RECENT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN REGARDING A TRANS-ISTHMIAN CANAL BY CLAUD KENNETH TURMAN A. B. University of Indiana, 1920 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, 1922 URBANA, ILLINOIS Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2015 https://archive.org/details/recentnegotiatioOOturm lx) ihho U N I V E R THE SITY OF ILLINOIS GRADUATE SCHOOL I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY_ ENTITLED. Cl A j? , C/ UswJjuL S&djsi. ^^Tn 1 3 U h. C_ Cvkl BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR o_. THE DEGREE OF OF. /I - 4T ' * V, ' In Charge ot Thesis (ft. UU $ Head of Department Recommendation concurred in* Committee on Final Examination* ^ 0(34 Required for doctor’s degree but not for master’s ■ r ! , l: • » ‘ , TABLE OP CONTENTS Page Chapter I. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1 Chapter II. Between the Treaties . . 21 Chapter III. The First Hay-Pauneefo te Treaty 32 Chapter IV. The Second and Final Hay-Paunc efo te Treaty. 52 Chapter V. The Tolls Controversy. . 63 Conclusion 85 Bibliography 87 CHAPTER I THE CLAYTON -BULWER TREATY During the past seventy-five years the various difficul- ties that at intervals seriously threatened the good relations between the United States and Great Britain have been settled amicably and honorably alike to both nations. One of these dif- ferences, however, has not yet been permanently adjusted. That is the limitation by Great Britain of the freedom of action of the United States in the construction, operation, maintenance, and regulation of any trans -isthmian canal. Where, then, did Great Britain get the right to restrict and to minimize the control of the United States over such a canal? The answer is found in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, the millstone about the neck of the United States in its control of a canal. To get a proper under- standing of this, it is obvious that one should take a brief look into the history of the canal neighborhood: the Bay Islands, Belize or British Honduras, and the Mosquito Shore. Soon after Columbus discovered the Bay Islands in 1502, the Spanish made small settlements, but due to the lack of precious 1 metals, they soon abandoned the islands for richer lands. The location was suitable to the freebooters of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and the islands served as a base of 2 operations against Spanish commerce. In 1742 the British seized 1 Bancroft, History of Central America, III, p. 263. 2 Travis, The History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty , 9. - 2 - the islands during a war with Spain, They were returned at the end of the war, and at the time of the creation of the Republic of Central America were under the control of Spain. When the Republic achieved its independence, they fell under the control of the province of Honduras. But the English had not forgotten them; and when some liberated slaves from the West Indies settled on these islands and refused to obey the laws of Central America, the British 3 forces from Jamaica came to their relief. Thus, Great Britain was placed in practical, though not legal, control of the islands by 1849. Belize has much the same history as the Bay Islands. The port of Belize also served as a home for the pirates of the Carib- bean. Although England apparently aided these men, they soon got 4 beyond control and steps were taken by the English to curb them. As a result, the freebooters turned to logwood cutting, and Belize became the center of a lucrative trade in dyewood. The Spanish held only nominal control, and the English wood-cutters did about 5 as they pleased. By the Treaty of 1786 Spanish sovereignty was recognized by the British government; but the settlers felt other- wise. When in 1798 by aid of a British warship they had driven off a Spanish expedition sent to subdue them, the British Government 3 Bancroft, Central America, III, 320. 4 Travis, Olayton-Bulwer Treaty . 6. 5 Ibid. , 9. 6 thereupon claimed the region by right of conquest. But once more, by the terms of the treaty of Amiens in 1802 and the alliance between England and Spain in 1809, Spanish sovereignty was again '7 recognized. When the independence of Central America was estab- lished, the feeble government instituted was unable to control the settlers. It called upon the United States for aid, but the appeal was ignored. In 1847 the port and the surrounding region were recognized as a British colony by the United States in the sending 8 of a consul to that place. Thus, Great Britain had planted another foothold on the isthmus, with the acquiescence of the United States. 9 Mosquito Shore was also discovered by Columbus in 1502. No attention was paid to it by the gold-thirsty Spaniards, and it, too, served as an ideal home for freebooters. These kept on good terms with the decadent natives, and also kept in touch with the governor of Jamaica. In time, the chief of the Mosquito Indians sent a request to the governor and asked him for British protection. Accordingly, when this half-witted chief visited Jamaica shortly 10 afterwards, he was crowned "King of the Mosquitos.” Then followed an extension of his territory. The British trading interests had 6 Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 10. 11. 7 Ibid., 12. 8 Ibid . , 15; Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presi- dents, V, 37. 9 Bancroft, Central America, I, 11. 10 Travis, Glayt on-Bulwer Treaty, 19 ff. -4- now reached the point where some notice was taken of them; conse- quently, during the war with Spain, George III appointed a superin- 11 tendent of their trade. But "by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Great Britain recognized Spanish sovereignty over the region. In return, 12 Spain allowed the British settlers to remain there. As "before, the settlers did as they pleased; and her exasperation at the stand of England in regard to the settlers was one of the factors that caused Spain to declare war again in 1780. Spain was not able to dislodge the British, who now seized the region outright. After attempts to settle the sovereignty, the English yielded in 1786. Again Spain was unable to enforce her rule and gave up the attempts 13 in 1796. Hence, by 1830 the British were in actual control of the Mosquito Shore. Meantime the king of the Mosquitos had been captured by the British. Before he died in 1840, he signed a will appointing the British superintendent as regent over Mosquitia dur- 14 ing the minority of the heir to the throne. The next year the Nicaraguan commandant at San Juan del Norte at the mouth of the San Juan River was ordered by the regent to recognize the authority of the king of Mosquitia. He did so, but under compulsion. Nicaragua protested valiantly and asked the United States for aid, but the 11 Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 25. 12 Ibid., 26. 13 Ibid . , 30. 14 Ibid., 36. -5- 15 note was ignored. Meeting with no opposition in their policy, the British announced in September, 1847, its protectorate over Mos- quitia. The Nicaraguan government was ordered to evacuate San Juan del Norte. Again and again, the distressed Nicaraguans asked the 16 United States for aid, only to have their appeals ignored. The British lost no time, however, and acting in the name of the king of Mosquitia, they forced Nicaragua to evacuate the port; and in March, 1848, a British consul was appointed. Nicaragua felt that this act was an invasion of her sovereignty and at once sent a minister to London to gain some recompense for the loss of her territory; and should such a request he granted, she felt her own 17 prestige amongst her sister republics would not be diminished. The mission, however, was not successful, and the situation remained unchanged. Soon after the seizure of San Juan, Gosta Rica became aggressive and brought up an old claim for some territory south of the San Juan river that at that time was under the control of 18 Nicaragua. The natural consequence of such a controversy in that part of the world was war. Nicaragua prepared to attack Gosta Rica, 15 House Executive Do cument , no. 75, 1st Session, 31st Con- gress, 43; Richardson, Messages, V, 35. 16 House Ex . Doc., no. 75, 1st Sess., 31st Gong., 79, 80, 84; Richardson, Messages, V, 35. 17 Travis, 01 ayt on-Bulwer Treaty , 46; Williams, Anglo - American Isthmian Diplomacy , 73. Travis, 01 ayt on-Bulwer Treaty , 55. - 6 - but at this time Great Britain and not the United States prevented a conflict. This was due to the influence of that aggressive British statesman, Lord Palmerston, the man who dictated the foreign policy of his government during the middle decades of the nineteenth cen- tury. In this instance, he ordered Nicaragua to yield to the claims 19 of Costa Rica, and the existing pretext for war was done away with. Thus it is seen that by 1849 England was in practical control of the eastern coast of Central America from Costa Rica to Belize. This predominance was attained by the extension of protec- tion to her trading interests so as to give her at least a pretence of a claim to some of these regions. Whatever may be said of the justice of her claims, the fact is that she was there. No doubt England feared the expanding tendencies of the United States and was determined to forestall any signs of expansion in Central America. In preparation for any eventuality, she had seized the 20 key to the passage to the Pacific. This is the position that has given her a voice in the control of any trans -isthmian canal--and we shall see that this same voice has never become dumb. The United States was a late entrant into the scramble for the control of a route across the isthmus. Her trading inter- ests were slow in getting a foothold. Hence, it is obvious that her policy in the canal region would not be of such a selfish type as 19 Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 55. 20 Bancroft to Clayton, Mar. 9, 1849. House Ex . Loo . , no. 75, 1st Sess., 31st Cong., 233. -7- that of Great Britain. As early as 1826, Henry Olay, at that time Secretary of State under President John Quincy Adams, had wanted a canal that was not to be under the exclusive control of any 21 particular nation. Pursuing this same policy, Senator John Olayton of Delaware had introduced in 1835 a Senate resolution directing the President to consider entering into negotiations with New Granada and Central America for the protection of such companies as might undertake to build a canal that was to secure to all na- 22 tions free and equal rights of navigation. The resolution passed unanimously, and President Jackson gave it his hearty approval. 23 But the mission that was sent to negotiate was unsuccessful. Prom 1830 to 1850 American shipping had begun to make 24 its influence felt in the commercial world, especially in Asia. In the trade with China the merchants of the United States were by far the leading competitors of the British traders. The first official notice of this interest was in the message of President Tyler's message in 1842. He then emphasized the growing trade with Asia; he pointed out that the British government had negotiated a commercial treaty with China, and that it was necessary for the 25 United States to make a similar treaty. The United States then sent an envoy to Canton to negotiate a treaty, and in 1844 a treaty 21 Congressional Record, 2nd Sess.. 63rd Cong.. 8946. 22 Congressional Globe , 2nd Sess., 32nd Cong., Aup., 251. 23 Ibid . 24 Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts , chapter 25 Richardson, Messages , IV, 211-214. ' - 8 - 26 was signed at Whampoa. American trade then increased rapidly. Thus, the United States gradually became interested in a shorter transit to China for the benefit of its Boston and New York mer- chants, who were primarily concerned at this time. President Polk, in 1846, revived the question of isthmian transit, and in that same year a commercial treaty was negotiated with New Granada. Among the provisions of this treaty was one which gave to the United States the right of way for a railroad or a canal across the isthmus in Panama. The transit was to be free and open to the government and the citizens of the United States; and in return, the United States guaranteed "perfect neutrality" of 27 transit. Polk was very anxious for the ratification of this treaty, and when he presented it to the Senate for ratification, he brought out the need of quick action on the part of the United States: in the first place, he noted the rapid development of trade with the west coast of America; in the second place, he emphasized the importance and value of the transit to the trade with Asia and the Pacific islands; and in the third place, he wanted the United States to be the first nation in this isthmian project, for he 28 feared that Great Britain or Prance might step in ahead. The 26 Morse, International Relations of the Chinese Empire, II, 343. 27 Malloy, Treaties . Conventions , International Acts , Protocols, and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers (1776-1909), I, 303-314. Of. The Public Statutes at Large of the U.S.A . , IX, 881-901. 28 Richardson, Messages . IV, 511. -9- treaty was ratified. Although the United States had sympathised with Central America in its struggle against Spain and had rejoiced in its in- dependence, that feeling soon died out because of the perpetual revolutions, factions, and lack of any stable government. In other words, this condition of sympathy had changed to one of almost total indifference. The United States was partially aware of British aggression, but had not felt disposed to intervene when 29 these states were impotent to help even themselves. It was not until the United States sent Elijah Hise as charge d'affaires in June, 1848, for the purpose of negotiating commercial treaties with Guatemala and Salvador that events began to shape themselves 30 directly for the unlucky convention of 1850. The interest of the United States on the isthmus, then, had grown in proportion to trading interests. After the conclusion of the treaty with Mexico in 1848, gold was discovered in Califor- nia. The whole world became interested in some method of transit. There must be a better access to "the West" than across the plains, deserts, and mountains. The isthmus seemed to solve the problem partially. Steamship lines were established between New York and Chagres, and between Panama and San Francisco. The Panama rail- road was being built as fast as possible. British companies and 29 Richardson, Messages. IV. 511. 30 House fix . Doc., no. 75, 1st Sess., 31st Cong., 92-95. . ■ . - - 10 - American companies were being formed for the purpose of constructing 31 a trans-isthmian canal. And last, but by no means least, the 32 United States was developing a strong national consciousness and a tendency towards territorial expansion that sooner or later must come into conflict with British interests on the isthmus. The Polk administration had made a name for itself that was not to be admired in the eyes of the Whigs, who immediately upon coming into office proceeded to discountenance any aggressive foreign policy. Strange though it may seem, the Democrats had not pursued their usual aggressive policy toward Central America. On the other hand, the incoming administration seemed to be very much alive to the possibilities of that region. President Taylor was very eager for the completion of a trans -isthmian route. Clayton, the Secretary of State, fully concurred with his chief. The policy of the administration is best summed up in the words of the President: "Should such a work be constructed under the common protection of all nations, for equal benefits to all, it would be neither just nor expedient that any great maritime state should command the communication. The territory through which the canal may be opened ought to be freed from the chains of any foreign power. No such power should occupy a position that would enable it hereafter to exercise so controlling an influence over the com- 31 Cong. Globe, op. cit.. 252-253. 