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 jndB a.^ strange m gxdmx. COMPLIMENTS 
 
 ROUMELIAN COUP D'ETAT, SERVO-BULGARIAN 
 
 WAR, AND THE LATEST PHASE OF THE 
 
 EASTERN QUESTION. 
 
 By R. HAMILTON LANG. 
 
 ALEXANDER, PRINCE OF BULGARIA. 
 
 Uontvoit: 
 
 HARRISON AND SONS, 59, PALL MALL, S.W. 
 
 1886. 
 
 PRICE SIXPENCE.
 
 Jgds a^ strange as Jidtoit. 
 • 
 
 ROUMELIAN COUP D'ETAT, SERVO-BULGARIAN 
 
 WAR, AND THE LATEST PHASE OF THE 
 
 EASTERN QUESTION. 
 
 By R. HAMILTON LANG. 
 
 ▲LEXANDEB, PBINCE OF BDLGARIA. 
 
 Uontron: 
 
 HAEEISON AND SONS, 59, PALL MALL, S.W. 
 
 188 6. 
 
 PRICE SIXPENCE.
 
 PEEFACE 
 
 An explanation may be expected for the publication of this 
 pamphlet. It is the reproduction of a lecture which I delivered 
 in Inverness on the 16th of February last, and in Glasgow on the 
 8th of March. I was then requested to publish it, but had not 
 at the time the leisure necessary to do so. Many of those who 
 heard the lecture may notice the absence of several anecdotes 
 with which I sought to enliven it. Their insertion in the 
 published text did not appear to me requisite. 
 
 The delay in publication has been advantageous in one 
 respect. The issue of a most interesting Blue Book on the 
 affairs of Eastern Eoumelia and Bulgaria enables me to append, 
 in the form of notes, authentic confirmation of many statements, 
 which thus no longer require to go forth to the public on my 
 own authority. In a general way I may add that that Blue 
 Book demonstrates forcibly not only the success and wisdom of 
 the Eastern Roumelian policy pursued by Lord Salisbury, but 
 also the remarkable tact and patience with which it was carried 
 out by Sir William White. Single-handed, the British Foreign 
 Secretary carried out a generous policy towards a small State, 
 determined to shake herself free of a foreign tutelage, and, thanks 
 to the ability and patient perseverance of his representative at 
 Constantinople, he was enabled to do so without ruffling the 
 susceptibilities of the other Great Powers whose projects he 
 was stultifying. 
 
 The "Eastern Question" has entered upon a new and 
 interesting phase, which it is of importance that the British 
 public should clearly understand. 
 
 E. HAMILTON LANG. 
 
 Fila Lodge, South Norwood FarJc, S.JE., 
 lUh June, 1886. 
 
 A 2

 
 o 
 
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 V
 
 EOUMELIAN COUP D'ETAT. 
 
 I. 
 
 Description and Political Situation of Eastern Europe. 
 
 Before describing the events which have recently transpired in 
 Eastern Eoumelia, it is advantageous to give you a clear con- 
 ception of what we call " Eastern Europe." It comprises all 
 the territory in Europe on the south side of the Danube from 
 its mouths up to Belgrade (in Servia), and along the south side 
 of the river Save up to the frontiers of Croatia (part of 
 Austria proper). All this vast territory, until after the last 
 Turco-Eussian War, formed part of the Turkish Empire, and, 
 with the exception of Servia already quasi-independent, it was 
 ruled over by The Sultan, through governors nominated by him. 
 You will remember that the first result of that war between 
 Turkey and Eussia was the Treaty of San Stephano, forced 
 upon defeated Turkey by victorious Eussia as a basis of peace, 
 without the intervention of the other Great Powers of Europe. 
 
 By that Treaty the provinces of Bulgaria and Eastern 
 Eoumelia were constituted into a United Principality, which 
 included the Balkan range of mountains, a long line of defence 
 of great natural strength, and, indeed, the only naturally strong 
 line of defence between the Danube and Constantinople. The 
 arrangements of that Treaty did not, however, suit Austria, as a 
 Great Power, nor Greece and Servia, as little States, and natu- 
 rally they did not suit Turkey if she could avoid them. On 
 the part of England Lord Beaconsfield objected to them because
 
 6 
 
 tliey left Constantinople at the mercy of Eussia whenever she 
 willed to advance upon that capital through Bulgaria. Lord 
 Beaconsfield wished to give Turkey a chance of preserving a 
 strong position in Europe, which the possession of the Balkans 
 might enable her to do. In consequence of the energetic action 
 of England, Eussia consented to assist at a Conference of the 
 Great Powers, held in Berlin, to fix by an International compact 
 the territorial arrangements resulting from the defeat of Turkey 
 by Eussia. The International compact established by that 
 Conference is called the Treaty of Berlin. It regulated the 
 situation of Eastern Europe, and consequently it is of im- 
 portance that we understand clearly its leading dispositions.* 
 1st. Starting from the mouths of the Danube we have a 
 corner of territory called the Dobrutscha, which is 
 formed by the Danube, from below Silistria, running 
 northwards instead of eastwards. This corner was 
 given to Eoumania in compensation for the Eouma- 
 nian part of Bessarabia demanded by Eussia. We 
 will not need further to occupy ourselves with this 
 province, which remains quietly in the possession of 
 Eoumania. 
 2nd. We have the province of Bulgaria, which was formed 
 into a Principality, and of which Alexander of 
 Battenberg was later on chosen to be the Prince. 
 The northern frontier of this province carries us up 
 the Danube to a little above Widdin. 
 3rd. We have Servia, which was recognised to be an 
 entirely independent State, and later on, with the 
 consent of the Powers, declared itself a kingdom 
 under its Prince, who became King Milan. The 
 northern boundaries of Servia run along the Danube 
 to Belgrade, and thence along the river Save, a 
 tributary of the Danube, to a little above Mitro- 
 vitza. 
 
 • See Map on otlier side.
 
 4th. We have Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were handed 
 over to Austria to be occupied and administered by 
 her. These two provinces are shut out from the 
 Adriatic Sea by Dahnatia, belonging to Austria. 
 5th. South of Bulgaria, and separated from it by the 
 Balkan range of mountains, lies Eastern Eoumelia, 
 which was erected into an autonomous province of 
 Turkey, and for which a Constitution was devised by 
 a European Commission. The Sultan was to name 
 its Governor-General, with the sanction of the Great 
 Powers. He was to be a Christian, and to rule 
 according to the Constitution or organic statute just 
 mentioned. 
 6th. Greece, who had taken no part in the Ptusso-Turkish 
 War, but threatened to give trouble to Turkey just at 
 its close, was to have a rectification of her frontiers 
 on the side of Turkey, and the Powers agreed to offer 
 their mediation between Turkey and Greece in the 
 event of differences arising in the negotiations. 
 Greece thus obtained a good slice of the Turkish 
 province of Thessaly at the most southern corner of 
 Eastern Europe. 
 7th. Turkey was left with direct rule over the rest of 
 Eastern Europe, excepting the little mountainous 
 plot belonging to Montenegro, whose sturdy moun- 
 taineers had fought for and acquired their inde- 
 pendence long before the Turco-Eussian War. With 
 that exception and the part of Thessaly ceded to 
 Greece, you will notice that Turkey retained all the 
 most southern part of Eastern Europe and held 
 direct power over the seaboards of the Adriatic 
 below Dalmatia, the ^Egean, the Dardanelles, the 
 Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus, and the European 
 side of the Black Sea from a little below Bourgas 
 (Eoumelia). As near as may be, the half of Eastern
 
 8 
 
 Europe was severed from Turkey. All the territory 
 given to Austria, Servia, and Bulgaria looks south, 
 and the ambitions of these three countries are all 
 towards the seaboard of the ^gean. They all desire 
 its invigorating sea-breezes, and cast longing eyes 
 upon the rich plains which lie between them and it. 
 This land left in the hands of Turkey resembles a 
 tempting morsel of cheese lying within sight of three 
 hungry mice. Between Servia and Eastern Eoumelia 
 a corner of Bulgaria comes down and forms a wedge 
 between the two. This wedge is all the facing to- 
 wards the ^gean which Bulgaria received. In that 
 wedge lies Sophia, the capital of Bulgaria. 
 
 Keep always in view the ^gean as the goal of the am- 
 bitions of Austria, Servia, and Bulgaria, and you have the key 
 to the recent fighting between Servia and Bulgaria. While 
 Bulgaria remained separate from Eastern Eoumelia, and Eastern 
 Eoumelia belonged to Turkey, Servia had no dread of the 
 ambitions of Bulgaria ; because in the event of the latter 
 State menacing Macedonia the Bulgarian wedge could always 
 effectively be acted on by Turkey on the one side and Servia 
 on the other. But supposing Eastern Eoumelia to become 
 united to Bulgaria the two form a solid square, menacing both 
 Macedonia and Thrace, and capable of cutting off absolutely 
 Servia from sight of the seaboard of the JE^j^ean. It was there- 
 fore essential to the ambitions of both Austria and Servia that 
 Eastern Eoumelia should not unite with Bulgaria. Greece 
 away down in the southern corner of Eastern Europe looked 
 up for more land northwards to Macedonia, which was 
 especially coveted because it had been the birthplace and 
 kingdom of Alexander the Great, of blessed memory in Greek 
 hearts. If anybody was to have Macedonia she wanted it, but 
 she could accommodate her views to the desires of Austria and 
 Servia, and be satisfied with an advance of frontier on the
 
 side of Macedonia and the extension of her territory westwards 
 in Epirus, in face of Corfu. 
 
