F'"^^'- 
 
 ^ * * 
 
 1 
 
 THE 
 
 DRAMATIC AND MIMETIC FEATURES 
 
 GORGIAS OF PLATO 
 
 BY 
 
 J. 'V^^. 
 
 BARKER NEWHALL, M.A. 
 
 r-At:r^ 
 
 i^V 
 
 Mi 
 
 A DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. 
 
 I89I 
 
 ^:^ 
 
 
 
 ~^ 
 
 
 s - 
 
 BALTIMORE: 
 
 PRESS OF ISAAC FRIEDENWALD CO. 
 
 189I. 
 
 'r^- 
 
 . :t- 
 
,i:--'- 
 
 '.' 'J-,./'/' 
 
 'i-''i^' 
 
THE 
 
 1. 
 
 DRAMATIC AND MIMETIC FEATURES 
 
 OF THE 
 
 GORGIAS OF PLATO 
 
 BY 
 
 BARKER NEWHALL, M. A , 
 
 A DISSERTATION PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 IN THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY. 
 
 1891 
 
 BALTIMORE: 
 
 PRESS OF ISAAC FRIEOENWALD CO. 
 
 189I. 
 
'^im^ 
 
>^>jiMiF.:'.f^'.^-T^^;;-^yfc:i/^ ^ ' ,. 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 Introduction ' . . i 
 
 GORGIAS 4 
 
 POLUS 8 
 
 POLUS AND CaLLICLKS II 
 
 CALLICLES . . 12 
 
 Chaerephon 15 
 
 Socrates : 
 
 I. Personality 16 
 
 (A). Language 16 
 
 (B). Character 21 
 
 II. Philosophy 22 
 
 (A). Sources ........... 22 
 
 (B). Method . . 22 
 
 (C). Doctrines 24 
 
Prefatory Notes. 
 
 (i). The proportion of participation is (excluding formulae of 
 question and answer, and direct quotations) for Socrates 77^ per 
 cent ; Callicles i^} per cent ; Polus 4 per cent ; Gorgias 3-j^ per 
 cent ; Chaerephon ,78 per cent. 
 
 (2). For the genuine dialogues, to Teuffel's list were added the 
 lo, Menexenus, and Parmenides. 
 
 Literature. 
 
 Gorgias. Besides Foss (1828), Blass, Attische Beredsamkeit' 
 (pp. 47-91), 1887, and Diels (Berlin Acad. 1884) ; Schanz : Bei- 
 trage zur vorsokrat. Philosophic aus Platon, I, 1867. 
 
 Socrates: van Heusde: Characterismi principum philoso- 
 phorum veterum, 1839 ; Kochly : Socrates und sein Volk, Vor- 
 trage (219-386), 1859. (See also pp. 22, 24.) 
 
 Plato: Olympiodorus : /7/)a?t? ;r,o} -ou /'ojo^joti, Jahn's Archiv, 
 XIV 47 ff. ; van Prinsterer: Prosopographia Platonica, 1823; 
 Hirzel: Das Rhetorische bei Platon, 1871 ; Novak: Platon und 
 die Rhetorik, Jahrb, Phil. Sup. XIII 443 f. ; B6nard : Platon his- 
 torien de la Sophistique, Acad. Sci. Mor. (p. 338 f), Paris, 1885. 
 
THE DRAMATIC AND MIMETIC FEATURES OF 
 THE GORGIAS OF PLATO. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 The great mimetic and dramatic powers of Plato were recog- 
 nized by the ancient world. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (ad 
 Pomp. I) says xwfKpSsi robi npu laurou . , . Fopyta'^ xai llmktiv 
 
 xrX., and elsewhere (Rhet. X 2, XI 6) alludes to his skilful 
 ^donoUa, while Basilius Magnus,' citing three of his characters, 
 writes rrapaxcuiiwdei to. Ttpoawiza. Olympiodorus opens his com- 
 mentary with the remark ol <ptk6<To<pot . . . dadyouai -puawna 
 diaXsyo/ieva . . . xai i^ tu,/ fOiyyovTat rd? Cwdy ^apaxTspH^ouar/, and 
 adds that Socrates strengthens (xpazuvet) the speech of Callicles 
 that he may not gain an empty victory. We know from the 
 same authority that Plato was a close student of the mimes of 
 Sophron and of Aristophanes, to whose influence were due the 
 mimetic features of his dialogues. The division of his works 
 into tetralogies by Thrasyllus, and into trilogies by Aristophanes 
 of Byzantium, also bears witness to the general feeling. Modern 
 criticism has more than confirmed the judgment of antiquity. 
 We admire the solemn tragedy of the Phaedo as well as the 
 bright comedy of the Protagoras, while the graceful introduction 
 to the Phaedrus, the rhetorical parody of the Menexenus, and 
 the wonderful microcosm of the Symposium all show the touch 
 of a master hand. Indeed, only in his latest and most metaphysical 
 dialogues do we wholly miss the dramatic coloring, which adorns 
 alike his maiden essay and his maturer work. So real do the 
 characters seem that we feel with van Heusde that while others 
 wrote Socratic dialogues, Plato alone composed mimes. 
 
 The dramatic and mimetic art of Plato has been quite fully 
 treated by von Stein, and Taine has done some clever work in 
 this field by his essay " Les Jeunes Gens de Platon," while com- 
 mentators and critics, notably Steinhart, have incidentally alluded 
 
 ' Epist. 135, V. K. O. Miiller: Gesch. Griech. Literat. II 221, n. 
 
to its more apparent manifestations. The a"'/"!*'? of the Sympo- 
 sium has been discussed by Professor Gildersleeve and others, 
 and judging from the title " Charakterbilder aus Protagoras," a 
 certain Mayr of Komotau has devoted a program to similar 
 study in that dialogue. The merry satyr-drama, the Euthydemus, 
 and the great tetralogy,' the Republic, with their wealth of finely- 
 drawn characters, would well repay special investigation, and the 
 more juvenile interludes, Lysis, Laches, Charmides, would not be 
 without interest. Dramatic analyses of the Phaedo by Suckow, 
 and of the Republic by Bacher deserve mention. Whether the 
 purpose of dramatic form be merely external ornament, or the 
 reinforcement of argument and the vivifying of principles, matters 
 less to the student of literature than to the philosopher. We 
 must bear in mind that the dialogue, even when most artistic, is 
 only analogous to the drama, and in many matters of detail the 
 resemblance is often partial or faint. Still more important is the 
 typical nature of Platonic ixiixTjai^. His own principle is stated in 
 
 the Republic (396 E) iriuxpov rt /lipug h tzoXXui Xoyu} 7^9 lupujasw^, 
 and he deprecates the imitation of evil characters, unless for sport 
 (1. c D and E). The characters are generally few, in accordance 
 with antique precedent, and their delineation is not allowed to 
 distract attention from the purpose of the work. They are repre- 
 sentatives of intellectual and moral tendencies, and so the lines 
 are drawn more subtly than for the mere individual. For the 
 same reason only certain features are emphasized, and the result 
 is often more or less one-sided. Professor Gildersleeve has noticed 
 that, when the space is limited, the portraiture is coarser and more 
 exaggerated, and so Prodicus and Thrasymachus stand in bolder 
 relief than Protagoras and Gorgias. "Simple, fine and intensive " 
 is the verdict of von Stein, and this fresh and delicate rjOonotia 
 would alone justify his title of " Homer of philosophers." Well 
 does van Heusde say "risum nobis . . . excitat Lucianus, hand 
 secus atque Aristophanes, in Platone legendo . . . subridemus." In 
 a word, where the quality is fine, the quantity is small. One 
 drop of the honey of Hymettus, one note from Apollo's swan, 
 may fitly shed their sweetness over an entire life. 
 
 In the Gorgias the earnestness of thought and intensity of 
 feeling exclude the brilliant decoration of the Protagoras, yet the 
 art of the master is far from lacking. No Platonic dialogue, says 
 
 ' (l) Satyr-drama, Thrasymachus, Book I. (2) Rdhc, II-IV (p. 427). (3) 
 'Aw/p, IV-VII. (4) AiKaioavvii, VIII-X (p. 612) tfotSof (612-621). 
 
3 
 
 Steinhart, so closely resembles a tragedy in its lofty pathos of 
 language and in its basic thought man's presumption opposed to 
 God's eternal law. The allusions to the approaching death of the 
 chief actor (486 B, 511 B, 521 C), and to the heroism of his life 
 (473 E), are like the expressions of double meaning which so 
 often foreshadow the catastrophe of a Greek tragedy, and of which 
 the Oedipus Tyrannus affords the best example. These premoni- 
 tions find peculiar expression in an ironical form (521 E), when 
 Socrates parodies his own trial by the instance of a physician 
 who is accused by a confectioner before a court of boys. The 
 abundant irony and word-play as well as the occasional oxymoron 
 are also characteristic of tragic diction. Kochly has drawn a 
 skilful parallel between the Antigone and the life of Socrates, and 
 thus we see that Plato had before him a tragic life to inspire his 
 drama. Moreover, it has been shown that the dialogue falls into 
 five parts, corresponding to the five acts of a tragedy. They 
 are: (I) the TzpoXoyo^ (chap. 1-15); (II) the first episode, or 
 TtpoTa<Ti<s (16-36); (III) the second episode, or i^rtraffj? (37-54) ; 
 (IV) the third episode, or iierd^aaii (55-78) ; and the s^odu^ 
 (79-83). The first and second episodes are suitably marked by 
 the entrance of a new character, and the third by the partial 
 retirement of the second actor. The only vestiges of the stasima 
 are the summaries of the argument made by Socrates at the close 
 of each episode (480 Ef., 500 A-D, 522 C-E), the last showing 
 some poetic fervor. The parados is still less apparent. A faint 
 trace maybe found in the intermezzo at chap. XIII, where serious 
 and positive discussion is really introduced for the first time. The 
 preceding chapters merely define the sophistic position, the internal 
 principles, as the short prooemium (chap. I) presents the characters 
 and scenery, the external features of the drama. The progress 
 of argument follows the lines of development of a tragic plot, so 
 that in the last act all the previous discord of passion grows into 
 purest harmony. Here, too, the gods appear upon the scene, 
 like so many dez ex ntachina, and the myth, in its function of 
 exodus, as in the Republic, " points the moral," as well as " adorns 
 the tale." The final chapter, like the solemn anapaests, sums up 
 the whole thought of the drama, and closes with a personal exhor- 
 tation. The chorus, as an integral part of the action, steadily 
 decreased in importance, and in Euripides and the latest works 
 of Aristophanes it occupies comparatively little space.' Here it 
 
