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 THE NEW SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 ^-^^QJi:::^'^^^^:::^'^-:^^ 
 
 CONSIDERATIONS 
 
 ADDRESSED TO 
 
 THE COMMITTEE OF SHIPOWNERS 
 
 APPOINTED AT 
 
 THE MEETING HELD ON THURSDAY. MAY 10th, AT 
 THE CANNON STREET HOTEL. 
 
 XonOon : 
 
 METCHIM & SON, 20, PARLIAMENT STREET, S.W., AND 
 32, CLEMENT'S LANE, E.C.
 
 THE NEW SUEZ CANAL. 
 
 The question of the Suez Canal is pregnant with issues 
 so momentous, that no proposed solution can ever be 
 accepted by Her Majesty's Government, which does not 
 command the assent of the Nation. Any difficulties, 
 engineering or financial, which may have to be sur- 
 mounted, are insignificant in comparison with those 
 which a consideration of the political position discloses. 
 It may be wise that the responsibility of the initiative 
 should be left to private persons, but no Company, how- 
 ever constituted, can be strong enough to construct a 
 second Canal through Egypt without the support of the 
 Ministry and of Parliament, with whom the ultimate 
 acceptance or rejection of any proposal which may be 
 made must necessarily rest. Not even the shipowners 
 and the Chambers of Commerce, acting in unison, will 
 be able to enforce their views, unless those views are 
 approved by the people of England. 
 
 Doubtless the Committee appointed at the meeting 
 held on Thursday, May the loth, are better qualified than 
 any other body of men could be^ to explain the nature 
 of the present hindrances to our Oriental trade, and to 
 suggest the proper remedies ; but great as the influence 
 of the gentlemen who compose that Committee, de- 
 servedly is, they will not attain the objects which they
 
 have in view, unless they approach the consideration of 
 the question in the spirit of statesmen, unless they 
 recognise limitations imposed by the peculiar necessities 
 of the case, unless they are prepared to admit that 
 there exist arguments which may have more weight 
 with the nation than an increase of speed in the rate of 
 passage between London and Bombay, or than a 
 diminution in the freight of cargoes. 
 
 British merchants have a strong case against the pre- 
 sent Canal, but to exaggerate a good case is to weaken 
 it, to claim more than can rightly be demanded is to 
 discredit it, to ask that which should be refused, is to 
 lose the chance of obtaining relief which may be secured 
 by consulting national as well as commercial interests. 
 
 The Suez Canal is not only a trade route, it is also 
 the most important, and, at present, the weakest link in 
 the chain which unites England with her vast possessions 
 in the East, and no proposal for a new Canal will merit 
 serious attention, which does not, while affording the 
 increased accommodation which shipowners have a right 
 to expect, add something to the security of our commu- 
 nications with India and Australia. The present must 
 not be allowed to mask the future, and the possibilities 
 of war must be considered as well as the more immediate 
 needs of peace. 
 
 While it would be a national folly, and little short of 
 a national crime, to let the opportunity of our present 
 position in Egypt pass without the settlement of a 
 question in which we are so deeply interested, the rights of 
 others must be respected. So long as this is done, so long 
 as we show due consideration for the legal claims of 
 Mons. de Lesseps and of his shareholders, our just claim 
 to make a road to our Indian empire, which shall be at 

 
 all times under our own control, is beyond dispute. The 
 only valid objections could be raised by Egypt, and if 
 we are careful to protect and advance her interests, her 
 approval is not doubtful. Fortified by the consent of 
 the landowner, we cannot be expected to acquiesce any 
 longer in a state of things inconvenient and possibly 
 prejudicial to ourselves, when it is in our power to 
 change it. 
 
 In order to arrive at a clear view of the changes 
 which should be effected, we must consider at some 
 little length the nature of our present difficulties and 
 some suggested remedies. 
 
