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 WANT OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTERS. 
 
 [SECOND EDITION.] 
 
 SIR R. PEEL'S SPEECH, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, THURSDAY MAY 27, 1841. 
 
 Price Fourpence. 
 
 Sir R. PEEL : I shall proceed without a word of needless apology or 
 elaborate preface to address myself to the subject of the motion of which 1 
 have given notice for this night. When on Thursday last the Chancellor 
 of the Exchequer intimated that it was his intention to proceed with the 
 business of the Government, I entertained a strong impression that after 
 the defeats to which that Government had been subjected — defeats, as I 
 thought, indicative of the withdrawal of the confluence of this house — indi- 
 cative of inability on their part to give effect to measures which they deemed 
 important for the public welfare — I . did feel, I say, that after that notice, 
 unaccompanied with the slightest explanation of Government, it was im- 
 possible for me to acquiesce in the propriety of the course proposed to be 
 pursued, without taking some step which should bring to issue the question, 
 whether Government did or did not possess the confidence of the House of 
 Commons ; and having come to that conclusion, I infinitely preferred 
 bringing the question to issue in the most direct and manlv manner in 
 which the sense of tlie house could be taken. I might hav r e resorted to 
 other proceedings. I might have obstructed the course of the government 
 with respect to measures of great importance to the commerce and industry 
 of the country. I might have threatened the government with obstructions 
 to the grant of supplies. I might have taken the milder course of submit- 
 ting a proposition for the postponement of some important bill, and thus, 
 in an indirect manner, testing the opinion of the house ; but I thought it 
 infinitely better, on the very first day the forms of the house would permit 
 me to do so, to bring, in the direct manner I now propose, under the consi- 
 deration of the House of Commons the question, whether it gives the present 
 government its confidence. 
 
 The resolution which I mean to propose affirms two propositions — first, 
 that her Majesty's government do not sufficiently possess the confidence of 
 the House of Commons to enable them to carry through the house measures 
 which they deem of essential importance to the public welfare ; and, se- 
 condly, that their continuance in office, under such circumstances, is at 
 variance with the spirit of the constitution. My duty is to establish those 
 propositions, and, if I do establish them, I have a fair right to claim the 
 assent of the house to the resolution which I am about to move. 
 
 With respect to my first proposition, that " ministers do not sufficiently 
 possess the confidence of the House of Commons to enable them to earn/ through 
 the house measures which they deem of essential importance to the public wel- 
 fare" is it necessary for me to offer any detailed proof of its truth % Will 
 any man affim, after the experience, not of one or two nights, but after a 
 long and continuous experience — will any man affirm that ministers posses, 
 so much of the confidence of the House of Commons as to enable them to 
 carry measures which ^hey deem of essential importance to the public wej. 
 fare? I am not speaking of occasional defeats. I am not speaking f 
 
 9
 
 2 
 
 occasional obstructions to the progress of public business. I speak of the 
 general course of public events. I speak of occasions in which measures 
 have been postponed almost without an effort to cany them. I speak of 
 other occasions on which measures proposed by the government have been 
 modified in deference to the opinions of those who opposed them. I am 
 speaking of their failure to carry into effect measures which they had strongly 
 recommended to the adoption of the house. I am speaking not, as I said 
 before, not of one or two failures, not of obstructions offered to the govern- 
 ment on its first formation ; but I am drawing my inference of loss of con- 
 fidence from the continuous course of the government in respect to legisla- 
 tion and the degree of support which they have received from the House of 
 Commons. I am speakng, of course, immediately with reference to the 
 defeat they sustained the other night on a most important measure connected 
 with the financial administration of the country, following other defeats 
 which they had recently met with. Now, I do say that these are complete 
 and decisive proofs that my first proposition is correctly stated — that the 
 government do not possess such a degree of confidence on the part of the 
 House of Commons as has enobled them, or will enable them, to give effect 
 to measures which they deem important to the public welfare. 
 
 If that proposition be true — if her Majesty's ministers do not possess the 
 confidence of the House of Commons, then, I say, that their continuance 
 in office is at variance with the principle and spirit of the constitution. I 
 presume I shall hardly be asked to define what I mean by the " spirit of 
 the constitution." I do not speak of those theories which refer to some 
 combination of the opposing elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and demo- 
 cracy, each armed with defensive and offensive instruments, by which they 
 keep each other in check. I speak only of that system of Parliamentary 
 government which has prevailed in this country since the accession of the 
 house of Hanover. I speak of that system which implies that the minis- 
 ters of the Crown shall have the confidence of the House of Commons. I 
 speak of that system which has prevailed during the period, when, according 
 to the expression — the just expression of the noble lord, whom I now see 
 opposite to me, in his able and dispassionate essay on the English constitu- 
 tion, " the centre of gravity of the state has been placed in the House of 
 of Commons." When I use the phrase, "spirit of the constitution," I 
 speak of the system of government which has maintained the equilibrium 
 between monarchy and democracy — of that system of government which 
 has harmonised those apparently conflicting elements — of that system of 
 government which, by the constant yet almost unfelt interposition of slight 
 checks, has prevented the necessity of recurring to the use of extreme in- 
 struments in the collision of antagonist powers. That is the spirit of the 
 constitution of which I speak, and that spirit of the constitution appears 
 to me to be violated by the continuance in office of ministers who have not 
 the confidence of the House of Commons. 
 
 My impression on that subject is confirmed by a reference to all historical 
 precedents having analogy to this case. It is confirmed by the authority 
 of all eminent writers, all statesmen versed in the practical administration 
 of affairs. But my impression also receives melancholy confirmation from 
 the actual experience of positive evils which arise when another system of 
 o-overnment is substituted for that which has hitherto prevailed. It is con- 
 firmed, likewise, by the course of historical precedent. I look to the period 
 which all constitutional writers have referred to as the period from which 
 dates the necessary system of parliamentary government, the appointment 
 of Sir R. Walpole to the office of premier minister at the accession of the 
 house of Hanover — and I say that, recurring to the history of administra- 
 tions, we shall find that invariably, or at least with scarcely an exception, 

 
 a minister, whatever might have been his power, however confirmed his 
 influence, however long the duration of his authority, when deprived of the 
 confidence of the House of Commons, has felt it incumbent upon him to do 
 homage to the principle of representative government, and to abdicate his 
 functions as minister of the Crown. I begin with Sir Robert Walpole. 
 He held office for, I think, the long period of twenty-five years. If I mis- 
 take not, he was appointed in 1715, and the termination of his power took 
 place about one hundred years from the period at which I am now speak- 
 ing, namely, in 1742. Sir R. Walpole was dispossessed of power under 
 these circumstances : — A motion was made by Mr Pulteney, which implied 
 the withdrawal of the confidence of the House of Commons. That motion 
 was negatived in favour of ministers by a majority of three ; but upon Sir 
 R. Walpole being in a minority on the Chippenham election (and then the 
 determination of election questions was exclusively influenced by party 
 spirit, and they were looked upon as convenient modes of testing the strength 
 of ministries), notwithstanding the slight majority which he had on the 
 question of confidence, Sir R. Walpole relinquished office, after having 
 been minister for twenty-five years. 
 
