385.732 
 Il6d1900 
 v.1, v.2 
 cop. 2 
 
 
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 . : . .AOAW'S . 
 
 Afi8TlClAN, INTERSTATE 

 
 \ 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF ILLINOIS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 385 T32 
 
 i-e&a 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 -PRESENTED BY-
 
 Return this book on or before the 
 Latest Date stamped below. 
 
 University of Illinois Library 
 
 MM 27 r 
 
 * 
 
 L161 H41
 
 DECISIONS AND OPINIONS 
 
 ,S 
 
 OF THE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 1889 to 1899 
 
 \A I.Z 
 
 COMPILED BY 
 WM. KlLPATRIOK 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD. ILL.: 
 
 PHILLIPS BROS.. STATE PRINTERS 
 
 1900.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE 
 
 
 of 
 
 THE CHICAGO & CALUMET TERMINAL RAILROAD Co. 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON & QUINCY RAILROAD Co. 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 PETITION TO DETERMINE MODE OF CROSSING. 
 
 Petition Filed September 6, 1889. Crossing Viewed September 12, 1889. 
 Answer Filed September 26, 1889. Hearing September 26, 
 to October 10, 1889 Opinion Filed Novem- 
 ber 30, 1889. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, COL. R. S. THOMPSON AND H. S. MONROE. 
 For RESPONDENT, WIRT DEXTER.
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
 
 The petitioning company, the Chicago & Calumet Terminal Rail- 
 road Company, seeks by this proceeding a decision of this Commis- 
 sion under the act in force July 1st, 1889, compelling respondent, the 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, to permit peti- 
 tioner to cross respondent's tracks at a point in the village of La 
 Grange, Cook county, Illinois, on grade. The point of proposed 
 crossing is near fourteen miles out from respondent's Chicago depot. 
 The prayer of the petition is resisted on the ground that a grade 
 crossing at the point in question would "unnecessarily impede and 
 endanger the travel and transportation" upon respondent's road. 
 
 The petition alleges among other things, the following: That pe- 
 titioner is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue 
 of laws of the State of Illinois; that it has laid out its route and par- 
 tially constructed its tracks from Lake Michigan to near the Des 
 Plaines river, and reached a point near the right of way and railroad 
 tracks of respondent, and is desirous of building its road and con- 
 structing its tracks across the right of way and tracks of said respond- 
 ent near where they cross the west line of section three, (3) town 
 thirty-eight (38) North, range twelve (12) east, in Cook county, 
 Illinois; that it, the petitioner, desires to cross said tracks upon a 
 level with its own tracks, and offers to be at the entire expense of 
 constructing said crossing, introducing and maintaining a system of 
 inter-locking signals, paying all salaries and expenses of the same, 
 and to give all the trains of respondent preference and precedence at 
 said crossing; that petitioner has demanded of respondent that it be 
 permitted to cross at grade, but permission to do so has been refused ; 
 that respondent insists that petitioner cross said tracks and right of 
 way at an elevation of not less than twenty-one feet clear above the 
 top of the rails of petitioner's track, which will make an elevation of 
 from twenty-five to thirty feet; that the point at which petitioner 
 desires so to cross is part of a level plain extending miles each way; 
 that a crossing upon grade with proper signals and appliances will 
 not unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel or transportation of 
 the respondent company; that an overhead crossing is more danger- 
 ous to foot and carriage passengers seeking to cross the tracks of the 
 road running under an elevated crossing than a crossing on its grade ; 
 
 746685
 
 that the property owners in that vicinity are opposed to such over- 
 head crossing, and threaten to bring suit for damages to enjoin the 
 same; that the trustees of the town of La Grange wherein said pro- 
 posed crossing is located are taking measures to enjoin the erection 
 of an overhead crossing for the reason that such a crossing is unnec- 
 cessary and will create a perpetual nuisance, and will injure and de- 
 preciate the value of property in its immediate vicinity. The petition 
 prays for a decision of the Commission prescribing the place where 
 and in the manner in which said crossing shall be made. 
 
 In answer to this petition the respondent Company admits that 
 petitioner has laid out its route and partially constructed its tracks 
 as alleged; that demand was made upon it by petitioner for a grade 
 crossing, and that respondent, believing that a grade crossing would 
 unnecessarily impede both the travel and transportation upon its- 
 railway, refused said demand. Respondent denies the averment that 
 said proposed grade crossing will not unnecessarily impede or en- 
 danger the travel or transportation upon its railway, and alleges the 
 contrary to be the fact; and says that respondent owns and operates 
 6,000 miles of railroad converging at Chicago, which is its eastern 
 terminus, and has traffic arrangements with other companies, con- 
 necting with respondent's lines; that all traffic over respondent's road 
 destined to or from Chicago, or east by way thereof, passes over said 
 tracks proposed to be crossed; that in the regular course of respond- 
 ent's business, fifty trains in each direction, or one hundred trains 
 in all each day pass over respondent's tracks at the point of the pro- 
 posed crossing, about half being freight trains and the other half 
 passenger trains; that respondent has now three tracks at the point 
 in question and the increase of its business will soon require the 
 building of a fourth, and that the increase in population and develop- 
 ment of business are likely to cause the necessity for double the 
 number of trains upon respondent's tracks within ten years; that re- 
 spondent in addition to its general passenger and freight trains is 
 now doing a very large suburban business, nearly all of which orig- 
 inates west of said proposed crossing; that about 2,500 suburban 
 passengers pass over respondent's road each day at the point of said 
 proposed crossing, which suburban traffic is constantly increasing at 
 the rate of twenty-five or thirty per cent per year; that the point of 
 said proposed crossing is at the foot of a maximum grade, and that 
 trains at said point both ways run at a maximum speed; that west 
 bound trains are obliged to run at high speed at said point for the 
 purpose of making the ascending grade; that if the proposed grade 
 crossing is made all trains of respondent will be compelled to reduce 
 speed at the point of crossing to a very low rate; that in addition to 
 the delay which will thus be caused, many trains will be compelled 
 to stop and wait for trains on petitioner's road to pass the crossing; 
 that on account of the necessity of running at a low rate of speed 
 and making possible stops at this point, respondent's west bound 
 trains could not run for the grade at this point as heretofore, and 
 respondent would be compelled for this reason to reduce the length 
 of many of its west bound freight trains; that it is entirely prac- 
 ticable for petitioner to cross respondent's railway either by an over-
 
 head or an under crossing; that the trustees and citizens of the town 
 of La Grange where said crossing is located are opposed to a cross- 
 ing at grade as unnecessarily impeding and endangering public 
 travel. 
 
 At the hearing respondent, having abandoned its previous alleged 
 contention for an overhead crossing, presented to the Commission a 
 proposition and estimate for an under crossing, which proposition 
 and estimate contemplated the raising of respondent's roadbed by 
 petitioner, at the point of the crossing to an elevation eight feet 
 above its present position, being in all nearly twelve feet above the 
 natural surface, and that the petitioner should make a cut twelve feet 
 below the natural surface at the point of crossing, so as to admit of 
 its trains passing under the tracks of respondent. . 
 
 Upon proof being made, however, to the effect that the stage of 
 high water in salt Creek, about one mile distant, which would form 
 the only outlet for drainage of the proposed cut, would not admit of 
 the cut being drained, if extended to the depth of twelve feet as pro- 
 posed, the respondent Company presented modifications of its prop- 
 osition and estimate to meet such proofs. Respondent's amended 
 proposition contemplates the raising of the Bnrlington tracks about 
 eleven feet instead of eight as before proposed, and a corresponding 
 reduction of the depth of the cut to be made for petitioner's road so 
 to admit of what respondent contends would be complete drainage to 
 Salt Creek during high water; all the work to be done of course by 
 the petitioning Company. In addition to this respondent's counsel at 
 the close of the hearing made an oral offer that respondent would pay 
 one-third of the increased cost of constructing the crossing in ac- 
 cordance with their amended proposition over and above what such 
 cost would be if the crossing were made at grade; also one-third of 
 all damages adjudged against petitioner and in favor of adjacent 
 property owners on account of the construction of the crossing in 
 the manner proposed; also one-third of the increased cost of all 
 switch connections. It may be said in passing that these propositions 
 of respondent to permit its tracks to be raised and to pay part of the 
 expenses of the crossing are not within the power or jurisdiction of 
 the Commission to be ordered or enforced, and would depend en- 
 tirely upon the respondent's own voluntary stipulation. 
 
 There is little real conflict in the evidence heard by the Commis- 
 sion except upon a few subsidiary questions. It is conceded that 
 these roads approach each other upon a level plain which offers no 
 natural facilities for any crossing other than at grade; nor can this 
 be avoided by any change in the place of crossing proposed; the ad- 
 jacent country is all flat. It is also a fact not controverted that pe- 
 titioner had obtained its charter and begun construction of its road 
 before this law was passed; that its road is to be chiefly for the car- 
 riage of freight, its object being, as its name indicates, to form con- 
 nections with the various lines of road out from Chicago, including 
 of course the lines of respondent, so as to distribute among these 
 lines the products of the large factories in the vicinity of Calumet 
 Lake. So the allegations of the answer touching the extent of re-
 
 spondent's passenger and freight traffic, the number of its trains, the 
 state of its grade at the crossing point, and the resultant necessity of 
 speed being made by its trains are practically uncontroverted. It is 
 conceded that to make a non-grade crossing a clear passage way of 
 twenty feet from top of rail to lowest point of superstructure above 
 is necessary; and that, to obtain this twenty foot clearing, there 
 would be a necessity for a considerable additional distance taken up 
 by rails, ties, ballast and side ditches, for drainage of the servient 
 roadbed. 
 
 In the course of the hearing memorials and petitions were pre- 
 sented from the municipal authorities and residents of several towns 
 on the line of respondent's road, including La Grange, favoring an 
 under crossing. Before the proposition for such an under crossing 
 had been made, however, a petition had been numerously signed by 
 adjacent property owners in La Grange strongly favoring a grade 
 crossing as against the overhead crossing then contemplated. It may 
 therefore be taken that public sentiment among residents in the 
 vicinity generally favors, first an under crossing by petitioner if that 
 can be had, and if not then a grade crossing; and that an overhead 
 crossing is more objectionable than any other. Such is the import 
 of the public expressions before the Commission, which, though per- 
 haps not in strictness legal evidence, the Commission felt constrained 
 to hear and consider for whatever they might be worth. Many per- 
 sons owning property immediately adjoining the roads naturally op- 
 pose the unsightliness and inconvenience of either a high embank- 
 ment or a deep cut, insisting that the value of such adjacent prop- 
 erty would be thereby greatly lessened, a conclusion not easily to be 
 resisted 
 
 One question upon which there is some conflict in the evidence is, 
 whether or not a reduction of speed is necessary at crossings where 
 the latest improved inter-locking signals and devices are in use. 
 Upon this question we think the evidence preponderates in number 
 and certainly in credibility that it would not be perfectly safe (at 
 least so long as no device for a continuous rail at crossings is brought 
 into use) for trains to pass crossings otherwise than "under con- 
 trol." The Commission has not so far, at any rate, seen its way to 
 issue permits to railroads to pass crossings having inter-locking de- 
 vices, without the train being at the time under "control." As to- 
 what is "control," it appears from the evidence, that for an ordinary 
 passenger train, "control" would be a speed of about fifteen miles 
 per hour; and this would, of course, vary inversely with weight and 
 consequent momentum of train. 
 
 There is also some conflict upon the question as to whether im- 
 proved crossing devices have entirely eliminated the element of dan- 
 ger at railroad crossings, where the same are in use. That they have 
 great efficacy in preventing accidents is conceded. Where the latest 
 inter-locking devices are used there is, indeed, very little probability 
 of a collision between trains. A derailment of one train may occur if 
 the engineer is not attentive to signals; but a collision would be pos-
 
 sible only in the event that the derailed train were heavy enough or 
 moving with sufficient momentum, to pass over the ground or ties 
 from the derailing point up to the crossing, proper, a distance us- 
 ually of about three hundred feet. 
 
 Under the evidence before us as to danger and delay our view con- 
 trains us to consider this case upon the basis, first, that wherever 
 two trains are liable even by possibility to pass through the same 
 space there must necessarily be some danger to those who ride, and 
 second, that a reduction of speed of trains down to the point of "con- 
 trol" would be necessary, or at least prudent, at all grade crossings 
 however equipped. We see therefore that there must be some delay 
 to travel and transportation, and also a small liability to danger in 
 the case of all grade crossings. Whether or not such delay and such 
 danger would be "unnecessary" within the meaning of that term as 
 used in the statute, all circumstances and surroundings of the pro- 
 posed crossing duly considered, is the question for our decision. 
 
 Most of the evidence before us has been addressed to the question 
 of fixing the point of high water in Salt Creek. The high water 
 point is important to be arrived at with reasonable certainty as it 
 bears directly upon the question of drainage, and drainage is an es- 
 sential element of respondent's plan. If the point fixed by some of 
 petitioner's witnesses be taken as the ordinary high water point, 
 an under crossing by the petitioning road would be rendered entirely 
 impracticable, as only a very shallow cut could be drained in time of 
 high water; and an under crossing on that basis would really mean 
 the raising of respondent's road to such height as would make the 
 crossing in fact an over crossing by that road, subject to the many 
 and grave objections such a structure naturally raises. Upon the 
 other hand if we should assume the lowest point fixed by some of 
 the witnesses of respondent as being high water mark, feasible drain- 
 age could be obtained for a twelve-foot cut as contemplated by the 
 first proposition of respondent. Without discussing the evidence in 
 detail which is deemed unnecessary, the Commission have arrived at 
 the conclusion from consideration of all the testimony touching the 
 question, that in order to insure drainage it would be necessary, in 
 case an under crossing should be adopted, for the Burlington tracks 
 to be raised at least twelve feet above their present position and the 
 tracks of the petitioning road to be depressed below the surface 
 sufficiently after providing for side ditches, ballast, ties and rails, to 
 leave twenty feet in the clear between the top of rail and the low- 
 est point of girder. 
 
 In addition to the above questions there has been placed before us 
 some general expert testimony as to the merits and demerits of grade 
 crossings, with reference to the safety and convenience of the travel- 
 ing public. The weight of this testimony is against the general pol- 
 icy of grade crossings, a view in which no doubt all will concur, 
 wherever conditions are at all favorable to crossings of some other 
 kind.
 
 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 This case derives it chief importance from the fact that it is the 
 first one arising under the act conferring jurisdiction upon the Com- 
 mission, and a conspicious position is therefore likely to be assigned 
 to this ruling as a precedent. We think it proper, however, to ob- 
 serve that a ruling of the Commission in any individual case, arising 
 under this statute, can not be taken as necessarily controlling other 
 cases except where in the opinion of the Commission, the same con- 
 ditions obtain; and since the conditions can rarely be the same in 
 any two cases, it follows that in the application of this statute each 
 .crossing must be considered essentially by itself. 
 
 The act under which this proceeding is had is short and may be 
 quoted in full. It is as follows: 
 
 (LAWS OF 1889, PAGE 223.) 
 
 "An Act in relation to the crossing of one railway by another, and to prevent 
 danger to life and property from grade crossings," 
 
 SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented 
 in the General Aseembly: That hereafter any railroad company desiring to 
 cross with its tracks the main line of another railroad company shall construct 
 the crossing at such place and in such manner as it will not unnecessarily 
 impede or endanger the travel or transportation upon the railway so crossed. 
 If in any case objection is made to the place or mode of crossing proposed by 
 the Company desiring the same, either party may apply to the Board of Rail- 
 way and Warehouse Commissioners, and it shall be their duty to view the 
 ground, and give all parties interested an opportunity to be heard. After 
 full investigation, and with due regard to safety of life and property, said 
 Board shall give a decision, prescribing the place where and the manner in 
 which said crossing shall be made, but in all cases the compensation to be 
 paid for property actually required for the crossing, and all damages resulting 
 therefrom shall be determined in the manner provided by law in case the 
 parties fail to agree." 
 
 "SECTION 2. The railroad company seeking the crossing shall in all cases 
 bear the entire expense of the construction thereof, including all costs and in- 
 cidental expenses incurred in the investigation by the Board of Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners." 
 
 "Approved May 27, 1889." 
 
 From the terms of the above act, what if anything may we deduce 
 as to the general policy of the state touching this question of cross- 
 ings? Certainly we can not from it infer that the law makers in- 
 tended to abolish grade crossings. Had that been their object it was 
 competent for them to have said so in plain terms. This was not 
 done; but a tribunal was instead designated to pass upon cases as they 
 arise. From this we must infer that the legislature believed there 
 would be some cases where grade crossings would be proper and 
 others where over or under crossings would be proper. Each case 
 was left by the legislature to be decided upon its merits. This 
 Commission would have no more right under the statute to set up a 
 general unvarying standard for all future crossings in Illinois than it 
 would have to enact a law which the legislators did not think proper 
 to enact for themselves.
 
 9 
 
 In the exercise of the discretion so vested in the Commission, a 
 strong, and in many cases, controlling consideration would be the 
 natural configuration of the ground at and near the place of crossing. 
 The fact that the statute authorizes the Commission to pass not only 
 upon the mode but also upon the place of crossing seems to imply, 
 that it might be proper in some cases to vary the place of crossing 
 with the view of striking the road to be crossed at a more favorable 
 point for a non-grade crossing. It will not be questioned for a 
 moment that wherever the lay of the ground is favorable to a cross- 
 ing over or under without great additional expense, or the erection 
 of unsightly embankments to the great injury of property, a non- 
 grade crossing should be under this law preferred. We have seen, 
 however, that the topography of the country does not in the case 
 before us favor a non-grade crossing; and if the locality were remote 
 from a large center of population and the road proposed to be crossed 
 were not one over which a large traffic daily passes, the case would 
 be quite easy of solution. But the contrary is the fact. The point 
 is near a rapidly growing city, having already a population of twelve 
 hundred thousand; nearly one hundred trains, passenger and freight, 
 pass this point daily and the number is likely to steadily increase. 
 Already three tracks are in use upon respondent's road, and there 
 will soon be need for a fourth. Several suburban stations of impor- 
 tance lie beyond this crossing. Under such circumstances are the 
 delay and the danger from a grade crossing such as to warrant the 
 Commission in ordering the under crossing proposed? 
 
 The increased cost of the proposed under crossing, over that of a 
 grade crossing, is not fixed by the evidence with certainty, there be- 
 ing disagreement among the engineers of the Companies. This in- 
 creased cost may be safely placed within the limits of from $125,000 
 to $150,000, with a large additional sum for increased cost of switch 
 connections, sidings, turn-outs," etc., incidental to the non-grading 
 status; and while the Commission is exceedingly loth to weigh even 
 the possibility of the destruction of human life against a mere matter 
 of dollars, yet the serious financial hardship, under which an order 
 for an under crossing would lay petitioner, can not be ignored. The 
 petitioning company obtained its charter at a time when the law per- 
 mitted the road seeking a crossing such as this to selact for itself the 
 Elace and mode of crossing. It could, under the former state of the 
 iw, have itself designated the character and conditions of the use 
 sought here, and, under the eminent domain act, could have had 
 damages assessed on the basis of its own proposition, whether for a 
 grade crossing or otherwise, (113 111., 156). Having begun the con- 
 struction of its road, petitioner is met with this new statute, and 
 asked to make an increased outlay of over $100,000 in this single 
 crossing, exclusive of the one-third respondent offers to pay; and, if 
 compelled to do this in the present instance, it is, to say the least, 
 not improbable it- may be required to do the same with the many 
 other lines of road across which its route is projected. To do this 
 would, perhaps, cripple, if it would not entirely forbid the enterprise.
 
 10 
 
 Considering further the subject of switch connections above al- 
 luded to, it should be remembered the very object of the petitioning 
 company is to form these connections with the several roads, leading 
 from Chicago, across which its survey runs. 
 
 Under paragraph 6, Sec. 19, Act of 1872, for the Incorporation of 
 Railroad Companies, petitioner has the right, 
 
 "To cross, intersect, join and unite its railways with any other railway be- 
 fore constructed at any point in its route and upon the grounds of such other 
 Railway Company with the necessary turnouts, sidings, and switches and 
 other conveniences in furtherance of the business of its connections; and 
 every corporation, whose railway is or shall be hereafter intersected by any 
 new railway shall unite with the Corporation owning such new railway in 
 forming such intersections and connections and grant the facilities aforesaid, 
 etc." 
 
 This section is as much a part of the law of Illinois as that con- 
 ferring the jurisdiction now to be exercised. Under it, petitioner 
 will want switch connections with each of the lines where the mode 
 remains yet to be determined, nine or ten in number. Indeed, as 
 we have said, the very object and purpose of petitioner is the form- 
 ing of these -connections; and, in their formation, the statute enjoins 
 it as a duty upon the roads crossed to "unite" with petitioner. The 
 inconvenience, expense, and unsightliness which such switch connec- 
 tions, turnouts, etc., must occasion in each instance if a non-grade 
 basis is adopted on this level plain will be realized upon a moment's 
 reflection. Either a separate track would need to be built on the 
 natural surface alongside the Terminal Road's excavation, starting 
 at the head of the cut, or else a switch-track would have to be taken 
 out from the cut a considerable distance back from the crossing point 
 and gain the surface by a sharp grade; and this would be less than 
 half the difficulty. Respondent's tracks would on the basis of the 
 proposition submitted, be about fifteen feet high, which elevation 
 would have to be overcome by an embankment for switch-track, de- 
 scribing a curve Jong enough in distance to make the ascent prac- 
 ticable for engines with loaded cars. Stated another way, whether a 
 non- grade crossing be got by depressing one road, or by elevating 
 the other, there would be at best a distance of about twenty-two feet 
 from rail to rail to be overcome by a feasible track and roadbed for 
 switches, turnouts and sidings. That it could be done is not disputed; 
 but to do it, would certainly require a long track, a high embank- 
 ment, a probable cut, and consequently a much more extensive right 
 of way than if a grade crossing were used. All this would tend to 
 disfigure the neighborhood of the crossings so constructed, inflicting, 
 perhaps, a damage upon property in a growing village which would 
 never be adequately measured by a judgment in condemnation or for 
 damages. 
 
 Besides these considerations, the Commission is satisfied from 
 previous personal investigation, as well as from the evidence heard, 
 that inter-locking devices which are fully recognized by statute in 
 Illinois, the most approved patterns of which petitioner stipulates, 
 at its own expense, to put in and maintain, giving all trains of re- 
 spondent the right of way, are so efficient, as demonstrated by actual
 
 11 
 
 use, that they reduce both the delay and the danger to a very small 
 limit. With the watchman in the signal tower instructed to give 
 the Burlington trains precedence, it must be very rare indeed, that 
 one of that company's trains need come to a full stop. So far as its 
 freight trains are concerned, the delay would be unimportant; and 
 the mere matter of lowering the speed of passenger trains to fifteen 
 miles per hour to conform with permit, and good usage, need not 
 occasion, as the Commission believe, a delay to any given train ex- 
 ceeding two minutes, and with a light train even Isss, which is not a 
 very great matter. 
 
 If the danger and delay to result from a grade crossing at this 
 point are regarded as so important, it would seem a wide field is open 
 for the management of the respondent Company to reduce both delay 
 and danger at some of its present grade crossings where no inter- 
 locking devices are in use; and the same remark well applies to other 
 managements of old companies, members of which have testified be- 
 fore us in this case urging no more grade crossings. Certain it is, 
 that when no inter-locking devices had been recognized by law, or 
 were in use, and both danger and delay were confessedly much greater, 
 it was the practice of nearly all the companies in this State to build 
 crossings on grade. 
 
 The greater solicitude, arising now when the occasion is less, might 
 suggest to some (though the Commission certainly does not take that 
 view), that these old established lines, now that they no longer have 
 occasion to build extensions, are not averse to imposing upon new 
 candidates conditions which rest largely upon specious but unprac- 
 ticed precepts. 
 
 Nothing here said is, however, to be understood as committing us 
 to any general policy favoring grade crossings, as such. On the con- 
 trary, wherever circumstances favor, or even permit, we should much 
 prefer to separate the tracks of crossing roads. We have hesitated 
 long before seeing our way to order a grade crossing even in the 
 present case. If respondent's tracks were already elevated to a point 
 which would render an under crossing with good drainage feasible, 
 we should perhaps be inclined to put the petitioning road under. 
 With the circumstances and conditions as they now in fact confront 
 us, we are unable to do so. 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is therefore decided and ordered that petitioner have leave to 
 cross with its tracks, the tracks of respondent at the point designated 
 in its petition on grade, and level with the tracks of respondent; but 
 only upon condition that before its road is used at said crossing point 
 for the passage of trains it will at its own expense set up and fully 
 equip ready for use at said crossing, the latest, best and safest inter- 
 locking appliances, signals and devices, together with electric annun- 
 ciators to announce the approach of trains, and also upon condition
 
 12 
 
 that before proceeding to construct such crossing, petitioner give 
 bond in the penal sum of $20,000, with securities to be approved by 
 respondent, or the Commission, conditioned, that it will perpetually 
 maintain such interlocking system in good order and condition, and 
 pay all salaries of men needed to efficiently maintain and operate the 
 same. 
 
 Inasmuch as no general rules of practice for proceedings under 
 this act have been heretofore promulgated, it is ordered that ten days 
 be allowed from the date of filing this opinion in which either party 
 may file petition for re-hearing, first giving notice to the opposite 
 party, in analogy with the rule of the Supreme Court of Illinois 
 touching re-hearings; and the operation of the above decision and 
 order will be suspended until any petition which may be so filed is 
 heard and disposed of.
 
 APPLICATION 
 
 New or Amended Rules 
 
 GOVERNING THE 
 
 INSPECTION OF GRAIN 
 
 OPINION AND RULING OF THE COMMISSION 
 
 IN ANSWER TO COMMUNICATION OF 
 
 P. BIRD PRICE, CHIEF INSPECTOR OF GRAIN. 
 
 Chicago, Illinois.
 
 15 
 
 COMMUNICATION OF P. BIRD PRICE. 
 
 OFFICE OF CHIEF INSPECTOR OF GRAIN, 
 
 Chicago, III, December 28, 1889. 
 
 Hon. John R, Wheeler, Chairman Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission, Springfield, Illinois. 
 
 DEAR SIR: At a meeting of your Honorable Board, held in Chicago, 
 September 12, 1889, an amendment to Rule Two was made, creating 
 the grades of Nos. 1, 2 and 3, White Spring Wheat, which amend- 
 ment, after the statutory publication of twenty days, went into effect 
 October 7, 1889. 
 
 By the terms of this amendment, all Spring Wheat containing 5 
 per cent or over of White Wheat, is required to be graded as "White 
 Spring Wheat." 
 
 At the time this amended rule went into effect, there was a consid- 
 erable quantity of wheat in store in the elevators under the jurisdic- 
 tion of this department, which, under the original rule, had been 
 graded No. 2 Spring; but which, under the rule as amended, would 
 be graded No. 2 White Spring. 
 
 It has been held by former Commissions and by this department, 
 as I belive, from its creation, that the authorities were precluded by 
 law from changing the grade of grain while in store, and that, there- 
 fore, no new rule could be made to apply to grain in store at the time 
 of its adoption. 
 
 In pursuance to this fundamental idea it has been the custom to 
 apply to all grain on coming out of an elevator the rule that was in 
 force when it was received, but, such grain having been once delivered 
 from the house into possession of its rightful owner, under the origi- 
 nal rule, and his rights thereby saved as far as possible, it has been 
 held that any further inspection of the grain became a new transac- 
 tion, to which any new or amended rule then in force would apply, 
 exactly as if the grain in question had arrived from a point outside 
 of the jurisdiction of the department. 
 
 In dealing with the questions that have arisen under this amend- 
 ment of Rule Two, ,[ have adhered to the principle above outlined; 
 and the house inspectors have in every case, of their own motion and 
 without asking or receiving instructions, applied the rule as it stood 
 before amendment to all wheat that was in store October 7th, show-
 
 16 
 
 ing conclusively that the custom of applying to grain coming out of 
 store the rule as it stood when the grain was received, was too well es- 
 tablished to admit a question of their duty in the premises. 
 
 I can see no way to make any change in an established rule with- 
 out affecting in some way or other the value of the property in store, 
 and equity would seem to require that that course should be pursued 
 which will reduce any damage of this kind to the minimum. 
 
 The State Legislature evidently had this in mind when it required 
 a public notice of twenty days to be given before any new rule or 
 amendment could legally go into effect. 
 
 To apply a new rule at once might cause very serious damage by 
 reason of existing contracts or already perfected arrangements for 
 handling, and to apply it even after 20 days' notice to grain already 
 in store, could hardly fail, in most cases, to inflict a hardship upon 
 the owners. 
 
 Conditions of the market not infrequently exist under which it 
 would be impossible to move the grain from store, within twenty days, 
 without a loss more serious than that occasioned by a change of 
 grade. 
 
 On the other hand I can see no way in which injury can be 
 worked by delivering to the holder of a warehouse receipt the grain it 
 calls for under the rule in force when it was issued. 
 
 He has then received his grain just as he put it into store, with the 
 same grade, and stands in the same position he would if it had never 
 been in store. 
 
 If the receipt has in the meantime changed hands, the purchaser 
 has at least been put upon the inquiry by the statutory notice and 
 the public comment upon every such change, end has an opportunity 
 to protect himself by examining into the quality of the grain to be 
 delivered him, or abstaining from its purchase altogether. 
 
 No such opportunity would be given to the holders of receipts if the 
 right of the Commission, under the law, to change the grade of grain 
 while in store should be established. 
 
 It might be a physical impossibility for him to move his grain, 
 while to let it remain in store a day after the expiration of the statu- 
 tory notice, would entail a serious decline in the value of his property. 
 
 As a considerable amount of grain affected by this rule was in store 
 at the time the amendment went into effect, and as a large .part of it 
 is still in store, the questions arising under the amendment will be 
 constantly arising, and that I may have some rule by which to act 
 beyond that of precedent and long established custom, I respectfully 
 ask a ruling by your Honorable Board upon the following points: 
 
 1. When grain has been inspected out of a warehouse of Class A, 
 and has been delivered into the absolute possession and control of 
 the owner, has this department any further relation to such grain or 
 any further duty concerning it?
 
 17 
 
 2. When grain is presented for inspection with a view to storage 
 in any warehouse of Class A, is it incumbent upon this department 
 to inquire as to the origin of such grain, or to ascertain whether it 
 has previously been inspected by its employe's or not? 
 
 3. When grain that is presented for inspection with a view to 
 storage in any warehouse of Class A, has been previously inspected 
 from store and delivered into the absolute possession and control of 
 its owner, does or does not the duty of this department in relation to 
 it differ from its duty in relation to grain arriving from points out- 
 side of its jurisdiction? 
 
 4. When grain is presented for inspection with a view to storage 
 in any warehouse of Class A, should the fact (if such should be the 
 case) that such grain has been previously inspected out of the same 
 or any other such warehouse under the provisions of a rule no longer 
 in force, except as to grain going out of store, affect the action of 
 this department? 
 
 5. In case of the amendment of an established rule of inspection, 
 should grain already in store be inspected out under the rule as it 
 stood at the time such grain was received, or under the amendment 
 in force at the time of its delivery? 
 
 In view of the importance of the interests involved, and of the fact 
 that the owners of some of the grain affected by the amendment 
 above mentioned are desirous of transferring their property from one 
 warehouse to another within the jurisdiction of the department, I 
 respectfully ask that the ruling of your Honorable Board upon the 
 above points be made as promptly as circumstances will admit. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 P. BIRD PRICE, 
 
 Chief Inspector, 
 
 OPINION AND RULING OP THE COMMISSION. 
 
 September 12, 1889, the Commission amended the Spring Wheat 
 Rule ''No. 2," by creating separate grades for wheat containing 5 per 
 cent or more of the white variety. White Spring had previously 
 been graded with other wheat, without any distinction based on 
 color, and it was all denominated "Spring Wheat." By the amend- 
 ment so adopted, if 5 per cent or more of wheat is white, it takes the 
 same grade number it would have taken before the amendment, but 
 the word "white" is inserted, making it "White Spring Wheat" in- 
 stead of "Spring Wheat.'' 
 
 The statutory notice of twenty days was given, and the amended 
 rule went into force October 7, 1889. 
 
 The change was made upon urgent and convincing representations 
 made to the Commission, and its policy and justice is not questioned 
 in any quarter. Its effect is, that White Wheat is now called in the 
 market by its right name. 
 2 O
 
 18 
 
 It appears from the Chief Inspector's communication that when 
 this amendment went into effect, there was a quantity of wheat in 
 store in the elevators which, under the original rule, had been graded 
 "No. 2 Spring," but which, under the rule as amended, would be 
 graded ''No. 2 White Spring." The questions presented concern 
 entirely the application of this amended rule to the wheat so in store 
 when it went into effect. Shall the rule as amended be applied to 
 this No. 2 Spring Wheat which was in store in the Chicago eleva- 
 tors, and under the jurisdiction of this department at the time the 
 rule took effect; and if not applied to wheat already in store when 
 inspected out, then shall the new rule be applied to such wheat in 
 case of application being made for re- inspection of it into another 
 elevator? These are the principal questions raised by the inspector's 
 communication. 
 
 We understand our predecessors on the Commission have uniformly 
 held that changes or amendments of the grading rules were not 
 properly or legally applicable to grain in store when the same took 
 effect, and that such grain should be inspected out under the rule in 
 force when it went in; and the custom and practice of the depart- 
 ment have, we learn, always been in accordance with this holding. 
 It has further been the practice of the department to apply to all 
 grain seeking admission into elevators the rule in force at the time 
 application therefor is made. 
 
 After full consideration of the interests involved, we see no reason 
 to depart from this uniform ruling of our predecessors and the im- 
 memorial practice of the department. 
 
 Grain which is in store in warehouses of Class A, and held under 
 warehouse receipts issued in pursuance of the statute, may be said to 
 be strictly under the jurisdiction of the Commission. We do not 
 think there is any legal warrant for changing the grade of such wheat 
 while so held. The No. 2 wheat which is involved in the present 
 case, has a fixed value in the markets of the world, depending in 
 some part at least upon the certificate of its grading, that giving it a 
 certain and definite character as a commodity of commerce. To hold 
 that the Commission could change the grade and therefore the value 
 of this wheat while in the warehouse, and held under receipt, would 
 be to assume an arbitrary power which we believe the law-makers 
 never intended to confer upon the Commission, and it was not the 
 purpose of the Commission in amending the rule to give to their 
 action any such application. 
 
 It must be remembered that warehousemen of Class A in Illinois 
 perform a public calling, for the performance of which they are re- 
 quired to procure a license, which is revocable by the court upon any 
 failure on their part to comply strictly with the law. Such ware- 
 housemen give bond conditioned for a "full and unreserved compli- 
 ance with the laws," of this State, in relation to warehouses. 
 
 A part of that law is in these words: "It shall be the duty of every 
 warehouseman of Class A to receive for storage any grain that may 
 be tendered to him in the usual manner in which warehouses are ac- 
 customed to receive the same in the ordinary and usual course of 
 business, etc."
 
 19 
 
 It is further provided that "no warehouseman in this State shall 
 insert in any receipt issued by him any language in any wise limit- 
 ing or modifying his liabilities or responsibility as imposed by the 
 laws of this State." 
 
 It is further provided by the statute that on the return of any 
 warehouse receipt issued by a warehouseman, and the tender of all 
 charges, the property held under the receipt shall be "immediately 
 deliverable to the holder of such receipt;" and that "unless the prop- 
 erty represented by such receipt shall be delivered within two busi- 
 ness hours after such demand shall have been made, the warehouse- 
 man in default shall be liable for damages, in the sum of one cent 
 per bushel, and also a further damage of one cent per bushel for each 
 day of refusal, etc." 
 
 In determining what effect shall be given to new or amended rules, 
 all the above provisions of the statute are to be considered. Were it 
 held that a change of rule applies to wheat in store when it takes 
 effect, the obvious result would be that a warehouseman could be 
 compelled by law to take grain into store the day before the change 
 takes effect in the rule which he could not deliver back on the next 
 day upon the same receipt issued therefor. The duty to take the 
 grain and store it is mandatory. Before the changed rule takes effect 
 the grain must of course be graded by the old rule. The warehouse- 
 man could not, as we have seen, insert in the receipt "any language 
 in any wise limiting or modifying his liabilities or responsibility" as 
 provided by the statute. In the present case, therefore, it was the 
 legal duty of every warehouseman to receive this wheat up to Oc- 
 tober 7, 1889, when the rule went into effect, and to give receipts 
 therefor according to the old grading, that is to say, receipts simply 
 for "No. 2 Spring Wheat," even though the grain so offered were 
 White Wheat, and would be graded as "No. 2 White," the moment 
 the new rule took effect. The warehouseman would then be under 
 legal obligations to take wheat as "No. 2 Spring Wheat," and deliver 
 it as "No. 2 White," and all by the arbitrary operation of a rule of 
 this Commission. It seems to the Commission this would be an ex- 
 ercise of power not warranted by law, and as before observed, the 
 Commission did not mean to exercise any such power, but had in 
 view when the amendment was adopted the uniform ruling and prac- 
 tice of the department. 
 
 If a change of rule were held to apply to grain already in store, a 
 case might readily be supposed where a warehouseman could not 
 possibly in his deliveries comply with the law. Suppose, for instance, 
 a warehouseman should have on hand, on the day a new rule takes 
 effect, only grain of a variety which would fall under the new grade 
 created by the new rule. His receipts outstanding, having been 
 issued under the old rule, have of course given this wheat on hand 
 the grade and denomination fixed by the old rale. If, therefore, his 
 patrons should apply on the next day for their wheat, how could he 
 possibly give it to them if the new rule is applied? Such a con- 
 struction would here meet with a physical impossibility, and the 
 case, too, is one which might occur in practice. If we suppose the 
 amount on hand falling under the new grade to be some portion less
 
 20 
 
 than the whole, viz.: one-half or one-third, there would still be the 
 same difficulty, unless by mixing his wheat the warehouseman could 
 in some way make the whole of it pass as of the original grade. In the 
 present case 5 per cent of White Wheat serves to make the wheat grade 
 "White;" and of course if the amount of White Wheat on hand were 
 less than 5 per cent of the total amount, the mixing of the two kinds 
 together thoroughly would enable the warehouseman to pass it all 
 out as "No. 2 Spring." Otherwise he would have to hold his White 
 Wheat until such time as he could make the necessary dilution, or 
 else lose the difference in the value of the two grades. 
 
 We are not saying that the hardships here suggested would all 
 actually occur in the present case, in the event of holding the rule to 
 apply to wheat in store, but are simply supposing cases that might 
 occur as illustrating the general principles that should be applied to 
 cases of this kind. The question is one of law, and goes largely to the 
 powers derived by the Commission from the statute, in the deter- 
 mination of which the whole statute should be considered. 
 
 In regard to in-inspection the case is different; and the fact that 
 wheat presented for inspection into an elevator has previously been 
 stored in a warehouse of Class A and under the jurisdiction of the 
 Commission, does not, in the opinion of the Commission, present a 
 ground for continuing to inspect it by the old rule. The new rule 
 must be applied somewhere, and we know of no better place to apply 
 it than at the door of the elevator, and to wheat going into store. If 
 wheat has once passed out from the elevator, and the warehouse re- 
 ceipt has been taken up an canceled, it is then out from under the 
 jurisdiction of this Commission. If it knocks at the door of another 
 elevator, or even the same elevator for re-admission, it must be 
 treated as any other grain arriving from any other point. 
 
 Persons placing wheat in store since the amendment went into 
 effect, have had power to protect themselves, in some measure at 
 least, either by selecting elevators in which there is no White Wheat, 
 of which there are several, or by causing their wheat to be stored in 
 a "separate bin" as provided by the statute, thus insuring the re- 
 delivery to them of the identical wheat stored. The warehouseman, 
 we have seen, has no such power to protect himself against the hard- 
 ships which an application of the amended rule to wheat in store 
 might impose upon him. 
 
 It is perhaps difficult to make any change of grade which would 
 not work an injury to somebody. The statute requiring changes of 
 rule to be published twenty days before taking effect, was no doubt 
 designed, by warning persons interested, to reduce the damages to a 
 small limit by enabling all persons to get ready for the change. The 
 damage that must necessarily result, not withstanding such notice, 
 ought to fall (since it must fall somewhere) upon him who could by 
 diligence best have protected himself. 
 
 It is therefore, in reply to the questions of the Chief Inspector, 
 ruled by the Commission
 
 21 
 
 1. That when grain has been inspected out of warehouses of Class 
 A and has been delivered into the absolute possession and control of 
 the owner, the inspection department has no further relation to such 
 grain, and no further duty concerning it. 
 
 2. When grain is presented for inspection with a view to storage 
 in warehouses of Class A, it is not incumbent upon the department 
 to inquire as to the origin of such grain, or to ascertain whether it 
 has previously been inspected by the employe's of the department or 
 not. 
 
 3. When grain that is presented for inspection with a view to 
 storage in a warehouse of Class A has been previously inspected from 
 store and delivered into the absolute possession and control of its 
 owner, the duty of the inspection department in relation to such 
 grain does not differ from its duty in relation -to grain arriving 
 from other points outside of its jurisdiction. 
 
 4. When grain is presented for inspection with a view to storage 
 in a warehouse of Class A, the fact that such grain has been pre- 
 viously inspected out of the same or some other warehouse under the 
 provisions of a rule no longer in force, should not, except as to grain 
 going out of store, affect the action of the inspection department. 
 
 5. In case of the amendment of an established rule of inspection, 
 grain already in store when the rule takes effect, should, in the opin- 
 ion of the Commission, be inspected out under the rule as it stood at 
 the time such grain was received. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, January 4, 1890. 
 
 Subsequently, on the 21st day of May, 1890, upon further discus- 
 sion of the question of application of new or amended rules of in- 
 spection, the Commission unanimously adopted the following general 
 rule to apply to all such cases: 
 
 All grain in store of any warehouse of Class A, at the time any 
 amendment to the established rules of inspection, (affecting such 
 grain) may hereafter go into effect, shall be inspected out, (in satis- 
 faction of warehouse receipts dated prior to that time only) in ac- 
 cordance with the rules as they stood prior to such amendment.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 COMPLAINT. 
 
 CITIZENS OF LANSING, ILLINOIS. 
 COMPLAINANT. 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, ST. Louis & PITTSBURG R. R. Co. 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 RESTORATION OF STATION BUILDING AND PRIVILEGES. 
 
 Complaint Filed December 12, 1889, Hearing January '3, 1890. 
 Decision Rendered January 24, 1890. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Complainants, J. A. CRAWLEY. 
 For Respondent, CHAS. WATTS.
 
 25 
 
 STATEMENT OF FACTS, 
 
 The petition in this case prays that action may be taken by the 
 Commission to compel the restoration of the station privileges and 
 building at the village of Lansing, on what is known as the "Pan- 
 handle" road. It appears that in 1864 the Chicago & Great Eastern 
 Railroad Company built the line of road now owned by respondent 
 upon which the village of Lansing is situated, in the township of 
 Thornton, Cook County, twenty-seven miles from the Chicago station, 
 and near the Indiana line. 
 
 There is some conflict in the evidence as to the extent of the pop- 
 ulation of Lansing. Petitioners claim it numbers over three hundred, 
 while respondent places it at two hundred and twenty-five. Each 
 estimate is claimed to be based upon actual count. We do not, how- 
 ever, deem this question a vital one in this case, or one which it is 
 necessary to settle to the nicety of a unit. Whether the population 
 of Lansing be three hundred, or only two hundred and twenty-five, 
 the community has rights which we will endeavor to determine as 
 best we can from the evidence before us. 
 
 Lansing is not an incorporated town or village. Its lands are, how- 
 ever, subdivided, platted and sold by lot numbers; and the place has 
 all the requisites of a legal municipality except the formal incorpora- 
 tion. 
 
 When this road was built in 1864 or 5, a station building was 
 erected and full station privileges established at the place called 
 Lansing, and a regular station agent has been located and main- 
 tained there all the time until the fall of 1889, when such agent was 
 removed; and a little later the station building was, on a Sunday, 
 removed by the Company from Lansing. 
 
 There is evidence before the Commission showing the extent of 
 the business transacted at Lansing. Quite a large trade is done there 
 in hay and coal, these being the most important items. The other 
 business of the place is such as is ordinarily done in a community or 
 village of similar size located near a great city, as Lansing is. 
 
 It appears from the evidence that prior to the building of the road 
 a contract was entered into between the Company building it and 
 the proprietors over whose land the construction was proposed, 
 whereby the right of way was granted to the Company upon certain 
 considerations, among which were the establishment of certain stations 
 and the running of certain trains between the Chicago station and
 
 26 
 
 the Indiana State line. As the evidence does not advise us as to the 
 manner in which the respondent Company succeeded to the road 
 and franchise of the original Company, we are unable to say that 
 this contract is material in a legal point of view in determining the 
 rights of petitioners. If respondent came in by purchase at a judicial 
 sale it would seem, under the ruling of the Supreme Court in the L. 
 & N. case, 120 111. 48, that the obligations of the contract would not 
 attach to respondent as such purchaser. This question will, however, 
 be for the courts to decide in case this controversy shall be finally 
 settled by suit. 
 
 It further appears from the evidence that a subscription was circu- 
 lated on which money was raised from the residents of the vicinity 
 to build the first station house at Lansing, $1,200 being subscribed 
 for that purpose. The particular station house so built had been re- 
 placed and was not the one removed by respondent from Lansing in 
 November. 
 
 Although we do not base our opinion or action in this case upon 
 the contract or the subscription mentioned above, yet they are circum- 
 stances of some moral value in arriving at petitioners' rights, and 
 strongly persuasive to a full enforcement of those rights when ascer- 
 tained. 
 
 A good deal was said in the course of the hearing about the mo- 
 tives which induced the superintendent of respondent to take away 
 these station privileges. With this question we have nothing to do. 
 It is the substantial rights of petitioners and of respondent which 
 are before us for consideration. If the community known as Lansing 
 is not legally entitled to depot privileges, then it could not get them, 
 whatever secret or unjustifiable motive may have entered into the 
 withholding of them. On the other hand, if this community is 
 legally entitled to depot privileges, then it should have them, how- 
 ever sincerely, or in whatever good faith, these privileges may have 
 been withheld. 
 
 The sale of tickets for Lansing was, after the removal of the sta- 
 tion building, discontinued by the Company; but on this point we 
 accept the statement of the superintendent that the withdrawing of 
 these tickets was a mere error, not intended by the management, 
 which has since been corrected, and the tickets restored. 
 
 Among the reasons assigned by respondent for removing this sta- 
 tion and withdrawing the agent are, that it became necessary to 
 maintain an agent at South Chicago Junction on this line of road, 
 something over a mile from Lansing, and that it will not pay the 
 Company to maintain another depot and agency so near by, at the 
 village of Lansing. It is also said that the privileges now accorded 
 to the community known as Lansing are fully equal to those given 
 to other villages or communities of like grade or importance upon 
 the line of respondent's road. It is also claimed by respondent that 
 the withdrawal of the agent does not subject the people of Lansing 
 to any serious inconvenience, inasmuch as he continues to reside at 
 Lansing and orders for cars, etc., can be giyen to him mornings and
 
 27 
 
 evenings when he is at home. The fact of the present agent's resi- 
 dence at Lansing is, however, only a coincidence. No guarantee is 
 given for its continuance. The next agent may reside in Chicago, 
 instead of Lansing, or this one may at any time remove there, for 
 aught that appears. 
 
 Nor is it established to our satisfaction that the business of Lan- 
 sing may be as conveniently transacted with the present facilities as 
 with those formerly furnished, as respondent insists is the case. In- 
 deed, it seems little less than absurd to insist upon such a propo- 
 sition. With no station building where freight can be cared for 
 between the time of its arrival and delivery, or between the time of 
 its delivery at the track and the arrival of the train which is to carry 
 it, and with no agent present to receive and bill freight or to sell 
 tickets, and no place where passengers may find shelter while await- 
 ing a train, no telegraph facilities by which cars may be ordered for 
 shippers, it seems useless to contend that the people of Lansing are 
 not subjected to a serious inconvenience over what many of them 
 had a right to expect when their lot was cast in that community. A 
 shipper wishing to order cars must go to a distant telegraph station 
 on the line, unless he chooses to await the slow processes of the mail. 
 The fact that he may at present see the agent in the evening or the 
 morning while in Lansing is simply his good fortune and is not a 
 legal right he could ever insist upon in the courts, if he should here- 
 after be deprived of it. The resident of Lansing or of Thornton 
 township, who wishes to ship less than a car load of freight from 
 this point, has no resource but to go himself to the track where only 
 a very indifferent "cinder platform" has been provided, and there 
 await with his goods the coming of a freight train which may be 
 hours behind time. He can not bill his goods and go home leaving 
 them under shelter at the risk of the Company. He must personally 
 see the conductor of the train, and depend upon the goods being 
 billed from the next station. The receiver of freight is subjected to 
 a like inconvenience. His goods are thrown from the train upon the 
 ground, where he must find them and care for them, or leave them 
 to be damaged by the weather. 
 
 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 None of the reasons assigned for withdrawing these station priv- 
 ileges are, in the view of the Commission, sound, or sufficient in law. 
 It is not conceivable that in the quarter of a century during which 
 station privileges have been maintained at Lansing that the busi- 
 ness and property interests of the neighborhood hare not conformed 
 themselves largely to the circumstances of the existence of such 
 depot privileges. These interests were no doubt built up largely 
 upon the faith that such privileges would be continued, and values 
 have adjusted themselves on that basis. The fact that the business 
 is not extensive, and that the town is not a large one, does not affect 
 the question, so long, at any rate, as it does not appear that a station 
 can only be maintained at Lansing at a positive loss to the Company. 
 So the fact that the crossing of another road near this place made it
 
 28 
 
 necessary to keep an agent at the junction thus formed is, as the 
 Commission view it, beside the real question, as is also the fact, if it 
 is one, that respondent furnishes no better facilities to other villages 
 of like grade. It does not appear that other communities, circum- 
 stanced as this one is, have been deprived of station privileges which 
 had long been voluntarily granted, and, to the existence of which 
 the business interests of large numbers of people had conformed 
 themselves. And even were this shown, it does not follow that be- 
 cause one community of people have not enforced their legal rights 
 that another will therefore be compelled to relinquish theirs. 
 
 In the mind of the Commission, the right of the residents of Lan- 
 sing to have this station restored, and an agent kept there by the 
 road for the transaction of their business, does not admit of a ques- 
 tion. 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that respondent restore said station build- 
 ing, and also keep hereafter an agent at the town of Lansing, and 
 that it furnish reasonable train facilities at that point for the tran- 
 saction of the business of the place, both as regards passengers and 
 freight; and in default of a compliance with this ruling, it is further 
 ordered that the Attorney General be requested to begin an action 
 in mandamus to compel its enforcement by the courts.
 
 BFFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 THE CHICAGO, MADISON & NORTHERN RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE BELT RAILWAY Co. or CHICAGO, 
 
 AND 
 
 THE CHICAGO & WERTERN INDIANA RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION TO DETERMINE PLACE OP CROSSING. 
 
 Petition Filed December 18, 1889. Crossing Viewed January 9, 1890. Answer 
 Filed January 13, 1890. Hearing January 24 to January 
 29, 1890. Opinion Filed February 13, 1890. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Petitioner, B. F. AVER AND E. H. GARY. 
 For Respondents, OSBORN & LYNDE.
 
 31 
 
 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
 
 The petitioning company was incorporated August 3, 1886, with 
 authority to construct a line of road extending from Chicago to a 
 point in Stephenson County on the Wisconsin state line. It now 
 seeks to cross with its tracks the line of the Chicago & Western In- 
 diana Road (which road is now operated under a lease by the Belt 
 Railway Co. of Chicago, co-respondent), at a point near the center of 
 the northwest quarter of section thirty-four (34), in the Town of 
 Cicero, Cook County, Illinois, through the west half of which section 
 the road of respondents runs in nearly a due north and south direc- 
 tion. Objection made by respondents to the place of crossing pro- 
 posed gives rise to the present inquiry. The mode of crossing is not 
 in controversy, it being conceded the crossing, wherever made, may 
 be at grade 
 
 The place of proposed crossing is within the corporate limits of the 
 Town of Cicero, which town has power under the general act of in- 
 corporation "to provide for and change the location, grade and cross- 
 ings of any railroad." The trustees of the town on December 4, 
 1888, granted by ordinance the right of way to petitioner through 
 the town, providing among other things as follows: 
 
 "At the west line of section thirty-three (33), the northerly line of the right 
 of way of said railroad company shall be the south line of 33d street, as laid 
 out by T. F. Baldwin in his subdivision of the northwest quarter of section 
 thirty-three (33) township thirty- nine (39) north, range thirteen (13) east of 
 the tnird principal meridian, said south line of 33d street, being 1,360 and 
 92-100 feet south of the northwest corner of said section thirty-thre (33) ; 
 thence the track or tracks of said railroad eastward through said section 
 thirty- three (33) shall be laid south of 33d street; and through section thirty- 
 four (34), township thirty-nine (39) north, range thirteen east of 3d principal 
 meridian, shall be laid south of the north half of the north half of said sec- 
 tion. 
 
 "Said tracks to be laid upon any ground now owned or that may hereafter 
 be acquired by said railroad company upon the line of said route, but noth- 
 ing in this ordinance shall be construed so as to authorize the said company 
 to occupy any streets or alleys lengthwise. 
 
 "Provided, that'when the railroad tracks of the said company shall cross any 
 street, alley or other line of railroad, such crossing shall not be on any trestle 
 work or viaduct; and when the tracks of said company shall cross the tracks 
 of any other railroad company, such crossing shall be at grade." 
 
 This right of way was granted upon several conditions expressly 
 named in the ordinance covering the questions of rates of fare to be 
 charged to and from Chicago, the location of certain stations in the 
 town and the payment of $10,000 by the company into the town 
 treasury. The company promptly accepted the conditions, paid the 
 $10,000, acquired a right of way through sections thirty-three (33)
 
 32 
 
 and thirty-four (34) , near the northerly limit fixed by the ordinance, 
 and proceeded with the construction of the road, eighty per cent of 
 the work being done by May 1, 1889, as testified by the engineers of 
 petitioner. 
 
 As the work progressed negotiations were in progress between the 
 general managers and engineers of the companies concerned with re- 
 gard to the terms on which the new road should cross the tracks and 
 right of way of respondents at the point which had been selected. 
 These negotiations have been proven before the Commission at 
 great length, it being claimed by petitioner that its officers had the 
 full consent and agreement of respondents to make the crossing at 
 the point now proposed. This claim respondents deny, and assert 
 that while many conferences were had no agreement was ever finally 
 made, and that the question whether or not any such agreement was 
 made is for the courts and not for the Commission. In the negotia- 
 tions it was assumed upon both sides that petitioner had the right to 
 select itself the place of crossing; and up to July 1, 1899, when the 
 statute went into effect conferring jurisdiction upon the Railroad 
 Commission in such cases, this assumption was entirely correct. 
 
 Respondents insist that the place proposed by petitioner for cross- 
 ing is peculiarly disadvantageous to them. The proposed crossing 
 place is a little less than one mile south of the place where respond- 
 ents' tracks cross the C., B. & Q. R. R. by means of viaduct, which 
 viaduct is approached from the south by a sharp ascending grade; 
 while a little less than a mile south from the proposed crossing the 
 tracks of respondents' road cross the Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 
 Railroad, which at that place runs north of and parallel with the 
 canal. South of the canal and parallel with it is the Chicago & Al ton 
 Railroad. Respondents insist the place selected is dangerous on 
 account of the liability of the long and heavy trains of the Belt Line 
 Company to become stalled on the grade ascending to the Burlington 
 viaduct, and the further liability of such trains to break their coup- 
 lings upon the viaduct and precipitate loose, unmanageable cars 
 down the grade upon this crossing. It is also claimed that the en- 
 tire distance northward between the Atchison tracks to the Burling- 
 ton viaduct is needed as an uninterrupted running ground for heavy 
 trains to acquire necessary momentum to make the grade at the via- 
 duct; also that heavy trains coming southward over the viaduct are 
 liable to be uncontrolable at the point of crossing, and that no inter- 
 locking appliance has been suggested or can be devised which will 
 render a crossing at this point safe. 
 
 Respondents ask that petitioner be compelled to vary the course 
 of its line to the southward from its present location, beginning 
 such deviation in the northeast quarter of section thirty-two (32) , 
 proceeding thence southeasterly through section thirty-three (33), 
 emerging from the latter section near the southeast corner thereof, 
 crossing respondents' tracks near the point where the same are crossed 
 by the Atchison road, and south of the south line of section thirty- 
 four (34) , that from such point of crossing petitioner's road should 
 proceed parellel with the Atchison to a point in section thirty-six
 
 33 
 
 (36), where it should again reach the line of its present location. 
 The advantage claimed for such a change in petitioner's course and 
 place of crossing is that it would enable the crossings of the Atchi- 
 son, the Alton and that of petitioner's road to be interlocked by a 
 single system, and would leave respondents the distance of about a 
 mile and three-quarters southward from the Burlington viaduct free 
 of obstruction over which northward trains could run for the grade t 
 
 It is proved before us that the additional distance which would be 
 traversed by such a diverted line would be a little over 2,100 feet, 
 and the additional cost to petitioner of such a change of location 
 would be $153,000. Petitioner insists that the crossing as now pro- 
 posed can be safely interlocked, and that by placing electric annun- 
 ciators at the Burlington viaduct on the north, and at or near the 
 Atchison crossing on the south to notify the man in the tower of the 
 approach of respondents' trains at these distant points, this crossing 
 if equipped with a Saxby & Farmer machine would not materially 
 obstruct or endanger the business of respondents, consisting as it 
 does entirely of freight. 
 
 We have not attempted to state all the facts and contentions in 
 detail, but only sufficient to show the nature and scope of the con- 
 troverted questions. It will be seen three questions have been the 
 subjects of controversy before us: 
 
 First Have the parties by private agreement settled the point of 
 crossing for themselves? 
 
 Second Will a crossing at this point equipped with the interlock- 
 ing and signaling device proposed result in "unnecessary" delay or 
 danger, or both, to transportation and travel upon the road of re- 
 spondents? 
 
 Third Had the action of the town authorities of Cicero, provid- 
 ing for the location of petitioner's line, and the subsequent acts done 
 and expenditures made by petitioner in pursuance of such action, 
 before the statute of 1889 was passed, or took effect, so far settled 
 the location of petitioner's road and consequently the place of this 
 crossing that this Commission can not now legally change it? 
 
 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
 
 There is undoubtedly some force in the objection urged against 
 this place of crossing; but the liability to delay and danger, has we 
 think, been much exaggerated by some of respondents' witnesses. It 
 is not proposed, however, to discuss the evidence in detail upon this 
 branch of the case; nor is it proposed to discuss in detail the ques- 
 tion whether or not the parties reached a binding agreement in their 
 negotiations during the summer of 1889. In the view taken of the 
 case by the Commission an answer to the last of the three questions 
 stated above effectually disposes of the case. To that question we 
 shall now devote a few concluding words. 
 
 30.
 
 34 
 
 The act conferring jurisdiction upon the Commission in these 
 crossing cases was approved May 27, 1889, and took effect July 1, 
 thereafter. Under the law existing prior to the taking effect of this 
 act, it was the right of the company seeking a crossing to propose its 
 own place and mode, and proceed accordingly under the Eminent 
 Domain act; provided the place of crossing were outside the corpo- 
 rate limits of any city, town or village. If the place were within 
 such a municipality, then while the railroad lo be crossed had itself 
 no more power of objection against the place or mode than though 
 the place were outside, yet the power of the road proposing the cros- 
 sing was in that case to be exercised in accordance with the power of 
 such municipality expressed in the statute "to provide for and change 
 the location, grade and crossings of any railroad," a power the gen- 
 eral act for the incorporation of railroads expressly preserves to the 
 municipal authorities. The power to locate conferred in the petition- 
 er's charter had to be exercised in accordance with the provisions 
 made by the municipality. (Dunbar's case, 100 111., 110.) 
 
 We have seen the Town of Cicero did act by ordinance in this 
 matter December 4, 1888. True a definite line for petitioner's road 
 was not fixed at the particular point of crossing, but a definite point 
 was named at the west line of section thirty-three (33) to which the 
 road should run, and it was further provided that "thence the track 
 or tracks of said railroad eastward through said section thirty-three 
 (33) , shall be laid south of 33d street; and through section thirty- 
 four (34), * * * shall be laid south of the north half of the 
 north half of said section." The point to which respondents insist 
 this crossing should be moved is entirely south of the south line of 
 section thirty-four (34), and would not for that reason comply with 
 the ordinance. 
 
 The question now presented is whether by acquiring its right of 
 way and locating and grading its road upon the present line at a time 
 when it had a perfect legal right to exercise its own discretion in the 
 premises, subject only to the direction of the Town of Cicero which 
 then had unquestionable jurisdiction to provide for the location of 
 railroads, petitioner has not acquired substantial rights which can 
 not be disturbed by any order of this Commission. The question is 
 not precisely whether the act of 1889, under which we proceed, has 
 repealed the statute conferring upon cities, towns and villages power 
 over this subject, but is rather this: Assuming that the act of 1889, 
 is by implication a repeal of the former power of towns and villages, 
 has there not been acts done and rights acquired under an existing 
 state of law which could not be affected by such a repeal and by the 
 conferring of a new jurisdiction upon this Commission? 
 
 Section 4 of the act to revise the law in relation to the construction 
 of statutes, approved March 5, 1874 (omitting immaterial words), 
 provides as follows: 
 
 "No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law whether such 
 former law is expressly repealed or not as to any ' act done 
 
 or any right accrued or claim arising under the former law, or in any way 
 whatever to affect any such * * * act so committed or done * or 
 
 any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect; save only
 
 35 
 
 that the proceedings thereafter shall conform so far as practicable to the law 
 in force at the time of such proceeding. * * * This section shall extend 
 to all repeals either by express words or by implication whether the repeal is 
 in the act making any new provision upon the same subject 01 in any other 
 act." 
 
 The petitioning company at a time when under the law it might 
 judge of the propriety of the location of its line and the place of 
 crossing other roads, subject only to the discretion vested in the 
 Town Board of Cicero, acquired its right of way, constructed eighty 
 per cent of its road, paid $10,000 into the treasury of the Town of 
 Cicero, all in pursuance of existing law. The Town Council set cer- 
 tain limits for the location through sections thirty- four (34) , that is 
 to say: That the road should proceed south of a certain line. The 
 discretion thus left to petitioner's officers by the municipal authori- 
 ties of Cicero has been exercised by the location of the road definitely 
 upon a certain line, which line was then known to the officers of re- 
 spondents, and large expenditures of money were made in the con- 
 struction of a road upon the line so fixed before the act conferring 
 jurisdiction upon this Commission had been passed. Can it be said 
 that the "new law" repealed the "former law" as to all these "acts 
 done" and "rights accrued" and "claims arising under the former 
 law" or that the new law can "in any way whatever affect any such 
 act so done or rights accrued before such new law took effect?" It 
 seems to the Commission that to so hold would be a violation of the 
 letter and spirit of the section of the statute above quoted. 
 
 To say petitioner had lawfully acquired a right of way and built a 
 line over all the distance in question, except the hundred feet in 
 width of respondents' right of way, but that because no pecuniary 
 right had been acquired in that particular spot before the new law 
 went into force, that, therefore, the whole question of the location of 
 this road is an open one for the Commission, would not, we think, be 
 consonant either with the statute or with justice. 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that petitioner have leave to cross with its 
 track or tracks the track of respondents' road at grade at the point 
 proposed by it, and designated in its petition; but in accordance 
 with petitioner's stipulation before the Commission, it is further 
 ordered that petitioner shall put in and maintain at said crossing a 
 system of interlocking signals and devices, with electric annunciators, 
 and a Fontain crossing of the character proposed and presented by 
 its counsel upon the hearing, the same to be subject to examination 
 and approval by the Consulting Engineer of the Commission. 
 
 Opinion filed February 13, 1890.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, MADISON & NORTHERN RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 VS. 
 
 THE BELT RAILWAY Co. OF CHICAGO, 
 
 AND 
 THE CHICAGO & WESTERN INDIANA RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION TO DETERMINE PLACE OF CROSSING. 
 
 Petition Filed December 18, 1889. Crossing Viewed January 9, 1890. An- 
 swer Filed January 13, 1890. Hearing January 24 to January 29, 
 1890. Opinion Filed February IS, 1890. Petition for 
 Rehearing Filed February #5, 1890. Answer 
 Filed February 28, 1890. Opinion 
 Filed March 20, 1890. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Petitioner, B. F. AYER AND E. H. GARY. 
 For Respondents, OSBORN AND LYNDE. 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING,
 
 39 
 
 OPINION ON PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
 
 While recognizing fully the force and ingenuity of the reasons 
 urged by the learned counsel of respondents in their petition for re- 
 hearing, we are unable to assent to the conclusions arrived at. It is, 
 in substance, insisted: 
 
 First That the Commission should have made a formal finding 
 upon the question whether the proposed point is a "proper" place 
 for a crossing, having due regard to the effect thereof upon travel 
 and transportation upon respondents' road; that said question was 
 the only one properly before the Commission for decision, and that 
 this ^ital question has been ignored. 
 
 Secondly That the Commission is widely wrong in the opinion 
 expressed to the effect, that petitioner had acquired such a right in 
 the proposed line of location through sections thirty-three (33) and 
 thirty- four (34), by virtue of "acts done" and expenditures made 
 prior to the passage of the statute of 1889, as would carry with it 
 the right to cross upon such line, and such a right as would, in the 
 opinion of the Commission, be saved to petitioner by section 4 of the 
 act on Construction of Statutes. 
 
 Thirdly That if such a right as would be saved out of the opera- 
 tion of the act of 1889 was so acquired by petitioner, then the only 
 proper order to be made by the Commission on that hypothesis 
 would be one dismissing the petition for want of jurisdiction. 
 
 Such the Commissioners understand to be the substantial grounds 
 of the petition; and we remark: 
 
 1. That even if the only question before the Commission were, as 
 contended, whether the proposed place of crossing is under the cir- 
 cumstances "proper," the consideration of its "propriety" (using that 
 term in the broad sense it must take in such a connection), would 
 involve all the matters discussed in the Com mission's former opinion. 
 All those matters would come in as reasons for the propriety of the 
 crossing if the matter of vested legal rights were entirely waived. It 
 might be "proper" to order a crossing in a place where the company 
 seeking it could allege no legal right, but only a right to be made 
 out by considerations of reason and equity based upon circum- 
 stances and addressed entirely to the discretion of the Commission. 
 But if such moral considerations were reinforced by antecedently ac- 
 quired legal rights in the company seeking the crossing, the "pro- 
 priety" would certainly be only increased by that circumstance.
 
 40 
 
 Counsel are in error in saying the real question involved has not 
 been decided. The statute does not require that reasons be given for 
 the order made. The language is, "Said Board shall give a decision, 
 prescribing the place where and the manner in which said crossing 
 shall be made." The naked ruling fixing place and manner would 
 fully comply with the law. It is not incumbent on the Commission, 
 nor would it add the least force, formally to say, "We hold the pro- 
 posed crossing will not unnecessarily impede or endanger travel or 
 transportation, and is, under all the circumstances, a 'proper' cross- 
 ing; therefore it is 'with due regard to the safety of life and prop- 
 erty' decided, etc." Facts are more important than forms. The fact 
 that a crossing is ordered is evidence the Commission hold it under 
 all circumstances proper, however unfortunate the reasons given may 
 be. Grounds are stated, and reasons given largely out of deference to 
 counsel who have been heard at length upon the case, and may care 
 to know the views of the Commission upon the subject discussed. 
 They are in law no part of the decision proper. If a right decision 
 is arrived at, the fact, if -it be such, that no reason, or even a wrong 
 reason is given, certainly does not invalidate the decision. We freely 
 admit the policy of giving reasons at all is questionable. The party 
 who succeeds is never much concerned about the court's mental op- 
 erations; and reasons can rarely be cogent enough to convince or 
 satisfy the party defeated. 
 
 2. We see no reason to modify what was before said touching the 
 antecedently acquired rights of petitioner, or the expressed view that 
 section 4 of the act on Construction of Statutes is broad enough to 
 save those rights. We are aware the line where police power ends 
 and vested property rights begin has ever been a battle line of liti- 
 gation. But "rested rights," in the constitutional sense, were not 
 meant to be discussed in the former opinion. We thought section 4, 
 which, among other things says, no new law shall, "in any manner 
 affect" any "act done" or any "right accrued" or any "claim arising" 
 under the former law, was broad enough to save to petitioner its sub- 
 stantial property right in a line of road nearly completed when the 
 new law was passed, and which had cost many thousands of dollars 
 that would be a total loss if a crossing elsewhere were ordered. If, 
 now, it were fully established that no such "saved" or "vested" rights 
 as are legally conclusive have been shown by petitioner, the undis- 
 puted fact would still remain that a large expense (stated in the evi- 
 dence at $153,000) , would be inflicted on petitioner if compelled to 
 adopt the new route suggested. The further fact would remain that 
 property values along the road as built, and near the crossing as pro- 
 posed, have adjusted themselves on the basis of the present status. 
 The further fact would exist that the Town of Cicero had, for a con- 
 sideration of $10,000 exercised an undisputed power by ordinance in 
 directing within fixed limits the location of petitioner's road through 
 Cicero, and petitioner had acted under the ordinance. All this had 
 taken place without the fault of petitioner or the public who are to 
 be affected. These acts were done and rights, if any, accrued, before 
 any law existed under which the right to cross as proposed could be 
 questioned. True, the right of way over the particular strip of
 
 41 
 
 ground belonging to respondents had not been acquired, but acquir- 
 ing right of way and constructing a road are acts which can not take 
 place simultaneously at all points. .The work must begin somewhere, 
 and end somewhere. Acts done at other points are not deprived of 
 force because the right to a particular one hundred feet was not ac- 
 quired before this law was passed. Petitioner was not bound to first 
 acquire the right of way at that particular place in anticipation of 
 fiome exercise of police power by the Legislature. As well say it 
 could only build its road through Stephenson, Winnebago, Boone, 
 DeKalb, Kane and DuPage counties at its peril, lest its right to enter 
 Cook county might be revoked. We say, waiving the question of 
 any conclusive legal right, all the above considerations and facts 
 would still remain and be powerfully persuasive to the same con- 
 clusion at which the Commission arrived, only reaching it by a dif- 
 ferent process of reasoning. The law under which we act says 
 crossings must be made in such place and in such manner as will not 
 ""unnecessarily impede or endanger, etc." In a philosophical sense 
 nothing is "necessary" except that which can not possibly be avoided 
 that which is inevitable. No certain place of crossing or manner 
 of crossing could ever be regarded as "necessary," using the term in 
 this rigid sense; for there would in every case be a possibility of 
 changing it to avoid even the slightest danger or delay. The statute 
 uses the term, however, in a different sense, and under the term 
 ""unnecessarily," we deem the Commission authorized to consider all 
 the facts and circumstances of each case, among which in the case at 
 "bar would certainly be the facts of petitioner's expenditures and other 
 acts done and arrangements made before the law of 1889 was passed, 
 the fact that the public have acquired interests to be injuriously 
 affected by the proposed change, the fact that such change would 
 cost petitioner an additional $153,000, the fact that appliances are 
 proposed to be used and maintained by petitioner at the proposed 
 crossing which will, the Commission believe, render the much exag- 
 gerated danger and delay to respondents' trains very small, and many 
 other facts we shall not now stop to name. In view of all these mat- 
 ters we could say, independently of the question of legal right, that 
 a crossing in the place proposed will not, all facts and circumstances 
 duly considered, "unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel or 
 transportation upon the railway crossed." The same result precisely 
 vould thus be reached by a slightly different process. 
 
 3. The question of jurisdiction does not trouble the Commission 
 in view of the fact that both parties have in effect invoked its action 
 in the premises. On one question, and only one, both parties have 
 been agreed from the first, namely: That a place for this crossing 
 may be designated by this Commission. The disagreement is en- 
 tirely as to where that place shall be. Indeed, the jurisdiction which 
 petitioner expressly invokes, could only be objected to by respond- 
 ents upon grounds entirely fatal to their case. If the Commission 
 has not jurisdiction, then petitioner can cross as proposed. But let 
 us see whether a legal right to cross, and a right to ask the Commis- 
 sion for an order be really so incompatible as counsel suppose. In 
 these cases the Commission sits as a court of very limited jurisdic-
 
 42 
 
 tion. If it assumes to act in any case of the subject matter of which 
 it has no jurisdiction, its order will be of no more legal force than a 
 sheet of blank paper. Notwithstanding any order made in such a 
 case, all parties would still retain and could still assert, through the 
 proper courts, any legal rights they had before. So that a wrong as- 
 sumption of jurisdiction would in no case be a great matter. According 
 to the statute the existence of just one fact gives the Commission 
 jurisdiction to proceed, and that is the fact that "objection be made." 
 The full language is, "If in any case objection be made to the place 
 or mode of crossing proposed by the company desiring the same, 
 either party may apply to the Board of Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commissioners, and it shall be their duty, etc." Can not "objection 
 be made" as well in a case where a legal right exists, as where the 
 right asserted is only moral? There has certainly been "objection" 
 enough made in the case at bar to bring it within the language of 
 the statute, if taken literally, and we have seen no harm can come 
 from so construing the statute. The counsel seem to suppose our ex- 
 pressed opinion that petitioner has a legal right is a judicial deter- 
 mination of the fact. It is not at all, but is simply a reason given for 
 our order. If this Commission had power to judicially determine that 
 question in this proceeding, in a manner binding upon the parties, 
 and could by some proper writ execute the order, it might with some 
 consistency be said nothing further would be required. But we can 
 not judicially determine the fact, and what was said in our opinion 
 binds nobody. The order which it is conceded we have power to 
 make, does not execute itself, but remains to be enforced through 
 the courts. The learned counsel of respondents disagree with as as 
 to the existence of any legal right in petitioner. We have much re- 
 spect for their opinion while not assenting to it. For aught we know, 
 they might succeed, in a forum having jurisdiction, in securing a 
 judgment upon that question contrary to our poorly expressed 
 reasons. Then the parties would be, at the end of such litigation, just 
 where they now are, and would still be under the necessity of calling 
 on the Commission for an order. It may be freely conceded that if 
 petitioner could show no ground except a cold legal right without 
 equity or justice a case where all the equities were against the 
 crossing proposed, and where we would not act but for the legal 
 right shown then the action suggested might be proper. The peti- 
 tion could perhaps properly in such a case be dismissed, and the 
 parties relegated to their legal rights and judicial remedies. Such is 
 not this case; and under all circumstances, and particularly in view 
 of the strong equities made out by petitioner in addition to what we 
 have deemed its legal rights, we must decline to grant a rehearing 
 upon the grounds assigned. 
 
 Rehearing denied. 
 
 Opinion rendered March 20, 1890.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, MADISON & NORTHERN RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 VS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & WESTERN INDIANA RAILROAD Co., 
 
 AND 
 THE PITTSBURG, FT. WAYNE & CHICAGO RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION TO DETERMINE PLACE AND MODE OF CROSSING. 
 
 Petition Filed March 22, 1890. Crossing viewed March 27, 1890. 
 Answer. C. & W. I. R. E. Co. Filed March 27, 1890. 
 Hearing March 27 to April 3, 1890. Opin- 
 ion Filed and Order Entered April 
 17, 1890. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, Hon. B. F. AYER, HON. JAMBS FENTRESS, AND HON. E. H. 
 
 GARY. 
 
 For Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co., OSBORN & LYNDE. 
 For Pittsburgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Railway Co., HON. GEO. WILLARD. 
 
 OPINION F COMMISSION.
 
 45 
 
 OPINIONS OF COMMISSION, 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 Petitioner proposes to cross with its two main tracks the tracks of 
 the respondent companies upon and near Stewart avenue in the city 
 of Chicago. It alleges that objection to the proposed crossing is 
 made by respondents, and asks that this Commission enter an order 
 under the act of 1889, prescribing the place where and the manner 
 in which said crossing shall be made. Such formal matters are 
 alleged in the petition as bring the case within the statute. 
 
 The first point made relates to the jurisdiction of the Commission, 
 which is questioned upon the ground that respondents did not, prior 
 to the exhibiting of the petition, make specific objection to the cross- 
 ing as now proposed. The statute says: "If in any case objection 
 be made to the place or mode of crossing proposed by the company 
 desiring the same, either party may apply to the Board of Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commissioners, etc." Whether objection to the pre- 
 cise proposition now contained in the petition was ever in terms 
 made by respondents or not, there is no doubt at all that objection is 
 now being made to it, and there is further no doubt that objection to 
 any crossing, unguarded by interlocking devices, has all the time ex- 
 isted, whether such objection was ever formally expressed or not. 
 Ordinarily when a defendant concedes the right claimed in a suit, he 
 comes into court offering to perform all that is demanded, and say- 
 ing he has ever been willing and thus makes a question as to plain- 
 tiff's right to costs. But there can be between these parties no 
 question of costs, because the statute makes petitioner pay the costs, 
 without regard to the fate of its petition. Were this otherwise, that 
 is, were the costs to abide the result of the suit as in ordinary cases, 
 and were respondents now disclaiming all objection to petitioner's 
 proposition, offering to let the crossing be constructed as proprosed, 
 and asking a dismissal at petitioner's cost upon the ground that no 
 objection had ever been made, the position would better commend 
 itself to our ideas of consistency and justice. But to say, "we now 
 object, but did not formally do so before suit, wherefore we ask that 
 petitioner go out of court," (only, it may be added, to come im- 
 mediately back again with the same proposition now pending) 
 would be, to say the least, taking rather "finer sights" than a due re- 
 gard for substantials would justify. 
 
 The objection to the jurisdiction should, therefore, be overruled.
 
 46 
 
 It is contended that the crossing as proposed by petitioner will, 
 if constructed, occasion danger and delay and that the Commission 
 should, as the case stands, do one of two things, namely: First 
 either refuse the prayer of the petition and deny the crossing alto- 
 gether; or, secondly allow the crossing only upon condition that a 
 system of interlocking switches and signals be put in covering these 
 crossings and such other points in the neighborhood as would neces- 
 sarily be comprehended in a practical system. It is strenuously 
 urged that this Commission has power to do either of these things. 
 
 To these questions a few words will now be devoted. 
 
 And first, would it be proper to simply refuse the prayer of this 
 petition, without making any affirmative order for a crossing? The 
 statute says: "After full investigation, and with due regard to safety 
 of life and property, said Board shall give a decision prescribing the 
 place where, and the manner in which said crossing shall be made. 1 ' 
 This is not equivalent to saying, if the proposed crossing is safe and 
 proper the Commission shall authorize it, and, if the contrary, refuse 
 it. Some crossing in some place and mode, must, in any event, be 
 provided for; and the decision must "prescribe" a crossing, not deny 
 one. It need not necessarily be the same crossing prayed for in the 
 petition, but may differ from that in place and manner, the word 
 "manner" being used in the sense hereinafter assigned to it. We 
 might vary the place of crossing; and we might compel a crossing 
 over or under, or a crossing at a different angle, or a crossing con- 
 structed with different frogs or appliances from those proposed. 
 We might, in short vary the proposition in any particular which re- 
 fers to the manner of the location of the tracks of the one company 
 across the tracks of the other company. 
 
 But, in this case there is no contention for a crossing in a differ- 
 ent place or in a different mode from that proposed. The Commis- 
 sion might, of its own motion, have the neighborhood of the cross- 
 ing examined by expert engineers with a view to some variation of 
 place or mode. The interests of respondents are, however, a guaran- 
 tee of as high vigilance to find a better place and mode as would 
 likely be exercised by any experts we could employ; and since no 
 other place or mode claimed to be better is suggested by any of the 
 parties interested, we may safely conclude a grade crossing in the 
 place and manner proposed will occasion as little danger and delay 
 as any we could select; and a decision must, on this point, be made 
 accordingly. 
 
 It only remains, therefore, to determine whether the Commission 
 has power to compel the petitioner, or the parties generally concerned, 
 to guard and operate this crossing (which, we have seen, must be 
 authorized) , by means of an interlocking system. Is an interlock- 
 ing plant embraced in, or any part of, a "crossing" as the term is 
 used in the act of 1889? 
 
 The question is a new one. In each of the cases arising under this 
 law, previously decided by the Commission, the petitioner stipulated 
 before the Commission to put in and maintain interlocking devices;
 
 and the order entered in each case only embodied the stipulation, 
 without the Commission having really considered the question of its 
 power under the statute in the absence of agreement. The question 
 is therefore as open as though nothing had been contained in the 
 former decisions upon the subject. 
 
 The respondents in this case have signified their willingness to 
 submit to this Commission on their part the question of interlock- 
 ing. We might therefore, so far as they are concerned, if petitioner 
 were also consenting, make an order covering the subject by way of 
 arbitration, exercising not the power conferred by statute, but by 
 the parties. But the petitioner is not consenting, and stands upon 
 its legal rights. 
 
 It may be premised that an interlocking machine would be of no 
 efficacy, unless provision were fully made for its maintenance and 
 future operation. It would therefore be idle to order the construc- 
 tion of a plant, unless we have power to go further and order its 
 maintenance, and its use at this crossing, and clearly, if one power 
 exists, the other must exist also, or the law is futile. 
 
 It may be further premised that interlocking devices have more 
 particular reference to the speed of travel than they do to safety. 
 The legislature of this Stute has for the safety of the public, pro- 
 vided by general statute a certain measure of caution to be observed 
 at all railway crossings, which statutory regulation is as follows: 
 
 "All trains running on any railroad in this State, when approach- 
 ing a crossing with another railroad upon the same level, * * * 
 shall be brought to a full stop before reaching the same, and within 
 eight hundred (800) feet therefrom, and the engineer or other person 
 in charge of the engine attached to the train shall positively ascer- 
 tain that the way is clear and that the train can safely resume its 
 course before proceeding to pass the * * * crossing." 
 
 This precaution is enjoined under a penalty of $200.00 against the 
 engineer in charge of the train, and $200.00 against the corporation. 
 Lately, interlocking devices have been brought into use, by means of 
 which the delay from these full stops at crossings may be avoided; 
 and in 1887 the legislature of this State passed a law recognizing 
 these devices, under which law the operating companies are empow- 
 ered to voluntarilj r interlock their crossings, and with the sanction 
 and approval of this Commission, run them without stopping. It is 
 the desire for speed, far more than safety, which leads to interlock- 
 ing. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the use of any device 
 yet invented is more safe than to obey the statutory injunction and 
 come to a full stop. 
 
 If, now, we examine more closely this statute of 1887 which did 
 confessedly give to the Commission certain power with reference to 
 interlocking plants, we find that when the legislature had this sub- 
 ject of interlocking before them and were professedly acting upon it, 
 they gave to the Railway Commission no power to force interlocking 
 upon any unwilling company. Under that act, the companies must, 
 by mutual agreement, set up, equip and arrange for the operation of 
 the interlocking plant, leaving to the Commission only the function
 
 48 
 
 of inspection and approval. The legislature must have known there 
 were many old crossings in Illinois where the danger is as great as 
 at the new ones, and the delay vexatious to travelers. Yet they did 
 not see fit to provide for any other or further interlocking plants 
 than could be mutually agreed upon by the companies concerned. 
 Had the legislature intended to invest this commission with power 
 to guard the public against danger and delay by means of interlock- 
 ing devices, is it not reasonable to suppose they would have conferred 
 that power clearly and unmistakably, and have done so in the act 
 upon that particular subject, instead of leaving so important a power 
 to be gathered incidentally, and purely by implication, from an act 
 embracing a wholly different subject matter? And would they not, 
 while about it, have made the power broad enough to include other 
 crossings besides newly constructed ones, which other crossings are as- 
 much within the mischief as any; and their equipment could surely 
 as well be paid for by old established companies as that of new cross- 
 ings could by new and presumably weaker companies? 
 
 Nor is this all. This act of 1887, while giving the Commission 
 power to approve crossing devices voluntarily put in, confers no- 
 power whatever to compel their continued use and maintenance. The 
 companies which mutually agree to interlock a joint crossing, may 
 mutually agree to abandon the system, and go back to the statutory 
 method of coming to a full stop, and this Commission could exercise 
 no control over their free choice in that particular. It would be in- 
 teresting to know how we would justify the exercise of a greater 
 power under the act of 1889, which says no word about interlocking, 
 than we could exercise under the act of 1887, which does professedly 
 embody the legislative will upon that subject. And, as before ob- 
 served, unless we can compel the maintenance and use of a plant, to 
 order its construction, at a cost of many thousands of dollars, would 
 be sheer idleness and folly. 
 
 Such being the state of the law when the act of 1889 was passed, 
 let us now look at that particular act, and see if it confers any such 
 power as is here claimed, either expressly given, or necessarily im- 
 plied. 
 
 The most careful reading of the statute reveals to me no power 
 whatever, over the subject of interlocking. The act meets only the 
 case of how one company may cross "ivith its tracks the main lines 
 of another railroad company." The confusion has arisen entirely 
 through a misapprehension of what is included in the word "cross- 
 ing." It is one thing for a company to cross the line of another 
 "with its tracks," and another thing to cross the same point after- 
 wards with its trains. The manner in which the tracks shall cross is 
 one thing, and the manner in which trains may cross, or pass, and 
 how they shall be operated, is quite another thing. When we speak 
 of a railway crossing, we properly refer to the position of the tracks 
 of two roads, and not to the passage of trains. 
 
 If the act is read with this distinction clearly in view, there seems 
 to be no doubt as to its meaning. The title of the act, which may 
 properly be referred to to aid in a doubtful construction, is in these
 
 49 
 
 words: "An act in relation to the crossing of one railway by 
 another, and to prevent danger to life and property from grade 
 crossings." Clearly, "the danger to life and property," which was to 
 be prevented was that arising "from grade crossings" as distinguished 
 from those crossings which are not at grade; that is to say: cross- 
 ings either over or under, and nothing further than this was in the 
 mind of the man who drafted this title. 
 
 Passing a step further we find the general declaration that a com- 
 pany "desiring to cross with its tracks the main line of another * 
 * * * shall construct the crossing at such place and in such man- 
 ner as will not unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel, etc." Tt 
 does not say the crossing shall be so guarded after construction as to 
 secure reasonable safety and expedition, but it shall be so "con- 
 structed" in the first instance as to Secure that end. Unless the 
 construction of a crossing can be said to include also both the con- 
 struction and the operation of an interlocking plant, it is difficult to 
 see what authority so far appears to do the acts contended for. 
 
 The same may be said of that clause of the statute which directs a 
 decision, "prescribing a place where and the manner in which said 
 crossing shall be made." Here is nothing affecting the manner in 
 which a crossing shall be guarded or the manner in which trains 
 shall be operated across it, and it is a "crossing" that is to be "pre- 
 scribed" and "made" and not an interlocking plant. 
 
 Section 2 of the act provides that "the railroad company seeking 
 the crossing shall in all cases bear the entire expense of" what? 
 An interlocking plant to regulate the operation of trains at 
 the crossing? Not at all. Shall "bear the entire expense of the 
 construction thereof." How does the Commission from this derive 
 the power to make petitioner bear another and much larger expense, 
 not arising from the construction of the crossing proper, but having 
 relation entirely to the manner of operating the trains of the com- 
 panies? 
 
 It is agreed that an interlocking plant, to be effective at this point, 
 must embrace certain crossing points on the Chicago & Alton and 
 the Santa Fe" tracks and right of way. Mr. Thomas, General Man- 
 ager of one of the respondents, testified on this point as follows: 
 
 "Q. At Stewart avenue could an interlocking system be put in 
 that would be safe, that did not include all of the tracks at that 
 point?" 
 
 "A. It should include all of them." 
 "Q. That would include what tracks?" 
 
 "A. The Madison & Northern, Ft. Wayne & Chicago, Alton, and 
 Western Indiana, and I think the interlocking of the lead track of 
 the Santa Fe~." 
 
 The Alton and Santa F6 Companies are not before us, and not 
 parties to this proceeding. How, therefore, could we make an order 
 affecting their property and controlling the operation of their trains, 
 which would be binding upon them? It involves only an elementary 
 
 O 4
 
 50 
 
 principle to say that parties who have not had their day in court 
 can not be bound by the judgment, even where the subject matter 
 of the proceeding is within the jurisdiction. But where jurisdiction 
 of parties and subject matter are both wanting, the very suggestion 
 of such an order becomes little short of preposterous. 
 
 To further illustrate the want of power in the premises, suppose 
 the respondent companies were consenting to nothing in this case, 
 did not even come before us with any suggestion, as would be their 
 undoubted right, and we upon looking over the crossing proposed 
 should believe it improper unless protected by interlocking. Could 
 we in such a case, make an order which would comtemplate the tak- 
 ing, or use, of respondents' grounds, by the location on them of pipes, 
 boxes, wires, signals and perhaps a tower house, some of the appli- 
 ances extending thousands of feet upon their lands, the use of which 
 being imperatively commanded, would materially and permanently 
 affect the operation of their trains, and all without their consent? 
 Certainly we would have no such power. And it does not even tend 
 to answer the difficulty to say the order would in that case, be for the 
 benefit of respondents.- Parties have some right to judge for them- 
 selves what is beneficial to their property; and those who would take 
 that delicate function from them must show undoubted legal authority. 
 
 That this subject is one within the power of constitutional police 
 regulation by the legislature is not questioned; but the legislature 
 must act before the Commission can act. The case before us can not 
 be decided upon sentimental notions as to what the law ought to be, 
 but must be met upon the plain issue of what the law in fact is. 
 Nothing in the act of 1887 or of 1889 empowers this Commission to 
 compel interlocking, in the absence of the mutual agreement of the 
 parties, nor can any such power be said with reason to be implied as 
 being necessarily involved in the carrying out of the objects of either 
 of those statutes. The precautions for public safety which are put 
 within the discretion of this Commission by the act of 1889 are such 
 and only such as arise out of a choice of the different ways in which 
 the crossings of railway tracks proper may be constructed, the most 
 obvious distinction being between those which are built on a level 
 and those which are separated, one passing over the other. The 
 question why a larger power has not been conferred may properly be 
 addressed to the legislature. 
 
 It is my opinion an order should be entered prescribing a crossing 
 in the place and manner designated in the petition. 
 
 CBIM, Commissioner: I concur in the conclusions reached in the 
 foregoing opinion. 
 
 WHEELER, Chairman, dissenting. 
 
 I present my views in the case under advisement with great re- 
 luctance, but, being unable to reconcile the opinion of a majority of 
 the Commission with the facts and law in the case as I understand 
 them, I am led to dissent from certain of their findings for the fol- 
 lowing reasons:
 
 51 
 
 My interpretation of the statute under which this hearing is held 
 gives it a broader scope, and a more extended jurisdiction to the 
 Commission than my associates allow, and, I may add, broader and- 
 more extended than the learned counsel for the parties to the contro- 
 versy admit. 
 
 The right of the petitioning company to cross the tracks of the 
 respondent companies at some point is conceded, and no other point 
 being suggested, it may be assumed that the place proposed is the 
 most feasible and the best that can be selected. Therefore, "the 
 place where said crossing shall be made" may be considered estab- 
 lished. Thus far the Commission seem to be of one opinion. 
 
 The vital point in the controversy, and upon which our views differ, 
 is found in "the manner in which said crossing shall be made." 
 What does the word "manner" as used in the statute mean? How 
 far does the question of "manner" extend? Must we confine it to 
 that portion of the respondent companies' "main lines" actually en- 
 closed by the petitioning company's tracks? 
 
 The statute under which this case is brought is somewhat obscure, 
 inasmuch as it does not specifically define the meaning of the term, 
 and upon the conclusion reached depends the extent of the jurisdic- 
 tion of the Commission. The cost of constructing the crossing is 
 provided for in the act ; aside from that, the only reservation is found 
 in the question of "damage," which, with the extent of jurisdiction, 
 covers the entire matter in controversy. 
 
 The enacting clause of the statute clearly indicates that the intent 
 of its framers was to "prevent danger to life and property from grade 
 crossings," and in its first section it is expressly stipulated that the 
 Commission shall have "due regard to safety of life and property," 
 and "shall prescribe the manner in which said crossing shall be 
 made." Can there be any doubt about the intention of the law-mak- 
 ing power? The question of safety is made paramount the first to 
 be considered one that must not be lost sight of; therefore, I con- 
 clude that a reasonable construction of this clause places all matters 
 pertaining to the question of safety within the jurisdiction of the 
 Commission, including the side tracks, switches, turn-outs, etc., 
 of all companies adjacent to and affected by the crossing. All of 
 these, in my opinion, are covered by the statute and must be subject 
 to the restrictions contemplated by the law. 
 
 Assuming this view to be correct, do we not fail in our duty if we 
 ignore the plain intent of the law and allow a crossing in a locality 
 teeming with human life without such safety appliances as will re- 
 duce the element of danger to a minimum? 
 
