. - 700 A.D. (or 1000 B.C. - 900 A.D.) c , D . aco 1000 B.C. - 100 A.D. Early Phase inn 4 n . M A D intermediate Phase W A.D. _ 300 A.D. Te™inal Se pha; e : \ '. .". ". '• '. '• '. '■ '• '■'■■'■ '• ™ A ' D - " 70 ° A ' D - TRANSITIONAL PHASE 700 A.D. - 900 A.D. LATE HORIZON 300 A.D. - 18 50 A.D. (or 700 A.D. - 1850 A.D., r ■ ' n . T 300 A.D. - 700 A.D. %?* P Sf e \ 700 A.D. - 1100 A.D. " ldle D . f l . 1100 A.D. - 1500 A.D. Late Phase l c i d^ co tt .... 1500 A.D. - 1700 A.D. uMteM 1 . ::::::::::: . .. . i7 00 a.o. - isso a.d. 2F-19 ETHNOGRAPHY Introduction The location of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 falls within the tribal boundaries of two different California Native American groups - the Costanoans or Ohlone and the Northern Valley Yokuts (cf. Levy 1978; Wallace 1978; Bennyhoff 1977; Heizer 1966; Kroeber 1925). Researchers are in some doubt as to the group(s) present in the Corral Hollow region with the general consensus that the area was probably utilized on a sporadic basis by both groups for marginal hunting and gathering (cf. Levy 1978; Wallace 1978; Cook 1955, 1957; Cutter 1950; Bennyhoff 1977 among others). Costanoans One of the aboriginal groups belonged to a group of tribes known as the Costanoans (from the Spanish Costanos or "coastal people") (Fig. 3). The group believed to have utilized the Site 300 area is thought to be the Chcchenyo Costanoans (or East Bay Costanoans) with a pre-contact estimated population of 2000 individuals (cf. Levy 1978; Thompson 1957; cf. Galvan 1968: 12). Costanoan is a language of the Penutian language family (cf. Broadbent 1972:55) with seven to eight known dialect areas (cf. Krober 1925:463-465; Levy 1978) (Fig. 3). Pre-contact ethnographic data on this group is sorely lacking due to the effects of missionization, disease and subsequent alteration of the traditional life way. Survivors from this period often left their home territories, undergoing extreme and organized pressure to assimilate into the larger society, and in general experiencing the discrimination and deprivation of a dispossessed people. Anthropologists place present estimates for persons of Costanoan descent in the Bay Area at over 200 (cf. Galvan 1968; Levy 1978). With respect to ethnographic information on the contact-period Costanoans, Levy (1978) has presented the most thorough synthesis of the presently avail- able data. The brief ethnographic sketch below relies heavily on his synthesis. Theodoratus et al . (1979) and Bickel (1976) present other reviews of Costanoan ethnography while King (1977, 1978) details additional ethnohistoric information on the Costanoan groups of the Santa Clara Valley. Linguistic evidence points to A.D. 500 as the date when the Costanoans moved into the area replacing earlier Hokan (?) speakers. This apparent move roughly coincides with the appearance of the Late Horizon artifact assem- 2F-20 Fig. I. Eihnic groups and tnbelets (late 18th century). Tnbelets: 1. karkin (Los Carquines); 2. xucyun; 3, (Palos Colorados); 4. (San Antonio): 5. lisvan; 6. 'oroysom (San Francisco Solano): 7. sewnen (El Valle): 8. (Santa Ysabel): 9. (Santa Clara): 10. (San Juan Bautista); 1 1. (San Jose Cupertino): 12. pus son (Arroyo de San Francisco); 13. lamstn (Las Pulgas): 14. salson (San Matheo): 15. sipliskin (San Bruno); 16, ramax (Canada de las Almejas): 17. satunumnu (San Egidio); 18, koixen (La Punsima): 19. °olxon; 20. kaxasia (San Antonio); 21. cuakiak (San Juan); 22. savant (San Juan Capistrano); 23. °uypi (San Daniel); 24. °apios (San Lucas); 25. °awsa\ma; 26. xunstak. 27, kululisiak (San Bernardino); 28. °oresiak- 29; koieiak; 30. xumoniwas: 31. paxs'in; 32. mutsun (La Natividad); 33. wacron; 34. kalenia ruk, 35. calon. 36. n ensen (Los Sanjones): 37. 'acista (San Carlos); 38. °ic\enia (San Jose); 39, sarxema ruk (R del Sur). Names in parentheses are Spanish designations. (From Levy 1978) Figure 3 2F-21 blages. In 1770, the Costanoans were living in 50 separate politically autonomous nations or tribelets - each of which had one or more permanent village sites. During various time of the year, groups left the villages for temporary camps at scattered locations in the triblet's territory to engage in fishing, hunting and the collection of seasonal plant foods. The average tribe- let number some 200 individuals with a range of 50 to 500 persons. The large triblets usually had several permanent villages located close to one another (Levy 1978). The territorial boundaries were clearly defined by physiographic features and hostile neighbors kept each tribelet confined. Chiefdomships were in- herited patrilineally by the son (or in rare cases daughter or sister) with the approval of the community. The chief was the leader of a council of elders and his main function was as advisor to the community and as host to visitors. The Costanoan individual was free to pursue life without interference except in time of war (Levy 1978:487-488). Costanoan kinship and social organization differed to some degree from those of o + her Penutian groups. Households were larger comprising ten to fifteen individuals. Ethnographic evidence indicates some occurrence of sororal polygnous marriages with co-wives sharing the same residence with the children. Patrilineally extended families are also noted with clan groupings within deer and bear moieties. Kinship terminology indicates possible cross-cousin marriage and appears to be a practice due to the heavy influence by the Salinan to the south (Levy 1978:488). Warfare was a practice among the Costanoans and was commonly caused by territorial infringements. Captives were killed (excluding young females), heads taken as trophies and enemy villages burned. The chief weapon was the bow and arrow. Trade relations are revealed indirectly by linguistic evidence in the use of borrowed words for items not available locally by Costanoan, Miwok, Yokut and Salinan groups. Mussels, dried abalone shells, salt and cinnabar were commonly exported, while pinon nuts, obsidian and clam shell disk beads from the east are the only known imports (Levy 1 978 :487-488;Davis 1961). In religious practice the Costanoan regarded prayers and offerings to the sun as important. Meal and smoke were common offerings. Dreams and omens aided and guided future personal actions, while shamans controlled natural events by dancing and cured serious illness and injury by sucking and the use of herbs. Witchcraft was practiced by the grizzly bear doctors (Levy 1978:489- 2F-22 490). Music for the Costanoan was closely connected with ritual and myth. The musical form is described as relaxed, non-pulsating with the "rise" type of form and movemen and closely resembles Yuman style. Instruments included bird bone whistles, alder flutes, split stick rattles of laurel wood, cocoon rattles and a stringed instrument plucked with the fingers. At puberty girls observed the menstrual avoidances similar to those of post-partum and were removed from male contact while boys were initiated into a datura society where they were given a hallucinogen to induce visions necessary for entrance into manhood (Levy 1978:490). Marriage was informally marked by a gift exchange to the bride's kin and followed by patrilocal residency. Divorce occurred not infrequently but the children remained with the mother. The death of a member was observed by the mourning of the widow and other female kin by cutting of the hair, smearing of the face with ash or asphalt and self mortification of their bodies with a pestle. Cremation was common with inhumation less common as a result of a lack of kinsmen to gather firewood for the pyre. The personal belongings of the dead were either destroyed in the cremation or buried. The widow observed a period of mourning for one year. The Costanoan had a belief in the here- after as the dead were thought "to go to a land across the sea." The name of the deceased was taboo until given to another. A special suffix was added to the name when reference to the deceased was desired. Levy (1978:490) postulates that annual mourning ceremonies were probably observed for all the individuals who had died the previous year. The subsistence of the Costanoan was that of a hunter/gatherer. Annual controlled burnings insured an abundant regrowth of seed-bearing annuals and increased the forage areas of larger game. The acorn ranked high among plant foods. Harvesting was done by long poles to knock them to the ground. They were gathered, ground and leached of tannin. Bread and mush were the favored food forms. Other nuts included California laurel, hazel nuts, and buckeyes. The seeds of numerous plants were gathered and parched in trays. Other seeds were crushed to make meal. Berries and wild grapes were dried. Roots of various plants were eaten along with green shoots, sprouts and pollens. Nearly all mammals of every size were trapped or shot by bow and arrow. Hides and skins were preserved and used for mats, blankets and robes. Waterfowl were lured by decoys and were captured in nets and snares. Bolas and cagelike 2F-23 traps of twigs were used to capture smaller birds. Eagles, owls, ravens and buzzards were not killed or eaten. Fish and shellfish comprised an important part of the diet with steelhead, salmon and sturgeon the major portion. Spear- ing and dip netting were the main methods of capture. Mussels, abalone, and octopus were among the common shellfish collected. Reptiles were eaten although toads and frogs were excluded. Insects included yellow jacket larvae, grass- hoppers and caterpillars (Levy 1978:491-492). Costanoan structures included domed thatched houses, wickiups, sweat- houses or temescals, dance houses, and storage structures. The houses ranged from 6-10 feet across with a square doorway and a hearth in the center of the floor. The covering was described as a thatch of tule, alfalfa or fern over a bent willow framework. The temescal was an excavated pit in the middle of a stream with the superstructure laid against the bank. Wickiups were pole, brush and plaster wind or sunshelters (Theodoratus et al . 1979:21). Dance enclosures were circular or oval fence-like structures with a door and an opposing opening in the rear and usually located in the village proper (Levy 1978:492). Costanoan technology included numerous woven items such as baskets, fish nets, mats, cradles, balsas, traps and snares. Stone tools included manos, metates, mortars, pestles, net sinkers, projectile points, bifaces and other items manufactured from either locally available or imported materials. Cinnabar and hematite were used a pigments. Bone items included awls, scrapers and whistles. Wood was used for the manufacture of paddles, cooking utensils and decorative items. Shell was used for ornaments and spoons (Levy 1978:492). The Costanoan male usually went naked while the female wore a small front apron of braided grasses and rear one of buckskin. Both sexes wore robes of woven rabbitskin or buckskin for protection in cold weather. Hair styles were long or cropped, women wore bangs. Males had beards or were clean shaven. Shell tweezers or hot coals were used to remove facial hair. Tatooing was favored as were pierced ears and septums. Jewelry consisted of shell pendants and feather and bead ornaments (Levy 1978:493). Social amusements consisted of gambling and athletic games. Ball race, played by kicking a wooden ball along a course, and shinny, played with a wooden puck, were favorites. Gambling games included "toussi" where four players try to guess which hand conceals a small wooden tube and "takersia" a 2F-24 a game using a five foot cane and a small hoop, the object being to keep the hoop spinning (Culin 1902-1903:248, 282, 472). Northern Valley Yokuts The other aboriginal group present within the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site 300 region is the Northern Valley Yokuts whose westernmost boundary was the crest of the Diablo Range (cf. Wallace 1978; Bennyhoff 1977; Latta 1977) (Fig. 4). Little is known ethnographical ly of this northern San Joaquin Valley group due to their rapid disappearance as the result of disease, missionization and colonization of the Gold Rush. Wallace (1978) has presented a cogent summary of this group. The extant linguistic data for the group suggests that the Yokuts are relatively recent arrivals in the northern Valley possibly having displaced the earlier Costanoans, Miwok or both, who had previously occupied the country (cf. Kroeber 1959:269-277; Wallace 1978). Pre-contact population estimates vary with recent estimates ranginf from 25,000 to 31,000 (Cook 1955; Baumhoff 1963). The native population was not evenly distributed with the highest densities present on the lands bordering the San Joaquin River and its main tributaries (10+ per square mile). The plains density has been estimated at 2-3 inhabitants per square mile while to the west, the population, concentrated on semipermanent watercourses well within the foothills, was much sparser (Wallace 1978:463). Northern Valley Yokut's subsistence was oriented around a gathering/ hunting 1 i feway directed towards the seasonal exploitation of plant, animal, and fish resources. Fish and water fowl were important dietary items and were taken by variety of capture methods. Big-game hunting of deer, elk and antelope was probably a marginal subsistence activity (cf. Wallace 1978:464). The harvesting of wild plant foods, especially the acorn, was of prime impor- tance. Seeds of various types were also collected as were tule roots. The Yokuts also practiced the regular firing of native vegetation to improve and promote the following year's seed crop (cf. Cook 1960; Wallace 1978). Clothing was simple, probably similar to the Costanoans, and personal adornment consisted of marine shell necklaces probably secured through trade (Wallace 1978:464). Facial tatooing was practiced. The usual dwellings consisted of small, lightly built structures covered with tule stalks, apparently woven into mats. Two other specialized structures are also known - the sweathouse and ceremonial assembly chamber 2F-25 CTi c c CD CO E o S- en 2F-26 ■ « I (Wallace 1978:465). Twined and coiled basketry was made from local plant materials. Stone mortars, pestles and chipped stone tools were manufactured from both local and imported stone. Both bone and wood tools and implements were fabricated for a number of uses. Light watercraft of tules were manufacturing for fishing use (Wallace 1978:465). Trade relations were maintained with a number of groups including the Miwok and Costanoans (cf. Davis 1961). Social organization is very poorly known. It is probable that the family unit was dominant. Kroeber (1925:493) has suggested that a totemic moiety system based on patrilineal descent prevailed among this Yokut group based on their association with the southern Yokuts and upland Miwok. The Northern Valley Yokuts were divided into tribes of approximately 300 or so individuals. Most members of the tribe lived in one principal settlement under the direction of a headman. Smaller communities of varying sizes existed within each group's territory (Wallace 1978:466). Seasonal excursions for gathering and hunting were made from the principal village by the family units. Warfare, usually on the level of petty hotilities, did occur between neighboring groups although this was the exception rather than the rule (cf. Wallace 1978:466-467). Very little is known concerning the religious beliefs and practices of the lower San Joaquin Indians. Ethnographic data gathered from the bordering tribes suggests participation in the datura and kuksu ritual systems although the evidence for the Kuksu cult is open to some question (cf. Wallace 1978: 467-468 and the references therein). Shamanism was undoubtedly practiced although little data are available for this or other ceremonies concerned with birth, puberty and death. Death was followed by either cremation or inhumation in a flexed position (Wallace 1978:468). 2F-27 HISTORIC OVERVIEW Introduction Corral Hollow and Lawrence Liver-more National Laboratory's Site 300 project in particular straddle both Murray and Tulare Townships of Alameda and San Joaquin Counties respectively. The regional transportation corridor Corral Hollow Road, is located along the southern boundary of LLNL Site 300 During the Hispanic Period, the road, creek and canyon were known as "Buenos Ayres" or "Buenos Aires" ("Good Winds") with the present name of Corral Hollow apparently due to the influx of Euro-American influence during the American Period of settlement. At present the flow of water through Corral Hollow Creek has been reduced considerably on account of the Hetch-Hetchy Reservoir system and no longer poses a flood threat during times of heavy rainfall as in the past (cf. Williams 1956-58/1975). Various county histories have viewed the mountainous terrain of Corral Hollow as only suited to stock raising (Wood 1883:457; Gilbert 1968-128) The area was so devoid of population during the late 19th century that Robert Livermore, of the historic Livermore clan, apparently allowed his cattle to roam from the Amador Valley into the San Joaquin River (Wood 1883:461). In addition to stock raising, minerals and timber were also recognized as significant resources in Corral Hollow. Though few trees remain today, steam powered wagon trains were used to harvest timber in Corral Hollow circa. 1888 (San Joaquin County Historical Society 1973:14), Prior to the extension of the railroad system to the area in the 1890s the residents of the Corral Hollow region depended upon the single main road now known as "Corral Hollow Road." The expansion of the railroad was not due to the ranching activities but was the result of mineral exploitation In time three town sites were established in Corral Hollow - the mining town of Tesla, and the manufacturing facilities of Pottery at Walden Spur and Carnegie in the vicinity of LLNL Site 300. The initial dependence on coal, the sole resource at Tesla, was later supplemented by the mining of clay and the production of pottery and fired bricks at Pottery and Carnegie. This marriage of mining and manufacturing was responsible for the explosive growth of the western area adjoining LLNL Site 300. 