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Wie a Bere iG in t ai He He ul ta hi a Ba i Htc th ii ie a f nec Wish eu nae Mi Lith ona) Penne a toh HR a fy on Faye ry an ist F ah ethos ; ve rns tee fen rf co : eee i ea iy) Upay na Hi a ot Y a a to ee ie if bbe Fi ae mil a ve o i) be ts i sili Se it f Wr rual putt at af Mh Prensa a toe :] 7 ea By saver dtd a Cee JALAL AA RS eye Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below. University of Illinois Library wh +\4 L161—H41 r+ ; — rei os > Ee ie ‘Gas a “taste ti i Lonpon: Printed by A. SrorriswoopE, New-Street-Square. } arr tT . Me th. 7 A Le men fs ** * sre Medet oan ‘ Ki ft refi ve of! Bo} € oi ey oka eee a ‘a \ A » f : at - ; a ; rh 74 3 ' | She ni ; @ a" weet o spaces i om i ' ‘ j fs aa) Mies a5 5 : i oy . 7 Sa 7 %, z "TYRPAAS ty) eink.” + ey PO TAL ‘snag Sa We punrvey ¢ pe e ie, nnmnons bliin: RES i oS vd A he oe oe N Neweeme « ‘ “Va eae WHVOO a. da OS. io < VEN yr ad, esata sa" (h P 4 vary ~~. whee SP Meio - r PMS Gd" kw: “ ' > ‘ Ne : MA aoe ag oe +e Ns on a ae oR cies on i. a x me on rae tits * 1% ? 14> . ’ e te ’ ST AY A OL ia j , Stlomba”” pTambre ° Santiago 40° Mertolao ° Lamego wast SJoao a cC emaring M ‘Badajoz Xe | ° } i Meri °dlmagro s M ON = kc | a 2 3 dranda Monsanto 23 : a . Tata ue la Montarbar _ Lain (dranjue> Pus 3 = Jevica°~— Idanhia a “Nova 3 ani Seqorbe > Segura ‘aterra PULMTOPO. | Salas ° ne eS Erfias Fittany Mea o Me Miran Do liriase, It } Haro alstorga S Miguel Nagera , oe Legrone Bayi, | os Domingo cl la aGanexa i Calzada Calahorra.° Arnedo o Balbastre , “Borja SU Mon 01), Plasencia 6 ° (aldas alona. Badalo a dela de °Penatiel en alba. Duero Sale ° Momblaneh a Valls Ss nw Candas” ; ¢ yi @ilatayud, Gorales °® | A) Fuentelapena * ° Puentelsarico Frasno La Seca ° 8 ueda® oNava ° dina del\Campo | | Jupelvedo Vendrell “era [Torr ede } 2 | “Moncorvo. Ledesma) ery a 2 Cantidgyo ‘, ° ‘o daspe \ - Salamanca °Madrigal as teks a eee : Calanda Alba de Tormes' dadraque s { poh Tora (ijuentes : SOP EIA 7 iy itla Viviosa Brihuegat ea Lye \WHucte f erte | Piempoxuelos: FPuen i 2 fA, Chinchoh ote, Colnenar i ESE, z a m wer 9») (eS \Bunol 2 - Bircntara, | \ i AN 2 Mit ana, Ae ts Orde pear Gampilie “ iP ye Villanueva de Laxcara o Caceres ° dlcaxar de S.Fua es °Triestit wa ae a S.Clemente ° Tarazona Gud | ou ria run r ___o Manzanares: ' | o Montero ° ° chinchilla % Cy: Solana Ciudad Real ‘ ° _Almanza o { 41707 Fuente la Montalegre ato Caudete o | further down the gulf, with the view of unloading | in safety, and some merchandise and treasure was accordingly brought on shore, but they were soon pursued and overtaken by the English squadron. By order of the French and Spanish Admirals the — greater part of the cargoes was then thrown into the sea, and the vessels set on fire; but the English exerted themselves in extinguishing the flames, and — succeeded in securing six galleons and seven ships * San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p- 80. t London Gazettes, 1702. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. -of war. ‘The roar of the artillery, the crackling of the flames, and the plunging of sailors from the ‘burning ships into the sea, mingled their various sounds with the lamentable shrieks of the wounded, _and the exulting shouts of the conquerors. War has seldom assumed so hideous an aspect as Vigo ‘now displayed, and two thousand French and Spaniards are computed to have perished on this dreadful day. Before the fighting was over, Chateau Renault appears to have fled from Vigo on the road ‘to Santiago de Compostella, declaring it to be his ‘immediate duty to secure against attack a city so important to the Spaniards, and indeed to the whole Catholic world, from its supposed religious sanctity, and so alluring to invaders from its accumulated votive offerings. ‘To the same place, also, was for- warded in all haste, the small remnant of the bullion and merchandise which the Spaniards had succeed- _ed in saving ; but this remnant became still further diminished, and, in fact, brought down to nothing, _ by depredations at Santiago and its neighbourhood. _It is remarkable, that the residents in places of pil- _grimage or reputed holiness, who might be sup- _ posed more pious, are commonly far more base, _unprincipled, and depraved than other men. Next morning the Allies sent down some divers to recover, if possible, the treasure thrown over- _ board by the Spaniards ; but, annoyed by the firing from shore, and satisfied with their spoils, they soon desisted from the attempt, and steered home- wards. The loss of the Spaniards on this occasion, 63 CHAP. : ” 1702. 64: WAR OF THE ° CHAP. in goods and treasure, exceeded eight millions: of) H.. dollars, but from the quantity sunk or destroyed, 1702, it is certain that not one half this value was gained by the Allies. The want of these expected supplies at a period of great distress, and at a court crowded with greedy claimants, proved most em- ‘barrassing to Philip, and obliged him to leave un- performed many promises and contracts. He found himself deprived of his best, almost his only fleet, and was therefore compelled for some time | to throw the American commerce into the hands’ of the French, who had long been grasping at this important privilege, but who, by its exercise, offended all the Spanish merchants. On the other | hand, the attacks on Cadiz and Vigo proved almost | as injurious to the Archduke, from the unpopu- larity they raised against his cause and his allies; and to counteract this first feeling required the operation of some time, of many causes of internal discontent, and of many striking examples of defection. | Of these the chief and most important was that of the hereditary Admiral of Castille, Don Juan Henriquez y Cabrera. His high rank, his princely fortune, and his extensive influence, gave lustre to great natural abilities, and a love of literature and learning, seldom found among Spanish. grandees, A candidate for Court favour during the last reign, he had endeavoured to stem, but at last sunk be- neath the overwhelming power of Portocarrero, | who considered him as his most formidable rival, SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. ' 6 oD -and who made use of his authority at the accession CHAP. of Philip, to dismiss him from his office of Master ‘of the Horse. Even before this time he had been ‘looked upon as no well-wisher to the House of Bourbon ; and now with this indignity rankling in his mind, he became an enemy the more dangerous because disguised. An humbler individual might have safely avowed his discontent at his dismissal, and indulged in the pleasure of complaint, but ‘not so the Admiral — his rank was so exalted that ‘he could only secure his safety by the most abject ‘submissions to the crown. So great were his ta- ents for intrigue, that he found means whilst treat- ‘ing with Vienna, and stirring up the disaffected jat home, to become in some degree a personal fa- vourite with the Queen and Princess Orsini. Much alarmed at his increasing influence, Portocarrero ‘determined to remove him altogether from its ‘sphere. He accordingly induced the government to name the Admiral ambassador at Paris, an ap- pointment, which, however high, was looked upon ‘by the haughty noble as Halo his expectations, and which he feared might be intended as the first step to arrest, imprisonment, or even death, ‘when once removed from his country and con- ‘nections. | In spite of such forebodings, the Admiral was too skilful a politician not to know that danger is often incurred by the mere expression of fear; and, far ‘from betraying his uneasiness, he seemed to receive the appointment with pleasure, and to make every F Ev; 1702. 66 Cha, aoeeeaen? 1702. WAR OF THE preparation for filling it with dignity. He selected the persons for his suite; he fixed a time for his journey ; he accepted from the treasury a large sum of money for his expenses, and requested the royal permission (requisite in Spain for these purposes) to raise some more by mortgage on his own domains. During this time he actively employed himself im completing his negotiations with the Archduke, and arranged a plan for retreating into Portugal. Having taken'a solemn leave of the Court, he set out on the road to France, but had only proceeded three days on his journey, when a sealed despatch, which he had left behind him for this very purpose, was brought him by express. He read it with an air of surprise; and, turning to his attendants, in- formed them that he had just received counter- orders from her Majesty (the King was still im Italy), and was now instructed to proceed in the first place to the Court of Portugal, and attempt to con- firm its wavering alliance. Believed and followe¢ by all his suite, he forthwith turned to the left anc made for Zamora, where the authorities were de- ceived by the same pretence, and afforded hur every facility for passing into Portugal. Ever after crossing the frontier, he did not throw aside the mask, but still protesting of his attachment tc King Philip, declared that the base intrigues of his enemies at court, and the unjust suspicions tc which these had given rise, induced him to with: draw for a time until his innocence should be felt and acknowledged. Such was his power of dissi- SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 607 mulation that he again obtained full credit with all CHAP. - those whom he addressed; and proceeding to Lis- t f ey i bon, entered that city in state with a great number of carriages and a train of three hundred persons. | He was received with much distinction by the | Ff King of Portugal, and took up his abode in a palace of the Duke of Cadaval, from whence he ty soon published a manifesto, asserting the will of Charles the Second a forgery, and transferring his allegiance to the Archduke as to his rightful King. | Most of the gentlemen who had accompanied him q fi i I hae te followed his example, although several, and_ his own nephew Don Pascal Henriquez, remained ' steadfast in their loyalty and hastened back to Spain. | His flight excited no small surprise and alarm at ' Madrid, where he was proclaimed a traitor, and eta). >. vr? _attainted in body and estates; and though the former was safe from the sentence, the latter were eagerly seized. ‘The Admiral perceived that the - scabbard was thrown away on both sides, and that 2 . eae he must remain an exile for life should his party not prevail. Stripped of all his domains, he knew _ the importance of money to him in such circum- _ stances, and how much his means of subsistence, - or at least of respect amongst strangers, would depend on its possession. Yet with the true Spanish sense of honour, he instantly sent back to Madrid the large sum which had been paid him for the expenses of his embassy, and which he would not consent to use for any other purpose. The Admiral now applied himself with equal Fg eee Luss Oct. 23. 