RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS 1819 — 1823 . A LESSON AND A WARNING TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES. t BY HENRY CAREY BAIRD. Money should be a thing of, or belonging to, a country, not of or belonging to the world. An exportable commodity is not fitted to be Money, and no¬ thing could be more monstrous than England’s principle—followed by the United States up to the war—her legislation forcing her people to be buyers of gold, and making their possession of gold— one of the scarcest articles in the world—the condition of their being able to furnish themselves with food and clothing. Hon. Isaac Buchanan, of Canada. PHILADELPHIA: COLLINS, PRINTER, 705 JAYNE STREET. im. RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS IN ENGLAND. The President of the United States having officially proclaimed to the world, that, in his opinion, paper money—the United States legal tender note—“is nothing more than promises to pay, and is valuable exactly in proportion to the amount of coin that it can be converted into,” and having also earnestly recommended to Congress that it shall enact “ such legislation as will insure a gradual return to specie payments,” it would seem in the highest degree desirable that the people should be made to realize what “ a return to a specie basis” involves, and what it is likely to cost them. Almost from the hour in which the war closed in 1865, and when the country was bleeding at every pore, and the southern portion of it was almost wholly ruined,* the nation was called upon by the then Secretary of the Treasury, Hon. Hugh McCulloch, to conform itself in practice to the theories which he happened then to hold. Had he not been stopped by Congress in mid-career of his contraction policy in 1868, he would long ere this have inevitably caused the complete bankruptcy of the country and of the national treasury. Notwithstanding this fortunate interposition of Congress, the uniform policy of the Treasury Department from April, 1865, to the present time, has been that of looking to the “ specie basis” goal, and obliging the people to square their affairs in accordance with this scheme of finance. To this basis, we are now, in the midst of ruin and distress further invited by the President, notwithstanding the fact that it has always and everywhere proven to be as unstable as the sands of the sea-shore, and with a superstructure many times greater than itself, it has almost always been a mere pretence and a fraud. Indeed, if the President’s own doctrine were true, notes resting upon this basis, and “ valuable exactly in proportion to the amount of coin that they can be converted into,” would usually be worth but from 12^ to 25 cents on the dollar, f But the President unduly magnifies the importance of the precious metals, the great power of which comes not of any inherent and natural qualities but of their being made by governments “ a basis” for all of the business and financial * Sad to say, it is far worse off now, mainly owing to tlie mismanagement of the currency of the country. f An official statement of the condition of the Banks of Massachusetts shows that between 1825 and 1838 theVproportion which the “basis” bore to 3 affairs of their countrymen, and a legal tender for the payment of debts.* While the President greatly exaggerates the virtues of specie, it is, on the other hand, quite impossible for any one to exaggerate the ruin which will result from any legislative attempt whatsoever to force the country to place itself and its affairs upon this ticklish “ basis.” Fortunately for us, it is not now necessary that we should try the experimentum crucis for ourselves, it having been tried by Great Britain between 1815 and 18^3, with such results that any tyro may read the story and learn the lesson as fully and completely as even a President of the United States. Great Britain in 1793 and 1797. In 1793 the British Government under the leadership of William Pitt declared war against France, and by the 27th of February, 1797, the superstructure varied between one to four and one to eight and three quarters , as follows :— Year. Paper. Specie. Year. Paper. Specie. 1825 . • 6 xo to 1 1833 . • 8| to 1 1826 . • 2 t to 1 1834 . • H to 1 1827 . • 4 f to 1 1835 . . 8} to 1 1828 . . 6* to 1 1836 . • H to 1 1829 . • . 5 to 1 1837 . • 6| to 1 1830 . • 4 to 1 1838, Feb. . . 5* to 1 1831 . • . 8^ to 1 1838, Oct. . . 4 to 1 1832 . . 