 Eastern Roumelia was too small to have any independent 
 longings, and besides, she was by the Treaty left attached to 
 Turkey. With the exception of an insignificant number of 
 Mussulmans and Greeks her population is Bulgarian in race, 
 language, and sympathy — indeed so thoroughly Bulgarian that 
 a stranger can scarcely perceive any difference between the 
 two peoples. Too small to accomplish anything great alone, 
 the ambition of Eastern Roumelia was to connect herself with 
 Bulgaria — disunite herself from Turkey and share in the future 
 fortunes of her larger brother. 
 
 Such was the position created in Eastern Europe by the 
 Treaty of Berlin, and you will notice how each of the parties 
 benefited, naturally gravitate towards Macedonia and Thrace, 
 left in the possession of Turkey. Excepting Turkey all were 
 placed in positions which only satisfied them temporarily, 
 but the ambitions of each required that no one of them should 
 move out of the limits indicated to it by the Treaty of Berlin ; 
 whichever made a move became the enemy of the others, until 
 the happy time to which all looked forward when a fresh 
 spoliation of Turkey by common consent was possible. 
 
 I will now proceed to show you how Eastern Eoumelia 
 worked to effect her union with Bulgaria, and in doing so set 
 all tlie dogs of the quarter barking.
 
 10 
 
 II. 
 
 How Eastern Roumelia worked to effect her Union 
 WITH Bulgaria. 
 
 Aleko Pasha Vogorides was the first Governor-General of 
 Eastern Roumelia. He was a Bulgarian by birth, and of a 
 princely family of ancient renown in Bulgaria. Notwithstand- 
 ing his Bulgarian blood and strong patriotic proclivities, he 
 very honestly discharged the delicate role which he was called 
 upon to play as representative of the Sultan. Turkey was 
 satisfied with him ; the Roumeliotes were fairly so, as were all 
 the Great Powers, with the exception of Russia. An amusing 
 incident occurred when he took possession of his post. Aleko 
 Pasha left the presence of the Sultan wearing on his head a 
 Turkish Fez. When he arrived at the Eastern Roumelian 
 frontier the Roumeliotes provided him with a Bulgarian cap, 
 called a "kalpak," which he donned, laying aside the "fez," 
 and so attired he entered the capital of Eastern Roumelia. 
 The incident produced a sensation in Turkish circles, and 
 threatened to cause trouble. Aleko pleaded in excuse that he 
 had received no orders on the subject of his dress, and that, 
 taken by surprise, he did not like to mar the harmony of his 
 first reception for the matter of a headdress. Profuse expres- 
 sions of devotion to the Sultan enabled him to escape from 
 the awkward dilemma, but the incident, as a straw shows 
 how the wind blows, pointed clearly whither the aspirations 
 of the Roumeliotes lay. Had Aleko Pasha been an intriguer 
 and a strong man, Roumelia might have given a future 
 Prince to Bulgaria, instead of the German Prince of Bulgaria 
 becoming the chosen of the Roumeliotes. But, although an 
 honest, good man, Aleko was not of the type to attempt 
 .great things. I have said that he did not please Russia.
 
 The real reason was not avowed, but Eussia doubtless found 
 out tliat it did not suit her game that a patriotic Bulgarian 
 should rule in Eastern Eoumelia. In giving Bulgaria a 
 nominal independence, she did not intend that Bulgaria 
 should have independent national aspirations, but remain a 
 useful pawn, handy in her Eastern game. However this may 
 be, when Aleko Pasha's first term of office was about to 
 expire, the Eussian Consul picked a quarrel with him about 
 some trumpery questions, and this was made the pretext of 
 Eussia's refusing to sanction his reappointment.* Long negotia- 
 tions between the Powers and the Sublime Porte ended in the 
 choice of a simple-minded nobody, named Gavril Chrestovich, 
 who had been Aleko Pasha's secretary. No one could count 
 upon him for much, as he was simply a nullity of respectable 
 appearance. Eussia thus got rid of the Bulgarian nobleman 
 who was too honest for her purposes, and replaced him by an 
 unpretentious individual who owed his position to her influence. 
 The Eoumeliotes had found out that Aleko Pasha was too timid 
 to play their game, and saw put in his place, with satisfaction, 
 a well-dressed doll, around which they could prepare their plots 
 without fear or restraint. 
 
 In August of last year it was thought well that Gavril 
 Pasha should visit Constantinople, on the pretext of settling 
 some affairs with the Porte. He did so, remaining there about 
 three weeks and returning to Philippopolis on the 13th of 
 September. Much had been concocted in his absence of which 
 he was quite ignorant. He was well received by his people, 
 
 * " Aleko Pasha was got rid of by the Eussians for being Anti-Russian, and 
 Gavril Pasha, who has j ust been deposed, was simply a Russian Agent, and for 
 that reason he was overthrown." — Dr. Stranski to Major Trotter, Blue Book, 
 page 66. 
 
 At the third meeting of the Conference the Eussian Minister said : " In 
 Bulgaria wise counsels have not prevailed. The national sentiment has there 
 been made use of by agitators. ... In Eastern Roumelia, tinder the first 
 Governor-Greneral, the party in power encouraged this tendency." — Blue Book, 
 page 245. i
 
 12 
 
 but many who flattered him with vain compliments must have 
 laughed in their sleeves at the farce they were preparing for 
 him. On the Thursday following, the 17th, a little row was got 
 up about the collection of taxes at a village near the capital. 
 The Prefect of Police hastened to the spot, but was put under 
 arrest by the villagers. Next morning the rails at the Turkish 
 frontier were lifted and the telegraph wires cut. Thus isolated 
 from the outer world the Unionists proceeded to carry out their 
 little game at the capital. What happened tliere was graphic- 
 ally described by an Englishman who had arrived at Philippo- 
 polis on the previous day, intending to continue his journey on 
 the morrow. He went to bed without any notion of what was 
 brewing. The town was perfectly quiet, and neither from our 
 Consul nor from any one did he hear of anything disquieting. 
 Next morning, about five o'clock, he was aroused by an unusual 
 stir in the street, and on looking out he saw passing an open 
 carriage in which was being paraded His Excellency Gavril 
 Pasha, with a woman in full Bulgarian costume seated by his 
 side. In this playful and harmless way the Governor-General 
 of Ptoumelia was transported from the Government House to a 
 private residence in a village near by, where he was requested 
 to consider himself under arrest. A second carriage trans- 
 ported the Chief of the Gendarmerie, a pompous German who 
 had also been named by the Sultan.* The town was en fete. 
 The union of Eoumelia with Bulgaria was proclaimed, and the 
 
 * " At 2 o'clock on Friday morning the soldiers, led by Major Nicola'iefT, 
 fired a volley to awaken the town, and then proceeded to the Square, where they 
 were met by Drigalski Pasha with a small body of troops, who had, however, 
 been secretly instructed not to obey his orders. Drigalski Pasha was put under 
 arrest, and Major Nicolaieff placed himself at the head of the army. It was 
 now 4 o'clock in the morning, and a proclamation declaring that the union of 
 Eastern Eoumelia and Bulgaria had been accomplished was already printed, and 
 copies dispersed throughout the town. A deputation was sent to inform the 
 Governor- General of what had taken place and request him to leave the town. 
 He was then ignominiously paraded through the streets in a carriage past the 
 Kussian Consulate, after which he was conveyed to Konarg, and a few days 
 later to Sophia." — Despatch of Acting Consul, Blue Book, page 37.
 
 13 
 
 cessation of Turkish rule. The ringleaders of the movement 
 formed themselves into a Provisional Government and resolved 
 to request the Prince of Bulgaria to accept the homages of 
 the Eoumelian people and consider them his faithful subjects. 
 The whole scene had passed off as a cleverly played charade. 
 The popular enthusiasm knew no bounds. Not a voice of 
 opposition had been heard, no discordant note had marred the 
 universal harmony.* So well had the plans been laid and their 
 secret kept that the coup d'dtat burst upon the world as an 
 incredible surprise. The Paissian Consul, as much in darkness 
 tis the rest of the world,! proceeded to declare to the ringleaders 
 the disapprobation of his Government, and to remind them of 
 the grave consequences which would follow their acts. They 
 replied that they could not believe in the opposition of the 
 great Czar, who had done so much for the Bulgarian people. 
 
 If we are to credit the solemn word of the Prince of Bulgaria 
 (and I do) the coup d'6tat came upon him unexpectedly. He 
 described his position as that of a dilemma. The enthusiasm 
 in Bulgaria was as great as in Eoimielia. Had he refused 
 the unexpected honour the Prince virtually threw away his 
 Bulgarian Princedom, which he had no wish to do.J So he 
 telegraphed to the Sultan informing him of the desire of the 
 Eoumeliotes, and adding that although he had been no party 
 to the movement he could not oppose it. The promptitude of 
 his decision did credit both to his head and his heart. 
 