68 CHAP. ie 1703. WAR OF THE talent and activity to forward the cause he had espoused. His two first objects were to induce | the Emperor to send over the Archduke Charles, and to obtain the co-operation of Portugal, an ally | more important from its position than its power. | Each of these schemes was, however, attended | with peculiar difficulties. Leopold had only one | son besides Charles, and that son having only as | yet daughters by his marriage, he was unwilling to | expose the last hope of his succession to the uncer | tainties and dangers of a distant expedition, more especially when he considered his own advanced | age and declining health. ‘The King of Portugal, on the other hand, was in character thoroughly selfish, and like all selfish men, he was naturally | prone to indecision, as always desirous of combin- | ing incompatible advantages. For many months | he wavered between the arguments of the Ad- | miral and those of the Duke of Cadaval, the first | of the grandees, and a zealous partisan of the French. On the one side, the Admiral held out | as lures an increase of territory, and the payment of subsidies; he spoke highly, like all exiles, of his | influence and connections at home; he urged that | the weakness and disunion of Spain would render it an easy prey, and somewhat inconsistently as- serted, that its existing government entertained a serious and settled plan of conquering Portugal. ‘«* What matters it,” exclaimed the Duke of Ca- daval in reply, when the subject was discussed at council,—‘* what matters it to us whether the ruler | | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. . t ‘ i bp ie . ' it 7 | 4 i { * t “at Madrid be of the House of Hapsburg or of “Bourbon ? In either case he will be the King of ** Spain ; he will act as such against the Portuguese ; “he will never consent to yield to them one foot of “land from his provinces; and, least of all, from “those which serve as a bulwark and safeguard to **the rest. The cessions which the Archduke is ! : | ** now so ready to promise will be prevented by his ‘ interest if victorious, by his inability if vanquished. ; ' « Tt is easy to be liberal with the property of others. ** ‘To carry on a war we should need many auxiliary ' “ troops, and must expose our pure Catholic popu- “lation to be corrupted and defiled by so much in- ' tercourse with the Dutch and English heretics.” ty . . e \ These arguments were not without their weight, but, through a master stroke of policy, the Admiral i f ft} 6 se { fourid means to neutralise the obstacles at Vienna and at Lisbon by playing off the one against the ‘other. To the Emperor he represented the arrival ‘of the Archduke as an indispensable condition, fapthont which the Portuguese would never stir: at the Court of Lisbon he affirmed that its accession to ‘the Grand Alliance was the only means of inducing Leopold to part with his son. Thus artfully draw- | ing aid from opposite difficulties he succeeded in his views. A treaty between Portugal and the 3 allied powers was signed at Lisbon on the 6th of May acknowledging Charles as King of Spain, and - undertaking to vindicate his rights.* It stipulated | I { ' that Don Pedro should maintain at his expense * Lamberty, vol. ii. p. 501. F 3 h | h 69 CHAP. Ii. en 1703. 70 WAR OF THE | CHAP. fifteen thousand men and receive subsidies for ll. yaising thirteen thousand more, so that the whole 1703. Portuguese army might amount to twenty-three thousand foot and five thousand cavalry, besides which he was promised the aid of twelve thousand auxiliary troops. Two other private articles, more- over, agreed, on the part of Charles, that as soon as he should be seated on his throne he would cede to the King of Portugal several cities, such as Badajos and Albuquerque on the Estramaduran frontier, on» the Gallician those of Tuy, Bayona, and Vigo, and in America the district of Rio de la Plata. These — articles were kept most strictly secret, it being fore- seen how offensive they would prove to the national pride of the Spaniards ; and, in fact, some years afterwards their premature disclosure was of all the events in the war one of the most unfavourable to the cause of Charles. On his part the Emperor duly performed his engagement, after some of that procrastination and delay by which the most hopeful undertakings are so often marred at Vienna. On the 12th of September he held a public court, and with much solemnity renounced his claims to the crown of ' Spain in favour of Charles ; his eldest son the King of the Romans did the same, and a few days after- wards the young monarch set out on his journey. So ill had he been provided with the means of pushing his pretensions, or even maintaining his dignity, that he found it necessary in Holland to raise some money by pawning his jewels—an inaus- SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 71 ‘picious commencement to a reign! Early next On _ January he arrived in England, where he was re- , } _ ceived with royal honours, and paid a visit to Queen Anne at Windsor; after which he re-embarked for _ Lisbon.* _ Meanwhile the return of Philip from Italy had been hastened by the news of the attack on Cadiz -and of the disaster at Vigo. On his arrival at Zaragoza he was strongly urged to resume the sit- tings, and ratify the acts of the Cortes convoked by the Queen; but he evaded a request which he thought dangerous to his prerogative, and his refusal did not fail to raise great discontent in Aragon. Most of the members of these Cortes were men of _ great personal weight and character ; and even had _ they been the reverse, it is one of the most common weaknesses of mankind to revere collectively those whom they despise as individuals. Philip reached his capital on the 17th of January amidst great _ public rejoicings, and attended by the new French ll Ea. er. — ambassador. ‘The Cardinal d’Estrées (such was his name and dignity) had been selected by Louis with peculiar care. His family was no less illustrious than his station in the church, and both of these seemed likely to endear him to so proud and so pious a nation as the Spaniards. His diplo- matic talents had been tried in several important missions, and matured in the favourable air of Italy, but his real character was one of inordinate vanity, * Tindal'’s Hist. vol. 3. p. 569. ed. 1763. KF 4 1704. 1703. 1703. G2 me - petulance, and indiscretion. He came to Madrid — WAR OF THE —.— deeply impressed with the incapacity of Philip’s 1703. ministry and with his own superior skill, and ex- pecting to rule every thing without restraint or opposition. Accordingly he attempted to carry on matters with a high hand, plunged at once into the most intricate affairs, and at his very outset wifully embroiled himselfwith the two chief persons at Court, Cardinal Portocarrero and Princess Orsini. Even to their Catholic Majesties he showed but little respect, and insisted on the right of immediate - admission to their presence on all occasions, not only for himself but for his nephew the Abbot d’ Estrées.* A succession of petty quarrels now ensued, which _ from the number and garrulity of French memoirs — for in France during the old system there was hardly — an underling in office, or a valet near the Court, who did not think himself entitled to print his recol- | lections, — might be detailed with great minuteness, but which seem scarcely to deserve it. Nor is it always easy to discern the truth on such trifles, which lie so near the ground, that the dust raised up by the disputants in the fury of the combat obscures them from the eye of the historian. I shall, therefore, pass lightly over a long train of | plots and cabals, representations and counter-repre- sentations to Louis, orders from him to his grand- son, and Jamentations from the latter and his Queen. * San Phelipe, Coment. vol. i. p. 88. Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 3. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. Perplexed and bewildered by these contradictory reports the King of France, though strongly leaning ‘to the side of d’Estrées, and espousing his views on all occasions, hardly knew at length what to be- lieve or what to do. It may be observed, that female talents, though inferior in state affairs, seldom fail to prevail in court intrigues. The Cardinal d’Estrées found to his cost that Princess Orsini was not to be thwarted and defied with impunity. So well established was his influence at Versailles, so powerful his connec- tions, and so high the esteem which Louis enter- tained for him, that he thought his own disgrace impossible—as if there were ever any impossibilities . to the vengeance of awoman! A fitting tool for her purpose was found in his own nephew the Abbot, ‘whom she artfully inspired with the wish and de- sign of supplanting the Cardinal as ambassador. While, therefore, she plied the French Court with incessant complaints against the Cardinal, whilst the King and Queen under her direction wrote in a similar strain, a secret representation was also made by the Abbot, which received the greater credit as his relationship seemed a pledge of his sincerity. He was even thought at Versailles highly deserv- ing of promotion and reward for the violence thus put upon his private feelings in drawing the veil from the errors of his kinsman; and the recall of the Cardinal having first been wrung from Louis | by these means, a subsequent application to Philip 73 ae ; 1703. 74 WAR OF THE 7 easily obtained the appointment of the Abbot in his room. For a time every thing now went on smoothly from the implicit deference of the new ambassador to the Princess. But he soon became anxious to attain some portion at least of the high authority which his predecessors had enjoyed, and the suc- cess of his former duplicity encouraged him to more. ‘The Princess was informed, that whilst in his public despatches he affected to extol her plans and her proceedings, his secret letters were filled - with the most bitter invectives against both. To ascertain the fact, she obtained an order from Philip to the Post-office, and seized on one of these con- fidential communications, which fully confirmed the suspicions she had formed. Not only did it inveigh in the severest terms against her administration, but it entered into all the details of her private life, and endeavoured to make her appear ridiculous as well as hateful. All the woman broke forth in the Princess as she read these revilings ; and forget- ful of her usual prudence and discretion, she added comments in her own hand on the margin, instead of closing the parcel, and endeavouring to conceal her fraudulent knowledge of its contents. One of her notes is too characteristic to be left unnoticed. D’Estrées had accused her of gallantries with her secretary, D’Aubigny, and of having afterwards secretly married him : she made no remark on the first charge, but wrote opposite the second:— | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 75 « As for married,—No!” With such additions, CHAP. the letter was again committed to the post, and to- —__, gether with several copies taken by the Princess and forwarded to her friends, in due time reached ‘its destination at Versailles*. This bold measure did not fail to ruin D’Estrées, _by showing the opposition between his public and private statements ; but it also ruined the Princess. Had the despatch been allowed to proceed unopen- pe Eo. | ed, or (what would have been the same) had her | opening it been unsuspected, its charges might probably have been disbelieved, or at least not thought of sufficient consequence to ground any ' measures upon them; but to find it intercepted _ was a gross and glaring breach of faith, and, more- over, the strongest proof of her unscrupulous, | daring, and vindictive character. In this instance, _as in many others, the indiscretion of the answer St _ i = proved far more injurious than the violence of the accusation. From that moment it is believed that Louis determined to recall from Madrid both the _ Princess and the Abbot; although he considered " it expedient, at first, to suppress his displeasure, and to convey to her new expressions of esteem and regard. Resentment, however, always gathers strength from the necessity of concealing it, and Louis kept his object steadily in sight. It was not to be accomplished without some difficulty. ‘he Princess entirely governed the Queen, and the Queen her husband; so that a positive order from * Mém, de St. Simon, vol. iii. p. 163. ed. 1829. 