ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SURVEY 
 
/3 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
 in 2012 with funding from 
 
 University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/musicianspetrillOOIeit 
 
JAMES C. PETRIUjO 
 MUSIOCNT 
 
 CARL A. BAUMANN 
 
 JOE COIKUIX 
 
 LOCAL NO. lO, A. F. OF M. 
 
 Chicago Federation 
 
 CHICAGO 2, ILL. 
 
 To all members of the Chicago Federation of 
 Musicians : 
 
 This book THE MUSICIANS and PETRILLO is sent to 
 you with the compliments of the Chicago Federation 
 of Musicians by order of the Board of Directors 
 of Local No. 10. 
 
 Fraternally yours, 
 
 ^u^^i a,^^6e^> 
 
 Recording Secretary 
 
JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO 
 
The Musicians and Petrillo 
 
 By 
 ROBERT D. LEITER 
 
 BOOKMAN ASSOCIATES, INC. 
 
 New York 
 
Copyright 1953 by 
 Bookman Associates, Inc. 
 
 All rights reserved 
 
 No part of this book may be reproduced 
 
 without permission from the publisher. 
 
 Reviewers may quote brief passages. 
 
 First edition 
 
 First Printing, June 1953 
 Second Printing, September 1953 
 
 145 
 
 Manufactured in the United States of America 
 
To the memories of 
 
 my mother, gussie 
 
 and 
 
 my father, j. heschel 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 Preface 7 
 
 Chapter 1 The Musicians Form a Union 9 
 
 Chapter 2 The Union Gains Prestige and Status 26 
 
 Chapter 3 Enter James Caesar Petrillo 42 
 
 Chapter 4 The Musicians Encounter Technology 54 
 
 Chapter 5 The Supremacy of the National Union 75 
 
 Chapter 6 The Jurisdiction and Operation of a Local 94 
 
 Chapter 7 Petrillo Removes Two Thorns 112 
 
 Chapter 8 The Record Ban in 1942 or Roosevelt 
 
 Couldn't End That One 132 
 
 Chapter 9 How the Interlochen Dispute Led 
 
 to the Lea Act 149 
 
 Chapter 10 Petrillo Stabilizes Labor Relations 164 
 
 Chapter 11 Petrillo Marches On— Technological Prob- 
 lems Remain 181 
 
 Notes 188 
 
 Bibliography 196 
 
 Index 198 
 
PREFACE 
 
 The story of the musicians union is a study in personalities, 
 power, and technological change. For more than half a century 
 the union of musicians— the American Federation of Musicians- 
 has been dominated by forceful leaders who, when they desired, 
 have imposed their wishes upon the organization. These men 
 generally have adhered scrupulously to the laws and rules of the 
 union; but at the same time the laws have been so formulated 
 that the international president has been able, if he deemed it 
 necessary, to balk the desires of the majority of the members. 
 
 The power of the union is evident not only in the internal 
 affairs of the organization, but in the union's relations with 
 employers. The American Federation of Musicians exercises 
 complete control over professional musicians in the United 
 States. A musician who is not in the union normally cannot 
 earn a livelihood by playing an instrument. The union fre- 
 quently has been able to impose the terms of employment upon 
 employers without negotiation. Some employers and some agents 
 have been required to secure licenses from the union before 
 being able to hire or deal with musicians. 
 
 The judicial functions performed by the AFM have made it 
 unnecessary and unusual for members or employers to appeal to 
 the courts. Claims are collected for members or employers, fines 
 are imposed, and regulations are enforced. The ability of the 
 union to expel a member or to put an employer on the unfair 
 list and thereby make it impossible for him to obtain the 
 services of musicians has proved sufficiently effective in enforc- 
 ing its decisions. 
 
 Inventions have changed the forms and types of music which 
 the public hears. These technological advances have impinged 
 on the employment opportunities of musicians and have raised 
 problems and issues which have been the concern of the public 
 for many years. The activities of musicians are closely connected 
 with the entertainment industry and have therefore aroused 
 more popular interest than the work of most other laborers. Only 
 
during the last few years, however, has some progress been made 
 in solving a few of these problems. 
 
 This book traces the development and growth of the union 
 as an economic force. It begins with the earliest attempts to 
 unionize musicians in the United States and carries the narra- 
 tive to the present time. It considers the various problems which 
 arose, the impact of the actions of musicians on other sectors of 
 the economy, and the personalities of the men who shaped the 
 destiny of the union. Throughout its existence, the American 
 Federation of Musicians has been involved in a competitive 
 struggle. At first organized musicians were faced with the com- 
 petition of the nonunionized instrumentalists. When this prob- 
 lem was essentially solved, it was replaced by the more serious 
 and complicated one involving the competitive force of tech- 
 nology. 
 
 This study was made over a period of several years. It involved 
 a careful examination of every issue of the monthly newspapers 
 of the international union and of the New York local, of the 
 periodicals of several other locals, and of official documents 
 released by the union. Clipping files and newspaper indexes 
 were consulted. Numerous magazine articles dealing with the 
 musicians and with James Caesar Petrillo were studied. All the 
 Congressional hearings and reports connected with this union 
 were analyzed. Relevant publications issued by trade associa- 
 tions and by interested employers were read. Many books were 
 checked for pertinent information. 
 
 Scores of conferences and interviews were held with represen- 
 tatives of management, with elected and appointed officials of 
 the international union and of several locals, and with persons 
 interested in music. Many working musicians, some of whom 
 were my students at the time of the discussions, supplied various 
 types of information. To all of these persons, a great number 
 of whom have asked to remain anonymous, I express my 
 gratitude. 
 
 R.D.L. 
 City College of New York 
 June 1, 1953 
 
THE MUSICIANS FORM A UNION 
 
 1 
 
 ". . . by far the most marked progress our organization 
 has made was made by reason of its readiness to confer 
 with the employer and settle controversies over the con- 
 ference table." 
 
 JOSEPH NICHOLAS WEBER 
 
 • The Place of the Musician in the Nineteenth Century 
 
 Musicians represent a respected group in the labor force today, 
 but they did not always enjoy such status. For centuries musi- 
 cians, along with actors, magicians, acrobats, hypnotists, and 
 other performers, in general, were regarded as peculiar persons. 
 The ability to play an instrument was considered by many people 
 to be strange. The public was especially suspicious of those men 
 who supplemented their musical performance with other feats 
 in order to earn a livelihood. Such cases were not unusual. An 
 application letter from a musician written during the Middle 
 Ages and preserved at Oxford University says: "I can play the 
 lute and the pipe, the harp, the organistrum, the bagpipe and 
 the tabor. I can throw knives and catch them without cutting 
 myself. I can tell a tale against any man and make love verses for 
 the ladies. I can move tables and juggle the chairs. I can turn 
 somersaults and stand on my head." 1 
 
 Musicians were looked upon askance in the United States 
 throughout the nineteenth century. Since then, however, their 
 prestige has risen. A number of factors have been responsible for 
 the change. 
 
 A competent musician had to have both talent and skill. Yet 
 before the twentieth century, only in rare cases was he able to 
 make a living by working solely as a musician. Employment op- 
 portunities were not good. Permanent symphony orchestras 
 were found only in a few of the largest cities. There were not 
 many big bands, and several of those in existence were found in 
 state penitentiaries. Musicians were limited essentially to playing 
 at dances, picnics, serenades, and funerals. 
 
10 
 
 The struggle by musicians to improve their economic status 
 was similar in many ways to those engaged in by other workers; 
 but in various respects it had its own characteristics. Music at 
 first was not classified either as a trade or as a profession. But 
 musicians formed labor associations by the second half of the 
 nineteenth century and in this regard they acted like other 
 skilled workers. 
 
 Unskilled workers usually lacked the education, intelligence, 
 experience, and energy, to set up permanent organizations for 
 their own advantage. Workers with skills had higher standards of 
 living and more opportunity to examine their status and plan 
 for the advancement of their interests. The craftsmen in the 
 larger cities were the first to form labor unions. 
 
 These unions, however, did not have the same purposes as 
 those in existence today. Twentieth-century trade unions are con- 
 cerned mainly with the improvement of wages, hours, and con- 
 ditions of work. During the first part of the nineteenth century 
 the right of workers to engage in such activities was not estab- 
 lished legally. Concerted demands upon employers often were 
 considered conspiracies in restraint of trade. The first labor 
 unions therefore were social organizations. Frequently, they 
 functioned as mutual insurance organizations and members 
 would be entitled to sick benefits, death benefits, and unemploy- 
 ment benefits. By the middle of the century rulings of the judi- 
 ciary established the right of workers to organize and exert eco- 
 nomic strength in order to improve their economic position. 
 
 Shoemakers, carpenters, printers, and tailors established labor 
 organizations. Professional groups like teachers, lawyers, and 
 doctors, even when employed by others, were not affected by 
 unionization. Feelings of independence and of being able to 
 advance through the exercise of initiative always have dominated 
 the thinking of professional employees. During the nineteenth 
 century musicians stood midway between these groups. 
 
 The long period of training and experience necessary to per- 
 form satisfactorily on an instrument provided an aspect of pro- 
 fessionalism to the work of musicians. Manual skills and dexteri- 
 ty had to be present but they were subordinate to musical instinct 
 and intuition. Yet as in the case of other skilled workers, the 
 greatest efficiency of the musician, especially on wind instru- 
 ments, usually is achieved at a comparatively early age. The con- 
 
11 
 
 ditions surrounding the economic life of the musician were un- 
 favorable and the opportunities for improving his status were 
 limited. The standards and codes of the nineteenth century 
 frowned upon the work of the musician. Entertainers were sup- 
 posed to represent an inferior social class and they were shunned 
 in the social intercourse of the community. 
 
 Though rapid movement from one social class to another was 
 still possible, the establishment of trade unions was one of the 
 first signs of more rigid stratification of classes; it marked the 
 acceptance of this condition by the wage earners. Many musicians 
 liked to think that they were part of a professional class but they 
 were not completely correct because the public was not impressed 
 with their qualifications. The audience usually expected the 
 musician to perform a vaudeville act as well as to play an in- 
 strument. 
 
 Orchestras were expected to take part in minstrel shows. Musi- 
 cians blackened their faces and became end men and jesters. 
 Music was a public attraction in many parts of the United States 
 only if it was supplemented by some unusual demonstration. A 
 pianist would fasten sleigh bells to his legs, bands would rein- 
 force sound effects with cannon shots, musicians would execute 
 400 notes in one measure, or singers would sing 600 words and 
 300 bars of music in four minutes. Freak stunts were part of the 
 usual routine by which musicians earned a living. During the 
 nineteenth century, most of the musicians who stuck to music 
 only, were barely able to eke out an existence. They played at 
 picnics, in theater pits, in churches, at grange halls, in dance 
 halls, and at parades. Employment was unsteady and conditions 
 of work were poor. 
 
 Generally, musicians have no permanent employer but con- 
 stantly are seeking new jobs. In this respect the work of musicians 
 is different from that of employees in other fields where the em- 
 ployer hires workers for relatively long periods of time and where 
 the hours and conditions of work are more regular. Within a short 
 span of time, a musician may be employed by many men, each 
 of whom operates a different type of establishment— for example, 
 theater, night club, restaurant, catering hall, symphony, or fra- 
 ternal organization. Musicians have to move from one place of 
 work to another. Usually such travel occurs only within one town 
 or city but many performers lead an itinerant existence. They 
 
12 
 
 search for employment opportunities throughout the country 
 and thereby create problems for musicians who stay in one 
 locality. 
 
 Music differs also from most other occupations in that a large 
 number of musicians are not working as instrumentalists all the 
 time. These men have a regular trade or occupation but play an 
 instrument to add to their incomes. They are known as the semi- 
 professional musicians and are distinguished from the group 
 of professional musicians whose full time normally is devoted 
 to the rendition of music. (Nonprofessional musicians receive 
 no income for their performance.) 
 
 These peculiarities of the musical field have led to an unusual 
 method of employing personnel. The hiring system depends 
 upon a contractor. When a band or orchestra is needed for 
 any function or engagement, the employer hires a contractor, 
 who is more familiar with the talent available, to secure the 
 necessary personnel. The musicians are supervised by the con- 
 tractor and the employer. Formerly, the generally weak eco- 
 nomic position of the musician was a severe handicap to him. 
 Since employment was not steady, he was competing constantly 
 with his fellows for the available positions. Straitened circum- 
 stances made him willing to accept a lower price and thereby 
 tended to force his wages down. In addition, competition be- 
 tween contractors to secure the engagement from the employer 
 tended to reduce the remuneration of the musician still further 
 because the contractor had less money to distribute among the 
 men. By quoting a lower price to the purchaser of music, the 
 contractor was forced to lower the wage scale of the instru- 
 mentalist. 
 
 The first musicians unions were not organized to alleviate 
 adverse economic conditions among the membership. These 
 unions comprised the elite among instrumental performers. 
 They maintained an element of exclusiveness by setting rigor- 
 ous entrance requirements; and inferior performers at first were 
 not admitted to these organizations. An air of fraternalism pre- 
 vailed in them. Basically they were social clubs where members 
 could get together for discussions and entertainment. 
 
 In most of these early unions the German element predomi- 
 nated. Such, for example, was the typical case of the St. Louis 
 local of musicians where an analysis of the national origin of 
 
13 
 
 the 191 members disclosed that in 1888, 78 came from Germany 
 and only 65 were born in the United States. By 1910, however, 
 when the local had 835 members, it was found that 660 of them 
 were born in the United States. Germany fell to the second 
 rank, contributing only 77 members. 2 
 
 A large number of the band and orchestra leaders of that 
 time were saloon keepers. 3 Many members of the bands were 
 recruited from among the beer drinkers in these saloons. In 
 Cincinnati, the local union of musicians was organized as a 
 result of the actions of some of the younger instrumentalists 
 who wished to rid themselves of the arbitrary control exercised 
 by the leaders. These younger men organized a union in order 
 to force the bandmaster to come to them when he needed musi- 
 cians. In order to further strengthen their position, they also 
 organized a cooperative saloon so that musicians would stay out 
 of the rival establishments (where hiring took place) ; but this 
 venture was short-lived. 
 
 It is true that these unions were interested in the welfare of 
 musicians and would take steps to protect their members if the 
 occasion made such action urgent, but for many years they 
 were concerned mainly with enforcing certain rules applying 
 to benevolent programs which they had set up; a program of 
 death benefits was most typical. The musicians' organizations 
 were interested in presenting programs for the entertainment 
 of the public, planning affairs for their own enjoyment, and 
 engaging in "social hilarity." Only late in the century were 
 attempts made to enforce performance price lists. 
 
 Though Baltimore and Chicago had musicians unions as 
 early as 1857, the first organization of a group of musicians 
 whose purposes and objectives were clearly those of a trade 
 union usually is considered to have taken place in New York 
 City. In 1863, under the leadership of Henry D. Beissenherz, a 
 union was formed. The following year, the organization was 
 chartered under the laws of New York State. (It was customary 
 for labor unions to incorporate during that era.) In the suc- 
 ceeding decade, organization was very rapid and many cities in 
 the East and Midwest formed musical unions. 
 
 • National Organizations of Musicians 
 The local in Philadelphia took the initiative in 1871 and 
 
14 
 
 called a meeting of the various independent musical unions in 
 the country. It was decided to establish a national organization 
 in order to deal with matters of common interest to musicians 
 and to tackle the problems caused by the competition faced by 
 members of each local from traveling musicians and road 
 shows. The organization, which was known as the National 
 Musical Association, held several conventions, but it endured 
 less than ten years. It never comprised more than 17 locals and 
 its activities were rather limited. It could accomplish nothing 
 because the constituent locals themselves were lacking in author- 
 ity and power. 
 
 By 1885 many unions of musicians had secured a firmer foot- 
 hold in their jurisdictions and under the leadership of the 
 Cincinnati local a meeting was called for 1886 in New York 
 City. Seven unions were represented— Cincinnati, New York, 
 Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, Milwaukee, and Detroit— and 
 they agreed to form the National League of Musicians of the 
 United States. The members of the League remained essenti- 
 ally independent locals and retained final authority over all 
 matters in which they were concerned. 
 
 The growth of the NLM was rapid. It had 15 locals in 1887, 
 and by 1896, it had 9,000 members in 79 locals. These units 
 were scattered all over the United States. The debates in the 
 conventions held by the League engendered much factional 
 strife and bitterness over the question of whether musicians 
 were artists and professionals or whether they were laborers. 
 Those musicians who claimed they had little in common with 
 workers in manufacturing and construction activity derisively 
 called the other faction "stove polishers," "stove molders," and 
 "shoe makers." The element which considered itself to be 
 laborers called its opponents "silk hats," "toppers," and "Prince 
 Alberts." It was not uncommon for delegates at the annual 
 conventions of the NLM to wear Prince Albert coats, silk hats, 
 and patent leather shoes. In 1887 the NLM voted down a reso- 
 lution recommended by its president which declared that musi- 
 cians were "laborers in the field of music." 4 
 
 Affiliation with the American Federation of Labor hinged on 
 this issue. The AFL which had its inception in 1881, was ex- 
 panding its membership and desired to include all the organ- 
 ized musicians. The Knights of Labor, a rival national organi- 
 
15 
 
 zation of workers, which attained its peak membership in the 
 middle of the 1880's, also wanted to enroll the musicians. Indi- 
 vidual locals had the choice of joining either the AFL or the 
 Knights, or of remaining independent; and all three alternatives 
 had its adherents. The Knights of Labor, however, soon weak- 
 ened and became of negligible importance in the labor move- 
 ment, so that the issue which crystallized for each of the locals 
 was whether or not to join the AFL. Beginning with the second 
 NLM convention, in 1887, the AFL regularly invited the NLM 
 to affiliate with it, but was regularly turned down. The faction 
 opposing affiliation maintained that musicians had little in 
 common with other workers or their unions, and that the 
 musicians union would suffer a loss in dignity and prestige by 
 affiliation. Those men who desired to join the AFL countered 
 with the argument that musicians, like other laborers, were 
 wage earners and that their conditions could be improved more 
 effectively if they combined with the general labor movement. 
 The president of the NLM reported to the 1891 convention: 
 "Concerning the affiliation of the League with the American 
 Federation of Labor, which has been urged repeatedly, thus 
 far without success, those for and against appear to be about 
 evenly divided, with the probability that a majority would 
 favor affiliation, provided it did not involve a surrender of the 
 League's independence. It is a serious question, and the ad- 
 visability of refraining from committing the League to either 
 side of the questions at issue between Capital and Labor should 
 receive your most earnest consideration." 5 
 
 Although a majority of the locals desired to affiliate, the 
 voting procedure made such a step difficult. The element which 
 opposed affiliation (that is, the group which considered itself 
 professional) was centralized in New York and the other metro- 
 politan areas in the East. It had a much greater membership 
 than the other faction and therefore heavier voting strength 
 in the conventions. Furthermore, the newer Western locals, 
 which were more inclined to affiliate, were generally unable to 
 afford the expenses of delegates and did not send any. The 
 New York local, which opposed affiliation, had from 26 to 30 
 votes in a convention that never had more than 125 votes. 
 
 The American Federation of Labor, therefore, undertook to 
 charter locals of musicians directly, until there would be enough 
 
16 
 
 of them so that it could create a national union within its own 
 ranks. By 1895, a large majority of the locals of the NLM were 
 affiliated with the AFL either directly or indirectly. Some of 
 the locals in the League had been chartered directly by the 
 AFL and other unions of musicians were indirectly connected 
 with the AFL through affiliation with the central labor bodies 
 in their respective cities. 
 
 •. The American Federation of Musicians 
 
 The convention of the AFL in that year authorized President 
 Samuel Gompers to give the NLM one final opportunity to 
 join the AFL. The understanding was that a new national 
 union would be organized if the offer should be rejected. When 
 the NLM, by a tie vote, decided not to join the AFL, Gompers 
 issued a call for a national convention of musicians unions to 
 meet on October 19, 1896. Twenty-six unions representing 24 
 localities responded to the convention notice by sending either 
 a delegate or a letter. Of these 26, 17 were in the NLM and 
 nine were independent. The delegates represented 4,000 mem- 
 bers, 886 of whom were not members of the League. 6 The 
 convention successfully organized the American Federation of 
 Musicians, and received a national charter on November 6, 
 1896. Owen Miller was elected the first president of the new 
 union. 
 
 The AFM desired to avoid jurisdictional difficulties with the 
 NLM. Some of the unions which were independent of the NLM 
 had accepted members from jurisdictions claimed by League 
 locals. In all cases, locals of the NLM were given preference in 
 joining the AFM over other locals in the same areas. Most of 
 the NLM locals were soon members of both organizations. The 
 leaders of the NLM, however, battled those League locals 
 which had joined the American Federation of Musicians. When 
 the 1897 convention of the NLM was held, an attempt was 
 made to bar the delegates from those locals which were also 
 members of the AFM. But the delegates secured a court in- 
 junction which ordered the NLM leaders to admit them to the 
 convention. From that time on, the NLM began to decline, and 
 it subsequently never was able to regain its former prestige. 
 
 The somewhat prolonged struggle which ensued between the 
 party in the NLM which opposed affiliation, built around the 
 
17 
 
 Musical Mutual Protective Union of New York, and the 
 American Federation of Musicians finally ended with a com- 
 plete victory by the AFM over the NLM. The National League 
 of Musicians distributed its funds among its component locals 
 and was dissolved at its convention in 1904. "Grand Old Man" 
 Beissenherz, who had been the temporary chairman of the 
 first AFM convention, presided over the final sessions. 
 
 The disintegration of the National League of Musicians was 
 not a serious calamity to the musicians. The NLM had failed 
 to assist the locals in improving wages, hours, and other em- 
 ployment conditions. It never had the opportunity to carry 
 out what should have been its chief purposes and functions 
 because it was mainly a forum. The loose nature of its organ- 
 ization, under which the locals retained most of the authority 
 and discretion, did not give it any cohesiveness. The only unit- 
 ing element in the League was the national death benefit scheme 
 which it had set up and supervised. 
 
 The major problem which had faced the NLM was the jeal- 
 ousy and rivalry among the locals. The weaknesses of the League 
 all stemmed from this condition. The attempt to establish a 
 national death benefit scheme which would operate smoothly 
 was a failure. Complaints were leveled against the assessment 
 plan because some locals were receiving more money in bene- 
 fits than they were paying in as premiums. Such unequal dis- 
 tribution is to be expected under any insurance plan and atti- 
 tudes of resentment which emerged were not conducive to the 
 satisfactory operation of the plan. 
 
 Each local was distrustful of its neighbors and carefully 
 guarded its own jurisdiction. The League required member 
 musicians to seek employment only in their own locality. This 
 rule was desired by the locals and was aimed at keeping musi- 
 cians out of the jurisdiction of locals other than the one to 
 which they belonged. Each local believed that by building a 
 wall around itself, it would pre-empt the employment oppor- 
 tunities in its own area. But this did not happen because the 
 rule was unenforceable; and it became a dead letter. It was 
 not possible to keep qualified musicians from taking jobs in 
 areas other than their home base when an employer desired 
 to hire them. 
 
 The effectiveness of the League was even further curtailed 
 
18 
 
 because there was no provision for an adequate transfer system. 
 Musicians had no simple or convenient way of changing their 
 local affiliation. This worked undue hardships upon them and 
 weakened the structure and value of the NLM. Musicians who 
 found it necessary to move about freely practiced an outright 
 disregard of the rules. 
 
 Each union of musicians believed that the device of restrict- 
 ing the membership of the local would benefit its own mem- 
 bers. Behind this policy was the mistaken notion that only 
 union musicians were capable of securing employment. The 
 unions refused to recognize their own limitations and weak- 
 nesses during this formative period. Before 1900, they almost 
 never had control of any sizable segment of the employers of 
 musicians in any city. The entrance requirements set by the 
 unions, particularly in the East, were designed to exclude musi- 
 cians rather than select qualified performers. Examinations for 
 admission were discriminatory, arbitrary, and unduly difficult; 
 and initiation fees were exorbitant. Favoritism towards certain 
 nationalities was practiced. It is no wonder that these prac- 
 tices increased rather than lessened competition among musi- 
 cians. Not only was the existence of a nonunion group encour- 
 aged, but rival unions flourished in many cities. 
 
 The voting system of the League was poorly devised. Though 
 apparently democratic in that all matters were decided on the 
 basis of a majority of the full membership, the conditions and 
 circumstances of the organization at that time were not pro- 
 pitious to the utilization of this voting procedure. Since the 
 number of votes of each local in the convention was based upon 
 its membership figures, undue advantage was given to certain 
 locals. The few largest musical unions were able to dominate 
 the convention. New York, in combination with a few other 
 Eastern locals, was able to prevail on most issues. This was 
 especially true because the smaller Western locals whose views 
 were closer to those of the general labor movement rarely 
 sent delegates to the conventions. Instead they handed over 
 their proxy votes to the larger locals, which were well repre- 
 sented already. As a result limited interests were served and 
 national considerations were relegated to a position of sec- 
 ondary importance. 
 
 It would be a mistake nevertheless to assume that these con- 
 
19 
 
 ditions brought about the end of the NLM and led to the 
 organization of the American Federation of Musicians. Rather 
 the schism between the two groups was mainly the outcome of 
 a political struggle for control. The AFL desired the affiliation 
 of musicians. Some of the leaders in the NLM agreed that this 
 should be done, but others disagreed. In the events which 
 followed, the faction which desired to join the AFL won. There 
 was a change in leadership of the national organization of 
 musicians and nothing more. The American Federation of 
 Musicians, which originally faced the same problems that weak- 
 ened the NLM, was able to overcome these difficulties. It then 
 began a remarkable career in which the interests of its members 
 substantially were advanced. 
 
 The musicians have been fortunate in their leadership, for 
 able and untiring men have always headed the organization. 
 In more than half a century of existence, the destiny of the 
 AFM has been largely in the hands of three men. But all three 
 have been skilled politicians whose policies and tactics, on 
 many occasions better described as machinations and maneu- 
 verings, have enabled them to reach and remain at the top of 
 the national union. The first leader was Owen Miller, a forceful 
 individual, who became president of the union when it was 
 founded. His life is interwoven in the development and early 
 growth of trade unionism among musicians. 
 
 At an early age Miller was forced to seek employment be- 
 cause of the impoverished condition of his family. The pres- 
 sure of financial need made it impossible for him to enjoy an 
 education beyond the public schools. But he was a self-taught 
 man and his later life showed that he had wide knowledge and 
 a grasp of affairs. In 1885 he was instrumental in organizing the 
 St. Louis local of musicians, in which he served as president 
 and in other capacities until his death. Miller helped form the 
 National League of Musicians; and he served as president of 
 the organization during the 1891 term. He favored the affiliation 
 of the NLM with the AFL and when the NLM refused to do so 
 he was one of the musicians who helped organize the first 
 convention of the American Federation of Musicians in 1896. 
 
 Owen Miller was active in labor affairs in the state of Mis- 
 souri. He was a member of the State Senate of Missouri for a 
 time and one of the leaders in the State Federation of Labor 
 
20 
 
 and in local councils. His opinions seemed to be highly re- 
 spected in labor circles. It is clear that his advice was sought 
 and accepted by the musicians, and that he wielded a cohesive 
 influence upon the American Federation of Musicians during 
 his lifetime. However, the achievements of his administration, 
 which lasted until 1900, were negligible. Only the problem 
 connected with matters of jurisdiction was solved. Some of the 
 locals originally joining the Federation included on their mem- 
 bership rolls individuals expelled from other locals. This cre- 
 ated a delicate situation. But the regulation of membership was 
 turned over to the national union and an amicable adjustment 
 was reached in individual cases. 
 
 In 1900, when nearly 49 years of age, Miller decided to step 
 down from the presidency of the union. Although there had 
 been some growth in the size of the organization, its progress 
 had not been conspicuous. There were few signs to distinguish 
 the AFM from its predecessor, the NLM. On the other hand, 
 several of the very large and important Eastern locals had 
 refused to join. The major factor which led to Miller's decision 
 was financial. The salary of the president of the AFM was 
 only $100 while that of the secretary was $750. Yet the burdens 
 of the president's office were heavy. Miller therefore became 
 secretary of the union and president of the St. Louis local. He 
 added to his duties the editorship of the union's monthly maga- 
 zine when it commenced publication in 1901. In this way his 
 monetary income was increased. Joseph Nicholas Weber was 
 elected to succeed Miller as president. 
 
 Unlike Miller, Weber was not a native of the United States. 
 He was born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire on June 21, 
 1865, 7 and came to the United States when 14 years of age. He 
 traveled widely in his capacity as a musician, playing the clari- 
 net in various parts of the country. Weber joined the Denver 
 musicians union in 1890 and soon demonstrated that he was 
 politically able and adept. He became secretary of the Denver 
 local and its delegate to the NLM. At the NLM convention of 
 1891 he favored affiliation with the AFL. In 1893 he joined the 
 Seattle local and was elected vice president. In 1895, he went 
 to Cincinnati, where his father, who was a bandleader, oper- 
 ated a saloon. The younger Weber was elected to the board 
 of directors of the musicians union there. He then became pres- 
 
21 
 
 ident of the Cincinnati local and a delegate to the AFM con- 
 vention. It is apparent that wherever he went, he soon emerged 
 as one of the leaders of the local union. He was a conservative 
 in his ideas and always clung to the view that changes should 
 be made slowly but steadily. 
 
 Weber's first acts demonstrated that he was the actual and 
 not merely nominal head of the organization. In short order, he 
 crushed the smoldering resentment over his victory. Opposi- 
 tion was led by the editor of the American Musician, a monthly 
 privately owned magazine. Under a contract with the AFM, this 
 magazine served as the official publication of the musicians 
 union. The editor, who previously had beaten Weber in an 
 election held to select the delegate of the AFM to the AFL 
 convention, was displeased with Weber's elevation, and he 
 refused to take orders from Weber in regard to the contents of 
 the magazine. The publication thereupon was suspended as the 
 union periodical and the editor was expelled from the musi- 
 cians union. During the next 40 years Weber was never again 
 seriously challenged regarding his powers as head of the AFM. 
 
 Weber recognized that growth of the musicians union would 
 take place only if the organization successfuly controlled com- 
 petition in the industry. Musicians, much more than workers 
 in most other occupations, have been mobile in seeking employ- 
 ment. Many of them have moved from town to town. If they 
 were hindered from doing so by the rules of the labor union 
 which solicited their membership, they did not join the organi- 
 zation but competed with it. Though the requirements for ad- 
 mission to the locals had been liberalized somewhat by 1900, 
 the walls around each of them continued to exist. The AFM 
 also faced the problem of competition from the traveling con- 
 cert or military band. These bands sometimes lessened the em- 
 ployment opportunities of local musicians. Weber saw these 
 problems and tried to solve them. He was fortunate in that 
 circumstances arose which made it advisable for him to insti- 
 tute changes in the rules of the organization. 
 
 These circumstances developed in connection with the Chicago- 
 Denver controversy of 1900. The AFM law at the time was that 
 bands and orchestras were not permitted to accept engagements 
 in the jurisdiction of a local other than their own without the 
 consent of that other local. Violations subjected each offending 
 
22 
 
 member in the band or orchestra to a fine, half of which was 
 paid to the national union and the remainder to the local where 
 the infraction had occurred. This rule engendered much bitter- 
 ness among the locals. Its most significant test occurred when a 
 Chicago band performed an engagement in a Denver park with- 
 out the consent of the Denver local. The Denver local fined the 
 members of this band, but they refused to pay and the Chicago 
 local refused to enforce the fine. As a result the Chicago local was 
 expelled from the AFM. (It was later readmitted when it agreed 
 to approve the fine.) 
 
 This incident forcefully brought to Weber's attention the fact 
 that laws which created antagonisms between members or locals 
 were not conducive to the furthering of the best interests of the 
 Federation. It seemed at first that the only alternative to this 
 severe restriction on the movement of musicians from place to 
 place was a universal membership law which would make a 
 member of one local automatically a member of all the other 
 locals and entitle him to the rights and privileges of the mem- 
 bers of the local in whose jurisdiction he was employed. Such 
 membership rules, however, were not acceptable to the locals and 
 could not be adopted. 
 
 A compromise was worked out which became known as the 
 transfer law. Musicians were given the right to transfer from 
 one jurisdiction to another, in order to seek employment. No 
 obstacle to such movement could be set up by the local union 
 in the area to which the musicians had migrated. Although this 
 law has never been completely palatable to the locals and has 
 caused much resentment over the years, it nevertheless was re- 
 sponsible more than any other factor for the rising fortunes of 
 the union, which began to become apparent at that time. Mem- 
 bers were permitted to move about, within the framework of the 
 regulations of the union, and employers could hire union men 
 who had come from other parts of the country. What formerly 
 caused severe competition among musicians could be better con- 
 trolled and regulated under the new policy. The AFM recog- 
 nized the right of traveling members and traveling bands to 
 operate within the union framework. 
 
 Many of the largest locals had refused to join the AFM 
 because they feared that the opportunities of their members 
 would be restricted if union musicians would be prohibited from 
 
23 
 
 traveling freely. (Most of the traveling shows that hired musi- 
 cians and a large majority of the nation's leading instrumental- 
 ists were concentrated in the East.) The AFM therefore was 
 forced to charter rival locals in several Eastern cities, though 
 these unions typically remained of minor importance in their 
 respective jurisdictions. Rival unionism was not at all unusual 
 in the United States during this period, but the American Fed- 
 eration of Musicians energetically opposed all rivals. After pas- 
 sage of the transfer law Weber undertook to integrate and con- 
 solidate the musicians unions in the larger cities with renewed 
 vigor. The situation was more propitious than previously be- 
 cause some of the fears and doubts of the larger independent 
 locals had been allayed by the transfer law. 
 
 Though this law permitted all union members to come into 
 the jurisdiction of the larger locals, it also entitled the members 
 of the larger locals to go elsewhere. Furthermore, the larger 
 locals recognized that the influx of competing musicians had 
 been going on, anyhow. Now, at least, transfers were granted 
 under the supervision of the AFM. 
 
 Over-all supervision by the national body was particularly 
 helpful to a local like New York. Indeed, it would not have been 
 possible for the New York local to unionize some of the theater 
 houses, such as Loew, Fox, and Proctor, and the larger hotels, 
 if it were not for the fact that the national union cooperated and 
 kept potential strikebreakers from other locals out of New York 
 City during the critical periods of negotiations. In 1904, Weber 
 could appear before the ninth annual convention of the Amer- 
 ican Federation of Musicians and announce that amalgamations 
 had been completed successfully during the preceding year in 
 Philadelphia, Baltimore, Boston, Pittsburgh, and the important 
 New York locals. The larger locals accepted the agreement which 
 had been reached several years before on the method of voting 
 at the convention. Larger locals were given a greater number 
 of votes than smaller ones, but the maximum vote that could 
 be cast by any local in a convention election was ten. This com- 
 promise restricted the power of the larger units and avoided one 
 of the weaknesses of the NLM. 
 
 With the network of locals across the United States relatively 
 complete, the national union was able to try to raise the economic 
 status of musicians. Nonunion competition had to be reduced 
 
24 
 
 and union working conditions had to be established. The power 
 of the contractors, who had often dominated the local to the 
 disadvantage of the rank and file musicians, was reduced sharply. 
 Band and orchestra conductors, in general, were required to 
 become members of the union and as a result cooperation from 
 them was obtained more readily. The union was always ready 
 to bargain collectively with employers. It did not like to exert 
 its economic strength by calling strikes. Said Weber: ". . . by far 
 the most marked progress our organization has made was made 
 by reason of its readiness to confer with the employer and settle 
 controversies over the conference table." 8 
 
 But even at the turn of the century the union was manifesting 
 signs of unilateral action in fixing conditions of employment 
 which have reappeared again and again throughout its history. 
 When its power has enabled it to do so, this union has tended 
 to lay down the law to employers without requesting their 
 acquiescence and without consulting them. Back in 1904 a New 
 York theater manager complained: "I notice that the union does 
 not make any distinction between good and bad musicians. The 
 bad ones, and they are many, get just as much pay as the good 
 ones. Besides their regular pay they charge $2 extra for every 
 holiday. There not being a sufficient number of legal holidays to 
 suit them, they make holidays themselves. Easter Monday, St. 
 Patrick's Day, and the eve's of New Year's, Washington's birth- 
 day, Thanksgiving and Christmas are all holidays in the eyes of 
 musicians." 9 
 
 Despite the resentment expressed by numerous employers, the 
 union continued to flourish. Indeed, by 1905, the growing trade 
 union of musicians had developed a position of more complete 
 control over its business in the United States and Canada, to 
 which it had extended its interests in 1900, than that occupied 
 by any other union in the American Federation of Labor. 10 
 The achievement is outstanding when consideration is given to 
 the status of workers and labor unions 50 years ago. At the turn 
 of the century it was the general practice of management to 
 oppose trade unionism and union men vigorously. Physical 
 violence in labor relations during that period and the succeed- 
 ing years was common. Discrimination against employees for 
 union membership was not only lawful, but zealously pursued by 
 employers. Yellow-dog contracts, blacklists, lockouts, and in- 
 
25 
 
 junctions were regular weapons used against union members. It 
 is a remarkable fact that under these conditions the union of 
 musicians was able to secure complete control over the profes- 
 sion. For outside of employment on the railroads and in the 
 building trades no other area of enterprise was strongly union- 
 ized. Moreover, on the railroads and in construction work, many 
 distinct unions shared the membership. 
 
 A limited amount of dualism remained in the unionization 
 of musicians in scattered sections of the country until the late 
 1930's, but the AFM was powerful enough to make the closed 
 shop a characteristic of the working conditions of musicians in 
 the United States. Quite early in its history, the AFM provided 
 in its bylaws for the automatic expulsion of those members ap- 
 plying to the courts for injunctions. This rule helped the union 
 prevent a weakening of the organization that could result from 
 judicial intervention. The musicians union wholeheartedly ac- 
 cepted its leadership. The organizational success of the union 
 at that early date enabled the leaders to turn their attention to 
 the problems connected with nonunion competition and with 
 increasing the employment opportunities of musicians. 
 
THE UNION GAINS <^ 
 
 PRESTIGE AND STATUS • ^* 
 
 "Owing to the rules of the Pressmen's Union of St. Louis, 
 Mo., the plant is compelled to employ a pressman all 
 the time, whether he is needed or not." 
 
 OWEN MILIAR 
 
 • The Changing Scene 
 
 As the American Federation of Musicians grew, Weber's pres- 
 tige increased too. The salary of $100 which he received in the 
 beginning was not particularly attractive but the power that went 
 with the position of president appealed to him. At first his 
 office was located in his home but in 1908 it was set up in sep- 
 arate quarters in New York. As the revenues derived by the AFM 
 increased, Weber was able to obtain a higher salary, furnish a 
 more luxurious office, and secure adequate clerical assistance. 
 His political sagacity was evidenced as he steered along a path 
 that was rife with factionalism. Weber was a politician of the 
 first order and he played his cards wisely. Because the union 
 was successful he received the benefit of every doubt from the 
 membership. Throughout his long tenure of office, however, he 
 was not able to escape bitter and severe censure from various 
 elements in the union. In 1912 Weber declared to the conven- 
 tion of the AFM that he would not run for re-election as presi- 
 dent because of the general criticism expressed by the member- 
 ship regarding his motives and his honesty. A petition signed by 
 every delegate to the convention induced him to alter his de- 
 termination. 
 
 The spells of sickness and the nervous breakdowns from which 
 Weber had always suffered, were becoming more acute. He re- 
 luctantly decided to step down from office in 1914 because of his 
 failing health and was designated president emeritus. Frank 
 Carothers was chosen president. Weber, however, could not re- 
 sist the lure of activity and the power which he had yielded. 
 Without fanfare he was re-elected president of the AFM in 1915. 
 
27 
 
 Immediately, his opponents renewed their campaign of per- 
 sistently challenging his motives. 
 
 Although by the end of the first decade of the twentieth cen- 
 tury, the AFM had settled the issues of artist versus worker, local- 
 ism versus universality, and exclusion of membership versus 
 expansion of membership, the first quarter of that century 
 brought about many changes in the status of musicians and in 
 the field of musical entertainment. Forms of musical rendition 
 which were typical means of public diversion at the beginning 
 of the period became obsolete or of minor importance as the 
 years went on. The era was marked by the passing of the legi- 
 timate road show, the partial passing of burlesque, the decline 
 in the use of music at picnics and excursions, the wane in the 
 importance of the monster balls held by fraternal societies, and 
 the adverse effects of prohibition on the employment opportuni- 
 ties of musicians. The epoch was also characterized by the disap- 
 pearance of the traveling concert or military bands which had 
 been the prime attractions in the amusement parks and theaters 
 and which had been led by such outstanding conductors as 
 John Philip Sousa, Arthur Pryor, Victor Herbert, and Giuseppe 
 Creatore. These bands had utilized the services of hundreds of 
 AFM members. 
 
 Other forms of musical diversion came to the fore. New types 
 of music, known as ragtime, jazz, and swing became prominent. 
 After a tenuous reception by the public, they became well estab- 
 lished and popular. Though the employment opportunities of 
 the older members were lessened because of their inability to 
 adapt themselves satisfactorily, the AFM profited from the inno- 
 vations. The traveling dance orchestra or name band had its 
 origin about 1910 in connection with these developments. Pre- 
 viously performances by dance bands were rarely given beyond 
 the neighboring areas and if played in territory adjacent to the 
 home base, they were considered out-of-town engagements. The 
 players returned home after every concert. Name bands, today, 
 travel from place to place, and often do not return to their 
 home base for many months. The popularity of the name band 
 has continued to increase. 
 
 The AFM has been a highly complex organization, for it has 
 had to deal with a diversity of employers. It has been required 
 to negotiate with employers hiring musicians for operas, musical 
 
28 
 
 comedies, burlesques, motion pictures, symphony orchestras, 
 vaudeville shows, concerts, dances, parades, and receptions. Some 
 of this musical work may be considered to be permanent. The 
 portion which represents only seasonal employment includes 
 work in summer resorts and in municipal parks. The remainder 
 is of a miscellaneous nature. In the midst of all these intricate 
 and difficult relationships, the union was confronted with three 
 major problems of competition. First, there was the question of 
 the respective roles of the national union and the locals. The 
 jurisdiction and powers of each had to be decided definitively. 
 Secondly, the influx of foreign musicians, in so far as it served 
 to undermine standards and curtail employment opportunities 
 in the United States, had to be resisted. Thirdly, unfair compe- 
 tition from the bands organized by the armed forces had to be 
 eliminated. 
 
 • The Struggle with the New York Local 
 
 During the 30-year period following the establishment of the 
 American Federation of Musicians, the union was able to gain 
 substantially improved working conditions from employers all 
 over the United States; but, more important, the national or- 
 ganization conclusively was able to assert its hegemony over the 
 local unions. 
 
 Some of the larger and more powerful locals had remained 
 uncooperative and intractable after becoming affiliated with 
 the American Federation of Musicians. Although the AFM slowly 
 increased its membership and gradually was recognized as the 
 spokesman of musicians by employers, it was not until the re- 
 calcitrance of the New York local was broken in the early 1920's 
 that the domination of the national union was assured. Up to that 
 time it was not clearly evident whether the national or the local 
 would prevail in a test of strength between them. 
 
 When the AFM was organized in 1896 there were 16 distinct 
 musicians unions in New York City but except for a few all of 
 these were small and relatively unimportant. One of them, how- 
 ever, was the most important local union of musicians in the 
 country. This local was the Musical Mutual Protective Union 
 of New York, which had played a leading role in the NLM and 
 which had fought against the establishment of the AFM. When 
 the MMPU refused to affiliate, several minor unions in the city 
 
29 
 
 combined and formed local 7, AFM. Local 7 soon was expelled. 
 The New York charter then was given to local 41, which imme- 
 diately undertook to recruit the members of the MMPU. At 
 first, the MMPU had 3,000 members and local 41 had 400 mem- 
 bers but early in 1901, 1,000 members of the MMPU joined 
 local 41. This group of a thousand, which belonged to both 
 organizations, tried to bring the remaining Mutual musicians 
 within the fold of the AFM. 
 
 The rivalry between these two New York locals was intense and 
 for several years union musicians were incapable of dealing ef- 
 fectively with many employers because of the uncertainties 
 associated with the divided jurisdiction and control. However, 
 in July 1903 the MMPU and local 41 amalgamated. The new 
 organization received a charter from the AFM, and was called 
 local 310. The predominant element in the new local was the 
 MMPU. The MMPU had been incorporated under the laws of 
 New York State and therefore was entitled to a certain amount 
 of freedom from interference in its internal affairs. Though the 
 AFM requested local 310 to yield its state charter, this action 
 was never taken by the local. The achievement of unity in New 
 York City, however, was extremely important in furthering the 
 establishment of control over employment opportunities by the 
 musicians union. 
 
 Local 310 was an important unit of musicians. It included 
 many of the country's leading instrumentalists and was cog- 
 nizant of its prestige and strength. There was constant friction 
 between this local and the national union because the local re- 
 fused to subordinate its own interests to those of the AFM or 
 of the other locals. The national was not anxious to bring about 
 an open rupture or to provoke the local to secede so that fre- 
 quently it did not press its prerogatives. Over the years, however, 
 the prestige of the AFM suffered because the refractoriness of 
 the local was known to employers and to the union's members. 
 
 The leadership of the New York local did not hide its anti- 
 pathy to the national heads of the union and the local leaders 
 felt pleased when they could set little obstacles in Weber's way. 
 For many years Alexander Bremer was president of the New 
 York local. He had been one of the most vitriolic opponents to 
 the establishment of the AFM during the NLM days. In 1918, 
 Bremer, then president of 310, was alleged to have expressed 
 
30 
 
 sympathy with the German cause. Upon the advice of Weber he 
 was expelled from the local. 1 This incident showed that the New 
 York local, despite its independence, nevertheless was subject 
 to the influence of the national union. At the same time, it is 
 known that Bremer's reported attitude in this matter was ob- 
 noxious to many of the members in his local. 
 
 In 1920, local 310 demanded an increase in the wages of 
 musicians in the New York theaters. When the employers could 
 not settle the matter with the local, they appealed to the na- 
 tional union to adjust the dispute so that a strike would be 
 averted. Weber entered the negotiations and reached an agree- 
 ment with the employers. His action, however, crystallized resent- 
 ment against the AFM among New York musicians. Several 
 hundred members in the local were dissatisfied with the arbi- 
 trary way in which the national officers had stepped in, and disap- 
 proved the terms of the settlement. This faction formed a club 
 within the local known as the "Quorum Club," ostensibly to 
 guarantee the presence of a quorum at every membership meet- 
 ing of the union, but actually to gain and maintain control of 
 local 310. At the next election it succeeded in gaining a majority 
 on the board of directors of the local by concentrating its votes 
 on a few candidates, but it was unsuccessful in an attempt to 
 win the presidency. 
 
 The president of the local soon was in conflict with his board 
 of directors and when he acted in violation of the rules of the 
 local, the board suspended him from office. He appealed to 
 Weber and Weber set aside the action of the board. But the 
 members of the board disregarded Weber's order and ejected the 
 president from a subsequent meeting. As a result, they were ex- 
 pelled from the union. Since such action, if enforced, would mean 
 the loss of employment to the directors, they appealed to the 
 courts to set aside Weber's expulsion order. The decision handed 
 down by a New York court was that Weber had no right to in- 
 terfere in the internal affairs of local 310 because it was incor- 
 porated under the laws of the state. The court said: "If the 
 union itself [local 310] had committed any act which was repug- 
 nant to the purposes of the federation, the right of affiliation 
 might have been withdrawn." 2 
 
 The members of the board of directors of local 310 became 
 bolder after their reinstatement by order of the New York Su- 
 
31 
 
 preme Court. They decided not to receive transfer cards de- 
 posited by members of other locals. This action, however, violated 
 the bylaws of the American Federation of Musicians. Local 310 
 was given a hearing and then suspended by the national execu- 
 tive board early in July 1921. 
 
 Plans were made by local 310 to organize a rival national 
 union, but they never materialized. The strike which the local 
 called in the New York theaters was unsuccessful and the union 
 suffered a serious defeat. Employment conditions in New York 
 were becoming demoralized. New York theater owners had to 
 decide whether to deal with the AFM or with the New York 
 local. By a narrow margin they agreed to negotiate with Weber 
 and the national union. This move by the employers decided 
 the issue and spelled the defeat of the Musical Mutual Pro- 
 tective Union. 
 