 In spite of the success of the Suez Canal and of its 
 present importance to the trade of the world, it may 
 still be questioned whether England has on the whole 
 profited by its construction. Having now the choice of 
 two roads to the East, the Canal and the Ocean, we use, 
 and shall certainly continue to use, that which effects a 
 saving of time ; but there are yet some who retain their 
 opinion that we lost rather than gained in strength by 
 the opening of a maritime route to India across Egypt, 
 inasmuch as that route is not under our management, 
 and may possibly be interfered with at a critical moment 
 by African, Asiatic, or European Powers, who would be 
 entirely unable to hamper the freedom of our action on 
 the open sea. It is no slight inconvenience, and may 
 become no trivial danger, that our way should cross 
 foreign territory, that our navies, whether of peace or 
 war, should be confined at one portion of their voyage 
 to the narrow passage of a Canal which is not in our 
 own hands, and that our command of the sea should 
 thus be subjected to restrictions, the exact effect of which 
 at a time of need can hardly be estimated beforehand.
 
 That those who made the Canal, believed that it would 
 in time of war be a source of danger to our Eastern 
 possessions is certain. It is by no means certain that 
 they were mistaken. An English Canal would have 
 been an addition to the strength of England ; a French 
 Canal could hardly be expected to produce the same 
 result. 
 
 What no one foresaw was the immense development 
 of a special branch of our mercantile marine, which has 
 resulted from the construction of the Suez Canal. By 
 this fact a totally new state of things has arisen, and we 
 have become more interested than any other nation in 
 the maintenance of a road, to which we once saw objec- 
 tions which have not lost all their force because the road 
 is in other respects useful to us. While the sovereignty 
 of the country through which the Canal passes is 
 Egyptian or Turkish, while the direction remains in 
 French hands, the merchants who use it, the ships which 
 pass through it, the money which pays its shareholders 
 are mainly English. That the undertaking has proved 
 to be a financial success is due entirely to English 
 enterprise, which quickly recognised the commercial 
 value of Mons. de Lesseps' great work. Our position 
 is not a dignified one. We opposed the original 
 project for a maritime Canal, and are its principal cus- 
 tomers ; we recognise that it is the gate of India, and we 
 leave the key in other hands ; we pay its expenses, while 
 others make the laws under which we are permitted to 
 use it. 
 
 Hitherto we have been unable to help ourselves. We 
 had made a mistake and were obliged to bear its con- 
 sequences. We never ought to have suffered the junction 
 between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea to be
 
 made by any hands but ours. We thought the scheme 
 impracticable and stood aloof from it ; we ought to have 
 seen that it was practicable and made it our own. We 
 repeated the blunder of those Sovereigns who refused 
 the offers of Columbus to show the way to a new world, 
 but, having once perceived the blunder, we lost no time 
 in making use of the discovery which we had previously 
 rejected. We can take credit for no more than this, that 
 we accepted the situation frankly, and showed no foolish 
 ill humour with those who had been wiser than we. To 
 act otherwise would only have been to put ourselves 
 more in the wrong. 
 
 The routes of commerce, like the paths of Empire, 
 settle themselves by a balance of considerations, many of 
 which are small, and which tend every year to become 
 more minute. They cannot be deranged by authority, no 
 Government can fix them, they are not primarily in- 
 fluenced by the instinct of patriotism. At present our 
 Eastern trade and our communications with that vast and 
 scattered Empire, the shores of which are washed by 
 Southern Seas, tend by the operation of causes which 
 can only be indirectly controlled, to pass through the 
 artificial passage which Mons. de Lesseps opened for 
 them. It becomes then the duty of the English Govern- 
 ment and of Englishmen to make that passage as safe 
 and as convenient as possible. Under its present con- 
 dition, and under its present management, the Suez 
 Canal is neither safe nor convenient. On these two points 
 at all events, there is universal agreement; for the one 
 has been decided by the recent action of Her Majesty's 
 Government in proposing neutralisation, and the other 
 by the unanimous expression of mercantile opinion. 
 
