ALBERT A.WOLDMAN 
 
 LINCOLN 
 
 RUSSIANS 
 
 The story of Russian- American 
 diplomatic 
 relations during 
 the Civil War. 
 
 By the author of LAWYER LINCOLN 
 
$5-°° 
 
 LINCOLN AND 
 THE RUSSIANS 
 
 by Albert A. Woldman 
 
 Lincoln and the Russians is the first vol- 
 ume to explore extensively a much neg- 
 lected aspect of American diplomatic 
 relations: American— Russian relations 
 prior to the first World War. It is only 
 since the Russian Revolution of 191 7 that 
 emphasis has been placed on the subject 
 of American-Russian diplomacy; yet 
 Russia played an important part in achiev- 
 ing Lincoln's goal in the Civil War: the 
 preservation of the Union. Although the 
 purchase of Alaska is a familiar story, the 
 story preceding it reveals an aspect of 
 history in which Russia contributed ma- 
 terially toward preventing British and 
 French recognition of and aid to the 
 Confederacy. 
 
 Albert Woldman has investigated thor- 
 oughly the reports to St. Petersburg of 
 Baron de Stoeckl, Russian Minister to the 
 United States. He has quoted much of the 
 correspondence which passed between 
 the American and Russian diplomatic 
 corps, and the result is a unique contribu- 
 tion to Americana and Lincolniana. 
 
 The attitudes and actions of Russia, a 
 Czarist country with little love for the 
 principles of democracy, will come as a 
 surprise to those whose knowledge of 
 American-Russian relations is limited to 
 the purchase of Alaska. But most en- 
 couraging is the knowledge that once 
 an Autocratic Russia and a Democratic 
 America found common cause for 
 friendship. 
 
 THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK 
 
LINCOLN ROOM 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
 LIBRARY 
 
 MEMORIAL 
 
 the Class of 1901 
 
 founded by 
 
 HARLAN HOYT HORNER 
 
 and 
 
 HENRIETTA CALHOUN HORNER 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2012 with funding from 
 
 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 
 
 http://archive.org/details/lincolnrussiansOOilwold 
 
LINCOLN 
 AND THE RUSSIANS 
 
 ® 
 
® 
 
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 ® ® ® 
 
 ® ® ® ® ® ® 
 
 Lincoln 
 and the Russians 
 
 ALBERT A. WOLDMAN 
 
 ® 
 
 •<s€ m^) lb©« 
 
 THE WORLD PUBLISHING COMPANY 
 
 CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK 
 
FIRST EDITION 
 
 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 52-8436 
 
 wp 1152 
 Copyright 1952 by Albert A. Woldman 
 
 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form 
 
 without written permission from the publisher, except for brief passages 
 
 included in a review appearing in a newspaper or magazine. 
 
 Manufactured in the United States of America. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 PREFACE Vii 
 
 i. Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 3 
 
 2. The Divided House 15 
 
 3. Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 38 
 
 4. The Gloomy Year 1861 58 
 
 5. Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 84 
 
 6. Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 104 
 
 7. Cameron's "Exile to Siberia" 1 14 
 
 8. United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 124 
 
 9. T&e Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 140 
 
 10. The Myth of Russian Friendship 156 
 
 11. Alexander the Liberator and Lincoln the Emancipator 167 
 
 12. The Czar Criticizes Lincoln's Proclamation 180 
 
 13. "Lincoln's War" 190 
 
 14. What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 216 
 
 15. It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 226 
 
 16. Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 242 
 
 17. Democracy Has Stood the Test 255 
 
 18. Russian Tributes to Lincoln 261 
 
 19. The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 2jj 
 
 CHAPTER NOTES 29 1 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 299 
 
 INDEX 305 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The story of Lincoln and Russia is virtually an unknown chapter in 
 the Lincoln saga. It needs retelling today not only because of the light 
 it may shed upon current problems, but especially because Russia's real 
 motives in befriending the United States during the Civil War, con- 
 cealed even from Lincoln, have only recently been revealed as a result 
 of diligent research among the dusty archives of the Russian govern- 
 ment. Much of my source material is from the voluminous diplomatic 
 correspondence between Edouard de Stoeckl, Russia's Minister to 
 Washington during the Civil War, and Prince Gortchakov, the Czar's 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs in St. Petersburg. This correspondence 
 was written in French. Another source is the Krasnyi Arkhiv, the Red 
 Archives, written in Russian. I have had these materials translated and 
 many excerpts thereof appear in this text. Still another source — espe- 
 cially for new material on Cassius M. Clay — is the Lincoln Papers 
 which became available in 1947. 
 
 Is a Russian-American war inevitable? Must the conflicting political 
 systems of the democratic United States and communistic Russia lead 
 them to the battlefield? Or can they — despite their clashing ideologies 
 — co-exist in peace and work together for the salvation of the world? 
 
 The little-known story of American-Russian relations during the 
 Civil War may help to furnish answers to these all-important questions. 
 Abraham Lincoln, "the supreme American," who knew Russia as a 
 "country where they make no pretense of loving liberty," and regarded 
 her government as the exemplar of despotism, led our government into 
 an informal yet firm alliance and working partnership with the realm of 
 the Czars — despite the fact that our "government of the people, by the 
 people, for the people" and Czar Alexander IPs absolute autocracy 
 were the very antithesis of each other. 
 
 This Russian-American entente cordiale was a political paradox with- 
 out equal. To the ruling classes of Europe, the United States was then 
 the world's most dangerous and extremist revolutionary government. 
 We were the "Reds" of those days. On the other hand, Americans 
 regarded Russia as the classic example of absolute power and despotism, 
 and the foremost exponent of suppression of popular movements 
 
 vii 
 
viii Preface 
 
 throughout the world. From the official Russian viewpoint this alliance 
 was probably more difficult for Russia to swallow than for the United 
 States. Lincoln as the head of a democratic nation fighting for survival 
 could more easily justify the partnership than the Czar could justify it 
 in the eyes of the autocrats, haters of democracy and champions of 
 absolutism who surrounded him. As will be seen, the United States and 
 Russia became international bedfellows because they had a common 
 fear and a common enemy — Great Britain. Russian autocracy would 
 have been pleased to see American democracy destroyed. Americans 
 had nothing but contempt for Russia's absolutism. Yet, for mutual 
 protection against a common foe, they forgot their ideological dif- 
 ferences and formed a working partnership that kept the two govern- 
 ments firm friends for decades. This strange alliance was a potent 
 factor in preventing European intervention in the American Civil War, 
 and in stopping an Anglo-French alliance from attacking Russia over 
 the turbulent Polish question. 
 
 If the analogy between Russian-American relations of Lincoln's day 
 and those of the present period is not identical, the similarity is, never- 
 theless, substantial. Then as now the Russians as a people had never 
 experienced real freedom. The territorial and other demands of the 
 Soviets of today are not much different from those of their czaristic 
 predecessors. Then, as now, the centuries-old desire of Russia to reach 
 an ice-free port on the Black Sea, the Bosphorus or the Persian Gulf 
 met with the unswerving opposition of the British and their allies. 
 Then, as now, Russia was the most hated nation on the continent. The 
 repressive despotism of the Czar's government was then as odious to 
 democratic America as is Russia's communism today. But our Ministers 
 to St. Petersburg were instructed to do all within their power "to con- 
 firm and strengthen" the traditional "relations of amity and friendship" 
 between the two nations. 
 
 Lincoln found political collaboration (as distinguished from ideologi- 
 cal rapprochement) between the world's most liberal democracy and 
 the world's most repressive despotism not only feasible but imperative 
 for the Republic's welfare. 
 
 He built this policy on confidence in America, not on distrust of 
 Russia. He was moved by faith in democracy, not by fear of autocracy. 
 He believed that only a strong, united nation with unchallengeable 
 power and unquestioned supremacy over the States in the national 
 
Preface ix 
 
 domain could maintain for us a lasting peace. This mighty faith was but 
 a reemphasis of his expression of faith at Cooper Union, February 27, 
 i860: "Neither let us be slandered from our duty by false accusations 
 against us, nor frightened from it by menaces of destruction to the 
 government, nor dungeons to ourselves. Let us have faith that right 
 makes might, and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as 
 we understand it." 
 
® 
 
 Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 
 
 On the evening of January 8, 1852 Abraham Lincoln left his dingy 
 law office in Springfield, Illinois, and walked briskly to the courthouse 
 on the square. A meeting — a result of the "Kossuth craze" which was 
 sweeping the Northern States — was about to take place there and he 
 had been invited to address the gathering. It was to be a demonstration 
 on behalf of Hungarian freedom and a protest against Russia's unwar- 
 ranted intervention in Hungary's struggle to throw off the yoke of 
 Austrian tyranny. 
 
 Across the Atlantic Ocean, some four thousand miles distant from 
 Springfield, political convulsions were shaking European civilization to 
 its very foundations. The dark year of 1 848 had seen the barricades and 
 battalions of revolution rise from Paris to Moscow and from Prussia in 
 the north to Sicily in the south. A democratic revolution had broken 
 out in France in February of that year. Soon men throughout Europe 
 rose up in arms for liberty — for economic security and better standards 
 of living. Even in England there was unrest in the shape of the Chartist 
 movement. This spree year of liberty was the year when two clashing 
 ideologies represented by France, liberal and republican, and Russia, 
 reactionary and monarchical, were creating divided counsels and con- 
 flicting prophets, and keeping all Europe in a ferment. It was the year 
 of Karl Marx's Communist Manifesto-, the year when Czar Nicholas of 
 Russia wrote to Victoria of England, "What remains standing in 
 Europe?" 
 
 3 
 
4 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Awakened Hungary under the inspired leadership of Louis Kossuth 
 had succeeded temporarily in winning her independence from the 
 Austrian overlords. The only resource left to the thoroughly beaten 
 Hapsburgs was to invite the willing intervention of Russia. 
 
 Like a tempest from the north, the huge armies of Czar Nicholas I 
 swept down on the little land of the Danube. To the fighters behind the 
 barricades the Emperor issued a manifesto which closed with the words 
 from Isaiah, "Listen, ye heathen, and submit, for with us is God!" 
 Kossuth's followers fought heroically against hopeless odds, but after 
 a brief resistance were utterly crushed. Gloatingly the Russian general 
 reported to the Czar, "Hungary is lying at Your Majesty's feet." 
 
 Terrible was the reaction throughout Europe when the workmen and 
 peasants who had seized power briefly were shot down by superior 
 guns, and their revolutions blown off the map. The ebbtide rushed back 
 violently and swept away all that the liberal agitations had won. As the 
 gales of 1 848 blew themselves out completely, a funereal gloom settled 
 upon Europe. Absolutism was restored in the lands from which it had 
 been briefly banished. By the hundreds of thousands, homeless, land- 
 less and property-less peasants and toilers, whose hopes of winning oft- 
 promised rights and reforms had been shattered, now turned their faces 
 longingly toward America. Soon tidal waves of hungry, discontented 
 people began pouring across the Atlantic bringing with them har- 
 rowing accounts of the plight of their countrymen who could not 
 escape. 
 
 The heart of America went out to Europe's victims of oppression. 
 This nation's sympathy manifested itself in various ways. Among them 
 were public demonstrations on behalf of Hungarian independence. 
 One such meeting had already taken place in Springfield, on September 
 6, 1849. Lincoln's good friend and predecessor in Congress from the 
 Springfield district, Edward D. Baker, had been the principal speaker, 
 and Judge David Davis, who presided over the Eighth Judicial Circuit, 
 had been the chairman of the meeting. The judge appointed Lincoln, 
 his frequent traveling companion, together with five other citizens of 
 Springfield, to draft appropriate resolutions to be sent to the American 
 Secretary of State. As spokesman for the committee, Lincoln submitted 
 a group of resolutions which, after expressing admiration for the Hun- 
 garians "in their present glorious struggle for liberty," urged the 
 United States government to "acknowledge the independence of 
 Hungary as a nation of freemen at the very earliest moment." This 
 
Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 5 
 
 recognition, the resolutions recited, is due from American freemen to 
 their struggling brethren in the general cause of republican liberty 
 and does not violate the just rights of the government against which 
 the Hungarians are contending. 1 
 
 Now, more than two years later, another public demonstration on 
 behalf of Hungarian freedom was being held in Lincoln's home town. 
 Governor Kossuth, exiled leader of Hungary's revolt, was touring the 
 United States, pleading the cause of his oppressed people. In Washing- 
 ton, Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Lincoln's illustrious fellow-towns- 
 man, had been eloquent in his advocacy of an official governmental 
 welcome to Kossuth. Dramatically the Little Giant from Illinois had 
 asked: "Shall it be said that democratic America is not to be permitted 
 to grant a hearty welcome to an exile who has become the representa- 
 tive of liberal principles throughout the world lest despotic Austria 
 and Russia shall be offended?" And he had answered, "The armed 
 intervention of Russia to deprive Hungary of her constitutional rights, 
 was such a violation of the laws of nations as authorized ... the United 
 States to interfere and prevent the consummation of the deed." 2 
 
 Lincoln, who had apparently abandoned politics and was now to all 
 intents and purposes completely immersed in the law, was glad to 
 participate in the public remonstrance against tyranny, and to raise his 
 voice on behalf of human freedom. Far away as Hungary and Russia 
 were from the banks of the Sangamon, they represented something 
 vitally significant to him as a free American. Russia stood as the ex- 
 emplar of repressive despotism, while Hungary represented the helpless 
 victim of oppression struggling to be free. Hating slavery in any form, 
 Lincoln sympathized instinctively with the underdog. 
 
 The meeting had been well publicized and "a large concourse of 
 people from different portions of the state" gathered in the courthouse 
 for the occasion. John Calhoun, who presided, opened the meeting and 
 explained the purpose of the gathering to the audience, which included 
 a number of men who had been identified with the republican move- 
 ment in Europe. He recited the dramatic details of Hungary's struggle 
 to throw off the yoke of Austrian oppression. He recalled how the 
 Russian despot had come to the aid of the Hapsburg despot with 
 armies, guns and money, and had succeeded in suppressing the revolt 
 and rendering all the sacrifices of the Magyars unavailing. Judge 
 Lyman Trumbull and others then described Kossuth's flight to Turkey, 
 his imprisonment there at Austria's instigation, his release through the 
 
6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 influence of our government, which sent the navy frigate Mississippi 
 to bring the exiled leader to the United States, and the wild enthusiasm 
 with which this "apostle of world democracy" was being greeted 
 wherever he appeared. 
 
 The speakers also called the gathering's attention to the sharp protest 
 of the Austrian Charge d' Affaires at Washington against our govern- 
 ment's "intervention." The American eagle fairly screamed with the 
 orator's reply that since our nation has given the world a successful 
 example of free government which has stood as the natural inspiration 
 of republican movements everywhere, we shall always cherish an 
 interest in nations struggling for similar institutions, and shall continue 
 ever to raise our voices in protest whenever tyranny attempts to de- 
 prive a free people of their independence. The principle of noninter- 
 vention, shouted one of the speakers, must never be construed so as to 
 "prevent this nation at any time from interfering in favor of any people 
 who may be struggling for liberty in any part of the world." 3 
 
 After the speeches, the presiding officer appointed a committee com- 
 posed of Lincoln, Judge Trumbull, Archibald Williams, William I. 
 Ferguson, Anson G. Henry, Samuel S. Marshall and Ebenezer Peck to 
 draft resolutions implementing the sentiments expressed at the gather- 
 ing. The next evening Lincoln presented these resolutions: 
 
 Whereas, in the opinion of this meeting, the arrival of Kossuth 
 in our country, in connection with the recent events in Hungary, 
 and with the appeal he is now making in behalf of his country, 
 presents an occasion upon which we, the American people, cannot 
 remain silent, without justifying an interference against our con- 
 tinued devotion to the principles of our free institutions, therefore, 
 
 Resolved i. That it is the right of any people, sufficiently 
 numerous for national independence, to throw off, to revolu- 
 tionize, their existing form of government, and to establish such 
 other in its stead as they may choose. 
 
 What strange words to be coming from the mouth of the man whom 
 destiny was preparing to wage America's great Civil War against 
 secession! 
 
 And yet this was the second time within about three years that 
 Lincoln had expressed his belief in the right of secession. In 1848, in 
 a speech in Congress, he had declared: 
 
Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism j 
 
 Any people anywhere, being inclined and having the power, 
 have the right to rise up and shake off the existing government, 
 and form a new one that suits them better. That is a most valuable, 
 a most sacred right — a right which we hope and believe is to 
 liberate the world. 
 
 Nor is the right confined to cases in which the whole people of 
 an existing government may choose to exercise it. Any portion 
 of such people that can, may revolutionize and make their own so 
 much of the territory as they inhabit. 
 
 This is what Lincoln believed in 1848 and as late as 1852. But in 
 
 i860 he would no longer hold to that belief — although the South did. 
 
 But to get back to the resolutions he helped prepare in January 1852: 
 
 2. That it is the duty of our government to neither foment, nor 
 assist, such revolutions in other governments. 
 
 3. That, as we may not legally or warrantably interfere abroad 
 to aid, so no other government may interfere abroad, to suppress 
 such revolutions; and that we should at once announce to the 
 world our determination to insist upon this mutuality of non- 
 intervention, as a sacred principle of the international law. 
 
 4. That the late interference of Russia in the Hungarian struggle 
 was, in our opinion, such illegal and unwarrantable interference. 
 
 5. That to have resisted Russia in that case, or to resist any 
 power in a like case, would be no violation of our own cherished 
 principles of nonintervention, but, on the contrary, would be ever 
 meritorious, in us, or any independent nation. 
 
 6. That whether we will, in fact, interfere in such case, is purely 
 a question of policy, to be decided when the exigencies arise. 
 
 7. That we recognize in Governor Kossuth of Hungary, the 
 most worthy and distinguished representative of the cause of civil 
 and religious liberty on the continent of Europe. A cause for 
 which he and his nation struggled until they were overwhelmed 
 by the armed intervention of a foreign despot, in violation of the 
 more sacred principles of the laws of nature and of nations — 
 principles held dear by the friends of freedom everywhere and 
 more especially by the people of these United States. 
 
 The audience was unanimous in its support of the points covered by 
 the resolutions. "But what about Ireland?" asked a Mr. McConnell. If 
 
8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the resolutions would add an expression of sympathy with Ireland's 
 struggle against Great Britain, and with all other people who were 
 righting for liberty, he could wholeheartedly support the entire series. 
 Lincoln's committee saw no objection to doing this and so added two 
 more resolutions: 
 
 8. That the sympathies of this country, and the benefits of its 
 position, should be exerted in favor of the people of every nation 
 struggling to be free; and whilst we meet to do honor to Kossuth 
 and Hungary, we should not fail to pour out the tribute of our 
 praise and approbation to the patriotic efforts of the Irish, the 
 Germans and the French, who have unsuccessfully fought to 
 establish in their several governments the supremacy of the people. 
 
 9. That there is nothing in the past history of the British govern- 
 ment, or in its present expressed policy, to encourage the belief 
 that she will aid, in any manner, in the delivery of continental 
 Europe frpm the rope of despotism; and that her treatment of 
 Ireland, of O'Brien, Mitchell and other worthy patriots, forces the 
 conclusion that she will join her efforts to the despots of Europe 
 in suppressing every effort of the people to establish free govern- 
 ments, based upon the principles of true religious and civil liberty. 4 
 
 After more spread-eagle oratory, the resolutions were adopted, and 
 the meeting adjourned with "three hearty cheers for Kossuth, Hun- 
 gary and Ireland." 
 
 For befriending the fugitive Hungarian Kossuth and the Irish and 
 German patriots, Lincoln gained a footing as a liberal which was to 
 stand him in good stead in his political campaigns that lay ahead. 
 
 An unexpected result of Kossuth's visit to the United States was an 
 extraordinary impetus to the growth of the movement from which was 
 to spring that political phenomenon, the American or Know-Nothing 
 Party. Kossuth's sojourn focused attention upon the flood of immi- 
 grants who were pouring into this country. The apprehensions, jeal- 
 ousies and bigotries that made up nativism came violently to the fore. 
 The Know-Nothings constituted a secret fraternity whose cry was 
 "America for Americans." The Party received its nickname from "I 
 don't know," the ever-repeated reply of its members to questions about 
 its purposes and activities. They denounced the alien liberalism of 
 Kossuth, Garibaldi and Mazzini and the tendency to push democracy 
 to extremes. They thundered that the "radical" ideas propagated by 
 
Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 9 
 
 "German infidels and Italian patriots" threatened to undermine Amer- 
 ican institutions. So they admonished, "Put none but Americans on 
 guard," and proceeded to oppose politically all who were not native- 
 born white, Protestant Americans. The Know-Nothings grew rapidly 
 in membership and influence and soon became a political power of 
 great importance throughout the country. 
 
 Know-Nothing zealots called on Lincoln in Springfield to join them 
 in their antiforeign and anti-Catholic campaign. It was the expedient 
 thing for politicians to do. With unfeigned disgust Lincoln gave his 
 reply: "Who are the native Americans? Do they not wear the breech- 
 clout and carry the tomahawk? We pushed them from their homes, 
 and now turn on others not fortunate enough to come over so early 
 as we or our forefathers." 5 
 
 It was while denouncing the bigotry of the Know-Nothings that 
 Lincoln found his second occasion to denounce Russia as the world's 
 leading exemplar of despotism. In a letter to his friend Joshua Speed 
 written on August 24, 1855, he declared: 
 
 I am not a Know-Nothing; that is certain. How could I be? 
 How can any one who abhors the oppression of Negroes be in 
 favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in de- 
 generacy appears to me to be pretty rapid. As a nation we began 
 by declaring that "all men are created equal." We now practically 
 read it "all men are created equal, except Negroes." When the 
 Know-Nothings get control, it will read, "all men are created 
 equal, except Negroes and foreigners and Catholics." When it 
 comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where 
 they make no pretense of loving liberty — to Russia, for instance, 
 where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy 
 of hypocrisy. 6 
 
 Lincoln made this reference to Russia as the outstanding example of 
 despotism and repression at a time when the United States and Russia 
 were the warmest of international friends. Notwithstanding the fact 
 that Russia was then the stronghold of reaction and the most hated and 
 despised nation in Europe, democratic America was openly and 
 proudly proclaiming her friendship for the realm of the Czars. 
 
 During the first half of the nineteenth century Russia, like the 
 United States, was constantly at odds with Great Britain, and as the 
 years progressed the clash of European imperialisms made war between 
 
io Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Great Britain and Russia inevitable. The Crimean War broke out in 
 1853, nominally over a monkish issue between Russia and Turkey 
 involving the guardianship of certain holy places in Jerusalem and the 
 insistence of the Czar in exercising protection over the Greek Orthodox 
 subjects of the Sultan. This quarrel proved a felicitous occasion for 
 the French and British to draw the sword against the Czar. It was to 
 develop into an epic struggle between the Lion and the Bear for the 
 control of the route to India. The squadrons of the Allies entered the 
 Black Sea and bottled up the Russian fleet, and laid siege to the heavily 
 fortified city of Sebastopol, Russia's mighty arsenal in the Crimea and 
 the military center from which she threatened the south. 
 
 Ties of blood and a common language and a common history should 
 have made the United States rabidly pro-British in this war of im- 
 perialism. "England is our friend when the question is against Russia; 
 for who does not see that Russia represents that spirit of life and 
 government which is diametrically opposed to our own." This opinion 
 expressed by Harper's Magazine was the feeling of many Americans. 
 But the United States had become England's bitterest maritime rival. 
 Decades of bickering over the rights of neutrals and clashing commer- 
 cial interests now came to the fore to throw official American sympathy 
 violently on the side of Russia as another great victim of British 
 imperialism. 
 
 Edouard de Stoeckl, Russian Charge d'Affaires at Washington, ob- 
 served with pleasure the jealousy and bitterness existing between the 
 governments of Great Britain and the United States as they quarreled 
 constantly over commercial rivalries. Stoeckl tried ever so hard to drag 
 America into the Crimean War as an ally of ,St. Petersburg. "Russia," 
 he wrote, "must be ever watchful, must never lose an opportunity to 
 fan the flames of hatred." 7 He played upon the bitter rivalries of the 
 two English-speaking nations. In disregard of American neutrality, he 
 proposed plans to engage American privateers to prey upon British 
 commerce. He prevailed upon his government "to encourage the 
 Yankees to trade with her, to offer them special inducements in the 
 way of lower tariffs, especially on cotton and colonial goods which 
 have until now been brought in English bottoms." He wrote, "The 
 Americans will go after anything that has enough money in it. They 
 have the ships, they have the men, and they have the daring spirit. The 
 blockading fleet will think twice before firing on the Stars and Stripes. 
 
Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 1 1 
 
 When America was weak she refused to submit to England, and now 
 that she is strong she is much less likely to do so." 8 
 
 It was not Stoeckl's fault that the United States did not become an 
 active belligerent in the Crimean War. His propaganda in Washington 
 proved highly effective. The Russian Legation was flooded with re- 
 quests for letters of marque from American citizens desiring to enter 
 the service of the Czar. From Kentucky came the offer of three hun- 
 dred riflemen who volunteered to go to Sebastopol to fight the British. 
 
 President Pierce rather expected a rupture with England over neutral 
 rights. Complaining of British tactics, he said, "We desire most sin- 
 cerely to remain neutral, but God alone knows whether it is possible." 
 Secretary of State Marcy added bombastically that the United States 
 would defend to the utmost her right as a neutral to carry on legitimate 
 commerce, and that she would not recognize a paper blockade. He 
 announced that orders were being dispatched to the American squad- 
 ron then on its way to Japan to proceed instead to the Baltic to defend 
 United States shipping. 
 
 In the spring of 1855, Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War in the 
 Cabinet of President Pierce, sent a commission of three American army 
 officers to Russia and other lands of Europe to study the organization 
 of European armies and to observe the war in the Crimea. Among the 
 observers was Captain George B. McClellan, then only twenty-eight 
 years old and looking even younger. In France, the American officers 
 were presented to Napoleon III and the Empress Eugenie. They were 
 royally entertained in Russia, but were refused permission to visit the 
 battlefront. Notwithstanding this refusal, Captain McClellan and his 
 associates journeyed to Sebastopol where they studied the military 
 developments firsthand. 
 
 American friendship for Russia manifested itself in numerous ways 
 throughout the Crimean War. In an effort to prevent American mari- 
 time power from going to the aid of Russia, Great Britain strove avidly 
 to avoid trouble with the United States. She yielded voluntarily, though 
 sometimes sullenly, on practically every issue involving the blockade, 
 and gave assurance to Washington that she and her allies would observe 
 a strict conduct as to neutrals. America's insistence that England accept 
 the principle that the flag protects the cargo proved tremendously 
 helpful to Russian commerce. Fear of American power was largely 
 responsible for the rejection by the allies of Spanish help against the 
 
1 2 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Czar. Some Russians expressed the belief that had not England humili- 
 ated herself by backing down on every controversy with the United 
 States, America would have actually taken up arms as an ally of Mus- 
 covy. 
 
 During friendly exchanges between Washington and St. Petersburg, 
 Secretary Marcy made it a point to ascertain how Russia would view 
 annexation of the Sandwich Islands by the United States — a move 
 which both England and France strongly opposed. The Czar's Foreign 
 Minister advised Marcy that anything which would antagonize her 
 enemies would meet with Russia's approval. 9 
 
 One hand washes the other. So a few months after receiving this 
 friendly assurance, Marcy imparted to Stoeckl some highly important 
 secret information that had fallen into his hands. The United States 
 government had learned from sources regarded as reliable, Marcy 
 disclosed, that England was planning to attack and seize Alaska. Acting 
 on this information Stoeckl warned the Governor of Alaska to prepare 
 for eventualities. Officers of the Russian-American Company, fearful 
 that they were in no position to defend Alaska against a British raid, 
 made a frantic effort to insure the safety of their possessions by the 
 ruse of a fictitious sale to an American company. They thus hoped 
 that Alaska could be claimed to be American rather than Russian ter- 
 ritory, in the event of its falling into the hands of the British. The 
 United States government refused to be a party to such a plot, and the 
 plan of a pretended sale was abandoned. 10 
 
 But the United States undertook to display her good will in another 
 manner. Recalling that Russia had proposed to act as mediator in the 
 War of 1812, Marcy now offered the tender of a similar service by our 
 government in the Crimean War. The President, with the approval of 
 the Cabinet, stood ready to act as mediator, he advised Stoeckl. 11 The 
 Secretary of State was working on a plan to be submitted to the bel- 
 ligerents whereby the bloody struggle could be brought to a speedy 
 end. The Russian government neither accepted nor rejected America's 
 offer. Her Chancellor professed his faith in the impartiality of the 
 United States, but he doubted whether the enemy would agree. Baron 
 de Stoeckl expressed the belief that England would surely reject 
 Marcy's proposal because of "America's well-known partiality for 
 Russia." To which Marcy replied, "Let her do so. It will be one more 
 count against her in our eyes. You surely cannot object to that." 12 As 
 in the case of Russia's offer to mediate the War of 181 2, so now Amer- 
 
Lincoln Denounces Russian Despotism 1 3 
 
 ica's proposal to act as mediator in the Crimean War likewise fell 
 through. 
 
 Throughout the war Marcy repeatedly expressed his friendship for 
 the Czar, while on numerous occasions Czar Nicholas I, and later his 
 son Czar Alexander II, who succeeded to the throne when his father 
 died in March 1855, sent thanks to President Pierce and Secretary 
 Marcy for their kindly deeds and encouraging words on behalf of 
 Russia. 
 
 As the allied operations against the great Sebastopol arsenal in the 
 Crimea stretched out for almost a full year, and the ultimate defeat of 
 Russia became more and more apparent, one European nation after 
 another abandoned the ranks of neutrals and joined the enemies of the 
 Czar. By the time the beleaguered Black Sea port finally fell into the 
 hands of the allied conquerors, the United States was the only major 
 government in the world that was neither ashamed nor afraid to 
 acknowledge her friendship for the Muscovite Empire. 
 
 But back in Springfield Abraham Lincoln remained altogether un- 
 moved by the pro-Russian propaganda with which the Czar's legation 
 in Washington had flooded the land. Nor was he influenced by the 
 gestures of mutual admiration which the heads of the two governments 
 exchanged. He remembered Russia only as the "foreign despot" who 
 "in violation of the most sacred principles of the laws of nature and 
 of nations — principles held dear by the friends of freedom everywhere 
 and more especially by the people of these United States — " had, 
 through unwarranted armed intervention, overwhelmed little Hungary 
 as she strove to throw off the yoke of Austrian tyranny. So when in 
 August 1855 Lincoln desired to illustrate to Joshua Speed what happens 
 when bigotry, reaction and suppression overwhelm a land, he instinc- 
 tively pointed to "Russia . . . where despotism can be taken pure, and 
 without the base alloy of hypocrisy." 
 
 Lincoln was still a stranger to the mysteries of world power politics 
 which had made America so violently pro-Russian during the Crimean 
 War. Idealist that he was, he still did not realize that altruistic friend- 
 ship is a thing almost unknown among nations; that their relations 
 toward each other are not necessarily determined by sentiment or 
 gratitude, but first and foremost by self-interest; and that the absence 
 or presence of conflicting interests or common animosities, fears, 
 hatreds or enemies are the foundations upon which most alliances and 
 ententes have been constructed. Nearly six years were still to come and 
 
14 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 go before Lincoln would be suddenly catapulted into the colossal 
 responsibility of saving the Union from breaking into pieces, and of 
 managing the nation's delicate foreign affairs while the United States 
 trembled on the very brink of a foreign war. Then — irony of ironies — 
 in these soul-stirring days, democratic America would be able to count 
 on only one friend among the entire family of nations — democracy- 
 hating, despotic Russia, where, as Lincoln so aptly phrased it, "they 
 make no pretense of loving liberty." 
 
® 
 
 The Divided House 
 
 Edouard de Stoeckl, who as Charge d'Affaires had rendered extraor- 
 dinary service in winning American sympathy for the Russian cause 
 during the Crimean War, in 1857 became St. Petersburg's Minister 
 Plenipotentiary to the United States. 
 
 He had first come to Washington in 1841 as attache or secretary of 
 legation. In 1854, upon the death of Alexander Bodisco who had served 
 as the Czar's Minister to the United States for seventeen years, Stoeckl 
 presented his credentials as Charge d'Affaires. In this post he served 
 with zeal and cunning and his elevation to ministerial rank was his 
 reward. In Washington, Stoeckl made many friends, and there in 1856, 
 at the age of forty-eight, he married Elizabeth Howard, "American, 
 Protestant, without property" — so he reported to the Czar. She was a 
 charming woman, "stately as a queen and beautiful as a Hebe." And 
 she was a clever woman, too, who helped her diplomat husband win 
 his way into the best society in Washington. 
 
 Edouard de Stoeckl was tall and aristocratic in bearing. He was 
 frequently addressed as "Baron" although he had no title of nobility. 
 His jovial face was bedecked with side whiskers and mustache. He 
 moved on friendly terms with members of Congress, leading states- 
 men, and numerous other prominent persons of the Capital — wining 
 and dining in their company and frequently relaxing with them over 
 the gambling tables of Washington. As the representative of one of the 
 greatest of the world powers he had ready entree to the office of the 
 
 15 
 
1 6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 President of the United States, and was on many occasions a guest at 
 the receptions in the White House. He conferred frequently with the 
 Secretary of State and other members of the Cabinet. He exchanged 
 observations with members of the foreign diplomatic corps stationed 
 in Washington, and kept a close contact with army officers, newspaper 
 correspondents and other sources of information. 
 
 From this favorable environment he was able to make shrewd ob- 
 servations of events and trends. He wrote to Prince Gortchakov, the 
 Czar's Foreign Minister, frequently and at great length concerning 
 what was going on in the United States. And Czar Alexander II and 
 the Foreign Minister encouraged him to continue these detailed reports. 
 Russia was greatly interested in what was happening in the United 
 States — her one potential friend in the family of nations. 
 
 Moreover, the Russian serf problem had much in common with the 
 American slavery question. When the disastrous outcome of the 
 Crimean War made it crystal clear that reform could not be delayed 
 much longer, Czar Alexander II had addressed these solemn words to 
 the marshals of the noblesse of Moscow: 
 
 As you yourselves know, the existing manner of possessing serfs 
 cannot remain unchanged. It is better to abolish serfage from 
 above, than to await the time when it will begin to abolish itself 
 from below. I request you, gentlemen, to consider how this can be 
 put into execution, and to submit my words to the noblesse for 
 their consideration. 
 
 Feeling such concern over the miserable condition of the serfs of 
 his own country, it was but natural that the Emperor should be keenly 
 interested in the controversy raging with ever-increasing intensity in 
 the United States over the kindred question of Negro slavery. 
 
 So Stoeckl had much to write about. While his dispatches from 
 Washington during the years of the Crimean War dealt almost exclu- 
 sively with diplomatic issues relating to the conflict, his correspond- 
 ence to St. Petersburg after the termination of the war abounded with 
 reports of the difficulties between the North and the South, and the 
 growing sectional bitterness and misunderstanding. 
 
 From his vantage point in Washington, Stoeckl watched the passing 
 of the giants of the old order — powerful personalities and influential 
 statesmen — John C. Calhoun, the old nullifler, in whose eyes burned 
 the implacable resentment and defiance of the South, who was con- 
 
The Divided House 1 7 
 
 vinced the Union must break up soon, and with virtually his last breath 
 murmured "the South, the poor South"; and the great pacificators, 
 Henry Clay and Daniel Webster, who had been holding the nation 
 together by a series of compromises. Like modern Joshuas they had 
 commanded the sun to stand still. 
 
 They left behind, when they passed on, a whirlpool of sectional 
 rivalry and political hate so bitter that Stoeckl felt that the union 
 between the North and the South had in reality become nonexistent 
 since no two nations upon earth entertained feelings of more bitter 
 rancor toward each other. 
 
 The Russian Minister saw, with the passing of the great compro- 
 misers, a new generation of political leaders come to the front to cope 
 with the madness of the times. The statesmen of the Webster and Clay 
 school, Stoeckl wrote in December i860 to Prince Gortchakov, 
 
 have been replaced in Congress and in the local legislatures by 
 men undistinguished either by ability or reputation. Totally lack- 
 ing in patriotism, they have but one purpose: the increase of the 
 antislavery irritation. . . . They preach war against the South and 
 demand the extirpation of slavery by iron and fire. 1 
 
 Stoeckl saw the American skies grow dark with portentous clouds. 
 He heard the halls of Congress ring with the angry debates between 
 free-soil and slavery advocates clashing over the admission of the 
 Territory of Kansas. Reports reached Washington of violence and 
 disorder — men shot; towns sacked; constant deeds of brutality; men 
 from the North and men from the South seemingly losing all sense of 
 their common humanity. "Bleeding Kansas" became a new watchword 
 in the North as people began to realize that the "Kansas War" was but 
 a rehearsal for something bigger. Antagonists of the "popular sover- 
 eignty" doctrine pointed to this anarchy-ridden territory as a tragic 
 example of the failure that resulted when the voters of a territory were 
 allowed to choose between freedom and slavery. 
 
 In the exciting debates on the admission of Kansas in 1857, as Senator 
 Seward bitterly denounced the use of federal troops for the enforce- 
 ment of the laws in that territory, he boomed, "When you hear me 
 justify the despotism of the Czar of Russia over the oppressed Poles . . . 
 then you may expect me to vote supplies of men and money to the 
 President that he may keep the army in Kansas." 
 
 The hidden fires of coming revolution were already smoldering at 
 
1 8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the Capital when James Buchanan took the oath of office as the fifteenth 
 President of the United States on March 4, 1857. That evening Min- 
 ister and Madame de Stoeckl with other members of the diplomatic 
 corps and their elegantly attired ladies had attended the gala presi- 
 dential inauguration ball. While greeting the Russian Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary, President Buchanan could recall that more than a quarter of 
 a century back he had served as the United States envoy to St. Peters- 
 burg. Here he had attended a Te Deum with the Czar in the Church of 
 St. Alexander Nevsky, and in 1832 he had written to President Andrew 
 Jackson that he had talked with the Empress. "She observed," reported 
 Buchanan on that occasion, that "we had troubles enough among our- 
 selves at home and alluded to our difficulties in some of the Southern 
 States. . . . God forbid that the Union should be in danger." Now 
 Stoeckl, while dancing at the inauguration ball with Madame de 
 Sartiges, wife of the French Minister, commented that the current 
 crisis in Washington compared with the situation in Paris just before 
 the revolution of 1830. Then, at a ball given by the crafty Louis 
 Philippe in the Palais Royal, Talleyrand whispered to the monarch, 
 "We are dancing on a volcano." 
 
 It was an apt comparison as only two days after the inauguration of 
 President Buchanan came the epochal Dred Scott decision which 
 fanned the all-consuming slavery question into a white flame. The 
 Supreme Court of the United States speaking through Chief Justice 
 Taney ruled that Negro slaves must be regarded as property in the 
 same sense as cattle. Owners of slaves were entitled to protection of 
 such property in every part of the Union. Consequently, the Missouri 
 Compromise and all prohibitory acts against the free traffic in slaves 
 were unconstitutional. 
 
 From every corner of the North enraged antislavery spokesmen 
 assailed Chief Justice Taney's cruel pronouncement with unrestrained 
 vehemence. The Supreme Court decision, thundered Horace Greeley 
 in his New York Tribune, deserved no more respect than if made by a 
 "majority of those congregated in any Washington barroom." A most 
 sensational attack against the decision came from Senator Seward, 
 when on the floor of the Senate he openly accused the Supreme Court 
 with having entered a conspiracy with President Buchanan and the 
 slave oligarchy to perpetualize slavery in the United States. 
 
 But of all the discussions of the Dred Scott decision, either in Con- 
 gress or elsewhere, none were to have so powerful an effect upon the 
 
The Divided House 19 
 
 people as the opinions uttered by the then little-known Abraham 
 Lincoln of Sangamon County, Illinois, and Senator Stephen A. Douglas 
 in their famous senatorial campaign of 1858. With invincible logic, 
 keen analysis and remorseless persistence Lincoln attacked the deci- 
 sion's inhuman doctrine that Negroes have no rights which white men 
 are bound to respect, and literally tore it to shreds. 
 
 His initial address in the canvass, his famous "house divided against 
 itself" speech, delivered at Springfield in June 1858, was an analysis of 
 "that almost complete legal combination — piece of machinery, so to 
 speak — compounded of the Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott 
 decision." In the speech's immortal opening paragraph, Lincoln said: 
 
 A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this govern- 
 ment cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not 
 expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to 
 fail — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all 
 one thing or all the other. 
 
 In this most famous State campaign in all our history, Douglas won. 
 But a national reputation became Lincoln's reward for his brilliant 
 presentation of the burning issues of the day. The fire and logic of his 
 speeches echoed over the land. Observers like Stoeckl, whose business 
 it was to evaluate events, became faintly aware of a new rising star in 
 America's political firmament. 
 
 A peaceful political solution of the slavery problem having been 
 rendered impossible by the Supreme Court, the way was open for a 
 fanatic like John Brown to attempt to settle the issue by "direct ac- 
 tion." With a Bible under his arm and a saber in his hand, this self- 
 willed abolitionist from Kansas on October 16, 1859 crossed the bridge 
 at Harpers Ferry at the confluence of the Potomac and Shenandoah 
 Rivers only fifty-three miles from Washington itself, and with a small 
 band of fanatical followers seized the United States arsenal and began 
 to execute his cherished dream of freeing the slaves. Like a shot in the 
 night this absurdly gallant exploit struck terror in the hearts of the 
 entire nation. Long had the South suspected that the real intent and 
 wish of the abolitionists was to rouse a slave insurrection and bring woe 
 and devastation to all slave-holding sections. Now, by a single stroke, 
 John Brown's raid solidified all their fears and gave body and awful 
 meaning to their suspicions. 
 
 Captured, convicted, sentenced to death and hung, John Brown 
 
20 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 became the symbol and standard-bearer of an inspired cause. His tragic 
 death on December 2, 1859 gave the abolitionists a martyr to order. 
 They now had a saint to hold up before the sentimental masses of the 
 North. Literally tens of thousands dipped their handkerchiefs in his 
 blood and paraded throughout the North spreading his gospel of free- 
 dom. His tragic death became one of the greatest blows struck against 
 slavery. It solidified Northern sentiment. John Brown on the gallows 
 made men search their hearts over the great moral issue. Soon inspired 
 hosts in blue would be marching to the tune of the John Brown song — 
 a mighty battle hymn, which was to deal not with his sword, but with 
 his soul. 
 
 Stoeckl, in informing Prince Gortchakov about John Brown's dra- 
 matic exploit, placed the blame upon the agitation of the New England 
 abolitionists. 
 
 When the sad result of this foray became known, John Brown was 
 proclaimed from the very roof tops as the equal of our Savior. I 
 quote these facts to point out how far Puritan fanaticism can go. 
 Little by little the extreme doctrines of New England have spread 
 throughout the land. 2 
 
 President Buchanan, the irresolute pilot, stood helpless and be- 
 wildered at the steering wheel while the ship of state was hurled upon 
 one rock after another throughout his tragic administration. He as- 
 serted that the people of the North had no more right to interfere with 
 the institution of slavery in the South than with the serf question in 
 Russia. In a message to Congress, he stated: 
 
 How easy would it be for the American people to settle the 
 slavery question forever and restore peace and harmony to this 
 distracted country. All that is necessary to accomplish the object, 
 and all for which the slave States have ever contended, is to be let 
 alone and permitted to manage their domestic institutions in their 
 own way. As sovereign States, they, and they alone, are respon- 
 sible before God and the world for the slavery existing among 
 them. For this the people of the North are no more responsible 
 and have no more right to interfere than with similar institutions 
 in Russia or Brazil. 
 
 With everyone grimly discussing the "impending crisis," with South- 
 ern hotspurs shouting for State sovereignty or disunion — amid sectional 
 
The Divided House 2 1 
 
 bitterness, bewilderment and confusion without parallel — the fateful 
 presidential election of i860 got under way. Members of the European 
 diplomatic corps in Washington, looking on at the critical campaign, 
 saw in Senator Douglas, long the leading Democratic candidate, a 
 popular and experienced political leader of extraordinary talent and 
 capacity. In Senator Seward, the acknowledged head of the Repub- 
 licans, they saw a brilliant and accomplished statesman of great ability 
 and high intellectual power who had performed historic services in 
 behalf of the antislavery cause, and who was well versed in international 
 affairs. In Jefferson Davis, Edward Everett — a scholar in politics, James 
 Buchanan, and others they saw statesmen of culture and cosmopolitan 
 experience. All of these they regarded as comparing favorably with 
 the foremost political leaders of Europe. 
 
 But Abraham Lincoln, the provincial lawyer whom events were soon 
 to make so famous, ranked very low in the estimation of Stoeckl and 
 other foreign observers. It was known that he possessed practically no 
 experience in statesmanship, and that his entire executive training was 
 limited to a term as a village postmaster. 
 
 When the Northern Democrats nominated Senator Douglas as their 
 party's standard-bearer, the Southern wing bolted the convention and 
 proceeded to nominate John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky to uphold 
 the cause of the slave owners. Another group, the Constitutional Union 
 Party, nominated Governor John Bell of Tennessee on an evasive 
 platform which called simply for loyalty to the Union and for silence 
 on the slavery question. 
 
 When the hour came for the Republicans to select their candidate, 
 they tried to be very careful. Though the Republicans repudiated 
 Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty and denounced the Dred 
 Scott decision, they were violently opposed to anything that looked 
 like abolition. Accordingly, the selection of a bitter and uncompro- 
 mising antagonist of slavery like Senator Seward was thought highly 
 unwise. His declaration that there is a higher law than the Constitution 
 governing the nation's stewardship of the public domain had associated 
 him in the public mind with extreme abolitionists who were accused 
 of openly flouting the Constitution. He could never carry the Midwest, 
 asserted his enemies. Horace Greeley despised him and was prepared to 
 go to any length to defeat him. 
 
 Other prominent candidates — Senator Salmon P. Chase, former Gov- 
 ernor of Ohio; Justice John McLean of the United States Supreme 
 
22 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Court, competing with Chase for the Ohio delegation; Edward Bates 
 of Missouri; and Simon Cameron, powerful machine politician from 
 Pennsylvania — from one standpoint or another were equally as objec- 
 tionable as Seward. 
 
 Since the opening of the year i860, the name of Abraham Lincoln 
 had been freely mentioned as a possibility for the Republican nomina- 
 tion. His strength lay not only in his rivals' weaknesses but in his own 
 obscurity. This humble son of poor pioneer parents had received less 
 than one year of actual schooling during his entire life. He had grown 
 to young manhood amid the primitive wilds of the frontier. Each of his 
 practical experiences as surveyor, legislator, lawyer, congressman and 
 candidate for the Senate had contributed something essential to his 
 unique mental makeup. He was a speaker and writer of unusual power, 
 commanding by the use of clear and simple language the minds and 
 hearts of those who heard him or read his printed words. Of his 
 honesty and sincerity there could be no doubt. 
 
 Of Southern origin, he was, nevertheless, an outspoken opponent of 
 slavery. But he was not an abolitionist. Though he was willing to leave 
 slavery undisturbed in the South, he was unalterably opposed to its 
 admittance into the Territories. He did not believe that Congress had 
 any constitutional power to interfere with slavery in the States. 
 
 Comparatively unknown, he had fewer enemies than any of the more 
 conspicuous candidates. Consequently he was in a better position to 
 unite all the factions of the Republican Party. Moreover, he was strong 
 in the doubtful Western States which had been carried by the Demo- 
 crats in 1856. This high "availability" commended him strongly to 
 the delegates. 
 
 But Seward, with more pledged delegates than any other candidate, 
 felt so certain that the Republican convention in Chicago would tender 
 him the nomination, that he bade farewell to his colleagues in the 
 Senate and returned to his home in Auburn, N. Y., to write his ac- 
 ceptance message. 
 
 Seward led on the first two ballots, but Lincoln was a close second. 
 His unexpected strength made such an impression on the convention 
 that Seward's enemies soon combined on Lincoln, and on the third 
 ballot, when Cameron transferred his fifty pledged delegates, it was all 
 but a stampede for the self-educated lawyer from the wind-swept 
 prairie of Illinois. Some of Seward's followers actually shed tears for 
 their fallen idol, never dreaming that a greater man had risen. 
 
The Divided House 2 3 
 
 No sooner did the campaign get under way when deep mutterings 
 foretold the coming storm. "Elect Lincoln, and the South will secede!" 
 cried the campaign orators of the South. While the cloud of the presi- 
 dential election hung heavy over the Capital, Stoeckl hastened to report 
 to St. Petersburg his grave fear "that the election of Lincoln and party 
 passions might cause the people to lose their heads and lead them to 
 disrupt the Union." In his opinion, "The man above all others who 
 should be President of the United States" was Senator Seward. He 
 regarded the New York political leader as "the ablest American states- 
 man." 3 
 
 For months preceding the outbreak of hostilities, Stoeckl's corre- 
 spondence with St. Petersburg referred again and again to the threat- 
 ened secession of the Southern States. But almost to the very end he 
 expressed the hope that the conservative element in the American 
 population and the material interests of the rival sections would yet 
 avert the calamity. Although he was fearful that the election of Lincoln 
 would cause the proslavery zealots to lose their heads and clamor for 
 the disruption of the Union, he nevertheless believed that "the Amer- 
 ican people — that is, the conservative element — possessed too much 
 common sense to allow this disaster." He was sure that 
 
 a people, so absorbed in their material interests as Americans are, 
 must realize that federation and not democracy was chiefly re- 
 sponsible for their prosperity. The industrial classes and farmers 
 of the North and the agricultural class of the South were too 
 dependent on each other to separate. The economic bonds that 
 bind the North and the South were too strong to permit the 
 destruction of the source of their prosperity. And even if these 
 two sections should be so foolish as to encourage separation, the 
 West would never allow it. The rapidly growing West realizes 
 that its continued growth and development depend on the products 
 of the North and the South and the sale of its products in the 
 markets of both sections. The power of the West's large delega- 
 tion in Congress is the best guarantee of the permanence of the 
 Union. 4 
 
 The election fell on November 6. The split in the Democratic Party 
 made the result a foregone conclusion. When the tidings flashed over 
 the land that Lincoln had been elected President by a vote of the 
 North against the South, a howl of derision rose from the South. Of 
 
24 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the nearly 2,000,000 votes he received, only 24,000 came from the 
 slave States. 
 
 The wires had hardly ceased to thrill with the message of death to 
 slavery extension when the South began to boil with activity. South 
 Carolina, "the cradle of secession," where the spirit of the dead Calhoun 
 still reigned, sounded a trumpet call to the South. Her legislature im- 
 mediately called a State convention to decide whether the State should 
 remain in the Union or not. The success of the "black Republicans" 
 meant the doom of slavery, said the Southerners. They must now 
 choose between abolition and secession. On December 20, the conven- 
 tion unanimously adopted an ordinance declaring, "The union now 
 subsisting between South Carolina and other States under the name of 
 the United States of America, is hereby dissolved." 
 
 Stoeckl hastened to impart to his Foreign Office in St. Petersburg a 
 detailed account of South Carolina's secession from the Union. "The 
 separation of a State numbering scarcely 300,000 white inhabitants 
 would be insignificant were it not the prelude to the complete dissolu- 
 tion of the American Confederation." He described how provocative 
 acts of New England antislavery leaders succeeded in inflaming the 
 passions of the South to the point that the split became inevitable: 
 
 Everything was thus prepared, and the leaders of the South were 
 awaiting only the opportune time to put their plan for the dis- 
 solution of the Union into execution. The election of Mr. Lincoln 
 furnished them with this opportunity. . . . 
 
 Without any doubt the secession of South Carolina will be 
 followed by other slave States. The dissolution of the Union from 
 this day forward may be considered to be a fait accompli. It is a 
 question now whether the States once separated, can ever be re- 
 united. ... It is not impossible. There is one circumstance which 
 might react favorably for a course of conciliation. It is the distress 
 which prevails from one end of the Union to the other, and which 
 grows from day to day. This distress has already produced a cer- 
 tain reaction principally in the North, where the people are no less 
 attached to their material interests than to their principles . . . and 
 it is certain that Mr. Lincoln, if the election were being held today, 
 would lose half of the votes he obtained in November. The people 
 of the North would be disposed to make some concessions. . . . But 
 events are moving too swiftly. 5 
 
The Divided House 25 
 
 In the same report Stoeckl went on to place the blame for the rupture 
 of the government on both sides: 
 
 I had the occasion recently to speak with one of the Senators of 
 the extremist party of the South, and I expressed to him the opinion 
 that if the slave States would make a joint proposal to the free 
 States, I believed that the North would not be averse to working 
 out a compromise. He replied that that might be true, but that to 
 start discussing compromises concerning a revolutionary move- 
 ment was tantamount to putting it out of existence, and the South 
 wanted the revolution at all costs. Thus the two sections are 
 equally responsible for the rupture of the federal pact — the North 
 for having provoked it, and the South for wanting to precipitate 
 events with a speed which makes rapprochement impossible. . . . 6 
 
 The consequences will be horrible for all the parties of the 
 Union. Politically America will cease to be a great nation. Once 
 split in two, the separate sections will not fail to subdivide further. 
 They will thus lose their importance, their present prosperity, and 
 will not be able to avoid a civil war. . . . 
 
 In my opinion all hopes of a reconciliation are not yet lost. Dur- 
 ing my long stay in the United States I have had the opportunity 
 to study American character, and as gloomy as things now appear, 
 it is impossible for me to believe a people so practical and so de- 
 voted to their own material interests and prosperity can permit 
 their passions to drag them to the point of sacrificing everything . . . 
 and it is not unlikely that at the last moment an unforeseen event 
 might yet save the country. I wish it with all my heart because 
 aside from political considerations, we shall deeply regret the 
 downfall of a great nation with which our relations have always 
 been friendly and intimate, and which at one memorable occasion 
 was almost the only power which sympathized sincerely with 
 our cause. 7 
 
 In his next dispatch to the Russian Foreign Office, a few days later, 
 Baron de Stoeckl advised Prince Gortchakov that Francis W. Pickens 
 was the new Governor of the seceded State of South Carolina. The 
 Foreign Minister knew Governor Pickens well, as for two years past 
 the Southern politician had been serving in St. Petersburg as America's 
 Minister. 
 
 Governor Pickens, under instructions from the South Carolina se- 
 
2 6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 cessionist convention, sent three commissioners to Washington to advise 
 President Buchanan officially of South Carolina's withdrawal from the 
 Union. "They arrived in the capital like envoys from a foreign power," 
 Stoeckl observed, and presented demands for 
 
 the transfer of three forts situated at the entrance of Charleston, 
 the principal port of South Carolina. The garrisons of these three 
 forts are composed of only a hundred men or so. Major Anderson, 
 the commanding officer, has constantly asked for re-enforcements. 
 The President refused them on the ground that sending troops to 
 the coast of South Carolina would offend that State. But at the 
 same time he ordered Major Anderson to defend the fort in case 
 of attack. Placed in a position of peril by the irresolution of the 
 government, this officer adopted the only measure which prudence 
 dictated. He concentrated his men in a single fort and abandoned 
 the others after burying the cannons in the ground and setting the 
 gun carriages on fire. 
 
 Angered over Anderson's skilful maneuver, South Carolina's 
 convention ordered her militia to occupy the abandoned forts and 
 to raise the State banner in place of the nation's flag. This incident 
 has created a violent sensation. The President, whose subservience 
 to the South is well known, disavowed the acts of Major Ander- 
 son, and it was feared that, influenced by Southern Senators, he 
 would give that officer orders to evacuate the fort in which he was 
 entrenched. This would be a shameful capitulation. If Mr. Bu- 
 chanan would yield to the counsel of the plotters who surround 
 him and commit such an act, the North, regardless of party distinc- 
 tions, would arise as one to avenge the affront to the national flag. 8 
 
 In his next dispatch to St. Petersburg, Stoeckl wrote of President 
 Buchanan's proclamation setting aside a day for fasting and prayer to 
 invoke Divine Power to save the American nation from the perils which 
 threatened it. 
 
 It seems that only the intervention of heaven can stop the onrush- 
 ing events and avoid the civil war which now appears imminent 
 and almost inevitable. 
 
 The representatives South Carolina sent to Washington to dis- 
 cuss the peaceful transfer of the ports have returned to Charleston 
 after delivering what amounted practically to an ultimatum. South 
 Carolina has already seized the arsenal at Charleston, and other 
 
The Divided House 27 
 
 Southern States have seized federal property — even while they are 
 still members of the Union and their representatives still sit in 
 Congress. 
 
 Some hope was attached to the deliberations of a committee ap- 
 pointed by the Senate in i860 which had presented a plan of com- 
 promise submitted by Senator J. J. Crittenden, an ardent pro-Union 
 man from the border State of Kentucky. One of Crittenden's proposals 
 provided for a Constitutional Amendment which would prohibit slav- 
 ery "in all territory of the United States, now held or hereafter ac- 
 quired, north of latitude 36 30'," while in all territory now held or 
 thereafter acquired south of that line, it should be permitted. To ap- 
 pease the slaveholders they were to be guaranteed by Constitutional 
 Amendment the right of holding human beings in involuntary servi- 
 tude, and the North was to acquiesce in their bondage. 
 
 Stoeckl advised Prince Gortchakov that "the two committees named 
 by the Senate and the House to effect a compromise have accomplished 
 nothing. The situation is so menacing that it seems impossible to avoid a 
 civil war. To all intents and purposes it has already broken out." He 
 reported the treasury of the United States empty and payments sus- 
 pended, and American capital refusing to underwrite a government 
 treasury bond issue except at a discount of twenty per cent. 9 
 
 After Mississippi cast her lot with secession on January 9, 1861, fol- 
 lowed one and two days later by Florida and Alabama, Baron de 
 Stoeckl predicted that "the other States of the South would not be long 
 in following them." In Georgia, Alexander H. Stephens, one of the 
 South's ablest statesmen, pleaded for remaining in the Union. Before 
 that State's legislature he urged: "The election of no man, constitution- 
 ally chosen to the presidency, is sufficient cause for any State to sepa- 
 rate from the Union. Let the fanatics of the North break the Constitu- 
 tion. . . . Let not the South, let not us, be the ones to commit the 
 aggression." Nevertheless, Georgia followed South Carolina's example 
 and on January 19 became the fifth State to withdraw. Louisiana 
 became the sixth on January 26, and Texas the seventh on February 1. 
 "If Virginia secedes she will take with her the other border States," the 
 Russian Minister wrote, "and disunion will be complete." Of Charles- 
 ton, he added, 
 
 A troublesome incident occurred to aggravate the situation. After 
 hesitating for a long time, the government finally decided to send 
 
28 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 reinforcements to Major Anderson who is commanding the federal 
 port. At the entry of the Port of Charleston a commercial steamer 
 loaded with supplies was fired upon as it approached the coast of 
 South Carolina, and was compelled to seek the open sea. For- 
 tunately, there were no casualties. 
 
 In Congress the event of the week was the communication to 
 Congress of a presidential message. The President reports that the 
 country is headed into full rebellion; that in several States the forts 
 and the federal arsenals are invaded and that the acts of aggression 
 against the federal government are growing every day; that danger 
 is imminent and that it is necessary to act without delay. The 
 President adds that it is his function to execute the laws and not 
 to make them; that it is consequently the Congress' duty to seek 
 means of re-establishing peace by any possible act of conciliation. 
 Mr. Buchanan concludes by saying that the only choice is between 
 compromise and civil war. 
 
 This message occasioned heated discussions in the Senate. The 
 most noteworthy speech was made during yesterday's session by 
 Mr. Seward. He is the head of the Republican Party, and he is 
 designated for the post of Secretary of State under Mr. Lincoln. 
 His speech which may be considered the program of the new 
 administration was listened to with the most rapt attention. 10 
 
 The entire nation had eagerly awaited the scheduled address by 
 Senator Seward. Not that he was noted for his eloquence. As a matter 
 of fact, he was an indifferent, perfunctory speaker. But it was known 
 that this bland, cynical, complex, equivocating and temporizing in- 
 timate of Thurlow Weed, New York's astute political boss, was to 
 become the head of Lincoln's cabinet — President in all but name. He 
 was to speak for that unknown quantity in Springfield who throughout 
 these days of painful suspense sat like a sphinx, silently and inactively 
 watching the Union slowly fall to pieces. 
 
 When on January 12, 1861, Seward, clad in a gray frock coat, arose 
 in the crowded Senate chamber to deliver his long-awaited address, he 
 appeared to be the only calm person present. Stoeckl, who sat in the 
 section reserved for members of the diplomatic corps, after listening 
 attentively, wrote to the Foreign Office in St. Petersburg that Seward's 
 effort was a disappointment. "No one was satisfied by this speech. Both 
 
The Divided House 29 
 
 the abolitionists and secessionists concluded they could expect nothing 
 from the Republicans." 
 
 In the opinion of Stoeckl, the address, though vague, conciliatory 
 and temporizing, nevertheless constituted a strong plea for the preserva- 
 tion of the Union — "the soul of the nation and the source of her pros- 
 perity and greatness": The Russian Minister wrote, 
 
 With frankness he [Seward] predicted that dissolution of the 
 Union would be disastrous. It would relegate the separate, rival 
 sections to the status of the small states of Central and South 
 America — constantly in danger of becoming victims of the am- 
 bitious great powers of Europe. "My party and I are prepared to 
 make all sacrifices to preserve the Federal pact. We offer concilia- 
 tion, concessions and the open hand of peace." 
 
 Stoeckl thought that Seward, who regarded the proposed Crittenden 
 compromise as "unconstitutional and ineffectual, hesitates and contra- 
 dicts himself at every step. In a word, he has made a number of slight 
 concessions but not what the situation demands. . . . With this speech 
 practically all hope of reconciliation disappeared." 11 The same dispatch 
 contains a long analysis of the situation: 
 
 Mr. Seward hesitated a long time before accepting Mr. Lincoln's 
 offer to become the head of his Cabinet. In finally accepting this 
 post, he believed himself strong enough to silence the storm and 
 pacify the country. 
 
 From what I heard from Seward's intimate friends and what I 
 understood from my own conversations with him, his plan was to 
 break away from the abolitionists and align himself with the mod- 
 erate factions of the Republicans and Democrats and thus form a 
 strong conservative party to bring the South back into the Union 
 by granting the concessions she desires. This is unquestionably a 
 statesmanlike program, and if executed vigorously would prove 
 successful. 
 
 It was the moment to act but Seward lacked the courage and 
 by his hesitation lost the opportunity of rendering an eminent 
 service to his country. 
 
 The present administration will last only a few weeks longer. . . . 
 It will then devolve upon Lincoln and his Cabinet to direct affairs 
 
30 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 and face eventualities. Mr. Lincoln's administration will be faced 
 with two alternatives: recognition of Southern demands or sub- 
 mitting corrective measures. 
 
 The North will not permit dissolution of the Union. The Dem- 
 ocrats would preserve it by compromise, the Republicans by force. 
 Mr. Lincoln, elected by the latter, will naturally be obliged to 
 follow their desire. This raises a question whether the Northern 
 States have the right and the means of compelling the secessionists 
 to remain in the Union by force. The American nation was born 
 in revolution. Since winning her independence she has regarded it 
 as political dogma that a people has the right of self-government. 
 The United States has applauded all the revolutions which have 
 broken out in Europe and Spanish America. All the agitators of 
 the old and new continents have been acclaimed here, and only a 
 few years ago the President and Senate of the United States wel- 
 comed Kossuth, who according to them was the very personifica- 
 tion of human liberty. Now the very States which participated in 
 these demonstrations would subjugate by force of arms a third of 
 their fellow Americans who desire to leave them and live under a 
 government of their own. The right of State secession from the 
 Union is a question which has never been decided, and even in the 
 North public opinion is divided on this point. 
 
 On the other hand, the free States although more numerous than 
 the slave States hardly possess the material means necessary for an 
 aggressive war. The forts and arsenals which stretch out along the 
 coast from South Carolina to the Gulf of Mexico, are in the hands 
 of the secessionists. It would be necessary to recapture them and 
 occupy all points where the rebel flag has displaced the federal 
 flag. Where are the necessary troops and naval forces? A country 
 of such vast area with 9,000,000 inhabitants inspired with courage 
 and endowed with energy, will not readily yield to the North. 
 Moreover, the Southern States will have the advantage of fighting 
 on their own soil and will not have to send large forces of men 
 great distances. They can await the attack and prepare to repulse 
 it. The chances of the two sections are thus balanced, and the 
 struggle will be all, the more bitter and prolonged because of the 
 very fact that neither side has much advantage over the other. 
 
 There is no doubt that religion and humanity condemn slavery, 
 but the government must have time to uproot so great an evil. To 
 
The Divided House 3 1 
 
 accomplish this end it is necessary to combine with intelligence 
 adequate legal measures, proper timing, and a willingness to give 
 up some private property rights. 
 
 The number of slaves in the United States has increased to 
 4,000,000, representing a capital of more than three billion dollars, 
 without counting the losses which would be suffered by those 
 sections which would become impoverished by the freeing of the 
 slaves, since whites cannot labor in the hot climate of the Mis- 
 sissippi valley and the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The figures I 
 have cited prove the impracticality of emancipating the slaves by 
 indemnifying the slaveholders as England did in her colonies. 
 Abolition of slavery will be accomplished only by a gradual 
 process. 12 
 
 In Stoeckl's opinion, the violent measures preached by the abolition- 
 ists have succeeded only in "arousing the passions of the South, throw- 
 ing the nation into a turmoil and perhaps destroying its very existence." 
 He wrote thus on the need of each section for the other: 
 
 The downfall of the great American Republic will not be the 
 least important event of our epoch, and one wonders what will 
 become of these States when once separated. While united by a 
 federal pact they formed a power of the first order. But who can 
 predict what a civil war will lead to? . . . The struggle must stop 
 some day. The mutual hates must subside and the hardships which 
 are inseparable from a civil war must necessarily produce a reac- 
 tion. If at this time the American people have not lost their com- 
 mon interests, they will realize that their only salvation is a restored 
 Union. The North needs the South, exploits its commerce and 
 finds there a market for its manufactured goods. The $ 1 80,000,000 
 brought in annually by the sale of cotton passes through the hands 
 of the bankers of New York and some other large commercial 
 cities of the free States, which earn large profits therefrom. Strictly 
 speaking the North can exist without the South, but it will lose the 
 principal source of its wealth and prosperity. The South, from its 
 standpoint, ought to realize that it will find no security for the 
 institution of slavery except in the guarantees granted it by the 
 Constitution. 13 
 
 Stoeckl was appalled by "the demagoguery, confusion and corrup- 
 tion" which he believed were undermining the very foundations of the 
 
32 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 government. He placed much of the blame for the deplorable state of 
 affairs upon the Constitution itself, and he predicted that the United 
 States could not long continue unless the American people made some 
 drastic changes in their Constitution. He had a suggestion that might 
 save the nation: 
 
 In order to consolidate the federal pact it would be indispensable 
 to remodel the Constitution by giving the government more exten- 
 sive power to restrict universal suffrage; to hold elections less 
 frequently since elections create disorders and anarchy; to enact 
 laws capable of preventing corruption; and to put an end, if pos- 
 sible, to the propagation of the revolutionary and socialist spirit — 
 that plague from the old world which European immigration has 
 transplanted to this country during the last ten years. 14 
 
 Having thus analyzed the situation in the United States, the Russian 
 Minister in another dispatch to St. Petersburg expressed the opinion 
 that if the Crittenden compromise "had been submitted to the people 
 as Senator Crittenden of Kentucky had urged, it would have been 
 approved by a large majority. The representatives of the South have 
 accepted this compromise, but the Republicans have rejected it on the 
 ground that it was in conflict with the principles of their party." This 
 contention Stoeckl regarded as "nothing but hypocrisy." 15 
 
 The Southern States, Stoeckl thought, at least had the courage of 
 their convictions. They claimed the legal right of secession — a right 
 once claimed by their forefathers who shook off the yoke of English 
 tyranny by revolution. The reply of the North, he maintained, con- 
 stituted poor legal argument. "They have neither the forthrightness to 
 accept a plan of reconciliation nor the courage to propose measures 
 needed to save the country." 
 
 No doubt the Emperor was interested in knowing what Lincoln was 
 doing while the United States government trembled on the brink of 
 disaster. 
 
 The President-elect remains at Springfield, Illinois. He scrupu- 
 lously avoids issuing any opinion regarding the events of the day. 
 To all questions addressed to him, he answers invariably that he 
 still is an ordinary common citizen and not until his inauguration 
 will he announce the program of his administration. His position 
 
The Divided House 3 3 
 
 is hardly to be envied, and the rivalries and jealousies of the heads 
 of his party do not make his task any lighter. 16 
 
 Actually, Lincoln was leaving no doubt in the minds of his adherents 
 as to where he stood on the question of the extension of slavery. On 
 December 10, i860 he wrote to Lyman Trumbull, "Let there be no 
 compromise on the question of extending slavery. If there be, all our 
 labor is lost, and ere long, must be done again. . . . The tug has. come, 
 and better now than at any time hereafter." 17 In response to a letter 
 from William Kellogg of the House Committee on the crisis, the 
 President-elect wrote again, "Entertain no proposition in regard to the 
 extension of slavery. The instant you do they have us under again: all 
 our labor is lost, and sooner or later must be done over." He sent a 
 similar letter on December 13 to Elihu B. Washburne urging that "on 
 'slavery extension' . . . hold firm, as with a chain of steel." 18 
 
 Nine days after Seward's disappointing speech, Stoeckl witnessed 
 another tragic drama in the Senate chamber as Senator after Senator 
 arose and solemnly announced his resignation from his seat and his 
 renunciation of allegiance to the United States. As Senators Jefferson 
 Davis, Yulee, Mallory, Clay and Fitzpatrick marched out, women grew 
 hysterical and men wept. Not a person present failed to understand the 
 awful significance of the hour. It was as if an invisible Samson were 
 pulling down the pillars of the temple and the whole government 
 structure was about to topple down. 
 
 Events were moving with an inexorable speed. In a dispatch dated 
 February 2, 1861, Stoeckl reported: 
 
 The rebellion continues to spread in the South. Louisiana has 
 seceded from the Union. On February 4 the delegates of the se- 
 cessionist States are to meet at Montgomery, Alabama, to organize 
 a provisional government to elect a President and a Vice President 
 and to form an independent State. 
 
 In the border States partisans of the Union and of the secession 
 movement are practically equally divided. The legislature of Vir- 
 ginia requested the other States to send delegates to Washington 
 to endeavor to work out a compromise. The seceded States and 
 the extremists of the North have refused, but about fifteen States 
 of the Midwest have replied to this appeal and their delegates are 
 scheduled to meet. However, it is doubtful whether they will 
 
34 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 achieve any satisfactory result. This conference has no legal stand- 
 ing, whatever its decision may be. It will have to be sanctioned by 
 the Congress and the latter is not inclined toward compromise. 
 Public opinion prevailing in the North has found no response in 
 the Capital. Numerous petitions are addressed daily to Congress 
 and the City of New York recently sent a petition signed by 
 38,000 merchants and industrialists who urgently request the 
 adoption of measures calculated to pacify the country. These ex- 
 pressions of public opinion have no effect on the Republicans in 
 Congress. Senator Seward is the only one who manifests any con- 
 ciliatory attitude. Unfortunately, he has not succeeded in winning 
 over the other members of his Party, who refuse to yield on a 
 single point. 
 
 Even though the Republicans persist in this unyielding policy, 
 at least they are doing nothing to aggravate the situation. The 
 agitators of the South on the other hand are overlooking no oppor- 
 tunity to precipitate the civil war. They are preparing to attack 
 the two forts of Charleston and Pensacola, the only points still 
 occupied by the federal troops on the coast of the secessionist 
 States. Their goal is to hasten the winning over of the still waver- 
 ing border States. It appears, however, that the States of the South 
 do not possess the means of seizing these forts. On the other hand, 
 Mr. Buchanan has issued the order to the commanding officers to 
 exercise the greatest vigilance and to remain on the defensive. If a 
 conflict can thus be avoided, conditions will remain unchanged for 
 the four weeks still remaining before the inauguration of the new 
 President. 19 
 
 In a report dated February 12 the Russian Minister continued his 
 account of the crisis: 
 
 The conference of the delegates of the border States and of the 
 North met this week in Washington under relatively favorable 
 auspices. There is no one, however, who dares to predict any 
 favorable results from this meeting. 
 
 Congress during last week concerned itself with the tariff ques- 
 tion and with a loan of $45,000,000 intended to cover the expenses 
 of the new administration which, coming into power, will find the 
 federal treasury literally empty. It is easier to vote money than to 
 raise it. The last loan was negotiated at a discount of 1 2 y 2 per cent. 
 
The Divided House 35 
 
 But the government cannot procure its needs even at these burden- 
 some rates. The leading financiers of New York have come to 
 Washington, and have declared to Congress that if a settlement 
 were made they would be ready to advance the funds at the 
 ordinary rates of 6 per cent. Otherwise, the government was not 
 to depend on them. 
 
 The army and navy have not escaped this general demoralization. 
 Among the officers, a majority of whom are residents of the South, 
 resignations and absences from duty are very prevalent. The com- 
 mander of the American squadron in the Gulf of Mexico has had 
 to forbid, under threat of extremely severe penalties, any political 
 discussions. Even though suffering a lack of provisions, he sailed to 
 Havana in order to get away from the coast of the United States. 
 
 We have just received the news by telegraph that the Congress 
 of the Secessionist States, meeting in Montgomery, Alabama, has 
 named Mr. Jefferson Davis, former Senator of Mississippi, the 
 Provisional President of the Confederation of the South. 20 
 
 On the day Lincoln began his eventful eleven-day journey from 
 Springfield to Washington, Stoeckl conferred with Senator Seward to 
 discuss the critical situation which confronted the President-elect, and 
 thus reported the meeting: 
 
 Mr. Seward said to me that the first duty of Mr. Lincoln in 
 taking up the reins of government will be to save his country with 
 his friends if he can, if not, with his enemies. If the influential men 
 of the Republican Party persist in refusing to make concessions, 
 Mr. Lincoln will have to break from them and appeal to all the 
 conservatives who will stand by him. 
 
 I asked him if he were sure that the new President shared his 
 views. To that he replied: "I am not well acquainted with Mr. 
 Lincoln. However, if he is a man of courage and ability, as I be- 
 lieve him to be, he will quickly realize that it is the only way of 
 saving us from the dangers which surround us. If on the contrary 
 he wishes to adopt extreme measures, all will be lost. I shall not 
 associate myself with such policies, and the responsibility for 
 eventualities will fall on those whose advice he has followed." 
 
 Mr. Seward realizes that in the light of the events of the times 
 the program of the Republican Party is impracticable, and with 
 characteristic wisdom, he feels the necessity of modifying it. By 
 
36 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 adopting that policy he has created implacable enemies for him- 
 self. Among the twenty-six Republicans who sit in the Senate, he 
 can count on the support of scarcely three fourths. The others 
 have openly declared themselves as opposed to him. These men, 
 distinguished only for their violent fanaticism, are demanding a 
 blockade of all the ports of the South, and the use of force to sub- 
 due the seceded States. They know that Mr. Seward is opposed to 
 these extreme measures. And so they seek to discredit him in the 
 estimation of Mr. Lincoln, and to stop him from participating in 
 the new administration. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln left his residence in Springfield and is en route to the 
 National Capital. Since his election he has kept absolute silence 
 about events and about policies which he intends to follow, but 
 during a recent stop in Cincinnati, he delivered a speech in reply 
 to the greetings of the local authorities. The tenor of this speech 
 could hardly be considered conservative, and produced a bad im- 
 pression on the public. On his arrival here a bitter struggle will 
 arise between the moderates headed by Mr. Seward, and their 
 opponents to determine who will have the upper hand in the new 
 administration. If the former prevail, there will still remain a 
 chance for peace. With the other eventuality nothing can stop the 
 storm which threatens to break the Union into pieces. 21 
 
 Writing to Prince Gortchakov a few days later, under date of 
 February 28, Baron de Stoeckl reported that Lincoln had arrived in 
 Washington two days before: 
 
 During his trip through the Western States, where thanks to the 
 abundant harvest of last year the population was able to escape the 
 disastrous effect of the political crisis, Mr. Lincoln was received 
 with acclaim and not a word was addressed to him regarding the 
 agitations which prevailed in the country. 
 
 But it wasn't the same when he passed through the principal 
 commercial cities of New York and Philadelphia. The greeting 
 which he received from the people of these great cities was ap- 
 propriate enough for an incoming President, but nothing more. In 
 his welcoming speech the Mayor of New York did not mince 
 words about the deplorable state into which business has fallen 
 and the hardships which a civil war would bring to the commercial 
 metropolis of the Union. The Mayor of Philadelphia went even 
 
The Divided House 37 
 
 further: "I regret," said he, "that you are not going to stay longer 
 with us, and see for yourself the misery among the working classes 
 . . . due to the greed and to the evil motives of the politicians of all 
 parties. Beware of their advice and count on the people. They will 
 rise up and help you save the country." 
 
 Mr. Lincoln showed some embarrassment at the frankness of 
 these two mayors, and he replied that he was not less attached to 
 the Union than they were, and that all his efforts would be devoted 
 to preserving it. It was feared that his trip through Baltimore 
 would give rise to disorder, so he passed through this city during 
 the night without stopping there. 22 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 
 
 Fears for the security of the nation's Capital grew alarmingly as Lin- 
 coln's inauguration day approached. Washington's nextdoor neighbors 
 — the States of Virginia and Maryland — rocked with secessionist agita- 
 tion, and debated excitedly whether to remain in the Union or to throw 
 in their lot with the new Southern Confederacy. Wild rumors filled the 
 air to the effect that secessionist leaders were plotting the seizure of 
 Washington for the purpose of making it the seat of the Confederate 
 government. Senator Iverson of Georgia had made just such a declara- 
 tion in a speech on the floor of the Senate. And on Christmas day the 
 Richmond Examiner defiantly called for citizens of Maryland to join 
 with Virginians in seizing the Capitol. 
 
 In Washington, people spoke in fearful whispers of rumored secret 
 secessionist organizations prepared to capture the city and the public 
 archives, and take control of the government. So widespread became 
 the reports of a conspiracy, that Senator Seward, surely not an alarm- 
 ist, decided that President-elect Lincoln in Springfield ought to know 
 about the situation. Accordingly, Seward wrote to him: "A plot is 
 forming to seize the Capitol on or before the 4th of March, and has its 
 accomplices in the public councils. You must not imagine that I am 
 giving you suspicions and- rumor. Believe me that I know what I write." 
 
 Extra guards were placed at the entrances of the Capitol, and a 
 nightly search was made in the basement of the structure for hidden 
 
 38 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 39 
 
 explosives. The anxiety spread to the foreign legations in Washington. 
 It was clear to Stoeckl that should the conspiracy succeed, Lincoln 
 would have to establish his seat of government elsewhere. So nearly 
 two months before Lincoln's scheduled inaugural, Stoeckl posed the 
 question to the Czar's Foreign Minister — what should his legation do, 
 in that eventuality? 
 