32 Von Holst, Constitutional History of the United States. Ill, 270. , - 11 - merce of the world or obstruct a highway which ought to he dedi- cated to the common uses of mankind.... It is our policy to en- courage every practicable route across the Isthmus which connects North and South America, either by railroad or canal, ... especially in consequence of the absolute necessity of facilitating inter- 33 course with our possessions on the Pacific...." Clayton was thoroughly distrustful of Hise’s intentions; and to checkmate any attempt on the part of Hise to obtain any exclusive privileges, he appointed Squier as American charge d’af- faires to succeed Hise. furthermore, the new charge was to ne- gotiate a treaty with Nicaragua; he was "to claim no peculiar privilege--no exclusive right — no monopoly of commercial intercourse .... If a charter or grant of the right of way shall have been in- cautiously or inconsiderately made before your arrival in that country, seek to have it properly modified to answer the ends we have in view.... We only ask an equal right of passage for all 34 nations on the same terms." But Hise was the man on the job, so to speak, and seeing the situation as it existed in reference to the aggressions of Great Britain, he determined to meet the issue by concluding a treaty with Nicaragua. Accordingly, on June 21, 1849, he concluded a convention with Nicaragua that gave the United States the ex- clusive right to construct "a convenient communication" between the 33 Richardson, Messages , V, 9-24. 34 House Ex . Doc ., no. 75, 1st Sess. 31st Cong., 118-130. - 12 - Gar ibbean and the Pacific; that both parties should enjoy equal privileges; that the United States should have the right to fortify the work anywhere; that tolls should not be levied on the property of the United States or that of its citizens; and that in return for all these concessions, the United States was to guarantee the 35 political integrity of Nicaragua in defensive wars. When Hise brought the treaty back with him to the United States, it soon met the disapproval of the administration and con- firmed the anticipations of Clayton. He saw in it a political al- 36 liance. The worst feature was that it gave the United States such exclusive rights; and he fully realised the political capital that his opponents could make against him in case he failed to push its ratification. Should such a course as that of submitting the treaty to the Senate be followed, he feared the demands of that body would bring on war with Great Britain in view of the inevitable 37 conflict at the mouth of the Ban Juan river. No one can question the highmindedness of both Taylor and Clayton in their action re- garding the Hise treaty. They wanted an international canal and were confident that the matter could be settled amicably "by a little mutual forbearance" on the part of both C-reat Britain and 38 the United States. At the same time, they knew that if the 35 British and Foreign State Papers , XL, 969-979. 36 Cong. Globe, op. cit., 252-253. 37 Crampton to Palmerston, State Papers, XL, 955. 38 Ibid. , 958. -13- British remained obstinate and refused to yield at all in regard to the hold on Greytovn and Mosquitia, they would he compelled to 39 accept the treaty in self defense. This treaty was never sub- mitted to the Senate. In the meantime, Squier had proceeded to Nicaragua and had obtained the concession for the American Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company. On September 3, he obtained a treaty with Nicaragua. This convention provided for the protection of the property and 40 lives of the members of the canal company. As in the Hise treaty, no tolls would be charged upon vessels belonging to the United States or its citizens; and such privileges were not to accrtie to any other nation unless it entered into similar stipulations for 41 the protection and defense of the proposed canal. As had been the case with the Hise Treaty, so this one of Squier was unsatisfactory, and it was not at the time presented to the Senate. Clayton had become so filled with the idea of an international canal, with no one country possessing exclusive privileges, that any other solution was distasteful to him. He also believed that the two nations, Great Britain and the United States, should unite to protect the neutrality of the waterway, since both 42 nations had common interests. It may be that the obstinacy of the 39 Crampton to Palmerston, State Papers, XL, 959. 40 Ibid . , 980-988. n Ibid., 1052-1064. 42 Crampton to Palmerston, Oct. 15, 1849. Ibid . , 966. ■ -14- British in the ease of the protection given the Mosquitos against Nicaragua forced him into such a compromising attitude. As Clayton had been persistent in his attempts to prevent the construction of a canal under the exclusive control of any na- 43 tion, this stand found an echo in the attitude of Palmerston. He likewise stoutly maintained that Her Majesty 1 s Government en- tertained no selfish designs on any part of Central America. Be- sides, he wanted a canal that was to be free and open to the com- merce of all nations, and he was willing to receive any proposal that would settle the difficulties at hand — on condition that the communication should he free and open at all times. To the constant inquiries of Lawrence, United States minister at St. James, as to British intentions and designs, Palmerston was consistent in the stand that Great Britain had no ulterior motives. But he did have misgivings in regards to the Squier treaty, for In it he saw — or thought he saw — an interpretation that the United States would aid Nicaragua in recovering Mosquitia. In case that the United States would give such aid and assist the Nicaraguans, he informed Lawrence 44 that Her Majesty’s Government would oppose any interference. To negotiate a convention that would settle the point at issue, Great Britain sent Sir Henry Bulwer as minister plenipoten- tiary to Washington. His purposes went hand in hand with those of Clayton. He, too, wanted England and the United States to unite in 43 Palmerston to Crampton, Nov. 9, 1849. Ibid., 961-962. 44 Palmerston to Lawrence, Nov. 13, 1849. Ihid., 964. -15- the g anal project, and he could see no difficulty in attaining such an agreement "since both countries were so self-denying" , as he 45 expressed himself. He realized that it was impossible to come to an agreement with the United States as to Mosquitia; so instead of keeping it in the foreground, he wisely determined to keep it in as unimportant a place as possible and to settle that problem after 46 means had been taken to expedite the building of the canal. The Senate, however, was growing restive, and soon took a step that precipitated negotiations. On Jan. 28, 1850, a reso- lution was passed calling for the treaties and the correspondence relating to Central America. Such men as Stephen A. Douglas, Senator frcm Illinois, were becoming uneasy lest the administration 47 had been bartering away the rights of the United States. Bulwer as well as Clayton realized the effects of turning all this over to the Senate. They saw that when the instructions to Laurence were read, the opposition would make political capital out of the revelations and would accuse the administration of giving away a most vital necessity of the people. So then the situation narrowed down to one of two courses for Clayton: he must either submit or he must hold off the Senate and the public long enough to reach a settlement with Great Britain. Accordingly President Taylor re- fused to yield to the Senate at that time. 45 Bulwer to Palmerston, Jan. 6, 1850. Ibi d. , 995. 46 Ibid., 996. 47 Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 1850. Ibid. , 1004. . *5 , . -16- Briefly, then, the situation was as follows: the United States had morally espoused the case of Nicaragua; the canal had become a national necessity — but Great Britain blocked the way at Greytown and showed no disposition to yield its sovereignty to 48 "feeble Nicaragua;" in fact, Bulwer held that it was indeed fortunate that Her Majesty's Government was in such a position to benefit mankind, since the United States would otherwise monopolize •49 the route. A convention was soon drawn up on February 3, 1850. This was not entirely satisfactory, but it settled the question at issue ' 50 namely, facilitating the construction of a canal. Yet Bulwer was uneasy and wanted the Mosquito question solved, for he felt that the Americans were exaggerating the intentions of the English in 51 Central America. Palmerston was also very anxious for a speedy settlement, but at the same time he refused to change his attitude ' 52 on the Mosquito protectorate. By the middle of March, Clayton seemed to have lost hope in arriving at any settlement, and on March 19, President Taylor submitted the Squier treaty to the Senate. In his message he as- 48 Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 3, 1850. Ibid., 1005. 49 “ Ibid. 50 Ibid . , 1007. 51 Bulwer to Palmerston, Feb. 18, 1850. Ibid., 1011-1012. 52 Palmerston to Bulwer, Apr. 10, 1850. Ibid. , 1023. -17- sailed the British retention of the port of San Juan in the name of the Mosquito king as being without a just foundation, and he ex- 53 pressed his intention to ratify the treaty should the Senate concur. At the same time Clayton reassured Bulwer that there would he no ’ 54 step taken that would he inconsistent with their proposed draft. On the 19th of April, 1850, the final draft was signed hy Clayton and Bulwer with only a few minor modifications of the first draft. It was soon passed hy the Senate hy the vote of 42-10 on May 22. What were the terms of the treaty? Both governments de- clared that neither would "ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the ship-canal"; nor would either nation "ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same... or occupy or fortify or colonize or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Mosquito Coast or any part of Central America." They were to protect the persons and the property of those building the canal. They were to try to secure a free port at each end of the canal. After it was completed, both nations agreed to protect and guarantee the neutrality "so that the canal may forever he open and free." Other nations were to he invited "to enter into treaty stipulations so that all may share in the 53 Richardson, Messages , V, 39. 54 Clayton to Bulwer, Apr. 19, 1850. State Papers , XI, 1025^ 1026 - ■ -18- honor and advantage of having contributed to a work of such general interest and importance. n Each was to enter into stipulations with Central American states so as to aid in carrying out 'Vne great design of the convention, namely, that of maintaining the canal for the benefit of mankind on equal terms to all." Both nations were to support any company. In the last article, article VIII, they desired to accomplish "not only a particular object, but also to establish a general principle, and agree to extend their protec- tion to any route across the isthmus"; and all charges were to be 55 "just and equitable". The negotiators were most optimistic as to the future of their handiwork and predicted that the bonds of friendship would be honorably strengthened between the two great kindred na- 56 tions. Taylor was very enthusiastic as to the future of the treaty, especially since it guaranteed the independence and sovereignty of all the Central American Republics and the non- 57 exclusiveness of a canal. The press also felt very happy over the outcome. England particularly welcomed the settlement. The Times felt it a "relief to turn from the complicated and untoward aspect of our political relations with the principal states of Europe to the state of our 55 Malloy, Treaties, I, 659-663; Cf. Statutes at Large, IX, 995-998. 56 Bulwer to Clayton, Apr. 19, 1850. State Papers, XL, 1026-1027. 57 Richardson, Messages . V, 42-44. ' -19- affairs in a country where a totally different policy has been pur- sued with a totally different result. It hoped that if there had been any designs of the ministry in Central America, that the "ab- surd and captious policy of setting up one republic at the expense 58 of another" had been abandoned. The Spectator , however, was very dubious as to the building of the canal and truly prophesied that in case it was not built, "the Convention is no more than a stale and cumbersome joke--a device to confer on the ’state of Mosquito’ some importance, but dragging down the two great states of Britain 59 and America into a burlesque." Nor did the New York Herald , al- though predicting a commercial revolution, see things so brightly, for it regarded the treaty as sowing the seeds for a naval conflict between the United States and Great Britain that would surpass 60 anything in the world’s history. There was some delay, however, before the final ratifica- tions were exchanged. The British author iti es feared that the United States might place an interpretation upon the treaty so as to drive Great Britain out of Central America; accordingly, before the Foreign Office would assent to ratification, Bulwer was re- 58 Editorial in the London Times , May 27, 1850. N. B. At this time British affairs on tne continent were in a muddle partly due to the aggressive policies of Palmerston. The Times was an op- ponent of Palmerston’s policies in regard to Europe. 59 "Topics of the Day" in the London Spectator. June 15, 1850. 60 Editorial in the New York Herald , Apr. 26, 1850. This is taken from The Times , May 11, 1850. - 20 - quest ed to insist that the United States make a declaration that would agree with the one dictated by the Foreign Office which was as follows: ,T Her Majesty does not understand the engagements to apply to Her Majesty’s settlement in British Honduras or to its 61 dependencies." Glayton very promptly yielded, but sought to nullify the force of his declaration by limiting British authority 62 to British Honduras and the small islands "in the neighborhood." Due ratifications were then exchanged. Thus, the act was consummated that gave Great Britain a firm grip upon the United States so as to prevent the building of an "American canal", and in fact, prevented the construction of any canal. 61 Palmerston to Bulwer, June 8, 1850. State Papers, XL, 1035. 62 Olayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850. Ibid . , 1039. . - 21 - CHAPTER II BETWEEN THE TREATIES Great as were the expectations of all responsible parties for the blissful path of the treaty, events soon proved that it would be a bone of contention instead of a bond of peace between the two nations. The first obstacle to a mutual friendly disposition was the British retention of the colony at Belize and the fact that in 1852 they had made the Bay Islands a full colony — basing all upon the declarations made after the treaty had been signed. Besides, there did not seem to be any indication that England had the slight- est intention of giving up the Mosquitos to the Nicaraguans; in fact, she interpreted the treaty as justifying such a course as she was pursuing.' 5 ' Another obstacle was the political situation in the United States. The Democrats seized upon the golden opportunity to assert themselves as anti-British; if nothing else, to oppose the treaty 2 because it had been made by a Whig Administration. When the decla- rations were presented to the Senate on January 4, 1853, the storm broke. The Democrats claimed that the treaty as signed was the only authentic document and not the declarations, and that it excluded the British from Central America entirely. In view of her actions, then, England had violated the treaty. 1 Travis, Clayton - Bulwer Treaty . 143. 2 Cong . Globe, 2nd Sess., 32nd Cong., App., 177. 3 Ibid . . 171ff. - 22 - Yet another impediment was the expedition of Walker and his filibusters. The American public had aided and abetted these, and the administration also encouraged them by its failure to stop them. The British saw nothing in these attempts but the extension of the boundaries of the United States and the expansion of slavery; consequently , when the feeble republics turned to the British for 4 aid, it was soon forthcoming. It was this that led to the down- fall of Walker and as a result, it seemed that peace between the two countries was near an end. In May, 1856, an attempt was made to settle the points at issue: that is, the controversy arising over the British seizure of the Bay Islands which to the United States was a violation of the treaty; the continual conflict between Nicaragua and Mosquitia, the latter being aided and abetted by England; and the British reten- tion of the colony at Belize, which fact also was considered by the United States as a violation of the treaty. The Dallas-Clarendon Treaty was then negotiated. It confirmed British claims in Belize, gave Honduras legal control over the Bay Islands, recognized the sovereignty of Nicaragua over Ureytown, and gave to the Mosquitos some territory in addition to their indemnification by Nicaragua.^ Everything was favorable to its ratification. But when the Presi- dent submitted it to the Senate, that body proceeded to make numer- ous amendments. England accepted all but the amendment that demand- ed the absolute control of Honduras over the Bay Islands, and 4 Travis, Glayton - Bulwer Treaty , 185. 5 Ibid . . 