 In 1782 Lord North yielded to the same influence. In that year two mo- 
 tions were submitted to the House of Commons. The first was brought 
 forward by Sir John Rouse, and the second by Lord G. Cavendish. One 
 motion declared that it was impossible for the house to place confidence in 
 tlie Government, and the other was couched in terms very nearly similar. 
 One was negatived by a majority of nine, the other by a majority of ten ; 
 but Lord North, nevertheless, yielded to the necessity implied by the with- 
 drawal of the confidence of the House of Commons ; and his authority also 
 came to an end. In 1804, Lord Sidmouth retired from office, although he 
 had in his favour a majority which has been almost unknown in the recent 
 history of parliamentary contests. Lord Sidmouth, in the* course of his 
 administration, frequently had majorities to a great extent, but they having 
 been reduced to, I think, thirty-seven, his lordship felt it his duty to retire. 
 He considered a majority of thirty-seven only as indicative of the with- 
 drawal of the confidence of the House of Commons. In 1812, on the first 
 formation of Lord Liverpool's government, the House of Commons, on the 
 motion of Lord Wharncliffe (then Mr. Stuart W T ortley), by a majority of 
 four agreed to a resolution expressing an opinion that a more efficient ad- 
 ministration ought to be formed. That majority of four was decisive of 
 the fate of the first administration attempted to be formed by Lord Liver- 
 pool. He and his colleagues resigned their trust into the hands of the 
 Sovereign, and it was not until attempts, which proved ineffectual had been 
 made to form another administration, that Lord Liverpool was again placed 
 in office. The next administration which yielded to the influence of public 
 opinion, as expressed by the House of Commons, was that which was pre- 
 sided over by my noble friend the Duke of Wellington. In 1830, on the 
 meeting of Parliament upon the question whether or not the Civil List 
 should be referred to a committee of the House of Commons, we were de- 
 feated by a combination of parties entertaining opposite opinions, and the 
 House of Commons resolved by a majority of, I think, twenty-nine, to refer 
 the consideration of the Civil List to a select committee. I felt that a 
 minority in which the government had been left was decisive of its fate. I 
 thought it sufficiently significant of the fact that we had not the confidence 
 of the House of Commons ; and therefore the Duke of Wellington and 
 myself felt it our duty to retire from office. The right lion, baronet oppo- 
 site, the President of the Board of Control, will recollect that upon that 
 occasion his opinion anticipated ours. I recollect that immediately after 
 the deision, the right lion, baronet, entertaining an opinion which was just
 
 and natural, and which was in conformity with that of many others, en- 
 quired from me, " whether, after such an expression of opinion on the part 
 of the house, it was the intention of ministers to retain their places and 
 continue to carry on the government ?" 
 
 [Sir J. C. Hobhouse : Since that period I made an apology to the house 
 for having done so, and said that I considered the course I pursued very 
 improper.] 
 
 Sir R. Peel : I am sure I never thought of complaining of any want of 
 courtesy on the part of the right honourahle baronet. I never thought 
 that the right honourable baronet proposed the question in an offensively 
 hostile manner, and if I had supposed so, I would not have alluded to the 
 circumstance on this occasion. The opinion which the right honourable 
 baronet implied by his question, was entirely confirmed by the House of 
 Commons. Lord Brougham in vain attempted to ajmease the impatience 
 of the House of Commons on that night, and my own opinion so strongly 
 concurred with that implied by the right honourable baronet's question, 
 that, on the next day, I signified to the Crown my intention to withdraw 
 from its service. On the night after the right honourable baronet put his 
 question, which never excited an angry feeling in my mind, Mr. Brougham 
 suggested that, after what had taken place, it would be better to permit the 
 ministers of the Crown to have some time for deliberation, and, considering 
 the position in which they were placed, proposed that the appointment of 
 the committee, which it was wished should take place immediately, should 
 be deferred till the next day. His advice, hoAvever, was overruled ; and 
 such was the impatience of the House of Commons to proceed to some deci- 
 sive act which should imply the downfall of the government, that, on that 
 very night, the select committee on the civil list was appointed. The next 
 administration which also yielded to public opinion, as signified by that of 
 the House of Commons, Avas that over which I myself presided for a short 
 time in 1835. I did carry on, for a short time, an unequal contest in op- 
 position to the power leagued against me ; but this I must say, that the 
 first time I was positively obstructed in an act of legislation, that moment 
 I felt it my duty to withdraw from the management of public affairs. I 
 beg to remind the noble lord, that, at a much earlier period than the date 
 of my resignation, he implied an opinion that I was holding power inju- 
 riously to the public interests, because I did not possess the confidence of 
 the House of Commons. So far back as the 2d of March the noble lord ob- 
 served, that he believed no ministry ever stood before, in respect to the 
 House of Commons, in so extraordinary a position ; and the noble lord ob- 
 served on the evil influence which my attempt might have upon public 
 affairs. On the 16th of March, the noble lord said, " I own I come more 
 and more to the opinion that Ave ought to revert, Avhenever Ave can, to that 
 old practice of the constitution, under Avhich the poAvers of the CroAvn Avere 
 administered and exercised by persons in whom the house and the country 
 had confidence." The noble lord said, that Avhile persons exercised the 
 poAvers of the CrOAvn in AA r hom the house reposed no confidence, they im- 
 posed the necessity of making motions most inconvenient, and, perhaps, un- 
 constitutional, such as that Avhich had been made relative to the appoint- 
 ment of a noble friend of mine to an embass}- at St. Petersburg. The noble 
 lord said — 
 
 " You, by remaining in poAver, are contravening the principles of representative 
 government, and you alone are responsible for the delays and obstructions that may 
 arise, or for any offence to which, by your acts, the Crown is exposed. " 
 
 The noble lord Avas then, day by day, waxing stronger in the opinion, that 
 we ought to revert to the old practice of the constitution.
 