 * " The upsetting o£ the existing Government was accomplished with the 
 most perfect order." — Colonel Trotter, Blue Book, page 44. 
 
 t Count Kalnoky said " movement liad been organized in Bulgaria, but 
 without the connivance or knowledge of either the Emperor or Government of 
 Kussia, whom he believed it would take as much by surprise as it certainly had 
 him."— Despatch of Sir A. Paget, 20th September, Blue Book, page 3. 
 
 X " The Prince has joined us ; he had no other alternative but to do so or 
 to abdicate." — Dr. Stransky, 21st September, Blue Book, page 50. " I had not 
 the faintest expectation of what was going to occur, nor indeed, until last 
 Friday morning, when I received news at Yarna of the coup d'etat" — The 
 Prince to Major Trotter, Blue Book, page 64.
 
 14 
 
 III. 
 
 Loss OF THE Moment for Action by Turkey. 
 
 While the Eoumeliotes and Bulgarians were intoxicated with 
 enthusiastic joy great was the stir in the outer world. The fear 
 which came uppermost in the minds of the Sultan and his 
 Ministers, and indeed of every one, was that Eussia was in the 
 plot, and that she must have been the string-puller in the 
 stirring drama which had been enacted. It was little known 
 how profoundly the Bulgarians chafed under the yoke of their 
 Eussian protectors.* Few could suppose that, unaided by or 
 without advice from the Power which posed as the protector 
 of Bulgaria, the Eoumeliotes would have dared so much. 
 JSTevertheless, the Eussian Ambassador, after having communi- 
 cated with St. Petersburg, hastened to inform the Sublime 
 Porte officially that what had happened in Eoumelia was 
 without the knowledge and without the approval of his 
 Government.f 
 
 ISTow was the moment of action for Turkey. The Treaty of 
 Berlin had provided that in any emergency endangering the 
 internal or external security of Eastern Eoumelia the Sultan 
 was authorized to send troops into the province. He was thus 
 made the custodian of the Treaty's dispositions in regard to 
 Eastern Eoumelia, and that their defence should be prompt the 
 Treaty gave the Sultan, in anticipation, authority to act. Very 
 clearly such an emergency as the Treaty foresaw to be possible 
 
 * " This revolution was directed against Eussian tutelage, as it liad become 
 intolerable."— Dr. Stransky to Consul-G-eneral Fawcett, Blue Book, page 49. 
 
 t Prince Alexander telegraphed to Czar, " You love the Bulgarian nation, 
 I therefore hope you will approve what I have done." Czar replied, " It is 
 because I love the Bulgarian nation that I disapprove what you have done." — 
 Despatch, Sir F. Malet, Blue Book, page 6.
 
 15 ■• 
 
 had arisen. The Treaty had been torn up, its stipulations 
 ignored, the legal Governor-General arrested, and all connection 
 with Turkey violently severed. Incredible although it had 
 appeared at first sight, all this had been accomplished by a 
 popular rising, destitute of any influential backing, and without 
 the advice of any of the Great Powers. To many it seemed 
 intolerable that an insignificant people, chiefly half-civilized 
 j)easants, with absolutely no military force to aid them, should 
 coolly drive a carriage- and-pair through a solemn Treaty which 
 all the Great Powers of Europe with infinite labour had devised, 
 and by many acts had shown their determination to have 
 respected. These half-civilized peasants had calmly put under 
 arrest the representative of the Sultan, the nominee of all the 
 Great Powers, and had even associated with this act circum- 
 stances of playful bravado. Yet so it was. There is something 
 superb, when we look back upon it, in the apparent unconscious- 
 ness on the part of these impetuous peasants of the colossal 
 greatness of the Powers which they simply ignored, and of the 
 solemn nature of the international covenant which they set at 
 naught, just as a chubby-faced boy lays hold irreverently of his 
 stately father's beard or tears into shreds, with quiet satisfaction, 
 the pages of the most sacred Book. 
 
 The punishment of this extraordinary audacity seemed 
 easy, and the duty devolved upon Turkey. Said Pasha, the 
 Sultan's Grand Vizier, was a man of clear views, and was not 
 lacking in resolution. He was neither German nor Eussian 
 in his proclivities. His great aim had always been — and from 
 a Turkish standpoint it was a patriotic one — to diminish all 
 foreign interference, and to strengthen the legitimate influence 
 of his Government in the country by a policy which consulted 
 only Turkish interests. As soon as Said Pasha felt assured 
 that Ptussia was not only not in the game of the Eoumelian 
 Unionists, but also abhorred its presumption, he promptly 
 decided upon active measures, and in a Council of Ministers 
 obtained for these measures the approval of all his colleagues
 
 16 
 
 without exception. He proposed to withdraw from the well- 
 appointed garrison of Constantinople six thousand men, and 
 despatch them at once to occupy the capital of Eastern 
 Roumelia. When by this occupation he had put himself in 
 the position of Beati possidentes, he then proposed to consult 
 with the Powers as to future action.* No objection could 
 possibly be made to this proceeding by any of the Powers, 
 because Turkey was thereby simply executing the clearly ex- 
 pressed disposition of the Treaty of Berlin in its 16th Article. 
 And there is little doubt that had the decision been promptly 
 carried out, not a dog would have barked at the soldiers of 
 the army of occupation, for in Eastern Eoumelia there were 
 only a few undisciplined policemen, without their European 
 chief, to oppose them.f The Prince of Bulgaria was prudent 
 enough not to bring any Bulgarian troops into Eoumelia 
 until he saw what action Turkey was about to take, and had 
 that action been the advance of six thousand Turkish regulars 
 it is a moral certainty that the Bulgarian soldiers would have 
 stayed at home.+ The proposition of the Council of Ministers 
 was submitted to the Sultan for approval on the 23rd Sep- 
 tember, but there it stuck. 
 
 * This Ministerial decision is indicated in a telegraphic despatch ofAssim 
 Pasha to the Turkish Ambassador at the Court of St. James', under date 23rd 
 September, in which, after relating with great clearness the situation, it is said : 
 " The Ottoman Grovernment cannot regard with indifference a situation of such 
 gravity. Therefore, strong in their natural rights and duties, they feel bound, 
 in virtue of the power conferred upon them by Article XVI of the Treaty of 
 Berlin, to put an end to these disturbances, and to reinstate the province in the- 
 position accorded to it by this international act." — Blue Book, page 10. 
 
 t Consul-GTeneral Fawcett, in writing to the Marquis of Salisbury, says r 
 " We were obliged to give our parole not to state the number nor positions of 
 the Roumelian troops. It is, however, well known that they possess only four 
 cannon and hut little ammunition. There will probably be a large undisci- 
 plined body of armed men collected, but I much doubt if they can make any 
 serious resistance to Turkish regulars." — Blue Book, page 18. 
 
 X Phihppopolis, 28th September. •' Three thousand regular^troops arrived this 
 evening from Sophia." — Telegraphic despatch, Willmore, Blue Book, page 34.
 
 17 
 
 The Governmental system in Turkey is very different from 
 that to which we are accustomed. Under the present Sultan it 
 has become much more autocratic than it has been since the 
 days of Sultan Mahmoud. Abd-ul-Medgid was so much of an 
 exhausted sensualist that he was unable to follow, as Sultan 
 Mahmoud had done before him, the affairs of the Empire. A 
 monarch who had some two hundred wives and concubines to 
 look after may be excused if he had not leisure to devote to 
 mental work. Although resembling Solomon in one respect he 
 was unlike him in intellectual capacity. In consequence, during 
 the reign of Sultan Abd-ul-Medgid, the Ministers, who represent 
 what is called the Sublime Porte, acquired more power, and it 
 was really they who directed the administration and diplomacy 
 of the Empire. Amongst them were fortunately men of remark- 
 able ability such as the Pashas Pteschid, Fuad, and Ali. Sultan 
 Abd-ul-Aziz, who succeeded Abd-ul-Medgid, although a much 
 stronger man physically, was fond of pleasure and had no head 
 for business. Under him the Sublime Porte retained its power. 
 But the present Sultan is a plodding, indefatigable worker — 
 indeed I should say he is the most hard-working Sovereign in 
 Europe. His whole time from early morning to late night is 
 consecrated to the affairs of State. Every scheme, great or 
 small, which occupies the attention of his Ministers is scruti- 
 nized by him even to its most minute details. Thanks to this 
 untiring devotion to work, the present Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid 
 has been able to concentrate all important action in his own 
 hands. When any great emergency occurs, the Ministers are 
 called to the Palace and there remain at the disposal of the 
 Sultan, eating and often sleeping at Yildiz. When the Sultan 
 thinks fit he summonses notables of the nation, civil, military, 
 and religious, to meet with his Ministers and consult with them. 
 These meetings are said to be held under the Presidency of 
 the Sultan, but in reality they are generally held in a room 
 contiguous to that of the Sovereign, and one of the chamberlains 
 informs the Sultan of the course of the debates, and carries to 
 
 A 3
 
 18 
 
 the Assembly the thoughts of his master. Such a system would 
 be thought by us to be an intolerable waste of time, but in a 
 country where neither the Press nor free discussion prepares 
 men's minds to arrive at decisions, this lengthened period of 
 gestation is necessary and often advantageous. As an example 
 of the absorbing nature of a Turkish Minister's duties, I may 
 mention that a few days after the news of the Eoumelian coup 
 d'etat I called at the present Prime Minister's house, and was 
 told by the servant that his master had remained at the Palace 
 during three days and nights without returning to see his 
 family. Fancy Mr. Gladstone or Lord Salisbury and all their 
 colleagues being kept at Windsor during three consecutive days 
 and nights deliberating in the ante-room of the Queen ! 
 
