973.7 N822w Erie L. Norton. War Elections, 1862-1864. (1944) LINCOLN ROOM UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY MEMORIAL the Class of 1901 founded by HARLAN HOYT HORNER and HENRIETTA CALHOUN HORNER WAR ELECTIONS 1862-1864 BY LEE NORTON The struggle for national unity in the free states during the critical years of the Civil War, and the triumph of the coali- tion forces in the re-election of President Lincoln. INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS . NEW YORK WAR ELECTIONS 1862-1864 BY LEE NORTON International Publishers New York ALL RIGHTS RESERVED PRINTED IN THE U. S. A. This International Publishers Wartime book is produced in full compliance with the Government's regulations for con- serving paper and other essential material CONTENTS Preface 5 THE FIGHT FOR EMANCIPATION 9 The Soldiers Versus McClellan 14 THE ELECTION OF 1862 18 THE ELECTION OF 1863 20 The People Organize 22 Arming the Negro People 26 THE ELECTION OF 1864 33 The Blahs and Reconstruction 33 The Draft-Lincoln Movement 36 The Peace Democratic Campaign 38 Reference Notes 47 For Katy, Wendy and Gay Ellen And the bright new world they will build together PREFA CE Not since the war elections of Abraham Lincoln's time have the American people been faced with the task of making political decisions which directly affect the winning of a people's war and the peace to follow. A study of the elections of 1862, 1863, and particularly Lincoln's second election in 1864, provides us with the only parallel in our nation's history co the elections in November, 1944. Then, as today, our nation was engaged in a progressive w r ar whose future was to be determined as much by the ballots of the loyal citizens as by the bullets of their brothers on the battlefield. War is no mere contest between rival military forces. Armies and navies are the tools of civil policy and are the last resource of nations whose problems cannot be solved peaceably. Once the weapon of war is employed its conduct becomes subject to the political purposes of the groups in control of that nation. If, during the course of the war, those groups are thrown out of power and new T ones with totally opposite aims and policies take over, the conduct of the war will correspondingly change. During the Civil War the Republicans were the progressive party. They represented the political union of the western small farmers and the industrial capitalists of New England and the middle states, supported by the workers. These people saw in the extension of slavery a threat to their own existence. Small free farmers could not compete successfully side by side with large-scale slave holdings. Slave labor threatened to drag the wage w-orker down to its miserable level. Industry could not grow, transportation could not ex- pand, markets could not rise if slaves w r ere the only labor force available, cotton the only crop, and the plantation owner the only customer. Modern industrial society could only develop if the stranglehold of slavery on the nation could be broken by the forces within the Republican Party. Formed in 1854, the Republicans first ran General John C. Fremont against the Democrat, James Buchanan, in 1856, polling more than a million votes. Many of the or- ganizers of the party and the leading figures in its councils 5 urged not merely the restriction of slave territory, but the destruction of the system itself. These anti-slavery men, known as the Radical Republicans, were no doctrinaire theoreticians. Although they made no secret of their ultimate aim, they looked for a program that the majority of the people would support and found it in the popular reaction to the outrageous decision of Chief Justice Taney, a Southern Bourbon, in the case of the slave, Dred Scott. In 1857 Scott had sued for his freedom on the grounds that his master had taken him into territory made free by the Com- promise of 1850, and since the law recognized no slavery in free territory, he was no longer a slave by virtue of his residence there. Taney decided against Scott, declaring that a slaveholder could take his "property" with him anywhere he went, and that "a Negro has no rights that a white man is bound to respect." In effect this decision destroyed all restrictions on the extension of slavery and opened up to it the vast territories of the West. The universal outcry against the Dred Scott Decision in the North and West marked it as the major issue in the coming Presidential election. The Republicans raised the slogan: "No further extension of slavery to the territories," and made that the central plank in Abraham Lincoln's 1860 platform. No mention was made of abolition. Indeed, in areas like Lincoln's own district around Springfield, Illinois, where the name "Republican" was considered far too radical to gain widespread support, Lin- coln campaigned under the title "People's Party." There were three other Presidential aspirants in the 1860 election. John Bell ran as a Constitutional Unionist with no program at all. Stephen A. Douglas was the nominee of the northern Democrats who advocated "squatter sovereignty," or the right of the settlers themselves to decide whether or not they wanted slavery. The southern wing of the Demo- cratic Party, which had split from the other group over this question, campaigned for John Breckinridge, calling for the extension of slavery to every part of the Union. This split in the Democratic ranks helped elect Lincoln. It was a split deliberately engineered to provide an excuse for the slave- holding wing of the Democratic Party to secede from the Union on the pretext that Lincoln was a minority candidate who would govern in favor of the free section of the nation and against the interests of the slave section. On April 10, 1861, this group, now organized as the Confederate States of America, took up the sword as the last remaining means of maintaining its rule over the country when it attacked Fort Sumter. It hoped for a quick war against a larger, stronger but unprepared Union. The Confederates looked for aid to members of the Democratic Party in the North, many of whose ties with the plantation system were very close. Abroad, they sought allies among the Palmerston Tory elements in England. In the North the Democratic Party was faced with the problem of supporting the war and working with the Republi- cans, or of sabotaging the war. The greatest number of them, following the lead of Douglas, immediately pledged their loyalty to the nation regardless of what administration was in office. The leading generals of the Union, William T. Sherman, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin F. Butler, John A. Logan, and many others were eminent Democrats. Evidence of the growing identity of the Republicans and these "War Democrats" as they proudly called themselves is provided by the appearance of "Union" tickets in all wartime elections composed of both Republicans and Democrats standing on a common win-the-war platform. But the remainder of the old Northern Democratic Party which could not break their ties with the South entered the political arena as the "Peace Democrats," and called for peace-at-any-price throughout the war. Victory for Lincoln's emancipation policy was achieved only by a vigorous fight in the North against the pro-slavery Copperheads centered around the Peace Democrats. In 1864 the victory of the National Union Party under Abraham Lincoln on a unity platform with unity candidates gave the military arm of a free people the necessarv direction and strength to crush the slaveholders' rebellion. The defeat of those who sought to burn the brand of slaverv upon the American nation deserves our careful attention since we still have the unfinished task before us of delivering not only our nation but the world from the threat of the world-wide slavery that is fascism. In 1860 there were scarcely 3,000 Abolitionists in the United States. In 1865 Abolition was the settled policv of a 7 nation of 22,000,000, and was supported by the vast majority. The story of this revolutionary change in the thinking of an entire people is vividly reflected in the election campaigns of the war, from the Unionists' defeats in 1862 to their sweeping victories in 18(54. It shows that a people's war can- not be merely a war "against" a reactionary way of life. By its own dynamics it forges new weapons, new patterns of thought, creates possibilities for a new and richer life for all the people. What had begun in 1861 as a war just to restore and preserve, the Union was transformed through military necessity and the active campaigning of the Radical anti-slavery men into a war for the freedom of an enslaved people. The Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment forever abolishing slavery, which was the fruit of military and political victory, followed the democratic pattern first established by the Declaration of Independence and since rewon in every critical period of our nation's history. Today the agreement at Teheran strengthens and continues the great American traditions which the armies of Washington and Lincoln gave us and those of Roosevelt are now translating into realities. Like the patriots of Lincoln's day we are faced with essentially the same problem. We have already built the armies and created the world coalition that is destroying the armies of fascism. On November 7, 1944 — eighty years to the day when the American people sealed the doom of slavery with the ballot stamp — and in the face of the con- centrated attack of all the defeatist, pro-fascist elements in the nation represented by the candidates and policies of the present reactionary Republican Party, and their supporting Copperhead press, we must co-sign the Teheran Accord with the votes of a united people, to ensure not only the complete extirpation of this modern slavocracy, but also to lay the foundations of a new, free world. The historic victory of the American people in 1864 is a spur to unity and victory today. THE FIGHT FOR EMANCIPATION The political history of the first two years of the Civil War is the history of the consistent, untiring efforts of the Radical Republicans to convince the national leaders and the majority of the people that Negro emancipation was im- perative if victory w r as to be won. Armed with a clear anti- slavery policy, the Radicals, led by Thaddeus Stevens, Con- gressman from Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and Charles Sumner, Senator from Massachusetts, played an educating, leading part within the ranks of their party, advocating measures which they saw the logic of events would soon force the Executive and Legislature to adopt. To accomplish this it was necessary for them to fight against the border-state, slaveholding Republicans who were unwilling to accept emancipation, as well as against the dangerous group of Peace Democrats, led by Clement L. Vallandigham of Ohio whose policies and activities throughout the war completely favored the Confederacy. From the beginning of the war to Emancipation Proclama- tion in 1863 the official policy of the government was one of expediency. The nation was merely pledged to the restoration of the Union as it was before the opening of hostilities. Men- tion of slavery was strictly avoided, the Crittenden Resolu- tions, adopted in July, 1861, declaring that the war was not being fought by the United States for any "purpose of over- throwing or interfering with the rights or established institu- tions of those States, but to defend and maintain the suprem- acy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union. . . ." If the Union was silent, the Confederates had no hesitancy in proclaiming to the world why they were fighting. Alex- ander H. Stephens, Vice President of the Confederacy, an- nounced in a speech on March 21, 1860, that his government had put to rest for all time the question of the South's "peculiar institution." "This," he categorically declared, "was the immediate cause of the late rupture and the present revolution." "Our new government is founded ... its cornerstone rests upon, 9 the great truth that the Negro is not equal to the white man; that Slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition." 