 [Lord J. Russell made some observation across the table.] 
 Sir Robert Peel continued : So little did I think that I had cause of 
 personal offence in the remark made in 1830, that in 1835 I myself shared 
 the opinion of the noble lord. In 1835 the right lion, gentleman opposite 
 told me that the fault and difficulty of my position did not rest with the 
 opposition, but from an act which would be the fruitful source of evils, 
 namely, the endeavour to govern by a minority ; and being therefore, fully 
 sensible of the difficulties of my position, so soon as the noble lord had 
 carried a resolution which implied that no adjustment of the tithes would be 
 satisfactory except that which he advocated, I did not wait for the progress 
 of the bill, for I thought that the resolution indicated that I did not possess 
 the confidence of the House of Commons ; and, therefore, being obstructed 
 in the progress of important legislation, although I had remained in office 
 after having been defeated on the amendment to the address, and on the 
 choice of a Speaker ; yet, being, as I have said, obstructed in the progress 
 of important legislation, I at once signified my intention of resigning office. 
 In speaking of administrations which have yielded to the authority of the 
 House of Commons, I have omitted to mention a case in which the prece- 
 dent appears at first sight to be somewhat different. I mean in 1780, when 
 Mr. Pitt, notwithstanding the adverse votes of the House of Commons, 
 remained in office, and continued to hold office, until he could take the 
 sense of the people by a dissolution. But I contend that the circum- 
 stances of that case were in no degree analogous to the present. The cir- 
 cumstances of the contest between Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox, in 1783, were 
 these : — On December 17, 1783, the bill which had been brought in by Mr # 
 Fox, for the regulation and management of affairs in India, was rejected. 
 On the 17th of December, the very same day, the House of Commons 
 resolved to go into a committee of the whole house on the state of the nation 
 on the Monday following. On the 19th of December the government of Mr. 
 Fox and Lord North was dissolved, and on the 19th of December Mr. Pitt 
 was appointed minister. But before Mr. Pitt could take his place as 
 minister in the House of Commons an address to the Crown was moved not 
 to dissolve Parliament. At the outset of the government, before even there 
 was time for the re-election of Mr. Pitt, his seat being vacated by the ac- 
 ceptance of office, an address to the Crown was moved not to dissolve 
 Parliament, and his Majesty was earnestly entreated to hearken to the 
 advice of his faithful Commons, and not to the secret advices of particular 
 persons who might have private interests of their own, separate from the 
 interest of his Majesty and his people. An adjournment of Parliament 
 took place. Parliament re-assembled on the 12th of January, 1784, and 
 before any one act of the government could be submitted to the considera- 
 tion of the House of Commons, on the very day on which Mr. Pitt appeared 
 to the House os Commons as minister of the Crown, on the very first day, 
 a resolution of the house was come to as follows : 
 
 " That it is the opinion of this committee that in the present state of his Majesty's 
 dominions, it is peculiarly necessary that there should be an administration which 
 has the confidence of this house and the public." 
 
 On the 10th of January, four days after the meeting of Parliament, it was 
 moved by Lord Charles Spencer — 
 
 " That the appointments of his Majesty's present ministers were accompanied by 
 circumstances new and extraordinary, and such as do not conciliate or engage the 
 confidence of this house j" and that " the continuance of the present ministers in 
 trusts of the highest importance and responsibility, is contrary to constitutional 
 principles, and injurious to the interests of his Majesty and the people." 
 
 The objection to the continuance of Mr. Pitt, was not that the confidence 
 of the House of Commons was witheld from the measures which he proposed.
 
 There were surmises or allegations that Mr. Pitt owed his power to the 
 exercise of undue influence ; that the King's name had been made use of. 
 for the purpose of influencing elections. The objection, therefore, was 
 taken at the outset to the administration of Mr. Pitt. Before Mr. Pitt 
 could take his seat, hostile resolutions were come to ; and before he could 
 bring forward any one act of government upon which the sense of the House 
 of Commons could be taken, resolutions were affirmed implying objections, 
 not to acts of that government, but to the principle upon which it was con- 
 stituted. The principle involved was not the principle that a minister 
 ought to have the confidence of the House of Commons for the purpose of 
 carrying on the government, but it was contended that Mr. Pitt having a 
 majority in the House of Commons, was attempting to controul the consti- 
 tutional perogative of the Crown, and, without reference to the public acts 
 of the government, implied beforehand a want of confidence in that admin- 
 istration. True, there were in that case repeated motions implping a want 
 of confidence, but I say the circumstances are not analogous — that they did 
 not imply want of confidence in the acts proposed by that government, but 
 a suspicion that it owed its origin to unconstitutional causes ; and it was 
 the duty of the House of Commons to reprobate such a formation. It was 
 upon that principle that the great contest took place in 1783 and 1784, and 
 which led to a dissolution. But in the case analogous ! Am I obstructing 
 a government at its first formation ? Am I depriving it of the opportunity 
 of submitting its measures to the consideration of Parliament ? Am I not 
 arguing that you have had in repeated sessions the opportunity of laying 
 before the House of Commons the measures you think essential to the public 
 welfare, and that in some cases those measures have been so altered and modi- 
 fied, and in other cases have so completely failed, or have met with so 
 little support either in principles or details, that this long-continued expe- 
 rience of your weekness is the foundation of the resolution I propose. I sa} r 
 that constitutional precedent — that the records of history, with one excep- 
 tion only, and that not analagous — show that ministers, not possessing the 
 confidence of the House of Commons, have felt it their duty to relinquish 
 their offices. I say again, that the authority of public men and public 
 writers come in aid of that constitutional principle. The authority of Mr. 
 Burke — the authority of all who have advocated the popular principle of 
 representative government — all are in unison with the opinion I have ex- 
 pressed on this point, and confirm the view I have taken. Mr. Burke said : 
 " A House of Commons respected by his ministers is essential to his Majesty's 
 service. It is fit that they should yield to Parliament, and not that Parliament 
 should be new modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If our authority is only 
 to be held up when we coincide in opinion with his Majesty's advisers, but is to be 
 set at nought the moment it differs from them, the House of Commons will sink 
 into a mere appendage of administration, and will lose that independent character 
 which, inseparably connecting honour and reputation with the acts of this house, 
 enables us to afford a real, effective, and substantial support to his government. It 
 is the deference shown to our opinion, when we dissent from the servants of the 
 Crown, which alone can give authority to the proceedings of this house when it 
 concurs with their measures." 
 
 That was the opinion of Mr. Burke. What was the opinion of Mr. Fox ? 
 He says : — 
 
 " That it was true, that the most solid and incontrovertible basis upon which a 
 government could be built, was the confidence of the House of Commons. He 
 meant that cordiality and union that constituted the spring of the House of Com- 
 mons ; and it was the confidence in the House of Commons which gave energy 
 and effect to every administration. However disagreeable the issue, it must be 
 imputed to those who thought themselves wiser than the House of Commons, and 
 they alone must answer for it."
 
 But did Mr. Fox say, it was the duty of a minister never to differ from the 
 House of Commons 1 Did lie not, on the contrary, arrogate to himself the 
 right of proposing measures he deemed necessary for the public welfare, not- 
 withstanding the adverse opinion of the house ? He said : — 
 
 " He was far from meaning that a minister was never justifiable in differing from 
 the House of Commons. No man was more likely so to differ than himself; but 
 he would adhere to his own opinion, and when he found that the house differed 
 from himself he would resign, and say to the House of Commons— 'Choose some 
 other instrument to carry on the public business ; I am no longer fit to serve you.'" 
 
