* OTA ITE 252 PB86-120425 Superfund Strategy (U.S.) Office of Technology Assessment Washington, DC $ . ' - A v-** Apr 85 I f U S. D®pstwje?i d Cssssissc® Hatirh?J TedmsJ tafenra&M Savin I a i i OTA SUPERFUND STRATEGY ITE 252 Hazardous Waste Research and Information Center Library One East Hazelwood Drive Champaign, IL 61820 217/333-8957 BEMCO w .., '.. _ ... ' .. .. _- • 30773-101 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PACE _____ 4. Titl. and Subtitle 1. REPORT HO. OTA-ITE-252 Superfund strategy 7. Author^) 9. Performing Org&niiation Nima and Addreee Office of Technology Assessment U.S. Congress Washington, D.C. 20510 12 Sponsoring Organisation Name and Addreas Same as box 9* IS. Supp10 * i % Recommended Citation: Superfund Strategy (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess¬ ment, OTA-ITE-252, April 1985). Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600527 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 204u?. Foreword The cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Federal Superfund program has received much attention since Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act in 1980. As Congress debates reauthorization and possible expansion of the program, it is instructive to examine the “lessons learned” from the initial Superfund program. The objectives of this OTA study are, as requested by the House Energy and Commerce Com¬ mittee and the House Science and Technology Committee: 1) to understand future Superfund needs and how permanent cleanups can be accomplished in a cost-effective manner for diverse types of sites: 2) to describe the interactions among many components of the complex Superfund sys¬ tem: and 3) to analyze the consequences of pursuing different strategies for implementing the pro¬ gram. The study brings together a great deal of information on what can be learned from the ini¬ tial Superfund program in order to improve it. In particular, the study focuses on the choice between continuing and improving the current program and adopting a new strategy on the basis of im¬ proved information. Such a new strategy has been defined and analyzed by OTA in considerable detail to provide Congress with an understanding of critical policy trade-offs. As Congress and the Nation attempt to address major economic and budgetary issues, it is important to examine the economic as well as the environmental dimensions of the Superfund program. In the face of scientific uncertainties, limited information, fiscal constraints, public de¬ mands for cleanups, and real threats to health and the environment, how can Congress assure ef¬ fective and efficient spending of Superfund resources? How can it determine how much to spend? How can it deride on whether to proceed with costly cleanups in the absence of national cleanup goals and with technologies that may not be effective? Is there a need to perceive Superfund as a long-term program that would require money to be spent in improving institutional capabilities and cleanup technologies? Because of the strong emotions surrounding this major national environmental program, com¬ prehensive analysis can assist all interested parties in their quest for technically sensible, cost-ef¬ fective, and equitable solutions. The present reauthorization process provides an opportunity to examine the latest information and alternative strategies. This report builds on the analyses and findings in OTA’s earlier work on hazardous waste issues, specifically our March 1983 report. Technologies and Management Strategies for Hazard¬ ous Waste Control. That report identified many of the problems with long-term containment of newly generated hazardous wastes; these problems are of direct relevance to the Superfund pro¬ gram, both in understanding the likely size of the uncontrolled hazardous waste site problem, and in examining technology choices for Superfund wastes. A number of other OTA studies bear on the issues surrounding the Superfund program. Inter¬ ested readers are referred to Habitability of the Love Canal Area—A Technical Memorandum (June 1983), Protecting the Nation's Groundwater From Contamination (October 1984), Technologies for Disposing of Waste in the Ocean (in progress), and Hazardous Materials Transportation: Technol¬ ogy Issues (in progress). The view points of the private sector, community and environmental groups, academia, and State officials were sought in conducting this study. Many private and public groups cooperated in surveys performed for this study, and provided useful information. OTA thanks the many peo¬ ple-advisory panel members, workshop participants, reviewers, and consultants—who assisted in this work. As with all OTA studies, the information, analyses, and findings of the report are the sole responsibility of OTA. JOHN H. GIBBONS Director Hi Superfund Strategy Advisory Pane! Martin Alexander, Chairman Cornell University Kirk W. Brown Texas A&M University Morton Corn School of Hygiene and Public Health The Johns Hopkins University Bonnie L. Exner Colorado Citizens Action Network Ted Greenwood Columbia University Linda E. Greer Environmental Defense Fund Robert Kissell E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. Gary Kovall ARCO Petroleum Products Co. Stephen Lester Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes Adeline G. Levine State University of New York at Buffalo Randy Mott Breed, Abbott & Morgan Norman H. Nosenchuck New York State Department of Environmental Conservation James T. O’Rourke Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. James Patterson Illinois Institute of Technology Robert Repetto World Resources Institute Bernard L. Simonsen IT Corp. William A. Wallace CH2M Hill 1 I I OTA Project Staff— Superfund Strategy Lionel S. Johns, Assistant Director, OTA Energy, Materials, and International Security Division Audrey Buyrn, Industry, Technology, and Employment Program Manager Joel S. Hirschhorn, Project Director Miriam Heller, Analyst Karen Larsen, Senior Analyst Kirsten Oldenburg, Analyst William Sanjour* Patricia Canavan, Administrative Assistant Andrea M. Amiri, Secretary Individual Contractors Harold C. Barnett James Cannon George Trezek James Werner Chris Elfring, Editor Irene S. Gordon, Editor Contractors Arthur D. Little, Inc. Colorado School of Mines Environ Corp. ERM-Midwest JRB Associates TTEMD, Inc. \ •On detail from hi* A f OTA Workshop—The Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies for Superfund Remedial Action I Lowell C. Bowie RoTech, Inc. Michael Model I MODAR. Inc. Jimmy W. Boyd J. M. Huber Corp. Pranas Budininkas CARD, Division of Chamberlain Manufacturing Louis I lax Lopat Enterprises Linda Jones Missouri Department of Natural Robert Kissel 1 E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc. M. L. Muliins Monsanto Co. Norman Nosenchuck Now York State Department of Environmental Conservation Creg Peterson CH2M Hill Stanley Sojka Occidental Chemical Corp. Theodore Taylor NOVA. Inc. ' Resources V -'»• rt *-?**.«* «V*« * Sc- «r. A Kt* ‘ Contents Chapter I’-iflt' 1. Summary and Introduction. 3 2. Policy Options . 37 3. A Systems Analysis of Super-fund. 61 4. Strategics for Setting Cleanup Goals. 103 5. Sites Requiring Cleanup. 125 6. Cleanup Technologies. 171 7. Achieving Quality Cleanups. 223 8. Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program. 257 Index . 277 I Page Page Overview. 3 Background. 5 Tits Key Policy Option: Considering a New Strategy lor the System. 7 Cleanup of How Many Sites, and at What Costs? .■.. 11 Costs and Strategies . 13 Resolving the “How Clean is Clean?” Issue. 17 Do Wc Have end Use Effective Cleanup Technologies? . 18 Axe Superfund Efforts Resulting in Quality Work?. 20 Is Public Involvement Adequate?. 22 Financing Mechanisms. 22 Cleanups by Responsible Parties. 24 The Role cf the States. 24 Scope and Objectives cf the Superfund Assessment. 25 Suporfund Seen Through Case Studies. 26 The Seymour Site. 27 The Stringfeliow Site. 28 The Sylvester Site. 30 Other Case Studies on Completed Cleanups. 32 list cf Tables Table No. Page 1-1. Summary Data on Solid Waste Facilities. 11 1-2. Summary cf Problems With RCRA Groundwater Protection Standards Governing Operating Hazardous Waste Facilities. 12 1-3. Factors in EPA’s Examination of Potential NPL Sites That Lead to a Low' Projection . 12 1-4. Current Estimates for Cleaning Up Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites. 14 1-5. Illustrative Scenarios for Two Different Cleanup Strategies . 15 1-6. Future Use of Containment Technologies. 19 1-7. Future Use of Treatment Technologies. 19 1-8. Summary Data on Some Innovative Cleanup Technologies. 21 1-9. Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes. 23 List ol Figures Figure No. Page 1-1. Program Length v. Impermanence Factor. 16 1-2. Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor. 16 inw ~ JWSJ* r-— ™ : — t t ny s &r --- Chapter 1 Summary and Introduction OVERVIEW The Federal Superfund 1 program for clean¬ ing up toxic waste sites has made progress, and much can be learned from its initial efforts to improve protection of public health and the en¬ vironment. The Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) low estimate of Superfund costs can be traced to a lack of detailed planning for the program and optimism about both the number of toxic waste sites that will require cleanup and the effectiveness of cleanup technologies. While EPA estimates that about 2,000 sites will reach the National Priorities List (NPL), OTA estimates that 10,000 sites (or more) may require cleanup by Superfund. With Super- fund’s existing resources, it is not technically or economically possible to permanently clean up even 2,000 sites in less than several decades. OTA defines permanent cleanups to be those where the likelihood of recurring problems with the same site or wastes have been mini¬ mized through the use of treatment rather than containment technologies. Only 50 percent of the 538 sites now on the NPL are receiving remedial cleanup attention, even though about $1 billion (two-thirds of the initial 5-year program’s funding) have been committed. Initial actions and cleanups now emphasize the removal of wastes to land dis¬ posal facilities, which themselves may become Superfund sites, or wastes are left on the site. Current “remedial cleanups" iend to be imper- ’This study is limited to one use of the Superfund program established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA): the cleanup of un¬ controlled hazardous waste sites. However, the Superfund pro¬ gram is very broad and other threats from releases of hazard¬ ous substances are managed, such as leaking underground storage tanks, spills from transportation accidents, and ground- water contaminated from pesticide use. The demands on Super- fund from these uses in the future are uncertain but may also increase. This study does not consider federally owned uncon¬ trolled sites, which are recognized to pose a large problem, but which do not qualify for cleanup under Superfund. manent. Some sites get worse, and repeated costs are almost inevitable. Environmentally, risks are often transferred from one commu¬ nity to another, and to future generations. Underestimating national cleanup needs could result in an environmental crisis years or decades from now. With many more NPL sites, repeated responses, and uncertainty about private cleanups end contributions, cleanup needs could outstrip financial, per¬ sonnel, and technological resources. Environ¬ mental damage could escalate. The issue now is not so much about whether or not to have a continued, expanded Suoerfund program as it is to choose to continue with the current approach or, on the basis of what we have learned so far, to restructure the piogram. OTA finds that a two-part strategy (see below) offers cost and time advantages over the current program with its lack of attention to long-term factors. Even so, costs to Superfund could easily be $100 billion— out of total costs to the Nation of several hundred billion dollars, and it could take 50 years to clean 10,000 sites. The two parts of the strategy would overlap in time, but differ in focus and priorities. This two-part strategy could be advantageous re¬ gardless of the size cf the Superfund program. (I) In the near tern, for perhaps up to 15 years, the strategy would focus on: a) early identification and assessment of potential NPL sites, b) initial response to reduce near-term threats ai all NPL sites and prevent sites from getting worse, c) permanent remedial cleanups for some especially threatening sites, and d) de¬ veloping institutional capabilities for a long¬ term program. A substantially larger Super- fund program would be needed to carry out these efforts. Initial responses that accomplish the most significant and cost-effective reduc¬ tion of risks and prevent sites from getting worse might cost a 1 nit $1 million per site for 3 4 * Superlund Strategy most sites. This is three times the current cost of immediate removal actions and about 10 per¬ cent of currently projected remedial cleanup costs. Case studies by OTA and others reveal that both immediate removals and remedial cleanups are ineffective for their intended purposes. Under the two-part strategy, initial responses would emphasize covering sites and temporarily storing wastes and contaminated materials to reduce groundwater contamina¬ tion and, where technically and economically feasible, excavating wastes to minimize re¬ leases into the environment. (II) Over the longer term, the strategy would call for more extensive site studies and focus on permanent cleanups, when they are tech¬ nically feasible, at a!! sites that pose significant threats to human health and the environment (unless privately or State-fc.:ded cleanups of¬ fering comparable protection have taken piacet. These cleanups would draw on the in¬ stitution building that occurred during the first phase. Spending large sums before specific cleanup goals are set and before permanent cleanup technologies are available leads to a false sense of security, a potential for incon¬ sistent cleanups nationwide, and makes little environmental or economic sense. Federal support could contribute in five areas. Such efforts take time, but erst little rela¬ tive to Superfund’s total costs and could result in more environmental protection at lower costs. The five areas are: 1. Intensify Federal ef r orts to obtain more in¬ formation on health and environmental ef¬ fects and develop specific national cleanup goals. Without this effort, selecting tech¬ nologies. estimating costs, and evaluating public and private cleanups will be diffi¬ cult and contentious. Cleanup goals could employ site classification based on locally decided site use. in combination with other information such as risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and existing environ¬ mental standards. 2. Provide substantially more support for de¬ veloping and demonstrating innovative, per> ianent cleanup technologies for a va¬ riety of problems. The immediate costs for cleanups based on waste containment and redisposal omit much: monitoring, oper¬ ation and maintenance, and the costs of future cleanups, especially for ground¬ water. Also, they are highly uncertain and can add greatly to total costs. For some geological settings, iike the Stringfellow site in California, containment does not work. Permanent remedies, which de¬ stroy, detoxify, or otherwise treat wastes will be necessary to any cost-effective, long-term Superfund program; many inno¬ vative approaches exist, but they face sub¬ stantial barriers to demonstration and use, such as the absence of protocols to evaluate their effectiveness. 3. Provide increased support for EPA and perhaps the States so they can improve technical oversight of contractors and thus ensure quality cleanups. 4. Provide Federal support for technical training programs. An expanded national cleanup ef fort could increase the need for certain technical specialists fivefold by 1995; shortages of experienced technical personnel such as hydrogeologists have already been noticed. 5. Improve the Superfund program, and pub¬ lic confidence in it. by supporting public participation in decisionmaking about ini¬ tial responses and remedial cleanups and providing technical assistance tc commu¬ nities. Improved public participation could address the intrinsic tension between the desires of communities lu obtain fast, ef¬ fective, and complete cleanups at their sites and the limitations and goals of a na¬ tional program. OTA has considered only one use of Super- fund, the remedial cleanup of hazardous waste sites that are “uncontrolled” because actual or potential releases of hazardous substances into the env ironment must be managed. A number of other applications exist and could increase in the future (e.g.. leaking underground stor¬ age tanks, pesticide contamination areas, and transportation accidents). There is little doubt about the need to clean up sites that now get . placed on the NPL, but additional sites are likely to require clean up. OTA’s estimate of additional waste sites include: 5,000 sites from the more than 600,000 open and closed solid waste facilities, such as sanitary and munici¬ pal landfills, which can release toxic sub¬ stances to groundwater: 2,009 from an im¬ proved site identification and selection process; and 1,000 from hazardous waste man¬ agement facilities operating with ineffective groundwater protection standards. A much larger Superfund program would likely mean that more reliance would have to be placed on general tax revenues or some other broadly based tax. Along with continued use of the tax on chemical and petroleum feedstocks, a tax on hazardous wastes could raise significant sums, but this latter tax would generate significant revenue only in the near- term, if less hazardous waste is generated over time. If such “waste-end” taxes, already adopted by 20 States, were made simple to administer, they would aid in reducing the gen¬ eration of hazardous waste and the use of land disposal and, hence, the creation of still more Superfund sites. Finally, OTA has stressed estimating future national needs, without making specific assumptions about non-Federal spending. Ch 1—Summary and Introduction • 5 Other research has assumed significant cost recovery of Superfund expenditures through enforcement actions and a fairly high level of privately ^nd State-funded cleanups. Such assumptions often are not made clear, tend to be quite optimistic, and lead to "adjusted” costs for Super.und that could prove to be substan¬ tially low. Cost recovery to date has amounted to about 1 percent of Superfund spending, but EPA assumes cost recoveries of 47 percent for removals and 30 percent for remedial actions. To date, about $300 million has been commit¬ ted by responsible parties for cleanups, an amount commensurate to what EPA has spent. EPA assumes that 40 to 60 percent of sites will be cleaned by responsible parties. Current ob¬ stacles to private cleanups, such as uncertain future liabilities, could discourage private spending. Continued, substantial spending by the private sector on cleanups is desirable and incentives (or the removal of barriers) may be necessary. However, clear cleanup goals and technical oversight are still essential to assure that effective cleanups are performed. Further¬ more, it is not necessarily correct to assume that current policies on required matching funds from States will remain, as significant concerns exist about the willingness of some States to provide these funds. BACKGROUND Proved releases of hazardous substances have occurred from uncontrolled sites through¬ out the Nation. Groundwater and surface waters have been contaminated, drinking water supplies have been lost, and people have been evacuated or, in some cases, permanently relocated. There have been some fires and ex¬ plosions. Most sites must be strictly off limits to unprotected people. Across the Nation, from Love Canal in New York, to Times Beach in Missouri, to the Stringfellow Acid Pits in California, people are worried about acute and chronic threats to their health, loss of natural resources, and sharp declines in the value of their homes and property. After Federal legislation was enacted to man¬ age newly generated hazardous wastes, it be¬ came apparent that a separate Federal program was needed to tackle the cleanup of uncon¬ trolled waste sites. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 was followed by the Comprehensive Environmental Re¬ sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980. CERCLA established the Superfund program to handle emergencies at - 6 • Supwrlund Strategy uncontrolled sites, to clean up the sites, and to deal with several other related problems. At the very beginning of Superfund, the full scope of the uncontrolled site problem was unclear. Several releases of hazardous sub¬ stances into the environment had been docu¬ mented, and limited and often anecdotal evi- dence °f advene health and environmental impacts had been gathered. But unambi°uous comprehensive, and scientific understanding of the effects particularly of the long-term et tects, of such leleases was lacking. For these reasons. Congress limited the Superfund pro¬ gram Tne Environmental Protection Agency was directed to establish an NPL of at least 400 sites which needed remedial cleanup;* consid¬ erable flexibility was allowed to respond to emergencies. In addition, Congress directed he Department of Health and Human Services ° S at J le . r , d&t f ,°, n heal,h im P acts from uncon¬ trolled sites. Although in 1980 and earlier some people thought the evidence showed that a very large program would be necessary, many uncertainties and the new. highly technical challenge of performing large numbers of to 6 ?? R P h’ n aUSed Congress ,0 limit the program to 51.6 billion over 5 years. Now, as we approach the end of the initial Superfund program. Congress and the Nation have the benefit of more information about un¬ controlled sites and can learn much from the early experiences of the program. This study concentrates on what can be learned from the results of the initial program; but it must be stressed that the Superfund program has made p ogress, especially considering that the pro¬ gram was created as a fast public policy re- sponse to a newly recognized and highly com¬ plex, technical, and diverse set of problems. Much uncertainty about health and environ¬ mental effects remains. But EPA and the States have obtained more information about the number and kinds of uncontrolled sites, and C 'T UP - 3 S ‘ ,e mUS ' bG P ' aced o" 'he ical ratine I Z f Sys,em 15 High: 10% landfills, 2% impoundments likely to release toxic substances. J4,euu Conservative figure used for cleanup by 50Q0 Superfund . .c- a Z85"iequ^ted~ror~piacernenTon Nat.onal Pnont.es List, current h.ghesl s.te score is 75 6 SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment that pose threats to public health or the envi¬ ronment for cleanup. OTA’s estimates are only semi-quantitative, but an effort has been made to be conservative, especially in view of the uncertainties ot cleanup actions by States and responsible par¬ ties. Furthermore, there is no reason to con¬ clude that the additional sites pose substantially smaller or more easily managed risks than EPA’s 2.000. OTA’s projection ol an NPL with 10,000 sites is consistent with the results of a survey conducted by State officials which in¬ dicated a need to clean up about 8,000 sites. 4 •The survey, funded by EPA. was conducted of its members bv the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Manage¬ ment Officials (ASTSWMO). With re ponses from 44 of its mem bers a report issued in December 1983 presented the following 12 • Superfund Strategy Table 1-2.—Summary of Problems Wish RCRA Grourrdwetsr Protection Standards Governing Operating Hazardous Waste Facilities* * • Interim Status Facilities: Groundwater protection stand¬ ards for these facilities are less stringent than for new facilities, and most of them already are, or are likely to become leaking sites. • Fixing Leeks: With confirmed groundwater contamination there are no requirements that a facility be closed until the leak is found and coirected. nor to even find or stop the leak. • RCRA Coverage Limited to 30 Years: New facilities must be designed not to leak for 30 years after closure during which time the operator must maintain the facility, but later when leaks are more likely CERCLA becomes responsible. • Contaminants Which Are Regulated: Because CERCLA regulates more substances than RCRA. and detection levels for other substances are set lower by CERCLA than by RCRA standards, a permitted but leaking RCRA facili¬ ty can beccme an uncontrolled she under CERCLA • Toleranco Levels ot Contemlnants:Acceptable levels of groundwater contaminants are not based on health effects, and using detection limits of analytical techniques may not be protective of human health. • Geological Standards: There are difficulties in predicting groundwater movement or the rapid movement ot con¬ tamination in seme geological environments which mane early detection and correction uncertain at some sites. However, RCRA has no facility siting standards to restnet hazardous waste sites to geoiogicatiy suitable locations. • Groundwater Monitoring: Technical complexity and site specificity make it difficult tor government rules to set the conditions for effective groundwater monitoring. • Monitoring In the Vadose Zone: Aahough the technology exists, RCRA standards do not require monitoring in the land between the facility and underground water, hence, an opportunity to gam an early warning of leaks is lost. • Test for Statistical Significance: Tests required by RCRA keep the probabil'ty ot falsely detecting contamination low at the expense ot high probability that contamination might go undetected. • Corrective Action Delays: Complex RCRA procedures can lead to delays of several years, increase cleanup costs, and increase the chances of CERCLA financing of cleanup. • Compliance Monitoring and Corrective Action: Technology does not necessarily exist to meet the RCRA standards tor taking corrective action, nor in ail cases for compliance mo nitoring, requi' d after contamination is found *B*ceuse o! ii»« problems OTA has estimated tfi# SO percent oi mese laomies may '•Out* cleanup by Supertund SO"WCC Off»c# ot Technology A»ae*sment The principal reasons why EPA’s projection of a 2,000 site NPL differs so substantially from OTA’s estimate of 10,000 are summarized in table 1-3. (Note that EPA considered several categories of sites that OTA ignored, such as mining waste sites and leaking underground storage tanks.) EPA has stated that a full ex¬ amination of the problem of future sites could lead to a situation where the costs “would over¬ whelm” the Superfund program. But OTA’s point is that by acknowledging the full extent of future needs, rather than underestimating them, effective planning could prevent a crisis. For planning purposes, an NPL with 10,000 sites implies a need for a much larger Super- these sites is likely to be less than for sites listed on the National Priorities List." Tho latter observation did not appear in the original report which also indicated that only about 10 percent of known site* had oecn scored to evaluate eligibility for place¬ ment on the NPL. The States - estimate of Superfund sites was not used by EPA in its CERCLA 301 (a)(1)(C) study on future Superfund needs also issued in December 1984. The usefulness of ASTSvVMO data has been shown by the fact that the States were the basis for the 1983 estimate by OTA of hazardous waste generation in the United States of about 250 million metric tons annually, a figure over six times greater than the then current EPA estimate. The figure of about 250 million metric tons an¬ nually was later verified by EPA and will be substantiated shortly by the Congressional Budget Office. Teble 1-3.—Factors In EPA’s Examination* of Potential NPL Sites That Lead to a Low Projection Site category: Factor Solid waste facilities: • Surface impoundments are not included, even though ail types now account for one-third of NPL sites, and they are recognized as a major problem in EPA’s Groundwater Protection Strategy • No accounting for closed industrial landfills • The basis for saying that there are only twice as many closed municipal landfills as open ones is not given findings: "At least 7.113 sites nationwide require some form of remediation. These figures understate the extent o( the nation’s uncontrolled hazardous waste site problems because they do not take into account the states not responding to our questionnaire. Our members judgments on the number of sites needing re¬ sponse were significantly greater than the number ol sites now on the NPL." When EPA used the survey for its CERCLA 301 (aXl)(E) study on State participation given to Congress in De¬ cember 1984. the following statement appeared. "The most im¬ portant observation ... is that states' estunato that over 7.000 sites require response (sic), although the scope of response for Hazardous waste facilities: • No accounting tor the more stringent 1984 amendments to RCRA and effect on number ot failures of companies • No consideration ot the sites created due to failure of EPA’s RCRA groundwater protection standards as acknowledged in EPA's Interim Status Ground-Water Monitoring Implementation Study Site selection process: • Limited consideration of current site selection process and potential changes in it *us Environmental protection Agency "Extent of the Hazardous Release Prob- lem and Future Funding Needs—CERCLA Section 30l(a)(1KC» Study." Oecembet 1964 SOURCE: Office ot Technology Assessment. / - Ch. 1— Summary and Introduction • 13 fund than previously contemplated, easily $100 billion or more over some decades. A better estimate of future Superfund needs could be made if more were known about the extent of environmental contamination. For example, it is unclear how many sites will require ground- water cleanup, which is the most costly type of cleanup. Nor is it yet clear how advanced technology might reduce the costs of perma¬ nently effective cleanups and provide solutions that do not now exist. For example, although it is sometimes possible to pump and treat con¬ taminated groundwater at considerable cost and time, it is not clear that an aquifer, once contaminated, can be restored to a drinkable condition. 5 •See U S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment. Pro¬ tecting the Nation’s Groundwater From Contamination. 03 A- 0-233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Oc¬ tober 1984). In addition, it is difficult to estimate how much money will be recovered Irom respon¬ sible parties and will be spent by industry and the States for cleanups (for non-NPL sites and for thev share fer NPL sites). A number of States nave not yet earmarked enough money to provide their expected share of cleanup costs. OTA has stressed estimating future na¬ tional Superfund needs, without making spe¬ cific assumptions about non-Federal spending on the problem. Other estimates of future Superfund needs often make explicit assump¬ tions (leading to “adjusted costs for Super- fund) even though they are highly speculative. Table 1-4 is a brief summary of several recent estimates of future national unadjusted cleanup costs and program lengths. COSTS AMD STRATEGIES OTA has considered the implication of two primary strategies (see chapter 3) on the costs and duration of a program that must deal with about 10,000 sites. The variable used by OTA in its modeling of these strategies called the “impermanence factor’’ describes in an aver¬ age, statistical sense the extent to which in¬ terim actions result in unforeseen future costs. It is an attempt to examine the consequences of currently employing cleanup technologies that are less than totally effective in the long term. The impermanence factor can be inter¬ preted in several ways, and the particular inter¬ pretation does not affect the results of this sim¬ ple model. One simple way to think of the impermanence factor is that it is the ratio, aver¬ aged over all sites, of the costs of successive interim actions at the same site or on the same wastes. That is, for example, for an imperma¬ nence factor of 0.5, 100 first interim actions will result at some time in 100 second actions at one-half the cost, which in turn result in 100 third actions at one-quarter the cost of the first action, and so on. Other more complicated in¬ terpretations of the impermanence factor are \ possible; these incorporate continuous operat¬ ing and maintenance costs in addition to the probability and/or cost of discrete repeated actions. Increasing impermanence factors signify in¬ creasing environmental risks and damages. High impermanence factors indicate the use of cleanups that are on average ineffective and lead to future spending. Later in this chapter, when the results of several case studies are given, it is seen that an impermanence factor greater than 1 for a specific site is possible. Ex¬ perience to date with cleanups indicates that rather high impermanence factors are likely with the widespread use of containment and land disposal for cleanups because these meth¬ ods are known not to be permanently effective.® Continuing operating and maintenance costs can also account for a high impermanence factor. 'Sec U.S. Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, Tech¬ nologies and Management Strategies for Hazardous Waste Con¬ trol. OTA-M-196 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1983). s ■ . C/). 1—Summary and Introduction • 15 Two strategies are modeled: an interim strat¬ egy (which simulates the approach of the cur¬ rent EPA program) and a two-part strategy. Both strategies are described and compared in table 1-5 and figures 1-1 and 1-2. The imper¬ manence factor is used in interim strategy; but for the two-part strategy, it is simply assumed Table 1-5.—Illustrative Scenarios tor Two Different Cleanup Strategies Scenario I: Interim Strategy Scenario II: Two-Pa't Strategy Brtel description: Cleanups result in repeated future costs. Initial response (at most one per site) over first 15 years (Part I). After 15 years, for 90 percent of sites, permanent cleanups, with no future costs (Part II). System assumptions: • In Scenario I. future costs depend on the imper¬ manence factor and the average interim cleanup cost. In Scenario II, future costs of initial actions depend on the cost of permanent cleanup, which is taken at 90% of sites. • Total number of sites requiring cleanups = 10,546 a • 20% of sites require groundwater (gw) cleanup. • Initial period (5 yr) budget = $5 billion; growth @ 100% for each of next three periods then @ 20% each successive p eriod. b _ Scenario assumptions: Average interim cleanup costs: $6M per site $12M per site, with gw cleanup Average initial response costs: $1M per site $3M per site, with gw cleanup Average permanent cleanup costs: $24M per site $60M per site, with gw cleanup___ • Breakeven program cost at S313 billion, breakeven program length is 45 years. • On the basis of program cost alone; the interim strategy is chosen if its average impermanence factor is less than 0.73. • On the basis of program length alone, the interim strategy is chosen if its average impermanence factor is less than 0.25. • Overall, when the average impermanence factor is less than 0.25, the Interim Strategy is preferred; when it is greater than 0 73, the two-part strategy is pre¬ ferred; for values in between, reduced program length can be obtained with the two-part strategy at a cost above that the interim strategy.___ initially 1»46 sites, 200 new sites per year for years 1-5. 800 ^ew sites per year for years 6-10; and 1 000 new sites per year for years 11-15. ^Budgets and total costs reflect total spending by all parties, not Just by the Superfund program. c Tlme to initiate 90% of work Timos are given for future costs incurred over 30 years SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment that 90 percent of the initial cleanups will have to be followed by a permanent cleanup during the second part of the program. The total ad¬ justed cost and duration of the program de¬ pends on a number of assumptions, such as the average cost of site cleanup; the important as¬ sumptions are summarized in the table. The program duration and costs shown in table 1- 5 and figure 1-1 do not represent what will hap¬ pen in the future, but only what might happen under certain conditions and policy decisions. If a program duration of more than about 50 years is unacceptable, then under most condi¬ tions (i.e., levels of “impermanence" as dis¬ cussed above) a two-part strategy offers both cost and time advantages over an interim strat¬ egy. The results are similar for the other com¬ puter-simulated scenarios described chapter 3, including those with a smaller NPL. However, to the extent that the interim strat¬ egy modeled by OTA approximates the current program, there are conditions urder which the current program could be viewed in a positive manner. Much depends on the values for the average impermanence factor for the remedial cleanup technologies now being used. As dis¬ cussed above, there are several reasons why OTA believes that the average impermanence factor is likely to be high, at least 0.5 to 0.7. If this is the case, then a two-part strategy offers time and probably cost advantages over the current program (i.e., the interim strategy). If the average impermanence factor were to be low, say about 0.1 or 0.2 (i.e., remedial clean¬ ups which had a low probability of leading to unforeseen future costs), then a decision to con¬ tinue with the current program would not lead to undesirable consequences. Adoption of a two-part strategy would still be a valid option to consider because of the opportunities it af¬ fords for institution building, for quickly ad¬ dressing most sites through initial responses, and because the medium-cost, low imper¬ manence actions of the interim strategy could then be appropriate for part two. If, however, the current program continued and it became clear that the average impermanence factor was high, then much money and time could be wasted. The conclusion of OTA's \ i ^TVVr'i"-— ■ ■ II I n’t I ‘ riM r -rHiiVri-r-'nSif .. - ' . Program cleanup cost (billions of dollars) ti Years to start 90% cleanups 16 • Supertund Strategy Figure 1-1.—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor (Scenario 1USG) igure 1-2. Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor (Scenario 1USG)* Ch. 1— Summary and Introduction • 17 analysis is that, in the face of important uncer¬ tainties, the two-part strategy is less risky and more “fail-safe" in the sense that proceeding with it is less likely to result in ineffective spending. Policy Options: Congress may wish to con¬ sider including in CERCLA a statement on what strategy the program is to pursue. More specifically. Congress may wish to consider directing EPA to: 1) examine the potential cleanup problems of RCRA Subtitle D solid waste facilities and to strengthen and hasten the development of Federal regulations for: a) the monitoring of a broad range of hazardous substances at both open and closed sites, and b) the future operation of open and new solid waste sites; 2) reexamine its RCRA Subtitle C regulatory program for hazardous waste land disposal facilities, particularly the groundwater protection standards, from the perspective of minimizing the creation of future uncontrolled sites; and 3) redesign its system of identifying, assessing, and ranking sites for the NPL to re¬ duce the likelihood of excluding sites that merit cleanup. Congress may also wish to reexam¬ ine the policy requiring matching funds from States, particularly the 50 percent match for State and municipally owned and operated fa¬ cilities. Already, the 10 percent State match¬ ing requirement for private sites presents an obstacle to cleaning up some sites. The unwill¬ ingness, but not necessarily the inability, of many States to provide their matching require¬ ment might slow the national cleanup as much as or more than almost any factor. RESOLVING THE “HOW CLEAN IS CLEAN?” ISSUE Identifying and quantifying risks to health and the environment for the extremely broad range of condiLions, chemicals, and threats at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites pose for¬ midable problems. Risk management will have to proceed even though there is no quick way to determine the precise levels of cleanup. I-or example, quantitative risk assessments cannot be performed for most cases, except at consid¬ erable cost and time, as the necessary techni¬ cal data do not now exist. The paucity of documented, unambiguous findings of adverse health and environmental effects caused by uncontrolled sites does not mean that such effects have not occurred or will not occur. Nor is it inconsistent to say that enough information exists to know that a site presents significant risk to warrant action, but not enough to know precisely what the level of cleanup should be. Much better understand¬ ing is needed of adverse health effects from un¬ controlled sites, and the work required by Con¬ gress is proceeding slowly. How'ever, society must understand that multiple exposures to toxic chemicals at home, in the workplace, and in the general environment make it difficult to attribute causality to any one source of ex¬ posure. A detailed framework for determining and achieving cleanup goals that are nationally con¬ sistent in themselves or in the process used to reach them, effective in protecting human health and the environment, and appropriate for site-specific conditions does not yet exist. While there are a number of approaches to establishing cleanup goals, none are simple or easily administered. OTA has examined the current ad hoc, highly flexible, and nonspecific approach and six others. It finds that the cur¬ rent approach is not satisfactory- and that more explicit attention is warranted for this issue at the highest policy levels. Without clear and well-supported cleanup goals the selection of cleanup technologies and the ultimate evalua¬ tion of cleanup performance will remain con¬ tentious. Two approaches to establish cleanup levels are not practicable teconically or economically; they are: 1) requiring sites to be restored to pris¬ tine or background L-vels, and 2) using best ' IB • Superfund Strategy available technology. A third approach, the use of existing environmental standards or criteria for particular chemicals, will cover only a small fraction of the broad range of the health threats at uncontrolled sites and does not address all environmental problems. However, this a|>- proach can be used to some extent. Two other approaches, risk assessments and cost-benefit analyses, present many difficulties and uncer¬ tainties but also offer ways to establish cleanup levels. One approach has been found to offer a pol¬ icy framework for moving more forcefully toward clear cleanup goals: it is to use infor¬ mation and decisions about restoration, rehabitability, and reuse of the site to establish cleanup levels. In particular, it appears worth¬ while to examine in more detail how classify¬ ing sites according to their future use and other site conditions can be used to select the proc¬ ess to set cleanup levels, as well as determine how the site is managed more generally. For example, the use of costly risk assessments could be limited to high-priority sites where reuse and rehabitation is certain. Cost-benefit analyses could be used for sites where future use may be limited or where risk management options other than site cleanup (e.g., relocation of residents) is practicable. For some sites where exposures are small and reuse not an issue, use of existing standards may be suffi¬ cient. Since this approach relates to land use, it is clear that local communities would have to be involved in decisions. It is also necessary to address the extent of action needed in initial responses. Generic standards that consider both immediate reduc¬ tion of exposures to hazardous substances and the prevention of further deterioration while the site is awaiting remedial cleanup would be useful. Policy Options: For risk management pur¬ poses, Congress could consider a Superfund policy that: 1) first establishes environmentally effective cleanup goals for a site, then 2) deter¬ mines the cost-effective site response, and lastly 3) implements the fund-balancing provi¬ sion of the statute by considering how a site cleanup or risk mangement decision affects ac¬ tions taken at other sites. Congress may also wish to consider two more specific options: 1) having EPA develop an implementation plan that establishes cleanup levels on the basis of a classification of sites according to their future use and other site conditions, and 2) designat¬ ing a well-funded, high-priority interagency program (e.g., EPA, Department of Health and Human Services. Department of the Interior) whose purpose is to more expeditiously and comprehensively deal • vith the problem of ob¬ taining more comple'e information on the health and environmental effects of toxic wastes. DO WE HAVE AND USE EFFECTIVE CLEANUP TECHNOLOGIES? The problems with using containment and land disposal approaches to cleanup have already been discussed. These technologies are not likely to be effective over the many decades corresponding to the lifetimes of some toxic chemicals of concern. Even though they may be proven technologies for their original ap¬ plications in construction engineering, they are not proven for long-term effectiveness in con¬ taining hazardous wastes. Nor are their imme¬ diate costs indicative of the likely total long¬ term costs, including monitoring, operation and maintenance, and the costs of future cleanup actions, especially for cleaning up con¬ taminated groundwater. Table 1-6 projects future uses of conventional containment tech¬ nologies. Table 1-7 gives similar projections for conventional treatment technologies; these ex¬ isting technologies that can permanently clean up sites are underused. These projections are _•*** *»P-. -*Vl -~ ' * » ' Cb. i—Summary and Introduction • 19 Table 1-6.—Future Use of Containment Technologies Techn ique _ Barriers: Sluiry wall . Grout curtain. Vibrating beam . Sheet pile. Bloc'x displacement ... Hydraulic controls (wells) Subsurlace drains. Runon/runoff controls ... Surface seals and caps .. Solidification, etc. . Applicability Effectiveness Confidence 23 2 3 3 2 2 s 1 2 1 1 1 1-2 1 1.3 1 3 2.3 1.3 2 2 2- 3 2 4 1 2 1 2 3- 4 Capital cost 2 2-3 2-3 2-3 3 1 1 1 1 2 CapfO&M 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 Projected level of use Extensive Limited Moderate Nil-Limited Nit Extensive Moderate Extensive Extensive Moderate-Limited KEY Applicability 1 - very bfoad'y applicaWe. little or no site dependency 2 — Broadly applicable, some sites unlavorabie 3 - Limited to sites ot specific characteristics Effectiveness. 1 - Can produce leak tiflht containment 2 - Can reduce miration—some leakage likely 3 - Used as supporting technique In con|unction with other elements Confidence 1 - Well proven—long-term effectiveness—hign 1 - Well proven—long-term eliectiveness—unknown SOURCE A D Little. "Evaluation Nov 15. 1984 3 - Limited experience; used In other applications 4 - Developmental. little data Capital cost tor function provided 1 - Low 2 - Normal Capftaf"fo operation and maintenance IOSM) coat ratio. 1 ~ Capital higher than O&M 2 - Capital about same as O&M 3 - Capital lower than O&M ot Available Cleanup Technologies lor Uncontrolled Sites.' " contractor report prepared lor the Office ol Technology Assessment. Table 1-7.—Future Use of Treatment Technologies Applicability Effectiveness Confidence Capital cost Cap/O&M Secondary disposal Projected level use ot Bioiogical treatment. Chemical treatment: Neulralization/precipitation . Wet air oxidation. ... Or, 1-2 ... In, 1 ... Or, 2 ... In, 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 3 2 1-2 2 1-2 2 3 4 1 1 2 Moderate-Extensive Limited Limited Nil ... Or, 3 2 3 3 3 Limited Reduction (Cr). Physical treatment: Carbon adsorption . Sedimentation/filtration .... ... In, 3 ,... Or. In, 1 .... Or. In, 1 .... Or, 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2-3 2-3 2 2-3 4 4 4 Moderate-Extensive Moderate-Extensive Moderate Limited .. .. Or, 2 2 1 4 Nil _ In, 3 1-3 3 3 J 4 Nil Reverse osmosis. Gas stream controls: Thermal oxidation. Carbon adsorption. Incineration _ Or, In, 3 .... Of. 1 .... Or. 1 .... Or, 1 1-2 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2-3 1 i 23 3 s 3® Limited-Moderate Limited-Moderate Limited Moderate In situ biodegradation. .... Or, 1 .... Or, 3 1 2 1 3 2 3 1 Limited NOTES •Mutt ditto** ®o«KJ residues bo^t^nds on reactive material used. KEY Applicability. Oats Or - Organic compounds In • Inorganic compounds Range 1 - Broadly applicable to compounds »n in¬ dicated class 2 • Moderated app*icat>ia depends on waste composition concentration 3 - Limited to special s*tua*iona Effectiveness 1 - Highest levels available SOURCE A D Little NOV t5. 1964 2 - Capital about the same 3 - Capital lower than O&M Secondary treatment or disposal: 1 - None 2 - Minor 3 « Major, but does not require hazardous waste techniques 4 - Basically a sepa'ation process, must be used with subsequent hazardous waste treatment or secure disposal step 2 - Output may need further treatment, may have pockets untreated i»n-sttu) Confidence y mm well proven—easily transferable to site cleanup 2 - Weil proven—but not In clean-up settings 3 - Limited experience 4 — Developmental, tittle data Capital cost tor function provided 1 - Low 2 - Normal 3 - High Capita to operations and maintenance (O&m) cost basis 1 - Capital higher than O&M , '• contractor report prepared lor the Office of Technology Assessment. . "Evaluation of Available Cleanup Technologies lor Uncontrolled Sites, V vJPftsn**-. ; *»!«.•> vH*0 »^! >k C/j. 1—Summary and Introduction • 21 ~ E 2" y t- ■?; °° 5 5 ; $ 5 5 — 1 CD O O O O O o o w w . o-oooooooooooooooooooo' 2 2 Q_ . 2 ° ?VV , >.V>V? , 7’VVVVVVV?7*VQ-7 , ^-V O I p; rr >-^>->->-a.a.a.>->->'>-o.>-d.a.>-z>->->->-a.CL>->- -: zzzzzrzzzzzzz; 2 ZZZZ>O.ZCL>->>- E =■ C i J F * O O 5 O ,*EE, e e I ” * t •£3 r* p» E * s * EEE E E EEEE ^ > Z 3 3 J JC 3 r 3 x: 3 3 - 3 ^ O a o o T3 T3 3?^ TJ ?DDb6 f> - > O' f- r- — — o «x xz o £ u x: c. ic u cu — EEE E E EEEE * 5 o o fl i C EE 5 3 3 r ? T3 T3 -3? p < O O XI c S E 5 ^ r r c c • . a? ?? ?o>E ^ x x r x i? c» E £ EEE 3 • r: 3 3 3 £ n C- -o t C»C^ t)DD ? o ;? xr a> a> a> x_ E TS EEE _ , - - B . _ X. M [ _ ^ M X- — t . t - , . ^ , - Cl t _ --* -» p 0 0 0 0 0^0 ^ p O O P ^p = ppppp=p o. cx Q. a. a. — o. ©> d d ii a )- Cl— d a d d d- q.^q .0 rr rr Q> w Q. O fl SI £ C „ « c 2 oSSljSse ■= u ~ S * 3 ef y 2 » _ = y S ^ ^ O ^ ^ c i ? 5 S { vt ii J * >■» P — rr rT a <3 _ O ^ V» -w _ ^ S £ ;r £ o> 5 ? 2 CT “ X O c c leE* 295 ” _ QJ r! ffl k- ct y r _ ° d a < w O X3 o t> C3 O ^ ro ^ O ^ £!o *“,1^ CO »3 i; o u > E a> x: _ O O *® c u — — « > ^ 0 ' 0 - ' 5 ® > ° 0 > 0 o •i — 0 0 O E 3? . i/i O o * s ■O r I *? § O £ JS.SSi.S 2 t: Q- C V «i C ? »a?i5s4 S o ^ C-> X3 «? P = > g is? 3 XI >s x ►- dT ►— 0 0 Q ® *■* * P 5< i^ -P 0*0 Noaw P CO gj O Q O (9 p | CD c m 07 ZD co »— O. -> °. % « E i © H a o I c a If '0*0 Zoo r p ’ c x: c o i o a . il o 22 • Superfund Strategy sources. Current educational programs may not be able to prepare sufficient numbers of some professionals, particularly hydrogeolo¬ gists, and perhaps toxicologists, geologists, civil engineers, and some types of chemists. But a more critical problem is that the already strong demand for people with a masters degree and 3 to 5 years of experience may increase and not be met for the next decade. Policy Options: If the Superfund program is to be a long-term one, the Congress may wish to consider: 1) funding various expanded train¬ ing and educational programs, perhaps $5 mil¬ lion to $10 million annually for some years; 2) providing funding for EPA to build up its in- house professional staff in disciplines appro¬ priate for cleanup work and oversight, perhaps increased funds of $25 million to $50 million annually; 3) making direct grants to the States for their staff development, perhaps $25 mil¬ lion to $50 million annually for some years; and 4) directing EPA to reexamine: a) how it selects and uses contractors, particularly with respect to its emphasis on the cost of proposals rather than technical qualifications; and b) how it in¬ volves government agencies at Superfund sites. IS PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT ADEQUATE? More emphasis is needed to address the legitimate concerns of the public, improve pub¬ lic confidence in the Superfund program, and promote effective public participation in site identification, site assessment, initial re¬ sponses, cleanups, and long-term monitoring. EPA has concentrated on providing informa¬ tion to the public rather than involving the pub¬ lic in decisionmaking. An expanded public role in the Superfund program might reduce delays by dealing with community concerns before substantial actions are taken and by providing useful oversight of activities. Public participa¬ tion, if given Federal support for obtaining technical assistance, could lead to more effec¬ tive cleanups for all communities, not just for those who happen to be better organized or for¬ FINANCING Many of the results of this study suggest the need for a considerably larger Superfund pro¬ gram than the present one. A larger Superfund program would need to consider broadly based funding and more extensive use of general tax revenues in contrast to the current emphasis on the tax on chemical and petroleum feedstocks. While this study did not assess the tunate enough to have citizens with political or technical expertise. Concerns about delays caused by more public participation could be addressed by using established methods of ar¬ bitration and mediation, for example. Public education is also critical. Policy Options: Congress may wish to con¬ sider incorporating in CERCLA a mandate, similar to that in other environmental statutes, for public involvement in decisions that deter¬ mine which sites are placed on the NPL and the type of cleanups or other actions to be used at Superfund sites. Providing Federal support to aid communities in obtaining technical assistance is also worth consideration. MECHANISES financing question in depth, it did examine the use of a tax on hazardous wastes currently gen¬ erated (generally referred to as a was‘e-end tax) to help finance a Superfund program for the near term. A summary of the three principal sources of funds—feedstock tax, waste-end tax, and gen- Ch. 1— Summary and Introduction • 23 eral tax revenues—is given in table 1-9. These three sources could generate considerable sums annually. If Superfund is expanded greatly it may prove necessary to rely much more on general tax revenues or some other broadly based tax, as there are limits—perhaps $1 billion to $2 billion annually—to the amount that could be raised with feedstock and waste- end taxes. It should also be noted that this study has examined uncontrolled hazardous waste site cleanups only. Should other major uses of Superfund be mandated by Congress, such as a victim compensation program, long-term Superfund requirements could be far greater than $100 billion. A waste-end tax could provide funding to complement other sources, but of equal or greater importance, it should be designed to slow the creation of still more uncontrolled waste sites. The tax could be large enough to provide an economic incentive for generators to reduce the amount and degree of hazard of their wastes and to shift management of waste away from land disposal, the chief cause of Superfund sites. Indeed, the greater the future cleanup needs facing the Superfund program, the greater is the need to stop creating stih more uncontrolled sites and to stop adding (O the mass of hazardous wastes at existing sues. OTA and others have found that 20 States are using waste-end tax systems effectively and without major problems. A Federal waste-end tax could be made simple to administer and could generate from $300 million to SI billion annually over the next several years, before waste reduction efforts reduce the tax base sub- stantially. It would not be necessary or produc¬ tive to displace State waste-end taxes, however; a deduction for waste-end taxes paid to States is possible. Table 1 - 9 .—Summary Comparison of Several Major Financing Schemes r-eeasu Current Fairness: Very few companies pay most of the taxes Expanded Improved Low Good, many parties pay High Improved if land disposal gets high tax General tax revenues 0 Parties most directly responsible for problems do not bear burden Administrabillty: Easy, established Probably easy Probably easy on basis of States’ experience Possibly more enforcement necessary Very easy Secondary Impacts: None apparent Might reduce international competitiveness of some companies None likely Provides economic incentive to reduce wastes and shift away from tar id disposal, thus capacity to raise basic revenue With large amoun’ may have undesirable effect on Federal budget declines tmber of material taxed CCurrenlly a small traction (12 5 peresnt) from this source, but much lar 8 er amounts could be ra sed SOURCE Ottice ot Technology Assessment. 24 • Supertund Strategy CLEANUPS BY RESPONSIBLE PARTIES To a substantial extent, future Superfund spending depends on how many sites are cleaned up by responsible parties. Although considerable sums have been spent by private parties, the original users and operators of un¬ controlled sites are worried that the current program does not facilitate private responses. The most frequently heard concern is that after private cleanup many uncertainties about future liabilities remain. Both in government and the private sector there is interest in pro¬ viding greater incentives for cleanups by re¬ sponsible parties. Although various approaches can be considered, including reducing future liabilities, sharing costs, and aiding attempts to use innovative cleanup technologies, sen¬ sitivity is needed to two problems addressed in this study. Explicit, environmentally effec¬ tive cleanup goals are needed whoever does cleanup, and public awareness and effective technical oversight by the Government are im¬ portant for private cleanups. OTA is aware that there now exists what might be called a “quiet market” for cleanups. Responsible parties are cleaning up sites, usu¬ ally on their property, before the sites enter the Superfund system and before public awareness is awakened. Although these cleanups may be done well, there are no assurances that these actions (which will often make detection of the sites difficult) are environmentally sound. In¬ terestingly, one positive aspect of this situation is that some new cleanup technologies are be¬ ing given a chance to prove themselves under field conditions. However, it is not clear that information about positive and negative results is being disseminated. THE ROLE OF THE STATES Congress has always envisioned the Super¬ fund program to be a joint Federal-State effort. States could clean up some uncontrolled sites on their own (this has occurred to a limited ex¬ tent), and States are required by statute to pay for some of the costs undertaken under Super¬ fund. However, there is evidence that a num¬ ber of States are unwilling to meet their share of cleanup costs. 7 At the beginning of the Superfund program. States may have faced fi¬ nancial constraints; however, this does not now appear in general to be the case. The ef- ’Eor example, e recent study o! Slate efforts to clean up un¬ controlled waste tiles teached the following conclusions: "States appear less willing to 'boulder the financial burden associated with hazardous waste correction actions . . . While state legislatures respond to ‘he hazardous waste problem with pol¬ icy statements. th» allocation of stale dollars does not necessarily follow . . . The availab.lity of federal dollars strengthens the |necded responsc| linkage, the influence of hazardous waste- related industry in stale politics depresses it." (A. O'M. Bowman, "Explaining State Response to the Hazardous Waste Problem." Hazardous Waste, vol. 1. No. 3. H)U4. pp. 301-308 ) feet is that some cleanups have not and will not take place because some States are not pro¬ viding and may not provide future required matching funds. However, it must also be stressed that several States, usually those with many uncontrolled sites, have established means to raise substantial sums for cleanups and do have extensive State programs (e.g., New York, California, New Jersey, and Illinois). Under Superfund, States are required to pay 10 percent of capital costs (50 percent for pub¬ licly owned and operated sites) but all future operating and maintenance (O&M) costs. The selection of the cleanup approach used at sites has been influenced by the availability of State funds. The result is a bias on the part of States for high “up-front” costs, usually meaning more expensive and permanent remedies. But this understandable State preference is counter to EPA’s general preference for the use of con¬ tainment and land disposal, which usually have uncertain and high O&M costs. OTA finds little reason to believe that most States could play a stronger role in the Super¬ fund program, particularly if it were to be greatly expanded. However, a smali number of States with many NPL sites could do so. On the other hand, questions can be raised as to why some States have not confronted their own current and future needs in cleaning up sites. The slowness of some States to devise ways to raise funds for cleanups may he explained 1 y many factors, including: State priorities that do not give a high rank to this environmental problem; a “wait-and-see” attitude concerning the matching share requirements of Superfund; local obstacles to raising revenues for this pur¬ pose; and a perception of an uncertain and still ineffective Federal program. Another problem is that many States lack technical know-how and people to assume ma¬ jor responsibilities for leading cleanups or to carry out other aspects of the Superfund pro¬ gram such as site identification, selection, an long-term monitoring. For the most part, Stales Ch. 1 —Summary and Introduction • 25 have difficulties obtaining experienced techni¬ cal professionals. Even with current spending, the demand for such professionals is so great that most States cannot offer competitive salaries. Policy Options: If OTA is correct in its esti¬ mate of much greater future cleanup needs, then Congress may wish to consider two op¬ tions. First, Congress may wish to accept the trend toward reducing the matching fund re¬ quirements for the States (as EPA has done) or it may wish to allow de facto decisions on what sites get cleaned up because of the unwill¬ ingness of some States to supply matching funds. Alternatively, Congress may wish to provide incentives for the States to retain or expand their role in the Superfund program. This could be done by providing near-term aid to improve States’ technical staffs, arranging for more effective Federal oversight, and direc¬ ting EPA to establish an information transter program about cleanup technologies. SCOPE AMD OBJECTIVES OF THE SUPERFUNB ASSESSMENT Congress has decided, and has reaffirmed through oversight, the need for a national Superfund program to clean uncontrolled waste sites. Everyone understands that infor¬ mation on the scope of the problem is im¬ perfect and incomplete. Scientific uncertainty about adverse health effects is substantial and data on environmental contamination are in¬ complete. But in the absence of an effective and substantial cleanup program, releases ol haz¬ ardous substances into the environment could cause widespread damage to public health and the environment long before these uncertain¬ ties can be resolved. This Superfund report addresses the prob¬ lems and issues in implementing and continu¬ ing the Superfund cleanup program, not in justifying its fundamental need. The Superfund program has achieved much, especially con¬ sidering that it was a fast public policy re sponse to a diverse set of newly recognized, highly complex, technical problems. The basic issue at hand, however, is to decide whether it is necessary to change and improve the pro¬ gram so it can achieve its goals and, if so, how to do this in the most economical and e.ticient way by learning from the experiences of the past 5 years. OTA has not addressed all the issues sur¬ rounding Superfund. As in its earlier study, Technologies and Management Strategics for Hazardous Waste Control, a work that was chiefly concerned with the RCRA program, the focus has been placed on those issues with a significant technical content. Chapter 2 presents policy options for con¬ gressional consideration. The options are sup¬ ported by the results and conclusions of the other chapters. Some of these options are 38-745 0 - 85 -2 \ ■ 31503- ' 26 • Superiund Strategy broad, while others are specific. Several broad policy issues directly and indirectly related to the Superfund program, such as approaches to financing Superfund and the role of the States in the program are also discussed. Chapter 3, a systems analysis, ties together a number of technical and economic variables of the national cleanup program. Two different strategies are examined for their effects on total program duration and costs under various assumptions and constraints, such as number of sites requiring attention and budget limita¬ tions. The strategies make use of an important concept, the “impermanence” of cleanup ac¬ tions, which assesses currently unforeseen long-term costs following the immediate costs of a cleanup. The difficult choices and trade¬ offs facing policymakers are illustrated through the use of scenarios comparing the two strategies. Chapter 4 addresses the issue of strategies to achieve cleanup goals and examines the dif¬ ficult issue of how to establish cleanup goals that are protective of the environment, na¬ tionally consistent, flexible enough to deal with site-specific situations, and administratively feasible and practical. Resolution of this issue affects the selection of cost-effective cleanup technologies, selection of sites for action, and evaluation of cleanup performance. Chapter 5 considers the number of sites re¬ quiring cleanup and examines the future needs of Superfund by assessing the extent to w'hich certain types of sites may merit cleanup. This is an area of considerable uncertainty, but one which is fundamental to policy decisions about the nature and size of the national program. The benefits of investment in a stronger institu¬ tional infrastructure—such as developing inno¬ vative cleanup technologies—increase with in¬ creasing size of the NPL. Chapter 6 discusses cleanup technologies. The purpose is to provide a more comprehen¬ sive understanding of the capabilities and limitations of existing cleanup technologies, and the problems involved in choosing among them. It also examines the need for, potential benefits of, and problems facing emerging, innovative technologies, and the need for ad¬ ditional or different Federal research, develop¬ ment, and demonstration efforts. A variety of cleanup technologies are necessary to meet en¬ vironmental protection goals, and meet them in the most cost-effective way. Chapter 7 examines issues related to achiev¬ ing quality work and assesses current and future problems in achieving timely and effec¬ tive cleanups at reasonable cost. Three areas are examined: a) the performance to date of the Superfund program; b) EPA’s oversight func¬ tion at cleanups undertaken by EPA, States, and private parties; and c) problems associated with the need for highly specialized technical personnel for site investigations and cleanups. Chapter 8 considers public confidence and participation and examines how the public cur¬ rently is involved in Superfund cleanup activ¬ ities. Perhaps more than other Federal environ¬ mental programs, Superfund has been shaped by public demands. Yet the formal role of the public in decisionmaking is limited by statute. SUPERFUND SEEN THROUGH CASE STUDIES OTA performed several major case studies of Superfund sites to understand the problems confronting the program and better define the issues facing Congress in its deliberations over the extension and possible expansion of the program. It is common to introduce the sub¬ ject of Superfund with statistics. Such a review usually focuses on numbers of various types of actions, numbers of sites and types of prob¬ lems at the sites, actual and potential damages to health and the environment, levels of spend¬ ing, and how' these and other factors have changed over time. Such statistics are used throughout this report. ' Ch. 1—Summary ana Introduction • 27 However, to introduce both the general sub¬ ject and this report, OTA believes it is useful to present summaries of case studies. OTA’s engineering case studies, based on in-depth analysis of how each site has been managed, illustrate the difficult and diverse set of chal¬ lenges facing the national cleanup program. While there is some truth to the proposition that each uncontrolled site is unique, it is also true that sites share some common character¬ istics that become more obvious as the cleanup program progresses. It is likely, therefore, that these case studies can be instructive in learn¬ ing how to im^iove the Superfund program. For example, these studies reveal problems associated with the current approach to estab¬ lishing cleanup levels, with the quality of cleanup work, and with inadequate technical oversight by the Government. The case study sites were selected because they had received a good deal of response ac¬ tion that could be examined for effectiveness. These sites all had major problems, though not necessarily typical of all Superfund sites. The Seymour Site The Seymour Recycling Corp. (SRC) site in Seymour, Indiana, was one of the first major cleanup actions under Superfund. Although land disposal sites are the most common oper¬ ation requiring cleanup, the Seymour site illus¬ trates how a processing or treatment facility can also create substantial problems. Over a 10-year period SRC established and operated a facility where large amounts of hazardous waste were sent for recycling and treatment. Eventually, authorities discovered that these wastes were not well managed. By 1978 the State of Indiana found it necessary to file a law¬ suit to get SRC to clean up an estimated 40,000 drums of waste in various states of decay, leak¬ age, and disarray. In 1980, after SRC had ceased operations, EPA became involved through the Clean Water Act. Limited containment actions costing less than $1 million were taken, and two companies voluntarily spent slightly more than $1 million to remove their drums and place them in a commercial land disposal facility. EPA esti¬ mated that total cleanup costs would be $25 million. Throughout 1980 EPA took legal ac¬ tions against a number of parties, spent more than $700,000 removing some wastes for in¬ cineration, and hired contractors to investigate the groundwater. In 1981, EPA took the position that Super¬ fund should not be used at SRC because the site did not present an emergency. The State maintained it did not have the resources to cover the 50 percent match ($15 million at that time) required under Superfund for the city- owned site. As a result, EPA pursued an en¬ forcement strategy based on getting responsi¬ ble private parties, chiefly the generators of the wastes, to pay for cleanup. To some extent, EPA’s policy now is to use Superfund to clean up NPL sites first and later try to get responsi¬ ble parties to pay for the cleanup. Much seems to depend on how urgent the cleanup is deemed and on whether responsible parties are known and financially able to contribute to the costs. Although the problem of States not being able to pay for their matching requirement still exists, current policy requires the 50 percent match only when the local government also operates the facility. This was not the case at SRC. However, the State might have had diffi¬ culty providing even 10 percent of the $30 mil¬ lion required at that time. Currently the Slate and city face the problem of the operating and maintenance costs of an onsite treatment fa¬ cility. This facility cleans surface water run¬ off before the water enters the local sanitary sewer system. The runoff is quite contami¬ nated, revealing that the surface cleanup (de¬ scribed below) left substantial contamination in place. During 1982 and 1983, two important events took place. EPA reached a settlement with some of the companies that had used the site. Those companies agreed to spend as much as $15 million for a surface cleanup, and EPA agreed to eliminate their responsibility for future subsurface cleanup. The issue of collect ing money for groundwater cleanup (estimated at $15 million but quite uncertain), is not re- - . 28 • Super!and Strategy solved; $5 million has been collected from some parties. A major issue raised in this ap¬ proach is the question of whether it is techni¬ cally possible and administratively reasonable to make a distinction between surface and sub¬ surface cleanup. Indeed, the case study has revealed that the negotiated surface cleanup was not technically sound. Although 1 foot of soil was removed, there is no reason to think that all contami¬ nated soil was removed. No testing was done before or after the removal to demonstrate that all contaminated soil was removed. No cleanup goals were set for acceptable levejs of residual contamination in the remaining soil. Leaving significantly contaminated soil at the site could worsen groundwater contamination over time. It should be noted that an early estimate judged that 5 feet of soil would need to be removed; removal of only 1 foot reduced removal costs substantially to about $8 million. The surface cleanup was completed in early 1984. The surface cleanup simply extended the fundamental approach used from the begin¬ ning; that is, for the most part, cleanup con¬ sisted of removing wastes and contaminated soil from the site and sending them elsewhere for land disposal. The issue of future problems associated with land disposal sites that have received removed wastes has become impor¬ tant, as the problems with the technical sound¬ ness of and regulatory control over operating hazardous waste land disposal facilities have become more evident. During 1982 and 1983, the SRC site was scored to determine its eligibility for placement on the NPL. The site received a relatively high score, in large part because an observed release of hazardous substances into both surface and groundwater was recognized. There are indica¬ tions that there were problems with the at¬ tempts to assess air pollution from the site. The air route for migration of hazardous substances off the site appears to be the most troublesome one for the NPL scoring system. The scoring of the site, results of various studies, and the need to supply alternate drink¬ ing water to some residents suggest that a potentially large, costly groundwater cleanup may be required. It is not clear yet, however, exactly what the extent of groundwater con¬ tamination is, what the difficulty and costs might be, what cleanup goals would be used, and what the effect of the surface cleanup has had on the groundwater problem. Nor is it clear if groundwater cleanup will be delayed until responsible parties agree to pay for it or whether Superfund will be used. Finally, the Seymour site illustrates the con¬ cept of impermanent cleanups leading to high future costs {as discussed in chapter 3). About $12 million has been spent thus far at Seymour for initial responses involving site containment and waste removal, surface cleanup involving waste iemoval, and many studies and investi¬ gations, including the ongoing groundwater work. Nevertheless, no permanent cleanup can be said to have occurred. Future actions will be required, including a probable groundwater cleanup, a possible need to remove or treat much contaminated soil, possible cleanup ac¬ tions at land disposal sites that have received wastes from Seymour, and continuing O&M costs for the water treatment plant. Altogether, future spending for this site is likely to surpass what has already been spent. The Stringfelicw Site The Stringfellow Acid Pits site near Glen Avon, California, was used as a surface im¬ poundment between 1956 and 1972, during which time over 30 million gallons of a large variety of liquid hazardous wastes were dis¬ posed there. The history of investigations and actions at Stringfellow is longer than at most Superfund sites. Much of the w-ork, and many of the misinterpretations of the site hydroge¬ ology, occurred before Superfund was even passed; EPA and Superfund are therefore late arrivals on t!.e Stringfellow stage. However, just because the history is so long, and so much happened so early, this case study is especially rich. Original geological studies concluded that the site was on impermeable bedrock and that, with the installation of a downstream concrete Ch. j —Summary and Introduction barrier, there would be no damage of ground¬ water contamination. Therefore, the canyon site was legally sanctioned as a hazardous waste facility. Subsequent information and events have revealed that the site was quite un¬ suitable for such a facility, and there have been substantial amounts of surface and ground- water contamination over a period of years In fact, the site sits over the Chino Basin aquifer, a major source of water for drinking and other uses in an area serving about 500,000 people. Even now, it is not clear whether there is a far more serious groundwater contamination problem than previously recognized, but recent data suggest there is. Early findings of groundwater contamina¬ tion in 1972 were wrongly interpreted to be a result of surface water runofl rather than groundwater contamination. The same mistake was made by other consultants in 1977. Undue optimism about the suitability of land disposal sites for hazardous waste disposal is not un¬ common, as detailed data on the characteristics of a location are usually lacking. One lesson 10 be learned from Stringfellow is that prob¬ lems can arise from having many different con¬ sultants, contractors, and government agencies involved with cleanup studies and decisions. The record indicates problems with inadequate oversight of work by qualified government peo¬ ple, problems with redundant activities, and problems associated with conflicts among many local, State, and Federal agencies. Now there is little doubt about the moving plume of contamination in the groundwater, and it is likely that it will enter the main flow of the Chino Basin sometime in 1985- Down- gradient wells 1 mile and more from the site have revealed substantial contamination by toxic chemicals in concentrations sufficient for decertification of a drinking water supply. Al¬ ternate drinking water is being supplied to some local residents. In 1977, the option of total removal of all con¬ taminated liquids and solids from the site was estimated to cost $3.4 million. Two years later, after inaction and heavy rains, this option was still the preferred one, but the estimated cost was four times higher. A State agency, there¬ fore, chose a lower cost option based on con¬ tainment, which involved removing contami¬ nated liquids and some contaminated soil, onsite neutralization ol soil with kiln dust, placement of a clay cap, and installation of monitoring and interceptor wells to deal with groundwater. Both before and after this ap¬ proach was implemented, large discharges oi contaminated water from the site flowed into the downhill area of Glen Avon (800,000 gallons) and 4 million gallons of contaminated water was disposed of at considerable expense in a California land disposal site. This site (BKK in West Covina) is now recognized to be leak¬ ing as well and was closed recently to hazard¬ ous waste. The Casmalia Resources landfill that now receives 70,000 gallons per day from Stringfellow was fined recently by EPA loi in¬ adequately' monitoring the groundwater. Thus, Stringfellow illustrates the problem of trans¬ ferring risk from one community to another when cleanup is based on removal of wastes to land disposal sites. Already about $15 million has been spent at the site and all concerned acknowledge that no permanent cleanup has been achieved. A per¬ manent cleanup is still being studied by EPA, but its cost could be very high. The State esti¬ mates it would cost $65 million. A program for onsite treatment of contaminated groundwater is now underway. But this, too, is not a per¬ manent solution. The OTA case study has con¬ cluded that the unfavorable hydrogeology of the site (e.g., fractured bedrock and under¬ ground springs) has frustrated ail containment attempts to date. Therefore, a commitment is needed to excavate toxic wastes and contami¬ nated soil, and store them onsite until the ma¬ terials can be treated to render them as harm¬ less as possible. As long as these mater als remain in the ground it will be necessary to at¬ tempt to extract contaminated water and treat it at considerable O&M costs to the State. Even so, there may well be furthe r spread of contam¬ inated groundwater in the surrounding aquifer as extraction is not likely to be completely ef¬ fective. It is not clear whether ongoing studies to determine a cost-elfective cleanup are ade- - ' ' % JJ * . 30 • Superlund Strategy quately considering total removal and treat¬ ment of hazardous materials. For about 15 years, dependence on land disposal and con¬ tainment at the site has not provided either en¬ vironmental protection or cost effectiveness, but it is still not clear that the cleanup solution preferred originally—total removal of all con¬ taminated liquids and solids—is being seriously considered, since its near-term costs would be quite high. In all likelihood the eventual cleanup costs for the site will far surpass what it would have cost some years ago to remove materials and even treat them. (The original plan was for removal followed by redisposal in land disposal facilities.) As time continues to pass, cleanup costs are likely to mount, and cleanup may be¬ come infeasible if there is widespread con¬ tamination of more soil and groundwater. In¬ deed, actions other than cleanup may have to be considered eventually. As in the previous case, much money has been spen* on imper¬ manent “cleanup” of the site with a high prob¬ ability that much more money will be spent in the future for more permanent cleanup, expen¬ sive groundwater monitoring of a large aquifer, and possibly for cleanup of the site that has already received much waste from Stringfellovv. The Sylvester Site The Sylvester site in Nashua, New Hamp¬ shire, was a former sand and gravel pit where hazardous wastes were dumped illegally along with solid wastes for 5 to 10 years through 1979. In addition to large quantities of non- hazardous materials, drums of hazardous waste, bulk materials, and liquids were dis¬ posed in a 3- to 4-acre area. Various consultants who have worked on the site used a figure of about 240,000 pounds for the total weight of hazardous waste deposited, based on an esti¬ mated 800,000 gallons of dilute liquid wastes, and exclusive of 1,314 drums removed from the site (see below). OTA finds that this figure could be a significant underestimate. State officials are confident, however, that the figure of 240,000 pounds is substantially correct, based on: 1) affidavits submitted by I several potentially responsible parties; 2) rec¬ ords of inspection and surveillance at the dump; and 3) exploratory test pits and borings in the solid materials in the pit above the water level. But the purpose of test pits and borings is to sample the site, not to examine all of it. Based on the number of solid samples, and what they contained, considerable amounts of waste could be present, but undetected, in the volume above the water level; that is, the possibility of a significantly higher figure for total hazard¬ ous waste deposited cannot be rejected with confidence on the basis of the sampling of solid material at the site. (Groundwater sampling seems to have well delineated the amount oi hazardous materials currently in the ground- water.) State officials have put considerable confidence on the affidavits, inspection, and surveillance, and OTA cannot judge how well placed that confidence is. OTA notes, however, that various documents speak of the site being used for hazardous waste disposal for about 5 years, through late 1979, and agree that the site was used for waste disposal of some sort for 10 years. A legitimate question can be raised about how perfect inspections and surveillance were likely to have been over this long period. For example, such inspections and surveillance did not prevent illegal disposal of hazardous wastes at the site. This site became eligible for Superfund cleanup because in 1980 a wide variety of haz¬ ardous substances were tound in groundwater, surface waters, and air. It became clear that a plume of contamination had seeped into a brook which eventually fed into the Merrimack River, a source of drinking water for Lowell, Lawrence, and Methuen, Massachusetts. Sev¬ eral nearby private drinking water wells were also threatened, and air pollution threatened a nearby trailer park. Early actions included supplying municipal water to replace the private wells, removal of 1,314 drums (roughly 70,000 gallons) that were visible and accessible from the surface for land disposal elsewhere, installation of a security fence and a number of groundwater monitor¬ ing wells, and, for about a year, operation of a groundwater interception and recycle system to delay further seepage of leachate into the nearby brook. The latter system has been re¬ started because of the delay in completing the chosen remedial cleanup and because there is an indication^ greater than expected water flow off the site. The strategy adopted to clean up the site was to: 1) minimize the amount ol water entering and leaving the site through use of a slurry wall around the area and a cap over it. and 2) clean up the contaminated groundwater and contam¬ inated soil through a complex water treatment system. The latter system includes pumping contaminated groundwater downgradient of the site and discharging it upgradient. and treating contaminated water by several tech¬ niques to remove a variety of contaminants. On the one hand this strategy was bold and inno¬ vative. However, there are several uncertain¬ ties with this cleanup approach. The slurry wall and cap system has been much less elective than anticipated. The de¬ sign predicted a 95 percent reduction in water flow through the site. A year after installation of the cap and slurry wall system, measure¬ ments of the outflow showed only a 39 to 67 percent reduction of the original flow; that is, over five times as much water is flowing through the system as was predicted. A hydro- geological study is underway to evaluate this problem. On the basis of extensive modeling, the hydrogeological contractor believes that the cause of the leaky containment is water flow¬ ing under the wall. Some underflow was pre¬ dicted because the bedrock is fractured, and the contractor and the State officials now think that the bedrock is more highly fractured than originally estimated. Another possible contrib¬ uting factor is problems with construction during the installation of the wall. A further possibility, which State officials reject based on the hydrogeological modeling, is leakage through the wall because of the degradation of the wall by the contaminants in the water. The possibility of chemical degradation of the slurry wall has come up several times in con¬ tractor reports, and a recognized side-benefit of the water treatment systems is that the flows Ch. 1— Summary and Introduction • 31 it sets up would protect at least part of the wall from the contaminated water in 'he site. The reduced effectiveness of the contain¬ ment system will not cause major problems if the treatment system removes the contamina¬ tion to the degree predicted. The design ot the treatment system assumes that nearly all con¬ taminants will be flushed out during the rela¬ tively brief period (about 2 years) currently planned for treatment. However, to the extent that there is uncertainty about the quantity and particularly the nature of waste that may re¬ main in the soil and in the portion of the site above the water level, there is uncertainty about the long-term effectiveness of the groundwater cleanup. The cleanup may suc¬ ceed in removing contaminants from grounc - water in several vears, as the operation ot the pilot plant indicates, and still leave waste that will leach out over time, recontaminating groundwater. If this should occur, the contain¬ ment system will not be capable of preventing the new contamination from flowing offsite. Prudence suggests that extensive monitoring of groundwater will be needed at Sylvester lor a long time, and that a contingency plan be de¬ veloped to deal with recontamination should it occur. The cleanup goals established for the site re¬ quired a hundredfold reduction in the release of contaminants from the site. The goals were based on: 1) meeting the acceptable lifetime ex¬ posure level for inhalation of chloroform, the most serious of the airborne pollutants from the site; and 2) meeting water criteria at the Lowell intake of the Merrimack River, with arsenic as the chemical of greatest concern. This attempt to set explicit goals was com¬ mendable. As EPA and the State recognize, however, the earlv emphasis on arsenic was misplaced. The background levels of arsenic in the area are very high; the arsenic levels in the Merrimack ;'re about 1,000 nanograms per liter (ng/1), and the contribution of Sylvester to Merrimack of arsenic would be only about 15 ng/1. This contribution is relatively unimpor¬ tant, and by itself, probably not worth the cost / I ■ !*»»•<«: , f ■ UK 3®SQP*ctfl| lIMIIU -** 3 , >. fw 32 • Superfund Strategy of stringent cleenup. However, there ere sev- eral other toxic chemicals predicted to exceed water quality criteria at the Lowell intake, and other toxic chemicals at high levels for which criteria have not been formulated; the back¬ ground levels at Lowell for these are likely to be lower, relative to the Sylvester contribution, than is the case for arsenic. If so, these chemi¬ cals are appropriate ones on which to for¬ mulate cleanup goals based on water quality. When only the chemicals for which water qual¬ ity criteria exist are considered, the cleanup goal is similar to that originally proposed on the basis of arsenic. In the case of Sylvester it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the cleanup strategy. If State officials are correct in their estimate of the nature and quantity of the haz¬ ardous waste disposed at Sylvester, the cleanup will be permanent. If not. future costs could raise the total cleanup costs significantly above the currently estimated S13 million. O’her Case Studies on Completed Cleanups Recently a study was performed on six NPL sues cleaned up under the Superfund program. These six sites had fewer problems than the OTA case study sites, but they too can be in¬ structive. 8 The report questions the widespread impression that the Superfund program has permanently cleaned up six dangerous hazard¬ ous waste sites. According to its evaluation, which OTA f inds valid, there were thorough cleanups at two of the sites (Chemical Mirorals Recovery and Walcott Chemical) which posed only minor hazards. A thorough cleanup was done at the Luminous Processes Site, but some problems remain, including the need for med¬ ical testing of former workers exposed to radium. But actions at three sites (Chemical Metals Recovery, Butler Tunnel, and the Gratiot Country Golf Club) have not been per¬ manent cleanups. Surrounding communities finn a | C p B,rd ; ,r T an c M ' Podhorzer - "Evaluations of the Six Na onal p r.ority List Sites Delts.ed by the Environmental Cro.ec ic H ?s csrsr ^ stilt could be exposed to serious hazards, and future cleanups may be necessary. The Luminous Processes, Inc., facility (Athens, Georgia) was a radioactive watch and clock dial painiing operation initially licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1952. The plant used considerable quantities of radium until it was forced to close in 1978 due to repeated violations of Federal and State reg¬ ulations. The company was also required to decontaminate the facility, which was heavily contaminated with radium-226. Investigation and limited removal of contaminated materials began in 1979. However, most of the cleanup was accomplished with Superfund assistance This work began in 1982, 3 years after the site was abandoned by Luminous. Overall, the study f inds a thorough job was done. About 15,000 cubic feet of radioactive soil was bar¬ reled and transported to a low-level radiation facility in Richland, Washington. The building was also cleaned. A slab of concrete was removed from the floor; testing revealed that soils below the building were not contami¬ nated.. The study does point out that monitor¬ ing and cleanup may have missed contami¬ nated layers below the level of testing (3 feet in most cases). No monitoring of test wells was conducted to detect potential rad : ation at deeper levels or possible groundwater con¬ tamination. Furthermore, the grounds were not surveyed for the possibility of waste burial a frequent practice at many plants. Also, there has been no medical testing of former employ¬ ees for radium contamination effects. The Chemical Minerals Recovery site (Cleveland, Ohio) was a warehouse that had been used for less than 1 year as a temporary storage facility. The warehouse was closed down by judicial order after a fire. It was near collapse, and contained 700 drums o r various chemicals, plus another 700 drums outside Both the company and the property owner refused to clean up the site. EPA approved im¬ mediate funding of $205,000 in November 1981. The removal was completed in May 1982 There was little reason to believe that sig¬ nificant amounts of chemicals had been spilled » ■ into the ground or remained below the surface. Cleanup in this case consisted of removal to another land-based facility. The Walcott Chemical Co. site (Greenville, Mississippi) consisted of two warehouses. Both were in poor condition, but only one was des¬ ignated as a Superfund site. It became an NPL site because the State chose it as its priority site, not because it scored high enough. The first problem with the site in April 1981 occurred when a fire official filed a fire and explosivity hazard complaint. EPA investigated the site in July 1981 and soon thereafter the property owner cleaned up the site by removing the wastes to a land disposal facility. There was no evidence of spilled materials and in July 1982 the site was judged clean. The Butler Tunnel (Pittston, Pennsylvania) cleanup dealt with discharges of oily wastes into the Susquehanna River, but not with the remaining wastes and contamination in the tunnel itself. The initial incident occurred in Iuly 1979 prior to the Superfund program. At that time, tens of thousands of gallons of wastes began discharging from the old coal mining tunnel; discharges continued through March 1980. Pollution w r as detected .n the drinking water of Danvers, 60 miles downstream. Fed¬ eral funding for the response came entirely from funds provided under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act. The original discharge drew a quick and thorough response. EPA and State agencies cleaned up the large spill on the river and took steps to monitor and prevent future damage. Substantial evidence exists, however, to indicate that significant quantities of toxic chemicals still exist in the tunnel. These pose threats to residents living above the tunnel. Cyanide gases in dangerous concentrations have reached the surface through boreholes to the tunnel, which are common in the area and, for the most part, not tested. In June 1980, EPA believed that it had identified the location of the “mother lode” of the wastes in the tunnel, but funding was suspended. Further cleanup was abandoned. In 1983, the State investigated whether dangerous chemicals from sediment Ch. 1—Summary and Introduction • 33 contamination may be accumulating in fish, which are caught and eaten. The study has not been made public. The Gratiot Country Golf Club site (St. Louis, Michigan) was a sanitary landfill; clean¬ up consisted of relocating the problem. The Velsico Chemical Co. used the 3.5-acre site on the Pine River to dump and burn toxic indus¬ trial chemicals between the 1930s and 1970s. In November 1982 Velsico signed a consent agreement w'ith the State and EPA, under which it agreed to spend $38 million to clean up the site and two others across the river. Velsico was to remove soil to a level c‘. 3 feet below' where any chemicals w r ere identified through testing. About 68,000 tons of soil were removed to the company’s site across the river, where ihey were placed on a clay liner and under a clay cap. In other words, wastes w'ere land disposed in a sensitive area. In addition, 1.25 million gallons of contaminated water were disposed of in a deep well, raising ques¬ tions about future leakage. The company was not required to conduct a health effects study, nor was it required to consider the feasibility of removing highly toxic chemicals from river sediments. Even now', for 60 miles downstream, the State warns against fish consumption. The Chemical Metals Industry site (Balti¬ more, Maryland) consists of two properties in a commercial and residential section, on both sides of a group of 20 row' houses. Initially, there were reported complaints of eye, nose, and throat irritation during spills that occasion¬ ally forced residents to leave. There were also burns to children and animals playing in the area, and runoff into one of the neighboring basements. The company never had a permit to handle hazardous materials, and it was shut down in August 1981. EPA investigated the fa¬ cility, determined that it presented an imme diate threat, and that it warranted an immedi¬ ate removal action. Approximately 1,500 drums of hazardous materials w'ere removed for land disposal. Significant levels of contamination were detected as deep as 15 feet, but less than 1 foot of the contaminated soil was removed i 54 • Superfund Strategy for disposal. No action was taken to intercept the migration of chemicals into groundwater, despite evidence of contamination. Although local residences do not use the groundwater, there is a threat of contamination of the Gwynn Falls tributary. It is also likely that toxic gases are escaping into neighboring basements. *WW*pW Choosing a Strategy for the Superfund System A Two-Part Strategy . Generic Strategic Goals .. . . ATiiSSSSSr.r 4 Etfe<;,ive Funding Levels. .... Coping With Uncertainty Funding Increases Over Time Spending by Responsible Parties Matching Funds From States .. Other Uses of Superfund * rogram Duration and Equity Financing Superfund. Goal 2: Accurate Estimates of the National Problc TL al M : . Inltia r Res P° nses all Priority Sites . . The Nature of Initial Responses in the Two-Part StVateev 8> Economic Issues.... . 2 in , Goal 4: Implementation Needs ol Resolve the " Technical Staffs, Support, and Oversight Detailed Strategic Planning Public Participation. List of Tables Tpble No. 2 2 Page 37 39 40 48 49 50 51 52 52 53 53 54 55 56 57 -1. Summary Comparison of Several Miinr Pinor>r-;„ c l Pa s e -2. Summary ofSta.e Waste-End Tax/FeTsyCr § Srogram provides flexibility to respond to new information and experiences. • An alternate view is that the early lessons learned from Superfund can be applied now to change the program, and that enough information has been collected to define a more explicit stiategy for policy and progiam implementation. OTA has examined the accomplishments of the Superfund program to date. Some signifi¬ cant changes have already been made. Al¬ though EPA is discussing still more changes in the progiam and has made some proposals, it is not possible at this time to know what changes will be made and, importantly, how they will be implemented. 1 Thus, a critical 'For example, on (an. 28, 1905, EPA announced proposed revi¬ sions in Superfund's National Conlinge icy Plan; the public has an opportunity to respond to the proposal and, hence, it is not known what changes will finally be made. One of the mapir changes resembles what OTA has stressed in the first part of choice for Congress centers around how much confidence it and the public have in EPA's determination and institutional capabilities to improve the Superfund program in an evolu¬ tionary manner. The situation is complicated by Superfund’s relationship to other national issues. For exam¬ ple, increases in Superfund budgets are related to national budgetary and fiscal issues and the state of the economy. It is inevitable that Super¬ fund will be compared to the progress of Re¬ source Conservation and Recovery Act (KCRA), enacted in 1976, the other major Federal envi¬ ronmental program that deals with hazardous waste. Congress recentlv culminated extensive examinations of the RCRA program with a re¬ authorization that includes substantial changes in its policy and implementation. It is not clear whether the Superfund program could evolve into a more effective program in a smoother fashion than RCRA has, but it might. Many of the findings of this study support the second view—that it is time to change the Superfund program—because: 1) proceeding with the current program poses significant uncertainties and risks, and 2) the absence of an explicit Superfund strategy makes it diffi¬ cult for Congress to evaluate the long-term con¬ sequences of important decisions. There are three concerns with continuing with the current program. First, a program fo¬ cused on site-specific problems and needs does not necessarily lead to a national program that the two-part strategy: quickly taking more effective initial re¬ sponses at NPL sites, without requiring State matching funds unless the facility was owned by the State. However, there re¬ mains considerable emphasis on using removal for redisjjosal Another change would be the circumvention of the Hazard Kanx- ing System, which OTA believes could be improved, for sites where health effects were known to be importart Other changes concerning cleanup goals and public participation do not fully address the problems OTA found. 37 - 33 • Superfund Stratepy is effective environmentally and economically. This study indicates that as the National Pri¬ orities List (NPL) increases (even if only to EPA’s projected 2.000 site level), it will no longer bo efficient or effective for the program to respond to problems that capture public af- tentior on a site-by-site basis. Nor is it prudent to ignore inter-site effects. The technical and institutional complexities of individual uncon¬ trolled site problems should not overshadow the interlocking technical, social, and econom¬ ic components of the national Superfund sys¬ tem. Conflicts arise between the needs of in¬ dividual sites and the limits on a national program. The future will demand a thoroughly discussed and explicit Superfur.d strategy. Second, there is evidence that the scope of tae national uncontrolled site problem has been underestimated. If this is true, an unmanage¬ able environmental crisis might occur years or deca les from now. I he environmental deficit created today could come due in the future. Manv cleanups in the current remedial cleanup piogram are costly and. because they are not effecti\e in the long term, all too frequently need repeated expensive work at the same sites or on tne same wastes. Detailed national cleanup goals or a process to achieve them and to se¬ lect cleanup technologies and evaluate their performance have not been formulated. In the absence of goals, the least costly alternative may look effective because of the wav the cleanup requirements are set. Even best avail¬ able technology may not be able to achieve ade¬ quate or effective environmental protection at some sites over the long term (see chapter 4). Third, many, if not most, uncontrolled sites have not received significant cleanup attention of any sort other than removal of waste. This may get worse as more sites arc added to the , L - ,f is ,lkel - v every site which merits placement on the NPL. because it is found to require a long-term (i.e., permanent) remedial cleanup, would also f ,*nefit from an initial re¬ sponse to: 1 ) provide environmental protection during the long time it is awaiting remedial cleanup, and 2) ensure that the site does not get worse during this period. While it may be suggested that some sites may not need initial responses, the benefits of doing so for all NPL sites, if the costs are kept low, are likely to outweigh the costs of not doing so. However, a case can be made for continu¬ ing with the current Superfund program. Chap¬ ter 3 shows that, to the extent that the interim strategy modeled by OTA approximates the current program, there are conditions under which the current program can be viewed in a positive manner. Much depends on the val¬ ues (or the average impermanence factor (de¬ scribed in chapters 1 and 3) for the remedial cleanup technologies now being used it has not been possible for OTA to obtain data on a large number of current Superfund sites to calculate values for the impermanence factor (i.e., basically the extent of unfor seen future costs). However, detailed umrk on several case studies of Superfund sites (see chapter 1), an analysis of future operating and maintenance costs (see chapter 3). and the conclusion that containment and land disposal technologies are not permanently effective.