1 It was for a state "based upon this great physical, philosophi- cal, and moral truth" that the South was fighting. Senator Charles Sumner voiced the sentiments of the Radicals when he went among the people in the latter part of 1861 agitating for a popular demand upon Congress for an aggressive war policy: "All must see, and nobody will deny, that slavery is the ruling idea of this rebellion. It is slavery that marshals these hosts and breathes into their embattled ranks its own barbarous fire. It is slavery that stamps its character alike upon officers and men. It is slavery that inspires all, from general to trumpeter. It is slavery that speaks in the word of command, and sounds in the morning drum-beat. It is slavery that digs trenches and builds hostile forts. It is slavery that pitches its wicked tents and stations its sentries over against the national capital. It is slavery that sharp- ens the bayonet and runs the bullet; that points the cannon and scatters the shell, — blazing, bursting unto death. Wherever this rebellion shows itself, whatever form it takes, whatever thing it does, whatever it meditates, it is moved by slavery; nay, the rebellion is slavery itself, — incarnate, living, acting, raging, robbing, murdering, according to the essential law of its being." 2 But even though Lincoln himself admitted in his First Inaugural Address that "one section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended — this is the only substantial dispute," he was not yet in a position to pledge the country to its extermination. Essentially a com- promise candidate, Lincoln combined within his party Radi- cals, slaveholders, and a large section of western farmers who opposed the extension of slavery but not the institution itself. Though basically in sympathy with the anti-slavery men he recognized the need of broadening that sentiment to include the more backward elements in the party and in the country. Not until he was sure that an advance in policy would also mean a further advance in party and national unity did Lincoln act. Throughout the war every step forward that he took was only achieved as the result of bitter struggle on the part of the Radicals, both to convince Lincoln and 10 the people of the necessity of the move, and against the con- servatives within the party who sought to retard the develop- ment of a consistent emancipation policy. Throughout 1861 and 1862 the American ministers abroad reported to Secretary of State William H. Seward how the cause of the Union had suffered "from the assumption that the government which maintained it is favorable, or at least not unfavorable, to the perpetuation of slavery." Relieved of the necessity of explaining away the relation of slavery to the American conflict, Confederate commissioners in Europe glibly claimed that the slave states were waging a just war against an oppressive Union which sought to deny them the rights guaranteed by the law of the land. The im- pression the Confederates tried to convey was that they were wholly in the right while the United States was fighting "for empire only." The insignificant fact that it was the treacher- ous assault upon Fort Sumter by the slave power while in the midst of "peace negotiations" at Washington that pre- cipitated the war was of no consequence. A wag might have mildly enquired: "What was Fort Sumter doing in the middle of Charleston Harbor, anyhow?" If the avowed purpose of the nation, the preservation of the Union, was to be accomplished, it could only be done, the Radicals pointed out, by crippling the productive power of the Confederacy, that is, by removing from the fields and shops the 4,000,000 slaves who formed the backbone of the Southern war effort. How could this be better achieved than by issuing an Emancipation Proclamation declaring those slaves free men and inviting their equal participation in the war? The arguments of the Radicals were always projected in that light. They took the position that emancipation of the slaves was a military necessity for victory. The problem, as Stevens saw it, and as the majority of the nation w r ere slowly coming to appreciate, was to deprive the South of its labor force. But more than that, it was to transfer that force into active participants in the war against their ex- masters. That was Stevens' policy, and it was his belief, subsequently carried out, that emancipation and the arming of the Negroes would be the policy of the whole free people of the North in two years' time. Powerful groups within the nation during this period 11 brought all their political guns to bear against the anti- slavery fighters. Foremost among these were the men, soon to earn the disgraceful title "Copperhead," whose interests called for defeat of the Union armies, and who did every- thing possible to prevent giving them the proper military and political weapons to achieve success. While division, compromise and expediency ruled inside the Republican Party, the rump of the Democrats who refused to join in the struggle for the life of the Union raised the banner of "peace at any price" and presented to the people a program of defeatism, obstructionism and treason from the early days of the war to its victorious finish. The leaders of the Peace Democrats included Clement Yallandigham, Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York, and the pro-slavery Fernando Wood, mayor of New York City and co-owner with his brother, Benjamin, of the New York Daily News, chief Copperhead organ. These men represented those whose interests were so bound up with the slave system that defeat of the Union was the only way in which they could maintain their former economic and politi- cal dominance of the country. A negotiated peace — their constant demand during the war — seemed to be the surest way of Northern bankers and commission men regaining the $300,000,000 debt owed them by the plantation owners. Peace would remove the blockade which had destroyed the monopoly of coastwise trade held by New York and Phila- delphia shippers. The attacks by Confederate privateers upon American shipping had been so successful that exporters re- fused to use American bottoms in the European trade. If the war continued long the merchant marine would soon be extinct and American shipowners bankrupt. In the West where a large portion of the business of many small "wildcat ' banks had been connected with the carrying trade down the Mississippi, numbers of men, hard hit by the stoppage of transport and the depression of 1861, turned to the Peace Democrats for aid. By 1862 the Copperheads had drawn into their ranks all those who placed their own narrow interests against the cause of a free, united nation, and had captured the machinery of the Democratic Party in every state since most of the lead- ing War Democrats were in the army. As early as July 10, 12 1861, Vallandigham had already called in Congress for "peace, immediate honorable PEACE, with all its blessings." The practical results of his proposal, made just after the Union defeat at Bull Run, would have been disunion, in- dependence for the slave states and the constant threat of new wars. But Vallandigham was not concerned over those possi- bilities. He could live very well in a slave-dominated Union. From then on every Congressional act of his party was designed to embarrass the war effort and to sabotage it. The principal weapon of the Peace Democrats was the "states' rights" argument which went like this: Under the Constitution every power not specifically delegated to the national government is reserved to the states. No national authority can interfere with the domestic institutions of any state. Slavery is a domestic institution of several states. The Federal Government, therefore, has no authority over it. Interference with slavery by the government is a violation of the Constitution and should be resisted by all right-think- ing men. This idea was well expressed by Governor Seymour when he told a correspondent of the London Times at a dinner given at a New York banker's residence that the tactics of his party in dealing with the Lincoln administra- tion was "to knock them down with the 'Constitution' " at every opportunity. 3 On July 4, 1862, public opinion already becoming loud in the demand for emancipation, Vallandigham rallied the Cop- perheads for a last ditch struggle to prevent the establishment of such a policy. In a speech before the Democratic Conven- tion of Ohio he gave them their battlecry: "The Constitution as It is, and the Union as It Was!" In the House Thaddeus Stevens fiercely attacked those who would use the Constitution to cripple the war effort. "He who wishes to re-establish the Union as it was cannot escape the guilt of attempting to enslave his fellow men," he charged. "The 'Union as it w r as and the Constitution as it is,' is an atrocious idea; it is man-stealing. The Southern States have forfeited all rights under the Constitution w r hich they have renounced. They are forever stopped from claiming the Constitution as it was." To him the Copperhead proposal was "but a persistent effort to re-establish slaverv and rivet 13 anew forever the chains of bondage on the limbs of im- mortal beings." Lincoln was now convinced that his administration must get out of the quicksands of expediency onto the rock of emancipation. On July 13, 1862, he confided to Secretary of State Seward and Secretary Welles of the Navy that he now believed emancipation "a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the nation," and the increasingly anti-slavery temper of the country made it easier for him to establish such a policy. The Soldiers versus McClellan But as the popular demand for emancipation swelled, the conservative elements in the nation also increased their pressure on Lincoln to prevent the formulation of such a policy. From military sources as well as civil came urgent appeals from the friends of slavery. Many of the regular army officers had been educated at West Point in a faith that identified devotion to slavery with loyalty to the Federal Constitution. At the outset of hostilities 386 out of 1,100 officers resigned their commissions and offered their services to the Confederates. Of those remaining little effort was made to conduct the war on any but the most "constitutional" basis. General George B. McClellan, commander of the Union armies, typified this conservative, hands-off policy toward slavery both in his official statements and in his conduct of the war in 1861 and 1862. In his communiques to the army and the people in the areas he invaded he betrayed a special regard for the institution. On May 26, 1861, in an address to the inhabitants of Western Virginia he assured them that, "Notwithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among you will be sig- nalized by interference with your slaves, understand one thing clearly — not only will we abstain from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on their part." In Congress Stevens vigorously attacked McClellan's state- ment. 14 "No sound of universal liberty has gone forth from the capital," he cried. "Our generals have the sword in one hand and the shackles in the other. . . . Let it be known that this government is fighting to carry out the great principles of the Declaration of Independence and the blood of every freeman would boil with enthusiasm and his nerves be strengthened for a holy warfare. Give him the sword in one hand and the book of freedom in the other, and he will soon sweep despotism and rebellion from every corner of this continent." As long as McClellan's pro-slavery policy was in force the Union armies suffered defeat, for his high regard for slavery reflected itself in a fear of the strength of the slavocracy's armies. Although