 'v. Haigh: Attic Theatre, 259-261. 
 
is only represented by the silent audience, to whom allusion is 
 often made (447 C, 55 C, 73 E, 90 B), and whose expressions of 
 interest are indicated by 0(ipu[ios (458 C). Chaerephon is evidently 
 its coryphaeus. He assumes its mediating functions, evinces its 
 fussy interest in the action, and has a like fondness for the wise saw 
 and trite maxim, but he lacks the lyric beauty of their speech. 
 In accordance with the rules of the drama, he is on the side of 
 the protagonist, who is, as in all but the latest dialogues, Socrates 
 himself. Callicles is the deuteragonist, while Gorgias and Polus, 
 who represent one and the same stage of the discussion, together 
 assume the r61e of the third actor. 
 
 We may notice the artistic placing of the first word, TcoX^fiou, 
 which indicates the nature of the dialogue, and the pathetic posi- 
 tion of the last word, KaUixXtt':, which is quite consistent with the 
 prominent part that he plays.' It is well to notice that tragedy, 
 not comedy, was Plato's model in economy, nor, on the other 
 hand, does the Gorgias lend itself very readily to a comparison 
 with the Pindaric ode.' The asymmetry which the Terpandrian 
 system of analysis produces is objectionable in Plato as well as 
 in Pindar, while the myth here, moreover, is at the close, not in 
 the centre. The third act resembles the aywv of the comedy 
 and the 6ix<paX6<i of the ode merely in its position as the crisis of 
 the action and the kernel of the thought of the whole dialogue. 
 Further comparison would be fanciful. In regard to the mimetic 
 features of our dialogue, Bfenard remarks that the persons are 
 " avec pr6cision caracteris6, chacun a son langage, sa manifere 
 d'agir." To demonstrate the validity of this claim and to examine 
 the phenomena upon which it is based, the investigation embodied 
 in this essay has been made. If it has contributed, however 
 slightly, to a clearer insight into the art of Plato, it has fully 
 achieved its purpose. 
 
 Gorgias. 
 
 Gorgias, like other sophists, busied himself with the study of 
 Homer. He put Homer after Musaeus, and he compared the 
 neglecters of philosophy to the suitors of Penelope. Moreover, 
 he wrote encomia of Achilles arid Helen, and a defense of Pala- 
 medes. Very appropriately, then, almost his first words are o ye 
 
 ' Cf. fc($c, Apol., Crito (fin.), Leg. (init.) : iroTuriKOv, Polit. (fin.) : Uepaijv, Aesch. 
 Pers. (init.): stelle, Dante, Infer., Purg., Parad. (fin.). 
 Cf. Suckow, 501 ff. 
 
eSxofiat ehai, &? efTj'Otir]po<; (449 A), a phrase which recurs some 
 twenty times in the great epic. Then, too, his eini, iitjSkv ijik 
 aiaxovOeii (463 A) maybe a reminiscence of /JLtjSi tC (i aiSdiievoi; 
 [lediaiTso (y. 96). In 450 B we meet with two words which Olym- 
 piodorus tells us are Sicelisms (^Fopyia? ai>Td<; cm' ixeivou Ttpo<pipst 
 rdf ^^fe:? iy^iopiouq ouaaq'), while he notes that Socrates uses xupo^. 
 ^eipobpyriiia occurs Only here, and xupwaiq elsewhere only in 
 Thucyd. and Josephus. The former may easily have taken the 
 word from his master, and Josephus from the present passage. 
 This seems to be the only place in this dialogue where the local 
 peculiarities of the speakers are reproduced, but, like the frTo* 
 Zsui; of Cebes in the Phaedo (62 A), a little dialectic color is given, 
 and the reader is left to complete the picture. So the Doric 
 forms sprinkled through the chorus of the tragedy satisfied the 
 Athenian mind with a hint of the lyric, of which Doric was the 
 type. 
 
 Besides dignity and conceit (449 A, C, 51 D, 55 D, 63 D) we 
 may note the lofty condescension of 451 A and 455 D. He is 
 the teacher, and Socrates the pupil, a delusion which the latter 
 encourages by his modesty (e. g. [lavOdvw, 450 D). His offer to 
 answer all questions (448 A) is known to be historic,' and a sample 
 of his skill in eluding inconvenient queries is seen in 448 D. 
 So the Scholiast on 458 B says Jidotxev 6 Fopyia^ xai tptbysi T^v 
 dtdXs^cv, ahtazat dk roh^ T:ap6vTa<; Tzavoupyw^ to? ohx avs^ofxivoui. To 
 this trickery we may compare his evasion of the famous bean 
 puzzle,' as proposed to him by this same Chaerephon. Perhaps 
 the most apparent imitation of Gorgias' style put in his own mouth 
 is found in 452 E. Notice first the chiasm of beginning and end- 
 ing, rreiOetv . . . Xdyot^ and Xiystv xal rtecOscv, recurring at the close 
 to the theme of the little speech. Then the paronomasia of 
 iv Sixaarrjpiui Suaardq xtX., and the allied fi^ura etymologica in 
 ^prjixariar^': . . . ^prj/xart!^6fievo^, with the anaphora of 5o'bh>v, as 
 of aiia (D), and the isokola of the sentence. The word douXov, 
 with its semi-poetic idea, is taken directly from Gorgias himself, 
 for Protarchus (Phileb. 58 A) has often heard his master claim 
 that rhetoric Tzavra u<p^ aOr^ SoW.a . . . -koio'ito. This delicate 
 epitome of style closes with a pathetic apostrophe, <roi t<p duvafiivm 
 (cf. Blass, 69). Mark also the unnecessary fulness of expres- 
 sion and repetition of iv ^uXloyu), S-rrc^ ^uXloyoq and of aXXot xai ou^ 
 auTw, adXa aoi. This professional padding is still more abundant 
 
 ' Cf. Philostratus, Vit. Soph. p. 482K. Cf. 1. c. p. 483K. 
 
in the longer speech (456 A-57 C), where indeed it is the chief 
 peculiarity. The phrase ou del Toh(; diddaxovzai; fitcstv re xa\ h.^dk- 
 Xer^ Iz Twv noXswv (6 E) is later (7 B, C) twice repeated almost word 
 for word ; so rj ^rjropui^ ^prjaOat wantp tt^ olXa-q aytovia (6 C) recurs 
 in part in the next clause, and again nearly entire (7 B) ; so ob toO- 
 Too ivxa (6 D) ; ipii>j-:ai oux dpewq (7 A) is resumed just below by ol 
 fiij -/pM/xEvot opOwi;; rrsp) otou -niOavmrepov iv izhjdei (6 C) finds its 
 echo in niOaxoTspo^ . , . iv toi? TzkijOeaiv nep) 8rou (7 A) ; kxelvot 
 Ttapidouav in\ ruT Stxatox; yrprjadat (6 E) appears slightly changed in 
 7 C. The a'j^r/iia xar' apaiv xai Oiaw of aixovoo'iivou^, p.ij uirdp^ovTag 
 (7 A) shows the same tendency. Besides these verbal repeti- 
 tions, the thought, which one sentence would have expressed, is 
 repeated positively and negatively with slight variations through- 
 out the speech. Notice, too, the rhetorical and emphatic position 
 of the adverb Spff&q at the close of the sentence (7 A twice^, of 
 which usage in Demosthenes Rehdantz gives many examples, 
 and to which Thucydides, Gorgias' pupil, is not averse.' Antitheses 
 are common, though inartistic, and are expressed by aUo<:, aXXd 
 and OUTS OUTS. This speech has its real proem in 455 D and E f. 
 This same fullness of expression is seen in occasional peri- 
 phrases, of which his extant speeches afford examples (v. Blass 
 65). So the partitives eviai rSiv dTzuxpitrsw)/ (449 C) and ro rcav 
 TzapovTtuv (458 B) exemplify a usage, which another pupil, Isocrates, 
 was later to extend and mould into a characteristic formula. The 
 phrase rob^ kdpiu^ TzoteiaOat (449 C) might be added, though 
 Socrates has it as well (460 E), and ro ri;^ Ti-/vTj^ (450 C) also, 
 where they are perhaps necessary for philosophic exactitude of 
 definition. However, they are not uncommon periphrases, and 
 here merely show a general tendency, which is once more mani- 
 fested in the addition of xa) dtxattag vTzokaji^dveiq (451 E). On the 
 other hand, a careless form of brachylogy appears in kx twv (for 
 zrjq T&v) drjixioupyuiv (455 E). We know from Aristotle's Rhetoric 
 (189, 20 Rom.) that irony was a characteristic of Gorgias, though 
 Aristotle refers it to the use of poetic ornament. Blass (63) cites 
 the story of the swallow. In our dialogue the interposed oliiai 
 (460 A) and the protest to Callicles (497 B), Travriu? ou aij uuttj jj 
 7i;j.Tj, show this feeling. Some consider the latter phrase to be a 
 proverb, but its application would show irony quite as well, and 
 it is doubtful if the dignified old gentleman would descend to the 
 vulgarity of a proverb, even though Protagoras and Hippias do 
 
 'v. Classen: Einleit. 79. 
 
use a few. It has been noted that the Helen has very few par- 
 ticles, hence is epideictic, while the Palamedes has a great 
 variety and the favorite oratorical combinations, and so is forensic. 
 Here only two places can fairly be called speeches by Gorgias. 
 The former (452 E), a declamatory glorification of rhetoric, has 
 only the common particles xa\, xairot, aUd, iilv and Si, so is 
 epideictic, as its more artistic form and ornament would lead us 
 to expect. The latter (456 A-7 C), an endeavor to prove the 
 power of the art by instance and argument, has 16 different par- 
 ticles and combinations of particles, hence is forensic. In the 
 matter of oaths a quiet vr^ Ji'a or fid rdv Ac'a (448 A, 63 D, 73 A) is 
 all that the two sophists use. 
 