2F-28 Ultimately this dependency on a single resource and product was responsible for the demise of the towns. As company towns the towns were planned, flourished and died within the remarkably short time span of 1892 to 1912. The prior pattern of stock raising and isolated on-site residence pattern continued throughout the industrial period. This same pattern, with the exception of Site 300 and the state recreational park, is still viable within Corral Hollow today. Compilation Sources The historical portion of this report has relied on the resources of the Bancroft Library of the University of California, Berkeley and the manuscripts on file in the Stockton and Tracy branches of the the Stockton San Joaquin Public Library. Additional materials were consulted from the files of the LLNL Site 300 library. The manuscripts of Earle E. Williams form the single most important set of documents on the Corral Hollow area from the Hispanic to the Late American Period. A more intensive historical review of the Corral Hollow District would include consulting the collections of the Historical Societies of both Alameda and San Joaquin Counties as well as the personal collections of Earle E. Williams (Tracy) and Louis L. Stein (Berkeley). Further library research on the mines and ceramic industry in the Bay Area should also be undertaken along with a detailed county records search. No photographs of the Corral Hollow area are presently available aside from several early views of Carnegie in various publications. Undoubtedly early photographs of this area are extant but the scope of this project did not allow for their location. Hispanic Period (ca. 1750-1850) The Hispanic Period was an era of both exploration and nationalistic expansion undertaken first by Spain and then continued by Mexico. For the most part, the emphasis of these programs was upon the assessment of geo- graphical resources. None of the exploratory parties entered the Corral Hollow region although the expedition led by Pedro Fages reached the southern rim of the San Joquin Valley in 1772. The party of Captain Juan Bautista de Anza, commissioned by the Viceroy of Mexico, Antonio Maria Bucareli y Ursua, was the first group to actually enter the San Joaquin Valley in April of 1776 (Williams 1956:10). Captain Bautista was accompanied by Father Pedro Font and 2F-29 Lieutenant Jose Moraga who were seeking to find a route from "El Rio Grande de San Francisco" to the Sierra Nevada. Their trek began after Christmas in 1775 and ended rather abruptly on account of the combination of impassable tule patches and tule burning along El Rio Viejo by the Native American in- habitants of the region (Williams 1956:10). In returning to Monterey, the de Anza party camped just west of Corral Hollow in Callagham Gulch on April 4, 1776 (Anonymous 1976:2; Williams 1956.-10) 1 . Callaghan Gulch is located 5 or 6 miles to the west of Corral Hollow in a region characterized by Font as, "It appeared to me that the country is so bad that it could not easily be inhabited by human beings. At least I was left with no desire to return to travel through it, for besides the smarting of the eyes which I brought from there, and the fever in my mouth which I had corrected but which today returned to assail me, I have never seen an uglier country" (Williams 1956:11 (from Bolton 1930)). The next Spanish partyunder the leadership of Gabriel Moraga was sent by Governor Jose Joaquin de Arillaga in 1805 from Mission San Jose into the "Valle de los Tulares" or the San Joaquin Valley to review the Indian problems and locate sites appropriate for missionization (Williams 1956-58;2,5) . Although Moraga did not explore even the periphery of the Corral Hollow area, he did ford the San Joaquin River just south of present-day Stockton and explored the entire length of the Calaveras River. Fortunately for the Native Americans located in the interior Moraga failed to locate sites suitable for the construction and support of a mission(s) (Williams 1956-57:5). In 1810 Father Jose Viades accompanied Gabriel Moraga on his second reconnaissance through the area of Pescadero (Bethany) to the north of Corral Hollow (Beck and Hasse 1974:No. 21). The Mexican wars for independence from Spain curtailed the expeditions and settlement throughout Alta California (Beck and Hasse 1974:No. 41). With the transfer of Alta California to Mexico in 1822, the military concentrated on the recovery of stolen animals and limiting attacks by Indians on towns, missions and ranchos. Further, no major expeditions were commissioned but rather, the policy was toward private settlement (Beck and Hasse 1974:No. 22). As a result of this policy, land grants were made to individuals during the latter part of the Mexican Period (1828-1846) in contrast to the Spanish Period practice of granting only the rights of settlement and grazing 2F-30 privileges (Beck and Hasse 1974:No. 24). Corral Hollow Road was part of the El Camino Viejo, the "Old Road" of the Hispanic Period from about 1795. At this time the road was known as the "Camino del las Buenos Ayres" or "Aires." The road originated in the south at San Pedro and continued through the San Joaquin Valley along the eastern slope of the Coast Range foothills (the El Diablo range) until reaching Corral Hollow in San Joaquin County. The route then proceeded wester- ly over the summit and down Arroyo Seco (Dry Gulch) to the Las Positas (Livermore) Valley, over Vallecitos and through the Sunol Valley. It continued over Mission Pass to Mission San Jose de Guadalupe and then west to its terminus at Yerba Buena (San Francisco) (Williams 1965:11). It should be noted that the Corral Hollow road was not a major road such as a Camino Real . According the E.E. Williams, a local historian, the old Spanish trails followed the valley rims, that is, along high ground, not along creeks and canyons as used by the game and aboriginal groups. The justification for this upland placement was supposedly for the better footing provided through- out the year and the access to fresh water every 10 to 15 miles at springs and pools (Williams 1965:3). The position of the Corral Hollow Road contradicts the traditional upland road location but it must be noted that Corral Hollow is the most southerly exit through the Diablo Mountains, a spur of the Coast Range. As part of the El Camino Viejo, the road served as a conduit for the movement of travelers and settlers as well as for the annual spring cattle drives which occured from 1808 to 1849 as part of the annual Matanza cycle (cf. Bente 1980). The hides and tallow recovered as part of this cattle raising cycle formed the economic basis of the economy of western North America as well as constituting a major foreign export product during the Hispanic and Early American Periods (Williams 1965:10). The noted historian Jacob Bowman studied the disenos (maps) of land grants for the period ca. 1835 to 1846 and includes some information on Corral Hollow Road (Bowman 1946). He concluded that the topographic features of Corral Hollow Canyon, Creek and Road found on contemporary maps, first appeared as the Portezuela (pass) de Buenos Ayres on the diseno of Las Positas (Gudde 1969:75). The Mexican land grant of Las Positas was located to the northwest of the Corral Hollow region (Beck and Hasse 1974:No. 30). By the 1850s the name of "Coral 1" replaced the Arroyo Buenos Ayres on the map as drawn by Trask and Goddard (Gudde 1969:76). The name change may be attributed 2F-31 to presence of a large corral used for wild horses which was located at the mouth of the canyon (Gudde 1969:76). Conversely the local oral and written tradition ascribes the present name of Corral Hollow to the misspelling of the surname of Edward B. Carrel 1 , one of the owners of a road house located on the eastern end of the hollow (Gudde 1969:76; Williams 1961:1). Apparently confusion was minimal because as even as late as 1879, Thompson and West illustrate a transition with both "Arroyo Buenos Ayres or, Carral Hollow" (Fig. 7). The location of ranchos/land grants and their relationship with the Corral Hollow area as outlined by Beck and Hasse indicate that Corral Hollow Road was not a major route between ranchos or even missions or a presidio (Beck and Hasse 1974:Nos. 28, 30; Bowman 1946:5). As far as can be determined, there were no adobe structures within the Corral Hollow region - a factor which would have fostered a road network to the east and west (Bowman 1951; Hendry and Bowman 1940). The lack of Hispanic settlement in the Corral Hollow region is related to two major environmental factors - the hilly terrain and the lack of potable water. The lack of abundant water and by extension navigable waterways, prevented easy access with the other economic centers in the state. Thus, the original residents arrived gradually and concentrated on enterprises demanding minimal capitalization such as ranching. The area was not directly explored during the Spanish period of discovery or exploration. Nonetheless, it did reflect the transition from Spanish to Mexican rule in that the region was part of a road network related to ranching but was considered inappropriate for missionization or land grants which were characteristic of the Hispanic cultural pattern. American Period Toward the end of the Hispanic Period, isolated forays were made into Alta California by Canadian and American frontiersmen. To the east of Corral Hollow, in the San Joaquin Valley, the earliest Americans were trappers and include such notables as Jedediah S. Smith, 1925-1827 and John M. Leod, 1827-1828 (Gilbert 1968:10-11). The arrival of French-Canadian trappers in the valley in 1828 was associated with the Hudson Bay Company and with the California-Oregon trail which extended from Fort Vancouver to French Camp. Trappers and their families returned to this area, known as "Castoria" 2F-32 repeatedly until about 1845 (Williams 1958:1). Other less established trappers who ventured into the San Joaquin Valley were Ewing Young in 1829, 1830 and 1832 and Michel La Framboise in 1832-1833 (Gilbert 1968:20). Proceeding closer to the Site 300 study area, the first American residents within San Joaquin County settled along the Upper Sacramento Road while the second concentration was located at the mouth of Corral Hollow. The Corral Hollow contingent arrived early in November of 1846 in four covered wagons under the command of Captain Charles Imas (Williams 1965:8). The party members consisted of Captain Imas, his brother (Christian name unknown), John W. Laird, his brother William Laird and brothers John F. and Thomas Pyle (Williams 1965:9). These men and presumably their families pitched their tents on the high ground of the fork of the El Camino Viejo near the future site of "Wright's Zink House" (Williams 1965:8-9). The placement of the Zinc House in 1850 was approximately 500 yards north of the California Registered Landmark No. 755 located to the east side of Site 300 (San Joaquin County Historical Society 1966). The Laird Brothers continued to live in their tents near the Zink House after its construc- tion in an area known to have been an Indian village (Williams 1965:9-10). The year 1847 brought problems between the new settlers of Corral Hollow and the Indians. The conflict was rumored to have been initiated by a "renegade Mexican" who disputed the "possesion of California with the American." As a result of this turmoil, which had a great impact on the San Joaquin Valley, Captain Charles Weber of Stockton reportedly returned to San Jose via Corral Hollow Road "... leaving four thousand head of cattle and his possessions to the mercy of the Indians ..." (Williams 1965:17). After the discovery of gold January 19, 1848 at Sutter's Mill, some of the first gold rush horde of Spaniards, Mexicans and Americans travelled through Corral Hollow. These fortune seekers went east and north to the south- ern part of the Mother Lode traversing either the expanse of the San Joaquin River or via the more indirect, but less arduous route of the experienced traveler along the El Camino Viejo south (Gilbert 1968:20; Williams 1965:21-22). In the 1850s, the wealth of the San Joaquin Valley continued to be exploited by hunting parties. Migrating honker geese were killed and processed so that the feathers were shipped for sale in San Francisco; fat rendered for the Jewish trade; and, the meaty thigh and breast meat dried and exported to China (Williams 1956:2-3). This massive "harvesting" helped to hasten the demise of the native fauna and in combination with the drought of 1864 2F-33 irreparably altered the ecology. The general trend from wildlife hunting and trapping to ranching, wheat growing and other such sedentary pursuits was then repeated in the San Joaquin Valley (Gilbert 1968:130). The increasing traffic between the west to the eastern side of the Coast Ranges was accomplished by travelling through one of three passes. In addition to Corral Hollow, Patterson Pass to the north was used as was Altamont Pass still further to the north (Williams 1975:1). A tavern was built along Corral Hollow Road to take advantage of the movement through Corral Hollow. The builders of the only American tavern along the El Camino Viejo arrived in Corral Hollow in 1849 when they returned from mining in the Tuolumne area (Williams 1960:1). Horatio P. Wright, William H. Brayton and John A. Stockholm erected this building, known as the "Zink House", from materials purchased in Stockton and hauled by wagon to the site. This tavern, on the mail route, served both Americans and Mexicans. It provided alcoholic beverages, food and supplies for both Corral Hollow residents and transients (Williams 1960:4). Upon the murder of Brayton on October 24, 1850, reportedly for the gold accumulated for services provided to the miners, Edward B. Carrell became a part owner of the "Zink House" (Williams 1960:4). In addition to the tavern several other establishments were set up in Corral Hollow to serve the road traffic. One of these was a combination gambling and entertainment tent which had been moved from Sonora to Tuolume City to Corral Hollow. The relocation was superb since Corral Hollow was a major access road between the coast region and the southern mines. The enterprise lasted only two months from its initial arrival in December 1850 on account of the murder of four men in the tent (Williams 1973b:20). In addition to the road traffic, the Henry C. Lee Little South American Circus (later the Lee and Marshall's Great National Circus, 1852; and Lee and Bennett's Circus, 1857) was one of the annual trekkers through the Corral Hollow Pass from 1850 to 1859 (Williams 1975:1-2, 6). Each year the circus travelled from its headquarters in San Francisco to Howard's Circus Ranch in Stockton and on to the Mother Lode towns as part of its annual tour (Williams 1975:7). Hittel (1861) in his account of James Capen Adams, better known as Grizzly Adams, states that Corral Hollow Pass was used intensively by the "mountain men." While Grizzly Adams was hunting and capturing grizzly bear, 2F-34 cougars and the like in the Corral Hollow area, he noted three hunters from the "Redwoods" along with another group of adventurers from Kern River. Adams also recognized the presence of coal and sulphur springs in the Corral Hollow area (Hittel 1861:311-312). Adams built three bear traps in 1855 (Williams 1975:8) and with Charley Foster built a hunter's cabin at the mouth of Mitchell Ravine (located to the west and south of Pottery) in 1856 (Williams 1956-58/1975:9). Horatio P. Wright's diary of the Zinc House includes the supplies furnished for Grizzly Adams among which were "2 bottles of cologne, large quanties of sugar and syrup, shot and powder, sheet iron, lumber, nails" and cash loans to the "bear man" totalling $124.56 (Williams 1960:5). Between 1854 and 1857 California was in a depression. This apparently led to the excavation of a prospect tunnel in Corral Hollow (Williams 1975:7). This event began in 1856 with sheepman John O'Brien developing a coal outcrop which had originally been discovered by a man known only as "Baker." The O'Brien Ranch was situated on the extreme western part of the "gulch of Corral Hallow in Alameda County adjoining the San Joaquin County line" (that is, within LLNL Site 300) (Ward and Williams 1971:3). With Edward Carrell of Zinc House fame as both a friend and business partner, O'Brien succeeded in the development of what was known as the "Eureka" seam which was later to be incorporated into the Tesla Mines. The mining activities of O'Brien and Carrell at Baker's Ravine started on January 1, 1857. Henry C. Lee and David Howard of the Great National Ci us also played a part in the early development of the coal deposits in Corral Hollow (Williams 1975:6-7, 10). O'Brien secured a loan for the mining operation from Lee in March of 1857. David Howard, who was the third partner in the initial organization of the Pacific Coal Mine, helped to finish the prospect tunnel using circus equipment (Williams 1975:6, 8, 10). The financial arrange- ment between O'Brien, Carrell and Lee resulted in a one quarter ownership of the mine for Lee. O'Brien hired a Dr. McClintok at $40 per month to cook and a blacksmith in San Francisco at the rate of $50 per month (Williams 1975:8). Charley Foster, a compatriot of Grizzly Adams and who lived in the cabin built by the two, also labored in the prospect tunnel in 1857 and 1858 (Williams 1956-1958/1975:9). Work on this tunnel was finished on Saturday, August 7, 1858. During these operations, Carrel continued his search for additional capital in San Francisco. When the Pacific Coal Mining Company 2F-35 was formally constituted, Carrell reportedly took a "note for $6000" (Williams 1960:6). The Eureka Mining Company came into existence after Carrell, unable to meet the note, transferred his share to F. Griffings on May 21, 1860. This company later became the Commercial Coal Mining Company with Carrell as the principal (Williams 1961:2). Historic maps place the Commercial Coal Mining Company in Sections 29, 30 and 32 (T 4S, R 3E) (Figs. 5-6). Coal transportation was via a wagon road to Mohr's Landing located some 14 miles from the Zinc House. This road was "put in service" at the estimated cost of $500 (Williams 1960:6). All coal was transported on the completed road running eastward from Elkhorn Ravine past the Zinc House and northward to Mohr's Landing on the Old River at which point the coal was loaded on barges (Williams 1960:6-7). Wheat grown in the San Joaquin Valley was also shipped to San Francisco in the same manner. While the coal mining was not especially successful, approximately 1800 tons were shipped via this route to San Francisco and San Antonio (East Oakland) between 1857 and 1861 (Williams 1974:1). Teamsters hauling the coal were furnished room and board at Carrell' s "White House Corral Hollow." This "White House" was a two story house of re- sawed siding built beside the creek about midway between the Zinc House and Hog's Back to the east. Built in 1861, "White House Corral Hollow" was situated upon an Indian village/cemetary site (Williams 1960:6-7). Thus, O'Brien and various backers of the mine were responsible for the second phase of economic development within Corral Hollow. The traditional pattern of stock- raising still continued while the era of coal mining was initiated. In 1861 the Whitney Geologic Survey, lead by William H. Brewer, actually sought out the Corral Hollow area in order to view the traces of coal which had been found by "some forgotten prospector named Baker" (Williams 1956-1958/ 1975:25). Brewer and his three assistants arrived in Corral Hollow on October 10, 1861 and took advantage of the recently built "White House." The tavern was situated at a spring and