 But, it is argued, safety appliances concern only the operation of 
 railroads, a question not referred to this Commission by the act, 
 therefore it is outside of and beyond our jurisdiction. In answer, 
 permit me to say that while I claim no right to impose conditions on, 
 or in any manner interfere with, any crossing constructed or located 
 prior to the time the present act went into effect, i. e., July 1, 1889, 
 I am clearly of the opinion that we not only have the right, but it is
 
 52 
 
 our solemn duty to require proper safeguards for public protection 
 in all cases arising subsequent to that date, failing in which, the 
 community will hold us responsible for any disaster that may occur. 
 
 Again, we are told that interests other than those of the parties to 
 this case will be disturbed by the construction and operation of 
 safety appliances, interests not submitted to us for adjudication, and 
 any decision of this Commission affecting such interests will not be 
 recognized as binding by the parties thereto. In reply, it may be 
 said that, while all parties that may be directly or indirectly inter- 
 ested in the decision of the Commission have an undoubted right to 
 a hearing, our authority to act in the premises is not abrogated by 
 their failure to appear, and our duty to render a decision covering 
 the whole question remains whether they do or do not appear. 
 
 How far the question of damages extends is, perhaps, more diffi- 
 cult to determine. It may not, however, be unreasonable to claim 
 that it covers only such property as is rendered wholly or partially 
 useless by the tracks of the petitioning company and the necessary 
 safety appliances. In my opinion it does not include the cost of 
 such appliances, their operation or maintenance, these being an 
 expense, not a damage. My conclusions therefore are: 
 
 1st. The law as enacted gives the Commission full jurisdiction 
 over all questions pertaining to crossings at grade, cost of crossing 
 and damage excepted. 
 
 2d. The Commission has the right to name the place of crossing, 
 and the right to prescribe the manner as well. 
 
 3d. In prescribing the manner, the Commission has the power to 
 require such appliances as will insure a reasonable degree of safety 
 to the public. 
 
 4th. The cost of constructing, operating and maintaining the 
 necessary safety appliances does not fall under the question of dam- 
 ages. 
 
 5th. The Commission has no right to grant the request of the 
 petitioning company without requiring such safety appliances as 
 will render the crossing practically safe. 
 
 The following order was entered by the Commission: 
 CHICAGO, MADISON & NORTHERN R. R. Co., J peUUon ^ determine 
 
 CHICAGO & WESTERN IND!ANA R. R. Co. and ? lace . and mode 
 
 Jf*rnQ Qi'ii /i 
 ing. 
 
 In the matter of the above petition it is decided and ordered by 
 the Commission that petitioner have leave to cross with its tracks 
 the main lines and tracks of the respondent companies at the place, 
 and in the manner designated in its petition, and as shown upon the 
 plat to said petition.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS. 
 
 COMPLAINT. 
 
 JOSEPH TAYLOR, Complainant, 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE OHIO & MISSISSIPPI RY. Co., Respondent. 
 
 EXTORTION AND UNJUST DISCRIMINATION. 
 
 Complaint Filed June 20, 1890. Hearing July 1.1, 1890. Decision Rendered 
 
 September 20, 1890. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 For Complainant. WILDERMAN & HAMILL.
 
 55 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 Complainant, Joseph Taylor, in 1888, opened a coal mine in St. 
 Clair county, some twelve miles from East St. Louis, between the 
 stations O'Fallon and Alma, and a distance of 2,800 feet north of the 
 line of defendant's railroad. While the shaft was being sunk, Taylor 
 applied to president Barnard, of the railway company, to put down 
 a track from the railroad to his coal shaft, which the president de- 
 clined to do. The negotiations were partly oral and partly by cor- 
 respondence. 
 
 On July 11, President Barnard wrote Taylor: 
 
 "How do you propose to get the coal, provided the track is laid 
 from your mine, to the tracks on the company's right of way? Have 
 you counted upon the company being willing to make the delaj' and 
 the extra run without charge, or do you propose to haul it by mules, 
 or horses, or otherwise." Also, "With satisfactory assurance that a 
 much increased business can be secured at such rates as we can get, 
 or are willing to make, on coal, I shall be able to determine to what 
 extent we can afford to put money into side tracks to so aid the de- 
 velopment of your property." 
 
 On August 13, President Barnard again wrote Taylor: 
 
 "I have to advise you that this company will only undertake to 
 put down such tracks as may be on its right of way. If you wish to 
 reach your shaft, therefore, you had better make arrangements to 
 procure rails, spikes, ties, etc., for the laying of the tracks yourself. 
 Another thing to be considered will be the getting of cars to and 
 from the mine, as we can not afford, with the low rates that we get 
 from Alma to St. Louis, to stop trains on the main line and run 
 engines a half a mile from it to get loads and place empties." 
 
 And on November 13, Taylor wrote Barnard: 
 
 "In regard to grading, etc., and side tracks at my mine would say 
 that the grading, etc., is about completed, and that I have several 
 teams at work in order to have all in readiness. Wish you would 
 rush the matter and have the material on hand at the time. Hope 
 you will use every effort .to have the rails, etc., on the ground with- 
 out delay, as I am really anxious to have it done as soon as possible, 
 as will soon be to the coal."
 
 56 
 
 To this Barnard replied November 14, "I have your letter of the 
 13th inst, but can not understand what you mean. I told you when 
 you were here I would have Mr. Stevens endeavor to find out what 
 you could get rails for and let you know. I told you also where I 
 thought you could bay. This company has not undertaken to pro- 
 cure material for your track, and not only that, I advised you about 
 where you could get them yourself, and I think Mr. Stevens may 
 have told you (I am not sure of this) , where you could buy and at 
 what price. I told you we would only lay the track necessary for 
 the connection so much as run on the O. & M. right of way. You 
 can not have misunderstood this." 
 
 Taylor subsequently at his own expense built his track, with some 
 advice and help from the company's engineer. The track thus built 
 extends from the company's main track and at substantially a right 
 angle therewith, a distance of 2,800 feet to the mine. 
 
 There was other correspondence and negotiations, but the above 
 suffices to show the circumstance under which Mr. Taylor's track was 
 built, and the connection made with the defendant's road. 
 
 About three miles east of Taylor's mine, and further from East St. 
 Louis, are the Consumers' and Crowson's mines, both of which are 
 situated practically upon the right of way of defendant, the switches 
 and tracks leading to them being almost, if not entirely, upon the 
 company's right of way. The principal point of the complaint is 
 that defendant company charges from the Consumers' and Crowson's 
 mines 45cts. per ton freight for shipment of coal to East St. Louis, 
 while from Taylor's mine it charges the same price, 45cts. per ton, 
 and in addition thereto, one dollar per car as a switching charge for 
 the service of placing empties and carrying loads from Taylor's mine 
 to the main track, 2,800 feet. No switching charge is made in the 
 case of shipments from the Consumers' and Crowson's mines. The 
 facts are not disputed. The company concedes having made these 
 switching charges on all of Taylor's shipments, and avows its pur- 
 pose to continue them. 
 
 Complainant claims this extra dollar per car constitutes both an 
 extortion and an unjust discrimination under the statute of this 
 State; and the Commission is asked to 'prosecute the defendant for 
 the penalties denounced by the statute against these offenses. 
 
 So far as extortion is concerned, the case is not difficult. If the 
 company may rightfully make a switching charge for the transporta- 
 tion of cars over Taylor's road, then the amount of one dollar per car, 
 being within the maximum switching charge fixed by the Commis- 
 sion, can not be said to be extortionate. The real question is whether 
 the company may rightfully charge at all for this service. If it may 
 not, that is to say, if for the present purpose the track laid by Taylor 
 is to be regarded as part of defendant's road, and his mine is to be 
 regarded as a station on that road, as contended, then the charge as 
 to discrimination would seem to be made out.
 
 57 
 
 We have examined the numerous Illinois decisions cited by com- 
 plainant's counsel. Most of these arose under section 5, article 13, 
 of the constitution, which provides : 
 
 "All railroad companies receiving and transporting grain in bulk or other- 
 wise, shall deliver the same to any consignee thereof, or any elevator or pub- 
 lic warehouse to which it may be consigned, providing such consignee, or the 
 elevator or public warehouse can be reached by any track owned, leased or 
 used, or which can be used by such railroad companies; and all railroad com- 
 panies shall permit connections to be made with their tracks, so that any such 
 consignee and any public warehouse, coal bank or coal yard may be reached 
 by the cars on said railroad." 
 
 Under the above provision, the Supreme Court holds (in language 
 no more plain, it may be observed, than the constitution itself,) that 
 railroads are bound to deliver cars of grain at the particular ware- 
 house or elevator to which they are consigned, if accessible by any 
 track belonging to the company or which the company has the right 
 to use. 
 
 Vincent vs. C. & A. R. R., 49 111. 33. 
 People vs. C. & A. R. R., 55 111. 95. 
 C. & N. W. Ry. Co. vs. People, 56 111. 365. 
 Hoyr vs. C. B. & Q., 93 111. 601. 
 
 And in such a case no extra switching charge for delivering cars 
 of grain at an elevator reached by such track, can be made. 
 
 Vincent vs. C. & A. R. R. Co., 49 111. 33. 
 
 But the company would not be bound to procure for that purpose 
 from another company, or person, the right to use a track required 
 for such delivery. 
 
 People vs. C. & A. R. R. Co., 55 111, 95 
 
 And, it seems, where the delivery would occasion great inconven- 
 ience to the company, it would be excused from such delivery, even 
 though having a right to use the necessary tracks. 
 
 C. & N. W. Ry. Co. vs. People, 56 111. 365. 
 
 All of these cases hold that any switch or track extending from a 
 company's main track to any such elevator, whether such track is 
 owned or leased by such company or not, if put there for the accom- 
 modation of the elevator, by some arrangement under which the road 
 can use it is to be regarded as a part of the company's line for the 
 purpose of the delivery of grain. 
 
 The foregoing cases, however, relate solely to the delivery of cars 
 . of grain, which is expressly enjoined by the constitution. 
 
 With regard to coal mines, the constitutional provision quoted 
 above is, simply, that the company "shall permit connection to be 
 made with their tracks," which it will be seen is essentially different 
 in its terms from the provision in regard to grain deliveries. 
 
 In a late case it was held that a railroad company could not dis- 
 connect a switch which had been laid to a coal mine and which had 
 for several years been used for making shipments of coal therefrom. 
 
 C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Suffern, 129 111. 274.
 
 58 
 
 Commenting on the above constitutional provision in its relation 
 to coal mine connections, the court says, in the Suffern case: 
 
 "It was the evident design of the constitutional provision above quoted to 
 compel the railroads to furnish the coal mines in the State with all necessary 
 facilities for the shipment and transportation of coal. As the railroad com- 
 panies must deliver grain to all elevators upon the lines of their road, or con- 
 nected therewith by side tracks, so also must they receive shipments of coal 
 .from all coal mines on the lines of their roads or connected therewith by side 
 tracks." 
 
 The Suffern case was a petition for mandamus, and, as bearing 
 upon the present inquiry, that case enlightens us no further than to 
 show that Taylor has the undoubted right, under the foregoing 
 clause of the constitution, to have his track and mine connected with 
 defendant's road. The constitution commands defendant to "permit 
 connection to be made" with Taylor's coal mine. Tbis it has done. 
 The constitution did not command defendant to build a track, ex- 
 tending 2,800 feet off from its own right of way, to reach this mine; 
 and this it refused to do. 
 
 The connection has been made; and no question arises here, as in 
 the Suffern case, as to any right of the company to sever such con- 
 nection. It is not proposing to sever it. Nor does any question arise 
 here as to the right of defendant to refuse to receive and transport 
 coal from Taylor's mine. It has not so refused. What the company 
 does refuse to do is, to take empty cars from the track to the mine, 
 and loaded cars from the mine to the track, 2,800 feet, unless it is 
 paid for that service extra, over and above the regular freight rate 
 which obtains from the point of connection. 
 
 Undoubtedly, if Taylor would arrange to deliver his coal at the 
 right of way he could avoid this charge, and would then have the 
 right to have his coal transported at the regular rate of freight, and 
 no more. The real question is, has he a right under the above quoted 
 provision of the constitution, to compel defendant to operate his 
 2,800 feet of railway without compensation? It seems to the Com- 
 mission he has not that right. If he may compel defendant to op- 
 erate his 2,800 feet of road gratis, may not some one else compel it 
 to operate a road a mile, two miles, or five miles in length, gratis? 
 Where will the line be drawn? 
 
 Does the declaration of the court in the Suffern case, that this 
 constitutional injunction was intended "to compel the railroads to 
 furnish the coal mines in the State with all necessary facilities for 
 the shipment and transportation of coal" mean that the railroads are 
 compelled to furnish those facilities gratuitously, long distances be- 
 yond their own switches and tracks, wherever the mine owner may 
 build a track and tender it? Does the further declaration of the court 
 in that case, that railroad companies "must receive shipments of 
 coal fr^m all coal mines on the lines of their roads or connected 
 therewith by side tracks" mean that such companies must receive 
 such shipments at some distant point upon a track built by others, 
 or does it mean only that the roads shall receive such shipments at 
 their own respective rights of way on switches or in yards estab- 
 lished for the purpose?
 
 59 
 
 We think such a construction as is contended for, would extend 
 the constitution far beyond the cases meant to be provided for by its 
 framers. 
 
 We can well understand how a company might, by its own acts, or 
 by contract, bind itself to perform such a service gratuitously. We 
 can understand how, in many cases, railroad companies, for the sake 
 of developing the coal fields along their rights of way, thereby en- 
 hancing their own trade and earnings, might enter into arrangements 
 with coal operators, whereby they would be estopped to make switch- 
 ing charges, even in cases where the extra service might be larger 
 than is here demanded of defendant. Doubtless some of the cases 
 related in the testimony offered by complainant, as to the practice 
 upon other roads in this same coal field, are of this character. But 
 the fact, if it exists, that other roads have made such arrangements, 
 furnishes no ground upon which to predicate a rule of law which 
 will bind defendant. It may be, if it were shown that this same 
 company was accustomed to perform a like- service for other mine 
 owners on its line, and competing in this field, without charging for 
 it, that fact would furnish a basis for a prosecution for discrimina- 
 tion. But the other mines, whose shipments have been compared 
 with complainant's for the purpose of making out the discrimination, 
 are located immediately upon defendant's right of way. It performs 
 no switching service for those companies, so far as the evidence dis- 
 closes. 
 
 In the case of complainant, it can not with justice be claimed in 
 the light of the evidence, as was claimed by the petition, that de- 
 fendant either promised complainant, or by its acts induced him to 
 believe that it would operate his track without charge. He was 
 plainly told by letter, as he admits, and in conversation, as President 
 Barnard testifies, that he must pay for this service, and that too be- 
 fore his track was laid, or any considerable work had been done upon 
 his mine. 
 
 While we realize fully the disadvantage under which complainant 
 labors in the present state of competition felt in the coal trade, we 
 are not convinced that the law affords any remedy, and greatly fear 
 that a prosecution for either extortion for discrimination would fail. 
 
 The petition will therefore be dismissed. 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., September 20, 1890.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 COMPLAINT No. 64. 
 
 UNION BREWING COMPANY, OP PEORIA, Complainant. 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, BURLINGTON, & QUINCY R. R. Co., Respondent. 
 
 REFUSAL TO SWITCH CARS. 
 
 Filed Aug. 27, 1890. Hearing at Chicago, Oct. 4, 1890. 
 Decision Rendered Dec. 10, 1890.
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 This is a complaint by the Union Brewing Co., a corporation, of 
 Peoria, 111., against the C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., alleging a refusal to 
 switch cars. 
 
 Switching has been defined by the Commission to be, "the hauling 
 of loaded cars from the station yards, side tracks, elevators or ware- 
 houses to the junctions of other railroads when not billed from sta- 
 tions on its own road to said junctions, and from junctions of other 
 railroads to the stations, side tracks, elevators and warehouses situa- 
 ted on the tracks owned or controlled by the railroad company doing 
 said switching. In other words, switching is that transfer charge or- 
 dinarily made for moving loaded cars for short distances for which 
 no regular way bill is made, and which do not move between two 
 regularly established stations on the same road." 
 
 ' A particular car loaded with "cerealine" and billed to complainant, 
 was transported to Peoria by the C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., and was 
 either by the carrying company, or an intervening company delivered 
 to respondent, and marked for "Carson's track." Carson's track is a 
 team track of respondent, one block from complainant's brewery, on 
 which complainant was accustomed to receive its cars of freight. 
 Respondent after receiving this car in fact switched it to Carson's 
 track, not knowing it was for the complainant; but, upon learning 
 whose car it was, the agent of respondent ordered it taken away ; and 
 it was then placed upon a team track of the P. & P. U. road, in a 
 place considerably further from the brewery, and much less conven- 
 ient for complainant, where it was finally unloaded. 
 
 Respondent declined to switch this car to Carson's track (or rather 
 to leave it there after inadvertently switching it,) and declines gen- 
 erally to switch any cars for complainant, because of a controversy 
 arising between them as to the payment of certain car-service 
 charges, levied through the Car Service Association of Peoria, for 
 the detention of two cars which had been previously switched by re- 
 spondent to Carson's track for complainant; which two cars last 
 mentioned had not been unloaded by complainant within forty-eight 
 hours after arrival, which is the time allowed free of charge by the 
 rules of the Car Service Association.
 
 64 
 
 The Car Service Association is composed of the several roads doing 
 business in Peoria. Its object is to prevent the unreasonable deten- 
 tion of cars by consignees; and under its rules a charge of one dollar 
 per day is made against any consignee for each day he fails to un- 
 load a car, after the expiration of forty-eight hours from the time 
 such car is set by the railroad company in a proper place for un- 
 loading. 
 
 In the case of the two cars upon which the unpaid car-service 
 charges were made, the brewing company claims that the railroad 
 company was at fault in failing to give notice of arrival. It also 
 claims that the charge of one dollar per day. is unreasonable in 
 amount. The respondent, upon the other hand, claims it was not its 
 duty to give complainant notice of the arrival of these cars, that be- 
 ing the duty of the company transporting them to Peoria, a duty 
 which in this case respondent further insists was in fact performed 
 by the C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. Respondent further claims that 
 the two cars named were placed in plain view of the brewery and 
 only a block away, and that complainant in fact knew the cars were 
 there in time to have unloaded them within the forty-eight hours, if 
 its agents had seen fit; and it urges further that these car-service 
 charges of one dollar per day for detaining cars are proper and rea- 
 sonable, and that they are in the true interest of shippers, since they 
 prevent the rolling stock of railroads from being tied up to the great 
 disadvantage of those shippers who, for that reason, often can not get 
 cars. 
 
 We thus state the controversy as to these car-service charges, not 
 for the purpose of deciding it, but rather as a help to arrive at what 
 we deem the real question before us We content ourselves with the 
 single observation that since the statute of this State (Sec. 5, Act 
 "Receiving, Carrying and Delivering Grain,") provides that a con- 
 signee of grain transported in bulk "shall have twenty-four hours, 
 free of expense, after actual notice of arrival, etc., in which to re- 
 move the same from the cars of such railroad corporation," there 
 would seem to be an implied right under the statute to charge for a 
 longer detention than the twenty-four hours which the statute names. 
 Indeed, no reason is perceived in law or justice why an unreasonable 
 and unnecessary detention of cars by consignees should not be paid 
 for; and the Car Service Association seems from the proof before us 
 to be only an agency established to keep account of claims so aris- 
 ing, and enforce them. The charges so made would have to be rea- 
 sonable, under all the circumstances. The statute does not seem to 
 refer the matter of fixing the maximum of such demurrage charges 
 to this Commission; and the question probably did not occur to the 
 law makers. Car demurrage is an important subject, which has 
 arisen, in a practical way, only within late years, and long after our 
 statute for the regulation of railroads was passed. It does not, how- 
 ever, follow that, because there is no statutory regulation of the 
 question, there is no law. The charge, as before observed, must be 
 reasonable; and what is reasonable in a given case must depend upon 
 the facts of that case, and be arrived at, if the parties can not them- 
 selves agree, by a judicial determination, in a court competent to try
 
 65 
 
 the question. Whether or not the seven dollar cer-service or demur- 
 rage charge made for the detention of the two cars in question is 
 reasonable, under all the circumstances, can only be determined 
 authoritatively and judicially, when the parties carry the case into 
 court. Not being a court for any such purpose, this Commission 
 can not determine it. 
 
 We do not even assume to decide that "cerealine" is "grain" 
 within the meaning of the statute above cited. The nature of the 
 article has not been very fully explained. It is a product of corn, the 
 hull and germ being removed, and is used as a part substitute for 
 malt. We have assumed it to be "grain" in the observations above 
 made. 
 
 Respondent does not deny the refusal to switch cars, but expressly 
 avows it; and the important question is, has the railroad company 
 shown a state of facts which will excuse it from switching cars for 
 complainant to Carson's track? In justification of its refusal the 
 railroad company alleges two grounds, which may be stated in the 
 language of its own answer, as follows: 
 
 1. "This company further states, that it does not do or hold itself 
 open to do, a general switching business in the city of Peoria, but 
 states that the service heretofore rendered to the said Union Brew- 
 ing Co., in so switching these cars, was done for tho accommodation 
 of said Union Brewing Co., and are not such services as this com- 
 pany is compelled by law to perform " 
 
 2 "This company further denies that the railroad companies, 
 centering in Peoria, and forming such association, have violated any 
 law of the State of Illinois; and it asserts that the rules and regula- 
 tions of said association are reasonable and lawful, and for the public 
 good, and necessary for the protection of said railroad companies; 
 and it further asserts that the charges herein complained of are just, 
 reasonable and lawful, * * * and that in refusing to switch the 
 cars of the said Union Brewing Co , shipped over foreign lines, until 
 said just and reasonable charges, heretofore exacted, are paid, it has 
 acted in accordance with the law." 
 
 The first ground stated seems to imply, that unless a railroad com- 
 pany holds itself out to do "a general switching business, "it is under 
 no legal obligation to switchj cars. On this we observe that if re- 
 spondent were confining itself strictly to handling only such cars at 
 Peoria as it transports thither upon its own line, and if "Carson's 
 track were a track used by it exclusively for the accommodation of 
 its patrons, who ship cars to Peoria over its own line, the case would 
 stand on a basis entirely different from that presented by the evi- 
 dence. Then the question would be presented whether or not the 
 switching of cars from one point to another within the same city, 
 for which no way bill is made, is a service by law demandable from 
 a railway company which does not ordinarily do a switching busi- 
 ness. 
 
 5 O
 
 66 
 
 If this were in fact the case before us, we should hesitate before 
 holding that a switching service can in no case be legally demanded 
 of a railroad company unless such company does a general switching 
 business. The principle upon which a distinction would be made, 
 between the obligation to haul one mile, and the obligation to haul 
 ten, is very difficult to perceive; and the interests of a patron might 
 become as vitally involved in the one service as in the other. If one 
 wishes a switching service only, and is willing to pay for it, why can 
 he not command the service? 
 
 It is, however, unnecessary here to decide any such question. The 
 evidence amply shows that the respondent is accustomed to switch 
 cars at Peoria in case of shipments not originating on its own line. 
 It has numerous patrons for whom it switches cars, turned over by 
 other roads, and switches them, too, to the particular track known as 
 "Carson's track." Receipted bills of respondent issued from its 
 "Switching Department," showing the switching of seventy-one such 
 cars at one dollar each, switching charge, have been filed by com- 
 plainant in this case. Moreover the company did in fact switch the 
 car in question, supposing it to be the car of another patron, but re- 
 moved it upon learning it was for complainant. The fact that respond- 
 ent does switching in the city of Peoria is really not denied. What 
 is denied is that it does "a general switching business." 
 
 The question, therefore, is not whether a road which does no 
 switching can by law be made to switch cars, but whether a road may 
 switch for some, and refuse to switch for others; whether it may ac- 
 commodate some patrons upon a convenient track and arbitrarily ex- 
 clude others from the same privilege, making them go for their goods 
 to another track less convenient. 
 
 We believe the position of respondent upon this question is wholly 
 untenable. The principle of law is fundamental that railroads must 
 treat all alike. They must accommodate all that apply in the order 
 of their applications, extending favors to none, and excluding none 
 from equal participation in the use of their facilities. They perform 
 a public calling to be exercised impartially for every member of the 
 public they were created to serve. 
 
 These principles have been so often and so universally held by all 
 courts of the common law that we deem a citation of authorities un- 
 necessary. Indeed, nothing could be more dangerous in practice 
 than to allow the railroads which wield such powerful instrumentali- 
 ties, on the use of which the welfare of every citizen more or less de- 
 pends, to choose for themselves whom they will serve. Armed with 
 such a power the railroads of the land could build up or destroy at 
 will both private fortunes or communities. 
 
 We therefore are of opinion that since respondent switches cars at 
 Peoria for some of its patrons U is under a legal obligation to switch 
 impartially for all who apply, and who tender its reasonable charges. 
 We hold, when respondent switched cars for complainant to Carson's 
 track, it performed, not a mere "accommodation," but a legal duty.
 
 67 
 
 The second ground alleged for refusal to perform this switching 
 service remains to be considered; namely, the refusal of complainant 
 to pay the charges for detention of the two former cars. As before 
 remarked we can not decide this controversy. We are of opinion, 
 however, that whether this particular charge be legally collectible or 
 not, its non-payment can not justify a refusal to switch cars for com- 
 plainant. When complainant demands of the Burlington company a 
 service such as it performs in Peoria for others, tendering it its 
 reasonable charges, that company can not excuse itself from exer- 
 cising its legal functions because of an unsettled controverted ac- 
 count, arising out of a wholly different transaction. If complainant 
 owes it for unreasonably detaining cars, the courts are open to it. 
 The account must there be ultimately settled. The railroad company 
 can not, in our view, determine this question for itself, or hold its 
 switching facilities in the city of Peoria as a mere "accommodation" 
 by the optional use of which it can compel payment of a past dis- 
 puted claim. This unsettled claim, it will be observed, is not for a 
 switching service, but for another thing the detention of cars. It 
 could not be known in advance that further car-service charges 
 would accrue upon the cars respondent has been refusing to handle 
 for complainant. 
 
 We are of opinion that respondent is not released from the legal 
 duty of switching, by the failure of complainant to pay demurrage 
 damages. 
 
 The only question now remaining concerns the remedy. The act 
 creating this Commission provides: 
 
 "Said Commissioners shall examine into the condition and management, 
 and all other matters concerning the business of railroads and warehouses in 
 this State, so far as the same pertain to the relation of such roads and ware- 
 houses to the public, and to the accommoeation and security of persons doing 
 business therewith. * * * And whenever it shall come to their knowledge 
 either upon complaint or otherwise, or they shall have reason to believe that 
 any such law or laws have been, or are being violated, they shall prosecute, 
 or cause to be prosecuted, all corporations or persons guilty of such violo- 
 lation." 
 
 In Section 17 of the same act it is provided: 
 
 "It shall be the duty of the Attorney General and the State's attorney in 
 every circuit or county, on the request of said Commissioners, to institute 
 and prosecute any and all suits and proceedings which they, or either of 
 them, shall be directed by said Commissioners to institute and prosecute for 
 a violation of this act, or any law of this State concerning railroad companies 
 or warehouses," etc. 
 
 Section 18 further provides as follows: 
 
 All such prosecutions shall be in the name of the People of the State of 
 Illinois, and all monies arising therefrom shall be paid into the State treasury 
 by the sheriff or other officer collecting the same," etc. 
 
 The act upon "extortion and unjust discrimination" further pro- 
 vides that the Commission shall enforce that act and "cause suits to 
 be commenced and prosecuted against any railroad corporation which 
 may violate the provisions of this act." It further provides in what 
 counties of the State prosecutions may be begun, authorizes the
 
 68 
 
 Commission to employ counsel "to assist the Attorney General," if 
 they think it necessary, and says that no such suit shall be dismissed 
 unless the Commission and the Attorney General both consent 
 thereto. 
 
 From the above provisions it seems evident that the "prosecutions' r 
 which it is incumbent upon this Commission to institute and conduct 
 are prosecutions for those penalties denounced by the statute against 
 railroad companies for violation of the several provisions of the rail- 
 road and warehouse law. It was evidently not intended that the 
 Commission should carry on any man's private suit at public expense. 
 A writ of mandamus to compel the switching of cars for complainant, 
 while running in the name of the people, would, in fact, be the pri- 
 vate suit of complainant. It would not be a "prosecution" in the 
 sense that term is used in the statute. The statute fixes no tine or 
 penalty for refusal to switch cars. The party damaged by such re- 
 fusal could no doubt recover his damages; but this, too, would be his 
 private action and not a public prosecution. The courts are open to 
 complainant to prosecute its suit for itself. The intention to confine 
 this Commission to those prosecutions in the name of the people for 
 penalties or the prosecution of such suits as affect the public gener- 
 ally, or large communities of people, is also pointed to by the fact 
 that the act concerning unjust discrimination expressly provides for 
 private suit by the person discriminated against wherein he may re- 
 cover treble damages and his attorney's fees. 
 
 Inasmuch as the parties had placed this case before us at some 
 length, we have not hesitated, under the injunction of the statute 
 that we shall "examine into the condition and management, and all 
 other matters concerning the business of railroads and warehouses 
 in this State," etc., to thus express our views of the law for the guid- 
 ance of those who may be affected by them, or may have confidence 
 to follow them; and we hope the matter may be now ad justed bet ween 
 the parties without resort to judicial determination of the question, 
 which, not being a court in the proper sense, we are not authorized 
 to make. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, Illinois, Dec, 10, 1890.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STHTE OF ILLINOIS, 
 
 COMPLAINT No, 71, 
 
 LYON & SCOTT, Complainants. 
 
 vs. 
 
 PBORIA & PEKIN UNION RY. Co. AND THE ILLINOIS CAB SERVICE 
 ASSOCIATION OF PEORIA, Respondents. 
 
 REFUSAL TO SWITCH CABS. 
 
 Filed November 25, 1890. Decision Rendered Dec. 10, 1890.
 
 71 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 This complaint raises practically the same questions which are dis- 
 cussed in the opinion of the Commission in thecomplaint of the Union 
 Brewing Co., v. The C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. and we need do little more 
 than refer the parties to the ruling in that case. No evidence has 
 been heard, but the conceded facts show that an unpaid car-service 
 charge, concerning the justice of which there is a controversy, has 
 been the principle cause of the refusal to switch cars. One matter is 
 rather indirectly stated in the answer of the P. & P. U. Ry. Co., 
 which might, if proved, take the case out of the principle. It is said 
 the team track opposite blocks 6 and 7 where Lyon & Scott demand 
 to have their coal cars placed is a "merchandise track," and that Lyon 
 & Scott insist upon having their coal cars placed upon this merchan- 
 dise track for unloading. It is not precisely averred that this track 
 is held by the company exclusively for merchandise. We can under- 
 stand how, under some circumstances, it might be highly proper for 
 a company to establish one track for coal and another for merchan- 
 dise, and if the coal track were suitable and proper for that commod- 
 ity a coal merchant could not demand to have his coal cars put upon 
 a track properly set apart for a different business. But the principle 
 stated in the Union Brewing Co.'s case, that the railroad company 
 must treat all alike would here apply with its entire force. Special 
 favors could not be arbitrarily extended. If a suitable and proper 
 track for coal cars is offered complainants where other coal merchants 
 are accommodated, and the company is ready and willing to switch 
 the cars there, then the refusal to pay the car-service charges would 
 make no figure in the case. Respondent has in that case simply done 
 its duty and is not in default. 
 
 The P. & P. U. states in its answer, that the delay in transporting 
 the cars of coal which Lyon & Scott sets up as a reason for refusing 
 to pay the car- service charges, (alleging that two or three clays busi- 
 ness was by the fault of the carrier thrown upon them at once), was 
 not the fault of the P. & P. U. Company which only switched the 
 cars, but was, if anybody's, the fault of the carrying company. If 
 this can be established, then it will show Lyon & Scott must look 
 for their damages for delaying their cars to the company at fault, and 
 that they can not set it off against a car-service charge of the P. & P. 
 U. Company otherwise just and proper. But all this is matter for
 
 72 
 
 proof in a court of justice. As observed in the Union Brewing Co.'s 
 case, we can not settle a controversy of this kind. The parties must 
 have their rights adjudicated, if they can not agree between them- 
 selves. 
 
 Here, as in the case of the Union Brewing Company, the remedy, 
 if one exists, must be sought by complainants in their own private 
 suit in mandamus, or by a proceeding in chancery for a mandatory 
 injunction. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, Dec. 10, 1890.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STHTE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 COMPLAINT No. 42. 
 
 J. H. LINNEMAN & Co., Complainants. 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL R. R. Co., Respondent. 
 
 UNJUST DISCRIMINATION. 
 
 Filed Oct. 8, 1889. Hearing at Chicago, and Dismissed at request of Complain- 
 ants, Jan. 3, 1890. Reinstated at Bequest oj Complainants, 
 Oct. 4, 1890. Hearing at Chicago, Oct. 24, 
 1890. Decision Rendered Dec- 
 ember 11, 1890.
 
 75 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 J. H. Linneman & Co., a firm doing business at Flanagan, Liv- 
 ingston County, 111., complain that the Illinois Central R. R. Co., 
 has discriminated against them in freight charges from Chicago, in 
 in that said railroad company has, it is claimed, charged complain- 
 ants more for the same class and quantity of freight from Chicago 
 to Flanagan, than was at the same time charged for the like freight 
 from Chicago to Minonk, Minonk being the greater distance by 
 about 13 miles, and the Minonk shipments passing through Flana- 
 gan on the same line of road. 
 
 Minonk is a competing point.being reached from Chicago by a line of 
 the Santa Fe" road, and by two lines of the Illinois Central. One Illinois 
 Central line reaches Chicago from Minonk by way of Mendota, run- 
 ning in connection with the C. B. & Q.; while the other goes by way 
 of Kankakee and is owned continuously to Chicago by the Illinois 
 Central company. The Kankakee line is the one on which the town 
 of Flanagan is situated, between Chicago and Minonk. 
 
 The Santa F6 line which passes through Minonk, reaches in its 
 farther southward progress Pekin and Peoria, where there is water 
 competition, and it is insisted by respondent that such water compe- 
 tition has resulted in compelling the Santa Fe" company to fix a rate 
 at Minonk which is unreasonably low, the Santa F6 being unable, 
 under the law, to make a higher rate at Minonk than its through 
 rate. Respondent, however, shows that while its rate to Flanagan 
 from Chicago is in fact slightly higher than to Minonk, it has not 
 been the intention to ship any of the Minonk goods by the Kankakee 
 line and through Flanagan; that if any such shipments were so sent, 
 it was done inadvertently and against orders; and respondent wholly 
 disclaims any purpose to violate the law by hauling, for less freight, 
 a longer distance, in the same direction, over the same line. 
 
 While the proof is not specific or clear, we think it probable, that 
 some of these shipments to Minonk were hauled through Flanagan; 
 and this, if proved, would be a violation of the Illinois statute pro- 
 hibiting unjust discrimination. Competition at a point is by our 
 statute expressly excluded from the class of facts which our courts 
 have said might be alleged to show a discrimination to be not "un- 
 just." If there is competition at the end of the line, our statute gives 
 all intermediate stations the benefit of it. In this ous statute directly 
 differs from the Inter-State Commerce act, which empowers the Na-
 
 76 
 
 tional Commission to allow a less charge for a greater distance where 
 there is competition, if they deem it just and proper. This Commis- 
 sion is without any such power. To haul a like quantity of freight 
 to Minonk from Chicago for a less rate than to Flanagan, a less dis- 
 tance, over the same line of road in the same direction, is a violation 
 of our statute. 
 
 We do not, however, think the public good requires that re- 
 spondent be prosecuted for the penalty denounced by the statute. As 
 we before said, the proof already produced is not clear, and better 
 and more conclusive proof would need to be found before instituting 
 suit. The statute being penal would be strictly construed. The exact 
 case stated in the statute would have to be proved in order to re- 
 cover the penalty. We are not satisfied from the proof produced that 
 a prosecution would succeed under the construction given this act 
 by our courts. 
 
 C. B. & Q. vs. People, 11 111. 443. 
 
 Karikdkee Coal Co. vs. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 17 App, 
 6U. 
 
 But even if specific proof were forthcoming, in view of the show- 
 ing made that respondent's general freight agent had given orders to 
 ship to Minonk only by the Mendota line, and in view of the further 
 fact that respondent gives the Commission positive assurance that 
 care will be taken to observe the statute in future, it is decided to in- 
 stitute no suit for the penalty, unless there shall be future viola- 
 tions. 
 
 Complainants have filed with us a bill of many items for over- 
 charges of freights by respondent, presumably with a view to our 
 assisting in the collection of this private bill. This we can not do. 
 Our function is to prosecute for fines and penalties where we believe 
 the public welfare demands it. The courts are open to complainants 
 for the collection of such overcharges as they can prove. The stat- 
 ute concerning "Extortion and Unjust Discrimination" expressly 
 provides (Sec. 6), that any private individual who may be damaged, 
 through a violation of the statute, as to discrimination, may recover, 
 in a civil suit, three times the amount of all his damages, together 
 with his reasonable counsel fees to be taxed as costs. The remedy 
 of complainants is thus made very ample for their private injury, if 
 they are able to show one; and this Commission is not the proper 
 forum for that part of this complaint which embraces this private 
 claim for damages. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, Dec. 11, 1899.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 ST. Louis & EASTERN RAILWAY Co., 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 TOLEDO, ST. Louis & KANSAS CITY RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 PETITION FOB LEAVE TO CROSS.
 
 79 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, COMMMISSIONER. 
 
 This is an application of the St. Louis & Eastern Railway Company 
 for leave to cross with its proposed track the track of the Toledo, St. 
 Louis & Kansas City Railroad Company at a point about three- 
 quarters of a mile east of the station called Peters, in Madison County, 
 Illinois. Respondent resists, alleging that a crossing at the point 
 proposed by petitioner will "unnecessarily impede and endanger the 
 travel and transportation" upon respondent's road. 
 
 Respondent, however, offers to allow a crossing at the point pro- 
 posed, provided petitioner will at its own expense set up and main- 
 tain interlocking at such crossing; or it offers to permit petitioner to 
 cross without interlocking at a point a little over a half mile further 
 west than the place proposed. Petitioner declines both these offers 
 and insists upon the crossing proposed without interlocking. 
 
 Respondent alleges in its answer "that the proposed crossing is at 
 the foot of a working grade of from thirty-five to forty feet to the mile; 
 that result of such crossing will be to compel all trains upon the 
 Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City Railroad to stop at the foot of such 
 grade, and thereby lose the momentum necessary to carry trains 
 of ordinary size over such grade;" that a crossing at this point will 
 necessitate diminishing thejtrain load on respondent's road by several 
 cars, thus increasing the expense of operation, as wellasdelayingand 
 interfering with traffic; and that its management has already decided 
 upon a change of grade at the proposed point of crossing, rendered 
 necessary in the economical operation of its road, which road, it is 
 alleged, is in the course of being reconstructed, this grade being 
 among the last to be changed. 
 
 The evidence on which we are asked by petitioner to order this 
 crossing is meagre and unsatisfactory. Two witnesses testified for 
 complainant, stating in terms (without objection) that a crossing at 
 the point proposed "would not unnecessarily impede or endanger the 
 travel and transportation upon respondent's road," and this general 
 conclusion was, in a manner, supported by further expert theoretical 
 testimony given by the same witnesses. 
 
 The testimony does not inform us as to the actual state of traffic 
 on respondent's road, how many and what kind and weight of trains 
 it runs, or any other of the many specific facts which might readily
 
 80 
 
 have been made the subject of observation and have been put before 
 the Commission. Neither did any witness who had had actual ex- 
 perience in handling engines, or in hauling trains over grades of this 
 kind, testify before us. We confess to some prejudice in favor of 
 the notion that the best way to prove how the running of freight 
 trains is affected by the grade at the point of proposed crossing, and 
 what freight locomotives can haul there, and what speed and "mo- 
 mentum" must be acquired at that point to insure the ascent of the 
 grade eastward, would be to show what is actually done by the freight 
 trains that daily pass this point and ascend this grade. No evidence 
 on this line was offered. 
 
 The expert testimony offered by complainant was controverted by 
 the chief engineer of respondent, whose testimony substantially and 
 very plausibly supports the objections to this crossing stated in the 
 answer of respondent. 
 
 The petitioner held the burden of proof and ought to have made 
 clear, by a preponderance of the evidence, the fact that this crossing 
 will not unnecessarily impede and endanger respondent's traffic. 
 This could not be done by witnesses swearing to that conclusion in 
 terms as they did. The general conclusion as to the propriety of the 
 crossing is for the Commission, not for witnesses. Actual facts 
 should have been placed before us on which we could judge. 
 
 The railroad first upon the ground gains important rights by the 
 fact of its presence. The use of its line ought not to be lightly in- 
 terfered with. It was undoubtedly in part the object of the Act of 
 1889, while insuring safety to persons and property transported, to 
 protect established companies in the enjoyment of their rights. One 
 way of arriving at the propriety of a proposed crossing would be to 
 consider whether the line to be crossed would have been built as it is 
 as respects grades, curves, etc., had those building it known a cros- 
 sing was to be made in the place proposed. Such a test might not 
 be decisive, but is worthy of consideration in every case. 
 
 The Act of 1889 took away the arbitrary power of new roads to lo- 
 cate crossings at will; and its effect is to put upon them the burden 
 of showing that the crossing will not "unnecessarily" impede and 
 endanger the travel and transportation upon the road crossed. They 
 should point the Commission a clear way to order the crossing de- 
 sired with proper regard to existing rights and uses. This we can 
 not say has been done in the case before us. Giving due force to the 
 testimony, the question remains in serious doubt. 
 
 In this case it appears from an unchallenged estimate that the in- 
 creased expense of placing the crossing at the point a half mile 
 further west, as contended for by respondent, would be only $8,594; 
 unless petitioner should be obliged to purchase nine acres of ground 
 between its right of way and the creek on the south, in which case 
 the cost would be increased to $10,844, estimating this land at $250 
 per acre, which is, it seems to the Commission, a very liberal if not 
 extravagant allowance. Thus, we see, the change contended for by 
 respondent does not involve a large outlay by petitioner; and we are
 
 81 
 
 unwilling to permanently obstruct or cripple an established line, or 
 to take a serious chance of doing so, where the expenditure of a few 
 thousand dollars will remove all objections. 
 
 The petitioning company acquired no equities in the proposed 
 crossing by prematurely grading its road to the point. The corres- 
 pondence submitted shows the officers of respondent never, expressly 
 or by any fair implication, consented to the crossing unless petitioner 
 would interlock it in the manner stated in the form of contract sub- 
 mitted by them. This is not a case like that of the Chicago, Madi- 
 son & Northern, where the right of way was acquired and eighty per 
 cent of the work done before this crossing law was passed. If pe- 
 titioner, with the law before it, and without either an order of the 
 Commission or the consent of respondent, chose to grade its road for 
 a crossing, it did so on its own responsibility, and at its own peril. 
 
 Under the evidence as it stands before us, we are unable to find 
 that a crossing in the place proposed will not, in the language of the 
 Act, "unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel or transportation 
 upon the railway crossed." 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is therefore decided and ordered, that the petitioner, the St. 
 Louis & Eastern Railway Company, have leave, and it is hereby em- 
 powered, to cross with its track the main line and track of the Toledo, 
 St. Louis and Kansas City Railroad Company at grade at a point in 
 the N. E. quarter of the N. W. quarter of Section 4, Town 3 North, 
 Range 8 West, of the 3rd P. M., 2,940 feet west of the point named 
 for said crossing in the petition filed in this case. 
 
 The point of crossing hereby established is marked by the letter 
 "B" upon the plat submitted by petitioner and now with the files in 
 this cause, to which plat reference is hereby made for greater cer- 
 tainty. 
 
 It is ordered that petitioner pay all costs and expenses of the Com- 
 mission incurred under its petition. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, January 7, 1891.
 
 LIVE STOCK TARIFF 
 
 THE FOLLOWING CORRESPONDENCE WILL BE FOUND TO ILLUSTRATE 
 CERTAIN POINTS ARISING UNDER THE 
 
 NEW SCHEDULE 
 
 LIVE STOCK RATES 
 
 ADOPTED BY THE 
 
 IN FORCE JANUARY 1, 1891. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL.: 
 PHILLIPS BROS., STATE PRINTERS. 
 
 1900.
 
 85 
 
 LETTER OF PRES. J. F. BARNARD. 
 
 OHIO & MISSISSIPPI RAILWAY Co., j 
 
 PRESIDENT'S OFFICE, 
 CINCINNATI, December 29, 1890. ) 
 
 Hon. James H. Paddock, Secretary Illinois Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commissioners, Springfield, Illinois. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant duly received, with 
 enclosures, and there being some points about it which I thought I 
 ought to consult counsel about, I so consulted them, and by their ad- 
 vice I write you this letter. 
 
 Our counsel say that a compliance with your order "would be a 
 direct and positive discrimination and violation of the Illinois stat- 
 utes, particularly paragraph 147, chapter 114, Starr & Curtiss. We 
 can see no reason for discrimination between the two classes of cattle 
 which the Commission makes." 
 
 This refers to a point I would make as to whether there is any- 
 thing in the law making it obligatory on the company, or empower- 
 ing the Commission to fix a different rate on cattle which might be 
 denominated "stock cattle and feeders" than that on cattle generally. 
 We are impressed with the idea that the leading feature of the duties 
 of the Commission is to fix maximum rates, and that the schedules by 
 them so prepared are prima facie evidence; and there is no provision 
 in the statutes exempting the railroad company for discrimination, 
 even though it should comply with the order of the Commissioners 
 in making such discrimination. 
 
 I would be glad if you will cite to me the law giving the Commis- 
 sion authority to prescribe the number of persons that shall be car- 
 ried free with a specific number of car loads of cattle, and returned 
 free on any regular train of the company. 
 
 I would also like to know what authority there is for a discrimina- 
 tion against the shipper of one car load of live stock or his agent, 
 inasmuch as your schedule says: "The shipper of one car of live 
 stock, or his agent, shall be carried free with such animals to take 
 care of the same, and shall be entitled to a return ticket, good on any 
 regular train of the company, for not to exceed one-half fare." This 
 implies that the company, in your judgment, might charge him one- 
 half fare or less. Would not this be a case of clear discrimination 
 against the small shipper, when, in the next paragraph, you say that
 
 86 
 
 the shipper of two or three cars of live stock shall be carried free 
 and returned free? Has the Commission authority thus to discrimin- 
 ate against the small shipper? 
 
 Again, I would ask the question: Whence does the Commission 
 derive its authority to fix minimum weights of loads for different 
 sizes of cars and for different classes of live stock? 
 
 I believe it is the practice with many western roads, in dealing 
 with this matter, to give passes about as the Commission have sug- 
 gested that is to say, the shipper of two or three cars of live stock 
 shall be carried free ; four two seven cars, two persons free ; eight 
 cars or more, three persons free. This has grown to be a practice 
 among western roads, but is not uniform. On the Ohio & Mississippi 
 road, on the inter-state business going to Cincinnati, passes are issued 
 to the shippers to accompanv stock going to market on about that 
 basis. ALL PAY THEIR FARE HOME, whether shippers of one 
 car or several. Of course you will say that with inter-state business 
 the Commission does not claim to deal. The same rule applied hith- 
 erto on this road on any stock shipped into East St. Louis from Illinois 
 points. I only desire to know how far the Commission is acting un- 
 der the law, and how far, if at all, its action is of an advisory nature. 
 It has always been understod that cattle shipments were accompanied 
 by certain (one or more) persons to look after them in transit; get 
 them up if they got down ; see that they are properly watered and 
 cared for, etc. Cattle have always been understood to be carried at 
 less rates than otherwise because of the persons accompanying them 
 to look after them. I was not aware that there was any law requir- 
 ing that railroad companies should carry persons with live stock nor 
 providing how they shall be returned, free or otherwise. But I do 
 know that competition for a long term of years has resulted in return 
 passes being given for live stock shippers or their agents, but I know 
 of no law to that effect. 
 
 Have I made the points clear? First, about discrimination between 
 stock as feeders and other classes of cattle; then, about minimum 
 weights; and, finally, about the discrimination which you suggest 
 between the small shipper and the larger shipper, in the matter of 
 return fares. 
 
 Upon receipt of your reply, I will be glad to submit the same to 
 our counsel and see if matters, which are not a doubt in their minds, 
 shall be so set out as that we shall be better informed. 
 
 Presumably, if we should fail to comply with your orders, suits 
 may come, and that notwithstanding your order allows what we think 
 an unjust discrimination. Of course courts might not exhibit any 
 great zeal in holding a corporation liable for the compliance with 
 your order, but that remains to be seen. 
 
 Yours respectfully, 
 
 J. F. BARNARD, 
 
 President.
 
 87 
 
 REPLY TO COMMUNICATION OF J. F. BARNARD, MADE 
 
 ON BEHALF OF THE COMMISSION, BY ISAAC 
 
 N. PHILLIPS, COMMISSIONER. 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) 
 
 OFFICE OF RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, > 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., January 21, 1891. ) 
 
 J. F. Barnard, Esq., President O. & M. Railway Company, Cin- 
 cinnati, Ohio. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Replying for the Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion, to your letter of December 29, 1890, addressed to Secretary 
 Paddock, I have to say, the advice of your counsel to the effect that 
 the fixing of a different rate of freight on "stock cattle and feeders" 
 from that on other cattle, is a "direct and positive discrimination and 
 violation of the Illinois statutes, particularly paragraph 147, etc.", is, 
 in my judgment, not sound. 
 
 The point thus made, as I understand it, in effect raises the ques- 
 tion whether or not the Commission can legally divide, for freight 
 purposes, animals known as "cattle" into two classes. In a broader 
 sense it may be considered as raising the question of the Commis- 
 sion's power under the law to classify articles of freight at all, for if 
 this attempted classification of cattle is illegal, it is quite evident the 
 effort to classify numerous other articles is likewise illegal. 
 
 If the Commission is not empowered in making its schedule of 
 maximum rates to make a classification of freight, then I am unable to 
 see how it could make a schedule at all. The Commission is not, in 
 my judgment, bound to classify all kinds of cattle in one classs, any 
 more than they would be bound to classify all articles of iron or of 
 wood in one class. 
 
 Each description of the offense of discrimination contained in sec- 
 tion 147, to which you refer, provides expressly that the freight 
 hauled shall be "of the same class." The charging of 'one shipper 
 more than another for "a like quantity" of freight does not, under 
 that section, constitute per se, a discrimination, provided the freight 
 is of a different and higher class in the one case than in the other. 
 
 To what do these words "of the same class" refer? Evidently they 
 refer to those classes of freight which it was expected the Railroad 
 Commission would fix in the schedule it was ordered to make. The 
 statute, it is true, did not say in so many words that the Railroad 
 Commission should divide freight into classes; and on the strict con- 
 struction principles of your counsel, I suppose it would be said the 
 Commission has, therefore, no power to classify freight. It is, how- 
 ever, the view of the Commission that the word "schedule" was used 
 in the statute in the sense it had acquired in railroad practice; and, 
 obviously, to make a schedule of rates implies the classification of 
 the freights. 
 
 When I speak of our having classified feeders and other cattle sepa- 
 rately, I do not of course mean we have made a classification in form
 
 88 
 
 like that used for other articles, numbering or lettering the classes. 
 That was unnecessary in law, or for purposes of convenience and 
 perspicuity as in the case of other articles. The effect of the schedule 
 is to divide cattle into two classes one, "stock cattle and feeders," 
 and the other all other cattle; and this is just as effective as though 
 we had numbered or lettered the classes. The simplicity of the sub- 
 ject did not require the latter to be done. 
 
 It is difficult to see upon what principle your counsel could come 
 to the conclusion that all animals known as cattle necessarily fall "in 
 the same class." In making tariffs railroad managers do not assume 
 that nature has classified articles in a manner binding upon them. 
 There may be different classes of cattle. We could surely make a 
 separate class of young cattle, called calves, and yet calves would 
 fall under the generic term of "cattle." 
 
 Classifications of freights are efforts to apportion charges justly, 
 according to risk, bulk, value and other elements; but every classifi- 
 cation is, after all, but a matter of judgment, and in a sense arbi- 
 trary. It is safe to say no court will ever inflict the statutory penalty 
 upon any company because in its charges it submits to a classification 
 of freight established by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 
 even though the court might be of opinion such classification was ar- 
 bitrary and not based upon sound reason It is only when a company 
 makes discrimination between shipments of the same class that it in- 
 curs the penalty. For that purpose "stock cattle and feeders" are one 
 class and other cattle another and different class. 
 
 So much for the alleged violation of law which your counsel think 
 would be involved in the shipments of feeders for a less rate of 
 freight than fat cattle. 
 
 Coming now to the reasons which actuated the Commission in 
 making a separate class and rate for feeders, I have only to say that 
 the Commission in this matter simply followed the practice of the 
 railroad companies themselves. Your company may not have joined 
 in that practice, but all the companies entering the city of Chicago 
 have long been carrying stock cattle at three-fourths of the rate 
 charged for cattle transported to market. This practice was adopted 
 without suggestion from the Railroad Commission, and no Railroad 
 Commission ever thought of prosecuting any company for this as a 
 discrimination under section 147. 
 
 The reason for the practice probably was, that in most cases, stock 
 cattle transported out from the stock yards are fed and again re- 
 turned, and the company that transports them out, in almost every 
 case, has a second haul of the cattle, transporting them again to 
 market. I do not pretend to know positively that such was the reason, 
 but do know the custom had long prevailed when the new schedule 
 was adopted. The fact that stock cars usually return empty, proba- 
 bly had something to do with it. 
 
 The Commission had reason to believe that when a new tariff of 
 live stock rates was adopted, the roads would come plump up to the 
 tariff in all particulars, and would give shippers what the tariff gave
 
 89 
 
 them, and no more. In view of this fact, you can see that the Com- 
 mission could not well take the chance of raising rates to the extent 
 of one-third on shipments of stock cattle above what the roads have 
 voluntarily made them. 
 
 It should be remembered the Commission had to make a tariff, not 
 for a single road or a single section of the State, but for all roads 
 and covering the entire State. Upon such a basis, and in view of all 
 the interests involved, our live stock schedule wae made. 
 
 I may add that the Commission believe their tariff and classifica- 
 tion, as made, is not unreasonable, considered on its merits, and in- 
 dependently of the practice which I have stated originally gave rise 
 to it. 
 
 You further say in your letter, "I would be glad if you will cite 
 me to the law giving the Commission authority to prescribe the 
 number of persons that shall be carried free with a specific number 
 of car loads of cattle, and returned free on any regular train of the 
 company." 
 
 If, by this, you inquire for some expressed statutory words which 
 give the Commission that power, then I answer there is no such ex- 
 press provision. But it does not follow, because authority is not 
 given in terms, that the power does not exist. 
 
 The live stock tariff, in effect, provides that live stock shall be 
 carried in car loads at so much per hundred pounds, and that the 
 freights paid shall include the right of the owner, or his agent, to 
 go with such stock without paying a separate fare for himself; and 
 in the case of a single car shipment, the freight so paid shall in- 
 clude half the return fare; and in case of a larger shipment, shall in- 
 clude a free return. The Commission believe such a provision is 
 within the authority of the statute, being included in the power to 
 fix maximum rates of freight and maximum passenger fares. 
 
 You may believe the rates so fixed are unreasonably low, and it is 
 a right any railway company has, under the statute, to litigate that 
 question at its own peril, if its managers see fit. 
 
 I see nothing whatever in the point you make to the effect that the 
 shipper of a single car is discriminated against, under the statute, 
 because he is not also returned free, as in the case of a shipper of 
 more cars. 
 
 If it were provided that the shipper of one car might return 
 free, then your point as to this discrimination, as you now state it, 
 would be obviated; but you might still say unless provision were 
 made to return the shipper of one or two animals (less than a car 
 load) free, such smaller shipper might still complain of discrimina- 
 tion. Of course, the quantity of live stock shipped might be so small 
 that the fare of an attendant would amount to much more than the 
 freight on the stock, and it would obviously be unreasonable and un- 
 just to compel the free carriage of a man where the whole freight in- 
 volved is so small. The freight, in this case, would have to be raised 
 to a point that would make it reasonable for the whole service per- 
 formed, or the schedule would not be defensible.
 
 90 
 
 To illustrate: It would be less reasonable to say the payment of 
 $5.00 for the transportation of a single animal, say 150 miles, should 
 entitle a man to go and return free, than it would be to say the pay- 
 ment of $75.00 for the carriage of three car loads of animals the 
 same distance, should entitle a man to like free carriage. 
 
 Besides, you will observe, upon again reading the schedule, that it 
 does not compel you to charge the half fare in the case of a single 
 car. You are at full liberty to pass the owner of such stock back 
 free, if you see fit, and thus avoid the discrimination of which you 
 seem to fear the consequences. 
 
 In this matter, as in the case of the decreased rate on stock cattle, 
 the Commission but followed the practice of the roads themselves, 
 the only change being in the matter of returning the shipper of one 
 car at half fare. It was to correct the discrimination made in practice 
 against the shipper of a single car, that it was provided he should 
 have a half fare return rate; but in this the Commission thought it 
 reasonable to take into consideration the quantity shipped, and the 
 amount of revenue involved in the transaction. So they gave the 
 shipper of a single car but a half fare home, as against the free ride 
 of the larger shipper. 
 
 I speak of it as a "free ride," but it is not such in fact. The fare 
 is really paid when the freight on the stock is paid. 
 
 Most roads, I think, not only allow the shipper, or his agent, to go- 
 free with the stock, but require it, not wishing to take the increased 
 risk of injury to the stock which would devolve upon the company 
 did its own agents assume the care of the stock in transit, instead of 
 the owner or his agent. It does not seem unreasonable that they 
 should return the shipper free, or at reduced fare, depending upon 
 the amount of his shipment and the corresponding revenue derived. 
 
 Again you say, "Whence does the Commission derive its authority 
 to fix minimum weights of loads for different sizes of cars, and for 
 different classes of live stock?" 
 
 This question would seem to almost answer itself. Obviously, it 
 would be unjust to fix the same minimum weights for sheep, for in- 
 stance, that is fixed for cattle or horses, because the rate is higher, 
 and with the same minimum, a much larger revenue would be ob- 
 tained for a smaller service. A car of sheep is lighter and less valu- 
 able than one of cattle or horses, and, equitably, should bring less- 
 revenue instead of more. 
 
 No railroad manager, making a tariff, would think of doing so ab- 
 surd a thing as to fix the same minimum for every kind of live stock. 
 None has done such a thing so far as the Commission is advised. 
 
 It would be likewise unjust to fix the same minimum for cars of 
 varying lengths, ranging from twenty-eight to thirty-six feet. In the 
 days of car-lot rates the companies insisted upon the justice of mak- 
 ing a distinction in the freight charge between short and long cars. 
 The Commissioners' present livestock tariff proceeds upon the theory 
 that it is just to give the company more for a large car than for a 
 small one. Do you regard this as unreasonable?
 
 91 
 
 It is true, the statute, which is the Commissioners' charter of au- 
 thority, says nothing in terms about minimum weights for car loads. 
 I suppose your counsel would say, since the statute does not name 
 minimum weights, that the Commission has no power over the sub- 
 ject; bat, obviously, if the Commission is to fix the rate, and the 
 companies are to fix their own minimum, then it will be easy to evade 
 any tariff the Commissioners might make. All that would be neces- 
 sary would be, when the Commission lowers the rate, for the com- 
 panies to raise the minimum. The minimum could be put high 
 enough upon a car of live stock so that one cent per hundred would 
 bring more freight than the present rates for any given distance. 
 
 When the Commission was authorized to make a schedule of rates, 
 it is fair to presume it was intended it should make a complete sched- 
 ule one that would prove in practice effective, reasonable for the 
 roads and reasonable also for shippers, and not one that would prove 
 a felo de se and fall by its own fatal omissions and inconsistencies. 
 
 It only remains to be said in reply to your request to know how 
 far the Commissioners deem themselves to have acted within the law, 
 and how far their schedule is simply "advisory," that the schedule is 
 in no particular meant to be simply advisory; that in the opinion of 
 the Commissioners it is within their power to make the schedule in 
 form and manner as made; and it may be added the Commissioners 
 do not shrink from any test of its legality which any company of the 
 State may see fit to make. They, however, hope that a resort to the 
 legal penalties may not in any case be found necessary. 
 
 The live stock schedule was not made hastily, but after a very full 
 consideration of the facts, and of the situation presented by the live 
 stock business of the State; and in its preparation due regard was. 
 had to the present practice of the roads themselves. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 
 For the Commission.
 
 IsTO. 13 
 
 CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES 
 
 ARISING FROM 
 
 ERRONEOUS INSPECTION 
 
 ORAIX. 
 
 OPINION BY HON. GEORGE HUNT, 
 Attorney General. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD. ILL.: 
 PHILLIPS BROS., STATE PRINTERS. 
 
 1900.
 
 95 
 
 OPINION OF HON. GEORGE HUNT, ATTORNEY GENER- 
 AL OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL, March 31, 1891. 
 
 HON. ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, Chairman Board Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commissioners. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Sometime since, your Board submitted to me the 
 papers relating to the claim of Franklin, Edison & Co., of New York, 
 for $1,156.70, which they ask the Grain Inspection Department of 
 Chicago to pay. Accompanying the papers was an elaborate argu- 
 ment in favor of the claim by Hon. Francis A. Riddle, attorney for 
 the claimants. 
 
 The basis of said claim is the alleged false or erroneous inspection, 
 by the employe's of the Grain Inspection Department of Chicago, of 
 40,060 bushels of wheat, bought in Chicago, and which was subse- 
 quently delivered to Edson & Co. at Brooklyn, New York, and on 
 account of such false or erroneous inspection, the purchasers were 
 damaged in said sum of $1,156.70. The sufficiency of the proof to 
 establish the fact of the injury, its cause, or the amount thereof, is 
 neither admitted nor denied, and my opinion is asked only as to the 
 liability of the department, as such, for such injury. 
 
 In answer to your communication, permit me to say: 
 
 The liability of the department for such a claim, and the authority 
 of the officers to pay out money in their custody in satisfaction there- 
 of, must be found in the statute, either by express provision or such 
 clear implication as to leave no doubt as to the intention of the Leg- 
 islature relating thereto; and unless so found, neither such liability 
 or authority can be held to exist. The provisions of law relating to 
 this subject are all found in section 14 of "An act to regulate public 
 warehouses and warehousing and inspection of grain, and to give 
 effect to Article XIII of the Constitution of this State," in force 
 July 1, 1871. Hurd's Rev. Stat. Chap. 114, pps. 1029, 1030, 1031. 
 
 The first paragraph of said section provides for the appointment 
 of a Chief Inspector of Grain; the second fixes the duties, and the 
 fourth relates to his oath and bond, and the liabilities thereon by 
 reason of failure to properly discharge the duties of his office. The 
 third paragraph is as follows: 
 
 "The said Chief Inspector shall be authorized to nominate to the Commis- 
 sioners of Railroads and Warehouses, such suitable persons, in sufficient 
 number, as may be deemed qualified for assistant inspectors, * * and also
 
 96 
 
 such other employes as may be necessary to properly conduct the business of 
 his office; and the said Commissioners are authorized to make such appoint- 
 ments." 
 
 The liability of the assistant inspector is fixed in the fifth para- 
 graph, which is as follows: 
 
 "And each assistant inspector shall take a like oath; execute a bond in the 
 penal sum of $5,000, with like conditions, and to be approved in like manner 
 as is provided in the case of the Chief Inspector, which said several bonds 
 shall be filed in the office of said Commissioners; and suit may be brought 
 upon said bond or bonds in any court having jurisdiction thereof, in the 
 county where the plaintiff or defendant resides, for the use of the person or 
 persons injured," 
 
 I find no provision of the law fixing the liabilities of the depart- 
 ment, as such, for the erroneous inspection of grain; but the fifth 
 paragraph above quoted, taken in connection with the fourth, clearly 
 provides that the assistant inspector shall be liable to any person in- 
 jured, for all damages occasioned by his neglect or failure to dis- 
 charge his duties, and that suit may be brougnt on his bond for the 
 recovery of such damages. The law requires that he shall be quali- 
 fied for the duties which he assumes, and his bond is given for the 
 purpose of holding him to the faithful performance of those duties, 
 and to idemnify those who may be injured by his neglect so to do. I 
 note what the claimants and their learned counsel say as to the right 
 to recover on the bond of the assistant inspector, but I can not con- 
 cur either in the reasoning or conclusions reached by them. The 
 remedy for the injury of which they complain, must, in my opinion 
 be found by suit on the bond of the assistant inspector, and this 
 remedy seems to be adequate. 
 
 Again, paragraph six of said section provides that the Board of 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners "shall also have the power 
 to fix the rate of charges for the inspection of grain, and the manner 
 in which the same shall be collected; which charges will be regulated 
 in such a manner as will, in the judgment of the Commissioners, pro- 
 duce sufficient revenue to meet the necessary expenses of the service 
 of inspection, and no more." 
 
 The eleventh paragraph is as follows: 
 
 "All necessary expenses incident to the inspection of grain, and to the of- 
 fice of Registrar economically administered, including the rent of suitable of- 
 fices, shall be deemed expenses of the inspection service, and shall be included 
 in the estimate of expenses of such inspection service, and shall be paid from 
 the funds collected for the same." 
 
 The power of the Commissioners to raise funds for the expenses 
 incident to the inspection of grain is found in the sixth paragraph, 
 and the exercise of this power is expressly limited to the raising of 
 such amount "as will, in the judgment of the Commissioners, pro- 
 duce sufficient revenue to meet the necessary expenses of the service 
 of inspection, and NO MORE." 
 
 It seems quite clear that this paragraph confers upon the Commis- 
 sioners no power to impose charges for the purpose of raising a fund 
 to meet unforeseen claims for damages caused by the negligence or 
 incapacity of employes. The amount of such claims it would be im-
 
 97 
 
 possible to foretell or properly provide against. Besides, the attempt 
 to do so would impose extortionate charges upon those whose grain 
 is inspected, to shield from personal liability negligent or incompe- 
 tent appointees. In the eleventh paragraph, what shall be included 
 in the estimate of expenses is somewhat specifically named. Claims 
 for injury are not mentioned, nor do I think they were contemplated 
 by the Legislature. 
 
 From this I conclude that the statute confers upon the Commis- 
 sioners no authority to use funds collected for the necessary expenses 
 incident to the inspection service in paying claims for injuries aris- 
 ing from false or erroneous inspection. 
 
 Permit me to express my regret that the pressure of official duties, 
 which I could not postpone, have prevented an earlier answer to your 
 communication. I am, 
 
 Very respectfully yours, 
 
 GEORGE HUNT, Attorney General. 
 
 7O
 
 No. 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS. 
 
 COMPLAINT No. 78. 
 
 COWLES & McKEE, Complainants. 
 
 ' 
 . 
 
 vs. 
 
 
 
 THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY Co., Respondent. 
 
 lEIXTOIR/TIOlsr 
 
 Filed May 9, 1891. Hearing at Chicago, July 29, 1891 
 Decision Rendered October 7, 1891. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Complainants, N. G. IGLEHART. 
 For Respondent, THOS. S. WRIGHT. 
 
 PINION F eMMISSIN.
 
 101 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN: 
 
 The object of this complaint is to correct alleged extortionate 
 charges for the switching of cars in Chicago. It is alleged the de- 
 fendant, in January, 1891, put into effect a switching tariff between 
 junction points and the industries upon its line, by which the charge 
 for switching loaded cars between 41th and 22d streets was made 
 four dollars per car, the distance being under three miles, thus ex- 
 ceeding the maximum switching charge for a three mile haul fixed 
 by the Commission. It is further alleged specifically that on May 
 2, 1891, car No. 6824 loaded with oats was delivered by the Atchison 
 Company to defendant to be switched from 44th street to complain- 
 ants' elevator, located at 22d street, the distance being about 13,700 
 feet, which car respondent refused to switch unless four dollars were 
 first paid for the service, and that a tender of two dollars, the maxi- 
 mum rate, was made to the local agent of respondent which he de- 
 clined to receive, compeling complainants to pay four dollars. 
 
 The switching schedule referred to in the petition does on its face 
 provide rates for switching in excess of the maximum rate fixed by 
 the Commission, which latter is two dollars per car for a distance not 
 exceeding three miles. This maximum, fixed by the Commission, is 
 made by law prima facie a reasonable rate, and any company which 
 charges more must assume the burden of showing in defense, when 
 prosecuted for extortion, that the maximum fixed by the Commission 
 is unreasonable, and therefore not legal and binding. If a company 
 can show this to the satisfaction of jury and court, it can defeat the 
 Commissioners' schedule. It must, however, be noted that no prose- 
 cution lies against a railroad company for the simple act of making 
 an improper schedule, or a schedule higher than the maximum fixed 
 by the Commission. Only overt acts done, and specific charges de- 
 manded, or received, on actual shipments, can avail as evidence in a 
 prosecution for extortion. We might, and no doubt would, admonish 
 a company we saw preparing to make illegal charges, but could not 
 prosecute before it had done the act. 
 
 Respondent, to the allegation concerning the issuing of this tariff, 
 says, it was not intended to make a schedule in defiance of the Com-
 
 102 
 
 missioners' authority: and certain explanations are given in regard 
 to objectionable portions of the schedule which will appear from the 
 discussion further on. 
 
 The important and particular allegation of the complaint concerns 
 car No. 6824 for the switching of which from 44th to 22d street it is 
 alleged four dollars was demanded, the distance being under three 
 miles. This allegation, if proved, would ground a prosecution for 
 extortion. Upon this allegation evidence was heard, and this evi- 
 dence shows, conclusively, that while the expense bill was made upon 
 this car as from the 44th street yard of respondent, the car was in 
 fact received by respondent at and transported by it from its 51st 
 street yard, which latter yard it is conceded is more than three miles 
 from the complainants' warehouse. The car was taken to the yard 
 at 51st street by the Atchison engineer, as he himself testified with- 
 out contradiction, and there delivered to respondent. But it is said, 
 in passing to this yard, the car came upon a track of respondent at a 
 point nearer than three miles to complainants' warehouse at 22d 
 street; and it is therefore insisted, that only the distance from such 
 nearer point to the warehouse ought to be considered in determining 
 the length of the haul. This latter position we will now examine. 
 
 It is contended that the establishment and operation of different 
 yards by respondent in the city of Chicago as distributing points for 
 different classes of freight and cars is a measure taken merely for the 
 convenience of the company to enable it to handle its business more 
 economically and efficiently, and that since it is possible for the com- 
 pany to deliver cars from the point on its track nearest the destina- 
 tion to which the car first comes, that point should be taken as the 
 place from which to measure the length of the haul rather than the 
 distributing yard to which the car may go in pursuance of the reg- 
 ulations of the company. 
 
 In this view of complainants we are unable to concur. It does not 
 seem to the Commission unreasonable that a railway company doing 
 a large business in a large city should establish distributing points 
 for the different classes of freight or cars which it hauls. Such an 
 arrangement would indeed seem to be imperatively demanded by 
 good railroad practice. It is shown that complainant handles daily 
 in Chicago about 2,000 cars. Without a methodical system of tran- 
 sporting these cars it would be difficult, if not impossible for respond- 
 ent to transact its business. Therefore upon this point we must hold 
 the contention of complainants and their counsel not to be sound. 
 
 If it were shown by the proof that a car was received by the com- 
 pany at a point nearer than three miles of its destination, and that 
 such car was actually hauled by respondent direct to its destination, 
 a distance of less than three miles, then the mere fact that the com- 
 pany may have a distributing point farther away to which the car 
 might have gone, would not justify the company in charging for the 
 longer distance from this distributing yard which was not in fact 
 traversed; and if such a charge were made, it would constitute, if 
 above the fixed maximum, a prima facie case of extortion. Such a 
 case was not made by the proofs under this complaint.
 
 103 
 
 A large number of other switching bills were placed before the 
 Commission at the hearing, though not set forth in the complaint. 
 Many of these, like the bill of Car No. 6824, purport to show a haul 
 from 44th to 22d street; others from 16th to 22d street, and perhaps 
 others show hauls between other points, all less than three miles. 
 The officers of respondents in explanation of these bills testified to 
 facts tending to show the actual hauls made may have been, and 
 probably were, different from those stated upon the face of the oills. 
 It was shown the clerk who makes the bills for switching is liable 
 not to know when he writes them where the car was transported 
 from; that the regular course of business, as regard cars to be de- 
 livered to industries such as complainants' warehouse, would be, even 
 though the cars were received at 16th or 44th street, to transfer them 
 to the distributing yard at 51st street, from which they would be 
 switched to the destination ; and that the economical and proper 
 management of respondent's business imperatively requires that this 
 method should be pursued. The expense bills might therefore show 
 16th street, or 44th street, when in fact the initial point of the 
 switching service was the yard at 51st street, and the billing clerk 
 might use in the bill the name of the 'yard into which the car first 
 came. 
 
 This testimony as to the course of business pursued by respondent 
 is strongly corroborated by what we Know took place in the case of 
 car 6824 mentioned in the complaint. The service in switching this 
 car was described in the expense bill as a haul from 44th to 22d 
 street, but the car was in fact placed by the company bringing it to 
 Chicago in respondent's 51st street yard, and was there received, and 
 from there switched by respondent. 
 
 The officers of respondent took the numerous bills of other cars 
 presented and have made a statement to us regarding a small num- 
 ber of them which they were able to trace, showing that like car 
 6824 the actual haul was over three miles. Shipments shown by a 
 large number of other bills, they report they were unable to trace. 
 
 We must not be understood to hold that a railway company may 
 make arbitrary and oppressive arrangements with reference to the 
 distribution and delivery of cars. In adopting methods of business 
 the law would require that the convenience and accommodation of 
 the public should form a chief object. Arrangements needlessly op- 
 pressive, having in view only increased revenue, neither justified by 
 the company's necessity, nor required by the public good, would 
 certainly be illegal. In the case before us we do not pass upon the 
 propriety of respondent's distributing yards and methods in general. 
 What we say is that a company may legally systematize its business; 
 and there is nothing before us in this case which proves that re- 
 spondent in doing so has acted oppressively. 
 
 Being satisfied that if all the facts before us were taken into court 
 a prosecution for extortion would not be sustained, we are constrained 
 to dismiss the complaint; but by this action it must not be under-
 
 104 
 
 stood we recede from our established maximum rate for switching, 
 or that we shall shrink from testing this rate by a prosecution, when 
 a case shall be shown to have arisen under it. 
 
 The complaint will be dismissed. 
 
 Adopted by the Commission, October 7, 1891. 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) 
 
 > ss. 
 SANGAMON COUNTY, ) 
 
 I, J. H. Paddock, Secretary of the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission of the State of Illinois, do hereby certify that the above is a 
 true and correct copy of the opinion of the Commission in the mat- 
 ter of the complaint of Cowles & McKee versus the Chicago, Rock 
 Island & Pacific Railway Company, adopted by said Commission on 
 October 7, 1891. 
 
 Witness my hand and the seal of said Commissson at Springfield, 
 Illinois, on this 8th day of October, A. D. 1891. 
 
 J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary,
 
 No. 15 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE JACKSONVILLE, LOUISVILLE & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 VS. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION No. 6, FOB LEAVE TO CROSS. 
 
 Petition Filed July 18, 1891. Answer Filed July 29, 1891. Crossing Viewed 
 
 July 30, 1891. Hearing September 7, 1891 Opinion Filed 
 
 and Ordered Entered October 23, 1891. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Petitioner. I. L. MORRISON, 
 For Respondents, GEORGE B. BURNETT. 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION,
 
 107 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILIPS, CHAIRMAN: 
 
 This is a petition by the Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis Rail- 
 way Company for leave to cross with its track the main track of the 
 respondent, just north of the city of Litchfield, in Montgomery coun- 
 ty. A crossing at the point proposed is resisted by respondent upon 
 the ground: 
 
 1. That petitioner does not show such ownership or interest in 
 the St. Louis & Chicago Railway, which it operates, as entitles it to 
 ask for the crossing; that its only interest is held under a contract 
 with a receiver which may terminate at any time, and will surely ter- 
 minate when the receiver's functions are performed and he is dis- 
 charged. 
 
 2. That the statute of 1889, under which the proceeding is begun, 
 was intended to meet the case of new lines of road only, and that a 
 crossing sought by an old company in merely changing the location 
 of its lines is not within the purview of the statute. 
 
 3. That petitioner shows no public necessity demanding the cross- 
 ing, but merely seeks to secure its own convenience. 
 
 Such, in substance, is our understanding of the points made by re- 
 spondent. 
 
 After carefully considering the evidence and suggestions of coun- 
 sel, we have arrived at the conclusion that the order for the crossing 
 should be granted. In doing this, we do not judicially determine the 
 questions that have been made by respondent. Not being a court 
 for that purpose, we would be unable to make any adjudication of 
 the questions presented which would be binding upon the parties. 
 The order which we grant in the case is merely preliminary, and de- 
 termines nothing except the propriety of the crossing as affecting the 
 safety and convenience of the public. In other words, the power we 
 exercise as a Commission is one of police regulation only. We do 
 not determine constitutional rights, or construe statutes or laws af- 
 fecting the building of railroads in general. All the questions that 
 are here sought to be made, can be made in a court competent to de- 
 cide them, when the petitioning company goes into court to condemn 
 its right of way across the right of way of respondent. There it can 
 be determined judicially whether the petitioner has such an interest 
 as entitles it to seek this crossing, and it can there also be determined 
 whether, in case it is found to have such an interest, it is otherwise
 
 108 
 
 in an eligble position, which involves the other points made. As a 
 mere matter of police regulation, we are not able to see that there is 
 such impropriety in this crossing as would justify its denial, particu- 
 larly in view of the fact that the petitioning company proposes to in- 
 terlock the new crossing with suitable appliances, and maintain and 
 operate the interlocking plant without expense to respondent. All 
 the Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis traffic that would pass this 
 proposed crossing now passes over respondent's line at another point 
 where there is no interlocking, and where trains consequently must 
 stop. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that the petitioner, the Jacksonville, Louis- 
 ville & St. Louis Railway Company, have leave to cross with its 
 track the track of the respondent company at the point designated in 
 its petition, to- wit: Nine thousand seven hundred and ten (9710) 
 feet north of the center of the present crossing of petitioners track 
 and the track of respondent south of the city of Litchfield, Montgom- 
 ery county, Illinois, upon condition, however, that the said Jackson- 
 ville, Louisville & St. Louis Railway Company will, at its own ex- 
 penses, construct, place in position, maintain and operate at said 
 crossing an interlocking machine such as may be designated and ap- 
 proved by this Commission. 
 
 It is further ordered that the petitioning company pay all costs 
 and expenses of this proceeding. 
 
 Adopted by the Commission October 23, 1891.
 
 OPINIONS AND ORDERS 
 
 ILLIHsTOIS 
 
 RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION 
 
 INTERLOCKING CASES. 
 
 PADUOAH JUNCTION CROSSING. 
 
 JAKSONVILLE JUNCTION CROSSING-. 
 
 BELT and O. & A. CROSSING, Near Hawthorne. 
 CORWITH CROSSING. 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 
 JOHN R. WHEELER, 
 J. C. WILLIS, 
 
 Commiss i oners .
 
 Ill 
 
 ILLINOIS INTERLOCKING ACT, APPROVED JUNE 2, 1891. 
 
 An act to protect persons and property from danger at crossings 
 and junctions of railroads by providing a method to compel protec- 
 tion of the same. 
 
 SECTION 1 . Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, 
 represented in the General Assembly : That in every case where 
 the main tracks of two or more railroads cross at a grade in this 
 State, any company owning or operating any one of such tracks, 
 whose managers may desire to unite with others by protecting such 
 crossings with interlocking or other safety devices, may file with the 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission a petition stating the facts of 
 the situation, and asking said Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 to order such crossing to be protected by interlocking signals, de- 
 vices and switches, or other safety appliances. Said petition shall be 
 accompanied by a plat showing the location of all tracks; and upon 
 the filing thereof, notice shall be given to each other company or 
 person owning or operating any track involved in such crossing, and 
 the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall thereupon view 
 the site of such crossing and shall, as soon as practicable, appoint a 
 time and place for the hearing of such petition. 
 
 2. If the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall, from 
 information obtained in any manner, have cause to believe that any 
 such grade crossing,as described in section one of this act, is dangerous 
 to the public or to persons operating trains, and requires protection, 
 then it shall be the duty of the said Commission, without any peti- 
 tion, and of its own motion, to cite the several companies or persons 
 owning or operating the railway tracks forming such crossing, to 
 come before said Commission at such time and place as may be 
 named, and show cause why they should not be required to provide 
 such crossing with interlocking or other safety appliances. 
 
 3. At the time and place named for 1 earing under any petition 
 filed in pursuance of section one of this act, or in any citation issued 
 in pursuance of section two thereof, unless the hearing is for good 
 cause continued, said Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall 
 proceed to try the question whether or not the crossing shall be pro- 
 tected by interlocking, or otherwise, and shall give to all companies 
 and parties interested an opportunity to be fully heard, and said 
 Commission shall, after such hearing, enter an order upon a record 
 book or docket, to be kept for the purpose, denying the petition or 
 discharging the citation if the protection of such crossing as pro- 
 posed is deemed unnecessary, or, if said Commission shall be 'of 
 opinion, from the evidence and facts produced, that the public good 
 requires that such crossing be protected, then the Commission shall 
 enter an order prescribing an interlocking device or equipment for 
 such crossing, in case the companies interested can not agree upon a 
 device, in which order shall be specified the kind of machine to be
 
 112 
 
 used, the switches, signals and other devices or appliances to be put 
 in, and the location thereof, and all other matters which may be 
 deemed proper for the efficient protection of such crossing, and said 
 commission shall further designate, in such order, the proportion of 
 the cost of the construction of such plant, and of the expense of 
 maintaining and operating the same, which each of the companies or 
 persons concerned shall pay. In case, however, one railroad company 
 shall hereafter seek to cross at grade with its track or tracks, the 
 track or tracks of another railroad company, and the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission shflll determine that interlocking or other 
 safety appliances shall be put in, the railroad company seeking to 
 cross at grade shall be compelled to pay all cost of such appliances, 
 together with the expense of putting them in and the future main- 
 tenance thereof. 
 
 4. It shall be the duty of every railroad company or person 
 owning or operating any track involved in any such crossing to com- 
 ply with and carry out fully, or unite with the others in doing so, 
 any order of the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission made in 
 pursuance of any proceeding instituted or had under this act, such 
 work to be completed within ninety days after such order is made 
 unless the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall for good cause 
 shown extend the time; and when any such plant shall have been 
 completed and made ready for use, it shall be the duty of the com- 
 panies or persons concerned to notify the said Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission thereof, whereupon said Commission shall inspect 
 or cause to be inspected the said completed plant in the same manner 
 as now provided in the act upon that subject, approved June 3,1887; 
 and if, upon such inspection, the said plant is deemed to be well con- 
 structed and suitable and sufficient for the purpose, the said Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission shall issue a permit empowering the 
 several companies or persons owning or operating the tracks involved 
 therein to run such crossing without stopping, under such rules and 
 regulations as may be in force, or may thereafter be adopted by 
 the said Commission, any law now in force upon the subject of stop- 
 ping trains at railway crossings to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 5. Any company, person or corporation refusing or neglecting 
 to comply with any order made by the said Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission in pursuance of this act shall forfeit and pay a penalty 
 of $200 for each week of such refusal and neglect, the same to be re- 
 covered in an action of debt in the name of the People of the State 
 of Illinois, and to be paid, when collected, into the county treasurer 
 of any county where any such suit may be tried. 
 
 6. All expenses incurred in any proceeding under this act shall 
 be paid by the railway companies concerned, in equal portions, upon 
 bills to be rendered by the secretary of said Commission. 
 
 7. Every junction of two or more railroad tracks, whether the 
 tracks joining each other are owned by different companies or by the 
 same company, shall be taken and deemed to be a crossing within 
 the meaning of this act: Provided, that this section shall not apply 
 to switch, spur or side tracks.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD Co., 
 
 AND 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION NO. 6 PROTECTION OF CROSSING AT PADUCAH 
 
 JUNCTION. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. WM. BROWN. 
 
 For Illinois Central Railroad Co. JOHN MAYO PALMER. 
 
 For Wabash Railroad Co. B. A. WINSTON. 
 
 8O.
 
 115 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition, filed under the interlocking act of 1891, by the 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. The Wabash Railroad Com- 
 pany and the Illinois Central Railroad Company are made defend- 
 ants in the petition. The prayer of the petition is that this Com- 
 mission will order the crossing of the main tracks of the three 
 companies named, at what is called Paducah Junction, near Pontiac, 
 in the county of Livingston, to be interlocked. 
 
 The companies all agree that the crossing in question is a proper 
 one for interlocking under the statute, and that the Commission may 
 designate the device to be used. They, however, widely disagree as 
 to the basis on which the cost of the interlocking and the expense 
 of its future maintenance and operation shall be apportioned among 
 the companies. 
 
 The tracks of the several companies at this place are so located as 
 to form a triangle, each road crossing the other two, thus forming 
 three distinct main track crossings, ranging from six hundred to one 
 thousand feet apart. The Alton tracks extend from northeast to 
 southwest; the Wabash track from northwest to southeast, and the 
 Central track from southwest to northeast. The Alton road is the 
 senior of the three, having been built long before the others. The 
 Wabash is next in point of time, and the Central was built last. The 
 traffic over the Alton at this point is heavy, and it has here a double 
 track. The Wabash runs but three regular trains a day each way 
 over this crossing. The Central also runs three daily trains each 
 way. Upon the south side of the Central track, about half way be- 
 tween the crossing of the Alton and the Wabash, is the Pontiac sta- 
 tion building, at which all Central trains stop. There is also upon 
 the line of the Central, a short distance east of its crossing with the 
 Wabash, a coal mine, at which all Central trains stop for coal. The 
 Alton and Wabash trains make no regular stops at this place, except 
 those made for the crossings. 
 
 We confess the question of apportioning the cost and expense of 
 this interlocking among the companies has given us much trouble. 
 This and the other cases now under consideration, are the first that 
 have arisen under the statute. It has been insisted that the Com- 
 mission should at the outset lay down some general principle, in ac- 
 cordance with which the cost and expenses of interlocking are to be
 
 116 
 
 apportioned under this act, thus making this first batch of cases de- 
 cisive of all that may hereafter arise. While we recognize that such 
 a method would greatly simplify the subject and save much labor, we 
 see many difficulties in the way of adopting any of the general rules 
 of determination that have been proposed. 
 
 It is contended by the Alton company that seniority should solve 
 the whole question. It is urged that the road first upon the ground, 
 which once had the right of way unobstructed by the crossing, should 
 pay no cost or expense, and that the junior road, whose track has- 
 been built across that of the senior, thus occasioning the necessity 
 for stopping trains, and the danger incident to the crossing, should 
 be compelled to bear the whole burden of protecting the crossing by 
 an interlocking device. It is said that in making contracts for cross- 
 ings in the present day it is customary to require the junior company 
 to pay all costs and expenses, including the wages of gateman or 
 flagman when needed. It is further said that only such matters as 
 were in contemplation when condemnation of right of way across 
 other tracks took place, can be deemed to have been settled by the 
 judgment of the court, and that in the case of these crossings, made 
 before interlocking came into use, the burden of equipping with the 
 new appliance should be visited upon the junior company in the 
 same manner that it is customary at the present time to allot expenses 
 by contract. 
 
 It is insisted the principle of seniority contended for is recognized 
 in the statute under which this proceeding is had. That statute pro- 
 vides that "in case one railroad company shall hereafter seek to cross 
 at grade with its track or tracks the track or tracks of another rail- 
 road company, and the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall 
 determine that interlocking or other safety appliances shall be put in r 
 the railway company seeking to cross at grade shall be compelled to 
 pay all the cost of such appliances, together with all the expense of 
 putting them in and the future maintenance thereof." It is argued, 
 that since, by the terms of this statute, roads causing new crossings 
 are to bear the whole burden, an application of the same principle 
 would require that crossings already in existence should be inter- 
 locked upon the same principle, all expenses being cast upon the 
 last comer. 
 
 The contention of both the Central and the Wabash companies is 
 that first cost of machine should be borne equally, but that the cost 
 of subsequent operation, which is far the most important item, should 
 be apportioned among the companies according to the number of 
 trains which pass over the crossing on each line. This, it is con- 
 tended, would be equitable for the reason that it would assess the 
 cost and expense upon the basis of benefits. Every stopping of a 
 train entails expense in wear and tear of machinery, in consumption 
 of fuel, and in delay; and from this it is argued that the benefit re- 
 ceived by a company is in direct proportion to the number of trains 
 run by that company, and which are relieved, by the interlocking, 
 from the statutory stop. Hence it is said maintenance and operation 
 should be paid for in proportion to the number of trains run.
 
 117 
 
 Another basis which has been propounded to us in another case 
 now before us, and which may be considered here, is that each com- 
 pany should pay both of original cost and expense of operation in 
 proportion to the number of main tracks which it has in use at the 
 crossing. The reasons for such a division have not been very elab- 
 orately stated before us. In the particular case where the theory 
 was advanced, we have thought the method did not work any injus- 
 tice, and have accordingly used it for that case only. (See opinion 
 in C. & A. R. R. Co. vs. A., T. & S. Fe R. R. Co., petition for pro- 
 tecting crossing at Corwith.) 
 
 In addition to the above methods, we may here name a fourth, 
 which comes to the notice of the Commission by reason of its having 
 been actually used by certain companies in the case of a very com- 
 plicated crossing at Stewart avenue in Chicago, now being interlocked 
 by agreement of parties. The fourth method is to assess upon each 
 company the cost of that portion of the device which pertains to its 
 own particular tracks and switches. That is to say, each company 
 pays for the construction of its own derails and signals, and for the 
 pipes, attachments, wires, etc., by which the same are operated. 
 Then the cost of the operating machine, tower house, and other gen- 
 eral expenses which pertain to all the roads alike, including wages 
 of men, are assessed among the companies on the basis of levers, 
 each road paying that portion of the whole expense which the num- 
 ber of levers required to work its own derails and signals bears to 
 the total number of levers used to operate the entire plant. While 
 none of the counsel in the present case have propounded this latter 
 theory, the Commission, in fact, took it into consideration in connec- 
 tion with all these cases, knowing it had been adopted in practice by 
 several of the best railroad men in the State. 
 
 The result of our deliberations is that we find ourselves unable to 
 adopt any one of the rules stated as an unyielding principle of de- 
 termination for all cases. Some force may be allowed to each of 
 them; but any of them, if universally applied, would in many cases 
 work injustice. 
 
 Take first the principle of seniority; and here we remark that 
 where condemnation proceedings have been had at the time of es- 
 tablishing the crossing, the damages allowed would, in legal con- 
 templation, cover all injury to the line crossed which could be 
 regarded as proper legal damages. The use declared for across the 
 right of way of the old company would, it seems to us, be such as 
 would call for the allowance of all damages that could in any event 
 arise. We can think of no damage obtainable by condemnation in 
 any case that would not arise by the mere fact of building the one 
 track across the other. It is held in Illinois that damages which 
 may accrue from collisions and accidents at crossings are too remote 
 and speculative to form a subject of recovery in condemnation. (P. 
 & P. U. Ry. Co. vs. P. & F. Ry. Co., 105 111., 110.) So likewise it is 
 held that damages which arise from the statutory regulation for the 
 stopping of trains at crossings, is not such as the law will recognize
 
 118 
 
 (C. & A. K. R. Co. vs. J. L. & A. Ry. Co., 105 111., 388); because the 
 statute is said to be a mere police regulation, which may be changed 
 at any time; and no company is entitled to compensation for obey- 
 ing the law. 
 
 Under the authority of these cases it may be questioned whether in 
 condemnation proceedings the cost of interlocking could be consid- 
 ered any more than could the question of the stopping of trains. This 
 Commission now proceeds under the act of 189] , which is purely a 
 police regulation. It is the public interest that is to be subserved 
 in these eases, by lessening the danger to life and property and by 
 expediting travel. Interlocking is a burden cast by the police power 
 of the state upon the companies solely for the public good, not for 
 the pecuniary benefit of the companies themselves. If its cost would 
 not be in any case within the purview of condemnation proceedings, 
 it can hardly be contended that priorty affects the equities between 
 the companies on the ground stated that interlocking appliances 
 were not in use when the condemnation was had. 
 
 Nor does the contention, in our judgment, derive any additional 
 force from the fact that in the case of the Paducah crossing the lines 
 of the Wabash and the Central crossed by a verbal license from the 
 Alton company without any damage having been paid or any bur- 
 dens imposed. The Alton could have required condemnation and 
 the assessment of damages, if it had seen tit. It did not do this, and 
 we are unable to see that the status of the companies before us is 
 now materially different on that account. Interlocking, it is true, 
 has been recently introduced; a legal method of compelling its use is 
 now for the first time prescribed by law. This added police regula- 
 tion is in accordance with the modern tendency alike shown by legis- 
 latures and railroad managers, to secure greater safety and speed, 
 and generally better railroad practice. 
 