 When the possibility of a rapid influx of musicians from all 
 over the country became likely during the period in which no 
 unit of musicians recognized by the national union functioned 
 in New York City, some of the instrumentalists acted quickly to 
 forestall chaotic conditions. They presented a petition from 
 more than a thousand musicians in the city and requested the 
 AFM to charter a new local. The national union agreed to do 
 so but only after the petitioners stipulated that the officers of 
 the new local were to be appointed by the national union and 
 that the rules and regulations of the local would be subject to 
 the approval of the AFM executive board. Local 802 in New 
 York City was then chartered on August 27, 1921. 
 
 Before long almost all of the members of the MMPU had 
 joined local 802. Though the MMPU never had more than 
 8,000 members, local 802 encompassed 12,000 musicians shortly 
 after being formed. The increase came about mainly because of 
 the nominal initiation fee of two dollars which had been set. 
 Musicians who had refused to join when the entrance fee was 
 high hastened to take advantage of this opportunity. Local 802 
 took over control of the labor relations of musicians in the city. 
 Most of the members of the MMPU continued to maintain their 
 connection with that organization because the MMPU owned 
 property (mainly, a building) valued in excess of a half million 
 dollars. 
 
 A few of the ringleaders in the Quorum Club were not per- 
 
32 
 
 mitted to join local 802 and these disgruntled members applied 
 to the courts for an order to reinstate local 310 in the AFM and 
 to dissolve local 802. The New York courts, however, were not 
 hospitable to the contentions of the plaintiffs and ruled that 
 the AFM had acted in accordance with its rights. 3 Nevertheless 
 court litigation of this issue cost the AFM and local 802 the 
 sum of $250,000. At the height of the struggle Weber had to 
 be protected by city detectives but eventually the unions became 
 reconciled. The Musical Mutual Protective Union changed its 
 name to the Mutual Musical Corporation and for several years 
 leased the building which it owned, to local 802. The Mutual 
 Musical Corporation was dissolved in 1947 and its property was 
 divided among 900 persons— 600 members and 300 heirs of 
 members. 
 
 The events in the dispute between the American Federation of 
 Musicians and the New York local had reverberated throughout 
 the organization but their aftermath was beneficial to the na- 
 tional union. It was established decisively that local rules were 
 valid only if they did not conflict with those of the AFM. Since 
 then, the organization has been much more cohesive and the 
 authority of the national officers has been more apparent. Weber 
 had won one of the major victories of his career. 
 
 • Competition from Foreign Musicians 
 
 Establishment of the principle of national supremacy over 
 the local was an internal matter within the scope of union poli- 
 tics. Much more difficult were the attempts to regulate the im- 
 portation of foreign musicians and to prevent the competition 
 of military and naval bands. The existence of these conditions 
 tended to negate the organizational efforts of the union and 
 made it more difficult for the AFM to establish control over the 
 musical industries. 
 
 The musicians union was anxious to enlist all American in- 
 strumental players within its organization. But there was no 
 desire to increase the number of musicians unduly. The device 
 of restricting the number of workers available for employment 
 in specific occupations and thereby enabling such workers to 
 gain more concessions from employers was well known to labor 
 unions and practiced by many of them. Traditionally, the 
 American Federation of Labor has opposed immigration, for the 
 
33 
 
 immigrant has been considered as a source of competition to the 
 laborer in the United States. The musicians gave their complete 
 support to this notion, and they favored a governmental policy 
 which would impose very limited immigration quotas. 
 
 The half century preceding 1910 was one in which millions 
 of persons were entering the country. The American people, in 
 general, did not desire to cut off this influx, for the spirit of 
 boundless economic opportunity was still characteristic of the 
 times. Labor, however, turned its attention to those groups of 
 immigrants which were a direct and immediate threat to labor 
 standards. Unlike Europe where the abundance of labor has 
 tended to depress wages, wage rates in the United States, as in 
 other new countries where workers have been relatively scarce, 
 always have been comparatively high. These higher wage rates 
 have attracted the foreigner to American shores. 
 
 It was not too difficult for unscrupulous individuals to under- 
 mine American wages, hours, and working conditions, and at 
 the same time benefit personally, by deliberately importing 
 aliens, on a contractual basis, to work for wages lower than 
 those to which workers in the United States were accustomed. 
 Such activities were possible because of the marked disparity 
 between American and European wages. Recognizing the harm- 
 ful effects emanating from these circumstances, in 1885 Congress 
 passed a law forbidding an individual from importing and con- 
 tracting with aliens to perform labor in the United States. In 
 1907, a proviso was added that skilled and unskilled contract 
 laborers were not to be admitted to this country. The labor 
 movement was solidly behind the alien contract labor legislation. 
 The musicians were in full agreement with these laws but 
 nevertheless they did not benefit from them, because the Attorney 
 General ruled that musicians were not included within the 
 scope of the enactments. Musicians, he declared, were artists and 
 professionals, not laborers. Under the legislation, contracts could 
 be entered into for the purpose of importing alien artists. 
 
 Though the musicians union did endeavor for many years to 
 bring about a reversal in the pronouncement of the Attorney 
 General, it also undertook to use its own economic pressures to 
 combat the entry of foreign musicians. It refused to stand by 
 idly while hundreds of musicians were brought in from vari- 
 ous parts of Europe under contract. Members of the American 
 
34 
 
 Federation of Musicians involved in bringing over alien instru- 
 mentalists were subject to fines and other penalties. Agents and 
 employers of the imported individuals were put on an unfair 
 list, and union members were barred from working for them. 
 Contract labor musicians were excluded from membership in 
 the union; under the rules only citizens or those who had se- 
 cured first papers were eligible to join. 
 
 It was in connection with this issue that Walter Damrosch was 
 fined by the union in 1905. Damrosch came to this country in 
 1871, at the age of nine. Soon, because of his musical talent, he 
 had achieved a reputation as an eminent conductor. He joined 
 the MMPU of New York, but when he attempted to hire a non- 
 union violoncellist in 1893, he was nearly expelled from the 
 union. The matter, however, was adjusted. 4 In 1903, Damrosch 
 became director of the New York Symphony Orchestra and 
 undertook to reorganize it. The wood-wind section was par- 
 ticularly weak, and feeling that the musicians best-able to play 
 those instruments were to be found in France, Damrosch went 
 there and brought back five players. It was his contention that 
 New York musicians were unsatisfactory performers on wood 
 winds and that better players were necessary to enable the New 
 York orchestra to compete successfully with the nonunion Bos- 
 ton Symphony Orchestra. The other members of the New York 
 orchestra were all in the union and they refused to play with 
 the five Frenchmen. The New York local then decided that the 
 five could play only as "soloists," since, at that time, under such 
 circumstances they were not required to be union members. 
 
 Public opinion and the New York press were behind Dam- 
 rosch and excoriated the musicians union, but the French instru- 
 mentalists could not play. Damrosch appealed to the national 
 officers in 1905, and they were more amenable to his arguments 
 and the public pressure. The men were permitted to enroll in 
 the New York local and play with the orchestra. But for violat- 
 ing the laws of the AFM in bringing over alien musicians, Dam- 
 rosch was fined a thousand dollars. Damrosch paid the fine. 5 
 
 The union was highly critical of foreign bands which were 
 brought to this country by agents and employers. The union 
 strongly opposed the entry of Giuseppe Creatore and his band 
 of 55 men from Italy in 1902. Several years later, Creatore unsuc- 
 cessfully tried to take the Italian musicians out of the Philadel- 
 
35 
 
 phia local of the AFM. 6 The American Federation of Musicians 
 fought a plethora of imported Royal Italian bands which 
 seemed to be playing everywhere. 
 
 The Federation of Musicians also tried to bring to an end the 
 productions of the French Opera Company of New Orleans. This 
 company contracted for the services of foreign musicians and 
 paid their transportation costs to the United States. The musi- 
 cians were paid wages far below the union scale. They played 
 three months in New Orleans and three months on the road, 
 after which they were free to drift. If they returned to Europe, 
 they had to pay their own costs of transportation. If they re- 
 mained in the United States, they were ineligible to join the 
 AFM since under the rules of the union, contract labor musi- 
 cians could not be accepted. Some of these men continued to 
 play for the company in succeeding seasons. The AFM itself 
 occasionally undertook to finance these musicians back to Europe, 
 in order to get rid of them. The union declared that it was will- 
 ing to admit a musician who came to this country of his own 
 volition and with an intent to find employment by his own 
 efforts, but that it would not admit alien contract musicians, 
 unless the circumstances were exceptional. In 1908, with the aid 
 of President Theodore Roosevelt, the union was able to prevent 
 importation of musicians by the Metropolitan Opera House. 7 
 Except in Boston, the AFM was strong enough to prevent the 
 symphony orchestras from bringing in foreign musicians. 
 
 The secretary of the AFM wrote constantly to the musicians 
 unions in France, England, and other European countries warn- 
 ing them of the difficulties of obtaining employment in the 
 United States and of the high cost of living here. The foreign 
 unions seemed to appreciate the problem of competitive wages 
 and always promised their cooperation. As the years passed, 
 competition from foreign bands gradually became negligible. A 
 Congressional law in 1917 re-enacted the ban on the immigration 
 of contract laborers, and this statute was interpreted by the Sec- 
 retary of Labor, through the Bureau of Immigration, to include 
 ordinary musicians. Only instrumental soloists were admitted 
 under the provision permitting the entry, under contract, of 
 artists. 
 
 Nevertheless in spite of favorable Congressional action, court 
 decisions modified the intent of the legislation of 1917. The 
 
36 
 
 meaning of artist was gradually expanded, so that many bands 
 and orchestras were admitted to this country under that desig- 
 nation. Finally, an amendment was passed in 1932, which spe- 
 cifically prohibits the entry of alien instrumental musicians 
 under the category of artist, unless they show distinguished merit 
 and ability. 8 The long battle of the AFM was ended. No further 
 importation of alien musicians has taken place. Problems with 
 regard to refugee musicians which arose in the early 1940's were 
 quite different, because the refugees entered under a quota, had 
 no employment contract in advance, and were eligible to join the 
 union. 
 
 Ironically, the contract labor laws were applied by the United 
 States to prevent the movement of musicians from Canada into 
 this country. The AFM, which had many members in Canada, 
 did not especially desire to block their entry into the United 
 States but could not induce the authorities to permit Canadian 
 contract musicians to enter. The Canadian government, on the 
 other hand, at first did not bar contract labor musicians from 
 admission. An order in council in 1929, however, prohibited 
 labor under contract, in general, from entering Canada. This 
 was interpreted by Canadian immigration authorities to mean 
 that, with the exception of concert groups and outstanding solo- 
 ists, foreign musicians could enter Canada under contract only 
 if the same number of Canadian musicians were employed on 
 the same engagement and for the same hours. After the second 
 World War the general order was suspended because of the need 
 for skilled workers. 9 This action caused a movement of traveling 
 cocktail and tavern groups of musicians into Canada; though 
 similar privileges were not available to Canadian instrumental- 
 ists. Leaders of the AFM have been attempting to get the gov- 
 ernments of the United States and Canada to work out a reci- 
 procal arrangement in connection with this problem. 
 
 On the domestic scene the hostility of the union to a practice 
 similar to contract labor was manifested by its fight against 
 colonization. Although the union adopted the transfer law which 
 permitted the free movement of musicians from jurisdiction to 
 jurisdiction in seeking employment, union rules did not permit 
 an employer to bring in single musicians from other locals nor 
 for an individual member who intended to go to an area under 
 the jurisdiction of another local to contract with an employer 
 
37 
 
 for a job in advance of his arrival. This practice was known as 
 colonizing and was outlawed by the AFM. One of the contentions 
 of local 310 at the time of its expulsion was that it refused to 
 accept the transfer cards of members seeking admittance to the 
 territory within its jurisdiction because those members were 
 colonizers. The ban did not apply to traveling dance bands. 
 
 • Competition from the Army and the Navy 
 
 Elimination of the competition of other musicians was the 
 main task of the AFM during the first two and a half decades of 
 this century. For in addition to the competition of contract aliens 
 the union was faced with the pressing issue of competition from 
 groups within the country. Rival unionism never was a serious 
 problem to the musicians union. Although nonunion competi- 
 tion from unorganized workers and from bands of children, ama- 
 teurs, fraternal orders, and institutions were more important, 
 even these activities were not significant. But competition from 
 musicians employed by the federal government gave rise to the 
 most widely publicized grievance of the union during this period. 
 This issue related almost entirely to the bands of the army and 
 navy, although occasionally other units were involved. In 1915, 
 for example, the Letter Carriers Band of Omaha received a city 
 contract to play in the public parks because it had accepted a 
 wage scale lower than the one indicated in the union bid; and 
 the resulting dispute with city officials and the Postmaster Gen- 
 eral was settled only with great difficulty. 
 
 The union cannot perform its economic functions of improv- 
 ing the wages, hours, and working conditions of its members 
 effectively, if it is unable to prevent undercutting of its price 
 schedules. Elimination of this practice required the union to be 
 in a position where it could exercise disciplinary control over 
 the musicians who played for a price under the wage scale. The 
 musician in the armed forces acted in the role of undercutter. 
 But these men have not been permitted to join or remain active 
 members of the American Federation of Musicians since the 
 union has not been in a position to exercise control over their 
 actions. 
 
 Historically, the musician enlisting in the army was allowed 
 to take outside engagements providing the engagements did not 
 interfere with his other duties— which involved playing at guard 
 
38 
 
 mount, rehearsal, dress parade, and evening concert. This sched- 
 ule, however, actually made it impossible for the enlisted musi- 
 cian to compete seriously with the civilian. But since the rate of 
 pay was low a sufficient number of competent musicians did not 
 enlist in the services; despite the relatively greater economic 
 security which these men would have had if they had done so. 
 The Secretary of War in James Madison's cabinet, as an induce- 
 ment to attract musicians, permitted commanding officers to grant 
 regular "leaves of absence" to the band. This action made pos- 
 sible the acceptance of other opportunities of employment. Ci- 
 vilian musicians filed protests with the War Department against 
 such competition as early as 1824, but these protests were un- 
 heeded. 
 
 It was not until 1885, that the War Department issued an 
 order, which was reinforced by a circular letter in 1897, pro- 
 hibiting army bands from engaging to play at prices dispro- 
 portionately lower than those of other bands performing similar 
 services. This order seemed to meet the most serious objections 
 of the local unions, except that in the course of the next 30 
 years, hundreds of cases were tabulated by the NLM and AFM 
 in which the order was violated. 
 
 The first convention of the National League of Musicians, 
 which met in March 1886, passed a resolution protesting against 
 army competition; later that year General Philip Sheridan, 
 who was in charge of the United States Army, ordered the 
 confinement of army bands to their military duties. Immediately 
 thereafter, however, the Secretary of War abrogated this order. 
 Under the renewed pressure of the musicians, the Secretary or- 
 dered that the military bands stationed at the recruiting depots 
 of the army (St. Louis, Missouri; Columbus, Ohio; and Gov- 
 ernor's Island, New York) had to remain at their reservations 
 except by special permission. But the competition of all other 
 army bands and of all naval bands persisted. The succeeding 
 Secretaries of War ignored the confinement order, and the lim- 
 ited concession to civilian musicians thus became a dead letter. 
 
 The musicians took their case directly to President Theodore 
 Roosevelt at the White House late in 1903 and he promised 
 some redress, but the competition from military bands con- 
 tinued. The AFM convention of 1903, however, already had 
 passed a resolution that no union musician was permitted to 
 
39 
 
 play at any function where a government service band also was 
 employed or engaged. This resolution was partially successful 
 in achieving its objective and was of great benefit to the AFM 
 until the passage of legislation in 1908, and even thereafter. 
 
 Lack of cooperation from the executive branch of the govern- 
 ment led the musicians to turn their attention to Congress. Some 
 attempts were made by Congressmen in the 1880's to obtain 
 passage of bills barring enlisted musicians from competing with 
 civilians. At first, these efforts were unavailing. Finally in 1908, 
 with the aid of Congressman Richard Bartholdt, a Republican 
 member of the House, the musicians obtained what they had 
 desired. Congress included provisions in both the army and navy 
 appropriations bills forbidding army and navy musicians from 
 competing with civilians. The pay of army musicians was in- 
 creased and navy musicians received the benefit of a general 
 increase to enlisted naval personnel. 
 
 These bills were approved in the middle of May. At the end 
 of May, the Secretary of the Navy requested an opinion from 
 the Attorney General, as to whether the Act applied to the 
 United States Marine Band. In November, after a delay of more 
 than five months, the Attorney General, Charles J. Bonaparte, 
 replied that the Marine Band was exempt from the provision 
 barring competition from naval bands, since it was not a naval 
 band. 10 
 
 The union fought the exemption of the United States Marine 
 Band and the violations of the law committed by army and navy 
 bands. For many years complaints against the infractions of the 
 1908 provisions were made to the appropriate administrative 
 officials, though generally without avail. In 1916, Democratic 
 Senator James A. Reed succeeded in attaching an amendment to 
 a bill increasing the size of the army. The amendment prohibited 
 enlisted musicians of the army, navy, and marines from engag- 
 ing in any task which would conflict with the opportunities of 
 civilian musicians. The bill became law in 19 16. 11 
 
 This law was enforced strictly under the administration of 
 President Wilson. Beginning with the inauguration of President 
 Harding, competition from naval bands again developed, al- 
 though the union did not complain of any army infractions. At 
 Weber's request, Samuel Gompers, president of the AFL, pro- 
 tested the Navy's interpretation of the law to President Coolidge 
 
40 
 
 in 1924. But Coolidge's noncommittal reply was that he would 
 favor remedial legislation. It was not until 1934 that the Navy 
 ended the practice of allowing its bands to compete with civilian 
 musicians. The American Federation of Musicians has not ob- 
 jected to the use of enlisted bands for military purposes and on 
 military occasions or in patriotic and charitable activities which 
 are national in scope and nonpartisan and nonsectarian in char- 
 acter. In the last 10 years, local and isolated cases of competition 
 from bands of the armed forces have occurred and the AFM only 
 recently has succeeded in getting the matter adjusted at the 
 higher levels. 
 
 During the first World War the AFM put forth efforts to im- 
 prove the status of the military bandsmen. The union favored 
 a program under which musicians would serve in a capacity 
 where their musical talent would be utilized, the size of the band 
 would be enlarged, and bandleaders would be raised to com- 
 missioned rank. Sometimes, an army bandleader was not even a 
 noncommissioned officer. Near the end of the war, General John 
 J. Pershing ordered that United States army bands in France 
 should be increased from 28 to 50 men and that the leader of the 
 band should be raised to the rank of first or second lieutenant 
 depending upon the length of his army experience as band- 
 leader. 
 
 The strength of the union enabled it to force a gradual, but 
 substantial, upward movement in wage rates during the second 
 decade of the twentieth century. The main countermove on the 
 part of employers was to reduce the number of musicians they 
 employed. The problem of unemployment which emerged both 
 from this action of employers and from the growing membership 
 of the union was solved by the advent of the war. Many mem- 
 bers of the musicians union in the United States and Canada 
 enlisted or were drafted into the armed forces. This process re- 
 duced the number of available civilian musicians and brought 
 about a better balance between the demand for and the supply 
 of musical services. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians had developed from a 
 puny organization in 1896 to one whose power and prestige were 
 unrivaled in the labor movement by 1925. It exercised unques- 
 tioned and complete control over its internal affairs after the 
 New York local was subdued. And by that time, with the aid of 
 
41 
 
 Congressional alien contract labor laws and restrictions on mili- 
 tary and naval bands, it largely had eliminated competition from 
 musicians who were not members of the union. But though it 
 tightened its restrictions on employers, it complained of cer- 
 tain union practices which affected its own printing plant. Plain- 
 tively Owen Miller reported to the AFM convention: "Owing to 
 the rules of the Pressmen's Union of St. Louis, Mo., the plant is 
 compelled to employ a pressman all the time, whether he is 
 needed or not." 12 This was a practice which locals of the AFM 
 themselves subsequently adopted. 
 
 Nevertheless, the musicians' chief problem from a competitive 
 force was yet to arise. It developed from various technological 
 advances. 
 
ENTER JAMES CAESAR PETRI 
 
 LLO • J 
 
 ". . . Petrillo ... is, to my almost certain knowledge and 
 to my strong conviction, not a crook." 
 
 WESTBROOK PECLER 
 
 • Petrillo's Early Life 
 
 "... Petrillo ... is, to my almost certain knowledge and to my 
 strong conviction, not a crook." 1 Westbrook Pegler, who does not 
 generally think highly of labor leaders, condescended to make 
 this statement about Petrillo. Even though it is expressed in 
 negative terms, it may be assumed that Pegler made a relatively 
 exhaustive inquiry into the most unfavorable aspects of Petrillo's 
 life. Yet Petrillo met Pegler's test of honesty. Who is Petrillo? 
 Where does he come from? How did he get his power? What 
 does he do with it? The answer to these questions will go far 
 towards explaining the attitude and position of the American 
 Federation of Musicians today on many issues. 
 
 James Caesar Petrillo was born in Chicago on March 16, 1892, 
 and spent almost all of his first 50 years in that city. He was 
 raised in an environment dominated by misery and violence but 
 he seemed to thrive under those conditions. Early in his life, 
 Petrillo became connected with the work of the labor movement 
 in the field of music; and with the prevalence of gangsterism and 
 hoodlumism in the Chicago area for many years, he found that 
 a person had to be tough in order to get ahead in union politics. 
 James C. Petrillo, whose youthful experiences with strong-arm 
 methods and tactics proved to be of great value to him, was of 
 that mold. He has maintained a fondness for such rough actions 
 to this day, even though he no longer has to employ them. 
 
 In order to understand Petrillo, it is necessary to depict the 
 conditions prevailing among the musicians in Chicago. A Chicago 
 Musical Union was formed in 1857, but it disbanded in 1865 
 because of the competition of other fraternal societies and because 
 
43 
 
 of the demands of business interests on the time of its members. 
 It is doubtful whether the purposes of this organization were 
 similar to those characterizing a trade union today. A local of 
 musicians was established in 1864 but it remained in existence 
 only a decade. The first permanent union in Chicago was or- 
 ganized in 1880. Soon several rival unions of musicians were in 
 existence though none showed any substantial growth. When the 
 AFM was established, one of the locals in Chicago, which had 
 about 750 members, received the charter numbered 10. But it 
 withdrew from the AFM in 1898 and was replaced almost im- 
 mediately by an amalgamated unit of several locals— the Chicago 
 Federation of Musicians— which then totaled 1,400 members. 
 The details of the Chicago-Denver controversy of 1900 and the 
 expulsion and readmission of local 10 already have been nar- 
 rated. The union charter thus dates from 1901. The following 
 year a local of Negro musicians was chartered in Chicago as 
 number 208. Local 208 never has been completely independent, 
 since it has had to abide by some of the rules of the white local. 
 
 From 1900 to 1937, the most prominent case of dual unionism 
 among musicians in the United States was found in Chicago. 
 The American Musicians Union, which attempted to establish 
 a national labor union, had its strongest base there, and for a 
 time its membership was as large as that of the Chicago local of 
 the AFM. These two unions struggled bitterly with each other to 
 control employment in that city. Generally, local 10 was more 
 successful because of the advantage which it derived from its 
 affiliation with the AFM. The AFM could bring pressure to 
 bear on the employer, if the employer had other business con- 
 nections in the field of music outside of Chicago. The American 
 Musicians Union tried to get the courts to force members of 
 the AFM to work with its own members, but it was not success- 
 ful. 
 
 As the membership of the Chicago Federation of Musicians 
 expanded, it became necessary for the local to obtain larger and 
 more adequate quarters. The Chicago Musicians Club therefore 
 was incorporated to acquire property. The union soon was able 
 to acquire a building for $75,000 on a 99-year lease. Member- 
 ship in the Club was limited to persons already in local 10 and 
 provided a social link among the musicians. In 1933, during 
 
44 
 
 Petrillo's regime, the local moved into a new two-story building 
 which cost over a hundred thousand dollars to construct and 
 which was paid for in cash. 
 
 Petrillo's father, who came to this country from Italy and 
 settled in Chicago, worked for the city as a sewer digger. He 
 raised a family of five children. His only other son, Caesar James, 
 is a dance band conductor and trombone player for CBS. James 
 Caesar was not a bright boy. Although he attended the Dante 
 Elementary School for nine years, he never got beyond the 
 fourth grade. "They bounced me around," he complained. "One 
 year I would be in the fourth grade and next year in the third. 
 They drove me nuts! After nine years I give it up." 2 It is not 
 unexpected, therefore, that he never gained a good command 
 of the English language, although he has shown improvement 
 over the years. Profanity and blasphemy are liberally interspersed 
 in his conversation and he uses adjectives only on formal oc- 
 casions. 
 
 When Jimmy was eight years old his father bought him a 
 trumpet, but despite much practice he never learned to play it 
 well. For eight years he played on the Chicago Daily News 
 band. He also played a trumpet in the Hull House band where 
 he received free music lessons. But he was an ambitious boy. 
 He sold newspapers, ran elevators, drove a delivery cart, and 
 sold peanuts and papers on the railroads. Later he opened a 
 cigar stand and he helped to run a saloon. Petrillo showed cour- 
 age and pugnacity. He did not avoid fights, and it is reported 
 that he once beat nine boys, one at a time, in two hours of con- 
 tinuous fighting. Petrillo formerly took part in the annual 
 Chicago affair in which executives who were sometime news- 
 boys, sold newspapers on the streets for one day in order to 
 bolster a Christmas fund. 
 
 At 14 he organized his own four-piece dance band and although 
 he was under the minimum age limit, was permitted to join 
 the American Musicians Union by special dispensation. He 
 played at dances, at weddings, at picnics, in beer gardens, and 
 on band wagons. It was not uncommon for some of these en- 
 gagements to break up in fights. This represented a typical 
 example of existence for many Chicago musicians. 
 
 Before long, Petrillo "lost his lip" and switched to politics. 
 Though he also had tried to play the drum, he never had learned 
 
45 
 
 to do so well. He was more successful in his political endeavors 
 within the union. After several years, he had established him- 
 self as a powerful figure in the AMU. In 1914 he was elected 
 president of the union at the age of 22. He served in that office 
 for three years with mediocre success and then was defeated for 
 re-election. Petrillo was so disappointed by the defeat that he 
 resigned from the American Musicians Union and early in 1918 
 joined the Chicago local of the AFM. 
 
 • Petrillo in the Chicago Local 
 
 The political activity within the local was his main interest 
 and he was assigned the task of organizing the musicians in the 
 Chinese restaurants. The task was difficult since Chicago was 
 torn by labor wars and racketeering. But Petrillo already was 
 accustomed to rough tactics. His methods were not tactful but 
 they were very effective and in a short time he unionized most 
 of those restaurants. As a result he was elected vice president in 
 1919. 
 
 The Chicago theater strike at the end of 1920 was marked by 
 much intimidation and many threats of violence. The local was 
 torn by internal strife and dissension. One faction was respon- 
 sible for assaulting and inflicting a severe beating on the presi- 
 dent of local 10, Joseph F. Winkler, early in 1922, 3 for exploding 
 a bomb in the offices of the union, and for blackmailing the 
 board of directors. It was during this period of internecine diffi- 
 culty that Petrillo was elected president of the local. The year 
 was 1922. 
 
 One of the first important actions undertaken by the new 
 president was to require radio stations to pay musicians. Pre- 
 viously musicians had played over the airwaves merely for 
 the advantages which such publicity gave them. Petrillo de- 
 scribed his negotiations with the stations: "They told me to 
 see their lawyer. The lawyer was usually an ex-Judge So-and- 
 So. He had a lot of books on the table to prove the Government 
 owned the air. I said, 'I know the Government owns the air. 
 What I want to find out is who pays the musicians!' We won the 
 fight." 4 In 1924 the porch of Petrillo's home was wrecked and 
 the windows blown out by a bomb. 
 
 In 1927, the Chicago local went out on strike against the 
 theaters in what represented the biggest walkout in the history 
 
46 
 
 of the AFM. An attempt to secure an injunction restraining 
 Petrillo was blocked in the federal courts by his lawyers, 
 Clarence Darrow, Donald Richberg, and David Lilienthal. The 
 union gained its demands after four days. Under threat of a 
 strike, Petrillo also was able to complete the task of unionizing 
 the hotels in 1931. He won wage increases from the restaurants, 
 theaters, opera, and symphony. He negotiated the first musi- 
 cians' contract with a radio station when he signed with WMAQ. 
 
 Chicago's most important jobs for musicians soon were con- 
 trolled by Petrillo. Although there was a rival union and many 
 nonunionists in the city, the Chicago Federation of Musicians 
 gradually gained more control. Scores of conductors of dance 
 bands joined the union after being subjected to strong pressure. 
 Petrillo had to clash with many notables in order to protect 
 the interests of the musicians. When Charles G. Dawes was Vice 
 President of the United States, during the second term of the 
 administration of Calvin Coolidge, he was touring through 
 Europe and became interested in some Hungarian musicians. 
 The La Salle Hotel imported them for an engagement on 
 Dawes' recommendation. Petrillo was furious. "Where do those 
 foreigners get off coming in here when my boys are walking 
 the streets? Who does Dawes think he is?" 5 Petrillo threatened 
 to cut off the hotel from the radio and from the services of his 
 musicians but he relented and permitted the Hungarian musi- 
 cians to stay for six months when the hotel agreed to hire mem- 
 bers of local 10 for all functions held in the hotel. This dispute 
 apparently left no hard feelings between Petrillo and Dawes 
 because in 1929, Dawes made a contribution of $1,000 to sup- 
 port a series of outdoor band concerts sponsored by the Chicago 
 musicians union. 
 
 Petrillo also tangled with Benito Mussolini. The sponsors of 
 an Italian jubilee scheduled for Chicago in 1931 arranged to 
 have a nonunion band. Petrillo cabled Mussolini that his consul 
 in Chicago had failed to cooperate with the union. The response 
 which he received was not favorable, although an Italian band 
 and a union band both played at the jubilee. During the same 
 year Chicago elected Anton J. Cermak as mayor. Cermak 
 planned to use a high school band at his inauguration cere- 
 monial. This meant that professional musicians would not be 
 
47 
 
 employed. But as the new mayor also was to broadcast over the 
 NBC network, Petrillo warned the radio station that he would 
 call a strike if it allowed that broadcast to take place. The high 
 school band was withdrawn and a band of 50 musicians from 
 local 10 led the inaugural procession. 
 
 Late in 1931, Petrillo was held up and robbed of $1,900 as 
 he was returning home one night. As a result he increased the 
 number of bodyguards which surrounded him. Later, the city 
 of Chicago assigned two detectives to stay with him while he 
 was in the city. Chicago continued to give him this special 
 protection until the end of 1945. When he traveled at night he 
 had a half-dozen men with him. For a time he rode in a bullet- 
 proof car and had bulletproof windows in his office. Reporters 
 found bullet marks on the rear window of his car when he 
 traded it in for a new one in 1936. Towards the end of 1933 
 there were rumors that Petrillo had been kidnaped by the 
 Touhy mob in June, and had been ransomed by the union for 
 $100,000. Two members of the local filed a suit to secure an 
 accounting of the funds of the local four days before the union 
 election in December. 6 In the few days that remained, Petrillo 
 had accountants audit the books of the local and certify that 
 they were in perfect order. Then he spent several thousand 
 dollars to notify the membership of the result and to advertise 
 in the newspapers. His two opponents were defeated decisively 
 in the election for the presidency and the suit filed against him 
 was thrown out of court for want of prosecution. One of Pe- 
 trillo's opponents for the presidency suddenly lost the job he 
 had held in a theater. He was not able to find another position 
 for several years and when he did it was in another state. Since 
 the balloting in 1933 Petrillo has been unopposed in local 
 elections. 
 
 James Caesar Petrillo lived a hectic life during the depression 
 years, but the local prospered. Union affairs involved him in 
 many difficult problems and required numerous decisions, but 
 he met and made them all. Petrillo was concerned with the 
 economic opportunities of musicians at a time when unemploy- 
 ment was high and when very few musicians had full-time jobs 
 in their profession. Although Chicago had employed about 
 2,000 musicians in its theaters before the coming of the sound 
 
48 
 
 films, by the mid-1930's only 125 jobs remained. In order to 
 increase employment, Petrillo tried to get the city of Chicago to 
 give free summer concerts in the public parks, but he was un- 
 successful. He therefore decided to get on one of the park 
 boards. Governor Henry Horner of Illinois appointed Petrillo 
 to the West Park Board in 1933, upon the recommendation of 
 Mayor Cermak. After Chicago's park boards were merged, 
 Petrillo was put on the new board by his friend, Mayor Edward 
 J- Kelly. 
 
 The park board however refused to appropriate any money 
 for concerts. The Chicago local, in presenting free concerts, 
 spent many thousands of dollars in 1935 to pay musicians. 
 Millions of persons attended those highly successful concerts. 
 The city reconsidered its opposition and then decided to sub- 
 sidize them. The union continued to bear part of the cost and 
 until 1943, it paid the soloists. Much employment has been 
 provided by this project. 
 
 Petrillo has supported the Democratic party in politics. The 
 Chicago local made a substantial contribution to Roosevelt's 
 campaign in 1936 and then welcomed the President with a 300- 
 piece band when he came to that city. In 1939, Petrillo cele- 
 brated Mayor Kelly's re-election in an affair at the Chicago 
 stadium by "requesting" the appearance of 19 of the country's 
 leading name bands and four leading symphony orchestras. 
 When, however, Chicago politicians of the Republican and 
 Democratic parties had tried to play recorded music from sound 
 trucks during the election campaign of 1932, Petrillo threatened 
 to force them off the radio. Music for political rallies in Chi- 
 cago now is provided by live musicians. 
 
 As Petrillo tightened his control over the affairs of the musi- 
 cians of Chicago, he began reaching out on a wider scale. At the 
 1927 convention of the AFM he was defeated for election as a 
 member of the international executive board, running fifth in 
 a field of five. Four years later Petrillo, who already had re- 
 ceived the praise of Weber for his conduct during the Chicago 
 theater negotiations, was defeated by Charles L. Bagley for the 
 vice presidency of the national union, in the race to choose a 
 successor to William L. Mayer. Bagley is still the union's vice 
 president. However, in 1932 Petrillo was elected to the executive 
 board and his power on a national scale began to grow. 
 
49 
 • Petrillo at Odds with John L. Lewis 
 
 A serious challenge was presented to the musicians of Chi- 
 cago by the organization of the CIO. John L. Lewis, of the 
 United Mine Workers, who headed the CIO, was searching for 
 a union of musicians which would affiliate with the CIO. In 
 1937 he invited the American Musicians Union, which com- 
 prised 2,500 members in Chicago, to join his federation as the 
 nucleus of a new national organization. Petrillo acted quickly. 
 He temporarily waived the initiation fee of the Chicago local, 
 which was $100 for new members, and almost all the musicians 
 in the AMU joined his organization. On this occasion the 
 Chicago Federation of Musicians also absorbed the Polish- 
 American Musicians Union. These developments marked the 
 end of any competitive threat which had faced the AFM from 
 rival unionism. Subsequent attempts by the CIO to organize 
 musicians were failures. 
 
 The clash between Lewis and Petrillo had begun in 1936. 
 William Green, president of the AFL, was a member of the 
 United Mine Workers. In 1936, when the AFL suspended the 
 CIO unions, one of which was the Mine Workers, it appeared 
 as if Green would hold no membership in any AFL union. 
 Petrillo came to his aid and made him a member of the musi- 
 cians union. During 1944, however, Green expressed his opposi- 
 tion to a series of Midwestern strikes by the AFM against the 
 broadcasters because labor had given its pledge not to strike 
 during the war. On that occasion, Petrillo attacked Green for 
 failing to clean out racketeering in the AFL and told him to 
 keep out of the internal affairs of the musicians union. 
 
 One rash act committed by Petrillo was corrected by the 
 pressure of public opinion. Late in 1939, Petrillo ordered the 
 theaters to eliminate all mention of the name of John L. Lewis 
 from two plays being performed in Chicago theaters. In George 
 White's Scandals, Lewis was named in a skit performed by 
 Willie Howard; and Lewis also was referred to in several lines 
 of The Man Who Came to Dinner. The theaters complied but 
 the country's press attacked Petrillo. Critics called him a censor. 
 A national issue was avoided only when Petrillo hastily with- 
 drew his order and the lines were restored in the two plays. 
 He recalls: "They said I was un-Constitutional and all that 
 
50 
 
 stuff. I never had nothing like that in my mind. 7 . . . I just 
 thought I'd push Lewis around a little." 8 
 
 In June 1949, Petrillo renewed his quarrel with Lewis. In an 
 address to the delegates of the AFM convention, Petrillo criti- 
 cized Lewis for ordering the miners not to work during the 
 period when Congress was considering labor legislation. He said: 
 "So far as I'm concerned— and I invite the press to record this— 
 I think John L. Lewis is nuts. I say to him: 'You are not a faith- 
 ful labor leader, nor are you faithful to the people of America.' 
 There it is. Somebody had to say it, so I did. I have a right to 
 say it— I'm a sincere labor leader. . . . I'll take him on here— on 
 the radio— any place in America." 9 Later that month, Petrillo 
 sent telegrams to several United States Senators and other high 
 government officials criticizing the intransigent position of 
 Lewis in regard to the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law. 10 
 
 • The Situation in Chicago 
 
 The Chicago Federation of Musicians has grown and pros- 
 pered under Petrillo's leadership. For many years it was the 
 second largest local of musicians in the United States and only 
 recently it has fallen to third rank, but it remains the most 
 powerful and aggressive local in establishing and maintaining 
 employment opportunities in its jurisdiction. Petrillo pioneered 
 in developing the standby in the field of music. (A standby is 
 a musician who is engaged to be present on a certain occasion 
 though he is not expected to render any services.) The practice 
 has been utilized by the union especially when the employer 
 desired to use a nonunion musician, but it also has been used 
 when the employer has hired a union musician from another 
 jurisdiction. Sometimes a standby fee has been paid to the union 
 but no musicians have been required to appear for work. 
 
 Close scrutiny by Congress of various practices by the musi- 
 cians union has made the AFM less inclined to use the standby. 
 Standbys have been eliminated completely from the radio by the 
 Lea Act of 1946. Formerly Petrillo frequently utilized this device 
 whenever amateurs or children were employed as musical per- 
 formers. Petrillo also succeeded in adopting a related make-work 
 scheme. Employers, particularly in the theaters, are required to 
 hire a minimum number of men for an engagement. There is 
 little doubt that on many occasions fewer musicians would 
 
51 
 
 suffice for the purposes of the producers. He has eliminated free 
 rehearsals and he has banned the practice whereby musicians have 
 played without pay in a public place for their own amusement 
 on occasions when other musicians might have been hired. 
 When Alec Templeton and Tommy Dorsey played some music 
 while waiting for studio pictures to be taken after a broadcast, 
 Petrillo sent the advertising agency which handled the show a 
 bill for $33 overtime. 
 
 Petrillo is a tough man to deal with. Formerly, he accepted a 
 compromise only as a last resort; though frequently his opening 
 demands during negotiations merely are maneuvers to secure 
 a more strategic bargaining position. His word is good and all 
 employers who have dealt with him admit readily that his oral 
 promise is just as satisfactory as a written contract. Nor has he 
 ever violated or broken contracts. Petrillo does not tolerate 
 performers who are not doing their best, or who appear late or 
 who get to work in an inebriated condition. These players are 
 warned and fined, if the circumstances warrant such action. The 
 policy of the AFM has never been to guarantee jobs to specific 
 musicians. Each man stands or falls on his own merit. 
 
 At the head of the Chicago local stands the president with 
 wide discretionary powers. There are six other members on the 
 board of directors elected by the musicians. This board acts on 
 all matters not specifically provided for in the bylaws. The union 
 has a trial board of nine men, a body of original jurisdiction, 
 which hears all charges of violations of wage scales and union 
 bylaws. This board is elected by the members and like the other 
 officials has a five-year term. The president may appoint a group 
 of assistants to aid him in conducting the affairs of the local. 11 
 
 The revenues of the local are derived from initiation fees of 
 $50, annual dues of $16 or $20, and an income tax on the 
 earnings of musicians, the rate depending on the amount earned 
 per week. The tax is highest on radio engagements. The union 
 also derives funds from fines. It pays death benefits to its mem- 
 bers, has a hospitalization plan, and operates a relief depart- 
 ment. 
 
 Despite public criticism of Petrillo, the members of the local 
 support him wholeheartedly and enthusiastically. He has raised 
 the wages, reduced the hours, and improved the working con- 
 ditions of the union members by significant and substantial 
 
52 
 
 amounts. The musicians feel and believe that if there is anyone 
 who can get something for them, that man is Petrillo. There is 
 little likelihood that the membership will turn him out as long 
 as he wants his Chicago job. Formerly, complete reports were 
 made to the local on operations and activities in the Inter- 
 mezzo, the monthly publication of the local; but this newspaper 
 has not been published for several years. The union has flour- 
 ished during Petrillo's tenure in office. His attempts to enlarge 
 the jurisdiction of the union, however, by including radio an- 
 nouncers and sound effects men proved to be abortive. 
 
 Since he was elected to the presidency of the national union, 
 Petrillo has spent much time in New York, where the main 
 headquarters of the AFM are located. He prefers Chicago to 
 New York. Of New York he says: "What a town! Everybody in 
 it's a lawyer. I get to town and sit down, and bam!— there's a 
 dozen lawyers, all try in' to serve a paper on me." 12 He is the 
 highest paid labor leader in the United States. He receives 
 $26,000 as president of the local plus a contingency fund and, 
 until 1944, a sum sufficient to pay the income tax on this 
 amount. In addition, he has been provided with an automobile, 
 a chauffeur if he desires one, and formerly with bodyguards. On 
 occasion, the local has given him presents of various kinds, such 
 as the money to pay for a trip to Europe with his wife, and a 
 $25,000 summer home in Wisconsin. He can get anything he 
 wants. Since his election to the presidency of the national union, 
 he has received in addition a salary of $20,000 plus a contin- 
 gency fund and expense allowances which amount to many 
 additional thousands of dollars. 
 
 As a family man, Petrillo is a proud father and devoted 
 husband. He was married to Marie Frullate in 1916. One of 
 their sons, Lester, died from football injuries two decades 
 ago. The eldest, James J., is the financial secretary of the Chi- 
 cago local of the AFM. He has another son, Leroy, and a daugh- 
 ter, Marie. In May 1951, Petrillo set up the Lester Petrillo 
 memorial fund for disabled musicians in memory of his son. 
 
 Petrillo generally remembers his own humble beginnings and 
 appreciates the effects of poverty. Sometimes, however, he has 
 become too emotional in an attempt to demonstrate his patriot- 
 ism and loyalty to the United States. During the second World 
 War he required all orchestras to play the Star Spangled Banner 
 
53 
 
 before and after every program. Subsequently, in testifying 
 before a Senate committee in 1943, he magnanimously said: 
 "Senator, the A. F. of M. is second to none in patriotism. If we 
 are needed in the factories, we'll go, including myself." 13 
 
 James Caesar Petrillo looks and acts tough. 14 He is only five 
 feet, six inches in height, but weighs about 190 pounds. During 
 the years in which he has fought for the musicians, he has de- 
 pended only to a slight extent on aid and support from other 
 labor organizations. The only union which occasionally worked 
 with Petrillo was the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage 
 Employees, whose notorious Chicago leader during the 1930's 
 was George E. Browne. Together they were better able to raise 
 wages in the theaters of Chicago to the highest level in the 
 country. 
 
 Petrillo's behavior and actions can be appreciated only in 
 connection with his environment and background. His boyhood 
 and youth, passed in the city of Chicago during an era of 
 violence, racketeering, and labor wars, were marked by personal 
 difficulty and strife. Petrillo found his place amid that turmoil 
 and made his mark. Times of stress call for tough leaders. Pe- 
 trillo played his part well. As his grip on the industry and on 
 the union became more secure, his attitudes mellowed notice- 
 ably. Nevertheless, employers are not yet in a position to take 
 advantage of this apparent mildness. Above all, in evaluating 
 the man, his honesty and his integrity have impressed his op- 
 ponents. Joseph H. Ream, the executive vice president of the 
 Columbia Broadcasting System, told a committee of Congress 
 in 1948: "So far as I know . . . Mr. Petrillo is always a gen- 
 tleman." 15 
 
THE MUSICIANS A 
 
 ENCOUNTER TECHNOLOGY • * 
 
 ". . . nothing will destroy the usefulness of an organiza- 
 tion surer than to set its face against progress no matter 
 how unfavorable we may at present consider same to our 
 interests." 
 
 JOSEPH NICHOLAS WEBER 
 
 • Motion Pictures with Sound 
 
 At first, the strength of the musicians union lay in its control 
 over instrumentalists in the theaters. Before the development of 
 the motion picture industry, the theater orchestras were found 
 mainly in the combination houses where the dramas, musical 
 comedies, and farce comedies were performed. Many additional 
 musicians were employed in the burlesque and vaudeville 
 theaters. Throughout the country' there were about 1,000 houses, 
 but the bulk of theatrical employment was provided by about 
 200 orchestras, each containing, on the average, eight men. 
 (Rarely did a theater orchestra have as many as 15 men.) It 
 was the theater musicians, numbering only a few thousand, 
 who held the most permanent and most desirable jobs in the 
 field of music. Until 1926, they were the most powerful and 
 important element in the musicians unions. 
 
 Rendition of music was profoundly changed by the develop- 
 ment of two inventions of the late nineteenth century. These in- 
 ventions, the recording of sound and the motion picture, were 
 both the work of Thomas A. Edison. Though the origin of the 
 record goes back to 1877, its commercial possibilities and uses 
 were not recognized until 1900. The formation of several Euro- 
 pean companies at that time for the exploitation of this inven- 
 tion was soon followed by similar developments in this country. 
 The American celebrity recordings began in 1903 and during 
 the subsequent decade the emphasis of musical records was on 
 singing rather than on instrumental presentations. But the 
 fidelity of the tone constantly improved and made musical re- 
 
55 
 
 productions more worthwhile. In 1913, it was possible to begin 
 orchestral recording. This type of presentation proved to be 
 exceedingly popular. 
 
 The effect of these events on the musicians was salutary. The 
 public accepted the record and the phonograph, and they 
 became important household appliances. The result was a wider 
 understanding and appreciation of the various forms of music. 
 The use of records did not curtail the number of jobs available 
 to musicians. Though there were probably many occasions and 
 celebrations when records were substituted for live musicians, 
 the effects of these situations on employment opportunities 
 were more than counterbalanced by the musical education of 
 large numbers of people and the ensuing demand for musical 
 performances. The utilization of records in competition with 
 living musicians did not become a major problem until the 
 1930's when the radio industry began to place extensive depend- 
 ence upon the disks. 
 
 Recorded music, however, developed in another way in 
 connection with motion pictures. The kinetoscope was invented 
 in 1889 and five years later the first showing of motion pictures 
 took place. Until 1910 motion films were a novelty and were 
 used mainly as an auxiliary feature of vaudeville. But the 
 appearance of the multireel picture in 1909 assured the success 
 of the industry. 
 
 One of the first groups to benefit from the introduction of 
 motion pictures was the musicians for the performance of music 
 was necessary to relieve the monotony of pictures which were 
 then unaccompanied by sound. The programs of the picture 
 houses divided themselves into two classes. In one category 
 vaudeville attractions were supplemented by pictures and the 
 regular orchestra was retained. In the other group only pictures 
 were shown but these were accompanied by music. During that 
 early period, stages were not especially built or furnished for 
 the presentation and many stores and halls were turned into 
 motion picture houses. 
 
 During the second decade of this century a wave of theater 
 building swept the country. The number of theaters in most 
 towns and cities multiplied. In many instances, the supply of 
 musicians, especially of organists, became inadequate. But the 
 increased demand soon brought on an increased supply, and by 
 
56 
 
 the middle of the 1920's an equilibrium had been reached in 
 connection with the employment of musicians in the theaters. 
 The motion picture industry had been responsible for a tenfold 
 increase in the number of musicians employed in the theaters. 
 