1703. 76 CHAP. II. 1704, April. WAR OF THE Louis, without any preparation, might have been met by Philip’s positive refusal, and have produced a total rupture between the two Courts. The best policy, therefore, was to wait patiently for some months, until Philip could be separated from the Queen, and the approaching campaign in Portugal — seemed a favourable opportunity for this purpose. He was eagerly pressed by the ambassador to show himself at the head ofhis army: he consented; and - no sooner had he reached Placentia than D’Estrées _ put into his hands a letter from Louis, requiring him to dismiss Princess Orsini, and to select another Camerara-mayor from a list of four ladies which was laid before him. Removed from the circle of the magician, the King no longer obeyed the spell, and after some lamentations and com- plaints, complied with the wishes of his grand- — father. At the same time the Abbot was informed of his own recall, which ‘was represented as a peace-offering to their Catholic Majesties. Another French agent at Madrid had the unwel- come task assigned him to inform the Queen of the exile of her favourite, and exhort her to submission. Maria Louisa heard this communication in sullen silence, and seemed brooding over some project of resistance ; but the Princess, at this crisis, displayed all the prudence, skill, and mastery of temper for which her character in general was so remarkably distinguished. Without giving way to any useless tears or wailings, she perceived at once the whole extent of her disaster, and immediately formed a SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. TL plan for retrieving it, and once more rising in the CHAP. favour of the Court of Versailles. Not only did 7 -Immoyeably fixed on the summit of his cliffs, ready again to pour down his force into the plains on the first favourable opportunity; and he had also taken care to line with some new levies the chain of mountains between Villa Velha and Abrantes, so as to defend the latter town. ‘Thus baffled, Berwick, having no cannon with him for a second siege of Monsanto, and seeing no other enterprise * Dos Grandes de Portugal, p. 167. 93 CHAP. Ii. hacen alee 1704. 94 CHAP. III. 1704. WAR OF THE within his reach, returned over the Tagus to the camp at Niza. On his arrival, he found the army reinforced by. the Marquis of Villadarias and his troops from: Andalusia, and immediately intrusted to that enter-: prising officer the reduction of Castel de Vida. But the summer heats, which in Estremadura and the neighbouring districts are proverbially scorch-' ing and unhealthy, had now set in with more than’ usual violence; disease, their natural consequence, was raging through the camp; and they also com-: pletely spoiled, and made unfit for use, the bread. brought from Spain for the army. Under these cir- | cumstances, Castel de Vida might have given Vil- ladarias much trouble, garrisoned as it was by one. English and two Portuguese regiments, had not the latter been commanded by a coward. ‘The scanty artillery of the Spaniards had played but four days, and had merely, according to the expression of Berwick, scratched the walls of the place, when this worthless Portuguese offered to surrender; and finding the English still determined to hold out, contrived to steep in water their stores of powder, and thus compelled them to follow his ex- ample. With this capitulation ended the cam- paign. It was no longer possible to keep the field under that burning sun, had even sickness spared a sufficient number of men for active undertakings. — Of the French horses two thirds had already died from the effects of the heat; and the Spanish had | . SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. } ‘ suffered almost as severely from the want of barley, which Berwick could not believe to be so abso- Mialy necessary for them as the natives repre- sented. The truth of this singular fact, which was tried by the Duke of Wellington in nearly the same district a century afterwards*, now cost the )Duke of Berwick all present service from his cavalry. On the Ist of July he broke up his camp ,at Niza, and marched back to Spain, having first, however, rased the fortifications of Castel Branco, paortalegre, and nearly all the other places taken during the campaign. He fixed his own _head- quarters at Salamanca, to observe and restrain Das Minas at Almeida; and stationed Serclaes at Ba- ‘dajos, while the King returned to Madrid, and ‘Villadarias to Andalusia. On the other part, Das Minas was reduced to the same inactivity, not only from the same effects -of the season, but from the feeble character of the English general, with whom his power was unfor- tunately shared. Nothing, indeed, could be less honourable than the part performed by the Duke of Schomberg during the whole course of this cam- paign. His army, it is true, far inferior to that of the Spaniards, was unable to cope with them in the field ; but might at least have intercepted their * “ We have lost many hundred horses by the use of other “ grain, parley. being the only wholesome food for horses in “this country.” Letter from Sir Arthur to the Marquess ‘Wellesley, dated Deleytosa, Aug. 10, 1809, and printed in the | papers laid before Parliament, B. 24. ; . ; ; CHAP. III. 1704. 96 CHAP. is 1704. WAR OF THE communications and stopped their supplies ; might have raised the peasantry against them in the Alen- tejo, as Das Minas had done in Beira; might have destroyed their scattered parties and detachments ; might, in short, have carried on that guerrilla war- fare so peculiarly suited to the nature of the coun-' try and to the temper of the people. Instead of this, ‘‘ he did not even,” says Berwick, “take the “‘ trouble to watch our plans and proceedings ; but ‘* stood aloof, with his arms folded, merely moving “‘ from Elvas to Estremoz, and from Estremoz back: “again to Elvas.” The opinion of Colonel Stan- hope, on the other side, is not at all more favourable to that general. One of his letters from Lisbon* severely reflects on the ‘‘ ignorance and pride both ‘of the Portuguese ministers, and of those who ‘ought to have advised them better, if they had “been capable of giving good advice or a good “example. . . . . In short, if the King of France ‘* had an Intendant here to make a disposition of ‘‘ military matters, it could not have been more to his *‘ advantage.” The dissatisfaction at Schomberg’s conduct was, as might have been expected, loud and universal in England, where the people are ready enough to cavil at even a victorious general; and a formal complaint having been sent over from the Portuguese Court, he was recalled in the course of * To his father, May 31, MS. He was then recovering from his illness in the ambassador's house, and hoped to be able to. join his regiment again in a fortnight; but it was taken at’ Portalegre before that time. ae SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. his room. ' The same period was also productive of im- ‘ portant transactions in other parts of Spain. The - Prince of Darmstadt had always advised the equip- ment, and wished to undertake the command, of an ' expedition to Catalonia, where he carried on an ‘active correspondence with the malcontents. To ' them he had promised the aid of twenty thousand ( men, headed by Charles himself: to the English he had held out the strongest assurances that the province would rise as one man on their approach. ) In compliance with his views, a force of five or six thousand men was entrusted to his direction, and ‘embarked in a fleet commanded by Sir George Rooke. It sailed from Lisbon in the beginning of . May, and appeared off Barcelona at the se of ‘the same month. The place, and, indeed, the ' whole province, was nearly destitute of means for (defence; and had no resource but the firmness ‘and decision of the Viceroy, Don Francisco de Velasco. By great exertions, and by what in such times is still more effectual, weight of character, he bore up against the disaffected; who were, moreover, sjustly incensed at the smallness of the English ‘armament, who expected the personal appearance of Charles, and who, as is usual in such cases, were far more willing to join an insurrection than to strike its first blow. Darmstadt proceeded to land ‘his men, and lead them against the city; but, trust- ‘ing much more to the exertions of the Catalans } H | | | | j the summer, and the Earl of Galway appointed in CHAP. 97 III. — 17C4, 98 WAR OF THE CHAP. than to his own, he brought no cannon to bear ues against the ramparts, and only threw a few bombs 1704. to terrify the garrison. These, however, —his force being, in fact, altogether inadequate to a regular investment,—tended rather to exasperate than to frighten ; and though conspiracy was busy within, and numbered in its ranks the Vecurr (one of the chief magistrates), it was in all its undertakings an- ticipated and baffled by Velasco. From without, few or none of the Catalans came to join the English standards. The Admiral, expecting the attack of a French squadron, was impatient for departure, which Darmstadt, on the disappoimtment | of all his hopes, could not venture to oppose; and they accordingly re-embarked and set sail. Their | failure, however, was perhaps more apparent than | real; for though the harvest of rebellion had not. Bann gathered, its seed was sown, and, as we shall find, sprung forth in the ensuing year. Anxious to retrieve their reputation, the Prince and Admiral planned, on their return, an attack on Gibraltar. Few situations are so singular and striking as that of this celebrated fortress. The mountain under which it is built rises steeply from the sea in front of Africa, and is only connected with the Andalusian coast by a narrow strip of sand. The Moors, feeling the importance of this station, had fortified it by a castle whose ruims yet remain ; and a rampart across the mountain, and many other works, had been added by the Emperor: Charles the Fifth. At this period, however, it was SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. ~ far from being prized as it deserved: its value had not yet been proved by the number, nor its strength by the failure, of long and bloody sieges ; nor was it considered, as now, the key of the Mediterranean, _ and the natural bulwark of Spain. Though strongly _ fortified, its garrison could scarcely muster one hundred effective men: but its governor, Don Diego de Salinas, a brave veteran, considered -Tather his spirit than his strength, and rejected all proposals for surrender. On receiving his answer, _ the Prince of Darmstadt immediately landed with eighteen hundred marines upon the isthmus, while Sir George Rooke opened his batteries by sea. The bombardment began on the 2d of August, and continued on the 3d, when a part of the garrison and inhabitants, recollecting that this was the festival of one of their favourite saints, conceived that they should more effectually contribute to the defence of the place by offering their prayers at his shrine, than by remaining at their posts as sentinels or soldiers. Whilst thus devoutly employed, the eastern quarter of the rock was left unguarded, and a party of English sailors seized this opportunity to scale the almost inaccessible precipice ; thus threatening the fortress from the heights which _ overhang it. At the same time also the Admiral . directed a Captain (his name was Whitaker) to man _ his boats, and storm in front the South Mole Head ; _and this service was very gallantly performed. The , foremost who landed were blown to pieces by the _ Springing of a mine beneath them; forty men were | H 2 i See ann es Ci eee =). Se Sn gS Oi Eee ee... ee I? wee v9 CHAP. III. ae 1704. 