in command of an army twice the size of that of Lee he deliberately avoided action, inventing all sorts of excuses to explain his procrastination. When he did accept battle it was always on the enemy's terms and usually re- sulted in the defeat of his far superior forces. Writing in Die Presse, of Vienna, on March 3, 1862. Karl Marx summed up McClellan's role in the early years of the war: "That his influence, however, acted as a brake on the general conduct of the war, is beyond doubt. One can say of McClellan what Macauley says of Essex: 'The military mistakes of Essex sprang for the most part from political compunction. He was honestly, but by no means warmly, attached to the cause of Parliament, and next to the great defeat he feared nothing so much as a great victory.' " 4 While Lincoln, at Washington, was sending telegram after telegram to McClellan urging immediate, vigorous, offensive action, McClellan took it upon himself to write to the Presi- dent on July 7, 1862, telling him how he thought the war ought to be fought. The war, he said, "should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization." Naturally if conducted in that manner, "neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, territorial organi- zation of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be considered for a moment." Expressing views which were echoed by Vallandigham in Congress, he assured Lincoln that "a declaration of Radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies." The only solution that he could offer to the task of converting constant defeat 15 into victory was that Lincoln become an open military dic- tator with McClellan as his second in command. All the Copperhead officers flocked into McClellan's Gen- eral Staff. Their leadership of the troops is directly responsi- ble for the failure of the Union forces to pursue and destroy the Confederate army after its defeat at Antietam. On Sep- tember 26, 1862, Lincoln ordered the dismissal from the armed service of a member of McClellan's staff, Major John J. Key, who had stated to another officer that the reason for the failure of the Union army to trap Lee before he escaped was because: "that is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other, that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise and save slavery." Not till Lincoln dismissed McClellan and armed his generals with an anti-slavery policy could the swift, aggressive war that he had always wanted begin. On November 5, 1862, the President finally re- moved the "Little Napoleon," and converted what he had termed "McClellan's bodyguard" into a strong fighting force under General Burnside. From that time on the fortunes of the Union changed. But if pro-slavery sentiment guided many of the Union officers, the same was not true of the rank and file of the army. Nowhere was the change in popular sentiment better ex- pressed than among the fighting men. "The soldiers," wrote Horace Greeley, Radical editor of the New York Daily Tribune, "who, though generally enlisted with strong anti-Negro prejudices, quite commonly experienced a gradual change under the discipline of service at the front, where they found every Black their ready, active, zealous friend, and nearly every slaveholder or overseer their quiet but deadly, im- placable foe." 5 One of the earliest evidences of this change came on July 7, 1861, when Vallandigham visited the Ohio regiments of the Army of the Potomac. The feeling of the men was made quite clear when an entire company of volunteers from his own district ordered him to leave their camp. When he refused they threatened to throw him out bodily. Only the intervention of a group of friendly officers and men prevented his expulsion. Vallandigham's constituents were telling him 16 in no uncertain terms what they thought of his pro-slavery activities. The growing dissatisfaction with the government's hands-off policy in regard to slavery was shown in all ranks. The re- fusal of Colonel H. E. Paine to obey an order of the Com- manding General of the Department of the Gulf to turn away fugitive slaves from the Union lines because "of the demoralizing and disorganizing tendencies to the troops of harboring runaway Negroes," resulted in Paine's arrest and removal from command. But the experiences of the war only hastened the swing toward an anti-slavery army despite some official efforts to stem it. Although "great tenderness was exhibited by many Union Generals for the doomed Institu- tion," in the early days of the war, wrote the War Democrat, General John A. Logan, "... Bull Run did much to settle the military as well as the public mind in proper grooves on the subject. Besides employing Negro Slaves to aid Rebellion, by digging trenches, the throwing up of intrench- ments, and the erection of batteries, their Rebel masters placed in their hands arms with which to shoot down Union soldiers." 6 Writing to Chief of Staff Lt. General Winfield Scott on May 27, 1861, General Benjamin F. Butler reported the use of slaves by the Confederates in Virginia in emplac- ing batteries that held up the Union advance. He strongly urged the acceptance of fugitive slaves into the Union lines and their immediate employment by the army. "As a mili- tary question it would seem to be a measure of necessity and deprives their masters of their services." Thus at a time when the Negro people were not yet accorded the status of free men, but only of rather dubious "contraband" or confiscated property, they were already serving the cause of the nation as guides, teamsters, laborers, and cooks. It was but a step from the acknowledgment of their services to the historic order of General Abner Doubleday that "all Negroes, coming into the lines of any of the camps or forts under his command, are to be treated as persons, and not as chattels." 1 By midsummer of 1862 it had become apparent that the army not only would support an Emanci- pation Proclamation, but required one to win the war. At home the powerful radical press, particularly Greeley's 17 New York Tribune, the Philadelphia Press, the Chicago Tribune, published by Joseph Medill, and the important German-American newspapers especially in the West, were driving home the lessons of the war. The American Anti- Slavery Society, under the leadership of Frederick Douglass and Wendell Phillips, sent its speakers to every city in the country demanding the abolition of slavery. From Congress, Charles Sumner, George W. Julian of Indiana, Owen Love- joy, brother of Elijah Lovejoy who had been murdered by a pro-slavery mob, and other Radicals toured the land under the auspices of the Young Men's Republican Union, calling for popular support of emancipation. To the nation's capital in August, 1862, came a delegation of ministers representing every religious denomination in Illinois, to petition Lincoln for an edict of emancipation. The inexorable logic of the conflict coupled with the active efforts of the Radical Re- publicans to explain that logic to the people found its answer in Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation on September 22,. 1862. "The general judgment now," wrote Edward L. Pierce, secre- tary to Sumner, "is that the President's advance in an antislavery policy came as early and was as rapid as the state of public sentiment admitted; but this does not impeach the wisdom of antislavery men who, by earlier agitation in favor of that policy, prepared the way for his decisive step in September, 1862. If they had left the field to the border state men and Northern conservatives, he would have had no public opinion to support him." 8 THE ELECTION OF 1862 In the midst of this popular movement toward emancipa- tion came the Congressional elections of 1862, the results of which seemed to contradict the idea that the masses of the people espoused an anti-slavery policy for the nation. In this election the Democrats almost doubled their seats in the House, raising them from 44 to 75. In the most important state election, the governorship of New York was won by the Copperhead Horatio Seymour. Five states 18 that had given Lincoln their electoral votes in 18G0, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania and New York, returned Democratic majorities. How were the results to be analyzed? The most significant aspect of this election was that the Peace Democrats campaigned on a "war platform." They did not attempt to advance a peace program to the electorate, but rather capitalized on the popular dissatisfaction with the discouraging results of the year and a half of war under the Republican Administration. They campaigned on the promise of a more efficient prosecution of the war. In 1862 the majority of the loyal Democrats who followed the policies of the late Stephen A. Douglas, who had unhesitatingly thrown his lot in with the Union after it had been attacked, were still confused by party labels, voting for peace men who were "Democrats" on the ballot slips. Gauging well the spirit of the people, the Copperheads kept their anti-war feeling under wraps, declaring that, "The Democratic party is for the war as long as it shall be prosecuted for the preservation of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union." They assured the voters that Democratic support of the war was "unconditional" and success could best be insured by turning out the party that had not only showed itself incapable of carrying it on, "but had complicated it by raising the question of abolition." If the Peace men were united, the same was not true of the Unionists. The internal struggle over emancipation had caused sharp disagreements which were slow in healing. Only in the border states and New England, stronghold of the Abolitionists, were Union Congressmen overwhelmingly returned to office. An important aspect of the results was the very small majorities by which the Democrats had won: in Pennsyl- vania, 3,524; in Ohio, 5,577; in New York, 10,000. There was more than a little credence to the statement of the New York Tribune that the absence on the battlefield of 100,000 men, the bulk of them Republicans, had spelled the difference between victory and defeat. At home, the paper declared, the Republican Party had to meet "every partisan of slavery, every sympathizer with rebellion, every coward who feared the draft." 9 But excuses could not erase the fact of Copperhead victory. 19 The campaign had revealed several serious weaknesses that had to be overcome if the President was to have the un- qualified support of a win-the-war Congress. First, the Union men saw that the war could no longer be conducted only by the Republicans. The Union coalition had to be broadened until it included men of all parties and of no party, people who had never before participated in politics — the Negroes, women, the foreign-born, workers, farmers, em- ployers. Only a non-partisan movement that expressed the interests of the entire nation could defeat the enemies of the nation. Second, this coalition was necessary, not only on election day, but had to find its best means of serving the country by the establishment of numerous organiza- tions, clubs, associations throughout the land, which, in their everyday activities, could mobilize the entire nation in the single direction of winning the war. The Union leaders saw that the Civil War was a two-front war — against the slaveowning Confederacy in the trenches, and against the friends of slavery in the North who placed their selfish interests above the national cause. The election of 1862 was a warning to the American people that the internal front was in danger and great efforts had to be made to prevent the destruction of the Union from within. The promise of victory lay through the full participation of the people in the war effort. "Bear in mind," Lincoln had told them, "that not with politicians, not with Presidents, not with office-seekers, but with you, is the question: Shall the Union and shall the liberties of this country be preserved to the latest generations?" THE ELECTION OF 1863 On the night of April 18, 1861, a young lieutenant in the service of the army of the United States issued an order: "Destroy the arsenal." A few minutes later the calm Virginia night was shattered by the blast which forever prevented the enemies of the nation from using the thousands of rifles and millions of rounds of ammunition that high-placed traitors had so carefully stored at Harper's Ferry. The 20 spirit of the martyred John Brown rejoiced in the heroic decision of the garrison of 45 who bravely put the torch to everything that might he of value to the enemy. The scorched earth policy was born in the first days following the sneak attack of the slavemasters upon the Union. Keynoted by the resistance of Colonel Anderson's men at Fort Sumter the response of the American people to Lincoln's call to arms was a grand uprising of the people. "Mass action ruled. The people swarmed into meeting halls and churches. The shooting of the Stars and Stripes off the Sumter flagstaff — and the Lincoln proclamation — acted as a vast magnet on a national multitude." 