179. * • ’ . . , - N t ' * -23- off ered a new treaty with the Senate amendments minus the one £ mentioned. The Senate refused to agree to this. Thus affairs stood by the latter part of the decade, and President Buchanan viewed the situation as well-nigh hopeless to the extent that he advised mutual abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 7 The Senate failed to take such a stand. Fortunately for both countries the British Foreign Office was pacific and soon negotiated a treaty with Honduras in 1859 that fully restored the Bay Islands to Honduras with no other restrictions than that British Q subjects were to have religious freedom. 0 Again, in 1860 the Britisi signed a treaty with Nicaragua: Oreytown was to be made a free port and the British were to relinquish their protectorate over Mosquitia. In return, Nicaragua was to grant the Mosquitos some Q territory and an indemnity. These treaties were a great relief to Buchanan, for in his message in December, 1860, he announced that "the dangerous questions arising from the Olayton-Bulwer Treaty have been amicably and honorably adjusted." 1 ^ But as yet there was no canal nor could there be expected to be any progress made when the two nations who were to protect the construction were at loggerheads with each other. The Americans soon became involved in the Civil War. The British made no attempt 6 Travis, Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 180. 7 Richardson, Messages , V, 444. 8 State Papers. XLIX. 3-26. 9 Ibid . . L, 106-126. 10 Richardson, Messages . V, 639. _ , . .. - • . / . -24- to built it. The situation remained the same until Colombia made a concession to De Lesseps and a group of French capitalists in 1878. ^ This incident aroused the United States from its lethargy in regard to a canal, and a change in policy followed. The reasons for the change of policy are obvious. In the first place, there was a lingering distrust of the European powers because of their attitude during the Civil War. The public had not forgotten the British sympathy with the South nor the French invasion in Mexico when our hands were tied. In the second place, the Monroe Doctrine was get- ting to be a part of the national consciousness more than ever be- fore; and the Americans knew that in case a canal were built under the guarantee of neutrality by Europeans they all would have to keep troops in the canal zone continually for protection from the chronic rebellions in Central America. Hence, President Hayes sounded the first call for an "American canal" in his message in December, 1880. In case that any treaties would prevent such control, then said Hayes, "Suitable steps should be taken by just and liberal negotia- tions to promote and establish the American policy on this subject consistently with the rights of the nations to be affected by it.... It is the right and duty of the United States to assert and maintain 12 such supervision and authority over any interoceanic canal." It was not until the next administration, however, that efforts were made to carry out the suggestion made by Hayes. 11 Travis. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 205. 12 Richardson, Messages . VII, 585. -25- Jam es Gr. Blaine became the new Secretary of State, and it was not long before he had a chance to open the question. For some time the European press had been advocating a combination of the powers to guarantee the neutrality of a trans -isthmian canal. ^ So per- sistent was this propaganda that Blaine felt that the time had come for the United States to take a stand in regard to any such agree- ment. Accordingly, he wrote to James Russell Lowell, who was the American minister at the Court of St. James, that in case he found plans under way to interfere in the isthmus, he was to intimate that the United States would consider such action as an "uncalled-for in- trusion”. It was at this time that Blaine set forth the policy that helped to guide one of his successors, John Hay. This dictum was as follows: "Nor in time of peace, does the United States seek to have any exclusive privileges accorded to American ships in respect to precedence or tolls through an interoceanis canal any more than it has sought like privileges for American goods in transit over the Panama Railroad, under the exclusive control of an American corpora- tion” In November of the same year Blaine sought a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. In the first place, his main reasons were, that at the time of the negotiation of the above treaty Amer- ican capital was not strong enough to undertake the construction of 13 Blaine to Lowell, June 24, 1881. Senate Documents , no. 237, 1st Sess., 56th Cong., 380. 14 Ibid., 381. -26- the canal but the times had changed and now the United States cap- italists were able to carry it out and assistance was unnecessary.^ In the second place, the United States was unwilling to perpetuate any treaty that impeached our right and our long-established claim to priority on the American continent. In the third place, the time had come for the United States to have absolute control as a measure of self-defense and to have the right to exclude an enemy's vessels in time of war. Blaine's way out of the difficulty was to cancel the clause prohibiting fortifications, to retain the clause that kept both nations from making any territorial acquisitions, to establish free ports, and to remove the article that invited other nations to guarantee the neutrality of the canal. ' There is no doubt that he was sincere in his efforts for a modification. He considered the Convention of 1850 as the only cause for any quarrels between the two' nations, and he regarded it as "mi sunder standingly entered into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted, and mutually 18 vexatious" • Lord Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, soon re- plied to this. He held that the canal was for the benefit of the whole world and therefore should be on an international basis; that when the United States should begin to fortify the route, then the 15 Blaine to Lowell, Nov. 19, 1881. Senate Document , no. 237, 1st Sess., 56th Cong., 380. 16 Ibid., 385-388. 17 Ibid., 388-390. 18 Blaine to Lowell, Nov. 29, 1881. Ibid., 395. . , . ' -27- Central American states concerned would soon cease to be independent; that the principles of the negotiators were sound, and that this was an opportune time for other powers to enter into the capacity of a guarantor; that there was no need for any settlement, because that had already been settled in the latter part of the fifth decade of the century when Great Britain had yielded almost everything for the sake of amity. 1 " Blaine resigned his position in the early part of 1852 and was succeeded by P. T. Frelinghuysen. The latter was a tactless and brusque individual for the office of Secretary of State. He deter- mined to carry on the battle that Blaine had started, however, and went to lengths that his predecessor had not even contemplated. He accused the British government of bad faith in its dealings with the United States and the isthmian states by the retention of British Honduras, an act that was a flagrant violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; therefore, the treaty was "voidable at the pleasure of the United States." Anyway, he considered it a dead letter since it had been meant "to secure a thing which did not exist and which now never could exist." It had applied only to the Nicaragua route and the one under discussion was the Panama route. w To such argument there was only one thing for Granville to do and that was to deny all the allegations that had been made. He refused to abrogate the treaty, and apparently irritated at the 19 Granville to West, Jan. 7, 1882. Senate Document, no. 237, 1st Sess., 56th Cong. , 397-400; Granville to West, Jan. 14, 1882. Ibid., 400-409. 20 Prelinghuysen to Lowell, May 8, 1882. Foreign Relations of the United States 1882-1883, pp. 272-282. . ■ . < -28- tone and manner of Frelinghuysen, finally informed him that Great Britain could see no reason for changing her attitude and that fur- ther discussion was of no avail. A But Frelinghuysen was determined to have the last word and sent another reminder to Granville by way of Lowell reminding him that the British had violated the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty and that it had lapsed * * Frelinghuysen evidently meant all that he had said, for in December, 1884, he concluded a treaty with Nicaragua that gave the United States exclusive rights in a canal that was to be built via the Nicaraguan route. 23 But President Cleveland withdrew it from the Senate on the basis that "Whatever highway may be constructed ... must be for the world’s benefit — a trust for mankind, to be re- moved from the chance of domination of any single power, nor become the point of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambi- tion.... The lapse of years has abundantly confirmed the wisdom and foresight of those earlier Administrations which, long before the conditions of maritime intercourse were changed and enlarged by the progress of the age, proclaimed the vital need of interoeeanic transit across the American Isthmus and consecrated it in advance to the common use of mankind by their positive declarations and 24 through the formal obligation of treaties." 21 Granville to West, Dec«30, 1882., Senate Document , no. 237, 1st Sess., 56th Cong., 411-417. 22 Frelinghuysen to Lowell, Nov. 22, 1883, Ibid . , 423-425. 23 Senate Report, No. 1. 1st Sess., 57th Cong., 345-352. 24 Foreign Relations 1885, vi. -29- The diplomatic discussion of the treaty stopped for several years. Once in a while some statesman would make himself heard regarding it. The canal question was kept before the public by the Maritime Oanal Company. It had been formed in 1880, was re- chartered in 1884, and was incorporated by an Act of Congress in 25 1889 after having already received a concession from Nicaragua. The lack of funds drove the directors of the company to ask for the aid of the government of the United States. Not much attention was paid to these requests; for it was not until early in 1895 that an act was finally passed which gave aid to the company, and in certain contingencies the government was to be put in almost complete con- trol. 26 The ideas of Frelinghuysen had left their imprint, for in 1891 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a statement de- claring that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was obsolete and that the United States was no longer under any obligations to act under its 27 provisions. Richard Olney, Secretary of State in the administra- tion of President Cleveland, took a public stand that the treaty was still in existence; that if changes were necessary, the true remedy was not in ’’ingenuous attempts to deny the existence of the treaty or to explain away its provisions, but in a direct and straight for- ward application to Great Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter.” 26 25 Travis. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 240. 26 Sen . Rpt . . No. 1944, 2nd Sess., 51st Cong., 18. 27 Cong. Record, part 6, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 6029. Q " - 1 Root ’ s Addresses on International Sub .jects . 217. Cf. part 2, 3rd Sess., 62nd Cong., 1818-1825. . ; . - . , . . ' -30- The United States public, however, was apparently indif- ferent to the building of a canal. It was going through, as it were, a period of instruction preoaratory to a full realization that a canal was necessary, not only from a standpoint of commerce but of national defense. An event that contributed to this education took place during the war with Spain when the "Oregon" made its historic voyage around Gape Horn to join the Atlantic fleet. Another factor was our acquisition of the Philippines and of Hawaii, and of our rapidly expanding commercial interests in China. The British public was, on the whole oblivious to the growing sentiment in the United States for a canal. But there were some Englishmen who felt that if a canal was to be built at all, it must needs be. owned, built, and controlled by the United States, and that it was the duty of the Foreign Office to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which had served go as a veto upon the construction of any trans -isthmian canal. ^ The relations between the two countries had on the whole been friendly during the latter part of the century. President Cleveland T s message in 1895 relative to the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute had nearly precipitated the two countries into war, but the British yielded to his demands for arbitration and the matter was hushed. The aid that the British had extended to the United States during the Spanish-American war was not lost upon the American public. It was not disposed to forget, for a short time at least, 29 "Topics of the Bay" in The Spectator . Aug. 27, 1898. , , - . . -31- that it was the stand of Great Britain which had prevented the interference of France and Germany on the side of Spain. Uor at the time had it forgotten the value of the British maintenance of neutrality at Port Said when the authorities refused to allow the Spanish fleet coal on the way to the Philippines. During this period John Hay, American Ambassador to Great Britain, was doing all that he could to cement the cordial relations of the two countries. His opportunity to further his aims came when he was appointed Secretary of State in September, 1898, and took charge of affairs in October . ^ The time for a reconsideration of the Glayton-Bulwer Treaty was at hand; and it was obvious that each party would have to yield some- thing in return for a quid pro quo from the other. The history of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has received a brief treatment, but it has probably been observed that at one time the United States wanted abrogation, at another, modification; that at another, the United States was so bold to declare that such a thing as the treaty did not exist, and that the last tendency had been towards modification. Statesmen have been doing all the talking but now another element in American government, the Senate of the United States, is to step in and assert its presence, and literally force the issue. 30 Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay . II, 173. -32- CHAPTER III THE FIRST HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY Since the interest of the United States and Great Britain in a canal was in a dormant state, the message of President McKinley on December 5, 1898, served to wake up the American people to the need of a canal. In this message McKinley informed Congress that he had learned that Nicaragua had made a grant to another associa- tion aside from the Maritime Canal Company; and he suggested ’’the urgency of some definite action hy Congress at this time if the labors of the past are to be utilized and the linking of the At- lantic and Pacific oceans by a practical waterway is to be realized ...and the prospective expansion of our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and our national policy now more imperatively than ever calls for its control by this Government are propositions which I doubt not the Congress will duly appreciate and wisely act 1 upon” . The Senate got busy, and a bill was soon introduced that provided for governmental aid to be given to the Maritime Canal Company to the extent of ov/ning ninety-two and a half per cent of the stock, virtually giving the United States the ownership and the 2 control of the canal when completed. Senator Morgan was the leader of the canal votaries. He had made a study of the canal prob- lem and was enthusiastic for a Nicaraguan canal at any price. 1 Foreign Relations 1898, lxxi. 2 Cong . Record , part 1, 3rd Sess., 55th Cong., 895. -33- In the discussion of the bill, it is not surprising that the Senators soon found that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stood in the way. Some regarded the treaty as having died a natural death owing to the change of conditions and had vanished into "thin air," while 3 others felt that the bill was not a violation of the treaty at all. There was a realization that the rapid expanse of our relations in the Orient was now demanding a canal. The South was very anxious because of the expanding cotton trade with Japan and Ohina. There was considerable opposition, however, to plunging headlong into what many felt to be an open violation of the treaty, and although amendments asking for negotiations were voted down, this opposition was strong enough to delay precipitate action, at least for a time. One thing may be noticed and that is that there was little tendency for exclusive control in the matter of tolls. All this debate in the Senate had its effect upon Hay who feared dangerous conse- quences from all the debate since the Senators would commit them- selves in a way that would prevent them accepting any arrangement 4 that might be made. Nevertheless, the bill passed on January 21, 5 1899, by a vote of 48-6, with 36 not voting. The House of Representatives was also alive to the demands of not only the President but also the people, for petitions were 3 For the debate, see the Gong . Record , part 1, 3rd Sess., 55th Cong., during the months of Dec. 1898 and Jan. 1899. 