 Whatever the attractions of a quick route to India may
 
 8 
 
 be, however valuable the power of despatching troops 
 within the shortest possible time to or from the East, 
 nothing is gained, unless that route is sure to be at all 
 times open to our ships. At a time of sudden danger 
 in India, or when England is threatened with the com- 
 plication of a European war, a few days more or less 
 may be of incalculable value. Then it may be all im- 
 portant to the security of our Empire, that the com- 
 munication between the Mediterranean and the Indian 
 Ocean should be speedy and unhindered ; but it is 
 precisely under these conditions that an unimpeded 
 passage from Port Said to Suez cannot be relied on. 
 We may guard the extremities with fleets, which will 
 thus be rendered useless for other work, but, if we 
 cannot traverse the Canal itself, we derive no advantage 
 from its existence. All that our maritime preponderance 
 will enable us to do, is to prevent others from using it to 
 our damage. In order to be certain of using it ourselves, 
 we must hold and defend it. Is it probable that, at such 
 a time as we are now considering, we could spare soldiers 
 to occupy the Canal itself, and unless we are prepared 
 to take this measure, where will be our profit ? These 
 risks are not merely hypothetical. We have had recent 
 experience of the manner in which French officials use 
 their opportunities, and it would be folly to neglect the 
 warning. Even at a time when we were engaged in the 
 prosecution of objects which had the approval of France, 
 the Directors of the Company showed no desire to 
 facilitate our movements. If we were engaged in a war 
 with which France had no sympathy, what treatment 
 could we expect } It is needless to ask further what 
 would happen in a case when French interests might be 
 opposed to ours.
 
 If Frenchmen think it hard that Englishmen should 
 decline to leave their highroad to India subject to the 
 rule of a French Company, they must remember that 
 they have Mons. de Lesseps to thank for an unwelcome 
 decision. It may be well on this point to quote the 
 opinion of an impartial critic. Lt.-Col. Hermann Vogt, 
 after referring in language of studied moderation to the 
 proceedings of Mons. de Lesseps, at the time of the 
 occupation of the Suez Canal by the English army in 
 August of last year, adds *' England can come to no 
 other conclusion than that she ought to keep possession 
 of this important maritime passage ; important, not only 
 for herself, but for the whole world, as well for com- 
 mercial as for military purposes."* 
 
 The possible, the inevitable dangers of foreign control 
 it is understood that Her Majesty's Government propose 
 to meet by neutralisation ; but if the neutralisation of 
 the Canal is all that England is to gain from her 
 recent interference in Egypt, she might have-saved her 
 money and the lives of her men. That proposal needed 
 no military operation to enforce its acceptance, yet it 
 was the paramount importance of maintaining uninter- 
 rupted communication with the East, which was declared 
 to be the justification of the Egyptian expedition. Our 
 interest is to extend as widely as possible the activity of 
 our fleets in time of war ; to declare any waters neutral 
 is to limit their activity. Neutralisation benefits all 
 other maritime powers more than ourselves, for the 
 simple reason that it removes a certain portion of the 
 sea from the control of that power which rules the sea. 
 
 * The Egyptian War of 1882, by Lt.-Col. Hermann Vogt, of the German 
 Army. Translators — Kegan, Paul, French & Co., 1883. Pages 128 and 
 130.
 
 10 
 
 How far will neutralisation protect us from the con- 
 sequences of war ? The battle excluded from the Canal 
 will rage outside the defined boundaries, our ships will be 
 exposed to attack before entering and after leaving the 
 neutral waters, their path to and from the mouth of the 
 Canal can be exactly calculated, the road will still be 
 unsafe, because the portion protected by the interna- 
 tional police will only be a fraction of the whole. To 
 protect ourselves effectually, we shall have to clear the 
 Mediterranean and the Red Sea of hostile fleets ; we 
 shall have to take precisely the same measures of defence 
 whether the Canal is declared to be neutral or not. 
 
 Neutralisation then gives us no sufficient return for 
 the sacrifices which we have made ; considered as a result 
 of our recent war it is an absurdity, for it weakens 
 rather than strengthens our power in comparison with 
 that of other nations ; and it has dangers of its own. 
 The necessity, which we shall be under, of defending and 
 maintaining such regulations as may be made, will tend, 
 when we are at war, to embroil us with neutral powers, 
 and, when we are at peace, to drag us into the strife of 
 combatants. 
 