* indicate that rather high impermanence factors are possi¬ ble for many sites. OTA believes that the cur¬ rent program’s average impermanence factor is likely to be at least 0.5 to 0.7. If this is the case, then the two-part strategy defined below oflers time and probably cost advantages over the current program. If the average impermanence factor were to be low. say about 0.1 or 0.2 (i.e., remedial clean¬ ups that had a low probability of leading to un¬ foreseen future costs), then a decision to con¬ tinue with the current program would not lead to undesirable consequences. Adopting the two-part strategy would still be a valid option, however, because of the opportunities it affords for institution building, for quickly reducing risk at most sites through initial responses, and because low impermanence actions of the in¬ terim strategy could also be used. If, however the current program continued and it became clear that the average impermanence factor was high, much money and time could be wasted cM*tr U..V v.wiiKress. umcKol Technology Assessment Tech- Z'i'oi"" "•'•'■lous IV.MS Con- ■ 1 Ch. 2—Policy Options • 39 OTA concludes that, in the face of important uncertainties, the two-part strategy is less risky and more fail-safe than Superfund’s current ad hoc strategy and less likely to result in meifec- tive spending. For all these reasons, OTA finds that: 1) even though some sites are being worked on, from a national perspective the current strategy can be judged to be both environmentally and eco¬ nomically unsound; and 2) the two-part or per¬ manent strategy OTA has examined oilers a number of advantages. A Two-Part Strategy The two parts of OTA’s strategy overlap in time, but differ in their focus and priorities. (1) In the near-term, for perhaps up to 15 years, the strategy would focus on: a) earl\ identification and assessment of potential NPL sites, b) initial responses to reduce near-term threats at all NPL sites and to prevent sites from getting worse, c) permanent remedial cleanups for some especially threatening sites, and d) developing of institutional capabilities for a long-term program (see below). A substan¬ tially larger Superfund program would be needed in the next 5 years to carry out these efiorts. Initial responses that accomplish the most cost- effective and significant reduction ot risks and prevent sites from getting worse might cost about $1 million for most sites. 1 his is three times the current cost of immediate removal actions and about 10 percent of EPA s cun ent- ly projected remedial cleanup costs. Case stud¬ ies by OTA and others find that both immediate removals and remedial cleanups are ineffective for their intended purposes. Under the two-part strategy initial responses would emphasize covering sites and temporarily storing wastes and contaminated materials to reduce ground- water contamination and, where technically and economically feasible, excavating wastes to minimize releases into the environment. (II) Over the longer term, the strategy would perform more extensive site studies and locus on permanent cleanups, when they are tech¬ nically feasible, at sites that pose significant threats to human health and the environment (unless private or State-funded cleanup actions offering comparable protection have taken place). These cleanups would draw on the in¬ stitution building that occurreo during the first phase. Spending large sums before specific cleanup goals are set and before permanent cleanup technologies are available leads to a false sense of security, a potential ior incon- sistent cleanups nationwide, and makes little environmental or economic sense. This two-part strategy resembles what is sometimes done in the current program. For example, in the case of the sites in Missouri contaminated by dioxin, large amounts of con¬ taminated soil may be temporarily stored un¬ til cost-effective permanent solutions become available. Testing and evaluation of permanent solutions are proceeding. One of EPA’s most experienced Superfund contractors has proposed a strategy almost identical to this one: Realizing that there are significant shortfalls in or current knowledge oi destruction tech¬ nologies and that permanent containment is not a solution, I propose the following strat¬ egy: Destroy what contamination we can and hold the rest in temporary containment until a permanent solution can be found. Similarly, another of EPA’s major Superfund contractors has cited the need for a two-phase approach: At these complex sites, although not widely recognized, there are typically two distinct phases or remediation. The first is an imme¬ diate action which usually lasts from 1 to 2 years. This phase is very site-specific and is very effective for the amount of money spent in that it dramatically and quickly reduces the threat to public health. The second is a com¬ plex and expensive long-term action which could last from 2 to 20 years or even 30 years." •William A. Wallace. CH2M Hill. Inc., testimony at hearings before the House Subcommittee on Commerce. Transportation, and Tourism. 1983. Serial No. 98-128. ‘Gary A. Dunbar. Camp Dresser & McKee Inc., testimony at hearings before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, I rans- portation. and Tourism. 1983. Serial No. 98-128. - 40 • Superfund Strategy Generic Strategic Goals OTA suggests four major goals that the two- part strategy or indeed any strategy for a long¬ term Superfund program should be able to meet: 1. Provide nationally effective, long-term pro¬ tection of public health and the environ¬ ment at the lowest possible cost from the threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. 2. Rapidly identify all uncontrolled sites and avoid underestimating the national clean¬ up problem. Use site selection criteria for the NPL that are consistent with the first goal. 3. Assure the public that they are being pro¬ tected while they wait for remedial clean¬ ups. That is, in the near-term give the high¬ est priority to providing initiaJ responses at all NPL sites in order to quickly and sharply mitigate immediate threats to pub- lie health and the environment. 4. Address the institutional needs of a long¬ term program. For example, develop and demonstrate the effectiveness of new per¬ manent cleanup technologies, improve in¬ stitutional capabilities of Federal and State agencies, resolve scientific uncertainties, improve public participation in decision¬ making, and develop a detailed strategic plan to implement a decades-long effective Superfund program. OTA finds that the present program falls short ol meeting these goals. Discussion of these goals, the means for their implementa¬ tion. and the policy issues they raise are given below. References are made to the findings and conclusions of other chapters which the reader can consult for further details. GOAL 1: COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE NATIONAL PROTECTION Because of urgency and limited resource' the initial Superfund program has fallen shor of providing comprehensive and effective pre tection. This is probably a consequence of th original emergency nature of the program Fo example, contrary to the statutory mandate sites that pose threats to the environment bu not to human health do not enter the Super fund system. A different strategy respondin' to the same conditions and constraints migfr have brought such sites into the program, but with a different priority and management ap proach. Loss of natural resources and effect' on sensitive elements of the ecosystem, impor¬ tant in themselves, may also lead to substan- ial indirect effects on human health and wel- tare. Even for threats to human health the current system is likely to exclude sites that threaten relatively small numbers of people bites that pose uncertain long-term health ef¬ fects may not be given as high a priority as less ambiguous acute effects. Congress can meet this goal through clear pol¬ icy directives, provision of adequate budgets, and effective oversight of Federal programs. A Long-Term Program A most important policy issue for Congress to consider is whether Superfund should be continued as a long-term program. If so, the initial steps would include directing EPA to plan for a long-term program and providing it with resources to implement a multi-decade program. Without a commitment to long-term lunding, comprehensive protection based on a long-term strategy will be difficult to achieve Therefore. Congress might reconsider the current approach of authorizing Superfund for 5-year periods. Should a longer period than 5 years be used for authorization, budgeting could still be done for shorter periods based on the scope ol the national problem and the progress of the program. - ' r-'-f-'- ■ V " ", -v* ^ V- .1 * iV“'*:r . { x- S-* *• jwyarBtgp**; , C/7. 2—Policy Options • 41 Funding Levels Based on the analyses in chapters 3 and 5, OTA concludes that a multi-decade Superfund program could easily require about $100 bil¬ lion of Superfund resources out of total costs to the Nation of several hundred billion dollars. Note that an NPL considerably smaller than 10,0u0 sites would not alter OTA’s principal conclusions about the need for an improved, better defined Superfund strategy encompass¬ ing well understood cleanup goals and the de¬ velopment of new technologies effective over the long term. (See chapter 5 for derivation of the 10,000-site figure.) The estimate of the costs to Superfund con¬ tains many uncertainties. Consequently, the estimate could be too high or too low' depend¬ ing on: • The number of sites that qualify for the NPL. —OTA’s estimate that 5,000 solid waste sites (RCRA Subtitle D sites) may be¬ come future Superfund sites might be low; this figure is only about 1 percent of OTA’s estimate of the Nation’s open and closed solid waste sites. Moreover, improving the site-selection process by, for example, removing the cutoff score for NPL placement and recognizing en¬ vironmental threats, might lead to more than the 2,000 additional sites estimated by OTA. OTA did not include in its esti¬ mate of future uncontrolled sites several categories which even now are being ad¬ dressed by Superfund and which will al¬ most surely increase in number. Exam¬ ples are leaking underground storage tanks, mining waste sites, and pesticide contamination sites. —However, it is also possible that OTA may have overestimated the number of sites to be placed on the NPL. In particu¬ lar, perhaps groundw'ater problems and threats from solid waste facilities have been overstated. With EPA’s current groundwater protection strategy, many aquifers may not be classified so as to require cleanup; this possibility deserves detailed examination by Congress. National cleanup goals and the costs of cleanup. —National cleanup goals might lead to levels of cleanup that would be more ex¬ pensive than indicated by experience so far, and cleanup costs for treatment of wastes may be underestimated. Waste treatment costs are typically two to eight times greater than the immediate costs for land disposal. But the costs of waste treatment technologies may decrease be¬ cause of technological innovation, and savings may be realized from learning curve and economy-of-scale effects. —Furthermore, the costs of groundwater cleanup are very uncertain. Groundwa¬ ter problems exist at more than three- quarters of current NPL sites although fewer sites than that may eventually need groundwater cleanup. Experience ubth groundwater cleanup is scanty and costs may be extraordinarily high, de¬ pending on cleanup goals. —Finally, a 10,000-site NPL resulting, in part, from increased site identification efforts might include some sites with far higher cleanup costs than are now typi¬ cal; for example, very large solid w'aste landfills which contaminate important aquifers, very large mining waste sites, and deep injection wells. 5 » The size of expenditures by private parties and States. —To date, expenditures by private parties and the States have contributed signifi¬ cantly to cleanup (although cost recovery has been extremely low so far). These contributions are discussed below, and could increase or decrease in the future depending on several factors, also dis¬ cussed below. In particular, under cur¬ rent policies that require matching funds “There are now about 700 deep injection wells which could be receiving hazardous wastes but lor which there are not Fed¬ eral requirements tor monitoring nearby underground sources of drinking water. MS T'St ..•HMk* Mi*a %Vl» * VI i 42 • Superfund Strategy from the Stales, some States may not provide these funds and consequently nZnT r S i teS may not « et cleaned up under (he Federal program. Coping With Uncertainty . .^ * S , no ana| yhc way to resolve all uncer¬ tainty. Chapter 3 addresses the conseouences of making important policy decisions in tne face of uncertainty. OTA’s analysis indicates that there are substantial costs and risks in un¬ derestimating future Superfund needs. Prevcn- lon is far less costly than remedial action w hen ‘ com f s t0 hardens waste problems. Further¬ more, techn-cally speaking it is possible to con¬ ceive of a situation where, as EPA savs, the sys¬ tem could he “overwhelmed.” Simply out releases of hazardous substances from many uncontroHed sues could cause pollution so uidespread that ,t would either be technically r P red S r b 6 ’ C °' tIy - ° r t0 ° Ume-consuming Jress. In particular, contamination of evefET | inki, ' S wa,er - 'indeed il could or be cleaned up. would be an exceedingly expensive and lengthy job. The task is to re- duce risk while developing information and technology to reduce uncertainty. Funding Increases Over Time If OTA is correct that a much larger longer program will De necessary, how might Con- Snn S p f reS , hape S u P e rfund? A much larger tamedia n (u'vT Sr ,h m ' :annot be ira P'™™led immediate y. To the contrary, many of OTA’s findings from case studies and other work (s Pe chapters 5. 6. 7, and 8| indicate that S 1 Thus S aNh n n ed h' ' h ° T™"' ' eVel ° f f ™d- ev'will L H J 8h , V f ry larse ,mi °unts of mot,, ey Will be needed for the nrooram in tu near-lem, funding could be increased gradual^ ZZUfr are dare '°P ad a " d i-Wutto fal c l mt io„ S ‘fTr ed ' T, " S is « to|»rlam di- OTA Th r two-part strategy examined by urA. The first par! of the strategy might Jas , ch P ao,erV earS ' °T Vs "odd bapter 3, a period of lb years is used but this .gore should no, be regarded as certafn or as Od.) A major uncertainty during part one ol the strategy is how fast sites are added to the N1 L this will determine, to a large degree an- esv !Si need E' THe SeC ° nd parl of ,he strat¬ egy, with its emphasis on permanent cleanuDs might last for as long as 30 to 40 years The m i’ costsoMe inti6S at l deanUP «° als -d the on goals P ' ' C ° SlS dependin S -n pari For example, under the two-part strateev abouillEn 8 l, bU ' ld “ P ‘ r0m cu ™" levels of about $300 million to $400 million annually to perhaps $800 million for the first year of the and $^R e Mr ’ $1 r 2 b p on for the second year und Si.b billion for the third year. Afterwards unding imght be stabilized at about $2 billion to $3 billion per year to address more costly wl™n n a 8 tnV1 eanUP , S : These fi 8ures would re- $10 1 Slin! r spending of about $7 billion to fj° b,1!lon . for a 5-year period. These near-term 3nnUal Spendin g ara very large But the efforts stressed in the first part of the strategy are those that EPA is best able to im F t eqUire fevver te ^nical sperial- bd " tbe later Period with its emphasis on remedial cleanups rather than initial responses Moreover as discussed later, these figures would inc.ude significant sums devoted to im¬ proving institutional capabilities. Spending by Responsible Parties Higher levels of cost recovery and non-Fed- eral spending are likely in the future. Even so projections of future Superfund needs seem tions y Q • r*. j,.; 44 • Superfund Strategy gest that money alone does not explain the dif¬ ficulties some States have in supplying match¬ ing funds to clean up Superfund sites. Therefore, a policy change may he viewed as unnecessary because many States have the potential to supply the matching funds; indeed, a number of States have developed a variety of means to do so. Moreover, the obligation currently placed on the States to pay for all future operating and maintenance costs pro¬ vides considerable incentive to use either lower cost initial responses or moie permanent rem¬ edies rather than containment at the site. The reasons why some States have been less enthusiastic about helping to pay for Superfund cleanups include: a) spending priorities that give cleanups low rank; b) uncertainty about the Federal program, with a “wait-and-see” at¬ titude about changes in the matching funds re¬ quirement; c) dissatisfaction with the Federal program and the States' limited role in deciding policy; dj conflicts among State agencies and between legislatures and executive branches that result in inaction; e) the influence of haz¬ ardous waste-related industries ou State deci¬ sionmaking or the perceptions of potential neg- ati\e impacts on industry; and f) obstacles to establishing highly technical programs, such as limits on salaries or hiring freezes. Other Uses of Superfund It must be emphasized that OTA has consid¬ ered only the hazardous waste site cleanup function of Superfund in estimating future needs. Should other major uses be mandated for this program, such as for victims compen¬ sation or cleanups of Federal sites, these would have to be taken into account. Moreover, OTA has not considered uncontrolled sites under the responsibility of Federal agencies which, al¬ though placed on the NPL, do not now quali¬ fy for funding from Comprehensive Environ¬ mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Program Duration and Equity Program duration is an important factor and it probably will become more of an issue. It will likely take several decades to address even a 2,000-site NPL. OTA has assumed that about 50 years is the longest practical program, but it is not clear how the public will respond to such a long program. In developing the two-part strategy, OTA stresses the importance of taking initial re¬ sponses that are effective in managing imme¬ diate risks, but that, in most cases, are not cleanups. Nevertheless, there is an inherent tension in a program that places priority on tak¬ ing initial responses at all sites, while most sites wait a long time for permanent cleanup. This is why it is necessary to develop detailed plans to decide when sites receive a permanent cleanup, to develop goals to decide whether all sites need perrm n- nt cleanup, and to involve the public early in tne entire process, from site identification through initial response and re¬ medial cleanup. Some may view an iiit a! period w here few permanent cleanups occur as unacceptable. Hut there are two basic reasons to support this appioach. I irst, it is both technically and eco¬ nomically impossible to permanently clean up all sites—even for an NPL of only 2.000 sites— in the near term, certainly nut w ithin 20years. Cost-effective permanent cleanup technologies for some problems do not yet exist; ‘here is not enough information on most sites to make deci¬ sions about permanent cleanup; there are no detailed national cleanup goals; and there are not enough people to implement a large per¬ manent cleanup effort. Second, the current Superfur d program does not offer equity, as it assures neither rapid re¬ duction of risk at all NPL sites nor permanently effective cleanups. Furthermore, the way par¬ ticular sites are chosen for cleanup in the cur¬ rent program is not clear. EPA has said that the hazard ranking scores given sites as part of the site selection process for the NPL do not establish exact priorities for responses. How¬ ever, according to EPA’s latest data on the 538 NPL sites the site scores seem to have an ef¬ fect; for example, 30 percent of all sites on the NPL are receiving some type of remedial at¬ tention, but out of the top 50 ranked sites GO percent are receiving attention. For the next I • . Ch. 2—Policy Options • 45 V 50 sites, 40 percent are receiving attention and for the remainder just over 20 percent. This mav be viewed with some concern because of Seisms of the Hazard Ranking System (HRS). 6 There is evidence that decisions to take ac¬ tion at a site also depend on which L A Re gion the site is in, the resources available from fhe State, the ability of the local community to present a forceful case for_ action and new s media attention. The time it takes for EPA to get responsible parties to agree m payor clean up may also have some effect, nut perhaps more on thenature of the cleanup than on when takes place. Financing Superlund This study has focused on estimating future needs rather than on analyzing how to raise funds for the program. In suggesting to Con¬ gress that a much larger, longer Superlund pr - gram mav be necessary. OTA is sensitive to broader financing issues. A mu’tmilhon dolla Superfund program raises issues about poten tial impacts on the national economy and the 'TTrThTntt.r 5 Also • Workshop on Selection of Hazardous Waste sSK Su|»ri,,nJ F„nd,n S .' U.S.S«,.»~n Appropriations, March 1982. Federal budget which are beyond OTA’s capa¬ bilities to examine. When Congress was considering CERCLA, various financing mechanisms were exaimned for Superfund. In 1980, Congress adopted a tax on chemical and petroleum feedstocks supple¬ mented by general tax revenues. Discussmas on the extension and expansion of Superlund have examined a number of other approaches. OTA has analyzed only one of these, a tax on the generation and/or the management of new¬ ly produced hazardous wastes-generally re¬ ferred to as a “waste-end tax. I his approac was considered but judged unworkable inA 80. A brief comparison of the feedstock tax was. end tax, and general tax revenues as funding sources for Superfund is given in table 2 1. Note that there are limits to the amount of money that could be ^sed fro™ waste-end taxes, perhaps SI billion to S~ bi lion annually from both. Feedstock taxes raise concerns about adverse secondary impacts cu industry, such as a loss of internalJ.°^ x baTe petitiveness. With a waste-end tax, will gradually shrink as waste reduction efforts proceed. Thus, although a combination o! al hree sources is possible, a larger Superfund program increases the likelihood ol reliance on general tax revenues to a greater extent or Table 2-1.— Summary Comparison of Several Maj or Financing Schemes Feedstockjaxj_ "Currem Expanded Fairness: Very few companies pay most of the taxes Admlnistrabillty: Easy, establisheo Improved Probably easy Good, many parties pay Probably easy on basis of States experience Improved if land disposal gets high tax Possibly more enforcement necessary General tax revenues 0 Parties most directly responsible for problems do not bear burden Very easy None likely Provides economic incen¬ tive to reduce wastes and shift away from land disposal, thus capacity to raise basic revenue declines With large amount may have undesirable effect on Federal budget Secondary impacts: None apparent Might reduce international competitiveness of some companies ___. ---- and n u ni' of materials taxed SOUHCE 0«>c« o' Tecfv>o*>>e''l 46 • Superfuncl Strategy adopting some new, broadly based tax. This also becomes more likely if non-cleanup uses of Superfund are mandated. Waste-End Tax Approach OTA examined the waste-end tax option be¬ cause it concluded in its 1983 report on haz¬ ardous waste that a waste-end tax was an im¬ portant option to deal with the national hazardous waste problem. Its importance stems from its potential to generate funds while it serves as an economic incentive to reduce waste generation and shift management away from land disposal. However, to use a waste- end tax as an economic incentive, the tax must be structured carefully. This means varying tax rates depending on the nature of the waste, the way it is managed, or both. Moreover, the tax rates must be sufficiently high to act as an eco¬ nomic incentive. This requires an understand¬ ing of current market conditions and manage¬ ment policies. Many of the original objections to using the waste-end tax have less force today. Because of the gradual development of the RCRA pro¬ gram, many States have found it practical to use a waste-end tax. OTA, ERA, and others have concluded that a Federal waste-end tax could be made administratively manageable. 7 For example, for the past several years ERA found that State income from waste-end taxes as a percent of projected revenues were: Cali¬ fornia, 89 percent; Connecticut, 71 percent; Il¬ linois, 83 percent; Ohio, 98 percent; Minnesota, 102 percent; New Hampshire, 107 percent; New York, 101 percent; and South Carolina, 96 percent. For comparison, ERA reports that collections from the feedstock tax ranged from 78 to 84 percent of projected revenues from 1980 to 1983. 8 But there remain different viewpoints on whether to structure the tax to provide an eco- ’U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Policy Anal¬ ysis. “Survey of States' Experience With Waste-End Taxes." Sep¬ tember 1984; Howard |. Hoffman, "Workability of the Waste- End Tax," testimony before the House Ways and Means Com¬ mittee, July 25, 1984. •"Survey of States' Experiences With Waste-End Taxes,” op. cit. nomic incentive for changing waste generation and management practices, or to use it simply to generate revenues. OTA has concluded that the benefits of using a waste-end tax for pre¬ venting more Superfund problems are likely to outweigh the costs of implementing such a measure. It is possible to structure a waste-end tax both to raise substantial revenues in the near-term and to act as an economic incentive to modify waste disposal practices and reduce waste generation. To act as an economic incentive, that is, to affect waste generation and waste management practices significantly, tax rates would have io be about $30 to $50 per ton of hazardous waste. This is because of the current costs faced by waste generators: about $50 to $100 per ton for most land disposal, and usually from $200 to $800 per ton for waste treatment. Most of the 20 States that have adopted waste-end taxes have relatively low rates (see table 2-2). Only six States have maximum tax rates high enough to significantly affect waste disposal practices. The States have not encountered major prob¬ lems in implementing waste-end taxes, although at the beginning some States made rather im¬ precise estimates of revenue generation. 9 Note that States are concerned about whether a Fed¬ eral waste-end tax could seriously reduce State sources of revenue. This could be dealt with by explicitly allowing States to have their own waste-end taxes or by providing for a deduc¬ tion to Federal taxpayers for waste-end taxes paid to a State. Several illustrations of a Federal waste-end tax are given in tables 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5. These are based on 1981 EPA data that are imprecise and may not be valid today because the Fed¬ eral RCRA and Superfund programs have in¬ creasingly influenced waste management prac¬ tices. The tax rates chosen were based on industry concerns, the costs of waste manage¬ ment options, and what some States found ef¬ fective. These examples show how the degree of hazard of a waste can be used, and how dif- •For more detail on States' experiences and waste-end taxes, see the EPA report referenced above and testimony of Joel S. Hirschhorn on behalf ot OTA for ’he hearing record of the Sen¬ ate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Sept. 10. 1984. ■ Ch. 2—Policy Options • 47 State Table 2-2.—Summary o' Stale Waste-End Tax/Fee Systems Alabama. California. Colorado. Connecticut Illinois. Indiana. Iowa. Kansas .• Kentucky. Louisiana. Maine . Minnesota. Mississippi •• •■ Missouri New Hampshire New York . Ohio. South Carolina. Tennessee .... Wisconsin. Treated wastes taxed Higher rate for oftsite management ..X .... X. . .X. ..X. . X . . . X . . . X . . X . X . .X. X . X X . .X. .X . .X .. . X . .X X X ?C * pc' ton rate * Mere than one tax rate may t>e t ^ Off we»ght ton c Tie ? percent change on d*soos«* '*:e»o?s •% not metoOed 0 Higher rates may soon be implemented e Basted on ,S62 J-spcsa; charces and b pe-cent cna-ge on disposal receip s SOURCE 0‘iice o< Technology Assessment Generators pay "TT.T7TX. .x. ___x. . x. . X_ . .X. . X . . .X. .X. X. ,x. X X Facility erators pay Highest possible tax rate 3 (per ton) . .X. $10 00 . X. $4566 . X. $ 2 00 $1000 . X. $ 6 60 X. S 1 50 X ... $50 00 . X . S 500 Sll 00 X .. $10 00 s X. $33 00 $70 40 X $ 9 03 ... y. $26 00 1 $36 60 $1200° ... x .. . i 8 99* .. x . . S 7 00 $ 7 00 . . X. $ 0 135 Table 2 - 3 .-Illustration of Applying a Hazardous Waste-End Tax by Management Activity Tax category _ Weil injected waste. All other b land disposed waste- Treated waste. Annual Quantity 3 (mill'On metric tons! 32 0 22 -5 1760 Total revenue^. • • • • • • a Waste Qt,»»t.t.e» CM» from Hibonr Su-e, o' HsfanKius Waste &»-> 9 ratr oared 'or the EPA by Westat rnc April ’ rC-i t Landfills. sort ace impoundments land appneatron, etc Sceii.'ioT _Sce nario 2 _ » ra te Revenue 1 Tax c ateg ory_ Tax rate Lend disposal* excluding well Injection: . $50'tonne . $10/tonne Well Infection: ■ 1 . $ 5/tonne > 1 . $ 3/tonne Total revenue . * W«l* Qu*r ""-«5 a*,, Ifom -Ntnon* o' W«'e Go-wralO'S *r<3 ' !w t>* IPX 6, WMli! l->C Ap-.i 1<*4 V,.»!« o„i->l,ly ctv>s.<2*-Jt,ocJ Scenario 1 -■ Scenario 2 Quantity 6 Revenue ($ mi (lions) Quantity 6 " Revenue ($ million <0 1 $ 1.5 180 S 900 0 21.1 211 0 3.0 300 0 0 6 1 305 26 1 783 20 0 60 0 < 1.020 te«i(T»ot s>i„ ’Te fc» D.-OOMI Fac'inw* R*j u i*i«j ura*. RC«A in ) Jo: i-uvsrv] ~ c 1- ?!'' “«r “**'« !o = ’ c «'•«"» so Ouan „.«. 4 on , t0 . „oo, ,<>,* 0 , seosal outlines So^ev *5 ajI1S *'r> SvtH*Cl »0 9fdlr)ltC«l reH&bility MSumptiOn) " :::::: ^ 100 000 ,on ''«* 01 - 1 « —-«-«•—.»«*« 0 >,. n 0 ..*= c i.gnpd - 0 »n».»i.o , I»nn O'»oon.( *fm ««* 1J8I 0**'«'Mt'O'>s f, ° m '*>• *«*«• «M «« NO 102 May 25 1983 Ptopcmo b o1 . 5 only trvose »«stes a p'oocsega report t&q quality of ^ c ^ -•ponaoi. Qua-.M, of 1 «na.n 5 La^O i.ls »u .ace ia*>Q at»c>*»cafetc v SOU^CF Off* of TfrCft''o*Ofly A$sos^eet ferent types of waste management can be taxed. Where judgments have been necessary, OTA has used data that reduce revenue estimates in its examples. One way to deal with estimates that might be overly optimistic and with a trend toward increasing waste reduction and shifting awav from land disposal is. within limits, to steadily increase the tax rate (as California has done). For example, the tax rate lor each cate¬ gory might be increased by 10 percent annually until some limit was reached. Reducing the Generation of Hazardous Wastes If a waste-end tax is successful as an econom¬ ic incentive, the tax base will shrink over lime as less waste is produced and as it is managed in more desirable ways. Thus, a waste-end tax to raise money for Superfund has limits. Never¬ theless, the more serious the national uncon¬ trolled site Toblem is perceived to be. the stronger is 2 reason to use an approach that will reduct le number of new uncontrolled sites. To a 1. ge degree, the need to encourage waste reduction has been better recognized by some States than by the Federal Government. A handful of States (e.g.. Massachusetts, Il¬ linois, North Carolina, and Minnesota) have started efforts to foster waste reduction, par¬ ticularly by smaller companies. Most of these efforts emphasize information and technology transfer, and local technical assistance. The connection between hazardous waste reduc¬ tion and the Supertund program is likely to be¬ come sharper if the program is seen more as a long-term, high-cost effort. GOAL 2: ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL PROBLEM The importance of accurate estimates of the national cleanup problem for planning pur¬ poses is discussed in chapter 3. Substantial risks and penalties result if the problem is un¬ derestimated; for example, if loo small a future NPL is assumed, or if the future costs of im¬ permanent cleanups are ignored, or if the costs of more permanent cleanups are underesti¬ mated. The findings in chapter 5 on future NPL sites, the case studies given in chapter 1 and elsewhere, chapter 4 on the difficulties of de¬ veloping national cleanup goals, chapter (3 on the limitations of current cleanup technologies, chapter 7 on problems in implementing the 'ax-*- wr.r ' program, and chapter 8 on the effects of limited public participation in the current program all provide much support for concluding that most estimates about the current program’s effec¬ tiveness and about future needs have been overly optimistic. While information to support policy debates is often incomplete, the situation for Superfund is particularly vexing because of the combina¬ tion of perceived environmental threats and the high costs of the program. Specific options for Congress to consider are: • Direct EPA to examine and assess poten¬ tial cleanup problems at solid waste facil¬ ities. Not only can this provide more ac¬ curate figures on future Superfund needs, but a reassessment of RCRA’s Subtitle D program for solid waste facilities could lead to stronger Federal regulations to help prevent the formation ol more uncon¬ trolled sites. The greatest immediate need is to monitor groundwater near such fa¬ cilities lor a full range of hazardous sub¬ stances. • Direct EPA to reexamine its RCRA Sub¬ title C regulatory program for hazardous waste facilities, particularly the effective¬ ness of its groundwater protection stand¬ ards for land-based facilities, and to assess the number of future NPL sites likely to come from this source. This work would C/7. 2—Policy Options • 49 also bear on the problem of redisposing Superfund wastes at these RCRA facilities. • Direct EPA to develop a comprehensive plan consistent with Goal 1 to redesign its system of identifying, assessing, and rank¬ ing sites. The plan should include efforts to identify sites, develop a revised Hazard Ranking System, reevaluate the concept of an arbitrary cutolf score for NPL place¬ ment, and include environmental threats. An assessment of how such changes would affect the size of the NPL should be given to Congress, including an analysis of dif¬ ferences among EPA Regions and States. • Direct EPA to assess the impacts on the NPL if Superfund were to address other types of uncontrolled sites. This option and tne immediately preceding option would give Congress a more detailed and accurate projection of the future NPL than is now available. • Direct EPA to provide, for any approach it uses to establish national cleanup goals, an assessment of the impacts on future types, costs, and times for cleanups. • Direct EPA to assess the potential magni¬ tude of cleaning up contaminated ground- water associated with NPL sites, the ex¬ tent to which it is technically feasible to restore contaminated aquifers, the need for innovative cleanup technologies, and the possible costs of such actions. GOAL 3: INITIAL RESPONSES AT ALL PRIORITY SITES An important aspect of the early Superfund program was its ability to respond quickly to emergencies and high risk conditions. For un¬ controlled sites. EPA has used emergency ac¬ tions. immediate removals, planned removals, surface removals, and interim remedial meas¬ ures to achieve rapid responses. Although these have generally been effective in addressing some threats, there have been several undesir¬ able effects: 1) in most cases wastes and con¬ taminated materials have been removed for re¬ disposal at operating hazardous waste facilities which may themselves become Superfund sites in the future, or they have been left at the site; 2) in some cases these actions have made it more difficult or costly to achieve a permanent cleanup; and 3) often a mistaken impression is conveyed that the site has received a cleanup when in fact it has simply been controlled to some extent and will need further attention. •» i i'.» t rj mmflmi , » "» a n;<■»» : w . ’ ip»r, s n < war «! K- .. m mj. m gw c M t r * ~r*'* rnr 50 • Superfund Strategy As discussed previously, OTA stresses the importance of conducting initial responses at all NPL sites. Congress may wish to consider a specific legislative mandate to EPA that with¬ in a prescribed period of perhaps 1 year from being placed on the NPL, an initial response must be initiated for each site. Such a provi¬ sion should not be used, however, to limit the size of the NPL. The Nature of Initial Responses in the Two-Part Strategy How would the initial responses envisioned in the two-part or permanent strategy differ from existing approaches? Initial responses should be clearly recognized to have a high im¬ permanence factor; that is, they are not likely to be permanent cleanup remedies, although in a few cases they may be so judged when bet¬ ter information on the site exposures and ad¬ verse effects is obtained. The two primary ob¬ jectives of any initial response are: 1) to rapidly and sharply reduce exposures to hazardous substances, and 2) to stop the site from deteri¬ orating while it is awaiting remedial cleanup. Initial responses should offer low-cost immedi¬ ate protection, generally in the range of $500,000 to $2 million per site. Initial responses include: excavating wastes and contaminated materials to prevent migra¬ tion of hazardous substances into the environ¬ ment; onsite or offsite, above ground tem¬ porary storage of wastes; detoxification or destruction of wastes; pumping and barriers to contain groundwater contamination; covers, caps, and enclosures to prevent contact be¬ tween the site surface and water, air, and peo¬ ple; and environmental monitoring. Some of these actions, such as excavation and waste treatment, are costly and should be used only where they offer substantial benefits. Removal to and redisposal of wastes and contaminated soil or water at land-based hazardous waste fa¬ cilities should be prohibited, except in the most unusual situations. Because of the steady im¬ pacts of the RCRA program on increasing the costs of land disposal and limiting its use, costs of initial responses may fall below the costs of removal followed by redisposal in land disposal facilities. In the current program, actions called remov¬ als do not necessarily include removal of wastes or contaminated materials from the site. Other actions, alone or in combination with re¬ moval, are also taken, lor example, onsite con¬ tainment of all or some wastes. Containment is often ineffective, may exacerbate groundwa¬ ter contamination, and may have to be fol¬ lowed by further containment work or removal prior to remedial cleanup. Removal and redis¬ posal are more common for sites not on the NPL, where further remedial cleanup is not an¬ ticipated, but these sites may not have been fully evaluated and may later qualify f or place¬ ment on the NPL. An effective initial response should consider the extent to which present and future expo¬ sures are reduced, under the assumption that no further action may take place for some years. For example, if the site is exposed to water intrusion, partially draining or building berms around a surface impoundment contain¬ ing liquid waste is unlikely to be effective be¬ cause of the potential for repeated overflows. Nor will removing some surface waste and contaminated soil be effective at a landfill ex¬ posed to rain it other contaminants can reach groundwater. Waste removal and excavation, temporary storage, and surface capping and covering can be mere effective and might be viewed as simply common sense. In exceptional circumstances, it may be nec¬ essary to take risk management actions that do not deal with the site itself. For example, alter¬ native supplies of v/ater may be supplied or residents may be temporarily or permanently relocated. While these are appropriate risk management options for some situations, for some sites they are not necessarily substitutes for addressing the site itself. Problems With Removal Redisposal The chief reason why OTA finds removal for redisposal at RCRA facilities inappropriate is that these sites themselves are likely to become Ch. 2—Policy Options • 51 uncontrolled sites even it they aie in compli¬ ance with RCRA regulations and standaids, which often they are not. 10 ERA agrees that Superfund wastes have been brought to leak¬ ing RCRA facilities. This situation has been de¬ scribed as a “toxic waste merry-go-round.” n Several other aspects of using removals for redisposal merit attention. First, there is little doubt about EPA’s reliance on such removals. In establishing a priority list of 31 activities lor all of EPA during fiscal year 1985. the first pri¬ ority is given as, “Stabilize imminent threats at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites through Superfund removal actions. 12 Second, the head of the Superfund program noted recently that with regard to ihe use of RCRA facilities “the requirement for inspec¬ tion is not applicable to removal actions due to time constraints.” 13 However, it removal is part of a remedial action, an inspection is nec¬ essary if there has not been one within the past 12 months. Third, in EPA’s January 1985 proposal for a revised National Contingency Plan there is evidence that removal for redisposal will not necessarily be limited in the future, for exam¬ ple, EPA gives some examples where RCRA regulations would not be applicable which seem to ignore the basic nature of the waste: 1) a case where RCRA wastes are indiscrimi- ,c 7his conclusion about land disposal sites for Superfund wastes is supported by the analysis in chapter 5 on oiwrating hazardous waste facilities. The recently reauthorized RCRA with its planned prunibition on the land disposal of some hazardous wastes will not necessarily eliminate redisposal. Hie prohibi¬ tions mav not take effect for some years. ERA may also be able to gran, waivers for Superfund wastes, especially for situations where it would take time to verity that the wastes were covered by RCRA prohibitions. "Some companies are making considerable money from waste removals even though they themselves have been responsible parties at Superlund sites. Even though they may not have paid for cleanup, they have been funded by the government to take wastes and dispose of them and. for the Stringfellow and Sey¬ mour sites, the redisposal sites have either been shut down or fined by EPA for substantial violations of existing RCRA regu¬ lations. >'U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, memorandum by Alvin I.. Aim, "Development of Operating Year Guidance for FY 1985 and FY 1986." Nov. 2. 1983. “William N. Hedeman. |r., "The Pursuit of Consistent Deci¬ sionmaking Under Superfund." paper presented at American Bar Association Conference. 1984. nantly disposed on a roadway, anti 2) contami¬ nated riverbeds. Apparently a waste that might be prohibited from land disposal, but which be¬ came a Superfund waste in a transportation ac¬ cident or through purposeful midnight dump¬ ing, could be land disposed, and a river sed¬ iment contaminated with polychlorinated bi¬ phenyls (PCBs) could also be land disposed even though PCBs would not normally be al¬ lowed to be so managed. Finally, it is also stated that interim measures might not have to be consistent with existing standards, If the selected remedy is not the final remedy for the site, it might be impractical or inappropriate to apply other environmental standards. 1 his raises the possibility of Superfund wastes be¬ ing taken to a RCRA facility which is not in compliance with existing regulations. Finally, it should be noted that the States also perform a considerable number ot removal ac¬ tions at uncontrolled sites without the use ol Superfund. Removal of wastes for redisposal is typical for small sites where hazardous materials are easily accessible from the surface. A survey of States performed for EPA found that in 1901 and 1982 for 29 responding States there were 350 immediate removals; there were 106 Federal removals for these same States in that period, and nationwide in that time there were 212 Federal immediate removals. (There are also other types of removals in the Super- fund program.) Better Use of an Improved Hazard Ranking System Choosing the correct initial response is an important decision, which could be helped if the initial site evaluation were improved. Cur¬ rently preliminary assessments, site investiga¬ tions, and the Hazard Ranking System are lim¬ ited to arriving at a score to determine eligi¬ bility for the NPL. There is little linkage be¬ tween the initial hazard assessments and subse¬ quent studies to decide on action at the site. If the early assessment system were improved, it could help determine the appropriate initial response more rapidly. Costly and lengthy studies could be avoided in the first part of the strategy. 52 • Superfund Strategy Technical Issues The widespread use of initial responses would raise several technical issues. To what extent can above ground temporary storage be effec¬ tive? There are a variety of existing technolo¬ gies to store waste in a safe and cost-effective way. For example, containerization as used in transportation and traditional storage of chem¬ icals would be possible for small amounts of waste. Stronger materials with greater corro¬ sion resistance have been developed for such containers. Containers can be placed in struc¬ tures that are protected from the weather. For larger amounts, bulk storage in tanks, vaults, and other structures is possible. Here. too. much conventional storage technology exists in the chemical and petroleum industries. Considerable opportunities to use offsite stor¬ age facilities, perhaps even some constructed on a regional basis to manage Suoerfund wastes, may be possible. Indeed, this may be necessary when there is not enough space at the NFL site. However, the use of off site facil¬ ities raises the issue of public opposition to siting new hazardous waste management fa¬ cilities. as well as problems obtaining RCRA permits for facilities. Furthermore, some States will not want to receive wastes from other States. There is no simple solution to this, but it does suggest that some initial responses may be contingent upon the State or local commu¬ nity providing a site or storage facility for Superfund wastes. Finally, innovative ideas are being developed for temporary storage {see chapter 6). An associated issue is: over what length of time will storage be effective? Any container or storage structure will have some finite en¬ gineering lifetime. Generally speaking, it should be possible to safely store wastes for 5 to 20 years. Moreover, above ground storage provides the important advantage of accessi¬ bility. That is, it is relatively easy to visually inspect containers and structures to detect damage or leakage. Many types of monitoring devices are also available. EPA could develop information on above ground storage and other initial response tech¬ niques for general use by contractors. States, and companies. Some R&D in this area might be warranted. Another issue is waste treatment. Some haz¬ ardous materials might be treated immediately to render them as harmless as possible. Over the past several years there has been consid¬ erable unused waste treatment capacity at many facilities. Furthermore, in some cases it might be cost effective to build onsite treatment facilities immediately; regional treatment facil¬ ities serving the Superfund program are also possible. If initial responses are used for all N'PL sites, it is likely that the private waste treatment industry will respond to the demand. However, this could lead to problems with sit¬ ing new facilities. The issue of determining the extent of an ini¬ tial response is discussed in chapter 4. Simple generic standards could be developed to satisfy the two primary goals of these actions. Economic Issues The advantages of initial responses at all sites depend on keeping the the costs are kept low relative to permanent cleanup costs (see chap¬ ter 3). On average, initial responses should cost about 10 to 20 percent of permanent cleanup costs. If the cost of initial responses are too high, they would resemble the current high- cost impermanent cleanups. Put if the costs are too low, the actions would be no more effec¬ tive than current removal actions. As a result of examining the costs of specif ic technical ac¬ tions (see chapter 6), OTA finds that initial re¬ sponse costs would probably average about $1 million per site. This is about three times greater than the costs of immediate removal ac¬ tions (i.e., an average of $302,000 per action for 165 sites from December 1980 through Feb¬ ruary 1984). Impermanent remedial cleanups (consisting initial remedial measures, sur¬ face cleanups, phase one remedial cleanups, and final remedial cleanups) typically cost from $5 million to $10 million per site, but additional costs may be incurred later. Questions may arise concerning who is re¬ sponsible for operating, maintaining, and mon- - : * • Ch 2—Policy Options • 53 boring an initial response before permanent cleanup is achieved. Since so many NFL sites are likely to receive only initial responses for some time, the public must be assured about several things: 1) that the initial response meas¬ ures are effective, and that there are no signif¬ icant uncertainties about their continued effec¬ tiveness over the limited period of time before cleanup, and 2| that the site will receive a re¬ medial cleanup. Therefore, a policy to assure adequate funds for each site to cover future costs may be necessary. Where possible, these could be obtained from responsible parties. Perhaps the costs of initial responses should not require matching State funds, f urthermore, an explicit program is needed to gather infor¬ mation on the site for remedial cleanup as is a decisionmaking process to determine objec¬ tively the timing of the remedial cleanup. Lastly, there are circumstances that will tend to favor the rapid use of a remedial, permanent cleanup. First, there will be some sites that are so bad that it would be unacceptable to delay permanent cleanup. Second, some responsible parties may want to resolve the cleanup cost issue as soon as possible. Possible specific congressional actions to ad¬ dress Goal 3 are: • Simplify the categories of responses to NFL. sites to initial responses and remedial cleanups. Modify the statute to allow ini¬ tial responses to have costs exceeding $1 million. • Require initial responses at all NFL sites to be initiated within one year of place¬ ment on the NFL. • Require EFA to establish simple generic standards to determine the extent of an in’ tial response by setting goals to deal uith immediate threats and to prevent the s:te from deteriorating. • Require LPA to establish procedures to as¬ sure communities that sites will be se¬ lected for remedial cleanups in an equita¬ ble and objective manner. • Direct EFA to perform an analysis of the potential demand lor new storage and treatment facilities for Superfund wastes and recommend ways to address obstacles to siting and permitting these facilities. GOAL 4: IMPLEMENTATION NEEDS OF A LONG-TERM PROGRAM Because it is almost inevitable that Superfund will be a long-term program. Congress may wish to consider ways to improve the Super- fund delivery system. Resolva the Cleanup Goals Issue and Address Scientific Uncertainties The discussion in chapter 4 on establishing cleanup goals demonstrates the difficulty of re¬ solving the issue of “How clean is clean? It appears necessary' to elevate policymaking on the degree of cleanup to the statutory level and clarify the role of the Federal Government in determining levels of cleanup performed by States and responsible parties. It is vital to obtain more information on health and environmental effects, both laboratory and epidemiological data. Without more complete information, it will be difficult to implement any approach to establish national cleanup goals and determine the magnitude of the na¬ tional problem. Although it is impossible to remove all scientific uncertainty, the goal should he to steadily reduce uncertainties over time. In this regard, although cleanup actions cannot wait indefinitely, the two-part strategy does offer some opportunity to significantly im¬ prove the information base befor r large sums of money are spent. Specific options for congressional consider¬ ation are: • Establish an interagency group (e.g., EPA. Department of Interior, '»nd the Depart¬ ment of Health and Human Services) to re- - 54 • Superfund Strategy port periodically to Congress on the state of information on health and environmen¬ tal effects of uncontrolled sites, gaps in the data base, and proposed means to address these deficiencies. Such an effort would benefit from the participation of people from outside the Federal Government. • Increase spending on laboratory and field research to obtain more data on health and environmental effects. • Direct EPA to develop and implement a classification system based on the present and future use of NPL sites to help estab¬ lish cleanup goals and determine other site management priorities. Classification based on reuse, restoration, and rehabita¬ tion of the site could help determine the extent of cleanup and the applicability of health and environmental effects in the cleanup decision. • Direct EPA to better define how the Super¬ fund program evaluates the performance and effectiveness of remedial cleanups fi¬ nanced under Superfund, by the States, and by private parties, over both the short and long terms. This should include expli¬ cit attention to unintended consequences involving transfer of hazardous chemicals among environmental media, transfer of risks among populations, and residual con¬ tamination. Technology The results of chapter 6 on cleanup technol¬ ogies support the need for greater Federal in¬ volvement in the research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) innovative cleanup technologies. For the first 5 years of Superfund, EPA will have spent about $25 million on cleanup RD&D. Although some conventional containment, disposal, and treatment technol¬ ogies will continue to be used, and may be im¬ proved, substantial opportunities exist to ad¬ vance treatment technologies that are geared to the needs of cleaning uncontrolled sites. These technological advances offer the prom¬ ise of permanently effective cleanups for a va¬ riety of uncontrolled site problems and, possi¬ bly, reduced cleanup costs over time. OTA has identified a number of innovations that have advanced beyond the laboratory s’age. The chief problem is that some institu¬ tional barriers stand in the way of using these innovative technologies. It is in the environ¬ mental and economic interests of the Nation to foster a competitive market for cleanup tech¬ nologies. For example, currently the major al¬ ternative to land disposal and waste contain¬ ment is incineration, which has a long history in the management ol newly generated hazard¬ ous waste, but even though it can be effective in treating Superfund wastes, the costs are high, and regulation may be inadequate (e.g., few' standards for air emissions of toxic chem¬ icals). Other technical approaches are less fa¬ miliar to the regulatory community and waste generators and face more severe obstacles to their evaluation and use. A number of specific Federal initiatives could prove effective: • Analyses of cost effectiveness could be di¬ rected to include: a) a clear statement of the total cleanup objectives for the site; b) a discussion of whether alternative tech¬ nologies have proven capabilities or uncer¬ tainties for the application under consid¬ eration; c) a discussion of which (if any) innovative technological approaches might be demonstrated at the site and how demonstration would aid the national cleanup effort for similar sites; d) an esti¬ mate of all short- and long-term costs for each alternative which takes into account: i) uncertainties about effectiveness in meeting the cleanup objectives, and ii) the likelihood that further cleanup and correc¬ tive actions will be required; and e) a dis¬ cussion of technical and economic needs and uncertainties, including institutional considerations, for long-term monitoring, operation, or maintenance of the site. • Federal support could be substantially in¬ creased to help private companies and uni¬ versities develop and demonstrate innova¬ tive permanent cleanup technologies. These are the most costly phases of tech¬ nological innovation, but they are neces¬ sary to prove technical feasibility under Ch. 2—Policy Options • 55 operating conditions and to oolain accu¬ rate cost data. Demonstrating a particular application of a new technology olten re¬ quires several million dollars. I he work should focus on techniques that can re¬ duce permanent cleanup costs. A program funded at the level of perhaps $25 million to $50 million annually for some years could pay off handsomely for a long-term Superfund program. These funds would be in addition to what EPA now spends on R&D. Special attention should be given to small businesses; these firms face major problems in getting money and coping with institutional barriers, even though they often have attractive innovations. It should be noted that increased spending in this area would also benefit the RCRA program because some cleanup technolo¬ gies could also treat newly generated haz¬ ardous waste. • EPA could be directed to develop proto¬ cols by which technologies can be evalu¬ ated by the government and companies; such protocols should address different generic types of problems at uncontrolled sites (e.g., decontamination of soil, ground- water. or buildings; destruction of wastes). Without evaluation protocols, innovations struggle with the Catch-22 of not being able to prove themselves and not being used because they are not proven. • EPA could be directed to help companies: a) obtain samples from uncontrolled sites, and b) conduct field demonstrations and pilot cleanups at NPL sites to better estab¬ lish technical performance and reliability and provide more accurate estimates of ac¬ tual costs. If public resistance to the use of new technologies is feared, incenti\es could be considered, such as a high prior¬ ity for cleanup and financial support for direct citizen involvement in the cleanup effort. However, the public may be quite receptive to new technologies, provided they are kept informed and have some voice in the decisions (see chapter 8). • EPA could be directed to develop incen¬ tives for responsible parties to use or dem¬ onstrate innovative cleanup technologies. • EPA could be directed to provide a sim¬ plified means of determining whether res¬ idues from waste treatment operations qualify as RCRA hazardous wastes; those that are not can be disposed of simply and at low cost. • EPA could be directed to expeditiously es¬ tablish appropriate RCRA regulations for waste storage and treatment facilities of particular importance to Superfund ef¬ forts. • EPA could be directed to expand its infor¬ mation and technology transfer functions and make better use of what has been and will be learned from cleanups throughout the Nation. There does not appear to be any central repository of information and insights obtained by EPA’s Regions and contractors, who often repeat the similar work at different sites. Technical Staffs, Support, and Oversight Chapter 7 shows the need to improve the ca¬ pabilities of EPA and the States to implement Superfund and, particularly, to carry out vari¬ ous oversight functions. EPA has a responsi¬ bility to oversee its Regions, it. contractors, the States, and private parties carrying out clean¬ ups. The States must oversee its contractors and, sometimes, local government units. In¬ creased funding may be required. Also, more appropriately trained and experienced techni¬ cal professionals are needed in a number of cri¬ tical disciplines, plus an assurance that the most qualified contractors are used. Working with hazardous waste is a relatively new area and, therefore, many technical specialists do not have the specific experience with hazard¬ ous waste necessary for cleanups. For exam¬ ple, hydrogeologists may be experts about the flow of water but not about the movement of con¬ taminants, which can be much more complex. Options for congressional consideration are: • Provide Federal funding for training pro¬ grams in disciplines of particular impor¬ tance to Superfund, such as hydrogeology, toxicology, environmental engineering, and chemistry. Emphasis should be placed '• . 56 • Superlvnd Strategy on continuing education and training pro¬ grams to increase the pool of experienced specialists who know how to deal with the specific problems of hazardous waste sites. A program costing perhaps $5 million to $10 million annually for some years could yield great benefits in the long term. • Provide increased funding, perhaps $25 million to $50 million annually, to EPA to build up its in-house professional staff and emphasize the need to carry out technical oversight. There has been a steady drain of experienced people from EPA’s Super¬ fund program to its contractors and the private sector, whose cleanup work of on receives little EPA scrubnv. • Provide direct grants to States to develop and expand their technical staff. This would be similar to the RCRA grants pro¬ gram. Over a period of perhaps 5 years, such grants could do much to strengthen the States’ capabilities and perhaps their willingness to participate in the national program. As with the RCRA program, some formula could be devised to deter¬ mine how much money a State received; for example, basing the amount on its number ol sites in EPA’s national inven¬ tory of uncontrolled sites, on its number of NPL sites, on the number of cleanups where it has assumed the lead role, and on its number of cleanups funded without Federal funds. Nationally, such a grants program might require from $25 million to $50 million annually. This compares to $80 million annually authorized for RCRA Subtitle C and I) grants to States for fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1988. Total annual Federal spending on RCRA is roughly one-quarter of current annual Superfund spending. • Direct EPA to reexamine how it selects and uses contractors and involves govern¬ ment agencies at Superfund sites. The per¬ formance of contractors on work already completed and underway in the Superfund program needs to be evaluated. The al¬ ready rapid expansion of the Superfund program often has resulted in poor tech¬ nical performance by contractors eager. but not necessarily qualified, to enter this market. Another possibility is to use a single contractor for a site, rather than a succession of contractors who each start from scratch. EPA could examine its pro¬ curement procedures and place more em¬ phasis on technical qualifications rather than cost proposals. • Improve the relationships between EPA and State agencies by providing more op¬ portunities for the States to participate in decisionmaking (even though they may only be paying for 10 percent of the costs) and in policy development. Detailed Strategic Planning Detailed strategic planning is fundamental to any long-term program. In the case of the Superfund program, this is a particularly dif¬ ficult problem because there are so many in¬ terrelated technical, social, and economic fac¬ tors to consider (see chapter 3). The two-part strategy stressed in this study is not the only possible alternative strategy. Nor has OTA con¬ sidered in detail the myriad problems facing implementation of any long-term strategy. If it did not wish to change Superfund now. Con¬ gress could direct EPA to submit a detailed strategy (or several options) for a long-term Supertund program. The proposal should make clear how critical decisions about the choice of sites to be cleaned are to be made, the spe¬ cific criteria by which the performance of the program can be measured, and how institution¬ al capabilities assure that funds are spent effi¬ ciently and effectively. The inherent conflict between the current cost-effectiveness and fund-balancing provi¬ sions of the CERCLA statute must be ad¬ dressed. As discussed previously, there is often an inherent conflict between what is viewed as necessary on a site-by-site basis and what is possible for the national program. What may be a cost-effective cleanup to provide maxi¬ mum protection at a single uncontrolled site may be unreasonable considering the resources that are available from tne national program for other sites. As the Superfund grows (even - Ch. 2—Policy Options • 57 if only to the 2,000-site NPL envisioned by EPA), this inherent conflict will become more acute. The problem intensifies even more when costly permanent cleanups are deemed necessary for some sites, particularly for groundwater clean¬ up. To some degree, the current program has trapped itself. If it stressed more permanent cleanups, it could not take so many actions. It tries to get many sites into the pipeline. But the actiors are ineffective and meanwhile the num¬ ber of sites increases steadily. The pipeline nev¬ er seems to end. Any str.itegic plan must ad¬ dress this issue and introduce objectivity and equity into decisions about the allocation of scarce resources to address many sites over time. Public Participation Chapter 8 supports the need to involve the public more directly in decisionmaking in all phases of the Superfund program—from site identification and selection for the NPL, to choosing an initial response and remedial cleanup, to measuring the effectiveness of the cleanup measure. Congress could consider making CERCLA more similar to other envi¬ ronmental statutes, such as RCRA, by mandat¬ ing specific roles for the public in the decision¬ making process. Whatever is done, however, it must be rec¬ ognized that the interests of affected commu¬ nities often conflict with the limits and goals of a national program. But it is possible that early and iteady public participation in deci¬ sionmaking could lead to more effective site cleanup and a more effective national program. It is necessary, however, to consider whether such participation might incur delays. This po¬ tential problem could be addressed by trying to resolve conflicts equitably and expeditiously through, for example, mediation, binding ar¬ bitration, and ombudsmen. More specifically. Congress may wish to consider providing funds to communities and other groups to help them obtain independent technical expertise so, even when they lack economic and techni¬ cal resources, they can fairly evaluate the tech¬ nical complexity and options available to deci¬ sionmakers. Where this has been done, it has proved beneficial. . Preceding page blank ; I ! I ! ■i ! i Introduction. Page Current Estimates of Future Superfund Need 3 .* *. ^ Uncertaiaiy and tfca Need to Evehieta the Susgffand Proer«-*i H "mnWl p A i! Pr ° aCl,0S *? f rojectin 8 Superfund Needs’.. Histonca! Performance of the Super fund Program. "'; .. j* A Systems Analysis Approach to Befiee a Long-Term Stro*se.V p» a « Srmulatson; A Systems Analysis Method for Comparing Two ItrateS. and Incorporating Long-Term Uncertainty strategies Models and Reality . . Use of Medals and Findings A Two-Part Strategy .. . Non-Federal Money . Discount Rate. Means to Address Uncertainties Appendix A. List of Tables 64 67 Conclusions; Program Planning Under Uncertainty .. Effectiveness and the Future Cost of Cleanups . Number of Sites. ^ . Health and Environment Effects 70 74 74 83 85 85 88 88 88 89 89 SO Table No. .1 3 3. System Definitions and Assumptions 65 3-4. Summary ot Simulation Scenarios . 71 It SenitTu°AF H ° W a ". Arerase ""P«™ce Factor ofo.s' Migiu' Arise .W" 73 3-7. Program Planning With Uncertainty. 78 ‘ . 87 List of Figures Figure No. 3-1. Superfund System . Pegu 0*43. 3-2b Program .ength v. Impermanence Factor 3-3a urogram Cost v. Impermanence Factor 3-lK Program Length v. impermanence Factor 3-4 program Cost v. Impermanence Factor i^rogiam Cost v. Impermanence Fedor 3-Rh rogram Length v. Impermanence Factor 3-6 i rogram Cost v. Impermanence Factor ^-7 rrogram Costs v. Impermanence. Piogiain Costs v. Impermanence 3-8 b P.ogram Length v. Impermanence Factor rrogram Lost v. Impermanence Factor Chapter 3 A Systems Analysis ef Superfund INTRODUCTION In the Superfund program so far, more at¬ tention has been paid to short-term costs and budgets than to total program costs and pro¬ gram durations which can cover decades. A Superfund program designed from a short-term perspective may not be consistent with the need for long-term programs to permanently deal with the problems posed by thousands oi uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, vAt out adequate planning, the result may be a cleanup program that extends beyond several decades, presenting uncertain and possibly serious health and environmental risks. This chapter examines how future financial needs of the Superfund program may be as¬ sessed and what program strategy can meet these needs. A simple simulation model is pre¬ sented which illustrates how cleanup costs, present and future, might be taken into ac¬ count. The past performance ol the program is considered, the uncertainty of historical costs is recognized, and alternative strategies are compared. The results indicate there will be trade-offs between program cost and the time required to mitigate the threats posed by large numbers of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Finally, a two-part cleanup strategy is iden¬ tified that shows promise as a sound, long-term approach to the proolem. especially in the face of many uncertainties. Current Estimates of Future Superfund Needs Recent estimates of future financial needs of the Superfund program confirm the need for an expanded fund. The studies summarized in table 3-1 estimate that the cost to clean up the Nation’s uncontrolled hazardous waste sites will be substantially greater than the current fund of $1.6 billion. Their estimates range from $6 billion to $92 billion, with all but one cal¬ culating the Federal share of these costs at $5 billion to $26 billion. Only the Department of Commerce (DOC) study predicts that the cur¬ rent Superfund of $1.6 billion can meet require¬ ments for cleanup. However, DOC assumed that only f 16 sites would be eligible for the Fund; this estimate is already out-of-date since over 200 new sites have been proposed lor list¬ ing on the current 538 site National Priority List (NPL). Several sources of uncertainty are responsi¬ ble for the wide range of estimates in table 3- 1; the most important are the number of sites requiring cleanup and the costs of cleanup. Estimates for the total number ol sites to be cleaned ranged from 1,400 to over 7.000. W hile this may appear large enough to encompass true lower and upper bounds, there is evidence to the contrary. OTA finds that a more appro¬ priate estimate is 10,000 sites (see chapter 5), without including several categories ol candi¬ dates for Superfund sites, e.g., as many as 75,000 mining wastes sites and 100,000 cui- rentlv leaking underground storage tanks, pro¬ jected to increase io 350,000 within the next 5 years.’ Similarly, estimates of cleanup costs vary a great deal', from $1 million to $20 million per site. Also, most of the predictions of total cleanup cost assumed that the w'orst sites, those requiring the most costly response, were cap¬ tured in the current estimates of the numbers of sites. This may not be so. For example, DOC estimated that those sites not already on the NPL will cost much less to clean up than N L sites ($3.2 million per site v. $9.7 million per ' ’Donald V. Feliciano, "Leaking Underground Storage Tanks: A Potential Environmental Problem." U S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. |an 11. 19B4. 61 i 62 • Superfund Strategy >. CD 6 . o : CO to Q> © iO CO $ 3 O *D CO rsi <3 r T> © C o o c 3 CL 3 G3 C C CO © <: s i Oi Q. o O 2 o to 2 co E © E I U c © V. 3 o co © JO CO ° I < O c o o. to © © o'ti o 2? *r £ ^ O CD ^ oui ^ ™.ab 2 CM CO CJ> c © o Q. CO __ ^ QO co CD 5i ” © C\! © —• >> O © o £ O 3 t0 «*5 O ca c T3 O O 3 O 05 © _ CO c c E o *o Q. 3 CO — © : — ;t= - ► t/» $ o E __ £> c o E © © T3 •D Cl • c « S » " ^ c o - e I 2 "I i 8 e w u o Oi $ cry h- 00 < •O © > © £ * CO to CO O o o =.HSg h- C/> (O 3 O CD © t/» "5 «- CD to*) t/> < Z CM *T t/> CD _j Q. _J ■C_ CO CO m V WWtA iD o © <0 c o Q. CO © © II © © i * T3 C o § O O ? — co . 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C c* o g*° * T> 5 S D ») •c M S' c a *i o ^ £ » it Cl Is — o C «- © r. e - < c * c to O ■i to/ CT C o o C •s c. — 5 £ ? a — O c J v; 15 3 I i4: i ^c£ £ g < T c tfi (J _, o T) a a ® 2 5 8| * t? c 5 eu ? c “■ «- _ a- o © ® to# CN — > £ •* « R • Q c * ? a to O _ = to *0 ^ r 5 3 3 O ° „ . - to w u rsi to r j 5 T3 S s i 9 O E to ^ to £ O • * O c I i#> to TJ to — <* ^ £ •#> to aj w r» z: n to a V < S L Z « to# * r d c: u ^ ^ 5 ir u >Jo 5 a 5 »r * - a$°«n « •HOC i|I 5^11 - ^ c* ^ ; *: G »I 8 £ * TT 2 Siis iflil ;S;S ! IJ - ^ I o !s* ; » i i 5 = s - . E * £ a*-; c x .. IS o o JCCt-2* E t 1 3 “ | £ k ' c i t 2 E §&!&£?& V L, o X ? £ u to O J 2 £ o c s*-5«SS 1 . — C >. zi £ ^ ^ “o d - 3 gf 5 t2 o ; tO to ^ i ° to c.^I 5 |S PS'cJ ■ , i ■* 3 a. ’ O X i t i to 6 ? ? E * o sJ- &I-2; r c ^c > ? ? = ^ | ° : •? | S ? s ? ;m s ?s :*• 7 5 D « 5 c c c r - o ; ? o | ' ? -■ I; \ c o • , i - 1 2? Li -i J ? II « ^ CO - cO to «n UJ -■f 5. < < ir. < u c o ► t; o O c o II ? l*£- "> *0 o O 19 c C * ® o = = Ills > > c d * n -a C C to n to toj «- towGQ o c c c « e> J E E to to to to J £ ^ 3 3 3 3 < < 2 ^ n «* *r> so " < VVashl "8>on. DC: Office of ck.5d Was e and Emergency Response. December 1984) w Ibid "Ibid. nf ih c KnV ,’ r0, lT, enlal |,r0,ec,,on Azrncy. "The Effectiveness ol the Superfund Program. CERCLA Section 301(a)(1)(A) Study" Washington. DC: Office of Emergency and Remedial Response December 984). 1 hese statistics include CERCLA-financS. en¬ forcement-lead. and responsible party actions. 1 Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund • 65 The remedial aspects of the program, which pertain to long-term cleanups, are occurring more slowly. By the end of fiscal year 1982 only about 60 remedial investigation and feasibility studies (RI/FS) had been initiated; but by the end of fiscal year 1984, 315 RI/FSs had been started. 55 Remedial design has begun on 56 sites. Six sites have been designated as clean. Of the remedial cleanup actions currently underway or approved, most responses have been removal of hazardous materials for off¬ site disposal, or onsite containment, or both. Table 3-2 summarizes remedial actions taken for 24 sites. 56 The institutional framework for responding to uncontrolled sites is in place. Despite ini¬ tial problems, the program is beginning to oper¬ ate more swiftly and smoothly. Many more sites have moved into the Ri/FS and design study stages. As more studies are completed, more sites will move into the construction phase. He .ever, only 30 percent of the 538 sites now on the NPL are receiving remedial cleanup attention. It is also necessary to understand what is be¬ ing done, and what the implications of current actions are for the future. Most of the cleanup actions approved so far involve removal and/or excavation, followed by offsite disposal. Al¬ though the facilities where Superfund wastes are taken are regulated under RCRA, these reg¬ ulations do not assure detection and preven¬ tion of groundwater contamination. There is "Ibid. '•Ibid. Table 3-2.—Summary of Remedia* Cleanup Actions Approved Cleanup actions approved Number of decisions Removal/oftsite disposal with or without source contr jl . . Removal/cffsite disposal wit', some incineration. Alternative water supplv. Alternative water supn.y with treatment. Treatment (1 aereiion. 1 air-stripping) Sou r ce control and onsite treatment SOURCE U S F /' r onmen»a’Protection Agency The Effectiveness of Ibe Super fun' Program. CERCLA Section 301(a) (IRA).' December 1964 a strong likelihood that a number of RCRA. fa¬ cilities may become Superfund sites, some might even be able to qualify as Superfun J sites now, and some already have. This issue is examined in more depth in chapter 5 and 1 ,j ds to the conclusions that removal folio Wi bv disposal is rot an effec¬ tive or efficient cleanup option, environmen¬ tally or economically, unless removed wastes are destroyed, detoxified, treated, or stabilized in some fashion prior to redisposal. Without the measures just specified, offsite removal will probably only relocate the hazard and transfer the risk. Furthermore, offsite re¬ moval usually leaves seme (often considerable) residual surface waste in the form of contami¬ nated soil that can threaten groundwater. Off¬ site removal does not address problems of groundwater already contaminated at the site. While partial c.eanups have been common, source control and containment have also been used after r unoval to address groundwater problems. 5 v'hile the short-term costs of these remedial methods often compare favorably with other options, their long-term effective¬ ness cr.n be greatly limited by site conditions, such as hydrogeology, rainfall, and geomor- phraogy. 17 Another response to groundwater contami¬ nation is to provide an alternative drinking water supply. (Note that water for other uses, such as bathing, often is not supplied even though health effects may be significant.) Sometimes this response is appropriate, for ex¬ ample when the alternate water is easily acces¬ sible and not too costly and when the affected population is not large. However, with ground- water now providing 50 percent of the Nation's drinking water, this can be a viable long-term alternative for only a limited number of sites. It is not an alternative for large populations. There is a limit to how many aquifers can be foresaken. The groundwater problem is receiving atten¬ tion; EPA has recently established an Office of 'The experience at the Stringfellow Acid Pits illustrates manv of the problems that can arise with continued use of contain¬ ment (see chapter 1). 14 1 3 2 2 2 - 66 • Superfund Strategy Groundwater and developed a groundwater protection strategy. 18 The EPA has also ac¬ knowledged that groundwater contamination at Superfund sites has not yet been extensively addressed. When it is addressed, it will greatly increase the cost of the program. The performance of cleanup actions during the last 4 years of the Superfund program do not support the use of the descriptive method for predicting future costs. The approved ac¬ tions are weighted heavily m favor of least-cost options that are available now. While they are often called proven, the long-term effectiveness of these options is highly uncertain, and they may be ineffective even in the short term. The total costs of cleanup using these technologies are not accurately represented by the sum of their construction costs and first year operat¬ ing and maintenance costs. On the contrary, these options are likely to prove costly in the long term. Additional remedial measures at the original sites or at other redisposal sites may be required as a consequence of the original cleanup technology decisions. In a sense an environmental deficit is created for future gen¬ erations. The final consideration is whether new, more efficient technologies exist or can he devel¬ oped. The descriptive prediction method, rely¬ ing on historical cleanup decisions, assumes little technological change or improvement. OTA has found that there are substantial op¬ portunities to develop permanent, cost-effec¬ tive cleanup technologies (see chapter 6). Many innovative cleanup technologies, ranging from methods of biological and chemical treatment to thermal destruction show great promise, but their development and demonstration are ham¬ pered by several institutional problems, includ¬ ing the fact that the Superfund program has not recognized their potential long-term cost effectiveness. Thus, when the state of knowledge is con¬ sidered, coupled with the experiences of the '•For more information see U S. Congress, Office of Technol¬ ogy Assessment. Protecting the Nation's Groundwater prom Contamination, OTA-O-233 (Washington. PC: U S. Government Printing Office. October 1984|. program and the potential for new technolo¬ gies, it is clear that projections of the costs of the Superfund program must be based on: ® a comparison of alternative strategies; and • future development, demonstration, and use of innovative, permanent cleanup tech¬ nologies. The desirability of defining a preferred long¬ term strategy becomes greater as evidence ac¬ cumulates that many more sites may need cleanup. The long-term costs of traditional cleanup technologies, possibly acceptable with a relatively small number of sites, grows bur¬ densome as the number of sites rises—with the number going as high as 2,000, 10,000, or more. Policy and planning decisions based mostly on low short-term costs may hamper program progress, if site after site deteriorates and must be recleaned, and as still more sites are discov¬ ered. Under such conditions, the total cost and time required to fulfill the Superfund mandate may become unacceptable to society. The need to reevaluate and perhaps define a new program strategy is not a r *w concept. It was suggested by William Hedeman, EPA’s Superfund chief: And it seems lo me that the more fundamen¬ tal question that has to be asked is whether or r ot the program and the structure and stat¬ utory base that has been estab 1; shed thus far to deal with this problem is really the most sensible way to go. Whether indc d we don’t have as much of a national problem in the area of abandoned hazardous waste as we had in the 1930s and 40s in terms of flood control, or as we had in the 1970s with contaminated air and contaminated water? And we haven’t inadvertently set into motion a system with a problem that is so convoluted and complex and difficult to manage that it could collapse of its own weight rather than accomplishing the results that were ever intended? 18 ‘“"A Conversation With Superfund Chief Bill Hedeman." The Environmental Forum. August 18H3. - rev***" yo* •net Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis ol Superfund ® 07 A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS DEFINE Has the current Superfund program “inad¬ vertently set imo motion a system with a prob¬ lem that is so convoluted and complex and dif¬ ficult to manage that it could collapse of its own weight rather than accomplishing the re¬ sults that were ... intended?” The critical step toward developing a better program strategy is to realize that, in fact, the Superfund pro¬ gram, with its response mechanisms for threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, is a complex system. The Superfund system can be viewed as a series of interacting issues, conditions, and decisions. The mechanics of the system are de¬ picted in figure 3-1. The primary inputs are listed in the box labeled issues/conditions. These include the poteniial number of Super¬ fund sites, public demands and perceptions about the threats posed by these sites, and the technologies available to deal with them. All of these components affect Federal policy de¬ cisions. Superfund policy decisions at the federal level define an upper limit on the resources to manage the problem, provide the framework for management, and set the goals of the pro¬ gram. Furthermore, Federal policy dictates what sites are eligible for consideration. For Issues/ conditions Figure 3-1.— SuperfumJ System Federal Program policy management decisions decisions Program goals or evaluation criteria Potential m mber of site 3 — Current ERRIS sues — Active Subtit e C facilities — Closer and active Subtitle P Existing technologies > Existing qualified personnel • Health and environmental- effects data Public demands and perceptions Respons ble parties State programs and funds • Fund size and * Number of sites duration • States’ share eligible for fund (NPL) requirements ® Measures of immediate and • Sites selection ionq-term risk criteria • Method of • Cleanup goals remedial tech- • CERCLA enforce- oology selection ment and recovery • Application of • RCRA rules and cleanup goals enforcement at sites • Technology RD&D • Allocation ot fund • Research on effects from • Oversight/ guidance for hazardous was'e contractors, responsible parties, and • Technical states personnel 1 ^ • Selection of ® Tela! cleanup initial cost 5 responses • Duration • Selection of remedial cleanups ® Environmental protection effect‘veness • Selection of other actions ■ -.- ' - — —a— • Eguily/tund ./ V yv O SOURCE Olt'Ce or TecOoology Awessrr^nl ' ■ ■ |ll I nil - «*»■*■*- »r« Wf.H " «*» » ■ < my v « <-w-- -t ----- 68 • Superfund Strategy ‘ mxn instance, EPA has decided that sites with only environmental problems, which do not pose threats to human health, do not now qualify for Superfund attention. The Hazard Ranking System has no component to account for nat¬ ural resource damages that do not affect hu¬ man health directly. Even though Congress did not establish this policy, it did limit resources for the program. In addition. non-Superfund policy decisions may influence the Superfunrl program. For ex¬ ample, policy changes in the RCRA program for hazardous and solid waste land disposal fa¬ cilities may alter the frequency at which new Superfund sites enter the pool, depending on improvements in prevention, detection, and correction o* leaks and groundwater contam¬ ination. Federal policy also affects how the fi¬ nancial requirements placed on the States might affect the cleanup of facilities. Many sites may fall into the 50 percent State matching share category. Broad Federal policies are eventually trans¬ lated into a program strategy via program man¬ agement policies. Management decisions on ranking criteria and methodology determine which sites are included on the NFL. Program management policies also govern the allocation of resources to eligible sites and define which cleanup technologies are employed. These de¬ cisions are extremely complex because they, too, entail many interdependencies and inter¬ actions. For example, cleanup technology deci¬ sions are dependent not only on what technol¬ ogies are available and at what cost, but also on the availability of funds and qualified per¬ sonnel, the nature of cleanup goals, and the threats posed by uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Management decisions by EPA define the scope and form the strategy, even if uninten¬ tionally, of the cleanup program. The resultant program strategy may in turn lead to secondary, long-term consequences that also affect the system. The remedial actions alter the risks associated with the remediated sites but, if they are not wholly effective, they may impose future costs and risks. Decisions to remove and dispose of waste offsite may pose threats at other sites, which, in turn, may result in further demands on Superfund re¬ sources. Thus, current program decisions af¬ fect future system inputs and needs. The his¬ torical emphasis in the Superfund program has been on detailed site-bv-site analyses, with lit¬ tle, if any, analysis of intersite effects. This is one reason why responses have usually en¬ tailed offsite disposal. But cleanup on a by-site basis is not necessarily an effective tional cleanup. Considering each uncontrolled site independently may also lead to inconsis¬ tency; sites posing similar risks in different locations may be dealt with differently. More¬ over. the long-term effects of all the interac¬ tions may not be obvious unless viewed sys¬ tematically. The complexity of the Superfund program suggests that projections of needs or changes of the program strategy should be tackled in a systems framework, using the discipline of systems analysis. With the interdependencies and interactions defined, program strategies can be evaluated more objectively and thoroughly. Definition of Gcals An obvious Superfund objective is to mini¬ mize the cost of cleaning up uncontrolled sites. Ibis goal raises an interesting question, namely, costs to whom? Focusing only on the costs to the Fund can lead to distortions. For instance, long-term operating and maintenance (O&M) costs are the States’ responsibility. Con¬ cern with only the costs to the Fund, therefore, might emphasize cleanup technologies with lower capital costs even if the total cleanup costs will ultimately be very high (and higher than other options) because of high operating and maintenance costs. Although the current methodology used in feasibility studies for se¬ lecting remedial action does deal with O&M costs, three points should be made. First, fund¬ ing estimates currently include only the initial year of O&M costs regardless of estimates made in the feasibility studies. Second, the fea¬ sibility studies often choose optimistic esti¬ mates despite limited experience with the O&M costs of the remedial technology options. Fur- . ; • wmm99 Jp WEJyjHg? •7?r*^ ■ >-* sues requiring groundwater cleanup SOURCE 0*1.ce or Tecnnotogy Assessment used. These costs, therefore, are the average costs of interim responses. 1 he model conserv¬ atively estimates that 20 percent of the sites would require groundwater response, although more than three-quarters of NFL sites have groundwater problems. A method of allocating a fixed annual budget (or total, unadjusted cost* to all parties) to the sites is also detined. 1 he annual budgets are distributed to surface and groundwater responses so that the same percentage of each type of site is addressed. This allocation method may be overly optimistic with regards to the attention that groundwater has received historically. 22 Tr~\ statistical analysis jwirformed on those sites for which monies were obligated prior to m.d-l<»83 revealed that sites with higher levels of groundwater contamination, as reflected by their HKS scores, bore a negative relationship with fund financed a , tions. See Harold C. Barnett. "The Allocation of Superfund. 1«W0-1983." Department of Economics. University ot Khode Island. **cv 72 • Superfund Strategy Only two NPL sites now have an active reme¬ dial program for contaminated groundwater. Finally, because the program length is an evaluation criterion, certain assumptions about time are made. It has been estimated that the average remedial response takes 3 years to complete. 23 Since surface responses provide most of the experience, this estimate is in¬ creased to 6 years for groundwater actions. I hese estimates are for interim actions. Since no permanent cleanup has been implemented its duration is speculative. It is assumed that permanent surface cleanups take 3 years to complete, and permanent cleanups of ground- water contamination take 10 years. For those elements of the system that are ill- defined, different options are tested for their dlects on the system. A simulation scenario is defined by choosing one option for each ele¬ ment. These choices are summarized in table 3-4. Because this model could not consider site- specific data on risk and fund balancing, onlv total program cost and total program len'- Les s costly initial response only (not more than once per site) over first 15 years. Afterwards required, a permanent cleanup with no future costs Future costs of Impermanent cleanup actions: Impermanence factor varied between 0 and 1 . Average permanent cleanup costs: 1. $24 M—surface cleanup $60 M — groundwater cleanup 2. $12 M — surface cleanup $30 M—groundwater cleanup Time distribution ol future cleanup actions: Interim actT ^ °'^ 30 years after ar > E action aCt ' 0nS occur ear '^ ' e • 5 V eaf s after an interim L action. aC ' IOnS ° CCUr ^'' 6 ' 30 years a,,er an m,erim Budget: * ,s s ' 6B: s,owm ® IXZZZ’gjT*” 15 s ’ ® •*» ““sit 1 “pa. 6 ” 3 " ,s s9B; °'°*"’ ® 3o% Each period (5 yr> budget is $98 iachoCvt'V 5 yr> ^ d9e ’ ,S S5B: 5row,h @ ig 0% 'or each o, next 3 per-ods then @ 20% for each successive Afumfter of new sites per year tor the first 15 years: F. 100 M. 200 G. 200 fo. years 1-5; 800 for years 6-10; and 1,000 for years SOURCE Otf.ce o' Technology Assessment elude offsite disposal of wastes and contami¬ nated materials, and traditional onsite control and containment techniques. To capture future costs, the impermanence !o J ,S 7“ faC ‘°- is i,solf uncertain. , . uus ,° f r r the fac,or between 0 and 1 are tested in different scenarios. The imperma¬ nence factor averages the future costs of all in- enm actions over the w iole system. (Note that the future costs of interim actions may vary G D S si* •• i '•i i -'3 =3 Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfuna • 73 widely among the individual responses, but this model can deal only with averages.) An il¬ lustration of how an average impermanence factor might be derived from various cleanup actions is given in table 3-5. The average impermanence factor can he in¬ terpreted in a number of ways. To illustrate one interpretation, suppose each initial interim sur¬ face response, costing $6 million, has an im¬ permanence factor of 50 percent (0.50). I hen the second action required for each interim ac¬ tion will cost only S3 million per site. But this second action will also be interim, and there¬ fore will result in a third response, at half the cost of the second, and so on. The result is a decreasing geometric series with a finite sum. That is, each interim action requires another interim action, whose cost is related to the cost of the previous action by the impermanance factor. In other words, the sites slowly ap¬ proach cleanliness, or the repeated cleanup process finally becomes effective. The second way to interpret the imperma¬ nence factor is that an interim action only has a probability of requiring another interim ac¬ tion. If required, the future action will have the same unit response cost. An impermanence factor of 50 percent (0.50), in this case, would mean that half of all interim actions require an additional interim action. In other words, out of 100 initial interim actions performed at a cost of $6 million per site, 50 interim actions will be required at the same unit cost. These in turn will result in 25 interim actions and so forth. (As before, cleanup of the system of sites slowly becomes effective.) More compli¬ cated interpretations that explicitly incorporate long-term operating and maintenance costs could also be constructed. However, the model may underestimate such costs since they are represented as decreasing with time for imper¬ manence factors less than 1. Another uncertainty is the timing cf future costs. Because the program ends when the ex¬ penditures stop, it is necessary to investigate a number of alternatives. One option is that the future costs of an interim action occur uni¬ formly over 30 years after completing the ac¬ tion. the other options are that the future costs occur evert, 5 years or every 30 years, choices which represent optimistic and pessimistic estimates of the time over which interim re¬ sponses are effective. (Note that interim actions are performed over time, so that the entire pro¬ gram lasts substantially beyond 30 years.) The Permanent Strategy For the permanent cleanup strategy, the model assumes that permanent remedial tech¬ nologies for all types of site problems will be available in 15 years. (Some are available now.) Table 3-5.—Illustration of How an Average Impermance Factor of 0.5 Might Arise Sites incurring future costs Cleanup actions Type _ Partial removal (offsite disposal) . Partial removal (offsite disposal) plus onsite containment. Onsite containment. Onsite contuinment/treatment. Alternative water supply or relocation of residents . Contribution to average Percent future cost Percent 3 factor factor 10 • Future action at disposal 50 2.0 0.10 site • Future action onsite 40 • Future action at disposal 30 1.5 0.18 site • Future action onsite • High O&M costs 20 • Future action onsite 75 1.0 0.15 20 • High O&M costs 50 0.5 005 10 • Future action onsite 20 1.0 0.02 Average impermanence lactor 0 50 Af*em*.ne explored later. Furthermore, depending on the costs ot permanent cleanups and preferences on program length, an interim cleanup strategy might be the preferred strategy. Question: Based on evaluation criteria of total program cost (to ail sources, not just Superfund) and program length, under what conditions would the interim cleanup strategy be prefera¬ ble to the permanent cleanup strategy? Findings: Many of the assumptions listed in table 3-3 may affect the values of these two eval¬ uation criteria. But it is primarily the average costs of an interim cleanup technology class and permanent cleanup technology class, and the impermanence factor (signifying the level 76 • Superfund Strategy of future costs) that determine total program cost and length. For example: • Under some conditions the interim cleanup strategy is clearly preferable: when future costs of interim cleanups are very low (i.e., impermanence factors are very low), and the cost of permanent cleanups is high compared to the cost of interim cleanup. It health and environmental risks do not exist or are small, it makes sense not to spend money to develop and use permanent cleanup technologies because the interim strategy costs less and the pro¬ gram progresses about as quickly. • Under other conditions, the permanent strategy is preferable. Even when the costs of interim cleanups adjusted for future costs are equal to the costs of permanent technologies, the interim strategy pro¬ gresses more slowly than the permanent strategy. Because greater health and envi¬ ronmental risks may be incurred with the longer program, the permanent strategy is preferred. • When the adjusted interim cleanup costs are higher than the costs of permanent cleanups, program costs under the interim strategy skyrocket and the program pro¬ gresses much more slowly. Total long-term costs and risks would be minimized by de¬ voting resources to the development and use of permanent cleanup technologies. • If the adjusted costs of interim cleanups are moderately lower than those of perma¬ nent cleanups, there will be trade-offs be¬ tween program cost and duration: the per¬ manent strategy will cost more but pro¬ gress more rapidly. Strategy decisions would have to be made based on other cri¬ teria, most importantly the reduction or avoidance of risk, which would favor the permanent strategy. Figures 3-2a and 3-2b illustrate how the im¬ permanence factor influences program clean¬ up costs and the time to initiate 90 percent of the work 26 under each strategy, according to Scenario 1UAF. (See table 3-4 for scenario specifications.) With an impermanence factor of 15 percent (0.15), the program length under each strategy is the same. However, at this impermanence factor the total program cost under the interim strategy is about $18 billion, considerably less than about $32 billion under the permanent strategy. Under Scenario 1UAF, then, for im¬ permanence factors less than or equal to the relatively low value of about 0.15, the interim cleanup strategy is preferable in terms of total program cost and program length. In contrast, in Scenario 1UAF, when the im¬ permanence factor reaches 0.76, the total costs of both strategies are equal, but the interim strategy leads to a much longer—probably un¬ acceptably longer—program. Cleanup takes several decades with the permanent cleanup strategy, but well over 100 years with the in¬ terim strategy. For impermanence factors above 0.76, the interim cleanup strategy costs rise rapidly; the cost, as well as the program duration become highly unfavorable. In the range of impermanence factors be¬ tween 0.15 and 0.76, choices must be made be¬ tween program cleanup cost and program length, for example, at 0.5 the permanent strat¬ egy costs $50.8 billion: under the interim strat¬ egy it is only $29.5 billion. The program length under the interim strategy is, however, 83 years, about double that of the permanent strat¬ egy HI years). The trade-off between program duration and cost is $507 million for each year the program is shortened. If it were worth $507 million per year to eliminate the risks in the entire system (an average of only several hun- "Kor impermanence factors less than 1.0. the interim strat- egy represents a decay process. Thus, a progress percentile must be used to measure program duration. The progress percentile of 90 percent, used in the findings, is the number of vears after the start of the program to initiate 90 percent of all the cleanup actions ultimately required. Results for progress percentiles are found in the appendix. i - Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund • 77 Figure 3-2a.—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor Scenario 1UAF ■: i > I Figure 3-2b.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Facto. Scenario 1UAF H WL WJ '• ' • ■ .;• ;• •• • ... . -• - 78 • Superfund Strategy dred thousand dollars per site per year), then the permanent strategy would be preferred. Knowing the risk consequences of interim cleanups is important to an intelligent program selection. In general, as the impermanence factor rises, the cost advantage of the interim strategy (dol¬ lars saved for each additional program year) shrinks (see table 3-6). If 50 years is judged, for example, to be the longest program the public is likely to accept, then in Scenario 1UAF the permanent strategy is always preferred lor im¬ permanence factors greater than 0.3. Knowledge about actual future costs is vital to understanding the relative benefits of the dif¬ ferent strategies. As it becomes clearer that cer¬ tain cleanup technologies are impermanent (e.g., containment and land disposal), then the economic and environmental advantages of de¬ veloping and using permanent cleanups be¬ come clearer. Only with low impermanence factors is the interim strategy advantageous. Question: Since the costs of permanent tech¬ nologies are quite speculative, how would program strategy preferences change if the average costs of the permanent technologies changed? Findings: If the costs of permanent cleanups were to decrease, as might happen over time with experience or improvement, the perma¬ nent cleanup strategy is preferred to the in¬ terim cleanup strategy over a wider range of impermanence factors. The impermanence factor at which the costs of both strategies is equal drops, narrowing the trade-off range. In Scenario 2UAF, the cost of a permanent sur¬ face cleanup averages $12 million (versus $24 million per site as in Scenario 1UAF) and the cost of a permanent groundwater cleanup is $30 million (versus $60 million). The results of Scenario 2UAF are given in figures 3-3a and 3-3b. The point where costs are equal drops to slightly below' 0.53, compared to 0.76 in Sce¬ nario lUAF (see figures 3-2a and 3-2b). Addi¬ tionally, where trade-offs occur (impermanence factors between 0.1 and 0.53), the penalty for choosing the permanent strategy, higher pro¬ gram cost, is reduced. This static analysis of two different sets of permanent costs can be extrapolated to under¬ stand the effects of permanent cleanup costs decreasing as the program gains experience (i.e., the “learning curve” effect). As cost-eftec- tive permanent technologies are used mere, program costs and duration both decrease. The opposite may occur. If the cost of the permanent cleanups were higher than antici¬ pated. the interim strategy would be preferred over a broader range of impermanence factors and the differences in the costs of the two pro¬ grams over the trade-off range would be larger. Certainly as the costs of permanent cleanups decline, the permanent strategy becomes more appealing. If, however, permanent cleanups costs are underestimated, there is a risk of in¬ correctly choosing the permanent strategy. Question: How does the budget affect cleanup strategy decisions and the evaluation criteria values under each strategy? Table 3-6.—Scenario 1UAF Average impermanence tacior Ol 03 0.5 C.6 0.7 0 8 0 9 Interim strategy: Program cost (in billions). $16 4 $210 $29.5 $36.5 $49.1 $73 7 $147.3 Program duration* (years). 17 49 83 113 >140 >140 >140 Permanent strategy: Program cost (in billions). $31.4 $41.1 $50 8 $55 6 $60 5 $65 3 $70.2 Program duration* (years). 21 33 41 43 44 44 45 Trade-oft 6 (SB/year). $1 256 $0 507 $0,269 <$0,119 __ •Measured by tne time to atari 90 percent of the cleanup work ^Oniy app;»e taper oif, less anil less money is re¬ quired. permanence factors where the permanent strat¬ egy has the lower cost, program costs are great¬ er for the larger budget scenario (Scenario 1UCF) than for the more limite 1 budget sce¬ nario (Scenario 1UAF). While thi; suggests that no initial actions be taken if fut ire costs are ve-y high, recall that there are nt explicit risk criteria in this model. It may be necessary to take some interim actions to mitigate risk when no permanent cleanup technology is available, or to consider other options, such as relocation of residents. Now compare the interim strategy and the permanent strategy. If the adjusted costs of in¬ terim cleanups are less than those of perma¬ nent cleanups, more confidence is needed about low levels of future cost before a larger budget is devoted to interim cleanups. This makes sense: it is desirable to be more certain about the effectiveness of a particular cleanup strat¬ egy before more money is invested in it. The effect of increasing the annual budget is dem¬ onstrated by comparing Scenarios 1UAF (low budget) and 1UCF (high budget) in figures 3-2a and 2b and 3-5a and 5b. As the budget is increased, the interim cleanup strategy leads Figure 3-4 —Prog am Cost v. Impermanence Factor Permanent Strategy (Scenario 1UAF & 1UCF) t Program cleanup cost (billions of dollars) Ch 3—A Systems Analysis of Supertund • 81 Figure 3-5a.—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor Scenario 1UCF Figure 3 - 5 b.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor Scenario 1UCF vmcrafcMwtt Will ■minium!(SB® 82 • Superfund Strategy to a shorter program over a narrower range of impermanence factors: up to 0.15 for the low budget scenario versus up to 0.10 for the high budget scenerio. The downward shift occurs because the program duration is reduced under both strategies as the budget increases. Thus, an increased annual budget can affect cleanup strategy decisions. Similarly, reducing the annual budget also can affect the strategy decisions. In particular, a lower annual budget (e.g., lower spending by Sur'ir . Inienm Interim strategy strategy undiscounted discounted at 10% SOURCE Oll'ce o> Tocnnoiofl* Assess'nef'l inti described as cleanups. Low-cost initial re¬ sponses could include pumping to contain plumes of contamination in aquifers, covers to keep out water, excavation and temporary stor¬ age of wastes and contaminated soil above ground (greatly reducing the use of below ground barriers), and environmental monitoring. In contrast to the current immediate removals, more money would be spent and removal of wastes to operating land disposal sites would be avoided. A strategy of low-cost initial responses w'ould achieve rapid risk reduction at many sites, thereby responding in an equitable manner to public demands for protection and visible prog¬ ress. OTA’s modeling, however, suggests that the costs of initial responses should be low Permanent Permanent strategy strategy •jndisccunted discounted at 10 Vo (about 10 percent of permanent cleanup costs), and that they should be followed not by other impermanent responses, but rather by a per¬ manently effective response. In this strategy the conservative assumption is made that 90 percent of all sites will need a permanent cleanup; that is, 10 percent of the initial re¬ sponses will subsequently be found to be suf¬ ficient. In th.s variation of the permanent strategy the costs of initial responses are: Si million per site for surface response and $3 million per site to initially respond to groundwater contamina¬ tion. Additionally, to examine the effect of many more sites, after all sites are discovered. 