NICARAGUA CANAL ADDRESS DELIVERED BY Hon. John F. Miller, U. S. SENATOR, BEFORE THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, BOARD OF TRADE, and MANUFACTURERS’ ASSOCIATION, [ OF SAN FRANCISCO, June 17 , 1885 San Francisco : Bosqui Engraving & Printing Co. 3 ?<*> f y a cP b ADDRESS O F Hon. John F. Miller, In the Hall of the Chamber of Commerce, San Francisco, June 17, 1885. Mr. President and Gentlemen: There was published in the New York Tribune newspaper, about five months ago, a document purporting to be an accurate copy of a treaty of recent date, between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua, relating to the construction by the United States of a ship canal through Nicaragua, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Vigilant as you gentlemen are known to be in all that con¬ cerns the commercial and other important interests of this coast, it may be assumed that this publication did not escape your attention. It was copied in a greater part of the newspapers of the country, and the public mind rests in the belief that the document in ques¬ tion was an authentic copy of a treaty then reported to have been sent to the Senate by the President, and at that moment supposed to be under consideration by that body. Such is the faith of the American people in the truth and accu¬ racy of the public press! The rules of the Senate forbid me, in this instance, to say aught which shall tend to disturb that faith, or to confirm and strengthen it. In all that I shall say at this time, there shall be no betrayal of confidence, no revelation of Senate secret proceedings, nor transgression of Senate rules. It is my purpose to deal with historic facts ; with questions of public law ; with pub¬ lic records, and with topics which have been the subjects of public discussion in and out of the Senate. Thus restricted, I propose to briefly consider some of the questions which have grown out of the proposition for the construction of a great waterway across the Nicaraguan Isthmus, to be mainly owned and completely controlled [ 2 ] by the United States! Whether the Tribune publication was a cor¬ rect copy of a treaty or a pure fiction, it was sufficient to raise, and did raise (but not for the first time), the questions as to the advan¬ tages and benefits to be derived from the contemplated work; the responsibilities assumed ; the obstacles in the way ; the possible and probable international involvements ; the policy of an extra¬ territorial national undertaking of such proportions ; and many other questions and matters of fact and of public law, having rela¬ tion to the subject matter we are about to consider. Upon the hypothesis that such a treaty might have been made, oV may be possible in the future, it is interesting to note that it pro¬ vides, in direct and simple terms, for the construction of deep water communication between the Atlantic and Pacific shores of the two countries which unite in the enterprise ; the one contribut¬ ing the territory, and the other furnishing the money—the actual management and control to remain with the latter. The details of the proposed, or supposed, arrangement for the creation of one of the greatest public works of modern times are carefully set out, and need no explanation or elaboration here. Immediately upon the appearance of this Tribune treaty, the press in this country and elsewhere entered upon a general discussion of its provisions ; and the most prominent question which engaged the attention of pub¬ licists and statesmen was the international question suggested by the existence of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of 1850, known as the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. I propose to examine this question first, for if it be true that considerations of national honor and national safety are involved ; if we may not proceed in the canalization of the Isthmus, without an unjustifiable disregard of treaty obligations and the danger of an indefensible war, wise statesmanship demands that we should pause. There have been long, able and earnest discussions between the diplomatic representatives of England and the United States upon the terms, construction and validity of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and the American case will probably never be better presented than it has been by Mr. Fish, Mr. Blaine and Mr. Frelinghuysen. These statesmen have all contended that the treaty, long since lapsed, became obsolete and inoperative as a restraint upon the United States in its assertion of the right of control over inter- oceanic communication across the American Isthmus, and I believe that their arguments have never been successfully answered. In order to a clear comprehension of the issues upon the treaty of 1850 (Clayton-Bulwer), it is requisite to examine the antecedent history of the transaction, as well as the attending circumstances and the conditions and relations of the parties interested. As early as 1823, the Government and people of the United States had manifested a lively interest in the political condition of the Central American States, and in the canalization of the Isthmus. This in¬ terest found expression in the message of President Monroe, which contained the famous “Monroe Doctrine.” ~ 71 PS ■:> In 1825, Senor Canaz, Minister of the “Republic of the Center,” proposed to Mr. Clay, then Secretary of State, the project of a ship canal through Nicaragua, to be built by the United States, and owned jointly by the two republics. Mr. Clay received the propo¬ sition, discussed it and favored it, and it was made known to Con¬ gress ; but the poverty of the nation at that time seemed to forbid the enterprise. In 1830, the “ Dutch Company,” under the patronage of the King of the Netherlands, obtained a concession from the Govern¬ ment and Congress of Central America for a canal severing the Isthmus, to certain parts of which objection was made by our Gov¬ ernment, although it contained a provision that, in respect to navi¬ gation and commerce, generally, the Netherlands and the United States were on an equality. Mr. Livingston, then Secretary of State, in instructions of July 20, 1831, insisted on two cardinal points in respect of the concession : 1. That the United States must be entitled to all advantages accorded to other nations. 2. That if the grant to the Dutch Company should not be com¬ pleted, he desired to secure for the citizens of the United States, or for the Government itself, if Congress should deem the measure proper and constitutional, the right of subscribing for the stock. In consequence of the revolution in Belgium, the Dutch Com¬ pany failed to enter upon the work. The next affirmative acts of the Government of the United States in respect of the proposed canal were the Canal Resolutions, which passed the House and Senate in March, 1835, and the ap¬ pointment, in pursuance of them, by President Jackson, in May, 1835, °f Charles Biddle, to proceed to Nicaragua to procure infor¬ mation as to routes, plans, surveys, and estimates for a canal. These resolutions requested the President to open negotiations with the Central American States and New Granada, for “ the pur- “ pose oBeffectually protecting, by suitable treaty stipulations, such “ individuals or companies as may undertake to open communica- “ tion between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, by the construction “ of a ship canal across the Isthmus, which connects North and “ South America.” In the year 1846, the United