 We can anticipate two possible situations which might affect our 
 legation's policy. First, there is the possibility that President-elect 
 Lincoln will be inaugurated and then establish his headquarters in 
 a city other than Washington. Then there is the possibility that 
 the Confederates will make overtures for the establishment of 
 diplomatic relations with Russia. It is evident that we must con- 
 sider Mr. Lincoln as the legally elected President. If he remains in 
 Washington, the diplomatic corps will reside there also. But it is 
 possible that the secession movement will embrace Virginia and 
 Maryland. In that event Washington would find itself an enclave 
 in disunionist States. There is talk among the leaders of the South 
 of launching a campaign to take possession of the city by force for 
 the purpose of establishing the Capital of the new Confederation 
 there. If this occurs, the diplomatic corps must, it seems to me, if 
 only temporarily, leave Washington and accompany Mr. Lincoln 
 to his new seat of government. The situation has not yet advanced 
 to the point where we must form a decision relative to the estab- 
 lishment of diplomatic relations with the Confederacy. 
 
 It appears to me that the policy which would best conform to 
 our own interests and dignity is this: We should recognize the 
 independence of the Confederacy only after it has settled its own 
 permanent relations with the North. 
 
 It is important to us not to take sides with the secessionists pre- 
 maturely, as the preservation of the Union is for our own best 
 interests. But, on the other hand, it is for our benefit to make 
 friends everywhere and not to antagonize any State regarding 
 matters which do not involve our interests. . . . My proposal, it 
 seems to me, combines these two advantages: it retains our Union 
 friends, and at the same time does not offend the secessionists. 1 
 
 The dire predictions of the seizure of the Capitol before Lincoln's 
 arrival did not materialize. The President-elect reached Washington 
 
40 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 nine days before his inaugural — "like a thief in the night," according to 
 the report of Rudolph Schleiden, Minister from the Hanseatic Republic 
 and the Free City of Bremen. Now all Washington was gossiping about 
 Lincoln's secret night trip from Harrisburg to the National Capital. 
 His advisors had persuaded him to cancel a scheduled stop at Baltimore 
 to outwit would-be assassins who awaited him in that hot-bed of 
 secession. 
 
 Stoeckl hastened to report to the Russian Foreign Office that the 
 President-elect had arrived safely in Washington. "According to estab- 
 lished custom, the Foreign Ministers left a visiting card with the new 
 President, and it is not until after the inauguration that the diplomatic 
 corps is officially presented to him" : 2 
 
 Upon Mr. Lincoln's arrival here a furious struggle ensued be- 
 tween the moderates led by Mr. Seward, and their radical oppo- 
 nents in the Republican Party, to determine who will have the 
 upper hand in the new administration. If the former triumph, there 
 still remains a chance of saving the Union. In the other event 
 nothing can save the nation from splitting up. 
 
 It is now definite that Mr. Seward will be Lincoln's Secretary of 
 State. The extremists of the Republican Party gave up their oppo- 
 sition to his selection. Realizing that the situation is growing more 
 critical day by day, they prefer to leave the responsibility to Mr. 
 Seward, while standing by, ready to attack him, should he deviate 
 too greatly from their program. 3 
 
 Though the Russian envoy had not yet seen or met the incoming 
 Chief Executive, he did not hesitate to give official credence to the 
 rumors prevalent throughout the Capital that the ungainly Westerner 
 was a statesman of mediocre ability, and possessed of no knowledge 
 beyond provincial politics: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln has just one week to form his Cabinet and to decide 
 on the direction his administration will take. I had the opportunity 
 recently of speaking with one of the most influential leaders of the 
 Republican Party. He said, "We want to preserve the Union, but 
 we cannot make concessions to the South without abandoning our 
 principles." I asked him what measures the new administration 
 would adopt to maintain the principles of the Party and at the 
 same time avoid hostilities with the seceded States. He admitted 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 41 
 
 that this was a dilemma and that neither he nor his colleagues 
 knew how to cope with this difficulty. 
 
 This indecision is even more dangerous in that Mr. Lincoln does 
 not appear to possess the talents and the energy which his Party 
 attributed to him when they nominated him as their candidate for 
 the Presidency. Even his partisans admit today that he is a man of 
 irreproachable honesty but of mediocre ability. 4 
 
 This opinion of Lincoln's mediocrity was shared generally by the 
 Washington diplomatic corps, closely watching the course of events. 
 Rudolph Schleiden compared his election with a lottery. "It is possible 
 that the United States has drawn the first prize, on the other hand the 
 gain may only have been a small one. But unfortunately the possibility 
 is not excluded that it may have been merely a blank." 5 Most of them 
 predicted that Seward would determine the policy of the new ad- 
 ministration. 
 
 In marked contrast to Stoeckl's low opinion of Abraham Lincoln was 
 his very high regard for Jefferson Davis, whom the Russian diplomat 
 had known intimately for a number of years. Contrasting the procras- 
 tination prevailing in Washington with the vigorous action taking place 
 in the South, Stoeckl added in his report to St. Petersburg: 
 
 Mr. Jefferson Davis, who has been named "Provisional Presi- 
 dent," is one of the most remarkable men in the United States. He 
 began his career as a military man and distinguished himself in the 
 Mexican War, in which he commanded a brigade. Since then he 
 has been Senator and Secretary of War in the administration of 
 President Pierce. He occupied the post during the Crimean War, 
 and showed himself an ardent friend of our cause. This circum- 
 stance put me in intimate relations with him, and gave me the 
 opportunity to know him well. He is one of those cold and ener- 
 getic characters who never draw back from any obstacle. Mr. 
 Seward himself told me that the secessionists could not have se- 
 lected a more capable leader. 
 
 Mr. Davis' inaugural address was most temperate. He declared 
 that his greatest desire is to have the seceded States live in peace 
 with the nation of which they were once a part. However, should 
 the attempt be made to subdue them by force they would accept 
 the challenge and defend themselves to the bitter end. 6 
 
42 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 A few months later Stoeckl added: "So far he [Davis] has fully 
 justified the reputation of an able and energetic man which he has 
 always enjoyed. He has gained the confidence of his fellow citizens to 
 the point of exercising absolute power, and this gives no small advan- 
 tage to the people of the South over their adversaries in the North 
 where everyone commands and no one wishes to obey." 
 
 The arrival of Lincoln to take over the reins of government caused 
 Stoeckl to conclude that it now appears 
 
 almost impossible that conflict can be averted. Until now a sort of 
 armistice existed between the seceded States and President Bu- 
 chanan, but the advent of the new administration alters this tem- 
 porary state of affairs. Once in power, the new administration must 
 move in one of two directions: either accept secession as a fait 
 accompli, and evacuate Southern forts still occupied by federal 
 troops, or propose an amicable settlement to the Confederacy as 
 required by the circumstances. This would be the best policy one 
 could recommend to the new administration. . . . True, it is a bold 
 program, and, in view of their party principles can hardly be ac- 
 ceptable to Republican leaders, just coming into power. . . . Recon- 
 ciliation, if at all possible, will be achieved not by force of arms 
 but by favorable public opinion. 7 
 
 Stoeckl caught his first glimpse of Abraham Lincoln at the inaugura- 
 tion ceremonies on the steps beneath the unfinished dome of the spread- 
 ing structure of the Capitol. The Russian Minister rode in his barouche 
 in the procession headed by the carriage bearing President James 
 Buchanan and his successor. Down cobblestoned Pennsylvania Avenue 
 the long procession proceeded toward the unfinished Capitol dome still 
 encased in ugly scaffolding. Stoeckl was amazed at the presence of so 
 many troops. "The principal thoroughfares," he wrote to his Foreign 
 Minister, "were occupied by two thousand militiamen and by two 
 batteries of artillery, fiostile demonstrations on the part of Southern 
 sympathizers were feared. But there were no disorders and all went off 
 peacefully." 8 Only faint occasional cheers greeted the incoming Presi- 
 dent as he rode along. Washington in many respects was a Southern 
 city and its residents for the most part sympathized with the South. 
 
 Amid the pall of impending national tragedy, Abraham Lincoln took 
 the oath of office as President of the United States. In his resonant, 
 high-pitched voice trained in open-air meetings of the West, Abraham 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 43 
 
 Lincoln gave assurance to the nation that he had no intention of inter- 
 fering with slavery where it already existed. Argument, persuasion, 
 entreaty followed as he made it crystal clear that the Union must be 
 preserved at all costs. 
 
 Physically speaking, we cannot separate; we cannot remove our 
 respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall 
 between them. ... In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow country- 
 men, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The 
 government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without 
 being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in 
 Heaven to destroy the government; while I shall have the most 
 solemn one to preserve, protect, and defend it. 
 
 And then that impressive ending touched with haunting beauty: 
 "I am loath to close. We are not enemies but friends. We must not be 
 enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our 
 bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory stretching from 
 every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearth- 
 stone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union 
 when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of 
 our nature." 
 
 It was an address "filled with contradictions," Stoeckl wrote to 
 Prince Gortchakov. In his judgment, Lincoln's declaration that 
 
 his duty was to execute the federal laws in all the States, that is, to 
 occupy the forts and arsenals and to collect the duties, indicates 
 rather well the intention of the new administration to have re- 
 course to coercive measures; but . . . probably with the intention 
 of softening the effect, Mr. Lincoln announced that he would 
 strive to avoid civil conflict and that he would devote all his efforts 
 to bring back the seceded States through conciliatory measures. 
 The only interpretation one can give to this speech, so filled 
 with contradictions, is that Mr. Lincoln came into office without 
 having a fixed program. It even appears that he does not realize 
 what the actual situation of the country is, and the imminence of 
 the civil conflict which threatens it. He maintains that the nation 
 is intact at the very moment when seven States have seceded from 
 the Union, and have organized a separate independent government. 
 On the one hand he speaks of coercive measures, on the other of 
 
44 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 moderation. But he is silent as to the measures he expects to adopt 
 to compel the seceded States to return to the Union, and as to the 
 guarantees he will grant in order to placate them. The nation 
 which awaited with such anticipation the announcement of the 
 new administration's policies so it might resolve its hopes and its 
 fears, knows no more today than it did on the eve of inauguration. 
 
 The same vacillating spirit which one observes in Mr. Lincoln's 
 address, shows itself in the organization of his Cabinet. It wasn't 
 until a day after his inauguration that he succeeded in completing 
 his Cabinet. 
 
 All the attempts to form a homogeneous Cabinet have failed. 
 Mr. Lincoln was forced to accept both conservatives and radicals, 
 the former as represented by Mr. Seward, and the latter as repre- 
 sented by Mr. Chase. Though he does not possess the talents or 
 capabilities of Mr. Seward, Mr. Chase is a man of great energy, 
 and his political skill will, doubtless, enable him to gain ascendancy 
 over the other counsellors of the new President. Friends of Mr. 
 Seward, foreseeing this difficulty, advised him against entering the 
 new administration unless he is given the opportunity of selecting 
 his Cabinet associates. However, he has not taken their advice, 
 stating that he cannot in good grace withdraw at a time when the 
 aid of all influential men of the party is so essential for the salvation 
 of the country. 
 
 In the present circumstances Mr. Seward is the indispensable 
 man, and his withdrawal would have been fatal to the administra- 
 tion, and if only he had insisted Mr. Lincoln would have been 
 obliged to yield to all of his demands. But Mr. Seward was not 
 firm enough on this point, and it is more than probable that he will 
 find it necessary either to comply with the policies of the radicals 
 or leave the Cabinet. 
 
 The first question with which the new administration will have 
 to concern itself will be to deal with a deputation sent to Washing- 
 ton by the seceded States to demand the surrender of the arsenals 
 and the two or three forts which are still held by federal troops. 
 It was decided not to receive these delegates officially. But an 
 informal conference for the purpose of giving some sort of answer 
 to their demands cannot be evaded. Should that take place, we 
 shall probably learn what attitude the President will assume toward 
 the seceded States. 9 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 45 
 
 Stoeckl, who was very grateful to Buchanan for "the care he took to 
 maintain friendly relations" with imperial Russia, and "for the kind- 
 nesses with which he had personally honored" him, felt a keen pity for 
 the vain and helpless old man whose term of office had come to a close: 
 
 Mr. Buchanan has passed nearly all of his life in the service of his 
 country. He has occupied the high posts of Ambassador, Senator 
 and Secretary of State with marked distinction. But once en- 
 sconced in the presidency, he revealed a glaring lack of the qual- 
 ities necessary for a Chief Executive of a great nation. Even 
 keeping in mind the extraordinarily difficult situation in which he 
 was placed, it cannot be disputed that his own vacillation and the 
 ineptness and frequently the lack of integrity on the part of his 
 advisors, have at least in part hastened, if not actually brought 
 about, the present crisis. The outset of his administration found 
 the affairs of the nation in excellent condition. Business and indus- 
 try were never more flourishing. All classes of the population, 
 without exception, enjoyed a prosperity without parallel. And the 
 public treasury had a surplus of $20,000,000. He is leaving to his 
 successor an empty treasury, with government credit ruined. The 
 Union is about to dissolve and civil conflict ready to break out. 
 
 Then Stoeckl went on to describe Buchanan's failures in foreign 
 affairs; and his shortcomings as a party leader which resulted in quar- 
 rels with former President Pierce, Senator Douglas and others, the 
 virtual wrecking of the Democratic Party, and the inevitable victory 
 of the Republicans. 
 
 The failures of Mr. Buchanan are due to the weakness of his 
 character aggravated by his advanced age. An excessive egotism 
 always caused him to show an obvious preference for anyone who 
 flattered his vanity. Thus he was always surrounded by worthless 
 men of questionable reputations. ... Of course Mr. Buchanan is 
 not alone responsible for the present crisis, but in any event, his 
 will be the rather dubious honor of having his name irrevocably 
 linked with it. . . . 
 
 Immediately after the inauguration of the new President, Mr. 
 Buchanan left Washington to return to his residence in Pennsyl- 
 vania. The night before his departure the diplomatic corps went 
 to his home to bid him farewell. I took advantage of the occasion 
 
46 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 to tell Mr. Buchanan how much my government appreciated the 
 care he took to maintain friendly relations with us, and I thanked 
 him for the kindnesses with which he had honored me. 10 
 
 Three days after the inauguration ceremonies President Lincoln 
 received the diplomatic corps officially at a reception given in its honor 
 by Mrs. Lincoln and himself in the Executive Mansion. It was there 
 that Baron de Stoeckl formally met Lincoln for the first time. 
 
 The President wore his inauguration suit and fresh white kid gloves. 
 In obvious discomfort, he stood for a long time shaking hands with his 
 callers. The Foreign Ministers, bedecked with the ribbons and medals 
 of their offices, extended the greetings of their sovereigns. Practically 
 all possessed the average European aristocrat's contempt for repub- 
 licanism, and had a morbid curiosity about the self-made product of 
 Western democracy. 
 
 Lincoln listened gravely to Senhor de Lisboa, envoy from Portugal, 
 who as dean of the diplomatic corps in Washington had been selected 
 by his colleagues to speak on their behalf. De Lisboa, noted for his wit 
 and humor, expressed the happiness of the assembled diplomats over 
 the President's advent to power and wished him a most successful 
 regime. In a brief response, the President thanked the envoys for their 
 good wishes and assured them that he would leave nothing undone to 
 maintain the friendliest relations with their respective governments. 
 
 Lincoln knew that the good will of these men who exercised such 
 great influence upon the thought of Europe was of great importance to 
 the United States. In greeting each of them warmly he fixed their faces 
 and foreign-sounding names indelibly in his mind, knowing that in the 
 coming months his administration would have to deal with them again 
 and again. Aristocrats all, they considered the Southern slaveholders to 
 be gentlefolk. Washington's most aristocratic society had been the 
 wealthy slaveholders or sympathizers sojourning in the National Capital 
 as members of Congress or the President's Cabinet. The diplomatic 
 corps had been brought in close social contact with the men and 
 women of this class who had vied with one another in extravagant 
 entertainment. The representatives of the foreign governments in turn 
 received extremely pro-Southern impressions and influenced their 
 governments accordingly. This, in a measure, was to account for the 
 reason that European powers were to take so favorable a view of the 
 power and prospects of the Confederacy. 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 47 
 
 At his first opportunity after the reception, the Russian Minister 
 recorded his impression of President Lincoln. In his dispatch to St. 
 Petersburg of March 12, 1861 Stoeckl wrote: "Without having a re- 
 markable face, Mr. Lincoln has an agreeable and honest expression. 
 His manners are those of a man who has spent all his life in a small 
 Western town, but he was polite and engaging toward all, and in 
 general the diplomatic corps has only praise for the reception which 
 was given it." 11 
 
 During the epoch-making four years of the Civil War the Russian 
 Minister was to see Lincoln more or less frequently. Seldom could he 
 find anything complimentary to report about the American statesman. 
 He could see only the agreeable and well-meaning provincial politician 
 — weak, undecided, inexperienced, the slave of unscrupulous political 
 intriguers and office seekers who had supported his candidacy only 
 because his weakness and inexperience would make him their ready tool. 
 
 On the day the Lincoln administration was only three weeks old — 
 which was time enough, according to Stoeckl, "to realize the full 
 gravity of the situation" — the Russian Minister in his report to St. 
 Petersburg, described the President's indecision and vacillation regard- 
 ing the Fort Sumter difficulty: 
 
 In his inaugural address, Mr. Lincoln had hastily asserted his deter- 
 mination not to give up the forts and arsenals of the United States 
 located in the South. He has not been long in realizing that the 
 execution of this program is impossible. . . . Major Anderson in 
 command of Fort Sumter, situated in Charleston Bay, South Caro- 
 lina, has provisions for only a few days. He has warned the Secre- 
 tary of War that the entrance of the port has been so fortified as to 
 require from eight to ten thousand men to force a landing. Unable 
 to prepare this force, the government has no alternative but to 
 evacuate Fort Sumter. 
 
 But the President hesitates to give such an order as he knows full 
 well what effect the abandonment of the fort will have upon the 
 country. In the North even his rabid partisans will regard it as a 
 humiliating defeat. The South will seize upon it as proof of the 
 government's impotency. The administration will find itself in an 
 even greater predicament if, in conformity with the program of 
 the Republican Party, it determines to repossess the forts already 
 taken over by the seceded States. Such operations will require 
 
48 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 rather substantial military forces, and the government does not 
 possess them. The active army of the United States is fixed at 
 17,000 men but the ranks are never complete. The strongest divi- 
 sion was stationed in Texas and was comprised of almost 4,000 
 men. It was under the command of General Twiggs, a native of 
 the seceded State of Georgia. This officer disbanded his army and 
 placed the arms and material in the custody of the authorities of 
 the Southern Confederacy. This corps no longer exists. The same 
 has happened regarding several other detachments commanded by 
 Southern officers who have offered their services to their respec- 
 tive States. 
 
 True, the government is preparing a small squadron sufficient 
 to blockade the ports of the South, but blockade is an act of war, 
 and the President would be violating one of the fundamental laws 
 of the Constitution in initiating an attack without first receiving 
 authority from Congress which possesses the exclusive power of 
 declaring war. 
 
 This anomalous situation is further complicated by the discord 
 which prevails in the Cabinet, and the indecision of the President 
 who is occasionally influenced by individuals who counsel peace 
 and moderation, but who more frequently is influenced by m^n 
 who advocate violence and extreme measures. As a result, one day 
 he is for peace, and the next, for war. 
 
 The Russian Minister sensed an intense desire for peace in the ranks 
 of conservatives both in the North and the South. This circumstance, 
 he believed, was a sublime opportunity for a mutually trusted mediator 
 to perform a historic service. Who better than he could fill the role of 
 go-between? He had intimate friends among the leaders of both sec- 
 tions. So without being asked by anyone to do so, he decided to under- 
 take the onerous task of peacemaker. 
 
 However, Stoeckl advised his Foreign Office that because of the 
 vacillating policy of Lincoln's administration, the President has not yet 
 made up his mind whether it would be advisable for him to 
 
 consult . . . with representatives sent here by the seceded States . . . 
 to present their demands, which Mr. Seward himself admits are 
 reasonable. As yet the President has not replied to them. Like many 
 other matters, it remains suspended in the air. . . . 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 49 
 
 In the border States the factions for and against secession are 
 equally balanced, but the first aggressive act on the part of the 
 federal government will drive them out of the Union. The break- 
 ing up of the Union is causing consternation in California, and 
 already there is discussion whether it would not be in the best 
 interests of the Pacific Coast States to form an independent re- 
 public. It is not altogether unlikely that this will occur in the 
 future. . . . 
 
 Though we find ourselves in the midst of a widespread rebellion 
 which threatens to convulse the nation, all of this is taking place 
 without violence. Commerce and industry are at a standstill. The 
 working classes are in more or less distress. But as yet there are no 
 disorders. The Americans seem to look at the disruption of their 
 political and social system with indifference. This can be explained 
 only by the confidence which they have in their national destiny. 
 Peace and tranquility prevail, but is this calm an indication of a 
 return toward reconciliation, or rather a precursor of civil war 
 and anarchy? Only the future will tell. 12 
 
 Early in April, the Russian Minister, "following established custom," 
 gave a dinner for the members of Lincoln's Cabinet. As Stoeckl wrote 
 in giving his report of the affair: 
 
 When everyone had left, Mr. Seward expressed the desire of 
 speaking to me privately. He asked me if I had any opinion as to 
 what impression American events were producing in Europe. I 
 replied that our government regretted exceedingly the dissension 
 in the United States and would regard the dissolution of the Union 
 as a real catastrophe. In so far as France and England are con- 
 cerned, it appears to me that these powers are so concerned with 
 their own commercial interests that it is not probable that they will 
 do anything unless the Washington government takes measures 
 that would seriously affect their commerce. 
 
 "In that event," continued Mr. Seward, "our relations with the 
 powers of Europe will undergo no change for there will be neither 
 an attack upon nor blockade of the South. We will leave the 
 Southern States alone. . . . Abandoned to themselves these States 
 cannot exist as a separate entity and will end up sooner or later by 
 returning to the Union." 13 
 
50 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 As Stoeckl had already reported, three commissioners of Jefferson 
 Davis' government — Martin J. Crawford, John Forsyth, and A. B. 
 Roman — were then in Washington to obtain recognition of the inde- 
 pendence of the new Confederate States of America. They were seek- 
 ing to adjust upon terms of amity and good will all questions of the 
 political separation of the two sections of the United States, by nego- 
 tiating the surrender of the forts within the Southern States and adjust- 
 ing monetary losses to the federal government resulting from the 
 surrender of federal property in the South. The Russian envoy offered 
 his services as mediator or go-between: 
 
 I told Mr. Seward that I had seen Mr. Roman, one of the South- 
 ern commissioners, who assured me that he and his colleagues were 
 in a most conciliatory state of mind, and that they were prepared 
 to make all reasonable concessions to avoid the conflict which 
 would inevitably result in civil war. 
 
 Mr. Seward seized this occasion to tell me that he did not per- 
 sonally know Mr. Roman, but that he was familiar with his reputa- 
 tion for being a temperate-minded man. He regretted that because 
 of his official position he could neither visit Roman nor have 
 Roman come to his office. He then asked me if I would have any 
 objection to arranging a secret meeting in my residence where 
 they could meet as if by chance. I hastened to assure the Secretary 
 of State that I would be happy to serve in any way I possibly can 
 to bring about a reconciliation. 
 
 Accordingly, Stoeckl communicated with Commissioner Roman, 
 suggesting an informal meeting at the Russian Embassy over a cup of 
 tea two days later. Roman was highly pleased with the suggestion and 
 readily accepted the invitation. But the next day Seward changed his 
 mind and sent his regrets. Having thought the matter over carefully, 
 he had come to the conclusion that it would be wiser not to keep the 
 appointment as he had agreed. Horace Greeley, the New York editor 
 and Seward's arch enemy, had just arrived in Washington, and Stoeckl 
 concluded that the Secretary of State feared the meeting might become 
 known to the press. 14 
 
 Several days later, I met Mr. Seward at the home of Lord Lyons. 
 His attitude had entirely changed; he spoke only of the blockade 
 and coercive measures. A rather lively discussion took place be- 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 51 
 
 tween him and the English Minister in my presence and that of the 
 French Minister. Mr. Seward said to me, "I wish to inform you 
 gentlemen that if civil war breaks out all commercial relations 
 with the South would have to stop." Lord Lyons argued that such 
 measures would be ruinous to English trade. "We regret it," said 
 Mr. Seward, "but you will have to forego cotton for a while." 
 Abandoning his customary reserve, Lord Lyons answered that 
 England could not get along without cotton and that she would 
 obtain it in one way or another. Although Mr. Seward made no 
 reply, there no longer remained any question what England would 
 do in the event of a blockade of the cotton States. 15 
 
 The agents of the Confederacy, waiting patiently in Washington to 
 see the President or the Secretary of State, were shocked to hear that, 
 contrary to assurances, an expedition was on its way to succor the 
 federal forts in the South. On April 9, Stoeckl informed St. Petersburg: 
 
 For several days there has been great activity in the port and 
 arsenals of New York. A frigate and several other vessels loaded 
 with provisions and munitions and carrying troops have left this 
 port. . . . The administration . . . has decided on coercive measures 
 toward the seceded States. On the other hand I have learned from 
 the representatives of the Southern Confederacy that Mr. Seward 
 has given them the most formal assurances that the federal govern- 
 ment was not contemplating any attack on the Southern ports and 
 that the preparations being made in New York . . . are only for 
 the purpose of appeasing the radicals of the Republican Party who 
 have been excoriating the administration for its inaction. One 
 cannot explain the apparent contradiction existing between the 
 overt acts of the government and the assurances of peace of the 
 Secretary of State unless one considers the indecision of the Presi- 
 dent and the disagreements which prevail in the Cabinet. Mr. 
 Seward ... is for conciliation, but he is influenced by his quarrel- 
 some colleagues in the Cabinet so that he leans first toward one 
 side, then toward the other. 16 
 
 When on April 8 ships for the relief of Fort Sumter began their 
 journey from New York, the commissioners sent a protest to Seward 
 through Justice Campbell of the Supreme Court, who had been acting 
 as intermediary. The Secretary replied, "Faith as to Sumter fully kept; 
 
52 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 wait and see." Outraged at being betrayed, the commissioners broke 
 off negotiations. Jefferson Davis took up the challenge and demanded 
 the evacuation of Fort Sumter. Lincoln had the choice of vindicating 
 the power of the government or making an unconditional surrender. 
 On April 12, the fort was bombarded and after thirty-six hours the 
 unprovisioned garrison capitulated. The Confederate flag was raised. 
 The long-dreaded Civil War had begun. 
 
 The expedition which was being prepared at New York left this 
 port on April 8: it was composed of four frigates, as many ships of 
 smaller dimensions and several transports; roughly 3,000 men of 
 the regular troops were on board. This expedition was intended to 
 reprovision Fort Sumter in South Carolina and Fort Picken in 
 Florida and then to go along the coast of Texas, which has seceded 
 from the Union but which has not as yet joined the other insur- 
 gent States. 
 
 The government at Washington has announced to Mr. Jefferson 
 Davis, the provisional head of the Southern Confederacy, that the 
 forces of the United States will not commit any hostile act unless 
 resistance is met while reprovisioning the federal forts. But Mr. 
 Davis regarded the sending of such a strong expedition to the 
 coasts of the South tantamount to a declaration of war; and con- 
 sidering it dangerous to permit forces of the North to enter to 
 fortify strategic points on the territory of the seceded States, gave 
 to General Beauregard, commander of the troops which the Con- 
 federates had assembled at Charleston, the order to attack Fort 
 Sumter immediately. The bombardment started the day before 
 yesterday and lasted almost 36 hours, at the end of which the fort 
 surrendered. The news arrived here last night. Since newspapers 
 are not published on Sundays and since the telegraph office is 
 closed, we have not been able to obtain any details today concern- 
 ing the attack on Fort Sumter, and the reasons for the inactivity 
 of the squadron which was on hand during the bombardment 
 without making the slightest attempt to meet force with force. 17 
 
 A blaze of fury passed over the North as the news of the firing on 
 the nation's flag spread like wildfire. Overnight the shock of the conflict 
 united all factions. "There can be no neutrals now, only patriots and 
 traitors," declared Senator Stephen A. Douglas, lately Lincoln's bitter- 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 53 
 
 est political antagonist. From every city, town and hamlet of the North 
 came the patriotic cry, "The Union must be preserved!" President 
 Lincoln issued a call for 75,000 volunteers to serve for three months. 18 
 Typical of the responses was the one from Iowa: "Ten days ago we had 
 two parties in this State; today we have but one, and that one is for the 
 Constitution and the Union unconditionally." 
 
 Seward had not intended to deceive anyone. He had given assurances 
 about Sumter on his own responsibility, without warrant from Lincoln. 
 He was certain his "policy" would be approved by the President. 
 
 Still smarting over his defeat at the Republican convention, Seward 
 had accepted the most important office in Lincoln's Cabinet fully 
 expecting to rule Lincoln and the country. But he learned quickly that 
 Lincoln meant to be a real President and that under no circumstances 
 would he permit anyone else to assume his responsibility of preserving 
 the Union. It was he who gave the order to succor Fort Sumter, 
 notwithstanding Seward's assurances to the contrary. The authority 
 of the Union must be asserted at all hazards. This was President 
 Lincoln's first major decision during the bewildering first month in 
 office while he was vacillating in his policy — or lack of policy — re- 
 garding the forts. 
 
 According to Frederick W. Seward, assistant to his father in the 
 Department of State, the Russian Minister in Washington "went to the 
 very verge of diplomatic prudence in his efforts to bring them [the 
 Southern representatives] into a good understanding with the Lincoln 
 administration." Of course, these efforts were made with a view of 
 keeping them in the Union. Equally, of course, perhaps, the secession- 
 ists chose in their published correspondence and in the press, to claim 
 that these were intimations on the part of Russia of a design to manifest 
 "sympathy with the South" and to "recognize" and "open diplomatic 
 relations with the Confederacy." 19 
 
 The intercourse between the Russian Minister and the Southern 
 Senators came to an abrupt end when the first gun was fired at Sumter. 
 Stoeckl reported that Secretary Seward's fickleness, lack of resoluteness 
 and "posing as a great man" disgusted him. His earlier opinion of the 
 Cabinet officer as "the ablest American statesman" changed as soon as 
 Seward displayed his irresoluteness over the Fort Sumter issue. In the 
 eyes of the Russian diplomat his conduct was tantamount to bad faith. 
 Thereafter he relegated the Secretary of State to a class of "small 
 
54 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 politicians" without strong convictions and grossly ignorant of inter- 
 national affairs. 20 
 
 Stoeckl's over-zealous efforts to act as go-between during the frantic 
 days before the fall of Fort Sumter were misunderstood by the Secre- 
 tary of State and in part became responsible for his amazing memoran- 
 dum, Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, which he sent 
 to President Lincoln on April i, 1861. Seward, an avowed expansionist 
 and apostle of manifest destiny, believed that nothing would so readily 
 unite the warring sections of the United States as a common war against 
 a foreign foe. 
 
 Reports reached Washington that Spain had reasserted her authority- 
 over Santo Domingo. As a result of a revolution the Dominican Repub- 
 lic was overthrown and the flag of Spain was again flying over that 
 island of the West Indies. "The reoccupation of Santo Domingo by 
 Spain," wrote Stoeckl, "has created a sensation in Washington. A de- 
 mand has been made of M. Tassara, Minister of Spain, what the inten- 
 tions of his government are. The United States will resist this move as 
 a violation of the Monroe Doctrine." 21 From neighboring Mexico came 
 even more startling rumors. Great Britain, France and Spain, it was 
 reported, were threatening intervention in Mexico in order to redress 
 the wrongs their subjects were suffering from the anarchy and violence 
 there, and to collect their debts. 
 
 Here was a great opportunity for the egotistical Secretary of State. 
 Believing that President Lincoln was utterly incapable of formulating 
 policies and that it was up to him to take over the real leadership of the 
 government and to save the country, Seward decided to act. Losing all 
 sense of reality he proposed the fantastic scheme of reuniting the 
 North and the South by deliberately fomenting a foreign war — prefer- 
 ably with France and Spain and perhaps also with Russia and England. 
 
 "We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a 
 policy either domestic or foreign" began the statement. Then Seward 
 proceeded to offer suggestions for both. For the "policy at home" he 
 proposed as the ruling idea: "Change the question before the public 
 from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for a question upon Union 
 or Disunion." 
 
 His plan "For Foreign Nations" was even more breath-taking. He 
 would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically at 
 once: 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 55 
 
 I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and 
 send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a 
 vigorous spirit of independence on this continent against European 
 intervention. And, if satisfactory explanations are not received 
 from Spain and France, would convene Congress and declare war 
 against them. 
 
 But whatever policy we adopt there must be an energetic pros- 
 ecution of it. 
 
 For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and 
 direct it incessantly. 
 
 Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while 
 active in it, or 
 
 Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. 
 
 Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide. 
 
 Modestly Secretary Seward closed with the statement: 
 
 "It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade nor assume 
 responsibility." 22 
 
 Putting on his strangely small glasses President Lincoln read his 
 Secretary's wild proposal for plunging the United States into an utterly 
 unjustifiable predatory foreign war. The "thought" which virtually 
 suggested that he abdicate his powers as President to his worldly-wise 
 Secretary made him wince. But if it was galling to him, he did not make 
 his feelings known to anyone. His lips showing taut, he penned a reply 
 which answered Seward's contentions point by point. Calmly but 
 firmly and with lofty dignity he ended with: "If this must be done, I 
 must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted . . . upon points 
 arising in its progress I wish, and I suppose I am entitled to have, the 
 advice of all the Cabinet." 23 
 
 Then he pigeonholed Seward's amazing document and kept it con- 
 cealed so that no word of its contents became public as long as either 
 of the two men was still alive. 
 
 Seward now acquired a genuine respect for his chief and drew closer 
 to him. To his wife he wrote soon after receiving Lincoln's reply, 
 "Executive force and vigor are rare qualities; the President is the best 
 of us." Thereafter he settled down under Lincoln's leadership and 
 throughout the rest of the Civil War conducted America's foreign 
 affairs with great ability. 
 
$6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 As soon as Prince Gortchakov learned that Southern newspapers 
 were construing Stoeckl's conferences with leaders of the slave States 
 as a forerunner of Russia's opening diplomatic relations with the Con- 
 federacy, he gave "the unequivocal assurance of Russia's sympathy with 
 the Union." 24 
 
 Thereafter the Russian envoy had no further dealings with the gov- 
 ernment of Jefferson Davis. The failure of his efforts at mediation and 
 the outbreak of hostilities filled Stoeckl with sorrow. He believed the 
 Union permanently destroyed. And although he regretted the fact very 
 much, he nevertheless hoped that the North would soon accept the in- 
 evitable and seek close co-operation with the South in commerce and 
 foreign relations. 
 
 Following Stoeckl's failure at conciliation, the Washington foreign 
 diplomatic corps as a body, headed by England's Lord Lyons and 
 France's Henri Mercier, planned mediation with their respective gov- 
 ernments acting as umpires of the American dispute. But they quickly 
 dropped this program when Secretary Seward, in a statement to the 
 Governor of Maryland on April 23, made it crystal clear that under no 
 circumstances would the differences between the federal government 
 and the seceded States be submitted to foreign arbitrament. The Anglo- 
 French mediation proposal was but masked intervention, he declared, 
 and would be treated accordingly. In consequence, Lord Lyons wrote 
 to Lord Russell, Britain's Foreign Minister, that Seward was a per- 
 nicious and dangerous person in Lincoln's government. 
 
 Bremen's Minister, Schleiden, then proposed to the President and the 
 Secretary of State that he be permitted to hold confidential discussions 
 with Vice President Stephens of the Confederacy, in an attempt to 
 prevent bloodshed. Lincoln advised Schleiden that the federal govern- 
 ment could not authorize negotiations nor invite proposals, but inti- 
 mated that there could be no objection if he negotiated with Stephens 
 without special authorization. Seward handed the diplomat a pass 
 through the Union lines, and the next day Schleiden met with Stephens 
 behind closed doors in Richmond. The Confederacy's Vice President 
 believed that all attempts at peace would be useless as the South sus- 
 pected the acts of Lincoln and Seward. Their objective, he pointed out, 
 was the "subjugation of the Southern people." Unless these objectives 
 were changed, "no power on earth can arrest or prevent a most bloody 
 conflict." When Secretary Seward received Schleiden's report, he 
 
Stoeckl Attempts Mediation 57 
 
 replied by an unofficial and confidential communication that the Presi- 
 dent was of the opinion that a continuance of the negotiations would 
 be without beneficial results. 
 
 The dispute would have to be left to the arbitrament of the battle- 
 field. 
 
® 
 
 The Gloomy Year 1861 
 
 The outbreak of hostilities between the North and the South deeply 
 affected Edouard de Stoeckl. He had intimate friends in both sections 
 of the United States. It grieved him, he wrote to Prince Gortchakov 
 shortly after the fall of Fort Sumter, 
 
 to see the two sections of the country, called by nature herself into 
 the most intimate alliance, engaging in a war without rhyme or 
 reason and without any other possible termination than mutual ruin 
 and destruction. Eighty years of prosperity without equal in his- 
 tory are due to this Union. It has been broken in the name of an 
 abstract principle and converted into mutual hate and hostility. It 
 appears that in all human nature there lurks a lust for blood that 
 must be satisfied from time to time. 1 
 
 Within a few days Stoeckl was advising his government: 
 
 Washington is in a state of blockade. Mail is interrupted, telegraph 
 wires cut, railroads out of commission by the partial destruction of 
 the roads or of several bridges. For eight days we have received no 
 mail or newspapers. 
 
 Confusion reigns supreme. Men by the thousands are leaving 
 their shops, stores or professions and volunteering for military 
 duty. Massachusetts troops have arrived in Washington. More 
 
 58 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 59 
 
 than 20,000 militia will soon be concentrated in the National 
 Capital. 
 
 Stoeckl also pointed out that President Lincoln's proclamation for 
 75,000 men, though successful in raising troops for the federal army, 
 served also to consolidate the South. "The legislature of Virginia has 
 declared for secession. Maryland mobs attacked United States troops 
 as they passed through Baltimore." The Russian Minister predicted 
 that Maryland, too, would soon secede. More and more officers were 
 resigning their commissions in the federal army and navy and joining 
 the Confederates. Most noteworthy were Colonels Robert E. Lee and 
 Joseph E. Johnston. Few if any experienced military leaders were left 
 in the federal forces. 
 
 On assuming the powers of his office, the President was com- 
 pelled to make the choice between two courses: the use of concili- 
 ation or the use of force. By his proclamation he adopted the 
 medium of force. With a single stroke of his pen he divided the 
 Union into two hostile camps without hope of reconciliation. The 
 border States which up to now have served somewhat as inter- 
 mediaries between the North and the South have been practically 
 expelled by force from the Union. Ostensibly the purpose of the 
 proclamation was the defense of the Capital, but unfortunately it 
 had to entail as a necessary and inevitable consequence the seces- 
 sion of Virginia and Maryland, and the placing of the Capital 
 within enemy territory. At this moment the White House, the 
 residence of the President, is almost within cannon shot of Virginia 
 on the opposite bank of the Potomac River. It had been rumored 
 for several days that an attack by the forces of the South is im- 
 minent. The White House is defended by a guard of one hundred 
 men. The federal treasury has been converted into a fortress, and 
 the Capital into a barracks. This state of affairs cannot continue. 
 It will be necessary either to abandon the Capital and destroy the 
 public buildings to prevent them from falling into the hands of 
 the enemy, or to seize Maryland and Virginia by force of arms 
 and govern them as conquered provinces — which would indeed 
 be an anomaly in a republic. 
 
 Cassius M. Clay, the Kentucky aboli.tionist who stumped his State for 
 Lincoln and as a reward was to be appointed Minister to Russia, de- 
 
60 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 layed his journey to St. Petersburg to organize and captain a volunteer 
 White House guard. He expected the war to come momentarily to 
 Washington. Armed with three pistols and an "Arkansas tooth pick," 
 he was prepared for a last-ditch battle at the doors of the Executive 
 Mansion. 
 
 The danger and predicament in which the nation's Capital found 
 itself, Stoeckl believed, was due to President Lincoln's "gross inexperi- 
 ence in the management of the more important affairs of state as well 
 as of military affairs." He wrote, "Several thousand troops are stationed 
 here and no measures have been adopted to provision them. Washing- 
 ton obtains its provisions from Virginia and Maryland. . . . Indignation 
 is so great in Baltimore that any relations with Washington are re- 
 garded as high treason." 
 
 Stoeckl reported that the federal government, realizing its inability 
 to hold the arsenals at Harpers Ferry and Norfolk, Virginia, had 
 ordered the buildings burned and the supply of arms and ammunition 
 destroyed. "The value of the destroyed property at the Norfolk naval 
 arsenal is estimated at $27,000,000. Several fine naval vessels which were 
 not quite ready to take to sea have been burned and sunk." 
 
 In addition to these troubles, Lincoln was beset with a quarrelsome 
 Cabinet of divided counsels. The President, wrote the Russian Minister, 
 was being influenced too strongly by 
 
 Mr. Blair, the Attorney General, and his father, an old man of 
 remarkable intelligence, both violent abolitionists. They will at- 
 tempt by hook or crook to impose . . . their extreme views of the 
 slavery question. The President's policies which have alienated the 
 border States have resulted in still another critical loss — all the 
 military and naval personnel of these States have resigned and have 
 offered their services to Jefferson Davis. 
 
 In the meantime Jefferson Davis is organizing an army of 50,000 
 which he can double if need be. He counteracted Lincoln's proc- 
 lamation for 75,000 men by issuing a call to shipowners to arm 
 themselves as privateers to prey upon the merchant ships of the 
 North. Mr. Davis, wielding almost dictatorial powers, is enthusi- 
 astically supported by the people of the South who manifest great 
 confidence in him. . . . Though his policies have not been made 
 public, all feel they will be intelligently thought out. Up to this 
 point there is no indication that the single serious danger which 
 
The Gloomy Year 1S61 61 
 
 the Southern Confederacy has fear of — an insurrection of the 
 Negro slaves — will ever take place." 2 
 
 The rumors of a huge army of rebels marching from Baltimore to 
 sack Washington, and of Confederate gunboats sailing up the Potomac 
 to shell the Capitol, did not materialize, and Washington's residents 
 breathed easier. So on May 6 Stoeckl wrote, "Now that the danger to 
 Washington is over the people demand the carrying of the war to the 
 South to force the seceded States to return to the Union." 
 
 Stoeckl pointed out that Lincoln had plenty of troops. However, 
 they first had to be trained and properly equipped for a war of in- 
 vasion. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln should not delude himself that a conquest of the 
 South — even should he achieve it — will succeed in re-establishing 
 the Union. Moreover, he should know that by invading the South 
 during the months of June and July, he would be risking the 
 destruction of his armies because of the terrible heat of the South. 
 But his position is such that he cannot withdraw. He is entirely 
 under the influence of the demagogues of his Party and cannot do 
 otherwise than to obey them. These violent men are masters of the 
 situation and are trying to take advantage of the enthusiasm dis- 
 played by the general public of the North by agitating their own 
 radical doctrines. 
 
 Under their direction committees are being organized every- 
 where which claim the right to deal with the government and 
 which almost daily send deputations to the President to dictate to 
 him the course of action he should follow. Senator Wilson, noted 
 for his radical views, arrived here with a group of extremists and 
 called upon the President. In their conversation Senator Wilson 
 said to the President, "We saved you from an attack by the seces- 
 sionists. But you are now threatened by an even greater danger — 
 one from the North. One backward step or even one false step will 
 result in your downfall." 
 
 The principal newspapers of the large cities have become the 
 mouthpiece of the extremists. Their fanaticism spares neither Lin- 
 coln nor his Cabinet. Mr. Seward especially is the object of their 
 attacks. They are regarded as being too moderate under the pres- 
 ent conditions. They no longer demand conquest alone, but also 
 the extermination of the Southern States. One of these newspapers 
 
6i Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 declared: "The people will not wait. They will not hesitate to 
 choose a new leader should Lincoln fail them." The spread of such 
 subversive propaganda by an unbridled press must necessarily lead 
 to complete anarchy. Already disorders are taking place in the 
 large cities. In New York, mobs are marching through the streets 
 and engaging in all kinds of violence. Citizens have been compelled 
 to organize and arm themselves to defend their persons and 
 property. 3 
 
 The struggle, Stoeckl predicted, would be one of the fiercest ever. 
 At first he thought it would be over by winter. Then he changed his 
 mind and predicted it would last until the end of the year or possibly 
 until spring. The apparent advantage which the North held in the 
 matter of numbers and resources would be counterbalanced by the fact 
 that the Confederates would be fighting on their own soil, in defense 
 of their homes. If by spring the federal' government could not suppress 
 the insurrection, it would have to give up from sheer exhaustion. He 
 was to change his predictions again and again as the conflict raged on 
 with ever-increasing intensity. "The end of the conflict is not yet in 
 sight," he was to write on one occasion. And on another, "The conquest 
 of the South is still an open question." 
 
 Early in May Stoeckl had occasion to confer with Secretary Seward. 
 "He assured me," Stoeckl reported, "that Union sentiment in the South 
 is widespread and awaits only the presence of federal troops to assert 
 itself. ... I have reason to believe that the Secretary of State is deluding 
 himself on this point. According to the reports we have of the South, 
 public opinion is unanimous for secession, and their hatred for the 
 North grows daily. It is doubtful, despite what Mr. Seward says, that 
 these sentiments would disappear under the humiliation of a defeat." 4 
 
 Stoeckl concluded that the Secretary of State, up to now "moder- 
 ately disposed, has like Lincoln, succumbed to the pressure from the 
 extremists." "On to Richmond" had become the battle cry of the 
 North. It rang constantly in Lincoln's ears. It confronted him daily in 
 the flaring headlines of the Neiv York Tribune and other journals 
 which demanded that Richmond must be taken before the Confederate 
 Congress could meet there. It was becoming more and more apparent 
 that a forward movement would have to be made as an absolute 
 political necessity. 
 
 General Winfield Scott, old and infirm, but viewing the war as a 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 63 
 
 soldier, not as a politician, declared that it was impossible to weld a 
 mass of raw recruits into an efficient army overnight. From sixty years' 
 experience he knew it takes a long time to make an army, and that it is 
 impossible to organize, train, march and fight all at the same time. 
 
 From the Russian Embassy in Washington, Stoeckl kept watching 
 developments and reporting in detail to St. Petersburg. On May 1 3 he 
 informed Prince Gortchakov: 
 
 More than 50,000 troops are in Washington and Maryland. 
 These contingents are composed of militias who have enlisted for 
 only three months. They will be replaced by 64,000 enlisted vol- 
 unteers as soon as their training is completed. 
 
 A campaign was to have been launched on the third of this 
 month. It is proposed that Virginia be invaded at three points: at 
 Norfolk near the coast, at Alexandria located seven miles from 
 Washington on the right bank of the Potomac, and at Harpers 
 Ferry on the west. From these three points the federal troops are 
 to advance towards Richmond, the Capital of Virginia, and take 
 possession of the State. But up to this moment no movement has 
 taken place and the army is in the same position that it was one 
 week ago. 
 
 This delay is due to the disturbing news received from the West. 
 Tennessee declared it has seceded from the Union; Kentucky is 
 still undecided, but everything appears to indicate that she will 
 follow the example of Tennessee. These two States could furnish, 
 in case of need, 80,000 men who are accustomed to the privations 
 of Western life and who, when it comes to handling firearms, have 
 no equals in the Union. 
 
 General Scott, who commands military operations, hesitates to 
 enter upon a war of invasion with an army composed of untrained 
 and badly organized militias. These troops have neither wagons 
 nor field hospitals; they lack the most rudimentary needs of an 
 army. . . . There are no commissaries. The regiments which arrived 
 here procured provisions as best they could and paid for them in 
 gold. At New York and at Philadelphia and also here in Washing- 
 ton, several regiments have been lodged in hotels where each 
 soldier is costing the public treasury one to two dollars a day. 
 
 In the South preparations are being made for a desperate resist- 
 ance of the Northern invasion, but we know absolutely nothing of 
 
64 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the campaign plans of Jefferson Davis. It is on this point that the 
 government at Montgomery has an immense advantage over the 
 Washington government whose every strategic movement is im- 
 mediately known and often publicized in advance by the press. 
 
 There is a great divergence of opinion between Mr. Lincoln and 
 General Scott. The former is subject to the pressure of the North- 
 ern States, which, as the price of their sacrifices, demand that the 
 government act without delay. Mr. Lincoln cannot escape the 
 exigencies of public opinion; he must act, no matter what the risk. 
 General Scott sees the question only from the military standpoint 
 and refuses to undertake an expedition without reasonable assur- 
 ance in advance of success. As to the members of the Cabinet, some 
 share the President's opinion, others General Scott's; and the result 
 of this discord will be the adoption of half-measures which will 
 satisfy no one and which will serve only to increase the adminis- 
 tration's predicament. 5 
 
 Stoeckl then discussed Lincoln's contention that no State possesses 
 an inherent right to secede from the Union. 
 
 To permit the principle of secession, that is to say, the right of a 
 State to break the federal pact when it decides that it is appropriate 
 to do so, is to render absurd the very idea of a confederation. A 
 government thus constituted would be an utter fallacy. If a State 
 may secede at will, why, under the same principle, could not a 
 county or a city withdraw? Secession could continue indefinitely 
 and all power, all authority, would become but a meaningless 
 phrase. The supremacy of the federal government finds its author- 
 ity in public opinion. It is only necessary that this opinion be 
 expressed by constitutional means. The Constitution left wide 
 latitude to future reforms through the amending process. This 
 means was open to the Southern States. They failed to avail them- 
 selves of it. 
 
 To give legal sanction to secession "would be to pronounce the doom 
 of all governments present and future," he asserted. "Vigorous action 
 on the part of the government will have the wholesome effect in the 
 loyal States of a reasseftion of national supremacy. It is essential that the 
 secessionists be either vanquished or taught a bitter lesson." 
 
 Stoeckl pointed out that Lincoln's and Seward's declarations that the 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 $? 
 
 United States is one nation inseparable and indivisible, though correct 
 in theory, was altogether false in fact. In their view, 
 
 The Union has not ceased to exist. The secessionists are merely 
 insurrectionists. The United States is one and will continue to 
 remain one single nation. In theory this view is incontestable Un- 
 fortunately ... in actuality ... Mr. Seward is mistaken when he 
 says the United States is one nation. 
 
 From the very beginning of the federal government the North 
 and the South have been different. Under the influence of different 
 local institutions, and perhaps also of diverse climatic conditions 
 two nationalities, mutually antipathetic, have developed. The fed- 
 eral pact, during recent years, tended more and more to become 
 only an artificial bond between two sections which instinctively 
 found each other repulsive. The question of slavery is the principal 
 incident in this phenomenon. However, it is but one incident The 
 rupture of the Union was the explosion of a long-smolderine 
 national antipathy. & 
 
 Thus the question of nationality, which is so important in 
 Europe, is found also in the United States, and is complicated fur- 
 ther by the race question. In the present crisis involving abstract 
 principles of authority and legality, the federal government is 
 being conducted along the lines of European governments. 
 
 It now flagrantly contradicts its own declarations made during 
 the Hungarian revolution and its actions in the hasty recognition 
 of the Italian kingdom; it finds itself constrained now to recognize 
 in America what it wanted to deny in Europe: that a government 
 cannot exist without authority and that, in order to maintain this 
 authority, even if that authority exists in principle, a display of 
 power is at times indispensable. 
 
 The war which has broken out here is essentially a war of prin- 
 ciples. The government's case is a difficult one. On the one hand 
 it is a question of safeguarding the integrity of the principle of 
 supreme authority; on the other, it is a question of yielding to the 
 exigencies imposed by circumstances. Sooner or later a compromise 
 is inevitable. The skill of the government will lie in its ability to 
 act at the right time. If it does not recognize its true function and 
 if, yielding to the pressure of the extremists, it tries to conquer and 
 subjugate the South, then instead of restoring the Union it will 
 
66 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 only succeed in bringing about its destruction and undermining the 
 principles which form the basis of its existence. 6 
 
 Stoeckl was amazed at the patriotic fervor with which the people of 
 the North responded to President Lincoln's proclamation for troops: 
 
 If Mr. Lincoln's administration only knew how to take advan- 
 tage of this outburst of patriotism, great benefits would result. But 
 to attain this, it will be necessary to act with skill and vigor. But 
 none of the administration heads possess these qualities. Each new 
 difficulty frightens them. They temporize, evidently waiting for 
 July 4, the day set for the convening of Congress, so that Congress, 
 rather than they, can assume full responsibility. 
 
 Then the Russian Minister again voiced his low opinion of the capa- 
 bilities of Lincoln, whom he regarded as "President only in name." He 
 believed the President to be completely under the domination of the 
 extremists who surround him and actually control the government: 
 
 The more complicated the situation becomes the more feeble 
 and undecided he [Lincoln] appears. He admits that his task is 
 beyond his powers. Fatigue and anxiety have broken him down 
 morally and physically. 
 
 As for Mr. Seward, his services in the office of Secretary of State 
 hardly justify the high reputation he formerly enjoyed. He is 
 completely ignorant of international affairs. At the same time his 
 vanity is so great that he will not listen to anyone's advice. His 
 arrogance harms the administration more than does the mediocrity 
 of his colleagues. 
 
 Having thus disposed of President Lincoln and his chief Cabinet 
 officer as mediocrities and failures, the Russian Minister now reported 
 to his government: 
 
 Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, is the only one who pos- 
 sesses real ability. A confirmed abolitionist, he has been consistently 
 opposed to making concessions or offering compromises to the 
 South. But he does not advocate the use of force as a means of 
 restoring the Union. 
 
 Besides the official advisors of the President there are sinister 
 influences which unfortunately exercise great power over the 
 vacillating Chief Executive. Mr. Greeley and Mr. Blair, experts in 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 6j 
 
 the art of partisan intrigues and scheming, are at the head of a 
 secret coalition of Senators and Members of the House of Repre- 
 sentatives. Mr. Greeley is in New York where he influences public 
 opinion through the medium of the press. Mr. Blair is here and 
 acts directly upon the President. 
 
 This group imposes pressure upon the President to use extreme 
 measures, and hostilities would have started already were it not for 
 the opposition of General Scott who has said again and again to 
 the President that launching an invasion with an army composed 
 of raw recruits badly trained and without proper equipment would 
 result in certain defeat. ... In consequence General Scott has been 
 violently attacked by Greeley and Blair. He would have already 
 been replaced were it not for the difficulty of finding a commander 
 who would consent to obey their dictates more or less blindly. 7 
 
 A few days later Stoeckl learned that "the federal government has 
 given up the plan of launching an invasion of the South. . . . General 
 Scott has succeeded in demonstrating the dangers of such a move. He 
 has prevailed in his proposal of occupying strategic points in Virginia 
 and Missouri and waiting in this position until autumn, and then to 
 advance into the South if necessary. It is hoped that in the interim, the 
 Confederate States, surrounded on land along their entire borders and 
 blocked by sea, will be forced into submission." 8 
 
 On July 3, 1861, the day before Congress assembled for its extraordi- 
 nary session, while President Lincoln was putting the finishing touches 
 on his message, Stoeckl wrote to Prince Gortchakov: 
 
 I have had opportunity of talking with several leaders. If I can 
 judge from their comments they have decided to adopt the most 
 violent measures and to undertake a war to the bitter end, and to 
 denounce as traitors all who dare to speak of compromise. As hap- 
 pens in all political convulsions men of peace and moderation are 
 howled down, and events are directed by a noisy minority who 
 resort to extremes. 
 
 The administration itself will not exercise much leadership. The 
 extremists of the Republican Party have not forgotten that the 
 President has been inclined to negotiate with the Confederates. 
 They are trying to maneuver him so as to prevent him from at- 
 tempting such a step. 
 
 But the scheming in Congress will be directed chiefly against the 
 
68 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 commanding general of the federal army. He is criticized for his 
 inaction and failure to invade the South with the 200,000 men 
 under his command. They do not dare to attack him openly be- 
 cause he is too popular throughout the country. But they endeavor 
 to undermine him secretly. The extremists in Congress who fear 
 the moderate policies of General Scott and his influence upon the 
 President will overlook no opportunity to oust him and replace 
 him with someone who will comply with their views. 
 
 General Scott has not been intimidated by these threats and con- 
 tinues to act with prudence and circumspection. Although he has 
 an army of from 200,000 to 250,000 men, they are untrained. The 
 stagnation of business and industry threw thousands of persons 
 onto the streets who found relief only in the army. The large cities 
 furnished the vast majority of these men. They are a strange con- 
 glomeration of all nationalities. Several regiments are composed 
 entirely of Germans. Others contain only Irish. There are still 
 others in which you find Spaniards, Italians, Belgians and French. 
 There are even a number of Russians and Serbians. The generals 
 are men who only yesterday were lawyers and merchants, and are 
 entirely ignorant even of the elementary principles of their new 
 offices. Officers of the regiments are chosen by the soldiers, so how 
 can they issue orders to men to whom they owe their positions and 
 who have the right to dismiss them at will? 
 
 Some 50,000 to 60,000 troops are bivouacking in the environs of 
 Washington. It is difficult to name a form of disorder or rowdyism 
 they do not commit, and under the very eyes of the President and 
 the high command. Is it any wonder then that General Scott hes- 
 itates to undertake an invasion with an army composed of such 
 elements, particularly with the season of bad weather approaching? 
 This able American army veteran does not underestimate his ad- 
 versaries, who though not superior in organization or size have the 
 advantage of fighting on their own soil and of being able to convert 
 the fighting into guerrilla warfare. They have already started this 
 form of attack. The outposts of the federal troops cannot venture 
 beyond their lines without falling into some ambush of the Vir- 
 ginia guerrillas. - 
 
 There is still another motive contributing to General Scott's 
 policy of moderation: it is his desire to avoid bloodshed as far as 
 possible. He told me recently, "If the objective of this war is the 
 
 i 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 69 
 
 reconstruction of the Union, if our enemies of today are again to 
 become our compatriots, it is unwise to antagonize them unduly." 
 
 However, the present state of inaction cannot long continue. 
 Public opinion, inspired by demagogues, demands action, and Gen- 
 eral Scott will be compelled to move and attack the secessionists. 
 The latter, blocked by sea and lacking financial and material re- 
 sources, will be on the defensive. 
 
 The President of the Confederacy has changed the seat of gov- 
 ernment to Richmond, Va., whence he directs military opera- 
 tions. . . . 
 
 Up to this point Jefferson Davis has completely justified the 
 reputation he has always enjoyed of being a skilful and energetic 
 leader. He has won the confidence of his people to the point of 
 being able to assume dictatorial power. This is not a small advan- 
 tage which the South has on her adversaries of the North where 
 everyone wishes to command and no one to obey. 
 
 Whereas the army of the North costs (and I have this from 
 the Secretary of the Treasury himself) a million dollars a day, Mr. 
 Davis, without any resources other than a loan of $15,000,000, has 
 succeeded in raising an army of an estimated 100,000 men who 
 are fairly well armed and ardently resolved to defend every inch 
 of their territory. 
 
 The unrestrained threats of conquest and extermination hurled 
 constantly against the seceded States by the press, government 
 officials and even the pulpit of the North have convinced the South 
 that only in a desperate resistance lies any hope for them. There- 
 fore, the separation which at the beginning of the crisis appeared 
 to be sheerly political, has become in the eyes of the people of 
 the South, a matter of life or death. And if it is difficult to predict 
 all the phases through which the American revolution is destined 
 to pass, there is at least one thing that seems certain, and that is 
 that the reconstruction of the Union has become an impossible 
 task. 9 
 
 On July 4, 1 86 1, the eighty-fifth anniversary of the Declaration of 
 Independence, Congress assembled in special session in pursuance to 
 Lincoln's call. From March 4 until July 4, the momentous issues of the 
 Civil War had been decided by Lincoln alone. By his own fiat he had 
 suspended the writ of habeas corpus, first in a limited area and then 
 
70 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 generally over the country. He had issued a proclamation of blockade 
 in all the ports of the seceded States. He had declared martial law. By a 
 proclamation he had ordered the regular army increased by 22,714 
 officers and men and the navy by 1 8,000, and had called for volunteers 
 to serve for three years. Public money was spent without congressional 
 appropriation. 
 
 As a congressman, Lincoln had once bitterly denounced President 
 Polk for his alleged usurpation of power in prosecuting the Mexican 
 War. Now Lincoln as President was going infinitely beyond Polk. 
 
 Stoeckl, sitting with Mercier and other diplomats in the dimly lit 
 gallery of the House of Representatives, listened intently as a clerk 
 with droning voice read the message of President Lincoln on this ex- 
 tremely hot day of July 4. Lincoln reported what had been done to 
 meet the emergency and asked for approval. 
 
 This issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. 
 It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a 
 constitutional republic or democracy — a government of the people, 
 by the same people — can or cannot retain its territorial integrity 
 against its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether dis- 
 contented individuals, too few in numbers to control administra- 
 tion according to organic law in any case, can always, upon the 
 pretenses made in this case, or any other pretenses, or arbitrarily 
 without any pretense, break up their government, and thus prac- 
 tically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us 
 to ask: "Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness? 
 Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of 
 its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? " 
 
 Toward the end of the message Lincoln said: "This is essentially a 
 people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintain- 
 ing in the world that form and substance of government whose leading 
 object is to elevate the condition of men — to lift artificial weights from 
 all shoulders." Lincoln then requested an appropriation of $400,000,000 
 to make the contest "short and decisive." 10 
 
 What could Congress do but approve? Six days after receiving Lin- 
 coln's message, a joint resolution was offered in the Senate, which after 
 reciting the President's "extraordinary acts, proclamations and orders," 
 approved and declared them to be "in all respects legal and valid, to the 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 71 
 
 same intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and 
 done under the previous express authority and direction of the Con- 
 gress of the United States." 
 
 The President was authorized to raise the army to 500,000 men, to 
 borrow $200,000,000, and to issue $50,000,000 in treasury notes. Only 
 four months earlier the country seemed to prefer disunion to war. But 
 Lincoln by his tactful and forceful measures had resolved the issue; the 
 rebellion must be crushed and the Union restored. His war policy 
 received approval in the House with only five dissenting votes. 
 
 While Congress was voting approval of the President's conduct of 
 the conflict and granting him men and money to crush the rebellion, 
 the cry rang throughout the North, "On to Richmond!" As long as he 
 could, General Scott had resisted the demands for immediate action. 
 But the political pressure and the newspaper clamor became too power- 
 ful, and at last he gave way. Reluctantly he gave the order for an 
 advance upon Richmond, the Confederate Capital. 
 
 General McDowell, in command of 35,000 men, was ordered to strike 
 a Confederate force and drive the Southerners back from Manassas near 
 a little stream called Bull Run. Another Union commander, General 
 Patterson, was to advance up the Shenandoah Valley to prevent the 
 Confederates there from going to the aid of their comrades at Manassas 
 Junction. On July 16, McDowell led his citizen soldiers across the 
 bridges spanning the Potomac and began the long-awaited advance. By 
 the 19th he was at the Bull Run stream behind which the Confederates, 
 led by General Beauregard, lay. 
 
 Members of Congress, confident of a victory and anxious to see the 
 Confederate rebels receive a whipping they would never forget, took 
 horses or hired vehicles and accompanied by their ladies drove south- 
 ward from Washington to watch the spectacle of real war across the 
 Potomac. On the field of Bull Run, less than a day's horseback ride 
 southwest of Washington, the green federal army fought courageously 
 for many hours. Lincoln waited anxiously in the White House for 
 reports of the battle. The first accounts were regarded as favorable. 
 But what should have been a victory turned into horrible disaster 
 chiefly because of the inexcusable failure of General Patterson to stop 
 Confederate General Johnston from coming to the aid of Beauregard. 
 Johnston, uninterrupted and unfollowed by Patterson, united his forces 
 with those of Beauregard and attacked the green federal army, which 
 
72 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 crumpled up and was driven from the field. Panic-stricken the raw 
 recruits turned into a mere mob of individuals and fled in terror. 
 
 In his next reports to the Russian Foreign Office, Stoeckl gave prac- 
 tically an eyewitness report of the Union disaster: u 
 
 At about 4 o'clock . . . General Beauregard hurled 2,000 cavalry- 
 men, who had not up to this time taken part in the action, against 
 the federal army. . . . The effect of this maneuver was instantane- 
 ous. All troops without exception took to their heels and soon the 
 entire army was one mad stampede in the woods and on the high- 
 way. The officers of the militia were the first to take flight, and the 
 soldiers ran after them, throwing away their haversacks and rifles. 
 It was thus that the federal army returned to Washington only 
 four days after taking to the field. 
 
 Stoeckl stated that the official government bulletin of July 21 con- 
 cerning the disaster appeared to be carefully censored. It admitted 
 Union casualties of only 50 killed and 200 wounded, whereas a foreign 
 correspondent who had been on the scene estimated the casualties at 
 5,000. Although the official bulletin stated that "the enemy was superior 
 in number," Stoeckl reported: 
 
 The armies must have been almost equal in numerical strength. 
 General McDowell had more than 60,000 men. The Southern army 
 was composed of between 40,000 to 45,000 men, but was eventually 
 re-enforced by 15,000 of General Johnston's men. 
 
 Manassas Gap was the important point and McDowell sent half 
 of his forces there. But Patterson, instead of pursuing Johnston, 
 retraced his steps and permitted him to go by forced marches to 
 Manassas Gap, where he arrived with the rest of his troops the 
 night before the battle. This contributed to the success of the 
 Southern army. The brilliant maneuver of General Johnston, and 
 the bungling retreat of General Patterson can be explained by the 
 fact that the former is one of the most capable officers of the army, 
 whereas the latter is a Philadelphia stockbroker. Patterson offers 
 as the excuse for his retreat that he had no means of transportation, 
 that he lacked provisions, and that his troops had refused to ad- 
 vance. It is probably the truth, for with untrained volunteers and 
 a commissary which was entirely disorganized, nothing is impos- 
 sible. He was stripped of his command, but apparently they have 
 
The Gloomy Year 1S61 73 
 
 not profited from their mistake as they replaced him by Mr. Banks, 
 a Boston lawyer. 
 
 The federal army's losses have been enormous. Everything was 
 abandoned: seventy cannons, thirty to forty thousand rifles, a con- 
 siderable quantity of ammunition, wagons and medical supplies 
 have fallen into the hands of the Southern army. The loss of men 
 is terrific. The government published nothing on this subject, but 
 from all the information that I have been able to obtain, the num- 
 ber of killed, wounded, captured, and deserters is at least 10,000 
 men. 
 
 Stoeckl's estimate of 10,000 federal casualties proved to be far from 
 accurate. The official figures are: killed, 460; wounded, 1,124; missing, 
 1,312 — a total of 2,896. Similar inaccuracies will be noted in his reports 
 pertaining to some other battles. Remarkably well informed as a rule, 
 the Russian Minister, nevertheless, was reporting contemporaneously, 
 frequently immediately after the event, and had to rely upon unofficial 
 sources and hearsay for his information. Considering the dispatch with 
 which he usually forwarded his quickly acquired information to St. 
 Petersburg, it is surprising how accurate he proved to be in most in- 
 stances. 12 
 
 Continuing his report of the Battle of Bull Run, Stoeckl depicted the 
 despair and confusion which enveloped the North after the disaster: 
 
 The day after the battle, Washington offered a sad spectacle 
 indeed. Groups of soldiers, returned from the battlefield, exhausted 
 and bedraggled, crowded the streets and begged for food from 
 door to door. A deadly fear pervaded the city that momentarily 
 it might be invaded. Fortunately a thousand regular troops per- 
 forming police functions succeeded in leading the deserters into 
 the camps near the Capital which they had occupied prior to the 
 march on Virginia, and order was restored. 
 
 No one was more affected by this disaster than General Scott. 
 He knew from experience the danger of sending untrained volun- 
 teers into combat and had resisted as long as he could. But . . . the 
 pressure was too great and he had to yield. When the news of the 
 rout arrived here the President went to the residence of General 
 Scott to ascertain what emergency measures were now necessary. 
 "The first thing that you must do," the veteran answered, "is to 
 accept my resignation because I have committed one of the gravest 
 
74 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 offences possible, that of yielding to the clamor of the dema- 
 gogues." However, General Scott is the only one who has not lost 
 his head, he has already started to reorganize the army. But he has 
 declared that he will require ample time before he will again be 
 in a position to take the offensive. 
 
 We do not know what the Confederate army will do following 
 this victory. It has again advanced toward Washington, the out- 
 posts being but five or six miles from here, but it cannot take the 
 Capital, which is separated from Virginia by the Potomac. The 
 first attack will probably be directed upon the army of General 
 Banks. This force cannot venture into Virginia since the main army 
 has been destroyed. Therefore, General Banks has been ordered to 
 fall back upon Harpers Ferry where there are entrenchments, and 
 if necessary to recross the Potomac. But it is a question whether he 
 can elude General Johnston, who, it is reported, started advancing 
 immediately after the battle of Manassas Gap to cut off the retreat 
 of General Banks' forces. The danger to the latter has been aggra- 
 vated by the fact that his strength has been reduced by reason of 
 the departure of 17,000 of his men whose terms of service have 
 expired. On the other hand, Johnston's army has been reinforced 
 by several regiments added from Beauregard's army. In any event 
 Johnston will be the master of the upper Potomac and will be able 
 almost at will to enter the State of Maryland where the secession- 
 ists are in the majority and await only the arrival of Southern 
 troops to issue a declaration of secession from the Union. If that 
 happens, we will again be surrounded in Washington as we were 
 three months ago. 
 
 However, it is not to be taken for granted that Jefferson Davis, 
 who directs operations and who up to this moment has demon- 
 strated the greatest of prudence, will decide to extend operations 
 to the upper Potomac. It is fair to assume that he will continue to 
 remain on the defensive in Virginia where his greatest resources 
 are located. 
 
 While Washington trembled with fear that Generals Beauregard and 
 Johnston were planning next to strike at the Capital, President Lincoln 
 sent out a call to Major General George B. McClellan, in charge of 
 military operations in Western Virginia, to hasten to Washington to 
 replace McDowell in command of the Army of the Potomac. He was 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 75 
 
 a stocky young fellow only thirty-four years of age. Stoeckl included 
 an account of this new military development in a dispatch to the For- 
 eign Office: 
 
 General McClellan is a young man who lacks neither ability nor 
 energy, but who has not yet proven himself as the commander of 
 an army. Before the Civil War, he was a mere Captain. . . . His 
 task now is to reorganize the army shattered by defeat and to 
 replenish the ranks with new regiments of volunteers. 
 
 Radicals in Congress, whose clamoring for action is responsible 
 for the disaster at Bull Run, are doing their utmost to oust General 
 Scott, whose moderation and popularity annoy them. In a secret 
 meeting held the day after the battle they decided that Congress 
 should dismiss Scott, order the complete mobilization of the North, 
 and decree emancipation of the slaves. However, because of the 
 consternation the battle has caused throughout the nation, they do 
 not dare to initiate these moves at present. . . . The public fully 
 appreciates the wisdom of eighty-year-old General Scott, who has 
 served the nation for sixty years . . . and it is now generally recog- 
 nized that the nation would have been spared the disgrace of 
 ignominious defeat if his advice had been followed. The catas- 
 trophe at Bull Run has become a personal vindication for General 
 Scott. 
 
 As the days passed the impact of the military disaster upon the cause 
 of the Union loomed more and more crushing. As Stoeckl observed: 
 
 The federal defeat is greater than anyone expected. Everyone 
 was sure of a victory. . . . The retreat was disgraceful. . . . Russell, 
 the correspondent of the [London] Times, who is here, witnessed 
 the event. He told me that he had never seen such a rout, not even 
 among the Hindus or the Chinese. The Southern troops on the 
 other hand fought extremely well. 
 
 It is impossible to describe the confusion which the disaster has 
 caused here. The administration and Congress have completely 
 lost their heads. In the secret meetings being held here day and 
 night no one listens, for confusion is everywhere. No one seems to 
 possess authority to give directions for the future. All that is being 
 done is to request the several States to send additional regiments 
 of volunteers. But they will have difficulty in raising them. 
 
y6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Stoeckl then told of the difficulty the federal army was having in 
 replenishing its depleted ranks. Volunteer enlistees, highly disgruntled, 
 are demanding their releases. "Some eighty thousand men had enlisted 
 for three months. The government is offering a premium of fifty dollars 
 to anyone who will re-enlist for three years, without getting many 
 takers." The Russian Minister related that "on the morning of the 
 Battle of Bull Run, a Pennsylvania regiment whose term of service 
 expired the same day left the army at the moment when the action was 
 to start and returned serenely to Washington." 
 
 Prince Gortchakov, reading this paragraph at his office in St. Peters- 
 burg, noted on the margin of Stoeckl's dispatch, "Charmant/" (How 
 charming! ) 
 
 With the passing of time, the situation becomes increasingly 
 more critical. When hostilities end — and they must end sooner or 
 later — new difficulties and more serious ones will appear: How to 
 establish a line of demarcation between the North and the South? 
 What to do with the West linked so intimately to both sections as 
 to make a separation physically and geographically impossible? 
 What to do about disruption of trade and commerce which 
 the dissolution of the Union must inevitably bring about? Such 
 are the questions everyone asks and for which no one has the 
 answers. 
 
 During a stay of more than twenty years in America, I have had 
 the opportunity of making a study of the country. But I must 
 admit frankly that I am at a loss to conjecture as to the future. I 
 can only repeat that we can see nothing but the beginning of one 
 of those political convulsions which overturn a nation from top 
 to bottom. 13 
 
 To which Gortchakov added the comment: "I think so too." 
 Not only had military affairs gone badly on land, but the blockade, 
 too, is more or less of a failure, Stoeckl reported: 
 
 In spite of all its efforts the government has not succeeded in ac- 
 cumulating a naval force of sufficient size to blockade the Southern 
 ports effectively and to halt the privateers which are pursuing 
 federal merchant ships as far north as the Massachusetts coast. 
 More than forty Northern vessels have already been captured, 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 77 
 
 whereas, up to this time, the United States fleet has seized only 
 one privateer. 
 
 But more serious than all other difficulties is the financial situa- 
 tion.... Congress had generously granted the President $500,000,000 
 instead of the $400,000,000 he had requested. But it was another 
 story when it came to raise this exorbitant amount. An embarrassed 
 Congress is suggesting a direct tax, but representatives of the 
 people are objecting because of the unpopularity of such a tax. . . . 
 The big bankers of New York are in no position to lend the gov- 
 ernment more than forty to forty-five million dollars. Mr. Chase 
 has sent agents to Europe to float a loan, but its success is doubtful. 
 The recourse will have to be to treasury bonds with the result 
 that paper money will lose its value and public credit will be 
 ruined. 14 
 
 From then on for practically the remainder of the year 1861, 
 Stoeckl's dispatches to St. Petersburg dealt largely with the inactivity 
 of General McClellan's Army of the Potomac. 15 "Since the Battle of 
 Bull Run, military operations on the Potomac are suspended," he 
 wrote on August 13. "It will be some time before General McClellan 
 can take the offensive." In his dispatch of September 9, Stoeckl 
 reported: 
 
 No military operations have taken place during the last two or 
 three weeks. The army camped in Washington has been reinforced 
 by several volunteer regiments recruited in the North and it num- 
 bers today more than one hundred thousand men. General Mc- 
 Clellan, who commands it, has succeeded in inculcating a certain 
 degree of discipline but in so far as military training is concerned 
 the army is mediocre. It lacks officers, who are more difficult to 
 procure than volunteers. Seventy-five thousand men of this army 
 are encamped on the opposite bank of the Potomac, almost in 
 sight of the enemy pickets, but they have made no forward move- 
 ment to push back the Confederates, whose flags can be distinctly 
 seen from the top of the Capitol. It appears that the federal troops 
 in other sections have not been any more active than those on the 
 Potomac, for if they had won any success the government would 
 have hastened to publish it. 
 
 A state of inactivity is to be expected from the Confederates. 
 
78 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 They are acting on the defensive and as long as they can win 
 positions and prevent the enemy from advancing, they have a 
 measure of success. On the other hand, inaction for the army of 
 the North is proof of lack of power and weakness. 
 
 Nearly a month passed, and on October 6 Baron de Stoeckl was still 
 writing in the same vein, as indeed was the case on into December: 
 
 [October 6:] General McClellan still hesitates to attack the enemy 
 although his strength is 170,000 men. At Washington plans are 
 made and remade daily. Time is being wasted in conferences with 
 bad weather coming on. . . . The newspapers are clamoring for 
 vengeance. The government is endeavoring to comply with public 
 opinion. But matters are becoming increasingly confused and 
 vacillating. 
 
 [October 21:] The great Army of the Potomac is still immobile. 
 Two months have passed without delivering a blow. The opposing 
 armies each of 150,000 men content themselves with intercepting 
 communications and destroying bridges and roads. 
 
 [November 5:] General McClellan is immobile. He has been in 
 the same position for the last three months. General Johnston is 
 master of the River. For ten days Washington has been under 
 blockade. Supplies are coming in by a single route. . . . The cost of 
 necessities is exorbitant. . . . Washington is cut off from its water 
 route to the outside world by a smaller force than the federals 
 have available. 
 
 General Scott has resigned, bringing new gloom to a situation 
 already very dark. In all justice to President Lincoln it must be 
 said that he has always treated General Scott with the highest 
 consideration and regard worthy of his long* and distinguished 
 record of service. 
 
 [December 3:] Military operations continue with the same lack 
 of progress. . . . General McClellan is in the same position as four 
 months ago. 
 
 However, while McClellan was holding the Army of the Potomac 
 inactive in its camps, the Western armies were up and doing. In his 
 August 13 dispatch Stoeckl reported a battle raging in Missouri. "But 
 the silence of the government, which controls the telegraph wires, 
 indicates a lack of success." As a matter of fact, five days later he was 
 
The Gloomy Year 1S61 79 
 
 reporting that "the campaign in the West has been to the advantage of 
 the Confederates. . . . General Fremont in command of the Army of 
 the West has set out to retake Lexington. We are awaiting results as 
 they will be decisive to the federal cause." 16 
 
 The Russian Minister also reported that "a strong naval expedition 
 organized by the government several months ago was now prepared to 
 attack New Orleans or Mobile." 17 Less than a month later he was writ- 
 ing of "good news" which "produced a terrific moral effect" upon the 
 nation: 
 
 A naval expedition the government has been preparing for two 
 months, set out and has occupied Beauford off the coast of South 
 Carolina. The administration will be able to announce a victory 
 which should aid the financial situation. It is an important event as 
 it may prove the springboard for expeditions against Charleston 
 and Savannah." 18 
 
 However, on December 3 he apprised Prince Gortchakov that "the 
 naval operations on the South Carolina coast were making no advance." 
 He believed that the cause for the North's military failures lay in the 
 fact that most of the federal commanders were lawyers and merchants 
 by training without any skill for organizing an army. 19 
 
 Nearly nine months without a single major military victory, coupled 
 with the staggering disaster at Bull Run, had their inevitable effect 
 upon the nation. The same people who in midsummer were clamoring, 
 "On to Richmond," were by the end of the year crying, "Down with 
 Lincoln." "The situation of the country is deplorable," Stoeckl had in- 
 formed his government on September 9, 1861. 
 
 It is sad to see a nation which was so prosperous hardly a year 
 ago dragged toward its complete ruin by demagogues who have 
 risen from the scum of the population, whose personal interest is 
 their only guide — who risk everything, for they have nothing to 
 lose. During the several days I spent recently in the North, I per- 
 sonally became aware of the change which has come about every- 
 where. One doesn't see either the industrial activity or the pros- 
 perity which used to exist in the cities and even in the villages. 
 These have been replaced by gloom and depression and for the 
 first time in America I saw beggars seeking alms in the streets. One 
 of the tricks employed by the radicals is to spread rumors that the 
 
80 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 South is in a deplorable condition and that all will be ended in one 
 or two months. Thus the first question I was asked everywhere 
 was: "Will the South surrender? Is the war going to end?" 
 