 The periodology of Gorgias is very simple, and, owing to the 
 use of his peculiar figures, is dual, antithetic, and composed of 
 short kola. Our dialogue shows but little strong- antithesis, and 
 the duality is only apparent in a few places. The best cases are 
 452 E, 456 A-C, and 456 DE od3i ys TzoXewv. Often it is very 
 simple, but a more complicated arrangement is seen in (457 A) of Sk 
 fiSTaiTTpi<pavT<; | ^pcuvrat tj Iff^ot | xai n' ri^nTj | oux opOax;, where the 
 second and third kola are parallel, and, less clearly, the first and 
 fourth, so 6-K6Tepov (56 C), <jpa<; ore (56 A) ; also as in (452 E) 
 xairot iv raorrj tj Suvd/xt | dooXov . . , iarpov | SouXov . . , rtaiSo- 
 zpi^fjv II J ^e . . . oLtoi; | akXo) . , . ^p-^fiart^^o/ievog | xai ou^ aorat, 
 
 where in each period the second and third kola are coordinate, 
 but together parallel to the first; so xai si (457 C). The only 
 tricks of speech which are not used bj' master or pupil are 
 long compounds, bold metaphors, and the artistic asyndeton, 
 which is probably intended by the d-6(TTa(Ti<; and -poajioXij of 
 Philostratus. Out of these, however, Callicles employs the bold 
 metaphors, and shows some asyndeton, while Socrates has one 
 long compound, xaraipsudofiapTup-^Oeirj (472 A), which may parody 
 this trait of the sophist. 
 
 The whole delineation of Gorgias is marked by great modera- 
 tion, and the aged Nestor (Phaedr. 261 C) is treated with the 
 utmost respect by Socrates. So it remains for his younger fol- 
 lowers to show the exaggeration of his style and the extension of 
 his principles, and to receive the brunt of the attack. He is said, 
 on reading this dialogue, to have assured his friends, rather need- 
 lessly, that he never said anything of the sort, to have exclaimed 
 oji;xaX<u<: nkdriov olds laiijiitieiv (Athen. XI 505), and to have styled 
 
 * JahrbUch. f. Philol. 103, 442. 
 
8 
 
 him a new Archilochus. It has been thought ' that Aristophanes 
 parodied Gorgias in the Birds, while he attacked him indirectly 
 by the caricature of his pupil, Agathon, in the Thesmophoriazusae, 
 but in neither case is the parody as apparent as here. Besides 
 the famous travesty in the Symposium, the Menon, a sort of pre- 
 lude to the great tragedy, begins the attack through the pupil, 
 who voices the ideas of his master " and stands in his stead. 
 
 POLUS. 
 
 This model pupil is far inferior to his master in depth of mind, 
 and cannot follow the course of dialectic, but must be repeatedly 
 corrected and instructed. He disrespectfully pushes ahead of 
 Gorgias, accuses Socrates of ill-breeding, and is altogether rough, 
 impetuous and arbitrary. This may be seen by such expressions 
 as Tt' Se TOUTO, idv aoi ys [xavw^ (448 A), aypoixia (46I C), 67:60^ av ^ou- 
 Xu)/iat (D). Impatience is shown by ipdOt (462 D twice) and xal 
 Anoxptvai (3 E), and conceit by aXridij ye ul6;xvo^ (473 B). The short 
 speech 448 C is an excellent example of exaggerated Gorgiasm. 
 The paronomasia, homoioteleuton, isokolon, and allied figures are 
 apparent to every one. The word al&va affords an instance of the 
 poetic diction with which Gorgias embellished his writings, and 
 the rare use of nopsueaOac seems affected. The unusual position 
 of the vocative at the head of the sentence may impart a certain 
 dignity. Except in some half-dozen cases, it seems to open in 
 Plato a longer and more formal speech. This piece is regarded 
 by most scholars (after Schol. R.) as a verbatim extract from 
 Polus' own Ti-/vrj, since Socrates mentions (462 B) having read the 
 term i/izscpta in that book, and since Hermogenes cites the first 
 part, Aristotle the last, as Polus'. However, the allusion of 
 Socrates is merely to the one word, and the citation of Hermo- 
 genes may be, as Sittl suggests, from this very place in Plato. 
 Blass thinks that only the first sentence is an extract, while the 
 rest is in the idea, but not the form, of Polus.' The case is not 
 so certain, then, as is generally considered, and it seems at least 
 quite possible that the fine mimetic artist has here made as bold a 
 parody of Gorgianic style as he did in the Symposium. The 
 comment of Olymp., 6 Flwloq B s ar p ixSx; Tzpo^ipst rov Xoyov, 
 
 ' Silvern : Ub. Ar. V6gel, 25-35, 47-55 (Av. 465-625, 1685 ; Vesp, 419). 
 'Meno, 71 D to 72 A, 82 A ; v. Taine, p. 180; Schanz, 120 f. 
 'P. 83 : "was Platon ihn . . . weiter sagen lass/." 
 
seems to indicate that he recognized its dramatic nature. As an 
 epideictic speech, it shows poverty of particles. We may notice 
 that Hirzel thinks yufivdaiov (493 D) may be an shovokoyia (Phaedr. 
 267 C) from the above-mentioned rixvi). 
 
 His abrupt entree (461 C) presents the only ' case of decided 
 anacoluth used by the three interlocutors, who thus show their 
 careful rhetorical training in marked contrast to the conversational 
 familiarity of Socrates. Keck ' would emend away this case, but 
 it is clearly due to the excitement and impatience seen in the 
 
 hyperbaton of ayeiv . . . zohi; koyouq and of i^ij in lav /xij eXOrj Taura 
 eid(oq. The alliteration d^anaq, ooto? dyayiuv seems almost 
 too striking to be accidental. Polus followed his master in the 
 study of Homer, and wrote a catalogue of the ships and a gene- 
 alogy of the heroes (Suidas), so the word ayirkia (467 B) and the 
 phrase kx^^'s '=' npwriv (470 D ; cL B 305) may be epic reminis- 
 cences. The irony, which Gorgias shows here so slightly, is very 
 apparent with Polus (v. p. 10), and he is only second to Socrates 
 in its use. A second characteristic speech is given 471 A-C, with 
 its pompous prelude in 470 D (cf. 455 D), which calls forth the 
 comment of Olympiodorus, ^rjTopixw-epov ixzidszai. It is a good 
 instance of the apodeictic use of the narrative, and its abundant 
 and combined particles (as hWd /xkv dij, A, and roiydpToi vuv, C) 
 witness its forensic nature. The proem is A, the narrative proper 
 B to the middle of C, and the epilogue the remainder. The 
 speech opens with a rhetorical question (cf. 473 B), an artificial 
 position, which is avoided by the most effective and earnest 
 orators. Indeed, this figure, so abundant in the Palamedes of 
 Gorgias, is such a pet weakness of Polus that he introduces it 
 twice into his attempted dialectic (466A, C), and Socrates ridi- 
 cules it by pretending to regard it the opening of an oration 
 (jp6rriim i^ Xoyou ap^ijv, 1. c). The Strong and vivid terms, xara- 
 p.sOu(sa<;, k/jt^a^u, iTziaipa^sv, ijipdvtaev, a-o-jzyt^a^, as the accumulated 
 tortures in 473 B-C, exemplify au^rjirc?. Cicero (Brut. 47) tells us 
 that "rem augere laudando, vituperandoadfligere " was a specialty 
 of Gorgias, and Olymp. (on 473 C) says rd? ffu/i^opd^ ao^wv 
 
 Cron, in his note on 483 DE, eiret ttoi^ romiiro ^eyetv, says " Das zusam- 
 menfassende died tritt aus der Konstruktion," but this is really a rhetorical 
 aposiopesis. Callicles impatiently cuts short the proposed arguments, ttoIu 
 kaTparevaev and 6 irar^p ^Mar, and leaves them both incomplete. This is 
 lively, but artificial, like the question (toi^), which is a favorite Gorgianic 
 opening (cf. pp. 9, 12). 
 
 ' JahrbUch. f. Philol. 83, 412. 
 
lO 
 
 diyjyslrat. Similarly the jerky apposition of o{6v, hve<in6v, yjXutArrjv 
 (B) and of a8k<p6v, ul6v, natda (C), as Seanortjv xal Oslov (A), heap- 
 ing one relationship upon another, with the three-fold repetition 
 of 'Aixz'TT]^ and the stem of 5ouXoq (A), all very strongly empha- 
 size the guilt of Archelaos. The bitter irony all through these 
 speeches (as -j^als-Kmrspov, tawi, 473 B ; aOkmza-zo^, Hirwi, 471 C) also 
 contributes to this effect. The name of the subject of the eraii/o? 
 is artistically made the last word of the speech, as both Gorgias 
 and Isocrates put Helen's name in the last sentence of their 
 encomia.' Finally the heaped-up participles denote the heaped- 
 up guilt, though they mar the intended apodeictic force of the 
 speech.'^ The ratio of finite verbs in the narrative is 13 to 8, and, 
 excepting the first finite verb, we have a curious artistic grouping : 
 
 24 2424 2 
 pp. PPPP I f f. Pfpf I f f. PPPP I fp- 
 The verbs of 473 B-C show like symmetry: 
 
 22323 2X3 2 
 
 pf I pp, f ff I pp, fff I pf, pf, pf I pp. 
 