 Such were the opinions of Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox. I will now refer to 
 another high constitutional authority — no other than the noble lord him- 
 self, as expressed in that work to which I have before referred, and now 
 refer again with the most sincere respect, as containing a most moderate, 
 dispassionate, and able view of the British Constitution. The passage I am 
 about to quote, be it remembered, is no hasty expression uttered by the no- 
 ble lord during the heat and excitement of debate, but is the calm and deli- 
 berate opinion of the noble lord delivered in his character of a writer on the 
 constitution of the country, upon the relative position of the Crown and the 
 House of Commons. The noble lord says : — 
 
 " The accession of Geoige I. was the era when government by party was fully 
 established in England. During the reign of William, Whigs and Tories had been 
 employed together by the king ; and although the distinction of a Whig ministry 
 and a Tory ministry were more decidedly marked during the reign of Anne, yet 
 Marlborough and Godolphin, who formed great part of the strength of the Whig 
 ministry, were Tories; and H.irley and St. John, who put themselves at the head 
 of the Tory administration, had held, a short time before, subordinate offices under 
 the Whigs. But the complete downfal of the Tory administration, who had signed 
 the peace of Utrecht, and the well-founded suspicion, which attached to the whole 
 party, of favouring the claim of James II.'s son, placed George I. entirely in the 
 hands of the Whigs. At the same period, the financial difficulties which followed 
 the winding up of the war, and the great practical talents of Walpole as a statesman, 
 contributed to give agreater importance to the House of Commons than ever, ai d 
 to place within that house, if I may so express myself, the centre of gravity of the 
 State." 
 
 The noble lord sets forth in powerful language the necessity for minis- 
 ters enjoying the confidence of the House of Commons, and paints the con- 
 sequences that would follow from such a departure from the constitution 
 as their remaining in power without possessing that confidence. He tells 
 us that 
 
 " Their measures will be thwarted,their promises distrusted, and finding all their 
 steps obstructed, their efforts will be directed to the overthrow of the constitution." 
 
 Now, though the noble lord opposite is in office, I will not take the ex- 
 treme view he has taken of the consequences of persevering in that cause. It 
 may not follow that the ministers being obstructed will meditate " the 
 overthrow of the constitution," but those other evils that the noble lord 
 has spoken of must necessarily and inevitably follow, as the consequences of 
 endeavouring to govern by a minority in the House of Commons. You 
 cannot, in this country, restrict the influence of party. You say " you have 
 met this government by party opposition." Why not lend them your cor- 
 dial and hearty support, without reference to their merits and thus enable 
 them to go on. Why, the noble lord himself has scouted such an idea. 
 The noble lord said " that from the collisions of party arose the vital energy 
 of the constitution, and that among the denouncers of party conflicts he 
 never found any others than mock philosophers — effeminate men and sen- 
 timental women." 
 
 " The natural and inevitable consequence (he continued) of endeavouring to
 
 8 
 
 govern by a minority would be such as I met with. Almost every night my pro- 
 ceedings were obstructed. Even irr committee of supply I was prevented from 
 proceeding with the public business, and ultimately I resigned." 
 
 But of all the administrations that ever existed, considering the relative 
 position of majority and minority, there never w r as a government that had 
 met with less of obstruction, or less of factious or of mere violent and vexa- 
 tious opposition than the present. 
 
 But this much I will say, without any extravagant apprehensions as to 
 the overthrow of the constitution, that practical experience proves that 
 great evils, absolute and inevitable evils, in the administration of public 
 affairs, will result from the suspension of constitutional rules and the at- 
 tempt govern without sufficient power. Let me take the present Parlia- 
 ment. Let me take three measures — one at the commencement of Parlia- 
 ment, one when it may be considered to have arrived at maturity, and one 
 of more recent occurrence, now that it is supposed by some to be verging 
 towards an end. Let me take the history of the appropriation clause, of 
 the Jamaica Bill, and lastly, of the Sugar Duties. Can I see what has 
 taken place on these three questions without coming to the conclusion that 
 by the course pursued in regard to them the authority of the House of Com- 
 mons has not been supported ? I never taunted the noble lord with aban- 
 doning the appropriation clause. I thought he was placed in a situation of 
 necessity, which upon the whole, made it desirable for the public interest 
 that the question should be settled without it. But can I conceal from 
 myself that that situation of necessity arose from the weakness of the 
 government itself ? from that want of confidence which left the government 
 no alternative than to recede from the most express engagements, or by not 
 receding from them to sacrifice a great public interest. 
 
 Let me now take the Jamaica Bill. Do I want any proof of the evil 
 consequences that arose from that measure on account of its abandonment 
 by the government? The ministers brought in a bill, the object of which 
 was, to extinguish representative government in the colony of Jamaica. 
 They failed. We opposed them. They were compelled to bring in another 
 bill in conformity with our views upon the subject. But what was the 
 statement of anticipated evils that was made by the noble lord at the head 
 of the government, and by the noble lord the Secretary for State ? Lord 
 Melbourne said — 
 
 " It is obvious that in Jamaica the authority of the Crown will be greatly weak- 
 ened by any vote of the House of Commons giving support to the contumacy of 
 the Assembly at Jamaica, against the proposition of the ministers of the Crown. 
 In continuing in the administration of affairs, not having a sufficient degree of 
 confidence and support to carry on those affairs efficiently in this house, we should 
 be exposing to jeopardy the colonies of this country." 
 
 Lord Melbourne went on to state : — 
 
 " I say the measure (the Jamaica bill) is of paramount, of indispensable im- 
 portance for the great object of emancipation — that the vote of the House of Com- 
 mons was fatal to that measure. Not only that, but it indicates with sufficient 
 clearness and distinctness such a want of confidence on the part of great body 
 in the other house of Parliament, as to render it absolutely impossible that we 
 should continue to administer the affairs of her Majesty's government in a manner 
 useful and beneficial to the country." 
 
 That was the opinion you gave as to the degree to which colonial interests 
 were compromised by the attempt to govern by a minority in the House of 
 Commons. Now let us take the case of the sugar duties. Can you, or "can 
 any man say, that the position of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was a 
 satisfactory or becoming position, when, after the grounds of the measure
 
 had been stated, after the importance that had been attached to it, after the 
 expectations of relief that had been held out as a consequent upon its passing ; 
 was it, I ask, a becoming position in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
 was placed, when he moved, without one single word, the adoption of the 
 existing sugar duties, precisely in conformity with our views'. 
 