 The seniority theory would be wholly impracticable in cities where 
 tracks are concentrated, and where a single interlocking plant may 
 cost from $50,000 to $100,000. Here to make the youngest, and pre- 
 sumably the weakest road, pay the whole expense, would be little 
 short of ruinous. 
 
 For the reasons given, seniority can not be taken as a basis of de- 
 termination, discarding other considerations. There may arise cases 
 where it will constitute an^ element proper to be considered; but, 
 speaking generally, if the Commission finds two railroads in opera- 
 tion upon the ground, without special contract burdens as between, 
 themselves, they must be dealt with on a basis of practical equality. 
 
 In the proposition to make each company pay in proportion to the 
 number of trains passing the crossing, we see somewhat more equity 
 than we have found in the rule of seniority. But will the train basis 
 do as an infallible principle of determination for all cases? Take the 
 case of a great trunk line doing a heavy traffic, which has been recently 
 crossed by some new line which does very little business; the one 
 may run a hundred trains per day and the other not more than two. 
 Would not the train basis work a very palpable injustice in such a 
 case? The fact that the junior road has crossed the older road ere-
 
 119 
 
 ates the entire necessity for interlocking, and for that necessity the 
 new road is certainly as much responsible as the old one; more so, if 
 its junior position is to have weight. Yet, if the train basis is used, 
 the new road will be practically exempt from operating expense. The 
 fact that one road does a lignt business, does not decrease the cost of 
 the machine to be used, nor the expense of its maintenance and 
 operation. Under this theory of apportioning expenses, if specula- 
 tors build a new and useless line of road for speculative purposes, as 
 has been too much done in this state, the very fact that the new line 
 is useless and does no business, would enable its projectors to compel 
 other companies, which do a substantial service to the public, to 
 maintain and operate interlocking at all the crossings. This would 
 certainly be unjust. The presence of the crossing tracks renders in- 
 terlocking necessary, and the public benefit arising from increased 
 safety to life and property and greater expedition in travel is the 
 principal fact to be regarded, not the pecuniary benefit to the com- 
 panies. 
 
 Besides, a train basis for apportioning expenses would constantly 
 fluctuate. The time cards of the companies would furnish no ade- 
 quate basis for such an apportionment, because many roads run more 
 wild trains than regular ones, and any road may run twice as many 
 trains in one month as it runs in the next. Under the train basis 
 the question would constantly be open for readjustment, and the un- 
 certain situation in which the order would be left would invite con- 
 stant wrangling between the companies as to the proportions to be 
 paid. 
 
 Under all the circumstances we can not, therefore, adopt the tram 
 basis as a decisive principle to be applied in all cases. 
 
 We come now to the proposition to apportion expenses of opera- 
 tion upon the number of main tracks in use by each company at the 
 point of crossing. This, it appears to us, would in many cases be in- 
 equitable. It seems to the Commission only a clumsy way of appor- 
 tioning expenses upon the volume of traffic, and as such the train 
 basis would be superior to it; and "wheelage" would still better ap- 
 ply the principle underlying this method. Cases no doubt exist 
 where the road with a double track at the crossing point does less 
 actual business than another with a single track. The actual use of 
 a machine, and the activity of those operating it, might be more fre- 
 quently called forth by a single track road than by a double one. 
 Again, a road might have a thousand miles of double track else- 
 where, and, at the particular point of crossing, if in some city or 
 other crowded place, might have a single track. 
 
 We can understand that if the tracks, sidings and switches of one 
 company be so arranged that a very large proportion of the cost of 
 the original construction is occasioned thereby, it might be equitable 
 to consider that circumstance in apportioning the original cost of the 
 machine, and also the cost, of repairs; but the same reason would not 
 exist in many cases for allowing that circumstance to control the ex- 
 pense of operating. The wages of operators would be the same even 
 though in the course of a day they move a few more levers for one of
 
 120 
 
 the companies than for the other. Then, too, the actual working of 
 the machine to accommodate a company's traffic might not bear a 
 direct ratio to the number of protected points on such company's 
 right of way. 
 
 If we should apply here the principle of seniority, the Alton would 
 pay nothing. The Wabash could also plead its seniority over the 
 Central, and, carrying the principle to its logical outcome, we should 
 have the Central paying the whole cost and expense of the machine 
 and its operation. It is fair to consider also in this connection that 
 the Central company can, by interlocking, be saved but one stop for 
 its trains, which is that now made by the trains bound eastward be- 
 fore crossing the Alton tracks. All other statutory stops are made by 
 stopping for the station and at coal chutes. Thus the company which 
 gets the least benefit would pay the whole expense. If we should 
 adopt the train basis for apportioning costs and expenses, we should 
 have the senior road, for which entire exemption is claimed under 
 the opposing theory, paying nearly the whole cost of operation and 
 maintenance. If we should adopt the principle of apportioning ac- 
 cording to the number of main tracks, then the Alton would pay one- 
 half of the maintenance and operation and each of the others one- 
 fourth. If we should apportion first cost according to the number of 
 derails, signals, and their connections actually located on each line, 
 and other expenses according to levers in the tower, as has been done 
 in the crossing agreement for Stewart avenue above referred to, we 
 should then have here again the anomaly of the Central company, 
 which derives the least benefit from this machine, paying the largest 
 share both of the cost of construction and of the expense of opera- 
 tion; for according to the plan prepared for this crossing, the Cen- 
 tral road has a total of thirteen levers, while the Alton has but 
 twelve, and the Wabash eight. Hence, on this basis, the Central 
 would pay thirteen thirty-thirds, the Alton twelve thirty-thirds, and 
 the Wabash eight thirty- thirds. 
 
 Turn which way we may, difficulties are encountered in attempting 
 to apply any one of the principles we have thus had under consider- 
 ation. At the same time, we admit that all of these might properly 
 be considered in cases where they have special weight. 
 
 If we were compelled to adopt a rule to be followed unswervingly 
 in all cases a thing we should not regard as good policy or as tend- 
 ing to justice we are free to say, after very careful deliberation, 
 that rule would be to apportion all cost and expense among the sev- 
 eral companies whose tracks are involved, equally, share and share 
 alike. But since this would, in exceptional cases, work hardships, 
 as is notably the case at the Corwith crossing now pending before 
 us, we are unwilling to adopt the rule of equality as an inflexible 
 and decisive one to be applied in all cases. We are, however, con- 
 vinced that it would be fair to assume at the outset of every case that 
 both or all the companies concerned are equal in their liability to 
 bear this new burden cast upon them by the State for the public 
 good in the exercise of the police power. If highly exceptional cir- 
 cumstances exist, which are claimed to be sufficient to take any case
 
 out of the principle of equality, it should be for the company claim- 
 ing the exemption to show these circumstances; but neither benefits 
 nor hardships to companies can receive as large a measure of con- 
 sideration as the public interest and the public good, which latter it 
 is the great function of this Commission to subserve, and the sole 
 object of this statute to promote. 
 
 In the case now under consideration, we have concluded the facts 
 do not warrant us in departing from the principle of equal payment 
 by the companies. 
 
 An order will therefore be entered by the Secretary in this pro- 
 ceeding, providing that the crossing described in the petition, and 
 also the crossing of the Wabash and Central tracks near the other 
 two, be all interlocked b)' the three companies concerned, by means 
 of a single interlocking system, and that each of said three companies 
 pay one-third of the original cost of the device used, and one-third 
 of the expense of the future maintenance and operation of the same. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 THURSDAY, December 10, 1891. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day 
 present, Isaac N. Phillips, John R Wheeler, and J. C. Willis, 
 Commissioners, J. H. Paddock, Secretary, and Charles Hansel, Con- 
 sulting Engineer the following proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and de- 
 termination before the Commission this 10th day of December, 1891, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, 
 the agreements made by the parties through their respective counsel, 
 and the arguments of counsel made before the Commission at a 
 former session, and being fully advised in the premises, doth find: 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossings formed at the 
 said Paducah Junctipn by the tracks of the Chicago & Alton Rail- 
 road Company, the Wabash Railroad Company, and the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company be protected and operated by an inter- 
 locking device or machine; that it would be just and equitable for 
 each of the said three companies to pay one-third part of the entire 
 original cost of such device and its several parts, attachments, and 
 appurtenances, and one-third part of the expense of maintaining the 
 same in good repair and order, and also one-third part of the expense 
 of operating such device. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 to- wit: the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, the Wabash Rail- 
 road Company, and the Illinois Central Railroad Company, forthwith 
 proceed to protect said crossings by an interlocking device of the 
 kind and description shown upon the blue print drawing and plan 
 which is attached hereto, and which is hereby made part and parcel 
 of this order, f 
 
 t The plan referred to here appears upon the docket in connection with, and as part of, 
 the final order, but it is not practicable to show the same in the printed copies.
 
 122 
 
 EXPLANATION OF PLAN. 
 
 It is further ordered that for the better understanding of the said 
 plan, the following explanations thereof be observed: 
 
 The position of derails is indicated by a shaded point, the location 
 being fixed by measurement indicated by figures. 
 
 Main track routes are governed by the top blade of high sema- 
 phore signal placed on engineman's side of the track which it gov- 
 erns. 
 
 The back-up and switching movements are goverened by dwarf 
 semaphore signals. 
 
 The distance of signal from point it governs is fixed by figures. 
 Its position may be shifted laterally if the space between tracks i& 
 not sufficient to receive the post without danger. 
 
 In case it is not desired to operate switches marked on plan as 
 "worked or bolt-locked," then the lower blade governing such switch 
 may be omitted. 
 
 GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said interlocking device and machine 
 be constructed by said companies in accordance with the following 
 general specifications, to- wit: 
 
 1. The switches, derails, and signals must be operated from a 
 central tower house, as indicated on blue print plan. 
 
 2. All signals must be of semaphore type. 
 
 3. All switches and locks must be worked by one-inch iron pipe, 
 plugged and riveted at joints, and carried on anti- friction pipe car- 
 riers fixed on oak posts placed firmly in the ground not to exceed 
 eight feet apart. Each line of pipe must be automatically compen- 
 sated. 
 
 4. All signals must be worked with two lines of wire. 
 
 5. All signal blades must be so constructed as to go to the danger 
 position in case of breakage of connections anywhere between the 
 operating lever and blade. 
 
 6. All facing point switches must be fitted with duplex facing 
 point locks. 
 
 7. All cranks and pipe compensators must be fixed on founda- 
 tions firmly imbedded in concrete. 
 
 8. All cranks, compensators, chain wheels, and main pipe lines- 
 must be boxed. 
 
 9. All derails and operated switches must be provided with de- 
 tector bar. 
 
 10. All switch points must work on iron plates so arranged as to- 
 keep the track at switch points accurately to gauge. 
 
 11. All connections must be accurately adjusted so as to make it 
 impossible to give a clear signal with the switch open or partially 
 open.
 
 123 
 
 12. Each part of the machine and connections must be made suffi- 
 ciently strong for the work it is to perform. 
 
 13. All movements of switches and signals must be made by levers 
 arranged and interlocked so as to prevent the operator from giving 
 conflicting signals. 
 
 14. The material and workmanship must be in all respects first- 
 class, and the entire plant must be constructed in accordance with 
 the best practice in signaling, and the plant, as a whole, must, when 
 finished, be complete and perfect, and in every way fit for the pur- 
 pose of its construction, and all details not herein specified, which 
 may be found necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the 
 machine and plant, shall be supplied by the said companies the same 
 as though they were herein particularly set forth. 
 
 15. The machine to be used for the operation and interlocking of 
 the signals, switches, and derails must be approved by this Commis- 
 sion before construction was commenced, and the entire plant must 
 be constructed subject to the approval of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, and permit duly issued, as required by statute before it 
 is put into operation. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said three companies pay equally one- 
 third each of the original cost of the construction of the said device 
 and machine, one- third each of the cost of the future maintenance of 
 said machine in good order and repair, and one-third each of the ex- 
 pense of the operation of said machine. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said companies shall construct the 
 said device and machine and have the same in order and ready for 
 use within ninety days from the entering of this order (December 10, 
 1891) as provided by statute.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, PEOBIA AND ST. Louis RAILWAY Co. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD Co. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co. 
 
 CITATION No. 4. PROTECTION OF CROSSING AT JACK- 
 SONVILLE JUNCTION. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Chicago. Peoria & St. Louis Railway Co. I. L. MORRISON. 
 
 For Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. WM. BROWN. 
 
 For Wabash Railroad Co. B. A. WINSTON.
 
 127 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a citation issued by the Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion to each of the three companies named in the title, under the act 
 approved June 2, 1891, commanding said companies to show cause 
 why the crossing formed by their respective main tracks at Jackson- 
 ville Junction, Morgan county, Illinois, should not be protected by in- 
 terlocking or other proper appliances. The counsel of the respective 
 companies appeared before the Commission November 4, 1891, and 
 agreed that the crossing might, by order of the Commission, be inter- 
 locked, and that the Commission might fix in the order the kind of 
 device to be used. They further agree that the original cost of the 
 appliance to be used might be assessed upon the companies equally, 
 one-third to each. 
 
 These mutual agreements of the companies relieve the Commission 
 from the decision of all questions except that as to the apportion- 
 ment of the expense of future maintenance and operation. Upon this 
 latter question the Chicago & Alton and the Chicago, Peoria & St. 
 Louis companies, through their respective counsel, agree that the 
 order of the Commission may apportion the expense of operation and 
 maintenace in the same ratio as that of the original cost; namely: 
 one- third to each company. 
 
 On this point, the counsel for the Wabash Company contends for 
 what would, in the present case, be a slightly different division of the 
 expense of operation He contends this expense should be distributed 
 in proportion to the number of trains run over the roads respectively. 
 Since, however, it appears from the time cards of these roads on file 
 that the number of regular trains of the Alton and Wabash compan- 
 ies are equal, nineteen each daily, and those of the Chicago, Peoria 
 & St. Louis within one of that number, being eighteen daily, there 
 seems no reason to discuss the feasibility or equity of the train basis 
 for dividing expenses in connection with this citation. The Chicago, 
 Peoria & St. Louis is the company which would profit here by the 
 adoption of the train basis for operating expenses, and that company 
 consents to pay one third. A letter of Mr. Hayes, general manager 
 of the Wabash. now on file in the case, concedes the propriety in this 
 case on his own basis of assessing the operating expense one-third to 
 each road.
 
 128 
 
 The companies are, therefore, practically at an agreement on the 
 division of expenses for this crossing, though they disagree widely as 
 to what principle should be applied by the Commission generally in. 
 such cases. The agreements made contemplate only this particular 
 crossing, and are in the nature of a compromise. This case can not, 
 therefore, be fairly urged as a precedent, nor can the agreements 
 made be held to estop these companies, or any of them, from main- 
 taining in other cases, principles which would lead to a different re- 
 sult. We have discussed the different theories held by these com- 
 panies as to what is a proper basis of distribution of expense in con- 
 nection with another case now before us, wherein such diverse 
 theories have been insisted upon.f 
 
 The payment of one-third of all cost and expense by each company 
 at this place, while finding a sufficient basis in the mutual agreements 
 of the parties, seems to the Commission, at the same time, to be fair, 
 reasonable, and just, under all the circumstances of the case. 
 
 An order will therefore be entered by the Secretary for the protec- 
 tion of said crossing by interlocking, and providing that the original 
 cost and the expense of future maintenance and operation of said in- 
 terlocking plant, shall be paid for equally by the three interested 
 companies. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 THURSDAY, December 10, 1891. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips, John R. Wheeler, and J. C. Willis, Com- 
 missioners; J. H. Paddock, Secretary, and Chas. Hansel, Consulting 
 Engineer the following proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this citation having come on to be finally heard and de- 
 termined before the Commission this 10th day of December, 1891, and 
 the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, the 
 agreements made by the parties through their respective counsel, 
 and the arguments of counsel made thereon, and being fully advised 
 in the premises, on consideration doth find: 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossing described in the 
 citation be protected and operated by ah interlocking device and 
 machine; that it would be just and equitable for each of the three 
 companies named in the citation to pay one-third part of the entire 
 original cost of such machine and its several parts, attachments and 
 appurtenances, and one-third part of the expense of maintaining the 
 same in good repair and order, and also one-third part of the ex- 
 pense of operating said machine. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 to-wit: The Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway Company, the Chi- 
 cago & Alton Railroad Company, and the W T abash Railroad Com- 
 
 tSee opinion in the case of the Paducah Junction crossing.
 
 129 
 
 pany, forthwith proceed to protect said crossing by an interlocking 
 machine and device of the kind and description shown upon the 
 blue print drawing and plan which is attached hereto, and which is 
 hereby made part and parcel of this order. f 
 
 EXPLANATION OF PLAN. 
 
 It is further ordered that for the better understanding of the 
 said plan, the following explanations thereof be observed: 
 
 The position of derails is indicated by a shaded point, the location 
 being fixed by measurement indicated by figures. 
 
 Main track routes are governed by top blade of high semaphore 
 signal placed on engineman's side of the track which it governs. 
 
 The back-up and switching movements are governed by dwarf sem- 
 aphore signals. 
 
 The distance of signal from point it governs is fixed by figure. Its 
 position may be shifted laterally if the space between tracks is not 
 sufficient to receive the post without danger. 
 
 In case it is not desired to operate switches marked on plan as 
 "worked or bolt-locked," then the lower blade governing such switch 
 may be omitted. 
 
 GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said interlocking device and machine 
 be constructed by said companies in accordance with the following 
 general specifications, to- wit: 
 
 1. The switches, derails and signals must be operated from a 
 central tower house as indicated on blue print plan. 
 
 2. All signals must be of the semaphore type. 
 
 3. All switches and locks must be worked by one-inch iron pipe, 
 plugged, and riveted at joints, and carried on anti-friction pipe car- 
 riers fixed on oak posts placed firmly in the ground, not to exceed 
 eight feet apart. Each line of pipe must be automatically com- 
 pensated. 
 
 4. All signals must be worked with two lines of wire. 
 
 5. All signal blades must be so constructed so as to go to the danger 
 position in case of breakage of connections anywhere between the 
 operating lever and blade. 
 
 6. All facing point switches must be fitted with duplex facing 
 point locks. 
 
 7. All cranks and pipe compensators must be fixed on founda- 
 tions firmly imbedded in concrete. 
 
 tThis plan could not be shown on this printed copy, but can be seen on the docket of the 
 Commission. 
 
 9 O
 
 130 
 
 8. All cranks, compensators, chain wheels, and main pipe lines 
 must be boxed. 
 
 9. All derails and operated switches must be provided with de- 
 tector bar. 
 
 10. All switch points must work on iron plates so arranged as to 
 keep the track at switch points accurately to gauge. 
 
 11. All connections must be accurately adjusted so as to make it 
 impossible to give a clear signal with the switch open or partially 
 open. 
 
 12. Each part of the machine and connections must be made suf- 
 ficiently strong for the work it is to perform. 
 
 13. All movements of switches and signals must be made by 
 levers arranged and interlocked so as to prevent the operator from 
 giving conflicting signals. 
 
 14. The material and workmanship must be in all respects first-class 
 and the entire plant must be constructed in accordance with the best 
 practice in signalling, and the plant, as a whole, must, when finished, 
 t>e complete and perfect and in every way fit for the purpose of its 
 construction, pnd all details not herein specified which maybe found 
 necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the machine and 
 plant shall be supplied by the said companies the same as though 
 they were herein particularly set forth. 
 
 15. The machine to be used for the operation and interlocking of 
 signals, switches, and derails must be approved by this Commission 
 before construction is commenced; and the entire plant must be con- 
 structed subject to the approval of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, and permit duly issued, as required by statute, before it 
 is put into operation. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said three companies pay equally 
 one-third each of the original cost of the construction of the said de- 
 vice and machine, one-third each of the cost of the future mainte- 
 nance of said machine in good order and repair, and one-third each 
 of the cost of the operation of said machine. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said companies shall construct the 
 said device and machine and have the same in order and ready for 
 use within ninety days from the entering of this order (December 
 10, 1891) as provided by statute.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD Co. 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & WESTERN INDIANA RAILROAD Co., 
 THE BELT RAILWAY Co. or CHICAGO, LESSEE, 
 
 AND 
 
 THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD Co, 
 
 Petition No. 1. Protection of Crossing near Hawthorne. 
 
 Citation No. 5. Protection of Crossing of Chicago & Western 
 Indiana Railroad, the Belt Railway Company, of Chicago, 
 lessee, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail- 
 road, near Hawthorne, Consolidated. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Co., The Belt Railway of Chicago, 
 
 Lessee. C. M. OSBORNE, Gen'l Sol., AND C. 
 
 DOUGHERTY, Chief Engineer. 
 
 For Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. WM. BROWN, Gen'l Sol. 
 For Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railroad Co. A. D. WHEELER, Attorney.
 
 133 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIBMAN. 
 
 This is a petition by the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company to 
 interlock the crossing of its tracks with the tracks of the Chicago & 
 Western Indiana Railroad Company, operated under lease by the 
 Belt Railway Company of Chicago, 
 
 The Belt and Western Indiana Companies are made parties de- 
 fendant in the petition. 
 
 The crossing sought to be interlocked is in the city of Chicago. 
 The tracks of the Alton at that point of crossing run parallel with 
 the Illinois & Michigan Canal on the south side. Parallel with the 
 canal upon the other side run the tracks of the Atchison, Topeka & 
 Santa F6 Railroad Company. These parallel lines of the road the 
 ^tj-lton and Atchison are about five hundred feet apart, and they are 
 both crossed by the tracks of the Western Indiana Company. Deeming 
 it impracticable to interlock one of these crossings without including 
 the other in the same system, the Commission, after the petition in 
 this case was filed, of its own motion,'issued a citation directed to the 
 Atchison Company, and also to the Western Indiana and Belt Com- 
 panies, commanding them to show cause why they should not inter- 
 lock the crossing of their tracks upon the other side of the canal. 
 This citation, has by agreement of all the parties, been consolidated 
 with the petition in this case, so that we have the whole question of 
 interlocking both crossings now before us. 
 
 We have discussed in the case of the Paducah Junction crossing 
 the different theories advanced for the apportionment of cost of con- 
 struction and expense of maintenance and operation, and it is unnec- 
 essary to repeat here what has been there said. 
 
 The Western Indiana Company here crosses with its tracks two 
 other roads. It has a double track; the Alton crossed by it has also a 
 double track, and the Atchison is now constructing a double track, 
 and consents that the case may be considered upon the basis of its 
 having the same completed. It is expected, we believe, that the sec- 
 ond track of the Atchison Company will be completed by the time 
 this interlocking is ready for use. 
 
 There are a switch and signal which add two levers in the tower, 
 and are located between the tracks of the Alton and the Atchison, 
 upon one of the Western Indiana tracks. These appliances are not
 
 134 
 
 essential to the interlocking of the crossing, but are put in, we learn 
 from the Consulting Engineer, at the request of the Western Indiana 
 and Belt Companies for their exclusive accommodation. So far as 
 the other companies are concerned, the crossings could be perfectly 
 interlocked without these appliances. We therefore think it not un- 
 just to charge the extra cost of these particular appliances to the 
 Western Indiana and Belt Companies. Without these, the number 
 of switches, signals and levers would be exactly equal upon all these 
 lines. Apportioning first cost upon levers, which under the circum- 
 stances we think would be just, the Chicago and Western Indiana 
 and the Belt Companies would pay four-tenths of the first cost, the 
 Chicago & Alton three-tenths, and the Atchison three-tenths. We 
 think such apportionment of the first cost of the plant would be fair 
 under the circumstances. 
 
 A question arises here, which had no place in the Paducah Junc- 
 tion case, and that is as to whether existing contract burdens for 
 watchmen and gate-keepers should be continued upon the companies 
 that now sustain them when interlocking is introduced, which takes 
 the place of flagging and the operation of gates. It appears that by 
 contract the Western Indiana and Belt Companies are bound to 
 maintain gatemen at their crossing with the Alton, and that the 
 Atchison, by a like contract, is bound to maintain gateman at its 
 crossing with the Western Indiana and Belt upon the other side of 
 the canal. We have before us the affidavit of Mr. Thomas, President 
 of the Belt Company, showing that he now pays two men at the rate 
 of $55 per month each, at the crossing of the Alton; but the affidavit 
 also shows a station is mantained there, and therefore the company 
 keeps telegraph operators at that place, who command higher wages 
 than could be earned by a man competent only to manage the gates. 
 He swears that suitable men could be procured at $40 per month 
 each for the work contracted with the Alton to be performed. As it 
 would require a day man and a night man, it would therefore be 
 necessary, according to Mr. Thomas' affidavit, for the Western In- 
 diana & Belt Companies to expend $80 per month for the guarding 
 of this crossing in accordance with the contract with the Alton. 
 
 We have before us the affidavit of Mr. Nixon, of the Atchison, 
 showing what the Atchison pays for help at the other crossing, in 
 which affidavit he estimates that $65 per month would be sufficient 
 to procure the services called for by the contract of the Atchison 
 with the Belt and Western Indiana Companies. Evidently it would 
 cost as much at one place as it would the other, they being only a 
 few hundred feet apart, and the services required being the same in 
 both cases. We are therefore inclined to adopt the statement of Mr. 
 Thomas as to the contract obligation, namely, $80 per month, or $960 
 per year for each crossing. Such wages should be paid as will com- 
 mand efficient service. These contract burdens were assumed by 
 these companies severally in order to obtain their crossings, and the 
 Commission see no reason why the burden should not be continued 
 after interlocking is adopted. The interlocking dispenses with the 
 necessity of keeping gateman or flagman, and the work is performed
 
 135 
 
 by the interlocking machine much more satisfactorily and with much 
 more benefit to the companies than it could be done in the old way. 
 It is therefore the opinion of the Commission that these burdens 
 should be continued and applied to the operation of the interlocking 
 plant so far as ihey may be needed for that purpose. 
 
 An order will therefore be entered in this case providing that the 
 two crossings mentioned in the petition and in the citations shall be 
 interlocked in a single system; and that of the original cost of the 
 construction of such interlocking plant, the Western Indiana and 
 Belt companies shall pay jointly four-tenths, the Alton company 
 three-tenths, and the Athison company three- tenths; that the expense 
 of maintaining said interlocking machine and plant in good order 
 and repair shall be paid by the said companies in the same propor- 
 tion; that of the cost of operating the said interlocking machine the 
 Western Indiana and Belt Companies shall jointly pay one-half 
 thereof, up to the point where said one-half may reach the sum of 
 $80 per month, or $960 per year, and the other half of the expense of 
 such operation shall be paid by the said Atchison company, up to 
 the point where the said Atchison's one-half shall reach the sum of $80 
 per month, or $960 per year, and in case the cost of operation of said 
 interlocking plant shall exceed the aggregate of the sums so ordered to 
 be paid by the Western Indiana and Belt Companies and by the Atchi- 
 son Company, to- wit: the sum of $160 per month, or $1,920 per year, 
 then the order shall provide that the excess over and above that 
 amount shall be paid equally by the three companies concerned. 
 
 FINAL OKDEK OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 THURSDAY, December 10, 1891. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips, John R. Wheeler and J. C. Willis, Com- 
 missioners; J. H. Paddock, Secretary, and Chas. Hansel, Consulting 
 Engineer the following proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this petition and citation, consolidated by a former order 
 of the Commission, having come on to be finally heard and determined 
 by the Commission this 10th day of December, 1891, and the Com- 
 mission having considered the evidence taken therein, the agreements 
 made by the parties through their respective counsel, and the argu- 
 ments of counsel made before the Commission at a former session, 
 and the Commission being fully advised in the premises, on considera- 
 tion doth find: 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossings described in the 
 said petition and citation be protected and operated by an interlock- 
 ing device; that it would be just and equitable for the companies 
 named in said petition and citation to pay for the original cost and 
 future maintenance of said device as follows: 
 
 The Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company and the Belt 
 Railway Company of Chicago, lessee, four-tenths; the Chicago & 
 Alton Railroad Company three- tenths, and Atchison, Topeka & 
 Santa Fe Railroad Company three-tenths; and that it would fur-
 
 136 
 
 ther be just and reasonable, in view of the burdens for gatemen now 
 resting upon certain of them by contract, that the expense of the 
 operation of said device should be paid for by said companies as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 The said Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company, and the 
 said The Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee, to pay one-half 
 of said operating expense, up to the point where the same shall reach 
 the sum of $80 per month, or $960 per year; the said Atchison, Topeka 
 & Santa Fe Railroad Company to pay the remaining one-half of such 
 operating expense, up to the point where the same shall reach a like 
 sum of $80 per month, or $960 per year; and of the expense of such 
 operation, if any, over and above the sum of said payments so to be 
 made, to- wit: $160 per month or $1,920 per year, the said Chicago & 
 Western Indiana Railroad Company, and the said The Belt Railway 
 Company of Chicago, lessee, to pay one-third thereof, the said Chi- 
 caga & Alton Railroad Company one-third thereof, and the said At- 
 chison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company one third thereof. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies 
 to- wit: The Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company, and The 
 Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee, the Chicago & Alton Rail- 
 road company, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Com- 
 pany, proceed to protect said crossings by an Interlocking device of 
 the kind and description shown upon the blue print drawing and plan 
 which is attached hereto, and which is hereby made part and parcel 
 of this order.f 
 
 EXPLANATION OF PLAN. 
 
 It is further ordered that for the better understanding of the said 
 plan, the following explanations thereof be observed: 
 
 The position of derails is indicated by a shaded point, the location 
 being fixed by measurement indicated by figures. 
 
 Main track routes are goverened by top blade of high semaphore 
 signal placed on engineman's side of the track which it governs. 
 
 The back-up and switching movements are goverened by dwarf 
 semaphore signals. 
 
 The distance of signal from point it governs is fixed by figures. 
 Its position may be shifted latterly if the space between tracks is not 
 sufficient to receive the post without danger. 
 
 In case it is not desired to operate switches marked on plan as 
 "worked or bolt-locked," then the lower blade governing such switch 
 may be omitted. 
 
 GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said interlocking device and machine 
 be constructed by said companies in accordance with the following 
 general specifications, to- wit: 
 
 tThis plan can be seen attached to the docket, but the same can not be shown here.
 
 137 
 
 1. The switches, derails and signals must be operated from a cen- 
 tral tower house as indicated on blue print plan. 
 
 2. All signals must be of the semaphore type. 
 
 3. All switches and locks must be worked by one inch iron pipe, 
 plugged and riveted at joints and carried on anti-friction pipe car- 
 riers fixed on oak posts placed firmly in the ground, not to exceed 
 eight feet apart. Each line of pipe must be automatically compen- 
 sated. 
 
 4. All signals must be worked with two lines of wire. 
 
 5. All signal blades must be so constructed as to go to the danger 
 position in case of breakage of connections anywhere between the 
 operating lever and blade. 
 
 6. All facing point switches must be fitted with duplex facing 
 point locks. 
 
 7. All cranks and pipe compensators must be fixed on founda- 
 tions firmly imbedded in concrete. 
 
 -8. All cranks, compensators, chain wheels and main pipe lines 
 must be boxed. 
 
 9. All derails and operated switches must be provided with de- 
 tector bar. 
 
 10. All switch points must work on iron plates so arranged as 
 to keep the track at switch points accurately to gauge. 
 
 11. All connections must be accurately adjusted so as to make it 
 impossible to give a clear signal with the switch open or partially 
 open. 
 
 12. Each part of the machine and connections must be made 
 sufficiently strong for the work it is to perform. 
 
 13. All movements of switches and signals must be made by 
 levers arranged and interlocked so as to prevent the operator from 
 giving conflicting signals. 
 
 14. The material and workmanship must be in all respects first- 
 class and the entire plant must be constructed in accordance with 
 the best practice in signalling, and the plant as a whole, must, when 
 finished, be complete and perfect and in every way fit for the pur- 
 pose of its construction, and all details not herein specified, which 
 may be found necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the 
 machine and plant shall be supplied by the said companies, the same 
 as though they were herein particularly set forth. 
 
 15. The machine to be used for the operation and interlocking of 
 the signals, switches and derails must be approved by this Commis- 
 sion before construction is commenced ; and the entire plant must be 
 constructed subject to the approval of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, and permit duly issued, as required by statute, before 
 it is put into operation. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said companies pay the cost of the 
 original construction and of the maintenance of said device as fol- 
 lows:
 
 138 
 
 The Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company, and The 
 Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee, shall pay four-tenths 
 thereof, the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company shall pay three- 
 tenths thereof, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Com- 
 pany shall pay three-tenths thereof; and of the expense of the oper- 
 ation of said device when complete, the said Chicago & Western In- 
 diana Railroad Company, and the said The Belt Railway Company 
 of Chicago, lessee, shall pay one-half thereof, up to the point where 
 the same shall reach $80 per month, or $960 per year, and the said 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Company shall pay the other 
 half of said expense of operation up to the point where the same 
 shall reach the sum of $80 per month, or $960 per year; and of the 
 expense of operation over and above the sum of the two amounts so 
 provided to be paid, if any, the said Chicago & Western Indiana 
 Railroad Company, and the said The Belt Railway Company of Chi- 
 cago, lessee, shall pay one-third of such excess, the said Chicago and 
 Alton Railroad Company shall pay one-third thereof, and the said 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Company shall pay the re- 
 maining one-third of such excess. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said companies ehall construct the 
 said interlocking device and have the same in order and ready for 
 use within ninety days from the entering of this order (December 
 10, 1891) as provided by statute.
 
 BEFOKE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STHTE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, & ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 PETITION No. 2. PROTECTION OF CROSSING AT CORWITH. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, WM. BROWN, General Solicitor. 
 For Kespondent, A. D. WHEELER, Attorney.
 
 141 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition by the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company for 
 an order to compel the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe" Railroad Com- 
 pany to join the petitioner in interlocking the crossing of the tracks 
 of the two companies at Corwith, in Cook county. The location of 
 the tracks of the Atchison company at this point are peculiar. The 
 Alton has two tracks running parallel with the Illinois & Michigan 
 canal and immediately on the south side thereof. The Atchison has, 
 or will have, two main tracks also running parallel with the canal 
 upon the north side. Another main track of the Atchison company 
 connecting with the Corwith yards and running north and south , 
 passes over the canal and forms a crossing with both the tracks of 
 the Alton and the other tracks of the Atchison. Besides these there 
 is a switch or turn-out of the Atchison extending over the canal and 
 crossing the Alton tracks near the place where the other north and 
 south line of the Atchison crosses them. It is necessary to include 
 both the main track crossings, the turn-out crossing, and all the 
 switches in one system of interlocking. 
 
 The Alton here, as in the other cases before us, has contended that 
 the entire burden of putting in, maintaining and operating this in- 
 terlocking should be cast upon the Atchison because it is the junior 
 company. We have disposed of this claim of seniority in our opinion 
 rendered in the case of the Paducah Junction crossing. In the case 
 before us, however, a very large proportion of the cost of the inter- 
 locking plant is occasioned by the number and peculiar location of 
 the tracks of the Atchison company, and it would be unjust to com- 
 pel the Alton company to pay equally with the Atchison under the 
 peculiar circumstances of this case. 
 
 The Atchison company contends that the expense of construction 
 operation and maintenance should be apportioned according to the 
 number of main tracks of each company involved in the crossing, 
 which in this case would be a burden of two-thirds of such expenses 
 upon the Atchison company and one-third upon the Alton company. 
 While we have in the other case referred to expressed our dissatis- 
 faction with this basis of apportioning expenses as applied to ail 
 cases,yet in the particular case now under consideration we think the re-
 
 142 
 
 suit which would be obtained by applying the main track basis would 
 be just and equitable. The Atchison company offers to pay two- 
 thirds of all cost and expense and we are inclined to regard this, un- 
 der the circumstances, as a fair offer. 
 
 Since this case was heard before the Commission the Atchison 
 company has filed a plat or drawing showing that the projected line 
 of the canal to be built by the Chicago Drainage Commission passes 
 near the proposed crossing of the tracks of these two companies, and, 
 it is said, if the canal is built as this plan indicates, some change may 
 have to be made in the location of the tracks of the Atchison com- 
 pany. We are, however, advised by our consulting engineer, that the 
 building of the canal as proposed will not necessarily interfere with 
 the interlocking plant required for these crossings; and inasmuch as 
 the digging of the canal is somewhat remote, and may depend upon 
 contingencies, we have concluded not to change the plan of inter- 
 locking upon that account. We do not think the proposed canal a 
 sufficient reason for denying the prayer of the Alton's petition. 
 
 An ordor will therefore be entered in this case for the interlock- 
 ing of the system of crossings and switches shown upon the plats 
 that have been submitted and partly described in the petition in 
 this case, which order shall provide that the original cost, expense 
 of future maintenance, and the expense of operation, shall be paid 
 two-thirds by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe" Railroad Company, 
 and one-third by the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 THURSDAY, December 10, 1891. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day; 
 present Isaac N. Phillips, John R. Wheeler and J. C. Willis, Com- 
 missioners; J. H. Paddock, Secretary, and Chas. Hansel Consulting 
 Engineer the following proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and deter- 
 mination before the Commission on this 10th day of December, 1891, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, 
 the agreements made by the parties through their respective counsel, 
 and the arguments of counsel made before the Commission at a pre- 
 vious session, and the said Commission being fully advised in the 
 premises on consideration doth find: 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossing described in said 
 petition, and the other crossing and switches of the Atchison, Topeka 
 & Santa F6 Railroad Company hereby found to be necessarily in- 
 volved in the interlocking system, be protected and operated by an 
 interlocking device; that it would be just and equitable for the said 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company to pay one- third part of the en- 
 tire original cost of said device and its several parts, attachments, 
 and appurtances and of the expense in maintaining and operating 
 the same, and for the said Atchison, Topeka and Santa F6 Railroad 
 Company to pay two-thirds of such original cost and of such expense 
 of maintenance and operation.
 
 143 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 lo-wit: The Chicago & Alton Railroad Company and the Atchison, 
 Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Company, forthwith proceed to protect 
 said crossings by an interlocking device of the kind and description 
 shown upon the blue print drawing and plan which is attached hereto, 
 and which is hereby made part and parcel of this order.f 
 
 EXPLANATION OP PLAN. 
 
 It is further ordered that for the better understanding of the said 
 plan, the following explanations thereof be observed: 
 
 The position of derails is indicated by a shaded point, the location 
 being fixed by measurement indicated by figures. 
 
 Main track routes are governed by top blade of high semaphore 
 signal placed on engineman's side of the track which it governs. 
 
 The back-up and switching movements are governed by dwarf 
 semaphore signals. 
 
 The distance of signal from point it governs is fixed by figures. 
 Its position may be shifted laterally if the space between tracks is 
 not sufficient to receive the post without danger. 
 
 In case it is not desired to operate switches marked on plan as 
 "worked or bolt-locked," then the lower blade governing such switch 
 may be omitted. 
 
 GENERAL SPECIFICATIONS. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said interlocking device and machine 
 be constructed by said companies in accordance with the following 
 general specifications, to- wit: 
 
 1. The switches, derails and signals must be operated from a cen- 
 tral tower house, as indicated on blue print plan. 
 
 2. All signals must be of a semaphore type. 
 
 3. All switches and locks must be worked by one-inch iron pipe, 
 plugged and riveted at joints, and carried on anti-friction pipe car- 
 riers fixed on oak posts placed firmly in the ground not to exceed 
 eight feet apart. Each line of pipe must be automatically compen- 
 sated. 
 
 4. All signals must be worked with two lines of wire. 
 
 5. All signal blades must be so constructed as to go to the danger 
 position in case of breakage of connections anywhere between the 
 operating lever and blade. 
 
 6. All facing point switches must be fitted with duplex facing 
 point locks. 
 
 7. All cranks and pipe compensators must be fixed on foundations 
 firmly imbedded in concrete. 
 
 8. All cranks, compensators, chain wheels, and main pipe lines 
 must be boxed. 
 
 tFor plan referred to, see docket of the Commission.
 
 144 
 
 9. All derails and operated switches must be provided with de- 
 tector bar. 
 
 10. All switch points must work on iron plates so arranged as to- 
 keep the track at switch points accurately to gauge. 
 
 11. All connections must be accurately adjusted so as to make it 
 impossible to give a clear signal with the switch open or partially 
 open. 
 
 12. Each part of the machine and connections must be made 
 sufficiently strong for the work it is to perform. 
 
 13. All movements of switches and signals must be made by 
 levers arranged and interlocked so as to prevent the operator from 
 giving conflicting signals. 
 
 14. The material and workmanship must be in all respects first- 
 class, and the entire plant must be constructed in accordance with 
 the best practice in signaling, and the plant as a whole, must, when 
 finished, be complete and perfect, and in every way fit for the pur- 
 pose of its construction, and all details not herein specified, which 
 may be found necessary to the completeness and efficiency of the 
 machine and plant, shall be supplied by the said companies the same 
 as though they were herein particularly set forth. 
 
 15. The machine to be used for the operation and interlocking of 
 the signals, switches, and derails must be approved by this Commis- 
 sion before construction is commenced, and the entire plant must be 
 constructed subject to the approval of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, and permit duly issued as required by statute before it 
 is put into operation. 
 
 It is farther ordered that the said Chicago & Alton Railroad Com- 
 pany pay one-third of the original cost, and of the expense of main- 
 tenance, and of the future operation of said device, and that the said 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Company pay two thirds of 
 such cost and expense. 
 
 And it is further ordered that the said companies shall construct 
 the said device and machine and have the same in order and ready 
 for use within ninety days from the entering of this order (December 
 10, 1891) as provided by statute.
 
 No 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 CLAIM OF McCouETiE, HILL & Co. 
 
 GRAIN INSPECTION DEPARTMENT, CHICAGO. 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION, 
 
 -10 O.
 
 147 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 McCourtie, Hill & Co. ask the Commission to refund twenty dollars 
 deposited by them upon their appeal from the grading of four cer- 
 tain cars of oats. The track inspector graded the cars "No. 3 oats." 
 Claimants appealed, insisting the grade should be "No. 3 white oats," 
 but the Appeals Committee affirmed the original inspection. A re- 
 turn of fees is sought upon two grounds, namely: 
 
 1. That a proper interpretation and application of the printed 
 rule establishing grades of oats would have made the cargo in ques- 
 tion "No. 3 white." 
 
 2. That certain similar oats before inspected for claimants, had 
 been graded "No. 3 white,'" thereby giving claimants good cause to 
 believe the grade of the four cars would be changed on appeal, and 
 the claimants, having thus been misled, without their fault, should 
 in equity be repaid fees. 
 
 That part of rule 4 establishing and defining the two grades of 
 oats which are here in question is as follows: 
 
 "No. 3 WHITE OATS shall be seven-eighths white, but not suffi- 
 ciently sound and clean for No. 2," (meaning No. 2 white oats). 
 
 "No. 3 OATS shall be all oats that are damp, unsound, dirty, or 
 from any cause unfit for No. 2," (meaning No. 2 oats) . 
 
 The oats in question were all white. So far therefore as color 
 alone could be decisive, it points to a grading of these oats as 
 "white;" and claimants contend that upon this ground of color the 
 four cars should have been graded as white oats, if graded at all. 
 One question here is, therefore, whether the element of color is by 
 itself decisive of grade. 
 
 The words of the above rule for 3 white, "but not sufficiently sound 
 and clean for No. 2," have received an interpretation by the long 
 practice of the department, which can only be understood by re- 
 curring to the definition of the grade of No. 2 white, which latter are 
 required to be "seven- eighths white, sweet, reasonably clean, and rea- 
 sonably free from other grain." The words iii the No. 3 rule, "but 
 not sufficiently sound and clean for No. 2," are held to mean that in 
 soundness and cleanness No. 3 shall be but a single degree or point 
 below what is required for No. 2. This clause is not construed, as
 
 148 
 
 contended here, to embrace all other oats which are seven-eighths 
 white, and not too unsound and dirty to be graded at all. Such a 
 construction the words might bear, perhaps, if standing alone; but 
 all parts of the rule, establishing grades of oats, should be con- 
 strued together; and when it is considered that the definition of "No. 
 3 oats" ambraces "all oats" of certain defective qualities, we think 
 the interpretation which the 3 white rule has received in practice is 
 not unreasonable. Oats which are musty, very dirty, or unsound are 
 not graded white, even though the color of them is, in fact, such. 
 Such oats, if fit to grade at all, are called "No. 3 oats." 
 
 The oats in the four cars of McCourtie, Hill & Co., were musty 
 so shown to be by the samples produced at the hearing. They had 
 been damp, and, at the date of inspection, were not approximately 
 up in quality to No. 2 white, in soundness and sweetness. Their 
 proper place was, therefore, in the grade of "No. 3 oats," which, it 
 will be seen from the above rule, embrace "all oats" of the character 
 described in it; that is to say, oats of all colors which are "damp, 
 unsound, dirty, etc." 
 
 The second ground urged is, that a previous inspection made for 
 claimants of similar oats as "No. 3 white" misled claimants into be- 
 lieving in good faith that the cars in question had been wrongly 
 graded, and hence the fees should in equity be refunded. 
 
 It does appear from samples shown at the hearing, that certain 
 musty oats, of perhaps no better quality than these four cars, had 
 previously been graded for claimants as "No. 3 white oats." It is 
 not shown what track inspector did this. The alleged mislead- 
 ing inspection was, however, clearly erroneous, and not in line with 
 the general practice of the department. 
 
 It would result in no end of difficulty and confusion, if we should 
 hold, that one inspector is bound to follow the error of another in- 
 spector of equal rank, or even that he is bound to follow his own 
 error, if so unfortunate as to make one. The judgment of the track 
 inspector who gave the grade which claimants say they relied upon, 
 is of no higher authority than the judgment of the other track in- 
 spector who called these cars "No. 3 oats." If this appeal demon- 
 strates anything it is that the first inspection was wrong. It is the 
 voice of a tribunal of arbitration provided by law, and its action is 
 conclusive as to the grade of these oats of claimants. 
 
 We are sufficiently convinced of the desirability that all inspec- 
 tions should be absolutely correct, if that were possible. So long, 
 however, as the department must rely upon the judgments of fallible 
 men, errors will occur, and will be expected by patrons. The problem 
 is, by wise regulations and proper selection of inspectors, to reduce 
 errors to a minimum. Some hardships would, perhaps, be incident 
 to the best system that human wisdom could devise. Claimants were 
 no doubt led by their experience to believe an appeal would, in this 
 case, be successful; and, if their belief had been based upon a judg- 
 ment of the same tribunal to which their appeal was taken, instead 
 of being based upon the judgment of a track inspector of no higher
 
 149 
 
 authority than the judgment appealed from, there would be better 
 reason to say they should in equity be reimbursed. Even then the 
 question would be raised whether the Commissioners, unskilled as 
 they are in the technical requirements of inspectiou, would be willing, 
 by refunding these fees, to discredit the judgment of the Appeals 
 Committee in a matter peculiarly within the skill and jurisdiction of 
 that committee. The Commission does not hold up either its Ap- 
 peals Committee or its track inspectors as infallible; but we believe 
 all of them are skillful and conscientious. Unfortunately the grading 
 of grain is not a process which admits of mathematical accuracy. 
 Definitions of grades are after all but words, and words are elastic 
 things. It is less remarkable that errors sometimes occur than that 
 they occur so seldom. If an inspector does err the department can 
 not undertake to be bound by his error, nor to indemnify those who 
 may be so unfortunate as to rely upon the error as authority. 
 
 For the reasons given, the claim has been denied. 
 Adopted March 2, 1892.
 
 No. 18 
 
 STHTE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 E 
 
 CLAIM OE W. W. HUNTER, 
 
 GRAIN INSPECTION DEPARTMENT AT CHICAGO, 
 
 For Error in Certificate. 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION.
 
 153 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a claim of W. W. Hunter for $19.16 damages alleged to 
 have resulted to him from a clerical error in a certain certificate of 
 inspection of a car of oats. The facts out of which the claim arises 
 have been succinctly stated to the Commission by Mr. Price, Chief 
 Inspector, in the following letter: 
 
 CHICAGO, October 23, 1891. 
 Hon. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. and W. Com., Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I beg to snbtnit herewith, for the consideration of Your Honor- 
 able Board, a claim for $19.16 made against the department by Mr. W. 
 W. Hunter. The circumstances are as follows: 
 
 Car 5032, C. S. L., was inspected on the C.,B . & Q. R. R., Sept. 21st, 1891, 
 as No. Two (2) Oats, "Subject to approval on unloading." On the same day, 
 car 5062 was inspected as the same grade, but without the qualification. 
 
 By an error in copying, Mr. Fishback left the first car off the books. When 
 a certificate on the car was called for, the number could not be found; but 
 5062, being so nearly the same number, and agreeing exactly as to date and 
 grade, the natural supposition was that one of the figures was wrong. Some 
 one in the office called up the track men and asked which number was cor- 
 rect. The track men happened to find 5032 first, and reported that such was 
 the number on their books. On the strength of this report the number 5062 
 was erased and 5032 inserted in its place, but without the limitation. 
 
 On the strength of the clear certificate furnished him, Mr. Hunter paid for 
 the car and forwarded it to a customer at Kokomo, Ind. In unloading the 
 grain at that point it was discovered that the car was badly "plugged," and 
 that the oats should have been three (3) oats, instead of two (2). The claim 
 of two (2) cents per bushel is a very reasonable one, considering the quality 
 of the oats delivered. 
 
 It is impossible to fix the fault definitely upon any person, but at the same 
 time Mr. Hunter has been damaged beyond question by some one or more of 
 the employes of this department. Mr. Fishback erred in leaving the car 
 number off his records. The man also who took the matter up first made an 
 excusable error in jumping at the conclusion that the two cars were identical, 
 while the track men are not entirely blameless, in that they did not, when re- 
 porting that they found car 5032 on their books, also report that it was in- 
 spected "subject to approval." If this had been done, or if the car had been 
 at first copied as it should have been, Mr. Hunter would have been put upon 
 his guard and a re-inspection ordered which would have developed the true 
 state of affairs, and thrown the blame upon the guilty party. 
 
 I know the position in which the Commission and the Department are 
 placed by the opinion of the Attorney General, but I know also that the pub- 
 lic confidence in the Department suffers severely whenever we fail in a single 
 instance to make our grades good.
 
 154 
 
 The dissatisfaction among the grain men with what they consider a dishon- 
 orable shirking of a plain business responsibility, is growing all the time, and 
 1 am forced to take some severe "overhaul ings" on account of it. 
 
 I believe that every man on the Board of Trade, without a single dissenting 
 voice would uphold the position that such claims as this should be paid from 
 the Department funds, and further, that all such claims should be paid 
 promptly, and such amounts as may deem best collected back from the in- 
 spectors in error. 
 
 I know this matter is considered settled, but I respectfully ask your Honor- 
 able Board to look carefully into it again and see if there can not be found 
 some justification for following the long line of precedents and custom of 
 years, rather than the opinion of the Attorney General, which, while it is 
 doubtless good law, is very prejudicial to the rights of the public and the 
 interest and reputation of the Department. 
 
 Respectfully yours, 
 
 (Signed) P. BIRD PRiCE t 
 
 Chief Inspector. 
 
 The reasonings of the Attorney General in the opinion referred to 
 by Mr. Price, taken in their broadest scope, might perhaps exclude a 
 claim of the character here presented, but the claim of Franklin, Ed- 
 son & Co., on which that opinion was rendered was for the error of 
 an inspector and not a clerk. The inspector graded No. 8 wheat as 
 No. 2; and, it may be added, the error was so glaring as to raise a 
 suspicion of the inspector's good faith. 
 
 The statute provides that each track inspector shall execute a bond 
 in the penal sum of $5,000, conditioned among other things, "that he 
 will pay all damages to any person or persons who may be injured by 
 reason of his neglect, refusal, or failure, to comply with the law and 
 the rules and regulations." 
 
 One of the contentions of the counsel of Franklin, Edson & Co. 
 in the case on which the Attorney General's opinion was given, was 
 that the bond required by statute of an inspector is for the protec- 
 tion of the Department itself as well as of patrons. It was contended 
 the Commission could pay the claim of Franklin, Edson & Co., and 
 look to the bond of the inspector for reimbursement. The Attorney 
 General did not, however, concur in this view. He states the liability 
 of the inspectors upon their bonds at page 5 of his opinion, in these 
 words: 
 
 "The law requires that he shall be qualified for the duties which he as- 
 sumes, and his bond is given for the purpose of holding him to the faithful 
 performance of those duties, and to indemnify those who may be injured by 
 his neglect so to do. I note what the claimants and their learned counsel say 
 as to the right to recover on the bond of the assistant inspector (i. e. the right 
 of the Commission to recover), but I can not concur either in the reasoning 
 or the conclusions reached by them. The remedy for the injury of which 
 they complain, must, in my opinion, be found by suit on the bond of the as- 
 sistant inspector; and this remedy seems to be adequate." 
 
 After quoting, and commenting upon the law as to what may prop- 
 erly be included in the estimate of expenses which the Commission 
 is authorized to raise revenues to meet, the Attorney General con- 
 cludes his opinion in these words:
 
 155 
 
 "I conclude that the statute confers on the Commissioners no authority to- 
 use funds collected for the necessary expenses incident to the inspection ser- 
 vice in paying claims for injuries arising Jrom false or erroneous inspection.^ 
 (Page 7.) 
 
 Evidently the Attorney General meant to give no opinion beyond 
 the case that was before him, that is to say: The case of a claim for 
 the erroneous grading of grain by an inspector who has given bond 
 under the statute. The substantial basis of the opinion, as we under- 
 stand it, is the fact that in the case of such damages the statute pro- 
 vides injured parties a complete remedy upon the inspector's bond r 
 and thus negatives the idea that the Commission was expected to 
 pay them. In other words, the law so specifically and clearly points 
 out another remedy that in the opinion of the Attorney General the 
 Commission is without power to make other provision for payment;, 
 and he holds further that the recovery on the bond must be by the 
 injured party and not by the Commission. 
 
 As before remarked, this case is not like that of Franklin, Edson 
 & Co. Here the error can not be distinctly traced to any officer or 
 employe" of the department who is required by statute to give a bond. 
 The clerks in the office, where the first mischievous errors arose, do 
 not give bond for the protection of patrons. No remedy is, therefore- 
 provided by law for errors made by the Chief Inspector's clerks. 
 Even in the case of those employe's who have given bond, we con- 
 ceive that cases might arise where it would be impossible to trace 
 the error in such way as to furnish to patrons an effective remedy 
 for the injury. 
 
 The question is raised whether in such cases this Commission shall 
 leave the patrons of the inspection department without a remedy. 
 Unless the Commission are at liberty to regard damages, arising from 
 errors made by employe's who give no bond, as a part of the necessary 
 expenses of the department, patrons will be left without protection, 
 We are advised by the Chief Inspector that to do this tends seriously 
 to discredit the inspection department among its patrons, all of whom 
 insist, with much show of reason, that the department should make 
 its grades good. 
 
 It was known when this law passed that fallible men would be em- 
 ployed to do the work of the inspection department, and that the 
 most careful men, when acting under the best devised system, will 
 frequently make mistakes. Would it, then, do any violence to the 
 law, or the intention of its framers, to hold that errors committed by 
 employe's, which cause patrons damage, shall, in the absence of other 
 express provision for the payment, be taken and held as a part of 
 the necessary expenses of the inspection department, to be paid as 
 other expenses, and for which revenue may properly be raised from 
 inspection fees? Surely such claims for damages could have been 
 as well forseen as could bills for the rent of offices, or the pay-roll of 
 employe's. Nothing else was to have been expected than that errors- 
 would occasionally be made, and that damages to patrons would arise 
 therefrom.
 
 156 
 
 While respecting entirely the Attorney General's opinion, we at 
 the same time realize the necessity so well expressed in the Chief 
 Inspector's letter, of adopting a proper policy for this large depart- 
 ment of State work. We are further influenced by the fact lately so 
 well established that the patrons of the department, those from whom 
 the department derives its revenues, are unanimons in their wish that 
 damages arising from errors may be considered as an expense of the 
 department, and considered in fixing the inspection fees. We are, 
 therefore, constrained to adopt a rule permitting the use of the funds 
 of the department for the purpose of paying such claims for damages 
 as may arise from errors that can not be distinctly traced to some 
 employ^ of the department who is required by statute to give a bond. 
 It is to claims arising from errors of this latter class of employe's 
 which we believe the Attorney General intended to apply his opinion, 
 and there his opinion will be given full force. As already shown, 
 the case before the Attorney General was for a flagrant error com- 
 mitted by a bonded inspector, and his opinion, like the opinions of 
 courts, can not have force, and was not intended to have force beyond 
 the class of facts out of which it arose. 
 
 It only remains to be said, that this Commission, foreseeing the 
 importance of this question, recommended to the last General As- 
 sembly a law authorizing the Commission to pay claims of this kind, 
 and providing also for such a change in the wording of the condition 
 of the inspector's bonds as would enable the Commission in the first 
 instance to settle all damages for errors as well of the inspectors as 
 of clerks, leaving the adjustment of the matter of the employe's lia- 
 bility to be settled between him and the Commission. This law, 
 which we deem to be urgently needed, passed the Senate but died in 
 the House. We hope the next General Assembly may see the im- 
 portance of enacting a statute relieving this subject from all doubt, 
 and placing the Commission in a position to make good its grades 
 against the errors of all classes of employes. 
 
 For the reasons given, the claim of W. W. Hunter, for $19.16, is 
 hereby ordered paid. 
 
 Adopted March 3, 1892.
 
 No. 
 
 STHTE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 SWITCHING CARS 
 
 OPINION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HUNT UPON THE LEGAL DUTY: 
 
 DEVOLVING UPON KAILROAD COMPANIES TO 
 
 SWITCH LOADED AND EMPTY CARS. 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 
 JOHN R. WHEELER, 
 
 J. C. WILLIS, 
 
 J. H. PADDOCK, Secretary. 
 
 Commissioners.
 
 CORRESPONDENCE. 
 
 TOLEDO, ST. Louis & KANSAS CITY R. R., 
 W. S. WEED, General Freight Agent. 
 
 TOLEDO, Ohio, Sept. 22, 1891. 
 
 Mr. J. H. Paddock, Sec'y III. R. R. & Warehouse Com'n, Spring- 
 field, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: The question has arisen as to whether or not it is ob- 
 ligatory under the Illinois State Law for competing lines at 
 junction points in Illinois to switch loaded cars from a competitor, 
 same to be unloaded on tracks of the other; also as to placing empty 
 cars of a competitor, to be loaded and forwarded via the latter. It is 
 claimed that the law only requires the switching of loaded cars for 
 unloading, and that there is no provision for switching empty cars 
 from a competing line to the side tracks of another, to be loaded and 
 forwarded via the former. Will you kindly advise fully at your earli- 
 est convenience? 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 (Signed) W. S. WEED, 
 D. G. F. A. 
 
 Office of RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 SPRINGFIELD, Sept. 24, 1891. 
 
 W. S. Weed, Esq., G. F. A., T., St. L. & K. O. R. R., Toledo, Ohio. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Replying to your favor of the 22d inst.: I will lay 
 the same before the Commission at its next meeting. In the mean- 
 time can you not state a little more specifically the case you present, 
 that is, locating it at the junction point referred to and giving names 
 of the roads? 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary.
 
 160 
 
 TOLEDO, ST. Louis & KANSAS CITY R. R., 
 W. S. WEED, General Freight Agent. 
 
 TOLEDO, OHIO, Sept. 29, 1891. 
 
 Mr. J. H. Paddock, Sec'y III. JR. JR. & Warehouse Com'n, Spring- 
 field, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Responding to your favor of the 24th inst., we have 
 no objection to giving you more specific information as to the case 
 we have in mind. At Cowden, 111., the O. & M. take the stand that 
 while they are required to switch loaded cars from us to be unloaded 
 on their tracks, they do not understand that it is obligatory for them 
 to switch empty cars to their side tracks to be loaded for shipment 
 via our line. We would like a full interpretation of the law as it 
 affects the matter of s'witching at junction points. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 (Signed) W. S. WEED, 
 D. G. F. A. 
 
 Office of RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Oct. 8, 1891. 
 
 Hon. Geo. Hunt, Attorney General, Springfield, 111. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Enclosed I hand you two communications from Mr. 
 W. S. Weed, General Freight Age'nt, Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas 
 City Railroad Co. 
 
 The Commission have adopted the following order in relation 
 thereto: 
 
 "Ordered, That the Secretary place the communications of W. S. 
 Weed, General Freight Agent, Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City R. 
 R. Co., dated September 22 and 29, 1891, in the hands of the Attorney 
 General, with the request that he communicate to this Commission 
 his opinion thereon as soon as practicable." 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Office of RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 SPRINGFIELD, Nov. 5, 1891. 
 
 Hon. Geo. Hunt, Attorney General, Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: If you will return to me the letters of Mr. W. S. 
 Weed, the Commission will try and formulate an inquiry in regard 
 to the matter which will be perfectly clear, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary.
 
 161 
 
 "BLUFF LINE." 
 
 ST. Louis, ALTON & SPRINGFIELD RAILROAD, 
 JOSEPH DICKSON, Receiver. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Nov. 3, 1891. 
 Mr. J. H. Paddock, Sec'y, Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I would respectfully ask your opinion on a matter of 
 switching facilities furnished by one railroad for another. The case 
 on hand is as follows: 
 
 At Alton, 111,, the Alton Lime and Cement Works are located on 
 our tracks, and can only be reached by other companies through our 
 switching their cars. This company furnishes lime to the Spring- 
 field Gas Company, who have all the shipments routed via the C. & 
 A. R. R., notwithstanding the fact that we agreed and are willing to 
 meet any ra'.e the C. & A. R. R. makes. 
 
 As this business justly belongs to us, are we compelled to switch 
 the C. & A. Cars at Alton to and from these works on their paying 
 us the customary $2 per car switching charge? An early reply will 
 greatly oblige. 
 
 Yours respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) F. E. FISHEB, 
 
 G. F. A. 
 
 Office of RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, Nov. 16, 1891. 
 
 F. E. Fisher, G. F. A., St. L., A. & S. E. R., Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Your communication of the 3d inst. was referred to 
 Chairman Phillips for investigation. As soon as he makes his re- 
 port thereon I will furnish you with a copy of it. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, Secretary 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, Dec. 7, 1891. 
 Hon. George Hunt, Attorney General, Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: The inclosed letters of W. S. Weed were formerly 
 transmitted to you by the Secretary of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission under order of the Board, which read: 
 
 "Ordered, that the Secretary place the communications of W. S. Weed, 
 General Freight Agent, T. St. L. & K. C. R. R. Co., dated Sept. 22d and 
 29th, 1891, in the hands of the Attorney General, with the request that he 
 communicate his opinion thereon as soon as practicable." 
 
 Subsequently you returned the letters with a communication say- 
 ing, in substance, that the questions on which an opinion was desired 
 were not stated in the letters with sufficient particularity for you to 
 
 11 O
 
 give an opinion. Upon receipt of this communication from you the 
 letters were referred to me with the instructions to state the ques- 
 tions to you in such manner as to make them intelligible. 
 
 Since that time other communications raising a kindred question 
 have been received from Mr. F. E. Fisher, of the "Bluff Line," which 
 communications I have marked No. 2, and inclose them herewith to- 
 gether with the letters of Mr. Weed, formerly in your hands. I will 
 say that I regard the question raised by these letters as a very impor- 
 tant one, and one that is likely to lead to litigatien before very long. 
 The question of the legal obligation of a railroad to switch cars for 
 another road, or to switch cars for patrons who may desire it done in 
 those places where no regular switching business is done by any com- 
 pany, is one which, so far as I know, has never been directly settled. 
 Questions of this kind naturally arise in small towns rather than in 
 large ones, for the reason that in large cities there are roads which 
 devote themselves to doing switching business. There is, in the city 
 of Chicago, at least one company, I think, which does nothing else, 
 ^nd in the city of Peoria, the Burlington road has a "switching de- 
 partment." In such places, therefore, there is an agency to do the 
 switching, and questions of this kind do not arise. But Mr. Weed 
 mentions that at Cowden, 111., the O. & M. draws the line of its legal 
 obligation at the switching of empty cars from its side-track to be 
 loaded for shipment by way of the Clover Leaf Line. The question 
 is, whether under the common law and statutes of Illinois, there is 
 legal obligation upon the O. & M. to take empty cars from another 
 xoad and place them at factories or institutions located on its line to 
 be loaded for shipment by way of another line of road. 
 
 In the correspondence of Mr. Fisher, you will see that a similiar 
 question is raised. He desires to know whether the Bluff Line is 
 under a legal obligation to switch cars for the C & A. company to 
 and from certain cement works, located on the Bluff Line, the C. & 
 A. road offering to pay the customary two dollars per car for switch- 
 ing charges. 
 
 The question is highly important, and the Commission do not feel 
 like guessing it off without full investigation and without taking 
 your opinion, inasmuch as suits may grow out of these questions. 
 
 The only case in which this Commission has had occasion to at all 
 consider the question was in complaint No. 64, Union Brewing Co. v. 
 C., B. & Q.; but in that case it was unnecessary, as the Commission 
 thought, to decide squarely the question of the legal obligation to 
 switch cars. The question in that complaint was, rather, as to 
 whether a company which did habitually do a switching business 
 could, while switching for some, refuse to switch for others. 
 
 I inclose you herein the printed opinion of the Commission in that 
 complaint wherein you will see on pages 6, 7 and 8, what the Com- 
 mission have said touching this question. I do not send this to you 
 as an authority at all, but rather as a help to you to understand the 
 point of these inquiries. I will say that the Commissioners did not 
 make up their minds upon the main question. 
 
 It may also make some difference that the parties applying to have
 
 103 
 
 cars switched in the cases stated in these letters were other railroad 
 companies, and not an individual patron of the road. Whether this 
 makes any difference or not, I leave you to judge. In the case of the 
 O. & M., the company seems to base its refusal upon a distinction 
 between the switching of loaded cars to their destination, and the 
 switching of empty cars to the initial point to be loaded for shipment. 
 This question will, of course be considered by you. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 (Signed) ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, Chairman, etc. 
 
 NOAH H. PIKE, 
 
 Dealer in Lumber and Coal. 
 
 CHENOA, ILL., Feb. 1, 1892. 
 I. N. Phillips, Esq., R. & W. Commissioner. 
 
 DEAR SIR: The first of this year, the C. & A. R. R. Co. issued or- 
 ders to their agent here not to do any more switching for me on lum- 
 ber less than 2.7 cents per 100 Ibs., making it cost me for the smallest 
 car (20,OOU Ibs.) $5.40, when, as I understand the price for switching 
 established by the R. & W. Commissioners is $2.00 per car, the price 
 I have always paid before Jan. 1, 1892. 
 
 Can you do anything for me, or have they any legal right to make 
 such a charge? 
 
 Hoping to hear from you soon, I am, 
 
 Very truly, 
 
 (Signed) NOAH H. PIKE. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 
 C. H. CHAPPELL, Gen. Manager, 
 CHICAGO, ILL., Feb. 4, 1892. 
 
 Isaac N. Phillips, Esq., R. R. & W. H. Comm'r, Bloomington. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Your favor of the 3d, addressed to the General Soli- 
 citor, inclosing complaint from Noah H. Pike, of Chenoa, regarding 
 switching, has been referred to me. 
 
 In reply, I beg to say that if our company has ever done any 
 switching at Chenoa for Mr. Pike, it was all wrong. We do not un- 
 dertake to furnish terminal facilities for the use of other roads, and 
 we have never authorized any of our agents at junction points to do 
 switching of business arriving by our competitors. If they have 
 done so, it has been doue by them without authority from the officers 
 of the company. In a few cases we learned that this was being 
 done, and have given orders putting a stop to it, except at the Com- 
 missioners' rate for the shortest distance. You can readily see how 
 impossible it would be for us to furnish facilities to do the business 
 of other roads at a switching charge. 
 
 This same question was up at Alton some time ago, through 
 Commissioner Wheeler. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 (Signed) C. H. CHAPPELL.
 
 164 
 
 OFFICE OF RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., Feb. 6, 1892. 
 Hon. George Hunt, Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Under this cover I send you a letter of Noah H. Pike, 
 of Chenoa, Illinois, dated Feb. 1, 192. Also a letter of C. H. Chap- 
 pell, General Manager of the C. & A. R. R. Co,, dated Feb. 4, 1892. 
 
 These letters, you will observe, raise practically the same legal 
 question which the Commission some time since submitted to you, 
 and which you now have under advisement, relating to the legal ob- 
 ligation of railroad companies to switch cars in those places where 
 they have no regular switching department, and where they do not 
 hold themselves out to do, and in fact do not do, a switching busi- 
 ness. 
 
 I refer you to my letter of Dec. 7, 1891, for an extended statement 
 of the legal questions that are arising concerning switching, and to 
 the correspondence in the O. & M. case, and the Bluff Line case, 
 which had been previously submitted to you. 
 
 I foresee that this question of the'obligation of companies to switch 
 cars is likely to arise in a great many cases in this State in the near 
 future, and I wish to emphasize the importance of taking a proper 
 stand upon it, and hope the subject, when the crowded condition of 
 your office permits, will receive full and careful attention. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 (Signed) ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 JOLIET, WILL Co., May 26, 1892. 
 
 To the Honorable Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commission- 
 ers, Springfield, III. 
 
 This complaint I wish to file with you for your consideration at 
 your next session. 
 
 I am handling coal (car loads only) on commission for the Roan- 
 oke Coal Co. Their mines are situated on the Atchison, Topeka & 
 Santa Fe" Railway, at Roanoke, Woodford Co., 111. There being no 
 other railroad at that point we are compelled to ship our coal via. 
 A. T. & S. Fe" Ry. At Joliet I have several industries I supply with 
 coal, situated on side tracks of the C. & A. R. R. Consequently coal 
 shipped to these places has to be switched by the C. & A. after ar- 
 riving on the A. T. & S. F6 at Joliet, for which services the C. & A. 
 charge one dollar and fifty cents ($1.50) per car. For years here the 
 C. & A. has switched all coal coming into Joliet via. other lines, but 
 since the 1st of last April General Mgr. C. H. Chappell, of the C. & 
 A., positively refuses to handle my coal, and in one or two interviews 
 I had with him he told me industries on his road must buy their coal 
 from mines situated on the C. & A. road. I had contracted last March 
 with some of these firms to supply them with coal for the quarry 
 season, and under the present difficulties with the C. & A. R R. I 
 can not meet my obligations, and I am damaged at least $40.00 per 
 month.
 
 165 
 
 The Michigan Central, the Rock Island, the E. J. & E. and the 
 A. T. & S. Fe" Rys. all switch coal in and about Joliet coming from 
 other roads, the C. & A. included, at a rate of $1.50 per car. The C. 
 & A. will switch any other commodity but draw the line on coal. 
 
 Now I submit to your honorable body this question for fair adjust- 
 ment. Will you gentlemen allow the Chicago & Alton R. R. Co to 
 discriminate against me in this manner? The M. C., the Rock Island 
 and the E. J. & E. Railway companies all switch my coal here to in- 
 dustries situated on their tracks for $1.50 per car, which is the agreed 
 price among all railroad companies here for switching. I am a poor 
 man striving to make an honest living out of the coal business. Will 
 you allow this C. & A. R. R. Co. to freeze me out, or will you compel 
 them to switch my coal? 
 
 (Signed) LUTHER PENNINGTON. 
 
 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of may, 1892. 
 
 CHARLES F. BLOOD, 
 
 Notary Public. 
 
 OFFICE OF RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 
 SRRINGFIELD, June 8, 1892. 
 C. H. Chappell, Esq., G. M., C. & A. E. R., Chicago, III, 
 
 DEAR SIR: Enclosed please find copy of complaint filed with the 
 Commission, to which please make answer as soon as possible. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY, 
 C. H. CHAPPELL, General Manager, 
 CHICAGO, ILL., June 13, 1892. 
 
 J. H. Paddock, Esq., Sec'y Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 
 Springfield, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of yourfavorof June 8th, 
 enclosing complaint of Mr. Luther Pennington, of Joliet, that we re- 
 fuse to switch coal arriving by Santa F6 road to side tracks on our 
 line. 
 
 In reply, this is the same complaint that has been made at Alton 
 and other places. We do refuse to furnish our terminal facilities for 
 the use of other roads. It is simply confiscation to ask us to do so. 
 If such a rule was made, any new road entering Chicago could build 
 to the city limits and then demand that the older roads do their busi- 
 ness at a switching charge. There is no discrimination against Mr. 
 Pennington, we refuse to switch the coal of any dealer in Joliet when
 
 166 
 
 arriving by a competing line. If any coal was ever switched for him 
 it was done without the knowledge and against the orders of the man- 
 agement. We expect our competitors to consult their own interest 
 in deciding whether they will switch for us or not. 1 am not advised 
 that they do switch coal for us at Jcliet or not. In framing the 
 Inter-state Law, Congress saw the injustice of allowing competing 
 lines to use the terminals of other companies. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 (Signed) C. H. CHAPPELL, 
 
 General Manager. 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
 
 Office of RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION, 
 SPRINGFIELD, June 16, 1892. 
 
 Hon. Geo. Hunt, Attorney General. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Enclosed I hand you complaint of Luther Pennington, 
 of Joliet, 111., against the Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., which the 
 Commission have referred to you for your opinion thereon. They 
 desire me to call your attention to the fact that this complaint is in 
 the same line with other complaints referred to you some time ago 
 for an opinion as to the question involved. The Commission desire 
 to know if there is a legal obligation resting upon a railroad company 
 to switch cars for other railroad companies. The Commission also 
 call your attention to the answer of Mr. C. H. Chappell, General 
 Manager C. & A. R. R. Co., giving his reasons why they decline to 
 perform the service of switching at Joliet for other lines. 
 
 The Commission will await your decision as to whether the 
 grounds set up in the answer are sound and legal or not. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, Secretary. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, June 20, 1892. 
 
 Hon. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. & W. Commission. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I have the honor to receive for my consideration at 
 the request of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission your favors 
 concerning inquiry of W. S. Weed, as to the duty of the O. & M. Ry. 
 Co., in regard to switching at Cowden, and of F. E. Fisher, as to the 
 duty of the ''Bluff Line," at Alton, and the complaint of Noah H. 
 Pike, at Chenoa, against the C. & A. R. R. Co.; and also a letter from 
 J. H. Paddock, Secretary, enclosing complaint of Luther Pennington 
 against the C. & A. R. R. Co., at Joliet. 
 
 While the questions submitted differ in some particulars, they all
 
 167 
 
 relate to the subject of switching cars by a railroad company at a 
 junction point, which cars have been or are to be transported over a 
 line of railroad controlled by another company. 
 
 In my opinion it is the duty of every railroad company which is 
 doing a general railroad business to haul all cars, loaded or unloaded, 
 properly delivered to it or required to be hauled over its line or a 
 part thereof for the carriage of freight, either for another railroad 
 company or for a private patron. 
 
 The railroad company can not compel the public to patronize its 
 line either by a refusal to deliver cars to another railroad as in the 
 "Bluff Line" case, or by a refusal to receive them, as in the Penning- 
 ton case at Joliet. The patron may select his carrier, and the rail- 
 road company is bound to carry for all those offering freight and de- 
 manding service, and can not discriminate by refusing to carry, on 
 the ground that the commodity would come in competition with like 
 commodities or industries on its own line, or that it would lessen the 
 demand for commodities that might otherwise be carried over its own 
 line. 
 
 However, where freight is shipped over one line, I do not think 
 there is any rule of public duty, or any obligation of public carriers 
 that will require another railroad company to transfer cars, either 
 loaded or empty, without compensation. 
 
 So in the matter inquired about by Mr. W. S. Weed, concerning 
 the duty of the O. & M. at the junction at Cowden, I am of the opin- 
 ion that it is the duty of the O. &. M. Railway Company to switch 
 empty cars, delivered to it at the junction, to its side track, as re- 
 quested, to be there loaded for shipment over another line, and to re- 
 turn them to the connecting road, as well as to receive loaded cars to be 
 unloaded at its side track. 
 
 In the "Bluff Line" case, I think the shipper may select the line 
 over which he will ship the lime referred to, and if he prefers the C. 
 & A. line, it is the duty of the "Bluff Line" to deliver the cars to the 
 C. & A. as requested, and the "Bluff Line" can not compel the ship- 
 ment of the lime over its road by refusing to switch the cars to the 
 other road. 
 
 In the matter of the complaint of Noah H. Pike, of Chenoa, it 
 seems that the C. & A. R. R. Co. is willing to do the switching re- 
 quired, and the only question there raised is as to the amount of 
 compensation to be paid. The complaint does not show what the 
 extent of the service is, nor is it material for this office to know; but 
 I am of the opinion that the Commission should ascertain the facts 
 in this respect and should determine what is a reasonable charge 
 for the service required ; for that purpose it may be material to ascer- 
 tain whether the required movement of the cars is such as to amount 
 to a "haul," or is only what is commonly called a "switching" service. 
 As the company acknowledges its willingness to do the switching in 
 moving the cars, and only raises the question of the amount of com- 
 pensation, this becomes a matter purely for the Commission to deter- 
 mine.
 
 168 
 
 In the matter of the complaint of Luther Pennington, at Joliet, the 
 statement is indefinite as to the distance the cars are required to be 
 hauled by the C. & A. R. R. Company. The railroad company, how- 
 ever, it appears, refuses to haul the cars furnished by Pennington on 
 any terms; and, in this, it seems to me the railroad company refuses 
 to perform a plain duty. The apparent object of the refusal is to 
 compel the purchaser of coal, to whom Pennington desires to deliver 
 it, to purchase coal which shall be shipped over the line of the C. & 
 A. railroad, and from a mine located on that road. The public can 
 not be coerced in this manner to patronize any particular mine or 
 line of railroad. It is the duty of the company to take the coal of- 
 fered to it at its junction of another road, to be delivered to another 
 point for the delivery of coal on its road. Whether the service which 
 it is required to perform is such as to amount to a "haul," or is only 
 "switching." should be determined by the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, and a reasonable maximum charge for such service 
 should also be fixed, by that body. 
 
 I return herewith the letters, complaints and communications sub- 
 mitted to me by you in relation to the above entitled cases. 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) GEORGE HUNT, AWy General*
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CENTRALIA & CHESTER RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD Co. 
 
 PETITION FOB LEAVE TO CROSS 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, W. S. FORMAN. 
 For Respondent, J. M. HAMILL.
 
 171 
 
 CROSSING ORDER 
 
 BY THE COMMISSION. 
 
 The really disputed question here is whether or not petitioner shalF 
 be required to interlock this crossing. Having been unable as yet to 
 arrive at a conclusion satisfactory to all of us on this question, and 
 realizing the injustice of longer holding the case, while peti- 
 tioner is waiting to build its road, we have concluded to enter an or- 
 der permitting petitioner to cross so the work can be proceeded with, 
 and to reserve consideration of the question of interlocking. By 
 this means the Commission will not lose jurisdiction of this subject, 
 and that deliberation can be had which will insure a more nearly cor- 
 rect conclusion. There are said to be machines in use less expensive 
 and better adapted to a crossing of this kind than the more elaborate 
 appliances commonly in use, and which it would not be onerous 
 upon petitioner to put in at this crossing. We can, while holding 
 the question, investigate these appliances; and in the meantime 
 actual experience arising from use of the crossing may demonstrate 
 more clearly what the public good requires in the premises. 
 
 It is ordered that the petitioner, the Centralia & Chester Railroad 
 Company, have leave to cross with its track the track of the respond- 
 ent, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, at the point men- 
 tioned in their petition now on file in this cause. 
 
 Ordered further that this cause be kept on the docket and that the 
 question of the protection of said crossing by interlocking or other- 
 wise be held under advisement. 
 
 Adopted March 18, 1892. 
 
 INTERLOCKING ORDER BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 Upon further consideration of this petition the Commission have ar- 
 rived at the conclusion that the crossing requires protection byin+er- 
 locking. It is probable that if in any case the Commissic n found them- 
 selves able, consistently with their views of duty, to permit any new 
 crossing to be formed without the protection of interlocking, this would 
 be such a case. We are, however, firmly convinced that all new 
 crossings at grade hereafter constructed in this State should be pro- 
 tected. A device can be used at the crossing in question, which, it 
 is believed, will not cost to exceed $1,500. The business of the Cen- 
 tralia and Chester Railroad will probably be light for some time to
 
 172 
 
 come, and the distant signals on that road might be dispensed with 
 and an interlocking device adopted and put in, to be operated by 
 the trainmen of the Centralia & Chester road, thus dispensing with 
 the necessity of keeping a force expressly for the purpose of opera- 
 ting this machine. This implies, of course, that the signals on the 
 Louisville & Nashville road be kept set at "advance" in both direc- 
 tions. When a tram on the Centralia & Chester road desires to 
 cross it will be necessary for it to stop at the dwarf home signal, a 
 trainman can proceed to the tower house, reverse the signals and 
 givft the Centralia & Chester train the right of way. Then, after the 
 train has passed the home signal upon the other side, the trainman in 
 the tower can again set the signals at "advance" for the Louisville & 
 Nashville trains. By this means the expense of operation could be 
 avoided. Should, however, a plan be adopted which does not con- 
 template a regular force for operation, it will be absolutely necessary 
 that some employ^ of the Centralia & Chester Railroad Company be 
 charged with the duty of keeping the machine in adjustment, oiling 
 the same, and cleaning, filling and hanging out the signal lamps. 
 
 The above are suggestions which the roads concerned have the 
 power to adopt or not as they choose. Mr. Chas. Hansel, Consulting 
 Engineer of the Commission, has prepared a plan for such a device 
 as we have suggested, a copy of which will be furnished the respective 
 companies upon application. 
 
 Should the companies prefer a device of the regular pattern in use 
 with distant signals upon both roads to be operated by men kept 
 for the purpose, there will, of course, be no objection on the 
 part of the Commission to the adoption of such a device by the agree- 
 ment of the parties. We should indeed prefer such a device, but 
 have been constrained to make the above suggestions upon the sup- 
 position that the new company, the Centralia & Chester, is perhaps 
 not financially in position to put in an expensive machine at this 
 time. Should the business of the Centralia & Chester road increase, 
 and should it be hereafter demonstrated by experience that a more 
 elaborate plant is necessary, high home signals and distant signals 
 can be added on the Centralia & Chester road, and provision be made 
 for the operation of the plant by regular men; and this matter will be 
 within the power of the Commission at any time if application is 
 made by either party in this behalf, or the Commission can proceed 
 of its own motion if the public good is found to require it. 
 
 It is ordered that the crossing of the main track of the Centralia 
 & Chester Railroad and the Louisville & Nashville Railroad de- 
 scribed in the petition in this cause be, and the same is hereby or- 
 dered to be protected by a system of interlocking and switches. 
 
 It is further ordered that the petitioner, the Centralia & Chester 
 Railroad Company, shall pay the first cost of the construction and 
 the putting in of such interlocking device, and also the expense of 
 maintaining the same in good order, condition and repair; but the 
 question of apportioning the expense of the operation of said plant
 
 173 
 
 is hereby reserved until such time as the device to be used shall have 
 been agreed upon by the parties, or in case of their failure to agree, 
 prescribed by the Commission. And inasmuch as under the statute 
 the companies are permitted to agree upon a plan of interlocking, 
 provided they can do so, therefore it is ordered that this case be held 
 under consideration by the Commission, pending the efforts of 
 parties to agree upon a plan. 
 
 Adopted June 21, 1892.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE TAMAROA & MT. VERNON RAILWAY Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 VS. 
 
 THE LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD Co. AND SOUTHEAST & 
 ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 PETITION FOR LEAVE TO CROSS. 
 
 APPEARANCES. 
 
 For Petitioner. H, CLAYHORNER. 
 For Respondent, J. M. HAMILL.
 
 177 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition under the act of 1889, wherein the Tamaroa & 
 Mt. Vernon Railway Company asks leave to cross, with its proposed 
 track, the track of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company at 
 a point in the city of Mt. Vernon, Jefferson county, Illinois, about 
 1,700 feet east of the passenger station of the Louisville & Nashville 
 Company, in that city. Although at the immediate point of proposed 
 crossing the Louisville & Nashville track is practically level, there is 
 a sharp up-grade to the west of the crossing extending to the neigh- 
 borhood of the passenger station. For a distance of 1,200 feet east 
 or southeast of the proposed crossing, the grade of the Louisville & 
 Nashville road is level, and still farther to the eastward the grade 
 falls. The proposed crossing is on a two degree curve. 
 
 Our function under this petition is to prescribe the place and 
 manner of this crossing, the parties not having been able to agree. 
 As to the manner of crossing, it is not contended that the same 
 should be constructed otherwise than at grade as proposed. The 
 place of crossing is objected to by respondent on account of the 
 down-grade from the west approaching the crossing point; but there 
 seems to be no serious contention that a better point, which would 
 at all answer the purpose of the petitioning companj', could be 
 selected. At any rate, no sufficient showing is made to justify the 
 Commission in ordering the crossing at a different place from that 
 proposed. 
 
 It seems also to be conceded that the Commission should, under 
 the power conferred under the interlocking act of 1891, cause this 
 proposed crossing to be interlocked ; and certainly the location and 
 steepness of the grades renders this imperative. 
 
 The really controverted question is, whether or not the petitioning 
 company shall pay the entire expense of the operation of the inter- 
 locking plant, or whether such expense shall be divided, in the dis- 
 cretion of the Commission, between the two companies. The 
 petitioner's counsel concedes that, under the act of 1891, the petitioner 
 is bound to pay the original cost of the "construction" of the inter- 
 locking machine, and also the expense of "maintaining" the same- 
 restricting the latter word to include only such repairs and renewals 
 
 12 O
 
 178 
 
 as the interlocking device may from time to time require. Respond- 
 ent insists that a proper construction of the statute requires that pe- 
 titioner, in addition to the cost of construction and the expense of 
 maintaining, should also bear the whole expense of operating the 
 plant after it is completed, meaning by expense of operation the 
 wages of those who work the machine. 
 
 The language out of which this question arises occurs in the con- 
 cluding portion of section 3 of the act of 1891, and is as follows: 
 
 "Said Commission shall further designate, in such order, the proportion of 
 the cost of the construction of such plant, and the expense of maintaining and 
 operating the same, which each of the companies or persons concerned shall 
 pay. In case, however, one railroad company shall hereafter seek to cross 
 at grade, with its track or tracks, the track or tracks of another railroad 
 company, and the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall determine that 
 interlocking or other safety appliances shall be put in, the railroad company 
 seeking to cross at grade shall be C9mpelled to pay all cost of such appliances, 
 together with the expense of putting them in and the future maintenance 
 thereof." 
 
 It will be noted that that portion of this language which relates to 
 crossings already in existence, names three items of expense, namely, 
 "cost of construction," "expense of maintaining," and expense of 
 "operating." The language which refers to those companies which 
 "shall hereafter seek to cross at grade," etc., mentions only "all cost 
 of such appliances, together with the expense of putting them in, 
 and the future maintenance thereof" Undoubtedly the word "main- 
 tenance" is broad enough, in its common acceptation, to include the 
 cost of operating the machine. However, to arrive at its meaning in 
 the place where it stands in this section, it is necessary to consider 
 the language used in the preceding part of the section, and there we 
 find the expense of maintaining the plant mentioned as one item of 
 expense, and the expense of "operating" as another. We think the 
 , word "operating," so used, designates the wages of such employes as 
 may be needed to control and work the machine in actual use. The 
 legislature having included the wages of operators in a phrase dis- 
 tinct from that of "maintaining" the machine in this same section, 
 we do not feel at liberty, under the well recognized canons of statu- 
 tory construction, to extend the meaning of the phrase "future main- 
 tenance," as subsequently used, so as to include such wages. 
 
 We shall enter into no learned disquisition in support of this 
 view, but state it as the conclusion at which we have arrived, and 
 which, we think, would be adopted by the courts, if construing this 
 statute under the long-established and well recognized rules of stat- 
 utory construction. 
 
 In case of the interlocking of crossings already existing when the 
 act was passed, a discretion was vested in this Commission to ap- 
 portion cost of construction, expense of maintaining and expense of 
 operation between the companies, as justice might be deemed to re- 
 quire. In the case of crossings afterwards to be constructed, the ex- 
 ercise of this discretion by the Commission was withheld so far as 
 the items of first cost and maintenance are concerned, the legislative 
 discretion having been here substituted through a positive statutory
 
 179 
 
 direction. Thus the cost of "operating," meaning, as we view it, the 
 wages of men to operate the machine, is, in the case of new crossings, 
 left unprovided for, and this remains to the reasonable discretion of 
 this Commission. 
 
 How shall this undistributed expense be apportioned by us? Left 
 to our judgment in the premises, we confess we could see no good 
 reason to treat expense of operation differently from the other items 
 named; and, perceiving no sound distinction, we might follow the 
 policy of the legislature, and visit the expense of operation also upon 
 the company seeking the crossing. This, however, we are not at lib- 
 erty to do, because it is the legislative view, not our own, which we 
 must seek to follow; and, whether we are able to perceive a distinc- 
 tion or not, we must suppose the legislature saw a distinction, other- 
 wise they would have included expense of operation with the other 
 items to be paid by the new comer, which latter, with the subject di- 
 rectly before them for consideration, the law-makers did not do. We 
 therefore conclude the expense of operation should, under the 
 language of this section, be apportioned by us between the com- 
 panies on such basis as we may deem equitable under all the circum- 
 stances of the case. 
 
 And it seems not improper to remark here, that when a railroad 
 company lays down its track, it does so as a public agency by virtue 
 of a franchise derived from the State, and which it holds for the pub- 
 lic benefit, and subject to such future regulations and burdens, po- 
 lice and otherwise, as may, in the proper care for the public interest, 
 be imposed from the same source. Had the right of way of the first 
 road which crossed Illinois been held by law too sacred to be crossed 
 by the tracks of other roads without the imposition of large burdens 
 based solely upon the advantages of priority in time, it is not diffi- 
 cult to see that the development of the State might have been, by 
 such a policy, seriously retarded. 
 
 In the case of the petition of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Com- 
 pany for the interlocking of its crossing with the Illinois Central 
 and Wabash tracks at Paducah Junction, wherein it was urged that 
 the petitioning company was entitled to exemption from cost and ex- 
 pense by reason of its seniority, this Commission observed: 
 
 "For the reasons given, seniority can not be taken as a basis of determina- 
 tion, discarding other considerations. There may arise cases where it will 
 constitute an element proper to be considered; but, speaking generally, if the 
 Commission finds two railroads in operation upon the ground, without spe- 
 cial contract burdens as between themselves, they must be dealt with on a 
 basis of practical equality." 
 
 The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Chicago & Alton 
 Railroad Co. v. Joliet, Lockport & Aurora Railway Co. 105 111., 388, 
 at the particular page 401, discussing the question whether or not the 
 stopping of trains by the senior road at the proposed crossing, as re- 
 quired by statute, could properly be considered as an element of 
 damage in condemnation, speaking through Chief Justice Scott, says:
 
 180 
 
 "Corporations, as well as citizens, are subject to the police power of the 
 State * Should it be held that before a 
 
 new railroad could be laid across the track of a railroad previously con- 
 structed, the damage for any inconvenience such company might suffer on ac- 
 count of haying to submit to and observe police regulations in regard to the 
 conduct of its business thereafter should first be ascertained and paid by the 
 new road, it would amount to a practical prohibition of the construction of 
 new railroads in the State. 
 
 "Unless, therefore, every railroad corporation takes its right of way sub- 
 ject to the right of the public to have other roads, both common highways 
 and railways, constructed across its track whenever the public exigency 
 might be thought to demand it, the grant of the privilege to construct a rail- 
 road across or through the State would be an obstacle in the way of its future 
 prosperity of no inconsiderable magnitude. The claim made for damages, in 
 this respect, has neither reason nor weight of authority for its support. In 
 Railway v. Railway HO Ohio St. 604, it is well said: 'While the elder road can 
 demand compensation for its property to the extent of its appropriation, it 
 has no right to demand tribute from the junior road for the enjoyment of the 
 same corporate franchises that it possesses. Each owes its authority ta 
 operate its road to the same source, the State, and neither has the right to 
 tax the other for the enjoyment of these mutual privileges. It is true that 
 the crossing imposes a new burden, but it is one to which it is subject by the 
 nature of the case and the terms of its charter.' Other courts of acknow- 
 ledged authority sustain the same general doctrine." 
 
 We think these ^iews applicable here, and it is our opinion that 
 since the legislature left the item of expense of operation for appor- 
 tionment by the Commission between the companies, it would not be 
 unjust in this case, in view of the fact that all other expenses are 
 cast by law upon the new comer, to require the expense of operating 
 the plant to be paid equally by the companies, which will accordingly 
 be done. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is ordered and decided that petitioner, the Tamaroa & Mt. 
 Vernon Railway Company, have leave to cross with its track at grade 
 the track of the respondent, the Louisville & Nashville Railroad 
 Company, at the place and in the manner specified in the petition on 
 file in this cause, right of way for such crossing being first obtained 
 under the laws of Illinois relating to Eminent Domain. 
 