 The quieter proem (471 A) has the opposite ratio, i to 8, while 
 the epilogue shows a more even balance. The little speech 
 (473 B-C) has its proportionately short proem and epilogue, ^rui? 
 Uyeii ; and rauza Xiysis xtX. The fullness of expression seen in 
 Gorgias is found in the pleonasm apTt, roumu Tzpi'mOsv (467 B). 
 One of Gorgias' precepts was el 6 Ivavrio^ anoudala liy^t, yiXa xa\ 
 k'xxfxius wni'iM (Olymp.), and so Polus employs this device of his 
 master (473 E). 
 
 Teichmiiller ' notes that Polus uses the answer rai? yap ou ; five 
 times in 475 B-8 C, and suggests that it may represent the Thes- 
 salian culture of Gorgias' school. Callicles uses it seven times, 
 Gorgias three. Socrates has it twice, but it may be a mocking 
 echo of the sophists. Moreover, it is twice employed by the 
 imaginary objectors introduced by Socrates, who must be counted 
 as a part of the outside world. Excluding Socrates, the total is 
 .14S to the page. In order to see how far this form of answer is 
 sophistic in its tendency, all the dialogues of Plato have been 
 examined, and the cognate forms jtcS? d' ou ; and ::u? yap av ; also 
 
 Cf. Isaeus 5, Lys. 26 near the end Lye, Dem. 23, Thuc. I 43, VI 87, etc. 
 'v. Am. Journ. Philol. IX 146. 
 ' Literarische Fehden, II 321. 
 
II 
 
 noted. It does not appear in the Apol., Tim., Criti., Symp., Prot., 
 lo, and Menex. Socrates uses it once in the Euthyd. and Crat., 
 twice in the Gorg., and thrice in the Rep. Four persons use it 
 more often than .10 to the Teubner page : (i) Theaetetus in the 
 Soph. (.23; wtS? it' ou ; .14); (2) Thrasymachus in the Repub. I 
 (.21; for actual participation, .32); (3) Protarchus in the Phileb. 
 (.16), and (4) Aristotle in the Parm. (.124 ; for actual participa- 
 tion, .16J). The first was a disciple of Theodorus, and he of 
 Protagoras, the second (Phil. 58 A) and third either pupils of, or 
 strongly influenced by, Gorgias, while of the last we only know 
 that he was one of the Thirty. Three of these, then, point clearly 
 to sophistic influence, while the fourth, being otherwise unknown, 
 and appearing in a dialogue of doubtful genuineness, renders testi- 
 mony neither pro nor con. Though the Thessalian theory of 
 Teichmiiller finds no support, we infer that this answer in the 
 Gorgias may be one of the finer mimetic touches of our author. 
 Lysis (.16S) and Alcibiades in Ale. I (.20) have been excluded, 
 the former dialogue being too short, the latter spurious. 
 
 POLUS AND CaLLICLES. 
 
 These two pupils of Gorgias exhibit interesting diflferences and 
 similarities of language and demeanor, and some of the more 
 important cases may be briefly noticed. At their entree each has 
 the same idea in his mind, but Polus is rough and excited (461 B, 
 cf. p. 9), while Callicles politely turns to Chaerephon first, and is 
 cool and calm to Socrates (481 BC). Accordingly, Polus receives 
 no explanation and is silenced with little ceremony, but Callicles 
 is allowed to make a long speech, after Socrates has graciously 
 explained his position. Both accuse the philosopher of trickery 
 (461 C, ei? rucaura ayeiv ; 482 E, et? roiadra aysit;'), and depreciate 
 Gorgias with the same phrases (461 B, f^a^oyOyj ivavria Xiyetv 
 8 Jij ayana^ 482 D, alff^u^d^vat cvoKTi'a slizelv as: Se touto ayaixav). 
 Polus attempts dialectic, of which he is clearly incapable, and 
 begins before he knows Socrates' position, while Callicles makes 
 a long and able speech, after ascertaining his opponent's views. 
 The former starts too soon and is at once interrupted, the latter 
 waits till the proper time. Polus advocates the right of the 
 stronger in crude and revolting language (466 C, 471 A-C, cf. p. 9, 
 473 B arptpXwrai, xazaTimtudrj xrX.'), and uses a coarse barbarian as 
 an example, Callicles in specious terms {<fO(fi% vs. v6ixoz) and poetic 
 phrases {avstpdvTi, i^ikaiiipev), and cites Pindar and Euripides 
 
12 
 
 (482 A-486 D). The answers of Socrates indicate the contrast, 
 /io/>fxoXijTrsc al) (473 E) tO the One, si ^joou^v e/tuv , , . r^v <pu'/[rj^ 
 (486 D) to the other. Polus uses the wrong verb, 'Ap^iXaov 6pai 
 (470 D), Callicles the right one, de;u<rToxXia dxouen ; (503 C). 
 Both allude to the many possible examples (470 D, oddsv . . , 8et 
 
 -aXatinq TzpiiyixafTiv : 483 DE, (iXXa jiupia d'lT!? iyiii Xiyeiv), but one 
 dwells on his tyrant's crimes, the other passes quickly from Xerxes 
 to the more distant Darius. Both begin with a rhetorical question 
 (471 A, 473 B ; 491 E), but Callicles answers Socrates first ; both 
 treat their opponent with scorn (470 C, 491 E, 495 D), and show 
 great confidence (473 B, 474 B ; 488 D, 495 C), though the general 
 tone of Callicles is firmer (-yo a<p6Spa 'dXsyov, iydt (toi o-a^o)? Xiyw). 
 Both use the rediccHo ad absurdum (473 E, cf. 474 B : 481 C), and 
 both show embarrassment : Socrates twice asks Polus ri oux 
 ar.iixpvjsi ; (468 D, cf. 474 C, D 3 times), and says dnoxpiyou (515 C, 
 cf. 509 E) to Callicles after three unanswered queries, and finally 
 has to answer himself. For similar expressions cf. 466 A, Socr. 
 to Polus, rrjXixouro^ aiv (defensive), and 489 B, Callicles to Socr., 
 id. (ofTensive) : 468 E and 499 B, w? Srj ah: 471 E, Soxet mi wi 
 
 Xiyoi, and 495 B, xm yap ai> ; 473 C, dia<poy(bv Tupavvo? xaradrr, and 
 484 A, Sca^uywv , . . metpdyiq dsdTtozrj^ : 473 A, arona iTztyscpsli; (cf. 
 480 E), and aroro? el, 494 D ; 467 B and 489 B, uuTo^(^r) d.n^p 
 tT/JzX'.a Xiyn? and oo -Kaixit-ai <pXuapmv. Socrates uses irony only 
 playfully with Polus, and attacks personal weaknesses (461 B, 
 470 D), but very keenly with Callicles to combat logical errors 
 (as 490 C-E, 494 C-E). He gives each two examples, to Polus 
 prosaic incidents in his own life (469 D, 474 A), to Callicles poetic 
 myths from the philosophers (492E-4A). 
 
 Callicles. 
 
 As Gorgias represents the theory of rhetoric, and Polus its 
 technique, so Callicles its practical application ; or, as Jahn puts 
 it, Gorgias is positive. Polos comparative, Callicles superlative. 
 He is, as already shown, quite the most skilled antagonist of the 
 three in logical thought and energetic expression, and he exceeds 
 in the length of his main speech any Platonic interlocutor, except- 
 ing Protagoras and the speakers of the Symposium and Republic. 
 His independence of action is shown by his frequent attacks 
 upon Socrates (489 B, E, 490DE, 97 A, 505 D, 511 A, 15 B, 21 B), 
 his sophistic changing of ground (489 C, 91 A, 99 B), his frequently 
 
13 
 
 restricted assent (495 A, 501 D, 13 E, 14 A, i6B,D) and his 
 refusal to continue the discussion C505D). Olymp. compares 
 him to Sisyphus, who pushes forward the stone and then draws 
 back. He might have added that it is the overpowering weight 
 of the Socratic elenchus which compels Callicles to retreat. He 
 is clearly none of those lay-figures which appear so universally 
 in the Platonic dialogues. 
 
 The rhetorical influence of Gorgias appears in the artistic asso- 
 nance, iTraivooi} knaivobaiv xai <pdyou^ ^'iyooaiv (483 B) ^ekrio\i6<; ts 
 xai xpiiTTuvoi , , . ^sipovtov re xai ijTrovutv (484 C), vofiov re xai Xoyov 
 xai tpdyov (492 B), '<rra* tooto oorm (504A); in the bold meta- 
 phors, diapprj^af . . . xara^zan^trai . . . ^EffTrdny? . . . i^iXaix4>tv (484 A), 
 jT/larTHyTe? (483 E) , <JUiii:i>Si<T0si<s, iT:s<TTtifi.{<Tdyj (482 E), noppw ftXoao^iaf 
 iXauvovra? (486 A), and similes (483 E, 99 B) : in the rhetorical 
 questions (491 E, 2B,C), and the alliteration -eiOou, xadaai . . . 
 7rpayp.dTwv (486 C). Under this head may be classed the cases of 
 hyperbole (/lupt'a 483 D) and catachresis (/St'o? 486 D). The 
 sophistic criticism and adaptation of the poets is seen in quota- 
 tions from Homer and Pindar, but especially from the rhetorical 
 Euripides, selections from one of whose prjaeti are skilfully woven 
 into Callicles' own argument (485 E, 86 BC). Though thus 
 dependent on Gorgias, he is also a man of the world, and 
 approaches to the simpler style of Socrates in his litotes (513 C), 
 slight cacophony (^tyw Xiyw 484 B), careless hyperbaton, ipuatv 
 . . . yexvaiav (485 E), his use of proverbs (447 A, 505 C, 21 B) 
 and ^g-ura etymologica (8). Here also may be placed his asyn- 
 deton (483 C, E, 484 A, 489 B), though, as we have seen (p. 7), 
 a more artistic form might be ascribed to the contact with Gorgias. 
 The massing of four (483 E) and six (84 A) participles at the most 
 brilliant part of his long speech, crowded as it is with poetic 
 tropes and bitter scorn, reminds us of the exploits of his prede- 
 cessors. At 458 C, Schol. O. notes that Chaerephon desires the 
 continuation of the discussion, because it is profitable (jtpitopytai- 
 Tspov), but Callicles, because it is pleasant (^ffOr/n). So he says 
 intOu/xsl lujxpdTTjz (447 B), but the latter answers jSouXofiat (Olymp.). 
 