apparently had the only trees in a "dozen miles." Brewer also noted that at this time there was no water in Corral Hollow Creek though water was present in Mitchell Ravine (Williams 1956-1958/1975:3, 25). While leading this geological exploring party, William Brewer sent letters from Corral Hollow on October 3rd and 12th of 1861, and again on June 3rd of 1862. In this correspondence there is no reservation as to the rigors of the Corral Hollow environment "... we find it a most 2F-36 Godforsaken, cheerless, inhospitable, comfortless region" and "... few trees grow in the bottom of this Canyon (Brewer 1930:205)." The lack of water was a problem for the only water consisted of " . . . some alkaline springs which neither mule or I could drink (Brewer 1930:200)." At this time, water was secured from a deep well located at the O'Brien House some three miles up the canyon. This source was inadequate in amount and taste, and known "to spils (spoil) tea" (Williams 1956-1958/1975:3). The original Spanish name of Arroyo de los Buenos Ayres, that is, "good winds" appears to be linked to the fierce winds described carrying dust, grass, sticks and other such debris which contributed to the discomfort of the Brewer party (Brewer 1930:206). As a geologist, Brewer was the first to comment upon the inferior quality of the coal found in Corral Hollow. The position of the coal beds was a complicating factor as well for the bedswere found discontinuously and generally only encountered at a 45 degree angle (Brewer 1930:107). During the years of 1861-1862, Brewer noted that only one mine in Corral Hollow was of any consequence and that it had sold not over 300 to 400 tons. As a portent of the future, Brewer continued, "I question if any mine here will ever prove profitable (Brewer 1930:206)." The great deluge of 1861-1862 began in November of 1861 and subjected Corral Hollow to such flooding that the road was des- troyed. As a consequence, all coal mining stopped and only a few men opted to stay (Williams 1956-1958/1975:12). On the death of Edward B. Carrel, September 5, 1880, his estate became the principal stock holder of the then inoperative coal properties in Corral Hollow (Williams 1961:2). According to the research of Earle E. Williams, Carrell spent part of each year in San Francisco where he projected the image of a coal baron. Needless to say, the coal mine was not equal to the myth (Williams 1961:3). From the Hispanic Period through to the Twentieh Century, stock raising was a traditional pattern in the Corral Hollow area. In fact, the diary of Edward Carrell discusses the purchase of a "beef" from Joe Livermore, son of the original settler John Livermore who married an heir to a Mexican land grant (Williams 1975:7). At the time of the purchase in 1857, just after the infusion of capital from Henry C. Lee for the coal mine, Carrell lived in a tent "on the ledge in the upper gulch." The steer (presumably) was brought by Livermore and two of his vaqueros, butchered on site, and hung to age. For 2F-37 his effort Livermore received payment of $25, plus $5 for a previous debt (Williams 1975:7). The mention of this debt provides the only evidence for continuous or at the wery least prior relationships between the residents of Corral Hollow and Livermore. Further, the interaction with Livermore suggests that the stock raising in Corral (Carrel) Hollow was confined to sheep. If the maps of Wallace, Thompson and West and their accompanying data are correct, there was no building or mining structures within the boundaries of LLNL Site 300 in 1870-1878 (Wallace 1870; Thompson and West 1878; Gilbert 1968; Figs. 5-7). Further, the occupations of the men listed in Thompson and West are primarily farmers and stock-raisers, although the Murray township does include a miner and a farmer and a miner/farmer combination. This roster of names is on further indication of the importance of ranching within the Corral Hollow region which was ongoing during the initial portion of the mining era. There is no doubt that a number of great sheepdrives began in Corral Hollow proper (Rickman 1976:2) and that life in the region was extremely precarious. The short biographical sketch of sheepherder Henry Comes Banta catalogs the vagaries of nature - dry years in 1877, 1898, interspersed with floods in 1881, 1883, 1890 and the complication of market price fluctuations for meat and wool in 1894 and 1895 (Banta 1954:4). The importance of the ranching pattern within LLNL Site 300 is best summarized in the short biography of Michael Mulqueeney published in 1883. Within this sketch, Mulqueeney is identified as a native of Ireland; an emigree to Canada; and, a Canadian resident for four years. Upon his arrival in San Francisco on April 23, 1868, he moved to Alameda County. The next year, 1869, he purchased the first part of his holdings, which by 1882 were to reach "four thousand acres located about two miles from Midway", that is, Corral Hollow and environs. The succeeding year Mulqueeney doubled his acreage and he was acknowledged "... king of that industry in this section of the state, having from five to eight thousand head of sheep on his range (Wood 1883:950)." This emphasis on stock raising continues in Corral Hollow though a portion of the Mulqueeney property, 1202 acres to be exact, was to form a part of LLNL Site 300 in the 1950s (R. Mull ins, personal communication, 1981). 2F-38 Late American Period (c. 1880-1930) During the winter of 1888 coal was scarce. This scarcity and the resultant high cost was the consequence of strikes in the mines of British Columbia as well as a reduced export market for wheat. Wheat was important in that English coal was shipped to the United States only as ballast and was then exchanged in California for wheat (Mosier 1978:114). Though the coal obtained from the Mount Diablo and Livermore regions was extremely high in sulphur, it was considered appropriate for generating steam and used in "... locomotives, ferryboats, factories and mills (Mosier 1978:115; cf. Tesla Coal Co. 1900)." Corral Hollow, with its minimal resources, was a backwater which seems to have escaped the railroad building trend prevalent from 1865 through 1880 (Sandoval n.d.a.:4). The building of a rail line to and through Corral Hollow had to await capitil ization of the mining resources. The apparent scarcity of coal in 1888 led to a reassessment of the coal deposits within the region. If coal was to be profitably exploited, a more efficient market transportation system was necessary. Toward this end a preliminary railroad survey through Corral Hollow to the Livermore coal mines was made in January of 1888 (Mosier 1978:115-116). Thus, the original plan for the transport of coal by rail was to proceed from Livermore to and through Corral Hollow. As projected, this road/line would have veered off of the Western Pacific Railroad at George May's crossing, 2.5 miles south of Livermore, and run east following the foothills (Mosier 1978:116). This line was not built. In the early 1890s, the noted San Francisco financiers, the Treadwell brothers, initiated a move to purchase all the outstanding shares of the Commercial Coal Company. At this time, share values were as low as $2 - a marked contrast to the earlier par value of $10 per share (Williams 1961:3). As stated earlier, the predecessors of the Tesla Coal Mines of the Treadwell brothers were the Commercial Coal Company, the Eureka Coal Mine and the Pacific Coal Mines (Williams 1956-1958/1975:3). The Commerical Coal Mine, located midway along Corral Hollow Road, is not within the southwestern boundaries of LLNL Site 300 (Thompson and West 1878; Gilbert 1968; Wallace 1870; Figs. 5-7). In addition, the Livermore Coal Company, probably active in the 1870s, was located in the mid-Corral Hollow area as indicated by the 1878 map of Thompson and West (1878) of Alameda County (Fig. 6). The Tesla Mine 2F-39 system incorporated all of the individual mines as illustrated in the 1907 map by Barzellotti (Fig. 11). The Treadwells and their associates proceeded to develop the mines at Tesla named in honor or the inventor Nicolai Tesla. The improvements, of reportedly a million dollars, included the building of a railroad to the tide- water in Stockton. In time, two pottery manufacturing plants were built - one at "Pottery" located at Walden Spur in the middle of Corral Hollow, and the other, Carnegie, further to the east (Williams 1961:3). The impact of the branch railroad on Corral Hollow was immense. The spur ran along Corral Hollow Road from the east along the southern border of LLNL Site 300. The original Western Pacific Railroad attempted to build the rail branch following the coal wagon route from Corral Hollow crossing the railroad at Ellis Coaling Station which was located three miles west of Tracy. This railroad spur was abandoned after only four miles had been laid, stopping quite conveniently across the creek from the old "Zink House." The construction of the Alameda and San Joaquin Railroad line, between Stockton and Tesla, began in earnest in 1891. In keeping with the expansion of the Treadwell empire, John Treadwell held the position of General Manager, while his brother had the title of Director of the Alameda and San Joaquin Railroad (Ward and Williams 1971:16). This rail line was built by more than 200 men, mostly Chinese laborers, along with White laborers who were engaged as teamsters, mule skinners and bridge builders. Five bridges or trestles were necessary as the line crossed and recrossed Corral Hollow Creek (Williams 1962:32). The "Zink House" of H.P. White and E.B. Carrell was reopened on account of the construction of the railroad line. Prior to the construction, the tavern had been closed for approximately 25 years. The rebuilt house functioned as both a saloon and tavern catering to the railroad workers (Williams 1962:32). When completed, the Alameda and San Joaquin Railroad Company line was only 36.6 miles in length connecting the mines at Tesla with the coal bunkers in Stockton (Ward and Williams 1971:3). Designated stops on the route proceeding from the turntable at Tesla were Harrietville, equidistant between Tesla and the next stop at Pottery at Walden Spur, followed by Carnegie and Manganese. The latter two stops were in or near the southern border of LLNL Site 300. Further east the stops included River Rock and Kerlinger, Carbona and then Lyoth which was the junction and crossing of the Southern Pacific 2F-40 line (from the San Joaquin Valley to Fresno) and on to Lathrop and Stockton (Denny 1913; Ward and Williams 1971 :Map 2, 3, 6). The daily railroad schedule consisted of moving empty cars from Stockton to Tesla in the morning, exchanging the rolling stock for filled cars and the proceeding back to Stockton with a noon stop for lunch at the Company boarding house (Williams 1961:33). Local transportation between Tesla and Pottery at Walden Spur was supplied by a large, four-wheel flat car, gravity operated, which could carry some fifty to sixty persons to work or school. "In the late afternoon the return trip was made with the aid of a white horse. The boy from the livery stable in Tesla rode the animal down and hitched onto the car loaded with workers for Harrietville and Tesla, plus any other wayside stops." The same procedure was followed when a dance took place in Carnegie (Ward and Williams 1971 :10). The Tesla quadrangle map, based on the survey data of 1905, has the most extensive record of the placement of buildings in the Corral Hollow area (Fig. 9 ; Ward and Williams 1971:17). In addition to the structures, the map also has the exact route of the railroad line in relation to Corral Hollow road. In combination with the adjacent Carbona quadrangle map (1922 edition) a number of observations can be made (cf. Figs. 10 ). With only one minor exception, the railroad line is to the north of the road. The town of Carnegie is bounded by the two rail lines so as to enclose the portion of the town located directly opposite LLNL Site 300. The southern portion of this rail spur was definitely outside of the LLNL Site 300 boundary (Fig. 11 ; Barzellotti 1907). Only when the line turns norths in Section 25 (T 3S, R 4E) does the rail line cross the road twice - moving to the east and back again. Still later, in Section 24 (T 3S, R 4E), outside of the eastern boundary of LLNL Site 300 the rail line crosses again. In brief, the railroad line is always north of the road except when enclosing Carnegie and when the road and rail line move sharply northward. The relative position of the line is important for industrial debris was often loaded on railroad cars and hooked behind the caboose. During the trip back to Stockton, the cars would be "cut off" and two Chinese laborers would unload the debris before the arrival of the next Tesla bound train (Williams 1961:33). In addition, dumping of the debris often occurred on the grade along the Hog's Back and old Carrel 1 House. At this point the discards would be shovelled directly into the creek and would await the "yearly freshnets" (Williams 1963: 2F-41 30). The railroad adjusted to the limited and hard water by erecting a 15,000 gallon holding tank at the west side of a bridge leading into the Stockton Channel. This tank was used to pump soft water into the locomotive and tank cars which were used to haul this water to Tesla for mine machinery use. The water problem was so severe that condensors were employed by both the railroad and mining company to recover the desperately needed soft water (Ward and Williams 1971:6). The problems with the boilers and subsequent explosions in Corral Hollow were directly related to the mineralization associated with hard water use. In keeping with the rise and fall of the Treadwel 1 empire, the railroad was ordered to terminate at Carnegie in 1918 by the United States Railroad Administration. However, the railroad continued in operation to Tesla until 1922. In 1922 the railroad was moved from Tesla to Moy located four miles west of Carbona (Ward and Williams 1971:16). There were three major residential clusters within the Corral Hollow area in addition to scattered residences. Tesla at the far west along Corral Hollow Road was the most important with mines for coal and clay. The second cluster was Pottery at Walden Spur, a sewer pipe and tile plant fabrication center. The town of Carnegie and its associated industrial facility produced firebrick, face brick and miscellaneous terra cotta wares. Each town or locus was approximately two to two and half miles from the others (Fig. 9 ). Carnegie, directly opposite and present on a portion of LLNL Site 300 is commerated as California Registered Landmark 740 (San Joaquin Historical Society 1966). The Treadwel 1 businesses in Corral Hollow were known as "The San Francisco and San Joaquin Coal Company" in contrast to "The Alameda and San Joaquin Railroad." Undoubtedly San Francisco was much more prestigous than "Alameda" as well as being the final destination for the Tesla coal. As discussed previously, the coal was transported from Corral Hollow eastward to Stockton and then shipped via barge to San Francisco (Williams 1961:3). During the heyday of mining, the daily output reached 500 tons while the annual productionfor the years of 1897 to 1902 hovered around 90,000 tons (Ward and Williams 1971:12). At Tesla, electric power was generated by the boiler plant and used to operate the electric mine locomotive as well as to run the plant sawmill. Electricity was also used for mine illumination as well as for street lighting (Ward and Williams 1971:12). 2F-42 ■ The mineral resources in Corral Hollow were not confined to coal alone. Both shale and clay were known as a result of the exploitation of the coal deposits. The quality of the clay was excellent and led to the development of another Treadwell Company, the "Carnegie Brick and Pottery Company." The clays ranged in quality from high grade plastic fire clay to red burning clays and shales used in the manufacture of sewer pipe and paving bricks. Further, large amounts of high grade quartz were available from the Tesla Mine. The quartz, when combined with the non-calcareous white or light cream color clay, resulted in the famous Carnegie "firebrick." In fact the term "Carnegie" for this brick type eventually became the generic name applied to the highest grade of fire brick (Williams 1961:6). In addition to the local clays and quartz, lime was produced locally from 1900 to 1911. The lime was a necessary ingredient for the mortar used in the construction of the kilns and smokestakes at Pottery and Carnegie. The lime- stone was mined from a ravine in the rear of the Carnegie Hotel (Williams 1961:5) and from the crest of a hill about a quarter of a mile from the plant at Carnegie (i.e., the southeast corner of Section 33, T 3S, R 4E) (Ward and Williams 1971:10). The limestone was then concentrated in the lime-burning kilns located to the south of Carnegie (Williams 1961:5). Production at the hill quarry averaged approximately 75 barrels a day (Ward and Williams 1971:10; cf. also Clark 1959:39). Another lime source was located in the southwestern corner of Section 32, T 3S, R 4E to the south of Corral Hollow Road between Carnegie and Pottery (Huey 1948:62). Deposits of cinnabar were also mined in Corral Hollow and processed to provide the mercury necessary in some mining operations. It is possible that both the Phoenix Quicksilver Mining Company and possibly the Marsel Mining Company were the only cinnabar producers in Corral Hollow (Alameda County, California 1904:50; Ward and Williams 1971:10). The rail stop of Manganese appears to be named on account of the manganese deposits within Mitchell Ravine located to the south of Corral Hollow Road (i.e., T 3S, R 4E, (Denny 1913)). The Ladd Mine reportedly shipped 5000 tons to England between 1867 and 1875 depending on the wagon drayage to Mohr's Landing at Old River (Clark 1955:39; Ward and Williams 1971:6). The mine, in the southeast quarter of Section 2, T 4S, R 4E, continued production until 1902 and reopened during World War I (Huey 1948:62-63). It is currently inactive. 