4 Hay to White, Jan. 13, 1899. Thayer, John Hay, II, 216. 5 Cong. Record , part 1, 3rd Sess., 55th Cong., 911. . . . • ' ' • . . -34- being made asking for the construction of a canal under the owner- ship of the United States. The result was the Hepburn bill, intro- duced early in December of 1898, which provided for the construction 6 of a canal by the United States. This bill instantly met the dis- approval of Hay who considered it not only an evasion of the Olay- ton-Bulwer Treaty but an open violation of it; consequently, he preferred that the question of United States control should first 7 go through diplomatic channels. The message also served to awaken the British public to a realization that the United States needed the canal and would control it, and that English capital was not disposed to finance the building of one; therefore, there was no reason for a continua- 8 tion of the Olayt on-Bulwer Treaty. Englishmen were willing to modify it on the condition that the canal should be international in character, free and open on equal terms to all nations. The attitude of the British is best summed up in an editorial of The Times : "On the one hand, our treaty rights are undeniable and unassailable. We have paid for them, we have got them, and we cannot be expected to surrender them for nothing. On the other hand, we are quite ready to admit that while our interests in the canal scheme are large, those of America are vital. We acknowledge 6 Pong . Record , part 2, 3rd Sess., 55th Gong., 133. 7 Hay to Ohoate, Jan. 15, 1900. Thayer, John Hay, II, 222, 223. 8 "Topics of the Day” in The Spectator , Dec. 10, 1898; editorial in The Times, Dec. 6, 1898. . -35- accomplished facts when they confront ns, and amongst such facts we 9 recognize the superior interests of the United States in the Canal." The Spectator in a similar vein said: "Let us show the world that, though in the case of foreigners we shall tie tenacious of our treaty rights to the last iota, we can in the case of our own kith and kin 10 think of their interests as well as our own". The speeches of such men as Chamberlain and Balfour always portrayed a distinctly 11 kindly feeling towards the United States, all of which was ob- served by our incoming ambassador, Joseph H. Choate, when he ar- rived in England in February, 1899 . On the other hand, there was an element of distrust of the United States friendship for Great Bri- tain as seen in a pungent criticism of the America by the Saturday Review . This proverbially anti-American paper seemed uneasy about the canal question. Referring to the discourtesy shorn towards Canada in the matter of a discriminatory tariff, this weekly said: "Whether the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and our interests will be treated with the same scant courtesy remains to be seen. Ghangeableness is 12 the one certain thing of American politics". The State Department of the United States government was fully aware of the conditions as they existed; namely, that state 9 Editorial in The Times, Feb. 14, 1899. 10 "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator, Dec. 10, 1898. 11 News articles in The Times, Dec. 10. 1898 and Jan. 31. 1899. 12 Editorial in the Saturday Review , Jan. 21, 1899. -36- aid was necessary to the construction of a canal; that when the people demanded a canal Congress would act accordingly; that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stood in the way of a canal as the public wanted it; and that in the event of such responsive legislation, there would be a violation of a recognized treaty which would injure 13 the foreign relations of the United States everywhere. As a re- sult, the department wanted to modify it without affecting the 14 ’’general principle of neutralization". Hay was determined that as long as he was Secretary of State no action would be taken con- trary to his conviction that the one indispensable feature of the foreign policy of the United States should be a friendly under - 15 standing with England. Accordingly, early in December, 1898, Hay instructed Henry White, American charge d'affaires in London, to sound Lord Salisbury, who at that time was the British Foreign Secretary, as 16 to his attitude. Lord Salisbury was willing to modify the treaty on the condition that the canal should be open to all nations on 17 equal terms. No time was lost in framing a draft of a new treaty, 13 Hay to Choate, Jan. 15, 1900. Thayer, John Hay, 11,221. 14 S ena te Document , no. 474, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 13; Parliamentary Paoers, U. S. no. 1, 1901, XCI, 3. 15 Hay to Choate, Sept. 24, 1899. Thayer, John Hay, II, 221 . ‘ 16 Hay to White, Dec. 7, 1898. Sen . Doc., no. 474, op . cit . , 2. 17 White to Hay, Dec. 22, 1898. Ibid . , 3. ' -37- which was concluded by Lord Pauncefote, English Ambassador at 18 Washington, and Secretary Hay, on January 11, 1899. But this treaty was not accepted at once. It soon became evident that the proposal would become mixed up with other points at issue between the two countries. There was the old question of the fur-seal fishery as yet unsettled, the dispute over the alien labor laws, reciprocity and other controversial points. The point most at issue at this time was the dispute over the boundary of Alaska and Canada's demand for a seaport from her portion of the Klondike region. Canada used this opportunity to try to get some concession from the United States in return for any rights England was giving up in the case of the proposed Hay-Pauncef ote Treaty. The existing ministry was disposed to yield to the Canadian pres- sure for fear that the public would not sustain it; c onsequently, 19 there was no action taken upon the treaty. Fortunately, however, events were moving in such a way as to revive the good feeling between the two countries that had seemed to slacken during the simmer. In September, when the English war with the Boers broke out, the United States immediately issued a proclamation of neutrality, and the American consulate at Pre- toria took over British interests. The British had been in thorough sympathy with the American policy in suppressing the Filipinos, as taking up the "white man's burden", and now the people of the 18 Lansdowne to Pauncefote, Feb. 22, 1901. Sen . Doc . , no. 474, on. cit., 13. 19 Ibid.; editorial in The Times , May 26, 1899. . : -38- Uni ted States at this time seemed to have a realization of the 20 problem of the British in the Transvaal. Further, the decision of the arbitration commission relative to the Venezuelan boundary dis- pute was made on October 3, 1899, largely in favor of the British 21 claims. Most important for its direct relation to the canal question was the agreement in October between the United States and England to a modus vivendi in regard to the Alaskan boundary dis- 22 pute. Hence, the situation in the fall caused Ohoate to believe 23 that relations had never been closer since 1783. In the meantime, the United States was investigating routes for a canal. The Isthmian Oanal Commission was at work at such a task. Moreover, the impetus for a canal was gradually gathering momentum. All this made the British ministry uneasy, be- cause it saw the temper of the Senate and feared that it might force the administration to yield. Such a c ontingency would most surely have injured the amicable relations then existing; and the ministry set about to forestall such an eventuality by yielding to the 24 United States as a proof of British friendship. Consequently, a treaty was concluded and signed at Washing- 20 See The Times all during the summer and fall of 1899, especially the editorial, Nov. 10, 1899. 21 Article in The Times, Oct. 4, 1899. 22 Dunning, The British Empire and the United States, 330. 23 Speech in The Times, Dec. 11, 1899. 24 Lansdowne to Pauncefote, Feb. 22, 1901. Sen. Doc., no. 474, 13-14. -39- ton on the 5th of February, 1900, to facilitate the construction of some canal by the United States without impairing the general prin- ciple of neutralization established in Article VIII of the Clayton- 25 Bulwer treaty. A summary of the treaty is as follows. The United States was to have the right to construct, regulate, and manage the canal. Both countries were to preserve the neutraliza- tion features of the Clayt on-Bulwer Treaty. Also, the canal was to be free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all na- tions, in time of peace as in time of war, on equal terms. There was a number of clauses that concerned the action of belligerents in the canal, but the most important one was one that prevented the United States from making any fortifications along the route. Last- ly, one article provided that other nations were to be invited to enter into treaty stipulations in accordance with the terms of the proposed treaty. On the same day that it was signed, the treaty was pre- sented to the Senate. Immediately the storm broke. The State Department was roundly accused as being unmindful of the country's 26 honor and the glory of the flag and as being derelict in its duty. All this storm of disapproval seemed "mere spite" to Hay, and he ap- pealed to Senator Lodge to champion the treaty in the Senate and to 27 use hie influence to prevent any amendments. This plea, however, 25 Lansdowne to Pauncefote, Feb. 22, 1901. Sen . Doc . , no. 474, 289-291. 26 Hay to Choate, Feb. 6, 1900. Thayer, John Hay, II, 224. 27 Ibid. , 223. . -40- fell on deaf ears. Nor did he derive any sympathy from Roosevelt who at that time was Governor of New York, He regarded Hay*s posi- tion as "incomprehensible”, and as a step backward and "fraught with mischief". Although he would back the administration as heartily as ever, he earnestly hoped that Hay and McKinley would drop the treaty and push through a bill "to build and fortify our own canal". His first objection was that it was a false naval policy which would allow an enemy's ships to pass through the canal. In the second place, he wanted the canal fortified. And his other objection was that the invitation to other powers was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine and was setting a precedent for joint-ownership over any 28 part of South America — which situation would not at all have been to his liking. Hay received some consolation, however, from the ministers of the Central American States all of whom approved of 29 the non-fortifications provision. Many newspapers came to his aid, such as the New York Tribune , which felt gratification "at so happy an ending of an ancient and sometimes vexatious controver- sy.... The vast majority of the people of the United States will, 30 we are convinced, hail the signing and ratification with great joy." As to fortifications, it likewise upheld him: "The question seems to 28 Roosevelt to Dr. Albert Shaw. Bishop, Theodore Roose - velt , I, 144, also, Roosevelt to Hay, Feb. 18, 1900, I, 144, 145; Thayer, Theodore Roosevelt, 180-181. 29 Hay to C. K. Davis, Feb. 8, 1900. Thayer, John Hay, II, 224. 30 Editorial in The New York Tribune , Feb. 6, 1900. I -41- be whether the United States is big enough and brave enough and strong enough to open this canal to the world and trust its own ability to cope with whatever improbable emergencies may arise, or is so given to seeing ghosts that it must line the canal with fortresses and sit up o' night to watch lest some bad pirate enter The British response was on the whole rather favorable. There was some annoyance, however, at the reception of the treaty by the Senate. Englishmen seemed to regard the treaty only as a great concession from Great Britain. This resignation was hard to swallow since they thought that the Foreign Office had let Canada go a-begging. Early in March, Hay had become very doubtful of the treaty’s 33 passing the Senate. On March 9, the report of the Foreign Rela- tions Committee was made. This told a brief history of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty and recognized its validity. As to American policy in regard to a canal, the committee said: "Ho American statesman speak- ing with official authority or responsibility, has ever intimated that the United States would attempt to control this canal for the exclusive benefit of our government or people. They have all with 31 Editorial in The New York Tribune, Feb. 7, 1900. 32 "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator , Feb. 24, 1900; editorial in The Times , Feb. 26, 1900; edi torial in the Saturday Review , Feb. 10. 33 Hay to Choate, Mar. 7, 1900. Thayer, John Hay , II, 225. . -42- one accord, declared that the canal was to he neutral ground in time of war, and always open on terms of impartial equality to the ships and commerce of the world.... We will never find it necessary to differentiate our rates of toll in favor of our own people in order to secure a very great profit on the investment.” It then recommended the passage of the treaty with the amendment that none of the provisions of Article III were to apply to any measures that 34 the United States might take for its own safety. This was called the Davis Amendment in honor of the chairman of the Gommittee, Senator Cushman X. Davis. Thoroughly disgusted with what he con- sidered a crime by the Senate and annoyed by the adverse criticism, Hay offered his resignation to the President. This, of course, was 35 instantly refused. The Hepburn Bill was now again before the House. In the debate over its provisions, there was a noticeable hostility towards the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, not only from the Democrats but 36 from the Republicans. The extent of the opposition is plainly shown in the vote upon the bill on May 3, the yeas numbering 224 and the nays only 36, with 84 not voting. The bill, as passed, gave the President the authority to purchase the territory for a canal and to take proper measures for its defense; and the construe 34 Sen . Doc . , no. 268, 1st Sess., 56th Cong.; Sen . Rpt . , no. 1, 1st Sess. 57th Cong., 421-435. 35 Hay to McKinley, Mar. 13, 1900, Thayer, John Hay, II, 227; also McKinley to Hay, Mar. 13, 1900. Ibid. 36 Con£. Rec . , part 6, 1st Sess., 56th Cong. Debate on May 2, 1900. -43- tion was to be under the supervision of the Secretary of War. The President was to withhold action, however, until it was seen how the Senate was to act in regard to the treaty before it. Thus the House had taken a stand unalterably opposed to the treaty and to the 37 administration. It desired an American canal and naturally re- flected the attitude of the American public. When one considers the fact that a presidential election was approaching, another interpretation may be put upon the vote. All of these actions by the House and the report of the Foreign Relations Committee dismayed the British public for it saw the best relations with the United States vanishing. Then, in addi- tion, the campaign of 1900 was approaching, and those who were nervous of a breaking of good relations warned the public to be calm and to swallow the hard things that would be said in the heat of the campaign against England and to consider the circumstances. There was much opposition to the Davis amendment, for it was re- garded as a consequent subversion of neutrality. Besides, the English regarded the Foreign Office as having gone as far as it 38 could to retain an amicable understanding. Nor were their anticipations wrong. In the coming presi- dential campaign in which imperialism was the "paramount issue" and opposition to the gold standard had not wholly died down, and where 37 Cong . Record , part 6, 1st Sess., 56th Cong. Debate on May 2, 1900, 5015. 38 Editorial in The Times , Mar. 3, 1900; "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator , Apr. l4, 1900. _ , « -44- it was "good politics” to get the Irish and the German vote, it was to be expected that Great Britain would come in for a large amount of abuse, since she was considered our national temptress. The Republican party advocated the construction of a canal owned and 39 protected by the government, but for political reasons it was no more than lukewarm towards the treaty under discussion. The Demo- cratic party also declared for the construction, ownership, and control of a canal by the United States; but it denounced the Re- publicans as being insincere because they had failed to push through the Hepburn Bill even though they had a majority. It also con- demned the Hay-Pauncefo te Treaty "as a surrender of American in- 40 terests not to be tolerated by the American people." But the traditional howling against Great Britain proved to no avail, and the Republicans returned McKinley to the White House. When Congress met again in December, President McKinley 41 urged the Senate to give early attention to the pending treaty. It soon became evident that there would be more amendments to the treaty than the Davis amendment. There was an assumption that be- cause of her desire for our friendship, England would yield, no mat- ter what the Senate demanded, and that after all she was not inter- ested in the canal. The Times did not hesitate to deny any such feeling. It regarded the British as being calm because they con- 39 Stanwood, History of the Presidency from 1897 to 1916, 150. 