10,546 "ites are to be cleaned and a higher budget is allocated. (Table 3-4 defines Scenario H frfry.T nr-- ■ lVY - .. t^***-*-™**-'*- • • — •. '* •*«•*«,■*»* -->^MiWM l V..IW«li*ilft.'R>«, ,-r I .- 'll **av-*r^r*r*r--„ lUSG.) This variation was compared with the interim cleanup strategy under the same sce¬ nario. The results are illustrated in figures 3-8a and 3-8b They show that at an assumed imperma¬ nence factor of 0.9. the total program cost o the two-part strategy is about S310 billion. At an impermenence factor of about 0.73 in the interim strategy, the two strategies have the same program cost ($310 billion). The two-part strategy is preferable to the in¬ terim strategy on the grounds of program dura¬ tion. except lor impermanence lactors under about 0.25. II the impermanence of the interim responses is greater than 0.73. then the two- part strategy is preferred both in terms o total cost and program duration. When total pro¬ gram costs are the same lor hot . strategies, he interim strategy results in an unacceptably long program (longer than 100 years). Strategv decisions between the two-part strut egy and the interim strategy are interestingly altered if high discount rales are used. With verv high discount rates, the present value ot program cleanup costs under either strategy Ch 3--A Systems Analysis ot Supertund “^85 become insensitive to the impermanence of the cleanup response. The costs incurred in tie earliest years of the program determine the (present value) program cost. However, since initial actions are less costly than interim ac¬ tions. with high discount rates the two-part strategy will result in lower discounted pro¬ gram costs, in addition to shorter programs, than the interim cleanup strategy. If there is sufficient justification for a high discount rate, then the two-part strategy with low-cost initial responses is preferable over all levels ol imper¬ manence. In summary, the two-part strategy used ini¬ tial (and emergency) responses as a first pri¬ ority for allocating program resources, with re¬ maining funds spent on permanent cleanups at sites that have been ‘ isolated.’ "recontrolled or “stabilized.” Exactly how lunds would be al¬ located (the order of actions and cleanups) under this third strategy considering budget, qualified personnel, and technology constraints is an extremely difficult problem. Its solution depends on the resolution of the cleanup goals issue (see chapter 4) and a systematic approach to the problem that illuminates trade-o ts. CONCLUSIONS: PROGRAM PLANNING UNDER UNCERTAINTY The results of the simulation exercise indi¬ cate that cleanup costs and program duration show a high degree of sensitivity to a number of uncertain factors. The potential effects of planning without considering these uncertain¬ ties also can be derived from the simulation findings. The probability of adverse effects of uncertainties could be limited in a carefu \ planned program. Table 3-7 presents the sources of uncertainties in the Superfund program as identified by OTA. the dangers posed by plan¬ ning without considering them, and offers op¬ tions to mitigate their adverse effects. Effectiveness and the Future Cost of Cleanups A primary element of uncertainty is the ef¬ fectiveness ol the cleanup responses and their future costs. OTA’s findings indicate that it is desirable to develop. demonstrate, and use per¬ manent cleanups if the effectiveness of the in¬ terim cleanup and its future costs are uncer¬ tain. The interim cleanup strategy is preferred onlv if future costs arc known to be small, i his is because the interim strategy results in an ex¬ tremely long program (despite an advantage in total cleanup cost) for a wide range of interim ' 86 • Superfund Strategy Figure 3-8a.—Program Length v. Impermanence Factor Scenario 1USG Figure 3-8b.—Program Cost v. Impermanence Factor Scenario 1USG Impermanence (actor SOURCF Otf*c4 ot Technology AndMwtM ✓ 4 4 t 1 *»& :«*rs - wy^nwfw Ch 2 —A Systems Analysis ol Supe rfund » 8 7 Table 3 . 7 __Program Planning W.th Uncertainty Dancers of planning . without mnsirlar ation ot uncertainty ---— Flfectlvenassand iuturo cost of cleanups: fnade.iuate funds and program infrastructure, . Cleanup delays . Risks are aggravated rather than mitigated Loss of public confidence Number of sites requiring res P on ^' c{ure . Inadequate funds and program infrastructure, • Cleanup delays . increasing risks and cleanup costs Inefficient resource allocation: • Worst sites are not addressed — Risks and cleanup costs increase —Cleanup delays . . Less hazardous sites are over-cleaned Loss of public confidence Health and environmental effects: Inefficient resource allocation: • Worst sites are not addressed —Risks and cleanup costs increase —Cleanup delays . . Less hazardous sites are over c ^ ane J d . ineffective technologies continue to be used Loss of public confidence Non-Federal money: . , Inadequate funds and program infrastructure . Cleanup delays |c,ea»P voices Discount rate: Inadequate funds: • Cleanup deiays • Cos', effective responses not chosen Risks are transf erred. Potio ns to hedge a gainst_adverseeffects_ Incorporate future costs and cleanup effectiveness in cleanup strategy decisions developing end using permanent cleanups Consider all likely sources of sites; and potential for citps to enter program over long term Develop -ong-term strategic plan based on revised estimates “Recontrol" responses at maximum number of sites Resolve cleanup goals sequentially as improved tt°S Plan 10 , long-lerm permanent cleanups Use conservative estimates; refine estimates w.th experience Fxrlude discount rate or use conservative discount fate; test sensitivity of cleanup strategy decisions to rates SOURCE: Otlice ol Technology Assessment. cleanup future costs. A mistake in estimating future costs of interim cleanups carries tie penalty of a drastic, unanticipated lengthen¬ ing of the program—and of a period of perhaps high risk-under the interim strategy. For high- e/levels of future cost, the interim strategy re¬ sults in both unacceptably high cleanup costs and program duration. A program designed without consideration of cleanup response effectiveness and futu.c costs is likely to result in a lack of money and inadequate program jnta.lmc.unj Even more money is expeditiously provided, it is unlikelv that the program infrastructure, or in¬ stitutional delivery system, will he able to grow rapidly^enough for timely responses. Indeed, a contributing factor to the slow startup of the 1980 program was simply the time require organization and staffing. Further delays m the cleanup program may result in site deter.ora tion and increasing risks. In turn the f^ia cleanup may escalate, impose greater financial burdens »nd delays; a crisis situation could em sue. In EPA’s words, the program could “overwhelmed.” In addition, delays in cleanup end the use of ineffective cleanups may con¬ tribute to loss of public confidence. 88 • Superfund Strategy To deal with uncertainty about cleanup ef¬ fectiveness and future costs, more realistic esti¬ mates can be used. For instance, life-time or life-cycle O&M costs could be included in cleanup cost estimates. The implications of in¬ corporating realistic O&M costs can be signif¬ icant. EPA has estimated average annual O&M costs at $400,000 per site. The average Federal cleanup cost per site, less the first year O&M, is about $7.5 million. This is comparable to the average cleanup costs used in the model which shows that if O&M costs are the only future costs of interim clean jp, and are incurred over only 5 years, then the corresponding imperma¬ nence factor is about 0.27. T hus, the inclusion of realistic O&M costs can reduce the margin for error. Number of Sites The number of sites that will ultimately re¬ quire cleanup is another source of uncertainty which, if not adequately taken into account, could seriously .mpact the cleanup program. Insufficient money and an underdeveloped program infrastructure could result from over¬ ly optimistic (under) estimates of the number of sites to clf^n. The program grows too slowly for effective response and further delays resuit in site deterioration and increasing risks, in¬ creasing costs, further delays, and loss of pub¬ lic confidence. Health and Environment Effects Although health and environmental issues could not be incorporated into OTA's simple model, high uncertainties of their effects exist and their importance is felt in making trade¬ offs. If health and environmental effects are not better understood, and cleanup goals better defined, any program will potentially misallo- ca/e resources. Without effective cleanup goals it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of clean¬ ups. A rush to ‘•cleanup” sites by. for exam¬ ple, mandating cleanup schedules, before goals are established could result in too many initial resources being devoted to: 1) the use of inef¬ fective technologies; and 2) the less hazardous sites, depriving worse sites of attention. One reliable way to plan with uncertainties in a dynamic system is to resolve the cleanup goal issue sequentially, incorporating new in¬ formation as it becomes available, while tak¬ ing more limited initial responses, and “recon- troling” a maximum number of sites. At the same time, other initiatives should focus on planning for more extensive, permanent clean¬ ups that will be needed at some sites, and which can be accomplished gradually. Non-Federal Monay How much of cleanup costs will be provided by potentially responsible parties (PRPs), in¬ come from cost recovery, and States' shares? EPA estimates it will recover 47 percent for removals and 30 percent for remedial actions (see table 3-1). The limited experiences of the program sug¬ gest that lower contributions will be received. As of September 30, 1984. cost recoveries have totaled $6.6 million, less than 1 percent of total obligations and disbursements toward hazard¬ ous substance response. 28 One cause of these high estimates is the assumption that rates of recovery will be comparable to those for early removals conducted under the Clean Water Act. Direct cleanup actions by responsible parties are projected by EPA at 40 to 60 percent. Sim¬ ilarly, estimates from GAO range from 29 to 44 percent for RP lead activities (see table 3-1). The uncertainty of both these estimates may be heightened by the much larger numbers of sites and sums of money that could be involved. Additionally, it might be expected that it will become more dilficult to identifv some respon¬ sible parties as the program progresses and older, abandoned sites are identified. While many sites in the larger estimate may be small¬ er, industrial surface impoundments, which may have associated with them lower remedial costs and fewer (often single), identifiable re¬ sponsible parties, others may be large munici- '•U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Hazardous Sub¬ stance Response Trust Fund Receipts. Obligations, and Dis¬ bursements. CERCLA Sections 301|a)(l)(B) and (D)" (Washing¬ ton. DC. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. December 198d|. pal landfills. This broader, more costly aspect of the program may stress the States willing¬ ness to provide their matching shares of con¬ struction costs. Discount Rate The differences between present and future values of cleanup expenditures and risks result from uncertainty over future values of money, inflation, and risks. Cleanup costs and risks may occur over a period of decades. Discount¬ ing is used in program evaluations and plan¬ ning to adjust the costs and lisks to present value. The discount rate, an expression of the time value of money, should retlecl how society values current versus future consumption. To illustrate how costs and risks might be val¬ ued differently over time, consider a decision¬ maker faced with the choice of a program that costs $5 billion now and $5 billion over the next 20 years and a program that costs $10 billion now. The choice might be simplified if it could be shown that the $10 billion program reduces risk more over the next 20 years and if a relia¬ ble dollar number could be calculated for the risk reduction. However, in reality, the differ¬ ence in risk reduction associated with program options is rarely simple. Controversy arises over the choice of discount rates for public investments. 29 One school of thought holds that society should have a longer planning horizon than individuals, which means that public discount rates should be lower than private rates. Furthermore, since future gen¬ erations have no way to express their prefer¬ ences, an unimaginative society may err on the side of too high discount rates, from the point “For private sector investments, the discount rate is applied to known investment costs and anticipated benefits, both of which can usually be calculated easily in dollars. - 1 he appro¬ priate discount rate is usually the corporate internal rate of re¬ turn on capital or the rate of return on alternative investment opportunities. Ch 3—A Systems Analysis ot Superfund • 89 of view of their descendants. Many would argue that this is happening now-. OTA makes no attempt here to resolve these issues. However, discounting often has utility, and the selection will influence the allocation of resources, the level of social welfare, and cleanup strategy. It (he discount rate is too high the Superfund program may be underplanned. Means to Address Uncertainties The potential risks arising from uncertainty can be mitigated in several ways. Clearly, re¬ solving the uncertainties w'ould be the most ef¬ ficient approach. Resources can be devoted to learning how many sites will require cleanup, understanding health and environmental risks, developing cleanup goals, and deciding on a realistic, achievable level of non-Federal con¬ tributions. However, the cleanup program can not wait fer total and perfect knowledge. Rath¬ er, the program plan should be sequentially re¬ fined as new information is available. The effectiveness of currently used cleanup technologies and the extreme sensitivity of pro¬ gram duration and cost to these uncertainties suggest that efforts are needed to develop per¬ manent cleanup technologies. Limited initial responses in the near-term make economic and environmental sense only if they arc part ot a long-term, flexible strategic plan whose goal is permanent cleanup. Otherwise, public confi¬ dence will not be obtained. There are intrinsic conflicts between maxi¬ mizing the number of limited initial responses, and their effectiveness over time, and keeping their costs low to save enough money for ex¬ pensive permanent cleanups. In addition, there will be competition for money and people for research, demonstration, and use of permanent technologies, and enforcement. Furthermore, a method to allocate and schedule cleanups efficiently must be part of a long-term strate¬ gic plan. 38-745 0-85-4 ' 90 • Superfund Strategy APPENDIX A This appendix provides detailed information on the mathematical formulations and assumptions used in OTA’s model discussed in chapter 3. Undiscounted Program Cost Definitions of Cleanup Strategies If costs are not discounted, total program costs can be derived without the use of simulation. Three strategies are defined and discussed in terms of costs and cost comparisons. Interim Cleanup Strategy The total undiscounted program costs adjusted for futuie costs, TC,, under the interim cleanup strategy can be expressed mathematically as: TC, = C,X + iC,X + !'C,X + i J C|X + i‘C,X + ... (1.1) where: C| = average near-term cost of an interim action. X = number of sites to clean up. i = average system impermanence factor of interim actions. In equation (1.1), the first term is total near-term costs of interim actions. The remaining terms, which constitute a geometric series, represent total future costs of all future actions. (It should be noted that if O&M costs are included in i, they may be under¬ stated if i < 1, since the terms decrease.) For all i < 1, this series converges, so that: TC, - C,X/(l-i) (1.2) Thus, the average adjusted cost per site under the interim strategy is: AvgfTC,) = C,/(l-i) (1.3) Equation (1.2) elucidates the use of the imperma¬ nence factor in the interim strategy. Rearranging terms reveals: TCj = CjX + iTCj (1.3a) The total cost of the interim strategy is composed of the total near-term cost, C,X. plus total future costs, iTC,. In the model, however, equation (1.2) was only used as a tool for terminating scenarios that exceeded computer memory. Actual cost cal¬ culations were made on the basis ol equation (1.1). Clearly, no scenario with a system impermanence factor equal to or greater than 1 was run since, on the basis of either equations (1.1) or (1.2), total cost will be infinite. Basic Permanent Cleanup Strategy The total undiscounted program costs adjusted for future costs, TCj, under the permanent cleanup strategy can be expressed mathematically as: TCp = CjYX + CpiYX + C p (l - Y)X (1.4) where: C p = average cost of a permanent action Y = percent of all sites addressed by an initial action during the first 15 years of the program. This per¬ centage will be dependent on funding availabil¬ ity during the 15 years. The first term in equation (1.4) represents near- term costs of the impermanent interim actions tak¬ en in the first 15 years. In the basic permanent cleanup strategy, the interim actions are the same as the interim actions under the interim strategy: the technologies are the same, the costs are the same, and the impermanence factor is the same. The second term is the future costs of initial actions relating to the need for second hut permanent ac¬ tions. This term may misestimate *otal costs since permanent cleanup costs after an initial action may be more or less than costs of permanent cleanups at sites that have had no response. The last term is the costs ol permanent cleanup at sites that have no response. The average cost per site under the permanent cleanup strategy is: AvK(TCp) - C,Y + Cp(iY + 1 - Y) (1.5) Two-Part Strategy The two-part strategy is a variation of the perma¬ nent strategy and differs from the basic permanent strategy in that the initial responses are not neces¬ sarily the same as those of the interim strategy. The unit cost is less for an initial response than for an interim response. Therefore, the impermanence factors may be different for initial responses and interim responses. The total cost of the variation of the permanent strategy, TC pv . may be ex¬ pressed as: TOp V - C, V YX + C p i v YX + Cptl - Y)X (1.6) where: C |v » average near-'erm cost of an initial action. i v *• impermaner.ee factor for initial actions. - r^s*-**^ r jt^gt Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis ot Supertund • 91 New Sites In all of the strategies, new sites are discovered during the first 15 years ot the program. These sites may be responded to in the following year. Slight deviations from the above cost formulae occur as a result of sites entering the system in the 15th year. In the basic permanent strategy and the two-part strategy, these sites only receive permanent cleanups. Cost Comparisons ot the Interim and Basic Permanent Strategies Since the interim actions considered in the inter¬ im and basic permanent strategies are identical, equations (1.1) and (1.4) can be equated and solved for in terms of i. The impermanence factor at which either total program costs or average program costs are equal under either strategy, i*. is called the crit¬ ical impermanence and .s expressed as: i* = 1 - C,/Cp (17) At this impermanence factor, we are indifferent to the cleanup strategies, on a cost basis, For all i < i*. the interim strategy is preferred if only cost is considered and duration (discussed below) is ig¬ nored. For all l > i\ the permanent strategy is un¬ ambiguously preferred. Cost Comparisons of the Interim and Two-Part Permanent Strategies The difference between the interim actions of the interim strategy and the initial actions of the two- part permanent strategy demand a different cost comparison method than that stated above. Given equations (1.1) and (1.6), a total cost for the two-part strategy can be based on a specific value for i v . The impermanence factor for the interim strategy, i, can then be determined and results in the same total cost. If the impermanence factor for interim actions is above this level, then the two-part per¬ manent strategy is unambiguously preferred. Program Duration With Uncertain Technology Effectiveness While undiscounted program costs can be de¬ rived mathematically, simulation must be employed to determine program duration under each strat¬ egy and to determine the effects of discounting, which is time dependent, on cleanup strategy deci¬ sions. A simulation model, programmed using LOTUS 1-2-3, was developed to mimic cleanup actions, the impermanence of those actions, and additional ac¬ tions resulting from impermanence, over time. The following discussions are focused on the interim and basic permanent strategies. While the discus¬ sions are related to the two-part permanent strate¬ gy, modifications in analysis would have to be made. Impermanence Factor In the model, two impermanence factors were used: i(sc), the impermanence factor for interim surface actions, and i(gw), the impermanence fac¬ tor for interim groundwater actions. This break¬ down is consistent with previous calculations since these two cleanup types are assumed to be inde¬ pendent of one another. The independence assump¬ tion may compound the conservative esiimate of the percent of sites requiring groundwater response (20 percent) since it does not permit sites w ith sur¬ face contamination to deteriorate in a way that causes groundwater contamination. In fact, surface contamination often leads to groundwater contam¬ ination. If. however, the impermanence factor for surface contaminated sites is high, it may capture the future costs associated w r ith deterioration. Iotal program costs under the interim strategy can be ex¬ pressed as: TC, - C Uc (1 - Y gw )X/(i - i(sc)( + C lgw (Y rw X)/( 1 - i(gw)l (3.1) where: C, . = average near-term cost of an interim surface action. C, = average near-term cost of an interim groundwa¬ ter action. Y = percentage of all sites requiring groundwater re¬ sponse. Similarly, total program costs under the perma¬ nent strategy are: TCp = C lsc Y(l-Y g JX + C Igw YY gw X + Cp sc (l-YY RW )(i(sc)Y + (1-Y))X + C Pgw Y gw (i(gw)Y + (1-Y))X (3.2) where: C Hsc = average cost of a permanent surface action. C p R . = average cost of a permanent groundwater action. W Separability of costs relating to surface actions and groundwater actions permits the derivation of individual critical impermanence factors, i * (sc) and i*(gw), the impermanence factors where costs associated with surface actions and groundwater actions, respectively, are equal under either strat¬ egy. These are: i’(sc) = 1 - C lsc l C Psc (3.3a) i*(gw) = 1 - C lgvv /C,, RVV (3.3b) - il l "., • w c*.-<,* immiimu^, r 92 • Superfund Strategy can be determined from equations™.?” an^ b^Fol devoted! ^V* reqUir ° cleaniJ P' ,he annual budget '• - iMi - V ) + i*(gw|y ,3 4| cS ™Sfr hi T"""" '“hnologles, and dis^ »„d h 3° rSr »** agnations ,3,l.b. S3 ,£ SST, S* S^pSrSSSSE SSSESSSS?i of currently used technologies, if the model is over- Base Case Simulation fuhme cZV n SOme f, SSUrnptio , ns (namely, when the ■ u,ure cos,s occur, the annual budget, the costs of To model the system, various system definitions few"!?anvc^T'° gieS a , nd discou,lt rates), then and assumptions about model parameters are re V V f " e ' dl unqualified statements can be dn.red. Those model definitions (prosTnfed in,able' f"" P I***” u " d °' -- 3-3) represent conservative astimates of their real El h Tt ' resul,s remain Spratly world analogs. real ! h ® same while each element of uncertainty is var- To calibrate the model, a base case is generate h, ’ • h ° n *J e model can P^vide meaningful ron- where the uncertain estimates are defined to closely F^sJ Themed! S ^ f ■ P Stn,tegy decisi 'onmaking. match current real world estimates. Although it is lions inir T ,hods .°. f incorporating these assump- ncorrect to use the term interim cleanup strategy ofThe model" ut discUSSC * ,he ""sitivity f the impermanence factor is zero, simulation of dei hese assum P , ‘ons follows. uTe C nt e E P PA 0 e!,' 65 *^7™ ^ —P a -on with _ The Tro Umq,es of program costs and length. Assumptions About Timing he zero impermanence assumption appears to be , * consistent with EPA's exclusion of future costs , Whl ! e ,h ° assum P tio IS about how long it takes R]1 ? C . ost estima tes for currently used technologies per,or [ n an interim cleanup are founded in ex- . 86 oopons A a °d C were the lowest budgets pene ntial data, little data exists on which to base EPA 8 T b ? e C3Se propram ^orations similar to assumptions about how long after an impermanent EPA estimates (see table A-l). actlon future costs are incurred. That future cosK .. . °- , Inde “ d> res,,lt from impermanent actions has Uncertain Assumptions and Mode, Sensilivity s ” u ^ impermanence of interim ac,io„s P ,he number'of ZtoZZlXZ * T? 3 > ™’« umtorm over 30 years. In the early option, there -- Comparison o, Simulatio n Base Case Wi.n Corren, Eslim81es . ----^PA n984 f ^E PA n9ft3j i ~-- Projected time to clean sites . S7.6-S22.7 Sl0.3-$20.6 -7,; , —-- Number of sites.. .. NA 14 years for 1 800 sit** , Total average cleanup cost per site. 1, ^?£? )0 1 400-2,200 ’ ^ yearsS . jid.tM 1 - $6 M i.oa-o Percent of sites requiring ^JsponsT" 9 gr0undwa,er SK' M including groundwater flroundwater response response Average length of response. NA 23-56% . NA 3 years* f /o 3 /ears apo r so -—-- 5 years including p Ptnge ccrrespondsTo Budgei'Op,^A^n^c* °' ' h ' S chap,er ~ --- er response o D«s no, include Inn,a, remed.almeasuVs SOURCE As ZZ*' P '°' eC "°" Aflenty - CERCLA 301 < a M’He) Study - draft. December 1984 I?c , £G&<> v *^:*'!#VTirirv.C*«?icwW.r^ fc 'd*.%A**^M»**»^ ... . • __... ___.,_- -, - - . -, -__ Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund » 93 would be rapid response and early information on the level of impermanence. The late option corre¬ sponds to the 30-year period required under RCRA for post-closure care of disposal facilities. 1 he uni¬ form distribution reflects that sites and cleanups will vary. Some Examples of Timing The mathematical formulation follows, but sev¬ eral simple, nonmathematical examples are gi\en first. (I) Assume the interim strategy, surface cleanups only, with an impermanence factor of 0.5, and the 5-vear timing option. Then, of every 100 primary cleanups started in year 1 of the program, there will be 50 secondary cleanups at the same cost as the primaries (or 100 secondaries at hall the cost of the primaries) started in year 9 of the program, and 25 tertiaries at the same cost as the primaries (or 100 tertiaries at one-quarter the cost of the primaries) started in year 17 of the program. The secondaries are started in the ninth year of the program, ratlit r than the sixth, because they are started 5 years after [he completion of the primaries, and it takes 3 years to perform a surface cleanup. (II) Assume the interim strategy, surface clean¬ ups only, impermanence factor ol 0.5, and the uni¬ form timing optio”. Then, 120 primary cleanups started in year 1 of the program will be followed by three sets consisting of: a) 10; b) 20; and c) 30 secondaries at the same cost as the primaries (or. a) 20; b) 40; c) 60 secondaries at half the cost of the primaries) which will be started in years 9, 19, and 34 of the program. That is, the “uniform” distribu¬ tion is not continuously uniform, but is clumped in three bunches. (This choice was made for ease of computing; a more accurate representation of a discrete uniform distribution using more and small¬ er intervals could have been used with a faster com¬ puter.) Note also, that tertiary and higher order ac¬ tions following early secondary cleanups overlap with later secondary cleanups of the same primary set. (Ill) Assume the permanent strategy, with surface cleanups only, and impermanence factor of 0.5 and the uniform timing option. This means that, if 120 initial responses are started in year 1 of the pro¬ gram, 10 require a future action in year 9, 20 in year 19, and 30 in year 34; these 60 sites are slated for permanent cleanup. The sites that require addition¬ al action in year 9 cannot be addressed until year 15 or later; they go into a pool of sites that will re¬ ceive permanent cleanup in the future. How the Model Handles Timing, Mathematically Future costs arc incorporated into the model by pooling future action requirements. Let FJt) and F (t) denote the costs of future actions that be¬ come necessary at time t due to previous interim surface and groundwater actions, respectively. Let XJt) and X (t) indicate the number of interim surface and groundwater actions started in year t. For future costs incurred on the early schedule, the undiscounted costs of actions that enter the pool for future action in year t are related to previous actions so that; F„.(i> - Usc)C, sc X s Jt-8) gw ,(t) = i(gw)Ci g w X KW tl_ 111 (4 la) 14.lb) The 8-vear lag in future costs for interim surface actions reflects the 3 years required to complete the action and the 5 years after that before which ,uture actions are required. Simila'ly the 11-vear fag tor interim groundwater actions includes 6 \ears to complete the action. If the future actions are required after 30 years, the lags become 33 years for interim surface re¬ sponse and 36 years for interim groundwater re¬ sponse, so that: F sc (t) = i(sc)C lsc X sc lt-33) (4 2d) F RV ,( 1 ) = ■(gw)C |gw X gw («- 36 ) (4 2 b) For future actions that are required on a 30-vear uniform schedule, the time distribution is repre¬ sented discretely in tlie model, with costs incurred 5, 15, and 30 years after completion of the interim actions. The undiscounted costs of actions required in year t are related to previous actions as. F |t) = l/t;|i(sc)C lst .X 5l _lt-B|| + 2/6|i(sc)C lsc X sc ()-18|| + 3t6[i , sc)C| sc X 5C (t -33)1 14.3.1) F (1) - l/6[i(gw)C, X (t-11)) K + 2/6[ilBw)C lgw X R Jt)-21)i 4- 3/6(i(g'.v)C Ig .,.X RW (t-36): (4.2bl As before, the lags of 3 and 6 years reflect com¬ pletion time for interim surface and groundwater response, respectively. In all of the cases above, the future costs of an interim action are a function of the number of ac¬ tions taken, the costs of those actions, and their im¬ permanence. In the permanent strategy, impermanence of the initial actions results in permanent response. Let FJt) and P.Jt) denote the number of permanent actions taken in year t due to previous imperma¬ nent actions. The future costs associated with the initial actions can be represented mathematically in a way similar to equations (4.la-4.3b), depend¬ ing on the time distribution of future actions. For l \ - 94 • Supertund Strategy example, if future actions are required under the early time distribution, they are: P sl «) = ilsc)Cp 51 X sr (l - H (4-4a) PgwftV- ilSw)Cp RW X gw (t 11 14 41.) In this case, costs resulting from impermanent actions are a function of the number of imperma¬ nent actions taken, the impermanence of those ac¬ tions. and the costs of permanent cleanup. Comments on Timing The assumptions about the time distribution of future actions may directly determine the program duration, although it is typically these assumptions together with budget assumptions that do so. II the budget is large enough, and grows quickly enough, then the bulk of the cleanup efforts can be achieved earlier in the program. However, the results of im¬ permanent actions linger. For instance, if there were no budget constraints, under the permanent strategy all initial responses would be taken in the first year. The latest future groundwater actions that would result from these impermanent actions would be dealt with in the 37th vear.ffi years to com¬ plete the action and 30 years until additional ac¬ tion is required). The shortest program attained in the modeling effort for the permanent strategy was 2(i years. This reflected the last initial groundwater cleanups starting u the 15th year. Six years is re¬ quired to complete the initial response, then future actions can be started 5 years later, under the early time distribution of future action occurrence. Of course, with expensive enough permanent clean¬ ups. high enough impermanence factors, and/or a low enough budget, the piogram would be longer, as there would not be enough money to do all per¬ manent cleanups in the year they came due. Any of the time lags before future actions are taken may be lengthened because of the budget con¬ straints. Because the model incorporates no meas¬ ure of risk, future actions may be deferred without penary. Therefore, in this model, no distinction is made in allocating the budget between sites requir¬ ing first time response and sites requiring addition¬ al response. (The only exception is for permanent responses under the permanent strategy during the first 15 years; they are not permitted.) Budget Allocation Each annual budget is allocated so that the fund is distributed in a deterministic way among surface and groundwater responses, primary and follow- on responses. Consider first the interim strategy. If S (t) indicates the number of sites that have never been addressed requiring surf ace response in year t, and S RW (t) is similarly defined for sites requiring groundwater response, then an alloca¬ tion percentage, Yt. is defined for an annual budget in year t, B(t), as follows: Y(t) - B(t)/|C lsc S sc (i) + C lKVV S KW tt) + F s ,(t) + K gw (t)| (5.1) The percentage is similar during the first 15 years of the permanent strategy except there are no terms for future costs. Instead, the future costs enter the model when permanent cleanups are pursued, after the 15th year. The percentage then becomes: YU) = Hlt)-|C |>sl S v (l| + C PRW S RW (I) + P sr (t) + P f , w lU| (5.2) The effect of this allocation is response to sites with surface and groundwater contamination in the san ,j proportion as their occurrence. If the imper¬ manence factors for interim and initial actions for surface and groundwater contamination are the same, this proportion is maintained through the simulation: that is, the initial 80 percent surface to 20 percent groundwater occurrence assumed in the model stays constant as ttie program runs. (Note that groundwater responses are more expensive than surface response by a factor of 3 in most simulations: therefore if the ratio of occurrence is 80:20. the budget is split as 0.57:0.43, the ratio of cost.) If. however, the impermanence factors are different the proportion will change. For example, if the groundwater responses have higher imper¬ manence. more attention and money will be de¬ voted to groundwater response as the program pro¬ gresses. One outcome of this allocation method is that no preference is given to primary actions under either strategy. It is possible, therefore, that with a low- enough budget and high enough impermanence factor, nearly all funds could be devoted to second¬ ary and higher order interim actions in the interim strategy and secondaiy but permanent actions in the permanent strategy. This is particularly strik¬ ing if future actions are required on the early time distribution schedule. While the real-world impli¬ cations of this are unappealing, i.e.. sites are not addressed and deteriorate, this poses few problems in terms of affecting the performance of the strate¬ gies in the simulation. The correct amount of mon¬ ey is spent and it is the length of time these expend¬ itures continue that determines program length. Measuring Program Duration To evaluate the strategies in terms of program length and examine the effects of different time distributions of future cost occurrences, a method - a * wy^ C h 3—A Systems Analysis of Superfund^ • 95 i Prn The inverse relationship may bias strategy dect- of measuring program duration was requited. I r g towar d the interim strategy for low imperma- gram duration could he measured in erms factors if low program progress perccnti es a last year where expenditures are madefor an ac ^ ^ mcasure duratlon . For example if a 30 per tion Since responses extend over time, this way program progress level is used for i = 0.1 measuring duration would shorten program long lin der the interim strategy, this represents no more by at most 10 years, the time required to comp e e under the ,nt J^ q[ the sltes the longest response-the permanent groundw - ^ feason the g0 percent program progress cleanup. cirateev for i level, which could represent first cleanup o a si ■ Bv definition the interim cleanup strategy_to . = Q J ///je /ovves/ impermanence factor fewer^n'terinf acUons^are tTen oLrlime. It ^ - — to " ^ r y 0 tl^e urne needld g to Model Sensitivity lion (or fraction, thereof, since real variables were ^ strategy was simulated for impermanence used). By the same token, it would be equa y ■ where total costs were supposed to be equal leading to only consider the time required ‘o m U t - ^ ^ stratcgie s. Varying budgets (options A. ate all first interim actions since these m ght c ^ c and D) were run to verify that cleanup actions stitute only a very small fraction - < were modeled properly and that correct piogram urogram under the inte r im strategy. f wpre eenerated, and to derive corresponding P tS resolve .his dilemma, fWMRjgE” progmm'u^tons. Resells are given in .able A-2. measured in terms of the year at \ _ jer- All program costs were equal at the critical lmpcr percentages of all expected cleanups were und^ pence factors. i‘(sc) = 0.75 and .'(gw = 0.8. taken. The percentiles are 30, 50. 7C, ■ • thereby verifying this aspect of the model. 100 percent. Assuming that the mode i Despite the mathematical justification for meas- between primary and future actions, a sin ^ uri prograin duration in terms of the 90 percent pretation of progress percentiles can S'- program progress level, to arnve at a verifiable con- instance. under the interim cleanup.strategy, d i(sc P J J ach slrategy was compared in terms of = ifgw) = 0.7, the 30 percent program progres duration at all program progress levels, might mean (depending on the timing o 1 future a See 8 lables A-3a and A-3b for simulation results at Hons) that at most all first tntenm cleanups were (bee^ , mpermanence r actor levels.) At the cnti- completed, and no future actions ha d started F d )mperma nence factors for permanent cost op- i(sc) = i(gw) > 0.7, the 30 percent program progress cat l 1 am costs of the two strategies mark would have to include addittonal future ^ ^ eq ’ ual , he inter im strategy performs poorly in tions. In general, the minimum progr 1 . terms of program duration even at the 30 perc.en Sr--- iretK “ ,ab,esA - ,a * nd . v ,) = moil - i) 16 11 Table A-2 -Simulation of Cleanup Program Progress Ranqes of Years in Which Required Cleanups are Imtiat Ranges oi ^ program Co$t s63 . 6 Billion _ -- Selected percenta ges ol site s__ “M*- 70°/° 90°/°_ 95% _ 100 ” / — i lniiial Budget^ $16 B;i(sc) = 0.75; Hg*) = 0.8 Cleanup slrategy: „ 48 140 1- 84-140+ 110-140+ 140 + Interim. JJ*® ^ 22-65 26-79 26-82 27-85 Permanent . 14 la II. Initial Budget » S9.0 B; Use) - 0.75; i(gw) - 0.8 Cleanup strategy: 42 ,i40+ 79-140+ 104-140+ 140 + Interim. 1497 25 ,f ^40 24-53 25-56_2 S-59 Permanent . . . •__----- a Pango de'» ' _ . ,r «F longest programs to scenario ILB C I Shone- p yams correspond to sc * , ECF longes. programs to scenario U.D+ II Snort.>t programs correspond lo scenario 1ECP. lo.ges. p oy SOURCE oillcc Ol Technology Assessment | ■ 96 • Superlund Strategy o TO c © u (/) in .oi£l , e i 3 , '5 I . 2 : , O’ r- * I K V I “ Z* [ 'i: , : i 1 "Z, 3 _ &> ! i :!|j g i s I E | _ S, i »- hi c •o ; CO i «o -j n »- (») O O CD -i -r *r r~ K O N. •J *J *- •- ir) r- O iO (\ ' ° ® ; ^ f- -T — A * C a> Q i "5 m O' — »! 12 :-! *- ■- l/l fS( ^ ao •» r- «r 4/3 I (*) M •- *- CT> , CN* ! 0) ■a TO a r> < © -D TO . F . ii| J5 t £ ~ i ~ *| fci - , a> fN .n r* u ’-k ! o o r. o E | £ r- ,n fS| u I •- »/> CO O k to n •- n | 4 1 •- iT> | t- & & & & ~ o o o o 1/1 cn fN. 4 T> co *- «T - AAA t/> 1 co . — O <’) •>» r>- i ! a> : O g <£, UD 00 | O 7? ^TI CNi t^» ^ p' >l£ cn CNi m CO I ' D | m CN* •- cn i | cn • c e :. S|3li ■? I co *nj «o •- * ! o csi to : id «r> o tn * to n* n. n ' v> 03 m 'r o 03 -7 CN* — iO CO *9 CO CD ] r> cm * ^ i co — cn I C\J I *** \ j ct> *j cn v c\j *t o >n ' CN* »- »- a~> — fN. co 2? ^ 2' 2° . o o o o o> n. in n O CD CD ^ ] 2 2 2 2 S I AAA ^ . co i > co | cO ■ -r to n io ° 1 «r *o *- cn . On®'-®; o ^ n - to ' O *T O'! 'T ' CD CO CNJ CD CNI CO “I ^ ' «✓> ^ ^ 2? 5? O O O CD CT> r-- iT) C*D Cj c* 3 * - • . - i • Table A- 4 a.—Summary of Simulation Results With Budget Options A and B a Program Duration Ranges for i = 0.1 to 0.9 (in years) Permanent strategy Interim strategy Time distribution option: cost range^ cost range ^ Program progress_>31 4 - - W'ltorm (U): 101 140 + . 28-47 38 - 140 + . 21-45 17 140 + £, 4 . 15 - 27 16 - 140 + ™ 0 , . 13-18 13 140 + :::::::::: «>- 13 11 81 26 - 28 4, - 140 + K*.. 21-26 1 ' ™ l . 13-17 13 64 Lete(L): 119 )40 + Zt . 42 51 48 r*7 - 140 + K 0/ . ... 15-41 16-140 + . 13-18 13 140 + Z : ' :::.. . - hjl iii— c^s tcorreTnns ;°o" 6 ! 0 ge' OP-cA and r .01 High cost corresponds lo budget option B and i - 0 9 SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment Ch. 3—A Systems Analysis ot Superfund • 97 Table A- 4 b.—Summary of Simulation Results With Budget Options C and D a Program Duration Ranges for i = 0.1 to 0.9 b (in years) Permanent strategy Interim strategy Time distribution option: cost ranfle: cos. W Program progress^ ___ Uniform (U): g8 14 O + S?. 29' 5 45 35 - 140 + . 16-41 16-140 + . 12 25 12 140 + 70/0 . 7 -(5 7 - 140 + . 3 7 3-76 IOoV E> ' 26 27 39 - 140 + . .... 16 - 25 . 15 - 140 + f 0 % ^ ^ 50% . 7 13 3 32 100% U 51 115 - 140 + 95% 38 - 47 41 - 140 + QO% . 16 45 16-140 + 700 /° . 12 - 37 12 - 140 + 50 %:::::::::: ... .. 7 ^ 7 -;<° + 30 % . :: _ 3 - 7 _ 3 -105- *+'crmanent cleanup costs option 2 and new sites option F b sh0(l programs correspond to budget option C and i - 0 1 Long programs cor resDond tc budQet option D and i = 09 Clow cost corrv+oonds lo budget option C and r - 0 1 High cost correspo ds to budget option u and i = 0.9 SOURCE Office of Technc'ogy Assessment Since under either strategy, lor i < i*. the interim strategy is preferred on the basis of cost. Hut pro¬ gram durations under the interim strategy so great¬ ly exceed those ol the permanent strategy at the crit¬ ical impermanence factor that trade-offs between program cost and duration are expected. Therefore, the hypothesis for cleanup strategy decisionmak¬ ing based on two evaluation criteria at this point is: Regardless of when future costs occur and how ive choose to measure program progress. 1. The permanent strategy is preferred unequiv¬ ocally for i > i* because it is both cheaper and shorter. 2. For i < i*. there are trade-offs between pro¬ gram cost and length. At some level of impermanence, the interim strategy is preferred both in terms of program cost and duration. To be sure the method of measuring program progress or assumptions about the time distribution of future costs do not disprove this hypothesis, sen¬ sitivity analysis is performed. All program progress levels for each stra.egy were calculated while varying values of i = (0.1. 0.3, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7. 0.8. and 0.9). To properly ascer¬ tain the shortest and longest program duration, the time distributions of future costs and budgets were also varied. The shortest program under eacn strat¬ egy is achieved for the high growth ia f e budget op¬ tions, A and C, and for the early future cost tune distribution. The longest program under each strat¬ egy occurred for the low growth budget option b and D and for the late future cost time distribution. This information is given in tables A-5 and A-G. Examination of these tables shows that the hy¬ pothesis is supported, since parts 1 and 3 are true, and 2 is intuitive. Regardless of when future costs occur and our measurement of program duration, the permanent strategy is preferred for i > i*. Again regardless of these assumptions, the interim strategy is preferred only at low impermanence val¬ ues and/or if program duration is measured at biased low program progress levels. Solving the Allocation and Scheduling Programs: Systems Modeling as a Management Tool While simulation models enable comparison be¬ tween strategies, they require that the strategies first he defined. The simulation so far defined only 98 • Superfund Strategy two extreme and inflexible strategies. 11 is not likely, in a real program, that choice would be reduced to a very expensive permanent solution on the one hand or an ineffective impermanent solution, w'hich is not even cheap, on the other. More likely, different levels of cleanup would be warranted at sites according to their different levels of health risks and environmental threats. There appears to be a trend emerging at EPA where cleanup would be approached in stages. The notion of “operable units” has been put forth in draft versions of the revised NC,. Essentially, the remedial response system will be approached in terms of phased-in cleanup, which for most sites will separate surface from subsurface cleanups (this is not necessarily technically sound). Cleanup will assume the form of a three-stage process.’ This approach could be somewhat consistent with the "hedge-against-un- certainty" strategy defined earlier. With cleanups structured into three-stage proc¬ esses, a cleanup strategy could define or provide guidance for long-term allocation and scheduling policies, i.e., the tactics of the program. Decisions must be made about which sites are cleaned to what level and when each stage of cleanup is imple¬ mented. These are difficult management policy de¬ cisions for a number of reasons. First, the crucial element for evaluating schedul¬ ing and allocation tactics is a measure of risk and/or cleanup goals. Such measures or goals could: 1) de¬ fine the urgency and level of cleanup on a site-spe¬ cific basis; 2) aid in designating sites requiring dif¬ ferent levels of cleanup; 3) provide information for assessing cost effectiveness on an intersite basis, which could be used to measure the equity of clean¬ up schedules and allocations over all sites; and 4) maintain consistency within the cleanup strategy. Second, it is necessary to relate various cleanup actions to levels of risk reduction or avoidance. Without defining such relationships, it is not pos¬ sible to evaluate the site-specific cost effectiveness of cleanup options. In evaluating the cost effective¬ ness of the cleanup options it may be necessary to not only consider immediate risks but potential risks as well. A particular option may not appear very cost effective w'hen considering only the near- term risks but may be extremely cost effective in light of longer term risks. This complication touches on the third difficulty, that of evaluating cleanup action cost effectiveness on an intersite basis. The problems arise due to the interrelationship between allocation and schedul¬ 'Inside E.P.A., June 15. 198-1. ing. Limitations on budget, the availability of per¬ manent cleanup technology, or the degree to which program infrastructure is developed will likely de¬ lay some remedial actions or some stages of reme¬ dial action. While initial responses may retard the deterioration of a site, some sites will continue to degrade. For this reason, scheduling and allocation of the Superfund among sites are deeply linked with projected or potential risks and costs of reme¬ dial measures. Trade-offs are likely between more extensive actions and initial responses in the near term, and between permanent cleanup actions at different sites in the long term. The fourth management problem to address is the enormous number of possible allocation and sched¬ uling sequences. There will be many possible clean¬ up action-risk reduction relationships, all of which may have different levels of cost effectiveness de¬ pending on when the actions are undertaken. The possibility of 2,000 to 10.000 sites and three stages of response represents well over a trillion possible sequences. Even though some will be patent non¬ sense and experience can eliminate others, a meth¬ od for evaluating allocation schedules will be indispensable to efficient and equitable fund dis¬ tribution, especially in a program of such magni¬ tude and subject to intense public scrutiny. Simulation could provide valuable comparative information among schedules if measurements of risk and the in’errelationships of allocation and scheduling were reflected in the model. However, to arrive at preferred schedules, simulation meth¬ ods would require defining them all and exhaus¬ tively testing them; this would most likely be com¬ putationally infeasible. Thus, simulation may not be the most useful tool for deciding management policies at the tactical level. Fortunately, there are systems techniques that offer greater flexibility than simulation. Such tech¬ niques might include linear and nonlinear program- ling, dynamic programming, and decision analy¬ sis methods, all in a multicriteria context given that there would be more than one evaluation criterion. One of the largest applications of such mathemati¬ cal models is in financial and investment planning, e.g., capital budgeting, cashflow analysis, portfolio management, etc. 2 Mathematical models would not require predefining tactics; the preferable tactics would be the output solution. Modeling the system might begin with site clas¬ sification, a step that might also be lime dependent. *F.|. Fabozzi and | Valentc, “Mathematical Programming in Ameri¬ can Companies: A Sample Survey.” Interfaces . vol. 7, No. 1. November 1976. pp. 93-98. - ■ < - ■ ” m ^ -— T~ r- -~T—{LW»M«WJI> Ch. 3—4 Systems Analysis of Superfund • 99 In addition to the classification scheme presented in EPA’s groundwater protection strategy, certain States, e.g., New York, have already implemented a site classification scheme as a method of allo¬ cating cleanup actions. The effects of deferring cleanup actions at particular site classes could be reflected by a deterioration coefficient. The dete¬ rioration coefficient might transform deferred sites from one classification to another. The variables in the model could relate specific classes of sites and cleanup actions that would also he time dependent Again it is the value of these variables in the model solution that would provide the tactics. These variables might represent how many ac¬ tions using a specific technology were applied to how many sites of a particular class in a given year. Remedial actions would also alter the site classifica¬ tion. This problem might be formulated to minimize program cost and duration subject to a cleanup goa constraint. The level of cleanup might be increased to reflect the effects of increasing margins of safety, and solutions could be compared on the basis of system cost effectiveness. The solution—the distri¬ bution of remedial technologies over sites as a func- tion of time—could also be used as a management tool. This could be done by more closely examin¬ ing site-specific data to determine which sites would actually undergo cleanup using that type of technology. While it may appear to be an ambitious under¬ taking, efforts are being taken already to incorpor¬ ate limited but useful health information into deci¬ sionmaking. EPA is formalizing its risk assessment guidelines and attempts are being made to apply them to hazardous waste disposal site cleanup. Fur¬ thermore, site-specific hazardous waste informa¬ tion is accumulating as RI/FSs are completed. Other data are becoming available as the Hazard Rank¬ ing System is applied to more and more sites. For example the HRS has been applied to over 1,700 sites. 3 The next step is to develop and formalize a risk management strategy that would account tor intersite cost-effective trade-offs over time. More extensive and systematic use of the information available now and in the future is desirable. Devel¬ oping a strategy for the partial system that could be ref ined as health and environmental effects data are enhanced is also appropriate. To capture the dynamics of the system, a systems approach could be considered. >1' S environmental Protection Agency. "Extent ol tlie Hazardous Re¬ lease Problem and Future Funding Needs, CtlRCl.A Sec t.on 301UXHC) Study." Final Report. Oi-cember 19iW mrrr’Trrrr^.^rr^r f ? “V y .-■“7 ' •• 5 - W- *** -. - ->* 4 lOl •• b'T. if L rt ii .il fe Preceding page blank E-iHMi 1 wu rw mga i i gw qftwyqHwq j iE «—rr-t **xpm&r*t ;A « VT ^ -H W T., ’r-»»g~^-'T-r-vr»r^ J ~"- c^ }0 2- HltSfll® Introdaciloa. . 1C3 Csirrsnt SnfsisS&Jsjs’SB! Fpsas^werk •••...... CEkCLA: Summary of Key Provisions. . Nations] Contingency Plan: Summary of Key Provisions'. {JS 0f aeanup * Sto 104 Use of Cleanup Goals ... *05 . 105 Approaches to Establishing Cleanup Goals or Standards. 1ftB Factors for Evaluating Alternatives 113 Discussion of Alternative Approaches 1.'. jj 6 Conclusion. . 119" List ol Tables Table No. 4-1. Illustration of a Sita Classification System for Selecting Cleanup Coals. r’o *-..**-> mj*jv Chapter 4 Establishing goals for cleanup by Superfund, the States, and private parties will depend on scientific, technical, economic, and legal anal¬ yses. Ultimately, however, the answer to “How clean is clean?” will be a major policy judgment that must strike a delicate balance among cer¬ tain and uncertain health and environmental risks, available resources, technological capa¬ bilities, and public concerns. OTA’s analysis does not produce a simple answer to this key question. However, one approach has emerged that offers a way to choose among several proc¬ esses for determining cleanup goals; it is based on a classification of sites according to their present and future use. When a site has been identified as a poten¬ tial source of dangerous chemical releases, de¬ cisions are made on how to respond. 1 Removal actions are short-term responses to immediate threats. Remedial actions are long-term re¬ sponses designed to provide permanent rem¬ edies and are the focus oi this chapter. A criti¬ cal component of the Superfund program is determining the extent of cleanup that is re¬ quired at sites, i.e., defining the residual level of contamination or exposure that is accept- 'Uncontrolled release of chemicals from Superfund sites pre¬ sents the potential for various types of damage. Some releases can ha^m people directly, others primarily aftc-ct the environ¬ ment. Some damage may be immediately observable while other harm may manifest itself only after years ol exposure. able. Unfortunately, it is possible to know f hat a site poses significant threats, but not know precisely what those threats are or what con stitutes a safe level of cleanup. While certain criteria, such as the necessity of fund balancing and use of cost-effective remedies, are present in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the National Con¬ tingency Plan (NCP), they do not actually pre¬ scribe a course of action. 1 his lack of clear direction has led to problems. The current methods for determining the ex¬ tent of cleanup at Superfund sites may not meet statutory goals of public protection, current ac¬ tions appear to be ad hoc and inconsistent, no notional goal on the extent of cleanup has been defined. Without specific cleanup goals (with which to confirm cleanup), the selection, use, and evaluation of cleanup technologies will be difficult and contentious. Moreover, goals can help determine whether a technology is tech¬ nically feasible and guide the development of new technologies. The chapter begins by examining the current institutional framework within which goals are now structured. It then discusses six factors to evaluate alternative approaches to establish¬ ing cleanup goals and outlines seven alterna¬ tive approaches. Finally, the chapter the clean¬ up goals issue might be resolved. CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK CERCLA: Summary of Key Provisions CERCLA, or Superfund, was enacted to ad¬ dress the problem of uncontrolled releases of hazardous substances into the environment. Removal actions are shori term responses to prevent or mitigate immediate threats. Reme¬ dial actions (the focus ol this chapter) ere longer term responses designed to provide per¬ manent remedies. The statute does not provide 103 I . < x > - v- - - 104 • Superfund Strategy explicit guidance on how to decide on the ex¬ tent of a cleanup. The statute does, however, impose constraints on the choice of removal and remedial actions. Removal actions are lire ited to $1 million or 6 months unless certain statutory conditions are met. Remedial actions are restricted by fund- balancing and cost-effectiv .* requirements. The fund-balancing requirement limits the selection of a remedial action to one that provides a bal¬ ance between the need to proteci public health and welfare and the environment at tiiat site and the availability ol Superfund money for re¬ sponse to other sites. The NCP is directed to require that remedial actions be cost effective over the period of potential exposure to the haz¬ ardous substances or contaminated materials. It is coinmoniv accepted that cost effectiveness pertains to a lixed goal that different approaches may meet. National Contingency Plan: Summary of Key Previsions The NCP establishes the process for deter¬ mining appropriate removal and remedial ac¬ tions at Superfund sites. The NCP can be re¬ vised pciiodicallv, which was last done on July 16. 1982. EPA proposed revisions to the NCP on January 28, 1985. pursuant to a settlement agreement reached in Environmental Defense Fund and the State of \ r ew Jersey v. EPA. The existing NCP authorizes two types of re¬ moval actions: immediate and planned. EPA is empowered to conduct immediate removal actions when it determines such actions are necessary to prevent or mitigate an immediate and significant risk to human life or health or to the environment. There is no explicit pro¬ vision establishing the required extent of clean¬ up. Immediate removal actions are considered “complete” when there is no longer an imme¬ diate and significant risk to human life or health or to the environment, and the contami¬ nated waste materials have been treated or dis¬ posed of properly offsite. Planned removals are authorized when the Environmental Prr .action Agency (EPA) deter¬ mines that continuing an immediate removal action will result in a substantial cost savings or that the public or the environment will be at risk if response is delayed at a site not on the National Priorities List (NPL). As with im¬ mediate removals, there is no explicit provision establishing the extent of cleanup for planned removals. They are “terminated" when the risk to the public health or the environment has been abated. The current NCI’ provides extensive guid¬ ance lor choosing an appropriate remedial ac¬ tion plan. There is a process EPA uses to eval¬ uate the nature and extent ol contamination at a site: propose and evaluate possible remedial alternatives; and select a remedial action plan. As with removal actions, the !\'CPdoes not pro¬ vide explicit guidance on what degree of clean¬ up must he achieved hv a remedial action. The appropriate extent of remedy is determined by selecting the most cost-effective remedial alter¬ native (i.e., the lowest cost alternative that is technologically feasible and reliable and which effectively minimizes damage to and provides adequate protection of public health, welfare, and the environment). As with CERCLA. the NCP requires that the need to respond to other releases with f und monies be considered in de¬ termining the appropriate extent of remedy. Applicability of Other Laws to Determining Extent of Cleanup at Superfund Sites The proposed draft revisions to the NCP in¬ corporate EPA's policy on CERCLA compli¬ ance with the requirements of other environ¬ mental statutes. For removal actions. EPA proposes to meet applicable or relevant stand¬ ards of other Federal environmental and pub¬ lic health laws to the maximum extent prac¬ ticable. considering the exigencies of the situation. For remedial actions, EPA proposes to com¬ ply with applicable and relevant standards of other Federal public health and environmental laws, with limited waivers. Specifically, the draft revisions would require that the appro¬ priate extent of remedy be determined by se- r-r r. wtmmmam' - ,'^.r ". /- '.r*S.*54n Ch. 4 —Strategies tor Setting Cleanup Goals • 105 lecting a cost-effective remedial action that ef¬ fectively mitigates and minimizes threats to and provides adequate protection ol public health and welfare and the environment. In particular, the remedy must, at a minimum, at¬ tain or exceed applicable or relevant existing Federal public health or environmental stand¬ ards. Applicable standards are those standards that would be legally applicable if the actions were not taken pursuant to Section 104 or lO of CERCLA. Relevant standards are those that are based on scientific or technological con¬ siderations that are similar to conditions at the site. Where two or more alternatives achieve com- parable levels of protection of public health ana welfare and the environment , the most cost- effective alternative will be selected; one which provides the most favorable balance between cost and protection. Selection can consider the reliability of the remedy, available technology, administrative concerns, and other relevant factors. According to EPA, an alternative that does not meet applicable or relevant standards may be selected for one of the following reasons; • fund-balancing; , • the selected alternative is not the final remedy; • technological infeasibility, • unacceptable environmental impacts; or • overriding public health conceins. Thus, it is not clear that EPA’s approach nec¬ essarily leads to a cleanup decision consistent with the level of protection originally intended for a site. Use of Hazard Ranking System Sites that are included on the NPL are ranked by the Hazard Ranking System (HRS). I he score assigned to each site is intended to re¬ flect the relative potential of the hazardous sub¬ stances present to cause damage, the rapidity with which the damage will occur, and the magnitude of the impact. Three scores are com¬ bined to produce the final rank. 1 hese scores reflect the potential for harm by chemicals that have migrated away from the facility and are found in the groundwater, surface water, air. If the final priority score is equal to or above 28.5, the site is placed on the NI L and is eligible for remedial action. The HRS addresses the possibility that a site will cause harm. Since it neglects actual expo¬ sures and effects, however, it does not provide a qualitative assessment of the risk presentee bv the site. Moreover, sites where data are lack¬ ing may have lower scores than appropriate be¬ cause zero is generally assigned for any spe¬ cific points lacking data (see chapter 5). Some of the factors used in the HRS model indicate the types of concerns that should be addressed in determining cleanup goals. model estimates hazard based on limited data and can lead to scores which other informa¬ tion could increase or decrease. For example, an increasing number of points are given lor decreasing distance to surface water, buildings, or local populations. The current model can¬ not incorporate additional knowledge that would substantially affect the danger posed by the site, e.g.. whether the geologic conditions are likely to allow the chemicals to contami¬ nate the surface water, whether the bui ( 'U£s are occupied, or whether the activities of the local population cause frequent contact with the site. The presence of an observed release, an unusual smell, or a large number of drums or tanks increase the score in the model. Thus some parts of the current model address issue, of concern for determining extent of cleanup, but not all important issues are considered. 1 he model was not designed to and is not used to determine extent of cleanup and, as currently structured, is inadequate for this Purpose. But a revised, improved model could be used to de¬ termine, at least partially, the extent of re¬ sponse, even if only the initial response (see chapter 2). Use of Cleanup Goals At the four sites CTA examined closely, all the remedial strategies were based primarily on waste containment and groundwater treat¬ ment rather than waste removal and treat- 106 • Superfund Strategy ment. Several factors seened to influence these decisions. Costs required for complete site cleanup appeared to be important factors at the Love Canal and Seymour sites. At Stringfellow. incorrect assumptions regarding the permea¬ bility of underlying bedrock formed the basis for remedial action decisions that have proven ineffective. Little consideration was given to the long-term effectiveness of containment, continually increasing operating and mainte¬ nance costs, possibilities of containment fail¬ ure and continuing groundwater contamina¬ tion, and practical problems resulting from the very long times (hundreds or thousands of years) required to manage these hazardous waste sites. At three of the sites (Seymour, Stringfellow, Love Canal), initial actions were required prior to remediation. These actions were short-term solutions to immediate problems, and in some cases may have actually wor ned the problem. At these sites, there was also a lack of specific cleanup goals specifying acceptable residual levels of contamination. The Sylvester site was the only one where environmental goals were set prior to remedial action. The specific cleanup goals involved a hundred-fold reduction in the offsite release of contaminants in groundwater, compliance with EPA water quality standards at Lowell drink¬ ing water intakes, and compliance with certain EPA air quality criteria at a nearby trailer park. In particular, the goals were aimed at meeting standards for several contaminants in water and chloroform in air emissions. The cleanup goals did not consider other sources of toxic chemicals entering the water supply. APPROACHES TO ESTABLISHING CLEANUP GOALS OR STANDARDS This section will evaluate some alternative approaches to establishing the extent of clean¬ up at Superfund sites. No attempt has been made to consider all possible approaches. The approaches selected were those that appear most reasonable given current knowledge and past experience with remedial actions at Super¬ fund sites. The analysis of each approach will consider six major factors that define the nature and ex¬ tent of cleanup that is possible at Superfund sites: 1) inherent hazard of the chemical wastes found at the sites; 2) site-specific considerations and exposure; 3) assessment of risks to human health, environmental biota, and natural re¬ sources; 4) available technologies and remedial action alternatives; 5) resource limitations; and 6) institutional constraints. While many of these factors involve scientific and technical issues, it is important to recognize that the choice of a cleanup goal or standard is ulti¬ mately a policy decision. Factors for Evaluating Alternatives Inherent Hazard of Chemical Wastes Found at Superfund Sites The inheren' hazard the chemicals present at a site determines their potential to cause harm to human health or the environment. When inherent hazard is combined with po¬ tential exposure, the potential risk (i.e., the pos¬ sibility of an adverse effect) for harm to human health or the environment can be assessed. In¬ herent hazard of chemicals can be evaluated by the type of damage they cause, the amount present as compared to existing standards and acceptable levels, the extent of reliable knowl¬ edge about them, and the mixture of hazard¬ ous substances present at the site. Several types of hazard can occur from the release of chemicals into the environment. For example, some chemicals are likely to ignite or explode, causing both the danger of physi¬ cal damage and the potential for the chemicals t **$=**&•:r» lo be spread over a large area. The corrosive properties of chemicals can directly damage human health or the environment and can af¬ fect the stability oi the site by causing a breach of natural or engineered barriers. The chemi¬ cals can also present a toxicological risk to peo¬ ple or local flora and fauna. Each chemical can present one or several types of toxicological hazards. The compound can be acutely toxic, i.e., exposure for minutes or hours can produce an ef fect that is general ly observed within a very short period of time. Somewhat longer exposures may also produce adverse effects, either a more severe conse¬ quence or an entirely different effect, including cancer. Certain more sensitive populations may be affected by lower levels of exposure than the general population. For instance, some chemicals are most toxic to developing fetuses in utero but cause little harm to (he pregnant woman. Still other effects may be ob¬ served in young children or the elderly. Adverse health effects range from reversible effects, e g., skin or eye irritation, to irreversi¬ ble damage, e g., malfunction or cancer of vital organs. A chemical may cause predominantly one effect or may cause several diverse toxic reactions. Moreover, each chemical can pro¬ duce a variety of effects depending on the level of expo sure. While all chemicals can produce an adverse effect at some level of exposure, the level of exposure will determine both the type of damage and the severity of the harm. Thus, low levels of some chemicals will produce diz¬ ziness or headaches while higher levels may cause unconsciousness or death. Similarly, a dilute acid may cause skin irritation while a more concentrated solution will burn the skin. Knowledge of both the inherent toxicity of the chemicals present at the site and levels of po¬ tential exposure is. therefore, necessary to de¬ termine what hazard exists. Standards or levels that have been deemed acceptable exist for some of the chemicals found at Superfund sites. Some standards, which have had some peer and pub'ic review, and other established levels (e.g., judicially es¬ tablished action levels) can be used to evaluate Ch. 4—Strategies tor Setting Cleanup Goals • 107 inherent hazard. Care must be taken to ensure that the standard or other acceptable level is appropriate for the Superfund site. Standards are usually developed for one medium and one route of exposure. For example, a standard of 1 part per billion of dioxin in soil has been set for Superfund sites, but not for water or air. A standard developed for one medium is fre¬ quently inappropriate for another since the medium may determine the extent and route of exposure. The severity and type of toxicity of a chemical can also vary with route of ex¬ posure. Furthermore, some standards are for acute (short-term) exposures while others are lor chronic (long-term) exposures. Occupation¬ al standards for exposure assume a limited time exposure for healthy adults. Other standards may be partially based on cost or available tech¬ nology and should not be considered a meas¬ ure of inherent toxicity. Although the inherent toxicity of several chemicals has been studied in depth, a recent study by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that most chemicals have not been adequately examined for all potential toxic ef¬ fects. 2 Based on an examination of randomly selected compounds, the report estimates that no toxicity information is available on 76 to 82 percent of chemicals in commerce included on the Toxic Substances Control Act Inventory, 38 percent of pesticides and inert ingredients of pesticides formulations, 56 percent of cos¬ metic ingredients. 25 percent of drugs and ex¬ cipients used in drug formulations, and 46 per¬ cent of food additives. Lcs 3 than 18 percent of the chemicals in these categories were esti¬ mated to have a sufficient data base to provide a complete health hazard assessment. The lack of data is a particular concern for chemical wastes, i.e., chemicals that are unwanted by¬ products of chemical synthesis or other man¬ ufacturing process. Until recently, there has been little economic incentive to study the po¬ tential toxic effects of such chemicals. More¬ over. there have been few studies on health ef- 'Nationdl Research Council. To\iritv Testing. Strategies to De¬ termine Xet^tis anti Priorities (Washington. DC: National Acad¬ emy Press. 108-»|. ifnnw—murirn i«nmr»nwnn i»» n 108 * Superturid Strategy fects associated with actual uncontrolled sites, and those completed have generally posed sig¬ nificant scientific uncertainties. Finally, few waste sites contain only one chemical; thus, chemical and toxicological in¬ teractions need to be considered. Chemical re¬ actions can result in new compounds whose physical, chemical, and toxicological proper¬ ties differ significantly from those originally at the Superfund site. Chemical reactions can also cause fire or explosions. The potential of toxi¬ cological interactions is poorly understood. While some chemicals have been shown to en¬ hance or interfere with the toxicological effects of another (e.g., synergism or antagonism), only a few such mixtures have been examined. In the absence of knowledge, the hazards of com¬ binations of chemicals is generally ignored and may present a large uncertainty in the assess¬ ment of the site. Site-Specific Considerations and Exposure For chemicals to pose a hazard to health and the environment, people, flora, and fauna must be exposed to them. Geology, geography, and weather conditions are some of the factors that will affect the routes and levels of exposure. Thus, site-specific factors will affect which media are contaminated and the routes and ex¬ tent of potential exposure. Site-specific factors will determine the prob¬ ability that chemicals will leach into ground- water, drain into rivers, or evaporate into the air. For example, soil with high organic con¬ tent will tend to retain hydrophobic chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyls (RGBs) while soils w r ith less organic content will tend to re¬ lease these chemicals into the groundwater or air. Soil composition and permeability will in¬ fluence the rate at which contaminants leach from the site, which in turn can affect the rate and extent of exposures, e.g., via drinking wa¬ ter wells or via contamination of nearby sur¬ face water. Weather, including temperature, amount and type of precipitation, and wind strength or direction can affect the movement of chemicals and their transfer among media. Conditions that affect the route of exposure, e.g., exposure to contaminated soil via dermal contact versus inhalation of dust particles, can affect the amount absorbed into the body and, thus, the extent of exposure. Models can be used to predict environmental fate and potential levels of exposure by vari¬ ous routes. Confirmation of the accuracy of en¬ vironmental late models is limited by the pau¬ city of data on the actions and reactions of chemicals in the environment. For example, predictions of a chemicals’s movement for sev¬ eral decades is often based on data collected over several months. Small errors in initial measurements or in assumptions can be com pounded for long-term predictions. Modeling potential exposure will also de¬ pend on the ability of the assessor to estimate human activity. Route and level of exposure will depend on the activities of the local pop¬ ulation, e.g., digging in soil, swimming in or drinking of water. Inhalation exposure levels will vary with breathing rate which, in turn, depends on factors such as age and level of activity. The average exposure for a population can differ significantly from the exposure of a person whose habits or occupation cause more or less contact with the site. Exposure models also make assumptions about the ex¬ tent to which an individual’s activities will change over a lifetime and the likelihood that people will remain in their current residence and/or occupation. The size and sensitivity of the local popula¬ tion and the nature of the flora and fauna will determine the extent of the effects of exposure to the chemicals. The size of the local popula¬ tion and its proximity to the site will determine the number of people potentially exposed. The presence or absence of particularly sensitive populations (e.g., children, the elderly) needs to be known to adequately assess the level of exposure that will produce an adverse effect. Knowledge of activities on or near a site will indicate potential routes of exposure and allow reasonable estimations of durations of expo¬ sure, e.g., children at Love Canal faced poten¬ tially high exposure because of the location of their school and playground. Ch 4—Strategies (or Setting Cleanup Goals • 109 A Superfund site should not be examined in a vacuum. Other factors in the surrounding en¬ vironment can affect the nature and extent of remedial action at a site. Naturally occurring chemicals can present a hazard when combined with residual levels from a cleaned site. Even if a Super fund site is cleaned to a level that is acceptable by itself, the background level of some toxic chemicals, such as heavy metals, may be sufficiently high that exposure to the background levels combined with the residual contamination can raise exposure to an unac¬ ceptable level. Local sources of pollution need to be considered when determining the poten¬ tial risk to an exposed population. Some of these other sources may cause concomitant ex¬ posures, especially if they contaminate the same resource, e.g., the same aquifer. Other sources may cause exposure to the same chem¬ icals but by different routes, for instance, or¬ ganic solvents may be in the drinking water or in the air. Assessment of Risks to Human Health, Environmental Biota, and Natural Resources An assessment of a site’s potential health and environmental risks is based on the inherent hazard of the chemicals present and the routes and levels of potential exposure. Risk assess¬ ment is the use of available data to estimate the potential effects of exposure to particular haz¬ ardous materials or situations on an individ¬ ual, species, or populations. Results of risk assessments are frequently expressed as the probability of the occurrence of a particular ef¬ fect under specific conditions. The National Academy of Sciences has identified four proc¬ esses that comprse a risk assessment: 3 • Hazard identification: The determination of whether a particular chemical is or is not casually linked to particular health effects. • Dose-response assessment: The determina¬ tion of the relation between the magnitude of exposure and the probability of occur¬ rence of the heahh effects in question. ’Ibid. • Exposure assessment: The determination of the extent of human exposure before or after application of regulatory controls. • Risk characterization: The description of the nature and often the magnitude of hu¬ man risk, including attendant uncertainty. The first three issues were discussed during considerations of inherent hazard and site-spe¬ cific condition <= Risk characterization is dis¬ cussed below. Risk assessments should explicitly consider the uncertainties in knowledge about the inher¬ ent hazard of the chemicals at the site and the routes and levels of exposure. Thus, if the tox¬ icological data limitations were greatest for chemicals that would be expected to volatilize easily and if the greatest exposure were ex¬ pected to be by inhalation, a greater uncertain¬ ty factor might be incorporated into the risk assessment to account for these compounds’ potential toxicity. Similarly, if the toxicity of the compound that poses the most significant risk at the site were estimated from incomplete da*a or from experiments that were inadequate¬ ly performed, a greater uncertainty factor would be included in the risk assessment or, alternatively, the next most toxic chemical might be used for the evaluation. A site-specific risk assessment is comprised of a series of such assessments: for each route of exposure, for each duration of exposure (i.e., acute, short-term, or chronic), and for various adverse effects (e.g., cancer or organ toxicitv) for each organism (e.g., human, animal, or plant) potentially affected. Usually the expo¬ sures producing the highest risks based on pre¬ liminary assessments for the populations of concern are more carefully evaluated. In addition to uncertainties associated with conditions at a site, the process of risk assess¬ ment itself has inherent uncertainties. For ex¬ ample, toxicological risk assessments are based on current knowledge and assumptions about biological processes use models that have been developed to describe them. Often the models are designed to overestimate rather than un¬ derestimate risk. While such prudence is rea¬ sonable given the limitations of toxicological 110 • Superlund Strategy knowledge, it must be recognized that such de¬ cisions aic based on considerations other than those provided by science alone. This is one example of the difference between risk assess¬ ment and risk management. Risk assessment is defined as the calculation of the probability of adverse outcomes such as injury, disease, or death. Risk management in¬ corporates other considerations such as accept¬ ability of risk, costs and benefits, and policy into a dele mination of a course of action. Al¬ though theoretically distinct parts of the deci¬ sionmaking process, risk assessment and risk management are too often interwoven. In the case cited above, deciding which risk extrap¬ olation model to use is a risk management deci¬ sion. Evaluating and selecting data to be used in the extrapolation model, as well as the ex¬ trapolation process, are elements of risk assess¬ ment. Decisions about what actions to take based on the extrapolated risk are risk manage¬ ment judgments. When elements of risk man¬ agement are imbedded in risk assessment proc¬ esses. cor fusion about the “scientific" or objective content of policies and decisions can result. Site-specific risk can be compared with risk levels that are considered to be acceptable. Non-chronic toxic effects are thought to have a threshold cf exposure below which no tox- ici*y will occur. Acceptable exposure levels for tn ;se compounds are frequently based on a no- roserved-adverse-effect level which is lowered bv uncertainty factors that consider concerns such as variation in individual susceptibility and extrapolation of results from animals to man. The resultant levels are often called ac- ccptable daily intakes or ADIs. EPA has pub¬ lished draft guidance on the use of ADIs for assessment of the risk to human health from nonchronic effects." Acceptable exposure levels for carcinogens are usually based on the estimated increase in an individual’s probability of contracting can¬ cer. In the past. EPA has regulated carcinogens wlslur IrrTr* 1 ,>ro,ec,ion A * enc V Guidance and Moth- tlZn;tz cce,, ' Mo nm,y ,ntah ’ sa '- at individual risk levels in the range of 10" (l in 10.000) to 10° (1 in 100.000.000). The oreadth of this range is caused by many factors includ¬ ing cost-benefit analysis (when npnlicable under the appropriate legislation), availability of sub¬ stitute chemicals (e.g., for regulating pesti¬ cides). or feasibility (e.g.. ability to remove chemicals >rom groundwater). In general EPA recommends that residual risk levels for car¬ cinogens at Superfund sites be in the range of 10 " to 10 ° before consideration of site-specific factors, 5 with a risk of 10“ (1 in 1.000.000) as the point of departure lor an acceptable level Available Technologies and Remedial Action Alternatives The ability to detect the identity and levels of contaminating chemicals and achieve clean¬ up goals depends on curren-tlv available tech¬ nology. Although technology continues to ad¬ vance. it has limitations that cannot be exceeded regardless of situation or intentions; there can be no a priori assurance that even f J )rov,!n technology will work for each particu¬ lar situation. Technological limitations affect several aspects of cleanup goals and pro¬ cedures. The state of the art of sampling technology limits the extent to which the identity and lev¬ els of chemicals contaminating a site can be ( e , l r orm . inf * d - Sampling can represent the most difficult problem at large sites with diverse chemical contaminants and geologic conditions. Analytical procedures do not exist for the un¬ ambiguous identification of all chemicals that may be encountered at Superfund sites Pro¬ cedures have been developed for some chemi¬ cals. but they only detect that compound above a certain level. As analytical procedures limit knowledge of the presence of chemicals, they also limit the extent to which cleanup can be achieved with certainty. After a remedial clean- up. the presence or absence of a compound can at Pest be determined to be at or below the lim- M S Km-irunment.il Protection Agency. Memorandum bv I ee 19. It " l'«l*r ACL Demonstration. Nov. - Ch 4—Strategies tor Setting Cleanup Goals • 111 its of detection. These may be above or below levels of concern for threats to health or envi¬ ronment. Cleanup technologies are similarly limited. Public expectations usually ignore the limita¬ tions of even the best technology to eliminate exposure to a waste once it is released into the environment, particularly groundwater, or to completely prevent future releases. Current options for handling waste chemicals include destruction (e.g., incineration), blocking move¬ ment (e.g., slurry walls), or removal (e.g., off¬ site disposal). Many prospective cleanup tech¬ nologies are in the R&D or the pilot plant stages of development (see chapter 6). The unintended consequences of the use of any remedial technology may include transfer of toxicants among media, transfer or risks among populations, and residual pollution re¬ sulting from the technology. Transfers of tox¬ icants among media may involve the same chem¬ icals (e.g., when chemicals are stripped from water by aeration) or chemical byproducts of processing the orginal contaminants (e.g., transfer of combustion products of solids or liq¬ uids into air pollutants by incineration). Al¬ though such processes can remove the contam¬ inants from the Superfund site, the residual risks posed by the chemicals or their byprod¬ ucts in new media need to be considered. Remedial technologies can also involve the transfer of risks among populations. Offsite dis¬ posal of waste chemicals will potentially ex¬ pose additional populations during transit, treatment, or disposal of the waste chemicals. Risks to new and previously unexposed popu¬ lations should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of any remedial action. Mop* technologies will leave some level of re¬ sidual contamination, either at the original site, in aquifers distant from the site, or at the ulti¬ mate site of treatment or redisposal. Some re¬ sidual contamination results from the inability of any process to completely eliminate a chem¬ ical. Risks posed by this residual contamina¬ tion should be considered when cleanup goals are established. Other remedial processes pro¬ duce new wastes (e.g., contaminated carbon from filtration systems). While not always im¬ mediately obvious, generation of such wastes must be considered in establishing cleanup procedures and goals. Resource Limitations A number of resource limitations significant¬ ly affect the nature and extent of remedial ac¬ tions. First, there is a finite amount of public and private money that can be devoted to the cleanup of Superfund sites. In addition to fi¬ nancial limitations, other resources such as the number of trained personnel, laboratories for sampling and analysis, and equipment to acnieve the desired cleanup response are also limited and may not be available even if money were (see chapter 7). Similarly, decisions to use offsite hazardous waste management facilities assume that these facilities have sufficient capacity. Dividing the total available resources among all NPL sites involves difficult decisions based on limited data and can result in inconsisten¬ cies in the extent of cleanup among sites. What¬ ever the allocation of resources for any site, the cleanup should obtain the highest level of cleanup for resources spent. But this still begs the issue of cleanup goals. It is becoming in¬ creasingly clear that at this time the potential number of Superfund sites is not accurately known, nor is it known what resources will be needed for remedial actions at those sites. Con¬ sequently, the resources made available for any single site must be carefully considered. With¬ out such consideration, several intractable sites could significantly deplete the available funds and necessitate less extensive cleanup at seri¬ ous sites that are discovered or investigated later (see chapters 2 and 3). Institutional Constraints As discussed, CERCLA and the NCP as cur¬ rently drafted provide little guidance about how to determine the extent of cleanup re¬ quired at Superfund sites. Draft revisions to the NCP would require that in most cases, clean¬ ups must attain or exceed relevant and appli¬ cable Federal standards. It is not clear that this ve ' 112 • Superfund Strategy requirement would really resolve the issue of extent of cleanup, especially in light of the ex¬ ceptions incorporated in the draft provision. The extent to which other laws and regula¬ tions may define the extent of cleanup and the manner in which the cleanup is achieved also lacks clarity. For example, it is obvious that ma¬ terial removed from a Superfund site for off¬ site disposal must be handled in compliance with the provisions of the Resource Conserva¬ tion and Recovery Act (RCRA). (However, see chapter 5 for a discussion of the problems with RCRA facilities.) Less clear is the impact of the provisions of RCRA if the material is to be dis¬ posed, stored, or contained on site. Does the site become , de facto RCRA facility that must comply with all RCRA requirements? The res¬ olution of these issues could substantially af¬ fect the nature of remedial actions. Other laws such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), Clean Water Act (CWA), and Clean Air Act (CAA) regulate contaminants in the en¬ vironment. Current provisions of these acts are insuflicient to define the extent of cleanup under CERCLA. The number of chemicals reg¬ ulated under each act is small compared with the number of compounds already identified at Superfund sites. The standards developed under these laws consider one medium and/or route of exposure: SDWA. drinking water (in¬ gestion): CWA, surface water; CAA, air (inhala¬ tion). SDWA health advisories only consider short-term effects (1 day to 2 years) and do not, therefore, consider carcinogenic effects. While none of these existing standards are alone suf¬ ficient to determine the extent of cleanup, they may provide guidance for a particular medium or route of exposure. Hazardous waste sites have generated con¬ siderable public, political, and media interest. These concerns have focused attention on the problem in general, and decisions about ac¬ tions at Superfund sites are being examined with increased intensity. While the high level of interest may increase the probability that all alternatives are examined and that appropri¬ ate action is ultimately taken, this interest can also present problems. The issues involved in determining the extent of cleanup at any site are technically complex and contain large un¬ certainties. Oversimplification of the issues can lead to an overstatement or understatement of the risk that, in turn, can lead to unnecessary concern or complacency. Public, political, or media pressure may cause cleanup based on notoriety rather than hazard. When the method or extent of cleanup is well-publicized at one site, public perception of fairness may require that the same method or extent of cleanup be used at another site, even if site-specific con¬ siderations would suggest a different action. Actions of the local population, media, or elected officials can be based on calculated, po¬ tential adverse effects or on their perception of risks that may not exist. Studies of real ver¬ sus perceived risk have clearly demonstrated that the risk perceived by the public may dif¬ fer significantly from the calculated risk, not that calculated risk is necessarily a complete indicator of actual risk. 6 Both perceived and actual risks may have to be addressed in the remedial action program, perhaps through more effective public participation in decision¬ making (see chapter 8). One factor influencing public perception of risk will be actions taken at other sites where remedies have been instituted. Public reaction may be adverse if actions that are perceived to be less stringent are implemented at one site as compared with another. Because of site-spe¬ cific factors affecting the design of remedial action programs, comparison of one cleanup plan with another will be difficult and in many cases unfair. What is ultimately important and realistically achievable is consistency in the process of determining what the cleanup of sites should be, rather than necessarily mak¬ ing all cleanups the same. Discussion of Alternative Approaches This section analyzes seven alternative ap¬ proaches for determining the extent of cleanup 'V.T. Covoilo. W.C. Kin mm, J.V. Rodricks, and R.G. Tardiff, The Analysis of Actual Versus Perceived Risks (New York: Plenum Press, 1083). . vj. *»w v Ch. 4—Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals • 113 at Superfund sites. The primary focus of four of the approaches is to establish cleanup goals based primarily on current scientific and tech¬ nical considerations: site-specific risk assess¬ ments, national levels of residual contamina¬ tion, background or pristine levels of chem¬ icals, or best available technology. The fifth ap¬ proach, the use of cost-benefit analysis, bal¬ ances the extent of cleanup at each site against cost, with or without a site-specific resource limitation. A potential-use driven approach is designed around a classification system based on present and future use of sites. Also dis¬ cussed is a continuation of the current ad hoc practices. Continued Use of Current Ad Hoc Practices Description of Approach.— In general, the present reliance on ad hoc practices has not provided a consistent explicit process for determining goals. Nor is it likely that the remedial actions thus far have resulted in consistent levels of cleanup among sites posing similar threats. A review of remedial actions at various Super- fund sites indicates that the inherent toxicity of the chemicals present has, in part, deter¬ mined the chosen remedy. Site-specific factors, especially as they affect feasibility, have also been considered. Risk assessments of the po¬ tential for sites to harm human health or the environment have rarely been explicitly in¬ cluded in the decision process. Availability and presumed effectiveness of best available remedial technologies have been driving factors in determining the extent of cleanup. This may be due, in part, to the com¬ parative ease of analyzing the cost, feasibility, and reliability of existing technologies con¬ trasted with the difficulty of making such judg¬ ments regarding health and environmental risks. There has been some sensitivity to the concerns of the local population, elected offi¬ cials, and the media. Analysis of Approach.— Continuation of current practices, possibly with additional guidance, would provide an increased opportunity to evaluate remedial actions. One might then have a stronger basis for deciding on the preferred approach to establishing cleanup goals. On the other hand, CERCLA was enacted over 4 years ago; considerable resources have been ex¬ pended and continue to be spent with mixed results. Now may be the time to resolve an issue which is critical to the remedial action Description of Approach.— One alternative ap¬ proach to determining cleanup goals involves the explicit use of risk assessment coupled with a site-specific or national determination of ac¬ ceptable risk levels. Uniform procedures and methodologies would also need to be used. Risk assessment would involve determining the po¬ tential hazards of the chemicals at each site, characterizing exposures based on site-specific considerations, and calculating risks based on the inherent toxicity of chemicals at the site and potential exposures to humans and the en¬ vironment. Various models can be used to determine site-specific risk. One model illustrates some of the issues that need to be resolved in site- specific risk assessment. 7 In this model, the in¬ dividual chemicals to be used in the risk assess¬ ment are selected by a ranking scheme that evaluates each chemical’s potential for toxicity (based on ADI and/or carcinogenic potency) and exposure (based on quantity present and physical-chemical properties). For each se¬ lected chemical, potential exposure is esti¬ mated by all appropriate routes, for each re¬ medial action plan considered. The risk for each chemical for each route is calculated and compared with the predetermined acceptable level for the toxic effect. Remedial actions are compared, and the appropriate response is se¬ lected to av hieve the maximum difference be¬ tween the residual and acceptable level of risk at the lowest cost. For the sake of consistency and defensibilitv, uniform procedures and methodologies should be used in risk assessment; therefore, a num- 7 f.V. Rodricks. "Risk Assessment at Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites,” Hazardous Waste, vol. 1, 1984. pp. 333-362. program. Site-Specific Risk Assessment uses rcati&u w . .r... , . 114 • Superfund Strategy ber of choices must be made. A site-specific risk assessment of human health effects can be expressed in terms of individual or population risk. Individual risks estimate the risk of any person exposed under the conditions stated in the estimate and are independent of the size of the population exposed. Population risks are derived by multiplying the individual risk by the number of people exposed by that route of exposure. If individual risks am used for set¬ ting the standards for extent of cleanup, clean¬ ups will be consistent throughout the country regardless of the size of the potentially exposed population. If population risks arc used. Super- fund sites in sparsely settled locations may have higher residual individual risk than those in more populated areas. Since most Superfund sites contain many chemicals, the risk assessor, for a variety of rea¬ sons, including cost and expediency, may choose to determine the risk on the basis of a few indicator substances. If the selection of in¬ dicator chemicals is based on their relative abundance at the site, the most toxic chemi¬ cals may be overlooked. If the selection is based on inherent toxicity, compounds that have been extensively studied may be favored since knowledge about lack of toxicity is not always distinguished from lack of knowledge about toxicity. Clearly making such a choice without doing assessments for the alternatives could lead to results that are not indicative of the site's greatest risks. Similarly, choices must be made for predict¬ ing potential exposure. These choices are often between the use of models to predict exposures and collecting more extensive data on actual exposure. After the site has been generally characterized for factors such as geology, weather, and local population, models can pro¬ vide an estimate of exposure, albeit with some uncertainty. Gathering more data can reduce this uncertainty, but can delay action, cause more exposure to the pollutants, and be quite expensive. Analysis of Approach.— By definition, a cleanup goal determined by risk assessment must give appropriate consideration to the inherent haz¬ ard of the chemicals present at a site, the site- specific factors affecting exposure, and the po¬ tential risks to human health, environmental biota, and natural resources. All of the previ¬ ously discussed uncertainties and concerns associated with these factors would still apply. It is possible to structure conservative risk assessments through a “worst-case” perspec¬ tive, or to consider “average” or “likely” risks. This approach’s sensitivity to technology and resource limitations depends to a large extent on whether the cleanup would need to achieve a national or site-specific standard (perhaps within a nationally established range of accept¬ able residual risk). For example, an inflexible risk goal for a chemical or for the total site may not be achievable for technical reasons. The goal may be below ihe limits of detection with current analytical procedures Technologies may not exist to remove low levels of specified chemicals from air, water, or soil. Alternative¬ ly, the technologies may exist but may require resources disproportionate to the incremental reduction of risk. To attempt to achieve a na¬ tional risk goal might allow a few sites to vir¬ tually bankrupt the system, unless considerable resources were provided. A site-specific stand¬ ard would be more sensitive to the particular circumstances of a site and the resources and technologies that are available to effect clean¬ up, but does not assure national consistency for protection at similarly contaminated sites. In any event, performing a risk assessment is a costly, time-consuming process that re¬ quires highly trained technical specialists in a number of disciplines. Thus, a critical issue is how to choose when to use risk assessment. A risk assessment approach to establishing cleanup goals is not inconsistent with CERCLA. Because of the uncertainties that are likely to be associated with a particular site and the un¬ certainties in the risk assessment process itself, public acceptance of the outcome of risk assessment is likely to be mixed. This would be especially true when the “real” risk is quite different from the “perceived” risk. Consider¬ able effort to educate and inform the public would need to accompany this approach. The . £? Si**K6* >-V. -, w m,n 5«g a r5-—r~- - Ch. 4 — Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goals • 115 choice of a national or site-specific standard of acceptable risk (i.e., a probability) would have a significant impact on public reaction. A single, minimal national standard for accept¬ able risk, if perceived to provide adequate pro¬ tection, would be easy to explain and would result, at least in theory, in consistent clean¬ ups. A site-specific standard (even within a range of acceptable ink) would probably result in inconsistent cleanups and cause more pub¬ lic concern. National Goals for Residual Contamination Description of Approach. —This approach would involve setting new residual levels end using available ones for all chemicals or classes ot chemicals found at Superfund sites. These lev¬ els would be the same for all sites and not con¬ sider site-specific conditions. A major issue that would need to be resolved in the use of this approach is what factors to consider in es¬ tablishing new levels, i.e., inherent hazard, cost and/or available technology, or some combina¬ tion of them. Existing standards, criteria, and guidelines will be of limited utility in establishing national goals. They currently exist tor only a small number of chemicals found at Super ».und sites. Most were designed for a specific environmen¬ tal medium and none suit all possible routes of exposure that may exist at Superfund sites. Many were developed for exposures that are not compatible with those at Superfund sites. For example, a standard developed for an oc¬ cupational exposure (the calculated risk would be for a group of healthy adults for a daily dura¬ tion of 8 hours, 5 days per week) would not match the conditions of exposure of most Super¬ fund sites. This is not to say that existing standards, cri¬ teria, and guidelines cannot be used, only that one needs to be careful in doing so. In fact, as discussed previously, draft revisions to the NCP would require remedial actions in most cases to comply, at a minimum with “applica¬ ble” and “relevant” Federal standards. Under this approach to establishing cleanup goals, for those chemicals for which there are no existing applicable or relevant standards, new ones would need to be developed, or peihaps some other approach to setting cleanup goals used. Hence, what at first appears to be an expe¬ ditious approach may be just the opposite. Analysis of Approach.— Establishing ^ national goals for residual contamination would certain¬ ly consider, to some extent, the inherent haz¬ ard of the chemical wastes. As discussed, there currently exists limited knowledge ol the in¬ herent hazardous properties of chemicals at Superfund sites. Consequently, the establish¬ ment of standards for all hazardous substances or classes at Superlund sites would be ham¬ pered by a limited data base and would involve extrapolation of current knowledge beyond limits of verification. This approach would not consider site-spe¬ cific conditions, and the extent to which risk assessment is considered would depend on how the standards were established. For exam¬ ple, if the standards were established in a way so that, under any conditions of exposure, the resulting risks would be acceptable, then a site- specific risk -sessment would be of i.o addi¬ tional value. Resource and technological limitations could be addressed i" the development of the goals. For example, the cost and/or availability ol cleanup technology could be the determining factor in establishing a goal for particular chemicals. Such a standard might not achieve an acceptable level of risk. On the other hand, goals established solely on the basis of inherent hazard may be only theoretical benchmarks if the resources and technologies are not avail¬ able to attain them. Establishing national goals is certainly con¬ sistent with the direction that ERA is moving in the draft revisions to the NCP and would sat¬ isfy the need for national consistency. But if this approach was based on a commitment to develop standards for all or most chemicals and conditions, the system would be slow to initiate and the costs would be substantial. If the goals are set at levels generally perceived to protect health and the environment, public concern w-ould focus almost exclusively on the - 116 • Superfund Strategy effeclive implementation of those goals. On the other hand, if the driving force behind the goals is perceived to be resource limitations, public confidence could quickly erode. Clean to Background or “Pristine” Levels Description of Approach.