 It is ordered further that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed, 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals and switches, to be 
 agreed upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the 
 parties are able to agree, the cost of construction and the expense of 
 maintenance of which device shall be paid for by the Tamaroa & Mt. 
 Vernon Railway Company, as provided by statute, but it is hereby 
 ordered and decided by the Commission that of the cost of the opera- 
 tion of such interlocking device, the said Tamaroa & Mt. Vernon 
 Railway Company, petitioner, shall pay one-half, and the said Louis- 
 ville & Nashville Railroad Company, respondent, shall pay one-half. 
 And inasmuch as the statute only directs the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission to prescribe by order a plan of the interlocking in 
 case the parties are unable to agree, therefore, it is ordered that this 
 petition be further held under consideration by the Commission 
 pending the efforts of petitioner and respondent to agree upon a 
 plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted June 21, 1892.
 
 No. 21 
 
 INTERLOCKING CASE 
 
 No. I 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 vs. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & WESTERN INDIANA RAILROAD Co., 
 {THE BELT RAILWAY COMPANY OF CHICAGO, LESSEE), 
 
 AND 
 THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD Co. 
 
 CROSSING NEAR HAWTHORNE 
 
 Opinion and Order of Commission adopted November 11, 1892, 
 
 on Application of Chicago & "Western Indiana Railroad 
 
 Company (The Belt Railway Company of Chicago, 
 
 lessee), for Modification of Original Order, 
 
 entered December 1O, 1891.
 
 183 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is an application by the Chicago & Western Indiana Rail- 
 road Company (The Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee), to 
 modify the order heretofore entered in the above petition and cita- 
 tion upon the point of .the division of the original cost of the con- 
 struction of the device ordered, and of the expense of the maintenance 
 of said device in good order and repair. 
 
 In the original opinion entered in this matter, it was said: 
 
 "There are a switch and a signal which add two levers in the tower, and 
 are located between the tracks of the Alton and the Atchispn, upon one of the 
 Western Indiana tracks. These appliances are not essential to the interlock- 
 ing of the crossing, but are put in, we learn from the consulting engineer, at 
 the request of the Western Indiana and Belt Companies for their exclusive 
 accommodation. So far as the other companies are concerned, the crossings 
 could be perfectly interlocked without these appliances. We therefore think 
 it not unjust to charge the extra cost of these particular appliances to the 
 Western Indiana and Belt Companies. Without these, the number of switches, 
 signals and levers would be exactly equal upon all these lines. Apportioning 
 first cost upon levers, which, under the circumstances, we think would be 
 just, the Chicago & Western Indiana and the Belt Companies would pay fpur- 
 tenths of the first cost, the Chicago & Alton three-tenths, and the Atchison 
 three-tenths. We think such an apportionment of the first cost of the plant 
 would be fair under the circumstances." 
 
 In the order for the interlocking, entered on the same day the 
 opinion was delivered, the following provision was incorporated upon 
 the subject of this present application: 
 
 "That it would be just and equitable for the companies named in said pe- 
 tition and citation to pay for the original cost and future maintenance of said 
 device, as follows: The Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad Company (The 
 Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee), four-tenths; the Chicago & Alton 
 Railroad Company, three-tenths, and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Rail- 
 road Company, three-tenths." 
 
 The present application is made upon the ground that the division 
 of this expense was made by the Commission under a misapprehen- 
 sion of the facts. It is urged that the Commission have made a mis- 
 take, and have power to correct it, and should correct it. The ground 
 chiefly urged for this application is, that the Commission erred in 
 believing and saying that the switch and signal located upon the 
 track of the Western Indiana Company, between the Alton and 
 Atchison tracks, is of benefit only to the Western Indiana and Belt
 
 184 
 
 Companies. The representatives of the latter companies admit that 
 said switch and signal were put in at their request, but deny that 
 they were put in for their exclusive benefit. It was not, howerer, 
 shown upon the hearing that the Chicago & Alton Company is in 
 any way benefited by this switch and signal. We understand the 
 claim, so far as the Alton Company is concerned, was abandoned, 
 but it was urged upon the hearing that the Atchison Company is 
 benefited equally with the Western Indiana and Belt Companies. 
 
 Upon the further hearing of this case under this application, it 
 becomes apparent that the Atchison Company is, to a small extent, 
 benefited by these appliances, but the benefit it derives from them 
 is very much less than the benefit derived by the Western Indiana 
 and Belt Companies. It would be very difficult, indeed, to apportion 
 the added cost of this switch and signal between the companies upon 
 the evidence before us. The benefit conferred upon the Atchison 
 Company being so slight compared with the benefits derived by the 
 Western Indiana and Belt Companies, and the appliances having 
 been originally placed where they are upon the request of the latter 
 companies, we are unable to see our way to charge any part of them 
 to the Atchison Company. 
 
 It is very apparent, however, that there is an error in this order. 
 Dividing the cost upon the basis laid down by the Commission, there 
 is ao possible way in which the division into tenths could have been 
 made except through a blunder, which was in fact committed. 
 
 It will be observed the opinion says: "Without these (meaning 
 the switch and signal in question), the number of switches, signals 
 and levers would be exactly equal upon all these lines." This is true. 
 Counting the switches, signals and levers upon each of the three 
 roads concerned, aside from the extra derail and signal in question, 
 the number is thirty, there being ten switches and signals on each 
 line. Therefore, without the extra derail and signal, the order would 
 correctly have been for each company to pay one-third of the cost. 
 But when the extra derail and signal are added they make the num- 
 ber thirty-two in all; and upon the basis adopted, the cost would re- 
 solve itself into thirty- seconds instead of tenths. On that basis the 
 Chicago & Alton Company should pay ten thirty-seconds, the Atch- 
 ison Company ten thirty-seconds, and the Western Indiana and Belt 
 Companies twelve thirty- seconds, which would be a less proportion 
 to be paid by the latter. The exact excess charged to the Western 
 Indiana and Belt Companies on this basis, is one-fortieth. Hence it 
 is no more than just that this mistake should be corrected and the 
 order modified. 
 
 The Commission are satisfied, further, upon consideration of the 
 whole matter, that a better way to have arrived at the extra cost to 
 be paid by the Western Indiana and Belt Companies, would have 
 been to tax these companies not with an extrajproportionate share of 
 the whole cost, but with the actual cost of the switch and signal in 
 controversy. If these companies pay the actual extra cost of these
 
 185 
 
 appliances, it is all that could be justly demanded, and that extra 
 cost, the Commission are informed, would be less than a proportion- 
 ate share based upon the number of levers, as attempted to be done 
 in the original order. 
 
 It is, therefore, directed that the Secretary enter upon the docket 
 the following modified order upon the particular question of the ap- 
 portionment of the original cost and future maintenance of said 
 device that is to say: 
 
 MODIFIED ORDER. 
 
 "Each of the said companies, to- wit: The Chicago & Western 
 Indiana Railroad Company (The Belt Railway Companj r of Chicago, 
 lessee), the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and the Atchison, 
 Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company, shall pay one-third part of 
 the original cost of construction, and of the expense of maintenance 
 of said entire device, with the exception of the switch and signal 
 located upon the track of the Chicago & Western Indiana Railroad 
 Company, between the tracks of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Com- 
 pany and the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad Company; and 
 as to the original cost and expense of maintenance of the said last 
 mentioned switch and signal so located, it is ordered that such actual 
 cost and expense be paid by the Chicago & Western Indiana Rail- 
 road Company (The Belt Railway Company of Chicago, lessee). 
 
 "And it is further ordered, that the original order entered in said 
 cause, except as the same is hereby expressly modified, shall stand as 
 originally entered in this proceeding."
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 RAILROAD AND WAREHODSE COMMISSION 
 
 STATE F ILLINOIS 
 
 THE BALTIMORE & OHIO & CHICAGO RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER, 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE SOUTH CHICAGO CITY RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 Petition No. 10 For Protection of Crossing at Commercial 
 Avenue, South Chicago. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, E. R. JEWETT, Attorney. 
 For Respondent, OSBORN & LYNDE, Attorneys.
 
 189 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The petition in thia case shows that the South Chicago City Rail- 
 way Company, defendant, "is seeking under and by virtue of an or- 
 dinance of the City of Chicago, to lay its car tracks along and upon 
 Commercial Avenue, and to cross the tracks of petitioner in said 
 Commercial Avenue at the west end of your petitioner's yards, at 
 grade, and without precaution looking to the safety of the public, or 
 to the protection of human life transported by the said Street Rail- 
 way Company or petitioner;" also that said Street Railway Company 
 proposes to operate its line with electrical power, under the system 
 known as the "trolley system," and that it (defendant) "proposes to 
 put in the grade crossing aforesaid, irrespective of the control exer- 
 cised by your Honorable Board in the matter of the place and man- 
 ner of railroads crossing or intersecting each other; and without re- 
 gard to the safety of the public." 
 
 Accompanying said petition is a plat showing the location of the 
 proposed crossing; and the petition "prays that action may be taken 
 by your Honorable Board in the premises, to the end that said cross- 
 ing may be rendered safe, and as far as possible free from danger to 
 the public." 
 
 It is objected by the defendant among other things, that the peti- 
 tion does not state a case coming within the provisions of the statute 
 of Illinois relating to railroad crossings, and does not ask any relief 
 which comes within the jurisdiction of this Board. 
 
 The only power of the Commission to compel the protection of 
 railway crossings must be found in the act entitled, "An Act to pro- 
 tect persons and property from danger at the crossings and junctions 
 of railroads," etc., approved June 2, 189J . The first section of that 
 act provides: 
 
 "That in every case where the main tracks of two or more railroads cross 
 at grade in this State, any company owning or operating any one of such 
 tracks whose managers may desire to unite with others by protecting such 
 crossing with interlocking, or other safety devices, may file with the Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission, a petition stating the facts of the situation, and 
 asking said Railroad and Warehouse Commission to order such crossing to be 
 protected by interlocking signals, devices and switches, or other safety ap- 
 pliances, etc."
 
 190 
 
 Section 3 of the act directs the manner of proceeding to hear cases 
 for the protection of crossings, giving the Commission power to ap- 
 portion costs and expenses, and concludes as follows: 
 
 "In case, however, one railroad company shall hereafter seek to cross at 
 grade with its track or tracks, the track or tracks of another railroad com- 
 pany, and the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall determine that in- 
 terlocking or other safety appliances shall be put in, the railroad company 
 seeking to cross at grade shall be compelled to pay all costs of such appliances, 
 together with the expense of putting them in and the future maintenance 
 thereof." 
 
 Do these provisions confer upon the Commission power to order 
 the protection of the crossing described in the petition? In other 
 words, is the South Chicago City Railway a "railroad" within the 
 meaning of the Interlocking Act of 1891? We think not. We are 
 constrained to hold that this Commission has no jurisdiction in the 
 premises. The legislature has provided for the incorporation and 
 regulation of street railways by an act separate and different from 
 that which pertains to the incorporation and regulation of railroads 
 proper. Street railways were evidently not intended to be included in 
 those acts of the legislature which confer jurisdiction upon the Com- 
 mission to make and enforce schedules of maximum rates, to cause 
 dangerous roads to be repaired and other like powers. Those acts 
 have always been understood to refer to railroads, and not to street 
 railways; and there is nothing to indicate that the legislature in- 
 tended that the Act of 1891 for the protection of railroad crossings 
 was intended to have a wider scope than the previous Acts. 
 
 The fact that another power, electricity has been substituted 
 which supplies a higher rate of speed, and makes street cars more 
 dangerous instrumentalities than they were in the days when horse 
 power was exclusively used, has not, we think, made them "railroads" 
 within the meaning of such acts as that now under contempla- 
 tion. 
 
 The petition does not pray for specific relief. It asks that "action 
 may be taken to the end that said crossing may be rendered safe, 
 etc." The only provision looking to the safety at crossings which 
 the Commission has power to enforce is their protection by interlock- 
 ing signals or derails, or other like safety appliances. We have 
 sought to avoid building up any technical system of pleading and 
 practice before the Commission in these cases, and might accordingly 
 overlook the very general terms of the prayer of this petition, were 
 the case one over which we deem ourselves to have any power. 
 Holding as we do, however, that this Board is without jurisdiction 
 in such a case, the petition must be dismissed, and the Secretary will 
 enter an order accordingly.
 
 191 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 Tuesday, December 27, 1892. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, and J. 
 H. Paddock, Secretary the following proceedings were had in this 
 cause : 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and deter- 
 mination before the Commission this 27th day of December, 1892, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein 
 and the arguments of the counsel made before the Commission at a 
 former session, and being fully advised in the premises, doth find 
 that this Commission is without jurisdiction in this case. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said petition 
 be dismissed. 
 
 Adopted December 27, 1892.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 THE CHICAGO, & ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD^CO., 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 Petition No. 14 Protection of Crossing at Normal. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner WM . BROWN, General Solicitor. 
 For Respondent J. F . WALiLi ACE, Chief Engineer. 
 13 O.
 
 195 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 Respondent does not object to an order for the interlocking of the 
 crossing described in this petition. The sole question made is as 
 to the division of the cost. One item, that of the "operation" of the 
 device, is not, however, in controversy, it being agreed that the com- 
 panies should pay this equally. The question made is, how the first 
 cost of the interlocking device, and the expense of its maintenance, 
 shall be paid for. 
 
 Mr. Wallace, Chief Engineer of the Illinois Central road, has 
 urged upon us with much force of reason a general basis for the di- 
 vision of expenses in cases of this kind. We fully recognize the de- 
 sirability of adopting some just rule of determination to be applied 
 to such cases; but we have heretofore hesitated to lay down an in- 
 flexible rule, knowing well that experience sometimes spoils theories, 
 and that it is not possible to foresee what new conditions may arise 
 in future cases, not considered in adopting the rale. 
 
 Since discussing the different proposed rules of determination in 
 our opinion in the case of the crossing at Paducah Junction, we have 
 continued to give the subject attention. We are now strongly in- 
 clined to adopt, in the main, the basis suggested by Mr. Wallace as 
 a rule of determination to be applied to future cases, except those 
 which may be very exceptional in their facts and conditions, or in 
 which subsisting contract obligations may change the rule. 
 
 That basis is as follows: 
 
 First Each company to pay the original cost of all the apparatus 
 and mechanism used upon its own tracks, including all signals, de- 
 rails, pipe-lines, wire-lines, boxing and all connections in its tracks, 
 and also the cost of putting all these in ready for use, and of main- 
 taining the same in good repair. 
 
 Second The cost of the interlocking machine proper and the ex- 
 pense of maintaining the same in good working order to be divided 
 between, or among, the companies in the proportion that the levers 
 used to operate the appliance in the tracks of each company bear to 
 the whole number of levers.
 
 196 
 
 Third The cost of the tower house wherein- the interlocking ma- 
 chine is housed, and the expense of the operation of the machine, 
 (i. e., wages of operators) , to be divided upon the basis of the num- 
 ber of roads using the system. 
 
 We have varied the proportion of Mr. Wallace to the extent of 
 dividing the cost of the tower on the basis of the number of roads 
 instead of upon the basis of the number of levers. There is little to 
 choose between the two methods, but we deem the division above 
 stated the fairest, as a tower house would be needed in any event, 
 and the cost of such tower would be little, if any, enhanced by a few 
 additional levers. We therefore think cost of tower may be better 
 grouped with expense of operation, than with the cost of the inter- 
 locking machine. 
 
 We see a possible difficulty to which this plan may lead, which we 
 deem it proper to notice here. Under the second point above, which 
 divides the cost of the interlocking machine in proportion to the 
 levers used to operate the appliances located on the several tracks, a 
 temptation will be offered to reduce the number of levers by making 
 each lever carry too much work. The companies to the present pro- 
 ceeding, being under very enlightened and progressive management, 
 are not likely to fall into an error so at variance with good signaling 
 practice. It is not for them particularly that we add this caution. 
 Any manifestation of the disposition stated in future cases must be 
 corrected by the Consulting Engineer of the Commission. 
 
 An order will be entered in this proceeding providing for the in- 
 terlocking of the crossing described in the petition, and apportioning 
 costs and expenses in the manner hereinabove specified. Our Con- 
 sulting Engineer has prepared a plan for the interlocking of this 
 crossing which we submit to the companies as a suggestion of wha^ 
 is deemed to be requisite for the proper protection of the crossing. 
 The companies have a right, under the statute, to agree upon details 
 of plan, if they can. In default of their speedy agreement in this 
 particular, we will enter a further order covering that part of the 
 case. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 TUESDAY, December 27, 1892. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, and J. 
 H. Paddock, Secretary the following proceedings were had in this 
 cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and deter- 
 mination before the Commission this 27th day of December, 1892, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, 
 the agreements made by the parties hereto, and the arguments made 
 before the Commission at a former session, and being fully advised 
 in the premises doth find:
 
 197 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossing formed at Normal, 
 Illinois, by the tracks of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company 
 and the Illinois Central Railroad Company, be protected and operated 
 by an interlocking device or machine, and that the following would 
 be a just and equitable basis on which to apportion the cost of said 
 device or machine: 
 
 First Each company to pay the original cost of all the apparatus 
 and mechanism used upon its own tracks, including all signals, de- 
 rails, pipe-lines, wire-lines, boxing and all connections in its tracks, 
 and also the cost of putting all these in ready for use, and of main- 
 taining the same in good repair. 
 
 Second The cost of the interlocking machine proper, and the ex- 
 pense of maintaining the same in good working order to be divided 
 between the two companies in the proportion that the levers used to 
 operate the appliance in the tracks of each company bear to the whole 
 number of levers. 
 
 Third The cost of the tower house wherein the interlocking 
 machine is housed, and the expense of the operation of the machine 
 (i. e., wages of operators) to be borne equally by the petitioner and 
 respondent. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 to- wit: The Chicago & Alton Railroad Company and the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company forthwith proceed to protect said crossing 
 by a system of interlocking signals and switches, to be agreed upon 
 by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the parties are 
 able to agree, the cost of construction, the expense of maintenance 
 and the cost of the operation of such interlocking device to be divided 
 upon the following basis: 
 
 First Each company to pay the original cost of all the apparatus 
 and mechanism used upon its own tracks, including all signals, de- 
 rails, pipe-lines, wire-lines, boxing and all connections in its tracks, 
 and also the cost of putting all these in ready for use and of main- 
 taining the same in good repair. 
 
 Second The cost of the interlocking machine proper and the ex 
 pense of maintaining the same in good working order to be divided 
 between the two companies in the proportion that the levers used to 
 operate the appliance in the tracks of each company bear to the whole 
 number of levers. 
 
 Third The cost of the tower house wherein the interlocking ma- 
 chine is housed, and the expense of the operation of the machine 
 (i. e., wages of operators) to be borne equally by the petitioner and 
 respondent. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration by the Commission pending the efforts of petitioner and 
 respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted December 27, 1892.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 THE PEORIA & PEKIN UNION RAILWAY Co., 
 IPETITIONER. 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE PEORIA TERMINAL RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Peoria, 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner W. S. HORTON, Attorney. 
 
 For Respondent GEORGE B. FOSTER, Attorney.
 
 201 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The proposed crossing, which the petition prays to have interlocked, 
 is in the city of Peoria, at a point on the track of the Peoria & Pekin 
 Union Railway, 250 feet from the west end of the Illinois river bridge. 
 A crossing at the point in question was originally proposed by the 
 Peoria & Farmington Railway Company, which, at the May Term, 
 1883. of the Peoria County Court, obtained by judgment in condem- 
 nation a right to cross at this point the right of way and track of the 
 Peoria & Springfield Railroad Company, to which the latter company, 
 petitioner, is the successor in the property by purchase on foreclosure. 
 The track of the Peoria & Springfield Railroad (now the Peoria & 
 Pekin Union) was before that time laid and being used, but the 
 Peoria & Farmington road was but partly constructed after the con- 
 demnation, and its track never was laid. Respondent, the Peoria 
 Terminal Railway Company, has succeeded to the Peoria & Farming- 
 ton franchise and rights, and is now proceeding to construct the road 
 on the line of condemnation, thus giving rise to the present proceed- 
 ing. 
 
 The questions only are presented here. The first is, does the 
 public good demand the protection of the proposed crossing under 
 the Act of 1891? We do not understand the respondent seriously to 
 contest this proposition. The P. & P. U. track at the point of the 
 proposed crossing is used by three other companies under lease, 
 namely: the L. E. & W., the J. S. E. and the "Big Four." The 
 trains, both passenger and freight, passing the point are numerous. 
 Proceeding westward into the city from the point of crossing, the 
 P. & P. U. ascends a grade, and describes a curve, while on the east 
 very near, is the draw-bridge of the P. & P. U. across the Illinois 
 river, a navigable stream. In this day, when good practice is fast 
 leading to the protection of all railroad croosings, on grounds of 
 economy as well as safety, we could not long hesitate to hold that 
 this crossing requires protection, even though it is true as contended, 
 that the Peoria Terminal Railway Company will haul but few trains 
 over the crossing. 
 
 The remaining question concerns cost and expense. Is this case 
 one wherein the Commission has discretion to apportion first cost of 
 the apparatus, and the expense of putting in and maintaining the same 
 between the companies; or is it one in which these items of cost and 
 expense are, by the statute, cast upon respondent, as being a com- 
 pany "seeking to cross" with its track the track of another company?
 
 202 
 
 Section 8 of the act of 1891 for the protection of crossings closes 
 with the following provision relative to crossings which might be 
 constructed after the passage of the act: 
 
 "In case, however, one railroad company shall hereafter seek to cross at 
 grade with its track or tracks, the track or tracks of another railroad com- 
 pany, and the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall determine that in- 
 terlocking or other safety appliances shall be put in, the railroad company 
 seeking to cross at grade shall be compelled to pay all cost of such appliances, 
 together with the expense of putting them in and the future maintenance 
 thereof." 
 
 Here, then, is the question: Does the judgment of the County 
 Court in condemnation'entitle respondent to cross the the track of pe- 
 titioner without assuming those expenses of interlocking, mentioned 
 in the provision above quoted, and now adjudged by us to be re- 
 quired at this crossing for the public good? 
 
 It is important to note that the function of the Commission under 
 the act of 1891 is wholly distinct from the function of the County 
 Court in condemnation. The two lines of action do not touch at any 
 point. Condemnation fixes the damages for the use declared; the 
 Commission enforces a police regulation applied to the operation of 
 trains, and designed for the public safety. As regards claims for 
 damages, respondent reads its title clear in the judgment of condem- 
 nation. As regards right of way, it has, in legal contemplation, al- 
 ready crossed petitioner's track. As regards the police regulation 
 embraced in the act of 1891, it has not crossed, but is still "seeking 
 to cross." Had no judgment of condemnation been obtained prior 
 to the passage of the act of 1891, we concede that respondent might 
 even now, with that act in full force, proceed to condemn and get 
 judgment, placing itself in precisely the legal attitude it now occu- 
 pies, leaving the interlocking still unsettled as it now is. In other 
 words, it could, we think, in face of the interlocking act, obtain its- 
 right to cross, so far as damages and right of way are concerned, but 
 the question of the protection of the crossing to be made, would re- 
 main as it remains now. That question would legally arise when 
 respondent should physically "seek to cross with its track." By getting- 
 its right of way through condemnation proceedings, respondent did 
 not obtain exemption from the operation of such police regulations 
 as were then in force, or might afterwards be provided by law. 
 
 Such is the view we are constrained to take. Much nice reason- 
 ing might be indulged, but what has been said is deemed sufficient 
 to express our view, which is, that respondent comes within the pro- 
 visions of the statute above quoted, which casts upon the road seek- 
 ing to cross, (1) the first cost of the machine to be used; (2) the 
 expense of putting the machine in; (3) the expense of maintaining 
 the same in good order and repair. 
 
 The question whether this statute is broad enough to compel the 
 company seeking to cross to pay also the expense of operating the 
 machine, was a subject of contention before the Commission in the 
 case of the Tamaroa & Mt. Vernon Ry. Co. vs. The Louisville & 
 Nashville R. R. Co., which was decided by us June 21, 1892. We 
 refer to the opinion in that case for the construction of the statute
 
 203 
 
 in this particular. We arrived then at a conclusion which we see no- 
 reason to change, namely: That the expense of ''operating" the 
 machine was, by the statute, left to be apportioned by the Commis- 
 sion in its discretion. In that case we divided such expense equally, 
 and we think the same should be done here. 
 
 An order will be entered in this cafle in accordance with the views 
 here expressed, which order will embrace the interlocking of the 
 crossing and the fixing of the costs and expenses to be paid as herein 
 indicated. But the companies still have a right under the statute, to 
 agree upon the plan of the interlocking if they can do so, subject to 
 the approval of the Commission. The order therefore entered will 
 not embrace specifically the details of the device to be put in, that 
 question being left for the parties to agree upon, if they can. In 
 that connection we suggest that the Consulting Engineer of the 
 Commission, who is an expert in such matters, and has given the 
 subject of interlocking very large attention, be consulted by the 
 parties. 
 
 TUESDAY, December 27, 1892. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this 
 day, present, Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, and 
 J. H. Paddock, Secretary, the following proceedings were had in this 
 cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and de- 
 termination before the Commission this 27th day of December, 1892, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein 
 and the arguments of the counsel made before the Commission at a 
 former session, and being fully advised in the premises, on consider- 
 ation doth find : 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossing to be formed at 
 Peoria, Illinois, by the tracks of the Peoria and Pekln Union Rail- 
 way Company and the tracks of the Peoria Terminal Railway Com- 
 pany be protected and operated by an interlocking device or machine, 
 to be agreed upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, 
 if the parties are able to agree; that the first cost of the machine, 
 the expense of putting the machine in, and the expense of maintain- 
 ing the same in good order and repair should be paid for by the 
 respondent, the Peoria Terminal Railway Company, as provided by 
 statute; and that it would be just and equitable for each of the com- 
 panies named in the petition to pay one-half of the expense of the 
 operation of such interlocking device or machine. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the crossing to be 
 formed at Peoria, Illinois, by the tracks of the Peoria & Pekin Union 
 Railway Company and the Peoria Terminal Railway Company be- 
 protected and operated by an interlocking device, and that the re- 
 spondent, the Peoria Terminal Railway Company, pay the first cost, 
 of the machine, the expense of putting the machine in, and the ex-
 
 204 
 
 pense of maintaining the same in good order and repair. It is further 
 ordered by the Commission that of the cost of the operation of such 
 interlocking device the said Peoria & Pekin Union Railway Com- 
 pany, petitioner, shall pay one-half, and the said Peoria Terminal 
 Railway Company, respondent, shall pay one-half. ^55 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration by the Commission pending the efforts of the petitioner 
 and respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted December 27, 1892.
 
 No. 23 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 INTO. 
 
 CITIZENS OP SHAWNEETOWN, Complainants. 
 
 vs. 
 
 LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE R. R. Co. Respondent. 
 
 PASSENGER TRAIN SERVICE. 
 
 Filed Aug. 5, 1892. Hearing at Shawneetown, Aug. 26, 1892. 
 Decision Rendered Jan. 3, 1893. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Complainants, W. R. McKERNON and THOS. R. REID. 
 For Respondent, J. M. HAMILL.
 
 207 
 
 OPINION OF COMMISSION. 
 
 SRINGFIELD, Jan. 3, 1893. 
 
 Hon. W. R. McKernon, State's Attorney, Shawneetown, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: Answering your letter of recent date to Mr. Paddock, 
 Secretary of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, wherein you 
 inquire what decision the Commissioners have come to upon the 
 complaint of the Citizens of Shawneetown against the Louisville & 
 Nashville Railroad Company, I have to say, that the Commissioners 
 have as yet rendered no decision or opinion in the case. Although 
 convinced that the passenger service between McLeansboro and 
 Shawneetown is not such as is desirable, it seems to be very ques- 
 tionable whether the law affords any remedy for the unpleasant state 
 of affairs which exists. I will here briefly state the difficulties which 
 the Commissioners have encountered in their attempt to find a way 
 to afford legal relief to the citizens of Shawneetown. 
 
 The complaint of the citizens of Ben ton, Franklin county, against 
 the "Cairo Short Line" embodied, substantially, the same state of 
 facts presented in the complaint of the citizens of Shawneetown. 
 The Commissioners being in doubt in the Benton case, and having 
 in view the fact that the Attorney General is made, by statute, their 
 legal adviser, referred the whole question of their power to compel 
 additional train service, to the Attorney General. His elaborate 
 opinion upon this question, and his view of the law applicable to the 
 facts presented in the Benton petition, will be found printed in our 
 report of 1889, p. 196. 
 
 The conclusion of the Attorney General was that the Railway 
 Commissioners of Illinois are without power to enforce relief upon 
 the state of facts presented by the citizens of Benton, which facts, 
 we have before said, are practically identical with those presented in 
 your petition. 
 
 It appeared in the Benton case, from statements made by the 
 auditor of the company, that the line running through Benton was 
 being operated at a loss. The same fact appears with reference to 
 the line between Shawneetown and McLeansboro, from the statement 
 produced by Superintendent Dickson, and sworn to by him as a cor- 
 rect summary of what appears from the books of the auditor. In 
 the Benton case, it appeared that the line operated under the name 
 of the "Cairo Short Line," as a whole, earned money over and above 
 expenses. Attorney General Hunt, in his opinion, discussing the
 
 208 
 
 question whether the surplus revenues from other lines furnished a 
 legal basis for compelling the company to operate additional trains 
 on the Eldorado division, which was losing money upon the train 
 already in use, says: 
 
 "I have given this matter much consideration, have found no case which 
 sustains that position, and have serious doubts whether such liability can be 
 forced. The sworn report of the auditor of the company, submitted with 
 the company's answer, and not controverted, shows that in the five years- 
 1884 to 1888, inclusive the total loss in operating the Belleville & Eldorado 
 line was $44,810.64. With this exhibit, and on the statement of facts on 
 which the complaint in this cose is based, I do not believe that a court would, 
 in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, hold the company liable or for- 
 feit its franchise for refusing to increase its losses in operating the line." 
 
 The opinion of the Attorney General on this point is strongly sup- 
 ported by the case of the Fitchburg R. R. Co. vs. Commonwealth, 12 
 Gray, 180, and was doubtless examined by him upon this point, 
 though it is not cited in his opinion. 
 
 We note what you say about the unfairness of considering the line 
 from McLeansboro to Shawneetwn as merely a branch, and not as 
 part and parcel of the entire line known as the Southeast & St. Louis, 
 and also your criticism of the manner in which the statement of the 
 company is made up, and we might incline to take your view of these 
 matters at least so far as to order an expert examination of the books 
 of the company for the purpose of getting a corrected statement of 
 earnings and expenses were it not for the fact that there seems to 
 be an insuperable legal obstacle in the way of an action in this case, 
 independently of the question whether the line makes or loses 
 money. That obstacle is found in the very imperfect state of the 
 remedial law upon the subject of compelling train service by a gen- 
 eral writ in the name of the people. In our report for the year 1889, 
 page 16, you will find the views of the Railroad Commissioners of 
 this State fully expressed on this subject. In that report we urged 
 the necessity of further legislation to meet such cases as that em- 
 braced in the petition of the citizens of Shawneetown. 
 
 The Attorney General in his opinion upon the Benton case, to 
 which reference has been made, held that a writ of mandamus would 
 not lie to compel additional train service upon a railroad. His opin- 
 ion was professedly based upon the case of O. & M. Ry. Co. vs. The 
 People, 120 111., page 200. The learned Justice delivering the opin- 
 ion in that case, used the following language: 
 
 "It is believed no case can be found, which, in the absence of a statutory 
 requirement, has gone to the length of holding that a railway company may 
 be compelled by mandamus to increase the number of trains on its road, or 
 to run daily a particular number of trains over its road; and we are satisfied 
 there is no common law authority for making such an order." 
 
 If this be sound law (and it certainly is the law in Illinois until re- 
 versed) , then it would seem that there is no means by which the 
 Commissioners could act in the direction of affording the relief 
 prayed. To proceed to forfeit the franchise of the road by a writ of 
 quo warranto, might entirely cut off the train service of Shawnee- 
 town, and it is not perceived how such an action could possibly make
 
 209 
 
 the train service better. Orders of the Railway Commissioners, you 
 are, of course, aware, have no binding force as judgments, but re- 
 main to be enforced through the process of the courts. Should we 
 make an order in this case which the courts afford no remedy to en- 
 force, the act would be merely nugatory, and would afford your people 
 no relief. 
 
 For the reasons given, the Commissioners have not judged it pru- 
 dent to make any order in the premises, and I am authorized to say 
 that the views here expressed meet the approval of the Commis- 
 sioners, and may be regarded as our opinion upon the case as made. 
 
 One practice of the company shown by the evidence is in direct 
 violation of the statute. It was shown that the company is accustomed 
 to haul freight cars in its trains behind passenger coaches. Against 
 this practice the statute denounces a penalty, which the company 
 incurs whenever it hauls its freight cars in this manner. 
 
 It was also shown that the company is accustomed to distribute 
 cars upon its main track, between stations, to be loaded, and that, on 
 the return, the custom is to push such freight cars ahead of the 
 locomotive until a siding is arrived at where they can be . trans- 
 ferred to the rear. True, it appears that by this practice the company 
 accommodates many of its patrons, particularly those who ship 
 blocks and logs, thus saving them the trouble and expense of trans- 
 porting their freight to distant side tracks, which, it is said would 
 render the business unprofitable. The Commissioners can not, how- 
 ever, take note of these little conveniences which result from viola- 
 tions of the statute. Our duty is to enforce the law as we find it. 
 You are therefore authorized by the Commissioners, as State's At- 
 torney of Gallatin county, and as one of the legel advisers of the 
 Commission, made so by statute, to proceed to prosecute violations 
 of the statute in the particulars last noted. You are upon the ground, 
 and the facts are accessible to you. You will please advise us, how- 
 ever, of such prosecutions as you may institute for these violations 
 of the statute. 
 
 Regretting that we can not afford relief of a more comprehensive 
 character to your people, I remain, sir, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman R. R. and W. Commission. 
 Adopted January 3, 1893. 
 
 14 O
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE MADISON, ILLINOIS & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co., THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO 
 
 & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., THE CHICAGO & 
 
 ALTON RAILROAD Co., 
 
 RESPONDENTS. 
 
 Petition No. 11. For Leave to Cross near Kinder. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner J. H. Overhall. 
 
 For Wabash Railroad Co. GEORGE B. BURNETT. 
 
 For Cleveland, Cincinnatti, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. JAS. 
 A. CONNELLY. 
 
 For Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. WM. BROWN.
 
 213 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN: 
 
 Petitioner seeks to cross with its tracks, the tracks of the Wabash, 
 the "Big Four," and the Chicago & Alton Railroads, near Kinder, 
 Madison county, Illinois. The respondent companies are all object- 
 ing to the proposed crossing. Hence this petition for an order of 
 the Commission granting leave to cross. 
 
 The crossing is objecteted to, among other things, upon the ground 
 that there is no public necessity for the building of petitioner's road 
 across the tracks of respondents at the point proposed; that from all 
 that appears the road will terminate on a prairie where there are no 
 inhabitants; that the industries and factories which petitioner alleges 
 it is seeking to reach upon the west are merely projected, and no one 
 knows whether they will ever be built. 
 
 It is further objected that the only object of petitioner in forcing 
 this crossing is to connect with what is known as the "Bluff Line" 
 just beyond the point of crossing. 
 
 It is further contended that in case petitioner is permitted to cross 
 at all, an overhead crossing should be ordered in order to avoid the 
 danger and delay to travel and transportation which the statute di- 
 rects shall not be "unnecessarily" interfered with. 
 
 Finally it is said, in case petitioner is permitted to cross at grade 
 as prayed, it should bear all the expense of protecting the crossing, 
 including the expense of operating the interlocker. 
 
 Upon these several points of objection we observe: 
 
 1. That the Railroad Commissioners of Illinois are not made by 
 law judges of the necessity for building railroads. The General As- 
 sembly, in the act for the incorporation of railroads, has fixed all the 
 conditions and limitations which exist on this subject. Neither this 
 tribunal nor any other has been designated by law to judge of the 
 traffic necessity of new lines. Some states, we believe, have put re- 
 strictions upon the building of railroads; but ours has not. Charters 
 are taken out fixing the termini of the line to be built; and consider- 
 able latitude is allowed to the constructing company in locating its 
 line between these points. Existing lines have in some cases been 
 almost parallelled by useless and speculative lines of road; but there 
 has been and is no legal authority, so far as we know, to prevent this, 
 however much good business judgment may be violated.
 
 214 
 
 2. The same may be said of the objection that the sole object of 
 petitioner is to meet the "Bluff Line," and give that company traffic 
 arrangements for crossing the tracks of respondents. If this objec- 
 tion were sustained it would go to the rigl t of petitioner to build the 
 road, and not merely to the particular place where it is seeking to 
 locate its line. We are not aware that a connection with the "Bluff 
 Line : ' is an illegal object, or that the Commissioners of Railroads 
 have any power to examine into the motives of petitioner and to 
 deny its petition upon the ground that its object is not deemed to be 
 justifiable. The Commissioners are simply directed by the statute, 
 aftei hearing, to "prescribe the place where and the manner in which 
 such crossing shall be made." If the company has complied with 
 the necessary statutory provisions to enable it to build a railroad, 
 we, as Railroad Commissioners, are not authorized to deny that a 
 crossing of some kind may be made of the tracks across which it pro- 
 jects its line. In other words, we are to "prescribe" a crossing, not 
 deny one altogether. 
 
 We have said no power exists to prevent petition&Pfrom proceeding 
 with the construction of its line upon the ground that it meets no 
 public necessity and that the objects and motives of its projectors 
 are not proper. It is sufficient, perhaps, to say that this Commission 
 can assume no such power under the statute. Petitioner, before pro- 
 ceeding to cross the right of way of respondents with its road must, 
 in addition to getting leave of the Commission, proceeed to condemn 
 its right of way in the County Court. If any power exists in that 
 court to check the building of this line upon the grounds urged, re- 
 spondents can there interpose their objections, and that tribunal will 
 judge of its own jurisdiction and powers. 
 
 3. The objection based upon the danger to travel and transporta- 
 tion upon respondents' lines, which will result from the proposed 
 crossing, raises the question whether, with such crossing, well pro- 
 tected by interlocking, will entail an "unnecessary" danger and de- 
 lay within the meaning of the statute. It is the judgment of the 
 Commissioners that every crossing, however well protected by inter- 
 locking, introduces some elements of danger and of delay to travel 
 and transportation. The language of the statute is that future cross- 
 ings shall be constructed "at such place and in such manner as will 
 not unnecessarily impede-or endanger the travel or transportion upon 
 the railway so crossed." 
 
 We once had occasion to observe in the case of the Chicago, 
 Madison & Northern R. R. Co. vs. The Belt. Railway Company of 
 Chicago, that the word "unnecessary" is not used in this statute in 
 its strict philosophical sense. In that sense, only that is "necessary" 
 which can not possibly be avoided, and there would always be a pos- 
 sibility of changing the place and manner of a crossing in order to 
 avoid even the slightest danger or delay. The General Assembly 
 evidently expected that some crossings would still be made at grade. 
 Grade crossings were not positively prohibited, but a means was pro- 
 vided by which, when the configuration of the ground proved favor- 
 able, crossings might be ordered to be constructed over or under. It 
 was doubtless intended that reasonable regard should be had to the
 
 215 
 
 circumstances of each case. The question here, therefore, is not 
 whether there will be some danger and some delay, but will this 
 crossing "unnecessarily" impede or endanger travel or transportation 
 within the sense intended by the General Assembly? Recognizing; 
 fully the desirability of separating crossing tracks where that is feas- 
 ible, we do not think a fair application of this statute justifies us in. 
 ordering an overhead crossing in the present case. We have caused 
 an estimate to be made of the expense of such a crossing, which i& 
 about $77,000. Such a burden, the railway companies of this State 
 have only in rare instances voluntarily imposed upon themselves in 
 the past for the sake of avoiding danger and delay, even though 
 when their lines were built, no such safety appliances were used or 
 existed as those which may now be put in at this crossing. 
 
 Putting expense aside, however, as not to be weighed against dan- 
 ger to life and property, a further difficulty still exists. Petitioner 
 states one of its objects to be to connect its line with the three re- 
 spondent railways, particularly the "Big Four," which is the middle 
 track of the three, they all lying parallel and near together at the 
 point designated, the Wabash being upon the east, the "Big Four" in 
 the middle and the Alton upon the west The act for the incorpora- 
 tion of railway companies provides that every corporation formed 
 under the act shall have power: 
 
 "To cross, intersect, join, and unite its railways with any other railway be- 
 fore constructed, at any point in its route, and upon the grounds of such 
 other railway company, with the necessary turnouts, sidings and switches, and 
 other conveniences in furtherance of the objects of its connection; and every 
 corporation whose railway is or shall be hereafter intersected by any new 
 railway shall unite with the corporation owning such fiew railway in forming- 
 such intersection and connection, and grant the facilities aforesaid; and if the 
 two corporations can not agree upon the amount of compensation to be made 
 therefor, or the points and manner of such crossings and connection, the 
 same shall be ascertained and determined in manner prescribed by law." 2 
 Starr & Curtis, page 1914, Par. 6. 
 
 In order to "intersect, join and unite'' its tracks with the tracks of 
 respondents, as it seems petitioner has a right to do under the above 
 provision, petitioner would be compelled to build an additional track 
 upon a level with the tracks crossed. But the same difficulty we now 
 have would then again present itself; for petitioner could not connect 
 with the "Big Four" from the east without crossing the Wabash ; and it 
 could not connect with the Alton without crossing both the Wabash 
 and the "Big Four." Thus if petitioner were to insist upon its right 
 to connect with these roads, we should have practically a grade cross- 
 ing at last; and although such a crossing, made for the purpos of de- 
 livering and receiving cars, would perhaps be less used than a regu- 
 lar grade crossing, it would, nevertheless, in the judgment of the 
 Commission, be such a crossing as would require protection by inter- 
 locking. Thus we see an order for an overhead crossing would 
 probably tend very little to simplify the situation. We have there- 
 fore determined that we can not deny the prayer of the petition. 
 While interlocking machines do not entirely avoid danger and delay 
 at crossings, they do have the effect of reducing these to a minimum.
 
 216 
 
 With such an equipment we are not able to say in the language of 
 the statute that a grade crossing here would "unnecessarily impede 
 and endanger travel and transportation." 
 
 4. The question of the division of the expense of operating an inter- 
 locker remains to be considered. Petitioner concedes that the statute 
 casts upon it the burden of paying the first cost of the interlocking 
 appliance, of putting the same in ready for use, and of maintaining 
 the same in good repair. Respondents contend that to this should 
 be added the burden of also operating the machine. Upon this ques- 
 tion the Commissioners have fully expressed their views in the 
 opinion in the case of the Tamaroa & Mt. Vernon Ry. Co. v. The 
 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., decided June 21, 1892. We have 
 seen no reason to change the views we there expressed. Under the 
 construction given to the statute in that case the expense of the 
 operation of this interlocker, i. e., wages of operators, would be paid 
 for upon the basis of the number of roads using the machine, each 
 paying equally. 
 
 In accordance with the views here expressed an order will be en- 
 tered granting petitioner the right to cross at grade at the point 
 designated in the petition The order will provide that the crossing 
 shall be protected by an inlocker of improved modern pattern, upon 
 the construction and details of which the companies will be left to 
 agree if they are able to do so. The order will provide that the first 
 cost of such interlocker, the expense of putting the same in, and the 
 expense of maintaining the same in good order and repair shall oe 
 paid entire by the petitioner; and that the cost of operating the said 
 machine shall be paid by petitioner and the three respondents equally, 
 one-fourth each. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is ordered and decided that petitioner, the Madison, Illinois & 
 St. Louis Railway Co., have leave to cross with its tracks, at grade, 
 the tracks of the respondents, the Wabash Railroad Co., the Cleve- 
 land, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., and the Chicago 
 & Alton Railroad Co., at the place and in the manner specified in the 
 petition on file in this cause, right of way for such crossing being 
 first obtained under the laws of Illinois relating to Eminent Domain. 
 
 It is ordered further, that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals and switches to be 
 agreed upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the 
 parties are able to agree, the first cost of such interlocking machine, 
 the expense of putting the same in, and the expense of maintaining 
 the same in good order and repair to be paid for by the Madison, 
 Illinois & St. Louis Railway Co. as provided by statute; but it is 
 hereby ordered and decided by the Commission that of the cost of 
 the operation of such interlocking device, the said Madison, Illinois 
 & St. Louis Railway Co., petitioner, shall pay one-fourth, and the
 
 217 
 
 said Wabash Railroad Co., Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. 
 Louis Railway Co., and Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., respondents, 
 shall pay one-fourth each. And inasmuch as the statute only directs 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to prescribe by order a 
 plan of the interlocking in case the parties are unable to agree; 
 therefore, it is ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration by the Commission pending the efforts of petitioner and 
 respondents to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 Adopted January 3, 1893.
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD Co. r 
 
 PETITIONER. 
 
 VS. 
 
 TOLEDO PEORIA & WESTERN RAILWAY Co., 
 
 RESPONDENT. 
 
 Petition No. 13. For Protection of Crossing at Watseka- 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner W. H. LYFORD. 
 For Respondent W. S. HORTON.
 
 221 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILIPS, CHAIRMAN : 
 
 The grade crossing at Watseka, 111., which the petition prays may 
 be protected by an iiiterlocker, is not more dangerous, perhaps, than 
 many other such crossings in this State. We can not, however, agree 
 with the allegation in respondent's answer, "that said crossing is safe 
 to life and property, and does not require the protection prayed for 
 in the petition." We do not believe any grade crossing of main tracks 
 can be perfectly safe to life and property. We think all such cross- 
 ings should be protected as rapidly as due regard to revenues, 
 and to all other kindred precautions looking to the public safety will 
 permit. Everything can not be done at once, however; and it was not 
 the intention of the lawmakers, in passing the act of 1891, to compel 
 all crossings to be forthwith interlocked. Had this been their object, 
 they would have so provided. 
 
 The counsel of petitioner stated upon the hearing that the petition- 
 ing company would be willing, rather than that the protection of this 
 crossing should entirely fail, to pay two- thirds of the cost of the con- 
 struction of the device. The disparity in the volume and importance of 
 the traffic on these roads, while not admited to be a controlling con- 
 sideration in such cases, is deemed a sufficient reason on which to 
 take petitioner at its own offer. The respondent road is a property 
 which, under its present excellent and efficient management, is con- 
 stantly improving, and rapidly retrieving the misfortunes of the com- 
 pany's earlier period. We think, under all the circumstances, the pe- 
 titioner can well afford to pay two-thirds of the cost of an interlocker 
 at this crossing. The expense of the maintenance and operation of 
 of the machine will, however, be equally divided between the two 
 companies. 
 
 The Secretary will enter an order directing that the crossing de- 
 scribed in the petition be interlocked, and providing that of the first 
 cost of the device and of putting the same in ready for use petitioner 
 pay two- thirds and respondent one-third, and that of the cost of 
 maintaining such device in good order and repair, and of operating 
 the same, each of the companies pay one-half. The order will pro- 
 vide that the case be further held while petitioner and respondent 
 agree upon the details of an interlocking device, as provided by 
 statute, if they are able to do so.
 
 222 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF COMMISSION. 
 
 CHICAGO, January 4, 1893. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of 
 the State of Illinois, held in Chicago, Illinois, on this day; 
 present Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, and J. 
 H. Paddock, Secretary the following proceedings were had in this 
 cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and deter- 
 mination before the Commission this 4th day of January, 1893, 
 and the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, 
 and the arguments made before the Commission at a former session, 
 and being fully advised in the premises, doth find: 
 
 That the public good requires that the crossing formed at Wat- 
 seka, Illinois, by the tracks of the Chicago and Eastern Illinois Rail- 
 road Company and the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railway Company, 
 be protected and operated by an interlocking device or machine, and 
 that the following would be a just and equitable basis on which to 
 apportion the cost of such device or machine, to- wit. : That the said 
 petitioner, the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company pay 
 two-thirds, and the said respondent, the Toledo, Peoria & Western 
 Railway Company, pay one-third of the first cost and of putting 
 the same in ready for use, and of the cost of maintaining such de- 
 vice in good order and repair and of operating the same, the said pe- 
 titioner, the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, pay one- 
 half, and the said respondent, the Toledo, Peoria & Western Rail- 
 way Company pay one-half. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that said crossing be 
 protected by a system of interlocking and signals, to be agreed upon 
 by the companies, with this Commission's approval, if the companies 
 are able to agree, and that said companies shall bear the proportion 
 of the first cost of putting in the device and of maintaining and oper- 
 ating the same as above set forth. 
 
 And it is further ordered that this petition be further held under 
 consideration by the Commission, pending efforts of petitioner and 
 respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted January 4, 1893.
 
 nsro 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS CORRESPONDENCE 
 
 COVERING THE QUESTIONS OF SCHUDLES, 
 FURNISHING CARS, TERMINAL FACILI- 
 TIES, INTERLOCKING, ETC. 
 
 J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 JOHN R. WHEELER, 
 J. C. WILLIS, 
 
 Commissioners .
 
 225 
 
 CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SCHEDULES AND 
 RATES OF THE L. E. & W. R. R. CO., AND REFER- 
 RING TO CERTAIN PROSECUTIONS FOR DISCRIM- 
 INATIONS. 
 
 LETTER OF ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO GEORGE L. BRADBURY. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, 111., May 13, 1892. 
 
 
 
 George L. Bradbury, Esq., General Manager L. E. & W. R. R., 
 Indianapolis, Ind. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I am advised that copies of a jobber's special tariff 
 have been sent by the freight department of your company to the 
 wholesale men of Bloomington, superseding the tariff formerly in 
 force on your road. I have just applied to your station office for a 
 copy of this new tariff, but none was furnished me. I understand 
 the effect of this tariff is to considerably raise rates to Bloomington 
 jobbers, bringing them up, so it is said, to the maximum schedule 
 adopted by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. 
 
 I was informed some days ago that some member or members of 
 your freight department had been in Bloomington, and had taken 
 occasion while here to intimate to the jobbers of this city, that un- 
 less a certain suit now pending for discrimination here should be 
 withdrawn, your company would raise the rates to the limit allowed 
 by the Commissioner's tariff, and thereby place Bloomington job- 
 bers in a considerably worse position than they were before. 
 
 It is not my province, or desire, as a member of the Railway and 
 Warehouse Commission, to ascribe motives to a move of this kind; 
 but before a measure is taken with a view to punishing Bloomington 
 jobbers because the Railway Commissioners have thought fit to en- 
 force the statute against discrimination, I think it not improper to 
 call your attention briefly to the provisions of the law regulating 
 railroads in this State, and to the practice of the Railroad Commis- 
 sion under the same. 
 
 Section 8 of the act concerning extortion and unjust discrimina- 
 tion in force July 1, 1878, provides (and the same phraseology is 
 preserved in later amendments of the act) , that 
 
 15 O.
 
 226 
 
 "The Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners are hereby directed 
 to make for each of the railroad corporations doing business in this 
 State, as soon as practicable, a schedule of reasonable maximum rates 
 of charges for the transportation of passengers and freights and cars 
 on each of said railroads," etc. 
 
 The method pursued by the Commission for a long time was to 
 make a schedule for each road doing business in the State; but, un- 
 der the further provision of the statute, which allowed the Commis- 
 sion to classify the roads, various classifications were made, until 
 finally the Illinois roads were all placed in two large classes as at 
 present, known as class "A," and class "B." 
 
 It has never been the object of the Commission to press maximums 
 down to so low a point as to leave the roads no room to adjust their 
 rates to the exigencies of their business. It has been recognized 
 that competition must sometimes be met, and so long as in meeting 
 it the railroad violated no law against discrimination, its right to 
 protect itself was not interferred with. The harmony which has 
 generally come to prevail between the Railway Commission and the 
 roads of Illinois, and between the roads and the, shippers of the State, 
 has, I assure you, been quite agreeable to the Commission. 
 
 It is, however, apparent that should the roads conclude to treat 
 this schedule of maximum rates as one to be put in force by them in 
 all cases, not treating it as a maximum only, a very serious revision 
 of the schedules would at once become necessary. 
 
 It has been a practice with the freight officers of many railroads 
 (and I may add, a very unjustifiable practice), whenever shippers 
 complain of treatment they deem to be unjust, to show to them the 
 Railroad Commissioners' schedule, and to point out to them how 
 much worse they might fare should the railroads see fit to put that 
 schedule in force. 
 
 Since I began this letter, a gentlemen of this city has shown me a 
 letter of one of your agents in which your agent says, in response to 
 a complaint concerning what was deemed an extortionate charge: 
 
 "Referring to correspondence, and expense bills attached, I don't 
 see how there is any remedy for this. Stations in Illinois take Illi- 
 nois State rates, and it is governed by Illinois classification, and it 
 seems to be a very high rate. Take goods from Cincinnati: I ex- 
 pect they will come nearly as cheap as from Bloomington, as that 
 business is governed by the official classification, and it being an in- 
 ter-state affair brings it down to a comparatively small rate." 
 
 I leave you to judge how long the Railway Board of Illinois is 
 likely to leave in force a maximum rate which your own officers and 
 agents see fit to point to as exhorbitantly high, seeking to place the 
 responsibility upon the Railway Commission. You will have only 
 yourselves to blame if the maximum rates fixed by the Commission 
 for your company shall cease to serve as bugaboos to scare the pa- 
 trons of your company into acquiescence in whatever practices you 
 may see fit to adopt. .
 
 227 
 
 Though I have not examined your tariff, I judge from accounts re- 
 ceived of it that it seriously raises the rates to Bloomington shippers 
 above what had long been in force, fixed voluntarily by your freight 
 department. If this proves to be the case it will become necessary 
 for the Railway Commission to at once make a special schedule of 
 maximum rates for your company as contemplated by the section of 
 the statute above quoted. If our maximums are to be taken as ac- 
 tual working rates, then you can easily see that the Commission must 
 be guided by different principles, in adjusting the schedule, from 
 those which were permitted to have force in adjusting what was 
 meant only for a maximum schedule. 
 
 This matter will be considered at an early meeting of the Railway 
 Board, of which I will direct the secretary to give you notice, so you 
 may be present and be heard if you see fit to do so. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 (Signed) ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 
 Chairman R. R. and W. Commission. 
 
 LETTER OF SINGER & WHEELER TO W. W. MARMON. 
 
 PEORIA, ILL., MAY 13, 1892. 
 W. W. Marmon, Esq., Bloomington, Illinois. 
 
 DEAR SIR: We have been in correspondence with H. C Parker, 
 traffic manager of the Lake Erie & Western Railroad. As you have 
 no doubt noticed, the road has raised the rates about fifty per cent 
 on the strength of the Bloomington people suing the road under the 
 Illinois law, as we understand it, on account of a mistaken idea that 
 the Lake Erie & Western road was giving special rates not enjoyed 
 by your people. About three years ago, you will recollect, what high 
 rates there were in this State, and our jobbers undertook the task 
 and went before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission five or six 
 times and finally compelled the Illinois railroads to reduce their tariff' 
 to the same basis as the inter-state tariff was. Indianapolis and Chi- 
 cago could ship goods into Bloomington cheaper than Peoria could, 
 and the same arrangement will be in force now, since they have raised 
 the rate. The writer can not see why your jobbers should have 
 brought suit against the two roads running to Bloomington without 
 first positively ascertaining whether there was any special tariff else- 
 where or not. We do not think that Bloomington has gained any- 
 thing by this action. It has simply made their own rate higher as 
 well as ours, but probably with the temper of the management of the 
 Lake Erie and the "Big 4" on this subject, nothing can now be done 
 in the matter. I feel that it certainly was a short-sighted policy of 
 the business men of Bloomington. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 SINGER & WHEELER 
 (P. J. Singer.
 
 228 
 
 LETTER OF ISSAAG N. PHILLIPS TO SINGER & WHEELER. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., May 14, 1892. 
 
 Messrs. Singer & Wheeler, Peoria, Illinois. 
 
 GENTLEMEN: Mr.W.W. Marmon, of this city, has shown me a let- 
 ter written by your firm to him, of date May ISth, wherein you say, 
 "We have been in correspondence with H. C. Parker, traffic manager 
 of the L. E. & W. R. R." You further say, "You have no doubt 
 noticed the road has raised the rates about 50 per cent, on the 
 strength of the Bloomington people suing the road under the Illinois 
 law, on account of a mistaken idea that the L. E. & W. road was 
 giving special rates not enjoyed by your people." 
 
 You further, in your letter, speak of the "short-sighted policy of 
 the business men of Bloomington," in bringing this calamity upon 
 themselves, and say that "with the temper of the management of the 
 L. E. & W. and the "Big 4" on this subject, nothing can now be done 
 in the matter." 
 
 My attention, as a member of the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission, had previously been called to the fact that the rates had 
 had been raised by the L. E. & W. Company, and I had little doubt 
 it was as you say, a matter of "temper" with them, and done as a re- 
 taliation on account of the action, not of the "busines men of Bloom- 
 ington," but of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. I infer 
 that it is a matter of "temper" on their part, for the reason that if 
 the notion that they were discriminating were a "mistaken idea," as 
 you seem to imply, they could, of course, have defeated the suit upon 
 the merits. Hence, I infer that it was because it was not a "mis- 
 taken idea" that they have resorted to this questionable practice for 
 the purpose of gaining an advantage in the suit to which you refer. 
 
 My purpose in writing you is, as chairman of the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission, to ask you to preserve this "correspondence 
 .with H. C. Parker," to which you refer in your letter. Your people 
 will be interested, along with the people of Bloomington, in seeing 
 that this railroad company does not arbitrarily and oppressively in- 
 crease rates, whatever their motives may be in the premises. The 
 correspondence to which you have referred is likely to be needed by 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission in certain investigations 
 likely to occur in the near future. Therefore, I desire, in behalf of 
 the Railway Board, to request you to preserve it and be ready to pro- 
 duce it when it is neeeed. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman R. R. & W. Commission.
 
 229 
 
 GEORGE L. BRADBURY TO ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., May 16, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. R. and W. Commission, 
 Bloomington, III. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR I have your favor of the 13th inst. I have been in 
 charge of railroad properties extending into Illinois since the first 
 Commission was appointed, and can not recall a single instance 
 wherein I have failed to accord to each Commission full respect to 
 them and their rulings, and I fully hope to be able to continue do- 
 ing so. Of course, I am not advised why your Commission should 
 institute suit against this company without first making complaint 
 to us, or advising us of some wrong-doing, thus enabling us to desist 
 and make restitution, if proper. Yet I presume your reasons were 
 good. I desire to say no representative of this company had any au- 
 thority to intimate to the jobbers of Bloomington any retaliation as re- 
 ferred to, and I think a wrong construction must have been placed on 
 his words. 
 
 I am advised by our traffic department that no complaints of our 
 tariffs from Bloomington have come to his knowledge. On the con- 
 trary, this company has been favored by the jobbers of Bloomington 
 giving us preference in their business on account of our favorable 
 tariffs, so that we are at a loss to understand why the case or suit has 
 been brought against us. Our desire is to make such just and reason- 
 tariffs as will enable all the cities on our line to reach out to the 
 fullest extent in business, as against other cities located on other 
 lines, either state or inter-state; as for instance, we desire to have 
 Peoria and Bloomington compete in our territory with Chicago and 
 LaFayette and St. Louis, so far as we can without violating the 
 spirit of your laws or doing any one an injustice ; and this we were do- 
 ing, or endeavoring to do, and .still desire to do. We had no inten- 
 tion whatever to violate your laws or do violence to the people of 
 Bloomington, and we still have none, and this was the reason our 
 traffic manager visited them, that he might ascertain wherein the 
 trouble existed. I assume your Commission will not press any suit 
 against us, unless you find intentional wrong-doing, with refusal on 
 our part to correct. 
 
 If you will indicate a time when it will be convenient for yourself 
 or the full Commission to meet with us, I will be glad to conform to 
 it, and I doubt not all questions can be harmonized. 
 
 Very truly, 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY, 
 
 General Manager.
 
 230 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO GEO. L. BRADBURY. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., May 19, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Geo. L. Bradbury, Gen. Man. L. E. & W. E. R. Co., Indian- 
 apolis, Ind. 
 
 DEAR SIR I have your letter of 16th inst., and have endeavored 
 to note and digest its contents. 
 
 Among other things you say, you are not advised why the Com- 
 mission should institute suit against your company without formal 
 complaint. It is true that no formal complaint in writing was lodged 
 with the Commission against your company for discrimination. 
 Shippers often apprehend they may be greatly annoyed if they in- 
 cur the enmity of railroad managements, and while they may be very 
 profuse in secret complaints to officials, do not wish to go upon 
 record for fear their business may be injured or destroyed by the 
 action of earners. I can assure you there has been no dearth of 
 complaints that your company has long been discriminating against 
 Bloomington, in territory which naturally belongs to Bloomington 
 jobbers. 
 
 In this connection, please note that the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission does not sit as a court to try questions of discrimina- 
 tion. The only function of the Commission in such cases is that of 
 a public prosecutor, and I am not aware there is any obligation, 
 moral or legal, to carry the evidence obtained to the offending com- 
 pany and exhibit it before bringing suit. It is true, when a formal 
 complaint is lodged, notice is sometimes given to the company, and 
 even a hearing had with a view to determining whether there is- 
 sufficient grounds for a prosecution. But when the Commissioners 
 receive from any source such information as satisfies them the law 
 has been violated, their duty is very plain under the statute. They 
 are expressly commanded to prosecute in all such cases. 
 
 It seems pertinent to observe here, that if the Commission has 
 instituted a prosecution under a misapprehension of the facts, or 
 upon insufficient evidence, there is no surer way or better place to 
 make the fact apparent than in the defense and at the trial. Retal- 
 iatory measures would certainly be unnecessary where there is a 
 legitimate defense. 
 
 You further say that no representative of your company had any 
 authority to intimate to the jobbers of Bloomington any retaliation, 
 etc. What authority your agents have, I, of course, do not know. 
 The fact is very well established that the intimation was conveyed. 
 It seems useless, however, in the light of developments, to discuss 
 the question whether retaliation was merely threatened or not. The 
 actual retaliation itself, which has now come in the form of your 
 special tariff, is a better evidence of the fact than any mere threats; 
 and this, by the way, may serve to illustrate why the suit in question 
 was brought without any formal complaint having been filed by 
 shippers before the Railroad Commission. Where there is such
 
 231 
 
 liability to punishment, it does not seem wonderful that shippers 
 should be timid and expect others to take the responsibility for 
 prosecutions. 
 
 I call your attention to the fact that my former letter discussed 
 entirely the matter of your special tariff, in which I am advised you 
 raise rates to Bloomington jobbers to the extent of simply put- 
 ting in force as your tariff the Commissioners' schedule of maximum 
 rates. Upon this subject, to my surprise, your letter is silent; and 
 I have not yet been able to obtain a copy of the tariff in question, 
 though, as I stated before, I applied to your office here for it and 
 was told it would be sent to me. 
 
 I now refer you to my former letter, as embodying my views on 
 the subject of this special tariff, and the action which its enforce- 
 ment seems to make necessary; and I have to say further, that, 
 while that tariff remains in force, there will, in my judgment, be no 
 occasion for the meeting you suggest with a view to "harmonizing" 
 interests. I am in favor of peace, harmony, and good will all around, 
 and have no wish for a contest, unless one is necessary. But, so far 
 as I am personally concerned, I am not in the habit of acting under 
 the influence of coercive measures, and shall not do so in this case. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 (Signed) ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman R. R. and W. Commision. 
 
 GEORGE L. BBADBUBY TO ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., May 20, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman JR. R,. & W. Commission, Bloom- 
 ington, III. 
 
 MY DEAR SIB I have your favor of 19th inst. It is true, as you 
 say, there is no obligation on the part of your Commission to give us 
 notice of complaint, or a hearing, to determine whether there is suf- 
 ficient ground for prosecution, but I have always understood your 
 Commission generally adopted such measures, and it was the excep- 
 tion when you instituted suit before giving the parties complained 
 of an opportunity to correct the wrong-doing, especially if the parties 
 were innocent in intent. I have said to you, our purpose was to 
 comply with your rulings and we had not knowingly, and do not de- 
 sire to discriminate against Bloomington jobbers. It is true, the 
 courts can determine whether we have violated the laws or not in 
 the suit you have brought, but if. as I assume to be the case, your 
 purpose is to correct the wrong-doing and afford quick relief, I sub- 
 mit, we being innocent offenders, if at all, would it not accomplish 
 the purpose of your Commission to give us a hearing and an oppor- 
 tunity without reverting to the courts? It is true, we have put in 
 force the Commissioners' schedule of rates, which is an in'-rease over 
 our former tariff, but it is the same to all, and there certainly is no 
 discrimination, which is the thing complained of, and not the rates. 
 We have no desire to work any hardship or retaliation to any person
 
 232 
 
 or community; we had a tariff in force which we thought and in- 
 tended to be in the best interest of all parties; our first notice to the 
 contrary is your suit, and pending that or a settlement, we simply 
 adopt the Commissioners' schedule. 
 
 It would be very absurd for me to think of attempting coercive 
 measures with your Commission, and I beg to assure you I had no 
 such intent, notwithstanding all you may have heard to the contrary. 
 I am candid in the desire to be in harmony with your Commission, 
 and with our patrons, and to do what is fair and right in the adjust- 
 ing of our tariffs, to comply with the law, and to avoid all discrimin- 
 ations, and now submit with this statement, can you not reconsider 
 your conclusions and name an early day for a meeting when the mat- 
 ters complained of can be heard from on both sides and harmonized? 
 If we fail, all your present resources are still with you. I enclose 
 our schedule. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY, 
 
 General Manager. 
 
 GEORGE L. BRADBURY TO ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., June 2, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. R. & W. Commission, Bloom- 
 ington, III. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR Referring to my letter of May 20, will you not 
 kindly gire me an answer at your early convenience? 
 
 Very truly, 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY, 
 General Manager. 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO GEORGE L. BRADBURY. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., June 6, 1892. 
 
 George L. Bradbury, Esq., General Manager, L. E. & W. R. R., 
 Indianapolis, Ind. 
 
 DEAR SIR I have your letter of June 2, in which you ask me to 
 give you an answer to yours of May 20. 
 
 The case is just this: The Railway Board, on the advice of the 
 Attorney General, authorized a prosecution against your company 
 for charging in one case more, and in another case the same, for a 
 longer than for a shorter distance on the same class of goods, in the 
 same direction. In a short time the jobbers of Bloomington were 
 threatened that unless they had this suit dismissed their freights 
 would be increased. I know positively from two sources that such 
 threats were made, but am not at liberty to state my evidence. 
 Thereupon freights were largely increased to Bloomington merchants; 
 and having resorted to this retaliatory measure, your company now 
 proposes a meeting with the Commission to "harmonize" matters.
 
 233 
 
 I am quite willing to believe that you did not personally devise a 
 scheme of this kind, and that it was begun without your knowledge. 
 I have information which points to the fact that the "bulldozing" 
 policy had a strong abettor here in Bloomington. I think a man of 
 your ability and experience would have known that this was a very 
 poor way of "harmonizing" matters; and that a public official having 
 any considerable spirit or self respect would not submit to even con- 
 sider the question of compromise with the sword of Damocles sus- 
 pended over his head. 
 
 The Railway Board meets in Springfield tomorrow, and will be in 
 session there perhaps till Wednesday night. It is then expected we 
 will adjourn to Chicago and hold a hearing there in which the Chi- 
 cago & Northwestern Railroad is concerned. During this meeting I 
 shall bring this question before the Board, of which I am only one 
 member, and shall propose to the Board the making of a schedule of 
 maximum rates for your road in pursuance of the statute quoted to 
 you in a former letter. 
 
 Since getting your last letter, I have learned from the jobbers here 
 that shipments are now actually being made and charged for at the 
 rates named in your new tariff. That is to say, I have learned that 
 you have actually put in as working rates from Bloomington to Illi- 
 nois points the schedule of maximum rates established by the Rail- 
 road and Warehouse Commission. This, as I indicated before, 
 renders it necessary, in my judgment, that these maximum rates, so 
 far as your road is concerned, should be revised with the object in 
 view of the maximum being used as working rates. With a view to 
 this, I have been collecting data with reference to your very much 
 lower charges for like distances from Indiana points into this State, 
 by means of which you are giving jobbers outside of Illinois an ad- 
 vantage over those at Peoria and Bloomington. It seems if you are 
 not permitted to specially favor Peoria you are determined to "boy- 
 cott" the whole State. This will, of course, bear upon the question 
 of what constitutes reasonable rates. I do not think it can be shown 
 that because goods in transitu cross a state line, the road is entitled 
 in reason and justice to make the freight cheaper than upon goods 
 which are transported wholly within the state. 
 
 If my colleagues agree with me upon the necessity of this action, 
 I will say that after our schedule is completed, if you desire to be 
 heard upon the question as to whether it is a reasonable and proper 
 schedule, an apportunity will be given you to appear before the Com- 
 mission in person or by such representative as you may desire. 
 
 I see no need for any other or different consultation than this in 
 the present aspect of affairs touching this prosecution. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 (Signed) , ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 
 Chairman R. R. and W. Commission.
 
 234 
 
 GEORGE L. BRADBURY TO ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., June 7, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. R. & W. Commission, Spring- 
 field, Illinois. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I have your favor of the 6th inst. I am unable, as 
 yet, to ascertain the real cause for the suit. The case seems to have 
 been worked up against us, and I regard it as purely technical. If 
 there has been any abettor at Bloomington I am certainly not aware 
 of it. I find a difference between the Commission and ourselves, 
 and ask simply for a hearing, which you do not seem disposed to 
 grant me. Our traffic department is now, and has been for some 
 time, engaged upon a tariff that will comply with the clause of the 
 law which we are now sued upon. I say, unhesitatingly, if the rail- 
 roads of Illinois would undertake to comply with that clause literally, 
 you would hear of more complaints than any commission has ever 
 yet encountered. We find it almost impossible to work up a tariff 
 under it except, perhaps, by using one-hundredths of a cent. I de- 
 sired to explain all this to you, and to show you the difficulties under 
 which we labor, which I could do so much better verbally than by 
 letter. As an illustration, permit me to say, we a short time since 
 desired to put a commodity from Sandusky, Ohio, into East St. Louis, 
 via Bloomington and the C. & A., when we found the C. & A. rates 
 from Bloomington were higher than the rate we had to make from 
 Sandusky. As soon as we can harmonize a tariff for Illinois we shall 
 put it into effect. Should your Commission decide at any time to 
 give me a hearing, I will be glad to attend. I have never known of 
 a case before where either a state or inter-state Commission declined 
 to give a hearing to a road complained of, or when a suit was brought 
 without first giving the road an opportunity to correct a technical 
 violation, if any, and yet I assume your only purpose is to do your 
 duty. Whatever schedule your Commission may adopt we will ex- 
 pect to carry out in good faith ; in fact, a suggestion would be com- 
 plied with the same as your order. I feel that I have offered to do- 
 my whole duty in this matter, and in a proper spirit. 
 
 Very truly, 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY, 
 General Manager. 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY TO ISAAC N. PHILLIPS. 
 
 INDIANAPOLIS, IND., June 10, 1892. 
 
 Mr. Isaac N. Phillips, Chairman R. R. & W. Commission, Bloom- 
 ington, III. 
 
 DEARSiR: Our traffic department have prepared a tariff on freights 
 for Illinois points which is a material reduction from Commissioners' 
 rates, and I have ordered it into effect, hoping it may prove very sat- 
 isfactory. I think I could readily convince you of the inconsistency 
 of the claim under which the suit against us is brought.
 
 235 
 
 The Commissioners' tariff applied to this road violates the section 
 Under it the rates Peoria to Garlock, thirty miles, and to Congerville,. 
 twenty-six miles, are the same. Again, from Bloomington to Rankin 
 and Kirks, one being sixty and the other fifty-six miles, the rates are 
 the same; and many other points are similar. It is now twenty- one 
 years since the act was promulgated, and this question has never be- 
 fore been raised to my knowledge. There is not a railroad in the 
 country that has not adopted the blocking system for making rates, 
 and that system has received the approval of the Inter-state and all 
 State Commissions so far as I know; in fact, it is difficult to see how 
 any other could be used without causing great distress and discrim- 
 ination. I think you will admit this when you come to go into the 
 question more fully. The Commissioners' tariff made upon a mileage 
 grade alone can not be used except for short distance; nor can a 
 tariff be made on that scale alone that would not work a hardship to 
 either the railroads or people. 
 
 This company desires to be in harmony with its patrons and with 
 the laws. I am of the opinion, however, that no one not in the posi- 
 tion to encounter them can truly judge of the many difficulties under 
 which we labor in meeting the varied questions arising. 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 GEO. L. BRADBURY, 
 
 General Manager. 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO GEORGE L. BRADBURY. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., June 11, 1892, 
 
 Mr. George L. Bradbury, General Manager L. E. & W. It. R. Co., 
 Indianapolis, Ind. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I have your two letters written since my last. In the 
 one received this morning you say you have ordered in a modified 
 tariff for Illinois. I have not time just now to reply to you as fully 
 as I wish. I assure you I do not mean to be unreasonable with your 
 road, or any other. I am aware that, as a practical railroad man, 
 you know a great deal more about railroad business and freight tariffs 
 than I do. As a member of the Railway Commission, I have gener- 
 ally acted on the supposition that railroad men know their own busi- 
 ness better than I do. I intend, so far as I am able, to perform the 
 public functions I am appointed to perform; and I intend to perform 
 them without any captious or oppressive measures against railroads. 
 I have tried not in any case to be controlled by public clamor. I be- 
 lieve that the way to have good railroad service is to have the rail- 
 roads of the country prosperous; and I further believe that their be- 
 ing prosperous is not incompatible with the interests of the people,, 
 but subserves those interests. 
 
 I am glad you have under consideration a different freight tariff 
 from the one now in use, and I hope all efforts of your agents to ma<e 
 capital for your company out of the exceedingly lenient maximum 
 rates of the Railway Commission will at once cease. It is the very
 
 236 
 
 last thing you can afford to seek a popular advantage from. I fur- 
 ther hope the schedule you are about to put in will prove of such a 
 character that it will render the contemplated action of the Railway 
 Commission unnecessary. 
 
 I have further to say, if you have views you wish to place before 
 the Commission upon the general subject of freight rates, and wish 
 a conference for that purpose, as I now understand from your last 
 letters, you will be heard early and as fully as you may desire. I un- 
 derstood the conference you asked for referred particularly to the 
 suit now pending at Bloomington; and, concerning that particular 
 matter, I did not care, in view of facts fully stated by me before, 
 to have any conference. I assure you, as a member of the Railway 
 Board, I have no disposition to reject light or counsel from any 
 proper source, and certainly not from those far more experienced 
 and much wiser than I am concerning railway freight matters. 
 
 I mean you to understand from this letter, that if you approach 
 this subject in what I conceive to be the proper spirit, I will meet 
 you half way, and you will not, I think, find me unfair or unreason- 
 able in the treatment of your company. 
 
 I speak, of course, only for myself, but have no doubt what I here 
 say will be approved by my colleagues. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman R. R. & W. Commission. 
 
 TRAIN SERVICE CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THE 
 STOPPING OF CERTAIN TRAINS AT MT. FOREST AND 
 WILLOW SPRINGS, HAD UPON THE LETTER AND 
 PETITION OF S. T. HART, VILLAGE CLERK OF SPRING 
 FOREST. 
 
 LETTER OF C. H. CHAPPELL TO J. H. PADDOCK. 
 
 CHICAGO, ILL., September 14, 1892. 
 
 J. H. Paddock, Esq., Secretary Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion, Springfield, Illinois. 
 
 DI-AR SIR: I am in receipt of your communication of Sept. 13, 
 giving copy of letter from S. T. Hart, Village Clerk of Spring For- 
 est, and in reply beg to say : The stations of Mt. Forest and Willow 
 Springs are about half a mile apart, and we have for the last two or 
 three years declined to stop all of our trains at both stations. 
 
 Going north, train No. 7, passing Willow Springs and Mount For- 
 est about 7:00 a. m. makes both stops; train No. 9, passing about 
 9:00 a. m. stops only at Willow Springs; train No. 5. about 12:30 
 noon stops at both stations; train No. 1, about 6:30 in the evening 
 makes both stops.
 
 237 
 
 . Going south, train No. 2, about 10:00 a. m. makes both stops; 
 train No. 6, at 1:45 p. m. makes both stops; train No. 10, at 5:45 in 
 the evening, stops only at Mount Forest. 
 
 We think these ample accommodations and more than we should 
 really be called upon to furnish. One stop should answer for all the 
 business in that vicinity. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 C. H. CHAPPELL, 
 General Manager. 
 
 LETTER OP J. H. PADDOCK TO S. T. HART. 
 
 November 11, 1892. 
 
 8. T. Hart, Esq., Village Clerk Spring Forest, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR: I have placed your communication of November 4tb 
 before the Commission at its meeting today, and, after considering 
 the same, the Commission direct me to say: 
 
 1. The enforcement of the ordinances of your village against the- 
 high speed of trains is a question with which the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission has nothing to do, that being a matter for the 
 consideration of your village officials. 
 
 2. Neither has this Commission anything to do with the fact of 
 your being carried by your station on one or more occasions, when 
 you rode upon Chicago & Alton trains. 
 
 3. There is no rule of law which compels a railroad to stop it& 
 trains at any certain station, simply because it has formerly done so. 
 
 4. The measure of duty of a railroad company is to give a reason- 
 able train service to its patrons under all circumstances. The 
 Supreme Court of Illinois has held that a contract made by a rail- 
 road company to maintain a station at a certain point is not binding 
 upon the company, it being a matter of public policy, and that policy 
 requiring every company to furnish a reasonable accommodation 
 to all its patrons; and, that what is a reasonable accommodation is 
 not to be controlled by a contract of the company. Even though a 
 company agreed to furnish a station at a certain point, yet if the 
 necessities of the public required the stop to be made at another 
 place rather than the one covered by the contract, it would be the 
 duty of the company, notwithstanding its contract, to change the 
 stopping place. This is the substance of the law as declared by the 
 Supreme Court of this State. 
 
 M. <k O. R. R. Co. vs. People, 132 111., 559. 
 
 5. Upon consideration of the whole case, the Commission are of 
 opinion that the present train service furnished by the Chicago & 
 Alton R. R. Co. at the two stations in question ( Mt. Forest and 
 Willow Springs), is a reasonable service; that any suit to enforce a 
 different service would probably fail. They therefore order that 
 your complaint be dismissed.
 
 238 
 
 This letter embodies the opinion of the Commission upon your ap- 
 plication, having been dictated by the Chairman of the Board, with 
 the concurrence of his associates. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 (Signed) J. H. PADDOCK, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 LETTER OF ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO H. A. FISHER, CONCERNING THE 
 
 SWITCHING OF CARS. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., Jan. 19, 1893. 
 
 MR. H. A. FISHER, General Manager St. L., A. & S. R. E. Co., 
 Alton, III. 
 
 DEAR SIR In closing up the business of the present Board of 
 Railway Commissioners, I find in a pigeon-hole your letter of Au- 
 gust 10, 1892, which I greatly fear has never received an answer. 
 Wishing to leave as little unfinished business as possible to our suc- 
 cessors, and recognizing the importance of the question, I now an- 
 swer your letter. Since in the long time that has elapsed you may 
 have forgotten the precise point of inquiry, I here quote your letter 
 in full: 
 
 "I have read with interest your pamphlet No. 19, containing the Attorney 
 General's opinion in regard to switching cars of competing lines at common 
 points, but the C. & A. has sprung a new feature on me. They now take 
 the position that they are not compelled to switch our cars, either loaded or 
 empty, to and from their 'wagon loading tracks.' Tracks on which no per- 
 manent industries are located, but which are used for public or miscellaneous 
 loading and unloading. How is it?" 
 
 In answer to this, I have to say, that in my judgment the position 
 taken by the C. & A. management does not conflict with the spirit, 
 and I think not with the letter, of the Attorney General's ruling; nor 
 does it violate the law as I understand it. I think there is a clear 
 distinction between the case of a permanent "industry" located upon 
 a line of road, having its own switch tracks for the loading and un- 
 loading of cars, and a company's team track which it has built to 
 accommodate its own patrons. Each railroad company doing busi- 
 ness in any city or town is under obligation to furnish its patrons 
 with reasonable terminal facilities, which would include tracks for 
 loading and unloading by wagons and the like. If cars are shipped 
 to any city or town on one road, I do not think it reasonable, merely 
 because the merchandise track of another company in such town or 
 city happens to be more convenient to the consignee of the cars, that 
 he should require the company over whose line his merchandise was 
 not hauled to furnish its terminal facilities for his use. Nor do I 
 think it a reasonable proposition that the railroad which has the haul 
 should require some other road to furnish terminals, team tracks, 
 etc., for the use of its patrons or of itself. 
 
 The case is somewhat different where a permanent industry is lo- 
 cated upon a line of road. Such industry usually has its own track. 
 In such case I do not believe that the managers of the road on which
 
 239 
 
 ihe industry is located can compel the owners of such industry or 
 factory to patronize only their own road; which would in effect be 
 the case if they could decline to switch cars coming over other lines 
 of road to such industry or factory. Nor do I think the managers of 
 the road on which such industry is located could refuse to take its 
 cars and deliver them at junction points to other lines of road. To 
 compel a company to switch cars under such circumstances is not 
 compelling them to furnish terminal facilities for the use of other 
 companies. 
 
 In the case put in your letter, it would simply be making one com- 
 pany furnish its merchandise tracks to the patrons of another road, 
 which I do not think the law requires. 
 
 Apologizing for the great delay in answering your letter, I remain, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman R. R. & W. Commission. 
 
 LETTER OF ISAAC N. PHILLIPS TO WILLIAM GODDARD, RELATING TO 
 THE DUTY OF FURNISHING CARS. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL,, January 19, 1893. 
 Mr. William Goddard, Supt. Perry Co. Coal Mining Co., Duquoin, III. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR In closing up the business of the present Railway 
 Board, preparatory to going out of office, I find a letter from you of 
 October 7, 1892, which I fear has not been answered. I will there- 
 fore now answer your questions in their order to the best of my 
 understanding of the law. 
 
 You ask, first, whether you have any legal recourse against a rail- 
 road company, on whose line you are located, if it fails to furnish 
 cars, or furnishes only a part of what are ordered. In answer I will 
 say, that a railroad company is bound to use reasonable diligence 
 and foresight to supply the wants of its customers in the matter of 
 cars. Such company is bound to keep on hand and to furnish cars 
 to meet all the ordinary wants of its customers. Such demand for 
 cars as it may reasonably foresee, it is under a legal obligation to 
 supply. If exceptional circumstances arise, and there is an unusual 
 and unexpected demand for cars, at some particular time, owing to a 
 rush of traffic, then the railroad company would not be held respon- 
 sible for a failure to do that which its managers could not reasonably 
 expect would be required of it. Such is the legal duty of a railroad 
 company in the matter of furnishing cars, as I understand it. 
 
 Your second inquiry is, whether a railroad company has a right to 
 furnish its cars to mines not located on!its road in preference to mines 
 that are so located. In answer I will say, I do not think it would 
 be a reasonable exercise of its rights, or a legal compliance with its 
 duty, for a company to send its cars off of its line for use elsewhere 
 before the reasonable demands of the patrons along its own line had 
 been supplied. 
 
 Your next inquiry is, whether, in case cars are so furnished by a 
 company to industries located off its line, to the denial of the rights of
 
 240 
 
 customers on the line, that circumstance would afford a rightful 
 claim for damage. Certainly if a railroad company, for any reason, 
 fails to supply cars to patrons on its own line, when it is reasonably 
 within is power to do so, such company would be liable in damages 
 for the failure. I think if a railroad company should send its cars 
 away when its managers knew they were needed at home, or when, 
 by the exercise of reasonable judgment, they would have so known, 
 such fact would be ground for an action for such damages as the 
 patron could prove he had suffered from the failure to furnish cars 
 to the extent they could have been furnished had not the cars been 
 thus needlessly sent away. 
 
 Your next inquiry is, whether or not your company, being located 
 on the Illinois Central, two miles distant from the junction of that 
 road with the "Cairo Short Line," could lawfully demand cars from 
 the C. S. L. when you are not connected with its track except by 
 way of the Illinois Central. In answer to this I would say, I do 
 not think you could in any event compel the Cairo Short Line to 
 send its cars to you. I think a railroad company has a right to keep 
 its cars on its own track if it sees fit to do so. Roads do interchange 
 cars as a matter of convenience, and it is almost imperative that they 
 should do this in order to transact the business of the country. I 
 understand it is the duty of a company, when another road hauls a 
 loaded car to the point of junction with such company, and delivers it 
 to be hauled further, to take the car and haul it to its destination, or 
 so far on the way as its track extends. In such case, the loaded car 
 would be tendered to it at its own track, and there would be a legal 
 obligation on the company to haul the car. But I do not think that 
 a company having its business located on another line of road at a 
 distance could demand cars from any road except the one on which 
 it is located. Of course, if that road, by arrangement with other 
 roads, gets cars of other companies for its patrons, as very often 
 happens in practice, that would be another matter; but I do not 
 think the distant company could be legally compelled to furnish its 
 cars to industries on the tracks of other companies. 
 
 I have thus answered, I hope, specifically your questions, and trust 
 my answers will be understood, and not misunderstood. The statute 
 and the common law alike make it incumbent upon the managers 
 of railroads to use all reasonable diligence and foresight to supply 
 their patrons with cars for shipping purposes. It does not require 
 them to foresee extraordinary demands and provide for them. Con- 
 sequently, when traffic suddenly becomes unexpectedly heavy, there 
 is often a "car famine," and patrons seriously complain of being un- 
 able to get cars. In many such cases that I have been cognizant of, 
 there was no liability on the part of the company for the failure; be- 
 cause the company had supplied themselves with enough cars for 
 ordinary demands, and were not bound to constantly be ready for 
 unforeseen exigencies. 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 (Signed) ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman B. R. and W. Commission.
 
 241 
 
 THE INTERLOCKING ACT. LETTER CONCERNING THE 
 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSINGS ON THE L. E. 
 
 & W. RAILWAY. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., May 14, 1892. 
 
 Mr. George L. Bradbury, Gen. Manager L. E. & W. R. R. t Indian- 
 apolis, Jnd. 
 
 DEAR SIR I call your attention to the large number of unpro- 
 tected grade crossings of your company within the limits of the State 
 of Illinois, and to the further fact that a statute was passed by the 
 last General Assembly of Illinois under which these crossings can 
 now be protected by a system of signals and derails worked by the 
 interlocking system. (See Illinois Session Laws, 1891, 80 82.) 
 Under this act you will observe that you can, if you desire, proceed 
 on your own motion by petition to properly interlock your crossings; 
 or in case this is not done, the Railway Commission is empowered 
 to take the initiative, and, after hearing, order proper interlocking, 
 apportioning cost and expense of operation and maintenance accord- 
 ing to what they deem the justice of the case. 
 
 So far as the Commission have communicated with the railway 
 managers of the State, a commendable disposition has been shown to 
 go forward under this law and protect the many dangerons grade 
 crossings of the State which are almost daily proving so destructive 
 to life and property. All agree that not only the public interest, but 
 proper economy and good railway practice, require that this work be 
 done soon, and that the appliances used should be of the latest and 
 best make, and in every way first-class. In this opinion, I am led 
 by my knowledge of your reputation as an able and progressive rail- 
 way manager, to believe you will heartily concur. 
 
 I count on your road, within Illinois, nine grade crossings and one 
 junction point, outside the city of Peoria. The C. & A. management 
 would, I am quite sure, meet you in a plan to suitably interlock the 
 crossing of their tra< ks at the Union depot in this city; and I have 
 reason to think the Illinois Central would not oppose the interlocking 
 of either of their two tracks which you cross at grade in this State. 
 Some companies prefer to have the Commission proceed without 
 petition, and we have already done this in several cases. I may say 
 We are quite willing to proceed without petition where the com- 
 panies for any cause do not wish to take the responsibility of the pro- 
 ceeding. 
 
 My attention has recently been called quite pointedly to the fact 
 that freight engineers are in the habit of disregarding the law which 
 requires full stops at grade crossings. I have, myself, recently 
 observed passenger engineers do the same thing. They prefer to 
 "take chances" rather than lose the time and take the trouble re- 
 quired to stop and again get under way. Occasionally a train is in 
 the way, and then, as in the case of the Jacksonville disaster, the 
 innocent public must suffer death and maiming, and the company at 
 fault has to pay enough in de mages to more than interlock the 
 crossing. 
 
 16 O
 
 242 
 
 The Railway Commission of this State will be glad to have you 
 signify, at an early day, what the disposition of your management is 
 with reference to the speedy interlocking of your grade crossings. 
 The function of the Railway Commission in the premises is, as you 
 will see from the act, to serve the public interest; and it seems to be 
 pretty fully conceded by all good railroad men that both the public 
 welfare and good business economy require that all grade crossings 
 be interlocked. 
 
 Awaiting your early attention to this important matter, I remain, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, 
 Chairman B. R. & W. Commission.
 
 NO. 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 COMPLAINT No. 97. 
 
 J. C. SHIRLEY, Complainant. 
 
 vs. 
 
 CHICAGO & NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY Co., Respondents. 
 
 FAILURE TO REDEEM CODPONS OF COMMUTATION TICKET, 
 
 Filed July 12, 1892. Decision Rendered January 17, 1893.
 
 245 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 Shirley purchased of the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. a 
 "monthly commutation ticket," good for sixty rides in the month of 
 May between Chicago and Lakeside, a distance of eighteen miles. 
 The ticket cost $6 50, or at the rate of 10 5-6 cents per ride. Fifty- five 
 of the sixty coupons were used in the lifetime of the ticket. Five re- 
 mained unused; and these unused coupons were presented by Shirley 
 to the company for redemption under the act of 1875. Shirley 
 claims that fifty-five cents should be refunded to him as the redemp- 
 tion value of the ticket. His theory is that the five coupons are re- 
 deemable at their cost price. The company refused to redeem the 
 five unused coupons at the rate stated, or any other rate, claiming 
 that they were without any redemption value under the statute. 
 
 The statute relied upon is the act of 1875, section 5 of which 
 provides: 
 
 "That it shall be the duty of the owner or owners of railroad or 
 steamboats, by their agents or managers, to provide for the re- 
 demption of the whole or any parts or coupons of any ticket or 
 tickets as they may have sold, as the purchaser for any reason has 
 not used, and does not desire to use, at a rate which shall be equal 
 to the difference between the price paid for the whole ticket and the 
 cost of a ticket between the points for which the proportion of said 
 ticket was actually used," etc. 
 
 Under this ungrammatical and clumsy provision, was anything due 
 Mr. Shirley from the railway company upon the remaining five cou- 
 pons of his sixty- ride ticket? 
 
 This coupon ticket was by its terms not transferable. It could be 
 used only by Shirley himself, whose name was written upon it. The 
 courts hold the condition which prohibits the transfer of commuta- 
 tion tickets to be reasonable and therefore legally enforcible. 
 Shirley's ticket could then have no general market value, because a 
 third party could use it only by perpetrating a fraud upon the com- 
 pany. If the ticket had any value, that value is measurjd solely by 
 the statutory liability of the issuing company under the section above 
 quoted. 
 
 If each coupon of a commutation ticket is redeemable at its cost 
 price, as contended, then it is evident that any passenger can compel
 
 246 
 
 the company to carry him at the lowest commutation rate, whether 
 he rides much or little. That is to say, if the regular fare between 
 two stations seven miles apart be twenty cents, and the company 
 puts on sale ten-ride commutation tickets between these stations 
 at one dollar, or at the rate of ten cents per ride, the reduction being 
 made in consideration of ten rides being taken at one purchase, then 
 no patron of the company need pay more than ten cents per ride be- 
 tween these points; because he can purchase a ten- ride ticket, use 
 one coupon for a single ride, present the remaining nine coupons to- 
 the ticket agent at the end of the journey for redemption, and re- 
 ceive back ninety cents. 
 
 This merely illustrates one of the consequences of admitting the 
 contention of complainant. Such a consideration, however, can not 
 control the present decision. We are to determine what the section 
 of the statute above quoted means, and its meaning must be found 
 in the language used. It is not a question as to what the law ought 
 to provide, but what it does in fact provide. 
 
 The statute says the company shall "provide for the redemption 
 of the whole or any parts or coupons of any ticket," etc. This re- 
 demption was to be made, according to the language of the statute, 
 "at a rate which shall be equal to the difference between the price 
 paid for the whole ticket and the cost of a ticket between the points- 
 for which the proportion of said ticket was actually used." 
 
 Had the law-makers meant that coupons should be redeemed at 
 their cost price they could have said so in a word. They did not say 
 so, but said something else, namely, that the difference between the 
 price paid for the whole ticket and what it would have cost the pas- 
 senger to have bought a ticket for the riding actually done on the 
 ticket shall be the redemption value. The language of the section 
 is a little awkward and a trifle muddy, but the above is its clear 
 meaning. 
 
 The question then is, could Mr. Shirley have ridden fifty-five 
 times between Chicago and Lakeside for less than $6.50, the cost of 
 the ticket, either by paying regular fares, or upon any other style of 
 commutation ticket issued by the company? If he could have done 
 so, then he was entitled, under this statute, to the difference between 
 what it would have cost him to ride fifty- five times and .the $6.50 
 he paid. For instance, if the company at the time this ticket was 
 purchased would have sold Shirley fifty- five rides for $5.95, then 
 clearly Shirley has, under the company's own practice, ridden but 
 the worth of $5.95, and is entitled under the language of the above 
 section to the fifty-five cents he claims, but not otherwise. 
 