10 From every part of the country worker, farmer, student, merchant, Republican, Democrat and Constitutional Union- ist, native and foreign born flung the gauntlet of the slave- owner back into his face. How meaningful now were the words of Lincoln, uttered at a public meeting: "To the salvation of the Union there needs but one thing — the hearts of a people like yours. When the people rise in mass in behalf of the Union and the liberties of this country, truly may it be said, The gates of Hell cannot prevail against them.' ' The people's reply fully sustained Lincoln's faith in them. Overnight every city park and village green became a troop bivouac. Drill clubs to teach future soldiers the art of war sprang up everywhere. Throughout the land the hoarse commands of weary sergeants led the volunteers through the mysteries of close-order drill. In New York City which had given most of its votes to Douglas in 1860 both native and foreign born, regardless of party, rushed to enlist. The Irish immediately recruited four regiments, including the famous 69th. The Italians formed an Italian Legion and another unit, the Garibaldi Guards, whose membership included Hungarians, Bulgarians, and other South Europeans. The Germans, led by the Communist, Joseph Weydemeyer, continued their great tradition of service to America by organizing the Steuben Volunteers, the De Kalb Regiment, the German Rifles and the Turner Rifles. Former members of the British army and Irish constabulary set up the Irish Home Guards; 21 while British subjects in the city offered their regiment, the British Volunteers, to the service of the Union. Massachusetts was the first to put her militia into the field. Under the command of General Benjamin Franklin Butler, a Democrat who had voted 57 times for the nomina- tion of Jefferson Davis at the 1860 Democratic convention,* her troops stormed through the pro-slavery mob that terror- ized the city of Baltimore and were the first to reinforce the Federal garrison at Washington. From Iowa, to which the President had sent a telegram asking Governor Kirkwood to raise a single regiment, came an almost instantaneous reply informing Lincoln that Iowa had raised ten regiments with more coming. "For God's sake, send us arms," read the wire, "We have the men." This enthusiastic response of the citizens of the only Republican government in the world could only be compared to the popular uprising of revolutionary France in 1793 to repel foreign invasion. "The spectacle of the armed uprising of a MILLION of men," wrote the editor of the Army and Navy Journal, "must always remain an incompar- able illustration of the fecund patriotism of a free dem- ocracy." 11 But the precondition of victory for the Union was a nation united on an anti-slavery program. Not till the Proclamation of Freedom was issued was it possible to unite the entire loyal civil population. The People Organize "... on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever, free; and the Execu- tive government of the United States, including the military and * Although Butler favored compromise with the slave interests in 1860 his loyalty to the nation led him to become the most radical of the War Democrats after the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter. Through his ex- periences on the battlefield he learned that only by the destruction of the slave system and the emancipation and arming of the Negro people could the Union be preserved. So uncompromising was he that he early earned the title "Beast Butler" from his former friends.^ 22 naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the free- dom of such persons. ..." These stirring words of Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation struck the first blow for the Union in the elec- tion campaigns of 1863 and 1864. Its message had been in- delibly burned into the determination of a people who had already given one hundred thousand of their sons and hus- bands in the cause of a free Union. It echoed their resolve to do everything necessary to ensure a complete victory over slavery. To give strength to the proclamation thousands of non- partisan Union clubs were organized to combat the wide- spread network of Copperhead organizations already in existence. The peace men had taken full advantage of the divisions within the Union Party, which had prevented their most effective use of the public forum and press during the early years of the war, to perfect their party machine and organize secret political associations through- out the country. These groups, variously named Knights of the Golden Circle, Circle of Honor, McClellan Legion, Order of American Knights and Sons of Liberty, stood for the absolute right of slavery, states' rights, and the right of armed resistance to constituted authority. "The Order is hostile in every respect to the general government," stated a leader of the Missouri Knights, "and friendly to the so- called Confederate Government. It is exclusively made up of disloyal persons — of all Democrats who are desirous of securing the independence of the Confederate States with a view of restoring the Union as it was." 12 These Copperhead groups developed a program of sabotage that included encouraging soldiers to desert, spying for the enemy, circulation of disloyal newspapers and pamphlets, the destruction of government property, terrorization of Union men, and assassination of army officers and draft officials. By 1863 they had an estimated membership of several hun- dred thousand and had set themselves up as a single national organization, the Order of American Knights. They now began a more serious activity. Within every political club, or temple as they were called, a dual military club was established which was secretly armed, drilled and carefully 23 prepared for a purpose known only to a few top leaders — an uprising against the United States. To further their purposes the Copperheads had created a special propaganda agency in New York City, the Society lor the Diffusion of Political Knowledge, which, in conjunc- tion with the Democratic Party pamphleteers and the Copper- head press, systematically poisoned the minds of the American people. It was in an atmosphere of terror that Union men began to organize their own clubs. In Pekin, Illinois, where the first Loyal League was formed, late in July, 1862, utmost secrecy was observed. So great was the Copperhead danger in that state that the immediate form the Illinois clubs of the Union Leagues* of America took was that of armed companies. The members took an oath borrowed from the Union guerillas of East Tennessee pledging to defend the nation not only with the ballot but with arms if need be. These clubs which today harbor the most reactionary elements of the Republican Party were in those days the most progres- sive groups and were to play much the same role as that of the Revolutionary Committees of Correspondence and Safety in earlier times. By January, 1863, there were over 100,000 members in Illinois alone. In February of that year a member described the effect of Union organization in that state: "Matters look somewhat better in Illinois. The union men are organized in every County in the State. ... I see militia co.'s are organizing — three co.'s in Springfield are full — two in Alton forming. Traitors are being informed that this Government must and shall be preserved/' 13 In Philadelphia, where, as late as 1863, the expression of Union sentiments was a rarity in that city's high society, a group of leading industrialists, railroad magnates, insurance promoters, and bank directors, including J. Gillingham Fell, President of the Lehigh Valley Railroad, John P. Verree, President of the National Capital Life Insurance Company, Charles E. Smith, President of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad, and Edwin N. Benson, a member of the banking * The Union clubs were all popularly known as Loyal Leagues although they bore many different titles; Union League Clubs, National Union Clubs, Loyal National Leagues, Democratic Loyal Leagues, etc. 24 firm, Alexander Benson and Company, helped organize the Union League Club of Philadelphia. Under the guidance of the Radicals George Boker and Charles Gibbons, the War Democrat Daniel Dougherty, and the moderate Re- publicans Judge J. I. Hare and George Meredith, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia club grew to num- ber well over a thousand members and became the organiz- ing center for other clubs throughout the West. In New York a Union League was established at the same time by the loyal financiers, educators, writers, and politicians of the city. There, the Democrat, Peter Cooper; the Radical, Horace Greeley; and the Communist, Frederick Kapp, worked together in the common cause. Its membership included George Bancroft, the historian; William Cullen Bryant, poet and editor of the New York Post; Charles King, President of Columbia College; and George P. Putnam, the publisher. Nowhere was the glowing national unity better demonstrated. In Boston, inspired by Charles Sumner, Richard Henry Dana, and Edward Everett, the latter Vice Presidential candidate on the Constitutional Union ticket in 1860, the Union League of Boston was born, which helped father similar clubs in Charlestown, Salem, and other cities in Massachusetts. In Baltimore, Cincinnati, and San Francisco, the initiative of the Radical Republicans helped to build hun- dreds of broad, mass associations dedicated to the preserva- tion of the Union and support of Lincoln. On May 20, 1863, these clubs joined in a national federa- tion, established headquarters in Washington, D. C, and prepared to lend their combined strength to the prosecution of the war. Nor was political action reserved to the men. Despite the fact that women were excluded from the franchise at that time, they took an active part in politics. They organized the Women's Loyal League, gave their time and money to the Sanitary Commissions, the forerunner of the Red Cross, entered the war factories, the hospitals and maintained re- freshment salons for the troops passing through the cities on their way to the front. It was the women of New York who braved Copperhead censure to present a stand of colors to the first Negro regiment raised by the state, the 25 20th U. S. Colored Troops, on March 5, 1864. On its own initiative the Women's Loyal League circulated a nation- wide million-signature petition for the adoption of the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery, the first hundred thousand of which were presented by Sumner to the Senate in support of his resolution calling for such an amendment on February 9, 1864. An antidote to the treasonous literature of the Copper- heads was provided by the Board of Publications of the Philadelphia League and the Loyal Publication Societies of New York and New England. Through their joint efforts more than a million pieces of literature were printed and distributed, at least 100,000 reaching the armed forces and military hospitals. 