—This approach for establishing the extent of cleanup would re¬ quire that the cleanup continue until the levels of all contaminants were indistinguishable from those of the surroundin'; background. A variation of this approach would require that the cleanup continue until the site were “pris¬ tine,” i.e., as if the pollution had never oc¬ curred. The first issue that would need to be resolved with this approach is how to determine back¬ ground or pristine levels. Historical back¬ ground levels are not usually available for most sites, for a diversity of chemicals and media. Frequently, background is determined by sam¬ pling nearby locations and can include pollu¬ tion from other sources. In most cases, pris¬ tine would be a cleaner level than background, especially if the site is in an industrial area. Analysis of Approach.—Cleaning to background or pristine levels does not explicitly consider the inherent hazard of the chemical wades on site. Only the environmental context of the site is considered in determining the levels of clean¬ up This approach includes an implicit risk assessment, i.e., it assumes that any level above background or pristine is an unacceptable risk and levels at or below background or pristine are acceptable. These assumptions may not be true. For example, certain industrial contami¬ nants do not exist naturally in the environment and the pristine levels for these chemicals would be zero. Putting aside the financial or technical capability of reaching a zero level of residual contamination, it is hard to imagine that such a result would be necessary' from a public health or environmental perspective. Further, “background” levels might not nec¬ essarily provide the desired level of protection, especially in heavily industrialized areas with multiple sources of industrial contamination. This approach to establishing a cleanup goal is not particularly sensitive to resource limita¬ tions or available technologies. In general, this approach would be expensive and difficult to implement. Because this would likely be the most expen¬ sive approach, its successful implementation would be significantly constrained by the fund balancing provision of Superfund. Public ac¬ ceptance of this approach could be expected to be mixed. There would be inconsistencies among cleanup of sites with similar wastes de¬ pending on where they are located. Moreover, because this is a costly approach, fewer sites could be expected to be cleaned up at any one time. Technology-Based Standard: Best Available Technology or Best Engineering Judgment Description of Approach.—This approach would involve examining all available remedial tech¬ nologies that address the chemical contamina¬ tion at a Superfund site. A remedial action plan would be developed that used the best avail¬ able technology to minimize exposure to the waste chemicals at the site. Analysis of Approach.—A detailed analysis of the inherent hazard of the chemical wastes found at a s te would no* be an integral part of this approach. However, it might be important to at least identify the wastes of major health and environmental concern at a site as a guide to the designers of remedial action. Site-specific factors would be critical. Knowledge of the ouantity and identity of wastes present; of the geology and geography of the area; of the iden¬ tification of potentially affected natural re¬ sources and local populations; and of the routes and levels of exposures would be essential to reach a best engineering judgment as to what remedial measures to take. A risk assessment would not need to be per¬ formed. Implicit in this approach would be the assumption that, by using the best available technology, the risks from the site would be re¬ duced to the lowest level that is technically fea- ' gC?JTX •>“’^^iS3»S»9!«^^^^»»J-« ..^■aro ,‘C«. Ch. 4—Strategies tor Setting Cleanup Goals • 117 sible. (It may be suggested that technical fea¬ sibility is a practical limitation of any approach to establishing cleanup goals for remedial ac¬ tion. However, delaying cleanup or taking other risk management actions can be consid¬ ered also.) A technology-driven approach would be sen¬ sitive to the strength and weaknesses of cur¬ rently available remedial procedures. The less confidence there is in existing technologies, the less satisfactory is this alternative. Since risk assessment is not an integral part of this ap¬ proach, concerns about the transfer cl risks among populations and the risks associated with residual pollution from the disposal tech¬ nology would not be central to the decision¬ making process. Unless limits were imposed on cleanup costs, this approach could be perceived as providing a blank check for those in the cleanup business. The designers of the remedial action program should employ a cost-effective use of resources. But can this be done without pre-established cleanup goals? Without some assessment of the risks, significant resources could be spent on a site that posed little or no risk. Unproven technologies might be used with little protec¬ tion obtained. The incremental public health or environmental protection provided by a technology that is substantially more expensive than the second choice might be insignificant, but this could not be evaluated without a risk assessment. How would one know exactly what constituted a complete cleanup, or when to cease operations such as groundwater treat¬ ment? Moreover, advances in technology could raise the possibility of subsequent expensive retrofits to achieve higher levels of piotection. This approach would make it difficult to make informed decisions under the fund-bal¬ ancing provision of CERCLA. Public reaction is likely to be mixed. A policy that Superfund sites will be cleaned up using the best available technology is initially appealing and appears to offer the best that can be provided. Realisti¬ cally, limited resources are available to devote to cleaning up uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. This approach might create enormous pressure to be among the first sites where re¬ sources are spent, without attention to the uncertainties of clc inup effectiveness and the benefits of waiting for different technology or specific goaL more related to exposures. Com¬ promises would need to be made that would likely result in inconsistent cleanups. Cost-Benefit Approach Description o? Approach. —A quantitative cost-ben¬ efit approach to establishing cleanup goals would require that the costs of any initial or incremental remedial measures be compared with the benefits (reduction of potential adverse effects to health and the environment) to be derived from such expenditures. Only il the (total or incremental) benefits are greater than the (total or incremental) costs would the expenditures be made. All this assumes that the benefits are measurable and the unit of meas¬ urement is comparable to costs. Benefits and cleanup goals are variables weighed against available funds. A less formal cost-benefit anal¬ ysis based on articulation rather than quanti¬ fication also could be used. Analysis of Approach.— This approach requires an understanding of the benefits to be derived from remedial measures at a site, i.e., the re¬ duction in risk to public health or the environ¬ ment that those measures are likely to produce. To determine this, an analysis of the inherent hazard of the chemical wastes on site, a con¬ sideration of site-specific factors, and a risk assessment would be required. All of the uncer¬ tainties abou f the hazards of the materials of concern, the site-specific conditions, and the process of risk assessment would need to be recognized in a quantitative approach, espe¬ cially when uncertain additional health or envi¬ ronmental protection would be compared with certain expenditure of resources. The more un¬ certain the benefits, the more dubious the re¬ sults of the analysis. An assessment of risk and reduction of risks would need to be determined on a site-specific basis. This approach would not use national standards for residual risks. If there were national goals for residual risk levels, a cost-benefit analysis would be super¬ fluous. -■ ’.r^rpwf' www wigyBwp ' ^ SWWfSgS?! 118 • Superfund Strategy Calculating the benefits of a reduced risk is difficult. In the first place, regulatory decision¬ makers are generally unwilling to assign dollar values to human lives, addhional cases of can¬ cer, or even the value of natural resources. The evaluation of costs would need to be done carefully. Not only should the initial costs associated with a remedial measure be in¬ cluded but its impermanence and long-term (of¬ ten uncertain) costs associated with the moni¬ toring and maintenance of the technology need to be included in the calculation as well. This approach would certainly be consisten* with the fund-balancing provisions of CEKCLA. However, public reaction is likely to be mixed. Attractive in theory, this approach would cause decisionmakers at individual sites to be tested publicly, especially when the uncertainties and value judgments implicit in this approach be¬ came apparent. Inconsistent levels of cleanup among sites could result unless very specific national procedures and policies were used. Site Classification: Determining Cleanup Levels by Present and Future Use of a Site Description of Approach.—To date, little attention has been given to what will happen to a site after it is cleaned. Under this approach, tlw ex¬ tent of cleanup would be based on the present and future use of a site and its surrounding area, as determined by local government and communities. How a particular site is classified as to its present or future use (i.e., restoration, rehabitation, and reuse) would be -he driving force in the selection of a remedial plan. Classes could be established ear.v in the pro¬ gram. for example, when a site i» placed on the NFL. For purposes of classification, the site would include any land or waters already or likely to be contaminated. A classification system based on current and potential use has been recommended as part of EPA’s groundwater protection strategy.® In establishing this strategy, EFA considered its •U.S. Knvironmenlal Protection Aitoncy, A Crouno**atcr Protac- tion Strategy lor the Environmental Protection Ayenc\. Auttust 1984 . inability to protect all groundwater from con¬ tamination, its fundamental purpose of protect¬ ing human health and the environment, and ♦he cost and difficulty of monitoring and clean¬ ing groundwater. These same considerations apply to NPL sites. In EPA’s groundwater pro¬ tection strategy, three classes of groundwater are recommended. Class I includes special groundwater, so designated because it repre¬ sents irreplaceable sources of drinking water or ecologically vital areas, e.g., contamination would destroy a unique habitat. Class II in¬ cludes current and potential sources of drink¬ ing water. Class III includes groundwaters that are not a potential source of drinking water and are of limited beneficial use, e.g., with total dissolved solids over 10.000 mg/1 or already so contaminated that they cannot be cleaned by methods reasonably employed in public water treatment. Analysis of Approach.—Implicit in the develop¬ ment of such a classification system is the pol¬ icy decision that the extent of and the initia¬ tion of cleanup would differ among sites. Con¬ sequently, some of the cleanup approaches pre¬ viously described could be used with such a system. For example, certain sites might be classified as so valuable as present or future resources that the goal would be developed through use of a site risk assessment. Other sites might not require any cleanup. Based on a cost-benefit analysis, the provision of an alter¬ native water supply or the relocation of nearby residents might comprise the remedial (risk management) response. For sites where only minimal remedial meas¬ ures are taken because of limited future use (e.g., a site "paved over” and used for an air¬ port runway or a large parking lot), methods such as deed restrictions must be used to com¬ municate these decisions to future generations so that these contaminated resources are not unknowingly used for unforeseen purposes. The uncertainties in future land use must be weighed against the costs of more extensive cleanup. Transfer of liability to future land users or developers might be effective in en¬ forcing land use restrictions. The development of a classification system would be consistent with the fund-balancing provision of CERCLA. In many ways, it would be the most nationally cost-effective approach discussed in this chapter. Public reaction Ch. 4—Strategies lor Setting Cleanup Goals • 119 would be mixed depending on the classifica¬ tion system developed, the proposed response at individual sites, and the degree of local par¬ ticipation in deciding on land use. CONCLUSION On the basis of its analysis OTA finds that: • There is a need to raise the cleanup goais issue to the highest levels of policymaking and to have open, public debate on it. 1 he effectiveness of the Superlund program and private and State cleanups depend on an equitable and technically sound resolu¬ tion of this issue. • What is ultimately important and realisti¬ cally achievable is consistency in the proc¬ ess of determining what the cleanup of sites should be, rather than necessarily making all cleanups the same. • In setting cleanup levels, it is necessary to examine whether the remedial technolo¬ gies under consideration can lead to un¬ intended consequences, including trans¬ fer of toxicants among media, transfer of risks among populations, and residual pol¬ lution. • It is no longer acceptable to continue cleanups under the current ad hoc ap¬ proach. As a large number of sites enter the program, dealing with each site as a unique case is inefficient and there is in¬ creasing likelihood that sites with similar problems will not be cleaned to compara¬ ble levels of environmental protection. • Pursuing a strategy of establishing cleanup levels on the basis of background or pris¬ tine chemical levels does not make envi¬ ronmental, technical, or economic sense. This approach does not assure protection of health and the environment, in many cases is not possible to achieve, and it would cost excessive sums. • Although seemingly attractive and exten¬ sively used, best available technology or best engineering judgment do not offer en¬ vironmental protection comparable to the likely high costs of implementation. This approach does not directly address actual or potential exposures threatening health and the environment. • Although the use of existing standards, risk assessment, and cost-benefit analysis approaches pose considerable problems and have substantial limitations, they could be used. The most important conclusion is that a cleanup strategy based on site classdication could be the most beneficial approach to pur¬ sue. The present and future use of an uncon¬ trolled site is now sometimes considered prior to cleanup decisions. What this approach would do is to explicitly and uniformly incor¬ porate a decision about site use as the key ele¬ ment of a policy framework. To do this, how¬ ever, means that a decision about land use must be made. Such a decision would generally need to be made at the local level. This is crucial to proceeding with this approach. It is consistent with the need to have public participation in cleanup decisionmaking (see chapter 8). Developing a classification based on site use also presents an opportunity to have a hierar¬ chy for establishing priorities for site response. It can provide a policy framework that objec¬ tively decides what process is used to set clean¬ up levels for a site on the basis of the most im¬ portant site-specific consideration—how the site is or will be used and, hence, wnat expo¬ sures must be considered to determine health and environmental effects. An illustration of how this approach might be used i: - given in table 4-1. Under this classi¬ fication, the most technically sophisticated but 120 • Superfund Strategy Table 4-1.—Illustration of a Site Classification System for Selecting Cleanup Goals Classes of NPL sites (established when si‘e placed on NPL) Cleanup goals for remedial cleanup set by Likely course of action For comparison purposes, EPA classes of groundwater"* 1. Known or likely exposures to people or sensitive ecological elements re¬ quiring restoration of site (for possi¬ ble rehabitation or reuse), including cleanup of contaminated ground- water if technically feasible. Site risk assessment. 1. High priority initial re¬ sponse to recontrol site using HRS° information. 2. Obtain necessary data and perform risk assessment 3. High-priority full-scale per¬ manent cleanup when technology available tc meet cleanup goals. 1 Special groundwaters vul¬ nerable to contamination ana a) irreplaceable source of drinking water to substantial popula¬ tions, or b) ecologically vita! II. Known or likely exposures exist, but limited number of people and sensi¬ tive environments. Clear alternatives to site cleanup such as relocation and use of alternative water supply; site restoration or reus* not critical. Cost-benefit analysis. 1 Initial response 2 Alter cost-benefit analysis choose risk management option. II Current and potential sources of drinking water or have other uses. ill. Site not likely to lead to exposures to people and not situated near sen¬ sitive environment. No site restora¬ tion or reuse anticipated. Applicable and rele¬ vant environmental standards. 1 Low-priority initial response 2. Reevaluation every 5 years to assess need for remedial c.eanup Ill Not potential source of drinking water and of limited use. a U S Environmental Protection Agency Ground-Water Protection Strategy August SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment except as noted expensive process of risk assessment is used for the highest priority sites. These sites un¬ equivocally require a remedial cleanup, the ex¬ tent of which depends on the exact nature of the site’s use. The next category of sites are those where site use suggests risk management options that would allow delay of a remedial cleanup, or a less complete cleanup, or con¬ ceivably no cleanup. For example, the risk management options could he relocation of res¬ idents, supplying alternate waier, and creating an area where all use is prohibited. For this cat¬ egory, therefore, it is reasonable to use a cost- benefit process to establish cleanup levels in a context that allows comparison to non-clean¬ up alternatives. Lastly, the third category of sites are those where exposures and damages are minimal. For this category, existing standards might be used to set cleanup levels; indeed, it might be unlawful or unacceptable to do otherwise. However, cleanup may noc be necessary or it may be delayed. Also shown in the table, for comparison, are the analogous categories established by EPA in its groundwater protec¬ tion strategy. However, it must be emphasized that cleanups of uncontrolled sites often in¬ volve much more than dealing with contami¬ nated groundwater. The table also shows site management deci¬ sions other than cleanup that could be associ¬ ated with the site categories. For example, deci¬ sions concerning initial responses and timing of cleanups could be consistent with the hierar¬ chy based on site use. This discussion pertains to remedial clean¬ ups that are expected to be effective in the long term. There is also a parallel question concern¬ ing actions known in the current program as immediate removals (comparable to initial re¬ sponses in O l’A's suggested two-part strategy). These actions are acknowledged to be tempo¬ rary. Such actions must proceed quickly on the ' **—>'‘”>'’fBSr!^ v.V :.. • »■» ••■ -:. • v- ... i.: • -»r» *»,•«* - ««r«m. basis of limited information. Hence, a practical approach might be to establish generic stand¬ ards to direct actions based on: 1 reducing the immediate threats to health and the environ¬ ment by blocking or preventing releases ot haz¬ ardous substances into the environment; and 2) assuring that the site, exposed to known cn- vironmenfal conditions, would not deteriorate :h. 4- -Strategies for Setting Cleanup Goa ls • 121 further over a substantial period of time, per¬ haps some years before it could receive reme¬ dial cleanup. Such standards would not imply that the site is cleaned, but rather that it is iso¬ lated, stabilized, and recontrolled. A generic standard could also require continued moni¬ toring and/or inspection consistent with the nature of the site and the likely exposures. 30-745 0 - 85 -5 - -..... - •* A?J Contents Summary. Introduction. Solid Waste Facilities. Current Recognition end Evidence of the Problem . Case Studies ... Estimate of Possible Future Contribution to the NPL Hazardous Waste Facilities • • • .... * * * * EPA’s Dependence on Current Groundwater Protection Standards RCRA and Land Disposal. Interim Status. Limitations on Coverage. Groundwater Monitoring Wells. Contaminant Tolerance Levels. Monitoring in the Vadose Zone. Delays in Starting Corrective Action. Statistical Analysis... Compliance Monitoring. Corrective Action. Estimating Future Needs. The Site Selection Process. Site Identification. Setting Priorities for Sites. Site Inspections . Site Scoring. Variability Among EPA Regions. Estimate of Future NPL ... Summary Estimation - Preceding page blank Page 125 125 126 127 131 137 138 138 139 142 142 145 149 152 153 155 156 158 159 159 161 161 162 162 164 167 List of Tables Table No. Page 5-1. Known Problem Subtitle D Sites by EPA Region and State. i:;0 5-2. Mismanagement Events at Problem Subtitle D Sites. 130 5-3. Affected Media at Problem Subtitle D Sites. 130 5-4. Affected Receptors at Problem Subtitle D Sites. 130 5-5. RCRA Subtitle D Facilities by State. 135 5-6. Types of Surface Impoundments. 13 S 5-7. Purpose of Impoundments. 136 5-6. Estimates cf Sites With Potentially Significant Releases into the Environment 137 5-9. EPA Detection Limits for Some Carcinogens. 146 5-10. Data on RCRA Pollutants With Primary Drinking Water Standards. 147 5-11. Some Pollutants Regulated Under CERCLA But Not Under RCRA. 148 5-12. Some Examples of Groundwater Detection Levels of Hazardous Chemicals Which Are Higher Under RCRA Than Under CERCLA. 148 5-13. Some Carcinogenic Chemicals for Which EPA Has Not Yet Determined the Levels at Which They Can Be Detected in Groundwater by the Methods of Reference 149 5-14. Scenario for Instituting Corrective Action at a RCRA Permitted Site in Detection Monitoring. 153 5-15. Removal of Selected Specific Organics Frcm Groundwater. 158 5-16. Site Selection Variability Among EPA Regions. 163 5-17. Summary Statistics on Hazard Ranking Scores. 163 5-18. Anah sis of NPL Sites With Air Route HRS Scores. 164 5-19. ERR.S/NPL v. State Officials Views on Site Cleanup Requirements. 165 5-20. Range of Estimates for Futuie Size cf the NPL. 167 List cf Figures Figure No. Pgge 5-1. Summary Site Scoring Flowchart. 160 5-2. Region 5 Prioritization Criteria. 161 / r ^ s<**s* : -v ~s*«b^ - ;. r p |g ^ g*?Tf^ ^ 14 «"^' -■ ■-•,•. n ;„ r .V -•' • Chapter 5 i'i^i Requiring OTA'S assessment of-ajor sources of waste sites and improvements tn s'tej „ ods indicates that “'““J Sorities hist t^tandLTeven 6 this H f ^t nsesut> quire cleanup. M leas. 5.000 of the « 1 f“°|S”SnW Closed sofief waste facilities *> § may such as sanitary and mumc Qf th(J cur . require cleanup. A f ac iHties More than Environmental Protection n^t'w - ~ tection standards. An improved site -'"X^L^n- place some 2.000 more artes on th provements would include attend.^ g ^ site investigation. nificantly underest,mate the future Superfund. This chapter will dtscuss in for OTA’s higher estimates. INTRODUCTION needs; they are. 1) 1V subtitle D of the Re¬ waste facilities governed V Act (RCRA], source Conservation and f l ^ ';: n r p r r y o«d U ,r“r n°o, .Myjo be placed on the NPL but that may warrant cleanup To rWrmine whether or not a site merits clla°nu e p under Superfund able informalion about the hazards u p ^ ^babiUstic^sen^theruaniber of sites no, ade ( P q ut,; aSunmd for in EPA's prefect,ons of future national needs. From a oolicv and planning perspective such »„ C Thekey po^. 1 S*' S^iionSan^^abouU^ S j: e ;r h Eachof the three areas listed above will be examined in detail. sSs?;2|31iSS also qualify Tor inclu , sl °"“" and areas leaking underground storage ,a E nks an ^ ^ a contaminated by p - .. is likely to in- *»"“ f Cht^rconidS 5 '^ associ- ,h! “ ° T „ A b S ccm sTcompanle^ and States may dean-up sdes o, their own wilhou, the use of 125 4 126 • Superfund Strategy -* ^'** I Superfund. Hut a low estimate may result from the exclusion of some sites from the analysis. As discussed in chapter 3. underestimate the future size of the NHL could lead to cleanup strategies and allocation of resources that even¬ tually incur higher costs and environmental risks than necessary. Consider this scenario: a large number of sites go unattended or receive highly imperma¬ nent cleanups. These sites get worse over time and lead to large amounts of environmental contamination, particularly of drinking water. At some time, alter Superfund lesources have been depleted, the costs to cleanup the sites be¬ come staggering, perhaps impossible, if perma¬ nently effective cleanup technologies or ade- quate numbers of technical personnel are not available. Overestimating future needs appears o he far less likely, and it presents fewer prob¬ lems because Congress could adjust the pro¬ gram to account for smaller expenditures. SOLID WASTE FACILITIES Our society produces exceptionally large amounts of solid waste from households, com¬ mercial establishments, industrial facilities and virtually every other place where materials are consumed, processed, or examined The traditional, convenient, and cheap way of dis¬ posing of these vast quantities of waste has been to place them in landfills if they were mostly solid or in surface impoundments if they were mostly liquid. Solid waste disposal has been managed both by local governments and private industry. Onlv recently has it be¬ come clear that the land disposal of solid wastes might pose threats to public health and he environment similar to those stemming from the disposal of what are now called haz ardous wastes. There are three reasons why solid waste fa- 1 "ties may become uncontrolled sites that can release hazardous substances into the environ¬ ment and, therefore, be eligible for the NHL. nhh’ 'T t0 /n 6 creat ' on an< J implementation o the Federal RCRA Subtitle C program, haz¬ ardous wastes were generally disposed of along ordinary solid wastes. Prior to the 1970s lew people recognized the dangers of hazard- ~ 6S 9 , nd tHe l ° Xic Chemicals 'hem. thus hazardous waste produced over many decades simply were placed in land disposal sites, many of which have since been closed. WorldW Ca Tr e P l r ‘i Cularly si 8 n ificant after World War II, with the widespread production use, and disposal of synthetic organic chemi¬ cals, many of which are toxic and very stable These closed facilities present unique problems because by now their locations mav not be known and there are few, if any, records of what was placed in them. Now they are part > the landscape on which new, often subur- t)lared 0 Th n f ^ ? tHer bu i ldin 8 s h ‘™e been placed. The technology used to build those fa¬ cilities and contain the waste was far less so¬ phisticated and safe than today’s still-limited containment technologies. Furthermore, be¬ cause there was little consideration of environ¬ mental threats, they were more likely to be placed near sensitive areas such as aquifers that supply drinking water. Second, even after the regulation of hazard¬ ous waste on a broad national level various stat¬ utory and regulatory exemptions and exclu¬ sions continue to make it possible for some hazardous waste to be disposed of legally in solid waste facilities. A forthcoming report by the Congressional Budget Office estimates that m 1983 over 26 million tons of hazardous- wastes were disposed of in sanitary landfills nationwide. It is important to note that rela¬ tively small amounts of hazardous waste from individual sources, including households and small businesses, can add up to substantial amounts in a particular solid waste facility The tact that solid waste facilities may be very large often hundreds of acres, and that the liazard- i Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup 9 127 ous waste may be only a small fraction of, and widely dispersed within, the total waste does not preclude major environmental problems. To the contrary, although it might take longer, often decades, for hazardous substances in these sites to reach the environment, eventually large amounts of a broad variety of substances may be released. Moreover, cleaning up such large operations or closed sites presents ma¬ jor engineering problems and is very costly. Third, even with a well-enforced regulatory program for hazardous wastes on both the fed¬ eral and State levels, which is not yet the case, there will be illegal disposal of hazardous waste in solid waste facilities. It is virtually impossi¬ ble to examine and monitor all incoming waste to detect the broad range of hazardous sub¬ stances that might be present, perhaps in small amounts and in containers. In many cases it is also possible for midnight dumpers to gain access to a solid waste facility and bypass nor¬ mal inspections of incoming materials. Current Recognition and Evidence ot the Problem There are several reasons that explain why the solid waste facility problem for Superfund has received little detailed attention. State and local officials, closest to the problem, comment to OTA that they are aware of the likelihood of release of hazardous substances from solid waste facilities. Because of limited resources, including a nearly total ending of Federal sup¬ port for solid waste programs, they have tended to focus on hazardous waste facilities and there has been little testing and monitoring of solid waste sites. Where testing has been done, the broad range of hazardous substances of con¬ cern to Superfund may not be tested for. More¬ over, although some monitoring results have indicated a significant problem of leachate leaving the site, such results generally are not made public. There is considerable concern that once there is public documentation con¬ necting toxic waste problems with solid waste facilities there will be public pressures against their operation and the siting of new facilities. How would the vast amounts of smid waste be managed? Nor is it likely that States could finance cleanups of large numbers of leaking solid waste facilities, either by themselves or even under the current Superfund program. Super¬ fund requires a contribution from the States for cleanups, and for publicly owned and operated facilities that contribution is 50 percent. At the Federal level, little attention and fund¬ ing has been given solid waste programs. EPA has only recently recognized that solid waste facilities might be a major source of sites for Superfund. In a congressionally mandated study to evaluate the first period of the Super¬ fund program, EPA states: Municipal landfills, both large and small, can cause potentially serious problems. Some facilities have already been closed down, some are still operating. Although such (acu¬ ities can no longer accept hazardous wastes, many especially in large urban areas and in heavily industrialized areas did in the past ac¬ cept industrial waste which could include hazardous waste. In addition, people ma; continue to dump small quantities ol paints, solvents, pesticides and other household chemicals which are hazardous. In big land¬ fills, these can potentially add up to big prob¬ lems. In small towns and rural areas, while the problem may be small, it can be signifi¬ cant to the surrounding community.’ Similarly, municipal and private landfills are widely used for sludges from wastewater treat¬ ment, generally in very large quantities. The National Research Council recently concluded. Landfills have been increasingly used to iso¬ late wastewater sludges containing trace con¬ taminants at levels high enough to be of regu¬ latory concern. The assumption has been that remobilization of such contaminants is mini¬ mized by using landfills and that release of contaminantr, to the environment is unlikely. The panel believes that the data supporting such a conclusion are scant and that remobil¬ ization of contaminants in surface and groundwaters as well as to the atmosphere is possible . 2 'U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Supporting Analy¬ sis for CERCLA Section 301 (a)( 1 )(c) Study." draft. July 1984, p. 5. 'National Research Council. Disposal oflndustri.il ana Domes¬ tic Wastes (Washington. DC. National Academy Press. 1984). p. 16b. 128 • Superfund Strategy The above statements, however, consider only one part of the solid waste facility uni¬ verse, municipal landfills. The following state¬ ment contained in EPA’s Ground-Water Protec¬ tion Strategy provides a more comprehensive view of the problem, although only with re¬ spect to groundwater contamination rather than the full range of environmental problems that solid waste facilities pose: In addition to facilities receiving hazardous wastes, other facilities that may contominate ground water are of concern. In the mid 1970s, EPA and the States became increas¬ ingly concerned that all waste disposal land¬ fills (not just those receiving hazardous wastes under RCRA) may be creating a substantial problem for ground water. There are an esti¬ mated 93,000 such landfills in the United States. Of these, 75,COO are classified as on¬ site/industrial, and we know little about them. Another 18.500 are classified as municipal. Fewer than 10 States require any form of reg¬ ular monitoring for ground-water quality at these facilities. Landfills are invariably located on land that is . . . susceptible to ground-water contamination problems. A similar situation obtains at pits, ponds, and lagoons—usually grouped and referred to as surface impoundments—that receive both hazardous and non-hazardous wastes. EPA's recently completed Surface Impoundment As¬ sessment (SIA) surveyed the numbers and lo¬ cations of surface impoundments, and esti¬ mated their potential effects on ground-water quality . . . The SIA identified a total of 181,000 surface impoundments. Most of them are unlined. About 40 percent of municipal and industrial impoundments are located in areas of thin or permeable soils, over aquifers cur¬ rently used for drinking or that could be used for drinking. About seven percent of all sites appear to be located so as to pose little or no threat to ground water. Because of the lack of generally available knowledge, ground-water protection was rarely, if ever, considered when these facilities were sited . . . facilities handling non-hazardous wastes and hazard¬ ous wastes produced by small generators are covered by RCRA Subtitle D criteria (enforce¬ able under citizen suits), but they are not reg¬ ulated under the Federally enforceable provi¬ sions of RCRA. These facilities may be sig¬ nificant sources of ground-water contami¬ nation. 3 Within the context of Superfund, EPA has acknowledged, but only to a limited degree, the contribution to the future size of the NPL by solid waste facilities. These sites, along with several other types of sites “not currently in¬ cluded in the determination of NPL sites,” caused EPA to conclude that as many as 800 more NPL sites might result. 4 This brought the total projected NPL to a maximum of 2.2C0 sites, but EPA has generally used a figure of 2,000 sites. Congress recently has acknowledged the sig¬ nificance of the solid waste facility problem for Superfund. However, improvements in regu¬ lations and their enforcement would not occur for several years and might significantly affect only new facilities. The Conference Report on the recent reauthorization of RCRA noted: Subtitle D facilities are the recipients of un¬ known quantities of hazardous waste and other dangerous materials resulting from the disposal of household waste, small quantity generator wastes, and illegal dumping. Since construction, siting, and monitoring stand¬ ards for these facilities are either nonexistent or far less restrictive than those governing hazardous waste disposal facilities, environ¬ mental and health problems caused by Subti¬ tle D facilities are becoming increasingly seri¬ ous and widespread. A high proportion of sites listed on the National Priority List were sanitary landfills. Without the additional envi¬ ronmental protection that the implementation of this provision will provide, even more Sub¬ title D facilities are destined to become Super- fund sites. s Solid waste facilities continue to attract at¬ tention at the State and local levels across the Nation. For example, a New York State legis- ’L.S Environmental Protection Agency, ,4 Ground-Water Pro¬ tection Strategy for the Environmental Protection Agency Au¬ gust 1984. pp. 14 and 38. •Alvin R Morris. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency memorandum to Alvin L Aim and Lee M. Thomas on the re^ suits of a Superfund Task Force assessment, Dec. 8, 1083 , p. 5 . 5 U.S. Congress. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Conference Report 98-1133. . Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 129 lator brought to public attention that a high fraction of solid waste lanofills could be con¬ taminating groundwater: In late 1983. at least 50 of the state’s 538 legal landfills were known to be polluting ground water. Officials at the state s Depart¬ ment of Environmental Conservation estimate that the number could be 200 or more. 6 Similarly, an official in the Puerto Rican leg¬ islature indicated the severe nature of the prob¬ lem there: The major problem is underground water contamination caused by inadequate disposal of hazardous wastes. For more than 10 years, these industries have been disposing of waste in sanitary landfills in a region where the underground is basically permeable to liquids. 7 For a closed landfill in Southwest Philadel¬ phia for which Superfund cleanup had not yet been obtained the following was reported: The state Health Data Center recently re¬ leased a study that showed the cancer mor¬ tality rate in Sharon Hill. Darby Township, and Darby Borough—which are adjacent to the landfill—is 22 percent higher than in the state and the nation. . . . The landfill was ordered closed in 1972 by a court order, but documents and photographs . . . show that the landfill is still operating. . . . EPA officials confirmed the findings of a study that showed a number of carcinogens and other toxic sub¬ stances were leaking from the landfill into Darby Creek. Although EPA officials said toxic wastes were only found m small quan¬ tities, they said it posed a hazard to children who may swim or fish in the creek. 8 In Maryland an aluminum smelting plant’s waste has been interpreted to be an exempted mining waste, but controversy has continued: Residents have complained, without much success, about the threat of wastes produced by the plant, particularly contamination of we" water with the cyanide they say is leach¬ ing out of disposed materials. ... In 1981, after receiving no public comment to the con- »)ohn ). Marchi, The New York Times. June 16, 1984, Op-ed page. »The New York Times. Feb. 21, 1984. •The Philadelphia Tribune, june 5, 1984. trarv, EPA pulled pot liners off its list [of haz¬ ardous wastes], pending completion of the study_Asa result of that action [the com¬ pany] terminated an agreement to recycle the pot liners ... and instead decided to bury them on its 2,000-acre plant she here. The company received a landfill permit trom the state last year, but a consultant s report re¬ leased in April found cyanide in groundwater at the plant site.® In a more systematic way, a study performed for OTA analyzed three data bases on sites already known to be or likely to become un¬ controlled sites eligible for Superfund cleanup. The three data bases, which coniained sulti- cient detail to make a judgment as to whether a site could be characterized as a RCRA Sub¬ title D facility, were: 1) a computerized data base maintained for EPA on about 1,000 mis¬ managed waste facilities, 2) 550 NPL site descriptions, and 3) a survey of 365 sites where remedial actions have been performed. Out of 1,389 sites, 245, or nearly 18 percent, were Subtitle D facilities. For the 550 sites pro¬ posed or included on the NPL, 10o sites, oi nearly 20 percent, were classified as Subtitle D facilities. Examination by OTA of recent pro¬ posed additions to the NPL and other data in¬ dicate that these percentages are low. The dis¬ tribution for the 245 solid waste facilities according to EPA Region and State is gi\en in table 5-1. The greatest number of problem solid waste sites were in EPA Region II, which contained 33 percent of the sites. Regions III, IV, and V also had relatively large numbers of sites. To¬ gether these correspond to the Eastern (Atlan¬ tic coastal area] and Midwestern portions of the Nation. New York had the greatest fraction with 17.5 percent, followed by New Jersey with 15 percent, Pennsylvania with 7.5 percent, and Tennessee with 5 percent, with these four States containing 45 percent of the sites iden¬ tified. These statistics should not be interpreted to mean that other regions and States do not have current or potential problems with solid waste facilities; but the older, more densely »The Washington Post. Nov. 22, 1984. - 130 • Superfund Strategy Table 5-1.—Known Problem Subtitle D Sites by EPA Region and State Location Number Location Number Region 1: Connecticut .... . 5 Michigan. Minnesota. .12 . 1 Maine . . 2 Ohio. 1 1 Massachusetts.. . 3 Wisconsin. . 5 New Hampshire . . 5 ~38 Rhode Island ... . 3 Vermont . . 1 19 Region VI: Arkansas. . 2 Region II: Louisiana. . 2 Oklahoma. . 5 New Jersey. .36 New York. .43 9 Puerto Rico . . 2 81 Region VII: Missouri. . 1 Region III: Nebraska. . 1 Delaware. . 8 2 Maryland. . 2 Region VIII: Pennsylvania . . . .18 Colorado. . 6 Virginia. .6 Montana. . 3 West Virginia . . . . . 4 South Dakota . . . 1 38 Utah. . 2 Region IV: Alabama. . 2 Region IX: 12 Florida. .10 Arizona. . 4 Georgia. . 1 California. . 3 Kentucky. . 4 Nevada. . 1 North Carolina ... . 1 ~8 Tennessee . .13 Region XI: 31 Guam. . 1 Region V: Idaho. . 1 Illinois. . 5 Washington .... . 5 Indiana . . 4 7 Total . SOURCE JRD As-iXtates. Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facilities,' contrac !or repot* prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment. June 1984 populated and more highly industrialized areas may find more environmental problems with larger numbers of solid waste facilities. Table 5-2 presents the waste mismanagement events identified at the solid waste sites. Mis¬ management events are categorized as docu¬ mented or suspected based on available infor¬ mation. For example, a documented leachate mismanagement event would be one where groundwater monitoring data showed down- gradient contamination by leachate. For a sus¬ pected event there would be some evidence of leachate movement from the site, such as con¬ tamination of surface water, but insufficient hydrogeologic data to establish a causal con¬ nection between the site and groundwater con- Tabie 5-2.—P^ismanagement Events at Problem Subtitle D Sites 8 Total Event_ Documented Suspected frequency Erosion . 24 ' 11 35 Flood. 2 6 8 Fire/explos'on. 15 6 21 Gaseous emission . . 20 15 35 Leak. 17 23 40 Leachate. 129 66 195 Spill . 15 9 24 Other. 11 3 14 individual facilities may be classified in several categories There'ore. totals do not add to 245 SOURCE. JRB Associates. “Evaluation ol RCRA Subtitle 0 Facilities," contrac tor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, June 1984 tamination. Leachate migration was the most common problem, occurring at 80 percent of the sites and leading to groundwater contami¬ nation; at 65 percent of the sites surface water was affected (see table 5-3). Table 5-4 gives the data on affected recep¬ tors of hazardous releases. Drinking water was the most frequently affected receptor at 49 per¬ cent, followed by human health at 23 percent. Table 5-3.—Affected Media at Problem Subtitle D Sites 3 Exposed me dia Documented Suspected Total Air. 27 23 50 Groundwater. 119 77 196 Soil. 63 71 134 Surface water. 74 85 159 ^Individual facilities may t>e classified in several categories Therefore, totals do not add to 245 SOURCE JRB Associates. “Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facilities contrac¬ tor report prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment June 1984 Table 5-4.—Affected Receptors at Problem Subtitle D Sites 3 Affected receptor Documented Total Suspected frequency Drinking water .... 54 67 121 Fauna. 8 29 37 Flora . 13 15 28 Human health. 8 48 56 Property damage .. 22 7 29 individual facilities may be classified in several categories. Therefore, totals do not add to 245 SOURCE JRB Associates. “Evaluation of RCRA Subtitle D Facilities." contrac¬ tor report prepared lor the Office of Technology Assessmen. June 1984 m .......--- —■— y~**rr*WP - - - I —’*— -W* Various other information was obtained on the sites. Ownership data showed that near y half of the sites were owned and probably ope - ated by municipalities. About 80 percent of the facilities were landfills, and nearly 20 P er( er surface impoundments. Generally the contain - nants found at the facilities and their frequency resemble what has been found at all sites ev al- uated for the NPL. The most common contami¬ nants. found at at least 30 sites, were lead, benzene, phenol, toluene, and trichloroethene. Data on the size of 02 sites were available; the mean size was 67.4 acres if one 5.000 acre site is excluded. Hazard Ranking System (H Kb) scores for placement on tne NPL were avada- ble for 77 of the solid waste faculties. 1 he me¬ dian score lor the solid waste facilities was 40.8 and for the original 406 sites on the M L it was 42 2 The range for the solid waste sites was from 19.5 to 75.6. All the infer, lation suggests that solid waste sites on the NPL score simi¬ larly to NPL sites that dealt solely with hazard¬ ous w r astes. Limited information on Superfund expend¬ itures was found. Average Remedial In vest l- gation/Feasibility Study costs for 41 site? a\ er¬ ased $ 450 , 000 . which is about half of what LI . now estimates to be average KUFS costs. Lsti- mated remedial cleanup costs (including RLK costs and excluding operating and mainte¬ nance costs) for six sites averaged S3 million, less than halt of the average figure or reme¬ dial cleanups now being used by hi A. Case Studies As part of the effort to examine the current problem with solid waste facilities two sets of detailed case studies were performed. In the first set, four landfills already on the NPL were examined; in the second set, four landfills oe- lieved to be typical of solid waste facilities^ but which have not been considered lor the M L. were examined. These eight case studies are summarized below. The Combe Fill South Landfill. Chester Township. New Jersey, received an HRS score of 45.2. The 60- to 100-acre site was privately Ch. 5— Sites Requiring Cleanup • 131 owned and operated before the last owner filed for bankruptcy in 1982. The original 30 -acrc landfill operated from the i940s and was closed in 1972; a newer, engineered landfill was . i proved by the State in 1972 for nonhazardous waste disposal and it was closed in 1981.1 he site is atop a hill in a wooded, rural residen¬ tial area. Within one-haif mile are 90 residen¬ tial drinking wells; within one-quarter mile are 38 residential^ zoned lots; 1 mile away is a State park; and the immediate area is the head- water for several local streams and a brook hat receive .'itnolf front the site. In 1981 . State agencies sampled surface and groundwater near the site, found contamination and a threat to drinking water supplies. Later ar emissions of volatile organics were found. Lk m if RCkA Subtitle C regulations lor a hazardous waste landfill had been applied to this site, they prob- ablv would not have been effective. 1 he site is fundamentally unsuitable for land disposal. The Laurel Park Landfill. Naugatuck. Con¬ necticut. received an HRS score of 46.8. I he facility is a 35 -acre, privately owned and oper¬ ated sanitary landfill, active since 1951 and is atop a hill. About one-half mite downhill are homes; one side of the hill is heavily wooded and abuts a State forest; the area comprises part of the headw-aters of two watersheds. Roughly 200 tons per day of municipal and in¬ dustrial wastes, and septic and sewage sludge are discharged at the site. Since the early 1960s the site has been subject to numerous citizen complaints and regulatory actions. There were fires, spills on roads, noxious fumes, and find¬ ings of contaminated leachate affecting surface and groundwaters. Various actions have al¬ lowed the facility to remain in operation in¬ cluding; monitoring groundwater, installing leachate collection and treatment systems and supplying potable water to some residents. As the site is not particularly well suited for land disposal, even RCRA Subtitle C regulations would not have been totally effective in com¬ bating these problems. The Marshall Landfill, Boulder. Colorado, re¬ ceived an HRS score of 46.5. Marshall Lake is about one-quarter mile east and receives run¬ off from the sita; the town of Sui*:rior is 2 miles 132 • Superiund Strategy west; industrial and cattle grazing areas are nearby; and Boulder is 3 miles southeast of the site. Several bodies of wafer that ultimately re¬ ceive runoff from the site are used as drink¬ ing water supplies. There is an inac five 80-acre portion and an active 80-acre portion of the site. The inactive portion was operated under various owners from 1955 to 197-4 and received municipal solid wastes, septic tank wastes, sec¬ ondary wastewater treatment sludges, and un¬ known industrial liquid wastes. The active por¬ tion accepts sewage sludge, but suspicions have arisen concerning the disposal of radio¬ active waste and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). There is evidence of contamination ol surface and groundwaters, as well as methane generation. If the facility had been regulated under Subtitle C. many of the problems could have been reduced or prevented. The Svossct Landfill. Svosset. New York, re¬ ceded an HRS scoie of 54.3. It is located in a residential and light industrial area of Long Island with five public water supply wells with- in 6,000 feet of the site. The 40-acre landfill was opened in 1936 by the local municipality and closed in 1975. because of suspected ground- water contamination. The water table is only about 30 feet below the bottom of the fill; the landfill is in a recharge zone (where new water enters) of a sole source aquifer. In 1968 the landfill stopped receiving municipal waste. Pri¬ or to 1968 and up until 1975 the site received much industrial waste. A study in 1982-83 re¬ vealed evidence of migrating contamination, but public water supply wells were not yet con¬ taminated. Compliance with Subtitle C regu¬ lations would have mitigated, or at least de¬ layed. the environmental impacts of this facility. Further, the facility probably would not have been located in a recharge zone of a sole source aquifer. The second set of case studies was performed on four currently operating or recently closed Subtitle D facilities that arc not on the NPL. (Three of these sites have not been named at the request of the operators.) Sites selected for the case studies had to have groundwater mon¬ itoring data, which are not generally available lor most solid waste facilities, but not all of the sites made the data available. Two HRS scores were calculated for each site. 10 The methodol- ogy, however, was altered because rigid adher¬ ence to the current procedure would lead to zero values when certain data were absent: this is a major criticism of the current scoring pro¬ cedure. Site A is a closed, county-owned municipal landfill in Maryland that operated from 1962 to 1982. The 161-acre site is hilly and part of the site was originally a ravine. The site is bounded by two streams which discharge to a river that is not a source of drinking water. Groundwater monitoring data obtained by the county over an 8-year period indicate that groundwater leaving the site and discharging into local streams is contaminated with acidic- leachate from the landfill. Although probable sources ol hazardous substances were being dumped in the unlined site, there is little in¬ formation about the specifics of the situation. At this point, although human health problems do not appear imminent, environmental dam¬ age is hkelv and there is a potential for future remedial action at the site. It is important to note that the site monitoring does not moni¬ tor mr halogenated organic toxic chemicals nor lor some toxic metals. Lead, however, has been found downgradient. There are no Federal or State requirements to perform such monitor¬ ing. HRS scores calculated for this site were T5 and 4.4; these low scores currently preclude placement on the NPL and result because the contaminated water does not affect people downstream. Site B is a municipally owned and operated landfill in Pennsylvania and was officiallv per¬ mitted by the State in 1983. The 175-acre site is surrounded mostly by cropland. Several houses within 1 mile downgradient have pri- '“For the firs! score, the lowest non-zero rating value was user! to M ore items (or which data on waste quantity and toxicity were missing. For the second score, certain assumptions were made lor example, it was conservatively assumed that 0.01 percent o vfJe * * m ? Un ' ° f " asle was hazardous. This approach to 11.0 MRS provides an indication of th epossible level ol scutes I his exercise also confirms two other problems with ihe MRS procedure a discounting of sites which affect small populations or vs h.ch affect env ironmenlal quality but no! human health di- 3 r~~’ F * r ' r ^ Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 133 vate wells. There is shallow, diffuse, and slow groundwater flow at the site, and surface water discharges into a tributary of a large creek. 1 he facility receives mostly domestic waste, some debris from construction demolition, and some industrial wastes. Before the open dump was turned into a municipal facility, industrial wastes were disposed there, including chemi¬ cal and fertilizer wastes, dyes used for textiles and printing, sludges from foundries, and shoe factory wastes. Now, surface runoff and leach¬ ate are treated and the discharged water ap¬ pears to meet its National Pollution Discha-ge Elimination System (NPDES) permit require¬ ments. Groundwater monitoring began in 1983 but it does not measure organic pollutants nor most inorganic chemicals of importance in Subtitle C facilities. Monitoring, however has revealed evidence of contamination, including some toxic metals, attributed to migrating leachate from the unlined site. I here is a sig¬ nificant potential For future remedial action to prevent contamination of drinking water sup¬ plies downgradient. The HRS scores lor this site were 14.8 and 18.5, which are below the current NPL cutoff of 28.5 primarily because the affected population is small. Site C opened in 1972 and is a municipally owned sanitary landfill in Virginia, operated by a contractor. It is located in a generally ru¬ ral area, but with some nearby commercial de¬ velopment and light industry. Hie 57-acre site, with 20 acres still operating, is in marshy area, although the site itself is not marshland With 50 feet of land buffer, there is a wooded rural residential area to the south and a cattle graz¬ ing area to the west. One mile downstream is a small lake used infrequently for irrigation. Surface runoff also enters streams used tor rec¬ reational fishing. A shallow aquifer near the site is used by resi¬ dents to the south and east. A higher quality but deeper aquifer is used by a company to the north. The facility is unlined and has no leach¬ ate collection system. Waste received is primar¬ ily residential and commercial refuse, with some industrial waste, including chemical- resistant fabric, residues from plastic process¬ ing, and residues from glues ior paper prod¬ ucts. Much emphasis has been placed on not accepting hazardous waste. Groundwater rnon- itoring of the shallow aquifer has occurred for about 2 years, but not for toxic organic chem¬ icals. There is evidence of groundwater con¬ tamination by leachate from the site and, hence;, future remedial action may be required. HRb scores calculated for this site were 3.5 and 26, too low for placement on the NPL. The last site is the Marathon County landfill, Wisconsin, owned and operated by the county. The landfill comprises 27.3 acres and could be expanded greatly. The surrounding area is mostly woodlands and forest. A small number of nearby residences are believed to have pri¬ vate wells and there is a dairy nearby, but both are separated by the 572 acres of the overall site The site does not drain into locally used surface waters. The site is in a recharge zone for aquifers used for some residences. A clay liner is used together with leak detec¬ tion and leachate collection systems; contami¬ nated leachate is treated in a nearby industrial wastewater treatment plant, just over halt the wastes accepted originates from industry, in¬ cluding wastewater treatment sludge, fly ash, alkaline sludge, foundry sand, and papermak¬ ing waste, none ol which are RCRA hazard¬ ous wastes. There is extensive air, surface, and groundwater monitoring by the county, as re 1 as various State-imposed financial responsibil¬ ity requirements. To date, the containment technology appears to be preventing any migio- lion of leachate offsite. The HRS scores were zero for this site, and it is unlikely to require remedial actions because of the care applied to its location, design, and operation. However, the groundwater monitoring program does not measure for a number of toxic chemicals, and some hazardous substances are probably in the wastes accepted. The case studies support the general propo¬ sition that many, if not most, solid waste fa¬ cilities have and will continue to pose threats associated with the release of hazardous sub¬ stances into the environment. Subtitle D facil¬ ities already identified for Superfund attention resemble hazardous waste sites, just as impor- 134 • Superfund Strategy tant, the solid waste facilities that have been placed on the NPL are basically similar to typ¬ ical ones, such as the three out of four in the second set of case studies that might qualify someday for the NPL. Moreover, those solid waste facilities, closed or operating, that have not been judged appropriate for the NPL have not been monitored closely for the range of haz¬ ardous substances that might qualify them for the NPL, even though considerable evidence often exists for migration of leachate offsite. This suggests that the 20 percent of the NPL now accounted for by solid waste facilities could rise substantially. The concerns of citi¬ zens. the media, some State and local officials, and the EPA about the Subtitle D facility prob¬ lem for Superfund appears well founded. Estimate of Possible Future Contribution to the NPL It appears very likely that many solid waste facilities will become uncontrolled sites requir¬ ing cleanup under Superfund. The next ques¬ tion, then, is how will this affect the size of the NPL? OTA first examined the total number of Subtitle D facilities and then estimated what fraction of this total might someday be placed on the NPL. Data on Operating and Closed Facilities There is considerable uncertainty about how many Subtitle D facilities there are in the Na¬ tion. The uncertainty is greater for closed, old¬ er facilities than for operating ones. Table 5-5 presents survey data by EPA Region and State on operating landfills for the years 1981-83. The table also gives the number of open dumps identified by States in their 1983 inventory and projected numbers of dumps that will be up¬ graded to landfill status (sites not upgraded are usually closed). The numbers of open dumps reported may be low because additional dumps probably exist and remain uninventoried. The data also presents problems because there are varying definitions of landfills. Some States may include industrial landfills, perhaps only oftsite ones, while most include onlv munici¬ pal landf ills. Definitions may also change from year to year, explaining, for example, the large increase in Texas from 1981 to 1982; 793 sites surely were not built in 1 year in Texas. Con¬ sidering the transformation from open dumps to landfills and whet appears to be a rate of ap¬ proximately 500 new landfills being permitted annually, the number of operating and presum¬ ably chiefly municipal or sanitary landfills in 1984 was probably about 14,000, up from 13 000 in 1983. The same survey indicates that in 1983 the estimated number of landfills with groundwa¬ ter, gas, and/or leachate monitoring wells was 1,009, although 14 States did not reeort this in¬ formation. An estimated 37 facilities had arti¬ ficial liners in 1983, with 12 States not report¬ ing this information. In 1983. 30 percent of the facilities were publicly owned, G5 percent pri¬ vately owned, and 5 percent had some combi¬ nation of ownership. T here must, in addition, be many closed mu¬ nicipal and sanitary landfills. To estimate their number, O I A obtained data from several Slates on operating and closed landfills. For six States there was a minimum of 2.784 closed facilities and a total of 895 operating ones. This ratio of about 3:1, applied nationally, yields an estimate of 42,000 closed municipal and sanitary land¬ fills in 1984. EPA estimates that approximately 75,000 on¬ site, nonhazardous waste industrial landfills operate nationally. Although this figure has been used in 1984, it is based on an estimate made in 1978 and the advent of the RCRA and Superfund programs may have reduced it sig¬ nificantly. There are no estimates for the num¬ ber of closed, onsite industrial landfills, but an estimate of twice the above number—150.000- may be reasonable. Surface impoundments falling under the Sub¬ title D classification include wastewater treat¬ ment lagoons, potable water treatment lagoons, pits, ponds, basins, mining waste disposal fa¬ cilities. evaporation ponds, agricultural waste disposal facilities, and others. Often a site may consist of several impoundments. EPA’s Sur¬ face Impoundment Assessment for 1978-80 gives the best available data. Table 5-6 summa- Ch. 5 —Sites Requiring Cleanup • 135 State 1981 Region 1: Connecticut. ' Maine. “J Massachusetts. New Hampshire. 4 “^ Rhode Island. Vermont. Region 2: New Jersey. New York. Puerto Rico. Region 3: Delaware . District of Columbia . Maryland . Pennsylvania. Virginia. West Virginia. Region 4: Alabama. Florida. Georgia . Kentucky. Mississippi . North Carolina . South Carolina. Tennessee . Region 5: Illinois . Indiana. Michigan . Minnesota. Ohio. Wiscoi sin. Region 6: Arkansas . Louisiana. New Mexico . Oklahoma. Texas . 1982 155 328 273 250 22 85 1983 b Number of open 5w«*^,w?s wvr 136 • Supertund Strategy Tabl» 5-5.—RCRA Subtitle D Facilities by State—Continued Stale _Number of all landfills 1981 1982 1983*>~ Region 10: Alaska . NA NA Idaho . 130 132 Oregon. 249 226 Washington. 136 136 Guam. NA NA Total. 11,704 12,991 *DaI 4 tor 1963 1 **'*'* 0* so'r.e ow-l«c txitAoon tnese cotun.n entries Number of open dumps 3 * 3 NA 42 28 36 NA 2.396 Open du mps to upgrade 3 NA 20 3 18 NA 598 SOuWCC N Peterson 1963 Survey ol Lend'ilis Wiste Age v ol 14. Mo 3. March 1983 'Land Disposal Survey Waste Age. vol. 12, No. 1. January 1981. Table 5-6.—Types of Surface Impoundments Ac,^sites* Ac v e impoundments- ~^ A bandoned site s_ Abandoned impoundments Municipal. 19.116 36 179 1™ 270 !" duS,r,al . 10.819 25749 94 ? Win,r '9. 7.100 24 451 npj 2,163 . 21.527 ,70,'98, 002 December ,983 rizes the results of this survey, which found a total of 176.242 active facilities and a minimum of 4.731 closed ones. The latter is a minimum because the survey did not attempt to count dosed impoundments and a more realistic fig¬ ure might be as high as the number of active impoundments. Table 5-7 gives the data broken down accord- ing to purpose of the impoundment. An un¬ known fraction of the 96.443 storage and treat¬ ment facilities may pose environmental problems similar to disposal impoundments and thus may aflect future Superfund needs. For e->.ample. both during storage, which may be for long periods, and treatment, which may only constitute settling or evaporation, hazard¬ ous substances may migrate into the land and water. Evaporation of volatile organic toxic chemicals also presents problems. Only 29,250 of all impoundments had any sort of liner, arti¬ ficial or natural. Based on limited data, only 1,359 impoundments had any type of monitor- ing. EFA found that about one-quarter of im¬ poundments potentially would affect ground- water supplies. Table 5-7.—Purpose o, Impoundments (by percent 3 and number) Category Storage Percent Number Disposal Percent Nnmhor Treatment Agricultural.. . Municipal Industrial. 26 31 31 27 67 4,983 11,215 19 64 iNumuer 3,642 23,155 Mining Oil and gas . . Total. 7,982 6,602 43.517 74,299 52 56 4 13,390 13,693 2,598 56 478 storage disposal and treatment per category ^7™'*' P,0 " M,O ° A9ant * Su "~ •Wfnt Assessmen, Kauona, Repo*. EPA 570*84 002. De - , I The above data suggest a total of as many as 281,000 landfills, and 340,000 surface im¬ poundments, including both open and closed facilities. These figures are only approximate but are based on the best available, albeit lim¬ ited and imprecise, data. Estimates of Future Superfund Needs The key question is what fraction of the above total of 621,000 Subtitle D facilities might re¬ quire cleanup under Superfund? There is, of course, no precise means of answering this question. One approach is to consider several possible percentages that appear conservative and reasonable, based on the information from case studies, the lack of current monitoring for hazardous substances, and on the very small numbers of facilities with liners and monitor¬ ing wells. Information presented earlier on Subtitle D facilities on the current NPL suggest that landfills may pose more serious problems than surface impoundments. This is consist¬ ent with the fact that many impoundments may be used for dilute aqueous wastes that pose less serious problems than do the more concen¬ trated hazardous materials often placed in landfills. Table 5-8 presents two scenarios for sites that might release significant amounts of hazard¬ ous substances. The low scenario estimates that 5 percent of landfills and 1 percent of im¬ poundments might require cleanup and leads to a total of 17,400 cleanups. The high scenario estimates that 10 percent of landfills and 2 per¬ cent of impoundments might require cleanup and leads to a total of 34,800 cleanups. If these figures, which OTA believes to be conservative, are even approximately correct, they suggest that very large sums of money will be needed just to perform studies of Subtitle D facilities, and much more to clean them up. The figure could be hundreds of billions ol dollars. Even a fraction, say 5,000 sites or one-third, of the lowest estimate, together with other contribu¬ tions to be discussed, would quintuple the size of EPA's projected 2,000-site NPL. Table 5-8. — Estimates of Sites With Potentially Significant Releases into the Environment Low High scenario scenario Landfills (281,000). ....5% 14,000 10 % 28.000 Surface impoundments (340,000). . ...1% 3.400 2 % 6.800 17,400 34.800 SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES The espectation has been that effective pro¬ tection of public health and the environment from hazardous wastes eventually would be achieved by Superfund’s cleaning up past prob¬ lems and RCRA’s preventing future ones. The purpose of this section is to examine the ex¬ tent to which operating RCRA Subtitle C haz¬ ardous waste facilities might become candi¬ dates for cleanup under Superfund. OTA has studied the groundwater protection standards covering land-based facilities regu¬ lated by RCRA. Although other types of envi¬ ronmental pollution are possible from hazard¬ ous waste facilities, groundwater problems exist at most NPL sites. Moreover, other types \ \ \ of environmental problems are not addressed by the RCRA regulatory program to the same extent as groundwater contamination. For ex¬ ample, there are few regulations covering air emissions of toxic chemicals. A recent report by EPA’s Superfund Task Force 11 indicates that as of December, 1983, groundwater contamination was the number one problem in uncontrolled sites. For exam¬ ple, for the 881 sites rated for the NPL, 526 had observed releases of hazardous substances into groundwater. Over 6 million Americans are po¬ tentially exposed to the groundwater from these "Morris memo, op. cit. I - 138 • Supertund Strategy sites, and for about 350 of these sites the con¬ taminated groundwater is the only source of drinking water for the affected population. An¬ other 6.5 million people are potentially exposed to contaminated surface water at 450 sites. EPA acknowledges that most of the 444 com¬ monly encountered toxic pollutants found at these 881 sites exhibit chronic toxicity and pose health threats at extremely low levels of human exposure. Of the 538 sites on the NPL, 40 per¬ cent were originally landfills and 30 percent were surface impoundments. Furthermore, most of the cleanups being con¬ ducted under Superlund involve eithci leaving the wastes in the ground and attempting to con¬ tain them, or removing contaminated materials to land disposal sites. Land disposal sites that have and continue to receive Superfund clean¬ up wastes may themselves become Superfund sites (although not solely because of the redis¬ posal of wastes), so this issue is particularly im¬ portant. We are beginning to see examples of this already (e.g.. the BKK facility in Calilor- nia). This is to be expected, as EPA estimates that 50 to 60 precent of interim status land dis¬ posal facilities are leaking. Over 50 RCRA in¬ terim status facilities regulated by EPA are already on the NPL.’ 2 EPA’s Dependence on Current Groundwater Protection Standards Current Federal regulatory control of hazard- ous waste land disposal facilities is critically dependent on EPA’s groundwater protection standards. Because of the admitted deficien cies and uncertainties of land disposal technol¬ ogy, such as the unproven long-term effective¬ ness of leachate liners and collection systems, protection of human health and the environ¬ ment rests ultimately on the protection af¬ forded by the groundwater monitoring require¬ ments. For example, EPA’s director of its Office of Solid Waste has said: While no method of hazardous waste man¬ agement is failproof, our rules should protect ,J U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, computer printout from the "Hazardous Waste Data Management System." pro¬ vided by [effrey Tumarkin. June 19. l'ltci. human health and the environment. Even if a containment system fails, groundwater moni¬ toring will identify leakage and the pollutant plume will have to be cleaned up.' 3 However, no mention is made of dealing with the leak itself, nor of stopping the disposal of hazardous materials in the leaking site. Clean¬ ing up the pollutant plume is of limited effec¬ tiveness if the leakage continues. The director for air and waste management in EPA’s Region VIII has said: In the Agency’s view, the cornerstone of our land disposal program rests on the groundwa¬ ter protection standards. They were devised to provide essential environmental and healtti controls. 14 More recently, EPA has formulated a nation¬ al groundwater protection strategy that recog¬ nizes that “cleaning up contaminated ground- water is difficult, expensive, and often un¬ successful. These facts clearly argue for future programs to focus on better protection of the resource while efforts to detect and deal with serious contamination resulting from past ac¬ tions continue.” EPA’s new national ground- water protection strategy guidelines indicate that the RCRA groundwater protection stand¬ ards will still be used.' 5 OTA finds that, because of the inadequacies of the RCRA groundwater protection standards, the goal of protecting the resource rather than cleaning it up after the tact is in jeopardy. RCRA and Land Disposal Several aspects of the RCRA regulations have already received considerable analysis. Forex- ample, OTA completed a major study of haz¬ ardous waste control in March 1983. 19 Another ’’lohn N. Skinner. U S. Environmental Protection Agency, let- . ;r to Keith H. Gordon. Aug 12. 19t<:i. '•Robert L Duprev. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, letter to I .00 Younger. Aur. 10. 1*103. "A Ground Water Protection Strategy tor the environmental Protection Agency. op. cit. •‘U.S. Congress. Office ofTechnoloity Assessment. Ttc hnol- ORie.v and Management Strategies tor Hazardous Waste Control. OTAM-Plti (Washington. DC' U.S Government Printing Office. March 19H3). - Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 139 major study was done by the National Acad¬ emy of Sciences. 17 These works show that even with the best available land disposal technology, hazardous wastes placed in land disposal facilities will likely migrate into the broader environment sooner or later. Moreover, there are commer¬ cially available waste reduction and waste treatment alternatives to the land disposal of many hazardous wastes. Finally, RCRA regu¬ lations present technical and economic disin¬ centives to industry that limit the use of alter¬ native technologies. More resources continue to be allocated to the regulation of fundamentally flawed land disposal technology than to the development and demonstration of alternatives to land dis¬ posal. EPA frequently has been criticized for not encouraging alternative technological ap¬ proaches to the land disposal of hazardous waste. EPA’s response has been: a| that the technology for recycling and alternative treat¬ ment to land disposal may not exist for all or most wastes, b) that the technologies are not “on-the-shelf” but are in some stage of devel¬ opment, an 1 c) that to the extent to which tech¬ nology does exist, the necessary plant capac¬ ity may not be in place. However, EPA’s land disposal groundwater protection regulations do not meet these standards either. To sum up, RCRA regulations do not over¬ come the fundamental inadequacies of land disposal technology because: 1) experience has shown that regulatory enforcement efforts do not assure compliance with regulations; and 2) as the following analysis show's, even with compliance with RCRA groundwater protec¬ tion standards, land disposal will still pose seri¬ ous risks to health and environment. Interim Status When Congress passed RCRA in 1976, it pro¬ vided a grandfather clause for existing facil¬ ities so that they could continue to operate as ’’National Materials Advisory Hoard, Management of Hazard¬ ous Industrial Wastes Research and Development Seeds, NMAB- 398 (Washington. DC: National Academy Press, 1903). if they had a permit until EPA issued them a permit. 16 This interim status was to allow for a smooth transition to a condition of federally permitted hazardous waste facilities. There remains considerable uncertainty as to the exact number of interim status sites cov¬ ered by the groundwater protection standards. According to applications for RCRA permits, as of December 1983, 2,000 out of 8,000 inter¬ im status sites were required to monitor ground¬ water. 19 To date only about a dozen of these 2,000 facilities have been issued permits by EPA, thus most continue to operate under in¬ terim status. EPA estimates that it will not com¬ plete the permitting of the 2,000 facilities for 10 more years. 20 In the following discussions the use of the terms ‘new” or “permitted” fa¬ cilities refers to either newly built facilities or interim status ones that have received permits. EPA’s Implementation In May 1980, EPA issued “interim s*atus standards” 21 as the “minimum requirements” for interim status facilities. These interim sta¬ tus standards (or Part 265 standards) are “in lieu of the more stringent Part 264 standards 22 that go into effect only after the facility is per¬ muted by EPA. This action cut off any means of bringing an interim status facility into com¬ pliance with standards “adequate to protect human health and the environment” short of issuing (or denying) a permit. 23 The RCRA re- "RCRA. Section 3005(a). ">U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ‘ Summary Report on RCRA Activities—January 1984" (Washington, DC: Office of Solid Waste. January 1984|; As of mid-1984 EPA had status sheets on only 972 facilities, but a number of State officials indicate that more facilities exist in their areas than EPA is aware of. To date. EPA has permitted only a few disposal facilities under RCRA. 20 U.S. General Accounting Office, Interim Report on Inspec¬ tion. Enforcement, and Permitting Activities at Hazardous Waste Facilities, CAO/RCED-83-241 (Gaithersburg. MD: U.S. General Accounting Office, Sept. 21. 1983). ”40 CFR 285 ”40 CFR 264.3 "There are provisions in both RCRA and CERCLA for EPA to seek an injunction to require action if it can be demonstrated that there may be an imminent and substantial endangennent to health or the environment. These provisions may have been used in a few rases to require corrective action for groundwater pollution at an active interim status site. Their use at an active RCRA regulated site would indicate that there are no pertinent regulations with which the agency can require compliance. ^ 1 140 • Superfund Strategy authorization has addressed this issue in part (see below). Although the interim status groundwater monitoring requirements have only recently gone into effect, as of mid-1984 210 out of 972 facilities were “in assessment” because their groundwater monitoring systems indicate that they are polluting groundwater. 24 Some of these are receiving wastes from Superfund cleanups. Of the 210 lacilities, only 72 were found by EPA to have adequate monitoring programs, with 86 not evaluated by a State or EPA office.’ Of the 586 facilities in the normal detection mode, only 175 were found to have adequate monitoring programs; 85 had no monitoring wells at all, and 173 never were evaluated. Thus, more than the 210 facilities might he re¬ quired to be in the assessment monitoring mode il they were performing adequate detec" tion monitoring, perhaps as many as 400. A 1983 study by the General Accounting Office of several States with above-average regulatory programs found that only 22 percent of the reg¬ ulated facilities were complying with the in¬ terim status groundwater monitoring require¬ ments. 25 EPA estimates that 50 to 60 percent of the interim status land disposal facilities are leak¬ ing and will require corrective action. 26 There is some evidence that the figure might be closer to 90 percent. A study conducted by EPA in 1975 investigated 50 randomly selected facili¬ ties and found that over 90 percent of them were leaking into groundwater. 27 Therefore even before the passage of RCRA, the poor state of these interim status facilities was known. EPA could have written regulations for fi¬ nancial assurance for corrective action, regu¬ lations to monitor and gather necessary envi¬ ronmental data, and regulations to bring facilities promptly into compliance or close "I U S .',v nVi T ,nen,al Pro,RCtion Agency, "Interim Slat ',7*,; ™" Monitoring Implementation Study," draft. 198 wAO/K(,I-,0-83-241, op. ( it. "■Inside E.l‘.A., Feb. 17. 1984, p. .') "yBW-g?>?wr ■<»« ? StC'.*.*’?-! fis*l'*-x^'C5.MW. mi. **— M .. „^.-yr'- ■ . « «. ' t ' - : ‘ - ' . , .J- :' - Ch 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 141 many geochemical controls on pH, such as natural buffering capacity, that it is difficult to predict what changes in pH might occur in a leachate migrating through the unsatu¬ rated and saturated zones. In addition, unless extremely acidic or basic, the addition of large amounts of leachate will likely be required to significantly alter pH. Consequently, pH may be suitable only as an indicator of gross con¬ tamination. Detectable changes in specific conductance will similarly require a relatively large increase in ion concentrations. Conse¬ quently, it may also be useful as an indicator of gross pollution, and then only at facilities where constituents migrating to groundwater are primarily inorganic ions. 31 Further criticism of the ability of the indica¬ tor parameters to detect toxic contaminants at critical concentrations was made at a recent groundwater symposium: .. . there can be highly selective migration of contaminants that are hazardous to human health in drinking waters at concentrations far less than those that would be detected using the “indicator” parameters. 32 More recently, EPA has acknowledged that “the indicator parameters are not functioning in either an efficient or effective manner . . . ” 33 Number of Monitoring Wells The interim status standards require only three wells for detecting groundwater contam¬ ination. This is true regardless of the size of the facility, the size of the aquifer, the extent of pollution, or the potential for damage to hu¬ man health and the environment. In many cases, three wells are far too few to give a reasonable probability of detecting pollution early. In proc¬ essing RCRA permits, the number of required detection wells is generally 4 to 20 for interim status sites currently operating with 3 wells. “GeoTrans. Inc., "RCRA Permit Writers Manual. Ground- water Protection. 40 CFK Part 264 Subpart F,” Oct. 4, 1983. p. 192. ”G. Fred Lee and R. Anne (ones, "Water Quality Monitoring at Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Is Public Health Protection Possible Through Monitoring Programs?" paper presented at the ’t hird National Symposium on Aquifet Restoration and Groundwater Monitoring sponsored by the National Water Well Association. Columbus, OH. May 1983. “U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Interim Status Ground-Water Monitoring Implementation Study." op. cit. On the State level, one interim status site in Il¬ linois was required by the State to install 40 wells and another over 50, 34 and three sites in New Jersey are required to have over 100 wells. 35 RCRA Reauthorization Congress has addressed several aspects of the interim status facility issue. The lifetime of in¬ terim status has been limited. Existing facilities will lose their interim status 12 months after enactment ^November 1985) unless application is made for a final RCRA permit and the site is certified to be complying with the ground- water monitoring and financial responsibility requirements. Existing facilities that become subject to Subtitle C have 6 months to apply for a final permit. Interim status surface im¬ poundments become subject to minimum tech¬ nological requirements for at least two liners, leachate collection, groundwater monitoring, and early leak detection, unless certain strin¬ gent conditions are met and evidence to allow an exemption is sunmitted within 24 months. Furthermore, upon closure an exempted im¬ poundment (e.g., because of a natural clay liner being present) must remove or decontaminate all waste residues, all contaminated linerlna- terial and contaminated soil. If the latter is not removed the operator must comply with post- closure requiremenis. EPA is also given addi¬ tional means to seek corrective action at inter¬ im status sites by obtaining an administrative order through a civil Federal court action. Summary The facilities that are most likely to leak, about 2,000 interim status facilities, have a much less stringent groundwater monitoring standard then the three permitted and presum¬ ably far better designed new facilities. Accord¬ ing to EPA, these standards are “minimal and are specificrdly designed not to be burden¬ some.” 36 There are no corrective action re- “Michael N'echvalal, Illinois Environmental Protection Agen¬ cy. private communication. Mar. 23. 1984. “William Brown. Supervisor with the New Jersey Bureau of Groundwater Discharge Permits, private communication. Mar. 19. 1984. “U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, SW-634. op. cit. a - w j ! - U2 • Superfund Strategy quircments or requirements to stop disposal should groundwater contamination be detected. Sites found to be polluting will be put on a “fast track” for issuing a permit so that corrective action may be required, but so far few Federal permits have been issued to interim status fa¬ cilities requiring groundwater monitoring. Al¬ though the recent legislative changes reduce the risks associated with interim status, a likely effect may be to hasten the closure of interim status facilities prior to applying for, or obtain¬ ing, full permits. To the extent that a facility operator perceives that a permit is unlikely to be issued, or very high costs would be required, closure could lead to placement on the NPL. Limitations on Coverage EPA’s strategy, as evidenced in the ground- water protection provisions of Part 264 of RCRA, is to determine when groundwater is becom¬ ing polluted enough to threaten public health and then to require the groundwater to be cleaned up. However, groundwater monitor¬ ing is not a substitute for techniques such as leak detection systems to analyze the engineer¬ ing soundness of the waste management facil¬ ity, e.g., to locate a ruptured liner in a landfill or a leaking storage tank. Permitted facilities are required to he built to exacting EPA engineering standards whose goal is to “minimize the formation and migra¬ tion of leachate to the adjacent subsurface soil or groundwater.” 37 However, when leachate does appear in groundwater, facility operators are not required to find out what went wrong, “a landfill liner which has been designed not to leak does not violate the design standards if the liner fails at some future time.” 38 RCRA regulations for fully permitted facilities do not require that the leak be fixed or that the waste disposal activities be halted. When pollution may he coming from one of several sources, there is no requirement to determine which of them it is. In short, it is not a violation of any RCRA regulation to pollute. Nor is there cur¬ rently any evaluation of the implications of a ”47 Federal Register 32312. ”47 Federal Register 32330. leak for the continued operation of a facility. There is only the requirement that the pollu¬ tion that has reached groundwater he cleaned up. This, as will he discussed later, is a very limited requirement. Under RCRA jurisdiction, EPA limits the site owner’s responsibility for site maintenance to 30 years after site closure. 39 Since EPA (and many others) have concluded that it is “inevi¬ table” that landfills and disposal lagoons will leak, 40 many of these facilities are likely to even¬ tually fall under Comprehensive Environmen¬ tal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). As firms go out of business, clean¬ up costs would shift from facility owners and users to the government. RCRA Reauthorization Several of the above problems have been ad¬ dressed legislatively, hut it is not yet clear how the neA> legislative provisions will be imple¬ mented. The minimum technological require¬ ments for almost all types of land disposal fa¬ cilities include the use of early leak detection systems; however, the requirement applies only to new units. Another change concerns regu¬ lations and permits issued after enactment. Fa¬ cilities must act to control and clean up ail re¬ leases of hazardous constituent from all units at the facility, including inactive ones. This re¬ quirement may hasten the closure of some fa¬ cilities in ways that result in their eventual placement on the NPL. Groundwater Monitoring Wells The hydrogeology of the site is important in the design of a groundwater monitoring sys¬ tem for interim status and permitted facilities. A good knowledge of the hydrology and geol¬ ogy in the immediate area of a wacte disposal site is necessary to know where, how many, and how deep to locate detection monitoring wells. In addition, for compliance monitoring it may also be necessary to create a mathemati¬ cal model to get some understanding of the >•40 CFR 264.117 and 205 117. *°40 Federal Register 11126-28. . Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 143 m speed and direction of the movement of con¬ taminants. In determining the location, depth, number, and type of monitoring wells a great many as¬ sumptions have to be made about the under¬ ground geological structure and the location, depth, quantity, direction, and speed of under¬ ground water. Furthermore, the proper loca¬ tion of monitoring wells depends on a knowl¬ edge of how all the above parameters may vary with season, rainfall, tidal water, and ground- water usage. These latter factors can cause groundwater flow to greatly increase, decieasc, or even change direction over time. Hydrogeological structures have physically hidden characteristics that must be inferred from limited data. Data are obtained from sources such as core samples, well drilling logs, and historical records of rainfall. The difficulty ol doing this was summarized picturesquely in a recent review by the Princeton University Wa¬ ter Resources Program: Imagine that we cannot see the sky. we can¬ not tell the direction or velocity of the wind, and we ask: Is the lactorv (with its thousands of little chimneys) polluting the air? That is our groundwater monitoring problem—at its easiest. It is made more difficult because the geological properties of the soil vary with depth and direction, and this variation is un¬ known or uncertain. When we look up in .he sky. we observe the spatial variation of the ool- lutants. If we could look up only through a small tube or telescope, then the information we gathered from the one sighting might not be representative of what we would see if we looked everywhere. The small tube into the sky is like our groundwater monitoring well: the data we gather may not tell us too much about what is occurring in other nearby loca¬ tions. 41 One of the few studies of operational land disposal sites was an investigation of 50 typical hazardous waste disposal sites conducted in 1976-77 for EPA. 4J This study concluded: ♦’Princeton University Water Resoun.es Program. Groundwa¬ ter Contamination From Hazardous Wastes (Englewood t.lifts. N| Prentice-Hall. «'U.S. Knvironmental Protection Agency. SVV*634. op. cit. At sites presently monitored the use of wells as an aid in evaluating groundwater condi¬ tions is generally poor, due to inadequacies with respect to one or more of the following parameters: number of wells, distance of wells from potential contamination source, position¬ ing of wells in relation to groundwater flow, selection of screened intervals, use of proper well construction materials, sealing against surface water contamination, or imer-aquifer water exchange, completion methods (such as development, maintenance, and protection against vandalism). Of the 50 sites evaluated, 32 had existing groundwater monitoring systems, usually in¬ stalled to meet the requirements of State law. Of the 32, the study found seven monitoring systems (or 22 percent) so inadequate that they had to install new wells to conduct the rela¬ tively basic monitoring required by the contract. More recently, EPA has found considerable problems with monitoring wells. 01 148 inter¬ im status facilities that had implemented groundwater monitoring programs in response to RCRA interim status regulations, 64 facil¬ ities (or 43 percent) had “deficiencies related to the number, depths, and/or locations of mon¬ itoring wells.” 43 Among the problems encoun¬ tered wmre: • background wells not in the uppermost aquifer. • background wells affected by the facility, • downgradient wells not located in the di¬ rection of expected contamination move¬ ment, and • downgradient wells not located at depths which would intercept contaminants. These studies show that the percentage of un¬ satisfactory monitoring systems was 22 percent in the 1977 study and 43 percent in the 1983 study. These two studies are not comparable, so it is simplistic to conclude that groundwatei monitoring had deteriorated in those 6 years. «U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. "Resource Conser¬ vation and Recovery Act. Ground-water Monitoring Interim Status Regulations—265.90-94. Evaluation of the Requirements. Phase II Report toOMH. Implementation of the Requirements (Washington. OC: Office of Solid Waste. Mar. to. 19S3). t 144 • Supetiund Strategy But there is no basis for believing, in spite of improvements in technology, that the practice has gotten better. There are several possible ex¬ planations (not mutually exclusive) for this state of affairs. First, monitoring may be mostly a procedure to reassure the public. One expert pointed to limitations in the state of the art as a second explanation. He observed, for example, that “contamination migration in fractured rock is complex and generally unpre¬ dictable’’ and that “prediction ... is generally beyond the state of the art. Pollutant movement is easiest to predict in sand and gravel. Ironi¬ cally, sand and gravel make the worst base for land disposal because pollutants move very rapidly in these porous soils. Soils that have good containment properties and are hydro- geologicallv predictable are found in only about 10 to 20 percent of the United States. 44 There are many other hydrogeological con¬ ditions that make the design of groundwater monitoring systems very difficult: • There can be connections between differ¬ ent aquifers that are difficult to detect.' 15 • Groundwater flow can change direction because of intrusion of tidal water, season¬ al recharge patterns, or nearby production wells. • Leachate does not always flow straight down to an aquifer, but under some geo¬ logical conditions would flow at an angle and enter an aquifer downstream of the monitoring wells. 46 • Liquid contaminants in an aquifer do not always flow in the same direction as the groundwater. A third possible explanation for lack of prog¬ ress is that a proper groundwater monitoring M j. A. Cherry. "Contaminant Migration in Groundwater With Emphasis on Hazardous Waste Disposal," Workshop on Ground- water Resources and Contamination in the United States, Mar. 14 and 15. 1983 tWashington, DC: Division of Policy Research and Analysis, National Science Foundationj; /. A. Cherry, per¬ sonal communication. Dec. 7, 1983. “ U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Permit Writers Training Course on Groundwater Monitoring. RCRA 264. Sub¬ part F" (Washington, DC: Office of Solid Waste, lulv 19831 pp 3-7. “Burnell Vincent. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, pri¬ vate communication, Oct. 21. 1983. system takes a great deal of money, time, and expertise. In order to meet governmental reg¬ ulatory requirements without spending too much, reliance is placed on engineering judg¬ ment rather than hard data. This warning ap¬ pears in the EPA RCRA permit writers guide: Experience with the installation of monitor¬ ing systems for compliance with the Interim Status Regulations has indicated that most owners/operators who have hired a ground- water consultant to install the groundwater monitoring system have not envisioned spend¬ ing the time or money to conduct as thorough an investigation as is suggested in this chap¬ ter. To retrieve all of the information neces¬ sary to design the system in accordance with considerations in this document, test-coring and piezometer installation programs will be necessary. Though some local geologic re¬ ports usually exist in the region of most facil¬ ities, site specific considerations almost invar¬ iably require extensive test borings. Because of the lack of time and funds, in most cases parameters such as the direction of ground- water flow and the nature of subsurface ma¬ terials have been determined through evalua¬ tion of local topography and. to the extent possible, evaluation of existing building foun¬ dation borings. Monitor wells are usually located on the basis of this information and completed to just below the water table. Varia¬ tions in ground-water flow direction and geo¬ logic variability have usually not been consid¬ ered because of lack of information. The primary factors for minimizing the pre-mon¬ itor well installation field investigation have been time and cost. 47 A similar point about cost was made at a con¬ gressional hearing in 1982 on EPA’s Part 264 groundwater protection standards: There are, of course, certain geologic envi¬ ronments in which monitoring becomes ex¬ tremely expensive and may not be cost-effec¬ tively employed. In order to obtain credible information, dozens of wells and hundreds of groundwater samples may be required to de¬ velop an adequate analysis of the hydrogeo¬ logic system. Although there are probably a large number of existing land disposal sites located in such areas, it is my recommenda- ,7 CeoTrans. Inc., op. cit.. p. 16. Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • U5 tion that no new land disposal facilities be allowed under these conditions regardless of engineering design. 48 What is required for a facility operator to de¬ tect groundwater pollution? The hazardous waste disposal facility operator must want to detect groundwater pollution and must deter¬ mine how effective monitoring will be, given the geology of his site. The operator must be willing to hire experts, spend time, and spend money (probably far in excess of EPA’s mini¬ mum requirements). Finally, sampling and analysis procedures must be designed that op¬ timize the ability to detect contamination, even if they are more stringent than EPA’s proce¬ dures (see the section in this chapter on statis¬ tical procedures). Some facilities operate this way, although they are not required to do so, but they are not required to report to EPA the results of anything over the minimum re¬ quirements. At the other extreme is the facility operator who fulfills only the minimum requirements of the law. Consultants may not be used to op¬ timize the efficiency of the groundwater detec¬ tion system. Under these circumstances, ground- water detection systems have a low probability of detecting contamination. Many ot the sites on the National Priorities List had such ground- water monitoring systems. 49 The latest EPA Part 264 regulations (July 26, 1982), while an improvement over the Part 265 standards, do not acknowledge the past failure of regulatory groundwater monitoring systems, nor the unsuitability of many geological forma¬ tions. They continue to rely on regulatory groundwater monitoring in any terrain to de¬ tect leaks. But the minimum requirements of the regulations are inadequate to assure a high probability of detection. «David IV. Miller. Ccraghty 8 Miller. Inc., testimony before hearing or the House Subcommittee on Natural Resources. Agri¬ culture Research and Environment, Nov. 30. 1982. n U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Hazardous IVasfe Site Descriptions: National Priorities List. Pinal Rule, and Pro¬ posed Update (Washington. DC: Office of Solid Waste and emer¬ gency Response, August 1983). Contaminant Tclsrance Levels The RCRA regulations for EPA permitted land disposal facilities,* 0 unlike those for inter im status facilities,* 1 provide lor detection mon¬ itoring of the specific contaminants being dis¬ posed as an alternative to the use of :he four indicator parameters (at the discretion of the EPA permit writer). This would overcome the problem of indicator parameters mentioned in the section on "Interim Status.” Upon close ex¬ amination, however, this process raises other issues having to do with the tolerance levels of these contaminants. In regulatory parlance, the tolerance level of a chemical is the concentration that is accept¬ able to tl e regulatory agency. The Part 264 RCRA regulations do not have explicit toler¬ ance levels for groundwater contaminants ex¬ cept for the 16 chemicals listed in the EPA pri¬ mary drinking water standard. However, for the hundreds of toxic constituents listed in the RCRA regulations** there is an implicit toler¬ ance level. The regulations specify that the EPA publication “Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical Methods"* 1 be used to determine whether a sample contains a given toxic constituent.* 4 For most substances, this publication lists more than one analytical method. Some meth¬ ods are more sensitive than others. In issuing permits, EPA plans to use relatively low-cost scanning techniques, which are the least sen¬ sitive methods, explaining: The Agency feels that a special hierarchical approach is appropriate for this purpose. These approaches will first use scanning tech¬ niques designed to detect broad classes of compounds. If the presence of a particular class of compound is detected, more specific analysis to determine which constituents are actually present can then be initiated. Al¬ though some sensitivity may be sacrificed by “40 CFR 264. “40 CFR 265. “40 CFR 261 appendices Vll and VIII. “IJ.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical Methods. SW-846. 2d edition (Washington. DC: Office of Solid Waste. 1982). “40 CFR 261 appendix 111. *rs -fT." r'-n? 146 • Superfund Strategy such an approach, the range of detection of cer¬ tain scanning methods are clearly adequate ... Therefore, the detect ion limit of the scanning methods, which are the least sensitive of the required test methods, constitutes a do facto tolerance level, since no further action will be taken if the scan does not detect contamina- ti jn. Furthermore, there are more sensitive test methods than those chosen, and EPA has dem¬ onstrated in the case of dioxin that more sen¬ sitive methods can he developed when required. The RCRA regulations do not explain why cer¬ tain test procedures were chosen and others were not. Finally, tolerance levels are implicit rather than determined for most cases. Table 5-9 illustrates that these implicit toler¬ ance levels are quite high, when certain EPA health effects projections are considered. The first column shows the minimum concentra¬ tions at which 12 selected chemicals can lie detected using the RCRA procedures. 44 The second column shows EPA’s estimate of the concentration thai EPA projects will cause one cancer per 100.000 people drinking 2 liters a day ot the water over a lifetime. These cancer estimates are based on animal studies. There are substantial disagreements about the accu- *H.’ S Environmental Protection Aui-ncy. SW-A46. op < tt. racy of such projections, and the values listed in table 5-9 are not universally accepted. How¬ ever, they continue to be used by EPA, although they may be changed. Since it is EPA’s criteria which determine whether a site should be in¬ cluded in CERCLA, these projections are rele¬ vant to this study. The projected number of cancers j .er 100.000 is estimated in column three. For example, table 5-9 shows that a hazardous waste disposal site operator, permitted by EPA. may. without violating his permit, pollute groundwater with up to 2,500 nanograms per It er of dieldrin. This is a concentration which EPA projects may cause 3,500 cancers per 100,000 people who drink the water over their lifetime. EPA is currently seeking to ban the use of pesticides for which the cancer risk is as low as 1 in 100,000.** Therefore, it is likely that a facility which is polluting groundwater at a lev¬ el projected to cause 3.500 cancers per 100.000 would com o ihe attention of CERCLA. Next, coi ;ler the explicit tolerance levels associated v h the 16 contaminants for which there is an EPA drinking water standard. EPA allows that for pollutants for which there is an '‘Pesticide & Toxic Chemical \'en.s. vol 12. No. 4. |ori. 51. me p IS Table 5-9.—EPA Detection Limits tor Some Carcinogens Concentrauon projected** Highest permiueJ to cause one cancer per EPA detection hmii 100.000 peoplett Projected** cancers per Chemical_ (nanograms/literj (t) (nanogramslliterj 100.000 peopie aidrin. 1.900 0 74 2.600 dieidnn . 2.500 0 71 3,500 1.1.2.2-tetrachloroethane. 6.900 1,700 4 3.3 -dicblorobenzidme. 16.500 103 160 heptachlor. 1.900 2 78 680 PCBs. 36.000 0 79 46.000 benzo(a)pyrene. 2.500 28 90 benzidine. 44.000 1 2 37,000 chlordane . . 14 46 3 DDT. ... . . 4.700 0 24 20.000 *A rv* *rvo$'*m »s a b*t;*onth of ft Qfftm One nanog'a'T' c ** r l»ter «s appronmatety one part per trillion * ‘P'ojections based on the consumption 2 liter* mm calculated by OTA by Omding column 1 py cdumn 2 Tht* calculation cor^t bftc*. to twgh doses Uncertainties introduced mtocoiumn 7 6r» high to^ow eat'acotatron* a*e t*>u» partially corrected *or *n deriving cotulTM 3 Column 3 uxna’it no correction tor oncer*, art tie * introduced by applying animat '**u'tS to human* TUS Em.'onmeotai Protection Agency Test Methods fcr £Va*uabng So#«d Waste PnysrcarCnermca/M*/nod* SW446 ?d ed Washington OC 0*t*ce c* So*rd Wasttr EPA 19G2, ttReterenca 45 FR ’V34I - frt of l„\i, Effort ol Chemical Substances |U aslunjiton. IK. I u >- Ik health Service. Centers lor Disease Control. National Insti¬ tute lor Occupational Health ami Safety. February 1‘t82|. e-r s Environmental Protection Agency. Scientific and /« >- a/ tiwuwiii Erport on (..ulmium. EI’A-fc0P-TSa)03 |U a_-,h- inslon. Dt: Office of Kec-an h anil Development. March IS. >1 Ch 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 147 Regarding tolerance levels, not all toxic pol¬ lutants that can cause a site to be regulated under CERCI.A are monitored under RCRA. A conspicuous example is dioxin contaminated soils. Although sent to RCRA regulated land¬ fills, EPA has not been able to require that the soil he monitored for some dioxins, although they have proposed doing so. 60 Table 5-11 lists other hazardous substances regulated under CERCLA that are not regu¬ lated or monitored under RCRA. 61 A reportable quantity (RQ) is the quantity of a hazardous substance which if spilled must be reported to the National Response Center 62 to determinate if any response under CERCLA is necessary. RQs are based on six criteria: aquatic toxicity, mammalian toxicity, ignitability, reactivity, acute toxicitv. and carcinogenicity. They are in five reporting levels: 1. 