 Various picture house managers, but particularly Samuel L. 
 Rothafel (better known as Roxy) , favored the use of large 
 orchestras, so that in many cases the ensemble approached sym- 
 phonic proportions. In 1926 there were 22,000 players employed 
 in the pits of theaters throughout the country. They were hired 
 to play appropriate music during the course of the picture. 
 
 The existence of the musicians' jobs depended upon the fact 
 that the pictures were silent. Neither music nor words were 
 rendered mechanically. Words were suggested by the addition 
 of titles or brief statements thrown on the screen explaining the 
 action. Music was added by the live musicians. Scientists, how- 
 ever, were engaged constantly to find a method by which the 
 production of both words and music by mechanical means 
 could be achieved. 
 
 The theater musicians comprised nearly a fifth of the total 
 membership of the American Federation of Musicians in the 
 1920's and their solid support gave the union much of the 
 power which it exerted. Suddenly, in 1926, the musicians were 
 struck by the first blow from mechanical music. The potency 
 of the blow was of such force that it nearly shattered the union. 
 Warner Brothers introduced the Vitaphone to New York City 
 audiences. The Vitaphone is a device which synchronizes a 
 disk of phonographic music with the action of the picture by an 
 attachment placed in the booth of the operator. The following 
 year, Fox Film Corporation gave its first public demonstration 
 of Movietone. This invention records the sound on the same 
 film with the motion picture. 
 
 Although the installation of sound equipment in the theaters 
 throughout the country was delayed by several factors, even- 
 tual utilization of the new devices was inevitable. The leaders 
 of the union hoped desperately that sound projection was a 
 passing fad which would be abandoned by the public after a 
 short trial. Furthermore, Weber did not know what to do and, 
 under those circumstances, he did nothing. The existence of 
 union contracts with the theaters in the United States served to 
 cushion any immediate substantial adverse effects on employ- 
 
57 
 
 ment. In many cases, the contract extended for several years 
 and the theater was not able to eliminate the orchestra even if 
 it had that desire. In other cases, however, the theater was able 
 to purchase the contract from the union. The public, in general, 
 did not protest when motion picture orchestras were replaced. 
 
 The economics of the situation was the decisive element in 
 bringing about the replacement of musicians. The cost of main- 
 taining an ensemble of only 15 men at an average wage of $60 
 a week, was $46,800 a year. This figure excludes the salary of 
 the conductor. The cost of installing sound apparatus was 
 from $13,500 to $15,000 for a house seating 2,500 to 3,500; and 
 $9,000 for a house with a capacity of 750 to 1,250 persons. Even 
 when the costs of operations are added the saving to theater 
 owners was obviously enormous. By 1929, 2,000 theaters had 
 been wired for sound pictures. 
 
 There were still over 19,000 musicians employed in the 
 theaters in 1929 and they were receiving almost $1,000,000 a 
 week in wages. The next year there were fewer than 14,000 men 
 so employed and the weekly wages had declined to less than 
 $700,000. Since 1930, the number of musicians employed in the 
 theaters has hovered around 5,000. As the volume of unem- 
 ployed AFM men increased, the power of the musicians union 
 waned. Regretfully, Weber admitted in 1931 that the union had 
 lost its ability to strike successfully. Not a single theater could 
 be closed by the refusal of musicians to work. The substitution 
 of sound pictures for silent films and orchestras had been 
 effectively achieved by the theater owners. 
 
 The displaced musicians were unable to find other desirable 
 employment in the field of music. In 1929 there were 20 appli- 
 cants for every vacancy in symphony orchestras, though three 
 years prior to that time it was difficult for a symphony manager 
 to induce a good theater player to change his job. It is true 
 that the production of sound films opened up approximately 
 200 new jobs. The studios needed musicians to record the music 
 for the synchronized sound films. But only musicians of the 
 highest caliber could be used for these jobs paying $500 a week. 
 The average unemployed theater musician was not equipped 
 to engage in the delicate work involved. 
 
 The scarcity of these recording jobs did not deter many hun- 
 dreds of musicians from traveling to Los Angeles in the hope 
 
58 
 
 of being engaged by the motion picture industry. Almost all 
 were disappointed and disillusioned. After staying for a while, 
 they had to retrace their steps homeward, often being forced 
 to borrow money in order to meet expenses. Weber therefore 
 gave the Los Angeles local special authority to refuse transfer 
 members the right to work in motion pictures. 1 The union 
 desired to curtail the heavy influx of men into that region be- 
 cause it knew that their chances of securing jobs were negli- 
 gible. 
 
 The weakened condition of the union was aggravated by 
 internal dissension, internecine strife, and external pressures. 
 Important elements in the musicians union favored taking the 
 bull by the horns in attacking the problem. Many locals, but 
 particularly the one in St. Louis, wanted musicians to stop 
 recording. They felt that such action would eliminate the pro- 
 duction of sound films and restore the theater jobs. The Com- 
 munists in some of the larger locals proposed that the union 
 should amalgamate with the other entertainment unions in 
 order to gain strength. 2 Weber, however, opposed these factions 
 because he believed that it was impossible to block technological 
 advances permanently. Said Weber: ". . . nothing will destroy 
 the usefulness of an organization surer than to set its face against 
 progress no matter how unfavorable we may at present consider 
 same to our interests. . . ." 3 
 
 It was Weber's belief that since the public would make the 
 final decision a propaganda campaign could succeed in molding 
 and turning public opinion against sound pictures. On the other 
 hand, he feared that any decision to stop recording for films 
 would only lead the motion picture interests to guarantee an- 
 nual salaries to men who would leave the Federation. It did 
 not appear that it would be too difficult to induce many quali- 
 fied men to resign from the union in exchange for the high 
 scale offered by the film industry. The Communist arguments, 
 the union heads maintained, were intended merely to disrupt 
 the AFM and were criticized in those terms. The Communists 
 had taken advantage of the difficulties of the union to inflame 
 the members against the leadership, but these radical agitators 
 were unsuccessful. The AFM took a strong position in opposi- 
 tion to the Communist movement during the entire decade of 
 the 1920's. 
 
59 
 
 Weber's grip on the organization, even during this critical 
 time, was complete. His program was carried out in its entirety. 
 The AFM conventions of 1928 and 1929 refused to bar mem- 
 bers from playing for mechanical music machines. Instead 
 Weber's propaganda program was adopted. He was authorized 
 to spend considerable sums of money to develop and organize 
 opinion against sound pictures. But as the program was being 
 put into effect the difficulties of the musicians were augmented 
 by the increasing severity of the economic depression. The de- 
 pression further complicated the employment problem of 
 musicians. 
 
 The American press generally has been antagonistic to labor 
 unions. The musicians union however was more highly respected 
 than most other labor organizations. The union was known to 
 carry out faithfully all the provisions in the contracts which it 
 negotiated. The conservative attitude of its leaders had been 
 demonstrated to the satisfaction of businessmen by the experi- 
 ences of many years. Newspapers rarely criticized the AFM 
 severely. In this respect Weber was fortunate, for success in 
 molding public opinion required the active cooperation of 
 many newspapers. The project he undertook, however, afforded 
 him of itself a partial means of gaining the support of the press. 
 
 The publicity campaign against sound movies or "dehuman- 
 ized entertainment of canned music" began in earnest in 1929. 
 The implications that the struggle was one of workers against 
 machines were avoided. Instead the union expressed its opposi- 
 tion on a cultural and educational plane and offered the 
 opinion that mechanical music tended to debase the art. News 
 stories were released by the union to the press and special 
 articles were prepared for labor newspapers. General criticisms 
 of technological improvements, by other labor leaders were 
 reproduced. 
 
 Late in 1929 a systematic advertising campaign was launched. 
 Cartoons ridiculing sound pictures became a regular feature in 
 the distribution of criticism. A publicity firm was engaged and 
 advertising space to present the message of the AFM was 
 bought from 798 newspapers and 24 magazines. The huge ex- 
 penditures on advertising were responsible partially for the 
 favorable attitude taken by the press towards the union cam- 
 paign. Large numbers of editorials supporting the union's 
 
60 
 
 contention that the public should shun mechanical music ap- 
 peared in the American press. 
 
 That the methods adopted by Weber to combat the inroads 
 of sound pictures on the employment opportunities of musi- 
 cians were not approved by the entire membership, has been 
 indicated already. Petrillo, it appears, did not agree with the 
 union's arguments against sound pictures. He was not con- 
 cerned particularly with the fact that music was being debased. 
 Instead, as early as 1929, he expressed the main argument against 
 mechanical music, which subsequently was adopted and is 
 now used by the American Federation of Musicians. He con- 
 tended that unlike other cases of technological displacement, 
 the musician himself was creating the mechanical device used 
 to replace him and in effect, therefore, the musician was de- 
 stroying himself. 4 Petrillo argued that the musician had a right 
 to protect himself in these circumstances. Though Petrillo 
 reiterated this argument consistently, it was not generally used 
 by the AFM until he became president. 
 
 Early in 1930, the union announced in newspapers through- 
 out the country that it was creating a Music Defense League. 
 In order to join, a person was required merely to sign and send 
 to the union a coupon published in any of the hundreds of 
 papers or dozens of magazines carrying them, in which opposi- 
 tion to the elimination of living music from the theaters was 
 expressed. No obligation of any kind was assumed by the signer. 
 Eventually, over three million coupons of membership in the 
 Music Defense League were received by the AFM. 
 
 Perhaps the major accomplishment of the Music Defense 
 League was that it retarded the contraction of employment in 
 the theaters. The success achieved was quite limited, however, 
 as employment in the theaters declined to 4,100 musicians in 
 1934. The Music Defense League campaign cost the union 
 nearly a million dollars over a two-year period. The propaganda, 
 however, was effective in maintaining public interest in living 
 music. Some support for this conclusion may be derived from 
 an investigation conducted by the inquiring reporter of a New 
 York newspaper in which five of the six people questioned stated 
 that they would prefer to see the return of picture house or- 
 chestras. 5 Costs, however, were the decisive factor and the 
 cinema industry was not impressed by mere expressions of pref- 
 
61 
 
 erence. Moreover, the position of the union was further 
 weakened by the constant improvements in the production of 
 the music for the sound films. 
 
 • The Union in the Depression 
 
 During this period the national organization encouraged its 
 locals to undertake a project aimed at increasing the public's 
 appreciation of music. It hoped that the project subsequently 
 would create additional jobs for musicians and would relieve 
 some of the unemployment which existed. The project, called 
 Living Music Day, was operated on a local basis. The musicians' 
 local union in any city first secured the cooperation of a local 
 newspaper. This was relatively easy because of the favorable 
 relationship which had been built up during the advertising 
 campaign. The newspaper agreed to print a Living Music Day 
 supplement on a selected day. This supplement contained the 
 advertisements of local merchants, each of whom noted that he 
 was sponsoring a concert in his store on that day. The local 
 unions supplied the bands and orchestras to the merchants 
 without any charge. 
 
 The locals were expected to gain increased employment op- 
 portunities from the publicity. A Living Music Day was con- 
 ducted in more than 120 cities and much favorable publicity 
 resulted. Indeed, so widespread was the publicity, that a Living 
 Music Day was held in Johannesburg, South Africa. It is not 
 clear whether there were any important effects on employment 
 even though a few occasional jobs subsequently resulted— partic- 
 ularly in connection with merchandise shows, style openings, 
 and other business and civic events. As a general conclusion, the 
 project was not successful because the original intention of the 
 union to make this event an annual affair was never carried out. 
 Very few locals were willing to repeat the undertaking. 
 
 It should not be forgotten that external factors were super- 
 imposing difficulties on the problems faced by the union. For 
 the effects of the depression beginning in 1929 continued to 
 become more serious until 1933. Employment opportunities in 
 almost all industries were contracting and unemployment was 
 mounting throughout the country. Many labor unions declined 
 substantially in membership and were considerably weakened; 
 some went out of existence. The musicians suffered also from 
 
62 
 
 these general adverse effects. The prevailing economic conditions 
 reinforced the problems arising from technological change. 
 
 Some locals in the AFM attempted to alleviate unemploy- 
 ment through various devices. Petrillo's local in Chicago paid 
 out union funds to unemployed members who were assigned 
 to play in the parks and charitable institutions of Cook County, 
 Illinois. In addition, hundreds of baskets of goods were distrib- 
 uted each week to unemployed members of the Chicago local. 
 The New York local also aided its needy members. Through- 
 out the United States, many unemployed musicians were 
 assisted. 
 
 The election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as president 
 ushered in large-scale changes in the American economy and 
 brought about direct governmental attempts to mitigate the 
 general distress which had been caused by the depression. The 
 activities of the federal government primarily affected musicians 
 through the operations of the National Recovery Administration 
 and of the relief programs. Under the NRA, codes of fair com- 
 petition were drawn up in each industry which, among other 
 things, fixed maximum hours of work and minimum wage 
 rates. The musicians, however, generally opposed operating 
 under the provisions of these codes. Though their union had 
 been greatly depleted in strength during the preceding five years, 
 it was still strong enough to maintain hours, wages, and work- 
 ing conditions which were far superior to those enjoyed by 
 other industries. For example, only rarely did a musician on 
 a steady engagement work more than 40 hours a week; so that 
 a code which set a 40-hour maximum work week was of no 
 benefit to the musicians. The union had little to gain by accept- 
 ing a code which specified working conditions for industry 
 which were inferior to those it enjoyed already. 
 
 The AFM was willing to depend on its own economic 
 strength to achieve its objectives. It feared that if it subscribed 
 to any code containing a minimum wage lower than that which 
 musicians were getting, a tendency to cut wages would be 
 established. Though the musicians union was interested in the 
 radio code, hotel code, and shipping code, it only joined the 
 legitimate theater code. It soon withdrew from that code, how- 
 ever, when the representatives of industry requested an amend- 
 ment that disagreements between labor and management should 
 
63 
 
 be resolved by arbitration. The union did not desire to be 
 guided by the decisions of outsiders. Most of the codes drawn 
 up left the musicians free to negotiate in their accustomed 
 manner. 
 
 At the request of the government, the union undertook to 
 stagger employment in the theaters in order to spread the work 
 among a greater number of musicians. Theaters replaced those 
 musicians holding steady engagements every fourth week. An 
 unemployed musician was used as a substitute. The program, 
 however, was designed so as not to increase the cost of music 
 to employers. Shortly thereafter, however, the program was 
 abrogated when it was found that, on a national scale, the 
 staggering policy was unsuccessful. Protests by employers, who 
 objected to the disruption of a well-knit and unified orchestra 
 which resulted from substitution, and discontent among the 
 musicians, who were forced to yield some of their work, led to 
 the abandonment of the plan, in 1934; upon the consent of the 
 Administrator of the NRA. Individual locals were permitted 
 to continue to stagger employment if they were so inclined. 
 Though staggering was common in various industries at that 
 time and was endorsed and approved by a large number of 
 labor unions, it was not applied by the musicians to any other 
 musical field after it failed in the theater. 
 
 The relief activities of the federal government were examined 
 carefully by the musicians union. Outright doles to musicians 
 were endorsed heartily by the union. The administration of 
 work relief projects, however, raised some significant issues. The 
 union desired that musicians employed on relief jobs sponsored 
 by the Work Projects Administration should perform work 
 in which they would use their skill, instead of other unrelated 
 work. This proved to be unfeasible on many occasions because 
 some of the responsible administrative officials did not fully 
 support the idea that musical performance should constitute a 
 relief activity. 
 
 During the last half of the 1930's the union fought all attempts 
 to reduce the rate of pay of musicians employed by the WPA 
 and objected to Congressional cuts in relief appropriations. It 
 felt that expansion, rather than contraction, of relief work was 
 in order. At the peak of WPA activities, 12,500 members of the 
 AFM were employed by the agency, and an additional 2,500 
 
64 
 
 musicians on the rolls were nonunion members and music 
 teachers. 
 
 The union of musicians had passed through a period in which 
 its very existence had been at stake. The decade 1926-1936 was 
 one in which it could not do much more than hold its own. But 
 despite numerous setbacks the AFM was held together by its 
 leaders. Although technological displacement of musicians and 
 the effects of the depression were still serious in 1936, the eco- 
 nomic power of the AFM had passed its low point and was 
 on the rise. 
 
 The eighteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United 
 States which had been adopted in 1920 had made serious in- 
 roads in the employment of musicians, for it had brought an 
 abrupt end in the sale of liquor; and many establishments 
 which had depended on such sale and simultaneously had been 
 employing musicians were forced out of business. But the re- 
 peal of the eighteenth amendment by the twenty-first amend- 
 ment, in 1933, was a herald of returning opportunities of em- 
 ployment in night clubs, cafes, and restaurants serving liquor. 
 The membership of the union, which had reached a peak of 
 146,326 in 1929 had declined sharply until 1934 when it stood 
 at 101,111. Then it began a slow but steady rise, and subse- 
 quently, for a number of years, it showed a tremendous accele- 
 ration in growth. 
 
 The ability of the union to overcome what appeared to be 
 imminent financial collapse was the single most important factor 
 in giving it renewed vigor and in helping it to re-establish its 
 position. The expenditures of the union had been rising over 
 the years, but the income did not keep pace with the outlay 
 during the depression. In 1932 the main sources of income 
 available to the union were per capita taxes, fines, and condi- 
 tional membership fees. The per capita taxes collected during 
 those years had declined, however, because of the reduced 
 membership. The chief item of expenditure was salaries and 
 wages of officers and employees. These payments did not de- 
 cline. As a result the general fund of the union showed a 
 substantial deficit after the operations of 1932. This was also 
 true in 1933. 
 
 Under these circumstances, a change of lasting importance 
 was inaugurated in union finances. The laws of the union still 
 
65 
 
 required traveling orchestras to charge a fee of 30 per cent over 
 the local scale so that the travelers would be at a disadvantage 
 when competing with local musicians. This money was for- 
 warded to the union and held until the completion of the 
 engagement; it was then returned to the traveling musicians. 
 For many years, however, it was clear to the officers of the 
 Federation that evasion of this law was notorious. Double con- 
 tracts were used and leaders often loaned the amount represent- 
 ing 30 per cent of the engagement price to the members of the 
 orchestra for temporary payment to the union. National officers 
 therefore urged the repeal of the law. Said the treasurer of the 
 AFM: "I will not go on any further with the detail of this 
 'nightmare,' but I would ask the Convention to take under 
 serious consideration the question of abolishing the entire 30% 
 law. I am of the firm opinion no one is getting it except those 
 few who would get the same price if the law did not exist." 6 
 Local unions, however, demurred from agreeing to such action. 
 
 Finally a compromise was reached and was put into effect in 
 September 1934. The finances of the organization had been im- 
 proved somewhat by 1934, because for the preceding two years 
 a two per cent tax had been levied on traveling orchestras; this 
 tax was deducted from the 30 per cent fee sent into the treasurer. 
 But both the 30 per cent levy and the two per cent tax were 
 given up. Instead, a 10 per cent surcharge over local price lists 
 was instituted as the minimum scale for traveling orchestras. 
 This 10 per cent was paid to the local which then forwarded 
 the money to the national treasurer. At the end of the engage- 
 ment four per cent was sent back to the local, three per cent 
 was returned to the band member, and the remaining three per- 
 cent was kept by the national union. The enforcement of this 
 rule was much more practicable because the 10 per cent sur- 
 charge was not as obnoxious to employers as the 30 per cent 
 levy had been, and attempts to evade payment therefore were 
 not too frequent. The success of this plan soon was established. 
 The general fund was balanced easily beginning in 1935; and 
 the 10 per cent surcharge remained the most important bud- 
 getary item of the next decade. 
 
 The campaign to increase employment in theaters was in- 
 tensified in 1936 and 1937. Previously dependence had been 
 placed on appeals to the public. The new pressures were 
 
66 
 
 exerted directly on the motion picture houses. Though under- 
 taken only by the individual locals throughout the country, 
 these drives received the support of the international union. 
 The most spectacular events and demonstrations occurred in 
 New York City. Huge picket lines paraded before the leading 
 picture houses of the city in an effort to induce the management 
 to hire live musicians. Near the end of its campaign, the New 
 York local concentrated its efforts against the RKO chain. The 
 drive culminated in a theater sit-in strike at the RKO Palace by 
 200 members of the union. 7 No permanent gains, however, were 
 registered by the musicians as a result of these efforts. 
 
 The losses sustained in theater employment have never been 
 recovered. At one time musicians had been employed in 4,000 
 motion picture houses, but in 1950 only 458 theaters employed 
 them though there were 9,635 houses with a seating capacity of 
 500 or more persons. Of these 458, 57 used men on a 52-week 
 basis. 8 
 
 Employment of Musicians in Theaters in 1950 
 
 Number Earnings of Musicians 
 
 Type of Performance of Musicians 
 
 (dollars) 
 
 Burlesque 171 
 
 526,898 
 
 Dramatic and Musical 1,471 
 
 2,818,127 
 
 Opera and Ballet 808 
 
 1,008,405 
 
 Organ 18 
 
 56,310 
 
 Vaudeville and Presentation 1,617 
 
 2,656,980 
 
 Total 4,085 
 
 7,066,720 
 
 • Musical Records and the Radio Industry 
 
 Gradually the American Federation of Musicians formulated 
 more complete policies regarding the mechanical reproduction 
 of music. Primary emphasis was shifted from the theaters to 
 other employers and dispensers of music. The union desired to 
 gain greater control over juke boxes, wired music, and radio 
 stations. It had failed to attain any influence in connection with 
 the distribution of phonographic records. 
 
 The commercial success of the radio industry was not assured 
 until after it already had been in operation for several years. 
 
67 
 
 The broadcasting industry had its origin in 1920 when the 
 results of the Harding-Cox election were announced on the first 
 nonamateur program, but it was not until 1922 that the first 
 commercially sponsored program took place. The national net- 
 works, NBC and CBS, were organized in 1926 and 1927. In the 
 latter year Congress established federal control over the radio. 
 This authority was exercised through the Federal Radio Com- 
 mission until 1934; and then the Federal Communications 
 Commission assumed jurisdiction over regulation of the industry. 
 
 During the early 1920's musicians began appearing on radio 
 programs. They were not paid for their services, but neverthe- 
 less felt that the publicity which they received by having their 
 names mentioned on the air was more than adequate compensa- 
 tion for their efforts. Soon, however, the musicians union, on 
 a local basis, established wage scales for radio work and the 
 musicians were expected to adhere to them. Radio stations then 
 found that musical records frequently could be used as a sub- 
 stitute for the personal appearance of performers. It became a 
 common practice to play recordings with the specific intention 
 of misleading the public into the belief that a live rendition 
 was taking place. 
 
 The increased use of music records and the misrepresentation 
 as to whether the program was recorded led to the first vigor- 
 ous protests by the AFM, in 1930, to the Federal Radio Com- 
 mission. The rules of the governmental agencies supervising 
 radio always have required that when records are played they 
 must be announced as such. The union also attempted to pre- 
 vent the broadcasters from using phonographic records by 
 having the phrase "for home use only" inserted on the face of 
 each record. The union then encouraged the institution of 
 tests suits in the courts to determine whether a station could 
 disregard the afore-mentioned condition agreed to between the 
 recording companies and the performing artists. During the 
 early cases the union's contentions prevailed. The Supreme 
 Court of Pennsylvania ruled that musicians had the right to 
 prevent the unauthorized use of their recordings. 9 But the 
 federal courts overruled the state courts. The circuit court of 
 appeals decided in 1940 that the property of the orchestra 
 leader in the performance ended with the sale of the records, 
 so that radio broadcasting companies could not be restrained 
 
68 
 
 from using the records in broadcasts. 10 It appeared that musicians 
 could not establish property rights in recordings without spe- 
 cific Congressional legislation (such rights have been given to 
 the record manufacturers in England) . In the United States, 
 motion picture producers, on the other hand, have had copy- 
 right rights to their pictures since 1912. Furthermore, the 
 American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers has had 
 the right to collect royalties for the use of the songs written 
 by its members. The AFM has opposed the right of ASCAP to 
 make these collections, though it has favored giving a similar 
 power to musicians. 11 Since, however, the union did not have 
 any legal control over the use of musical records by the radio 
 industry, it was forced to take more direct action. 
 
 Throughout the 1930's the most vociferous opposition to 
 recordings was expressed by James C. Petrillo. It has been indi- 
 cated already that he was the first to stress that musicians were 
 destroying their own employment opportunities by making 
 records. But he was also responsible for the first economic pres- 
 sure exerted against the broadcasters in connection with record- 
 ings. In 1931, the Chicago local called a strike of Chicago radio 
 musicians effective at midnight of New Year's Eve. One of the 
 purposes of the strike was to prevent the use of records in com- 
 mercial broadcasting. But the strike was settled when the 
 stations agreed to reduce the working hours of musicians. 
 
 In December 1936, Petrillo took the lead again. He announced 
 that effective the following February 1, in order to end the 
 menace and threat to employment which had been brought 
 about by canned music, the Chicago Federation of Musicians 
 would not permit its members to make any recordings or tran- 
 scriptions without special permission from the executive board 
 of the local. He recognized that the result might be only to 
 shift recording work from Chicago to other jurisdictions, but he 
 maintained that the musicians could not afford to wait any 
 longer before undertaking an attack on the problem of recorded 
 music. "Someone had to start the move," said Petrillo, "and I 
 believe all other Locals will follow." 12 He was not discouraged 
 by the fact that musicians in Chicago would suffer some im- 
 mediate loss of employment. 
 
 Though Weber may have doubted the widsom of such drastic 
 action by Petrillo, he was forced to approve it. For by the time 
 
69 
 
 the June convention rolled around in 1937 some persons felt 
 that Petrillo had become a strong challenger for the presidency 
 of the AFM. At the convention, therefore, Weber commended 
 Petrillo's plan; and then the AFM again endorsed and re-elected 
 its president. Weber received a mandate from the convention to 
 begin a fight on the encroachments of mechanical music. 
 
 Weber called in representatives of the radio, transcription, 
 and record companies for conferences. He made sure that they 
 would come by setting a date on which a nationwide radio 
 strike would go into effect if the broadcasters did not attend. 
 He also threatened to halt all recording work by musicians. The 
 union, however, was ready to give up its plan to ban recordings 
 provided it could increase the employment of musicians in the 
 radio stations. Many more than a majority of all radio stations 
 did not employ any musicians, but depended for their music on 
 recordings and on network programs. Neither the radio strike 
 nor the record ban ever was put into effect because the un- 
 folding events led first to postponement and then to aban- 
 donment. 
 
 The union formulated demands under which every radio 
 station using musical records would place on its payroll a num- 
 ber of musicians acceptable to the AFM. These musicians all 
 were to be union members. Furthermore, no station could 
 transmit any musical program to another station that did not 
 employ musicians. Hundreds of radio stations were represented 
 at the conferences. The representatives of the industry were 
 willing to compromise but for a time they maintained that the 
 stations ought to be permitted to broadcast without any re- 
 strictions as to the destination and that it was the union's job, 
 not industry's, to get the small stations to hire more musicians. 
 
 After 14 weeks of intense negotiations the AFM reached an 
 agreement with the key stations of the three networks (ABC 
 was not yet in existence) and with the independent network 
 affiliates. The networks and their affiliates had been spending 
 $3,500,000 yearly in wages for musicians. They agreed to spend 
 an additional $2,000,000 on staff musicians, a quarter of this 
 amount being assigned to the key stations of the networks. In 
 1938, such quota agreements also were reached by the union 
 with unaffiliated stations negotiating through the National 
 Committee of Independent Broadcasters. The unaffiliated sta- 
 
70 
 
 tions agreed to expend for staff musicians an amount equal to 
 five and a half per cent of 1937 time sales over $15,000, except 
 that stations whose income did not exceed $20,000 were ex- 
 empted. The terms of these agreements, which were valid for 
 two years, provided that staff musicians could be used in both 
 sustaining and commercial programs, that stations should not 
 pay rates for musicians higher than those paid by advertisers, 
 and that orchestra leaders' salaries should be counted in the 
 quota. 
 
 Subsequently, the Department of Justice advised the parties 
 that the agreements were illegal so that when they expired in 
 1940 they were not renewed. A precarious armistice existed 
 thereafter; but although the number of radio stations increased, 
 the number of staff musicians declined. Late in 1938 the AFM 
 began licensing companies making recordings and transcrip- 
 tions. These licenses were contracts by which the companies 
 agreed to employ only union members, in return for which the 
 AFM permitted its members to make records. No musician, 
 however, could work for a company that did not have a license. 
 
 • Other Technological Displacement 
 
 The opinion of the Department of Justice reopened the con- 
 flict between the AFM and the radio broadcasting industry. 
 Simultaneously, the union was grappling with other problems 
 raised by mechanical music. The union has had no opportunity 
 to prevent the competition of juke boxes. Though many of the 
 more than a half million juke boxes in operation are located in 
 small establishments and have not displaced live musicians, it 
 may be inferred from the fact that so many machines have been 
 introduced in cafes and restaurants that the jobs of hundreds 
 of musicians have been eliminated. Many of the two- or three- 
 piece bands formerly found in the small towns are no longer 
 used. 
 
 The exercise of control over wired music, supplied by the 
 Muzak Corporation, has been somewhat more successful. This 
 •ervice consists of a specially prepared transcription played in 
 A central station and sent over the wires to those desiring this 
 music. Under the contract executed between the company and 
 the New York local of the AFM in 1938, the company stipu- 
 lated that it would not make its facilities available to any 
 
71 
 
 establishment if such action would cause the replacement of 
 live musicians. Since wired music is used in many places which 
 might employ small orchestras, in various instances musicians 
 have been displaced. This is particularly true of the hotel salon 
 ensemble and the restaurant string orchestra. The union, how- 
 ever, has feared to exercise its full rights under the contract 
 because Muzak Corporation might substitute ordinary phono- 
 graph records for the special records it now uses. Wage rates paid 
 by the Muzak company were not covered by the local contract, 
 since they are based upon the scales set by the national union. 
 
 The union fought a technique by which a great portion of 
 the music used on sustaining programs was not paid for by the 
 radio station. The stations arranged with hotels and restaurants 
 to pick up, by a system of remote control, music played at those 
 establishments. In return, the hotels and restaurants received 
 free advertising when the station announced the place of origin 
 of the music. Musicians, for a short time, received extra pay 
 from the station when it picked up the program. Today, in the 
 jurisdiction of the New York local the hotel pays each musician 
 involved in the remote control broadcast a fee of three dollars 
 above the scale. The money is turned over to a radio remote 
 control fund which is used by the local for the relief of needy 
 members. One of the novel ideas which might have injured the 
 union but which never caught on was a plan to make a film of 
 a band, throw the film on a screen in a hotel restaurant, and 
 play the recorded music of that band. In another area of tech- 
 nological advance, the American Federation of Musicians suc- 
 cessfully negotiated with the film industry to prevent "dubbing," 
 the practice of transferring music from one picture to another. 
 
 • The Decline of Weber 
 
 The years between 1926 and 1940 were times of strain for the 
 American Federation of Musicians. At the opening of the period, 
 the union was at peak strength. It completely controlled the 
 rendition of professional music in the United States and domi- 
 nated most of the American employers of musicians. Then there 
 came a sudden weakening of the union and a substantial decline 
 in membership, which shook the organization to its very founda- 
 tion. But by 1940 the AFM had recovered most of its former 
 strength and its position was as firm as ever. The musicians 
 
72 
 
 union had met and had overcome the twin blows resulting 
 from mechanization and depression. Other unions also passed 
 through a cycle during those years, but in few cases were the 
 effects as vigorous or as significant. Some unions were not able 
 to survive even the effects of one of these forces. 
 
 Throughout all this time, Joseph N. Weber remained in un- 
 disputed control of the organization. His political acumen and 
 foresight were manifested continually and his annual re-election 
 was a matter of course. Indeed, even during the period when 
 musicians were suffering from heavy unemployment, Weber's 
 salary was increased substantially and his expense allowances 
 were multiplied. There was considerable criticism, but it gen- 
 erally was sporadic, often was incoherent, and never was consoli- 
 dated. To some extent Weber's control over the AFM was made 
 possible by the rivalry and jealousy between locals. (In 1929 
 he had been elected a vice president of the American Federation 
 of Labor.) 
 
 The musicians union had followed the general practice of 
 labor unions and had remained neutral in politics. But during 
 the period of the New Deal, Weber broke with precedent and 
 supported Franklin D. Roosevelt openly and enthusiastically. 
 It is a curious historical fact that Franklin Roosevelt had been 
 denounced vigorously by this union back in 1914. As Acting 
 Secretary of the Navy he had answered a communication from 
 the Chicago local of the AFM with a routine letter expressing 
 the views of his Department regarding the United States Marine 
 Band. The union then announced that Roosevelt was un- 
 familiar with the problem and claimed that ". . . Roosevelt . . . 
 was particularly pernicious in his hostility to civilian musicians 
 and could always be depended on to find some technicality or a 
 loop-hole through which the Marine Band and other bands of 
 the U. S. Navy were enabled to continue unfair competition." 13 
 
 But time was moving on, and Weber was getting older. In 
 1935 he had passed his seventieth birthday. His illnesses and 
 nervous breakdowns had continued to plague him. Almost 
 always the AFM paid Weber's doctor bills and vacation bills. 
 In 1934, the convention of the union ordered Weber and his 
 wife to take a vacation in Europe for eight weeks. It was on the 
 occasion of this voyage that he became better acquainted with 
 
73 
 
 James C. Petrillo. They traveled to Europe together, as the 
 Chicago Federation of Musicians had authorized Petrillo and 
 his wife to take a trip, too. Weber soon was aware of Petrillo's 
 ambition and he knew that Petrillo would succeed him as 
 president. 
 
 The clash between these men was soon in the open. Petrillo 
 was younger and tougher. As an exponent of more direct action 
 in solving the mechanical music problem he was more aggres- 
 sive than Weber. Petrillo's ban of recordings in Chicago had 
 forced Weber to move more quickly to prevent criticism. Pe- 
 trillo, however, was dissatisfied with the action taken by Weber 
 and the other members of the international executive board in 
 dealing with the representatives of radio and phonograph 
 recorders during the negotiations of 1937 and 1938. He said so 
 outspokenly, and when he was overruled by his colleagues on 
 the international executive board, he boycotted the meetings 
 of the board. 
 
 In a front-page editorial in the union publication, Weber 
 attacked Petrillo. 14 Weber denied the correctness of the general 
 impression that Petrillo was the strong man in the union. He 
 was angered particularly at a newspaper statement that: "Pe- 
 trillo is the 'tail that wags the dog.' What he does for the musi- 
 cians in Chicago sets the standard for the fiddlers, trumpeters, 
 flutists and accordion players all over the country." Though 
 Weber admitted that the musicians of Chicago were the highest- 
 paid men in the union, he berated Petrillo for being "a self- 
 appointed so-called strong man" and accused him of "dispens- 
 ing hot air." 
 
 As Petrillo's stature increased it became evident that it was 
 only a question of time before he would replace Weber. In 1937 
 the AFM had set up a trust fund of $250,000 for Weber and his 
 wife. The beneficiaries were entitled to the interest earned by 
 the fund, though this money was deductible from Weber's salary 
 as long as he remained on the union payroll. Finally, at the 
 convention of 1940, the forces behind Petrillo were sufficiently 
 strong to convince Weber to retire. Weber was eased out grace- 
 fully from the presidency; he had served for 40 consecutive 
 years, except for one year when he had been in retirement. 
 Weber was made honorary president and general adviser to 
 
74 
 
 the union for the remainder of his life and was voted an annual 
 salary of $20,000. He held this position until his death on De- 
 cember 12, 1950, at the age of 85. 
 
 Petrillo was elected unanimously as president of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians on June 15, 1940. Petrillo was 48 
 years old at the time. 
 
THE SUPREMACY OF C 
 
 THE NATIONAL UNION • ** 
 
 "Senator Clark of Idaho. . . . But would you not say 
 pretty generally that Mr. Petrillo dominates the conven- 
 tion of the Federation of Musicians? 
 Mr. Padway. I would say exactly the opposite; he does not. 
 Senator Clark of Idaho. I am glad to have your expres- 
 sion on that." 
 
 • Centralized Control 
 
 During a hearing before a subcommittee of the Senate Inter- 
 state Commerce Committee in 1942, Senator D. Worth Clark 
 asked Joseph A. Padway, attorney for the American Federation 
 of Musicians, whether Petrillo controlled the legislative sessions 
 of the AFM. Padway vehemently denied that such was the fact. 
 "Senator Clark of Idaho. . . . But would you not say pretty 
 generally that Mr. Petrillo dominates the convention of the 
 Federation of Musicians? Mr. Padway. I would say exactly the 
 opposite; he does not. Senator Clark of Idaho. I am glad to have 
 your expression on that." 1 
 
 Both Clark and Padway were aware that Petrillo exercised 
 considerable discretion and power as head of the musicians 
 union. Padway, however, was able to express his opinion with- 
 out equivocation because all of Petrillo's acts as president had 
 been performed within the framework of the constitution and 
 regulations of the union and had been approved by the mem- 
 bers. Nevertheless, an examination of the constitution and by- 
 laws establishes the fact that power is centralized and vested 
 mainly in one man— the national president. Petrillo has com- 
 pletely dominated the union. Yet the members of the union 
 rarely have evinced criticism of their constitution and only 
 occasionally have they complained regarding the bylaws and 
 standing resolutions. The members have been behind Petrillo 
 because he has improved their working conditions and has de- 
 voted himself zealously to work for their benefit. Petrillo himself 
 
76 
 
 passionately has denied that he exercises absolute power. He 
 testified before a committee of Congress to that effect in 1948. 
 "Mr. Hoffman. . . . You know very well, and everyone in this 
 room knows you are the absolute dictator as to what these locals 
 shall or shall not do. Mr. Petrillo. I object to that question. That 
 is not a fair question. Mr. Hoffman. That is a matter of opinion. 
 Mr. Petrillo. I am not a dictator and I don't dictate to the 
 locals." 2 
 
 The union of musicians always has been strongly centralized 
 and controlled. The first president, Miller, was elected four 
 times and then decided not to run again. Weber held the office 
 for the next 40 years, except during the one year in which he 
 was not a candidate. The authority he exercised over the affairs 
 of the union may be appreciated from a remark he made, when 
 he was ready to retire: "It is with great pride that I am in a 
 position to say that almost all of the recommendations I ever 
 made to the Federation were enacted into laws and almost all 
 of them have achieved the constructive results I expected of 
 them." 3 Petrillo was elected unanimously in 1940 and similar 
 action has been taken each time he has stood for re-election, 
 except in 1949. That year, because of widespread criticism of 
 the lack of democracy in the union's elections, Petrillo was 
 opposed for the presidency at the national convention; but 
 he won overwhelmingly. Indeed, there have been few occasions 
 in the more than 50 years of annual elections, when the dele- 
 gates to the convention have had a choice among candidates 
 for any of the top offices of the AFM. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians of the United States 
 and Canada consists of locals of musicians and of the musicians 
 themselves. In 1936, the union extended its jurisdiction to 
 copyists, arrangers of music, and orchestral librarians. During 
 the early period of organization both the area of coverage and 
 the membership were expanded until musicians all over the 
 United States, Canada, Alaska, and Hawaii were included. In 
 1951, the musicians of Puerto Rico affiliated with the AFM. For 
 many years the number of locals has remained approximately 
 constant, although the number of members still is increasing. 
 Until September 1943, some regions in the United States were 
 not in the jurisdiction of any local. But at that time the AFM 
 
77 
 
 decided that all neutral territory would be assigned to some 
 local, so that coverage of the country has been completed. 
 
 The AFM holds an annual convention in June, and except 
 in 1943 and 1945 when the conventions were canceled because, 
 as a war measure, the government had requested organizations 
 to limit their use of transportation facilities as much as possible, 
 these yearly meetings have taken place since 1896. Each local 
 may send up to three delegates, depending on its membership. 
 The convention is primarily a legislative body and theoretically 
 the supreme organ in the union. It elects the officers of the 
 national union— the president, vice president, secretary, treas- 
 urer, and five members of the executive committee, one of 
 whom must be a resident of Canada. All these officers collectively 
 constitute the international executive board. 
 
 Though each of the structural units of the AFM has its func- 
 tions, the powers of the president are so immense that strong 
 central control is established. The relevant provision of the 
 president's authority is in article I, section 1, of the bylaws, 
 which states: "Duties of President. ... It shall be his duty and 
 prerogative to exercise supervision over the affairs of the Fed- 
 eration; to make decisions in cases where, in his opinion, an 
 emergency exists; and to give effect to such decisions he is 
 authorized and empowered to promulgate and issue executive 
 orders, which shall be conclusive and binding upon all mem- 
 bers and/or Locals; any such order may by its terms (a) enforce 
 the Constitution, By-Laws, Standing Resolutions, or other laws, 
 resolutions or rules of the Federation, or (b) may annul or set 
 aside same or any portion thereof, except such which treat with 
 the finances of the organization and substitute therefor other 
 and different provisions of his own making, . . ." 4 Numerous 
 specific duties are detailed, but this general provision gives the 
 president absolute control. These vast powers have been as- 
 signed to the president of the AFM since 1919, and although 
 they have never been utilized to the disadvantage of musicians, 
 the president has no clear check on his discretion. In almost 
 all cases where the president has had to make hasty decisions 
 he has consulted and received the unanimous approval of the 
 executive board. 
 
 A variety of problems connected with musical entertainment 
 
78 
 
 are of a local nature and a considerable amount of decentraliza- 
 tion of authority and power has been necessary in this labor 
 union. However, the union is so constituted that the national 
 organization may wield control over the actions of the local. 
 The national may intervene whenever it feels so inclined, and 
 it has done that in the past. In addition to the enormous 
 powers of the president, the union has several means of guiding 
 locals and members. The International Musician, the monthly 
 publication of the organization, has been published since July 
 1901. It contains much pertinent information regarding union 
 matters. The latest regulations of the AFM are included in a 
 prominent place in the magazine, but material of educational 
 value to musicians also is featured. Minutes of the meetings 
 of the international executive board and proceedings of the 
 conventions are included. There are three regular columns 
 which focus attention on groups ostracized by the musicians 
 union. The journal publishes a list of suspended and expelled 
 members, a national defaulters list comprising the names of 
 employers who have not fulfilled their contracts, and an unfair 
 list containing the names of employers who refuse to deal with 
 the union or have violated some of the rules. Union members 
 may not work for, or with, any persons or organizations named 
 on any of these lists. Each member receives a copy of the 
 International Musician. Several years ago, the magazine was 
 revitalized by the appointment of a managing editor. 
 
 The president has appointed eight traveling representatives 
 who visit local jurisdictions to establish better contact between 
 the locals and the Federation. They conduct investigations 
 ordered by the president. In addition, an officer is appointed in 
 each state of the United States and in each province of Canada. 
 These representatives protect the interests of the AFM at the 
 state, provincial, and district conferences which are held peri- 
 odically by groups of territorially adjacent locals to discuss 
 regional problems. 
 
 The constitution of the union provides that musicians are 
 members not only of the local which they join, but of the 
 national as well. This provision was inserted to give the na- 
 tional more direct control over the musicians. Formerly condi- 
 tional members were accepted by the AFM directly when they 
 resided in an area that was unassigned to any local. Since the 
 
79 
 
 entire country is now within the jurisdiction of some local, all 
 applicants must join a local union. 
 
 Officers of the AFM have the power to prevent any local 
 from violating laws of the national union. Relations with em- 
 ployers which are purely local matters are negotiated and 
 approved by the locals themselves, but all contracts specify that 
 they are valid subject to present and future rules and actions 
 of the AFM. This provision has enabled the national union to 
 pull the locals out on strike even when the local had a con- 
 tract. Both the president and the international executive board 
 have the power to remove from office a local officer who inter- 
 feres in any way with the purposes, objectives, or affairs of the 
 American Federation of Musicians. 
 
 Although it appears that the annual convention has final 
 authority on all matters concerning the union, this is not strictly 
 correct. The compromise provisions worked out at the time of 
 the formation of the union and written into the constitution 
 specify that locals are permitted one vote for each hundred 
 members, but no more than ten votes, in all elections. On mat- 
 ters affecting changes in the laws of the AFM, each local may, 
 upon roll call, cast as many votes as it has members. But all 
 laws which have been so passed are referred to a convention 
 committee consisting of the executive board of the AFM and 
 the chairmen of all committees appointed at the convention. 
 This group may sanction or veto the law and its action is final. 5 
 Since chairmen of committees are appointed by the president, 
 the final decision need not have the support of a majority of 
 the delegates. However, this rule which permits the desires of 
 the convention delegates to be circumvented, never has been 
 applied; because roll call votes have not been used. 
 
 The power of the union impinges on the employer in ways 
 other than through negotiation. Many employers must be mem- 
 bers of the union and others must be licensed by the union. 
 Such requirements are effective in promoting control over the 
 industry. Some employers of musicians, such as bandleaders, 
 play instruments themselves, and they therefore must be mem- 
 bers of the union. The first group which was required to obtain 
 licenses from the union, in order to deal with the members, 
 was the bookers. The demand for jazz orchestras in the 1920's 
 led to the establishment of booking offices which furnished em- 
 
80 
 
 Number of Locals and Membership in the American Federation 
 of Musicians in Selected Years 6 
 
 Year 
 
 Convention 
 
 Number of Locals 
 
 Membership 
 
 1896 
 
 1 
 
 26 
 
 4,000 
 
 1897 
 
 2 
 
 51 
 
 5,979 
 
 1898 
 
 3 
 
 77 
 
 9,152 
 
 1899 
 
 4 
 
 91 
 
 9,563 
 
 1900 
 
 5 
 
 117 
 
 10,176 
 
 1904 
 
 9 
 
 372 
 
 37,490 
 
 1905 
 
 10 
 
 402 
 
 40,741 
 
 1906 
 
 11 
 
 402 
 
 44,451 
 
 1907 
 
 12 
 
 428 
 
 47,198 
 
 1908 
 
 13 
 
 481 
 
 50,635 
 
 1909 
 
 14 
 
 511 
 
 56,961 
 
 1910 
 
 15 
 
 536 
 
 56,565 
 
 1917 
 
 22 
 
 703 
 
 83,992 
 
 1928 
 
 33 
 
 780 
 
 146,421 
 
 1929 
 
 34 
 
 743 
 
 146,326 
 
 1930 
 
 35 
 
 736 
 
 139,398 
 
 1931 
 
 36 
 
 716 
 
 126,423 
 
 1932 
 
 37 
 
 703 
 
 118,364 
 
 1933 
 
 38 
 
 684 
 
 108,271 
 
 1934 
 
 39 
 
 675 
 
 101,111 
 
 1935 
 
 40 
 
 672 
 
 102,385 
 
 1936 
 
 41 
 
 641 
 
 105,013 
 
 1937 
 
 42 
 
 644 
 
 111,960 
 
 1938 
 
 43 
 
 685 
 
 124,221 
 
 1939 
 
 44 
 
 712 
 
 130,794 
 
 1940 
 
 45 
 
 723 
 
 134,372 
 
 1941 
 
 46 
 
 721 
 
 137,005 
 
 1942 
 
 47 
 
 718 
 
 134,853 
 
 1944 
 
 48 
 
 696 
 
 146,772 
 
 1946 
 
 49 
 
 693 
 
 181,794 
 
 1947 
 
 50 
 
 704 
 
 216,469 
 
 1948 
 
 51 
 
 711 
 
 232,370 
 
 1949 
 
 52 
 
 705 
 
 237,535 
 
 1950 
 
 53 
 
 698 
 
 239,777 
 
 1951 
 
 54 
 
 701 
 
 240,269 
 
 1952 
 
 55 
 
 702 
 
 242,167 
 
81 
 
 ployers with such bands. Competition between different bookers 
 who sought to gain the commissions paid by musicians for the 
 jobs to which they were referred led to cutting of wage scales. 
 Beginning in 1936, the union has required booking agencies 
 to obtain licenses. These licenses have been confiscated in indi- 
 vidual cases for violation of rules. Recording companies were 
 licensed from 1938 until 1943. 
 