2F-43 Gravel and sand deposits were also mined. A pit was located to the east of Carnegie and the material was shipped by train to Stockton and beyond (Leary 1962:5). The gravel deposits were exploited until 1911 when the flood of Corral Hollow Creek destroyed five railroad trestles (Ward and Williams 1971:8). These gravel pits were the last segment of the Treadwell industrial complex to be abandoned in 1911 on account of both the collapse of the trestles and the bank failure of the California Safe Deposit Bank in San Francisco (Williams 1961:6; Ward and Williams 1971:8). The pattern of urbanization in Corral Hollow during this Late American Period was essentially that of planned company towns with scattered, affiliated residential clusters. Tesla and Carnegie had both a public and residential section, with the residential sections divided and ranked according to the position of the worker within the plant hierarchy. On the other hand, Pottery had no residential section. Residences were nearby and scattered. The plant at Pottery consisted of three brick smokestacks with 12 beehive kilns clustered around them (Williams 1961:4). Four kilns were arranged with each smokestack with brick-lined tunnels running from the stack to each kiln (cf. Lowell 1916:608). When not in use, a kiln was blocked up. To facilitate transportation of the finished products a spur track of the railroad entered the plant (Williams 1961:4). Among the many specialities manufactured were glazed porcelain headrests for Chinese as well as cornices and store fronts for Chinatowns (Williams 1962:12). The plant at Pottery was so successful that a larger plant, known as "Carnegie", was constructed along Corral Hollow Creek about two miles east of Pottery (Williams 1961:4). From 1895, the Carnegie Brick and Pottery Company operated both the Pottery and Carnegie plants as a single entity with clay supplied from the Tesla deposit (Ward and Williams 1971:10). The machinery and plant equipment was estimated to have approached one half of a million dollars (Lowell 1916:608). The first stage of development at Carnegie consisted of the building of several kilns and making brick on site (Stewart 1964:14). Initially the first four kilns at Carnegie were located around a low smokestake. The bricks manufactured in these kilns were then used to construct the other kilns and smokestacks with a final total of 13 stacks and 45 kilns (Williams 1961: 4). When the Carnegie plant was enlarged in 1904, the number of kilns increased from 3 to 8 bee-hive shaped kilns; 3 additional small kilns and 2F-44 another four muffle type kilns. Shortly after the initial building phase, the hotel, general store and "everything" of Tesla was moved to Carnegie (Stewart 1964:12). The official post office, however, remained at Tesla along with apparently a number of buildings (cf. Frickstad 1955:2; Fig. 9 ). In its heyday, Carnegie had churches, schools, company stores, a hotel, saloons, pool halls, laundries, ice cream parlors, barber and beauty shops, bunk house for the single men and company housing for married men and their families (Williams 1961:7; Stewart 1964:11). The approximately 2500 inhabitants of Carnegie were not entirely of European ancestry. Japanese bakers, pantrymen and vegetable "peelers", Chinese cooks, dishwashers and laundrymen, one black family and one Mexican family were also present (Williams 1961:7, 13, 21; Stewart 1964:11, figures pp. 12-15). The transition from Tesla to Carnegie for many of the Corral Hollow residents consisted of residing in Tesla and commuting the five miles to Carnegie by foot, horse or by railroad hand car (Stewart 1964:14). The livery stable and lumberyard appear to have remained in Tesla but the fate of the "residential" suburbs is unknown. The exact placement of the various "towns" or "suburbs" is currently not possible. The personal accounts of residents of Corral Hollow such as Josephine Leary (1962) and Marie Cordelia Stewart (later Mrs. Charles Dewalt (1964)) provide some insight but often describe the residential concentrations by name or physical characteristics rather than by geographical location. For example, 25 or more houses were scattered on the hills between Carnegie and Tesla and many of these structures were built of brick with "beautiful yards which were enclosed with fences and shaded with buckeye and pepper trees" (Williams 1961:21). At present, it is not possible to correlate this description with the Tesla quadrangle map (Fig. 9 ) or the approximate locations for the "suburbs" of "Treadwell Row", "Fry Town", "Jimtown", and "Harrietville." "Jimtown" , named in honor of James Treadwell, was associated with Tesla and located on a "hill at the end of Treadwell Row." Treadwell Row consisted of about 16 to 20 rows of five small houses per row, each of four rooms each, while the Treadwell House was first and larger than the others. Another concentration was found, "On the right, if you were in Jimtown, and down a hill, was a small flat, or meadow, with three big tents." Further, "Across a small creek and nestled into the hill was Frytown, named after Bob Fry" (Williams 1961:19). "Harrietville" named in honor of James 2F-45 Treadwell's daughter Harriet, was located about one mile from Tesla and consis- ted of about 48 houses, a school, slaughterhouse and a diary (Williams 1961: 20). The houses at Harrietville were arranged so that the "the quadruple row of four-room houses on the lower flat was known as "Silk Stocking Row" by the people who lived in a double row of smaller houses higher on the hill" (Williams 1961 :30). In addition to these named suburbs, there was "more than a dozen neat brick homes for workmen who worked in Carnegie" located on the hills between Pottery and Carnegie (Ward and Williams 1971:9-10). Cultural material associat- ed with this series of houses is still probably present on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300. The density and stratification within and between residential districts is quite evident in the manuscripts presently available. This differential social stratification may be reflected in the number, types and quality of archaeological surface material present at these locales . While the town of Carnegie flourished, some of the sheep and cattle raised in the area were butchered in Carnegie. The meat was processed for the hotel and sold in the butcher shop for individuals (Williams 1961:8). The "industrial revolution" in Corral Hollow obviously did not replace the traditional pattern of stock raising to any great degree. One of the more vivid events of inform- ant Marie Stewart involved watching Italian and Basque sheep herders shear sheep at the shearing sheds located one mile south of Carnegie (Stewart 1964: 15-16). The quality of the coal mined at Tesla was poor, so poor that a briquette plant was built in Stockton as a means of compressing the soft coal and dust into a more "useful" product. These briquettes were used by the locomotives of the Alameda and San Joaquin Railroad Company but fired so poorly that the firebox grates had to be cleaned halfway up to Tesla (Ward and Williams 1971:4). Further, the instantaneous combustabil i ty of the briquettes must have been another factor which may have discouraged the mining of the Tesla deposits (Eugence R. Prince, personal communication, 1981). The April 6th, 1906 earthquake was such that, in the words of Marie Stewart, "... our beds skidded across the rooms hitting first one wall and then back to the other, all furniture doing the same. The broken dishes and windows crashing added to the din. We looked over at the brick plant and the tall smoke stacks were toppled to the ground, and most all the bricks and 2F-46 building (sic) were in shambles" (Stewart 1964:20). The Tesla Coal Mine closed in 1906 as a result of the April 6 earthquake and the failure of the California Safe Deposit Bank of San Francisco (Williams 1961:6). Carnegie continued in operation utilizing oil-fired kilns (Ward and Williams 1971:10) even though the earthquake had damaged the facilities. The intensive use of the Tesla clay deposit had exhausted the clay near the surface of the mine by 1911 or 1912 (Williams 1960:4; 1961:6). The wet winter of 1911 and related flooding down the gulch had a devastating effect. The mine was closed below the 250 foot level. The floods destroyed five railroad testles and caused widespread damage along the entire line as well as destroying the John O'Brien and Edward Carrell ranches (Williams 1961:6). Carnegie continued operations until ca . 1911 although production had been declining since 1902. The lack of quality water and an adequate supply, the poor quality of the Tesla coal and the earthquake of 1906 coupled with the failure of the financial foundations of the Treadwell empire all conspired against Carnegie. The earthquake of 1906 led to a switch from clay sewer pipe to reinforced concrete in both Oakland and San Francisco lessening the demand for Carnegie products. Floods caused extensive damage in 1907 and 1911 (or 1912). By 1916 "the era was over," the Carnegie plant was sold to Gladding, McBean and Company who dismantled it to keep out competion. Tesla was purchased by the Beckman-Linden Corporation in 1919, while the Pottery at Walden Spur and the gravel operation were dismantled (Ward and Williams 1971: 14). Carnegie was abandoned by 1912 and by 1919 only the mine tailings, plant foundation and miscellaneous depressions marked the former Treadwell operations in Corral Hollow (Williams 1961:9). The order to terminate the railroad was issued in 1918 although it continued in operation until 1922 (Ward and Williams 1971 :6). Thus, Corral Hollow shared in the "Industrial Revolution" during the waning years of the 19th century and opening years of the twentieth. The revolution included a railroad, a commercial coal mine and a ceramic manufacturing facility. In contrast to the initial migration into Corral Hollow, a population explosion occurred. However, the lack of profitability, due to both natural and cultural causes, resulted in the failure of the industrial enterprises and the reversion to the original patterns of growth native to Corral Hollow. At present, the Corral Hollow region has reverted to its traditional 2F-47 pattern of livestock grazing and scattered residences coexisting with a State Recreation Area and the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's research facility of Site 300. Notes In early California, a camino was understood to be a horse or pedestrian trail, while at the latter part of the Mexican Period, a camino referred to a cart road. The program of the Stockton San Joaquin County Public Library places Callaghan Gulch to the west of Corral Hollow. If this gulch is "Callahan Gulch" as drawn on the Tesla Quadrangle of 1907, the location is directly south of Corral Hollow. Of course, the exact route of the de Anza party through this region is problematic. Both the prehistoric and historic remains of the site appear to have been destroyed during the construction of a modern bridge (Williams 1960:6-7). Bakers Ravine is not labelled on any historic or contemporary maps. The mine referred to by Brewer may be the O'Brien and Carrel 1 Mine. Unfortunately the number of smokestacks and kilns is in dispute. The total ranges from 3-12 (Williams 1961:4) to 2-8 (Ward and Williams 1971: 11-12). Note that the photograph of the Carnegie plant in Lowell (1916) exhibits eight smokestacks. 2F-48 HISTORIC EVENTS Statewide Gold Rush Statehood 1848 1850 Corral Hollow Hunting/Capture First American Period Occupation Stock Raising First Commercial Building Second Commercial Building Railroad - From Stockton - From Livermore - From Stockton ca. 1820s Nov. 1846, Capt. Imas Group ca. 1840s - Present 1850 - Zinc House 1861 - White House Corral Hollow (Carrell) ca. 1870 - abandoned across from Zinc House 1888 - Surveyed, not built 1891-1922 - Alameda and San Joaquin RR ndustrialization Company Towns - Tesla ca. 1896 ■ ■ 1912 - Pottery ca. 1895 ■ -1912 - Carnegie ca. 1904 ■ - 1912 General Corral Hollow ca. 1892 ■ - 1912 2F-49 ! 4- 3— 3 J* 1 9 ."3 *i — ^^w> id 8 <0 m WM>JV y ^ ipfsojifuicfly ^^M- £JR> s l -umurhntjSM o o c oo ■r- i — i cr d) 03 u O n3 S £ 1 ' S 5#=5 "•**♦ This page of the original report is an envelope containing foldout maps for Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12; economy precludes reproducing them here. 2F-54 FIELD RECONNAISSANCE Field Methodology An intensive Class III field reconnaissance conforming to Bureau of Land Management specifications was conducted for all accessible areas of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Site 300. "The objective of a Class III inventory is to identify and record, from surface and exposed profile indications, all cultural resources within a specified and defined area. The Class III inventory results in a total inventory of cultural resource sites observable within a specified area. Upon completion of a Class III inventory within a specified area, no further cultural resource inventory work will usually be needed. However, further cultural resource data studies may be carried out, as necessary (Bureau of Land Management, Manual, Release 8-3, 8111.14)." The survey was conducted systematically on a section by section basis by a three to five member field team utilizing straight line transects spaced on 25 meter intervals and averaging one mile in length. The orientation of the individual transects varied (Table 3 ) but in general they were oriented either north-south or east-west. In several sections the topography was too rugged to attempt compass-oriented transects effectively or safely. Transects oriented along the contours of the major topographical features were utilized in this situation. To ensure full coverage using this approach, flagging tape was left at intervals to use as a guide in subsequent transects. This procedure allowed the survey crew to walk the canyon sides, bottoms and ridgetops rather than attempting to keep straight line transects while surveying the steep slopes. Intervals of 25 meters were maintained on these transects. Table 3 North-South 15 16 17 20 26 Transect Orientation East-West 22 26 33 34 35 Contour Orientation 21 27 28 29 26 (Note: Mixed strategy in several cases) Survey progress and ground inspection were hampered by the thick grass 2F-55 ground cover present throughout the project area. The ankle to waist high grasses and forbs obscured the ground surface in many areas making inspection difficult. Some ground visibility and subsurface soil exposures were provided by rodent burrows, animal trails and rocky areas. Several small areas of LLNL Site 300 were not surveyed due to disturbance impacts (e.g., parking lots, administration areas, golf course); safety consider- ations (e.g., designated disposal areas); and, security requirements (e.g., "Process Area") (Table 4 ). In addition, some of the extremely steep hi IT and canyon sides in Sections 21, 27, 28 and 29 were not inspected due to their hazardous nature. Table 4 Non-Surveyed Areas "No Access Pol icy" "Process Area" Test Areas 801 , 818, 823, 825-828, 832-838, 840, 841 , 851 , and 854 Disposal Pits - Sections 16, 17 and 23 Disturbed/Impacted Administration Area Parking Lots - Main and Contractors Gol f Course For the purposes of the project, a site was defined as an area with five or more cultural objects occurring within a 20 meter diameter circle. Locations of fewer than five cultural objects were treated as isolated finds. Site loci were identified utilizing standard Bureau of Land Management - Department of the Interior site definitions (cf. Appendix II). Rock art and rockshelter sites were identified by the presence of one or more permanent cultural features (i.e., bedrock mortars, incised/pecked petroglyph panel, etc.) as well as by the presence of any portable cultural objects. Pre- historic and historic sites were recorded on separate forms - the BLM Cultural Resources Inventory Form (Fig. 13 ) and the Basin Research Associates' Historic Site Survey Form (Fig. 14 ). Individual isolated finds and small sites were recorded on the Basin Research Associates' Short Form, Cultural Resource Inventory Record (Fig. 15). Rock art sites were recorded using another special form (Fig. 16 ) in addition to the standard site record. All sites and isolated finds were photographed using both color print and black and white film. Photographic logs (Appendix VI) were maintained for each exposed roll. All 2F-56 sites were flagged and sketch mapped from a datum point. Historic sites were normally recorded in English measurements while prehistoric sites used the metric system. All petroglyph panels and design elements were measured and sketched. Each cultural resource was plotted on the appropriate USGS topo- graphic map and the existing Site 300 blueline topographic map. Isolated finds of a portable nature were collected since field relocation would be difficult. Otherwise, a no-collection policy was followed. Each crew chief kept a field notebook to record data pertaining to the dialy fieldwork. Topics of interest included local topography, vegetation, observed fauna, geologic data and other relevant information not recorded on the site forms. In addition to the field notebook and site form information, a Basin Research Associates' Sample Unit Record Form was completed for each surveyed half section (Fig. 17 ) (cf. Appendix IV for forms). All cultural resource sites were field evaluated according to the criteria set forth in the Bureau of Land Management Cultural Resource Evaluation System (BLM-CRES) (Appendix III). Inventory Results (Fig. 18) The seven-hundred and twelve man-hours of field effort resulted in the location of 24 cultural resource properties. Of these, three are prehistoric, twenty historic and one is a multi component site consisting of both aboriginal and historic materials (Table 5 )• Overall, historic materials dominate the cultural resource inventory.- Historic cultural resources, both sites and isolated combined, comprise 83% of the total compared to 13% for prehistoric materials and 4% for multi - component sites (Table 6). In terms of the defined site types, historic petroglyphs and structures are most representative of the types recorded during the inventory. Site Summaries (cf. Appendix V ) 16.5 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 16, NW% of NW% (CRES S3) Prehistoric, small, light lithic scatter. Raw material is small chunks of chert and chalcedony-like material which may be opalized petrified wood. Five to six "waste" flakes were identified but whether or not they are culturally produced objects could not be reliably determined. No worked flakes were noted. Area is 7.5m x 5.0 m on a north facing hillside overlooking 2F-57 Table 5 General Site Inventory Results Site Cate gory Prehistoric (3) Prehistoric Isolate (0) Historic Site (18) Historic Isolate (2) Multicomponent (1) (Prehistoric and Historic) of Total Sites 13% 75% 8% 4% Table 6 LLNL Site 300 - Site Types Site Type (Aboriginal) Lithic Scatter Rockshelter with Bedrock Mortar(s) Rockshel ter/Milling Station Site Type (Historic) Petroglyph Structure Trash Dump/Rubble Isolated Find Town Mine 2F-58 the northern boundary of Site 300. 17 1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 17, SE^ of NEHi (CRES S3) " Historic petroglyph panel. Located on a single vertical sandstone panel, three-quarters of the way up a steep hillside. It consists of historic graffiti incised in the soft sandstone. There are no reliably discernible dates or cultural associations. 20.1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 20, SEU of NE^ (CRES S3) " Historic trash scatter, small and localized. Found on a flat grassy area south of small ravine. Scatter consists of rusted metal, broken white porcelain, buff crockery and broken bottle glass (various colors). Artifacts were clustered around a weathered wooden stake suggesting a secondary deposition of materials. 