14 The ammunition these groups dispensed helped the nation draw a collective bead on the Copperheads in the elections of 1863. Arming the Negro People During 1863 the Loyal Leagues were very active in rais- ing regiments of Negro troops. Though Congress had di- rected that the states might recruit Negroes for service against the enemy, only a few had done so. The popular prejudice against the Negro people, which had been so deeply engrained in the people's consciousness through the years by the institution of slavery and its ideological hold upon the nation, was seized upon by the Copperheads to discredit the President's policy of arming the freedmen. Replacing killed and wounded troops with fresh reserves was an acute problem in the latter years of the war. The last re- maining reservoir of manpower was the Negroes. Since the time was at hand when heavy and increasing blows could shatter the splintering Confederate defenses, the equal in- clusion of the ex-slaves in the army spelled the difference be- tween a long and a short war. In addition, the effect of Negro troops in arms against the slaveholders would de- moralize the Confederate army. "A single Negro regiment," Marx wrote to Engels, "would have a remarkable effect on Southern nerves." 15 Union Leagues of New York and Philadelphia challenged the prevailing anti-Negro feeling by raising as many Negrc 26 regiments as they could. The members of both clubs dug into their own pockets to provide $51,000 as bounty money for volunteers, set up their own recruiting stations, bought all equipment necessary, and in December, 1863, began to muster troops. The response of the Negroes was overwhelming. Nearly every male capable of bearing arms joined the Union League regiments. Of 6,000 Negroes of military age in the state, 1,500 had already enlisted in out-of-state regiments; 4,100 joined the League's units. In a few months the two clubs had raised, equipped, and sent off the 20th, 26th, and 31st New York regiments, and the 3rd, 6th, 8th, 22nd, and 25th Pennsylvania regiments. This action of the Union League provided the victory punch for the Union forces, the 200,000 :olored troops giving the army the strength to beat the memy quickly and decisively. It also served to break :hrough the shell of intolerance at home. When these troops left for the front they paraded through the center of New k'ork and of Philadelphia. In both cities, the citizens lined :he streets cheering, shouting, the women waving their handkerchiefs and showering them with flowers. It was a xiumphant demonstration of the loyal instinct of the public, rhe Leagues could be justly proud of so complete a vindi- :ation of their courageous policy. The National Guard of Philadelphia noted the striking change in the public ittitude. "A little more than a year ago," it editorialized, "the idea of naking black men soldiers . . . was entertained by comparatively :ew outside of the ranks of what were called 'the radicals'! Now, Presto! The whole thing is changed. In this thinking, newspaper- eading, discussing country, public opinion undergoes changes is rapid as they are radical. At this moment no measure of the \dministration is more popular among loyal men of all :lasses. . . ," 16 The unhesitating response of the Negro people to the call o arms is even more significant when one considers the lifrkulties colored troops had to endure. They were seore- rated in special regiments, paid less than white troops, em- ployed more often as labor battalions and garrison troops han permitted to join battle with the enemy. They knew, oo, that if they were captured in battle either death or en- 27 slavement would be their lot. The Confederates declared it their open policy not to treat Negro Union soldiers as prisoners of war but as fugitive slaves and insurrectionists. Nor did they stop there. They also made it clear that white officers in command of Negro troops would be treated in a like manner. The Army and Navy Journal reported many instances in which the commanders of Negro soldiers cap- tured by the enemy had been foully murdered before their troops. Nevertheless, at the same time the Journal was proud to report that the number of white officers who re- quested service with Negro regiments was more than twice the army's needs and their numbers were increasing daily. That was the soldiers' answer to the Confederates! At the beginning of the war many workers hesitated to give the Union their full support. Trade Union leaders for the most part took the position that the fight against wage slavery was as important as the fight against chattel slavery. Although the official attitude of the unions expressed these sentiments, the patriotic instincts of the workers showed themselves when whole unions volunteered en masse for service in armed forces. At first only the German-American workers, organized into the Communist Arbeiterbund, gave their official support to the fight against slavery. But as the meaning of the war became clearer the workers took an unequivocal stand on the question of support to the Union. Typical of their attitude is an article written by members of the New York Typographical Union before the 1863 elec- tions: "Our contest has a greater issue than these involved, and it is of the utmost importance that every workingman understand it clearly. If he would be a freeman, and enjoy the blessings of liberty for himself and his children — if he would be true to himself and the workingmen of the South — if he would be true to the interests of Labor throughout the World he must work and vote to overthrow rebellion and treason and maintain the government at every cost." 17 In their press, particularly Fincher's Trades Review and The Iron Platform, the trade unions now adopted a strong pro-Lincoln stand, urging consideration of the issues in- volved rather than party labels in voting. Broad unity 28 organizations of workingmen were formed in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago whose activities were largely directed toward re-electing Lincoln and a Union Congress. The Moulders Union, under William Sylvis, the Mechanics Union of New York, the Typographical Union, the Machinists and Blacksmiths Union, as well as many others, played an important part in the 1863 and 1864 elections, mobilizing the workers behind the National Union Party. From the beginning of the Civil War the working class of Europe threw in its lot with the Union. Led by the Inter- national Workingmen's Association, organized by Karl Marx, the workers of Britain and France especially, actively aided the Union cause. The almost universal sympathy of the upper classes in those countries for the Confederates, and the desperate attempts by the latter to embroil the European nations in the American war on their side, demanded prompt, mass action by the workers to prevent the success of the slaveholders' envoys. Although the blockade of southern ports cut off the cotton supply to British and French mills, threw hundreds of thousands out of work and brought them terrible suffering, nevertheless, the people stood solidly be- hind the Union. "It ought never to be forgotten in the United States," Marx reported in the Tribune of February 1, 1862, "that at least the working classes of England . . . have never forsaken them. To them it was due that, despite the poisonous stimulants daily administered by a venal and reckless press, not one single public war meeting could be held in the United Kingdom during all the period that peace trembled in the balance. ... In ordinary cir- cumstances, the conduct of the British workingmen might have been anticipated from the natural sympathy the popular classes all over the world ought to feel for the only popular government in the world." Hundreds of Emancipation and Union societies were organized in every part of Britain. Mass meetings in sup- port of the Union were an almost daily occurrence, uniting on their platforms not only the leaders of the trade unions but also the cream of Britain's intellectuals, including John Stuart Mill, Professor Thorold Rogers, and Reverend New- man Hall. The leaders of the industrial bourgeoisie, John Bright and Richard Cobden, representing the Liberal Party 29 ill Britain, provided Parliamentary opposition to the friends of the South in the government. The greatest service performed for the Union was that of Karl Marx, both as organizer of the most advanced section of the workers into the First International, and as correspond- ent. His articles in the New York Tribune in 1861 and 1862 served in many instances to set the policy of that lead- ing Radical organ, many of his writings being used as edi- torials. In Europe he acted at the same time as correspondent for one of the largest and most influential papers, Die Presse, of Vienna, where his profound analyses of the Civil War served to mobilize liberal opinion throughout Europe behind the North. Marx saw that the Civil War in America had great mean- ing for the advance of democratic institutions in Europe. If the slaveholders won, the hard-won rights of the European workers as well as those of the Americans would be im- periled. A Union victory, on the other hand, would be a spur to new advances for the masses in Europe. The direct tie between the cause of emancipation and the fight for the most elementary democratic rights of the people of Britain and France was clearly seen by the American Minister, Charles Francis Adams, who saw in every district in England the seeds of an emancipation society which might in time become a democratic one. Indeed the widespread organiza- tion of the British people during the Civil War was continued afterwards and became the spearhead of popular demands for the franchise for the workers and middle classes, and for the reapportionment of Parliamentary seats to the new factory districts. So great was this demand that in 1867 the Con- servative government of Disraeli was forced to pass the Second Reform Bill which gave a million workers the vote and re- districted thirty rotten borough seats* among the working class areas. * The rapid industrialization of England in the early nineteenth century had caused extensive shifts in population. Many boroughs, which roughly correspond to our Congressional districts, were almost completely emptied of people while those around the areas and cities where the industries were located were densely populated. Despite this change, however, a borough with 100,000 and one with 100 had the same representation in Parliament. Only the strongest organized protests of the workingmen and factory inter- ests for adequate redistricting was successful in gradually doing away with these "rotten boroughs." 30 As election time approached in 1863 many of the states with Union legislatures passed bills allowing their soldiers to vote. Not only did they eagerly exercise their right, but participated in the campaigning through letters, resolutions, interviews with war correspondents, all of which were car- ried in the Union papers, and in pamphlet form by the Loyal Publication Society of New York. It was from the officers and men in the field that some of the most telling arguments for the Union candidates came. The troops of every state were unanimous in denouncing those who wanted to thrust the "Peace" dagger into the heart of the nation. "We didn't take an oath to fight against traitors in the South alone — no," wrote a group of soldiers of the Fifteenth Ohio Corps to the Cincinnati Commercial from the front at Vicks- burg, "and we will willingly shoot down traitors in the North, whenever they have gone too far in their wicked schemes. They have gone far enough now and their infernal design against our dear Union must be crushed." 