 • Bargaining Relationships 
 
 The union wage policy of the musicians differs from that of 
 most other unions. Usually the output of a plant is directly 
 proportional to the number of workers employed. But musi- 
 cians normally are hired to work as a unit. The income derived 
 by the employer of a band or orchestra is largely independent 
 of the precise number of musicians in the unit. The union 
 therefore must pay particular attention to the number of 
 musicians employed as well as to the wage rates which they 
 receive. Minimum numbers of musicians are set by locals for 
 different occasions. Where locals have feared that courts would 
 object to contracts which specify a minimum number of men to be 
 employed, they have sometimes worked out sliding scales to induce 
 employers to hire more musicians. At other times, the union 
 has bargained with the employer for a sum of money to be 
 spent for musicians rather than for a specific wage rate. It is 
 significant that though the AFM always has favored the closed 
 shop, it never has tried to dictate to employers the specific 
 musicians to be hired and it never has attempted to protect the 
 jobs of particular instrumentalists. The employer has been free 
 to hire and fire on the basis of merit without any regard for 
 seniority. 
 
 The ability to control the members, the locals, and the em- 
 ployers with whom musicians must deal has enabled the AFM 
 to achieve outstanding success in governing employment in the 
 musical field. Improvement of the wages, hours, and working 
 conditions have been steady and at times even spectacular. 
 Though most of the negotiations are done on a local basis, the 
 national sometimes helps the local. The national itself, how- 
 ever, supervises employment conditions for specific groups of 
 musicians. Traveling bands and orchestras are supervised and 
 controlled by the AFM directly. Many of the problems of travel- 
 
82 
 
 ing musicians and bands have been considered in connection 
 with the growth of the organization. This group of instrumental- 
 ists includes not only members of name bands, but those in 
 traveling theater companies, grand operas, symphonies, fairs, 
 circuses, and rodeos. Very frequently wages are not negotiated 
 for these musicians, but determined unilaterally by the AFM. 
 
 The national union also has concerned itself particularly with 
 radio, recording, and film musicians. The problems raised by 
 radio and recorded musical presentations are of great impor- 
 tance to this union and they are discussed in connection with 
 technological change. The status of musicians in the film indus- 
 try has never been a serious problem because negotiations satis- 
 factorily have solved most of the matters in dispute. 
 
 The musicians union has depended on its own strength in 
 improving the working conditions of its members in the motion 
 picture industry. Although the Hollywood studios are techni- 
 cally subject to the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles local, the 
 AFM has maintained direct control over the motion picture 
 industry from the time it successfully prevented the influx of 
 musicians into Los Angeles during the period when heavy unem- 
 ployment resulted from the introduction of sound films. As 
 musicians continued to improve their status in the industry, 
 the Los Angeles local, in 1938, prohibited the use of sound 
 track in any picture but the one for which the music was 
 prepared. This made valueless millions of dollars of sound 
 track held by the studios. The producers reduced the size of 
 orchestras partially to combat the effects of the prohibition of 
 dubbing— that is, the rerecording of music from other film. 
 
 The first written contract between the film industry and the 
 AFM was signed in 1944. It covered the eight major pro- 
 ducers, and prescribed a minimum number of men to be em- 
 ployed in each studio on an annual basis. Dubbing was banned, 
 doubling on two instruments was permitted only if the musi- 
 cian received additional pay, distinctions between work done 
 at rehearsals and in actual performances were eliminated, night 
 work was assigned premium rates, and the remuneration of the 
 leader was increased. 
 
 The contract was renewed in 1946, but provisions of sub- 
 stantial advantage to the musicians were incorporated. The 
 
83 
 
 three largest producers, Loew's (MGM) , Twentieth Century- 
 Fox Film, and Warner Brothers, each agreed to employ 50 men 
 on a yearly basis. Paramount Pictures undertook to use 45 
 musicians; and Columbia Pictures, RKO Radio Pictures, Re- 
 public Productions, and Universal Pictures guaranteed to hire 
 36 musicians. Wages of film recording musicians, orchestraters, 
 arrangers, leaders, and copyists were increased by 33 per cent 
 and a two-week vacation with pay was granted by the industry. 
 Not only was a clause inserted in the contract which prohibited 
 the use of the musical sound track for any purpose other than 
 to accompany the picture for which it originally was made, 
 but the track could not be used on television. If the producer 
 leased or sold the film, these restrictions had to be assumed by 
 the buyer. The contract was extended for a year in 1948 and 
 was renewed again in 1949 and 1951. At the beginning of 1952 
 the agreement was renegotiated for a two-year period; the most 
 important change was the provision for a 15 per cent wage 
 increase. 
 
 The major studios employ many additional thousands of 
 musicians on a casual basis. These men are film recording 
 musicians, side line musicians, orchestraters, copyists, and li- 
 brarians; and they make up featured units of name bands, 
 hillbilly bands, and cowboy bands. The terms of the contract 
 are applicable to the entire United States and to Canada. New 
 York City itself provides casual employment for thousands of 
 musicians in the film industry. 7 
 
 In addition to the eight major studios, the motion picture 
 industry contains a large number of independent producers, 
 who in many instances do not have facilities of their own for 
 the production of pictures. When the AFM turned its atten- 
 tion to the smaller companies, they banded together. Four 
 groups of independents were formed. One agreed to employ 
 40 musicians on an annual basis; these men could be utilized 
 by all members of the group. The other three each agreed to 
 employ orchestras of 20 men. Musicians may work only for 
 companies which have signed agreements with the union. The 
 basic wage rate for a single session of three hours or less is 
 $39.90 per man. In 1948 a new contract for one year was 
 signed under which the independents agreed to employ musi- 
 
84 
 
 cians for at least 35,000 man-hours during the year. This repre- 
 sented a union setback. Beginning in 1952, separate pacts were 
 signed with each independent producer. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians was one of five unions 
 which formed a Motion Picture Internationals' Committee in 
 the movie industry to deal with employers. The carpenters, 
 painters, electrical workers, stage hands, and musicians suc- 
 ceeded in gaining a union shop in Hollywood in 1926 when 
 they signed the Studio Basic Agreement with nine employers. 
 The joint committee which includes also five representatives of 
 the employers, functioned well for a time in adjusting griev- 
 ances and settling disputes. Later the painters dropped out 
 and were replaced by the teamsters. Subsequently, the com- 
 mittee was torn by strife in a jurisdictional dispute between 
 the carpenters and the stage hands. 
 
 • Relationships with Other Unions— Jurisdictional Disputes and 
 
 Cooperation 
 
 The musicians union has had little in common with much of 
 the rest of the labor movement. William Green told the musi- 
 cians that they are different from other unionists who work 
 with their hands. 8 Since the activities of musicians are so 
 unique in the labor movement, the AFM has had few conflicts 
 with other unions on a nationwide basis. The number of alli- 
 ances and cooperative actions which it has undertaken has 
 been equally small. Dealings with other unions generally have 
 been limited to those unions engaged in some other phase of 
 entertainment. 
 
 Only four major disputes with other unions on a national 
 scale have developed in the long history of the AFM; the dis- 
 agreement with the American Guild of Musical Artists will be 
 considered in another connection. A serious misunderstanding 
 with the Metal Polishers Union (AFL) existed in 1912 and 
 1913. The metal polishers demanded that musicians should be 
 required to buy and play only those instruments bearing the 
 label of the polishers union. The AFM rejected this demand, 
 claiming that musicians must be permitted to buy the most 
 suitable instruments. The American Federation of Labor sup- 
 ported the AFM in this matter. The dispute ended when the 
 
85 
 
 musicians agreed to help the metal polishers unionize the plants 
 of the manufacturers of musical instruments. 
 
 A second and more recent dispute has had profound impli- 
 cations. The power and control exercised by the AFM have 
 been so great that the union rarely has had to use the machinery 
 created by Congress to protect the rights of labor. The musicians 
 have not had to call upon the National Labor Relations Board 
 for assistance. One jurisdictional dispute, however, involved 
 not only the NLRB, but the courts as well. A federal court 
 established a principle that would have altered the interpreta- 
 tion of the National Labor Relations Act, had that law not 
 been amended. 
 
 The controversy involved the operators of turntables, known 
 as platter turners. These persons place phonograph records on 
 the turntable, adjust the table for speed according to written 
 instructions, and remove the records after they have been 
 played. The operators require neither musical nor technical 
 skill. The National Association of Broadcast Engineers and 
 Technicians, an independent union of radio engineers, has rep- 
 resented the platter turners outside of Chicago at the National 
 Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Com- 
 pany since 1940. In Chicago, Petrillo and the AFM had gained 
 control over the turntable operators in 1927. (The AFM rep- 
 resents the platter turners working for the Columbia Broad- 
 casting System both in Chicago and St. Louis.) 
 
 In 1942, the NABET notified the broadcasting companies of 
 its desire to represent the platter turners in Chicago, but was 
 informed that this was not possible since the companies had 
 contractual arrangements with the AFM. The companies, NBC 
 and ABC, subsequently renewed their contracts with the Chi- 
 cago Federation of Musicians in 1944, and the AFM continued 
 to exercise jurisdiction over the platter turners. The AFM, 
 however, also had made demands. It had asked the broad- 
 casters to hire musicians as platter turners throughout the 
 United States. All the large broadcasting companies agreed 
 and Petrillo estimated that at least 2,000 more jobs for musi- 
 cians would be created. The union of broadcast engineers was 
 infuriated and countered this move by initiating representation 
 proceedings before the NLRB. It also filed a notice of intention 
 
86 
 
 to strike. The Board then conducted hearings and decided that 
 platter turners at NBC and ABC should be included in the 
 unit of musicians in Chicago, but in systemwide units of engi- 
 neers and technicians, elsewhere. Although the AFM consented 
 to the certification of the NLRB, it threatened the National 
 Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Com- 
 pany with strikes if they recognized the award to NABET. 
 Early in 1945 the National Labor Relations Board, to whom 
 the case returned, found that the companies had violated the 
 Wagner Act by their refusal to bargain with NABET and 
 ordered them to bargain upon request. 9 
 
 The Board petitioned the United States Circuit Court of 
 Appeals for enforcement of its order. The decision of the court 
 upheld the order requiring the companies to bargain, in spite 
 of the fact that the employers maintained that reprisals were 
 threatened by the AFM. Although the broadcasting companies 
 had requested the court to issue a restraining order against the 
 musicians union, the court refused to do so, but said: "If an 
 attempt to prevent the companies from complying with our 
 order should be made it would seem that the ordinary con- 
 tempt procedures available against a person with knowledge of 
 the decree although not named in it would enable the court to 
 protect its order." 10 It seemed that though the Norris-La 
 Guardia Act of 1932 had barred the federal courts from issuing 
 an injunction or restraining order in cases arising out of a labor 
 dispute, the court was ready to proceed against a union whose 
 objective was to negate a decision of the NLRB, even though a 
 labor dispute was involved. The NLRA had granted neither 
 the Board nor the courts any specific power to act against 
 unions. The matter was never tested beyond this stage, since 
 the AFM bowed to the court's decision. The Labor Manage- 
 ment Relations Act of 1947 has made this question academic, 
 because the union now may be restrained. 
 
 The most recent controversy involved the American Guild 
 of Variety Artists. It began in 1948 when AGVA, an affiliate 
 of the AFL, undertook to expand its membership. The AFM 
 and AGVA had an understanding that when a member of the 
 musicians union sang, danced, or told stories in a floor show 
 of a night club or on the stage of a theater he was eligible to 
 join AGVA. The Guild tried to get such performers to sign 
 
87 
 
 AGVA contracts for the engagements. On August 5, 1948, the 
 AFM dissolved the agreement with AGVA, warned AFM mem- 
 bers that they might sign only AFM contracts, and prohibited 
 musicians from joining AGVA without the permission of the 
 national office. 11 
 
 In December, Gus Van, the president of AGVA, appeared 
 before the international executive board of the AFM in an un- 
 successful effort to adjust the dispute. The controversy increased 
 in bitterness at the beginning of the following year when the 
 musicians union charged AGVA with raiding tactics. By Sep- 
 tember the AFM ordered all members of the AFM who were 
 also members of AGVA to resign from the latter organization, 
 even if they also performed as actors. It served notice on book- 
 ing agencies that if they insisted that musicians should join 
 AGVA, the license of the agency would be revoked. 12 This 
 ruling forced Tony Lavelli, an accordion player, and Victor 
 Borge, the pianist, to resign from AGVA under the implied 
 threat by Petrillo to strike the orchestras at the places where 
 they were entertaining. Borge explained: "It is easier for me 
 to get along without the AGVA group than it is to do without 
 an orchestra. ... I can't take any chances." 13 Subsequently, at 
 least 50 artists, including Vaughn Monroe, Artie Shaw, and 
 Spike Jones resigned from AGVA. 
 
 The American Guild of Variety Artists applied to the New 
 York State Supreme Court at the beginning of October 1949 
 for a temporary restraining order prohibiting the AFM to 
 prevent Guild members from carrying out their contract obli- 
 gations. The treasurer of AGVA said in an affidavit that 
 Petrillo was ". . . obviously overcome with ambition and 
 delusions common to the dictators." 14 William Green, address- 
 ing the AFL convention in St. Paul, Minnesota, criticized AGVA 
 for going to court instead of attempting to settle the dispute 
 within the house of labor. The Supreme Court later refused to 
 issue a temporary restraining order, but before the matter of a 
 permanent injunction could come to trial AGVA withdrew its 
 suit in order to resume negotiations with the AFM. 
 
 The international executive board of the musicians union 
 left the matter of concluding an agreement with AGVA in the 
 hands of Petrillo in January 1950. In May, an understanding 
 was reached between the AFM and AGVA. Performers who 
 
88 
 
 act on some occasions and play an instrument on others would 
 be eligible to join both unions. Instrumentalists who only inci- 
 dentally act or serve as masters of ceremonies must belong only 
 to the AFM. Actors, on the other hand, who play an instrument 
 during a small portion of the act belong in the jurisdiction 
 of AGVA. 1 * 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians occasionally has 
 made monetary contributions to support striking unions. In 
 1910, it helped striking streetcar workers in Philadelphia. The 
 most important link with another union, however, has been a 
 long and pleasant relationship of nearly 30 years with the 
 International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees 
 (AFL) . IATSE comprises the stage hands and the motion pic- 
 ture operators. In 1913 these two unions signed a national 
 agreement of cooperation and assistance, although agreements 
 on a local basis already had been negotiated. On many occa- 
 sions over the years, each of these unions supported the other 
 during periods of critical relations with employers and each 
 conducted numerous sympathetic strikes in the theaters at 
 the request of the other. Together they supported the Actors 
 Equity strike of 1919, which enabled the actors to organize 
 successfully. However, the New York courts denied the right 
 of IATSE to strike in sympathy with the AFM, when an 
 opera company utilized electrically transcribed recordings of 
 the musical score to produce the orchestra accompaniment. 
 In 1941, the Court of Appeals said: "For a union to insist 
 that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor may 
 take its place and thus secure additional opportunity of em- 
 ployment is not a lawful labor objective." 16 The dispute was 
 not settled, however, until 1945. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
 close relationship between the AFM and the IATSE, the agree- 
 ment between them was abrogated in 1942 when satisfactory 
 terms of a new pact could not be worked out. Over the course 
 of the years, the AFM has not needed much support from other 
 unions. 
 
 • Finances of the National Union 
 
 The strength or weakness of a union frequently may be 
 judged from its financial condition. The AFM has attained the 
 status of financial integrity and independence. Current income 
 
89 
 
 is more than adequate to meet the expenditures and the net 
 worth of the union continues to rise. Finance operations are 
 divided among three funds, the general fund, the theater de- 
 fense fund, and one which now has only slight importance, the 
 recording and transcription fund. The main source of revenue 
 of the AFM is derived from the ten per cent tax levied on 
 traveling orchestras, of which the three per cent kept by the 
 national union amounts to well over three-quarters of a mil- 
 lion dollars annually. The other important receipts in the 
 general fund are the per capita tax on the locals, interest on 
 investments, fines levied on members and locals, subscription 
 fees to the International Musician, and taxes from radio en- 
 gagements. The radio tax, a charge of 15 per cent, is paid by 
 traveling orchestras or guest conductors who play a commercial 
 radio engagement over a radio network in another local's 
 jurisdiction. The tax is based on the local's scale price and a 
 fifth of the amount collected is the share which goes to the 
 local. Traveling orchestras, however, may not play any radio 
 engagement which is purely local in character, without the 
 permission of the local which has jurisdiction. 
 
 The important expenditures from the general fund are for 
 the annual convention, salaries and expenses of officers, print- 
 ing costs, rent, legal and auditing expenses, public relations 
 and research expenditures, and per capita taxes to the American 
 Federation of Labor, to the Union Label Trades Department 
 of the AFL, and to the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada. 
 The surplus in the general fund is about two and a half mil- 
 lion dollars. 
 
 The surplus in the theater defense fund is more than two 
 and a half million dollars. This fund was originally created, in 
 the early 1920's, to provide a source of money which could be 
 used to pay strike benefits to theater musicians. Two per cent 
 of the salary of all theater musicians was paid as a tax to the 
 union; and in 1929 this levy was also imposed on those musicians 
 making sound pictures. Locals receive five per cent of the 
 amount collected. Over the years, however, the size of the fund 
 continued to swell because the volume of strike benefits paid 
 was small. In 1946 the convention removed the tax from musi- 
 cians employed in the theaters and the international executive 
 board reduced the rate paid by those making sound pictures to 
 
90 
 
 one per cent. This fund is utilized so sparingly that it continues 
 to grow rapidly. 
 
 The recording and transcription fund has fluctuated widely 
 in amount. It comprised the moneys paid to the union by the 
 recording and transcription companies and was based on the 
 sale of records. The fund reached a peak of several million dol- 
 lars, but has nearly been exhausted as the AFM allocated the 
 money to the locals so that they could present free public con- 
 certs and provide employment for musicians. Under contracts 
 with the recording and transcription companies, negotiated at 
 the end of 1948, a new fund outside of the control of the union 
 has been established. 
 
 The AFM has achieved and maintained an excellent record 
 in presenting the membership with all the pertinent data re- 
 garding the union's financial transactions. Expenditures made 
 by the AFM were considerably more itemized until the end of 
 1936, but nevertheless the reports are still fully satisfactory for 
 most purposes. The financial strength of the union has been an 
 important factor in the exercise of control over the members. 
 The union has never had any national insurance schemes, 
 though it unsuccessfuly attempted to establish an old musicians' 
 home in 1903. The AFM has made provision for the payment 
 of strike benefits on all occasions when it calls musicians out on 
 strike and especially for payment of benefits to striking travel- 
 ing musicians. The ability to make such payments has earned 
 the respect of the members and the employers. The mere avail- 
 ability of the money frequently has removed the necessity of 
 striking to gain objectives. 
 
 The AFM has fixed the maximum initiation fee which locals 
 may impose at $50. Though it does not tell the locals what 
 dues to charge, it has levied a per capita tax of a dollar and 
 sixty cents per member per year upon the locals, but this 
 amount also covers subscriptions to the International Musician. 
 This sum is one of the lowest union per capita fees levied by any 
 international. Since many musicians are not professionals and 
 derive only occasional income from music, the AFM and its 
 locals have had to depend largely on other sources of income. 
 
 Since the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935, the 
 identity of the employer of musicians for purposes of paying 
 the various taxes under this Act has not been clear. The union 
 
91 
 
 has contended that the person who hires the leader is the em- 
 ployer. Some of the persons affected by this rule have not always 
 acquiesced. However, for many years all leaders but name band 
 leaders were exempt from the taxes. By a decision of the United 
 States Supreme Court in 1947, however, all leaders were deemed 
 to be employers for purposes of social security taxes as long as 
 they organize an orchestra and hold it available for limited 
 engagements. 17 Organized orchestras as well as name bands are 
 included, regardless of the prominence or income of the leader. 
 As a result, the leader, rather than the purchaser of the music, 
 has become responsible for the taxes. 
 
 The subsequent interpretations of the Commissioner of In- 
 ternal Revenue of the United States Treasury Department have 
 varied. But near the end of 1947, he decided that, on the basis 
 of the court's ruling, the only leaders whom he would not con- 
 sider employers are leaders of staff orchestras in radio stations 
 and theaters and leaders of orchestras organized by an estab- 
 lishment or person to play permanently at that establishment 
 or for that person. 18 This interpretation has been challenged 
 unsuccessfully by the union. 
 
 In order to compensate the leaders for the increased financial 
 burden which the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
 imposed upon them, the AFM authorized the locals to alter the 
 form of the standard contract so that either the purchaser of 
 the music would agree specifically to accept liability for retire- 
 ment taxes, unemployment taxes, and income withholding 
 taxes; or, as an alternative, the locals were permitted to increase 
 the wage scales so that a sum of money adequate to cover the 
 tax liabilities of the leader would become available to him. 19 
 
 • Sundry Problems 
 
 On a national scale, the AFM has been enmeshed in various 
 problems only some of which were related to music. Apart from 
 its stand on immigration which has been considered in con- 
 nection with the importation of musicians, the AFM followed 
 the line adopted by many other unions in the 1920's and ex- 
 pressed its strong denunciation of Communists and commu- 
 nism. Communists, Fascists, and Nazis are ineligible to join the 
 union, and members may be expelled for holding such views. 
 Unfortunately, however, the AFM had to depend upon the sup- 
 
92 
 
 port of Father Charles E. Coughlin in order to make an editorial 
 comment regarding the concentration of wealth in the United 
 States. 20 On the other hand, Petrillo indicated in 1949 that he 
 would not permit Wilhelm Furtwaengler, German conductor 
 charged with having figured in Nazi concerts during the second 
 World War, to conduct the Chicago Orchestral Association. 21 
 
 Petrillo has argued that individuals have the right to free 
 speech. The cross-country trip of Senator Robert A. Taft at the 
 end of 1947 enabled many organized workers to express the 
 bitter resentment which had been aroused by his sponsorship of 
 the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Every time he 
 stopped along the route to deliver a scheduled address, Senator 
 Taft was met in force by labor pickets. The president of the 
 Des Moines local inquired of Petrillo whether a band of 26 
 pieces hired to play in connection with one of these speeches 
 should take part. Petrillo replied, in effect, that musicians should 
 pass through the picket lines if necessary to fulfill the band 
 engagement. He declared that Americans have the right of free 
 speech, even if their ideas and opinions are disagreeable. 22 
 
 The affiliation of Negro musicians has been a more delicate 
 problem. Though in most Southern regions, Negro members 
 must be affiliated through subordinate locals, this practice was 
 followed also in many Northern cities. Some locals in the North, 
 accepted Negroes on a basis of equality. In others, they were 
 forced into subsidiary locals whose policies and activities were 
 determined by white locals. It was only at a time when the 
 federal government was fighting the practice of discrimination 
 against the employment opportunities of Negroes that the inter- 
 national executive board, in 1944, canceled the charters of 12 
 colored locals operating under control of white locals in their 
 jurisdictions and chartered them directly. In 1940, the New 
 York local forced the Decca Company to withdraw from sale a 
 record which the local claimed was degrading to Negroes, en- 
 titled "WPA." During 1942 and 1943, Negro and white musi- 
 cians working for the Ringling Brothers circus went on strike 
 for higher wages. The national union refused to settle the 
 strike when the owners agreed to raise the wages of the white 
 musicians. The union demanded that the wages of both groups 
 should be increased. Eventually the salaries of the white musi- 
 cians were raised from $47.50 to $54.00 per week while those of 
 
93 
 
 the Negroes were increased from $26.50 to $30.50. In 1946, the 
 AFM convention canceled its outing in St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 after it was advised by local officials that the color line must be 
 observed in that city on all visits made by the delegates. Today 
 the AFM has more than 50 colored locals, of which the largest, 
 the one in Chicago, has over a thousand members. 
 
 Public attention has been directed in recent years to facts 
 which have established that some musicians have utilized drugs 
 and narcotics to improve their performances. In 1947 the con- 
 vention of the AFM gave the international executive board 
 power to expel all members convicted of being drug addicts. 
 
 The musicians union has not maintained a consistent policy 
 regarding the teaching of music in schools and the musical 
 training and education of children. Although it has not per- 
 mitted children to be used in professional bands and in com- 
 petition with adult musicians, it has been undecided as to 
 whether music should be taught in the public schools. The 
 union has been somewhat fearful that the stimulation of musi- 
 cal interest among public school students unduly increases the 
 number of potential musicians. Even today the policy of the 
 organization on this matter is uncertain. 
 
 The tactics and policies of the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians has enabled it to succeed in gaining control of musicians 
 in the United States and Canada. But it has never been very 
 important in Canada. Although it began chartering Canadian 
 locals in 1900, it was not until the Toronto convention in 1913 
 that a resolution was adopted changing the emblem of the 
 AFM. All reference to nationality was removed, for the old 
 emblem had contained the figure of the flag of the United 
 States. In 1946, the union had only 6,713 members in Canada, 
 and in 1947, it had 8,108 members. In 1951, there were 30 
 locals and more than 10,250 members in that country. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians has to some extent 
 been organized along the lines of the medieval guilds and has 
 exercised control over purchasers of music, leaders, conductors, 
 bookers, and musicians. At all points, the person who wants to 
 have any dealings with professional musicians comes in contact 
 with the AFM. The national union permits the locals to exercise 
 much discretion but it intervenes whenever it feels that such 
 action is necessary. 
 
THE JURISDICTION AND /I 
 
 OPERATION OF A LOCAL • ^ 
 
 "During the past ten years we have not granted a single 
 concession." 
 
 WILLIAM FEINBERC 
 
 • The Consolidation of the New York Local 
 
 The greater proportion of contacts between the employer and 
 the union occur on a local basis; fewer meetings are held be- 
 tween employers and the national officers. The power wielded 
 by the organized musicians may be understood only if the ac- 
 tivities and functions of the locals are examined. The AFM 
 includes locals of all sizes. The 31 largest locals, each having a 
 thousand or more members, cover all the important jurisdictions 
 in the country. There are hundreds of medium-sized locals, 
 which though lacking the prestige and authority of the larger 
 ones, constitute the heart of the Federation. Small locals, those 
 with a hundred or fewer members, are dominated by the na- 
 tional, a condition which permits the national to exercise con- 
 trol over the affairs of the union. The more than 200 small 
 locals, however, do not contribute significantly to the progress 
 of the union. 
 
 These different-sized units are not comparable in the scope 
 of their activities. The larger the local, the more complicated 
 is its structure and organization, and the more numerous are 
 its functions and operations. The larger locals are located in 
 the more populous cities, where a greater number of musicians 
 is needed because the types of performances are more diverse 
 and the occasions on which music is used are more frequent. 
 Although a description of a large local necessarily would not 
 be typical of the AFM, it would indicate, however, the range 
 and complexity of the tasks performed. Obviously a local with 
 50 or 60 members could not be very active in labor relations 
 and its dealings with employers generally would be highly 
 informal. 
 
95 
 
 Membership in the 20 Largest Locals of the American 
 Federation of Musicians, 195 l 1 
 
 
 State or 
 
 
 
 City 
 
 Province 
 
 Local 
 
 Membership 
 
 New York 
 
 New York 
 
 802 
 
 30,964 
 
 Los Angeles 
 
 California 
 
 47 
 
 13,456 
 
 Chicago 
 
 Illinois 
 
 10 
 
 11,850 
 
 Detroit 
 
 Michigan 
 
 5 
 
 5,013 
 
 Philadelphia 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 77 
 
 4,889 
 
 San Francisco 
 
 California 
 
 6 
 
 4,543 
 
 Cleveland 
 
 Ohio 
 
 4 
 
 2,503 
 
 Milwaukee 
 
 Wisconsin 
 
 8 
 
 2,476 
 
 Pittsburgh 
 
 Pennsylvania 
 
 60 
 
 2,377 
 
 Boston 
 
 Massachusetts 
 
 9 
 
 2,367 
 
 Toronto 
 
 Ontario 
 
 149 
 
 2,270 
 
 Miami 
 
 Florida 
 
 655 
 
 2,179 
 
 Newark 
 
 New Jersey 
 
 16 
 
 1,897 
 
 Montreal 
 
 Quebec 
 
 406 
 
 1,887 
 
 Seattle 
 
 Washington 
 
 76 
 
 1,864 
 
 Minneapolis 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 73 
 
 1,744 
 
 Washington 
 
 District of 
 
 
 
 
 Columbia 
 
 161 
 
 1,539 
 
 St. Louis 
 
 Missouri 
 
 2 
 
 1,477 
 
 St. Paul 
 
 Minnesota 
 
 30 
 
 1,345 
 
 Kansas City 
 
 Missouri 
 
 34 
 
 1,288 
 
 The New York local, the Associated Musicians of Greater 
 New York, Local 802, AFM, is by far the largest union in the 
 Federation. It is a well-rounded organization and demonstrates 
 how an efficient unit should operate. The early history of the 
 organization of musicians in New York City already has been 
 described in connection with the National League of Musicians 
 of the nineteenth century and the struggle between the locals 
 and the national during the first part of the twentieth century. 
 
 When local 802 was organized in New York in 1921 the 
 national union made certain that it would retain control of 
 the new unit. The constitution of the local was framed to pro- 
 vide that a majority of its governing board would be appointed 
 by the national union. The declared objective of this arrange- 
 
96 
 
 ment was to eliminate the possibility that a situation would 
 recur in which the group in power could violate the laws of 
 the AFM. But there were many persons in the local who were 
 anxious to gain autonomy. As the New York unit grew and as 
 the years passed, the demands upon Weber and the inter- 
 national executive board by these members became more vocif- 
 erous and their cries for autonomy became louder. Weber was 
 adamant, however, and refused to relinquish control. 
 
 Some of the musicians who demanded home rule, and who 
 had been opposed to Weber from the days of the struggle of 
 1920 and 1921, complained to Congress. A Congressional com- 
 mittee was investigating industrial and labor racketeering in 
 the early 1930's and upon the request of musicians it held a 
 hearing on the relationship between the national union and 
 local 802. 2 The unfavorable publicity resulting from the in- 
 vestigation forced Weber to modify his position and he decided 
 to permit the local to elect its own officers at the end of 1934. 
 They assumed office in 1935. The president, however, remained 
 an appointee of the AFM for another two years, and retained 
 the power to veto all local actions which in his judgment vio- 
 lated the laws of the national. Much of the success of the local 
 dates from that time when the membership repudiated the 
 officers appointed by Weber and elected those men who had 
 fought for autonomy. Edward M. Canavan, the appointee who 
 had ruled the local as chairman of the governing board became 
 one of Weber's assistants and until he retired in 1950 was one 
 of Petrillo's assistants. The traces of animosity between the 
 national union and local 802 still are evident though complete 
 formal cooperation between them exists. At the 1951 convention 
 of musicians, Charles R. Iucci, secretary of the local, was 
 elected to the international executive board. This marks the 
 first time that local 802 has had a member on this board. 
 
 The elected officers of the local include the president, the 
 vice president, the secretary, the treasurer, nine executive board 
 members, nine trial board members, and a number of delegates 
 to conventions and labor bodies. All have terms of two years. 
 The nine executive board members together with the four major 
 officers constitute the full executive board, the highest body in 
 in the local. General supervision over the affairs and property 
 of the local is vested in the executive board. It has the power 
 
97 
 
 to approve or disapprove all contracts and all leaders who hire 
 members of the local for professional engagements and it may 
 demand payment from the employer in advance. 
 
 The trial board of nine members has original jurisdiction 
 over all cases involving infractions of the local laws and reg- 
 ulations, and over all violations of wage scales and working 
 conditions. Charges against members or employers may be 
 brought by any union member. Appeal from the decision of 
 this board may be taken to a membership meeting or to the 
 international executive board. The members of both local boards 
 receive $125 a week. They must devote full time to the affairs 
 of the local and may not accept any professional engagement 
 during their tenure of office. 
 
 The biennial election of officers arouses the keen interest of 
 the membership and involves a vigorous campaign and election. 
 Candidates and their supporters engage in much political activ- 
 ity and electioneering. Balloting is supervised entirely by the 
 Honest Ballot Association; the local itself has no jurisdiction. 
 From 1935 until 1953, one group was able to retain control of 
 the organization, and in general gained each victory by a 
 substantial margin. This party has represented the more con- 
 servative element in the local, but nevertheless has introduced 
 many progressive ideas. A second party represents a more leftist 
 point of view and comprises a greater proportion of the younger 
 musicians, including many of the veterans of the second World 
 War. To some extent this group, not holding office, has been 
 able with convenience to propose greater benefits for the mem- 
 bership and stronger resistance to employers. A third faction 
 comprises the Communists, their sympathizers, and the more 
 radical veterans, but has been relatively weak. Although charges 
 were made by the losers that there were irregularities in the 
 method by which the Honest Ballot Association conducted the 
 elections of 1942 and 1944, these claims could not be substan- 
 tiated. Court action to upset the election of 1944 was withdrawn 
 by the plaintiffs. The conflict within the local usually gives 
 way on matters in which the national union is concerned, how- 
 ever, and even the extremists usually support the international 
 president, James C. Petrillo. 
 
 By the middle of 1948 it was clear that renewed internecine 
 strife on a major scale had broken out in local 802, preliminary 
 
98 
 
 to the biennial elections. The group in power accused its 
 opponents of being led and dominated by Communists. It 
 enacted a rule that all candidates for office must sign affidavits 
 that they are not Communists. The membership meetings of the 
 local became exceedingly bitter. The operator of the hall rented 
 by the local to conduct these meetings protested to the union 
 that fighting between members had occurred, that police and 
 detectives had to be summoned on several occasions because of 
 disorders, and that his property had been damaged. The exec- 
 utive board of the local set aside several decisions made by the 
 members, but on an appeal to Petrillo by the insurgents some 
 of the rulings of the local board were overturned. 
 
 Richard McCann was re-elected president of the local in 
 December 1948 but by a mere majority of 89 votes out of a 
 total of more than 10,500 ballots cast. The opposition group 
 claimed that the election results had been tampered with, 
 despite the fact that balloting had been under the control of 
 the Honest Ballot Association, and asked the international 
 executive board to set aside the vote. The AFM, however, 
 turned down the appeal. 
 
 The friction in local 802 continued. In the autumn of 1949, 
 two members of the local who had distributed leaflets maintain- 
 ing that McCann was a defender of "Ernest Bevin's policy of 
 antisemitism" were expelled from the local by the trial board 
 after being brought up on charges. At the beginning of 1950, 
 however, a membership meeting of the local at which about 
 900 persons were present overruled the trial board and reinstated 
 the two musicians. McCann then appealed the reversal to the 
 international executive board. Though the board sustained the 
 appeal, it nevertheless refused to expel the two members of 
 local 802. Just before the local elections in 1950, McCann 
 decided to retire. His party, however, continued in power until 
 1953, when some high offices were won by opposition leaders. At 
 the convention in 1951, Petrillo took note of the conflict 
 within the local and indicated that something would have to 
 be done about the Communist agitation there. 
 
 Most of the members are satisfied that local 802 is operated 
 democratically. The important activities and decisions of the 
 local are reported in the monthly publication, the Official 
 Journal, now entitled Allegro. Detailed minutes of the meetings 
 
99 
 
 of the executive board are included in the bulletin. The secre- 
 tary must make a semiannual report to the members and the 
 treasurer must submit a detailed quarterly certified statement 
 setting forth the financial condition of the local. The member- 
 ship generally is lethargic. Though the union schedules a meet- 
 ing each month under a constitutional provision, and advertises 
 it widely, a quorum rarely is present. Five hundred members 
 out of the more than 30,000 in the local constitute a quorum, 
 but in 1946 only three meetings were held. Indeed, this number 
 was so unusually high only because it was a year marked by 
 strikes. In 1947, poor attendance by members made it possible 
 for only one membership meeting to be held. Today it is still 
 very difficult to assemble a quorum. The power to approve 
 proposed changes in the price lists and bylaws, which is vested 
 in the members who take part in the monthly meetings, is con- 
 ferred upon the executive board when a quorum does not 
 appear. The officers of the local generally have been able to 
 carry out their own programs. 
 
 • Collective Bargaining 
 
 Musicians are hired by many kinds of employers. They are 
 used in symphonies, in theaters, in operas, for recordings, for 
 wired music, in hotels, for dances, for funerals, in the open air 
 and indoors, and on land and sea. Engagements are considered 
 steady if musicians are employed on five days a week for at 
 least one week or on three days a week for two or more weeks. 
 All other types of tenure are single engagements. Because of 
 this diversity of employment conditions, the rules and laws of 
 the local must be complex. 
 
 New York City practically is a closed shop for professional 
 musicians. Since musicians are educated and developed without 
 any relation to union policies or to training programs by em- 
 ployers, the union must admit them on relatively easy terms or 
 else face competition from nonunion musicians. The examin- 
 ing committee which passes on the qualifications of applicants 
 acts in a purely perfunctory manner. The New York local, like 
 the others in the AFM, is open to membership. Although the 
 important employers of musicians have been unionized for 
 many years in New York, a campaign to organize the smaller 
 and the occasional employers was undertaken by the new 
 
100 
 
 administration in 1935. To aid in this task, a branch office was 
 opened in Long Island, New York, as an adjunct to the main 
 Manhattan office, because the local has jurisdiction over Nassau 
 and Suffolk counties as well as over the five boroughs in the 
 city. The campaign was highly successful in achieving union- 
 ization. 
 
 The local does not negotiate with all who desire to hire musi- 
 cians. Instead it sets the price in advance and an employer must 
 pay the scale fixed by the local or go without musicians. In 
 dealing with the important and organized employers, the union 
 does bargain collectively. Among such employers are the theater 
 operators, hotel owners, motion picture houses, symphonies, 
 and opera houses. 
 
 Local 802 has fought hard in negotiations with the employ- 
 ers. William Feinberg, formerly secretary of local 802, in sum- 
 marizing the activities of the local, wrote in 1945: "During the 
 past ten years we have not granted a single concession. On the 
 contrary, every time a contract has come up for renewal, we 
 have fought for and obtained improved conditions." 3 
 
 Collective bargaining with the theater owners is typical of 
 the labor relations of local 802, although employment of musi- 
 cians for this type of work is particularly peculiar to New 
 York City. New York City has 30 legitimate theaters all of which 
 are represented by the League of New York Theaters. Among 
 the represented theaters, 15 are operated by the Shubert interests, 
 four by City Playhouses, and 11 are independent. 
 
 The local and the League negotiate a wage scale and some 
 working conditions, though most of the conditions of employ- 
 ment already have been determind by the union in its rules. 
 The value of the trade agreement from the point of view of the 
 employer is that it gives some stability to the industry and pre- 
 vents the union from making constant changes. 
 
 Plays are classified as dramatic, musical, or drama with music. 
 It is in connection with the latter category that controversy 
 arose. Some people were shocked when local 802 decided to 
 consider such plays as Maurice Evans' Hamlet, Androcles and 
 the Lion, Shakespeare's Henry VIII, Shakespeare's Tempest, 
 and Happy Birthday to be musicals. The producers asked the 
 union to designate a third category for plays with more music 
 than the usual overture, entr'acte, and exit march of the drama, 
 
101 
 
 but less than the usual score of standard musicals. Music in these 
 plays is not incidental, but an integral part of the production. 
 The union obliged and designated a category known as drama 
 with music, in which the musicians remain in the pit through- 
 out the show, but the employer avoids the necessity of hiring 
 the number of men required in a musical. On several occasions 
 the international executive board has set aside decisions of the 
 local with regard to the classification of specific plays. 4 
 
 The rules of the union designate the number of men to be 
 hired for each type of play. Musical plays given in theaters 
 seating under a thousand persons must utilize a number of 
 musicians determined specifically by the executive board. If 
 the theater holds between a thousand and 1100 people, 16 
 musicians must be employed. Larger theaters must use at least 
 22 men. Dramas with music take six musicians and pay the 
 wage scale of the musical. Dramas having incidental music em- 
 ploy four men, but at a lower scale. If no music is included in 
 the play, musicians need not be hired in New York City; 
 although in other jurisdictions a minimum number of men 
 must be employed regardless of whether there is music in the 
 play. In January 1951, the National Labor Relations Board 
 ruled that the demand by a local of musicians that a theater 
 employ a greater number of men than the operator desired did 
 not violate section 8 (b) (6) of the Taft-Hartley law— the 
 featherbedding provision— as long as the union actually was 
 seeking to increase employment. In May 1952, a lower court 
 reversed the Board. 5 On March 9, 1953, however, the United 
 States Supreme Court upheld the Board's decision. 
 
 The union has imposed additional regulations upon the 
 theater operators. At least four union men must be employed 
 when mechanical musical devices such as records and radio 
 music are utilized in the play. The union requires that the con- 
 tract for the season should be signed by the theater before 
 Labor Day. Otherwise a penalty wage scale applies and wages 
 are increased considerably. But those theaters paying a penalty 
 scale during one year must continue to do so if the same play 
 is performed, even if the contract for the following year is signed 
 before the September deadline of that year. The number of 
 musicians in a musical may not be reduced by the producer 
 during the first six weeks of the run even if originally set above 
 
102 
 
 the union's minimum, but subsequently may be cut to the 
 minimum if notice is given two weeks in advance. The leader 
 or contractor receives one and a half times the scale of the 
 ordinary musician and the conductor one and three-quarters 
 times the scale. In practice, the remuneration of the conductor 
 almost always is much more than the minimum. 
 
 One related incident which aroused national attention oc- 
 curred at the Mansfield Theater in January 1942, during the 
 performance of the play, In Time to Come. The producer 
 utilized recordings to play the Star Spangled Banner and other 
 musical selections in the play. Local 802 demanded that four 
 musicians should be hired by the producer, since under its 
 rules dramas with incidental music must employ at least that 
 number. When the employer refused to hire musicians because 
 he maintained that they were unnecessary, the local threw a 
 picket line around the theater. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, who 
 had tickets for one of the performances, refused to cross the 
 picket line. In her daily column she expressed surprise at the 
 union's demand. 6 This incident focused national attention on 
 the practices of requiring standby bands and of enforcing 
 featherbedding demands used by the musicians union. 
 
 Some of the requirements and regulations of the local are 
 obvious illustrations of featherbedding, but the union has been 
 powerful enough to impose such conditions on the employers. 
 The League of New York Theaters bargains to determine wage 
 scales paid by theater operators. The scale for traveling theater 
 musicians, over which the local does not have jurisdiction, is 
 fixed by the AFM. The national union fixes the scale, it does 
 not negotiate. 
 
 The local is faced with the problem of preventing kickbacks. 
 Sometimes employers have an understanding with musicians 
 that part of the salary is to be returned. On other occasions, 
 each musician hired gives part of the wages which he receives 
 to the leader. Many such cases have occurred and continue to 
 occur in the theaters and other types of musical employment 
 even though it is a violation of the laws of the State of New 
 York. 7 Progress has been made by the local in eliminating this 
 practice, but intensification of the kickback occurs as economic 
 conditions deteriorate and unemployment among musicians 
 increases. Kickbacks are not unusual today. The union requires 
 
103 
 
 that copies of all contracts entered into by musicians must be 
 filed at its office, and the union itself now is a party to all 
 agents' contracts. There is a standard union form of agreement 
 which must be utilized and which helps the local police the 
 industry. The requirement that contracts must be filed is par- 
 ticularly important to the union because of the prevalence of 
 small employment units where irregularities and violations of 
 union regulations are most likely to occur. 
 
 Only with great difficulty did the union organize the dance 
 field. Years of militant pressure, boycotting, picketing, and 
 policing were necessary. Hotels, cafes, night clubs, and taverns 
 are grouped in Class A, Class B, or Class C depending on their 
 ability to pay. Each class has its own wage scale. Single engage- 
 ments, which occur mainly in catering halls and hotel ball- 
 rooms, came under the union scale slowly, and only after many 
 leaders were expelled and many agents and bookers had their 
 licenses revoked. Today all major ballrooms are required to 
 employ a minimum number of musicians on all occasions when 
 music is utilized. 
 
 The scale on the general single engagement in the larger 
 establishments is $15 per man for a three-hour period during 
 the day or $20 on weekdays and $24 on Saturdays for four hours 
 of evening performance. Rehearsals must be paid for separately, 
 and overtime is computed at the rate of five dollars per hour 
 on weekdays and six dollars per hour on Saturdays. Scales on 
 steady engagements vary widely depending on the type of per- 
 formance, but those musicians holding permanent positions 
 are among the highest paid group of workers. 
 
 Though the caterers who owned or had concessions in the 
 different establishments at first were reluctant to come to terms 
 with the union they began to adjust themselves to the new con- 
 ditions once they made agreements. Each caterer had a group 
 of preferred leaders whom he had recommended to customers 
 engaging his establishment to run an affair. The local considered 
 this practice to be monopolistic and attempted to eliminate 
 the influence of the caterer in determining which musicians 
 should be employed. It prohibited caterers from giving leads 
 to those interested in hiring musicians. The caterers protested 
 to Petrillo, however, and the international executive board 
 overruled the local. 8 As a result, the caterer may recommend a 
 
104 
 
 band or an orchestra to the customers, but he is prohibited 
 
 from forcing them to accept his designations. 
 
 A serious conflict developed between the musicians and the 
 hotel operators in 1946. Musicians' wages in hotels had been 
 rising rapidly and the hotel owners, through the New York 
 State Hotel Association, refused to grant the full increase de- 
 manded by the union that year. Local 802 struck in over 50 
 hotels in New York City. Petrillo immediately brought the 
 national union to the support of the local. He pulled out the 
 musicians from hotels in Chicago and several other cities which 
 were linked by common ownership to the hotels involved in 
 the New York strike. 9 The Muzak Corporation cut off wired 
 service to those hotels and the International Brotherhood of 
 Electrical Workers (AFL) assured local 802 that it would not 
 install any juke boxes. After two and a half weeks the union 
 gained most of the demands it had presented. But the strike 
 cost the local over $80,000, of which more than $26,000 were 
 spent for strike benefits and over $37,000 were paid out to 
 pickets. Additional smaller gains have been made since that 
 time. In 1951, the National Labor Relations Board reaffirmed 
 its policy that hotels are not subject to the Taft-Hartley law. 10 
 This ruling permits the union to impose featherbedding provi- 
 sions providing the state law does not ban the practice. 
 
 Local 802 bargains with the independent radio stations in 
 New York City. In the spring of 1950, the most important 
 stations in this category agreed to contribute three per cent of 
 the scale paid to musicians into a fund to finance health and 
 hospitalization insurance for musicians. Radio station WINS, 
 however, refused to agree and dropped the eight musicians 
 which it had employed from its payroll. The union struck 
 against the station and placed WINS on its unfair list. 
 
 WINS asked the court for a restraining order against the 
 picketing. This request was granted in April. In May, the court 
 approved a temporary injunction against the union because it 
 did not find that a labor dispute existed. Subsequently, how- 
 ever, at the end of September the New York State Supreme 
 Court refused to grant a permanent injunction and ruled that 
 the union may picket the station. 11 It held that the musicians 
 were involved in a dispute with the station. It was not until 
 April 1951 that the strike was settled. WINS agreed to rehire 
 
YOUNG JIM PETRILLO IN 1919 
 
PETRILLO WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND GLADYS 
 SWARTHOUT AT A FREE CONCERT SPONSORED BY THE 
 AFM IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 
 
*fc 
 
 
 
 iWP wr 
 
 PETRILLO GREETS PRESIDENT EISENHOWER 
 AT AN AFL CONVENTION 
 
105 
 
 eight musicians at the previous wage scale and to pay into the 
 fund the same percentage which the other stations were con- 
 tributing. 12 
 
 • The Attack on Unemployment 
 
 In an industry where much of the employment is of a casual 
 nature and where many thousands of persons are not profes- 
 sionals, there usually is a considerable amount of unemploy- 
 ment. Local 802 has used various tactics to increase the em- 
 ployment opportunities of its members. The union has en- 
 couraged summer band concerts in the public parks. With the 
 cooperation of the city, with grants from a foundation, and 
 with the support of various merchants and business concerns, 
 these concerts have been given annually since 1938, in increas- 
 ing numbers. Considerable employment and income have been 
 provided for many musicians. 
 
 Since 1947, the moneys allocated to the local from the record- 
 ing and transcription fund and more recently from the music 
 performance trust fund— the funds based on the payments made 
 by the record and transcription companies— have provided many 
 jobs for union members. The musicians have spent these funds 
 in sponsoring thousands of free public concerts. Many different 
 types of performances have been held. 
 