 Said Pasha had been Grand Vizier during the long period of 
 six years with only two short intervals, the last of which was 
 only of twenty-four hours' duration. Hi's long enjoyment of the 
 favour of his Sovereign made Said think he could venture to 
 initiate some important financial reforms, which in Turkey 
 means stopping the pilfering of influential persons in the 
 provinces. Just before the Eoumelian revolt broke out, 
 Said began his financial reforms by removing all control of 
 the provincial treasuries from the Governors and making the 
 financial agents directly responsible to the Ministry of Finance. 
 Thereupon the intriguers against him at the Palace redoubled 
 their efforts, and rumours became rife that the Grand Vizier was 
 to be changed. Had no exceptional emergency occurred, I doubt 
 not the patriotism of the Sultan — for patriotism is indeed one 
 of his most distinguishing characteristics — would have led him 
 to remain true to his Minister. But it was in this atmosphere 
 of double-charged intrigue that the counsel of Said Pasha 
 for energetic action in Roumelia was submitted to the Sultan. 
 After a delay of forty-eight hours Said Pasha was dismissed, 
 and the Sultan decided not to take any action until he was 
 authorized by the Great Powers. This policy of inaction was 
 suicidal to Turkey, but great luck to the Roumeliotes. As an
 
 19 
 
 able diplomatist of our country said, " it was a woful declaration 
 of weakness, which could not fail to encourage all the many 
 turbulent spirits in the Empire." To understand why this 
 momentous decision was taken by the Sultan, we must realize 
 a variety of coincidences which exercised a powerful influence 
 on the mind of His Majesty. 
 
 When the coup d'etat in Eoumelia broke upon him as a 
 surprise the Sultan became very wroth with his Ministers for 
 allowing such an event to occur without their cognizance ; 
 indeed, perhaps ho may have been disposed for a moment to 
 doubt their ignorance. A week before the event occurred, 
 rumours had been rife about the Palace that a leading military 
 Pasha was disaffected towards the throne, and on no point is 
 the Sultan more sensitive. At a time when his fears had 
 thus been aroused and the suspiciousness of his nature excited, 
 the proposal to withdraw 6,000 troojDS from the garrison of 
 Constantinople was peculiarly disagreeable to the Sultan. True, 
 the garrison consisted of 15,000 picked and well-appointed men, 
 and any ordinary observer might have thought more than 6,000 
 could have been easily spared until the ranks were filled up 
 from the provinces ; but such was not the mind of His Majesty. 
 In these circumstances it w^as natural that he should lend a 
 willing ear to the opponents of Said Pasha, who, for the cause 
 already explained, v^ere exceptionally numerous and active, and 
 should accept the counsel of the timid spirits who advised him 
 to undertake no action except with the express sanction of the 
 Great Powers.* This course enabled the Sultan to avoid the 
 withdrawal of troops from the garrison of Constantinople, and 
 }^ad the appearance of deference to the Great Powers. But in 
 
 * From the Elue Book we gather that the Sultan may also have been 
 led astray by the ignorant delusion of the Russian Ambassador, who seems to 
 have felt confident that he could by his influence alone extinguish the move- 
 ment. On the 19th of September Sir W. White telegraphs to Lord Salisbury : 
 " M. de Nelidoff has expressed himself as having taken steps most likely to put 
 an end to this movement." — Blue Book, page 2.
 
 20 
 
 its necessary delays it allowed to pass the only moment of 
 action which was free from political complications, and an 
 occasion was lost which would have proved invaluable to show 
 the power of the Empire to act effectively and vigorously 
 against local movements of lawlessness. In many respects the 
 opportunity was peculiarly favourable. The necessary troops 
 were in readiness, for the garrison of Constantinople was not 
 only large, but it was also in excellent condition under able 
 German officers. Further, the frontiers of Eoumelia were in 
 railway communication with the capital, and in forty-eight 
 hours the whole contingent might have been transported to the 
 capital of Eoumelia. Money even, an important element in 
 warfare, was not wanting, for Said Pasha, in his foresight, had 
 assured himself of an immediate advance of £300,000. Had 
 Turkey, therefore, been true to herself the Eoumelian rising 
 would only have proved a flash in the pan, harmless of future 
 complications. Neglected opportunities are as fatal to nations 
 as to individuals.
 
 21 
 
 IV, 
 
 CoMPLiCATEp Game in Diplomacy. 
 
 When Turkey refused to avail herself of the right of military 
 intervention accorded to, and indeed, by being provided for, 
 enjoined upon her by the Treaty of Berlin, the whole situation 
 was necessarily referred to the Great Powers of Europe, and 
 then began a nlost remarkably complicated game in diplomacy 
 in which England won easily by simply allowing the three 
 Imperial Powers of Europe to exhaust their strength in vain 
 efforts to accomplish the impossible. The game, however, was 
 so interesting th^t it deserves a detailed description. 
 
 The present Czar has, of old standing, had a personal dislike 
 to the Prince of Bulgaria, and in an autocratic Government 
 like Eussia this had naturally influenced her policy towards 
 Bulgaria ever since the death of the late Czar. The Bulgarians, 
 on their side, after they became free from direct Turkish rule, 
 developed a " chauvinism " or jealousy of foreigners of the most 
 extreme type, which led them to become daily more jealous 
 of their Eussian instructors. The Prince, placed between two 
 opposing currents, that of the Eussians desiring to extend their 
 influence, and that of the Bulgarians to diminish it, inclined to 
 or was constrained to follow the current of his people, and by 
 so doing gave umbrage to the Eussian element which sought 
 to direct the destinies of the country. This had led the Eussian 
 agents in Bulgaria, a few weeks before the Eoumelian rising, 
 to address to the Czar severe strictures upon what they con- 
 sidered the disloyal conduct of the Prince of Bulgaria. Thus, 
 of long date, personally ill-disposed towards the Prince, and 
 furnished quite recently with what seemed to be authentic 
 proofs of the Prince's infidelity to Eussian aims, the Czar
 
 22 
 
 was in no humour to regard with benevolence the Eoumeliaii 
 coup cV4tat. However much he might sympathize with the 
 enlargement of Bulgaria in theory, he was opposed to it under 
 the auspices of Prince Alexander, and could only approve of 
 it if thereby Eussian influence were consolidated in Bulgaria.* 
 
 Austria showed herself from the first decidedly opposed to 
 accept the situation created by the Eoumelian Unionists. Her 
 only avowed motive of opposition was the necessity to enforce 
 respect for the Treaty of Berlin, but we are safe in assuming 
 that she participated in the alarm which the prospect of the 
 union of Eastern Eoumelia with Bulgaria caused in Servia and 
 Greece. The solid square, of which I before spoke, once formed, 
 the way of Austria and Servia to the ^gean became seriously 
 threatened.t Thus Austria reasonably disliked the union. 
 
 Germany, true to her role as honest broker in Eastern affairs, 
 sided with Eussia and Austria without any direct interest except 
 to preserve peace in Europe. The absence of the German 
 Ambassador from Constantinople until the 1st of October placed 
 her also at a disadvantage. 
 
 Ttaly and France did not count much in the question and 
 expressed no decided opinions, but were ready to consult with 
 the other Great Powers.^ 
 
 England had, however, to be counted with. And here I 
 
 * " About six weeks ago the Russian Political Agent at Sophia made 
 overtures to certain members of the National Assembly ofPering to support a 
 movement for Union, but on condition that Prince Alexander of Battenberg 
 should be got rid of, and replaced by some one who would act more in accord- 
 ance with Russian interests." — Dr. Stransky to Major Trotter, 21st September, 
 Blue Book, page 65. 
 
 t That Austria was early preoccupied by this thought is evident from a 
 conversation of Count Kalnoky with Sir A. Paget, on the 22nd September, four 
 days after the coup d'etat, in which the former said, " what appeared to him 
 of even more pressing importance was to prevent the revolutionary movement 
 spreading into Macedonia. The invasion of this province from Eoumelia, or 
 any rising there, might lead to the most momentous consequences." — Blue 
 Book, page 8. 
 
 X This is confirmed by the Blue Book at pages 8 and 17.
 