18 To the Copperhead-controlled legislature of Illinois which had recently passed a resolution calling for an immediate armistice the officers of the Illinois regiments of the Army of the Cumberland sent the following message: ". . . we have watched the traitorous conduct of those members of the legislature of the State of Illinois, who, misrepresenting their constituency, have been proposing a cessation of the war, avowedly to arrange terms of peace, but really to give time for the exhausted rebels to recover strength and renew their plotting . . and to them we calmly and firmly say: Beware of the terrible retribution that is falling upon your coadjutors at the South, and that, as your crime is tenfold blacker, it will swiftly smite you with tenfold more horror, should you persist in your damnable deeds of treason." 19 The bitter pen of an Indiana soldier who had just buried lis comrades on the battlefield of Murfreesboro asked, in a etter to the Chicago Tribune: "What else was the animus )f the Indiana [peace] resolutions than a mockery of the nemory of the Indiana dead." He proposed this epitaph : or his fallen buddies: 31 Here Lies A Fellow Whose Mistaken Zeal For His Country's Integrity and Honor Caused Him To Unconstitutionally Slay Our Dear Downtrodden Southern Brethren, In An Unholy Cause. And in every letter home, every communication, lay im- plicit the question the officers of the 12th Connecticut Volun- teers asked: "Are you at home under the delusion that in becoming soldiers we altogether ceased to be citizens? Are our rights as co-heirs in a freeman's heritage forfeited by our absence?" Only by repudiating the Copperheads at the polls could the civilians assure their brothers at the front that the cause they were dying for was safe. "Now, if you will be so kind as to see some of the per- sons who have the control of the check-list in my ward, and get my name on, I will be much obliged," wrote a wounded New Hampshire soldier from his hospital bed. "One vote is but a small thing, I know, but it may lead to great re- sults. . . ." And great results did come from the balloting that year. In Ohio where Vallandigham campaigned from exile in Canada, after being banished for treasonous activities, the War Democrat John Brough led the Union forces to victory by a margin of more than 100,000 votes, 39,179 from the soldiers at the front. This was a total gain over 1862 of 106,676 for the Union. In Pennsylvania Andrew Curtin was returned as governor largely through the efforts of the Union Leagues which he declared "had plastered the State with their handbills." His vote registered a 19,000 advance over the 1862 results. Union victories were reported from New York where the state was carried by 30,000, an increase of 40,000 war votes over the previous election. In Missouri the Union Emancipationist Radicals won enough seats in the legislature to ensure the election of the Radical B. Gratz Brown to the United States Senate. In every state but New Jersey Union candidates were victorious. The secret of winning the war — an organized citizenry armed with a policy aimed at the destruction of the military foe — was slowly being discovered. The twin campaigns of 32 1864, to destroy the Confederacy, and to re-elect Lincoln, were to mirror the effectiveness of a national people's coali- tion with a single purpose — victory and a secure peace. THE ELECTION OF 1864 As the nation entered the fourth year of war the prospect of victory seemed bright. With the Union armies unified under Grant and a large popular majority supporting the war administration many people expected the summer cam- paign to end the strife. Since 1864 was also a Presidential election year, the contest for the highest office in the land would be especially important. To win the election and the war — that was the problem facing the Union men. To accomplish this the fundamental prerequisite was unity of all Union forces. Now that eman- cipation was the settled policy of the country, it was neces- sary to incorporate it into public law. In 1864 the feeling of the nation demanded the enactment of the 13th Amend- ment which would forever abolish slavery. The amendment was introduced into the Senate early in the year and, despite Copperhead efforts to block it, passed to the House where it failed to receive the two-thirds majority necessary for enactment. The results of the Union defeats in the Congressional elections of 1862 now showed themselves. The defeat of the amendment by the narrow margin of 95 to 66 threw the question before the people as the central issue in the elections. The Unionists saw, too, that all their re- sources would be required to return to office a two-thirds majority of men who favored the basic policy of the country. This meant a vigorous campaign in every Congressional district in the land. Victory would be hollow if Lincoln was returned to office without a Union Congress. o The Blairs and Reconstruction But as the nation swung into the campaign elements of discord arose among the Unionists. This discord was fos- tered by a small number of men within the party, notably 33 Postmaster General Montgomery Blair and his brother Fran- cis who represented the border state conservatives, most of whom had long since found the program of the Peace Party more to their taste. Though they had little support from the rest of the party, the Blairs enjoyed a certain influence over Lincoln which exercised a retarding effect on the develop- ment of war policy. The question over which conflict now arose was reconstruction, and the tactics of the Blairs were deliberately calculated to split the bulk of the Union men from Lincoln. By 1864 a large portion of the former southern states had been retaken by the Union armies. Lincoln, concerned about securing the allegiance of a core of southern Unionists to the national cause, had issued an extremely lenient Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction on December 8, 1863, which proposed to set up state governments in the conquered terri- tory based upon state constitutions abolishing slavery and which were to be approved by 10 per cent of the voting popu- lation of 1860. In addition the proclamation removed all disabilities from ex-Confederates who took an oath of alle- giance to the Union. Lincoln looked on this plan as an experiment, to be changed as experience proved necessary. Indeed, the adverse reports on its functioning by Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt was bringing the President closer to the Radical ideas on reconstruction. "It is a noticeable fact," Holt wrote, "and one which I cannot press too earnestly upon your consideration, that of these roving cut-throats, thieves, and incendiaries, the proportion of those who have taken the amnesty oath is, as in Kentucky, at least nine-tenths. . . . These traitors recognize no obligation, human or divine, and the experiences of Missouri and Kentucky show that it is a mockery, if not an absolute insult to God, to ad- minister an oath to the perjured miscreants or their allies in arms against our Government." 20 This system of reconstruction was not acceptable to the majority of the Union Party and Lincoln was not inclined to project it as a major issue. However, at this point, the Blairs suddenly came out as the ardent champions of the President's plan, and in a series of speeches in Congress and outside bitterly attacked the Radicals who were now the dominant majority in Congress. The Blairs were using the question of 34 reconstruction to attack the entire policy of the party. Their political philosophy stemmed from the fact that they were ex- slaveholders to whom the Copperhead demand for "The Union as it was and the Constitution as it is," was not un- attractive. Their recent defeat in Missouri by the German Radicals only strengthened their determination to destroy the party by provoking internal dissension. In October, 1863, Montgomery Blair attacked the Radicals in a stump speech in Maryland in words which appeared in the press in time to be used by the Democrats in the state elections. Governor Curtin estimated that this speech had lost the Union 20,000 votes in Pennsylvania alone. J. W. Forney, editor of the Press, was so angry that he asked Blair in the presence of Lincoln to resign if he could not harmonize his views with those of his party. On February 8, 1864, Francis P. Blair joined his brother in another attack on the Radicals for opposing Presidential reconstruction, which provoked a demand from all sections of the party for the removal of both men from their positions. Lincoln could no longer ignore the sentiment of the party and he sent a letter to the Postmaster General asking him and Francis to cease their attacks, The latter's refusal to do so resulted in the President making plans to return him to his post in the army where he held a Major General's com- mission. He allowed Montgomery Blair to retain his cabinet seat, however, fearful of alienating the support of the border state men who still remained faithful to the Union. But the damage had been done and distrust of Lincoln was sowed among many Union men. A reconstruction bill was hastily framed by Henry Winter Davis and Benjamin F. Wade, passed by Congress, and vetoed by Lincoln. The President explained in his veto message that he was in agreement with the bill but thought it too early to be committed to one single plan. His own bill was only temporary and he was willing to change it if necessary. But he did not wish reconstruction to take precedence over the question of win- ning the war. Sumner and Stevens took essentially the same position, namely that the quickest way of obtaining a good recon- struction policy was to win the war quickly. They were not interested in outlining detailed blueprints at this time, but 35 only in agreeing on certain basic postulates to govern recon- struction policies. The major one according to Stevens was that the former states should be treated as alien territory subject to national authority. This was Lincoln's premise too, and this satisfied Stevens. "In details we may not agree," he told Congress, "but his plan of reconstruction assumes the same general grounds." 21 All during the campaign that year Stevens, Lovejoy, Arnold, Sumner and other leading Radicals fought for unity around the President, placing the all-out prosecution of the war and the 13th Amendment above all else. The Draft-Lincoln Movement If some members of Congress hesitated to support Lincoln the people did not. From all parts of the country a pro- Lincoln current, guided by the Loyal Leagues, gained mo- mentum. On January 6, 1864, the Republican State Com- mittee of Pennsylvania declared for his re-election. On the 1 1th, the Union League of Philadelphia adopted a resolution which was widely circulated, nominating him as the popular choice. The League also set up a special Committee of Seventy-Six to promote his campaign. On the 17th the National Union Club of the same city took similar action. By the end of February the state conventions of Connecticut, Maryland, and Iowa; the legislatures of Wisconsin, Kansas, Minnesota, and California; the party caucuses of Indiana and New York; and the powerful Union Leagues of Illinois came to Lincoln's support. Throughout the nation Unconditional Union Clubs and Union Lincoln Associations were formed urging his retention in office on a program including: "No peace involving compromise of liberty, the unqualified submission of traitors, the perpetual extinction of slavery, an unrelenting prosecution of the war until all this shall have been achieved . . . " 22 In- March the New York Democratic Republican Work- ingmen's Association sent a delegation to Lincoln pledging its support for his re-election. So widespread was the "draft Lincoln" movement that the efforts of Salmon P. Chase, Sec- retary of the Treasury, to advance his own candidacy evap- 36 orated when the Union Legislature of his own state of Ohio endorsed Lincoln. So strong was Lincoln's support that no other candidate could secure the Union nomination. But the effect of the Blairs' disruption now began to