 Local 802 has attempted to eliminate the practice by which 
 musicians play without remuneration. Rigorous control is exer- 
 cised over rehearsals and the musician generally must be paid 
 when performing in them. The union recently has established 
 the general policy that no free music may be supplied by any 
 musician to any organization on any occasion unless the other 
 goods and services utilized at the function, such as food, hotel 
 space, printed materials, and waiter service, are also obtained 
 without any cost by the organization making the request for 
 the music. 
 
 On several different occasions the local has made attempts 
 to spread the available work among a larger number of musi- 
 cians. For a time, doubling on instruments was prohibited. 
 Today the practice is permitted, but penalty rates are imposed 
 on the employer. The local tried to prevent those with steady 
 jobs and in the higher salary range from taking additional work, 
 but the protests were so loud and sustained that this plan was 
 
106 
 
 abandoned. Furthermore, eleven members of the union were 
 given permission by the international executive board to take 
 the case to court. As a result the local enacted a resolution that 
 any members having steady engagements of five or six days in 
 any week may not play on any of their off days. Though the 
 executive board attempts to enforce this rule very strictly, in- 
 fractions have been common. No penalties have been imposed 
 because members are lax in bringing charges against the 
 violators. 
 
 Membership in Musicians Unions 
 in New York City for Selected Years 13 
 
 Year 
 
 Local 
 
 Membership 
 
 1903 
 
 310 
 
 3,500 
 
 1913 
 
 310 
 
 5,100 
 
 1921 
 
 310 
 
 8,000 
 
 1921 
 
 802 
 
 12,000 
 
 1928 
 
 802 
 
 15,500 
 
 1930 
 
 802 
 
 17,000 
 
 1934 
 
 802 
 
 15,273 
 
 1937 
 
 802 
 
 17,766 
 
 1940 
 
 802 
 
 21,335 
 
 1943 
 
 802 
 
 22,092 
 
 1945 
 
 802 
 
 24,686 
 
 1947 
 
 802 
 
 28,771 
 
 1950 
 
 802 
 
 30,560 
 
 1952 
 
 802 
 
 30,746 
 
 Local 802 has been successful in reducing the seven-day work 
 week of musicians to one of five and six days without permitting 
 employers to cut wages correspondingly. In the last few years 
 it has also been able to induce several groups of employers to 
 grant vacations with pay. This victory marked a milestone in 
 the history of the musicians union. Many of the concessions 
 won by the local have tended to increase the employment op- 
 portunities of musicians. 
 
 Like the other locals, 802 has grown rapidly in the last 15 
 years and the problems of unemployment thereby have been 
 intensified. As a result, an old and troublesome grievance has 
 
107 
 
 been revived. As the number of transfer members coming to 
 the New York local has mounted, local 802 has expressed its 
 opposition to the policy of the national which permits the 
 unrestricted movement of members of one local into the juris- 
 diction of another local. However, there is little that it can do 
 to bring about any changes in the bylaws of the AFM. 
 
 While the union definitely discriminates against nonmembers, 
 there is no discrimination because of race, color, or religion. 
 For many years, Negroes have constituted about ten per cent of 
 the membership. The local has no special problems connected 
 with racial or religious antagonisms, even though cliques based 
 along such lines exist. On the other hand, every effort is made 
 to eliminate the competition of expelled and nonunion mem- 
 bers. At the end of 1948 the local prohibited student bands 
 from performing at college games played at Madison Square 
 Garden. It held that the matches were business ventures for 
 profit, and that professional musicians should be employed. 14 
 
 The union has appointed stewards and business agents to 
 police those employers whose labor practices are questionable 
 and to organize the unorganized. The Official Journal of the 
 union which contains much information of value to the mem- 
 bers and is one of the better union publications in the United 
 States, publishes a supplementary unfair list of local 802 and a 
 list of expelled members. It has printed photographs of musi- 
 cians who played in an establishment at a time when it was 
 being picketed, under the caption— dishonor roll. These musi- 
 cians have been barred from membership by the local. 
 
 In pursuing its objectives, local 802 occasionally receives help 
 from other unions. It has been indicated already that the 
 electrical workers agreed to cooperate during the hotel strike of 
 1946. The musicians local had an informal alliance with the 
 waiters, cooks, and bartenders during the period when intensi- 
 fied pressure was applied to unionize hotels and night clubs. 
 On a more general basis, regular delegates are elected to the 
 New York State Federation of Labor, to the Central Trades 
 and Labor Council, and to the United Hebrew Trades. Dues 
 are paid to the Negro Labor Committee and to the Jewish Labor 
 Committee. 
 
 Difficulties were encountered in relations with the Interna- 
 tional Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL) in 1941. The New 
 
108 
 
 York local of teamsters announced that when out-of-town bands 
 arrived at theaters in taxis and buses, their instruments would 
 have to be carried across the sidewalk by union teamsters at a 
 charge of ten dollars in the daytime or twenty dollars at night. 
 The musicians refused to agree to this procedure, and the 
 teamsters threw picket lines around the theaters. Petrillo ordered 
 his men to disregard the pickets. "Can you imagine them guys?" 
 he said. "They was being unreasonable!" 15 The policy of the 
 local has been to permit members to use their own judgment 
 whether to cross picket lines set up by other unions. Musicians 
 are not ordered to do so by officers of the local. 
 
 The musicians union has no control over the training of 
 instrumentalists. At any time, many thousands of persons who 
 are capable of earning their livelihood as musicians do not 
 choose to do so. If opportunities in the field of music become 
 more favorable— and they generally have been since the end of 
 the war— new members join the local to take advantage of eco- 
 nomic conditions. The test given by the examining committee 
 is generally no obstacle to admission and the new men soon are 
 seeking jobs and therefore tending to increase unemployment. 
 It is difficult to estimate how many members of the local are 
 unemployed because a large number of them are not profes- 
 sional musicians and may have jobs in different types of pro- 
 duction and enterprise. The membership of the local has 
 expanded rapidly and has kept pace with the growth of the 
 national. 
 
 • Finances 
 
 The financial operations of the New York local, which are of 
 considerable magnitude, have helped to establish a favorable 
 record for the local. When autonomy was achieved in 1935, the 
 bank balance of the local was just over $3,000 while the total 
 amount of unpaid bills was nine times as large. Reorganization 
 of the finances helped achieve a sound and stable position. 
 Like the national, 802 publishes comprehensive financial figures. 
 Quarterly and annual statements, audited by certified public 
 accountants, are printed in the Official Journal. At present the 
 surplus of the local, which has been declining for several years, 
 is about $425,000. At the beginning of 1952, the local increased 
 the annual dues by $8, though on previous occasions the mem- 
 
109 
 
 bers had refused to authorize a change. The local has for some 
 time been seeking means to enlarge its revenues, so that the 
 annual deficits may be eliminated. 
 
 The receipts of the local are derived from various sources. 
 All applicants for membership must pay an initiation fee of 
 $50. The dues of $24 a year which members pay constitute the 
 single main source of revenue. Though these payments are con- 
 siderably lower than those levied in other national unions, 
 especially when account is taken of membership privileges 
 derived by musicians, the local has imposed a one per cent tax 
 on the scale price of all engagements. This tax is levied also on 
 the salaries paid to officers and employees of the local who are 
 members of the AFM. This method of raising money is equit- 
 able because many musicians are not employed constantly at 
 the trade. Hence they have no tax to pay during the time they 
 are not working as musicians. In addition, the levy is imposed 
 only on the scale established in the price list so that those 
 earning above the scale need not pay on the amount in excess. 
 This tax does not affect the top artists of other locals who play 
 in the New York jurisdiction, and although the solo artists of 
 local 802 are expected to pay the tax, no issue is raised if they 
 
 do not. 
 
 Thousands of dollars are collected annually as fines for the 
 late payment of dues, fines imposed by the trial board, initiation 
 fees, and reinstatement fees. Investments yield some interest 
 and dividends, and advertising in the journal accounts for a 
 few thousand dollars. Local 802 receives its share of three taxes 
 imposed by the AFM-traveling band tax, radio tax, and theater 
 tax. Union receipts during the year exceed a million dollars. 
 
 The union provides a variety of benefits to the members. All 
 regular members are protected with a thousand dollar life in- 
 surance policy even if they contribute nothing more than the 
 annual dues. The insurance is paid by the Union Labor Life 
 Insurance Company. Indigent and unemployed members are 
 provided with relief. Originally relief was financed by a relief 
 and organization fund which derived its income from a three 
 per cent tax imposed on all engagements. But in 1943 this tax 
 was abolished by the membership. However, at the insistence 
 of the union leaders the one per cent tax already described was 
 substituted; though this income is not used for relief. 
 
110 
 
 Members over 50 years of age, who have been in the union at 
 least ten years and are in need, are eligible to receive relief. 
 They receive up to seven and a half dollars a week. The money 
 in the relief fund is derived from the radio remote control 
 charges. The local reserves the right to require recipients of 
 relief to perform work around the office, and assigns them to 
 do clerical work or to serve as doormen, investigators, or pickets. 
 Senile members receive donations. At the peak, 2,000 musicians 
 were on relief, but even during the prosperous year of 1947, 
 800 of them were being assisted. The figure has remained rela- 
 tively stable since then. 
 
 Members on the relief rolls, and some who are in financial 
 need, are entitled to the benefits of the medical and hospitali- 
 zation plan. The local pays the Manhattan General Hospital 
 $20,000 a year, so that relief members may obtain without any 
 charge, district doctor service, hospitalization, specialist care, 
 X rays, medicines, and vaccinations, whenever necessary. Form- 
 erly, members not on relief were eligible to take part in the 
 medical plan if they paid a special fee, but they were barred 
 subsequently because the scheme did not work well and because 
 the hospital was not favorably disposed to their participation. 
 
 Union lawyers are available to members whenever they have 
 difficulty in collecting wages and salaries. The local has a spe- 
 cial department which performs the task of collecting claims 
 and remitting the money to the appropriate members. A vet- 
 erans bureau was established in the union to assist members dis- 
 charged from the armed forces who have personal problems. 
 Unlike the AFM, local 802 has no standard provisions regard- 
 ing strike benefits. Although strike benefits usually are paid 
 when the members are called out, the executive board of the 
 local determines the amount as each specific occasion arises. 
 
 The Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802, 
 presents a picture of a thriving and active organization; but it 
 recently has been pervaded by fear and despair that the in- 
 creased use of recorded music is making the musician obsolete. 
 Though its activities and operations are quite extensive, basi- 
 cally it attempts to raise and protect the wage scales of the mem- 
 bership. The New York local typifies operations in their most 
 complex form. Few other locals in the AFM engage in activities 
 
Ill 
 
 on so vast a scale. But in its own way, and within the framework 
 of the rules and regulations of the AFM, each local must solve 
 similar labor problems. A description of the methods used by, 
 and the behavior of the New York local helps to gain an under- 
 standing of how other locals manage their affairs. 
 
PETRILLO REMOVES TWO THORNS • ' 
 
 "He's [Petrillo] a very able man in his line. For his 
 union he did a splendid job." 
 
 SERGE KOUSSEVITZKY 
 
 • The Change in National Leadership 
 
 Weber had the qualities needed by a good leader and he was 
 able to build the union from a small organization into a huge 
 and successful enterprise. But by nature he was cautious and 
 slow to act. It was his policy generally to gather, sift, and weigh 
 the facts in each situation carefully before making any major 
 decision. As a result, many tasks which should have been under- 
 taken and problems which should have been considered, but 
 which were not critical at the moment, were pushed aside. Only 
 in an emergency did he show boldness and daring. 
 
 Persons who knew Petrillo expected more aggressive action 
 from the musicians union after the change in leadership in 
 1940, and they were not disappointed. Petrillo has been more 
 willing to take a chance and more likely to act impetuously. He 
 has been more familiar with what he wants than Weber had 
 been. It was not long before employers, union members, and 
 the public realized this. 
 
 Petrillo had taken up the struggle against the mechanical 
 reproduction of music and musical recordings in his own local 
 in the 1930's, but his success in this matter had been quite 
 limited, for he had tried to deal with a national problem on a 
 local level. Nervertheless, his exceptionally successful leadership 
 of the Chicago local and his outspoken statements somewhat 
 had annoyed Weber and a few other leaders in the AFM, and 
 they had rebuked Petrillo severely. But he had remained un- 
 daunted. 
 
 Although the other national and local officers of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians understood that the unrestricted 
 use of records might reduce the employment opportunities of 
 
113 
 
 musicians, they had not been able to decide what should be 
 done. Weber and his assistants were not sure how to proceed. 
 They agreed that the musicians could not undertake a fight to 
 block the production and utilization of recordings. As a close 
 student of labor history, Weber was familiar with the decline 
 and demise of unions, like those in the glass industry, which 
 had fought technological advancement. But though the AFM 
 sought a solution to this problem for nearly 15 years, it did not 
 succeed in finding one. No means of control were discovered, 
 that were both practical and legal. 
 
 The new president was ready to throttle the recording in- 
 dustry. It was clear to him that musicians were losing work 
 and that job opportunities were being curtailed as a result of 
 the use of records. Now, for the first time, he had the whole 
 organization of musicians behind him, and he prepared to fight 
 the recording companies. It was Petrillo's belief that, as a 
 general principle, the production of musical recordings must be 
 terminated. There were, however, in 1940, two important weak 
 spots in the plan he had formulated to ban recordings which 
 he had to overcome before the program could be undertaken. 
 
 • The Dispute with the American Guild of Musical Artists 
 
 Two major groups of musicians were not controlled by the 
 musicians union at that time. First, solo instrumentalists and 
 their accompanists were not members of the AFM and, second- 
 ly, the members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra had never 
 been unionized successfully. These two gaps in the exercise of 
 control over American musicians by the union had to be closed 
 if success in the elimination of recordings were to be attained. 
 Otherwise, the companies would be able to produce a large 
 number of musical disks by utilizing these nonunion sources of 
 music. Within days after his election to the presidency, Petrillo 
 turned his attention to the removal of these obstacles to his 
 plan. 
 
 In 1896, the AFM had been given, in its charter from the 
 American Federation of Labor, exclusive jurisdiction to organize 
 performers on musical instruments. But the musicians had not 
 seen fit to organize the instrumental virtuosos of their profession. 
 The musicians believed that this group could be organized 
 only with great difficulty and that no advantage was to be 
 
114 
 
 gained by having them in the union, since these artists were 
 neither competing with ordinary musicians nor lowering stand- 
 ards. Subsequently, when the American Guild of Musical Artists 
 was organized as a labor union in 1936, it tried to enroll concert 
 and opera singers mainly, but accepted and encouraged solo 
 instrumentalists, accompanists, and symphony orchestra con- 
 ductors to join. Only a number of the solo instrumentalists, 
 however, became members of AGMA. At no time did the AFM 
 clearly relinquish its jurisdiction over the solo instrumentalists, 
 though there is little evidence that any strong protests were 
 made by the musicians union during the period when AGMA 
 began to organize them. 
 
 Early in August 1940, Petrillo decided to act. Since the long- 
 range program of the musicians union required that the union 
 should exercise some control over the instrumental soloists, 
 Petrillo ordered this group of musicians to join the AFM by 
 Labor Day. He warned that unless it did so, members of the 
 musicians union would not be permitted to play at any function 
 in which soloists participated. In his letter to Lawrence Tibbett, 
 president of AGMA, Petrillo stated that the instrumentalists 
 and symphony leaders must resign from AGMA and join the 
 AFM. He maintained that the policy of the AFM required 
 these individuals to join the labor union which had jurisdic- 
 tional rights. The musicians union formulated this position in 
 an attempt to prevent a gradual infringement on the area 
 which had been assigned to it by charter and to restrain the 
 excesses of AGMA. Notice of the union's position was sent to 
 radio networks, opera companies, symphony orchestras, and 
 others who might be affected. 
 
 Overnight the incident raised a national issue. The con- 
 testing personalities were colorful and the names of the leading 
 musical artists of America were involved. The nation chuckled 
 when Petrillo said: "Since when is there any difference between 
 Heifetz playing a fiddle and the fiddler in a tavern? They're 
 both musicians." 1 Describing the action of AGMA, he said: 
 "They went along and took the instrumentalists. They took 
 the piano players and then they took orchestras. They stole my 
 people and I'm going to get them. They're musicians and be- 
 long to me." Tibbett and Petrillo discussed the matter for two 
 weeks and it appeared as if some progress was being made 
 
115 
 
 towards an amicable settlement. The leader of the musicians 
 seemed willing to compromise. 
 
 But Lawrence Tibbett secretly was preparing a court case. 
 AGMA had worked diligently and laboriously in building its 
 membership to 1,800 persons and was not willing to relinquish 
 any part of it. Tibbett was no doubt aware that the proper 
 tribunal for adjudicating and adjusting the dispute was the 
 American Federation of Labor. But past experience had de- 
 monstrated that the more powerful labor union usually wins 
 its case before the councils of the AFL. His own AGMA had 
 absorbed a smaller AFL union through use of some highly 
 questionable legal technicalities on a previous occasion. 2 
 
 The American Guild of Musical Artists asked the court to 
 restrain Petrillo and the musicians union from carrying out 
 their threats against the instrumentalists. Justice Ferdinand 
 Pecora of the New York Supreme Court granted a restraining 
 order, which barred Petrillo from taking any action in the 
 matter until a regular session of the court could hear the case. 
 Great astonishment was expressed by the judge that the presi- 
 dent of the union had the authority to impose fines on members 
 of the union and to suspend or change any provision of the 
 union constitution, at his discretion. 3 These provisions were not 
 new, of course, for Weber had been vested with similar powers 
 for more than 20 years. It was not unexpected therefore that 
 the American Federation of Musicians turned down Pecora's 
 subsequent offer to mediate the dispute. 
 
 In a statement to the press Tibbett declared that the battle 
 between AGMA and AFM was not jurisdictional, but the be- 
 ginning of a fight for freedom of musical culture in America 
 from petty totalitarian dictators. Meanwhile, the position of 
 AGMA received general approval. Tibbett was unanimously 
 elected president of the American Federation of Radio Artists. 
 The Screen Actors Guild came out in support of AGMA. The 
 newspapers of the country generally were behind the Guild. 
 Pleaded Petrillo: "Everybody calls me the tsar, the chieftain 
 and this and that. What can I do?" 4 
 
 As both sides prepared for the next step in the court test, the 
 musical artists laid plans to stage a mammoth fund raising con- 
 cert which would include performances by Jascha Heifetz, 
 Efrem Zimbalist, Mischa Elman, Jose Iturbi, Lily Pons, Gladys 
 
116 
 
 Swarthout, Ezio Pinza, and Kirsten Flagstad. This concert was 
 never held, because many of the stars involved were uncertain 
 which side to support on the issue. 
 
 In the middle of November, Judge Aron Steuer of the New 
 York Supreme Court rendered a decision which set aside the 
 temporary stay of action granted previously, but at the same 
 time he stated that AGMA could have the issues in the case 
 tried in court. He declared that though members of the AFM 
 might be under dictatorial control and exposed to the danger 
 of union extortion, these facts were outside the scope of judicial 
 notice. 5 AGMA announced its intention to appeal, and Petrillo 
 assured the court that the matter would be held in status quo 
 until the case would be reviewed by a higher court. 
 
 The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court affirmed the 
 decision of the lower court in refusing to grant the Guild an 
 injunction, but went beyond that and held that since a labor 
 dispute was involved no cause for action could be found; and 
 it dismissed the case against the musicians. 6 This decision was 
 unanimous and clear-cut. When the AFM decided that solo 
 instrumentalists must become members of the union by March 
 1941 if they desired to perform with other musicians, the rush 
 to enroll began. Though only a few soloists met the announced 
 deadline, more than a hundred of the leading instrumental 
 artists in the country and many symphony conductors joined 
 the musicians union in the next few months. Some of them had 
 previously been members of AGMA and some had never been 
 in any union before. Sergei Rachmaninoff, Fritz Kreisler, and 
 Josef Hofmann were given honorary memberships by the musi- 
 cians. They were excused from initiation fees and dues, but 
 agreed to conform to the laws and rules of the union. Four 
 instrumentalists who were not United States citizens and there- 
 fore not eligible to join the union, and a minor, likewise in- 
 eligible, were given permits by the Federation of Musicians 
 when they agreed to adhere to the rules of the union. 
 
 Albert Spalding, who was one of the founders of the Guild, 
 resigned from that body and joined the Federation. He told the 
 press that while the original purpose of the Guild had been to 
 form an organization of solo singers and instrumentalists, AGMA 
 had proceeded to organize chorus members, dancers, and accom- 
 panists, so that instrumental soloists had become only a small 
 
117 
 fraction of the total membership. In addition, he said, the 
 soloists had been asked to employ only Guild members as 
 accompanists. Spalding then declared that the court rulings 
 were decisive and that he was joining the musicians union; his 
 attorneys had assured him that there was no basis for the fear 
 expressed by some persons that onerous terms and conditions 
 would be imposed by the AFM on the instrumental soloists. 
 
 Petrillo had won a resounding victory. The important solo 
 instrumentalists in the country were members of his union. The 
 Department of Justice then announced that a federal grand 
 jury would investigate charges that Petrillo had conspired with 
 radio chains and concert booking agencies to destroy AGMA. 
 The Department was interested in the arrangement under 
 which most of the concerts presented in the United States were 
 controlled by NBC and CBS. The networks were able to do so 
 through a technique by which Civic Concerts and Community 
 Concerts, affiliates of NBC Artists Service and Columbia Con- 
 certs Corporation respectively, supplied only block-booked 
 schedules. The investigation was to cover the practices used by 
 booking agencies, concert bureaus, and broadcasters in dealing 
 with artists in the musical fields and it was to examine the rela- 
 tionship between Petrillo and these organizations. The investi- 
 gation, however, was never made. 
 
 When the New York Court of Appeals, highest court in the 
 state, ruled in the summer of 1941 that the Appellate Division 
 had erred in dismissing the case against the AFM, AGMA al- 
 ready had lost the instrumentalists. The Court of Appeals held 
 that though it was proper to vacate the temporary court stay, 
 a trial should be held as to whether the musicians should be 
 prevented from taking over the soloists and whether they should 
 be required to pay damages. The court stated that the broad 
 doctrine had been established with regard to labor unions in 
 the State of New York that harm intentionally done is action- 
 able if not justified. 7 Justifiable harm— some activity having a 
 reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety, the 
 right of collective bargaining, or other condition of employ- 
 ment—would be a lawful labor objective. No such objective was 
 obvious to the court in this case and therefore a trial should be 
 held. The decision, however, had come after the AFM had con- 
 solidated its hold on the solo instrumentalists, and though 
 
118 
 
 AG MA did prepare for trial the outlook for the eventual suc- 
 cess of the Guild was hopeless. 
 
 During the winter of 1941 the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians finally moved in the direction which it had previously 
 rejected. It asked the American Federation of Labor to revoke 
 the charter of the Associated Actors and Artists of America 
 (Four A's) , the parent organization of AGMA, for trespassing 
 upon the jurisdiction of the AFM. 
 
 The AFL is vested with the power to take such action. A 
 union joining the labor federation receives a charter in which 
 its organizational jurisdiction is outlined. Exclusive rights to 
 organize certain kinds of workers are granted and no other labor 
 union in the federation may infringe on these areas. The AFL 
 has the authority to enforce and revoke the charter if a union 
 violates any of the provisions. Unfortunately the record of the 
 American Federation of Labor on matters jurisdictional has 
 been dismal. Economic power usually has been the only deter- 
 minant upon which it has based decisions in jurisdictional 
 questions and disputes. This weakness displayed by the AFL 
 has been the cause of much public criticism and concern and 
 has led to legislative intervention. 
 
 When Petrillo asked the American Federation of Labor to 
 investigate his charges that AGMA had transgressed jurisdiction- 
 ally, William Green, president of the AFL, advised him that 
 the unions should try to settle their differences through amicable 
 negotiation. The musicians union had won the struggle and 
 was interested in obtaining general acceptance of its new posi- 
 tion. The Guild desired to salvage what remained of its former 
 control. A settlement was reached in February 1942 after weeks 
 of negotiation. It provided that AGMA would recognize the 
 AFM's jurisdiction over concert solo instrumentalists and accom- 
 panists in all fields. AGMA, however, received authority to act 
 as the exclusive bargaining agent for all the solo instrumentalists 
 when they were engaged in the concert field only and it was 
 permitted to control the relationship between these musicians 
 and their managers. 8 The New York Supreme Court lawsuit 
 which was pending was discontinued. Even as agreement was 
 reached, Petrillo was able to state that 99 per cent of the solo 
 concert instrumentalists were already members of the American 
 Federation of Musicians. 
 
119 
 
 Both the AFM and the AGMA had been subjected to strong 
 criticism during the controversy. Petrillo, however, had borne 
 the brunt of the abuse. He had been threatened and reviled by 
 an indignant press and an aroused public. Nevertheless, as the 
 courts ruled in his favor and, subsequently, as a settlement was 
 reached with AGMA, there was a considerable tempering of the 
 attitude of the public and even an expression of occasional 
 words of approbation for Petrillo. AGMA, though subject to 
 much less censure, had not escaped unscathed. During the pre- 
 ceding years its activities, as well as those of its parent body- 
 Associated Actors and Artists of America, had been marked by 
 conflict and turmoil. The battle with the stage hands in 1939 
 had been one which aroused resentment and bitter enmity. These 
 facts were not forgotten by those persons who denounced the 
 actions of the Guild. 
 
 The outcome of the solo instrumentalist case strengthened 
 Petrillo's hand immeasurably. He was in much more strategic 
 position with regard to his objectives in the field of recordings, 
 and furthermore he could hasten the completion of his negotia- 
 tions with the Boston Symphony Orchestra which he had under- 
 taken and which was part of the larger plan. 
 
 • Unionization of the Boston Symphony Orchestra 
 
 The Boston Symphony Orchestra was founded in 1881. It 
 was organized by Henry Lee Higginson, whose name is often 
 prefixed by the title "major" because that is the rank he attained 
 in the army during the American Civil War. Higginson, a mem- 
 ber of a banking family, had considerable wealth when he 
 launched the orchestra. He had been a music enthusiast during 
 his youth and in his later years he desired to build an orchestra 
 which would be worthy of the highest merit. In the nearly 40 
 years of his association with the orchestra, he preferred to be its 
 sole underwriter. During that span of time he met deficits 
 aggregating nearly a million dollars from his personal resources. 
 
 The beginning of Higginson's long struggle with the union 
 came shortly before 1890 when a new conductor of the orchestra 
 was to arrive from Europe. The local musicians union objected 
 to the admission of this conductor to the United States on the 
 ground that his entry would violate the alien contract labor 
 law, but the contention was not sustained. Though this incident 
 
120 
 
 preceded the organization of the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians it is illustrative of what was to follow. 
 
 By the turn of the century all of the symphony orchestras in 
 the United States except the one in Boston had been unionized. 
 Higginson hated and resisted labor unions, and in order to 
 stem the tide of union affiliation which he foresaw coming 
 towards his orchestra, he introduced a pension plan in 1903. 
 Nevertheless a large number of the members of the Boston 
 Symphony joined the union by 1904. Higginson warned the 
 members of the orchestra that if the union interfered in any 
 way with his policies, he would disband the symphony. The men 
 who had joined all resigned from the union. 
 
 The union, thereupon, turned its attention to the task of 
 eliminating a major source of the supply of musical talent for 
 the Boston Symphony Orchestra. This source was the foreign 
 musician. Though the musical critics agreed that many foreign 
 instrumentalists displayed a higher caliber than those residing 
 in the United States, the union denied this assertion. The union, 
 on the other hand, maintained that foreign musicians tended 
 to undercut American wage standards. It therefore did not per- 
 mit any person to become a member unless he had declared his 
 intention of becoming an American citizen and had obtained 
 his first papers. At the union's Boston convention in 1906, Presi- 
 dent Weber said: "It is about time to give the American boy 
 a chance in America." 9 The union claimed that foreign musi- 
 cians were recruited only because the practice made it possible 
 to include elements of novelty in the season's preliminary press 
 notices; but that no improvement in the orchestra resulted from 
 the annual changes in personnel. 
 
 It is possible that the superior achievements of the Boston 
 Symphony might have been attained by depending solely upon 
 American musicians. But leadership among symphonies could 
 not be maintained if the orchestra were confined in its recruit- 
 ment to nonunion musicians. Except for members of the Boston 
 orchestra, the best musicians in the United States generally 
 belonged to the American Federation of Musicians. Since mem- 
 bers of the AFM could not be easily persuaded to join him, it 
 was incumbent upon Higginson to seek replacements and new 
 performers for his nonunion orchestra abroad. This process 
 effectively thwarted the union in its efforts to gain control over 
 
121 
 
 the Boston Symphony Orchestra, even though it had a closed 
 shop in the other symphonies performing in the United States. 
 
 During the years preceding 1920, the Boston Symphony 
 reached the height of its musical eminence under the leadership 
 of Dr. Karl Muck. Muck had been the conductor of the Royal 
 Opera in Berlin for 20 years when he was given permission by 
 the German Emperor to go to Boston in order to lead the 
 orchestra in that city. He remained in Boston during the seasons 
 of 1906 and 1907. Muck then returned to Germany to fulfill his 
 contract there, but he was again attracted by the much greater 
 financial remuneration offered in the United States; and he 
 resumed his leadership of the Boston Symphony Orchestra in 
 1912. 
 
 Early in the first World War, Muck was criticized severely 
 for presenting "all German" recitals. After the United States 
 entered the war, it became customary for all orchestras and bands 
 to play the Star Spangled Banner during each program. Muck 
 refused to comply with the public request that the Boston Sym- 
 phony adopt this custom and as a result set in motion a wave of 
 nationwide criticism. Higginson and Muck argued that the 
 national anthem was not suitable for symphony presentations. 
 Higginson threatened to disband the orchestra rather than to 
 allow it to play the anthem. Muck, however, became the center 
 of the storm when Walter Damrosch declared that Boston's 
 conductor was a loyal citizen of Prussia. 
 
 The mayor of Boston, James M. Curley, ordered the license 
 of Symphony Hall canceled if the orchestra failed to play the 
 anthem at every performance. The American Federation of 
 Musicians congratulated the mayor on his patriotic stand. Under 
 the severe public criticism the orchestra abandoned its first 
 position and agreed to play the Star Spangled Banner, but the 
 action came too late to save Muck. A few persons came to his 
 defense, but almost everybody else resented his attitude. The 
 Swiss legation in this country verified the fact that Muck was a 
 citizen of Switzerland. But since he had been born in Bavaria, 
 had been associated with Germany for the greater portion of 
 his professional life, and was conducting an orchestra which, 
 because of the foreign background of its members could not be 
 considered American, he became a symbol of the enemy. He was 
 arrested as an enemy alien and jailed. When the war ended he 
 
122 
 
 was released from internment and went back to Germany. He 
 refused many lucrative offers to return to this country. In 1939, 
 the year before his death, he was decorated by Adolph Hitler. 
 
 Although Higginson was strongly pro-Ally, he endured per- 
 sonal humiliation during the war because of the loyalty he 
 manifested to his conductor. When Muck was interned, Hig- 
 ginson, then 83 years of age, announced that others would have 
 to carry on the burden of supervising the affairs of the orchestra 
 and he severed his connections with the symphony. 
 
 After Muck was arrested, the managers of the symphony, in 
 order to appease public opinion, discharged all members of the 
 orchestra who were citizens of enemy countries. These men 
 were unable to secure new employment because they were not 
 members of the union. Union membership was a prerequisite 
 for all of the better jobs available to musicians in the country. 
 The National Alien Enemy Relief Committee requested the 
 union to admit these men to membership. Weber denied the 
 request because it required action that was in conflict with 
 the principles under which the union operated. No musician im- 
 ported under a contract could become a member of the union 
 because contract labor represented unfair competition. The 
 union maintained that members of the Boston orchestra had 
 been recruited in this unfair manner and that if they were per- 
 mitted to join, others would be encouraged similarly to violate 
 union rules. The National Alien Enemy Relief Committee ac- 
 cepted this explanation. 
 
 The most nearly successful attempt to organize the orchestra 
 prior to 1940, occurred in 1920. An attempt to unionize the group 
 had been made by some of the members in advance of the 
 opening of the 1918-1919 season. Management met this chal- 
 lenge by giving all the instrumentalists in the orchestra a bonus 
 of $250 for the season. This action ended unionization efforts. 
 Similar methods had been used by the orchestra to frustrate 
 union plans five years before. 
 
 Early in 1920, 80 members of the Boston Symphony Orchestra 
 requested the nine trustees to increase wages and at the same 
 time took steps to join the union. It was already clear that the 
 new management of the orchestra was also opposed to the 
 union. Judge Frederick P. Cabot, chairman of the board of trus- 
 tees, had threatened to disband the symphony if any signs of 
 
123 
 unionism were manifested. When he had been told by a com- 
 mittee of musicians the preceding year: "We can't live any 
 more these days on the salary you pay us," he replied: "Well, 
 gentlemen, all I can say is that you had better change your 
 profession." 10 
 
 The members of the orchestra had valid grievances. The 
 minimum wage paid to the members of the Boston Symphony 
 Orchestra was $35 a week. But in the other symphony orches- 
 tras, all of which were unionized, the minimum was $55. Cabot 
 estimated that the wage demand made by the players in 1920 
 would increase expenditures by $100,000 and declared that the 
 trustees were in no position to make this additional outlay. 
 Though he declared that the orchestra's wages were 30 per cent 
 higher than before the war, he did not mention that the cost of 
 living had doubled. Cabot, however, told the men that union 
 membership would not be an issue providing they were willing 
 to accept the open shop principle. Under no circumstances 
 would he recognize the union, since that would give it some 
 control over the orchestra. 
 
 It has never been established definitely whether the will of 
 Higginson had determined in any way the attitude that the 
 trustees took towards the union. Higginson had died in the 
 interim between his retirement and 1920. Though he had at 
 one time announced that his will provided $1,000,000 to perpet- 
 uate the symphony, he revised the instrument during the Muck 
 affair. Then he added several codicils. The probate of the will 
 showed that nothing was left to the Boston Symphony, but in 
 one of the supplementary documents he left his valuable 
 musical library and musical instruments to the orchestra con- 
 tingent upon the discretion of the executor who between three 
 and five years after the testator's death was to make or cancel 
 the gift, "guided by the manner in which the Symphony Or- 
 chestra shall have been and is being managed." 11 The trustees 
 might have been influenced by this provision. 
 
 The management remained adamant in its refusal to deal 
 with the players even though 90 per cent of the orchestra, in- 
 cluding Frederic Fradkin the concertmaster, had joined the 
 AFM. Suddenly Fradkin was discharged, ostensibly for disobey- 
 ing the conductor. Over 30 men struck to secure his reinstate- 
 ment, but Fradkin succeeded in getting them to return to their 
 
124 
 
 jobs. The trustees, however, withheld the pay of these men 
 pending disciplinary action. The men promptly struck again 
 and with the help of local musicians organized their own or- 
 chestra and actually presented several concerts. The Boston 
 police, however, prevented the strikers from picketing the Boston 
 Symphony Orchestra. 
 
 The revolt of the union members fizzled out. The trustees 
 remained firm. The press was united in opposing the strikers. 
 The public was apathetic regarding the entire question, just 
 having witnessed the abortive Boston police strike of 1919. And 
 the Boston Symphony left for a road tour after successfully 
 replacing the strikers. Former members of the orchestra were 
 rehired. New recruits were sought and found. Then some of the 
 strikers resigned from the union and rejoined the orchestra. By 
 the end of the summer the complement of men in the symphony 
 was once more complete. 
 
 The Boston Symphony was not to regain its prominence as 
 one of the world's leading orchestras until Serge Koussevitzky 
 assumed the leadership in 1924. Under the successors of Muck 
 —Henri Rabaud and Pierre Monteux— the orchestra had deteri- 
 orated. The effects of the strike had not worn off when Kous- 
 sevitzky took over. But Koussevitzky had ability and energy. His 
 reputation marked him as one of the ablest of European con- 
 ductors. He immediately set about reorganizing the symphony. 
 
 Older players were pensioned or released and some of the 
 younger ones who were hired as replacements during the strike, 
 but were only second-raters, were dismissed. The dismissal plan 
 aroused some resentment among the players and there were new 
 moves to affiliate with the union during 1925 and 1926. But 
 efforts to unionize failed because the number of men who were 
 sufficiently bold to show that they desired to join the union was 
 too few. For more than 12 years thereafter attempts to unionize 
 the orchestra were of negligible importance. 
 
 Europe was scoured for talent during the years succeeding 
 1924. The conductor felt that the best recruits were to be found 
 there. But as the seasons passed, Koussevitzky became one of the 
 more ardent exponents of American music. He also recognized 
 the improved quality of American musical education and dur- 
 ing the 1930's began engaging American-born musicians. It is 
 true that the American Federation of Musicians blacklisted 
 
125 
 
 the members of the Boston Symphony and fined union members 
 for playing at Koussevitzky's auditions. Nevertheless, many mu- 
 sicians went to the yearly auditions. When the second World 
 War opened in 1939, the orchestra was largely American because 
 of the new hiring policy and because most of the foreign-born 
 players had been Americanized. 
 
 During the first 15 years of his connection with the orchestra, 
 Koussevitzky remained neutral with regard to union matters. 
 He was not antiunion. In 1902 he had organized the first musi- 
 cians union in Russia and later he belonged to a musicians 
 union in Paris. But he was pleased with the nonunion status of 
 his orchestra because it gave him freedom from union regula- 
 tions and restrictions. However, he succeeded in inducing the 
 trustees not to put into effect a salary cut during the depression 
 after one had already been made and generally he protected 
 the men from the interference of management. 
 
 Notwithstanding Koussevitzky's efforts on behalf of the mem- 
 bers of his orchestra, the symphony player in Boston had an 
 inferior economic position in comparison to other musicians 
 performing similar duties. The weekly stipend was smaller in 
 Boston and the men did not have the same regularity in hours 
 which other symphony players had. Union men received addi- 
 tional pay for extra rehearsals and much higher fees when they 
 made symphony recordings. Apologists for the nonunion Boston 
 orchestra conceded that the weekly remuneration was smaller 
 in Boston but claimed that the annual salary was greater 
 because of more regular employment. These contentions were 
 unwarranted for though the season of the symphony man in 
 Boston may have been slightly longer as a result of extensions 
 through "pops" and festival programs, these engagements did 
 not counterbalance the much greater weekly remuneration re- 
 ceived by the union men. However, the Boston men made no 
 move towards union affiliation. 
 
 Unionization of the Boston Symphony came from the outside. 
 The orchestra's main income was derived from performances on 
 the radio, for recording, and in the concert hall. Whatever 
 deficit remained after the funds from these sources were ex- 
 hausted was covered by contributions of the trustees and friends 
 of the symphony. Shortly before 1940 the union undertook to 
 make the deficit grow to a point where the financial burdens of 
 
126 
 
 the trustees would became impossible to bear. Petrillo was suc- 
 cessful in carrying out this policy. 
 
 It was only two weeks after his elevation to the presidency of 
 the national organization, that Petrillo began an intensive 
 campaign to unionize the Boston Symphony Orchestra. The 
 orchestra was one of the more important recorders for RCA 
 Victor and control over the activities of the orchestra was neces- 
 sary in order for Petrillo to be able to halt the production of 
 all phonographic recordings and transcriptions. Some action had 
 already been taken against the Boston orchestra in 1939 by the 
 AFM. When the American Society of Composers, Authors and 
 Publishers decided to sponsor a music festival in New York's 
 Carnegie Hall, the Federation opposed the inclusion of the 
 Boston Symphony in the recital. Fiorello H. La Guardia, mayor 
 of New York, decided to remove the orchestra from the program 
 and the New York Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra was sub- 
 stituted. In addition, the musicians union had prevented the 
 Boston Symphony from performing over the radio subsequent 
 to the 1938 season. The union had threatened to pull out its 
 own musicians from radio programs if the broadcasters permitted 
 the nonunion group to go on the air. 
 
 Although Petrillo was negotiating with the orchestra from 
 the outset, he was neither in a vacillating mood, nor was he 
 inclined to waver from a firm resolve to unionize the symphony. 
 In August 1940 he told newspaper reporters: "They're through. 
 We've taken them off the radio and off the records." 12 All 
 record companies who desired to employ union musicians had 
 been forced to secure licenses from the AFM. When the AFM 
 ordered the RCA Victor company to stop recording the Boston 
 Symphony or else suffer the loss of its license, the company 
 hastened to obey. RCA Victor refused to renew its contract with 
 the Boston orchestra. Pressed records of the orchestra, however, 
 were released for many months thereafter because of the ac- 
 cumulated recordings cut prior to the termination of the 
 agreement. 
 
 The strategy and tactics of the union with respect to the 
 Boston Symphony may be divided into four parts. First, it 
 involved removing the orchestra from radio programs. Secondly, 
 the orchestra was prevented from making any recordings. These 
 objectives were accomplished with promptness and dispatch and 
 
127 
 
 helped the union to isolate and cut off the orchestra financially. 
 
 Thirdly, Petrillo refused to grant solo instrumentalists and 
 conductors permission to perform with the nonunion symphony 
 orchestra. Violinists Efrem Zimbalist and Joseph Szigeti were re- 
 fused permission to play scheduled dates. These men had joined 
 the AFM after resigning from AGMA. Conductors Howard 
 Hanson, Bruno Walter, and Carlos Chavez were similarly barred 
 from conducting the Boston Symphony. Walter was an honorary 
 member of the union and Chavez, as a Mexican alien, was the 
 holder of a permit entitling him to lead union orchestras. The 
 Boston orchestra was unable to obtain artists. (At the same time 
 union policy barred nonunion conductors from leading union 
 orchestras, although upon the personal appeal of Marshall 
 Field 3d, president of the New York Philharmonic's board of 
 directors, Petrillo consented to permit Koussevitzky to conduct 
 a series of the New York society's concerts early in 1942.) The 
 link between the enrollment of solo instrumentalists in the 
 union and the unionization of the Boston Symphony Orchestra 
 thus was made evident. The unionized solo instrumentalists 
 and the unionized conductors could be prevented from accept- 
 ing guest engagements with a nonunion orchestra. 
 
 The fourth action of the union was aimed at blocking the 
 road tours of the orchestra. Concert halls which scheduled recit- 
 als by the Boston Symphony were told that they would be put 
 on the union blacklist. This pressure was applied when the 
 orchestra tried to use the municipal auditorium in Springfield, 
 Massachusetts, the Eastman Theater in Rochester, New York, 
 and Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts. Though the 
 union was not successful in securing the elimination of the 
 orchestra from all of these halls, the orchestra undoubtedly 
 suffered from some unfavorable publicity. The union also con- 
 sidered picketing Symphony Hall, home of the Boston orchestra. 
 Carnegie Hall in New York City was put on the local's unfair 
 list in June 1942 because it refused to agree to schedule only 
 union orchestras. Petrillo, however, removed it from the list 
 pending the outcome of his negotiations with the Boston Sym- 
 phony. These negotiations already were on their way to success- 
 ful termination. 
 
 Even as the union was tightening its vise-like grip on the 
 orchestra, conferences between the AFM and the Boston Sym- 
 
128 
 
 phony had continued. As events unfolded, the executives of 
 the Boston orchestra maintained strict silence on the matter of 
 unionization. Only once was this rule broken. Rumors had per- 
 sisted that the will of Henry L. Higginson had provided re- 
 sources to the orchestra contingent upon its remaining free 
 from unionism. George Judd, manager of the orchestra, empha- 
 tically stated that the will did not prohibit the employment of 
 union musicians. In April 1942 Ernest B. Dane, president of 
 the board of trustees of the orchestra, died. He had been resolute 
 in his opposition to the union and, as the largest contributor, 
 had been the orchestra's most influential policy maker. His 
 death weakened opposition to the union. It then became pos- 
 sible for the parties to reach general agreement, although many 
 details remained to be worked out subsequently. 
 
 Koussevitzky had been trying to get the trustees to permit 
 unionization since 1939. He perceived the need for an unin- 
 terrupted flow of revenues from radio performances and record- 
 ings and he knew that the orchestra would suffer from its inabil- 
 ity to obtain guest artists and interchange conductors. But he 
 could not convince the trustees and he almost decided to sever 
 his connection with the Boston group and come to New York 
 as conductor of the Philharmonic. Petrillo appreciated the posi- 
 tion of Koussevitzky and told a reporter: "Look here, the Boston 
 Symphony wants the privilege of walking around the country 
 as a nonunion organization, whereas 95 per cent of its members 
 want to join. This includes Koussevitzky himself. How do I 
 know? He told me so personally, when I visited him at his home 
 in the Berkshires last summer." Petrillo added that Koussevitzky 
 had advised him to "go easy" with the trustees. Petrillo then 
 concluded: "I've been going easy for a year. But what do I get? 
 A letter from Ernest B. Dane that he will stand by Judd as 
 manager. And what did Judd write before that? He said he 
 could not go over the head of the trustees. All right, if a fight 
 is what they want, they can have it." 13 
 
 In November 1942 the parties reached full agreement and a 
 contract was signed. The 111 members of the Boston Symphony 
 Orchestra, including the conductor and assistant conductors, 
 agreed to join the union on condition that the orchestra be 
 given the right to hire instrumentalists from any part of the 
 United States and not, as had previously been required, only 
 
129 
 
 from within the jurisdiction of the local in which the orchestra 
 was located. In order to effect this basic change, the laws of the 
 union had to be modified. Petrillo consulted with representatives 
 of 15 of the largest locals in the United States; the necessary 
 revision of the union laws would directly affect these jurisdic- 
 tions. As might be expected, the changes proposed by Petrillo 
 were approved unanimously. Then under article I, section 1, of 
 the bylaws of the union, Petrillo modified the bylaws to provide 
 that all symphony orchestras might recruit players from any 
 part of the United States. A symphony instrumentalist may 
 now accept a symphony job in another jurisdiction without the 
 permission of the local in whose jurisdiction the job is located. 
 
 These changes produced pleasant relations between the or- 
 chestra and the union. Although the repealed provisions con- 
 cerning the employment of symphony players had not been 
 enforced strictly and many exceptions had been permitted by 
 the union, the trustees of the Boston orchestra felt that the mere 
 existence of the restriction in the union law was a threat to the 
 artistic integrity of the symphony. Said Serge Koussevitzky of 
 Petrillo: "He's a very able man in his line. For his union he did 
 a splendid job." 14 And indeed he did. But the time element had 
 favored Petrillo and had played a leading role in breaking 
 down the resistance of the directors of the orchestra to the union. 
 
 After 61 years of opposition to unionization, the Boston 
 Symphony Orchestra was forced to yield. The immediate cause 
 of its capitulation was dire financial necessity. Though this 
 orchestra was one of the world's finest and had been run effi- 
 ciently and economically, its budget could not be balanced. In 
 some cities, deficits were paid from the contributions of a few 
 patrons of art. In Boston, Higginson had made up the difference 
 between the income and outlay of the orchestra, and had at the 
 same time dictated the policies. After his death this task was 
 taken up by others. When Dane died, no person or group of 
 persons was willing to meet the deficit from its own resources. 
 The income that could be derived from radio engagements, re- 
 cordings, and road tours became indispensable for the continued 
 solvency of the orchestra. 
 
 Freedom in the selection of orchestra members had become a 
 changed problem over the years. The first decades of the century 
 had been highlighted by union attempts to prevent the 
 
130 
 
 influx of foreign musicians into this country. Orchestras and 
 bands, however, operated on the assumption that foreign play- 
 ers generally surpassed American instrumentalists. The union 
 took a long-range point of view and stressed the need for im- 
 proving the opportunities of American musicians and making 
 more adequate use of their talent. Laws restricting alien contract 
 labor were only partially successful from the union's point of 
 view, but immigration restrictions were somewhat more effective. 
 The first World War helped the union by cutting off the supply 
 of immigrants. In some cases the contract labor law had an indi- 
 rect influence on the number of foreign musicians entering the 
 United States. When a musician from abroad was brought to 
 this country in the expectation of subsequently getting a contract 
 from the Boston Symphony, he had to wait several months in 
 order to meet the requirements of the law. As a result the musi- 
 cian insisted that the contract which he finally signed should in- 
 clude special provisions and should be of long duration. This 
 arrangement made for more rigid conditions and reduced the 
 flexibility of the orchestra. 
 