 The President, honest man that he is, sees this evil but is helpless 
 to stop it. As for Mr. Seward, he continues to lean first toward 
 one faction, then toward the other. Evidently he is looking for a 
 road of conciliation but he is afraid and doesn't dare to act. The 
 radicals who suspect him of moderation work to overthrow him 
 and it is very possible that they will succeed. 
 
 If the reign of the demagogues continues for a long time, Gen- 
 eral Fremont is destined to play an important role. He is already 
 the standard-bearer of the radical party, and he will become the 
 head of the party because of his superiority over the other leaders, 
 among whom are only mediocre men and not a single leader of 
 talent and energy. 
 
 A contributing factor to the disorder which prevails everywhere 
 in the administration, as in the army, is that everyone here believes 
 that he has the right to meddle in the affairs of state, or at least to 
 give advice. There is not a newspaper which does not recommend 
 its own military strategy and plans, and which does not have its 
 favorite general whom it extols to the skies. Spinster ladies visit the 
 hospitals and create embarrassment or annoyances, but every one of 
 them wants to play the role of Miss Nightingale. Some committees 
 named by charitable organizations go through the camps followed 
 by doctors and French cooks to teach the soldiers to take care of 
 their health and to cook. Finally, religious sects, of which there is 
 a considerable number here, send deputation after deputation to 
 enjoin the President to observe the Sabbath strictly in the army. 
 
 The President is forced to meet all of these people, to listen to 
 them, to talk with them, and often to yield to their demands, ab- 
 surd as they may be. In order to please the Puritan clergy, the 
 commanding general, by order of the President, has just ordered 
 the heads of the different corps to observe the Sabbath religiously, 
 and not to engage in any military operations on Sunday other than 
 to defend themselves in case of attack. All of this will give an idea 
 of the chaos which exists. 
 
 Americans who refuse to take cognizance of the true condition 
 of the country look upon the diplomatic corps with distrust. They 
 
The Gloomy Year 1861 81 
 
 see in us troublesome witnesses of their misfortunes, and our re- 
 ports, which are as often as official as they are social, are on occa- 
 sion rather annoying to them. Our personal position is hardly bet- 
 ter. We have for a garrison a large undisciplined army of volunteers 
 recruited for the most part from the dregs of the large cities and 
 who from what some of my colleagues who recently returned 
 from Turkey say, are no better than the bashi bozouks (Turkish 
 irregulars). More than once, I and my colleagues have been ex- 
 posed to the excesses of these volunteers, but we have not com- 
 plained formally in order not to embarrass the government which 
 already has troubles enough. 
 
 Luckily the Potomac shelters us from sudden attack by the enemy 
 whose advance posts are only 4 or 5 versts [a verst is about two- 
 thirds of an English mile] from here. But they can cross the river 
 easily twenty-five miles from here and surprise the city from the 
 rear. In such case I do not know from where we would be threat- 
 ened most— from the soldiers who are here to protect us, or from 
 the Confederates who may attack us. Probably we would be 
 plundered by both. My wife along with the families of all the dip- 
 lomats have gone North, and as for us we are so accustomed to 
 these conditions that we don't think anything about them. 20 
 
 Continuing his analysis of the "deplorable situation," Stoeckl dis- 
 cussed in some detail the efforts of the radicals to gain control of affairs: 
 
 The danger to the country lies not so much in the lack of suc- 
 cess in military operations as in the intrigues and secret dealings of 
 the radical parties and the weakness of the administration which, 
 without sharing the views of the demagogues, succumbs to their 
 evil influence and permits itself be dragged blindly along to certain 
 ruin. 
 
 In one of my preceding reports, I had the honor to tell Your Ex- 
 cellency that the radicals were seeking a man devoted to their in- 
 terests to place him at the head of the army. They had eyes on Mr. 
 Fremont, a veteran officer of that type, but who had left the army 
 to devote himself to political activities. In 1856 he was the candi- 
 date of the Republican Party. He is an ambitious man of great 
 daring and perhaps destined to play an important role in this rev- 
 
82 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 olution. His followers desired him for the supreme command of 
 the army, but the President would not consent to replace General 
 Scott. Instead he placed Fremont in command of the federal 
 troops in the West. Scarcely had Fremont arrived at his head- 
 quarters in St. Louis than he issued a proclamation establishing 
 martial law in the whole State of Missouri, and announced that all 
 insurgents would be shot. Moreover, he declared free the slaves of 
 all persons who directly or indirectly had taken part in the seces- 
 sionist movement. 
 
 General Fremont acted without authorization of the President 
 and even contrary to his instructions, which forbade him to act in 
 regard to the slave States of the West where Unionists are still 
 fairly numerous. So the President was greatly astonished to learn 
 about the proclamation of General Fremont. He regarded it as an 
 act of insubordination. For a while there was consideration of dis- 
 missal, but after all he did nothing and did not even dare to rep- 
 rimand him. The radicals, emboldened by this triumph, demand 
 today that the edicts laid down by General Fremont in Missouri 
 shall be applied everywhere. In other words, they demand that the 
 government should convert the present struggle into a war of ex- 
 termination. 
 
 What the radical party fears most is a reaction which would 
 bring its ruin. So it takes advantage of the hold it has on the ad- 
 ministration in order to drive it to extreme measures. The govern- 
 ment has forbidden postmasters to carry newspapers in the mails 
 which advocate conciliation and compromise. The result has been 
 that the majority of newspapers which were opposed to war have 
 had to suspend publication. In several towns the extremists have 
 gone even further. They have stirred up the populace, which has 
 smashed the plants of the moderate newspapers. Conditions are 
 such that mere denunciation by a general is sufficient for a person 
 to be arrested and imprisoned. The act of habeas corpus and all 
 the personal guarantees which the Americans have appeared to 
 prize so much, have vanished and have given way to martial law, 
 which ... is being enforced throughout the North. . . . 
 
 We are not far from a reign of terror such as existed during the 
 great French Revolution, and what makes the resemblance more 
 striking is that all these acts of oppression are made in the name of 
 liberty. 
 
The Gloomy Year 1S61 83 
 
 Stoeckl wrote that the people of the North were being misled into 
 believing that these drastic measures would hasten the peaceful restora- 
 tion of the Union. But he did not believe the deception could persist: 
 
 People will not be duped long by their political leaders. The re- 
 action will necessarily take place. But unfortunately it will come 
 too late to repair the harm that the demagogues have done to the 
 country. 
 
 The Civil War will be prolonged until the end of the year, per- 
 haps even until spring but without result, and as I have already had 
 the honor of telling Your Excellency, the separation can be con- 
 sidered as a fait accompli. 
 
 But when the separation is completed the North, exhausted of 
 men and money, will submit as a sad necessity, and the two con- 
 federations will find themselves facing new and grave difficulties. 
 It will be necessary again to reconcile the rivalries of the different 
 States, to combine the needs of the manufacturing States of New 
 England with the interests of the great State of New York and 
 those of the West, where agriculture is the principal source of 
 wealth. It will be the same in the States of the South which are 
 united at this moment but where discord will break loose the day 
 when they have acquired their independence. It will be necessary 
 finally to revolutionize the political and administrative institutions 
 which function well enough in peaceful times but which have 
 weakened upon the first rock against which the nation has been 
 hurled. In the North and in the South they will have to reconstruct 
 the edifice which the founders of the Republic have had so much 
 trouble in building. . . . The present war is only the prelude of the 
 political convulsions which this country will have to pass through. 21 
 
© 
 
 Domestic Trouble Invites 
 Foreign Intervention 
 
 The Old World powers were not displeased at the trials which de- 
 mocracy was encountering in the United States. Their ruling aristoc- 
 racies rejoiced at the news that democracy across the Atlantic was 
 riding to a fall. The breakup of the American democratic republic 
 would be a blessing to Europe's monarchies. The example of successful 
 republican government in the United States was a constant source of 
 inspiration to European agitators and of apprehension and exasperation 
 to the ruling authorities of the monarchial states. Its failure here would 
 be a setback to democracy everywhere. If the North should win, her 
 leveling idea in government would become almost irresistible in lands 
 where the masses were still disenfranchised. But this was not likely 
 now, as European observers regarded the dissolution of the Union in- 
 evitable. 
 
 In England, few if any tears were shed over the impending break- 
 down of her formidable maritime rival. British aristocracy had much 
 in common with plantation aristocracy and little with the "vulgar, 
 boastful Yankees." Let the Union split in two. Independence of the 
 Confederate States would weaken a dangerous commercial competitor, 
 remove a barrier for the advancement of England's interests in the 
 Western Hemisphere,, and free a source of cotton supply on which 
 hundreds of thousands of her textile workers depended for a livelihood. 
 
 Even European liberals and antislavery humanitarians withheld their 
 sympathy for the federal government, because Lincoln, striving des- 
 
 84 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 85 
 
 perately to keep the border States in line, announced emphatically that 
 the Civil War would be fought to save the Union and not to destroy 
 slavery. 
 
 Fully fifteen months before the bombardment of Fort Sumter, 
 Stoeckl had already prophesied "the approaching dissolution of the 
 American Union." But what concerned him most, he wrote on that 
 occasion in his reports to the Foreign Office of imperial Russia, was 
 that Great Britain — Russia's bitterest enemy — was to become the sole 
 gainer from the impending American tragedy. Sadly he predicted in 
 his dispatch of January 4, i860 to Prince Gortchakov: Great Britain 
 is about to experience one of those "strokes of fortune" which occur 
 but rarely in the history of nations, in the approaching dissolution of 
 the American Union. She alone of all the nations of the world, would 
 benefit by it through the expansion of her power, hitherto blocked by 
 the might of the United States. Broken into two or more hostile pieces 
 America would be at the mercy of England, to become her plaything. 
 "The Cabinet of London is watching attentively the internal dissen- 
 sions of the Union and awaits the result with an impatience which it 
 has difficulty in disguising." Great Britain would soon, in return for 
 cotton, give recognition to the South and, if required, armed support. 
 For this same cotton she would oppose emancipation of the slaves. The 
 breakup of the Union will be no less than a disaster for all nations save 
 England, since hitherto the "struggle" between England and the United 
 States "has been the best guarantee against the ambitious projects and 
 political egotism of the Anglo-Saxon race." 1 
 
 On April 14, 1861 Stoeckl advised his government that "England 
 will take advantage of the first opportunity to recognize the seceded 
 States and that France will follow her." On the same day in a separate 
 dispatch he also reported a new worry for Lincoln's sorely troubled 
 government — Spain's occupation of Santo Domingo. Later he added: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln has placed himself in the position where he must 
 either discontinue these protests or wage war against Spain. Tas- 
 sarra assured me that ... if Lincoln dared to threaten Spain, his 
 government would immediately recognize the independence of the 
 Southern Confederacy. Spain has a rather large squadron of ships 
 in the port of Havana and in the Gulf of Mexico, and the garrison 
 in Cuba has been augmented to 25,000 men, all excellent troops. 
 Thus prepared, Spain does not fear a war. Tassarra would relish 
 
86 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 such a conflict to avenge her many grievances against the United 
 States." 2 
 
 But of all European enemies of the Union none was as dangerous and 
 persistent as Napoleon III. He became the head and front of the foreign 
 conspiracy against the North. Greedy for glory and prestige and eager 
 to distract the public mind from the popular discontent kept alive by 
 the friends of the betrayed republic, the French Emperor launched an 
 adventurous foreign policy in which the American continent figured 
 most prominently. He was most pleased at the prospect of the United 
 States breaking into two hostile parts too weak to enforce the Monroe 
 Doctrine, which stood in the way of his plans. 
 
 The political chaos in Mexico offered him the springboard he sought 
 for devitalizing the Monroe Doctrine and for reviving his plans for a 
 French colonial empire. So he laid plans to establish Maximilian in 
 Mexico. This would again make France a world power, give a new 
 outlet to French trade and create a bulwark against American aggres- 
 sion southward. 
 
 Already in April 1861, only a few days after the outbreak of hos- 
 tilities in the United States, at the order of his government, French 
 Minister Henri Mercier was making overtures to Lord Lyons and 
 Stoeckl to secure authority from their governments to recognize the 
 Confederacy whenever they thought "the right time" had come. But 
 the British representative advised Mercier that he was loath to assume 
 this responsibility as such a step might embarrass him in his relations 
 with the North. Stoeckl also opposed the plan. He explained that Rus- 
 sia preferred to wait until Great Britain and France had acted. Then 
 she could recognize the Confederacy without offending Lincoln's gov- 
 ernment. 3 Stoeckl then advised St. Petersburg that the French Minister 
 
 has written to M. Thouvenel that as long as there had been any 
 hope of settling the dissensions which had arisen between the 
 North and South and there remained a possibility of reconcilia- 
 tion, it was improper to conduct diplomatic relations with the 
 seceded States. But now the situation was entirely changed. The 
 States of the South had a regularly organized government; seces- 
 sion had become a fait accompli, and France must think above all 
 else of safeguarding her commercial interests which the hostilities 
 between the North and South would seriously damage. In recog- 
 nizing the Confederation of the South, the French government 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 87 
 
 would give to the conflict the characteristic of a war, nation 
 against nation, and would thereby give her commerce the benefit 
 of neutrality rights. 
 
 The Minister of France points out that the United States has at 
 all times recognized governments without concerning herself too 
 much whether they had obtained their independence by revolution 
 or otherwise; consequently, she had no right to be offended if the 
 European powers followed the same policy towards her. Finally, 
 M. Mercier commends to his government the necessity of being in 
 agreement with England and the other great powers and of leav- 
 ing to the discretion of their representatives in Washington the 
 task of recognizing the Confederacy of the South at such time as 
 they deem proper. 
 
 Lord Lyons, with whom M. Mercier discussed this question be- 
 fore referring it to his government, said that he agreed entirely with 
 the views of the Minister of France, and that he had written to this 
 effect to Lord John Russell. But he adds . . . that he does not wish 
 to assume the responsibility of deciding the time when it would 
 be opportune to recognize the Confederacy and that, besides, such 
 a step on his part would compromise his position with the govern- 
 ment of Mr. Lincoln. It is more than probable that France and 
 England will make overtures to us on this matter. . . . 
 
 Today the rupture between the North and the South unfortun- 
 ately appears to be irrevocable, and it is no longer to our interest 
 to observe strict impartiality between the two sections. The recog- 
 nition of the Southern Confederacy by France and England will 
 offer us a very natural excuse to follow their example in recogniz- 
 ing a fait accompli without, however, giving us the appearance of 
 a previous agreement with these two powers. 4 
 
 From the outset it was apparent to President Lincoln that the first 
 task of his government in its conduct of foreign affairs was to prevent 
 the great powers of the world from recognizing the rebellious States 
 as a sovereign nation. But his administration got off to a bad start in its 
 wartime relations, not only with Spain but, what was far worse, with 
 England and France. 
 
 Lincoln's call for volunteers for the purpose of "repossessing" fed- 
 eral forts seized by the South, was followed on April 1 7 by a proclama- 
 tion of Jefferson Davis offering letters of marque and reprisal for com- 
 
88 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 missioning privateers to prey upon the commerce of the North. The 
 bait was most tempting as the American merchant marine was then the 
 largest on the seas. Two days later President Lincoln set on foot a 
 blockade of the entire coastline of the seceded States. Foreign trade was 
 the lifeblood of the South. If this traffic could be cut off, the new Con- 
 federacy would perish. The insurrection would be snuffed out without 
 firing a shot. 
 
 But even before official news of the blockade had been received by 
 Queen Victoria's government — on May 13, 1861, the very day that 
 Charles Francis Adams, America's new Minister to the Court of St. 
 James, reached London to present his credentials — England issued a 
 formal proclamation enjoining strict neutrality upon her subjects. As 
 England was most intimately related with the contestants, France, 
 Spain, The Netherlands, Brazil and other maritime powers followed 
 Britain's lead and subsequently issued similar proclamations of neutral- 
 
 The North rose in anger against England for her shocking dis- 
 courtesy and hasty action in giving recognition to the South as a 
 belligerent without even giving Lincoln's spokesman an opportunity 
 to be heard. Although England's declaration of neutrality did not 
 amount to a recognition of the independence of the Confederate States 
 of America, it did mean a recognition of her flag on the high seas and 
 the granting of her ships of war and commerce the same privileges in 
 neutral ports as were accorded to the ships of the federal government. 
 The British recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate States 
 while the President was branding the conflict as a local insurrection in 
 which no foreign power had a right to meddle, was deeply resented by 
 Lincoln as an unfriendly act and the first step toward ultimate recog- 
 nition of the Confederacy. 
 
 The Russian Minister, closely watching this British- American rift, re- 
 ported to his own government that the Lincoln administration in its 
 foreign affairs was displaying the same ineptness and the same lack of 
 foresight as in military affairs: 
 
 The North, and especially Air. Seward, led themselves to believe 
 that England would sympathize with them for humanitarian rea- 
 sons arising out of the question of slavery. For the first time the 
 American press expressed kind words for Great Britain. England, 
 said these journals, would never place her commercial interests 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 89 
 
 above her regard for human rights in a struggle between liberty 
 and slavery. But the British press is not impressed by such flattery. 
 It barely mentions slavery but gives much space to the question of 
 cotton. 
 
 The London Cabinet does not appear any more disposed to 
 sympathize with the Northern States than does the English press. 
 . . . Lord John Russell refused to promise Mr. Dallas that England 
 will not recognize the Southern Confederacy. The negotiations of 
 Mr. Adams, the new United States Minister to London, are being 
 awaited impatiently. But the Secretary of State told me that he is 
 no longer deluded regarding England's unfavorable attitude since 
 Lord Russell's declaration in Parliament that the Southern Con- 
 federacy in its capacity as a belligerent has the right of issuing 
 letters of marque and reprisal. 5 
 
 The South relied upon "King Cotton" to smash Lincoln's blockade. 
 Her statesmen pointed to the dependence of the French and English 
 textile industries on the South's plantations for fully eighty percent of 
 their requirements of raw cotton. This fact, they believed, was bound 
 to force these powerful nations to intervene and recognize the Con- 
 federacy as an independent republic. It was also Stoeckl's prediction 
 that "cotton will decide England's attitude": 
 
 A blockade of the Southern ports would harm every country 
 including Russia. However, the cotton exported to Russia is not 
 shipped until the end of January or the beginning of February, 
 and the blockade can under no circumstances last until then. If 
 the Civil War lasts until winter, and if the British lift the block- 
 ade, all their cotton will be shipped to Europe on neutral vessels. 
 Our maritime fleet in the Baltic should not overlook this opportu- 
 nity to realize considerable profits. 6 
 
 At first, hope of an early peace was entertained widely. Stoeckl felt 
 confident the war would be over by winter. But the Union disaster at 
 the Battle of Bull Run changed his forecasts completely. Writing to his 
 Foreign Office on June 3, he described the mounting resentment 
 throughout the North against Great Britain on account of the Queen's 
 declaration of neutrality. The North sees in Great Britain "a declared 
 enemy," while at the same time, England views with satisfaction the 
 political convulsion in America. 7 But he advised that the United States 
 
90 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 should be cautioned against breaking relations with England as "they 
 are entirely at the mercy of their rivals." The American naval force is 
 woefully outclassed by that of Great Britain. 
 
 Among the American fighting craft are six to eight frigates and 
 corvettes with propellers, which although not of the most modern 
 construction could render effective service, for they are well 
 equipped and ably commanded. But the remainder of her naval 
 forces consist of old sailing vessels most of which are hardly sea- 
 worthy. The blockade of the Southern ports is accomplished in a 
 large measure by merchant vessels armed with one or two cannon 
 and commanded by navy officers. England already has several 
 warships off the coasts of Canada and the West Indies. She need 
 only reinforce this squadron with a dozen frigates to sweep away 
 all the American ships engaged in the blockade of the ports of the 
 seceded States. . . . 
 
 But whatever may be her superiority, and however propitious 
 may be the time for humiliating the United States, England may 
 be expected to act with great circumspection and abstain from any 
 aggressive measure unless forced either by the necessity of procur- 
 ing cotton or by the instigation of the Americans. The latter are 
 extremely sensitive on this subject. Other international quarrels 
 have not lessened their vanity. They are threatening England in the 
 same manner as in the past. If, therefore, a conflict between these 
 two powers takes place, and I doubt that it can be avoided between 
 now and the end of the year, it will be brought about by the im- 
 prudence and provocative acts of the Americans. 8 
 
 Although the people of the North appeared angrier with the British 
 than with the French, Louis Napoleon was far more eager and insistent 
 to recognize the Confederate States as an independent republic, and 
 therefore was more dangerous. The French Emperor, harboring far- 
 reaching colonial designs, early decided not only to recognize the 
 Southern Confederacy but to assist her at the proper time by an armed 
 intervention. 
 
 Stoeckl reported that he had been advised by Mercier that although 
 the French Foreign Minister would not officially receive the commis- 
 sioners of the Southern Confederacy, 
 
 he could not avoid seeing them and conversing with them. Sec- 
 ondly, that French ports are open to all merchant ships . . . and 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 91 
 
 that France could not deviate from this principle without creating 
 serious hindrances to her commerce. Finally, concerning the rec- 
 ognition of the seceded States ... no early action was contem- 
 plated ... but that if the conflict were protracted and the separa- 
 tion became a fait accompli, the French government naturally 
 would follow the course which would serve her own best interests. 
 What places the United States in an extremely awkward posi- 
 tion as far as Europe is concerned is that her action is a contradic- 
 tion of her own traditional policy. Every revolutionary movement 
 in Europe has been applauded here. The Americans are not con- 
 tent merely with giving ovations to Kossuth, Kinkel and other 
 demagogues; they supply them with money for the express pur- 
 pose of inspiring new disorders. The Secretary of State requests 
 European powers not to recognize the representative of the se- 
 ceded States, but he seems to forget that hardly five years ago the 
 President of the United States officially recognized the Minister of 
 the Nicaraguan Republic, accredited by the government after the 
 famous Walker filibuster. Finally, at the very moment when they 
 clamor for the extermination of the Southern rebels, the New 
 York newspapers call the disorders which have recently broken 
 out at Narsorie patriotic uprisings, and accuse us of cruelty for 
 having suppressed them. 9 
 
 On June 10, Stoeckl reported to St. Petersburg that Louis Napo- 
 leon's government in emulation of England's recent proclamation of 
 neutrality, is of the opinion that 
 
 the Confederate States of the South have today an organized gov- 
 ernment and forces effective enough to make the result of the 
 struggle doubtful. The French government found it necessary to 
 recognize them as belligerents, and has expressed approval of the 
 right of the Confederate States to issue letters of marque and re- 
 prisal. ... 
 
 Mr. Seward became greatly irritated about this. He replied to 
 M. Mercier that he had hoped that Emperor Louis Napoleon, after 
 the friendly statements that he addressed to the representative of 
 the United States in Paris, would be on the side of the government, 
 but that he realized with regret that the French shared the views' 
 and the intentions of Great Britain. "We have not yet," he said, 
 "been officially informed of the recognition of the seceded States 
 
92 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 as a belligerent. As soon as we are formally notified about it, we 
 will vigorously protest the attitude of the foreign powers. We are 
 ready to face eventualities." As a result of these developments a 
 rupture between the United States and England and perhaps with 
 France seems to be inevitable. 
 
 A new conflict would thus be added to all those which are at 
 present agitating the entire world. With this possibility it is of 
 major concern to us to watch events carefully. 10 
 
 With the threat of foreign intervention hanging heavily over the 
 nation, a new international crisis arose which brought the United 
 States to the very brink of a war with Great Britain. Captain Charles 
 Wilkes of the USS San Jacinto, learning that John Slidell and James 
 Mason, Confederate emissaries to Paris and London, respectively, were 
 on board the British steamer Trent bound for England, stopped the 
 vessel twenty-five miles out from Havana by firing a shot across her 
 bow, and removed the Confederates by force. 
 
 The United States went wild with joy over the exploit of Captain 
 Wilkes. The capture of two Confederate hostages seemed to atone, in 
 a measure, for the military disasters at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff. So the 
 whole North broke out in enthusiastic approval of the deed. Wilkes 
 became the hero of the hour. Secretary Welles sent the "hero of the 
 Trent" the official approval of the Navy Department, and Congress 
 voted him a gold medal. 
 
 The diplomatic corps buzzed with disapproval of Wilkes' exploit. 
 Stoeckl, Mercier, and the Ministers from Prussia, Italy, Denmark and 
 other lands called on Lord Lyons to assure him of their belief that the 
 United States was wrong in the matter. In his report to St. Petersburg 
 about this "event which may entail serious consequences," Stoeckl 
 wrote, "Lord Lyons told me that he considered the action of Captain 
 Wilkes as the gravest insult ever perpetrated against the British flag." 11 
 He added: 
 
 Upon receipt of this news, the President was disposed to disavow 
 Captain Wilkes' act, restore the prisoners, and apologize to Eng- 
 land. But he ran into strong opposition from his Cabinet and from 
 the demagogues, among his advisors who believed . . . they [the 
 federals] were stronger than ever and could defy England. 
 
 I have learned from a reliable source that the captain of the 
 San Jacinto had acted under the specific instructions of the Sec- 
 
 i 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 93 
 
 retary of State, who having learned of the arrival of Mason and 
 Slidell in Havana, and believing they would go to Europe on the 
 English vessel, ordered the San Jacinto to the Cuban coast with 
 instructions to seize the two commissioners in disregard of the 
 British flag. I have learned also that this order was issued without 
 the knowledge of the President. 12 
 
 This information caused Prince Gortchakov to write on the margin 
 of Stoeckl's note: "Charmant!" 
 
 When at the end of November 1861 the full report of the Trent 
 affair was made public by the British government, all England went 
 wild with rage. Excitement swept across the country like a hurricane. 
 The newspapers filled their columns with abuse of the United States. No 
 time must be lost in teaching those damn Yankees "how to respect the 
 flag of a mightier supremacy beyond the Atlantic." The Cabinet met in 
 extraordinary session. Orders went out to the navy yards to dispatch 
 10,000 picked troops to Canada, and to prepare for war. An ultimatum 
 was prepared: within seven days Lincoln was to release the prisoners 
 and apologize to the British government for the "gross outrage and vio- 
 lation of international law." 
 
 Lincoln kept his head when all around him were losing theirs. "One 
 war at a time," he said. The United States had a bad case in interna- 
 tional law, and he said so to Attorney General Bates. 13 Lincoln drew 
 up a proposal for submission of the controversy to arbitration. But 
 Lord Lyons replied that his instructions were to demand immediate 
 yielding, and allowed no time and no discretion. This left Lincoln no 
 alternative. 
 
 Over the Christmas holiday Lincoln and his Cabinet struggled with 
 ,the problem. On Christmas Day Seward finally completed the Ameri- 
 can answer: Lincoln's conclusion— "We must stick to American prin- 
 ciples concerning the rights of neutrals"— determined its terms. The 
 British demand for the surrender of the hated Southerners was acceded 
 to. But no apology was made on the ground that Wilkes had acted 
 without orders. To the country it was, as Secretary Chase called it, 
 "gall and wormwood." But it was the common sense thing to do. "One 
 jwar at a time" was all the United States could afford. 
 
 On New Year's Day 1862, the Confederate emissaries were handed 
 jover to the commander of an English gunboat at Provincetown. Thus 
 ended the immediate threat of a war with Great Britain. But the danger 
 
94 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of recognition of the Confederacy by England and France continued 
 unabated. 
 
 The French people generally, hating slavery, favored an undivided 
 America. But their Emperor remained outspoken in his desire for a 
 weakened Union through the establishment of an independent South- 
 ern nation. On January 14, 1862 Louis Napoleon's representative in 
 Washington wrote Thouvenel that "there is no other outcome of the 
 crisis except a pacific arrangement based upon separation." 14 Under in- 
 structions from the French Foreign Office, Mercier undertook to mo- 
 bilize the foreign diplomatic corps in Washington to undertake the 
 mediation of the American dispute. He induced President Lincoln to 
 grant him a pass to visit Jefferson Davis in Richmond. 
 
 On April 10, 1862 the French Minister came to Lord Lyons, and 
 told him he was about to set out for Richmond, to discuss possibilities 
 of mediation with leaders of the Confederacy. He expressed the opin- 
 ion that the three great powers — Great Britain, France and Russia — 
 ought to act in concert. But he was loath to ask Lyons to accompany 
 him because of American "extreme susceptibility" to any interference 
 by Great Britain. However, he believed it would be proper for Stoeckl 
 to go along, and he stated that the Russian Minister was "pleased with 
 the idea." Lord Lyons was frank in saying that he was glad to be re- 
 lieved of the necessity of declining to go. However, he expressed re- 
 gret that Mercier was determined to proceed without Britain and ob- 
 jected strenuously to Stoeckl participating, as this meant a break in 
 "joint policy." 15 
 
 Stoeckl's report to St. Petersburg was at variance with Mercier's 
 statement: 
 
 M. Mercier invited me to accompany him on the trip in the 
 hope of establishing negotiations or at least of exploring the pos- 
 sibilities for conciliation. I replied that in the present state of 
 affairs I would have to refuse because I did not see any chance for 
 the success of his plan. ... In the interview which M. Mercier had 
 the next day with the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward acted coldly 
 to the offer of the Minister of France and refused to permit him to 
 make any overtures to the Confederates. 
 
 Two days later, I had the occasion of seeing the Secretary of 
 State, who spoke to me of this affair. "I do not know," he said to 
 me, "if M. Mercier has acted with or without the authorization of 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 95 
 
 his government. But the fact is that Louis Napoleon has more than 
 once attempted to force us to accept mediation. However, the con- 
 duct of the French government during the present crisis is not such 
 as to inspire great confidence. If any power should be called upon to 
 mediate, it certainly should be Russia who has given us so many 
 indications of friendship. But mediation," he said, "from whatever 
 source will not be popular with our nation. This is a domestic 
 quarrel which must be settled among ourselves. In any event, there 
 is nothing to do at present except to follow events and await the 
 result of military operations." 
 
 So the trip of M. Mercier which occasioned so many interpreta- 
 tions in the press of the United States, and which will also become 
 the subject of comment in the European press, did not bring about 
 any results. 16 
 
 Napoleon, despite his "sympathy for the South," was afraid to act 
 alone in the American conflict. He pressed for a European coalition to 
 bring about straight-out recognition of the Confederate States. Mercier 
 declared that if France took the initiative, supported by the other 
 powers, especially by Russia, America would be forced to yield. 
 
 Stoeckl reported on September 28 that Mercier was of the belief that 
 the United States was in no position longer to refuse a joint request of 
 the world powers to stop hostilities for the sake of the world's econ- 
 omy. But Lord Lyons was still fearful of pressing unwanted mediation. 
 He told Stoeckl, "We ought not to venture on mediation unless we are 
 ready to go to war." 
 
 The Russian Minister agreed with Lyons that efforts at mediation 
 would fail at the present time unless backed by the force required to 
 open up the Southern ports. But he believed "that eventually, America, 
 suffering from the ravages of war, would beg the world to mediate the 
 conflict." 17 
 
 After news of General McClellan's defeat in the Peninsular campaign 
 reached Napoleon in Paris, he concluded that the stage was cleared for 
 European intervention. The French Emperor took the British Minister 
 aside at a dinner, and told him in so many words that France was ready 
 to recognize the Confederacy as an independent nation if England 
 would go along. 
 
 Prime Minister Palmerston and the Foreign Minister, Lord Russell, 
 gradually yielded to Napoleon's views. Gladstone, declaring the moral 
 
96 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 duty of intervention, made a celebrated speech at Newcastle on Octo- 
 ber 7 in which he said: "Jefferson Davis and the other leaders have 
 made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made 
 what is more than either, they have made a nation." With such a pro- 
 nouncement coming from a prominent member of the Cabinet, the 
 natural construction put upon this speech was that the British had de- 
 cided to recognize the Confederacy. A Cabinet meeting of Queen Vic- 
 toria's Ministers was called for October 23, 1862, to consider formally 
 France's proposal to intervene in the American situation. 
 
 To thwart any American attempt to interfere with his scheme to set 
 up an empire in Mexico, the French ruler had launched anew his cam- 
 paign for joint direct interference on the part of the European powers 
 to settle our Civil War on a basis that would insure the permanent 
 split of the Union. 
 
 On October 30, Drouyn de Lhuys, an imperial henchman who had 
 replaced Thouvenel as Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Affairs, wrote 
 in the Emperor's name to invite England and Russia to join France in 
 a tripartite scheme to take action in the American affair. The Emperor, 
 according to Lhuys, was very anxious to "put an end to the war." A 
 few days later, Stoeckl reported that Mercier had informed him con- 
 fidentially that Drouyn de Lhuys was insisting 
 
 that France can no longer remain neutral in the conflict which was 
 affecting her interests so vitally. Neither Mercier nor Lyons have 
 any illusions about the chances of their offer of mediation being 
 accepted. . . . The next step will be recognition of the South. . . . 
 A high administration official told me that if France and England 
 recognize the South, the federal government will not hesitate to 
 sever diplomatic relations. . . . What good will this recognition 
 do France and England? It will not end the war and what is more, 
 it will not procure cotton for them, and the distress of the manu- 
 facturing districts will not be lessened. It can be accomplished only 
 by forcing open the Southern ports, thus leading to a clear rupture 
 with the North. 
 
 Drouyn de Lhuys in his telegram to M. Mercier speaks of the 
 intention of the French government to seek the cooperation of 
 Russia in case of intervention. Lord Lyons . . . added that the 
 Cabinet of London desires to associate itself not only with Russia, 
 but with the other great powers so that the attempt to stop the 
 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 97 
 
 fearful bloodshed will come not only from France and England 
 but from the entire civilized world. 18 
 
 Horace Greeley, chameleonic editor of the influential Neiv York 
 Tribune, like a prophet of doom, became more and more convinced as 
 the Union government staggered under a series of sickening military 
 reverses that the South could never be subjugated. He began to clamor 
 for a compromise that would restore the Union. Beguiled by the pro- 
 fuse professions of good will of the wily French Emperor, Greeley 
 readily accepted his plan of mediation by the European powers. Per- 
 sonally and by letter Greeley urged Mercier to secure the intercession 
 of the French government to put an end to the war. Mercier naively 
 believed that Greeley was a representative spokesman, if not for 
 Lincoln's administration, then at least for the Republican Party. Rely- 
 ing on Greeley's representations, Mercier suggested that the English 
 and Russian Ministers in Washington advise their governments that the 
 time was opportune to act in the American conflict. 
 
 On January 26, 1863, the day after Lincoln had replaced General 
 Burnside with General Hooker as commander of the Army of the 
 Potomac, Stoeckl called his government's attention to Greeley's activ- 
 ities. 
 
 The Netu York Tribune, the chief organ of the radical party, 
 recently published an article in which it suggested submitting the 
 conflict between the North and the South to the arbitration of the 
 Swiss Confederation. Some days after the appearance of this 
 article, Mr. Greeley, editor of the Tribune, came to Washington 
 to confer with the Minister of France. He asked him if the French 
 government was ready to undertake mediation and assured him 
 that the good offices of Emperor Louis Napoleon would be ac- 
 cepted. He added that the article suggesting arbitration by the 
 Swiss Confederation was intended only to prepare public opinion 
 for the idea of mediation, but that after all, it was France who 
 could more ably act in this situation. 
 
 When Mercier spoke to me about this interview, I replied that it 
 was true that Mr. Greeley wielded great influence through his 
 newspaper, but that it was highly essential to find out if the request 
 which he had made was supported either by the government or by 
 members of Congress. The Minister of France replied that he 
 didn't know and added, "Since your relations with the Secretary 
 
o8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of State are older and more intimate than mine, you will perhaps 
 be better able to discuss this subject with him." I saw the Secretary 
 of State the same day and told him confidentially what M. Mercier 
 had said. Mr. Seward replied that he had not seen Mr. Greeley at all 
 and that the administration was completely opposed to his plan. 
 
 "As for the leaders of Congress," Mr. Seward said to me, "you 
 know them too well to think that they would favor foreign medi- 
 ation at a time like this." Mr. Seward asked me to tell M. Mercier 
 not to put too much faith in Mr. Greeley's words. Accordingly, I 
 told my French colleague that I shared the opinion of Mr. Seward, 
 and that I knew Mr. Greeley by reputation as a man not to be 
 trusted. However, I could only half convince M. Mercier. He 
 wrote to his government and asked for instructions and full 
 powers to act as mediator if the occasion arose. 19 
 Stoeckl then explained that although some individuals like Greeley 
 favored mediation as the only way to end hostilities, actually the gov- 
 ernment, or rather the radicals who have control of it, are strongly op- 
 posed to the idea. 
 
 It is my opinion that if the powers friendly to the United States 
 wish to stop this dreadful bloodshed by mediation, it is essential 
 to await the propitious time. Any precipitate action would only 
 serve to make more difficult the later accomplishment of this hu- 
 manitarian objective. 
 
 In the course of conversation the French Minister asked me if 
 he would be able to count on my cooperation in the event of 
 mediation. I replied to M. Mercier that I felt myself authorized to 
 offer my aid only in case that our good offices would be sought by 
 the federal government or at least upon the assurance that our 
 offices would be favorably received. As for the means of media- 
 tion, I told M. Mercier that in my opinion the action of the several 
 powers which might be called on to intercede should be strictly 
 limited to effecting the cessation of hostilities and the opening of 
 negotiations. 20 
 In a dispatch dated two weeks later, Stoeckl stated that "the Minister 
 of France ... is moving heaven and earth to bring about mediation." 
 
 For my part, I am holding myself in reserve. To people who 
 have spoken of mediation, I have replied that the intentions of 
 good will on the part of the imperial government are too well 
 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 99 
 
 known to leave any doubt about the dispatch with which we will 
 act should the proper occasion present itself, but that I could not 
 deal with this matter except directly with the federal government. 
 ... It might be that the federal government may ask or consent to 
 accept the good offices either of France alone or of France and 
 Russia, excluding England. In this case, am I authorized to act 
 jointly with the Minister of France? 
 
 Louis Napoleon's persistence in meddling with the American crisis 
 served only to strengthen the Russian Minister's oft-repeated belief that 
 the Union was permanently destroyed. As much as Stoeckl regretted 
 it, he hoped that Lincoln would make a virtue of necessity and accept 
 the inevitable by seeking cooperation with the South in a commercial 
 union and in foreign relations. In time perhaps the split sections would 
 knit together again. 
 
 On February 10, 1863, Stoeckl hastened to advise his superiors in St. 
 Petersburg of Napoleon's "latest plan of mediation" as contained in a 
 message from Drouyn de Lhuys which Mercier showed him. 
 
 It was an offer of mediation directly to the American government. 
 The note stated: 
 
 "The French government regrets that its views were not sup- 
 ported by Russia and England, and that, full of solicitude for the 
 well-being of the United States, Emperor Louis Napoleon will con- 
 tinue, with the other powers if they wish to be associated with 
 him, or alone if necessary, to make efforts to put an end to this 
 disastrous war. M. Drouyn de Lhuys proposes a means which, 
 without wounding the feelings of the nation and without stopping 
 the military operations which the federal government hopes to see 
 turn in its favor, will perhaps bring about a peaceful solution. This 
 means would consist in appointing commissioners from each side, 
 who would meet at a neutral point and who would discuss the basis 
 of an agreement while the war continued its course." 
 
 The Minister of France, on order of his government, has sent a 
 copy of this message to the Secretary of State who has promised to 
 give him a reply after consulting with the President. 
 
 I saw Mr. Seward the day before yesterday and he asked me 
 how the imperial government would regard this new stand on the 
 part of France. I replied to Mr. Seward that I could not answer 
 directly but that the message of M. Drouyn de Lhuys carefully 
 
ioo Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 avoided any suggestion of pressure, and that the proposition of 
 France was nothing more than friendly advice which coincided 
 perfectly with the thoughts on peace and conciliation which we 
 ourselves have addressed more than once to the federal govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Mr. Seward did not wish to commit himself on the reply of his 
 government, but told me that Europe was mistaken as to the situa- 
 tion of the federal government and that it had a false impression 
 of the exhaustion of the resources of the country. He expounded 
 at length on this subject and sought again to make me share the 
 illusions to which he is a prey. . . . He told me that the proposition 
 of France had no chance for success. . . . 
 
 The fact is that the men who are in power . . . know that their 
 downfall is certain the day that they stop. So they have decided to 
 go forward and brave the consequences of their acts so as to keep 
 the power which is slipping from them and prolong their political 
 existence. 21 
 
 The cabinets of the Old World were acting on the conviction that the 
 restoration of the national authority was impossible. It was a hypothesis 
 that was completely repugnant to Lincoln's feelings. He, therefore, in- 
 structed Seward to prepare a note to William L. Dayton, our Minister 
 in Paris, for the attention of Drouyn de Lhuys. It was to serve as an 
 unequivocal answer to Emperor Louis Napoleon's new proposal of 
 mediation. 
 
 The note reiterated President Lincoln's view that "the protraction 
 of the struggle has not shaken the confidence [of the federal govern- 
 ment] in the definite success of its efforts ... to preserve the integrity 
 of the country." It rejected with absolute finality the French Minister's 
 fantastic suggestion that the federal government shall appoint commis- 
 sioners to meet with the commissioners of the insurgents and enter into 
 diplomatic discussions upon the questions of "whether or not the 
 country shall not be delivered over to disunion." 22 
 
 Lincoln's firm rejection of "the latest proposal of France" was ac- 
 cording to expectations, Stoeckl observed in his next dispatch to St. 
 Petersburg. However, he hastened to take issue with Seward on "the 
 bright picture of the condition of the country" which the Secretary 
 of State painted in his note to Dayton. "Unfortunately," Stoeckl wrote, 
 "it is not a true picture." 
 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 101 
 
 He maintains that in no part of the world in ancient or modern 
 times has any nation put forth such energy and achieved such vic- 
 tories as those which have marked the progress of this contest on 
 the part of the Union. 
 
 Mr. Seward claims that the French government has a mistaken 
 notion about the existence of dissension in the North and main- 
 tains that the American people are united on the question of war; 
 that they have decided to fight on until they have subjected the 
 whole South. 
 
 No one will question the enormousness of the resources dis- 
 played by the American nation in this war. But to speak of the 
 success of the Union army and to extend them beyond any com- 
 parison in history, is to stretch exaggeration too far. It denies the 
 cold facts which are before our very eyes. The outposts of the 
 enemy are a few versts from the Capital. And only the day before 
 yesterday we could still hear the cannon of the Confederates. 
 
 The Secretary of State is no more accurate when he says that 
 the Americans are united in their desire to continue the struggle. 
 On the contrary, the people are exhausted and clamoring for peace. 
 This feeling is particularly manifest in the West where they are 
 staging open demonstrations for peace at any price. 
 
 As to the proposal of Mr. Seward to call the representatives of 
 the South to Congress, it would be strange and very embarrassing 
 if the French government were to ask him by what right the 
 deputies of the seceded States could be requested to sit in the 
 Congress at Washington. 
 
 The Secretary of State has evidently issued his message with the 
 view of producing a favorable impression on his countrymen who 
 more than any other people are subject to flattery. It must be 
 admitted the impression produced on the public by this publica- 
 tion was rather favorable to Mr. Seward. 
 
 It remains to be seen what the reaction of the Cabinet at Paris 
 will be. Here we are concerned about this as it is feared that this 
 may be the preliminary for the recognition of the South by 
 France. 
 
 A few days later Stoeckl informed St. Petersburg that Louis Napo- 
 leon's proposal of collective mediation had stirred up bitter resentment 
 throughout the United States. Northerners regard it as a decisive step 
 
102 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 toward recognition of the independence of the Confederate States by- 
 France in the near future. The radicals in Congress are taking advan- 
 tage of the rumors of impending foreign intervention by pressing for 
 their extreme measures, especially the conscription bill which is very 
 unpopular. "Senator Wilson, the author of the bill, told Congress that 
 the government regretted the necessity of imposing conscription, but 
 in view of the hostile attitude of the European powers, it was essential 
 to take all precautions for the safety of the country." 23 
 
 On March 2, Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Affairs, told the Russian Minister that he would 
 present a resolution to Congress that day declaring that any offer of 
 mediation or of intervention on the part of foreign powers will be 
 considered an unfriendly act, and offensive to the American nation. It 
 would express his feeling that Napoleon's offer to procure a joint 
 mediation in our affairs, whatever its motive, is "an encouragement to 
 rebellion." "Trampler upon the republic in France, trampler upon the 
 republic in Mexico," Sumner stated, "it remains to be seen if the French 
 Emperor can prevail as trampler upon this republic." 24 
 
 Stoeckl thought that Sumner had a purpose other than just that of 
 warning foreign powers to stop meddling in American affairs: 
 
 Congress will complete its sessions in three days and the radicals 
 fear that the President and Mr. Seward may let themselves be 
 carried away by manifestations in favor of peace which are begin- 
 ning to appear in the country and that they may accept proposals 
 for a compromise. This resolution aims to constrain the adminis- 
 tration not to retreat from the policy of all-out war. 
 
 It is to be feared that this move, prompted by the latest proposal 
 of France, may produce a bad effect in Paris. It may stir up Em- 
 peror Louis Napoleon who already, as is commonly known, is not 
 too well disposed towards the federal government. 25 
 
 Stoeckl wrote that "these resolutions were adopted without debate 
 in the waning moments of the last session. They have produced little 
 interest in the country at large and the press has scarcely taken notice 
 of them. Lord Lyons told me that the London Cabinet will not pay any 
 attention to this act of Congress. But M. Mercier is of the opinion that 
 Emperor Louis Napoleon will regard it as a gesture hostile to France." 26 
 
 Moreover, Lyons informed the Russian Minister that "England would 
 have already intervened were it not for the fact that she is convinced 
 
Domestic Trouble Invites Foreign Intervention 103 
 
 that the subjugation of the South is impossible. . . . The English want 
 cotton and want it as cheaply as possible, and it is only by the toil of 
 slaves that they can obtain it thus. They would, therefore, be loath to 
 see emancipation come about, no matter what the orators of Exeter 
 Hall may say." 27 
 
® 
 
 Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 
 
 Lincoln, aware of Russia's intense anti-British feeling and her desire to 
 maintain the balance of power — the "universal equilibrium" of which 
 the United States was so important an element — looked around for an 
 envoy to St. Petersburg possessed of the skill to reap the full benefits 
 of this fortuitous circumstance. For it was evident both to Lincoln and 
 Secretary Seward that the ability of the North to counter the hostility 
 of England and France would depend to a large degree on the measure 
 of Russian support. 
 
 For the vitally important mission to St. Petersburg, Lincoln finally 
 decided on Cassius Marcellus Clay, eminent and picturesque Kentuck- 
 ian and kinsman of the famous Henry Clay. He was one of those rare 
 specimens, a rabid antislavery Union man in a border State. A Yale 
 graduate and a veteran of the Mexican War, he published The True 
 American, a weekly newspaper devoted to the overthrow of slavery. 
 It aroused such indignant opposition that his press was seized by a mob 
 and he was threatened by public resolution with assassination. By keep- 
 ing a bowie knife and two pistols constantly on hand he managed to 
 continue his abolitionist agitations and stay alive. 
 
 Clay was a firebrand, a spell-binding orator who took his politics 
 very seriously. Once at a rally his persistent heckling provoked a pro- 
 slavery political opponent into felling him with a club and then firing 
 his pistol straight at Clay's heart. The bullet struck the scabbard of the 
 bowie knife which hung around his neck; the Kentuckian drew the 
 104 
 
Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 105 
 
 knife, began to slash and cut with it, and ended up by burying it to the 
 hilt in his assailant's body. 
 
 He came to the Republican convention in Chicago with a number of 
 Kentucky emancipationist delegates pledged to him for the presidency, 
 but at the right moment he followed Cameron, Bates and Dayton in 
 releasing his delegates to insure the nomination of Lincoln over Seward. 
 Then he received a substantial vote for the vice-presidential nomina- 
 tion, but lost out to Hannibal Hamlin. 
 
 Clay then stumped Kentucky for Lincoln's election. With victory 
 achieved, he expected his reward by an appointment to the Cabinet, 
 and did not hesitate to let Lincoln know about it. He had hoped for the 
 post of Secretary of War and had considerable support for this office. 
 But political considerations dictated that the appointment should go to 
 Simon Cameron, who had swung Pennsylvania's bloc to Lincoln at the 
 Republican convention. 
 
 Bitterly disappointed, Clay then informed the President that, "Since 
 the Cabinet was full, I will go to England or France as Minister." Lin- 
 coln replied that Seward had promised these two most important min- 
 istries to Charles Francis Adams and William L. Dayton. Undaunted, 
 Clay expressed his next preference to be the post of Minister Plenipo- 
 tentiary to Madrid, although he did not particularly care for "an old 
 effete government like Spain." But here again political considerations 
 thwarted the Kentuckian's wishes. A place had to be found for Carl 
 Schurz. A political refugee, Schurz would not be acceptable in the 
 Russian court. The Spanish post seemed to be the only spot into which 
 he could be fitted. 
 
 Clay was angry, but Lincoln promised he would not forget him. 
 Senator Baker of Oregon, with whom Clay had served in the Mexican 
 War, interceded with the President on behalf of the Kentucky poli- 
 tician. What about appointing Clay envoy to Russia? Within a few 
 days, a telegram reached Clay at his home in Lexington, Kentucky. It 
 was from Montgomery Blair, Lincoln's Postmaster General. The Presi- 
 dent was prepared to offer him the post of Minister to St. Petersburg, 
 Blair wrote. Would he accept? Quickly, on March 27, 1861, Clay 
 telegraphed Blair his reply: "For the sake of the cause I accept the 
 Russian mission." 1 The next day he wrote to the President: 
 
 I yesterday received a telegram, by the Honorable M. Blair, 
 intimating that it would be agreeable to you that I should accept 
 
106 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the mission to Russia instead of Spain, in order to allow you to 
 send (as I conjecture) Carl Schurz, Esq., to Spain; as his mission 
 to Central and Northern Europe might be offensive to those 
 powers. My family preferred Spain, as well as myself, because of 
 the climate and possible negotiations; but as I had urged the ap- 
 pointment of these German leaders to satisfactory missions for 
 Party reasons, I desire to give you assurance of my fidelity to my 
 suggestions and my personal regard for yourself, by yielding to 
 your wishes and freeing you from your embarrassment. But the 
 Court of St. Petersburg is an expensive one — even necessaries being 
 very high: So that my family are in doubt whether it will not be 
 necessary (seven of us!) to split and a part remain in the U. S., for 
 economy's sake — and this was the chief source of my disappoint- 
 ment in not having a place in the Cabinet. Many senators promised 
 to raise my salary in Spain to 15,000$, if I would accept that: I beg 
 that you will use your influence to have the Russian Mission put 
 upon an equality with the English and French 17,500$: As it is an 
 equal power, becoming cosmopolitan, full of Americans and other 
 travelers — and the most expensive Court in Europe. Another thing, 
 I must employ a private secretary who speaks French, which will 
 greatly add to my expenses. 
 
 Now, Mr. Lincoln, in consideration of my lifelong sacrifices, 
 and my being again and again put back for the Party's sake, (all of 
 which I have done with good grace) would it be too much for me 
 to ask you to gratify me at last to some extent by appointing me 
 (in case of a vacancy) Minister to France or England? 2 
 
 Clay hurried to Washington and met with Senator Baker, who as- 
 sured the Kentuckian that the President was anxious to satisfy his 
 aspirations. In an account of this meeting, Clay wrote: 
 
 Baker said, "the country was divided into personal and political 
 factions and it was hard to solidify the party — " would I not accept 
 the mission to Russia? ... I then said, "Well, Russia is a young 
 and powerful nation and must figure greatly in our affairs. I will 
 accept." Without ceremony, Baker said: "Get your hat, and we 
 will go to the White House at once." We went; and without send- 
 ing up a card we entered Lincoln's reception room. He was alone 
 and evidently awaiting us. He was quite sad and thoughtful. With 
 his head bent down in silence he awaited Baker's report, who, 
 
Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 107 
 
 without sitting down, said: "Mr. Lincoln, our friend Clay will 
 accept the Russian Mission." Lincoln then rose up, and advanced 
 rapidly toward me, firmly took my hand and said: "Clay, you have 
 relieved me from great embarrassment." 3 
 
 The Cunard Line steamer Niagara which sailed out of Boston Harbor 
 May 1, 1 86 1 for Liverpool, carried among its passengers somber, dig- 
 nified Charles Francis Adams, appointed to the arduous and important 
 post of Minister to the Court of St. James in London, and also "the 
 Kentucky ambassador," Cassius M. Clay — spectacularly dressed, gar- 
 rulous and belligerent as ever — bound for Russia. He was accompanied 
 by his wife and five children and their nurse. Henry Adams, attending 
 his father as secretary, met the frank and blunt Kentucky politician and 
 promptly labeled him a "noisy jackass." 4 Lincoln's new envoys to 
 England and Russia hardly spoke to each other during the long voyage 
 across the Atlantic. On shipboard somewhere "off Ireland" Clay penned 
 a note to the President: "I think my talent is military. . . . Make me a 
 general in the regular service . . . and I'll return home at once upon 
 notice." 5 
 
 But, landing on British soil, Clay was "persuaded by Americans to 
 have a frank talk with members of the House of Commons and House 
 of Lords, and also with Lord Palmerston . . . because our affairs were 
 not at all understood in London and on the Continent." From Paris, he 
 wrote to Secretary of State Seward: "Lord Palmerston received my 
 remarks in a very kindly spirit: so did Lord Brougham and others. I 
 was also persuaded to write a popular article for the Times on the 
 American question [which] was . . . translated and put in the French 
 papers also." 6 
 
 In his effort "to make public sentiment for our cause," Clay declared 
 that the United States was fighting for nationality and liberty. This 
 caused the London Times to comment sarcastically that it was difficult 
 to understand how "a people fighting ... to force their fellow citizens 
 to remain in a confederacy which they repudiate, can be called the 
 champions of liberty or nationalism." 7 
 
 Minister Adams was highly offended by the "Kentucky ambassa- 
 dor's" activities in England and protested that they were a trespass on 
 his own diplomatic mission. Unperturbed, Clay wrote to Secretary 
 Seward, "I have it from private and confidential sources, England — the 
 government — not the people, probably would rejoice in our calamities." 
 
108 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 But more bothersome to Clay, as he was traveling to his post of duty 
 in St. Petersburg in slow and easy stages, were his private financial 
 troubles and the high cost of serving one's country in a diplomatic 
 mission. He complained to Secretary Seward: 
 
 You have drawn my letter of credit so that I cannot get my 
 salary till I get to "my post of official duty." Here I am in the 
 midst of my journey without means — the very railroad and boat 
 fares having exhausted my advanced $1000 — I left home on the 1 1 
 day of April on my mission, and have not spent a day which was 
 not absolutely necessary since on the way — as I was detained partly 
 in Washington by you, and then by the blockade of the city. 
 
 I trust, therefore, you will send me and the Baring Brothers & 
 Company a new letter of credit giving me pay from the 10th of 
 Apr. until now: until I get to St. Petersburg. I shall go on then in 
 a few days: borrowing money of friends till I hear from you there. 
 I have a wife, five children, a nurse (8 of us) and I am compelled 
 to hire a private secretary who can speak French, at a high rate: 
 and the Russian Court is the most expensive in Europe. Under all 
 the circumstances I earnestly ask you and the President to urge 
 upon Congress at its next session on the 4th of July to raise my 
 salary to 17-J^ thousand dollars: as is the case in England and 
 France. As I do not believe the government desires me to live in a 
 worse style than the poorest Ministers here: and then not have a 
 dollar after four years service in the cause of the country, in my 
 still more advanced years. I am sorry to trouble you with these 
 private matters during the Public Crisis but the necessity with me 
 is urgent and what the department and the President intended to 
 be to me an honour will prove a humiliation. 
 
 Clay concluded by urging Seward "to call the attention of the Presi- 
 dent to this matter and show him this letter." 8 
 
 Clay finally arrived in St. Petersburg in June 1861, and was dis- 
 appointed to learn that Czar Alexander II was gone on a visit to Poland 
 where a peasants' insurrection had broken out. John Appleton, our 
 retiring Minister, presented the Kentuckian to General Tolstoi, the 
 Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. But not until a month later, when 
 the Emperor returned to St. Petersburg, did Clay formally present his 
 credentials. He went to Peterhof Palace and there met His Imperial 
 Majesty and extended to him the greetings of President Lincoln. In his 
 
Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 109 
 
 official report to Washington, Clay gave his first impressions of the 
 Russian monarch who had succeeded to the throne March 2 1855, on 
 the death of his father, the late Emperor Nicholas I. "The Emperor," 
 he wrote, "is about my size and weight, grey eyes, auburn hair." A 
 member of the American legation present on the occasion described 
 the Czar as tall and soldierly in personal appearance. "He is about forty- 
 five years of age, stoutly built and of an exquisite figure. Very hand- 
 some, rather a round face, eyes a beautiful light blue, mustache, hair 
 shingled, and of a dark auburn color. Speaks 'American/ voice pleasant 
 and looks and walks and is every inch a King." 9 
 
 As a lifelong militant abolitionist, Clay was greatly stirred by 
 Alexander II's recent edict liberating Russia's millions of serfs. He was 
 sure that Lincoln was highly elated over this epoch-making humani- 
 tarian act which had freed these slaves from the "disposition" of the 
 landed nobility. So he hastened to report to the President how he had 
 favored the Ruler of All the Russias with a stump speech, congratulating 
 him for his historic deed. "The Emperor seemed much gratified and 
 really moved," Clay wrote, and the Czar replied that Russia and Amer- 
 ica "were bound together by a common sympathy in the common 
 cause of emancipation." With unrestrained self-praise the Kentuckian 
 was eventually to boast: "I did more than any man to overthrow 
 slavery. I carried Russia with us and thus prevented what would have 
 been a strong alliance of France, England and Spain against us, and 
 thus saved the nation." 
 
 Clay also wrote to Lincoln that the Czar inquired during his visit to 
 Peterhof Palace about the reports of England's intention to interfere in 
 the American conflict. Clay advised the President that he told the 
 Emperor, "We did not care what she did, that her interference would 
 tend to unite us the more — we fought the South with reluctance." 10 
 
 In his reports to Washington, Clay told Lincoln and Seward about 
 Prince Alexander Mikhailovich Gortchakov, the Czar's Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, whose policies were to affect American affairs so 
 vitally. In the last analysis the Prince would be the one who would 
 make the vital decision whether or not Russia would join England and 
 France in an intervention in the internal affairs of the United States. 
 Prince Gortchakov was a man of medium size, about sixty years old, 
 with short hair, a little gray — shrewd and agreeable. In 1854, during 
 the Crimean War, he served the Czar as Ambassador at the Court of 
 Vienna. It was due chiefly to his influence that Austria maintained her 
 
i io Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 neutrality. Two years later he replaced Count von Nesselrode as Min- 
 ister for Foreign Affairs. In time he was to become Vice Chancellor of 
 the empire and ultimately Chancellor. He was generally regarded as 
 one of the most able and experienced statesmen in Europe. He was a 
 scholar with an expansive intellect, and also a brilliant linguist. But, 
 born an aristocrat and essentially an autocrat, he was never popular 
 with the people. • 
 
 Shortly after Clay assumed his duties in St. Petersburg, he received a 
 letter of instruction from the Secretary of State. "Nations, like indi- 
 viduals," said Seward's note, "have three prominent wants, first free- 
 dom, secondly prosperity, and thirdly, friends. The first two were 
 early secured by courage and enterprise, but in spite of singularly 
 moderate practices, the United States has been slow in winning friends." 
 
 An "exceptional case" is Russia, Seward pointed out. The surprising 
 friendship between two such remote and unlike nations may be ex- 
 plained by the fact that Russia and the United States are "both improv- 
 ing and expanding empires," one toward the East and the other toward 
 the West, each conveying civilization to new regions, and each resisted, 
 at times, by nations "jealous of its prosperity or alarmed by its ag- 
 grandizement." "It will be your pleasing duty to confirm and strengthen 
 these traditional relations of amity and friendship." 
 
 To Russians who would ask about the causes of the American Civil 
 War, Clay was instructed to explain that the object of the revolution 
 was the South's attempt to build a nation on the "principle that African 
 slavery is necessary, just and beneficent, and that it may and must be 
 expanded over the central portion of the American continent and 
 islands, without check or resistance, at whatever cost and sacrifice to 
 the welfare and happiness of the human race." 
 
 Should this revolution prove successful it would result in a "division 
 of this great and hitherto peaceful and happy country into two hostile 
 and belligerent republics," which might later break into a number of 
 petty, hostile and belligerent states. Failure of the revolution, on the 
 other hand, would have as its consequence "the continuance of the 
 country in the happy career that it has pursued so auspiciously to the 
 repose of nations and the improvement of the conditions of mankind." 
 
 Finally, Seward's letter added, the President wished but one thing of 
 Russia's Emperor: "that the Sovereign is expected to do just what this 
 government does in regard to Russia and all other nations, it refrains 
 from all intervention whatever in their political affairs and it expects 
 
Cassius Clay's Mission to Russia 1 1 1 
 
 the same just and generous forbearance in return. It has too much self- 
 respect to ask more and too high a sense of its rights to expect less." 
 
 But Clay did not confine himself to Russian- American relations. The 
 outspoken Kentuckian believed it his duty to advise Lincoln, Seward 
 and the United States government in general concerning nearly every 
 current national and international issue. Despite instructions he would 
 not restrict his dispatches to subjects concerning his ministry or those 
 of a diplomatic agent. He irritated Seward by requesting that his letters 
 be called to the attention of the President. Again and again the Secre- 
 tary of State was to caution him to confine himself to the immediate 
 purposes of his mission to Russia. But impulsively the Kentuckian 
 would write his opinions on the attitudes of the various countries of 
 Europe which regarded our Republic with "jealousy and distrust." "In 
 case of war with England," he advised the President and the Secretary 
 of State, "Canada should be seized, money sent into Ireland and India 
 to stir up revolt; slaves as property should be summarily confiscated; 
 while extending the olive branch in case the rebels lay down their arms 
 and return to duty and the Union." 
 
 He even presumed to advise Lincoln concerning his attitude toward 
 General Fremont who, contrary to the announced policy of the admin- 
 istration and to the consternation of the President, had issued a proc- 
 lamation emancipating the slaves within his military district. Clay 
 wrote from St. Petersburg to Lincoln, "I hope you will stand by Genl. 
 Fremont's proclamation — the hour has come for that vital blow to 
 secession — and the cause of all our woes." 11 
 
 Soon irritations and frictions arose between Seward and Clay, and 
 the blunt Kentuckian did not hesitate to manifest in his official corre- 
 spondence his dislike for the Secretary of State, Senator Sumner — 
 Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, and all others 
 whom he suspected of obstructing his activities. 
 
 On July 25, 1 86 1 Clay wrote a private note to President Lincoln to 
 compliment him on his July 5 message to Congress, which, according 
 to the Minister to Russia, "is published in all the European journals": 
 
 I hope you will believe me when I say it is a very able paper, 
 and one which will add to your reputation very much. It comes 
 forcibly to the point, in that simplicity of words and structures of 
 sentences which is the true style of all great effort. I rejoice that 
 you have pursued steadily your way to this one end — the reunion 
 
1 1 2 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of the Union. The St. Petersburg Journal in summing up its judg- 
 ment of the message says, "The message of the President of the 
 United States is moderate in its tone {dans la forme), clear in its 
 style, firm in the maintenance of principles, trustful of the future 
 of the republic." It has produced a good effect upon the European 
 press. 
 
 Clay was sure that President Lincoln would be interested in his own 
 observations concerning the attitude of the great European powers 
 toward the United States. So he cautioned the President to be on his 
 guard against England: 
 
 I saw at a glance where the feeling of England was. They hoped 
 for our ruin! They are jealous of our power. They care neither for 
 the South nor the North. They hate both. Even the London Times 
 at this late date in concluding its comments upon your message 
 says, "And when we prefer a frank recognition of Southern inde- 
 pendence by the North to the policy avowed in the President's 
 message, it is solely because we foresee as bystanders that this is 
 the issue in which after infinite loss and humiliation the contest 
 must result." And that is the tone of England everywhere. Of 
 course, the hope is the father of the conclusion. Seeing that was 
 the spirit of the English, I thought the true policy was to set them 
 at defiance. . . . 
 
 Our only hope was to conciliate France, and to this end all our 
 efforts have been directed. The consequence was that while Eng- 
 land was on the way to allow privateers to bring their prizes into 
 English ports — which would have brought us at once to war, the 
 French Emperor refused: and only then, as he admitted to the 
 House of Commons, did Lord Palmerston following in the wake 
 of the French, come to the conclusion! If England would not favor 
 us, whilst following the lead of the antislavery policy — she will 
 never be our friend. She will now if disaster comes upon our arms, 
 join our enemies! Be on your guard. ... I think our policy is for 
 the future to keep upon the best terms with France: Her people 
 love and admire us — the Emperor though not a man to give way to 
 sentimentality, is friendly: After all the billing and cooing between 
 England and France, England fears and France hatesl They can 
 never be long friends. . . . 
 
 All the Russian journals are for us. . . . In Russia also we have a 
 
C as sius Clay's Mission to Russia 113 
 
 friend. The time is coming when she will be a powerful one for us. 
 The emancipation move is the beginning of a new era and new 
 strength. She has immense lands, fertile and undeveloped in the 
 Amoor country, with iron and other minerals. Here is where she 
 must make the centre of her power as against England. Joined with 
 our navy on the Pacific Coast we will one day drive her from the 
 Indies: The source of her power: and losing which she will fall. 
 
 Then Clay proceeded to tell the President how to conduct the war. 
 "You are now pressing war rightly. Go into the slave States and their 
 power is gone. The sooner you send troops into them — Tennessea — 
 [sic] the better for them and us. You thus save the Union men and 
 destroy the resources of the cotton States." Clay went on to recom- 
 mend the sending of troops down the Mississippi, and to extend the 
 blockade to every possible place of entry — "so that if England does 
 break in — she will be the aggressor before all the world. Don't trust 
 her in anything." 
 
 Clay took advantage of this note to the President again to urge an 
 increase in his salary. "I find this court more expensive than I was told 
 even. It is not possible for us to live here on 12,000$, without having 
 all my family excluded from court and entertainments, which we can- 
 not reciprocate. I could live on 15,000$. If my salary is not raised, I 
 shall be forced to return home: for Russian etiquette requires certain 
 forms and style which cannot be evaded without disgrace — which 
 would make my presence worse than useless. As the government allows 
 me no private secretary, I have been compelled to employ a French 
 one at my own cost." 12 
 
 But President Lincoln, burdened with the colossal task of crushing 
 a widespread rebellion, had other things to worry about. 
 
Cameron's "Exile to Siberia" 
 
 By the light of the midnight sun Cassius Clay continued to pen long 
 notes to Seward on sundry subjects and appeals to President Lincoln to 
 get his $12,000 salary raised. He was sinking deeper and deeper into 
 debt, he wrote. He might have saved a few dollars had he been ap- 
 pointed Minister to Madrid, as he had requested; now he longed for a 
 return to the United States. If a vacancy would occur in the Cabinet, 
 he wanted to be given first consideration. He would prefer the navy 
 post. Otherwise he would be better off with a commission in the regular 
 army. Nothing would please him more than to don the uniform of a 
 general and fight for the antislavery cause. 1 
 
 It was a fortunate circumstance for President Lincoln, who had be- 
 come highly displeased with Simon Cameron as Secretary of War. The 
 Pennsylvania politician's slovenly administration of the War Depart- 
 ment and his sudden advocacy of freeing and arming the slaves made 
 his dismissal imperative. But Lincoln was in a dilemma as to the means 
 of easing him out without inflicting loss of face and without creating 
 too great a public furore. 
 
 Then suddenly on January 11, 1862 the harrassed President dashed 
 off a couple of notes for delivery to his incompetent war minister. The 
 one that was made public was curt. It read: 
 
 Hon. Simon Cameron, Secretary of War 
 My dear Sir: 
 
 As you have more than once expressed a desire for a change of 
 position, 1 can now gratify you consistently with my view of the 
 114 
 
Cameron } s "Exile to Siberia" 115 
 
 public interest. I therefore propose nominating you to the Senate 
 next Monday as Minister to Russia. 
 
 Very sincerely , your friend 
 A. Lincoln. 2 
 
 But on the same day in a private communication to Cameron, Lincoln 
 discussed the situation in a less formal manner. He had not been un- 
 mindful of Cameron's long-expressed wish to resign, he wrote. "I have 
 been only unwilling to consent to a change at a time and under cir- 
 cumstances which might give occasion to misconstruction, and unable 
 till now to see how misconstruction could be avoided." Now he had a 
 solution. Cassius Clay's mission to St. Petersburg was about to end. He 
 was going to be appointed a major general of the army. This turn of 
 events enabled Lincoln to gratify Cameron's wish to resign, 
 
 and at the same time evince my personal regard for you, and my 
 confidence in your ability, patriotism, and fidelity to public trust. 
 I therefore tender to your acceptance, if you still desire to resign 
 your present position, the post of Minister to Russia. Should you 
 accept it, you will bear with you the assurance of my undiminished 
 confidence, of my affectionate esteem, and of my sure expectation 
 that, near the great sovereign whose personal and hereditary 
 friendship for the United States so much endear him to Americans, 
 you will be able to render services to your country no less impor- 
 tant than those you could render at home." 3 
 
 Thus by banishing Cameron to the faraway, cold, damp, foggy 
 Russian capital did Lincoln get him out of the vital war secretaryship 
 where he had proved himself a misfit. As a diplomatic exile on the banks 
 of the late-thawing Neva River, this political troublemaker could do 
 little mischief at home. This prompted Vanity Fair to publish a derisive 
 cartoon depicting the President as saying to Cameron: "I am resolved 
 what to do, Simon. I will send you to St. Petersburg where you may 
 serve nobly the cause of your country at the Court of the Kezzar." 
 
 In a reply to the President, predated January 1 1 , the Cabinet 
 officer, though deeply hurt by his "exile to Siberia," nevertheless ex- 
 pressed gratitude for Lincoln's confidence in his "ability, patriotism and 
 fidelity to public trust." "I have done my best. It was impossible, in the 
 direction of operations so extensive, but that some mistakes should have 
 happened and some complications and complaints should have arisen." 
 
1 1 6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 The "proffer for my acceptance [of] one of the highest diplomatic 
 positions at your bestowal" is "an additional mark of your confidence 
 and esteem. ... I, therefore, frankly accept the new distinction you 
 have tendered me. . . ." 4 Although no Cabinet officer had ever received 
 a more complimentary endorsement from a President than did Cam- 
 eron, the new envoy regarded the shift to the post of Minister Pleni- 
 potentiary to Peterhof Palace as political degradation. He "was affected 
 even to tears, and wept bitterly over . . . [the] personal affront from 
 Lincoln." 5 
 
 Members of the United States Senate wrestled long behind closed 
 doors with the question of Cameron's confirmation. Some attacked the 
 appointment as the whitewash of an incompetent and unfaithful public 
 servant. Others branded it as an immoral act. But after four days of 
 protracted debate and wrangling the ousted Secretary of War was 
 confirmed as Minister to Russia by a vote of 28 to 14. Said the New 
 York Herald: "The array against the nomination . . . deprive the con- 
 firmation of any complimentary complexion, and amount to a censure 
 of the conduct of the War Department." 6 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, a Pennsylvania lawyer and an i860 Democrat 
 who had served in Buchanan's Cabinet, was named by President Lincoln 
 to the war secretaryship. This despite the fact that only a few months 
 before his appointment he had voiced open and bitter opposition to 
 the administration. 
 
 Lincoln's nomination of Cameron as our Russian envoy and the 
 Senate's reluctant confirmation were met with derision by a hostile 
 press. Leslie's Weekly captioned its comment, "The Exiles of Siberia." 
 It declared: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln has a wide reputation as a humorist. The nomination 
 of Mr. Cameron to St. Petersburg, which is a long way on the road 
 to Siberia, looks as if he were addicted to practical joking. It would 
 be no joke for the ex-Secretary of War, however, if the Czar were 
 to take his appointment as a hint to "pass him on" to that land of 
 penance, and the companionship of that goodly company of army 
 contractors and speculators whose exploits in the Crimean War 
 failed to receive the imperial approval! 
 
 Harper's Weekly lampooned the affair by picturing Cameron with 
 a packed carpetbag in his hand, standing at the desk of the Secretary of 
 
Cameron's "Exile to Siberia''' 1 17 
 
 the Navy, and saying: "Good-by Welles. I'm off for Russia. There's 
 too much talk of hanging here to suit me!" 
 
 Thus did Simon Cameron, the political czar of Pennsylvania, under- 
 take the mission to meet the Czar of all the Russias and to represent the 
 United States in that cold capital city beyond the Baltic Sea where a 
 predecessor, James Buchanan, had once complained that "the tall wood 
 stoves failed to heat decently the big rooms." 
 
 Cassius Clay, sitting in his cold chambers in St. Petersburg awaiting 
 news from Washington of his replacement by a successor, took his quill 
 in hand and wrote to Secretary Seward concerning numerous subjects. 
 Among the leading topics of diplomatic conversations in the chancel- 
 leries of the continent was the subject of European intervention in the 
 American conflict. So, on April 13, 1862, from far-away St. Petersburg, 
 the Kentuckian felt it incumbent upon himself to impart this advice to 
 Lincoln and Seward: 
 
 Since steam can throw, in twelve days or less, the entire navies 
 of Europe upon our country, it is useless to deceive ourselves with 
 the idea that we can isolate ourselves from European interventions. 
 We became in spite of ourselves — the Monroe Doctrine — Wash- 
 ington's Farewell — and all that — a part of the "balance of power," 
 and constitute a portion of that "universal equilibrium" of which 
 Prince Gortchakov so aptly spoke. We must then strengthen our- 
 selves like other nations. . . . We must make and keep a navy equal 
 to any other nation. This we can well do without jeopardizing our 
 liberties. . . . Here has been the secret of English liberty — a small 
 army, and a large navy. Let us go, and do likewise. 7 
 
 Not until a package of weeks-old newspapers arrived by steamer 
 from the United States was Clay to learn about Cameron's appoint- 
 ment. Reading the general condemnation of the Pennsylvanian's unsat- 
 isfactory record as Secretary of War, the outspoken, retiring Minister 
 characterized Cameron's appointment to the court of St. Petersburg as 
 "a parachute to let him down gently." 
 
 By the time Cameron and Bayard Taylor, his Charge d'AfTaires, 
 arrived in St. Petersburg in June 1862, Clay had undergone a change of 
 heart about quitting the Russian ministry. In a "private" letter to Presi- 
 dent Lincoln, the unpredictable Kentuckian complained: 
 
1 1 8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 My appointment as General came so late and so unexpectedly, that 
 I had made up my mind to worry it out here, and by sending my 
 family home, I had made arrangements for a stay here and made 
 the necessary expenditures accordingly. I have several thousand of 
 roubles of property here, which is usually turned over to succes- 
 sors — but Mr. Cameron cannot buy: he says he will positively ask 
 leave to retire from this post at the end of the next quarter, the ist 
 of Sept. next. He proposes to come home on your leave of absence, 
 and then remain. So not knowing what you propose to do for me 
 after the war into which I have long since lost all hopes of taking 
 any efficient part, as you now have already too many generals in 
 the field, I ask that you will return me to this court on Mr. 
 Cameron's leaving. For at this season it is impossible to sell second- 
 hand property for anything like its value, and I have concluded to 
 let Mr. Cameron use some of it and store the balance till I see you 
 and know your intentions in respect to me. As I said before, I am 
 now in a much worse pecuniary condition than when I entered 
 the public service, but have hopes of being again sent here to save 
 in part my outlay, and some of my salary in the future. 
 
 I am mortified to have to trouble you so much with my "private 
 griefs" but circumstances compel me to smother all ill-timed sensi- 
 bility upon this subject. 8 
 
 Clay's request to remain in St. Petersburg was not granted. Although 
 Cameron kept delaying his departure for his post of duty in the domain 
 of the Czars, he eventually began his "exile in Siberia." He presented 
 his credentials to the Emperor, and within a few days he dispatched a 
 request to Secretary Seward in Washington for leave to return to the 
 United States. 
 
 Before Cameron's reluctant departure on his mission to Russia, Lin- 
 coln advised him that, after settling down to his new duties in St. 
 Petersburg, he should endeavor to secure a personal and confidential 
 interview with the Czar to learn the Russian monarch's attitude in the 
 event England and France forced their unwelcome intervention. 
 Shortly afterwards, Cameron reported that the Czar's spokesmen as- 
 sured him that in case of trouble with the other European powers, the 
 friendship of Russia for the United States would be shown in a "deci- 
 sive manner, which no other nation will be able to mistake." 9 
 
 The Russians were evincing the most candid friendship for the 
 
Cameron' f s "Exile to Siberia" 1 19 
 
 North, our new Minister wrote to Secretary Seward. The government, 
 he stated, was showing a "constant desire to interpret everything to our 
 advantage. There is no capital in Europe where the loyal American 
 meets with such universal sympathy as at St. Petersburg, none where 
 the suppression of our unnatural rebellion will be hailed with more 
 genuine satisfaction." Heartened by such dispatches from Cameron, 
 Secretary of State Seward wrote to John Bigelow, United States Con- 
 sul at Paris, on June 25, 1862: 
 
 Between you and myself alone, I have a belief that the European 
 state, whichever one it may be, that commits itself to intervention 
 anywhere in North America, will sooner or later fetch up in the 
 arms of a native of an oriental country not especially distinguished 
 for amiability of manners or temper. ... It might be well if it were 
 known in Europe that we are no longer alarmed by demonstrations 
 of interference. 10 
 
 During his brief sojourn in the Russian Capital, Cameron had a very 
 capable and dependable assistant in Bayard Taylor, serving as Secretary 
 of the United States legation. He had succeeded Green Clay, nephew 
 of Minister Cassius Clay, who had returned to the United States with 
 his uncle. Taylor, a poet and author of travel volumes, novels and 
 magazine articles, accepted the minor diplomatic post confident that it 
 would be a stepping stone to something more important — perhaps the 
 St. Petersburg ministry itself, since he knew with what reluctance 
 Cameron had accepted the appointment. 
 