 I say that those measures to which I have referred, and which are but 
 specimens and examples, are conclusive proofs that the evils which the noble 
 lord prophetically anticipated, as arising from the thwarting and obstruction 
 of the government, have been practically realized, as we ourselves have had 
 the opportunity of observing. Is this for the credit of the house of Com- 
 mons ? Is this for the maintenance of its authority as one of the consti- 
 tuent branches of the legislature 1 Alas! no. It may appear to a super- 
 iicial observer, that it is a proof of the strength of the prerogative of the 
 crown, that it should be able to support its ministers without a majority of 
 the House of Commons. But that is an imperfect and mistaken view. The 
 interests of the Crown and the interests of the House of Commons are iden- 
 tical. You cannot strike a blow at the House of Commons in its just and 
 legitimate authority, without at the same time striking a blow at the mo- 
 narchy of this country. But can it be said to add to the authority of the 
 monarchy that its ministers and representatives, who counsel measures in 
 this house on the authority of the Crown ? Can it be supposed that the 
 sorry triumph of being maintained in power by the Crown is a compensation 
 for the delays, for the spectacle of insufficiency and want of authority in 
 the government we have recently beheld ? 
 
 It may be said, " True, we may not have the confidence of the House of 
 Commons, but, perhaps, as Mr. Pitt was able to say, though Mr. Fox 
 denied it, if we fail in the House of Commons, there are sufficient indica- 
 tions that we possess the confidence of the country. First, however, I 
 should say with Mr. Fox, it is dangerous to admit any other recognised 
 organ of public opinion than the House of Commons. It is dangerous to 
 set up the implied or supposed opinions of constituencies against their 
 declared ami authorized organ, the House of Commons. The house and the 
 constituencies should not be brought into this unseemly contest. But if 
 you deny the force of that argument — if you hold that it is right to refer to 
 the opinions of the constituencies — can you, I ask, show me, in the elections 
 that have recently taken place, any just ground for the boast that the con- 
 fidence withheld from you by the house has been extended to you by the 
 constituencies of the empire ? I know not exactly how many vacancies 
 have occurred since the commencement of the present Parliament ; I believe 
 them to have been upwards of one hundred, but this I can say with confi- 
 dence, that upon the general balance there have been twenty elections in 
 which there have been changes of the former members, and of those twenty, 
 embracing large towns, boroughs, agricultural districts, in fact, every kind 
 and description of constituency, out of those twenty in which changes have 
 taken place, sixteen have been averse to you, and four only have been in 
 your favour. So that upon the whole in those places where changes have 
 taken place during the present Parliament there has been a positive loss of 
 not less than twelve members. I say, then, whatever may be the object 
 you expect from an appeal to the people, if that be the course you are medi- 
 tating, you have no right to say from the result of the elections hitherto, that 
 the opinion of the constituencies differs from that of their representatives. 
 I know very well it will be said, that although the doctrine I have broached 
 that ministers should not retain their power without a majority of the 
 House of Commons may be right under ordinary circumstances, yet there 
 are here special and peculiar circumstances. But we also know- that if 
 once you, being the judges — you, the executive government — may discover
 
 10 
 
 special and peculiar circumstances, operating- as a reason why you are to be 
 exempted from the ordinary rule that guides executive governments, there 
 is no limit to the application of the principle. The men who are to decide 
 upon the application of that principle are not quite impartial judges. 
 
 Perhaps, however, it may be said that you contemplate an appeal to the 
 people, and that you are holding office for the purpose of making - that appeal. 
 I know nothing whatever upon that subject. As a member of the House 
 of Commons I can have no evidence of the intentions of the Crown. But 
 I see you repeatedly in minorities ; I see indications that you have not 
 the confidence of this house. I know that you have power at any time to 
 dissolve — I know, too, that you can choose the most favourable time for a 
 dissolution. No doubt that is the prerogative of the Crown, a prerogative 
 of a delicate nature for the House of Commons to meddle with. But all 
 this does not relieve me from acquitting myself from what I conceive to be 
 a duty in calling upon the House of Commons to say if her Majesty's govern- 
 ment possess their confidence or not. And here too I will say, that I shall 
 have no additional confidence if, after exciting the public mind upon such a 
 subject as the sustenance of the people, you then make your appeal to the 
 country by a dissolution. I believe that you are not by that course advanc- 
 ing the measure which you advocate. I do not underrate the power of 
 clamour. I do not underrate the evils arising out of the conflict of opposing 
 parties. I do doubt your power to carry that law, as I doubt your power 
 to carry a proposal of a shilling a bushel fixed duty. Although I have no 
 right to anticipate the decision of the house upon the corn-law, but I appeal 
 to any rational man whether he does not concur with me in this conclusion, 
 that you are bringing forward your measure without a hope of being able 
 to carry it [loud cheers], or of procuring the assent of the present House of 
 Commons to your proposition. Therefore you bring it forward, I will not 
 say for the purpose of creating that which must be the necessary effect of 
 bringing the question before us — namely, the increased agitation of the 
 public mind. Still you will urge your intention of making a settlement of 
 the question, and, after taking a debate upon the corn-law, you will reserve 
 to yourselves the power of making an appeal to the country. I disregard 
 that consideration altogether as a reason for your conduct, and I am forti- 
 fied in so doing by the course you have taken with respect to another measure 
 of scarce less importance. I mean the consideration of the poor law. 
 What is the course you have adopted ? You proposed without, I think, a 
 sufficient authority, as a government, to submit an important measure on 
 the subject of the corn-laws, and yet at the same time you know you will 
 not bring forward a measure which you deem of most essential importance 
 — that for the amendment of the poor-law. And on what ground do you 
 withhold the consideration of that subject [loud cheers] % I have, upon 
 your own authority, from a statement made Ijy your own mouth, the reason 
 you withheld from the discussion in the House of Commons of a question 
 which you regard as of paramount importance ; and that reason is thus 
 expressed in a speech made by the noble lord opposite a short time ago. 
 The noble lord said, " It would be better, in the present state of affairs, not 
 to proceed with the Poor-law Amendment Bill." And on what grounds? 
 " That it would occasion protracted discussion, without leading to any final 
 result, and that speeches would be made with a view to the hustings." 
 That is the ground which you urge to the House of Commons as a 
 reason for withdrawing from the further discussion of the question of the 
 poor-laws — that there would be protracted discussion without final result. 
 If you expect protracted discussion without final result as applied to the 
 poor-laws, may not I anticipate the same as applied to the corn-laws ? If 
 I deviate from strict form— if I am unobservant of technicalities in antici-
 