States again awakened to the im¬ portance of the Isthmus transit, and made the subsisting treaty with New Granada, now the United States of Colombia, by which the neutrality of the Isthmus, and the territorial control of the State of Panama, are guaranteed to New Granada, and under which the Panama Railway was built and its property protected. In 1848, when the United States was about to conclude a treaty of peace with Mexico, so great was the interest then taken in the subject of Isthmian control, that the State Department instructed Mr. Trist, that in arranging the terms of the treaty, in place of the $15,000,000, which Mexico demanded for the cession of New Mexico and California, he might increase the amount to $30,000,000, to p'SLT 1ST secure the right of transit across the Isthmus of Tehauntepec. This offer was made by Mr. Trist, and rejected by Mexico ! Thus it is seen that, even prior to the acquisition from Mexico of our Pacific possessions, the Government of the United States had repeatedly recognized the importance of the canalization of the American Isth¬ mus, and had asserted its paramount interest in the Isthmian region. In truth, the evidences of the great solicitude felt on the subject by the ablest and wisest of our statesmen of that time abound in our historical records. After the acquisition of California, and the dis¬ covery of gold on the Pacific Coast, in 1849, the control of the Isthmian transit became a matter of the highest importance, and the liveliest concern in regard to it was manifested by the Govern¬ ment and people of the United States. It was then that Mr. Hise negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua, providing for the con¬ struction of a canal, on nearly the same route now selected by the American engineers, and which gave the United States complete control upon terms the most liberal and satisfactory. This saga¬ cious and highly advantageous treaty arrangement would have been hailed with delight by the American people had its terms been made public ; for it was confidently expected and ardently desired that a ship canal through the Isthmus would be speedily constructed either by the United States or by an American com¬ pany chartered by the United States, and under its patronage and control. A company had been organized, and had obtained a concession, in 1849, which was recognised by the Hise treaty, and had that company failed to execute its agreement, other American citizens stood ready to embark in the great enterprise. And the people of the United States were ready to extend Government aid to the work. This treaty was forwarded to the Department of State, and there it was speedily put to death and quietly entombed. It was never presented to the Senate! The cause of the suppression of that treaty was the fear of Eng¬ land, and upon that ignoble terror the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was founded ! That was the inspiration of the negotiations which led to that ill-advised and most unfortunate segment of American di¬ plomacy. To clear the way for that disastrous surrender of the American claim of control over the Isthmus transit, the Hise treaty was extinguished, and the American people remained ignor¬ ant of their betrayal and stupendous loss, until the great Douglas brought the timid authors and counsellors of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to bay in the open Senate ! England, with that clear fore¬ sight which has distinguished her statesmen and diplomatists dur¬ ing the greater part of her history, and mindful of the value and importance of the key to the Nicaraguan transit, uninvited and un¬ sought, had established her protectorate over a handful of miserable Mosquito Indians, and thereby placed her seal upon the eastern coast of Nicaragua, including the mouth of the San Juan river, the eastern port and terminus of the proposed canal ; and just six days after the treaty of Guadaloupe-Hidalgo was signed, by which we acquired California, an English fleet of war vessels entered the harbor of Greytown, and organized British control over that region ! The title of the Mosquito claim was as naked as the savages, whose rights Great Britain assumed to protect. Hitherto, the sovereignty of the Mosquitos was of no higher grade than that of the monkeys with which they contended for the wild fruits that formed their subsistence! Never was there invented so grotesque a divertisement for the nations as that of England’s creation, when she enthroned a clouted savage as king and sovereign, and mas¬ queraded the wandering, unclad, houseless band of Mosquitos as a nation of Central America, and gave them dominion over a great river, which was probably destined to bear the ocean commerce of half the world ! This was the shadowy, unsubstantial and poor suspicion of title which formed the excuse and claim for the British dominion on the Nicaraguan coast, and it was this imposture which frighted the soul of the American Secretary into that inglorious treaty which perpetuates his name. Unreal, fraudulent and impudent as was the claim of Great Britain to the control of the San Juan river, by means of the Mosquito protectorate, it served its purpose, and forced, or led, this nation into an Isthmian partnership with an European power, in which British intervention was admitted, and American interests were engulfed and abandoned. It is no histori¬ cal wonder that the canal was not built under the auspices of this foolish and fatal partnership. Mr. President, there has never been a time when the people of these United States have so parted with common sense, and have been so bereft of the faculty of judgment, that they would enter upon so dismal a venture as the construction of an interoceanic canal at the American Isthmus in copartnership with Great Britain ! The American people admire the English, and have an exalted opinion of them, but they want no partnership with Great Britain in an American canal ! But the shadow of this ancient and obsolete partnership treaty is invoked to perform in 1885 the function it served thirty-five years ago—namely, to stop the United States, or its citizens, from con¬ structing the canal. It is pretended that this nation is still fettered by a partnership agreement, the business of which neither party ever really entered upon ; a partnership which was formed for a spe¬ cific object, which was not attained nor attempted ; a partnership agreement which, on the British side, was never thought of except to break its covenants ; a partnership long since dissolved by the defeat and failure of its purpose, in consequence of the acts of one of the parties ; a partnership made obsolete by the march of great events and the changes of national fortunes! Upon the face of the treaty, the object and purpose of it was to cause the speedy con¬ struction of a canal through Nicaragua ; and it was declared by the treaty that the specific object of both nations was to promote the scheme for a canal, at that time in process of organization, under an existing concession from the government of Nicaragua. To that end Great Britain promised and agreed that the impediment which she had intentionally raised by means of the Mosquito protectorate should be immediately removed ; that the Mosquito claim was to be at once abandoned, and the mouth of the San Juan river left free under the undisputed sovereignty of Nicaragua. The im¬ mediate extinguishment of this pretended claim was one of the principal or moving considerations for Mr. Clayton’s abandonment of