 Only ten days after being presented to Czar Alexander II at Peterhof 
 Palace, Cameron was already writing to Secretary Seward expressing 
 his desire for a furlough. He chafed under the restraints of his "Siberian 
 exile." He had no desire for St. Petersburg's notorious excessively cold, 
 long and gloomy winter nights and debilitating social functions. He 
 was anxious to resume active political life by standing again for the 
 United States Senate from Pennsylvania. 11 
 
 Bayard Taylor, now as Charge d'AfTaires, nursed even brighter hopes 
 of becoming Cameron's successor. He was sure Secretary Seward "can 
 testify from my dispatches, that I am fully capable of conducting the 
 legation." Taylor was encouraged by the Secretary of State's note ad- 
 vising that President Lincoln had expressed gratification regarding his 
 services. But the unpredictable Cassius Clay, strutting around in Wash- 
 ington with his shoulder straps of a major general, was writing the 
 
120 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 President: "I . . . await your pleasure about again entering upon [diplo- 
 matic] service as you promised me. ... I trust you will allow him 
 [General Cameron] to come home at once on leave of absence and he 
 will resign so you will not lose public money by such leave." 12 
 
 Even if his duties as Major General took him into the field, Clay 
 wanted Lincoln to know "I don't mean to waive my right to avail my- 
 self of your kind promise to allow me— should Mr. Cameron resign — 
 or be recalled — to return to St. Petersburg as your Minister." 13 
 
 In the meantime Clay was causing the administration considerable 
 embarrassment by his intemperate speeches on behalf of emancipation. 
 He had reported to Lincoln on his return from Russia that all over 
 Europe he had found governments ready to intervene in America's 
 affairs and recognize the independence of the Confederate States. He 
 insisted that only a forthright proclamation of emancipation would 
 block these European autocracies. Russia had emancipated her serfs. 
 Why does not democratic America liberate her slaves? In a speech at 
 Odd Fellows' Hall in Washington, Clay declared: 
 
 I think that I can say without implications of profanity or want 
 of deference, that since the days of Christ himself such a happy and 
 glorious privilege has not been reserved to any other man to do 
 that amount of good; and no man has ever more gallantly or nobly 
 done it than Alexander II, the Czar of Russia. I refer to the eman- 
 cipation of the 23,000,000 serfs. Here, then, fellow citizens, was 
 the place to look for an ally. Trust him; for your trust will not be 
 misplaced. Stand by him and he will, as he has often declared to 
 me he will, stand by you. Not only Alexander but his whole family 
 are with you, men, women, and children. 14 
 
 Thus imbued with the ideal of emancipation, Clay declared openly 
 for liberation of the slaves captured in war, and of those of all the States 
 in rebellion. Meeting with opposition from Lincoln's administration, 
 Clay was eager to return to Europe, if he could. For, as he said, "What 
 was the use of fighting for the old Union with the cancer of slavery 
 left?" 15 
 
 Lincoln commissioned Clay to sound out public opinion on emanci- 
 pation in his own State of Kentucky. He also invited the Kentuckian's 
 opinion on the practicability of a plan to restore Florida to the Union 
 by armed colonization. The first chore enabled Clay to deliver more 
 speeches on emancipation. In Frankfort he declared, "If fall we must, 
 
Cameron's "Exile to Siberia" 121 
 
 let us fall with the flag of universal liberty and justice nailed to the mast 
 head. . . . The autocracies of Europe would not hesitate to destroy a 
 republic but they would not dare to interfere in behalf of slavery." 
 Regarding the President's Florida plan of armed colonization, Clay 
 stated it was "highly practical. . . . What can be done in Florida can be 
 done in Texas and other slave States." 16 
 
 There was a danger, Lincoln was advised, that Clay's unrestrained 
 agitation for emancipation would yet drive Kentucky into joining the 
 secessionist States of the South. So upon learning of Cameron's deter- 
 mination to resign his Russian ministry, Lincoln decided to send Clay 
 back to St. Petersburg, upon receipt of Cameron's formal resignation, 
 and notified the Kentuckian accordingly. 
 
 Clay promptly tendered his own resignation as Major General of 
 volunteers in the United States army— "to take effect on the resignation 
 of Simon Cameron, Esq. as Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia. I do 
 this to avail myself of your kind promise to send me back to my former 
 mission to the Court of St. Petersburg and where I flatter myself that 
 I can better serve my country than in the field under General Halleck 
 who cannot repress his hatred of liberal men into the ordinary courte- 
 sies of life [sic]." 11 
 
 Clay then reminded the President that the 1 ,000th anniversary of 
 Russia's national existence was being celebrated there with great pomp 
 and ceremony. In view of the Emperor's known expressions of sym- 
 pathy for the cause of the Union, "would it not be well to write him 
 an autograph letter of congratulation?" 18 
 
 Within less than a year after his appointment as envoy to Russia, 
 Cameron resigned, and President Lincoln nominated Clay for re- 
 appointment to his former diplomatic post. But much opposition arose 
 in the Senate against confirmation. Greatly alarmed, Clay wrote to the 
 President: 
 
 I am informed that the Committee of Foreign Relations will 
 report against me on the ground that I am unacceptable to the 
 Russian government. It is a false allegation. I can show more evi- 
 dences of the good feeling of the Russian Court than any Minister 
 
 there I have letters at home of the most flattering kind from 
 
 Prince Gortchakov before and since my arrival here. Baron de 
 Stoeckl called on me today and says if you will send for him he 
 would make a most favorable report of me. Please send for him 
 
122 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 and write to the Committee who takes the vote in the morning. 
 Don't allow me to be slaughtered by a calumny. I have stood by 
 you in good and evil report, and hope now you will see justice 
 done me. 19 
 
 After a long delay, the Senate finally approved the reappointment 
 of the controversial Kentuckian to the Court of St. Petersburg. Then 
 immediately a new vexation arose to annoy the President. This time it 
 was a strange controversy between Clay and Secretary Seward over 
 the naming of a Secretary of legation. 
 
 Bayard Taylor was bitterly disappointed over his failure to be se- 
 lected as Cameron's successor. He had superior qualifications for the 
 post, he wrote to a friend in Philadelphia. 
 
 On the other hand, a man (entre nous) who made the legation a 
 laughing stock, whose incredible vanity and astonishing blunders 
 are still the talk of St. Petersburg, and whose dispatches disgrace 
 the State Department that allows them to be printed, will probably 
 be allowed to come back to his ballet girls (his reason for coming) 
 by our softhearted Abraham Lincoln. Let the government send a 
 man who will not be laughed at — who has a grain of prudence and 
 one drachm of common sense, with a few moral scruples — and I 
 shall gladly give up all my pretensions and go home. From my 
 private correspondence I know that Lincoln says Clay is not fit for 
 my place, but he is an elephant on my hands, and I guess I will 
 give it to him! 
 
 Secretary Seward had high regard for Taylor's ability and services. 
 He desired that he should at least be retained in his position as Secretary 
 of legation. But Clay wished to appoint Henry Bergh, the eccentric son 
 of a wealthy shipowner whom General Hooker and General Butterfleld 
 had recommended highly. Going over the head of the Secretary of 
 State, Clay wrote directly to the President, "I trust you will allow me 
 to choose my Secretary as I was allowed no patronage in Ky. but the 
 appointment of my nephew Green Clay." 20 Two weeks later from New 
 York, he wrote another letter of bitter complaint to the President be- 
 cause the Secretary of State had ordered him "to set off to St. Peters- 
 burg and leave the subject of Secretary of legation — there was already 
 one at that place." Clay declared he had asked Bayard Taylor if he were 
 
Cameron *s "Exile to Siberia''' 123 
 
 interested in remaining as Secretary of legation, and he had "peremp- 
 torily declined." 
 
 Yet Mr. Seward accuses me of treating B. Taylor badly, by 
 asking my legal rights of a Secretary. You see all this is merely a 
 pretext to insult me by insulting my friends. Mr. Henry Bergh is 
 a descendant of American ancestors of revolutionary fame: is a 
 man who speaks most of the modern languages — is an author — and 
 in every way my or Mr. Seward's equal. Yet he is insulted because 
 I ask his appointment. The custom in all Europe is for the minister 
 to appoint his secretary — for the most obvious reasons. It has 
 always been the custom in this country. I feel that I have this 
 right. 
 
 It wouldn't be just to him, Clay protested, to have "a Seward spy in 
 my house. I name Wm. H. Bergh as my Secretary and no other can 
 render me any service. If a Sewardite is thrust upon me I shall regard 
 it as an unfriendly act on your part." 
 
 Clay had more complaints for the harassed President. "The rebels 
 have ruined my already poor means of living by their continuous raids." 
 Now Seward was delaying his letter of credit, and he was unable to 
 get a civil answer from the Department of State. "Mr Lincoln, I am 
 poor but honest. You have given me an office. I have discharged it faith- 
 fully and to the interest of my country — treat me justly. ... I grieve to 
 trouble you with this matter, or any matter. But I am not master of my 
 own movements. I am in the hands of men who seek my ruin. I ask 
 your protection." 21 
 
 In the meantime, Bayard Taylor, piqued by his failure to win promo- 
 tion and unwilling to remain as a subordinate to a man for whose ability 
 he had little regard, resigned as Secretary of legation. When Clay ar- 
 rived in St. Petersburg in the spring of 1863, he was accompanied by 
 his new Secretary — Henry Bergh. A dandy who wore clothes adorned 
 with gold lace, America's new Secretary of legation was soon to be- 
 come a notorious character in that far-off capital of the Czars. 
 
 Clay was to remain as Minister until 1869; he was resolved to outlast 
 Secretary Seward, whom he despised. 
 
® 
 
 United States and Russia: 
 Strange Bedfellows 
 
 The "traditional relations of amity and friendship" between the United 
 States and Russia which Ministers Clay and Cameron were instructed 
 "to confirm and strengthen" during their respective missions to St. 
 Petersburg, were the incongruous relations between two of the most 
 mismated international bedfellows in all recorded history. 
 
 No two civilized nations were more unlike than the United States, 
 where the people had elected Abraham Lincoln President, and imperial 
 Russia, where Czar Alexander II ruled by the divine right of kings. 
 Their peoples had different backgrounds, different cultures, different 
 outlooks on life. Russia of the Czars was an absolute monarchy — the 
 most repressive despotism on earth, where the Emperor reigned without 
 any constitutional limitations whatsoever. The Republic of the United 
 States — with its government of the people, by the people, for the 
 people — was the most liberal democracy in the world, hated and feared 
 by the autocrats of Europe. James Buchanan, U. S. Minister at St. 
 Petersburg (1832-33), had observed that the Czar's regime was mor- 
 bidly "afraid of the contamination of liberty." Russian imperialists 
 would have been pleased to see American democracy destroyed. The 
 expected end of the Union was regarded in St. Petersburg as a "turn 
 for the better." Even a friend like Stoeckl predicted that the downfall 
 of the democratic system "will serve as an instructive lesson to Euro- 
 pean anarchists . . . revolutionaries and demagogues . . . who have 
 124 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 125 
 
 always found moral support and often also material help in American 
 democracy." 
 
 But Russia's great enemy — England — was also our rival. Out of a 
 common hatred and fear of England emerged an "historic friendship" 
 between two mismated great nations. In practical world politics, the 
 enemies of our enemies are our friends. George Mifflin Dallas, an earlier 
 Minister at the Court of St. Petersburg than Clay and Cameron (1837- 
 39), had duly recorded these significant words of Czar Nicholas I in his 
 diary: "Not only are our interests alike, but," with emphasis, "our 
 enemies are the same." 1 
 
 Americans in general and Abraham Lincoln in particular had nothing 
 but contempt for the repressive despotism of the Czar's government, 
 and the antagonism toward a republican form of government was re- 
 ciprocated by the Russian ruling class. And yet despite the incompati- 
 bility of their political principles the two nations were thrown into the 
 strangest of alliances — an entente cordiale — which was to prove of 
 supreme importance to both. Poles apart ideologically, the extremes 
 nevertheless met in political collaboration. 
 
 The threads of the tradition of Russian-American friendship, spun 
 through the years because the two nations had a common rival in Great 
 Britain, wove naturally into the fabric of a political rapprochement 
 which brought strength and encouragement to Lincoln and the Czar at 
 a time when both governments were badly in need of friends. This 
 friendly relationship between two nations, so remote and so unlike, 
 excited much surprise. But it was realistic international politics in 
 full play. 
 
 With the governments of Great Britain and France watching like 
 vultures to intervene in the American conflict in order to make the 
 sectional split permanent; with Spain sharing the official feelings of 
 these two powers because of her own desire for a reconquest of Santo 
 Domingo; with Austria who had furnished the puppet Archduke for 
 Napoleon Ill's enterprise in Mexico, eager for the success of that ven- 
 ture; and with most of the other nations openly unfriendly or indiffer- 
 ent to the outcome of the American civil conflict, President Lincoln, 
 in his desperate struggle to save a great nation from falling apart, could 
 look to only one major power for help or active sympathy — Russia, 
 "where they make no pretense of loving liberty." 
 
 Through the two years or more while the wily, scheming Emperor 
 
n6 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of France persisted in his efforts for concerted aggressive intervention 
 by England, France and Russia in the American Civil War — a course 
 intended to split the Union for all time — despotic Russia was the 
 North's only dependable well-wisher among the European powers. 
 While the outcome of the war of secession was still uncertain, Russia's 
 attitude restrained France and England from proceeding with their 
 plan of intervention which inevitably would have led to the recognition 
 of the sovereignty and independence of the Confederate States. 
 
 Lincoln, striving with might and main to save the world's great 
 experiment in democracy, quickly saw in Russia the one possible ally 
 who might be counted on to help in the event of trouble with England 
 and France. In his nation's hour of need, Lincoln eagerly clasped the 
 only hand extended to him, even though it was the hand of a colossus 
 of barbarism and reaction. Despite Stoeckl's reports expressing lack of 
 confidence in Lincoln's leadership and in the Union's chances for sur- 
 vival, Czar Alexander II ranged himself openly and enthusiastically on 
 the side of Lincoln and the Union. While France and England were 
 waiting for the United States to break into two weak republics, Russian 
 policy required the perpetuation of a united American nation as an 
 essential element in the "universal equilibrium." 
 
 At a time when zeal for Russian participation in the French plan to 
 intervene in the American conflict was gaining strength, the Journal of 
 St. Petersburg, the official organ of the Czar's government, declared: 
 
 Russia entertains for the United States of America a lively sym- 
 pathy founded on sentiments of mutual friendship and on common 
 interests. She considers their prosperity necessary to the general 
 equilibrium. She is convinced that the American nation can only 
 find in the preservation of the Union the conditions of power and 
 prosperity which she wishes to see it enjoy. 2 
 
 "We desire above all things the maintenance of the American 
 Union as an indivisible nation," the Czar declared. For the imperial 
 Cabinet was deeply concerned, for Russia's own good, that nothing 
 should happen that would weaken the one powerful counterpoise to 
 England. It was Russia that gave the United States government the first 
 notice early in 1861 of the efforts of the French Emperor to effect a 
 coalition of the three great European powers against the North. 
 
 In Secretary Seward's memorandum, Some Thoughts for the Presi- 
 dent's Consideration, he urged that an explanation be demanded from 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 127 
 
 Russia because of reports in Southern newspapers and in political circles 
 in Washington that Russia was about to open diplomatic relations with 
 the Confederacy. In marked contrast was his dispatch of May 6, 1861 
 to Clay, in which he stated that "that power [Russia] was an early, and 
 it has always been a constant, friend." 
 
 While the specter of united intervention was haunting Lincoln and 
 Seward, Prince Gortchakov dispatched a note to Baron de Stoeckl in 
 Washington expressing the profound regrets of Czar Alexander II over 
 the troubles that were befalling the United States — "a nation to which 
 our August Master and all Russia have pledged the most friendly in- 
 terest." The Emperor, wrote the Czar's Chancellor and Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs, desired his Washington envoy to convey to President 
 Lincoln his cordial sympathy and the assurance that the United States 
 could continue to count on Russia's friendship. As a practical demon- 
 stration of this friendship, Prince Gortchakov had already assured U. S. 
 Minister Clay that the North would be granted the right to carry prizes 
 into Russian ports. 
 
 Gortchakov's message to Stoeckl, dated July 10, 1861, (Old Style), 
 was intended for President Lincoln's eyes. Speaking for the Emperor 
 himself, the Minister for Foreign Affairs said in the note: 
 
 From the beginning of the conflict which divides the United 
 States of America, you have been desired to make known to the 
 federal government the deep interest with which our August 
 Master has been observing the development of a crisis which puts 
 in question the prosperity and even the existence of the Union. 
 
 The Emperor profoundly regrets that the hope of a peaceful 
 solution is not realized, and that American citizens, already in arms 
 against each other, are ready to let loose upon their country the 
 most formidable of the scourges of political society — civil war. 
 
 For the more than eighty years that it has existed the American 
 Union owes its independence, its towering rise, and its progress, to 
 the concord of its members, consecrated, under the auspices of its 
 illustrious founders, by institutions which have been able to recon- 
 cile union with liberty. This union has been fruitful. It has ex- 
 hibited to the world the spectacle of a prosperity without example 
 in the annals of history. 
 
 It would be deplorable if, after so conclusive an experience, the 
 
128 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 United States should be hurried into a breach of the solemn com- 
 pact which up to this time has made their power. 
 
 In spite of the diversity of their constitutions and of their in- 
 terests, and perhaps even because of this diversity, Providence 
 seems to urge them to draw closer the traditional bond which is 
 the basis and the very condition of their political existence. In any 
 event, the sacrifices which they might impose upon themselves to 
 maintain it are beyond comparison with those which dissolution 
 would bring after it. United, they perfect themselves; isolated, 
 they are paralyzed. 
 
 The struggle which unhappily has just arisen can neither be in- 
 definitely prolonged, nor lead to the total destruction of one of the 
 parties. Sooner or later it will be necessary to come to some settle- 
 ment, whatever it may be, which may enable the divergent interests 
 now actually in conflict to coexist. 
 
 The American nation would, then, give a proof of high political 
 wisdom in seeking in common such a settlement before a useless 
 effusion of blood, a barren squandering of strength and of public 
 riches, and acts of violence and reciprocal reprisals, shall have 
 come to deepen an abyss between the two parties to the confedera- 
 tion, to end definitely in their mutual exhaustion, and in the ruin, 
 perhaps irreparable, of their commercial and political power. 
 
 Our August Master cannot resign himself to admit such deplor- 
 able anticipations. His Imperial Majesty still places his confidence 
 in that practical good sense of the citizens of the Union, who ap- 
 preciate so judiciously their true interests. His Majesty is happy to 
 believe that the members of the federal government and the in- 
 fluential men of the two parties will seize all occasions and will 
 unite all their efforts to calm the effervescence of the passions. 
 There are no interests so divergent that it may not be possible to 
 reconcile them, by laboring to that end with zeal and perseverance, 
 in a spirit of justice and moderation. 
 
 If, within the limits of your friendly relations, your language and 
 your counsels may contribute to this result, you will respond, sir, 
 to the intentions of His Majesty the Emperor, in devoting to this 
 rhe personal influence which you may have been able to acquire 
 during your long residence at Washington, and the consideration 
 ivhich belongs to your character as the representative of a sov- 
 ereign animated by the most friendly sentiments toward the Amer- 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 129 
 
 ican Union. This Union is not simply in our eyes an element 
 essential to the universal political equilibrium. It constitutes, be- 
 sides, a nation to which our August Master and all Russia have 
 pledged the most friendly interest; for the two countries, placed 
 at the extremities of the two worlds, both in the ascending period 
 of their development, appear called to a natural community of in- 
 terests and of sympathies, of which they have already given mutual 
 proofs to each other. 
 
 I do not wish here to approach any of the questions which 
 divide the United States. We are not called upon to express our- 
 selves in this contest. The preceding considerations have no other 
 object than to attest the lively solicitude of the Emperor, in pres- 
 ence of the dangers which menace the American Union, and the 
 sincere wishes which His Majesty entertains for the maintenance 
 of that great work, so laboriously raised, which appeared so rich 
 in its future. 
 
 It is in this sense, sir, that I desire you to express yourself, as well 
 to the members of the general government as to influential persons 
 whom you may meet, giving them the assurance that in every 
 event the American nation may count upon the most cordial 
 sympathy on the part of our August Master, during the serious 
 crisis which it is passing through at present. 
 
 Upon receipt of this message, Stoeckl hastened to have it translated 
 into English and sent copies to President Lincoln and Secretary of 
 State Seward. 
 
 On September 9, the Russian Minister reported the favorable re- 
 ception of the note to Prince Gortchakov: 
 
 Both were deeply touched by this sympathetic appeal of our 
 master. President Lincoln said to me, "Please inform the Emperor 
 of our gratitude and assure His Majesty that the whole nation ap- 
 preciates this new manifestation of friendship." The President and 
 the Secretary of State told me that of all the communications 
 which they have received from the European governments, ours 
 was the most friendly, with the most good will, or in the very 
 words of Mr. Lincoln, "the most loyal." I am persuaded that your 
 message by carefully avoiding sectional partisanship, will produce 
 the same effect throughout the nation and will prove as popular in 
 the South as in the North. 3 
 
130 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 At the suggestion of President Lincoln, the Secretary of State asked 
 the Russian Minister's permission to give wide publicity to this message 
 of his country's friendship for the United States, to which Stoeckl 
 readily assented. 
 
 Even while Russia was thus giving this conspicuous proof of its 
 friendly feeling towards the United States, there was little confidence 
 among the Czar's counselors of the ultimate success of Lincoln's striv- 
 ing to restore the Union. Stoeckl added in his September 9 report to 
 Prince Gortchakov: 
 
 Unfortunately, there is little hope that the wise counsel con- 
 tained in the message of Your Excellency will be followed. Passions 
 are too high to permit the voice of moderation to be heard. . . . 
 Mr. Seward . . . treats the present crisis as a simple incident belong- 
 ing to the past; "the international difficulties which for a time 
 seemed to threaten the American Union." The Secretary of State 
 is evidently deceiving himself, as the situation, far from improv- 
 ing, daily becomes more serious. 4 
 
 When the Trent affair, which had brought the United States to the 
 very brink of war with Great Britain, was amicably settled, Prince 
 Gortchakov expressed his own warm satisfaction and instructed Stoeckl 
 to convey the Czar's congratulations to President Lincoln on the adjust- 
 ment of the controversy. The Russian Emperor ardently wished for 
 an early restoration of the Union "not only because of the cordial 
 sympathy which unites the two countries, but also because the main- 
 tenance of its power is essential in the highest degree to the general 
 political equilibrium." 5 
 
 In reporting to St. Petersburg concerning the favorable American re- 
 ception accorded to Gortchakov's assuring message, Stoeckl wrote: "I 
 can assure you, my Prince, that this country in its entirety appreciates 
 the frank and loyal friendship indicated by the plain but sympathetic 
 words of the overture of Your Excellency." 6 
 
 In October 1862, perhaps the gloomiest and most desperate period of 
 the rebellion, when Louis Napoleon was intensifying his pressure upon 
 England and Russia to join him to stop the American war, there came 
 to Bayard Taylor as Charge d' Affaires of the American legation, fol- 
 lowing Cameron's resignation, a personal letter from President Lincoln 
 which Secretary Seward instructed Taylor to transmit to Prince Gort- 
 chakov for delivery to the Czar. With France all set to force media- 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 1 3 1 
 
 tion in the American situation, waiting only the word from England,, 
 and with the British Cabinet debating the issue, a worried Lincoln 
 wrote a personal letter to the Czar anxiously inquiring Russia's stand on 
 Louis Napoleon's latest proposal. 
 
 The Czar and his Minister for Foreign Affairs read and discussed 
 Lincoln's note of inquiry. Then on October 27, 1862 Taylor was sum- 
 moned by Prince Gortchakov to the Foreign Office. The memorable 
 conversation which ensued was reproduced "almost word for word" 
 by America's Charge d'Affaires and rushed to Lincoln and Seward by 
 Taylor. This document, dated October 29, 1862, commenced with 
 Prince Gortchakov saying: 
 
 "You know that the government of United States has few 
 friends among the Powers. England rejoices over what is happen- 
 ing to you; she longs and prays for your overthrow. France is less 
 actively hostile; her interests would be less affected by the result; 
 but she is not unwilling to see it. She is not your friend. Your 
 situation," said he, "is getting worse and worse. The chances of 
 preserving the Union are growing more desperate. Can nothing 
 be done to stop this dreadful war? The hope of reunion is growing 
 less and less, and I wish to impress upon your government that the 
 separation, which I fear must come, will be considered by Russia 
 as one of the greatest misfortunes. Russia, alone, has stood by you 
 from the first, and will continue to stand by you. We are very, 
 very anxious that some means should be adopted— that any course 
 should be pursued— which will prevent the division which now 
 seems inevitable. One separation will be followed by another; you 
 will break into fragments." 
 
 Taylor's report of the remarkable interview continued: 
 
 "We feel this," I replied, "the Northern and Southern States can- 
 not peacefully exist side by side as separate republics. There is 
 nothing the American people desire so much as peace; but peace 
 on the basis of separation is equivalent to continual war. We have 
 only just called the whole strength of the nation into action. We 
 believe the struggle now commencing will be final, and we cannot, 
 without disgrace and ruin, accept the only terms upon which the 
 rebels would treat until our strength has been tried and failed." 
 
 "You know the sentiments of Russia," the Prince exclaimed with 
 great earnestness. "We desire above all things the maintenance of 
 
132 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the American Union as one 'indivisible nation.' We cannot take 
 any part, more than we have done. We have no hostility to the 
 Southern people. Russia has declared her position, and will main- 
 tain it. There will be proposals of intervention. We believe that 
 intervention could do no good at present. Proposals will be made 
 to Russia to join some plan of interference. She will refuse any in- 
 vitation of the kind. Russia will occupy the same ground as at the 
 beginning of the struggle. You may rely upon it, she 'will not 
 change. But we entreat you to settle the difficulty. I cannot express 
 to you how profound an anxiety we feel — how serious are our 
 fears." 
 
 We were standing face to face during the conversation, and the 
 earnest, impassioned manner of the Prince impressed me with the 
 fact that he was speaking from his heart. At the close of the inter- 
 view he seized my hand, gave it a strong pressure, and exclaimed, 
 "God bless you!" I thanked him for his frankness and for the re- 
 newed declaration of the attitude of Russia. 
 
 I fixed in my memory at the time, and have reproduced almost 
 word for word, the conversation that occurred between us. 7 
 
 These heartening assurances brought comfort to Lincoln and Seward. 
 The entire proceedings were regarded to be of such vast importance 
 that by resolution of Congress they were ordered published and copies 
 distributed throughout the nation. 
 
 Louis Napoleon's plan was to urge upon the Washington and Rich- 
 mond governments "an armistice for six months, during which time 
 every act of war, direct or indirect, should provisionally cease on the 
 sea as well as on land, and it might be, if necessary, ulteriorly pro- 
 longed." Even if the attempt should fail, the French Minister said, it 
 would still serve a useful purpose in encouraging public opinion to views 
 of conciliation. 
 
 Napoleon's proposal precipitated a Cabinet crisis in England. 
 Lincoln's secretaries, Nicolay and Hay, have written: 
 
 Many years elapsed before it became generally known how near 
 the British government had come to accepting or even anticipating 
 the overtures of France for mediation. On the 17th of October 
 1 86 1, Lord John Russell had proposed a somewhat peremptory 
 summons to the North and South to make up their quarrel, but 
 Lord Palmerston had not thought it advisable. In September 1862 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 1 3 3 
 
 Lord Palmerston himself revived the proposition in a note to Lord 
 Russell, who was in attendance on the Queen at Gotha. Lord Rus- 
 sell at once gave his adhesion to the scheme. "I agree with you," he 
 said, "that the time is come for offering mediation to the United 
 States government, with a view to the recognition of the independ- 
 ence of the Confederates. I agree further that, in case of failure, we 
 ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent 
 
 A few days later Russell wrote to Palmerston: "My only doubt is 
 whether we and France should stir if Russia holds back. Her separation 
 from our move would ensure the rejection of our proposals." 
 
 After days of bitter debate the British reply to the French govern- 
 ment's overture was announced on November 13. In brief it declared 
 that it was the Cabinet's belief that there was no ground at that moment 
 to hope that Lincoln's government would accept the offer of mediation. 
 Therefore, it would be better to wait for a time when there would be 
 better hope for success. 
 
 The British decision had been influenced in no small degree by the 
 telegram received by Lord Russell from Napier in St. Petersburg to the 
 effect that Russia had already rejected Napoleon's proposal. Prince 
 Gortchakov had advised Louis Napoleon's Minister for Foreign Af- 
 fairs that it was "essential to avoid the appearance of any pressure of a 
 nature to offend American public opinion, and to excite susceptibilities 
 very easily roused at the bare idea of intervention." But although Rus- 
 sia, which "stood in peculiarly friendly relations with the United 
 States," could not see its way clear to join a European coalition to inter- 
 fere in American affairs, her Minister in Washington was nevertheless 
 instructed to give his moral support to any conciliatory measures that 
 might be taken — provided it would not cause irritation. 9 
 
 In view of Russia's reluctance to intervene, Russell wrote to Palmers- 
 ton: "We ought not to move at present without Russia." 10 
 
 Thus Russia's attitude on the question of American intervention, to 
 all intents and purposes, also determined the issue for the British gov- 
 ernment. Two days after Great Britain's decision not to accede to Na- 
 poleon's proposal, Bayard Taylor wrote to Secretary Seward: 
 
 While I infer . . . that Russia would, to a certain extent, be in- 
 clined to take part in a movement which she foresaw to be inevitable 
 on the part of England and France, rather than permit a coalition be- 
 
134 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 tween these two powers from which she should be wholly ex- 
 cluded, the probable refusal of the English government announced 
 today by telegraph relieves me from all apprehension of complica- 
 tions that might arise from the proposition. I stated to Prince Gort- 
 chakov, at our recent interview, my belief that England would not 
 accede, and am very glad to find it so soon confirmed. 11 
 
 Even though Russia was giving repeated conspicuous proof of her 
 friendship for the North, the Confederacy hoped to win recognition 
 from the Czar's government. Lucius Q. C. Lamar, appointed Commis- 
 sioner to Russia by Jefferson Davis in November 1862, traveled to St. 
 Petersburg to plead the South's case for independence. But Prince 
 Gortchakov refused to give him any encouragement and delayed re- 
 ceiving him officially. At length Davis recalled Lamar, ending his 
 hopeless mission. 12 Lamar had based his hope of eventual Russian rec- 
 ognition on the fact that there was "no party in Russia absolutely hos- 
 tile to the South." 
 
 Lincoln and his Cabinet were elated over these repeated manifesta- 
 tions of Russian friendship. Whatever their real motive, they strength- 
 ened the hand of our government and made possible a firm attitude 
 toward the persistent efforts of England and France to meddle in our 
 affairs. 
 
 Secretary Seward invited Stoeckl to visit him and discuss the mem- 
 orable meeting Bayard Taylor had held with Prince Gortchakov in St. 
 Petersburg. He requested the Russian envoy to convey to his govern- 
 ment the profound gratitude of America for the assurances of friend- 
 ship which the Prince had given. "The Secretary of State said that the 
 President was extremely grateful for the attitude taken by Russia in this 
 question." 
 
 Stoeckl assured Seward that the Russian "reply to the French pro- 
 posal was only the continuation of the frank and loyal policy followed 
 by the imperial Cabinet since the beginning of the American crisis." 13 
 But Stoeckl added that his government felt that an effort should be 
 made to conciliate the South: 
 
 The federal government could not hope that the secessionists 
 would surrender unconditionally . . . Why could not negotiations 
 be launched to sound out the intentions of the authorities at Rich- 
 mond to see if they would not be disposed to accept equitable 
 terms? 
 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfelloivs 135 
 
 Mr. Seward asked me "why I did not convey this question to the 
 President and assured me that Mr. Lincoln would listen to me with 
 the consideration due the representative of a friendly power. I re- 
 plied to Mr. Seward that in my confidential conversation with him 
 I could express myself freely, for I was speaking to a personal ac- 
 quaintance of fifteen years standing, as much as to the Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs. However, I could not be free to offer my opinions 
 to the President without his asking me for them. I would have done 
 it, except for the fact that it would have served no good purpose. 
 Mr. Lincoln is President in name only. The demagogues surround- 
 ing him control him. 14 
 
 Stoeckl was against Russian participation in any joint European ac- 
 tion. "The rebellion in the United States is destined to go through dif- 
 ferent phases and we may be called on to lend our good offices as medi- 
 ators or to be otherwise useful to a nation which has always had the most 
 amicable relations with us. Therefore, it is essential that we should be 
 free from all entanglements that might hurt us in American public 
 opinion." 15 
 
 On December 1, 1862 Stoeckl wrote to Prince Gortchakov of the 
 "violent repercussions" created in the North by news of the "proposal 
 made by France to our Cabinet and to that of London to offer collec- 
 tive mediation in the affairs of the United States." It had been expected 
 here that England would take the initiative. "So the refusal of the cab- 
 inet of London was the subject of surprise." 
 
 The American press is arrayed not so much against the French 
 government which initiated the move as against Emperor Napo- 
 leon, who is charged with being the personal enemy of America. 
 But public opinion remains inflamed chiefly against England. The 
 New York Herald declares, "Let us mistrust British neutrality. Her 
 desire is only to see the two sections destroy each other so she may 
 profit from the spoils." On the other hand the press is unanimous 
 in its praise of imperial Russia's attitude. 16 
 
 By April 26, Stoeckl was writing that strained British- American rela- 
 tions rendered collective mediation "in a friendly way" virtually an im- 
 possibility although he held out hope for an early cessation of hostilities: 
 
 As for France, it appears that she has equally renounced all idea 
 of intervention. ... If mediation was impracticable three months 
 
136 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 ago, it is even more so today. The military reverses suffered by the 
 Americans will cause them more than ever to resent any attempt of 
 foreign interference in their affairs, and more than ever offend their 
 national pride. . . . 
 
 The war is being waged on too large a scale to continue indef- 
 initely. It will have to end through negotiations, and in that case 
 the good offices of a neutral nation will eventually become essen- 
 tial. I do not hesitate to assert that then Russia, more than any other 
 power, will be in a position to render service to the Americans. 
 
 And in this respect I express the opinion of outstanding individ- 
 uals, among others, [former] President Pierce, whom I met re- 
 cently in New York. Mr. Pierce said that he read with the greatest 
 satisfaction the communications that Your Excellency had ordered 
 me to present to the federal government, and that he saw in them 
 the sincere expression of frank and cordial friendship. "In the midst 
 of our terrible experiences," Mr. Pierce said, "Russia alone has 
 shown herself our disinterested friend and it is on her that we must 
 count if ever we have need of an intermediary." 
 
 I spoke also with Mr. Pierce about the situation of the country. 
 He said, "Our misfortune comes from the men who are in charge 
 of affairs in the North as in the South. President Lincoln and the 
 chiefs of the Republican Party as well as Jefferson Davis and the 
 men who surround him are too deeply involved in this conflict to 
 stop it and thus risk their political future. If affairs could be put 
 back in the hands of the people they would quickly reach an agree- 
 ment. A national convention composed of delegates named ad hoc 
 would be able to arrive at a solution either by the formation of a 
 new federal alliance, or by separation which, after all, would be 
 more desirable than the prolonging of this Civil War. Moreover," 
 he added, "at the end of the struggle, we shall find ourselves in a 
 state of transition. We shall need time to find our equilibrium. If 
 the separation takes place it cannot be more than temporary. With 
 peace restored, the practical spirit of my countrymen will return. 
 Both sides will become convinced that union has made strength, 
 and a confederation on a new basis does not seem to be impractical. 
 But to accomplish that the war must end. If it is prolonged we shall 
 be exposed to new dangers whose symptoms are already too ap- 
 parent. We shall be divided into three or four independent repub- 
 lics, jealous and naturally enemies of each other." 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 137 
 
 Since the expiration of his presidential term, Mr. Pierce has lived 
 in retirement and has taken little part in public affairs, but he con- 
 tinues to exercise great influence on the conservatives. His views on 
 the state of the nation seem so accurate that I have felt it my duty 
 to submit them to Your Excellency. 17 
 
 One of Bayard Taylor's last official acts as Charge d'Affaires, while 
 awaiting the arrival of Clay and Bergh, was to attend a reception given 
 by Czar Alexander II on New Year's Day 1863. Here again the Emperor 
 and Prince Gortchakov expressed "words so full of good will" for the 
 United States. It was still another assurance that "the imperial Cabinet 
 will not change in any way from the policies that it has followed since 
 the beginning of the Civil War." 18 
 
 Stoeckl, after describing a visit with Seward on Washington's Birth- 
 day, when this new expression of Russian friendship was discussed, 
 added: 
 
 On the part of England, the federal government is equally re- 
 assured. The speech of the Queen at the opening of Parliament and 
 the debates that the speech caused proved sufficiently that for the 
 moment at least the British Cabinet has no intention of intervening 
 in the affairs of the United States. 
 
 It is to be presumed that in the present circumstances, France 
 will not renew her move, all the more since she must be convinced 
 today that this proposal would have had no better reception in 
 Richmond than the one made in Washington. The newspapers of 
 the South which we received recently, are very clear on this point. 
 They claim that the French proposition while constituting an indica- 
 tion of good will towards the seceded States, was not at all prac- 
 tical, and that the Confederate government will not consent to 
 open negotiations except on terms of an armistice. 19 
 
 This belief that "France will not renew her move" to bring about in- 
 tervention in American affairs, was without foundation. Undaunted by 
 the failure of his overture for joint mediation, the French Emperor 
 now undertook to approach the government of the United States 
 alone. This new solo attempt at "friendly mediation" by Louis Napo- 
 leon entailed the calling of informal conferences to be attended by rep- 
 resentatives of the North and South where reciprocal complaints could 
 be examined. 
 
1 3 8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 This new overture of French mediation, received February 3, 1863, 
 was promptly and firmly rejected three days later by Secretary Se- 
 ward under instructions from President Lincoln. Congress passed its 
 admonishing resolution that any further attempt in the same direction 
 would be looked upon as an unfriendly act. 20 
 
 But insidious rumors of foreign intervention continued to circulate 
 in the United States. On December 2, 1862, Seward had written to 
 Bayard Taylor that though he was no longer worried about a change 
 in Russian policy he would like to be certain about certain rumors 
 which were coming to his attention: 
 
 You may say to Prince Gortchakov confidentially that in British 
 quarters it is said that Russia is verging towards a French conven- 
 tion, while in French quarters it is said that Russia, though reluc- 
 tant, may yet be induced to join France if she should desire to 
 interfere in the United States. This government gives no heed to 
 any of these rumors. It has no apprehensions of British interfer- 
 ence. It knows that no possible advantage, and only misfortunes, 
 could result to France herself from any such interference or inter- 
 vention; and it further believes that France sees the right and justice 
 of our cause. 
 
 In regard to Russia, the case is a plain one. She has our friend- 
 ship, in every case, in preference to any other European power, 
 simply because she always wishes us well, and leaves us to conduct 
 our affairs as we think best. 21 
 
 The rumors to which "this government gives no heed" were plainly 
 worrying Seward. Early in 1863 he invited Stoeckl to visit him in the 
 Department of State for a discussion of these rumors. Bluntly he told 
 the Russian Minister that he had just been informed that a deal had 
 been made between France and Russia providing that in exchange for 
 concessions to be made by France to Russia in the affairs of Greece, the 
 imperial government had promised to support the proposals of Em- 
 peror Louis Napoleon in favor of intervention in the American crisis. 
 Were these rumors true or false? 
 
 The Russian Minister, in reporting this sensational conference to his 
 chief in St. Petersburg, wrote, "I replied to him that these rumors were 
 too absurd to be given any credence, and assured him again that the 
 imperial government would abstain from all intervention and that it 
 will offer its good offices only if called upon to do so." 22 
 
United States and Russia: Strange Bedfellows 139 
 
 From St. Petersburg, Prince Gortchakov hastened to give added as- 
 surance: "Tell Mr. Seward that the policy of Russia in regard to the 
 United States is fixed and will not be changed by the course adopted 
 by any other nation. . . . We shall gladly proffer our services when 
 they are mutually requested, but not until then." 23 
 
 Despite these assurances and reassurances from Russia, the attitude 
 of veiled hostility of the European powers remained a constant threat. 
 The Cabinets of the Old World saw no hope of reconciliation between 
 the North and the South, and were convinced that the restoration of 
 the national authority was impossible. One sickening military disaster 
 after another — Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Chickamauga — added 
 to this belief in Europe and spread gloom and despondency throughout 
 the United States. 
 
® 
 
 The Russian Fleet Comes 
 to the United States 
 
 The sickening and disheartening news of the bloody rout at Chick- 
 amauga, (September 19-20, 1863) with its 16,000 federal casualties in 
 killed, wounded and captured, had hardly reached the readers of the 
 nation's newspapers, when another news item — more joyous and hope- 
 ful — claimed their attention. 
 
 The imperial Russian navy had come to America and was standing 
 ready to help us against any foreign power that persisted in meddling 
 in our affairs. Just as the French had come in 1778 to help the strug- 
 gling colonies win their independence from Great Britain, so now 
 Russia was making common cause with us against England and France. 
 Thus ran the reports that spread like wildfire from one end of the 
 United States to the other. 
 
 For on September 24, four days after the military disaster at Chick- 
 amauga, the imperial Russian navy's flagship, Alexander Nevski, a 
 screw frigate carrying fifty-one guns, and the Peresvet, a frigate of 
 forty-eight guns, sailed into New York Harbor. Two days later, the 
 Variag, sloop of seventeen guns and 2,100 tons, and the Vitiaz, also a 
 sloop of the same gun power and tonnage, dropped anchor in the port. 
 And within another two and three weeks the Almaz and the Osliaba 
 made their appearance. The latter, a screw frigate of thirty-three guns, 
 2,800 tons and manned by 450 sailors and marine artillerymen, had been 
 sailing for three months since leaving its base in Greek waters in the 
 Mediterranean, to keep its rendezvous off the coast of New York. The 
 
 140 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 141 
 
 others had come from the roadstead at Kronstadt, where they had been 
 in constant danger of being bottled up in the Baltic if Great Britain and 
 France should join in a war against Russia. This very thing had hap- 
 pened to the imperial navy a few years before in the Crimean War. 
 The Russian Atlantic fleet of frigates, clippers and corvettes, which 
 cast anchor at the mouth of the Hudson River, was under the com- 
 mand of Rear Admiral Lisovski. 
 
 When Gideon Welles was officially notified by Stoeckl of the com- 
 ing of the fleet, the American Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Rus- 
 sian Minister under date of September 23, 1863: 
 
 The Department is much gratified to learn that a squadron of 
 Russian war vessels is at present off the harbor of New York, with 
 the intention, it is supposed, of visiting that city. The presence in 
 our waters of a squadron belonging to His Imperial Majesty's navy 
 cannot but be a source of pleasure and happiness to our country- 
 men. I beg that you will make known to the Admiral in command 
 that the facilities of the Brooklyn navy yard are at his disposal for 
 any repairs that the vessels of his squadron need, and that any 
 other required assistance will be gladly extended. 
 
 I avail myself of this occasion to extend through you to the 
 officers of His Majesty's squadron a cordial invitation to visit that 
 navy yard. I do not hesitate to say that it will give Rear Admiral 
 Paulding very great pleasure to show them the vessels and other 
 objects of interest at the naval station under his command. 
 
 Later Secretary Welles wrote in his diary concerning the arrival of 
 the Russian warships: "In sending them to this country there is some- 
 thing significant. What will be its effect on France and the French 
 policy we shall learn in due time. It may be moderate; it may exasper- 
 ate. God bless the Russians." 1 
 
 Lincoln told Senator James Harlan that in 1862 he had sought to 
 learn the Czar's attitude in case England and France forced their un- 
 welcome intervention. Lincoln stated that the Czar had replied to our 
 Minister Simon Cameron, that in such a case the friendship of Russia 
 for the United States would be shown in a "decisive manner." Was this 
 unheralded arrival of the Russian naval squadron the "decisive man- 
 ner" of demonstrating the friendship which the Czar had promised? 
 
 While Russia's Atlantic fleet was thus dropping anchor in the waters 
 of New York Harbor, her Pacific squadron was also converging off 
 
142 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 America's Pacific coast. On October 12, the Czar's Far East fleet, con- 
 sisting of the corvettes Bogatir, Kalevala, Rinda and Novik, and the 
 clippers Abrek and Gaidamak, sailed into San Francisco Bay; and its 
 commander, Rear Admiral Popov, immediately put himself in touch 
 with Minister Stoeckl in Washington. All the Muscovite ships bristled 
 with gaping guns. The vessels, of wood construction, carried steam en- 
 gines. But these were used only in cases of urgent necessity. At all 
 other times the sail was the principal means of motion. 
 
 Harper's Weekly reported of the Atlantic fleet, "The two largest of 
 the squadron, the frigates Alexander Nevski and Peresvet, are evidently 
 vessels of modern build, and much about them would lead an unprac- 
 tised eye to think they were constructed in this country." A reporter 
 going aboard the Alexander Nevski thought its deck to be "large 
 enough to accommodate a fair-sized army with an ordnance large 
 enough to blow up Fort Sumter." He was told by a Russian officer that 
 the flagship's guns "are of American make, being cast in Pittsburgh." 
 
 In its description of the other Russian warships anchored in New 
 York Harbor, Harper's Weekly continued: 
 
 The frigate Osliaba is unlike the other two; she has more the 
 appearance of one of the first of the heavy screw ships built in the 
 European dock yards. Her bluff bows and counter do not give 
 evidence of great speed; but she is doubtless a fair goer and fine 
 sea boat. The two steam corvettes, or sloops, as we term them, 
 Variag and Vitiaz, are apparently very superior vessels. They are 
 fully equal in tonnage to the steamers in our service of the class of 
 the Brooklyn, Richmond and others, and carry very serviceable 
 batteries. They are evidently constructed for speed, and have en- 
 gines of full power. All these vessels are ship-rigged, and are 
 heavily sparred, so much so that if their smokestacks were out of 
 sight you would hardly suppose them to be propelled by steam. 
 
 The batteries of these ships are of formidable character, al- 
 though all smooth-bored guns. They are of one caliber, throwing 
 a solid shot of sixty pounds' weight, and of two classes, the long 
 and medium, weighing about sixty and eighty hundredweight. 
 
 The welcome accorded Admirals Lisovski and Popov and their of- 
 ficers and crews was extremely enthusiastic. Both on the Atlantic and 
 Pacific coasts they were received with a warmth and cordiality that 
 well reflected "the friendship which the nation cherishes towards Rus- 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 143 
 
 sia." New York City, gaily bedecked with American and Russian flags, 
 bubbled over with sumptuous hospitality. Deputations came from sur- 
 rounding States to pay their respects to the visitors from the realm of 
 the Czar. 
 
 The Muscovite naval officers, wearing gold-laced chapeaux, were 
 wined and dined wherever they went. They were cheered as they were 
 being driven up Broadway in victorias, surrounded by American sol- 
 diers. The city's merchants and businessmen gave a banquet in their 
 honor at the Astor House. There was a grand ball for the officers at the 
 Academy of Music on November 5. According to the editor of 
 Harper's Weekly, "It was undoubtedly the greatest ball ever given in 
 this country, without excepting the ball to the Prince of Wales." 2 The 
 brilliantly lighted Academy was draped in Russian and American flags 
 and shields which bore the heraldic devices of the two nations. Quot- 
 ing from an account in the New York Herald, Harper's Weekly de- 
 scribed the affair: 
 
 Immediately after the Russians arrived the dance began. ... In 
 truth it was a very wonderful and "indescribable phantasmagoria 
 of humanity. . . ." Beautiful, be jeweled ladies vied with each other 
 for dances with the bearded and uniformed visitors. 
 
 Alas! for the Russians. It is known or should be, that these 
 Sclavic [sic] heroes are not the largest of the human race — that 
 they are small men in fact — and what is to become of small men in 
 such a jam? Early in the night — indeed, very soon after the dance 
 began — we saw several of them in the embrace of grand nebulous 
 masses of muslin and crinoline, whirled hither and thither as if in 
 terrible torment, their eyes aglare, their hair blown out, and all 
 their persons expressive of the most desperate energy, doubtless in 
 the endeavor to escape. What became of them we cannot tell. 3 
 
 Supper of the "Soiree Russe," prepared by Delmonico, was served in 
 the adjoining Irving Hall. The tables were decorated with likenesses of 
 Washington and Peter the Great, of Lincoln and Czar Alexander II. 
 
 A reporter for the New York World wrote: "As the ovation and 
 ball is one which may leave its traces on centuries to come, we give, for 
 the sake of history, an account of the principle edibles used, viz: 
 
 Twelve thousand oysters — 10,000 poulette and 2,000 pickled 
 Twelve monster salmon — 30 lbs. each 
 
144 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Twelve hundred game birds 
 
 Two hundred chickens 
 
 One thousand pounds of tenderloin 
 
 One hundred pyramids of pastry 
 
 One thousand large loaves 
 
 Three thousand five hundred bottles of wine 41 
 
 Always the name of Czar Alexander II was cheered as the emancipa- 
 tor of the serfs and the friend of America. In their turn the Russian 
 visitors drank toasts to President Abraham Lincoln and spoke elo- 
 quently about the historic friendship which bound the two nations. 
 
 Three Russian sailors who imbibed freely and became too boisterous 
 on the streets had to be locked up as common drunks. They were 
 booked as Russian No. i, No. 2, and No. 3. But they were promptly set 
 free the next morning by a police magistrate. He did not desire, he said 
 pompously, "to do anything calculated to disturb the friendly relations 
 which exist between the Emperor of Russia and the President of the 
 United States." 
 
 Harpefs Weekly in its Ocotober 17, 1863 issue painted this word 
 picture of the civic parade conducted in honor of the Russians: 
 
 After the procession has passed Union Square, and wheeling 
 fairly into the vast current of Broadway, the scene became splen- 
 didly animated. The moving pageant rolled in a glittering stream 
 down the broad thoroughfare between banks of upturned human 
 faces, the trappings of the equipages, the gold and silver epaulets 
 of the Muscovite guests and the sabres, helmets and bayonets of 
 the escort reflecting back in unnumbered dazzling lines the glory 
 of the evening sun. The cavalcade advanced to the joyous time of 
 exulting martial music like the vanguard of a conquering host re- 
 turning to the metropolis of its power, and there was a proud and 
 gratified feeling evident in the hearts of the vast concourse as- 
 sembled to greet it, that would have been befitting to the most 
 important triumphs at home. Far as the eye could reach down the 
 great central avenue of our imperial city, the sidewalks were 
 packed with human beings, and the balconies and windows — nay, 
 in some instances, the very roofs of the buildings above them — 
 were beset with eager multitudes, the general surface of this an- 
 imated borderwork richly varied and enameled, as it were, 
 throughout its length with groups of richly attired beauty. Above 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 145 
 
 nearly every building gayly fluttered the Stars and Stripes, some in 
 standards of immense size and others tricked off with scores of 
 little Russian flags, waving and sporting in the breeze side by side 
 with our own national colors. By-the-way, it may be remarked 
 that the great Autocracy and the great Republic had the scene all 
 to themselves, no other nation being represented even in bunting — 
 a significant incident of the ovation. 5 
 
 One Russian naval captain admitted he was thoroughly overwhelmed 
 by the extreme cordiality of New York's men and the grace and love- 
 liness of the fair dames and damsels. This caused a writer for Harper's 
 Weekly to comment: "On the chill banks of the Neva, perhaps when 
 far away on the boisterous billows of the Black Sea or the Caspian, he 
 will recall, in his lonely midnight vigil, while he paces the stormbeaten 
 deck, the sunny smiles that brightened the autumnal sunshine on the 
 borders of the Hudson." 6 
 
 The large sums of money spent in entertaining and staging demon- 
 strations in honor of the Czar's navy officers and crew brought severe 
 criticism from some New Yorkers. They protested that 
 
 Such extravagant festivities were out of place when the Boys in 
 Blue were dying in the trenches and when the government was 
 having hard work to raise money for munitions. . . . The million 
 spent on the "Ovation, Collation and Ball" should instead have 
 been given to the Sanitary Commission. 
 
 But most New Yorkers were convinced that the Russian fleet had 
 sailed thousands of miles across the ocean just to help the United States. 
 They felt, therefore, that these demonstrations of welcome were the 
 least they could do to show their appreciation. 
 
 The display was not altogether due to vanity. Its obvious purpose 
 was to show the King of England that New York would make more 
 fuss over a Russian admiral than it had over the Prince of Wales, and 
 to prove to the Czar of Russia that the United States was an ally worth 
 having. Harper's Weekly admitted that "The ceremony was intended 
 to have, and had, a political significance. . . . Every citizen felt bound 
 to do what in him lay to testify to the Russians our sense of gratitude 
 for the friendly manner in which Russia has stood by us in our present 
 struggle, while the Western powers have done not a little to work our 
 ruin." 7 Other commentators also saw "a special significance" in the 
 presence of the Russian warships in our ports: 
 
146 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 During the late Crimean War, the Russian fleet was closely shut 
 up at Kronstadt and in the Black Sea, and was unable to render 
 any effective service. The Russians have now quite an effective 
 naval force in the open seas. The experience of the Alabama and 
 Florida shows how much damage may be effected by one or two 
 armed vessels upon the commerce of an enemy. 
 
 Should a war break out, as still seems most probable, between 
 Russia and France and England, the example set by the English 
 government will afford a precedent for our dealings with the bel- 
 ligerents. The Russian vessels now at large, with such aid as we can 
 give, in precise accordance with the course of the English govern- 
 ment toward us, could render the commerce of England insecure. 8 
 
 In December the Russian Atlantic fleet sailed up the Potomac and 
 anchored near Alexandria. Secretary Welles ordered American naval 
 personnel to show the visitors "all proper courtesy." 9 Steamboats car- 
 ried excursionists from Washington on sight-seeing tours of the squad- 
 ron. The Russian sailors with their outlandish whiskers and with queer 
 lettering on their caps, wandered through the streets of Washington 
 as on a holiday. "They have vast absorbent powers and are fiendishly 
 ugly," John Hay observed. 10 The officers were entertained at banquets 
 by Secretary of State Seward, by Navy Secretary Welles and by Rus- 
 sia's Minister Stoeckl. 
 
 Bayard Taylor, back in Washington from his stint as Secretary of 
 legation in St. Petersburg, was delivering lectures on "Russia and the 
 Russians." Lincoln had suggested to him that "a good lecture or two on 
 serfs, serfdom and emancipation in Russia would be both interesting 
 and valuable, could you not get up such a thing?" One lyceum aud- 
 ience, addressed by Taylor on the Russian situation, included Admiral 
 Lisovski and several of his officers. John Hay noted in his diary that 
 Lincoln also went one evening to hear Taylor's lecture. 
 
 It had been expected that President and Mrs. Lincoln would also re- 
 ceive and entertain the Russian naval visitors at a grand ball. But 
 Lincoln had returned in poor health from Gettysburg where he had 
 delivered a few remarks at the dedication of the famous battlefield. 11 
 For a time he was confined to his rooms with a bilious attack and later 
 was advised he was suffering from a mild form of smallpox. Thus he 
 was prevented from attending any of the functions in honor of the 
 visitors. Secretary Seward wrote to Minister Clay: 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 147 
 
 I had the honor on the 5th inst. [December] to receive the Ad- 
 miral and his associates and after bidding them a cordial welcome 
 in behalf of the President, I presented them to my associates in the 
 administration. . . . The President earnestly desired that their re- 
 ception at the Capital might reflect the cordiality and friendship 
 which the nation cherishes toward Russia, and thus far, I am 
 happy to say, this wish has been realized. Indisposition of the 
 President has, until now, prevented him from giving them a formal 
 audience. 
 
 Not much attention was paid by the newspapers to this affair. But they 
 filled endless columns concerning a shipboard reception on board the 
 Russian frigate Osliaba, where General Dix and Mrs. Lincoln were re- 
 ported to have drunk a toast to the health of the Czar. In response 
 Russian Captain Boutakov toasted the President. 12 
 
 The New York Herald seized upon Mrs. Lincoln's toast as an act that 
 "will be heard with joy in the icy North and the steppes of Asia." And 
 the Richmond Examiner commented sarcastically: 
 
 The apparently trivial occurrence of a health being drunk by the 
 wife of an Illinois lawyer should convulse with fear, or elate with 
 joy, the people of Europe and Asia. Plain Mrs. Lincoln would never 
 have made much of a noise in the world. Appendant to that ex- 
 traordinary freak of nature, the President of the U.S., she can not 
 only distinguish herself by the resplendent tints of her silks and 
 possession of her jewels, but can frighten the world "from its 
 propriety" by simply drinking a glass of sherry. 
 
 Then the Richmond editor tore into Lincoln himself by drawing a 
 parallel between him and the Czar of Russia: 
 
 The Czar emancipates the serfs from their bondage of centuries, 
 and puts forth the whole strength of his empire to enslave the 
 Poles. Lincoln proclaims freedom to the African, and strives at the 
 same time to subjugate freeborn Americans. In this striking co- 
 incidence a similarity of character and feeling is denoted, which 
 accounts for their close friendship, heretofore suspected, and now 
 clearly displayed to the mingled admiration and awe of the world 
 by Mrs. Lincoln's toddy. 
 
 Other anti-Lincoln papers like the Chicago Times reprinted the 
 Richmond Examiner's comments and added a dig or two of their own. 
 
148 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 San Francisco's welcome to Admiral Popov and his Pacific squadron 
 officers and crew vied with New York's and Washington's hospitality 
 in warmth and enthusiasm. 13 The Russians expressed their gratitude by 
 deeds as well as by words. When, shortly after their arrival, a big fire 
 broke out in San Francisco, Popov ordered his men to aid in putting it 
 out. For this assistance they were voted the city's official thanks by the 
 municipal council. 
 
 The Russian visitors demonstrated they were willing to do more. 
 They stood ready to help fight America's battles if the opportunity 
 presented itself. This they revealed when rumors were circulated in 
 San Francisco in the winter of 1863-64 that the Confederate cruisers 
 Alabama and Sumter were off* the California coast and planning to 
 attack the unguarded city. Excited citizens appealed to Admiral Popov 
 for protection. Without consulting his superiors in St. Petersburg, the 
 Russian commander decided to act on his own responsibility. He gave 
 orders to his officers to prepare to prevent any attempt of the Con- 
 federates to attack the city. Should a Southern cruiser attempt an as- 
 sault, they were "to put on steam and clear for action." It was Popov's 
 belief that "the ships of His Imperial Russian Majesty's Pacific squad- 
 ron . . . are bound to assist the authorities of every place where friend- 
 ship is offered them, in all measures which may be deemed necessary 
 by the local authorities, to repel any attempt against the security of the 
 place." 
 
 The rumors concerning the Sumter and Alabama did not materialize. 
 The Confederates did not appear and the attack against San Francisco 
 did not take place. So it did not become necessary for the Czar's Pacific 
 fleet to execute Admiral Popov's orders which would have made Rus- 
 sia the active ally of the United States in the Civil War. 
 
 Popov had acted without instructions. When Minister Stoeckl re- 
 ceived a copy of the Admiral's orders he was shocked. He quickly dis- 
 patched them to Prince Gortchakov. Equally shocked, the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs instructed Stoeckl to reprove the naval commander for 
 his unneutral stand and to urge upon him the strictest neutrality in the 
 future. On March 13, 1864, Stoeckl sent Popov a scathing rebuke. As 
 far as imperial Russia is concerned, he wrote, there is neither North 
 nor South, but a United States. Therefore Russia had no right to in- 
 terfere in the internal affairs of that sovereign nation. Consequently, 
 he, Admiral Popov, must keep out of the sectional conflict. 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 149 
 
 From all the information to be obtained here it would seem that 
 the Confederate cruisers aim to operate only in the open sea and 
 it is not expected that cities will be attacked and San Francisco is 
 in no danger. What the corsairs do in the open sea does not con- 
 cern us; even if they fire on the forts, it is your duty to be strictly 
 neutral. But in case the corsair passes the fort and threatens the 
 city, you have then the right, in the name of humanity, and not 
 for political purposes, to prevent this misfortune. It is to be hoped 
 that the naval strength at your command will bring about the de- 
 sired result and that you will not be obliged to use force and in- 
 volve our government in a situation which it is trying to keep out 
 of. 14 
 
 The Russian Atlantic and Pacific squadrons remained in American 
 waters approximately seven months. On April 26, 1864, Gortchakov 
 notified General-Adjutant Krabbe of the imperial navy that the Em- 
 peror was of the opinion there was no longer any need for the fleet to 
 remain in America. The departing Russian naval visitors were profuse 
 in the expression of their thanks for the warm and wholehearted hos- 
 pitality they had received wherever they had gone in the United States. 
 
 The officers of the Atlantic squadron on taking their leave of New 
 York took up a voluntary subscription of $4,760. They presented the 
 gift to Mayor Opdyke to be used for the poor of the city. It was in- 
 tended as a token of appreciation for all the civic courtesies accorded 
 them during their stay in the American metropolis. At the farewell 
 banquet which the city of Boston tendered in honor of Admiral Lisov- 
 ski and his officers in June 1864, one of the principal responses was 
 given by Edward Everett. 
 
 When the Russians returned to Kronstadt they entertained Minister 
 Clay and Secretary of Legation Bergh aboard the flagship as the Russian 
 band alternated in playing Yankee Doodle and the Russian national an- 
 them. And they requested our St. Petersburg representatives to convey 
 to the American people the Russians' profound gratitude and appreci- 
 ation for the welcome and hospitality they had received throughout 
 their sojourn in the United States. 
 
 But what had been the real reason for the coming of the Russian 
 squadrons to America's Atlantic and Pacific coasts? What was behind 
 despotic, democracy-hating Russia's ostentatious demonstrations of 
 
150 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 friendship for Lincoln's government of the people, by the people, for 
 the people? 
 
 The British navy had been watching the Russian fleet with great sus- 
 picion. At one time English observers were sure the Czar's navy was 
 headed for Vera Cruz. The actual arrival of Muscovite men-of-war in 
 New York and San Francisco Harbors came as a shock and surprise to 
 London. Soon English newspapers were decrying Lincoln's "threats of 
 war" against Great Britain. 
 
 English journalists poked fun at the fuss Americans were making over 
 their Russian visitors. This caused Harper's Weekly to comment: 
 
 John Bull thinks that we are absurdly bamboozled by the Rus- 
 sian compliments, and laughs to see us deceived by the sympathy 
 of Muscovy. If one of the Russian officers, he says, were to express 
 in St. Petersburg a tithe of the regard for American institutions 
 which Americans recklessly attribute to them he would soon be in 
 Siberia. But we are not very much deceived. Americans under- 
 stand that the sympathy of France in our Revolution was not from 
 love of us, but from hatred of England. They know, as Washing- 
 ton long ago told them, that romantic friendship between nations 
 is not to be expected. And if they had latterly expected it, England 
 has utterly undeceived them. 
 
 Americans do not suppose that Russia is upon the point of be- 
 coming a republic; but they observe that the English aristocracy 
 and the French empire hate a republic quite as much as the Russian 
 monarchy hates it; and they remark that while the French empire 
 imports coolies into its colonies, and winks at slavery, and while the 
 British government cheers a political enterprise founded upon 
 slavery, and by its chief organs defends the system, Russia eman- 
 cipates her serfs. There is not the least harm in observing these 
 little facts. Russia, John Bull will remember, conducts herself 
 as a friendly power. That is all. England and France have shown 
 themselves to be unfriendly powers. And we do not forget it. 
 
 The conspicuously friendly attitude of The Great Autocracy for 
 The Great Republic gave rise to speculation in Europe of a secret 
 Russo- American alliance. The French and British legations were greatly 
 disconcerted by the rumors. They squirmed at the demonstrations given 
 by the American people in honor of their Russian visitors. But John 
 Hay noted in his diary: "The diplomatic body have all apparently 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 1 5 1 
 
 stopped blackguarding and those who do not like have been forced to 
 respect." 15 
 
 What was the fact as to the existence of a Russo-American alliance? 
 Clay in his speeches in the United States during the period between his 
 two missions to St. Petersburg frequently referred to the Russian 
 "alliance." Back in August 1861, Seward had actually signed a conven- 
 tion with Russia, but he never presented it to the Senate for ratification. 
 It became known at the time of the Trent affair only through the fact 
 that Minister Rudolph Schleiden of Bremen, in a report of November 
 14, 1 86 1 to his government, stated that Stoeckl inquired of Seward 
 
 whether the United States would equip privateers in case war 
 should break out with England and France. Seward thereupon re- 
 marked, "that is a matter of course." Stoeckl then remarked that 
 in any case no American privateer would be permitted to cruise 
 in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the 
 only state that has ports in these regions, would treat them as pi- 
 rates in accordance with the convention of August 24. Mr. Seward 
 exclaimed, "I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay 
 about it." 16 
 
 Gortchakov gave much thought to the possibility of concluding a 
 formal political alliance between his government and that of the United 
 States. However, he finally decided that a formal alliance would not 
 change anything in the existing position of the two nations. To Stoeckl 
 he referred on October 22, 1863 to "F alliance existant des inter -its et les 
 traditions politiques." To which Czar Alexander II added his comment: 
 "Tres bienP 
 
 If no formal alliance with the Czar's government already existed, one 
 ought to be negotiated, an editorial in Harper's Weekly of October 1 7, 
 1863 suggested: 
 
 Times had changed greatly since Washington had warned his 
 countrymen against entangling foreign alliances. 
 
 When Washington lived, steam, telegraphs and railroads were 
 unknown, and the United States were thirty days' distant from the 
 nearest port of Europe. . . . Intelligence circulated slowly. One na- 
 tion knew little of another; and peoples separated by an ocean were 
 absolutely ignorant of the most common features of each other's 
 idiosyncracies. 
 
152 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 In his time the United States were so far separated from the rest 
 of the world that their very isolation was ample protection against 
 foreign attack. No European nation could hope to carry on war 
 against them, at a distance of 3,000 or 4,000 miles from their base, 
 with any reasonable hope of substantial success. So protected, we 
 needed no foreign allies. 
 
 But three-quarters of a century have changed all this. We are 
 now within fifteen days of almost any port of the coast of Europe. 
 . . . Steam has placed Europe and America within easy striking 
 distance of each other, and the ocean is no longer a protection 
 against hostile attack. We are no longer isolated from the rest of 
 the world. . . . 
 
 It seems quite doubtful, under these circumstances, whether we 
 can possibly much longer maintain the position of proud isolation 
 which Washington coveted. . . . 
 
 The alliance of the Western powers, maintained through the 
 Crimean War and exemplified in the recognition of the Southern 
 rebels by both powers conjointly — is in fact, if not in name, a hos- 
 tile combination against the United States. 
 
 What is our proper reply to this hostile combination? . . . Would 
 it not be wise to meet the hostile alliance by an alliance with 
 Russia? France and England united can do and dare much against 
 Russia alone or the United States alone; but against Russia and the 
 United States combined what could they do? 
 
 The analogies between the American and Russian people have 
 too often been described to need further explanation here. Russia, 
 like the United States, is a nation of the future. Its capabilities are 
 only just being developed. Its national destiny is barely shaped. 
 Its very institutions are in their cradle, and have yet to be modeled 
 to fit advancing civilization and the spread of intelligence. Like 
 the United States, Russia is in the agonies of a terrible transition: 
 the Russian serfs, like the American Negroes, are receiving their 
 liberty; and the Russian boiars, like the Southern slaveowners, are 
 mutinous at the loss of their property. When this great problem 
 shall have been solved, and the Russian people shall consist of 100,- 
 000,000 of intelligent, educated human beings, it is possible that 
 Russian institutions will have been welded by the force of civiliza- 
 tion into a similarity with ours. At that period the United States 
 will probably also contain 100,000,000 educated, intelligent people. 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 1 5 3 
 
 To two such peoples, firmly bound together by an alliance as well 
 as by traditional sympathy and good feeling, what would be im- 
 possible? Certainly the least of the purposes which they could 
 achieve would be to keep the peace of the world. . . . 
 
 At the present time Russia and the United States occupy re- 
 markably similar positions. A portion of the subjects of the Russian 
 empire, residing in Poland, have attempted to secede and set up 
 an independent national existence, just as our Southern slaveowners 
 have tried to secede from the Union and set up a slave Confeder- 
 acy; and the Czar, like the government of the Union, has under- 
 taken to put down the insurrection by force of arms. In that 
 undertaking, which every government is bound to make under 
 penalty of national suicide, Russia, like the United States, has been 
 thwarted and annoyed by the interference of France and England. 
 The Czar, like Mr. Lincoln, nevertheless, perseveres in his purpose; 
 and being perfectly in earnest and determined, has sent a fleet into 
 our waters in order that, if war should occur, British and French 
 commerce should not escape as cheaply as they did in the Crimean 
 contest. 
 
 An alliance between Russia and the United States at the present 
 time would probably relieve both of us from all apprehensions of for- 
 eign interference. It is not likely it would involve either nation in 
 war. On the contrary, it would probably be the best possible guar- 
 antee against war. It would be highly popular in both countries. . . . 
 
 The reception given last week in this city to Admiral Lisovski 
 and his officers will create more apprehension at the Tuileries and 
 at St. James than even the Parrott gun or the capture of the At- 
 lanta. If it be followed up by diplomatic negotiations, with a view 
 to an alliance with the Czar, it may prove an epoch of no mean im- 
 portance in history. 17 
 
 If the United States entered into any secret alliance with Russia dur- 
 ing the Civil War, Lincoln and Seward kept it so secret that not even 
 the President's private secretaries, John Nicolay, John Hay and Noah 
 Brooks, to whom he frequently imparted state secrets, had any inkling 
 of it. Nor did Seward give the slightest hint of it to his bosom friend, 
 Thurlow Weed. 
 
 But Weed's grandson, Thurlow Weed Barnes, relying on the in- 
 accurate memory of his grandfather, has written: 
 
154 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Admiral David Farragut lived at the Astor House, where he was 
 visited frequently by the Russian Admiral, between whom, when 
 they were young officers serving in the Mediterranean, a warm 
 friendship had existed. Sitting in Thurlow Weed's room one 
 evening after dinner, Admiral Farragut said to his Russian friend: 
 "Why are you spending the winter here in idleness?" "I am here," 
 replied the Russian Admiral, "under sealed orders, to be broken 
 only in a contingency that has not occurred." 
 
 He added that the Russian men-of-war were lying off San Fran- 
 cisco with similar orders. During this conversation the Russian Ad- 
 miral admitted that his orders were to break the seals if, during the 
 rebellion, we became involved in a war with foreign nations. 
 
 In Washington, a few days later, Secretary Seward asked the 
 Russian Minister why his government kept their ships of war so 
 long in our harbors, and the reply, in disclaiming any knowledge 
 of the nature of the visit, was that it had "no unfriendly purpose." 18 
 
 The utter incredibility of this account is evidenced by the fact that 
 Barnes also quoted his grandfather as attributing the sending of the 
 Russian fleets to the United States to our trouble with England over 
 the Trent affair. Thurlow Weed is quoted: 
 
 The Russian Ambassador at London informed his government 
 that England was preparing for war with America on account of 
 the seizure of Mason and Slidell. Hence two fleets were immedi- 
 ately sent across the Atlantic under sealed orders, so that if their 
 services were not needed, the intentions of the Emperor would 
 remain, as they have to this day, secret. 19 
 
 Actually the Czar's war vessels came to American shores in 1863, 
 two years after the Trent crisis. The two events were entirely un- 
 related. 
 
 The myth of the Russian "concealed orders" crept into American 
 historical writings when Thomas L. Harris repeated the Weed version 
 almost word for word in his otherwise creditable book The Trent 
 Affair. Harris also repeated Barnes' statement that: 
 
 A well-known American who was in St. Petersburg when the Re- 
 bellion began . . . during an official call upon Prince Gortchakov 
 was shown by the Chancellor an order written in Alexander's own 
 
 
The Russian Fleet Comes to the United States 155 
 
 hand, directing his Admiral to report to President Lincoln for or- 
 ders, in case England or France sided with the Confederates. 20 
 
 Commander F. E. Chadwick of the U. S. Navy, and George Peirce, 
 a Philadelphia lawyer, have written similar accounts. For many years 
 Commander Chadwick was intimate with Governor Andrew G. Cur- 
 tin, of Pennsylvania, who succeeded Cassius Clay as Minister to Russia 
 in 1869. 
 
 Commander Chadwick stated that Prince Gortchakov personally 
 showed Governor Curtin a copy of the orders that had been given to 
 the Admiral commanding the Russian fleet sent to New York. These 
 orders instructed the Admiral, in the event of the recognition of the 
 Confederacy by France or England, to place his fleet at the disposition 
 of the American government. "In other words, the recognition was 
 to be the signal for the declaration by Russia of war against those 
 powers. And there can be little doubt that the knowledge by the French 
 and English Cabinets of these orders was the great leash which held 
 them in check." 21 
 
 All these traditional accounts giving Thurlow Weed or Governor 
 Curtin as the source of their information are based on inaccurate mem- 
 ories or hearsay. No official documents have ever been published or 
 undoubted evidence presented in verification. 
 
10 
 
 ® 
 
 The Myth of Russian Friendship 
 
 The sensational, unheralded visit of the Russian fleet when the Amer- 
 ican future seemed so dark, was hailed with grateful rejoicing as an 
 indication that, come what may, Russia — our old and staunch friend — 
 was prepared to stand by the Union. The belief that the Czar had 
 offered Lincoln the use of the Russian warships and that this gesture 
 was responsible for stopping England's and France's efforts to recog- 
 nize the sovereignty of the Confederate States, was to linger long in 
 American memory. 
 
 The poet, Oliver Wendell Holmes, lyricized this legendary inter- 
 national friendship by singing the praises of the Czar "who was our 
 friend when the world was our foe." Statesmen eloquently expressed 
 America's undying gratitude for the support which came in our hour 
 of trial and misfortune. It was a friendship, said Cassius Clay, which 
 sprang from "a common cause in the advancement of our common 
 humanity." 
 
 Actually, Russia's opposition to the British-French proposals for col- 
 lective American intervention resulted from no concern or friendship 
 for the United States. Rather it came from the necessity of being con- 
 sistent in opposing foreign intervention in all domestic struggles; or to 
 be more exact, in opposing threatened foreign intervention in Russia's 
 own explosive Polish -question. 
 
 The Czar's war vessels came to the United States not to aid the Union 
 or to bolster up the morale of the North, but to escape the danger of 
 156 
 
The Myth of Russian Friendship 157 
 
 being bottled up in European waters by the British navy, as had hap- 
 pened during the Crimean War. There were no "sealed orders" to go 
 to the rescue of the United States in the event of intervention by 
 European powers. If such mysterious orders existed they were kept 
 secret even from President Lincoln and Secretary Seward. And no rec- 
 ord of such orders has ever been found among the official archives of 
 the United States or Russia. 
 
 Actually, the Polish crisis not only determined the Czar's attitude 
 toward American intervention but was also responsible for his sending- 
 the empire's fleet to the United States. At the very time that France and 
 England were endeavoring to induce Russia to join them in intervening 
 in the American Civil War, they were also inviting the United States 
 to join them in protesting against Russia's treatment of her Polish sub- 
 jects. Russia, the most hated nation in Europe, was even more friendless 
 than Lincoln's government. Her Polish policy was threatening to em- 
 broil her in another European war. She needed America's support for 
 nonintervention in the Polish insurrection, as much as Lincoln's gov- 
 ernment needed Russian support for nonintervention in the rebellion of 
 the Southern States. U. S. Minister Dayton wrote from Paris on 
 February 23, 1863: 
 
 The Polish revolt, which has been smoldering since 1861, broke 
 into a fierce flame, and has driven American affairs out of view 
 for the moment. A disturbance on the continent, especially in Cen- 
 tral Europe, is so near at hand and touches so many of the crowned 
 heads of these countries, that distant events fall out of sight until 
 these more immediate troubles are settled. 
 
 Russia was ruthless in crushing the insurrection. Thousands of Poles 
 were slain or incarcerated or deported to Siberia. The estates of numer- 
 ous nobles were confiscated. And the last remnants of Polish autonomy 
 were extinguished. 
 
 Europe was touched by Poland's plight. France, England and Austria 
 decided to have recourse to diplomatic intervention, and invited the 
 other powers who had signed the Treaty of Vienna to join in their 
 remonstrance to persuade Russia to accord better treatment to her 
 Polish subjects. But the Czar, emulating Lincoln's stand in the Amer- 
 ican rebellion, declared that the Polish uprising was a purely domestic 
 affair and that foreign intervention was not acceptable. 
 
 Emperor Louis Napoleon, though thwarted in his scheme to inter- 
 
158 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 vene in the American conflict, had by no means lost his appetite for 
 foreign meddling. Now he became the spearhead of the movement for 
 collective intervention in Poland's insurrection. In May, 1863, Napo- 
 leon's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Drouyn de Lhuys, instructed Henri 
 Mercier, in Washington, to invite Lincoln's government to join France, 
 England and Austria in proposing a common demarche in St. Peters- 
 burg in favor of Poland. The Emperor appealed to the "historical sym- 
 pathies" of the Americans for the Poles. The invitation stated: 
 
 The good relations which exist between the government of the 
 United States and the court of Russia cannot but give greater 
 weight to the counsels presented in a friendly form; and we rely 
 entirely on the Cabinet in Washington to appreciate the measure in 
 which it will be able most satisfactorily to open its views to the 
 Russian government. 
 
 In reality the invitation was an attempt to break the bond between 
 the United States and Russia. 
 
 What should Lincoln do about Napoleon's appeal to help oppressed 
 Poland? Years before, as a private citizen back in Springfield, Lincoln 
 had not hesitated to take a leading part in protesting against Russia, "the 
 foreign despot," who "in violation of the most sacred principles of the 
 laws of nature and of nations" had, through unwarranted armed inter- 
 vention, overwhelmed Hungary when she was striving to throw off the 
 yoke of Austrian tyranny. He had subscribed to the principle: "That 
 it is the right of any people, sufficiently numerous for national inde- 
 pendence, to throw off, to revolutionize, their existing form of govern- 
 ment, and to establish such other in its stead as they may choose." He 
 had denounced Russia's interference in Hungary's struggle for freedom 
 because of his firm belief that one nation had no right to interfere in 
 domestic uprisings in other nations. "It is the duty of our government 
 to neither foment, nor assist, such revolutions in other governments," 
 he had written. By the same token that the United States "may not 
 legally or warrantably interfere abroad to aid, so no other government 
 may interfere abroad, to suppress such revolutions." He regarded "this 
 mutuality of nonintervention as a sacred principle of the international 
 law." 1 
 
 Now as the responsible leader of the American nation engaged in a 
 life and death struggle for survival because of the insistence of the 
 Southern States to the right to national independence, Lincoln declared 
 
 
The Myth of Russian Friendship 159 
 
 their claim to the right to secession as unconstitutional and sheer 
 treason. Unflinchingly he combated the sophism of the secessionists 
 who maintained that any State of the Union, consistently with the Con- 
 stitution, might lawfully and peacefully withdraw from the Union 
 without the consent of the Union or of any other State. Lincoln's an- 
 swer was: 
 
 The States have their status in the Union, and they have no other 
 legal status. If they break from this, they can only do so against 
 law and by revolution. The Union, not themselves, separately, 
 procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or pur- 
 chase, the Union gave each of them whatever of independence and 
 liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the States, and, in 
 fact, it created them as States. Originally some independent colonies 
 made the Union, and, in turn, the Union threw off their old 
 dependence for them, and made them States, such as they are. Not 
 one of them ever had a State Constitution independent of the 
 Union. 2 
 
 But on the question of foreign intervention in domestic affairs, Pres- 
 ident Lincoln remained consistent with his earlier views as a private 
 citizen. His sympathies lay with the oppressed people of Poland, to 
 whom Secretary Seward referred as "the gallant nation whose wrongs, 
 whose misfortunes and whose valor have so deeply excited universal 
 sympathy in Europe." But there was the principle of nonintervention 
 by foreign powers in domestic affairs which Lincoln had once insisted 
 to be a "sacred principle of the international law." As President of a 
 nation torn by civil war, he opposed intervention by Europe in Amer- 
 ica. Consistency demanded that he also oppose interference by the 
 United States with regard to the Polish uprising. 
 