 11 
 
 pating a discussion on the corn-laws, do not yon fall in the same error in 
 making prophecies in respect; tp a discussion on the poor-laws % You think 
 that that is a legitimate ground of action — you expect that there will he long- 
 discussion without final result on the poor-laws — I anticipate the same with 
 respect to the corn-laws. Nay, more : the no! >Ie lord (Lord John Russell) in the 
 next place said, that, with the expectation that every honourahle member 
 seemed to have that he would soon be obliged to account for his conduct upon the 
 hustings, he (Lord J. Russell ) thought that a great many motions, and a great 
 many speeches would be made, intended rather for the hustings than for any 
 useful purpose of legislation. Therefore, it was not upon the unpopularity of 
 the law — riot because the support of that law might inconvenience honour- 
 able members at a general election, but upon the ground that there would 
 be long discussion without final result, and that members would make 
 speeches addressed to the hustings rather than to the legitimate purposes of 
 legislation, that the poor-laws were to be altogether abandoned. But the 
 corn-law proposition is to be persisted in. Is there more prospect of a final 
 result from the discussion upon that question than upon the question of the 
 poor-laws? Is there less expectation of long speeches? Is there a dimin- 
 ished prospect that those speeches will be less addressed to the conviction of 
 the members who listen to them in this house, than to the favour of the 
 constituency, agricultural or manufacturing, whom the speakers in the debate 
 may happen to represent ? And it is with this opinion, as to the reasons for 
 abandoning the poor-laws — that it is understood, but 1 can scarcely believe 
 it — that her Majesty's government will propose the corn-law question, and 
 upon the result of that question will appeal to the people. If that appeal be 
 made upon such grounds, so far, in my opinion, from tending at all to 
 remedy the depression of trade, to calm the agitation in the public markets, 
 to increase public confidence — so far from tending to any of these desirable 
 ends, 1 firmly believe that, by suspending the operations of all ordinary retail 
 dealings in this metropolis — by leaving in a state of uncertainty for months to 
 come what may be the ultimate decision of the House of Commons on this 
 subject of the corn-laws — you will only aggravate the evils already connected 
 with the stagnation of commerce, and be throwing an effectual obstacle or 
 impediment in the way of the revival of trade. Therefore, as I said before, 
 if I have the perfect assurance, which you cannot give me, that it is your 
 intention to dissolve upon the corn-law question, so far from that being a 
 reason, why should I not press this motion to a division, it constitutes with 
 me only an additional ground for so doing. I have other grounds for deter- 
 mining to take that course ; but I do not now intend to enter upon them. I 
 rest my proposition to-night upon the constitutional point. I say that there 
 is sufficient proof that you have not the confidence of the House of Commons, 
 and that your continuance in office is at variance with the principles of the 
 constitution. I risk all the other grounds upon which I withhold my confi- 
 dence from you. 1 have a want of confidence in you on account of your ad- 
 ministration of finance. But I believe that your position of difficulty with 
 respect to finance mainly arises from the same evil — from the very same 
 cause as that which involves you in your present embarrassment. I believe 
 that it arises from the attempt to administer the duties of government without 
 the confidence of the House of Commons. Yes, it is that self-same cause 
 that has involved you in your financial difficulties. Had you possessed the 
 confidence of the House of Commons, I do not believe that in the face of an 
 increasing expenditure, and a diminishing revenue, you would have incurred 
 the risk — nay, that you would have incurred the certain evil of losing 
 1,200,000/. of revenue by your Post-office Bill. I believe that the very same 
 cause which induces you to have recourse to these expedients at the 
 present moment, led to the abandonment of the Post-office revenue.
 
 12 
 
 I believe that your weakness was the cause — constantly oscillating between 
 the Conservative opinions on this side of the house, and the opposite opinions 
 entertained upon your own — rinding it frequently necessary to conduct your 
 government upon Conservative principles, and seldom able to assert your own 
 views with any well-founded expectation of carrying them into execution, 
 you forfeited the confidence and encountered the opposition of our own friends 
 and supporters, until at length it became necessary for you to re-establish 
 yourselves in the favourable opinion of your adherents, to propose a measure 
 like that of the Post-office reduction. Am I wrong in that conjecture ? 
 When was it that the Post-office revenue was lost ? It was after your failure 
 on the Jamaica question. I cannot dive into your intentions, and therefore 
 I cannot say that the two questions, the Jamaica question, the Post-office 
 revenue question, stood together in the relation of cause and effect ; but it is 
 remarkable that it was not until after your defeat on the colonial question 
 that you resorted to a measure which I deprecated at the time — not doubting 
 the advantages which in many respects would result from a reduction of the 
 postage on letters, but because I thought you could not afford to hazard the 
 loss of a revenue of 1,600,000/., and because I did not believe that your pro- 
 position to supply any deficiency that might arise in the Post-office revenue 
 by increased taxation in other respects, would be listened to with any very 
 great favour when the reduction had once been acceded to. I believe it is 
 the same cause, your weakness, that has induced you now to propose those 
 great measures of fiscal change which have disturbed, perplexed, and em- 
 barrassed all the commercial transactions of the country. When you say 
 that your object in proposing these measures is to supply the deficiency in the 
 revenue you do not explain to us how that hope is to be fulfilled. The Chan- 
 cellor of the Exchequer never explained to us whether he expected to recover 
 the 1,400,000/. or 1,600,000/. lost in the post-office, by the imposition of a 
 fixed duty upon corn. It is necessary that that point should be explained, 
 for unless the admission of foreign corn at a fixed duty of Is. per bushel, 
 will secure a revenue of 1,600,000/., the budget of the Chancellor of the 
 Exchequer is worth nothing — literally worth nothing at all. 
 
 [It was here intimated that the calculation of the Chancellor of the Ex- 
 chequer was to raise only 400,000/. from the admission of foreign corn.] 
 
 Sir Robert Peel continued : I understand the calculation to be 1,600,000/. 
 but whether it were so calculated or not, it is plain that the revenue derived 
 from the admission of foreign corn must be at least equal to that sum, if the 
 deficiency in the revenue is to be supplied ; for as the ChancelLor of the 
 Exchequer estimates the amount of the customs for the present year at the 
 same amount as the customs of last year, and as 1,100,000/. or 1,200,000/. 
 of the customs' revenue of last year, was derived from the admission of corn, 
 it is clear that his calculation, to be just, must be upon the anticipation of 
 deriving somewhere about 1,600,000/. from the admission of foreign corn in 
 the present year. 
 
 Now with respect to the duties on timber. I have seen an answer returned 
 by Lord Sydenham to a deputation which waited upon him on this subject ; 
 what does Lord Sydenham say ? I have no official information on the subject. 
 
 [Here an observation was made by Lord John Russell.] 
 