 23 
 
 must pay a well-merited tribute to the perspicacity with which 
 Lord Salisbury judged the situation from the first moment of 
 its presentation. It must not be thought that I say this from 
 any spirit of party partiality. A long residence in the East, 
 removed from the excitement of party struggles, has made me 
 a very milk-and-water party man. Abroad, Englishmen become 
 insensibly Imperialists and not party men. They watch what 
 affects the power of our vast Empire, and follow more the 
 Foreign than the Home policy of the country. But, in truth, no 
 party spirit need enter into this question, for in our Eoumelian 
 policy both of the great political parties in England were 
 worthily represented — Lord Salisbury as Conservative Foreign 
 Minister, and Sir William White, our Minister at Constantinople, 
 as a Liberal and a Cobdenite. When the Eoumelian surprise 
 burst upon the world Lord Salisbury was at Dieppe, and his 
 first expression of opinion was penned from that Continental 
 town, where he could not certainly have had intercourse with 
 his colleagues. The statesmanlike clearness with which he at 
 once gauged a very unexpected situation was very remarkable. 
 One of the highest qualities of a General is military instinct, 
 and Lord Salisbury is endowed in a very high degree with just 
 instincts in Foreign policy. Loyalty to the Treaty of Berlin led 
 him to consider it incumbent upon the Great Powers, without 
 a moment's delay, to make a strong declaration in favour of 
 the defence of that Treaty, but as the question was not one 
 in which England could pretend to a direct interest, she was 
 bound to secure the consent of Austria to whatever action was 
 to be taken. The wisdom of this attitude was evident. Austria 
 was in a position to support materially any policy she resolved 
 upon, and she had every interest to seek the peace of Europe. 
 Further, she professed the most friendly dispositions towards 
 Turkey, and was more likely than any other Power to concert 
 a basis of action with Ptussia. Lord Salisbury immediately 
 ]3roposed to the Great Powers to join his Government in a 
 strong declaration to Bulgaria in support of the Treaty of
 
 24 
 
 Berlin. Had this move been promptly acted upon, the way 
 would have been cleared for the action of Tiiikey, and all 
 hesitation on the part of the Sultan removed. But there was 
 no longer a Gortchakoff at St. Petersburg, and vacillation is the 
 especial characteristic of Austrian diplomacy. Nothing but 
 talk came of the proposal.* The Great Powers not having 
 followed his lead,t Lord Salisbury took no further initiative, 
 and adopted a waiting policy, which secured him complete 
 independence when later on the other Imperial Powers made 
 a false move. 
 
 Fortunately, and we are not often so fortunate, the then 
 Acting British Minister at Constantinople is our highest 
 authority on the politics of Eastern Europe, and Sir William 
 White combines in an extraordinary degree the invaluable 
 diplomatic qualifications described in the phrase, " Siiaviter in 
 modo, fortiter in re.' Before the Turco-Eussian War he had 
 been attached to Lord Salisbury's Mission to Constantinople 
 for his exceptional knowledge of Eastern politics, and thus 
 when the Roumelian question arose, our interests, by a happy 
 coincidence, were in the hands of two men who knew each 
 other well. An astute diplomatist like Sir William White 
 promptly perceived, as soon as the Turks threw away volun- 
 tarily their only chance of effective action, that the union of 
 Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria was an accomplished fact. 
 Only force could destroy it, but where was that force to come 
 from, when it did not come spontaneously from Turkey? 
 
 * The Blue Book shows us that the proposal was made on the morrow of 
 the coup d'etat, the 19th of September. Had it been acted on at once the 
 declaration of the G-reat Powers would haye appeared before Prince Alexander 
 had left Bulgaria for Eastern Koumelia. On the 24th September Lord Salisbury 
 telegraphs to Sir William White — " This proposal not haring been agreed to 
 I hare made no further proposition since." — Blue Book, pages 2 and 14. 
 
 t On the 28th September Lord Salisbury writes of his proposal^-" It was 
 a step which in my judgment might have been of value if it had been taken at 
 the very first practicable moment. The lapse of a few days had deprived such 
 a measure of any possible utility." — Blue Book, page 32.
 
 Oould it be expected that Eussia, the professed godfatlier of 
 Bulgaria, would ever entrust Mussulman Turkey with the 
 task of opposing the aspirations of the Bulgarian people ? 
 Had she done so she would have forfeited Bulgarian sym- 
 pathies — indeed the sympathies of all the Christian populations 
 in Eastern Europe. Her own military intervention in Eoumelia 
 would have added to that evil the enkindling of the suspicions 
 of all the other Great Powers, and that Eussia should allow 
 Austria to intervene forcibly in Eoumelia was not for a 
 moment to be thought of. Thus, seeing that force could alone 
 dissolve the union which had been proclaimed, and that no 
 such force was available, it appeared to Sir William White 
 that the only honourable solution for Europe and Turkey was 
 that the latter should acknowledge the Prince of Bulgaria as 
 the Governor-General of Eastern Eoumelia, named, in con- 
 formity with the dispositions of the Treaty of Berlin, by the 
 Sultan, and sanctioned by the Great Powers. The Prince had 
 declared himself ready to accept such a solution,* and, ap- 
 proved by the Great Powers, the opposition of the smaller 
 States of Servia and Greece was not to be dreaded. 
 
 But the personal antipathy of the Czar to the Prince of 
 Bulgaria gave Eussian policy a vindictive turn. She desired 
 the deposition of Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria.! This the 
 Prince adroitly met by declaring that he had no personal 
 aims, and would be ready to retire if it were the wish of the 
 Bulgarian people, and in the interest of the country which he 
 had espoused. Here the question naturally arose, " Who is to 
 do it?" ''Who is to bell the cat?" and no one being found, 
 
 * " His Highness makes tlie solemn declaration," in a telegram dated Sopliia, 
 21st September, "that the union of the two provinces is effected without any 
 hostile intention towai'ds the Government of the Sultan, whose sovereignty lie 
 recognises." — Blue Book, page 6. 
 
 t " The Russian Political Agent might even now at the last moment offer 
 to recognise the union, provided that the Prince of Battenberg were got rid of. 
 But all parties were now united in favour of the Prince. No one would listen to 
 bueh overtures." — Dr. Stranski to Major Trotter, Blue Book, page QQ.
 
 1^0 
 
 this cliildisli piece of personal spite had to be abandoned. 
 But the Czar, baulked in the execution of this greater indignity, 
 proceeded to minor ones. He struck the name of the Prince 
 out of the Eussian army, in which he held the honorary rank 
 of head of a regiment, and recalled from the service of Bulgaria 
 all Eussian officers. The Prince bore these lesser indignities 
 with becoming composure, and their only effect was to make 
 him more popular in Bulgaria. 
 
 All this time England was silent, and the wily diplomatist 
 who represented her at Constantinople maintained an attitude 
 of imperturbable but friendly inaction, both towards Turkey 
 and the representatives of the Great Powers.* 
 
 At the suggestion of Eussia it was asjreed that a Conference 
 of Ambassadors should be held at Constantinople. At that 
 Conference Austria and Eussia, backed by Germany, proposed 
 as the only fitting solution of the problem a return pure and 
 simple to the status quo ante — in other words, to the restoration 
 of Turkish authority in Eoumelia, and the re-installation of a 
 Governor-General named by the Sultan and unconnected with 
 Bulgaria. Thereupon our representative declared that before 
 signing a Proctocol which engaged England it was necessary 
 to determine by what means the decision of the Great Powers 
 was to be enforced. Until this point was decided it was 
 useless to proceed. This reasoning was irresistible, and after 
 many deliberations it was agreed that the Porte should send 
 a friendly Mission to communicate the wishes of the Great 
 Powers to the Eoumeliotes, and ascertain whether there was a 
 
 * This admirable diplomatic reserve is exhibited by one incident mentioned 
 in the Blue Book. Sir William White writes to Lord Salisbury: "Hobart 
 Pasha was very anxious to learn the views of Her Majesty's Government as 
 regards the present crisis, and pressed me to give him at least my private 
 opinion as to the best course for the Ottoman Grovernment to pursue under the 
 circumstances, but this I declined to do." Again, in speaking of a meeting of 
 the Conference, Sir William White says to Lord Salisbury : " At the meeting 
 to-day I maintained an attitude of great reserve, for the situation is extremely 
 delicate." — Blue Book, pages 4 and 210.
 
 27 
 
 likelihood of their acquiescence. As was to be expected, the 
 Mission reported that such an acquiescence was not to be 
 hoped for.* 
 
 * The Blue Book furnishes lengthened details of this remarkable Conference. 
 It is most fittingly described by the expression, " The mountain was in labour and 
 brought forth a mouse." In regard to the proposal of a return to the status 
 quo ante, we find Lord Salisbury saying to the Austrian Ambassador, " If it 
 were put forward as one of the bases on which the Conference should deliberate, 
 Her Majesty's Government would have great difficulty in taking part in it 
 unless the proposal was modified by some agreement as to the ulterior action 
 to be taken." — Blue Book, page 148.
 
 28 
 
 V. 
 
 Servia Intervenes — Declares War on Bulgaria. 
 
 Meantime, when it had become evident that the Conference 
 was to prove an abortion, Servia, apparently unsolicited, rushed 
 on the scenes with a declaration of war upon Bulgaria. This, 
 was made on the 14th of November, after the fourth meeting 
 of the Conference at Constantinople, which had broken up 
 without any result except the manifestation of the powerless- 
 ness of the Conference to arrive at any practical decision. 
 
 Early last year Bulgaria, on the pretext of holding a review, 
 mobilized her troops, and Servia had answered by mobilizing 
 hers, pretexting the strained relations between the two countries. 
 Thus it happened that when the Eoumelian rising occurred, 
 both the Servian and Bulgarian armies were mobilized and 
 in readiness. The relative strength of the two armies was 
 107,000 men for Servia, and 36,000 for Bulgaria. But besides 
 its numerical superiority, the equipment of the Servian army 
 was much more complete than that of the Bulgarian; and 
 about a month before war was declared, Servia obtained about 
 £800,000 from Vienna and Berlin bankers, while Bulgaria 
 could procure and had obtained no money from abroad. 
 Furtlier, the withdrawal of all the Eussians from the Bulgarian 
 army rendered it deficient in officers.* In numeric power, 
 therefore, as well as in equipment, money, and organization, 
 the Servian army was greatly superior to that of Bulgaria. 
 