appear. A small group of War Democrats, Abolitionists, and Radi- cals, including Benjamin F. Wade, Henry Winter Davis, and Wendell Phillips, fell into the trap laid by the brothers. Placing reconstruction before the major problem of winning the war, they split off from the Union Party and held their own convention in Cleveland on May 31. Under the name Radical Democracy, they nominated General John C. Fre- mont, the first Presidential candidate of the Republican Party, for Lincoln's job. The platform they adopted called for an uncompromising prosecution of the war, the 13th Amendment, the control of reconstruction by Congress, and the one-term policy of office tenure. Though the chances of Fremont's election were negligible, this factionalism seri- ously endangered a united war vote and opened the possi- bility of a Copperhead victory. For a short time, even Frederick Douglass, the leading Negro Abolitionist, joined Fremont's supporters, as did the German-American Commu- nist, Frederick Kapp of New York. Though the bulk of the Fremont men were undoubtedly motivated by an honest, though short-sighted, sectarian view of the political scene, there was also present at their convention a group of New York State officials who attempted to inject the name of Gen- eral Grant into the proceedings. These men, inspired more by desires of hopelessly splitting the Union Party than by any Radical principles, did not succeed in nominating Grant, but did temporarily accomplish their purpose of splitting the Union Party. Until the Fremont faction re- joined the party, political success was endangered. Despite the defection of the Fremont group the convention of Lincoln's party that met at Baltimore on June 7 had never enjoyed broader support. No longer was it a Repub- lican party. Its new name, National Union, expressed its changed composition and the new forces from all sections of the nation who swelled its ranks. Not only were old-line Republicans represented, but there were also many War Democrats, former Whigs, and even a few Know-Nothings. This coalition did not stand on the same ground as the 37 narrower Republican Party of 1860. It was now prepared to demand not only that all the territory of the United States should be free, but that the government use the whole power of the nation to carry out that purpose. The main plank of the Union platform declared: "... that as slavery was the cause, and now constitutes the strength of this Rebellion, and as it must be, always and every- where, hostile to the principles of Republican Government, justice and the National safety demand its utter extirpation from the soil of the Republic. '" 23 The demand for the 13th Amendment was made, and the fifth plank of the platform whole-heartedly endorsed Lin- coln's policies, "especially the Proclamation of Emancipation, and the employment as Union soldiers of men heretofore held in slavery." Lincoln and the southern War Democrat Andrew Johnson were nominated -on this platform. Except for the personal antagonism toward Lincoln by Fremont and some of his followers there was no principled reason for a split in Union ranks. The door was left open for the return of the Fremont men to the party. The most significant thing about the Union platform was the omission of a plank on reconstruction. In the face of the need of mobilizing all loyal sentiment for the elections all groups within the party agreed to table that question. It was at this convention that the Radicals, led by Stevens, proved the major unifying force. Their leadership in drafting the party platform and their acquiescence in the nomination of Johnson, whose politics they questioned, is an indication of their understanding of the importance of a unified party geared for victory. The Peace Democratic Campaign As the election campaign developed it soon became clear that the two major parties were formulating completely divergent platforms. The American people were to vote on November 7, 1864, either for a more vigorous prosecution of the war and the abolition of slavery, or for a negotiated peace and the re-establishment of the hated institution. 38 If the Union men were organized, so were the Copper- heads. Although the election results of 1863, coupled with the defeat of the Confederates at Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, had put the enemies of the Union on the de- fensive everywhere, the very desperateness of their position drove them to greater activity. It is significant to find not only practical co-operation between "peace men" and the Con- federates in 1864, but also the establishment of direct liaison and planned, concerted action. "Political developments at the North," wrote Jefferson Davis, "favored the adoption of some action that might influence popular sentiment in the hostile section. The aspect of the peace party was quite encouraging, and it seemed that the real issue to be decided in the presidential election of that year was the continuance or cessation of the war." 24 Davis sent three commissioners to Canada with instruc- tions to enter into negotiations with Vallandigham for the purpose of utilizing the elections to split the unity of the nation and create conditions that would favor a negotiated peace and the independence of the Confederacy. The plan developed by the Copperheads and Confederates was very bold. With the use of $900,000 provided by the Confederate government, arrangements were made to arm the Copperhead association, ironically called the Sons of Liberty. Under cover of the confusion attendant on the Democratic convention to be held on August 29 at Chicago, plans were made to concentrate men around all the prisoner- of-war camps in the Chicago area, and to strike simultaneously against the handful of guards stationed there. Twenty thousand Confederate prisoners were thus to be liberated and using them as a nucleus a serious diversion was to be created in the heart of the Northwest. The entire plan agreed upon was twofold. The main efforts of the peace men would be devoted to organizing their societies on a complete military basis. At the same time the Copperheads were to gain complete control of the Democratic Party, capture its platform and nominate candidates who would do their bidding, so that in case of failure of the up- rising the electoral struggle would provide a strategic re- serve that might accomplish peaceably what arms had been unable to do. 39 The stake offered the Copperheads was an independent Northwest Confederacy. The Confederates hoped to use the idea, the seeds of which had been planted by Vallandigham himself, to effect the division of the United States into two hostile sections. Jacob Thompson, leader of the Confed- erates in Canada, wrote at this time to the Confederate Commissioners in Britain and France and outlined the plans afoot. He urged them to make all possible use of the ad- verse effect of a successful uprising on the prestige of the Union to press the question of recognition of the Confederacy and intervention by Europe to end the war in the South's favor. As he explained, the minimum aim of the conspira- tors was to liberate the Confederate prisoners and establish a second battle front within the Union. The maximum aim was to set up a separate Confederacy which, of course, would be under Confederate control. The move was intended to split the Union forces, draw off badly needed reinforcements from the armies of Grant and Sherman then deep in the heart of the Confederacy, thus preventing their further ad- vance. This would give the Confederates a breathing spell, permit them to regroup and launch an offensive that might bring victory. It was the last hope of the slave-holders, a desperate hope whose success depended upon the degree of co-operation of the enemies of the nation within the Union itself. The leaders of the Peace Party saw that their only possi- bility of winning the election was to throw the mantle of a popular candidate, associated in the popular mind with the winning of the war, over an anti-war program. Accordingly, their choice fell upon General George B. McClellan. The New York Daily News took the General under its editorial wing at an early date, which prompted the Tribune to ask: ''If there be one sincerely loyal man who still clings to McClellan, we ask him to answer this question — if Gen. M. is a true man, why is every traitor his noisy champion?" 2 * With McClellan as bait the Copperheads tried to draw back to the party the loyal War Democrats and to induce every class and section of the nation to support them. Peace was the commodity they were trying to sell and their selling talk was suitably adjusted to every group. In particular, the 40 Copperheads sought to swing the workers away from the Union Party. The peace press shed crocodile tears over the hard conditions of the laboring class, blaming all their difii- culties on the war and "the New England oligarchy which has fastened this reign of blood and debt upon the country. . . .' '- ,; Life was hard for the average man and woman during the Civil War. With no government means of controlling prices and trade unions weak it was difficult for them to secure wages which equaled the rise in living costs. In 1864 prices had risen to 100 per cent over their 1860 level, while wages had advanced only 25 per cent. Add to this the dis- content that arose over the escape clause in the Conscription Act which exempted all those who could provide S300 for a substitute and you find a fertile field among the workers for Copperhead disruption. Democratic clubs were formed in all the large cities, espe- cially in New York. These clubs were sounding boards for disaffection and through them professional "workingmen" operated. In New York the Copperheads sent one of their best organizers, McDonough Bucklin, to establish a "Work- ingmen's United Political Association of the City and County of New York." This Association never received the support of any of the bona fide unions in the city or gained much of a membership. Its chief function was one of propaganda. The tone of its "Addresses to the People" is indicated by this excerpt: "The very object of arming the Negroes is based on the instinctive idea of using them to put down the white laboring classes. . . . Let us all, therefore, fellow workingmen, unite in one grand effort to get the present Administration out of power." 