10. 100, 1.000. and 5,000 pounds. The lower the RQ, the more haz¬ ardous the substance. “•lH Federal Register , '-14. >”48 Federal Register 2^552. “CERCLA. Section 103 Table 5-10.-D?la on RCRA Pollutants With Primary Drinking Water Standards _ ---- 00 22 2 ' 300 “ arsenic. — o barium. 1,000 — a cadmium . ^ — — chromium. 50 — — lead . 50 — — mercury .. 2 _ — — nitrate (as N)- 10 000 _ _ — selenium . 10 — — silver. 50 — — fluoride. 1.400-2.400 _ _ — er,. Mintons the Senate Committee on A K n< ullure. Solution ami foreslrv. |an 23. 1984. “40 CFK 204.98|b). 1 150 * Superfund Strategy of the plume of contamination is between two monitoring wells, it could travel some distance past the wells before it is detected. Therefore, even if a detection monitoring system works well, considerable environmental damage could occur before the contamination is detected. The vadose zone is the ground above the up¬ permost aquifer. In humid areas of the United States it is rarely over 100 feet deep and is usu¬ ally much less. In arid western areas, however, the vadose zone can be several hundred feet deep. Water and associated contaminants from a land disposal facility will travel through the vadose zone to an aquifer at a rate determined b> the soil characteristics, the depth of the vadose zone, the amount of fluids in the waste, and the amount of water. It can take anywhere from a tew months to many decades. Bv the time contamination is discovered in a groundwater monitoring well, the vadose zone could have stored significant amounts of contamination. Thus toxic materials could con¬ tinue to pollute the groundwater for many dec¬ ades even if disposal is halted and tfie ground- water is cleaned. Furthermore, the trend is to require land disposal facilities to be located in areas with low-porositv clay soils, with great depth to groundwater. This may postpone the time it takes contamination to reach ground- water. but also increase the amount of contam¬ ination stored in the vadose zone. Not all contamination that reaches the aqui¬ fer is carried away by the groundwater. Some contaminants may be adsorbed on solid sur¬ faces or otherwise contained in the aquifer and gradually released or desorbed in small amounts to pollute the groundwater. One important ex¬ ample is the class of halogenated immiscible hydrocarbons such as paint thinners. pesti¬ cides. and PCBs. Thus, by the time this type of contamination is detected in groundwater the vadose zone may be significantly contami¬ nated. Thus it would be useful to detect leach¬ ate contamination in the vadose zone beneath a hazardous waste disposal site .efore it reaches groundwater. It might help *void the costs of groundwater and contaminated soil cleanup and human health and tfie environ¬ ment would be better protected. EPA does re¬ quire vadose zone monitoring for land treat¬ ment of hazardous wastes 87 in the standards for EPA permitted facilities of July 26, 1982. The preamble to the regulations states that “EPA believes that adequate technology and expertise is available to develop effective and reliable systems.’’ M Yet in the same regulations vadose zone monitoring is not required for landfills, surface impoundments, and waste piles where the need and the benefits would appear to be far greater. The technology for which there is the most experience in waste disposal monitoring in the vadose zone is the suction lysimeter, a porous ceramic cup placed in the vadose zone to col¬ lect a samp a of the fluids. In the interim status standards for existing land disposal facilities, EPA rejected the use of lysimeters with this ex¬ planation: Available leachate monitoring technology generally involves the placement of probes (lysimeters) beneath the disposal facility. Since each probe is not generally capable of monitoring a large area, many of them would have to he placed under a faciiitv in order to detect a localized flaw in tfie landfill design. !t may not be possible to place such devices below an existing landfill or surface impound¬ ment without completely removing tfie waste and redesigning the facility. Moreover, once such a system is in place, tfie probes tend to fail over time due to deterioration or plugging. It is difficult to determine when such a fail¬ ure occurs and, il discovered, the damage is generally irreparable. Under these circum¬ stances EPA does not believe that leachate monitoring should be a general requiremen' for landfills and surface impoundments dur¬ ing inierim status. 60 Other commentors have pointed out that ly¬ simeters do not work well in subfreezing or conditions of low soil moisture 70 or very hot and * I his method is used for less than 1 percent of wastes that are land disposed; it is also know n as land spreading or land farming of wastes. “47 Federal Register 32329. “45 Federal Register 33191, May 19. 1900. w Law engineering Testing Co.. "Lysimeter Evaluation Study" (Washington, DC: American Petroleum Institute. 1983). - / «r ?*&£*** ,>» ■T'T ~*~s* W»WS ~w —.-^‘ —** ffmry dry conditions. 71 Are these arguments valid? The first point, that the “probe is not general¬ ly capable of monitoring a large area is con- tradicted by field experience. Some data indi¬ cate that a suction lysimeter located 10 feet below an impoundment could measure a dis¬ tance of 10 to 30 feet laterally. 72 Second, plac¬ ing suction lysimeters under existing land dis¬ posal sites can and has been done by the technique of drilling at a slant. Third, the plug- ging problem can be largely overcome by pack¬ ing the sampler with silica flour, 73 a standard technique which appears in EFA manuals. 74 Fourth, the statement that the "damage is gen¬ erally irreparable” is unclear since what has been placed ought to be replaceable. As for the other comments, it is not very rele¬ vant that lysimeters do not work well in con¬ ditions of freezing or low soil moisture since these are not conditions in which there would be much leachate. And as for hot and dry con¬ ditions, vadose zone monitoring is currently being conducted in Beatty, Nevada. In any event, it is not necessary that lysimeters work perfectly (no technology does) or that they be convenient to use. The important question is whether they are cost effective in reducing groundwater cleanup costs through early de¬ tection of contamination. Lysimeters have been used lor many years for monitoring land disposal sites. At least one State, Texas, uses them for regulatory moni¬ toring. Wiscon.-in has been requiring vadose zone monitoring since the mid-1970s and there are 19 solid waste sites there with either suc¬ tion lysimeters or collection lysimeters. 75 Cal- ’’Terry L. Thoem. Conoco Inc., letter to U.S. Environmental Protection Agency docket for regulations of July 26. 1982 (47 FR 32274). docket No. Pl.DE 11 090. ’'Robert U. Morrison, Kenneth A. Lepic. and |ohn A. Baker. "Vadose Zone Monitoring at a Hazardous Waste Disposal Fa¬ cility,” paper presented at the conference Characterization and Monitoring in the Vadose Zone sponsored by the National Water Well Association. Las Vegas. NV, Dec. 8-10, 1983. ”Dr. L. C. Everett. Kamen Tempo, private communication. Mar. 23. 1984. , , mi. Q Everett. L. C. Wilson, and F.. W. Hoylinan. "Vadose Zone Monitoring for Hazardous Waste Sites." performed under contract No. 6d-03-3090 lor the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Santa Barbara. CA: Kamen Tempo), pp. 5-63. ’’Peter Kmet. Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, private communication. Mar. 20. 1984. \ \ ifornia has proposed regulations that would re¬ quire vadose zone monitoring in new installa¬ tions. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has in¬ stalled suction lysimeters (albeit, not without difficulty) at two existing low-level nuclear waste landfills. This research projected was started by USGS in 1981. 76 A 2-year study of three sanitary landfills by the Illinois State Geological Survey placed lysi¬ meters under the existing landfills; all three had contamination in the vadose zone that had not been detected by groundwater monitoring wells. 77 In one site the lysimeters showed that a clay liner had ruptured and in another site lysimeter monitoring showed that contamina¬ tion detected by a monitoring well was com¬ ing from a different site. The researchers did not experience the difficulties reported by EPA. There is also field experience with geophysi¬ cal vadose zone monitoring techniques. A com¬ mercial hazardous waste disposal facility in Oregon uses a vadose zone monitoring system that “integrates lysimeters, dual purpose ten- siometers/lysimeter units, and geophysical ar¬ rays to provide an early warning leak detec¬ tion and sampling system.” 78 A firm in Las Vegas has installed three resistivity grids since 1980 at hazardous waste lagoons, and they are all reported to be working well. 79 Many techniques available for monitoring in the vadose zone for both new and existing land disposal facilities have been evaluated. In 1980. the University of Arizona Water Resources Re¬ search Center reviewed a number of tech¬ niques for vadose zone monitoring below waste disposal sites for EPA. 80 Many of these are ’“Dr. |ohn B. Robertson, U.S. Geological Survey, private com¬ munication. Mar. 23. 1984. ”Thomas M. |ohnson and Keros Cartwright. Monitoring ot Leachate Migration in the Unsaturated Zone in the Vicinity of Sanitary Landfills. Circular 514 (Urbana. IL: State Geological Survey Division. Illinois Institute of Natural Resources, 1980). ’■Morrison, ct at., op. cit. ’“Dr. Robert Kaufmann. Converse Consultants. Las Vegas. NV, private communication. Mar. 20. 1984. «L. G. Wilson. Monitoiing in the Vadose Zone: A Review of Technical Elements and Methods. EPA-600/7-80-134 (l-as Vegas. NV: U.S. Environmental Protection .-.gency, |unc 1980). < ^JWW5?W» • Tq w m awr 'l i’w* ' >. wfp-^«^r»«wr; 752 • Superfund Strategy commercially available and are in common use. Another survey for EPA evaluated state- of-the-art techniques and techniques under re¬ search or development that are capable of 'o- calizing liner leaks. 81 EPA, in rejecting the use of vadose zone monitoring in 1982, referred to the University of Arizona work but discussed only one of the 26 techniques evaluated, the suction lvsime- ter. 82 This technique was rejected largely be¬ cause of cost, although no analysis was made of the trade-off of avoiding the cost of clean¬ ing the contaminated groundwater. The many applications ot vadose zone monitoring were not reviewed. The extent to which the require¬ ments in the reauthorized RCRA for leak detec¬ tion systems might lead EPA to require vadose zone monitoring is not clear. V'adose zone monitoring techniques are not generally easy to use nor are they inexpensive. No one technique is universally applicable and to get a reasonable assurance of detecting leachate, several may have to be used at any given site. Howexer, the techniques for ground- water monitoring are also difficult, fallible, and expensive. The cost of cleaning groundwater can be tens of millions of dollars, depending on the amount of contamination. Thus, even if the technology for vadose zone monitoring is more difficult and less reliable than ground- water monitoring there can be substantial ben¬ efits from detecting pollution early. Delays in Starting Corrective Action Under the Part 2C4 EPA standards for EPA permitted facilities in a detection monitoring mode, 83 if hazardous constituents are detected by the groundwater monitoring system a “com¬ pliance monitoring” program must be insti¬ tuted. This program consists of two parts. First, the EPA permit writer will establish a “ground- M. |. Waller and J. 1. Davis "Assessment of Techniques to Delect Landfill Liner Failings." Land Disposal of Hazardous Waste. KI’A-600Zq.«2 (*J2 ICincinnatti. Oil Municipal Fin 11011 - mental Research laboratory. March 10«2). p. 2.11. I S Lnvironment.il I’roti* tion Agency. "Summary and Anal¬ ysis ol Comments (-10 CFR f’art 264. Suhparts F. k. I.. M an.l M" (Washington. IX.\ Office of Solid W aste, July 9. 19«2|. p 72 •MO (,FK |*art 2b4. Sul»p«irt F. water pro'ection standard” for the unit, which will be specified in the permit for the facility. Second, a new groundwater monitoring pro¬ gram will be instituted to determine whether the unit is in compliance with its groundwater protection standard. This new program will consist of monitoring at the compliance point, i.e., the edge of the disposal area, to detect any statistically significant increase in the concen¬ tration levels of hazardous constituents. The groundwater protection standard includes the hazardous constituents to be monitored or removed if necessary, the concentration limits for each hazardous constituent that trigger cor¬ rective action, the “point of compliance” for measuring concentration limits, and the com¬ pliance period. The regulations require that the concentra¬ tion limits be set at the background level of the constituent in the groundwater or the maxi¬ mum concentration limits for drinking water established for any of the 16 hazardous con¬ stituents covered by the National Interim Pri¬ mary Drinking Water Regulations. The facil¬ ity owner may ask for a variance to establish an alternate concentration limit (ACL) if lie can demonstrate that the constituent will not pose a substantial present or potential hazard to hu¬ man health or the environment. If the groundwater protection standard is ex¬ ceeded. then ano'her step, the corrective ac¬ tion program, is instituted. This program at¬ tempts to bring the facility into compliance w ith the groundwater protection standard by removing the hazardous waste constituents from the groundwater or treating them in the aquifer. The regulations require that corrective measures be taken to clean up the plume of contamination that has migrated beyond the compliance point but not beyond the property boundary. Earlier it was shown that even in a well de¬ signed and properly functioning groundwater detection monitoring system, a long time (even, in some cases, decades) could elapse before contamination from a leak from a hazardous waste disposal site reached a detection moni¬ toring well. However, because of the structure .ju i . i m-ii* ' -; ii — j- 1 - rtw nww?a a^ VW* < V J ••vV**rA •- Ch. 5 -S/res Requiring Cleanup • «*«»*«»» 153 „f the EPA regulations, a long •>“« ““n^ elapse between the and the time any- reaches a monitoring 5 . 14 shows a sce¬ nario whe^ttu^ela^sed tune is «SSU.. I- reared t0 work through the many steps prescribed by the regulations. The action required tatthat ft£ groundwater contamination |h( . rop . “Writers zsiz Tno requ— "** 0t,Cra ' ,0n5 ' Statistical Analysis Jan -, 7 ,^ConTa^tnatton reaches gr^dwlter detection monitoring well. f TO m monitoring well. Well Apr 1. T 9 ^ -Sample is drawn (40 C F R 264 98(a)) must be sampled sem.-an"Semination is 3 months. Assume average t.me 'odetwico J fife |S a statist.- Way 1. »«M-o™ backg-una This deter- cally sigmhcant increase a reasonat)le t.me period mmatton must be made how ever. discussion in (264 98(g)(2)) Assume 1 ' „ misUc . next section will show this - ° p permit modthca- Aug t. '" o5,am v: t.on to establish co P 98(hK4). Include notice must be done within W days (2 f concentra „on ot intent to seek 9g(hk4)(iv)) tim.is under part vafiance under part Nov 1 7984-Subm.t data to ) nJ i(uen , lden t.f.ed under 264 9i - s “ B :;Lr?rr rrr." «»<»» r,rrr*;“ «—« Mar 1. 1985 (264.98(ii)). mil (or corrective Dec t, 1985 - EP ^ SS "! D ec?f Jl Mne regulations. Assume action. NO time '' n ;‘ era to review the data and prepare it takes 4 months tor EPA to re ^ jc comment . a draft permit. Notice s g __ Det ,od Regulations re- Ja n 15 1986.-End public comment period, 9 « p.™.. COUAdi- JZZ* » V«.‘ « trom statistical^*naiysis.--- ^RCE'dlhc* ol t^hnoiof), A«rtvn«"l 38-745 0 - 85-6 ssas|=:S (see table 5-14) is very unhkelj. ee tauie — - - * able variability due I contam ,nation. (reduction ol w fluctuations. geochem- These include seasonal »ucluaUons^ ical processes, pertur^tiws^b^rod^uce changes XS by the sampling mchni^e.nmural 265 ..... Iha. Sn ,0 a r s b atre of lh e SS —1K formulasTpproved byl^PA. Ther e are four possible outcomes from such a calculation: 3 - s ^ negative). *»M 0 CFH 2(14 07(h) and 265.931b). I CVtr-aUS«X!l*A3S(» - 4. The test could indicate that groundwater is not contaminated when in fact it is not (true negative). A test for statistical significance attempts to minimize the false positives and the false neg¬ atives. This can be done by increasing the sam¬ ple size, i.e., by increasing the number of mon¬ itoring wells, the frequency of sampling, and the number of samples taken Hut for a given sample size, any test of statistical significance that reduces the probability of false negatives also increases tiie probability of false positives and vice versa. rhere are two ways to design a test for sta¬ tistical significance. One is to decide in ad¬ vance the probability ol detecting groundwater contamination one wishes to achieve (the prob¬ ability of detection being one minus the prob¬ ability of a false negative). In this case the prob¬ ability of a false positive will fie a function of the sample size and the variability of the data. Another way is to determine in advance the probability of a false positive and allow those same factors to determine the probability of de¬ tection. In the former case the probability of a false positive will not be known in advance and in the latter case the probability of detect¬ ing contamination will not be known in ad¬ vance. EPA has chosen the latter approach. The cost of a false positive could be several thousand dollars: e.g., the cost of additional sampling and testing to establish that there is actually no contamination. The cost of a false negative, groundwater contamination that goes undetected, could be large additional cleanup costs and increased threats to human health and the environment. And if the owner can¬ not afford the necessary corrective action, the site might become a candidate for CERCLA ac¬ tion. Minimizing the occurrence of false posi¬ tives reduces the short-range costs of disposal site operators but OTA found no mention in any EPA document of why this approach was chosen over the other. bility of false positives (the level of significance) of 5 percent, fn the final regulations adopted in 1980. EPA decreased the probability to 1 per¬ cent. But this increased the probability of false negatives, fn the preamble of the regulations,* 8 it is implied that (lie change was made because of industry concerns over the cost of a false positive. There does not seem to have been an attempt to balance this against the cost of false negatives borne by industry and the public. In the 1982 regulations for EPA permitted sites, EPA raised tiie probability of false posi¬ tives to 5 percent once again, explaining: EPA is fixing the level of significance for the Student s t-tnst at 0.05 for each parameter at each well. When the Agency proposed this significance level for interim status ground- water monitoring, it received some criticism that this would produce too many notifica¬ tions of contamination where none had ac¬ tually occurred. EPA recognizes that this could be a prob¬ lem. particularly when there are many com¬ parisons being made for different parameters and for different wells. However. EPA is con¬ cerned that a lower significance level would unduly compromise the ability to detect con¬ tamination when it did, in fact, occur. 87 EPA did not. however, raise the probability of false positives from 1 to 5 percent at the in¬ terim status sites. No explanation was given for not including interim status facilities in this decision. O TA has tried to find an estimate by EPA of the probability of detecting groundwater con¬ tamination by this statistical procedure. While El A documents contain many discussions and calculations of false positives. OTA could not find an estimate of the probability of a false negative. The only related material is a study for EPA that was to "estimate the false positive and false negative probabilities for various sta¬ tistical procedures." 6 * However, the study esti- 7———■ 'I M-W'PPMWU trsnr —-v !■«w». k». . 154 • Superfund Strategy E.PA proposed standards for monitoring in¬ terim status sites on December 18, 1978,* 5 which included a statistical test with a proba- “43 Federal Register SH9U2 ” reoeral Register 33195 . ”47 Federal Register 32303. “|KI1 Associates. "Evaluation of Statistical Procedures for Oroundwaler Monitoring" in U S. Environmental Protect,on *."7 ('">undnatcr Monitorinfi Guidance fur Owners and nil ? a SW-963 (Washington IX ( dice of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Marc h 198 i) «W«^| ^^wvw-'' r -p*?*5J*w<» ^^^ 9 — f" gv g» - . -^-r-vn ~;svrv- ■-».'itr» '.-j*;--'. • f mated the probabilities of false negatives for only one statistical procedure, and that one is not the one that EPA uses. More recently. EPA has acknowledged that: the t-test, as it is currently being applied, is ill equipped to deal with the very small data sets being gener ited . . . nor can it effectively handle the wide and largely unknown varia¬ bilities due to spatial, temporal, sampling, and analytic problems. 89 The conference report for the recently reau¬ thorized RCRA that deals with surface im¬ poundments notes that in addition to a statis¬ tically significant increase over background concentrations “other evidence of leaking such as visible leaks or sudden drops in liquid level of the impoundment, also would be sut- ficient.’’ 90 It is not clear, however, to what ex¬ tent EPA might act on this use of adjuncts to statistical analysis. Compliance Monitoring Compliance monitoring at permitted facih- ties measures the degree and extent of the groundwater contamination. Results are espe¬ cially important in designing and evaluating corrective actions. Such monitoring is difficult and expensive: In a typical case . .. determining the extent and severity of a plume emanating from one single source in a shallow aquifer requires dozens of monitoring wells and hundreds of samples. It also takes a great deal of time and several hundred thousand dollars. II the ge¬ ology is more complex or several potential contamination sources exist, the cost will be on the order of halt a million dollars. In a case where the aquifer is deep or surface features cannot help in determining the hydrogeology, costs could soar to S2 or S3 million. Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 155 ••U S. Environmental Protection Agency. ‘ Interim Status Ground-Water Monitoring Implementation jtudy." op. cit. •°U.S. Conj»nrss. Kuport *48-1133, p. 93. "Sv\ep T llavis. Associate Assistant Administrator fur Water and Waste Management. US. Environmental Protection Agency-, statement before the |oint hearing of the Subt ornmittee on Health and the Environment and the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce. Aug. 22. 1980. Hero again, as with the placement of the monitoring wells, the science of hydrogeology enters, but with the additional requirement to model and predict underground contaminant How. Such modeling is not a routinely availa¬ ble technique like well drilling or chemical analysis; it is state-of-the-art scientific research generally carried out by universities and a tew companies. Where modeling groundwater How is possible, predicting contaminant flow may still be very difficult if possible at all (see the section on the vadose zone in this chapter). As pointed out in 1982: It is not presently possible to determine how thousands of individual chemicals will react in the groundwater environment or to conti- dently predict the aggregate effects of numer¬ ous processes such as attenuation, dispersion, and diffusion. A vast amount of field data would he required to develop a reliable basis for sucb predictions. It is frequently suggested that modeling could serve as an adequate predictive tool for this purpose. However, even detailed investi¬ gations which might cost on the order o $250,000 to $500,000 per site may not provide enough data to develop a model to he used in this capacity. Furthermore, a relatively suc¬ cessful modei based on adequate data can only he expected to vicld results within an order of magnitude of the actual situation. This level of accuracy may not be acceptable when pu > lie health is at risk and critical concentrations arc measured in parts pur billion. The process of obtaining the data for pre¬ dicting groundwater conditions, interpreting the information and making accurate deci¬ sions to implement compliance monitoring is a scientific endeavor. It can only be carried out in a confident manner by well trained groundwater technicians. There is presently a severe shortage of trained groundwater scientists in the public and private sector, and it is doubtful that there is sufficient talent available to work on more than a relatively small percentage of the existing sites that would fall under the compliance monitoring aspects of the new hazardous waste regula- tions. BJ ' “DavidW. Miller. Geraghty a Miller. Inc . testimony before hearing of the House Subcommittee on Natural Resources. Agri¬ culture Research and Environment. Nov. 30. 1982. ■I - 1 % 4 156 • Superfund Strategy EPA seems to understand these shortcom¬ ings for modeling and predicting contaminant flow. The preamble to the regulations states: The way to meet this objective [of protec¬ tion! > s * *° avoid regulatory schemes that prin¬ cipally rely on complicated predictions about the long term fate, transport, and effect of haz¬ ardous constituents in the environment. Such predictions are often subject to scientific un¬ certainties about the behavior of particular constituents in the hydrogeologic environ¬ ment and about the effects of those constitu¬ ents on receptor populations. 93 However, the RCRA permit writers’ manual in its instructions for evaluating the design of a corrective action program takes a somewhat different view of the capability of hydrogeol¬ ogy in predicting contaminant flow: Predictions of groundwater flow patterns throughout the contaminated areas, including the drawdowns and hydraulic gradients, that will be established by the recovery system should be provided. On the basis of predicted withdrawal rates, estimates should be pro¬ vided for the time required to exchange an amount of groundwater equivalent to that originally contaminated. 1 he applicant will need to use either ana¬ lytical solutions or numerical (computer) models to provide these predictions of the re¬ sponse of groundwater on site to the proposed recovery system. To summarize, the requirement that compli¬ ance monitoring predict plume movement is a regulatory requirement that depends on a technology which does not really exist. Thus, EPA is putting more reliance on state-of-the- art technology to clean up pollution than it does to prevent pollution. Corrective Action Corrective action regulations for permitted facilities require that contaminated groundwa¬ ter be cleaned to background levels. Background contaminant levels can be, and frequently are, extremely low if they are known at all. The reg¬ ulations require technology which is capable •M7 Federal Register 32283. of removing contaminants to below the level of detection. But again, the corrective action requirements ask for technology that does not really exist. This is acknowledged by EPA in the preamble to the regulations which states: . .. the technology of performing corrective action is new. The Agency’s and the regulated community’s experience in conducting reme¬ diation activities (beyond the feasibility study stage) is fairly limited to date. 94 The standards are based on the hope that technology will be¬ come available in the future as stated in the preamble. The national experience with ground- water cleanup ... is relatively limited at this time. EPA expects that over time, the state of knowledge about groundwater cleanup meas¬ ures will improve. 95 The most comprehensive study of attempts to clean up sites where groundwater had been polluted was made by EPA in 1980. M This was a study of 169 hazardous waste sites requiring remedial action. Groundwater was polluted at 110 sites. In most cases the groundwater supply was abandoned and replaced by a pipeline to another source. In very few cases, because of the high costs, was there any attempt to clean up the groundwater, and none were cleaned to background levels. Although experts have little experience in re¬ storing polluted groundwater to below detec¬ tion levels, some attempts have been made to restore groundwater to some degree. It is dif¬ ficult, very expensive, and the results have been mixed. I ypically, treatment of a plume is con¬ sidered adequate when levels of volatile organ¬ ics are at or below' 100 pg/1. Operating costs for a single site can run over a million dollars a year for 20 or 30 years. One expert summed up the situation: Substantial efforts are now- being made to reclaim polluted groundwater. In the south¬ western U.S., where highly prolific alluvial aquifers are common, a number of problems “M7 Federal Register 32313. * s -17 Federal Register 32286. “N. Neely. D. Gillespie. F. Schauf. and ). Walsh. U.S. Envi¬ ronmental Protection Agency. Remedial Actions at Hazardous IVasto Sites: Survey and Case Studies. EPA 430/9-81-05, SW-910 (Washington, DC: Oil and Special Materials Control Division January 1981). ' Ch. s—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 157 can be encountered when attempting to re¬ claim polluted groundwater. First, many o the zones of polluted water are large-otten in the range of thousands or tens of thousands of acre-feet. This results in the need to pump substantial amounts of water which must then be treated and/or disposed. Decades w ill be required to remove polluted water in many situations. Second, pumpage of groundwater for reclamation often has legal constraints. Third, land ownership often presents a formi¬ dable problem, because polluted zones fre¬ quently extend beyond property controlled by the responsible entity. Fourth, relatively deep water levels usually allow substantial amounts of pollutants to be in the vadose zone, wtiere pumping is not effective Filth. pu.np.PR schemes are inherently inefficient in belt r > geneous. non-isotropu: alluvial aquifers, due to inflow of unpolluted water during pump¬ ing. Because of the many limitations of recla¬ mation. groundwater quality management should focus on aquifer protection.*' The regulations permit two basic corrective approaches. The first is to pump out the con¬ taminated groundwater. This is not always simple: . . . in very arid portions of the country-, groundwaters are generally located wel, below the ground surface. Therefore it may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to pump such underground waters. In complex geologic environments, contaminants may- perch on clay layers. In such circumstances, even if pumping of surrounding waters were possible, such pumping would not succeed in bringing contaminants to the surface. In ad¬ dition, in these circumstances, the depth ot the contaminant layer may prohibit trenching to reach the contaminants .. . Shallow aqui¬ fers may not have sufficient waters to permit effective pumping. In addition, certain light clay formations may prohibit effecting pump¬ ing from shallow aquifers. In these circum¬ stances. if excavation is not possible, it is im¬ possible to remove all contaminants.** •’Kenneth D. Schmidt. "Limitations in Implementing Aquifer Reclamation Schemes." paper presented at rh.rd Nanona Sr^ posiuni on Aquifer Restoration and Groundwater Mon sponsored by the National Water Well Association. Columbus. -••Comments on Interim Final Hazardous Waste Regulations Promulgated by the UniteJ States Environmental t rotectmi. The EPA RCRA permit writers’ guide recog¬ nizes these difficulties and gives techno ogical approaches for handling them. Where there is insufficient groundwater for efficient pumping, then fresh water must be injected into the aqui¬ fer bv injection wells lo flush out the plume ot contamination. But the plume itself is the lesser problem: ...the removal of additional amounts of water, frequency many times in excess of that originally contaminated, will be required to reduce contaminant concentrations to accept¬ able levels . . • Many ol the hazardous constit¬ uents present in any plume of contamination migrating from a hazardous waste manage¬ ment facility will likely be subject to some amount oi adsorption to the geologic materials on site ... as contaminated groundwater is re¬ moved from the subsurface and replaced by water of lower contaminant concentrations, contaminants will desorb from subsurface sol¬ ids and establish new equilibrium concentra¬ tions of contaminants in the groundwater. Thus, the process of restoring groundwater quality will become a process, in most cases. ol not only removing contaminants originally present in groundwater but also of removing contaminants adsorbed to subsurface solids. The expensive process of pumping huge amounts of water lor decades does not guar¬ antee that cleanup standards will be met. 1 he issue of whether EPA will insist on lul com¬ pliance with its standards when faced with, such costs becomes important. In addressing such public concerns, an EPA official wrote: •‘It may be costly and take decades, hut it can be done and under the regulations the owner is required to undertake it.”** However EPA s instructions to their permit writers are less op¬ timistic: the jiermit writer should also consider the relative costs of these measures when deter¬ mining the adequacy of Hushing rates pre¬ dicted for proposed recovery systems. In- AcerujyTursuant lo Sections 3004 .ml 3003 of .he Resource Con¬ servation and Rec overy AC. Docket,3004. tor I .and Disposal Facilities" (Washington. DC. The American Petroleum Institute. Nov. 23. 1983). . -Lee M. Thomas. Assistant Administrator. L .S. Env ironmtn- Naylor K<»Kert C Bvrd. Dec. » .1 llr. liu-lmn AoPI l.iHur In 1983. 158 • Superfund Strategy creasing flushing by increasing pumping rates and the number of wells, well points, and/or drains will certainly increase the costs asso¬ ciated with the recovery system. Similarly, re¬ quiring the use of injection wells and/or in¬ creasing their number and rates of injection will increase cost. In some cases, particularly as flushing rates become higher, the cost of increasing Hushing rates by requiring these design changes will become disproportion- ally high relative to the additional flushing achieved and the advantages gained. Thus, the permit writer will need to balance a number of factors when reviewing the ade¬ quacy of flushing rates expected from a pro¬ posed recovery system. The EPA permit writers* guide also points out many problems that may be encountered in attempting corrective action and it does not have solutions to all of them. For example, the problem of cleaning up immiscible fluids is poorly understood. Once contaminated water is pumped out of the ground, something must be done with it. One solution is to remove the contaminants and return the cleaned water to the aquifer. This has been tried at some CERCLA sites. I able 5-15 shows some examples of the kind of levels of cleanup that can he practically (albeit at great cost) achieved using the most common techniques. Although impressive, these results are far from background levels, and are higher than generally accepted sale levels. Tabie 5-15.—Removal of Selected Specific Organics From Groundwater O rganic co mpound phenol .. toluene. benzene. ethyl acetate . formaldehyde. aceton. methyl ethyl ketone aniline. nilroaniline. methanol. isopropanol . isobutanol. methylene chloride . trichloroethylene 1.1.1 trichloroethane 1.1.2-trichloroethane tetracniorethylene .. nitrooenzene. a Noie AH values to or Opb Process effluent concentration range" Adsorption Stripping Biological — 10-50 <10 10-50 <10 10-100 — 10-20 — 50-100 — 10-20 — 25.con 10 20 — 10-50 50-100 — 10 50 15,000 10-50 — 10,000 10 50 — 40.000 10-50 <100 200 <50 <10 5-10 <10 <10 50 10-50 <10 50 1050 5-10 5-10 10-200 <10 — 100-1.000 SOURCE J R A&saton a „a „ R Rockenbury. -Treatme-.! AiiwmaHvos Evaiu*. Hon lor Aquifer Restoration maoer presented at the Third National Symposium on Aquifer Restoration and Groundwater Momlonnq spo n m3? m * Na! ‘ ona ' vVa,ei ,-Ve " Association, Columbus. On, May The purpose of this discussion is not to con¬ demn available technologies for cleaning up contaminated aquifers. However, it is possible to see the predicament facing a facility opera¬ tor with a need to take corrective action. To abandon tiis facility, thus making it a Super¬ fund site, may seem an attractive option. Estimating Future Needs A second technology that the RCRA ground- water protection standards allow for correc¬ tive action is "in situ" treatment. This is the introduction ot chemical or biological agents into the aquifer to react with and destroy the hazardous constituents. If anything, even less is known about these technologies tnan those discussed above, as the permit writers' guide points out: ... to date in situ treatment has been applied in only limited circumstances, and little ex¬ perience is available that can be related di¬ rectly to the cleanup activities required in Fart 2f>4 corrective actions programs. In most cases, use of these techniques will assume the char¬ acter of a field experiment. Data to Illustrate the Scope of the Problem About 2.000 hazardous waste land disposal facilities required to conduct groundwater monitoring have filed for interim status. Many more may require regulation, particularly sur¬ face impoundments. (Note that injection wells are regulated under another statute and not by the RCRA groundwater protection standards although they are used for hazardous waste disposal.) Various EPA data provide some in¬ dication of the number of hazardous waste management facilities that might threaten groundwater: surface impoundments, 770; landfills, 200; injection wells. 700; land treat¬ ment. 70; waste piles. 170; and storage and treatment tanks. 2,0-10. i Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 159 OTA has analyzed the data from EPA s 1981 study of waste management to examine the ex¬ tent to which land disposal facilities receive toxic hazardous wastes. Toxic wastes present long-term chronic health risks and are to be contrasted with wastes that are hazardous only on the basis of characteristics such as reac¬ tivity, ignitability, and corrosivity. 1 he data in¬ dicate that a significant fraction-pernaps a majority—of the wastes being placed in and disposal facilities nationwide are toxic chem¬ icals that would pose long-term health prob¬ lems if released into the environment, for sur¬ face impoundments and landfills almost all the wastes may be toxic, while for injection wells about one-third of the wastes may be toxic. Number of Future NPL Sites Planning needs to take into account the pos¬ sibility that currently operating RCRA hazard¬ ous waste facilities will become future M L sites. The reasons are: • Hazardous waste land disposal facilities have a poor record of performance. I he\ continue to be used for toxic materials pos¬ ing long-term problems. Even with the many changes in the recent RCRA reau¬ thorization, including the eventual limits on some land disposal, low-cost land dis¬ posal will remain widely used for some time. • The current groundwater protection stand¬ ards are so inadequate that, even wit i perfect compliance, they would not pre¬ vent the release of hazardous substances from many of the facilities they cover. Re¬ leases are unlikely to be detected early enough in all cases to limit contamination to levels that would or could be effectively cleaned up by RCRA facility operators. • One important consequence of the reau¬ thorized RCRA may be to h isten the clos¬ ing of the worst hazardous waste facilities. Many owners and operators may escape near-term and possibly long-term respon¬ sibility for cleaning up sites that have seri¬ ous enough problems to eventually place them on the NPL. As indicated earlier, it is possible only to esti¬ mate the number of facilities that might in¬ come future NPL sites. On the basis ol the ana.- vsis in this chapter. OTA believes that a rea¬ sonable estimate is that at least half of the ap¬ proximately 2.000 operating hazardous waste fa¬ cilities that are or should be subject to RLKA croundwater protection standards will become EIPL sites. Many more sites may require clean¬ up, but they might be cleaned up by their own¬ ers or users. THE SITE SELECTION PROCESS This section describes EPA’s current proc¬ ess for selecting sites for the NPL (figure 5-1). This process was analyzed to ascertain the like¬ lihood that sites that merit cleanup will not be placed on the NPL. Site Identification There is a large backlog of about 12,000 sites, that have not yet been evaluated. Efforts to dis¬ cover sites have slowed. For the most part. States do not have the resources for site iden¬ tification, and Federal resources are not being supplied. EPA policy is to place highest priority on evaluating already identified sites. Only a few States, including New York. Michigan, and California, have developed programs to iden¬ tify additional sites. However, even without emphasis on discovering new sites, the nation¬ al inventory has been growing steadily, to about 19,000 by late 1984. The argument has been made that the vast majority of the worst sites have been identified. But there are likely to be older, abandoneu sites 160 • Supertund Strategy Figuie 5-1.—Summary Site Scoring Flowchart I — -v.i v— Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 161 and sites that pose indirect environmental haz¬ ards that have not been identified. Setting Priorities far Sites As a result of the "desk-top” preliminary assessment (PA) based on known information, priorities for subsequent actions at the site are established. Each site is given a high, medium, low, or no priority ranking. Without priority, a site is retained in EPA’s basic site inventory, ERR1S (Emergency and Remedial Response In¬ formation System). High-priority sites are im¬ mediately inspected; the others wait their turn. Sites with low priority are unlikely to get at¬ tention. (Although some States may request in- spection of low-priority sites, this does not yet •ppear to be happening.) Documentation is re¬ quired only it a low or no priority status is assigned. There are no national EPA guidelines or criteria lor setting priorities. The process is subjective, rests on professional judgment, and provides little assurance of consistency among EPA Regions or States. No national data are available on the numbers of sites in the vari¬ ous priority categories. On most occasions, lit¬ tle atlemot is made to verify the completeness or accuracy of the information upon which the priority judgment is made. Although States usually conduct PAs. region¬ al EPA offices. EPA contractors, and Field In¬ vestigation Teams (FIT), also conduct them. The States are supposed to perform this task to a greater extent in the future. For fiscal year 1985. EPA has budgeted $1,800 per PA lor State work. An example of the type of guidance provided by some Regions is given in figure 5-2 for EPA Region 5. The guidance is minimal. In addition, as a practical matier. sites that do not affect a large population arc less likely to receive a high prioritv. even though they may present serious hazards. Figure 5-2.—Region 5 Prioritization Critoria High priority for Inspection Medium priority lor inspection Low priority tor inspection (pending! No further action SOLIPCf otiire cl Aicecsmerit 1 No hazardous waste ensrte or 2. Sue has been cleaned up cr 3 Hazardous material onsite, but handled correctly. Complete documenlalio.i needed to justify 1. Known or suspected hazardous waste onsite, and No potential to contaminate surface water, groundwater. O' air. and No potential to affect any population, or 2 Site has been or is being evaluated and State is taking action or 3 No known hazardous waste onsite, but the potential exisls. 1 Know n or suspected hazardous wssto onsile. and 2. Potential 1o contaminate surface water, . groundwater or air, or Potential to sheet any population. 1 K town hazardous watts onsite, end 2. Known contamination of surfuca, water, groundwater, or air, or Potential to aSfgoi (ergs population Site Inspections Most site inspections (Sis) are conducted by ERA FIT contractors with the purpose of ob¬ taining data to evaluate and score the site to determine its eligibility lor placement on the NPL. Sis involve considerable field work, often with limited sampling and analysis. For fiscal year 1985, EPA has budgeted $18,800 per SI for State work. The order in which sites are in- r:.i<«’ 2 -*; •' h- -^. 7 . 162 * Supertund Strategy spected docs not necessarily reflect the prior Jties assigned in the earlier step 5 spccho,,. schedules lake inlo account Ztal wfi n «ternj ,nd '" i,er , io8isii ' ;a ' iSi nnm the same region, the completeness of information entered into the SI form varies .onsiderablv according to who conducted the spection prior known facts about the site on'site scodn^ ^ ™ imp ° r,an ‘ Site Scoring can be regarded as a crude haLnd „ r risk the Shte 1 Th An ,nit ' al SCOrinR is conducted by ‘ State, the region, or the FIT. There are re- levels wiIh 0 FPArT al and h< ‘ H(if l u ' lr,ers ns. with LI A headquarters assigning the final score. All the tacts provided in he fife Ire assumed correct. The cutoff score of W5 (-hosen to provide an original \PL of 400 sites" c minimum required by statute. EPA has re- ,h ‘ s cutnlf lor administrative conven - net and consistency over time, even though n ° te t ? h , nical testification for believin'’ T tb (nver scores do not merit dean- i‘P. Sites designated by States as their highest dSe ? S T an ‘ ° Xampted lro,n the cutoff As Is C T-’™ 4 ,,r " y S u Ve " sil “ "'«■ soom less than 28.o were on the \PL. wh, h ,';. H , R „ S l T' hodoloKy h«* !»«> crifeed else- marized only “rS-hon™--^ f T" | b,! 5 ""'- * te'a v ery strong bias toward human he "h effects, with little chance of “she geltins a ln B h « „ re if ih„ r „ prinMrj| environmental hazards or threats hor human health effects, there is a strong bias m favor of high affected populations' r„„dinn“[Y]i lVi ' s, ° Silrs f,,r Mrtrdi 1982. ' 'Ommilleiion Appropriations. • I'Zmtr r M ,e there must be documen- at on fe.g.. laboratory data) of a release vvaler roules" 0 “ UCh requiremem f “ r 'he • Scoring for toxicity/persistence may be based on a site contaminant, which is not re e iease ar y ^ With " known or Potential • A site with a very high score for one migra- 0n r< ? u,e but zero or very iow scores°for be other two routes can get a relatively m total score while a site with moder- e scores for all three routes might gel a ngfiei score; in other words, averagin' the rou e scores creates a bias against a site • OnlvTh ne P£jrhCUlarly im P or b 1n t hazard, nlv the quantity and not the distribution t uastc is considered, even though simi- quantj ties over markedh different areas pose different threats. ‘ Variability Among EPA Regions ruble j 16 presents data, arranged by EPA «r^r.t£ " J„ h „Tw| nl ? f ERR,S Si,eS lhal h»ve bo- come M L sites varies from l.l percent . Im® 8 ' 011 ,} ,0 5-3 percent (Region 2) tory Kg' h, ' na ' IOnal EKRIS *nven- ,ory by Region varies from 3 percent I Re . «*. 0n 8 > ‘O 20 percent (Region s! he percent of the national NPL bv Region anes from 3 percent (Regions 7 and 8) to 26 percent (Region 5). 1 ° • NPLd! Ke " lons have a high fraction of gious 2 T'Tl ERRIS si '« (Re- murh s ~ ,'u ' "t"' 5 ' Two Re S lo ns have much smaller (radians uf (he N'PL S , 1 PS • S R ' S Si ' es (R °8 '°" s 6 ™d 7) fiscal year 1 985. plans to perform PAs her varies^r ° ^ Ko « ion;il ERR >S num¬ ber varies from 4 percent (Region 61 to 38 percent (Region 8). h J O • For fiscal year 1985. plans to perform Sis bur 8 /™"? ° f lh ° Rvgional ERRIS mm,. fr ™ I P®rccnl (Regions 5 and J to / percent (Region 10). i CO0D“'JO>CJ»^0Jf'O V ^cv&J9t!sesf?9qta*3P2l '£?’ a» *■ '*ar*na» wmwM 9*a*4XX rtKl Ch. 5—Sites Requiring Cleanup • 163 Teble 5-16.-Sil0 Selection Variability Among EPA Regions ___—-:---SyM FY 85 ERRIS % total 0 " 3 Preliminary Assessments (PAS) . Site Investigations (Sl^ _ . frrTs NPL Number (% ERRIS) S(OOC) Number {% ERRIS) $(000) Re^^Number^AN^ERRIS--— - {J - 4 32 55 (6) 921 1 . 937 4.8 5 6 24U I I na NA NA NA ::::::: ?$? S ” - 5 - 2 - % * *!« ::::::: !£S U S - <£ ’ “1 ,5 S! ::::::: ?SS R ’ | « g 5 Si S ::. 576 3 1 3 3 220 (38) 396 ^ ^ Nft 10 ;;; ;; ’’efs £3_ l __ 260 _ ,30) _ 468 — 05 -—- 1068 SOURCE 0't‘CC ot Technology Assessment, using oata 'torn vanous EPA aocu FY 85 PAiSI Total $(0001 1.353 1 775 1,820 5.226 2.750 1.869 690 647 805 1.556 % Total 7 10 10 28 15 10 4 3 4 8 • Regions 4 and 10 appear to have planned for”a large PA/SI effort for fiscal year 1985 as compared to their traction of the na¬ tional ERRIS sites. Conversely. Regions 5. 7, and 9 have relatively small efforts com¬ pared to their fraction of the national ERRIS sites. Data on variations in total and component HRS data for EPA Regions and the Nation are given in table 5-17. Whiie the variation among total scores for the regions is not great, (here are considerable variations for the component scores. This suggests problems in the Hazard Ranking System. In particular, for most regions the air route scores are very low, with the notable excep¬ tions of Regions 1 and 6 which have relatively high scores with high correlations of those scores with the total scores. To ascertain the extent and significance of the national varia¬ bility in air scores, a more detailed analysis was done; the results are given in table 5-18. In examining the number of sites with a non¬ zero air score, it is seen that Regions 4. 5. and 9 have relatively low fractions. 1-or all Regions. 20 percent o. the NPL sites received nonzero air scores, but without Regions 4. 5. and 9 that fraction increases to 29 percent. Of more im¬ portance is the number of sitrs with an air score for which placement on the NPL is cru¬ cially dependent on that air score (those sites that would have a total HRS score below 28.5 without their air scores). Consider the fraction of crucial sites relative to the number of NPL sites. Without Regions 4. 5. and 9. nine lament of N PL sites depend on their air scores tor N PL status, compared to ti percent ‘ )r all Regions. Table 517 .—Summary Statistics on Hazard Ranking Scores EPA Region 1 . Number N°L sites 45 Mean loial 46 6 Mean GW 67 3 R GW-total 0 557 0 468 0 525 0 777 0 710 0 557 0 748 0 722 0.578 0 443 0 712 Mean SW 20 7 R SW-totai 0 433 0 443 0 475 0 173 0 272 0 120 0 431 0 652 0 368 0 282 0 435 Mean A 16 9 13 9 R A lctal ~ C 570 0 390 2 . 122 44 9 62 7 cU 0 20 7 2 28 0 299 3 . 59 40 3 49 2 iy 0 0012 4 .... 66 42 9 68 5 3 79 24 9 0 232 5 . 137 42 5 68 6 0 539 6 . 29 43 5 59 0 11 6 0 1’9 7 . 14 335 52 7 8 78 C 270 8 . 18 459 61.1 6 42 0 007 9 . 28 392 51 5 19 3 0 335 10 . All. 21 539 409 42 5 52 5 59 3 201 12 9 0 055 Total - total *cof© GW groundwater score SW - surface water score A - a>r score n . conation coefficient tmf»een v.o-e •->« 'ot«i vLO'r SOURCE Office o! Technology Assessment . J64 • Superlund Strategy Table 5-18.—Analysis ot NPL Sites With Air Route HRS Scores — Number of NPL sites Sites with air scores Number/percent Nurr.ber/percent of NPL sites crucial lor listing*_ Crucial sites, percent ot NPL sites 45 12.27 3/25 7 7 122 30/25 15 . 59 22'37 o 67 3/5 0*0 141 11/8 2<18 7 . 30 13/43 2> It) 7 7 . ii 4 '29 M2o o lb 3'17 W 7 29 3/10 2-b7 21 7/33 3 43 546 108'2O 31/29 6 1 0 • • W'tsou! regions 4.5.9 399 91 29 27/30 U l •. ►.« • C-t.-.-* *' KW •' •'» ' 0 '“ MS; SOURCE U S ?'«i'C'*’'*-'UI P'C'tc***' *9*' , fCC^W If'f 9 ,r 9CO" **Pi daso<3 S*pt^ r t* f ' If the 9 percent ts applied to the Nl’I. sites of Regions 4. 5. and 9 (and accounting In' the tour crucial sites), then there is an indication tfi.it 17 sites may have been missed due to the pro¬ cedures followed in these three Regions. This discrepancy could increase if more attention is given to Subtitle 13 landfills, which often pose problems of methane generation. Although the groundwater route clearly has the highest scores and the highest correlation with total scores in table 5-17, here too there is considerable variation among the regions. Most ol the variations are difficult to explain other than through administrative, procedural, or policy variations among the Regions and States. The one exception is probably for Re¬ gions 1. 2. 3. and 5 (and to a lesser extent for Region 4). for which an argument could he made that these locations have a substantially greater number of uncontrolled sites resulting from earlier periods and higher densities of in¬ dustrial activities as compared to the rest of the Nation. Estimate of Future NPL Many sites may not he making it through the site selection system. Available statistical data support this view. Table 5-19 gives the results of a 1983 survey of States conducted by the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Ofti- cials (ASTSWMO). States w ere asked to iden¬ tify the number of sites that might require cleanup and the nuinoer of sites needing a cleanup response. 1'his table also gives the number of sites in l,PA s ERRIS tnventoiy and on the NEL (as of August 1984 ). These data re¬ veal marked differences between the estimates made bv States and ERA data for the total pop¬ ulation of uncontrolled sites, even though die totals appear similar, about 18.000 lor eat h. It appears that some States believe there arc many more sites than LEA. estimates, and in other cases the reverse appears the case. Only a ft-w States have estimates within about 10 percent of the ERRIS data. If the highest figures are used for each State, then the universe of uncontrolled sites appears to be about 24.000. The responding States estimate about 8.000 sites will require cleanup. 1 bat is. the States foresee the need for a large NEL. According to the States, about 40 percent of all uncon¬ trolled sites will need cleanup. But less than 5 percent of current ERRIS sites have been placed on the NEL. and EEA's projection of about 2.000 NEL sites out of a total ERRIS of 20.000 amounts to a 10 percent placement for the NEL. The problem of estimating the future size of the NEL is further shown by ihe con¬ siderable variation among the State estimates. Seventeen States believe that 50 pot cent or more of sites will need cleanup and 13 States believe that 10 percent or less will require cleanup. . > «3|g t ' ■? -•*» Ch 5 —Sites Requiring Cleanup • 165 Region I: Maine .. Vermont Massachusetts . Connecticut. Rhode Island. Subtotal. Region II: New York .. . New Jersey Puerto Rico . Virgin Islands Subtotal. Region III: Pennsylvania Maryland. Delaware. Virginia . West Virginia District ol Columbia Subtotal. Region IV: North Carolina South Carolina Florida . Alabama MiSSiSStbO' ■ Tennessee Kentucky .. Subtotal. Region V: Ohio . Indiana. Michigan. Illinois . . Wisconsin Minnesota Subtotal. Region VI: Arkansas. Louisiana. Oklahoma. Texas. New Mexico.. Subtotal .... Region VII: Iowa . Missouri. Kansas . Nebraska Subtotal. Region VIII: North Dakota South Dakota Wyoming V. State Officials Views on Si te Cleanup Requirements ——- - ASTSWMO data ERRIS/NPL data Percent Total sites Response needed Percent Total ERRIS Total NPL 78 5 6 12 96 360 200 6 50 53 200 60 52 15 100 22 74 465 230 78_ 2 10 16 6 6 9 14 4 3 6 657 309 47 937 45 5 760 1.600 200 eoo 27 53 1.132 1.041 139 29 85 8 3 ?l 6 1 0 0 1 0 0 2.251 1.000 44 2.313 122 5 1.200 100 60 275 600 11 8 15 50 11 10 6 1.008 166 69 280 213 39 3 9 4 4 4 2 13 1 2 200 3 0 0 5 0 0 1,858 634 34 1 741 59 3 646 3 - future NPL 22,000 (low) 6.859 15.141 4.239 (28%) 1.187 (28%) 538 1.725 1,484 (35%) 533 2.022 1.908 (45%) 533 2.446 fc r 5.299 (35%) 1.484 (28%) 538 2.C22 1.855 (35%) 533 2.393 c 2.385 (45%) 538 2.923 6.813 (45%) 1.908 (28%) 538 2.446 2.385 (35%) 538 2.923 f‘ 3.066 (45%) 538 3 604 32.000 (hign) 6.859 25.141 7.039 (28%) 1.971 (28%) 538 2.509 2.464 (35%) 538 3 002 3,168 (45%) 538 3.706 l 8 799 (35%) 2.464 (28%) 538 3.002 3.080 (35%) 538 3.618 3960 (45%) 538 4 4^8 11.313 (4 5 % 1 3 168 (28%) 538 3.706 3 960 (35%) 538 4 498 5.091 (45 V.) 538 5 629 NO r £ PA iment SOURCE Ot»*c<» ol T&jhnoiOQ, A»W5*m<*nt for a future N'PL based on an improved site se¬ lection process. In comparison to EPA’s pro¬ jection of about 2,OOP sites on the NPL, O I A projects an additional 1.000 to 3.000 sites. O 1 A believes that with an improved site selection process an additional 2.000 sites ini^ht be rec¬ ognized as requiring cleanup. SUMMARY ESTIMATION On the basis of the information in this chap¬ ter, OTA concludes that the number of uncon¬ trolled waste sites that may merit cleanup and placement on the NPL will l>e markedly greater than EPA’s current estimates. There are some basic benefits to be derived from a site selec¬ tion system that maximizes early identification. With early identification, bettor decisions can be made about priorities and the allocation oi resources for cleanups. There will Ik; less chance that the worst sites will be neglected. As discussed in chapter 3. setting national priorities requires as complete a picture as pos¬ sible of total cleanup needs facing the Super¬ fund program. It is not now possible to under¬ stand whether it makes sense, environmentally and economically, to let 50 percent ol the NPL sites go unattended, while at the same time some 30 }>ercent are receiving remedial clean¬ up. and another 20 percent receive attention of some sort. Placement on the N’PL establishes eligibility lor cleanup, and there is some indica¬ tion that a site's score establishes priority for determining whether it receives an initial re¬ sponse, a remedial cleanup, or studies to se¬ lect a cleanup option. OTA finds that the contribution from solid waste facilities to an expanded N'PL could eas¬ ily be 5.000 sites, and perhaps more. The con¬ tribution from operating hazardous waste fa¬ cilities could to be 1,000 sites. Improving the site selection process could add another 2.000 sites. Therefore, together with the 2.000 sites, which would result from current procedures and policies and which OTA agrees merit cleanup, the total NPL could reach 10,000 sites. • 168 • Superlund Strategy The largest uncertainty is for the contribution from solid waste facilities, both open and closed. Assuming that only 5,000 sites from this category might require cleanup is conservative; it could be two to three times greater. The 10,000 figure is consistent with the re¬ sults of the survey of State officials; they esti¬ mated a need for about 8,000 cleanups. Hut it is unlikely that the estimates of State officials included many solid waste facilities. 102 It should also be noted that State officials also concluded that the more than 10,000 sites that were not put into the highest priority category still had "the potential to threaten public health and the environment." Finally, consider EISA's recent analysis of f u¬ ture Superfund needs. 103 It concluded that “the current inventory of sites and anticipated new additions will produce an NHL of 1,500 to 2.500 sites over the next several years." Although EPA discussed a number of potential sc urces of additional NHL sites, including some that OTA did not. the major factors that lead to their lower projection include: • EHA did not consider surface impound¬ ments. even though: a) according to their data such sites are the single largest source of NHL sites, about one-third, and b) the surface impoundment problem is acknowl¬ edged in EHA's Ground-water Hrotection '■“This view is supported bv the twsir: similarity in tiie Status' estimates of total number of uncontrolled sites to the number hi KKKIS. iiml their dissimilarity from tno numbers of solid waste facilities. (EKKIS does contain some solid waste facilities, ••otni'- thing over 2.000 sites according to El*A. but tins is a small frac¬ tion of the total universe of Subtitle I) facilities.) ••'I S. Environmental Protection Agents. Extent of the Haz¬ ardous Release Problem and Kuture Funding Needs. CKRC1.A Section .1011aKl|(C) Study" (Wn bington. DC: Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Resjronse. Decemtier 1984). Strategy. In OTA’s analysis, 340,000 such facilities were considered. • EHA did not consider closed as well as open industrial landfills. OTA estimated that there were twice as many closed as open ones (150,000 sites). • No basis was provided lor concluding that there were only twice as many closed mu¬ nicipal landfills as open ones. OTA used data for several States to develop an esti¬ mate of three times as many closed as open facilities (42,000 such sites). • EHA did not account for the more strin¬ gent 1984 amendments to RCKA lor haz¬ ardous waste facilities that could lead to more failures ol companies. Nor was there any reference to EHA's problems with groundwater protection standards, which could lead to the creation of uncontrolled sites. EHA's Interim Status Ground-Water Monitoring Implementation Study sub¬ stantiates this problem. OTA estimated that 1,000 hazardous waste facilites could become NHL sites: EHA's estimate was about half this figure. • EHA gave limited consideration to the site selection process and changes in it that could result in more ERRIS sites, with more of them becoming NHL sites. Never¬ theless. there is some indication that EHA believes that an improved site selection process (w ithout further site identification) could add an additional 1.870 to 2,179 sites to the NHL. OTA's estimate from further site identification and improved site selec¬ tion was 2,000 additional sites. EHA has said that a full examination of the problem of future sites could lead to a situa¬ tion where the funding needed "would over¬ whelm" the Superlund program. But OTA's point is that by acknowledging the full extent of future needs, rather than underestimating them, effective planning can prevent a crisis. I ■ _ ^ ,> w. 170 Contents s? Pago Introduction .. 171 The Problem. 171 Site Conditions and Wastes ...-. 172 Technology Evaluation.. 172 Sarrieys to ike Adoption of Improved rr ««'bnolo§y. 175 Policy Uncertainties Create Market Uncertainties. 175 Access to RD&D Financing . 175 Institutional Practices and Regulatory Impacts. 177 The Status Quo/Existing Technology Bias Syndrome. 179 The Technical Options. 181 Temporary Storage. 181 Conventional Technologies. 182 Innovative Technologies. 193 Support of Cleanup Technology RD&D. 214 Introduction . 214 EPA Technology Research and Development. 214 Department of Defense. 219 National Science Foundation. 220 State Efforts . 220 Private Sector. 220 * $ List cf Tabias Table No. Peo e 6-1. Generic Technology Comparison. 174 6-2. Estimated Costs of Conventional Technologies. 183 6-3. Containment Technologies—Summary. 185 6-4. Treatment Technologies—Summary. 188 6-5. Innovative Technology Summary. 198 6-6. Innovative Technology Applicability to Superfund Sites. 199 6-7. Innovative Technology Advantages and Disadvantages. 200 6-8. EPA RD&D Budget. 215 6-9. Superfund R&D Budget. 216 Chapter 6 In the Superfund program so far cleanup of uncontrolled sites has generally meant that haz¬ ardous wastes are confined on the site or dis¬ posed of elsewhere. Containment strategies have been adapted from construction engineer¬ ing techniques and little thought given to the development and application of innovative technologies to deal with the unique problems encountered. With increasing evidence that containment is not effective in the long term and may result in the need to repeat site reme¬ dial action at the same site or on the same waste and as the dimensions of groundwater problems at these sites become clearer, tech¬ nologies which aim at destroying the toxic component of hazardous wastes are now be¬ ing developed by the private sector. However. the adoption of new treatment technologies by the Superfund program faces institutional, reg¬ ulatory and financial barriers. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section is an overview of the problems encountered at Superfund sites and an intro¬ duction to the applicable technologies. Next, the barriers to the adoption of improved tech¬ nology are discussed. In the third section, con¬ ventional and innovative technical options are summarized and analyses of the effectiveness and applicability of both types is provided, i he final section reviews the current status of f ed- eral, Stale, and private sector support for Superfund technology research, development, and demonstration (RD&D). THE PROBLEM The selection of the preferred technology or set of technologies for cleanup at a Superiund site depends on the characteristics of the site, the composition and distribution of hazardous materials, the technical characteristics of the technologies, the costs of the technologies, the nature of the selection process mandated by regulation, and other institutional factors. Ultimately, the selection of technologies for re¬ medial action is accomplished by examining the cost effectiveness of a technology or a set of technologies v : s-a-vis the alternatives. 1 The feasibility of any given technology for a site cleanup is decided early in the decision process. Once a Superfund site has been iden- 'A discussion of cost effectiveness and institutional factors that affect the decision process appears in the following section. "Barriers to the \dophon of Improved Technology." tified and remedial action proceeds, current practices call lor the following basic steps: 1. problem definition (Remedial Investi¬ gation); 2. selection of alternatives (Feasibility Study); 3. engineering design; 4. construction; 5. startup, trouble shooting, and cleanup; and 6. long-term operation and maintenance, if necessary. A Remedial Investigation (RI) and Feasibil¬ ity Study (FS) are required for all Superfund financed and enforcement-lead remedial ac¬ tions. The RI focuses on data collection and site characterization; the fS on data analysis and evaluation. Despite the dependence of the FS on results from the R' KPA conducts the two concurrently rather thr.ii sequentially. 171 172 * Superfund Strategy Site Conditions and Wastes As part of its data collection, the RI catalogs the site’s conditions and its wastes. Site fac¬ tors that affect technology applicability include its geologic, topographic, hydrologic, and me- teorologic characteristics. Waste characteris¬ tics pertain to the chemical and physical state of the waste and to the media where it is found. Hazardous wastes may have been placed in “surface impoundments,” such as settling ponds or lagoons that can contain liquid wastes and sediments; may be found in drums; and/or may have been landfilled (buried). Other Super¬ fund sites have been created by the application of pesticides (e.g., dioxin) to large land areas. Contaminated environmental media at Super¬ fund sites include air, soils, water (surface or groundwater), and biota. While there is an extraordinary degree of variability among uncontrolled sites, most wastes found at sites can be broken down into five distinct classes for consideration of appli¬ cable technologies: • slightly contaminated solids and soils, • contaminated groundwater, • concentrated liquid wastes. • concentrated organic sludges and solids, and • concentrated inorganic sludges an 1 solids. Organic materials of concern are hydrocar¬ bons (compounds of carbon and hydrogen) or compounds containing carbon, hydrogen, and other elements. The latter include solvents, PCBs, pesticides (e.g., dioxin and DDT), and halogenated compounds (primarily those with chlorine). Inorganic materials of primaly con¬ cern include heavy metals (e.g.. cadmium, chromium, mercury, copper, zinc), cyanide, ammonia, and nitrates. 2 Because mixed wastes, plus variable concentrations of wastes, must be dealt with. Superfund cleanup technologies must operate in a oifferent environment than 2 A recent El’A study shows that, of the 25 most frequent sub- stances found at Superfund sites. 11 are chlorinated solvents. 7 arc heavy metals, 5 are aromatic solvents, and 1 is cyanide. (Reported in the Hazardous Materials Control Research Insti¬ tute's hocus newsletter. February 1485.) those processes that treat the more consistent waste streams generated at industrial plants. Technology Evaluation As the FS evaluates alternative remedial ac¬ tions, various types of technologies are intro¬ duced as possible solutions to site problems. After an initial screening of technologies, ob¬ viously infeasible or inappropriate alternatives are eliminated. The remaining technologies are then subjected to complete technical, cost, in¬ stitution, public health, and environmental analyses to provide a “cost-effectiveness” evaluation. The cost-effectiveness measure at¬ tempts to weigh the costs of various options versus the effectiveness of the cleanup achieved. This evaluation limits the number of technologies suitable for consideration and forms the basis of an engineering design study for the cleanup procedure. However, without cleanup goals, alternatives cannot be properly evaluated. This leads to cost-benefit analysis where both effectiveness and cost vary. It is possible, therefore, to choose a relatively Iow- cost option whose level of effectiveness may equate to some arbitrary level of protection. The basic generic technological approaches at any Superfund site are: 1. in situ treatment of soils or groundwater containing hazardous w'aste; 2. excavation of the hazardous waste solids, liquids, and/or sludges for disposal, stor¬ age. or treatment offsite (removals) or on¬ site; and 3. pathway control through encapsulation and/or containment, or by ground or sur¬ face water diversion. 3 Nontechnical alternatives to cleanup that also are relevant to site (risk) management in¬ clude mitigating exposures by providing an ’Trade-offs occur when hazardous wastes are transported off¬ site. While transportation adds a cost that can be substantial, for low volumes of a particular hazardous waste it may be less expensive to treat in regionally loca’ed facilities. Transporta¬ tion offsite adds a health and environmental risk Onsite treat¬ ment may be restricted due to the availability and cost of nec¬ essary infrastructure, such as power and water sources. t ■ Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 173 alternate water supply, restricting land use, and evacuating people. Remedial technologies are often broken down into two broad categories: containment and treatment. Table 6-1 compares contain¬ ment and treatment technologies, both conven¬ tional and innovative, in terms of their elfec- tiveness, reliability, environmental media affected by their use, least compatible waste, and estimated cost. The primary functions of containment technologies are: 1) to arrest or prevent the movement of contaminants from a source (e.g., uvertlow of a holding pond); 2) to limit the extent of already contaminated groundwater plume or soil mass; or 3) to im¬ mobilize the contaminants to prevent or reduce exposure to humans or the environment. The functions of treatment technologies are: 1) to detoxify contaminants by changing or destroy¬ ing the chemical characteristic(s) that render them hazardous, or 2) to separate those haz¬ ardous materials from the environmental media that serve as routes of exposure. Since containment technologies do not ren¬ der harmless that which is the source of the problem. Superfund sites subjected to contain¬ ment may have to be monitored indefinitely, or at least for as long as containment is used, to assure continual protection. Landfills under Subtitle C of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) are containment technol¬ ogies. Treatment processes, while they have been shown to destroy extremely high percent¬ ages of hazardous constituents, inevitably pro¬ duce a residue that must he dealt with. Proc¬ esses such as incineration, for instance, produce ash that may or may not be consid¬ ered a hazardous waste and air emissions that may have to be controlled. Physical separation techniques produce an output stream that re¬ tains the hazardous properties of the original waste, frequently in a more concentrated, man¬ ageable form. These residues require proper disposal (and perhaps additional treatment) to achieve overall objectives. If the subsequent treatment and disposal are not properly man¬ aged, the original hazards may be shifted to other environmental media or locations and to new exposed populations. Such a shift is always the case when hazardous wastes are simply removed from Superfund sites for con¬ tainment (land disposal) elsewhere. Both containment and treatment technol¬ ogies range greatly in potential applicability and expected effectiveness. Most containment technologies depend primarily on site factors. On the other hand, most treatment technol¬ ogies are dependent on waste properties, both in terms of class (organic or inorganic) and also physical state. In general, containment systems have low capital costs but long-term operating and maintenance (O&M) costs which can be substantial if measured over their lifetime. The reverse is generally true for treatment technol¬ ogies: high capital costs with short-term O&M costs. The result is that if all costs are ac¬ counted for over the long term, then treatment technologies can offer lower overall costs. Off¬ site application of either type of technology adds cost to cleanup activity and introduces risks from the transportation of hazardous wastes. Containment systems generally fall into four types. The f irst, based on hydrologic principles, uses w'ells and pumping to control the outward flow from, or the potential contact of ground- water with, a source of contamination. Alter¬ natively, some sort of physical barrier, such as a grout curtain or slurry wall, can be installed to prevent groundwater from moving into or out of the contaminated mass of soil or aquifer. The third type comprises conventional inter¬ ception and drainage systems. The fourth set of technologies isolates the wastes in con¬ tainers or highly impermeable matrices. These techniques are often employed in combination to increase effectiveness. Treatment technologies employ many types of processes. Organic chemicals can be broken down by biological, chemical, or thermal meih- ods, or toxic organics can be separated from nontoxic materials by physical methods. De¬ toxification of inorganic species, such as arse¬ nic or cadmium, is more difficult. Toxicity often resides in the element itself. Treatment technologies act on inorganic species by im¬ mobilization and separation, or in a few cases. Tabic 6-1.—Generic Technology Comparison i 174 • Superfund Strategy o CD ■o CD C !5 ES! o o o d — C © g CD ® XI ^ F £ .c a - tr c s, 5 - _ * 5 *?ic y ? *- : cd I >s CT3 in , JZ Cl 03 CL CD c 1 cd; E i CO O CO CD c ^ . S ■ — C O) CO c z o 10 _ £ a> c E O c o. t o O o o o Q. 'll xr 8 03 o CO 03 O CD OJ 3 fr. E v, 1 ^ p x: E « E 5 >32 W x:: £ °;> 4> _ c ® cl « 5 = g § S TO 2- ^ CC ^ co CO Q. p cl t: o < X I 3 C o u ; m - <-> i O .iS - C * o - ■5g 1 g *-« l E CJ 1 lO O C 03 ... O ~ I -O ~ 03 3 . co ~ t: r oj j - CD F- 5 v J — * «' “O i: S3 y ^ ! — C - 0 ^ o ^5 g .9 W S J« g C O | w « 2 ^ ! O *- 5 ? c C — C O .E _ CD 3?".S« — .»» J p 03 co 5 W gg£^ - tf) 13 O ^ O £ O j a CD __ y ^25- O) C *' 7: P O •gs -O C ^ I O 10.^ 8 E _-m So I 3 m g .2 5 S ^ i- M U | 5 E CO CD JO) XI 10 n 0 10 3 >. n — 0 >H O' as E xi o o c CD P 03 T) ^ c6“r O O O O _ m t c o ID «n > > c ^ w os 5 C *» "I ' Cn 6—Cleanup Technologies • 177 cess to funds, or relevant programs.* State furding is. for the most part, constrained hv budgets that must consider immediate cleanup costs before engaging in long-term R&D fund¬ ing. Some market risk could be mitigated by indirect support, such as tax incentives. Institutional Practices and Regulatory Impacts It is often difficult to separate institutional practices and regulatory impacts. In terms of Superfund technology, these factors combine to increase the financial burden on technology firms seeking operating permits and increase the uncertainties over permitting for testing purposes. Testing standards are not available and valid testing materials are ditficult to ac¬ quire. A bottleneck exists, make recognized testing standards unavailable and access to testing materials from sites difficult, and create a bottleneck under RCRA hazardous waste en¬ listing procedures. The problems culminate when a technology is at the stage of actually demonstrating its effectiveness. They can raise the cost of (or bar) such demonstrations and result in inconsistencies in the information available on new technologies. There is no es¬ tablished procedure for collecting and dissem¬ inating the information that is generated. Authentication Permitting requirements under the RCRA program for processes in the RD&D stages are expensive and time-consunr ng. Procedural duplication between Federal and State agen¬ cies and differences between the various States, and even between EPA Regions, multiply time and expenses. A 1- to 2-year proc¬ essing period is not uncommon and one turn has calculated that it has spent SI million so far in permitting procedures. Because landfill and incineration technol¬ ogies are defined under RCRA, these technol¬ ogies are given de facto established technology status even though not much data has been col- T^7h7d.v:u«ion ol KPSI) lor technology in the Usl section of this chapter. lected about their performance as Superfund technologies. On the other hand, new technol¬ ogies are required to present recognized testing results to demonstrate comparable reliability and effectiveness. A protocol, a detailed, tech¬ nology and application specific testing proce¬ dure, must be followed. Protocols, however, by tbeir very nature are not available for innova¬ tive technologies, and cannot be written with¬ out first acquiring testing information. 1 he tol- lowing examples of what two diffe ent ums had to undergo in order to prove their technol¬ ogy illustrate these points. A permit for a 3-month demonstration proj¬ ect was applied for by MODAR Inc., a small RAD firm, through Region 2 of the Environ¬ mental Protection Agency (EPA) m August 1983. Permission was finally granted by Octo¬ ber 1984. over a year later. I wo parallel per¬ mitting processes were necessary, one under RCRA and the other under TSCA since one ol the wastes that MODAR intended to test was PCBs. (RCRA permits protect against adverse affects of hazardous wastes: TSCA regulates specific wastes.) Under RCRA law at the time, there was no provision for RAD permitting as opposed to operations permitting the svstem classified as an incinerator. MODAR s unit is not an incinerator, but they had to con¬ vince EPA of that fact. Eventually it was clas¬ sified as a “new chemical physical process” for which tests would be needed to develop a pro¬ tocol. In this instance. EPA decided that the 3-month demonstration testing would be con¬ sidered the required tests and gave MODAR a release to conduct those tests. For TSCA pur¬ poses. MODAR developed a set of tests tor their unit equivalent to those established for in¬ cineration and was given a permit. Meanwhile, the State of New York conducted its own in¬ vestigation and issued a permit after EPA did so The end result is a permit/release valid tor 3 months demonstration testing at one site in New York. Testing anywhere else, or beyond the 3-inonth period, will require MODAR to ap¬ ply for a new permit. 9 •Michael Modell. [>cr*oi>a! communication. IVt ember l'»H4 < - 178 * Superlund Strategy Lopat Enterprises has produced a sealant or encapsulant which they state is applicable to PCB contaminated structures. After trying un¬ successfully on their own to reach someone within EPA who could make a decision about evaluating the sealant, they secured assistance from congressional staff in setting up meetings with appropriate EPA officials. The writing of a protocol was agreed on but testing did not occur due to EPA’s lack of funds. Lopat, mean¬ while, was testing their product at their own expense. They were told, however, that run¬ ning tests on their own in a recognized labora¬ tory would not be valid because the govern¬ ment had to run parallel tests. At one point, when EPA was well aware that Lopat’s proc¬ ess was a chemical one, they provided a pro¬ tocol covering processes that incinerate RGBs. 10 Often no response is for.ncoming. Deluged with requests for authentication of many black box processes, EPA is forced, in the ab¬ sence of established procedures and adequate staff, to essentially ignore the information it re¬ ceives regardless of the possible merit of a tech¬ nology. One particular incident involved the participation of the Mayor of Verona. Missouri, who repeatedly asked the regional EPA office, EPA in Washington, and the State agency for a hearing on a chemical process designed to detoxify dioxin-contaminated soils. The Mayor saw i: as a possible alternative to expensive and controversal incineration techniques which were being imposed on her community. Over a period of months, meetings were agreed '■* and then canceled. No action was ever taken.” Testing Material Testing that will result in applicable and val¬ id data requires the use of real material rather than synthetically produced wastes. Material can be supplied from the outflow of an indus¬ trial process or can be samples from Superfund sites. Firms encounter costly delays and other ’•U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Small Business, hearings Oct. 27. 1933. From the statement of Louis Flax, president of Lopat Enterprises Inc., p. 49. "iano lohnson. Mayor of Verona. MO. personal communica¬ tion. September 1934 problems in the acquisition and transport of such material that can strain their resources. Transporting relatively small quantities of haz¬ ardous waste requires the transportation sys¬ tem and receiver to follow the same rules and procedures as those for regular hazardous waste shipments. Under these circumstances it can be difficult to locate an experienced car¬ rier who is willing to handle an ETC (less than carload) shipment. If the material is acquired, the receiver becomes subje "t to uncertain lia¬ bilities. Regulations This section about policy uncertainties has shown how the lack of regulations or uncer¬ tainty about new regulations can negatively af¬ fect technology development. Existing regula¬ tions also affect technology adoption because of: 1) duplication in permitting requirements between Federal, State, and local agencies; 2) differences between various States and EPA re¬ gions and; 3) the preemption of sister regula¬ tions. such as those covering landfill and in¬ cineration practices under RCRA. Simply figuring out which regulations apply in any given case can be frustrating. Experts attending an OTA workshop in November 1984 could not agree among themselves, even after extended discussion, about the applicability of various regulations In fact, the only agreement they reached was that sorting out conflicting regulations and determining applicability were a ma|or problem for technology developers who are trying to demonstrate their processes. There appears to be no one place to consult to obtain definitive information. One option available under Superfund reme¬ dial actions is to use mobile or transportable treatment systems, but the regulatory climate does not yet support this option. Under RCRA, once a permit is granted it only covers the oper¬ ation of a treatment technology on a particu¬ lar substance at a particular site. Moving the system requires engaging once more in the per¬ mit process. Tha availability' of class rather than site permits would alleviate a consider¬ able burden on treatment technologies. Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 179 Any residue from a hazardous waste treat¬ ment process is considered hazardous waste itself unless the residue receives a delisting, i.e., is removed from regulation. This is one of the most important steps in determining the ac¬ ceptability of a new process as it can provide information about the completeness of the de¬ struction and assure that no new hazardous products are created. Under current EPA prac¬ tices. however, delisting is a costly and lengtny procedure which can take over a year. Two components appear to adversely affect the pro¬ cedure- 1) lack of sufficient EPA staffing, and 2’ the analytical burden on the technology de¬ veloper to provide a negative finding (i.e., that the residue is in no way hazardous). The Status Quo/Existing Technology Bias Syndrome Both the regulations under the National Con¬ tingency Plan (NCP) that deal with remedial action (Section 300.08 of CFR 40) and EPA's “Guidance on the Preparation of Feasibility Studies" encourage a bias toward containment and. to a lesser extent, incineration technol¬ ogies. It is against these so-called established technologies that all others are measured, even though the presumption that such technologies have proven their effectiveness for cleanups generally is not correct. A predilection for short- erm costing and a leluctance to reach beyond comfortable, traditional technology fa¬ vors the status quo. For instance, the user of the Feasibility' Guide is advised to adhere to the guidance document in order to guard against legal challenges io en¬ forcement actions. 12 Since established tec inol- ogies are emphasized, innovative ide's seem to be viewed as detrimental to the overall proc¬ ess of remedial action. In another example, in the first step of the FS the Guide advises that “technologies which are unreliable, offer in¬ ferior performance, or are not demonstrated (emphasis added) processes should be elimi¬ nated from .urther consideration."” No pro- "U.S Environmental l*r»j:ectiiiti Agency. "Guidance on the Preparation of Feasibility Studies." final draft. Nov. 15. 1983. pp 1-6. "Ibid., pp 2-12. visions are offered for obtaining recognized in¬ formation that may constitute demonstration. The lack of demonstration data prevents a new technology from I ting considered in the RI/FS process and ultimately used for remedial action. Both the high cost of demonstration projects and the lack of EPA procedures and support for the evaluation of technologies are obstacles that a new technology must over¬ come to be adopted. (See the section, “Support of Cleanup Technology RD&D,” in this chapter.) The primary criterion for selecting technol¬ ogies at cleanup sites, as reflected in the NCP and in most equivalent State documents, is cost effectiveness; that is. the “lowest cost alterna¬ tive that is technologically feasible and reliable and which effectively mitigates and minimized damage to and provides adequate protection of public health, welfare, or the environ¬ ment." 14 In the Federal decisionmaking proc¬ ess, this criterion is qualified by the fund-bal¬ ancing provisions of the NCP. These provisions require that prospective costs at a given site be balanced against the overall needs for all sites to be cleaned up. In essence, even the most cost-effective alternative at a site may be ruled out if the total cost is out of line with needs at other sites. The effectiveness portion of the cost-effec¬ tiveness criterion is based on technical factors (performance, reliability, implementability), public health (level of cleanup/isolation achiev¬ able, reduction of impacts), institutional fac¬ tors (permitting requirements, community im¬ pacts). and environmental factors (beneficial and advers- affects) factors. 14 Costs considered include capital costs, operation and mainte¬ nance costs, and/or a present value calculation combining both capital and O&M costs. 1 * If these factors and their components are not uniformly applied to both containment and treatment technologies, the options will not be judged fairly. Containment technologies, for in¬ stance, despite increasing evidence to the con¬ trary, are considered to be more reliable than "tbiit.. p. ix. "Ibid., chapter 8. "Ibid. 160 • Superfur'4 Strategy treatment technologies. Moreover, permitting requirements for treatment technologies leml to be more burdensome than for containment technologies. The cost elements applied to containment versus treatment are quite different For treat¬ ment systems, estimates are generally quite straightforward. Project life is usually short; a few years is common. Assuming proper design and that the system will operate as projected, all the cost elements can be estimated quite ac¬ curately. (Decommissioning costs have been less consistently included and are more diffi¬ cult to estimate.) No long-term cost- are in¬ volved because the project is expected to end with an acceptable level of residual contami¬ nation. The situation for containment is quite differ¬ ent. Since the hazards remain in place inde¬ finitely. any future costs associated with main¬ taining the original level of protection, such as monitoring, major repairs, and future cleanups, should be included. When removal for redis- posal is considered and only the immediate costs for commercial land disposal are in¬ cluded in the cost projection, the analysis is not realistic. C&M costs for onsite containment, moreover, are usually considered only for a relatively short time, often 20 to 30 years. Since no long-term performance data is available for containment systems for hazardous waste aj>- plications, O&M uncertainties are likely to be high. Discounting or computing the costs on a present value basis, with conventional dis¬ count rates (currently around 10 percent), ef¬ fectively ignores costs beyond a 30-year oeriod. even though many contained hazardous wastes are likely to remain toxic and will need to be controlled well lieyond that period. One factor that has influenced the choice of technology is related to the cost-sharing pro¬ visions of CERCLA. For State and Federal lead sites, the Federal Government generally pays 90 percent of the capital costs and costs for the first year’s operation. Subsequent O&M costs. on the other hand, are entirely the State’s re¬ sponsibility. The consequences are fairly straightforward: the Federal Government favors technologies with low capital costs and States argue for low and/or short-term O&M costs. National cleanup goals do not exist to com¬ pare and evaluate technology performance. Without cleanup standards, choices must be made as to what environmental standards ap¬ ply (if any) to any given situation. If. for in¬ stance, effluent limitations rather than water qualify standards are chosen for a groundwater treatment system, capital and O&M costs can change. This will alter the apparent cost- effectiveness o! the solution and its potential for selection. If RCRA or equivalent State per¬ mits are deemed to be required for operations at cleanup sites, technologies considered dif¬ ficult to permit will be discriminated against, as obtaining a permit adds time, cost, and un¬ certainty to the process. The budget process in most States creates a bias against alternatives that have costs spread out over a number of years. Most States can only budget year-by-year and many have no au¬ thority to operate cleanup projects through trust funds or bond proceeds LPA and most State agencies rely heavily on contractors to carry out the RI/FS process. Be¬ cause of public end political concerns, there is tremendous pressure to move through the site study phases quickly. The time pressures can inhibit thoughtful and careful examination of all alternatives. This is of particular signifi¬ cance now because few sites have yet moved beyond the study phase. Consulting firms are conservative, concerned about liability, and are under considerable pressure to produce sound and reliable solutions and to control their costs. These conditions nave made it hard for inno¬ vative or developing technologies to receive se¬ rious consideration thus far in the Superfund program. Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 131 THE TECHNICAL OPTIONS Technical solutions to the problems of Super- fund sites are either long-term containment sys¬ tems or relatively expeditious treatment rem¬ edies These technologies are discussed in some detail in the following sections on con¬ ventional containment and treatment. A review of emerging innovator treatment^hodsUJ: lows. Another option is presented first, teen niques for temporary storage. These are most appropriate for use in initial responses to re¬ duce immediate threats to public health and the environment under a two-part Supeitunc strategy. Temporary StoraQe Increasing attention is being given to the above ground storage of cleanup wastes Is .. chapters 1. 2. and 3). A variety of ‘echnologies exist to carry out storage safely and cost cite tively There are three approaches: 1) when amounts are small, containerization as used in transportation and traditional chemical stor¬ age; 2) when amounts are large, bulk storage in tanks, vaults, and other structures; and ) when amounts are large, new forms of above ground encapsulation technology. 1 he first two options are likely to be combined at some Supertund sites. In general, it should he possible to safely store cleanup wastes for anywhere from 5 to 20 years. When onsite storage is difficult be¬ cause of limited space or unsuitable geologic or climatic conditions (e.g.. earthquake fault zones or flood plains), offsite storage can be considered. It may be necessary to examine the possibility of building regional storage facilities to deal with Superfund wastes Most impor¬ tantly. above ground storage offers the intrin¬ sic advantage, compared to traditional buna and land disposal, of ready accessibility and relatively easy visual inspection to detect leak¬ age and damage to containers and structures. Moreover, many types of instruments and monitoring devices are available to provide safeguards, including those to deal with the chance of fire and explosion. Recent advances in materials have improved containers. High-strength, corrosion-resistant materials are now readily available for the i hazardous materials; often these containers can be cleaned and reused. Containers can be placed in various types of structures to reduce the effect of weather. For example, they can be stacked on concrete slabs in shelters with roofs but not necessarily walls. Containers such as drums, can also he encapsulated with polyethylene to mitigate the effects ol leakage. If the amount of cleanup waste is relatively small, use of containers and onsite storage is feasible. Tanks, vaults, and more complete buildings are also’used for conventional storage in the chemical and petroleum industries. This is at¬ tractive for bulk materials that are not highly hazardous or corrosive, and materials that can be moved easily in large amounts, such as liq¬ uids and soil, If the amounts of cleanup waste are very large, it may be too costly to .tore on¬ site, and a regional storage facility may be needed. A recent proposal in Minnesota combines containers and bulk storage and illustrates what might be conceived of for regional stor¬ age facilities for Superlund wastes. The con¬ cept was developed lor “long-term monitorable and retrievable storage facility lor hazardous wastes ... The facility was designed to store 22 000 drums in a container building and 185,000 gallons in bulk-liquid tanks each year. Assum¬ ing an operating life of ten years, thefacility would require an area of 60 acres. 17 The study dealt with every conceivable type of environ¬ mental safeguard and was probably over de¬ signed. resulting in relatively high costs, par¬ ticularly for construction of buildings to house drums. The initial investment was estimated at $10.6 million; annual O&M costs varied from SI million to $2 million over the lifetime of the «?r | Lough el at.. "Above Ground Storage of Hazardous Waste," Management of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites (Silver Spring. Mb: Hazard us Materials Control Research in¬ stitute, 19#2J. \ 1 182 • Superfund Strategy facility. More recent work, such as in Missouri, has focused on the use of less costly structures while affording environmental protection. There have also been several recent propo¬ sals for new types of abjve ground storage aimed especially at the hazardous waste mar¬ ket. In one of these, wastes are chemically treated to solidify and stabilize them; they are then formed into an onsite mound on top of various engineered materials. The mound is covered to prevent water intrusion. Again, var¬ ious safeguards are used to collect and moni¬ tor water. The author notes that the method “provides easy access for future manipulation of the waste for resource recovery and new treatment technology.” 1 * It is also claimed that exhumation and solidification rates of about 1,000 to 3,000 tons per day are possible. Some cost data are provided that indicate savings over more traditional offsite removal and re- disposal. One project involving PCB sludge was estimated to cost S70 to $80 per cubic yard to evaluate and execute. O&M costs to moni¬ tor groundwater were not provided. A case has also been made for what is called an above ground “hillfill" that provides ease of collecting leachate and protection against contaminating groundwater. 18 Most of the problems with conventional landfills are re¬ duced or eliminated by this approach, which still allows removal of the wastes later for treatment. Conventional Technologies * 0 Since containment methods have been the technology of choice for Superfund remedial action, they constitute the bulk of applicable conventional technologies. Existing methods of treatment , such as incineration, are also con¬ ventional in the sense that forms of the tech- '•L Crayb.ll. “Evolution of Pratlical On Site Above Ground Closures." Management of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites (Silver Spring. MO: Hazardous Materials Control Research In¬ stitute. 1983). '•K.IV Brown and D C. Anderson. "The Case for Aboveground Landfills, I’ollutiun Engineering, November 1083 . *°This section is Used primarily on A t) Little. “Evaluation of Available Cleanup Technologies for Uni intruded Waste Sites." contractor re ( xirt prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment. November 1984 niques have been used in many industries for many years and are relatively easy to adapt to Superfund problems. These conventional con¬ tainment and treatment technologies are exam¬ ined below. Containment technologies use con¬ struction engineering techniques that have long records of successful use in that application. However, because relatively few remedial ac¬ tions have actually taken place and because no long-term record of performance at Superfund sites exists, there is little data available to sup¬ port the view that containment technologies are reliable or proven for use with hazardous wastes. In fact, the evidence appears to be pointing in the opposite direction (see chapter 5). Existing treatment technologies, so far lim¬ ited in use for Superfund cleanups, constitute the basis lor most emerging technologies. Table 6-2 compares the estimated costs of ap¬ plying a number of conventional technologies at Superfund sites. Conventional Containment Hazardous waste—regardless of whether dis¬ posed of in the ground, in barrels or drums, in impoundments, or in landfills—eventually leaks to some extent. The threat that this leakage (or migration) presents is related to the level of contamination (exposure) at points of concern. Migration primarily occurs when ground or surface water or air conies in con¬ tact with the hazardous waste. Thus the objec¬ tive of containment is to seal the hazardous waste as well as possible and reduce the pos¬ sibility of an inflow of migration media or out¬ flow 1 of contamination. In addition, any leach¬ ate formed by contact of the hazardous waste with water must be collected and treated. This system of control requires that a number of technologies be combined to produce the low¬ est possible probability of failure. The following is a summary’of these contain¬ ment technology components, how they are used and function. Their applicability depends almost entirely on site factors (e.g., topography, erosion potential, surFace and groundw ater wa- tet flow patterns, and expected rainfall) and is primarily independent of waste specific fac- TiuCl *** ftf. ?cv.. »7^*VS5?*&£' Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • »&3 Table 6-2.-Estimated Costs of Conventional Technologies -' Capital costs Paced on a hy pothetical site 3 _ Containment: Groundwater barriers: Slurry walls.$250 000 Vibrated beam.$250,000 2,400 tt long. 20 ft deep barrier Groundwater pumping.$55,000 to $65,000 18 PVC well points; 15 ft apart Pumped at 25 gpm with 18 pumps 1.250 ft piping, wellheads to treatment Subsurface drams.$15,000 to $20,000 200 ft long drain, 20 ft deep using 12 PVC pipe, backfilled with 5 ft clay Operation and mainte nance costs RunorVrunoff controls S1.0C0 600 ft dike, up slope . $32,000 .. S150.000 Surface seals/caps: Materials available onsite Using offsite matenals .. Synthetic cap (top layer) sub base materials available onsite. $50,000 Cap over source area consisting of sand (6 m). day (2 ft'. Due to the lack of operational experience us.ng these technologies at remedial sites, there fs little data available on which to base estimates of operation and maintenance costs. Operation and maintenance costs for containment technologies include site costs such as 1) the running ot any necessary equipment (i e pumps), 2) site monitoring (particularly for groundwater migration); 3) inspection of the systems, ana 4) any necessary repairs and possible replacement Repairs and replacement constitute the most expensive items. Several years atter construction repairs might cost 50 percent of the ong- ml cost, replacement, over 100 percent (due to inflation and worsening conditions). Uncertain depends on life of system relative to lifetime of toxic wastes. Onsite treatment: Solidification and stabilization Groundwater treatment sand/gravel (1 ft), and top soli(vege tation (2 ft) _ $5,000 to $10,000 60 cubic yards of sludge in lagoon excavated and mixed with kiln dust; then replaced Costs per 1.000 gallons Sased on treating 450 gallons per ^ ^ ^ treated 0 $3.1 million S940.000 $4 14 $650,000 $233,000 $1.03 $7.5 million $2 25 million $360,000 $3.8 million $1.2 million $153,000° $16 75 c $5.13 $0 67 d Biological Ireatment activated sludge. Chemical treatment neutralization and precipitation .$850,000 Physical treatment carbon absorption .... ion exchange. .^noo air stopping .$360 w u-- Pum. o. Mnumnewn «0 ” acd . C .O U n<1w„0, W:»•* «• «» 11 ZnfrKMrt «■*"» 20 *1 Mo- «co*eo*ogr % Cr 1 < ’ I f ✓ i 184 • Superfund Strategy tors. Table 6-3 presents the advantages, disad¬ vantages, and limitations of their use. Groundwater Barriers.-Groundwater barriers are designed to prevent the offsite migration of contaminated groundwater by physically re¬ stricting horizontal groundwater flow. Ground- water barriers have become one of the princi- pai options to contain plumes of contamination at cleanup sites threatening aquifers. They can be used alone, but often are employed in com- bmation with capping or groundwater pumo- ing All methods, except block displacement, are derived from general construction prac¬ tices. Experience under conditions at cleanup sites, however, is as yet limited, and little data are available to show the long-term effects of wastes in contact with the barrier. Considera¬ ble research evidence for adverse impact of wastes on barrier materials does exist. 21 Except for the block displacement technique barriers must be keyed in or attached to a low- permeability layer, such as bedrock or clay, be¬ neath the site that wih restrict vertical or downward migration of contaminants Barri¬ ers, then, are limited to sites where bedrock is not extensively fractured or is not too far below the surface. The extent of fracture in bedrock is difficult to predict. None of these techniques provides a com- pJetely impermeable barrier, even if constructed ideulh Rather, they reduce groundwater flow hrough the contained region to on the order ot 10 centimeters per second (77 gallons of groundwater per year would pass through a barrier 10 teet deep by 100 feet long). Thus, an ancillary pumping or drainage system is used o contain tne leakage or dewater the zone near the barrier. Caps over the site are used to re¬ duce tne amount of water that can enter the contained area Such systems must function in¬ definitely or as Jong as a medium for movement ot the contaminant is present. ab.hwnfo ms,a , n » e ' “ B ?"tar-Leachate Compatibility: P»rmo- and 'M Vne Gra * le y l, ’ a per printed at Spn,„. M3. Hazardous Malarial, CoMrol R«„„, ch Tne major types of groundwater barriers are: • Slurry walls: fixed underground physical barriers formed by pumping slurry (e.g., a cement-bentonite mixture) into a trench and either allowing the slurry to set or backfilling with a suitable engineered ma¬ terial. Use of a vibrating beam technique, a relatively new procedure, avoids the need to dig a trench prior to filling with slurry. • Grout curtains: fixed underground physi¬ cal Carriers formed by injecting a grout (ei¬ ther particulate such as Portland cement or chemb d such as sodium silicate) into the ground through well points. Pilings: fixed underground physical bar¬ riers constructed bv driving webbed sec¬ tions of sheet piling (typically steel) into the ground. Each section is connected with interlocking socket or bowl and ball loints that fill with fine-medium grain soil particles. This serves as a seal to restrict groundwater flow through the barrier • Block displacement allows for the placing of a fixed underground physical barrier be¬ neath a large mass of earth. This develop¬ mental technique was field tested by E U A in 1982. 