 As a result of a consultation of Secretary Seward with President Lin- 
 coln, the Secretary of State on behalf of the administration declined to 
 participate in the proposed collective anti-Russian action. The Amer- 
 ican answer expressed confidence that the Polish grievances would be 
 righted by the liberalism, sagacity and magnanimity of Czar Alexander 
 II. But the Secretary also pointed to the "insurmountable difficulty" in 
 the way of American active participation with France, Austria and 
 Great Britain in the Polish affair. Frequently the United States had seen 
 fit to decline invitations to participate in the consultations held by for- 
 eign states for the common advantage of the nations: 
 
160 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Our policy of nonintervention straight, absolute and peculiar as 
 it may seem to other nations, has thus become a traditional one 
 which could not be abandoned without the most urgent occasion, 
 amounting to a manifest necessity. Certainly it could not be wisely 
 departed from at this moment, when the existence of a local, al- 
 though as we trust only a transient disturbance, deprives the gov- 
 ernment of the counsel of a proportion of the American people to 
 whom so wide a departure from the settled policy of the country 
 must in any place be deeply interesting. 3 
 
 America's refusal to join Russia's enemies caused the Missouri Re- 
 public to declare that "the pale corpse of Poland's murdered liberty" 
 would haunt Lincoln in the days to come. Punch, in England, depicted 
 Lincoln in grotesque garb conniving with the Russian bear. French 
 journals likened the American Civil War to the Polish insurrection, and 
 pictured Lincoln placing his hand in the bloody hand of Czar Alex- 
 ander II. One French editor asked: "Is it right that fifty million Mus- 
 covites should unite to retain ten or twelve million Poles under a 
 detested yoke? Is it right that twenty million Northern Germans and 
 Irishmen should unite to impose on eight million Southerners an asso- 
 ciation they spurn?" 4 
 
 But the American refusal to join the anti-Russian remonstrance pro- 
 duced such great satisfaction in St. Petersburg that Prince Gortchakov 
 saw fit to give wide publicity in the Russian press to the expression of 
 the Czar's appreciation of 
 
 the firmness with which the government of the United States main- 
 tains the principle of nonintervention, the meaning of which in 
 these days is so often perverted; as well as the loyalty with which 
 they refuse to impose upon other states a rule, the violation of 
 which, in respect to themselves, they will not allow. The federal 
 government gives thus an example of justice and political pro- 
 priety which must increase the esteem which our August Master 
 has avowed toward the America nation. . . . 
 
 His Majesty, the Emperor, has been sensibly moved by the 
 sentiments of confidence which the government of the United 
 States places in his views and designs in regard to the general 
 well-being of his Empire. Such manifestation must strengthen the 
 bonds of mutual sympathy which unite the two countries and con- 
 stitute a consummation which too much accords with the aspira- 
 
The Myth of Russian Friendship 161 
 
 tions of the Emperor, His Majesty, not to look upon it with 
 pleasure. 
 
 Clay, from the American Embassy in St. Petersburg, applauded the 
 administration's stand on the Polish situation. "It was due from us to be 
 grateful for the past conduct of Russia toward us in our trouble, by a 
 like moral support of herself, in defense of the integrity of her Empire." 
 
 Some American citizens had urged Lincoln to accept Napoleon's 
 invitation to join the protest to Russia, because it would benefit the 
 Union cause by diverting attention from the Civil War. To them Clay 
 replied indignantly: How could it help the United States to weaken 
 "our steadfast friend"? For should Russia suffer defeat it would open 
 the way for our common enemies "to fall upon us." 5 
 
 In the meantime neither Russia nor the Western powers would back 
 down on their views on the Polish issue. France, England and Austria 
 contended it was an international question — in accordance with the 
 terms of the Congress of Vienna. On the other hand, St. Petersburg 
 insisted that it was a purely domestic uprising and that foreign inter- 
 ference could not be countenanced. It looked as if the dispute would 
 inevitably lead to a general European war. 
 
 The grave possibility of having to defend the Russian view by arms 
 caused the Czar real worry about his navy. During the Crimean War 
 the Russian fleet was bottled up in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. 
 The present navy was weak and no match for the combined sea power 
 of Great Britain and France. If it remained in European waters it would 
 be blocked in at Kronstadt and rendered useless. It was imperative that 
 the fleet be extricated from this potential danger in the event of a new 
 war which now appeared inevitable. 
 
 General- Adjutant N. Krabbe, who directed the imperial navy while 
 the Grand Duke Constantine was serving as Viceroy in Warsaw, urged 
 the Czar to order the vessels out to the open sea where they could not 
 be bottled up. Secret arrangements were, therefore, made to send the 
 Russian fleet away to the ice-free waters of the United States. From 
 the safe American coasts the Russians would be in a favorable position 
 for cruising against British commerce in the Atlantic and the Pacific, 
 should war suddenly break out over the tempestuous Polish question. 
 
 A note was dispatched to Stoeckl in Washington, outlining the 
 Russian strategy and instructing him to make ready for the arrival of 
 the warships. To Rear Admiral Lisovski, in command of the Atlantic 
 squadron, Krabbe sent these orders on July 26, 1863: 
 
1 62 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Direct your course with the whole squadron to the shores of the 
 United States of North America, not putting in to any port on the 
 way; and upon arrival in America, you will drop anchor in New 
 York. If it appears possible according to local conditions to remain 
 in this port with the entire squadron, then you will there await 
 the outcome of the negotiations on the Polish question. If our 
 Minister in Washington, with whom you will immediately estab- 
 lish communication upon your arrival in America, should find 
 that the sojourn of the entire squadron in New York might give 
 rise to difficulties with the federal government or to other un- 
 pleasantnesses, then it is permissible for you to divide the squadron 
 into two or three parts, and to scatter it among those ports of the 
 North American coast which will be recognized by you as the 
 most advantageous for this purpose. 
 
 In advance of a declaration of war, it is left to you to determine, 
 according to the consideration of the locality and the circumstances 
 of the moment, whether it is possible or advisable to remain with 
 the squadron in New York or other North American ports until 
 the actual outbreak of military activities or, leaving the anchorage 
 upon the supplementing of supplies, or at a time when a declaration 
 of war is becoming unavoidable and near, to put to sea so that at a 
 known rendezvous, which has been previously determined, you 
 will receive information of the declaration of war by means of a 
 ship chartered expressly for this purpose by Counselor of State 
 Stoeckl. It is understood that it will be necessary to preserve this 
 arrangement with the greatest secrecy; and the place of rendez- 
 vous must not be divulged to anyone, excepting our Minister. 
 
 Following these orders, Krabbe gave instructions to be observed in 
 the event of the outbreak of war. "Commence hostile action against 
 the commerce of the enemy. You will distribute these ships with such 
 consideration that they occupy the most frequented lanes on which are 
 directed the most important and most valuable tonnage." 6 The Russian 
 commander was told further that "these instructions are made purposely 
 general in order to give you a free hand to act according to your judg- 
 ment and discretion." 7 
 
 To Rear Admiral Popov, in command of the Russian Pacific squad- 
 ron, Krabbe issued similar instructions. "On receipt of news concern- 
 ing the outbreak of warlike activities" he was to direct his ships toward 
 
The Myth of Russian Friendship 163 
 
 the vulnerable places of enemy power, and likewise for the inflicting 
 of injuries on antagonists on lines of trade communication. In 5,000 
 words of instructions to Lisovski and Popov, there is not a word about 
 helping the North, or about "sealed orders," or about turning over the 
 fleet to Lincoln in case of foreign intervention in the American con- 
 flict. 8 
 
 Admiral Popov selected San Francisco Harbor because he considered 
 it the safest and most favorable base for action by his squadron. On 
 August 3, Popov wrote to the Russian Minister of the Marine: 
 
 I took such a decision because I do not have here any other in- 
 formation besides my own views, which tell me that our [Far 
 Eastern] ports are unfavorable for the concentration, just as they 
 do not represent any fortunate means either for provisioning the 
 squadron or for the indispensable repairs. . . . The republics of Cen- 
 tral and South America do not seem inclined to turn us out of 
 their ports, although they are indeed swamped with Poles. [But] 
 they, too, as in Mexico, do not hinder either the French or the 
 English from spying on our squadron in their roadsteads. There 
 remains, therefore, the United States of America which England 
 and France have worried to the utmost by their recent interfer- 
 ence. 9 
 
 Senator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the U. S. Senate Committee on 
 Foreign Affairs, wrote to John Bright on October 6, 1863: 
 
 At this moment I am more solicitous about France and England 
 than about our military affairs. . . . Foreign intervention will intro- 
 duce a new, vast, and incalculable element; it would probably pro- 
 voke a universal war. You will observe the hobnobbing at New 
 York with the Russian Admiral. Why is that fleet gathered there? 
 My theory is that when it left the Baltic, war with France was 
 regarded as quite possible, and it was determined not to be sealed 
 up at Kronstadt; if at New York, they could take the French expe- 
 dition at Vera Cruz. 10 
 
 Badly needing friends, the people of the United States readily inter- 
 preted the arrival of the Russian naval squadrons as special proof of 
 Muscovy's friendship for the Union in its hour of need, feted the 
 Czar's officers and sailors, toasted the Emperor and praised his govern- 
 ment. 
 
1 64 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 But it is highly significant that the Russians, too, were most profuse 
 in their expressions of obligation and of thanks and acknowledgment 
 of courtesies and favors received from the American government and 
 people during their sojourn in the United States. Clay, in his dispatch 
 of November 8, 1863, had written of the genuine gratitude which pre- 
 vailed in St. Petersburg toward the United States and her people for 
 the warm reception accorded the Russian fleet. 
 
 The Russian reception in American waters is the subject of con- 
 versation in all circles; and the gentry and the common people 
 seem alike to understand and feel the friendly demonstration made 
 at this time, when France, England and Austria are attempting, 
 under the pretense of national justice, to put them under the ban 
 of Christendom for defending the integrity of their Empire. 11 
 
 Upon the fleet's return to Russia, representatives of the Czar made 
 an official call upon U. S. Minister Clay, and amid pomp and ceremony 
 formally expressed the profound gratitude of the Emperor of All the 
 Russias for the help and cooperation granted to his navy and the favors 
 and kindnesses bestowed upon the officers and crews. 
 
 After Clay met the Emperor at Peterhof Palace, where he received 
 the personal thanks of the Russian ruler, the American Minister wrote 
 to Secretary Seward on August 22, 1864: "His Majesty told me that 
 he had allowed his officers lately in the United States to call upon me 
 en masse and express their gratitude for the courtesies extended them 
 in America, all of which was evidently as a national compliment." 
 
 Why — if the Russian warships had actually sailed to the United 
 States to serve the Union in a grave crisis — would the Czar's govern- 
 ment have felt itself under such obligation to Lincoln's government? 
 Had the cruise of the Russian fleet been in fact for American benefit, 
 the United States would have been under extraordinary obligation to 
 Russia, and would have called for Lincoln or Seward to make an official 
 public acknowledgment of American gratitude and indebtedness. No 
 such acknowledgment was ever made by Lincoln's administration. 
 
 Moreover, if the Russians had in truth come on a mission of naval 
 cooperation in actual war, the deal would have been a matter of official 
 record both in Washington and St. Petersburg. Diligent research among 
 Russian and American archives has revealed no record of "sealed or- 
 ders" or of any other overture offering the use of Russia's warships to 
 Lincoln in the event of Anglo-French intervention. 
 
The Myth of Russian Friendship 165 
 
 John Bigelow, who succeeded William L. Dayton as Minister to 
 France upon the former's death in 1864, has commented that "it was 
 not surprising" there was no official documentary record. "Flirtations 
 between governments as between the sexes, are not apt to be proclaimed 
 from the housetops, nor even made matters of record." 12 
 
 Was Lincoln deceived by the "sympathy of Muscovy," and "ab- 
 surdly bamboozled by the Russian compliments," as English journals 
 asserted? Henry Clews, the New York banker, who served as an agent 
 of the United States government in the marketing of bonds to finance 
 the Civil War, and who enjoyed the confidence of the administration, 
 has written: 
 
 William H. Seward, the Secretary of State . . . afterwards told 
 me that, when he heard of their [the Russian fleet's] arrival in 
 American waters, he invited them to accept the hospitalities of the 
 port of New York. He, of course, foresaw that their coming here 
 would, or at least might, have a good moral and political effect in 
 our favor both at home and abroad by depressing the South and 
 encouraging the North, and causing any foreign powers that might 
 have been considering the advisability of recognizing the Southern 
 Confederacy to postpone action under the impression that we had 
 or might have, Russia for an ally. 
 
 He was astute enough to see that this visit of the Russian squad- 
 ron might seem to be what it was not, particularly to foreign eyes. 
 Appearances, we all know, are sometimes deceptive, yet they 
 sometimes assert great influence. The visit of this squadron was a 
 case in point. It was a splendid "bluff" at a very critical period in 
 our history. 13 
 
 A contemporary cartoon in Harper's Weekly depicts "Dr. Lincoln" 
 prescribing Russian salve for Napoleon and John Bull. On the wall of 
 his shop is a sign reading, "Dr. Lincoln's Specific for Confederate 
 Rash — Russian Salve." "Dr. Lincoln" is shown talking to Seward, "the 
 smart boy of the shop," who is carrying a basket filled with the salve. 
 Lincoln, pointing to Napoleon and John Bull, across the way, instructs 
 delivery boy Seward: "Mild applications of Russian salve for our 
 friends over the way, and heavy doses — and plenty of it — for our 
 Southern patient." 
 
 Lincoln was not "bamboozled" by the "sympathy of Muscovy." He 
 realized that the Czar was acting for Russia's own interests exclusively. 
 
1 66 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 He knew that Russia's "actions towards us . . . were but moves made 
 by her upon the chessboard of European diplomacy." 14 But notwith- 
 standing the real motive of Russian friendship, Lincoln took full ad- 
 vantage of the fortuitous circumstance and used it astutely for the best 
 interests of the Union cause. Seward utilized the "sympathy of Mus- 
 covy" as a "splendid bluff" that a Russo- American alliance existed, and 
 Lincoln used it as a "salve" with which to dose the seceded States and 
 their would-be allies. As Clews has put it: 
 
 Russia was friendly to the United States of course, but this 
 friendship between the two countries was very different from an 
 offer, or a willingness to help us by armed intervention in our 
 favor. Russia has never intimated that she had any such intentions; 
 and, indeed, such intervention on her part would have been folly, 
 as her navy was then very small after the destruction of the 
 Crimean War, and would have been powerless against England 
 and France. 
 
 Gortchakov repeatedly said to our Minister that Russia greatly 
 favored peace and wished for a speedy return; but would never 
 take sides in the controversy between the North and the South. 
 
 Professor Frank A. Golder in 191 5, and Professor E. A. Adamov a 
 little later, discovered in the Russian archives in St. Petersburg the docu- 
 ments which prove beyond doubt that the Russian fleet had been sent 
 to the United States not to aid the North but for its own safety in 
 anticipation of an Anglo-French intervention in support of the Polish 
 revolt, and to put the vessels in a position where they might prey upon 
 enemy commerce in the event of war. As Golder summed it up, 
 
 It was a most extraordinary situation. Russia had not in mind to 
 help us but did render us distinct service; the United States was not 
 conscious that it was contributing in any way to Russia's welfare 
 and yet seems to have saved her from humiliation and perhaps war. 
 There is probably nothing to compare with it in diplomatic his- 
 tory. 15 
 
11 
 
 ® 
 
 Alexander the Liberator and Lincoln 
 the Emancipator 
 
 Just one day before Abraham Lincoln took the oath of office as the 
 sixteenth President of the United States and assured the South that he 
 would take no provocative step against slavery where it already existed, 
 Czar Alexander II by one stroke of his pen set more than 20,000,000 
 Russian serfs free. 
 
 This epochal act of freedom, like a distant lightning flash, graphically 
 illuminated the tragic predicament of the United States. Not that Rus- 
 sian serfdom was the same as Negro slavery in America. The white serf 
 in Russia, his blood identical with that of the noblest Muscovite families, 
 occupied a position only slightly comparable to that of the Negro 
 bondsman in the South. Russian serfdom at the time of its extirpation 
 was without the repulsive features of ordinary slavery. Many serfs 
 had been able to purchase the privilege of exemption from work for 
 their masters for a moderate payment. There were prohibitions against 
 the sale of serfs at public auctions or the separation of members of the 
 same family. In addition, the arbitrary rule of the landlords was held in 
 check by defining the punishments they could legally inflict upon their 
 serfs. Although there naturally remained much abuse of power there 
 was less flagrant cruelty than in the slave States of America. Unlike the 
 American slave who was of African and savage origin and held by the 
 
 167 
 
1 68 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Supreme Court to be an "inferior being," the Russian serf was one with 
 his master in race and his potential equal. 
 
 But though the systems of Russian serfdom and American Negro 
 slavery differed, the striking of the shackles from the millions of serfs 
 of the Czar's domain gave new courage and impetus to all who were 
 striving to destroy the institution of human slavery in the United States. 
 
 While all enlightened nations of the world were moving in the direc- 
 tion of emancipation, the United States of America — the nation which 
 Lincoln believed to have been "conceived in liberty and dedicated to 
 the proposition that all men are created equal" — was falling to pieces 
 because one large section was insisting on the permanence and, if need 
 be, the extension of the slave system. Void of shame, Alexander Ste- 
 phens, Vice President of the Southern Confederacy, said of the Consti- 
 tution adopted by the Confederate States: 
 
 The new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating 
 questions relating to our peculiar institution, African slavery. This 
 was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. 
 The prevailing ideas entertained by Jefferson and most of the lead- 
 ing statesmen at the time of the old Constitution were that the 
 enslavement of the African was wrong in principle, socially, 
 morally and politically. Our new government is founded upon 
 exactly the opposite ideas: its foundations are laid, its cornerstone 
 rests, upon the great truth that the Negro is not the equal of the 
 white man: that slavery — subordination to the white man— is his 
 natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the 
 first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, 
 philosophical and moral truth. The great objects of humanity are 
 best attained when there is conformity to the Creator's laws and 
 decrees. 
 
 Equally frank and shameless was the convention of the State of Missis- 
 sippi. "Our position," declared these Southerners, "is thoroughly iden- 
 tified with slavery." 
 
 Such was the stand taken by the South at a time when the con- 
 science of civilized man had become intolerant of involuntary servi- 
 tude, with the result that slavery had already withered away on three 
 continents. Slave trading within the British dominions had been abol- 
 ished by the Act of 1807, and the example of Great Britain had been 
 followed by the other European nations— France, Prussia, Austria and 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 1 69 
 
 the Dutch. In addition, the last vestiges of slavery had died away in 
 Latin America. And now Russia — where one-third of the whole popu- 
 lation was enslaved — on March 3, 1861 by autocratic decree inflicted 
 the deathblow to serfdom in the domain of the Czar. 
 
 No Russian law had ever enslaved the peasantry in the Czar's realm. 
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century through a decree of Boris 
 Godunov, the lord who owned the soil was granted control of the 
 peasants upon it, just as he owned the immovable boulders and ledges. 
 When Godunov later followed this decree with a vigorous fugitive- 
 serf law, he created a permanent serf-caste bound to the soil. 
 
 Already in the days of Peter the Great serfdom was recognized as a 
 vicious evil. Peter himself stormed forth in protestations and invectives 
 against what he stigmatized as "selling men like beasts — separating par- 
 ents from children, husbands from wives — which causes many tears to 
 flow." He declared that this inhuman practice should be ameliorated. 
 But, preoccupied with the building of St. Petersburg — where in drain- 
 ing the marshes, he sacrificed one hundred thousand men in one year — 
 he did nothing to improve the condition of the serfs. Actually the sit- 
 uation worsened. Serfage became practically undistinguishable from 
 slavery; and a few years later, in the reign of Empress Anne, bloomed 
 fully into slavery by reason of her decree permitting nobles to sell 
 serfs apart from the soil. 
 
 Catherine II aroused hope when she issued a decree prohibiting the 
 enslavement of serfs. She also encouraged the study of serf emancipa- 
 tion. But when she became embroiled in the crushing of Poland, the 
 effort to improve the condition of the serfs stopped. Instead, her nobles 
 prevailed upon her to issue an edict ordering the peasants of Little 
 Russia to remain forever on the estates where the day of publication of 
 the decree should find them. Court favorites, given advance information 
 of this edict, enticed peasants by the thousands onto their estates. This 
 edict was then sprung. "In an hour the courtiers were made rich, the 
 peasants were made serfs, and Catherine II was made infamous for- 
 ever." 1 
 
 Alexander I, roused by the wrongs of the serf system, seized a cross 
 and swore upon it that serfage would be abolished. He submitted to 
 the nobles of the land a plan of gradual emancipation whereby during 
 a period of twelve to fourteen years a serf could pass from serfage to 
 personal freedom with ownership of his cabin and the bit of land 
 attached to it. But serf-owners thwarted the plan everywhere except in 
 
170 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 three provinces. Alexander I, bitterly discouraged, dropped further 
 efforts. 
 
 During the thirty-year reign of Nicholas I no less than 556 serious 
 outbreaks by restless serfs took place. Nicholas, who became the world's 
 greatest apostle of downright despotism and the very incarnation of re- 
 action against revolution or liberalism, winced as he saw how serfage 
 was keeping Russia weak, sluggish and stagnant — a land of dissolute 
 lords and abject serfs. He vowed to improve conditions. But, like all his 
 predecessors, he became appalled by the magnitude of the task. He 
 dreaded the grave and perhaps fatal disturbances to the social and eco- 
 nomic life of Russia. In 1842 he issued a ukase creating a moderate in- 
 novation. Halfheartedly he established by decree the class of "con- 
 tracting peasants." Masters and serfs were empowered to enter into 
 contracts — the serf receiving freedom, the master receiving payments 
 in installments. 
 
 But the revolutions which overran Europe in 1848 filled Nicholas 
 with fear of all innovations. The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 
 ended even his feeble efforts to modify the iniquitous serf system. At 
 his death in 1855, he bequeathed to his son, Alexander II, not only the 
 war but a nation in bondage. 
 
 The breakdown of Russia following her ignominious defeat in the 
 Crimean War made a general recasting of institutions imperative. Agri- 
 culture and the industries were languishing because of the lack of free 
 labor. The most fundamental of needed reforms was the complete abo- 
 lition of the institution of serfdom. 
 
 When Czar Alexander II succeeded to the throne of his father, there 
 were over 47,000,000 serfs in Russia. Of these, nearly 25,000,000 were 
 crown serfs who enjoyed a large degree of personal freedom. They 
 exercised local self-government, and administered their own affairs in 
 communes through councils and tribunals which they themselves chose. 
 Moreover, they were not restricted in their right to acquire or dispose 
 of property or to remove from the place of their birth. 
 
 But the other 22,000,000 serfs, the "disposition" of approximately 
 100,000 nobles, were hardly better than slaves. 2 This enormous mass of 
 human beings, more than one-third of the population of Russia, was in 
 a state of bondage. They could be bought and sold with the property 
 on which they labored. They were human chattels which were part of 
 the estate of their master. Of the 100,000 Russian serf -owners, one 
 Count Scheremetiev possessed more than 300,000 souls. There were a 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 1 7 1 
 
 few others also whose possessions were enormous. However, more than 
 41,000 of the landed gentry owned less than twenty-one male serfs. A 
 proprietor who was the owner of less than 500 serfs was not considered 
 very rich, and there were about 4,000 of these. 
 
 Czar Alexander II realized that a serious general uprising of the serfs 
 was inevitable unless a radical solution could quickly be achieved, No 
 moderate amelioration would do. It had to be complete liberation ac- 
 companied by a land settlement. But he realized that so radical a revolu- 
 tion was fraught with danger to the entire economic and political 
 structure of Russia. Like his predecessors, Alexander II began by urging 
 the nobles of the realm to take the initiative in solving the problem. It 
 was better, he pleaded again and again, to abolish serfdom from above 
 than to wait until it begins to abolish itself from below. 
 
 In March 1856 the determined young Emperor invited his "faithful 
 nobility" to consider what steps were necessary to bring about eman- 
 cipation. He himself proposed emancipation during a period of trans- 
 ition from serfage to freedom lasting twelve years. At the end of that 
 time the serf was to be given his full freedom and ownership of his 
 cabin with an adjoining piece of land for cultivation. He asked the rul- 
 ing nobles to work out the details of a fair indemnity to themselves. 
 Committees of emancipation were set up in many areas. But the nobles 
 refused to cooperate and fought Alexander at every step. The Czar 
 concluded that the critical situation would no longer permit temporiz- 
 ing. He decided to take matters into his own hands. By autocratic de- 
 cree his predecessors had foisted serfdom upon the land. Now by 
 autocratic decree the new Czar determined to abolish serfdom through- 
 out his domain. 
 
 In February i860 Alexander, in anticipation of granting general free- 
 dom, liberated the crown serfs. On March 3, 1861 he issued a manifesto 
 setting all serfs of Russia free. By this action he raised 22,000,000 human 
 chattels to the rank of free men. He had struggled long and in vain to 
 work out satisfactory arrangements for gradual emancipation. Now he 
 forced immediate emancipation upon the unwilling nobility. Detailed 
 arrangements would have to be worked out afterwards. 
 
 The manifesto was read in all the churches. These were its funda- 
 mental principles: The serfs should at once receive the civil rights of 
 the free rural classes, and the authority of the proprietor should be re- 
 placed by communal self-government. The rural communes should as 
 far as possible retain the land they actually held, and should in return 
 
172 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 pay the proprietor certain yearly dues in money or labor. The govern- 
 ment should by means of credit assist the communes to redeem these 
 dues, or in other words to purchase the lands ceded to them. The do- 
 mestic serfs should continue to serve their masters two years for wages 
 and thereafter become completely free. But they would have no claim 
 on the land* 
 
 Against the strong opposition of the majority of nobles, the reform 
 was carried out by the autocratic sovereign in cooperation with a few 
 enlightened bureaucrats. A change so radical was naturally accom- 
 panied by many local disturbances and much bloodshed. For three 
 years a fierce struggle went on over the terms of emancipation. No one 
 Was completely satisfied. The peasantry was disappointed because they 
 were compelled to pay dues on land which they believed to be their 
 own by right. But liberation was ultimately achieved without civil war 
 and without widespread violence. 3 
 
 The removal of the shackles from the peasants of Russia heartened 
 the antislavery leaders in the United States and gave impetus to their 
 efforts to strike the fetters from the 4,000,000 Negroes held in slavery 
 in the Southern States. They contended that now that despotic Russia 
 had liberated her millions of serfs by "perhaps the greatest single 
 legislative act in the history of the world," how could America, pro- 
 fessing freedom and equality, justify her own moral position in the 
 world? So long as the barbaric institution with its odious conception 
 of human property remained the law of the land, America, they con- 
 tended, would be stigmatized with a foul blot that would enable 
 Europe to point the finger of scorn at her professions of liberty. 
 
 From the very outset of Lincoln's administration, impatient aboli- 
 tionists importuned him to bring about the immediate destruction of 
 slavery by emancipation. Lincoln hated slavery with every fiber of his 
 being; he fervently wished that all men everywhere might be free; he 
 had been the outspoken antagonist of the slave power. While serving 
 in Congress, he had introduced a bill to abolish slavery in the District 
 of Columbia. It provided for gradual emancipation with compensation 
 to the owners. The bill was buried in committee. 
 
 But despite his personal inclinations as a citizen, now as the President 
 of the nation with powers and duties prescribed by a fixed Constitu- 
 tion whose provisions he had sworn to obey, his personal feelings had 
 to be sacrificed to his sworn obligation. It was his duty to uphold the 
 Union and the laws. The barbaric institution of slavery was a part of 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 173 
 
 the law of the land countenanced by the Constitution and sanctioned 
 by the courts. It had existed even before the Constitution itself and had 
 been accepted by the creators of that great instrument as an unavoid- 
 able evil. Congress, he believed, had no right to interfere with slavery 
 in the States where it existed. As a lawyer and constitutionalist he took 
 the stand that slavery could be abolished only through means compat- 
 ible with the Constitution. 
 
 He believed that the abolitionists' rash disregard of the constitutional 
 rights of the slave States tended only to drive more States out of the 
 Union and make the disruption permanent. Slavery, he concluded, 
 could be abolished only by saving the Union. For it was clear to him 
 that if the Confederate States — whose government "rests upon the 
 great truth that . . . slavery — subordination to the white man — is his 
 [the Negro's] natural and normal condition" — were victorious in the 
 war — abolition would be impossible. 
 
 So with all his sympathy for the downtrodden slave, with all his op- 
 position to the extension of slavery, he took the anomalous position of 
 supporting, defending, and preserving the Constitution, which forbade 
 interference with that institution. His task was to save the Union — 
 with or without slavery. To this end he devoted his energies to hold 
 the border States. To this end he repudiated the orders of military 
 emancipation by General Fremont commanding in Missouri, and Gen- 
 eral Hunter commanding in South Carolina. 
 
 Yet while professing these policies he earnestly pressed his plan of 
 compensated emancipation upon the loyal slave States. He pointed out 
 that the cost of freeing the estimated 430,000 slaves in the border States 
 of Kentucky, Missouri, Delaware and Maryland, was about $120,000,- 
 000 — the cost of carrying on the war for two months. And although 
 Congress adopted Lincoln's recommendation the border States refused 
 to take a single step toward emancipation. 
 
 However, in April 1862, Congress did abolish slavery in the District 
 of Columbia, and, as compensation, paid the owners three hundred 
 dollars for each liberated slave. Stoeckl, reporting to Prince Gort- 
 chakov about this event, wrote that 
 
 abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia . . . will not be a 
 heavy burden on the treasury because out of a population of 10,- 
 000 Negroes, there are hardly 2,000 slaves in Washington and 
 environs. This emancipation should have been completed a long 
 
174 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 time ago. It was demanded by the dignity of the republic as much 
 as by considerations of humanity. 4 
 
 But impatient abolitionists accused Lincoln of temporizing with the 
 slavery question. They refused to accept his theory that the supremacy 
 of the Constitution and the preservation of the Union were the only 
 and the paramount issues. They demanded the immediate emancipation 
 of the slaves. Those who had been Lincoln's friends and supporters 
 now criticized and censured him with the vehemence of his bitterest 
 enemies. These radical abolitionists — many of whom even welcomed 
 disunion because the Union sanctioned slavery — attributed the Pres- 
 ident's failure to liberate the slaves immediately by a military edict to 
 his weakness and unsteadiness of purpose. 
 
 On August 20, 1862 Horace Greeley, in an editorial entitled The 
 Prayer of Twenty Millions, bitterly attacked the President for failing 
 to take immediate steps for abolishing slavery by some sweeping proc- 
 lamation of emancipation. With all the humility of a private citizen, 
 the President who had acquired a power that never before had been 
 wielded by a ruler of this nation, forgot the might and dignity of his 
 office and penned a reply to Greeley. 
 
 It was a reiteration of his whole creed, so far as emancipation and 
 the preservation of the Union were concerned. His personal wish, he 
 declared, was that all men everywhere could be free. But now his 
 paramount object in this struggle was to save the Union, and not either 
 to save or destroy slavery. 
 
 As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not 
 meant to leave anyone in doubt. I would save the Union. I would 
 save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the 
 national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 
 "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the 
 Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not 
 agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union 
 unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree 
 with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the 
 Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save 
 the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could 
 save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it 
 by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. 
 What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I be- 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 175 
 
 lieve it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear be- 
 cause I do not believe it would help save the Union." 5 
 
 Though President Lincoln subordinated the question of the over- 
 throw of slavery to the paramount issue of saving the Union, eventual 
 emancipation never for a moment left his mind. He knew that beneath 
 the preservation of the Union, was the preservation of the democratic 
 way of life. As he said, "slavery must die that the Union might live." 
 For how could the republic keep its integrity and shelter it while the 
 iniquitous institution of slavery was sanctioned by the supreme law of 
 the land? 
 
 Through all those soul-torturing struggles of the first two years he 
 was reading the signs of the times, calmly waiting, patiently waiting, 
 for the propitious moment when circumstances would permit the ful- 
 filment of his devout wish that all men everywhere might be free. 
 Bravely he bore the criticism of impatient friends and the hostility and 
 calumny of open and avowed enemies. He had registered an oath in 
 heaven to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. The rights 
 of the individual States in regard to their slave property must remain 
 inviolate until the safety of the Union demanded their forfeiture in 
 favor of the higher obligation. He alone was to be the judge of when 
 that exigency had arrived. His alone was to be the awful responsibility. 
 
 He waited until slavery's extinction became an imperative duty — 
 until further temporizing would prove disastrous to the cause of the 
 Union. Convinced that the propitious moment was at hand, without 
 further hesitation, without consultation, simply, undramatically, he 
 struck the deathblow to slavery. 
 
 Unknown to Greeley when he published his famous Prayer on Aug- 
 ust 20, was the fact that a month earlier, on July 22, Lincoln had se- 
 cretly called his Cabinet into session and informed them that he had 
 drafted an Emancipation Proclamation, declaring free the slaves in all 
 the States still in rebellion on the first of January ensuing but com- 
 mending once more to the loyal slave States his plan of compensated 
 abolition. He told his surprised ministers that he did not require their 
 opinions as to the competence of the edict. He had already made the ir- 
 revocable decision himself. He assured them that his mind was clear 
 and set. But Secretary Seward spoke up to question "the expediency 
 of its issue at this juncture." The Secretary of State believed "the de- 
 pression of the public mind, following upon recent reverses, might 
 
176 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 make it viewed as the last measure, a cry for help — the government 
 stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching 
 forth her hands to the government." Accordingly he advised deferring 
 its issue until supported by some military success. 
 
 The President regarded this view as sound counsel. So he put the 
 document away, waiting for a victory on the battlefield. The Eman- 
 cipation Proclamation already lay in a drawer of Lincoln's desk when 
 Greeley penned his famous editorial reproaching the President for his 
 apparent failure to do something about abolishing slavery. 
 
 On September 22, 1862, five days after the battle of Antietam, 
 Lincoln again summoned the Cabinet. "I made a solemn vow before 
 God, that if General Lee was driven back from Pennsylvania, I would 
 crown the result by a declaration of freedom to the slaves," he told 
 Secretary Chase. The battle of Antietam, though not a great victory, 
 was a distinct gain for the Union since it stopped Lee's invasion of the 
 North for the time being. 
 
 "I think the time for acting has now come," Lincoln told his min- 
 isters, "and I have got you together to hear what I have written down." 
 Calmly and solemnly he read his death warrant for slavery: 
 
 I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of America, 
 do proclaim that on the first day of January 1863, all persons held 
 as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people 
 whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall 
 then be, thenceforth and forever, free; and the executive govern- 
 ment of the United States, including the military and naval au- 
 thorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such 
 persons, and will do no act, or acts, to repress such persons, or any 
 of them, in any efforts they make for their actual freedom. 
 
 Upon this momentous and most beneficent military decree of his- 
 tory, and by Lincoln "believed to be an act of justice, warranted by 
 the Constitution," he invoked "the considerate judgment of mankind 
 and the gracious favour of Almighty God." 
 
 The Confederacy treated Lincoln's Proclamation as an idle threat. 
 On New Year's Day of 1863, none of the rebellious States having re- 
 turned, the Emancipation Proclamation went into full force and effect. 
 Automatically, all slaves within the territory then held by the Con- 
 federate armies were declared thenceforth and forever free. 
 
 The Proclamation did not completely abolish slavery. It was made 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 177 
 
 applicable only to those States or part of States in open rebellion. But 
 with its pronouncement "that the executive government of the United 
 States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will rec- 
 ognize and maintain the freedom of such persons," the mortal blow to 
 the hated institution, as events proved, had been inflicted, and its 
 absolute extinction through the length and breadth of the land became 
 only a matter of time. 
 
 The Emancipation Proclamation, which takes rank with the Declar- 
 ation of Independence as the second great charter of American free- 
 dom, was a military measure — an act of war based on imperative neces- 
 sity and deemed helpful in a military way to the Union cause. For 
 Lincoln concluded that to strike at slavery was to strike at the very 
 heart of Southern military strength. By virtue of his power as Com- 
 mander in Chief of the army and navy in time of actual armed rebel- 
 lion against the authority of the government, and as a fit and necessary 
 war measure for suppressing said rebellion, Lincoln justified his act. It 
 had no sanction as a constitutional provision. Congress had not ap- 
 proved it as a statute and no court had pronounced it as a binding rule 
 of law. 
 
 In normal times he was convinced that the President could not in- 
 terfere with slavery in the States, nor had he legal power to liberate a 
 single slave. But now, with the nation engaged in a life-and-death 
 struggle with public enemies, he was just as convinced that his wartime 
 powers authorized him to use against the rebels every expedient coun- 
 tenanced by public law. Among these powers was the confiscation of 
 the enemy's slaves. 
 
 He was frank to admit the legal weakness of the Proclamation and 
 its insufficiency as a permanent means of destroying slavery. But it was 
 a step in the right direction from which he would never retreat. He 
 was determined never to retract or modify this edict. Not one slave 
 liberated under its provisions must ever be returned to bondage. "If 
 the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive 
 duty to re-enslave such persons, another and not I must be their in- 
 strument to perform it," he declared. 
 
 If the Emancipation Proclamation, as a permanent and universal 
 remedy for the evil, was futile, then the next step was to change the 
 Constitution itself to confer upon Congress express power to enlarge 
 the field of personal liberty and restore to the four million human be- 
 ings the God-given right of freedom so long denied them. This could 
 
178 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 be accomplished by confirming President Lincoln's beneficent edict of 
 freedom by embodying the Emancipation Proclamation in the organic 
 law of the land by constitutional amendment. The Proclamation had at 
 least theoretically destroyed slavery in the rebellious States. Now it 
 remained for a constitutional amendment to make its effects practical 
 and permanent, not only in those regions but also in States not included 
 in the Proclamation. Suclv an amendment would not only destroy the 
 legal existence of the cursed institution, but would forever prohibit its 
 re-establishment. In urging the immediate passage of a proposed consti- 
 tutional amendment, the President said: 
 
 A question might be raised as to whether the Proclamation was 
 legally valid. It might be added that it aided only those who came 
 into our lines, and that it was inoperative as to those who did not 
 give themselves up; or that it would have no effect upon the chil- 
 dren of the slaves born hereafter; in fact, it could be urged that 
 it did not meet the evil. But this amendment is a king's cure for all 
 evils. It winds the whole thing up. 
 
 In 1864 a measure to submit a constitutional amendment abolishing 
 slavery came before the Thirty-Eighth Congress. Lincoln's friend from 
 Illinois, Senator Trumbull, reported the Thirteenth Amendment from 
 the Committee on the Judiciary and led the fight in its behalf in the 
 Senate. "This amendment adopted," he declared, "not only does slavery 
 cease, but it can never be re-established by State authority, or in any 
 other way than by again amending the Constitution." By a large ma- 
 jority it was approved by the Senate; but in the House the necessary 
 two-thirds vote could not be obtained. 
 
 However, when Congress reconvened after Lincoln's re-election, the 
 President in his Message pointed out that the victory of his party 
 clearly demonstrated that it was the will of the majority that the 
 amendment be ratified. Therefore, "May we not agree that the sooner 
 the better?" 
 
 On January 6, 1865 debate on the question was reopened. Powerful, 
 eloquent, and elaborate speeches covering both sides of the proposition 
 were made. On the last day of January a vote was finally reached, the 
 roll call proceeded, and amid the deepest excitement, enthusiasm, and 
 fervid rejoicing the Speaker of the House declared the amendment 
 approved. 
 
 To a body of citizens who marched to the Executive Mansion the 
 
 
Alexander and Lincoln 179 
 
 night following the passage of the measure, to congratulate the Presi- 
 dent, Lincoln in his characteristic homely fashion declared the "great 
 job" was completed. "The occasion," he said, "is one of congratulation 
 to the country, and to the whole world. But there is yet a task before 
 us — to go forward and have consummated by the votes of the States 
 that which Congress so nobly began yesterday." The necessary ratifi- 
 cation by twenty-seven of the thirty-six States was not to be accom- 
 plished until December 18, 1865, months after the madman's bullet had 
 taken Lincoln's life. But the "great job" was virtually finished. His cher- 
 ished hope that all men, everywhere, might be free would soon be 
 made good by law. The Thirteenth Amendment reduced to law, as it 
 were, Lincoln's life and creed. 
 
 Alexander the Liberator and Lincoln the Emancipator were the sub- 
 jects of the toasts proposed at the reception given in Kronstadt in 
 honor of U.S. Minister Clay by the officers of the Russian fleet which 
 had returned from its memorable visit to American ports. Rear Ad- 
 miral Lisovski in proposing his toast to the President of the United 
 States, said that he paid tribute to "a name, which the possessor has al- 
 ready rendered immortal by the exercise of high moral courage in 
 opposition to erroneous popular prejudice, and by the practice of a 
 sublime humanity in the emancipation of the slave." Clay responded 
 with a toast to the Emperor as "Alexander, not Emperor but Libera- 
 tor," whose deeds belong not to "Russia but to the world." Jubilantly, 
 Lincoln's Minister declared Emancipation to be "a new bond of union 
 with Russia." 
 
12 
 
 ® 
 
 The Czar Criticizes Lincoln's Proclamation 
 
 Emancipation changed the course of the Civil War. Thenceforth 
 the cause of liberty was to be bound up with the cause of the Union. 
 
 In his own heart Lincoln was confident that his Proclamation "will 
 commend itself to the enlightened judgment and moral approbation of 
 not only all Christian states but of mankind." The world could now see 
 that the American conflict was no simple political rebellion, but a battle 
 between slavery and freedom. It was now a war dedicated by Lincoln 
 to the destruction of human bondage — a crusade for liberty. With the 
 injection of this great moral issue, the Union's friends in Europe could 
 now uphold Lincoln's hand with zeal and courage. 
 
 The result was a turning point in America's foreign relations. The 
 danger of intervention by European powers began to vanish. From 
 London, Henry Adams wrote, "The Emancipation Proclamation has 
 done more for us here than all our former victories and all our diplo- 
 macy. It is creating an almost convulsive reaction in our favor all over 
 this country." This despite the fact that Earl Russell, Britain's Foreign 
 Minister, did not like Lincoln's edict of freedom. He declared it left 
 him puzzled as to what the President was trying to do. To Lord Lyons, 
 in Washington, he wrote: 
 
 The Proclamation professes to emancipate all slaves in places 
 where the United States authorities cannot exercise any jurisdic- 
 180 
 
The Czar Criticizes Lincoln's Proclamation 181 
 
 tion nor make emancipation a reality; but it does not decree eman- 
 cipation of slaves in any States or parts of States occupied by fed- 
 eral troops. . . . There seems to be no declaration of a principle 
 adverse to slavery in this Proclamation. It is a measure of war of a 
 very questionable kind. As President Lincoln has twice appealed to 
 the judgment of mankind, in his Proclamation, I venture to say 
 I do not think it can or ought to satisfy the friends of abolition, 
 who look for total and impartial freedom for the slave, and not for 
 vengeance on the slave owner. 
 
 But with the promulgation of the Emancipation Proclamation it be- 
 came clear that government heads of Great Britain would find it less 
 easy to interfere with the United States or lend aid to the South. The 
 England of Wilberforce, a nation that had taken the lead in the world 
 movement for ending slavery and which for decades had been holding 
 America up to scorn for supporting this barbaric institution, could 
 hardly be expected to support a rebellion being fought for the perpetu- 
 ation of slavery. And any Cabinet that took sides openly with the 
 effort to perpetuate human bondage would not have remained in 
 power twenty-four hours. * 
 
 From St. Petersburg, U.S. Minister Cameron wrote: "Now the con- 
 stitutional nations which have hitherto regarded the friendship which 
 exists between Russia and the United States as wanting a foundation in 
 common principles and sentiments, must, hereafter, admit that this rela- 
 tion is as natural as it is auspicious to both countries in its results." 
 
 Bayard Taylor sent an article from the St. Petersburg Journal which 
 praised the Proclamation as just and sagacious. It expressed confidence 
 in Lincoln's opinion that it would never produce a "servile insurrec- 
 tion" as the South feared. Taylor stated that in a conversation on 
 American affairs at an imperial ball the Emancipation Proclamation 
 was characterized as the equivalent of many battles by Emperor Alex- 
 ander II. 
 
 "Friends of America" in France were wildly enthusiastic in their 
 approval of Lincoln's act. Their message to him stated: "We declare 
 that we have never hoped nor wished for a more steady, rapid and res- 
 olute progress. We have understood the difficulties which surrounded 
 Mr. Lincoln. We have honored his scruples of conscience with regard 
 to the Constitution of his country which stopped his path. We have 
 
1 82 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 admired the courageous good sense with which he moved straight on, 
 the instant he could do so, without danger to his cause or violation of 
 the law." 
 
 The fighting Italian patriot, Giuseppe Garibaldi, who had expressed 
 a desire for a federal army command — providing the war would be 
 fought for emancipation of the slaves — rejoiced over the Proclamation. 
 "Let free men religiously keep sacred the day of the fall of slavery," he 
 declared. "Prosperity to you, Abraham Lincoln, pilot of liberty; hail 
 to all you who for two years have fought and died around her regener- 
 ating banner; weal to you, redeemed sons of Ham — the free men of 
 Italy kiss the glorious marks of your chains." 
 
 Garibaldi's followers, the republican liberals of Italy whose red shirts 
 had become symbols of freedom, added their lavish praise in these ex- 
 uberant phrases: "If in the midst of your titanic battles, our voice can 
 yet reach you, let us, O Lincoln, free sons of Columbus, send you a 
 word of good wishes and admiration for the great work that you have 
 begun. Heir of the aspirations of Christ and of John Brown, you will 
 pass to posterity with the name of the Emancipator, more enviable than 
 any crown or any human treasure." 
 
 It was clear that the emancipation of the slaves would thenceforth 
 be regarded as the crowning act of Lincoln's eventful career — the act 
 with which his fame would most indissolubly be linked. 
 
 But in Washington, Stoeckl expressed deep regret that the Emancipa- 
 tion Proclamation had been issued. In a conference with Seward, the 
 Russian Minister told Lincoln's Secretary of State that he regarded the 
 Proclamation "as but a futile menace," because "it set up a further bar- 
 rier to the reconciliation of the North and South — always the hope of 
 Russia." 1 
 
 In a lengthy report to St. Petersburg shortly after Lincoln issued 
 the preliminary Proclamation, Stoeckl charged that radical Republican 
 leaders had forced Lincoln into this extreme measure in a desperate 
 effort to maintain their waning political powers. "Their program 
 called for immediate and unconditional emancipation; the arming of 
 the slaves against their masters; the confiscation of all property belong- 
 ing to the insurgents; and finally the inauguration in the North of a 
 reign of terror to silence the protests of the timid conservatives." 
 
 Stoeckl described Lincoln as vacillating and resorting to half meas- 
 
 
The Czar Criticizes Lincoln's Proclamation 183 
 
 ures because "he does not dare to go along" with the radicals, nor does 
 he possess the courage to break with them: 
 
 He signed the confiscation bill. He authorized wholesale arrests in 
 the North and even suspended the writ of habeas corpus. But he 
 would not consent to their demands for placing the entire country 
 under martial law. These half measures fail to satisfy the radicals. 
 So they attack the administration, oppose the President in Cong- 
 ress, and climax it all by conspiring openly against him. 
 
 Some twenty prominent political leaders of New York have or- 
 ganized a permanent committee to prosecute the war in accord- 
 ance with their program. Without legal authority this committee 
 undertook to arm 50,000 men under the command of General Fre- 
 mont, one of the extremists of the radical party who, after his 
 disastrous campaign in Virginia, left the active service. The chair- 
 man of the committee wrote to President Lincoln to demand his 
 approval of the committee, declaring that if this authorization 
 were refused they would nevertheless put their plan into opera- 
 tion. Governor Morgan of New York State had already sanctioned 
 it. The President replied that such a step was illegal and that Gov- 
 ernor Morgan, a Republican, would not dare to assume the re- 
 sponsibility for this drastic act. 
 
 Another committee organized in the same manner in the West 
 sent a deputation here to ask the President that he give to Gov- 
 ernor Morton of Illinois, an ultra-radical, the chief command of 
 affairs of war in the West, and delegate to him in this part of 
 the Union all of the powers which the Constitution invested in the 
 Chief Executive of the Republic. The conference between the 
 deputation and the President, who naturally refused the request, 
 was a stormy one. Mr. Lincoln having said to one of the delegates 
 that Providence had betrayed the cause of the Union, the latter 
 answered, "It is the administration that has betrayed the people, 
 and you will be held accountable." I have been told on good 
 authority that this deputation demanded the President's resignation. 
 
 All these committees are affiliated with one another and work 
 hand in hand. They have skilfully employed the nation's press to 
 spread their doctrines and attacks upon the government. Their 
 newspapers have attributed the recent defeats of the federal army 
 
184 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 to the weakness and incompetence of the government. They have I 
 maintained that the generals placed in command of the army, and 
 McClellan in particular, were too weak to meet the exigencies of 
 the moment and that the country could not be saved except by | 
 replacing them with more aggressive men, that is to say, radicals. | 
 Some meddlers have gone still further in that they have threatened | 
 Mr. Lincoln with political destruction if he didn't openly accept 
 the dictates imposed by the radicals. 
 
 The President, intimidated by these intrigues and violent attacks, 
 decided to publish the Proclamation emancipating the slaves in all 
 States which by January 1, 1863 have not returned to the Union. 
 This Proclamation settles the question only halfway; slavery will 
 continue to exist in the States which recognize the Union, like 
 Maryland, or in those which return to the Union before the end of 
 the year. Slavery would not be abolished except in the States which 
 at that time still remain in rebellion, and where the decrees of the 
 President could not be executed. 
 
 According to this act, the protection of the government is 
 offered as a premium to the owners of slaves who will remain 
 faithful to the Union flag, and emancipation is not accorded to 
 Negroes except as a punishment imposed upon their masters. In 
 brief, emancipation is used by President Lincoln as a military 
 weapon to subdue his enemies and is not at all a proclamation of 
 human liberty. 
 
 Whatever it may be, the President's act is untimely and unwise. 
 The course which Mr. Lincoln should have taken in the present 
 difficulty was to have complied with the will of the people, the 
 vast majority of whom are conservative, and who while desiring 
 emancipation, want to achieve it in such a manner as to avert a 
 servile war. Several well-intentioned leaders have counseled the 
 President to take this step. Unfortunately, he adopted an entirely 
 different course of action and yielded to the radicals who today 
 are the masters of the situation. They will not stop with the recent 
 Proclamation. They will demand the dismissal of all Cabinet 
 officers and all army commanders who do not share their radical 
 views. Mr. Lincoln will be forced to submit to all their wishes, 
 even to his own abdication, for which the radicals have already 
 formulated secret schemes. 
 
 Yesterday I conferred with the Secretary of State about the 
 
The Czar Criticizes Lincoln } s Proclamation 185 
 
 President's Proclamation. He did not want to commit himself on 
 this act. He said only, "It is a coup d'etat; let us see what results it 
 will produce." He did not express his usual confidence. His influ- 
 ence on the President has diminished, but he still exercises enough 
 power to give offense to the radicals who will spare no effort to 
 have him ousted. Mr. Seward can well become the victim of the 
 edict at the bottom of which he affixed his signature. 
 
 We are thus threatened by a revolutionary anarchy, the conse- 
 quences of which will be even more disastrous than the Civil War 
 itself. 
 
 A new proclamation issued by the President suspends the writ 
 of habeas corpus and establishes martial law in the entire United 
 States. It is a new concession wrung from Mr. Lincoln by the 
 radicals. 2 
 
 Throughout the Civil War, Stoeckl persisted in his belief that the 
 Emancipation Proclamation was but a futile gesture. And what was 
 worse, he declared, was the continuous grave prospect of inciting 
 servile war in the South. If only the Proclamation had been made uni- 
 versal in its application, then he would have regarded it as "a great 
 triumph for the principle of universal freedom." 
 
 Perhaps the glaring failures of the liberation of the Russian serfs 
 caused Stoeckl to continue reporting about the weaknesses of American 
 emancipation. Misery loves company, so Stoeckl believed that reports 
 of Lincoln's troubles with a kindred problem might prove comforting 
 to the Czar Liberator. 
 
 The Russian Emperor's edict had satisfied neither peasants nor gentry. 
 On the contrary it had aroused murderous animosity among both 
 classes. Indeed, the Czar's ukase had granted a bare freedom in which 
 the lot of the liberated peasants did not at once seem improved. True, 
 no man was now the property of any other man. But the masses of 
 redeemed serfs were to remain for decades in a state of abject poverty 
 and economic thralldom. 
 
 Andrew Dickson White, the first president of Cornell University, 
 who lived in Russia, first as Secretary in the U. S. legation in St. Peters- 
 burg in 1855, and from 1892-94 as Minister Plenipotentiary, has written: 
 
 I do not deny the greatness and nobleness of Alexander II and the 
 services of the men he then called to his aid; but I lived in Russia 
 both before and since that reform and feel obliged to testify that, 
 
1 86 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 thus far, its main purpose has been so thwarted by reactionaries 
 that there is, as yet, little, if any, practical difference between the 
 condition of the Russian peasant before and since obtaining his 
 freedom. 3 
 
 Stoeckl reported to the Czar that the situation of the freed Negro 
 slaves of the United States was even worse than that of the freed serfs. 
 
 He wrote about the establishment of a Freedmen's Bureau as a branch 
 of the War Department in March 1865, shortly before Lincoln's death. 
 Its purpose was the general supervision of the liberated slaves. It was to 
 act as their advisor in respect to their new status in society, and to look 
 after their rights in the courts and elsewhere. 
 
 But within a few months, Stoeckl was also able to report that the 
 Southern legislatures were already passing stringent laws — "black 
 codes" — for the regulation of the freed black men. Not that he criti- 
 cized these laws. Their manifest purport was to keep the Negro sub- 
 servient and inferior to the whites. He could sympathize with the 
 white people of the South in whose midst millions of blacks were 
 suddenly turned loose; and he could understand their perplexity as they 
 undertook to deal with these illiterate ex-slaves, most of whom had not 
 the slightest conception of what it was all about. 
 
 The misery which the whole South was to experience during the 
 tragic era of reconstruction was the unavoidable consequence of a 
 revolution so radical. A massive old oak like slavery could not be up- 
 rooted without causing tremendous upheaval to the entire surrounding 
 terrain. 
 
 But the Czar, reading such reports on American conditions as Stoeckl 
 dispatched to the Russian Foreign Office in St. Petersburg, asserted 
 "the time must come when many will question the manner of American 
 emancipation of the Negro slaves in 1863." He boasted that he did far 
 more for the Russian serfs than America did for the slaves emancipated 
 by President Lincoln. Czar Alexander II made this claim to Wharton 
 Barker, a Pennsylvania banker who was serving as the financial agent 
 in the United States of the Russian government. For his services on 
 behalf of Russia, Mr. Barker was made a Knight of St. Stanislaus by 
 the Czar. 
 
 In August 1879 the American financier was the guest of Grand Duke 
 Constantine, the Czar's younger brother, at his palace in St. Petersburg. 
 He had made the trip to Russia at the request of the Grand Duke and 
 
The Czar Criticizes Lincoln } s Vroclamation 187 
 
 some of the Czar's Ministers to advise them regarding several large and 
 important railroad, coal, iron and steel enterprises about to be launched 
 in southern Russia. Mr. Barker has written that he was about to take his 
 leave upon the completion of the conference when the Grand Duke 
 bade him to remain as the Czar was expected at the palace, and he had 
 expressed a desire to speak with his American banker. 
 
 "The Emperor is coming," Grand Duke Constantine said. "He wishes 
 to talk with you in a somewhat informal way — a way in which he 
 could not talk if you were presented to him at a formal audience by 
 the United States Minister." In Mr. Barker's words: 
 
 The Grand Duke left me at the window and went to meet his 
 brother at the doorstep. With no escort of servants, no bodyguard 
 of armed men, the Emperor, mounted on a brown horse, came into 
 the yard. . . . He was followed by a one-horse phaeton, in which 
 were two ladies — the Empress of Russia and the Queen of Greece, 
 daughters of the Grand Duke Constantine. There was no pomp, 
 no display — nothing to mark the distinction of the little party of 
 great people who had driven through the park that summer 
 morning. . . . 
 
 On his entering, I was presented without any formality or delay 
 to the Emperor by the Grand Duke, as "Mr. Barker, Your 
 Majesty's American banker." 
 
 The Emperor's first remark was incisively inquiring: "Mr. 
 Barker, is your American system of banking, in your judgment, 
 adapted to meet the needs of Russia?" 
 
 There was then for a few minutes a general talk on economic 
 and financial questions that satisfied me the Emperor had been a 
 student of those questions that pressed upon his own country and 
 upon other countries as well. 
 
 He spoke of the liberation of his serfs; of his efforts to educate 
 them; of how and why those efforts had largely failed. He referred 
 with earnestness to the conditions he met in the course of discus- 
 sions with the landowners; of how he went through the provinces, 
 appealing to the conciliation spirit and the devotion of his nobility, 
 reprimanding those who hung back, reminding them that reforms 
 come better from above than from below. He even disclosed 
 frankly the manner in which he had packed the Imperial Commis- 
 sion with men devoted to the principles of emancipation. The 
 
1 88 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 commission declared for the immediate abolition of serfdom and 
 urged the most effectual measures to prevent the re-establishment 
 of the seignorial authority under other forms; and it decided, also, 
 that the peasant should become a proprietor on the payment of an 
 indemnity. 
 
 It is important to remember that the manifesto of March 3 1861 
 declared these fundamental principles. The peasants were to be 
 invested with all the rights of free cultivators of the soil. In con- 
 sideration of certain quit rents, they were to obtain full enjoyment 
 of their inclosures and also a quantity of arable land. More than 
 nine acres of land were given to every male peasant. The govern- 
 ment made loans so that the peasants could immediately liberate 
 themselves from their lords, yet remain debtors to the state. More 
 than one-half the land was thus taken from the lord and given to 
 the peasant. 
 
 After fully discussing what he had achieved for his serfs, the Czar, 
 according to Mr. Barker, declared "in earnest, aggressive, but sad 
 tones": 
 
 I did more for the Russian serf in giving him land as well as 
 personal liberty, than America did for the Negro slave set free by 
 the Proclamation of President Lincoln. I am at a loss to understand 
 how you Americans could have been so blind as to leave the Negro 
 slave without tools to work out his salvation. In giving him per- 
 sonal liberty, you gave him an obligation to perform to the state 
 which he must be unable to fulfill. Without property of any kind 
 he cannot educate himself and his children. I believe the time must 
 come when many will question the manner of American emancipa- 
 tion of the Negro slaves in 1863. The vote, in the hands of the 
 ignorant men, without either property or self-respect, will be used 
 to the damage of the people at large; for the rich man, without 
 honor or any kind of patriotism, will purchase it, and with it 
 swamp the rights of a free people. 4 
 
 Mr. Barker, who became the presidential nominee of the Anti-Fusion 
 Populists in the election of 1900, concluded: 
 
 The hopes and dreams of the Emperor Alexander, and of the 
 great men who helped him free the Russian serfs, and the hopes 
 and expectations of Lincoln, Garrison and the thousands of Amer- 
 
The Czar Criticizes Lincoln's Proclamation 189 
 
 icans who gave their lives and fortunes to the cause of Negro 
 emancipation, have not been realized. But the fears of Alexander 
 have been realized. The Emperor was right in thinking the solution 
 of the Negro slave question would debauch our people and bring 
 serious trouble to America. 5 
 
"Lincoln's War" 
 
 John Hay, writing to Nicolay in August 1863, said of Lincoln: "The 
 Tycoon is in fine whack. I have rarely seen him more serene and busy. 
 He is managing this war, the draft, foreign relations and planning re- 
 construction of the Union all at once. I never knew with what a tyran- 
 nous authority he runs the Cabinet till now. The most important things 
 he decides and there is no cavil." 1 
 
 The Civil War had in truth become "Lincoln's war." The history of 
 the Union after the assault upon Fort Sumter had virtually become one 
 with the history of Abraham Lincoln himself. He had become the 
 personification of the Union's struggles, aspirations and hopes. Lincoln's 
 unique personality and the trend of national history had become inex- 
 tricably interwoven. The slow shifting political aim from rescuing the 
 Union to the abolition of slavery was his decision alone. He took all 
 the strings of the government into his own hands — making political 
 appointments, creating armies, selecting generals, making historic deci- 
 sions. He was everywhere. He personally wrote to the Governors of 
 the States to supply more and more troops. He visited the battlefields. 
 He participated in war councils. He interviewed subordinate military 
 leaders as well as chiefs. He toned down Secretary Seward's irritating 
 diplomatic notes. Seward wrote to his wife: "There is but one vote in 
 the Cabinet and that is cast by the President . . ." Everything that hap- 
 pened and everything that did not happen for the moment depended on 
 
 190 
 
"Lincoln's War" 191 
 
 Lincoln's judgment. When things went right the credit was his. When 
 things went wrong he bore the blame. 
 
 But of all this Stoeckl seemed unaware, although as the represent- 
 ative of the most friendly foreign power he was accorded op- 
 portunities for information which no other members of the foreign 
 diplomatic corps in Washington received. On June 19, 1862 the London 
 Times complained editorially about "the partiality in favor of the 
 Russian ambassador at Washington." 
 
 Stoeckl was able to walk into Seward's office almost at will. He con- 
 ferred with President Lincoln frequently. He offered suggestions to 
 General Scott. He met and talked to General McClellan and other 
 commanders about military strategy. He asked Secretary of War Cam- 
 eron about the numerical strength of the federal armies, and did not 
 hesitate to dispute Cameron's figure as "an exaggeration." He obtained 
 information about Union army enlistments from General Halleck, 
 while he was Commander in Chief. Even Secretary of War Stanton 
 took the Russian envoy into his confidence on occasion. He obtained 
 plans of battles, fought and to be fought. He procured the designs and 
 blueprints of the ironclad Monitor and sent them to St. Petersburg. 
 He reported on secret maneuvers of federal troops and inferred that 
 he knew more about the Confederate armies than Lincoln did. He saw, 
 heard and reported on everything. 
 
 Although Stoeckl's dispatches were frequent, detailed and volumi- 
 nous, he seldom mentioned President Lincoln in them. On occasion he 
 would write: "Lincoln himself told me," or "Today I saw the Presi- 
 dent." But there were months at a stretch when Lincoln was not even 
 mentioned and, so far as the Russian Minister was concerned, was of 
 no importance to the events he chronicled. From the infrequent refer- 
 ence to Lincoln, the Czar and Prince Gortchakov, reading Stoeckl's 
 dispatches, could conclude that Lincoln was playing but an insignificant 
 role in the epoch-making drama which was then convulsing the Amer- 
 ican continent. 
 
 Stoeckl persisted in his belief that the North could never subjugate 
 the South. The Union, he felt, could not endure. He was sure it was 
 divided forever. "In my opinion, the permanent separation of the North 
 and South will be the inevitable consequence of the American crisis. 
 It is difficult to witness events without being convinced that a return 
 to the old system is impossible." 
 
192 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 A born aristocrat, Stoeckl blamed the plight and tragedy in which 
 the nation found itself on the "ultra-democratic system." He pointed 
 out that "only a handful of demagogues were able to accomplish this 
 work of destruction." He never ceased deploring the "rule of the mob." 
 This tragic "result of democracy" should be a warning to Europe, he 
 declared. 2 
 
 "I regret to say it," he wrote on another occasion, "separation is in- 
 evitable. As sad as this necessity may be, the North will be compelled 
 to submit to it." He hoped the North would accept the inevitable and 
 seek co-operation with the South. The sooner the bloodshed could be 
 ended the better for all concerned. He never overlooked an opportunity 
 to offer his services as conciliator. 3 
 
 After the federal forces commanded by General Grant had won 
 notable successes at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Nashville early in 
 1862, Stoeckl asked Seward "if it was not time now that the national 
 pride of the North was sufficiently satisfied to have recourse to means 
 of conciliation to bring about peace. He replied that nothing would 
 please him more, but the feelings were still too bitter even to think 
 about conciliation at the present time." 4 
 
 While Admiral David Glasgow Farragut was successfully conducting 
 a momentous naval campaign to open the Mississippi from the mouth, 
 capturing New Orleans, Baton Rouge and Natchez, the Confederate 
 ironclad, the Merrimac, was inflicting terrible damage upon ships of 
 the North in Chesapeake Bay. Covered with heavy armor made by 
 joining railroad rails together, the Merrimac attacked a federal squad- 
 ron in Hampton Roads. She rammed the Cumberland and sank her, 
 fired the Congress and forced her crew to surrender, and ran the 
 Minnesota and other vessels into shallow waters. The Merrimac re- 
 sumed her destruction of the federal fleet early on the following morn- 
 ing. It was feared that this strange sea monster would soon be bom- 
 barding Washington, and might even sail to Philadelphia and New 
 York. But during the night an even stranger craft had entered the scene 
 of conflict. The Monitor, built by John Ericsson, and looking like an 
 ironclad cheesebox on a raft, sighted the Merrimac and immediately 
 engaged her in battle. Ericsson had equipped the "Yankee Cheesebox" 
 with a revolving gun turret which gave her a greater range of action 
 than any warship hitherto built. The shot and shell poured by the 
 Merrimac against the Monitor's turret and deck inflicted but slight 
 
"Lincoln's War" 193 
 
 damage. After a battle of several hours the Monitor withdrew to shal- 
 low water and the Merrimac returned to Norfolk to repair her own 
 injuries, her victorious career at an end. 
 
 Excitedly, Stoeckl reported the exploits of these ironclads which had 
 revolutionized naval warfare: 
 
 I regret that no Russian naval officer was present to study the 
 battle. It marks an epoch in naval history because it is the first 
 serious engagement between armor-plated vessels. The battle shows 
 beyond a doubt the superiority of armor-plated ships over wooden 
 ones. . . . These floating batteries have given new impetus to the 
 American inventive genius. 
 
 Stoeckl hurried to the United States Navy Department to see what he 
 could find out about the construction of the Monitor. He requested 
 Assistant Navy Secretary Gustavus Vasa Fox to furnish the Russian 
 government with detailed plans and specifications. Fox replied "this 
 ironclad was not constructed by the government but by private in- 
 terests under the direction of John Ericsson, an engineer, who alone 
 possesses the plans." Ericsson was contacted, and he promised to furnish 
 the designs of his invention to Russia's Minister. Stoeckl hastened to 
 apprise Prince Gortchakov, "As soon as I get these plans I will forward 
 them to you in the hope that they will be of some interest to His 
 Imperial Highness." 5 
 
 After Grant's victory at Donelson, a fearful bloody battle was fought 
 at Shiloh or Pittsburg Landing in Western Tennessee. It was one of the 
 most hotly contested engagements during the entire war. It cost the 
 opposing armies twenty-four thousand men, killed, wounded and miss- 
 ing. Among the slain was General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Con- 
 federate commander. The indomitable courage and stubborn obstinacy 
 of General Grant turned impending defeat into a tremendous victory — 
 a victory which opened the Mississippi to Union vessels. But Stoeckl 
 complained in his dispatch to St. Petersburg that he could report only 
 a fragmentary account "as the government has clamped down a rigid 
 censorship to such a point that it is impossible even for the diplomatic 
 corps to remain well informed." 6 
 
 The government was also repressing news of an expedition against 
 New Orleans. But on May 5 the Russian Minister was able to confirm 
 the capture of New Orleans. Stoeckl regarded this as the "most impor- 
 
194 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 tant blow to the South since the beginning of the war." 7 "Nothing will 
 now stop the federals from becoming master of the entire Mississippi, 
 thus cutting the Confederacy in two. This development gives new 
 hope for the early end of the war. The President and the Secretary of 
 State should now advance steps for peace and conciliation. But they 
 are controlled by the radicals who demand complete destruction of 
 the South." 8 
 
 Stoeckl's dispatches throughout May and June dealt with the failures 
 of Generals McClellan and Halleck to take aggressive steps against the 
 rebels, "although Lincoln issues order after order to attack the enemy": 
 
 McClellan is seven or eight miles from Richmond. He will not 
 venture an attack without more re-enforcements. But President 
 Lincoln does not want to strip the Capital of its troops, some 
 12,000 to 15,000 in number. The President, without waiting for 
 sanction from Congress, issued a call to the Governors of the States 
 to raise more troops, organize them into regiments and to send 
 them without delay to the various army corps. 
 
 The situation is deplorable. Congress wastes its time in dema- 
 gogical debates. The administration possesses no overall military 
 plan and the President vacillates from one course of action to 
 another. The generals quarrel among themselves, each acting ac- 
 cording to his own dictates. Such is the present situation. God 
 alone knows the extremes to which this rebellion will lead this 
 country. 9 
 
 Stoeckl's dispatches during the summer of 1862 continued to speak 
 of the inactivity of the federal generals, the inept direction of the 
 government and the vacillating policies of Lincoln. "Lincoln and 
 the Secretary of War are rarely informed about the movements or the 
 strength of the enemy. They believed that Stonewall Jackson was com- 
 manding a large force which after repulsing General Banks could 
 advance upon and capture Washington." Actually Jackson with bold 
 strategy mysteriously left the Shenandoah Valley and after a series of 
 brilliant victories which sent the federal armies in full retreat, rode into 
 Richmond for a conference with Lee. 10 
 
 "Considering the vastly superior resources of the North, Lincoln 
 should have brought about a speedy suppression of the rebellion," 
 Stoeckl asserted on June 23. 11 "All eyes are centered on Richmond 
 
"Lincoln's War" 195 
 
 where the best troops of the North and the South face each other. A 
 great battle is expected which will vitally affect the outcome of the 
 war." 
 
 Before the battle, Stoeckl saw Secretary of War Cameron and asked 
 him how many men were in the armies of the North. "Mr. Cameron . . . 
 assured me that 750,000 volunteers have been enrolled. This is probably 
 an exaggeration, but it can be said with some accuracy that the number 
 of troops in active service has not been less than 600,000 men." 12 
 
 Seven days of fierce fighting from June 26 to July 2, 1862, around 
 Richmond from the Chickahominy to the James, created tremendous 
 excitement throughout the country. The losses on both sides were ter- 
 rific. "The President and the Secretary of War are not to be seen much 
 these days," the Russian Minister wrote. He added that the government 
 was issuing no report on the military operations with the result that 
 national anxiety was intensified. "Uncertainty is worse than the worst 
 news." However, Stoeckl wrote that he had 
 
 learned from some Senators who contacted the President that on 
 June 26 the Confederates attacked the right flank of General Mc- 
 Clellan and after a bloody battle forced him to cross over the 
 Chickahominy and to retreat to Harrisons Landing where he was 
 within reach of his gunboats and transports. McClellan's position 
 seems to be in jeopardy. Surely the silence on the part of the gov- 
 ernment does not indicate that results are favorable for the federal 
 troops. 13 
 
 The government's ironclad censorship did not stop the Russian Min- 
 ister from procuring details of the battle. Stoeckl learned them from 
 Prince de Joinville, a brother of the deposed King of France, whom 
 Lincoln had appointed to McClellan's staff. This scion of the House of 
 Orleans, which Napoleon had succeeded, had just arrived from Mc- 
 Clellan's headquarters. He described to Stoeckl how McClellan, after a 
 bloody battle, retreated from his position in front of Richmond: 
 
 It appears that the army of McClellan is completely disorganized 
 as a result of the precipitate retreat. From what Prince de Joinville 
 said, the carnage was frightful. The Southerners fought with dia- 
 bolical ferocity. The disorder was so serious that even at general 
 headquarters the true situation of the army was still not known. 
 The nation had a right to expect much more from the Army of 
 
196 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the Potomac, consisting of its best organized regiments and com- 
 manded by supposedly the most skilful general. 14 
 
 With Washington again in danger of attack, "General Halleck has 
 been ordered to Washington to take charge of military operations." 15 
 Stoeckl wrote that Lincoln was experiencing great difficulty in replen- 
 ishing the depleted military ranks. "The government has been com- 
 pelled to offer a premium of twenty-five dollars a man." Later he 
 reported that premiums up to fifty dollars have been offered, yet there 
 are few volunteers. Two weeks later, Lincoln had issued another call 
 for volunteers, with premiums of up to $300. 
 
 The government was compelled to resort to conscription. Lincoln 
 decreed that all men twenty to forty-five years of age were to be drafted 
 for military service: 
 
 Mr. Lincoln told me himself one day that in case of necessity he 
 could count upon two or three million men. Experience has 
 demonstrated that such estimates are inaccurate. ... At the outset 
 the armed services absorbed the adventurous types, the poor, the 
 unemployed laborers and the foreigners who filled the large cities. 
 Not many of these classes remain. The new recruits must come 
 from the farmers, businessmen and, in general, the prosperous 
 classes who are opposed to the war. 
 
 Those who volunteered at the outset never dreamed of the 
 dangers and privations which awaited them. It was generally be- 
 lieved that the mere presence of the Northern army would coerce 
 the South into rejoining the Union. I saw New York regiments 
 leave in a spirit of gaiety in the belief that they would be gone less 
 than three months. But events have shown how wrong they were. 
 The ever-increasing number of mangled, sick, crippled or maimed 
 soldiers who have returned to their homes has opened the eyes of 
 Northerners to the horrors of war. 
 
 Men no longer volunteer for military service. Bonuses of $250 
 to $300 are being offered to volunteers without spurring enlist- 
 ments. As a result, the government was forced to resort to con- 
 scription. But it is doubtful if the government will succeed in re- 
 cruiting the number Lincoln has fixed in his call. General Halleck, 
 now in command of federal forces, admitted to me that not more 
 than 300,000 to 350,000 men can be recruited, the majority for a 
 term of nine months. . . . 
 
"Lincoln's War" 197 
 
 The decision of the government to limit the term of service to 
 nine months is a tacit avowal that the conflict will not last beyond 
 that time. That is what the Secretary of State told me in trying to 
 convince me that everything would end with the subjugation of 
 the South. I agree with Mr. Seward that the conflict will not last 
 long but I do not share his opinion as to the outcome. In my 
 opinion, and I regret to say it, separation is inevitable. Sad as this 
 necessity may be, the North will be compelled to submit to it. 16 
 
 After General Pope led the Army of the Potomac to a second dis- 
 astrous defeat on the old battlefield of Bull Run on September 1, 
 Stoeckl wrote that "the President and his Cabinet cannot cope with the 
 situation. Everything is in a state of confusion and indecision." He 
 praised the military genius of Stonewall Jackson, and continued: 
 
 The Union generals are torn with dissension and hatred for one 
 another. Last week General McClellan was in disgrace and was 
 relieved of his command in favor of General Pope. Now Mc- 
 Clellan has been recalled to take command of the army. There is 
 no accord between McClellan, Halleck and Stanton — McClellan 
 accuses the Secretary of War of being an enemy of the country. 
 In short, the disorder is complete among the men in charge of 
 affairs. Not one is capable of forming a plan or giving counsel in 
 a crisis. . . . 17 
 
 The principal cause of all of these disasters must be attributed to 
 the intrigues and petty jealousies as much as to the incompetence 
 of the men who direct the affairs of state. The more serious the 
 situation becomes, the more intense becomes the discord. Mr. 
 Stanton, Secretary of War, who represents the ultra-radical party 
 in the Cabinet, places only those officers who are faithful to his 
 Party in command of the army, and ousts the conservatives from 
 these posts. He holds an unrelenting hate for General McClellan, 
 whose temperate policies provoke him. Unable to dismiss him, he 
 gradually withdraws his troops from his command and assigns 
 them to Pope, whose incompetence is notorious but whose policies 
 are in agreement with those of the Secretary of War. The last 
 disaster which the Union army suffered is a direct result of these 
 intrigues. . . . 
 
 Lincoln does not possess the moral courage to do anything. The 
 President was obliged to restore General McClellan as Commander 
 
198 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 in Chief of the army despite the fact that McClellan has yet to 
 prove any great military skill. By reason of his affability and be- 
 cause of his concern for the welfare of his men, he has won the 
 deep affection of his troops. But in making this concession to the 
 army, Mr. Lincoln did not have the moral courage to dismiss 
 Stanton. How can satisfactory results be expected from military 
 operations when the control is entrusted to two men who detest 
 each other?" 18 
 
 Again Washington was imperiled. "We are expecting a bloody 
 battle," Stoeckl wrote. On the night General McClellan left Wash- 
 ington to re-assume command of the Army of the Potomac, Stoeckl 
 conferred with him about the new crisis. "He assured me that he had 
 taken all necessary precautions, and he felt confident that he would be 
 able not only to repulse General Jackson, who was supposed to be 
 marching on Washington, but also to cut off his retreat." 19 
 
 The Battle of Antietam, a fierce contest in which the Union forces 
 lost more than 12,000 men and the Confederates nearly as many, was 
 claimed as a victory by McClellan. But, Stoeckl reported: 
 
 the Confederates did not suffer a defeat, as next day they crossed 
 the Potomac carrying with them their equipment and wounded. 
 It was not until two days later that McClellan pursued them into 
 Virginia but was repulsed. . . . 20 
 
 On November 4, McClellan, pressed by the President and public 
 opinion, decided to cross the Potomac for a decisive campaign to 
 end the war this fall, but finding the enemy in great numbers, he 
 stopped. The offensive campaign was postponed until spring. 21 
 
 McClellan's failure once more to take action caused Lincoln to re- 
 move him again. On November 5, General Burnside was named com- 
 mander. With the appointment came the order to move on Richmond. 
 Burnside obeyed — reluctantly. He pushed vigorously on the enemy. 
 The result was the massacre at Fredericksburg on December 13, 1862. 
 Could nobody beat Lee? 
 
 Now all who had a part in directing the military operations are 
 blaming one another. A congressional committee is visiting the 
 Army of the Potomac to investigate the causes for the military 
 
"Lincoln* s War" 199 
 
 disaster. These investigations are made here after every engage- 
 ment, but produce absolutely no results. With the disorder and 
 confusion which prevails in Washington it is impossible to fix 
 responsibility. 22 
 
 Thus the year 1862 ended on a note of gloom and disaster for the 
 North. The "Horror of Fredericksburg" led to Burnside's removal on 
 January 26. The command of the Army of the Potomac now went to 
 "Fighting Joe" Hooker, chief of Burnside's critics. Stoeckl's dispatches 
 for the month of January 1863 were filled with detailed reports of 
 United States military plans and operations. He met the new com- 
 mander and wrote, "General Hooker hopes to do better than his pre- 
 decessors." 23 But the Russian Minister added that the true situation, 
 which the government was endeavoring to conceal, was actually most 
 critical. "We hear that the troops are not being paid and discontent 
 prevails everywhere." 24 
 
 "With the federals inactive, the secessionists baffling in their activity, 
 and the incompetency of the Northern generals continuing, anything 
 seems possible to me. 25 So critical is the situation that ruin of the ad- 
 ministration along with what still remains of the Union is imminent. 
 
 "But of all the difficulties which assail the federal administration, the 
 most alarming is the state of the treasury." The Russian Minister 
 pointed out that Secretary of the Treasury Chase and Congress were 
 at odds how to raise the countless millions of dollars necessary to 
 finance the war: 
 
 Last week Mr. Chase went to New York to consult with the 
 bankers but he could obtain no relief. The value of government 
 bonds has been falling as rapidly as paper money. Government 
 bonds are now being discounted at 50 percent. . . . Congress will 
 probably end up by authorizing Mr. Chase to raise money as best 
 he can by selling treasury bonds at any rate he can obtain and by 
 issuing more paper money. . . . 
 
 Another great problem confronting the government is the diffi- 
 culty of procuring men for the army. The terms of these volun- 
 teers who had enlisted for two years and those who later enlisted 
 for nine months, will expire next May. Thus the army ranks will 
 be reduced by 250,000 men, without taking into account the losses 
 from battle casualties, sickness and especially desertions. This will 
 
200 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 make necessary a new call for men, but considering the opposition 
 which prevails throughout the land, the success of such a call 
 seems impossible. 
 