 The sound musical training instituted by American high 
 schools, colleges, and music schools had improved the quality 
 of orchestra players here. The foresight and vision of Kousse- 
 vitzky in substituting American men for the older foreign players 
 in the orchestra had eliminated a major grievance of the union. 
 In 1918, the Boston Symphony Orchestra consisted of 100 men. 
 Of these, 51 were American citizens but only 17 were native 
 born. Twenty-two were German, eight Austrian, six Dutch, 
 three French, two British, two Italian, two Russian, two Belgian, 
 and two Bohemians. In 1940 native Americans dominated the 
 orchestra. 
 
 The Boston Symphony Orchestra, therefore, was more in- 
 clined to deal with the union. Money derived from recordings 
 and radio programs was essential for the continuation of opera- 
 tions. In order to obtain such funds the demands of the union 
 had to be met. But it was now possible for the orchestra to 
 recruit an adequate supply of excellent musicians by sifting the 
 United States, because American players had attained extreme 
 proficiency and were among the best in the world. As soon as 
 the union was ready to make a few concessions the basis for an 
 agreement was found. The long struggle ended with a complete 
 
131 
 
 understanding when the union consented to modify its hiring 
 requirements. The importance of nonunion musicians in the 
 United States was entirely eliminated and the union's control 
 over professional musicians became complete. 
 
 Petrillo had accomplished his preliminary tasks. The two 
 weaknesses in the organization of musicians which he had found 
 when he became president were eliminated. The solo instru- 
 mentalists had been taken away from the American Guild of 
 Musical Artists and the Boston Symphony had been converted 
 into a union orchestra. His fight with the record companies 
 now could be undertaken. 
 
THE RECORD BAN IN 1942 Q 
 
 OR ROOSEVELT COULDN'T END THAT ONE • ° 
 
 "[The companies resorted to] bitterness, injustice, trick- 
 ery and reactionism which would do justice to slave- 
 owners [; they engaged in a} vile, indecent, malicious 
 and filthy campaign of libel, slander and vilification. . . . 
 Honesty and fairness . . . triumphed over falsity and 
 fraud. . . . If . . . the companies, fail to change [their 
 past course], the A.F.M. will not hesitate to break off 
 relations and leave them to die by their own nefarious 
 schemes." 
 
 JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO 
 
 • The Cessation of Recording 
 
 Petrillo realized that the ban on the production of recordings 
 which he had imposed on Chicago musicians for 18 months in 
 1937 and 1938 had cost the members of his local a quarter of a 
 million dollars in wages. Yet he was not afraid to re-engage in 
 battle against mechanical music. The conventions of 1941 and 
 1942 had authorized him to try to bring to an end the produc- 
 tion of musical records and transcriptions. When Petrillo had 
 succeeded in his preliminary maneuvers and had brought all 
 instrumentalists into the union, he acted with dispatch. 
 
 Late in June 1942, the recording and transcription companies 
 were notified that after August 1, members of the AFM would 
 not play or contract to make records, transcriptions, or other 
 types of mechanical reproduction of music. Elmer Davis, director 
 of the Office of War Information, requested the union to with- 
 draw its notices, but he was turned down; the order went into 
 effect as scheduled. Senator Burton K. Wheeler's offer to mediate 
 between the union and the companies was rejected by the union 
 on the grounds that it had no intention of dealing or negotiat- 
 ing with the companies. 
 
 Meanwhile, however, the government had intervened in the 
 record controversy in two ways. In August, Senator D. Worth 
 Clark introduced a resolution in Congress to investigate Pe- 
 
133 
 
 trillo and the union. Preliminary hearings were held and the 
 resolution was approved. 1 In January 1943, Petrillo and his 
 counsel appeared before the subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Interstate Commerce which was inquiring into the 
 ban on records. After lengthy testimony Petrillo promised to 
 negotiate with the companies. The government also acted 
 through the Department of Justice. In July 1942, Attorney 
 General Francis Biddle authorized Thurman Arnold of the 
 Department of Justice to seek an injunction from the United 
 States District Court to prevent the union from engaging in 
 restraint of trade and from violating the Sherman Antitrust Act. 
 The judge, however, supported the contention of the union 
 that a labor dispute was involved and he therefore did not issue 
 any injunction. The United States Supreme Court upheld the 
 decision of the lower court. 2 A second suit to secure an injunc- 
 tion was dropped by the Department of Justice in April 1943 
 after Tom C. Clark replaced Arnold as Assistant Attorney 
 General. 
 
 For six months Petrillo held firm to his resolution not to 
 permit his members to make musical recordings. He had told 
 the 1942 convention of the union that the industry would be 
 permitted to produce records if it gave assurances that they 
 would be used only in the home or that they would be used by 
 the armed forces; the ban would be dropped if President Roose- 
 velt would so request. During the first month after recording 
 had ceased, the manufacture of transcriptions which were to be 
 used only once and then destroyed had been permitted by 
 Petrillo. He had canceled this authorization when his lawyers 
 advised him that the concession might be construed as a viola- 
 tion of the law because it discriminated in favor of commercial 
 transcriptions and against library recordings and phonographic 
 records. The position of the union in the recording controversy 
 was supported by various groups and persons, mainly labor 
 organizations. In October 1942 the convention of the American 
 Federation of Labor, upon the recommendation of its executive 
 council, passed a resolution approving the ban on records. 
 
 The Puerto Rico Federation of Musicians announced that it 
 was supporting the AFM and that it too was banning the 
 production of musical recordings. The Puerto Rican musicians 
 claimed that this position was also being taken by the musicians 
 
134 
 
 of Cuba and Argentina. The Musicians Union of Great Britain 
 pledged itself to aid the AFM by preventing the export of 
 musical records from Great Britain. The British musicians did 
 not resume making records for shipment to the United States 
 and Canada, until after the AFM had reached an agreement 
 with the recording companies. This was of vital importance to 
 Petrillo for it eliminated what might have become a means of 
 dissipating the effectiveness of the ban on production which 
 had been imposed in the United States. Members of the AFM 
 backed the ban and completely refrained from making record- 
 ings. Personnel of name bands and symphony orchestras and 
 solo instrumentalists who were unable to record and whose 
 incomes were therefore curtailed, voiced very few complaints. 
 
 External opposition to the action taken by the union was 
 more vociferous and bitter. The public was disquieted. A Gallup 
 poll at the end of the summer of 1942 showed that 73 per cent 
 of the people favored legal action by the government to stop 
 Petrillo, while only 12 per cent were opposed. The chief antag- 
 onism to the union and Petrillo came from the National Asso- 
 ciation of Broadcasters. The NAB is the trade association of the 
 radio industry; and although it has enrolled most of the stations 
 in the country among its membership, it is dominated by the 
 large networks. In 1943, James L. Fly, then chairman of the 
 Federal Communications Commission characterized the NAB 
 as a "stooge organization" before a Senate committee. The 
 Association was vociferous in denouncing, taunting, and reviling 
 Petrillo. Acrimonious speeches were made, disparaging pam- 
 phlets were issued, special bulletins were published, and car- 
 toons ridiculing Petrillo were reproduced. The dictatorial 
 implications of Petrillo's middle name— Caesar— were stressed 
 by the NAB; Petrillo complained that the NAB had spent a 
 million and a half dollars publicizing this fact. Petrillo un- 
 doubtedly did not know that in 1908, the American Federation 
 of Musicians had attacked the policies recommended by the 
 temporary chairman of the Republican national convention, 
 Julius Caesar Burroughs; the AFM emphasized that such pro- 
 posals might be expected from a person bearing the names 
 "Julius Caesar." 3 
 
 The campaign waged by the NAB against the policy of the 
 musicians union was reinforced by the specific employers affected 
 
135 
 
 —the recording companies and the radio broadcasters. The 
 recording industry consists of two parts. Some companies manu- 
 facture records and others manufacture electrical transcriptions. 
 Phonographic records are readily available to the public. About 
 80 per cent of the records are purchased for use in the home, 
 19 per cent are bought for use in juke boxes located in hotels, 
 restaurants, and dance halls, and one per cent is obtained by 
 radio stations. The bulk of the records made in the United 
 States are produced by six companies— Columbia Recording 
 Corporation (affiliated with CBS) , RCA Victor (affiliated with 
 NBC) , Decca Records, Capitol Records, Mercury Record Corpo- 
 ration, and MGM Records. 
 
 Electrical transcriptions are specially prepared 33-inch plat- 
 ters which, because of the materials utilized and the method of 
 recording, may be used only for radio broadcasts. The tran- 
 scription business has two distinct divisions, generally known as 
 library and commercial. Library transcriptions are rented by 
 stations for use on sustaining programs— that is, programs which 
 have no commercial sponsor. Like phonograph records, they 
 may be played many times. Commercial transcriptions record 
 broadcasts which are sponsored by advertisers. They are rarely 
 used more than once. The radio recording division of NBC 
 controls a very large proportion of the transcription business. 
 Only a handful of firms render library service, though there are 
 a larger number engaged in making commercial transcriptions. 
 The gross annual income of the transcription industry amounts 
 to several million dollars. 
 
 The closed shop has prevailed in the recording industry for 
 many years, but until 1944 no negotiations concerning working 
 conditions ever took place. The AFM laid down the terms, in- 
 cluding the amount of wages to be paid and the number of 
 hours to be worked, and the companies adopted them. The 
 original reason for licensing the recording companies in 1938 
 was to force them to restrict the use of records to noncommercial 
 purposes. The court subsequently determined that such a limi- 
 tation could not be enforced legally. 4 Nevertheless the union 
 continued to issue licenses until the recording ban went into 
 effect. 
 
 The interests of the radio broadcasting companies have been 
 intertwined with those of the recording companies. Senator 
 
136 
 
 Burton K. Wheeler had at one time been advised by Petrillo to 
 investigate this connection, but Wheeler had been persuaded 
 by the radio interests not to do so. Radio stations and networks 
 were strongly opposed to the record ban. Most of the newspapers 
 in the country supported the radio industry but this attitude at 
 least partially depended on the fact that many of them own or 
 control radio stations. 
 
 Petrillo stressed that he could not expect very much more 
 employment from the recording companies, and that he was 
 really interested in getting at the radio stations. Nearly 75 per 
 cent of all radio time has been devoted to music; less than half 
 has consisted of live music and the remainder has constituted 
 recorded programs. The proportions have varied among the 
 stations, the amount of recorded music having been much 
 smaller, in general, on network outlets. Though the AFM con- 
 ceded that at least half of the radio stations earned incomes 
 which were too small to enable them to hire live musicians, it 
 demanded that stations which could afford to do so, should 
 increase the number of staff musicians. The union claimed that 
 musicians should share in the huge profits of the radio industry. 
 
 Bargaining with radio networks has been carried on mainly 
 on a local basis and handled by the local unions, but the 
 national organization has always been ready to help the local 
 deal with a station that is part of a network system. The AFM 
 was formerly able to do this by getting the network to induce 
 the local station to accept the terms of the local union. 
 
 Petrillo made a good impression when he testified before a 
 subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce 
 on January 12 and 13, 1943. 5 He stated that the union was 
 willing to negotiate with the recording industry in order to 
 work out a just solution. At one point Senator Clark broke into 
 the discussion and said to Petrillo: "Would you change jobs 
 with one of us? Today I would," was the answer he received. 6 
 
 In February 1943 the union proposed that recording compa- 
 nies should pay a fee for each record and transcription made 
 by union members. These fees would be put into a fund to be 
 used for the reduction of unemployment among musicians. 
 Both the phonographic record companies and the transcription 
 companies, which bargained separately with the union, turned 
 the proposal down. The companies refused to make payments 
 
137 
 
 into a fund which would be used for the benefit of musicians 
 whom they had never employed. After several months of fruit- 
 less conferences, the negotiations lapsed. Some of the companies 
 affected appealed to the United States Conciliation Service, and 
 when this agency could not settle the dispute it certified the 
 matter to the National War Labor Board. 
 
 Many of the companies, however, were in no haste to settle the 
 issues. Radio stations and juke box operators had had long 
 notice of Petrillo's intention to ban recording, and they had 
 accumulated huge stocks of musical selections. The recorders 
 continued to release records by pressing reissues and by dipping 
 into the backlogs which they had built up. They also manufac- 
 tured records and transcriptions for the United States govern- 
 ment. Petrillo permitted musicians to make recordings in con- 
 nection with the government's war effort. 
 
 The companies continued to record vocal arrangements, but 
 when they attempted to use vocal backgrounds simulating music, 
 Petrillo felt that they were going too far. He warned the top 
 ranking singers against this practice. They agreed to refrain 
 from using such backgrounds when they were told that the 
 musicians union would eventually take account of all their 
 activities during the ban. Recordings of music with instruments 
 not then covered by the union rules or contracts— such as harmon- 
 icas, ocarinas, and one-man bands— continued to be made but 
 they found little popular appeal. "Bootleg" recordings carrying 
 names like Hal Goodman, Peter Piper, and Johnny Jones, were 
 made to circumvent the ban, but they were not numerous. Other 
 records were brought in from Mexico and Cuba. 
 
 There was another reason why the record ban applied by 
 Petrillo was not too burdensome on industry. The record manu- 
 facturers were faced by an acute shortage of raw materials. 
 India has been the only source of supply of shellac and little of 
 this substance was imported during the war. Shellac normally 
 constitutes 20 per cent of the matter in each disk. It is used 
 because it pours evenly when the record is pressed, it resists 
 heat when the record is played, and it keeps surface noise down. 
 The only satisfactory substitute for shellac is vinylite (used in 
 making transcriptions) but the high cost has made it uneco- 
 nomical to use vinylite in the production of records. Manufac- 
 turers, thus dependent on reprocessed and salvaged shellac, 
 
138 
 
 found that production costs had increased and that the quality 
 of the records had been reduced. This situation and the impo- 
 sition of quotas by the government limiting the amount of 
 virgin shellac which the record companies could consume were 
 responsible for a decrease in the output of records. 
 
 As a result the recording industry had time to consider what 
 to do and to delay the acceptance of proposals submitted. When 
 the case went to the NWLB, the AFM denied that that agency 
 had any jurisdiction. In spite of the fact that the union had 
 maintained, and succeeded in winning its case before the courts 
 on grounds that it was involved in a labor dispute with the 
 recording companies, it denied to the NWLB that any labor 
 controversy existed. The American Federation of Musicians 
 therefore claimed that the NWLB had no jurisdiction. Follow- 
 ing a short hearing, however, the NWLB assumed jurisdiction 
 of the case in July 1943. 
 
 After the Board panel had begun hearings, Decca Records 
 capitulated to the union demands and signed an agreement in 
 September. Gradually all of the other record and transcription 
 companies accepted similar terms and they also signed contracts. 
 But Columbia, RCA Victor, and the NBC transcription division 
 refused to agree to the principle of making payments to the 
 union and continued the case before the panel. In March 1944, 
 the panel recommended to the NWLB that the men should be 
 ordered back to work and that no royalty plan should be ap- 
 proved. In June, the NWLB handed down its decision. 7 The 
 Board decided that the musicians should return to work at 
 once, but overruled the panel and held that immediate nego- 
 tiations should be held regarding the amount of contributions 
 that employers should make to a welfare fund. 
 
 The union, however, rejected the Board's directive. It refused 
 to work for the three companies unless they accepted contracts 
 similar to those agreed to by the others. The companies refused 
 to comply with the union's demand and the NWLB turned the 
 case over to Fred M. Vinson, Director of Economic Stabilization. 
 The union argued that war agencies had no jurisdiction over 
 the matter because the war effort was not involved; despite the 
 fact that Chauncey A. Weaver, a member of the union's inter- 
 national executive board for many years had maintained, in 
 another connection, that music is a war essential. 
 
139 
 
 Nevertheless, neither Vinson nor James F. Byrnes, Director 
 of War Mobilization was able to settle the case and it was 
 referred to President Roosevelt. On October 4, 1944, Roosevelt 
 sent a telegram to Petrillo asking him to comply with the 
 NWLB directive. Roosevelt said that he would not seize the 
 industry because noncompliance by the union was not unduly 
 impeding the war effort, but that he hoped the union would 
 accept the decision in the interests of orderly government. 
 
 Although Petrillo had stated publicly that he would end the 
 record ban if requested to do so by President Roosevelt, his 
 statement had been made before any of the companies had 
 signed agreements. Since almost all of them had come to terms 
 by October 1944, Petrillo turned down the request of the presi- 
 dent. He refused to give advantageous terms to those companies 
 which had not yet signed. Roosevelt announced that he would 
 check the law to see what he could do about Petrillo's decision. 
 But the president did nothing further and many people were 
 disappointed by his failure to act. The disappointment, in one 
 instance, was expressed the following year during hearings held 
 by a committee of the House of Representatives. Paul A. Porter, 
 chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, was 
 testifying. The dialogue was: "Mr. Brown. Do you mean to say 
 that even the appeal of the President did not move Mr. Petrillo 
 in the stand he had taken with reference to those records? Mr. 
 Porter. Mr. Petrillo was adamant. Mr. Brown. What was that 
 word? Mr. Porter. Mr. Petrillo did not budge. Mr. Brown. You 
 mean he just did not budge. Mr. Porter. That is right. Mr. 
 Brown. And there wasn't anybody who carried him out of his 
 office, was there? Mr. Porter. No." 8 
 
 Columbia and RCA Victor were not able to procrastinate any 
 longer because their competitive positions were deteriorating 
 rapidly. The War Production Board had increased shellac 
 quotas substantially and the output of records had begun to 
 rise. Decca, some of whose album sales reached enormous pro- 
 portions, was recording almost all the new tunes (a few smaller 
 and newer companies were expanding under the unusually 
 auspicious conditions) . But more important in prompting the 
 decision of Columbia and RCA Victor was the possibility that 
 many of their artists would switch to Decca. The imminence of 
 such changes was demonstrated when Jascha Heifetz ended his 
 
140 
 
 long exclusive connection with RCA Victor and signed a non- 
 exclusive agreement with Decca. 
 
 Although Columbia and RCA Victor had hesitated to concede 
 the principle of paying royalties to the union because it might 
 have led to similar demands by the union on the parent radio 
 networks, they were constrained to acquiesce by circumstances. 
 In November 1944, they agreed to terms and the bitter dispute 
 ended. It had lasted more than 27 months. Said Petrillo after 
 it was over: "[The companies resorted to] bitterness, injustice, 
 trickery and reactionism which would do justice to slaveowners 
 [; they engaged in a] vile, indecent, malicious and filthy cam- 
 paign of libel, slander and vilification. . . . Honesty and fairness 
 . . . triumphed over falsity and fraud. . . . If . . . the companies, 
 fail to change [their past course], the A.F.M. will not hesitate 
 to break off relations and leave them to die by their own 
 nefarious schemes." When Petrillo was asked to comment on 
 the companies' statement that the government was either un- 
 willing or unable to enforce its orders, he said: "Why should 
 I? I've already called them every goddamned name I could 
 think of." 9 
 
 The contracts signed by Columbia and RCA Victor were 
 similar to those of the other companies except that provisions 
 were added that should the union call a strike against either 
 of them, then their artists would be free to work for any record- 
 ing companies not involved in the dispute. The major provi- 
 sions of these contracts, which eventually applied to about 600 
 companies, established a fund controlled by the union into 
 which the companies paid a specified sum of money for every 
 record and transcription produced with the services of musi- 
 cians. The fees paid for each record varied from a quarter of a 
 cent for 35 cent disks to five cents for two-dollar records; and 
 the fee was two and a half per cent of the selling price of those 
 records which sold for more than two dollars. No fee was paid 
 for commercial electrical transcriptions manufactured for a 
 single broadcast but library transcriptions were assessed a sum 
 amounting to three per cent of the gross revenues derived from 
 their use. The union was given access to the books of the com- 
 panies and the companies were required to obtain permission 
 from the union to record any studio broadcasts. When rebroad- 
 casting transcriptions, the companies agreed to pay scale wages 
 
141 
 
 to the musicians who had made the recording. All contracts 
 were arranged to terminate on December 31, 1947. 
 
 These contracts represented a milestone in labor relations. 
 They were the first major contractual arrangements of the post- 
 war period under which employers paid money directly to a 
 labor organization and the agreements marked the beginning 
 of the establishment of a large number of welfare funds. Most 
 of the recording contracts specified that the purpose of the fund 
 was to foster musical culture by employing live musicians and 
 that no more than five per cent of the moneys collected could 
 be used for administration. The contracts stipulated that wage 
 scales could be changed only once during the period in which 
 the agreement applied. The union did not gain any direct 
 control over wired music or juke boxes (including telephone 
 music boxes in which patrons choose the selection through a 
 telephone device; and "soundies" in which the music boxes 
 have a picture accompaniment) . 
 
 In October 1946, the wage provisions of the contract were 
 re-examined and Petrillo was able to secure wage increases of 
 37i/2 per cent for recording services and of 50 per cent for tran- 
 scription work. The new base was $41.25 for three hours of 
 regular recording or $38.50 for two hours of recording by sym- 
 phony orchestras. Services of musicians for electrical transcrip- 
 tions were fixed at $27 for 15 minutes. 
 
 • Union Activities during the Second World War 
 
 Despite the union's ban on recordings and transcriptions, it 
 contributed generously and patriotically to the nation's war 
 effort. The government generally paid for services rendered to 
 it during the war, but the musicians contributed millions of 
 dollars worth of free music to different government agencies 
 and to army camps and hospitals. The union offered the services 
 of its members without charge to the army and navy so that the 
 armed forces could make records and transcriptions. Union 
 members even played for RCA Victor and Columbia during 
 the period when the recording case was before the NWLB. 
 
 The musicians union reintroduced some of the policies it had 
 followed during the first World War. By an order of Petrillo, 
 it exempted all members of the union who enlisted in the armed 
 forces, from the payment of dues and assessments. It required 
 
142 
 
 bands and orchestras to play the Star Spangled Banner at the 
 beginning and end of each concert or musical program. It pur- 
 chased many thousands of dollars of United States and Canadian 
 war bonds. It fought to raise the rank of the army band leader 
 from warrant officer to commissioned status. 
 
 Late in 1942, Petrillo visited President Roosevelt at the White 
 House. At Roosevelt's suggestion, the AFM undertook to pre- 
 sent a program of free public concerts in the smaller communi- 
 ties of the nation. In the summer of the following year the 
 union completed its plans. The most important symphonic 
 orchestras in the country agreed to take part. Although the 
 AFM had admitted that recordings by symphony orchestras 
 did not displace live musicians and although the leading or- 
 chestras had requested the union to remove the ban because 
 much of their income had been derived from recording work, 
 the orchestras agreed to cooperate in the project to spread 
 symphonic music even though they had received no relief. 
 Nearly 80 concerts were played by 20 leading symphony or- 
 chestras. All expenses, including the payment of more than 
 $100,000 in wages to the members of the orchestras, were borne 
 by the AFM. Transportation difficulties forced the cancellation 
 of many scheduled concerts. The concerts met with genera] 
 acclaim though some opposition to them was expressed by 
 members of the union who believed that the money should 
 have been spent to help unemployed musicians rather than to 
 employ symphony instrumentalists— a group already receiving 
 high wages. 
 
 • Problems related to the Radio Industry 
 
 The union gained an impressive victory when it negotiated 
 the establishment of the employment fund but simultaneously 
 it abandoned one of its major objectives. The union had not 
 opposed making records for home use, but it had contended that 
 radio stations should not be permitted to use phonographic 
 records. In spite of the opinion of the panel of the National 
 War Labor Board that radio broadcasting had not displaced 
 live music, the union maintained that such was the case. It 
 argued that stations were making excessive use of records. The 
 union was pleased with the action of the Canadian government 
 which prohibited the use of recordings on radio stations in the 
 
143 
 
 Dominion during evening hours; since this regulation encour- 
 aged the use of live talent. 
 
 The union particularly objected to the activities of certain 
 disk jockeys who were making large sums of money from musical 
 records but were not paying anything to musicians. During the 
 period when the record ban was in effect, the union engaged 
 in a brief strike at station WNEW in New York City because 
 Martin Block, disk jockey of the "Make Believe Ballroom" 
 program, played recordings of American tunes imported from 
 Great Britain. These records had been shipped to him by a 
 friend in England, though normally the British musicians union 
 had had to give written consent before any records could be 
 exported. Further controversy was averted when Block agreed 
 to stop using such records. WNEW had provided very little 
 employment for musicians, yet had been grossing over a mil- 
 lion dollars each year. A small station, WINX in Washington, 
 D. C, increased its value tenfold in four years by selling adver- 
 tisements on its musically recorded programs. 
 
 The radio stations were not affected by the terms of the 
 settlement between the union and the record companies since 
 the price of records did not rise. But the AFM continued trying 
 to get the radio stations to employ more musicians. The locals 
 in the union have had the major responsibility for the achieve- 
 ment of this task although the AFM has helped them with all 
 possible means. The AFM itself has been mainly concerned in 
 the negotiations with the four major networks. Since almost all 
 network programs originate in New York, Los Angeles, and 
 Chicago, the locals in these three cities have had the major role 
 in negotiating. Generally the locals have worked out wage scales 
 with the networks, and the AFM has been chiefly concerned 
 with working conditions. Since April 1946, however, all network 
 broadcasting contract provisions for musicians, other than for 
 staff orchestras and staff leaders, have had to be approved by the 
 AFM. Local contracts usually have run for three years, but nego- 
 tiations scheduled in 1947 were postponed to 1948 by extending 
 the contracts then in force. 
 
 Like other unions, the AFM has tried to secure guaranteed 
 employment for its members. The AFM, therefore, has tried to 
 get radio stations to use a greater number of permanent staff 
 musicians. Although there have been over 2,100 licenses issued 
 
144 
 
 to standard or AM broadcasting stations by the Federal Com- 
 munications Commission in the United States, only 301 of them 
 employed musicians steadily throughout the year in 1949. One 
 hundred and one additional stations used musicians with some 
 regularity. Forty-nine others employed musicians on a single 
 engagement basis only. Two hundred and fifty-nine of these 
 stations employing musicians were affiliated with networks and 
 192 were independent. Steady staff employment accounted for 
 the jobs of 2,450 musicians who received ten and three-quarter 
 million dollars during the year. Single engagement broadcast- 
 ing for sustaining programs provided musicians with a little 
 over two and a quarter million dollars, distributed among 
 several thousand men. 10 Single engagement commercial broad- 
 casting employment in the United States that year provided 
 jobs for about 3,700 men and yielded an income of over five 
 and a third million dollars. Since 1949, except for network staff 
 musicians, there has been a further decline in radio employ- 
 ment. 
 
 The union attempted to increase radio employment in various 
 ways. The technique which evoked the greatest criticism was 
 the requirement of standbys. Standby musicians formerly had 
 to be used by radio stations when programs were put on which 
 included amateurs, nonunion musicians, or traveling musicians 
 from other jurisdictions. This practice prevailed until the 
 passage of the Lea Act in 1946. For example, the union required 
 the employment of a standby band of union musicians when a 
 naval band broadcast at the graduation exercises of the Great 
 Lakes Naval Training Station in 1942. (In making a film, the 
 the Canadian government had to pay the AFM a standby fee 
 of $60 in 1946 because it used a nonunion church organist.) 
 
 For several years the union was perplexed by the problem 
 arising from remote control programs. Music played by name 
 bands at hotels, restaurants, and night clubs was piped over the 
 air by radio stations. Booking agents who controlled radio lines 
 were able to select the bands that played over the air. The union 
 maintained that this procedure limited competition among 
 orchestras and unfairly reduced the opportunities of some bands 
 to play on the radio. The AFM, however, was able to get the 
 radio stations, for a time, to pay the bands additional remunera- 
 tion when the music was picked up and in 1940 executed an 
 
145 
 
 agreement with the stations by which all radio lines were 
 removed from the control of bookers. Radio lines have been 
 handled since by the stations themselves. Today, stations an- 
 nounce that remote control programs are broadcast through 
 the courtesy of James C. Petrillo and the American Federation 
 of Musicians. The AFM expects that such pickups will not 
 replace programs which would have employed live musicians. 
 
 In 1941 the union suddenly banned musicians from playing 
 on cooperatively sponsored programs. These network programs 
 are broadcast across the country, but each region has a different 
 sponsor. The union maintained that sponsors were not paying 
 for the full value of the services rendered by the musicians. 
 The union claimed that it was losing employment opportunities 
 because cooperative programs eliminated the need for local 
 concerns to advertise on local programs and to employ live 
 musicians; and that such programs arranged by a national net- 
 work threw many local bands out of work. Naturally, radio 
 stations were reluctant to pay standby fees, although the AFM 
 never made such requests. For a considerable period of time, 
 cooperatively sponsored programs were not permitted to use 
 musicians. Instead they substituted vocal choirs for musicians. 
 Some of the programs affected were the Joan Davis show, Meet 
 Me at Parky's, Abbott and Costello, Alexander's Mediation 
 Board, and Headline Edition. Information Please, which pre- 
 viously had had a single sponsor, became a cooperative program 
 in 1947. Since the show had depended partly upon the per- 
 formance of a pianist and was no longer able to use one, the 
 producer filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board. 
 He claimed that the union violated the Taft-Hartley Act by 
 denying musicians to Information Please and by engaging in 
 an illegal boycott against the program. Although the union 
 contract was with the networks, Petrillo, upon their advice, 
 removed the ban in November 1947. The immediate effect was 
 that several cooperative programs engaged the services of orches- 
 tras and individual musicians. Petrillo, however, undertook to 
 determine the long-run effects of his action. 
 
 The action of the union in prohibiting the networks from 
 broadcasting any musical programs emanating from foreign 
 countries other than Canada was of wider significance. This 
 rule had been in effect prior to the war, but it was waived by 
 
146 
 
 the union during wartime to promote goodwill with other 
 nations. It was reinstituted after the war ended. The union 
 maintained that musical programs coming in from foreign 
 countries tended to reduce the employment opportunities of 
 American musicians. It argued that government policy prohib- 
 ited the importation of contract labor musicians to prevent 
 competition with American musicians and that the broadcasting 
 of foreign music was an evasion of the intent of Congress. The 
 AFM did not want such music to be broadcast in the United 
 States. 
 
 Only a few stations were affected by the ban but the protests 
 were numerous. The action by the union was considered a 
 setback to the cultural program of the United Nations. Petrillo 
 assured some of his critics that the ban on foreign music in no 
 way limited the broadcast of special religious services. Although 
 the Lea Act prohibited the union from continuing to impose 
 such restrictions, the AFM nevertheless has apparently had an 
 oral understanding with the networks that music originating in 
 foreign countries, in general, will not be rebroadcast in or 
 relayed to the United States. 
 
 The general prohibition against the employment of foreign 
 musicians in the United States was enforced rigidly. Cuban 
 consular officials threatened diplomatic action to break the ban. 
 The Mexican musicians union temporarily banned United 
 States musicians in retaliation. The British musicians union, 
 however, generally has supported Petrillo's actions. Petrillo had 
 also required American broadcasting companies to secure the 
 permission of the union before sending musical programs out- 
 side of the United States and Canada. 
 
 • The Recording and Transcription Fund 
 
 As union collections from the recording and transcription 
 companies increased criticism simultaneously began to mount. 
 Though the union had stated many times that the fund would 
 be used only to employ musicians without jobs, many persons 
 remained skeptical. Opposition voices became even louder 
 when John L. Lewis won a welfare fund for the miners in the 
 coal industry. Critics feared that the royalty principle would 
 be extended to labor contracts in general. The AFM was not 
 able to convince the public that the two funds were basically 
 
147 
 
 different. The musicians maintained that the miners were pro- 
 ducing a commodity which was consumed after being used once 
 and that therefore they were not digging themselves out of 
 jobs. Musicians, however, were making records which could be 
 played over many times and thus they were helping to displace 
 themselves. 
 
 In February 1947, the AFM put into effect a plan for the 
 expenditure of the recording fund which had been worked out 
 at the end of 1946 by Petrillo and a committee of three local 
 union presidents. As was anticipated by those who were familiar 
 with the sincere intentions of the leaders of the union, the fund 
 was allocated for the employment of musicians. During the 
 first allocation, each local, except the three largest, was entitled 
 to receive $10.43 for each member in good standing. The largest 
 three locals were entitled to this sum for each of their first 
 5,000 members and to $2.00 for each additional member. Every 
 program planned by any local had to be approved by the 
 national union. 
 
 Locals employed their own members to give the free public 
 concerts. Though the national union attempted to regulate the 
 locals strictly and ordered that no part of the allocated money 
 could be used for administrative purposes, complaints were 
 expressed by many members. There were charges leveled against 
 some locals that favoritism helped particular musicians to 
 secure employment and that the unemployed were not neces- 
 sarily the ones hired. Many of these charges, however, were 
 aired by disgruntled members. 
 
 Royalties paid to the musicians union during the life of the 
 contract were substantial. Almost all of this money came from 
 the recording, not transcription, companies. The sums paid to 
 the union kept increasing each year because the output of new 
 records kept rising; because the relative sale of more expensive 
 records, on which the royalties were higher, rose; and because 
 payments were made on new pressings of recordings made in 
 previous years covered by the agreement. 
 
 The money in the recording and transcription fund was 
 collected in a period of slightly more than four years— from 
 the signing of the contracts in 1943 to the end of 1947— although 
 small sums were received later because some of the records 
 made under the contracts were sold subsequently. During those 
 
148 
 
 years, the record and transcription companies contributed more 
 than $4,500,000 to the fund. Almost all of this money was spent 
 by the union in the three years between 1947 and 1950. It gave 
 nearly 19,000 performances at veterans hospitals, public schools, 
 and other institutions. The types of performances in order of 
 frequency included teen-age dances, entertaining units, band 
 concerts, orchestra concerts, regular dances, jazz concerts, parades, 
 and symphony concerts. More than 450,00 jobs for single en- 
 gagements were made available. These income and expenditure 
 figures are not connected with the music performance trust 
 fund set up by the union in 1948. 
 
 The most publicized free concert given by the AFM under 
 the program was the one held in Washington, D. C, on May 25, 
 1948. It was attended by President Harry S. Truman, many 
 members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and 
 numerous other high government and labor officials. The affair 
 was very successful. Subsequently, Petrillo was named National 
 Music Chairman for the inauguration of Truman in 1948. On 
 January 17, 1949, Petrillo gave President Truman, who plays 
 the piano, a gold card making him an honorary member of the 
 AFM for life. At the end of the presentation, which was also 
 attended by William Green of the AFL, Petrillo and Green 
 said to Truman: "We are now your presidents, just as you are 
 our President." 11 On June 19, 1949, a recording and transcrip- 
 tion concert was given at Colorado Springs, Colorado, in con- 
 nection with the annual conference of governors. 
 
 Union policies generally were carried out with great success 
 by the AFM. At the same time, a growing public interest in 
 musical developments brought about greater public concern 
 with the methods, tactics, and policies pursued by the union. 
 The end of the war enabled Congress to focus more attention on 
 the activities of this union. 
 
HOW THE INTERLOCHEN DISPUTE Q 
 
 LED TO THE LEA ACT • ^ 
 
 "This fellow {Tetrillo] has gone too far. We've got to 
 clip his wings. But we don't want to interfere with the 
 legitimate functions of a union." 
 
 CLARENCE J. BROWN 
 
 • Competition from Amateurs 
 
 If Petrillo had been content to confine his dispute with the 
 radio networks to matters dealing with recordings and to the 
 wages and hours of musicians employed by the stations, he 
 might have succeeded completely in his objectives. The position 
 taken by the musicians had substantial merit and impressed 
 those conversant with the recording problem that the welfare 
 fund was an equitable solution. The clamor of the National 
 Association of Broadcasters was loud, and was echoed by large 
 parts of the press and the public. Yet these vociferations would 
 have subsided in due course. Petrillo's zest for protecting and 
 improving the welfare of his members knew no bounds, how- 
 ever, and consequently he overreached himself and infuriated 
 many Congressmen. 
 
 Petrillo had ascribed many of the hardships of the musicians 
 to the radio industry and he felt that all aspects of the matter 
 should be considered at one time. He decided that the ban on 
 the production of records solved only one phase of the prob- 
 lem and that the competition between amateurs, especially 
 school orchestras, and professional musicians for radio time 
 must be eliminated. He probably did not realize that the 
 achievement of this goal could be of only slight benefit to 
 musicians. When amateur musicians played on the air standby 
 fees usually were paid to the AFM; though no fees generally 
 were paid when school bands were involved. Furthermore, the 
 number of such programs was extremely limited. Petrillo's 
 trait of ignoring the attitudes and opinions of the public when 
 undertaking an action on behalf of the musicians was not 
 
150 
 
 sensible. In return for the little he could gain by taking school- 
 boys off the radio, he became deeply involved in unfavorable 
 publicity. Congress then passed restrictive labor legislation 
 aimed at the musicians union which served as the harbinger of 
 a more general law curtailing the power of unions. 
 
 The music of high school and college bands and orchestras 
 for years had been one of the cultural features presented by 
 radio stations. Young musicians have been encouraged and 
 stimulated in pursuing their musical education by appearances 
 on the radio. Petrillo recognized this fact and together with 
 Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt he had sponsored a National Youth 
 Administration children's orchestra on the air. At the end of 
 1941, however, Petrillo was successful in forcing the cancellation 
 of a number of broadcasts. These programs were scheduled as 
 part of a series of presentations by the Music Educators Na- 
 tional Conference. School bands in Chicago, Cleveland, Wash- 
 ington, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Francisco, among other 
 cities, were not permitted to go on the air. And in New York 
 City, only the intervention of Mayor La Guardia enabled a 
 radio program to be scheduled at the High School of Music and 
 Art. These isolated restrictions, however, aroused little attention. 
 During the middle of 1941, a more serious controversy be- 
 gan. Petrillo told the National Broadcasting Company that the 
 summer series of concerts played by the National Music Camp 
 at Interlochen, Michigan must not be permitted to go on the 
 air. This camp had opened in 1928 as a summer music school 
 and had been attended every year by boys and girls selected on 
 a competitive basis from all over the United States. In 1930 it 
 began a series of radio programs over NBC which continued 
 through 1941. The manufacturers of Majestic Radios sponsored 
 the concerts in 1930 and paid for a standby orchestra of union 
 musicians. Each week that the program was on the air that year 
 an announcement had been made stating that the broadcast 
 was performed in cooperation with the American Federation of 
 Musicians. From 1931 on, the program was a sustaining feature 
 of the network and no standby musicians were employed. 
 
 When Petrillo made his demand of NBC in 1941, it was 
 explained to him that all the contractual and other arrange- 
 ments for the year had been completed, and that much incon- 
 venience would result from any changes. The union leader then 
 
151 
 
 dropped his request on the understanding that the matter 
 would be reopened by the company before scheduling the camp 
 for the 1942 season. The company either ignored or violated 
 this agreement with the union and completed plans for the 
 1942 Interlochen series. Just before the first concert was to go 
 on the air in the second week in July, however, Petrillo ordered 
 NBC to cancel the series. In a large measure the company had 
 forced his hand. Petrillo had acted with moderation and though 
 many persons felt that the 160 boys and girls of the school 
 orchestra had been roughly treated, there was no other course 
 of action which he could take. While the objective of the union 
 in this case was not felicitous, the decision had not been made 
 in haste. 
 
 The union had a closed shop agreement with the network 
 which permitted only professional musicians be used on the 
 radio. The AFM maintained that since the number of hours of 
 radio broadcast time is fixed, the more hours that are allocated 
 to the nonprofessional musicians— amateurs and school players— 
 the less that remain for the professional. Petrillo pointed out 
 that the Interlochen camp was a commercial enterprise because 
 it charged the students tuition fees and that the radio concerts 
 were used to advertise the camp and to attract new pupils. 
 Actually, school instructors formed the nucleus of the broad- 
 casting orchestra. 
 
 Dr. Joseph E. Maddy, the chief spokesman for the school, was 
 the founder and president of the camp and a professor of music 
 at the University of Michigan. The National Music Camp had 
 become affiliated with the university in 1942. About 40 courses 
 were given in the camp by the university and nearly 200 college 
 students attended. Maddy claimed that the institution was not 
 a commercial enterprise because the tuition fee of $300 for the 
 eight-week period covered the cost of clothing, board, the use 
 of instruments, library privileges, and camp facilities. He added 
 that although tuition is charged by colleges and universities in 
 the United States, they thereby do not become commercial 
 enterprises. The National Music Camp had been granted tax 
 exemption as a nonprofit educational institution, under opin- 
 ions of the United States Attorney General and the Michigan 
 Attorney General. Furthermore, beginning in 1939, each session 
 of the Michigan legislature had made specific appropriations to 
 
152 
 
 the camp and guest conductors such as Frederick Stock and 
 Walter Damrosch, had rendered their services without charge. 
 
 Many musicians associated with the Interlochen school had 
 not joined the union. Representatives of the camp maintained 
 that the average age of the children in the orchestra was 15 
 years and that they were therefore ineligible to become members 
 of the union. But there were undoubtedly many who met the 
 age requirements and who were not in the union. More than 
 half of the 50 instructors were members of the American Federa- 
 tion of Musicians, Maddy himself having been a member in 
 good standing ever since 1909. The camp authorities, who were 
 joined by other educators, stated that the action by Petrillo 
 discouraged the youths and hindered musical education, with- 
 out benefiting professional musicians. They noted that NBC 
 merely had substituted a studio symphony orchestra for the 
 Interlochen concert without hiring any additional musicians. 
 Maddy contended also that the refusal to allow the children to 
 play over the air was similar to a requirement that motorists 
 must join a taxi drivers union or that persons who delivered an 
 address over the radio must join a union. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians did not offer to nego- 
 tiate or compromise on this issue. When information was re- 
 quested of Petrillo regarding the Interlochen situation, he said: 
 "Too many people are talking about it. Too many people know 
 more about it than we do. So we'll let them settle it." 1 On other 
 occasions when reporters were looking for him, the union chief 
 was "out of town." From the union point of view, banning the 
 school children from the air was an ill-conceived, ill-advised, 
 and unfortunate step. Even assuming that some additional work 
 might have been gained by professional musicians, though this 
 result never was clearly evident, the benefit seemed scarcely 
 worth the risk of arousing and antagonizing the public. This 
 was especially true at a time when the recording ban had just 
 been announced. 
 
 In July 1942, immediately after Petrillo's order to NBC, the 
 Federal Communications Commission began an investigation of 
 the Interlochen situation at the instigation of Senator Arthur 
 H. Vandenberg of Michigan. In August, the Senate passed a 
 resolution, already noted in connection with the ban on record- 
 ings, to investigate the musicians union, which contained a 
 
153 
 
 reference in its preamble to the matter of school orchestras. But 
 these probes were ineffective. Nor were the appeals made to Wil- 
 liam Green of the AFL and to Vice President Henry A. Wallace 
 to intervene of any avail. Instead, the Cincinnati Conservatory 
 of Music, affiliated with the University of Cincinnati and sched- 
 uled to begin its ninth season of concerts in October over the 
 Columbia Broadcasting System, was forced off the air because 
 the school musicians were not union members. In Rochester, 
 New York, the orchestra of the Eastman School of Music was 
 obliged to cancel its radio concerts because many of the partic- 
 ipants were not members of the AFM. The Juilliard School of 
 Music in New York was more fortunate. Its concerts were all 
 broadcast over station WNYC, the independent noncommercial 
 municipal outlet, and were not affected by the ban on school 
 orchestras. 
 
 The musicians union and its president were criticized by 
 music schools throughout the country. The press, as usual, 
 found many uncomplimentary things to say. It was suggested 
 generally that Petrillo was acting strictly within his contractual 
 and legal rights, but that the labor laws required modification 
 to prevent such display of arbitrary power. Nevertheless the 
 issue concerning school broadcasts quieted down and no notice 
 was taken of it by the press during the entire year of 1943. 
 
 The whole affair was precipitated into the open again by the 
 action of Petrillo himself early in 1944. While reviewing the 
 activities of the union to the membership, Petrillo reported 
 boastfully with regard to school bands and orchestras: "How- 
 ever, when all the shooting was over and we came to the sum- 
 mer of 1943, there was no Interlochen high school student 
 orchestra on the air. Nor was there in the year 1943 any other 
 school band or orchestra on the networks and there never will 
 be without the permission of the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians." 2 This statement was taken by Maddy and sent to the 
 Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, where the investi- 
 gation of the union had lapsed. It renewed the interest of Con- 
 gress in the matter and resulted in the introduction of a bill by 
 Vandenberg in the middle of the year which prohibited inter- 
 ference with the broadcasting of noncommercial cultural or 
 educational programs. The bill passed the Senate in December 
 1944 but the session of Congress ended before the House 
 
154 
 
 of Representatives could take any action in this matter. 
 
 Vandenberg therefore reintroduced the measure immediately 
 upon the opening of the seventy-ninth Congress in January 
 1945. The Senate promptly passed the bill again. The proposals 
 included in the bill were quite mild and no specific punitive 
 provisions for violations were attached. The challenge to his 
 power which the Senate vote indicated and the vigorous cam- 
 paign waged against him by Maddy infuriated Petrillo. The 
 Interlochen camp therefore was put on the unfair list of the 
 AFM. This action made it impractical for any radio network to 
 carry programs from the camp, because union musicians would 
 then be forced to withdraw their services from the network. In 
 addition, it made it impossible for union members to conduct, 
 teach, or play at the camp. 
 
 Renewed criticism of Petrillo was expressed and even CIO 
 economist J. Raymond Walsh noted his strong disapproval. 8 
 The House prepared to toughen the Senate version of the bill. 
 Said Clarence J. Brown, a member of the House of Representa- 
 tives, in speaking of Petrillo: "This fellow has gone too far. 
 We've got to clip his wings. But we don't want to interfere with 
 the legitimate functions of a union." 4 The committee held 
 hearings over an extended period but Petrillo refused to attend. 5 
 
 The Senate bill was innocuous and would have prevailed but 
 for the increasing attention and criticism which were being 
 directed at Petrillo. Petrillo, however, was under pressure to 
 keep a rapidly growing membership employed. His techniques 
 aroused public resentment. Furthermore, the country was in 
 the middle of a world war and the tactics used by the union 
 were not consistent with governmental manpower measures 
 intended to conserve labor. Congressional scrutiny of the activi- 
 ties of musicians in radio broadcasting therefore was intensified. 
 
 Petrillo's efforts to increase the employment of musicians by 
 radio stations may be divided into two parts— one aimed at 
 eliminating the work of nonmembers and the other directed at 
 getting more employment for union musicians. First, he desired 
 to remove all nonunion musicians from the air; and the con- 
 tracts with the networks provided that only professional musi- 
 cians could be used on broadcasts. Any exceptions to this rule 
 had to receive the approval of the union. In this way school 
 bands and orchestras were barred. Amateur musicians could 
 
155 
 
 play an instrument on the radio only with the permission of the 
 union. Many times such permission was refused, and at other 
 times the program could be given only upon the payment of a 
 standby fee. Major Edward Bowes paid the union an average 
 weekly standby fee of $150. Other programs preferred not to 
 use amateur instrumentalists rather than to pay the standby 
 fees. The union however did not encourage the use of amateurs 
 even when fees were paid and frequently radio stations made 
 no requests for authorization to use amateurs since they antici- 
 pated union refusals. 
 
 Restrictions also were placed on the use of army bands by 
 the networks. Army bands came under the classification of 
 amateurs and in several cases the union had refused to allow 
 the radio station to put them on. But in 1940 the defense pro- 
 gram of the United States was gaining momentum and the 
 army deemed it essential to highlight various radio programs 
 with army bands. The recruiting drive that year included a 
 series of broadcasts depicting army life. When it appeared that 
 the number of requests to play army bands would increase 
 greatly, Petrillo in December 1940 suddenly ordered the net- 
 works to eliminate military bands from all programs. He ex- 
 plained the attitude of the union. "This is a good cause and 
 we're all for it, but if we allowed radio stations to put music 
 on the air from Army camps whenever they wanted to they 
 could soon dispense with our men," he said. "We are in favor 
 of their going on the air with programs telling about life in 
 the Army, but we want protection against the loss of jobs for 
 professional musicians. This is going to be a long-range affair. 
 It may last a couple of years, and the sensible thing is to talk 
 it over and make a deal." 6 The "deal" was soon made. The 
 networks guaranteed the union that the use of army music 
 would not result in any curtailment in the employment of studio 
 musicians. 
 