the Hise treaty, and all its benefits and advantages, and the acceptance, in its stead, of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Great Britain industriously, continuously and conspicuously violated the letter and spirit of the treaty in the matter of the Mosquito protectorate, beginning with the day of its date and continuing for ten years. That protectorate was maintained until her treaty with Nicaragua, which was made on the 28th day of January, i860. It was stipulated in the last mentioned treaty that “ the British protectorate of that “ part of the Mosquito territory (claimed by the Mosquito Indians “ within the frontier of the Republic of Nicaragua) shall cease three “ months after the exchange of the ratification of the present treaty.” The specific clause of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which England violated is the first article, wherein she agreed not to “ assume or “ exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito “ coast, or any part of Central America,” from and after its date. For more than ten years after that engagement Great Britain maintained the Mosquito protectorate, thus holding in her grasp the mouth of the San Juan ; our Government constantly urging her to relinquish her hold and to extinguish the Mosquito claim, as she had promised to do. This the diplomatic correspondence between the two gov¬ ernments shows, and in April, 1852, an arrangement was agreed upon between Mr. Webster and Mr. Crampton, the British Minister, by which the Mosquito difficulty was to be immediately settled, by the cession to Nicaragua of all the Mosquito claim south of 11° 34' north latitude, “ including Greytown.” This was to uncover the eastern terminus of the canal, and thus enable the company propos¬ ing the construction to proceed, but Great Britain delayed the exe¬ cution of this arrangement for eight years; and the American company could not safely proceed, nor obtain capital, while the pro¬ tectorate lasted. In June, 1852, Mr. Lawrence, then United States Minister at London, wrote to Mr. Webster concerning theCrampton- Webster arrangement, as follows : “ With respect to the construc- “ tion of the canal, I have often expressed my anxious desire that “ all questions touching the Mosquito Indians, and the disputes “ between Nicaragua and Costa Rica, should be definitely settled, “ in order that the canal company might be orga?iized and the zvork “ commenced .” The maintenance of the Mosquito protectorate was, therefore, a wilful and inexcusable violation of the treaty, and it was unques¬ tionably the primary, if not the sole cause, of the failure of the ca¬ nal company, to perform its contract with Nicaragua for the con¬ struction of the canal. Mr. Lawrence writes, in 1852, that money could be had for building the canal, if the Mosquito difficulty was settled, and had Great Britain kept faith, it is fair to presume that the stock would have been eagerly taken and the canal an accom¬ plished fact. But this is not the only infraction of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by Great Britain, which is a justification of the United States in re¬ garding it as a broken compact, and as no longer binding upon her. At the time the treaty was made, 1850, there was a settle¬ ment of British subjects on the Belize, under an ancient grant from Spain, for the sole purpose of cutting logwood and mahogony ; which settlement had remained under Spanish sovereignty, while Spain maintained her power, and, after the independence of the Central American States, under their sovereignty. A small British settlement had also been made on the Bay Islands, in the Bay of Honduras, which was under the sovereignty of Honduras at the time the treaty was made. In direct and palpable violation of the first article of the Clay¬ ton-Bulwer treaty, the British government, on the 17th day of July, 1852, proclaimed the organization of the Bay Islands into a British colony ! These are the words of the proclamation: “ This is to give notice that Her Most Gracious Majesty, the “ Queen, has been pleased to constitute and make the Islands “ of Roatan, Bonacco, Utilla, Barbarat, Helene and Morat, to be a “ colony, to be known and designated as the Colony of the Bay “ Islands.” Thus, within a little more than two years after the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was signed, Great Britain did the very thing it was stipulated by the treaty she should not do, and maintained her dominion over the Bay Islands until, under fear of a perma¬ nent breach of friendly relations with the United States, she, by treaty with Honduras, ceded back the sovereignty of the Islands to that Republic in 1859. But this is not all. The “ settlement ” on the Belize was promoted and encouraged, and expanded by Eng¬ land from a mere settlement in 1850, under the sovereignty of Gua¬ temala, within definite boundaries, and for the specific purpose of cutting wood, into an organized British colony, and is so maintained to this day, under the dominion and government of Great Britain, with boundaries extended to cover an area nearly as large as half of New England. In order to curb the expansive tendency of this colony, and to save her territory from being entirely overrun by the English, Guatemala entered into a treaty with Great Britain, in April, 1859, for the settlement of the boundary of “ British Hon¬ duras,” as the colony was called, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to fix the boundaries. Thus, Great Britain, in 1859, created another colony from the settlement on the Belize, and its existence is a continuous violation of the treaty. Now, it is urged that the United States is estopped from pleading these several wanton, in¬ tentional, and flagrant breaches of the treaty of 1850, on the part of England, because President Buchanan, in his Message to Con¬ gress in i860, said that the questions arising from the Clayton- Bulvver treaty, had by the three treaties between England and Nicaragua, Honduras and Guatemala, “resulted in a final settle- “ ment, entirely satisfactory to this Government! ” In respect to this contention, I have to observe, first, that Mr. Buchanan had ref¬ erence more particularly to the Mosquito dispute in his expression of satisfaction ; and it was not addressed to Great Britain, but to Congress ; and it was not intended as a condonation of England’s offences, but was a mere idle boast of an achievement of his admin¬ istration, and second, that Mr. Buchanan was not, at any time, the Government of the United States ! This is, I believe, the first at¬ tempt ever made in this country to exalt a President’s message into the dignity of a treaty, or of public law! Mr. Buchanan had no more authority as President of the United States, without action of Congress, to condone a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty than he had the power, of himself, to make war on England, and this the British Government perfectly understood. The language used in his message was no more than the expression of the opin¬ ion of James Buchanan, and about that time Mr. Buchanan held many opinions, upon a wide range of subjects, which the people of the United States did not endorse, and this was one of them. These violations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by England have never been condoned, nor excused, nor acquiesced in, nor forgiven, nor forgotten by the Government or people of the United States. For many years after Mr. Buchanan’s generous exclamation of satisfaction with the