100 WAR OF THE CHAP. killed, and sixty wounded: but the survivors still ) Iil. ye 1704. pressed on with undaunted bravery, drove the Spaniards before them, and, in afew minutes more, stood victorious on the summit of the rampart. Any further resistance now became impossible ; but Don Diego still obtained honourable terms for his little force, and marched out next day with all the honours of war. On entering the town, Darmstadt began by hoisting the Spanish standard and pro- claiming King Charles ; but the Admiral interposed, and took possession of the place in the name of the” Queen of England. ‘ And this,” says a native his-— torian, “‘ was the first stone that fell from the vast “ but ruinous edifice of the Spanish monarchy.” * | A garrison of two thousand men, headed by Darmstadt himself, was left at Gibraltar. The English Admiral then set sail; and after an unsuc- | cessful attempt on Ceuta, steered into the Medi- | terranean, and met the French squadron, with which he had been for some time expecting to fall in. It had been equipped at Toulon, and was commanded by the Comte de Toulouse, son of Louis the Fourteenth by Madame de Montespan, and, at this time, High Admiral of France. He had been joined by some Spanish, as Rooke by some Dutch, vessels, so as to compose on both sides a formidable armament. ‘The whole naval * San Phelipe, Coment. vol. i. p.130. See also Cunningham's History, vol. i. p.400. Campbell’s Lives of the Admirals, vol. iv. p.355, &c. The French writers make a scape-goat of | the Spanish governor. | : | j | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. iF | K force on this occasion is differently stated; but, -according to the French account, they had forty ‘nine ships of the line, and Rooke only forty-seven.* ‘On the 24th of August the two fleets met off Malaga, and engaged in a long cannonade, which ‘In those days was termed a battle, and described with the greatest minuteness; but which, after such engagements as the Nile or Trafalgar, seems by no means to deserve that name, nor that ‘notice. Several thousand men were killed, but iis ship was either sunk or taken; and the ap- iéach of night put a period to He conflict. The victory may be looked upon as undecided, al- though of the two the English seem to have the bbétter claim to it; having ASE wards remained in ‘the same station, while the French withdrew, and having suffered a much less heavy loss of men in action. Both parties, however, declared them- selves conquerors, so loudly and ostentatiously as to show their secret doubts of their own success ; and public thanksgivings were offered up alike at Madrid, at Paris, and at London. On the other * Targe, Hist. vol. iii. p. 372. Quincy, vol. iv. p.428. There ‘are very full particulars of this engagement in the “ Life of “ Leake:” but I have found this work extremely partial and pe and shall not quote from it. Great injustice is done to the memory of that gallant admiral by the absurd zeal of his biographer; who thus, for instance, actually denies all merit Fe Lord Peterborough; and in one place (p. 157.) speaks of the ‘folly, if not treachery,” of those who appointed him! This work was printed in 1750, but very prudently limited to private ‘circulation, and to the number of fifty copies. H 3 | | | : 101 CHAP. III. 1704. 102 CHAP. III. 1704. Aug. 13. WAR OF THE hand, to judge by the movements of the fleets, each seemed to act as if defeated ; for, after a short delay, the Comte de Toulouse returned to ‘Toulon, and Sir George Rooke to England. But whatever light the action off Malaga might else have reflected on either the French or British arms disappears as a lesser star before the sun- like brilliancy of Blenheim, which was fought within only a few days’ interval of the other. ‘This battle, one of the greatest and most decisive ever gained, not only annihilated the best army of the French, marred their projects of conquest, and reduced them to defend their own frontier on the Rhine, but saved the Germanic empire from down- fal, and Europe itself from the ascendancy of one too powerful state. Its details do not fall within the limit of Spanish affairs; but its effect upon them was strong, and quickly felt. It was the first important check which the arms of Louis had experienced: to the superstitious it seemed an omen, to the reflecting a cause, of decline. ‘The partisans of Philip foresaw that the chief brunt of the war in Spain must now fall upon themselves ; whilst the Austrian faction throughout the king- dom, and especially in Aragon and Catalonia, raised its head and daily added to its numbers. That party, too (in all countries a large one), which never fails to declare in favour of the pros- perous, now began to consider Charles’ as the safer side. In civil contests, power always begets power ; and that leader, however unjust his pretensions, ad SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. who is commonly supposed to have most. allies _ and partisans, may rely on being joined by many more. _ Encouraged by this great though distant vic- | tory, the allied Generals in Portugal determined, _ as soon as the summer heats had passed, to renew the campaign by taking the offensive. The Mar- quis Das Minas had now been appointed to the chief rank in the Portuguese army; but his com- _mand was shared, and his usefulness checked, by Lord Galway, a man utterly destitute of talent, and with few other requisites for a soldier be- yond high honour and great personal courage. A Frenchman in birth, and a Huguenot in faith, under the name of the Marquis de Ruvigny, he had left his country at the revocation of the edict of Nantes, and had risen to high em- _ployments and an earldom in England, —not so much from any supposed military merit as from his undoubted zeal in behalf of the Pro- _ testant religion. And thus, by a singular chance, when he and the Duke of Berwick encountered each other in the field, the English were headed by a French, and the French by an English, General. The King of Portugal and the Arch- duke Charles also left Lisbon to be present at this campaign, and fixed their station until its com- mencement at Coimbra. In their train, on this occasion, might be observed the statue of St. An- thony of Padua, who then appeared, and still ap- pears, upon the Army List of Portugal as an officer H 4 103 CHAP. III. 1704. 104 CHAP. III. 1704: WAR OF THE in its service; who (though never clamorous for promotion) has obtained it from time to time; and who regularly receives (through his monks) — a pay proportioned to his military rank*! The | statue was, no doubt, expected to perform valuable — duty in this campaign; and, indeed, we should be > doing it injustice were we to deny that it was fully as efficient and useful as many of the Portuguese - fidalgos. ‘The army amounted to twenty-three thousand effective men; while that of Berwick, thinned by disease, and receiving no reinforce- ments, could hardly muster half as many: but the greatest hopes of the Allies were derived from the promises of the Admiral of Castille, who had also joined their army, and who looked forward to nu-— merous and important desertions from the Spanish ranks. At the end of September, the Portuguese | having concentrated their forces at Almeida, ad- vanced against the head-quarters of Berwick, at Ciudad Rodrigo; but the French General, though harassed by contradictory orders from Madrid, and inferior in strength, did not give way at their approach. He determined to maintain the line of the Agueda; and so skilfully disposed his troops along its banks, that the Allies could not effect its passage without coming to a general engagement; and this was prevented by their jarring counsels, and especially the incapacity of Galway. On the other hand, the Spanish soldiers showed no dispo- * Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 167. Yon ee of Portugal, vol. i. p. 74. 3. | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. | so that, after a series of marches and counter- marches, the campaign was at length closed by the -autumnal rains, and the Allies withdrew in disap- ‘pointment. Amongst the other expedients em- ‘ployed on this occasion to confirm the Spaniards ‘in their allegiance to Philip, a medal had been «struck of his competitor, with the following sar- ‘eastic motto, in allusion to the title usually borne by the Spanish monarchs, and to the Allies, by -whom the Archduke was striving to assert it :— ‘ CHARLES THE THIRD, BY THE GRACE OF THE HERE- ‘tics, THE Catuotic Krve. ; Even before the end of this campaign, Berwick, -in reward for all the skill, and perseverance, and fidelity he had displayed in its course, received an order of recall from Versailles. It had been ob- tained at the application of the Court of Madrid, ‘now more than ever a labyrinth of cabals and in- itrigues. In these the plain and _ straightforward _character of Berwick did not allow him to take sany share; and all the factions, therefore, united against him, in the hope that his successor might become their partisan. So little was he intrusted ‘with state affairs, or fitted for them, that he had ‘not even been made acquainted with the designs of the King of France against Princess Orsini ; pe had, according to his instructions, urged the journey of Philip to the frontiers, without knowing its secret purpose. ‘The Queen now perceived that such a man neither would nor could take any mea- | : : - sures in behalf of her darling object—the return of : | ' 105 ition to desert, nor the Spanish peasantry to rise; CHAP. 1704. 106 CHAP. III. eee seed 1704, WAR OF THE the Princess: she therefore determined to remove him* ; and her attempt was seconded by the new French ambassador, the Duke de Grammont, who had entered Spain with the expectation of ruling it in every department, as a Viceroy might a Deacusted province. To his surprise, he found that Berwick very properly refused to admit his overstrained pretensions, and to receive military directions from an ignorant civilian. Besides this reason for wishing to see him displaced by another more pliant General, Grammont appears to have been mindful of some ancient petty pique or rivalry between them. Men often complain of short memories; yet how seldom do they forget even the slightest circumstance of even the slightest: injury !T In the place of Berwick, Louis sent into Spain the Mareschal de Tessé, the least distinguished and least able of all the French marshals in his time. Frivolous and empty, yet vain and over- bearing, his character bore a great resemblance to that of Grammont ; and from that very resemblance they did not fail to quarrel very soon, and very bitterly. All their public transactions display alike a singular readiness to judge without inquiry, and * “ Pourquoi donc l'avez vous fait rappeller,” said Marshal Tessé to the Queen. “Que voulez vous que je vous dise ?” was her reply. C’est un grand diable d’ Anglais sec, qui va toujours droit devant lui !”’—Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 177. + Compare Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 252. and Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 175; Mém. de St. Simon, vol. iii. p. 238. ' ed. 1829; and Letters from the Marquis de Montandre to Col. Stanhope, MS, SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. t } | ! ‘ple, that Grammont, who had never till then been ‘in Spain, wrote back to his Court deliberate opi- _nions on the Spanish government and Spanish [ people, before he had even crossed the frontiers ; ‘and it need not be added that these opinions proved entirely erroneous.* ‘The instructions he ‘had received for his embassy were ample and well considered ; ; but, like his own opinions, were partly ee on false or insufficient premises. He was ! assured that, since the recall of the Princess, he ‘would find the Court without factions, and the people without discontents; and was expected to satisfy the Spanish ministers by adherence to their established forms whilst withdrawing from them all essential power.t Several other points in these instructions do honour to the judgment and pene- ' tration of Louis the Fourteenth; but one deserves : to be particularly mentioned, as displaying a quality ' for which he was much less eminent, — humanity. He expresses a wish that the dungeons of the : Inquisition may be cleared of their crowd of captives; many having languished there for years, ‘ without having yet been able to obtain even the ' favour of a trial. Amongst these was Froylan | Diaz, confessor of the late King Charles the Se- ‘cond. He had endeavoured to persuade the dying | | _— = * Despatch to M. de Torcy, dated May 25, 1704. + Instructions from Torcy, dated April 27, 1704. ee iz condemn every thing which they could not CaS 107 — It will hardly be believed, for exam- Wu 1704. 108 CHAP. II. ‘1704. of Louis showed him as unbending in his pur- | ~ WAR’ OF THE monarch that his illness arose from the spells of some malicious sorcerer; and as the best means of counteracting them, recited over Charles the form of exorcism prescribed by the Roman Catholic church. It failed, and Diaz was disgraced. And this hap-: pened in Europe, less than a century and a half ago! The very first audience which Grammont had of] the young Queen showed him how mistakenly he| had reckoned on the usual fickleness of fifteen, and | levity of Courts, in hoping that the loss of the| Princess would be speedily forgotten. With much} force and feeling, Maria Louisa complained of the} harsh treatment which her favourite had under- gone, and of the base and unfounded accusations from which it had proceeded. ‘ Is it not lament-| <‘ able,” she exclaimed, ‘‘ that the King of France, “the wisest and most prudent of men, though “knowing the frank and upright character of his | ‘* erandson, and the envious cabals by which he is | ‘¢ surrounded, should yet admit every calumny of | “¢ the latter, and refuse all credit to the first? No, | ‘Duke of Grammont,” she added, bursting into | tears, “I do not deceive you when I say, that | ‘¢ T can never, never be consoled !” | Grammont did not fail to transmit these earnest | representations to his master; but the answer | pose as haughty in his style. ‘* Acquaint the ‘* Queen of Spain,” he wrote, ‘ that I removed | ‘‘ Princess Orsini after full deliberation, and | ‘‘ through reasons so strong as to render any change | SUCCESSION: IN SPAIN. a cabals or calumnies from the enemies of her m favourite have misled me. Above all, explain to “her that I determine on every thing myself, and “that no one should dare to suppose that the facts “which I admit are contrary to truth; since I ys « always learn them from different channels before “I consider them as certain, or allow them to in- “fluence my conduct.” With such ideas of his | own infallibility, itis no wonder that Louis, in the whole course of his reign, was so frequently and ‘so grossly duped; and we shall see hereafter how long he was able to persevere in the purpose which he now declared unchangeable. Meanwhile, he } not only rejected an application from the Princess to appear at Versailles and justify her conduct, } but ordered her to proceed to her former residence at Rome; and bestowed honours on her two mortal yenemies, the Cardinal and Abbot d’Estrées. He also determined to break up the administration at | Madrid, from which the Princess had removed Haeaely all the old and trusty friends of the House the Bourbon, to make way for her own friends and partisans. Even Cardinal Portocarrero had yielded to the torrent which he could not stem. Disgusted -with the predominance of French agents and of ) French councils, the overwhelming influence of the Princess and the decline of his own, he had ‘several months before retired to his metropolitan palace at Toledo, and resigned all his employments. He could not, however, at the same time divest | | | 109 impossible. Let her be convinced, that. no CHAP. hbk. 1704. 110 CHAP. III. 1704. WAR OF THE himself of his lofty genius, his habits of business, or his fondness for cabals: he was naturally rest- less in retirement, and from Toledo his influence was unseen but not unfelt at Madrid. Louis, who knew his talents, and remembered his services, would have wished to have seen him again in some active department of government, were it only t prevent his intriguing against it; but the Cardinal was personally hated both by the King and Queen of Spain, for no better reason, apparently, than because they themselves, after all their obligations, had latterly slighted and offended him. Strange as it seems, experience shows that we usually feel far more animosity against those whom we have injured than against those who injure us: and this remark holds good with every degree of in- tellect, with every class of fortune, — with a prince or a peasant, a stripling or an elder, a hero or a woman. ) Louis did not think it judicious to insist on the immediate reinstatement of the Cardinal, but was bent upon crushing Orry, the creature and chiei minister of the Princess. As such, he had been bitterly inveighed against by the two successive French ambassadors, the Cardinal and Abbot d’Estrées; and his disgrace, though hitherto de- layed, had been for some time decided at Ver- sailles. The request for his dismissal found, however, the Court of Madrid impressed with very different feelings towards him. ‘The Queen sup- ported him for the very reason of his recall, as the . Le } | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. | Agvourite of her favourite. The King had derived great advantage from his care, foresight, and ar- vangement in the late Portuguese campaign; and ‘both had so entirely committed all money trans- actions to his hands, as to feel quite helpless and bewilder ed in his absence. Orry, like other subtle and unprincipled persons of that stamp, had con- rived to involve the finances in an intricate web, of which the folds and windings were known to ‘himself alone ; and had thus, in some degree, made imself necessary to his office. He was a knave, un- idoubtedly — such the Court believed, and such his vast acquisition of riches proved him to be; but he was a daring, dexterous, useful knave, who filled ‘the coffers of his master after filling his own, and who, by the very frauds he ssraalived) understood ‘how to detect or prevent frauds in others. With much pain, therefore, did Philip and Maria Louisa hear of his being summoned to Versailles to explain and defend his conduct; and with much difficulty was ‘a reluctant consent wrung from them by the Duke ‘de Grammont. The next mandate, however, found pam less complying. ‘They were asked to re- i ppoint Ubilla, now the Marquis of Rivas, as sole | | secretary of the cabinet; but he being a personal enemy of the Princess, it was considered by the Sees that his appointment would be an additional bar to her return, and she therefore exerted all her ‘influence over Philip to prevent the proposed nomination. His spirit was also roused by seeing ‘the state of vassalage to which it was clearly ) | 111 a vig 1704. 112 CHAP. intended to lower him, and by perusing a memorial iz. 1704. ‘WAR OF THE®)>™™ presented at this juncture by the Marquis of Man- cera, the oldest of his ministers. This venerable statesman, then in his ninetieth year, and speaking with the just authority of age, and the never- failing eloquence of truth, expressed his wish of withdrawing from public life ; and took that oppor- tunity of beseeching his royal master to govern alone, and cling to Spanish forms and to Spanish maxims. A remonstrance, so upright and so well intended, greatly weighed with Philip in rejecting Rivas; and the utmost exertions of the Duke de Grammont could not overcome his resolution: Thus the ambassador found himself thwarted and stopped short in one of the very first steps of hi mission ; and, where he had expected easy and un- limited obedience, had to struggle with every sor of difficulty and embarrassment. rom the extrem of confidence (the mood in which he entered Spain) he passed at once to the extreme of de spondency. Seeing many cabals around him, he supposed every new event to arise from them ; an so foolishly fancied himself beset with traitors, as to neglect the advice and refuse the co-operation 0 all his truest friends. Whatever may be thought o confidence and blindness, a doubting and suspi- cious temper is, perhaps, still worse for success in state affairs; and Grammont certainly lost more by his own distrust than he could have done by the blackest and most universal treachery in others. His despatches to his Court at this period are sin- SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. tion in judgment. In one he requests Louis to show his teeth;” in another, dated only a few days afterwards, hie advises a directly opposite course - conduct, and recommends “a velvet “ paw.” Finding it impracticable to prevail over ‘Philip, and, goaded on by instructions from Ver: ‘Sailles, he was speedily reduced to the old systeni ‘which he himself had ridiculed and blamed, — of employing the influence of the Queen, and govern: ing her husband by her aid. He accordingly be- sought her intercession ; but Maria Louisa, seeing ‘her vantage ground, detente’ to preserve it, and et his request with many specious expressions of humility. At the same time, while declaring her incapacity for business, she showed herself deeply vesentful of the ah attempts to shut her out from ,t. “ How can,” she said ironically, “a girl of ‘ fifteen” (this was the very phrase which had been i. to her), “‘ presume to touch affairs of |‘ state?” Yet, whilst so diffident and submissive a her language, every transaction of importance land Grammont knew it) was passing through het hands and regulated by her will. She caballed vith disaffected nobles ; stirred up opposition in ll quarters; and, every evening, held a secret council which over-ruled the mibliG decisions of the sabinet : in short, according to the remark of Tessé, he seemed determined to lose her crown, and over- hrow the monarchy, rather than fail in her leading ! I | | , p 113 ‘gular specimens of vulgarity in style and vacilla- ie III. 1704. 