22 1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 22, SW*s of NW% (CRES S2/S3) ' Prehistoric rockshelter. Originally recorded by Dietz and Jackson (n.d.). The rockshelter faces NNE, near the base of a large hill. A spring is found about 150m ESE. The rockshelter is 2m high, 8m wide and 2.8m deep. The shelter contains three bedrock mortars with one possible incipient mortar on a step of bedrock along the rear wall. There is a tan-gray midden deposit within the rockshelter and extending a short way beyond it. A mano-pestle and a worked obsidian flake were present on the surface within the shelter. The ceiling is partially fire-blackened and some fire affected rock is present. 22.2 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 22, NE 1 ^ of SEk (CRES S2/S3) ' Prehistoric Rockshelter with one bedrock mortar. A shallow, narrow rockshelter facing NW. It is high on a steep slope above a N-S trending canyon. The she! ter is 9.2m wide, 2 .8m high and 3.4m deep. One shallow bedrock mortar (9cm x 15-17cm deep) is present in the back of the shelter. other cultural material or midden was present. Recent (1957-1960) graffiti was found on the soft sandstone at the rear of the shelter. 25 l - T 3S, R 4E, Section 25, mh of SW% (CRES S3) " Isolated find, historic. Partially buried, rusted metal band. Probably the outer binding for a wooden wagon wheel. Band is 1 5/8" wide. Diameter of wheel not known. Item not collected. 26.1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 26, SW% of SE% (CRES S3) Historic, pile of weathered wood on surface of alluvial fan. Several No 2F-59 Pieces are connected with wire and nails. Several other metal artifacts are also present. 1L1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 26, SE% of SW% (CRES S3) Historic rubble, mainly wood, just SW of an intermittent stream The rubble pile contains mainly wooden boards and standard guage railroad ties with spikes still embedded. Other metal, concrete and recent ceramic debris is scattered to the NW, 20m up the drainage. 27J. - T 3S, R 4E, Section 27, SE% of NE^ (CRES S3) Historic structure, partially collapsed. Found straddling the drainage of a deep NW-SE trending canyon. Large weathered beams cross the drainage while boards criss-cross on top of this. Standing portion held together by wire nails No other artifacts associated with this structure. IL1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 27, NW% of NW% (CRES S3) Historic trash scatter. Scatter spread down small drainage on steep east side of a large N-S trending canyon. The scatter includes historic to recent material including metal, glass (broken and jars), metal pots and cans, wood, a socket wrench, and the frame/chassis of a Ford Model-T. ^1 * T 3S > R 4E > Section 28, SW% of SW^ (CRES S3) Historic, portion of a pipeline and concrete foundations. Sections of a rusted metal pipeline and a parallel ceramic pipeline in a N-S drainage Both go underground to the north and small stretches are exposed intermittently beyond this. The metal pipe terminates on the south at a concrete foundation of four concrete posts, later found to be for a water trough. The ceramic pipe continues 13.7 feet further south before it ends. ?JL2 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 28, Sw\ of mh (CRES S3) Historic structure. Two room cabin standing, with a surrounding barbed wire fence in the bottom of a large N-S canyon. The building has square-cut nails in some of the wall boards but are not part of the building structure indicating that the boards were scavenged from elsewhere. Some historic debris was scattered around the building, including parts of a wood burning stove. "Oral testimony" indicates that the site was once a sheep station. 28j3 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 28, SE^ of NW% (CRES S3) Historic trash scatter. Wood, metal, ceramics and glass scattered over approximately 125 x 100 feet, with a concentrated dump near the center of this scatter which is at the confluence of two drainages. The site may have 2F-60 contained a building judging from the plate glass and amount of wood present. Purpled bottle glass is present along with some sguare cut nails. There are the rcetal head boards of a bed upright in the ground just northeast of the mam dump. 28 4 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 28, NE* of « (CRES S3) " Historic petroglyph in rockshelter. A sandstone rockshelter on a gently sloping hill with a single date, Mar. 11, 39, incised in the rock. No artifacts are associated with the site. 28 5 - T 3S R 4E, Section 28, Nkfc of N* (CRES S2/3) "Multi-component rockshelter, historic petroglyphs and prehistoric milling features Originally recorded by Dietz and Jackson (n.d.) as 28.1, a pre- historic site only. Large rockshelter with smaller alcove part way up the east side of a large, deep north-south canyon. Historic graffiti found throughout; names and initials with dates ranging from 1922 to 1976 incised in the soft sandstone. Three bedrock mortars and four depressions that may be incipient mortars are found beneath the sandy floor cover in the smaller alcove/ shelter. Chunks of opalized petrified wood are found in and near the large shelter but only one flake noted. No midden deposit discernible. 29 1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 29, Nw^ of NW^, (CRES S4) " Isolated historic find. Weathered hammer found hanging on northern section fence on side of steep canyon. Collected by survey crew. 29 2 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 29, NE% of Site (CRES S3 - ?) " Historic power/telegraph pole line. A line of wooden poles, some upright, some fallen, extending an unknown distance across the hills and canyons, approximately east-west (?). Wire is still present, running from pole to pole. Poles have glass insulators present. One insulator collected by survey crew. 29.3 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 29, SW% of SW^ (CRES S3 - ?) " Historic mine addit with nearby foundation rubble along drainage of N-S canyon. The addit has support timbers and continues an unknown distance into the hillside. Standing water present within the addit. On the slope above were several metal pipes coming vertically out of the ground, possibly for ventilation. Three discrete possible foundation sites with concrete and Carnegie bricks. Historic debris also present. *33 1 - T 3S R 4E, Section 33, NW and SEVs of HZk (CRES SI) — — Section 34, SW*a of NW% Historic townsite. This appears to be a major residential area for the factory town of Carnegie. The brick and pottery plant was located in Corral 2F-61 natural rather than cultural. 34 - 2 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 34, NW% of NE% (CRES S3) Rockshelter with historic petroglyphs. Shelter is midway up the steep western slope of a N-S trending canyon. Graffiti is incised in sandstone and consists of initials and the number 14 (representing 1914 ??). No artifacts were noted. 34 - 3 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 34, SW% of NE^ (CRES S3) Historic petroglyph. Two vertical sandstone panels, 20m apart, on the eastern slope of a N-S trending canyon. Only elements present are initials, no dates. The panels face west and northwest. No artifacts were noted. 34 - 4 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 34, SW% of NE% (CRES S3) Rockshelter with historic petroglyphs in and near it. Shelter is 60m north of Corral Hollow in a N-S trending canyon, 300m east of the townsite of Carnegie. The shelter and nearby panels contain historic graffiti. These are initials and dates (1913 and 1939) incised in the sandstone. No associated artifacts were noted. 35 - 1 - T 3S, R 4E, Section 35, NE% of NW% (CRES S3) Historic foundation. Found on southern slope of ridge terminus above two drainages. The foundations consist of a rectangular concrete platform with five oblong concrete slabs set on it. The concrete extends into the hillside. Three of the slabs have bolted on boards. The USGS map indicates a windmill at this site. This may have been the foundation for it. No other cultural material was associated with this site. 2F-62 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR Kl'KEAl- OF LAND MANAGEMENT Cultural Resources Inventory Record / _/ Aboriginal L — f Non-Aboriginal L~- -7 froth l.CBES rating (complete item 31. and enter here): 2.Fieldsite number 3. CA site number: k. HLM CR report number (it applicable): 5. Project: 6. State: County: District Resource area: Planning uni t 7. Map reference: 8. Township: Range : Section (to nearest k. of fc): Elevat ion: 9. L'TM (always complete if SI rated): 10. Location (proximity to roads, bldgs., towns, major topographical features): 11. Land ownership status 12. Other site numbers/designations/names 13. Site types: 14. Cultural af f i I iation(s) , dates of use: 15. Site description (use continuation sheet if necessary): 16. Area of occupation: 17. Depth (tested?) in 18. Artifacts, materials (collected? observed?): 19. Storage (if collection was made): 20. Site disturbance (Man caused and/or natural causes - erosional state, previous excavations, collections, etc.): 21. Possibility of destruction: 1 U ™.t ■> 22. Site marked'' How 3 C 3 cr (continued on reverse) Figure 13 2F-63 drological data (nearest water, types oi drainage patterns, ephemeral sources, possible former water sources, rain gauge data, etc.): 24. feomorphic context (geographical situation - landform type, slope, exposure, etc.) 5. Soil 6» substrate on site 26. Surrounding soil & substrate 27. Vegetation on site (major community, species composition, and X of cover) 28. Vegetation off site (major community, species composition, and 7 of cover) 29. Faunal observations: 30. Potentially exploitable resources (Your opinion, what resources did the occupants of this site possibly exploit - minerals? fauna? flora? water? soil? etc.): 31. GEES Classification , only to be completed by a CR Professional . Circle one and enter in item 1.: SI S2 S3 S4 SO £.xruanation: Evaluator Title: Date: 32. Other evaluation & remarks: 33. Informants &. references (published & unpublished references, National Register properties in general area): 34. Photos: 35. Xerox of topo. sheet: Yes No 36. Locational sketch, site sketch Yes No 37. Continuation Sheet: Yes No 38. Artifact illustrations Yes No 39. Recorded by 40. Date recorded 2F-64 BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES CULTURAL RESOURCE SERVICES HISTORIC SITE SURVEY FORM 1. Site Number 2. CRES Rating. 3. Other (numbers /names) 5. Location: T R 6. Map Ref 8. Verbal Location 9. UTM Grid Location: Zone 10. Ownership: Federal 11. NR Status: Candidate 4. County Section of 7. Elevation State Private Unk Potential Not Eligible No Determination 12. Disturbance: Animal Burning Vandalism ORV Other Explain . 13. Present Condition: Good Fair Poor Explain 14. Activity: Mining Railroad Military Exploration/Traveling Settlement Other Explain Homes teading Ranching 15. Site Type: 16. Features: Town _ Mine Military Camp Railroad Other Homestead Graveyard Road Trail Trashdump Structure Dugout Fire Hearth Cairn Rock Alignment Trashdump Irrigation Trail Road Corral Spring R&R Grade (berm) Mine Tailings Other Well Tram (road /way) Explain 17. Artifacts: Wood (size, type) Glass (color) Metal (type)_ Bone (species) Adobe (condition) Cans (size, type) Ceramic (color) Nails (size, type) Ordnance Other 18. Temporal Period: Circa 19. Recorder Era 20. Date Figure 14 2F-65 21. Photos 1 . Recorder (s) : 2. Date: BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES Short Form, Cultural Resources Inventory Record 3. BLM Rating A. Field //: 5. CA #: USE: For the recording of isolated finds and extremely small cultural resource properties (less than 20 items) as defined by current government practices and/or Basin Research Associates internal guidelines (06/79). 7. Project: 8. State: 9. County: 10. Elevation: 11. Map Reference: 12. T. R. 13. Site Type: , Section , k of of \ 14. Geological/Geographical Situation and Brief Description: 15. Nearest Water 16. Vegetation (Major community and flora at site or in immediate vicinity): 17. Artifacts, Materials (If all observed materials were not collected, so note) 18. BLM Classification (Note one and enter in No. 3): SI S2 S3 SA Date: Explanation: Evaluator Title: 19. Remarks (Photos (?), sketches (?), etc.) 20. Site Marked (staked (?), flagged (?), describe) Use Reverse If Necessary Figure 15 2F-66 ROCK ART RECORDING FORM BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES IDENTIFICATION Typo of Site (petroglyph, picLograph, combination) Name of site Recorded by (name/address) Site Designation_ Previous Designation(s) Date LOCATION Geographic Coordinates_ Section Lot Plan UTM Grid Reference Marine Chart Map Elevation (metric units above sea level)_ Location and Access (describe in detail) Historic Band Territory_ Band Address . Linguistic Group_ Airphoto No, Figure 16 2F-67 PROXIMITY TO KNOWN ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITES (be explicit) MAP OF SITE (indicate access routes, orientation, topographic features , etc . ) SCALE 2F-68 Indicate North by the use of an arrow. DESCRIPTION Meth od of Manufacture (pecked, incised, painted with brush, etc.) Type of Rock_ Direction the panel (s) face, use cardinal, quadrant or azimuth notation (eg. North- east; N45E, 450) : Panel 1_ Panel 2_ Etc. Angle of Inclination of panel (s) to ground surface: Panel 1 , Panel 2 Etc, Estimated insolation: (the number of hours of exposure per day for each season) 1) Spring_ 2) Suramer_ 3) Fall 4) Winter_ hrs./day FLORA OF AREA (be as specific as possible) DESIGN MEASUREMENTS AND CLASSIFICATION "Panel" refers to significantly separated design groups and are indicated by a capital letter eg., ?anel A, Panel B, etc. "Designs" refers to individual igures and are indicated by consecutive, non-repeated numbers, eg., Designs 1,Z, etc "Designs" refers to individual figures and are indicated by consecutive, non-re- peated numbers, eg., Designs 1,2, etc. "Type" may be either anthropomorphic zoo- morphic, geometric, or unknown. Dimensions of panels and individual designs are given in metric units. 2F-69 for example PANEL PANEL DIMENSIONS DESIGN DESIGN TYPE DESIGN dimension; A A B B 30m x 20m ii M 10m x 4m " x " 1 2 3 4 anthropomorphic geometric 1 zoomorphic 20cm x 9cm 30cm x 30cm 10cm x 6cm 12cm x 2cm PANEL PANEL DIMENSIONS DESIGN DESIGN TYPE DESIGN DIMENSIONS 2F-70 (continued on reverse if necessary) DESIGN COLOUR (Preferably from standard chart such as Munsell Soil Charts) DESIGN // COLOUR (continue on reverse if necessary) INTERPRETATION (give source of information, book, informant, personal, etc.) DESIGN H INTERPRETATION SOURCE CONDITION Lichen Present on Designs_ Nearby Type(s)_ Details (include diameter of lichen) Mineral Layer on Designs_ Nearby Details Type(s) Vandalism (description, location) Natural Damage (description, location) 2F-71 Possibility of Future Damage Re commendations /Conservation RECORDING Rubbings/Tracings (list method, materials, place of storage) and label each rubbing or tracing with panel letter and design number (s) . Number made Details Method/Materials Storage Location Moulds/Casts (list method, date and place of storage. A Casting Sheet giving speci- fic details of each moulding operation should be attached to this form). Number made Details Method/Materials Storage Location^ 2F-72 ■ Field Sketch of Panels/Designs (each panel and design should be assigned its correct letter and number) . 2F-73 SCALE PHOTOGRAPHY ROLL ("Subject" refers to panel and individual design or group being photographed. It should also indicate distance from rock face. All sites should be photo- graphed from a distance to show location, then closer to show entire site an finally each group and individual design should be photographed close up.) FRAME FILM TYPE TIME OF DAY SUBJECT Additional Comments Regarding Photography Other Photographs (if privately owned give owner's names, addresses, and date when photo- graphs were taken) ADDITIONAL COMMENTS CONCERNING SITE 2F-74 i i i i i i i m BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC SAMPLE UNIT RECORD FORM 1 . Sample Unit Number 3. Type of Unit (Circle One Only) 4. Map 2. Photo Number(s) Original Altered Discretionary Location of Unit Within Section 5 . Township 6 . Range 7. Section 9. Date 10. Other Units Today 11. Field Supervisor (Name) 12. Crew Members (Names) 13. Prehistoric Loci Recorded (Sites/Isolated Finds) 14. Historic Loci Recorded (Sites/Isolated Finds) 15. Describe (the suitability of this area for past human activity) 16. General Survey Conditions (Circle One Only) Good Average Poor 17. Describe (General Survey Conditions) 18. Describe (Method and Accuracy of Locating Sample Unit) Figure 17 2F-75 BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES UNIT 19. Vegetation (Describe) 20 Drainage (rank at least one) Converging Di verging Braided Other (Describe) 21. Distance to Nearest Permanent Water meters 22. Type (Circle One Only) Spring Seep Lake Stream Other 23. Water Resources (Describe) 24. Landform (Describe) 25. Slope (rank at least one) »o Level (0-3 w ) Gentle (3-8°) Moderate (8-16 ) Steep (16-26°) ^ery Steep/Prec. (26V 26. Aspect (rank at least one) North Northeast East Southeast South Southwest West Northwest None 25/26. Comments/Remarks 2F-76 BASIN RESEARCH ASSOCIATES - 3 UNIT 27. Surficial Deposts (rank at least one) Extrusive Igneous Intrusive Igneous Metamorphic Consolidated Sediments Desert Pavement Al 1 uvium Col 1 uvium Aeolian Deposits Other (Describe) 28. Geology (Describe) 29. Special Resources (Describe - lithic materials, clay, plants etc.) 30, Disturbance (rank at least one) Off-Road Vehicles (ORV) Mining Other Construction Erosion Grazing Other Animal Disturbances Cultivated Agriculture Other 31. Disturbance (Describe) 31. Intensity of Disturbance High Moderate Low 32. General Observations (Detail) 2F-77 This page of the original report is an envelope containing a foldout map for Figure 18; economy precludes reproducing it here. 2F-78 ■ SITE LOCALE ANALYSIS A total of 25 sample units were intensively surveyed. Nine of these units were devoid of cultural material. 16 units had prehistoric or historic cultural remains present. Of these, 13 possessed historic remains while four units contained prehistoric sites (one sample unit had a mul ti-compnent site--a site exhibiting both prehistoric and historic material--thus was counted twice). Though the sample size of units is small, a key question to ask is 'what distinguishes those units with sites from those without sites?' Site locale analysis, besides being a major topic in anthropology (Bettinger 1975; Busby and Kobori 1980; Thomas and Bettinger 1976; among others), can assist land managers by providing summary statements regarding the probability of site occurrence on land under their direct jurisdiction. To determine the pattern of site occurrence within Site 300, elementary summary statistics of central tendency plus non-parametric tests of com- parison were computed. These are described below. Table 7 summarizes the total number of sample units with cultural resources present. 