 Nor is it by any means certain that neutralisation 
 would stand the strain of national interests or of roused 
 passions. Neutralisation is, after all, nothing but the 
 result of a collective treaty, and treaties are not always, 
 if ever, respected by belligerents. Recent history has 
 not tended to establish their sanctity or the value of 
 international guarantees. They are good just so long 
 as they are needless ; at the time of trial they are broken 
 reeds, which pierce the hand. And if we cannot trust 
 others to observe them, can we trust ourselves ? It 
 would not be difficult to imagine circumstances, under
 
 II 
 
 which it might be the Imperative duty of an English 
 Government to violate the neutrality of the Canal for 
 reasons of self-protection. No one doubts that in that 
 case we should act, as we have acted before. The 
 fewer treaties we make, which restrain our right of 
 self-defence, the better for us, whatever name we may 
 choose to call them by, and those engagements are above 
 all to be avoided, which we may ourselves find it 
 necessary to break. 
 
 Our interest in securing our own right of way to 
 India at all times is so vital that we cannot accept a 
 paper security, when it is in our power to obtain a real 
 one. It is not denied that neutralisation offers us some 
 advantages at certain times, that for instance it is 
 desirable that, when England is at peace, the Canal 
 should not become the battle ground of other nations 
 who may be at war, to the detriment of our commerce, 
 but It Is clear that a Canal under English control would 
 offer us a far more effectual protection than any agree* 
 ment can afford. For such a Canal we can make our 
 own rules ; we can use it as we choose and when we 
 choose ; and for its defence we can take such measures 
 as we judge necessary. The value of a second Canal 
 to us is not materially affected by the neutralisation of 
 the existing Canal. 
 
 While the Suez Canal Is under present conditions, and 
 must continue to be under the contemplated conditions, 
 unsafe in time of war, It is inadequate for the purposes 
 of peace. The deputations from the Chambers of 
 Shipping and of Commerce, which were received by 
 Lord Granville on the 26th of April, have placed this 
 fact beyond a doubt. It is quite unnecessary to repeat 
 well-known figures. There is not room for the existing
 
 12 
 
 traffic ; there will be still less for the rapidly increasing 
 traffic; there are many minor inconveniences, which 
 cause unnecessary delay and needless expense. Com- 
 plaints, however well founded, receive slight attention 
 from the authorities. The monopoly possessed by the 
 Company has had its natural results in incivility and 
 extortionate charges. 
 
 These defects and annoyances neutralisation will do 
 nothing to remedy. It will rather tend to perpetuate 
 them, for the new position made for the old Company 
 will strengthen its powers, and it is not strong Companies 
 confirmed in the possession of exclusive privileges, 
 which do most for the public service. Still less can a 
 French Company, protected and sustained by an inter- 
 national guarantee, be expected to diminish its profits 
 for the convenience of English merchants, and in order 
 to facilitate the extension of British trade. 
 
 Various suggestions have from time to time been 
 made for the improvement or enlargement of the Canal 
 under the present management, but even if such 
 proposals should be accepted, and it is by no means 
 evident that they are favourably regarded by the share- 
 holders, they are all open to the same objections. They 
 may increase the accommodation of the Canal, but they 
 do not tend to increase its safety. They leave British 
 commerce under the control of a power which is 
 certainly foreign, and may possibly be hostile. To 
 accept them would be to give a hostage of yearly 
 increasing value to the stranger. 
 
 All that Mons. de Lesseps has shown any disposition 
 to do is to make certain minor improvements, quite 
 inadequate to the future requirements of our trade ; but 
 if we first induced and then assisted him to double the
 
 present Canal, or to make a second parallel Canal — a 
 work which the Company cannot do without obtaining 
 fresh powers, since they have sold to the Egyptian 
 Government, at a high price, the land which they had 
 received as a free gift — we should only increase the 
 authority of a Governing Body, which would still be 
 independent of England. When the Canal had been 
 neutralised and made twice as large, its owners would 
 be twice as powerful. We should have presented France, 
 or if not France then Europe, with the fee simple of a 
 road which is far more important to ourselves than to 
 any other nation. It is true that we should, in common 
 with others, possess a right of way, but by assuring that 
 right to all we place those least interested in the Canal 
 on the same footing as ourselves. It is not for English- 
 men to ignore the claims of England in order to establish 
 a Republic of Nations on Egyptian ground. 
 