114 WAR OF THE CHAP. object, —the re-establishment of the Princess.* : bs , Every thing, in consequence, fell into a state of 1704 anarchy. No orders, or, what is the same, contra dictory orders, were issued in the most pressing | emergencies ; confusion, inefficiency, and. discord prevailed in every department, at the very time when the attacks of the Allies from without, and the intrigues of the Austrian party at home, called most loudly for a firm, able, and united govern- ment. ‘The army itself was utterly neglected ; and the ambassador could not even succeed in obtain- ing, at the proper offices, authentic accounts of the soldiers, stores, and ammunition.t . | As a last resource, the Duke de Grammon j beginning to see how impolitic had been the re- moval of the Princess, and the consequent exas- peration of the Queen, earnestly applied to Louis for his intercession with the latter. The King of France, accordingly, wrote to her in terms of such affection and esteem as the circumstances of the time made it expedient to profess: he praised het judgment, as far beyond her years; he entreated her to forego the resolution she had expressed te Grammont, of never offering advice to her hus. band, or interfering in state affairs; and he ever condescended to solicit her influence for the nomi nation of Rivas and the settlement of the mi * Mém. de Tessé, vol. ii. p. 157, Mém. de St. Simon vol. iii. p. 341. ed. 1829. ae + Despatch of Grammont to Torey, dated July 29, 1704, | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN, EE } firm against a political tempest, was not to be . shaken by the gentle breath of flattery. Maria Louisa, indeed, expressed herself most dutifully and decorously ; and consented, as a sort of per- - sonal favour, and with much apparent unwilling. ness, to take, once more, an avowed share in ‘business: but she still continued to oppose and ‘prevent the appointment of Rivas; and it became every day more and more evident that Philip could ha governed only through his Queen, and the ‘Queen only through Princess Orsini. _ Such was the state of things at Madrid, when ‘the news of the fall of Gibraltar filled the Court with alarm and the people with indignation. Gram- mont did not fail to lay hold of this event to charge it on the neglect and improyidence of his adversaries, and to justify his late gloomy fore- bodings. ‘‘ Behold,” he wrote to Louis*, “ the “effects of the wise management of Orry! Were ** justice duly awarded, he would deserve to lose his “head. God grant that the people may not rise in ‘arms against the Queen and her wretched minis- try!” For the moment the ambassador triumphed: Philip and Maria Louisa were terrified into sub- mission, and not only consented to appoint Rivas, and new model the whole administration accord- ig to the plan proposed to them, but declared their firm intention to follow, in future, the advice heeded ke : | ) i i | | | | * Despatch of Grammont, dated August 10, 1704. Q IA | | | | | 11 Iil. 2 »& nistry. The resolution, however, which had stood CHAP. Leta 1704. August. 116 CHAP. Ii a own: 1704. WAR OF THE of Louis, to be guided by his will on all occasions, and intrust to his hands the preservation of the Spanish monarchy. On his part, Grammont made some concession, —yielding to their Majesties’ per- sonal dislike of Cardinal Portocarrero, and not in- sisting on his recall; and he was completely duped. by the appearance of union and tranquillity which every thing began to bear. His camelion-like despatches, now again assuming a different hue, began to praise the prudence and discernment of the King and the “ excellent heart” of the Queen.* In a very short time, however, he reverted (and not unreasonably) to his former opinions. The change in the Court of Madrid was found to go no deeper than the surface. ‘The ministry, indeed, had now been newly framed according to the wish of Louis ; but it was only a ministry in name, and the real direction of affairs rested, as before, with the secret junta of the Queen; so that the monarchy was threatened with the same evil which always weakens, and generally ends, democracies,—their singular separation between legal authority and effective power. The Queen frankly declared to Rivas, that she placed no confidence in him, and that he owed his appointment to French influence alone; and both she and Philip wrote to Louis, en- treating, in the most earnest terms, that Orry might be permitted to return, as the only hope and re- source of their finances. In spite of the distress * Mém. de Noailles, vol. iil. p. 238. | SUCCESSION IN SPAin. _ ducats was granted to Aubigny, the secretary and _ favourite of the Princess; and, from her exile, her ambitious spirit continued to rule the councils in which she had so long presided. AA result so contrary to his views deeply grieved and disappointed Louis. He had always hoped —— that time would soften the Queen’s enmity against _ the enemies of the Princess; but this “ girl of fif- _ “teen” had a mind of extraordinary firmness; and plang EERIE ae eS ed i ee fai a a See a Sh a > besides, even the most fickle changelings can be steady and persevering in projects of revenge. He now perceived that he had mistaken his road ; that he must retrace his steps, and treat the Princess not only with courtesy, but with kindness and in- ~dulgence. Accordingly, he made to her advances of conciliation: he promised to confer an embassy on her brother, the Abbot de la Tremouille, and to use his influence for gaining him a Cardinal’s - hat*; and he allowed the Princess herself to winter } at Toulouse, instead of insisting, as before, on her Speedy journey to Rome. It was, at the same ' time, insinuated to her, that her best mode of' re- | quiting these favours, and obtaining more, was by ) ‘ [ 3 4 | oa inducing her royal patroness to forward the .views _ of Louis, and soothe the opposition which prevailed. The effect of these milder measures was great and immediate at Madrid. The Queen laid aside her tone of sullen coldness; received the advice of | * Letter from T orcy to Grammont, dated Sept. 15, 1704, Q Da 117 | of this department, a pension of two thousand CHAP. III. 1704. 118 CHAP, Il. “1704. WAR OF THE Grammont with confidence and openness, and ceased to thwart his projects for a time ; so that the ambassador, always vain and hasty, thought all the difficulties of his mission overcome. In his despatches at this period, he boasts of having “ cut ‘* off the heads of the hydra ;” once more reverses his judgment on all the leading men of Madrid ; and, to excuse his frequent contradiction, compares them to the winds which change from day to day,— a comparison directly opposite to the slow and stately character of the Spaniards, but singularly applicable to his own. Perceiving that this happy change was entirely due to the influence of the Princess, Grammont expressed much gratitude for her services, and loaded her with praises. Thus the animosity of Louis against her was still further weakened and allayed; nor was it long before the Queen put his more favourable disposition to the trial. Too artful to demand at once the return of her favourite to Madrid, which would have been denied to her, she entreated, as a sort of prelimi- nary favour, that the Princess should be allowed to appear at Versailles to meet her accusers, justify her conduct, and inform Louis on the real state of Spain. The answer of the King of France de- clared that it was impossible for him to withstand the wishes of his dearest grand-daughter : and thus the required permission was granted. T° ops | Once at Versailles, and the triumph of the Prin- cess was certain. Her fascinating manners and natural talent for flattery were exerted with signa a fr ‘ ! sere \ Ca De SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. - success upon Madame de Maintenon, and upon Louis himself, who daily appeared more fond of her society, and who was, moreover, now assailed with renewed entreaties from the Queen of Spain. Her levee was attended by a never-failing crowd : of courtiers ; and she seemed to have arrived rather to dispense than to solicit favours. ‘The proba- bility of her approaching return was, however, most unwelcome to Grammont, and the other French agents at Madrid. They had been happy to make use of her influence from afar; and, in hopes of continuing to derive the same advantage from it, they wished her to be treated with all kindness and distinction in her exile; but they foresaw that, on her recall, their own power and consequence must forthwith dwindle to a shadow, and all business pass through her hands alone. Might not, they argued, the Princess very pro- bably be animated with the deepest resentment against the French, as the authors of her disgrace, _and only wait to manifest it until the hour of vic- tory and vengeance had arrived? Under this impression, and knowing that it was hopeless to detach the Queen from the Princess, Grammont determined on an attempt to detach the King from the Queen. For this end, he found a useful tool in the King’s confessor, D’ Aubenton, a French Jesuit ; and while the one stung the pride of Philip with the disgrace of being governed by “a girl of fifteen,” the other alarmed his conscience at the crime of a delegated trust. Roused for a moment by this I 4 119 CHAP. Vim 1704. 120 CHAP. III. 1704. 1705. Jan. WAR OF THE two-fold influence, the feeble monarch consented to write — or at least to sign —a secret letter to’ his grandfather, deprecating the return of the Prin- cess as distasteful both to his subjects and himself, and declaring that his former solicitations for it had arisen only from affection to the Queen. Gram- mont, at the same time, sent home a despatch in his usual tone of ignorant presumption. I have observed, that the most feeble and fluctuating minds are generally the most ready to believe in the steadiness of others: and thus,-the ambassador protested that he had hitherto mistaken the cha-| racter of Philip, who had now shaken off the chains of conjugal obedience, and shown both the will and the ability to govern.