 The fact that our knowledge of Callicles is limited to this dia- 
 logue has caused various speculations upon his identity. That 
 Plato has been considered not averse to the employment of pseu- 
 donyms may be seen in Teichmiilier's ' identification of Lysias 
 with Dionysodorus, a character whose reality Grote and Schaar- 
 
 ' Literarische Fehden, I 30 ff. 
 
14 
 
 Schmidt had already doubted. Indeed, Cicero (Leg. 1 15) thought 
 that the ?=>? of the Laws was Plato himself, and the Eleatic 
 strangers in the Sophistes and Politicus are certainly shadowy 
 characters. Steinhart and Stallbaum consider Callicles a typical 
 Athenian of his time, and van Prinsterer treats him as historical, 
 while Benard expresses doubts as to his real existence. Gotschlich 
 held that he represents Isocrates, not in traits of character so 
 much as in the expression of Isocrates' views, while he is forced 
 to draw conclusions which the orator would never draw. How- 
 ever, this is even more true of his relation to Gorgias, and he 
 could only in a very general way represent iwo people. Schmelzer 
 has a curious theory that the three interlocutors are the three 
 accusers of Socrates, Gorgias being Lykon, Polus Meletus, and 
 Callicles Anytus. He bases it chiefly on certain correspondences 
 in the last pair, which he sets forth at the end of his Gorgias and 
 in his Menon (pp. 50, 52, 58, 60, 62). They are both wily poli- 
 ticians and easily angered, alike condemn the sophists and warn 
 Socrates of his fate ; but Callicles is friendly, an aristocrat and 
 cultured, while Anytus is hostile, low-born and ignorant. More- 
 over, Callicles calls the accuser of Socrates Ttdw [lo-j^dtjpdi; xal 
 <pt>uXo^ (521 C). The most plausible view, which identified him 
 with Critias, was proposed by Cron in his Beitrage (1870), but he 
 abandoned it in 1886, apparently under the criticism of Bonitz.' 
 The similarity is, however, so very strong that it deserves notice. 
 Jowett (11 275) remarks, " had his name been Critias instead of 
 Callicles, his opinions would seem to reflect his life," and K. O. 
 Miiller, Zeller, Blass and others class their views together, making 
 them with Thrasymachus a trio of sceptics. This collocation is 
 as old as Themistius (Or. 26 fin.), and Olymp. often notices the 
 connection with Thrasymachus. This even extends to language, 
 such expressions as xaxoupysl's iv rot? A6yo(? and r^doi; el, beside TrtSy 
 yap ov ; above noted, being common to both, while they uphold 
 the right of the stronger in like terms (483 B, Rep. 338 E). All 
 three came under the instruction, or direct influence, of Gorgias. 
 To the striking points of likeness adduced by Cron a few others 
 may be added. Callicles is contradictory and changeable in his 
 opinions (p. 14) and in his public life (481 E), a character quite 
 like that of Critias (Cron 19). The defense of nXeovsxrsiv (Cron 
 17) is also seen in Xen. Hellen. (II 3, 16), where Critias joins 
 
 ' Jahrb. f. Philol. 133, 579. Now (141, 253) he calls Callicles' speech an ecAtt 
 of what Plato had heard Critias say. 
 
IS 
 
 nXiov s^scv and ap^ij as Callicles here (483 D). In dialectic both 
 change ground and withdraw their statements (Char. 164 D, 
 165 B), and object to Socrates' method of treatment (Char. 165 E, 
 166; Gorg. 497 A, 511). Very little is known of Critias' style, 
 and only scanty fragments of his works remain. A certain simi- 
 larity of idea is seen in the metaphor of Callicles, ouiir.odiaeei^ Iv 
 ToXi; koyoi? . . . al(T^u\/dsi? (482 E) and the line aidou? a-^a\y.tl)Tin(!iv 
 eUoxrac TziSaiq (598 N.), from the Peirithous, which K. O. Miiller 
 and others ascribe to Critias. Callicles' approval of Alcibiades 
 and Cimon was shared by Critias (Eleg. 3-5, Hist. 9). The fact 
 that (peuSotidpru!; (472 B) only occurs (until Plutarch) in Critias 
 (Trag. 9 N.) and in 472 B, is probably a mere coincidence, unless 
 Socrates intends it to be a compliment to the poet. 
 
 Chaerephon. 
 
 Olympiodorus devotes especial notice to the position and func- 
 tions of Chaerephon. He says that he is opdudo^o^, and is used 
 by Socrates as an example of ~u>i; lirttrTij/iovei yhovrai xai SiaXiyo-yrac, 
 but is not essential to the discussion. He is, moreover, a medium 
 between the two sides, diam)/>0/j.su[, and so, having had a previous 
 acquaintance and rencontre with Gorgias (p. 5), he questions him 
 in the place of Socrates (447 C). He uses a proverb, ^yw xai 
 Idaoixai (448 B), to match the preceding, as Socrates had matched 
 the proverb of Callicles, and turns the latter's own phrase, oidkv 
 inov TO auToy Iptordj (447 C), into an answer to the host himself 
 (481 B). So Socrates (p. 18) in his replies embodies the phrases 
 of his opponents. In fact, as in Aristophanes' Clouds, he is the 
 model Socratic pupil, and is the counterpart of Polus. He is 
 more respectful to his master, and shows his skill in understand- 
 ing Socrates by one example, while Polus needs many, and even 
 Gorgias two (449 D). A touch of his master's irony appears in 
 ^aSitoq uKoxpf^st (448 A), and he addresses 6oik Gorgias and 
 Socrates (458 C), though the latter wished to continue the conversa- 
 tion. In 458 C he may have had in mind the line of Pindar, da-/o/.[ag 
 b-izipTspov Kpayiia, which was probably a favorite quotation of 
 Socrates (v. Phaedr. 227 B). Here we may also note his figura 
 etymologica (458 C, 448 C), which, considering the small part that 
 he takes, is a large proportion. In the opening of the Charmides 
 he justifies the epithet of /^ai-tzo?, as his subordinate position here 
 does not allow him to do, and he occupies a like intermediate and 
 introductory position. 
 
i6 
 
 Socrates. 
 I. His Personality. 
 
 In approaching the character of Socrates we are at once con- 
 fronted by the difficulty of distinguishing the peculiarities of the 
 author in language and thought from those of his master. While 
 Xenophon and Aristotle may help us to extract the thought, 
 they leave us for the most part unaided in our study of the lan- 
 guage. We might look to the Clouds of Aristophanes, but there 
 the parody seems to be confined to method and doctrines. Those 
 figures and modes of expression which occur throughout the 
 Socratic dialogues (as given by Zeller), and which agree with our 
 knowledge of the character of Socrates, mjiy with a good degree 
 of certainty be considered dramatic reproductions of reality. 
 
 The most prominent and characteristic of these is the irony, 
 demanded by the special earnestness, plain speaking and hard 
 hitting of the philosopher. To cite all the cases in the Gorgias 
 would be to transcribe half the dialogue. It is sometimes quite 
 apparent, often keen and subtle, now a polite veil for dissent, now 
 a powerful engine of destructive criticism. Perhaps the most 
 pungent examples are the retorts to Polus, akka roi i^e::iTTj8ei xzX. 
 (461 C), and akk' axDuo) ys (470 D). Closely akin to this is litotes, 
 which is well suited to the mock modesty of the philosopher. 
 Whether it carries a positive meaning directly and clearly, or 
 makes simply a qualified statement, its form at least seems more 
 modest. It is most frequent in Xenophon and Plato, and this 
 may be due to the influence of their common master. Four of 
 the five cases of w Tzdvu are used by Socrates, as is also oox ^kiyrj^ 
 (461 B). So playful and genial does he always seem that we are 
 justified in considering peculiar to himself the occasional play 
 upon words, as the two ^^^"((481 E, cf 513B), Ivavrwv and ivavrta 
 (487 B), kdyou and koptv (523 A),''AtS(iu and dstdii (493 B). ntOov, 
 a;wijTou? and aw/ia are borrowed (493 A). This sportive fancy 
 is exemplified also in pompous legal expressions like Kakkuk^i 6 
 'A^^apvsb? sffj (495 D), ra //.iv akka xaOaTzsp (51 B), ffw/^^?'ij^<'9 (S^O A, 
 cf 501 C), 506 C, and in the mock solemnity of the patronymic 
 c! A'/iijvt'sco? (482 A). So is the use of antonomasia (482 B), and 
 oxymoron, Scd rd aia-j^msaOai. Tnkii.a (487 B). In this same familiar 
 tone are used the proverbs. Dorian in their character and origin, 
 as is seen by their frequency in Epicharmus and Sophron (Plato's 
 models) and by the gnomic trend of Doric thought, they were 
 
7 
 
 approved and studied by Aristotle, but considered vulgar and old- 
 fashioned by Isocrates. In Plato they are most abundant in the 
 Lys., Charm., Euthyd., Symp. and Phaedr., all dramatic and 
 familiar in tone ; then in the Theaetetus and Phil., then in the 
 Gorgias and Laws, the first three blending the serious with the 
 dramatic, the last counteracting its stiffness by a strong Doric 
 color; and finally in Euth'o, Phaedo and Repub., where the 
 elevation of tone somewhat overrides dramatic tendencies. Out 
 of 274 occurrences of 188 proverbs, 144 are put in the mouth of 
 Socrates, 56 are used by his interlocutors, and 74 appear in Leg., 
 Soph, and Polit., where he does not participate. In the Gorgias, 
 Socrates employs 13, a number slightly below his ratio, and 
 Chaerephon one, while the two sophists do not stoop at all to such 
 vulgarity (v. p. 6). Callicles again shows his neutrality by using 
 three, slightly more than his share. 
 