 If it is then impossible for us to leave France in 
 possession of our highway to the East, can we persuade 
 her to admit us to a share in the Government of the 
 present Canal ? Is a partnership possible ? One of the 
 gentlemen present at the meeting on May the loth 
 urged that proposals should be made to Mons. de Lesseps 
 for such a division of authority. He spoke with an 
 evident desire to act justly, which ensured the sympathy 
 of his audience, but when he came to formulate the 
 conditions which he would be willing to accept, it was 
 at once apparent that his councils were not likely to 
 produce much practical result. What chance is there 
 that Mons. de Lesseps would give up all that he has 
 hitherto struggled successfully to maintain; that he would 
 accept a Board composed of Englishmen and French- 
 men in equal proportions ; that he would consent to 
 hold every alternate meeting in London ?
 
 14 
 
 The speaker himself foresaw the probability of 
 refusal, and went on to say that, if we tried conciliation 
 and failed, our moral position would then be so strong, 
 that we should be justified in making a new Canal, in 
 spite of any objections which might be raised. The 
 conclusion, if any objections include legal objections, is at 
 least doubtful and certainly hazardous. Nor Is an offer 
 made in such terms likely to increase the friendly feeling 
 of those to whom it is addressed. It partakes too much 
 of the nature of a threat. If it were conceivable that 
 such proposals should be accepted, how would the 
 arrangement work ? How could the difficulty be 
 obviated, which was at once suggested by another 
 speaker, that there must be one supreme legal authority, 
 either English or French, to try such questions as must 
 from time to time arise between the Company and 
 individual shipowners ? 
 
 Even if we suppose that Mens, de Lesseps met our 
 offers with a cordiality which he has not previously 
 shown, that he denationalised his Company and recon- 
 stituted it under an Anglo-French direction, how would 
 such an agreement be regarded by both nations ? 
 
 In England we are congratulating ourselves on the 
 abolition of the Dual Control, the inconveniences and 
 perils of which are now fully understood. The proposal 
 referred to above implies the restoration of the Dual 
 Control, at that precise point where the interests of 
 England are most hazarded by divided rule. The one 
 assured result of our recent expedition to Egypt would 
 thus be destroyed, and the recent policy of the Govern- 
 ment rendered futile. The solution would be no 
 solution at all, but a temporary expedient, sure to break 
 down sooner or later. To make a formal partnership
 
 15 
 
 between Englishmen and Frenchmen in the Suez Canal 
 would be to renew, in spite of the lessons of experience, 
 the blunder which we made at first. We are now the 
 partners of France in the ownership of the Canal shares ; 
 the existing arrangements do not suit us ; will their in- 
 conveniences be removed by increasing the number of 
 English Directors? Will not a Board thus divided 
 be the scene of incessant conflicts between opposing 
 parties ? Is there not something more than a chance that 
 quarrels, begun in the committee room, may find echoes 
 beyond its walls ? What we want is the undivided 
 control of our own road to our own possessions, not a 
 share in a road liable to all the disputes and intrigues 
 to which the Dual Control gave rise. It is now again 
 in our power to say whether the road to India shall be 
 English or not. Are we a second time to throw away the 
 opportunity of securing such an advantage ? 
 
 In France the Canal is regarded with legitimate pride. 
 Whatever its defects, whatever the faults of its promoters 
 may have been, its annals are still the brightest page which 
 Frenchmen have contributed to the industrial history of 
 the world. It was made in opposition to the weight of 
 English opinion; it has proved to be a remarkable 
 success. Now that the work is done, will Frenchmen be 
 willing to admit us to an equal share in their authority 
 over it.-* The question is one on which they will feel, not 
 argue, and they will feel strongly. To make a second 
 Canal is to pay them the compliment of imitation, to 
 admit that they have taught us a lesson, as they have. 
 To obtain by negotiation with the Directors of the Com- 
 pany a surrender of the rights in the Suez Canal, which 
 Frenchmen regard as the property of the Nation, and to 
 do this as a result of our recent action in Egypt, would be
 