22 Unexpected geologic details’of he site interfered with accomplishment of the barrier placement according to the ue- sign plan. T -vu„u™aier (lumping involves the use of a series of wells to remove- groundwater for treatment or to contain a plume. Techniques are well developed, depend technology, and offer high design flexibility (number ot wells, location, depth and pumping rate) to meet a wide variety of site-specific requirements. Uncertainties with groundwater information and modeling, espe- cia y in complicated flow regimes and for deep well systems, mean that the effectiveness of the system must be verified in the field. Modifica- tions that might be required can reduce the cost effectiveness of the system. (See chapter 5 for n 12 m dnUl> U ' S ' HW ' Sch .umbur*. 1L. Ot,. I v tm Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 185 Advantages_ Groundwater barriers: • Slurry wall Most versatile, best understood barrier technology. Can be inexpensive compared to other barrier techniques. Low O&M. • Grout curtain: Minimal site disturbance. No excavation required. Low O&M. • Vibrated beam Special slurries improve chemical compatibilily. No excavation required. Low O&M. • Sheet pile No excavation required. Low O&M. • Block displacement No underlying impervious zone needed. Groundwater pumping: • Well points Proven and well understood Can (unction tor very long periods. High design flexibility. High reliability. Useful in many situations. Effectiveness can be verified. • Deep well systems Same as well points. Subsurface drains: Proven and well understood. Low O&M. Superior to wells under certain conditions. Less sensitive to design than wells. Conceptually simple. Runon/runolt controls: Proven and well understood. Inexpensive. Effectiveness desirable. Only conceptual design required. Surface seal/caps: Inexpensive compared to excavation and removal. May be used as an interim measure where surface infiltration is a problem. Table 6-3.—Containment Technologies—Summary Disadvantages_Li mitations Requires excavation Requires site area to mix backfill. Difficult to verily continuity of slurry or backfill. Difficult to key to bedrock. Chemicals in the grcut may cause site safety or environmental problems. Difficult to verify continuity of wall. Limited applicability. Expensive compared to other barriers. Difficult to key to bedrock. Very sensitive to construction quality. Difficult to verify continuity of wall. Difficult to key to bedrock. Relatively new technology. Expensive. Difficult to key to bedrock Continuity of wall at joints difficult to verify. Technology under development. Continuity is difficult to verify. Design may require expensive modeling Long-term O&M required. Performance sensitive to design. Collected liquid must be treated or disposed of. Same as well points. Less flexibility than wells. Susceptible to clogging. Excavation required. Collected liquid must be treated or disposed of. Periodic inspection and maintenance required. Periodic inspection and maintenance required. Must tie to impervious zone. Not 100% impermeable Long-term effects of some chemicals on permeability uncertain. Less than 20% soil can pass No. 200 sieve. Must tie to impervious zone Not 100% impermeable. Long-term effects of some chemicals on permeability uncertain No obstructions in soil Must tie to impervious zone Access for large crane needed. Not 100% impermeable Long-term effects of chemicals on permeability unce'lain. Soils must be loosely packed Limited to about 50 ft. Must tie to impervious zone. Not 100% impermeable. Some chemicals may attack piling material. Site conditions must conform to complex design requirements. Useful up to 10 meters. Will not affect contaminants in unsaturated zone or contaminants that do not flow. Site conditions may complicate use and performance Same as well points; except useful to any depth. Difficult to install beneath waste site. More cost effective in shallow applications. May not be able to handle abnormal stoims. Difficult for very large sites, or if obstructions are present. Subject to potential failure without proper design, installation, and maintenance. 38-745 0 - 85-7 I — 186 • Superfund Strategy Table 6-3.—Containment Technologies— ■ Summary—Continued Advantages Disadvantages Limitations Solidification and stabilization: Improves containment performance. High short term effectiveness possible. Waste material (e g . fly ash, kiln dust) can be used as pozzolan. Extensive testing may be required Many processes developmental Long term integrity uncertain. Not useful for many organics. Encapsulation: Improves effectiveness of land disposal. Developmental. Long term integrity uncertain. Requires solidification of bulk wastes. SOURCE ctfice ol Tech-.ology Assessmenl a discussion of problems related to understand¬ ing groundwater and containment movement.) As soon as a pumping system is shut down, groundwater flow patterns are likely to return to their pre-pumping condition. 1 herefore, pumping systems have to be operated for long periods of time unless the source of contamina¬ tion is eliminated or degraded through treat¬ ment. If. during this time, other wells are used to draw water from the same groundwater sys¬ tem, flow patterns may change. Subsurface Drains.— Subsurface drains can be in¬ stalled to collect leachate as well as lower the water table for site dewatering. They are built by placing tile or perforated pipe in a trench, surrounding it with gravel (or similar material), and backfilling with topsoil or clay. The use of subsurface drains is a very old technology, well proven in applications other than for hazardous waste environments. While overall costs will vary depending on site- specific conditions, the drains are relatively in¬ expensive to install and have low O&M costs. Drains are not as versatile as wells and are more sensitive to design errors. They compete with wells where soils are heterogeneous or ex¬ hibit low hydraulic conductivity, or where the plume of contamination is very large. They may be preferred to wells where there is a con¬ taminant layer floating on the groundwater or where the contaminants are viscous. Placing drains in highly contan.mated soils can require special construction techniques. They are susceptible to clogging and their per¬ formance can be affected by variations in groundwater flow and level, important prob¬ lems, considering the long lifetimes of many hazardous substances. Runon/Runoff Controls.— Surface water control technologies are designed to prevent contami¬ nated surface water from leaving a site and un¬ contaminated water from entering a contami¬ nated area. They are almost always employed in conjunction with other technologies (e.g., surface seals or excavation and removal). Con¬ ventional and inexpensive techniques include dikes, terraces, channels, chutes, downmpes, grading, and revegetation. Contaminated run¬ off, if it occurs, requires treatment prior to dis¬ charge. Surface Seals/Caps.— Surface seals are low- permeability barriers placed over a site to re¬ duce surface water infiltration, prevent con¬ tact with contaminated materials, and control fugitive emissions (gases and odors) at cleanup sites. Various materials are used including soils and clays; mixtures (e.g., asphalt and concrete, soil and cement); and polymeric membranes. Soil and vegetation generally cover these ma¬ terials. Surface seals are versatile and can be de¬ signed for most sites, although they may be dif¬ ficult to install at large sites, sites with surface obstructions, sites with extremely irregular to¬ pography, or sites with inadequate subbase sta¬ bility, which leads to subsidence or settling. They require very careful installation, as well as continued inspection and maintenance to ensure their integrity over time. Vents may be I Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 187 required to prevent gas buildup from cracking the cap. Over the long term, there are concerns about increased permeability resulting from puncturing by roots, animals, and activities on the surface. Under some conditions, contaci with waste or leachate also causes problems. Solidification and Stabilization.— Solidification, sta¬ bilization, and chemical fixation technologies reduce the potential for leachate production by binding waste in a solid matrix via a physical and/or chemical process. Wastes are mixed with a binding agent and subsequently cured to a solid form. The stabilized waste then usu¬ ally is capped, contained, or land disposed to prevent contact with water. Applicability of the technique is affected by both waste and site characteristics. Prime Can¬ didas for fixation by state-of-the-art processes are inorganic materials in aqueous solution or suspension and those containing large amounts of heavy metals or inorganic solids. Organic wastes and waste streams containing organic constitutents (one of the major problems at Superfund sites) are less amenable to iixation. Site-specific factors determine the feasibility of mixing the waste with a fixative, and wheth¬ er the mixing can occur in situ or after excava¬ tion of the waste. In some cases significant • ol- ume increases raise problems for onsite Pse. While in situ and onsite solidification ind stabilization technologies offer promise ir de¬ creasing leaching at cleanup sites (in comi ina- tion with caps and barriers), reliability .over time is uncertain due to the lack of moi. itor- ing data. Questions remain as to the long term integrity of the resultant matrices. Freeze thaw cycles can cause cracking in the was. is i bove the frost line. For in situ use, nonuniforn; con¬ ditions at a site and operational difficulties can create pockets of incomplete immobilization. Encapsulation.—Encapsulation is a process where wastes are enclosed in a stable water-re¬ sistant material. The process may be applied to wastes in containers or to wastes that have been bound into a matrix of sufficient strength to hold together while the covering is applied. Once encapsulated, wastes must be placed in a landfill. As long as the covering is intact, the poten¬ tial for leaking is very low. However, no data are available on the long-term stability and in¬ tegrity of the covering materials. Conventional Treatment Treatment technologies can be broken down into four major types: physical, chemical, bio¬ logical, and thermal. All tend to be waste-spe¬ cific, some more so than others. This section explains each type in general and looks at spe¬ cific conventional treatment technologies. Table 6-4 summarizes these technologies and their advantages and disadvantages. Few have been applied at Superfund sites. Largely, these technologies are standard proc¬ esses that are used to treat industrial hazard¬ ous waste streams and might be adaptable to Superfund wastes, perhaps using specially con¬ structed onsite facilities. The complexities and variability of wastes at Superfund sites as com¬ pared to the outflow of a given industrial proc¬ ess, however, may reduce the applicability and efficiency of most of these techniques. Thus, multiple treatment may be necessary. Physical Treatment.—Physical treatment proc¬ esses do not destroy contaminants. They change the hazardous constituents to a more conven¬ ient form through concentration and/or phase change. Ideally two output streams are pro¬ duced. One is a concentrated volume of haz¬ ardous material that must undergo additional treatment or be placed in a landfill and the sec¬ ond is a nonhazardous liquid or solid material. Physical treatment systems are used widely for conventional wastewater treatment, and methods are available to treat many types of wastes over a wide range of conditions. Never¬ theless, the combinations of wastes found at cleanup sites may limit the degree of separa¬ tion that can be achieved. Some of the more widely used processes in¬ clude carbon adsorption, flocculation, sedi¬ mentation, filtration, flotation, stripping, ion exchange, and reverse osmosis. Many are used in combination with other treatment processes. Some of the systems that remove inorganics 183 • Super!und Shatogy Table 6-4.—Treatment Technologies—Summary -^vantages_ Disadvantages Limitations DESTRUCTION/DETOX FICATION PROCESSES: " Biological treatment: • Conventional Applicable to many orcanic May produce a hazardous sludge which waste streams. must be managed. High total organic removal. May require pre-treatment prior to Inexpensive. discharge. Well understood and widely used in other applications. • In-situ biodegradation Destroys waste in place. Limited experience. Extensive testing may be required. , Containment also required. Chemical treatment: • Wet air oxidation Good tor wastes too dilite for incineration or too concentrated or toxic for biological treatment. Oxidation not as complete as thermal oxidation or incineration. May produce new hazardous species. Extensive testing is required. High capital investment. High level of operator skills required. May require post-treatment. Micro-organisms sensitive to oxygen levels, temperature, toxic loading, inlet flow. Some organic contaminants are difficult to treat. Flow and composition variations can reduce efficiency. Aeration difficult to depths > 2 ft Many common organic species not easily biodegraded. Needs proper combination of wastes and hydrogeoicgical characteristics. Ootainmg proper mix of contaminants, organisms, and nutrients. Organisms may plug pores. Poor destruction of chlorinated organics. Moderate efficiencies of destruction (40-90%). • Chlorination lor cy inide Essentially complete destruction. Well understood and widely used in other applications. Specialized for cyanide. Interfering waste constituents may limit applicability or effectiveness. • Ozonation Can destroy refractory organics. Liquids, solids, mixes can be treated. • Reduction for chromium High destruction Well understood and widely used in othe r applications. • Permeable treatment beds Limited excavation required. Inexpensive. • Chemical injection Excavation not required. No pumping required. Oxidation not as complete as thermal oxidation or incineration. May produce new hazardous species. Extensive testing is required. High capital investment; high O&M. Specialized for chromium. Deveiopmental. Periodic replacement of treatment media required. Spent treatment medium must be disposed of. Developmental. Extensive testing required Incineration: • Conventional incineration Destroys organic wastes (99.99 ♦%). Disposal of residue required. Test burn may be required. Skilled operators required. Expensive. Not well understood. Interfering waste constituents may limit applicability or effectiveness. Best for shallow plumes. Many reactants treat a limited family of wastes. Effectiveness influenced by groundwater flow variations. Best for shallow plumes. Need fairly homogeneous waste composition. Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 189 Table 6-4.—Treatment Technologies— Summary—Continued Advantages Disadvantages Limitations • Onsite Destroys organic wastes (99.99+%). Transportation of wastes not required. • Thermal oxidation for gases Proven technology High destruction efficiencies. Applicable to most organic streams. SEPARATIONTTRANSFER PROCESSES: Chemical: • Neutralization/precipitation Wide range or applications. Well understood and widely used in other applications. Inexpensive. • Ion exchange Can recover metals a! high efficiency. Disposal of residue required. Onsite feedstock preparation required. Test burn may be required. Skilled operators required. Expensive. May require auxiliary fuel. O&M cost can be high. Mobile units have low feed rate. Hazardous sludge produced. Generates sludge for disposal. Pre-trsatment to remove suspended solids may be required. Expensive. Physical treatment: Carbon absorption lor aqueous streams Well understood and d tmonstrated. Applicable to many organics that do not respond to biological treatment. Hign degree of flexibility in operation and design. High degree of effectiveness. • Carbon absorption lor gases Widely used, well understood. High removal efficiencies. Regeneration or disposal of spent carbon required. Pre-treatment may be required for suspended solids, oil. grease. High O&M cost. High capital and O&M cos's Flocculation, sedimentation and filtration Low cost. Well understood. • Stripping Well understood and demonstrated. • Flotation Well understood and demonstrated. Inexpensive. • Reverse osmosis High removal potential. Complexing agents reduce effectiveness. Resin fouling. Removes some constituents but not others. Many inorganics, some organics are poorly absorbed. Generates sludge for disposal. Air controls may be required. Generates sludge for disposal. Generates sludge for disposal. Pre-treatment to remove suspended solids or adiust pH may be required. Expensive. ___ More effective for low molecular weight, polar species. Disposal or regeneration of spent carbon required. Applicable only to relatively volatile organic contaminants. Variability in waste flow and composition effects performance. SOURCE Ollice ol Tecti'ioiOfly Ajseismtm I - 190 • Scperhind Strategy will produce a sludge or solid (e.g., heavy met¬ als) thai must be sent to a landf ill for disposal. Reverse osmosis and ion exchange produce a dilute aqueous stream containing the toxic sub¬ stances that have been removed. Stripping transfers volatile compounds to a gas stream where they may be destroyed by thermal oxi¬ dation, treated by other techniques, or emitted into the atmosphere. These systems range in cost from quite low (sedimentation, filtration) to quite high (ion exchange, reverse osmosis). Operating costs for carbon adsorption are gen¬ erally high and depend on the concentration of the contaminant stream. Under carbon adsorption waste streams are passed through beds of activated carbon par¬ ticles. Organic compounds and some inorganic species in the waste stream become bound to the surface of the particles and can subse¬ quently be removed along with the carbon ad¬ sorbent. But treatment and disposal of spent adsorbent poses a significant secondary prob¬ lem. The adsorbent can be regenerated, in which case the contaminants and carbon are separated and the contaminants must undergo subsequent treatment, or the adsorbent includ¬ ing contaminants must be destroyed or land- filled. Carbon adsorption is a highly effective, well demonstrated technique for removing organic compounds, and to a lesser degree metals, from aqueous waste streams. It is a widely used tech¬ nique for removing organic contaminants from gas streams. It also can treat many organic spe¬ cies that do not respond well to biological treat¬ ment. Streams with high organic concentra¬ tions can be treated but the cost may become excessive due to high carbon use and other O&M costs. In such cases, combining carbon adsorption as a finishing step with a cheaper process such as biological treatment may be more cost effective. Pre-treatment stages may be needed to remove suspended solids, oil, and grease, all of which would rapidly plug and de¬ activate the carbon bed. Flocculation, sedimentation, and filtration are used to remove suspended solids from a waste stream. Flocculation is a process in which small particles are brought together in larger a KR re gaies. The larger particles can then be fil¬ tered uut of the waste stream. Sedimentation removes suspended solids by permitting the particles to settle to the bottom of a vessel through the action of gravity. Filtration sepa¬ rates the solids from the liquids by forcing the fluid through a porous medium. Filtration can also be used to dewater sludges. Stripping removes volatile contaminants from an aqueous waste stream by passing air or steam through the wastes. Contaminants are transferred to the air stream, or, in the case of the steam process, to a distillate. Dissolved air flotation removes insoluble haz¬ ardous components present as suspended fine particles or globules of oils and greases from an aqueous phase. After being saturated with air at high pressure and being removed to tanks under atmospheric pressure, bubbles form in the aqueous mixture. The bubbles containing the fine particles and globules rise to the sur¬ face and can be skimmed off. In ion exchange, unwanted ionic species, principally inorganic, are exchanged with in¬ nocuous ions on a resin The process results in a sludge that requires management. Reverse osmosis removes contaminants from aqueous wastes by passing the waste streams at high pressure (usually in the range of 200 to 400 psi) past a semipermeable membrane. Clean water passes out through the membrane, leaving behind a concentrated waste stream for further treatment. Typical membranes are im¬ permeable to most inorganic species and some organic compounds. Chemical Treatment. —In chemical treatment, hazardous constituents are altered by chemi¬ cal reactions. In the process, hazardous con¬ stituents may be either destroyed or the result¬ ant product or products may still be hazardous, although in a more convenient form for further processing or disposal. Since chemical reac¬ tions involve specific reactants under specific conditions, these processes are usually used when only one substance is involved (or a few substances similar in chemical character). CAj. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 191 When chemical treatment is applied to a mixed composition waste, there can be problems be¬ cause the treatment chemical might be con¬ sumed by side reactions, the intended chemi¬ cal reactions might be blocked by impurity interference, or unexpected end products might add new hazards. 23 Neutralization and precipitation are widely used in industry to remove inorganic and some organic compounds from aqueous streams. They are important options for separating out heavy metals in hazardous wastes. Neutraliza¬ tion may be used alone or in combination with other techniques. Precipitation is always used with follow-up steps to remove the insoluble matter produced. Both are often used as parts of larger treatment programs. Neutralization adjusts the pH of acidic or basic liquid wastes, soils, or other contaminated materials, it may be used alone to reduce the corrosivity of wastes or to adjust the pH to a range where metals are immobilized (remain in insoluble torm). Pre¬ cipitation is used, often in combination with neutralization, to reduce the concentrat-on oi metals, and in rarer cases organics such as phthalates, to low levels in an aqueous stream. The major problem with both processes is that they create hazardous sludges that must be sub¬ sequently disposed of in a secure manner. Other chemical processes can be used to treat contaminated hazardous liquids. Both wet air oxidation and chemical oxidation can be ap¬ plied to broad families of organic wastes. Other processes apply to specific waste types. While there has been little or no experience with these technologies at Superfund sites, all have been used at regulated hazardous waste treatment facilities or in conventional industrial waste treatment. The variable nature of contaminant streams at cleanup sites may limit performance 'elative to conventional applications. Wet air oxidation involves a combustion re¬ action occurring in the liquid phase through addition of air or oxygen at high pressure (greater than 350 psi) and elevated temperature (greater than 170° C). The products of the re- »|ay A. Mackie. el at.. "Hazardous-Waste Mana S ement: The Alternatives," Chemical Engineering, Aug. 6. 1984. p. 57. action are steam, N 2 , C0 2 and an oxidized liq¬ uid stream. In chemical oxidation, an oxidant (e.g., ozone, perchloric acid, or permanganate) is mixed with the waste and reacts with those oxidizable species present. Neither process breaks down organic molecules as completely as thermal destruction or incineration, and new hazardous species may be produced in the process of destroying those in the waslqs. Both require extensive testing to determine their eiti- ciency and the properties of their effluents. Both are expensive to operate and require ma¬ jor capital investments. Toxic hexavalent chromium ion (Cr VI) can be reduced to the less toxic trivalent chromium ion (Cr III) by adding a reducing agent under highly acidic conditions. The reduction proc¬ ess is followed by Cr III removal through pre¬ cipitation as the insoluble hydroxide. Alkaline chlorination is used to remove cyanide irom alkaline cyanide-containing waste by oxidation Biological Treatment.— Biological treatment uses micro-organisms to degrade (biodegradation) or remove (bioadsorption) contaminants irom a waste stream. It lias seen widespread applica¬ tion for many years for treating wastewaters, both hazardous and nonhazardous, in closet systems such as sewage treatment plants. It is a generally inexpensive method of treatment for groundwater, surface water, or impounded liquids containing a low concentration of or¬ ganics. Although systems can be designed to achieve fairly higti levels of overall removal, the effectiveness lor specific hazardous organic species can be quite low. For this reason, some sort of post- or pre-treatment, such as carbon adsorption, may be required. Conventional biological treatment processes include activated sludge, aerobic stabilization ponds (surface impoundments), rotating biolog¬ ical disks, and trickling filters. All of these tech¬ niques produce a sludge containing the re¬ mains of the organisms, unreacted organic matter, and the insoluble inorganic constitu¬ ents. Metal removal occurs by processes that attach the metal cations to the sludge. Some organic compounds, such as PCBs and poly¬ nuclear aromatic compounds, may become ad- 192 • Superfund Strategy sorbed to the sludge and exhibit some removal although not by biological activity. The sludge may be considered hazardous and require ad¬ ditional treatment if residual toxic contami¬ nants are present. The performance of biologi¬ cal systems can vary substantially from unit to unit depending on the individual compounds treated. Variations are due to the basic com¬ position of the micro-organisms present, the degree to which the mix has become accli- ma'ed to the wastes, the presence of interfer¬ ing or toxic (to the organisms) contaminants, flow and concentration variations, and other factors. Biological treatment systems are very sensi¬ tive to changes in temperature, oxygen content, and to toxic loading of contaminants. Sensitiv¬ ity to changes in inlet composition is a particu- problem in adapting these techniques for use at cleanup sites. Achieving low enough re¬ sidual levels of contaminants can be a problem under some conditions. Biodegradation is discussed in the ‘‘Innova¬ tive Technologies” section. Thermal Treatment.—Thermal treatment proc¬ esses use high temperature as the principal mechanism, either to drive a chemical reaction or to simply break chemical bonds and thus de¬ stroy the hazardous nature of a substance. Dur¬ ing incineration, the conventional method of thermal treatment, organic materials are burned (i.e., oxidized) at very high tempera¬ tures. Common types of incinerators applica¬ ble to hazardous wastes include rotary kilns, multiple hearth, fluidized bed, and liquid in¬ jection and are discussed below. 24 New forms of thermal destruction processes are discussed under "Innovative Technologies.” The end products of complete incineration depend on the input materials but will gener¬ ally include CO„ H,0, SO,. NO x . HC1 gases, and ash. Emission control equipment (scrub¬ bers, electrostatic precipitators) for particu¬ lates, SO,. NO x . and products of incomplete “More complete information can be found in U.S Congress Office of Technology Assessment. Technologies and \1.ina K e- merit Strategies for Hazardous Waste Control. OTA M-l'm (Washington. DO. U.S. Government I'rmling Office. Mart h 1983 ). combustion (PICs) are needed to control emis¬ sion of hazardous air pollutants. Incineration is effective for essentially all organic contami¬ nants, particularly if they are present as liquids. Sludges and contaminated soils require special incinerators, usually rotary kiln types that properly mix the reactants and provide even heat transfer. Incineration can be employed on or off a Superfund site. Although commercially avail¬ able techniques could be adapted for onsite in¬ cineration, the technology has not been used at cleanup sites. Limited quantities of wastes and contaminated soils have been transported to offsite incinerators. As with the onsile/off- site applications of any technology, trade-offs will occur. Onsite units could be semi-perma¬ nent, constructed onsite, or mobile units brought to the site as component units and assembled onsite. Olfsite units could be regionally located, permanent facilities that might offer economies of scale. However, they would require that haz¬ ardous wastes be transported, an expensive and potentially risky operation. Onsite incin¬ erators require substantial supporting activi¬ ties, such as electric power, and must be per¬ mitted by Federal, State and, often, local governments for each site at which they are used. (See the "Barriers to Adoption of Im¬ proved Technology” section in this chapter.) The secondary' effects of incineration include residue disposal, possible exposure to un¬ burned contaminants or toxic products of com¬ bustion in the stack gases, scrubber sludge dis¬ posal. and scrubber effluent discharge. Remov¬ ing wastes to an offsite incinerator changes the population affected by exposure to these sec¬ ondary effects. Incinerating contaminated soil would produce large amounts of residues. Un¬ til the issue of delisting is handled efficiently, residues would be deemed hazardous and would have to be placed in a RCRA-permitted landfill. Rotary kilns can handle a wide variety of burnable waste feeds—solids and sludge, as well as free liquids and gases. A rotating cyl¬ inder tumbles and uncovers the waste, assur¬ ing uniform heat transfer. I he cylinders range in size and the kilns operate between temper- I wrr"'-*. p» »ig > Hqriyj tsaB Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 193 -1 atures of approximately 1.500° and 3,000° F. depending on the position along the kiln. Multiple hearth incinerators use a vertical cylinder with multiple horizontal cross-sec¬ tional floors or levels where waste cascades from the top floor to the next and so on stead¬ ily moving downward as the wastes are burned. This action provides for long residence times. While such incinerators are able to handle a wide variety of sludges, they are not well suited for most hazardous waste for two reasons. First they exhibit relatively cold spots wherein complete combustion will not occur produc¬ ing a very uneven burn. Second, because wastes are introduced relatively close to the top of the furnace, where hot exhaust gases a.so exit, there is the potential for volatile waste com¬ ponents near the top of the incinerator to es¬ cape to the atmosphere without being destroyed. Fluidized bed combusters are a relatively new design being applied in many areas. 1 hey achieve rapid and thorough heat transter to the injected fuel and waste, and combustion occurs rapidly. Air forced up through a perforated plate maintains a turbulent motion in a bed ot very hot inert granules, which provide lor di¬ rect conduction heat transfer to the injected waste. The bed itself acts as a scrubber tor cer¬ tain gases and particulates. The units tend to be compact and are simple to operate relative to incinerators but have low throughput capac¬ ity. Other disadvantages are a limited range ot applicable wastes and difficulties in handling the ash and residues. (The “Innovative Tech¬ nologies” section has information on adaptions of this conventional technique.) With liquid injection incineration, freely flowing wastes are atomized by passage through a carefully designed nozzle. It is important that the droplets are small enough to allow the waste to completely vaporize and go through all the subsequent stages of combustion while they reside in the high-temperature zones ot the incinerator. Injection incinerator designs tend to be waste-specific, especially nozzle de¬ sign, but can be designed to burn a wide range of pumpable waste Groundwater Treatment.—The contamination of groundwater is a common occurrence at Super¬ fund sites and mav be the major and most in¬ transigent problem. Treatment often incorpor¬ ates a combination of the above technologies, is costly, and there is no guarantee that com¬ plete renovation of aquifers can ever be accom¬ plished. While some innovative techniques pursue in situ biological or chemical treatment of ground- water, the current practice is to first contain a plume of contamination to avoid further mi¬ gration and then pump the contaminated water from the ground and through a treatment fa¬ cility located onsite. Treated water can be rein¬ jected into the ground to enhance and speed up the flushing of the contaminants from he system or pumped down gradient (i.e., returne to the aquifer or a stream or river). Some discussion of how technology has been applied at Superfund sites to treat groundwater and its effectiveness can be found in chaptei 5. For a more complete discussion of ground¬ water treatment options, see OTA’s report, Pro¬ tecting the Nation’s Groundwater From Con¬ tamination .“ Innovative Technologies Innovative technologies are varied but can be broadly classified into containment and treatment categories. The concentration in this section, however, is on new treatment technol¬ ogies 26 that offer the possibility to destroy haz¬ ardous wastes and eliminate the need to tie up resources ir. long-term operation and mainte¬ nance of containment facilities. Not all inno¬ vative treatment technologies destroy contami¬ nants, however. Some improve on physical separation methods and, as such, can provide important pre-treatment steps. Others, sucli as «jxsTcongress, Orf.ce of Technology Assessment. Protect- inf, the Nations Groundwater ’.Tom Contamination O. *<>233 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. October 19 »Most of these technologies are not breakthroughs in basic science but rather are innovative in adopting existing processes for the management of hazardous waste. V V I *** ' 794 • Superiund Strategy vitrification, decompose and entrap hazardous wastes. The nature of innovation makes it more dif¬ ficult to classify developing treatment methods as strictly physical, chemical, biological, or thermal processes. In fact, procedures for qual¬ ifying new technologies on the basis of pre¬ existing classifications can inhibit their adop¬ tion. New methods of analysis will have to be considered to properly evaluate the effective¬ ness and reliability of innovative technologies. because the procedure for testing incinera¬ tion technologies (the most common convention¬ al destruction technique) has been defined under RCRA and performance standards adopted, the recognized bottom line for any hazardous waste reduclion/destruction technology has be¬ come the Destruction and Removal Efficiency (DRE) 27 rating. This system forces all technol¬ ogies to a level of 99.99 percent (“four nines”) removal for organic hazardous wastes and 99.9999 (“six nines”) for PCBs (regulated under TSCA). The blanket use of this rating ignores the question of whether these degrees of thor¬ oughness are an appropriate level of hazard re¬ duction for the public and the environment for all hazardous wastes found in all media and whether the public ought to pay that cost in all cases. However, until national cleanup goals are established and/or additional ways of meas¬ uring technology effectiveness are adopted, DREs will remain the prime criterion for tech¬ nology evaluation. . Comparing technologies by their DREs must take into account that the type and concentra¬ tion of the input material can affect the out¬ come for each technology. Often it will be less '’The DKE is calculated by the following mass balance formula: DRE = (1-Wout/Win) x 100 percent where. Win = the mass feed rate of 1 principal organic hazard¬ ous constituent (I’OHC) in the waste stream going into the incinerator. Wout - the mass emission rate of the same POH , in the exhaust prior to release to the atmosphere. Incinerators are also regulated by the amount of hydrogen chloride and particulates emitted. See U S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment .Technologies and Management Strat¬ egies for Hazardous Waste Control, OTA-M-196. p 159 (Wash¬ ington. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. March 1983) for more detailed information. expensive to attain desired removal rates by combining techniques that individually offer relatively low removal rates. Other methods of regulating technologies include “design and operation” standards (such as applied to land¬ fill techniques under RCRA) a..d environmen¬ tal standards (comparable to National Primary and Secondary Air Quality Standards). With re¬ gard to the latter, it should be noted that even high DREs do not necessarily signify accepta¬ bly low levels of toxic air emissions in terms of the quantity released over time. Technology Comparisons Of the many technologies that are now be¬ ing conceived, researched, and developed OTA has selected some examples of alterna¬ tives to common Superfund practices that ap¬ pear to offer the potential for improved reli¬ ability and cost effectiveness. Much of the analysis of innovative technol¬ ogies and their applicability to Superfund must be based on judgement due to a lack of Super- fund performance data. 28 Comparisons among the technologies is difficult because of a lack of standardization in the available information. While only one of the technologies presented below has been applied at an uncontrolled site; some have been used to treat industrial haz¬ ardous waste streams. All have undergone a variety of tests, but only a few of the technologies have actually been tested on a Superfund site or on a large scale with Superfund waste (i.e., have been demon¬ strated). Instead, the material used fortesting has ranged from pure hazardous waste com¬ pounds to synthetically produced wastes to sample Superfund wastes, in varying concen¬ trations. Testing has been conducted at differ¬ ent levels (e.g , laboratory, bench, and pilot- scale) since the technologies exist at these dif¬ ferent levels of development. '•An assumption is often made that such data exists for con¬ ventional technologies and that, therefore their reliability and effectiveness is better known. In fact, conventional technologies are only conventional in the sense that the techniques have been proved in conventional applications; i.e., applications other than Superfund remedial action. j WW B W - ,» «, — v _;t . *~ r.~^, , • There are no standardized estimates of cap¬ ital and operating costs for each technology. Costing is often based on the results of tests specific to a certain type and concentration of hazardous waste and is not necessarily trans¬ ferable to the treatment of other types and con¬ centration of hazardous wastes. For example, as a waste stream becomes more dilute (i.e., the water content of an aqueous waste stream in¬ creases), incineration techniques become in¬ creasingly expensive due to the need to raise the water in the waste stream to treatable tem¬ perature. Therefore, while a technique may be technically capable of treating a variety of waste streams, it may be inefficient to do so. Physical, chemi 'al, biological, and thermal treatment processes have been described ear¬ lier under “Conventional Technologies. For innovative technologies, dermal and biologi¬ cal categories require further descriptions. Thermal Destruction.-High temperatures (800° to 3,000° F) are used to break down organic compounds into simpler, less or nontoxic forms under either oxidation or pyrolysis. Two important questions to ask are how completely the process will destroy the input hazardous wastes and what products are created out of the destruction of hazardous wastes. During incineration, combustion occurs in the presence of excess oxygen (more oxygen than theoretically needed for a reaction to oc¬ cur). In general, complete incineration pro¬ duces water, carbon dioxide, ash, and acids and oxides that depend on the input material. Pyrolysis occurs in an oxygen deficient atmos¬ phere, and pyrolysis facilities consist of two stages: a pyrolyzing chamber and a lume in¬ cinerator. The latter, which operates at 1,800° to 3,000° F, combusts the volatilized organics and carbon monoxide produced in the pyrolyz¬ ing chamber. This two-stage system avoids the volatilization of inorganic components (i.e., the production of hydrogen chloride, for instance, which can corrode the system) and forms in¬ organics, including any heavy metals, into an insoluble solid char residue. Thus, the air emis¬ sions and residues from incineration and py¬ rolysis are different and depend on the point Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 195 ir *m li at which they are removed from the system or released to the atmosphere. Ash and char res¬ idues can contain salts, metals, and traces of other noncombustibles that must be propeily handled. Incineration systems must be fitted with devices to control the release of acid gases and particulates. And these collected materials must be treated or landfilled. No system is perfect or operates at maximum efficiency at all times. Inevitably, PICs are pro¬ duced along with the expected products. A re¬ cent Science Advisory Board report 29 reviewed the environmental impacts of the incineration of liquid hazardous wastes and evaluated the overall adequacy of existing scientific data. Among their findings were: • the adoption of the concept of destruction efficiencies emphasizes the elimination of several preselected compounds in the waste and does not fully address either partial oxidation or chemical recombinations, which may create new toxic compounds in the incineratior process; • research on the performance of incinera¬ tors has been conducted only under opti¬ mal burn conditions, ignoring upset con¬ ditions that occur; and • the existing analytical data for emissions from hazardous waste incinerators have serious limitations and toxicology informa¬ tion on emissions is inadequate. While basic research still needs to be con¬ ducted on the processes of combustion, the emerging thermal processes offer improve¬ ments over traditional means of incineration. Improvements show in the ways they maintain adequate temperatures for the required re¬ actions to occur, provide for adequate turbu¬ lence (mixing) of waste feed and fuel with ox¬ ygen for even and complete combustion, and allow for adequate residence times in high- temperature zones so that waste materials can volatilize and the gases completely react. In ad¬ dition, new thermal processes may be superior “U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Science Advisory board. Environmental Effects. Transport and Fate Committee. "Draft Report on Incineration of Hazardous Liquid Waste." De¬ cember 1984. - &?%W>' ; *5KS£f MBURam *#**»*:* 196 • Superfund Strategy to traditional incineration because of reduced air emissions and improved quality control during processing. The thermal processes described below may be unique because of their heat transfer mech¬ anism (e.g., fluidized bed, supercritical water). Improvement in the transfer of heat can in¬ crease the probability of reaction and decrease the reaction time (and cost) of a process. They also offer different mechanisms for breaking the bonds of compounds. The plasma arc, for instance, uses the bombardment of very high energy free electrons. Vitrification.—This special form of thermal treatment involves the melting of soil and wastes by passing an intense electric current through the mixture. The high temperature fuses the materials and binds them into a glas¬ sy, solid matrix after cooling. In situ vitrification has been successfully tested in laboratory and pilot-scale tests for soils contaminated with radioactive wastes, but no data is available for applications to hazard¬ ous wastes. The p r ocess should be compatible with nonvolatile inorganic wastes/soil mixtures in general, but probably not with soils contain¬ ing organic contaminants. It may not be appli¬ cable to saturated soils and is limited by the amount of water present. Little data exist on long-term resistance to leaching. Vitrification may have limited applications because variable site conditions and the pres¬ ence of complex mixes of contaminants severe¬ ly lessen its reliability. If found to be practical, however, it could be used to treat wastes in situ and provide a more permanent containment solution than the use of barriers. Biodegradation.— These techniques involve the use of naturally occurring or synthetically gen¬ erated bacteria to break down chemicals via ingestion and respiration. They include either applying the organisms to ae. ated soils in situ or after excavation and deposition in surface impoundments, ponds, or treatment facilities wnere the wastes can be mechanically aerated. More recently, several concepts have been de¬ veloped where the biodegradation occurs with¬ in the saturated, contaminated soil/groundwa¬ ter system. Here, nutrients and oxygen are injected directly into the grcundwater. Oxygen is added by pumping air into the ground through well points located below the water table. Some systems rely on indigenous micro-organisms; ethers inject additional micro-organisms to¬ gether with nutrients. All pump and recirculate groundwater, since it takes more than one pass to obtain high removal efficiencies. While biological treatment of wastewater is not a new concept, its application to solid waste and contaminated soils, especially in situ, is . 30 Various natural and chemical proc¬ esses will affect the efficiency of biotechnol¬ ogy used in open systems. The effectiveness of the technology will be influenced by environ¬ mental conditions such as temperature, type of soil, type of naturally occurring micro¬ organisms, and the amount of air and water within the soil matrix . 31 A biotechnology system to degrade hazard¬ ous waste consists of micro-organisms (se¬ lected mutants of natural strains already pres¬ ent in the contaminated matrix or genetically engineered organisms) and a process technol¬ ogy. The process technology makes possible the use of the organisms in highly variable, real world conditions. So far, much of the research interest and funding has been directed toward the micro-organisms with only limited funding to develop the technology . 32 Before genetically engineered organisms can be used effectively in Superfund applications, especially in situ, certain problems require solutions : 33 • Foreign organisms injected into a particu¬ lar system will likely create problems of “Wastewater treatment facilities are closed systems where the proper envi. .nment can be maintained for optimal performance results. *'S. W. Pirages, et at., '‘Biotechnology in Hazardous Waste Management: Major Issues." paper presented at symposium Im¬ pact of Applied Genetics in Pollutions Control. University ol Notie Dame, May 1982. “Stanley Sojka, Manager. Environmental Technology. Oc¬ cidental Chemical Corporation, personal communication. De¬ cember 1984. ”M. A. Alexander. "Ecological Constraints on Genetic Engi¬ neering: Genetically Engineered Organisms in the Real World." paper presented at Genetic Control of Environmental Pollutants. University of Washington. Seattle. 1983. - Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 197 survival for either the indigenous or for¬ eign organisms. • Laboratory results cannot be directly ex¬ trapolated to full scale because of differ¬ ing conditions under which micro-orga¬ nisms operate. • Soil particles present a physical barrier to the movement of micro-organisms as wa¬ ter is required for movement between par¬ ticles. Lack of proper conditions would give uneven degradation. • The effect of possible abiotic stresses (e.g., unsuitable temperatures and pH levels) on rr.icro-organisms released into the environ¬ ment are unknown. Toxic elements within the environment might reduce, or elimi¬ nate, a microorganism’s ability to degrade chemicals of concern. In addition, possi¬ ble predators could be a critical factor to the effective use of laboratory bred or¬ ganisms. An additional point is that little work has been done using organisms to treat complex waste mixes. An advantage to using genetically engineered organisms at a Superfund site is that once the wastes have been degraded, the organisms should die. This is because the carbon source for growth and reproduction of the microor¬ ganism has been depleted or is unavailable to the organism. Illustrations of Innovative Technologies The following section describes 26 innova¬ tive technologies. Using available information, OTA has attempted to discuss: the principles on which each technology is based and the process itself; whether it destroys or contains hazardous waste; the expected products, air emissions and residues; the applicable wastes; economic costs and uncertainties; and the cur¬ rent stage of development and the level of test¬ ing. These technologies illustrate the scope of activity underway in cleanup technologies; OTA does not recommend or endorse any of them. Many more innovations are also likely to exist now, and yet more can be expected in the future. Table 6-5 provides a technical summary of the 26 technologies showing their development stage, an estimate of how well each removes or destroys hazardous wastes, and the relati\ e cost of their use. Table 6-G summarizes their applicability to Superfund sites and table 6-7 their technical advantages and disadvantages. A preferred technology would effectively treat a variety of hazardous wastes under a variety of physical conditions, be transportable so as to be useful for onsite treatment, transler lit¬ tle health or environmental risk through air emissions and residue, and would not require extensive post-treatment facilities. Many of the technical disadvantages and uncertainties of these emerging technologies might be resolved through demonstration testing. 1. GARD Division. Catalytic Dehalogenation.— In the presence of a catalyst, halogenated compounds (or¬ ganic compounds that include a halogen such as chlorine, bromine, or fluorine) react with hydrogen to form an acid and a hydrocarbon. In this system, organic material is detoxified by reacting with hydrogen to form nontoxic materials. GAKD. a division of Chamberlain Manufactur¬ ing. has developed a treatment system using a plat¬ inum-based reforming catalyst supported on gam¬ ma alumina. The system begins with a storage unit that holds the hazardous waste material. The ma¬ terial is pumped from the tank to a preheater. \N hen it reaches the proper temperature, it is sent to the catalytic reactor where it reacts with hydrogen, for a chlorinated compound, the reaction yields hydro¬ chloric acid and a hydrocarbon. During the proc¬ essing. most solvents remain intact and can be re¬ covered. After leaving the reactor, the products aie cooled and sent to a vapor-liquid separation stage. The dehalogenated hydrocarbon and acid are sent through a scrubber and on to another storage tank. A second conversion stage can be added to the system as a polishing stage to remove a second hal¬ ogen if necessary, and a provision for product recy¬ cle can be added to the reactor lor cases when one pass is insufficient. The second conversion stage could be used to remove oxygen from some mate¬ rials to enhance their fuel value. CARD'S process is probably best suited for Seat¬ ing liquids with low concentrations of halogenated compounds (e.g., Silvex herbicide), but it is also ca¬ pable of treating liquids that are pure halogenated compounds and solids (e.g., contaminated soils). Liquid wastes can be treated directly with no pro- 198 • Super!und St r ategy i Table 6-5.— Innovative Technology Summary Company Project development stage Removal/ destruction capability Relative estimated costs Capital Treatment Gard. Zerpol. Bend Research ... DeVoe-Holbein. MODAR . medium ? medium medium high low-medium ? low ■> low low medium medium medium low ? low low Ztmpro . . Methods Eng. .. . IT Corp. medium-high low low Huber. high high high high medium-high high ? medium medium-high high ? high ? medium high medium-high Thagard. Pyrolysis. Westmqhouse Lockheed . medium-high ? high high RoTech . Midland Rose . Waste-Tech. GA Tech . Rockwell ... Sandpiper .... Detox .. medium high medium medium medium medium low-medium medium ? 0 high medium GDS. SBR Tech . University of Gottingen Batteiie Pacific lopat-K20_ NMT-Fupbeton NOTES medium medium high na high high low ? ? ? low low low low ? ? low low low na - not aooi« 0 - not avaiiaoie KEYS nem 0 , ii OOT ,r u ct.ao (systems not ttecesMniy testeo on comparable eastei l-c,n* — »e*s tfvan 9C c^fce^i MW'um - 9C to 99 99 oerr^nt High - M % percent *'»0 greater Cap«tat coats (bared on full scale system *here poss>t>ie| Low - >ess than $t m»;t»on Medium - $i million to S5 million H*gn - more than Sf> million Treatment costs mot an systems evaluated usm 3 s*m« ocwrat.ng costs components) to* - less then $100-1 on 0 , jont-'gatlon Medium - stoo to IWtvton or 10 Ot to $1 gai'on Hi(jn - greater man liOOnon ot li gation SOUftCE Office of Technology Assessment treatment, except for filtering to catch solids. Solid waste must be dissolved .n hydrocarbon solvents first. Since the solvent is unaffected by the proc¬ ess. however, it can be used repeatedly. A bench-scale single pass reactor has been built for testing. CARD has considered building a pilot- scale system for further testing but is seeking finan cial assistance (private or public sector) before con¬ tinuing the research. Test results are available for Silvex and PCBs. With a single pass. Silvex was de- chlorinated by nearly 80 percent; with two passes, greater than 99 percent. Dechlorination of 93 per¬ cent in a single pass was achieved with material containing approximately 2.000 pom PCBs, but only 30 percent for material containing slightly more than 17.000 ppm PCBs. CARD has estimated costs based on the treatment of 1 million gallons of Silvex, assuming a feed rate of 50 gallons per minute. Capital costs would be SI 10.000 for a skid-mounted system and site hook- ups (e.g., electricity). Operating costs would be $99 per 1,000 gallons of Silvex treated and include cost of the hydrogen, pumping power, heating and cool¬ ing water without heat recovery, and labor. [CARD is located in Niles, IL; (312)647-9000.]« Each of the 26 technologies is listed by the firm de /eloping the technology and the firm's name for its product. In addition, each firm s location and telephone number are provided so that the reader who wants more information may contact the devel- oper directly. 1 I Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 199 © SD (0 y z-o CL « c Cl « ra < if) <0 El <1) TO if) — -D C © • (D t: to E ^ O ~ CT Q- S 2? O 0-. qo o D o o O O O uj O __ q3o OUU UJ r a. a.' Q.CLCLQCLQ.’CLCLtLCLCLQ-CLCLQCLCLQCLCLCLCLC' a,L»zizizzzzzzzzzzaaziuiz^ <0 c o «0 o Eg o> © if) 2 c/5 T3 C 3 w. 0) CL 3 (/) rj CO o "q. Ql < >* U) o o c £ o 0) K 0) > "ca > O c c CD jOOOOOOJWm-J co _r "j co to to 3 § 3 •q w - w . I co' CO to CO -i -J C3 O O co co CO to ,_oooooooooooooooooooooo S V 2'5 cl cl 0 . a. t- e- 2* 2'o. 2 ‘clcl 2 a. 2 t- e- Q-‘ e- E- t- v- co >-ZQ.z>y>>>'>zz>^> > - > ' >>zz>clz>> a. > Q. 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T3 T3 “■ (y m ; — X? <0 CO -UjC“ 5 CL £ o o : O to u. - O ^ VI I ! . i i i j 200 • Superfund Strategy Table 6-7.—Innovative Technology Advantages and Disadvantages Company: Technology GARD: Catalytic dehalogenation Zerpol: Zero Technology Bend Research: Coupled transport for sludge reclamation DeVoe-Holbein: Metal extraction MODAR: Supercritical water oxidation Zimpro: Wet air oxidation Methods Eng.: Submerged reactor IT Corp.: Catalyzed wet oxidation Advantages Little pre treatment for liquids Fuel recovery potential Good portability Conventional equipment Salt recovery possible Highly treated liquid discharges Highly concentrated residues Leads to metals recovery Potential for metals recovery Requires little ion exchange agent High copper, chromium, zinc applicability Selective exchange leads easily to metal recovery High metal capture efficiencies High DREs for wide range of organics Operates in self-sustained mode on low organic content wastes Applicable to large volumes of wastes Wide previous experience on variety of nonhazardous wastes Low energy requirement v. incineration Potential onsite application Operates in self-sustained mode on low- organic content wastes Applicable to large volumes of waste Can be operated to produce no aqueous residue Low-volume residue for further disposal Huber: Advanced Electric Reactor Thagard: Fluid wall reactor Pyrolysis: Plasma arc Westinghouse: Plasma arc Lockheed: Microwave plasma RoTech; Cascading Rotary Incineration System Midland-Ross: Rotary pyrolytic incineration Very high reaction temperatures/absence of oxygen limits unwanted product formation High destruction efficiencies for organics Applicable to large sites Demonstration tested Very high combustion temperatures PIC formation considered low 6 High destruction efficiencies for organics Applicable to large sites High operating temperatures result in high organic destruction efficiencies Mobile system possible High operating temperatures result in high organic destruction efficiencies High destruction efficiencies for chlorinated compounds Can process gases and liquids Small commercial-scale operation on actual wastes Cascading solids have very high contact with combustibles No afterburner required No refractory maintenance Fuel recovery possible Application shown on actual wastes Metals retained on residua: char Low or no NO, emissions Disadvantages/uncertainties Wastes must be in liquid phase Development at small pilot stage Has not undergone relevant testing Applicable to concentrated wastestreams Pretesting required to fix wastestream applicability—highly selective applicability Only tested at small scale High exchange membrane costs Sludge requires residue disposal Clean, dilute liquid wastes required Considerable pre-treatment required Requires demonstration testing Relatively high capital costs High pressure/temperatures process* Destruction dependent on residence time Higher capital investment than for incineration Elevated temperature/pressure process* Requires demonstration testing Relatively high capital costs High pressure/temperature process* Destruction dependent on rates of oxidation of compound in reactor— longer rates wtli dominate processing time for waste Elevated temperature/pressure process* High energy use High energy use Cost estimates incomplete Small-scale testing to date Cost estimates incomplete High degree of pretreatment required Bench-scale tests convince oeveloper to drop project Testing required on mixed wastes, metals emissions Need pre-treatment for waste size uniformity Destruction efficiency difficult to assess Not applicable to aqueous wastes Tested on a narrow range of wastes I -' 5 5SS?t3S$£!*«^ tgSaft* 1 t t. civ-tv. -*c.' • - Cfl. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 201 Table 6-7.—Innovative Technology Advantages and Disadvant3ges-Contmued Company Technology_ Waste-Tech: Fluidized bed incineration GA Tech: Circulating bed combustor Advantages Disadvantage s/uncertainties Rockwell: Molten salt incineration Sandpiper: SEGAS process Detox: In situ biological treatment CDS: Biological degradation SBR Technologies: Sequencing Batch Reactor University of Gottingen: Biological degradation Battelle Pacific: In situ vitrification Lopat: Chemical treatment New Materials: Chemical treatment Expect metals attenuation in bed Good combustion turbulence and waste contact Capita' costs compare to rotary kiln Destruction efficiencies high Hiqher turbulence than typical fluidized bed Expect metals retention in bed Shown on variety of wastes High destruction efficiencies Littl 2 /no gas discharge treatment required Low-temperature operation—expect low NO, emissions Little air emission of toxics Metals retained in melt Vary high destruction efficiency for organics Energy recovery possible Compact mobile system Tested at actual site on mixed wastes Demonstrated lower costs than some chemical/thermal processes Anaerobic capability Tested in a soil matrix Little pre-treatment Proven cleanup technology Each cycle is monitored by computer system High throughput possible Promising research approach No removal costs Very low teachability Application in past to radioactive wastes successful Good control for metals Low cost, safe chemical, easy to apply to wastes and contaminated surfaces Effective on organic and inorganic materials Low cost, safe chemical, easy 'o apply to wastes and contaminated surfaces Effective on organic and inorganic materials Proven technology^ Waste character and particle size should be uniform Need further metals emission testing and waste tests Need further metals emission testing Waste feed pre-treatment for character/size uniformity required Need fuller testing on mixed wastes Works best on tow ash content wastes; requires melt-ash removal system Small-scale test thus far Costs/testing for waste application incomplete Longer treatment times than chemical/thermal Intermediate compounds not defined Applicability dependent on site characteristics In situ phase contribution uncertain Production of sludge can reduce efficiency of operation Intermediates are formed Needs process technology High energy use Small site applicability For organics—requires offgas treatment High soil moisture increases costs Dura"'''" of effectiveness uncertain For so Is and wastes other additions such as r ement, increase volume Long-term (greater than 10 years) effectiveness uncertain *High-temperatu-e n.gh-pressure systems have inherent rsk ol process catastrophe Redundant safeguards requ.red bpic—Product ot Incomplete Combustion SOURCE: Oflice of Technology Assessment ***e*t*cetm* r x • f I - rCfTWfl 202 • Superfund Strategy 2. Zerpol Corp., Zoro Technology.— This pollution con¬ trol system developed for the metals finishing in¬ dustry is a unique collection of conventional proc¬ esses. The system recently has been extended to other industries, such as textile manufacturers, chemical manufacturers, petroleum refiners paper mills, and pharmaceuticals. It could provide a chemical method of removing organics, heavy met¬ als and inorganics, including cyanides, from con¬ taminated groundwater. There is no liquid dis¬ charge from the system. For wastewater from a metal finishing plant, pro¬ prietary chemicals sequentially reduce chromates, oxidize cyanides and adjust the pH to 9 to 9.2 (an alkaline solution). The primary objective is to re¬ duce the cyanide levels in the solution and precip¬ itate out heavy metals without the use of flocculat¬ ing and settling agents. The resultant liquid contains dissolved salts that must eventually be removed by a distillation process. The distilled water is then recycled back through the system. Residues from the process include heavy met¬ als and a concentrated salt solution that is dried by evaporation, producing a small amount of solids No test data is available on hazardous waste re¬ moval levels, nor is any information regarding cap¬ ital and operating costs. [Hatfield, PA; (212) 368-0501) 3. Bend Research, Coupled Transport for Sludge Reclama¬ tion. —This coupled transport system is an adaption of ion exchange technology in which an immobil¬ ized, liquid membrane process allows certain met¬ als to be selectively extracted from a solution con¬ taining various other metals. This system offers several advantages over other ion exchange proc¬ esses. It requires only small amounts of agent, thereby lowering costs, and feed pre-treatment, especially the removal of suspended solids, is ex¬ pected to be minimal. An inert, microporous support is impregnated with a water-miscible liquid ion exchange resin. (This agent is held in the pore of the support mate¬ rial by capillary forces.) When the membrane con¬ tacts an aqueous solution containing metal ions, the membrane exchanges ions of like charge, thereby extracting the metal ions from solution. The proc¬ ess includes acid leaching of sludge as a first step, followed by the exchange in which the metal is de¬ posited on one side of the membrane. An electro¬ lytic extraction of the exchange-concentrated solu¬ tion is the final step. Bend has developed three membranes so far, for copper, chromium, and zinc recovery. If the proc¬ ess can be made to work on a wider base of metals, the potential for treating hazardous wastes might be high. As this is a physical separation process, the products are a metal and a sludge residue. Giv¬ en that the metal is a hazardous waste component of the initial sludge, that product would have to re¬ ceive further treatment or disposal, if it is not recycled. The process has received only laboratory-scale testing. In those tests, copper purity in a sample was over 99.9 percent. Future work is required to demonstrate nickel recovery and to increase cop¬ per flux in the ion exchange unit, chromium oxida¬ tion efficiency, and the number of potentially ex¬ changeable metals. Costs have been estimated for a plant capable of treating 27,000 grams (60 pounds) per hour of sludge. Post-treatment of the metal residue and sludge disposal is not included. Capital costs would be $118,700 and operating costs, $85,700 per year, with payback within 4 years. At this level of oper¬ ation. resale of the metal values are said to result in income of $148,000, but this would depend on metal market conditions. [Bend, OR; (503)382-4100) 4. Devoe-Hoibein, Inc., Metal Extraction.— This tech¬ nology offers a method to extract metal from rela¬ tively clean waste streams using synthetically pro¬ duced compositions. Ion exchange then regener¬ ates the compounds by separating out the metals. The extraction compositons are patterned after the natural metal extraction capability of living cells. Each of the 30 compositions developed by Devoe- Holbein extracts a different metal. Both the com¬ position and the extracted metal can be recovered and reused, reducing the cost of the process. The technology might be used either as an independ¬ ent waste treatment or in conjunction with other processes as a pre-treatment step. The process is mainly applicable for treating di¬ lute wastes such as those produced by metal fin¬ ishing operations (i.e., electroplating). It is highly selective of the metal in question. Once metals con¬ sidered to be hazardous have been extracted, they must be reused or receive further management. The measure of success for the process is the per¬ cent of metal captured from the solution being treated. Synthetic compositions have been shown to capture nearly 100 percent of the metals in both aqueous solutions and industrial wastes in pilot- scale tests: 99.96 percent of copper in solution, 99.91 and 99.98 percent of zinc chloride and zinc phosphate from electroplating rinse solution, 99.99 and 99.97 percent of cobalt and zinc from a petro¬ chemical effluent. Large-scale testing is planned. Estimated capital and operating costs have been made for a representative plant treating 10 gallons per minute of waste and removing zinc. Capital in- i ' •*»• '*& *} w -»»^.cy ■? r *-rv?c.——•-« Cf,. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 203 vestment for this relatively smal’ plant would be $15,000. Stated operating costs of $6,100 to $6,600 per year (at 8 hours per day and 220 ( ays per year) work out to less than a penny per gallono wk te. but Devoe-Holbein has not included labor costs. (Quebec, Canada; (514)636-6042] 5 MODAR Inc., Supercritical Water Oxidation.— Super¬ critical water is used by MODAR to destroy organic materials by oxidation. Above its critical tempera¬ ture (374° C) anJ pressure (210 atm or 0.3 g'em ). the properties of water are quite different from that of the normal liquid or atmospheric steam f or ex¬ ample organic substances are completely solub c in water under some supercritical conditions white salts are almost insoluble under other supercritica conditions. The solubility of organics, coupled with low hydrogen bonding properties in supercritical water, facilitates the destruction of organics and formation of inorganic acids (from the Imogens. and possible metal elements present), plus carbon di¬ oxide and water. The acids can be precipitated out as salts by adding a base to the feed. The MODAR system is a multi-stage process. First the waste in the form of an aqueous solution or a slurry is delivered to the oxidizer inlet where it is pressurized and heated to supercritical con. lo¬ tions by direct mixing with recycled reactor elu¬ ent Oxygen is then supplied in the form of com pressed air and the inlet mixture is a homogeneous phase of air. organics, and supercritical water. 1 he organics are oxidized in a controlled but rapid re¬ action (residence time of 5 seconds). I he' e^ue is fed to a cyclone where the inorganic salts thi are originally present in the feed, or which form in the combustion reactions, precipitate out and are separated from the effluent. The fluid eftluent (some of which is recycled through the system as a preheater) is then a mixture of water, nitrogen, and carbon dioxide. Once cooled to subcritical tem¬ perature, the mixture forms two phases and enters a high pressure liquid-vapor separator. Practically all of the N 2 and most of the CO, leaves with the gas stream; the liquid consists of water, inorganic salts, and an appreciable amount of dissolved C,0 2 . The liquid is depressurized and fed to a low-pres¬ sure separator. The vapor stream is vented. At two points in the system, energy can be generated The MODAR process can be applied to organic wastes with a wide range of concentrations; solids must be slurried prior to treatment. Economically, it is currently particularly well suited for aqueous wastes containing 1 to 20 percent weight organics. For lower concentrated wastes, fuel value mus >e added; for higher concentrations, water. Originally designed to detoxify industrial aque- ous organic waste streams, the firm is now oiler- ing the process for use at Superfund sites. A dem¬ onstration. skid-mounted piSt-scale system is available for testing. A continuous flow, bench-scale system with an organic throughput of 1 gallon per day was used to collect the test results. Feed mixtures of various organic hazardous wastes were used, containing from 1 to 20 percent chlorine. Liquid effluents^were analyzed for total organic carbon (IOC.) and pH. Gaseous effluents were analyzed for low molecular weight hydrocarbons and permanent gases. In gen¬ eral organic carbon is reduced to less than 1 ppm (DRFs of 90 99 to 99.9999 jiercentl; organic chloride OREs are also 99.99 to 99.9999 percent. The system has low operating costs but relatively high capital costs. Operating costs are kept low be¬ cause the system recycles its superheated eftluent to heat incoming wastes. Consequently, the system requires almost no fuel once operation has begum The incoming slurry must contain at least „ pc cent combustible organic matter to maintain self- sufficiency (compared with a typical incinerator s feed of about 30 percent |. Excess heat generated by the system can be used to drive a turbine to genet- ate electricity (an option that might only be feasi¬ ble for a centrally located plant rather than a trans¬ portable system used for Superfund sites). Disposal costs have been protected by MODAK fer a representative plant processing to tons o organic waste per day; it would require a capita investment of neatly S5 million w.lh treatment costs of si.50 per gallon for organic liquid and solii wastes and $0.15 lor dilute aqueous wastes. (Natick. MA; (617)b55-7741) 6 Zimpro, We* Air Oxidation.— The basic principles of air oxidation are covered above under ‘Conven¬ tional Treatment Technologies. The use of water (-wet”) as a reaction medium allows tor reactions to take place at relatively low temperatures.J 75 to 325° C (347° to 617° F). It also modifies the re¬ action rates that remove excess heat by evaporation and provides an excellent heat transfer medium This allows the process to be self-sustaining i mallv with relatively low organic feed concentra¬ tions (i.e.. feeds with low fuel value) The process pressure is usually between 300 and 3.000 ps. to prevent excessive evaporation of the liquid phase in the reactor. , , „ Zimpro has been using wet oxidation for the treatment of industrial wastes for over 30 years, and they are now adapting the process for the treatment of hazardous waste. The degree of oxidation -■ , WVWWWWWfW iwwtnww*^ -r—r.^m vt •«?aarrr'~'*-»-"^| 204 • Superfund Strategy achieved (i.e., degree of destruction) depends on temperature and residence time in the reactor and oxidation conditions are waste-specific. Zunpro feels that wet oxidation can be valuable for the treat¬ ment ot dilute organic hazardous waste streams be¬ cause it is far more efficient (in terms of energy con¬ sumption) than incineration. Air pollution problems are nearly eliminated be¬ cause most harmful contaminants produced remain in the aqueous phase and do not burn off as gases. The only gases discharged from the process aie spent air and a small amount of carbon dioxide. Any harmful liquids produced may have to be treated. Bench-scale tests have been conducted with pure hazardous organic compounds and DREs ranged from 2.0 to 99.997 percent. The poorest performers were Kepone (31 percent). Arochlor 1254 (2 and 63 percent), and 1.2,-dichlorobenzene (32 and 69 per¬ cent). Otherwise. DREs were at least 82 percent and averaged over 99 percent. Testing and treatment of industrial hazardous waste streams show that most compounds are easily oxidized by the wet air process but that halogenated aromatic compounds (e.g., chlorobenzene and PCBs) are resistant. The capital investment for wet air oxidation is considerably higher than that for conventional in¬ cineration. but there is the potential for lower oper¬ ating costs. A small plant processing about 4 tons |>er day would require a capital investment between Si.9 million and $3.0 million. Zimpro expects wet air oxidation to save a great deal in operating costs because power requirement are low. Total operat¬ ing costs are expected to vary depending on plant capacity; estimates of $30 per ton (at 100 tons proc¬ essed per day) and $150 per ton (at 10 tons per day) have been made. (Rothschild. WI; (715)355-3523] 7. Methods Engineering, Inc., Burleson/Kennedy Sub¬ merged Reactor —The Burleson/Kennedy reactor uses a deep well to form a reaction chamber for the com¬ bustion of waste in water. The deep well promotes the conditions (pressure and temperature) neces¬ sary for supercritical water, which is used as a process medium (see MODAR, above). The ideal structure for the submerged reactor is an abandoned oil well at least 6,400 feet deep with a cement casing to retard heat loss. Water, pressur¬ ized oxygen, and the hazardous waste to be treated must be pumped imo the well The bottom of the well serves as the reaction vessel. An electrical cur¬ rent input near the bottom of the well heats the fluid for the reaction. Aqueous organic hazardous wastes would be the most appropriate use of this system. The products of the process are carbon dioxide, water, and vari¬ ous soluble and insoluble solid salts. Depending on the input waste, some of the salts may contain heavy metals that will need to be separated out for proper handling. Information is not available on testing results. Capital and operating costs were estimated in rnid- 1984. The initial capital outlay would be $1.2 mil¬ lion, and the system is expected to be capable of processing 480 million gallon, of wastewater per year at a cost of $0.0014 per gallon. (Anglcton, TX; (409)849-7033] 8. IT Corp., Catalyzed Wat Oxidation. —In conventional wet air oxidation, heat and pressure drive the dis¬ solution of oxygen from air and its reaction with dissolved organics in an aqueous solution. In this catalyst system, the transfer of oxygen to the dissolved state is speeded. With enhanced oxygen transfer, it is possible to oxidize organics at lower temperatures (165° to 200° C versus 250° to 325° C for conventional systems) and at lower pressures. The catalyst consists of bromide, nitrate, and man¬ ganese ions in acidic solution. In its simplest form, the reactor contains a con¬ tinuously stirred catalyst solution. Air and waste are continuously pumped into the reactor. Products formed that leave the reactor are C0 2 , N 2 , water va¬ por, and depending on the input, volatile organics and inorganic solids. Water is condensed and re¬ turned to the reactor, if necessary, as are condei. sable organics. Any inorganic salts or acids that may form have to be removed by treatment (e.g., filtration or distillation) of the catalyst solution in a closed loop stream. The vent gases are low in vol¬ ume and can, if necessary, be treated by conven¬ tional techniques such as adsorption or scrubbing. Nonvolatile organics remain in the reactor until de¬ stroyed and there is no aqueous bottoms product. This system is best suited for the treatment of liq¬ uid organics, and bench-scale tests have been con¬ ducted by IT Corp. Results show that organic re¬ duction varied depending on the compound tested, temperature, and residence time. Further R&D awaits more funding. The initial research was in¬ ternally funded by IT, supplemented by EPA funds. Preliminary treatment costs have been estimated so far and range from $0.12 to $1.04 per pound of compound. Actual costs will vary markedly de¬ pending on what compound is sent through the sys¬ tem. Slow destruction rate compounds would cost much more to treat than fast destruction rate com¬ pounds. In addition, treatment costs are influenced to a lesser degree by factors such as the air com¬ pressor, condenser size, cooling water require- I ****** - 1 - 384 ? * wwwxm * - y t aw ofli ments. neutralization or s ^ ub ’’' n8 ( ;;V q ^y 0 C ^i]' and catalyst loss. [Knoxville, TN; (blo)b90-321 ) 9 J M. Huber Corp., Advanced Electric Reactor.-The Advanced Electric Reactor (AER) rapidly heatsm - terials to temperatures in the range » . , (2,200° C) using intense thermal radration m he near infrared region. The reactants are isolated from the reactor core walls by means o a gaseous blanket formed by nowing nitrogen radially inward through the porous core walls (thus, its common name of “fluid wall reactor”). Solid waste is intio duced at the top of the reactor through a meter d screw feeder, and nitrogen is forced through the walls of the reactor. . After leaving the reactor, where pyrolysis occurs at temperatures of about 4.000° F, the product gas and waste solids pass through two pod-reactor treatment zones. The first is an insulated vessel to provide additional high temperature (in excess of 2 000° F) and residence time (5 to 10 seconds). I ht second is water cooled to reduce the gas tempera- ture to less than 1,000° F prior to downstream par¬ ticulate cleanup. Solids exiting these zones are cob lected in a sealed bin. Additional solids in he product gas are removed by a cyclone and routed back to the solids bin. The product ga> then enters a bag house for fine particulate removal followed by an aqueous caustic scrubber for chlorine rem ai. Any residual organics and chlorine are removed by passing the product gas through activated car bon beds just upstream of the emission stack The organic, particulate, and chlorine-free product gas composed almost entirely of nitrogen is then emitted to the atmosphere through the process St The AER runs entirely on electrical power and requires 800 to 1,200 kWh per ton for treating con¬ taminated soils and 1.500 to 2,000 kWh per ton for the complete dissociation of liquids. Gaseous, liq¬ uid or solid wastes can be treated. Pre-treatment of solids and liquids may be required to ensure hat feed particle size is small enough (or .he react to proceed to completion within the residence time. The system is suited for the treatment of low Btu content hazardous materials (i.e., contaminate soils, pure PCBs, and other heavily halogenatcd hy¬ drocarbons) and extremely hazardous materials (e g., dioxins and nerve gases). The principal products of soil-borne PCB destruc¬ tion using the Huber process are HU .ele¬ mental carbon, and a granular, free-flowing, solid material. Typical products ot incineration such as carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, and oxides of m- Ch 6—Cleanup Technologies • 205 trogen. are not formed in significant co-.icen- ,r Huber has built and maintains two fully equipped reactors as part of its over $6 million RD&D pro gram The smaller reactor unit (0.6 pounds per min¬ ute of contaminated soil feed capacity « * f d in a covered truck trailer for mobility. It is used io proof-of-concept experiments and onsite emo - strations The larger, pilot/commercial-scale reactor with a capacity of up to 50 pounds per minute or 10 000 tons per hour is used solely for resear P poses Although the larger unit hus 1been per™, ted hv ERA Region VI to commercial!;, treat 1 Gtt con laminated soils, corporate policy restricts its use ' 0 To U date. four test programs have been conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of the AER for treating soils contaminated with ’j azaI J°“ s wages. Tests were conducted in September 1983Ion. C Bs and certification was received from LI A Region V in May 1984 under TSCA. A second series of tests were conducted in May 1984 with carbon te ra- chloride in applying for a broad RCRA permit (ex¬ pected in 1985 ). In October 1984, a test senes was initiated on soils spiked with octachlorodibenzo p dioxin (a thermodynamically more stable surrog. - for the acutely toxic 2,3,7.8 tetrachlorodibenzo-p- dioxin isomer). In November 1984, at Times Beach, Missouri, the mobile reactor was tested on soil con¬ taminated with 2.3,7,8 TCDD and other dioxins Results from various test programs have provide typical gas phase DREs of 99.99999 + percent. In a! Leases, DREs were at least 99.9999 percent 1 tea te soil concentrations have always been equal or less than 1 opb of the contaminant in question (rGt5, CC\ dfoxin) and usually nondetectable. Further, no chlorinated products of incomplete pyrolysis have been observed. Operating costs depend on the size of the waste site and the soil pre-treatment requirements, which could Include drying and sizing. For a large she (containing more than 10,000 tons of materials) the 5 uSealed to be between S300 and $600 per Bui costs could be as high as $1,000 per tom Capital costs to build a large reactor are estimated at $10 million. [Borger. TX; (806)274-63311 10. Thagard Research, High Temperature Ffuid VVail Re¬ actor.—This High Temperature Fluid Wall (Hi r V) process is based on the same principles as the Hu¬ ber’s AER. The reactor was orginally developed tor the continuous dissociation of methane into carbon fines and hydrogen. To accomplish this, tempera¬ tures in excess of 1.700° C (3,092° F) and a mecha- ’ i ft - ftW i 206 • Superiund Strategy nism to prevent precipitate formation on the reac¬ tor walls were required. To meet both requirements at the same time, the reacting steam is kept out of physical contact with the reactor wall by means of a gaseous blanket. Energy for the reaction is sup¬ plied by carbon resistance heaters that bring the carbon core of the reactor to incandescense. Heat transfer occurs through radiative coupling from the core to the stream. The destruction process is driven by pyrolysis conditions in the reactor. In addition, some mate¬ rials (e.g.. soils) will vitrify under the high temper¬ atures. The system has a wide application to many hazardous wastes as long as they can be fed into the reactor in a pulverized form. This may require pre-treatment. Two sets of testing have been done on a pilot- scale unit. Thagard views one set to be correct and the other incorrect due to t rrors in testing (contam¬ ination occurred). DKEs for the former test were dichloromethane (99.9999+ percent), carbon tetrachloride (99.9+ percent), dichlorodifluoro- methane freon 12 (84.99 percent), trichloroethane (99.99+ percent), and hexachlorobenzene (percent¬ age not reported). In the latter tests, the most sig¬ nificant difference showed in dichloromethane. with much lower DREs. Extensive cost estimates (capital and operating) prepared by Thagard have compared its treatment process with the cost of landfills. They concluded that if wastes must be moved at least 100 miles at a cost of $65 per ton. the HTFW reac'or can be sub¬ stituted as long as at least 100 tons per day are be¬ ing processed. [Costa Mesa. CA; (714)556—4- 1 70) 11. Pyrolysis Systems, Inc.. Plasma Arc Techru'ogy.— The principle of plasma pyrolysis involves break¬ ing the bonds between organic constituents. Once the compounds are atomized, they reform into other compounds under controlled conditions that attempt to prevent the formation of hazardous materials. Waste fluids are injected into a plasma arc zone of a reactor vessel where temperatures ranging from 15,000° to 50,000° C exist in a gaseous cloud of charged particles between electrodes. The organ¬ ic molecules react with the plasma species and are destroyed within microseconds. These elements are subsequently released into another vessel where they recombine into stable forms such as hydrogen gas and methane. The new compounds created are predictable. Using a computer model, the appropriate operat¬ ing conditions can also be predicted prior to de¬ struction. Undesirable products can be reduced by altering the character of the feedstock or modify¬ ing the operating conditions. At the product gas outlet from the reaction cham¬ ber. water is injected along with liquid caustic soda to quench the product gas. neutralize acidic prod¬ ucts. and trap particulates. Saltwater and particu¬ lates are pumped and sampled before the discharge is approved. Product gas, mainly of hydrogen and carbon monoxide, flows to a flare stock where it is elec¬ trically ignited and burns between 2,000° and 3 ,000° C. The flare prevents the release of meth¬ ane gas to the environment. Chlorinated wasies produce a hydrogen byproduct that is converted to salt in a caustic scrubber. An activated carbon fil¬ ter blocks the release ot toxic material in the event of a power failure. The system has been designed to be mobile. All of the equipment is to be contained in a 45-foot trail¬ er. It includes a 500-kilowatt plasma device located at one end of a stainless steel reaction chamber with a graphite core. The technology has been developed with finan¬ cial assistance (up to Si.5 million) from EPA and the State of New York to treat the organic leachate from the Love Canal site. Pilot-scale testing (1 gallon per minute) on organic sludges is to begin in 1985 in Canada. These tests will provide data for the per¬ mit to place the unit on ihe Superfund site in New York for demonstration testing. Previous labora¬ tory scale tests of askarel fluids with contents up to 58 percent chlorine have produced DREs in ex¬ cess of 99.9999999 i>ercent. Handling contaminated soils for treatment would involve melting dow n the inorganic components and gasifying the organic components. Full-scale operating costs have not been estimated by Pyrolysis Systems yet. Estimates made in 1983 for the prototype model showed operating costs of about $0.30 per pound of waste at a treatment rate of 1 gallon per minute and that capital costs would be $2 million to $2.5 million for a full-scale unit with an input eed of 50 gallons per minute. Labor costs have not been estimated, but it is known that three operators would be required to run the system. [Welland, Ontario, Canada; (416)735-2401) 11. Westinghouse Electric Corp., Plasma Arc Technol¬ ogy. —Plasma arc technology has been described above under Pyrolysis Systems. Inc. Westinghouse has been a major developer of the torch systems in¬ corporated in plasma arc furnaces and has devel¬ oped a bench-scale reactor to test surrogate hazard¬ ous waste fluids. 'i - »n wg* *»g m±. The surrogate material chosen for testing was 31 percent by weight hexachlorobenzene in a slurry made up of wa'er (26 percent), alcohol (as an emul¬ sifier). and kerosene (31 percent). The researcher felt that the results for this surrogate would be simi¬ lar to those of PCBs. (PCBs were not chosen be¬ cause EPA approval is required to test with PCBs.) The results demonstrated the ability of the plasma technology to destroy hexachlorobenzene. diben- zofuran. and dibenzodioxin. In three tests the treat¬ ment product, analyzed by both a mass spectrome¬ ter and a gas chromatograph, showed 0.13, 0.3, and 0.5 ppm of hexachlorobenzene. The latter sub¬ stances were not detected at a 1 ppm resolution. The company has recently begun an intensive 10- month testing program that they expect will answer any remaining questions about the new technology on a larger scale. Preliminary cost estimates were made for a fixed plant treating 700.000 gallons of PCB liquids per year (assuming 7.000 hours of operation a year). Capitol cost was set at nearly $5.9 million, with total operating costs for one year at S2.8 million. These costs are now under revision. (Madison. PA - (412) 722-5000) 13 Luckhead Missies & Space Co., Inc., Microwave Plas¬ ma Detoxification.— In a microwave reactor, a plasma is generated by electrons subjected to microwaves. When used to decompose organic materials, a large number of complex reactions take place. Free rad¬ icals and atoms are produced from collisions of free elections with organic molecules. These species then react further to form secondary products. The reactor effluent consists mainly of carbon di¬ oxide and steam, with minor amounts of chlorine, hydrochloric acid vapors, and nitrogen oxides de¬ pending on the molecular structure of the material being destroyed. The hot gaseous plasma effluent is cooled, discharged through a caustic scrubber to remove acid products, and vented to the at¬ mosphere. Lockheed initiated a research program on apply¬ ing this process to hazardous waste detoxification in 1975. By 1980 a bench-scale reactor (rated at 15 kilowatts) had been developed to a stage where both gases and volatile liquids could be fed into the sys¬ tem. The feed rate was 10 to 20 pounds per hour, and reaction time was on the order of 10 milli¬ seconds. Simulated wastes were used for testing the bench- scale reactor. For vinyl bromide, DREs ranged from 99.98 to 99.9998 percent and carbon tetrachloride, 99.72 to 99.94. For tests of aniline, toulene and 1.1.1-trichloroethane. results averaged 99.99 per¬ cent. Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 20/ Lockheed has r.ot compiled cost data for this proj¬ ect, which was primarily funded by outside sources (EPA and a Canadian firm). It seems, however, to be an expensive way of destroying hazardous wastes. In 1980, EPA withdrew funding and Lock¬ heed abandoned the research before any demon¬ stration took place. Technical and political issues also contributed to the project’s termination. In¬ cluded among the technical problems were feed rates too slow to be commercially viable, difficulties in proving DREs of six nines, and corrosion by HC1 on the vaccum pump requiring an internal scrub¬ bing system. Politically, Lockheed faced problems in acquiring permission from the local community to test real wastes. (Palo Alto, CA; (415)424-2593) 14. RoTech Inc.(formerly Podco), Cascading Rotary In¬ cineration System. —T he RoTech technology is an in¬ cinerator whose cylindrical reactor unit rotates at 10 to 20 revolutions per minute (rpm). A conven¬ tional rotary kiln incinerator usually rotates at 1 to 3 rpm. This motion produces a cascading motion of the solids in the reactor (ash, unburned solids, and limestone residue) through the combustion gases. The high turbulence and solids-gas contact results in maximized heat transfer and optimal combustion kinetics. The intimate contact between solids and gases also provides the opportunity to neutralize acid gases (e.g., HCi) by adding limestone to the com¬ bustion zone. The high combustion efficiency and acid gas removal eliminates the need for afterburn¬ ers and acid scrubbers. Particulates are removed with baghouse filters. The system includes air preheating and solid re¬ heating by countercurrent flow with combustion gases. Combustion takes place between 1,200° and 1,500° F (640° and 807° C). RoTech’s system could be applied to a wide range of organic wastes: solids (pre-treated if necessary for size consistency), gases, solid-laden gases, sludges, and liquids. Low heat value wastes (sewage sludge at 1,650 Btu per pound, for instance) can be incinerated without auxiliary fuel. Combustion gas products include carbon dioxide, oxygen, and water. As mentioned above, acid gases produced from halogen compounds are reacted with limestone to produce salts. These solids, along with inert ash, are periodically removed from the furnace. Additional pollution control needs will be evaluated as testing proceeds. At present, a pilot or small commercial size unit is operating on industrial and other wastes and has been tested on a sludge/emulsion, an acrylic emul¬ sion, and a chlorinated aromatic waste. The DREs are expected to be high, better than 99.99 percent. r* ; ■ - - 1 w i n g mt .-'B— c vi—^ -w-.-jp. ,. -, . £05 • Superfund Strategy but the data are not yet available. The technology is ready for full-scale application, and several units with 100 ton-per-day capacity are under design. The installed cost for a system at the 35 million Btu per hour capacity level is estimated to be about $2.5 million; a 10 million Btu per hour unit is esti¬ mated to cost $1.5 million. Treatment costs are esti¬ mated to range from $70 to $150 per ton. (Cincin¬ nati. OH; (513)782-4519] 15. MidlandRoss Corp., Rotary Pyrolytic Incineration.— The main objective of this system is to convert waste material from a disposal problem to a gaseous fuel source using pyrolysis. (Pyrolysis produces a product stream that contains a high-energy content by virtue of its hydrocarbon concentration.) The treatment process begins with dried sludge being deposited onto a preheated, rotating hearth. When the sludge comes info contact with the hearth, its viscosity decreases and the material spreads out in a uniform, thin layer. Due to the absence of air, the material is pyrolyzed on the hearth. Volatile products are exhausted through a flue and the inert char materials that are left, mostly carbon and ash, are removed. The generated gases are combusted in a reactor at approximately 2,800° F in the presence of oxygen. The prime candidate hazardous wastes for this system are organic sludges. Products of the proc¬ ess are a char and gas effluent from the energy con¬ version unit. The char is collected to prevent leak- ag; to the atmosphere and must be shipped to a landfill. Three types of wastes have been tested using this process: API waste, styrene waste, and rubber plant waste. All three are organic wastes containing var¬ ious metals in amounts ranging from 0.1 to 1,000 ppm. Testing results have not been made available. Preliminary economic estimates have been made for the processing of API and rubber wastes (sty¬ rene waste was not included because of poor test results). The estimates were made for a system that included waste storage, a feed system, the pyro- lyzer, fume incinerator, and heat recovery. No costs were included for air pollution control, which could je necessary. The total estimated operating costs for the API waste is $894 per metric ton for a $440,000 system capable of processing 300 metric tons per year. For rubber waste, three systems were considered. At 1,000 metric tons per year, capital costs were estimated at $670,000 and operating costs, $526 per metric ton; at 2,000 metric tons, $920,000 and $296 per metric ton; and at 6,000 met¬ ric tons per year, $150 million and $117 per metric ton. [Toledo, OH; (419)537-6242] 16. Waste-Toch Services, Fluidized Bed Incineration.— The fluidized bed concept was described earlier under "Conventional Treatment Technologies.” Waste-Tech has extensive experience in such stand¬ ard systems, having provided 45 commercial fluid¬ ized bed incinerators for nonhazardous waste dis¬ posal. They are now building two similar incinerators for hazardous waste treatment. Solids, sludges, slurries, and liquids can all be treated with this system, although if is not very eco¬ nomical to treat liquids with a fluidized bed. Prod¬ ucts of the incineration process are flue gases and ash. The contents of both are dependent on the in¬ put hazardous waste. The ash generated is sent through a cyclone to remove particulate matter. Gases are then sent through a scrubber to remove the remainder of the particulate matter. A caustic neutralized wet scrub system can be used to remove HC1 from the exhaust gases before release to the atmosphere. All noncom- bustihle, inorganic wastes larger than the bed ma¬ terial are removed from the incinerator by a screen¬ ing and recycling system. This material and par¬ ticulates removed from ash and gases would have to be separately treated for any hazardous waste components. Waste-Tech has tested chemical compounds as well as actual wastes in their pilot incinerator. In¬ cluded have been fuel oil, carbon tetrachloride, tet- rachlorophenol, pentachlorophenol, and phenol at concentrations ranging from 0.5 to 40.8 percent by weight. All of the components tested had DREs of at least 99.99 percent except for tetrachlorophenol (99.97 percent). Waste-Tech claims to have de¬ stroyed tetrachlorophenol up to 99.99 percent in subsequent experiments by raising the system tem¬ perature. Pilot-scale testing has also shown that DREs are inversely related to the feed rate. The company estimates capital costs to be be¬ tween $790,000 and $1.35 million depending on the size of the incinerator required (a site-specific fac¬ tor). The smallest unit could treat about 2,500 tons of waste per year; the largest, 10,000 tons per year. The estimated operating costs for relatively small units range from $0.18 to $0.21 per pound of treated material, based on non-hazardous waste and in¬ clude costs for labor, utilities, consumable, depre¬ ciation, cost of money, and permitting. [Idaho Fails. ID; (208)522-0850] 17. G. A. Technologies, Circulating Bed Combustor.— I his circulating bed combustor is designed to be an improvement over conventional fluidized beds (see "Conventional Treatment Technologies"). It operates at higher velocities and with less and finer S-3T*i ■:*r r - • > ' ••• • .’ *" 4 •• »- • • '• ..-—»< Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 209 sorbents than conventional systems, allowing for a unit that is more compact and easier to feed. The unit also produces lower emissions and an offgas scrubber is not necessary. The key to the high efficiency (in terms of de¬ structive power) of the circulating bed combustor is high turbulence, a large combustion zone with uniform and relatively low (less than 850° C, or 1,562° F) temperatures, and longer residence times. This technology can destroy all types of halogen- ated hydrocarbons, including PCBs and other aro¬ matics. It is capable of treating solids, sludges, slur¬ ries, and liquids containing such compounds as chlorobenzenes, acetonitrile, carbon tetrachloride, trichloroethane, sodium fluoride, tributyl phos¬ phate. aniline, malathion, sodium silicates, and lead oxide. Wastes , however, must be homogeneous in compos,'ion when fed to the combustor. Due to the relatively low operating temperature of the system, acid gases can be treated w'ith lime scrubbing within the combustor, resulting in the re¬ lease of lime salts. The low combustor tempera¬ tures, coupled with good mixing in the combustor, prevent extensive formation of NO x . More than 7,500 hours of testing have been com¬ pleted using four pilot-scale combustors. The vari¬ ety of wastes tested have included spent carbone- ous cathodes from primary metal plants, halogen- ated hydrocarbon solvents, phosphate bearing wastes from polymer production, and radioactive waste carbon from metals production. All tests showed efficient destruction of hazardous chemi¬ cals, low emissions of air pollutants (NO x levels were 120 ppm or less), high combustion efficiency, and significant volume reduction. DREs exceed 99.99 percent for oily water sludge, chlorinated organic sludge, aluminum potlinings and PCB-con- taminated soil. Chemical plant wastes showed DREs of greater than 99.9 percent. The capital investment for a 25 million Btu per hour sludge incinerator, including a process steam generator, has been estimated at $2 million plus or minus 30 percent. A smaller, 6 million Btu per hour, incinerator is estimated at $1 million to $1.5 mil¬ lion plus or minus 25 percent. Operating costs vary widely depending on the wastes being destroyed. [San Diego, CA; (619)455-3045] 18. Rockwell International, Molten Salt Incineration.— Molten salt incineration is a method of burning organic material while simultaneously scrubbing the objectionable byproducts from the effluent gas stream. Materials to be burned are mixed with air and injected under the surface of a pool of molten sodium carbonate. The melt is maintained at tem¬ peratures on the order of 900° C, causing the hydro¬ carbons of the organic matter to be immediately ox¬ idized to carbon dioxide and water. Rockwell’s units are capable of being fed either crushed and sized solid material oi liquid fuels. I he pulverized solids, mixed with air being used for combustion, are injected into a stainless steel re¬ action vessel. The feed mixture passes through 6 inches of salt (in a bench-scale unit). Periodically, the inorganic materials that build up in the molten salt must be removed so that the bed can retain its ability to absorb acidic gases. Exhaust gases (car¬ bon dioxide and water vapor) can be directed through a scrubber and/or baghouse, if necessary, to remove particulates before being released to the atmosphere. The ultimate products of the molten salt process are carbon dioxide, water, various inorganic salts, and ash. The ash and any inorganic materials con¬ taining metals may be considered hazardous. Although molten salt technology has been used by several companies to incinerate wastes, only Rockwell’s system has been used to incinerate haz¬ ardous liquid or solid wastes. The company cur¬ rently operates three sizes of units: bench-scale (feed rate of 2 pounds per hour), pilot-scale (up to 250 pounds per hour), and a production unit that is operated as a coal gasifier and has not been de¬ signed for hazardous wastes. The bench-scale unit has been tested and shown to effectively destroy organic chemicals and wastes (DREs have exceeded 99.99 percent). No hazardous waste streams have been incinerated in the larger unit but since its bed depth is proportionally larger, it is reasonable to expect that its destruction effi¬ ciencies would be at least as great as in the bench- scale unit. Cost estimates are not available for Rockwell’s incineration system. [Conoga Park, CA; (818) 700-4887] 19. A. L. Sandpiper Corp., SEGAS Process.— SEGAS, or Sequential Gasification, converts incinerable sol¬ ids, sludges, and liquid waste to a medium heat-val¬ ue fuel gas. The process was developed in the 1970s to convert petroleum into more volatile products. Sandpiper is now testing the system for use on haz¬ ardous wastes typical of Superfund sites. The basis of the SEGAS process is a pressure ves¬ sel operating at 1,227° C (2,241° F) and 200 psi. The reactants, the wastes, and superheated steam are continuously fed into a proprietary fluid bed re¬ actor. Wastes are thermally decompored, releasing hydrogen and carbon. The steam reacts with the deposited carbon to form carbon monox’de and ad¬ ditional hydrogen. This mixture of hydrogen and ' 210 • Superfund Strategy l carbon monoxide—synthesis gas—is a fuel gas and basic raw material of the petrochemical industry. Chlorine and sulfur in the waste feed material re¬ act with the hydrogen within the reactor to form hydrogen chloride gas or hydrogen sulfide gas and are removed by conventional scrubbing technology. Solid residues will vary depending on the feed- stream and scrubbing technology and must be land- filled if not delisted. The process differs from conventional incinera¬ tion in that it does not burn the waste and, there¬ fore, no air of combustion is required in the sys¬ tem. The absence of air eliminates the necessity to contain, heat, cool, scrub, and discharge large vol¬ umes of nitrogen. The reactor and scrubbing sys¬ tem are substantially smaller than for conventional incineration of comparable waste streams. Results of testing hazardous wastes are not yet available but Sandpiper claims that extensive test¬ ing of the technology has been conducted on a va¬ riety of heavy petroleum products and has demon¬ strated process efficiency. Separate testing of the fluid bed reactor showed high DRE capabilities. In¬ tegration of the reactor with the SEGAS process will occur in a 60 gallon per hour demonstration unit expected to be available by June 1985. Sandpiper has designed a stationary or mobile unit (on a 40-foot trailer) to treat 600 gallons of waste per hour. They have projected capital costs for a stationary unit of $2.3 million and $2.2 mil¬ lion for the mobile unit. Operating costs will vary depending on the specific waste being processed. Sandpiper estimates that it will cost $0.03 per pound to process lower heat value, refractory ma- teriuls (e.g., heavily chlorinated hydrocarbons). Costs do not include any offset from the sale of syn¬ thesis gas. [Columbus, OH; (614)486-0405] 20. Detox Industries, Inc. (DTI), In Situ Biological Treat¬ ment.