 Likewise familiar and old-fashioned is the figura eiymologica, 
 which Isocrates seems consequently to avoid. Dionysius (De 
 Admir. Vi, 27), in his critique of the Menexenus, recognizes the 
 vulgarity of the figure, saying tiz olba el rt? av ii^iwasv siTzslw r&v 
 TTjv Af-TTji/ xai dxptjS^ xai xaOapdv SidXexzov i-crr/SsuovTiu)/' -pdzTsrat 
 yap rd Tzpdy/xara, ipydt^trai. ds rd epya. Kiihner ' thinks that the 
 more pleonastic forms (as ohiav olxoSotielv') have been taken into 
 literary language from popular speech. In studying the use of 
 this figure in Plato we must recognize a "doubtful " class, consist- 
 ing of the combination of a participle and verb (as 6 -oiwv -otsi 
 and rrojsfv to Tzoioup.evu-^') and the use with a neuter relative (as 
 Tzou'i. % TtouX), which are deliberate and more exact forms of speech, 
 and serve the needs of philosophic definition. The phrase <? 
 em<y e^;r?i' has been excluded, as being too common to give color. 
 All kinds are found in the Gorgias, cases where the noun is 
 in the nomin., accus., dat., and even genitive absolute (458 C, 
 513 C), and where the relative takes the place of the noun. 
 Socrates employs 75 (87 per cent), or, excluding the doubtful 
 class, 53 (46 per cent). This indicates that he owes his large 
 proportion mainly to the use of definition and to exactness of 
 speech. Chaerephon has it twice, the sophists more sparingly 
 (one each), and Callicles less than his share (8). In seven 
 Socratic ' dialogues (322 pp.) the ratio per page is .59, without 
 the doubtful, .36, of which Socrates has .47 and .26, while in four 
 
 Griech. Grammatik, 1086, 2. 
 
 * Frot., Lach., Euth'o, Gorg., Crito, Lys., Meno. 
 
i8 
 
 late ' dialogues (320 pp.) it is .49 and .34. This inconveniently 
 large proportion in the late dialogues is mainly due to the Laws, 
 where the exact legal tone and a certain rejuvenescence of 
 dramatic art at the beginning may be responsible. Out of the 
 dialogues examined, the largest proportion is in the Crito, then 
 Laws XL then Gorgias. In the Symposium Socrates has 36 per 
 cent and 14 per cent of the whole number, and Pausanias alone 
 approaches him with 18 per cent and 14 per cent. Here the 
 philosopher only exceeds the sophist by the use of definition. 
 Its frequency in the Memorabilia (48 and 34 cases) seems to show 
 that it wasdi favorite usage of Socrates, while the statistics from Plato 
 indicate that the latter became scarcely less devoted to it than his 
 master. 
 
 One of the most striking idiosyncrasies of Socrates is his great 
 fondness for oaths.' Two forms seem to have been his favorites : 
 vij rr/v'Hpav (449 D), which is properly a woman's oath, is found 
 in Xenophon as well, and Professor Gildersleeve has suggested 
 that he borrowed from his mother, together with her maieutic 
 art, of which Hera, through her daughter Eilethyia, was patron. 
 It is also used by others.' The second, the famous Rhadaman- 
 thine v-^ (fj-a) rdv xuva (46 1 B, 66 C) is due to the euphemism, which 
 goes a step further in the elliptic /xa t6v (466 E), and is explained 
 (482 B) by the addition rdv Alyu7:Tcu}v 8edv (Anubis). Beside the 
 above, we have r/x)? Jto?, <ptXiou, dswv; vai Qxa) Aia, and the jest- 
 ing iJ-a ruv ZrjOov (489 E). The free use of interjections also bears 
 witness to his lively and easy style. He cries out iou, uiu (499 C, 
 cf Rep. 432 D). Just two-thirds of the (18) interjections in Plato 
 ( Ast) are uttered by Socrates, /JaySai' being the favorite (7). Others 
 use the same words. The skilful dialectician often repeats the 
 phrases of his opponents in his own arguments, turning their 
 sharpest weapons against his foes. (462 B) i/mstpia from 448 C, 
 
 (475 D) OTTO Ttokkmv avOpm-ur^ from 474 B, (506 C) ourw? avrfp from 
 489 B, (518 A) a'^s?.suOip<iu<s, douhmpsTret?, 485 B, (526 E) dvstSt- 
 
 Z<u (Tot xtL, answers 486 A-C; avrcTcapaxaXw answers 485 E and 
 521 A; (527 D) vswHsusaOai answers 482 C, and 6i:oXov doxig xrX. 
 answers 466 C fT. With like droTzia (Symp. 215 A), he ironically 
 quotes their statements. (460 A) w(n:ep cTrs?, a-KoxaXixI'a'i (455 D), 
 (462 E, 509 A), dypouoTepov (46 1 C), (506 B) tijv 'A[i^iuvu^ pr^atv from 
 
 1 Soph., Pol., Criti., Leg. I-III, XI. 
 2v. Schanz, Nov. Comm. Plat. i8 ff. 
 *Xen. Conv. 3 times, Lach. 181 A, etc. 
 
19 
 
 485 E, (519 D) lot dXrjdai? di^iitjYope'iv from 482 C. This is really a 
 sort of parody in a parody, which is still more evident in the 
 assonance of (461 D) iv epyotg xai iv ^.dyot?, (465 D) woAy . . . 
 nSike, (467 B) to XuiaTe IlwXe, (461 C) a) xdXkt<TTs. JlcoXs. 
 
 It has already been noted that in the language of all the other 
 interlocutors there is but one case of anacoluth (p. 9). The speeches 
 of Socrates, on the contrary, exhibit a very loose and careless 
 style, which imitates the structure of easy conversation. We 
 know that the philosopher disregarded the mere externals of lan- 
 guage and system, and indeed he says himself (Symp. 199 B) 
 that he speaks Svdfiaat Si xal Oiffsi firj/MTutv Tocaurtj, dizoia d' av ti? 
 rbx^lj iT^^Xdouaa. This shows itself in loose, disjointed sentences 
 like 459 E, 465 D, 493 AB, 501 A, 505 D kTztdivra^, 507 DE, 
 508 CD, 511 DE, 512 Ef., 513 D, 17 E, 21 E, and in genuine 
 anacoluths, 453 AB ^j-w . . . iid, 477 D(?), 454 B "va/i^ <?au;uoCjj?, 
 464 A, 503 D Touzo dk riyjvrj xzX,, 515 D oux law?, dXX' dvdfxyj.; 517 D 
 ehac . . . TOiodrov ovra, 521 A dtaxovijffovra ;" also in the repetition 
 of a word, as 5ianpaTTo;iivrj (511 'D'),T:apiXa^ (516 B), in self-inter- 
 ruption (500 E), and in hyperbaton, (rdftaTt rw.. . . ytyvoixivut 
 (504 C), and StaXiyeadat . . . r/jo? aXXrjXou? (473 C). Here we 
 may class the frequent brachylogy,as tj vuv < ^zw rr^v vuv Xiyovziy- 
 f 493 D), avso < TOO (ppovri^eiv > roD ^sXziarov (465 A), itivovTsq Tzapd 
 for TO dcd6;xvov vtzu (467 C), dvTi yecpovwv for rod Tzou'iv 'j/ttpwai; 
 (515 D, cf. 516 C), and asyndeton, 455 B orav, 464 B Suo'tv and rr/v 
 [li'-i, 472 A fiapzupijaouat, 481 E ev te ixxXrjma, 487 B rive ; also the 
 awkward assonance or cacophony, as o5 oorot (451 D), kyco ipS> 
 C453D, 504 C), iym Xiyw (^-joE, 512 D, 518 A, 22C),4'iYw iycb 
 (517 B), iyu) ayw (494 E), tI 5k toSs; (474 D). Pleonasm and 
 polysyndeton are much rarer, as (480 E) rouvavriov ao pLSTafiaXovra, 
 (482 B) xpslTTov , , . jxaXXov, (453 B) bnoitTEuw rjv oljiat (modesty), 
 and (519 A) xal Xt/xivtuv xzX. 
 
 Gathering from various indices 166 cases of anacoluth, in 
 dialogues where Socrates participates, and 39 of brachylogy, he is 
 found to have 84 per cent of each. Of course, these figures only 
 show a general tendency, since they do not present all the cases, 
 nor do we know Socrates' exact ratio in the other dialogues. 
 This same carelessness of speech may be seen in the Memora- 
 bilia, as dpyt^sffdat . . . Xurel (III 13, i), II i, 18, II 3, 2 Suvarai 
 . . . dyvooudt, IV 2, 38 kvcoti dpxsl . . . diXd mpnzoiouvzat. 
 