course of Great Britain in Central America, the United States was busied in matters of domestic concern of supreme im¬ portance, some of which had resulted from the weak and yielding disposition of this same James Buchanan, and the nation was not taking much note of Central American affairs just then, and neither adopted nor disavowed Mr. Buchanan’s opinion thus expressed, but it has been emphatically disavowed since. But is there any reason, in honor or justice, why the United States should alone be bound in perpetuity by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty when every consideration for entering into has failed, and its prime object has been defeated ? Even though there had been no violation of it, the changed conditions of the parties, the lapse of time, the failure of the object for which it was made, the marvellous growth of commerce, the changes in the lines of transportation, the wonderful development of the Pacific States, and the general progress of the Western nations afford abundant reason for the attitude of the United States in giving notice to Great Britain, as has been done, that the United States will assume her rightful place among the nations of this hemisphere, and refuse to be bound by these rusty manacles, which, in an evil hour, were forged for her restraint. The language of Mr. Blaine, addressed to Lord Granville in November, 1881, appears to express the American view of this subject with great clearness and force. Speaking of the Clayton- Bulwer treaty, he says : “ This convention was made more than “ thirty years ago, under exceptional and extraordinary conditions “ which have long since ceased to exist—conditions which at best “ were temporary in their nature, and which can never be repro- “ duced. The remarkable development of the United States on “ the Pacific Coast since that time has created new duties fofc this “ Government, and devolved new responsibilities upon it.” Fur¬ ther on he says of the treaty: “ Its provisions embody a misconception of the relative positions “ of Great Britain and the United States with respect to the inter- “ ests of each government in questions pertaining to this continent. “ The Government of the United States has no occasion to disavow “ an aggressive disposition. Its entire policy establishes a pacific “ character, and among its chief aims is to cultivate the most “ friendly and intimate relations with its neighbors, both indepen- “ dent and colonial. At the same time, this Government, with re- “ spect to European States, will not consent to perpetuate any “ treaty that impeaches our right and long-established claim to “ priority on the American continent. “The United States seeks only to use for the defense of its own “ interests the same forecast and prevision which Her Majesty’s “ Government so emphatically employs in defense of the interests “ of the British empire. To guard her Eastern possessions, to se- “ cure the most rapid transit for troops and munitions of war, and “ to prevent any other nation having equal facilities in the same “ direction, Great Britain holds and fortifies all the strategic points “ that control the route to India. At Gibraltar, at Malta, at Cyprus, “ her fortifications gives her the mastery of the Mediterranean. She “ holds a controlling interest in the Suez Canal, and by her fortifi- “ cations at Aden and on the Island of Perim, she excludes all “ other powers from the waters of the Red Sea, and renders it a “ mare clmiswn. It would, in the judgment of the President, be “ no more unreasonable for the United States to demand a share “ in these fortifications, or to demand their absolute neutralization, “ than for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from “ the United States with respect to the transit across the American “ continent. The possessions which Great Britain thus carefully “ guards in the East are not of more importance to her than is the “ Pacific slope, with its present development and assured growth, “ to the Government of the United States. “ The States and Territories appurtenant to the Pacific ocean and “ dependent upon it for commercial outlet, and hence directly inter- “ ested in the canal, comprise an area of nearly eight hundred thou- “ sand square miles, larger in extent than the German empire and u the four Latin countries of Europe combined. “ This vast region is but fairly beginning its prosperous develop- “ ment. In the near future the money value of its surplus for export “ will be as large as that of British India, and perhaps larger. Nor “ must it be forgotten that India is but a distant colony of Great ‘ Britain, while the region on the Pacific is an integral portion of our [ IO ] “ national Union, and is of the very form and body of our state. “ The inhabitants of India are alien from England in race, language “ and religion. The citizens of California, Oregon and Nevada, with “ the adjacent Territories, are of our own blood and kindred—bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. " Great Britain appreciates the advantage, and perhaps the neces- “ sity, of maintaining, at the cost of large military and naval estab- “ lishments, the interior and nearest route to India, while any nation “ with hostile intent is compelled to take the longer route, and travel “ many thousand additional miles through dangerous seas. It is “ hardly conceivable that the same great power, which considers her- “ self justified in taking these precautions for the safety of a remote “ colony on another continent, should object to the United States “ adopting similar, but far less demonstrative measures for the pro- “ tection of the distant shores of her own domain, for the drawing “ together of the extremes of the Union in still closer bonds of “ interest and sympathy, and for holding, in the quiet determination “ of an honorable self-defense, the absolute control of the great “ waterway which shall unite the two oceans, and which the United “ States will always insist upon treating as part of her coast line. “ If a hostile movement should at any time be made against the “ Pacific coast, threatening danger to its people and destruction “ to its property, the Government of the United States would feel “ that it had been unfaithful to its duty and neglectful towards its “ own citizens, if it permitted itself to be bound by a treaty which “ gave the same right through the canal to a war-ship bent on an “ errand of destruction that is reserved to its own navy, sailing for “ the defense of our coast and the protection of the lives of our “ people. And as England insists, by the might of her power, that “ her enemies in war shall strike her Indian possessions only by “ doubling the Cape of Good Hope, so the Government of the “ United States will equally insist that the interior, more speedy, “ and safer route of the canal shall be reserved for ourselves, while “ our enemies, if we shall ever be so unfortunate as to have any, “ shall be remanded to the voyage around Cape Horn. “ A consideration of controlling influence in this question is the “ well-settled conviction on the part of this Government, that only “ by the United States exercising supervision can the Isthmus “ canals be definitely and at all times secured against the in- “ terference and obstruction incident to war. A mere agreement “ of neutrality on paper between the great powers of Europe might “ prove ineffectual to preserve the canal in time of hostilities. The “ first sound of a cannon in a general European war would, in all “ probability, annul the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic posi- “ tion of the canal, commanding both oceans, might be held by the “ first naval power that could seize it. If this should be done, the “ United States would suffer such grave inconvenience and loss in “ her domestic commerce as would enforce the duty of a defensive “ and protective war on her pare, for the mere purpose of gaining t II ] “ that control which, in advance, she insists is due to her position “ and demanded by her necessities. * * * * * * * “ For self-protection to her own interests, therefore, the United “ States, in the first instance, asserts her right to control the Isth “ mus transit. And, secondly, she offers by such control that abso- “ lute neutralization of the canal as respects European powers “ which can in no other way be certainly attained and lastingly “ assured.” Great Britain was here distinctly informed that the conditions under which the United States entered into this treaty were extra¬ ordinary and exceptional, and that these had passed away and new conditions, imposing new duties and responsibilities upon this nation, had developed, and that the United States would not be bound longer by the provisions of a treaty which “ impeaches our right “ and long-established claim to priority on the American continent,” and that for “self-protection to her own interests, the United States “ asserts her right to control the Isthmus transit.” This notice is accompanied by reasons for giving it, and a similar and no less positive assertion of the same position is made by Mr.Frelinghuysen subsequently, in his correspondence with Lord Granville, accom¬ panied by arguments so clear and convincing that no unprejudiced mind can fail to admit them as conclusive! All writers on inter¬ national law apply this maxim, in substance, to treaties: “When that “ state of things which was essential to and the moving cause of “ the promise or engagement has undergone a material change, or “ has ceased, the foundation of the promise or engagement is gone “ and their obligation has ceased.” The motive of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty being, as is shown by its terms, to encourage the immediate building of a canal by a com¬ pany then in existence and proposing to build it, or by private per¬ sons who should take the place of that company ; and, owing to causes which have been explained, neither the company nor any private persons have been able to even begin the construction; and thirty-five years having passed; the object of the treaty hav¬ ing failed, and the conditions of the parties having undergone the most marvelous changes, the contention that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty can be set up as a bar against the construction of this great work seems to be against reason. The obligations of the treaty in respect to the canal have lapsed, because there is no canal—no ob¬ ject to which they can be said to relate or apply. The treaty has been a dead letter! Nothing has been done in execution of its stipulations. Certainly not by England ; for she has performed no act in relation to it, except to violate it. With the movement of of time there have come to this country such changes, not only in respect of its internal development, but in its relations to other na¬ tions, that it is no longer prudent or possible for its Government to wait in hope of a consummation of the object and purpose of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty by the method contemplated by it. In no like period of the world’s history has such stupendous changes been wrought in the conditions of peoples and States as have taken place in the thirty-five years since the Clayton-Bulwer arrangement was made! There has never been greater progress made by mankind in the same space of time. A great waterway has been constructed through the drifting sands of the Isthmus of Suez, which has changed the conditions of trade, and the transpor¬ tation routes of the Eastern hemisphere. England, by her peculiar method of dealing with nations, has come in possession of that waterway, and this has enabled her to make conquest of all worth having in the East, and given her perpetual control of India and commercial supremacy in a greater part of the Orient. If she had control of a waterway through the Darien Isthmus, she would be not only “ mistress of the seas,” but the empress of the commercial world ! The changes on this side of the Atlantic have been the marvel of mankind. The United States has, in thirty-five years, developed and expanded from a commonwealth of twenty-three millions to a nation of fifty-six millions of people, possessing every element of a progressive civilization, and all the qualities which give a people power and consequence among the nations. Our Pacific States and Territories, which in 1850 were almost unex¬ plored, have developed into an empire, with opulent cities and a magnificent domain, capable of sustaining a population equal to that of the United States at the date of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ! Since then there have been added to our Union nearly six hundred thousand square miles of territory on the North Pacific. In 1850, our total annual revenues were $47,000,000. Now they are $400,000,000! The nation was not then financially able to build the canal alone. Now it can do it without aid from any quarter. Since then we have opened the doors of many Oriental marts to American commerce ! We have become one of the first manufac¬ turing nations, and our internal commerce exceeds that of any people on the earth ! We have built railways, whose tracks would four times encircle the globe ! These are some of the changes which have created new conditions and relations, and have super¬ seded those of thirty-five years ago. And to these should be added the courageous attempt of the French at Panama, which threatens to bring into existence and prominence new and totally different conditions and relations from those now existing, and which will impose other and different duties and responsibilities upon the United States than any dreamed of_in 1850, or perhaps much thought of now! The United States has need of a canal of her own for the uses of her own commerce, and for her own defence : for the French canal at Panama is a menace to the interests and safety of our Pacific possessions, and our commerce upon the sea. In 1850, the people of California were importing breadstuffs from Chile. They exported nothing but gold. Now the Pacific Coast can export a million and a half tons of wheat annually, and many thousands of [ 13 ] tons of other products! The commerce of the United States which would pass through the canal if built, both coastwise and foreign, would, at the same tolls charged on the Suez canal, pay four per cent, annual dividend on one hundred million dollars! This commerce is the result of development, which has taken place almost entirely since 1850. Shall it be said that an arrangement with Great Britain, made with reference to the conditions of 1850, and for a specific purpose which has failed, shall be held to restrain this nation from providing a route of transportation for her great and growing commerce ? Since the French have occupied the Panama transit, there is no other route but that through Nicaragua. Shall we be shut out from the Isthmus, and our Pacific coast and cities, and our merchant marine left at the mercy of European fleets ? Our commercial interests, no less than the common de¬ fence, demand that we have a waterway through Nicaragua, and no ancient, improvident, obsolete and lapsed agreement with Great Britain can be invoked to prevent its construction ! It may not be wholly useless to inquire how far, and in what par¬ ticular, the making of such a treaty as that printed in the Tribune , is violative of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Let us see what it was that the two nations engaged to do by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. 