 Surely the noble lord does not mean to draw a distinction between a private 
 letter written by him, saying " we are going to bring forward the timber 
 duties," and an official despatch in which the same intelligence was conveyed 
 iu a more formal manner. Surely the noble lord will not insist upon the dis- 
 tinction to be drawn between an intimation made upon large paper and one 
 made upon small paper — the one being marked " private," the other bearing 
 upon its cover the stamp of official business. But Lord Sydenham says, that 
 if the government should bring forward the timber duties, it will be his impe-
 
 13 
 
 rative duty to urge that due regard be had to all existing interests, and that 
 ample time be given to vested interests to dispose of them, and to provide for 
 the transfer of their property to some other branches of trade. If that be 
 the case — if that imperative duty be imposed upon Lord Sydenham — will it 
 be possible to realize in the course of the present year the revenue you anti- 
 cipate from an alteration of timber duties ? But it is not my intention to 
 enter into detail. I reserve altogether my opinion upon this and other mea- 
 sures of administration. I reserve altogether my opinion upon China. I 
 will only say that upon that question I can give you no confidence. I cannot 
 conceive a position more fraught with anxiety as to the moral influence of 
 England, not only in China, but throughout the whole of the India empire, 
 than that which we now occupy, as far as our present information goes, in 
 that quarter of the world. 
 
 Upon other great questions, such as our relation with America, and with 
 France, I retain the opinions I have previously expressed. I have viewed our 
 alienation from France with feelings of deep regret, and without entering 
 further into the subject I may state that notwithstanding the brilliant exploits 
 of our fleets and armies, I yet entertain the opinion that it would have been 
 possible to have effected everything that British and continental interests 
 required in a manner that would have been reconcileable with such a mode of 
 proceeding towards France as would have avoided the excitement of so bitter 
 a feeling towards us in that country, the consequence of which has been the 
 unproductive expenditure of a vast amount of capital in making preparations 
 for war, and the generation of a feeling in the French mind which, I fear, 
 will for some time prevent the re-establishment of those friendly relations 
 between France and this country which I sincerely wish to be permanent, and 
 which I believe to be one of the most essential foundations for the permanent 
 peace and tranquillity of Europe. But into these considerations I will not 
 enter ; because I wish mainly to urge the constitutional ground upon which 
 my motion is founded. 
 
 Confining myself to that ground, and maintaining silence upon all others, 
 I dare say I shall be met by the taunt that I have brought forward no scheme 
 of comprehensive policy of my own. I shall be told that this is a decisive 
 motion — that I might possibly have concealed my opinions when I was dis- 
 cussing the sugar duties, but that when I invited the house to concnr in a 
 motion of this kind, I ought to be prepared with some declaration of public 
 opinion upon all questions of public interest and national importance. To 
 that I answer — Where is the man that has more explicitly declared than I 
 have, his opinions upon all the great constitutional questions that have of late 
 years been raised — upon the ballot — upon the extension of the suffrage — upon 
 the shortening the duration of Parliaments ? Have I ever withheld my 
 opinions upon any one of those great questions. The hon. member for Fins- 
 bury says to me, " Make a bidding against the government. (Laughter.) 
 Outbid the government ! Propose something further than the government, 
 and then you shall have the support of gentlemen of extreme opinions like 
 myself." I shall do no such thing. I make no bidding for popular applause. 
 I maintain my opinions upon the great constitutional questions to which I 
 have referred, and I shall not, for the purpose of filching some support from 
 the government on the present occasion, indicate opinions at variance with 
 those which in the course of discussions upon those individual questions I 
 have constantly expressed. Did I not, when a question like the present was 
 last under the consideration of the house, did I not upon the vote of confi- 
 dence last year, fully and explicitly state my views with respect to all the 
 ordinary subjects of legislation ? Have I not, when any question has been 
 brought forward, whether church reform, church rates, or any other question 
 of important public interest, invariably expressed my opinions in plain and
 
 14 
 
 explicit terms ? What is the public question of ordinary legislation in respect 
 to which any rational doubt can be entertained as to my views t I certainly 
 draw a distinction between financial questions and ordinary matters of policy. 
 I stated the other night — I stated explicitly, that I would not express any 
 opinion upon the financial condition of the country ; and I repeat now — giv- 
 ing you the full advantage of that expression of my opinion — that if I were 
 called to power to-morrow I would claim the right (for it was in that sense 
 I used the expression") deliberately to review the financial position of the 
 country, and that I would not be forced into any precipitate measures for the 
 purpose of extricating the Exchequer from its present difficulty. These are 
 the grounds upon which I submit, with confidence, my resolution to the 
 House of Commons, I never have been a flatterer of the House of Com- 
 mons. I never have encouraged the House of Commons in any attempt to 
 carry measures which I thought would have the effect of unduly increasing 
 its own privileges and power at the expense of the prerogative of the Crown. 
 
 The very last occasion on which I gave a vote was in support of her Ma- 
 jesty's Government in their attempt to resist a motion, which, in their opinion, 
 would have the effect of unduly encroaching upon the prerogative of the 
 crown. I did what I could to support the crown's prerogative ; but my 
 example was not followed by many members of her Majesty's government. 
 I did what I could to resist the attempt of the House of Commons to interfere 
 with the undoubted prerogative of the crown. That attempt, sir, was de- 
 feated by your single vote. You were the single obstacle to a motion, which, 
 in your opinion, would amount to an interference with the prerogative of the 
 crown. You, sir, though the organ of the House of Commons, had the 
 manliness, which I expected from the consistency of your conduct ; yes, sir, 
 you had the manliness to interpose your single but exalted and effectual 
 authority against a measure which you deemed injurious to the principles of 
 the constitution. I expected that vote, and I expected the declaration of 
 principle upon which it was given. But when I saw how great had been the 
 risk, I could not but feel confirmed in my opinion that the prerogative of the 
 crown was not safely protected by a government, which, even with the aid 
 that I, assisted by my friends, could lend them, could command only an 
 equality of votes upon a question of so much importance, and were obliged to 
 call upon the Speaker to save them from the disgrace of defeat upon a matter 
 in which the prerogative of the crown was directly concerned. 
 
 But, although I have resisted, and always will resist, any unconstitutional 
 attempt on the part of the House of Commons to trench upon the prerogative 
 of the crown, I have yet endeavoured to maintain in the House of Commons 
 every just principle to which it could lay a claim. I supported the noble 
 lord (Lrord J. Russell) last year in defence of the privileges of the House of 
 Commons. I might upon that occasion have been seduced by the temptation 
 of party advantage to take a different course. As it was, I had to encounter 
 the pain of differing from, perhaps, a majority of my friends. But I thought 
 that vital interests — that important powers were at state, and I was deter- 
 mined that I would not, to conciliate the favour and affection of my own 
 esteemed friends, put to hazard the legitimate privileges of the House of 
 Commons, and subject the House of Commons to the control of a court of 
 law. I know that it is imprudent and unwise to advert to these things. I 
 know that it would be more politic on my part to conceal these differences 
 with my friends. But I will be guilty of no such concealment. I differed 
 from them and voted against them, from a sincere belief that it was abso- 
 lutely necessary for the vindication of the privileges of the House of Com- 
 mons, nay that it was essential to our existence as a legislative body, that 
 we should have the power of free publicatisn. Why should I shrink from a
 