* The confessor concurred in the same representation; and could only ascribe this sudden change to the immediate interposition of God. | These confidential letters were seen by no one at Versailles but Madame de Maintenon, the King, and Torcy, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom I name in the order of their comparative importance in the state. ‘They perceived at once’ that the ambassador was blinded by his vanity, and that no dependence could be placed on the talent or consistency of Philip. ‘* You know his ‘* weakness,” wrote Louis, in reply: ‘ In his next ‘‘ change of opinion he may, probably, teil the ** Queen that you spared no pains to make him * Despatch from Grammont to Torey, dated Dec. 25, 1704. _ SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. '* orders ; and that I look upon her control as dis- '** graceful to his understanding and destructive of _ ‘his interests. She would resent, as the deepest “injury, any insinuation aimed against an autho- _** rity to which she is, perhaps, not less attached '‘*than to her husband. Let us not be misled by: '“*the mere promise of a firmness which has never ‘yet appeared in action, and-which his whole ** character belies. The Queen will always reign '** over him ; and prudence, therefore, bids us use “and direct her influence, rather than vainly at- d ie , “tempt to overthrow it.” . The judgment and foresight of Louis were very ' speedily shown by the event. “Philip—one of those weak minds, over which habit is far more power- ‘ful than principle or argument — almost imme: diately sunk back, without a struggle, into his old ‘chains of conjugal obedience, and confessed to ‘ Maria Louisa the steps he had taken and the ad- .vice he had received. ‘The only result of an in, -trigue from which Grammont had expected. so smuch, was his own disgrace. Inflamed with re- /sentment against him, the Queen undertook to »urge his recall to Versailles with as much ardour -as that of Princess Orsini to Madrid. Under } her dictation, a letter from Philip to his grand- » father disavowed the part he had so lately played— ‘the sentiments so solemnly professed ; and, while he declared his unabated regard for the Princess, 121 es govern independently; that you did so by my CHAP. I. 1705. 122 WAR OF THE CHAP. bitterly inveighed against Grammont and his own | Ul. 1705. confessor, and requested their dismissal.* Such wavering imbecility was well fitted to con- firm Louis in the intention he had already formed — of placing no reliance on Philip himself, but go- verning him through the Queen, and the Queen through Princess Orsini. To the latter, therefore, he made known that he not only felt for her his former confidence, and desired her return to Ma- drid, but that he would grant the dismissal of Grammont, and leave to herself the choice of his | ambassador. ‘These high and honourable terms, | which had been so eagerly pursued, were not, to | the surprise of Louis, eagerly grasped by the Prin- cess. With every expression of respect and gra- | titude, she avowed much unwillingness to return | to Spain; and declared that her health no longer | admitted of her undertaking the laborious duties of | Camerera-mayor, or, still less, the high political character she was expected to fill. After much | entreaty, however, she promised to comply with the wish of Louis, if he should think it absolutely | necessary for his service; but even in that case | she pleaded that she could not venture on such _ a journey in winter, and must be allowed a respite | for some months. This unwillingness was, no doubt, partly pre- | tended, to show forth or enhance her own import- * Letter from Philip to Louis, dated March 10, 1705. ee SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. oe ance ; but it was also partly real. Struck with the i iB t } with the growing partiality which Louis displayed | for her company and conversation, she had con- ceived hopes of rivalling, or at least of succeeding, Madame de Maneensn in his favour. ‘To rule was still her darling passion; but to rule at Ver- _sailles was a far more splendid prospect than to rule at Madrid. The love of pleasure also, which, even in the most aspiring minds, sometimes clogs or outweighs ambition, made her shrink from re- turning to a Court whose monotonous dulness was only enlivened by dissensions and disputes. Re- oe however, not to relinquish a substance for a shadow, she sent forward Orry, on whom she | could thoroughly depend, to Madrid, to administer “once more the Spanish finances, and act as her | deputy and tool. At the same time she selected, _as French ambassador, in the place of Grammont, the President Amelot, who had shown abilities, _and gained experience in several former missions ; _ whose humble birth—unlike Grammont’s or D’Es- _ trees’—could not clash with the pride and preten- | sions of the Spanish grandees ; and whose promises . of future deference and submission to his patron- ess seemed still more powerful recommendations in her eyes. He and Orry set off for Spain to- _ gether. _ Meanwhile the Princess continued to play a splendid and successful part at Versailles. The , French ministers of state treated her almost as 123 CHAP, III. _ gracious reception she had found at Versailles, and C14 1705. 124 WAR OF THE CHAP. they might a foreign sovereign, the Spanish am-_ III. 1705. bassador, the Duke of Alva, almost as his own; and the little Chamberlain’s mind of St. Sitio | appears quite overwhelmed by the weight of the distinction and precedence she received.* In spite of these outward honours, however, she was induced to relinquish her hopes of governing in France, on further observation, together with the advice of her nearest kinsmen and most trusty friends. ‘They perceived that the increasing de- votion of the King, and his secret marriage with | Madame de Maintenon, rendered her influence | altogether unassailable ; that her intercession ‘had | been one main cause of the favourable reception | of the Princess; and that this intercession would | be turned with equal effect in the opposite direc: | tion, from the very instant she suspected her own | power to be threatened. Convinced by these re- | presentations, and having exhausted all pretexts | for delay, the Princess at length, in the middle of | July, took her departure for Madrid, to the inex- pressible joy of Philip and Maria Louisa, who went | out to meet her two leagues from their capital, and received her, says a Spanish writert, with | greater honours than had ever yet been paid by | sovereigns to a subject. They wished her to re- * St. Simon, Mém. vol. iv. p. 346. ed. 1829. She even ventured to appear at a Court ball with a lapdog in her arms; | and the animal, says St. Simon, had the high honour of being | patted by his Majesty @ plusieurs réprises. + San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i, p. 151. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. tum with them in the royal carriage ; a distinction “which—so contrary was it to Spanish forms, and so almighty were forms in Spain—would, perhaps, have stirred up serious discontents, had not the _ prudence of the Princess declined the dangerous honour. She proceeded to Madrid in a more ‘humble conveyance ; immediately resumed her as- cendancy at Court; and, together with Amelot and Orry, plunged into a fresh labyrinth of in- 'trigues, dissensions, and cabals. Considering her former unpopularity amongst the Spaniards, her return was much less displeasing to them than might have been expected: and. this, probably, arose from its having been so long deferred. In [every country the multitude are apt to expend all ‘their energy against the mere early rumours of a hateful measure; so that none is left to oppose its execution. 125, CHAP. TE Nemesia 1705. 126 WAR OF THE CHAPTER IV.: cHap. Tue possession of Gibraltar was, at first, very far IV. from being appreciated in England as much as it 1705. deserved. A barren rock—an insignificant fort — an useless charge,—such were the terms with which the first news of its capture were received ; and» during all the reign of George the First, the | ministers, justified in this by the public opinion, | were by no means unwilling to restore this cone quest as one of the terms of a peace. It was not till a later period that Gibraltat grew into the hearts of the English people; so that at present even the cession of Kent or Cornwall would hardly raise a louder or more universal cry. The Spaniards, however, discerned its importance from the moment they had lost it, and as soon as their sense of its value could no longer be of use to them. or its recovery they immediately made extensive preparations, of which one hundredth part, a few weeks sooner, would probably have been quite sufficient to secure their possession of the place. So early as the October following, the Marquis of Villadarias, as Captain-General of Andalusia, commenced the siege with eight thou- sand men; but the place, in itself almost impreg- nable, was most bravely defended by the Prince of | 10 SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. paxmstadt. Constant succours were introduced I by sea: a French squadron, under Baron de Pontis, found itself unable to prevent them; and from the _improvidence of the Spanish Ministry y, the besiegers _were far worse supplied than the besieged. Under these circumstances, the Spaniards made, of course, “put little progress; and the Court of Versailles, _ascribing this slowness to want of skill, directed { _ Tessé to hasten to the siege, and direct its opera- tions in person. Villadarias was required to put “himself under the command of this officer, —his inferior in age, in experience, and in reputation, | and no more than his equal in rank ; since the title of Marshal does not exist in Spain, and that of | Captain-General is admitted as equivalent to it. ' Villadarias could not but feel—could not but resent this unworthy treatment, and respectfully applied “for leave to resign his commission; but his mili- tary talent was too great to be so easily relinquished, and his spirit too noble to refuse the call of his King, in any rank or under any circumstances. At the request of Philip, he continued before Gibraltar as a subaltern*, and the injustice done him was soon declared by the event. With greater _ means, Tessé made even less progress in the siege. His despatches, at this period, are filled with la- mentations and complaints against all things and all persons ; like a froward child, which, in its passion, ‘ Chee es So ~~ a ™=t __* The reverse is asserted by Targe (vol. iii. p.391.); but his authority is very far inferior to that of the Mémoires de Noailles (vol. iii. p. 275.), founded on the original documents, _. —: 127 CHAP. IV. 1705. January. 128 CHAP. IV. 1705. May 5. WAR OF THE strikés at every object in its reach. His attacks | were repulsed, his projects baffled; the squadron of Pontis, being attacked by Admiral Leake, was partly scattered, partly taken or destroyed, and at length, in April, he found it requisite to raise the siege, | ae | _ A very few days after this event, the Emperor Leopold died at Vienna, in his sixty-fifth year, and was succeeded by his son Joseph, King of the | Romans: but this change was hardly felt beyond the precincts of the palace; as the new sovereign | adhered in every respect to his predecessor’s course | of policy. l a SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. L 4 169 } he could intercept the supplies of water, and stop CHAP. “the mills of the city of Valencia.