40 Ibid., 62. 41 Foreign Relations 1900 , xxv. ' . -45- si dered their moral and legal position as unassailable; it deplored the attitude of the Senate and if it adhered to its apparent policy, Englishmen would simply fall back on their rights under the old treaty: "We shall stand upon those rights. It is not the cus- tom of this country to conclude treaties of surrender with any na- tion-even with those whose friendship we value most — and that is 42 a custom from which we have no mind to depart". The Davis Amendment was passed on December 14, by the 43 large majority vote of 65-17. Then followed a flood of amend- ments, chief among them in importance being the Bard amendment: that "the United States reserved the right to discriminate charges in traffic in favor of American ships engaged in coastwise trade." 44 Like many of the other amendments it was rejected. This attitude of the Senate, especially the passing of the Davis amendment, served to cool off the relations so far as the pub- lic was concerned. The people of the United States seemed to be in a quandary, but at the same time they were growing more in favor of an "American canal"; and although they felt that the British would reject the amendment, there seemed to be a disposition to go ahead 45 and build it anyhow. On the other side of the water, the English felt that they had gone as far as they could in the matter of con- 42 Editorial in The Times, Dec. 9, 1900. 43 News article in The New York Tribune, Deo. 15, 1900. 44 Root's Addresses, 221. 45 Editorial in The New York Tribune , Dec. 14, 1900. . . -46- cessions. They based their opposition to the fortifications clause 46 to its being at variance with the Convention of 1850. What were the elements in the Senate that were producing this situation? In the first place, there were the jingoes who wanted an American canal at any price without any regard to foreign relations. Then there was the opposition of the trans -continental railroad companies and those Senators interested in the maintenance of the monopoly of the Panama railroad in collusion with the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. All these were opposed to any canal at all, but at the same time under cover of wanting an American canal, they indirectly and covertly worked for the passage of amendments that would be so offensive to Great Britain that she could not accept the treaty; consequently, they gambled on the possibility of there being no canal at all. And last among the elements was a disposi- tion--which we today consider almost chronic — of the Senate to have 47 a hand in the negotiations of the treaty itself. The Senate, after making two more amendments, finally passed the treaty on December 20. One of these amendments provided for the supers edure of the Clayt on-Bulwer Treaty; the other struck out entirely the clause inviting the other nations to adhere to the 48 treaty. Senator Lodge, who had taken the lead in pushing through 46 Editorial in The Times, Dec. 15, 1900. 47 Articles in The Times by the Washington correspondent in Nov. and Dec., 1900. 48 Sen . Doc . no. 474, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 289-291. T ' ! * . -47- the treaty as amended, explained the Senate action: "Let me say, first, that the amendments were not dictated hy hostility towards England, and still less in any degree a reflection on the Secretary of State.... The amendments were made hy the Senate solely because in its opinion they were necessary for the interests of the United States, for the avoidance of any question as to the control of the canal, and consequently for the sake of peaceful and harmonious relations with the rest of the world on that subject in the future. In the exercise of its undoubted rights, without the slightest reflection upon anyone and without a shadow of hostility to a friend ly nation, the Senate.* c anti nuing the negotiations of Mr. Hay, offers 49 three new propositions to England”. The British dissatisfaction at the action of the Senate was painfully evident. Even the most ul tr a -American journals were dismayed; for instance, the Spectator said: "The action of the United States Senate during the past week has been anything but cal- culated to raise that body in the opinion of serious people. It has not only treated a diplomatic instrument of great importance in itself and prepared by one of the ablest and most patriotic of American statesmen as if it were the work of the merest ignoramus in foreign affairs, but it has tolerated a levity and recklessness of tone in regard to solemn treaty obligations which shows that the Senate as a body is losing its sense of the high responsibility with 50 which it is entrusted under the constitution." lodge and the 49 News article in The New York Tribune, Dec. 21, 1900. 50 "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator , Dec. 22 , 1900. . ■ • -48- President were attacked for their stand: the former because he had opposed the treaty in the Senate, and the latter because he had vacillated. In their opinion he should have withdrawn the treaty. What seemed to provoke The Times was the abrogation of the Glayton- Bulwer Treaty without any conference with Great Britain: "We cannot imagine a nation whose greatness and prosperity are based in no small measure the inviolability of ordinary civil contracts, should seriously contemplate the one-sided rescission of an agreement in- 51 vested with special sanctity by the law of all civilized nations". The Saturday Review had predicted such action; and in this case, it spoke of the Senate's action as being "an inlovely spectacle which the Senate and President are at present affording the civi- lized world.... The worst of it is that we have only ourselves to blame for the whole pother. The policy of perpetual concession to the United States, and the overstrained eulogism of her statesmen, meets with no response from the other party save fresh demands and increasing insolence. The conviction that we shall on no possible grounds quarrel with them has become so ingrained in American politicians, and has been so carefully fostered by our courting of their good will, that it is almost impossible to convince them that 52 they are wrong". By January they exhibited a tendency to calm down and yield to the Senate. The death of Queen Victoria in that 51 Editorial in The Times, Dec. 24, 1900. 52 Editorial on "The Nicaraguan Scandal" in the Saturday Review, Dec. 22, 1900. -49- month and the American sympathy with the English public served to 53 stabilize good relations once more. Mr. Hay presented the amended treaty to Lord Lansdowne, who was the new Foreign Secretary. He was anxious for the British to act favorably because he despaired of ever getting another treaty 54 through the Senate. But the treaty was still unratified on March 4, which was the last day allowed by the terms, and it died a natural death. The Americans felt that this policy on the part of England - 55 was wise. It afforded the Senate, however, an excellent oppor- tunity to attack British policy. Senator Morgan took the lead in this assault in the fight for his resolution declaring the Clayton- 56 Bulwer treaty void. For the Senate to have passed such a resolu- tion would have set a bad precedent, but it seemed that the Senate was not worrying about precedents — it wanted a canal. Nevertheless, the British Foreign Office had made a reply. Although it was written on the 22nd of February, it was not pre- sented to the State Department until the 11th of March. England's opposition to the Senate's amendments was as follows: as to the 53 The British reciprocated this sympathy a few months later when McKinley was killed. Thus, it took the deaths of two good rulers to steady the international relations. 54 Hay to Choate, Jan. 25, 1901. Sen . Doc . no. 474, op . cit . , 10. 55 Editorial in The N ew York Tribune, May 6, 1901. 56 Cong. Record , 1st Sess., 57th Cong., 1378 ff. -50- superseding of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, the British still regarded it as a valid and international contract that should not have “been abrogated unless both parties had been consulted; besides, abroga- tion would mean a scramble for territory in Central America, since both parties would be exempted from the prohibitions of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty. In regard to the Davis amendment. Lord Lansdowne held that since the United States was not the owner of the territory through which the canal would pass, that fact would not permit it to fortify the canal; in addition, should the United States get into war with Great Britain, the United States would have rights in the canal that Great Britain would be denied. In other words, he re- garded this provision as being one-sided, and the ’’general principle of neutralization” would be subverted. Lastly, he opposed the elision of the invitation clause for he felt that such co-operation was necessary to the maintenance of the neutrality of the canal; but his strongest point was that in case of a general war, Great Britain, in spite of her great colonial interests, would be bound by the treaty and the other nations would have a great advantage over her by not being so bound. He preferred the <31 ayton-Bulwer Treaty as it was, but His Majesty’s Government "would sincerely re- 57 gret a failure to come to an amicable understanding”. On the whole, the American public opinion was kindly dis- 57 Landsdowne to Pauncefote, Feb. ££, 1901. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 11-17; Parliamentary Papers , no. 1, 1901, XCI, 3 ff . ; State Papers . XClY, 476,484. -51- posed towards Landsdowne's reply, especially in view of its friendly and courteous tone. It was felt that this was a favorable beginning 58 of an amicable settlement. Although there were discordant indi- viduals here and there that were clamoring for the immediate abroga- 59 tion of the treaty by act of Congress, fortunately, the element of serious -minded people was strong enough to prevent any such ac- tion. But strangely enough, the English were now more determined than ever to stand by their rights as they saw them. They felt a pride in the kindly but firm reply. As in the case of the note, they showed no inclination to close the doors to further negotia- tions, if only the Senate would reciprocate their good will. Never- theless, they showed no willingness to initiate the negotiations, 60 the Senate seeming to be a sort of a "bugaboo” to any undertaking. Thus, efforts to arrive at a settlement by means of the "First Hay-Pauncefote Treaty" had failed for the moment. It was a fortunate day for America that the Senate was made up of the ele- ments that it was; for after all, they made possible a more "American canal", at least more so than was thought possible at the time. 58 "The March, of Events" in The Worlds Work, May 1901. 59 Editorial in The Chicago Tribune , Mar. 13, 1901. 60 Editorials in The Times , Mar. 12 and Mar. 26, 1901; editorial in the Saturday Review , Mar. 30, 1901; "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator , May 11, 1901. -52- CHAPTER IV THE SECOND AND PINAL HAY-PAUNCEPOTE TREATY Taking his cue from the hint near the close of the reply from Lord Landsdowne , Secretary Hay immediately set to work to per- fect another treaty. But this time he used rare tact and showed his deference to the Senate, for he called some of the leading Senators into his confidence and got their sentiments before he began to negotiate with Lord Pauncefote. 1 Senator Lodge assured him that he believed a treaty would pass the Senate that provided for the abro- gation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty; that would allow the United States to fortify the canal if it chose to do so; and that would be free and open to all nations at equal rates with the United States. 2 The consequence was the first draft of the new treaty, completed on April 25, 1901. The preamble was much the same as that of the other treaty. In fact, it was very similar to the other treaty with the following exceptions. Firstly, the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was provided for in a separate article. Secondly, the United States, not the high contracting parties, agreed to adopt rules to carry out the "general principle," thus doing away with the joint guarantee of the first treaty. Thirdly, there is no mention of any fortifications. Fourthly, the phrase "in time of 1 Hay to Choate, Apr. 27, 1901. Sen . Doc.., no, 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong., 21-22. 2 Lodge to Hay, Mar. 28, 1901. Thayer, John Hay . II, 260. -53- peace as in war” was omitted, thus obviating the objections of the Senate that the canal would be open to an enemy's vessels in time of war when this phrase was retained. Lastly, there was the omis- sion of the clause inviting the other nations to adhere to the same rz rules. Thus, Hay had yielded entirely to the Senate and had striven for a treaty just as the Senate had passed the former one with the amendments added. And it was this same fear of the Senate that pursued the whole course of the negotiations for the final treaty. It may be that the presence of Senator Lodge in England in June caused the British Foreign Office to see the light, for while lunch- ing at one time with Balfour and Landsdowne he gave them some very straight talk that showed them at least the senatorial view of the matter 3 4 5 --and that was of no small consequence. Lord Landsdowne made his reply on August 3. He was dis- posed in no way to yield his former position; however, he had no objections to the United States being the sole guarantor of the c canal. Nor was he opposed to the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Convention; but on the other hand, he wanted some portions of it retained, so he proposed the following article which he called "III-A:" "In view of the permanent character of this treaty whereby the general principle established by Article VIII of the Clayton- Bulwer convention is reaffirmed, the high contracting parties hereby 3 Sen . Doc . . no. 474, 20-21. 4 Choate to Hay, June 24, 1901. Ibid . . 24. 5 Memorandum in letter from Landsdowne to Lowther. Aug. 3. 1901. Ibid . . 27. - i ■ * ■ ■ ■ -- - ' ■ : __ , . ; . ■ : •• -54- declare and agree that the rules laid down in the preceding article shall, so far as they may be applicable govern all intercoeanic communications across the isthmus which connects North and South America, and that no change of territorial sovereignty or other cir- cumstances shall effect such general principle or the obligations of £ the high contracting parties under the present treaty". Neither did he have any objection to the omission of any clause regarding forti- fications, as he understood that the United States reserved that right and that circumstances might arise when the United States would 7 find it necessary to fortify the route. One of the most impor- tant additions that he requested was the insertion of the clause "which shall agree to observe these rules" after "all nations" in 0 Article III, section 1. This amounted to an invitation to other nations to enter into treaty stipulations, otherwise from the British point of view, Great Britain would be in an unfair position in time of war. This was substantially the same argument that had been used by Lord Landsdowne before. Another addition that he wanted, so that there might be some mention of the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, was the addition in Article III, section 1, of the clause g "such conditions and charges shall be just and equitable".* There is 6 Memorandum in letter from Landsdowne to Lowther, Aug. 3, 1901. Sen . Doc . . no. 474, 28. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid., 29. 