64% of all units contained cultural material remains. Table 8 details the occurrence of historic sites and prehistoric sites. This table lists the total number of units, total number of sites, the mean number of sites per unit, the range of sites per unit, the standard deviation about the mean number of sites per unit, and the Coefficient of Dispersion (CD). The Coefficient of Dispersion is an elementary variance-mean ratio that examines the degree of clustering of cultural resources. A CD value equal to or less than 1.0 indicates a uniform distribution of sites whereas a value greater than 1.0 points to a nonrandom, clustered pattern of site occurrence. The table shows that units with historic sites possess a greater mean number of sites per unit, greater than 1 per unit. The units with pre- historic sites averaged only 1 site per unit in a uniform distribution. Mean- while, the units with historic sites ranged from one to four sites per unit. However, the CD value is still below 1.0. Based on this data the occurrence of sites on Site 300 could be interpreted as being almost random. Yet by examining the maps, the sample unit forms, and the actual land, it is obvious that some sample units were situated on rolling foothills while others crossed steep-walled canyons or gullies. Sample units were divided up by landform. Numerous units (20) crossed 2F-79 a canyon or gully at some point in their 320 acres. Of these units, 15 contained archaeologic or historic sites. Units located strictly within the foothill area of Site 300 (i.e., those units that did not cross canyons or gullies) had one unit with cultural resources present. Despite the low Coefficient of Dispersion values, it would appear that an association between site occurrence and landform exists. To test this possible associa- tion, the Chi-Square test was performed on the data. Due to the small values in expected and observed frequencies for the Chi-Square test, this test was re-computed utilizing Yates' Correction for Continuity (Siegel 1956; Blalock 1972; Johnson 1976). Chi-Square is indicated by X 2 , while Chi-Square utilizing Yates' Correction is indicated by X£. Table 9 tests the null hypothesis, H Q , that regardless of associated landform, all units have an equal probability of cultural resource occurrence. The alternative hypothesis, Hj_ , is that all surveyed units do not possess equal probability of cultural resource occurrence. The value of .1 is considered adequate to test for statistical significance when dealing with limited archaeological data (Plog 1978). The results comparing sample units with and without sites depending upon associated landoform, are statistically significant. The value for X£ is regarded as more accurate. The null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis, H^ , is accepted. Since the sample size of units is so small, a more reliable statistical test is the Fisher's Exact Probability Test. The Fisher's Exact Probability Test does not approximate probability as the Chi-Square test. The tested null hypothesis is, again, all units have an equal probability of cultural resource occurrence regardless of associated landform. The alternative hypothesis is directional, units that exhibit greater variety in landform will have a greater probability of cultural resource occurrence. The level of significance is .1 but since this is a directional test, the correct oMs .1/2 = .05. Table 10 lists the probability figures for the Fisher's Exact Probability Test. The probability figure is significant. The null hypothesis is rejected. The number of surveyed units and the actual number of sites and isolated finds recorded is very low. However, these elementary statistical tests indicate that cultural resource occurrence is associated more strongly with the canyon-gully landforms than the foothills. That is, activities on the Site 300 stand a much greater probability of impacting cultural resources when those tasks take place in and around canyon-gul ly areas. However, the occurrence of cultural resources does not appear to be clustered. 2F-80 Table 7 Summary of Survey Units with Cultural Resources Present (isolated finds included) units with units with historic sites prehistoric sites 13 1 total units with sites 16 (64%) total units w/out sites 9 (36%) total units surveyed 25 * a single multi component site (prehistoric and historic) counted twice Table 8 Site 300 Lawrence National Livermore Laboratory Summary - Cultural Resource Occurrence range- sites per unit 1 - 4 Survey Unit n units n sites X per unit Units with historic sites* 13 21 + 1.62 Units with prehistoric sites 4 4 + 1.00 Units without sites 9 — _ 1.19 0.00 CD 0.89 0.00 * two isolated finds included + a single multi component site (prehistoric and historic) counted twice n = number % - mean s = standard deviation CD = Coefficient of Dispersion 2F-81 Table 9 Chi -Square Test Landform and Cultural Resource Occurrence units with sites units without sites Total Units with gullies, ravines, canyons 15 (12.8) (7.2) 20 Foothill units (3.2) (1.8) 16 25 ( ) = expected frequencies df = 1 <*-= .1 level H = Regardless of associated landform, all units have an equal probability of cultural resource occurrence. H, - Al 1 surveyed units do not possess equal probability of cultural resource occurrence. X = 5.25 X 2 = 3.13 c Reject the H , results are significant 2F-82 Table 10 Fisher's Exact Probability Test Landform and Cultural Resource Occurrence For the Fisher's Exact Probability Test the Hj will be directional. P = (A + B)!(C + DliJA t C)!(B + D) j N!A!B!C!D! (for a 2 x 2 table) (Siegel 1956:97) H l = Regardless of associated landform, all units have an equal probability of cultural resource occurrence. Units with gullies, ravines, canyons have a greater probability of cultural resource occurrence. o<= .1/2 = .05 Fisher's Exact Probability Test, p = .0379 + .0016 = .0395 Reject the H , results are significant Units that exhibit greater variety in landform will have a greater probability of cultural resource occurrence. 2F-83 SITE SIGNIFICANCE It is the implicit purpose of both the federal and state environmental legislation and cultural resource mandates that all cultural resources found on federally and/or state owned or managed lands or adjacent to these lands are considered of importance and merit consideration. Not alj_ cultural resources are of equal value nor do they all merit National Register of Historic Places listing. In order to assess relative importance for management purposes and to identify those properties on the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300 that should be nominated to the National Register, Basin Research Associates used a Cultural Resources Evaluation System (CRES) devised by the Bureau of Land Management for its large scale inventories (Appendix III). Of the 24 cultural resource properties identified during the inventory, only four are either potential or eligible resources for the National Register of Historic Places (Table 11). The majority of the sites are either of S3 or S4 significance ("low significance") and while they merit consideration by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, that consideration should be mostly of a defensive nature. That is, the Site 300 management should only institute measures (other than normal protection from vandalism) to actively preserve such sites only when they are threatened by a proposed activity or undertaking. The SI and S2 sites (National Register significance to "mid-signifi- cance") merit a high and active degree of consideration by the management of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Both the Department of Energy and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory must work aggresively to insure the physical preservation of SI rated properties. These cultural resources must be nominated to the National Register of Historic Places. The "mid- significance" level sites (S2) also merit a high degree of consideration. Properties rated as S2 are such that with minor informational changes they would be classified as SI. Management recommendations for specific cultural resources are discussed in the following chapter. 2F-84 Table 11 SITE SIGNIFICANCE RAT: Site Number Site Type 16.5 Lithic Scatter 17.1 Petroglyph (Historic) 20.1 Trash Scatter (Historic) 22.1 Rockshelter - Prehistoric 22.2 Rockshelter - Prehistoric 25.1 Isolated Find - Historic 26.1 Trash (Historic) 26.2 Rubble (Historic) 27.1 Structure (Historic) 27.2 Trash Scatter (Historic) 28.1 Pipeline (Historic) 28.2 Structure (Historic) 28.3 Trash Scatter (Historic) 28.4 Petroglyph (Historic) 28.5 Rockshelter - Multi component 29.1 Isolated Find - Historic 29.2 Power/Telegraph Line 29.3 Mine Addit 33.1 Townsite - Historic 34.1 Petroglyph (Historic) 34.2 Petroglyph (Historic) 34.3 Petroglyph (Historic) 34.4 Petroglyph (Historic) 35.1 Foundation (Historic) CRES Rating National Register Rating S3 No S3 No S3 No S2/S3 Potential S2/S3 Potential S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S2/S3 Potential S4 No S3 (?) Possible S3 (?) Possible SI Eligible S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No S3 No 2F-85 SITE PROTECTION MEASURES The identification of site specific protection needs must be accomplished through the consideration of the regional archaeological and historical record. The protection measures employed must also be appropriate to the particular "use" identified for the resource. Such a committment is generally best determined where research and management objectives for an area have been developed. In general, the development of protection measures must be based on an understanding of the values associated with the resource, it's potential uses, and the nature of the threats to the resource (cf. Table 12). Clearly, the manipulation of the resource may not be appropriate in cases where socio-cul tural values are concerned with religious matters or formal social activities of a ceremonial nature. Such uses can frequently be im- pacted by modern intrusions out of character with the site values. The intrusions may not even need to leave physical evidence to contaminate the sacred character. Table 12 Selected Types of Impacts Applicable to Site 300 Vandal i sm Casual Off-Road Use Range Fires/Fire Control Materials Sites Rights of Way/Access Roads Construction The following table includes the major categories of protection measures that may be applicable to the cultural resources located within the boundaries of Site 300. Table 13 Protection Measures 1. Patrolling/Surveillance - to monitor natural deterioration, direct and indirect effects of development projects, and prevent vandalism and other unauthorized uses. This measure is appropriate for all site types, particularly those most accessible to human traffic. 2. Public Awareness - accomplished through signing, interpretive trails, brochures and publications. This measure is most effective for curbing vandalism and building popular support for archaeological/ historical programs. 2F-86 4 5 Project Avoidance - the preferred action when dealing with all site types, but particularly in cases where sites are of such substantial nature (e.g., rockshelters, extensive historic sites, etc.) that adequate data recovery procedures could not be implemented due to funding deficiencies and, particularly short time deadlines. Fencing - restricts access to sites. Should be used only in areas where surveillance and maintenance is feasible. Erosion Control - to protect sites from lake or river water levels, runoff areas, movement of sands by wind action, and other potential problems. Drainages may be modified, stream and lakeshore banks reinforced, and construction of catch basins, diversions or windbreaks. 6 Systematic Data Recovery - for situations where sites cannot be preserved in place This option is more applicable to scientific values than socio-cultural values, and is more accomplished by detailed recordation, surface collection and excavation. 7. Special Management Area Designations - this action is intended to provide long term in-situ preservation. In regard to scientific values, the resource is set aside in some cases so that future generations of scholars may be able to pursue field research with more sophisticated analytical methods and techniques than are currently available. The selection of the most appropriate measures is dictated by research objectives in addition to other factors. Research objectives can only be refined as the knowledge of the data base. Major data gaps presently exist for the LLNL Site 300 area especially in terms of aboriginal use and certain historic activity-use areas. These gaps may be corrected through future research. 2F-87 CULTURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS A number of cultural resource protection/management options are available to the management of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory for Site 300 in order to fulfill the requirements of the various federal and state mandates. For the CRES rated S3 and S4 sites, it is recommended that a strategy of passive/defensive protection (i.e., patrolling/surveillance) be instituted with active measures considered only when the resources are threatened by a proposed activity or undertaking (cf. Table 14). Table 14 Passive Protection Measures Site Number 16.5 17.1 20.1 25.1 26.1 26.2 27.1 27.2 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 29.1 34.1 34.2 34.3 34.4 35.1 Site Type Lithic Scatter Petroglyph (Historic) Trash Scatter (Historic) Isolated Find - Historic Trash (Historic) Rubble (Historic) Structure (Historic) Trash Scatter (Historic) Pipeline (Historic) Structure (Historic) Trash Scatter (Historic) Petroglyph (Historic) Isolated Find - Historic Petroglyph (Historic) Petroglyph (Historic) Petroglyph (Historic) Petroglyph (Historic) Foundation (Historic) The following recommendations are directed at specific sites inventoried during the survey. Prehistoric Cultural Resources Site 22.1 - This prehistoric rockshelter with three bedrock mortars and a midden deposit has potential for contributing data of scientific/educational 2F-88 value based on the evaluation of its surface component. A true assessment of its "significance" can only be determined through the implementation of a limited subsurface tesing program. It is recommended that the site be tested to provide the necessary data for determining its National Register of Historic Places significance. Patrolling, project avoidance and fencing are suggested as protection measures prior to the testing program. If testing is rejected, it is suggested that the site be designated as a "Special Management Area." Site 22.2 - One bedrock mortar and no discernible midden characterize this rockshelter. This site may have a potential subsurface desposit which should be determined through a limited testing program. It is recommended that the site be tested to provide the necessary informational data for determining its National Register significance. Until the advent of the testing program, it is recommended that patrolling, project avoidance and fencing be utilised as protection measures. If the testing option is rejected, it is suggested that the site be designated as a "Special Management Area." Multicomponent Cultural Resources Site 28.5 - This site contains both a prehistoric and historic component. Three bedrock mortars and four depressions, that may be incipient mortars, characterize the prehistoric features of the rockshelter. No midden deposit was discernible by the archaeological field team although all of the prehistoric features were found slightly below the present ground surface. Historic grafitti, ranging in date from ca. 1922 to 1976, are found incised on the rockshelter walls. In terms of National Register significance, it is recommended that the site be tested to determine if any significant subsurface prehistoric component is present. If the testing option is rejected, it is recommended that patrolling, project avoidance and fencing be considered as protective measures. In addition, it is recommended that the site be considered as part of a "Special Management Area" if no immediate determination of its significance can be made. Historic Cultural Resources Site 29.2 - This historic power or telegraph line requires additional archival information to establish its significance in the overall historic record of Corral Hollow. It is recommended that a passive program of avoidance be followed for the line. Additional archival research is recommended to determine its origin, use and significance. 2F-89 Site 29.3 - This mine addit with a S3 rating should be further investi- gated through archival research to determine its use and historical significance. It is recommended that a program of passive protection and unobtrusive signing be undertaken to warn personnel of the dangers of abandoned mine shafts. Site 33. 1 - This cultural resource locale appears to be a major residential area for the town of Carnegie. As such, it must be SI rated due to the significance of Carnegie in the overall historic records of Corral Hollow. It is recommended that this area be nominated to the National Register of Historic Places or, in cooperation with the State of California, that this area and the current site of Carnegie be nominated as a Historic District. Prior to the nomination process, it is recommended, if sufficient funds are available, that a selective subsurface testing program be instituted in Sections 33 and 34 to determine the locational boundaries, variety of material culture debris and integrity of the existing site. If funds are not available to adequately test the areas within the jurisdiction of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's Site 300, it is recommended that the area be placed in a "Special Management Area" designation and subjected to active protection including but not limited to patrolling/surveillance, public awareness and fencing due to its exposed location. It is further recommended that a selective "systematic data recovery program be given the highest priority to determine the significance of the scientific values currently extant at the site. Areas of Probable Historic Archaeological Impact In addition to the above specific sites, a number of areas within the Site 300 boundaries may be of potential archaeological significance. Mining - Section 29 (SW portion) is known to have principal shafts, addits and/or tunnels present (Sites 29.3; Barzellotti 1907). The San Francisco and San Joaquin Coal Company owned property all along the Corral Hollow Road including Section 29; the southern half of Section 28; Section 34 (which contains Carnegie); and the SW 1 ^ of the Sw\ of Section 27. The Lorraine Mining Company owned and worked within the NW4 of Section 26. Habitation - Sections 33 and 34. These sections had residential structures present which included houses occupied by management families, along with other residential row houses and probably bunkhouses assigned to the Italian artisans. In addition to the houses, there should be numerous out-buildings such as privies and trash pits (cf. Site 33.1). 