 i6 
 
 to wound them in their tenderest point. They will be 
 blind to the substantial advantages of a partnership — 
 advantages so great that England ought never to concede 
 them — and they will see only that France has lost the 
 last relic of her old supremacy in Egypt. The difficulties, 
 which must attend such an attempt to harmonise con- 
 flicting interests, are far greater than those which beset 
 commercial treaties, and it has not been found easy to 
 make or renew such engagements. If Mons. de Lesseps 
 were to advocate any such proposal, he would become 
 the most unpopular man in France, instead of being, as 
 he now is, the representative of a very strong and united 
 party; if he were to accept it at our suggestion, he would 
 be regarded as the victim of English force and fraud. 
 
 The fact is, that on both sides of the Channel this 
 whole question looms too large, and is too closely in- 
 volved with the sentiments of patriotism to be treated 
 as a pure matter of trade. The arguments that seem 
 strong in London will sound very weak in Paris, and 
 French utterances will only admit of imperfect trans- 
 lation into English. If Englishmen are right in seeing 
 that the control of the road to India is essential to their 
 empire ; Frenchmen are not wrong in saying that the 
 fact that four-fifths of the traffic is English gives England 
 no right to the possession of a road made by France. 
 Neither nation will permit a matter of such importance 
 to be dealt with, as if no one was concerned in it beyond 
 the shareholders on the one side and the customers of 
 the Canal on the other. The argument of the pocket is 
 not admissible. 
 
 We have thus reached these conclusions ; that 
 England cannot be content with the Suez Canal, as it 
 at present exists, because it gives her neither security in
 
 M 
 
 time of war, nor adequate accommodation for her trade 
 in time of peace ; that neutralisation, while obviating 
 some minor dangers, is an imperfect remedy for the 
 present state of things, leaves some risks unguarded, 
 weakens our power of defence if we should be directly 
 attacked, and introduces new liabilities which are likely 
 to be serious ; that the objects which England is bound 
 to keep in view are not to be attained by enlarging or 
 doubling the Canal under its present management ; and 
 that a partnership between England and France in the 
 ownership of an improved and extended Canal is not 
 likely to be willingly accepted by either nation, would 
 not satisfy English requirements, and would be full of 
 menace for the future. 
 
 Only one course then remains to us, the one which 
 has been already accepted by the Committee, whose 
 decision was embodied in a motion unanimously carried. 
 We must construct a second Canal, which shall be 
 English property, and under the management of an 
 English Company. 
 
 This course also will find French opponents, but there 
 is a vast difference between objections raised on legal 
 grounds, supported by valid arguments, appealing to 
 admitted principles of justice, and mere clamour roused 
 by popular excitement. The latter may be expected to 
 die away, the former live, and sooner or later are judged 
 and estimated at their real worth. It is not desirable 
 that we should sacrifice the interests of England, and 
 perhaps the future existence of our Indian Empire, to 
 French jealousy of our influence in Egypt, but it 
 would be deplorable that we should, by taking undue 
 advantage of our present position, afford France just 
 ground of complaint. We cannot force any step upon
 