 The union has contended for many years that when a non- 
 professional musician performs on the radio, the time remain- 
 ing for professional musicians thereby is contracted. The union 
 has not felt that nonmusical programs would be substituted for 
 the performances of the amateurs. Considering that the major 
 portion of radio time is devoted to music, the union argument 
 may be correct. But the union has failed to give enough weight 
 
156 
 
 to two facts— first that records might be used to fill the time and 
 secondly that radio stations have not always used the studio 
 musicians for the full number of hours for which they have been 
 hired under terms of the radio contracts. Additional hours of 
 performance by studio musicians therefore would not necessarily 
 increase the amount of wages paid to the instrumentalists. 
 
 The second part of Petrillo's program to increase the employ- 
 ment opportunities of union musicians was positive. He con- 
 tinually exerted pressure on the radio stations to augment the 
 number of musicians that they were employing. This plan 
 abandoned the objective of the 1937 and the 1938 contracts 
 under which the radio stations were required to expend a 
 minimum sum of money for the employment of musicians. In- 
 stead it called for the hiring of a specific minimum number of 
 men under guaranteed conditions of employment. 
 
 The union assigned each radio station a quota, based on 
 financial status and to some extent on the previous employment 
 record of the station. The greatest economic pressure by the 
 union to achieve its goal could be exerted on affiliated network 
 outlets all over the country for in such cases the network gen- 
 erally quietly intervened; because it was anxious to see the 
 dispute ended. The independent stations, being less dependent 
 on live musicians and more on recorded music could not be 
 subjected by the union to the same degree of pressure. 
 
 Some network stations did not want to employ any musicians 
 at all. Others claimed that they did not need the number of men 
 which the union had asked them to take. But these objections 
 were unavailing. The union pointed out that affiliated stations 
 were able to receive from the network and present to the public 
 programs which included the performance of live musicians. 
 These stations, however, were not paying the musicians for 
 this music and therefore should be required to employ a speci- 
 fied number of staff musicians. 
 
 The first of these assigned quota cases came during the month 
 of Petrillo's election to the presidency, in June 1940. The union 
 was successful in that and in every other similar case with net- 
 work stations occurring in the succeeding years in which it made 
 serious efforts to enforce quotas. The union was able to apply 
 three degrees of pressure after making its demands upon the 
 affiliate. First, it could bar name bands from playing for the 
 
157 
 
 network. The union was forced to prohibit the network from 
 piping in the name band from the hotel or club at which it was 
 playing in order to get at the individual station because the 
 chains maintained that they were under contract to provide 
 member stations with all programs. Though the network some- 
 times approved the position taken by its affiliated station, it 
 nevertheless encouraged the station to reach an agreement. 
 
 The union's second type of pressure was to pull out the net- 
 work studio musicians and thereby bring an end to all sustaining 
 musical programs. Even then the network generally was reluctant 
 to cut off its programs from an affiliated station. Though it 
 pointed out to the union that it could not exercise control over 
 the decisions of the stations in the chain, yet the union main- 
 tained that the recommendations of the network carried much 
 weight. The third and final step was to call a strike. Networks 
 have sought to avoid strikes because the financial losses involved 
 are substantial. The alternatives open to the chain when a strike 
 is threatened by the musicians are to grant the demands or to 
 suffer the losses involved in the elimination of all commercially 
 sponsored programs having music. Though commercial broad- 
 casts rarely have been cut off, in 1945 the Columbia Broadcast- 
 ing System had to cancel the Prudential Hour when Petrillo 
 barred Al Goodman and his orchestra from the program. In the 
 same year the National Broadcasting Company's Fitch Band- 
 wagon program lost the services of Artie Shaw and his band 
 when the union had difficulties with one of the system's outlets. 
 The most spectacular disagreement involved KSTP in St. 
 Paul, Minnesota, an affiliate of NBC. Disputes between the 
 union and the station in 1940 and 1942 over the number of 
 musicians to be employed had been settled with some difficulty. 
 In 1944, the union made new demands which were rejected by 
 the management of the station. A strike of musicians ensued at 
 this station in spite of the pledge which labor had given not to 
 strike during the war period. Mediators were unsuccessful in 
 bringing about any agreement. The decisions and orders of the 
 National War Labor Board directing the end of the strike had 
 no effect on the musicians union. Even the criticisms expressed 
 by William Green, which was an astounding display of initiative, 
 did not influence the AFM. 7 A Minneapolis court ordered the 
 arrest of Petrillo, but the leader of the musicians stayed out of 
 
158 
 
 that jurisdiction. At the end of a period of 11 months, KSTP 
 capitulated and signed a contract meeting the terms imposed 
 by the union. The union gained a number of jobs, but it also 
 won the bitter resentment of many members of Congress. 
 
 • The Lea Act 
 
 The House committee closely scrutinized the criticisms lev- 
 eled against the AFM, for union demands on the radio industry 
 came at a time when manpower shortages were felt acutely in 
 various sectors of the economy. Charges of featherbedding, of 
 excessive employment, and of standby requirements were 
 brought to the attention of the committee. Broadcasters main- 
 tained that the standby fee tended to prevent small radio sta- 
 ions from using and developing local amateur talent. 
 
 Congressman Clarence F. Lea was soon ready with proposed 
 legislation to curb the power and activities of Petrillo. The 
 proposals were much more severe than anything recommended 
 by the Senate. After a spirited debate in which Petrillo was 
 attacked for being a "Caesar" and in which House members 
 applauded, stamped their feet, and shouted approval, the bill 
 was passed overwhelmingly. A few members of Congress came 
 to the defense of the musicians. Representative Vito Marcan- 
 tonio of New York expressed fear that the measure might be 
 construed to outlaw strikes. Congressman Benjamin J. Rabin 
 of New York said: "... I do not come here to praise Caesar; on 
 the other hand, I do not come here to bury the hard-won rights 
 of labor, . . ." 8 The Senate was induced to accept the House 
 version and President Harry S. Truman signed the measure, 
 known as the Lea Act or Anti-Petrillo Act, in April 1946. 9 
 
 Actually the new law amended some of the provisions of the 
 Communications Act of 1934 which applied to radio broad- 
 casting. The Lea Act made it unlawful to threaten or to compel 
 a broadcaster to: 1. employ more persons than it needed; 2. pay 
 money instead of hiring more persons than it needed; 3. pay 
 more than once for services; 4. pay for services not performed; 
 5. refrain from broadcasting noncommercial educational pro- 
 grams; 6. refrain from broadcasting radio communications origi- 
 nating outside the United States. With regard to recordings, 
 the law prohibited: 1. payment of exactions for producing or 
 using recordings or transcriptions; 2. imposition of restrictions 
 
159 
 
 on production, sales, or use of records or transcriptions; 3. pay- 
 ment of exactions for rebroadcast of programs. Any violations 
 were subject to imprisonment up to one year, or to a fine of not 
 more than $1,000, or to both. 
 
 The provisions with regard to recordings were inserted in the 
 bill to prevent several practices which appeared obnoxious to 
 Congress. The AFM had forced a network to cancel the rebroad- 
 cast to the Pacific coast, by means of transcriptions, of the Jack 
 Benny and Rudy Vallee programs. The union demanded that 
 the second show should be performed over again by the live 
 actors, or as an alternative that the musicians should receive 
 double pay. The union also had imposed restrictions on the 
 production of records at amateur festivals. The union royalty 
 fund, however, apparently was not affected by this legislation. 
 
 Bing Crosby, Bob Hope, Frank Sinatra, and other radio stars 
 opposed the Lea Act because of the severity of its provisions. 
 The American Federation of Radio Artists also seemed to be 
 covered by the law since they engaged in many of the proscribed 
 practices, and some persons believed that writers would be pre- 
 vented from bargaining for secondary rights to their scripts. 
 The main target, however, had been Petrillo. Petrillo defied the 
 law, declaring that it was unconstitutional. 
 
 The coverage of the law was sufficiently broad to permit 
 Petrillo any one of a variety of constitutional tests. The test 
 case was undertaken at radio station WAAF in Chicago. The 
 station had been employing three members of the musicians 
 union, when the AFM requested it to hire three more musicians. 
 When WAAF proclaimed that it did not need any additional 
 musicians, the three union members were called out on strike 
 by Petrillo and a picket was placed before the business premises 
 of the station. Petrillo told reporters gathered in his office: "I'm 
 ready to face the music, gentlemen." Pounding his desk, he 
 continued: "I demand that the Government keep hands off. It 
 should permit the unions and big business to handle their own 
 affairs. . . . We had enough governmental regulation during 
 the war and if anyone thinks labor is going to stand aside and 
 lose all the privileges it has gained during the last thirty years, 
 he is wrong. All labor will be cemented together as never before. 
 We've got to be to save our own hides." 10 At one point he in- 
 terrupted his discourse and smiled at the reporters. "How am 
 
160 
 
 I doin,' boys?" he asked. Later he obliged photographers by 
 assuming a fighting stance with his left hand thrust out. 
 
 The next week Petrillo was told that Representative George 
 A. Dondero of Michigan, who had sponsored the equivalent of 
 the Vandenberg proposal in the House, was considering the 
 introduction of more rigorous curbs on the musicians union. 
 Exploded Petrillo: "Oh, that bum! He represents about 500 
 people up there in Michigan. He hasn't got the mentality to 
 know what to do. He's a gimme-gimme politician." Then ad- 
 ding a point of view, he said: "Under what law can they make 
 us go to work? The more labor laws they pass, the more labor 
 trouble they're going to have." 11 
 
 When the Federal Bureau of Investigation had completed 
 its report on Petrillo's action at station WAAF, the Department 
 of Justice decided to prosecute. The original prosecuting assist- 
 ant attorney general, J. Albert Woll, severed his connection 
 with the case when it was disclosed that he was the son of 
 Matthew Woll, one of the AFL vice presidents. During the 
 preliminary hearing Petrillo posted a $1,000 bond by stepping 
 into the district court clerk's office and peeling off ten crisp 
 $100 bills from a roll. 
 
 Labor rallied to the support of the musicians union and the 
 AFL convention in 1946 voted to fight the Lea Act. The Civil 
 Liberties Union, which also opposed the law, was prevented 
 from submitting a brief on behalf of Petrillo by United States 
 District Court Judge Walter J. La Buy. The government argued 
 that the AFM was a racketeering organization that had extorted 
 millions of dollars from the radio industry. It told the court 
 that in the months subsequent to the calling of the strike, the 
 work of the three musicians who had walked out was performed 
 by the switchboard operator and another girl in the station's 
 office. The attorney for the government contended that Petrillo 
 was attempting to coerce the employer into hiring more em- 
 ployees than the station required. 
 
 Judge La Buy, however, accepted the arguments of the union 
 and in December 1946 he held that the measure was uncon- 
 stitutional. The court said that the Lea Act conflicted with the 
 first, fifth, and thirteenth amendments to the Constitution of 
 the United States. The first amendment which guaranteed 
 freedom of speech was violated because the law prevented 
 
161 
 
 peaceful picketing, a form of speech. The fifth amendment was 
 transgressed because the Act discriminated against radio broad- 
 casting employees and hence did not grant to all persons the 
 equal protection of the laws. The Act also violated the thir- 
 teenth amendment prohibiting slavery and involuntary servitude 
 because it regarded as coercion the refusal of some employees to 
 work unless additional employees were engaged. 
 
 Under a special rule the government appealed the case di- 
 rectly to the United States Supreme Court. The highest tribunal 
 in a five to three decision overruled the district court in June 
 1947 and held that the law is constitutional. It said that though 
 the government might have to modify and clarify its complaint 
 against Petrillo, the statute appeared to be a valid one. 
 
 Petrillo, whose statement after his victory in the district court 
 was: "Thank God for the Federal Court.", 12 showed his respect 
 for the law when immediately after the adverse verdict in the 
 Supreme Court he said: "This is my country and the Supreme 
 Court makes the final rulings on its laws. No one will ever 
 say that Jim Petrillo fought his country or the Supreme Court. 
 I thought that I had the law on my side, and I made the best 
 fight I knew how. The Supreme Court has spoken, and I bow 
 to its dictates." 13 The fight on this law was by no means over, 
 however, because the case had been remanded to the District 
 Court. 14 Early in 1948, Judge La Buy acquitted Petrillo. He 
 ruled that the government did not prove that Petrillo had 
 attempted to compel WAAF to hire three allegedly unneces- 
 sary musicians. Nor did the judge find that the broadcaster had 
 been coerced. 15 More definite court interpretations of the Lea 
 Act must await new test cases. 
 
 Meanwhile the National Music Camp remained in the news. 
 When it reopened its doors in July 1945, Maddy, in defiance of 
 Petrillo, was there to conduct the orchestra. He was ordered to 
 appear before the international executive board to explain why 
 he disregarded the action of the union under which the camp 
 had been placed on the unfair list. After a trial in which Pe- 
 trillo deliberately did not participate officially, Maddy was 
 expelled from the union early in 1946. It is possible that this 
 penalty could have been invoked against him long before that 
 time, for engaging in conduct prejudicial to the welfare of the 
 union. The national officers, however, had not chosen to use his 
 
162 
 
 statements to the press and his written reports to the public as 
 grounds for their action. Their case against Maddy was much 
 stronger because they had waited. 
 
 Even after the passage of the Lea Act no network was willing 
 to sponsor an Interlochen program. The camp had been broad- 
 casting a musical program for four hours every week over the 
 Michigan State College station at Lansing, Michigan, an inde- 
 pendent station having no link with the AFM. New Congres- 
 sional hearings dealing with the AFM were held in 1947 by a 
 subcommittee, under the chairmanship of Representative Car- 
 roll D. Kearns, of the Committee on Education and Labor. 
 Petrillo threatened to expel Kearns, a music teacher, from the 
 AFM when the Congressman indicated that he might partake 
 as guest conductor in a music festival at Interlochen. 16 Kearns 
 had given varying statements to the press, but in the end he 
 stayed away from the camp. 
 
 As a result of Congressional hearings and further discussions 
 in the summer of 1947, the union reversed its policies in several 
 respects. It permitted school and military bands to make record- 
 ings. The records, however, could be cut only for the exclusive 
 use of the schools and colleges and for educational purposes. In 
 September 1947, the AFM signed a code of ethics with repre- 
 sentatives for the Music Educators National Conference and the 
 American Association of School Administrators regarding the areas 
 within which each was to operate. 17 This agreement convinced 
 Petrillo that there would be no competition between school 
 bands and professional musicians for employment, so he ended 
 the ban on radio broadcasting by school children. After a period 
 of five years in which they had been barred from the networks, 
 schools once more were permitted to resume broadcasting. But 
 the National Music Camp at Interlochen, Michigan, has re- 
 mained on the unfair list of the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians. Despite the Lea Act, therefore, radio networks have 
 refrained from broadcasting any Interlochen concerts. 
 
 The Lea Act represented the first significant legislative curb 
 imposed on the activities of labor unions subsequent to the 
 introduction of the New Deal labor policy by the federal gov- 
 ernment. The enactment of legislation such as the Lea Act, 
 curtailing the activities and power of trade unions was inevitable, 
 however, given the temper of Congress in 1946. The practices 
 
163 
 
 of featherbedding, of standbys, and of banning various groups 
 from radio broadcasting had irked many people who were not 
 fully conversant with the issues. 
 
 It should be recognized that policies similar to those adopted 
 by the musicians union, directed towards increased employment, 
 were approved and enforced by many other labor organizations. 
 Make-work problems are certainly more serious on the railroads 
 and in the building trades. But the methods used by the musi- 
 cians union constantly were arousing bitterness and resentment. 
 Attention had been centered on Petrillo and every move he 
 made was deemed worthy of newspaper headlines. The public 
 relations of the union were rather unsatisfactory. Weber had 
 enjoyed as much power as Petrillo and had been able to win 
 substantial gains for the musicians during his period of leader- 
 ship, yet he had kept the AFM in the background and had 
 avoided much of the unfavorable criticism hurled against the 
 union during the presidency of Petrillo. It is true that Petrillo 
 has gained his objectives more quickly, but only at a heavier 
 cost to the union. 
 
 The Interlochen dispute was an unfortunate episode; especi- 
 ally since it probably would have been settled satisfactorily if 
 Maddy had taken up the matter with Petrillo directly instead 
 of seeking assistance from Congress and the press. Banning 
 school children from taking part in musical radio programs has 
 not appeared to be a satisfactory technique for alleviating the 
 unemployment of musicians in any appreciable manner. The 
 number of such amateur programs has been extremely small. 
 But the hostile sentiments engendered by this dispute were 
 magnified by certain union practices which had existed for a 
 long time. At the culmination of public disapproval, the Lea 
 Act was passed. 
 
PETRILLO STABILIZES 1A 
 
 LABOR RELATIONS • 
 
 "Now Congressmen, make a law to make us go to work, 
 chew on that one for a while." 
 
 JAMES CAESAR PETRILLO 
 
 • Another Record Ban 
 
 The year 1948 was one in which major decisions were made 
 by the American Federation of Musicians. At the beginning of 
 January disputes were raging with regard to the manufacture 
 of records, the negotiation of radio contracts, the future of fre- 
 quency modulation, and the performance of live music over 
 television. Each of these difficulties essentially was adjusted by 
 the end of that year. Congress had expected the Lea Act to 
 solve the labor problems of the broadcasters. The only signifi- 
 cant immediate effect, however, was that the union abandoned 
 its practice of collecting standby fees from the radio industry. 
 Over a longer period, the number of staff musicians employed 
 by radio stations declined substantially. 
 
 Although a possibility exists that some sections in the Lea 
 Act affect the establishment of a recording and transcription 
 fund, no test of these provisions ever has been made. When 
 Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft- 
 Hartley Act) 1 in 1947, union welfare funds clearly became 
 subject to federal regulation. The law gave detailed specifi- 
 cations regarding the provisions necessary in an agreement 
 between labor and management which creates such a fund. 
 The purpose of the welfare fund must be set down in writ- 
 ing. Equal control over expenditures of the money in the 
 fund must be exercised by representatives of the union and of 
 the employers. If these representatives do not agree upon a 
 matter within their jurisdiction, they must select an impartial 
 umpire to make the final decision. The law states that the fund 
 may be used solely and exclusively for the benefit of the em- 
 
165 
 
 ployees, including their families and dependents, of those em- 
 ployers making the contribution. 
 
 The American Federation of Musicians had stated the general 
 purpose for which the money in its royalty fund would be used. 
 Minute details, however, had not been given in the agreements. 
 But the recording contracts expired at the end of 1947 and any 
 extension would be subject to the provisions of the Taft-Hartley 
 law. Petrillo refused to modify the basic conditions with re- 
 gard to the recording fund which he had included in the record- 
 ing contracts of 1943. He was at first reluctant to allow the 
 agents of the recording companies to have any voice in deter- 
 mining the disposition of the money in the fund. He also felt that 
 the fund would lose its main value to the AFM if it could be 
 used only for the benefit of those musicians who made the 
 records. The latter objection was removed, however, by the 
 United States Supreme Court decision that in defining the 
 term "employee" technical and traditional concepts were not 
 the sole guides to be used, but that account could be taken of 
 the more relevant economic and statutory considerations. 2 Al- 
 though all musicians thus could benefit from a welfare fund, 
 the Lea Act and the Taft-Hartley Act made it difficult for the 
 union to exercise that degree of control which it desired. (As 
 finally set up, the recorders agreed to pay royalties into a fund 
 to be used for the benefit of the public, so that the law's provi- 
 sions regarding the employees who might benefit from a welfare 
 fund apparently do not apply.) 
 
 Petrillo had warned the nation that the AFM would resist 
 any attempt to prevent the union from collecting royalties on 
 records. He had announced that if the circumstances warranted, 
 he would "send out a simple little letter. We'll just say, 'Gentle- 
 men on such and such a date, members of the American Fede- 
 ration of Musicians will not be permitted to perform in the 
 making of recordings and transcriptions.' " Petrillo continued: 
 "Now Congressmen, make a law to make us go to work, chew 
 on that one for a while." 3 
 
 Congress passed the Labor Management Relations Act and 
 Petrillo subsequently sent the letter he had promised. From the 
 convention of 1947, Petrillo had received the authority to order 
 the members of the union to cease making recordings upon the 
 expiration of the contract. He also was given permission either 
 
166 
 
 to negotiate new agreements with the recording companies or 
 to go into the recording business in competition with them. At 
 the end of October 1947, however, he notified the recording 
 and transcription companies that contracts with them would 
 not be renewed. He emphasized that the union irrevocably had 
 committed itself to a policy of never again working for any 
 recording company. 
 
 Petrillo's avowal that the record ban was permanent was not 
 given too much weight by the industry or by the public because 
 he had made similar statements on the previous occasions when 
 he had banned recordings. It seemed clear that Petrillo was 
 attempting to gain a stronger bargaining position. The record 
 companies were not too concerned with the union's threat to 
 go into the business because it was apparent that such action 
 would violate the antitrust laws. If the union were the sole 
 recorder of instrumentalists, competition would be eliminated 
 and trade would be restrained. The union itself recognized 
 these implications and refrained from moving in that direction. 
 
 On January 1, 1948, the production of musical records ceased 
 in the United States and Canada. But the major recording 
 companies already had had experience with a ban and were 
 prepared. Since they had been given sufficient warning in ad- 
 vance by Petrillo, they had cut enormous stockpiles of master 
 records. The backlog was so great that a supply of new musical 
 records would, if necessary, have been available to the companies 
 for several years. Only the newly composed popular song hits 
 could not be recorded. The large recording companies had 
 accumulated so much material that they would have sustained 
 losses if an immediate lifting of the record ban had occurred. 
 The smaller and financially weaker record companies, however, 
 were not prepared for a long contest with the union. 
 
 The AFM had the support of its entire membership, of many 
 labor unions in the United States, and of the unions of musi- 
 cians of Great Britain, Mexico, Cuba, Chile, and South Africa. 
 Petrillo emphasized that the record ban had been reimposed 
 because of the technological unemployment resulting from the 
 use of records. He referred particularly to the greater number 
 of juke boxes in use, to the increase in the number of disk 
 jockeys, and to the growth in wired music service. 
 
 There were several reasons, however, which induced Petrillo 
 
167 
 
 to negotiate with the record and transcription companies. First, 
 he had told members of Congress that he would be willing to 
 do so. Secondly, there was public pressure exerted to remove 
 the restrictions on recordings. Thirdly, the number of records 
 produced and sent into the United States from foreign countries 
 expanded throughout the period of the ban and served to weaken 
 the control of the AFM over the situation. Furthermore, the 
 production of bootleg records— in which musicians work anony- 
 mously or under fictitious names— increased. 4 Although sta- 
 tions employing live musicians could not use such records, those 
 radio broadcasters who depended entirely on recorded music 
 were under no such handicap. Fourthly, there was some talk in 
 the industry of signing musicians to long-term recording con- 
 tracts so that they would not be reluctant to risk expulsion from 
 the union for recording. Recording companies could not expect 
 to secure the services of leading orchestras and name bands, 
 however, because violation of the ban by any musician would 
 result in his expulsion from the union. Expelled musicians 
 would be barred from playing in unionized establishments, and 
 it has been in those places where professional musicians normally 
 have earned the major source of their income. Fifthly, charges 
 had been filed by the transcription companies with the NLRB 
 against the AFM, the New York local, and the Los Angeles 
 local in May 1948 claiming that the union had violated the 
 Taft-Hartley law because the record ban had compelled the 
 transcription companies to cease doing business with the radio 
 stations. This represented, they said, a secondary boycott. Sub- 
 sequently, however, in December 1948, the regional director of 
 the NLRB in New York ruled that the record ban did not 
 violate the Taft-Hartley law and he refused to issue any com- 
 plaints in this matter. 5 Sixthly, the threat of Congressional action 
 to break the efficacy of the ban was a distinct possibility. 
 
 In February 1948, Petrillo had eased the record ban to permit 
 the networks to record some of their shows when the disk was 
 to be used only once and then discarded. It was not until Sep- 
 tember that he was willing to negotiate regarding a general 
 solution to the problem. In December agreements were reached 
 with the record and transcription companies under which a 
 music performance trust fund was set up to provide employ- 
 ment for instrumental musicians, whether or not members of 
 
168 
 
 the union, and to promote the appreciation of instrumental 
 music by the general public. No admission fees might be charged. 
 The record companies were to pay a percentage of the retail 
 price of each record sold, ranging from one per cent of the 
 price of records under a dollar to two and a half per cent of the 
 price of records over two dollars, into the fund. The transcrip- 
 tion companies were to pay three per cent of the gross revenues 
 derived from leasing transcriptions. When the Solicitor of 
 Labor of the Department of Labor and the Attorney General 
 of the United States found that the trustee would not be ap- 
 pointed by or be a representative of the AFM, they held that 
 the trust agreement did not violate the Taft-Hartley law. The 
 contracts between the union and the major companies were 
 signed on December 14, 1948 and recording work was resumed 
 immediately. The first trustee, Samuel R. Rosenbaum, was 
 appointed by the companies. He was favorably regarded by the 
 union. Successor trustees are to be selected by the Secretary of 
 Labor. Wage scales remained the same as under the October 
 1946 agreement. 6 
 
 Since the agreement extends through the end of 1953, a rela- 
 tively long period of stability has been assured. In May 1949, 
 Rosenbaum outlined the procedures under which the music 
 performance trust fund would be administered. In general, the 
 trustee was satisfied with the operation of the recording and 
 transcription fund, and therefore modeled the new fund along 
 those lines. Allocations to the locals now are made twice a year. 7 
 
 Radio stations and networks were vitally interested in the out- 
 come of the record controversy because of the financial link 
 between the two industries and because radio programs have 
 depended on the use of records for much of the music they 
 present. There was fear that a strike by network musicians would 
 materialize at the expiration of the contract in January 1948. 
 Networks had been set to meet a strike by preparing in advance 
 many transcriptions of commercial advertisements which use 
 music. This material would have lasted several months. The 
 union and the networks, however, came to a basic understand- 
 ing and agreed to extend the expiring agreement temporarily. 
 The union announced two major concessions. It would no 
 longer apply pressure on the networks to force affiliated stations 
 to hire additional musicians. The AFM, which gave no indica- 
 
169 
 
 tion of any alternative tactics, had threatened to play only on 
 local programs, and thus cut off affiliated stations. The AFM 
 also agreed to modify its policy on frequency modulation (FM) 
 broadcasts. 
 
 • Developments in Frequency Modulation 
 
 FM was invented and perfected by Major Edwin H. Arm- 
 strong in the 1930's. It is a system of radio broadcasting which 
 provides the listener with high fidelity reproduction of sound 
 and with staticless reception. The first high-power FM station 
 began to operate in 1939. Since then FM stations have increased 
 in number very rapidly and it is possible that they may eventu- 
 ally replace many amplitude modulation (AM) or standard 
 broadcasting stations. Programs prepared for AM may be sent 
 over FM channels with only a slight increase in engineering 
 costs. 
 
 The standard broadcasters immediately recognized the po- 
 tential importance of FM and they secured FM outlets. Many 
 other persons and business organizations, however, who had no 
 connection with AM stations also built FM stations. The devel- 
 opment of the invention of frequency modulation has shown 
 slow progress because the public has not had the disposition to 
 buy receiving sets of this type. On the other hand, there have 
 not been many entrepreneurs willing to risk capital in order 
 to develop the invention during the period of its infancy. Radio 
 networks had the most money to spend on FM, but they did 
 not want to invest more than the minimum necessary to gain a 
 strong foothold. 
 
 The original intention of the Federal Communications Com- 
 mission, which regulates the radio industry, was to require sep- 
 arate programs to be broadcast on AM and FM. This policy 
 presumably was intended to give all groups interested in devel- 
 oping the new field an equal start. When the networks pro- 
 tested that the additional expense would impose a financial bur- 
 den that would retard the rapid development of frequency 
 modulation, the FCC reversed its position. It ruled that the 
 same program could be broadcast on both mediums simultan- 
 eously. As a result, by 1944, an accelerated development of FM 
 was forecast. Though the New York local of the AFM had pro- 
 tested the practice of simultaneous broadcasting over AM and 
 
170 
 
 FM in 1942 and 1943, the networks continued to engage in it. 
 
 In September 1944, immediately after the New York City 
 station of NBC received a commercial license for its FM trans- 
 mitter, Petrillo notified the four major networks that use of 
 musicians on FM programs without permission from the AFM 
 was a violation of the radio contracts. Some correspondence 
 between the networks and the union was interchanged, but no 
 solution was reached. The networks maintained that they had 
 to transmit programs over FM without any additional charges 
 to the advertisers because simultaneous broadcasts did not in- 
 crease the number of people able to hear the programs. Rates 
 to advertisers have been based upon the potential number of 
 listeners and not the actual size of the audience. 
 
 The musicians union claimed that the act of duplicating 
 programs over AM and FM without increasing the advertising 
 rates put independent FM stations at a competitive disadvan- 
 tage. Advertisers would not be encouraged to put programs on 
 FM stations only, if they could have them aired over both 
 mediums. This advertising policy would hurt the struggling 
 FM outlets. The AFM, however, wanted to protect the growing 
 FM industry because it had envisioned much future employ- 
 ment for its members in it. Some of the independent FM broad- 
 casters also opposed the simultaneous transmission of programs. 
 
 Petrillo and the networks were unable to break the impasse, 
 but Petrillo had the final word. After wrangling for a year, 
 during which time the networks continued to send AM pro- 
 grams over FM outlets, Petrillo ordered that beginning on 
 October 29, 1945, double crews of musicians would have to be 
 employed on all duplicated programs. Networks were not per- 
 mitted to feed chain programs played by orchestras on AM 
 stations to FM affiliates. Moreover, this ruling was applicable to 
 local independent AM stations. Locals of the AFM, however, 
 were permitted to make separate contracts to supply the services 
 of musicians who were to be used for broadcasting exclusively 
 on independent FM stations. The networks complied with these 
 orders because the radio contracts were silent on the FM ques- 
 tion and because of the implied threat of a strike by the musi- 
 cians. They did not employ additional musicians but they 
 stopped duplicating programs with music. 
 
 The policy of the musicians union was attacked by the radio 
 
171 
 
 industry. Public clamor also was directed against the union's 
 position. The Federal Communications Commission was power- 
 less to step into this labor dispute although the broadcasters and 
 the public requested it to do so several times. When Paul A. 
 Porter, Chairman of the FCC, addressed an interested audience, 
 he said jocularly: "The FCC is in favor of duplicate programs 
 but it appears that Petrillo has overruled the FCC." A woman 
 in the audience asked "where Petrillo got all his power." Porter 
 replied: "My dear lady that question has me puzzled. All I can 
 say is that he didn't get it from the FCC." 8 
 
 After the networks rejected Petrillo's plan, they decided to 
 shut down all FM transmitters. They took advantage of the 
 occasion and installed different transmitting equipment. This 
 operation was necessary because the FCC had assigned new wave 
 lengths for FM. The shift could best be executed by going off 
 the air for several months. 
 
 Those persons who had predicted that Petrillo would quickly 
 modify his order were wrong. For two and a half years the 
 AFM did not set any wage scales for FM network broadcasts 
 and no musical programs were duplicated, though some inde- 
 pendent FM stations continued to broadcast live music. Fur- 
 thermore, in September 1947 the AFM prohibited FM networks 
 from using musicians. Pleas by both AM and FM networks to 
 the union to alter its policy were unavailing even after passage 
 of the Lea Act. At the end of January 1948, however, while 
 negotiations were in progress to draw up new radio contracts 
 with the networks, Petrillo rescinded his order affecting FM. 
 The duplication of programs over AM and FM was permitted; 
 and FM networks could employ musicians. This action, how- 
 ever, put stations operating on FM only at a competitive dis- 
 advantage in securing commercial sponsors. 
 
 The decision of the union to permit duplication of programs 
 without asking for additional compensation for musicians was 
 welcomed by the radio industry and by the public. Except for 
 the fact that the established standard broadcasting companies 
 had a tremendous advantage over other FM operators, the devel- 
 opment of FM could be pushed forward rapidly. Yet the AM 
 networks, which were in the strongest financial and technical 
 position to advance FM, were not especially anxious to do so 
 because of their tremendous investment in standard broadcast- 
 
172 
 
 ing and because of the uncertainties regarding the future of the 
 radio industry brought about by the growth of television (TV) . 
 The expansion of frequency modulation broadcasting therefore 
 has been very slow. 
 
 Simultaneously with the long negotiations regarding FM, the 
 union was engaged in working out a policy in connection with 
 the other major technological invention affecting musicians. 
 The type of agreements subsequently reached for television were 
 entirely different. 
 
 • The Television Controversy 
 
 The idea of television is old, but public broadcasting service 
 on this medium did not begin in the United States until 1939. 
 Commercial programs began to be telecast in 1941. Much of the 
 broadcast time, however, was devoted to experimentation and to 
 the development of new techniques and procedures. In tele- 
 vision too, radio networks assumed the lead. Monetary outlays 
 during the developmental period were high though it was un- 
 certain whether the future returns would show the expenditures 
 to have been wisely made. 
 
 At first the AFM cooperated with the industry. During 1943, 
 Petrillo set the television scale for musicians at $18 an hour, 
 and put a lower price on rehearsals. In February 1945, however, 
 the international executive board prohibited musicians from 
 playing on any form of television program. This action imme- 
 diately affected two of the three major forms of video presenta- 
 tion—television programs are divided among studio broadcasts, 
 mobile unit pickups, and films. Musicians were cut off from the 
 first two of these types of broadcasts. The televising of motion 
 pictures containing music was prohibited subsequently, as al- 
 ready described, by contract with the film producers in 1946. 
 The 1945 ban was not coupled with any demand, suggestion, 
 or request. It applied even to those performances where the 
 music merely would be heard and the musician would not be 
 included in the field of vision. However, rumors that the object 
 of the ban was to help the film industry take control of tele- 
 vision from the radio industry were denied by spokesmen for 
 the film producers. 
 
 The development of TV was hampered by the action of the 
 musicians union, but the industry continued to grow. Aside 
 
173 
 
 from the musicians themselves, it was mainly the public which 
 suffered because it was barred from enjoying many possible 
 types of television entertainment. Television broadcasters had 
 greater difficulty in meeting the minimum program time require- 
 ments of the FCC with suitable presentations. The attitude of 
 the union, however, was understandable. It was based on the 
 fear that the disastrous unemployment which had occurred in 
 the theaters after the introduction of sound films would be 
 repeated with the development of television. Since television 
 programs may be produced by filming the show first and pre- 
 senting it at a later time over the video channel, Petrillo feared 
 that eventually canned television or the kinescope would dis- 
 place the live musicians employed during the early stages of 
 development. That is, for example, a television program of a 
 famous name band playing musical selections would be filmed 
 and used over again many times subsequently. The union was 
 trying to prevent the creation of a television record industry 
 which would become as important to television as phonograph 
 records have been to radio. Petrillo argued that before commit- 
 ting the AFM to any television policy, he wanted to have a 
 clearer idea of the direction in which video programs were 
 heading. The union also desired some assurance that the ap- 
 proximately $23,000,000 in income which its members have 
 been receiving from radio would not be lost by an inaccurate 
 decision regarding the future of television. 
 
 The solution had to be based on the assurance to musicians 
 that excessive use would not be made of kinescopes. The hesi- 
 tancy of the AFM to commit itself had justification. A decision 
 on its part probably would set the pattern for the future con- 
 tractual relations in an industry that seemed destined to replace 
 radio. The musicians union, therefore, either would have to 
 impose an outright prohibition on canned television programs 
 by the broadcasters or, as an alternative, it would have to de- 
 mand a royalty fund into which payments would be made each 
 time a canned musical program was televised. The union was 
 not concerned particularly with live television broadcasts, since 
 no displacement problem was presented by them. 
 
 In March 1948, Petrillo announced that a new three-year 
 agreement with the radio networks had been signed. Contracts 
 between the New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles locals and 
 
174 
 
 the four major networks were renewed without change in either 
 the wage scales or the number of staff musicians to be employed. 
 But the contracts were modified to permit the use of musicians 
 on television at wage rates that would be determined every few 
 months during television's developmental stage. The contracts 
 further were altered to permit the simultaneous use of musi- 
 cians on AM and FM and to allow broadcasting of cooperative 
 programs. 
 
 At the end of April the FM and the networks agreed to put 
 television pay scales into effect for a six-month period, begin- 
 ning on May 1. The rates set were lower than those established 
 for radio musicians, but depended on whether a network or 
 local program was involved. The agreement permitted musical 
 programs to be filmed for storage in network files or for a single 
 presentation at regular television wage scales. The agreement 
 subsequently was extended until April 1, 1949, at which time 
 a new one year contract was executed with the networks under 
 which the pay scales were increased. Locals retained the power 
 to make scales for local television broadcasts emanating from 
 independently owned stations. 
 
 The negotiations at the beginning of 1951 between the radio 
 networks and the AFM locals in New York, Los Angeles, and 
 Chicago over the terms of a new agreement to go into effect on 
 February 1, 1951 were not successful. Early in March the New 
 York local authorized a strike against the networks, subject to 
 the approval of the AFM. The Los Angeles local authorized the 
 AFM to take such action as it might deem necessary. Petrillo, 
 backed by the international executive board, decided to take 
 over the negotiations on March 13. He maintained that such 
 action was in the interest of all musicians. 9 In a relatively short 
 time he reached an agreement on the basic conditions for a 
 three-year contract extending to February 1, 1954. It included 
 radio, television, and television film contracts. 
 
 Many of the issues between the American Federation of 
 Musicians and the radio broadcasting and television industries 
 were resolved. The main gains made by the union were a 
 general increase in radio wage rates of 15 per cent and an agree- 
 ment to set the vacation period at two weeks. The broadcasters 
 successfully rejected demands to reduce the amount of recorded 
 music they would play and to increase the number of staff musi- 
 
175 
 
 cians. Wage rates for television programs were equalized with 
 those prevailing in the radio industry. 
 
 The union agreed to permit simulcasting over AM and FM, 
 AM and TV, FM and TV, and AM, FM, and TV. No extra 
 charge is made by musicians for a simulcast over AM and FM, 
 but if the program is played simultaneously over the radio and 
 over television, an additional sum, depending on whether the 
 program is a sustaining or a commercial broadcast, is paid to 
 them. 
 
 The musicians were not given any additional staff employ- 
 ment for television broadcasts. They will, however, receive many 
 single engagements on this medium. Some concessions were made 
 by the union in regard to kinescopes or television recording. 
 Such recordings may be shown only once in any city on a station 
 not receiving the original broadcast, but affiliated with the 
 network at the time the film was made. The kinescope must be 
 taken at the time of the regularly scheduled live broadcast and 
 must be shown within 60 days of production. A separate tele- 
 vision film agreement was negotiated with the networks under 
 which films could be made and shown providing the networks 
 would pay five per cent of the receipts derived from leasing the 
 films into a music performance trust fund. 
 
 Cooperative programs are paid for at the same rates as if 
 sponsored by a single advertiser. Participating broadcasts (one 
 integrated unit, but without a specific time allocation to adver- 
 tisers) , segmented shows (where there is a specific time alloca- 
 tion to sponsors) , and composite programs (a combination of 
 the two) may be aired only if musicians are paid at higher 
 wage rates. The contracts also require the networks to obtain 
 permission from the union before sending any musical program 
 abroad. 
 
 In 1951, the AFM also concluded its first major contracts with 
 motion picture companies for televising motion picture films. 
 In contracts with the Republic Pictures, a member of the Motion 
 Picture Producers Association, and the Monogram Company 
 the union agreed to permit the use of films on TV provided 
 that the musical score was replayed and that five per cent of 
 the receipts of the companies from the lease of the films would 
 be paid into a music performance trust fund. The preceding 
 year agreements had been reached with several small companies 
 
176 
 
 for the production of TV films under similar conditions. 10 
 
 The union thus has reached a stage where relatively stable 
 relations have been achieved with the recording, radio, and 
 television industries. Some major issues still remain. But it 
 appears that there will not be much controversy engaged in by 
 musicians in these industries for at least a few years. 
 
 • Congressional Investigations 
 
 The union's policies in connection with technological progress 
 and mechanical reproduction of music has aroused public 
 interest and criticism. Congressional inquiry into the objectives 
 and practices of the AFM was renewed in 1947, because it 
 appeared that neither the earlier investigations nor the Lea Act 
 in which they had terminated had affected or influenced Petrillo 
 or the union markedly. The victory of the Republican party 
 in the 1946 Congressional elections, gave Fred A. Hartley, Jr. 
 the chairmanship of the House Committee on Education and 
 Labor. In February 1947, just after the eightieth Congress was 
 organized, he introduced a resolution to give his committee the 
 power to subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths. The 
 House of Representatives agreed to this resolution. 
 
 The committee had received a number of complaints regard- 
 ing the practices of the musicians union. Although other organi- 
 zations were investigated also, Hartley was interested especially 
 in some of the policies and activities of the AFM. Dr. Joseph 
 E. Maddy had complained to the committee about the Inter- 
 lochen situation. Charges also had been brought to the committee 
 by Earl Carroll that the Los Angeles local of the union had 
 forced him to maintain an orchestra larger than he needed for 
 the operation of his theater-restaurant in that city. The com- 
 mittee subsequently suspected that officers and members of 
 local 47 in Los Angeles had been guilty of intimidating and 
 punishing Earl Carroll for bringing the charges. Hartley ordered 
 a thorough investigation of the charges. He appointed a subcom- 
 mittee of three members to determine whether any laws had 
 been violated and whether any witnesses had been coerced. 
 Carroll D. Kearns, of Pennsylvania, who was a member of the 
 musicians union, was named chairman. The subcommittee was 
 anxious to hear Petrillo testify and it served him with a subpoena, 
 though it delayed calling upon him until the United States 
 
177 
 
 Supreme Court had ruled that the Lea Act was constitutional. 
 As a result, in order to be at the disposal of the subcommittee 
 Petrillo was forced to cancel a scheduled trip to Europe. He 
 had hoped to formulate a plan, in cooperation with the British 
 musicians, under which a world federation of musicians would 
 be organized. This plan now must await a more propitious 
 occasion. 
 
 Most of the testimony was taken in Los Angeles. Much of it 
 was concerned with the policies and activities of the Los 
 Angeles local. Petrillo, however, testified in Washington, D. C, 
 in July. The president of the AFM reiterated many of the argu- 
 ments he had previously expressed regarding the necessity of 
 protecting the employment opportunities of musicians. Petrillo 
 claimed that musicians who do not work full time in the 
 profession, but who desire to do so, must be considered unem- 
 ployed. No accurate study of the working activities and schedules 
 of the membership ever has been made. It was estimated in 
 1947, however, that about 32,400 of the 216,000 members of 
 the AFM earned their livelihood by working exclusively as 
 musicians. About twice that number gained part of their live- 
 lihood in other vocations. More than 86,000 musicians had 
 dropped their instruments because there was no work for them 
 or because they developed other interests. 11 Throughout his 
 testimony, Petrillo manifested a disposition to compromise the 
 issues in dispute. 
 
 During one exchange with the committee, Petrillo said to 
 Congressman Kearns: "By the way, I understand you are a good 
 musician. Mr. Kearns. Thank you, Mr. Petrillo. Mr. Petrillo. 
 I mean that. Mr. Nixon. Do you understand he is also a good 
 Congressman? Mr. Petrillo. Not yet. I will tell you more about 
 that when we get through here." 12 At another time, Petrillo 
 said: "While we are talking about the Government, what are 
 we going to do about President Truman? He plays the piano. 
 Mr. Kearns. I will make the suggestion that we pay him as a 
 stand-by. How is that?" 13 
 
 Petrillo made several immediate and tangible concessions as 
 a result of his appearance before the Congressional subcom- 
 mittee. He executed a code of ethics with the American 
 Association of School Administrators and with the Music 
 Educators National Conference. This document permitted music 
 
178 
 
 students to perform in public, broadcast, and make audition 
 records in furtherance of their musical education, if such activity 
 was of a nonprofit, noncommercial, and noncompetitive nature. 
 Petrillo also agreed to permit the service bands of the armed 
 forces to make recordings to be used strictly for educational 
 purposes. Furthermore, Petrillo restored the union licenses to 
 two bookers who had complained to the subcommittee that 
 their licenses had been revoked without good cause. 
 
 The subcommittee found that the Los Angeles local had 
 adjusted its dispute with Earl Carroll in a manner satisfactory 
 to all concerned. It therefore recommended that that phase of 
 the investigation should be closed without any further action. 
 The report which it submitted to Congress, however, urged the 
 enactment of legislation which would end the monopolistic 
 practices of trade unions and bar unions from licensing employ- 
 ers who want to do business. The subcommittee said of Petrillo 
 and the AFM: "The continued exercise of such tyrannical power 
 by any individual or group should not be countenanced nor 
 tolerated in a free Republic." 14 
 
 The House Committee on Education and Labor began hearings 
 in January 1948 to consider the legislation proposed by the 
 subcommittee to forbid monopolistic practices of labor unions 
 which are injurious to the public interest. Representatives of 
 industry testified at length that the power of the AFM was 
 excessive and should be curbed. One witness became so irritated, 
 he said: "I have an ulcer which I would like to give to Mr. 
 Petrillo." 15 Spokesmen for the recorders, however, declared that 
 they were in favor of continuing payments under a royalty plan, 
 but that the Labor Management Relations Act had interposed 
 an obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the recording contro- 
 versy. Petrillo also was called to the witness stand. He declared 
 that he was willing to negotiate all issues, except the ban on 
 records. He agreed, however, to Hartley's suggestion that a 
 secret poll of musicians should be taken to determine whether 
 members of the AFM really favored the ban on recordings; the 
 vote never was held. Petrillo repeated that he had no objections 
 to the manufacture of records that would be used only in the 
 home, if such a system could be worked out. He was opposed to 
 the production of that 20 per cent of the records which is used 
 commercially. 
 
179 
 
 Petrillo was told by one of the members of the committee that 
 President Truman disagreed with him regarding the amount 
 of money available to the public for consumption expenditures. 
 "Mr. Owens. . . . And now, do you not believe the President? 
 Mr. Petrillo. I won't contradict the President. Mr. Owens. Well, 
 it is true; is it not? Mr. Petrillo. After all, he is a potential 
 member of the union; he is a piano player. Mr. Owens. That is 
 right. He was more than a piano player, Mr. Petrillo. He had 
 several other occupations, as well." 16 
 
 Various caustic and sarcastic remarks were interjected into 
 the testimony. The chairman related that he had been told by 
 a member of the AFM: "You know, in music when we say 
 'fortissimo,' we speak of loud music; when we say 'pianissimo,' 
 we speak of soft music; and when we say 'Petrillo,' we speak of 
 no music." 17 At one point, a discussion occurred regarding the 
 qualifications necessary for membership in the union. Both the 
 witness and the Congressman who questioned him felt that the 
 admission standards were too low." Mr. Hoffman. . . . the fellow 
 who carries a record from one room to another and puts it on 
 the machine— Mr. Asch. A platter turner. Mr. Hoffman. Is eligible 
 to become a member of the union. Mr. Asch. I am not sure. 
 They probably would make him a cymbal player and let him 
 bang the cymbals and take him in. Mr. Hoffman. . . . May a 
 janitor, for example, become a member of the union? . . . The 
 Chairman. Let us be in order." 18 It is therefore a curious fact that 
 at the beginning of 1950 a report by a committee of the Ameri- 
 can Conference of Academic Deans assailed the medical profes- 
 sion for using "Petrillo economics" to keep down the number 
 of students admitted to medical schools. Petrillo denied the 
 implied charge, pointing out that admission to his union was 
 relatively easy. 19 
 
 The first major result of these hearings was that Petrillo 
 rescinded the ban on the simulcast or duplication of AM and 
 FM programs. No double crew or additional pay was necessary. 
 This action by Petrillo already has been discussed. No legislation 
 was enacted by Congress as a result of these hearings and no 
 further investigations of the AFM have been made. 
 