 So far, the North has been more or less united and the govern- 
 ment has been able to raise immense resources in men and money. 
 But today, the States which have remained loyal are divided into 
 two factions which seem to have sworn implacable hatred to each 
 other. We already see proof of this in the legislative assemblies of 
 the States of New York and Pennsylvania which met a few days 
 ago. The Republicans and the Democrats resorted to acts of vio- 
 lence and they debated the issues with revolvers in hand. In addi- 
 tion to this bitterness between the Republicans and Democrats are 
 the sectional quarrels between the West and the East. 
 
 The Republicans demand the subjugation of the South without 
 realizing the obstacles which two years of fighting have demon- 
 strated so clearly. The Democrats contend that a compromise 
 based on the federal pact is today more possible than the conquest 
 of the South. So, the Americans seem to be rushing blindly into a 
 state of anarchy which will be the inevitable consequence of the 
 war if it continues much longer 26 
 
 Washington was filled with rumors about the Union campaign 
 against Charleston. The Russian Minister sought more authentic in- 
 formation. He received it from an officer of the United States navy: 
 
 Commander Goldsborough, one of the most distinguished naval 
 officers of the Union, told me that Charleston is so well fortified 
 that they hesitated to attack it and that the federal expedition will 
 probably go to Savannah and Mobile where the defenses are not so 
 strong. 27 . . . 
 
 The attack upon Charleston will have special interest from the 
 point of view of military technique. It is the first time that armor- 
 plated steamships will attempt to overwhelm shore batteries. I 
 regret that our war clipper Arriazr has not yet arrived so her com- 
 mander could observe the effect of the new armament which has 
 been introduced into naval warfare. 28 
 
 Weeks before the actual launching of the Charleston and Vicksburg 
 campaigns, Stoeckl observed: "The attack against Charleston and 
 Vicksburg was to have begun two weeks ago. But so far, nothing has 
 
"Lincoln's War" 201 
 
 been achieved. . . . The struggle will be bitter, the bloodshed terrific, 
 unfortunately without any hope that victory, whichever side may win 
 it, will solve anything." 29 
 
 Later when the Spanish Consul at Charleston came to Washington, 
 Stoeckl learned from him that the federal fleet sent to attack that Con- 
 federate stronghold had not accomplished its mission. The Spaniard 
 told the Russian Minister "that if the federals had made the attack six 
 weeks ago, they would certainly have succeeded. But the Confederates 
 have taken advantage of the North's failure to act and have installed 
 new defenses which make it almost impossible for them to take Charles- 
 ton, at least not without paying a terrific cost." From a letter written 
 by an officer commanding one of the ships of the federal squadron, 
 Stoeckl was able to report that "the armor-plated monitors are excellent 
 for defense, but not suitable for offensive operations." 30 
 
 Stoeckl attributed the loss of the gunboats Queen of the West and 
 the lndianola, "the best of the fleet of Admiral Porter at Vicksburg, to 
 the negligence of the commanders and to the halfhearted fighting of 
 the crews." 31 
 
 When the House of Representatives passed a bill authorizing the 
 President to arm 150,000 Negroes, Stoeckl reported that "the Demo- 
 cratic Party regarded this measure as humiliating for the nation" since 
 it was an admission that "an army of a million men cannot win without 
 the help of some 100,000 Negroes": 
 
 Mr. Stevens, author of this measure, said that the federal army . . . 
 far from being a million strong scarcely numbered 500,000 men 
 under arms; that half of these troops were scheduled to return 
 home soon since their term of service expired next May; that vol- 
 unteers are no longer enlisting; and that conscription was so un- 
 popular that the government hesitated to invoke it again. 
 
 Once again Stoeckl expressed the view that "the political separation 
 of the North and the South with the maintenance of commercial rela- 
 tions was the most favorable solution of the Civil War." 32 
 
 From conversations he had with Congressmen from the Western 
 States, Stoeckl learned that 
 
 conditions in that part of the country were pitiable; that the 
 hatred between Republicans and Democrats was as bitter as be- 
 tween the North and the South. Both factions are arming them- 
 selves and any day now fierce fighting may be expected. . . . 
 
202 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Peace, no matter what the terms, is the only means of resolving 
 this situation. But leaders in charge of affairs do not want it. Their 
 slogan is all-out war. Any compromise would endanger their 
 political existence. They are politicans of low caliber — men with- 
 out conscience, ready to do anything for money, individuals who 
 have achieved rank in the army and others who still have hopes of 
 obtaining high commissions. They constitute the swarm of specu- 
 lators, suppliers of material, war profiteers through whose hands 
 pass a large portion of the millions of dollars spent daily by the 
 federal government. 
 
 Aside from these and some fanatics, practically everybody else 
 desires the cessation of hostilities. But unfortunately, few dare to 
 protest, and those who have the courage and patriotism to express 
 their opinions, are too few in number to make their influence 
 felt. 33 . . . 
 
 Domestic affairs continue to worry the government as much as 
 military failures. The people are becoming more and more con- 
 cerned. The hatred between the parties gets more bitter especially 
 in the West where several towns have been the scenes of bloody 
 riots. 34 
 
 In New York Stoeckl conferred with some officers of the French 
 and Spanish warships who had arrived from Charleston, and gained 
 more information as to the dark state of affairs: 
 
 They confirmed all the reports which had previously reached us 
 about the fortifications of that port, and about the improbability 
 of destroying them. The monitors, according to these officers, are 
 not as effective as they claim here in Washington. It is apparent 
 that the commanders of the federal forces have not sufficient con- 
 fidence in their armor-plated ships, for they have been hesitating 
 for two months to begin the attack in spite of the repeated orders 
 of the federal government to take Charleston at any price. On the 
 Western front the federals have made several attempts to take 
 Vicksburg but without success. Some fairly serious engagements 
 have taken place, but judging from the silence of the government 
 the advantage has not been with the federals. 
 
 Thus the winter campaign ends without any result, and the 
 spring campaign is not being launched under very favorable con- 
 ditions. The heat has already set in on the lower Mississippi, and 
 
"Lincoln's War" 203 
 
 on the coasts of South Carolina, and in a few weeks the federal 
 government will be obliged to withdraw its troops from Charles- 
 ton and from Vicksburg unless it wants to see them decimated by 
 the pestilential climate of these regions. Domestic affairs, far from 
 improving, become more threatening every day. 
 
 The jealousies and dissensions among the men in authority keep 
 growing. The Democratic opposition is similarly torn with dis- 
 sension. As the peril increases, the confusion grows. In fact, the 
 entire nation seems to be carried along by the torrent of events 
 towards a future which is uncertain and full of dangers. 35 . ... 
 
 It is doubtful whether the attack will be renewed at least for 
 some time in the near future. 36 . . . The President and the majority 
 of his Cabinet desire the immediate renewal of the attack, at any 
 price at all. But they had to yield to the naval commanders who 
 were consulted. 37 . . . 
 
 In North Carolina, General Foster who commands the troops 
 stationed on the coast, wanted to make an excursion into the in- 
 terior. After a march of two days his corps of 4,000 men was sur- 
 rounded by the Confederates and it is feared that he was forced to 
 surrender. 
 
 The news from the West is equally bad. After a siege of six 
 months the federals have had to abandon Vicksburg. The army of 
 the North retired, having lost 20,000 to 25,000 men, of whom three- 
 fourths succumbed to sickness. 
 
 I scarcely need to tell you how much these successive disasters 
 have discouraged the federal government. All its hope is now cen- 
 tered in the Army of the Potomac which must proceed vigorously 
 towards Richmond. It remains to be seen if General Hooker who 
 commands it, will be any more fortunate than General McClellan 
 last year. In any event, it will meet with desperate resistance on 
 the part of the Confederates. 38 
 
 Thirteen days later, on April 26, Stoeckl noted that the new com- 
 mander was proving no less dilatory than his predecessors: 
 
 General Hooker, who commands the Army of the Potomac, was 
 to have started moving three weeks ago, but so far he has done 
 nothing except to throw some detachments of cavalry onto the 
 other side of the Rappahannock, to make reconnaissances. 
 
 The Confederates, realizing the importance of stopping the ad- 
 
204 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 vance of General Hooker on Richmond, have massed, so it is re- 
 ported, all the forces which they have been able to find, on the 
 left bank of the Rappahannock. If that is so, the two armies will 
 meet almost equally matched. The struggle will be one of the 
 fiercest and perhaps the bloodiest of this war. 39 
 
 At length, on April 30, . General Hooker led the Army of the 
 Potomac out of its camps, and fought his first — and last — great 
 battle, at Chancellorsville. "This army," wrote Stoeckl, "was destined 
 to add a new defeat to all those it has suffered, always due to the poor 
 leadership of its commanders." 
 
 When the anxiously awaited news finally arrived from the battle- 
 field, it was another terrible blow to the cause of the Union — the 
 greatest defeat the Union armies suffered in the Civil War. 
 
 "What will the country say? Oh, what will the country say!" Lin- 
 coln moaned. 
 
 Stoeckl hastened to give the Russian Foreign Office a detailed ac- 
 count of this new Union disaster: 
 
 After the reverses suffered by the federals during last winter, all 
 the hope of the nation was concentrated on the Army of the 
 Potomac, the best organized and the best disciplined in the Union. 
 General Hooker, who commands it, started out on April 22. He 
 avoided committing the fault of his predecessor by attacking 
 Fredericksburg from the front. He ordered the Rappahannock 
 crossed by a company of 25,000 men, a few leagues below that 
 town. And he himself crossed the river with the main part of his 
 army twenty-five miles above Fredericksburg. The plan of Gen- 
 eral Hooker was to upset the fortifications of the enemy and cut 
 his communications with Richmond. 
 
 The Confederates put up no resistance to the crossing of the 
 Rappahannock and fell back on their entrenchments. 
 
 On April 30 General Hooker issued a bulletin in which he said 
 that he had succeeded in maneuvering the enemy into the position 
 of either fleeing or leaving its entrenchments to fight a battle on 
 its own ground, and thus expose itself to certain defeat. 40 . . . 
 
 General Hooker has proved no more skilful and no more fortu- 
 nate than his predecessors, and instead of destroying Confederate 
 General Lee as he announced in his bulletin of April 30, he himself 
 was defeated by Lee who has demonstrated unusual military skill. 
 
"Lincoln's War" 205 
 
 It was on May 2 that the armies met at Chancellorsville, a little 
 village twelve or fifteen miles from Fredericksburg. After a battle 
 which lasted all day, the federal army was driven from its position. 
 On the next day — May 3 — they fought again with the same result; 
 the federals again lost ground. Then Hooker gave the order to 
 General Sedgwick, whom he had left with a corps of 30,000 men 
 close to Fredericksburg, to come to his aid. Sedgwick crossed the 
 Rappahannock on May 4 to join the army of Hooker. The latter 
 did not move the whole day. Lee, profiting by this inactivity on 
 the part of Hooker, drove a large part of his forces against Sedg- 
 wick and threw him back across the Rappahannock. During May 
 5 there were only a few skirmishes, and at nightfall the federal 
 army recrossed the Rappahannock without much resistance from 
 the enemy. Thus Hooker saved the greater part of his artillery, 
 but he left behind his wounded and much equipment. 
 
 The losses of the two sides have been immense. The Confederate 
 losses have been estimated at 18,000 to 20,000 men put out of 
 action. The federals admit 12,000 to 15,000 killed and wounded, 
 but some officers who have arrived here from the army report 
 numbers higher than 30,000. The regiment of Sedgwick alone lost 
 9,000 men — almost one-third of its strength. 41 
 
 Gathered so soon after the end of the fighting, it is not surprising 
 that Stoeckl's figures differ from those later released officially by the 
 government, which state that the Union lost 17,287 killed, wounded 
 and missing, the Confederates 12,764. But in general his report depicted 
 the magnitude of the disaster suffered by the Union. Stoeckl wrote: 
 
 The federal army is at present in its initial positions on the left 
 bank of the Rappahannock, with a strength of 120,000 men. It is 
 reported that it will take the offensive again, and that together 
 with Hooker's force, two other army corps will advance on Rich- 
 mond, one from the Monroe fortress and the other from Wash- 
 ington. These three armies will have the strength of 180,000 men 
 against whom the Confederates will hardly be able to muster 100,- 
 000. But if the federals possess the advantage in number, their 
 rivals have the advantage of fighting on their own territory and 
 of being commanded by generals of superior ability. 
 
 In spite of all these disasters, the federal government refuses to 
 
206 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 modify its policy with regard to the army. All the generals are 
 politicians. McClellan is the only exception, so he has been re- 
 moved from his command. Burnside, Pope and Hooker owe their 
 positions to their political connections. As for the division and 
 brigade chiefs, they are for the most part lawyers and journalists 
 whose only merit is that they made some contribution to putting 
 the present administration into power. 42 
 
 Chancellorsville was to Lincoln the darkest hour of the Civil War. 
 His critics became savage in their denunciations. Discontent manifested 
 itself everywhere. 
 
 Hooker began to reorganize the Army of the Potomac. Lee planned 
 an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania to take away the pressure 
 from the Confederate forces besieged by Grant at Vicksburg. On June 
 2 Stoeckl reported: 
 
 After the failure of the Army of the Potomac under General 
 Hooker, all the efforts of the government have been concentrated 
 on Vicksburg. 
 
 In my preceding reports I told of the unfruitful attempts made to 
 capture Vicksburg during last winter and spring by the federal 
 army and gunboats. However, General Grant was not discouraged 
 and conceived a bold plan which promised a happy result. He sent a 
 force of 40,000 to 50,000 men down the river and disembarked at 
 Grand Gulf, a little village fifty miles from Vicksburg. From there 
 he advanced towards Jackson, the Capital of the State of Mis- 
 sissippi, and cut communications with Vicksburg. Then without 
 stopping at Jackson he went on towards the Confederate fortress, 
 thinking he could easily take it from the rear. Grant accomplished 
 this march with great speed, and without much trouble overthrew 
 the small detachments which he encountered on his way. But 
 when he arrived behind Vicksburg he found that the fortifications 
 of this town on the land side were as formidable as those which 
 face the river. Grant, who is said to be a man of energy and who 
 commands veteran troops, decided to assault the enemy positions. 
 The soldiers marched forward boldly but they were driven back 
 each time with losses estimated at from 10,000 to 15,000 men. The 
 last assault took place on the 25th of May. 
 
 The state of affairs on the Mississippi has changed for the worse. 
 A week ago everyone was rejoicing in the impending fall of 
 
"Lincoln's War" 207 
 
 Vicksburg which they considered more or less accomplished, but 
 this certainty has given way today to serious concern about the 
 fate of the Army of McClellan threatened in turn by the Con- 
 federate General Johnston, who is commanding the Department 
 the West. It appears that Johnston has received reinforcements 
 from many sources, even from South Carolina, and he has sent a 
 message to the garrison of Vicksburg that if it could hold out for 
 two weeks he would arrive with sufficient forces to save it. At the 
 latest reports Johnston had re-occupied Jackson and his outposts 
 were on the Black River bridge, seventeen miles from Vicksburg. 
 Two divisions of the strength of 10,000 men each have rejoined 
 Grant to face Johnston. We are momentarily expecting the news 
 of a bloody battle. 
 
 Vicksburg is one of the most important points. If the federals 
 succeed in capturing it, they will be masters of the whole Mis- 
 sissippi, and will cut the Confederation of the South into two. 43 
 
 As regards the political situation, it is still deplorable. The quar- 
 rels and the rivalries between the members of the Cabinet, and, in 
 general, between the men in power, continue as in the past. The 
 administration is proceeding without any plan, and the end of the 
 struggle is more uncertain than ever. 
 
 The booming guns at Vicksburg were temporarily forgotten by 
 Washington as startling rumors flew through the Capital that Lee was 
 marching north to attack the city. The rebel cry, "On to Washington" 
 echoed up from Richmond. And the residents of the nation's Capital 
 listened in fear to the cannon fire rumbling ominously from the di- 
 rection of the Blue Ridge. In describing the new peril to Washington, 
 Stoeckl wrote on June 16: 
 
 A month ago the federal army with the strength of 1 50,000 men 
 crossed the Potomac to march on Richmond. Today, following 
 reverses due to the inability and intrigues of the men who direct 
 military affairs, it is the federal Capital which is in danger of fall- 
 ing into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 After the Battle of Chancellorsville, and the disastrous retreat 
 of Hooker, this general remained inactive in the presence of his 
 adversary who, more skilful and bolder than he, prepared to take 
 the offensive. General Lee, whose army was reinforced to 1 20,000 
 men, on June 12 directed General Ewell, at the head of 25,000 
 
208 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 men, to advance up the Potomac. With a rapid movement, Ewell 
 surprised the federal garrisons occupying Winchester, Martins- 
 burg and some other points, and thus made himself master of the 
 Shenandoah Valley. 44 
 
 This movement finally brought Hooker out of his inactivity. On 
 June 1 3 he left Falmouth and withdrew on Washington, closely fol- 
 lowed and harassed by the main part of the forces of General Lee. 
 
 In the meantime the Confederate corps of Ewell crossed the 
 Potomac and seized Hagerstown and Fredericksburg in Maryland, 
 crossed the borders of Pennsylvania, and according to telegraphic 
 news received last evening, he was already occupying Chambers- 
 burg. 
 
 The administration, caught off guard by this rapid movement, 
 called on the militias of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Ohio and West 
 Virginia for 100,000 men. 
 
 The President has said that he must rely on the State militias for 
 the defense of the area, as he could not, at this moment, release a 
 single regiment of the Army of the Potomac. As a matter of fact, 
 this army is hardly in shape to face Lee. 
 
 It appears that yesterday there were some serious engagements, 
 and at the moment of writing we can clearly hear the boom of the 
 cannons on the other bank of the Potomac. The federal authorities 
 are in consternation and various departments of state are hastily 
 packing up archives so that they may be sent away on gunboats in 
 case of necessity. 
 
 Yesterday there was a Cabinet meeting to decide whether to 
 leave Hooker in command of the army or replace him. But noth- 
 ing has been decided. Hooker has shown himself incompetent. But 
 they hesitate to dismiss him because he is supported by the radicals 
 whose willing tool he has become. 
 
 The diplomatic corps is, as last year, in an embarrassing posi- 
 tion. We have sent our families to the North and we are ready to 
 follow the government. I have taken all precautions to put our 
 archives in a place of safety in case of danger and I shall take with 
 me the most important papers of the imperial legation. 45 
 
 In his next dispatch, Stoeckl reported: 
 
 The principal forces of the two enemy armies are facing each 
 other on the right bank of the Potomac at a distance of a few 
 
"Lincoln's War" 209 
 
 miles from Washington. Skirmishes take place every day and yes- 
 terday a serious engagement must have taken place for we dis- 
 tinctly heard cannon fire the whole day long. But we do not know 
 the result of it, for the government continues to maintain its usual 
 silence. 
 
 Such is the position of Washington on the southerly side. We 
 are similarly threatened by a Confederate division of 15,000 men 
 which occupies the upper Potomac thirty miles from here. This 
 armed force has seized the railroad which links the Capital with 
 the West. If, as is feared, the Confederates also manage to seize 
 the railroad of the North, all communications from Washington 
 will be interrupted and the federal Capital will be completely iso- 
 lated from the other states. 46 
 
 The days following were ones of terrible suspense for the North. 
 With panic beginning to overtake the residents of Washington a 
 clamor arose for the reinstatement of McClellan to the Potomac com- 
 mand. But on the morning of June 28, 1863 a messenger from the 
 President arrived at the headquarters of General George Gordon 
 Meade, commanding Hooker's Fifth Corps, and handed him a dispatch 
 from Lincoln. It was an order to take immediate charge of the Army of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 Three days later (July 1) the newly led Army of the Potomac and 
 the advancing forces of Lee met head-on at the little village of Gettys- 
 burg. For three days the epochal battle raged. When it was over the 
 hitherto invincible army of Lee, decimated by 20,000 slain and 
 wounded, had lost one of the decisive battles of history. "They fought 
 bitterly on both sides and with equal courage," Stoeckl stated in his 
 account of the "terrific battle." 
 
 Finally, on the evening of the 4th, the Confederates withdrew in 
 the direction of Maryland, probably with the intention of crossing 
 the Potomac and returning to Virginia. 
 
 Meade says that his cavalry was pursuing the enemy. Every- 
 thing depends now on the skill of Lee's retreat to Virginia. If he 
 can do it without having his army seriously disorganized, the situa- 
 tion will be as it was before the invasion. But, if Meade should 
 succeed in cutting off the retreat of the Confederate troops, the 
 result will be disastrous for them. The losses have been terrific. 
 They are estimated at from 20,000 to 25,000 men on each side. 
 
210 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 This morning I saw the President and Mr. Seward whom I 
 complimented on the success of the federal army. 47 
 
 While Lincoln bemoaned Meade's failure to pursue Lee and cut off 
 his retreat, Stoeckl wrote: 
 
 As always happens in this war on one side or the other, General 
 Meade was not able to press the advantage gained at Gettysburg. 
 He followed Lee, but only after a lapse of two days after the 
 battle. This gave the enemy time to complete his retreat without 
 much trouble. 
 
 The two armies are again facing each other and we are awaiting 
 a clash at any moment. The federal government has done every- 
 thing to reinforce General Meade. They sent him all the troops 
 which could be spared and his forces must be up to 175,000 men, 
 among whom there are 25,000 to 30,000 militia on whom he can- 
 not rely for much help. 
 
 General Lee has been reinforced and his army today may be up 
 to 100,000 men, but this time he will have the advantage of being 
 on the defensive and of encountering the enemy in a country that 
 is wooded, mountainous and cut through with ravines. 48 
 
 Meanwhile the star of a great general was rising in the West. For two 
 years U. S. Grant had been hammering away at the "hard nut" of 
 Vicksburg. On this fateful July 4, while Lee was fleeing from Gettys- 
 burg, Confederate General Pemberton finally surrendered the strong- 
 hold to Grant. Stoeckl reported: 
 
 While the blood was flowing so freely on the plains of Pennsyl- 
 vania . . . the federal forces won a victory on the Mississippi of 
 the greatest importance. The stronghold of Vicksburg which has 
 been besieged for almost two years fell into the hands of the 
 federals. After having exhausted all their provisions and munitions 
 the Confederate General Pemberton capitulated. The garrison 
 with a strength of 12,000 men was taken prisoner. The officers 
 and the soldiers have been sent home on parole. With the fall of 
 Vicksburg it is improbable that Port Hudson, the last fortified 
 point of the Confederates on the Mississippi, can hold out much 
 longer. 
 
 It is the first time since the beginning of the war, apart from 
 
"Lincoln's War" 211 
 
 the taking of New Orleans, that the federals are gaining any real 
 and important advantages. 49 
 
 Only ten days after the great victories at Gettysburg and Vicks- 
 burg — while for the first time during the Civil War, Lincoln found 
 real cause for rejoicing — draft riots broke out in New York City over 
 the enforcement of the conscription act of 1863. The draft riots were 
 confined to a district of New York largely inhabited by foreign la- 
 borers. A slogan: "Rich man's war and poor man's fight," repeated 
 over and over again by antiwar agitators, had made a great impression 
 upon them. It arose from the permission to escape service by the pay- 
 ment of $300 — at the outset, the equivalent of the cost to the govern- 
 ment of a substitute. But it ceased to be so owing to the rise in prices 
 and wages due to the depreciation of the currency. The New York 
 riots did not reflect the spirit which animated the North generally. But 
 the Czar's representative advised his Foreign Office: 
 
 New York, the metropolis of the nation, with a population of 
 nearly 1,000,000, has been the scene of disorders more than once, 
 but never before to such a degree as this. For the first time the 
 people rose up against the duly constituted authorities. A mob in- 
 vaded the main recruiting office, drove out the officers and set fire 
 to the police station. Several men were killed by the troops who 
 interceded. This is an indication of the confusion and demagoguery 
 which prevails in the North. . . . The government is very uneasy 
 and has ordered the suspension of recruiting at Philadelphia where 
 riots are also feared. 50 
 
 Stoeckl also observed that as a result of the Union successes a new 
 split had resulted in the ranks of Lincoln's administration. The clash 
 was over future policy. 
 
 The conservatives want peace. They say that now that Northern 
 honor is saved, the time is at hand to start negotiations with the 
 Confederates for their re-entry into the Union on an equal footing 
 with the Northern States. On the other hand the radical Republi- 
 cans are demanding that the government should continue the vigor- 
 ous prosecution of the war and that it should not lay down arms 
 until the South is completely subjugated. 
 
 Unfortunately the administration is completely dominated by 
 
212 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the radicals. A recent incident is proof of this. Mr. Stephens, Vice 
 President of the Southern Confederation, came to Fort Monroe 
 in a government vessel, and requested permission to come to Wash- 
 ington to deliver a letter and to convey a verbal message to 
 President Lincoln from Jefferson Davis. Mr. Lincoln, after having 
 consulted with his Cabinet and several Republican senators present 
 in Washington, who were known for their extreme views, refused 
 to see Mr. Stephens. 
 
 Mr. Seward, with whom I spoke about this matter, said to me: "I 
 was of the opinion that Mr. Stephens, whom I have known for 
 many years and who I know is still attached to the Union, should 
 be received by the President, but the President decided otherwise, 
 and I did not insist." 
 
 The radicals who control the Republican Party want no com- 
 promise. They noisily demand continuation of the war in the hope 
 of assuring that one of their Party will become the Chief Magis- 
 trate of the Nation in the next presidential election. The con- 
 servatives who constitute the majority of the population are op- 
 posed to all extreme measures, but they are afraid to speak up. 
 
 At the outset of the conflict the North took its stand fighting 
 for liberty as against slavery. As a result public opinion was on 
 their side. Later the edicts of confiscation, the threats of inciting 
 a servile war, and the arbitrary acts of some of their generals, 
 purposely exaggerated by the English press, have damaged their 
 cause, particularly in Eastern Europe. They now have the op- 
 portunity of showing themselves magnanimous towards their 
 former countrymen, and thus regain the ground they have lost in 
 the eyes of the world. 51 . . . 
 
 In spite of the recent successes of the federal armies, the gen- 
 eral situation has not improved noticeably. The ranks of the 
 federal army must be replenished. . . . Conscription goes on very 
 slowly. . . . The government will be fortunate if it can obtain 
 150,000 of the 300,000 required. 52 
 
 Writing almost two months later, on September 23, 1863, Stoeckl 
 expected a long continuance of the contest, and wondered what it 
 would settle: 
 
 It is impossible to foresee the end of the Civil War in the near 
 future. The areas captured and occupied by the federal troops are 
 
"Lincoln' f s War" 213 
 
 situated either on the Atlantic coast or along the Mississippi River. 
 The task still remains to advance into the interior of this vast 
 territory and it is there that the Union troops will meet with the 
 greatest difficulties because they will be deprived of the support 
 of the gunboats which played such an important part in winning 
 the recent victories. The Southerners, in spite of their reverses, do 
 not appear demoralized, and the tenacity with which they defend 
 themselves at every point proves that they are not yet ready to 
 surrender. 
 
 In the event that the South is subjugated, a difficult but not im- 
 possible task, the question will arise as to what policy should be 
 assumed towards these States: Should they be occupied by the 
 army as some parts of Tennessee and other Southwestern States 
 are occupied today, or should they be admitted to the Union in 
 their former status? If the first possibility should come into reality 
 it would become necessary to maintain a permanent army of thou- 
 sands of men. The other alternative seems to be as impractical as 
 the first. Actually, how can it be expected that States which have 
 waged a long and fierce war can rejoin the Union and live in peace 
 and harmony with the loyal States? In addition, the North itself 
 is disunited and torn by partisan strife. The hate between the 
 Republicans and the Democrats is as bitter as that between the 
 North and the South. 
 
 These are very grave difficulties and I cannot share Mr. Seward's 
 optimism in seeing a quick re-establishment of the old Union. In 
 time the nation will be reunited. I have the firm conviction that the 
 American nation will regain its prosperity and greatness. But hav- 
 ing endured a cataclysmic revolution, the nation will be recon- 
 structed in a different form and under new conditions. 53 
 
 Having thus expressed his opinion regarding the political situation 
 and future reconstruction policies, Stoeckl went back to reporting the 
 military situation: 
 
 The military operations in the West which had been stopped 
 for a time after the fall of Vicksburg have started up again. Gen- 
 eral Rosecrans, who is Commander in Chief of the Department of 
 the West, set out two weeks ago and has occupied Chattanooga, 
 a very important military position on the boundaries of Georgia, 
 and continued forward with the intention of seizing Atlanta, one 
 
2 14 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of the principal cities of that State. When he arrived at Fayette- 
 ville, twenty or twenty-five miles to the south of Chattanooga, he 
 met the Confederate army of Generals Bragg and Johnston, which 
 had been reinforced by a division of the army of General Lee on 
 orders from General Longstreet. The two armies came upon one 
 another and fought one of the fiercest battles during September 
 19-21. 
 
 Mr. Seward, whom I saw this morning, has confirmed the 
 news of the defeat of the Union army at the Battle of Chicka- 
 mauga. He told me that Rosecrans was forced to withdraw to 
 Chattanooga, where he hoped to remain until the arrival of re- 
 inforcements from the North. 
 
 The siege of Charleston continues but with less intensity. The 
 federals are meeting much more stubborn resistance than they 
 expected. 54 
 
 On November 7 the Russian Minister reported that as a result of 
 Rosecrans' defeat by Bragg at Chickamauga he had been replaced by 
 General Grant "who has acquired an enviable reputation since his 
 capture of Vicksburg." 55 He added: 
 
 The federal armies are feeling the losses they sustained last 
 summer. I have been assured that these losses ran as high as almost 
 300,000 men, two-thirds of whom were lost on the banks of the 
 Mississippi and on the coasts of the South regions whose pestilential 
 climate is fatal to the men of the North. The government is doing 
 all it can to procure recruits, but it is meeting great obstacles. This 
 is not surprising as the country has already provided almost a 
 million fighters from a population of 20,000,000. The conscription 
 of 300,000 men decreed by the President last summer has so far 
 produced only 40,000 to 50,000 men at the most. A new decree re- 
 cently published calls to arms 300,000 volunteers. They will get 
 only a fraction of this number but not without difficulty and by 
 paying bounties in certain localities as high as $1,000 a man. 
 
 Placed in charge of all the forces between the Alleghenies and the 
 Mississippi, Grant's first task in his new command was to save Rose- 
 crans and the State of Tennessee. On October 23, he advanced upon 
 Chattanooga, and after waiting for the arrival of General Sherman 
 and his troops, attacked Bragg's forces. After one of the war's decisive 
 
"Lincoln's War" 215 
 
 battles, Grant — with Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan and Hooker as his 
 lieutenants — succeeded in dislodging Bragg's army from its seemingly 
 invulnerable positions and put it to rout. As a result, the entire State 
 of Tennessee was won for the Union. The Confederacy had again 
 shrunk in territory and resources. 
 
 Lincoln was elated. Had he at last found in Grant the leader he had 
 been searching for all these months? 
 
14 
 
 What Can Be Expected from 
 a Democracy? 
 
 In a series of dispatches written in late November and December of 
 1863, Baron Edouard de Stoeckl presented to his government a detailed 
 review of the historic events he had been witnessing in America. 
 
 He had formed certain definite opinions and impressions about the 
 United States, its institutions and its leaders. The importance of these 
 personal impressions lay in the fact that they were generally accepted 
 by the Czar, Prince Gortchakov, and the Russian nation as a whole, in 
 the formulation of Muscovite opinion regarding America, her people, 
 statesmen and institutions. 
 
 First of all was Stoeckl's conclusion that the foundations of true 
 democracy, as they existed in the United States before the Civil War, 
 had been completely undermined. With the President as Commander 
 in Chief usurping so much power, the Constitution had become an 
 empty shell, he declared. 
 
 "The republican form of government, so much talked about by the 
 Europeans and so much praised by the Americans, is breaking down." 
 Democracy in the United States had become "irresponsible," he be- 
 lieved, 
 
 owing to the rising streams of radicalism and universal suffrage at 
 home, to the influx of socialists and anarchists from Europe, and 
 to the rise of such men as Garibaldi and Bakunin. What can be 
 expected from a country where men of humble origin are elevatec 
 216 
 
What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 217 
 
 to the highest positions, where honest men refuse to vote and dis- 
 honest ones cast their ballots at the bidding of shameless politi- 
 cians? This is democracy in practice, the democracy that the 
 European theorists rave about. 1 ... If they could only see it at 
 work they would cease their agitation and thank God for the 
 government which they are enjoying. 2 
 
 He had rejoiced that "the crumbling of the American system" would 
 prove to be "a salutary lesson for European anarchists and visionaries" 
 who "preach limitless freedom and who are convinced that they have 
 found in America the realization of their theory of free will." They 
 "will necessarily become convinced that self-government, like all other 
 human institutions, has its weak points." Here in the United States it 
 had "operated under uniquely favorable conditions and seemed to be 
 absolutely secure." Failure of the ultra-democratic system under these 
 circumstances was to him convincing proof that it could not succeed 
 anywhere. 3 
 
 Second only to the Russian Minister's disdain for American democ- 
 racy was his continued low opinion of President Lincoln as a na- 
 tional leader in time of crisis. He considered Lincoln to be personally 
 honest, kind, courteous and possessed of a fine character. But as a leader 
 he believed him to be weak, inexperienced and lacking in moral cour- 
 age. He had neither an immediate plan nor a long-range policy. He 
 was the tool of unscrupulous intriguers who had made him their candi- 
 date for President for the very reason of his weakness. They were sure 
 they could bend him to their will and have him do their bidding. Now 
 he was forever vacillating between the conservatives and radicals and 
 always yielding to the extremists. Stoeckl declared: "Considering the 
 vastly superior resources of the North, Lincoln should have brought 
 about a speedy suppression of the rebellion." However, "the great 
 trouble with Lincoln was that the task was too great for him." 
 
 Stoeckl, however, had nothing but admiration for the American 
 people. "Nothing is impossible for this extraordinary people, nothing 
 is too difficult for them," he wrote. One of their chief characteristics 
 was their confidence in their nation and its destiny. Strangely, they 
 believe their form of government to be "the best government God ever 
 saw," and that it will last forever. 
 
 But the Russian envoy had no confidence in the leaders of democ- 
 racy. They appeared to him as a noisy, fanatic and ignorant lot of 
 
2 1 8 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 mediocrities. He looked on most members of Congress as demagogues 
 and intriguers, ignorant of the fundamentals of government. 
 
 With the start of the session of Congress which meets on 
 December 6, we are entering the fourth year of the American 
 revolution, for this revolution will date from the opening of the 
 federal legislature which preceded the inauguration of President 
 Lincoln. In fact, it is to the politicians of the two parties, Republi- 
 cans and Democrats, who were then sitting in Congress, that we 
 owe the Civil War. 
 
 No one at that time, neither the heads of the parties nor the 
 nation at large, could foresee the disastrous consequences of these 
 political dissensions which took place in Washington. The men of 
 the South believed that the Democrats of the free states would 
 sustain their cause and would prevent war. In the North they were 
 persuaded that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be sufficient to put 
 down the insurgent States. They were mistaken on both sides. The 
 Democrats of the North, far from opposing the war, made com- 
 mon cause with their political rivals and did not draw back from 
 any sacrifices in support of the struggle. 
 
 On the other hand, the federal government found on the part 
 of the secessionists a resistance which it hardly expected. 
 
 I shall not speak of the military operations of the last three years. 
 I shall only deal briefly with the causes that have paralyzed the 
 efforts of the federal armies and which have prevented them from 
 profiting from their successes each time that the fortunes of war 
 were in their favor. 
 
 The movement of the armies was directed from Washington 
 by the President as supreme head of the land and sea forces, by 
 the Secretary of War and by General Halleck, Commander in 
 Chief. The first two are lawyers by profession and naturally have 
 no knowledge of military art. The third is a former officer but in 
 the position which he occupies has already shown himself to be a 
 mediocrity. Never have these three individuals been able to agree. 
 Each one had his plan and each one issued orders. The commanders 
 of the army corps constantly received conflicting instructions and 
 did not know whom to obey. In addition, Congress named a com- 
 mittee of senators to supervise the progress of military operations. 
 The members of this committee visited the camps and assumed the 
 
What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 219 
 
 right to give orders which the generals had to comply with under 
 pain of dismissal. From these facts one gets some idea of the con- 
 fusion that this state of affairs produced in the army. 
 
 Military operations have always been subordinate to political 
 needs. Whenever it became necessary to influence the elections of 
 the States they gave the order to certain generals to advance and 
 wage battle without any concern whether they were prepared or 
 not. Often it resulted in a defeat instead of a victory. . . . Finally 
 the jealousy and the mistrust of the politicians towards the mili- 
 tary chiefs were equally important factors which hindered the 
 progress of operations. General McClellan is the object of deep 
 hatred of the radicals and the Secretary of War. Toward the end 
 of 1 861, General McClellan could have captured Richmond if they 
 had not taken away part of the army which was to have joined 
 him. Last May McClellan was besieging Richmond. McDowell, at 
 Fredericksburg with 40,000 men, was to march on Richmond to 
 join McClellan. At that time the Confederates had but a very 
 small defending force which could not possibly resist McDowell. 
 Richmond would doubtless have fallen. But the politicians inter- 
 fered. They did not want McClellan to get credit for capturing 
 Richmond. As McDowell set out for Richmond, President Lin- 
 coln ordered McDowell to take the greater part of his army into 
 the Shenandoah Valley. McDowell replied to the President that 
 he would obey but that such a maneuver would be fatal. "This is 
 a crushing blow to us," he said. The President answered that he 
 regretted the necessity of having to assign him to the new destina- 
 tion but that circumstances demanded it. McDowell, in comply- 
 ing with the order of his superior, felt it his duty to tell the Presi- 
 dent that it would take him ten days to reach the upper Potomac 
 and by that time General Jackson would have withdrawn. 
 
 The secret explanation for this maneuver is that McClellan had 
 always been the object of hate of the radicals and Secretary of 
 War Stanton who is their tool in the Cabinet. They couldn't per- 
 mit McClellan the honor of taking the Confederate Capital. 
 
 General McClellan was gaining the affection of his soldiers to 
 an ever-increasing degree, and they were afraid he might become 
 powerful enough to become a candidate at the next presidential 
 election. 
 
 According to the report of the Secretary of War at the beginning 
 
220 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of the present year, the federal army numbered more than a million 
 men. Now it must be reduced by at least half by battle, desertion 
 and above all by sickness. 
 
 I have had an opportunity to discuss things with several officers 
 who have returned from the armies stationed along the Mississippi 
 and on the coasts of the secessionist States. They admitted to me 
 that fever and other sicknesses carried off the staggering number 
 of 200,000 men. 
 
 In considering the progress of events in domestic affairs during 
 the last three years, one will find the same disorder and the same 
 confusion. The President has vacillated constantly between the 
 conservatives and the radicals, and has always yielded to the perni- 
 cious advice of the latter. Mr. Seward, without doubt the only 
 capable man among those in power, has always been motivated 
 by the best of intentions, but has never had enough power to make 
 himself heard. No strong leader has been found to direct affairs of 
 state. In the administration as in the federal legislature, no one up 
 until now has had any set plan. No one has proposed a single 
 practical measure. 
 
 The condition of the treasury is more satisfactory than one 
 might believe after three years of tremendous expenditures. The 
 public debt at this moment must be at least a billion and a half 
 dollars, if not more. In spite of that Mr. Chase, Secretary of the 
 Treasury, is not at the end of his resources. True, government 
 bonds have to be issued at a huge discount. However, Mr. Chase 
 continues to dispose of them, and succeeds by this method in rais- 
 ing revenues needed to meet government expenses, which are 
 roughly two million dollars a day. 
 
 It is believed that for next year the budget of Mr. Chase will 
 rise to $1,000,000,000. Thus if the war continues two more years, 
 the debt of the United States will reach the size of the English 
 debt, with this difference, that here the interest rates are double, 
 and that in addition to the federal debt, the States and the munici- 
 palities have their own separate debts. Up to this point interest has 
 been paid by floating new loans. But this state of affairs can hardly 
 continue and it remains a question how the government can later 
 fulfill its obligations, especially if the struggle results in a separa- 
 tion of the Southern States. A leading banker of New York with 
 whom I conversed on this subject, said to me: "We will be able to 
 
What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 221 
 
 pay the interest of the debt, no matter how heavy, if we succeed in 
 restoring the Union in such a way as to be able to profit from the 
 rich products of the South, as in the past. If not, bankruptcy is 
 inevitable." He added, "Since we have no foreign debt, we of the 
 United States will be the only people to suffer from it. The people 
 would rather see the government repudiate the public debt than 
 be overburdened with taxes." 
 
 Such, sir, is the military and political situation of the country. 
 The revolution has already been going on for three years and it 
 is impossible to foresee an end to this conflict. More than ever a 
 conciliation based on compromise has become impractical. The 
 nation wants it. The American people remember the benefits of 
 peace which they have enjoyed so long. They regret the loss of 
 their past prosperity and the high position that they occupied 
 among the nations of the world and of which they were so justly 
 proud. They find themselves today in the midst of a dreadful 
 fratricidal war and cannot deceive themselves on the dangers of 
 the future. The great majority of the nation would be ready to 
 compromise, but the voice of the conservatives is stifled among 
 cries of vengeance uttered by the radicals in their newspapers, on 
 the public streets, and even in religious gatherings. 
 
 The war will, therefore, have to continue. The resources of the 
 North have been strained, it is true, but not exhausted. There is 
 difficulty in procuring men, and public credit is no longer as firm 
 as it once was. Nevertheless, the government, with the great 
 powers it possesses today, will find the means of continuing the 
 struggle for another two or three years. The exhaustion of the 
 South is the only hope of seeing an early end to the war. 
 
 We have little contact with the seceded States. We do not know 
 their true condition, but it is certain that they are suffering the 
 greatest misery and distress. In spite of this they continue to de- 
 fend themselves with the utmost vigor. They have the advantage 
 of waging a defensive war, in a vast, widespread area which is 
 difficult to invade. They have had the good fortune of possessing 
 military leaders more skilful than their adversaries. Through well- 
 planned maneuvers they frequently succeeded in defeating the 
 federals who always outnumbered them. But the most effective 
 weapons which the Southerners have used to prolong the struggle 
 have been given them by their adversaries. The secessionist leaders 
 
222 
 
 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 have skilfully exploited the threats of conquest and extermination 
 uttered by the extremist party of the North. They have persuaded 
 the people of the South that they have no other alternative than 
 to conquer or be exterminated. They thus succeeded in creating 
 among these people a fanaticism which alone can explain this 
 desperate resistance. 
 
 But if it is still impossible to foresee the outcome of the struggle, 
 there are two things which can already be considered as a part of 
 history. The first is that the institution of slavery has received a 
 blow from which it will never recover. In the border States — 
 Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and a large part of Virginia and 
 Tennessee — occupied by the federal troops, slavery no longer 
 exists except in name and will disappear completely with the end 
 of the war. If the separation does take place this institution may 
 still be able to be maintained in the cotton States but under new 
 and less solid conditions. 
 
 In the second place, this revolution has undermined the founda- 
 tions of pure democracy as it existed in the United States. The 
 Constitution is now no more than an empty shell. Step by step the 
 President has assumed more and more discretionary powers. He 
 was led to this by the pressure of events rather than by his own 
 will. 
 
 Universal suffrage is practised here today more or less as it exists 
 in certain parts of Europe. The writ of habeas corpus has been 
 suspended. The rights of the States have been almost annulled, and 
 military authority is absolute in every part of the country. 
 
 There is a strange contrast as to what is happening at this mo- 
 ment on the two continents. In Europe the revolutionists, the 
 Utopians and the other restless spirits are agitating to upset the 
 whole order of things and to substitute for them democratic insti- 
 tutions. In America these same institutions seem to have run their 
 course. The military regime is taking root more and more, not 
 only in governmental affairs but even in the day by day activities 
 of the American people. 4 
 
 In a subsequent letter Stoeckl continued: 
 
 No one believed at the beginning of this struggle that the North 
 would be able to stand for such a long time the staggering ex- 
 penses of war and yet, after three years, the treasury continues to 
 
What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 223 
 
 meet the necessities of the situation, and in spite of an enormous 
 debt, public credit has not been greatly disturbed. Mr. Chase has 
 proved to be a skilful financier. He has procured the co-operation 
 of all the banks of the North by convincing them that the nation's 
 financial ruin would undoubtedly also result in their own bank- 
 ruptcy. Supported by the financial interests, Mr. Chase will be 
 able to furnish the funds for prolonging the war until a crisis 
 which is inevitable shall upset this procedure. 
 
 The difficulty of procuring men is even greater. In June the 
 President issued a call for 300,000 men by conscription. Later he 
 issued a decree calling 300,000 volunteers to arms. With difficulty, 
 40,000 to 50,000 conscripts and almost as many volunteers were 
 obtained. At the beginning of the war men came forward in large 
 numbers. Two or three weeks were enough to form a regiment. 
 But it is not so today. It is difficult to procure volunteers even by 
 offering them bounties of $700 to $800. This state of affairs is not 
 surprising. The States of the North have a population of 20,000,- 
 000. They have already furnished over 1,000,000 troops. All the 
 adventurous spirits that there were — all the unemployed in the 
 great cities — immigrants brought here from Europe by poverty, 
 have been absorbed by the army. Next, conscription will draft the 
 agricultural, industrial and commercial classes. Only force will be 
 able to drag men of these groups away from their homes, and it is 
 doubtful whether they will submit willingly to it. Congress has 
 already discussed this question. Several measures have been pro- 
 posed, but none has been judged practicable. In the ultimate, con- 
 scription will have to be enforced, no matter how unpopular it 
 may be. 
 
 However, with the almost limitless powers which the federal 
 government possesses it will manage to surmount these obstacles 
 up to a certain point, and the war will be prolonged still further, 
 intensifying the poverty and bloodshed which have overwhelmed 
 this country for three years." 5 
 
 Later, in February 1864, he wrote: 
 
 The President has just ordered a new conscription of 500,000 men 
 which forms with the two drafts of 300,000 men each, decreed in 
 the months of June and of October, 1,100,000 called to arms in 
 nine months. The two drafts of 600,000 men produced at most 
 
224 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 200,000 and it is improbable that the new order will produce a 
 larger number. 
 
 They have always tried here to delude themselves on the true 
 state of the South which the newspapers, especially those of the 
 ruling party, represent as being reduced to the last extremity. But 
 the federal government thinks otherwise, and the new draft of 
 500,000 men is proof of this. 
 
 According to the information that we have about the South, the 
 seceded States seem to be more determined than ever to continue 
 the struggle and are making tremendous efforts to resist the in- 
 vasion by the North. All men between the ages of twenty and 
 forty have been called into active service and those between forty 
 and sixty have been organized into garrisons in the towns. These 
 people, whose hatred against their former fellow countrymen is 
 growing daily, are truly answering the new appeal of Jefferson 
 Davis. 
 
 It seems that the plan of the coming campaign is to seize and 
 occupy the ports of Mobile and Savannah and to advance from 
 those two points towards the interior of the States of Georgia and 
 Alabama and Mississippi. These operations are to be combined 
 with a similar movement of two army corps which would leave 
 Chattanooga and Vicksburg also to converge towards the in- 
 terior. These different corps are to join in the center of the Con- 
 federate States. It is a bold plan and there is no doubt that if it 
 succeeds, the Confederate army will be destroyed. 
 
 But the distance that the federal armies have to cover, the lack 
 of good roads and the difficulties of procuring provisions and of 
 transporting munitions make the success of this enterprise problem- 
 atic, to say the least. 
 
 In the meantime, they are getting ready on both sides. The 
 armies are starting out and a month from now military operations 
 will begin seriously. 
 
 All the advantages are now with the North. Their troops are 
 more numerous, better equipped and better armed. They com- 
 mand the sea and all the waterways and thereby have a powerful 
 aid in their warships and their gunboats. But what they lack is 
 unity of action and the strong will to organize military operations. 
 I must also say that among their generals there has so far been 
 found not a single outstanding leader. In this respect, the leaders 
 
What Can Be Expected from a Democracy? 225 
 
 of the South are infinitely superior. Because of this situation there 
 remains an element of doubt as to successful operations. But what 
 is not doubtful is that the bloodshed will be terrific, and that the 
 losses in life will surpass all losses to date, as large as they have 
 been. 6 . . . 
 
 This war is a duel which, it now appears, will end only after 
 the resources of both sides are drained. 7 
 
15 
 
 ® 
 
 It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 
 
 An election of a President was due to take place In the autumn of 
 1864. The Russian Minister, accustomed to a government where the 
 Czar ruled by divine right, thought it strange that a popular referendum 
 to select a Chief Magistrate should take place in the middle of a war for 
 national survival, especially since Lincoln, the incumbent, had already 
 assumed dictatorial powers which perhaps not even the Czar wielded. 
 How could an orderly election be held amid such chaos, turmoil, bitter- 
 ness and partisan strife? No doubt it would be another example of the 
 "rule of the mob" in America. 1 
 
 In March, Stoeckl advised his superiors in St. Petersburg that he had 
 just learned that Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, had re- 
 fused to be a candidate for the presidency. "I regret this very much," 
 wrote the Minister, "because of all the men in power, Mr. Chase is 
 without doubt the most capable of pulling the nation out of the 
 dangerous crisis in which it finds itself." 2 
 
 Chase was actually engaged in open intrigues for Lincoln's over- 
 throw, while remaining a member of his Cabinet. While asserting that 
 he had no wish to be President he encouraged a campaign on his behalf 
 to develop. But the Chase-for-President movement soon collapsed, and 
 Lincoln accepted the resignation of his disloyal Cabinet officer. 
 
 All through the early, months of 1864 politicians were actively plan- 
 ning the defeat of Lincoln in the coming election. The antislavery cabal 
 could not tolerate his moderate and magnanimous views on reconstruc- 
 
 226 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War ny 
 
 tion and treatment of the vanquished. They wanted a President of their 
 own faction who would carry out their vengeful program of abolition 
 and subjugation of the seceded States. 
 
 Confederate leaders, seeing only extermination of all they stood for, 
 unless they conquered, would not recognize their impending defeat 
 and refused to try to make terms with the magnanimous Lincoln. Feel- 
 ing had become too bitter to permit that. They would struggle on as 
 long as resistance was possible. 
 
 In frightening and convincing words Jefferson Davis exhorted the 
 soldiers of the Confederate States to fight on. The eventual triumph of 
 the South, he declared, was inevitable, yet the Northerners insisted 
 upon continuing the conflict. "Their malignant rage aims at nothing less 
 than the extermination of yourselves, your wives and children." He 
 warned that the homes of the Southerners were to "be partitioned 
 among the wretches whose atrocious cruelties have stamped infamy on 
 their government." 3 
 
 The most terrible devastation, suffering and loss of life of the war 
 was now about to start as the armies of the North prepared to invade 
 the South in a wide sweep of desolation. Atrocities were to be answered 
 by counter strokes. An all-out effort to strike the Confederates on all 
 fronts through simultaneous advances, was launched by the Union 
 forces in February 1864. The plans were laid in strict secrecy, but the 
 Russian Minister learned the details. To Prince Gortchakov in St. 
 Petersburg he wrote on March 7: 
 
 Military operations began sooner than we expected, an unusual 
 spring having allowed the armies to start out in February. In order 
 to prevent the Confederates from reaching points threatened by 
 the federal government forces, they had decided to attack them on 
 all sides at once — both on the Atlantic coast and on the Western 
 front. 
 
 Either this strategy was poorly planned or the generals were un- 
 skilful in carrying it out. The fact remains that the results have been 
 unfavorable everywhere to the armies of the North. 
 
 General Sherman, at the head of 20,000 to 25,000 men, left Vicks- 
 burg and, abandoning his communications, went towards Meridian 
 from where he was to march to Mobile and encircle that town by 
 land, while Admiral Farragut was to attack it by sea. Another army 
 corps composed principally of cavalry troops under the command 
 
228 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 of General Smith, entered the State of Mississippi near Memphis. 
 This army was to join up with Sherman at Meridian and accom- 
 pany him to Mobile. General Grant, commanding the main army 
 of the West, advanced at the same time against the Confederate 
 General Johnston. And lastly an expedition was sent by sea to 
 Florida to occupy that State. 
 
 Unfortunately none of the federal commanders succeeded in 
 fulfilling the mission which had been entrusted to him. General 
 Grant advanced on Johnston, but after two or three days of bitter 
 fighting, returned to his former quarters at Chattanooga. Scarcely 
 had this news been received in Washington than it was learned that 
 General Smith had also failed in his enterprise. In the report that 
 this General sent to the Secretary of War, he said that for three 
 days he drove the enemy ahead of him, but when he arrived at 
 Pantatoc, he met a large Confederate force and in the struggle 
 which followed, two of his regiments weakened and adversely af- 
 fected the rest of his troops. He had to return to Memphis after 
 losing a great many men. But it was the Florida expedition which 
 was the most unfortunate. General Truman Seymour, who com- 
 manded it, disembarked at Jacksonville with eight or ten thousand 
 men. He immediately set march towards the interior without tak- 
 ing any precautions. When he arrived at a village called Alegator 
 [sic] he ran head-on into a Confederate force. It appears that the 
 federal troops put up only weak resistance. They were routed and 
 pursued as far as Jacksonville with a loss of 2,000 men killed, 
 wounded and captured. General Seymour was put under arrest and 
 is to be tried before a court martial. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac was also scheduled to participate in 
 this general movement, but it was delayed for two or three weeks 
 by preparations and only lately became ready for action. A detach- 
 ment of from 5,000 to 6,000 horsemen under the command of Gen- 
 eral Kilpatrick succeeded by a bold maneuver in reaching the rear 
 forces of the army of General Lee. It is reported that they advanced 
 within ten miles of Richmond, but having no support, General Kil- 
 patrick had to retreat, after suffering a loss of several hundred men. 
 
 There is no direct news from General Sherman, but it has been 
 learned from the newspapers of the South that he had reached Mer- 
 idian. It is doubtful that he will reach Mobile and we suppose that 
 he will return to Vicksburg. 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War iiq 
 
 The result of these military operations is unfavorable. But the 
 federal armies are too large to be seriously affected by a loss of 
 10,000 or 12,000 men. However, the moral effect has been strong 
 and the North has had to realize more than ever the obstacles that 
 it will meet in its invasion of the South. 
 
 In Washington, they were all the more disappointed because they 
 had been so confident about the success of this combined move- 
 ment of the armies. They accuse the President, Mr. Stanton, Sec- 
 retary of War, General in Chief Halleck, in fact, all those who di- 
 rectly or indirectly participate in the numerous military councils. 
 Mr. Stanton, with whom I spoke the day before yesterday, told 
 me that the future lay with the generals commanding the different 
 corps. But whose fault is it if not of those who direct affairs? The 
 administration, in order to retain partisan control of the armed 
 forces, appoints only those commanding officers who are loyal to it. 
 When it comes to naming a general, they give greater consideration 
 to his politics than to his military ability. It is, therefore, not sur- 
 prising that the federal armies have frequently suffered defeats 
 when they should have been victorious. Unfortunately it is un- 
 likely that this will change now while the parties are waging bitter 
 political warfare — one group to retain its power, the other to attain 
 it. 4 
 
 In the latter part of March, Stoeckl advised the Czar's government 
 of what was to be the final and decisive change in the high command 
 of the Union forces: 
 
 General Grant, who had distinguished himself last year by the cap- 
 ture of Vicksburg on the Mississippi, has been appointed Lieuten- 
 ant General and Commander in Chief of all the armies of the Union. 
 He is replacing General Halleck who is staying on in Washington 
 as Chief of Headquarters. 
 
 It is hoped that General Grant, whose vigor and perseverance are 
 well known, will give new drive to the federal armies in the cam- 
 paign which is about to start. The new head of the army has asked 
 for an increase in federal troops and the President has just issued 
 a proclamation drafting 200,000 men. This call, together with the 
 preceding drafts, increases the number of men whom the President 
 has requested from the country in the last nine months, to 1,300,- 
 000. 
 
230 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 In his proclamation the President assigns to each State a quota 
 that it must furnish, with the power of obtaining voluntary enlist- 
 ments if that is possible; and if not, by conscription. But it is feared 
 they will have to rely on this latter method, which is very unpop- 
 ular. The government has, therefore, been compelled to rely on 
 volunteers whose number has fallen far below the number re- 
 quested by the President. At most, 200,000 recruits have enlisted. 
 The total number today must be from 550,000 to 600,000 active 
 men. This constitutes a strong force against a comparatively weak 
 adversary. The country has the right to expect favorable results 
 from the approaching campaign, and if this expectation is not real- 
 ized the fault, as in the past, will be due to the confusion which 
 prevails in the councils of the administration and in the incapacity 
 of the generals. 5 
 
 One of these "improvised" generals, according to the Russian Am- 
 bassador, was General Banks. "He always held high rank among pol- 
 iticians, but he possesses no military ability." Yet he was placed in 
 command of an army of 25,000 men to invade Louisiana and take 
 Shreveport. 
 
 His army was advancing, stretched out on a line of thirty miles. 
 When they reached within two days of Shreveport, the federals 
 met the Confederate General Kirby Smith at the head of 12,000 
 or 15,000 men. Smith massed all his forces and broke up the fed- 
 eral divisions one after the other, compelling Banks to retreat sixty 
 miles. The federal defeat was complete. They lost 5,000 men killed 
 and wounded and 4,000 were taken prisoners. In addition, they left 
 in Confederate hands thirty pieces of artillery, two hundred wag- 
 ons and the military treasury containing a million dollars. 
 
 The government has sought to keep secret as far as possible the 
 extent of this disaster, but the details have gradually leaked out, 
 and the effect on the country has been most painful. From all sides 
 complaints have been lodged against General Banks, but as he has 
 great political influence, the President has not dared to remove him. 
 They try to appease public opinion by court martialing several 
 lesser generals. It is thus that the administration of President 
 Lincoln wages war* 
 
 The federal armies have also suffered defeats on the coasts of 
 North Carolina, in Kentucky and Tennessee, always through the 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 231 
 
 failures of the generals and the mismanagement of the government. 
 
 But all these preliminary operations have only secondary im- 
 portance compared with the events about to take place on the 
 banks of the Potomac and in the immediate vicinity of Washing- 
 ton. General Grant has collected an army of 1 80,000 men. Of these, 
 60,000 are to march on Richmond from Fort Monroe at the en- 
 trance of Chesapeake Bay, and 120,000 under the personal leader- 
 ship of General Grant are going from Washington to the Capital 
 of the South. General Lee seems to have taken all measures for put- 
 ting up a desperate resistance. The strength of his army is not 
 known, but it is estimated at 100,000 men. The delay by the fed- 
 eral government, necessitated by the extensive preparations for the 
 campaign, has enabled Lee to fortify not only the outskirts of Rich- 
 mond, but also all the principal strategic points on the road leading 
 to this Capital. 
 
 I recently obtained permission for Lieutenant Colonel Struve, 
 who is here on a scientific mission for the imperial Ministry of 
 War, to visit the Army of the Potomac. When he returned he gave 
 me some interesting information about this army. The troops were 
 in good condition but discipline was not perfect. The commanders 
 gave great praise to the soldiers who have been in the service since 
 the beginning of the war, but they admitted that they had little 
 confidence in the new recruits. Colonel Struve found the two 
 armies stretched out for a distance of forty miles, the sentinels in 
 sight of each other. We are thus at the eve of a new and frightful 
 sacrifice of men, without any hope that the result, whatever it may 
 be, will bring this terrible struggle to an end. 
 
 Washington has been converted into a vast hospital. Besides the 
 12,000 wounded already here, they have prepared 25,000 beds for 
 the maimed and wounded who will be brought here from the 
 battlefields. 
 
 The Secretary of State, whom I saw this morning, told me that 
 General Grant was expecting to be able to start on a campaign to- 
 day or tomorrow. It is, therefore, possible that before you receive 
 this report, you may be informed by telegram of the result of the 
 battle which is about to take place. 6 
 
 On May 13, 1864, Stoeckl wrote of the desperate fighting taking 
 place between Grant's and Lee's huge armies in the tangled wooded 
 
232 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 district called the "Wilderness," the outcome of which "will have 
 great effect upon the result of the war": 
 
 General Grant set out on May 4 with his entire army and sent 
 it across the Rapidan. General Lee was waiting for him at Chancel- 
 lorsville. On the 5th they fought from dawn till evening on even 
 terms. On the 7th the fight was renewed all along the line and 
 again lasted the whole day without either side gaining any real ad- 
 vantage. The two armies held their respective positions. During 
 the night of the 7th to the 8th, Lee left the battlefield and with- 
 drew a few miles. The news of Lee's retreat spread at once and 
 caused a great sensation in the country. It was believed, and the 
 government shared this opinion, that the enemy was in full re- 
 treat, but they were not long in learning they were mistaken. The 
 retreat of Lee was only a strategic move. In fact, this General re- 
 tired to Spotsylvania, a position which he had fortified in advance, 
 six miles beyond Chancellorsville. General Grant followed him 
 and the two armies continued fighting on the 8th, 9th and 10th, 
 but we have no official news about these battles. 
 
 The reports which we received from General Butler are as ob- 
 scure as those we have of the Army of the Potomac. This General, 
 who was to cooperate with Grant in the capture of Richmond, 
 went up the James River and disembarked his troops at City 
 Point, eighteen miles from the Confederate Capital. The day be- 
 fore yesterday he sent a report to the government in which he 
 states: "I am now well entrenched in City Point protected by 
 many gunboats," which proves that he has done nothing so far to 
 create a diversion in favor of Grant. 
 
 Butler became a general only during the war. Grant protested 
 against the order which entrusted the command of such an im- 
 portant expedition to an inexperienced man, but they did not fol- 
 low his advice, for Butler is a politician of great influence in the 
 North, and the President is afraid he might be against him at the 
 next election. 
 
 Fierce as previous battles have been during this war, the losses 
 suffered in the battles of the last five or six days have surpassed all 
 others. According to the most authentic reports that we have, the 
 army of Grant was reduced two days ago by 35,000 men, of 
 whom 25,000 were killed or wounded, and 10,000 were taken 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 233 
 
 prisoner or deserted. Five generals have been killed and seven or 
 eight wounded. The federals have taken 2,000 prisoners but they 
 admit having lost a larger number. Three of their generals have 
 fallen into enemy hands. We do not know about the losses of the 
 Confederates, but it is to be assumed that they are equal to those 
 of the federals. 
 
 Mr. Seward and the Secretary of War, with whom I talked, told 
 me that nothing is decisive yet. But the situation looked as though 
 there could be no doubt about final success. 7 
 
 Unable to pierce Lee's defenses at Spotsylvania, General Grant 
 wrote his famous dispatch that "I propose to fight it out on this line, if 
 it takes all summer." Lincoln was pleased with Grant's resoluteness. 
 Future historians were to declare, "The great and winning strategy of 
 the war was created by Grant." Military experts were to acclaim him 
 "a really great soldier" whose "Vicksburg campaign was a master- 
 piece." And a recent writer dealing with Lincoln's troubles in select- 
 ing winning generals was to state, "Grant was, judged by modern 
 standards, the greatest general of the Civil War. He was head and 
 shoulders above any general on either side as an over-all strategist, as 
 a master of what in later wars would be called global strategy. . . . He 
 was a brilliant theater strategist, as evidenced by the Vicksburg cam- 
 paign, which was a classic siege operation." 8 But Stoeckl, giving full 
 weight to the charges that Grant's incompetence, lack of precaution 
 and shortcomings as a tactician had been responsible for the heavy 
 Union losses at the Battle of Shiloh, wrote to Prince Gortchakov on 
 May 23, 1864: 
 
 General Grant has so far given no proof of being a great 
 strategist. It appears that he undertakes no maneuvers, and that 
 he simply drives his masses of men against the fortified positions 
 of Lee trying to crush him by sheer superiority of numbers. 
 
 Continuing his report of May 23, Stoeckl added: 
 
 On the peninsula, General Butler advanced with the intention 
 of attacking Fort Darling, an important place situated a few miles 
 from Richmond, but he was driven off and is today bottled up in 
 City Point where he landed three weeks ago. 
 
 But most important has been the defeat of the federal General 
 Sigel, who, at the head of 12,000 or 15,000 men, was advancing in 
 
234 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 the Shenandoah Valley in order to outflank the position of Lee 
 and cut his communication with Richmond. Sigel was advancing, 
 as often happens here, without taking any precautions. He sud- 
 denly found himself face to face with a Confederate division 
 which defeated him with considerable losses in men and equip- 
 ment. 
 
 This General Sigel is the same man who, in 1848, participated 
 in the revolution of Baden. Appointed general at the beginning of 
 the war, he has proven himself altogether incapable, but as he is 
 very popular among the German radicals of the North, and as the 
 administration needs their votes, the President has given him a 
 command. 
 
 The news from the West is better. General Sherman, who com- 
 mands the main body of the federal army, has left Chattanooga 
 and advanced towards Atlanta, one of the most important cities in 
 Georgia, without meeting any strong resistance on the part of the 
 Confederate General Johnston. 
 
 The government continues to express confidence and considers 
 the fall of Richmond a certainty. However, it admits that it needs 
 time and immense sacrifices of life to achieve this goal. The losses 
 so far have been terrific. They have already transported to Wash- 
 ington more than 18,000 wounded and 12,000 others are at present 
 in the temporary hospitals set up not far from the battlefield. 9 
 
 During the ensuing weeks, while the military situation was causing 
 profound anxiety, the political campaign was producing intense ex- 
 citement. On May 31 Republican bolters met in convention in Cleve- 
 land. They shouted their disgust for "the imbecile and vacillating 
 policy" of Lincoln, and demanded "immediate extinction of slavery . . . 
 by congressional action." They named as their presidential candidate 
 John C. Fremont who asserted that Lincoln's administration was "po- 
 litically, militarily and financially a failure." But the Fremonters struck 
 no responsive chord among the people, and during September Fremont 
 withdrew from the race. 
 
 Republican malcontents endeavored to persuade Lincoln to stay out 
 of the contest. They predicted that he could not be re-elected. But on 
 June 7 the National Union convention at Baltimore unanimously re- 
 nominated Lincoln for President. As his running mate they selected 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 235 
 
 Andrew Johnson, an energetic and aggressive war Democrat from 
 Tennessee. 
 
 The Democrats were to wait until the end of August before naming 
 their candidate. Confident of victory, they nominated General George 
 B. McClellan as their standard-bearer. He ran on a platform which stig- 
 matized Lincoln's war policy a failure, and cried for peace and a settle- 
 ment. 
 
 Amid this political excitement Stoeckl kept writing about the mil- 
 itary campaigns of the frightful conflict which, in its fourth year, was 
 devouring men and money without stint. On June 13, he reported to 
 his government: 
 
 To judge by the few details that we have regarding the move- 
 ment of the armies in the West, it appears that the victories have 
 been equally divided between the two sides, and that so far noth- 
 ing decisive has happened. What is certain is that the losses con- 
 tinue to be immense. It is now a question of what the government 
 will do to fill the gaps caused by these last battles. This question is 
 being discussed in Congress, but so far nothing has been decided. 
 The country has already supplied too many men to be able to give 
 any more. It is perhaps fortunate, for the exhaustion of the two 
 sides alone may put an end to this devastation and bloodshed. 10 . . . 
 
 The very day that I sent my last report on military operations, 
 we learned that the Confederates had crossed the Potomac and en- 
 tered Maryland. The government believed it at first to be an in- 
 vasion of guerrillas and did not take any steps. But they were not 
 long in realizing that the matter was very serious. Actually Lee 
 had detached a fairly considerable force whose number is not 
 known but is estimated at 20,000 to 30,000 men, in order to make a 
 demonstration against Washington, with the probable intention of 
 forcing General Grant to raise the siege of Richmond and come 
 to the help of the federal capital. 
 
 The Confederates first attacked Harpers Ferry, a town situated 
 on the Potomac, and carried off or destroyed munitions and pro- 
 visions to the value of some millions. They then crossed the north- 
 west of the State of Maryland and even entered Pennsylvania. 
 General Wallace, commanding the Union troops in Maryland, 
 gathered together 10,000 or 12,000 men and went against the 
 
236 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 enemy. A very fierce battle took place on the River Monacacy. 
 General Wallace was defeated and had to withdraw to Baltimore. 
 The Confederates advanced on Baltimore and Washington, and 
 at the moment are only about eight or ten miles from here. What 
 is strange and what characterizes the federal government, is that 
 Lee has been able to send a fairly considerable force from Rich- 
 mond to the Potomac without the authorities of Washington hav- 
 ing the least knowledge of it. It was only when danger was im- 
 minent that they began to take precautions against invasion. The 
 President appealed to the Governors of the States of the North for 
 25,000 or 35,000 militia, but this appeal was not received with en- 
 thusiasm, and so far not a single man has appeared. At the same 
 time, Grant was given the order to send troops here. I have been 
 assured that 30,000 men are already here: that several more 
 divisions were going up the Potomac and were to keep on arriv- 
 ing; and that the Capital was properly protected from attack. 
 Nevertheless, the Confederates continue to occupy the positions 
 that they had taken two days ago to the northwest of Washing- 
 ton. 
 
 We find ourselves again in the same danger which we ran into 
 two years ago. The city is in a state of consternation. The Presi- 
 dent and the members of the Cabinet have a gunboat ready to take 
 them away if the Confederates should succeed in entering the city. 
 We cannot hope that the government, in case of danger, will as- 
 sume responsibility for the diplomatic corps, and we shall have to 
 provide our own means of reaching safety. 11 
 
 However, two days later Stoeckl was able to write: 
 
 The federal Capital has just been saved for the fourth time dur- 
 ing this war from the danger of being captured by the enemy. 
 
 In my report of the day before yesterday I informed you that 
 the Confederates were besieging Washington. During the night 
 of the 1 2th to the 13th, the federals, having received reinforce- 
 ments from General Grant, made a reconnaissance and an engage- 
 ment took place without advantage to either side. Yesterday morn- 
 ing the Confederates had disappeared. All kinds of rumors were 
 circulating in the city. They said that the Confederates had with- 
 drawn in order to make the federals leave their entrenchments 
 and engage in battle. At the same time, reports were circulating 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 237 
 
 that a corps of 25,000 men from the South had crossed the Poto- 
 mac about ten miles from here and was coming to reinforce the 
 troops which were besieging Washington. The government had no 
 positive information and several generals with whom I spoke yes- 
 terday in the Department of War, admitted to me that they were 
 in complete ignorance of the whereabouts of the enemy. Never- 
 theless, it appears probable that the Confederates have abandoned 
 the siege and that they are recrossing the Potomac to go back to 
 Virginia. But there is nothing certain about this. 
 
 It is impossible to describe the consternation which has pre- 
 vailed and which still prevails in Washington. And the alarm has 
 been equally great among the federal authorities. The roads are 
 blocked with wagons of the residents from the outskirts who 
 sought refuge in the city. The department offices are closed and 
 the clerks, organized into companies, are drilling on the public 
 square. The fear was so great that arms were supplied to a crowd 
 of government workers, tramps, and Negroes without considering 
 that these people might be altogether useless for defense purposes, 
 and that they would be the first to pillage the city on the approach 
 of the Confederates. 12 . . . 
 
 As the European press has probably been filled with exag- 
 gerated accounts about the invasion of Maryland and the siege of 
 Washington by the Confederates, I feel it my duty to give you 
 some details about this event and the military operations which 
 preceded it. 
 
 While Grant was crossing the James River to attack Richmond 
 on the South, General Sheridan with 7,000 or 8,000 horsemen was 
 advancing towards Lynchburg situated 60 miles to the southwest 
 of the Confederate Capital. General Hunter, who was in the Shen- 
 andoah Valley at the head of 20,000 men, received similar orders. 
 These two divisions were to meet at Lynchburg, a railroad center, 
 to cut communications and entirely isolate the Confederate army. 
 This expedition which promised such important results, failed 
 completely. 
 
 Within a few weeks the fearless young General Sheridan was to 
 launch his brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. His decisive 
 victories over General Early at Winchester (Sept. 19), Fisher's Hill 
 (Sept. 22), and Cedar Creek (Oct. 19) were to shut forever the 
 
238 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 dangerous "backdoor to the North." But now Stoeckl in reporting the 
 failure of the Lynchburg campaign, advised Prince Gortchakov: 
 
 Sheridan was forced to withdraw. Hunter advanced as far as 
 Lynchburg but did not succeed in taking it. It appears that lack of 
 munitions and provisions compelled him to withdraw before en- 
 gaging Confederate General Early, who had been sent after him 
 with a division of Lee's army. Instead of returning through the 
 Shenandoah Valley and protecting Washington, Hunter headed 
 towards the West and has not been heard from since. Early took 
 advantage of the mistake of his adversary and invaded Maryland by 
 forced marches up the Potomac. He then scattered his army to 
 launch attacks on several points at once and thus gave the impres- 
 sion that he was in command of considerable forces. The authorities 
 at Washington were in fact made to believe that the invasion force 
 was 40,000 to 50,000 men strong, while in reality it scarcely num- 
 bered 15,000. After threatening Baltimore, the Confederates ad- 
 vanced towards Washington, and besieged it for two days, in the 
 presence of an army of 30,000 men, of whom 20,000 were veteran 
 troops sent here by General Grant. 
 
 But what is most surprising is that the Confederates, after wan- 
 dering around Maryland for two weeks and destroying the rail- 
 roads and carrying off a considerable number of horses and cattle, 
 retired with all their booty to Virginia without even being hin- 
 dered in their withdrawal. 
 
 The success of this invasion by the Confederates is due to the 
 confusion which prevails in the councils of the federal authorities, 
 and to the insubordination and lack of skill of the military leaders. 
 The troops defending Washington were under the orders of two 
 generals each claiming to be in command, and neither wanting to 
 obey. General Hunter, who was the chief cause of this humiliating 
 invasion, is a politician. He has experienced nothing but reverses 
 wherever he has gone. But they kept him in the service and during 
 this campaign the President gave him an important command only 
 to please the radicals whose protege he is. Finally, General Wal- 
 lace, who commands at Baltimore, is only a lawyer of second rank. 
 They have just removed him from his command. 
 
 In the light of this, it is not surprising that Early, who is re- 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 239 
 
 ported to be a skilful general, succeeded so well in his bold enter- 
 prise. He counted on the ineptitude of his rivals and was not mis- 
 taken. 
 
 The reports which we have from the West are more favorable 
 to the Northern cause. General Sherman is only a few miles from 
 Atlanta, one of the most important cities of the South. Grant is 
 still occupied with the siege of Petersburg. 13 
 
 The people of the United States had become weary of the war. 
 Sagacious Party leaders, observing this discouragement in their own 
 neighborhoods, reported it to Party headquarters. Most of them agreed 
 that there was no chance of winning the election with Lincoln heading 
 the ticket. From one quarter after another came the suggestion of set- 
 ting aside Lincoln and inviting Grant to be a candidate. In the middle 
 of August, Thurlow Weed, shrewdest of the Republican Party man- 
 agers, told Lincoln point-blank that his chances for election were hope- 
 less. A few days later the distraught President received a similar re- 
 port from the central Republican Committee, through its Chairman, 
 Henry J. Raymond. 
 
 Lincoln, watching the straws in the wind all pointing toward defeat, 
 admitted that the only chance for his winning in November lay in the 
 occurrence before that time of a military success — one great enough 
 to convince the people that there was no cause to despair of the war. 
 
 In the meantime advocates of a peaceful adjustment of the conflict 
 were insisting that a commissioner be appointed with authority to 
 negotiate with representatives of the Confederacy for peace. Lincoln 
 replied to Horace Greeley, the noisiest of this group: "If you can find 
 any person, anywhere, professing to have authority from Jefferson 
 Davis, in writing, embracing the restoration of the Union and the 
 abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him that he 
 may come to me with you." 
 
 Lincoln authorized the patriotic but erratic editor to act as a com- 
 missioner. Greeley went to Niagara Falls to hold an interview with 
 two rebel emissaries, Clement C. Clay and Jacob Thompson, who had 
 served as Secretary of the Interior in the Cabinet of President Bu- 
 chanan. 
 
 It soon became apparent that Jefferson Davis' representatives had 
 no authority to negotiate for peace. They were interested only in such 
 
240 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 propositions as were consistent with the independence of the Con- 
 federacy. The failure of Greeley was most humiliating, and for a while 
 he was effectually silenced. 
 
 As the terrible summer of 1864 dragged to an end, the autumn began 
 with surprising good news. The black clouds over the North suddenly 
 disappeared when on September 2, General Sherman electrified the 
 Nation by telegraphing: "Atlanta is ours, and fairly won." Only a 
 few days before, Admiral Farragut had defeated the Confederates in 
 the dramatic naval battle of Mobile Bay. The victory closed the Gulf 
 port, tightened the blockade, and greatly increased the isolation of the 
 South from the outside world. 
 
 To Lincoln the news of these victories was as welcome as a day of 
 warm sunshine in a winter month. Almost overnight the despondency 
 of the North gave way to hope. There was now a chance for Lincoln's 
 re-election. 
 
 Although Sherman had captured the important city of Atlanta after 
 besieging it, both his position there and his future movements were by 
 no means safe because of his precarious line of communications. 
 Stoeckl, reporting this situation to his government, wrote: 
 
 General Sherman has advanced into Georgia and has occupied 
 Atlanta, but he has had to stop there since he is too far from his 
 base of operations. The Confederates, not being strong enough for 
 a frontal attack, came in from the rear and cut his communica- 
 tions. Sherman has had to withdraw, and according to the latest 
 reports, was in a very difficult position. 
 
 The same is true of General Sheridan who invaded Virginia 
 through the Shenandoah Valley. His communications have also 
 been cut and while he was almost one hundred miles to the south 
 of the Potomac, a thousand guerrillas crossed that river and came 
 within twenty-five miles of Washington. Sheridan was obliged to 
 withdraw. 
 
 General in Chief Grant came to Washington recently to consult 
 with the President and the Secretary of War. Until a short time 
 ago, he continued giving the most positive assurances that Rich- 
 mond, the Confederate Capital, would soon be in his power. But 
 it appears now that he no longer is so confident and according to 
 information I possess, it is doubtful that the federals will succeed 
 in entering Richmond before winter. 
 
It Is Thus Lincoln Wages War 241 
 
 At this moment a great naval expedition against Wilmington, the 
 principal port of North Carolina, is being prepared. It is a daring 
 enterprise, for according to reports, Wilmington is defended by 
 fortifications as strong as those that the federals found before 
 Charleston. Several people with whom I have discussed the mat- 
 ter, among others the Secretary of State, have admitted to me that 
 its success was doubtful. 
 
 Actually this expedition has no other aim than to appease public 
 opinion and especially to influence the presidential election. 14 
 
 The election campaign continued in an atmosphere of military ex- 
 citement. On November 6, two days before the people of the North 
 went to the polls, Stoeckl reported that the various campaigns of the 
 all-out drive against the Confederacy were not succeeding at all. Grant 
 had met with a setback before Petersburg and Richmond. Sherman was 
 threatened at the Tennessee border by General Beauregard, the new 
 Confederate commander of the Army of the West. And Missouri, de- 
 pleted of her troops who had been sent to re-enforce Grant and Sher- 
 man, was invaded by Southern guerrillas. 
 
 In spite of all the efforts which the administration is making to 
 conceal the true state of affairs from the public, these last defeats 
 have not failed to produce an unfavorable impression about the 
 party in power. However, Mr. Lincoln and his adherents are sure 
 of winning the forthcoming presidential election. 15 
 
 Democrats denounced the War Department for turning its power 
 into the service of Lincoln's re-election. They claimed that thousands 
 of Republican soldiers were furloughed to return to doubtful districts 
 and vote, while few Democrats were granted leaves. This caused the 
 Russian Minister to write: "If the vote were free, the chances would 
 certainly be in favor of General McClellan, but with the powers which 
 the government possesses, it will find the means of controlling the 
 election. Universal voting is as easily managed here as anywhere else." 16 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 
 
 The people of the loyal States went to the polls November 8, 1864, 
 to elect a President of the United States. Never before in history had a 
 nation, embroiled in a civil war and righting for its very life, risked a 
 national referendum. 
 