 The same work shows us that Socrates was accustomed to 
 
 ' See also Engelhardt, Anacoluth. Platon. I 28-34. 
 
20 
 
 quote from the poets for illustration or support in his discussions. 
 We have there citations from Homer, Hesiod, Theognis and 
 Epicharmus, and he evinces considerable familiarity with poetry. 
 His friend Niceratus in the Convivium (IV 7, VH 45) was a good 
 Homeric scholar, and he was on intimate terms with the poet 
 Agathon (id. VIII 32). Accordingly we are not surprised to find 
 him quoting in our dialogue from Homer, Simonides (? 451 E), 
 Epicharmus, and Euripides. His intimacy with the last named 
 is well known.' We may also infer from Apol. 22 B and Prot. 
 339 ff. that he was fairly well versed in the poets, but it is doubt- 
 ful that he was really acquainted with all the 21 from whom 
 Plato makes him quote, and, indeed, as it stands, his percentage 
 (65) is not very high. Out of some 220 citations, or direct refer- 
 ences, from the poets, Socrates has 145, of which about half (70) 
 are from Homer. In both Xenophon and Plato, Socrates uses 
 many rare words, but it is probable that they are due chiefly to 
 the authors themselves, as this is characteristic of their style and 
 foreign to the simple nature of their master.' One word, however, 
 dixaiuTTi'; (508 A), as it only occurs elsewhere (till Cassius Dio) in 
 Prot. 331 B (Soc. loq.) and three times in Xenophon, may perhaps 
 be Socratic. In the Gorgias, Socrates has "jg^ per cent of the 
 a-a^ ksyuiisva, only a trifle more than his share ; Callicles and 
 Gorgias are below their ratio, Polus above. Although Xenophon 
 puts metaphors and similes into the mouth of Socrates, he was 
 not enough of a dramatic artist to imitate so closely the usage of 
 his master, and, though they abound in the sayings quoted by 
 Stobaeus, many of these citations are of doubtful authenticity. 
 On the other hand, from their poetic nature and their great 
 increase in the later dialogues, we may infer their Platonic origin 
 (cf. Demetr. 281, 3 Sp.). However, the comparison tw kdya) 
 msTzsp luTpiu Ttapi-^tiv (475 D, 480 C), which recurs in the Memo- 
 rabilia (I 2, 54), and the metaphorical use of Orjpa and Oy,ptbui 
 (464 D, 490 A, 500 E), which is found not only in Xenophon (Mem. 
 II 6, III II, 7 f.), but also in a dictum quoted by Stobaeus (Flor. 
 I 116), seem likely to have been favorite expressions. 
 
 There only remain a few figures, which do not seem Socratic, 
 nor yet directly satirical, but rather borrowed from the very sophists 
 whom he opposed. Cicero says (De Orat. I 47): "< Plato in 
 Gorgia > in oratoribus irridendis ipse esse orator summus vide- 
 
 ' Diog. L. II 18 ; Cic. Tusc. IV 29. 
 
 ' Cf. Rep. 487 E, ov ye oxik eludes "J'' e'cKdvuv Myetv. 
 
31 
 
 batur," and Dionysius (Ad Pomp. 2), ayr^imai . . . fidXiara toT? 
 rupyteioti; . . . ava^puvtrai and further ZrjXwimi; T0119 Tzepl Fopyiav. 
 For some of these sophistic figures see van Prinsterer (p. 104), 
 and on the whole subject of Platonic rhetoric, Novak (pp. 500- 
 521). In this dialogue we find the metaphors and similes pre- 
 viously mentioned, as vdarj/xadStxia? utcouXov (480 B,cf.479 B),/;Ot>ff^ 
 po/^ XT?.. (486 D), Xoyot ins^ip^et (492 D) and ini^ecpw/iEv (495 C), 
 fis/xtrjffae to. /itydka (497 C), dvaOiaOai and iitavopOou (461 D), ffxmzoi 
 . . , auvTsivovra (507 D), aiSrjpol.'i xai dSapavrivutt X6yot<; . . . Xutret 
 {^og A), xara^axTecsv Xoyot^ (^^12 C), piJTopss . . . ^|cTffv (517 A), 
 xaOep^Tj? (461 D), k-Ki^fiipi^iuv (474 A, 76 A), and in similes (481 DE) 
 the two Sripot, wtntsp rotirt' (502 E), i;j.T:XrjiTavzeq to vytsivou (518 C); 493 
 A-E are borrowed. Other comparisons come under thehead of ex- 
 amples (p. 23). Add also the artistic assonance, <pdiav xui xoa/iwrr^za 
 xalaw^poauvrjv xalSuacorrjza (^^08 A); the Strong personification T';^i'a? 
 . . . deanoha^ (518 A), 7 xokaxsoztx-q aiaOojiivrj . . . dTzoduffa (464 C), 
 (505 D) puOot; . . . avsu xstpakfji; Tzspttjj, < ij xu/Sepi/r^Tixi] > ov <Teij.vi)- 
 verat ia^rnjLartff/xevrj (511 D) < ffo^f? > oiSeT xai utzouXo^ (518 E), 
 T^ps/xsT 6 kuyoi; (527 B), Siaizep r^ys/xovt toT Aoyw (527 E) ; and the 
 alliteration nksuorrtv, Tzhwre'iv ' ttXoutoo yap ivsxa rrX.ioufftv (467 D) 
 and nvtyiuv dnopeXv ttoisT, izixporaza izmpaza . . . tzsvjTiV. Perhaps 
 also the frequent annominatio may be due to this influence. 
 Though anaphora is very common in the Memorabilia, it seems 
 unlikely a priore that it was really much used by Socrates. Here 
 we find uuro^ (510 C) and 'KnXiruo'i (513 B). While chiasm is 
 more or less natural (to the Greek), some of the more artistic 
 forms, which we encounter here, seem due to rhetorical training. 
 (Cf. 467 D Ttliouai, 481 D 'AXxificddrji, 493 C dnXTJaTw?, 497 C Xoizdiv, 
 500 E d<po7zoita, 522 A loj^aivtov, B Kowuvza.') 
 
 B. His Character. 
 
 If one feature of Socrates' character stands out in bolder relief 
 than another, it is his modesty, real or assumed. He ironically pro- 
 fesses to be entirely ignorant and sorely in need of instruction.' 
 Olymp. notes that (454 A) in e? n? pe epotzo Socrates refers the 
 fault to himself, and not to Gorgias, while in eXeyxs xa\ iXiy^ou 
 (462 A) he admires the pizpiov ^doq in the modest order of the 
 words (cf B. kpmza 7/ d-Koxpivoo). In the same line is his naivet6 
 xa\ iySt (454 B), <pwpv yj pij <pS)pev ; (480 D), and euphemism ^ eVt 
 
 ' 453 B, A, 55 B, 58 E, 62 E, 74 A, 88 A ; cf. Memor. i, 2, 34. 
 
22 
 
 Tt <re ipwTZ (494 E). His deep religious feeling, which is so mani- 
 fest in the Apol., Crito and Phaedo, appears throughout the 
 closing myth. By the phrase r.apa too jzarpo? TzapiXa^ov (523 A), 
 he reverently avoids allusion to the enmity of Zeus and Kroncs, 
 and he refers the guidance of his own life to God (512 E, cf Apol. 
 41 D, Cr, 54 E). Consequently he maintains his private judgment 
 against all authority of man (472 AB, 88 A f., 526 D, cf. Apol. 
 29 C, Cr. 44 C, etc.). That enmity to the democracy which has- 
 tened his death crops out in the references to his fate (p. 3), in 
 his condemnation of the statesmen (515 B ff.), and in the parallel 
 of the two fickle 5rjiioi (481 D ff.). 
 
 II. His Philosophy. 
 
 A. Sources. The discussion of the sources of Socratic philo- 
 sophy lies outside the province of this treatment. One class of 
 scholars, chief of whom are Hermann, Grote and Uberweg, 
 prefers the testimony of Xenophon to that of Plato, while another, 
 represented by Schleiermacher (Berlin Acad. 18 18), Brandis and 
 practically Zeller, claims greater fidelity for Plato, but makes use 
 also of Xenophon and Aristotle. This correct position Wytten- 
 bach thus summarizes, " In Xenophonte imago Socratis ; in 
 Platone ipse Socrates." Fouill6e (Paris, 1874) and others aptly 
 remark that Plato presents the ideal (sTSo?) Socrates, and Schleier. 
 thinks that the philosopher is faithfully and artistically portrayed, 
 but as the method and spirit of Socrates sway all the thought of 
 his pupil, Plato puts in his mouth what he believed to be the con- 
 sequences of his teaching, as well as the teaching itself. It is 
 generally agreed that Symp. 215-222 was intended to be a true 
 description of the character and method of the philosopher (cf. 
 Hermog. 372, 12 Sp.), and Brandis mentions Prot, Lach., Meno, 
 Char., Gorg. as those dialogues which most faithfully set forth 
 his teachings. Most scholars would add the Apol. and Crito. 
 The Prot. and Gorgias especially resemble the Memorabilia in 
 the fuller and more independent answers given by the interlo- 
 cutors, and even Hermann says that our dialogue exhibits " ganz 
 Sokratische Dialektik." 
 
 B. The method of Socrates' dialectic presents two sides, posi- 
 tive and negative. The latter shows, by means of critical exam- 
 ples, the change and contradiction of opposing ideas, and their 
 consequent untruth. This so-called irony appears in 490 C-E 
 
 
23 
 
 and 494 C-E, while 514 DE gives the reductio ad absurdum. 
 Allusion is made to this treatment in the Memorabilia (I 4, i, IV 
 2, 39). The positive side, maieutic, directs attention to the uni- 
 versal necessity and real nature of things by means of induction 
 and definition. The first step in induction is the example, which 
 is generally drawn from the most ordinary spheres of action. 
 Callicles objects to its vulgarity (491 A, 97 C), and so did Critias 
 (Xen. Mem. I 2, 37, cf. Sym. 221 E, Ar. Nub. 385 f.). Socrates 
 himself (Xen. Oec. XVII 15) speaks of the advantage of the ^ 
 method. 
 