1. To protect any parties having authority of the local govern¬ ment through which the canal may pass, their employes and prop¬ erty engaged and used in the construction of the canal, from unjust detention, confiscation, seizure or violence. 2. To use their influence with such local governments to facili¬ tate the construction of the canal, and the establishment of two free ports, one at each end of the same. 3. To protect the canal, when completed, from interruption, seizure or confiscation, and to guarantee the neutrality thereof, so that it shall remain Ppen and free, and the capital invested therein secure, conditionally , upon the company managing it without dis¬ crimination or unjust charges, either party being at liberty to with¬ draw its protection by giving six months’ notice. 4. To invite friendly States to enter into like stipulations, with the right of each of the two contracting parties to enter into treaty 9 stipulations with any Central American State to facilitate the con¬ struction and protection of the canal for the benefit of mankind, etc. 5. To give support and encouragement to the company first offering to build the canal, and give to the company which has a contract with Nicaragua the preference for one year. 6. To extend their protection by treaty stipulations to railway or canal communication across the Isthmus by way of Tehauntepec or Panama. These are all the affirmative obligations, and they relate, so far as Nicaragua is concerned, to a canal to be built by private persons, or a' company, and have especial reference to the company which then held a concession. No reference is made to any canal to be built by either of the Governments, or by both jointly. [ H ] What are the things the two Governments agree not to do ? 1. They declare that neither the one or the other will ever ob¬ tain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal. 2. They agree that neither will ever erect or maintain any for¬ tification commanding the canal, or in the vicinity thereof. 3. Nor occupy, nor fortify, nor colonize, nor assume, nor exer¬ cise, any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America. 4. Nor will either make any use of any protection which either may afford, or any alliance which either may have to or with any State, for the purpose of erecting any such fortifications, or of col¬ onizing, etc. Nor either take any advantage of any intimacy, or use any alli¬ ance, connection, or influence with any State through which the canal may pass, for the purchase of, or holding for the citizens or subjects of one any rights or advantages, in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal, which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or subjects of the other. These are the renunciatory clauses, or stipulations of restraint, and they are dependent upon the affirmative stipulations, and have relation to the same object. If the affirmative stipulations have lapsed for want of an object, to which they could be made to apply, then these renunciatory clauses have ceased to be obligatory. It will be observed that the first of these clauses is but a declaration of intention. “ The Governments of the United States and Great “ Britain hereby declare that neither the one or the other will ever “ obtain or maintain for itself any control over the said ship canal.” Does any one suppose that this declaration would have deterred Great Britain from purchasing a majority of the stock of that canal company if the canal had been built ? If an emergency had arisen similar to that in the case of the Suez Canal, how long would it have taken England to have changed her mind and intention ? We would have been told that renunciatory clauses in treaties are not of perpetual operation, and that they fall with important changes of conditions. Taking this first declaration with other parts of the treaty, it means that these two governments intend to guarantee that the canal about to be built by a private corporation, with its own money, shall remain under the control of that corporation, and under the sovereignty of Nicaragua, and that England and the United States will guarantee that Nicaragua shall protect the Company in its rights of property and control ; but this guarantee and protection to be withdrawn, if the corporation shall make un¬ fair discriminations as to the commerce of one of the parties over the commerce of the other, or shall impose oppressive tolls, etc. That this arrangement had direct reference to a canal then to be built by private parties, and had no reference to any canal which might in the future be built and owned by either of the parties to the treaty, is evident, and the declaration (or agreement, if it can [ i5 ] be so called), that neither would obtain exclusive control was never intended to apply to a government canal undertaken by either of the nations thirty-five years afterwards. If England had obtained a concession from Nicaragua, and began the construction of a canal in priority of the United States, after a lapse of a third of a century, the private parties having failed to build as contemplated, could the United States have claimed, under the treaty, a right to be admitted to a joint control ? It is probable that our Government would have sought to apply the Monroe Doctrine in such a case, but if the concession were such an one as is contained in the Tribune publication, by which the canal is free to all nations, and remains under the sovereignty of Nicaragua, it is difficult to see how the United States could have made objection upon any other ground than that of the Monroe Doctrine. And should the United States cease to pursue the pur¬ pose of building a canal, and Great Britain should take a conces¬ sion which we refuse, and construct the canal, it is difficult to per¬ ceive any ground of objection whatever, which the United States could reasonably make. Can the Clayton-Bulwer treaty be said to possess the quality of immortality ? Is it a never-ending, inextin¬ guishable compact which one of the parties may forever hold up as a scroll of fate, forbidding the progress of nations ? The other negative agreements in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty pre¬ sent no points of conflict with the Tribune treaty. The United States does not, by that document, propose to fortify the canal, nor occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, nor do any other thing forbidden by the first article of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Admitting that treaty to be a valid and existing agreement, (for the sake of argument,) before England can, with reason make any objection to such an arrange¬ ment with Nicaragua, she must ask to be admitted to a participa¬ tion in the undertaking, and offer to furnish her quota of the money, and to assume a share of the obligations and responsibilities of the venture. Until she is refused all this, it does not seem to me that she has ground for complaint, for even though we expand the meaning of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, so