8 to 1 How could anything but instability and insecurity come from such a system? Do not the ever varying and disproportionate relations of these figures alike utterly condemn the system which could produce them ? * That this is so, is proven by the results of the demonetization, to a large extent, of silver in Germany, and the caution which the government has now to exercise in disposing of the demonetized silver*to prevent its sacrifice. This caution it has practised in spite of the attempts of “the radical gold ultras,” as they are called, to force its sale at any price, it being “ evident that it is necessary,” says a German correspondent of the London Economist, “for the Government to sell as much of our superfluous .silver as can be got rid of at tolerable prices, and you know best how very small hitherto the sales have been.” The forlorn condition of this precious metal when it shall have lost the governmental prop throughout the world, is thus depicted by Paul Leroy Beaulieu, in a recent number of the Economiste Frangais , who says: “When the substitution of a gold for a silver currency in Germany is completed, there will remain, after due provision is made for subsidiary coins, a total of £48,000,000 worth of silver, the whole of which will be thrown upon the mar¬ ket. But this is not all. Denmark, Sweden, and Holland have decided to adopt a gold standard, and the same course will probably be followed by Belgium. In these countries the quantity of silver to be disposed of in conse¬ quence of the demonetizing of that metal will be not less than £24,000,000. Thus we have a total of £72,000,000 of silver, which, before very long, will be thrown on the market. The effect of this increase in the supply cannot fail to have great influence in the direction of a further fall in the price of silver. Moreover the ancient and characteristic predilection of the Oriental countries for silver—of which they have hitherto taken great quantities from Europe— is growing weaker, and hence the most intelligent of them, the Japanese, have adopted a gold currency. We cannot then reckon upon the great Eastern nations absorbing the enormous quantity of silver which is about to be thrown out of circulation in Europe. So far, therefore, it seems likely that the de¬ preciation of silver must go on indefinitely.” Our own crisis in 1873 proved the power of the quality of acceptability r 4 the condition of the Bank of England had become such that it found itself under the necessity of suspending specie payments, and the government interposed its so-called “ restriction” upon the Bank from paying any more gold or silver. Mr. Pitt subsequently obtained the passage of an Act of Parliament authorizing the restriction to con¬ tinue to June 24, before which time a new act was passed continuing .the suspension, and subsequently numerous other acts were had postponing it from time to time, until in 1819, when “ Peel’s Currency Bill” was enacted, providing fof complete resumption of cash payments by the Bank on May 1, 1823. Be it observed, too, that the Govern¬ ment and the Bank were driven to these expedients notwithstanding the fact that, while, with the enormous outlays, incident to maintain¬ ing large .armies on the continent, large fleets on the ocean, and other measures, calling for the export of gold and silver in large quantities, she was, owing to the extraordinary development of her diversified industries, enabled to draw from the rest of the world, the precious metals to perhaps as great or even a greater amount than that de¬ manded by these foreign expenditures. It actually appeared in evi¬ dence before the bullion committee in 1810, that from 1805 to 1809 inclusive, the balance of trade in favor of England had amounted to £50,000,000, or nearly $250,000,000. At or about the time of the overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, June 18, 1815, the circulation of the Bank of England was £27,000,000, while that of the country banks was estimated at about an equal amount, making a total circu¬ lation of £54,000,000. The premium on gold in the under-mentioned years was as follows:— 1814 .... 30£ p . c . 1815 . . . . 18| “ 1816 . . . . “ 1816 Oct. to Dec. under 1 “ 1817 . 1818 . 1819 . 1820 and 1821 2 k P- c. 5 “ 6 * “ par. The commercial paper under discount at the Bank of England was as follows:— 1815 . £14,917,000 1820 . £3,883,600 1816 . 11,416,400 1821 . 2,676,700 1817 . 3,960,600 1822 . 3,366,700 1818 . 4,325,200 1823 . 3,123,809 1819 . 6,515,000 1824 . 2,369,800 The results of such a selfish and cruel policy as is here exhibited in regard to contraction of loans, together with contraction of the for the payment of debts, by the heavy decline in United States bonds and gold, and even the willingness of parties to dispose of bonds previously at a large premium, to the government, at par for currency. During those dreadful days the power of this quality was exhibited in a marked manner in the almost frantic efforts to obtain control of bank credits, resembling those of the Bank of Venice, not even payable in “promises,” but merely transferable through bank clearing houses. At this hour live dollars worth of merchandise are seeking purchasers for every dollar of “ paper promises to pay” which is being offered in exchange for commodities. The value of these “ promises,” in the eyes of those who seek them, arises not from the ‘‘amount of coin they can be converted into,” but from the fact that they will be gladly accepted in exchange for commodities and in payment of debts. 