 In the Gorgias we have shoemakers (447 E), weavers (49 D), 
 painters (53 E), physicians (467 C, 77 Ef., 79 A), merchants (67 D, 
 77 E f., 518 B), foolish boys (497 E), poets, flute and lyre players 
 (501 Eff.), statesmen (503 C, 15 D ff.), pilots (11 D), engineers 
 (512 BC), cattle-trainers (516 A, cf. Xen. Mem. I 2, 32), charioteers 
 (16 E), cooks (18 B), and teachers of gymnastics (520 C). More- 
 over, the choice of various public officials (455 B) and the nature 
 of sickness (496 A) are adduced. The inductive process naturally 
 follows closely and applies these examples (cf. Xen. Mem. IV 6, 
 15). It is illustrated most forcibly in the final reduction of the 
 argument with Polus (474 DE, 76 C-E, 78 B), and in the clinching 
 of the refutation of Callicles (496 C-E, 98 B, E ff.). Expressions 
 like (498 E) aukXoyiaai zi <suni3aivsi (cf. 496 E) ix ruiv biJLokoyqixivwv 
 (cf. 476 D, 80 A) indicate the consummation of the process. Often, 
 though not always, the result of induction is definition (Xen. Mem. 
 IV 6, Ar. Met. XIII 4), which is necessary to the full and exact 
 knowledge demanded by Socrates. First we find rhetoric defined 
 (447 D-53 A) by Gorgias, then persuasion (53 B-55 A), then 
 rhetoric again by Socrates (462 C-66 A). Power (470 B), honor 
 (474 E), punishment (76 A) and happiness (73 D) have each its 
 place, while the stronger and the better (488 D, 89 E), good and 
 bad pleasures are carefully distinguished (495A-500 A). The 
 words opo<: and {!iC)6pi':oiJ.ai (as 470 B, 75 A, 88 D, 95 A, 513 D) or 
 diatpiu) (495 C) often point to this stage of the discussion. 
 
 Besides these fundamental principles, certain external devices 
 are employed, (i) An imaginary objector, or questioner, is 
 introduced, who usually represents the general public (cf. Prot. 
 311 D, 12 D, 30 C, 53A-56 E, Symp. 200 CD). In this dialogue 
 
 &aittp av t TJ? epotzo (45 1 A, C, 54 D), sfjzot ay 6 iarp6<; (452 A C), 
 v6;jLi(rov un' ixtivwv dvspwzaaOai (452 D) mark the query and 
 implied objection. This is more polite (and more forcible) than 
 
24 
 
 to make the criticism directly, and is therefore employed against 
 Gorgias alone. (2) The speaker may quote the previous state- 
 ments of his opponents, in order to be certain that they are rightly 
 understood (cf. Prot. 349 BC, ^9 AB, Xen. Mem. IV 6, 14). The 
 formulae employed are ippi^'fi raura rj 06 ; (460 D), oux ufirt eXsyei; ; 
 (466 D, 88 E), slTTsq; (73 D), ^5? ; (92 D, 98 E), xazd rdv adv Uyov 
 (88 E), ouTu) aou vo(i.iZovT^ (72 D), ^ 6p0uii};tifivr]fiat ; (88 B, cf. 95 D). 
 The requisites for discussion are three, iTztanj/j-yj, eo-j<na, Tzappijaia 
 (487 A, cf. Lach. 178 AB with 181 D), and the purpose of dialectic 
 is the discovery of truth. Hence Socrates is ready iUy^scu or 
 ikiy/Etrda:, whichever will attain this object, and this position he 
 carefully states to each successive interlocutor (458 AB, 62 A, 506 
 A, C ; cf. Char. 166 B.). 
 
 One factor of Platonic dialectic, division, is denied to Socrates 
 by Brandis, his reasons being Aristotle's reference of the process 
 to Plato alone, its prominence in the non-Socratic Sophistes and 
 Politicus, and its close connection with the doctrine of ideas. 
 Campbell,however, recognizes \ts germ in Socrates, while Fouill^e 
 holds that it is essential to definition, which is the result and union 
 of induction and deduction, and cites the alphabetic classification 
 of the Memorabilia (IV 2, 13 ff.). His deductions were inexact, 
 and reached only probable results, since they rested on concrete 
 classes (ji^r, ; Mem. IV 6, 12), but Plato improved and systema- 
 tized the process, basing it on transcendental concepts (s^Srj). 
 However, even if the latter view be correct, such divisions as 
 those of rhetoric and pleasure (463 E ff. and 474 E) seem too 
 elaborate to have been made by Socrates. Such simpler forms as 
 the two classes of persuasion (454 DE) and the recognition of 
 good, bad and indifferent (468 A ff.) might be ascribed to him 
 more readily, and, indeed, the latter is more or less implied in the 
 relative nature of good and evil (v. Mem. Ill 8, IV 2, 31-36). 
 
 C. His Doctrines. This subject has been thoroughly treated 
 by Brandis (Rh. Mus. 1827) and Ribbing (Upsala, 1870), and the 
 larger part of the Gorgias they have incidentally attributed to 
 Socrates. Upon examination of those portions of the dialogue 
 not thus classified, the following are shown by comparison with 
 Xenophon and the earliest Socratic dialogues (v. p. 22) to be the 
 views of Socrates, (i) The identification of a^'otfov with wft^-Ji/iwK 
 (468 C, 75 A ; Mem. IV 6, 8, Prot. 333 E) and with y.aX6v, and 
 consequently xaxuv with ata^pdv (474 D ff. ; Mem. Ill 8, 7, IV 6, 9, 
 Lys. 2i6 D). (2) The community of interest is essential to friend- 
 
25 
 
 ship (507 E, 510 B; Mem. II 6, 21-23, Plato often). (3) The 
 chief aim of the statesman must be the benefit of the state, not 
 personal power (5 10 D-i I A, 13E, 15C, 17C; Mem. Ill 2: 6,3ff.). 
 (4) The statesman must have previous training (514 B-E; Mem. 
 Ill 6 : 9, 10, IV 2, 2). (5) The good can suffer no harm (527 D ; 
 Apol. 41 D). (6) Moderate eating is essential to health (518 CD ; 
 Mem. Ill 13, 2: 14). The argument (480B-81 B) that punish- 
 ment should be sought for guilty friends, but kept from guilty 
 enemies, is merely an extension of the results of the preceding 
 discussion, and though itself not directly comparable with other 
 views of the philosopher, it is quite in the Socratic spirit. While 
 the precise distinction of xpsh-wv and /ScAn'tuv (488 C^ is not found 
 elsewhere, and Socrates seems to use them interchangeably in the 
 Prot. (358 C), the differentiation of yvAaOai and elvai in the same 
 dialogue (340 BC), and Socrates' frequent claim to be the pupil of 
 Prodicus (Prot. 341 A, Mem. II i, 21, etc.) make it not improbable 
 that the distinction is his own. Moreover, this is an essential of 
 definition. The discrimination of ^56 and ayaOov (497 A, D), and 
 the difficulty of separating good and bad pleasures (500 A), are 
 implied in the Memorabilia (IV 2, 35, 36, cf. Lys. 221 A, B). 
 Socrates emphasizes the great value of geometric balance of 
 character, and of geometry in general (508 A), but in the Memo- 
 rabilia (IV 7, 2, 3) he condemns any careful study of the science. 
 The defenders of Platonic testimony discredit the statement of 
 Xenophon, and, indeed, the neglect of systematic knowledge is 
 contrary both to the liberal Socratic spirit and to true philosophy. 
 The pupil of such a teacher would hardly write above his door, 
 fj.Tjds'i^ ayBat;j.iTprjTO(; slairtu. 
 
 The acquaintance of Socrates with the views and systems of 
 previous philosophers is evinced by the summary which he makes 
 in the Memorabilia (I i, 14). In the Gorgias he cites two mythi- 
 cal comparisons (493 A f ), which go back, ultimately at least, to 
 the Pythagoreans." Even if they are taken from Empedocles 
 (Olymp.), or Heraclitus (Schuster), it is probable that they merely 
 borrowed them from the Pythagoreans, upon whom they were 
 largely dependent. The same may be said of the theory of 
 cosmic harmony (507 E), whose fdia suggests the <p0.6zy]? of the 
 Sicihan. Pythagorean influences are more apparent in the later 
 dialogues, and it is doubtful that Socrates made much use of this 
 system. The quotation from Anaxagoras (465 D) is quite con- 
 
 ' V. Hirzel, Comm. hon. Momms., p. 11. 
 
m- 
 
 26 
 
 sistent with Socrates' knowledge, for in the Memorabilia (IV 7, 6, 
 7) he criticizes by name the views of that philosopher, and in the 
 Phaedo (97 B) states that he had listened to the reading of one 
 of his books. The closing myth shows considerable familiarity 
 with the Orphic hymns, of which Socrates could not have been 
 wholly ignorant. The poetic coloring and rhetorical nature, how- 
 ever, point to Plato, and the myth, as an integral part of dialectic, 
 was one of his most characteristic creations. Xenophon and the 
 earliest dialogues show no trace of its employment by Socrates, 
 and Plato, perhaps again under sophistic influence, first used it as 
 an engine of philosophic thought (v. Hirzel, 74, Nov&k, 502 f.) 
 
*_.:<<. _--!" 
 
 ii^?f-^d.;>.;.v:. 
 
,'^:^Wr7'^Sf!r^Jf?Si.' '^'W 
 
 '-*