— This is an assisted microbiological degrada¬ tion process for the destruction of organic com¬ pounds. It will work either aerobically or anaer¬ obically. In anaerobic conditions, an oxygenating agent is added. Chlorinated organics serve as the carbon source for the organisms and the process is more efficient in destroying toxic compounds if the carbon source is limited to the compounds of interest. DTI developed its degrading microbe culture by selective adaption of known bacteria in the pres¬ ence of various concentrations of PCBs. The orga¬ nisms were conditioned to use PCBs as the sole car¬ bon source. The biodegradation of 14,000 cubic yards of soil contaminated with penlachlorophenol has been completed, and PCBs (Arochlor 1260) have been treated in a 25,000 gallon tank. Treat¬ ment applied to several hundred thousand cubic yards of material can be expected to take months to complete. The first step is to determine the parameters of the material to be treated. Contaminant concentra¬ tions, acidity, density, solubility, temperature, ox¬ ygen, and moisture content are important variables. Then a design is developed to most effectively stim¬ ulate growth and biodegradation. The process uses naturally occurring microbes, but is proprietary. To be effective, proper mixing of and contact between the microbes, waste constituents, and nutrient sup¬ ply, along with control of environmental factors, must be maintained. The process has been tested on PCBs and can be designed to be applied in situ to detoxify soils, sludge, lagoon contents, or can be designed to oper¬ ate as a treatment process on or offsite. Degrada¬ tion results in carbon dioxiae, water, and cell pro¬ toplasm (new cells). After degradation is complete, the micro-organisms used in DTI's process die off and the original culture, or mix, of organisms be¬ comes dominant again. Demonstrations with DTI’s process have used concentrations ranging from 46 to 2,000 ppm of PCBs and have achieved destruction efficiencies greater than 99 percent. Further work will fix the efficiencies more accurately and extend the range of chemicals. Costs are highly site-specific. DTI has estimated that costs will range between $60 and $120 per cubic yard (about 1 ton) of material to be treated, depending on the initial concentration of contami¬ nant and the matrix within which it is contained. [Houston, TX; (713)240-0892) 21. Groundwater Decontamination Systems, Inc., Biologi¬ cal Degradation. —The CDS system takes place onsite and aims to eliminate hydrocarbon and halogen- ated hydrocarbon contaminants from groundwater and soil through accelerated biodegradation by micro-organisms existing in the contaminated soil. It was developed by Biocraft Laboratories in New Jersey as a remedial technique for cleanup of their own property under a consent order and is now be¬ ing marketed for use at other locations. It is essentiady a flushing and treating operation that must be specifically designed for the charac¬ teristics of each site and its contaminants. A pump¬ ing system is installed to remove contaminated groundwater from the site. The water is cycled through an activating tank, where the micro-orga¬ nisms found in the water are enriched with com¬ pounds of phosphates and ammonia. From the ac- I Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 211 tivating tanks, the water is transferred to settling tanks and the treated water, rich in oxygen, nutri¬ ents. and micro-organisms is reinjected into the ground upgradient from the intake system, ins permits biodegradation to occur in situ as well as in the tanks. The groundwater and soils are aerated through air injection wells to further increase ihe rate of biodegradation. At the original site, groundwater was contami¬ nated by leaking underground storage tanks the contamination covered a surface area oi 360 ieet by 90 feet and extended below the surface to a depth of 10 feet. Biodegradation treatment was con¬ sidered the most cost effective choice when com¬ pared with carbon absorption (too expensive) anti ozone treatment itoo ineffective). Measurements ot the effluent indicate that removal ol most ol the contaminants to the desired level has occurred. Average removal efficiency for the system was greater than 98 percent lor isopropyl alcohol, greater than 97 percent for butyl alcohol, greater than 88 percent for acetone, and greater than >4 percent for dimetnvl aniline during the tirst 16 months of operation In the following 7 months the acetone removal was increased to greater than 97 percent end dimethyl aniline to greater than 93 P GDS claims that conventional methods might have taken 15 to 20 years cleanup time whereas their svstem will be completed in less than the j years originallv estimated, and at a lower cost. At ihe New lersey site. 12.000 gallons of groundwater are being treated daily at a cost of less than S0.02 per gallon. Total cost of the project has been placed at S859.000 including the original R&D costs ot $453,000. [Waldwick. N); (2011796-6938] 22 SER Technotogtes, Sequencing Batch Reactor.— The Sequencing Batch Reactor (SBk) has been under de¬ velopment by Professor R. L. Irvine of Notre Dame University over the past 15 years. Although initially intended for municipal wastewater treatment, the technology recently has been shown to be applica¬ ble to treat contaminated groundwater and hazard¬ ous waste leachates. The SBR has several virtues that overcome the traditional disadvantages of biological treatment. For example, the SBR has been shown to he rela¬ tively insensitive to changing feed characteristics, including loading rates. It is not as susceptible to shock loadings; it selects for the proper micro¬ organism in a mixed population; and it combines all treatment functions in only one tank, a delinite economic advantage. The reactor does in time what traditional biologi¬ cal process technology does in space with sequen¬ tial tanks. There are five periods in its operation: fill, react, settle, draw, and idle. During fill, waste- water is charged to the reactor, and during react the biological processes started in fill are continued. Aerobic, anoxic, or anaerobic conditions can be created during the fill and react periods. During set¬ tle. the micro-organisms are allowed to settle to tne bottom of the tank, and during draw the superna¬ tant treated water is removed. Idle is a short time where the reactor is awaiting the next batch ot teed. The five time periods can be adjusted for optimum removal efficiencies for varying types of wastes. Two full-scale demonstration SBR plants exist, one in Indiana treating municipal waste and a 250 000 gallon per day facility at the Cecos site in Niagara Falls treating hazardous waste. The proj¬ ect at Cecos is cofunded under a demonstration contract with the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority and in part by Jet- Tech manufacturer of SBR’s aeration and decant svstem. A computer controls all phases of the treat¬ ment process. Laboratory studies show that the SBR can achieve 70 to 80 percent removal ot or¬ ganic materials and 98 percent removal of phenol. A carbon adsorption system has been added as a secondary treatment method to achieve higher re¬ moval levels. , This may be quite a cost-effective approach to the destruction of hazardous leachates, especially when coupled with some form of carbon treatment. Pro¬ duction of biomass or sludge is a potential disad¬ vantage; however, natural decomposition seems to circumvent the need for frequent sludge removal. [Mishawaka. IN; (219)236-5874] 23. University of Gottingen. West Germany. Biological De¬ gradation of Ctilorophenols.—West German research¬ ers have developed several bacterial strains that are capable of degrading chlorophenols. The process has been tested on synthetic sewage containing phenol acetone, and alkanols plus 4-chlorophenoi or a mixture of isomeric chlorophenols One par¬ ticular bacterial strain completely degraded the chlorophenols in the synthetic mix. The release ol chloride and a low conten. of dissolved organic car¬ bon in the cell-free effluents indicated total degrada¬ tion of the organic carbon. During adaptation to high loads of chlorophenols. hybrid strains were de¬ tected that were determined to be even more com¬ petitive than the original strain for the degradation of chlorophenol. The research has also shown, however, that trie presence of additional organisms capable of de- ' •• mt s-s** «*■' >** 272 • Superfund Strategy grading the phenol, acetone, and alkanols in the mix caused incomplete degradation of the chloro- phenols. Thus, the approach, while considered well defined, is valid only for one organism at a time. 24. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, In Situ Vitrification.— In situ vitrification glassifies contami¬ nated soils in place while the organic waste con¬ stituents contained within are pyrolyzed. The gases from the process combust when they rise above the soil and contact the air. The area to be treated is heated (between 1.100° and 1,600° C) electrically, melting the soil. As the soil is heated, the mohen zone grows outw r ard and downward approaching temperatures of 2,000° C. The high temperatures and long residence times re¬ sult in essentially complete combustion and de¬ struction of the organic components. An offgas hood is placed over the soil to catch small amounts of hazardous elements. The effluents are directed to an offgas treatment system in a mobile semi¬ trailer. The effectiveness of the gas capture system is not proven. Cooling takes several months and depends on the size of the mass produced. After cooling, the vitre¬ ous mass may be covered with clean fill. The mass is a containment system that could be enhanced by the addition of engineered barriers. This process was originally designed for radio¬ active wastes. Tests have been conducted on vari¬ ous metals (e.g., cobalt, cadmium, lead) as w-ell as carbon tetrachloride, tributyl phosphate, bibutyl butylphosphate, wood, plastics, and other organic compounds. Bench- and pilot-scale tests have been conducted on soils contaminated with metals and organic wastes. While organic materials will be de¬ stroyed by the process, metals are encapsulated. The cost of the process increases as the liquid con¬ tent of the waste increases. All residues are contained within the vitreous mass that remains in the ground. Air emissions are controlled by the offgas system, which includes a scrubber, a water separator and condenser, and particulate air filters. Battelle has estimated costs and the major varia¬ bles are soil moisture and cost of electric power. In five different scenarios, costs ranged from $4.60 to $6.30 per cubic foot ($161 to $224 per cubic me¬ ter) of soil vitrified. (Soil was vitrified to a depth of 5 meters in each case.) Calculations included site preparation, annual equipment charges, operation¬ al costs (labor), and consumable supplies such as electrical power and electrodes. [Richland, WA; (509)375-2927) 25. Lopat Enterprises, K-2Q Chemical Treatment.— The patented agent K-20 was developed to seal surfaces against water intrusion. It was found to be a fire retardant and to have the ability to encapsulate a number of toxic chemicals. K-20 is a mixture of potassium silicates and other materials, is said to be safe and nontoxic, can be varied to meet differ¬ ent objectives, and can be used in co. junction with cement and other inorganic agents. Unlike conven¬ tional chemical fixation and stabilization products, K-20 appears to be effective on organic as well as inorganic toxic materials. The product is applied to surfaces after being mixed with a catalyst. Little technical expertise is required to apply it once an effective formulation has been developed for a particular application. The product can penetrate porous materials of any sort to considerable depths. K-20 has been used commercially to a limited ex¬ tent on building surfaces contaminated with either PCB or chlordane. In both cases, readings on con¬ taminated surfaces and in the air after application of K-20 have been brought down to the nondetect- able level. Lopat Enterprises is pursuing studies to determine exactly how K-20 works on organic toxic chemicals. Questions have been raised about how long the chemical encapsulation will be effective. The company maintains that the base silicates it uses have been used for other purposes for many years and that its product should be effective for at least 50 years. The product has also been used effectively on buildings with asbestos contamina¬ tion. In this case, microscopic evidence shows that K-20 penetrates deeply and coats asbestos fibers so that they are not friable or suspendable in air. The company also has laboratory test results on contaminated soil. When mixed with portland ce¬ ment and soil with a lead content of 200 ppm, K- 20 reduced the measured lead level to 0.1 ppm ac¬ cording to EPA’s EP Toxicity test. The product was recently tested on dioxin-contaminated soil from Missouri. For a sample of soil containing 174 ppb of dioxin, treatment with K-20 at levels of 5,10, and 20 percent by weight resulted in a finding of less than 1 ppb, the limit of detection. Proponents say that contaminated soil could easily be treated in situ or in other ways. After treatment, the soil is an in¬ ert, friable material. Research is also planned for introducing K-20 into materials used for below ground barriers tor groundwater, such as slurry walls, to reduce attack or penetration by organic toxic chemicals. There is also potential for t’.ie product to be used with liq- I / Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies * 213 } - uids in uncontrolled surface impoundments to form solid harmless materials. Although precise cost data is not available, costs appear quite low. Cost depends on how much of the product is necessary, and that depends on a number of factors such as the nature of the contami¬ nated material, the contaminants, and the need for additional agents such as cement. For treatment ot contaminated soils, some equipment would be nec¬ essary to achieve thorough mixing of K-20 and soil. The company is a small business that has faced difficulties obtaining funds for RD&D. Thus far all its work has been self-supported. [Wanamassa, N), (201)922-6600] 26. New Materials Technology Corp., Fujibeton Encap¬ sulation.—Fujibeton is an inorganic polymer that has been shown to chemically bond with and physically encapsulate both inorganic and organic toxic com¬ pounds. It has been used in large hazardous waste treatment projects in Japan. The product was de¬ veloped by Fuiimasu Synthetic Chemical Labora¬ tories in Tokyo, and New Materials Technology Corp. is its exclusive manufacturer and distributor in the United States. Thu technology’s supporters claim over 10 years of successful application in Japan. - r in Fujibeton is an advanced iorm of cement. (Con¬ crete, which results from the reaction of w'ater, ce¬ ment, and aggregate is a relatively primitive exam¬ ple of an inorganic polymer.) It is able to improve the bonding properties and cross-linking abilities of silicate macromolecules. The result is to greatly reduce the release of hazardous chemicals from the treated materials. The combination of compounds and the nature of the bonding mechanism of the process are proprietary. New Materials Technology foresees several ap¬ plications in the hazardous waste rrea for their product. For remedial action, its prime use would be to treat and immobilize hazardous wastes in sol¬ id, sludge, and liquid forms. Liquid wastes must be first mixed with an absorbent, such as fly ash. The solidified end product can be reduced to a granular form without substantially reducing its effective¬ ness. Treatment can take place onsite with simple equipment (e.g.. a concrete mixer). An example of a successful application in Japan was the treatment and stabilization of PCB-contam- inated sludges and sediments found in the harbor ofTakasago West Port. Prior to treatment the sludge contained 450 milligrams per kilograms (mg/kg) of PCB plus 91 mg/kg of lead and 0.02 mg/kg of mer¬ cury. Leachable concentrations after treatment were 0.003 milligrams per liter (mg/1) of PCB, 0.01 mg/1 of lead and 0.0005 mg/1 of mercury. Two remedial action projects are planned tor 1985 in Japan using Fujibeton. Up to 763,000 cubic yards of contaminated material will be dredged from the bottom of Waka River which has been pol¬ luted over a long period of time with a whole range of industrial wastes. After treatment, the stabilized material will be used as a landfill for a new indus¬ trial site for Sumitomo Heavy Industries. At Lake Biwa, the largest inland lake in Japan, 25.5 million cubic yards of contaminated sediments will be treated in place to improve the water quality to an acceptable drinking level. The lake serves as the main source of water for the Osaka-Kyoto area with a population of 13 million. Several tests have been conducted on the ettect of applying Fujibeton to a variety of hazardous wastes, both organics and metals. In one Univer¬ sity of Arizona test, an electroplating sludge was treated; and the resultant material underwent the standard EPA EP Toxicity test. For all metals pres- ent, the extractable metal concentrations from the treated/stabilized material were one to two order of magnitude below the maximum allowable. For instance, lead ranging from 360 to 690 ppm was re¬ duced to 0.5 to 0.36 ppm; chromium, from 37 to 100 ppm to 0.8 to 0.35 ppm; and cadmium, from 1.7 to 2 9 ppm to an undetectable level. Similar results occurred when material from a toxic waste dump at Bridgeport, New Jersey, was tested. In addition, in the latter case the organics orginaily present were not detectable in leach tests on the treated samples. Comparative leach testing against conven¬ tional technologies (cement/soluble silicate and Portland cement) have shown Fujibeton to be su- P< There are no capital costs associated with the use of this encapsulation technology. Material costs for the treatment of contaminated soils vary depend¬ ing on the amount of Fujebiton required (5 to 15 percent) per pound of soil and the overall size of the project. The amount required varies depending cn the level and type of contamination, and the unit cost ($0.15 to $0.25 per pound) decreases as the project size increases. For instance, a project treat- ing 50,000 tons of soil and consuming 10 million of pounds of Fujebiton (at 10 percent per pound of soil) would cost from $30 to $50 per ton of soil. The treatment process would consist of three steps. ») excavation of the soils, 2) mixture with Fujibeton, and 3) cure and subsequent disposal as nonhazard- ous fill back into the original excavation. [Wichita, KS; (316)683-8986] 214 • Superfund Stretegy I SUPPORT OF CLEANUP TECHNOLOGY P.DSiD Introduction Research and development can lead to bet¬ ter ways oi tackling Superfund remedial action problems. Compared to existing cleanup op¬ tions, R&D can improve the range of applica¬ bility, the effectiveness, and the reliability of technology and also reduce costs. Hazardous waste problems at any one Superfund site can range from one to many, and a technology may be applicable to only a specific waste and form. A technology is effective when it achieves re¬ medial action objectives and is reliable if it is effective under operating conditions and has the ability to maintain its effectiveness over the long term. The design and development of innovative technologies are conducted within the private sector with little assistance from the Federal Government. The Federal Government funds Superfund-related R&D programs in EPA and in the Department of Defense (under its Instal¬ lation Restoration program). Within EPA the amount of funds for the support of Superfund technologies has been relatively small and nar¬ rowly focused. For example, while over 50 per¬ cent of EPA’s total R&D budget has been spent on contracts and grants during the last 5 years, only a fraction of the total (4 percent in fiscal year 1985) has been dedicated to the Superfund program and only a portion of that to cleanup technologies. 35 Most of the research contracts awarded by EPA under Superfund seem to complement internal activities rather than pro¬ vide for the influx of new ideas. In what may prove to be a more relevant link between research and technology, the National Science Foundation (NSF) in October 1984 pro¬ vided seed money for an Industry/University Cooperative Center in New Jersey that will con¬ centrate on hazardous and toxic waste re¬ search. "According to a summary sheet prepared by the Congressional Research Service in October 1984, a total of $307 million was appropriated for R&D at EPA for fiscal year 1985; $202 million is for grants and contracts, $9 million of which is for Superfund. EPA Technology Research and Development Because Superfund has been considered a short-term program, EPA has not followed the normal research and development process of concept development, laboratory evaluation, pilot testing, and field demonstration. Instead, the program has been one of: .. . technology assessment to determine cost and effectiveness, adaptation of technologies to the uncontrolled waste site problem, field evaluation of technologies that show promise, development of guidance material for the EPA Office of Emergency and Remedial Response (OERR), technical assistance to OERR and EPA Regional Offices. 36 Short-term thinking and an original interpre¬ tation by EPA that CERCLA excluded expend¬ itures for basic research has concentrated ac¬ tivity on applied research, such as adapting existing construction engineering technologies to improve disposal practices and evaluating containment and incineration technologies. This policy, compounded by an initial belief that existing technologies could indeed solve Superfund problems (i.e., innovation was not required ) has resulted in little if any emphasis on basic research and innovative approaches. There are some signs that this attitude is be¬ ginning to change within the EPA R&D system, but only evidence of a shift in funding levels in the next few years will confirm a real shift in commitment. In 1985, new emphasis will be placed on innovative approaches, such as in situ technologies and onsite treatment. 37 According to a recent report, EPA is now be¬ ginning to look at the prevalant wastes found "Ronald D. Hill. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "Promising Site Cleanup Technology," paper presented at Super¬ fund Update: Cleanup Lessons Learned, Schaumburg, 1L, Oct. 11-12, 1983. Similar statements were made in 1984 at EPA's Tenth Annual Research Symposium: Land Disposal of Hazard¬ ous Waste. J, Ronald Hill, director, Land Pollution Control Division. Of¬ fice of Research and Development. U.S. Environmental Protec¬ tion Agency, personal communication. Dec. 14, 1984. I Cti. 6 —Cleanup Technologies • 215 at Superfund sites and to attempt to match them with the best treatment technology. 38 R&D Funding The total EPA R&D budget during each of the Superfund program’s first 5 years is shown in table 6-8, with a comparison of the amounts dedicated to Superfund and Hazardous Waste activities. 39 Over the 5-year period, only about $50 million has been spent on Superfund R&D, a small fraction of the $1.6 billion Superfund program. The R&D amounts for the Superfund pro¬ gram are modest when compared with the total EPA R&D budget and with what many observ¬ ers think is requirec to adequately support the development and assessment of technology to handle Superfund problems. 40 The Superfund R&D budget for fiscal year 1985 represents about 4 percent of the EPA R&D budget, while “Theresa Hitchens. "Public Push for Alternatives to Land Dis¬ posal Years Ahead of Research," Inside E.P.A. Feb 15 1985 pp. 12-13. 5 “EPA breaks down its R&D budget into 11 media categories: air, water quality, drinking water, hazardous waste, pesticides, radiation interdisciplinary, toxics, energy, management, and Superfund. Each of these media are subsequently broken down into various program elements and program elements into ob¬ jectives. "According vo an internal EPA memo dated Dec. 3 1980 from Alvin R. Morris, director. Superfund Task Force, projected Sup¬ erfund program costs are dependent on the number of NPL sites. Under this scheme. Superfund R&D should total Si 15.5 million for 1,000 sites, S152.4 million for 1.400, $ 189.3 million for 1 800 and S226.1 million for 2.200 sites. As of late 1984, NPL sites to¬ taled 538. This would argue for a Superfund R&D budget of about $90 million. Table 6-8.—EPA R&D Budget (millions of dollars) Fiscal year Superfund Hazardo us Waste Overall 3 ]Hl . 21.9 30Tb . 29.2 314.6 ]2Jb. 33 4 228 5 . 33 5 250 0 J-- . 127 _ 40,7 306.0 ® up8rtuncl Hazardous Wasle plus Air, WaleroJ^hN * C ' dfcS - Rad ' a "° n ’ T0,ic Substances. Ene, 0> . nary, and Management categories “Estimated. SOURCE ^En.t-c-nema, Prolection A 0 ency. Office of the Comptroller. Do the Superfund program represents 35 percent of the total EPA Operating Budget request.* *' 1 The R&D funds are budgeted under the Of¬ fice of Research and Development (ORD) and within ORD divided as shown in table 6-9. At most, about half these funds are related to R&D in cleanup technologies. The EPA budget, as shown in table 6-8, also allocates R&D funds under hazardous waste (13 percent of R&D in fiscal year 1985) for RCRA-related activities. Some of this R&D, as well as that conducted under other programs is relevant to Superfund program needs. But only the funds committed under Superfund consider remedial action technology per se and are dedicated to solving Superfund’s special problems. R&D Activities Superfund and RCRA R&D within ORD were reorganized in late 1984 to more closely link the activities of the two programs. R&D objec¬ tives that deal with technology are primarily the concern of the ORD’s Office of Environ¬ mental Engineering Technology and its Haz¬ ardous Waste Engineering Research Labora¬ tory (HWERL). HWERL’s Land Pollution Con¬ trol Division (through its Containment Branch and Releases Control Branch) and the Alternate Technologies Division deal with Superfund- related technology investigations. The Contain¬ ment Branch is responsible for research in the area of remedial action (also for RCRA); the Re¬ leases Control Branch for emergency remov¬ als. The Alternate Technologies Division now conducts research in incineration, chemical and biological technologies, primarily those ap¬ plicable under RCRA. The Releases Control Branch work is divided into three areas. The goal of the personnel health and safety program is to develop pro¬ tective equipment and procedures for person¬ nel working in known or suspected dangerous environments. Efforts under removal technol- u T S ; n, n , Vi L 0nme " tal F>rf,,, ’ C " nn A K L 'nr:y, Summary of tl,c 1985 1984)° WaSh,n8l ° n ' DC; ° ffice of ,he Comptroller. January 1 ss-^nr^jr -«v 216 • Superhjnd Strategy | Table 6-9.—Superfund R&D Budget (millions of dollars) ORD Offic e_ FY34 FY85 Environmental Engineering Tecnnology. 3.7 6.3 Monitoring Systems and Quality Assurance. 3.7 4.9 Health and Environmental Assessment. 1.0 1.3 Environmental Processes and Effect Research. 0.5 0.2 Total 3 . 8.9 12.6 a Figures may not add to totals due to rounding Primary objectives Control technology, technical support Site assessment, quality assurance Site assessment, technical support Site assessment SOURCE: U S. Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Research & Development. December 1984 ogy center on demonstrating equipment for hazardous spill control. Under this program a mobile incinerator, carbon regenerator, and soils washer equipment are being modified, adapted, and field tested. The chemical coun¬ termeasures program is concerned with the use of chemicals and other additives that are in¬ tentionally introduced into the open environ ment for the purpose of controlling hazardous contaminants. The activity of the Containment Branch in¬ cludes: 1) the survey and assessment of current technologies, 2) field demonstration and veri¬ fication of techniques, and 3) site design anal¬ ysis. The first activity is a followup to remedi¬ al actions that have occurred, reviewing and evaluating techniques that have been applied at Superfund sites. Techniques identified as having “potential for being cost effective” or those being installed as part of a remedial ac¬ tion are given field testing and evaluation. For example the block displacement method of iso¬ lating hazardous wastes has been field tested and a particular slurry trench installed at a New Hampshire site has been given field eval¬ uation. The third category, which involves the publication of technical handbooks to guide those handling site design analysis, is an out¬ growth of the data collected and analyzed in the first two areas of activity. Specific projects under both branches can be broadly classified as either pertaining to treat¬ ment or containment technologies and include: • Treatment. Development of: 1) a mobile soils washing system that can be used to treat excavated soils onsite, 2) mobile and modular incineration systems for field use to destroy hazardous organic substances collected from cleanup operations at spills or at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites, and 3) a trailer-mounted system for the on¬ site regeneration of spent granular, activ¬ ated carbon from carbon adsorption sys¬ tems. In addition, bench-scale testing of a number of leachate treatment processes will be conducted and the Chemical Coun¬ termeasures Program mentioned above is underway. • Containment. Evaluation of installed slur¬ ry systems and low-permeability covers, pilot-scale tests of injection grouting, assessment of the feasibility of retrofitting membrane liner systems to existing sur¬ face impoundments, development of the criteria for evaluating the use of permeable materials as hazardous waste control mechanisms. Development and evaluation of a prototype full-scale process and equip¬ ment for encapsulating corroding 55-gal¬ lon drums of hazardous waste. The inves¬ tigation of asphalt encapsulation tech¬ niques to improve the leachate quality and act to reduce the hazardous nature of some sludges. The Alternative Technologies Division now incororates activities evaluating fixed incinera¬ tion systems that were ongoing under the pre¬ vious Industrial Environmental Research Lab¬ oratory. The division is funded ($8.8 million in contract funds in fiscal year 1985) 42 from the RCRA R&D budget and consists of two branches: the Thermal Destruction Branch, which will continue with the above incineration program, and a Chemical and Biological Technology Branch. The division’s primary emphasis is ap- "Clyde Dial, director. Alternative Technologies Division of the Office of Research and Development. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, personal communication, Dec. 13, 1984. 'Si -? t-xur .» Cb. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 217 plied research on industrial hazardous waste streams although some fundamental research is conducted in such areas as combustion (e.g., minimization of PIC formation) and genetic engineering. Although this division is RCRA- oriented, many of its activities could have ap¬ plicability to Superfund. The group has coop¬ erated with various States that wish to evaluate innovative technologies. In a project completed with the State of California, EPA paid for the sampling and analysis of molten salt, fluid wall, and wet oxidation processes. Emphasis on this typo of program could help generate standard¬ ized data collection to be used for the devel¬ opment of protocols for testing of new tech¬ nologies. Grants and Contracts One of the major ways that technology trans¬ fer occurs between the private sector and EPA is through the grants and contracts awarded by EPA. That portion of the R&D budget totals $201.8 million for fiscal year 1985 (66 percent of the overall R&D budget). The funds are spent under a grants program, a centers program, and by contracts let through the laboratories of ORD. Due to the Small Business Innovative Development Act of 1982 43 at least 1 percent of these funds must be spent to support small business R&D. The agency’s Small Business Innovative Re¬ search (SBIR) program was set up within ORD in November 1982. Once a year, it solicits bids on a dozen or so topics considered to be of in¬ terest to EPA. Twelve topics were listed in the 1984 offering, a number o f which are directly related to Superfund cleanup technology R&D. Included were improved stability of ^oi tain- ment mechanisms; organic waste/cor.tainment liner compatibility; biotecnnology applications for hazardous waste control; ad/anced ther¬ mal, chemical, and physical methods for haz¬ ardous waste destruction; methods for soil and aquifer decontamination; and innovative vol¬ atile organic compound control methods. To participate, a firm must first apply for a Phase I contract to show the scientific and technical •’Public Law 97-219. July 1982. merit and feasibility of its idea. Following suc¬ cessful completion of Phase I, a firm can apply for a Phase II contract to further develop the proposed idea. In the first year of the program (fiscal year 1983), 10 Phase I projects were funded for a total of $248 000. Ten Phase I and five Phase II projects (at about $100,000 each) were funded in fiscal year 1984 at a total cost of $856,000. In fiscal year 1985, the SBIR pro¬ gram expects to spend $1.9 million. Six to eight Phase II projects will be funde ’ at about S150.000 each, along with Phase I projects at about $48,000 each. The SBIR program is considered by the pri¬ vate sector to he the prime source of financial assistance for R&D in Superfund-related inno¬ vative technologies but it has its drawbacks. First, due to SBIR’s once-a-vear funding cycle, a firm must wait a full year to obtain follow- on (Phase II) funding. An option that would be more conducive to the private sector business climate would be to allow Phase II funding to proceed directly following the completion and evaluation of a Phase I project. Second, the size of the awards may not be consistent with pri¬ vate sector costs of R&D. Most of EPA’s basic research is funded under its grants program in ORD which has a 1985 budget of $12.2 million. The monies can be used by nonprofit entities only. General guidelines are provided in an annual proposals list covering five program areas: environmental health, environmental biology, environmental engineering, and physical/chemical measure¬ ment of air and water. Due to the initial deci¬ sion by EPA that Superfund monies cannot be expended for basic research, grants are not awarded for research specifically related to Superfund. Undoubtedly some of the research will eventually benefit Superfund but it is dif¬ ficult to measure how much. (Possibly about 10 percent of the work funded under the envi¬ ronmental engineering category will eventually benefit Superfund.) 44 ••Clarisc Gaylord, director. Grants Office of the Office of Kx- ploratorv Research of the Office of Research and Development. U.S. Environmental Protection Apency. personal communica¬ tion, December 1984. 38-745 0 - 85 -8 \ \ X uwhmmhmi 1 4HHM1 * rw**«r*&*z •*" "=“ 218 • Superlund Strategy The centers program was set up within ORD in 1979 in response to criticisms regarding EPA’s concentration on short-term research. EPA developed eight themes needing support in fundamental research, and eight centers based on these themes have now been funded through cooperative agreements at various universities. Each center receives about $500,000 per year from EPA (out of ORD’c R&D budget) and is expected to supplement its income from other public and private sector sources. The results of the research conducted by the centers are disseminated through peer review journals and publications. Three of the centers conduct research that may have a bearing on Superfund needs: the Hazardous Waste Center at Louisiana State University, the Center for Advanced Environ¬ mental Control Technology at the University of Illinois at Urbana, and the Industrial Haz¬ ardous Waste Elimination Center at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago. Of the three, the Hazardous Waste Center is most ger- maine to Superlund technology needs. Its re¬ search focuses on ultimate disposal and land¬ fill techniques and destruction technology. At Tufts University in Massachusetts, EPA ha:, funded at the specific request of Congress the Center for Environmental Management. So far, $3 million have been appropriated for the Center; $2 million in the fiscal year 1983 sup¬ plemental appropriations bill for EPA and Si million in the fiscal year 1984 supplemental ap¬ propriations. This program is outside of the Centers Program, and its grant money does not come from ORD’s R&D budget. This “national research, education, and policy center” is ap¬ plying a multidisciplinary research approach to link environmental research, technology, and pub'ic policy issues. 45 The chairman of EPA’s internal Hazardous Waste Committee oversees the Center’s research program, and efforts are made both by EPA and the Center to coordinate its research with that ongoing within EPA and with the activities of the cen¬ ters program. 4 * “Anthony Oort<-v>. director. Cpnter for Environmental Man¬ agement. personal communication. December HIM. “Mathew Hills. EPA's program manager for the Center for Environmental Management, personal communication, Decem¬ ber 1»«4. Of the first $2 million appropriated, six re¬ search projects were funded by the Center for $330,000. (The balance of the funds were spent on planning and setting up the Center.) One of these projects, investigating a new method for groundwater monitoring using laser fluo- resence fiber optics, is relevant to the Super- fund program. A proposal will be made by the Center in 1985 to use the remaining $1 million appropriation to set up a comprehensive re¬ search project dealing with an actual Super¬ fund site. An investigation of innovative clean¬ up techniques and followup assessment of their effectiveness is expected to be part of this proj¬ ect. 47 This prospect has the potential to make a substantial contribution to the Superfund program. Support lor the Private Sector Outside contracting by the EPA laboratories and program offices could be a source of sup¬ port for private sector R&D efforts. The estab¬ lished contract procedures, however, apparent¬ ly inhibit participation because they do not offer a mechanism lor handling unsolicited proposals from the private sector. Thus, if a firm is seeking financial assistance for R&D on its particular technology, it must be able to mesh its requirements with those established by an EPA Request For Proposal. From EPA’s point of view, funding an un¬ solicited proposal constitutes single source pro¬ curement and EPA is loath to being viewed as supporting any particular firm or technology over another. This appears to be a critical bar¬ rier to the adoption of innovative technologies. EPA is the buyer of technologies under Super- fund; yet if a technology ha<-' not been evaluated by them and testing methods declared accept¬ able, it will be eliminated from consideration during the FS process of evaluating a Super¬ fund site. (The situation may not be much dif¬ ferent for cleanups financed in other ways.) Re¬ moving this barrier will require an active dem¬ onstration projects policy on the part of EPA. Lately, EPA has made attempts to correct this situation and to devise ways to handle the large volume of unsolicited proposals that it receives. •’Cortese. fiersonal communication, op. cil. . . - | - ---- - I .. ' -- .I.—™ ..itu * u - - —. _ _ _ __ Ch. 6—Cleanup Technologies • 219 However, the amounts dedicated have been rel¬ atively minor and the decision process is slow. 48 According to one EPA official, 49 demonstra¬ tion projects to test commercially developed, new technologies under actual Superfund site conditions are hampered for three basic rea¬ sons: 1) EPA’s existing R&D funding levels are not sufficient to cover the costs: 2) demonstra¬ tion projects have required RCRA permits that are not obtainable without testing data the dem¬ onstration is intended to provide; 50 and 3) dem¬ onstrations conducted on Superfund sites can run against public sentiment, which wants cleanup activity to proceed quickly. 51 The Land Pollution Control Division initiated a demonstration program in 1984 ($150,000 was offered for two solicitations), and starting in 1985 it will begin an annual program. In 1985, with a maximum budget of $750,000, three to ten projects will be selected and testing will be conducted to develop protocols. A set of demonstration projects are planned for 1985 and the next 5 years by the Releases Control Branch. They are seeking technologies for use in removal actions where short-term response and mobility are key criteria. The initial year’s effort has a maximum budget of $250,000; the following years will be funded at about $400,000 per year. Not all of the monies will necessarily be spent, however. Actual spending levels will “The Alternate Technology Division, for instance, solicited bids for “ideas" in 1983. Out of 27 proposals received, 2 proj¬ ects were selected and funded in the fall of 1984. The total budget for the program is $300,000 for processes considered to be at the demonstration stage. One demonstration project can easily cost a firm $500,000 or more. “Hill, personal communication, op. cit. “Provisions in the RCRA legislation passed by the 98th Con¬ gress may reduce this barrier. Under Subtitle B, EPA is author¬ ized to issue special RD&D permits for any hazardous waste treatment facility which proposes to use an innovative and ex¬ perimental hazardous waste treatment technology or process for which permit standards have not been promulgated. One tech¬ nology firm commented to OTA that, while they were extremely pleased to see this provision, they were worried that the vagueness of the wording would cause EPA to be extremely cautious in using it. •'To avoid this potential problem, two Land Pollution Control Division demonstration projects will proceed in 1985 in coop¬ eration with the U.S. Air Force on Federal lands In Texas a microbial process will be tested on contaminated soils, and in Wisconsin. EPA's mobile soils washer. \ be determined by the quality and appropriate¬ ness of the solicitations. 52 The programs will be run on a cost sharing basis with the selected technology firms. Each firm is expected to provide the complete hard- wa:e (late pilot or full scale), pay for the oper¬ ation of tests, and obtain the necessary permits. EPA will help design the testing programs, pro¬ vide quality assurance anu quality control, and offer an independent evaluation of the results. Because of the potential high cost of this pro¬ gram to firms, only those firms with substan¬ tial financial resources will be able to partici¬ pate. Accordingly, these demonstration pro¬ grams are designed net to provide financial assistance, but to give firms access to appro¬ priate testing materials and to result in recog¬ nized testing results that will enable them to market their technology. In comparison to the above-mentioned fund¬ ing levels for demonstration projects and in¬ dicative of the real costs involved, EPA is plan¬ ning to spend approximately $3 million ($2 million from the Superfund budget and $1 mil¬ lion from R&D) in 1985 to run test burns at the Times Beach area in Missouri on its own mo¬ bile incinerator. 53 Technology firms have told OTA that demonstration costs can range from several hundred thousand to a million dollars for one test burn. Department of Defense The Department of Defense has been given the authority to conduct all hazardous waste cleanups on military bases, and the Installation Restoration (IR) program has been set up to parallel EPA’s Suoerfund program. Although the program has been in existence for about 7 years, only in the last 2 years has it received emphasis within DOD. Under this program, the U.S. Air Force is tak¬ ing the lead in R&D activity with a $12.1 mil¬ lion budget in fiscal year 1985 (an increase of $10.8 million over 1984). Included are projects •-'Mary Stinson, EPA project officer, personal communication. Dec 13, 1984. ““EPA to Conduct Dioxin Test Burns in Missouri,” Hazard¬ ous Wastes Keport. jan. 7. 1985. | % i .4 I \ TZF^SZ' iM»«faVWm»««a»MreJH» vtmmmm 220 • Superfund Strategy to develop technologies to clean contaminated groundwater. The U.S. Army will spend $2.7 million in fiscal year 1985 to develop treatment technologies for contaminated soil/sediment, water, and buildings; containment systems; and methods to recover energy and materials from hazardous waste. This program is pro¬ jected into the 21st century. National Science Foundation NSF awarded a 5-year grant of $350,000 in October 1984 to set up the Industry/University Cooperative Research Center for Hazardous and Toxic Waste at the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark. In addition to NSF, the Center is sponsored by private industry (a dozen or so companies have paid an annual fee of $30,000 each) and academic institutions. It has also received a grant of $1.2 million from the State of New Jersey. The goal of the Center is to help bridge the gap between governmental requirements and the needs of industry. Its research goal is to ad¬ vance the state of engineering management of hazardous and toxic waste. According to its di¬ rector, the Center has an annual budget of $2 million and has already solicited bids under specific research topics. 54 Included are a num¬ ber of research projects relevant to Superfund technologies, such as the incineration, biologi¬ cal/chemical, and physical treatment of hazard¬ ous wastes. Many of the projects are planned to proceed to the pilot stage. State Efforts Efforts by individual States to assist in RD&D for Superfund technology are hampered by a lack of funding and a need to be able to prove that any monies spent are directly applicable to specific State problems. Their first priority is cleanup itself, and often funding for this pur¬ pose alone is difficult to appropriate. However, some States do offer support to RD&D and a few examples are presented below. As the result of a comprehensive study of hazardous waste management in Illinois, in 1984 the State created a Hazardous Waste Cen- M )ohn W. Liskowitz, personal communication, Dec. 12. 1984. ter within the Illinois Department of Energy and Resources. It will be supported by the Stale hazardous waste tax and general revenue funds. The Center, which is to take a broad view of the hazardous waste problem from generation to cleanup needs, will focus on technology- based applied research and technology trans¬ fer. 55 The State of Pennsylvania has a similar program. Missouri has turned part of its Times Beach dioxin-contaminated area into a research fa¬ cility. The objectives are: 1) to identify those technologies that have potential to detoxify dioxin-contaminated material; and 2) to com¬ pare different, successful technologies for their ability to solve the State’s extensive problem with dioxin-contaminated soils. Plots of con¬ taminated soils are made available to firms to test their techniques, and some of the infra¬ structure (e.g., water and power connections) is provided. The cost for leasing a plot is a one¬ time fee of $16,500 and is meant to cover the cost of the State’s sampling and analysis program. New York has underway a project to assist in the development and demonstration of a plasma arc technology for use at Love Canal to treat organic sludges. The project is now budgeted at $1.5 million and while EPA is con¬ tributing to the cost, the State’s share is over 50 percent. Private Sector As the previous “Innovative Technology” section shows, a wealth of new technology ideas is being generated by the private sector. Two fundamental problems are faced by this group, however, in moving these technologies along the long path toward commercialization: 1) an initial difficulty in obtaining seed money to continue the R&D process beyond the first few tentative steps; and 2) overcoming the bar¬ riers to the adoption of these technologies, pri¬ marily through the ability to demonstrate their worth. I hese, and other barriers have been dis¬ cussed above and in a previous section of this chapter. “James Patterson. Chairman. Prit-ker Department of environ¬ mental engineering, Illinois Institute of Technology, personal communication, Dec. 18, 1984. ] / I i row*" 1 w ■ <*• «, y«y?ai»wn^ ».»l-g W j ^g gac --* , ... 225 Multiple Studies. Multiple Contractors.'" ‘. 226 Containment Rather Than Treatment. 227 Political Pressures . 227 Studies Versus Timely Actions . 228 Adequacy of Site Assessments.77. 7.. 2 29 Constraints on Superfund Contractors • • _-- • .. . 231 Effects of Early Responses on Long-Term Remedies... 232 Design and Construction of Remedial Measures. . 233 Implications for Future Superfund Strategy. .. ^ An Expanding Program’s Need for Technical Oversight..7.7.7.*....... • 234 Effectiveness of Contractor Oversight.. 7.7.. 235 A Larger Program . ". . .. 240 EPA Staffing Needs... 242 State Staffing Needs.‘ Availability of Qualified Technical Personnel for Superfund Cleanups ^ Technical Specialists for Cleanup of Uncontrolled Sites . . 2 49 Estimating the Pool of Available Professionals.777.77.777.. 249 Estimates of Future Demand . . 251 Analysis of Demand Projections .77..... .. 252 Encouragi'n^Tcciiriical Training tor Hazardous Waste Cleanups . 252 •'!»», a * »i i List of Tables Table No. p dge 7-1. Four Examples of Inconsistencies in Reported Site Characteristics. 236 7-2. Status of Cleanup Progress, July 1984 . 237 7-3. Summary of Remedial Cleanup Approved, 1981 to mid-1984 . 238 7-4. Superfund Obligations and Expenditures, 19 States, July 1984 . 239 7-5. Current and Optimal Technical Staffing Levels . 243 7-6. Technical Specialties for Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel Skills Survey- Importance of Technical Skills for All Site Activities. 245 7-7. Technical Personnel Needs for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites: Personnel Skills Survey— Importance of Technical Skills by Cleanup Category. 247 7-8. The Top Skills by Cleanup Category . 247 7-9. Current and Projected Funding Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity. 250 7-10. Current and Projected Funding Levels for the Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites. 25C 7-11. Current and Projected Manpower Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity. 250 7-12. Current and Projected Manpower Demand for 18 Critical Skills. 251 7-13. Preferences for Training. 253 List of Figures Figure No. ,, age 7-1. Desired Levels of Experience or Education for Technical Specialists. 246 7-2. Classification of Importance of the Various Technical Specialties for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Actions. 248 % i I Achieving Qu; Chapter 7 ilitv Claai This chapter considers the challenge of as¬ suring timely, environmentally sound, and cost-effective remedial work at Superfund sites. The chapter first identifies several major prob¬ lems affecting the quality of work at Superlund sites. Second, it examines technical oversight of cleanups. Good technical oversight is a key to a successful Superfund program. Finally, be¬ cause competent, trained technical specialists from many fields are critical to a successful na¬ tional cleanup program, OTA looks at current and projected needs for technical specialists. Bottlenecks that might slow the program or re¬ duce its effectiveness are discussed. PERFORMANCE AT SITE CLEANUPS Based on a broad examination of the Super¬ fund program and on several engineering case studies at NPL sites, OTA has evaluated the performance at site cleanups. I he analysis found problems with designing and building long-term, effective measures to control re¬ leases of hazardous substances. The three sites studied were: Stringfellow Acid Pits, Glen Avon, California; Seymour Recycling Corp., Seymour, Indiana; and the Sylvester Site, Nash¬ ua, New Hampshire. (See chapter 1 for sum¬ maries of the case studies.) OTA looked at the history of remedial re¬ sponse, the extent and quality of the site assess¬ ments, and at the evaluation, selection, and construction of remedial measures. 1 These 'Certain terms describing site cleanup have very specific mean¬ ings in the Superfund Program and the stages of remedial activ¬ ity. Immediate measures (also referred to as removals, planned removals, or interim or initial lemedial measures) stabilize site conditions and mitigate imminent danger to provide temporary or short-term protection. Remedial Investigations or KIs provide an assessment of site conditions and include onsite sampling and data collection Feasibility Studies or FSs evaluate possible response actions for long-term site protection. Separate feasi¬ bility studies can be done lor different phases of site cleanup. Remedial Design studies provide a detailed site remedial action plan and engineering specifications for construction of the selected remedy Remedial Construction, sometimes also referred to as remedial action, includes all constru. tion activities and an initial period of operations and maintenance. Remedial con¬ struction can include relocation of residents or provision of a studies show significant problems in the im¬ plementation of the Superfund program and a pattern of incomplete and inadequate site as¬ sessments. Problems were identified in such key areas as: • estimates of the amounts of wastes and contaminated materials on site; • estimates ot the costs of remedial alter¬ natives; • hydrogeological assessments; • design, installation and operation of groundwater monitoring systems; and • design and construction of onsite contain¬ ment systems. Insufficient coordination among some States, EPA regional offices, and EPA headquarters may have contributed to problems with con¬ tractor performance. Some problems may result from the newness of the Superfund program. But there are indica¬ tions that if the Superlund program expands, they may grow acute as less qualified and less experienced technical people are employed by permanent alternate water supply. A site may have more than one remedial construction phase. Operations and Maintenance or "OKM" are any onsite activities occurring after construction of the permanent remedy, such as operation of the onsite treat¬ ment plant, maintenance of the site cover, and monitoring. t . < 223 224 • Supeiiund Strategy the government and the private sector. Their frequency suggests that they may be endemic to the Superfund program as currently struc¬ tured and managed. These problems are dis¬ cussed below, not necessarily in order of im¬ portance. Cleanup progress at several Super- fund sites is examined to identify areas where the program might be improved. Nature of Surroundings and Contaminant Transportation The interaction of wastes with soil, clay, gravel, sand, and bedrock greatly influences the effectiveness of a cleanup. If these interac¬ tions are misunderstood or ignored, the con¬ trol measures selected may be ineffective. Chemicals, particularly complex chemical wastes, can change the properties of soils and clay. For example, clay, which is considered relatively impermeable at 10 7 cm/sec, can in¬ crease in permeability by several orders of magnitude in the presence of some contami¬ nants. 2 Some chemicals can migrate faster than 'Waste liquids and water carrying contaminants leadied from hazardous wastes can percolate through the soil and subsurface and reach groundwater. Typically, contaminants pass through the unsaturated subsurface, the “zone of aeration" or vadose zone, and then to the saturated zone where voids between rock or soil particles are filled with groundwater; this zone that can store and transmit significant quantities of groundwater is called an aquifer. Once contaminated, and depending on site condi¬ tions, restoration of groundwater to its previous condition can be difficult, it not impossible. Many factors influence ground- water flow and the behavior of contaminants in groundwater. Porositv and permeability control the ability of a material to store and transmit liquids. Porosity, expressed as a percent of the bulk volume of the material, is a measure of void space and how much fluid can be stored in it. See general'y David W. Miller, ed., IVasfe Disposal Effects on Groundwater: .4 Comprehensive Survey of the Occurrence and Control of Grx nndwater Contamination Re¬ sulting From IVasfe Disposal Practices (Berkeley. CA. Premier Press. 1980), pp. 45-59 This publication is a reproduction of a 1977 publication. 7 he Report to Congress. Waste Dis/xisal Prac¬ tices and Their Effects on Groundwater, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Office of Water Supply and Office of Solid Waste Management. See also U.S. Congress. Office of Technol- ogy Assessment, Protecting the Station's Groundwater From Contamination. OTA-O-233 (Washington. DC; U.S. Government Printing Office. October 1984) for a more detailed discussion of the nature of groundwater contamination and methods for detecting and correcting contamination in the groundwater. In particular, see Volume I. p. 116, for a description of problems and information used in assessing contamination and hvdroge- ologic conditions. See Volume II, p. 396. app. D for key definitions. water alone through porous materials such as soil and clay. When chemical wastes are placed into the ground they can migrate and eventually find their way into groundwater. No natural con¬ tainment is impermeable to chemical transport. Bedrock, often wrongly assumed to be imper¬ meable, may, for example, itself be an aquifer or contain fractures that can act as conduits for chemical transport. Chemicals can also at¬ tack and change the porosity and other prop¬ erties of engineered containment structures such as slurry walls. Eventually, these struc¬ tures become permeable to the chemical wastes they were designed to contain. Once chemicals reach the groundwater, a contaminant plume forms. Even if the waste source is removed, a threat remains in the mov¬ ing plume of contamination which may be 50 or 100 feet below the surface. The transport of chemicals in an aquifer by the contaminant plume is often incorrectly assumed to be simi¬ lar to the flow of groundwater. The movement of the contaminant plume may in fact be very different from the general groundwater flow. Contaminants in a plume may change the prop¬ erties of the medium, often adsorb and desorb from the surrounding medium and can interact chemically with each other. Thus, the rates of contaminant transport are complex and differ from that of water in the same medium. For these reasons, the common practice of using groundwater flow maps to describe plume mi¬ gration can produce misleading results. Some contaminant flow models exist, but they are not necessarily reliable in predicting the migration of contaminant groundwater plumes under complex hydrogeological condi¬ tions. The current practice of relying on homo¬ geneous models, such as Darcy’s Law, for pre¬ dictions in nonhomogeneous, stratified sub¬ surface conditions yields, at best, crude esti¬ mates of contaminant movement. Subsurface geology is often nonhomogeneous and contam¬ inant plume behavior may be complex. For ex¬ ample, aespite a predominant flow direction for groundwater, a contaminant plume may have multiple paths and directions. f yr nr- «W.« Qh /—Achieving Quality Cleanups 225 Multiple Studies, Multiple Contractors OTA’s case studies and other analyses oi re¬ medial activities at Superfund sites show that frequently a single site will undergo multip studies and have multiple contractors. Multi¬ ple studies at the same site create the pote - tial for delay or inaction without guaranteeing thorough site assessment or effective c ' ea ™P plans Often, these studies produce conflicting or inconsistent results and are of uneven qual¬ ity. Studies of site conditions may be repeated needlessly; for example, earlier adequal studies prepared for State or local agencies are S sometimes P ignored during the Superfund to- medial Investigation and Feasibility "ctiol (RI'FS) In ether cases, the scope and di - 'ofS studies and remedial actions have.been set by inaccurate or misleading initial studies. Sometimes poor coordination in the same s ,uS; can be P a problem. OTA’S case studies found examples of different sections of the same report using different dele “d assnmp^ tions Contractors who may not ha e quality work in an early phase may be rehire T« later stage of the study or during the tm- plementation phase. Some multiple studies at Superfund sites are inevitable because of the highly specialized skills required for cleanups and the sometimes rapidly changing or uncertain site conditions. Because multiple site studies continue to be done, it is especially impQrtmt that w^r- visors: 1) are technically competent and expert enced. and 2) maintain adequate oversight site contractors. How do problems with multiple or repetitive studies arise? After a site begins to have prob¬ lems or is known to have contaminated ground- water, local officials, perhaps under pressure from local citizens, may commission a stuoy to examine the problem and reC °™^ C " ters dial action. Because ground or surface wat are at risk, the local water district or the healt deoartmen* may become involved and commis- s.?n sSs. in addition to £ the State hazardous w'aste agency, ricts may have local civil-sanitary engineer¬ ing consultants who have worked many years for the district. Consequently, in many cases ^rSnT-,^fS:^ This lack of experience can result in a llawea study despite hard work and good intentions. Comment problems include: the effect of chem- “«^no=^usar, stratified are modeled as constant propc y dTctabfe Inilux. which is unlikely: of treating the wastes is usually not considered Other site-specific examples can be found ,n the case studies. Early studies may underestimate the magni¬ tude oh he problems, yet they often set the tone an d direction for future study and action. Up portunTties for effective, timely responses to detect or control the spread of contamination may be lost. For example, programs to moni¬ tor surface waters, basins, and aquifers wiU not le implemented if the problem is drought lo be localized. When a site becomes a Superfund site ERA and its consultants become involved. The Na Tonal Contingency Plan (NCP) -quir- that an pi/FS be completed before remedial action oe Sns and Zs. anolher study starts In many case' the Rl/FS follows reviews, updates, an ermcal evaluations by the ERA’S zone consub tant. so that the Rl/FS may represent the third or fourth study of the same siteU>y EPA cm tractors The Rl/FS contractor may be more ex perienced in hazardous waste management than the earlier contractors, but if 1 J iex P® rl . enced staff are assigned to tne work, the fin outcome may not be improved Two general problems have been encoun- Jed wTmuhiple studies: 1) Mistakes or omissions in early site stud.es are no. detected mm r^¥i%Tirrr? t T i:K i iTiffry »»• • ~ / - 226 • Superfund Strategy through timely and critical review and propa¬ gate through the RI/FS process, contributing to the adoption of ineffective remedies; and 2) good quality early work is ignored in a lock- step “start from scratch” RI/FS approach as studies are needlessly repeated, delaying reme¬ dial action. At first glance, the two results may appear contradictory, but they really are dif¬ ferent possible consequences of the inherent risks in multiple studies. Minimizing these risks is an important goal for effective oversight of Superfund contractors. Information and study results obtained by a consultant at a particular site generally are not shared with contractors working at other sites. Consequently, the study phase of the Super- fund program suffers from the “reinventing the wheel” syndrome. This is especially true for Feasibility Studies where the same alternative technologies are described and discussed ge- nerically for different sites. Even though infor¬ mation is obtained with public funds, consult¬ ants tend to take a proprietary view of their work. As an example, the approach to treating contaminated groundwater varies with con¬ sultants and may not incorporate field experi¬ ence gained at other Superfund sites. Containment Rather Than Treatment EPA shows a consistent bias toward contain¬ ing wastes on the site rather than rendering them harmless through treatments such as de¬ toxification, conversion, or destruction. Con¬ tainment is popular because it is often seen as a cost-effective remedy. For a variety of rea¬ sons, confining mixtures of complex chemicals in the ground can, at best, only be temporary. Some of these reasons have already been men¬ tioned. Engineered containments such as grout curtains and slurry cutoff walls can be affected by the chemicals they are designed to contain. A containment material that is highly imper¬ meable to water can become several orders of magnitude more permeable when altered by leachate from chemical wastes. Furthermore, such structures can be difficult to key or seal to bedrock, which may itself be fractured and/or only slightly less permeable than the containment material. Containment structures can only temporarily reduce the inflow of wa¬ ter into the wastes or retard the migration of contaminants from the site. Because containments provide only tempor¬ ary and partial control of the spread of con¬ tamination, they are sometimes used in com¬ bination with groundwater pumping and treatment. At the Sylvester site, a slurry wall and cap with pumping, treatment, and recir¬ culation of contaminated groundwater through the site have been designed to reduce releases of hazardous substances to acceptable levels within a few years. The slurry wall and cap have not reduced water flow from the site as much as projected. An interim pumping pro¬ gram has been started to contain the plume. The water treatment system is not yet complete. The experience at Sylvester thus far has been limited, and it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the remedial containment/ treatment strategy there. Waste sites often con¬ tain tons of hazardous substances. Removing these contaminants through a water treatment system could take decades. There is also no guarantee that pumping and treating a particu¬ lar plume are effective in stopping or control¬ ling all of the material leaving the site. These types of remedial actions may not he found in the longer term to be permanent cleanups, ex¬ cept under certain conditions, such as where wastes have been limited to relatively small amounts dissolved in groundwater. EPA’s preference for containment strategies rather than treatment has limited the consid¬ eration of other, more reliable alternatives. At many sites, waste treatment is only considered, if at all, as part of an excavation and removal for redisposal alternative. Although removing the wastes eliminates the source of the prob¬ lem at one place, it almost always means that the problem has been shifted to another loca¬ tion. Onsite treatment plants for contaminated soil and wastes are rarely considered in detail in an RI/FS even though the proposals and con¬ tracted scope of work for these studies call for evaluation of all options. In some cases, tech- - * Ch. 7 —Achieving Quality Cleanups • 227 nologies exist to detoxify and treat the wastes and materials that are contaminating the ground- water, but they are given little attention in the RI/FS. In other cases, innovative solutions would be required. There is an important lesson to be learned from the experiences of the Superfund pro¬ gram. In designing and evaluating alternative strategies for cleanup, the cost of failure or im¬ permanence is rarely included (see chapter 3). The selected remedy is often presumed to be totally effective. If, however, the cost of turther actions to repair failure is calculated, then an option which is initially more expensive, but more reliable, may prove to be the most cost- effective solution in the long term. Political Pressures Political influences rather than technical con¬ siderations can control the speed and nature of studies and cleanups at Sup<~rfund sites. In many cases, publicity and persistent citizen complaints eventually can force public officials and agencies to take action. Sites located in areas where the residents are politically sophis¬ ticated and organized are sometimes given pri¬ ority over other sites that ma> pose greater or more immediate threats to health or the envi¬ ronment. Political considerations have at times influenced the timing of resource allocations for cleanups. 3 In addition to being sensitive to public pres¬ sure, officials are sensitive to the types of re¬ medial actions that EPA prefers and is likely to fund. This has a direct bearing on the scope and results of contractor studies. The case stud¬ ies document several examples of the correla¬ tion between the views of the funding agencies and the recommendations of the consultant. Approaches that differ from familiar contain¬ ment and pumping alternative are given little attention in the RI/FS. Citizens, individually or in groups, often rely on common sense rather than on technical ex- »See also Hearings on EPA: Investigation of Superfund and Agency Abuses Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and In¬ vestigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 98th Cong.. 1st sess., 1983 (3 vol.). pertise, yet they can sometimes provide an ef¬ fective check and balance for the action being considered or implemented at a site* At sev¬ eral sites, citizen suggestions modified the preferred remedial approach (see chapter 8). However, opportunities for effective public in¬ volvement in and scrutiny of site assessments and evaluation of remedial alternatives are limited. Studies Versus Timely Actions Successful remedial action must be based on an accurate assessment of site conditions, risks to health and the environment, and the tech¬ nical feasibility and cost effectiveness of alter¬ native remedies. OTA’s revievy d’sclosed a number of problems with the adeq acy, com * pleteness, cost effectiveness, and timeliness ot site assessments. Many of the sites on the NPL have been known for some time and have or are undergo¬ ing a series of Federal and State responses. At all three OTA case study sites, remedial inves¬ tigations and emergency actions were initiated before passage of Superfund legislation. OTA has found that studies of site conditions otten were repeated by different State and Federal agencies. In one instance, and perhaps in others, studies were repeated to meet require¬ ments of various emergency and remedial re¬ sponse programs. EPA has defended its current ad hoc ap¬ proach by emphasizing that e\er\ site is unique. Many sites, however, share common characteristics and, with the experience the Superfund program has gained, it should be¬ come possible at many sites to limit extensive site assessments for initial responses and tor high-priority remedial measures. Time and money could be saved. For example, ..- to 3 year site assessments may cost many hundreds of thousands of dollars, but result in the selec¬ tion of a partial remedy costing only Si mil¬ lion to $3 million or less. Experience to date suggests that there has been overdesign and overemphasis on extensive, high-cost, time- consuming site investigations and feasibility studies for impermanent partial remedies such I ' iL-IJWh IHI—MTITI 225 • Superlund Strategy as temporary containments, removals, and al¬ ternate water supplies. At Stringfellow. remedial action was delayed while several successive groundwater contam¬ ination studies and site assessments were per¬ formed by locai, State, and Federal contractors. Contamination grew and site conditions changed. Over $15 million has been spent at the site so far. A permanent remedy is still under study and its cost could be very high, with the State now estimating $65 million. At Seymour, about $4 million has been spent so far in studies and emergency response to achieve a $7 million incomplete, limited sur¬ face cleanup by private parties. When further site assessment is completed, some of the ‘tox¬ ic hot spots" that were buried in the partial cleanup area may have to be reexcavated to re¬ move a continuing source of groundwater con¬ tamination. Adequacy of Site Assessments OTA found a number of technical problems with contractor studies for the three Superfund sites. Poor quality work or: groundwater con¬ ditions and site hydrology has been the most serious recurrent problem. This underscores the critical need for competent, trained tech¬ nical specialists in hydrology and related Felds to work on Superfund sites that have extensive or complex aquifer contamination. The initial site investigation of the Seymour Recycling facility had several shortcomings. The extent of offsite contamination from in¬ cinerator operations was not investigated. Pos¬ sible pathways of escape for contaminants off¬ site through surface runoff, groundwater, and city sewer lines were not adequately investi¬ gated. so that the suggested onsite containment and control options may not effectively prevent the spread of contaminants. There were alle¬ gations that preliminary groundwater monitor¬ ing wells were not installed properly. Some samples taken from these wells were reportedly not usable by EPA’s contractors. One genera¬ tor-funded contractor study attributed ground- water contamination to improper well installa¬ tion. OTA was unable to determine whether the monitoring wells were improperly in¬ stalled. Difficulties with inadequate design, in¬ stallation, and operation of groundwater mon¬ itoring systems are not uncommon at Super- fund sites and at interim status RCRA facilities (see chapter 5). At Sylvester, initial estimates of the degree to which bedrock was fractured now appear to have been low, and the amount of waste de¬ posited at the New Hampshire site might have been significantly underestimated. The Stringfellow case study found a long his¬ tory of problems with contractor work on site geology and hydrology. The complexity of the site geology was consistently underestimated with adverse consequences for the effective¬ ness of the control measures recommended. Until the late 1970s, it was generally assumed that the site lay on impermeable bedrock. Then it was discovered that the granitic and meta- morphic bedrocks were highly fractured and jointed and hosted several underground springs that flowed into the site. In 1932 the permeability of the site and down-gradient areas was found to be much greater than orig¬ inally thought. Earlier indications of the pres¬ ence of an extensive, rapidly moving plume of contamination had been discounted and wrongly attributed to surface runoff. In 1980, interceptor wells were drilled to control the plume of contaminants. However, the wells were not pumped continuously as required and the plume moved beyond the zone of influence of the wells. Incorrect conclusions about site geology caused two interceptor wells to be mis¬ placed. The wells were set west of the buried drainage channel in the alluvium underlying the canyon and drilling was abandoned when bedrock was not encountered at the projected 100-foot depth. Another Stringfellow contractor was unable to analyze depth-specific samples of the plume to determine its extent because its laboratory could not perform the appropriate analysis of total organics. As a result, information show¬ ing the three-dimensional extent of the plume and the areas with the highest concentration of contaminants is not available. The expense incurred in designing and executing an elab- Pi-? . Ch. 7 —Achieving Quality Cleanups • 229 & i orate drilling procedure to obtain the data was wasted. This waste might have been avoided if EPA had verified the contractor’s laboratory qualifications before awarding the contract and if EPA had required collection of two samples and the use of a backup laboratory. Optimistic Assumptions In all three case studies that OTA examined, a tendency towards optimistic assumptions about site conditions and remedial technol¬ ogies was evident. At Stringfellow, for exam¬ ple, optimism about containment has prevailed despite mounting evidence that the site is fun¬ damentally unsuited for this strategy. At Sey- mour, removal of a limited amount oi soil was deemed adequate, wuthout testing for residual contamination. (Contaminated surface water runoff indicates that significant amounts of contamination remain in the soil at the site.) At Sylvester, the figure adopted lor the amount of waste deposited at the site might be a sig¬ nificant underestimate. Finally, the pervasive preference for containment as a key fcsture of remedial cleanups at Superfund sites is based on an optimistic assumption of doubtful valid¬ ity about the long-term effectiveness of this technology. Constraints on Superfund Contractors Several Superfund contractors have expressed concern over the direction of the program and the structure of the remedial response under the NCP. These engineering firms complain of the lack of clear goals for cleanup design (see chapter 4). Lack of explicit cleanup standards or guidance from EPA makes it difficult for en¬ gineering firms to perform their assignments, such as comparing the relative cost effective¬ ness of remedial alternatives. According to one major Superfund contractor: (E)ngineering practice needs the law to re¬ quire the use of engineering criteria and standards on which to base the extent and cost effectiveness of a remedial action. 4 •Gary Dunbar. Camp Dresser «■ McKee, statement in Hearings on the Implements!,on of the Su^rtund Program before the Sub¬ committee on Commerce. Transportation and Tourism ol tltc House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 98th Cong.. 1st and 2d sess.. 1984. (Hereafter referied to as Hearings on Super¬ fund Implementation.) A representative of CH2M Hill, one of EPA s major Superlund contractors, testified that the lack of cleanup standards makes evaluating the suitability of alternative treatment and destruc¬ tion technologies difficult: There are a wide variety of existing and promising technologies that might be em¬ ployed to destroy hazardous contaminants . . . There are few design and performance cri¬ teria against which the technologies might be tested. In other words, we do not have any reliable performance standards or risk assess¬ ment methodologies that we can use to deter¬ mine whether or not a particular technology performs well enough to be applied to a spe¬ cific site (emphasis in the original]. It is very- difficult to determine whether a particular technology will clean up a site if we have not defined what “clean” means. 5 The cost-balancing test for remedial actions also poses difficulties for engineering con¬ tractors: The practice of “balancing” site-specific engineering issues, such as cleanup criteria, with external factors, such as availability of money and the remedial needs of other sites, hinders effective engineering efforts. We have found that this balancing requiiement poses several problems for engineering firms trying to develop and implement an adequate clean¬ up plan. First, it is difficult to judge ■ le cost- effectiveness of different plans without site- specific standards. Second, it is difficult to de¬ termine what a site can be used for after it is “cleaned up” if such standards do not exist. Third, the absence of standards can often de¬ lay a response action. Fourth, a remedial ac¬ tion lacking specific standards is not gener¬ ally trusted by the public. 6 Some consultants have noted that institution¬ al tensions in the program favor the selection of impermanent remedial alternat./es. A rep¬ resentative of the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council made the following observations about problems in the use of the cost-balancing test in the implementation of Superfund: The situation can best be described as one which results in the overdesign and evalua- •William A. Wal'ace. statement during Hearings on Superfund Implementation. •Dunbar, Hearings on Superfund Implementation, op. cit. 9 i 230 • Superfund Strategy tion of short-lerm cleanups; cleanups which will likely require additional future remedial action. 7 The current process for assessing remedial alternatives seems to be producing a “least cost’’ preference for containment approaches using slurry walls and caps-despite the fact that containment is not a permanent solution. Nor are these techniques appropriate for some hydrogeological conditions. According to con¬ gressional testimony, construction of a slurry containment wall at $3 million was selected as the remedial alternative at one unnamed NPL site in New England. Further site analysis has determined that a more cost-effective approach would be to install an onsite system to treat, rather than contain, the wastes at an additional cost of $4 million. The treatment option would have initially cost $i million more than con¬ tainment, “but in the end would have saved ap¬ proximately $3 million.” 8 Another adverse impact of the balancing test, in some opinions, is the trend toward employ¬ ing remedial options with high operation and maintenance (O&M) costs, e.g., dyking and counterpumping for long periods of time. These options may have low initial construction costs, but have high, and perhaps indetermin¬ able, O&M costs. These are paid by the States rather than the Federal Superfund. In most cases these strategies are not a truly permanent remedy to the threat posed: The “balancing test” issue is fundamental in both nature and choice: the fund can either be used to temporarily contain many sites at a lower short-term cost or be used to perma¬ nently remove site hazards from posing future threats to health and the environment at a higher short-term cost. It is a most difficult issue, but perhaps the most critical one on which Congress must act. 9 The artificial segmentation of projects into emergency actions, removal actions, and reme¬ dial actions, or into surface and subsurface re¬ medial actions, also poses difficulties. A con- ’Hearings on Superfund Implementation. •Ibid. •Richard Kortuna, testimony during Hearings on Superfund I m piemen tat ion. tractor is asked to look only at part of the problem and can expect to be responsible for that segment only. This limited focus may pre¬ clude consideration or design of more compre¬ hensive and effective cleanups. Not taking a comprehensive environmental systems approach to releases has also limited the effectiveness of engineering consultants in designing a reme¬ dial alternative appropriate for site conditions. It is very unlikely that a single engineering con¬ tractor will work on a site from initial response through completion of remedial construction. This switching of firms for successive phases of one project and without clear cause differs remarkably from what generally occurs in other large engineering projects. OTA found that contractor assessments of remedial alternatives were very limited in scope. Certain remedial alternatives were ex¬ cluded from detailed feasibility analysis for cost or nolicy reasons. This may contribute to the ineffectiveness of some remedial actions. In all three case studies (Siringfellow, Seymour, and Sylvester) the cost effectiveness, long-term reliability, and risk equity of removing wastes from the site and redisposal elsewhere was giv¬ en little or no analysis in EPA or conliactors’ documents. OTA's Seymour case study concluded that government contractors at the site generally performed satisfactorily within the scope of what they were asked to do. However, the re¬ port found that limitations on the amou it of money available and restrictions on its use (i.e., no offsite material disposal) may have ham¬ pered their effectiveness. At the Stringfellow site, pressures from EPA regional and headquarters officials may have precluded serious consideration of site excava¬ tion and removal of the wastes, contaminated soil, and groundwater followed by onsite or off¬ site waste treatment and/or destruction. Yet, in this case, extremely complex and unfavor¬ able hydrogeological conditions would make any successful containment option difficult if not impossible; removal of the materials from the site might be the only effective option. - m -•«*«■ - -* t *-*'' *»&-:.• Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 231 The Stringfellow fast-track feasibility study completed in 1984 was the basis for selecting an interim remedial action to pretreat contami¬ nated groundwater onsite. The contractor warned of possible problems with this option. Because of the lack of water sample testing, there exist “extremely signilicant uncertain¬ ties in the quantity of water to be treated, its characteristics, and response to trea’ment. These uncertainties may cause major revisions to cost estimates and projections of the treat¬ ment’s effectiveness. The contractor is now proceeding on bench-scale treatability studies that will shed some light on these uncertain¬ ties, but EPA appears to have no plans for a pilot facility on the site. Reliance on bench- scale work to adequately resolve uncertainties may be overly optimistic. 1 his interim action appears to be an attempt to respond to public pressure rather than being a thorough engi¬ neering solution. The full site investigation and feasibility study for Stringfellow is now underway and is scheduled to be completed in mid-1985. A review of the contractor's proposal, approved by EPA, indicates that the scope of remedial alternatives to be considered focuses on con¬ tainment strategies and excludes several im¬ portant permanent remedies. The feasibility of removal may not be examined and, hence, not considered as a permanent remedy. The option of building an onsite treatment facility for con¬ taminated materials may also not be consid¬ ered. EPA’s current preference in the Stringfellow Rl/FS would leave the contaminated soil and water at the site and control the inflow of groundwater upgradient by hydrofracturing the bedrock, which is an untested and unprov¬ en technique for this application. It would also use conventional containment systems. An on¬ site, permanent water treatment facility would be built to control the hazardous constituents leached from the site into groundwater. OTA’s study found that the proposed RI/FS did not attack the source of the problem: the buried wastes and contaminated soil. Remov¬ ing the source of contamination is not taken seriously in the proposal. Emphasis is on deal¬ ing with the effect rather than the cause of the problems, with consideration given only to containment methods similar to those that have been unsuccessful before at this site of com¬ plex geology. EPA has issued guidance documents to its contractors to help them prepare site assess¬ ments that will be used to select remedial alter¬ natives. The use of guidance manuals suggests the beginning of some degree of uniformity and consistency in work being done by EPA con¬ tractors. The manuals call tor extensive policy- related technical judgments by the technical personnel on matters such as the seriousness of site contamination and the relative effective¬ ness of alternatives. But the technical judgment of contractors is limited in other areas such as the suitability and reliability of particular re¬ medial technologies. The guidance documents do not yet include information to accommo¬ date changes in setting a cleanup standard for remedial alternatives under the proposed \CP revisions. It is thus possible that a significant number of sites moving through the Rl/FS and remedial design phases will not be consistent with the new policy. It is not known whether these site assessments will be required to be redone, or if remedial actions will proceed, per¬ haps with inconsistent and less stringent stand¬ ards of protection. Effects of Early Responses on Long-Term Remedies OTA has found that most emergency responses have worked well where materials were re¬ moved from the site because of immediate threats. When immediate removal actions con¬ sist only of waste containment, which they of¬ ten do, the site may get worse over time and require repeated removal actions. Actual re¬ movals, however, pose questions about the long-term adequacy of redisposal sites and the transfer of risks. The Superfund program man¬ agement has put little emphasis on inter-site problems. i 232 • Superfund Strategy Onsite emergency responses to contain wastes temporarily and control contamination have not advanced permanent cleanups and in some cases have exacerbated conditions at the site. Often, “cleanup” is used to describe a limited action. At Stringfellow and Seymour, initial actions have not been effective because contractors misinterpreted site conditions and applied in¬ adequate control measures. Lack of quality supervision in building and designing these controls may also have contributed to their fail¬ ure. Total cleanup involving removal of wastes, site decontamination, and groundwater treat¬ ment was advocated at an early stage. How¬ ever. because of the cost involved, this prompt remedial action was rejected in favor of par¬ tial removal, temporary containment, and fur¬ ther study. Delays let the plume of contami¬ nants spread substantially increasing the amount of contaminated soil and groundwater to be dealt with in later remedial actions at greater expense. In 1932, construction was completed on in¬ terim abatement measures for the Stringfellow. site that were originaily proposed in 1977 and approved in 1979. Some contaminated waste liquids and contaminateo soils were removed. The site was excavated, bedrock fractures were grouted, kiln dust was mixed with the waste and soil to neutralize it, and the site was cov¬ ered with a clay cap and regraded. A series of monitoring and interceptor wells were in¬ stalled to deal with groundwater contamina¬ tion. Contaminated groundwater is continuing to be pumped from the wells and shipped off¬ site to RCRA hazardous waste facilities for dis¬ posal. The emergency and interim cleanup actions taken to date at Stringfellow have allevi¬ ated immediate threats of floods and sudden catastrophic failure of the site impoundment, bu*. they have been largely ineffective in pro¬ tecting the water supply of the nearby commu¬ nity of Glen Avon from surface and subsurface contamination. Son" of the interim control strategy measures exacerbated soil and ground- water contamination. At the Seymour site the initial response in 1981-82 included: 1) security fencing, spill cleanup and removal, restaging about 45,000 drums, constructing a berm around the drum storage area to retard surface contamination (all typical immediate removal actions): and 2) building a rudimentary surface water pretreat¬ ment system consisting of an interception pond and two large concrete pipes filled with acti¬ vated carbon to treat contaminated surface wa¬ ter runofl before it entered the municipal :->an- itary sewer system. Some actions prior to the actual surface cleanup were relatively ineffec¬ tive and may have hindered the cleanup, since the structural integrity of the drums was re¬ duced. At least one contractor study of one site found that the bermed area was a source of soil and water contamination. The impact of the initial response actions on the cost of the sur¬ face cleanup, however, was slight. Design and Construction of Remedial Measures The effectiveness of a cleanup depends on the remedial alternative selected. An ineffec¬ tive remedy properly designed and built is still ineffective. However, effectiveness also de¬ pends on the quality of design and construc¬ tion of the chosen alternative. Cn A’s Stringfellow case study found several inadequacies in the design and construction of site control measures. Problems in construc¬ tion of the Stringfellow' interim abatement pro¬ gram were not corrected by State and Federal supervisors overseeing construction. For in¬ stance, during work at the site, underground springs were observed. The fact that these springs would cause leaching of materials left in the ground does not appear to have caused the site cleanup approach to be reevaluated. Kiln dust was mixed with soil to reduce the acidity of the waste, but its effectiveness could not be determined because no background test¬ ing was done on the soil before the addition of the kiln dust. The kiln dust may therefore only have added to the bulk of contaminated Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 233 material onsite. The clay cap does not appear to have been installed as designed and conse¬ quently may be of limited value. Because the construction contractor used local materials in¬ stead of imported clay, it is not certain that the site does in fact have a clay cap. Surface water intrusion into the ground was exacerbated be¬ cause the cover was built concave instead of convex because there was not enough material available to create the proper shape. Instead, drainage ditches were installed near the bot¬ tom of the cover. The site was not promptly seeded and rain has eroded the cover. The Sylvester slurry wall and cap completed in 1982 have not contained the flow of water to the degree predicted. A hydrogeological study is underway to evaluate this problem. Building a slurry wall around the 20-acre site to a relatively unprecedented depth of 100 feet to retard the spread of contamination in un¬ consolidated glacial material over fractured bedrock was a bold engineering initiative. Be¬ cause of the unprecedented construction in¬ volved, care was exercised in onsite supervi¬ sion of slurry wall installation, but nonetheless the containment is less effective than pre¬ dicted. State officials believe that most of the leakage is attributable to highly fractured bed¬ rock. Another cause for leakage may have been construction problems in the installation of the wall. In addition, laboratory studies gave early indications that contaminants in the ground- water could degrade the slurry wall material, increasing its permeability. Based on hydrogeo¬ logical modeling. State officials reject the pos¬ sibility of leakage through the wall. The effec¬ tiveness of the slurry wall over time is highly dependent on the quality of initial construction and the length of time during which the wall must maintain its integrity. No containment system has been proven effective for long peri¬ ods of time. At Sylvester, the cap design and construction may be inadequate for the long-term mainte¬ nance of a surface seal over the site. Specifica¬ tions for cap design, such as topsoil thickness, and drainage layer permeability, appear to be less stringent than that recommended for RCRA land disposal facilities. Implications for Future Superfund Strategy As seen in the case studies, the cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites poses many new technical and institutional challenges. The economic and environmental costs of inade¬ quate assessment of site conditions, of delays, and of impermanent remedies can be substan¬ tial. Public expectations of progress in site cleanup have been high, but the rate and suc¬ cess of cleanups have been disappointing. Pub¬ lic confidence in a renewed and expanded cleanup program can be improved if lessons are learned from past experiences and incor¬ porated into a long-term strategy for permanent cleanups that effectively protect public health and the environment. Difficulties esn be expected in the implemen¬ tation of the Superfund remedial action pro¬ gram and in the assessment, design, and con¬ struction of remedial measures. There are many reasons why such difficulties will occur. Some circumstances are inherent in the pro¬ gram and cannot be avoided, but they can be anticipated and dealt with through effective contingency plans. There are significant uncertainties and gaps in knowledge about site conditions, nature of hazards, environmental fate, interaction of sub¬ stances, and hydrologic characteristics and be¬ havior at sites. As more experience is gained and more research is done, some of these un¬ certainties will be reduced. But to a large de¬ gree, cleanup decisions, early or late, will always be based on incomplete information. Complex situations at Superfund sites re¬ quire specialized and sometimes novel or ex¬ perimental approaches to achieve permanent cleanups. Because of this, the possibility or probability of failure must be given greater con¬ sideration in the design and selection of clean¬ up approaches. The concept of an “Imperma¬ nence Factor” used in chapter 3 could be further developed by EPA. Means to measure the performance and efficacy of remedial ac¬ tions and assess the availability and feasibil¬ ity of later corrective actions should be given greater attention. Where appropriate, cleanup » wirF'!* ■***??■' vy».-»-c*r* »•*!•'■*~ *r'* M ■'-*yvr‘x?~*~~ v ; ^ ' : ~ 234 • Superiund Strategy \ i ! goals and specifications might provide for an adequate margin of safety because of the risk of failure. No proven technological solutions exist for many of the conditions present at uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. Despite this, construc¬ tion projects at remedial sites have been treated as routine public works projects rather than as experimental or demonstration efforts. Tech¬ nologies that may be proven for some applica¬ tions are not necessarily proven lor dealing with uncontrolled site problems. For example, some containment strategies being applied to uncontrolled sites, such as slurry walls, were not originally designed to control mobile, highly reactive hazardous sub¬ stances in soil and groundwater. The long-term effectiveness of these containments under Superfund conditions remains to be demon¬ strated. Methods must be established to moni¬ tor the performance effectiveness of such con¬ trol measures. Moreover, reliance on ground- water monitoring alone also poses some prob¬ lems, and so far, the success and effectiveness of this strategy has been poor at F-vCRA fa¬ cilities. How can problems be avoided when there are no specific criteria against which to meas¬ ure the cost or technical effectiveness of alter¬ natives? The determination of relative effective¬ ness (more a cost-benefit analysis) is left to the subjective judgment of individual contractors preparing background studies. Nor has any mechanism been established to let us learn from mistakes, so they are not repeated. An overemphasis on the uniqueness of each un¬ controlled site has resulted in very little col¬ lection of information for the national pro¬ gram. information and technology transfer among contractors, EPA, and States appear minimal. Yet the guidance documents encour¬ age an approach of selecting the alternatives to be analyzed from a list of approved technol¬ ogies (for the most part containment and land disposal). The suitability of site conditions lor alternative technologies is inadequately consid¬ ered. This is, of course contradictory to the “each site is unique” perspective, but might be the result of attempts to speed program prog¬ ress and compensate foi inexperienced per¬ sonnel. The Superfund program as currently struc¬ tured and administrated seems poorly prepared to assume greater responsibility as the number of NPL sites increases and as many sites pro¬ gress from site assessment to remedial design and construction. The whole cleanup program seems to assume that sites move smoothly through the process from site investigation to remedial design and construction and that there is little possibility of failure or mistakes. The history of site remedial actions contradicts this assumption. Design and construction of re¬ medial actions are not predictable, routine en¬ gineering or construction projects and should not be managed that way. Some aspects of re¬ medial action will always pose great uncertain¬ ties, but experience shows that these can be an¬ ticipated. The challenge is to build a Sujierfund program that can accommodate both the con¬ trollable and the uncontrollable. AN EXPANDING PROGRAM'S NEED FOR TECHNICAL OVERSIGHT Effectiveness of Contractor Oversight The quality of work at Superfi.nd sites de¬ pends largely on effective management of con¬ tractors. For cleanups performed by responsi¬ ble parties, technical oversight by EPA is also needed. Three aspects of cleanup supervision are important: technical direction, oversight, and continuity. Contractors must be given a technically adequate scope of work, perform¬ ance must be monitored to assure compliance and to allow modification of scope or effort if conditions change, and there must be some continuity of oversight for long-term contracts and multiple contractors at a site. Technical supervisors must have an appreciation of the V*3K» M^HnanMau Ch. 7 —Achieving Quality Cleanups • 235 complex and often unprecedented work they are overseeing. OTA’s Stringfellow case study found that the State and Federal people in¬ volved with the day-to-day operations were mostly young engineers with relatively little ex¬ perience in hazardous waste management. Without technically competent and experi¬ enced site supervisors, contractors are relic on to assure the quality of their own work. Out¬ side review can also be used, but as discussed in chapter 8, opportunities for effective tech¬ nical review of site studies and selected reme¬ dies by the public and by potentially responsi¬ ble parties are limited. The short amount o time available for review and comment and the lack of independent technical assistance lor community groups limit the utility of outside review as a quality control measure for Super¬ fund contractor performance. Assuring continuity in oversight of remedial work appears to be an emerging problem, and there is a very high turnover in agency sta responsible for onsite coordination of contrac¬ tor activities. OTA has been told bv several EPA on scene coordinators (OSC) that they t o not expect to be at the site when the evalua¬ tion is complete because they expect a reassign¬ ment or promotion to a more responsible posi¬ tion in Government or an outside ]ob ottei. Hish turnover rates increase the possibility that work will be repeated needlessly because of the lack of institutional memory. Management ot an expanding Superfund cleanup program should therefore anticipate high employee turn¬ over and adopt measures to minimize its impact. OTA found that multiple contractor studies at a single site frequently yielded conflicting conclusions. Examples from OTA’s case stud_ J es are summarized in table 7-1. The record does not indicate specifically how government technical site supervisors responded to these inconsistencies or even if they were aware of them. However, at Stringfellow, failure of go - eminent or contract personnel to recognize the implications of conflicting conclusions anc assumptions in a timely manner may have con¬ tributed to the selection or construction ol in¬ effective remedial measures at considcidble cost. To be effective, the remedial response proc¬ ess (particularly at the design and construction stages) must have the capability to be more hex- ible and responsive to new information or bet¬ ter interpretations about actual site conditions, even if these contradict earlier assumptions. This requires vigilance on the part of the site contractors and the government cleanup super visors. A Larger Program The number of remedial actions under the Superfund program will increase substantia y. New sites are being added to the NPL and moi - and more sites already on the NPL are mov¬ ing from the initial study phase toward ierne- dial design and construction. Cleanup at many of these sites may take years. Responsible par¬ ties also are initiating more private cleanups. As the level of activity increases, so will the need for additional qualified and experienced staff at the State and Federal level to design and implement an expanded program, to make judgments on cleanup goals, to support en¬ forcement efforts, and to supervise work by government contractors and responsible par¬ ties. To be successful, the program must have adequate, experienced staff to provide soun management and technical oversight. EPA’s current staffing levels appear to be too low to provide effective oversight of the rap¬ idly expanding number of sites requiring re¬ medial action. Moreover, EPA has identified several institutional constraints on its ability to expand its program quickly. EPA has pro¬ jected that States may take over management of as many as half of the NPL site cleanups. However, many States lack the needed tech¬ nical and administrative personnel to support Superfund cleanups. Where money is available, States report delays in obtaining qualified tech¬ nical specialists. There are several reasons to question wheth¬ er the Superfund program can effectively man- - ; ? i _ rrnr^y^f v-< , »w"'»'* ww'WH^ •«**••.,-JSSS^ C/j. 7 —Achieving Quality Cleanups • 237 age and oversee even current NPL site clean¬ ups, let alone an expanded number ol cleanups. First, progress to date has been slow. Certain¬ ly one reason for this has been the inherent de¬ lays in starting a new program, developing pro¬ cedures, identifying sites, and conducting preliminary site assessments. The buperfund program has also changed policy direction over the relative priority of fund-financed cleanups and enforcement. However, there is reason to suspect that EPA may fall short of meeting its currently projected cleanup goals. At the end of fiscal year 1984, EPA reported some form of remedial activity was underway at about 30 percent of NPL sites, however, site remedial construction had started at only 50 sites, a rela¬ tively small number of the 552 NPL sites. The number of sites where cleanup is considered complete or where a permanent long-term remedv is under construction is relatively low. Many remedial actions announced so tar are temporary or interim remedial measures that will need further work or nonremedial meas¬ ures, such as supplying alternate drinking water, intended to remove an immediate threat of exposure to hazardous substance releases. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, the ade¬ quacy of remedial action at several of the ‘com¬ pleted” cleanups is under question. 10 Detailed information on EPA cleanup activ¬ ities at Superfund sites is not easily obtained. One of few publicly available summaries track¬ ing Superfund cleanup progress at individual sites is The National Campaign Against Toxic Hazard’s recently published “Assessment ot Cleanup Progress at Superhind Sites.” 11 This report documents the status of remedial activ¬ ities at 343 NPL sites in 19 States as of mid- 1984 based on EPA data and a phone survey of EPA site project officers. (According to the Campaign, detailed information on the rema ‘ n ‘ ing 209 sites was not available for study be¬ cause of problems with EPA’s computerized •oSec also Richard C. Bird. |r. and Michael Podhor/er. "Evalua¬ tion of the Six National Priorities List Sites Delisted by the Envi¬ ronmental Protection Agency." National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards, Oct. 24. 1954. ... "Danna Tulis. Henry S. Cole, and Michael I odhorzer. An Assessment of Cleanup Progress at Superfund Sites.’ National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards. September 1984. site tracking system.) Table 7-2 shows the latest stage of remedial activity for the 343 sites sur¬ veyed as of July 1984. Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Stud¬ ies were underway or complete at about 44 per¬ cent of the sites. These stages are the beginning of the Superfund “pipeline.” However only 14 percent of the sites in the survey have ad¬ vanced to remedial design (seven sites) or re¬ medial construction (42 sites). Responsible party cleanups, rather than fund-financed cleanups, account for about half of the 42 sites where a long-term remedy is being imp.e- mented. The report found that some form ot Table 7-2.