 * Colonel Trotter, in writing to Mr. Barrington on 19tli September, says : 
 " If the Emperor withdraws all the Russian officers from the Bulgarian and 
 East Roumelian armies, their organization will to a great extent collapse, 
 especially in Bulgaria, where all the superior officers, down to commanders of 
 battalions, are Russians." — Blue Book, page 45.
 
 29 
 
 Confident in these advantages, Servia declared war upon 
 Bulgaria on flimsy pretences, but in reality because she feared 
 the effect of the union of Eastern Koumelia with Bulgaria, and 
 foresaw tliat the Great Powers lacked the means of preventing 
 it. But it would be too naive in us to see only Servia in 
 this declaration of war. Servia is absolutely dependent upon 
 Austria, and had the latter Power really wished to restrain 
 her, she could have done so by a simple declaration. Nor 
 would Servia ever have dreamed of attacking Bulgaria liad 
 she not been sure that her opponent would receive no help 
 from Prussia. We are therefore justified in assuming it as a 
 certainty that Eussia and Austria winked at the action of 
 Servia, and thought that through that action they would succeed 
 in attaining their object of restoring in Eastern Ptoumelia the 
 status quo ante. When Servia had sufficiently humbled the 
 Bulgarians, Eussia was to interfere in favour of the latter, and 
 would have delivered them on condition of the deposition of 
 Prince Alexander.* In fact, Austria and Eussia thought they 
 had found Servia " to bell the cat." 
 
 * It is not to be expected tliat we sliould find this stated in the Blue Book, 
 but we find that as early as the 26th of September Count Kalnoky said to 
 Sir A. Paget that he '* feared it will be impossible to re-establish the status quo 
 ante,'' and under date of the 17th October we hare a charming conversation 
 between Sir E. Malet and Count Bismark apropos of a question of the former, 
 whether the Prince of Bulgaria would retire from East Roumelia on a simple 
 invitation of the Great Powers. " Count Bismark replied that M. de Giers had 
 been of opinion that tbe Prince would, under the circumstances, obey the 
 unanimous voice of Europe, and retire to Sophia. Count Bismark had pointfd 
 out to M. de Giers the difficulty of the situation if the Prince refused and bad 
 asked what was to happen next, M. de Giers had replied, ' Alors les Puissances 
 aviseront.' " We see, therefore, plainly that Count Bismark understood and gave 
 M. de Giers to understand that the injunction of the Powers would not alone 
 attain the object in view, and that something must happen next. The some- 
 thing which led Austria to insist with espeoial firmness two days before the 
 declaration of war by Servia, on a policy which she had Ion* admitted to be 
 impossible, and which induced Russia to act similarly, was without doubt the 
 "rod in pickle " at their disposal in Servia. How these Powers came to the 
 conclusion at last that the rod must be employed ia evident when we read the
 
 30' 
 
 Protocol o£ the Fourth Conference at Constantinople (Blue Book, page 290). 
 At that Conference Turkey proposed the means of returning to the status quo 
 ante, with a rider that when this was attained a Commission would examine the 
 improvements required in the Constitution of East Roumeha. Italy, Austria, 
 Russia, and G-ei'many approved these means. Sir William White, in a masterly 
 exposition, while promising to submit the Turkish proposals to this Grovernment, 
 expressed the opinion that the Commission to examine the improvements re- 
 quired in the Constitution of East Roumelia should precede the other measures 
 proposed, and thus " effectively contribute to the security of the Empire, by 
 having due regard to past experience, and the wishes of the people whose 
 destiny is now imder our consideration," The Austrian, Russian, and G-erman 
 Ambassadors refused to give priority to the inquiry, and in very strong terms 
 declared that the wishes of the people are only a secondary consideration. 
 Said Pasha said "he repudiated the expression 'wish of the population.' 
 Thpjt expression is contrary to the conservative ideas which prevail in Europe." 
 In the course of the discussion the Austrian Ambassador said : " We cannot 
 set aside the facts which announce an approaching outbreak in the Balkan 
 Peninsula, and still more serious complications than those which occupy us 
 to-day, if we delay again the accomphshment of the important task devolving 
 upon us." It was delayed, and the outbreak intimated by the Austrian 
 Ambassador took place two days later by the Servian declaration of war.
 
 31 
 
 VI. 
 
 Servia is beaten, and game in diplomacy kenewed. 
 
 I happened to be in Cairo when the news came that Servia 
 had declared war on Bulgaria, and it was thought very 
 extraordinary when I expressed the opinion that Servia, if left 
 alone, would not "bell the cat." On entering Bulgaria from 
 Servia in the early days of September last year, about ten days 
 before the East Koumelian coup d'6tat, I had been greatly struck 
 with the difference between the Bulgarian and Servian peoples. 
 The Bulgarians appeared to me to have more "physique" — more 
 push — more "go," and are more industrious. In short, the 
 Bulgarians are a hardy, persevering, obstinate race, while the 
 Servians impressed me as being what we Scotchmen would call 
 "fushonless creturs." The Bulgarians are essentially plebian 
 and unsympathetic, because protrusively selfish, but I much 
 mistake if their greater weight of body and character does not 
 carry them further than any of the other races in Eastern 
 Europe. Eresh from these impressions I could not help doubt- 
 ing the success of the Servians, if left alone. 
 
 It is useless for me to occupy your time in recounting in 
 detail how fully my first impressions as to the Servians were 
 confirmed by results. How the Prince of Bulgaria did honour 
 to his Prussian military education, and with his almost un- 
 officered army of stalwart peasants out-generalled the Servian 
 invaders, must be in the memory of you all. The tactics of 
 Servia were to attack, on the one side, what we called the 
 Bulgarian wedge, and on the other, Widdin, on the Danube. 
 Had she succeeded, the consequences were evident. She would 
 have appropriated the wedge, and in that event she could have 
 complacently accepted the union between lessened Bulgaria
 
 32 
 
 and Eastern Eoumelia, as no longer menacing her future 
 hopes of Macedonia.* But ''the best laid plans of men and 
 mice gang aft agee." 
 
 The division of the Servian attack deprived her army of 
 much of its numerical superiority, for, leaving the garrison of 
 Widdin to take care of itself, Prince Alexander directed all 
 his efforts to repulse the invasion on the side of the Bulgarian 
 wedge. The enthusiasm of a strong people fighting for father- 
 land compensated for any inferiority in numbers and defective 
 organization. It was no war of artillery. The Bulgarians 
 ]iad little to boast of in that branch. They closed with their 
 foes in hand-to-hand fight, and literally bayonetted them off 
 the field. By irresistible brute force they drove them out of 
 their territory, and promptly following up their success they 
 carried the war into the enemies' country and took possession 
 of the important town of Pirot, some forty kilometres from 
 the frontier. This was the work of only thirteen days from 
 the declaration of war. The Servian army, which had advanced 
 with presumption, was now demoralized and panic-stricken. 
 A few days more and half of Servia might have been in the 
 hands of the Bulgarian heroes. But at this point Austria 
 interjDOsed in behalf of the little State that was fighting her 
 unavowed game, and declared to the Prince of Bulgaria that 
 unless he consented to an armistice, he would find Austrian 
 troops opposed to him.t After much negotiation the Prince 
 
 * Two significant despatches appear in the Blue Book. On the 6th of 
 October Mr. Wyndham telegraphs : "I am informed that the Austrian Govern- 
 ment is making endeavours to obtain a rectification of frontiers for Servia at the 
 expense of the Bulgarian Principality in the direction of Widdin." On the 
 16th of October the same Minister writes : *' From information which, has 
 reached me from oflBcial sources it appears that Servia now hopes to obtain the 
 cession from Bulgaria of what were formerly the Sandjaks of Widdin and 
 Sophia." This rectification, which Austria sought to accomplish by diplomacy, 
 and Servia hoped for, was the declared aim of Servia in attacking Bulgaria, six 
 weeks and a month after. — Blue Book, pages 57 and 169. 
 
 t Mr. Lascelles telegraphs on the 28th November : " The representatives of 
 the three Empires received a telegram this evening from the Minister of Foreign
 
 33 
 
 a<^reed to an armistice on condition that he was to be treated 
 as victor and allowed to retain the Servian territory which he 
 had conquered until the last Servian had quitted Bulgarian 
 territory on the side of Widdin. He had repelled an unpro- 
 voked attack, had floored his enemy, seized him by the throat, 
 and only released him when a Great Power which he could 
 not pretend to withstand called " Hands off I" 
 
 During the two short weeks of this sharp but decisive 
 struggle the sittings of the Conference at Constantinople had 
 languished, and at last by mutual consent been suspended.* 
 Great, of course, was the disappointment of Austria and Eussia 
 that Servia, far from having "belled the cat," had been "belled" 
 lierself Meantime, in the struggle the union of Eastern Eou- 
 melia and Bulgaria had been cemented by blood. Side by side 
 the two peoples had fought and died. What hope was there 
 that a covenant so sealed and ratified could ever again be 
 broken ? The popularity of Alexander of Bulgaria had passed 
 into hero-worship. He was justly regarded as the Saviour of 
 the nation — her deliverer in the past, her hope in the future. 
 The unpalatable truth that the union of Eastern Eoumelia with 
 Bulgaria was an accomplished fact could no longer be ignored, 
 even by Austria and Eussia. 
 