9 Ibid. . -55- no doubt that Landsdowne was sincere and was very hopeful of success, Choate immediately opposed some of the additions that had been suggested. He saw that the proposed III-A was too strongly flavored with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which was the very thing that the Senate was wanting to get rid of; consequently, the Senate would never pass it. He was also irritated at the persistence of the British in "lugging in the other nations" by virtue of the clause providing for the invitation to other nations; and as a means to offset the proposition--for he knew that the Senate would be sure to kill such an addition, he suggested that the sentence under discussior would read: "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce and war of all nations observing these rules". ^ The cause for the persistency of Landsdowne was largely political. The ministry was afraid that if there was not some de- finite retention of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty so as to force the United States to maintain the "general principle" the people would not sustain it. In other words, that was the concession on the part of the United States that the public wanted in return for the abro- gation. This seemed too much to Choate, especially the fastening of III-A upon the United States in perpetuum. -^ A pleasant feature of the whole negotiations was the trust that Hay and the President had in Choate. Invariably, they concurred 10 Choate to Hay, Aug. 16, 1901. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 32. 11 Choate to Hay, Aug. 20, 1901. Ibid . . 35. ' . , -56- wit h him and were influenzed by his judgment. This was evident when Hay wrote to Lord Pauncefote on September 2. In this letter, he tactfully informed him that one thing must always be kept in mind; 12 namely the power of the Senate minority in dealing with a treaty. Hay repeated the very arguments of Choate in regards to the addi- tions of Landsdovme . Was Hay using the Senate as a club? Anyway, he submitted the following substitute as Article IV for III -A: "It is agreed that no change of territorial sovereignty or of the inter- national relations of the country traversed by the before mentioned canal shall affect the general principle of neutralization of the obligations of the high contracting parties under the present treaty". This immediately met the approval of Lord Landsdowne Early in September Lord Landsdowne went away to Ireland for a vacation. Lord Pauncefote had returned to London. There he continued the negotiations with Mr. Choate, and the two together served to put the finishing touches, so to speak, on the treaty. Lord Pauncefote was more worried about pleasing the public than the Foreign Secretary had apparently been. Choate maintained that equality of terms was included in the words "general principle" but Pauncefote feared that a different interpretation might be placed upon these same words so as to discriminate against Creat Britain, and he insisted upon something explicit. ^ This detailed 12 Hay to Pauncefote, Sept. 2, 1901. Sen. Doc., no. 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong., 37. 13 Ibid. 38. 14 * Landsdowne to Lowther, Sept. 12, 1901. Ibid., 39. 15 Choate to Hay, Sept. 21, 1901. Ibid . . 40-42. ' . -57- phraseology was the one thing that Choate feared most, because any such addition only served to give the Senate a better opportunity to defeat the treaty. He suggested, then, an addition to Hay’s substitute which satisfied Lord Pauncefote. This provided for the "freedom of passage of the canal to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations on terms of entire equality". 16 It was at this time that Mr. Choate was somewhat irritated at Lord Pauncefote, speaking of him as being a "good deal governed by the old English maxim of never giving anything for nothing”. 17 At this moment in the game, Choate again showed his good common sense and advised the State Department to allow Senator Lodge to see the treaty and get his advice, the Senator being yet in London. 18 Immediately, the Department gave him permission. This was a very wise course, indeed. Mr. Hay and the President approved of the addition although they regarded it as unnecessary 19 Hay was very optimistic at this point and regarded the treaty as oractically settled; but Choate was not so sure, for he knew the task that he had of satisfying 20 Lord Pauncefote. On the 26th of September occurred an incident almost dram- atic. A few days prior to this, Lord Pauncefote had granted that 16 Choate to Hay, Sept. 20, 1901. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong., 40. 17 Choate to Hay, Sept. 25, 1901. Ibid . . 43. 18 Ibid . 19 20 Hay to Choate, Sept. 21, 1901. Ibid . . 42. ) Choate to Hay, Sept. 25, 1901. Ibid . -58- the treaty only referred to the Nicaragua route nor did he feel that reference to another canal was necessary, since the United States already had treaties with other countries that insured the "general principle." But on the day mentioned, he hurried to the American embassy, and in a very perturbed state of mind told the ambassador that he had been mistaken; that an article in The Times had led him to see that the United States had no such treaties as he had sup- posed; besides, he had heard news that led him to think that the United States would not use the Nicaraguan route, but would use the Panama route instead. In such a case, Creat Britain would be placed in the ridiculous position of having signed a treaty abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty that had no reference to the canal the United 22 States actually was contemplating. Choate tried to reassure Lord Pauncefote by emphasizing what he knew was Hay’s opinion; namely, that the treaty applied to all routes. Cablegrams from Hay confirmed Choate’s opinion, and 23 Roosevelt seconded Hay’s opinion. In the face of all this, Paunce' fote was not to be satisfied, for he feared a repetition of the Blaine episode; namely, a declaration that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 24 referred only to the Nicaragua route. Pauncefote was determined El Choate to Hay, Sept. El, 1901. Sen . Doc . . No. 474, End Sess. 63rd Cong. , 41. £2 Choate to Hay, Sept. 27, 1901. Ibid . . 44. E3 Hay to Choate, Sept. E9, 1901, and Oct. E, 1091. Ibid., 45. E4 Choate to Hay, Oct. E, 1901. Ibid . . 47. -59- that there would be room for no such stand this time, and insisted upon adding "by whatever route may be decided expedient" after the words "Atlantic and Pacific Oceans" in the preamble. 2 ^ Strange to say, Senator Lodge thoroughly approved of this amendment, consider- ing it an improvement.^ 6 Landsdowne returned about the first of October, and ex- pressed his satisfaction with the treaty. His attitude throughout had been commendable and Choate in expressing appreciation of his friendly attitude said of him: "He has shown an earnest desire to bring to an amicable settlement honorable alike to both parties, this long and important controversy between the two nations. In substance, he abrogates the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, gives us an Amer- ican canal on the sole condition of its being always neutral and free for the passage of the ships of all nations on equal terms, except that, if we get into a war with any nation, we can shut its ships 27 out and take care of ourselves". The United States approved all the amendments as early as 28 October 3; but the delay was due to the British officials not hav- 29 ing returned from their vacations. One more change was made, how- ever, and that was the voluntary elision by Lord Landsdowne of the 25 Choate to Hay, Oct. 2, 1901. Sen . Doc . . No. 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong., 46. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 48. 28 Hay to Choate, Oct. 3, 1901. Ibid . . 48. 29 Choate to Hay, Oct. 9, 1901. Ibid . -60 addition to Hay T s substitute that Pauncefote had insisted upon. This change was made also for the reason that the detailed wording rzn of it would cause much trouble in the Senate. By this time reports were beginning to leak out that a treaty had been made. Its terras were not yet known; but in England there was much anticipated satisfaction, because if Lord Pauncefote had agreed to it, it was all right. The fear of the Senate was not 31 entirely absent, however, and there was considerable anxiety. After minor changes were made the treaty was signed in Washington on November 18, 1901. In brief its terms were as follows: in the preamble the terms of the treaty were stated to apply to whatever route might be considered. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was superseded. The United States was to have the right to construct, manage, and regulate the canal. It was the third article that has excited the most controversy. One part of this provided that "The canal shall be free and open to the vessels of commerce of of war of all nations observing these rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any such nation, or its citizens or subjects, in respect of the conditions of traffic or otherwise. Such conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and equitable." (This is the well-known first section of Article III.) Then there were the provisions regarding the use of the canal by belligerent nations, all of which rules were based upon 30 White to Hay, Oct. 23, 1901. Sen . Doc . . No. 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong.. 50: White to Hay. Oct. 26. 1901. Ibid.. 51. 31 Editorial in The Times, Nov. 19, 1901. -61- the Treaty of Constantinople, the treaty that defined international rights in the Suez Canal, Lastly, there was an article that provid- ed that no change of territorial sovereignty of the lands traversed by the canal were to affect the "general principle of neutraliza- tion." 32 President Roosevelt laid the treaty before the Senate in his message on the 3rd of December, and he urged the ratification of it as guaranteeing to the United States everything that it had ever asked. So without much ado, the treaty passed the Senate by the overwhelming vote of 7E-6, on December 16. 33 No one was more elated than Hay, who felt that his great object had been attained, and he modestly gave the credit to the President and to Senator Lodge for the success of the ratification. 3 ^ The public of the United States was highly pleased, as was the English. All united in bestowing the chief credit to Mr. Hay 35 and Lord Pauncefote. The outflowing of friendship for the United *36 States was nowhere greater than in Parliament. There was one dis- cordant but prophetic voice raised amid all this international hap- piness and that was the Saturday Review . It regarded the result as no more than could be expected from a nation that was never asleep 32 Malloy, Treaties . I, 782-784. Cf. Statutes at Large . XXXII, part 2, 1903-1905. 33 Cong. Record, part 1. 1st Sess., 57th Cong., 318. 34 Hay to White, Dec. 26, 1901. Thayer, John Hay . II, 261. 35 Editorial in The New York Tribune . Dec. 17, 1901; editorial in The Chicago Tribune . Dec. 17, 190}.; "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator . Dec. 21, 1901; editorial in The Times . Dec. 17,1901. 3b Parliamentary Debates . 4th series, CL, 1902, 9-20. - 62 - to its own advantage, and it voiced the prediction that since the United States now had the absolute control of the canal, the civi- lized world might be made to feel the effects of any irritability 37 with which the Government may be affected from time to time. The conclusion to this chapter may best be summed up in an editorial taken from The Times in its comments upon the ratification of the treaty by the United States Senate: "Seldom, if ever, has an international question been approached with more unreserved willing- ness than British diplomacy has shown on this occasion to concede everything except essential and practical interests to the altered wishes and expanded aspirations of a friendly nation. We have met the views of the United States government at every step and in every way, short of surrendering the equality of trading rights and the privileges of neutrality, which we, like all commercial nations, have felt bound to claim. Above all, the services rendered by Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote, and in this country of Lord Lands- downe, should never be forgotten by those who wish to see the Britist nation and the people of the United States drawn together by the ties of amity and concord". 00 37 Editorial in The Saturday Review . Dec. 21, 1901. 38 Editorial in The Times . Dec. 17, 1901. : . • ... " ol r ' - ■ . ■ : , '■ . . . . , * X -63- CHAPTER V THE TOLLS CONTROVERSY Soon after the settlement with Great Britain had been made, the United States began to take steps to carry out the purpose of the convention; namely, the construction of a canal across the isthmus. After a report of another canal commission, which this time decided in favor of the Panama route, Congress passed the Spooner bill which became a law in June, 1902. This Act authorized the President to purchase the property and the rights of the French Canal Company, and to negotiate a treaty with Colombia to obtain the right of way for the canal. ^ Accordingly, the Hay-Herran treaty was negotiated, but the p Colombian government refused to ratify. Then followed the sudden revolt in Panama against the Colombian government which was as sud- denly followed by the recognition of Panama's independence by the United States in November, 1903. 3 The United States quickly nego- tiated and concluded a treaty with Panama that made the United States 4 the owners of a strip of land across Panama. Thus President Roose- velt "took the isthmus” for the benefit of mankind. During all this time the relations of Great Britain and the United States were most friendly, especially during the second administration of President Roosevelt. This was largely due to the 1 Statutes at Large. XXXII, part 1, 481-484. 2 “ Beaupre to Hay, Oct. 17, 1903. Sen . Doc . No. 474, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong. , 462. See the inclosure in the letter quoted, ibid., 459-462. 3 Hay to Beaupre, Nov. 18, 1903. Ibid., 479. 4 Malloy, Treaties. II. 1349-1357. Cf. Statutes at Large . aagi - QB 4 il -64- efforts of Elihu Root, American Secretary of State, and Viscount Bryce, the British Ambassador at Washington. The Alaskan boundary dispute had already been settled by Mr. Hay. In 1908 the way was paved towards the state of mind of the two countries that should have served to settle all questions at issue between the two great nations This was the arbitration treaty drawn up by Mr. Root and Viscount Bryce. It provided among other things that in case of dispute over the interpretation of a treaty, the question should be submitted to 5 the Hague Tribunal for settlement. There was only one incident during this period that por- tended dangerous consequences for the future. At least, it showed that Great Britain was thoroughly awake to what she considered her own interests. In the draft of the treaties negotiated between the United States and Colombia and the United States and Panama there was a provision that Colombian war vessels were to be allowed transit £ through the canal without the payment of tolls. When this fact was brought to the attention of the British Foreign Office, it immediate- ly threatened to protest on the ground that this clause was a viola- 7 tion of Sec. 1, Article III, of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Earl Grey, who at that time was the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was absent at the time, but Under-Secretary Hardinge evidently had 5 Malloy, Treaties , II, 1349-1357. Cf. Statutes at Large . XXXIII, 814-815. 6 Sen . Doc . . No. 474, op. cit., 180. 7 Reid to Root, Jan. 11, 1909. Ibid . . 71. -65- re garde d this as an opportune time to play a hig part. The State Department considered that the treaty was necessary to secure our rights in the canal zone; that it had nothing to do with the ques- tion of tolls; and that the purpose of the treaty was really to carry out the purpose of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, not to violate it. Neither was there any pretense or subterfuge to make the discrimina- 8 tion a matter of precedent* It was not long, however, till the under-secretary showed no intentions to haggle over the affair and withdrew his threatening disposition when he saw that the United St&tes assured His Majesty* s Government that the exemption of 9 Colombia would not be considered a precedent. And the matter was dropped. Colombia failed to act upon the treaty and nothing came of the affair except to show that Great Britain would watch care- fully any interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. 