 8 
 
 the Suez Canal Company which amounts to the un- 
 wiUing surrender of acquired rights. With the concession 
 granted to Mons. de Lesseps by the Viceroy, confirmed 
 by the Sultan, and tacitly approved by ourselves for a 
 quarter of a century, we cannot meddle. Since what 
 we find it necessary to do must be unwelcome to our 
 neighbours, we are bound to keep within the limits of 
 the most scrupulous legality; unable to avoid giving 
 some offence, we must take every care to give no just 
 cause of offence. Our plain duty and our future safety 
 are inseparable ; but, if we have no right to use our 
 present opportunity to the injury of Mons. de Lesseps, 
 neither has he any right to use his position on the 
 Isthmus to check the natural development of British 
 trade. We may not force him to act with us, but we 
 are perfectly at liberty to act without him. 
 ■'. There need be, and there should be, no hostility 
 whatever to the existing Canal. The measures which 
 we propose to take are purely of self-defence, not of 
 aggression. In protecting ourselves we need injure no 
 one. The present Company is in possession of the 
 shortest route, and has an unquestionable right to retain 
 that great advantage, which is amply sufficient to secure 
 a full return for the capital invested. This part of the 
 subject can hardly be better illustrated than by a quota- 
 tion from the speech of the Chairman at the Meeting 
 held on May the loth. The Canal was constructed to 
 convey 6,000,000 tons of shipping annually from sea to 
 sea. This was the estimate of the engineers who made 
 it. It now conveys more than 7,000,000 tons, and its 
 traffic is steadily increasing. It is actually at the present 
 moment doing more work than it was intended to do, 
 and more than it is capable of doing with due regard to
 
 19 
 
 the convenience of Its largest customers. The new 
 Canal will take from the old nothing which the latter 
 has a fair claim to retain. It will simply be required to 
 do the work which the old Canal is incapable of doing, 
 and by the time that it is finished there will be 
 abundant work for both. Who shall venture to say 
 that Englishmen have no right to supply their own needs, 
 when the French Canal is inadequate to supply them ? 
 Mons. de Lesseps has no more authority to close Egypt 
 against the passage of any number of vessels which our 
 merchants may desire to send to the East, than the 
 makers of the first railway through a new country would 
 have to prohibit the construction of a second. A Canal 
 is a road, and nothing more. As population and traffic 
 increase, new roads are required and are made. All 
 that the makers of a second or of a third road can be 
 required to do, is to respect the property of their prede- 
 cessors in similar work. 
 
 It remains to consider the direction which th^ second 
 Canal should take. Some doubt may exist as to the 
 precise value of Mons. de Lesseps' concession, but the 
 most favourable interpretation of that document can give 
 him no rights outside the Isthmus of Suez. The rest of 
 the country is open to us. Egypt is already intersected 
 by numerous Canals, and there are no engineering diffi- 
 culties which will prevent the construction of any number 
 of others, of any dimensions which may be required. The 
 new Canal will have to be somewhat longer than the 
 original work — so much is admitted — but the whole 
 voyage need be no longer. An increased length of 
 Canal may be compensated by a diminished length of 
 sea-passage. Nor does increased length of Canal neces- 
 sarily involve increased delay. A comparatively rapid
 
 20 
 
 transit may be secured by better construction, by greater 
 width, by improved arrangements, by the removal of 
 needless and irritating restrictions. 
 
 Some objections, which have been raised above to the 
 Suez Canal, will apply in various degrees to every Canal 
 through Egypt ; a road which crosses foreign territory 
 can never offer the same complete security as one 
 which lies entirely within our own jurisdiction. This is 
 a disadvantage inherent in the circumstances of the 
 case, which we cannot entirely escape, but which we 
 can materially modify. Much will be gained by placing 
 the new Canal under English management from the 
 first ; something will be added to safety by separating 
 the line of the new Canal as much as possible from that 
 of the old one ; but it is only by making the new 
 Canal useful to Egypt, which the Suez Canal certainly 
 is not, that her co-operation can be secured for its 
 construction, its preservation, and its defence. In this 
 respect the promoters of the existing Canal were 
 curiously short-sighted. They made vast promises, they 
 acquired a strange influence over the minds of the 
 Egyptian rulers, they obtained concessions of land, 
 money and men to an incredible amount, and they not 
 only gave nothing in return, but inflicted an immense 
 injury on the country which had welcomed them. In 
 many conversations recently held with Egyptian states- 
 men nothing struck the writer of this paper more than 
 the universal agreement of opinion with regard to the 
 proceedings of the Suez Canal Company. There was 
 not one who did not refer to them with detestation. 
 Rightly or wrongly Egyptians speak of the whole 
 concern as a gigantic job, by which their country was 
 robbed. The secret history of the Canal is yet
 
 21 
 
 unchronicled, but an entirely independent witness, 
 Mons. de Leon, the American Consul-General * has 
 published an estimate of the sums contributed by 
 Egypt to that undertaking. These money payments 
 amounted to ;£'i7,423,i78. The entire cost of the 
 Canal was probably between eighteen and nineteen 
 millions. In this reckless expenditure the Egyptians 
 see one great source of the public debt, which still 
 burdens the nation, and if we are so ill-advised as to 
 make an open alliance with the owners of the Suez Canal, 
 we must be prepared to share the odium attached to 
 their name. 
 