 The status quo ante ceased to be talked of. Austria set 
 to work to assist in a reconciliation between the Porte and the 
 Prince of Bulgaria. Eussia gave a sulky assent. Then it was 
 that the wisdom of the waiting policy adopted by England was 
 demonstrated. Unfettered by all that had gone before, and 
 
 Affairs (Bulgarian), dated Pirot to-day, in which he stated that in view of the 
 initiative taken by their Governments, and of the statement made to-day by 
 Count KhevenhuUer to Prince Alexander to the effect that if His Highness 
 advanced further on Servian territory he would be met by Austrian troops, 
 and taking into account the fact that the Bulgarian troops, by their victorious 
 entry into Pirot, had vindicated the honour of his army, His Highness con- 
 sented to cessation of hostilities and to negotiations for conditions of an 
 armistice." — Blue Book, page 341. 
 * Blue Book, page 341.
 
 34 
 
 uncompromised through his studied reserve, even when he 
 saw clearly the impracticability of the policy which the three 
 Empires were pursuing, our Minister at Constantinople was 
 called upon to effect the reconciliation, and after long and 
 patient negotiations Sir William White was enabled to bring 
 about an arrangement between the Sultan and the Prince of 
 Bulgaria whereby the latter was recognised as the Governor- 
 General of Eastern Eoumelia, named by the Sultan, and re- 
 newable by him every five years.* The Constitution of Eastern 
 Eoumelia was to be modified by a Commission to permit of the 
 Bulgarian laws being extended to it, and the Prince of Bulgaria 
 engaged to assist Turkey with his army against all foreign 
 aggression. To this arrangement, with certain modifications, 
 all the Great Powers have at length given their consent. It 
 is thus to England, and not to Eussia, that the Bulgarians feel 
 they owe their legal union with Eastern Eoumelia. Their real 
 union they owe to their own bold initiative, the military prowess 
 of their Prince, and their admirable bravery. 
 
 The pill was a bitter one to Eussia, especially bitter because 
 of the personal animosity which the Czar had shown to the 
 Prince of Bulgaria. Where the shoe pinched the Eussian foot 
 may be gathered from the objections to the arrangement formu- 
 lated by Eussia. She objected to the Convention being con- 
 cluded with Alexander of Battenberg as Prince of Bulgaria, 
 and not simply with the Prince of Bulgaria whoever he might 
 be. She objected to the renewal of the appointment every five 
 years by the Sultan without the sanction of the Great Powers. 
 Finally, she objected to the engagement of the Prince to assist 
 
 * The Blue Book shows that this counsel was communicated by Lord 
 Salisbury to the Ottoman Ambassador as early as the 5th October. " I recom- 
 mended," he said, " that His Majesty the Sultan should retain Prince Alexander 
 (whose circumstances and disposition tended to make him more favourable 
 to Turkey than any other occupant of the position the Porte woidd be likely to 
 obtain), and should address himself to reducing the union of Bulgaria and 
 Eastern Eoumelia, so far as possible, to a merely personal union under the 
 Prince," — Blue Book, page 80.
 
 35 
 
 ill repelling any aggression against Turkey.* On all these 
 particulars Eussia carried her point, and the Convention was 
 accordingly modified, but no less truly has the union been 
 legalized, to the satisfaction of Bulgarian aspirations and with 
 the minimum of harm to Turkey. And in its accomplishment 
 England scored a diplomatic triumph of the highest order, and 
 such as we have had of late years few examples to record. 
 
 * Unfortunately, just as the arrangement was concluded witli the Sublime 
 Porte, Lord Salisbury's Government left office, and prematurely Sir Edward 
 Thornton was allowed by the new Grovernment to take possession of his post at 
 Constantinople.
 
 36 
 
 YII. 
 
 Position of Turkish Provinces of Eastern Europe — 
 Needed Concession of Self-Government. 
 
 In our Eastern Eoumelian action we initiated what I conceive 
 to be our true policy at present in Eastern Europe — a friendly 
 sympathy, without alliance or partizanship, both with Mussul- 
 man Turkey and the rising Christian nationalities of Eastern 
 Europe. 
 
 No man has more cause than I have to feel sympathy 
 with the Mohammedan people. I have amongst them most 
 valued friends, with whom I have enjoyed relations of the 
 most unreserved confidence. They have invariably accorded 
 me a most gratifying consideration, and I have ever been able 
 to return their regard with the most loyal heartiness. 
 
 But it would be culpable and childish in me to allow 
 friendship to cloud my reason or shut my lips. The European 
 provinces left to Turkey, excepting the Vilayet of Andrianople, 
 cannot, as at present achninistered, be a strength to the Empire, 
 nor other than a hotbed of foreign intrigue. To preserve his 
 authority in Macedonia and Epirus the Sultan has recently been 
 obliged to concentrate in these provinces an army of a quarter 
 of a million of soldiers, drawn away exclusively from the 
 Mohammedan populations of Asia Minor and Syria. But tlie 
 financial resources and material condition of the Empire cannot 
 stand such a strain, and before long the consequences will be 
 felt from one end of the vast Empire to the other. To continue 
 the present situation is impossible ; to modify it without some 
 radical change upon the past is equally impossible.
 
 37 
 
 Tlie ostensible cause of the recent military concentration was 
 tlie attitude of Greece, but those who look below the surface 
 cannot fail to perceive that there is a deeply seated cancer 
 knawing the vitals of the provinces themselves in which the 
 concentration has had to be made. There is no backbone of 
 hearty allegiance to support direct Mussulman rule in these 
 Christian provinces. Nothing can be conceived more discourag- 
 ing than the present condition of Albania, Epirus, and part of 
 Macedonia. So nominal is the executive power of the Porte in 
 Albania that many of the legislative enactments of the Empire 
 are there set openly at naught. In Epirus and part of Macedonia 
 brigandage is so rife that a traveller cannot venture to remain 
 two nights at the same station, lest his presence should organize 
 a plan for his being plundered or held to ransom. This is not 
 an exceptional condition. It has existed for years, and is now 
 become chronic. The authorities are not wicked, but they are 
 weak, and they have no loyalty in the people to lean upon for 
 support. There is no disguising the fact that there will be no 
 solid peace in the Ottoman provinces of South-Eastern Europe 
 until direct Mussulman rule is withdrawn from them. The 
 concentration of large military forces to keep off aggression is a 
 process of certain exhaustion to the Empire ; remove them, and 
 free scope is left for foreign intrigue. 
 
 The only remedy for this embarrassing situation which 
 sincere friendliness to the Ottoman Empire can suggest, I 
 would express to Turkish statesmen as follows : — " Foresee the 
 inevitable. Give some degree of administrative autonomy to 
 your European provinces, and group them around you as 
 friends. England had to do the same with Canada; she has 
 had to do it with all her important colonies. You will thus 
 disarm the foreign intriguers, who seek only to advance their 
 personal aims by producing convulsions, and you will rear 
 around you children who, deeply inocidated with the love 
 of freedom, will refuse to be the slaves of aliens, the pawns 
 in the game of Eussia. Thus surrounded, your position at
 
 38 
 
 Constantinople becomes assured. There is no danger to Con- 
 stantinople from the races of Eastern Europe. Their ambitions 
 are not towards that capital; on the contrary it is for their 
 interest that Mussulman rule should continue in Constantinople. 
 The only real danger for Turkish rule in Constantinople is 
 from the great Northern Colossus." 
 
 Of the true policy for England there can be no doubt. It 
 is candid friendliness to Turkey, and hearty sympathy with 
 the rising nationalities of Eastern Europe. If ably carried 
 out, that policy will ultimately border the north of the 
 Mediterranean Sea with rising small States which would have 
 enough of independence to prevent them being the catspaws 
 of Eussia, and in whose material prosperity British commerce 
 would surely gain. Just before I went to Turkey, Eoumania 
 had achieved her freedom. In these thirty years her material 
 prosperity has more than quintupled, and she is now little 
 behind Italy in the standard of civilization. When I went to 
 Turkey, brigandage was perhaps less rife in Epirus and Mace- 
 donia than it is to-day. The administration in these provinces 
 was then bad, it is hardly improved now. "Look here upon 
 this picture, and on this." Growth into a vigorous manhood, 
 prosperity, and ever-increasing development: that is the one. 
 Impaired vitality, constant unrest, pale-faced discontent: this 
 is the other. And he who contemplates these two pictures 
 cannot fail to desire a beginning of better things for the 
 Turkish provinces of Eastern Europe, in administrative self- 
 government loillingly accorded ly the Sultan. Through that 
 means the Christian races of Eastern Europe may shake them- 
 selves free from the blighting influences of foreign intrigues, 
 and instead of forming new Polands, grow up into self- 
 contained, self-respecting centres of industry and contentment. 
 To Mohammedan Turkey the gain will not be less important. 
 Instead of the weakness resulting from continued military 
 concentrations and financial exhaustion, she will create around 
 her a bulwark of strength, defended by identic interests.
 
 against her only external foe. She will further thereby execute 
 with loyalty a promise which formed part of the Treaty of 
 Berlin, and thus secure for herself the sympathy of those of 
 the Great Powers of Europe who, with honest intentions, were 
 parties to that International covenant.
 