8 9 10 The year 1910 marked the settlement of practically all existing difficulties with Great Britain. But these good relations were not long to continue. The time was now close at hand for the opening of the canal-«and incidentally, a presidential election. Plans must be laid by the politicians. On December 11, 1911, President Taft sent a special mes- sage to Congress that was not only a harbinger of evil tidings to British commerce, but also to all who wished to keep the two nations 8 Root to Bryce, Jan. 16, 1909. Sen . Doc . . no. 474, End Sess. 63rd Cong., 74-74. 9 Memorandum from British Ambassador, Feb. 3, 1909. Ibid., 76-77. 10 Inclosure in letter — Northcote to knox, Oct. EO, 1909. Ibid. , E48-E49. - 66 - on the friendliest of terms and who sought for an era where nations should keep both the letter and the spirit of treaties. He asked Congress to pass an act to provide for the regulation, maintenance, and control of the canal, and to authorize the President to fix tolls for the benefit of American shipping. This message was the first official statement made in the United States upholding the right of the United States to deal with the canal as it saw fit, thus strain- ing the interpretation of the Hay Pauncefote Treaty. Said President Taft: "I am very confident that the United States has the power to relieve from the payment of tolls any part of our shipping that Con- gress deems wise. We own the canal. It was our money that built it. We have the right to charge tolls for its use. Those tolls must be the same to every one; but when we are dealing with our own ships, the practice of many Governments of subsidizing their own merchant vessels is so well established in general that a subsidy equal to the tolls, an equivalent remission of tolls, can not be held to be a dis- crimination in the use of the canal". 1 '*' In June, 1912, the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals reported favorably a bill providing for the opening, maintenance, protection and operation of the Panama canal, and the sanitation and government of the Canal Zone. One provision of the bill was that relating to American shipping, wherein all American shipping was to 11 Foreign Relations 1912, 467-469. i' ■ . - - . . 1 ■ - . . . f r -67- 1 2 be granted free transit through the canal. Unusual blustery debate was not long getting under way and that manner was maintained throughout, with the exception of the attitude of Senator Lodge, and most of all, Elihu Root, who at that time was a senator from New York. Throughout the debate, the latter vigorously denounced exemp- tion. The expected opposition from Great Britain was not long forthcoming. This was in the form of an informal protest on July 8, This maintained that the exemption from tolls of all American ship- ping would involve an infraction of the treaty; that a subsidy made by the remission of tolls charged would not be in accordance with the obligations of the treaty; and that it would be "impossible to frame regulations which would prevent the exemption from resulting in a preference to United States shipping and consequently an infraction 13 of the treaty", A few days later, Sir Edward Grey also let Mr. Whitelaw Reid, American Ambassador, understand that Great Britain regarded the terms of the bill as an "invidious discrimination". 14 With the exception of the Anglophobic element, the United States was fairly well divided in its opinion with the greater part against Congress. The noisy attitude of the Senate was enough to cause even the staunchest of Republicans to waiver in support of the IE Cong. 13 Record, part 9. End Sess . 6£nd Cong., 7985. 8E-83. Innes 14 to Knox, July 8, 191E. Sen. Doc. . no. 474, 470. Reid to Knox, July 15, 191S. Foreign Relations. 1912. - 68 - bill. There was a marked tendency to admit the plausibility of the 15 British protest and to want the question arbitrated. On the other side of the water, there was considerable dis- may, but a belief that the United States would not take such a stand against the sanctity of treaties. The English also trusted that if diplomacy failed that the matter could be settled by arbitration. 1 *^ The anti-American element could see nothing in the bill that had not been caused by the policy of conciliation that the various Foreign Secretaries had always maintained towards United States. The Saturday Review very ironically said: "Foreign Office wisdom may be summed up in the text: 'Never contradict the United States'. It must now be close on a century since we did. About ten years ago, sooner than contradict the United States, we abrogated the Clayton- Bulwer treaty which set out to express the eternal determination of the contracting parties--and was in force for just fifty years.... In this matter Americans have every reason to expect that, if they persist in their resolve to tear up the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. Great Britain will acquiesce. This is all we get and all we deserve to get 17 for our perpetual climbing down". 18 The Senate passed the bill by an overwhelming vote. The House, awake to the reaction caused by the drastic procedure of the 15 Editorial in The Chicago Tribune. Aug. 10. 1912. 16 Editorial in The Times . July 12 and 16, 1912; "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator. July 20, 1912. 17 Editorial in Saturday Review. July 20. 1912. 18 Cong . Record . part 11, 2nd Sess. 62nd Cong., 10590. . . 19 Senate, limited the exemption to coastwise vessels* Prior to the passage by the House, President Taft, also alarmed by the opposition and its character, proposed that Congress pass a joint resolution providing among other things that any alien, who felt that he had been deprived of rights that should have been his according to the treaty, should have the right to appeal to United States courts for redress; and that the act of Congress should not be deemed to repeal any portion of the treaty. Should Congress pass the resolution, Taft felt that the good faith of the United States would be recogniz- 20 ed* But Congress was not of such an apologetic mind and refused 21 to pass the resolution* The bill became a law on the 24th of August and the President was given the right to allow coastwise 22 vessels to go through free of toll* ~ In a memorandum accompanying his signature, Taft argued that the treaty did not deprive the United States of any right to regulate its own commerce; that the treaty only gave all nations most-favored-nation treatment — the corollary being that the word "all” in the treaty did not include 23 the United States* When he asserted that there was as yet no necessity for a discussion of the matter since the President had not yet issued an order exempting coastwise vessels, no doubt he intended 19 Cong. Record, part 11, 2nd Sess. 62nd Cong., 10590. 20 Ibid., 11324; Sen. Doc., no. 474, 326. 21 Ibid., 11324 ff. 22 Statutes at Large, XXXVII, part 1, 560-569. 23 Sen . Doc . , no. 474, 340-343. r ! ' ' i p • ' -70- to use it as a loophole to allow his "better sense to control his actions. Obviously, he was not fully satisfied with the bill, but seemed to feel that it was better than none. As it had been earlier in the controversy, the fair-minded press was divided; however, there seemed to be very little opposi- 24 tion amongst the editors to arbitration. But in England, even the best friends of the United States lost heart. They felt that the act of Congress was not only an outright violation of the treaty but also of the spirit in which Lord Pauncefote and Mr. Hay had negotia- ted it, in the light of the great concessions to the United States. Some called it an act of "cynical perfidy". Taft lost his reputa- tion there as a lawyer; but due to his past fondness for arbitration they had not entirely given up hope of a settlement in this case. 25 In the campaign, the Republicans were quiet on the subject The Democrats declared for the exemption of coastwise ships. The Progressives, after making a vigorous assertion of American rights 27 in the canal, declared for the exemption. The main utterance of any of the candidates was that made by Mr. Wilson, in which he up- held the exemption, but he made no reference to the dangers to our 24 Editorials in The New Yo rk T ribune . Aug. 11, 14, 16, and 21, 1912; "The March of Events" in The World's Work . Oct. 1912. 25 Editorial in The Times . Aug. 12, 1912; editorial in the Saturday Revie?/ . Aug. 31, 1912; "Topics of the Day in The Spectator . Aug. 31, 19l2. 26 Stanwood, History of the Presidency . 269. 27 Ibid . . 295-296. -71- foreign relations. 28 The attitude of the Foreign Office was expressed in a letter that was handed to Secretary of State Knox on December 9, 1912. It was a plain and straightforward statement, though very kindly and courteous. It stated that there was no intention on the part of Great Britain to deny to the United States the right to sub- sidize its own shipping, but a subsidy that produced results which were prejudicial to British interests as given her by the treaty was another matter, for British shipping interests were very large and equal treatment was given by the United States in return for the rights surrendered by Great Britain. Had not Great Britain super- seded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in order to retain Article VIII which gave just and equitable charges? Did not this retention limit the liberty of action of the United States? Had not the United States recovered the right to construct the canal solely at the stipulation of equal treatment? Such was the main argument of Sir Edward Grey. Besides, discrimination to him was unjust and placed the burden of the expense upon the foreign shipping. Furthermore, although Great Britain was reluctant to make a protest, she was certain that it was valid; but in view of the conflict of American opinion, she was 29 willing to submit the case to arbitration. 28 Cong; . Record . 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., App. 221. This was the celebrated speech made by Mr. Wilson, the Democratic candidate, on Aug. 15, 1912 when he made the following statement after an appeal to the crowd for exemption. "Our platform is not molasses to catch flies. It means what it says”. 29 Grey to Bryce, Nov. 14, 1912. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 85-93. -72- In the meantime, the President had issued his proclamation relative to tolls, hut he had refrained from exempting coastwise trade, an omission which lends color to the conclusion that he had felt the force of the British contention as well as the character of the opposition in the United States. The reply of Secretary Knox was controlled to a certain extent hy this omission. The answer was a strictly legal argument with no element of diplomatic courtesy nor the usual felicitations. In the first place, Knox held that since the President had done nothing as yet, the British claim was Based wholly on conjecture and not on facts. Moreover, the exemption of United States vessels from tolls was not a question for arbitration for the reason that at the time of the negotiation of the Hay-Herran Treaty which provided that Colombian vessels should be allowed to go through the canal free from tolls Great Britain had made no protest. A most important point was made when Knox asserted that in the figur- ing of rates, coastwise vessels had been included; consequently, in case of the exemption, the United States bore all the loss and thus 30 aided and subsidized foreign shipping. In other words, using the vernacular, the Secretary said, "Why should you kick?”. To this refusal to arbitrate. Viscount Bryce made no pre- tense to answer every argument. He maintained, however, that by all the principles of international law, any nation could protest when its rights were about to be infringed upon; that the omission in the proclamation had not changed the issue because Congress had declared 30 Knox to Laughlin, Jan. 17, 1913. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 93-100 . . . .. I . . . 1. V.. - . . • -73- its power to discriminate. He also used the argument, advocated in so many papers, that this was a proper question to test the effi- ciency of the arbitration treaty of 1908. Although there was a ten- dency to quibble over small matters as seemed to have been the case in the preceding notes, above all Bryce’s reply was courteous.^ 1 He wanted a settlement for the best interests of both nations, and showed no such tendency to evade arbitration as was only too evident in the lawyer’s argument of Knox. After the campaign was over in November, some of the lead- ing men of the United States began to take a more rational view. During the winter of 1912-1913 there was a considerable expression 32 of opinion on the subject. Ex-Secretary of State Olney supported the State Department. Roosevelt, who perhaps had had a hand in the writing of the platform of the Progressives, very early opposed ex- emption as being a violation of the treaty. He proposed that the American government should first get the consent of the other nations 33 before taking such action as had been advocated by Congress. 1 " Mr. Joseph H. Choate also vigorously opposed it as an outright violation of the treaty. 34 In the Senate, exemption was not allowed to rest in peace. Elihu Root had already introduced a bill to repeal the exemption part of the Panama Canal Act. 33 31 101 - 102 . 34 xii. oiie uciicfcuc, oAcinyi/jLuu Root had already introduce In a powerful speech on Bryce to Knox, Feb. 27, 1912. Sen . Doc., no. 474, 32 Cong . Record . part 1, 3rd Sess., 62nd Cong., 1981-1991. The "Coastwise Exemption”--protests of the nation against exemption. 33 George L. Burr to Repr. Underhill, Mar. 2, 1914. Cong . Record . 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., App., 17. 35 Ibid., 165-166. 35 Cong . Record . part 2, 3rd Sess., 62nd Cong., 1482. -74- the floor of the Senate, he urged it to retrieve the country's honor and reputation, and he attacked the disposition to refuse arbitration in these words: "Oh Mr. President, are we Pharisees? Have we been insincere and false? Have we been pretending in all these long years of resolution and declaration and proposal and urgency for arbitra- tion? Are we ready now to admit that our country, that its Congresse have all been guilty of false pretence, of humbug, of talking to the gallery, of fine words to secure applause, and that the instant we have an interest we are ready to falsify every declaration, every promise, and every principle? We must arbitrate the interpretation 36 of this treaty or we must retire from the position we have taken." The administration that came into power in March was sus- pected of having views on the question that did not bode well to the British, for had not the Democratic party declared for the absolute American control of the canal? It was not long, however, until the President began to change his mind about the tolls-exemption ques- 37 tion. About four months after the inauguration, the British govern' ment was made aware of the fact that the United States would get rid 7Q of this bone of contention when the opportune moment arrived. With this understanding, Earl Grey made no further protest against the disputed provision of the Panama Canal Act. Walter Hines Page, the Ambassador to the Court of St. James, was fully convinced that 36 Cong. Record, part 2. 3rd Sess.. 62nd Cong., 1482. 37 Ante. p. 71. 38 Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page . World's Work . Sept. 1921. -75- the United States was in the wrong. He met everywhere in England 40 the feeling of distrust of the United States. Nor did he hesitate to let the President know of the situation, and in his letters to Wilson may be found the contributing ideas that caused the President to take the stand that he did; for example, "And everywhere in circles the most friendly to us, and the best informed--I receive commiseration because of the dishonorable attitude of our Government about the Panama Canal Tolls. This, I confess, is hard to meet. We made a bargain--a solemn compact — and we have broken it. Whether it were a good bargain or a bad one, a silly one or a wise one; that's far from the point. And this Canal Tolls matter stands in the way of everything. It is in their minds all the time — the minds of all parties and all sections of opinion. They hold our Government in shame as long as this thing stands.... We can command these people, this Government, this tight island, and its world-wide empire; they honor us, they envy us, they fear us; they see the time near at hand when we shall command the capital and commerce of the world if we unfetter our mighty people; they wish to keep very close to us. But they are suspicious of our Government; they contend that it has 41 violated its faith. Is it so or is it not?" Page also felt that since Great Britain had yielded to let the United States deal with Mexico, the United States should give something in return. 39 Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page , World's Work. Sept. 1921. 40 Page to Wilson, Sept. 13, 1913. Ibid . 