 One main object of the new Company should be to 
 remedy the damage which Egypt has suffered ; not 
 that we are in any way called upon to atone for mis- 
 deeds with which we had nothing whatever to do, but 
 because it is the interest of England to support and 
 strengthen that Power, in whose keeping her road to 
 India lies. If we cannot be the owners of the toad, we 
 can at least do something to secure the independence 
 of the gatekeeper. The stronger Egypt is, the better 
 will she be able to resist foreign intrigue or pressure ; 
 and gratitude for the services already rendered will be 
 best secured by the future development of all the 
 resources of the country, agricultural and commercial. 
 For that development a new Canal may do much. 
 Egypt must in future be our ally, and while strong 
 allies are valuable to any nation, however great and 
 powerful, weak allies are only sources of danger. 
 
 Economy, too, must be studied. No new Company 
 will ever induce the Egyptian Government to provide the 
 enormous subventions which Mons. de Lesseps and the 
 
 * See Appendix to Egypt under its Khedives.
 
 22 
 
 Emperor Napoleon the Third extorted from the Viceroy. 
 The only way in which Egypt is likely to give, 
 or indeed could afiford to give pecuniary assistance, 
 is by moderate payment for services actually 
 rendered, and the Canal should for this reason, as 
 well as for that already given, take a direction, and be 
 of a nature, to benefit the country through which it 
 passes. Economy must be sought not in diminishing 
 the outlay but in multiplying the sources of income. 
 The expenditure which any such work demands, must 
 be large, but any expenditure, however large, is yet 
 economical, which produces an adequate return. It is 
 sufficiently obvious that, if one great undertaking can 
 be made to produce several distinct results, from each of 
 which a separate revenue may be derived, the capital 
 expended on attaining each result will be less than that 
 of several Companies would be, each of which might 
 separately undertake the different portions of the com- 
 plex whole. One Company being in possession of several 
 sources of income will be able to accept a lower rate of 
 remuneration for each service rendered, than separate 
 Companies would be compelled to demand. If there- 
 fore the new Company can do work for Egypt, and derive 
 a portion of its revenue from Egypt, it is evident that 
 the transit dues can be materially lowered, while Egypt 
 will pay less for what she receives than she would other- 
 wise be required to pay. Both countries will profit alike 
 by sharing the payments and the services of the Canal. 
 
 The selection of the line which the new Canal should 
 take, becomes then for many reasons of extreme im- 
 portance. It will be for the Committee, with the 
 assistance of the most competent advice, to choose the 
 best load, which is not necessarily the shortest, nor the
 
 2?, 
 
 cheapest. These are points, which will rightly receive 
 due attention, but which should not be suffered to 
 exclude still weightier considerations. It is not supposed 
 that any one of the plans which are now before the 
 public, can be adopted without important modifications 
 and additions — probably no one engineer will prove to 
 be master of the whole situation — but one thing will 
 at all events not be denied, that it is possible to make a 
 new Canal more secure, more convenient than the 
 existing Canal, and far more remunerative in propor- 
 tion to the capital expended. If the result of the 
 labours of the Committee should eventually be to give 
 to England a safe road to the East, while ensuring 
 to Egypt by a wise consideration for her needs those 
 benefits, which a Canal might be expected to confer 
 on the country through which it passes, but which 
 the Suez Canal does not and cannot from its nature 
 and position ever confer, they will render to both 
 countries services, the importance of which it is im- 
 possible to exaggerate. 
 
 O. C. WATERFIELD. 
 
 May 28///, 1883. 
 
 Metchim & Son, 20, Parliament Street, S.W., and 32, Clement's Lane, E.C.
 
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