 Despite the opposition of the politicians to Lincoln, the people 
 demonstrated their confidence in his administration. Every loyal State 
 excepting only three — New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky — gave 
 him its electoral vote. In response to public congratulations, Lincoln 
 said: 
 
 I am thankful to God for this approval of the people. But while 
 deeply grateful for this mark of their confidence in me if I know 
 my own heart, my gratitude is free from any taint of personal tri- 
 umph. It is not in my nature to triumph over anyone; but I give 
 thanks to Almighty God for this evidence of the people's resolu- 
 tion to stand by free government and the rights of humanity. 
 
 Stoeckl, who had expressed amazement at the phenomena of a strife- 
 torn nation conducting a national election while fighting for survival, 
 could have found his answer in a little speech which Lincoln made to a 
 party which came to "serenade" him. The re-elected President said: 
 
 It has long been a grave question whether any government not 
 
 too strong for the liberties of its people can be strong enough to 
 
 242 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 243 
 
 maintain its existence in great emergencies. On this point the pres- 
 ent rebellion brought our government to a severe test, and a presi- 
 dential election occurring in regular course during the rebellion 
 added not a little to the strain. But we cannot have a free govern- 
 ment without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to 
 forego or postpone a national election it might fairly claim to have 
 already conquered and ruined us. But the election along with its 
 incidental strife has done good too. It has demonstrated that a 
 people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of 
 a great civil war. Until now it has not been known to the world 
 that this was a possibility. But the rebellion continues, and now 
 that the election is over may not all have a common interest to re- 
 unite in a common effort to save our common country? 
 
 The people's mandate was clear: the war should be fought to the end. 
 
 Now the attention of the entire nation was focused on Sherman's 
 invasion of the South. He had been unable to maintain his line of com- 
 munications, and rumors were being spread that his army, surrounded 
 and starved, was in danger of capture. As Stoeckl wrote: 
 
 Public anxiety is all the greater because since the advance of 
 Sherman already twenty-two days ago, there is very little news of 
 this expedition. The Richmond newspapers which we receive here 
 fairly regularly have decided to remain silent on the movements 
 of the invading army. The federal government on its part is also 
 silent. The Secretary of State told me that all was going well, and 
 that there was no apprehension about the result of this campaign. 
 About twenty transports loaded with provisions and munitions 
 are cruising along the coast of Georgia and South Carolina ready 
 to help Sherman as soon as he arrives on the Atlantic Coast. 1 
 
 By the middle of December the Russian Minister was able to report 
 to his government that the suspense over Sherman was relieved. In fact, 
 the entire military situation had taken a favorable turn for the federals. 
 
 General Sherman, who left Atlanta to cross Georgia, reached 
 the Atlantic coast and got into communication with the fleet sta- 
 tioned along the Georgia coast. In a report that the government 
 has just received from him, he stated that he had surrounded 
 Savannah and that he did not doubt the early capture of that town. 
 
244 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 The loss of Savannah will be a heavy blow to the Confederates. 
 
 In the West, General Thomas, who was besieged at Nashville by 
 the Confederates under General Flood, after receiving reinforce- 
 ments attacked his enemy and forced him to withdraw, capturing 
 several thousand prisoners and thirty to forty cannons. The Con- 
 federate general will be compelled to abandon Tennessee again. 
 
 However, the people of the South do not seem to be discouraged. 
 Mr. Geoiffroy, the French Charge d'AfTaires, showed me a letter 
 from his Consul in Richmond dated the day before yesterday. He 
 said that the Confederates are prepared to defend themselves to 
 the last. He spoke also of their intention of arming the Negroes, 
 and added that the South is under no illusions about the impossibil- 
 ity of maintaining slavery. Their only goal is to separate from the 
 North. 2 
 
 At Christmas, General Sherman presented Lincoln with the city of 
 Savannah "as a Christmas gift." But there was great disappointment in 
 the failure to take Wilmington as well. In his last report for the year 
 1864, Stoeckl wrote: 
 
 According to the plan of operations drawn up by the federal 
 military leaders, the port of Wilmington was to be attacked and 
 taken at the same time as that of Savannah. They were all the more 
 sure of success since the preparations for this expedition have been 
 made on a gigantic scale. But the results have not been what the 
 government expected. 
 
 The port of Wilmington on the coast of North Carolina is of 
 great importance to the South. Ships can enter it from all sides 
 and for that reason it is difficult to blockade. It is to Wilmington 
 that the blockade-runners made in England have been going. It is 
 estimated that eight out of ten of these ships succeed in evading 
 the vigilance of the federal cruisers and enter the port. 
 
 The expedition for the attack on Wilmington was composed of 
 forty-eight armor-plated warships and forty transports, carrying 
 12,000 to 15,000 men. The land and sea forces simultaneously 
 attacked the fortifications, which defended the entry to the port, 
 but they met unexpected resistance. After a battle of two days the 
 fleet retired and the land troops were forced to re-embark. Admiral 
 Porter, commander of the fleet, and General Butler, leader of the 
 land troops, are accusing each other and are trying to shift the re- 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 245 
 
 sponsibility for this disaster to each other. The fleet has suffered 
 little damage but the land troops have had considerable losses. Of 
 the five or six thousand men who tried to capture the main Con- 
 federate fort, scarcely half succeeded in reaching the ships. Gen- 
 eral Butler has already returned to Fort Monroe. 
 
 The expedition was accompanied by an infernal machine or 
 torpedo of tremendous proportions. It was a ship loaded with 300 
 tons of powder. This invention which they believed would be a 
 new means of attack against the land fortifications, had been dis- 
 cussed for a long time in a secret committee of technicians. Some 
 among them held that at a distance of 400 meters the shock pro- 
 duced by the explosion of this machine would destroy the fort, and 
 even blow up its powder magazines. The ship was hauled onto the 
 beach at a distance of less than 400 meters. Nevertheless the ex- 
 plosion produced no effect. The Americans who had been so en- 
 thusiastic about the new invention were more upset by the failure 
 of their monster torpedo than by the lack of success of the expe- 
 dition. 3 
 
 It had become crystal clear to Lincoln that the issue between the 
 North and the South "could only be tried by war and decided by vic- 
 tory." But there were well-meaning advocates of peace conferences 
 who still insisted that the issue could be settled by mediation. They 
 begged Lincoln to be permitted to negotiate with commissioners of the 
 South. 
 
 Stoeckl observed, "We must believe that Mr. Lincoln is conscien- 
 tiously willing to make peace." 4 He overlooked no opportunity to 
 hasten the day of peace. Therefore, it was no surprise to the Russian 
 Minister to learn that 
 
 Mr. Lincoln has invited former President Pierce to Washington 
 and entrusted him with a mission of peace. I met Mr. Pierce in New 
 York two years ago and had a long conversation with him on the 
 affairs of the nation. He was then opposed to force and told me 
 that even the dissolution of the Union was preferable to civil war. 
 The high office which Mr. Pierce once occupied and his mod- 
 erate opinions made him most suitable to fulfill a mission of peace 
 between the two sections. Mr. Pierce has already been closely 
 associated with Jefferson Davis who, during the Pierce administra- 
 tion, occupied the post of Secretary of War. 5 
 
246 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Another would-be peacemaker was Francis P. Blair, a restless poli- 
 tician from Maryland, and father of Lincoln's Postmaster General. He 
 persuaded the President to grant him a permit "to go south and return." 
 In Richmond he held a confidential interview with Jefferson Davis. 
 Stoeckl reported to his government that he had learned from a "sure 
 source" that "Mr. Blair gave Jefferson Davis the assurance that if he 
 sent commissioners instructed to negotiate, Lincoln would receive them 
 officially." 6 
 
 Naively Blair proposed to the Confederate President that the Union 
 and Confederate armies cease fighting each other and unite to drive the 
 French out of Mexico. The rebel leader expressed willingness to appoint 
 and send, or to receive, agents "with a view to secure peace to the two 
 countries." Lincoln replied to Blair that he was ready to receive any 
 Southern agent who should be informally sent to him "with the view 
 of securing peace to the people of our one common country." Continu- 
 ing his report to the Czar, Stoeckl wrote: 
 
 Following this step, three Confederate delegates presented them- 
 selves under a flag of truce at the outposts of the federal army be- 
 fore Richmond and asked for permission to come to Washington. 
 These delegates were Alexander H. Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter and 
 John A. Campbell. All three had taken an active and important 
 part in public affairs. The first two served in Congress for twelve 
 and fifteen years, respectively, and the third was a Judge of the Su- 
 preme Court of the United States. 
 
 The President did not grant them permission to come to Wash- 
 ington, but ordered them to stop at Fort Monroe where he prom- 
 ised to go and meet them. He did, in fact, go with the Secretary of 
 State, and on February 3, had a conference with the commission- 
 ers of the South which lasted several hours. [It was held at Hamp- 
 ton Roads, on board the River Queen.] 
 
 The Secretary of State told me that the interview was one of 
 extreme cordiality; that they avoided making the least suggestion 
 which might offend, but they were unable to reach an agreement, 
 and the conference therefore came to nothing. 
 
 I managed to get some details from a senator, an intimate friend 
 of the President. He told me that the commissioners had first asked 
 for an armistice and for negotiations to be opened on the various 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 247 
 
 issues between the North and the South. Mr. Lincoln refused the 
 armistice, declaring that he could only deal on the basis of the 
 submission of the South and the reconstruction of the Union. The 
 commissioners did not accept his terms and they departed. 
 
 Another individual who also enjoys the confidence of the Presi- 
 dent assured me that the last word has not yet been spoken on the 
 subject, and that Lincoln continues to communicate with the Con- 
 federate authorities through General Grant and without the knowl- 
 edge of the Secretary of State. An article published yesterday in 
 the New York Tribune seems to confirm this assertion. It states 
 that it is absurd to believe that the President went in person to 
 Fortress Monroe simply to tell the insurgents that they had to lay 
 down their arms; that if nothing was settled, it was because the 
 question was too serious to be settled definitely by the commission- 
 ers and even by the President, chief of the state though he may be, 
 without consultation with their associates in power, and that the 
 conference might well be the prelude to an approaching peace. 
 
 I enclose the Tribune article. What makes it important is that 
 the Tribune is the leading newspaper of the Republican Party, and 
 that Mr. Greeley, its editor, has almost an unlimited influence over 
 the President. 
 
 It is possible that the President and some people of his immediate 
 circle may be sincere in the peaceful intentions which are imputed 
 to them, but I must admit that I find it hard to believe. So far I do 
 not see anything in these negotiations except the desire on the part 
 of the government to fix the responsibility of the continuation of 
 the war on its enemies, and to make the people bear with greater 
 patience and resignation the burden of taxes and of conscription. 
 I have no doubt at all that the secessionist leaders of Richmond 
 are acting with the same motives. 7 . . . 
 
 The South could not accept Mr. Lincoln's terms which were 
 tantamount to unconditional surrender. 8 
 
 With Jefferson Davis speaking of "the two countries," and unwilling 
 to accept anything less than the acknowledged independence of the 
 Confederacy; and with Lincoln reiterating the phrase, "our one com- 
 mon country," and insisting that there could be but one basis of nego- 
 tiation — Union and Emancipation — all attempts at peaceful mediation 
 
248 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 failed. He had exhausted all honorable means to secure peace. There 
 was nothing to do but to continue to fight it out. Sorrowfully Stoeckl 
 wrote, 
 
 The conference, which gave rise to so much hope, only went to 
 prove that the two sides were further apart than ever from reach- 
 ing an agreement and that a reconciliation was impossible. The 
 war will continue, and on both sides they are preparing for the 
 coming campaign which will be more bitter than ever. 9 
 
 Notwithstanding Lincoln's firm attitude, his unprecedented trip to 
 Fortress Monroe to negotiate with the commissioners of the Confed- 
 eracy gave rise to sensational rumors both in Washington and in Lon- 
 don. Blair's naive overture to Jefferson Davis, that the North and South 
 reconcile their domestic troubles through a restored Union and uniting 
 to fight the common enemies of America, caused gloomy forebodings 
 in London. A number of British leaders took it for granted that Eng- 
 land was the chosen enemy for this proposed foreign war. Lincoln, so 
 ran the rumors, was prepared to send armies into Mexico and Canada. 
 Stoeckl commented that today such a policy would be very popular 
 in the North, but that "Lincoln might change his mind tomorrow." 
 
 On the other hand, the rumors which were afloat in Washington were 
 to the effect that Lincoln was prepared to be "soft" with the South. 
 
 These reports produced real panic among the radicals who were 
 preparing to attack the President if he made the least concession 
 to the South. There already exists a marked coldness between the 
 President and the "ultras" of his Party who fear that Mr. Lincoln, 
 now that he is re-elected, will try to free himself from their in- 
 fluence. Recently I had the opportunity of discussing this with 
 one of them. He said to me: "We did not re-elect Mr. Lincoln for 
 his ability, but only because he obeys the Party orders to the letter. 
 He must accept our views, whatever they may be, or we will find 
 the means to ruin him." In outlining these views, he said to me: 
 "We wish to subjugate the South completely and to reduce it to a 
 territory governed by the authority of the North." 
 
 Some of these radicals go even further. They wish to exile all 
 the inhabitants of the South and to populate its vast territory with 
 immigrants from the North. 
 
 These dissensions, threatening discord in the ruling Party, and 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 249 
 
 creating serious financial troubles despite the vast resources of the 
 North, are not very favorable indications. The conquest of the 
 South, which may probably be achieved, could temporarily stop 
 the bloodshed, but it will not stop the progress of this revolution 
 which is undermining the foundations of the political and social 
 structure of the United States. The more I follow the conflicting 
 views the more the result seems to me uncertain and distant. 10 
 
 The Russian Minister continued to express doubt as to the outcome 
 of the Civil War even while Sherman was marching irresistibly 
 through the Southland, and Grant's iron hand lay heavily on the ram- 
 parts of Richmond. Clearly the Confederacy was crumbling. Its days 
 were numbered. The Russian Minister apprised St. Petersburg of the 
 North's capture of Fort Fisher and the closing of Wilmington to Con- 
 federate blockade-runners: 
 
 It is evident that the seceded States are almost exhausted, which 
 is hardly unexpected after such a long and bitter struggle. They 
 are short of men. The armies of the North, reinforced by the last 
 two conscriptions, must be at least up to 700,000 men. The Con- 
 federates have scarcely 200,000 to send against them. 
 
 But what is more serious for the South is that discord seems to 
 have broken out among the heads of the Confederation. It appears 
 that they are divided into two factions. One, led by Jefferson 
 Davis, wishes the immediate abolition of slavery and the continu- 
 ation of the war. They hope that by freeing their slaves, they will 
 win the favor of the foreign powers, especially France and Eng- 
 land, and will obtain, if not material aid, at least their moral sup- 
 port. The other faction wants slavery to continue and seems dis- 
 posed to return to the Union only on condition that the North will 
 permit them to retain a portion of their Negroes at least tempo- 
 rarily. The federal government will follow a wise course if it takes 
 these differences of opinion into consideration when it endeavors 
 to reconstruct the Union. The goal of restoration of the Union 
 would thus be more easily achieved in this way than by conquest. 
 Subjugation is not yet complete. When it does come about, the 
 North will find greater difficulties in winning obeisance of the 
 people of the South than it had in conquering them. 11 
 
 In the meanwhile Secretary Seward thought the time had come to 
 propose to the nations of Europe to withdraw their recognition of 
 
250 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Southern belligerent rights. In March, he suggested to Stoeckl that 
 Russia should take the lead in proposing this measure to England and 
 France. But the Russian Minister advised Prince Gortchakov not to 
 undertake this effort. In his opinion it would not meet with success. 12 
 
 Prince Gortchakov, ever eager for reconciliation between North and 
 South, favored a plan of mediation prepared by Constantine Catacazy, 
 affiliated with the Foreign Office. Catacazy, who had resided for a 
 number of years in the United States as Secretary of the Russian lega- 
 tion and who in 1869 was to succeed Stoeckl as the Czar's Ambassador 
 to Washington, felt that the time was most opportune to mediate the 
 conflict. Russia, he believed, as the warm friend of both the North and 
 the South, was the proper medium to bring the two together. Gort- 
 chakov was inclined to agree with Catacazy's suggestion. But he would 
 leave it wholly to Stoeckl's judgment and discretion to act upon the 
 proposal. But the Russian Minister declared that no mediation, friendly 
 or otherwise, could now end the bloodshed. The peace would have to 
 be achieved by the generals on the battlefields. 
 
 The second inauguration of Lincoln took place on March 4, 1865. It 
 was a raw and dismal day in the early hours, but it turned bright and 
 clear later when the sun burst through the clouds. The ceremonies were 
 held on a platform erected in front of the Capitol. Stoeckl sat in a sec- 
 tion reserved for the foreign diplomats, directly behind the seats of 
 the Supreme Court Justices. 
 
 As Lincoln stepped forward to take the oath of office, Stoeckl ob- 
 served how greatly the President had changed in appearance since his 
 first inaugural. Four years before he had appeared as a physical giant 
 from the prairies of Illinois. But four years of war, bloodshed, worry 
 and sleepless nights had taken their toll. Now he appeared haggard. His 
 shoulders stooped. The furrows on his face had deepened. His cheeks 
 were sunken. Great rings were under his eyes. 
 
 Then he spoke. Standing bareheaded under the March sky now 
 suffused with warm sunlight, he delivered his Second Inaugural Ad- 
 dress. It was a brief message — only a few noble, beautiful sentences 
 spoken in a clear, resolute voice. He spoke from the depths of his heart. 
 His message was a benediction and a plea — like the words of a prophet 
 bidding the people to complete the task God Almighty had put before 
 them, and to expiate their sins in humility. The closing words were 
 like a sacred poem, lofty in tone, majestic in grandeur: 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 251 
 
 dred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk and unril 
 every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be pa.d by anotn r 
 drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years Zl 
 
 SXTlX d -" The iudgments of the Lord « - -5 
 
 the work we are in; to bind up the nftion^S o r ^ 
 him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and Z 
 orphan-to do all which may achieve and cherish a just a"dTastin e 
 peace among ourselves, and with all nations. g 
 
 Following the inauguration Stoeckl observed: 
 
 Military operations have recently taken on extraordinary activ- 
 ity and everything seems to indicate that we are on the eve of 
 great event, The federal government has changed tactics Seal 
 of scattering its troops on a wide front in Confederate ttrSrt 
 it has massed them all on the Atlantic coast. The fall of heTom 
 of Savannah, Charleston and of Wilmington has faci itatecf the 
 transportation of provisions and munitions by sea 
 
 The principal objective of the campaign is Richmond. General 
 in Chief Grant, convinced of the impossibility of successfull^f 
 
 enS Sit which r ound -* 4S22£ 
 
 encircle it with all the forces at his command. 
 
 This plan of campaign has been put into execution by the differ- 
 ent divisions of the army. General Sherman, after resting his troo DS 
 n Savannah, left that city at the beginning of Februfry S 
 force of 7 o,ooo men headed straight for RicLond. Anolr om 
 pany of 30,000 to 35,000 men went to Newburn in North Carofina 
 and is also rushing towards Richmond. Finally, a thiTcolln or 
 about zo,ooo men under General Sheridan crLd West vZ n£ 
 and is advancing on Richmond from the west General X 
 awaiting the arrival of his lieutenants in ^opT^X 
 Richmond and the whole Confederate army. These various 2j 
 
252 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 corps combined total 250,000 to 275,000 men, including the troops 
 under Grant, who are presently besieging Richmond. 
 
 We have no accurate information as to the strength of the Con- 
 federate forces. They are estimated at approximately 130,000 to 
 1 50,000 men, of whom 70,000, commanded by General Lee, are de- 
 fending Richmond, and an almost equal number under General 
 Johnston are attempting to stop the march of Sherman. 
 
 Everything depends on this general. If the Confederates do not 
 succeed in stopping him, the government and what remains of 
 the army of the South will be forced to abandon Richmond and 
 to withdraw to the interior. The secessionists may be able to con- 
 tinue the struggle by waging a defensive action in the region of 
 the Blue Ridge Mountains. But the loss of Richmond will be a 
 serious blow to the cause of the South, whose people are already 
 utterly demoralized by the defeats which they have recently 
 suffered, especially by the loss of their ports which prevents them 
 from receiving aid from outside sources. 13 
 
 With Grant crushing Lee from the east, and Sheridan sweeping down 
 from the west and carrying everything before him, Richmond fell on 
 April 3. Within a few hours Stoeckl was writing a detailed report of 
 this great Northern victory to his superiors in St. Petersburg: 
 
 The fall of Richmond is one of the most important events of 
 the entire war. It has completely disorganized the military and civil 
 systems of the South. Jefferson Davis' government is in flight. The 
 armies of Confederate Generals Lee and Johnston may combine 
 and withdraw into the Blue Ridge Mountains of Virginia. But it 
 is unlikely that these troops will be able to resist the force of 300,- 
 000 men who will soon be surrounding them. In any event the 
 lack of provisions and arms will soon force them to give up. It is 
 rather improbable that the demoralized army, lacking food and 
 arms, can continue the resistance much longer. 14 . . . 
 
 The only region where the federals might still meet resistance 
 is in Texas. This State of tremendous size and bordering Mexico 
 is easier to defend than Virginia, and all attempts made by the 
 armies of the North to invade it have failed. In any event, this will 
 only be a sectional struggle. 
 
 The war to all intents and purposes may be considered at an 
 end. 15 
 
 
Now That Lincoln Has Been Re-elected 253 
 
 In the midst of composing this dispatch Stoeckl received the news 
 that "the Confederate army under Lee has surrendered to General 
 Grant." Lee, finding himself at Appomattox Court House, some seventy 
 miles west of Petersburg, surrounded and without hope of escape, 
 yielded to Grant's courteous invitation to surrender and spare further 
 slaughter. 
 
 Grant has given them the most honorable conditions. The 
 officers and soldiers, without exception, will be permitted to re- 
 turn home without trouble. The officers will be permitted to retain 
 their swords and personal belongings. General Grant acted with 
 commendable moderation. We hope it will set an example to the 
 politicians. 16 
 
 Stoeckl subsequently apprised St. Petersburg of General Johnston's 
 capitulation to General Sherman "on the same terms as General Lee": 
 
 This capitulation includes all the Confederate troops in all the 
 Southern States east of the Mississippi. Texas and a small part of 
 Arkansas are, therefore, all that remain of the Confederation. But 
 the federal officers stationed in the West are negotiating with Gen- 
 eral Kirby Smith, commander of the Confederate troops, and are 
 trying to persuade him to lay down his arms by offering him the 
 same conditions which were granted to the armies of the East. 
 
 The federal government considers the war definitely over and 
 has already taken measures to reduce the army to a strength of 
 100,000 or 150,000 men. 17 
 
 Now with the conflict ended, "the government is faced with the 
 tremendous problems of reconstruction." 18 The sudden climax took the 
 Russian Minister completely by surprise. It "has given the lie to all 
 predictions," he told Prince Gortchakov. He had predicted that the 
 war would continue until both North and South would drop from 
 sheer exhaustion: 
 
 Hardly three weeks ago, the President himself told me he was 
 hopeful that the war would be over by the end of the year. An 
 indication how little the government expected this turn of events 
 is the fact that they are still recruiting 300,000 men in the North, 
 who are due to replace the soldiers whose terms expire next 
 autumn. The fact is that the South was weaker than supposed. Four 
 years of all-out war has completely exhausted it. There were no 
 
254 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 more men to fill the gaps in the army caused by casualties and sick- 
 ness. The capture of the ports of Savannah, Charleston and Wil- 
 mington deprived the Confederates of arms, provisions and many 
 other necessities which, despite the blockade, had reached them in 
 great abundance from England. To this must be added the con- 
 flicts of opinion which broke out among the Southern States. 
 Some Governors, dissatisfied with Jefferson Davis, refused to 
 supply troops from their States. The Virginians, who supplied the 
 main body of troops which defended Richmond, seeing the indif- 
 ference of the other Southern States, were reluctant to go on fight- 
 ing and General Lee, a Virginian himself, had great difficulty in 
 persuading them to follow him after the fall of Richmond. 19 
 
 With the South "put down," Stoeckl again predicted that the "prob- 
 lems of governing a conquered people would be great and difficult." 20 
 
17 
 ® 
 
 Democracy Has Stood the Test 
 
 With the end of the Civil War, critics and enemies of democracy 
 throughout the world became cognizant of an amazing fact: American 
 democracy had undergone the convulsions of four years of the bitter- 
 est, bloodiest and costliest of civil wars and had weathered the storm 
 without much serious damage. Amid the exigencies of war, a free na- 
 tional election, with all its incidental strife, had been held according to 
 schedule. Though stern necessity had compelled Lincoln to assume 
 dictatorial powers unparalleled in the nation's history, the people had 
 been free to vote him out of office altogether. Faith in republican in- 
 stitutions not only remained intact but had actually grown stronger. 
 The Constitution of the United States, stretched and strained by the 
 exigencies of the war, immediately, with the ending of the national 
 crisis, could once more be invoked to protect the rights and liberties of 
 the citizen. 
 
 Stoeckl, in common with many other European observers, had be- 
 lieved democracy to be tottering and had predicted its certain fall. 
 America's rapidly developing power was in no way due to democracy, 
 he had believed. The source of her strength and prosperity lay in con- 
 federation, but the old Union was gone forever. The breach between 
 the North and South was irreparable, he had said. 
 
 He had constantly criticized the "inept leadership" of Lincoln, his 
 "vacillation," and his "lack of moral courage." How explain the tri- 
 umph of the federal government in the absence of strong leadership? 
 
 *55 
 
256 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 The Russian shrugged his shoulders and remarked that nothing is im- 
 possible for this extraordinary American people. Nothing is too diffi- 
 cult for them. If they lack strong leadership, they get along without it. 
 "All predictions fail when one has to do with a people Providence has 
 taken under his special protection." 1 
 
 Stoeckl had predicted that the inevitable failure of democracy in the 
 United States where it "operated under uniquely favorable conditions," 
 would contribute to its failure everywhere. Now he was ready to admit 
 that the triumph of democracy in the United States was a triumph for 
 democratic institutions everywhere. 
 
 All these things Baron de Stoeckl observed as he set about to answer 
 for the benefit of autocratic Russia the question: Has democracy stood 
 the test? Never an admirer of democracy, he nevertheless answered 
 honestly in the affirmative. Writing to Prince Gortchakov on that 
 fateful April 14, 1865, Stoeckl summarized the amazing outcome of 
 the American Civil War as follows: 
 
 The Civil War has been a succession of events which, like every- 
 thing that has happened to this exceptional people, has given the 
 lie to all predictions and calculations. 
 
 At the beginning, the rebellion of the Southern States caused 
 only slight anxiety. We could not imagine that a people of 4,000,- 
 000 could resist the 20,000,000 of the North. But we were surprised 
 later to see an army of 300,000 men not only capable of defending 
 the seceded States, but strong enough to threaten the very borders 
 of the North. 
 
 As late as last summer they were still fighting on the territory 
 of Pennsylvania and we were besieged in Washington. At that 
 time the public debt was rising above a billion dollars and the 
 paper money was only worth one-third of its normal value. We 
 despaired of reconstructing the Union, when suddenly and with- 
 out our being able to understand the reason, confidence began to 
 rise again. Bonds rose in value. The government recovered its 
 credit and raised enough money to meet the expenses of war which 
 were rising to two or three million dollars per day. Hundreds of 
 thousands of men flocked to reinforce the federal armies, and the 
 government became, stronger day by day. 
 
 Finally, the climax surprised everyone. It came suddenly — an 
 unexpected event. Richmond fell. General Lee, with the main 
 
Democracy Has Stood the Test 257 
 
 army of Virginia, was going down to defeat at the very moment 
 when the administration was making preparations to continue the 
 war through the next autumn. The Confederation was collapsing 
 from sheer exhaustion three weeks after the conference of the 
 commissioners of the South with Mr. Lincoln, who must have been 
 still rather uncertain about the final victory of his armies since he 
 was even then discussing the reconstruction of the Union on the 
 basis of a compromise. 
 
 I must say here that the war could have been ended sooner if the 
 government had been more skilful in using the vast resources that 
 it possessed. I shall not refer again to the intrigues of the men in 
 power, to their quarrels and their jealousies towards the generals. 
 I have mentioned that more than once in my reports. But if the 
 government was incompetent, the people proved themselves great. 
 Thanks to the sacrifices they were prepared to undergo, the insur- 
 rection was put down not by the skill of the men in authority, but 
 by an irresistible strength of the nation at large. 
 
 The struggle is over but it has created a new situation for the 
 institutions and even the everyday life of this country. "States 
 rights" have always been one of the foundations of the American 
 Constitution. Before the rebellion each State governed itself, but 
 during the last four years the federal government and Congress 
 have gradually extended their power and have managed to exercise 
 complete control over the internal affairs of the States. The people 
 have at all times been opposed to centralization in which they saw 
 peril to their liberties. They have yielded to it of late as a necessity 
 imposed by the war. But they will seek to regain these rights, and 
 it is to be feared that serious conflicts may result between the 
 federal government and the States. 
 
 Deciding the future of the emancipated Negroes will be a diffi- 
 cult problem to solve. What is to be done with the 4,000,000 col- 
 ored people in the midst of a population which in the North just as 
 much as in the South considers them an inferior race? Several plans 
 have been suggested to colonize them outside the country or to 
 resettle them in the West, but without any success. Now they have 
 suggested another plan. They want to force the Negroes to enter 
 contracts with the landed proprietors to work for a certain number 
 of years at wages. This plan may be good in theory, but it is too 
 similar to the system of the coolies which is in practice in some 
 
258 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 colonies. The substitution of the work of the coolies by that of the 
 Negroes in tropical countries has been a favorite topic for radical 
 philanthropists. But they have not shown any practical results. 
 Several hundred thousand Chinese and Italians have been taken 
 to Cuba. Nine-tenths have succumbed to the climate, to hard labor 
 and bad treatment on the part of the planters. Mortality among 
 the coolies is three or four times higher than among slaves. That is 
 quite natural, for the planter takes an interest in his slaves, but 
 masters do not bother about laborers hired only for a brief time. 
 
 The same thing will happen in America if the system which 
 they want to try is adopted. Slavery has been a problem for the 
 United States. The presence of freed Negroes will be troublesome 
 for them. The Negro will be tolerated only as long as he is useful 
 to the Americans who, like all Anglo-Saxons, are always ready to 
 speak piously about the rights of humanity, but are slow to put 
 them into practice. It is to be feared that the black race may suffer 
 the lot of the several million aborigines who formerly populated 
 the North American continent and of whom only a slight trace 
 remains. 
 
 The Civil War has thoroughly upset the financial system of the 
 United States. When Mr. Lincoln came into power, the federal 
 debt was gradually raised to $70,000,000, that is to say, $4,000,000 
 annual interest. Today it is officially up to two and one half billion, 
 but according to the information I have, a host of unforeseen items 
 will increase this figure to three and a half billion dollars, which 
 represents approximately $200,000,000 annual interest. Income in- 
 cludes $75,000,000 produced by customs and $250,000,000 coming 
 from taxes. Deducting therefrom the annual interest, there scarcely 
 remains $125,000,000 to supply the needs of the government. Now 
 the army alone, if it is reduced to 100,000 men, and that is the 
 minimum, will absorb this sum, for here the upkeep of a soldier is 
 estimated at more than $1,000 per year. The taxes which they have 
 imposed until now are already so heavy that it will be impossible 
 to increase them. It will, therefore, be necessary to reorganize the 
 financial system entirely. 
 
 But the most difficult trace of the rebellion to eradicate will be 
 the animosity of the South. This problem is worrying the people 
 more and more. We hope that common interests will gradually 
 cause the hatreds to disappear and persuade the people of the South 
 
Democracy Has Stood the Test 259 
 
 to form a new attachment for the Union. It is rather improbable. 
 These same interests existed before the uprising, yet they did not 
 prevent the rebellion from breaking out. 
 
 All the confederations which have existed have been based on 
 fragile foundations. This truism is particularly applicable to a 
 confederation like that of the United States which extends over 
 such a vast territory. The people of the North and those of the 
 South have grown increasingly apart in their customs and in their 
 habits. The same is true about California. That State remained 
 only half loyal to the Union. It made only small financial contribu- 
 tions but did not supply a single man during the entire war. 
 
 The animosities and jealousies of the various sections of the 
 Union do not date from the present. The uprising would have 
 broken out twenty years ago but for the skill and the moderation 
 of the men who then governed the country. Unfortunately, men 
 of that caliber are no longer found among the people whom uni- 
 versal suffrage, as practiced in the United States, has placed in 
 charge of affairs. In 1861 the uprising might have been prevented 
 if there had been in the administration and in Congress leaders like 
 Clay, Webster, Calhoun and so many others who have been the 
 glory of the American people. 
 
 The dangers which I indicate here for the nation loom for the 
 more or less distant future. Right now the American people must 
 recover their equilibrium. They have passed through one of the 
 greatest revolutions of a century replete with political convulsions, 
 and they have come out of it with their resources unexhausted, 
 their energy renewed through surmounting a thousand differences, 
 and the prestige of their power greater than ever. 2 
 
 Although American democracy had successfully passed the severe 
 test imposed by a cataclysmic civil war, Stoeckl's summary continued, 
 it had yet to face another political revolution — reconstruction. This 
 new formidable test would be met successfully, he predicted, only if 
 the United States would reform its political institutions. This meant 
 limiting the suffrage, keeping the demagogues out of power, and in- 
 ducing honest and conservative men to hold office. 
 
 He hoped that "the American people would demonstrate to the 
 world that democracy could be kept from developing into radicalism 
 and anarchy — a political phenomenon rare in the annals of republics." 
 
i6o Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 He realized that the American ship of state, so badly battered by 
 the storms of civil war, would have no easy sailing through the rocks 
 and shoals of reconstruction. The bitterness and hatreds engendered by 
 decades of sectional strife and the bloodshed of four years of fratricidal 
 conflict could not be quickly forgotten. 
 
 Notwithstanding this opinion of the Czar's Minister to Washington, 
 the St. Petersburg Journal in the fall of 1865 made this observation on 
 behalf of Russian officialdom: 
 
 The work of pacification goes on with that rapidity, that energy, 
 that practical good sense which the Americans ever bring to all 
 their undertakings. In both the North and South the people have 
 cast aside all bitterness, all desire for revenge and think only of re- 
 pairing the calamitous consequences of a fratricidal struggle. 3 
 
 Whereupon Stoeckl shrugged his shoulders and conceded that how- 
 ever stormy the revolution of reconstruction threatened to be, the 
 American people would not succumb to it any more than they had to 
 the Civil War. 4 For as he had said before, "One of the characteristics 
 of this nation is its confidence in itself, in its destiny, and in its belief 
 that 'the best government that God ever saw will last forever.' " 5 
 
18 
 
 ® 
 
 Russian Tributes to Lincoln 
 
 With a deep feeling of thankfulness that the Civil War with its blood- 
 shed and hardships was over, Abraham Lincoln turned to the task of 
 reconstructing the nation. But he was not destined to carry out his 
 plans. On the evening of April 15, 1865, in his box at Ford's Theater, 
 he met his death at the hands of the half-crazed actor, John Wilkes 
 Booth. 
 
 The dreadful news of the assassination of the Emancipator winged 
 its way across the country and throughout the world. It was received 
 in the North with incredulity and paralyzing shock which quickly 
 turned to rage and hysterical cries of vengeance. From all over the 
 world came expressions of sympathy and indignation. Mourning was 
 genuine among the masses of England, who had always opposed recog- 
 nition of the Confederacy. Both Houses of Parliament expressed "sor- 
 row and indignation." The French Senate and Chamber of Deputies, 
 imperialists and republicans alike, voted a joint resolution of sympathy, 
 and Emperor Napoleon sent a personal message of condolence to Mrs. 
 Lincoln. From Germany, Sweden, Norway — even from China, Japan 
 and Siam — came expressions of grief over the abhorred act of the 
 assassin. 
 
 In St. Petersburg, Czar Alexander II was in mourning over the death 
 of his twelve-year-old son and heir to the throne, the Czarevitch Nich- 
 olas, which occurred on April 24. But a note from Prince Gortchakov 
 expressed the condolences of the Emperor and his imperial Cabinet: 
 
 261 
 
262 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Scarcely has my August Master returned to his dominions, when 
 he orders me to testify to you his grief at this painful event. Tried 
 himself by a woeful loss which is also a cause of national mourning 
 for Russia, the Emperor joins me in the unanimous regrets which 
 encircle the memory of the eminent statesman, snatched away so 
 suddenly and in so terrible a manner from his noble career. 
 
 Stoeckl, despite his criticism of Lincoln as a statesman, had had 
 nothing but good will towards him as an individual. The President's 
 death, therefore, affected him deeply. Shortly afterwards, the Russian 
 Minister was advising his government that when Lincoln died some 
 Americans acted as though the world was coming to an end. But with 
 the new President — Andrew Johnson — at the helm, the American ship 
 of state was sailing on in proper order. 
 
 The curious parallelism that marked the history of Russia and the 
 United States during the mid-nineteenth century — their common fear 
 of England; each with a domestic insurrection to suppress; the libera- 
 tion of the serfs in Russia and the emancipation of the slaves in the 
 United States — was further extended by the strange coincidence that 
 Alexander the Liberator, like Lincoln the Emancipator, was destined 
 to meet death by assassination. 
 
 Just one year after the brutal murder of the American Emancipator, 
 the first of many subsequent attempts was made on the life of the Rus- 
 sian Czar Liberator. On April 16, 1866, as the Emperor was about to 
 enter his carriage in the Letny Gardens in St. Petersburg, a student 
 named Dimitri Karakozov raised his pistol to fire. This youth, member 
 of a band of nihilist fanatics, had been waiting long for this oppor- 
 tunity. But the shot was deflected by a liberated peasant, Ossip Komis- 
 sarov, who providentially chanced to be passing by and had stopped to 
 view his liberator, whom he had never seen before. As the would-be 
 assassin pulled the trigger, Komissarov lunged at him and struck the 
 pistol from his uplifted arm, causing the shot to go wild. 
 
 Karakozov was seized by the police and would have been lynched 
 by the infuriated crowd which quickly gathered, but for the remon- 
 strance of the Emperor. "Why did you try to kill me?" the monarch 
 asked the nihilist. "Because you have deceived us and given us an il- 
 lusory liberty and emancipation without land," was the sullen reply. 1 
 
 Komissarov, a journeyman capmaker by trade, became the hero of 
 the hour. The Czar pronounced him a noble. Honors and decorations 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 263 
 
 were showered on him by different sovereigns. Grateful countrymen 
 presented him with lands, houses, money and the freedom of their cities. 
 Karakozov, the twenty-four-year-old would-be assassin, was quickly 
 condemned to death by hanging. His sentence was carried out a little 
 more than a year after Mrs. Mary Surratt, George Atzerodt, David 
 Herold, and Lewis Powell — Booth's fellow conspirators — died on the 
 gallows for their participation in the conspiracy which took the life 
 of Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 At the news of Czar Alexander IPs providential escape from assassi- 
 nation, so soon after Lincoln's murder, U. S. Minister Clay hastened to 
 express to the Emperor the warm congratulations of the United States 
 government, and to assure him of the sincere respect, affection and 
 friendship of the American people. The Russian monarch replied that 
 he was deeply touched by this manifestation of friendship. "I trust 
 under Providence," he said, "that our mutual calamities will strengthen 
 our friendly relations and render them permanent." 2 
 
 In the meantime, the leaders of the Republican Party in Congress 
 concluded that something more solemn and tangible than a mere ex- 
 pression of congratulations was due to a nation that had been so sympa- 
 thetic to our cause during the dark hours of the Civil War. Accordingly 
 both Houses of Congress joined in a resolution authorizing the sending 
 of a special envoy in a naval vessel to Russia to convey in person to 
 His Imperial Majesty America's good will and congratulations to 
 "the twenty millions of serfs upon the providential escape from danger 
 of the Sovereign to whose head and heart they owe the blessings of 
 their freedom." 
 
 Gustavus Vasa Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, was selected 
 to head this delicate mission. The naval ironclad monitor Miantonomoh 
 was assigned to carry him and his party to Kronstadt. It was to be 
 accompanied by the side-wheel steamer Augusta. 3 It was a mission 
 unique in American history. 
 
 The Miantonomoh started from Newfoundland on June 5, 1866, 
 and arrived at Queenstown, Ireland, on June 16. Stops were also made 
 in England, France, Denmark and Finland. Everywhere the Americans 
 were cordially received. Great curiosity was manifested over the iron- 
 clad, "a strange vessel, with a strange figure and still stranger name." 
 
 In France, Fox had a private audience at the Tuileries with Emperor 
 Napoleon III. The conversation turned to his Mexican adventure. 
 "Mexico was in anarchy," the Emperor explained. "I desired only to 
 
264 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 establish a stable government, and thus prevent further expeditions; 
 and, now I am about to withdraw, I presume it will be overrun by 
 your people." 
 
 Fox assured the French Emperor that this was not the intention of 
 the United States. "We have an immense and valuable country that will 
 
 not be crowded until a hundred millions of people have settled in it 
 
 The war has developed our resources to such a degree that we feel no 
 anxiety in regard to it." 4 
 
 Later Fox had an interview with Prince Napoleon in the presence 
 of U. S. Minister John Bigelow. In the course of the conversation the 
 Prince admonished, "Do not be too friendly with Russia." To which 
 the navy official replied, "Russia and America have no rival interests. 
 Russia has always been friendly to America, and we reciprocate the 
 feeling." 
 
 "But you can stand alone," said the Prince. "You do not want 
 friends." 
 
 Fox answered, "When it was doubtful whether we should ever stand 
 again, at a time when the most powerful nations menaced us, Russia 
 felt and expressed her sympathy for us, and America will never forget 
 it." 
 
 "Russia is for herself alone," the French prince retorted. When Fox 
 remained silent, the subject was changed. 5 
 
 When the United States vessels finally came to anchor in the port of 
 Kronstadt in August, the Americans were warmly greeted by Rear 
 Admiral Lisovski. In the name of the Emperor he welcomed the mission 
 to Russia. 
 
 On August 8 Fox, accompanied by Minister Clay, formally presented 
 the Resolution of Congress to Czar Alexander II in Peterhof Palace. 
 Prince Gortchakov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had also become 
 Chancellor of the Empire, stood at the Emperor's right. After the for- 
 mal introductions, Fox read the following address in the English 
 language: 
 
 "Sire: The Resolution which I have the honor of presenting to 
 Your Imperial Majesty is the voice of a people whose millions of 
 lips speak from a single heart. 
 
 The many ties which have long bound together the great Em- 
 pire of the East, and the great Republic of the West, have been 
 multiplied and strengthened by the unwavering fidelity of the im- 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 265 
 
 perial government to our own, throughout its recent period of 
 convulsion. 
 
 The words of sympathy and friendship then addressed to the 
 government at Washington, by command of Your Imperial 
 Majesty, are fixed in the eternal remembrance of a grateful coun- 
 try. As one of the wide family of nations, we yield our willing 
 homage to that act of humanity which is especially referred to in 
 the Resolution of Congress. The peaceful edict of an enlightened 
 sovereign has consummated a triumph over an inherited barbarism, 
 which our western republic has only reached through long years 
 of bloodshed. 
 
 It is, therefore, with profound emotion that I offer to Your Im- 
 perial Majesty, to the emancipated subjects, and to all the people 
 of this vast realm, our heartfelt congratulations upon the prov- 
 idential escape from danger, which led to this spontaneous expres- 
 sion of regret for the attempt, and thankfulness for its merciful 
 arrest and failure. 
 
 The story of the peril from which a kind Providence has de- 
 livered Your Imperial Majesty brings with it the remembrance of 
 the mighty sorrow which so lately filled every loyal heart in our 
 own land at the sudden loss of our chief, our guide, our father. 
 
 We thank God that a grief like this was spared to our friends 
 and allies — the Russian people. 
 
 May the Father of all nations and all rulers protect, prolong, and 
 bless the life which He has so signally preserved, for the service of 
 the people to which it belongs, for the good of mankind, and for 
 the glory of His holy name!" 
 
 At the close, Mr. Fox handed to His Imperial Majesty the Joint Res- 
 olution of Congress. Accepting it, the Emperor replied to Mr. Fox's 
 address in Russian. His words were translated by Prince Gortchakov 
 into English, substantially as follows: 
 
 His Majesty said that he rejoices at the friendly relations exist- 
 ing between Russia and the United States, and he is pleased to see 
 that those relations are so well appreciated in America. He is con- 
 vinced that the national fraternity will be perpetual, and he, for 
 his part, will contribute all his efforts to sustain it, and to 
 strengthen the bonds. He is deeply sensible of the proofs of the 
 personal sympathy and affection of the American people, con- 
 
266 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 veyed in the Resolution of Congress, and he is grateful for them. 
 He desires to thank those who have come so great a distance to 
 bear these proofs to him, and he assures them of a warm welcome 
 to the soil of Russia. 
 
 His Majesty adds that the cordial reception given to his squad- 
 ron in the United States will never be effaced from his memory. 6 
 
 Later the Czar sent a formal note to President Johnson expressing 
 the appreciation of all Russia as well as of himself personally for the 
 testimonials of friendship conveyed by Mr. Fox. In addition, Gort- 
 chakov requested Stoeckl to say to the President that he regards the 
 mutual sympathy between the two countries to be 
 
 a consolatory fact in the face of the recent complications which 
 have just awakened in old Europe sentiments of hate, ambition, 
 rivalry, bloody struggles, appeals to force, so little in harmony 
 with the progress of humanity. . . . The seeds of mutual good will 
 and friendship sown between two great peoples, almost between 
 two continents, will bear fruit, become traditional, and inaugurate 
 between them relations founded on a real spirit of Christian civil- 
 
 These effusive declarations revived conjectures, both in Europe and 
 America, as to the existence or imminence of a full-dress Russian- 
 American alliance. 
 
 Before leaving Peterhof Palace, Fox paid his respects to Komissarov, 
 the liberated peasant who had saved the Czar's life. "I congratulate you, 
 in the name of the people of the United States, in having been chosen 
 by Divine Providence to save a life dear not only to Russia, but to the 
 civilized world," the American envoy told the hero of Russia. Later the 
 Americans were the Emperor's guests at the review of the Imperial 
 Guard. 
 
 The days and weeks that followed during the months of August and 
 September were crowded with an endless series of receptions, banquets 
 and balls given in honor of the American mission. A number of the 
 affairs were graced by the presence of the Emperor, the Empress and 
 the most important dignitaries of the imperial government. 
 
 There were exchange ' visits between the officers of the American 
 vessels and the Russian fleet. There were visits to the Kremlin in Mos- 
 cow, to palaces, cathedrals and historic places. There were entertain- 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 267 
 
 ments, parades, fireworks and demonstrations in the streets nearly 
 everywhere that the Americans went. And everywhere they were re- 
 ceived with enthusiastic shouts and cheers. The banquet halls, streets 
 and public buildings were decorated with shields bearing the portraits 
 of Washington, Lincoln and Johnson as well as of Czar Alexander II, 
 and the Stars and Stripes waved alongside of the Russian national em- 
 blem. 
 
 In Moscow, Fox, seeing the Russian and American flags flying side by 
 side, said: "If the hearts of the Americans present could be uncovered, 
 there would be found what I now behold, the flags of Russia and of 
 America intertwined. May these two flags in peaceful embrace be 
 thus united forever." 8 
 
 The cities of St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kronstadt and others be- 
 stowed honorary citizenship on Mr. Fox in elaborate and beautiful cer- 
 emonies. Merchants' associations and naval clubs bestowed honorary 
 memberships upon the American officers. 
 
 The invitations to the grand dinner given by the Kronstadt Naval 
 Club stated that the Russian officers desired "to express the sentiments 
 of friendship they bear toward the citizens of the United States, as well 
 as to show their appreciation of the warmth and heartiness of the re- 
 ception accorded to the Russian fleets in the cities of New York, 
 Washington, Boston and San Francisco." 
 
 Among the distinguished Russian naval officers who sang the praises 
 of the American mission at this affair were Vice Admiral Krabbe, Min- 
 ister of the Navy, and Rear Admirals Lisovski and Popov, commanders 
 of the Russian fleets which had visited America's Atlantic and Pacific 
 ports in 1863. 
 
 The Naval Club's desire "to show their appreciation of the warmth 
 and heartiness of the reception accorded to the Russian fleets in the 
 cities of New York, Washington, Boston and San Francisco," was sig- 
 nificant. 
 
 At all the receptions and banquets there were speeches by Russian 
 dignitaries. Not once did anyone claim that the purpose of the voyage 
 of the Russian naval squadrons to the harbors of the United States had 
 been to aid Lincoln's government against possible intervention by Eng- 
 land and France. Not once was there a reference to "sealed orders." On 
 the contrary the Czar himself and his spokesmen voiced only "appre- 
 ciation" and "gratitude" on their part for what the government and 
 the people of the United States had done on Russia's behalf. 
 
268 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Thus Vice Admiral Krabbe, who as chief of the Czar's Imperial 
 Navy had ordered Rear Admirals Lisovski and Popov to take their 
 fleets to New York and San Francisco Harbors, said at a farewell din- 
 ner in honor of the Fox American mission: "You remember, gentle- 
 men, with what attention and enthusiasm we followed the news of the 
 reception in America of Admirals Lisovski and Popov. At last Heaven 
 has allowed us to thank our dear guests personally for their hospital- 
 ity." 10 
 
 At the merchants' dinner at the Great Fair in Nizhni Novgorod on 
 the banks of the Volga, Mr. Schipov, president of the Fair, declared: 
 
 I thank our dear American visitors for the kind reception their 
 country gave our Russian naval officers. When Russia was ex- 
 periencing a dark hour, America showed her sympathy in unmis- 
 takable signs, and Kronstadt, St. Petersburg and Moscow have 
 been trying to return similar evidences of friendship. The friend- 
 ship of America has transformed more than one of the old enemies 
 of Russia into friends. The appearances alone of sympathy be- 
 tween Russia and America have sufficed to bring about such a re- 
 sult. 11 
 
 And at a grand banquet given by Prince Dolgoruki, the Governor 
 General of Moscow, the Russian official said in his address of welcome 
 to Fox and his associates: "The brilliant reception given by the United 
 States to the Russian squadron in 1863 and 1864 has left in Russian 
 hearts an ineffaceable remembrance of gratitude, and has drawn to- 
 gether still more closely, if possible, the ties of love and of sympathy 
 which unite the two nations." 12 
 
 If there was any truth at all to the legend which had grown up in 
 the United States that the Russian fleets had come to New York and 
 San Francisco Harbors with "sealed orders" to help the United States, 
 it received no substantiation whatsoever from Russia's own spokesmen. 
 At the numerous receptions and banquets, when words flowed in tor- 
 rents, the hosts could speak only of Russia's debt of gratitude to the 
 United States. 
 
 Addressing the guests at a banquet given by the aristocratic English 
 Club of St. Petersburg in honor of the United States deputation, Ad- 
 miral Lisovski said: 
 
 Allow me to tell you why success attended us when we were in 
 America. We found there a brilliant and friendly welcome pre- 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 269 
 
 pared for us. That welcome we owe to the words of Prince Gort- 
 chakov, who, as you all know, had refused at that time, in the most 
 unmistakable terms, to intervene in the Civil War in America, 
 leaving entirely to the glory, the strength, and the wisdom of the 
 United States government the care of ending the struggle as it 
 thought best. Such is the reason of the success, or of the founda- 
 tion of the success, which our expedition met with. In every cit- 
 izen we saw a friend, made by the words of Prince Gortchakov. 13 
 
 Notwithstanding the utter absence of any Russian claims of altruistic 
 motives for sending their fleet to the United States during the dark 
 hours of tne Civil War, members of the American mission persisted in 
 alluding to the aid and comfort which came to the North from the 
 visit. At one dinner Fox read a lengthy poem which Oliver Wendell 
 Holmes had written especially for the occasion. Typical of the ten 
 verses of the poem were these three: 
 
 Though watery deserts hold apart 
 The worlds of East and West, 
 Still beats the self-same human heart 
 In each proud nation's breast. 
 
 When darkness hid the stormy skies 
 In war's long winter night, 
 One ray still cheered our straining eyes, 
 The far-off Northern light. 
 
 A nation's love in tears and smiles 
 We bear across the sea; 
 O Neva of the hundred isles, 
 We moor our hearts in thee! 14 
 
 In a later poem Holmes added to the myth of Russo-American friend- 
 ship by singing panegyrically of the nation "who was our friend when 
 the world was our foe." 
 
 At all the affairs the Russian hosts were profuse in their praise of 
 Abraham Lincoln, the American martyr. Prince Gortchakov concluded 
 an address with "a few words of respect to the memory of President 
 Lincoln — that great citizen who sacrificed his life in the performance 
 of his duty." 15 At the great municipal banquet in Moscow, Prince 
 
270 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Stcherbatov, Mayor of Russia's ancient Capital, spoke eloquently of 
 Lincoln, the "untiring warrior for a sacred cause." He said: 
 
 With a loving interest do we follow each other's successes, with 
 mutual sympathy do we sustain each other in the hour of danger, 
 and we unite to praise the glorious names of the great men whom 
 Providence in mercy sends in the times of the great nations' trials. 
 The name of Lincoln is one of those illustrious names. Untiring 
 warrior for a sacred cause, he pressed forward, never losing sight 
 of his guiding star; and his death was the last tribute of his loyal 
 service to his country and to humanity. But the great immortal 
 idea did not perish with his life. Lincoln bequeathed the accom- 
 plishment of his work to his people, to his successor, and his last 
 will is now nearly fulfilled. 
 
 May God Almighty help you to reap the harvest of your glo- 
 rious labors and endeavors. May He strengthen the ties of the re- 
 vived Union of your great nation; may the American people, 
 blessed by peace, advance steadily onward to the realization of its 
 glorious historical calling, with its chosen leader at its head. 16 
 
 An elaborate and scholarly tribute to the memory of Abraham 
 Lincoln was read at the Moscow banquet by Basile Kokorev, a rich 
 banker. Following Prince Stcherbatov as a speaker at a Moscow ban- 
 quet, this influential Russian bracketed Lincoln with Columbus and 
 Washington as the three men who had had the most powerful impact 
 upon the New World: 
 
 Columbus discovered the New World, Washington founded its 
 civilization, and Lincoln gave equal rights to his countrymen by 
 abolishing slavery. Sentiments of thankfulness and gratitude at the 
 name of Lincoln, for what he did for the good of mankind, are 
 felt as a duty by every Russian. All the actions of Lincoln, as our 
 Mayor, Prince Stcherbatov, has observed, sprang from the force 
 of his character, from his steadfast aspiration toward the proposed 
 aim, in spite of every obstacle. When a youth in poor circum- 
 stances, in New Salem, Lincoln used to say: "Failures ought not 
 to deprive us of courage; on the contrary, they are the means of 
 exciting the activity of the brain." 
 
 After a most laudatory recital of Lincoln's rise to the presidency and 
 his conduct of the war, the Russian speaker concluded: 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 271 
 
 At the end of four years Lincoln was again elected President. 
 We may easily imagine the triumph of his people on this occasion, 
 when even in Russia there was an outbreak of universal jubilation 
 at the news. We all saw in this re-election the pledge of the tri- 
 umph of the Northern over the Southern States. 
 
 Rumors of threats, and of attempts made against the life of 
 Lincoln, produced the greatest sorrow in Russia. We feared for a 
 life not only indispensable for the New World, but precious for 
 all mankind. The gloomy apprehensions were not dispelled, when 
 our whole country was astounded by the shocking news that on 
 April 15, 1865 the traitorous hand of a murderer cut short the life 
 of him who called up to an independent life millions of slaves, who 
 during the whole war traveled without any guard, who received 
 everyone without announcement, who could have been killed at 
 any moment, but who was guarded by Providence for the ful- 
 filment of His decrees. But when the great deed of Lincoln's was 
 done, and mankind stretched out its hands to put the laurels of 
 merited glory upon his head, the Most High called him up to Him, 
 to receive a higher, heavenly reward. Men are not able to reward 
 the deeds of a life which was entirely devoted to acts of philan- 
 thropy and of truth. Only He who was crucified for the benefit 
 of mankind, the Almighty Son of God, can reward such deeds. 
 
 Then with the profoundest reverence let us lift our hands to 
 Heaven, and express our sincere gratitude, and the wish of an 
 eternal memory to the name of the friend of mankind, and the de- 
 fender of truth — Abraham Lincoln! 17 
 
 But of all of the Russian tributes to Abraham Lincoln, none was 
 more eloquent and sincere than the one voiced by Count Leo Tolstoi, 
 the social philosopher and great man of letters of czarist Russia, who, 
 though born in the higher circles of Muscovite aristocracy, spent a 
 lifetime battling for the rights of the peasants and the oppressed. It was 
 Tolstoi who in 1881 was to plead with Alexander III for mercy for the 
 assassins of the young Emperor's father, urging that they be exiled to 
 "some place in America." 
 
 Author of such great works as Anna Karenina, Kreutzer Sonata, Res- 
 urrection, and War and Peace, this onetime aristocrat and crusader for 
 human rights believed Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin to 
 be one of the world's great books because it represented art "issuing 
 
272 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 from love to God and man." He regarded William Lloyd Garrison as 
 "not only the liberator of slaves in America, but also the great prophet 
 of humanity." 18 
 
 To a newspaperman who interviewed him at his estate in Yasnaya, 
 Tolstoi related an amazing experience which revealed how the fame 
 of Lincoln had spread even among the primitive peoples of Asia. With 
 intense feeling he spoke of Lincoln's ever-deepening influence upon 
 mankind, exclaiming, "Of all the great national heroes and statesmen 
 of history, Lincoln is the only real giant." Yes, there were Alexander, 
 Frederick the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, Gladstone and Washington — 
 all outstanding figures in mankind's story. But "in greatness of charac- 
 ter, in depth of feeling and in a certain moral power," they "stand far 
 behind Lincoln." 
 
 Lincoln was a man of whom a nation has a right to be proud; he 
 was a Christ in miniature, a saint of humanity, whose name will 
 live thousands of years in the legends of future generations. We 
 are still too near to his greatness, and so can hardly appreciate his 
 divine power; but after a few centuries more our posterity will 
 find him considerably bigger than we do. His genius is still too 
 strong and too powerful for the common understanding, just as 
 the sun is too hot when its light beams directly on us. 
 
 If one would know the greatness of Lincoln one should listen to 
 the stories which are told about him in other parts of the world. I 
 have been in wild places, where one hears the name of America 
 uttered with such mystery as if it were some heaven or hell. I have 
 heard various tribes of barbarians discussing the New World, but 
 I heard this only in connection with the name of Lincoln. Lincoln 
 as the wonderful hero of America is known by the most primitive 
 nations of Asia. This may be illustrated through the following 
 incident: 
 
 Once while traveling in the Caucasus I happened to be the guest 
 of a Caucasian chief of the Circassians, who, living far away from 
 civilized life in the mountains, had but a fragmentary and childish 
 comprehension of the world and its history. The fingers of civi- 
 lization had never reached him nor his tribe, and all life beyond his 
 native valleys was a dark mystery. Being a Mussulman he was 
 naturally opposed to all ideas of progress and education. 
 
 I was received with the usual Oriental hospitality and after our 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 273 
 
 meal was asked by my host to tell him something of my life. Yield- 
 ing to his request, I began to tell him of my profession, of the de- 
 velopment of our industries and inventions and of the schools. He 
 listened to everything with indifference, but when I began to tell 
 about the great statesmen and great generals of the world he 
 seemed at once to become very much interested. 
 
 "Wait a moment," he interrupted, after I had talked a 
 few minutes. "I want all my neighbors and my sons to listen to 
 you. I will call them immediately." 
 
 He soon returned with a score of wild-looking riders and asked 
 me politely to continue. It was indeed a solemn moment when those 
 sons of the wilderness sat around me on the floor and gazed at me 
 as if hungering for knowledge. I spoke at first of our Czars and of 
 their victories; then I spoke of the foreign rulers and of some of 
 the greatest military leaders. My talk seemed to impress them 
 deeply. The story of Napoleon was so interesting to them that I 
 had to tell them every detail, as, for instance, how his hands 
 looked, how tall he was, who made his guns and pistols and the 
 color of his horse. It was very difficult to satisfy them and to meet 
 their point of view, but I did my best. When I declared that I had 
 finished my talk, my host, a gray-bearded, tall rider, rose, lifted 
 his hand and said very gravely: 
 
 "But you have not told us a syllable about the greatest general 
 and greatest ruler of the world. We want to know something 
 about him. He was a hero. He spoke with a voice of thunder; he 
 laughed like the sunrise and his deeds were strong as the rock and 
 as sweet as the fragrance of roses. The angels appeared to his 
 mother and predicted that the son whom she would conceive 
 would become the greatest the stars had ever seen. He was so great 
 that he even forgave the crimes of his greatest enemies and shook 
 brotherly hands with those who had plotted against his life. His 
 name was Lincoln and the country in which he lived is called 
 America, which is so far away that if a youth should journey to 
 reach it he would be an old man when he arrived. Tell us of that 
 man." 
 
 "Tell us, please, and we will present you with the best horse of 
 our stock," shouted the others. 
 
 I looked at them and saw their faces all aglow, while their eyes 
 were burning. I saw that those rude barbarians were really inter- 
 
274 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 ested in a man whose name and deeds had already become a 
 legend. I told them of Lincoln and his wisdom, of his home life 
 and youth. They asked me ten questions to one which I was able 
 to answer. They wanted to know all about his habits, his influence 
 upon the people and his physical strength. But they were very 
 astonished to hear that Lincoln made a sorry figure on a horse and 
 that he lived such a simple life. 
 
 "Tell us why he was killed," one of them said. 
 
 I had to tell everything. After all my knowledge of Lincoln was 
 exhausted they seemed to be satisfied. I can hardly forget the great 
 enthusiasm which they expressed in their wild thanks and the 
 desire to get a picture of the great American hero. I said that I 
 probably could secure one from my friend in the nearest town, 
 and this seemed to give them great pleasure. 
 
 The next morning when I left the chief a wonderful Arabian 
 horse was brought me as a present for my marvelous story, and 
 our farewell was very impressive. 
 
 One of the riders agreed to accompany me to the town, and get 
 the promised picture, which I was now bound to secure at any 
 price. I was successful in getting a large photograph from my 
 friend, and I handed it to the man with my greetings to his asso- 
 ciates. It was interesting to witness the gravity of his face and the 
 trembling of his hands when he received my present. He gazed 
 for several minutes silently, like one in a reverent prayer; his eyes 
 filled with tears. He was deeply touched and I asked him why he 
 became so sad. After pondering my question for a few moments he 
 replied: 
 
 "I am sad because I feel sorry that he had to die by the hand of 
 a villain. Don't you find, judging from his picture, that his eyes 
 are full of tears and that his lips are sad with a secret sorrow? " 
 
 Like all Orientals, he spoke in a poetical way and left me with 
 many deep bows. 
 
 This little incident proves how largely the name of Lincoln is 
 worshipped throughout the world and how legendary his person- 
 ality has become. 
 
 Now, why was Lincoln so great that he overshadows all other 
 national heroes? He really was not a great general like Napoleon 
 or Washington; he was not such a skilful statesman as Gladstone 
 or Frederick the Great; but his supremacy expresses itself alto- 
 
Russian Tributes to Lincoln 275 
 
 gether in his peculiar moral power and in the greatness of his 
 character. He had come through many hardships and much experi- 
 ence to the realization that the greatest human achievement is 
 love. He was what Beethoven was in music, Dante in poetry, 
 Raphael in painting, and Christ in the philosophy of life. He 
 aspired to be divine — and he was. 
 
 It is natural that before he reached his goal he had to walk the 
 highway of mistakes. But we find him, nevertheless, in every 
 tendency true to one main motive, and that was to benefit man- 
 kind. He was one who wanted to be great through his smallness. 
 If he had failed to become President, he would be, no doubt, just 
 as great as he is now, but only God could appreciate it. The judg- 
 ment of the world was right from the start. Sooner or later Lincoln 
 would have been seen to be a great man, even though he had never 
 been an American President. But it would have taken a great gen- 
 eration to place him where he belongs. 
 
 Lincoln died prematurely by the hand of the assassin, and 
 naturally we condemn the criminal from our viewpoint of justice. 
 But the question is, was his death not predestined by a divine wis- 
 dom, and was it not better for the nation and for his greatness that 
 he died just in that way and at that particular moment? We know 
 so little about that divine law which we call fate that no one can 
 answer. Christ had a presentiment of His death, and there are 
 indications that Lincoln also had strange dreams and presentiments 
 of something tragic. If that was really the fact, can we conceive 
 that human will could have prevented the outcome of the universal 
 or divine will? I doubt it. I doubt also that Lincoln could have 
 done more to prove his greatness than he did. I am convinced that 
 we are but instruments in the hands of an unknown power and 
 that we have to follow its bidding to the end. We have a certain 
 apparent independence, according to our moral character, wherein 
 we may benefit our fellows, but in all eternal and universal ques- 
 tions we follow blindly a divine predestination. According to that 
 eternal law the greatest of national heroes had to die, but an 
 immortal glory still shines on his deeds. 
 
 However, the highest heroism is that which is based on human- 
 ity, truth, justice and pity; all other forms are doomed to forget- 
 fulness. The greatness of Aristotle or Kant is insignificant compared 
 with the greatness of Buddha, Moses and Christ. The greatness of 
 
276 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Napoleon, Caesar or Washington is only moonlight by the sun of 
 Lincoln. His example is universal and will last thousands of years. 
 Washington was a typical American, Napoleon was a typical 
 Frenchman, but Lincoln was a humanitarian as broad as the world. 
 He was bigger than his country — bigger than all the Presidents 
 together. Why? Because he loved his enemies as himself and 
 because he was a universal individualist who wanted to see him- 
 self in the world — not the world in himself. He was great through 
 his simplicity and was noble through his charity. 
 
 Lincoln is a strong type of those who make for truth and justice, 
 for brotherhood and freedom. Love is the foundation of his life. 
 That is what makes him immortal and that is the quality of a giant. 
 I hope that his centenary birthday will create an impulse toward 
 righteousness among the nations. Lincoln lived and died a hero, 
 and as a great character he will live as long as the world lives. 
 May his life long bless humanity! 19 
 
19 
 
 ® 
 
 The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 
 
 A few months after the triumphant return to the United States of 
 *oxs mission to Russia, the long-pending negotiations for the sale of 
 Alaska came to a sudden climax. 
 
 At a strange midnight conference, the two incredible international 
 bedfellows, Russia and the United States, became close territorial 
 neighbors. How close, no one was to realize until the dawn of the 
 air age. 
 
 A world accustomed to seeing Russia add more and more land to her 
 domain until today she controls one-fifth of the earth's surface, may 
 well wonder at the motive which induced her to transfer to the United 
 States nearly 600,000 square miles of her territory for a trifling sum of 
 
 In the sale of Alaska-immensely rich in timber, fisheries, furs and 
 unsuspected mineral resources-Russia for the first and only time in 
 her history consented to the alienation of a vast area of her territory 
 by a peaceful cession. Why? } 
 
 Minister Clay reported that the general feeling among Russians 
 regarding the sale of Alaska to the United States was, "Well, we have 
 sold to you cheaply, but it's all in the family." In other words, it was 
 felt that the imperial government's unprecedented action was motivated 
 by altruistic friendship for this nation. This was largely a myth 
 
 Equally unwarranted was the popular belief in the United States that 
 we purchased that "dreary waste of glaciers, icebergs, white bears and 
 
 277 
 
278 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 walrus fit only for Esquimaux," because we were under some obligation 
 to Russia for her friendship during the Civil War. 
 
 True, the amity between the Great Autocracy and the Great Democ- 
 racy was partially responsible for the Alaskan deal. For example, Sen- 
 ator Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
 of the Senate, concluded his speech urging the ratification of the treaty 
 with this declaration: "Even if you doubt the value of these possessions, 
 the treaty is a sign of amity. It is a new expression of that entente 
 cordiale between the two powers which is a phenomenon of history." 
 
 But chiefly the transaction was actuated by other more compelling 
 reasons. Russia was anxious to get rid of her distant American pos- 
 session because it had become valueless to her and difficult to admin- 
 ister. She was in constant fear that Alaska might fall into the hands of 
 her hated enemy, Great Britain. She believed it advisable to strip for 
 the inevitable contest. So, inspired by hostility to England and amity 
 for the United States, plus $7,200,000 in gold, the imperial government 
 consented to sell the vast territory to the United States. 
 
 The Alaskan deal was an item of unfinished business inherited by 
 the Lincoln-Johnson administrations from their predecessors. As has 
 already been pointed out, during the Crimean War, when the Russians 
 were daily expecting the British Pacific fleet to seize Alaska, the Czar's 
 representatives attempted to forestall this anticipated seizure through a 
 fictitious sale of the territory to an American company. In case of a 
 British attack, the claim could then be made that American rather than 
 Russian territory was involved. The United States government refused 
 to become a party to this scheme. 1 
 
 During the Buchanan administration, Russian Minister Stoeckl was 
 sounded out on the possibility of his government ceding Alaska to the 
 United States. Senator William M. Gwin of California told the Czar's 
 envoy that Russia was too far away ever to do anything with this 
 territory. On the other hand the inhabitants of California and Wash- 
 ington Territory were vitally interested in Alaska's fisheries and fur 
 seals. The Senator thought that the United States government would 
 pay $5,000,000 for the possession. Later, Assistant Secretary of State 
 Appleton informed Stoeckl that the President was convinced that the 
 acquisition of Alaska would be advantageous to the people of our 
 Pacific coast, and that he was prepared to negotiate for its purchase. 
 From St. Petersburg, Prince Gortchakov replied that the offer was not 
 as high as his government might expect but that it merited consider- 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 279 
 
 ation. The Prince, therefore, instructed the Minister of Finance to 
 conduct an investigation and report back to him as a basis of action. 2 
 
 The report when finally submitted favored the sale of Alaska to the 
 United States. But by that time, Abraham Lincoln had become Presi- 
 dent, the nation was embroiled in a civil war, and action on Alaska 
 necessarily had to be deferred. However, in 1861, Russia and the United 
 States agreed to cooperate in establishing cable connections between 
 St. Petersburg and San Francisco by way of the Bering Sea and Siberia. 
 In his third annual message to Congress, Lincoln pointed out that 
 "Satisfactory arrangements have been made with the Emperor of Rus- 
 sia, which, it is believed, will result in effecting a continuous line of 
 telegraph through that empire from our Pacific coast." This new mani- 
 festation of amity between the two nations prompted our Minister, 
 Clay, to urge the Russian authorities to transfer to American interests 
 the privileges which the Russian-American Company had sublet to the 
 Hudson Bay Company. 
 
 On a steamer trip over the Atlantic in 1863, Clay met Robert J. 
 Walker, who had become a financial agent to Europe after serving as 
 Secretary of the Treasury in the Cabinet of President Polk. Walker 
 had acquired a reputation as "a life-long annexationist in favor of 
 annexation in any quarter." More than twenty years before the final 
 successful negotiations for the sale of Alaska to the United States, 
 Walker had suggested the acquisition of Russian America in a letter to 
 President Polk. On this trans- Atlantic trip in 1863, Walker told Clay 
 that Czar Nicholas had expressed willingness to give up Russian America 
 to the United States if we would move up our Pacific coast possessions 
 to 54 40' and thus take steps to shut British America from the Pacific. 3 
 
 "I impressed upon Walker the importance of the ownership of the 
 western coast of the Pacific in connection with the vast trade which 
 was springing up with China, Japan and the western islands," Clay re- 
 ported to Secretary Seward. 
 
 Walker became a most enthusiastic propagandist for the purchase of 
 Alaska. It was, therefore, not surprising that Stoeckl eventually hired 
 him as counsel for the Russian government to aid in "facilitating" the 
 transaction. 
 
 But the most influential of the proponents of the acquisition of Alaska 
 was Secretary Seward, "the greatest of all American expansionists." As 
 early as 1846, Seward declared that America's population was destined 
 "to roll its resistless waves to the icy barriers of the North, and to 
 
280 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 encounter oriental civilization on the shores of the Pacific." This 
 zealous believer in America's manifest destiny declared in a speech at 
 St. Paul in i860 that the outposts which Russia was building would yet 
 be the outposts of America. He saw in the acquisition of Alaska a 
 means of strengthening American influence in British Columbia and of 
 hastening political union of Canada and the United States. With 
 extraordinary foresight he predicted, "The Pacific Ocean with its coasts 
 and islands is destined to become in the future the great theater of the 
 world's affairs." 
 
 Seward found a strong ally in Senator Sumner, who also favored 
 acquiring Alaska, but not so much in a desire for territory as for "amity 
 with Russia" and a desire to "dismiss another European sovereign from 
 our continent." 4 
 
 Seward, Sumner and other American statesmen were watching with 
 deep concern the rapid progress of the British movement for the con- 
 solidation of the eastern provinces of British America. In March 1867, 
 the House of Representatives, without a dissenting vote, approved a 
 resolution from the Committee on Foreign Affairs expressing the solici- 
 tude of the United States concerning the proposed confederation of 
 the British-American provinces, and stating that such a measure would 
 probably increase the embarrassment already existing between the 
 United States and Great Britain. Some members of Congress declared 
 that a British confederation in Canada would inevitably drive the 
 United States into closer cooperation with Russia. 
 
 In the meantime inhabitants of Washington Territory had memorial- 
 ized the United States government to survey the fishing grounds in the 
 Bering Strait region and to use its best efforts to induce Russia to 
 permit American citizens to enter the ports and harbors of Alaska for 
 fuel, water and provisions, and to cure fish and repair vessels. In addi- 
 tion, Senator Cole of California presented a request of some California 
 citizens for a franchise to take the place of the Hudson Bay Company 
 to Russia's Minister in Washington. 
 
 Late in the autumn of 1866, when Stoeckl returned to St. Petersburg 
 on a visit, he presented all these matters to Prince Gortchakov. Stoeckl 
 had long considered Alaska to be a "breeder of trouble" with the 
 United States, and had thought that the sooner it was disposed of, the 
 better. 5 As far back as' 1857, he had concluded that by ceding Alaska 
 to the United States a serious blow could be inflicted against Great 
 Britain. He declared, "if the United States becomes master of our pos- 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 281 
 
 sessions, British Oregon (Columbia) will be cut off by the Americans 
 on the north and the south, and will escape with difficulty their aggres- 
 sions." 
 
 Gortchakov agreed with Stoeckl that it was extremely difficult to 
 govern the distant American possession. Then why not take a step 
 toward the expulsion from the Pacific of the British nation, whose 
 powers in the East Russia justly feared — especially when such a step 
 would secure the perpetual friendship of the powerful re-united Amer- 
 ican Republic? 
 
 Accordingly, Stoeckl was empowered, on his return to the United 
 States, to launch negotiations for a sale of Russian America. 
 
 Arriving in Washington in March 1867, the Russian Minister at once 
 informed Secretary Seward that the imperial government was ready to 
 sell Alaska. Seward was ready to buy. Stoeckl said the price would be 
 $10,000,000. Seward offered $5,000,000. A cable outlining this offer 
 was sent to St. Petersburg on March 15. Four days later came Prince 
 Gortchakov's reply to Stoeckl. The Russian Minister called on Secre- 
 tary Seward at his residence on the evening of March 29, 1867, just two 
 days after the adoption of the House of Representatives resolution 
 voicing concern over the British-American confederation, and advised 
 him that his government was prepared to compromise. The Secretary 
 of State decided to forego his whist game, and insisted that they get 
 down to business. A compromise figure of $7,200,000 was quickly 
 agreed upon — $7,000,000 for the cession, with the additional payment 
 of $200,000 to satisfy the claims of the Russian-American Company, a 
 trading concern. 
 
 The Russian Minister suggested that the formal treaty be prepared 
 the next day. But Seward exclaimed, "Why wait until tomorrow? Let 
 us make the treaty tonight." 
 
 Senator Sumner was quickly summoned. State Department clerks 
 were rounded up from their homes. Seward and Stoeckl worked all 
 night on the wording of the treaty. By 4 o'clock of the morning of 
 March 30, 1867 the document was ready. So only twelve hours after 
 the commencement of these final negotiations, the convention for the 
 transfer of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands from Russia to the United 
 States was duly signed and sealed. For the comparatively trifling sum 
 of $7,200,000 the United States was to add nearly 600,000 square miles 
 of territory to her possessions — 369,529,600 acres, to be exact, at about 
 two cents per acre. 
 
282 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Hardly was the ink on the treaty dry when it was presented to an 
 astonished Senate for approval. Spurred on by the persuasive Chairman 
 Sumner of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, who made the principal 
 address for ratification, the Senate promptly approved the convention 
 by a vote of 3 7 to 2 . 
 
 But there was a different reaction when the House began the con- 
 sideration of the bill for the appropriation of the funds necessary to 
 enable the President to fulfill the terms of the treaty. Some Congress- 
 men, bitterly hostile to President Johnson, refused to do anything that 
 would bring credit to his administration. 
 
 But in the main the opposition arose from a sincere belief that it was 
 inexpedient to appropriate money to purchase a territory that was 
 worthless, and from a conviction that the United States should not seek 
 the right to govern a horde of savages in a climate unfit for habitation 
 by civilized men. 6 
 
 Seward was ridiculed for attempting to purchase a God-forsaken 
 wasteland of "polar bear gardens, perpetual icebergs, eternally can- 
 nonading volcanoes and destructive hurricanes." Wits delighted in 
 referring to the region as "Seward's Folly" and "Walrussia." 
 
 Objections were also voiced because of the secrecy and mystery 
 which surrounded the transaction. Even Clay, our Minister at St. Peters- 
 burg, and a zealous advocate of our acquiring Alaska, wrote to Seward 
 that the "secrecy took me with a most agreeable surprise." However, 
 Clay congratulated the Secretary of State "upon this brilliant achieve- 
 ment, which adds so vast a territory to the Union. ... I regard it as 
 worth at least $50,000,000, and hereafter the wonder will be that we 
 got it at all." 7 
 
 It was intimated that we were under friendly obligations to Russia 
 for having offered us her fleet during the Civil War; and a story was 
 current that at least part of the purchase price for the "worthless" 
 Russian- American territory was in reality repayment to the Czar's gov- 
 ernment for expenses incurred in sending the fleet to American waters. 
 
 This caused Benjamin F. Butler, who opposed annexation of non- 
 contiguous territory, to declare: 
 
 If we are to pay for Russia's friendship this amount, I desire to 
 give her the $7,200,000 and let her keep Alaska. I have no doubt 
 that at any time within the last twenty years we could have had 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 283 
 
 Alaska for the asking, provided we would have taken it as a gift; 
 but no man, except one insane enough to buy the earthquakes of 
 St. Thomas and the icefields of Greenland, could be found to agree 
 on any terms for its acquisition to this country. 8 
 
 Manifest destiny was not to be silenced. One of its eloquent spokes- 
 men, Chairman Nathan P. Banks of the House Committee on Foreign 
 Affairs, pointed to the Aleutian Islands on the map and predicted that 
 the Aleutians would become "the drawbridge between America and 
 Asia," over which we could carry our institutions and laws to the East 
 as well as to the islands of the Pacific. 9 
 
 While Congress thus argued and wrangled, President Johnson, with 
 the consent of the Russian government, took possession of Alaska. The 
 formal transfer took place on October 1 8, 1 867 at Sitka, where appro- 
 priate ceremonies were held. United States troops, 250 in number, and 
 the Russian garrison were drawn up side by side facing a flagpole and 
 the open sea. "Present arms," sounded simultaneously in English and 
 Russian. The double-eagle emblem of Muscovy was lowered, and up 
 went the Stars and Stripes. Salutes were fired by both batteries, and 
 Alaska was formally a part of the United States of America. 
 