27 The loyal workers joined the Democratic-Republican As- sociation in New York. Like other Union groups it had been organized, as its name indicated, as a unity group, aiming to serve the working class as an organization through which members of all parties might work together for the nation. In Philadelphia the Democrats had even less success than in New York. Here the people had already experienced an invasion of their state and had seen the terrible face of the enemy at first hand. In their campaign for the governor- 41 ship they had decisively re-elected Andrew Curtin, sup- porter of the war policies of the President. Philadelphians had been among the first to organize against the Copper- heads. Large numbers of workingmen were active mem- bers of the mass National Union Club. The days when Copperhead newspapers publicly threatened the organizers of the Union League with death, and the doors of leading Re- publicans had been branded with large "Xs" so they could be easily identified and picked up by the approaching Con- federate troops if they reached the city, were never forgotten. Soothing peace talk held no meaning for men and women whose backyards had been battlefields. Throughout the campaign the Democratic refrain was the same. The war was a failure; it had dragged on for four years and would drag on four more. The South could never be defeated. The wicked Lincoln administration was over- riding the Constitution and destroying free government by arresting and denying the right of habeas corpus to Copper- heads. The Lincoln policy of emancipation would destroy the white race through intermarriage, while the free Negroes would undoubtedly come north and take away all the white workers' jobs. The lack of news from the front during the summer months gave rise to despair and doubt among the people. When no word came from Sherman, deep in the South before Atlanta, the Copperheads circulated rumors about the de- struction of his army. When the news of Grant's repulse at Cold Harbor arrived the swelled casualty figures provided more grist for the anti-war group. The very uncertainty of events gave some credibility to the shouts of the Copper- heads, and people began to wonder whether peace now would not be best for the nation. And all the while the peace men were preparing to rise against the country. As summer rounded into autumn, Union spies who had wormed their way into the Sons of Liberty reported the ship- ment of large consignments of arms from Canada. Armed bands of draft dodgers and deserters fought pitched battles with the federal authorities in the western states. The reports of the Union operatives revealed that the conspirators were preparing to strike at a time when every man who could be 42 mustered was being hurried to the armies in the South to sustain the military pressure on the enemy. All that remained behind to protect the Northwest were small units of the Invalid Corps, unfit for active duty, and the state militias, many of them filled with Copperheads and unreliable. At this time came the Democratic convention and with it, to Chicago, the conspirators. Fortunately for the country, the secret service had dis- covered the complete details of the rising and took prompt measures to prevent its maturing. On August 28, the night before the plot was to occur, special troops were moved to Chicago; extra guards were stationed at all prison camps; leading members of the Sons of Liberty w 7 ere arrested in Indiana, Ohio, and Southern Illinois. All that was left were the delegates who had come to the Democratic convention and a handful of Confederate officers who had filtered into the city from Canada. The action of the authorities com- pletely demoralized the Copperheads and they refused to go on with their plans. The uprising was reluctantly abandoned and the Confederates departed immediately. All that re- mained of Confederate hopes was contained in the program of the Peace Party. The Copperheads did not disappoint their friends. While every energy of the American people was concentrated on the Union offensive, the Peace Democrats adopted a platform whose first plank revealed its content: "Resolved, That this convention does explicitly declare, as the sense of the American people, that after four years of fail- ure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, during which, under the pretense of military necessity, or war power higher than the Constitution, the Constitution itself has been disregarded in every part, and public liberty and private right alike trodden down and the material prosperity of the country essentially impaired, — justice, humanity, liberty and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view of an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest prac- ticable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States." 28 While the Democrats were formulating this platform the fleet of Admiral Farragut and the cannons of Sherman were 43 blowing their words to pieces. News was brought to the convention floor of the capture of Mobile Harbor and At- lanta. It was received in stunned silence. "It was a con- vention," wrote a correspondent, "in which disaster to the Union armies would have been welcome news." 29 But the die was cast. The peace platform was already drawn and McClellan nominated. The rest was up to the people. National Unity Although the Union victories gave promise of Union suc- cess at the polls, the party could not be sure of winning the elections until every foe of slavery was within its ranks. The Fremont group had to be reunited with the bulk of the party. But the main obstacle to attaining this end lay in the con- tinuation of Montgomery Blair in the Cabinet. Realizing this, Zachariah Chandler, Radical Senator from Michigan, after discussing the prospects of the campaign with Senator Wade, came to the conclusion that unity could be won by the simultaneous resignation of Blair from the Cabinet and the withdrawal of Fremont from the Presidential race. Accord- ingly, in the latter part of August, Chandler set out to Wash- ington and New York to convince Lincoln and Fremont to take the action he outlined. At first neither man would agree to Chandler's proposal, but when the full meaning of the "Chicago Treason," as the War Democrats named the Chicago Peace Democratic Plat- form, became known, Lincoln signified his acceptance of the bargain. Fremont held out for a time, but he soon saw that his supporters were deserting him for Lincoln, so on Septem- ber 22 he withdrew from the race declaring that unity of the Union Party was the paramount need. Although he held certain reservations concerning the party's choice, neverthe- less Lincoln must be supported. This compromise, once again brought about by the Radicals, drove the final nail into the coffin of Copperhead aspirations. The cleansing of the government of Blair's influence brought to Lincoln's side the Negro leader, Frederick Douglass, and finally, in October, Wendell Phillips also came out for him. Now the party went into the field to get out the votes. Chase, Sumner, Stevens, Wade, Chandler, Seward, and Davis 44 covered the nation speaking to gatherings in every city, town and crossroad. On every platform the cry was the same: "A vote for McClellan is a vote for Jeff Davis. A vote for Lincoln will bring speedy victory and a sure peace." The Loyal Leagues also swung into action. Hundreds of thousands of pamphlets, newspapers, and posters were printed and broadcast over the country. Thousands were sent to the army, the prison camps and hospitals. To the Union and Emancipation Societies of London and Manchester went seven thousand pamphlets for distribution to the friends of the Union. The theme of every Union argument was victory through national unity, and when, on November 7, the democratic voice of the people spoke at the ballot box that argument had been heard. On that day the long years of patient effort on the part of the people at home, the men in the field and their leaders in the Union Party were rewarded. The returns gave Lincoln a majority of 494,567 out of a total vote of 4,166,537. He received the electoral votes of 22 out of 25 states voting. Though very large, the Union vote would have been still larger if more of the 2,000,000 soldiers had been able to vote. Of the 150,635 soldiers who voted, 116,887 cast their ballots for Lincoln. Though small in number these votes were sufficient to send eight Union men to Congress who would otherwise have been defeated on the home vote alone. The significance of both the home and soldier vote lay in the fact that Lincoln would now have the two-thirds majority in Congress to secure passage of the Thirteenth Amendment and to carry on the great task of reconstruction. The new Thirty- Ninth Congress had 145 Unionists to 40 Democrats. The will of the people had created a victory legislature. "Let the glad tidings go forth," cried Charles Sumner at an inpromptu victory rally on election night. "To whom it may concern, ' — to all the People of the United States, at length now made wholly free, — to foreign countries . . . that this Republic shall live, for Slavery is dead." 30 And from Europe the friends of the Union sent congratu- lations. Perhaps the most representative of all was the Ad- dress of the International Workingmen's Association, the First International, written by Karl Marx: 45 "From the commencement of the titanic American strife the workingmen of Europe felt instinctively that the Star Spangled Banner carried the destiny of their class," it read. "... The working classes of Europe understood at once, even before the fanatic partisanship of the upper classes, for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor, and that for the men of labor, with their hopes for the future, even their past conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict on the other side of the Atlantic." The faith of the workingmen in Europe was grounded in the belief "that, as the American War of Independence initiated a new era of ascendancy for the middle-class, so the American Anti-Slavery War will do for the working classes. They con- sider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggle for the rescue of the enchained race and the reconstruction of a social world." 31 46 Reference Notes 1. Horace Greeley, The American Conflict (2 vols., Hartford, 1864-66), Vol. I, p. 417. 2. Edward L. Pierce, Memoir and Letters of Charles Sumner (4 vols., Boston, 1893-94) , Vol. IV, p. 47. 3. William H. Russell, My Diary North and South (New York, 1863), p. 16. 4. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Civil War in the United States (New York, 1937) , p. 157. .">. Greeley, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 244-45. 6. John A. Logan, The Great Conspiracy (New York, 1886) , pp. 346-47. 7. Ibid., p. 391. 8. Pierce, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 66. 9. Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years (4 vols., New York, 1939) , Vol. I, p. 610. 10. Ibid., p. 215. 11. United States Army and Navy Journal and Gazette of the Regular and Volunteer Forces, October 10, 1863. 12. Report of the Judge Advocate General on the Order of American Knights or Sons of Liberty. A Western Conspiracy in Aid of the Southern Rebellion (Washington, D. C., 1864) . 13. Wood Gray, The Hidden Civil War (New York, 1942), p. 144. 14. Report of Proceedings at the First Anniversary Meeting of the Loyal Publication Society, L. P. S. No. 44 (New York, 1864) . ' 15. Marx and Engels, op. cit., p. 253. 16. Chronicle of the Union League of Philadelphia (Philadel- phia, 1902, p. 95. 17. Philip S. Foner, "Labor and the Copperheads," in Science and Society (Summer, 1944) , pp. 223-42. 47 18. The Three Voices: Soldier, Farmer, and Poet, to the Copper- heads, Loyal Pub. Society, No. 4 (New York, 1863) , p. 2. 19. Ibid., p. 3. 20. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (70 vols., Washington, D. C, 1880-1901) , Series III, Vol. IV, pp. 577-79. 21. Alphonse B. Miller, Thaddeus Stevens (New York, 1939), pp. 198-99. 22. Address of the Unconditional Union Central Committee for the City and County of New York, March 11, 1864. 23. Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Con- ventions of 1856, 1860 and 1864 (Minneapolis, 1893) , p. 225. 24. Thomas H. Hines, "The Northwest Conspiracy," in South- ern Bivouac, p. 438. 25. New York Daily Tribune, February 11, 1864. 26. New York Daily News, April 14, 1864. 27. lb id., August 5, 1864. 28. Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention Held in 1864 (Chicago, 1864) , p. 27. 29. Charles C. Coffin, Redeeming the Republic (New York, 1890) , p. 452. 30. Charles Sumner, His Complete Works (20 vols., Boston, 1872-1900) , Vol. XII, pp. 2-4. 31. Marx and Engels, op. cit., pp. 279-81. i 48 AMERICAN HISTORY THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN NATION Francis Franklin $2.00 THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN FREEDOM Herbert M. Morals $2.25 THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES Karl Marx and Frederick Engels $2.50 RECONSTRUCTION: The Battle for Democracy James S. Allen $ 1 .50 THE FIRST AMERICAN REVOLUTION Jack Hardy $0.75 MORALE EDUCATION IN THE AMERICAN ARMY: War for Independence, War of 1812, Civil War P. S. Foner $0.20 THOMAS JEFFERSON: Selections from His Writings Edited by P. S. Foner $0.25 THOMAS PAINE: Selections from His Writings Edited by James S. Allen $0.25 GEORGE WASHINGTON: Selections from His Writings Edited by P. S. Foner $0.25 ABRAHAM LINCOLN: Selections from His Writings Edited by P. S. 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