2F-90 Ranching - On the basis of personal interviews with Messrs. James E. McFarland and Roy F. Mullins of LLNL Site 300 coupled with archival research, a number of ranching related structures are known to have existed on the property. The O'Brien Ranch, destroyed in 1911-1912, was probably located in Sections 20 or 29. Other ranching related structures may be found in Sections 15, 16, 28 and 35. Section 15 had a ranching residence which on-site grading has buried. Section 16 was occupied by a number of separate, but family related buildings, which included a home, corral, barn and windmill. Section 28 has part of a sheepherder shack present (Site 28.2). The last section, 35, had a house, barn, corral and windmill (Site 35.1) present prior to condemnation. Native American Considerations No sites or locales of a sacred or utilitarian nature to local Native American groups were noted during the literature survey of the ethnographic data. Inquiries to the State of California Native American Heritage Commission revealed no known "sacred places" on their current inventory although their reply letter requested such information if any were located during our survey. Considering the transitional location of the property between two different tribal groups (cf. Ethnography, this report), it is unlikely that specific traditional gathering locales or religious areas would have been located in a zone utilized intermittently by two tribal groups. It is recommended however, that Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory cooperate with the Native American Heritage Commission if positive information or data are located that may support the presence of sacred locales within the boundaries of Site 300 as per Public Law 95-341 (American Indian Religious Freedom Act) . Summary A number of management options have been offered for the cultural resource properties located during the site inventory. It is recommended that the site testing and analysis option be seriously considered, where applicable, to further determine specific cultural resources properties significance. Passive protection measures are suggested for all sites to insure their preservation. An active program of site protection is recommended for Carnegie due to its accesibility and close proximity to a well travelled road. 2F-91 REFERENCES CITED Alameda County, 1904 Allardt, G.F. 1874 Cal i form' a Commissioner to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition right, Roosevelt Johnson, Alameda County. Copy- Official Map of Alameda County, California. Compiled from Official Surveys and Records and Private Survey Board of Supervisors of Alameda County. Brittor Co.,'Lith, San Francisco. tton Rey & Anonymous 1976 Baker, J.E. (ed, 1914 Bakker, E. 1971 Banta, H.C 1954 Barzellotti, C.E 1907 ) Baumhoff, M.A. 1963 Beardsley, R.K, 1948 1954 Beck, W.A. and Y 1974 de Anza Dedication. A program printed by the Stockton San Joaquin County Public Library, Tracy. Past and Present of Alameda County, California. The S J Clarke Publishing Company, Chicago. An Island Called California. University of California Press, Berkeley. 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Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioural Sciences McGraw-Hill , New York. Introduction to the Natural History of the San Francisco Bay Region. University of California Press, Berkeley. 2F-98 Stebbins, R.C. 1959 Reptiles and Amphibians of the San Francisco Bay Region. University of California Press, Berkeley. Stewart, M.C. (Mrs. C. DeWelt) 1964 ;,fter Fifty Years ... My Happy Childhood Days. MS on file, Stockton San Joaquin County Library, Tracy. Tesla Coal Company 1900 California Can Produce Good Coal, Jan. 16, San Francisco. Theodoratus, D., et al. 1979 Cultural Resources Evaluation: Edenvale Redevelopment Project Area Expansion. MS on file, California Archaeological Site Survey, Cabrillo College. Thomas, D.H. and R.L. Bettinger 1976 Prehistoric Pinon Ecotone Settlements of the Upper Reese River Valley, Central Nevada. Anthropological Papers, American Museum of. Natural History 53(3). Thompson, L 1957 Costanoan Survey, October 1956-September 1957. (MS in William F. Shipley's Possession). Thompson and West 1878 Official Historical Atlas Map of Alameda County, California Thompson and West, Oakland. Tinkham, G.H 1923 History of San Joaquin County, California with Biographical Sketches. Historic Record Company, Los Angeles. Turner, M.D 1951 Clay and Ceramic Industry of the San Francisco Bay Counties. IN O.P. Jenkins (prep.), Geologic Guidebook of the San Francisco Bay Counties, pp. 57-64. California Division of Mines, Bulletin No. 154. Wallace, J.W 1870 Map of the county of San Joaquin. Compiled from the United States Surveys, the Maps and Records of the County Surveyor and County Assessor. Map approved and declared official, Supervisors, July 6, 1870. On file, Bancroft Library. Wallace, W.J. 1978a Post-Pleistocene Archaeology, 9000 to 2000 B.C. IN R.F. Heizer (ed.), Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 8, California, pp. 25-36. Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington . 2F-99 Williams, E.E 1973b 1973c 1974 975 Tales of Old San Joaquin City. San Joaquin Historian 9(3). San Joaquin Historical Society, Inc., Lodi . Tales of Old San Joaquin City. San Joaquin Historian 9(4). San Joaquin Historical Society, Inc., Lodi. Tales of Old San Joaquin City. San Joaquin Historian 10(1). San Joaquin Historical Society, Inc., Lodi. Pauline Lee and Mazeppa of the Henry C. Lee Little South American Circus. IN Writings by Earle E. Williams, MS on file, Stockton San Joaquin County Public Libraries, Stockton and Tracy. Wood, M.W 1883 History of Alameda County, California: Including its Geology, Topography, Soil and Productions. M.W. Wood, Oakland. Uhle, M. 1907 The Emeryville Shellmound. University of California Publications in American Archaeology and Ethnology 7:1-106 2F-100 APPENDIX 3A ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE AT THE DOE LIVERMORE LABORATORIES This appendix lists the accidents at the DOE Livermore Laboratories which either had off-site impact or the potential for such impact. Accidents are listed in chronological order. A search of available records prior to 1960 indicated that none of the accidents listed had off-site impacts. Following each accident, an investigation was conducted to determine its cause, prevent reoccurrence, and decide if the potential existed for similar accidents. For those accidents not due solely to human error, some of the corrective actions are presented. Fire in a Curium-Processing Cave — Nov. 8, 1960 The fire started, apparently, as a result of an overheated oil bath. The fire, spread by the coating on the interior of the glove box, destroyed the contents of the room containing the cave. The fire was out in 12 min due to the rapid and effective response of the Fire Department. The total cost of the fire was estimated at $194,000. Fortunately, the cave contained only a few yCi of curium so that contamination was restricted to the immediate area. The following changes were made in the facility to prevent and mitigate a reoccurrence: • Overhead sprinklers were installed. • A research program on coatings and their flammability was started. • A drain and sump system was installed to retain contaminated runoff water from fire fighting. Nuclear Excursion — March 26, 1963 The excursion occurred in Building 261, during a criticality experiment, in a room designed for 17 such experiments. The excursion of 4 x 10 fissions was attributed to mechanical failure during the experiment. Sampling undertaken immediately after the incident showed that only small amounts of short-lived gaseous fission products were released from the experiment room. Equipment was redesigned to minimize reoccurrence. 3A-1 Release of Tritium to Atmosphere — January 20, 1965 350,000 Ci of tritium were released from Building 331 and vented to the atmosphere through a 30-n stack. The accident was the result of human error while working on a system containing H gas under pressure. Most of the H remained as H gas rather than oxidizing to tritiated water. Thus, no significant exposures or deposition occurred, either on site or off site. Administrative controls were adopted to provide greater safety in gas transfers. Plutonium Fire in Building 332— September 13, 1965 A plastic bag containing some plutonium and plutonium-plated pieces caught fire as it was being moved for placement in a metal can. It was immediately extinguished. No detectable plutonium escaped the building. The cost of $30,000 for the incident was for decontamination. Handling procedures were changed to prevent a reoccurrence. Release of Acid to the Livermore Sanitary Sewer — March, 1967 An acid discharge from LLNL's Building 321 Plating Shop caused the pH at the Livermore City treatment plant to drop to 3.2. This resulted in a reduction in the anerobic bacteria colony necessary for function of the sludge digesters. Plating Shop personnel were informed of the effects of such acid releases in the Treatment Plant's operation. Release of 239 Pu to Sewer — May 25 to June 15, 1967 239 During the above interval, 32 mCi of Pu was accidentally released by LLNL to the sanitary sewer. No samples taken during the release had concentrations greater than the maximum permissible 239 concentration in water as specified by ERDA Manual Chapter 0524. The Pu followed the sludge through the sewer plant and was deposited principally in the bottom of the sludge lagoons. 239 The dried sludge, which is used mainly as a soil conditioner, contained 2-3 pCi/g of Pu. LLNL has tilled samples of this dried sludge into a vegetable garden on the Livermore site. Air samples taken downwind during tilling showed concentrations up to 2.5% of the permissible concentration specified for the general public by ERDA Manual Chapter 0524. Samples of the vegetables grown in the test garden were analyzed for plutonium. Calculated radiation doses to an individual tilling the sludge and eating the vegetables were negligible compared with that received from natural sources. Details of this study are reported in IAEA-SM-199/42. 3A-2 Corrective action consisted of closer surveillance of tank discharges and installation of a continuously operating, highly sensitive effluent monitorial system. Release of Chromium to the Livermore Sanitary Sewer — September 6 & 20, 1967 Chromium was found in the influent stream in concentrations up to 50 ppm. The activity of the bacteria colony in one digester was reduced. LLNL paid for cleanup costs. Release due to "bright dip" cleaning operations. During investigation of the first release there was a second release of approximately 150 liters of chromic acid solution containing copper residue also from "bright dip" operations. Corrective action for these releases consisted of written procedures covering disposal of spent chromic acid and safety talks to shop personnel. Release of Radioactivity to the Storm Sewer — February 1, 1968 131 A liquid waste retention tank at Building 281 overflowed and released 380 uCi I and 2 90 uCi Sr, which eventually ran into the storm sewer. The 24-h average concentration, in water, for the two nuclides combined was 50 times the maximum permissible concentration in water specified by the ERDA Manual Chapter 0524 at the point where it left the site. However, dilution and deposition reduced the concentration to below detectable limits at the point where the Las Positas Creek (into which the storm sewer empties) crosses Vasco Road. Improved procedures for retention tank operation were adopted to minimize reoccurrence. Release of Copper-Cyanide to Sewer — April 1968 A tank containing copper-cyanide in the LLNL Building 321 Plating Shop failed. About 210 liters were released to the sewer. About 50% of the bacteria in the trickle filter (aeration tank) were killed. Routine inspections of tankage integrity were adopted. Release of Radioactivity to the Storm Sewer — April 13, 1970 Liquid waste was being transferred between tanks at LLNL Building 281 with two valves in the 60 58„ 65. . 51 rr wrong position. About 1640 liters of water containing 6.6 uCi of Co, Co, zn, ana it were released to the storm sewer. Rain water, mixed with the liquid waste, reduced the 24 h average concentration at the site boundary to 1/2 the maximum permissible concentration in water as specified 3A-3 by ERDA Manual Chapter 0524. Initial concentrations in Las Positas Creek, at Vasco Road, were 1% of tne maximum permissible concentration. Samples taken at the same point two days later were below detectable limits. Two corrective measures were taken as a result of this incident: (1) the valve that allowed the contaminated water to escape was padlocked closed and (2) a berm was constructed to retain future spills from the waste tank area on site. Re lease of Tritium to the Atmosphere — August 6, 1970 The failure of a component in a pressurized gas system containing tritium resulted in the loss of 300,000 Ci of H 2 to the atmosphere through the 30-m stack at Building 331. As a result of this release, the design criteria for H 2 pressure systems have been strengthened. Secondary vessels to contain the gas were included, where possible, to reduce the probability of another incident. No detectable doses were received by the public. Release of Acid to Sewer — February 10, 1971 A low pH led to diversion of flow at Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. Corrective action consisted of administrative controls in the form of written procedures governing discharge of acids to sanitary sewer. Release of Acid to Sewer — October 20, 1971 A low-pH alarm was caused by a leaking acid tank at LLNL's Building 321 Plating Shop. No diversion was required. Tankage repaired and routine surveillance of chemical tankage adopted. Plutonium in Off-Sit e Soil — April 1973 On December 10, 1973, ERDA-SAN was notified by LLNL that several annual off-site soil samples 239 collected in 1973 at locations east of Greenville Road contained Pu levels above those typical of global fallout. The plutonium content of these samples ranged from 30 to 200 fCi per gram, whereas global fallout J Pu in soils within the Livermore Valley ranges from 3 to 30 fCi/g. The elevated 2i9 Pu levels are believed to be due to an April 1973 release of activity during transfer of dry material from one of the solar evaporators located upwind from the Greenville Road locations. 3A-4 As a corrective measure, a closed evaporator is now used for volume reduction of radioactive liquid wastes and the solar evaporators are no longer employed for these wastes. Fuel Oil Tank Leak — January 1975 On January 14 or 16, 1975, a construction contractor working at SNLL unknowingly drove a grounding rod through the feed line connecting the fuel oil storage tank to the central boilers. On the 31st, natural gas service to SNLL was interrupted and oil was let into the line so that oil could be pumped from the fuel oil storage tank into the day tanks serving the central boilers. A gross leak 3 resulted, which was discovered on February 11 after rain displaced oil to the surface. About 227 m of fuel oil of the 655 m 3 stored there had seeped into the ground. A continuously reading fuel-level meter was placed on the tank. Release of Acid to Sewer — March 10, 1975 A low-pH alarm led to diversion at the Livermore Water Reclamation Plant. The release was due to nitric acid from SNLL Building 913 Plating Laboratory. Administrative controls were instituted to regulate disposal of chemicals and an improved design of pH meter was installed at sewage outfall. Americium to County Disposal Site — August 25, 1978 Twenty-one waste sacks containing approximately 43 uCi of americium were mistakenly placed in an LLNL Dempster Dumpster and delivered to the Eastern Alameda County Disposal Site. The material was located and recovered. Decontamination of the area was completed on August 29, 1978. A program of training and improved supervision was adopted to prevent a recurrence of misplaced radioactive waste. Gasoline Tankage Loss — March 11, 1979 On March 11, 1979, gaging showed that 33 m of gasoline had been lost at the LLNL motor pool due to probable rupture of old Navy tankage. Samples from a nearby off-site water well located down gradient (to the west) showed no hydrocarbon contamination of the groundwater. Operations were transferred to new tankage and old tankage was not repaired. No correction action taken. 3 A- 5 Plutonium Incidents-April 8 and 16, 1980 On April 8, 1980, a length of plastic tubing, used as part of an argon supply line inside a glove box in Building 332, popped off a hose-barb connection and overpressurized the glove box. The pressure burst a glove and contaminated the laboratory room with plutonium; approximately 3 yg of Plutonium was released to the environment outside Building 332. On April 16, 1980, a flash fire involving ethanol from an ultrasonic cleaner occurred in a sample-preparation glovebox in Building 332. The pressure generated during the fire was sufficient to force the top of the glove box out of its retaining clips, thus allowing a small amount of plutonium to escape and contaminate the laboratory room. No plutonium was released to the outside environment. On the first incident, release of plutonium to the outside environment was determined to be due to improper installation of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and failure to perform the required filter tests. Because such failures might apply to the entire building, routine operations in the Plutonium Facility were stopped until similar glove boxes were inspected for adequate pressure-relief mechanisms and all filters were tested for proper installation and performance. The second incident was caused by failure to turn off the ultrasonic cleaner, which resulted in evaporation of the ethanol and eventual electrical breakdown of the cleaning unit. A contributory cause of this accident was failure to flush the glove box sufficiently with an inert gas to reduce the oxygen content below that which will support combustion. Corrective action for both incidents included intensive training of all personnel in the technique of safety surveillance. A quality assurance program was instituted for filter installation and testing. Particular emphasis was placed on assuring that those responsible for facility management also recognized their safety responsibilities. 