 40 
 
 LATEST PHASE OF THE EASTERN QUESTION. 
 
 In publishing a lecture delivered three months ago, my readers 
 may expect me to refer briefly to the more recent course of 
 events concerning the countries of which I have treated. 
 
 Delay has arisen in the nomination of the Commissioners 
 to whom was to be confided the task of regulating the new 
 administrative conditions necessitated by the modifications in- 
 troduced into the situation of Eastern Eoumelia, but the Sublime 
 Porte has wisely regarded with a generous benevolence the 
 efforts of the Prince of Bulgaria to consolidate the interests of 
 order and good government in the two provinces which are 
 now united under him. This policy is highly significative of 
 the wisdom of the Sultan and of the Ministers who now enjoy 
 his confidence, and who, from personal knowledge I may add, 
 are men of exceptional horiesty and patriotism. 
 
 Time has only demonstrated with greater clearness the aims 
 of Eussian diplomacy. Irritated by the spirit of independence 
 which led the Bulgarians to attain the expansion they coveted 
 by their own efforts, Eussia has tried to alienate the sympathies 
 of the Sublime Porte from the Prince of Bulgaria ; but thus far 
 without result. By his Imperial utterance at Sebastopol, the 
 Czar sought to alarm Bulgaria with the prospect of an impending 
 vengeance, and by the reception of an address at Moscow which 
 in distinct terms invited him to achieve the restoration of the 
 noble edifice of St. Sophia in Stamboul to the purposes of a 
 Christian sanctuary he wrought upon the fears of the Sultan 
 in revealing the aspirations of his people. The wisdom of 
 these demonstrations has not thus far been justified. Their 
 only effect has been to show with more clearness to both
 
 41 
 
 Turkey and Bulgaria that their only hope for the future is 
 in mutual and sincere co-operation. 
 
 Yet another step has been taken during the last few days 
 by Eussia which has two significant aspects. She has retracted 
 her promise, engrafted in the Treaty of Berlin, that Batoum in 
 the Black Sea should remain a free port, and wilely profited by 
 a temporary Governmental weakness in England to proclaim 
 this retractation. Her first object in so doing is to counter- 
 balance the moral effect of the diplomatic failure of her Eastern 
 Koumelian policy. This first aspect of the step may be passed 
 over with indifference. It is true that the promise now retracted 
 was the pont d'or by which a dangerous gulph which separated 
 England and Eussia at the Conference of Berlin was crossed. 
 But the freedom of the Port of Batoum had never any greater 
 value than as an honourable escape from a difficulty for which 
 it was not advantageous to endanger greater interests. If the 
 withdrawal of that freedom should serve as a satisfaction to 
 Eussian amour propre, it may be as useful, albeit in a lesser 
 degree, as its promise was before. But the second aspect 
 of the recent Eussian declaration is more momentous. It 
 implies the little value Eussia attaches to the Treaty of Berlin, 
 and, in no unmistakeable manner, warns all concerned with 
 herself in that Treaty, that its dispositions are in her eyes of 
 ephemeral interest. This is no new revelation to those who 
 have followed the story of the preceding pages, but it ought to 
 prove useful as a more emphatic declaration of the real aim of 
 Eussia. She lost her hold over Eoumania because the Eouma- 
 nians found a wise German Prince under whose constitutional 
 rule they could develop their resources and create for themselves 
 a position of independent national life. She sees clearly tliat 
 Bulgaria hopes and promises to do the same under its German 
 Prince, and she would fain crush in the bud this future danger. 
 She is trying to alienate the sympathies of the Bulgarians, 
 from their Prince by showing them that that attachment will 
 bring down upon them Eussian vengeance. But the mass of
 
 42 
 
 the Bulgarians are much too thick-skinned to be affected by- 
 threats, and one of their most distinguishing characteristics is 
 dogged persistence. The words of Dr. Stransky to Major 
 Trotter may be cited as expressing the general sentiment of 
 the Bulgarian people. "A constant intrigue," he said, "has 
 been going on against him " (the Prince), " by the Russians, 
 because he shows independence; but we will stand by him, 
 as he has shown himself to be a constitutional Prince during 
 the last two years."* Or again, " The Prince," said Dr. Stranski, 
 "had now definitely thrown in his lot with the Bulgarians, 
 who w^ould therefore support him through thick and thin."t 
 The aberration of Russian diplomacy is as great to-day on 
 this point as it was when, on the morrow of the Roumelian 
 ■coup d'4tat, M. De Nelidoff expressed himself to Sir 
 William White as " having taken steps most likely to put an 
 end to this movement, which probably has for its object the 
 union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.":{: Nothing can 
 restore Russian supremacy in Bulgaria but the march of 
 Russian troops into that country to dethrone Prince Alexander, 
 and this she is not likely to venture upon as long as Germany 
 supports Austria in her Eastern policy. Could Russia succeed 
 in inducing the Sultan to quarrel with Bulgaria and oppose 
 forcibly Prince Alexander, her aim would most easily be 
 attained, but of this there ie not the slightest chance. The 
 Sultan and his Ministers are perfectly alive to the imprudence 
 of such a course, and as long as England maintains any 
 influence at Constantinople Russian efforts in that direction 
 should prove unavailing. But as Russia must already be 
 convinced of the futility of such efforts she will work towards 
 the gradual exhaustion of Turkey. To this end, by inspiring 
 the Sultan with distrust of the Prince of Bulgaria, Russia 
 induces Turkey to maintain the expensive military concentra- 
 
 * Blue Book, page 50. 
 t Blue Book, page 65. 
 X Blue Book, page 2.
 
 43 
 
 tion of troops in Macedonia and Thrace, — thus gradually but 
 surely bringing about the financial and material ruin of the 
 Ottoman Empire. An important step of Eussian diplomacy 
 in preparation for the last Eusso-Turkish War was inducing 
 Turkey to alienate European and especially British sympathy 
 by a needlessly offensive repudiation of her foreign debt. It 
 will endeavour to do so again by producing another financial 
 deadlock. It is as sure as that two and two make four that 
 this will be the consequence of the prolonged continuation 
 of the present military expenditure in Turkey. And it is for 
 this reason of vital importance to the Sublime Porte that it 
 should find a means of disarmament with honour to itself, 
 and without danger to its Imperial power. 
 
 The only means to attain this efficaciously is to calm the 
 discontent in its European Provinces by granting them a 
 large measure of self-government, and to do this promptly 
 and spontaneously. Fortunately the mechanism of that self- 
 government is already prepared. Pour years ago a Commission 
 of Ottoman and European delegates elaborated a scheme of 
 administration for the Provinces in question, and it only 
 requires the approval of the Sultan to put it into operation. 
 In that scheme the financial and imperial interests of the Porte 
 were carefully protected as well as the interests of the European 
 creditors of Turkey. The scheme is little known, but I can 
 speak of it with some authority, for during its elaboration I 
 was frequently consulted by the British Delegate on questions, 
 affecting the interests of the European creditors. 
 
 Of one thing the Sultan may be assured, that the races of 
 South-Eastern Europe prefer to remain attached to the Ottoman 
 Empire rather than become the prey of foreign despotisms. 
 And their preference is a just one. For there is more certainty 
 of individual freedom and a congenial administration in connec- 
 tion with the Porte than with any foreign Government. 
 
 The spontaneous concession of a certain measure of self- 
 government to his European provinces would range with loyalty
 
 aroiiud the throne of the Sultan their various populations, 
 enable His Imperial Majesty without misgiving to send back 
 to their homes in Asia Minor and Syria the vast army which 
 is at present concentrated in European Turkey, and assure to 
 liis cause the sympathies of freedom-loving countries such as 
 England, France, and Italy. 
 
 Should the Sultan not adopt this luise and magnanimous 
 course, it needs no gift of prophecy to warn His Majesty that the 
 forcible severance of his European Provinces hy foreign intervention 
 is only a question of time, and in that case his position at Constan- 
 tinople will become untenable. "Aide-toi et le del faidera." 
 
 In England we have reason to be proud of the generous 
 policy initiated by Lord Salisbury in connection with Eastern 
 Eoumelia. It is worthy of a great nation, and it is our duty to 
 continue that policy with a calm but resolute determination. 
 The difficulties of our Home policy have led Eussia to believe 
 that she can dare much wdth impunity, but when the public 
 opinion in England is sufficiently enlightened to grasp clearly 
 the present situation in Eastern Europe and the grave impor- 
 tance of its issues upon British interests, the w^eakness of 
 our Executive position will be mitigated by the growth of a 
 strong popular sentiment. It has been in the desire to con- 
 tribute something to the creation of such a popular sentiment 
 that the preceding observations have been penned, and if, even 
 in the very humblest degree, they tend to attract general atten- 
 tion to an important event happily consummated in Eastern 
 Eoumelia, and to the latest phase of what is called " Th 3 
 Eastern Question," their intention will have been attained. 
 
 BABBISON AND BO.VS, PBINTEBS, 69, PALL MALI, LONDOM.
 
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