5 circulation of the Bank from £27,261,650 in 1815, to £18,176,470 in 1823, were quite what they might have been expected to be. The story shall be told by Thomas Doubleday, Esq., a bullionist of the strictest stamp, but'not one who cOuld approve of such measures of confiscation as were practised upon his countrymen between 1815 and 1823. I quote from Doubleday’s Financial, Monetary, and Statistical History of England, (London, 1847, p. 238, et infra,) as follows :— Great Britain in 1815. “Hardly had the echoes of the cannon of Waterloo died into silence, when it began to be felt that this state could not continue longer. That monopoly of supply which the extraordinary circumstances of the war had thrown into the hands of Great Britain began forthwith to fall to pieces. The seas were now equally open to all. The colonies which, during the long period of hostilities, had been wrested from the French, Spaniards, and Dutch, w r ere now for the most part to be restored. We could not hold them in peace. Thenceforward the European nations were# not only independent of us as to colonial produce, but, freed from the rav¬ ages of war and the obstacles of blockades, they began to manufacture for themselves. The woollens of Saxony and the Merino fleeces of Spain began to be felt clogging the wheels of our machinery. That machinery, despite of penalties and prohibitions, in due time found its way across the narrow seas, up the Baltic, and beyond the broad Atlantic. Russia es¬ tablished the cotton manufacture. The United States did the same. The coal of Belgium began to work steam engines and mechanism unknown before. With all this, the expenditure of the government at home for warlike stores, recruits, commissariats, and transport-ships suddenly ceased. Prices fell, on a sudden, to a ruinous extent—banks- broke—wages fell • with the prices of manufactures ; and before the year 1816 had come to a close, panic, bankruptcy, riot, and disaffection had spread through the land. Vast bodies of starving and discontented artisans now congregated together, demanding a reform of the parliament, a repeal of the corn-laws, and a reduction of taxation. The discontents, the government, as usual, put down by an armed force, who with the constitution in their mouths, sabred the people d la Gossaque. The commercial distress they ascribed to ‘ the transition from war to peace and contented themselves with the application of some palliatives, in the shape of advances of money and Exchequer bills, through the Bank, hoping that affairs would gradually come round to a settled state. In this they were, after a time, partly gratified. The mercantile part of the community accommodated them¬ selves gradually, perforce, to the new scale of prices after a ‘ transition,’ which, in its progress through 1814, 1815, and 1816, rendered bankrupt no less than eighty-nine country hanks , together with an enormous number of traders of all grades and descriptions.” The Bank of England. “ In the midst of this turmoil, another grand cause of confusion remains to be mentioned ; and this was the new and ticklish position of the grandam of so many years of villany and egregious folly, to wit, of the ‘Old Lady of Threadneedle Street,’ as she now began to be called; that is to say, of the Bank itself. The reader will remember that throughout the various times when the acts for continuing Pitt’s ‘ Bank-restriction’ were to be renewed or altered, one clause was always retained, and that was the clause binding the Bank to ‘ resume cash payments 1 within a few mouths after peace should come. It has been asserted that Pitt never 0 meant this clause to be enforced, at least as far as regarded the fund- holders ; and that he intimated as much in Parliament on one occasion. This may possibly be true ; but the clause, nevertheless, was adhered to; so that, before the Waterloo bonfires were well out, the Bank Directors, with this clause staring them in the face, began to bethink themselves, how they might most quickly lessen the enormous bales of their paper that were afloat, so as to give them some chance of paying the remainder in gold and silver ‘ on demand.’ This was a new feature. During former revulsions, such as that in 1810, caused by the decrees of Bonaparte against the admission of British goods, the Bank had come promptly for¬ ward with loans and discounts to relieve the pressure. Now, however, the Directors scarcely dared to move an inch. They knew that ‘ the political economists’ were strong in the House, and that they were bent upon cash payments, at all risks. They knew that the Jews of Change Alley would secretly abet the same doctrine. Against a combination of usurers and theorists, one set all selfishness, the other all crotchets, there was no de¬ fence to be made.* The country gentlemen, who were the dupes of the economists, were led to believe that cash payments were necessary for both the interest and security of themselves. Those who had the power .were resolved, and nothing was left to the Bank but to narrow its issues, and look about for gold and silver wherewith to meet the storm. This was altogether a difficult business. In the year 1816 alone, thirty-seven Country Banks had become bankrupt. The commercial world, therefore, required additional propping. But the Government w r as in the same di¬ lemma ; and to it the merchants were sacrificed. Between February and August, 1816, the Directors lessened their discounts from twenty-three millions to eleven millions ; and before February, 1817, to eight millions; and before August of the same year to seven millions ; whilst up to nearly the same period, they held of Exchequer-bills, etc., twenty-five millions ! This reduction of private discounts answered two purposes of the Bank : it kept their circulation within bounds ; and, if it slaughtered the mer¬ chants and manufacturers, it brought about another novelty, viz., a reduc- # tion in the price of gold down to four pounds the ounce ; or nearly to the mint-price ! This enabled them to get gold on easier terms, and to make a flourish, by the voluntary issue of a large sum in sovereigns; a measure absurd and premature to the last degree, for by this addition thrown into the currency, the prices of gold and silver bullion were again raised a little, and the whole of this new coin was exported ! “This reduction of the Bank issues, and destruction and crippling of the Country Banks, had another and still more important effect, inasmuch as by causing the price of gold to fall to nearly the mint-price, it en¬ couraged the political economists to press forward, and, at last, in 1819, to pass an act, the most important in its consequences, and extraordinary in its circumstances, that ever was decided upon by any legislature, in any age or country. This was the celebrated Bill ‘ for the Restoration of Cash Payments,’ passed in 1819, and since famous as ; Peel’s Currency Bill.’ ” Peel’s Currency Bill of 1819. “The Currency bill of 1819 was passed at the instance of a committee, amongst the members of whom were included all the parliamentary dab¬ blers in political economy of any name or talent, and of whom Peel was chairman. Horner, the chairman of the bullion committee of 1810, was * How history repeats itself, and how this story reads like a chronicle of events of which we are now in the midst! To the credit of the Jews, how¬ ever, it may be said, that they have not at this time as a class arrayed them¬ selves against the people. H. C. B. 7 dead; but, in bis stead, they bad Ricardo, a rich Jew stock-jobber, who having made an immense fortune by this worst species of gambling, had also contrived to obtain a reputation by the publication of some books on political economy ; ingenious in argument, but, in many points, of very questionable soundness ; and frequently substituting an elaborate super¬ ficiality for wisdom and depth of reflection. Backed by the authority of this rich and arrogant man, the economists obtained on this occasion an almost entire command of the House of Commons. The ministry were led into the snare, with open eyes indeed, but, like somnambulists, with eyes of which ‘ the sense is shut.’ They selected a young member of their own body, Mr. Peel, to bring the bill for the restoration of cash payments before the House of Commons ; and hence the bill, much to his detriment, has borne his name. It is only justice to say that to Mr. Peel, now Sir Robert Peel, the obloquy of this greatest blunder that ever legislature committed, ought not to be given. He was but the mouth-piece, and the ignorant mouth-piece, of an ignorant and blundering Plouse of Commons, led by the nose by a self-conceited but shallow junta of theorists. He was pitched upon for this unfortunate service, merely because he was a young man of aspiring pretensions, vast wealth, and of that sort of me¬ diocre, but well-cultivated and accommodating talent, which recommends its possessor as likely to do what is expected to pass for a brilliant thing cleverly and showily. The fact was, the whole debate on this bill was a laughable farce. The mind of nearly every man in both Houses was made up to support this measure. That the finger of Providence was mani¬ festly in it, I cannot doubt, until I doubt whether there be a Providence. Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat ! The Houses made the plunge with one accord. There was hardly the semblance of an opposition. Ricardo had the enormous folly to tell the House that the bill was ‘ not worthy of half an hour of even their consideration and assured them that the whole question was one of ‘three per cent.this being the extent of the fall of prices, which this man calculated would take place, after all the one and two-pound notes in the kingdom were burned, and the re¬ mainder, of five pounds and upwards, made ‘payable on demand in gold sovereigns, coined from metal worth three pounds, seventeen shillings, and tenpence halfpenny the ounce V “ In short, there was only one man in the Commons who really understood and opposed the measure, and this man was Mr. Matthias Attwood. The Bank Directors had indeed said, they ‘ feared the country could not bear 'the measure/ but they dared not oppose it; and Mr. Attwood was pre¬ vailed upon to quit the House that the vote might be ‘ unanimous !’ In the House of Lords, Lord Grey alone ventured to dissent from the measure; but he only ‘ washed his hands of it/ as Pontius Pilate did before him, suffering the deed to be done, and drily saying, ‘he hoped it would pro¬ duce the consequences which their lordships expected from it / a signifi¬ cant sentence, and one of which their lordships must have, since that time, often thought! The Houses, however, for once, ‘ were all in one aq^ord.’ The Speaker and the Prince Regent congratulated each other on the com¬ pletion of this monument of the legislative wisdom of the empire; and ‘ the question of cash payments’ was, in the flippant phrase of Mr. Can¬ ning, ‘ set at rest forever’! “ As a bit of legislation, this ever-memorable act is remarkably brief, and to the point $ consisting only of thirteen not very long nor wordy clauses. It repeals, in the first place, all the acts for restraining the Bank from paying its creditors, which had been passed frqm 1797 up to that time, the repeal going into effect ‘ from and after the first day of May, 1823.’ This was a repeal of all Bank notes on demand for sums less than five pounds. It then provides for a gradual return, in the mean time, by the Bank to cash payments ; beginning with an issue of gold at four pounds one shilling the ounce, in 1820, and ending with the standard mint- 8 price of £3 17s. 10|cL The concluding clauses repeal all the old statutes against the melting and exportation of coin or plate, and repeal also the oath required from exporters of bullion, that it was not melted plate or coin, or clippings of coin, as far as relates to the melting portion, retain¬ ing only the portion that applies to clippings of the coin of the realm. It also required that the Bank should publish every quarter, until May, 1823, an account of its average circulation, for the benefit of the lieges who might doubt as to the prudence with which its affairs were conducted, an arbitrary and questionable step, but which was afterwards extended much further, on a subsequent occasion. “ This was the substance of the celebrated bill to which the name of ‘ Feel’ has, unfortunately for his reputation, been wedded, after a fashion that admits of no divorce in future time. By all, except the few minutely acquainted with its history, he will be believed to be the originator and framer of an act which, if, as is too probable, not only the present system, but the present form of government, be doomed to be in no long time swept away, will be found to have, been one of the grand preparatory causes of the catastrophe. That Sir Robert Peel is, partly at least, of the same opinion, seems evident in the attempts which he has so often made to shake off his reputation for its exclusive authorship, and to place the onus of the deed upon the rightful shoulders. For these attempts no man of common sense can blame him, and the only objection to them is that they must be fruitless as to the result which he so palpably desires. \ The Ruinous Fruits Gathered in 1822-23. “ When the two Houses of Parliament met for the session of the year 1822-3, to the eyes of intelligent observers an extraordinary scene pre¬ sented itself. There, on one side, were the two Houses, constituting ‘ the Imperial Parliament,’ gaged and pledged, as deeply and solemnly as ever men were pledged in all this world, to set the currency question ‘ at rest for ever,’ as far as extinction of all Bank notes for sums under five pounds, and the payment of the remainder on demand, in sovereigns coined out of gold at the rate of 3Z. 17s. 10^