3A-6 • ' -v. '<■■-. :■. v- APPENDIX 3B M 014 Rev. 3 DISASTER CONTROL PLAN ^■H «f University of California 1 1 ■ Lawrence Livermore i~d National Laboratory 3B-1 M-014 Rev. 3 LLNL DISASTER CONTROL PLAN October 1, 1981 If any changes or corrections are necessary, please contact Rice Trolan, Hazards Control, Ext. 2-5 123 3B-2 CONTENTS Introduction Purpose of the LLNL Disaster Control Plan Scope 3B-b 3B-7 3B-8 Authority and Promulgation &"% Emergency Operations Guide 3B-y Mission of Disaster Organization 3B-IU Role of Laboratory Organizations 3B-10 Fire Department 3B-lu Security Department 3B-I0 3b- IU 33-1 3B-1 313-1 3B-1 33-1 Plant Engineering Department Hazards Control Department Medical Department LLNL Departments and Divisions Position Duty Statements LLNL Director Disaster Control Director (Administrative Group) 3B-12 Deputy Disaster Control Director (Field Group) 3B-12 Emergency Control Coordinator (Field Group) JB-12 Plant Engineering Department Representative 3B-13 Security Department Representative 3B-13 Senior Fire Officer (Field Group) 3B-13 Plans/Logistics Section (Administrative Group) 3B-I4 Liaison (Administrative Group) 3B-lb Public Information Officer (Administrative Group) 3B-16 Off-Site Sampling Team (Field Group) 3b " 16 Support Groups (Field Group) Transition of Operations Organization Transition Matrix LLNL EOC Self-Help Plans Communications General Notification 3B_21 Emergency Call List 3B-23 3B-lb 3B-lb 3B-19 3B-20 3B-21 3B-21 3B-21 3B-3 Emergency Alarms 3B-23 Off -Hours Emergencies 3B-23 Supply and Logistics 3B-26 Fallout Shelters 3B-26 Disaster Control Plan Supplements 3B-26 Glossary 3B-29 3B-4 ■■■■■H LLNL DISASTER CONTROL PLAN INTRODUCTION Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), in its continuing effort to ensure safe and continuous operation, care for its employees, safeguard laboratory property and records, and minimize any off-site effects of incidents which may occur at the laboratory, hereby sets forth its Disaster Control Plan. The disaster response and mitigation philosophy of LLNL is one of maximum reliance upon and use of on-site organizational capabilities and resources. This is based upon the realization that during a major disaster, such as an earthquake or nuclear attack, outside help may not be available. The Laboratory Emergency Services, and other human and mechanical resources throughout the laboratory, shall strive for the common goal of incident mitigation, continuity of operations, and recovery. LLNL also stands ready to assist the surrounding community in time of disaster. The LLNL Disaster Control Plan describes how the integrated Matrix system, common to all laboratory operation's, functions in an emergency. This plan includes the following components: 1) the overall disaster control plan; 2) the Emergency Operations Guides; 3) supplements; and 4) the Organization Activation Matrix. The key is simplicity. The Disaster Control Organization must expand upon existing emergency service units which routinely cope with small and moderate accidents (Fig. 1). The basic emergency service support elements include the Fire Department, Security, Plant Engineering and Safety Team units. The plan outlined in this document is concerned with major emergencies or disasters that involve the total Disaster Contrcl Organization. The Disaster Control Organization is divided into an Administrative Group and a Fjeld Group . The Field Group is subordinate to the Administrative Group and is responsible for performing the field operations necessary to alleviate the effects of a disaster. The Field Group usually operates out of a field command post. The Adminstrative Group generally operates out of the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which is currently located in Bldg. 271; the A, trative Group develops policy guidelines governing the operations of the Disaster Control Organization. In the event of a disaster, the Administrative Group in the EOC 3B-5 •M 4-> Q. c 0) i- "a o Q i_ 0) u OJ CD to j: c ■a iZ O IS co N CO 1 1 _L C 13 C O) 0) c c *- l_ Qj 3 Ol a) O" O CD 0) *- C *- °- fO W «^ CO C o o ♦3 to 'ai o a> co c CO E i_ o l. o -t-> CO 3 •M CO ■M C/> r E CO a> t- o 'E O) CO _l CO 2 c c CO LU o > co O > t/5 10 a> _c 3 CO o c a o o o o < CO 3 a < cc CL a 3 a> Q_ LU LU o 1 | 1 | | 1 1 1 1 •i-j n to CL n _3 Q. U _5 co CD to c __ co o t/> o c o o to T5 L. b CO > 0) c o a> r— CO CO N CO IE co CO C CO c: o •r- -t-> CO N C CO CT> i- o o S- +J c o o s- a) +-> >o 41 o +J o»-*- 3— k t: k O V — <-• o St v» -r- i c c V - t- 0< Bi-o o o k k •— *■ k VI i5"S k *• O O o, . 41 k C «J -O 41 VI £ 'O «o o ••- vi u •.- c c C k w 4> ■O o> •»- <• 8S >»*» r- e ro*n ** u *• *» oi •#- > »■ ^~ t: o o o _i vi 8S 0) 1.41IPC <0 01 1- — •— *■*•<- oi o oi k k -^ +J > T«- VI - <0 k o r o x II Ml ■»- O *-♦* •€ r o * k c > a** a oi — S c « 'OP'- «II ,_ o -o — ■o o *»>*»«»- a. 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t ■»- k -o o ■r- 4 Q.-»- — k ■*- £ VI H- iA CL Oi ■ k ■ o 41 P— 3 >>4-» a y-^c Ulf I 4" . E«-» O -O 41 *> c — a. « ^ X e o oi 3 i — vi k S 8b u ■— I qui o > C * k 41 vol >oO u So <.. 41 o. -a-- k O 41 k f > >» o — o c c *» c •^ •<- O 01 Xi « n cn CL X QJ +J c o o s- E c o in c fO s- c o +-> fO N •r- £ C7) S- o C3 3B-17 i- o O k o t_> oi •- o x s. — ° o i- —. Ocfh g ci3 HE ■ = »- § o> < g X w •*- CO Qui'- -^ UJ , M «- O -O ••- • O V. Q v> (-3 Q. k 3 « || CO I L.X 'Z' - ■"* fe u B 01 <— 01 *-> •O •>- ,-o a. l. o at »■ ai o k •— «c ae o i— i ■j;t— 13 -o rf E a; — *-» co — • cXlu 3*" 1- 3U0O «UO 3 o k U 41 O v» T3 »<" o-o J3 2- • », ai □ « uw ex t. a 3 •» ai ■o > i i~ -c — — •— k o at *j — » o >> k 3 «■» £. k C7I Ot c -a OL 4 41 UOIJI • e t- >» VIU *-> ■o >>— k *-> *J «. « e oi 3 «— <• Of loiaw e o k I || k o — •0 (J ot o.>> c k k «J 41 3 « C V. U M • »■ 01 » O k 01 k 01 <- O Ol 1 f 01 § >» C»-, k U I. *-> 1 *-> enoi Secu Haza Plan ing, Hutu Safe O k k i- O- Ci_ ■ Ol o 0>"0 i. Ol ■•- k l. Oi M *-» V O «-• k « «S B VI O 3 > o <_> _c » ^ u •Q «« Q 1_ l_ « k -^ ^ T3 oi >>o oi u O) c *-• -^ *J U 3r-«tl ■O ** Q. O k « > • Jtf k 01 ■ Q.O 4-> > O VI C Ol *J O h- o \n 3 <: Q O (_) ^- « II o k e •—oi •at *-><-> i- * « «> o k > « *> S — «« y I O O u VI « E >»k >iO n oi Q. O 3 ♦* jT k « fl *-> •— ex S«— VI 01— » > e 01 o £? I >»k r- . ■O « O k y> ■ k o r~ c « j3 « « O O — Q. • CO T> 3 • O 1- U 9h k I k '--WOO'- k *» Q.'O C 5<— Ol aSk oi o « — oi«j o e> oi/) a *> . oi v> ■ v >» k 0IT» k k ♦» 0» C k >3 01 -O-— « ck to t/> .j uj : >.§ c^ • J30 L- L« 5 3 c "J C C C lA«< • 6 *• o « > OlT) — 01 k ** V 9 «• 8 a u ■ 5 o vi o -o ai Z3 c •r- c o u CM o 1! 3B-18 immediately, as may be the case in the event of a severe earthquake, nuclear attack, or terrorist intrusion. Figure 2 sets forth the following information for each level: incident level classification of the level incident level criteria overall incident conmand transition (who is in charge at each level) Field Operations Commander at each level EOC status Field Command Post status entities involved at each level Disaster Control Plan Activation by Group (Field and Administrative) necessary notifications. ORGANIZATION TRANSITION MATRIX The incident level designator provides a guide to assist emergency service personnel in understanding the mobilization sequence. This will key other Disaster Control Organization members, including dispatchers, as to what level of activation is occurring and what can be expected. Figure 2 is a guide . Any level can be activated by the senior person in charge at any point in the incident as the situation warrants. The key is the understanding of what level is in effect. At Level 3, the EOC is activated by the individual in charge of directing the emergency operations on instructions from the Deputy Disaster Control Director. The Deputy Disaster Control Director can order activation during Level 2 if desired. A severe earthquake triggers automatic activation. Command transition will occur as described below. The levels of response to all Laboratory emergencies are outlined in Figure 2. This response builds up in accordance with the following steps: Level Level The first employee to become aware of an accident must either report the accident immediately or have someone report it. Immediately after an accident occurs, the Program Director of the involved area is responsible for safeguarding his personnel and taking control actions his group can accomplish safely. 3B-19 Level 1 Once the Fire Department arrives, the Senior Fire Officer coordinates the control efforts of all personnel present. He relinquishes this responsibility to an Emergency Control Coordinator when he arrives at the scene. Level 1 If the Emergency Control Coordinator considers the accident to be major emergency or a disaster, the Head of the Hazards Control Department (or Site Manager if incident is at Site 300) is called Level 2 and serves as the Deputy Disaster Control Director to coordinate all field activities. At level 3, the Manager of Plant Services becomes the Disaster Control Director and takes administrative control of the entire operation through the activation and Level 3 operation of the LLNL Emergency Operations Center. LLNL EOC Upon activation by direction of the individual in charge of emergency operations, the EOC will operate as the primary command center for the disaster operation. The Administrative Group will operate in the EOC. The EOC activities will include the following: • command of overall incident; • coordinate all elements of the Disaster Control Organization; • collect and display damage assessment information; • collect and display situation status information; • establish incident strategy and priorities, and allocate resources; • coordinate the inter-agency interface and liaison; • manage media interface and media releases; • request resources from off-site (public and private sector); • ensure continuity of operations; and • manage recovery operations. The currrent EOC location is in the basement of Bldg. 271 (Police Department). The EOC may have to be relocated during a disaster if it is rendered inoperative by earthquake, hazardous gases, terrorism, fire, etc. alternate EOC will be designated by the Disaster Control Director. An 3B-20 Self-Help Plans If the disaster involves all or a major area of the laboratory and the emergency service elements are over-committed, the departments and divisions will implement their self-help plans which will provide for collection, control, and assistance to employees at designated assembly areas. Departments and divisions will establish communication with the EOC and advise of the status of personnel and facilities. COMMUNICATIONS GENERAL The Emergency Communications System serves three purposes. First, it provides a means for notifying proper authorities that an emergency exists. Second, it is used to alert emergency control forces, as well as Laboratory employees. Third, it provides tactical communication lines between various units and personnel combating the emergency. The communications system (Fig. 3) which includes radio, telephone, manual and automatic alarm systems, and messengers tie into a variety of on-site facilities as well as local, state, and federal agencies. NOTIFICATION The Emergency Dispatcher is responsible for notifying individuals of the Administrative and Field Groups whenever a major emergency or disaster has occurred or is imminent. This function may be handed off to the Police Department Dispatcher by the Emergency Dispatcher if the latter is overloaded. Call up is requested by the person in command of the incident. When notifying the groups, the dispatcher calls the first member of the particular team being activated. The contacted member, in turn, is responsible for notifying other members of his group. (LLNL Disaster Control Plan Supplement 2 lists these groups.) 3B-21 E CD •M •M l/> o o a CD CD C > 03 or cc DC a ~co o CD m CD o _CD Q_ c/1 4-" c '< iZ o ■a CD CD 1- > O c _) "co o CO CD ■M _i < CD 33 c 3 5 CD CD 3 ^ O _i < E Ll o CO _j z LU CJ 4_( C t/> CD > a>co CD CD (J LL CO lu a. o o co - CD , i co a E • • • • CD 6 2 I .§ CD +-* O > ao — i CD O to co Q" CO c ° 8 1 1 ? 2 gll.8 3 I O Q_ < CO LL i E a) -t-> to o •r- +-> CO U •r— =3 O o CO en c !_ CD CD CD C E CJ f cv> to r c LU CO CD 1- co c a> •M to 'c co 'o i_ ■(-« T) c J_ •(-> L. C) u CO CD co CO CD 0. LL 2 ^ LU CD > O > o •M — E L. CL CD ■n CD U co > O CO 7" ■D GO ■M _1 >4- o co CD UJ O < CO a X CD o to CD O > b E CO < CD •4-> CO *-> CO UJ O a LU O Q CD -z. CD .c ■4-> o c CD < 3B-22 BBBIHHHBHH^HHBHIDMH^V EMERGENCY CALL LIST Both Police and Emergency Dispatchers have a current Emergency Call List that is kept up-to-date by the Emergency Control Coordinator. Members of the Disaster Control Organization are responsible for informing the Emergency Control Coordinator of changes to the Call List. All changes are coordinated through the Emergency Preparedness Program Leader. EMERGENCY ALARMS Most emergency alarms are received by the Fire Department through emergency telephone extension 2-7333 (Ext. 333 at Site 300). Other alarms are received through automatic alarm systems. A diagram of the emergency alarm systems is presented in Fig. 4. A special telephone communicating system is used to alert emergency forces at the Laboratory. In addition, speakers connected to emergency telephone number 2-7333 permit emergency calls to be monitored. The Channel B radio system also is used to announce emergencies. A disaster paging system at the LLNL, air raid sirens, or both, announce large-scale accidents or imminent air raids. Radios and telephones are used exclusively at Site 300 to alert personnel of emergencies. Warnings of imminent enemy attack are received either through a special telephone connection with the North American Warning Alert System (NAWAS). Figure 5 diagrams the systems to be used to alert personnel at Livermore and Site 300. Disaster Control Plan Supplement 1 provides further details on the LLNL Emergency Communication System. OFF-HOURS EMERGENCIES In the event of a major emergency or disaster occurring at a time other than during the normal workday, the operations will generally follow the transition sequence previously described. The Fire Department, Security Department, and Plant Engineering Department maintain groups responsible for responding to Laboratory emergencies on an around-the-clock basis. The Police Department Watch Commander will take charge initially in incidents involving security; otherwise, the Fire Department Duty Chief will take initial response action. In either instance, the individual in charge will advise their 3B-23 Livermore Automatic Alarm System Laboratory Emergencies Off-site Emergencies NAWAS Telephone Police Dispatcher (Bldg 271) Emergency Telephone [Ext. 2-7333) Emergency Dispatcher (Bldg 323) Channel B Radio Bell and Light System County Fire Radio Special Mutual Aid Telephone Alameda County Tac-fone Automatic Alarm System Emergency Telephone (ext 333) Channel B Radio i i \ ' Site 300 Emergencies Police Dispatcher (Bldg 870) Fire Dept (Bldg 870) Off-site 1 1 1 i Emergencies Bell and Light System County Fire Radio Emergency Dispatcher (Bldg 323) FIG. 4. Emergency alarm systems 3B-24 Livermore Crash Telephone Foxtrot Emergency Dispatcher Disaster Paging System Direct Dial Centrex Sierra Police Dispatcher Hazards Control Electric Shop Maintenance Machinist Medical Dept. Air-raid Sirens -»- Radio Announcements Site 300 Radio Announcements Fire Dept. Hazards Control Medical Dept. Maintenance Machinist Main Gate FIG. 5. Group-alerting system, 3B-25 immediate supervisor and determine what further emergency response personnel and/or resources are required. SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS Many special purpose and common types of vehicles at the Laboratory are available for use during emergencies. The Emergency Control Coordinator maintains a complete inventory of this equipment in Supplement 13 to this Disaster Control Plan. It is recommended that Members of the Disaster Control Organization will become familiar with this inventory list. FALLOUT SHELTERS The Laboratory maintains a number of fallout shelters capable of housing approximately 11,000 people. The shelters are stocked with necessary medical supplies and radiological instruments (bring food). Fire Safety Division is responsible for marking and stocking these shelters. Shelters are managed by the responsible Laboratory departments and divisions. They are activated by the Laboratory Disaster Control Director. The Shelter Managers may refer to the Shelter Manager's Handbook (Supplement 9) as necessary. Shelter locations are shown on the map (Fig. 6). Shelter locations and travel routes are included in the Self-Help Plans for each program. Each program is assigned specific shelter locations. Lab shelters are also designated for use during relocation of citizens from the City of Livermore. DISASTER CONTROL PLAN SUPPLEMENTS The basic Disaster Control Plan is augmented by a number of supplements that describe in more detail the equipment and disaster control systems available during emergencies. The following supplements, when combined with this basic manual, comprise the complete Plan. Copies of the supplements may be obtained from the Fire Safety Division of the Hazards Control Department (Ext. 2-5194). 3B-26 8 EST ENTRANCE "ESOuite nay ,,ri 41 , (UJ MfOwJ ~ o''S r^ Q t ru- «iou » a. 4i5 Ciil □ P3 I «01 »02 «03 Q 5 C7[pt=D EAST AVENUE SOUTH ENTRANCE E«S - avenue B N I ™ I I I Buildings Bicycles Paths Parking Lots ] Trailers | Fallout Shelters FALLOUT SHELTERS Bldg Bldg Bldg No Spaces No. Spaces No Spaces 111 834 212 192 327 213 113 1,205 222 622 331 155 115 205 239 220 332 143 131 2.520 255 500 341 123 151 2 170 261 335 361 440 194 822 271 219 391' 1 ' 175 11.093 FIG. 6. Fallout shelter locations and accommodations, 3B-27 Supplement Title 1 LLNL Emergency Communications 2 Emergency Call out List 3 Heavy Equipment Available for Emergencies 4 LLNL Water Supply System— Emergency Water Supply Plans 5 Respiratory and Other Protective Equipment for Emergencies 6 Emergency Assistance Team 7 Environmental Evaluations Team 8 Operations Plan for Emergency Operations Center 9 Shelter Manager's Handbook 10 Public Information 11 Traffic Control Plan 12 Security (Classified) 13 Fire Department Equipment and Facilities 14 a&b LLNL Contract/Charter Aircraft Emergency Procedures 15 Response Plan for Fire in an Explosive Area 16 Bomb Threat Response Procedures 17 Medical Emergency Plan 18 Hazardous Materials Spill Plan 3B-28 i GLOSSARY ALCO Alameda County Civic Offices ARAC Atmopsheric Release Advisory Capability ECC Emergency Control Coordinator EOC Emergency Operations Center EOG Emergency Operations Guide DCD Disaster Control Director DDCD Deputy Disaster Control Director DOE Department of Energy FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FEMA Federal Emergency Management Administration NAWAS North American Warning Alert System NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OES Office of Emergency Service—State of California PIO Public Information Officer RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service GR/s * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1982 361-076/4507 3B-29 . / mmBKBBmmmmH& UNIVERSITY OF ILUNOIS-URBANA 3 0112 075681194 B c i OCJ