 The history of Congressional investigations of the AFM has 
 demonstrated one salient characteristic. The union of musicians 
 has corrected many of the undesirable practices and eliminated 
 
180 
 
 some of the abuses of which it has been guilty, as a result of public 
 hearings. Airing the problems before a legislative committee has 
 been effective in bringing the pressure of public opinion to beai 
 on the union and has served to narrow the area of many disputes. 
 Vengeful Congressional legislation, however, has not solved 
 the troublesome and vexatious problems faced by the musicians. 
 
PETRILLO MARCHES ON — 
 
 11 
 
 TECHNOLOGICAL PROBLEMS REMAIN • J " J ~ 
 
 "The machine of itself brings certain dangers and certain 
 benefits. To my mind the latter outweigh the former." 
 
 STUART CHASE 
 
 • The Stature of Petrillo 
 
 During the decade in which he has served as president of the 
 American Federation of Musicians, James C. Petrillo has gained 
 tremendous stature as a labor leader. Today, as he passes 60 
 years of age, he is emerging slowly as one of labor's elder states- 
 men. He is respected by the overwhelming majority of the 
 members of his union and by the employers with whom he 
 deals. Although, for example, there is much more amiability 
 between Petrillo and the film producers than between Petrillo 
 and the heads of the radio networks, his integrity is recognized 
 by all with whom he negotiates. In January 1951, Petrillo was 
 elected a vice president of the American Federation of Labor, 
 succeeding Joseph N. Weber in that position. 
 
 As Petrillo has increased his knowledge of the music industry 
 and as he has perfected the techniques of bargaining with 
 employers, he simultaneously has become milder. His position 
 of control in the union is so complete that he no longer has to 
 undertake vigorous campaigns against employers to demonstrate 
 his value to the organization. Employers frequently are more 
 willing to negotiate with Petrillo, whom they consider more 
 reasonable, than with local officers, whose more extensive 
 demands would be more costly if granted. There have already 
 been several minor indications that some local leaders are 
 anxiously waiting for the time when Petrillo will be ready to 
 retire. At present, though faint rumblings may be heard in a 
 number of locals, no member of the AFM poses a threat to 
 Petrillo's dominance. 
 
 It is a common practice for Petrillo to take action on certain 
 
182 
 
 matters first and then secure the concurrence of the international 
 executive board. Sometimes, however, it is not practicable to 
 wait for approval before taking the action. During his service 
 as president, Petrillo has built up a good record. He was respon- 
 sible for the unionization of all the nonunion professional musi- 
 cians who had not yet joined the AFM. Several jurisdictional 
 disputes were brought to an amicable termination. Written 
 contracts were negotiated with the record companies and film 
 producers for the first time. The principle of a royalty payment 
 into a fund used for the benefit of the musicians union was 
 formulated first in connection with the recording and tran- 
 scription companies and then carried over to the film and tele- 
 vision industries. Favorable agreements were concluded with the 
 radio and television networks. The most serious setback suf- 
 fered by the AFM in the last 10 years was the passage of the 
 Lea Act, the main result of which was that the network affiliated 
 radio stations and the independent stations were able to reduce 
 or eliminate the services rendered to them by live musicians. 
 
 Weber had had a relatively favorable press. From the time 
 Petrillo assumed the presidency of the international union in 
 1940, however, the new head of the AFM served as the butt of 
 vitriolic attacks by the newspapers and was caricatured unfavor- 
 ably by the cartoonists. Since 1948, when Petrillo decided to hire 
 a public relations adviser and to spend many tens of thousands 
 of dollars in influencing public opinion, there has been an 
 evident change in the treatment he has received from reporters. 
 In most descriptions of him which now appear, he is considered 
 to be a human being. 
 
 There have been several matters in which Petrillo has shown 
 an especial interest recently. He has clearly recognized and told 
 the members of the union that when business conditions deterio- 
 rate, it is necessary for the AFM to make concessions to employers 
 who are hard pressed to stay in business. 1 It is mainly for this 
 reason that the AFM has been waging a vigorous campaign 
 during the last few years to have the 20 per cent amusement tax 
 imposed on the prices charged by establishments where live 
 musicians are employed repealed. The union has maintained 
 that the decline in employment of musicians in restaurants, 
 night clubs, hotels, dance halls, and theaters might be arrested 
 
183 
 
 if the tax were eliminated. The tax has encouraged some employ- 
 ers to substitute wired music or juke boxes for the live musicians. 
 The employer thus is able to derive a revenue and to eliminate 
 the 20 per cent tax from his establishment. 
 
 The AFM has become more concerned with political activity. 
 Petrillo always has supported the Democratic party, but the 
 position of the union now is more clearly formulated and 
 regularly described in the pages of the International Musician. 
 The attitude generally follows the one taken by Labor's League 
 for Political Education of the AFL, to which body the musicians 
 union has given considerable financial support. The American 
 Federation of Musicians has made significant contributions in 
 assisting the government to conduct the "cold" war. The AFM 
 sometimes has donated its services and on other occasions has 
 waived its rules to make music available for the Voice of 
 America programs and to assist the Economic Cooperation 
 Administration. 2 
 
 • Technological Issues 
 
 The activities of the American Federation of Musicians affect 
 a quarter of a million members directly, but also have an impact 
 on the life of the nation. Leisure time and relaxation for millions 
 in the population are linked intimately with musical entertain- 
 ment. The decisions of the musicians union therefore should 
 be scrutinized closely by the public. Of most immediate concern 
 to the country has been the policy of the union in connection 
 with technological change. The position of the union on this 
 matter has been formulated slowly. 
 
 The musicians union suffered severe unemployment when 
 the sound films were introduced into the theaters. Since that 
 time the union has sought to arrest the development and utili- 
 zation of many mechanical devices and technological advances 
 in the field of music. Gradually, a distinction between the 
 different inventions has been made. Frequency modulation has 
 been recognized as a medium which will not involve any 
 displacement of musicians in the future. The television industry, 
 except for the use of kinescopes, seems to be of similar character. 
 The union decided therefore, though reluctantly, not to require 
 double crews when simultaneous broadcasts are made, although 
 
184 
 
 musicians do receive a higher wage rate for simulcasts involving 
 TV. The AFM also abandoned its attempt to impose especially 
 onerous conditions on cooperatively sponsored programs. 
 
 The situation differs when the musician helps to produce a 
 commodity which may be used subsequently to eliminate his 
 services. The first important invention of this kind was the 
 phonograph record. The problem has divided itself into two 
 parts. First, although the musician has been paid a high wage 
 scale by the company when he has performed for the recording, 
 he has had no further claim to remuneration no matter how 
 much income the company has earned from the record. Secondly, 
 the unlimited use of records by the radio stations has reduced 
 the need for live talent. In the last few years the disk jockey 
 and the juke box have become national institutions. 
 
 The AFM seems to have solved the first aspect of the problem. 
 The union has not been concerned primarily with the recording 
 musicians because the income of this group has been high. 
 Instead, the union has endeavored to assist those musicians who 
 supposedly are unemployed because of the encroachment of 
 records. Although the music performance trust fund has been 
 adopted as the means to that end, several alternatives had been 
 possible. 
 
 It has been proposed that the recording companies should 
 lease or rent their product, in a manner similar to the tran- 
 scription companies, rather than sell it outright. This procedure 
 would have enabled the companies to maintain control over the 
 phonographic record and prevent its unauthorized use by radio 
 stations, in juke boxes, and for other public commercial services. 
 The use of the records in the home, of course, would not be 
 supervised. This plan would have made it feasible for a fee to 
 be paid by radio stations and juke boxes for the use of records. 
 Court decisions which have nullified stipulations limiting the 
 use of the records to the home would have become inapplicable, 
 because records no longer would be sold. 
 
 It also has been proposed that the copyright law should be 
 modified. British laws provide for the payment of a fee to musi- 
 cians each time their records are used. The United States copy- 
 right law of 1909 provides that the composer and librettist of a 
 musical composition should receive royalties from radio stations 
 playing their records and from publishers of their songs. 3 Under 
 
185 
 
 a contract with the recording company, the band leader gets a 
 royalty on sales. Musicians in the band, however, are guaranteed 
 to receive nothing beyond the union scale, though they may be 
 paid above the scale. 
 
 The AFM admitted that performing musicians have been 
 well paid. It felt therefore that the copyright income should be 
 utilized for the benefit of unemployed musicians. This condition 
 would have necessitated transferring the receipts of the copy- 
 right from the performer to the union or assigning the copyright 
 to the manufacturer under a contract that a specified proportion 
 of the receipts would be turned over to the union. Neither the 
 union nor the recording companies were enthusiastic to obtain 
 copyright legislation of this nature. The union would have been 
 burdened with tax and administrative difficulties and possibly 
 with the resentment of recording musicians who would receive 
 none of the royalties. The companies were not disposed to 
 accept the principle of turning over copyright moneys to be used 
 for the benefit of musicians whom they never had employed. 
 Although copyright legislation might have been able to produce 
 the income which the union sought, the AFM never zealously 
 strove to obtain such provisions. 
 
 The manufacture of transcriptions never raised serious com- 
 plications because the industry is small and the product is leased, 
 not sold, to radio stations. The union receives a percentage of 
 the income of the transcription companies and hence is not 
 concerned particularly with the number of times the transcrip- 
 tion is used by the lessee. It is this plan which the musicians 
 union has adopted in connection with the television industry. 
 
 The second aspect of the problem is a major point of conten- 
 tion. Over the last decade there has been a gradual decline in 
 the number of staff musicians employed by radio stations in the 
 United States. To a larger extent, the independent stations have 
 depended on records for the musical portion of their schedules 
 and the affiliated stations have supplemented programs based 
 on records with programs supplied by the network. It is likely 
 that if this trend continues the union will give more attention 
 to the matter. The union, however, has not been able to gain 
 any control over the juke box operators. 
 
 Technological displacement problems seem to be less im- 
 portant to the musicians union today than at any time in the 
 
186 
 
 last 25 years. An adjustment has been made or a compromise 
 has been reached along many fronts. Yet as the future is envi- 
 saged several potential strike questions loom forth. First, a few 
 locals already have begun to exert pressure on the networks to 
 reduce the amount of time allotted to records and transcriptions. 
 The radio stations have resisted this demand forcefully. The 
 industry thus far has been free from any limitation on the use 
 of records and seems ready to take a strike rather than give way 
 on this issue. 
 
 Secondly, the growing use of the kinescope may raise a serious 
 issue. The kinescope, which for television corresponds to the 
 record in the radio industry, is a motion picture of a television 
 program. By building up a library of kinescopes it would be 
 possible for a TV station to operate a balanced schedule of 
 programs without employing musicians. The AFM has been 
 able to negotiate agreements with the TV networks that when 
 kinescopes are used the networks will allocate five per cent of 
 the income derived to a fund established for the benefit of 
 musicians. If the networks should decide not to renew such 
 contract provisions in the future it seems that a strike against 
 them is inevitable. 
 
 Thirdly, the union has begun to negotiate agreements along 
 similar lines for the use of regular motion pictures over tele- 
 vision. The union will try to prevent the motion picture film 
 industry or the television stations from presenting over video 
 the music of any film unless a payment is made to the music 
 performance trust fund. The AFM also must continue to 
 oppose the reuse of motion picture sound tracks in new pictures. 
 
 If the volume of unemployment among musicians becomes 
 high, the American Federation of Musicians may be expected 
 to take a stronger stand on some technological issues. Yet the 
 union must recognize that as long as it generally admits to 
 membership any person who claims to be a musician, the prob- 
 lem of unemployment may never be solved. Individuals are 
 inclined to join the union when they know that the union 
 provides for its unemployed. Everybody who can play an instru- 
 ment should not be classified as a professional musician. Persist- 
 ently high unemployment among musicians suggests that there 
 are too many of them and that some persons who consider 
 themselves to be professional musicians should be retrained. 
 
187 
 
 Some musical critics have supported the contention of the 
 union that excessive use of mechanical devices to replace live 
 musicians somehow must be blocked; otherwise a reduction in 
 the quality of musical performance eventually would take place 
 because persons would have less incentive to study music. The 
 ultimate result of such a situation would be a blow to cultural 
 progress. Although this argument has some merit, the economic 
 system in the United States leaves such decisions in the hands 
 of the public. The people must choose, through their monetary 
 outlays, the form of music they wish to hear. 
 
 The musicians union has accepted the principle that in a 
 democracy labor cannot permanently stifle technological prog- 
 ress. The decision by the union is wise. The public, however, 
 must recognize that technological change must come about 
 through a smooth adjustment without seriously disrupting the 
 lives of many workers. Stuart Chase concluded a study of the 
 problem of technology by saying: "The machine of itself brings 
 certain dangers and certain benefits. To my mind the latter 
 outweigh the former." 4 If machines are used with discretion they 
 serve to contribute greatly to the welfare of mankind. 
 
NOTES 
 
 Chapter I 
 
 1. Cecil Johns, "The Stony Road to Unionism," International 
 Musician, July 1946, p. 17. 
 
 2. International Musician, April 1950, p. 30. 
 
 3. Oscar Ameringer, If You Don't Weaken, 1940, p. 49. 
 
 4. International Musician, May 1907, p. 1. 
 
 5. Ibid., January 1946, pp. 1, 15. 
 
 6. American Musician, May 1, 1898, p. 3. 
 
 7. The biographical facts in Weber's life as detailed by the 
 union on different occasions show marked variation. Even 
 the year of his birth cannot be decisively established. See 
 International Musician, July 1925, p. 2 and January 1951, 
 p. 7. 
 
 8. Ibid., July 1927, p. 3. 
 
 9. New York Sun, July 17, 1904, p. 7:3. 
 
 10. John R. Commons, "Types of American Labor Unions— The 
 Musicians of St. Louis and New York," Quarterly Journal 
 of Economics, May 1906, p. 419. 
 
 Chapter II 
 
 1. Christian Science Monitor, March 18, 1922, p. 14:1 and 
 New York Times, April 21, 1918, p. 8:3. 
 
 2. Kunze v. Weber, 197 App. Div. 319, 323, May 27, 1921 
 (Appellate Division, New York Supreme Court) . 
 
 3. Musical Mutual Protective Union v. Weber (New York 
 Supreme Court) , New York Law Journal, October 4, 1922, 
 p. 41:3. 
 
 4. New York Tribune, December 20, 1893, p. 7:1 and Decem- 
 ber 23, 1893, p. 9:1. 
 
 5. Walter Damrosch, My Musical Life, 1923, pp. 212-14. 
 
 6. Philadelphia Public Ledger, December 14, 1908. 
 
 7. International Musician, July 1927, p. 1. 
 
 8. 47 Stat. 67, March 17, 1932. 
 
 9. The ban on contract labor was ordered on August 7, 1929 
 in P. C. 1413 and its suspension came on April 11, 1947 in 
 P. C. 1329. See Statutory Orders and Regulations of Canada, 
 Consolidation, 1949, Volume II, pp. 2183-84. 
 
189 
 
 10. Official Opinions of the Attorneys-General of the United 
 States, Volume 27, pp. 90-95. 
 
 11. 39 Stat. 166, 188-89, June 3, 1916. 
 
 12. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer- 
 ican Federation of Musicians, 1904, p. 76. 
 
 Chapter III 
 
 1. Westbrook Pegler, "Thieves with Union Cards," Collier's, 
 January 9, 1943, p. 30. 
 
 2. Bruce Dennis, "He Was Always Good at Arithmetic," The 
 Saturday Evening Post, October 12, 1940, p. 13. 
 
 3. International Musician, April 1922, p. 3. 
 
 4. Bruce Dennis, op. cit., p. 49. 
 
 5. Ibid. 
 
 6. Rizzo, Belcaster v. Petrillo, Records of Clerk, Circuit Court 
 of Cook County, Case B 281, 594, December 19, 1933; cited 
 in Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining 
 Works, 1942, p. 850. 
 
 7. Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, p. 74. 
 
 8. Geoffrey Parsons, Jr. and Robert M. Yoder, "Petrillo: 
 Mussolini of Music," The American Mercury, November 
 1940, p. 285. 
 
 9. International Musician, July 1949, p. 10. 
 
 10. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer- 
 ican Federation of Musicians, 1950, pp. 95-99. 
 
 11. A description of the Chicago local may be found in Twen- 
 tieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works 
 1942, pp. 848-66, 868. This is a section in the chapter on 
 Chicago Service Trades, written by C. Lawrence Christenson. 
 
 12. Robert Coughlan, op. cit., p. 70. 
 
 13. New York Times, January 14, 1943, p. 9:5, 6. 
 
 14. A good description of Petrillo by an artist who painted his 
 portrait may be found in International Musician, December 
 1949, p. 27. 
 
 15. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of 
 Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education 
 and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress, 
 2nd Session) , p. 308. 
 
 Chapter IV 
 
 1. International Musician, July 1929, p. 1. 
 
 2. See ibid., June 1930, p. 17. 
 
190 
 
 3. Ibid., May 1928, p. 21. 
 
 4. Ibid., November 1929, pp. 9-10. 
 
 5. New York Daily News, December 7, 1931, p. 22:3. 
 
 6. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians, 1932, p. 188. 
 
 7. New York Times, June 13, 1937, p. 1:4. 
 
 8. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians, 1951, p. 131. 
 
 9. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 194 Atl. 631, 
 October 8, 1937. 
 
 10. RCA Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F. 2d 86, CCA 2, July 
 25, 1940; affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, 311 U.S. 712, 
 December 16, 1940. 
 
 11. International Musician, October 1927, p. 22. 
 
 12. Quoted from the Chicago Tribune in the International Musi- 
 cian, January 1937, p. 13. 
 
 13. International Musician, September 1916, p. 9; see also ibid., 
 October 1914, p. 8. 
 
 14. Ibid., May 1938, p. 1. 
 
 Chapter V 
 
 1. Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before 
 a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
 United States Senate, 1942 (77th Congress, 2nd Session), 
 p. 110. 
 
 2. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of 
 Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education 
 and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress, 
 2nd Session), p. 371. 
 
 3. Official Journal, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater 
 New York, American Federation of Musicians, July 1940, 
 p. 9. 
 
 4. American Federation of Musicians, Constitution, By-Laws, 
 and Standing Resolutions, 1947, p. 20. 
 
 5. Ibid., p. 8. 
 
 6. Figures have been obtained from various union sources. For 
 some of the earlier years, conflicting figures may be found. 
 
 7. Figures on employment and earnings of musicians engaged 
 in the motion picture industry are reported by the union. 
 See Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the 
 American Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 132-33, for the 
 statistics for 1949. 
 
 8. International Musician, June 1927, p. 1. 
 
191 
 
 9. National Broadcasting Company, Inc., 59 NLRB 478, No- 
 vember 24, 1944 (certification), and 61 NLRB 161, March 
 31, 1945 (order to bargain). 
 
 10. National Labor Relations Board v. National Broadcasting 
 Co., Inc., 150 F.2d 895, 900, CCA 2, July 27, 1945. 
 
 11. International Musician, August 1948, p. 4. 
 
 12. Ibid., October 1949, p. 7. 
 
 13. New York Times, October 1, 1949, p. 2:3. See also Time, Oc- 
 tober 10, 1949, p. 92. 
 
 14. New York Times, October 5, 1949, p. 24:1. 
 
 15. International Musician, September 1950, p. 11. 
 
 16. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Joseph N. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 
 357, April 24, 1941. This decision overruled the Appellate 
 Division of the Supreme Court, 17 N.Y.S.2d 144, January 
 26, 1940, which in turn had overruled the decision of the 
 Supreme Court, 170 Misc. 272, January 24, 1939. 
 
 17. Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, June 23, 1947. 
 
 18. Official Journal, Allegro, Local 802, Associated Musicians of 
 Greater New York, May 1948, p. 6. But see ibid., March 1952, 
 p. 13, regarding responsibility for unemployment compensa- 
 tion taxes. 
 
 19. International Musician, May 1949, p. 8. 
 
 20. Ibid., March 1935, p. 8. 
 
 21. New York Times, January 18, 1949, p. 17:5. 
 
 22. International Musician, November 1947, p. 16. 
 
 Chapter VI 
 
 1. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 7-34. 
 
 2. Investigation of So-Called "Rackets," Hearings before a Sub- 
 committee of the Committee on Commerce, United States 
 Senate, Volume II, Part 1, 1934 (73rd Congress, 2nd Session) . 
 
 3. Official Journal, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater 
 New York, American Federation of Musicians, February 
 1945, p. 13. 
 
 4. See New York Times, June 28, 1948, p. 15:1 and March 18, 
 1949, p. 33:1. 
 
 5. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., 92 NLRB 1528, January 24, 1951; 
 reversed by Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Rela- 
 tions Board, 196 F. 2d 61, CCA 6, May 9, 1952. 
 
 6. New York World-Telegram, January 8, 1942, p. 17:1. 
 
 7. 1939 Laws of New York 2151, June 13, 1939. 
 
 8. International Musician, January 1950, p. 35. 
 
192 
 
 9. New York Times, September 12, 1946, p. 9:5. 
 
 10. Hotel Association of St. Louis, 92 NLRB 1388, January 17, 
 1951. 
 
 11. The text of the decision is printed in Official Journal, Al- 
 legro, Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York, 
 October 1950, p. 5. 
 
 12. Ibid., May 1951, p. 28. 
 
 13. The membership figures have been taken from the records of 
 the international union or of the local union. 
 
 14. New York Times, December 7, 1949, p. 1:6. 
 
 15. Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, p. 76. 
 
 Chapter VII 
 
 1. New York Times, August 14, 1940, p. 21:8. 
 
 2. See AGMA, Official Organ of the American Guild of Musi- 
 cal Artists, Inc., July- August 1937, p. 4 and September- 
 October 1937, p. 4. The union involved was the Grand 
 Opera Artists Association of America. 
 
 3. New York Times, August 30, 1940, p. 21:8. 
 
 4. Time, September 2, 1940, p. 45. 
 
 5. AGMA v. AFM, 23 N.Y.S.2d 947, November 19, 1940. 
 
 6. AGMA v. Petrillo, 24 N.Y.S,2d 854, January 24, 1941. 
 
 7. AGMA v. Petrillo, 286 N.Y. 226, July 29, 1941. 
 
 8. International Musician, June 1942, p. 25. 
 
 9. Ibid., June 1906, p. 8. 
 
 10. New York Telegraph, April 18, 1919; see Moses Smith, Kous- 
 sevitzky, 1947, p. 141. 
 
 11. John T. Morse, Jr., "Henry Lee Higginson," Harvard Grad- 
 uates' Magazine, March 1920, p. 391. 
 
 12. New York Times, August 14, 1940, p. 21:8. 
 
 13. Boston Globe, September 23, 1941; see Moses Smith, op. cit., 
 p. 318. 
 
 14. New York Times, December 15, 1942, p. 24:7. 
 
 Chapter VIII 
 
 1. Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before 
 a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
 United States Senate, 1942 (77th Congress, 2nd Session), 
 p. 3. 
 
 2. United States v. American Federation of Musicians, 318 
 U.S. 741, February 15, 1943, affirming 47 F. Supp. 304, Octo- 
 ber 14, 1942. 
 
193 
 
 3. International Musician, July 1908, p. 8. 
 
 4. RCA Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, CCA 2, July 
 25, 1940; affirmed 311 U.S. 712, December 16, 1940. 
 
 5. These hearings were held on January 12, 13, and 14, 1943. 
 The record was never published. 
 
 6. New York Herald Tribune, January 14, 1943, p. 14:2. 
 
 7. Electrical Transcription Mfrs., 16 War Lab. Rep. 369, June 
 15, 1944; the decision of the NWLB to take jurisdiction 
 was made on July 20, 1943, 10 War Lab. Rep. 157. 
 
 8. Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educa- 
 tional Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Inter- 
 state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 
 1945 (79th Congress, 1st Session), p. 16. 
 
 9. Time, November 20, 1944, p. 21. 
 
 10. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer- 
 ican Federation of Musicians, 1951, pp. 128-29. 
 
 11. Ibid., 1949, p. 145. 
 
 Chapter IX 
 
 1. New York Times, July 21, 1942, p. 15:2. 
 
 2. International Musician, January 1944, p. 10. 
 
 3. New York Times, February 9, 1945, p. 17:6. 
 
 4. Ibid., February 24, 1945, p. 13:3. 
 
 5. Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educa- 
 tional Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Inter- 
 state and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 1945 
 
 (79th Congress, 1st Session) . 
 
 6. New York Times, December 15, 1940, p. 1:2. 
 
 7. Ibid., April 21, 1944, p. 1:2. 
 
 8. Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 2nd Session, Volume 
 92, p. 1553. 
 
 9. 60 Stat. 89, April 16, 1946. 
 
 10. New York Times, May 29, 1946, p. 4:4. 
 
 11. Ibid., June 5, 1946, p. 14:1. 
 
 12. Ibid., December 3, 1946, p. 34:2. 
 
 13. Ibid., June 24, 1947, p. 5:6, 7. 
 
 14. The District Court handed down its decision on December 
 2, 1946 in United States v. Petrillo, 68 F. Supp. 845; the 
 Supreme Court ruled on June 23, 1947 in United States v. 
 Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1. 
 
 15. United States v. Petrillo, 75 F. Supp. 176, January 14, 1948. 
 
 16. New York Times, June 10, 1947, p. 1:6. Another version 
 
194 
 
 of the threat, less favorable to Petrillo, is given by Welling- 
 ton Roe. See Juggernaut, p. 212. 
 17. The code is reproduced in a Congressional document. See 
 Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of 
 Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education 
 and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress, 
 2nd Session) , pp. 363-65. 
 
 Chapter X 
 
 1. 61 Stat. 136, 157-58, section 302(c) (5), June 23, 1947. 
 
 2. National Labor Relations Board v. E. C. Atkins & Co., 331 
 U.S. 398, 403, May 19, 1947. 
 
 3. New York Times, June 4, 1946, p. 18:3. 
 
 4. Ibid., July 25, 1948, II, 5:1. 
 
 5. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer- 
 ican Federation of Musicians, 1949, pp. 103-4. 
 
 6. The various contracts with the recording and transcription 
 companies and the legal opinions of the government officials 
 are included ibid., pp. 152-86. 
 
 7. International Musician, July 1949, pp. 11-12. 
 
 8. New York Times, October 25, 1945, p. 23:4. 
 
 9. International Musician, April 1951, pp. 16, 33. 
 
 10. The various contracts may be found in Official Proceedings 
 of the Annual Convention of the American Federation of 
 Musicians, 1951, pp. 94-123. See also International Musician, 
 July 1950, p. 7 and New York Times, June 10, 1951, II, 3:1 
 and June 18, 1950, II, 13:6. 
 
 11. Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federa- 
 tion of Musicians, House of Representatives, Report No. 
 1162, December 15, 1947 (80th Congress, 1st Session), p. 6. 
 
 12. Investigation of James C. Petrillo, the American Federa- 
 tion of Musicians, et ah, Hearings before the Special Sub- 
 committee of the Committee on Education and Labor, 
 House of Representatives, 1947 (80th Congress, 1st Session) , 
 p. 185. 
 
 13. Ibid., p. 260. 
 
 14. Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federa- 
 tion of Musicians, op. cit., p. 12. 
 
 15. Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of 
 Musicians, Hearings before the Committee on Education 
 and Labor, House of Representatives, 1948 (80th Congress, 
 2nd Session), p. 114. 
 
195 
 
 16. Ibid., p. 361. 
 
 17. Ibid., p. 216. 
 
 18. Ibid., p. 101. 
 
 19. New York Times, January 10, 1950, p. 1:6 and January 11, 
 1950, p. 11:1. 
 
 Chapter XI 
 
 1. Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the Amer- 
 can Federation of Musicians, 1950, p. 92. 
 
 2. International Musician, August 1950, pp. 7, 34. 
 
 3. 35 Stat. 1075-76, March 4, 1909. 
 
 4. Stuart Chase, Men and Machines, 1929, p. 335. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 General Sources 
 
 Business Week 
 
 International Musician 
 
 Local 802, Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Ameri- 
 can Federation of Musicians, Official Journal, Allegro 
 
 New York Times 
 
 New York Times Index 
 
 Newsweek 
 
 Official Proceedings of the Annual Convention of the American 
 Federation of Musicians 
 
 Time 
 
 Books 
 
 Carpenter, Paul S., Music, an Art and a Business, 1950 (Chap- 
 ter 7-In Union There Is Petrillo, pp. 137-49) 
 
 Roe, Wellington, Juggernaut, 1948 (Chapter 16— G-Clef Caesar, 
 pp. 205-19) 
 
 Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works, 
 1942 (Chapter 15— Chicago Service Trades by C. Lawrence 
 Christenson: section 4, The Musicians of Chicago, pp. 848-66, 
 868) 
 
 Government Documents 
 
 Electrical Transcription Mfrs., June 15, 1944, 16 War Lab. Rep. 
 
 369-99 
 Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educational 
 
 Programs, Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and 
 
 Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, 79 Congress, 
 
 1 Session, February 22, 23, May 8, 10, 1945 
 Investigation of James C. Petrillo and the American Federation 
 
 of Musicians, House of Representatives, Report No. 1162, 
 
 80 Congress, 1 Session, December 15, 1947 
 Investigation of James C. Petrillo, the American Federation of 
 
 Musicians, et ah, Hearings before the Special Subcommittee 
 
 of the Committee on Education and Labor, House of Repre- 
 
197 
 
 sentatives, 80 Congress, 1 Session, June 17, 18, 19, July 7, 8, 
 August 4, 5, 6, 7, 1947 
 
 Investigation of So-Called "Rackets/' Hearings before a Sub- 
 committee of the Committee on Commerce, United States 
 Senate, 73 Congress, 2 Session, Volume II, Part 1, January 
 31, 1934 
 
 Prohibiting Certain Coercive Practices Affecting Radio Broad- 
 casting, House of Representatives, Report No. 1508, 79 Con- 
 gress, 2 Session, January 29, 1946; Part 2 (minority views) , 
 February 8, 1946 
 
 Restrictive Union Practices of the American Federation of Musi- 
 cians, Hearings before the Committee on Education and 
 Labor, House of Representatives, 80 Congress, 2 Session, Jan- 
 uary 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 22, 1948 
 
 Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, Hearings before a 
 Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, 
 United States Senate, 77 Congress, 2 Session, September 17, 
 18, 21, 1942 
 
 Magazine Articles 
 
 Beatty, Jerome, "Hard-Boiled Maestro," American Magazine, 
 October 1940, pp. 30-31, 130-31 
 
 Commons, John R., "Types of American Labor Unions— The 
 Musicians of St. Louis and New York," Quarterly Journal of 
 Economics, May 1906, pp. 419-42 
 
 Coughlan, Robert, "Petrillo," Life, August 3, 1942, pp. 68-70, 
 72, 74, 76 
 
 Countryman, Vern, "The Organized Musicians," University of 
 Chicago Law Review, Autumn 1948, pp. 56-85 and Winter 
 1949, pp. 239-297 
 
 Dennis, Bruce, "He Was Always Good at Arithmetic," The 
 Saturday Evening Post, October 12, 1940, pp. 12-13, 49-50, 
 52, 57 
 
 Lunde, Anders S., "The American Federation of Musicians and 
 the Recording Ban," Public Opinion Quarterly, Spring 1948, 
 pp. 45-56 
 
 Markey, Morris, "What Petrillo's Victory Means to You," Lib- 
 erty, May 19, 1945, pp. 24-25, 68-69 
 
 Parsons, Geoffrey, Jr. and Robert M. Yoder, "Petrillo: Musso- 
 lini of Music," The American Mercury, November 1940, pp. 
 281-87 
 
 Pegler, Westbrook, "Thieves with Union Cards," Collier's, Jan- 
 uary 9, 1943, pp. 21, 30 
 
 "Petrillo, James Caesar," Current Biography, 1940, pp. 650-52 
 
INDEX 
 
 Actor, 9, 86-88 
 Actors Equity, 88 
 
 Admission policy, 18, 21, 99, 108, 179 
 Allegro, 98-99, 107-108 
 American Association of School Ad- 
 ministrators, 162, 177 
 American Federation of Labor, 14- 
 16, 19-20, 24, 32, 49, 72, 84, 86- 
 89, 107, 113, 115, 118, 133, 153, 
 160, 181 
 American Federation of Musicians, 
 19-23, 25, 45-46, 181-183; 
 Boston Symphony, 119-131; 
 consolidation, 26-41; 
 finances, 64-65; 
 formation, 16-17; 
 Interlochen dispute, 149-163; 
 locals, 94-111; 
 
 membership, 56, 64, 80, 95; 
 organization and administration, 
 
 75-93; 
 Petrillo runs for office, 48; 
 radio, 143-146; 
 record ban in 1942, 132-141, 146- 
 
 148; 
 record ban in 1948, 164-169; 
 rival unionism, 43, 113-119; 
 second World War, 142-143; 
 technology, 54-61, 66-71, 164-180, 
 183-187 
 American Federation of Radio Art- 
 ists, 115, 159 
 American Guild of Musical Artists, 
 
 84, 113-119, 131 
 American Guild of Variety Artists, 
 
 86-88 
 American Musician, 21 
 American Musicians Union, 43, 45 
 49; 
 Petrillo joins, 44 
 American Society of Composers, Au- 
 thors and Publishers, 68, 126 
 Anti-Petrillo Act (see Lea Act) 
 Arbitration, 63 
 Armstrong, Edwin PL, 169 
 Arnold, Thurman, 133 
 
 Asch, Leonard L., 179 
 
 Associated Actors and Artists of 
 
 America, 118-119 
 Associated Musicians of Greater New 
 
 York, 95, 110 
 
 Bagley, Charles L., 48 
 Baltimore local, 13, 23 
 Band, 9, 21-22, 24, 27, 47, 81, 104- 
 
 105, 142, 150; 
 name, 27, 91, 134, 144, 167 
 Bartholdt, Richard, 39 
 Beissenherz, Henry D., 13, 17 
 Benny, Jack, 159 
 Bevin, Ernest, 98 
 Biddle, Francis, 133 
 Block, Martin, 143 
 Bonaparte, Charles J., 39 
 Bookers, 79, 81, 87, 93, 103, 117, 144, 
 
 178 
 Borge, Victor, 87 
 Boston local, 14, 23 
 Boston Symphony Orchestra, 34, 113, 
 
 119-131 
 Bowes, Edward, 155 
 Bremer, Alexander, 29-30 
 Brown, Clarence J., 139, 154 
 Browne, George E., 53 
 Burroughs, Julius C, 134 
 Byrnes, James F., 139 
 
 Cabot, Frederick P., 122-123 
 Canadian musicians, 24, 36, 40, 77- 
 
 78, 93, 142-146 
 Canavan, Edward M., 96 
 Carothers, Frank, 26 
 Carroll, Earl, 176, 178 
 Cermak, Anton J., 46, 48 
 Chase, Stuart, 187 
 Chavez, Carlos, 127 
 Chicago local, 13-14, 42-53, 62, 68, 
 73, 85, 143, 173-174; 
 
 administration, 51-52; 
 
 controversy, 22, 43; 
 
 formation of local 10, 43; 
 
 Negroes, 43 
 
199 
 
 Chicago Musicians Club, 43 
 Cincinnati local, 14, 20-21 
 Civil Liberties Union, 160 
 Clark, D. Worth, 75, 132, 136 
 Clark, Tom C, 133 
 Closed shop, 25, 99, 121, 135, 151 
 Collective bargaining, 24; 
 local union, 99-105; 
 national union, 81-84 
 Colonization, 36-37 
 Communists, 58, 91, 97-98 
 Conductor, 24, 57, 93, 102, 114, 119, 
 
 128 
 Congress of Industrial Organizations, 
 
 49, 154 
 Congressional investigation, 96, 152- 
 
 154, 158, 162, 176-180 
 Contract labor law, 33, 35-36, 41, 
 
 119, 122, 130 
 Contractor, 12, 24, 102 
 Coolidge, Calvin, 39-40, 46 
 Copyright legislation, 184-185 
 Coughlin, Charles E., 92 
 Cox, James M., 67 
 Creatore, Giuseppe, 27, 35 
 Crosby, Bing, 159 
 Curley, James M., 121 
 
 Damrosch, Walter, 34, 121, 152 
 Dane, Ernest B., 128-129 
 Darrow, Clarence, 46 
 Davis, Elmer, 132 
 Dawes, Charles G., 46 
 Denver local, 20; 
 
 controversy, 22, 43 
 Des Moines local, 92 
 Detroit local, 14 
 Dondero, George A., 160 
 Dorsey, Tommy, 51 
 
 Edison, Thomas A., 54 
 Elman, Mischa, 115 
 
 Featherbedding (See Standby) 
 
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, 160 
 
 Federal Communications Commis- 
 sion, 67, 134, 139, 144, 152, 169, 
 171, 173 
 
 Federal Radio Commission, 67 
 
 Feinberg, William, 100 
 
 Field, Marshall, 3d, 127 
 
 Flagstad, Kirsten, 116 
 
 Fly, James L., 134 
 
 Fradkin, Frederic, 123 
 
 Frequency modulation, 164, 169-172, 
 
 174-175, 179, 183 
 Frullate, Marie, 52 
 Furtwaengler, Wilhelm, 92 
 
 Gallup poll, 134 
 Gompers, Samuel, 16, 39 
 Goodman, Al, 157 
 
 Green, William, 49, 84, 87, 118, 148, 
 153, 157 
 
 Hanson, Howard, 127 
 
 Harding, Warren G., 39, 67 
 
 Hartley, Fred A., Jr., 176, 178 
 
 Heifetz, Jascha, 114-115, 139 
 
 Herbert, Victor, 27 
 
 Higginson, Henry L., 119-123, 128- 
 
 129 
 Hitler, Adolph, 122 
 Hoffman, Clare E., 76, 179 
 Hofmann, Josef, 116 
 Hope, Bob, 159 
 Horner, Henry, 48 
 Hotel, 46, 71, 104, 144, 182 
 Howard, Willie, 49 
 
 Immigration, 32-33, 91, 130 
 Initiation fee, 18, 90, 109 
 Injunction, 16, 25, 46, 86, 104, 116, 
 
 133 
 Interlochen dispute, 150-163, 176 
 Intermezzo, 52 
 International Alliance of Theatrical 
 
 Stage Employees, 53, 84, 88, 119 
 International Musician, 78, 89-90, 
 
 183 
 Iturbi, Jose, 115 
 Iucci, Charles R., 96 
 
 Jones, Spike, 87 
 
 Judd, George, 128 
 
 Juke box, 66, 70, 104, 135, 137, 141, 
 
 166, 183-185 
 Jurisdictional disputes, 82-88, 113- 
 
 119, 182 
 
 Kearns, Carroll D„ 162, 176-177 
 Kelly, Edward J., 48 
 Kickback, 102-103 
 Knights of Labor, 14-15 
 Koussevitzky, Serge, 124-125, 127-130 
 Kreisler, Fritz, 116 
 
200 
 
 La Buy, Walter J., 160-161 
 
 La Guardia, Fiorello H., 126, 150 
 
 Labor Management Relations Act 
 
 (see Taft-Hartley Act) 
 Lavelli, Tony, 87 
 Lea, Clarence F., 158 
 Lea Act, 50, 144, 146, 158-165, 176- 
 
 177, 182; 
 provisions, 158-159 
 Leaders, 13, 91, 93, 102-103, 185 
 League of New York Theaters, 100- 
 
 102 
 Lewis, John L., 49-50, 146 
 Lilienthal, David, 46 
 Living Music Day, 61 
 Local unions, 94-111; 
 
 finances, 89 
 Los Angeles local, 58, 82, 143, 167, 
 
 173-174, 176-178 
 
 Maddy, Joseph E., 151, 153-154, 161- 
 
 163, 176 
 Madison, James, 38 
 Marcantonio, Vito, 158 
 Mayer, William L., 48 
 McCann, Richard, 98 
 Metal Polishers Union, 84-85 
 Middle Ages, 9, 93 
 Miller, Owen, 16, 19-20, 41, 76 
 Milwaukee local, 14 
 Monroe, Vaughn, 87 
 Monteux, Pierre, 124 
 Motion Picture Internationals' Com- 
 mittee, 84 
 Motion Picture Producers Associa- 
 tion, 175 
 Motion pictures, 47-48, 54-61, 172, 
 181, 186; 
 industry, 82-84 
 Muck, Karl, 121-124 
 Music Defense League, 60 
 Music Educators National Confer- 
 ence, 150, 162, 177 
 Music performance trust fund, 105, 
 
 148, 167-168, 175, 184, 186 
 Musical Mutual Protective Union of 
 
 New York, 17, 28-32, 34 
 Musicians, 83, 93; 
 nineteenth century, 9-11; 
 nonprofessional, 12, 151; 
 professional, 10-12, 14-15, 27, 33, 
 
 71, 90, 105-106, 151-152, 186; 
 semiprofessional, 12; 
 
 unemployment, 47, 61-66, 88, 136, 
 
 163, 173, 177, 184-186; 
 unionization, 10, 12; 
 wages, 12, 17, 57, 81; 
 working conditions. 11-12, 27-28, 
 99 
 Mussolini, Benito, 46 
 Mutual Musical Corporation, 32 
 Muzak Corporation, 70-71, 104 
 
 National Association of Broadcast En- 
 gineers and Technicians, 85-86 
 National Association of Broadcasters, 
 
 134, 149 
 National Labor Relations Act (see 
 
 Wagner Act) 
 National Labor Relations Board, 85- 
 
 86, 101, 104, 145 
 National League of Musicians, 15-17, 
 23, 28, 38, 95; 
 formation, 14; 
 weaknesses, 18-19 
 National Music Camp (see Inter- 
 
 lochen dispute) 
 National Musical Association, 14 
 National Recovery Administration, 
 
 62-63 
 National War Labor Board, 137-139, 
 
 142, 157 
 Negroes, 43, 92-93, 107 
 New York local, 13-14, 17-18, 23, 62, 
 71, 167, 169, 173-174; 
 administration, 96-99; 
 collective bargaining, 99-105, 143; 
 consolidation, 94-99; 
 finances, 108-110; 
 local 802 chartered, 31; 
 membership, 106; 
 struggle with the AFM, 28-32; 
 unemployment, 105-108 
 Nixon, Richard M., 177 
 Nonunion musicians, 18, 23, 25, 64, 
 99, 107, 154, 182; 
 amateurs, 37, 50, 149-154, 159; 
 children, 37, 47, 50, 93; 
 foreign, 32-37, 120; 
 military, 37-40, 155, 162, 178 
 Norris-La Guardia Act, 86 
 
 Official Journal (see Allegro) 
 Owens, Thomas L., 179 
 
 Padway, Joseph A., 75 
 
201 
 
 Pecora, Ferdinand, 115 
 Pegler, Westbrook, 42 
 Pershing, John J., 40 
 Petrillo, Caesar J., 44 
 Petrillo, James C, 62, 69, 85, 87, 92, 
 97-98, 103-104, 108; 
 
 AGMA dispute, 113-119; 
 
 Boston Symphony dispute, 126-129, 
 131; 
 
 Chicago local, 45-48, 50-53, 112; 
 
 dispute with John L. Lewis, 49-50; 
 
 early life, 42-45; 
 
 frequency modulation, 170-171; 
 
 Interlochen dispute, 149-163; 
 
 national politics, 48, 183: 
 
 power, 75-76, 112; 
 
 radio, 145-146; 
 
 record ban in 1942, 132-141; 
 
 recordings, 68, 112-113, 147-148, 
 165-167; 
 
 relation to Congress, 176-179; 
 
 second World War, 141-142; 
 
 stature, 181-183; 
 
 succeeds Weber, 73-74; 
 
 technology, 60; 
 
 television, 172-173; 
 
 vice president of AFL, 181 
 Petrillo, James J., 52 
 Petrillo, Leroy, 52 
 Petrillo, Lester, 52 
 Petrillo, Marie, 52 
 Philadelphia local, 13-14, 23, 34-35 
 Pinza, Ezio, 116 
 Pittsburgh local, 23 
 Polish-American Musicians Union, 49 
 Pons, Lily, 115 
 Porter, Paul A., 139, 171 
 Price list, 13, 37, 100 
 Prohibition era, 27, 64 
 Pryor, Arthur, 27 
 Puerto Rico local, 76 
 
 Quorum Club, 30-31 
 
 Rabaud, Henri, 124 
 Rabin, Benjamin J., 158 
 Rachmaninoff, Sergei, 116 
 Radio, 45-47, 55, 82, 110, 136-137, 140, 
 149-150, 164, 181, 185-186; 
 
 cooperative programs, 175; 
 
 employment, 154-158; 
 
 recordings, 66-70 
 Ream, Joseph H., 53 
 
 Records, 54-55, 66-70, 82; 
 
 ban in 1942, 132-141; 
 
 ban in 1948, 164-169 
 Reed, James A., 39 
 Relief, 62-63, 109-110 
 Richberg, Donald, 46 
 Rival unions, 18, 23, 25, 37, 43, 46, 
 
 49 
 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 102, 150 
 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 48, 62, 72, 
 
 133, 139, 142 
 Roosevelt, Theodore, 35, 38 
 Rosenbaum, Samuel R., 168 
 Rothafel, Samuel L., 56 
 
 St. Louis local, 12-13, 19-20, 58 
 
 Screen Actors Guild, 115 
 
 Seattle local, 20 
 
 Shaw, Artie, 87, 157 
 
 Sheridan, Philip, 38 
 
 Sinatra, Frank, 159 
 
 Social security taxes, 90-91 
 
 Sousa, John P., 27 
 
 Spalding, Albert, 116-117 
 
 Standby, 50, 102, 104, 144-145, 149- 
 
 150, 155, 158, 163-164, 177 
 Steuer, Aron, 116 
 Stock, Frederick, 152 
 Strike, 24, 30-31, 45-46, 49, 57, 79, 
 87, 92, 123-124, 157, 159-160, 168, 
 174, 186; 
 
 benefits, 90, 110; 
 
 records, 68; 
 
 sit-in, 66; 
 
 sympathy, 88 
 Studio Basic Agreement, 84 
 Swarthout, Gladys, H5-116 
 Symphony orchestra, 9, 28, 34-35, 57, 
 
 82, 114, 119-131, 134, 142 
 Szigeti, Joseph, 127 
 
 Taft, Robert A., 92 
 
 Taft-Hartley Act, 50, 86, 92, 101, 
 
 104, 145, 164-165, 167-168, 178 
 Teamsters, 84, 107-108 
 Technology, 41, 88, 113, 183-187; 
 
 frequency modulation, 169-172; 
 
 radio, 142-146; 
 
 records, 132-141, 164-169; 
 
 sound films, 54-61; 
 
 television, 172-176 
 Television, 164, 172-176, 183-186 
 Templeton, Alec, 51 
 
202 
 
 Theaters, 31, 45, 47, 49-50, 53, 173, 
 182; 
 
 local bargaining, 100-102; 
 
 organization by musicians, 54, 56 
 Tibbett, Lawrence, 114-115 
 Transfer law, 22-23, 31, 36-37, 107 
 Truman, Harry S., 148, 158, 177, 179 
 
 Union Labor Life Insurance Com- 
 pany, 109 
 
 United Mine Workers, 49, 146-147 
 
 United Nations, 146 
 
 United States Conciliation Service, 
 137 
 
 Vacations, 106, 174 
 
 Vallee, Rudy, 159 
 
 Van, Gus, 87 
 
 Vandenberg, Arthur H., 152-154, 160 
 
 Vinson, Fred M., 138-139 
 
 Walsh, J. Raymond, 154 
 Walter, Bruno, 127 
 War Production Board, 139 
 W T eaver, Chauncey A., 138 
 Weber, Joseph N., 30-32, 39, 68-69, 
 76, 96, 112-113, 115, 120, 122, 
 163, 181-182; 
 
 assumption of presidency, 21-24; 
 
 criticizes Petrillo, 73, 112; 
 
 early life, 20; 
 
 health, 26, 72; 
 
 later life, 71-74; 
 
 praises Petrillo, 48; 
 
 sound films, 56-60 
 W T heeler, Burton K., 132, 136 
 Wilson, Woodrow, 39 
 Winkler, Joseph F., 45 
 Woll, J. Albert, 160 
 Woll, Matthew, 160 
 Work Projects Administration, 63, 92 
 
 Wagner Act, 85-86 
 Wallace, Henry A., 153 
 
 Zimbalist, Efrem, 115, 127