as to include any canal which may be at any time built, it is specifically agreed in Article VI as follows : “ And the contracting parties likewise agree, that “ each shall (may?) enter into treaty stipulations with such of the “ Central American States as they may deem advisable , for thepur- “ pose of more effectually carrying out the great design of this conven- “ tion, namely, that of constructing and maintaining the said canal “ as a ship communication between the two oceans, the benefit “ of mankind , on equal terms to all, and of protecting the same.” This is precisely what the United States would have done, had the Tribune treaty been made, and as no one else proposes to build the canal, it is proposed that the United States build it! Here seems to be sufficient warrant for making such a treaty with Nicaragua ; at least, the making of such a treaty is no violation of the Clayton- Bulwer treaty. At all events, it will be time enough to regard Great Britain’s complaints or protests, when they are received, and to consider the question of the admission of Great Britain to a co¬ partnership with the United States in an American canal , when the proposition is definitely made! My apology for so long a discussion of the international ques¬ tions involved is, that I know that there are some who hesitate to give such a measure their support, because they fear that there is here a contravention of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which involves questions of national honor and good faith, and the consequent danger of war. No more important considerations can occupy the attention of the people. It does not seem to me, however, that any of our existing engagements with Great Britain are violated by the proposed arrangement with Nicaragua for the canal, nor should there be any fear of war with England. There will be no questions or misunderstandings growing out of such an arrangement which will not be susceptible of honorable settlement by negotiations be¬ tween the two Governments, and I regard it as doubtful whether Great Britain will interpose any objection to our going forward with the great work, which will promote her interests as well as ours, and benefit mankind. Certainly she has no right to object. That the route selected by the American engineers is the best and most economical, for uniting the two great oceans by a com¬ mercial and military waterway, is abundantly shown, by the reports of Isthmus explorations and surveys, in the possession of the Gov¬ ernment. Nearly three-fourths of the distance of this waterway is by natural channels, which require but a small outlay to render them practicable for the largest vessels afloat. The magnificent lake which nature has provided in the heart of Nicaragua, for an international haven and harbor of refuge, is so ample and deep and placid, that the argosies of all the seas may rest in peace and safety upon its bosom, when once channels are opened from its east and west shores to the two great oceans ! Upon its islands there may be stored supplies for all the naval and merchant ships which may pass^from ocean to ocean ; and upon these islands, or upon the shore of the lake, may also be erected shops and docks for every kind of repairs. All engineers and experts in nautical science pro¬ nounce the proposed canal practicable, although they differ in their estimates of the cost. The estimate of the engineers of the Mara- time Canal Company, Mr. Menocal and others, was $41,000,000, including improvements to harbors at each end of the canal. To this should be added fifty per cent, for engineering contingencies, and twenty per cent, for other possible contingencies, making the probable cost about $70,000,000. I am aware that other engineers have estimated the cost much higher, and it is difficult to make even a close approximate estimate of the cost of so vast a work. There are numerous examples, however, of like works, which in some degree serve as guides in making estimates for contingencies. After an examination of the several plans and estimates, it would seem that the maximum estimate cannot exceed double the amount of the estimate of Mr. Menocal, which would give $82,- 000,000 as the ultimate cost. The Suez canal, 100 miles long, cost $92,000,000, including the construction of the harbor at Port Said, and docks for all sorts of repairs, and it is stated by engineers of high reputation, that the Suez canal could now be built for half the sum it cost. It is confidently asserted by the officers of the United States, who have made the surveys of the line of the proposed canal, that there are no considerable engineering difficulties to be expected. The restoration or creation of the harbor at the Eastern terminus does not appear to be problematical, and is much easier of accom¬ plishment than the creation of the harbor of Port Said. Some en¬ gineers have estimated the cost of reclaiming the harbor at Grey- town at five million dollars, while the plan of Admiral Ammen, Capt. Phelps, and others, does not involve more than half that sum. The engineer officers regard it as an easy matter to construct works at Brito, on the Pacific, which will ensure a good harbor at a maximum cost not exceeding $2,500,000. The deepest cut on the line is 41 feet, and the highest embankment required is but five feet. The lake area is 2,700 square miles, with a drainage basin of 8,000 square miles, and the lake being the summit level of the canal, fur¬ nishes an inexhaustible supply of fresh water throughout the year for canal purposes. It is possible that the forty-three miles of canalization, with the two harbors, the necessary works for slack water in the San Juan river; the thirteen locks; the necessary machinery, buildings, appliances, and everything necessary for the construction and for operating the canal, may aggregate a cost of $100,000,000, as estimated by the Humphreys Board ; but it is be¬ lieved that under no contingency will the work cost more than that amount; an immense sum, it is true, but while the cost is great, the benefits and advantages are almost inconceivably great. In a mere economic view, the enterprise is most desirable, whether the Panama canal be finished or not. The tonnage which will neces¬ sarily take the route of this canal in preference to that of Panama, could not fail to reach 2,500,000 tons annually, which would pay, at moderate tolls, a clear profit of four per cent, per annum on $100,- 000,000, the first five years, with a constant increase afterward. A statement of the saving in sailing distances will serve to indicate the volume of commerce which must pass the canal : From New York to Hong Kong, 5,870 miles ; from New York to Yokohama, 6,800 miles ; from New York to San Francisco, 8,600 miles ; from San Francisco to Fiverpool, 6,100 miles. The saving in freights alone upon the transportation of Pacific coast exports to European and American Atlantic ports, at a fair average estimate, would not be less than $9,000,000 per annum ; and with the progress of development in this region, the saving would be increased probably not less than ten per cent, per annum, or $1,000,000 per annum. In this calculation I have omitted the [ 18 1 immense saving in freights, upon merchandise shipped from the Atlantic ports to the Pacific ports. This canal would open a new, cheap emigration route to the Pacific coast, and this region, so de¬ sirable for settlement, would speedily increase in population and in its production, thus creating constantly