 It does not appear, however, that the difference between the price 
 paid and "the cost of a ticket between the points for which the pro- 
 portion of said ticket was actually used," would in this ease be any- 
 thing. 
 
 We therefore hold that the ticket has no redeemable value under 
 the statute. The complaint will be dismissed. 
 
 Adopted January 17, 1893.
 
 No. 27 
 
 OZESIDIEIE^S 
 
 INTERLOCKING CASES. 
 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSING SOUTH OF LITCHFIELD. 
 
 CASE No. 9. 
 
 WABASH RAILROAD Co. vs. JACKSONVILLE, LOUISVILLE & ST. Louis 
 RAILWAY Co., CONSOLIDATED WITH 
 
 CASE No. 10. 
 
 JACKSONNILLE, LOUISVILLE & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co. vs. ST. 
 Louis & CHICAGO RAILWAY Co. 
 
 CASE No. 11. 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSING NORTH OF LITCHFIELD. 
 
 WABASH RAILROAD Co. vs. CHICAGO, PEORIA & ST. Louis RAIL- 
 WAY Co.. LESSEE OF ST. Louis & CHICAGO RAILROAD.
 
 249 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Sailroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OP THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE JACKSONVILLE, LOUISVILLE & ST. Louis RY. Co., 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE ST. Louis & CHICAGO RAILWAY Co., 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 CASE No. 10. PROTECTION OP CROSSING AT LITOHPIELD. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, I. L. MORRISON, General Solicitor. 
 For Respondent, FRANK H. JONES, Attorney. 
 
 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 WEDNESDAY, January 18, 1893. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, this day, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, the fol- 
 lowing proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 The Commissioners being fully advised in the premises, find that 
 it is impracticable to interlock the crossing described in the petition 
 by a separate device, but that the same, together with the crossing 
 of the Wabash Railroad and the Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis
 
 250 
 
 Railway, in which latter crossing a petition has been filed (numbered 
 9 upon the docket of the Commission), should be interlocked with a 
 single system. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission, that this petition be, 
 and the same is hereby, consolidated with said cause No. 9, entitled 
 "The Wabash Railroad Company vs. The Jacksonville, Louisville 
 & St. Louis Railway Company," and that an order be entered in 
 said latter cause covering both crossings. 
 
 Adopted January 18, 1893.
 
 251 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co., Petitioner. 
 
 vs. 
 THE JACKSONVILLE, LOUISVILLE & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., 
 
 Respondent* 
 
 CASE No. 9. PROTECTION OF CROSSING AT LITCHFIELD. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, GEO. B. BURNETT, Attorney. 
 
 For Respondent, I. L. MORRISON, General Solicitor. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 WEDNESDAY, January 18, 1893. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, this day,, 
 present Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, the fol- 
 lowing proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this petition, No. 9, and also petition. No. 10, this day 
 consolidated by order of the Commission, having come on for final 
 hearing and determination by the Commission, and the Commission 
 having considered the evidence taken therein, the agreements made 
 by the parties, and the arguments of council, and the Commission 
 being fully advised in the premises, find that the public good re- 
 quires that the crossings described in the said two petitions be pro- 
 tected by an interlocking device.
 
 252 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said Jackson- 
 ville, Louisville & St. Louis Railway Company and the said Wabash 
 Railroad Company shall proceed to protect the said crossings de- 
 scribed in said petitions by an interlocking device, the plan and details 
 of which may be agreed upon by said companies, provided they find 
 themselves able to agree. 
 
 It is further ordered that the said Jacksonville, Louisville & St. 
 Louis Railway Company shall pay the original cost of all the appa- 
 ratus and mechanism of the said interlocking device used upon its 
 own tracks and upon the tracks of the St. Louis & Chicago Railway 
 Company (the latter being by agreement of the said J., L. & St. L. 
 Ry. Co.) , including all signals, derails, pipe lines, wire lines, boxing 
 and all connections in the tracks of the said Jacksonville, Louisville 
 & St. Louis Railway and the St. Louis and Chicago Railway, and 
 also the cost of putting the same in ready for use, and of maintaining 
 the same in good order and repair; and that the petitioner in this 
 cause, the Wabash Railroad Company, shall pay the original cost of 
 all the apparatus and mechanism used upon its own tracks, including 
 all signals, derails, pipe lines, wire lines, boxing and all the con- 
 nections in its tracks, and also the cost of putting the same in ready 
 for use, and of maintaining the same in good order and repair. 
 
 It is further ordered that the cost of the interlocking machine 
 proper, and the expense of maintaining the same in good working 
 -order be divided between the said Jacksonville, Louisville and St. 
 Louis Railway Company and the said Wabash Railroad Company in 
 the proportion that the levers used to operate the appliances in the 
 tracks of each company bear to the whole number of levers used to 
 operate said machine, the St. Louis & Chicago track being considered 
 as part of the Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis for this purpose. 
 
 It is further ordered that the cost of the tower house wherein the 
 interlocking machine is housed, and the expense of the operation of 
 said machine (i. e., wages of operators), shall be paid for, two-thirds 
 by the said Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis Railway Company, 
 and one-third by the said Wabash Railroad Company. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be held under consideration 
 by the Commission pending the efforts of the companies to agree 
 upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted January 18, 1893.
 
 253 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co., Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE CHICAGO, PEORIA & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., LESSEE, 
 ST. Louis & CHICAGO RAILROAD. 
 
 CASE No. 11 PROTECTION OF CROSSING NORTH OF LITCHFIELD. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, GEO. B. BURNETT, Attorney. 
 
 For Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Ry. Co., I. L. MORRISON, General 
 Solicitor. 
 
 For St. Louis & Chicago Railroad Co., F. H. JONES, Attorney. 
 
 FINAL ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 WEDNESDAY, January 18, 1893. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, this day, 
 present, Isaac N. Phillips and J. C. Willis, Commissioners, the fol- 
 lowing proceedings were had in this cause: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and deter- 
 mination before the Commission, and the' Commission having con- 
 sidered the evidence taken herein, the agreement made by the parties
 
 254 
 
 hereto before the Commission, and the contract submitted to the 
 Commission subsequently to the former hearing, and being fully ad- 
 vised in the premises, find that the obligations of the contract offered 
 in evidence do not extend to the present parties, and that there are 
 no contract obligations between the parties affecting the operation 
 of the interlocking device to be put in at said crossing. 
 
 It is therefore ordered, in accordance with the agreements hereto- 
 fore made before said Commission in open session, that the said 
 crossing described in the petition in this cause be protected by an 
 interlocking device, the same being judged by the Commission to be 
 necessary for the public safety; that one half of the cost of such 
 interlocking device, and of the expense of maintaining the same in 
 good order and repair, and of operating the same, be paid by the said 
 Wabash Railroad Company, and that the other half of such cost and 
 expense be paid by the said Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Railway 
 Company, lessee, etc., this division being in accordance with the said 
 agreements of the parties. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be held under consideration 
 by the Commission pending the efforts of the said companies to agree 
 upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted January 18, 1893.
 
 No. 28 
 
 LETTER OF 
 
 ISAAC N. PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 UPON THE QUESTIONS 
 
 1. Shall the attempt to apportion expense of operation between 
 the passenger and freight service be continued or abandoned? 
 
 2. Shall taxes be treated as a fixed charge or an operating ex- 
 pense?
 
 257 
 
 RAILWAY ACCOUNTING. 
 
 BLOOMINGTON, ILL., April 9, 1892. 
 
 Hon. William O. Seymour, Chairman Committee on Uniformity of 
 
 Railway Accounts, Washington, D. C. 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: I greatly regret that the illness of my wife must 
 prevent me from meeting, on the 12th inst., with the Committee on 
 Uniformity of Railway Accounts, of which I am a member with 
 yourself and Mr. Brown, and likewise from attending the conference 
 of Railway Commissioners to follow on the 13th. The considerable 
 time devoted, and the courteous pains taken, by the Executive Com- 
 mittee of the Association of Railway Accounting Officers to ac- 
 quaint our Committee with the grounds upon which suggestions for 
 changes in the form of report were made, render it proper, I think, 
 that the conclusions of all members of the Committee, upon the im- 
 portant questions so intelligently discussed before us, be fully stated. 
 
 Torching the minor changes which were suggested in the form of 
 report, there seemed, at our late conference in New York City, to be 
 little difference of opinion. Prof. Adams, statistician of the Inter- 
 state Commerce Commission, who met there with us, seemed dis- 
 posed to adopt all such suggestions of the Committee as related 
 merely to arrangement, form and nomenclature. We may, therefore, 
 fairly suppose that these minor suggestions will be substantially em- 
 bodied by the statistician in the next "Analysis of Operating Ex- 
 penses" which may be sent out for the guidance of accounting offi- 
 cers, and the same need not, therefore, be treated in detail in the re- 
 port to be presented by our Committee. 
 
 QUESTIONS STATED. 
 
 The two vital questions with which we are to deal are: 
 
 First. Shall the attempt to apportion expenses of operation be- 
 tween the passenger and freight serrice be continued or abandoned? 
 
 Second. Shall taxes be treated as a fixed charge or as an operating 
 expense? or, in other words, and more specifically, (as I understand 
 the question) shall taxes be deducted from earnings before making 
 the calculation to determine the "Percentage of Operating Expenses 
 to Earnings" provided to be made on page 45 of the form of report? 
 
 no
 
 258 
 
 These questions are of high importance. My enforced absence 
 renders it perhaps proper that I should place before yourself and 
 Mr. Brown the conclusions at which I have arrived touching them 
 more fully than I had time to state those conclusions before we 
 parted in New York. 
 
 I confess I originally entered upon the consideration of the "sug- 
 gestions" feeling strongly that our best course would be a conserva- 
 tive one. I felt that a form of report which had been generally ac- 
 cepted, and put into use by the companies, should not be changed, 
 except at the imperative demand of actual experience. I was accord- 
 ingly, at the date of the last conference at Washington, unwilling, as 
 a member of the Committee, to recommend either of the proposed 
 changes now under discussion. The propositions contended for, to 
 my thinking, then remained unproven by such preponderance as the 
 case required; though I had grave doubts upon both questions at the 
 time. The very full discussion, had before our Committee at New 
 York on March 22d and 23d, enforced very strongly and fully the 
 reasons for the changes proposed; and for one, I am quite ready to 
 speak out upon those questions in the report to be presented. 
 
 DIVISION OF EXPENSES. 
 
 First, as to the division of operating expenses between passenger 
 and freight service: It is well known that a large proportion of the 
 expenses of operation is common to both the passenger and freight 
 service, but exclusively chargeable to neither. Salaries of general 
 officers, station agents, and telegraph operators, expenses of the, main- 
 tenance of way and structures, and other like expenses, will serve as 
 examples of those outlays which do not naturally divide between the 
 passenger and the freight service. Other expenses there are that 
 classify themselves. What per cent of the entire expense of opera- 
 tion is incapable of being accurately classified, is variously stated; 
 the lowest estimate being forty per cent., while some allege the 
 amount to be as high as sixty per cent., of the entire expense. This 
 large proportion, expended for the common benefit of both branches 
 of the service must, therefore, if apportioned at all, be divided in ac- 
 cordance with some arbitrary general rule. The rule now used is 
 stated upon page 42 of the form of annual report in these words: 
 
 RULE OP INTER-STATE COMMISSION. 
 
 - "All expenses which are naturally chargeable to either passenger 
 or freight traffic should be entered in their respective columns; ex- 
 penses which are not naturally chargeable to either traffic should be 
 apportioned on a mileage basis, making the division as between pas- 
 senger and freight traffic in the proportion which the passenger and 
 freight train mileage bears to the total mileage of trains earning 
 revenue." 
 
 "Mixed trains will continue to be treated for the present as one- 
 fourth passenger and three-fourths freight."
 
 259 
 
 MIXED TRAINS. . 
 
 I may observe, first, that the rule referring to mixed trains appears' 
 so far as I can learn, to rest upon nothing more definite or valuable 
 than some one's conjecture, and the identity of the conjecturer seems 
 to be unknown. That it is based upon any experience, or upon any 
 theory, that finds a basis in the facts of the railway business of the 
 oountry, has never been made apparent. This arbitrary rule, that 
 one-fourth of the expense of all mixed trains must be charged to the 
 passenger service and three-fourths to the freight service, is applied 
 alike to those roads which do a large passenger traffic, and upon 
 which mixed trains are a rare exception, and likewise upon frontier 
 roads where both passenger and freight traffic is conducted exclu- 
 sively by mixed trains. There are several roads of the latter class 
 in the State of Illinois; and in the west it may be said generally that 
 freight trains carry a few passengers in the "caboose." Whether 
 every freight train which carries passengers at all would be classed 
 as "mixed," I do not know; but certainly, if such trains are so classed, 
 egregiously wrong results would be obtained under this rule, for on 
 the roads of the west many trains, carrying a heavy tonnage of 
 freight, frequently carry an average of two or three passengers whose 
 transportation forms but a mere incident of the entire service of the 
 train. 
 
 Without going into a detailed argument it will appear that the 
 basis so furnished for the division of expenses of mixed trains must 
 be of little value; and, while the volume of "mixed" service is, perhaps, 
 on the whole, not large, it seems to me, either a rule which will pro- 
 duce results substantially correct and true should be found, or else 
 the effort to classify the common expenses of mixed trains should 
 not be attempted. 
 
 WORKING OP THE RULE. 
 
 The most obvious test of the rules, given for both mixed and dis- 
 tinct trains, would be the results of experience in using them. The 
 test of actual practice fails to satisfy me that these rules are of any 
 utility, either to the companies or to the states or the nation. In- 
 deed, if not substantially correct, they could not be expected to be use- 
 ful, and may prove positively vicious. We know that results have 
 been reached by the application of these rules for division which are 
 grossly erroneous, not to say preposterous. To illustrate, I quote 
 from certain letters of Stuyvesant Fish, president of the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company. The first concerns the report of that 
 company for the year 1890. Mr Fish, writing to Chairman Cooley 
 said: 
 
 "The arbitrary rule laid down by the Commission for the distri- 
 bution of expenses between the passenger and the freight service 
 make it to appear that the Illinois Central earned 372 10 oo f a cent per 
 ton of freight per mile, and only u lim of a cent per passenger per 
 mile. The case of the Dubuque and Sioux City Railroad is even 
 ^worse, it being made to appear to earn 338 10 oo of a cent per ton of
 
 260 
 
 freight per mile, while its average receipts per passenger per mile- 
 are made to appear to be 273 10 oo of a cent less than the estimated cost 
 of carrying each passenger one mile. Obviously, the rule of the 
 Commission charges too much of the expense to the passenger and 
 too little to the freight service. 
 
 "Being unable to suggest a safe rule for dividing the expenses, we 
 do not presume to criticise the one adopted by the Commission 
 furthur than to point out wherein it fails of application to the busi- 
 ness of the Illinois Central R. R. Co., and to submit that it is not 
 right to draw conclusions from, or wise to predicate action upon,, 
 figures so obviously erroneous." 
 
 And again, commenting upon the report for 1891, Mr. Fish says: 
 
 "The arbitrary rule laid down by the Commission for the distribu- 
 tion of expenses between the passenger and the freight service make 
 it to appear that the Illinois Central earned during the past year 
 "^looo of a cent per ton of freight per mile, and that it lost " 10 oo of a 
 cent per passenger per mile, and that its entire passenger business- 
 was done at a loss of $141,715.37." 
 
 Roads could perhaps be found reporting to the Interstate Commis- 
 sion whose business is so divided between the passenger and the 
 freight service and is performed under such conditions as to render 
 the rule now in use as near right as any general rule that could be- 
 devised. Evidently that rule, as Mr. Fish says, fails of proper appli- 
 cation to the business of the Illinois Central Railroad Company; and,, 
 not improbably, other roads may be found from whose reports, follow- 
 ing this rule, it would appear that instead of too much expense being 
 charged to passenger service and too little to the freight, as in the 
 case of the Illinois Central Company, it would be found that too 
 much is charged to freight and too little to passenger. I have no- 
 such case at present in mind; but the varying conditions under 
 which the different railroads of the country do business, and the wide 
 difference in the character of their respective traffics, render it highly 
 probable that such cases exist, and might be found, if searched for. 
 
 In answer to one of the above letters of Mr. Fish, Judge Cooley 
 among other things wrote: 
 
 "I understand very well that it is absolutely impossible to so appor- 
 tion the cost of freight and passenger service as to reach accurate 
 results. Nevertheless, if it is desirable to obtain the statistics of the 
 roads at all, they ought to be obtained on the same basis. (?) They 
 would not otherwise be of much value. Our blank reports, therefore, 
 are the same for all the roads **#****- 
 
 "I may, perhaps, with propriety add, that I can very well see that 
 the application of the rule does not lead to correct information regard- 
 ing the cost of passenger traffic, considered by itself; and, if the mat- 
 ter were exclusively in my hands, I should probably make considera- 
 ble change. It is too important a matter, however, to act hastily 
 upon, and I think any action should be taken with the full accord of 
 the Association of Railway Accounting Officers.' 1
 
 261 
 
 I inclose herewith copies of Mr. Fish's letters, and a copy of the 
 letter of Judge Cooley from which I have quoted above; likewise a 
 -copy of a letter of Mr. J. C. Welling, vice president of the Illinois 
 Central road; all of which you and Mr. Brown may, T think, find in- 
 structive upon this question, I submit to your judgment whether 
 these letters might not with benefit be placed before the conference 
 of Railway Commissioners when our report is under consideration. 
 
 OPINIONS OP ACCOUNTING OFFICERS. 
 
 Referring to the statement quoted above from Judge Cooley, that 
 "any action should be taken with the full accord of the Association 
 -of Railway Accounting Officers," it may be noted that the opinions 
 of the Railway Accounting Officers, in the Association and out, 
 which have, through the kindness of the statistician, been collected 
 for the use of our Committee, are practically unanimous in favor of 
 discontinuing the attempt to apportion expenses between passenger 
 -and freight traffics. Thus we have the "full accord of the Associa- 
 tion," which his Honor, Judge Cooley, thought desirable; and, while 
 I am aware that railway officials do not always view questions of this 
 kind from the standpoint of public interests, as it is the duty of 
 Railway Commissioners to view them, still, as regards this matter, I 
 am convinced, after full reflection, that the public interest is not an- 
 tagonistic to that of the companies themselves, and that all the reo 
 ommendations are made in the utmost good faith. 
 
 PURPOSE OF THE DIVISION. 
 
 And this brings me to a consideration of the purpose of requiring 
 this division which it is admitted must be made, if at all, upon an 
 arbitrary basis. It has been said (and we should meet the case 
 squarely) that the fixing of tariff rates for the transportation of pas- 
 sengers and freight, under governmental authority, is likely to be- 
 come one of the leading functions of the Railway Commissions of 
 the country, and that it is therefore desirable that statistics be col- 
 lected from which can be derived the information called for at page 
 '61 of the Commissioner's form to be used as a basis for the fixing of 
 maximum freight and passenger rates. It is said such items as "esti- 
 mated cost of carrying each passenger one mile," "passenger earn- 
 ings per mile of road," "passenger earnings per train mile," "esti- 
 mated cost of carrying one ton one mile," "freight earnings per mile 
 of road," "freight earnings per train mile," are necessary as a basis 
 for the fixing of rates, and should be preserved even though per- 
 fectly correct results are not obtained. 
 
 Every one will admit that if the items of cost of freight and pas- 
 senger service above quoted from the form at page 61 could be ob- 
 tained with substantial correctness, the information would be valua- 
 ble; and it would certainly be quite as valuable for the roads as it 
 would be for Railway Commissions or other governmental agencies. 
 But I have not yet arrived at the point of being able to see how a 
 body of irrelevant statistics, which are supposed to support another 
 body of erroneous deductions, can be of practical value to any legis-
 
 262 . 
 
 lative or executive branch of government, any more than thejr 
 would be valuable to the companies themselves. It is said a uni- 
 form basis must be adopted, and maintained, to secure the benefit of 
 comparisons; but it is difficult to understand how, if one error is 
 vicious and harmful, an accumulation of errors may become salu- 
 tary; and it is quite as difficult to see how true statistical instruc- 
 tion may be derived] by comparing a large number of errors more or 
 less gross with each other. 
 
 I have little share, anyway, in the expectation that just railway 
 rates will ever be established through statistical tables showing "per 
 mile," "per ton," or "per passenger" costs. I do not believe that in- 
 formation of this kind ever did furnish the basis for actually fixing 
 tariff rates, or that it ever will; because I believe that even where 
 Railway Commissions are clothed with power to fix rates, such rates 
 will be made up upon a different basis, and depend upon different 
 conditions from any disclosed by such statistics. Particularly must 
 this be true so long as the cost items per unit of traffic are confess- 
 edly erroneous and do not represent the true facts of the case. 
 
 So far, therefore, from the statistics obtained from this division 
 being valuable as affording a criterion for railway rates, I believe 
 that the very fact that this false information is liable to be so used, is- 
 the most cogent reason which could be given for ceasing to furnish 
 a basis confessedly erroneous. A man who travels in the wrong di- 
 rection is certainly as likely never to arrive at his destination as one- 
 who travels not at all. 
 
 By all this I do not mean to be understood as saying that unless- 
 absolutely correct and accurate information is obtained, the attempt 
 to classify expenses should be abandoned. I do, however, mean to 
 say that unless a result which is substantially and approximately 
 correct can be had, it is better to leave the subject untouched, and 
 to permit (if a cost criterion must be had) the statistics of each road 
 to be estimated separately, and in the light of its own conditions of 
 traffic, and I may add, be so estimated by those who may have the 
 rate-making power, and who will presumably be as good "guessers" 
 as those who may make future deductions from the body of false 
 statistics we are now engaged in collecting. 
 
 UNIFORM BASIS NOT PRACTICABLE. 
 
 In the somewhat lengthy investigation we have made in this mat- 
 ter, one fact has arisen to a position of absolute clearness in my 
 mind; which is, that no universal or uniform basis of such division 
 of expenses will ever yield statistical results near enough correct to- 
 be of practical use, or indeed, not to be positively harmful. 
 
 When we consider that the proposed division of expenses must on, 
 say, some coal road of Southern Illinois which hauls an occasional 
 passenger, be made by the same rule and upon the same basis which 
 is applied to a passenger road connecting New York and Philadel- 
 phia, or Philadelphia and Washington, what possible value can be 
 expected in results so obtained?
 
 263 
 
 If it were possible, as I believe it is not, in the case of any single 
 road to arrive at a correct rule for apportionment of operating ex- 
 penses, it would remain doubtful whether the rule thus found would 
 be applicable to any other road doing business in the country; and, 
 certainly, it could never be applied to any considerable number of 
 other roads. 
 
 Nor do I believe that any geographical classification of roads by 
 groups, such as is now being attempted by the Interstate Commerce 
 Commission, can be valuable as assisting to solve this difficulty. It 
 is the character of the traffic and the conditions under which the 
 service is performed which must control this question, and point to 
 the true rule, and those elements will not likely be found to arrange 
 themselves upon geographical or sectional lines. 
 
 CLASSIFICATION OF TAXES. 
 
 Turning now to the second question above propounded, namely: 
 how "taxes" shall be classed and treated in the report, I will say, I 
 have been on this subject more slow in arriving at a conclusion, and 
 it is perhaps fair I should add, I am less confident in that conclusion 
 than is the case with the other question as to the division of ex- 
 penses. 
 
 The question is, whether or not taxes shall be transferred from the 
 place where they now appear at page 31, under the head of 
 "Deductions from Income," to the head of "Operating Expenses," 
 found on page 45, on which latter page it is proposed taxes shall 
 make a fifth item, under the sub-heading "Recapitulation of Ex- 
 penses." If this is done, operating expenses complete would then 
 appear under five items as follows: 
 
 1. "Maintenance of Way and Structures." 
 
 2. "Maintenance of Equipment." 
 
 3. "Conducting Transportation.'' 
 
 4. "General Expenses." 
 
 5. "Taxes." 
 
 If the word "expenses" is to be taken in a narrow sense, taxes 
 would hardly be included. But as I understand the question pre- 
 sented, it is not one simply of the meaning of words. Webster 
 defines the word "expenses" as "that which is expended, laid out, or 
 consumed; cost; outlay; charge; as, the expenses of war." Substance 
 is, however, more important than form, and things more tangible 
 than words. The real object which, I assume, is sought by those 
 who wish to place taxes in the list of operating expenses, is to secure 
 the deduction of taxes from the sum of the earnings before making 
 the calculation to find what is the "Percentage of Operating Ex- 
 penses to Earnings," which is provided to be stated at page 45 of the 
 form of report. Of course taxes will be shown in any event, and 
 wherever they appear in a distinct item by themselves, and from the 
 report of any given road, it can readily be ascertained how much of 
 the outlay shown is for taxes. It would, therefore, require but a 
 small calculation, from the data given in the report, to arrive at the
 
 264 
 
 percentage of operating expenses to earnings, with the taxes added 
 in as an expense. I suppose the effect which is sought by the sug- 
 gestion to be avoided is the formal and what may appear an authori- 
 tative statement of this percentage from so high a tribunal as the 
 Interstate Commerce Commission which is apt, by reason of the great 
 authority and dignity of that body, to be received by legislative and 
 executive officials as a correct result without a critical examination 
 in detail of the methods by which the result has been obtained. 
 
 It has occurred to me no good reason could be alleged against 
 making the statement of the percentage of expenses to earnings both 
 ways; that is to say, with taxes excluded from the account of operat- 
 ing expenses, and also with the taxes included in that account. This 
 might satisfy the fears of the railway officials, and would, so far as I 
 can see, do no possible harm. 
 
 ANALOGY OF TAXES TO EXPENSES. 
 
 There is a sense in which taxes may logically be regarded as an 
 expense. What are taxes? Taxes, so far as they concern railroads, 
 are a charge which railroad property pays for the law and order un- 
 der which civil society enables them to conduct their business; in 
 short, it is what the road pays for the maintenance of civil govern- 
 ment. If requisite protection to the property and business of a rail- 
 road company were not furnished by government, or if we could 
 suppose a railroad to be operated in some land without governmental 
 protection, then it would be necessary for such railroad to provide 
 its own police protection and regulation, such as would accomplish 
 for it the end which is now reached through government. If we 
 thus suppose a railway company to be procuring this service for it- 
 self, we can see the resulting outlay would come strictly in the form 
 of an expense, and stand upon the same basis as the wages of watch- 
 men or other like employes. The sum paid for this purpose would 
 then be as much an "expense of operation" as clerk hire or the sal- 
 aries of trainmen. But the railway companies of the land, in com- 
 mon with others, find an agency ready established which secures 
 them in the enjoyment of their property and franchises, guarantees 
 them the right to perform their functions under the shield of law, 
 supplies them with police protection, affords them courts through 
 which to enforce their contracts, and officers to administer the laws 
 which fix their duty and liability to the public and the duty and 
 liability of the public to them. For this protecting agency, which we 
 call government, the -railroads, like others, pay through the medium 
 of taxes. They thus in substance pay for a service rendered them; 
 and looking at the matter from this point of view, it would do no 
 violence to the truth of the case if the certain sum so paid were called 
 an expense of operation. 
 
 Be this as it may, however, this tax is a sum that must be paid 
 and can not possibly be escaped. Its amount and its payment are 
 both beyond the volition of railway officials. It is a burden so in- 
 evitable that its very name has become associated in the public mind 
 with death, and the phrase "as certain as death and taxess" has
 
 265 
 
 passed into common speech. Why then should this known and in- 
 evitable charge not be deducted as an expense, or at least as if it 
 were an expense, when computing the percentage of expenses to 
 earnings? 
 
 If I am correct in my understanding, that what is desired is that 
 taxes be deducted from earnings before making the computation 
 which is to show to the world what per cent of earnings is paid out 
 as expenses, then I am free to say I see no objection to the sugges- 
 tion being acceded to. 
 
 AN ADJUCATION. 
 
 My attention has been called to certain decisions of the Supreme 
 Court of the United States which give an interpretation of the term 
 "net earnings." The case of the U. P. R. R. Co. v. United States, 
 99 U. S., 402, arose out of a claim made by the Union Pacific R. R. 
 Co. for certain services alleged to have been performed for the gov- 
 ernment. The act which had granted certain land and bond sub- 
 sidies to the company provided among other things that "after said 
 road is completed, until said bonds and interest are paid at least 5 
 per centum of the net earnings of said road shall also be annually 
 applied to the payment, etc." In adjusting the account between the 
 government and the road it therefore became necessary to determine 
 what were "net earnings" within the meaning of the statute; and it 
 was held, apparently without controversy, that the item scheduled by 
 the company under the term "General Expenses (including taxes,)" 
 should be deducted from the gross earnings in order to arrive at the 
 net earnings from which payment to the government was provided 
 by law to be made. Other items of the schedule of expenses set up 
 by the company were controverted. Among the controverted items 
 were "interest on bonds," "sinking fund bonds," and other like 
 charges; but the item designated as expenses in the schedule fur- 
 nished, and which was stated to "include taxes," was permitted to be 
 deducted from earnings without question. The decision referred to 
 was later affirmed in other cases which I need not quote. These 
 cases seem to establish, as a proposition of law, that "net earnings" 
 must be found by deducting taxes with other operating expenses. 
 
 I know it may be thought that this is not a question to be settled 
 by legal precedents. If, however, we regard it as a question to be 
 solved by considerations of public policy alone, it must still be re- 
 membered that that is never a sound public policy which does not 
 tend to establish justice. 
 
 Not further to extend this letter, which has already been made 
 much too long, my conclusion is that it is proper and right to deduct 
 taxes along with operating expenses, whether calling them by the 
 technical name "expenses" or not, from the earnings, before calculat- 
 ing the percentage of operating expenses to earnings; and I assent 
 still more heartily to the proposal to abandon the present attempted 
 apportionment of expenses between the two branches of passenger 
 and freight service.
 
 266 
 
 I have not attempted to here present all the considerations which 
 have occured to me in the progress and as the result of our investi- 
 gations had upon these important questions. I doubt not other 
 views yet more conclusive than any I have given will occur to the 
 minds of my brethren of the Committee and be embodied in the re- 
 port which you present. 
 
 I authorize you to attach my signature to any report you prepare 
 which embodies substantially the views herein expressed. 
 
 Again expressing my regret at being unable to meet with the 
 Committee and with the Conference of Railway Commmissioners, 
 and heartily wishing that both meetings prove as pleasant as profit- 
 able, I remain 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 (Signed) . ISAAC N. PHILLIPS,
 
 267 
 
 BEFORE THE 
 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 
 OF THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 No. 5. 
 
 THE MADISON, ILLINOIS & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE WABASH RAILROAD Co., THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO 
 
 & ST. Louis RAILWAY Co., THE CHICAGO & 
 
 ALTON RAILROAD Co., Respondents. 
 
 This case originally came up under the former Commission, the 
 following being the opinion and order: 
 
 OPINION BY PHILLIPS, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 Petitioner seeks to cross with its tracks the tracks of the Wabash, the 
 "Big Four," and the Chicago & Alton Railroads, near Kinder, Madison 
 county, Illinois. The respondent companies are all objecting to the 
 proposed crossing. Hence this petition for an order of the Commis- 
 sion granting leave to cross. 
 
 The crossing is objected to, among other things, upon the ground 
 that there is no public necessity for the building of petitioner's road 
 across the tracks of respondents at the point proposed; that from all 
 that appears the road will terminate on a prairie where there are no 
 inhabitants; that the industries and factories which petitioner al- 
 leges it is seeking to reach upon the west are merely projected, and 
 no one knows whether they will ever be built. 
 
 It is further objected that the only object of petitioner in forcing 
 this crossing is to connect with what is known as the "Bluff Line," 
 just beyond the point of crossing.
 
 268 
 
 It is further contended that, in case petitioner is permitted to cross 
 -at all, an overhead crossing should be ordered in order to avoid the 
 danger and delay to travel and transportation which the statute di- 
 rects shall not be "unnecessarily" interfered with. 
 
 Finally it is said, in case petitioner is permitted to cross at grade 
 as prayed, it should bear all the expense of protecting the crossing, 
 including the expense of operating the interlocker. 
 
 Upon these several points of objection we observe: 
 
 1. That the Railroad Commissioners of Illinois are not made by 
 law judges of the necessity for building railroads. The General As- 
 sembly, in the act for the incorporation of railroads, has fixed all the 
 conditions and limitations which exist on this subject. Neither this 
 tribunal nor any other has been designated by law to judge of the 
 traffic necessity of new lines. Some states, we believe, have put re- 
 strictions upon the building of railroads; but ours has not. Charters 
 are taken out fixing the termini of the line to be built; and consider- 
 able latitude is allowed to the constructing company in locating its 
 line between these points. Existing lines have in some cases been 
 almost paralleled by useless and speculative lines of road; but there 
 has been and is no legal authority, so far as we know, to prevent this, 
 however much good business judgment may be violated. 
 
 2. The same may be said of the objection that the sole object of 
 the petitioner is to meet the "Bluff Line," and give that company 
 traffic arrangements for crossing the tracks of respondents. If this 
 objection were sustained it would go to the right of petitioner to 
 build the road, and not merely to the particular place where it is 
 seeking to locate its line. We are not aware that a connection with 
 the "Bluff Line" is an illegal object, or that the Commissioners of 
 Railroads have any power to examine into the motives of petitioner 
 and to deny its petition upon the ground that its object is not deemed 
 to be justifiable. The Commissioners are simply directed by the 
 statute, after hearing, to "prescribe the place where and the manner 
 in which such crossing shall be made." If the company has com- 
 plied with the necessary statutory provision to enable it to build a 
 railroad, we, as Railroad Commissioners, are not authorized to deny 
 that a crossing of some kind may be made of the tracks across which 
 it projects its line. In other words, we are to "prescribe" a crossing, 
 not deny one altogether. 
 
 We have said no power exists to prevent petitioner from proceed- 
 ing with the construction of its line upon the ground that it meets 
 no public necessity, and that the objects and motives of its pro- 
 jectors are not proper. It is sufficient, perhaps, to say that this Com- 
 mission can assume no such power under the statute. Petitioner, be- 
 fore proceeding to cross the right of way of respondents with its 
 road, must, in addition to getting leave of the Commission, proceed 
 to condemn its right of way in the County Court. If any power 
 exists in that court to check the building of this line upon the 
 grounds urged, respondents can there interpose their objections, and 
 that tribunal will judge of its own jurisdiction and powers.
 
 269 
 
 2. The objection based upon the danger to trarel and transporta- 
 tion upon respondents' lines, which will result from the proposed 
 crossing raises the question whether, with such crossing well pro- 
 tected by interlocking, will entail an "unnecessary" danger and de- 
 lay within the meaning of the statute. It is the judgment of the 
 Commissioners that every crossing, however well protected by inter- 
 locking, introduces some elements of danger and of delay to travel 
 and transportation. The language of the statute is that future cross- 
 ings shall be constructed "at such place and in such manner as will 
 not unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel or transportation, 
 upon the railway so crossed." 
 
 We once had occasion to observe in the case of the Chicago, Madi- 
 son & Northern R. R. Co. vs. The Belt Railway Company of Chi- 
 cago, that the word "unnecessary" is not used in this statute in its 
 strict philosophical sense. In that sense, only that is "necessary" 
 which can not possibly be avoided, and there would always be a pos- 
 sibility of changing the place and manner of a crossing in order to 
 avoid even the slightest danger or delay. The General Assembly 
 evidently expected that some crossings would still be made at grade. 
 Grade crossings were not positively prohibited, but a means was pro- 
 vided by which, when the configuration of the ground proved favor- 
 able, crossings might be ordered to be constructed over or under. It 
 was doubtless intended that reasonable regard should be had to the 
 circumstances of each case. The question here, therefore, is not 
 whether there will be some danger and some delay, but will this 
 crossing "unnecessarily" impede or endanger travel or transportation, 
 within the sense intended by the General Assembly? Recognizing 
 fully the desirability of separating crossing tracks, where that is- 
 feasible, we do not think a fair application of this statute justifies us 
 in ordering an overhead crossing in the present case. We have- 
 caused an estimate to be made of the expense of such a crossing, 
 which is about $77,000. Such a burden, the railway companies of 
 this State have only in rare instances voluntarily imposed upon them- 
 selves in the past for the sake of avoiding danger and delay, even 
 though when their lines were built, no such safety appliances were- 
 used or existed as those which may now be put in at this crossing. 
 
 Putting expense aside, however, as not to be weighed against dan- 
 ger to life and property, a further difficulty still exists. Petitioner states- 
 one of its objects to be to connect its line with the three respondent 
 railways, particularly the "Big Four," which is the middle track of 
 the three, they all lying parallel and near together at the point des- 
 ignated, the Wabash being upon the east, the ''Big Four" in the 
 middle and the Alton upon the west. The act for the incorporation 
 of railway companies provides that every corporation formed under 
 the act shall have power: 
 
 "To cross, intersect, join and unite its railways with any other 
 railway before constructed at any point in its route and upon the 
 grounds of such other railway company, with the necessary turnouts, 
 sidings and switches, and other conveniences in furtherance of the 
 objects of its connection; and every corporation whose railway is or
 
 270 
 
 shall be hereafter intersected by any new railway shall unite with 
 the corporation owning such new railway in forming such intersec- 
 tion and connection, and grant the facilities aforesaid; and if the two 
 corporations can not agree upon the amount of compensation to be 
 made therefor, or the points and manner of such crossing and con- 
 nection, the same shall be ascertained and determined in manner 
 prescribed by law." 2 Starr & Curtis, page 1914, par. 6. 
 
 In order to "intersect, join and unite" its tracks with the track of 
 respondents, as it seems petitioner has a right to do under the above 
 provision, petitioner would be compelled to build an additional track 
 upon a level with the tracks crossed. Bat the same difficulty we now 
 have would again present itself, for petitioner could not connect with 
 the "Big Four" from the east without crossing the Wabash; and it 
 could not connect with the Alton without crossing both the Wabash 
 and the "Big Four." Thus, if petitioner were to insist upon its right 
 to connect with these roads, we should have practically a grade 
 crossing at last; and although such a crossing, made for the purpose 
 of delivering and receiving cars, would perhaps be less used than a 
 regular grade crossing, it would, nevertheless, in the judgment of the 
 Commission, be such a crossing as would require protection by in- 
 terlocking, Thus we see an order for an overhead crossing would 
 probably tend very little to simplify the situation. We have there- 
 fore determined that we can not deny the prayer of the petition. 
 While interlocking machines do not entirely avoid danger and delay 
 at crossings, they do have the effect of reducing these to 
 a minimum. With such an equipment we are not able to say in the 
 language of the statute that a grade crossing here would "unneces- 
 sarily impede and endanger travel and transportation." 
 
 4. The question of the division of the expense of operating an 
 interlocker remains to be considered. Petitioner concedes that the 
 statute casts upon it the burden of paying the first cost of the inter- 
 locking appliance, of putting tbe same in ready for use, and of main- 
 taining the same in good repair. Respondents contend that to this 
 should be added the burden of also operating the machine. Upon 
 this question the Commissioners have fully expressed their views in 
 the opinion in the case of the Tamaroa & ML Vernon Ry. Co. vs. 
 the Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., decided June 21, 1892. We 
 have seen no reason to change the views we there expressed. Under 
 the construction given to the statute in that case, the expense of the 
 operation of this interlocker, i e, wages of operators, would be paid 
 for upon the basis of the number of toads using the machine, 
 each paying equally. 
 
 In accordance with the views here expressed an order will be en- 
 tered granting the petitioner the right to cross at grade at the point 
 designated in the petition. The order will provide that the crossing 
 shall be protected by an interlocker of improved modern pattern, 
 upon the construction and details of which the companies will be 
 left to agree, if they are able to do so. The order will provide that
 
 271 
 
 the first cost of such interlocker, the expense of putting the same in, 
 and the expense of maintaining the same in good order and repair 
 shall be paid entire by the petitioner; and that the cost of operating 
 the said machine shall be paid by petitioner and the three respond- 
 ents, equally, one-fourth each. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is ordered and decided that petitioner, the Madison, Illinois & 
 St. Louis Railway Co. have leave to cross with its tracks, at grade, 
 the tracks of the respondents, the Wabash Railway Co., the Cleve- 
 land, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., and the Chicago 
 <fe Alton Railroad Co., at the place and in the manner specified in 
 the petition on file in this cause, right of way for such crossing be- 
 ing first obtained under the laws of Illinois relating to Eminent 
 Domain. 
 
 It is ordered further, that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals and switches to be 
 agreed upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the 
 parties are able to agree, the first cost of such interlocking machine, 
 the expense of putting the same in good order and repair to be paid 
 for by the Madison, Illinois & St. Louis Railway Co., as provided 
 l>y statute; but it is hereby ordered and decided by the Commission 
 that of the cost of the operation of such interlocking device, the said 
 Madison, Illinois & St. Louis Railway company, petitioner, shall pay 
 one- fourth, and the said Wabash Railroad Co., Cleveland, Cincinnati, 
 Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., and the Chicago & Alton Railroad 
 Co., respondents, shall pay one-fourth each. And inasmuch as the 
 statute only directs the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to pre- 
 scribe by order a plan of the interlocking in case the parties are 
 unable to agree; therefore, it is ordered that this petition be further 
 held under consideration by the Commission pending the efforts of 
 petitioner and respondents to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted January 3, Itf93. 
 
 On March 13, 1893,- the respondents, the Wabash Railroad, Chi- 
 cago & Alton and Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis, rep- 
 resented by their attorneys, filed petition before this Commission 
 praying for the further consideration of the case, and to set aside the 
 order of the former Commission. 
 
 April 14, 1893, at the office of the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission in Springfield case was set for hearing, at which time the 
 attorneys for both petitioner and respondents appeared. 
 
 The motion by the respondents to set aside the order of the former 
 board was overruled and the hearing closed with no modification in 
 the order as previously given. 
 
 On April 22d the respondents caused the case to be transferred, by 
 writ of certiorari, to the Circuit Court of Madison county, since which 
 time we have no further knowledge of the case.
 
 272 
 
 INADEQUATE TRAIN SERVICE. 
 
 In our report for last year, reference was made to the complaint of 
 citizens of Benton and other towns on the Belleville & Eldorado- 
 division of the St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co., alleging insufficient 
 train service, which complaint was heard by the Commission at Ben- 
 ton, Franklin county, on January 9 and 10, 1894. This hearing re- 
 sulted in the following opinion and order by the Commission: 
 
 Complaint No. 101. 
 
 CITIZENS OP BENTON, et al, 
 
 Petitioners, 
 vs 
 
 THE ST. Louis, ALTON & TERRE HAUTE R. R. Co., 
 
 Respondents . 
 
 Passenger Train Service. 
 
 Filed November 22, 1893. 
 
 Hearing at Benton, January 9 and 10, 1894. 
 
 Appearances : 
 
 For Petitioners, HON. C. H. LAYMAN and D. R. WEBB, 
 For Respondents, HON. GEO. W. PARKER and 
 
 F. M. YOUNGBLOOD. 
 
 OPINION or THE COMMISSION. 
 
 Opinion by Cantrall, Chairman. 
 
 STATEMENT OF PETITIONERS. 
 
 This is a petition of the citizens of Benton, Eldorado, Galatia, 
 Thompsonville, Christopher and Mulkeytown, stations on the Belle- 
 ville and Eldorado Division of the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute 
 Railroad, a line of railroad extending from DuQuoin.in Perry county, 
 to Eldorado, in Saline county, a distance of fifty miles.
 
 273 
 
 The petition charges that the only train operated by the respon- 
 dent on this division of its road is a "mixed train," consisting of coal, 
 stock and freight cars, to which is attached two passenger coaches, 
 leaving DuQuoin at 11 o'clock a. m, and arriving at Eldorado at 3 
 o'clock p. m., and is due at DuQuoin at 6:50 o'clock p. m. on its re- 
 turn. That Eldorado is the junction of the 0., C., 0. & St. L. and 
 the Louisville and Nashville railroads. 
 
 That passengers desiring to go north on either of these roads are 
 compelled to remain in Eldorado from sixteen to eighteen hours. 
 That passengers from stations east of DuQuoin, desiring to go to St. 
 Louis, or any point on respondent's road west of DuQuoin, are com- 
 pelled to remain in DuQuoin from 6:50 o'clock p. m. until 4:35 oclock 
 a. m. on the following morning. Thai this is the only train that runs 
 east of Benton. That a train consisting of a baggage car and one 
 passenger coach leaves DuQuoin for Benton at 10:10 o'clock p. m.,on 
 Sunday and Monday only, arriving at Benton at 11 o'clock p. m., 
 where it remains until 3:45 o'clock the following morning. That the 
 "mixed train" carries the United States mail. That it is not run on 
 its schedule time, being frequently from twenty minutes to three 
 hours late, and that by reason thereof the mails are delayed. That 
 the present train service does not furnish the patrons of the road 
 with necessary and adequate means of travel. That the population 
 of Eldorado is 2,000; Galatia, 800; Thompsonville, 500; Raleigh, 500; 
 Benton, 1,200; Christopher, 200; Mulkeytown, 200; DuQuoin, 5,000. 
 That the population of Perry county is 17,529; Franklin county, 
 17,138; Saline county, 19,332. 
 
 Petitioners ask that the defendant be required to "operate its rail- 
 road as a continuous line from St. Louis, Mo., to Eldorado, 111., so 
 as to give to complainants, and to the public generally, a through 
 daily passenger train thereon, making appropriate connections with 
 other roads at St. Louis, DuQuoin and Eldorado. 
 
 ANSWER OF RESPONDENT. 
 
 The respondent avers in its answer to the petition: 
 
 That it ought not to be required to furnish greater train service 
 than patrons of the road are willing or able to pay for. 
 
 That the business of the line will not justify additional train 
 service. 
 
 That the Board has no authority to require a service which the 
 business will not compensate. 
 
 That the company is not financially able to incur an expenditure 
 beyond the earning power of the road. 
 
 That to grant the prayer of the petition would antagonize both 
 State and Federal Constitutions. 
 
 That it is operating this division at a loss. 
 
 The evidence in this case shows that the respondent, the St. Louis, 
 Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company, is operating as lessee aline 
 
 18 O
 
 274 
 
 of road known as the Belleville and Eldorado Railroad, running from 
 DuQuoin, in Perry county, eastward through Benton to Eldorado, a 
 distance of fifty miles; that this line connects at DuQuoin with the 
 Belleville & Southern Illinois Railroad, also operated by said com- 
 pany as lessee, running from DuQuoin to Belleville, where it con- 
 nects with the Belleville & Carondelet Railroad also operated by the 
 same company under a lease, and there it also connects with its pro- 
 prietary line for St. Louis. That said company is also operating as 
 lessee a line of railroad from Pinckneyville, a station on the Belle- 
 ville & Southern Illinois Railroad, to Brooklyn, Illinois, known as 
 the Chicago, St. Louis & Paducah Railroad. That the entire length 
 of lines owned and operated by the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute 
 Railroad Company is 239.4 miles. That there are located on the line of 
 respondent's road east of DuQuoin seven stations, with an average 
 population of about 700. 
 
 That the population of DuQuoin is 5,000, Benton, 1,200, and Eldo- 
 rado, 2,000. That the aggregate population of Perry, Franklin and 
 Saline counties is 53,999. That DuQuoin is the junction of the Illi- 
 nois Central Railroad, and the Belleville & Eldorado, and Belleville 
 <fe Southern Illinois Railroads. That Eldorado is the junction of the 
 Belleville & Eldorado, the Cairo division of the C., C., C. & St. L. and 
 the Shawneetown branch of the L. & N. Railroads. That the only 
 train operated over the entire length of the B. & E. division is a 
 "mixed train" consisting of coal, stock and freight cars, to which is 
 attached a combination car and passenger coach; that this train car- 
 ries freight, express, baggage, stock, mail and passenger; that said 
 train does not make any connections at Eldorado with either of the 
 roads at that place; that it does not connect at DuQuoin with any of 
 respondent's passenger trains for St. Louis. That this train makes 
 a round trip from DuQuoin to Eldorado daily (except Sunday); that 
 passengers living east of Benton and desiring to go to any point west 
 of DuQuoin can not go beyond DuQuoin on said train, but are com- 
 pelled to remain in DuQuoin over night and resume their journey 
 the following morning. That a train consisting of a baggage car and 
 one passenger coach leaves DuQuoin for Benton at 10:10 o'clock p. 
 m. on Sunday and Monday only, arriving at Benton at 11 o'clock p. 
 m., where it remains until 3:45 o'clock the following morning, when 
 it leaves for St. Louis. 
 
 That the respondent company does not furnish sufficient passenger 
 trains to accommodate the travel along the line of the Belleville & 
 Eldorado division of their road, and that by reason thereof the pub- 
 lic is greatly inconvenienced, and are compelled to accept passage on 
 a "mixed train" if they desire to travel on the line east of Benton. 
 
 That the respondent company, as a corporation, has the financial 
 ability to furnish the additional passenger train asked for by 
 petitioners.
 
 275 
 
 That in their annual reports to the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission the gross earnings of the respondent company from oper- 
 ation, less the operating expenses, show net earnings per mile of road 
 owned and operated by them to be in 
 
 1888.. 
 
 $2,327 43 
 
 1889 
 
 1,853 53 
 
 1890 
 
 2,335 12 
 
 1891 
 
 2,411 00 
 
 1892 
 
 2,696 00 
 
 1893 . .... 
 
 2 776 00 
 
 
 
 It is true that the evidence of the auditor of respondent shows that 
 estimating the earnings of the B. & E. division upon a strict mileage 
 basis, and charging it with 4 per cent, of the general expenses of the 
 entire system in addition to all the expense they are able to locate on 
 that division, there is a deficit for every year they have been operat- 
 ing the road, save one. In the opinion of the Commission, the earn- 
 ings of this division should not be confined to a strict mileage basis, 
 but an "allowance" or "constructive" mileage should be given it, such 
 as is just and equitable, and as is the custom among other railroad 
 corporations operating branches in connection with their main stem 
 or proprietary line. If this division is to be treated by respondent, 
 in its sworn report to the Commission, as a part of its system, then 
 respondent must treat it as a part of its system where the rights of 
 the public are affected. It can not be a part of the system of re- 
 spondent for one purpose and a separate and independent line for 
 another. If it shall bear part of the general expense of the whole 
 system, this is equitable, this is just, both to the stockholders and to 
 the public. 
 
 The duty a railroad corporation owes to the public is no longer a 
 controverted question in Illinois, there is no uncertain sound in the 
 expression of our Supreme Court on this subject. Many cases have 
 been cited by counsel for petitioner and respondent, all of which we 
 have examined with care, and quote from some of the leading cases 
 which we deem in point. 
 
 "The primary consideration and principal object in the creation of 
 railroad corporations, and in conferring upon them privileges not 
 enjoyed by private citizens, was the accommodation of the public 
 and the promotion of their interests. It was not merely to aggran- 
 dize and enrich the stockholders; the benefits to be derived by the 
 stockholders are only incidental to accomplish the primary object. 
 To accomplish these purposes the people in a large number of coun- 
 ties, cities, villages and townships have incurred debts, which in the 
 aggregate, amount to a.vast sum, to subscribe for stock in railroads, 
 or as donations, and to aid in their construction. In many instances 
 heavy taxes have been laid to meet the interest on their bonds issued 
 to pay for such stock, and, in most cases, their stock has been wiped 
 out of existence, and they have nothing to show for their immense 
 liabilities thus incurred. Can it be insisted that the people have in- 
 curred these heavy liabilities, burdened themselves in many instances 
 to the point of ruin, only for the benefit of private stockholders?
 
 276 
 
 On the contrary, all know such liberality in granting the aid thus 
 afforded, and privileges thus conferred, was mainly to advance the 
 public interest, and private interest merely as an incident." 
 
 P. & R. I. Ry. Co. v. C. V. M. & Co., 6S 111., 489. 
 
 "The rights and privileges legally exercised by them are exclusive 
 in their nature, and for that reason they should be held strictly to act 
 within the powers granted. It will not do to say it is more con 
 venient, more profitable, to the company to act in a particular man- 
 ner. When these bodies accept their charters they are held to enter 
 into a contract with the State to discharge all the duties imposed, 
 and to exercise the rights and privileges conferred on them in the 
 manner described. And they must be held to a performance of this 
 contract in precisely the same manner as is required of individuals." 
 
 O. & M. Ry. Co. v. Dunbar, et al., 20 111., 626. 
 
 "By virtue of the power of eminent domain, railroads may take the 
 lands of the citizen against his will, and can, if need be, demolish his 
 house. Is it supposed these great powers were granted merely for 
 the private gain of the corporators? On the contrary, we all know 
 the companies were created for the public good. The object of the 
 Legislature was to add to the means of travel and commerce. Rail- 
 way charters not only give perpetual existence and great power, but 
 they have been constantly recognized by the courts as contracts be- 
 tween the companies and the State, imposing reciprocal obli- 
 gations " 
 
 C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. The People, 56 111., 379. 
 
 They are, in consideration of the valuable privileges conferred 
 upon them by the State, bound to respond by providing the most 
 ample accommodations for the public, and by discharging every duty 
 imposed upon them with fidelity and dispatch. 
 
 111. Cent. R. R. Co. v. Waters, 41 111., 379. 
 
 Numerous cases can be found both in the reports of our own and 
 other supreme courts where the same doctrine has been repeatedly 
 laid down. It is so well settled that it will not be denied. 
 
 While railroad companies have the right to appropriate a portion 
 of their trains exclusively to carrying freight and to entirely exclude 
 passengers from the same, by a parity of reasoning the public may 
 compel a railroad company to furnish sufficient passenger trains, 
 from which freight cars are excluded, to accommodate the travel. 
 
 C. & A. R. R. v. Randolph, 53 111., 510. 
 
 It is insisted by counsel for respondent that the case of The People 
 v. The O. & M. Ry. Co., 120 111,, page 200, is conclusive of this case, 
 and in connection with it we are also referred to the opinion of ex- 
 Attorney General Hunt. We are quite familiar with both. The 
 Attorney General's opinion is based upon the opinion in the O. & M. 
 case, therefore we need only refer to the latter. We have no fault 
 to find with the opinion of the court upon the admitted facts in the 
 case. The court, in passing upon the case, uses this language:
 
 277 
 
 "It is believed, however, no case can be found which, in the ab- 
 sence of a statutory requirement, has gone to the length of holding 
 that a railroad company may be compelled by mandamus to increase 
 the number of trains on its road, and we are satisfied there is no com- 
 mon law authority for making such order." 
 
 By reference to the case of State v. H. N. H. R. R. Co , 29th Con- 
 necticut, on page 538, it will be seen that the supreme court of Con- 
 necticut, in a proceeding by mandamus to compel the defendant 
 company to run a passenger train to the terminus of their road, held, 
 in awarding the writ of mandamus, "that the railroad company had 
 no right to retain their franchise and refuse to discharge their cor- 
 porate duty that chartered companies are obliged fairly and fully to 
 carry out the objects for which they are created, and that they can 
 be compelled to do so by mandamus." 
 
 The case is approved by our own Supreme Court in the case of 
 the C. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. The People, 56 111., page 384, and is 
 therefore as much an authority in Illinois as the decision of our own 
 Supreme Court; but we do not think the O. & M. case is an author- 
 ity in this case, for the reason that the facts upon which the court 
 based its opinion are admitted as true, while in the case before us 
 they are not only not admitted but are controverted. In the O. & M. 
 case the inability of the company to comply with the order of the 
 court granting the writ of mandamus was admitted, while in the 
 case before us the evidence shows conclusively that the respondent, 
 &B a corporation, is abundantly able to furnish ample and convenient 
 train service on any part of its system ; therefore the two cases are 
 not parallel. 
 
 The power of the Board to regulate train service, or to make an 
 order granting the prayer of the petition herein, is denied by re- 
 spondent, and in this connection we desire to call attention to Sec- 
 tion 163, R. S., Chapter 114, which provides: 
 
 "Said Commissioners shall examine into the condition and man- 
 agement and all other matters concerning the business of railroads 
 and warehouses in this State so far as the same pertains to the rela- 
 tion of such roads and warehouses to the public and to the accommo- 
 dation and security of persons doing business therewith, and whether 
 such railroad companies and warehouses, their officers, directors, 
 managers, lessees, agents and employe's comply with the laws of this 
 State now in force or which shall hereafter be in force concerning 
 them. And whenever it shall come to their knowledge, either upon 
 complaint or otherwise, or they shall have reason to believe that any 
 :such law or laws have been or are being violated, they shall prose- 
 cute all corporations or persons guilty of such violation." * * * 
 
 While this statute has never received a construction by our Su- 
 preme Court, we are of the opinion that a fair construction of it will 
 warrant the Board, in a proper case, to make an order regulating train 
 service; and that upon the failure, neglect or refusal of the railroad 
 corporation to comply with such order, that the courts in the proper 
 proceeding will compel the railroad company either to discharge the 
 duty it owes the public, or forfeit its franchise.
 
 278 
 
 It is not insisted by the Board that it has any judicial functions 
 or that it could, independent of the courts, enforce any order it may 
 be pleased to make concerning this or any other matter in which it 
 may nave jurisdiction, but it is believed by the Board that it has the 
 power, in a proper case, to recommend to a railroad company that it 
 shall discharge its duty to the public as required by law, and that 
 upon its failure to do so, that the Board may cause proper suit or 
 suits to be instituted in the proper courts to compel it to do so. 
 
 The franchise granted a railroad corporation are public grants, 
 and clothe the property constituting the railway with a public use. 
 It gives it a semi-public character and subjects it to the regulation 
 and control of the State in behalf of the public to the extent that 
 its charges must not only be reasonable, but its management safe,. 
 convenient and ample for the accommodation of the public. When 
 these objects are accomplished, the right of the State control ceases 
 because the rights of the public are secured. 
 
 Therefore, believing as we do, from the evidence in this case, that 
 the citizens living along the line of the Belleville and Eldorado di- 
 vision of respondent's line of railroad are not furnished with ample 
 or convenient passenger trains to accommodate those who may de- 
 sire to be transported over said division or any part thereof, and be- 
 lieving further that no case can be found requiring the public to- 
 travel on a freight or "mixed train," and being convinced from the 
 evidence in the case that the respondent has the financial ability to 
 operate a passenger train in addition to the present "mixed train" 
 now being operated by it, over its entire line, and in doing so it 
 will not only discharge the duty it owes to the public, but will, at the 
 same time, increase the earning capacity of its road. 
 
 We therefore recommend to you, the St. Louis, Alton & Terre 
 Haute Railroad Company, that you, without delay, caused to be 
 placed and operated on the Belleville and Terre Haute division of 
 your road, in addition to the "mixed train" now being operated by 
 you on said line, a daily passenger train, suitable and sufficient to- 
 carry all passengers, with their necessary baggage, in comfort and se- 
 curity and at a reasonable speed, and that you operate your said 
 railroad from East. St. Louis as a continuous line, so that persons 
 desiring to leave Eldorado and intermediate points in the morning 
 of each day (Sunday excepted) may be able to go on said railroad 
 to East St. Louis and return the same day. 
 
 This order the St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co. refused to comply 
 with and the proceedings against the railroad company for a writ 
 of mandamus were instituted to the October term of the Franklin 
 County Circuit Court. 
 
 This trial resulted in the dismissal of the petition of the Commis- 
 sion, and an appeal was then prosecuted to the Supreme Court of 
 the State of Illinois to the Springfield division thereof, where the 
 case is now pending and a decision almost daily expected.
 
 279 
 
 COMPLAINTS. 
 
 No. 111. 
 
 Before the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of the State of 
 Illinois. 
 
 Complaint of Wm. H. King & Son, of Kings, Ogle county, Illinois, 
 v. the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne & Chicago Railway Company for alleged 
 extortionate switching charges. Complaint filed March 10, 1894; 
 hearing at Chicago May 11, 1894. Decision rendered Dec. 5, 1894. 
 
 Opinion of the Commission by W. S. Cantrell, Chairman. 
 
 The object of this complaint is to correct alleged extortionate 
 charges for the switching of cars of wet glucose feed from the Sugar 
 Refining Company's factory at the corner of Beach and Taylor 
 streets, in the city of Chicago, to the tracks of the Chicago, Burling- 
 ton & Quincy Railroad Company. It is alleged by the complainants 
 that in the years 1892, 1893, and January of 1894, they shipped from 
 Chicago, Illinois, 61 cars of glucose feed to Chana, Ogle county, Illi- 
 nois, and 193 cars of such feed to Kings, Ogle county, Illinois, both 
 of which places are on the line of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
 Railway Company. 
 
 That all such feed was loaded into the cars of the respondent at the 
 factory of the Chicago Sugar Refining Company, at the corner of 
 Beach and Taylor streets in the said city, and by the respondent 
 switched to the tracks of the C., B. & Q. R. R Co,, and that the dis- 
 tance said cars were transported by the respondent was less than three 
 miles; that the respondent wrongfully and unlawfully charged for 
 such switching the sum of five dollars per car, and exacted and ex- 
 torted from the said C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., and by it entered up as 
 back charges, and charged to the complainants with the regular 
 freight bills rendered by said C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. to the complain- 
 ants, and the complainants thereby paid to the respondent said sum 
 of five dollars per car for each of said cars above mentioned (as 
 shown by freight bills filed in evidence), by paying the regular 
 freight bills of said C., B. & Q. R. R. Co.; that the respondent there- 
 by exacted and extorted from said complainants the sum of five dol- 
 lars per car for such switching charges when it was only entitled, 
 under the rules of the Commission, to two dollars per car for such 
 services. 
 
 The respondent avers in its answer to the complaint in substance 
 as follows:
 
 280 
 
 First That the factory of said Sugar Refining Company is not 
 situated on any track owned or controlled by the respondent. 
 
 Second That the rate of $5 per car charged on the switching in 
 question is an average uniform rate fixed by the respondent for all 
 switching between all points along the line of this respondent in the 
 city of Chicago, and all other points on the lines of all other roads in 
 said city, and embraces distances varying from a fraction of a mile 
 to twelve miles. 
 
 Third That all of the fifteen or more railroad companies having 
 lines and terminal facilities in said city of Chicago on January 1, 
 1892, adopted uniform rates per car for switching, embracing dis- 
 tances varying from a fraction of a mile to twelve or more miles, 
 such uniform rates being the sum of $3.50 to $5 per car. 
 
 Fourth That the charge of $5 per car as set forth in the com- 
 plaint includes the switching into and out of said yard all empty 
 cars taken to said factory to be loaded and all empty cars taken away 
 from said factory after being unloaded. 
 
 Fifth That the merchandise with which said cars were loaded for 
 transportation is of a perishable nature and therefore required im- 
 mediate attention, whereby cost of switching was enhanced. 
 
 Sixth That the rate of $5 per car charged by respondent for 
 switching said cars herein mentioned is not unreasonable or excessive 
 under the circumstances of the case. 
 
 Seventh That it is not desirable to have more than one switching 
 charge for any line and that charge should include the longest dis- 
 tances as well as the shortest between switching points. 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 The rule of this Commission, which complainants aver has been 
 violated by the respondent, is as follows: 
 
 "The reasonable maximum rate for switching loaded cars for dis- 
 tances not exceeding three miles shall be $2 per car." 
 
 The question before us is whether or not the defendant company 
 has been guilty of a violation of this rule, which is based upon the 
 power granted this Commission by the statute authorizing them to 
 establish reasonable rates, etc. 
 
 It appears to us quite conclusively from the preponderance of the 
 evidence that some of the cars in question were hauled by the re- 
 spondent not to exceed three miles. The number of the cars so 
 hauled does not affect the merits of this case. If only one car was 
 switched by respondent, and the distance was not exceeding three 
 miles, and a charge of more than $2 was made for this service, it is a 
 violation of the rule above referred to. 
 
 The point urged by respondent, "that it did not take these cars 
 from any point on any track owned or controlled by it," is not well 
 taken, for the reason that respondent did this switching with a full 
 knowledge of the switching charges as fixed by the Commission, and
 
 281 
 
 also with a full knowledge of the fact that they were taking these 
 cars from a point on a line of railroad not owned or controlled by it, 
 and it is therefore estopped from claiming any advantage or general 
 benefit thereby. 
 
 It is also true that respondent could not have been compelled to 
 go to the Sugar Refining Company's works for these cars, as it was 
 not located "on any tracks owned or controlled by respondents," but 
 having elected to do so, it can not now plead in defense of its con- 
 duct that the cars were not taken from a point on track or tracks that 
 was not owned or controlled by it. 
 
 If respondent in good faith had desired to avoid the violation of 
 the rule of the Commission which provides a maximum rate for 
 switching cars, it could have done so by refusing to go upon the 
 tracks of another company to do this switching. Not having done 
 so, the rule of law is that they intended to violate or ignore the rule 
 of the Commission fixing this switching charge. 
 
 The complainant, when he ordered the cars switched from the 
 Sugar Refining Company's works, had a right to suppose that the 
 Switching Company would conform to the rule of the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission in such cases made and provided. If the 
 distance these cars were switched did not exceed three miles, he had 
 ;a right to expect to pay but $2 per car for the service performed. 
 
 It is contended that the evidence does not show that the charge of 
 $5 for switching the cars in question was unreasonable. In the 
 opinion of the Commission this position is not tenable, for the rea- 
 son that the maximum charge fixed by the Commission is made by 
 law prima facie a reasonable rate, and any railroad company which 
 charges more must assume the burden of showing in defense, when 
 prosecuted for extortion, that the maximum rate fixed by the Commis- 
 sion is unreasonable. 
 
 In summing up this case, we have arrived at the following con- 
 clusion : 
 
 The evidence clearly shows that some of the cars in question were 
 received by the defendant company, the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & 
 Chicago Railway Company, at a point less than three miles from their 
 destination, and that such cars were actually hauled by respondent 
 direct to their destination, a distance of less than three miles, and 
 that the respondent company has charged for such service the sum 
 of $5 per car, which is in excess of the rate established by this 
 Commission for such service, and that this constitutes a prima facie 
 case of extortion. 
 
 (Signed) W. S. CANTRELL, 
 
 Chairman.
 
 282 
 
 No. 116. 
 
 Before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State 
 
 of Illinois. 
 
 Complaint No. 116. 
 
 Mexican Amole Soap Company, 
 vs. 
 
 Peoria & Pekin Union, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy and Chicago, 
 Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Companies. 
 
 REFUSAL TO SWITCH CARS. 
 
 Filed October 15, 1894. 
 
 Hearing at Chicago, January 18, 1895. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Complainants, A. A. BRAYSHAW, President Mexican Amole Soap 
 Company. 
 
 For Respondents, HON. W. S. HORTON for P. & P. U. and C., R. I. 
 & P. and L. O. GODDARD, W. F. MERRILL and HON. C. M. 
 DAWES for the C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. 
 
 Opinion of the Commission. 
 
 Opinion by CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 Decided February 1, 1895. 
 
 In the matter of the complaint of the Mexican Amole Soap Com- 
 pany against Peoria & Pekin Union Railway et al. 
 
 STATEMENT OP FACTS. 
 
 On the 8th of October, 1894, the Mexican Amole Soap Company, of 
 Peoria, Illinois, complainants therein, had a car load of box lumber 
 shipped from St. Paul, Minn., to Peoria, 111., over the Chicago, 
 Burlington & Quincy Railroad. On its arrival in Peoria the com- 
 plainants were notified of the fact, and gave the C., B. & Q. R. R. 
 Co. instructions to switch the car over the tracks of the P. & P. U. 
 Ry. to their factory, which is located in block 3 on the line of the* 
 free delivery or team tracks of the said P. & P. U. Ry.
 
 283 
 
 Complainants were informed by the C., B. & Q. that the P. & P.. 
 U. Company would not accept the car. The president of the com- 
 plainant then went to the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad 
 Company offices and saw Mr. Lord and Mr. Lintner of said company, 
 the latter of whom is the agent there, and asked them to switch this- 
 car on to their tracks, which are also located convenient to complain- 
 ant's factory, and are parallel with the P. & P. U. Company's tracks. 
 The president of the complainant company was informed by said 
 parties that they would like to accommodate him, but could not do 
 so. He then told them that he was willing to pay whatever they- 
 charged for the service, but they still refused to switch the car. He 
 then made application to the P. & P. U. Company to have this car 
 placed on their tracks opposite complainant's factory in block 3, and 
 it also refused, giving as a reason therefor that it had written in- 
 structions not to switch any cars from the C., B. & Q. tracks or any 
 other line that was not in their Union. He replied that he was wil- 
 ling to pay whatever the charge was for said service, and they stated 
 that they had no price and would not switch the car. 
 
 The tracks of the P. & P. U. and C., R. I. & P. R. R. Co.'s above 
 referred to are known and designated as free delivery, team or un- 
 loading tracks. There is no contention here that the P. & P. U. and 
 C., R. I. & P. have ever refused to place on their respective free de- 
 livery tracks any cars coming to Peoria over their respective lines. 
 The free delivery track of the C., B. & Q., where the car in question 
 was delivered, is about four blocks from the factory of complainants.. 
 The evidence shows that there is an interchange of business between 
 the C., B. & Q. and the C., R. I. & P. and the P. & P. U. companies 
 in Peoria for points in that city for which a switching charge is 
 made, but none of this interchange of business is handled on the 
 free delivery tracks of either of said roads, and the switching that is 
 done is to private or industry tracks. The evidence also shows that 
 the Peoria railroads refuse to switch cars arriving at Peoria over 
 lines other than their own to their respective free delivery or team 
 tracks. They base their refusal to switch cars as above upon the 
 ground that to do so would be furnishing terminal facilities for other 
 roads. 
 
 OPINION. 
 
 The evidence shows in this case that the car in question was shipped 
 over the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. from St. Paul to 
 Peoria; that upon its arrival in Peoria the complainant was notified; 
 that it requested the C., B. & Q. agent to have it switched to a point 
 opposite its factory on the P. & P. U. or C., R. I. & P. R. R. Com- 
 panies' tracks; that application was made to each of these roads and 
 was refused; that the factory of complainant is located on the team 
 or free delivery tracks of the Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. ; that the 
 tracks of the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Company at 
 or near complainant's factory are also free delivery tracks. 
 
 It is very evident that that the only object complainants had in 
 desiring this car switched was its own convenience and to save the 
 expense of unloading by wagon and hauling to its factory. The C.,.
 
 284 
 
 B. &Q. "team tracks," where this car was placed, are about four blocks 
 from complainant's factory, and while there is no doubt that either 
 the P & P. U. or C., R. I. & P. "team tracks" are nearer the factory 
 than the "team tracks" of the C., B. & Q., yet we do not think this a 
 sufficient reason why either the P. & P. U. or C., R. I. & P. should 
 be compelled to switch this car to their free general delivery or team 
 tracks, to hold that they should do so would in effect hold that one 
 railroad company can be compelled under the law to furnish terminal 
 facilities for another, which we do not believe to be just or equitable. 
 
 "Team or free delivery tracks" are tracks that are built, maintained 
 and used by railroad companies for loading and unloading freight 
 shipped over their lines for the accommodation of their own patrons. 
 Each railroad company is required to furnish its patrons with rea- 
 sonable terminal facilities, in which are included tracks for loading 
 and unloading by wagon. 
 
 We have examined the evidence in this case carefully, and are of 
 the opinion that the real question in this case is not whether one 
 railroad company can be compelled to switch cars for another, but 
 rather, "can one railroad company be compelled to furnish terminal 
 facilities for another?" We are of the opinion that it can not, but 
 that each railroad company must under the law furnish its own ter- 
 minal facilities for its own patrons. 
 
 For the reasons above stated the complaint is hereby dismissed.
 
 285 
 
 CROSSINGS. 
 
 THE BELLEVILLE CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 
 THE LOUISVILLE, EVANSVILLE & ST. Louis CONSOLIDATED RAILROAD- 
 COMPANY, Respondents. 
 
 PETITION TO DETERMINE PLACE OF CROSSING. 
 
 Petition filed March 20, 1894. Crossing viewed March 26, A. D 
 1894. Answer filed April 3, 1894. Hearing April 3, 1894, and April 
 19, 1894. Opinion filed April 25, 1894. 
 
 Opinion of the Commission, by W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 This is a petition by the Belleville City Railway Company for 
 leave to cross with its track the track of the Louisville, Evansville & 
 St. Louis Consolidated Railroad at grade at a point near the most 
 northeasterly corner of Lot No. 106, in the third subdivision of 
 Cahokia commons in said St. Clair county and State of Illinois, at 
 an angle of about 42 degrees, the center point of crossing being about 
 1,373 feet south, 41 degrees west from center point of crossing of the 
 St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company with the said 
 Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Company 
 in the city of East St. Louis. 
 
 A crossing at the point proposed is resisted upon the ground : 
 
 First "That the proposed crossing will unnecessarily impede and 
 endanger existing travel and transportation more than would a like 
 crossing at the present intersection of the Mobile & Ohio and the 
 East St. Louis & Carondelet (Conlogue) Railroad." 
 
 Second "That the statute of 1889 takes away the right of the new- 
 comer or petitioner to choose its place of crossing, and gives the 
 right to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to prescribe the 
 place where and the manner in which the crossing shall be made." 
 
 As to the first objection, we do not believe it well taken. This 
 part of respondent's road which the petitioner seeks to cross is not 
 used for passenger service at all, but only for freight traffic, there- 
 fore it may be said that there is no travel over it. Taking the two 
 words used in the statute, "travel" and "transportation," and con- 
 struing them together, we think a fair construction of them would
 
 286 
 
 mean "passengers being transported." There being no travel trans- 
 ported over this particular part of line, then there could be no danger 
 to travel from the crossing asked for by petitioner. 
 
 But admit, for the purpose of this case, that this part of respond- 
 ent's line is used for the transportation of passengers, as well as 
 freight, and that numerous trains are operated over it daily, from 
 either side of this proposed crossing, would there not be less danger 
 at the proposed crossing than there would be to intersect respond- 
 ent's road at its intersection with the M. & O. and Conlogue Rail- 
 road, where there are eighteen regular trains of the M. & O. that 
 pass over this crossing daily in addition to the almost innumerable 
 trains of the Conlogue? 
 
 We can not comprehend how there would be less danger in cross- 
 ing one track over which there is operated fourteen regular trains 
 than there would be in crossing three tracks over which is operated 
 the same fourteen trains and eighteen additional trains, together 
 with numerous trains, the exact number of which we are not advised, 
 but which it is admitted do pass over this crossing. 
 
 In the first instance, these fourteen trains are only freight trains 
 and do not carry passengers, while in the latter six of the eighteen 
 are passenger trains. Wherefore we do not consider this objection 
 tenable or well taken. 
 
 As to the second objection, "That the statute of 1889 takes away 
 the right of the petitioner to select or choose its place of crossing 
 and gives the right to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission to 
 prescribe the place and manner of crossing," we are inclined to the 
 opinion, in the absence of any judicial construction of this statute, 
 that this position is well taken. All the cases cited by counsel on 
 either side were rendered prior to the statute of 1889 and are only 
 authority in this case by analogy, and aid the Commission but 
 little in the construction of this statute. 
 
 There is no controversy here as to the rights of petitioner to cross 
 the track of respondent, but it is most seriously contended by counsel 
 for respondent that it is the duty of the Commission to prescribe a 
 place of crossing other than the one proposed by petitioner. That 
 the same results can be obtained by the petitioner by crossing the 
 track either at the intersection of the Mobile & Ohio and Conlogue 
 with respondent's road, a distance of about 1,256 feet southwest of 
 proposed crossing, or to remove the crossing 1,373 feet northeast of 
 the proposed crossing to the intersection of the respondent. 
 
 The crossing of respondent's road and the M. & O. and Conlogue 
 roads is the head of the switching yards of respondent's road and 
 the point where respondents do the greater part of their switching 
 aud the making up of their freight trains. To locate the crossing of 
 petitioner at this point would very largely increase the danger both 
 to "travel and transportation," and subject each of the roads at this 
 point to the greater inconvenience and delay in handling the busi- 
 ness of their respective lines.
 
 287 
 
 It has also been urged that petitioner could cross the line of 
 respondent at its intersection with the St. L., A. & T. H. R. R., a 
 distance of about 1,373 feet northeast of proposed crossing; to do 
 this would require the petitioner to relocate that part of its line from 
 lot 263, using the Cakokia road, which is a public highway, to the 
 corner of lot 295; thence diagonally across the race track to the 
 northeast corner thereof where it would intersect the crossing of the 
 St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. and respondent's line. This would, to say 
 the least, be impracticable for many reasons. First, the right of way 
 along the Cahokia road and across the race track would have to be 
 obtained, which would cost a large sum of money and doubtless in- 
 volve the petitioner in long continued litigation, which would delay 
 the completion of its road. 
 
 Second. The right of way of petitioner already obtained north- 
 west of lot 263, and upon which petitioner has constructed its embank- 
 ment, would have to be abandoned and all the cost of construction 
 be thrown away. 
 
 Third. The crossing of these two roads, the St. L., A. & T. H. R. 
 R. and the respondent would be met with just as persistent opposi- 
 tion as at the proposed crossing. 
 
 Fourth. If the permission to cross should be obtained at this 
 point, there is no way that petitioner could make its connection with 
 the Conlogue or Wiggins Ferry Lines except to use the tracks of the 
 St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co., which would impose additional burdens 
 in the way of rentals of trackage or they would be compelled to 
 condemn a right of way over lots upon which are already built busi- 
 ness houses, residences, etc., and which would, in a thriving, grow- 
 ing, prosperous and populous city like East St. Louis, cost a fabulous 
 sum of money. 
 
 The St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. operates over this crossing daily 
 eighteen regular trains, six of which are passenger trains. Add to 
 this fourteen freight trains of respondent, which are also operated 
 over this crossing, and we have a total of thirty- two trains, and if we 
 should thrust a third crossing in at this point it would most seriously 
 interfere with the traffic of these lines and very greatly enhance the 
 danger to travel. 
 
 In the final argument of this case counsel for respondent insisted 
 that if the petitioner should be granted the permission to cross the 
 track of the respondent at its proposed crossing, then the Commision 
 should provide in its order that it protect its crossing with proper 
 interlocking devices. If the respondent operated regular passenger 
 trains over this particular part of their line, the Commission would 
 not hesitate to order the crossing interlocked, but as they do not do 
 so, and inasmuch as it is stated by counsel for petitioner that its road 
 is purely a freight road, we do not see the necessity at this time to 
 ask the petitioner to incur this expense. There are so many cross- 
 ings in the State over which are operated a large number of passen- 
 ger trains daily, and which are more dangerous than the proposed 
 crossing, that are not protected by interlocks, that we do not feel 
 that we should say to this petitioner that before you are allowed to
 
 288 
 
 cross respondent's road you shall interlock your crossing. If at any 
 time in the future the business of petitioner and respondent on this- 
 line should grow to that extent that either or both should do a reg- 
 ular passenger business, then the Commission can and doubtless will 
 order the crossing interlocked, but at present we do not deem it 
 proper to do so. 
 
 The fact that petitioner has graded its road up to the right of way 
 on either side of respondent's road is not a sufficient reason in itself 
 for granting the prayer of petitioner in fact it is not a good practice 
 in cases of this character to proceed so far with the work of grading 
 until an order from the Commission prescribing the place and man- 
 ner of crossing shall have first been obtained. 
 
 After a careful examination of the conditions at and surrounding 
 the proposed crossing, we are of the opinion that a more practicable 
 and less dangerous crossing of respondent's line could not be found 
 than the one asked for by .petitioner, and to change it to either of 
 the points suggested by the respondents would impose additional 
 and heavy burdens of expense upon the petitioner; and unless to do 
 so would render the crossing 'less dangerous, and would less impede 
 the business of respondent's road, then we should not make this 
 change; therefore the prayer of the petition is granted. 
 
 ORDER OF THE COMMISION. 
 
 It is therefore decided and ordered that petitioner have leave to 
 cross with its tracks the tracks of respondent's road at grade at the 
 point proposed by it, being thirteen hundred and seventy-three 
 (1,373) feet from the center of the track of the St. Louis, Alton & 
 Terre Haute Railroad where the same crosses the line of respondent 
 in the city of Eist St. Louis, in the county of St. Clair, and twelve 
 hundred and fifty-six (1,256) feet from the center of the crossing of 
 the Mobile & Ohio Railroad with the tracks of the respondent in said 
 city, the right of way of such crossing being first obtained under the 
 laws of Illinois relating to eminent domain. The right to present a 
 petition for rehearing is expressly reserved: Provided, same shall be 
 filed with the Secretary of the Commission within five days from 
 this date, and provided further, that counsel for petitioner shall be 
 furnished with copy of petition within said time. 
 
 (Signed) W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 Attest 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary. 
 
 On April 30 a petition for rehearing was filed with Commission, 
 which was heard before the Commission on May 28, 1894, and the 
 following opinion rendered by W. S. Cantrell, Chairman: 
 
 "The causes assigned for the rehearing in this case were presented 
 on the argument of the answer to the original petition for leave to 
 cross. No new questions have been raised on the argument of this 
 petition by counsel on either side; it is simply an attempt to 'thresh 
 the old straw over again,' and while we admire the zeal, energy and
 
 289 ' 
 
 persistency and the very able manner in which counsel has presented 
 the case for the respondent, yet we do not feel that the facts warrant 
 us in granting a rehearing in this case. 
 
 The hearing is therefore denied. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that this case stand con- 
 tinued for such further order or orders as the Commission may deem 
 proper to make when occasion should require, with reference to an 
 interlock at said crossing. 
 
 (Signed.) W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 CHICAGO, PADUCAH & MEMPHIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 
 LOUISVILLE, EVANSVILLE & ST. Louis CONSOLIDATED RAILROAD 
 COMPANY, Respondent. 
 
 LEAVE TO CROSS AT MT. VERNON. 
 
 This petition was filed with the Commission on November 7, 1894, 
 and came up for hearing at Springfield on Decemcer 19, 1894. 
 
 Both companies were ably represented by learned counsel, and after 
 hearing the evidence, the matter was taken under advisement by the 
 Board, and resulted in the following order being made by them under 
 date of January 8, Ib95: 
 
 CHICAGO, PADUCAH & MEMPHIS RAILROAD 
 COMPANY, 
 
 Petition for leave 
 
 VS. r 
 
 to cross. 
 
 THE LOUISVILLE, EVANSVILLE & ST. Louis 
 CONSOLIDATED RAILROAD COMPANY. 
 
 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 It is ordered by the Commission that the petitioner, the Chicago, 
 Paducah & Memphis Railroad Company, have leave to cross with its 
 track at grade the track of the respondent, the Louisville, Evansville 
 & St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Company, at the place and in the 
 manner specified in the petition and map accompanying same on 
 file in this cause. Right of way for such crossing being first obtained 
 under the laws of Illinois relating to eminent domain. 
 
 It is further ordered, that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed, 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals and switches, to be 
 agreed upon by the parties with this Commission's approval, if the 
 parties are able to agree. The cost of construction and the expense of 
 
 19 O
 
 290 
 
 maintenance of which device shall be paid for by the Chicago, Padu- 
 cah & Memphis Railroad Company as provided by statute; and it is 
 further ordered by the Commission, that of the cost of the operation 
 of such interlocking device the said Chicago, Paducah & Memphis 
 Railroad Company shall pay two-thirds and the said Louisville, 
 Evansville & St. Louis Consolidated Railroad Company shall pay 
 one third. 
 
 And inasmuch as the statute only directs the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission to prescribe by order a plan of the interlocking 
 in case the parties are unable to agree, therefore it is ordered that 
 this petition be further held under consideration by the Commission 
 pending the efforts of the petitioner and respondent to agree upon a 
 plan of interlocking, 
 
 Adopted January 8, 1895. 
 
 (Signed.) W. S. CANTEELL, 
 
 C. F. LAPE, 
 THOS. GAHAN, 
 
 Commissioners. 
 Attest: 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary.
 
 291 
 
 INTERLOCKING. 
 
 OENTBALIA & CHESTER RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent. 
 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSING NASHVILLE, ILL. 
 
 Under date of June 25, 1892, it was ordered by the Board of Rail- 
 road and Warehouse Commissioners, upon further consideration of 
 the petition of the Centralia & Chester R. R. Company for leave to 
 -cross the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville R. R. Company, that 
 the petitioner, the Centralia & Chester R. R. Company, shall pay the 
 first cost of the construction and the putting up of an interlocking 
 device, and also the expense of maintaining the same in good order, 
 condition and repair. But the question of apportioning the expense 
 of the operation of said plant was reserved until such time as the de- 
 vice to be used shall have been agreed upon by the parties, or, in case 
 of their failure to agree, prescribed by the Commission. Inasmuch 
 as under the statutes the companies are permitted to agree upon a 
 plan of interlocking, provided they can do so, it was ordered that this 
 case be held under consideration by the Commission pending the 
 efforts of the parties to agree upon a plan. 
 
 On the 14th day of June, 1893, came the parties in the above cause, 
 by their respective solicitors, and it appearing to the Commission 
 that the parties in interest had been wholly unable to agree upon 
 the kind of interlocking system or device to be used at the point 
 where the Centralia & Chester R. R. Company crosses the Louisville 
 & Nashville, and it further appeared to the Commission that it is not 
 probable that said parties will be able to agree upon said interlock- 
 ing system or device for protecting said crossing, and that both parties 
 are desirous that the Commission itself shall order and determine the 
 kind of interlocking system ^r device to be used in the protection of 
 said crossing, and the said parties having signed an instrument in 
 order that said Commission could at once take action as to the kind 
 of interlocking system or device that should be used for the protec- 
 tion of said crossing.
 
 292 
 
 Whereupon the Commission instructed their consulting enginee 
 to view the crossing and prepare plans for an interlocking device for 
 the protection of said crossing. Plans were prepared by the consult- 
 ing engineers, approved by the Commission, and forwarded to the 
 railroad companies in interest. The general plan of the device ap- 
 proved being as economical as practicable, having due consideration 
 for the statutes and the requirements of the Board bearing upon this 
 subject. 
 
 In the early part of April, 1894, information reached the Commis- 
 sion that the order of the Board directing the construction of an in- 
 terlocking plant at this point was not being complied with. Investi- 
 gation was made as to the facts in the case, and finding that the order 
 was being disregarded, the Commission on May 28, 1894, directed the 
 following order issued to the Centralia & Chester R. R. Company: 
 
 To the Centralia & Chester R. R. Co. : 
 
 On the 18th day of March, 1892, in the matter of the petition of 
 the Centralia & Chester Railroad Company for leave to cross the 
 track of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, at Nashville, 
 Illinois, an order was made by the Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion granting the prayer of your petition. 
 
 Afterwards, to-wit: on the 21st day of June, 1892, a further order 
 was made by the Commission requiring you, the said Centralia & 
 Chester Railroad Company, to protect said crossing by a system of 
 interlocking. 
 
 It has been made known to us that you have not complied with 
 said order above referred to. and the said Louisville & Nashville 
 Railroad Company are very much inconvenienced and their trains 
 unnecessarily delayed by reason thereof. 
 
 Therefore, you, the said Centralia & Chester Railroad Company, 
 will please take notice, that if .you do not commence in good faith by 
 June 15, 1894, to put in and complete (as soon as it can reasonably 
 be done) a good and sufficient interlocking device according to the 
 plans which have been heretofore submitted to and approved by this- 
 Commission, we shall direct the Attorney General to proceed against 
 you for the penalty provided for in Section 211 of Chapter 114, R. S. 
 of Illinois. 
 
 (Signed) W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 Attest : 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary. 
 
 August 22, 1894, report was received from the consulting en- 
 gineers of the Board, Messrs. R. P. Morgan & Son, approving the 
 interlocking device (which had been put in as directed) and August 
 29, 1894, permit for the same was issued by the Secretary.
 
 293 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 On January 17, 1895, the Commission sent the following letter to 
 Chicago Board of Trade passing upon certain questions sub- 
 mitted by them with reference to the storage of grain in the Chicago 
 elevators : 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., January 17, 1895. 
 
 Jno, Hill, Jr., Board of Trade, Chicago: 
 
 MY DEAR SIR: My attention has been called by the Governor to 
 your favor of the llth inst. to him enclosing copy of your letter to 
 me of July 1, 1894. and my reply to same dated July 21, 1894. The 
 questions upon which you desire my opinion are most important 
 ones, and I shall answer them as I understand the law. 
 
 First "Has the Board of Trade, as an organization, the right to 
 examine wheat in the Chicago elevators?" 
 
 Answer There is no common law or statutory authority giving it 
 such right. Section 150, Chapter 114, R. S. 1893, provides that all 
 persons owning property or who may be interested in the same in 
 any public warehouse, and all duly authorized inspectors of such 
 property, shall have the right to examine any and all property stored 
 in any public warehouse, but this section can not be construed so as 
 to give the Board of Trade the right. 
 
 The section just quoted is the only provision upon this subject, 
 and the Supreme or Appellate courts have never passed upon the 
 question, therefore I am left to place my own construction upon the 
 language employed in this section. 
 
 Second "Have the warehousemen the right to handle their own 
 grain through their own houses with the grain of their customers?" 
 
 Answer At common law a warehouseman exercised a mere pri- 
 vate employment, but under our statute he becomes a qua'si-public 
 officer; before transacting any business in his warehouse he is re- 
 quired to obtain a license from the proper authority and to give bond 
 for the faithful discharge of his duties. This becomes necessary 
 because he is dealing with the public in his quasi-official character, 
 and that the public may be protected from loss from any cause. 
 
 He is allowed to charge the public for the use of his warehouse; 
 he must publish ea'ch year in one or more newspapers a table or 
 schedule of rates charged by him for the storage of grain in his 
 warehouse, which can not be increased during the year; he shall not
 
 294 
 
 mix grain of different grades together, or select different qualities of 
 the same grade for the purpose of storing the same, nor shall he 
 attempt to deliver grain of one grade for another, or in any way 
 tamper with grain while in his possession or custody with a view of 
 securing any profit to himself or any other person. 
 
 He shall not discriminate between persons desiring to avail them- 
 selves of warehouse facilities, but he shall receive for storage any 
 grain that may be tendered him in the usual manner in which ware- 
 houses are accustomed to receive the same. He is required to issue 
 a warehouse receipt to parties storing grain, which receipt is, as the 
 Supreme Court has held, a contract of bailment, the warehouse- 
 man thereby becoming the mere bailee or custodian for the owner. 
 Continuing, the Court says: "The fact that the warehouse is a public 
 warehouse is, of itself, notice to the world that the grain therein 
 stored is held not for the warehouseman but for others." 
 
 The warehouse act was passed in 1871, immediately after the 
 adoption of the new constitution, and was, to use the language of 
 Chief Justice Breese in the case of Munn vs. The People, "to pro- 
 tect prod acers and shippers against exorbitant charges on the part 
 of warehousemen, against unjust discrimination and against all 
 species of fraud which the warehouseman might be guilty of." 
 
 The statute requiring warehousemen to receive grain for storage 
 does not mean that he shall receive his own grain from himself, but 
 the definition of the word receive means the act of taking. From 
 whom? From one's self? Certainly not, but from a third person; 
 therefore the construction of this word reeeive, in my opinion, can 
 only mean that article or thing taken from a third person. 
 
 While the statute permits the warehouseman to mix the grain of 
 the same grade and of different owners, in my opinion, the proper 
 construction of this statute is that it applies only to the grain of 
 third parties and not to his own grain. If a warehouseman desires 
 to handle his own grain, he can do so without taking out a license or 
 giving bond, but when he elects to become a public warehouseman, 
 he can only handle the grain of the public. 
 
 As to your last question, submitted by Mr. -Coon, will say that the 
 grain department has from its organization inspected grain for all 
 persons calling for inspection. There is no statute requiring th& 
 department to do so, neither is there any statute prohibiting it. It 
 seems to be an unwritten law, which, by long established custom,, 
 has become the law of the department. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 
 Chairman
 
 295 
 
 INADEQUATE TRAIN SERVICE. 
 
 In our report for last year reference was made to the complainant 
 of citizens of Benton and other towns on the Belleville & Eldorado 
 division of the St. L. A. & T. H, R. R. Co., alleging insufficient train 
 service, which complaint was heard by the Commission at Benton, 
 Franklin county, on January 9 and 10, 1894. At the time of the 
 publication of our last report the case was pending in the Supreme 
 Court on an appeal from the Circuit Court of Franklin county. 
 
 The Supreme Court at its January term, 1896, handed down its 
 opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court, with instructions 
 to the lower court to award the writ of mandamus we give below the 
 full text of the opinion. 
 
 THE PEOPLE I 
 
 vs. > Appeal from 
 
 ST. Louis, ALTON & TERRE HAUTE R. R. Co. ) Franklin. 
 
 STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
 
 This is a petition for writ of mandamus in its amended form, 
 presented in the name of the People of the State of Illinois, at the 
 relation of William S. Cantrell, a citizen and property owner of Ben- 
 ton, Franklin county, Illinois, as the patron of the defendant railroad 
 company, the prayer of which petition is as follows: 
 
 "That a writ of mandamus b.e issued, delivered to the St. Louis, 
 Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company, commanding it to cause to 
 be furnished, placed, run and operated on said railroad, extending 
 from Eldorado to DuQuoin, a daily (Sundays excepted) passenger 
 train, each way, suitable and sufficient to carry all passengers with 
 their necessary baggage, in comfortable and reasonable security, and 
 at a reasonable speed, and to operate said line of railroad from East 
 St. Louis to Eldorado as a continuous line, and that upon final hear- 
 ing hereof, such further order be made in the premises as to the court 
 shall seem meet and proper." 
 
 The petition was answered by the respondent railroad company; 
 a replication was filed to the answer, except as to one paragraph 
 thereof which was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained; a jury 
 waived, and the cause was submitted by agreement for trial before 
 the Circuit Judge without a jury; the trial judge rendered judgment 
 refusing the prayer of the petition, and dismissing the same, from 
 which judgment the present appeal is prosecuted.
 
 296 
 
 A large amount of testimony, oral and documentary, was introduced 
 upon the hearing, including reports of the respondent company to 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners; the charter of the 
 Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company, as found on pages 485, 486 
 and 487 of the private Laws of 1861, and the lease executed by the 
 Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company to the respondent in 1880. 
 
 The petition avers that the railroad of the B. & E. R. R. Co. is 
 the only railroad in Franklin county, and also contains the following 
 averments: , . 
 
 "That on or about December 1, 1883, numerous citizens of said 
 towns of Benton, Eldorado, Christopher, Mulkeytown, Thompson- 
 ville and other towns along said line of railroad, presented petitions 
 to the said Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of the State of 
 Illinois, complaining of the train service on said railroad extending 
 from Eldorado to Duquoin, and setting forth the alleged facts relat- 
 ing thereto, and asking said Commission to take cognizance of their 
 complaint, and by appropriate order or orders, or by appropriate suit 
 or suits, compel the said St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad 
 Company to run its trains through from St. Louis to Eldorado as one 
 continuous line, and run a daily through passenger train, with appro- 
 priate connections with other trains at DuQuoin and Eldorado, and 
 give the public such further relief in the way of train service on said 
 railroad as justice and right demand. 
 
 "That thereupon said Commission gave notice to said railroad com- 
 pany of the presentation of said petition, and such action was there- 
 upon afterwards taken and had by such Commission, that on January 
 9 and 10, 1894, a hearing was had at Benton on said petition, at which 
 time and place said railroad company was present and represented 
 by its president, Hon. George W. Parker, and its counsel, F. M. 
 Youngblood, and said petitioners were represented by Hons. C. H. 
 Layman and D. R. Webb, and thereupon, after hearing and consider- 
 ing the evidence introduced by the petitioners and said company, the 
 said Commission made and promulgated the following order or 
 recommendation in the premises, to- wit: 
 
 "We therefore, recommend to you, the St. Louis, Alton & Terre 
 Haute Railroad Company, that you, without delay, cause to be placed 
 and operated on the Belleville & Eldorado Division of your road, in 
 addition to the mixed train now being operated by you on said line, 
 a daily passenger train, suitable and sufficient to carry all passengers 
 with their necessary baggage, in comfort and security, and at a rea- 
 sonable speed, and that you operate your said railroad from East St. 
 Louis to Eldorado as a continuous line, so that persons desiring to 
 leave Eldorado and intermediate points in the morning of each day 
 (Sundays excepted) may be able to go on said railroad to East St. 
 Louis and return the same day." 
 
 "That said St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Railroad Company has 
 wholly neglected to comply with said order, or follow said recom- 
 mendation, but, on the contrary, refuses to comply therewith, and 
 yet continues to run its said train as before, and still fails to accom- 
 modate the traveling public."
 
 297 
 
 Such other facts, set up in the pleadings and developed by the 
 proofs, as are necessary to an understanding of the question involved 
 are sufficiently stated in the opinion. 
 
 MAGRUDER J.: 
 
 The main question in this case is, whether a railroad company can 
 be compelled by mandamus to run a passenger train. The appellee 
 operates about fifty miles of railroad running from DuQuoin easterly 
 to Eldorado* which it leased in 1880 for 985 years from the Belleville 
 & Eldorado Railroad Company; and it is conceded that it runs no 
 passenger train, that is, no train for passenger service, exclusively, 
 over this distance of fifty miles between DuQuoin and Eldorado. 
 On Sunday and Monday evenings a train, consisting of a baggage 
 car and one passenger coach, runs from DuQuoin easterly to Benton 
 about 18 miles, returning from Benton to DuQuoin the next morning 
 about 4 o'clock, but the only train which runs the whole length of 
 the branch road between DuQuoin and Eldorado is what is called a 
 mixed train, consisting of coal, stock and freight cars, to which are 
 attached a combination car and a passenger coach. This mixed train 
 leaves DuQuoin daily at 11 o'clock A. M. for Eldorado, and return- 
 ing in the afternoon, arrives at DuQuoin at 7:10 P. M. Appellee 
 runs through trains from St. Louis by way of Belleville to DuQuoin; 
 but the mixed train in question does not connect at DuQuoin with 
 any of the passenger trains run by appellee from DuQuoin to St. 
 Louis, nor at Eldorada with with any of the trains upon the Cairo 
 Division of the C., C., C. & St. L. Railroad, or the Shawneetown 
 branch of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad. Passengers for St. 
 Louis or points west of DuQuoin must remain over night at Du- 
 Quoin and take the train next morning at 4:50 o'clock. 
 
 The mixed train carries freight, express, baggage, stock, mail and 
 passengers; on account of the freight carried and handled, it is a 
 slow train, being often behind its schedule time from twenty minutes 
 to three hours; during the busy season it often has to be cut in two 
 on the grades, one part going forward to a switch, and returning for 
 the balance cf the train, including the passenger coach; at Eldorado, 
 the entire train is often pushed in front of the engine down to the 
 depot; when the mixed train goes east, the passenger coach, which is 
 used by all classes of passengers, both ladies and gentlemen, is be- 
 tween the freight cars and the combination coach; the mixed train 
 has two brakemen, is operated by hand brakes, and has no air-brakes; 
 the regular passenger trains on the other parts of the road are 
 equipped with air-brakes operated from the engine; and the road bed 
 is dirt ballast, and the passenger car on the mixed train is dirtier and 
 dustier than the passenger cars on the west end of the road; there is 
 often an odor from the stock cars ahead of the passenger coach; it is 
 bad for ladies and children; the stock cars are frequently filthy and 
 offensive from the manure in them; the train is often delayed at the 
 station to take on and deliver freight; it is subject to jars that stag- 
 ger the passengers; much switching is done, and, when switching is 
 done at a station, the passenger coach is usually uncoupled; and pas- 
 sengers must wait while the cars are loaded with stock, cattle and 
 hogs, and are often inconvenienced by the gang planks thrown out.
 
 298 
 
 The country through which the mixed train passes is a farming- 
 country and well settled. The products shipped are mostly grain, 
 mill products and live stock, and the freight distributed along the 
 line is merchandise. St. Louis seems to be the commercial cente'r 
 for that part of the State. Of the counties through which the mixed 
 train runs Franklin county has a population of 17,138, Perry county 
 17,250, Saline county 19,342; and of the towns along the road. DuQuoin 
 has a population of about 5,000, Benton 1,200, Eldorado 2,000, Galatia 
 800, Thompsonville 500, Raleigh 500, Christopher 200, Mulkevtown 
 200. Improved lands in that section are worth from $20 to $50 per 
 acre. 
 
 Such being the character of the mixed train, and such being the 
 population and character of the territory through which the mixed 
 train runs, ought the appellee be required to furnieh the people with 
 a passenger train? The question is not whether appellee should run 
 more than one train, but the question is, whether it does all that it 
 is required to do when it runs a passenger coach attached to a freight 
 train, or whether it is its duty to run one or more passenger coaches,, 
 separate and disconnected from freight cars, for the accommodation 
 of passengers only and not of passengers in connection with shippers. 
 
 When it is sought by mandamus to compel a railroad company to 
 do any act in relation to the equipment and operation of its road, the 
 courts, as a general rule, will not interfere with its management of 
 its railway in these respects, except where the act sought to be en- 
 forced is specific, and the right to its performance in the manner 
 proposed is clear and undoubted. (The People ex. rel. vs. 0. & A. 
 R. R. Co., 130 111. 175.) Whether or not the People are here en- 
 titled to relief by mandamus against the appellee company must be 
 determined by the answer to the inquiry, whether the act sought to 
 be enforced is specific, and whether the right to a performance of 
 that act is clear and undoubted. 
 
 There can be no doubt about the clear legal duty of the appellee 
 to operate the railroad from DuQuoin to Eldorado, leased by it from 
 the Belleville & Eldorado Railroad Company. The act of February 
 12, 1855, to enable railroad companies to enter into corporate con- 
 tracts, and to borrow money, authorized railroad companies organ- 
 ized under the laws of Illinois to make contracts and arrangements 
 with each other, and with railroad corporations of other states, for 
 leasing or running their roads, or any parts thereof. (Starr & 
 Curtis, Stat. p. 1921.) In case of a lease, by one railroad company 
 to another, the lessee assumes the rights, franchises and obligations 
 contained in the charter of the lessor, and must conform to the re- 
 requirement of said charter. (1 Rorer on Railroads, p 610; 19 Am. 
 & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 897.) "And when one company leases its 
 road to another, the lessee must, in operating it, be governed by the 
 charter of the lessor." (City of Chicago vs. Evans, 24 111. 52.) 
 When, therefore, the appellee leased the road in question from the 
 B. & E. R. R. Company, it assumed the charter obligations of the 
 latter company, and agreed to conform to its charter requirements. 
 Section 1 of the act to incorporate the B. & E. R. R. Co., in forca
 
 299 
 
 February 22, 1861, declares, that the company shall possess all the 
 powers * * * * necessary to carry into effect the objects and 
 purposes of this act, which is to lay out, build, construct, equip, com- 
 plete and continue in operation a railroad from Belleville in St. 
 Glair county by way of Benton in Franklin county, and Galatia and 
 Raleigh and to Eldorado in Saline county; * * * and they may 
 make connections with any railroad on the line, or at either terminus, 
 on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon between the parties." 
 (Priv. Laws of 111. of 1861, p. 485). Section 4 of the act provides 
 that "said company shall have power, when in their discretion, they 
 have a sufficient amount of capital stock subscribed, to proceed to 
 lay out, locate, construct, build, equip, complete and operate their 
 their road." (Idem., p, 486.) 
 
 It will be noticed that the charter of the B. & E. R. R. Co. pro- 
 vides for the construction, equipment and operation of a railroad 
 "from Belleville in St. Clair county by way of Benton in Franklin 
 county and Galatia and Raleigh and to Eldorado in Saline county." 
 As a matter of fact, however, the B. & E. R. R. Co. never constructed 
 a road from Belleville to Eldorado. It constructed a road about 50 
 miles long from Eldorado to DuQuoin in Perry county, the latter 
 place being distant more than 56 miles from Belleville, and, as soon 
 as the road between DuQuoin and Eldorado was finished, and on 
 July 1, 1880, it leased the latter road to appellee. At that time ap- 
 pelle owned and operated a railroad running from East St. Louis, oppo- 
 site St. Louis, to Belleville, a distance of a little more than 14 miles, 
 and, prior to that time had leased for a long term of years the rail- 
 road of the Belleville and Southern Illinois Railroad Company, run- 
 ning from Belleville to DuQuoin, and was then operating the entire 
 line from East St. Louis to DuQuoin as one road, commonly known 
 as the "Cairo Short Line." 
 
 The lease made on July 1, 1880, by the B. & E. R. R. Co. to ap- 
 pellee recites the ownership by appellee of the road from East St. 
 Louis to Belleville, and its lease of the road from Belleville to 
 DuQuoin, and its operation of the two as one line; and also recites the 
 completion of the road from DuQuoin to Eldorado, and that it is 
 deemed and considered for the mutual interest of the parties hereto 
 (the. B. & E. R. R. Co. and appellee) "that said roads" (the three 
 roads) "should be placed under the same management and operated 
 as one line; and to that end, the party to the second part" (appellee) 
 "has agreed to lease from the party of the first part" (the B. & E. R. 
 R Co.) "its railroad from DuQuoin to Eldorado," etc. It thus ap- 
 peared from the recitals of the lease of July 1, 1880, that the object 
 of that lease was to so connect the road from DuQuoin to Eldorado 
 with the roads from East St. Louis to Belleville and from Belleville 
 to DuQuoin, as that the three roads could be operated as one line. 
 And so, although the B. & E. R. R. Co. did not construct a road from 
 Belleville to Eldorado as its charter provided, yet, by the connection 
 thus made with the road leased by appellee which ran from Belleville 
 to DuQuoin, it became a part of a continuous line from Belleville to 
 Eldorado, the terminal points named in its charter.
 
 300 
 
 As the B. & E. R. R. Co., the lessor company, was bound to equip 
 and operate its road, the appellee the lessee company, was also 
 bound to equip and operate the leased road. "Equipments as ap- 
 plied to railroads has deen defined to be 'the necessary adjuncts of a 
 railway, as cars, locomotives.' " (Rubey vs. Mo. Coal & Mining Co., 
 21 Mo App. 159; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, p. 655, n. 1.) Section 
 12 of Article 11 of the Constitution says: ''Railroads heretofore con- 
 structed, or that may hereafter be constructed, in this State are 
 hereby declared public highways, and shall be free to all persons for 
 the transportation of their persons and property thereon, under such 
 regulations as may be prescribed by laws. (1 Starr & Cur. Stat. p. 
 163.) It follows that the obligation to equip, and operate, and con- 
 tinue in operation, the leased road involved the obligation to furnish 
 and use cars and locomotives for the transportation of persons and 
 property, that is to say, for the carriage of both persons and freight. 
 Section 22 of the act of this State in relation to fencing and operat- 
 ing railroads, provides (2 Starr & Cur. Stat. p. 1940) that: 
 
 "Every railroad corporation in the State shall furnish, start and 
 run cars for the transportation of such passengers and property as 
 shall, within a reasonable time previous thereto, be ready or be of- 
 fered for transportation at the several stations on its railroad and at 
 the junction of other railroads, and at such stopping places as may 
 be established for receiving and discharging way passengers and 
 freight." It is claimed, however, in behalf of appellee, that while it 
 is obliged to furnish cars for the carriage of passengers, yet it is not 
 necessarily obliged to carry passengers upon a separate passenger 
 train; and that it has the right to exercise its own discretion as to 
 the manner of their transportation. The discretionary power of 
 railroad companies in this respect is subject always to the condition, 
 that there is no statutory provision limiting and restricting such 
 power, and that its exercise is not opposed to the terms of the char- 
 ter. (The People ex rel. vs. C. & A. R. R. Co., 130 111. 175; M. & O. 
 L. R. R. Co. vs. People, 13 111. 559; 2 Morawetz on Corp., 2d ed., 
 Sec. 1119.) 
 
 This discretion is also subject to the condition, that it must be 
 exercised in good faith and with a due regard to the necessities and 
 convenience of the public. (The People ex rel. vs. C. & A. R. R. 
 Co., supra.) 
 
 Counsel for appellant rely upon articles 1 and 6 of the lease of 
 July 1, 1880. Article 1 is as follows- 
 
 "The party of the second part shall have, possess and operate the 
 said railroad from DuQuoin to Eldorado for and during the term 
 hereinbefore mentioned upon the terms and conditions herein set 
 forth, and shall, at all times during the continuance of this lease, 
 furnish all necessary rolling stock and equipment for the complete 
 and perfect operation of the said demised railroad." And in the 
 sixth article, the defendant company covenants as follows: "The 
 said party of the second part shall and will, during the term hereby 
 granted, operate, maintain and keep in good repair the railroad and 
 premises hereby demised and shall from time to time make all nee-
 
 301 
 
 essary additions and improvements and shall and will indemnify and 
 save harmless the said party of the first part, its successors and as- 
 signs, from and against all costs, charges and expenses, damages and 
 liabilities whatsoever growing out of the maintaining, repairing, 
 operating, or using of the said road." Tnus, by the terms of the 
 agreement made for the connection of the road of the B. & E. R. R. 
 Co. with the roads of appellee, appellee was to operate the three 
 roads from East St. Louis to Eldorado as one road, and to "furnish, 
 all necessary rolling stock and equipment for the complete and per- 
 fect operation" of the road from DuQuoin to Eldorado. 
 
 But, independently of the provisions of the lease, which was a 
 contract between the lessor and lessee companies, the right of the 
 people to insist upon the running of a separate passenger train is- 
 implied from the charter obligation to equip and operate the road. 
 
 Inasmuch as a railroad company is bound to carry both passen- 
 gers and freight, the obligation of the appellee required it to furnish 
 all necessary rolling stock and equipment for the suitable and proper 
 operation of the railroad as a carrier of passengers no less than as a 
 carrier of freight. It can not be said that the carriage of passen- 
 gers in a car attached to a freight train is a suitable and proper oper- 
 ation of a railroad so far as the carriage of passengers is concerned. 
 The transportation of passengers on a freight train or on a mixed 
 train is subordinate to the transportation of freight, a mere incident 
 to the business of carrying freight. To furnish such cars as are nec- 
 essary for the suitable and proper carriage of passengers involves the 
 necessity of adopting that mode of carrying passengers which is best 
 adapted to secure their safety and convenience. This can be accom- 
 plished better by operating a separate passenger train than by oper- 
 ating a mixed train. That is to say, the duty of furnishing all nec- 
 essary rolling stock and equipment for the suitable and proper 
 operation of a railroad carrying passengers involves and implies the 
 duty of furnishing a train which shall be run for the purpose of 
 transporting passengers only, and not freight and passengers to- 
 gether. 
 
 Railroad corporations engaged in the transportation of passengers 
 for hire or reward are bound to the exercise of the highest degree of 
 care and diligence in the conduct of their business. "Their duties 
 and liabilities in this respect extend as well to the appliances used 
 as to the manner of using them. (2 Rorer on Railroads, pp. 948, 
 949.) But there are necessary differences between passenger and 
 freight trains. (2 Wood on Railroads, p. 1288.) These differences 
 need not be here noticed, but are well understood and easily recog- 
 nized. 
 
 Railroad companies are not required to adopt on freight or mixed 
 trains all the appliances which they use on passenger trains, but 
 they are merely required to use the highest degree of care consistent 
 with the practical operation of such trains. (Oviatt vs. Dakota 
 Cent. R. Co , 43 Minn. 300; 44 Am. & Eng. R. R. Co.'s 311.) When
 
 302 
 
 passengers are carried on freight or mixed trains, the care required 
 by the company, so far as such appliances are concerned, is such as 
 the nature of the train permits. (2 Wood on Railroads, p. 1268.) 
 
 And when a passenger rides on a freight or mixed train, he takes 
 upon himself the increased risk and lessened comfort which is inci- 
 dent thereto; nor has he the legal right to demand any other care in 
 the management of such a train than is requisite for that kind of a 
 train, or any other security than such a mode of conveyance affords. 
 (2 Rorer on Railroads, p. 947; C. & C. U. R. R. Co. vs. Fay, 16 III. 
 568; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. vs. Hazzard, supra.) 
 
 It follows, that when the only train operated by a railroad com- 
 pany is a mixed train, passengers, being unable to ride upon any 
 other kind of train, are forced to incur risk and submit to incon- 
 venience, which do not exist on a separate passenger train. Hence, 
 the operation of a railroad with a mixed train only is inconsistent 
 with the duty of furnishing such cars and locomotive as are necessary 
 to the suitable and proper operation of the railroad when engaged in 
 the passenger traffic. We are not unmindful of the fact that, within 
 certain limits, a discretion may be exercised as to what rolling stock 
 and equipment are necessary for the suitable and perfect operation 
 of a railroad carrying passengers. Where the mode of carrying 
 passengers is separate from the mode of carrying freight, the legiti- 
 mate exercise of discretion may begin. What we hold is, that there 
 can not be a suitable and proper operation of the railroad as a carrier 
 of passengers where the car in which it carries its passengers is part 
 of a freight train, because freight trains are inferior to passenger 
 trains, and travel in them attended with less comfort, convenience 
 and safety than travel in passenger trains. The inferiority of a 
 freight train to a passenger train as a mode of carrying passengers 
 is so obvious that no man of ordinary understanding would regard 
 the use of a freight train for the purpose of hauling a passenger car 
 as a suitable and proper operation of a railroad in the matter of 
 transporting passengers. 
 
 We are, therefore, of the opinion that the act here sought to be en- 
 forced the running of a passenger car or cars separately from freight 
 cars is sufficiently specific to be enforced by man<l(imus, and the 
 right to compel its performance is clear and undoubted, unless such 
 right is changed or modified by the decision of the question, whether 
 the expense of running such passenger car or train would be justi- 
 fied by the amount of business over the particular line or road run- 
 ning from DuQuoin to Eldorado. Counsel for appellee insists that 
 a railroad company is not bound to provide a separate passenger 
 train when its business is not sufficient to warranr it in doing so. 
 
 In O. & M. Ry. Co. vs. The People ex rel., 120 111. 200, where the 
 lower court awarded a 'mandamus upon a petition to compel a rail- 
 road company o repair and improve generally a certain portion of its 
 road, and to increase the trains thereon, we reversed the judgment, 
 and held that the writ was improperly issuer!, upon the grounds that 
 the business of the road did not pay the current expenses, that the 
 defendant was unable to perform the acts sought to be enforced, and
 
 303 
 
 that the requirement made upon the defendant was too general, and 
 involved too much discretion as to details; but it was there said, 
 that a railroad company could be compelled by mandamus to per- 
 form any specific duty which it owed to the public as owner or oper- 
 ator of its road, such as, operating its road as a continuous line and 
 running daily trains; and the following language was used: "It is 
 believed, however, no cause can be found which, in the absence of a 
 statutory requirement, has gone to the length of holding that a rail- 
 way company may be compelled by mandamus to increase the num- 
 ber of trains on its road, or to run daily a particular number of i trains 
 over its road; and we are satisfied there is no common law authority 
 for making such an order. Of course, where the charter of the com- 
 pany expressly requires that no less than a given number of trains 
 shall be run daily, the company may be compelled by mandamus to 
 perform this, like any other specific duty enjoined by its charter, or 
 t)y other statutory provision. ***** A company that runs 
 a daily passenger train each way over a road which can not, with 
 proper management, be made to keep up repairs and pay running ex- 
 penses, certainly does as much as the law requires of it, so far as 
 passenger trains are concerned." 
 
 There are several marked differences between the O. & M. Ry. Co. 
 case and the case at bar. Here the appellee does not run a daily 
 passenger train from DuQuoin to Eldorado. Here the charter en- 
 joins a duty which cannot be regarded as otherwise than specific in 
 view of the considerations already presented. Here it can not be said 
 that the appellee is financially unable to discharge the duty imposed 
 upon it by the law, and which it owes to the public. The learned 
 Circuit Judge before whom this case was tried below says, in his de- 
 cision of it, that "the defendant railway company is solvent and in a 
 prosperous condition, its net earnings last year being over $600,000 00, 
 a net income of about $3,000.00 per mile of road." After a careful 
 examination we are satisfied that the statement thus made is sus- 
 tained by the evidence. 
 
 When, however, it is said, that "the defendant railroad company" 
 has a net yearly income of $600,000 00, the reference is to the defend- 
 ant railroad company, of its branches or leased roads, as well as the 
 main stem. So far as appears from this record, the main road, owned 
 by appellee and operated under its own charter, is the short line run- 
 ning from St. Louis to Belleville; but besides the leased roads run- 
 ning from Belleville to DuQuoin and DuQuoin to Eldorado, appellee 
 aUo operates three other roads leased by it for a long term of years, 
 to-wit: The Belleville & Carondelet Railroad, a short road, about 17 
 miles long, running west from Belleville to East Carondelet, on the 
 Mississippi river; the St. Louis Southern Railroad, about 46 miles 
 long, which taps the said leased road that runs from Belleville to Du- 
 Quoin, at Pinckneyville about ten miles east or northeast of DuQuoin, 
 and runs from Pinckneyville to Marion; and the Chicago, St. Louis & 
 Pdducah Railway, about 52 miles long, running from Marion to 
 Brooklyn, on the Ohio river. The Balleville & Carondelet road was 
 not leased by appellee until June 1, 1893, and. therefore, but little 
 consideration can be given to it in making up the estimates of earn-
 
 304 
 
 ings and expenses as found in the record. The large net income re- 
 ferred to is based mainly upon the earnings of the other five roads 
 already mentioned. 
 
 It is said that the earnings of the Belleville & Eldorado Railroad, 
 running from DuQuoin to Eldorado, when that road is taken by itself 
 and considered separately, are not sufficient to justify the expense of 
 running a separate passenger train from DuQuoin to Eldorado. But 
 why should this branch be considered separately and by itself? Ap- 
 pellee operates its main road and its leased branches as one system, 
 and, e,s thus operated, the main road and its connections or branches 
 yield the net yearly income of about $600,000.00, already referred to. 
 All the divisions, which are entirely within the boundaries of the 
 State of Illinois, are mere feeders of the main road running from 
 East Si. Louis to Belleville, which is also in Illinois; and all the 
 leased roads above mentioned, except that running from East CJaron- 
 delet, are feeders of the road running from Belleville to DuQuoin. 
 The latter road and the B & E. R. R. are required by the charter of 
 the B. & E. R. R. Co., and by the terms of its lease, to, or agreeable 
 with, appellee, to be operated as one line, and such operation as one 
 continuous line is merely the carrying out of the original intention 
 of said charter, which provides for the operation of one continuous 
 line from Belleville to Eldorado. It is no more proper to select the 
 fifty miles from DuQuoin to Eldorada of this compact network of 
 roads, all operated under one system, and all contributing to the sup- 
 port of each other, as being deficent in the profits necessary to justify 
 a reasonably safe and convenient operation of passenger traffic, than 
 it would be to select any other portion of the line running from East 
 St. Louis to DuQuoin, and charge that portion with being deficient 
 in such profits. 
 
 If it be admitted that a railroad company is not bound to run a 
 separate passenger train when its business is not sufficient to warrant 
 it in doing so, we are confronted at this point with the question, 
 whether this doctrine refers to the business done by the main road 
 and other roads leased to it and connected with it, all of which are 
 operated, or are required to be operated, as one line, or whether it 
 can be made to refer to a small part of the continuous line or system 
 which happens to run through a section of country where the freight 
 is not so much, and the passengers are not so many, as in the case of 
 some other part of the line. We are of the opinion that the whole 
 business of the various parts operated as one line should be taken 
 into consideration where the circumstances are such as revealed by 
 this record. 
 
 The duty required of a railroad cempany in the matter of trans- 
 porting passengers is the duty to meet and supply the public wants. 
 Those wants are measured by the business actually done, or what it 
 could be clearly shown would be done if increased facilities were 
 granted. That there is here a public demand for passenger service 
 is shown by the fact that a passenger car is attached to a freight 
 train, and that passengers are invited to ride, and do ride, upon this 
 mixed train. It is not contended that appellee is not abundantly 
 able, out of the earnings realized by it from the system controlled by
 
 305 
 
 it, to pay the expenses of running a passenger car separately from 
 freight cars over the B. & E. R. R., and thereby save the traveling 
 public from the increased danger and inconvenience of taking pas- 
 sage on a freight train. Nor does it appear that such expense could 
 not be easily met by the earnings of the line running from East St. 
 Louis to Eldorado by way of DuQ.uoin. The following language, 
 used by the Supreme Court of the United States in St. John vs. Erie 
 Ry., 22 Wall., 136, is applicable here: 
 
 "The business of the road was a unit. If it had been disinte- 
 grated, as proposed by complainant, we apprehend that it would have 
 been found that the co-relation of the main stem and the branches 
 were such, and that the expenses and charges incident to the entire 
 business, and to those of the several parts, were so interwoven and 
 blended that an accurate ascertainment of the net profit of the main 
 line, and any of the auxiliaries taken separately from the rest, would 
 have been impracticable. An ancillary road may be short and yield 
 but little income, yet by reason of its reaching to coal fields, or from 
 other local causes, its contributions to other roads of the series may 
 be very large and profitable. Whether in this case the partial com- 
 putations insisted upon could or could not have been made, the pro- 
 cess was one upon which the company was neither bound nor had 
 the right to enter," 
 
 The reports made by appellee to the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 missioners for the years 1891, 1892 and 1893 show that it has never 
 kept a separate account of the actual earnings or expenditures of 
 the Road from DuQuoin to Eldorado; but has treated the line from 
 East St. Louis to Eldorado as one continuous line, making no dif- 
 ference in its accounts between the divisions from DuQuoin to Eldo- 
 rado and any other portion of the road. 
 
 In estimating the liabilities of the B. & E. R. R. Co., certain in- 
 debtedness, which is in the nature of preferred stock, is charged up 
 as a liability in the accounts produced to show that the obligations 
 of appellee are such as to relieve it from the duty of operating the 
 passenger train asked for. This is manifestly improper, because guar- 
 anteed or preferred stock is but a dividend and not a debt, and the 
 holder of a certificate for such stock can have no action against the 
 company as for a debt, but his right is to a dividend. (Taft, Trustee, 
 vs. H. P. & F. R. R. Co., 8 R. 1. 310; St. John vs. Erie Ry. Co. Supra; 
 1 Rorer on Railroads, p. 167.) 
 
 The object of incorporating railroad companies is to secure to the 
 the public increased facilities of transit from point to point and an 
 improved mode of carrying persons and property. Their public char- 
 acter is apparent from the fact that they are clothed with the power 
 of taking private property, through the exercise of the right of em- 
 inent domain. Prior to the adoption of the present constitution, mu- 
 nicipal corporations were authorized to aid in the construction of 
 railroads by subscriptions for their stock. As a matter of fact, Frank- 
 lin county, through which the B. & E. R. R. passes, subscribed 
 
 20 O
 
 306 
 
 $150,000 to its construction, of which indebtedness $37,000 is still 
 outstanding. Railroads are creatures of the law, and are entrusted 
 with the exercise of these sovereign powers to promote the public in- 
 terest, and are, therefore, bound to conduct their affairs in further- 
 ance of the public objects of their creation. The interest of stock- 
 holders in their profits is secondary, and, in the main, subsidiary to 
 the interest of the public. It is in view of their public character that 
 the courts are authorized to determine and enforce the public duties 
 enjoined upon them. The duties which they owe to the State and 
 the general public can not be shirked or evaded. (I. Wood on R. 
 R., p. 12 ;R. R. Commissioners vs. P. & O. C. R. R. Co., 65 Mo. 269.) 
 We do not think that there is here such insufficiency of business 
 or profits as to'present valid defense to the application of the people. 
 The writ of mandamus should issue as prayed for. 
 
 The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is 
 remanded to that court with directions to enter a judgment awarding 
 .the writ in accordance with the prayer of the petition. 
 
 Reversed and remanded with directions.
 
 307 
 
 COMPLAINTS. 
 
 No. 118. 
 
 Before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of 
 
 Illinois. 
 
 James Brown, of Dwight, 111., 
 
 v. 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. 
 
 Charging Extortion. 
 
 Filed December 14, 1894. 
 
 Hearing at Chicago, March 7 and 8, 1895. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, PECK, MILLER & STARR. 
 
 For Respondent, HON. WM. BROWN, General Solicitor. 
 
 Statement of the Case and Opinion, Filed October 1 5, 1895, 
 By W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 This is a complaint filed by Charles A. Mallory, as the represent- 
 ative of James Brown, a stock dealer of Dwight, Illinois, charging 
 the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company with extortion, in this, that 
 the respondent charged the complainant the sum of two dollars 
 as a terminal charge, in addition to the amount it was allowed to 
 charge under the schedule of rates fixed by the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission, on a car of hogs shipped by the said Brown on 
 said railroad on September 5, 1894, from Dwight, Illinois, a station 
 on the line of the Chicago & Alton Railroad, to Mallory, Sons & 
 Zimmerman, live stock commission merchants, at the Union Stock 
 Yards, in the city of Chicago.
 
 308 
 
 There is little controversy as to the main facts in this case. The 
 main and important question involved in the contention, to-wit: the 
 "two dollars terminal'' charge being admitted by respondent in its 
 answer to the complaint, but there is a most serious contention as ta 
 the right, under the law, to make this charge. 
 
 A case very similar was decided by Judge Grosscup in the United 
 States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on the 
 26th day of November, 1894, in the matter of the Union Trust Com- 
 pany of New York vs. Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Com- 
 pany, in which Judge Grosscup held that the two dollars terminal 
 charge imposed by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Company was 
 illegal, and entered an order that the "Receiver should discontinue 
 the levying of the additional charge, etc." This case is now pending 
 in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. 
 
 It is insisted by counsel for complainants that the case before the 
 Commission is on all fours with the Santa Fe case, while counsel for 
 respondent does not admit that the decision of Judge Grosscup is de- 
 cisive of this case. If there was nothing for the Commission to pass 
 on but this question, it would not give us much concern, but we are 
 asked to lay down a precedent which will affect every railroad that 
 brings live stock into Chicago. We are asked by counsel for com- 
 plainant to hold that this terminal charge of two dollars per car is 
 illegal and extortionate, and that it is a discrimination against the 
 live stock interests of Chicago. And while the respondent only an- 
 swers for itself, yet an order holding it liable in this case would have 
 the effect to hold that all railroads delivering stock to the Union 
 Stock Yards in the city of Chicago are also violating the law, because 
 they all have been making this terminal charge since June 1, 1894. 
 Prior to June 1, 1894, no charge was made for this extra service, be- 
 cause no charge was exacted by the Union Stock Yards and Transit 
 Company for the use of its tracks, but when the Union Stock Yards 
 and Transit Company imposed upon the railroads using their tracks 
 a charge of 40 cents per car each way, then the railroad companies 
 added this charge of two dollars per car, and called it in some in- 
 stances a "terminal charge" and in others "switching charge." In 
 the case now before us on the statement of billing it is called a "ter- 
 minal charge," while in the argument of counsel for respondent he 
 is pleased to call it a "switching charge." 
 
 The evidence shows the respondent has the license or right by con- 
 tract to use the tracks of the Union Stock, Yards and Transit Com- 
 pany for the purpose of delivering stock at the Union Stock Yards, 
 and returning to their own tracks, but no authority is shown by re- 
 spondent by which it is authorized to use these tracks for switching 
 purposes. It has been the custom of respondents for many years 
 when stock was shipped over its line to Chicago to deliver it at the 
 Union Stock Yards, and we feel warranted in saying it has been its 
 universal practice to deliver it there; that it has done so without 
 any directions from the shipper other than to have the agent of 
 respondent bill it to Chicago.
 
 309 
 
 The evidence also shows that respondent maintains an office at the 
 Stock Yards; that it has agents, telegraph operators, and other em- 
 ploye's necessary to properly conduct their live stock business at that 
 point; that chutes and pens known and designated as the "Alton 
 chutes" are set apart for it by the Stock Yards Company; that it de- 
 livers stock there with its own engine and crew, and that the Union 
 Stock Yards and Transit Company have nothing whatever to do with 
 the handling of cars of stock delivered at the Stock Yards. To all in- 
 tents and purposes, therefore, the tracks of the Union Stock Yards and 
 Transit Company, when being used by respondent within the scope 
 of its license or authority, is as much a part of its road as any part of 
 its main line. With this view of the case the question of delivery 
 beyond respondent's line, and the right to make an additional charge 
 for such service does not enter into this case. 
 
 Let us assume that the terminus of respondent's road was at a 
 point 2| miles from the city limits of Chicago, but that it had a 
 depot or station inside the city limits, within 3 miles from its 
 terminus, which it reached by running its trains over the tracks of 
 another company. It accepts for shipment a carload of merchandise 
 at East St. Louis to be delivered at Chicago, for which it charges 
 the maximum rate allowed by law to Chicago. Will it be insisted 
 that under such circumstances an additional charge of two dollars or 
 any other sum could be legally made because of the fact that the last 
 2f or 3 miles haul was made by the respondent over tracks that did 
 not belong to it, or which was beyond their terminus, and for the use 
 of which they had to pay trackage? We apprehend not. But, says 
 the learned counsel for respondent, to perform this service from 
 Brighton Park to the Stock Yards we are required to pay for the use 
 of the tracks in going and returning from the yards. That is true, 
 yet isn't it equally true in the illustration we have given that you 
 would also have to pay for the use of the tracks in getting to and 
 from your depot inside the city limits? It makes no difference so 
 far as it affects the right to make the two dollars charge what amount 
 respondent is required to pay for the use of its tracks to enable it to 
 discharge its duty to the public. Its undertaking was to deliver the 
 shipments in question at the Union Yards; its duty was to deliver it 
 there. The complainant, Brown, understood, as he had a right to 
 understand from the long established custom of respondent's, that it 
 would be delivered there It was in fact delivered there. The ser- 
 vice rendered was but a single service as much as a delivery from 
 station to station on its main line, for which the respondent had the 
 right to charge the maximum rate allowed by the law for the distance 
 this car was actually hauled by it and no more. 
 
 The fact that the complainant agreed by express contract to pay 
 an additional sum of two dollars as a switching charge, and did pay 
 it through his representative, is no excuse nor defense. It was not 
 within the power of the respondent by contract, agreement or other- 
 wise to burden the complainant with charges for services it was 
 bound to render without any other compensation than the legal 
 charges for transportation, and such contract is illegal and void.
 
 310 
 
 The distance from Dwight, the point of shipment, to Chicago, as 
 shown by respondent's official time table is 73.6 miles. The distance 
 from Dwight to Brighton Park, the junction of respondent and the 
 Stock Yard tracks, and the point where this shipment left the tracks 
 of the respondent, is 68. 5 miles. The distance from the junction of re- 
 spondent at Brighton Park to the Stock Yards, where the car of hogs 
 was unloaded, is If miles Therefore the actual distance respondent 
 hauled this stock was 70J miles. The maximum allowed respondent 
 for this service, if there was no terminal charges, would be $19.55 or 
 $1.15 per thousand pounds, while the amount actually charged, ex- 
 clusive of terminal charges, was $20.06, or $1.80 per thousand on a 
 basis of 75 miles haul. While this is prima facie a violation of the 
 statute, yet we do not believe it was intentional, but rather an error 
 of the agent at Dwight who made the billing, and we do not feel in- 
 clined to hold the respondent liable for it. If, however, we believed 
 that this over charge was made with the intention to disregard the 
 rate fixed by the Commission, we should not hesitate to invoke the 
 machinery of the law and prosecute the respondent for it, however 
 trifling the amount involved may be. 
 
 The evidence of the general manager of respondent, Mr. C. A. 
 Chappell, shows, that the respondent has a piece of ground 100 feet 
 wide by 200 feet long situated on their right of way between Joseph 
 and Mary streets in the city of Chicago, that it is fenced; that there 
 is a platform there; that the yards will hold about ten cars of stock; 
 that this enclosure has been there a good many years, probably ten 
 years; but there are no employe's of the road there; no food for live 
 stock there; no water there; that there has been no delivery of live 
 stock there for two or three years; that these pens were put there for 
 the accommodation of packing houses that were located near there, 
 but that some two or three years ago these packing houses, or a great 
 many of them, moved away, and no live stock has been delivered 
 there since; that these yards would not take care of their daily re- 
 ceipts; that the custom of respondent is, when live stock is consigned 
 to Chicago, to deliver it to the Union Stock Yards, and that this was 
 its practice prior to and since June 1, 1894; that no change in the 
 action of live stock shippers had anything to do with the imposition 
 of the terminal charge of two dollars. 
 
 The evidence further shows that respondent has delivered at the 
 Union Stock Yards, from 1889 to 1894, inclusive, 131,039 cars of live 
 stock, on an average of about 60 cars per day, Sundays included. In 
 the light of this evidence will it be seriously contended that the fa- 
 cilities at Joseph and Mary streets are either ample, suitable or suf- 
 ficient to accommodate the daily receipts of live stock shipped on re- 
 spondent's road to Chicago? We do not think so. As said by Judge 
 Grosscup: "The fact that the defendant may have some place on its 
 line of road in Chicago where stock could be delivered is not abso- 
 lutely controlling. The understanding of the carrier's undertaking 
 is derived from what the carrier commonly does. To circumvent 
 that understanding by a pretense of maintaining yards where they 
 are not used might be worse than bodily disregarding the law itself.'*
 
 311 
 
 The universality of delivery at a certain place may be the very 
 thing that constitutes that place the company's depot. 
 
 If the practice of the carrier is of such a character that the public 
 is reasonably led to understand a certain place to be the company's 
 depot, the carrier should be held to that understanding. Terminal 
 charges are allowed in particular cases where the delivery is to be 
 somewhere else than at the carrier's depot, but that does not allow 
 the carrier to establish its depot at some place oft' its line and then 
 add terminal charges. 
 
 The same may be said with reference to switching charges. There 
 is no more reason or right for adding an additional sum for "switch- 
 ing charges," under the facts of this case, than there is for making 
 the "terminal charges." Therefore, with our view of the law, it makes 
 no difference in this case whether the two dollar charge is called a 
 terminal or switching charge. Either is unwarranted and illegal. It 
 is the duty of the carrier, as said in the Covington Stock Yards case, 
 139 U. S., 128, to furnish facilities for loading, carrying and unload- 
 ing live stock, and its obligation is not discharged until the shipper 
 is furnished with proper facilities to unload. The carriage includes 
 the delivery, and there can be no delivery except at such place as is 
 suitable to the delivery of the particular thing carried." A delivery 
 of live stock unattended with suitable chutes, yards, etc., would be 
 no delivery at all. 
 
 There is no question in the minds of the Commission that the 
 stock pens at Joseph and Mary streets have long since been aban- 
 doned, and that the respondent has adopted the Union Stock Yards- 
 as its Chicago depot for delivering live stock, and that it has no other 
 facilities ample, suitable or sufficient in the city of Chicago for that 
 purpose. 
 
 We have carefully examined and considered the authorities cited 
 by counsel as well as many other cases not cited. We have given the 
 evidence such weight as it is entitled to, and have given the case 
 that degree of consideration which its importance demands, and we 
 have arrived at the following conclusions: 
 
 That the respondent is not entitled, under the laws and facts in this- 
 case, to charge any sum whatever in addition to the regular tariff 
 rate oh this shipment. 
 
 We therefore find that the allegation of complainant's, in so far as 
 it charges the respondent with extortion as to the terminal or switch- 
 ing charge, is true. 
 
 That the additional charge of two dollars made by respondent in 
 this case, whether it be called a terminal or a switching charge, is a 
 violation of the statute, that this charge is extortionate, and is there- 
 fore illegal and void. 
 
 We further find that the Union Stock Yards in the city of Chicago 
 has become by usage the Chicago depot or station of respondent for
 
 312 
 
 the delivery of live stock, and that the respondent has no other facil- 
 ities, ample, suitable or sufficient, in the city of Chicago that will ac- 
 commodate the daily receipts of live stock that are shipped over re- 
 spondent's road. 
 
 We further find that the service rendered in this case is but a 
 single service for which the respondent is allowed to make but a 
 single charge, and that charge should not exceed the maximum tariff 
 rate as fixed by the Commission, for the actual distance the shipment 
 was hauled by respondent. 
 
 OEDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission, that the respondent, the 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, be and they are hereby found 
 guilty of extortion in this, that they charged, collected and received 
 from the complainant, James Brown, the sum of two (2) dollars as a 
 terminal or switching charge, in addition to the amount it was 
 allowed to charge under the schedule of rates fixed by this Commis- 
 sion, on a car of hogs shipped by the said Brown on said railroad on 
 September 5, 1894, from Dwight, Illinois, a station on the line of the 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad, to Mallory Sons & Zimmerman, live stock 
 commission merchants, at the Union Stock Yards in the City of 
 Chicago, State of Illinois. 
 
 And it is further ordered by the Commission that the Attorney 
 General be, and he is hereby, requested to prosecute the said Chicago 
 & Alton Railroad Company for said extortion as provided by statute. 
 
 Adopted October 15, A. D. 1895. 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 THOMAS GAHAN, 
 
 GrEO. W. FlTHIAN, 
 
 Attest: Commissioners. 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, 
 
 Secretary.
 
 313 
 
 Nos. 122-134. 
 
 JOHN C. Ross AND JOHN HILL, JR., COMPOSING THE WAREHOUSE 
 COMMITTEE BOARD OF TRADE OF CHICAGO, 
 
 vs. 
 GEO. A. SEAVERNS ET AL. 
 
 Petition for Cancellation and Revocation of Public Warehouse 
 
 Licenses. 
 
 Filed March 8, 1895. 
 
 Hearing at Chicago, March 26 and April 3, 4 and 11, 1895. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioners, John Hill, Jr., Hon. H. S. Robbins. 
 
 For Respondents, Hon. J. R. Custer, Hon. James E. Munroe. 
 
 Respondents first filed a Plea to the Jurisdiction. 
 This was overruled in the following opinion by W. S. Cantrell, 
 
 Chairman. 
 
 "This is a complaint filed by a committee appointed by the Board 
 of Trade of the city of Chicago against the defendant and twelve 
 other public elevators of Class "A" located in the city of Chicago, 
 charging each of them with a violation of the R. R. & W. law by 
 .dealing either directly or indirectly in grain stored in their respect- 
 ive warehouses, by reason of which the complainants ask that the 
 license issued to the defendants be cancelled. The defendants file a 
 motion in each case in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction of the 
 Commission. The question to be passed on now is whether or not 
 this Commission has the power to investigate the charges contained 
 in the several complaints, and to make any order concerning the 
 same. 
 
 "To determine this question, we must have reference first to the 
 constitution, the organic law of the State, from which the powers of 
 the Commission are primarily derived. Article 13, section 1, defines 
 what are public warehouses. 
 
 "Section 2. Defines the duties of proprietors, managers, etc., of 
 such warehouses.
 
 314 
 
 "Section 3. Provides that the owners of property stored in any 
 warehouse shall at all times be at liberty to examine not only the 
 property stored but all books and records of such warehouse in re- 
 gard to such property. 
 
 "Section 4. Provides that all railroad companies and other com- 
 mon carriers on railroads shall weigh or measure grain at points 
 where the same is shipped and shall receipt for the full amount and 
 shall be responsible for the delivery of the same at the place of desig- 
 nation. 
 
 "Section 5. Provides for the delivery of such grain to the con- 
 signee or any elevator or public warehouse, provided the same can 
 be reached by any track owned, leased or used, or which can be used 
 by such railroad companies, and all railroad companies shall permit 
 connections to be made with their tracks for this purpose. 
 
 "Section 6. Provides that 'It shall be the duty of the General 
 Assembly to pass all necessary laws to give full effect to this article 
 of the Constitution, which shall be liberally construed so as to pro- 
 tect producers and shippers. And the enumeration of the remedies 
 herein named shall not be construed to deny to the General Assembly 
 the power to prescribe by law such other and further remedies as 
 may be found expedient, or to deprive any person of existing com- 
 mon law remedies.' 
 
 "Section 7. Provides that the General Assembly shall pass laws 
 for the inspection of grain for the protection of producers, shippers 
 and receivers of grain and produce. 
 
 "The Constitution, of which Article 13 is apart, was adopted May 
 13, 1870, ratified by the People July 2, 1870, and went into effect 
 August 8, 1870. 
 
 "On April 13, 1871, 'An act to establish a Board of R. R. & W. 
 Commissioners and to prescribe their powers and duties was passed 
 and approved and went into effect July 1, 1871. 
 
 "Section 11. Of said act Provides that said Commissioners shall 
 examine into the condition and management and all other matters 
 concerning the business of railroads and warehouses in this State so 
 far as the same pertains to the relations of such railroads and ware- 
 houses to the public, etc., and whether such warehouses, their officers, 
 managers, etc., comply with the laws of this State now in force or 
 which shall hereafter be in force concerning them. And whenever 
 it shall come to the knowledge, either upon complaint or otherwise, 
 or they shall have reason to believe that any such law or laws shall 
 have been or are being violated, they shall prosecute or cause them to 
 be prosecuted. 
 
 "Section 12. Provides that said Commissioners are hereby au- 
 thorized to hear and determine all applications for the cancellation 
 of warehouse licenses which -may be issued in pursuance of any law 
 of this State, and to adopt such rules concerning such hearing and 
 determination as may from time to time by them be deemed proper,
 
 315 
 
 and if upon such hearing it shall appear that any public warehouse- 
 has been guilty of violating the law concerning the business of such 
 public warehousemen, said Commissioners may cancel and revoke 
 the license of such warehousemen. 
 
 "It will be observed that there is no provision whatever in this act 
 requiring public warehousemen to take out a license, the only refer- 
 ence to the question of license being found in section 12 last above 
 quoted. Therefore we are relegated to the following act for author- 
 ity to license public warehouses, 'An Act to regulate public ware- 
 houses, and the warehousing and inspection of grain, and to give- 
 effect to Article 13 of the Constitution of this State.' This act was 
 approved April 25, 1871, and in force July 1, 1871. 
 
 "Section 1. Provides that the property lessee or manager, before 
 transacting any business, shall first obtain a license from the Circuit 
 Court of the county in which such warehouse is located and that 
 such license shall be revokable by the court upon proof of the viola- 
 tion of law. 
 
 "Section 4. Provides that licensee shall give bond. 
 
 "Section 5. Provides that any person who shall transact the busi- 
 ness of a public warehouse of Class "A" without first having obtained 
 a license, or who shall continue to transact any such business after 
 such license shall have been revoked, shall be fined. 
 
 "The question now recurs upon the construction of the two acts 
 above referred to. Do they conflict? Is either repugnant to the 
 other? 
 
 "The statute should be so construed that the whole, if possible, 
 shall stand when it can be so construed and applied as to avoid a 
 conflict with the Constitution, such construction must be adopted 
 Porter v. R. I. & St. L. R. R., 76 111., 561. 
 
 "In the construction of statutes all of the provisions are taken to- 
 gether in ascertaining the intention of the law-giver. Davis v. 
 Haydon, 3 Scam., 35. 
 
 "A section of a statute will be construed with reference to the pro- 
 visions of other sections relating to the same subject and so as to 
 leave all the words in the different sections in full effect according 
 to their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Thompson vs Bui- 
 son, 78 111. 277. 
 
 "In construing statutes we must be governed by the intention of 
 the Legislature. 
 
 "The law does not favor a repeal by implication. The earliest 
 statute continues in force unless the two are clearly inconsistent 
 with and repugnant to each other, or unless in the latest statute 
 some express notice is taken of the former, plainly indicating an 
 intention to repeal it. 
 
 "Ottawa vs. LaSalle Co., 12 111., 339. 
 
 "Where two acts are seeminly repugnant they should, if possible, 
 be so construed that the latter may not operate as a repeal of the 
 former by implication.
 
 316 
 
 "Bruce us. Schuyler, 4 Gibn., 221. 
 
 "Town of Ottawa vs. LaSalle Co., 12 111., 339. 
 
 "So a subsequent statute which is general does not abrogate a 
 former statute which is particular. And a general law does not 
 operate as a repeal of a special law on the same subject passed at the 
 same session. 
 
 "Id: Covington vs. City of E. St. Louis, 78 111., 548. 
 
 "But whenever a reasonable construction can be given by which 
 both acts may stand, it will be done. 
 
 "Cord vs. McCaleb, 69 111., 314. 
 "Chicago vs. Quimby, c)8 111., 274. 
 
 "While the first act referred to gives the Board of Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners the authority to cancel or revoke the 
 license issued to public warehousmen, it does not in express terms 
 provide for or require a license. 
 
 "The second act, however, cures this defect by requiring public 
 warehousemen to take out a license, and also provides that the same 
 power to whom is delegated the authority to grant the license 
 shall have power in a proper case to revoke it. But construing both 
 acts together, there is no question in the minds of the Commission 
 but that either the Circuit Court granting the license, or the Board 
 of Commissioners, who ha* T e the power to determine by investiga- 
 tion whether either of said acts have been violated, either has the 
 power to cancel or revoke such licenses. Their powers are concur- 
 rent in that respect. 
 
 "We are not unmindful of the general common law docrine that 
 the authority to issue a license carries with it the power to revoke it, 
 but in the case presented there is special statute extending this 
 power to the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners, 
 thereby enlarging the common law, and we are not left to speculate 
 or surmise as to the intention of the Legislature in enacting the 
 statute, as it is explicit. The constitutionality of this law has been 
 passed upon by the Supreme Court of this State and by the United 
 States Supreme Court, in the case of Munn et al. vs. The People, in 
 which both courts held the act constitutional. 
 
 "The acts of April 13 and 25 both became operative on the same 
 day, notwithstanding they were passed and approved on different 
 da3 r s; therefore, unless there is a conflict, repugnance or inconsis- 
 tency between the two acts, there can be no reason for holding 
 either void, but both must be held to be in force. 
 
 "For the reasons above stated, the motion to dismiss is overruled." 
 
 Evidence was then heard and the cases taken under advisement 
 by the Commission. 
 
 On the 23d day of September the following opinion was filed and 
 -adopted by the Commission. 
 
 Opinion by W. S. Cantrell, Chairman:
 
 817 
 
 "On March 8, 1895, John C. Ross and John Hill, Jr., members of 
 the Warehouse Committee of the Board of Trade of the city of Chi- 
 cago, filed in the office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 of Illinois, at Springfield, complaints against the following public 
 elevators or warehousemen of Class 'A' doing business in the city 
 of Chicago, to- wit: 
 
 " 'Geo. A. Seaverns, Chas. Counselman & Co., South Chicago 
 Elevator, Santa Fe Elevator, Central Elevator, Keith & Co., Chicago 
 Elevator Co., National Elevator & Dock Co , Chicago & Pacific Ele- 
 vator Co., A. C. Davis & Co., Chicago Railway & Terminal Elevator 
 Co., Armour Elevator Co., and Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 
 charging, in substance, that each and every one of said elevators 
 were operated as public warehouses of Class 'A' under a license 
 from tho Circuit Court of Cook county, and that the said owners, 
 proprietors or managers of said respective warehouses or elevators,, 
 and each of them, had been guilty of violating the laws of the State 
 of Illinois, in that they and each of them did either directly or in- 
 directly buy, sell, own and deal in grain stored in said elevators, and 
 that they and each of them mixed the grain owned by them with 
 the grain of other persons stored by them in said elevators. And 
 that said warehousemen were transacting their business for private 
 gain, and not for the public good, and asking that the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission cancel and revoke the license of each of said 
 elevators.' 
 
 "These cases were set down to be heard at the Palmer House, 
 Chicago, at the request of the counsel representing complainants- 
 and respondents, for April 4, 1895. On the hearing counsel for res- 
 pendents filed a motion in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction of 
 the Commission, which was overruled. A large number of witnesses 
 were introduced on the part of the complainants. Also a large 
 amount of documentary evidence. No evidence whatever was intro- 
 duced by the respondents. Counsel for respondents insisting that 
 the Commission had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the ques- 
 tions involved in the complaints. There is no controversy as to the 
 facts in these cases, sufficient evidence having been introduced to 
 make out the charges contained in all the cases, with the exception 
 of the Armour Elevator Co., A. C. Davis & Co., The Chicago Rail- 
 way Terminal Elevator Co. and the Illinois Trust & Savings Bank. 
 The facts being settled, then the only remaining question to be de- 
 termined, has the Commission the power to hear and determine the 
 charges contained in the several complaints, and to make an order 
 concerning the same? 
 
 "The Constitution, the organic law of the State, from which the 
 powers of the Commission are primarily derived, defines public 
 warehouses to be 'All elevators or storehouses where grain or other 
 property is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored 
 be kept separate or not.' See Art. 13, Sec. 1. 
 
 "Section 2 defines the duties of proprietors, managers, etc., of such 
 warehouses.
 
 318 
 
 "Section 3 provides that the owner of property stored in any 
 warehouse shull at all times be at liberty to examine, not only the 
 property stored, but all books and records of such warehouse in re- 
 gard to such property. 
 
 "Section 4 provides that all railroad companies and other common 
 carriers on railroads shall weigh or measure grain at points where it 
 is shipped, and receipt for the full amount, and shall be responsible 
 for the delivery of the same at the place of destination. 
 
 "Section 5 provides for the delivery of such grain to the consignee 
 thereof, or any elevator or public warehouse to which it may be con- 
 signed: Provided, such consignee or the elevator or public ware- 
 house can be reached by any track owned, leased, or used, or which 
 can be used by such railroad companies, and all railroad companies 
 shall permit connections to be made with these tracks for this pur- 
 pose. 
 
 "Section 6 provides that 'It shall be the duty of the General As- 
 sembly to pass all necessary laws to give full effect to this article of 
 the constitution, which shall be liberally construed, so as to protect 
 producers and shippers? 
 
 "Section 7 provides that the General Assembly shall pass laws for 
 the protection of producers, shippers and receivers of grain, etc. 
 
 "The constitution, of which article 13 is a part, was adopted May 
 13, 1870, ratified by the people July 2, 1870, and went into effect 
 August 8, 1870. 
 
 "On April 13, 1871, an act to establish a Board of Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners, and to prescribe their powers and duties, 
 was passed by the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, ap- 
 proved by the Governor, and went into effect July 1, 1871. 
 
 "Section 1 provides for the appointment and defines the term of 
 the Commission. 
 
 "Section 2, the qualification of the Commissioners. 
 
 "Section 3, the oath and bond. 
 
 "Section 4, the compensation, etc. 
 
 "Section 5, 6, 7 and 8 are applicable to railroads only. 
 
 "Section 9 provides that it shall be the duty of every owner, lessee 
 and manager of every public warehouse in this State to furnish in 
 writing, under oath, at such times as the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commissioners require and prescribe, a statement concerning the 
 condition and management of his business as such warehouseman. 
 
 "Section 10 provides that the Commissioners shall report to the 
 Governor. 
 
 "Section 11 provides that said Commissioners shall examine into 
 the condition and management and all other matters concerning the 
 business of railroads and warehouses in this State so far as the same 
 pertains to the relation of such railroads and warehouses to the pub- 
 lic. * * * And whether such railroads and warehouses, their 
 officers, directors, managers, lessees, agents, etc., comply with the 
 law concerning them.
 
 319 
 
 "Section 12 provides that said Commissioners are hereby author- 
 ized to hear and determine all applications for the cancellation of 
 warehouse licenses which may be issued in pursuance of any laws of 
 this State, and for that purpose to make and adopt such rules and 
 regulations as may by them be deemed proper. And if upon such 
 hearing it shall appear that any public warehouseman has been 
 guilty of violating any laws of this State concerning the business of 
 public warehouses, said Commissioners may cancel and revoke the 
 license of said public warehouseman. 
 
 "On April 25, 1871, there was passed by the General Assembly, 
 and approved by the Governor, 'An act to regulate public warehouses, 
 and the warehousing and inspection of grain, and to give effect to 
 article 13 of the constitution of this State,' in force July 1, 1871. 
 
 "Section 1 provides that public warehouses shall be divided into 
 three classes A, B and C. 
 
 "Section 2 defines a public warehouse of class 'A' to be all ware- 
 houses, elevators, etc., in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which 
 the grain of different owners is mixed together, or in which grain is 
 stored in such a manner that the identity of different lots or parcels 
 <jan not be accurately preserved. Such warehouses, etc., being 
 located in cities having not less than 100,000 inhabitants. * * * 
 
 "Section 3 requires the lessee or manager, before transacting any 
 business in such warehouse, to take out a license from the Circuit 
 Court of the county in which such warehouse is located, and that 
 such license shall be revocable by the court upon proof of the viola- 
 tion of law. 
 
 "Section 4 provides that licensee shall give bond for the faithful 
 performance of his, duty as a public warehouseman of class 'A.' 
 
 "Section 6 provides that such warehouseman shall receive for 
 storage any grain that may be tendered him, * * * not making 
 any discrimination between persons. 
 
 "The two acts of the General Assembly above referred to were 
 enacted for the purpose of giving effect to article 13 of the constitu- 
 tion, and although both operative on the same day, they were passed 
 and approved on different days. Therefore, unless there is a plain 
 conflict, repugnance or inconsistency between the two acts, there is 
 no reason or authority for holding either void, but both must be sus- 
 tained. It is insisted by counsel for respondents that these com- 
 plaints should have been filed in the Circuit Court instead of being 
 brought before the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. While it 
 is doubtless true that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction in such cases, 
 yet it is equally true that the same jurisdiction is given the Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission, and parties complainant have the right 
 under the law to file their complaint either with the Circuit Court or 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. Or, in other words, they 
 have the right to select either forum in which they may be heard. 
 
 "It is manifest that the intention of the Legislature in passing 
 these acts was to give more definite expression to article 13 of the 
 constitution, and instead of circumscribing those for whose benefit
 
 320 
 
 the law was intended, to- wit: producers and receivers of grain, and 
 confining them within narrow limits, they gave them the option to 
 have their complaints heard either in the Circuit Court or before the 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission, the jurisdiction of either in 
 cases under these acts being concurrent. 
 
 "It is a well settled rule in the construction of statutes that all the 
 provisions of an act should be taken together, and where two acts on 
 the same subject have been passed by the Legislature at the same 
 session, they must both stand, unless there is clearly a conflict, re- 
 pugnance or inconsistency between them. The law does not favor a 
 repeal by implication. Ottawa vs. LaSalle County, 12 111., 339. A 
 general law does not operate as a repeal of a special law on the same 
 subject passed at the same session. Covington vs. City of East St. 
 Louis, 78 111., 548; Chicago vs. Quimby, 38 111., 274; Cord vs. Mc- 
 Caleb, 69 111., 514. Numerous authorities could be cited sustaining 
 this rule of construction of statutes, but it is so well settled that 
 further citations are unnecessary. 
 
 "Therefore, the opinion of the Commission is that it has jurisdic- 
 tion of the subject matter and of the parties in these proceedings, 
 and has the power to hear and determine applications for the can- 
 cellation and revocation of the licenses of warehousemen of class 
 'A' or public warehousemen. 
 
 "The question of jurisdiction being disposed of, the next question 
 involved is, 'Have the proprietors, managers or lessees of public 
 warehouses the right, under the law, either directly or indirectly, to 
 buy or sell grain and handle the same through their own public 
 warehouses, and mix the same with the grain of their customers?' 
 
 "This question was before the Commission on a former occasion 
 before any formal complaints had been filed, and was answered by 
 the chairman of the Commission in the negative. A thorough and 
 careful examination of the authorities on this subject since the cases 
 herein were submitted confirms the position assumed, and we now 
 affirm it. 
 
 "It will be borne in mind that all references to warehouses or ware- 
 housemen in this opinion are confined to warehouses and warehouse- 
 men of class 'A.' 
 
 "A public warehouseman for the storage -of grain is engaged in a 
 public employment and occupies a position similar to other public 
 servants. Before transacting any business in his warehouse he is 
 required to obtain a license from the Circuit Court of the county in 
 which his warehouse is located, and to give a bond in the sum of ten 
 thousand ($10,000) dollars for the faithful discharge of his duties. 
 Why are these requirements necessary? Because he is dealing with 
 the public, and the object of this law is to 'protect the public.' If a 
 warehouseman other than of class 'A' desires to buy, sell or store 
 grain on his own account in his private warehouse, he can do so 
 without license or bond. But when he opens a public warehouse he 
 is required by law to receive grain from all persons upon equal terms 
 and without discrimination, for which service he is allowed a com- 
 pensation. Will it be seriously contended for a moment that the
 
 321 
 
 Legislature intended to give him the right to store his own grain in 
 his own public warehouse and mix it with the grain of his customers, 
 and to receive grain from himself and issue receipts to himself for 
 his owm grain, and lastly, charge himself for the storage of his own 
 grain in his own warehouse? We think that such a contention 
 would not be seriously urged. 
 
 "The Legislature has placed certain restrictions upon public ware- 
 housemen; it has regulated their charges for storage so that the 
 warehouseman shall not practice extortion upon his customers; it has 
 prohibited him from mixing grain of different grades together, and 
 he is not permitted to tamper with the grain while in his possession 
 or custody. Such regulations would not be necessary only for the 
 fact that he is the custodian or bailee for the owner of the grain 
 stored, and it his duty to take care of said grain for the owner. The 
 object of this law is to protect producers and shippers against exor- 
 bitant charges on the part of warehousemen, against unjust discrim- 
 ination and against all species of fraud. Munn vs. The People. 
 
 "Our decision therefore is that public warehousemen can not, un- 
 der the law. either directly or indirectly, buy or sell grain and handle 
 the same through their own public warehouse; that to do so is against 
 not only the letter but the spirit of the law; that it is against public 
 policy; that it is a discrimination against the public, and that it af- 
 fords an opportunity to practice frauds upon those dealing with such 
 warehouses. 
 
 "An order will therefore be made revoking and cancelling the li- 
 cense of each of the following warehouses, viz: Geo. A. Seaverns, 
 South Chicago Elevator, Santa Fe Elevator, Rock Island Elevator, 
 Central Elevator, Keith & Co., Chicago Elevator Co., National Ele- 
 vator & Dock Co., and the Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co. 
 
 Entered this 23d day of of September, A. D. 1895. 
 " (SEAL] W. S. CANTRELL, 
 
 "Attest: Chairman. 
 
 "J. W. YANTIS, Secretary." 
 
 The case against the Illinois Trust and Savings Bank was dis- 
 missed by the complainants before the hearing. 
 
 The cases of the Armour Elevator Company, the Chicago Railway 
 Terminal Elevator Company and A. C. Davis & Company were con- 
 tinued pending an application to the Circuit Court of Cook county 
 for attachments for witnesses who had refused to appear and testify 
 before the Commission in pursuance of process of subpoena issued 
 by the Board and served on them. 
 
 Upon the promulgation of the order above referred to common 
 law writs of certiorari were sued out of the Circuit Court of Cook 
 county in all the cases in which orders were made, except the case of 
 the National Elevator & Dock Company, which has taken no steps 
 in the matter. These cases were heard before Judge Tuthill, of the 
 Circuit Court of Cook county, and taken under advisement by him. 
 
 21 O
 
 322 
 
 No. 136. 
 
 O. L. Brining, of LeRoy, Illinois, 
 
 v. 
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Company. 
 
 Refusal to Switch Cars at LeRoy. 
 
 Filed June 1, 1895. 
 
 Hearing at Springfield, September 3, 1895. 
 
 APPEARANCES : 
 
 For Petitioner, O. L. BRINING. 
 
 For Respondent, HON. H. J. HAMLIN, of Counsel. 
 
 Opinion filed November 7, 1895. 
 
 Opinion by GEORGE W. FITHIAN, Commissioner. 
 
 This is a complaint by O. L. Brining, of LeRoy, Illinois, against 
 the C., C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., alleging a refusal to switch a car of 
 coal at LeRoy, Illinois. 
 
 The proof in this case shows that the complainant purchased a car 
 of coal and had it shipped to him over the Illinois Central Railroad 
 to LeRoy. While the car was in transit the complainant sold it to 
 Cleary & Payne, to be delivered at their place of business, located on 
 a switch of the C., C., C. & St. L. R. R. Co., at LeRoy, Illinois. The 
 car was delivered by the Illinois Central R R. Co. to complainant 
 at LeRoy, and then placed on the "Y" or transfer track, which was a 
 common track used by the trains of both the Illinois Central and the 
 C., C., C. & St. L. railroad companies. After the car was placed on 
 the track the complainant tendered the agent of the C., C., C. & St. 
 L. R. R. Co. $2.00, which is the maximum switching charge fixed by 
 this Commission, and requested him to have the car switched to 
 Cleary & Payne at their place of business. The agent of respondent 
 refused to switch the car, stating that the proper officers had told 
 him not to switch it, and that he had been instructed to refuse to 
 switch cars to industries on the Fig Four which came in over the 
 Illinois Central.
 
 323 
 
 Rule 21 of this Commission fixes the maximum rate for switching 
 loaded cars for distances not exceeding three miles at $2.00 per car, 
 and defines switching to be "the hauling of loaded cars from the sta- 
 tion yards, side tracks, elevators or warehouses to the junctions of 
 other railroads, when not billed from stations on its own road to said 
 junction, and from the junctions of other railroads to the stations, 
 side-tracks, elevators and warehouses situated on the tracks owned or 
 controlled by the company doing said switching; it is that transfer 
 charge ordinarily made for moving loaded cars for short distances for 
 which no regular waybill is made, and which do not move between 
 two regularly established stations on the same road." 
 
 The complainant testified on the hearing of this case before this 
 Commission that the respondent discharged freight at the place of 
 business of Cleary & Payne, the place where he, Mr. Brining, 
 wanted the car switched, and that it also at times received small con- 
 signments of lumber and other freight at that place. 
 
 When this Commission adopted Rule 21 it evidently was of the 
 opinion that railroad companies were required, -under the law, to 
 perform just such service as was demanded by the complainant of the 
 respondent railroad company. 
 
 This Commission, as formerly constituted, in the case of the Union 
 Brewing Company, of Peoria, Illinois, vs. the Chicago, Burlington & 
 Quincy Railroad Company, practically decided the question involved 
 in this case. In that opinion the Commission said: "The principle 
 upon which the distinction should be made between the obligation 
 to haul one mile and the obligation to haul ten is very difficult to 
 perceive; and the interests of a patron might become as vitally in- 
 volved in the one service as the other. If one wishes a switching 
 service only, and is willing to pay for it, why can he not command 
 the service?" 
 
 On the hearing of this case it was admitted by counsel for re- 
 spondent that the maximum rate fixed by this Commission of $2.00, 
 which amount was tendered by complainant to the agent of re- 
 spondent for switching this car, was fair and reasonable compensa- 
 tion for the service. 
 
 On September 29, 1891, W. S. Weed, General Freight Agent of 
 the Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City Railroad, in a communication 
 to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, stated that: "At 
 Cowden, 111., the O. & M. takes the stand that while they are required 
 to switch loaded cars from us to be unloaded on their tracks, they do 
 not understand that it is obligatory for them to switch empty cars to 
 their side-tracks to be loaded for shipment via our line," and asking 
 for a full interpretation of the law as it affects the matter of switch- 
 ing at junction points. 
 
 On November 3, 1891, F. E. Fisher, General Freight Agent of the 
 St. Louis, Alton & Springfield Railroad Company, in a letter to the 
 Commission stated that: "At Alton, 111., The Alton Lime & Cement 
 Works are located on our tracks, and can only be reached by other 
 companies through our switching their cars. This company furnishes
 
 324 
 
 lime to the Springfield Gas Company, who have all the shipments 
 routed via the C. & A. R. R., notwithstanding the fact that we 
 agreed and are willing to meet any rate the C. & A. R. R. makes." 
 
 On May 26, 1892, Mr, Luther Pennington filed complaint with this 
 Commission against the C. & A. Railroad Company for refusing to 
 switch cars delivered at Joliet over other lines to points on the C. & 
 A. road, and stated that in interviews with the General Manager, C. 
 H. Chappell, that he had been informed that industries on the C. & 
 A. must buy their coal from mines situated on the C. & A. 
 
 All these communications were referred by the Commission to 
 Hon. George Hunt, then Attorney General, for his opinion. The 
 Attorney General, on the 20th of June, 1892, rendered his opinion to- 
 the Commission, from which we quote the following: 
 
 "While the questions submitted differ in some particulars, they 
 all relate to the subject of switching cars by a railroad company at a 
 junction point, which cars have been or are to be transported over a 
 line of railroad controlled by another company. 
 
 "In my opinion it is the duty of every railroad company which ia 
 doing a general railroad business to haul all cars, loaded or unloaded, 
 properly delivered to it or required to be hauled over its line or a 
 part thereof for the carriage of freight either for another railroad 
 company or for a private patron. 
 
 "The railroad company can not compel the public to patronize its 
 line either by a refusal to deliver cars to another railroad, as in the 
 "Bluff Line" case, or by a refusal to receive them, as in the Penning- 
 ton case at Joliet. The patron may select his carrier, and the railroad 
 company is bound to carry for all those offering freight demanding 
 service, and can not discriminate by refusing to carry, on the ground 
 that the commodity would come into competition with like commod- 
 ities or industries on its own line, or that it would lessen the de- 
 mand for commodities that might otherwise be carried over its own 
 line. 
 
 "So in the matter inquired about by Mr. W. S Weed, concerning 
 the duty of the O. & M at Cowden, I am of the opinion that it is the 
 duty of the O. & M. Railway Company to switch empty cars, de- 
 livered to it at the junction, to its side-track, as requested, to b& 
 there loaded for shipment over another line, and to return them to 
 the connecting road, as well as to receive loaded cars to be unloaded 
 at its side-track. 
 
 "In the 'Bluff Line' case, I think the shipper may select the line 
 over which he will ship the lime referred to, and if he prefers the C. 
 & A. line, it is the duty of the 'Bluff Line' to deliver the cars to the 
 C. & A. as requested, and the 'Bluff Line' can not compel the ship- 
 ment of the lime over its road by refusing to switch the cars to the 
 other road. 
 
 "In the matter of the complaint of Luther Pennington, at Joliet, 
 the statement is indefinite as to the distance the cars had to be hauled 
 by the C. & A. R. R. Co. The railroad company, however, it appears, 
 refuses to haul the cars furnished by Pennington on any terms; and
 
 325 
 
 in this case, it seems to me the railroad company refuses to perform 
 a plain duty. The apparent object of the refusal is to compel the 
 purchaser of coal, to whom Pennington desires to deliver it, to pur- 
 chase coal which shall be shipped over the line of the C. & A. Rail- 
 road, and from a mine located on that road. The public can not be 
 coerced in this matter to patronize any particular mina or line of 
 railroad. It is the duty of the company to take the coal offered to 
 it at its junction of another road, to be delivered at any point for the 
 delivery of coal on its road. Whether the service which it is required 
 to perform is such as to amount to a 'haul,' or is only 'switching,' 
 should be determined by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 
 and a reesonable maximum charge for such service should also be 
 fixed by that body. 
 
 "In the matter of the Mexican Amole Soap Company vs. P. & P. 
 U. et al., decided February 1, 1895, the Commission here held, under 
 the facts in that case, that one railroad company could not be com- 
 pelled, under the law, to furnish terminal facilities for another. The 
 question in that case was not whether one railroad company could 
 be compelled to switch cars for another, but whether one railroad 
 company could be compelled to furnish terminal facilities for an- 
 other. The facts presented in the case now under consideration are 
 essentially different from the facts presented in the case last above 
 referred to. 
 
 "The Commission is therefore of the opinion that it was the duty 
 of the respondent to perform the switching service demanded by the 
 complainant. But the statute fixes no fine or penalty for refusing to 
 switch cars, and from a careful examination of the statute it is evi- 
 dent that the prosecutions which it is incumbent upon this Commis- 
 sion to institute and conduct are prosecutions for those penalties de- 
 nounced by the statute against railroad companies for violation of 
 the several provisions of the railroad and warehouse law. 
 
 "The complainant must seek his remedy in a civil action for dam- 
 ages, or by writ of mandamus to compel the switching of cars." 
 
 At a meeting of the Commission at Springfield on the 7th day of 
 November, A. D. 1895, the above opinion was concurred in by the 
 Commission, and decision is rendered accordingly. 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 THOS. GAHAN, 
 Attest: GEO. W. FITHIAN, 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary. Commissioners.
 
 326 
 
 INTERLOCKING. 
 
 No. 19. 
 
 THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 THE LAKE ERIE & WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Eespondent 
 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSING PAXTON, ILL. 
 
 Petition filed July 1, 1895. Crossing viewed July 2fi, 1895. Hear- 
 ing at Springfield, July 30, 1895, and following order made: 
 
 ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 TUESDAY, July 30, 1895. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present W. S. Cantrell, C. F. Lape and Thomas Gahan, Commis- 
 sioners, and J W. Yantis, Secretary the following proceedings were 
 had in this case: 
 
 And now this petition having come on for final hearing and de- 
 termination before the Commission, this 30th day of July, 1895, and 
 the Commission having considered the evidence taken herein, and 
 agreements made by the parties hereto, and the arguments made be- 
 fore the Commission, and being fully advised in the premises, doth 
 find that the public good requires that the crossing formed at Paxton, 
 Illinois, by the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Lake Erie 
 & Western Railroad Company, be protected and operated by an in- 
 terlocking device or machine. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the companies, to- 
 wit: The Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Lake Erie & 
 Western Railroad Company, forthwith proceed to protect said cross- 
 ing by a system of interlocking signals and switches, to be agreed 
 upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the parties 
 are able to agree, the cost of operation of such interlocking device to 
 be divided upon the following basis:
 
 327 
 
 First Each company to pay the original cost of all the apparatus 
 and mechanism used upon its own tracks, including all signals, de- 
 rails, pipe lines, wire lines, boxing and all connections in its tracks, 
 and also the cost of putting all these in ready for use, and of main- 
 taining the same in good repair. 
 
 Second The cost of the interlocking machine proper and the ex- 
 pense of maintaining the same in good working order to be divided 
 between the companies in the proportion that the levers used to op- 
 erate the appliance in the tracks of each company bear to the whole 
 number of levers. 
 
 Third The cost of the tower house wherein the interlocking ma- 
 chine is housed, to be divided between the companies in the propor- 
 tion that the levers used to operate the appliance in the tracks of 
 each company bear to the whole number of levers. 
 
 Fourth The expense of the operation of the machine (i. e., wages 
 of operators) to be divided equally between the companies. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration by the Commission pending the efforts of petitioner and 
 respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 (Signed) W. S. CANTRELL, Chairman. 
 
 C F. LAPE. 
 
 Adopted July 30, 1895. THOMAS GAHAN. 
 
 Attest : 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary. 
 
 No. 20. 
 
 THE TERRE HAUTE & INDIANAPOLIS RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 THE PEORIA, DECATUR& KVANSVILLE RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent. 
 
 PROTECTION OF CROSSING AT GREENUP. 
 
 Petition filed July 2, 1895. Crossing viewed August 10, 1895. 
 Case came up to be heard at Springfield September 3, 1895, and by 
 agreement the following order was made by the Commission: 
 
 ORDER OP THE COMMISSION. 
 
 TUESDAY, September 3, 1895. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, held at its office in Springfield, Illinois, on this day, 
 present W. S. Cantrell and Geo. W. Fithian, Commisssioners, and 
 J. W. Yantis, Secretary the following proceedings were had in this 
 case:
 
 328 
 
 And this petition having come on for final hearing and determina- 
 tion before the Commission, this 3d day of September, 1895, and the 
 parties having reached an agreement as to the division of the expense 
 of construction, maintenance and operation of the interlocking plant 
 to be installed at Greenup, Illinois, and the Commission being fully 
 advised in the premises, doth find that the public good requires that 
 the crossing formed at Greenup, Illinois, by the tracks of the Terre 
 Haute & Indianoplis Railroad Company and the Peoria, Decatur & 
 Evansville Railway Company, be protected and operated by an in- 
 terlocking device or machine, and, 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 to- wit: The Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company and the 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company, forthwith proceed 
 to protect said crossing by a system of interlocking signals and 
 switches, to be agreed upon by the parties, with the Commission's 
 approval, if the parties are able to agree; the cost of construction, 
 the expense of maintenance and the cost of the operating of such de- 
 vice to be divided upon the following basis: 
 
 First The Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company to pay 
 three-fourths and the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company 
 one-fourth of the cost of the plant, including all signals, derails, pipe- 
 lines, wire lines, boxing and all connections in the tracks, and also 
 the cost of putting all these in ready for use. 
 
 Second The Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company to pay 
 two-thirds and the Peoria, Decatur & Evausville Railway Company 
 one-third of the cost of maintenance and operation of the said plant. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration by the Commission pending the efforts of the petitioner 
 and respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking, for which pur- 
 pose they shall be allowed a period of thirty days from this date. 
 
 Adopted September 3, 1895. 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 GEO. W. FITHIAN, 
 
 Attest: THOMAS GAHAN, 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary. Commissioners.
 
 329 
 
 COMPLAINTS. 
 
 No. 138. 
 
 JOSEPH W. VANCE AND WILLIAM S. WASHBURN, doing business under 
 the name of the Egyptian Coal Company, 
 
 vs. 
 CHICAGO, PADUCAH & MEMPHIS RAILROAD COMPANY. 
 
 Overcharge for Switching. 
 
 Opinion by GEORGE W. FITHIAN, Commissioner. 
 
 The complaint filed by the petitioners allege, among other things, 
 that on December 31, 1894, the defendant switched for complainants 
 from their mine known as the Spiller mine near Marion, to the Cairo 
 Short Line Railroad, at Marion, Illinois, a distance of less than three 
 miles, one car of coal and charged and collected from consignee there- 
 for the sum of five dollars. That said car was billed and shipped to 
 W. B. Ward, at Metropolis, Illinois. Also on January 2, 1895, com- 
 plainants shipped to said Ward, at Metropolis, Illinois, one other car 
 of coal from their said mine, and another and different car of coal on 
 the 31st of January, 1895; and on the 19th day of January, 1895, 
 they shipped one car of coal to one J. R. Mayer, at Creal Springs, 
 Illinois, and another car on the 5th day of February, 1895, to the 
 -same consignee; and on the 15th day of January, 1895, another car 
 to complainants at Marion, Illinois, each of which cars was received 
 by the said Chicago, Paducah & Memphis Railroad Company at said 
 Spiller mine and switched by it to Marion, Illinois, a distance of less 
 than three miles, and delivered to the Cairo Short Line Railroad 
 Company for shipment to its destination, except the last mentioned 
 car, which wus delivered to complainants. That said coal mine is 
 not a station on defendant's road, that said cars were billed from 
 Marion, and that the said railroad company charged for hauling each 
 of said cars a distance less than three miles the sum of five dollars. 
 
 The evidence in this case shows that Spiller mine is located about 
 two and one-fourth miles north of the junction of the Cairo Short 
 Line and the Chicago, Paducah & Memphis Railroads, at Marion,
 
 330 
 
 Illinois, and that it is not a station on the last named railroad. There 
 is no station house or agent of said railroad company maintained at 
 said Spiller mine, and the cars transported above were billed from 
 Spiller mine to the junction of said railroads by the railroad agent 
 of the Chicago, Paducah & Memphis Railroad Company, at Marion, 
 Illinois. 
 
 The attempt was made by the railroad company to show that these 
 cars were billed from Johnston City, a station on the defendant's road, 
 to Marion, but the Commission do not think that the evidence sap- 
 ports that contention. Rule 21 of this Commission fixes the maxi- 
 mum rate for switching loaded cars for distances not exceeding three 
 miles at two dollars per car, and defines switching to be "the hauling 
 of loaded cars from the station yards, side tracks, elevators or ware- 
 houses, to the junction of other railroads when not billed from sta- 
 tions on its own road to said junctions, and from junctions of other 
 railroads to the stations, side tracks, elevators and warehouses situ- 
 ated on the tracks owned or controlled by the railroad company doing 
 said switching; it is that transfer charge ordinarily made for remov- 
 ing loaded cars for short distances for which no regular waybill is 
 made and which do not move between two regularly established sta- 
 tions on the same road." The contention of the railroad company is 
 that the services performed in the matter complained of were not 
 switching services, but were regular hauls for which they were en- 
 titled to charge the usual maximum rates. 
 
 The opinion of the Commission is that the service rendered was a 
 switching service; that the distance was less than three miles, and 
 that the railroad company was only entitled to charge two dollars per 
 car, the maximum rate fixed by this Board under Rule 21 for switch- 
 ing cars. That the charge of five dollars per car collected by the 
 railroad company was in excess of the rate fixed by this Board and 
 was extortionate. 
 
 And the Commission further finds that the said Chicago, Paducah 
 & Memphis Railroad Company, by collecting from the complainants 
 a rate in excess of two dollars for each car, under the statute rend- 
 ered itself guilty of extortion. 
 
 W. S. CANTELL, 
 THOS. GAHAN, 
 GEO. W. FITHIAN. 
 Dated January 7, A. D. 1896. 
 
 Attest : 
 J. W. YANTIS, Secretary.
 
 331 
 
 PETITION. 
 
 No. 139. 
 
 Petition of Millers' Association of Illinois, 
 
 v. 
 Railroad Companies in Illinois. Filed December 4th, 1895. 
 
 To the Honorable, the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sioners of the State of Illinois : 
 
 We, the undersigned, a special committee appointed by the State 
 Millers' Association of Illinois, respectfully represent to your honor- 
 able body that the number of actual flouring mills in the State of Illi- 
 nois is about seven hundred, said mills being generally distributed over 
 the entire State; that their capacity is in the neighborhood of 75,000 
 barrels of flour per day ; that the amount of capital invested in these 
 properties is about $13,000,000; that in the conduct of their business 
 these millers pay out over thirty million dollars yearly, and that it is 
 to-day, even in its crippled condition, the largest industry in the 
 State of Illinois. 
 
 With this preliminary reference to the extent and importance of 
 the industry, we beg to submit for your consideration these our com- 
 plaints of certain discriminations and practices of the railroads of 
 Illinois in the matter of rates on flour; which discriminating rates 
 and practices have compelled the closing down of many mills, the 
 curtailment of the output of many more, the surrender in great part 
 of our home market to the millers of other States to whose benefit 
 these discriminations and practices inure, and such heavy impair- 
 ment of the values of milling property in this State as threatens, if 
 not remedied, the destruction of the milling industry of Illinois. 
 
 We represent, further, that for many months last year, and during 
 the present year, the millers of the State have diligently sought, by 
 a respectful presentation of their complaints, such as are hereinafter 
 set forth, to induce the Illinois roads to abate the discriminations 
 and practices complained of, and give them the relief from these op- 
 pressive and ruinous conditions which we are now compelled to ask 
 at your hands. 
 
 It is not the purpose of the millers to antagonize or embarass the 
 railroads of this State by entering this formal complaint before the 
 State Commission. They desired, and very much preferred, to com-
 
 332 
 
 pass an arrest and discontinuance of these abuses through an appeal 
 to the officials of the roads interested; and in line with this preference 
 an appeal was made to them. Although two meetings were called 
 by the roads last year to take the matters complained of under consid- 
 eration, one meeting was a total failure on account of non-attendance 
 of representatives of the roada, and at the other meeting there was 
 but one representative of these roads present, except the agents at 
 the city of Springfield, at which place the meeting was called, and 
 nothing whatever was done. 
 
 Under these circumstances we come before you with the following 
 allegations, and ask, at your hands, such remedial action as, under 
 the law and in answer to our needs, you may be able and disposed to 
 grant: 
 
 First That the rates at present charged by the railway companies 
 for the transportation of flour locally in the State of Illinois are, in 
 most cases, the maximum freight rates named in the Railroad & 
 Warehouse Commissioners' schedule. 
 
 Second That an association of railroads known as the "Western 
 Freight Association." of which the following Illinois railroads, and 
 s we believe, others, are members: The Chicago, Burlington & 
 Quincy; The Chicago, Burlington & Northern; The Chicago & North- 
 western; The Chicago Great Western; The Chicago, Milwaukee & 
 St. Paul; The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific; The Illinois Central; 
 The Iowa Central, and the Rock Island & Peoria, have issued and 
 have now in force a tariff of rates known as "Joint Tariff No. 205," 
 which tariff, the millers are imformed by various officials of Illinois 
 roads, furnishes virtually the basis of rates from Minneapolis and 
 other northwestern points to what are termed "group points" in the 
 State of Illinois. That, taking these rates which are admittedly 
 made by the initial roads at Minneapolis and St. Paul, the following 
 railroads of Illinois, and other Illinois roads not here mentioned, 
 have issued tariffs or have accepted tariffs issued by the initial roads, 
 naming rates from these northwestern points on flour and wheat at 
 all stations in the State of Illinois: The Iowa Central; The Illinois 
 Central; The Peoria & Eastern (leased by the C , C., C. & St. L.;) 
 The Lake Erie & Western; The Terre Haute & Peoria (leased by 
 the Vandalia;) The Peoria, Decatur & Evansville; The Chicago, 
 Peoria & St. Louis; The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy; The Chi- 
 cago, Rock Island & Pacific; The Balimore & Ohio Southwestern; 
 The Toledo, Peoria & Western. Copies of these tariffs, so far as we 
 have been able to obtain them, are filed herewith. 
 
 Third That by reason of these rates on flour charged by the rail- 
 road companies as shown in the Joint Tariff of the "Western Freight 
 Association," and in the tariff of the Illinois roads, either members 
 of that association, or accepting the basis of rates fixed by that asso- 
 ciation, the product of the Minneapolis and and other Minnesota 
 mills is delivered to hundreds of Illinois points at rates of freight less 
 than the maximum rates of the Illinois schedule in effect from Illi- 
 nois milling points to the same Illinois points, and thus the millers 
 of the northwest are enabled to reach Illinois territory over much
 
 333 
 
 longer distances, at lower rates than are charged Illinois millers who 
 are practically driven from their home market, forced into idleness, 
 or to seek trade in other and distant States to the east, and in foreign 
 markets via the seaboard. 
 
 Fourth That the "Western Freight Association" referred to, to- 
 gether wi'th, or with the sanction of Illinois roads, accepting the 
 basis or rates fixed by said association, have made without authority 
 of law a division or partition of the territory comprised within the 
 limits of the State of Illinois, making application to all stations in 
 one division of the State a rate of 12f cents a hundred on flour; to 
 all stations in another division a rate of 15 cents a hundred; to an- 
 other and a very large division a rate of 16 cents a hundred ; to an- 
 other and a very small division a rate of 17|- cents a hundred; to an- 
 other division a rate of 18 cents a hundred; and to another division 
 a rate of 20 cents a hundred; that said arbitrary division of the State, 
 shown on map herewith marked "A", if made at the dictation of the 
 initial roads at Minneapolis, which roads admittedly make the rates 
 of all these divisions of the State of Illinois, is a most ingenious par- 
 tition by powerful influences outside the State, to accomplish the 
 capture of the home trade* of the Illinois millers, and drive them out 
 of business entirely, or to other States, or into the markets of the 
 world. If, however, said partition was made by the Illinois roads, 
 under shelter of the maximum rate of the Illinois schedule on local 
 business, it is a voluntary surrender on their part of a home industry 
 into the hands of an industry of like character in other States, which 
 emphasizes all the rp.ore the complaints of the millers of the State 
 that are to follow. 
 
 Fifth That while under the tariffs referred to, car-load flour is: 
 delivered over two Illinois roads if coming from Minneapolis or com- 
 mon points in Minnesota to hundreds of points in this State from 
 four hundred to five hundred and fifty miles distant from Minneap- 
 olis, at a rate of 15 cents a hundred, under the present schedule of 
 rates in Illinois, the charges to any Illinois miller for a car-load of 
 flour to points in this State over two Illinois roads where the distances 
 aggregate one hundred and thirty-five miles only, are over 15 cents 
 a hundred. 
 
 Sixth That while Minnesota flour in car-loads is hauled into this 
 State a distance of from four hundred to six hundred miles and de- 
 livered over two Illinois roads to hundreds of Illinois points named 
 in these tariffs at the rate of 16 cents a hundred, car-load flour from 
 Illinois mills is charged under the Illinois schedule the same or a 
 higher rate for a distance of only one hundred and fifty miles; and 
 that what is said herein concerning the inequalties of rates on flour 
 from the northwest to 15 and 16-cent points as compared with rates 
 charged by Illinois roads to the millers of this State, applies to those 
 districts taking 17^, 18 or 20 cents. 
 
 Seventh That Illinois roads are hauling car-load flour from Min- 
 neapolis and other northwestern points to 15 and 16-cent rate points 
 in this State, accepting as their division of the through rate for a 
 haul of one hundred miles or more, 3 2-10 cents a hundred in some
 
 334 
 
 cases whereas, for hauling car-load flour from Illinois mills an equal 
 distance on the same roads the maximum charge is on class "B" 
 roads 9.36 cents a hundred, and on class "A" roads the maximum 
 charge is 8.91 cents a hundred; and whereas, flour from Illinois mills 
 that reaches these points over two Illinois roads must pay two locals 
 the sum of which for a distance of even twenty miles is three hun- 
 dred per cent higher than the cost of ths Minneapolis miller of haul- 
 ing a car-load of flour a distance of one hundred miles. 
 
 In this connection the millers of Illinois insist, that while it may 
 be true as a rule that divisions of through rates should not be the 
 measure of local rates when the discriminations between local and 
 through rates tax an Illinois industry with charges from two hundred 
 per cent to three hundred per cent higher than those accepted by 
 Illinois roads on a like product from a neighboring State, and 
 threaten the very life of the home industry, such rates are unreason- 
 able, and warrant the millers of this State in asking remedial action 
 at the hands of the State Commission. 
 
 Eighth -That Northwestern millers are permitted by some of the 
 Illinois roads to bed their flour in cars with from one to two tons of 
 bran or other mill feed which pays no freight, thus cheapening the 
 flour from that section to the Illinois purchaser to the extent of from 
 three to six dollars per car. This practice not only strengthens the 
 competition the Illinois miller must meet on flour from the north- 
 west, but it destroys also his trade in bran. The Illinois millers do 
 not allege that this permission is openly granted to the millers of the 
 northwest by the Illinois roads, but they do say that agents of 
 the mills in the northwest refer to this practice as an inducement to 
 the Illinois dealer in flour, and that when the attention of agents of 
 Illinois roads has been directed to the practice, apparently no effort 
 has been made to discontinue it, and the practice still goes on. They 
 say further, that agents of roads whose attention has been called to 
 the matter excuse themselves from interference on the ground that 
 it is Inter-State business; an admission by implication that any vio- 
 lation of rules that brings Inter-State business to the road may prop- 
 erly be ignored, however disastrously such Inter-State competition 
 may affect a home industry of like character. 
 