—Status ot Cleanup Progress, July 1984 (343 NPL sites) — Number of sites at Percent of sites at 1 atest staae of remedial activity 3 stage stage No site activity 0 . Immediate measures only c : 96 27 28 8 19 5 Tntal . 46 13% Remedial Investigation (Rl): 5 1 77 23 82 24% Feasibility study (FS): FS complete . 25 46 7 13 Total . 70 20% Remedial design (RD) a : 2 1 5 1 Tr»tal . 7 2% Remedial construction (RC) RC complete, delisted ...... RC complete. 2 4 36 1 1 10 Total. 42 12% Grand total. 343 sites_100%__ 'SSSSSSXRVXrX stjsssk ■Srasxrs zxrssrss; car ass NPL are no. rncluded Some no activity sites have had plan iRAMP) s.udies completed are W* «« J^> u d , sco „„„ u9 d nt available information on the site hamrs were recenuy u » Clmmedia.e measures include removals .ha. were taken after the sue was listed __ *h q ki pi Not alt NPL sites require immediate measures ^Sdes^roceed °o the remedial design stage after setedon of an appropriate femedy based on the RbFS Setect.on of an appropriate remedy is documen ed in a Record of Decision (ROD) SOURCE Office ot Technology Assessment from National Campaign Against SOURCE 0°'«“ vaias .. An 9y AssessmeM of Cleanup Prog.ess at Supedund Sites.” September 19M . 238 • Super! und Strategy onsite cleanup work, either immediate meas¬ ures and/or long-term remedial construction, had occurred at 147 of the 343 sites. (Immedi¬ ate measures at 105 sites; remedial construc¬ tion underway or complete at 34 sites; eight sites had both immediate measures and reme¬ dial construction.) Some sites with immediate measures have progressed to later stages of re¬ medial activity as shown in table 7-2. No on¬ site cleanup had occurred at 196 of the 343 sites surveyed (57 percent). There were 100 sites with studies only and 96 sites with no reme¬ dial activity at all. Based on EPA records, the Campaign was able to assess the cleanup progress through the end of fiscal year 1984 for all 552 NPL sites (in¬ cluding six delisted sites where cleanup is com¬ pleted). The group found that there has been no onsite cleanup (either immediate measures or remedial construction) at 332 NPL sites. Some form of remedial action (RI/FS, design, or construction) had begun at 120 sites. There were immediate measures underway at 100 more sites. The Campaign’s study focused on the stage of remedial" activity at NPL sites and did not examine what kinds of remedial activities were occurring and whether the remedies would provide effective long-term control oi threats to human health and the environment. OTA’s own review of EPA Records of Decision (RODs) for remedial actions at NPL sites and the site activities described in the Campaign s report suggests that both the EPA and Campaign fig¬ ures overstate the progress made in cleaning up Superfund sites. Many of the remedial ac¬ tions taken do not represent a final or perma¬ nent remedy providing for the removal, de¬ struction, or treatment of the wastes and the decontamination and, where feasible, restora¬ tion of the site. Such remedial actions require more technical oversight than the early meas¬ ures that now account for most program activ¬ ity. (See table 7-3 and the discussion in chapter 2 of this report.) Of 24 RODs reviewed, 10 were for initial remedial measures to deal with im¬ mediate problems at the site. Of the 14 reme¬ dial actions, six involved complete or partial remeoies with additional measures to effective¬ ly deal with site releases and contamination sti!) under study. Three remedial actions pro¬ vided for replacement or treatment of the threatened water supply; three others involved only partial or surface removals with source control measures. Only eight sites had a final or permanent remedial action underway (these eight are in addition to the six sites where El A says cleanup has been completed). The RODs indicate that completion of remedial construc¬ tion at many sites will not result in site cleanup or a final remedy. Additional remedial activi¬ ties at these sites may continue for years or may be required at some later time. It may take many years for cleanups at cur¬ rent NPL sites to be completed and varying de¬ grees of oversight and activity will be required for the duration of each cleanup. At the same time, more and more sites can be expected to Table 7-3.—Summary of Remedial Cleanup Approved, 1S81 to mid-1934 Cleanup actions approved Number of decisions a 1 initial remedial actions b/ Remedial actions Final remedies cl Removal/offsite disposal with/without source control 14 6 8 d / 5 1 0 1 1 . 3 1 2 0 . 2 1 1 0 . 2 1 1 1 . 2 1 1 1 . 24 10 14 8 a/ Total includes two sues and two RODs each which are combined In Ihe above table. c, Rnli?. a ^""i S al actions that are intended as the las, act,on a. the she and that. II success,ul. will e„ec,ive,y control releases Iron, the site <31 Includes three partial remedial actions, e 9 . surface cleanup, additional remeo.al measures are still unoer review el Includes treatment of contaminated drinking water f/ Includes treatment of contaminated groundwater SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups * 239 enter the system. The RI/FS process can take up to 18 months to complete, remedial designs take 9 to 12 months. The whole pre-construc¬ tion process can take 3 years once activity has begun and without any other delays. A range of from 2 to 5 years from site investigation to completion of construction. Complex sites, par¬ ticularly those with extensive groundwater contamination, will require more time to as¬ sess, and to design and construct a remedy. Operations, maintenance, and monitoring could continue for 20 to 30 years or more at sites with significant groundwater contamination and cleanup. There will be a continuing long-term need for technical oversight and monitoring at a large number of sites. The rate at which EPA has been able to obli¬ gate and spend Superfund appropriations gi\es some indication of the agency’s ability to han¬ dle a greatly expanded program. Only a small percentage of funds obligated for remedial ac¬ tion actually has been spent on construction of long-term remedies. With two-thirds of Superfund's SI.6 billion obligated, the re¬ sources of EPA and State agencies may not be adequate to manage an accelerating rate of cleanup activities, even if only for a 2.000 site NPL. There appear to be significant delays in moving sites from the study stage to construc¬ tion. A major portion of the $1.6 billion Super- fund appears to have been obligated for initial contractor assessments and administrative ex¬ penses, creating the probability that the pro¬ gram will need very large amounts for reme¬ dial construction and, hence, oversight in the future. The Campaign found that for 343 sites sur¬ veyed, over $100 million had been obligated for remedial actions out of a total of over $236 mil¬ lion in Superfund obligations in those 19 States. Less than half of the remedial action obliga¬ tions were for construction. Of the total monies obligated, $44 million had been paid out (see table 7-4). The slow rate of cleanup and the small por¬ tion of obligated funds spent on remedial con¬ struction suggests that EPA and State agencies may not have sufficient resources or person¬ nel to carry out the process efficiently. EPA officials have admitted that the frequent switching of project officers has been a prob¬ lem in maintaining the momentum of cleanup activities. Retention of experienced, qualified cleanup supervisors was also identified as a problem in OTA's case studies. Table 7-4.—Supertund Obligations and Expenditures, 19 States. July 1984 State Number ot sites Remedial actions funds obligated Total funds obligated Total tunds expended California . Connecticut. 19 6 . 29 S25.478.390 $37,867,020 1.369.000 6.390.828 $1,010,047 49,965 1.766.279 678.855 307.519 1.075.276 90 306 2.241 413 908.517 4,719 449 7,049.176 8,373.695 2.364.17C 5.394.571 2.266 4.110.436 2.373,831 0 2.346.767 11 0 4.069.291 17 0 3.911.401 3 0 2.187.014 . 5 0 1.639.932 Massachusetts... . 15 23 8.121.800 0 17.415.68 5.903.543 New Hampshire .. . 10 . 65 10.007 018 17,885.809 13.605.340 55.004.130 . 29 11,702,800 31.173.799 North Carolina ... . 3 . 23 2.374.176 3.191.125 2.364.176 9.787.656 3 0 139.000 40 11,440,400 23.576,594 . 6 5.043.570 5.766.831 . 2 0 360.000 14 5.000.00 13,620.269 19 State total . 343 $100,235,088 $236,350,445 $44,862 594 SOURCE National Campaign Against To.ic Hua-fls An A»**»sm*nt ot C«>an„p Prog.*s» at SupoHimO 240 • Superfund Strategy EPA Staffing Needs The pace at which Superfund remedial ac¬ tions are moving through the system suggests that current staffing levels are not sufficient to support current Superfund activities. This is shown by the lag between the number of sites with RI/FSs and the number of sites where con¬ struction is underway and by the percent of ob¬ ligated remedial action funds that have been spent (see tables 7-2 and 7-4). The problems with effective technical oversight of EPA con¬ tractor work revealed in OTA’s case studies is another indication that EPA staffing may not be adequate either in the number of technical staff assigned to a site or in the qualifications and experience of those employees. EPA has greatly expanded the number of em¬ ployees allocated to the Superfund program. Administrator Ruckelshaus testified that the hiring rate for Superfund is now at the high¬ est level that EPA has ever experienced. 12 EPA’s authorized Superfund employment has been increased from 774 workvears in fiscal year 1983 to 1,357 in fiscal year 1985. This staff¬ ing level is needed to support currently planned activities for only a moderately increased pro¬ gram. With this staff, EPA estimates that it could support about 115 sites in the RI/FS stage per year. EPA expects that a total of about 200 sites will reach the remedial design and con¬ struction stage at the end of fiscal year 1985 (including 68 new designs and 46 new reme¬ dial cleanups). About 150 immediate removals are also projected for fiscal year 1985. By the end of fiscal year 1986, some kind of remedial response would have been started at about 400 existing NPL sites. After that, the number of sites in various phases of response would re¬ main fairly constant. EPA has said that there may be an upper limit of about 600 NPL sites that EPA can effectively deal with at any one time. This includes overseeing removals. RI/FSs, and remedial design and construction. 13 u Hearings on HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations. 19f’S-l t art 1. Before the Senate Committee on Appropriations. 98th ConR.. 2d sess.. '.984. pp. 302. '•Lee Thomas, statement before the Environmental I-aw In- stilute-American Uar Association Superfund Conference. Nov. 29. 1984. EPA officials are concerned that the agency may not be able to quickly absorb a significant¬ ly expanded number of cleanups even if addi¬ tional funds were made available for more staff. They have identified the following limita¬ tions on the agency’s capacity to expand: 1. Superfund staff and resources are already expanding at an exceptional rate to man¬ age projects already in the pipeline. 2. The Federal Government’s competitive hiring regulations would delay the hiring and housing of additional new employees 6 to 8 months at a minimum; 3. Intensive training would be required be¬ fore the newly hired staff would be fully effective—at least 2 to 3 months on-the-job training for nontechnical personnel and considerably longer for technical per¬ sonnel. 4. The private sector support industry for Superfund would not be able to expand rapidly enough to allow effective use of a larger work force for several reasons. The analytical laboratory industry, already operating near capacity, is unlikely to in¬ crease its capacity for organic sample anal¬ ysis and high hazard sample analysis at a correspondingly rapid rate. Lead time for procuring additional, highly specialized equipment is up to 6 months. It could take years to find, hire, and train competent technical staff. Administrator Ruckelshaus argued that too rapid an expansion risked increased potential for fraud, waste, and abuse: Too large a program pushed at too rapid a pace could create excessive public expecta¬ tions that even with the best of management and will could not be met. The result could be—could be—one more case of disillusion¬ ment with the ability of Government to pro¬ tect and serve the public responsibly. 14 EPA’s claimed inability to expand may be a consequence of its own policies. Moreover, the constraints cited by Mr. Ruckelshaus are pri- " Hearings on Superftind Reauthorization Before the Subcom¬ mittee on Commerce. Transfuirtatwn and Tourism of the House Committlee on Energy and Commerce. 98th Con^.. 2d sess., 1984. pp. 725-28. - -- MWn«a Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 241 marily short-term constraints of perhaps a year or two. Some of EPA’s statements seem to as¬ sume that Superfund staffing will not increase much over currently projected levels. This as¬ sumption may reflect budget policies more than actual experience or actual need. EPA has been able to accommodate the significant spending and hiring increases in the Superfund program of the last 3 years, albeit with some inefficiencies. The capacity—and, more impor¬ tantly, the quality —of the private analytical lab¬ oratories to accommodate increased need for chemical analysis for cleanups is a matter that merits further investigation. Another assumption in EPA’s projections for only modest additional Superfund expansion seems to be that sites are dealt with expedi¬ tiously and will not require further attention after the 2 to 5 years needed to complete re¬ medial construction. This view does not reflect the impermanent nature of many remedial ac¬ tions or recent experience with cleanups. Per¬ haps EPA is assuming that the States will be able to take over all oversight of sites with com¬ pleted remedial construction. If this is so, then State staffing needs will continue to grow, and probably will be largely unmet. Without in¬ creases in staffing and resources for Superfund cleanups, it could take decades to dispose of the large number of known sites that are an¬ ticipated to require remedial action. The 10,000 site NPL seen possible by OTA (see chapter 5) would clearly require decades under almost any conceivable program. OTA does not have information on specific EPA personnel needs for an expanded num¬ ber of remedial actions under Superfund. The long-term nature of cleanup actions suggests that long-range planning for hiring, training, and retaining qualified technical personnel to oversee cleanups is warranted. Existing infor¬ mation provides some indication of the mag¬ nitude of future staff needs. EPA estimates that it requires 2.8 staff workyears to complete a Superfund remedial action.’ 4 Given the com- _ »Donal7Tazarchick. ASTSWMO. testimony at Hearings on Superfund Koauthorixation Before Ihe Subcommittee on Com- merce. Transportation and Tourism of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 98th Cong., 2d sess., 1984. pp. 536. plexity and long-term nature of many site cleanups, this estimate may be low for both the duration of site activity and the level of man¬ agement required. One State Superfund agency representative has advised OTA that most sites require a team of several technical specialists from various disciplines over the 2 to 5 years required to oversee site activities from initial investigation to completion of all construction. (This would suggest a modest estimate of from 4 to 10 staff workyears per site.) More complex site cleanups would require a larger team and probably more time. Post-construction opera¬ tions, maintenance, and monitoring of the site will present a continuing need for oversight. OTA’s review of technical personnel availa¬ bility later in this chapter estimates that there are about 3,750 technical specialists currently working on Superfund cleanups both inside and outside of government. There were an esti¬ mated 1.000 Federal and 700 State staff posi¬ tions (including administrative and technical jobs) for Superfund and other remedial activi¬ ties in 1984. Not all of these people are directly involved in site activities and so total Super¬ fund program employment may no! have to in¬ crease in direct proportion to the growth in cleanup expenditures. Assuming that site per¬ sonnel currently represent one-half of govern¬ ment positions at most, this ratio would sug¬ gest that government employment would have to increase significantly to accommodate an ex¬ panding number of cleanups. OTA has esti¬ mated that overall demand for technical per¬ sonnel could grow to about 22,750 specialists in 1990-95 under a moderately expanded level of funding for cleanups. New State and Federal positions for techni¬ cal specialists to supervise site cleanups will likely represent a significant share of this in¬ creased demand. Even with a significant ex¬ pansion in State and Federal technical person¬ nel to direct and oversee site cleanups, the Superfund program will still depend to a great degree on private contractors for site assess¬ ments, design, and construction of remedial ac¬ tions for decades. f 242 • Superfund Strategy State Staffing Needs State agencies have repeatedly testified that they do not have enough qualiiied and experi¬ enced staff available to meet their responsibil¬ ities under the current program for identify¬ ing and ranking sites, consulting with EPA on site activities and enforcement, and in partici¬ pating as the lead agency at some sites. Al¬ though some Federal funds are available to the States, they are limited and almost entirely site specific. States vary in their ability and will¬ ingness to provide funding for these activities. Remedial staff and funding are concentrated in a small number of States. Massachusetts, Michigan, California, New York. New jersey, and Tennessee accounted for over 60 percent of positions in 1983 and 70 percent in 1984. These States have a total of 201 sites. On a na¬ tional average, nearly 75 percent of the posi¬ tions are paid for by State monies and about 25 percent are funded by Superiund or other Federal sources. The percentage of Federal funding, however, varies greatly by State. Reliance on State funding for their own staffs leaves 20 States being able to devote less than 2.5 person years annually to Superfund pro¬ gram work. 16 EPA is currently projecting that State lead sites will account for about half of Superfund site cleanups. Cleanups may fall short of projections it States do not have enough technical people to provide direction and effective oversight. The Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials (ASTSWMO) has testified that States should receive Federal funding for a number of activities under Super¬ fund including site identification, assessment. and investigation and the development and im¬ plementation of State contingency plans. Funds are needed to support enforcement, health studies, equipment, and staff training. These funds are in addition to funds that States might receive as part of a site-specific cooper¬ ative agreement. A survey done by ASTSWMO in December 1983 for EPA s study of State participation in the Superfund program required by Section 301(a)(1)(E) of CERCLA concluded that States would have to increase their total fiscal year 1983 technical staffing levels by 84 {percent to reach optimal levels to support the current Superfund program (table 7-5). I he greatest need is for staff to oversee site cleanups. State technical staff allocated to remedial activities was expected to increase by 65 percent from 1983 to 1984 (from a total of 259 to 428 person years). These aggregate figures do not reflect the dii.erences in individual State staffing levels nor do they differentiate between State- funded cle oups and Superfund actions. The AS .WMO survey also identified the types of t hnicai specialists needed by the States. Th. most critical technical staffing needs wen? engineers, hydrologists, and chem¬ ists (table 7-5). Among the constraints identified by the States in quickly obtaining additional techni¬ cal personnel to support remedial activities were limitations on hiring under State civil service regulations, problems with the institu¬ tional stability of the programs such as hiring freezes and noncompetitive salaries. Another constraint on expanding State activities are de¬ lays in obtaining private contractors for site studies, remedial design, and construction due to competitive bidding and contract review procedures under State procurement regu¬ lations. '•Lazarchick. op. cit., pp. 530. - Ch 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 243 TablO 7-5.—Current and Optimal Technical Staffing Levels (Annual totals for respondent states in person years) (41 States) Civil engineer. Sanitary engineer. Environmental engineer. Chemist. Biologist... Public health specialist .. Geologist/hydrologist. Soil scientist... Other. Agricultural engineer. Chemical engineer. Environmental held officer/scientist techmcan. Field inspectors.. Investigator. Industrial hygienist. Pharmacist .. Specialists (radiauon solid waste, environmental enforcement, environmental, pollution control, resource control. emergency response, water quality). Toxicologist . Zoologist. . Totals . . Number of additional Number of Number of staff needed Percentage current optimal (optimal — increase staff staff current) needed 15.9 29.0 13.1 82 86.6 165.1 78.5 91 35.7 96.6 60.9 171 42.0 108.0 660 157 46.7 55.7 9.0 19 46 3 63.6 15 3 33 47 0 119 5 72.5 154 14 6 31.1 16.5 113 05 03 -0.2 -40 3.1 4.3 1.2 39 27.2 42 9 15.7 58 5.0 5 C 0.0 0.0 00 1.0 1.0 — 0 8 1.5 0 7 88 1.0 10 0.0 0.0 119.2 177 0 57 8 48 0.0 0.5 0.5 — 1.0 50 4.0 400 492.7 907 1 414.5 88 a •P»reeni«g<. .nc-«»4e"oi tot* current technical sun 'o achieve total optimal technical stall SOURCE ASTSWMO *un,*y U S Environmental Protection Agency State Participation in the Sopertund Program CERCLA Section 301(a)OKE) Study ' final report AVAILABILITY OF QUALIFIED TECHNICAL PERSONNEL FOR SOPERFUNO CLEANUPS An Overview of Findings Cleanup of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites requires a concerted multidisciplinary ap¬ proach. The situations often involve great un¬ certainty over the amounts, types, and behavior of the wastes and the appropriateness, feasi¬ bility. and effectiveness of various technical re¬ medial options. Because of the relatively short history of a large-scale commitment ic clean¬ ing up hazardous waste sites, there is not yet a large cadre of experienced professionals in this area. As the number and complexity of public and private cleanup efforts continue to increase, demand for qualified technical per¬ sonnel will grow. Because the availability of technical specialists could become a short- and long-term constraint on a greatly expanded cleanup effort, OTA conducted a study of the expected demand and supply of professionals in the required technical specialties. . *%*T&2gi 4f%89ME0EMk :**->*■ rs*atsjoidme**c&Gam*& 244 • Superfund Strategy » v.fi* St«TV t>n»l tw>» no '964 Overall, hydrology seems to be the most crit¬ ical specialty. This is because of the frequency of water contamination problems encountered at sites. For instance, the EPA reports that 75 percent of the NFL sites showed groundw ater contamination and about 50 percent showed surface w'ater contamination. With increasing attention being given to protecting groundwa¬ ter resources, the demand for hydrologists will increase not only for w-aste site cleanups, but for design and monitoring of RCRA facilities and for groundwater protection programs. Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 249 The importance of qualified specialists for monitoring systems to determine the effective¬ ness of Superfund cleanups and to prevent fu¬ ture groundwater contamination at active haz¬ ardous waste facilities cannot be overstated. Groundwater consultant David W. Miller pointed this out in congressional testimony in 1982: t The process of obtaining the data for pre¬ dicting groundwater conditions, interpreting the information and making accurate deci¬ sions to implement compliance monitoring is a scientific endeavor. It can only he carried out in a confident manner by well trained groundwater technicians. There is presently a severe shortage of trained groundwater scientists in the public and private sector, and it is doubtful that there is sufficient talent available to work on more than a relatively small percentage of the existing sites that would fall under the compliance monitoring aspects of the new hazaidous waste regula¬ tions. 18 A report of the House Committee on Govern¬ ment Operations reviewing the development of a national groundwater protection strategy also noted the possibility of shortages of com¬ petent technical personnel: The Committee concludes that as the Groundwater Protection Strategy moves from the planning and strategy development phase into the implementation phase, there will be a significant increase in the need lor well- trained professional groundwater specialists if the strategy is to succeed. The Committee, therefore, recommends that EPA and the De¬ partment of the Interior act in concert to assess the future and take such steps as are necessary to prevent any shortfall. 18 Estimating the Pool of Available Professionals Estimates of the current number of techni¬ cal specialists it. the work force and their prob¬ able future numbers were developed from data '•David VV. Miller. Hearing* before the Haute Subcommittee on Natural Resources. Agricultural Reseanh and hnvimnnient of the House Committee on Science and Technology. 97th Cong . 1st sess. Nov. 30. 1982. ’•U.S. Congress. Croundwater Protection: The Quest fora Na¬ tional 1‘olicv. report of the Hous< Committee in Government Operations. 98th Cong.. 2nd sess . October 1984, p. 17. 38-745 0-05-9 on enrollment trends, the awarding of techni¬ cal degrees, and from membership in profes¬ sional and scientific societies. Enrollment and degree figures tend to overstate the potential availability of trained graduates because not all students find work in their academic fields. Membership data, however, would tend to yield conservative estimates of available man¬ power because not all practitioners are members. Performance issues aside, current staffing needs are being met for the most part. This is partly attributable to the slowdown in the min¬ erals, petroleum, and construction industries which has reduced the demand for geologists, hydrologists, and civil engineers. Future staff¬ ing problems are likely to depend on general economic conditions as well as Federal fund¬ ing for cleanup programs. The future levels of Federal funding for cleanup activities will greatly affect the overall levels of effort, even though not all activities will be funded from Federal sources. EPA Superfund monies cur¬ rently fund about half of all cleanup activity. Other cleanup actions are being funded by other Federal agencies, such as the Depart¬ ments of Defense and Energy, and by the States. Responsible parties in the private sector also pay for a substantial share of cleanups. It seems likely that cleanups paid for with non-Super- fund money will continue to play a significant role in the demand for trained technical per¬ sonnel. The perception of the importance of cleanup actions in the Nation s priorities will affect the future funding levels by these other sources; this perception will be largely shaped by the levels of funding authorized under Superfund. Estimates of Future Demand Using a range of what are believed to be rea¬ sonable projections of future funding needs, (see tables 7-9, 7-10, and 7-11), the demand for cleanup professionals was estimated using his¬ torically observed ratios of funds to technical personnel (table 7-12). About 3,750 profession¬ als are estimated to be involved in current cleanup activities nationwide. It will undoubt¬ edly take many decades to complete the clean- i - - -t~- ,--i-ro' <*r' 250 • Superfund Strategy Table 7-9.—Current and Projected Funding Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup Activity (bi.lions of dol lars) 1980 85 Type of activity _ Long term cleanups . Short-term cleanups. Emergency responses . Site investigations . Totals .. . a AII dollar^alues are m Billions and reflect mid-ange est,males Dollar SOURCE A Keith Turner -Potential tor Future Shortages ot Technical Personnel tor a Funding L evels 3 1935-90 1990-95 Five-year total Average annual expenditure Five-year total Average annual expenditure Five-year total Average annual expenditure $0.75 $1.0 $0 25 $1.0 $0.15 $0.2 $0.05 $0.2 $50 $2 75 SO 25 $2.5 $1 0 $0.55 $0 05 $0 5 $10 0 $5.5 $0 25 $5.0 $20 $1.1 $0.05 $1.0 $3 0 $0 6 $10 5 $2 1 $21 0 $4.2 aiues a r e constant 19&4 dollars National Cleanup of Hazardous Waste Sites final reoort. Nov 30. 19*4 r '^1 A 1 Table 7-10.—Current and Projected Funding Levels for the Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites (billions of dollars) Funding levels 3 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 . $3.0 — Projected: $ 7.6 $190 $10.5 $21.0 High. $14 4 $25 6 a 7nc!udes"Suoerlund other Federal leg, DOD. DOE), Statr-tunOed programs, and nnvate industry SOURCE A Keith Turner, • Potentiaitor Future Shortages ot Technical Person¬ nel lor a National Cleanup o‘ Hazardous Waste Sites, contractor report prepared tor tne Ofnce 01 Technolog/ Assessment. Nov JO I9fu up of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. The projections cover two 5-vear increments 1985- 1990 and 1990-1995. In making these projec¬ tions it was assumed likely that after an initial steep increase in funding levels, the number of cleanups, and the number of required tech¬ nical specialists, the program would reach a plateau or steady state and activity would con¬ tinue at a similar level for several more decades. With national spending to clean up uncon¬ trolled hazardous waste sites at approximately $4 billion annually, the demand for cleanup professionals will rise to about six times cur¬ rent levels, to about 22.750 professionals in 1995, and remain stable at this higher level for several decades as the cleanup actions are con¬ tinued. This growth will not affect all special¬ ties equally. As discussed in the iollowing sec¬ tion, for most specialties, such growth can be accommodated by the present work force and the educational system, but additional empha¬ sis on training in toxicology, hydrology, anc engineering geology will be necessary to pre¬ vent shortages in these areas. There will he an unavoidable shortage of experienced technical Table 7-11.—Current and Projected Manpower Levels Allocated to Type of Cleanup A ctivity ___—- Funding levels 3 ___ 1980-85 1984 90 _l 9 ? 0 ! 9 ^ Type ot activity Ratio 6 T300.000 Long-term cleanups . v?ooooo Short-term cleanups. f Emergency response Site investigation 1 : 200,000 1 : 100.000 Totals . . Average ratios 6 . .. .- iillTuod^ t*v.i» A" rn billion* am) lettect m.o.ange «"™to Average annual funding^ ~ SO 15 02 0 05 0.2 ~ SO 6 1 160.000 Number of FTEs Average annual funding Number of FTEs Average annual funding Number of FTEs 500 $1.0 3,500 $2 0 7.000 1 000 0.55 2,750 1.1 5,500 250 005 250 005 250 2.000 0 5 5.000 1.0 10,000 $2 1 11,500 $4.2 22,750 1:182.600 _ 1:184.600 -- -Mil turiuiity ivvci —- - . .. rr: . ... c^o. *.*,. — ,o ' SOURCE A K cum nU number of such professionals hy 1995, it grow does not occur. The civil eneineering profession as a whole will not he affected because a arge number construction management, ^astevvater en^ gineering, however, some changes will quired. lesser extent, for analytical chemists, and to even smaller extent fo r organic chemnts. .There appears S d££d is Si and will remain relatively small .perhaps 500 people). mins on the present populations in these fields. n r eoual or greater concern to the number of technical specialists available is their qua i y V *3 1 : i - . ■ , '< ■v| J ' t if i % i 4 •s k k 3 i 252 • Superfund Strategy and experience. The personnel needs survey indicated a strong preference for experienced middle managers, people with masters degrees and/or 3 to 5 years of experience. The demand for experience is going to be a major problem. The projected rate of growth over the decade, coupled with the relatively small base of experi¬ enced persons on which to build, will cause a continuing shortage of fully qualified, experi¬ enced specialists in almost all the critical skills. The impact of this shortage can be mitigated, at least in part, with specialized training courses, and in part, by careful personnel management policies, but the shortages cannot be fully over¬ come by these measures. Nevertheless, sugges¬ tions for increased training opportunities are made later in this chapter as one of the most effective methods for dealing with this problem. Other Factors Other factors affecting the future availabil¬ ity of technical specialists for hazardous waste cleanups should also be noted. Survey respond¬ ents noted problems already with employee burnout due to job stress and'heavy workloads. This appears true both in the administrative agencies and in tecnnical and administrative jobs with contractors and consultants. EPA’s system of awarding major contracts for the Superfund program may create some problems in providing a stable technical work force. Because it cannot be guaranteed that contracts will be renewed, large consulting firms are hesitant to invest in developing skills of employees who may have to be let go. Long¬ term employment commitments for technical specialists may be limited. In submitting con¬ tract proposals, many firms rely on the quali¬ fications of persons not yet employed or under contract to them. Once the contract ir awarded, the team will be assembled. Some professionals may be offered as staff by several different firms competing for the same contract. If a ma¬ jor contract is not renewed, experienced site assessment and remedial design teams may break up and disperse. Shortages at State or Federal agencies caused by hiring freezes or noncompetitive pay-scales could greatly hamper the cleanup programs. A recent ASTSWMO study (1983) explored these issues at the State agencies and found them to be important. 20 Increased use of technicians and less quali¬ fied professionals in field and site investigators hinges on the availability of experienced pro¬ fessionals to manage these teams. This under¬ scores the importance of augmenting the sup¬ ply of experienced professionals. The survey also found that training in health and safety procedures for all current and future onsite employees will be required. Although the market is likely to respond to the demand for expansion oi such courses and training fa¬ cilities without government help, there may be some need for government assistance in quality control and monitoring. Encouraging Technical Training for Hazardous Waste Cleanups OTA’s analysis concluded that the greatest need is for experienced scientists and engi¬ neers. There do not appear to be major prob¬ lems in providing basic technical training to enough people. Methods for gaining practical experience rapidly are essential. Although nothing can fully substitute for years of on-the- job experience in the field, several alternatives can help. The personnel needs survey asked questions about ways to gain experience. The results are shown in table 7-13. There were differences in preferences among respondents. The EPA, Superfund contractors, and industry respond¬ ents favored intensive retraining/refresher courses, while State agencies and other con¬ sulting firms favored masters level graduate training. *°The ASTSWMO report is published as: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ‘'State Participation in the Superfund Pro¬ gram.CEKCLA Section 301(a)(1)(E) Study"(Washington, DC: Of¬ fice of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, December 1984 ). Ch. 7—Achieving Quality Cleanups • 253 Table 7 - 13 .— Preferences for Training Respondent/training method Choice ranking^ 1st 2d ~3d 4th EPA: 0 Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) Training. Retraining/refresher courses On job training. State Superfund agencies: Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) training. Retraining/refresher courses On job training. Superfund contractors: Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) training. Retraining/refresher courses On job training. Private consultants: Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) training. Retraining/refresher courses On job training. Industry: Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) training . Retraining/refresher courses On job training. Academic: Undergraduate training. Graduate (MS) training. Retraining/refresher courses On job training. SOURCE: A Keith Turner, "P tential lor Future Shortages ol Technical Person nel tor a National Cleanup ol Hazardous Waste Sites.’ t - oport, Nov 30. 1984 Each method has advantages and disadvan¬ tages. The intensive courses, if properly pre¬ pared, can significantly upgrade skills in a short time. Graduate training is slower, usu¬ ally more expensive, but offers a greater depth and breadth of study. It also allows for the con¬ tinued development of improved methods through research programs. Accordingly, a strategy combining the two methods appears beneficial: 1. develop additional intensive short course programs for training and retraining and for maintaining skills; and 2. expand graduate research and training programs. A number of short courses and programs are currently offered by universities, professional societies, and private firms. Their quality is not uniform. In addition, there are limited sources of public information available, beyond that of¬ fered by the EPA. A selected number of regional technical cen¬ ters might be established to assist in the fol¬ lowing: e offer short courses on topics of interest to hazardous waste professionals, including health and safety training; • develop graduate programs for hazardous waste cleanup skills within existing aca¬ demic disciplines; • conduct research on technical problems at cleanups; • enhance the current EPA technical guide¬ lines literature with other guidelines, tech¬ nical memoranda, anil reports aimed at the public, local and regional planning offi¬ cials, and others; and • serve as regional public information clear¬ inghouses to assist the public, businesses, and State and local governments on haz¬ ardous waste issues, much as the existing State Water Resource Research Centers and Agricultural Extension Stations have assisted their clients in the past. Such regional centers should be explicitly identified and funded for these activities. The cost would be a small fraction of the total clean¬ up budget and could be a solid investment in the overall program efficiency. Sources. The following OTA working papers were used in the preparation ol this chapter: 1. George J. Trezak, “A Case Study of the Syl¬ vester Superfund Site," February 1985; 2. ERM-Midwest, Inc., "Case Study: Sey¬ mour Recycling Corporation, Seymour, In¬ diana,” March 1984; 3. George ). Trezak, “Engineering Case Study of the Stringfellow Superfund Site,” Aug¬ ust 1984; anu 4. A. Keith Turner, "Potential for Future Shortages of Technical Personnel for Na¬ tional Cleanup of Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites,” Nov. 30, 1984. 38-745 0-85-10 wri anil iwr il I Chapter 3 i Preceding page blank Contents Summary. Introduction. Public Participation Provisions Under CERCLA The National Contingency Plan . EPA ProjKised Changes to NCP. The EPA Community Relations Program. Tho Superfund Program in Action ... The National Priorities List . Fund-Financed Removals ami Remedial Enforcement and Other Legal Action .. Responses Public Participation Under CERCLA Versus RCRA I’agc 257 258 259 260 263 263 264 265 267 271 273 i i < i f i i t i % Chapter 8 e a SUMMARY Public confidence in the Superfund program is vital to its success. The Superfund program, however, contains few formal opportunities for public participation in decisionmaking. In this chapter, the term “public” includes local resi¬ dents. community groups, businesses, organi¬ zations such as environmental groups, and bus¬ iness and trade associations. “Public" also generally includes potentially responsible par¬ ties: however, discussion of their specitic in¬ volvement in cleanups, negotiation of settle¬ ments. and liability issues is beyond the scope of this chapter. Public participation does not necessarily slow the implementation of Superfund clean¬ ups. While public participation adds steps to the process, which take time, it also adds pub¬ lic support. Public support can help a cleanup progress smoothly and effectively, while short- cutting public review in the hope of speeding cleanups can have unintended adverse effects, public review of the adequacy ol site assess¬ ments and other contractor work is a check on the quality of work and the effectiveness ot remedial activities, and public scrutiny of agen¬ cy performance can help management of the Superfund program. The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) information dissemination programs have re¬ ceived mixed reviews. Although some pro¬ grams have drawn praise for keeping people informed, information dissemination it so It of¬ fers only a one-way communication that does not substitute for active participation in deci¬ sionmaking. If cleanup strategies are developed behind closed doors, the public will feel disen¬ franchised and suspicious, eroding public con¬ fidence in the Superfund program. The principal opportunity for public involve¬ ment in Superfund cleanups occurs late in the decisionmaking process after a proposed clean¬ up strategy lias been identified. Even though the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) process may have lasted for several years and remedial design and construction of an approved remedy may take several more years, the tune allowed for review and com¬ ment may only be several weeks. Effective par¬ ticipation is frequently hindered because the public may iack the expertise needed to ana¬ lyze complex en\ ironmental. public health, and technological issues. EPA. with rare exception, does not provide funds for citizens to hire tech¬ nical advisers. The limited opportunity for public involve¬ ment in decisionmaking to develop specific cleanup plans ami the inability of public groups to obtain cosliv technical advice can affect tiie type of cleanups that are undertaken at Super- fund sites. For example, local residents who do not understand complex remedial technol¬ ogies or who are not involved in the develop¬ ment ol cleanup plans can he less likely than their more technically oriented counterparts to: a) support more permanent cleanup strategies based on onsite treatment or decontamination of hazardous wastes, und h( understand it such permanent cleanups are not yet available. Lack of technical expertise can also result in some viable cleanup strategies that might be accept¬ able to the local population being prematurely rejected or not considered by ERA. The pollution problems and community con¬ cerns at every Superiund site are substantial. Furthermore, the problems of assigning re¬ sponsibility among large numbers of former 257 253 • Si,perfund Strategy waste disposers are unparalleled. The complex¬ ity and variety of Superfund issues complicates attempts to modify the program to increase public participation. Opening the doors to pub¬ lic participation in negotiations and enforce¬ ment aciions, granting new access tv. the courts for the public to seek nidress of grievances, and even increasing public access to data collected in the course of Superfund activities are all conironted oy some often equally compelling counterarguments. That public participation in the Superfund program could be improved is clear. How to go about making the improvements is not near¬ ly so obvious, and there currently is no clear consensus, even among groups in the public sector, on precisely how it should be accom¬ plished.' •Set- the “National Contingency Plan’ section below for a de¬ scription of how EPA's recent proposed changes to the NCI’ would address concerns about public participation. INTRODUCTION “The Superfund community relations pro¬ gram encourages two-way communication be¬ tween communities affected by releases of haz¬ ardous substances and agencies responsible tor cleanup actions ... An effective community re¬ lations program must be an integral part of every Superfund action.These words, amid other EPA policy statements, attest to the per¬ ceived importance of public participation in Superfund decisionmaking and establish an EPA objective to promote public involvement in the Superfund program. This chapter compares that EPA objective with how public participation actually works in the Superfund program. It discusses the pro¬ visions for. and constraints on. public partici¬ pation during the development of the national Superfund program and during the implemen¬ tation of cleanup programs at individual Super- fund sites. The chapter examines the public’s efforts to become involved in Superfund deci¬ sionmaking, both through avenues provided by the program and through other pathways. It also assesses how participation has shaped overall public confidence in the Superfund pro¬ gram. confidence that has been shaken in re¬ cent years by the slow pace of program imple¬ mentation at many sites and previously during the period when allegations of program mis- •L' S Environmental Protection Agency. "Community Rela¬ tions in Si4*?rfiin- lic participation in the Superfund program with other environmental programs, most not¬ ably with the hazardous waste permitting proc¬ ess of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). For the purpose of this chapter, the term “public” refers broadly to anyone who is not working as an employee or under contract to a government agency directly responsible for implementing the Superfund program. Thus, the public includes citizens living near Super¬ fund sites, businesses, local governments, orga¬ nizations such as environmental groups, pro¬ fessional and trade associations, and poten¬ tially responsible parties (PRPsj. PRPs can be made to clean up sites or to reimburse the gov¬ ernment for fund-financed cleanups. PRPs share with the public many of the same con¬ cerns about the availability of information and opportunities to participate in decisionmaking about remedial activities. PRPs. however, can be held liable for the costs of cleanup and in some cases for punitive damages. This liabil¬ ity exposure creates additional complications for PRP participation that do not apply to other groups. PRPs are or may soon be involved in adversarial proceedings with the EPA. Litiga¬ tion strategies may influence the governments’ willingness to share information with PRPs. Litigation considerations may also limit the PRP's willingness to work with other members of the public. I - Ch. 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Progiam • 259 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROVISIONS UNDER CERCLA The Comprehensive Environmental Re¬ sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) has, compared to other key environmental laws enacted since 1970, few re¬ quirements for, or references to, public partici¬ pation in decisionmaking. The only guaranteed opportunities for public involvement occur as a result of Federal agency rulemaking proceed¬ ings mandated by CERCLA. The Act contains 11 rulemaking requirements. 3 Under the Admin¬ istrative Procedures Act, rulemaking would nor¬ mally include a public comment period on the proposed regulations. CERCLA requires that the following be accomplished through rule- making: • Designating hazardous substances and es¬ tablishing reportable quantities of hazard¬ ous substances (Section 102). • Establishing information reporting re¬ quirements (Section 103). • Defining emergency procurement powers (Section 104). • Revising the National Contingency Plan (Section 105). (There are several require¬ ments for rulemaking in this section.) • Evaluating a program of optional private post-closure liability insurance for hazard¬ ous waste facilities (Section 107). • Determining financial responsibility for vehicles (Section 108). • Assigning money-spending powers to gov¬ ernment officials (Section 111). • Giving notice to potential injured parties (Section 111). • Establishing procedures for filing claims (Section 112). Section 113 of CERCLA discusses access to the courts by parties that disagree with EPA actions. Subsection (a) permits the public to seek judicial review of any Federal regulation promulgated under the Act in the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C. Addi¬ tionally, subsection (b) provides that “ . . . the •Fred Anderson. Negotiation and Informal Agency Action The Case of Superfund. Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S.. May 25. 1984. United States district courts shall have exclu¬ sive original jurisdiction over all controversies arising under this Act. . . ,” but it is silent on who has standing to bring suit regarding what types of controversies. These are the only state¬ ments in CERCLA concerning the rights of the public to initiate or participate in legal actions related to Superfund activities. Absent from CERCLA are provisions allow¬ ing “citizen suits" to be brought against the government or a private party, such as a po¬ tentially responsible party, thought to be act¬ ing in violation of the law. Citizen suits are ex¬ plicitly permitted under most other major environmental protection laws including the Clean Air Act (Section 304), the Clean Water Act (Section 505), the Endangered Species Act (Section llg). and the Toxic Substances Con¬ trol Act (Section 20). 4 Moreover, CERCLA does not define procedures by which the public may petition EPA to promulgate new regulations under the Act. Citizen petition provisions are contained in the Toxic Substances Control Act (Section 21) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Section 7004). 5 Finally, CERCLA does not guarantee that the public may intervene in Superfund negotiation or en¬ forcement actions involving potentially respon¬ sible parties, 8 and several courts have ruled that community groups may not join Superfund lawsuits as intervening parties. 7 These limita¬ tions in CERCLA may have resulted from con¬ cerns about delays in the cleanup process and about problems associated with getting PRPs to fund cleanups if the public were more rectly involved. CERCLA contains instructions to guide the EPA as it develops the Superfund program, •|eri Bidinger. "Hazardous Waste Cleanup in Wyoming; Legal Tools Available to the Finale Citizen." Iaind and Water ban Review. 1984. •Natural Resources Defense Council, Memorandum from Jane Bloom to the Superfund Reauthorization Coalition. |an. :i. 1933. pp. 9-11. •Ibid., p. 1. ’Randy Mott, letter to Karen Larsen. Office of Technology Assessment. Nov. 30, 1984. Hereafter referred to as the Mott letter. 260 * Superlund Strategy but, with one exception, these instructions make no reference to public involvement. For example, CERCLA requires that the Attorney General be consulted prior to the issuance of “guidelines for using the imminent hazard, en¬ forcement, and emergency response authori¬ ties” (Section 10f>(c)), but does not require pub¬ lic review of those guidelines. Similarly, Section 105(8)(B) requires that "each State shall establish ... priorities for remedial action.” but it does not order the States to allow public in¬ volvement during that process, nor does it in¬ sist on public participation during EPA reviews of State nominations. The one exception. Section 105(4). requires that the revised National Contingency Plan ex¬ amine the “appropriate roles and responsibil¬ ities for the Federal, State, and local govern¬ ments and for interstate and nongovernmental entities in effectuating the plan" (emphasis added). While the public is not mentioned spe¬ cifically, it could arguably be considered a sub¬ set of nongovernmental entities. No guidance is offered about how the "appropriate roles” might be determined. CERCLA was drafted during an era when for the first time many abandoned hazardous waste sites were discovered to be leaking sub¬ stances that could endanger public health. News of “toxic timebombs” such as Love Ca¬ nal. New York, appeared in the press routinely. These announcements, coupled with the appar¬ ent inability of the government or private par¬ ties to take quick action to protect the health of jjeople living near the sites, heightened pub¬ lic fears and created an emotionally charged atmosphere. In that environment. Congress en¬ acted a law to facilitate a rapid response by the Federal Government to what many thought was a national emergency. The law seems to reflect a belief that this is a problem best handed to the experts. The ex¬ tent of pollution and the public health threats it causes at many uncontrolled hazardous waste sites is poorly understood. The selection of appropriate cleanup technologies often re¬ quites sophisticated engineering and scientific judgments. The assignment ol liability to par¬ ties that caused environmental problems in¬ vokes difficult legal issues. The two themes of promoting quick action and domination of decisionmaking by ERA and technical experts acting on behalf of a frightened public are reflected in CERCLA and guide the devclop- ment and implementation of the Superfund program. THE NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN CERCLA ordered the EPA to develop a frame¬ work for the Superfund program in the form of Federal regulations incorporated into the National Contingency Plan (NCP), first devel¬ oped under the Clean Water Act. Public participation during the NCP revision process took tw'o forms—litigation and formal public comments on proposed regulations. Lit¬ igation resulted because the EPA missed the June 9, 1981 statutory deadline for promulgat¬ ing revisions to the NCP. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) then sued in the U.S. Cir¬ cuit Court of Appeals in Washington, D.C.. seeking a court order forcing EPA to propose NCP revisions. 8 The suit was later combined with a similar action by the State of New Jer¬ sey.® On February 12, 1982. the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered the EPA to complete NCP revisions by May 13, 1982. 10 The deadline was extended for 15 days by the court on March 18, 1982, to provide additional time for public comment on the proposed rules •U S. Court of A|)|>cals. District of Columbia Circuit. Civil Ac¬ tion »H1-20H3. *1 1 S. Court of Ap|>eals. District ol Columbia Circuit. Civ il Ac ¬ tion «8l-22b‘J. '"DiT-ston published in the* h'rnimnmcntal l„w Krftorter at 12 ELK 20370-20378. April 1982. &M>£g9r**tefia Cb. fl-Pubbc Participation and Pub„c Con,,Pence in ,„e Super,und Proguun • 26 , (which was expanded from 30 to 45 days).*‘ The final regulations were promulgated on julj, 10. 1982. 11 During the 45-day comment period. El’A re¬ ceived 146 written statements from the public, government agencies, and industry that ,nc, “ l over 1.000 pages of text.” The preamble to the final regulations notes that the regulations were modified in response to comments. However, with one exception. EPA rejected even recom¬ mendation to expand public paHic.paUon pro¬ cedures outlined in the draft NCI . I he pre¬ amble noted four major themes contained in comments related to public participation. • there should be stronger advocacy ot pub¬ lic participation in the NC.P: • the draft NCP placed too rune., an horitx in the hands of the lead agency and the Na¬ tional Response Team; • some procedure should be established to help the public understand what cleanup actions were being taken; and • the NCP should include speci.ic public participation requirements. Consequently. EPA added a provision requir¬ ing that government personnel "be sensitive to local community concerns (in accordance w it! applicable guidance)” when assessing the nu.d for planning, or undertaking Sujier uml mam ed actions.” However. EPA did not include the guidance as part of the regulations, nor did. it define any specific public participation re¬ quirements. With regard to other comments related to public involvement in the Superfund program. EPA rejected a request that the Hazard Rank¬ ing Svstcm (HRS) be expanded to include con¬ sideration of nontechnical faclors-mcluding community interests-when used to assess the severity of a site’s environmental problems. EPA reasoned that the appropriate place to consider community interests was during the development of cleanup strategies, well after ‘•ModiTicali<>n t.ublidicd in tl.e Environmental K.y»rter at 12 Kl-K 2(401. Slav 1««2. • 47 Federal RcRist«-i 3UB0-31220. >47 Federal Rejte.ter 31U M >' •47 Federal Register 311‘ia. >40 CFR «KM.llcK3|. the site ranking.’ 9 However, sites not receiv¬ ing a high hazard ranking are not considered for remedial cleanup actions. Also relevant to the “community interest’ issue is that the HRS scoring criteria does con¬ sider population density near sites. I hat cri¬ terion can create a bias in favor of adding Ni b sites in populated regions m comparison to equally hazardous sites in sparse v popu a ~d regions. To the extent that densely populated cgioH* arc likely .0 have high levels olcom¬ munity interest compared to rural areas a W; ing a specific “community interest criterion to the HRS could exacerbate that bias. EPA also rejected a recommendation that meetings of the National Response learn be o£ n to the public by saying that “such a pro¬ vision is not appropriate in this Plan, since some meetings may be public and others ma\ require executive session. 17 finally, recom¬ mendations that private parties be allowed to suggest to EPA that particular On-Scene Coor¬ dinators (OSCs) of Superfund actions be re¬ placed were also denied. EPA continued to it such suggestions to the Regional Response Teams—which contain no members from the public—reasoning that "it is inappropriate to encourage such requests in the R'an. especiall> since the OSC will often be involved in situa¬ tions where private parties have failed to clean up properly."’* The final NCP is similar to CERCLA itself in its lack of specificity with regard to required public involvement in Superfund ac * lv,t .! es J* is perhaps notable that the word public does not appear anywhere in the introductory Sec tion 300.3 which defines the scope of the en¬ tire NCP. In addition to the requirements, cited above, for "sensitivity to local community concerns when studying cleanup options and for pu- lic comments on proposed adoitions to the NPE, the following NCP sections address pub¬ lic participation issues: • “Federal agencies should coordinate plan¬ ning and response action with affected •M7 Federal Kr-RiMer 31 1 H/. •47 Federal Register 3U‘*7. ’47 Federal Rcfiister 31347. \ 262 • Superlund Sratesy State and local government and private cit¬ izens" (40 CFR 300.22(h). • "Industry groups, academic organizations, and others are encouraged to commit re¬ sources for response operations” (40 CFR 300.25(a)). • "It is particularly important to use valu¬ able technical and scientific information generated hv the nongovernment local community along with those from Federal and State government to assist the OSC in devising strategies where effective stand¬ ard techniques are unavailable" (40 CFR 300.25(b)). • "Federal local contingency plans should establish procedures to allow lor well- organized. worthwhile, and sale use of vol¬ unteers" (40 CFR 300.25(c)). • "The USCG (IJ.S. Coast Guard) Public In¬ formation Assist Team (PI AT) and the EPA Public Affairs Assist Team (PAAT) may help the OSCs and regional or district offices meet '.he demands (or public infor¬ mation and participation during major re¬ sponses. Requests for these teams may he made through the (National Response Cen¬ ter)" (40 CFR 300.34(f)). The promulgation of the final revised NCP precipitated a second legal challenge by EDF and the State of New Jersey. 18 The plaintiffs argued that the NCP did not contain the nec¬ essary information in sufficient detail to com¬ ply with CERCLA 10 Negotiations between EPA and the plain.ills resulted in a consent decree signed on January 16. 1984. i '> In the agreement. EPA promised to propose further revisions to the NCP to address six major issues, one of which was public participation. Specifically EPA agreed to the following: EPA will projtose amendments to the NCP to (a) require development of Community Re¬ lations Plans for all Funded-financed response measures, (b) require public review of the Fea¬ sibility Studies for all Fund-financed response measures, and (c) provide comparable public "U S. On -1 of Appeals. District of Columbia Circuit, Civil Ac¬ tions *82 2234 ami *82-2238 '•Hob Percival. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF). [>ersonal communication. Oct. 9. 19H4. '’Copy of the Settlement Agreement obtained from ED!’. participation for private-parly response meas¬ ures undertaken pursuant to enforcement ac¬ tions. 22 EPA released a second draft version of pos¬ sible regulatory language to the plaintiffs in September 1964. The dralt requires community relations plans at every Superfund site and orders a 21-day public comment period on all feasibility studies. 23 These actions have to date been EPA policy, hut they have not been regu¬ latory requirements. Also, the draft contains language that would permit public participa¬ tion in enforcement actions, but only when EPA determines that public participation will be “useful to further the cause of settlement.” EDF has taken issue with that condition by re¬ sponding to EPA as follows: This requirement ignores the fact that the central purpose of public participation is not to facilitate settlements but rather to deal ef¬ fectively with the concerns of the surround¬ ing community ... If public representatives are willing to comply with the other condi¬ tions. including small numbers, technical and legal expertise, and a pledge ol confidentiality, the y should be permitted to participate in the negotiations. 24 It is important to note that many people dis¬ agree. at least in part, with EDF’s position on public involvement in all stages of enforcement actions. One lawyer believes, for example, that "public participation in enforcement cases is a potential necessity, but public access to set¬ tlement discussions would have a potentially disastrous effect on voluntary cleanup. We have generally conducted all our negotiations in the open, but this is the exception, not the rule and. even then, on some issues privacy is critical.” 25 A paper on Superfund negotiations written for the Administrative Conference of the United States cites discussions involving the allocation of cleanup costs among private parties or involving analysts of the amount, tox- "Ibiil.. p. 2. " "Comments of the Environmental Defense Fund on the Sept 10. 1984. Draft Revisions to the National Contingency Plan." Oct. 1. 1984. p. 8. Mailer! from KDF's Washington. IX:. office to EPA. "Ibid., p. 8. "Moll letter. o H . cit. Qlj g _ Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program • 263 icitv. longevity, and condition of the wastes de¬ posited by individual parties as examples of issues that might require privacy. 29 ERA Proposed Changes to NCP On January 28. 1985. EPA announced its pro¬ posed changes to the NCP.” A number of im¬ portant changes have been proposed concern¬ ing public participation. 1 lowever. the proposal undergoes public comment lor 60 days and it is not now possible for OTA to know how the proposal may be changed in response to pub¬ lic comments or how the new NLP will be im¬ plemented. Nevertheless, the proposed changes significantly address concerns about public participation. A new section to Subpart C on Organization entitled Public Information is proposed. This sets up the mechanism to "address public in¬ formation at a response." The purpose is to en¬ sure “that all appropriate public and private interests are kept informed and their concerns considered throughout a response. A new section to Subpart F on Hazardous Subsii nee Response entitled Community Re¬ lations is proposed. The Preamble notes that: "The purpose of the community relations pro¬ gram is to provide communities with accurate information about problems posed by releases of hazardous substances, and give local offi¬ cials and citizens the opportunity to comment on the technical solutions to the site problems. A formal community relations plan is required for all removal actions and all remedial actions, including enforcement actions, but not for “short term or urgent removal actions or ur- “AndorNon. op. cit.. p. 97. •The revisions are published at 50 Federal Register 5Kbl. Feb. 12. 1985 gent enforcement actions." Moreover, the for¬ mal plan is to be "based on discussions with citizens in the community” and "should be re¬ viewed by the public.” The plan should be de¬ veloped and implementation begun prior to field activities" for remedial actions, including enforcement actions. A "responsible party may develop and implement specific parts of the community relations plan with lead agency oversight. ’ Furthermore: the minimum public comment period al¬ lowed for review of feasibility studies tor re¬ medial actions at NPL releases shall be 21 cal¬ endar days. The comment period is to be held prior to final selection of the remedy anti al¬ lows for effective community and responsible party input into the decisionma! ing process The public may also have the opportunity to comment during the development of the fea¬ sibility study. This will provide the public with advanced warning as to possible reme¬ dial alternatives. Records of decision would be required to have a responsiveness summary “addressing the ma¬ jor issues raised by the community. Lastly, with regard to the interactions be¬ tween the lead agency and PRPs. there could be meetings with "a limited number of repre¬ sentatives of the public, where these represent¬ atives have adequate legal and technical capa¬ bility and can provide i ppropriate assurances concerning any confidential information that may arise during the discussions, if in the judg¬ ment of the lead Agency such meetings may facilitate resolution of issues involving the appropriate remedy at the site. Note that the remainder of this chapter ex¬ amines and discusses the current Superfund program, even though some of the abo>e changes might address the issues and concerns that now exist. THE EPA COMMUNITY RELATIONS PROGRAM The Community Relations Program defines public participation procedures that agency staff should follow as a matter of policy, rather than law or regulation. The document that cur¬ rently explains the program is a September 1983 report entitled "Community Relations in ****m^s&.it*&m I 264 • Superfund Strategy Superfund: A Handbook.” It describes in detail public participation activities that EPA staff should conduct during the development and implementation of cleanup efforts at Super¬ fund sites. (The specifics of how the program is operated are discussed later in this chapter.) Despite the length of the handbook—over 100 pages and its degree of detail, there are some notable limitations to the program it defines. First, the document is an “interim version” and is incomplete. For example, an entire chapter concerning public participation in enforce¬ ment actions is missing. EPA has drafted sev¬ eral versions of the chapter, but none have been adopted.™ Secondly, the program applies only to cleanup activities at NPL sites. It does not induce procedures to promote public partici¬ pation during the review of proposed regula¬ tions or policy or during the hazard ranking or site selection processes. Thirdly, the pro¬ gram focuses on public participation activities by EPA employees, it does not establish legally enforceable minimal requirements for public involvement at Superfund sites. As explained above. EPA has agreed to promulgate new reg- '•VldtRai-wt Kiinddll. Deputy Director >f the 0(1 ice of Public Affairs U A Keg,„„ U ami I .11,an Inhnson. Superfund Comm.,- mtv Relations Coordinate, CPA Re R „>„ || personal rommunt- i dtions. Or.I. 24. 1SK4 Hereafter referred to as the KPA Ree.on II inters lew. illations requiring Community Relations Plans, but implementing the program is currently dis¬ cretionary. Finally, the handbook is designed to help EPA officials develop community relations pro¬ grams, not to help the public participate in them. Indeed, the handbook specifically cau¬ tions that it: ... does not serve as a public participation manual. In the past, several public participa¬ tion manuals have been prepared for EPA, particularly in die water program. Readers that need detailed guidance on public partici¬ pation techniques ... should consult these manuals.™ The Superfund program dilfers considerably from other EPA programs. The task of explain¬ ing public participation procedures to the pub¬ lic has fallen to citizen groups involved in Superfund issues. For example, the Environ¬ mental Defense Fund has published a public participation manual entitled IJumpsitp Clean¬ ups. A Citizen s Cuide to the Superfund Pro¬ gram. 30 C ommunity Relations Handbook, op. cit p n -Knvironmenlai Defense Fund. Pumpsite Cleanups: A Cif, zen s Guide to tin- Superfund Program. Washington. DC is«j Hereafter referred to as Dumpsite Cleanups. THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM IN ACTION The actual implementation of the Superfund program can be divided into two phases. The first involves identifying potential sites for Superfund cleanup and ranking those sites ac¬ cording to the severity of the environmental and human health risks they present. The sec¬ ond phase involves selecting and conducting cleanup programs at uncontrolled sites, includ¬ ing emergency and remedial cleanup actions. EPA provides opportunities for public partici¬ pation in each of these phases, as discussed later. c „ Participation ar.0 PoPtic Cont.oancejrnna Sooe^oOPjop^-J* The National Priorities List With the exception of some short-term emer¬ gency actions, cleanup of a hazardous waste file as part of the Superfund program s no undertaken unless the site is on the National Priorities List (NPL). which is revised periodi¬ cally. A site cannot become part of he NPL un less\t has been identified as a potential M L candidate and the severity of its pollution prob¬ lems have been evaluated. While EPA states the purpose of the NPL merely*'as an informational tool for use by EPA in identifying sites that appear to prest. a significant risk to public health or the em j- ronment.” 3 ’ appearance ol a site °n the . ^ has other implications. For example, listing can provide State leverage to pressure El A cleanup funds or offer citizens nroups.no- mat ion with which to pressure EPA. States, and responsible parties to take actions. Al . publication of the list and the press coverage that accompanies it provide a way or e pu lie to learn about the Nation s hazardous waste problems and track the progress of the Supc fund program. On the other hand. NPL listing can have some potential adverse consequences. For example, appearance of a site on ■ • can heighten community fears beyond whaUs warranted by the health risks po^ by the site, and it can cause negative economic con. . quences such as reducing local property val¬ ues Thus for a number of reasons many citi zen groups are keenly interested in the selection process and are anxious to participate m i . About 19.000 uncontrolled S'tes bave been identified in the United States and EPA. estn males that the list might ultimately reach 22,000. 12 Many sites were identified by their »resent or past operators as required under Section 103 of CERCLA. Site iaent.ficatiun s an ongoing process, however, and there ar "o official pathways by which the publican bring potential Superfund candidates to El A attention. First. CERCLA and the NCP require the National Response Center in Washington D C.. to record site identifications phoned n by the public and to report this information to the On Scene Coordinator for Superfund activ¬ ities in the appropriate region In addition EPA headquarters and each EPA Region mm tain Superfund ‘ hot-line numbers tha^ peo¬ ple can use to identify hazardous waste sites. niq Federal Register 40320. Oct 15. 1<*84 -SnnTs Melamed. "Superfund From S,.e Select,on o Clean¬ up " Environmental and Enemy Study Lonlcrence (.utde (Wadv •n R ,„„. UC: Inly 11. 1984|. p. 1. Hereafter referred to Kb.SC Guide. Once a site has been identified, its pollution problems are evaluated. The first two steps in IhTs process involve the collection of inform^ tion during a preliminary assessment and a site inspection (see chapter 5). While there are no formal opportunities for public comment c ur ing these procedures, the EPA Community R •- lations Handbook suggests that EPA es ah «h contact by phone with State and local officials ami with key citizens” during the prelnnmary assessment. 34 Furthermore, “community rela tions activities during a site inspection should focus on informing the community of site in spection activities and the likely schedule future events.” 35 The public now has no formal way to influ¬ ence which sites are selected for preliminary assessments and site inspect ions or when Aose evaluations are conducted_ In the wo Margaret Randall. Deputy D,rector of the Of¬ fice of Public Affairs at EPA Reg.on It. EPA decides when the (evaluation processl in ”*> One community group in Greenup UU nuts, has gone as far as holding pub tc dem¬ onstrations at a potential Superf.n si c “EPA Region 11 interview, op. cit. “Comrouml; Relations Handbook op. cit.. p. S-i. , p. 3-2. “Ibid “tutu.. ,«• - — ., “EPA Region II Interview, op. ci«. MUOM T.MWWW4 ThU*.' .XS-Jt - ■mr-ar-icvir. . - "--n 1 266 • Superfund Strategy F« pressure EPA into beginning a preliminary assessment. 37 If the site inspection uncovers potential or actual discharges of hazardous substances, the HKS is used to evaluate and “score” its pollu¬ tion problems. The development of the HRS it¬ self included some public participation. Pub¬ lic comment was solicited on an HRS model proposed by EPA in a Federal Register notice along v\ ilh the draft NCP on March 12, 1982 3a EPA received extensive comments on the HRS and modified it in several ways prior to adopt¬ ing a linal version on July 16, 1982. 39 The development of the HRS also involved an unusual effort by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD-Independent Agen¬ cies to sponsor a workshop on the topic at¬ tended by representatives from industry, gov¬ ernment, and one environmental organization. I he 2-dav workshop, convened on March 19 and 20. 1982, in the midst of the puh'ic com¬ ment period on the draft NCP and HRS. was moderated by a professional mediator, and a written record of portions of the proceedings was later published.* 9 While the information and opinions discussed at the workshop were not entered into the public comment record for he draft HRS, EPA officials were present and the meetings provided an avenue for public participation in the HRS decisionmaking process. There are no opportunities for public partici¬ pation during the application of the HRS to sites after the site inspection. Moreover, there are no public participation provisions during the reviews performed subsequently' by the States and the EPA. HRS scores and the work¬ sheets produced during the evaluations are not made public either by Stales or the EPA unless ’'Kobert Gmsburg. Citizens for „ Better Environment personal communication. Oct. 8. 1984 . personal ’•47 Federal Register 10975. Mar 12. 1982. "47 Federal Register 31186-21191. July 16. 1982. "Sam Gusman. Senior Associate of die Conservation Foun¬ dation, personal communication. Oct. 5. 1984 The written rec¬ ord ot the workshop appears as Workshop on Select,on of Haz¬ ardous Haste .Sites for Superfund Fundmgs. Sponsored by the ? f , F artme,U 0l Hous,n * and Urban Develop- nwnt-lndei^ndcnt Agencies of the Committee on ApproprL- bons. U.S. Senate. Mar. 19-20. .982 (Washington PC: U S Gov- m21 * - - and unlit Iho EPA publishes a lisl of sites pro- posed for inclusion on the NPL. EPA treats in- formation on sites that are not added to the NPL as privileged and it is not available to the public. Once proposed additions tc the NPL have been published in the Federal Register, a 30- day public comment begins. At the beginning of the comment period, EPA releases ranking worksheets and other background information, but only for sites named for the NPL. Com¬ ments were received on about 50 percent of the sites named to the first proposed NPL list About 90 percent of the comments came from potentially responsible parties and changes were made in the rankings for about 2 percent , the sites based on information provided in the public comments.* 1 During the most recent ?™J°S!?a NPL Hs,ing - com P le,ed in September 1984, EPA received 128 comments. Fifty of the 133 proposed sites were the focus of 112 com¬ ments. Only 16 comments addressed sites not included on the proposed list.* 2 In short, the public is completely excluded from the draft NPL selection process itself, and then is provided information only about pro¬ posed NPL candidates to assist them in prepar¬ ing comments. Although many people are con- cerned that sites with severe toxic pollution problems might be omitted from the NPL (see chapter 5), the current decisionmaking proc¬ ess does not offer (hem an opportunity to ex¬ amine why sites were rejected. Thus, the current process does not generate Mn, > C co L nfldence th at sites not named to the i L ‘‘St have been justifiably omitted. As a re¬ sult, some experts believe that “every site picked is bad, but not every bad site is Fk C mdi “ P ,herS ’ Such as PRPs - be, *eve that the NI L selection process overscores as many sites as it underscores.** Several groups have attempted to obtain in- tormation about sites not proposed to the NPL “EESC Guide, op. til., p 4 . “"Background Information: National Priorities List Update M. September 1984." obtained from EPA Region II l.mda Greer. Environmental Defense Fund, personal com¬ munication. Oct. 8. 1984. ' 1 co,n “Mott letter, op. tit. i or to influence which sites are placed on the list. For example, prior to the publication of the first NPL candidate list, a law firm filed a Free¬ dom of Information Act request seeking data about the sites submitted by the States. 1 he re¬ quest was refused. The firm had better luck at the State level. According to an attorney at the firm, “we had input into the 115 list solely be¬ cause we went to States and found the candi¬ dates they were submitting and (somehow) managed to whip in data and information in the process.” 45 The staff of a public interest organization in Ohio had a completely different experience. They attempted to obtain information from the State environmental agency about a site that had been evaluated, but their request was denied, /he information was obtained from EPA, however, not as part of EPA policy, but unofficially from a sympathetic agency em¬ ployee. 48 Bonnie Exner, representing the Colorado Cit¬ izen Action Network, was involved in a review of a ranking process at the Lowry Landfill site near Denver that resulted in a reevaluated score 20 points higher than originally calcu¬ lated. Several years ago during a controversy over the permitting of an operating hazardous waste facility at Lowry, the Governor formed the Lowry Landfill Monitoring Committee, an advisory group that included local citizens and representatives of EPA, the State health depart¬ ment, local government, and a waste disposal company. After a 300-acre area within the much larger landfill site was evaluated as part of the Superfund program, the local citizens decided to perform their own HRS scoring. When the citizens' score turned out to be much higher than the official evaluation, they “forced the issue,” in Exner s words, and the higher score was ultimately submitted by the State to EPA as part of its NPL nomination. 47 As a final example, a citizens group in Cali¬ fornia, Concerned Neighbors in Action, used ♦^Workshop record, op. cit.. p. 81. ♦•Steven ; ester, Citizen’s Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes. Inc., personal communication. Oct. 11. 1984. 47 Bonnia Exner. Colorado Citizen Action Network, personal communication. Oct. 18. 1984. lobbying and a threatened press conference to expose conditions at the Stringfellow Acid 1 its to influence the State selection process. The Stringfellow site did not receive the highest ranking of all sites evaluated in the State dur¬ ing the initial site selection process. But, as one analyst has summarized, the citizens group: was very active in lobbying for the passage of the State’s Superfund law. Prior to an¬ nouncing passage of the law, the State was leaning toward selecting the McColl dumpsite in Fullerton as the highest priority site. The citizens prevailed, claiming that if McColl was selected and money was not allocated for Stringfellow, a press conference would he held The State ultimately chose Stringfellow as the highest priority site; McColl was not placed on the Interim Priority List, but was placed on the 1982 NPL. However, a new Calilornia ranking process has changed the entire situation. Fund-Financed Removals and Remedial Responses Removal Actions Removal programs are categorized accord¬ ing to the length of time involved in the clean¬ up” Varying levels of community relations activities accompany the different types ol re¬ moval programs. For removals estimated to last fewer than 5 days, the Community Relations Handbook instructs EPA staff to be ready to respond to requests for information from the media, to provide information to government officials to help them to answer questions from their constituents, and to explain the removal program directly to the public. 4 If a removal is expected to last between 5 and 45 days, regional EPA staff must prepare a Community Relations Profile that must be ap¬ proved bv EPA headquarters prior to the undertaking of the removal program. The pro¬ file should explain the public participation pro- “George |. Trezek. "Engineering Case Study of the Stringfellow Superfund Site.” contractor report prepared for the Ogice of Technology Assessment. August 1984. p. 50. “Community Relations Handbook, op. cit., p. 2-1. 268 • Superfund Strategy visions EPA expects to conduct during the re¬ moval. Recommended activities include desig¬ nating a single EPA contact person, publiciz¬ ing the phone number of the contact, provid¬ ing information to government officials, hold¬ ing a press conference if there is sufficient interest, establishing a repository for docu¬ ments explaining the removal, and meeting pe¬ riodically with small groups of local officials and interested citizens. 50 For removals lasting between 45 days and 6 months, regional EPA staff must prepare a Community Relations Plan as part of the Ac¬ tion Memorandum or Draft Cooperative Agree¬ ment that must be approved by EPA headquar¬ ters. Recommended public participation activities during these lengthier removal ac¬ tions include briefings and periodic progress reports for officials and interested citizens, public meetings and workshops, site tours, and news releases describing developments at the site. After completing the removal, regional EPA staff must submit a “responsiveness sum¬ mary” to EPA headquarters describing what community relations activities were actually conducted. 51 All community relations efforts at removals have a common focus on providing informa¬ tion. No activities permit the public to partici¬ pate in decisionmaking about what type of re¬ moval program should be implemented or how it should be implemented. Indeed, none of the 18 suggested “community relations tech¬ niques” described in the Community Relations Handbook for use during Superfund site activ¬ ity involve public participation at the points when cleanup decisions are actually made. 52 All the techniques involve information dissem¬ ination, tours, or citizen group meetings where no cleanup decisions are made. Moreover, the Community Relations Hand¬ book instructs EPA staff to fit their activities to respond to the degree of public interest or concern. The higher the level of interest, the more extensive the community relations pro¬ “Ibid.. cp. 2-3. *'Ibid., pp. 2-7. “Ibid.. pp. 4-1 through 4-33. gram. There is a certain logic to this guideline, but it places citizens groups in an awkward position, as described by Lois Gibbs, Director of the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes: The message this policy sends out is “orga¬ nize and raise hell and you'll have input—sit back, behave yourselves and you'll be ignored.” The very nature of this policy is to force people into an adversarial role. Once a relationship begins poorly, it is difficult, if not impossible, to build trust. 53 Because rural or low-income areas often have fewer resources and organizations compared to more densely populated or middle-class areas, this could produce a bias against pro¬ viding extensive community relations pro¬ grams for some areas. Remedial Actions All remedial actions musi include at least one formal opportunity for public participation. Re¬ medial responses must be undertaken when¬ ever cleanup of a Superfund site cannot be ac¬ complished within the 6-n:onth lime limit set in CERCLA. The key steps in remedial actions include an in-depth investigation of the she (the remedial investigation), the development of several cleanup plans and the selection of a preferred alternative (called the feasibility study), the final approval of a cleanup program, and the execution of the cleanup. The Community Relations Handbook ex¬ plains public participation activities that may or must occur during remedial actions. 54 Those activities must be explained in an approved Community Relations Plan prepared by region¬ al EPA staff after meetings with local officials and citizens to assess community concerns and the technical complexity of the site’s pollution problems. During the remedial investigation and the drafting of the feasibility study, the ob¬ jectives of community relations activities are to distribute information and to elicit citizen “hois Gibbs. "Why Government and Indu- try Have Failed at Public Participation at Superfund Sites." undated reprint, p. 192. “Community Relations Handbook, op cit.. pp. 3-1 through 3-13. Ch 8—Public Participation and Public Confidence in the Superfund Program • 269 views. The recommended techniques again fo¬ cus on small or informal meetings, news re¬ leases, tours, briefings, and progress reports. It is only after the publication of the feasi¬ bility study and the delineation of a preferred cleanup strategy that the public is given a for¬ mal opportunity to comment to decisionmakers on the development of a remedial action. EPA requires that a public comment period of at least 3 weeks must follow the release of a fea¬ sibility study; EPA may extend the comment period upon request, and it frequently does so. After selecting a final remedial design and while the remedial action is occurring, EPA continues the same sorts of information dis¬ semination activities that characterize the ear¬ lier phases of the program. In addition, EPA community relations staff is instructed during the cleanup implementation phase to “make sure local residents understand that cleanup of the site may not resolve all problems .. . Meetings with small groups of citizens and officials . . . may again be the most effective communications technique during this stage of the response action.” 55 When a remedial ac¬ tion is completed, regional EPA staff must sub¬ mit a report to headquarters describing and evaluating the overall community relations effort. Two general criticisms of the public partici¬ pation program for rund-iinanced cleanups are frequently stated by citizens groups active at Superfund sites. The first is that the public is not given the opportunity to influence deci¬ sionmaking early in the process while cleanup strategies are being selected. The second crit¬ icism is that the program does not address the lack of technical expertise on the part of citi¬ zens groups tb.»t hampers constructive public nartirination cj..oi». “ibid., p. 103. •’Bidinger, op. cit.. pp. 413-417. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION UNDER CERCLA VERSUS RCRA Comparing Superfund s public participation provisions with those provided by CEKCLA s legislative cousin, RCRA, can give insight into the extent and adequacy of the public partici¬ pation opportunities. RCRA specifically requires or permits pub¬ lic involvement in Federal or State hazardous waste management programs that are denied to the public or not mentioned in CERCLA. '\s mentioned, for example, RCRA contains a cit- \ I 274 • Superfund Strategy izen suit provision (Section 7002) not contained in CERCLA. RCRA also permits "any person" to petition the EPA to request the promulga¬ tion of new hazardous waste regulations (Sec¬ tion 7004(a)). No petition powers are enumer¬ ated in CERCLA. Perhaps most importantly, RCRA contains in Section 7004(b) specific instruction for pub¬ lic participation. The law reads: Public participation in the development, re¬ vision, implementation, and enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information, or pro¬ gram under this chapter shall be provided lor. encouraged, and assisted by the Administra¬ tor and the States. The Administrator, in coop¬ eration with the States, shall develop and pub¬ lish guidelines for public participation in such processes. Other RCRA provisions require a public comment period and public hearings to review operating permits issued under the Act (Sec¬ tion 7004(2)). State programs must include pub¬ lic participation provisions if the States are to receive EPA authorization to implement their hazard waste management programs. Rulemaking under RCRA, as under CERCLA, requires public notice and comment periods. There is a dilference, however, because RCRA requires more extensive rulemakings of greater complexity than does CERCLA. Like CERCLA, RCRA permits the public to seek judicial re¬ view of regulations and, in addition, it offers judicial review of petitions. In short, the hazardous waste management program defined in RCRA requires and per¬ mits far more public participation than does CERCLA. Specific public participation objec¬ tives and requirements lacking in CERCLA are given in RCRA. The public has more opportu¬ nity to become involved in the shaping of tne RCRA program because of its detailed rulemak¬ ing requirements. Public participation at hear¬ ings must be allowed during the permitting process—which is the backbone of the imple¬ mentation phase of RCRA. And the public, with some limitations, is guaranteed access to the courts for judicial review of the RCRA pro¬ gram or its' implementation. The applicability of RCRA public participation requirements to Superfund remedial actions (that might other¬ wise require a RCRA permit) is not clear. EPA has said at various times that Superfund ac¬ tions will adhere to substantive RCRA require¬ ments. If EPA considers public participation and review to be procedural rather than sub¬ stantive. public involvement rights under RCRA may be curtailed at Supertund sites. . var* Administrative Conference of the United States, 262 one Advanced Electric Reactor. 176. 205 Association ^of Slate and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials. 164. 165. *-42. 251. 252 A systems analysis of Superfund. 61-99 current estimates of future Supertund needs. 01 uncertainty and the need to evaluate the Superfund program, 63 alternative approaches. 64 historical performance A systems analysis approach to define a long¬ term strategic plan, 67 conclusions. 65 health and environment effects, 86 non-Federal money. 88 definition of goals. 6b interim strategy, 72 model description, 71 permanent strategy. 73 simulation: a systems analysis method .or comparing two strategies and incor¬ porating long-term certainty. 70 use of model findings. 74 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 63 Athens. GA. 32 Atomic Energy Commission, 32 Baltimore. MD. 33 . , . Batteile Pacific Northwest Laboratories. 212 Biocraft Laboratories. 210 Borger. TX, 205 Boulder. CO. 131 Burleson/Kennedy submerged reactor. 204 Butler Tunnel. 33 California. 5. 43. 46. 151. 159. 207. 242 Avon, 28. 29. 223 Casmelia Resources Landfill. 29 Chino Ba'in. 29 Conogo Park. 209 Costa Mesa. 206 Glen Avon. 28. 29 Palo Alto. 207 San Diego. 209 West Covina. 29 Canada, 206 Welland. 206 Casmalia Resources Landfill, 29 Index Center for Advanced Environmental Control Technology. University of Illinois at Urbana. 218 Center for Environmental Management. 218 Chamberlain Manufacturing, 197 CARD. 197. 193 Chemical Metals Industry. 33 Chemical Minerals Recovery Site. 32 Chester Township. Nj, 131 Chicago. 218 Chino Basin, 29 Cincinnati. OH. 208 Citizens for a Better Environment 2. 1 Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes. 268. 269. 271 Cleanup technologies. 171 institutional practices and regulatory impacts. 177 site conditions and waste. 172 status quo bias, 179 support of cleanup technology R&D, 214 EPA technology R&D. 214 technical options. 181 conventional technologies, 182 conventional treatment, 187 innovative technologies. 193 technology evaluation, 172 barriers and improved technology. 175 Cleveland, 32 Colorado, 131. 271. 287 Boulder, 131 Marshall Lake. 131 Superior. 131 Colorado Citizen Action Network. -6/ Colot ado Citizens Against Lowery Landfill, -71 Columbus. OH. 210 Commerce, U.S. Department of, 61 Comprehensive Environmental Response. Com¬ pensation and Liability Act. 5. 10. 22 Concerned Neighbors in Action. 270 Congress. U.S.. 6. 10. 17. 18. 20. 22. 23. 37. 40. io. 49. 50. 54. 57. 63. 64. 126. 128. 139. 141.218.272.273 Congressional Budget Office, 126 Connecticut. 46. 131 Naugatuck, 131 Conogo Park. CA. 209 Costa Mesa, CA. 206 current institutional framework. 103 approaches to establishing cleanup goals or standards, 106 assessment of risks. 109 277 Page 275 and 2?6 blank. \ j 7.78 • Superfund Strategy available technologies, 110 site-specific considerations, 108 National Contingency Plan. 104 use of cleanup goals, 105 use of Hazard Ranking System, 105 Danvers, PA, 33 Darby Creek. PA, 129 Darcy’s Law, 224 Defense, U.S. Department of. 219, 249 Denver, CO. 267 Detox Industries Inc., 210 District of Columbia. 43 Emergency and Remedial Response Information System. 64. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 168 Energy, L'.S. Department of. 249 Environmental Defense Fund, 260 Environmental Protection Agency, U.S., 3. 4, 5, 6. 10. 11, 12. 15. 18. 20. 22. 27, 28. 29. 31, 32, 33, 37. 38. 39. 42, 43. 44, 45, 46. 49, 51. 52, 53. 54. 55. 56, 57. 63. 64, 65, 68. 87, 88. 92. 98. 99. 104. 105. 106, 110. 115. 118, 120, 125. 127, 128. 129. 131. 134. 136. 137, 138. 139. 140, 141. 142, 143. 144, 145, 146. 147, 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155, 156, 15., 158. 159. 161, 162. 163. 164. 167. 168. 171, 177, 178. 179, 180. 204. 206. 207. 213. 214. 215, 217, 218. 219. 225. 226. 227, 229, 230. 231. 233, 234, 235. 237, 238. 239. 240, 241. 242. 245. 248. 249. 252. 253. 257. 258. 260. 261, 262, 263. 264. 265, 266, 267. 268, 269. 270, 271. 272. 273, 274 Office n'. Groundwater. 65-66 A'l’mative Technologies Division. 216 Ci.cmiral and Biological Technology Branch. 216 Thermal Destruction Branch. 216 Community Relations Program, 263 Hazardous Waste Committee. 215 Hazardous Waste Treatment Council. 229 Industrial Environmental Research Laboratory. 216 Releases Control Branch. 215 Office of Emergency and Remedial Response, 214 Office of Environmental Technology. 215 Hazardous Waste Engineering Laboratory, 215 Land Pollution Control Division, 215, 219 Containment Branch, 215, 216 Office of Research and Development, 215 Office of Solid Waste, 138 Surface Impoundment Assessment. 128. 134 Exner, Bonnie, 267. 269 Federal Register, 272 Fijimasu Synthetic Cher ical Laboratories, 213 Florida, 149 CARD, 197. 198 G. A. Technologies, 208 General Accounting Office. 88, 140 Geological Survey. U.S.. 151 Georgia. 32 Athens. 32 Luminous Processes, Inc., 32 Gibbs. Lois, 268. 270 Glen Avon. CA. 28. 29 Gratiot Country Golf Club, 33 Greenville, MS. 33 Groundwater Decontamination Systems. Inc.. 210 Gwynn Falls, MD. 34 Hatfield. PA, 202 Hazard Ranking System. 45. 49, 51. 64, 68. 99. 105, 131. 132^ 133. 162, 163. 261. 266 Hazardous Waste Center, Louisiana State University, 218 Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of. 6, 18. 53 House Committee on Government Operations, 249 Houston. TX, 210 J. R. Huber Corp.. 176. 205 Advanced Electric Reactor. 176. 204 Idaho. 208 Idaho Falls. 208 Illinois, 43. 46. 48. 141, 198 Chicago. 218 NMes, 198 Illinois State Geological Survey, 151 Indiana. 27. 2.1. 223, 270 Mishawaka. 211 Seymour. 27. 28. 106, 223, 270 Industrial Hazardous Waste Elimination Center, Illinois Institute of Technology. Chicago, 218 Industry/University Cooperative Center. 214 Interior, U.S. Department of. 53. 249 Irvine, R. L., 211 IT Corp., 204 Japan, 213 Takasago West Port, 213 Index • 279 Tokyo. 213 VVaka River. 213 Johnson. Lillian, 270 Justice. U.S. Department of. 272 Kansas, 213 Wichita. 213 Kingston. NH. 272 Knoxville, TN. 205 I^wrence, MA, 30 legislation: Administrative Procedures Act, 259. Lid Clean Air Act. 112. 259 Clean Water Act. 27. 33, BO, 112. 259. 260. 272. 273 Comprehensive Environmental Response. Compensation, and Inability Act. 5. 10. 12. 17. 22. 14. 45. 52. 56. 57. 64. 69. 103, 104. 105. 111. 112. 113, 114. 117, HO, 119. 14^. 146. 147. 148. 149. 154. 158. 175. 180, 214. 242. 259. 260. 261. 262. 265. 268. 270. 272. 273. 274 Endangered Species Act, 259 Freedom of Information Act, 267 National Environmental Policy Act. 273 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. •>. 11 12 17. 20. 37. 41. 4b. 49. 50. 51. 5.». 56. 57’ 63*. 65. 68. 112. 125. 126. 128. 129. 131. 133 134. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144 145 146, 147. 148. 149. 152. 155. 156. IS?'. 158. 159. 173. 175. 177. 178. 180. 194. 215. 218. 231. 233. 234. 248. 258. 259. 272. 273. 274 Safe Drinking Water Act. H2 Small Business Innovative Development Act. 217 Toxic Substances Control Act. 175, 177. 194. 259 Lester. Steven. 269 LIFE. 270. 271 Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.. 207 Lopat Enterprises. 178. 212 Love Canal. 5. 106, 108. 260 Lowell. MA. 30. 32 Lowell Fair Share. 271 Lowery Landfill Monitoring Committee. 267 Luminous Processes, Inc., 32 Madison. PA. 207 Marathon County. Wl, 133 Marshall Lake. CO, 131 Maryland. 33. 129. 132. 271 Baltimore, 33, 271 Chemical Metals Industry site. 34 Gwynn Falls. 34 Massachusetts. 30. 48. 218. 242. 2/0. 271 Lawrence. 30 Lowell. 30. 32 Merry mack River. 30. 31 Methuen. 30 New Bedford Merrimack River. MA. 30. 31 Methods Engineering. Inc.. 204 Methuno, MA. 30 Michigan, 33. 159. 242. 272 rs_i i-viinf r\' f”. Cl I F C.lUiJ. 3*1 Pine River. 33 Velsico Chemical Co.. 33 St. Louis. 33. 272 Midland-Ross Corp.. 208 Miller. David W.. 249 Minnesota. 46. 48. 181 Mishawaka, IN, 211 Mississippi. 33 Walcott Chemical Co.. 33 Greenville. 33 Missouri. 5. 219 Times Beach, 5, 219 Verona, 178 MODAR. Ioc.. 177. 203. 204 Naugatuck. CT. 131 Nashua. NIL 30. 223 National Academy of Sciences. 109 13. National Campaign Against I oxic 23; N«*iunat Contingency Plan. 51. 63. M. 103. 104. Ill, 115. 179. 229. 231. 260. 261, 263. 266. 272 A / A. National Governors Association. 43 National Pollution Discharge Elimination Svstem. 133 National Priorities List. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. . . • 12 13 15. 17. 27. 28. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 44. 48'. 49. 50. 52. 53. 54. 55. 57. 61. 63 64 65. 68. 70. 71. 72. 104. 111. 118. 125. 126. 128. 129 131. 132. 133. 134. 137, 138. 142. 145. 169*. 162. 163. 164. 167. 223. 227. 230, 234. 264. 265, 266. 267 National Research Council. 127 National Response Center. 147. 265 National Response Team. 261 National Science Foundation, 214 National Water Well Association. 2ol Nevada, 151 ■ 260 • Superfund Strategy Beatty. 151 Las Vegas, 151 New Bedford. MA. 271 New England, 230 New Hampshire. 30. 46. 216. 228, 272 Kingston. 272 Nashua. 30 Sylvester site. 30. 31. 32, 223, 228 New Jersey. 104. 129. 131. 141. 210. 211. 213. 242, 262. 270 Chester Township, 131 Industry/University Cooperative Center. 214 Waldwick, 211 Wanamassa, 213 New Materials Technology Corp., 213 New York. 5. 43. 46. 99. 128. 129, 159. 177. 206. 242. 260. 271 Energy Research and Development Authority, 211 Love Canal, 5. 106. 108. 206. 271 Niagara Falls. 211. 271. 272 Syossett. 132 Niagara Falls. NY. 211. 271. 272 Niles. 1L. 108 North Carolina. 48 Notre Dame University. 211 Office of Groundwater. 65-66 Office of Technology Assessment, 3. 4. 7, 8, 9, 11. 12. 13. 15. 17. 20. 23. 27. 29, 30. 32. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 50. 52. 54. 56, 61. 66. 71. 74. 84. 85, 88. 89. 103. 104. 105. 119. 120. 125. 127, 129. 134. 137. 138. 154. 159. 165. 167. 168. 178, 193. 194. 197. 219. 223. 225. 227. 229. 230. 231. 232. 235. 238, 239, 240. 241. 243. 244, 252. 263 Ohio. 32. 46. 267 Chemical Minerals Recovery Site. 32 Cincinnati. 208 Cleveland. 32 Columbus. 210 Toledo. 208 Palo Alto, CA, 207 Pennsylvania. 33. 129. 130. 271 Bruin Lagoon. 271 Butler Tunnel. 33 Danvers. 33 Darby Creek. 129 Hatfield. 202 Madison, 207 Philadelphia. 129 Piltston, 33 Sharon Hill. 129 performance at site cleanups. 223 adequacy of site assessments, 228 constraints on Superfund contractors, 228 containment rather than treatment. 226 contaminant transportation, 224 design of remedial measures, 232 effects on early responses. 231 EPA staffing needs. 240 analysis of demand projections, 251 availability of qualified technical personnel, 243 estimates of future demand. 249 estimating pool of professionals, 249 other factors, 252 technical specialists, 245 expanding program's need for technical over¬ sight, 234 implications for future strategy, 233 larger program, 235 multiple studies and contractors. 225 political pressures, 227 studies versus timely actions. 227 Philadelphia. PA, 129 Pine River. MI. 33 Piltston. PA, 33 Plasma Arc Technology. 206 policy options. 4. 37-57 choosing a strategy for the Superfund system. 37 generic strategic goals, 40 tw'o-part strategy. 39 comprehensive and effective national protec¬ tion. 40 coping with uncertainty. 42 financing Superfund. 45 funding increases over time. 42 funding levels. 41 long-term program. 40 matching funds from States. 43 other uses of Superfund. 44 program duration and equity. 44 sj>ending by responsible parties. 42 goal 2: accurate estimates of the national problem. 48 goal 3: initial responses at all priority sites, 49 better use of an improved hazard ranking system. 51 economic issues. 52 nature of initial responses in the two-part strategy. 50 technical issues, 52 goal 4: implementation needs of a long-term program. 53 detailed strategic planning, 56 / N J » fe t 1 c ?: % ** £ V i- i = * Index • 281 public participation, 57 resolve cleanup goals issue and address scientific uncertainties. 53 technical staffs, support, end oversight. 55 technology, 54 Princeton University Water Resources Program. 143 , Protecting the Nation's Groundwater From Con¬ tamination . 193 public participation and confidence in Super¬ fund. 257 EPA community relations program. 263 National Contingency Plan. 260 public participation provisions under CERCLA. 259 public participation under CERCLA versus RCRA. 273 Superfund program in action, 264 National Priorities List. 265 fund-financed removals and remedial responses. 2C7 enforcement and other legal action, 271 Puerto Rico. 129 Pyrolysis Systems, Inc.. 206 Randall. Margaret. 265 Regional Response Team. 261 Richland. WA. 32. 212 Rockwell International. 209 RoTech Inc., 207 Rothschild. WI. 204 Ruckelshaus, 240 San Diego. CA. 209 A. L. Sandpiper Corp.. 209 SBR Technologies. 211 Science Advisory Board. 195 Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on MUD. 266 Seymour. IN. 27, 28. 106. 223. 270 Seymour Recycling Corp.. 27, 28. i06. 223. 230. 232. 233. 270 Sharon Hill. PA, 129 sites requiring cleanup. 125 hazardous waste facilities, 13/ comoliance monitoring, 155 contaminant tolerance levels. 145 EPA’s dependence on standards, 138 site selection process, 159 estimate ol future NPL. 164 variability among EPA regions, 162 solid waste facilities. 126 case studies. 131 current recognition and evidence of prob¬ lem, 127 estimate of possible future contributions to the NPL, 134 South Carolina. 46 St. Louis. ML 33 Stringfellow Acid Pits, 5. 28. 29, 106, 223. 228. 230, 231. 232. 235. 270 Superfund. 3, 6, 7, 8, 10. 13, 18. 22, 23, 27, 28. 30, 32. 33, 37, 39, 40. 42, 43. 44, 45, 48. 49, 51 52, 54, 55, 56. 61. 63, 64. 66. 67, 68, 69, 70. 71, 74. 75. 80. 82. 85, 92. 103. 104. 106. 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113. 114. 115. 116, 117, 119, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131. 134, 136. 137, 138, 140. 168. 171, 172, 175. 176, 181. 182, 191, 197, 206, 269. 214, 215. 216, 217. 218. 219. 223. 224 225. 2 27. 229. 233. 234. 235, 237. 239, 240, 241. 242, 244. 245. 246. 249. 252. 257. 258. 259. 261. 262. 264. 265, 270. 271. 272. 273. 274 policy options. 4 Superior, CO, 131 surface impoundment assessment, 128 Sylvester site. 30. 31. 32. 106. 223. 226. 228. 233 Svossett, NY, 132 systems analysis of Superfund. 61 Takasago. West Port, Japan. 213 Tennessee. 205. 242 Knoxville, 205 Texas, 134, 151, 205 Angleton, 204 Borger. 205 Houston. 210 Thagard Research. 205. 20.6 Times Beach. MO. 5. 219 Tokyo. 213 Toledo. OH, 208 Trezak. George J.. 253 Tufts University. 218 Turner. A. Keith, 253 University of Arizona Water Resources Research Center. 151 University of Gottingen. 211 U.S. Coast Guard. 262 U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. 259. 260 Velsico Chemical Co.. 33 Verona. MO. 178 Virginia. 133. 271 Virginia Environmental Endowment. 271 \ i M l . . Illllll r i i fW MIWTfWrilTr m ill I' T 1 — " ,n " I ‘ [r /• •* f-V / . % V, -t m r w*uaw*rt*,TS* 282 • Superfund Strategy VVaka River, [apan, 213 Walcott Chemical Co., 33 Walwick, NJ. 211 Wanamassa, NJ, 213 Washington, Stale of, 32 Richland. 32. 212 Waste-Tech, 208 Welland, Canada, 206 West Covina, 29 West Germany, 211 University of Gottingen, 211 Westinghouse Electric Corp., 206 Wichita, KS, 213 Wisconsin, 133, 151 Marathon County, 133 Rothschild, 204 Zimpro, 203, 204 f « |