 Congress, convening in 1868, was confronted with a fait accompli. 
 The House of Representatives now had little choice. On July 14, 1868 
 it reluctantly approved the bill appropriating the funds due Russia 
 under the purchase agreement. Few if any of the congressmen and sen- 
 ators felt that the United States was getting an amazing bargain. "I 
 doubt," said Seward, "if there was any member of either house of Con- 
 gress who supposed the government had any other motive in the pur- 
 chase of Alaska than to recognize its obligation to the Czar." 10 
 
 From St. Petersburg, Clay wrote that Russians were expressing the 
 hope that the cession would lead ultimately to the expulsion of England 
 from the Pacific. 11 American advocates of manifest destiny, on their 
 part, saw in the acquisition of Alaska the first step in the occupation of 
 the whole North American continent. It was an entering wedge toward 
 the peaceful absorption of Canada. In fact, some now expected Great 
 Britain to tender her North American colonies to the United States. 
 What actually happened as a consequence of the acquisition of Alaska 
 by the United States was a stimulation of the determined Anglo- 
 Canadian policy of completing the scheme for the confederation of the 
 British colonies from sea to sea. The union of the provinces of Quebec, 
 
284 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 Ontario, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was the beginning of the 
 era of expansion and consolidation. From it sprang the great Dominion 
 of Canada of today. 
 
 Not all of the $7,200,000 Alaskan purchase price reached St. Peters- 
 burg. A portion was deposited in the Riggs Bank in Washington to the 
 credit of Baron de Stoeckl. 12 Rumors still persisted that part of the 
 purchase price was in reality a repayment by the United States of ex- 
 penses incurred by Russia in sending her fleet here. 
 
 Thus Charles Glover, President of the Riggs National Bank, remem- 
 bered that as a young employee of the bank in 1868, he was handed 
 two warrants upon the United States Treasury, with instructions to 
 place them in the bank safe. His recollection years later was that one 
 warrant was for $1,400,000, and the other for $5,800,000, and that the 
 warrants remained in the safe of the bank for a week, after which they 
 were sent to New York. The Glover account of the affair, in a con- 
 versation with Franklin K. Lane long after the event, was at consider- 
 able variance with other reports and only adds to the confusion which 
 marks the whole episode: 
 
 These warrants were the payment to Russia for the Territory 
 of Alaska. Why were there two warrants? I never knew until 
 some years later, when I learned the story from Senator Dawes, 
 who said that prior to the war, there had been some negotiations 
 between the United States and Russia for the purchase of Alaska, 
 and the price of $1,400,000 was agreed upon. In fact, this was the 
 amount that Russia asked for this great territory, which was re- 
 garded as nothing more than a barren field of ice. 
 
 During the war the matter lay dormant. We had more territory 
 than we could take care of. When England, however, began to 
 manifest her friendly disposition toward the Confederacy, and we 
 learned from Europe that England and France were carrying on 
 negotiations for the recognition of the Southern States, and pos- 
 sibly of some manifestation by their fleets against the blockade 
 which we had instituted (and which they claimed was not effec- 
 tive and merely a paper blockade), we looked about for a friend, 
 and Russia was the only European country upon whose friendship 
 we could rely. Thereupon Secretary Seward secured from Russia 
 a demonstration, in American ports, of Russian friendship. Her 
 ships of war sailed to both of our coasts, the Atlantic and the 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 285 
 
 Pacific, with the understanding that the expense of this demon- 
 stration should be met by the United States, out of the contingent 
 fund. It was to be a secret matter. 
 
 The war came to a close, and immediately thereafter Lincoln 
 was assassinated and the administration changed. It was no longer 
 possible to pay for the demonstration, secretly, under the excuse 
 of war, but a way was found for paying Russia through the pur- 
 chase of Alaska. The warrant for $1,400,000 was the warrant for 
 the purchase of Alaska, the warrant for $5,800,000 was for Russia's 
 expenses in her naval demonstration in our behalf, but history only 
 knows the fact that the United States paid $7,200,000 for this terri- 
 tory, which is now demonstrated to be one of the richest portions 
 of the earth in mineral deposits. 13 
 
 Had Lincoln and Seward actually made a secret arrangement to 
 repay the Czar's government as soon as convenient, for sending the 
 Russian fleet? Was the purchase of Alaska the manner in which Seward 
 undertook to fulfill America's obligation? Speculation regarding these 
 questions continued for many years. But the matter was never com- 
 pletely cleared up — least of all by statements like that of Glover which 
 consisted chiefly of boyhood recollections and hearsay. 
 
 But more ugly were the persistent rumors and charges that a part of 
 the Alaska purchase money was used by the Russian Minister in brib- 
 ing members of Congress to vote for the appropriation. 14 The Wor- 
 cester Spy published charges that Robert J. Walker and government 
 officials had received large sums from the appropriation. Reports 
 reached Washington that while the sum paid Russia was $7,200,000, 
 the draft transmitted abroad and cleared through London was only 
 $5,000,000. Speculation immediately arose as to what happened to the 
 remainder of $2,200,000. Nearly everyone connected in one manner or 
 another with the advocacy of the transaction or with facilitating the 
 passage of the appropriation bill, was suspect. Rumor put down Secre- 
 tary of State Seward with having received no less than $250,000. 
 General Nathan P. Banks, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
 Committee, who had zealously championed the bill, was credited with 
 the same amount. A number of other congressmen were on the list for 
 various sums. 15 
 
 Goaded on by the widespread publication of these scandalous reports, 
 the House of Representatives ordered a thorough investigation of the 
 
286 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 ugly charges of corruption. At the hearing before the House committee 
 on expenditures, Walker testified that he and his associate counsel, 
 Frederick P. Stanton, had received fees totaling $26,000 for services as 
 lobbyists for the Russian Minister, in promoting the passage of the 
 legislation. He also admitted that he had conferred with Senator Sum- 
 ner and Representatives Banks and Thaddeus Stevens about the matter, 
 and had written newspaper articles to accelerate public opinion in 
 favor of the appropriation. 16 
 
 The Russian Minister, he testified, had retained him early in May 
 1868, when hostility to the appropriation became evident in the House. 
 Stoeckl was fearful lest Congress adjourn without voting any appro- 
 priation. Not only was there powerful opposition from congressmen 
 motivated by partisan hostility toward President Johnson and from 
 those who believed Alaska to be a worthless wasteland, but there was 
 also an unexpected serious threat to block action on the bill by a group 
 who had become interested in the so-called Perkins claim. 17 
 
 Benjamin Perkins, a merchant of Boston, claimed that during the 
 Crimean War the Russian government had retained him through a 
 member of its Washington legation to procure one hundred fifty tons 
 of gunpowder and thirty-five thousand stands of arms for the Czar's 
 army. It was a verbal agreement, he asserted. After the end of the war, 
 when Russia refused to pay Perkins for his services, he filed suit in the 
 State courts of New York. The case was dismissed. Although Perkins 
 accepted $200 from the legation, he did not drop his claim for dam- 
 ages. The amount he asked was $300,000. His counsel offered to com- 
 promise for $130,000. But the imperial government refused to acknowl- 
 edge any obligation whatsoever. Perkins then petitioned Secretary of 
 State Cass and later Secretary Seward to intercede on his behalf. But 
 since pressing the claim against "a proud and impatient autocracy" 
 would involve the "impeachment, either of the veracity or the memory 
 of a minister accredited to this government, and whose relations to it 
 have always been of the most considerate and friendly character," they 
 refused to support the claim. 
 
 Perkins died. The matter was all but forgotten, when, years later, the 
 heirs of Perkins appeared before the congressional committees dealing 
 with the Alaska purchase measure, and appealed for justice. The claim 
 skyrocketed to the sum of $800,000. A stock company was organized 
 and interests in the claim were distributed to senators, congressmen, 
 lawyers, lobbyists and newspaper editors who enlisted in the agitation 
 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 287 
 
 to force the Russian government to pay. The Perkins lobbyists first at- 
 tempted to persuade the Senate to order $800,000 to be withheld from 
 the purchase price before the treaty was ratified. Failing there, they 
 turned to the House of Representatives, where they hoped to block the 
 appropriation bill until Russia would buy them off. 
 
 Thaddeus Stevens, powerful majority leader of the House and Chair- 
 man of the Committee on Appropriations, was among the first to cham- 
 pion the Perkins claim in the House of Representatives. This ruthless 
 and vindictive assailant of President Johnson paused long enough in his 
 efforts to drive the President from the White House to insist that the 
 Czar's government do justice to the widow of Benjamin Perkins by 
 paying the claim that had nearly tripled in amount since the deceased 
 claimant had first presented it to Stoeckl. However, Seward and Stoeckl 
 conferred with Stevens and succeeded in inducing him to disassociate 
 himself from the case. 
 
 But Benjamin F. Butler presented an amendment to the appropri- 
 ation bill providing that $500,000 be withheld from the $7,200,000 
 Alaska purchase price to satisfy obligations due from the Russian gov- 
 ernment. 18 Stoeckl was greatly worried. Fie wrote to St. Petersburg 
 that Butler was interested in the Perkins matter to the extent of $30,000; 
 and that other influential leaders were also financially motivated. He 
 asked for additional instructions. St. Petersburg replied that he should 
 insist on the full $7,200,000 payment. The two governments could then 
 in due course take up the Perkins claim. 19 Walker, Stoeckl's Washing- 
 ton lobbyist, thought the time would come when it would be necessary 
 "to manipulate some members of the committee." 20 
 
 On July 14, 1868 the bill carrying the appropriation was finally 
 passed. From St. Petersburg, U. S. Minister Clay wrote that he thought 
 that Stoeckl "had been roughly handled by the parties to the [Perkins] 
 claim." 21 
 
 Had congressmen been paid for their favorable votes? The investi- 
 gating committee could find no direct and conclusive evidence to 
 warrant taking action against any individual. Walker, though admitting 
 receipt of fees from Stoeckl to himself and associate counsel, emphat- 
 ically denied ever offering money to any member of Congress, or 
 having any personal knowledge of payment to any public official. 
 
 Secretary Seward appeared before the committee and declared that 
 he had no knowledge whatever of the use the Russian Minister made 
 of the $7,2oo,ooo. 22 Stoeckl was tendered an invitation to send a repre- 
 
288 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 sentative of the Russian legation to make a statement concerning the 
 subject. But to the committee's regret and disappointment, the Czar's 
 envoy declined the invitation. 23 
 
 The committee learned that of the $7,200,000 paid by the U. S. 
 Treasury to Stoeckl, $7,035,000 was sent abroad. The remainder of 
 $165,000 was deposited in the Riggs National Bank to the credit of the 
 Russian Minister. Of these funds, $26,000 was admittedly paid to 
 Walker and his associate counsel. The balance of $139,000 was with- 
 drawn in various amounts between August 1 and September 16, 1868. 
 A payment of $3,000 was traced to the brother of John W. Forney, 
 Secretary of the U. S. Senate till June 4, 1868, who was also publisher 
 of the Washington Chronicle and the Philadelphia Press, which gave 
 steady and strong editorial support for the acquisition of Russian 
 America. Another $1,000 payment was traced to a California news- 
 paperman. But what Stoeckl did with the balance of $135,000, the in- 
 vestigating committee was unable to ascertain. 24 
 
 The committee admitted in its report that the results of the investi- 
 gation were far from satisfactory. But nothing could be done without 
 proper evidence. 
 
 Years later, there was found among the papers left by President 
 Johnson, a strange memorandum in his own handwriting, which cast 
 an ominous light upon the mysterious Alaska affair. Less than four 
 months after the termination of his gruelling impeachment trial, Presi- 
 dent Johnson went out for a carriage ride with Secretary Seward. 
 They stopped under a grove of trees for "refreshments." While par- 
 taking of the cup that cheers, Seward began to go over the recent dead- 
 lock in the House of Representatives over the Alaska appropriation 
 bill and the suspicious actions of some of the congressmen. Russian 
 Minister Stoeckl, whose relations with the Secretary of State were very 
 intimate, had given him some sensational information of bribery con- 
 nected with the transaction. Amid the refreshments imbibed under the 
 shady trees on that early September day of 1868, Seward confided to 
 Johnson what Stoeckl had told him. On his return to the White House 
 the embittered President made a permanent record of this conversation 
 by pencilling the following memorandum on a sheet of note paper, 
 reproduced here verbatim: 
 
 On the 6th of Sept Sundy 1868 Mr. Seward and myself rode 
 out some seven or eight miles on the Road leading to Malsboro 
 
The Mystery of the Alaska Purchase 289 
 
 Md — near place called old fields, we drove out into a shady grove 
 of oak trees — While there taking some refreshment, in the current 
 of conversation on various subjects, the Secretary asked the ques- 
 tion if it had ever occurred to me how few members there were in 
 congress whose actions were entirely above and beyond pecuniary 
 influence. I replied that I had never attempted to reduce it to an 
 accurate calculation, but regretted to confess that there was a 
 much smaller number exempt than at one period of life I had sup- 
 posed them to be — He then stated you remember that the appro- 
 priation of the seven $ million for the payment of Alaska to the 
 Russia Govnt was hung up or brought to a dead lock in the H of 
 Reps — While the appropriation was thus delayed the Russian min- 
 ister stated to me that John W. Forney stated to him that he 
 needed $30,000 that he had lost $40,000, by a faithless friend and 
 that he wanted the $30,000 in gold — That there was no chance of 
 the appropriation passing the House of Reps without certain influ- 
 ence was brought to bear in its favor — The 30,000 was paid hence 
 the advocacy of the appropriation in the Chronicle — He also 
 stated that $20,000 was paid to R. J. Walker and F. P. Stanton for 
 their services — N. P. Banks chairman of the committee on foreign 
 relations $8000, and that the incorrup table Thaddeous Stevens re- 
 ceived as his "sop" the moderate sum of $10,000 — All these sums 
 were paid by the Russian minister directly and indirectly to the 
 respective parties to secure appropriation of money the Govnt had 
 stiputed to pay the Russian Govnt in solemn treaty which had 
 been ratified by both Govmts. — 
 
 Banks and Stevens was understood to be the counsel for a claim 
 against the Russian Govnt for Arms which had been furnished by 
 some of our citizens — known as the Perkins Claim — Hence a fee 
 for their influence in favor of the appropriation &c — Banks was 
 chairman of the Committee on foreign retions — 25 
 
 The "incorruptible Thaddeous" Stevens was a sick old man when 
 the appropriation bill was under consideration. He died on August 11, 
 a few days after Stoeckl began to withdraw the funds he had on deposit 
 in the Riggs Bank. Even if he were on the Russian's "pay-off" list, as 
 intimated, it was unlikely that he ever got his share. 26 
 
 President Johnson's memorandum of Seward's statement of suspected 
 recipients of Stoeckl's bounty is, of course, no proof that either Stevens 
 
290 Lincoln and the Russians 
 
 or Banks actually received a bribe from the Russian Minister. On the 
 other hand, if Seward was not certain of the facts, why did he make 
 the statement to President Johnson, and why did the latter make a 
 permanent record of it among his papers? These must remain among 
 the many unanswered questions involving the mystery of the Alaska 
 purchase. 
 
 Czar Alexander II was very pleased with Stoeckl's $7,200,000 deal, 
 and ordered Prince Gortchakov to reward the Minister to Washington 
 with a gift of 25,000 rubles. Stoeckl was disappointed. He felt that his 
 government should have been more liberal, considering that he ob- 
 tained $2,000,000 more for the cession than had been expected. 27 
 
 Trained in Russian diplomacy, which had few scruples against using 
 bribery as a means of achieving its ends, Stoeckl was nevertheless dis- 
 gusted over the corruption, shady dealing and dirty work that had to be 
 resorted to in order to get the bill approved. With his discreet bribes 
 he had contributed liberally to the fetid, unsavory atmosphere he com- 
 plained about. Nevertheless, as soon as the transaction was completed 
 he requested the Russian Foreign Office to take him away from Wash- 
 ington and send him to "any other post" in the world — anywhere that 
 he could forget the rough handling he had received from congressmen, 
 lobbyists, "mercenary editors" and others in connection with the 
 Alaskan transaction. 28 
 
 Stoeckl's wish was granted. In October 1868, he was replaced in 
 Washington by Constantine Catacazy, a wily, meddlesome intriguer 
 who was poorly balanced for diplomatic service. He quickly proved 
 himself offensive to the United States government, and his forced 
 recall began the rupture of the Russo-American entente cordiale of 
 Civil War days. 
 
 After a sojourn in the United States of more than a quarter of a cen- 
 tury, Edouard de Stoeckl who loved to be called "Baron" although he 
 possessed no title of nobility, 29 had failed utterly to gain a genuine 
 understanding of the American people and their democratic institutions. 
 Trained in the autocratic philosophy of Nicholas I, it was next to im- 
 possible for him to understand those who believed in the ideals of Lin- 
 coln. With the termination of his mission to Washington, he was free 
 to return to his beloved Russia, where — in the words of Lincoln — "they 
 make no pretense of loving liberty . . . where despotism can be taken 
 pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy." 
 
CHAPTER NOTES 
 
 All references identified by "S" refer to Edouard de StoeckVs diplomatic dispatches 
 to the Russian Foreign Office. They are known as ^Central Archive, Moscow, 
 Russia, Foreign Affairs, 49" and will be found in the Division of Manuscripts in 
 the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 
 
 All dates are according to the Western (New Style) calendar. During the period 
 covered by this book, the Russian (Old Style) calendar was twelve days behind 
 that of the West; thus their July 2 would be equivalent to our July 14. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 i. The Illinois Journal, Sept. 7, 1849 
 (original in Illinois State Historical So- 
 ciety, Springfield, 111.); Nicolay and 
 Hay, Complete Works of Abraham 
 Lincoln (12 vols.), Vol. 2, pp. 127-28. 
 
 2. H. M. Flint, Life of Stephen A. 
 Douglas, p. 49. 
 
 3. The Illinois Journal, Jan. 12, 1852. 
 
 4. Paul M. Angle, New Letters and 
 Tapers of Lincoln (1930), pp. 81-83. 
 
 5. Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, 
 The Prairie Years, Vol. 2, p. 71. 
 
 6. Letter to Joshua Speed, Aug. 24, 
 1855. Nicolay and Hay, Vol. 2, p. 287. 
 
 7. Frank A. Golder, Russian-American 
 Relations during the Crimean War. 
 American Historical Review, Vol. 31 
 (1925-26), p. 464. 
 
 8. Golder, p. 465. 
 
 9. Archives of the Russian Foreign 
 Office, Washington, No. 544, Nov. 4, 
 1854; second date not given. From 
 Golder, p. 467. 
 
 10. Frank A. Golder, The Purchase of 
 Alaska. American Historical Review, 
 Vol. 25 (1919-20), p. 411. 
 
 James Morton Callahan, The Alaska 
 Purchase. West Virginia University 
 Studies in American History, Series I, 
 Nos. 1 and 2 (1908), p. 8. 
 
 11. Resolution favoring mediation, by 
 Thomas L. Clingman in the House of 
 Representatives, Dec. 11, 1854. Congres- 
 sional Globe, Vol. 30, p. 76. 
 Resolution of Charles Sumner in the 
 Senate, Dec. 21, 1854. Senate Journal, 
 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 63. 
 
 12. Archives of the Russian Foreign Of- 
 fice, Washington, Nos. 1370 and 1779, 
 
 July 14, 1855. From Golder, Russian- 
 American Relations, p. 472. 
 
 chapter 2 
 
 1. S., No. 60, Dec. 23, i860. 
 
 2. S., No. 60, Dec. 23, i860. 
 
 3. S., No. 146, Jan. 4, 1861. From Frank 
 A Golder, The American Civil War 
 Through the Eyes of a Russian Diplo- 
 mat. American Historical Review, Vol. 
 26, (1920-21), p. 456. 
 
 4. S., No. 1681, Aug. 27, 1856. From 
 Golder, p. 455. 
 
 5. S., No. 60, Dec. 23, i860. 
 
 6. S., No. 60, Dec. 23, i860. 
 
 7. S., No. 60, Dec. 23, i860. 
 
 8. S., No. 61, Dec. 31, i860. 
 
 9. S., No. 61, Dec. 31, i860. 
 10. S., No. 1, Jan. 15, 1861. 
 n. S., No. 2, Jan. 21, 1861. 
 
 12. S., No. 2, Jan. 21, 1861. 
 
 13. S., No. 2, Jan. 21, 1861. 
 
 14. S., No. 2, Jan. 21, 1861. 
 
 15. S., No. 62, Jan. 7, 1861. 
 
 16. S., No. 62, Jan. 7, 1861. 
 
 17. Gilbert A. Tracy, Uncollected Let- 
 ters of Abraham Lincoln, p. 171. 
 
 18. Nicolay and Hay, Vol. 6, pp. 78-79. 
 
 19. S., No. 5, Feb. 2, 1861. 
 
 20. S., No. 7, Feb. 12, 1861. 
 
 21. S., No. 10, Feb. 18, 1861. 
 
 22. S., No. 11, Feb. 28, 1861. 
 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
 i. S., No. 3, Jan. 21, 1861. 
 
 2. S., No. 11, Feb. 25, 1861. 
 
 3. S., No. 10, Feb. 18, 1861. 
 
 4. S., No. 11, Feb. 25, 1861. 
 
 5. E. D. Adams, Great Britain and the 
 American Civil War (2 vols., 1925), 
 Vol. 1, pp. 1 15-7. 
 
 291 
 
292 
 
 Chapter Notes 
 
 6. S., No. 11, Feb. 25, 1861. 
 
 7. S., No. 11, Feb. 25, 1861. 
 
 8. S., No. 15, March 12, 1861. 
 
 9. S., No. 15, March 12, 1861. 
 
 10. S., No. 15, March 12, 1861. 
 
 11. S., No. 15, March 12, 1861. 
 
 12. S., No. 18, March 25, 1861. 
 
 13. S., No. 20, April 9, 1 86 1. 
 
 14. Frederick Bancroft, William H. 
 Seward, Vol. 2, p. 117. 
 
 15. S., No. 810, April 7, 1 861; Adams, 
 Vol. 1, p. 54, note 1. 
 
 16. S., No. 20, April 9, 1 86 1. 
 
 17. S., No. 22, April 14, 1 86 1. 
 
 18. S., No. 26, April 15, 1861. 
 
 19. Bancroft, Vol. 2, p. 135. 
 
 20. S., No. 35, May 23, 1861. 
 
 21. S., No. 24, April 14, 1 86 1. 
 
 22. Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lin- 
 coin, A History, Vol. 3, pp. 445-47. 
 Frederick Bancroft, Seward's Proposi- 
 tion of April 1, 1 86 1 for a Foreign War 
 and a Dictatorship. Harper's Monthly, 
 Vol. 99 (1899), pp. 781-91. 
 
 23. Nicolay and Hay, Works, Vol. 5, 
 p. 280. 
 
 24. Bancroft, William H. Seward, Vol. 
 2, p. 135. 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
 i. S., No. 27, April 27, 1 861. 
 
 2. S., No. 27, April 27, 1861. 
 
 3. S., No. 30, May 6, 1861. 
 
 4. S., No. 30, May 6, 1861. 
 
 5. S., No. 32, May 13, 1861. 
 
 6. S., No. 33, May 13, 1861. 
 
 7. S., No. 35, May 23, 1861. 
 
 8. S., No. 39, June 3, 1861. 
 
 9. S., No. 46, July 3, 1861. 
 
 10. Richardson, Messages and Papers of 
 the Presidents, Vol. 6, pp. 15-16, 18, 19. 
 
 11. On Battle of Bull Run and its effect 
 upon the North, S., No. 50, July 21, 
 1861; No. 51, July 21, 1861; No. 52, 
 July 26, 1861; No. 53, Aug. 4, 1861. 
 
 12. The Confederate loss was: killed, 
 387; wounded, 1,582; missing, 13; total, 
 1,982. 
 
 13. S., No. 52, July 26, 1861. 
 
 14. S., No. 53, Aug. 4, 1 86 1. 
 
 15. S., No. 5s, Aug. 13, 1861; No. 57, 
 Sept. 9, 1 861; No. 62, Oct. 6, 1 861; No. 
 63, Oct. 21, 1861; No. 67, Nov. 5, 1861; 
 No. 71, Dec. 3, 1861. 
 
 16. S., No. 55, Aug. 13, 1861. 
 
 17. S., No. 63, Oct. 21, 1861. 
 
 18. S., No. 68, Nov. 18, 1861. 
 
 19. S., No. 71, Dec. 3, 1861. 
 
 20. S., No. 57, Sept. 9, 1861. 
 
 21. S., No. 57, Sept. 9, 1861. 
 
 chapter 5 
 
 1. S., No. 6, Jan. 4, i860. 
 
 2. S., April 14, 1861 (no number); 
 No. 24, April 14, 1861; No. 38, June 3, 
 1861. 
 
 3. S., No. 23, April 14, 1861. 
 
 4. S., No. 23, April 14, 1 861 
 
 5. S., No. 35, May 23, 1861. 
 
 6. S., No. 42, June 17, 1861. 
 
 7. S., No. 37, June 3, 1861. 
 
 8. S., No. 37, June 3, 1861. 
 
 9. S., No. 35, May 23, 1861. 
 
 10. S., No. 40, June 10, 1861. 
 
 11. S., No. 68, Nov. 18, 1861. 
 
 12. S., No. 68, Nov. 18, 1861. 
 
 13. Titian J. Coffee, Reminiscences of 
 Abraham Lincoln (edited by Allen 
 Thorndike Rice), p. 245. 
 
 14. French Foreign Office, Vol. 126, 
 No. 80, Jan. 14, 1862. Cited in F. L. 
 Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, pp. 
 
 217-23- 
 
 15. Adams, Great Britain and the Amer- 
 ican Civil War, Vol. 1, pp. 281-3. 
 
 16. S., No. 34, May 5, 1862. 
 
 17. S., No. 1776, Sept. 28, 1862. 
 
 18. S., No. 79, Nov. 17, 1862. 
 
 19. S., No. 2, Jan. 26, 1863. 
 
 20. S., No. 2, Jan. 26, 1863. 
 
 21. S., No. 4, Feb. 10, 1863. 
 
 22. Seward to Dayton, Feb. 6, 1863, in 
 Edward McPherson, The Political His- 
 tory of the United States During the 
 Great Rebellion, pp. 345-346. 
 
 23. S., No. 10, Feb. 24, 1863. 
 
 24. John T. Morse, Jr., Charles Sumner 
 (American Statesmen Series), p. 250-51. 
 The details of Sumner's resolutions will 
 be found in the Congressional Globe, 
 March 3, 1863, pp. 1497-1541. 
 
Chapter Notes 
 
 293 
 
 25. S., No. 12, March 2, 1863. 
 
 26. S., No. 17, March 10, 1863. 
 
 27. S., No. 14, March 2, 1863. 
 
 chapter 6 
 
 1. Lincoln Papers (Library of Con- 
 gress) : Telegram, Blair to Clay, March 
 27, 1 861; Mearns, Vol. 2, p. 493. 
 
 2. Lincoln Papers: Letter, Clay to Lin- 
 coln, March 28, 1861; Mearns, Vol. 2, 
 p. 495. 
 
 3. Rice, ed., Reminiscences of Abraham 
 Lincoln, pp. 299-300. 
 
 4. Henry Adams, Letters of Henry 
 Adams, p. 92. 
 
 5. Lincoln Papers: Clay to Lincoln, 
 May 11, 1861. 
 
 6. Lincoln Papers: No. 10024-5, Clay 
 to Seward, from Paris, May 22, 1861; 
 Mearns, Vol. 2, pp. 612-3. 
 
 7. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, p. 
 208. 
 
 8. Lincoln Papers: Clay to Seward, 
 May 22, 1861. 
 
 9. James R. Robertson, A Kentuckian 
 at the Court of the Tsars, p. 46. 
 
 10. Diplomatic Correspondence of the 
 U.S. in the Archives of the Department 
 of State, June 21, 1861. 
 
 11. Lincoln Papers: No. 12084-5, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from St. Petersburg, Sept. 
 27, 1861. 
 
 12. Lincoln Papers: No. 10880-4, Clay 
 to Lincoln, private, July 25, 1861. 
 
 chapter 7 
 
 1. Lincoln Papers: No. 14755-7, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from St. Petersburg, March 
 1, 1862. 
 
 Robertson, p. 104. 
 
 2. Nicolay and Hay, Complete Works, 
 Vol. 7, p. 79. 
 
 3. Nicolay and Hay, pp. 79-80. 
 
 4. Nicolay and Hay, pp. 80-81. 
 
 5. A. K. McClure, Abraham Lincoln 
 and Men of War Times, pp. 164, 165. 
 
 6. New York Herald, Jan. 17, 1862. 
 
 7. Clay to Seward, Dispatches, Russia, 
 Vol. 19, No. 22, April 13, 1862, in U.S. 
 Dept. of State Manuscripts, i860- 1869. 
 Washington. 
 
 8. Lincoln Papers: No. 16526-7, Clay 
 to Lincoln, June 17, 1862. 
 
 9. James M. Callahan, Russo-Amer- 
 ican Relations during the Civil War. 
 West Virginia University Studies in 
 American History, Series I, No. 1. 
 
 F. W. Seward, Life and Letters of Wil- 
 liam H. Seward, Vol. 3, p. 49. 
 
 10. John Bigelow, Retrospections of an 
 Active Life, Vol. 1, pp. 499-500. 
 
 11. Cameron to Seward, June 26, 1862, 
 Dispatches, Russia, in U.S. Dept. of 
 State Manuscripts, i860- 1869. Washing- 
 ton. 
 
 12. Lincoln Papers: No. 17632-3, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from Washington, Aug. 13, 
 1862. 
 
 13. Lincoln Papers: No. 18303-4, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from Washington, Sept. 9, 
 1862. 
 
 14. Quoted by Charles A. de Arnaud, 
 The Union and Its Ally Russia, p. 25, 
 Cincinnati Gazette, Aug. 19, 1862; 
 Thomas, p. 129. 
 
 15. Rice, Reminiscences, pp. 302-4. 
 
 16. Lincoln Papers: No. 18735-6, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from Washington, Sept. 29, 
 1862. 
 
 17. Lincoln Papers: Nos. 18733-4 ana " 
 191 22, Clay to Lincoln, from Washing- 
 ton, Sept. 29, 1862 and Oct. 21, 1862. 
 
 18. Lincoln Papers: No. 191 22, Clay to 
 Lincoln, from Washington, Oct. 21, 
 1862. 
 
 19. Lincoln Papers: Nos. 21987-8 and 
 21989-91, Clay to Lincoln, from Wash- 
 ington, Feb. 26, 1863. 
 
 20. Lincoln Papers: No. 22521-2, Clay 
 to Lincoln, from New York, March 19, 
 1863. 
 
 21. Lincoln Papers: No. 22780-3, Clay 
 to Lincoln, private, from New York, 
 April 2, 1863. 
 
 chapter 8 
 
 1. Susan Dallas (ed.), George Mifflin 
 Dallas Diary, p. 209. 
 
 2. Journal of St. Petersburg, Aug. 6, 
 1862. 
 
 Benjamin P. Thomas, Russo- American 
 
294 
 
 Chapter Notes 
 
 Relations, 1 815-1867. Johns Hopkins 
 Studies, Series 48 (1930), pp. 130-31. 
 
 3. S., No. 57, Sept. 9, 1861. 
 
 4. S., No. 57, Sept. 9, 1861. 
 
 5. Notes, Russia, Vol. 5, Gortchakov 
 to Stoeckl, Jan. 4, 1862; Thomas, p. 
 126. 
 
 6. S., No. 76, Feb. 24, 1862. 
 
 7. MS. Dispatches, Russia, Vol. 19, No. 
 16, Oct. 29, 1862. See Benjamin P. 
 Thomas, Russo-American Relations, 
 1815-67 (Johns Hopkins Studies, Ser. 
 48, 1930, p. 133). 
 
 8. Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lin- 
 coln, A History, Vol. 6, pp. 66-67. 
 
 9. Russian Archives, Foreign Office to 
 Stoeckl, Oct. 27, 1862 (Old Style); E. 
 D. Adams, Great Britain and the Amer- 
 ican Civil War, Vol. 2, pp. 60, 63. 
 
 10. Palmerston MS., Russell to Palmer- 
 ston, Oct. 20, 1862; Adams, Vol. 2, p. 54. 
 
 11. Taylor to Seward, Nov. 15, 1863. 
 Diplomatic Correspondence (1863-64), 
 Vol. 2, pp. 844-46, in U.S. Dept. of State 
 Manuscripts, i860- 1869. Washington. 
 
 12. James M. Callahan, The Diplomatic 
 History of the Southern Confederacy, 
 p. 95. (See McPherson) 
 
 Dispatches from U. S. Legation, Rus- 
 sia: Bayard Taylor to Seward, No. 30, 
 March 3, 1863 (encloses intercepted 
 communication of Judah P. Benjamin 
 to Lamar) ; 14 Instr. Russia, Seward to 
 Clay, No. 2, March 31, 1863. 
 
 13. S., No. 81, Dec. 1, 1862. 
 
 14. S., No. 82, Dec. 1, 1862. 
 
 15. S., No. 79, Nov. 17, 1862. 
 
 16. S., No. 81, Dec. 1, 1862. 
 
 17. S., No. 29, April 26, 1863. 
 
 18. S., No. 10, Feb. 24, 1863. 
 
 19. S., No. 10, Feb. 24, 1863. 
 
 20. Nicolay and Hay, Abraham Lincoln, 
 A History, Vol. 6, pp. 68-76. 
 
 21. MS. Instructions, Russia, Vol. 14, 
 No. 10, Dec. 23, 1862; Marie Hansen 
 Taylor and Horace E. Scudder (eds.), 
 Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor, Vol. 
 1, pp. 399-401; Diplomatic Correspond- 
 ence (1863-64), Vol. 2, pp. 851-52. 
 
 22. S., No. 10, Feb. 24, 1863. 
 
 23. Taylor, Vol. 1, pp. 401-3. 
 
 chapter 9 
 
 1. Diary of Gideon Welles (3 vols., 
 191 1), Vol. 1, p. 443. 
 
 2. Harper's Weekly, Vol. 7 (Nov. 21, 
 1863), p. 746. 
 
 3. Same. 
 
 4. Same. 
 
 5. Harper's Weekly, Vol. 7 (Oct. 17, 
 1863), pp. 661-62. 
 
 6. Same, p. 662. 
 
 7. Same, p. 661. 
 
 8. Harper's New Monthly Magazine, 
 Vol. 27 (1863), P- 848. 
 
 9. Welles, Diary, Vol. 1, pp. 480-81. 
 
 10. Tyler Dennett (ed.), John Hay 
 Diaries; Lincoln and the Civil War 
 (1939), p. 134. 
 
 11. Dennett, p. 128. 
 
 12. Earl S. Pomeroy, The Visit of the 
 Russian Fleet in 1863. New York State 
 Historical Assn., Vol. 24 (1943), pp. 
 512-7. 
 
 13. Benjamin F. Gilbert, Welcome to 
 the Czar's Fleet. California Historical 
 Society Quarterly, San Francisco (March 
 1947), pp. 13-19. 
 
 14. Frank A. Golder, The Russian Fleet 
 and the American Civil War. American 
 Historical Review, Vol. 20 (1914-15), 
 pp. 801-12. 
 
 15. Dennett, p. 137. 
 
 16. Schleiden MS; see G. B. Adams, 
 Great Britain and the American Civil 
 War, Vol. 1, p. 171. 
 
 17. Harper's Weekly, Vol. 7 (Oct. 17, 
 1863), p. 658. 
 
 18. Life of Thurlow Weed, Including 
 his Autobiography (2 vols., 1883-84), 
 Vol. 2, p. 346. 
 
 Horace Cutter, Russia and America. 
 Overland Monthly, 2d Ser., Vol. 20 
 (1892), pp. 311-3. 
 
 19. Weed, Vol. 2, p. 347. 
 
 20. Thomas L. Harris, The Trent Af- 
 fair (1896), pp. 208-10. 
 
 21. Thomas W. Balch, The Alabama 
 Arbitration, pp. 28-31. 
 
 What We Owe to Russia. New York 
 Evening Express, Sept. 1, 1874. 
 
Chapter Notes 
 
 295 
 
 CHAPTER IO 
 
 i. Paul M. Angle, New Letters and 
 Papers of Lincoln, pp. 81-82. 
 
 2. Nicolay and Hay, Complete Works, 
 Vol. 6, p. 315. 
 
 3. Seward to Dayton, May 11, 1863, 
 Messages and Documents, 38 Congress, 
 
 1 Session, Washington, 1864, pt. II, pp. 
 738-739, cited in Harold E. Blinn, 
 Seward and the Polish Rebellion of 
 1863. American Historical Review, Vol. 
 17, (1939-40), pp. 828-33. 
 
 4. W. Read West, Contemporary 
 French Opinion on the American Civil 
 War. Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in 
 Hist, and Polit. Sci., 1924. Quotation 
 from La Patrie, Jan. 12, 1864. 
 
 5. James R. Robertson, A Kentuckian 
 at the Court of the Tsars, pp. 149-50. 
 
 6. E. A. Adamov, Russia and the 
 United States at the Time of the Civil 
 War. Journal of Modern History, Vol. 
 
 2 (1930), pp. 586-611, esp. 603-7. 
 
 7. Frank A. Golder, The Russian Fleet 
 and the American Civil War. American 
 Historical Review, Vol. 20 (1914-15), 
 pp. 803-4. 
 
 8. Adamov, pp. 603-7. 
 
 9. Adamov, p. 597. 
 
 10. John T. Morse, Jr., Charles Sumner 
 (American Statesmen Series), p. 247. 
 
 11. MS Archives, Department of State: 
 Foreign Relations, 1863. 
 
 12. John Bigelow, Retrospections of an 
 Active Life, Vol. 1, p. 500, note 1. 
 Jordan and Pratt, Europe and the 
 American Civil War, p. 272. 
 
 13. Henry Clews, England and Russia 
 in our Civil War. North A?nerican Re- 
 view, Vol. 178 (1904), pp. 812-9. 
 
 14. Oscar S. Strauss, United States and 
 Russia. North American Review, Vol. 
 181 (1905), p. 243. 
 
 15. Golder, p. 812. 
 
 CHAPTER 11 
 
 1. Professor A. D. White, The Devel- 
 opment and Overthrow of the Russian 
 Serf System. Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 10 
 (1862), pp. 538-52. 
 
 2. According to the statistics of the 
 
 Russian Ministry of the Interior, there 
 were 22,558,748 serfs in Russia on Janu- 
 ary 1, 1 86 1, out of a total population 
 of 60,143,478. These included 21,976,232 
 who were the personal property of the 
 landowners, 541,962 who belonged to 
 proprietors of factories and shops, and 
 40,554 who belonged to various other 
 establishments. 
 
 3. Nathan Appleton, Russian Life and 
 Society, ps. 184, 195, 200; Atlantic 
 Monthly 8, pp. 39-57, July 1861; Atlan- 
 tic Monthly 10, pp. 538-552, November 
 1862. 
 
 4. S., No. 28, April 22, 1862. 
 
 5. Nicolay and Hay, Complete Works, 
 Vol. 8, p. 15. 
 
 CHAPTER 12 
 
 i. S., No. 2171, Dec. 1, 1862. 
 
 2. S., No. 69, Sept. 25, 1862. 
 
 3. Andrew D. White, Autobiography, 
 Vol. 2, pp. 28-29. 
 
 Also White, The Development and 
 Overthrow of the Russian Serf System. 
 Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 10 (1862), pp. 
 538-52. 
 
 4. Wharton Barker, The Secret of 
 Russian Friendship. The Independent, 
 Vol. 56 (March 24, 1904), 645-9. 
 
 5. Mr. Barker has written that during 
 this memorable audience with Czar 
 Alexander II on Aug. 17, 1879, the Rus- 
 sian Emperor also said to him: 
 
 In the autumn of 1862, the govern- 
 ments of France and Great Britain 
 proposed to Russia, in a formal, but 
 not in an official way, the joint rec- 
 ognition by European powers of the 
 independence of the Confederate 
 States of America. My immediate 
 answer was: "/ will not cooperate in 
 such action; and I will not acquiesce. 
 On the contrary, 1 shall accept the 
 recognition of the independence of 
 the Confederate States by France and 
 Great Britain as a casus belli for 
 Russia. And, in order that the govern- 
 ments of France and Great Britain 
 may understand that this is no idle 
 threat, I will send a Pacific fleet to 
 
296 
 
 Chapter Notes 
 
 San Francisco and an Atlantic fleet 
 to New York." Sealed orders to both 
 Admirals were given. My fleets ar- 
 rived at the American ports; there 
 was no recognition of the independ- 
 ence of the Confederate States by 
 Great Britain and France. The Amer- 
 ican rebellion was put down, and the 
 great American Republic continues. 
 All this I did because of love for my 
 own dear Russia, rather than for love 
 of the American Republic. I acted 
 thus because I understood that Russia 
 would have a more serious task to 
 perform if the American Republic, 
 with advanced industrial develop- 
 ment, were broken up and Great 
 Britain should be left in control of 
 most branches of modern industrial 
 development. The Independent, Vol. 
 $6 (1904), p. 648, 
 
 CHAPTER 13 
 
 i. William Roscoe Thayer, Life and 
 Letters of John Hay (2 vols., 191 5), 
 Vol. 1, pp. 196-7. 
 
 2. S., No. 55, July 22, 1862. 
 
 3. S., No. 57, Aug. 8, 1862. 
 
 4. S., No. 9, Feb. 24, 1862. 
 
 5. S., No. 9, Feb. 24, 1862; No. 15, 
 March 11, 1862; No. 18, March 17, 1862; 
 No. 19, March 28, 1862; No. 35, May 
 12, 1862. 
 
 6. S., No. 24, April 13, 1862. 
 
 7. S., No. 28, April 22, 1862. 
 
 8. S., No. 32, May 5, 1862. 
 
 9. S., No. 39, May 26, 1862. 
 
 10. S., No. 42, June 2, 1862. 
 
 11. S., No. 48, June 23, 1862. 
 
 12. S., No. 48, June 23, 1862. 
 
 13. S., No. 50, July 1, 1862. 
 
 14. S., No. 54, July 3, 1862. 
 
 15. S., No. 56, July 22, 1862. 
 
 16. S., No. 59, Aug. 8, 1862. 
 
 17. S., No. 63, Sept. 5, 1862; No. 64, 
 Sept. 9, 1862. 
 
 18. S., No. 6$, Sept. 9, 1862. 
 
 19. S., No. 64, Sept. 9, 1862. 
 
 20. S., No. 70, Sept. 25, 1862. 
 
 21. S., No. 75, Nov. 4, 1862. 
 
 22. S., No. 88, Dec. 16, 1862; No. 92, 
 Dec. 22, 1862. 
 
 23. S., No. 97, Jan. 5, 1863. 
 
 24. S., No. 3, Jan. 26, 1863. 
 
 25. S., No. 100, Jan. 12, 1863. 
 
 26. S., No. 1, Jan. 26, 1863. 
 
 27. S., No. 8, Feb. 16, 1863. 
 
 28. S., No. 18, March 10, 1863. 
 
 29. S., No. 13, March 2, 1863. 
 
 30. S., No. 19, March 24, 1863. 
 
 31. S., No. 18, March 10, 1863. 
 
 32. S., No. 5, Feb. 10, 1863. 
 
 33. S., No. 9, Feb. 24, 1863. 
 
 34. S., No. 19, March 24, 1863. 
 
 35. S., No. 23, April 7, 1863. 
 
 36. S., No. 27, April 13, 1863. 
 
 37. S., No. 31, April 26, 1863. 
 
 38. S., No. 27, April 13, 1863. 
 
 39. S., No. 31, April 26, 1863. 
 
 40. S., No. 33, May 4, 1863. 
 
 41. As officially reported, the Union 
 loss at Chancellorsville was 1,082 killed, 
 6,849 wounded, and 4,214 missing. In- 
 cluding the losses at Fredericksburg, 
 Marye's Heights and Salem Church the 
 Union loss in the entire campaign, April 
 27 to May 5, was 1,606 killed, 9,762 
 wounded, and 5,919 missing, an aggre- 
 gate of 17,287. The Confederate loss 
 during the campaign was 1,665 killed, 
 9,081 wounded, and 2,018 captured, an 
 aggregate of 12,764. 
 
 42. S., No. 35, May 11, 1863. 
 
 43. S., No. 43, June 2, 1863. Confederate 
 General Pemberton, defending Vicks- 
 burg, surrendered to Grant on July 4, 
 1863. Grant's losses in his entire Vicks- 
 burg campaign from April 30, including 
 Sherman's siege of Jackson, were 1,243 
 killed, 7,095 wounded, and 535 missing. 
 The exact Confederate losses are not 
 known but have been estimated at 40,- 
 000 men killed, wounded and captured. 
 
 44. Actually the force was under the 
 command of General Jackson, whose 
 army of 6,000 men was joined by Ewell 
 with 8,000 and Edward Johnson with 
 3,000 men. Ballard, The Military Genius 
 of Abraham Lincoln, pp. 85-86. 
 
 45. S., No. 44, June 16, 1863. 
 
 46. S., No. 48, June 22, 1863. 
 
Chapter Notes 
 
 297 
 
 47. S., No. 51, July 6, 1863. As officially 
 reported, the Union loss at Gettysburg 
 was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded, and 
 5,434 missing, an aggregate of 23,003. 
 The Confederate loss was 2,592 killed, 
 12,709 wounded, and 5,150 missing, an 
 aggregate of 20,451. 
 
 48. S., No. 53, July 14, 1863. 
 
 49. S., No. 53, July 14, 1863. 
 
 50. S., No. $5^ J ul y *4> l86 3- 
 
 51. S., No. 54, July 14, 1863. 
 
 52. S., No. 58, Aug. 2, 1863. 
 
 53. S., No. 61, Sept. 23, 1863. 
 
 54. S., No. 64, Sept. 23, 1863. 
 S5- S., No. 66, Nov. 7, 1863. 
 
 CHAPTER 14 
 
 i. S., No. 74, Dec. 4, 1863. 
 
 2. Frank A. Golder, The American 
 Civil War through the Eyes of a Rus- 
 sian Diplomat. American Historical Re- 
 view, Vol. 26 (1920-21), 457. 
 
 3. S., Feb. 12, 1862 (no number). 
 
 4. S., No. 74, Dec. 4, 1863. 
 
 5. S., No. 81, Dec. 31, 1863. 
 
 6. S., No. 9, Feb. 19, 1864. 
 
 7. S., No. 66, Nov. 7, 1863. 
 
 CHAPTER 15 
 
 i. S., No. 1900, Dec. 11, 1864. 
 
 2. S., No. 16, March 28, 1864. 
 
 3. Channing, History of the United 
 States, Vol. 6, p. 595. 
 
 4. S., No. 12, March 7, 1864. 
 
 5. S., No. 16, March 28, 1864. 
 
 6. S., No. 25, May 3, 1864. 
 
 7. S., No. 27, May 13, 1864. 
 
 8. Colin R. Ballard, The Military 
 Genius of Abraham Lincoln (1952), p. 
 
 237. 
 
 W. E. Woodward, Meet General Grant 
 
 (1928), pp. 202, 203. 
 
 T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and his 
 
 Generals (1952), p. 312. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Personal Memoirs (World, 
 
 1952), see "Strategy" in the index to 
 
 this edition. 
 
 9. S., No. 29, May 23, 1864. 
 
 10. S., No. 35, June 13, 1864. 
 
 11. S., No. 41, July 12, 1864. 
 
 12. S., No. 44, July 14, 1864. 
 
 13. S., No. 45, July 18, 1864. 
 
 14. S., No. {6, Oct. 17, 1864. 
 
 15. S., No. 59, Nov. 6, 1864. 
 
 16. S., No. 59, Nov. 6, 1864. 
 
 CHAPTER l6 
 
 1. S., No. 6$, Dec. 5, 1864. 
 
 2. S., No. 70, Dec. 19, 1864. 
 
 3. S., No. 76, Dec. 31, 1864. 
 
 4. S., No. 6, Jan. 24, 1865. 
 
 5. S., No. 6, Jan. 24, 1865. 
 
 6. S., No. 7, Feb. 7, 1865. 
 
 7. S., No. 7, Feb. 7, 1865. 
 
 8. S., No. 8, Feb. 13, 1865. 
 
 9. S., No. 8, Feb. 13, 1865. 
 
 10. S., No. 8, Feb. 13, 1865. 
 
 11. S., No. 3, Jan. 24, 1865. 
 
 12. S., No. 523, March 13, 1865. 
 
 13. S., No. 19, March 21, 1865. 
 
 14. S., No. 21, April 4, 1865. 
 
 15. S., No. 23, April 10, 1865. 
 
 16. S., No. 23, April 10, 1865. 
 
 17. S., No. 32, May 2, 1865. 
 
 18. S., No. 21, April 4, 1865. 
 
 19. S., No. 23, April 10, 1865. 
 
 20. S., No. 6, Jan. 24, 1865. 
 
 chapter 17 
 
 1. S., Aug. 15, 1867 (no number 
 given); Frank A. Golder, The Amer- 
 ican Civil War through the Eyes of a 
 Russian Diplomat. American Historical 
 Review, Vol. 26 (1920-21), p. 461. 
 
 2. S., No. 24, April 14, 1865. 
 
 3. Robertson, A Kentuckian at the 
 Court of the Tsars, p. 262. 
 
 4. S., No. 9, Feb. 28, 1866. 
 
 5. S., Jan. 24, 1865 (no number given) ; 
 Golder, p. 461. 
 
 chapter 18 
 
 1. J. F. Loubat (ed. by John D. 
 Champlin, Jr.) , Fox's Mission to Russia, 
 p. 11. 
 
 2. Robertson, A Kentuckian at the 
 Court of the Tsars, p. 194. 
 
 3. Loubat, pp. 10-21. 
 
 4. Same, pp. 44-45. 
 
 5. Same, pp. 46-47. 
 
 6. Same, pp. 88-90. 
 
298 
 
 Chapter Notes 
 
 7. Same, pp. 302-5. 
 
 8. Same, p. 233. 
 
 9. Same, p. 101. 
 
 10. Same, p. 378. 
 
 11. Same, p. 292. 
 
 12. Same, p. 233. 
 
 13. Same, pp. 356-57. 
 
 14. Same, pp. 180-81. 
 
 15. Same, p. 345. 
 
 16. Same, pp. 243-44. 
 
 17. Same, pp. 254-58. 
 
 18. Albert Parry, Tolstoi Looks at 
 America. Asia Magazine, Vol. 30 (1930), 
 pp. 772-77. 
 
 19. Tolstoi Holds Lincoln World's 
 Greatest Hero. Interview by Count S. 
 Stakelberg, New York World, Feb. 7, 
 1909. 
 
 CHAPTER 19 
 
 i. Frank A. Golder, The Purchase of 
 
 Alaska. American Historical Review, 
 Vol. 25 (1919-20), p. 412. 
 
 2. James M. Callahan, The Alaska 
 Purchase. West Virginia University 
 Studies in American History, Series I, 
 Nos. 1 and 2, p. 8. 
 
 3. Golder, pp. 415, 416. 
 
 4. Moorefield Storey, Charles Sumner, 
 
 P- 339- 
 
 5. Golder, pp. 413, 418. 
 
 6. Callahan, p. 23. 
 
 7. Russian Dispatches, Clay to Seward, 
 May 10, 1867; Callahan, p. 21. 
 
 8. Callahan, p. 23. 
 
 9. Congressional Globe, Vols. 40-42, 
 Appendix, pp. 386-88. 
 
 10. John Bigelow, in New York Sun, 
 Jan. 5, 1902. 
 
 11. Callahan, p. 21. 
 
 12. Robertson, p. 236. 
 
 13. Letters of Franklin Lane (Anne W. 
 Lane and Louise H. Wall, eds.), pp. 
 260-61. 
 
 14. William A. Dunning, Paying for 
 Alaska. Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
 27 (191 2), pp. 385-398. 
 
 15. Dunning, p. 392. 
 
 16. H. R. Rep. Fortieth Congress, Third 
 Session, No. 35, pp. 40-43; Dunning, p. 
 
 393- 
 
 17. For accounts of the Perkins claim, 
 see Robertson, Chapter 17; Golder, pp. 
 422-23; Dunning, pp. 390-91. 
 
 18. Dunning, p. 391. 
 
 19. Golder, p. 423. 
 
 20. Golder, p. 423. 
 
 21. Robertson, p. 207. 
 
 22. Dunning, pp. 395-96. 
 
 23. Dunning, p. 392. 
 
 24. Dunning, pp. 392-95. 
 
 25. Dunning, pp. 385-86. 
 
 26. Dunning, pp. 397-98. 
 
 27. Golder, p. 421. 
 
 28. Golder, p. 424. 
 
 29. In 1864 Stoeckl was made a privy 
 counselor but was granted no title of 
 nobility. See Hunter Miller, Russian 
 Opinion of the Cession of Alaska. 
 American Historical Review, Vol. 48 
 (1942-43), p. 521. 
 
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INDEX 
 
 Adamov, Professor E. A., 166 
 Adams, Charles Francis, Minister to 
 
 England, 88, 105, 107 
 Adams, Henry, 107, 180 
 Alaska, 277, 278, 280-290 
 Alexander I, Czar of Russia, 167-170 
 Alexander II, Czar of Russia, 13, 16, 
 108; description, 109, 124, 126, 137, 
 143, 144, 159; frees serfs, 167, 170- 
 172; on emancipation of American 
 slaves, 186, quoted by Wharton 
 Barker, 187-189; assassination at- 
 tempt on, 262, 263, 290 
 Alexander III, Czar of Russia, 271 
 American or Know-Nothing Party, 8 
 American-Russian relations during 
 
 Crimean War, 11-12 
 Anderson, Major Robert, 26, 28, 47 
 Appleton, John, 278 
 Austria, 5, 125, 158 
 
 Baker, Edward D., 4 
 
 Baltimore, Maryland, 61, 236, 238 
 
 Banks, General Nathan, 73, 74, 194, 
 230; on Alaska purchase, 283, 285, 
 286, 289 
 
 Barker, Wharton, on Alexander II and 
 emancipation, 186-189 
 
 Barnes, Thurlow Weed, 153 
 
 Bates, Edward, 21 
 
 Battles: Bull Run, 71-73, 75-76; Fred- 
 ericksburg, Chancellorsville, Chick- 
 amauga, 139, 140, 214; Fort Henry, 
 Fort Donelson, Nashville, New 
 Orleans, Shiloh, 192-193; second 
 Bull Run, 197; Antietam, 198; Fred- 
 ericksburg, 198, 199; Vicksburg, 
 200, 206-207, 213; Chancellorsville, 
 204, 205, 232; Gettysburg, 209-211; 
 the Wilderness, 232; Winchester, 
 Fisher's Hill, Cedar Creek, 237 
 
 Beauregard, General Pierre G. T., 52, 
 71, 72, 74, 241 
 
 Bell, John, 21 
 
 Bergh, Henry, 123, 149 
 
 Bigelow, John, quoted, 165 
 Blair, Francis P., 60, 66, 6j, 246 
 Blair, Attorney General Montgomery, 
 
 60, 66, 67 
 Bodisco, Alexander, 15 
 Booth, John Wilkes, 261 
 Boston, Massachusetts, 149, 267 
 Bragg, General Braxton, 214 
 Breckinridge, John C, 21 
 Brooks, Noah, 153 
 Brown, John, 19-20, 182 
 Buchanan, James, Minister to Russia, 
 18; President and Dred Scott de- 
 cision, 18, 19, 21, 34, 45-46, 117, 124 
 Burnside, General, 198, 109, 278 
 Butler, General Benjamin F., 232, 233, 
 244, 245, 282, 287 
 
 Calhoun, John, 5, 259 
 
 Calhoun, John C., 16, 24 
 
 California, 49 
 
 Cameron, Simon, Secretary of War, 
 21, 22, 105; appointed Minister to 
 Russia by Lincoln, 114-117, 118; re- 
 signs, 121, 124; on Emancipation 
 Proclamation, 181, 191, 195 
 
 Campbell, Justice John A., 246 
 
 Canada, 280 
 
 Cass, Lewis, Secretary of State, 286 
 
 Catacazy, Constantine, 250, 290 
 
 Catherine II, Empress, 169 
 
 Chad wick, Commander F. E., 155 
 
 Charleston, South Carolina, 27, 34, 47, 
 79, 200, 202, 214 
 
 Chartist movement, 3 
 
 Chase, Salmon P., 21; in Cabinet, 44, 
 66, 199, 220, 223; resigns, 226 
 
 Chattanooga, Tennessee, 214, 224, 228 
 
 Chicago Times, 147 
 
 Clay, Cassius Marcellus, Minister to 
 Russia, 59-60; description, 104-105; 
 106, 107, 108, no, in; writes to 
 Lincoln, 11 2-1 13; 114, 117; with- 
 draws resignation, 118, 119; desires 
 reappointment, 120; espouses eman- 
 
 305 
 
306 
 
 Index 
 
 cipation, 1 20-1 21; resigns as Major 
 General, 121; reappointed Minister 
 to Russia, 122; controversy with 
 Seward, 123; 124, 148, 149; refers to 
 Russian "alliance," 151; 155, 156, and 
 Polish question, 161; reports Rus- 
 sian gratitude over fleet reception, 
 164, 179; 264; on Alaska purchase, 
 277, 279, 282, 283; and the Perkins 
 claim, 287 
 
 Clay, Clement C, 239 
 
 Clay, Green, 119 
 
 Clay, Henry, 17, 259 
 
 Clews, Henry, quoted, 165, 166 
 
 Confederate States of America, 52, 56, 
 69, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 203, 224, 227, 
 246, 247, 249, 252 
 
 Crawford, Martin J., 50 
 
 Crimean War, 10-13, T 57> I ^ I » I 7°» 2 7% 
 
 Crittenden compromise, 32 
 
 Crittenden, Senator J. J., 27 
 
 Curtin, Andrew G., 155 
 
 Dallas, George Mifflin, 125 
 
 Davis, Judge David, 4 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, Secretary of War in 
 President Pierce's Cabinet, 11; Sen- 
 ator, 21, 33; President of Confeder- 
 ate States of America, 41-42, 52, 55, 
 60, 64, 69, 74, 87; letters of marque 
 and reprisal, 87-88, 94, 224, 227, 245, 
 and "two countries," 247, and 
 slavery, 249, government in flight, 
 252 
 
 Dayton, William L., Minister to 
 France, 100, 105, 157 
 
 Dolgoruki, Prince, 268 
 
 Douglas, Senator Stephen A., speech 
 on Russia's intervention in Hungar- 
 ian revolt, 5; senatorial campaign of 
 1858, 19; presidential candidate, 21, 
 
 45, 52 
 Dred Scott decision, 18, 19, 21 
 
 Early, General Jubal A., 237, 238 
 Emancipation Proclamation, 175-178; 
 
 changes course of war, 1 80-181 
 England, 87; declaration of neutrality, 
 
 88, 89, 92 
 Eugenie, Empress of France, 11 
 
 Everett, Edward, 21, 149 
 
 Ewell, General Richard S., 207-208 
 
 Farragut, Admiral David Glasgow, 
 154, 192 
 
 Ferguson, William I., 6 
 
 Forney, John W., 288 
 
 Forsyth, John, 50 
 
 Fort Fisher, 249 
 
 Fox, Gustavus Vasa, Assistant Secre- 
 tary of the Navy, 193; heads Rus- 
 sian mission, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 
 268, 269 
 
 France, 86, 87, 88, 92 
 
 Fremont, General John Charles, 79, 
 80, 81, 82, 173; presidential candi- 
 date, 234 
 
 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 8, 182, 216 
 
 Garrison, William Lloyd, 272 
 
 Georgia secedes, 27 
 
 Gettysburg, battle, 209-211 
 
 Gladstone, William Ewart, speech at 
 Newcastle, 96, 272, 274 
 
 Glover, Charles, 284, 285 
 
 Godunov, Boris, 169 
 
 Golder, Professor Frank A., quoted, 
 166 
 
 Goldsborough, Commander, 200 
 
 Gortchakov, Prince Alexander Mik- 
 hailovich, Russian Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, 16, 17, 19, 27, 36, 58, 
 63, 67, 76, 79, 93; description, 109- 
 110; note expressing Russia's friend- 
 ship, 127-130, 131; memorable con- 
 versation with Bayard Taylor, 131, 
 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138; deems 
 formal alliance with U. S. unneces- 
 sary, 151, 154; pleased with U. S. 
 stand on Poland, 160, 166, 191, 193, 
 216, 227, 238, 250, 253, 261, 264, 269; 
 on sale of Alaska, 278, 280, 281 
 
 Grant, General Ulysses S., 192, 193; 
 replaces Rosecrans, 214, 215, 228; 
 commander-in-chief, 229, 231; the 
 Wilderness, 232-33, 235, 237, 238, 
 239; in Washington, 240; before 
 Petersburg and Richmond, 241, 247, 
 249; Richmond campaign, 251-252 
 
 Great Britain, Russia's enemy, 85 
 
Index 
 
 307 
 
 Greeley, Horace, editor, N. Y. Trib- 
 une, 18, 2i, 50, 66-67, 97-98; Prayer 
 of Twenty Millions editorial, 174, 
 175; peace commissioner, 239; fail- 
 ure, 240, 247 
 
 Gwin, Senator William M., 278 
 
 Halleck, General, Henry W., 191, 
 
 194, 196, 218, 229 
 Harper's Ferry, 63, 74, 235 
 Harper's Weekly, 116, 142, 143, 144, 
 
 145, 150; urges Russian alliance, 
 
 151-153, 165 
 Harris, Thomas L., 154 
 Hay, John, 132, 150, 153, 190 
 Henry, Anson G., 6 
 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, 156, 269 
 Hooker, General Joseph ("Fighting 
 
 Joe"), 199, 204, 205, 206, 208, 215 
 Hungary, 3, 4, 5, 6, 158 
 Hunter, General David, 237, 238 
 Hunter, Robert M. T., 246 
 
 Ireland, 7, 8 
 
 Jackson, President Andrew, 18 
 Jackson, General Thomas Jonathan 
 
 ("Stonewall"), 194, 198, 219 
 Johnson, President Andrew, 235, 266, 
 
 267, and Alaska purchase, 282, 283; 
 
 memorandum on Alaska purchase, 
 
 288-289, 290 
 Johnston, General Albert Sidney, 
 
 slain, 193 
 Johnston, General Joseph E., 59, 72, 
 
 74, 207, 214, 228, 234, 252; capitula- 
 tion to Sherman, 253 
 
 Kansas, "Bleeding," 17 
 Karakozov, Dimitri, 262, 263 
 Kellogg, William, 33 
 Kentucky, 63 
 
 Kilpatrick, General Judson, 228 
 King Cotton, 89 
 Know-Nothing Party, 8, 9 
 Kokorev, Basile, 270 
 Komissarov, Ossip, 262, 263, 266 
 Kossuth, Louis, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 30, 91 
 Krabbe, General-Adjutant N., Russian 
 Minister of the Marine, 149; orders 
 
 Russian fleet to U.S., 161-163, 267, 
 268 
 Kronstadt, 146, 149, 161, 163, 264, 267, 
 268 
 
 Lamar, Lucius, Q. G, 134 
 
 Lane, Franklin K., 284 
 
 Lee, Robert E., General, 59, 198, 204, 
 207, 208, 209, 210, 214, 228, 231, 232, 
 238, 252; surrender, 253, 256 
 
 Lhuys, Drouyn de, French Minister 
 of State, 96, 99, 100, 158 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, and Kossuth, 4, 5; 
 presents resolutions for Hungarian 
 independence, 6, 7, 8; and secession, 
 6, 7; denounces Know-Nothing 
 movement, 9; Russian despotism, 9, 
 13, 14; attacks Dred Scott decision 
 in Douglas senatorial campaign, 
 1858, 19; "availability" for Presi- 
 dency, 22; elected President, 23, 28, 
 29; remains in Springfield, 32; stand 
 on slavery extension, 33; en route 
 to Washington, 36; arrival in Wash- 
 ington, 39-40; "honest but of medi- 
 ocre ability," 41; first inaugural, 42- 
 43; receives diplomatic corps, 46; 
 Stoeckl's impressions of, 47; vacillat- 
 ing policy, 48; pigeonholes Seward's 
 Thoughts for the President's Con- 
 sideration, 55; Proclamation for 
 troops, 59; Stoeckl describes Lin- 
 coln's "inexperience," 60; pressures 
 from extremists, 61-62; on secession, 
 64-65; "President in name only," 66; 
 acts without congressional sanction, 
 70; message to Congress, 70-71; Con- 
 gress approves conduct, 71; and 
 Battle of Bull Run, 71; described as 
 unable to cope with situation, 79- 
 80; 84, 85, 87; proclaims blockade, 
 88; resents England's declaration of 
 neutrality, 88; and Trent affair, 92- 
 93; rejects French proposal, 100; 
 104, 106, 107, 108, in, 112; appoints 
 Cameron Minister to Russia, 114- 
 115; commissions Clay, no; 124; 
 contempt for Russian despotism, 
 125; note to Czar, 130; 135; orders 
 rejection of French mediation, 138; 
 
308 
 
 Index 
 
 143, 144; illness prevents (President 
 from) entertaining Russians, 146, 
 147; 153; attitude on Polish question, 
 158-159, 161; on secession, 159; 164; 
 Harper's Weekly cartoon, 165; 167; 
 and emancipation, 172-179; reply to 
 Greeley's Prayer of Twenty Mil- 
 lions editorial, 174-175; and Thir- 
 teenth Amendment, 178-179; Eman- 
 cipation, 179, 181; criticized by 
 Stoeckl, 182-185; "Lincoln's war," 
 190-191; call for troops, 194; and 
 conscription, 196; 197-198; and battle 
 of Chancellorsville, 204; differences 
 among advisors, 211-212; Stoeckl on 
 Lincoln, McDowell and McClellan, 
 219; re-election opposed, 226-227; 
 renomination, 234; re-election 
 doubted, 239; reply to Greeley, 239; 
 confident, 241; re-elected, 242-243; 
 and peace negotiations, 245-246; re- 
 fuses armistice, 247-248; threat of 
 ruin, 248; second inauguration, 250; 
 appearance, 250; address, 251; re- 
 ported uncertain of final victory, 
 253; 257; assassination, 261; Stoeckl's 
 comments, 262; 267; tribute by 
 Prince Stcherbatov, 270; tribute by 
 Basile Kokorev, 270-271; tribute by 
 Count Leo Tolstoi, 271-276; and 
 Russian telegraph line, 279; 285; on 
 Russian despotism, 290 
 
 Lincoln, Mary Todd, 147 
 
 Lisboa, Senhor de, 46 
 
 Lisovski, Rear Admiral, 141, 142, 149, 
 161, 163, 267, 268 
 
 London Times, 107, no, 191 
 
 Longstreet, General James, 214 
 
 Louisiana secedes, 27, 33 
 
 Lyons, Richard Bickerton Pemell, 
 Lord, 50-51, $6, 86, 87, 95, 96, 102 
 
 McClellan, Captain George B., ob- 
 server in Crimean War, 1 1 ; General, 
 replaces McDowell, 74-75; fails to 
 attack, 77-78; defeat in Peninsular 
 campaign, 95 
 
 McDowell, General Irvin, 71, 72, 219 
 
 McLean, Justice John, 21 
 
 Manassas Gap, 72 
 
 Marcy, William L., Secretary of State, 
 
 n, 12, 13 
 Marshall, Samuel S., 6 
 Marx, Karl, Communist Manifesto, 3 
 Maryland, 38, 59, 60, 63, 74 
 Massachusetts, 58 
 
 Maximilian, Emperor of Mexico, 86 
 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 8 
 Meade, General George Gordon, 209- 
 
 211 
 Mercier, Henri, French Minister, $^ 
 
 86, 87, 90, 94, 96, 97-98, 99, 102, 158 
 Merrimac and Monitor, 192-193 
 Mexico, 102, 263 
 Miantonomoh, 263 
 
 Mississippi convention, on slavery, 168 
 Missouri Compromise, 18 
 Missouri Republic, 160 
 Mobile, Alabama, 224, 228 
 Moscow, 267, 268 
 
 Napoleon III, Emperor Louis, of 
 France, n, 86, 90, 91, 94; presses for 
 European coalition to recognize 
 Confederate States, 95, 97, 99, 10 1, 
 102, 125; plan for armistice, 132; solo 
 attempt at mediation, 137, 138; atti- 
 tude on Polish affair, 157-158, 263 
 
 New Orleans, 211 
 
 New York, City of, 267, 268 
 
 New York Herald, 116, 135 
 
 New York Tribune, 18, 62, 247 
 
 New York World, 143 
 
 Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, 3, 4, 13, 
 109, 125, 170, 279, 290 
 
 Nicolay, John G., 132, 153, 190 
 
 Nizhni Novgorod Fair, 268 
 
 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis- 
 count, British Prime Minister, 95, 
 107, 112, 133 
 
 Patterson, General Robert, 71, 72 
 
 Peck, Ebenezer, 6 
 
 Pensacola, Florida, 34 
 
 Perkins, Benjamin, claim, 286, 287, 289 
 
 Peter the Great, Emperor, 143, 169 
 
 Petersburg, Virginia, 239 
 
 Philadelphia Press, 288 
 
 Pickens, Francis W., 25 
 
Index 
 
 309 
 
 Pierce, President Franklin, 11, 13, 45, 
 136-137, 245 
 
 Poland: Russia, France, Great Britain, 
 United States and the Polish ques- 
 tion, 157-161 
 
 Pope, General John, 197 
 
 Popov, Rear Admiral, 142, 148, 162, 
 163, 267 
 
 Porter, Admiral David D., 244 
 
 Raymond, Henry J., 239 
 Richmond Examiner, 38, 147, 240 
 Richmond, Virginia, 62, 63; becomes 
 capital of Confederacy, 69, 71, 219, 
 231, 234, 237; captured, 252, 256 
 Roman, A. B., 50 
 Rosecrans, General William S., 213, 
 
 214 
 Russell, Lord John, 87, 89, 95, 132, 
 
 133 
 Russia, relations of, with the U.S.A., 
 
 9, 112, 113, 121, 126, 127-130, 133-134* 
 135, 136, 138, 139, 150, 151; and 
 Lincoln's Emancipation Proclama- 
 tion, 1 80- 1 81; and U.S. A., a parallel- 
 ism, 262, 264; fleet visits the U.S.A., 
 140, 141, 142, 267, 268 
 Russia and Alaska, 277, 278 
 Russia and Crimean War, 10, 11, 20, 
 
 53 
 Russia and Hungary, 3, 4 
 Russia and Polish question, 157-161 
 Russian- American Company, 12 
 
 San Francisco, California, 267, 268 
 Santo Domingo, 85, 125, 191 
 Savannah, Georgia, 224, 243 
 Schleiden, Rudolph, 40, 41, 56, 151 
 Schurz, Carl, Minister to Spain, 106 
 Scott, General Winfield, 62-63, 67, 
 
 68, 71, 73, 74, 75; resignation, 78 
 Sebastopol, 11, 13 
 Secession, 64 
 
 Sedgwick, General John, 205 
 Serfs, Russian, 109, 167, 169-172 
 Seward, Frederick W., 53 
 Seward, William Henry, Senator, 17, 
 
 18, 21, 22, 23; speech, 28-29, 33; 
 
 Secretary of State, 29, 34, 35, 36, 38; 
 
 speech, 40; to rule administration, 41; 
 
 Stoeckl calls him indispensable, 44, 
 48; private conversations with 
 Stoeckl, 49, 50; 53; Thoughts For 
 President's Consideration, 54-55; 56; 
 Stoeckl reports pressures on, 62; 
 "ignorant of international affairs," 
 66; 91, 94, 98, 09, 100, 101, 104, 107, 
 no, in, 134, 135, 138, 146, 153, 157; 
 and Russian-Polish affair, 159; 164, 
 185, 197, 210, 212, 214; on Southern 
 belligerent rights, 250; on Alaska 
 purchase, 279, 281, 284, 285, 287, 
 288 
 
 Seymour, General Truman, 228 
 
 Sheridan, General Philip H., 215, 237, 
 238, 240 
 
 Sherman, General William Tecumseh, 
 214, 215, 227, 228, 234, 239; captures 
 Atlanta, 240; 241, 243; captures 
 Savannah, 244; 249, 252; Johnston 
 capitulates to, 253 
 
 Sigel, General Franz, 234 
 
 Slavery, 30, 31; compared to serfdom, 
 167-168; abolished by European na- 
 tions, 168-169; 222 
 
 Smith, General Kirby, 228, 230 
 
 South Carolina secession, 24, 25, 30 
 
 Spain, 85, 88, 106 
 
 Speed, Joshua, 13 
 
 Springfield, Illinois, 3, 13, 22, 36, 38 
 
 Stanton, Edwin M., Secretary of War, 
 116, 191, 197, 229 
 
 Stanton, Frederick P., 286, 289 
 
 Stcherbatov, Prince, 270 
 
 Stephens, Alexander H., 27, §6; on 
 slavery, 168; 212, 246 
 
 Stevens, Thaddeus, 286, 287, 289 
 
 Stoeckl, Edouard de, Russian Charge 
 d' Affaires at Washington, 10; tries 
 to drag U. S. into Crimean War, 
 10-11; 12; appointed Minister to 
 U. S., 15; described, 15, 16; 17; on 
 John Brown, 19; 23; reports seces- 
 sion movement, 24; fixes blame for 
 rupture, 25; 26, 27; on downfall of 
 American Republic, 31; suggests 
 changes in Constitution, 32; account 
 of crisis, 34-35; confers with Seward, 
 35; reports Lincoln arrival, 36-37; 
 rumors attack on Washington, 38- 
 
3io 
 
 Index 
 
 39; low opinion of Lincoln's ability, 
 41; high regard for Jefferson Davis, 
 41-42; conflict inevitable, 42; attends 
 Lincoln inaugural, 41-42; calls in- 
 augural address contradictory, 42- 
 43; discusses Buchanan's failures, 
 45-46; meets Lincoln, 46; impres- 
 sions of Lincoln, 47-48; gives dinner 
 for Cabinet, 49; private conversa- 
 tion with Secretary Seward, 49; 
 offers to serve as mediator, 50; re- 
 ports Fort Sumter expedition, 51; 
 subsequent confusion, 58; blames 
 Lincoln's "gross inexperience," 60; 
 believes Lincoln controlled by ex- 
 tremists, 61-62; discusses secession, 
 64-66; voices low opinion of Lin- 
 coln's capabilities, 66; discusses 
 General Scott's precautions, 67-69; 
 account of Battle of Bull Run, 71- 
 73, 74-75; on financial situation in 
 North, 77; McClellan's inactivity, 
 77-78; deplorable conditions and 
 Lincoln's helplessness, 79-81; asserts 
 disunion is fait accompli, 83; op- 
 poses recognition of Confederacy, 
 86; on British naval superiority, 89; 
 reports Trent affair, 92-93; 95, 96, 
 98, 99, 100, 101; predicts downfall of 
 democracy, 124; 130, 134; opposed 
 to Russian participation in joint 
 action, 135; 137, 146; and Russian 
 fleet, 162; on Emancipation Procla- 
 mation, 182-184, 185; on freed slaves, 
 186; contacts with American offi- 
 cials, 191; blames democracy, 192; 
 reports battle of the Merrimac and 
 the Monitor, 193; federal military 
 campaigns, 193; reports McClellan's 
 inactivity, 194; confers with Cam- 
 eron, 195; reports conditions, 196; 
 confers with McClellan, 198; reports 
 on military and domestic affairs, 
 201-208; on battle of Gettysburg, 
 209-210; on draft riots, 211; on split 
 in Lincoln's administration, 21 1-2 12; 
 on political situation and reconstruc- 
 tion, 212-213; comments on democ- 
 racy, 216-218; review of events, 
 218-225; on General Grant, 229; 
 
 reports "Wilderness" fighting, 231- 
 232; on military operations, 235; 
 on Lincoln's re-election, 241; Sher- 
 man's advance, 243; reports discord 
 among Confederate leaders, 249; 
 reports final battles, 252-254; sur- 
 prised at war's sudden end, 254; 
 admits triumph of democracy, 255- 
 256; summary of rebellion, 256; on 
 emancipated Negroes, 257-258; fi- 
 nancial situation, 258; on recon- 
 struction, 259-60; and Alaska pur- 
 chase, 278, 280, 281; and proceeds 
 of sale, 284, 286, 288, 289, 290; suc- 
 ceeded by Catacazy, returns to 
 Russia, 290 
 Stowe, Harriet Beecher, Uncle Tom's 
 
 Cabin, 271 
 St. Petersburg, 108, 119, 267, 268 
 St. Petersburg Journal, 126, 181, 260 
 Struve, Lieutenant Colonel, of Russia, 
 
 231 
 Sumner, Senator Charles, 102, 278, 
 
 280, 281, 282, 286 
 Sumter, Fort, 47, 52, 53 
 
 Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Maurice 
 de, 18 
 
 Taney, Chief Justice Roger Brooke, 18 
 
 Tassara, Garcia y Don Gabriel, Span- 
 ish Minister, 85 
 
 Taylor, Bayard, 117, 119, 122, 123, 
 130; receives Gortchakov's assur- 
 ance of Russia's friendship, 1 31-132; 
 
 i33, i37> 138, H 6 > lSl 
 Tennessee, 63 
 Texas secedes, 27 
 Thirteenth Amendment, 178-179 
 Thomas, General George H., 215, 244 
 Thompson, Jacob, 239 
 Thouvenel, Edouard Antoine, 86, 94 
 Tolstoi, Count Leo, 271; tribute to 
 
 Lincoln, 272-276 
 Trent affair, 92, 154 
 Trumbull, Lyman, 5, 6, 33 
 
 United States and Russia, contrasted, 
 124-125; parallelism, 262 
 
 Vanity Fair, 115 
 
Index 
 
 3" 
 
 Vicksburg, battle, 200, 206-207, 213, 
 
 224, 228 
 Victoria, Queen, of England, 3 
 Vienna, Treaty of, 157 
 Virginia, 27, 38, 59, 60, 63, 73 
 
 Walker, Robert J., 279, 285, 286, 289 
 Wallace, General Lew (is), 238 
 Washburne, Elihu B., 33 
 Washington, D.C., 38, 39, 58, 60, 61, 
 
 63, 7*» 72> 73, 74, 209, 2 3 J > 2 3<5, *37> 
 238, 256, 267, 272, 274 
 
 Washington Chronicle, 288, 289 
 Washington, George, 267 
 Webster, Daniel, 17, 259 
 Weed, Thurlow, 29, 153, 154, 155, 239 
 Welles, Gideon, Secretary of the 
 
 Navy, 92, 117, 141, 146 
 White, Andrew Dickson, 185 
 Wilkes, Captain Charles, and Trent, 
 
 92 
 Williams, Archibald, 6 
 Wilmington, North Carolina, 241, 244 
 Worcester Spy, 285 
 
Abra/i, 
 
 ^W* 
 
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