 Ninth That it is the practice of some Illinois roads to permit 
 flour from Minneapolis and the northwest, billed as car-load flour at 
 car-load rates, to be distributed (when the car contains 25,000 pounds) 
 at two points in Illlinois by the payment of an additional 2 cents 
 per hundred, thus creating a grievous discrimination against Illinois 
 millers on flour in less than car-load lots, amounting, as we are pre- 
 pared to show, on hauls of sixty and sixty-five miles to $6 50 a car, 
 and for hauls of one hundred, and one hundred and five miles, to 
 more than $14.00 a car. And these differences against the Illinois 
 millers refer only to a haul on a single Illinois road; whereas, on two 
 Illinois roads the difference would be so great as to entirely prohibit 
 the shipment of Illinois flour in less than car loads in competition 
 with that from the northwest. 
 
 Tenth That a "milling in transit" rate is in force, established and 
 permitted by the initial roads at Minneapolis and by the Illinois
 
 335 
 
 roads, under which mills in Iowa located on the west bank of the 
 Mississippi river may bring wheat in some cases a long distance 
 through the State of Illinois, from Minneapolis and other northwest- 
 ern points, to their mills in Iowa, convert it into flour and ship it to 
 any station in Illinois, except to certain stations on the Wabash. St. 
 Louis & Pacific, and the Chicago & Alton roads, at the through rate 
 on flour from Minneapolis to Illinois points; whereas, no Illinois mill 
 can use northwestern wheat on a "milling in transit" rate except the 
 flour be marketed at points east of the Illinois-Indiana line, thus 
 opening all stations in Illinois referred to to Iowa mills on a "mill- 
 ing in transit" rate, while denying that character of rate to Illinois 
 mills unless the product is hauled past the homes of the Illinois con- 
 sumers and marketed in other states or in foreign countries. 
 
 Eleventh And finally we allege, that two leading railroads in this 
 State claim that they have not only declined to accept the divisions 
 accorded by the northwestern lines on flour from that territory, but 
 that they are forced to make and are making concessions from the 
 maximum Illinois schedule to millers on their lines, in order that 
 they may compete with northwestern millers in Illinois. 
 
 It is not denied by the millers that such concessions are now and 
 then made to favored millers, but the practice furnishes in itself the 
 argument that if concessions from the Illinois schedule are absolutely 
 necessary to protect the home miller, and no proper protection can 
 be given the Illinois miller under present conditions without making 
 reductions from the schedule rates, the situation as herein described 
 can not be ignored without sanctioning the "pernicious evil" of spec- 
 ial rates so vigorously reprobated in the report of the Illinois Com- 
 mission of 1881. 
 
 The millers disclaim any desire to seek rates that work an injustice 
 to the railway interests of the State, believing that railway rates, while 
 being compensatory, should be so adjusted as not to work an injustice 
 to any other business interests of the State, and in such manner as 
 to allow the legitimate and proper business of the State to be done 
 therein. They do claim, however, that when Illinois roads accept 
 on flour from neighboring states rates and divisions dictated, and in 
 many instances forced by the officials of powerful initial roads con- 
 trolling the distribution of a vast tonnage, which divisions are from 
 200 per cent to 300 per cent lower than the maximum rates applied 
 on flour shipped locally, they are warranted in asking your interpos- 
 ition, to the end that our largest industry be not unreasonably taxed 
 to provide revenues for Illinois roads which they fritter away in their 
 struggle for Inter-State traffic; and for such relief and protection 
 they will ever pray. 
 
 E. C. KREIDLE, President. 
 D. S. SHELLABARGER. 
 S. W. GIFT. 
 
 This case was set for hearing several times and postponed at re- 
 quest of petitioners, and petition was finally withdrawn by petitioners 
 with a statement that the differences had been amicably adjusted.
 
 336 
 
 EXTORTION IN CHARGE. 
 
 Nos. 140-143 Inclusive. 
 
 Complaint of CHICAGO LIVE STOCK EXCHANGE, 
 
 vs. 
 
 CHICAGO & NORTHWESTEBN; C. B. & Q.; C., R. 1. & P., and C. W. 
 ST. P. RAILWAY COMPANIES. 
 
 Extortion in Terminal Charge Made at Union Stock Yards/^Chicago, 
 
 Filed December 11, 1895. 
 Answer filed December 24, 1895. 
 
 These cases were heard jointly at Chicago/January 13, 1896, and 
 respondents found guilty as charged, and Attorney^General directed 
 to bring suits for the penalty.
 
 337 
 
 CROSSINGS. 
 
 THE CHICAGO & ALTON RAILWAY COMPANY, Petitioners, 
 
 vs. 
 THE ALTON RAILWAY AND ILLUMINATING COMPANY, Respondents. 
 
 Petition to Determine Place and Manner of Crossing. 
 
 Petition filed April 24, 1896. 
 Crossing viewed May 8th, 1896. 
 Answer filed May 8th, 1896. 
 Hearing at Springfield May 8th, 1896. 
 Opinion filed May llth, 1896. 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 By W. S. Cantrell, Chairman. 
 
 This is a petition of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, ask- 
 ing the Commission to prescribe the place where and the manner in 
 which the respondent, the Alton Railway and Illuminating Com- 
 pany, may be permitted to cross with its track k the track of peti- 
 tioner in the city of Alton. 
 
 The petition avers that the petitioner is a railroad corporation or- 
 ganized and doing business under the laws of the State of Illinois, 
 and owning and operating a railroad between the city of Chicago, in 
 the State of Illinois, and the city of East St. Louis, in said State; 
 that its main track runs through the city of Alton, in the county of 
 Madison, in said State; that it has legal authority from the said city 
 of Alton to run its railroad and its several trains upon and overPiasa 
 street in said city; that said street is 66 feet in width and 46 feet be- 
 tween the curbs; that the track of petitioner is 4 feet 8 inches in 
 width; that the cars of petitioner range in width from 10^ to 11 feet; 
 that that portion of Piasa street between Second and Third streets is 
 at the foot of a very heavy grade amounting to 90 foot a mile rise, 
 22 O
 
 338 
 
 and that it is very difficult to draw trains of petitioner up said grade, 
 or to control them when coming down same; that the Alton Railway 
 and illuminating Company is a railroad corporation organized under 
 the laws of the State of Illinois, and pretends to have a franchise 
 from the city of Alton to construct and operate its line of railway 
 from a point on Second street to a point on Third street in the city 
 of Alton, along the east side of petitioner's track in Piasa street, and 
 intends to build its track across the track of petitioner at the inter- 
 section of Third and Piasa streets at the foot of said 90 foot grade; 
 that said proposed crossing, if made, would be a very dangerous one 
 to the lives and limbs of passengers and employes of both the peti- 
 tioner and the Alton Railway and Illuminating Company; that such 
 crossing, if made at the place and in the manner proposed by the 
 said Alton Railway and Illuminating Company, will necessarily im- 
 pede and endanger the travel or transportation upon petitioner's 
 railroad. Petititioner therefore objects to said company crossing its 
 track at grade at the place so selected by it, and asks the Commis- 
 sion to prescribe the place where and manner in which said crossing 
 shall be made, having due regard to the safety of life and property. 
 
 The respondent admits in its answer the organization of petitioner; 
 that it owns and operates a railroad as averred; its occupancy of 
 Piasa street by the authority of the city of Alton; the width of said 
 street and the width of its cars, but denies that the grade on Piasa 
 street between Second and Third streets is a heavy grade, and that 
 it is very difficult to draw trains up said grade or to control them 
 going down the same. Denies that it is a railroad corporation, but 
 avers that it is organized under the general laws of the State of Illi- 
 nois, and that the object of incorporation was and is to furnish elec- 
 tric light, heat and power and to maintain and operate electric street 
 railways; that it has now in operation in the city of Alton two lines 
 of electric railways, and that it has now in process of construction a 
 third line extending from the city hall in the city of Alton to the 
 village of North Alton ; avers its authority by ordinance of said city 
 to construct its line along and over Piasa street, Third street and 
 other streets in said city; admits that it intends and proposes to 
 build its said electric railway track on Piasa street along the east 
 side of the track of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, and in- 
 tends to cross said track of said Chicago & Alton Railroad Company 
 at the intersection of Third and Piasa streets. Denies that said 
 crossing will be a dangerous one either to employes or patrons of 
 either company, and that the crossing would not injure the track of 
 the petitioner. Denies that it intends to construct its crossing over 
 the track of petitioner in such manner or place as will impede and 
 endanger travel or transportation, but avers that said crossing will 
 be at a proper and suitable place, and will be built and constructed 
 in such manner as to be as little dangerous to life, limb or property 
 as any crossing could, would or might be, and that the crossing pro- 
 posed by it will be proper and safe. Admits that it will be at grade 
 but denies that there is any valid or legal objection to said crossing 
 at grade, and that the petitioner has any right under the law and 
 facts to make objection to said crossing. The respondent joins in
 
 339 
 
 the request of the petitioner that the Commission view the ground. 
 Avers that the city council of the city of Alton having granted a 
 franchise to it to lay and construct its tracks in Piasa street, it there- 
 by acquired the right to cross the track of said petitioner; therefore 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission has no jurisdiction to pre- 
 vent said crossing at grade or to prescribe the place where said cross- 
 ing should be. 
 
 The question of the jurisdiction of the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission to hear and determine this case is raised by the answer 
 of respondent. It is insisted that the respondent is not organized 
 under the general railroad law, but that it is incorporated under the 
 general corporation act; that paragraph 102, section 38, of chapter 
 114, R. S., and paragraph 133, section 2, of chapter 114, R. S., ex- 
 pressly excepts street railroads from the operation of the respective 
 acts. This contention is not only tenable, but is correct, and if this 
 proceeding was under either of the acts referred to we would have 
 no hesitancy in dismissing the petition, but this petition is brought 
 under the act entitled "An act in relation to the crossing of one rail- 
 way by another, and to prevent danger to life and property from 
 grade crossings. Approved May 27, 1889; in force July 1, 1889," 
 which provides, "that hereafter any railroad company desiring to 
 cross with its track the main line of another railroad company shall 
 construct the crossing at such place and in such manner as will not 
 unnecessarily impede or endanger the travel or transportation upon 
 the railway so crossed. If, in any case, objection be made to the 
 place or mode of crossing proposed by the company desiring the 
 same, either party may apply to the Board of Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commissioners, and it shall be their duty to view the ground 
 and give all parties interested an opportunity to be heard. After 
 full investigation, and with due regard to safety of life and property, 
 said board shall give a decision prescribing the place where and the 
 manner in which said crossing shall be made." 
 
 There is nothing in this act which excepts street railroads. The 
 first question for our consideration is, does the case fall within the 
 provisions of this statute? In order to determine this we must as- 
 certain whether or not the Alton Railway and Illuminating Company 
 is a railroad company. 
 
 In 1859 the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case of Moses et al. 
 v! P., F. W. & C. R. R. Co., 21 III., 523, in passing upon the right of 
 the appellants to enjoin appellee from laying its tracks in Beach 
 street, in the City of Chicago, uses this language: "Cars upon street 
 railroads are now generally, if not universally, propelled by horses, 
 but who can say how long it will be before it will be found safe and 
 profitable to propel them with steam or some other power besides 
 horses? Should we say that this road should be enjoined, we could 
 advance no reason for it which would not apply with equal force to 
 street railroads." 
 
 Again, in the case of the City of Chicago v. Evans et al., 24 111., 56, 
 the Supreme Court in passing upon the right of horse railways to 
 unite their roads and make running arrangements with each other
 
 340 
 
 (under the act of February 12, 1855,) says: "The act in terms ap- 
 plies to all railroads organized or incorporated under or which may 
 be incorporated or organized under the authority of the laws of this 
 State." This language is manifestly sufficiently comprehensive to 
 embrace horse railways as well as railroads whose cars are propelled 
 by steam or other power, as well as roads authorized to transport pas- 
 sengers and freight by other power. The language of the enactment 
 embraces all roads then organized, as well as those which might 
 afterwards become so, and the act makes no distinction or reserva- 
 tion as to the character of the railroad. The members of the Gen- 
 eral Assembly were fully aware that these various roads existed, and 
 if any roads answering either description were not designed to be 
 embraced they would, it appears to us, have limited the operation of 
 the act so as to have excluded them. Horse city railways unques- 
 tionably fall within the description of the class of subjects of which 
 they were legislating. They are in every sense of the term "rail- 
 roads." 
 
 The Supreme Court of this State, in the case in 24 111., above citedr 
 says that "Horse railroads are in every sense of the term 'railroads.' " 
 That the language of the act of 1855 is sufficiently comprehensive to 
 embrace horse railways as well as railroads whose cars are propelled 
 by steam or other power. If this opinion states the law correctly, 
 then a company owning or operating a street car line propelled by 
 horses or by any other power is a railroad company, and as such is 
 subject to the provisions of the act known as the Crossing Act, above 
 cited, whether such street railroad is incorporated under the general 
 railroad act or the general corporation laws of this State. Having 
 disposed of the question of jurisdiction, the next question is as to 
 the proper place where, and manner in which, the crossing shall be 
 made. There is little conflict in the evidence as to the facts. It is 
 admitted by the respondents that all grade crossings are more or 
 less dangerous, but in the absence of any evidence on this point ex- 
 perience teaches us that all grade crossings, whether of steam, cable, 
 electric or horse railroads, are fraught with danger even when pro- 
 tected by gates, bars or interlocking devices, and that however care- 
 ful their management may be collisions are not infrequent. 
 
 It is said that the ordinance throws around the proposed crossing 
 at Third and Piasa streets all the safeguards which are necessary to 
 protect the passengers of the respective roads, as well as their em- 
 ployes; but common experience has shown that howsoever strict may 
 be the rules and regulations thrown around employe's, and however 
 much vigilance may for a time be used by them, that they have 
 proven ineffectual to protect the lives of the passengers upon the 
 respective roads and of the employe's themselves. The employe's be- 
 coming accustomed to the crossings, look upon them as common 
 affairs and their vigilance is often relaxed and accidents occur. And, 
 again, allowance must be made for the inattention and negligence of 
 employe's, howsoever carefully they may be selected and however 
 stringent may be the rules under which they act. We know that 
 they do relax in vigilance, and serious accidents occur therefrom; 
 and it therefore becomes our duty, under the statute of this State, in
 
 341 
 
 so far as may be done, to put it out of the power of the employes to 
 bring about accidents by negligence and omission of care. The safe- 
 guards of the ordinance, we apprehend, would not prove efficient to 
 prevent accidents at the proposed crossing. Yet there are conditions 
 which practically preclude any other than grade crossings, and when 
 such conditions exist, the only safeguard that can be employed is to 
 reduce the danger to a minimum by requiring such safety devices as 
 have been discovered. But it must be borne in mind that the ingenu- 
 ity of man has not yet found any device that will absolutely prevent 
 all danger at grade crossings. The nearest approach to it is to inter- 
 lock such crossings. The conditions at the proposed crossing at 
 Third and Piasa streets are of such a character that we feel that the 
 danger of life would be greatly enhanced, for the reason that said 
 crossing would be very near the foot of the 90-foot grade, and at a 
 point where the evidence shows that the trains of the petitioner com- 
 ing down this grade have, on different occasions, become unman- 
 ageable and have gotten beyond the control of the trainmen, and 
 -were stopped quite a distance south of Third street. 
 
 Another objection to this crossing, and an additional reason why 
 it is a dangerous one, is that the motorman or conductor could not 
 see a train or engine on petitioner's road approaching this crossing 
 from the south but a very short distance, on account of a sharp curve 
 in the petitioner's track just south of Second street. This last ob- 
 jection is obviated by the crossing prescribed by the Commission, as 
 a good view of the petitioner's tracks can be had for about one-half 
 mile north and several hundred feet south, so that the danger of a 
 collision at this crossing is minimized as compared with the proposed 
 crossing at Third street. It would be far better for both roads and 
 for the public were the physical conditions such as to admit of an 
 overhead crossing, but they are not; therefore we can only use the 
 authority conferred on us by law to throw all the safeguards in our 
 power around this crossing so the lives of passengers and employe's 
 may be protected. This we have done in prescribing the place and 
 manner of this crossing. While it is true that interlocking it will 
 impose on the respondent additional expense, yet a question of ex- 
 pense should not enter into the case where the lives of the public or 
 the employe's of the petitioner and respondent are involved. 
 
 For the reason above stated we hold that the Commission has ju- 
 risdiction in this case to prescribe the place and manner of crossing. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the respondent, the 
 Alton Railway and Illuminating Company, have leave to cross with 
 its track at grade the track of the Chicago & Alton Railroad Com- 
 pany at the intersection of Piasa street with Second street in the city 
 of Alton. 
 
 It is further ordered that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals to be agreed upon 
 by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the parties are 
 able to agree. The cost of construction and the expense of mainte- 
 nance of such device shall be paid for by the Alton Railway and 
 Illuminating Company, as provided by statute, and it is further
 
 342 
 
 ordered by the Commission that the cost of the operation of said in- 
 terlocking device, the said Alton Railway and Illuminating Company 
 shall pay one-half, and said Chicago & Alton Railroad Company shall 
 pay one-half. And, inasmuch as the statute only directs the Rail- 
 road and Warehouse Commission to prescribe by order a plan of the 
 interlocking in case the parties are unable to agree; therefore it is 
 further ordered that this petition be further held under considera- 
 tion by the Commission pending the efforts of the petitioner and re- 
 spondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 Adopted May 11, A. D. 18%. 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 GEO. W. FITHIAN, 
 Attest: THOS. GAHAN, 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, Commissioners, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company 
 
 vs. 
 Alton Railway and Illuminating Company. 
 
 Petition for the crossing of the said Alton Railway and Illuminating; 
 Company over the tracks of the Chicago & Alton Rail- 
 road Company in Alton, Illinois. 
 
 And now on this 29th day of May, 1896, come again the parties to 
 the above entitled proceeding, upon the petition of the Alton Rail- 
 way and Illuminating Company for a modification of the order here- 
 tofore made, to-wit: on the llth of Maj, 1896, and the said cause 
 coming on to be heard on said petition, and it appearing to the Com- 
 mission that the parties hereto have reached an agreement as to the 
 mode of protecting the crossings to be made by the Alton Railway 
 and Illuminating Company over the tracks of the Chicago & Alton 
 Railroad Company, and it appearing that the point hereinafter men- 
 tioned, to-wit: a point fifty-one (51) feet south of the property line 
 of Second street, is less objectionable as a place of crossing than the 
 point heretofore ordered, and it also appearing that the Chicago & 
 Alton Railroad Company, while not waiving its objections to any 
 crossings at grade, prefers that the crossing, if made at all, should 
 be made at said point, fifty- one (51) feet south of the property 
 line of Second street, it is therefore ordered and adjudged that 
 the order of the llth of May, A. D. 1896, be modified in respect of 
 the place of crossing, and also in respect of the manner of protecting 
 said crossing; and it is also ordered that the Alton Railway & Illum- 
 inating Company have permission to cross the tracks of the Chicago 
 & Alton Railroad Company at grade at a point fifty-one (51) feet
 
 343 
 
 south of the south property line of Second street upon condition 
 that the said Alton Railway and Illuminating Company protect said 
 crossing by placing in their tracks the derailing device mentioned in 
 the petition herein filed this day, and upon condition that it forever 
 operate and maintain said protection in accordance with the petition 
 herein made as follows: Said device shall be placed in the tracks of 
 said Alton Railway & Illuminating Company, and of said company 
 only, and it shall be placed on both sides of the track of the Chicago 
 & Alton Railroad Company at a distance of fifty feet therefrom, and 
 that said device shall be such as will keep the tracks of the Alton 
 Railway & Illuminating Company open at all times except when a 
 conductor or switchman of said Alton Railway & Illuminating Com- 
 pany shall close it for the purpose of making a crossing. 
 
 A plat of the place of crossing and a plan of the proposed crossing 
 and derailing device are herewith filed and made a part of this order; 
 and it is ordered that the said Alton Railway & Illuminating Com- 
 pany shall now and at all times strictly comply with the same, and 
 that the permission to cross the tracks of the Chicago & Alton Rail- 
 road Company at grade at the point aforesaid be given upon that 
 express condition. 
 
 (Signed.) W. S. CANTEELL, 
 
 THOMAS GAHAN. 
 Attest : 
 
 J. W. YANTIS, 
 
 Secretary. 
 [SEAL.]
 
 344 
 
 INTERLOCKING. 
 
 Illinois Central Railroad Company, Petitioner, 
 
 vs. 
 Wabash, Chester & Western Railroad Company, Respondent. 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Tamaroa, Illinois. 
 
 At a session of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the 
 State of Illinois, begun and held at Chicago, Illinois, on the 3d day 
 of September, 1896 present, W. S. Cantrell and Thomas Gahan, 
 Commissioners; J. W. Yantis, Secretary, and D wight C. Morgan, 
 Consulting Engineer the final order and decision of said Commis- 
 sion was duly rendered. 
 
 Be it remembered, that at a special session of the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois, begun and held on 
 Thursday, September 3, 1896 present, W. S. Cantrell and Thomas 
 Gahan, Commissioners; J. W. Yantis, Secretary, and Dwight C. 
 Morgan, Consulting Engineer came on to be heard and determined 
 the petition by the Illinois Central Railroad Company against the 
 Wabash, Chester & Western Railroad Company for the protection 
 by a system of interlocking appliances or devices of the railroad 
 crossing at Tamaroa, Perry county, Illinois. 
 
 C. V. Gwin, Esq., attorney, and Mr. J. F. Wallace, chief engineer 
 of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, appearing for said com- 
 pany. 
 
 H. C. Homer, Esq., attorney, and Mr. C. B. Cole, general manager 
 of the Wabash, Chester & Western Railroad Company, appearing 
 for said company. 
 
 And the Commission, after hearing the evidence of petitioner and 
 respondent and the argument of counsel, took said case under advise- 
 ment, leave being granted both petitioner and respondent to file 
 brief and argument in twenty (20) days. 
 
 And afterwards, to-wit: on the twenty-fifth (25th) day of Novem- 
 ber, A. D. 1896, this cause coming on again to be heard, there being
 
 345 
 
 present. W. S. Cantrell, Chairman; Thomas Gahan, Commissioner; 
 J. W. Yantis, Secretary, and Dwight C. Morgan, Consulting En- 
 gineer and it appearing to the Commission that the respondent had 
 not filed any briefs or arguments, and the Commission being fully 
 advised in the premises: 
 
 Doth find from the evidence that the public safety requires that 
 the crossings formed at Tamaroa, Perry county, Illinois, by the 
 tiacks and side tracks of the Illinois Central Railroad Company and 
 the Wabash, Chester & Western Railroad Company shall be pro- 
 tected and operated by a system of interlocking appliances or devices. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that the said companies, 
 the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Wabash, Chester & 
 Western Railroad Company, shall forthwith proceed to protect said 
 crossings of all the main tracks, side tracks and switches of the said 
 railroad companies respectively, at Tamaroa, Perry county, Illinois, 
 by a system of interlocking appliances and devices of the kind and 
 description, and at the places and in the manner set forth and shown 
 upon the blue print drawing and plan for applying an interlocking 
 plant and device at said crossings, heretofore filed with this Com- 
 mission, and approved by the Consulting Engineer of this Commis- 
 ion, a copy of which said plan is attached hereto, and is hereby 
 made a part of this order. And said system of interlocking appli- 
 ances or devices shall be erected, maintained and operated in accord- 
 ance with the rules, regulations and requirements heretofore adopted, 
 and now in force by this Commission. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that each of said com- 
 panies shall pay one-half the entire cost and expense of erecting, 
 constructing and putting the interlocking device in place ready for 
 use, including the cost of the tower house, and all appliances, ma- 
 terials, work, labor and expense incidental to the full completion and 
 equipment of said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that each of said com- 
 panies shall pay one-half the cost of maintenance, repair and com- 
 plete operation of said interlocking device at said crossings, both day 
 and night, including the wages of the day and night tower men and 
 all other employe's, and all expenses incidental to the full and com- 
 plete operation of said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered that said companies shall construct the said 
 interlocking device, and have the same in order and ready for use, 
 within ninety days from the date of this order. 
 
 And it is further ordered that this petition be further held under 
 -consideration by this Commission pending the efforts of the peti- 
 tioner and respondent to agree upon the character and cost of the 
 device to be installed under this order. 
 
 W. S. CANTRELL, 
 
 THOMAS GAHAN, 
 
 Commissioners. 
 Dated this 25th day of November, A. D. 1896. 
 
 Attest: J. W. YANTIS, Secretary.
 
 346 
 
 ORDERS AND OPINIONS. 
 
 The following orders and opinions have been rendered by the 
 Commission: 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION or THE STATE. 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company, 
 
 vs. 
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. 
 
 Petition to Cross at Grade at Pekin. 
 
 Messrs. Conkling & Grout, for Petitioner. 
 Mr. Horton, for Respondent. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is an application filed by the St. Louis, Peoria & Northern 
 Railway Company for leave to cross at grade with its proposed track 
 the main line and track of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. 
 Louis Rail Road Company within the limits of the city of Pekin. 
 
 The hearing of this petition was first set for July 6, 1897, when it 
 was called up, and, on motion of the respondent was continued to 
 August 3, 1897, but afterwards set by the Commission for August 
 10, 1897. 
 
 During this time the respondent had surveyed by its engineer a 
 different route from the one proposed by the petitioner, running on 
 the high land east of the proposed route mentioned in the petition, 
 and crossing the tracks of the respondent at a point 835 feet east of 
 the place set forth in the petition. The respondent asks that the 
 petitioner be required to cross its track overhead at the point above 
 mentioned.
 
 347 
 
 The evidence in this case shows that the proposed line of the peti- 
 tioner would cross Park street, Court street, Spring street, Ridge 
 street, Fourteenth street, Broadway and Market street. The line 
 proposed by the respondent would cross Fourteenth street, Court 
 street, Broadway and Market street, and would cross a park situated 
 in that p .rtion of the city of Pekin. The petitioner's proposed 
 crossing would be about on the grade of the Big Four, while the 
 grade of the proposed line, as suggested by the respondent, would 
 take the maximum grade of the petitioner, which is 85 feet to the 
 mile. 
 
 The evidence of the engineers of the petitioning company shows 
 that the total cost of an overhead crossing would be in the neighbor- 
 hood of $122,120, and that the streets crossed by the petitioner's pro- 
 posed line would have the be spanned by viaducts. 
 
 The Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad parallels the respond- 
 ent's road at the point of the proposed crossing. The Atchison, 
 Topeka & Santa Fe" Railroad Company has entered into an agree- 
 ment with the petitioner permitting the petitioner to cross at grade 
 the track of the said Atchison, Topeka & Santa F6 Railroad Com- 
 pany, petitioner agreeing to interlock the crossing when built. 
 
 One point to be considered in this connection is, should an over- 
 head crossing be ordered by the Commission at this point it would,, 
 also, necessitate an overhead crossing over the tracks of the said 
 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe" Railroad Company, and the agree- 
 ment entered into between the petitioner and the said last mentioned 
 company for a grade crossing with an interlocker could not be 
 carried out. 
 
 The respondent avers that at this particular point of crossing there 
 is a highway which is one of the main highways in the city of Pekin,. 
 and that it would endanger life and property to have a grade crossing 
 at this particular point. 
 
 There can be no question but that all grade crossings of railroads 
 or of highways are in the main dangerons, and should be avoided 
 whenever it is practical or possible to do so without placing too 
 great a burden upon the company constructing the same. We be- 
 lieve that the policy of this Commission should be to order overhead 
 crossings whenever it is possible and practicable so to do. Under 
 the existing law of this State it is compulsory upon the company 
 desiring to cross to pay all of the expenses of constructing said 
 crossing and the maintenance of the same. 
 
 Section 206 Revised Statutes: "The railroad company seeking the- 
 crossing shall in all cases bear the entire expense of the construction 
 thereof, including all costs and incidental expenses incurred in the 
 investigation by the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sioners." 
 
 The cost of constructing an overhead crossing at this place would 
 be enormous, and would have to be borne entirely by the petitioning 
 line.
 
 348 
 
 The proposed line of the respondent changes the route of the 
 petitioner, making quite a curve south and east of the said proposed 
 line of the petitioner, which the evidence shows would not be in 
 keeping with the proper construction of a first-class railroad. The 
 proposed line of the respondent proceeds along a ridge, and if this 
 line should be varied, or the curves lessened, it would require heavy 
 fills to reach the grade required by the crossing. On the north side 
 of the route proposed by the respondent is high land, and the evi- 
 dence shows that should the petitioner continue its route to Peoria 
 that it would have to cross the low lands a short distance north of 
 the proposed crossing, which would necessitate heavy fills to make 
 their maximum grade. 
 
 In the construction of a railroad one of the most important things 
 to the new company is the location of its depot in the city through 
 which it runs. Should the petitioner be required to elevate its 
 tracks over the tracks of the respondent at the proposed crossing 
 And where they now propose to build their depot, in the city of 
 Pekin, the petitioner's track would be at an elevation of about 20 
 feet, and there can be no question but that it would be very detri- 
 mental to the freight and passenger traffic of the road at the city of 
 Pekin. The site proposed by the petitioner for its depot is as near 
 and convenient to the business part of the city as is possible, and 
 is a very desirable location, while the one proposed by the respond- 
 ent is at some distance from the business portion of the town and 
 not so desirable. 
 
 The evidence shows that of all the streets crossed by this company 
 on its proposed line there are only two that are used to any great 
 extent, these two being Court street and Broadway, as this road runs 
 through the outskirts of the city where these cross streets are not 
 used very extensively, but should the overhead crossing be ordered, 
 each of these streets would have to be bridged. 
 
 The respondent produced evidence to show that at the petitioner's 
 proposed point of crossing there is a heavy grade of the respondent's 
 road, reaching 78 feet to the mile, and extending for about 6 miles, 
 and that if the petitioner was allowed to cross at grade it would in- 
 crease the operating expenses of their road, as it would necessitate 
 the stopping of the respondent's trains on this grade, and should one 
 of their trains break in two on that grade it would endanger life and 
 property, even though the crossing was interlocked, the respondent 
 claiming that an interlocking system at this place would unnecessa- 
 rily impede and endanger travel and transportation of the respond- 
 ent's road. The respondent's evidence upon this point was merely 
 theoretical, not being based on actual accidents of this character, 
 being merely statements of what might happen, and were largely 
 imaginary. 
 
 In the decision of Mr. Phillips, a former member of this Commis- 
 sion, in the case of the St. Louis & Eastern Railway Company vs. the 
 Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City Railway Company, the ground is 
 very properly taken that "the railroad first upon the ground gains 
 important rights by the fact of its presence. The use of its line
 
 349 
 
 ought not to be lightly interfered with. It was undoubtedly in part 
 the object of the act of 1889, while insuring safety to persons and 
 property transported, to protect established companies in the enjoy- 
 ment of their rights. One way of arriving at the propriety of a pro- 
 posed crossing would be to consider whether the line to be crossed 
 would have been built as it is as respects grades, curves, etc., had 
 those building it known a crossing was to be made in the place pro- 
 posed. Such a test might not be decisive, but it is worthy of consid- 
 eration in every case." 
 
 There can be no question that there would not have been a differ- 
 ence in the construction of the respondent's road at this particular 
 point had it known that a crossing would be established at this 
 place, and we can not see how, with a proper interlocker at this par- 
 ticular point it would impede or endanger the traffic on the respond- 
 ent's road, and further, this grade extends for such a distance that 
 it would be impossible for the line of the petitioner to cross at grade 
 any point within reasonable distance where it would not meet the 
 same obstacles and the same grade that it does at the point pro- 
 posed by the petitioner. The objection to this point could not be 
 avoided in any possible way within six miles with a grade crossing. 
 
 The respondent sets up that the cost of the interlocker would be 
 $2,100 per year, and that amount capitalized at 6 per cent, together 
 with the cost of constructing the interlocker, would build the entire 
 overhead crossing. We are not prepared to say that such is the case,, 
 but we believe, if the respondent deems it fair to proceed on this 
 basis, that' it would also be fair to capitalize the cost of the annual 
 operation of this plant to the respondent. Under the rulings of the 
 previous Boards it has been held that the road crossing another at 
 grade must pay for the construction and future maintenance of the 
 interlocking plant, but that the operating expenses shall be equally 
 divided between the two roads. This being the ruling of the Com- 
 mission, the cost to the respondent for its share of the operating 
 expenses of this interlocker would be about $50 per month, and if 
 we should capitalize the cost to the petitioner we ought, also, capi- 
 talize the cost to the respondent, and $50 per month capitalized 
 would be about $10,000. In justice this certainly should be done if 
 an overhead crossing is ordered, but, under the existing law, we are 
 powerless to assess the road crossed in this manner, and until the 
 laws are changed to that effect we must assess the entire cost of an 
 overhead crossing to the petitioner. 
 
 It is and will be the policy of this Commission to order overhead 
 or under crossings wherever and whenever it is possible to do so, 
 believing, as we do, that the advanced thought and system of rail- 
 road building demands it, and that the increased speed of trains 
 and the safety of life and property require it, but where the railroad 
 crosses the outskirts of a city, as in this case, and the cost of neces- 
 sary viaducts and bridges over the highways and the roads is so 
 immense that it would seem unjust to burden this new road with 
 this great cost, which the Commission is required to do under the 
 statute.
 
 350 
 
 For the above stated reasons, we are compelled in justice to the 
 petitioning road in this case to permit it to cross at grade the track 
 of the respondent. 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is, therefore, decided and ordered that the petitioner, the St. 
 Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company, have leave, and it is 
 hereby empowered, to cross with its track the main line and track of 
 the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St, Louis Railway Company 
 at grade at a point near the intersection of Broadway and Fifteenth 
 street, in the city of Pekin, in the county of Tazewell and State of 
 Illinois. The exact point of crossing established in this decision is 
 marked "A" on the plat filed and made a part of the petition in the 
 above entitled cause. 
 
 It is further ordered that the petitioning road interlock the cross- 
 ing at the above named point with an interlocking system in accord- 
 ance with the rules and requirements of the Board of Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners of the State of Illinois, and that the cost 
 of the construction and future maintenance thereof shall be paid by 
 the petitioning road, and that one half of the cost of the operating 
 expenses of said interlocking plant at said point shall be paid by 
 the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, 
 the respondents herein. 
 
 It is further ordered that the petitioner pay the costs and expenses 
 of the Commission incurred under its petition. 
 
 Springfield, 111., August 23, 1897. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company, 
 
 vs. 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railroad Company. 
 
 Petition to Cross at Grade at Green Valley. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is an application for leave to cross respondent's road at Green 
 Valley at grade. The petition is in the usual form and is based on 
 the provisions of the statute as provided in the 6th paragraph of 
 section 19, of chapter 114, of the act of March 1, Ib72, concerning 
 railroads. Petition also asks that the Commission enter an order fix- 
 ing the place of said crossing at grade and to provide a proper device
 
 351 
 
 and appliance for the protection of said crossing in pursuance of 
 an act entitled, "An act to protect persons and property from danger 
 at the crossings and junctions of railroads by providing a method to 
 compel the protection of the same," in force July 1, 1891. 
 
 Respondent has filed its answer herein denying that the place at 
 which pesitioner seeks to cross respondent's track is a proper and 
 safe place for such crossing, and that a crossing at grade at such 
 place will unnecessarily impede and endanger the travel and trans- 
 portation upon respondent's road, alleging that an overhead crossing 
 would obviate such danger and the delay and impeding of travel and 
 transportation incident to such grade crossing, and that such over- 
 head crossing can be constructed at a reasonable expense to peti- 
 tioner. Respondent offered on the trial of this cause to depress its 
 track four feet at its own expense, in the event that an overhead 
 crossing is ordered. 
 
 It is contended by counsel for petitioner that the right or power 
 in the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners in this State 
 to order an overhead or underneath crossing where one road proposes 
 to construct its line of track across another already constructed and 
 in operation, is doubtful. Under the constitution the right of peti- 
 tioner to condemn its right of way across the respondent's road can 
 not be denied, and any statute which wouJd deny that right would 
 be in contravention to the constitution and the provisions of the act 
 of 1872 permitting the construction and uniting of one road with 
 another, with proper turn-outs, etc., is in full force and effect. In 
 construing the various acts of the Legislature on the subject of rail- 
 road crossings in this State, passed since the adoption of the consti- 
 tution of 1870, there is, in the opinion of the Commission, no conflict 
 whatever. 
 
 Uuder the act entitled "An act in relation to the crossing of one 
 railroad by another, and to prevent danger to life and property from 
 grade crossings," in force July 1, 1889, the Commission is expressly 
 clothed to prescribe "the place where and the manner in which said 
 crossing shall be made." But with the question of compensation for 
 property actually taken for such crossing, and the damages resulting 
 therefrom, the Commission has nothing to do. Those questions are 
 to be determined under the laws of eminent domain, and this statute 
 does not in any way conflict with the constitution or any statute on 
 the subject of railroad crossings in this State. The act of 1891 was 
 passed for the purpose of furnishing means of protection to grade 
 crossings on railroads already constructed and in operation, and on 
 such railroads as shall hereafter cross each other at grade, but this 
 statute does not conflict in any way with the act of 1889. The acts 
 of 1872 and 1891 do not give an absolute right in one road to cross 
 the main line of another at grade. When a proper case is brought 
 before this Commission, raising the question as to the place and 
 manner that a proposed line of railroad shall cross the main line of 
 another railroad already in operation, this Commission has full 
 power to prescribe an overhead or underneath crossing if, in their 
 opinion, the facts warrant such an order. The act of 1889 was passed
 
 352 
 
 expressly for this purpose. The language of the statute is broad, 
 and, while the words overhead or underneath are not expressly used,, 
 much broader and more comprehensive language is used. 
 
 The danger to life and property from grade crossings has been 
 frightfully demonstrated in this State, and no ingenuity of man has 
 yet found a device or appliance that will absolutely prevent all 
 danger at grade crossings. 
 
 With the number of railroads in operation in the State of Illinois,, 
 carrying, as they do, thousands of people daily, and recognizing, as 
 we must, that however strict the rules and regulations thrown around 
 employes, and however much vigilence they may exercise, they have 
 proven ineffectual to protect the lives of passengers and of the em- 
 ployed themselves. The trainmen become accustomed to these grade 
 crossings and look upon them as common affairs, and trains are run 
 at high rates of speed over these crossings provided with interlock- 
 ing devices, and fearful accidents have occurred. This is a matter of 
 common experience. Private inconveniences and cost must yield to 
 public necessity, and, while the cost of an overhead crossing in this 
 case will be much larger than a grade crossing, yet the protection to 
 life and property require it. 
 
 The present Railroad and Warehouse Commission has fully 
 determined, where physical conditions will permit, and in proper 
 cases, not to order grade crossings in the construction of new lines 
 of railroads within this State. The lives of the traveling public and 
 of the employes of the many railroads operating in this State are 
 more to be considered than the mere question of cost. 
 
 The petition and answer filed in this case, and the evidence taken, 
 bring this case under the provisions of the act of 1889. 
 
 It appears from the evidence submitted in this case that the 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company operates ten trains 
 daily, that is, five each way, over its line at the point of the proposed 
 crossing. It further appears from the evidence that from the loca- 
 tion of the side track of the respondent at Green Valley that trains 
 approaching from the southeast that desire to head in on the side 
 track would have to stop on the crossing, if a grade crossing should 
 be permitted. It further appears that the physical conditions are 
 such that an overhead crossing can be constructed at an estimated 
 cost of $20,000. 
 
 The Commission therefore finds that, with due regard to the safety 
 of life and property, it will be necessary, to construct an overhead 
 crossing at the crossing of said railroads. 
 
 The Commission further finds that a grade crossing at this point, 
 and in the manner provided by the petition, would impede and en- 
 danger travel and transportation at said point on the Peoria, Decatur 
 & Evansville Railroad.
 
 353 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is hereby ordered and adjudged that the petitioner, the St. 
 Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company, have leave, and is 
 hereby empowered, to cross with its tracks the main line and track of 
 the respondent, the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company, 
 by an overhead crossing, leaving twenty-two feet in the clear, that 
 is, the lower part of the superstructure of the said overhead crossing 
 shall be twenty- two feet above the top of the rails of the said Peoria, 
 Decatur & Evansville Railway Company. The measurement to 
 commence at the top of the rails of the said respondent, the Peoria, 
 Decatur & Evansville Railway Company, after the said respondent 
 shall have depressed its track four feet, according to the agreement 
 of the receiver of said road made in this cause. 
 
 The point of crossing shall be fifteen feet, more or less, west of 
 the north and south center line of section 35, township 23 north, 
 range 5 west of the 3d P. M., in the county of Tazewell, in the State 
 of Illinois, more clearly shown by the plat, marked "Exhibit One," 
 filed by the respondent in this cause. 
 
 It is further ordered and adjudged that the said petitioner shall 
 pay all the cost of the construction and future maintenance of said 
 crossing. 
 
 It is further ordered that, according to the agreement made by the 
 said Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company, in this cause 
 filed, that the said Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company 
 depress its tracks four feet at the point of the above mentioned 
 crossing at its own expense. 
 
 It is further ordered that the petitioner pay the cost and expenses 
 of the Commission incurred under its petition. 
 
 It is further ordered that permission be, and the same is hereby, 
 granted to the said petitioner, the St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Rail- 
 way Company, to construct at grade temporary tracks and 
 crossings to be used, if necessary, for the construction of the over- 
 head crossing in this order described. Said temporary tracks and 
 grade crossings to be removed within one year from the date of this 
 order. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be further held under con- 
 sideration until the completion of said overhead crossing and the re- 
 moval of said temporary tracks and grade crossings aforesaid. 
 
 SPRINGFIELD, ILL., August 23, 1897. 
 
 23 O.
 
 354 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Illinois Central Railroad Company 
 
 vs. 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company. 
 
 Petition for the Protection of the Crossing of Said Roads at Mattoon, 
 
 Illinois. 
 
 September 7, 1897. Petition filed. 
 
 September 8, 1897. Copy of same sent respondent. 
 
 September 8, 1897. Date of viewing set for September 13, 3 p. m. 
 
 September 13, 1897. Crossing viewed by the Commission. 
 
 September 18, 1897. Hearing set for October 2, 1897. Parties 
 notified. 
 
 September 22, 1897. Date of hearing changed to October 5, 1897. 
 
 September 22, 1897. Change in date sent to both parties. 
 
 October 2, 1897. Date of 'hearing reset for October 11. 
 
 October 2, 1897. Both parties notified of change. 
 
 October 9, 1897. Answer of respondent filed. 
 
 October 11, 1897. Case called at 10 a. m. Evidence heard, and 
 matter taken under advisement by Commission. 
 
 January 4, 1898. Opinion and order recorded. 
 
 Colonel Gwin, representing petitioner. 
 Mr. Horton, for respondent. 
 
 OPINION OF THE COMMISSION, BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition for the protection of the crossing of the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company and the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville 
 Railway Company, at Mattoon, Illinois. 
 
 Petition by the Illinois Central Railroad Company was filed, and 
 answer made thereto by the respondent, the Peoria, Decatur & 
 Evansville Railway Company. Petition is filed under the provisions 
 of the present statute governing interlocking devices. The evidence 
 has been heard, and the Commission has made an examination of 
 the crossing in question. 
 
 It is contended that, by virtue of a contract heretofore made by the 
 Grayville & Mattoon Railroad Company with the petitioner, the Il- 
 linois Central Railroad Company, that the respondent should pay
 
 355 
 
 the cost of constructing, maintaining and operating said interlocking 
 system. The contract was made at the time of the crossing by the 
 Mattoon & Grayville Railroad of the Illinois Central Railroad, since 
 which time the respondent has succeeded to the right of the said 
 Mattoon & Grayville Railroad Company. 
 
 We have carefully examined the briefs filed by the petitioner and 
 the respondent, and the law governing the contract in question. The 
 contract provides that the Mattoon & Grayville Railroad Company 
 should erect and maintain gates and supply watchmen at said 
 crossing. 
 
 The petition for an interlocker, under our present statute, in no 
 way could be controlled or regulated by the contract in question. We 
 are further of the opinion that the covenants in said contract would 
 not be binding upon the respondent, the Peoria, Decatur & Evans- 
 ville Railroad Company, so far as it affects the question involved in 
 the constructing and maintaining of an interlocking system at the 
 crossing in question. 
 
 As to the right of the Illinois Central Railroad Company to main- 
 tain an action against the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway 
 Company under the contract in question, to compel the respondent 
 to maintain gates and watchmen at said crossing, we express no 
 opinion. The question does not arise in this proceeding. 
 
 We are of the opinion that an interlocking system should be con- 
 structed, maintained and operated at the crossing in question for the 
 safety of the public. 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is, therefore, ordered by the Commission, that the said com- 
 panies, to- wit: the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the Peo- 
 ria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company forthwith proceed to 
 protect the said railroad crossing at Mattoon, Illinois, by an inter- 
 locking system acceptable to the Commission. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission, that each of said railroad 
 companies shall pay such proportion of the cost of constructing, 
 erecting and maintaining the said interlocking system, and all 
 thereto appertaining, as the number of levers that shall operate the 
 switches, signals and other parts of the said interlocking system 
 in and for the respective tracks of the said companies shall bear to 
 the whole number of levers required in said interlocking system, 
 and each of the said companies shall pay one-half the cost of oper- 
 ating the said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission, that this petition be held 
 under consideration by the Commission pending the efforts of the 
 petitioner and respondent to agree upon a plan of interlocking, for 
 which purpose they shall be allowed a period of sixty days from and 
 after this date. 
 
 Dated Springfield, Illinois, January 4, 1898. 
 Adopted January 4, 1898.
 
 356 
 
 BEFORE THE KAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 O. L. Brining, of Le Roy, Illinois, 
 
 vs. 
 
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, and 
 
 The Illinois Central Railroad Company (cited by the 
 
 Commission as a party in interest.) 
 
 Complaint and petition that the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and 
 St. Louis be compelled to replace a certain Y connection track 
 which said company tore up. 
 
 Petition and complaint filed November 12; answer of the Cleve- 
 land, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company filed 
 November 20, 1897; evidence heard and petition taken under ad- 
 visement January 4, 1898; petition denied and complaint dismissed 
 February 8, 1898. 
 
 O. L. Brining, representing himself. 
 
 Moss, Hudson, Jamieson & Keepers, representing the^Illinoi& 
 Central. 
 
 Mr. C. V. Jaquith, representing the Cleveland, Cincinnati^ 
 Chicago & St. Louis. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a complaint filed by O. L. Brining, of Le Roy, 111., against 
 the two above named railroad companies, charging that the Cleve- 
 land, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, on the 10th 
 day of October, 1897, took up a portion of a certain Y track con- 
 necting the Illinois Central Railroad and the said Cleveland, Cin- 
 cinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway at the point above mentioned. 
 
 It appears from the proof in this case that several years ago, when 
 this portion of the Illinois Central Railroad Company was owned by 
 a different corporation, and was a narrow gauge road, this connection 
 was built. 
 
 The statute permits railroads which cross or intersect each other 
 to enter into an agreement to make proper connections between each 
 other, and, on failure to agree, proceedings could be had at law com- 
 pelling such connection to be made. (Hurd, '97, S. 20, P. 6, p. 1240.)
 
 357 
 
 The statute further provides in the same connection, that "all 
 railroad companies incorporated or organized, or which may be in- 
 corporated or organized, as aforesaid, shall have the right to connect 
 with each other and with the railroads of other states on such terms 
 as shall be mutually agreed upon by the companies interested in 
 such connection." (Hurd, '98, S. 45, p. 1245.) 
 
 It will be seen from these two provisions of the statute that this 
 connection was legally made, and was duly authorized under the 
 law. The question here presented is, has either of the above men- 
 tioned railroad companies the right to terminate this contract and 
 terminate the connection between the two lines? 
 
 It appears from the proof that the complainant's elevator is sit- 
 uated on the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad Company. 
 It is insisted by him that he has a right to use the Y track for the 
 purpose of transferring grain from his elevator on the Illinois Central 
 tracks to the line of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis 
 tracks at that point for the purpose of shipment over the said last 
 mentioned company's road. That this Y connection is a matter of 
 considerable convenience to him can not be questioned, but when the 
 elevator was built on the line of railroad of the Illinois Central it is 
 to be presumed that he could only rightfully insist upon the facili- 
 ties afforded him by the railroad upon whose track this elevator is 
 situated. While the removal of this Y connection might inconven- 
 ience a shipper whose elevator was upon a different road, yet the 
 same thing could be insisted upon at any other point where a con- 
 nection is made between two railroad companies by a shipper who 
 desires to avail himself of such connection. To illustrate: If there 
 was no connection between the two roads at Le Roy, but at a point 
 20 miles distant from Le Roy a connection was made between the 
 said companies, it could as well be insisted that the shipper would 
 have a right to have the connection maintained at said point 20 
 miles distant. In this view we can not concur. The Y connection at 
 Le Roy, from the proof, was shown to exist merely by agreement be- 
 tween the two lines. The proof further shows that it has ceased to 
 be used as a transfer track for car load lots from one road to the 
 other for a long time. 
 
 This being the case, we are of the opinion that the above men- 
 tioned railroad companies have a right to discontinue the connection 
 and use of the Y track. The cost of maintaining this track is a mat- 
 ter of some consideration, and, so long as the railroad companies 
 have ceased to use it for the purpose of transacting business between 
 the two lines, and, in view of the fact that the complainant has 
 ample facilities on the line on which he is situated, we are of the 
 opinion that the removal of the track was not in violation of any law 
 of this State. 
 
 Petition denied and complaint dismissed.
 
 358 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Postal Telegraph Company 
 
 vs. 
 Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company. 
 
 Petition to Compel Respondent to Deliver Material Between Stations. 
 
 August 10, 1897. Complaint filed. 
 
 July 28, 1898. Evidence heard, and case taken under advisement. 
 
 August 24, 1898. Case decided and opinion and order on file. 
 
 Appearances: Mr. J. R. Mclntosh, for petitioner; Mr. Lansden 
 and Mr. Herbert, for respondent. 
 
 OPINION AND ORDER BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition filed by the Postal Telegraph Company asking 
 for an order compelling the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company to dis- 
 tribute the poles and material for the construction of a line of tele- 
 graph between stations, the petition setting forth that it was the pur- 
 pose of the said Postal Telegraph Company to construct a line of 
 telegraph from Cairo, Illinois, to East St. Louis, in connection with 
 a line extending to Mobile, Alabama. 
 
 The petition above mentioned was filed on August 10, 1897, and 
 the case was called for hearing on September 7, 1897, at which time 
 representatives of both petitioner and respondent appeared before 
 the Commission, and the counsel for respondent thereupon entered a 
 motion asking that the matter be continued for the reason that an 
 injunction had been granted by the Circuit Court of the county of 
 Jackson restraining the said Postal Telegraph Company from con- 
 structing its line of telegraph on the right of way of the said respond- 
 ent. The case was continued pending the hearing of the injunction 
 suit. 
 
 On July 9, 1898, the injunction was dissolved by Judge Vickers, 
 Circuit Judge of the county of Jackson, whereupon the petitioner 
 prayed for a hearing upon its petition. The case was set for trial on 
 July 28, 1898, at which time it was heard. 
 
 The main ground upon which the petition is based is the fact that 
 the said respondent did distribute the poles and material for the con- 
 struction and repair of the telegraph line of the Western Union Tele-
 
 359 
 
 graph Company between stations, and that the refusal upon the part 
 of the respondent to render a like service for the petitioner was un- 
 just discrimination within the statute of Illinois governing unjust 
 discrimination. 
 
 The respondent, the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company, filed its 
 answer to the above mentioned petition, which answer set forth that 
 upon the ]6th day of June, 1896, the said respondent entered into a 
 contract with the Western Union Telegraph Company, under and by 
 which contract the said respondent agreed to distribute the poles and 
 materials between stations for the construction and repair of the tele- 
 graph line of the said Western Union Telegraph Company. In con- 
 sideration of which the Western Union Telegraph Company agreed 
 to furnish the respondent, among other things, one wire for the busi- 
 ness of the railroad company, exclusively, from Jackson, Tennessee, 
 to St. Louis, Missouri, to be operated in connection with the railroad 
 company's wire from Mobile, Alabama, to Jackson, Tennessee. The 
 telegraph company further agreed to set apart for the joint use of 
 both the telegraph company and the respondent, for the transaction 
 of railroad and commercial business, one wire on its poles from Mo- 
 bile to St. Louis, and one wire on branches where the telegraph com- 
 pany may have telegraph lines, it being understood in case of inter- 
 ruption to the exclusive railroad wires that important railroad mes- 
 sages, directing the running of trains, should have precedent on said 
 joint wire along said railroad, and such messages should, also, have 
 precedent on joint wires along branch railroads so far as the same 
 legally may. It was further agreed upon the part of the Western 
 Union Telegraph Company that if, at any time, the railroad company 
 should require the exclusive use of more than the wires above men- 
 tioned it should have the right to appropriate to its own use one ad- 
 ditional wire upon the poles of the Western Union Telegraph Com- 
 pany upon giving sixty days' notice in writing thereof to the tele- 
 graph company, and upon paying to the telegraph company the value 
 of such wire upon the poles, including the insulators thereunto be- 
 longing, or that the railroad company might, at its own expense, erect 
 such wire on such poles in such position as the telegraph company 
 might designate. 
 
 This is as much of said answer as is necessary, in our opinion, to 
 refer to for the decision of this case. 
 
 It was insisted by the petitioner that the agreement to distribute 
 wires, poles and other necessary material for the Western Union 
 Telegraph Company, by virtue of said contract, between stations, and 
 a refusal to perform a like service for the Postal Telegraph Company 
 constituted unjust discrimination. 
 
 The unjust discrimination provided by our statute refers only to 
 any "unjust discrimination in rates or charges of toll or compensa- 
 tion for the transportation of passengers or freight of any descrip- 
 tion, or for the use and transportation of any railroad car." (Chap. 
 114, Sec. 125, H's R. S., '97.) 
 
 The discrimination complained of here is not an unjust discrim- 
 ination under our statute.
 
 360 
 
 The next question that presents itself, is it an unjust discrimina- 
 tion at common law? 
 
 The rule laid down by the clear weight of authority at common 
 law is that "a railroad carrier, so far as concerns the receipt and 
 transportation of goods, however it may be as to rates of freight, 
 must, where the conditions and circumstances are identical, treat all 
 shippers alike. It can not furnish facilities to some shippers and 
 deny them to other shippers, unless there is a difference in the con- 
 ditions or circumstances such as make a discrimination a just one." 
 (Elliott on R. R., Vol. 4, Sec. 1468, and authorities cited.) 
 
 On an examination of the authorities under this rule, it will be 
 seen that this rule only applies to the delivery of goods at regular 
 stations or stopping places. No well considered case can be found 
 which holds that it is a duty that the railroad company owes to the 
 shipper or the public to stop its trains at any other than regular 
 stations. 
 
 In the case under consideration the respondent entered into a con- 
 tract with the Western Union Telegraph Company, by which con- 
 tract it receives special benefits. This contract is legal and binding 
 both upon the Western Union Telegraph Company and the railroad 
 company so far as the construction and operation of its telegraph 
 line is concerned. In consideration of the special benefits derived 
 by the respondent it agreed to distribute the poles and material 
 between stations. To hold that the railroad company would be bound 
 to perform the same services for any other telegraph company that 
 might see fit, by condemnation or otherwise, to pass over or along 
 its right of way without receiving any benefit therefrom, would be 
 destroying the right of contract. 
 
 The proof in this case does not bring it within the rule, as laid 
 down in Elliot on Railroads, supra. "The conditions are not iden- 
 tical." There is a wide difference in the conditions and circum- 
 stances which makes the seeming discrimination here a just one. 
 
 The case cited by counsel for petitioner, Mercantile Trust Co. vs. 
 Atl. & P. R. R. Co.. 63 Federal, p. 915, does not militate against the 
 rule here announced. 
 
 In that case an application was made to the receivers of the Atl. & 
 Pac. R. R. Co. by the Postal Telegraph Company for an order re- 
 quiring the railroad company to distribute the necessary material 
 between the regular stations and the furnishing of water to the force 
 engaged in the construction of their line. A brief extract from that 
 opinion shows an entirely different state of facts than is presented by 
 this record. 
 
 The Court says on page 915 of the opinion: 
 
 "The evidence shows what is also judicially known to the court 
 that the right of way of the Atl. & Pac. Ry. Co. between the Needles 
 and Mojave is over a desert country, and that the railroad company, 
 through the receivers, has possession and control of all the available 
 water supply upon and along the right of way. Evidence was also 
 given to the effect that it was customary for the railroad company to
 
 361 
 
 furnish miners and other parties at and between the stations with 
 water for their necessities upon compensation paid therefor, and that 
 the poles and other materials can be distributed and water furnished 
 to the petitioner without any inconvenience and in acccordance with 
 the usual and ordinary method of transacting the business of the 
 railroad between the Needles and Mojave." 
 
 It is apparent in the case cited that it was customary for the rail- 
 road company to furnish water between stations to all parties not in 
 the employ of the railroad company performing any labor between 
 the regular stations between the two points named. The railroad 
 passed through a desert country. The regular stations were at long 
 intervals. The railroad was in the hands of receivers, who were 
 operating the road and were clothed with a large discretion in the 
 matter, and under the peculiar facts existing in the case the court 
 made an order providing for the distribution of poles and materials 
 between stations. This case is clearly not in point. 
 
 It can not be maintained that because a railroad company should 
 stop its train between stations to permit a passenger to alight on one 
 or two occasions that it would thereafter be bound, or owe any duty 
 to the public or any one, to perform a like service for some one else. 
 Or, if a railroad company should see proper, under certain circum- 
 stances, to deliver freight at a point between stations, that it would 
 be bound as a matter of law to stop at such point and deliver freight 
 for other persons, or for the public in general. Nor can it be suc- 
 cessfully maintained that if a railroad company makes a contract by 
 which it is itself specially benefited, to deliver material between sta- 
 tions for the construction and operation of a line of telegraph which 
 is necessary to the operation of the railroad, that it should be bound 
 to distribute like materals for other telegraph companies from whom 
 it derives no special benefit, by contract or otherwise, and that its re- 
 fusal so to do would constitute unjust discrimination. 
 
 The only duty incumbent upon the respondent in this case is to 
 receive, transport and deliver the poles and materials for the Postal 
 Telegraph Company at its regular stations upon proper compensation 
 being paid therefor. 
 
 Under the condemnation proceedings the Postal Telegraph Com- 
 pany has an easement over the right of way of the Mobile & Ohio 
 Railroad Company, which gives it the right to enter upon the right 
 of way of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad Company at any point neces- 
 sary for the construction of its line. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that the prayer of the petitioner be denied 
 and that the petition be dismissed. 
 
 Dated SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, August 23, 1898.
 
 362 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 H. A. Hammond, on |Behalf of the Citizens of Wyoming, Illinois, 
 
 vs. 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company. 
 
 Petition for the Removal of Depot. 
 
 For Petitioner: H. A. Hammond. 
 For Respondent: Mr. W. C. Brown. 
 
 Petitioners against removal: Mr. A. H. Castle and J. H. Clock, 
 and Attorney C. L. Billings. 
 
 OPINION AND ORDER BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is an application in the matter of the location of a freight and 
 passenger depot on the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy -Railroad at 
 Wyoming, Illinois. 
 
 The original application in this case asked for the removal of the 
 present railroad station at what is known as North Wyoming to what 
 is known as South Wyoming. 
 
 The Commission has examined the evidence introduced by the 
 parties in interest, and is of the opinion that it has no power in the 
 premises to compel the removal of a depot on the line of any railroad 
 from one given point to another. 
 
 The evidence in this case shows that a large proportion of the pop- 
 ulation and business interests of Wyoming is located in what is 
 known as South Wyoming, and that there is a large amount of freight 
 and passenger business emanating from that point. The evidence 
 further shows that there is a necessity for the location of a pas- 
 senger and freight depot at South Wyoming. 
 
 The statute in this State provides: "That all railroads in this State 
 carrying passengers or freight be, and they are hereby, required to 
 build and maintain depots for the comfort of passengers and for the 
 protection of shippers of freight where such railroad companies 
 are in the practice of receiving and delivering passengers and 
 freight, in all towns and villages having a population of two hun- 
 dred or more on the line of their road and roads leased or oper- 
 ated by them." (Chap. 114, S. 50, H's R. S. '97.)
 
 363 
 
 The proof in this case further shows that South Wyoming has a 
 population of over two hundred, and that the Cnicago, Burlington & 
 Quincy Railroad Company has been in the habit of receiving and 
 delivering freight at a point in South Wyoming where it is pro- 
 posed to construct a new depot. 
 
 This, in the opinion of the Commission, is sufficient to bring the 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company under the pro- 
 visions of the above section referred to. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
 Railroad Company, within ninety (90) days from this date, shall con- 
 struct a suitable railroad and passenger station at such a point at 
 South Wyoming as shall best accommodate the people and the busi- 
 ness interests therein represented. 
 
 It is further ordered that this cause be continued for such further 
 action in the premises as may be necessary. 
 
 It is further ordered that the Secretary of the Board shall serve 
 said Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company with a copy 
 of this order and opinion. 
 
 Done at Springfield, Illinois, August 23, 1898. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OP THE 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 IN THE MATTER OF THE REVISION OF THE SCHEDULE OF RATES ON 
 
 LIVE STOCK. 
 
 A petition in this cause was filed by the Chicago Live Stock Ex- 
 change of Chicago against the various railroads in Illinois, asking 
 for a revision of the schedule of rates on live stock. The parties 
 appeared on the fourth day of May, 1897, when the petition was dis- 
 missed on motion of the defendants on the ground that the Chicago 
 Live Stock Exchange was not an interested party under the rules of 
 procedure of the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission, 
 whereupon leave was granted to various stock shippers and owners in 
 the State of Illinois to file a petition in said cause, which petitions 
 were filed, setting up the same cause of action. The various rail- 
 roads filed their respective answers thereto. 
 
 The petition charges that the petitioners are engaged in the busi- 
 ness of feeding and shipping live stock in the State of Illinois, and 
 that the live stock owned, fed, shipped and sold by them is habit- 
 ually shipped over the lines of defendants' railroads; second, that 
 the defendants are common carriers, engaged in the transportation 
 of passengers and freight by railroad, and as such common carriers.
 
 364 
 
 are subject to the laws of the State of Illinois; third, that tho 
 published rates of the defendants' lines on live stock between points 
 in Illinois are unreasonably high and extortionate, and that the said 
 tariffs of defendants' lines on live stock are generally based on the 
 schedule of maximum rates authorized by the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission of the State of Illinois, and that the rates on 
 live stock contained in said schedule of rates are unreasonably high ; 
 fourth, that it has been, and is, the custom of the def ndant rail- 
 ways to so adjust their rates on live stock between points wholly 
 within the State of Illinois so as to exact the full measure of charges 
 which they are permitted by said schedule of the Illinois Board of 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners to collect, without any re- 
 gard to the conditions surrounding and which ordinarily are consid- 
 ered controlling factors in the adjustment of rates; fifth, that the 
 rates at which defendant railways carry live stock from points in 
 Illinois are adjusted on a scale so much higher than the rates from 
 points within the State of Illinois to points in Indiana, Ohio or 
 New York, that it has made it unprofitable for Illinois shippers to 
 ship live stock to Illinois markets, and has resulted in discrimination 
 against the Illinois markets and unreasonable and undue preference 
 in favor of other markets; that the defendant railways decline to ad- 
 just their rates on live stock between points in Illinois to a basis 
 reasonably fair, just and equitable. 
 
 Accompanying the petition and made a part thereof is a proposed 
 schedule of rates on live stock submitted by the petitioners, which 
 they ask the Commission to adoot. 
 
 The defendant railways admit that they are common carriers, etc. 
 They deny that the schedule of maximum rates authorized by the 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission on live stock is unreasonably 
 high, but insist that they are unreasonably low. The defendants 
 admit that the tariffs of defendants' lines on live stock are generally 
 based on the schedule of maximum rates authorized by the Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission. The defendant railways deny that it 
 has been and is their general custom to so adjust their rates on live 
 stock between points wholly within the State of Illinois so as to 
 exact the full measure of charges which they are permitted by law 
 to collect, without regard to surrounding conditions, etc. The de- 
 fendant railways further deny that the rates on live stock from points 
 in Illinois to points in Indiana, Ohio and New York are adjusted on 
 a scale so much lower than the rates applying wholly within the 
 State of Illinois, so as to discriminate against Illinois markets, and 
 aver that if there is any discrimination against Illinois markets on 
 live stock shipments it arises from the excessive and exhorbitant com- 
 missions charged shippers of live stock by the commission merchants 
 at the Union Stock Yards and the excessive charges of the Union 
 Stock Yards and Transit Company for handling such live stock at 
 the Union Stock Yards. Defendant railways further deny that the 
 proposed schedule of rates offered by petitioners would be fair and 
 just, but, on the contrary, would be unjust, unfair and inequitable.
 
 365 
 
 In the decision of all cases brought before this Commission, it is 
 the duty incumbent upon us to consider the results as they will affect 
 all interested parties the investor or employer, the employ^ and the- 
 general public. 
 
 The law contemplates that we shall be the custodian of the inter- 
 ests of these three great classes, and in the performance of this duty 
 it is necessary that we shall consider how a reduction of rates would 
 affect, not only the railroad company itself, but the employe's and the 
 public. 
 
 The annual report of this Board shows that, for the year ending 
 June 30, 1897, there was a total decrease in the revenues of the roads 
 in all departments in Illinois of $2,338,541. The result of this de- 
 crease in receipts affected more materially the employes of the roads 
 than any one else, because the records show that the decrease in the 
 number of employes was 3,151 and that the decrease in the amount 
 of salaries paid was over one million dollars. 
 
 This report further shows that while there was a decrease in the 
 earnings of the roads of almost two millions and a half dollars, a de- 
 crease in the number of employe's of more than three thonsand, a 
 decrease in the salaries paid to the employe's of over a million dollars, 
 that the amount of freight carried was increased by 619,314 tons, 
 which is evidence that a larger amount of business was done by the 
 railroads with a less number of employes. 
 
 In this case a petition was presented to the Board, signed by twenty 
 thousand railroad employe's, asking that the freight rates on live 
 stock should not be reduced. This petition was presented by men 
 who are at the heads of different organizations, representing seventy 
 thousand railroad employe's in the State of Illinois. 
 
 It must be admitted by all fair-minded men that the railroads, hav- 
 ing just emerged from the long period of depression brought about 
 by the false economic policies of the government, which drove many 
 of them into bankruptcy, and into the hands of receivers, are in no 
 condition, at this time, to stand a further reduction in freight rates, 
 when the evidence shows that, in the last 30 years, those rates have 
 been cut in two. 
 
 In view of these and other conditions, which it is not necessary 
 here to reiterate, it is evident that any reduction in rates would ma- 
 terially affect the wages of those seventy thousand railroad employe's, 
 and it necessarily follows that their diminished capacity to earn 
 would lessen their consumption of the products of all who produce 
 the necessaries of life. 
 
 This is the most progressive age in the world's history; this the 
 most progressive nation. Our railroad systems have made the most 
 rapid progress in the way of rapid transit and facilities, and our rail- 
 road employe's are the best that the world produces, and the tendency 
 of the present condition of traffic is to largely increase the number 
 of employes, and we do not feel that it is justice to the employe's or 
 to -the public to lower the present live stock rates, which would af- 
 fect their existing wages, which, to say the least, are now only re- 
 munerative.
 
 366 
 
 After having passed through the condition that existed from 1893 
 to 1896, in which period all business interests of the country had suf- 
 fered materially, and all evidence now indicating that the country is 
 on the eve of prosperity, it would be unwise to make a material re- 
 duction in rates that might seriously cripple the railroads of the 
 country, which are the arteries of the progress of the nation. 
 
 A large mass of testimony has been taken bearing upon the sub- 
 ject at issue. The case has taken a wide range and many questions 
 discussed and facts submitted that are not necessary to be considered 
 in the decision of the case. Much has been said, and many exhibits 
 offered, showing through rates from Southern Illinois points to east- 
 ern markets, and from Kansas City to Chicago. It would, perhaps, 
 be a sufficient answer to so much of the case that presents the ques- 
 tion of interstate rates to say that the Commission has no power 
 over such rates, and could not change them if it should desire so to 
 do, but, in so far as such rates may be used in comparison with the 
 Illinois rates, it is proper to consider them. Nearly every rate which 
 has been suggested for comparison by the petitioners in this case was 
 over through lines running from the Mississippi river to the sea- 
 board, and the rates complained of are those of intersecting lines 
 crossing the through lines from the west to east. It was not shown 
 that such rates were remunerative or otherwise. 
 
 It must be conceded that the east and west lines, passing through 
 the State of Illinois, are entitled to a fair share of the business trib- 
 utary to their lines, and that points where they cross north and 
 south lines are clearly competitive territory. The east and west 
 lines, acting under the influence and control of eastern trunk sys- 
 tems, and the desire to secure what each may conceive to be its 
 share of traffic from competitive territory, will change rates from 
 time to time so as to, as nearly as possible, secure such share of the 
 competitive traffic. It has not been shown in this case that the east 
 and west lines are carrying more than they are entitled to of the 
 competitive traffic. A reduction of rates made by this Commission 
 solely upon the ground of reducing the present Illinois rates so as 
 to make them equal to the east and west rates at these competitive 
 points, upon the theory that such a course would result in more stock 
 being shipped to Chicago from such points, would not bring about 
 the effect sought; because it can not be supposed for a moment that 
 the east and west lines would submit to such wholesale diversion of 
 traffic from their lines, but the logical conclusion is that they would 
 promptly reduce their rates to meet the rates so fixed by the Com- 
 mission, and the same condition of things would exist as before the 
 reduction, and, therefore, the very object sought would not be at- 
 tained, and no more stock would go from such points to Chicago than 
 at present. 
 
 The proposed schedule offered by petitioners, if adopted by the 
 Commission, would not reduce the Illinois rates at these intersect- 
 ing points to a basis as low as the east and west rates now are at such 
 points.
 
 367 
 
 If the rates in Illinois are to be reduced so as to remedy the con- 
 dition at these intersecting points, they must be made lower than 
 the schedule proposed by the petitioners. 
 
 It must be remembered that the east and west lines traversing the 
 State of Illinois bear their burden of taxation and contribute their 
 support to the public school fund, the road and bridge fund, and all 
 other forms of local taxation, the same as north and south lines trav- 
 ersing the State entering the city of Chicago. 
 
 The Commission is bound to act fairly and justly to all lines in the 
 State of Illinois without regard to which way they run or what mar- 
 ket they enter. 
 
 In all the contests waged in the legislatures of the various states, 
 the Congress of the United States, and the several courts of the dif- 
 ferent states for the control of the railroads by the power that cre- 
 ated them, no law has gone further than to claim the right to fix the 
 maximum rates by the body created by the state for that purpose 
 and to punish discrimination. 
 
 The Illinois Commission has power to fix the maximum rates that 
 a railroad may charge for hauling any kind of freight or passengers, 
 but has no power to fix the minimum rate for hauling the same. The 
 railroad can carry freight at its own price so long as it does not ex- 
 ceed the maximum rate thus fixed, and carries the freight at the 
 same compensation for all shippers from the same point, without in- 
 terference of the Railroad Commission, unless discrimination is 
 proven. This condition will remain so long as the Commission has 
 only power to fix maximum rates. 
 
 The rule of the Inter-State Commerce Commission, that the road 
 can not charge more for the short haul than it does for the long haul, 
 opens wide the doors of competition, and has resulted in the exceed- 
 ing low rates referred to in the evidence. 
 
 Madness seems to have seized many railroad managers, and in 
 their desire to carry freight much of the freight of the country is 
 carried at prices far below actual cost. The conditions have obtained, 
 and this rate cutting has continued, until there is less faith among 
 railroad managers in regard to their agreements to maintain rates 
 than can be found in any other business. There seems to be no 
 good faith, so far as traffic agreements are concerned. 
 
 These facts, together with the depression in railroad business above 
 referred to, in 1893 to 1896, led to the bankruptcy and receiverships 
 referred to of these seaboard lines. 
 
 For this Commission to reduce the rates in Illinois to meet these 
 reckless rates, would be worse than suicide to our Illinois lines, and 
 materially unjust and unfair to one-fifth of our population who are 
 directly interested in the railroads of our State. 
 
 The main question presented by the record in this case is, are the 
 present live stock rates in Illinois too high, and should they be re- 
 duced?
 
 368 
 
 The present schedule of maximum rates on live stock has been in 
 force since July 1, 1895, at which time a general revision of the 
 schedule of maximum rates on all commodities was made. It is not 
 desirable, either for the stock shipper or the railroads, that constant 
 changes in rates should be made. 
 
 The consideration of freight rates is of necessity almost entirely 
 one of comparison. It is not possible, in this case, to adjust rates 
 upon the theory suggested by the Supreme Court of the United 
 States in the Nebraska Rate Case, "that rates should be adjusted 
 so as to yield such a revenue that would pay a fair return on the 
 money invested in the construction and operation of railways." If 
 that is the rule, it would also be fair to consider the cost of raising 
 live stock and transporting it to market in order that the rates should 
 be so adjusted that the stock shipper and raiser might receive a fair 
 return on his investment. There is no evidence in this case touch- 
 ing either of these propositions. 
 
 Comparing the rates on live stock in Illinois with other states 
 practically occupying the same territory, namely: Iowa, Michigan, 
 Wisconsin, Minnesota, Dakota, Missouri and Nebraska, some of 
 which have laws similar to Illinois, it will be found, without almost 
 a single exception, that the live stock rates in Illinois are materially 
 lower than in any other western state. 
 
 It appears from the evidence offered that in Illinois the distance 
 tariff for horses and mules, for car-load lots, in cents per one hundred 
 Ibs. for 100 miles is 10.4; cattle, 9.5; hogs, 13; sheep, 14.4; while 
 in Iowa the rate on horses and mules for the same distance is 12.5; 
 cattle, 11.32; hogs, 10.96; sheep, 16.00 per one hundred Ibs. In 
 Michigan, for a like distance, the rate on horses and mules is $38.50 
 per car; cattle, 17.5; hogs, 17.5; sheep, 17.5 per hundred Ibs. In 
 Wisconsin for a distance of 100 miles the rate on horses and mules 
 is 16.5; cattle, 15; hogs, 18.5; sheep, 18.5 per hundred Ibs. In 
 Minnesota the rate for 100 miles on cattle is 15.; hogs, 15.; and 
 sheep, 15. per hundred Ibs. In Dakota, for the same distance, the 
 rate on cattle is 16.5; hogs, 18.5; sheep, 19.5 per hundred Ibs. 
 
 Thus, it is evident that Illinois has a much lower live stock rate 
 than neighboring states similarly situated. Yet, it might be con- 
 tended that the rates in the adjoining states are too high. That 
 leads us to the consideration of the question of the cost of carrying 
 live stock as compared with the cost of carrying other classes of 
 freight. An average train of live stock, as shown by the proof, con- 
 sists of about 25 cars, while an average train of dead freight consists 
 of about 35 cars. The stock train is required to make quick time 
 and can not be delayed. Any delay is the occasion for a claim for 
 damages should there be an unfavorable change in the market price 
 to the shipper. Stock is required to be watered en route. If an ac- 
 cident occurs by which the stock is injured the loss is necessarily 
 great as compared with accidents to dead freight. The proof shows 
 that free transportation is given to one person accompanying one car 
 of stock and one-half fare for the return trip; and shippers of two or
 
 369 
 
 iree cars are entitled to free transportation for one person to the 
 arket and return; and as the number of cars increases there is a 
 >rresponding increase of the persons entitled to free transportation. 
 
 Under the rule laid down by the Supreme Court of Illinois, per- 
 ms traveling in these stock trains are entitled to recover for per- 
 >nal injuries growing out of any negligence of the railroad company 
 te same as parties traveling on passenger trains. 
 
 It was further shown in the proof that the value of a car load of 
 ittle shipped in a standard car is about $850.00; such valuation 
 nng based on twenty head to the car and on a value of $42.50 per 
 jad. The revenue derived by the railroad company, under the 
 esent rates fixed by the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 on for a distance of 100 miles on a car load of cattle, is $18.05; 
 hile the revenue derived by the railroad company for carrying a 
 ir load of hay, based on nine tons to the car, at $7.50 per ton, mak- 
 :g the car load $67.50 for a distance of 100 miles, is $12.70, A car 
 ad of brick, valued at $48.00 per car, earns for the railroad com- 
 my, for a distance of 100 miles, $30.43. Lumber, valued at $144.00 
 car, earns for the railroad for a carriage of 100 miles, $26.04. Salt, 
 hich has a valuation of $50.40 a car, earns $20.15 per car for a dis- 
 nce of 100 miles. 
 
 A large number of other items of dead freight might be cited to 
 low that the rates for carrying live stock are relatively much lower 
 lan for carrying almost any other commodity. Live stock is among 
 te most valuable of freight carried, and the value of the commodity 
 irried should rightfully be considered in fixing the rate of carriage. 
 
 It further appears in the proof that about ninety per cent of all the 
 irs used for the transportation of live stocti are returned empty, 
 hile only twenty per cent of the cars used for the transportation of 
 ,her commodities are returned empty. 
 
 The present market price of live stock is much higher than at any 
 me since the last revision of live stock rates in this State, and is 
 day paying to the stock raiser a better profit than any other com- 
 odity raised on the farm, and is being transported to market at a 
 slatively lower freight rate than any other commodity of like value. 
 
 The Commission, having carefully examined all the evidence in- 
 oduced, is of the opinion that the present live stock rates in Illi- 
 )is are reasonable and should not be reduced. 
 
 During the progress of the trial of this case in March, 1898, the 
 aestion of the two dollar terminal charge made by the defendants 
 r delivering stock at the Union Stock Yards was raised. There is 
 Dthing in the original petition, or answers filed thereto, touching 
 tis question; but the Commission, with a view of trying to adjust 
 le question of the terminal charge, held several conferences with the 
 spresentatives of the railroad companies and the Union Stock Yards 
 
 Transit Company relative thereto. The Commission is not called 
 pon to decide the question of this terminal charge, as such question 
 
 24 O
 
 370 
 
 is no part of the record in this case. Much of the delay in the de- 
 cision of this case has been occasioned by the attempt to bring about 
 such adjustment. 
 
 The representatives of the railroad companies have stated to the 
 Commission their willingness to take off the two dollar terminal 
 charge provided the Union Stock Yards & Transit Company would 
 take off their trackage charge for the use of the tracks of the said 
 Union Stock Yards & Transit Company from the termini of the 
 various railroads to the Union Stock Yards. The Commission has 
 been unable to secure any agreement between the railroad interests 
 and the stock yard interests looking toward the removal of the ter- 
 minal charge of two dollars or any reduction of the charges made by 
 the Union Stock Yards & Transit Company for trackage, yardage, 
 etc. 
 
 It is shown by the representatives of the railroad companies that 
 the two dollars charges will not more than cover the trackage charge 
 imposed by the Union Stock Yards & Transit Company and the cost 
 of furnishing engines and crews to handle the stock to the Union 
 Stock Yards, and until there is some legislation on this subject the 
 Commission is unable to regulate the charges made by the Union 
 .Stock Yards Company. 
 
 It is, therefore, ordered that the petition be denied, and that the 
 schedule of maximum rates on live stock be and remain the same as 
 now in force. 
 
 Dated Springfield, Illinois, September 8, 1898. 
 
 BEFORE THE KAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company 
 
 vs. 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company. 
 
 Petition to cross at grade at Green Valley. 
 
 Messrs. Conkling & Grout, for petitioner. 
 Stevens' & Horton, for respondent. 
 
 This application having come on to be further heard upon the pe 
 tition of the St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Railway Company for t 
 vacation of the order entered herein August 23, 1897, whereby it wag
 
 371 
 
 ordered that an overhead crossing be constructed at the place indi- 
 cated in the original petition, and that in lieu thereof the said peti- 
 tioner be allowed to cross with its track the main line and track of 
 the respondent at grade, and the Commission having heard the evi- 
 dence, and the respondent not objecting to the change in said orig- 
 inal order, as prayed: It is therefore ordered and decided that the 
 original order entered herein August 23, 1897, requiring the con- 
 struction of an overhead crossing at the place described in said peti- 
 tion be, and the same is hereby, vacated. 
 
 It is further ordered and decided that the petitioner, the St. Louis, 
 Peoria & Northern Railway Company, have leave to cross with its 
 track at grade the track of the respondent, Peoria, Decatur & Evans- 
 ville Railway Company, at the place specified in the original petition 
 on file in this cause, right of way for such crossing being first ob- 
 tained by agreement, or in the manner provided by law, in case the 
 parties hereto fail to agree. 
 
 It is further ordered that the crossing of tracks to be thus formed 
 be protected by a system of interlocking signals and switches to be 
 agreed upon by the parties, with this Commission's approval, if the 
 parties are able to agree, the first cost of such interlocking machine, 
 the expense of putting the same in, the expense of maintaining the 
 same in good order and repair, and all other expenses and cost of 
 such interlocking appliances, and of putting them in, and the future 
 maintenance thereof, and also all present and future expenses of the 
 operation of said plant, to be paid for by the said St. Louis, Peoria 
 & Northern Railway Company, its successors and assigns. Neither 
 the Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Company, nor its Re- 
 ceiver, nor any purchaser or future owner of its property, to be at 
 ,ny expense, present or future, touching the construction, mainte- 
 nance, operation, or otherwise, of said interlocking plant or appli- 
 ances. 
 
 It is further ordered that this petition be held under consideration 
 Tjy the Commission pending the efforts of petitioner and respondent 
 to agree upon a plan of interlocking. 
 
 It is further ordered that said interlocking plant should be fully 
 completed and in operation by or before January 1, 1899.
 
 372 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Citizens' Coal Mining Company, a corporation, 
 
 vs. 
 Chicago & Alton Railroad Company. 
 
 Excess Switching Charges. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Complainant, Mr. Wilson. 
 For Respondent, Wm. Brown. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The petitioner in this case avers that the Chicago & Alton Railroad 
 Company demanded and received five dollars per car for switching 
 cars loaded with coal from the junction of the said Chicago & Alton 
 Railroad Company with the St. Louis, Chicago & St. Paul Railway 
 Company to the Alton Railway & Illuminating Company, which is 
 situated on the line of the said Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, 
 and not a regular station, and which is less than two miles from the 
 junction aforesaid. 
 
 The respondent did not deny that it charged five dollars per car 
 for switching carloads of coal from the junction aforesaid to the 
 Alton Railway & Illuminating Company, nor that the distance from 
 the said junction to the said Alton Railway & Illuminating Company 
 was less than two miles. The said respondent set up in its answer 
 and in the evidence before the Commission, as a reason for making 
 said excessive charge that it was done in retaliation for the said St. 
 Louis, Chicago & St. Paul Railway Company charging five dollars 
 per car for switching cars from the junction of the said Chicago*& 
 Alton Railway Company to manufacturing establishments situated 
 on the line of the said St. Louis, Chicago & St. Paul Railway Com- 
 pany. 
 
 The evidence in this case sustains, beyond controversy, the peti- 
 tion of the petitioner, and this Commission is of the opinion that 
 this case comes clearly within Rule twenty-one of the "Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners' Revised Schedule of Reasonable Maxi- 
 mum Rates of Charges for the Transportation of Passengers and 
 Freight on all the Railroads in the State of Illinois," and that the 
 said respondent had no right, nor does it have any right, to charge 
 more than the maximum rate set forth in said Rule twenty-one, which 
 reads as follows:
 
 373 
 
 "The reasonable maximum rate for switching loaded cars for dis- 
 tances not exceeding three miles shall be two dollars per car. 
 Switching includes the hauling of loaded cars from the station yards, 
 side tracks, elevators or warehouses to the junctions of other rail- 
 roads when not billed from stations on its own road to said junctions, 
 and from junctions of other railroads to the stations, side tracks, 
 elevators and warehouses situated on the tracks owned or controlled 
 by the railroad companies doing said switching; it is that transfer 
 charge ordinarily made for moving loaded cars for short distances 
 for which no regular way-bill is made, and which do not move be- 
 tween two regularly established stations on the same road." 
 
 It is, therefore, ordered and decreed by the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission of the State of Illinois, that no charge made for 
 switching cars loaded with coal or other commodities within the 
 City of Alton shall exceed two dollars per car, when said switching 
 is within the limits of Rule 21, above set forth. 
 
 Dated, Springfield, Illinois, December 6, 1898. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Boston Water and Light Company, 
 
 vs. 
 St. Louis, Chicago & St. Paul Railroad Company. 
 
 Excess Switching Charges. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The complaint in this case was filed on October 12, 1898. The re- 
 spondent filed its answer on October 27, and the matter was set for 
 hearing in Springfield, Illinois, on December 6, at which time it was 
 heard, both complainant and respondent being represented. 
 
 The complainant sets forth in its complaint that the respondent, a 
 corporation organized and doing business under the general railroad 
 law of the State of Illinois, has been persistently violating, within 
 the past six months, Rule 21 of the "Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 missioners' Revised Schedule of Reasonable Maximum Rates for the 
 Transportation of Passengers and Freight in the State of Illinois," 
 by charging the complainant herein a greater sum than two dollars 
 per car for switching loaded cars in the City of Alton for distances 
 not exceeding three miles. The complainant cites several particular 
 instances in which defendant charged it in excess of two dollars per
 
 374 
 
 car for switching loaded cars within the City of Alton for distances 
 not exceeding three miles. The complainant further sets up that on 
 divers other occasions the defendant charged it more than two dol- 
 lars per car for switching loaded cars from the junctions aforesaid to 
 complainant's water works; and that said water works are in said 
 City of Alton and within one hundred feet of defendant's track and 
 less than two miles from the junctions aforesaid. 
 
 The defendant, in its answer, admits that on the 9th day of July, 
 1898, a car loaded with cement, shipped to said City of Alton over 
 said Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway and con- 
 signed to complainant at said City of Alton, was transported by the 
 said defendant from the junction of said defendant's railroad with 
 the railroad of said C., C., C. & St. L. Ry., over said defendant's 
 railroad to the water works of said complainant; and that, for so 
 transporting said car, said defendant charged and required said com- 
 plainant to pay, and complainant did pay to defendant, the sum of 
 four dollars and seventy-three cents. 
 
 Defendant also admits that on the 17th day of August, 1898, a car 
 loaded with alum, shipped to said city of Alton over the Chicago & 
 Alton Railroad and consigned to complainant at said city of Alton, 
 was transported by defendant from the junction of said defendant's 
 railroad with the railroad of said Chicago & Alton Railroad Company 
 over said defendant's railroad to the water works of said complainant; 
 and that, for so transporting said car, said defendent charged and re- 
 quired the complainant to pay, and the complainant did pay to de- 
 fendant, the sum of six dollars and seventy-seven cents. 
 
 As to the allegation in said complaint that on divers other occa- 
 sions the defendant charged it the complainant in excess of the 
 legal rate for switching loaded cars within the city of Alton, the de- 
 fendant neither admitted nor denied, but called for strict proof. 
 
 The defendant, in its answer, further admits that there is a side 
 track to the water works belong to the complainant, but avers that 
 the said side track belongs to and is a component part of the tracks 
 of said defendant. 
 
 The defendant, in its answer, sets up that the track leading from 
 the junction, where the cars were transferred to the works, of this 
 company, and the side tracks at said works belong to and are a part 
 of the railroad of said defendant company. 
 
 The defendant, further answering, states that the charges made 
 against and collected from the said complainant for transporting the 
 cars, as alleged in said complaint, are reasonable and necessary for 
 the proper maintenance and operation of defendant's said railroad. 
 
 In conclusion, the defendant denies that it has, within the six 
 months last past, persistently and grossly violated Rule 21 of the 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 
 The proof in this case fully sustained the allegations set forth in 
 the complaint of the complainant. It was proven that the water 
 works belonging to the complainant were situated along the line of 
 the defendant's railroad, in the city of Alton, and were less than two
 
 375 
 
 liles from the junction where the cars were transferred from other 
 ailroads to the railroad of the defendant, for the purpose of being 
 witched by the defendant to the place of business of the complain- 
 nt. 
 
 The defendant admitted at the hearing, (and as admitted in its an- 
 wer) , that it did make the several charges set forth in the complaint, 
 >ut the defendant maintained that it owned the tracks, and owned the 
 witch, and that fact gave it the right to charge the complainant the 
 egular "cents per hundred pound" rate, as set forth in the schedule 
 f maximum rates of this Commission. 
 
 It was further proven that in billing these cars to the complainant 
 rom the junction aforesaid the defendant billed them to the first 
 tation beyond the works of the complainant, and charged the com- 
 ilainant the regular cents per hundred pound rate for the haul, drop- 
 ting the cars off on the side track of the said complainant. 
 
 The defendant averred and claimed that this was the custom and 
 he usual manner in which it transacted this business; that, in con- 
 ideration of the fact it owned the track, it therefore had a right, 
 inder our rules, to charge the several amounts paid by the complain- 
 nt for transporting these cars. 
 
 Rule 21, above referred to, reads as follows: 
 
 "The reasonable maximum rate for switching loaded cars, for dis- 
 tances not exceeding three miles, shall be two dollars per car. 
 Switching includes the hauling of loaded cars from the station yards, 
 side tracks, elevators, or warehouses to the junctions of other rail- 
 Toads when not billed from stations on its own road to said junctions, 
 ; and from junctions of other railroads to the stations, side tracks, ele- 
 'vators and warehouses situated on the tracks owned or controlled by 
 ; the railroad company doing said switching; it is that transfer charge 
 'ordinarily made for moving loaded cars for short distances for which 
 'no regular way-bill is made, and which do not move between two 
 'regularly established stations on the same road." 
 
 From this rule it is clearly apparent that whenever a loaded car is 
 aken at the junction of anotl er railroad to be transferred to any side 
 rack, elevator or warehouse situated on the tracks owned or con- 
 rolled by the railroad company taking charge of such car at said 
 unction, that the company doing said transferring shall deliver the 
 lame on their own tracks to the place of destination for two dollars, 
 provided that it is not a regularly established station on the same 
 oad. 
 
 The evidence in this case showed that the place of business of the 
 complainant is not a regularly established station on the line of the 
 lefendant, and under this rule it is clearly evident that the defendant 
 ;vas violating Rule 21 above set forth. 
 
 ORDER. 
 
 It is therefore ordered and decreed that the said St. Louis, Chi- 
 cago & St. Paul R. R. Company, the defendant herein, shall deliver 
 ill cars taken at junctions, where within the distance specified in
 
 376 
 
 Rule 21, above set forth, for two dollars, and that the switching 
 charges made by said defendant to the complainant shall not exceed 
 two dollars per car load of material of any description where the 
 switching is done by the defendant from the junctions of other roads 
 to the place of business of the complainant. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 8th day of December, A. D. 1898. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Illinois Central Railroad Company, 
 vs. 
 
 Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company and Indiana, Decatur 
 & Western Railway Company. 
 
 Petition for the Protection of the Crossing of said roads at 
 Tuscola, Illinois. 
 
 APPEARANCE: 
 
 John C. Drennan, For Petitioner. 
 
 Will H. Lyford, For C. & E. I. R. R. Co. For I. D. & W. Ry. Co. 
 
 OPINION, LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a petition for the protection of the crossing of the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company's tracks and those of the Chicago & East- 
 ern Illinois Railroad Company's and the Indiana, Decatur & Western 
 Railway Company's tracks, at Tuscola, Illinois. 
 
 Petition was duly filed and notice given to the said defendants, as 
 required by the statute of Illinois. 
 
 At ten o'clock, a. m. this day, all parties interested, by their re- 
 spective representatives, appeared at the office of this Commission, at 
 which time and place a full hearing was given to each and all of said 
 parties; 
 
 And after hearing the evidence and argument on behalf of the re- 
 spective parties and being fully advised in the premises, the said 
 Commission finds: 
 
 That an interlocking device is a public necessity at the said rail- 
 road crossing, and that an interlocking system should be constructed, 
 maintained and operated at the same; 
 
 That 3 continuing crossing contract exists between the petitioner 
 and the Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Company, but that no 
 such contract exists between the petitioner and the other defendant, 
 or between the said defendants.
 
 377 
 
 DECISION. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the said Commission that the said peti- 
 tioner and the said defendants forthwith proceed to protect the said 
 railroad crossing at Tuscola, Illinois, by an interlocking device ac- 
 ceptable to said Railroad and Warehouse Commission, and that the 
 same shall be completed within ninety days from this date. 
 