41 Page to Wilson, Jan. 6, 1914. Ibid . -76- President Wilson began to put out feelers in the Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee. He was fully determined to repeal 42 the exemption clause. In a statement to his private secretary, Joseph Tumulty, he said, M I am the trustee of the people and I am bound to take cognizance of the fact that by reason of our attitude on Panama Canal Tolls our treaties are discredited in every chancel- lery in Europe, where we are looked upon as a nation that does not live up to its plighted word... We cannot expect to hold the friend- ship of the world, especially of England, Prance, and Japan, if we are to treat agreements not as inviolable contracts, but as matters of convenience, whose plain terms are to be ignored when matters of expediency dictate ... .Some unforeseen contingency may arise where it will be found that the reason for their withdrawal of friendship for us was our petty attitude in this affair... It is important that every agreement that America subscribes her name to shall be carried out 43 in the spirit of those w ho negotiated it”. In this frame of mind he appeared on March 5, 1914, before Congress and asked it to repeal the exemption provision of the Panama Canal Act, emphasizing all the while the maintenance of our good re- lations with the world. He closed his short address with this appeal: "I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the adminis- tration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even 42 House to Page, Jan. 14, 1914. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter Hines Page. World's Work. Sept. 1921. 43 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson as _I Know Him . 165-166. -77- great er delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to 44 me in ungrudging measure.” It is doubtful if at any time in his career Wilson ever received the noble support of the leading men of the nation as he did after this message--especially the Republicans. They commended him for his high purpose in view of the reversal of his former 45 stand on the question. The point that he had made in regards to the condition of our national honor had "gone home," so to speak. There was much opposition, however, even aside from the Hearst pa- pers. Other newspaoers questioned what they regarded as wounding 46 American pride, unless he explained his allusion to foreign problems. The British were naturally elated at the turn of affairs, but were dubious as to whether Wilson would realize his wish, due to the fact that anti -British sentiment had been inflamed because of the Ulster situation. Moreover, they recognized a strong tendency in the United States that it should do as it pleased, regardless of 47 what the consequences might be. The bill to repeal the exemption clause soon got under way in the House, where it met heavy opposi- tion from leading democrats, largely because of its open violation 44 Gong. Record, Dart 5, 2nd Sess., 63rd Gong. , 4313. 45 Editorial in The Hew York Tribune, Mar. 7, 1914. 46 Editorial in the Washington Post, Mar. 26, 1914. Gong. Record , part 6, 2nd Sess. 63rd Gong., 6106. 47 "Topics of the Day" in The Spectator , Apr. 4, 1914; editorial in The Times, Mar. 23, 1914. 49 of the Democratic platform. The leader of this group was Ohamp 48 Clark. But the hill passed, nevertheless, on the 31st of March. The debate over the bill in the Senate was not of the blustery type that was sweeping the country at the time. Instead of stooping to insolence and rancor towards Great Britain, the 50 Senators weighed the question carefully. An interesting feature here was the introduction into the Senate, as had already been the case in the lower House, of letters from the ex-Senators who had been in the Senate at the time of the failure of the First-Hay- Pauncefote Treaty. These gentlemen disagreed as to the reason the Senate at that time refused to pass the Bard amendment excluding the coastwise trade from the operation of the treaty. Some, like ex- Senator Beveridge of Indiana, maintained that the reason that it had failed was because the Senate thought that it was an unnecessary 51 addition since the right to exempt was included in the treaty. On the other hand, ex-Senator and ex -Vice President Fairbanks ex- plained the failure of the Senate to include the Bard amendment by showing that the Senate regarded such a provision for exemption as 52 a violation of the spirit of equality. Another feature was the 48 Cong . .Record , part 6, 2nd Sess. 63rd Cong. Speech of Clark on Mar. 31. 49 Ibid., 6089. 50 Ibid., part 7, 8942-8956. 51 Ibid., 5923, 6334, 52 North Amer i can Review , May 1914. -79- reading into the Congress ional Record of the letters and statements of Mr. Choate and Mr. White, both of whom maintained that such a thing as any exemption was unheard of in any part of the negotia- tions. Mr. Choate was especially vehement in his denunciation of 53 exemption as being an outright violation of the treaty. One of the most important statements brought to light was one that had been made by Hay about the time of the treaty with Panama. He had said: ’’All means all. The treaty was not so long that we could not have made room for the word ’other 1 if we understood that it belonged there. ’All nations 1 means all nations, and the United States is certainly a nation. It was the understanding of both Governments, and I have no doubt that the Senate realized in ratifying the second treaty without such an amendment it was committing us to the principle of giving all friendly nations equal privileges in the 54 canal with ourselves. That is our golden rule”. Senators McCumber, Kenyon, Burton, Lodge, and Root, we re the leaders for the repeal. Lodge maintained that the United States had the legal right to exempt coastwise trade; but in view of the difference of opinion of such leading men as Olney and Root, he was in favor of repeal. He did not think it wise to take a firm stand upon a doubtful question, neither to flout the rigits of other 53 White to McCumber, Mar. 31, 1914. Cong . Record , part 7, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 6286; Choate to McCumber , April 6, 1914. Ibid . , 6267. 54 Root ’ s Addresses, 257. . . nations nor to oppose the "understanding” of Hay, Choate, and White. In one of the greatest speeches of his career. Root manfully ar- gued for the United States to maintain its prestige abroad. He pointed out the duty of the United States to mankind; that America had always stood for equality of treatment from the time of Clay and Adams; that at this time the conscience of America was at stake. He, too, maintained that the United States had the right to subsidize its own shipping, but that the broad view of the treaty excluded it from granting a subsidy in favor of American shipping in the canal; furthermore, the "understanding" of Hay and Choate must be taken into consideration in the interpretation of the 56 treaty. Senator O’ Gorman, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and hitherto a leading advocate of Wilson's policies, now took the floor against his leader. In a forceful and convincing speech, he denied that the United States was included in the term "all nations", he opposed the violation of the party platform, and he accused the administration of truckling to Great Britain. The duty of the Senate, he believed, v/as to the American people first of all, no matter about foreign relations. He opposed the repeal upon economic grounds, arguing that the exemption would favor cheaper freight rates. He ridiculed the "understanding" of the 55 Cong . Record , part 7, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 64 5 2 , 64 55. 56 Ibid. , 8955-8956. . . , « ■' i : ’ < ‘ -81- negotiators. In an outburst of sarcasm, he questioned: T ’What is our status? Do we own the canal, or are we only an international caretaker, with no special privilege except to foot the bills and to maintain a sufficient military force to defend the canal and pre- serve its neutrality? Is our only reward the glory of the achi eve- 57 ment?" The passage of the repeal bill on June 11, even though an amendment was made that the action of the Senate was not a disavowal 58 of United States' rights, was a great relief to the President, and he took a personal pride in the outcome, for he felt it to be a 59 landmark of his administration. And it seemed to be regarded so at the time by the press of both countries. Even papers in England that had a chronic anti-American habit felt that after all there was an element of Puritanism in Americans that made them want to do 60 the right thing. Sir Edward Urey, in an address before Parliament, referred to Wilson's achievement and uttered a prophetic statement: "I believe it (his special motive) has been much the greater motive and feeling that any Government — any one of the great civilized Governments which is going to use its influence to make the rela- tions not between tvro countries, but between all the great civilized and peaceful nations of the world, if the opportunity arises — must 57 Cong. Record, part 7, 2nd Sess., 63rd Cong., 8212-8220. 58 Statutes at Large, XXXVIII, part 1, 385-386. 59 Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson, 162. 60 Editorial in Saturday Review . June 27, 1914. ■ -82- never flinch or quail from interpreting treaty rights. If that he so, the settlement of this question has an influence, and a much greater influence than the relations between the United States and 61 Great Britain." Not long after this temporary settlement of the dispute, the World War hurst upon Europe. Strangely enough, the United States and Great Britain came to the verge of war with each other, due to a difference of opinion regarding the rights of neutrals on the seas, aided hy what the United States considered violations of those rights. It was due to the heroic efforts of Ambassador Page 62 in handling the matter in London that war was averted. The United States eventually entered the war on the same side with Great Britain, and the relations between the two countries probably were best during the summer of 1918. But the passage of the Repealing Act in 1914 may not be as permanent as was hoped by its sponsors. When the Republican Party met in June, 1920, it was a thoroughly nationalistic body, partly the results of efforts to remain party harmony between the "irreconcilables" and the rest of the party. The Committee on Resolutions adopted without a dissenting vote a "plank" presented by Senator Borah: "We recommend that all ships engaged in coastwise trade and all vessels of the American merchant marine shall pass 61 Parliamentary Debates, 5t,h series, 1914, LXIV, 107. 62 Hendrick, Wal t er Hines Page , November and December (1921) numbers of The Worlds Work. -63- 63 through the Panama Canal without payment of tolls". This was more or less lost sight of during the campaign, hut Senator Borah had not entirely forgotten it. Hence, in the sum- mer of 1921 he introduced in the Senate a bill in accordance with his plank in the platform. Only one thing stood in the way and that was the coming international conference that had been called by President Harding to discuss the problem of the limitation of arma- ments. Many Senators felt that the time was most inopportune for a discussion and passage of a bill that was plainly out of sympathy C A with the British interpretation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In fact, the Senate was asked by the President to put the bill away until after the conference. The majority, however, was indisposed to brook any delay or even interference , and the debate continued. As was to be expect- ed, no new evidence was brought to bear upon the question, the argu- ments used being oractically the same as found in the debates over 65 the Panama Canal bill and the repeal two years later. Many Senators used a very popular line of argument when they related the great expenses of the canal to the United States; the $40,000,000 to the French Canal Company, $10,000,000 to Panama and an annuity of $250,000, and were about to pay Colombia the sum of $25,000,000 as "heartbalm" , and the estimated cost of the building of it — about 63 Cong . Record . 1st Sess., 67th Cong., 6910. Statement by Senator Watson from Indiana, who was chairman of the Committee on Resolutions. 64 Ibid., 6896. 65 Ibid . . 6900. - • . • « . . -84- ,000,000. These figures were played upon for arguing that the United States ought to he allowed to do as it pleased. Another was that since Great Britain had conceded the United States special rights in all the other sections of Article III, why should she have any right to hold the United States to the strict wording of the first section? One praiseworthy feature of the debate was a growing 66 willingness to submit the question to arbitration* Yet another element entered into the debate that should not be lost sight of, and that was the Senatorial pride — or should it be called arrogance? Por instance. Senator Borah said: "We are put- ting a construction upon the treaty by act of Congress. . .so that when we pass this law, we shall then have arrived at the point .. .where arbitration can properly be asked for by Great Britain — and there will be something to arbitrate. We do not by this act refuse to arbitrate. When she asks for arbitration, then we can cross the bridge" . 6 7 The bill passed on October 10, 1921, by the rather close vote of 47-37, with 12 not voting. So far, at the present writing, the House has not taken up the bill as passed by the Senate. But the signs point in the direction of a passage of the bill by the Senate and the signature of the President — unless he switches from his platform as did his predecessor. 66 Cong . Record , 1st Sess., 67th Cong., 6910. Debates of Oct. 10, 1921. Note Senator Lodge's speech. Ibid . 6894-6895. Note that his stand was entirely consistent with his stand in 1912, 1914# 67 Ibid., 6911-6912. 68 Ibid. . 6916. -85- CONCLUSION Today, when one reads statements which assert that all existing controversies between the United States and Great Britain have been settled and that relations between them are the best that they have been since 1783, he is gratified and at the same time hopeful that these good relations will continue. There is room, however, for one to be somewhat pessimistic of any perpetuation of these good relations as long as there is the canal question. After the Spanish-Amer ican War, it was thought that rela- tions were closer than they had ever been. But what happened? The Senate soon proceeded to threaten to get rid of the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty. It even worked itself up to such a temper that it made demands upon Great Britain by means of the amendments to the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that she could not honorably accept. It must be admitted, however, that that mood put such fear into the hearts of the men who negotiated the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that a more nearly "American canal" was made possible. Again, in 1912, relations were thought to be the closest. All controversies had been settled. But all of a sudden, Congress passed the Panama Canal Act which was soon approved by President Taft. Due to the fact that Great Britain regarded the exemption clause as a violation of the treaty, she made an entirely natural and logical protest. She gained little by this, and relations gradually became worse than they had been since 1900. With the aid of Elihu Hoot and others, President Wilson prevailed upon Con- gress to repeal the objectionable portion of the act. Thus, confi- . - 66 - dence was restored. It is the observation of these facts that makes the people of the United States realize that the question is by no means settled. In the past, whenever the United States has changed her policy in regard to a canal with little thought of treaty obliga- tions, Great Britain, ever on the alert to prevent any violation of the treaty when it affected British interests, has protested. A repetition of any action by the United States derogatory to the spirit and letter of the treaty will most assuredly bring about a protest from England. The situation is pregnant of possibilities. The United States has now come to be regarded as the probable leader of the world. Will she accept this role and set an example by keeping the letter and spirit of the Hay-Pauncef ote Treaty? Or will she become so overjoyed at her present fort-unate "splendid isolation" that she will disregard the spirit and letter of that treaty and deal with the canal as a purely "American Canal"? Our "canal policy" may yet be the indicator of the future history of the United States. -87- BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE Meyer, H. H. B. 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