 15 
 
 reference to the opinions I then expressed, and the vote I then gave ? Is it 
 not rather a subject of pride with me that I can be permitted to take my own 
 independent view as to the vital privileges of the House of Commons, and yet 
 that due justice shall be done to my motives, and that I shall again be able to 
 rally around me in the bond of common connection and common esteem, 
 those friends from whom I happen upon this particular question to differ. 
 Acting in conformity with these views, which teach me to resist the encroach- 
 ment of the house upon the prerogative of the crown, and yet to maintain 
 for the house itself its legitimate influence in the state, I think I may fairly 
 conclude that the House of Commons has a right to expect that the minister 
 of the crown, who is alike the proper guardian of the royal prerogative and 
 of parliamentary privilege, should possess its confidence. This present 
 House of Commons has been constituted and moulded upon the views of the 
 noble lord the member for Stroud (Lord J. Russell). The noble lord was the 
 author of the bill by which this House of Commons was constituted. 
 It was the noble lord who thought it expedient to abolish the system of nomi- 
 nation boroughs. It was the noble lord who thought it expedient to introduce 
 more of popular spirit into the constitution of this house — to make it corres- 
 pond more with the progress of popular intelligence, and with the advance of 
 knowledge. To achieve this the noble lord thought that we ought to make 
 the house more an image of the public opinion — an assembly more sympa- 
 thizing with the people — more originating from the people — more expressive of 
 the public view. This House of Commons, thus constituted according to the 
 views of the noble lord — this House of Commons had the advantage (if it 
 could be so considered) of being elected under the noble lord's auspices ; and 
 whatever benefit there may be from having had its election at the time when 
 her gracious Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms, that benefit also 
 the noble lord was possessed of. Yet this House of Commons so consti- 
 tuted, so elected under the auspices of the noble lord — this House of Com- 
 mons it is that has given, as I think, sufficient indications that it withholds 
 its confidence from the government of which the noble noble lord is a con- 
 spicuous member. 
 
 I trust I have executed this duty in conformity with the spirit in which I 
 intended to execute it — with none of that asperity of party which I may 
 sometimes be betrayed into when rising at the end of a debate to speak under 
 the excitement and agitation which naturally belong to that period of our de- 
 liberations. It has not been my intention to treat with disrespect those who 
 hold the executive offices of government, but it has been my intention to say 
 to the government, 
 
 '*lt is your duty to the House of Commons — if it has those additional claims 
 upon public confidence which you ascribe to it — if it embodies more of the public 
 spirit — if it reflects more accurately the image of the public mind than those wbich 
 have preceded it — it is your duty, your peculiar duty, not to deprive it of any of 
 the legitimate influence which it possessed under other circumstances, and which 
 you were the first to recognise, and to wish to extend." 
 
 Of this I am convinced, that if the House of Commons so constituted had 
 ratified your decrees — had acted in conformity with your suggestions, you 
 W r ould have been the first to acknowledge its opinions with respect ; and let 
 me tell you that when the House of Commons takes a different course, it is 
 your bounden duty not to reject its decisions with scorn, because they are 
 unfavouroble to your views, and hostile to your continuance in power.
 
 Printed and Published by W. E. Painter, 342, Strand, 
 In one vol. cloth, price 8s., 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY SPEECHES. 
 
 Session 1840. 
 
 "OPENING OF PARLIAMENT" — THE QUEEN'S SPEECH. 
 " WANT OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTERS" — SIR JAMES GRAHAM, LORD STANLEY, AND 
 
 SIR ROBERT PEEL. 
 
 " PROGRESS OF SOCIALISM" — THE BISHOP OF EXETER (TWO). 
 
 ' PROVISIONAL GRANT TO PRINCE ALBERT" — MR. HUME, MR. LIDDELL, SIR R. 1NGLIS, 
 
 MR. GOULBURN, COL. SIBTHORP, SIR J. GRAHAM, AND SIR R. PEEL. 
 
 "FINANCIAL STATE OF THE COUNTRY" — MR. HERRIES AND MR. GOULBURN. 
 
 " THE MONTEAGLE NEWPORT-EXCHEQUER JOB 1 ' — MR. LIDDELL, MR. LEADER, AND 
 
 SIR ROBERT PEEL. 
 
 " THE IRISH REGISTRATION" — LORD STANLEY (TWO) AND SIR G. SINCLAIR. 
 
 "IMPRISONMENT OF THE SHERIFFS EVANS AND WHEELTON " — LORD DENMAN.. 
 
 " THE CORN LAWS" — SIR ROBERT PEEL. 
 
 " WAR IN CHINA" — SIR JAMES GRAHAM AND SIR ROBERT PEEL. 
 
 "CHURCH RATES : THOROGOOD'S CASE" — LORD JOHN RUSSELL, DR. LUSH1NGTON, 
 
 AND SIR ROBERT INGLIS. 
 
 " ECCLESIASTICAL DUTIES AND REVENUES" — ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY, 
 
 BISHOPS OF WINCHESTER, GLOUCESTER, SALISBURY, LINCOLN, 
 
 ROCHESTER, EXETER, AND LONDON. 
 
 " PRINCE ALBERT'S REGENCY" — THE DUKE OF SUSSEX. 
 
 "PROROGATION OF THE PARLIAMENT OF 1840 " — THE QUEEN'S SPEECH. 
 
 Many of the Speeches revised by the Speakers. 
 %* Most of the above Speeches may be had separate. 
 
 OIR ROBERT PEEL'S SPEECHES, on Want of Confidence 
 O in Ministers (1840), 4d. ; Sugar Duties, Gd. ; Corn Laws, 3d. ; War in 
 China, 3d. ; Tamworth Election, 3d. 
 
 pOLONIAL BISHOPRICS.— Speeches of the Archbishop of 
 V-y Canterbury, Bishop of London, Mr. Justice Coleridge, Mr. Labouchere, 
 and Mr. W. E. Gladstone, at Willis's Rooms, on Tuesday, April 27, 1841. 4d. 
 
 T 
 
 HE CHARTIST: OR, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF 
 JAMES ARNOLD. WITH A FRONTISPIECE. 
 
 Shewing the Progress and Results of Insubordination. 
 In cloth, 2s. ; stiff covers, Is. 6d. 
 
 FIFTH THOUSAND, 
 
 With new and complete Index to each Volume, in two vols, cloth, embossed 
 
 with the Huntingdon Arms, 24s., 
 
 THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SELINA 
 
 COUNTESS OF HUNTINGDON, 
 
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 The Materials for this Work, which have occupied in their collection and 
 arrangement a period of upwards of twenty years, are supplied by 
 
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