 It is further ordered by said Commission that each of said rail- 
 road companies shall pay such proportion .of the cost of construct- 
 ing, erecting and maintaining the said interlocking system and its 
 appurtenances, and the number of levers used in operating the 
 switches, signals and other parts of said interlocking system in and 
 for the respective tracks shall bear to the whole number of levers re- 
 quired in said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered by the said Commission that the Indiana, 
 Decatur & Western Railway Company shall pay one-third of the 
 cost and expense of operating the same; that the Chicago & Eastern 
 Illinois Railroad Company shall, owing to its said crossing contract 
 with the petitioner, pay the remaining two-thirds of the cost and ex- 
 pense of operating the same, so long as said two-thirds shall not ex- 
 ceed seventy dollars per month, but in case said two-thirds shall at 
 any time exceed seventy dollars per month, then the said Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company shall pay one-half of such excess over and 
 above said seventy dollars per month. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this third day of May. A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Rock Island & Peoria Railway Company, 
 
 vs. 
 Davenport, Rock Island & Northwestern Railway Company. 
 
 Petition to Cross at Grade. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, Robert Mather. 
 For Respondent, Davison & Lane. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners of the State 
 of Illinois, after hearing the evidence in the above entitled cause, 
 issue the following order:
 
 378 
 
 It is hereby ordered and adjudged that the the defendant, the Dav- 
 enport, Rock Island & Northwestern Railway Company, have leave, 
 and is hereby empowered, to cross the main line and tracks of the 
 Rock Island & Peoria Railway Company at grade at a point east of 
 Seventeenth street in the city of Rock Island, as described in the pe- 
 tition of the Rock Island & Peoria Railway Company, and further 
 described in the blue print exhibit filed with the petition in the 
 office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission at Springfield,. 
 Illinois. 
 
 It is further ordered that the crossing be not protected by an in- 
 terlocking plant at this time. 
 
 It is further ordered that the Davenport, Rock Island & North- 
 western Railway Company pay all the expenses of the cost of con- 
 struction and future maintenance of said crossing. 
 
 It is further ordered that the Board of Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commissioners of the State of Illinois shall have authority, at any 
 future time, to order an interlocking plant or device to be constructed 
 at said crossing of the Davenport, Rock Island & Northwestern Rail- 
 way Company over the Rock Island & Peoria Railway Company 
 when, in their judgment, the safety of the public demands the con- 
 struction of such a device; and that the cost of the construction of 
 the same shall be adjusted according to the rules of the Commission, 
 as in cases where one road seeks to cross another at the time of the 
 construction of the crossing. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, June 14, 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, 
 
 vs. 
 Illinois Central Railroad Company. 
 
 Petition for Addition to Tower at Paxton, Illinois. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, Thomas H. Perry. 
 For Respondent, H. Baker. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This was a case brought on petition filed by the Lake Erie & 
 Western Railroad Company representing that they were the owners 
 and operators, jointly, with the Illinois Central Railroad Company 
 of the interlocking plant composed of the tower, interlocking ma- 
 chine, signals, connections, etc., at Paxton. They further represented
 
 379 
 
 in their petition that soon after the construction of the interlocking- 
 plant, to- wit: in the summer of 1898, the towerman's view of the 
 Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company's eastern bound trains was 
 obstructed by and is now obstructed until the trains of the Lake 
 Erie & Western Railroad, east bound, arrive at a point within de- 
 rail distance of the crossing by the remodeling and extending of a 
 warehouse building on a lot corner at the northwest corner of the 
 intersection of said railroad company's right of way. The Lake Erie 
 & Western Railroad Company further set forth in their petition that 
 they have been ready and desire to unite with the Illinois Central 
 Railroad Company in a plan and the cost necessary to enable the 
 towerman to observe the Lake Erie & Western Railroad Company's 
 east bound trains at a point at least where they were in view before 
 this obstruction existed; that it is necessary, in order to secure this 
 view, to extend the tower ten feet south, according to plans sub- 
 mitted with the petition ; that the total cost of the construction of the 
 addition to the tower is one hundred and forty-five dollars, ($145.00). 
 
 The Illinois Central Railroad Company stated that the present lo- 
 cation of the interlocking tower was agreed upon when the plant was 
 constructed; that it was not particularly favorable to the Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company for the reason that the view of Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company's trains from the south was shut off by 
 the Illinois Central freight house building, which had been in that 
 location for a great many years; stating further that the location of 
 the tower was decided by the Railroad Commission at the time of 
 its construction; that it was approved by both roads; that it was ac- 
 cepted by both roads; that after it was constrncted the Illinois Cen- 
 tral Railroad Company, to secure a better view of their track, removed 
 their freight building entirely at their own expense, simply that the 
 towerman might have a view of their line to the south, claiming that 
 they did not ask the Lake Erie & Western road to participate in that 
 expense. 
 
 The evidence was heard in this case. The evidence shows that this 
 elevator is constructed upon private land and not upon the right of 
 way of the Lake Erie and Western Railroad. The Lake Erie and 
 Western Railroad had no authority to control the building when con- 
 structed nor to prohibit the building of the same. Nor does it ap- 
 pear from the evidence that the Lake Erie and Western Railroad 
 Company participated in any way in the construction of this eleva- 
 tor. The claim that the Illinois Central presents, that it became 
 necessary for them to remove their freight depot that the towerman 
 might see the trains from the south, can not enter materially into 
 the decision in this case, for the reason that the Railroad Commission 
 at that time fixed the position of the tower, and the freight depot in 
 question was upon the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad 
 Company and they had entire control of the depot and could move it 
 as they saw fit, and the Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company 
 could not be asked to participate in the expense of removing an ob- 
 struction upon the right of way of the Illinois Central Railroad Com- 
 pany which obscured the view of the towerman of no train on their 
 line approaching the crossing.
 
 380 
 
 If, from the evidence, it did appear that this elevator in question 
 was constructed upon the right of way of the Lake Erie and Western 
 Railroad Company, or was constructed at the request or behest of the 
 Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, or they were part owners 
 of the elevator building itself, owners or part owners of the land upon 
 which the elevator was constructed, then they would be in the same 
 position that the Illinois Central Railroad Company occupy in regard 
 to the obstructed view caused by the freight depot on the right of 
 way of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, and would be required 
 to remove this obstruction at their own cost, and the Illinois Central 
 Railroad Company could not be required to participate in the ex- 
 pense. 
 
 In view of these facts, the Commission are of the opinion that in 
 the building of the addition to the tower house caused by this ob- 
 struction of a building not on the right of way of either of the rail- 
 roads, or not under the control of either one of the railroads, that 
 they should both participate in the same proportion in the expense 
 of this addition to the tower that they did in the original construc- 
 tion of the same. 
 
 It is therefore ordered and decreed that an addition be made to the 
 tower house of the interlocking plant at the crossing of the Illinois 
 Central and the Lake Erie and Western Railroads at Paxton accord- 
 ing to the specifications in the plan presented by the petitioner, and 
 that each railroad pay the same proportion of the cost of the con- 
 struction of the addition to the tower house that they paid in the 
 construction of the original plant itself. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 26th day of July, A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute Railroad Co. 
 
 vs 
 Indianapolis, Decatur & Western Railway Co. 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Casey. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 T. J. Golden, for Petitioner. 
 G. H. Graves, for Respondent. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a case brought by the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute 
 Railway Company asking for the interlocking of a crossing at Casey, 
 Illinois, where the Indianapolis, Decatur & Western Railway Com-
 
 381 
 
 pany crosses the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute Railroad Com- 
 pany at grade. The petition of the latter company was filed and the 
 required notice under the statute given to the officials of the Indian- 
 apolis, Decatur & Western Railway Company, and a day set for hear- 
 ing the case at the office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 at Springfield. Prior to the hearing of the case the representatives 
 of the contending lines entered into an agreement with one another 
 in regard to the cost of the erection, maintenance and operating ex- 
 penses of the said interlocking system at said point. 
 
 The order of the Board will be in compliance with the agreement 
 as signed by the representatives of these companies. That as soon 
 as possible an interlocking device shall be erected at the crossing of 
 the said railways at Casey, Illinois, and that the cost of erecting the 
 machine and tower shall be divided between the two companies on 
 the basis of levers used by each. That the expenses of the erection 
 and maintenance of said interlocking plant shall be divided on a 
 basis of levers used by each company on a plan to be finally approved 
 by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Illinois. 
 
 It is further ordered that the operating expenses be divided be- 
 tween the companies, one-half to each, with the understanding that 
 so long as the Vandalia is able to use its telegraph operators at that 
 point to throw the levers that the wages of these operators shall be 
 charged one-half to the Vandalia Company and one-half to the tower. 
 The one-half chargeable to the tower shall be divided between the 
 said railroad companies, half and half to each. 
 
 It is further ordered that any changes made in the switches at this 
 crossing, or changes in the track of either of the lines for the pur- 
 pose of lessening the number of levers used, shall be submitted to 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission for their approval before 
 the interlocking device is erected. 
 
 It is further ordered that if at any time either of said railroads 
 should desire to add to its tracks in such a manner as to require ad- 
 ditional levers to the tower, the company making such additions to 
 its road shall be required to pay the entire cost of such changes as 
 are made with the approval of the Railroad Commission. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 2d day of August, A. D. 1899.
 
 382 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute Railroad Co. 
 
 vs. 
 Jacksonville & St. Louis Railway Co 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Smithboro. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 T. J. Golden, for Petitioner. 
 C. M. Stanton, for Respondent. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This case was brought before the Commission by a petition pre- 
 sented by the Receiver of the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute 
 Railroad Company asking that the crossing at Smithboro, Illinois 
 where the main track of the Jacksonville & St. Louis Railway Com- 
 pany crosses the main track of the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre 
 Haute Railroad Company at grade, be protected by proper interlock- 
 ing devices and appliances to secure greater safety to persons and 
 property, and further that the Railroad Commission proportion the 
 cost of the construction, maintenance and operation of said device 
 between the respective parties. The petition was duly filed and 
 notice given to said defendant as required by the statute of Illinois. 
 The defendant, the Jacksonville & St. Louis Railroad Company, filed 
 an answer asking that such device be not ordered for reasons set 
 forth in said answer. The Commission, after hearing the arguments 
 of the attorneys of both roads and the evidence in the case, find: 
 
 That an interlocking system should be constructed, maintained 
 and operated at the said crossing of the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre 
 Haute and the St. Louis & Jacksonville Railway Companies, at 
 Smithboro, Illinois, for the safety of the public. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that said companies, 
 to-wit: the St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute Railroad Company 
 and the Jacksonville & St. Louis Railroad Company forthwith pro- 
 ceed to protect said railroad crossing at Smithboro, Illinois, by an 
 interlocking system to be approved according to the statute by the 
 Railroad Commission.
 
 383 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that each of said railroad 
 companies shall pay such proportion of the cost of constructing, 
 erecting and maintaining the said interlocking system and all thereto 
 appertaining as the number of levers that shall operate the switches 
 and signals and other parts of said interlocking system in and for 
 the respective tracks of each of said companies shall bear to the 
 whole number of levers required in said interlocking system; and 
 each of said companies shall pay one-half the cost of operating the 
 said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered that should either of the companies aforesaid 
 desire to add to the number of levers used in the interlocking device 
 for their own benefit, that said company desiring the addition of 
 such levers shall pay the entire cost of such addition, when properly 
 approved by the Railroad Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 2d day of August, A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAIROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OP THE STATE 
 
 OP ILLINOIS. 
 
 Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co. 
 
 vs. 
 Terre Haute & Peoria Railway Co. 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Mackinaw. 
 
 APPEARANCES : 
 
 C. A. Paquette, for Petitioner. 
 
 T. J. Golden and J. J. Turner, for Respondent. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This case was brought before the Commission by a petition pre- 
 sented by the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway 
 Company, asking that the crossing at Mackinaw, Illinois, where the
 
 384 
 
 main track of the Terre Haute & Peoria Railway Company crosses 
 the main track of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis 
 Railway Company at grade be protected by proper interlocking de- 
 vices and appliances to secure greater safety to persons and property, 
 and further that the Railroad Commission proportion the cost of the 
 construction, maintenance and operation of said device between the 
 respective parties. The petition was duly filed and notice given to 
 said defendant as required by the Statute of Illinois. The defend- 
 ant, the Terre Haute & Peoria Railway Company, filed an answer 
 asking that such device be not ordered for reasons set forth in said 
 answer. The Commission, after hearing the argument of the attor- 
 neys of both roads and the evidence in the case, find: 
 
 That an interlocking system should be constructed, maintained 
 and operated at the said crossing of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chi- 
 cago & St. Louis Railway Company and the Terre Haute & Peoria 
 Railroad Company, at Mackinaw, Illinois, for the safety of the 
 public. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that said companies, 
 to-wit: the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway 
 Company and the Terre Haute & Peoria Railway Company forth- 
 with proceed to protect said crossing at Mackinaw, Illinois, by an 
 interlocking system to be approved according to the statute by the 
 Railroad Commission. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that each of said railroad 
 companies shall pay such proportion of the cost of constructing, 
 erecting and maintaining the said interlocking system and all thereto 
 appertaining as the number of levers that operate the switches and 
 signals and other parts of said interlocking system in and for the 
 respective tracks of each of said companies shall bear to the whole 
 number of levers required in said interlocking system, and each of 
 said companies shall pay one-half of the cost of operating the said 
 interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered that should either of the companies aforesaid 
 desire to add to the number of levers used in the interlocking device 
 for their own benefit, that said company desiring the addition of such 
 levers shall pay the entire cost of such addition when properly 
 approved by the Railroad Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 2d day of August, 1899.
 
 385 
 
 BEFORE THE BOARD OF RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSIONERS 
 OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 The Wabash Railroad 
 
 vs. 
 The Indiana, Illinois & Iowa Railroad. 
 
 Protection of Crossing at Reddick. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 B. C. Winston, for Petitioner. 
 R. J. Carey, for Respondent. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This case was brought before the Commission by a petition pre- 
 sented by the Wabash Railroad Company asking that the crossing- 
 at Reddick, Illinois, where the main track of the Indiana, Illinois & 
 Iowa Railroad Company crosses the main track of the Wabash Rail- 
 road Company at grade, be protected by proper interlocking devices 
 and appliances to secure greater protection to persons and property ; 
 and further, that the Railroad Commission proportion the cost of 
 construction, maintenance and operation of said device between the 
 respective parties. The petition was duly filed and notice given to de- 
 fendant as required by the statute of Illinois. 
 
 The Commission proceeded to view the crossing and fixed the date 
 for hearing the case. On August 1, 1899, the case was heard before 
 the Commission, both companies being represented, and submitted 
 arguments orally and filed exhibits. The Commission, having had 
 the case under advisement, found: 
 
 That an interlocking system should be constructed, maintained and 
 operated at the said crossing of the Wabash Railroad and the Indiana, 
 Illinois & Iowa Railroad at Reddick, Illinois, for the safety of the 
 public. 
 
 It is therefore ordered by the Commission that said companies, 
 to-wit: The Wabash Railroad Company and the Indiana, Illinois & 
 Iowa Railroad Company, forthwith proceed to protect said crossing 
 at Reddick, Illinois, by an interlocking system to be approved ac- 
 cording to the statute by the Railroad Commission. 
 
 It is further ordered by the Commission that each of said railroad 
 companies shall pay such proportion of the cost of construction^, 
 erecting and maintaining the said interlocking system and all thereto 
 25 O.
 
 386 
 
 appertaining as the number of levers that shall operate the switches 
 and signals and other parts of said interlocking system, in and for 
 the respective tracks of each of said companies, shall bear to the 
 whole number of levers required in said interlocking system, and 
 each of said companies shall pay one-half of the cost of operating 
 the said interlocking system. 
 
 It is further ordered that should either of the companies aforesaid 
 desire to add to the number of levers used in the interlocking device 
 for their own benefit, that said company desiring the addition of such 
 levers shall pay the entire cost of such addition when properly ap- 
 proved by the Railroad Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 
 Dated at Chicago, Illinois, this 5th day of August, A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OP THE 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 John Miller 
 
 vs. 
 Cleveland. Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company. 
 
 Complaint for Overcharge of Freight Rates. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, George L. Zink. 
 For Respondent, G. F. McN ulty. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 The complaint in this case was filed by John Miller against the 
 railroad company, charging that the complainant, Miller, was engaged 
 in business at Hornsby, in the purchase and sale of grain, live stock 
 and of coal in car load lots; that he purchased his coal, during the 
 time covered by the complaint, of the Consolidated Coal Company 
 of St. Louis at its mine located on defendant's line of road one and 
 one-third miles west from Hornsby station; that the cars of coal 
 were hauled by the defendant railroad company from said mine over 
 its road to Hornsby, a regular station on said railroad, and placed on 
 the switch for the use of complainant. The moving of the loaded 
 cars of coal from Hornsby mine to Hornsby, under the proof, is 
 shown to have been done by|the defendant railroad company's regu- 
 lar trains. The proof shows that there is no station at the Hornsby 
 mine. The proof further shows that the coal mine in question was
 
 387 
 
 over a mile beyond the switching limits at Hornsby station. After 
 the loaded cars of coal were placed upon the siding at Hornsby sta- 
 tion they were unloaded at the coal house of the complainant, or in 
 trucks and wagons, and were retailed by the complainant from 
 Hornsby station. The evidence in this case further shows that the 
 complainant, Miller, signed a statement, which is in the form of a 
 request, to switch from Hornsby Illinois mine to Hornsby, Illinois, 
 giving the car number and the initial of the car desired to be 
 handled. Upon this statement was placed a rate by the railroad 
 company for the handling of each car: "Switching $2.50, rental of 
 car $2.00," making a total charge of $4.50 for handling each loaded 
 car from the mine to Hornsby station, a distance of one and one- 
 third miles. 
 
 It is contended that under Rule 23 of the schedule of rates made 
 by the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners, which pro- 
 vides a switching charge of two dollars for handling loaded cars a 
 distance not exceeding three miles from the station yards, side tracks, 
 elevators or warehouses to the junctions of other railroads, when not 
 billed from stations on its own road to said junctions, and from junc- 
 tions of other railroads to the stations, side-tracks, elevators and 
 warehouses situated on the tracks owned or controlled by the rail- 
 road company doing said switching; that there was an overcharge in 
 this case of $2.50 on each car. If the transportation of a loaded car 
 from Hornsby mine to Hornsby station came within this rule, the 
 contention of the complaint would be true, and there would clearly 
 be an overcharge. While it is true that the railroad company in this 
 case have required the complainant to sign a statement purporting 
 on its face to be partially a switching charge and partially for the 
 rental of the car, yet that does not constitute a charge for the mov- 
 ing of the cars in question from the Hornsby mine to Hornsby sta- 
 tion, under this rule, a switching charge. A casual reading of the 
 rule will clearly show that the facts in this case do not bring the 
 movement of these cars complained of under a switching charge. 
 The railroad company would have a perfect right, under the facts in 
 this case, to charge the regular distance tariff rate for transporting 
 the cars in question from the mine at Hornsby to Hornsby station. 
 The regular rate for a distance of one and one-third miles on a car 
 of coal would be over $6.00 a car. The railroad charged in this case 
 $4.50, which is less than the rate that the railroad company could 
 charge under the schedule of rates fixed by the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission, hence there is no overcharge in this case. 
 
 Counsel for complainant in this case have a misconception of the 
 meaning of Rule 23 governing the switching of loaded cars. The 
 handling of loaded cars for a distance not exceeding three miles, of 
 itself, does not determine that it is switching within the meaning of 
 this rule; there must be many other conditions existing in order to 
 constitute it a switching charge. The handling of a loaded car from 
 any factory or mine on the line of a railroad, for any distance, 
 whether it be one inile or ten, to a regular station on the line of the 
 same railroad, there to be delivered to the consignee, does not come
 
 388 
 
 within the meaning of switching, as defined by Rule 23, especially 
 when the station to which it is hauled is the end of the haul and 
 final delivery of the commodity in the car. 
 
 The Commission, therefore, find that the handling of the cars in 
 question is not switching within the meaning of Rule 23, and there- 
 fore the complaint is dismissed. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 23d day of October, A. D., 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Petition for Order for Interlocking Plant at Arcola, by Illinois 
 
 Central Railroad Company and Terre Haute and 
 
 Indianapolis Railroad Company. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner J. F. Wallace. 
 
 For Respondent V. T. Malott. \ 
 
 ORDER BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 On the petition filed before the Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion, presented by the Illinois Central Railroad Company and the 
 Terre Haute and Indianapolis Railroad Company, asking for an or- 
 der to provide for the construction, operation and maintenance of an 
 interlocking plant at Arcola, Illinois, the said parties to the petition 
 having agreed that an order should be entered for the construction 
 of the plant as above described, it is therefore, 
 
 Ordered and decreed by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 of the State of Illinois that an interlocking plant be constructed in 
 accordance with the laws of the State and the rules of said Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission, under the supervision of the Consulting 
 Engineer of said Commission; and that the cost of the construction 
 and maintenance of said plant be divided between the said Illinois 
 Central Railroad Company and the Terre Haute and Indianapolis 
 Railroad Company on the basis of the number of levers necessary to 
 control the switches, derails and signals in or adjoining the tracks of 
 each company, respectively; and that the expense of operation of 
 said plant be divided half and half between the two said companies. 
 
 Dated at Springfield. Illinois, this 7th day of November. A.D , 1899.
 
 389 
 ORDER. 
 
 IN RE-INTERLOCKING DEVICES. 
 
 ORDER BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 After having careful examinations made and heard reports bearing 
 on the use and safety of the old style wheel interlocking machines 
 that have been in use in this State, and in service varying from nine 
 to ten years, it is the opinion of the Commission that their use is un- 
 reliable and unsafe, and, 
 
 It is therefore ordered and decreed that such railroad corpora- 
 tions as use them, or who may be responsible for their use at grade 
 railroad crossings in this State, replace said wheel machines with 
 better and more modern devices by July 1, 1900. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 7th day of November, A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 William Atzel, 
 
 vs. 
 Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Company. 
 
 Complaint and Petition Charging Extortion, and Praying that De- 
 fendant be Compelled to Refund Certain 
 Alleged Overcharges. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner I. Ingenthron. 
 For Defendant M. Breeden. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 Complaint was filed by William Atzel against the railroad com- 
 pany setting up certain overcharges made by the railroad company 
 at different times. The evidence has been taken. It'appears that 
 the complainant is a coal and wood dealer in the city of Chicago, Illi- 
 nois, with places of business at 475 and 477 Kedzie avenue, in said 
 city. Running alongside of said places of business the defendant
 
 390 
 
 has a track upon which deliveries of the shipments in question were 
 made to the complainant. This track was called the Kedzie avenue 
 team track. The shipments consisted of coal and wood, and orig- 
 inated in other states. Most of the consignments consisted of vari- 
 ous cars of coal, which originated in Pennsylvania. 
 
 The proof shows that the cars of coal were billed to one Rend, who 
 was a wholesale dealer in coal, in the city of Chicago, and by him 
 were sold to the complainant, Atzel, in car load lots. The defendant 
 railroad company is engaged in a transfer and terminal business, 
 that is, in handling cars from foreign roads. The cars of coal in 
 question were received in Chicago by Rend or others as the con- 
 signee, and were sold by them and handled by the Transfer Company 
 to the complainant's place of business. 
 
 The first question raised in this case that we desire to consider is: 
 was the handling of the coal cars in question a part of an interstate 
 haul, and has the Commission jurisdiction over the subject matter of 
 this complaint? It is insisted by counsel for the railroad company 
 that, as there was no change in the car load lot, but that it remained 
 in the original car, the package undisturbed, until it was delivered 
 to the complainant, and the car having originated in a foreign state r 
 was solely a subject of interstate commerce. If this contention be 
 true, then it would not be necessary for us to consider the other 
 question in the case. A number of authorities have been referred 
 to, to sustain the contention made by counsel for the railroad com- 
 pany, but we do not consider it necessary to refer to many of them. 
 
 In the case under consideration the coal was billed to Rend, as the- 
 consignee in Chicago. It was delivered to Rend in Chicago. It is 
 true it was not unloaded by the railroad company into any ware- 
 houses, either of Rend's or of the company, but after the delivery to 
 Rend it was sold by him to the complainant. It is true as a general 
 rule that merchandise, being once started upon its passage from one 
 state to another, is subject to exclusive regulation by Congress until 
 lost in the general mass of property of the state to which it is sent. 
 This principle has been upheld principally in what is known as the 
 tax cases and license cases, many of which have been referred to by 
 counsel for the railroad company. 
 
 In the case of Welton vs. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, the Court says: 
 "That it would be premature to state any rules which would be uni- 
 versal in its application to determine when the commercial power of 
 the federal government over a commodity has ceased, and the power 
 of the state has commenced. It is sufficient to hold now, that the 
 commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be 
 the subject of discriminating legislation by reason of its foreign 
 character. That power protects it, even after it has entered the 
 state, from any burdens imposed by reason of its foreign origin." 
 
 In the absence of such considerations, it has been held that, for 
 some purposes, goods pass from federal to state control at the moment 
 when they are delivered by the carrier to the consignee. Commerce
 
 391 
 
 clause of the federal Constitution, page 66. Fuqua vs. Pabst Brewing 
 Company, 90 Texas, 298. The great difficulty that has arisen, however, 
 is the practical application of the general rule. 
 
 In the case of Brown vs. Maryland, 12th Wheat., 419, Chief Jus- 
 tice Marshall lays down the rule, "that importation of goods for sale 
 was not complete until the goods had been sold, and the article 
 could not be considered as incorporated with the general mass of 
 property of the state while still remaining in the first hands and in 
 the original package." This case was subject to great criticism and 
 was in effect overruled by subsequent decisions. But in the case of 
 Leisy vs. Harden, 135 U. S., 100, the original rule laid down in Brown 
 vs. Maryland is sustained. 
 
 The question presented by this record does not involve, necessarily, 
 the point sustained in the above cases; while it may be true that 
 upon questions of the right to sell goods in the original package, 
 although the sale of such goods are prohibited by the state to which 
 they are shipped; and that no tax can be levied or license be collected 
 on goods until they have become a part of the general mass of prop- 
 erty in the state, on the ground that it is a matter of federal con- 
 trol under the commerce clause of the Constitution, yet we are of 
 the opinion, in this case, that when the coal in question was received 
 in Chicago by Rend, the consignee, that that ended the interstate 
 haul, so far as questions arising out of the switching charges and 
 track service charges made by the defendent in the case. 
 
 The defendant is engaged within the State of Illinois in the 
 handling of foreign cars, and these charges for handling of such cars 
 within the State are subject to regulation by the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission of the State of Illinois. The charge made by the 
 Terminal Railroad Company entered into and formed no part of the 
 charges made by the railroad company for hauling the car from 
 Pennsylvania to Chicago. The Terminal Transfer Railroad Com- 
 pany of Chicago is engaged in an independent business, and that of 
 furnishing transfer and terminal facilities to the various railroads 
 and to coal yards and other industries located in Chicago which its 
 road reaches. To hold that the cars received by and handled by 
 them from foreign railroads in original car load lots are not subject 
 to State control, simply by reason of the fact that the car load lot 
 has been undisturbed, would practically leave the Transfer and Ter- 
 minal Company subject to no control whatever by the State, and it 
 could impose any charge it saw fit without regard to the rates fixed 
 by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. In adopting this view 
 we do not lose sight of the rule laid down in the tax and license 
 cases, and original package cases referred to, but hold that the rule 
 does not apply to the facts in issue as shown by this record. 
 
 The next question presented is, was the defendant railroad com- 
 pany guilty of extortion in making certain charges for the switching 
 of the cars in question and the use of the team track? The proof 
 shows that only 117 cars were placed upon the side track or team 
 track, and according to the evidence some of them remained there 
 from one to twenty-one days before they were unloaded. For the
 
 392 
 
 transportation of the cars to and from the side track or team track 
 in question, the railroad company has made a charge of $3 per car, 
 and also a charge of $1 for the use of the car and team track, making 
 a total of $4 for each car handled. 
 
 It is contended by counsel for the railroad company that under the 
 act creating the Railroad and Warehouse Commission that there are 
 seven different services for which rates may be established, six of 
 which relate to the transportation of freight. While perhaps such a 
 division may be considered as entering into the transportation of 
 freight, yet in our opinion the various services referred to all enter 
 into and are a part of the term "transportation of freight." Charge 
 for transportation of freight includes all of the services performed 
 by the railroad, such as hauling the car, use of car, and reasonable 
 use of main and side tracks at points of destination. It is apparent 
 from the proof in this case that in some instances there was an un- 
 reasonable delay in the unloading of the cars by Atzel. He made 
 use of some of the cars for warehouse purposes. This is a growing 
 evil at large terminal points, like Chicago. Loaded cars are held on 
 side tracks, blocking the movement of trains and producing a car 
 famine over the State. There ought to be some remedy for this con- 
 dition. The law governing questions of demurrage charges is in a 
 very unsettled condition. Whatever may be the opinion of the Com- 
 mission as to the extent of this evil, our own court has refused to 
 sustain these charges. 
 
 In the case of Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co. vs. Jenkins, 103 
 Illinois, 590, it was contended that the railroad company had a right 
 to hold the property until its charges for demurrage were paid. It 
 appeared that the published rules and regulations of the company 
 provided for the payment of such charges, yet the court says, "the 
 right to demurrage, if it exists as a legal right, is confined to mari- 
 time law, and only exists by carriers by seagoing -vessels. It only 
 exists by contract. Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co. vs. Jenkins, 
 103 Illinois, 599. 
 
 Again, in the case of the C., C., C. & St. L. R'y Co. vs. Lamm, 73 
 App., 592. This was a case when a $1 charge was made for each 
 day or fraction of a day after forty-eight hours' notice that the car 
 remained unloaded. The court says: "Railroad companies can not 
 create in their favor a demurrage lien on freight not removed from a 
 car within a short time by simply publishing to the public their in- 
 tention of doing so." 
 
 Acquiescence and payment of such charges do not create any lia- 
 bility against the consignee. It can only be created by contract or 
 by statute. C., C., C. & St. L. R'y Co. vs. Lamm, 73 App., 599. 
 
 The Terminal Company had no right to impose the one dollar 
 charge, but under the facts and circumstances as shown in this case, 
 we do not believe it constitutes an extortion under the present statute 
 governing extortions. This statute is a penal one, and must be 
 strictly construed. An action of law would lie to recover the money 
 paid, but such a case has not been made out, in our opinion, as would 
 justify a prosecution under the statute for extortion.
 
 393 
 
 The only other question in this case to be decided is the question 
 of switching charges as governed by Rule 23, found in the schedule 
 of reasonable maximum rates of charges as fixed by the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners of Illinois. 
 
 The evidence in this case shows that some of the cars in question 
 were hauled less than three miles by the road delivering them to 
 Kedzie avenue. Wherever in this case the distance that the car was 
 hauled was three miles or less, the railroad company had no right 
 under that rule to charge more than two dollars for switching the 
 car; and wherever the railroad company or companies, in this case, 
 made a charge of more than two dollars for switching the car of coal 
 to Kedzie avenue, where the distance was less than three miles, they 
 were guilty of extortion; because the rule clearly sets forth that 
 switching includes the hauling of loaded cars from "junctions of 
 other railroads to stations, yards, side tracks, elevators, and warehouses 
 situated on the tracks owned and controlled by the railroad company 
 doing said switching." It is equally true that wherever, in this 
 case, the distance that the car was hauled from the junction point to 
 Kedzie avenue exceeded three miles, that the railroad company haul- 
 ing said car had a perfect right, and were entitled, to charge the reg- 
 ular schedule rates as fixed by the Railroad and Warehouse Commis- 
 sion of Illinois in their schedule of reasonable maximum rates of 
 charges. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 5th day of December, A. D. 1899. 
 
 BEFORE THE RAILROAD AND WAREHOUSE COMMISSION OF THE STATE 
 
 OF ILLINOIS. 
 
 Keeney & Little 
 
 v. 
 Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company. 
 
 Discrimination. 
 
 APPEARANCES: 
 
 For Petitioner, Hamilton & Patton. 
 For Defendant, W. S. Horton. 
 
 OPINION BY LINDLY, CHAIRMAN. 
 
 This is a complaint filed by Keeney & Little against the Toledo, 
 Peoria & Western Railroad Company, charging that: 
 
 I. That the T., P. & W. R. R. Co. will not quote rates of freight 
 on grain to points known as Ohio river points.
 
 394 
 
 II. That the defendant above named is a common carrier engaged 
 in the transportation of freight and passengers by railroad, and as 
 such common carrier subject to the law of the State of Illinois. 
 
 III. That the T., P. & W. R. R. Co. will not receive grain con- 
 signed to Ohio river points. 
 
 IV. That the T., P. & W. R. R. Co. will not switch to the C. & E. 
 I. R. R. Co. grain in car lots consigned to Ohio river points. 
 
 V. That the T., P. & W. R. R. Co. will not switch to the C. & E. 
 I. grain in car lots at all. 
 
 VI. That with the exception of Brazil block coal, the T,, P. & 
 W. R. R. Co. will not switch bituminous coal in car lots from the C. 
 & E. I. R. R. tracks to coal sheds on their lines in Watseka, 111. 
 
 VII. That the T., P. & W. R. R. Co. will not switch anthracite 
 coal from the C. & E. I. R. R. tracks to coal sheds on their lines in 
 Watseka, 111. 
 
 In regard to the first and third charge, that the T., P. & W. R. R. 
 company will not quote rates of freight on grain to points known as 
 Ohio river points and will not receive grain consigned to Ohio river 
 points, we hold that this is a question of Inter State Commerce, and 
 that it is wholly without the province of this Commission. As to 
 the other charges, they can properly be considered together, as they 
 really involve the same question, viz. : 
 
 As to whether a railroad company should be compelled to switch 
 loaded cars from an industry on their own line to the junction of an- 
 other railroad, and whether they should be compelled also to switch 
 loaded cars from a junction point of another railroad to an industry 
 located on their own line, as set forth in Rule 23 of the Schedule of 
 Reasonable Maximum Rates of Charges. 
 
 Rule 23 provides as follows: 
 
 "The reasonable maximum rate for switching loaded cars for dis- 
 tances not exceeding three miles shall be two dollars per car. Switch- 
 ing includes the hauling of loaded cars from the station yards, side 
 tracks, elevators or warehouses to the junctions of other railroads 
 when not billed from stations on its own road to said junctions, and 
 from junctions of other railroads to the stations, side tracks, eleva- 
 tors and warehouses situated on the tracks owned or controlled by 
 the railroad company doing said switching; it is that transfer charge 
 ordinarily made for moving loaded cars for short distances for which 
 no regular way-bill is made, and which do not move between two 
 regularly established stations on the same road." 
 
 It appears from the evidence that the elevator and coal sheds of the 
 complainants are situated upon the side track of the T., P. & W. R. 
 R. Company; it further appears from the evidence that this side track 
 is used both for the purpose of loading grain from the elevator into 
 the cars, and also for receiving loaded cars of coal at complainants 
 shed, and also are made use of by the railroad company as a team 
 track. 
 
 The fact that the defendant railroad company uses the side track 
 in question both for the purpose of a team track for the benefit of its
 
 395 
 
 patrons, as well as a side track for the benefit of the industries of the 
 complainants, can not affect the question at issue. If the railroad 
 company desires to make such double use of the side track in ques- 
 tion, that is a matter of their own choice, and it can not affect the 
 rights of the complainants in the use of the side track in question 
 for the purposes for which they use it. So far as the complainants' 
 rights are concerned in this case, the use by the railroad company of 
 this track for a team track for their patrons does not affect the rights 
 of the complainants, who are not seeking to use such track as a team 
 track. 
 
 Under Rule 23 above cited, it is the duty of the railroad company 
 to switch loaded cars from the elevator of complainants to the junc- 
 tion point with the C. & E. I. R. R. Company for a switching charge 
 of two dollars, as provided in such rule, the distance being within the 
 three mile limit. 
 
 It is also the duty of the defendant railroad company to switch cars 
 from the junction point -with the O. & E. I. R. R. Company to the 
 elevator and coal sheds of the complainants situated on the side track 
 in question for the same charge. 
 
 In the case of the Mexican Amole Soap Co. vs. P. & P. U. Ry. Co. 
 is referred to by counsel for defendant. There is a clear distinction 
 between the case cited and the one at issue. It appeared in the case 
 referred to that the delivery was made upon a team track. The proof 
 in that case showed that the track in question was not used for the 
 purposes of a side track to an industry, but was used purely as a team 
 track for the delivery of commodities, merchandise, etc., to the pat- 
 rons of the road. The distinction in this case is obvious as well as in 
 the case of Brining vs. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., also cited. 
 
 It is therefore ordered that the defendant, the T., P. & W. R. R' 
 Co., be and they are hereby required to switch loaded cars for the 
 complainants from the junction point of their road with the C. & E. 
 I. R R. Company to the elevator and coal sheds of the complainants, 
 and to switch loaded cars from the elevator and coal sheds of the com- 
 plainants to the junction of their line with that of the C. & E. I. R. 
 R. Company on the payment of a switching charge of two dollars as 
 provided in said Rule 23. 
 
 Dated at Springfield, Illinois, this 5th day of December, A. D. 1899.
 
 RULES OF PRACTICE 
 
 Adopted by the Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission of Illinois, May 4, 1897. 
 
 IN FORCE FROM AND AFTER JUNE 1, 1897.
 
 399 
 
 RULES OF PRACTICE. 
 
 1. 
 
 REGULAR SESSIONS. 
 
 The regular sessions of the Commission foi hearing contested cases and 
 cases under the interlocking law will be held at its office in Springfield, Illi- 
 nois, on Tuesday after the first Monday in each month, and continue from 
 day to day thereafter, if necessary, until the business of such meeting is fin- 
 ished. But if the day above designated for such meeting shall at any time 
 fall upon an election day, or a legal holiday, then the meeting shall be held 
 upon the day following. 
 
 Sessions for receiving, considering and acting upon petitions, applications 
 and other communications, and also for considering and acting upon any 
 business of the Commission, other than contested cases, maybe taken up and 
 disposed of at any time that a quorum of! the Commission may be present. 
 
 2. 
 
 SPECIAL SESSIONS. 
 
 Special sessions may be held at other places, when, in the judgment of the 
 Commission, the public interest requires it. 
 
 3. 
 
 MEETINGS IN CHICAGO. 
 
 The Commission shall meet at the office of the Chief Grain Inspector, in 
 the City of Chicago, on Thursday after the first Monday in each month, for 
 the purpose of auditing the bills of the Grain Department, and for the trans- 
 action of such other business as may legally come before it. 
 
 4. 
 
 COMPLAINTS. 
 
 All complaints must be by petition, printed or written (or partly printed 
 and partly written) , setting forth briefly the facts claimed to constitute a vio- 
 lation of the law, and must be verified by the petitioner, or by some officer, 
 agent or corporation, society or organization, or other body making the com- 
 plaint, who must be a party in interest, to the effect that the allegations of 
 the petition are true to the best of the knowledge or belief of the affiant, and 
 may be sworn to before any officer authorized to administer paths in the 
 State of Illinois. The name of the carrier or carriers complained against 
 mus.t be stated in full, and the address of the petitioner, with the name and 
 address of his attorney or counselor, if any, must appear upon the petition.
 
 400 
 5. 
 
 SERVICE OP PETITION. 
 
 The Commission will cause a copy of the petition, with notice to satisfy or 
 answer the same within a specified time, to be served personally or by mail 
 in its discretion, upon each carrier complained against. 
 
 6. 
 
 ANSWERS. 
 
 A carrier complained against must answer within twenty days, unless ex- 
 tended, from the date of a notice, but the Commission may, in a particular 
 case, require the answer to be served within a shorter time. The time pre- 
 scribed in any case may be extended, upon good cause shown, by special 
 order of the Commission. Original answers must be filed with the Secretary 
 of the Commission, at its office in Springfield. The answer must admit or 
 deny the material allegations of the petition, and may set forth any addi- 
 tional facts claimed to be material to the issue. The answer must be verified 
 in the same manner as the petition. If the carrier complained against shall 
 make satisfaction before answering, a written acknowledgment thereof must 
 be filed by the complainant or petitioner, and in that case the effect of satis- 
 faction, without other matter, may be set forth in the answer. If satisfac- 
 tion be made after the filing and service of an answer, a supplementary 
 answer, setting forth the facts and terms of the satisfaction, shall be filed 
 with the Commission and served. The filing of an answer, however, will not 
 be deemed an admission of the sufficiency ot the petition, but a motion to dis- 
 miss for insufficiency may be made at the hearing. 
 
 7. 
 
 SERVICE OF PAPERS. 
 
 Copy of notices or other papers must be served upon the adverse parties- 
 personally or by mail; and when any party has appeared by attorney, service 
 upon such attorney shall be deemed proper service upon the party. 
 
 8. 
 
 AMENDMENTS. 
 
 Amendments to any petition or answer in any proceeding or investigation 
 may be allowed by the Commission in its discretion. 
 
 9. 
 
 EXTENSION OP TIME. 
 
 Extension of time may be granted upon the application of any party to the 
 proceeding in the discretion of the Commission. 
 
 10. 
 
 STIPULATIONS. 
 
 The parties to any proceeding or investigation before the Commission may, 
 by stipulation in writing filed with the Secretary, agree upon the facts, or any 
 portion hereof involved in the controversy, which stipulation shall be re- 
 garded as evidence on the hearing. It is desired that the facts be thus agreed 
 upon whenever practicable.
 
 401 
 11. 
 
 HEARINGS. 
 
 Upon issue being joined the Commission will assign a time and place for 
 hearing the case, which will be at its office in Springfield, unless otherwise 
 ordered. Witnesses will be examined orally before the Commission, and 
 their testimony taken down and filed in the case, unless the facts be agreed 
 upon as provided for in these rules. The complainant must in all cases estab- 
 lish the facts alleged to constitute a violation of the law, unless the carrier 
 complained against admits the same or fails to answer the petition. Facts 
 alleged in the answer must also be proved by the carrier unless admitted by 
 the petitioner. In case of failure to answer, the Commission will take such 
 proof of the facts as may be deemed proper and reasonable, and make such 
 order thereon as the circumstances of the case require. 
 
 12. 
 
 WITNESSES AND SUBPCENAS. 
 
 Subpoenas requiriag the attendance of witnesses will, upon the application 
 of either party, or upon the order of the Commission, be issued by the Secre- 
 tary, under the seal of the Commission. Subpoenas for the production of 
 books, papers or documents (unless directed to issue by the Commission upon 
 its own motion) will only be issued upon application in writing; and when it 
 is sought to compel witnesses, not parties to the proceeding, to produce such 
 documentary evidence, the application must be sworn to and must specify as 
 nearly as may be the books, papers or documents desired, and that the same 
 are in possession of the witness or under his control; and also by facts stated 
 in said application show that they contain evidence material to the issue. Ap- 
 plications to compel a party to the proceedings to produce books, papers or 
 documents, need only set forth in a general way the books, papers or docu- 
 ments desired to be produced, and that the applicant believes they will be of 
 service in the determination of the case. 
 
 13. 
 
 PROPOSED FINDINGS. 
 
 Upon the final submission of the case, each party must prepare and submit 
 for the consideration ot the Commission, proposed findings, embracing the 
 material facts and propositions of law claimed to be established by the evi- 
 dence. 
 
 14. 
 
 PRINTING OP PLEADINGS. 
 
 For convenience in reading and filing it is requested that pleadings, briefs 
 and other papers of importance be printed or typewritten whenever practic- 
 able, and that only one side of the paper be used. 
 
 15. 
 
 COPIES. 
 
 Copies of any petition, complaint or answer in any matter or proceeding 
 before the Commission, or of any order, decision or opinion by the Commis- 
 sion will be furnished without charge upon application to the Secretary by 
 any person or party to the proceeding. Copy of testimony will be furnished 
 upon such terms as the Commission shall prescribe. Copies of blank forms 
 as contained in these rules will be furnished on application by the Secretary 
 without any charge. This rule shall not apply to copies of opinions, orders 
 or other papers in interlocking or crossing cases. 
 
 26 O
 
 402 
 16. 
 
 ADDRESS OF THE COMMISSION. 
 
 All complaints concerning anything done, or omitted to be done, by any 
 common carrier and all petitions or answers in any proceeding or application 
 in relation thereto, and all letters and telegrams should be addressed to the 
 chairman of the Commission at Springfield, Illinois, unless otherwise specially 
 directed. 
 
 17. 
 
 QUORUMS. 
 
 Two members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the transac- 
 tion of all business that may come before the Commission, and if no quorum of 
 the Commission be present on any day named in these rules for any regular 
 meeting of the Commission, and there are causes on the docket ready for 
 hearing, the Secretary of the Commission shall adjourn such meeting from 
 day to day (noting the same upon the record) until a quorum is present for 
 transaction of business, at which the hearing shall be proceeded with in the 
 same manner as it would had a quorum been present on the day named in 
 the rules of said meeting. When the Secretary shall be aware in advance 
 that a quorum will not be present on the day named for regular meeting, he 
 shall, as far as practicable, advise all interested parties by letter or otherwise, 
 of the fact, and also let them know on what day a quorum is expected to be 
 present. 
 
 18. 
 
 MANNER OF CONDUCTING CASES. 
 
 In all contested cases the petitioner will open and close the case. Each 
 party to the hearing will be allowed to introduce such evidence as is admis- 
 sible under the common law rules of evidence, and each party will be fully 
 heard in argument upon all points of the case by the counsel or other repre- 
 sentatives. 
 
 19. 
 
 PRACTICE. 
 
 The Commission will be governed by the practice which obtains in the 
 Circuit Courts of Illinois, so far as the same is applicable.
 
 403 
 
 FORMS. 
 
 No. 1. Complaint Against Carriers. 
 
 \8B. 
 
 ). J 
 
 A. B. 
 
 vs. 
 The KailroadCo. 
 
 The petition of the above named complainant respectfully shows : 
 
 I. That (here let complainant state his occupation and place of business.) 
 
 II. That the defendant above named is a common carrier engaged in the 
 transportation of freight and passengers by railroad, and as such common 
 carrier is subject to the laws of the State of Illinois. 
 
 III. That (here state concisely the matters complained of) . 
 
 Wherefore the petitioner prays that the defendant may be required to answer 
 the charges herein, and that upon a final hearing hereof the commission will 
 make such order in the premises as may seem meet. 
 
 Dated at , Illinois, day of A. D 
 
 A. B. 
 Complainant' 1 s Signature. 
 
 STATE OF ILLINOIS, \ .... 
 County. j SSt 
 
 A. B. being duly sworn, upon his oath, states that he is the complainant 
 in this proceeding, and that the matters set forth in the foregoing petition 
 are true as he verily believes. 
 
 A. B. 
 
 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of A. D. 19. ... 
 
 C. D., Justice of the Peace. 
 (Or other officer authorized to administer oaths.) 
 
 FORMS. 
 
 No. 2. Answer . 
 
 Iss. 
 
 The Railroad Co. 
 
 ats. 
 A. B. 
 
 The above named defendant for answer to the complainant in his proceed- 
 ing respectfully states: 
 
 I. That (here follows the usual admissions, denials and averments.) 
 Wherefore the defendant prays that the complaint be dismissed. 
 
 The Railroad Co. 
 
 By E. F. (Title of Officer.) 
 
 STATE OF \ 
 
 County of J &b> 
 
 E. P. being duly sworn, says that he is the of the 
 
 Railroad Company, defendant in this proceeding, and that the foregoing au- 
 swer is true as he verily believes. 
 
 E. F. 
 
 Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of A. D. 19 
 
 C. D., Justice of the Peace. 
 (Or other officer authorized to administer oaths.)
 
 404 
 
 RULES OF PRACTICE IN CROSSING AND INTERLOCKING CASES. 
 
 I. 
 
 For the hearing of cases arising under the act approved May 27, 1889, con- 
 cerning crossings, and the act approved June 2, 1891, concerning interlocking, 
 there shall be held at the office of the Commission, in the State House, in 
 Springfield, a regular meeting of the Commission on the Tuesday after the 
 first Monday in each month, and continuing from day to day thereafter, if 
 necessary, until the business of such meeting is finished; but if the day above 
 designated for such meeting shall at anytime fall upon a general election day 
 or legal holiday, then the meeting shall be held upon the day following. 
 
 II. 
 
 If no quorum of the commission shall be present on any day named in these 
 rules for any regular meeting of the Commission, and there are causes on the 
 docket ready for hearing, the Secretary of the Commission shall adjourn such 
 meeting from day to day (noting the same upon the record), until a quorum 
 is present for the transaction of business, at which time the hearing shall be 
 proceeded with in the same manner as they would had a quorum been pres- 
 ent on the day named in the rules for said meeting. When the Secretary 
 shall be aware in advance that for any reason a quorum will not be present 
 for the transaction of business on the day named for a regular meeting, he 
 shall, so far as practicable, advise all interested parties by letter or otherwise 
 of the fact, and also let them know on what day a quorum is expected. 
 
 III. 
 
 Upon the filing of any petition in pursuance of any of the provisions of 
 either of such acts, the Secretary of the Commission shall at once issue and 
 cause to be served upon or delivered to the defendant in such petition such 
 notice as the law requires, or as may be prescribed by the Commission; and 
 the Secretary shall also, for the better information of such defendant, mail to 
 its president or general manager a copy of the petition; but a failure by de- 
 fendant to receive the letter shall not be taken as a failure of notice. 
 
 IV. 
 
 If the notice provided for in the last rule shall be served upon or received 
 by the defendant ten days before the next regular meeting of the Commission 
 as above established, the case shall stand for hearing at that meeting; but if 
 such notice shall be served or received less than ten days before such regular 
 monthly meeting, then such petition shall stand for hearing at the next regu- 
 lar monthly meeting succeeding that one.
 
 405 
 
 V. 
 
 In the case of any proceeding begun under the said interlocking act of 1891, 
 by a citation issued by order of the Commission instead of by petition, the 
 Secretary shall make such citation returnable at the next, regular monthly 
 meeting of the Commission, if the same shall take place ten days or more 
 after the time of issuing such citation; but if such citation shall not be served 
 upon any defendant therein named ten days or more prior to the first day of 
 the next meeting, then such citation shall stand for hearing at the next regu- 
 lar meeting succeeding. 
 
 VI. 
 
 Such answer as any defendant may desire to make to any petition, or such 
 return as any company may desire to make to any citation which may be 
 issued, shall be filed in the office of the Commission not later than the morn- 
 ing of the day upon which said petition or citation stands for hearing upon the 
 docket in accordance with these rules, and such answer or returns shall close 
 the written pleadings in the case. 
 
 VII. 
 
 Cases shall stand for hearing at such regular meetings in the order of their 
 numbers unless the Commission shall for good cause vary such order; and in 
 the general manner of conducting hearings, producing testimony, etc., the 
 Commission will be governed by the general system of practice which obtains 
 in the Circuit Courts of Illinois, so far as the same is applicable to these pro- 
 ceedings. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 All evidence offered on any such hearing shall be reported in full by the 
 stenographer of the Commission, who shall write the same out correctly in 
 typewriting, and file the same for reference with the papers in the case in 
 which the same is taken. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Every case which may for any reason remain on the docket, not finally dis- 
 posed of at the conclusion of any such regular meeting of the Commission, 
 shall stand continued to the next regular meeting, and the secretary shall 
 enter an order to that effect, in such case, without specific action or instruc- 
 tions by the Commission. 
 
 X, 
 
 The Secretary of the Commission is hereby empowered, without further 
 specific order, to issue from time to time, under his hand and the seal of the 
 Commission, such subpoenas for witnesses in any cause arising under either 
 of said acts as any party thereto may request to be issued. Said Secretary 
 shall advance no fees for the service of any such subpoenas, but leave the 
 party calling for the same to serve it or procure it to be served as he shall 
 think fit. 
 
 XI. 
 
 In every trial had under these rules, the petitioner will open and close the 
 case. Each party to the hearing will be allowed to introduce such evidence 
 as to facts and expert questions as may be thought necessary, provided the 
 same is admissible under the common law rules of evidence; and each party 
 will be fully heard in argument upon all points of the case by counsel or other 
 representative, but no petition for rehearing will be entertained in any such 
 case, unless the right to present the same is expressly reserved in the final 
 decree or order of the Commission.
 
 406 
 
 XII. 
 
 The petition mentioned in section 1 of this act of 1891, concerning inter- 
 locking, will be deemed sufficient if in substantially the following form : 
 
 To the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois: 
 
 The , Rail Company represents that 
 
 it owns and operates a certain railroad extending from to 
 
 within the State of Illinois; that the main track of said 
 
 railroad crosses at grade the main track of the 
 
 Rail Company 
 
 in the County of. ; that petitioner desires 
 
 to unite with the said Kail 
 
 Company in protecting said crossing with proper devices and appliances, thus 
 securing greater safety to persons and property, and enabling trains to pass 
 said crossing without stopping, but is unable to agree with said company upon 
 a plan of the same, that the public good requires that said crossing be so pro- 
 tected: and petitioner files herewith a plat showing the location of the tracks 
 involved in said crossing, and make said plat a part of this petition 
 
 In consideration of the premises, petitioner prays this Commission to give 
 
 notice to the said Rail 
 
 Company, which is made defendant to this petition, and to proceed to view 
 the site of said crossing, and appoint a time and place for a hearing of this 
 petition, and that upon such hearing the Commission will enter an order pre- 
 scribing: a proper device and machinery for the protection of said crossing in 
 pursuance of an act of the General Assembly, entitled "An act to protect per- 
 sons and property from danger at the crossings and junctions of railroads, n 
 etc., approved June 2, 1891; and petitioner further prays that the Commission 
 will fix in such order the proportion of the cost for the construction, mainte- 
 nance and operation of such device which each of the parties hereto shall 
 pay; and prays generally for such other relief as may be appropriate to the 
 case. 
 
 Petitioner. 
 Its Solicitor. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 The notice to be give in pursuance of section 1 of said act of 1891, may be 
 in substance as follows: 
 
 Office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 To the Rail Company: 
 
 You are hereby notified that on the day of 190 . . , 
 
 the Rail Company filed in the office 
 
 of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois a petition, 
 praying for the protection, by proper devices and machinery, of a certain 
 grade crossing of the main tracks of your railroad and that of the said peti- 
 tioner, situated 
 
 in the county of , in the State of Illinois, in pursuance of an 
 
 act of the General Assembly approved June 2, 1891, entitled "An act to pro- 
 tect persons and property from danger at the crossings and junctions of rail-
 
 407 
 
 roads," etc.; and you are hereby further notified that under the rules of said 
 Commission the said petition will stand for hearing at the office of said Com- 
 mission in the State House, in the city of Springfield, Illinois, on. . . . 
 
 the day of 19 at 9 o'clock a. m., at which time and 
 
 place the said Commission will proceed to try the question whether or not 
 the said crossing shall be protected by interlocking or other devices, and in 
 case the said companies are unable to agree, to prescribe if the public good 
 is deemed to require it, what kind of device, equipment and machinery shall 
 be put in by the companies concerned, and the proportion of the cost of the 
 construction, maintenance and operation thereof, which each of said com- 
 panies shall pay; and you can, if you think proper, appear through your 
 E roper officers or counsel at the time and place above mentioned, and be fully 
 eard by the Commission upon all the matters involved in said petition. 
 
 The Commission will, if practicable, advise you of the time when the site of 
 said crossing will be viewed, so you may be present if you desire. 
 
 Witness Secretary of said Commission, and 
 
 the seal thereof, at Springfield, Illinois, this 
 
 day of A. D. 190.... 
 
 Secretary. 
 XIV. 
 
 The citation provided for in section 2 of said act of 1891, may be in sub- 
 stantially the following form : 
 
 Office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 To the Rail Company : 
 
 WHEREAS, Facts have come to the knowledge of the Railroad and Ware- 
 house Commission of the State of Illinois, which give the said Commission 
 
 cause to believe that the grade crossing between the main tracks of the 
 
 Rail Company and the 
 
 Rail Company, situated 
 
 in the county of in the State of Illinois, is probably danger- 
 ous to the public, and to persons operating trains across and over the same, 
 and that said crossing probably requires protection by proper devices, ma- 
 chinery and appliances, in accordance with an act of the General Assembly 
 entitled, "An act to protect persons and property from danger at the cross- 
 ing and junctions of railroad," etc., approved June 2, 1891- 
 
 Now, therefore, you, the said 
 
 Rail Company, impleaded herein with the said 
 
 Rail Company, are hereby notified and cited to come 
 
 before the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission at 
 
 on the day of 19 , at the hour of o'clock 
 
 m., then and there to show cause why you should not be required to unite 
 
 with said Rail 
 
 Company in providing said crossiug with such safety appliances, devices and 
 machinery, as may, in the judgment of said Commission, after full hearing, 
 be thought requisite for the proper protection thereof; and said Commission, 
 in case the protection of said crossing is, after hearing, deemed necessary, 
 will also, unless the companies agree thereon, prescribe and order proper de- 
 vices, machinery and appliances for the protection of said crossing, and also 
 fix the proportion of cost each company concerned shall pay for the construc- 
 tion, maintenance and operation thereof; upon all which matters you will, 
 through your proper officer or counsel, be fully heard at the time and place 
 specified, if you see fit to appear. 
 
 Witness Secretary of said Commission, and 
 
 the seal thereof, at Springfield, Illinois, this 
 
 day of A. D. 19.... 
 
 Secretary.
 
 408 
 
 XV. 
 
 The form of notification to be given in cases arising under the act of 1889 , 
 concerning crossings, may be in substantially the following form: 
 
 Office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois. 
 To the Rail Company: 
 
 You are hereby notified that on the day of 19 
 
 the Rail Company filed in the 
 
 office of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission of the State of Illinois, a 
 petition praying the Commission for leave to cross with its tracks the main 
 
 line of your railroad at in the county of 
 
 , in the State of Illinois, in pursuance of an act of tke 
 
 General Assembly, approved May 28,1889, entitled,!" An act in relation to the 
 crossing of one railroad by another, and to prevent danger to life and prop- 
 erty from grade crossings;" and you are further notified that under the rules 
 of said Commission, the said petition will stand for hearing at the office 
 of said Commission, in the State House, in the city of Springfield, Illinois, on 
 
 , the day of ,19 , at 9 o'clock a. m., 
 
 at which time and place you can appear through your proper officers or coun- 
 sel and be heard upon the question involved m said petition, if you see fit to 
 do so. 
 
 The Commission will, if practicable, advise you of the time when the site of 
 said crossing will be viewed, so you may be present if you desire. 
 
 Witness Secretary of said Commission , and 
 
 the seal thereof, at Springfield, Illinois, this 
 
 day of A. D. 190.... 
 
 Secretary.
 
 INTERLOCKING DEVICES. 
 
 Statutory Provisions and Rules Governing Same.
 
 410 
 
 
 STATUTORY PROVISIONS. 
 
 Act relating to crossings on same level; approved June 3, 1887, in force 
 July 1, 1887. 
 
 AN ACT in regard to dangers incident to railroad crossings on the same level. 
 
 SECTION 1. That when and in case two or more railroads crossing each 
 other at a common grade, or any railroad crossing any stream or harbor by 
 swing or draw bridge, shall, by a system of interlocking and automatic sig- 
 nals, or by other works, fixtures and machinery, to be erected by them, or 
 either of them, render it safe for engines and trains to pass over such cross- 
 ing or bridge without stopping, and such system of interlocking: and signals, 
 works or fixtures, shall first be approved by the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commissioners, or any two of them, and a plan of such interlocking and signals, 
 .works and fixtures for such crossing, designating the plan of crossing, shall 
 have been filed with such Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners, then, and 
 in that case, it is hereby lawful for the engines and trains of any such rail- 
 road or railroads to pass over such crossing or bridge without stopping, any 
 law, or the provisions of any law, now in force to the contrary notwithstand- 
 ing; and all such other provisions of laws contrary thereto are hereby de- 
 clared not to be applicable in such case: Provided, that the said Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commissioners shall have power in case such interlocking 
 system, in their judgment, shall, by experience, prove to be unsafe or im- 
 practicable, to order the same to be discontinued. [As amended by act ap- 
 proved May 28, 1891.] 
 
 2. The said Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners may appoint a com- 
 petent civil engineer to examine such proposed system and plans, and report 
 the result of such examination for the information of such Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commissioners, and said Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners 
 are hereby authorized to allow and reward five dollars per day as a compen- 
 sation for the services of such civil engineer, or such reasonable sum as such 
 commissioners shall deem fit, and to allow and reward such other and fur- 
 ther sums as they shall deem fit to pay. all other fees, cost and expenses to 
 arise under said application, to be paid by the railway company or companies 
 in interest, to be taxed and paid or collected as in other cases. And the said 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners are also empowered, ou application 
 for their apDroval of any such system of interlocking and signals, works or 
 fixtures, to require of the applicant security for such fees, costs and expenses, 
 or the deposit, in lieu thereof, of a sufficient amount in money for that pur- 
 pose, to be fixed by them. 
 
 APPROVED June 3, 1887.
 
 411 
 
 ILLINOIS INTERLOCKING ACT, APPROVED JUNE 2, 1891. 
 
 AN ACT to protect persons and property from danger at the crossings and junctions of 
 railroads by providing a method to compel the protection of the same. 
 
 SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois , represented in 
 the General Assembly: That in every case where the main tracks of two or 
 more railroads cross at a grade in this State, any company owning or oper- 
 ating any one of such tracks, whose managers may desire to unite with others 
 by protecting such crossing with interlocking and other safety devices, may 
 file with the Railroad and Warehouse Commission a petition stating the facts 
 of the situation, and asking said Railroad and Warehouse Commission to 
 order such crossing to be protected by interlocking signals, devices and 
 switches, or other safety appliances. Said petition shall be accompanied by 
 a plat showing the location of all tracks; and upon the filing thereof, notice 
 shall be given to each other company or person owning or operating any 
 track involved in such crossing, and the said Railroad and Warehouse Com- 
 mission shall thereupon view the site of said crossing, and shall, as soon as 
 practicable, appoint a time and place for the hearing of such petition. 
 
 {! 2. If the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall, from informa- 
 tion obtained in any manner, have cause to believe that any such grade 
 crossing as described in section one of this act, is dangerous to the public, or 
 to persons operating trains, and requires protection, then it shall be the duty 
 of the said commission, without any petition, and of its own motion, to cite 
 the several companies or persons owning or operating the railway tracks 
 forming such crossing, to come before said Commission at such time and 
 place as may be named, and show cause why they should not be required to 
 provide such crossing with interlocking or other safety appliances. 
 
 3 3. At the time and place named for hearing under any petition filed in 
 pursuance of section one of this act, or in any citation issued in pursuance 9f 
 section two thereof, unless the hearing is for good cause continued, said 
 Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall proceed to try the question whether 
 or not the crossing shall be protected by interlocking or otherwise, and shall 
 give to all companies and parties interested an opportunity to be fully heard, 
 and said Commission shall, after such hearing, enter an order upon a record 
 book or docket, to be kept for the purpose, denying the petition or discharg- 
 ing the citation if the protection of such crossing as proposed is deemed un- 
 necessary, or, if said Commission shall be of opinion, from the evidence and 
 facts produced, that the public good requires that such crossing be protected, 
 then the Commission shall enter an order prescribing an interlocking device 
 or equipment for such crossing, in case the companies interested can not agree 
 upon a device, in which order shall be specified the kind of machine to be 
 used, the switches, signals and other devices or appliances to be put in, and 
 the location thereof, and all other matters which may be deemed proper for 
 the efficient protection of such crossing, and said Commission shall further 
 designate in such order, the proportion of the cost of the construction of such 
 plant, and of the expense of maintaining and operating the same, which 
 each of the companies or persons concerned shall pay. In case, however, 
 one railroad company shall hereafter seek to cross at grade with its track or 
 tracks, the track or tracks of another railroad company, and the Railroad and 
 Warehouse Commission shall determine that interlocking and other safety ap- 
 
 Eliances shall be put in, the railroad company seeking to cross at grade shall 
 e compelled to pay all costs of such appliances, together with the expense 
 of putting them in and the future maintenance thereof. 
 
 \ 4. It shall be the duty of every railroad company or person owning or 
 operating any track involved in any such crossing to comply with and carry 
 out fully, or unite with the others in doing so, any order of the said Railroad 
 and Warehouse Commission made in pursuance of any proceeding instituted 
 or had under this act, such work to be completed within ninety days after 
 such order is made, unless the Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall, for 
 good cause shown, extend the time, and when any such plant shall have been 
 completed and made ready for use, it shall be the duty of the companies or 
 persons concerned to notify the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission 
 thereof, whereupon said Commission shall inspect or cause to be inspected
 
 412 
 
 the said completed plant in the same manner as is now provided in the act 
 upon that subject, approved June 3, 1887; and if, upon such inspection, the 
 said plant is deemed to be well constructed and suitable and sufficient for the 
 purpose, the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission shall issue a permit 
 empowering the several companies or persons owning or operating the tracks 
 involved therein to run such crossing without stopping under such rules and 
 regulations as may be in force, or may thereafter be adopted, by the said 
 Commission, any law now in force upon the subject of stopping trams at rail- 
 way crossings to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 5. Any company, person or corporation refusing or neglecting to comply 
 with any order made by the said Railroad and Warehouse Commission in pur- 
 suance of this act shall forfeit and pay a penalty of $200 for each week of re- 
 fusal and neglect, the same to be recovered in an action of debt in the name 
 of the People of the State of Illinois, and to be paid, when collected, into the 
 county treasury of any county where any such suit may be tried. 
 
 \ 6. All expenses incurred in any proceeding under this act shall be paid 
 by the railway companies concerned, in equal portions, upon bills to be ren- 
 dered by the Secretary of said Commission. 
 
 \ 7. Every junction of two or more railroad tracks, whether the tracks 
 joining each other are owned by different companies- or by the same company, 
 shall be taken and deemed to be a crossing within the meaning of this act: 
 Provided, that this section shall not apply to switch, spur or side tracks. 
 
 (For rules governing the construction of interlocking devices, see next page.)
 
 413 
 
 RULES GOVERNING THE INSTALLATION OF INTER- 
 LOCKING DEVICES. 
 
 For the information of railroad officials contemplating the construction and 
 operation of interlocking devices for the protection of grade crossings and 
 junctions, in accordance with the statutory provisions governing the same, as 
 defined in the foregoing acts, the following general rules and specifications 
 are adopted and will be held as requirements by the Railroad and Warehouse 
 Commission, where the approval of any such interlocking signals and switches 
 or permit for operating the same, is applied for, as provided in the several 
 acts of the General Assembly concerning interlocking: 
 
 INFORMATION TO BE PILED WITH THE SECRETARY OP THE COM- 
 MISSION WITH PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF ANY PLAN, AND 
 FOR INSPECTION OF ANY INTERLOCKING SYSTEM. 
 
 I. 
 
 Prior to the commencement of the erection of an interlocking 
 system, there should be filed with the Secretary of the Commis- 
 sion, for approval of or amendment by the Consulting Engineer, 
 a complete plan in duplicate showing the location of all main 
 tracks, sidings, switches, cross overs, spur tracks, buildings and 
 other obstructions to the view, at or in the vicinity of the crossing 
 or junction to be protected; also showing the proposed location of 
 all switch points, signals, locks, detector bars, tower, etc., the 
 same to be fixed by measurement indicated by plain figures, or by 
 a plan drawn to a scale of no less than fifty feet nor more than 
 one hundred feet to one inch. 
 
 The grade of each track per one hundred feet must be shown on 
 the said plan, also the direction in which trains are moved there- 
 on. All tracks must be marked "main," "side," "transfer," 
 etc., according to use. 
 
 At each switch, derail, signal, detector bar, lock, etc., shown 
 on the said plan there must be marked the number of the lever to 
 operate the same. 
 
 II. 
 
 A petition for inspection of any interlocking system filed as 
 provided in the acts of 1887 and 1891, must be accompanied by a 
 plan similar to that described in Article I, with all corrections 
 made thereon that may be necessary to show the interlocking sys- 
 tem as completed. 
 
 Request for 
 approval of 
 plan. 
 
 Plan of com- 
 pleted sys- 
 tem.
 
 414 
 
 Diagram 
 locking. 
 
 of 
 
 Manipulation 
 .sheet. 
 
 Copy of rules. 
 
 Style of sig 
 nals. 
 
 Home signal. 
 
 III. 
 
 A complete diagram of locking must be furnished with petition 
 for inspection of any interlocking system. This diagram must 
 correspond with the arrangement of locking dogs as finally lo- 
 cated and fixed. 
 
 IV. 
 
 A manipulation sheet showing the combination necessary to be 
 set up for each of the several routes governed by signals must be 
 furnished with petition for inspection. 
 
 V. 
 
 Where special instructions are issued for the guidance of em- 
 ployed using the tracks within the limits of an interlocking system 
 of unusual complicity, a copy of such instructions should be fur- 
 nished with the petition for inspection. 
 
 IMPORTANT REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GUID- 
 ANCE IN CONSTRUCTION. 
 
 VI. 
 
 It being desirable that a uniform system of signals should be 
 used at all interlocking systems, it is recommended that all sig- 
 nals should be of the semaphore type. All signals must be so 
 constructed as to go to the danger position by force of gravity in 
 ase the connections between the operating lever and the signal 
 are broken. All signals must be provided with a lamp, showing 
 front lens properly focused, and a back light, except as herein- 
 after provided. 
 
 VII. 
 
 The home signal should, when practicable, be located on the 
 engineman's side of the track it governs, and should not be less 
 than fifty (50) feet nor more than two hundred (200) feet in ad- 
 vance of the point it governs, except where special conditions 
 exist. The signal mast point to the right of the track it governs, 
 and should have a square end. When the derail or facing point 
 or crossing is set against the train movements governed by the 
 aomc signal, the signal must be locked in a horizontal position, 
 showing red, or danger color light by night, indicating "danger 
 stop." When the track it governs is clear and safe for the pas- 
 sage of trains the signal may be inclined at an angle of about 
 sixty (60) degrees or more, from the horizontal, showing a white 
 or line clear Tight by night to approaching train, indicating "clear 
 :rack advance." In case two signal arms are used on the home 
 signal post the top signal should in all cases govern main or high 
 speed routes, and the lower signal the diverging route or routes, 
 [n mechanical interlocking systems the home signal may be 
 worked by either pipe or wire connections. In case wire is used 
 ;here must be two lines.
 
 415 
 
 VIII. 
 
 The distant signal should be located not less than twelve hun- 
 dred (1200) feet m advance of the home signal with which it op- 
 erates, on the same side of track, with the arm pointing in the 
 same direction. The distant signal should be distinguished by a 
 notch cut in the end of a semaphore arm. It must be so arranged 
 and connected with the home signal that it will be held in a hor- 
 izontal position, showing green or caution color light by night to 
 approaching train when the home signal indicates danger. The 
 distant signal must be worked by two lines of wire. 
 
 IX. 
 
 Rotating indicators, known as pot or disc signals, should only 
 be used as switch indicators, operating with the switch. 
 
 X. 
 
 Dwarf signals haying a small arm and suitably adapted as to 
 height, should be similar in design and location to the home sig- 
 nal. They should be used only to govern movements on secon- 
 dary tracks or movements against the current of traffic on main 
 tracks when such reverse movements become necessary, and 
 where necessary in yards. 
 
 XI. 
 
 Bracket posts should be used in all cases where it is necessary 
 to signal trains on different tracks, operated in the same direc 
 tion, from the same main post; the position of the posts on the 
 bracket to correspond to the position of the track on which move 
 ments are to be governed. 
 
 XII. 
 
 The signal man in the tower should be able to see the arms and 
 the back lights of all signals; the back lights of the lamps to be 
 made as small as practicable, having regard to efficiency. When 
 the front lights are visible to the signalman in the tower no back 
 lights will be required. If from any unavoidable cause the arm 
 or light of any signal can not be seen by the signalman, a re- 
 peater or indicator should be provided in the signal tower. 
 
 XIII. 
 
 The fixed light in the signal tower should be screened off so as 
 not to be mistaken for the signals exhibited to control the run 
 ning of trains. 
 
 XIV. 
 
 When the grade is practically level, the derailing points on 
 high speed tracks shall be located not less than five hundred (500) 
 feet in advance of crossing or fouling point which it is intended 
 to protect; bat, in case of a descending grade toward the crossing 
 or fouliug point, the derailing point must be located at such a 
 distance from the crossing or fouling point as to give the same 
 measure of protection that is required for level approach. 
 
 When in the opinion of the Consulting Engineer of the Com- 
 mission the train service and character of traffic on any high 
 speed track is such that the above limit can be varied from, he 
 may approve location of derails at such a distance in advance of 
 crossing or fouling point as in his judgment would give an equal 
 measure of protection. 
 
 Distant s i g- 
 
 nals. 
 
 Switch indi- 
 cators. 
 
 Dwarf Signal. 
 
 Bracket posts. 
 
 General a r - 
 rangement 
 of signals. 
 
 Fixed lights 
 in tower. 
 
 Derails .in 
 high speed 
 tracks.
 
 416 
 
 Guard rails. 
 
 Derail point* 
 o n second 
 ary tracks. 
 
 Where a single main high speed track crosses another railroad 
 at grade, and trains are moved in both directions on such single 
 track, then derails must be provided therein on both sides of the 
 rossing in accordance with the foregoing requirements. 
 
 Guard rails will be required in interlocking systems hereafter 
 constructed wherever the Consulting Engineer shall deem them 
 necessary. 
 
 XV. 
 
 On secondary tracks, such as switching, drilling, storage and 
 low speed tracks, the derail point should be located so as to give 
 the same measure of safety required for high speed tracks. 
 
 XVI. 
 
 Derail for 
 main track 
 er ossing 
 
 When the crossing is made by a switching, drilling, storage or 
 low speed track with a high speed track on which trains are 
 second ary moved in both directions the derail on the high speed track 
 should be located on each side of the crossing, and at the dis- 
 tance therefrom indicated in article XIV. A derail should be 
 located on the secondary tracks on each side of the crossing, ac- 
 ording to the requirements of article XV. 
 
 track. 
 
 Derails on 
 second ary 
 track. 
 
 Derails on 
 
 spur 
 
 or sidings. 
 
 Derails on 
 double track 
 b a c k - u p 
 derails. 
 
 Derails how 
 worked. 
 
 Locks for de- 
 rails, slip 
 switches 
 and movable 
 point frogs. 
 
 XVII. 
 
 In case two or more secondary low speed tracks cross each 
 other at grade, each track should be provided with a derail on 
 each side of the crossing. The distance of the derail in advance 
 of the crossing should be governed by the kind of traffic upon 
 such tracks, provided that the same measure of safety is secured 
 at such crossings as is required for the protection at crossings of 
 high speed tracks. 
 
 XVIII. 
 
 In case a spur, siding or switch track connects with the main 
 f^* track between the derail and the crossing which it protects, the 
 spur or siding should be treated as the crossing track, and be 
 provided with a derail in accordance with the foregoing require- 
 ments. 
 
 XIX. 
 
 In case of double track crossings where trains are moved on 
 each track, as a rule, in one direction, a derail should be pro- 
 vided for back up movements, and for the further purpose of in- 
 suring clearance of crossing before the clearance signal can be 
 given on opposite route. The back-up derail should be placed not 
 less than one hundred and fifty (150) feet nor more than three 
 hundred (300) feet from the crossing. 
 
 XX. 
 
 In mechanical interlocking plants all derails and point switches 
 whether facing or trailing, must be worked either by iron or steel 
 pipe not less than one inch in diameter. 
 
 XXI. 
 
 All slip switches, movable point frogs and derails should be 
 locked either by a separate line of connections from those used to 
 move such slip switches, movable point frogs or derails or by 
 double pointed switch and lock movement of approved pattern.
 
 417 
 
 Where the double pointed switch and lock movement is used on 
 high speed main tracks it must be in connection with a bolt lock 
 operated with the home signal, which indicates the position of the 
 facing point. 
 
 a Switch move- 
 ments. 
 
 Detector bars. 
 
 XXII. 
 
 Switch movements should be located on long ties extending 
 sufficient distance from the rail or on other suitable foundation, 
 and the switch movement should be further connected with the 
 rails by a continuous plate extending under the rails, fitted with 
 rail braces to insure accurate adjustment and maintenance of 
 guage of track. All ties to which lock movements or switch and 
 lock movements are fastened should be firmly strapped to ad- 
 jacent ties. 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 All derails, facing point switches, sketch blocks, torpedo sig- 
 nals or other fixtures used in either changing the route or imped- 
 ing the progress of trains shall be protected by detector bars. 
 These detector bars must be at least fifty (50) feet in length. The 
 first interval of the movement of the switch lever which with- 
 draws the locking pin must at the same time raise the detector 
 bar above the level of the rail. The final movement of the switch 
 lever must advance the detector bar to its normal position level 
 with the rail. If the detector bar is not worked on the switch 
 lever it must be actuated before the switch is moved in either di- 
 rection. 
 
 XXIV. 
 
 When, in the opinion of the Consulting Engineer of the Com- 
 mission, it is practicable, detector bars or electric locking will be 
 required at each crossing. Crossing bars should be interlocked 
 with the movement that operates the derails, to insure a clear 
 crossing before an opposing route can be set or signal be given. 
 
 XXV. 
 
 In all mechanical interlocking the levers by which points and Arrangement 
 signals are worked should be grouped in a tower and supported 
 on a suitable foundation, which should be independent of the 
 foundation of the tower. All levers should be pivoted on one 
 common center. So far as may be practicable and consistent 
 with a simplified lead-out, the levers, especially in large ma- 
 chines, should be so arranged that those used in any route com- 
 bination shall be near together, preference being given to combi- 
 nations most often set up. The levers should be numbered from 
 left to right. The visible parts of the levers above the machine, 
 except the finished part of the handle, should be painted as fol- 
 lows: Switch levers, black; lock levers, blue, switch and lock 
 levers, black and blue; home signal levers, red; distant signal 
 levers, green; and movable point frog levers, yellow. 
 
 XXVI. 
 
 The locking should be actuated by the action of the latch rod, 
 or by a device performing similar service in advance of the first 
 movement of any lever. The first act in reversing a lever must 
 ock the levers of all conflicting routes. 
 
 Detector bar 
 at crossings. 
 
 of levers in 
 
 mechanical 
 
 machine. 
 
 Preliminary 
 locking:. 
 
 27 O
 
 418 
 
 Locking 
 levers. 
 
 of 
 
 Signal towers. 
 
 Automatic 
 compensa- 
 tors. 
 
 Foundation of 
 pipe com- 
 pensators 
 and cranks. 
 
 General re- 
 quirements . 
 
 System to be 
 complete 
 when in- 
 spection is 
 requested. 
 
 XXVII. 
 
 The levers should be so arranged that while the signals are in 
 their normal position, i. e., at Danger, the levers operating points 
 shall be free to move: Provided, however, that the preliminary 
 act of reversing any lever shall lock all signal levers controlling 
 opposing routes. The arrangement of locking must be such as to 
 make it impossible for the signalman to lower the signal for the 
 approach of the train until he has first set the points in proper 
 position for it to pass over the route governed by such signal. 
 The locking must be so devised as to make it impossible for the 
 signalman to exhibit at the same moment any two signals or com- 
 bination of signals that can lead to a collision. 
 
 XXVIII. 
 
 5 Signal towers should be so placed and of such height as to 
 afford the best possible view of the signals and other parts of the 
 interlocking system.; ... 
 
 vrrrTp '"" ** ' ~~~" : "VVTV Tr* ' *7 ~' ~"* ' 
 
 iil ._*J Rfciig ""j j A.A.1A. ,^_. ';-! 
 
 Each line of pipe operating: points must be automatically com- 
 pensated. Such automatic compensators must be located at such 
 intervals in the line as to completely provide for expansion and 
 contraction at various temperatures. 
 
 XXX. 
 
 All pipe compensators and cranks must be fixed on suitable 
 foundations. 
 
 XXXI. 
 
 In case there are cross-overs, turn-outs or^'other connecting 
 tracks involved in the general system upon which the movement 
 of cars and trains present an element of danger, which danger 
 will be enhanced by the passage of trains over crossings or junc- 
 tions without stopping, and subsequently at higher speed than 
 would be the case without the permit sought, then, and in all 
 such cases, whether such enhanced danger be of collision between 
 different cars or trains of the same road, or between cars or trains 
 of different roads, it will be necessary, in addition to the protection 
 oj the main crossing, to provide by the proper devices and appliances 
 against any such increased collateral dangers in the same complete 
 manner that is required in the case of the main crossing. The ma- 
 terial and workmanship must be in all respects first-class, and the 
 entire system must be constructed in accordance with the best 
 practice in signaling, and as a whole must, when completed, se- 
 cure protection at every point within its limits, and be in every 
 way suitable and sufficient for the purpose. 
 
 XXXII. 
 
 Inspection for issue of permit will not be made until the entire 
 system is completed, connected and operated under orders to hold 
 home signal against trains until they have made a full stop for 
 the crossing or junction governed by such signal. And in no 
 case will the inspection be made until all information hereinbe- 
 fore specified to be furnished to the Secretary shall be on file in 
 the office of the Commission.
 
 419 
 
 Changes in 
 system after 
 permit is is- 
 sued. 
 
 XXXIII. 
 
 In case any company desires to make any change in the me- 
 chanical construction, arrangement or location of any interlock- 
 ing system or machine now or hereafter operated under permit of 
 the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, or any of the parts of 
 such system, a new or supplemental petition, with amended plans, 
 shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, showing: 
 specifically the nature of the changes proposed, and a new per- 
 mit procured thereon to operate such system as changed or 
 amended, and any such change made without a new permit first 
 being procured in pursuance of this rule, or any change made by 
 any company in the manner of moving cars and engines within 
 the limits of the interlocking system not contemplated by the 
 Commission when the permit was issued, will be deemed ipso 
 facto to work a forfeiture of the permit. 
 
 XXXIV. 
 
 Blank forms for monthly reports of inspection and maintenance 
 will be supplied to each railroad company having interlocking 
 equipment in operation under authority from the Commission, 
 and on the first day of each month it shall be the duty of the 
 proper officer of each company to answer thereon as fully as 
 practicable, and separately for each interlocking system or de- 
 vice, ihe questions set forth, and promptly forward the same to 
 the Consulting Engineer of the Commission at Springfield. 
 
 In the event of a disagreement in the reports submitted for any 
 interlocking system or device, and where such disagreement calls 
 in question the safe operation thereof, it shall be the duty of the 
 Consulting Engineer to examine such system or device and report 
 its condition to the Commission. 1 
 
 Approved and adopted by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission Sep- 
 tember 8, 1897. 
 
 WILLIAM KILPATRICK, Secretary. 
 FRANK G. EWALD, Consulting Engineer. 
 
 Monthly re- 
 ports of the 
 general con- 
 dition, etc., 
 of each in- 
 terlocking 
 system.
 
 421 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 OPINIONS IN CROSSING CASES. 
 
 Chicago & Calumet Terminal R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. fLaGrange 1-12 
 
 Chic afro, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co J 
 
 Chicago, Madison & Northern R. R. Co 1 
 
 vs. f Town of Cicero 23-35 
 
 The Belt Ry . of Chicago J 
 
 Chicago. Madison & Northern R . R . Co .--1m 
 
 vs I Town of Cicero, Petition for re- 
 TheBeltRy. of Chicago ..'. J hearing 37-42 
 
 Chicago, Madison & Northern R. R. Co "1 
 
 VS 
 
 Chicago & Western Indiana R. R. Co. and Pitts- [Stewart A ve 43-52 
 
 burgh, Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co J ( 
 
 St. Louis & Eastern Ry ) 
 
 vs. XPeters 77-81 
 
 Toledo, St. Louis & Kansas City R. R. Co J 
 
 Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis Ry . Co ~| 
 
 vs. ^Litchfleld 105-108 
 
 The Wabash Ry. Co j 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. VPaducah Junction 113-123 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co. and The Wabash R. R. Co. ) 
 
 Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Jacksonville Junction 125-130 
 
 Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. and The Wabash R. R. Co. ) 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co . 
 
 Chicago & Western Indiana R. R. Co. and Atchi- \ Hawthorne 131-138 
 
 son.Topeka & Santa F6 R. R. Co , 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Corwith 139-144 
 
 Atchison,Topeka& Santa Fe" R. R. Co J 
 
 Centralia & Chester R. R . Co . . . . . ) 
 
 vs. ^Nashville 169-173 
 
 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co J 
 
 Tamaroa & Mt. Vernon Ry. Co ] 
 
 vs. 
 
 ille 
 
 St. Louis Ry. Co. 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co "j 
 
 VS 
 
 Chicago & Western Indiana R. U. Co. and Atchi- f Hawthorne 181-185 
 
 Louisville &_Nashville R.R. Co and Southeast & j" Mt - Vernon 175-180 
 
 son.Topeka & Santa F6 R. R. Co 
 
 Baltimore & Ohio & Chicago R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. > Commercial A ve 187-191 
 
 Scuth Chicago City Ry. Co ) 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. VNormal 193-197 
 
 llinois Central R.IR. Co )
 
 422 
 
 Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Peoria 199-204 
 
 Peoria Terminal Ry. Co J 
 
 Madison. Illinois & St. Louis Ry. Co 1 
 
 WabashR. R. Co., Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago f Kinder 211-217 
 
 & St. Louis Ry. Co. and Chicago & Alton R. R. CoJ 
 
 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co 1 
 
 vs. VWatseka 219-222 
 
 Toledo, Peoria & Western Ry. Co J 
 
 Wabash Railroad Co } 
 
 vs. 
 
 Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis Ry. Co | 
 
 ! Litchfleld 247-2 5 
 
 Jacksonville, Louisville & St. Louis Ry. Co I 
 
 vs. 
 St. Louis & Chicago Ry. Co ) 
 
 Wabash Railroad Co ) 
 
 vs. XLitchfleld 253-254 
 
 Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis Ry. Co J 
 
 Madison, Illinois & St. Louis Ry. Co ] 
 
 WabashR. R. Co., C., C.*!'C. & St. L. Ry. Co. and[ Kinder 267-271 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co J 
 
 Belleville City Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Cahokia 285-289 
 
 Louisville, Evansville & St. Louis Cons. R. R. Co. J 
 
 Chicago, Paducah & Memphis R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Mt. Vernon 289-290 
 
 Louisville. Evansville & St. Louis Cons. R. R. Co. ) 
 
 Centralia & Chester R. R. Co ) 
 
 TS. ^Nashville 291-292 
 
 Louisville & Nashville R . R . Co ) 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. XPaxton 326-327 
 
 Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co J 
 
 Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs . fGreenup 327-328 
 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co J 
 
 Chicago & Alton Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. J-Alton 337-343 
 
 Alton Railway & Illuminating Co J 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. >Tamaroa 344-345 
 
 Wabash, Chester & Western R. R. Co j 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. XPekin 34C-350 
 
 C..C..C. &St. L. Ry. Co j 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. > Green Valley 350-353 
 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville R. R. Co J 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. >Mattoon 354-355 
 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co J - 
 
 St. Louis, Peoria & Northern Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. ^Green Valley 370-371 
 
 Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Ry. Co I 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co ] 
 
 Chicago & Eastern Illinois R. R. Co. and Indiana. [ Tuscola 376-377 
 
 Decatur Western Ry. Co J 
 
 Rock Island & Peoria Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. Rock Island , 377-378. 
 
 Davenport, Rock Island <& Northwestern Ry. Co ,., I
 
 St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute R. R. Co } 
 
 vs >Casey 380-381 
 
 Indianapolis, Decatur & Western Ry. Co ) 
 
 St. Louis. Vandalia & Terre Haute R. R. Co ) 
 
 vs. >Smithboro 382-383 
 
 Jacksonville & St. Louis Ry. Co ) 
 
 C.. C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co ) 
 
 vs. VMackmaw 383-384 
 
 Terre Haute & Peoria Ry. Co J 
 
 The Wabash Railroad Co \ 
 
 vs. VReddick 385-386 
 
 Indiana. Illinois & Iowa R. R. Co J 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co "I 
 
 vs. fArcola 388-389 
 
 Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. R. Co J 
 
 COMPLAINTS. 
 
 Citizens of Lansing ) 
 
 vs. f Removal of Depot 23-28 
 
 Chicago, St. Louis & Pittsburgh R. R. Co J 
 
 Joseph Taylor ] 
 
 vs. ^Extortion o3-59 
 
 Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co J 
 
 Union Brewing Co. of Peoria } 
 
 vs. ^Refusal to Switch Cars 61-68 
 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co J 
 
 Lyon & Scott 1 
 
 Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co. and Illinois Car Ser- \ Refusal to Switch Cars 69 ' 76 
 
 vice Ass'n of Peoria J 
 
 Cowles &McKee ) 
 
 vs. ^Extortion 99-104 
 
 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co J 
 
 Citizens of Shawneetown ) 
 
 vs. ^Insufficient Train Service 205-209 
 
 Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co J 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS. 
 
 Application of Rules Grain Inspection Department 13-21 
 
 Communications relative to application of Commissioners' Live Stock Schedule 83-91 
 Claim for damages Erroneous Inspection of Grain Opinion of Attorney General 93-97 
 Interlocking Act approved June 2, 1891 109-112 
 
 Claim of McCourtie, Hill & Co ~| 
 
 vs. [-Appeal from Grading 145-146 
 
 Grain Inspection Dept., Chicago J 
 
 Claim of W. W. Hunter ) 
 
 vs. VError in Certificate 151-156 
 
 Grain Inspection Dept., Chicago ) 
 
 Opinion of Attorney General Duty of Railroad Companies to Switch Cars i. 157-168 
 
 Correspondence relating to Schedule of Rates, Train Service, etc 223-242 
 
 Railway Accounting 255-266 
 
 Letter of Chairman to Chicago Board of Trade relative to Storage of Grain in Ele- 
 vators 293-294 
 
 J.C.Shirley ^. loemand for redemption of cou- 
 
 Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co J P ns 243,246 
 
 Citizens of Benton ] 
 
 St. Louis. Alton & Terre Haute R. R. Co f Inadequate train service 272. 278 
 
 (See Supreme Court decision, page 295) 
 
 Wm. H. King & Son... ..) 
 
 vs. VExtortion 279,281 
 
 Pittsburgh. Ft. Wayne & Chicago Ry. Co J
 
 424 
 
 Mexican Amole Soap Co 
 
 TT vs ^,u- P y Refusal to switch cars 282,284 
 
 Peoria & Pekm Union. Chicago. Burlington & I 
 Quincy and Chicago.Rock Island&PacificR.R.Cos J 
 
 The People ] 
 
 * rn V CT' 4. r> r> n \ Inadequate train service 295,306 
 
 St, Louis. Alton & Terre Haute R. R. Co 1 
 
 (Decision Illinois Supreme Court) 
 
 J ames Brown ) 
 
 vs. X Extortion 307, 3J2 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co ) 
 
 John C. Ross and John Hill. Jr ) .. 
 
 vs (, Petition for revocation of h- 
 
 George A. Seaverns. etal..' j cense 313.321 
 
 O. L. Brining ) 
 
 vs. ^Refusal to switch cars 322, 325 
 
 C.. C.. C. &St. L. R. R. Co.... j 
 
 Joseph W. Vance and Wm. E. Washburn Egyptian] 
 
 Coal Co (Overcharge for switching 329,330 
 
 vs. 
 Chicago, Paducah & Memphis R. R. Co J 
 
 Millers' Association of Illinois ") 
 
 vs. ^Discrimination 331,335 
 
 Railroad Companies of Illinois J 
 
 Chicago Live Stock Exchange ") 
 
 vs 
 
 C. & N. W.. C.. B. & Q.. C.,'R. I. & P., and C., M. & f Extortion 336 
 
 St. P. Ry. Cos J 
 
 O. L. Brining ) 
 
 vs. VTo replace "Y" 356.357 
 
 C.. C-. C. & St. L. Ry. Co j 
 
 Postal Telegraph Co... l T o compel delivery of material 
 
 Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co....' j between stations 358,361 
 
 Citizens of Wyoming, 111 ) 
 
 vs. f Removal of depot 362,363 
 
 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co J 
 
 Chicago Live Stock Exchange ) 
 
 vs. ^Revision of live stock schedule 363.370 
 
 Various Railroads ) 
 
 Citizens' Coal Mining Co ) 
 
 vs. f Excess Switching charges 372-373 
 
 Chicago & Alton R. R. Co ) 
 
 Boston Water & Light Co ) 
 
 vs. >Excebs Switching Charges 373-376 
 
 St. Louis, Chicago & St. Paul R. R. Co ) 
 
 Lake Erie & Western R. R. Co V 
 
 vs. >- Addition to Tower at Paxton . . . 378-380 
 
 Illinois Central R. R. Co J 
 
 John Miller ) 
 
 vs. ^Overcharge of Freight Rates... 386-388 
 
 C.. C..C. & St. Louis Ry. Co j 
 
 William Atzel ) 
 
 vs. ^Extortion 389-393 
 
 Chicago Terminal Transfer R. R. Co j 
 
 Keeney & Little ) 
 
 vs. ^Discrimination 393-395 
 
 Toledo, Peoria & Western R. R Co ) 
 
 Blank form of complaint and answer 403 
 
 Rules governing all proceedings before the Commission 397 
 
 Rules governing the installation of interlocking devices 413 
 
 Rules of practice in crossing and interlocking cases 404 
 
 Statutory provisions governing interlocking devices 409