new business for the canal ; and instead of injuring the transcontinental lines of railway, their business would be increased in volume by the rapid and steady de¬ velopment of the country through which they pass. The Suez canal, which the wise men said would never pay, furnishes an in¬ structive example as to the ratio of increase in the business of such a canal. In 1870 net tonnage passed “ 1871 “ “ 1872 “ “ 1873 “ “ 1874 “ “ 1875 “ , 436,609 tons; receipts, $1,031,865 761,467 “ “ 1,798.746 1,160,748 “ “ 3,281,518 1,367,767 “ “ 4,579,465 1,631,650 “ “ 4,971,476 2,009,984 “ “ 5,777,260 This illustrates the ratio of increase for the first six years. In the next five years the increase was not so rapid ; but in 1880 it had reached : Tonnage passed, 3,057,421 tons; receipts, $8,364,179. And in 1883, the tonnage passed was 5,775,861 tons ; receipts, $13,- 762,413- In 1884 the business was about the same as in 1883, for which the stockholders received eighteen per cent, dividend on their in¬ vestment. The tolls have been reduced to $1.93 per ton, and the pilot dues have been abolished. While the American canal will start with a much larger business than that of the Suez canal in 1870, perhaps five times as great, it will probably increase in a like ratio, to the ratio of increase shown by the figures I have quoted. There need be no fear of the Pana¬ ma canal. Within ten years there will be business for both canals, leaving for Eads’ Tehauntepec Railway all the ships it will ever be able to safely carry. But ; Mr. President, it is unnecessary tq detain this assembly with descriptions of the canal, or the technology of its construction, or with speculations in regard to rival enterprises. The reports of the officers who have made the surveys are voluminous and accessible, and are sufficiently thorough and instructive to give all necessary information concerning the enterprise. That it is practicable, and will prove to be of great utility and value, there can be no doubt. Why then should not the United States go forward to the accom¬ plishment of a work so grand in its design, so necessary to the in¬ dustrial and commercial interests of the country, and which prom¬ ises results so beneficial to many millions of our race ? Is it not time for this great nation to peacefully assert its power, and utilize its influence among the nations of the West ? Is it not time that we should look out upon the world and contemplate the possibili¬ ties of new commercial relations ? Is it not prudent to secure con- » trol of an agency, which, in the possession of a great European power, would be used to our detriment not only in times of peace, but which might be utilized to the great injury of our Pacific coast, and our general commerce in time of war ? A strong naval power in possession of the lake of Nicaragua and its islands, with a ship canal connecting its waters with the two oceans, would hold the commerce of this hemisphere at its mercy. Once in possession of that line of transportation, no single power, nor the allied powers of half the world could dislodge her, and there in the security of that interior sea she would concentrate her fleets of war ships and the material of war, and be able to send forth her commerce de¬ stroyers to swarm upon either ocean, and her iron-clads to devastate the towns and cities of either coast There is no such strategic position for naval operations in all the world ! Why not occupy it ourselves? If we give it up, another will take it, and then the chain of our environment will be complete! If constitutional objections to this great undertaking are raised, it may be answered, that it is a specific constitutional power and duty of Congress to provide for the national defence, and to promote the general welfare. The question of securing markets for American manufactures is one which is being pressed upon the attention of those who have to deal with such questions, with constantly increasing force. Pro¬ duction has been so stimulated in this country, that the home mar¬ ket is overfilled, and to-day, we have the plant, machinery, capital, workmen and facilities for manufacturing the leading articles of manufacture, sufficient for the wants of at least eighty, perhaps one hundred millions of people, and we have fifty-six millions to sup¬ ply ! The extension of our commerce into new fields, and among other peoples, has become a necessity of our industrial system. Whatever, therefore, promotes the discovery or creation of new and additional markets for our manufactures, is a national blessing. The proposed canal will open new fields to American enterprise, and by shortening transportation routes, the American people will be able to successfully contend for the trade of many millions of people, whose profitable commerce is now enjoyed by England and European nations, because of the shorter lines of transportation open to them. The merchant marine of the United States will be revived and restored, and life and activity will be visible in the shipyards, which are now deserted and desolate. By the control of this canal, the foreign commerce of this country, created and fostered by it, will be conducted by Americans, and carried by American vessels. By means of this canal, we shall be brought into closer commercial relations with all Central America, and the Pacific States of South America, and ultimately we shall control the commerce of those States. Our metropolitan cities will be¬ come the centers of the financial systems of the peoples of this hemisphere, with whom our people trade. American ideas and American methods will be gradually adopted, and American civili¬ zation will spread and vivify like the sunshine throughout those / [ 20 ] regions, and the consequent development will create new wants, which our people will supply to the benefit of the nation ! This great work will unlock the gate which bars our way to the com¬ merce of the Orient, and it will give the key to American mer¬ chants ! Our Eastern commercial centers will have the shorter line to China and Japan, and the Islands of the Pacific, as compared with European lines of transportation. ^ The advantages and benefits which the control of this canal will bring to this coast and the whole United States are incalculable. Its construction will be an achievement worthy of the first nation + of the earth ! It will be an illustration of the power, the nerve and sagacity of the American people, which will challenge the respect of all mankind. It will be an object lesson to the nations of Europe, teaching the American method of dealing with great affairs, and illustrating in a practical way the future policy of this Government in respect to the nations and peoples of this hemi¬ sphere ! It will mark a new era in the life of this nation. The consummation of this work will be a triumph of peace, no less renowned than our greatest victories in war! Sir, this is the na¬ tion’s opportunity, and the turning point in the destiny of the Pacific States. This is the age of prodigious enterprises and great utilities. It is the age of action ! The day of the manifesto has passed. National greatness is measured by national performance! This nation has taught the Western nations the lesson of progress by example ! Why should we halt or hesitate now ? Shall we ask consent of Great Britain, before we proceed to the execution of this great design ? Or shall we go forward without fear, with firm and steady step in the grand march of progress toward the fulfill¬ ment of American destiny !