* To secure his own position, and stop Peterborough’s: progress, ihe depended mainly on a strong body of horse, “under Brigadier Mahoni, at the pass of Murviedro. ‘This place is built at the foot of the mountain, formerly crowned by the city, and now by the Tuins of Saguntum, which have given the name ‘((uROs viIEJos, old walls,) to the modern town. A iriver which flows in front was commanded by strong ‘works and a numerous artillery ; while beyond was ‘a plain of above two leagues in extent, and scarcely ‘to be passed without a superiority in cavalry. The regular force was also assisted by eight hundred armed townsmen; and the skill of Mahoni had ‘made the best use of his excellent position. Peter- ‘borough perceived that he must again, as at San Mateo, have recourse to stratagem; but the one which he employed on this occasion seems by no means worthy of an honourable enemy. _ His first measure was to despatch a flag of truce, und request a conference with General Mahoni, who was of Irish extraction, and related to the second rN : vountess of Peterborough.t The meeting took place 1s he desired ; each general riding to an appointed ‘pot, with only a few horsemen as their escort. In i. ‘heir conversation Peterborough made every ex- ) * See in Freind’s Account (p. 249.) a letter to Lord Peter- orough from the Jurats, Racional and Syndic of Valencia, ated Jan. 26. 1706. } Freind’s Account, p. 259., and Collins’s Peerage, vol. iii. » 318., ed. 1812. 1. 1706. 170 CHAP. IV. 1706. WAR OF THE ertion to gain over his adversary to the cause of} Charles ; offering him high rank, and every other | advantage in the Austrian or the English service. ) Failing in his attempt, he determined to impute the treachery which he could not produce. In the interview, he had so far misused the open-hearted confidence of the honest Irishman, as to draw from him an avowal of his intention to advise Arcos to march across the plain to his assist- ance ; and he also found means, by pretending an equal frankness, and a kinsman’s regard, to impress Mahoni with the conviction that an overwhelming} force, both in men and in artillery, lay before him. Peterborough then made choice of twe dragoons, who, upon the promise of promotion, un: dertook to go over to Arcos as pretended deserters; Being admitted to the Duke’s presence, they re| ported that, while drinking wine together behind ‘ rock, they had witnessed the conference betweet Peterborough and Mahoni; had seen the forme hand over to the latter a bag of five thousand pi toles ; and had heard him promise Mahoni the rant of major-general on the English establishment, anc the command of ten thousand Irish Catholic! to be raised for the service of Charles. On thy other hand, they declared that Mahoni had under taken not only to betray his post at Murviedro, bu to induce the Duke of Arcos to march across th plain, and thus entrap him into a position wher the English army might find it easy to overpowe him. The Duke was confounded at this intell’ | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. gence, and still doubted its truth; but, shortly afterwards, he saw Mahoni’s aide-de-camp arrive ‘with the very proposal of which the spies had fore- ‘warned him, and of which Lord Peterborough had | FE ‘become apprised by his enemy’s incautious frank- ness. No doubt could now remain in the mind of Arcos as to Mahoni’s treason: he had him imme- diately arrested, and sent off a prisoner to Madrid ; while, so far from marching across the plain as Mahoni_ had suggested, and as good policy re- juired, he broke up his camp, and retreated with orecipitation to the mountains. Making use of Ais flight, and of the confusion and distrust of the Spanish detachment at Murviedro, Peterborough ould now effect the passage of the river without Lificulty ; and, next day, the 4th of F ebruary, aurived in triumph at Valencia. It is gratifying, . ah to be able to add, that the innocence of Mahoni was discovered and acknowledged at Madrid, and that he was reinstated in his rank and | , 2mployments. Arcos, on the other hand, was dunished for his credulity; being superseded by |e us predecessor, Las Torres. _ Lord Peterborough had now gloriously attained he aim of his expedition, and was supposed to be ust beginning to rest from his fatigues, when he arnt that a body of four thousand men was on " march to reinforce the Spanish forces, and had dvanced as far as Fuente la Higuera. He imme- liately took his measures with his usual secrecy nd skill. Se er ar s : s_ | °° °&x£« Dg yee * CHAPTER V. Th. ae r HE news of the taking of Barcelona, and of the Catalan and Valencian insurrections, struck the Court of Madrid with dismay. The wide differ- once that separates a courtier from a statesman was now apparent in the ministers of Philip; and ne alone whom prosperity had found timid, irre- solute, and helpless, seemed to be raised and dig- hiffed by. evil fortune. With great promptitude ind firmness he determined to lead in person an ummy for the recovery of Barcelona; and his letter, ‘nnouncing this resolution to his pal anitiel did ot, as formerly, request his advice, but only im- Jlored his assistance. Nor did Louis, though him- elf threatened with invasion, and pressed on every ‘ide by increasing enemies, remain deaf to this ppeal. He promised that a French fleet should ‘nvest Barcelona by sea, and that a diversion by and should be made on the side of Roussillon. ivery exertion also was made by both monarchs 0 collect a numerous army at Zaragoza. The ‘eater part of the troops on the Portuguese fron- er was recalled to this more important service ; a in order to repair the absence of so many men | y the genius of one, the command on that frontier yas again committed to the Duke of Berwick. It | } | | | Y 173 CHAP. 1706. 174 CHAP. V. 1706. WAR OF THE was settled that the Queen should remain at Ma- drid, with the title of regent, and under the guidance of Amelot and Princess Orsini,—a plan which was not adopted without much of the cabal and intrigue grown usual at this Court.* But the great and leading defect of the whole| arrangement was, to appoint the weak and unsol- dierlike Marshal Tessé as chief of the army under Philip. He reached Zaragoza in January ; and, within a few days after his arrival, ingeniously found means to embroil himself with the high-spirited inhabitants. Disgusted at an attempt he had made to withdraw several Spanish culprits from theit own courts of justice, and subject them to military law, they raised some difficulties as to the admis: sion of a new French regiment into the city. Th Marshal immediately ordered it to force its way with fixed bayonets; anda tumult ensued, whiel was not quelled without bloodshed. He ther proposed (incredible as it may seem) that all the other troops should advance and sack the city | but, being restrained by the leading men abou him, the affray led, at that time, to no further con! sequences. He thought proper, however, soo afterwards to remove his head-quarters to Pind further down the Ebro, where he was again guilt of the same barbarous impolicy. Some Frencel troops, stationed at Gurrea, having found one their lieutenants murdered in his bed, razed th’ * Mém. de Noailles, vol. iii. p. 317. | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. j i : i the neighbouring peasantry; and their conduct vas openly approved by Tessé.* Every part of ais proceedings, in short, displayed the same belief on which his government had lately acted with heir Calvinists at home, — that havoc and cruelty te sure to overbear all opposition, and must finally revail.t At the same time, his boldness against a unarmed population was remarkably contrasted vith his timidity in the prosecution of the war. All his letters to Versailles or to Madrid were lled with doubts and misgivings: he exaggerated ae force of the enemy ; he disparaged his own; he ‘poke of the difficulties of the march, of the doubt- al arrival of supplies, of the fatal results of a ulure. According to him, an army in each pro- ince would hardly suffice to maintain the waver- : ag loyalty of the Spaniards ; according to him, the ‘ege of Barcelona ought not to be thought of, bili Valencia, Lerida, and Gerona were first bdued. From every thing he foreboded defeat ad disaster ; and, in short, he adopted throughout je prudent policy of objecting to every plan pro- osed by others, and proposing none himself. hilip, however, continuing firm in his purpose, 't out from Madrid, joined Tessé at Alcaniz, on * Mém. de Tessé, vol. ii. p. 210. + This belief is strongly shown in the pages of St. Simon. er telling us that Las Torres had put a party of insurgents to > sword in Aragon, and refused all quarter; “ mais cela,’ he ds with surprise, “ n’arréta pas la révolte!” (Mém. vol. v. 3. ed. 1829.) : : | 175 jouse, plundered the town, and killed several of CHAP. Lean coma 1706. 176 WAR OF THE. CHAP. the 8th of March, and entered Catalonia at the V. head of more than twenty thousand men. — a} en . 1706. Lord Peterborough, meanwhile, made every exertion to withstand the coming storm. His chief hopes lay in England; where the Queen and Parliament had received the tidings of General Stanhope with the highest exultation ; and lent a favourable ear to his request for reinforcements. An additional supply of 250,000/. was voted for the service of Charles*; General Stanhope w appointed the English envoy extraordinary at that Court ; and was, moreover, directed to lead ti Barcelona the fresh troops sent for its relief. As. from this period, we shall find him taking a prin: cipal part in the war, his life and character, like those of its other leading personages, may perhap: seem to require some detail. He was grandson 0 the first Earl of Chesterfield and son of Mr. A Stanhope, whom I have already had occasion t mention as ambassador to Spain in the days of it Charles the Second. Having passed his youth a his father’s house in Madrid, he was well acquainte with the Spanish language, manners, and feelings and thus peculiarly fitted to conduct any publi business in that country. For his military studie he had found opportunity in Flanders, and a maste in Marlborough. His diplomatic talent was tries by this most difficult mission to Charles th Third at Barcelona. In both departments of wa * Parl. Hist. vol. vi. p. 477. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 177 and state affairs, he was considered by his contem- CHAP. \poraries as well skilled ; and they saw him at suc- cessive periods attain the highest pinnacle of each, —being at one time Commander-in-Chief in Spain, and afterwards First Lord of the Treasury in Eng- land. In both he is admitted to have shown very zreat disinterestedness as to personal profit and enrichment. Thus, for instance, when directed dy his government to conclude, if possible, a com- nercial treaty with King Charles, and having at “he same time rendered that prince important mili- vary services, he was offered, as a recompence for ‘hese, a grandeeship and estate in Spain, but re- ‘used them; and only requested that, if any grati- ude were felt towards him, it might be displayed nm a readiness to adjust and concede the disputed irticles of the treaty. Many men accordingly have eft a more ample fortune, but few a more blame. ess character, behind them. Even now, his high jualities are recorded by tradition in the country vhere they were most conspicuously shown : his tame yet lives in the honourable recollection of he Spanish peasantry ; and two of his great-grand- hildren, who fought (and one fell) in the late ?eninsular campaigns, met with frequent enquiries, vhether they were any wise related to “ Don * Diego Estanop,” the great English general in ie War of the Succession. _ The promised reinforcements under Stanhope, eing much wanted, were eagerly expected at varcelona. As they could not, however, be looked N V. 1706. 178 CHAP, Y. 1706. WAR OF THE for in time for the siege nor be relied on for | sustaining it, Lord Peterborough, in their place, | devised a most adventurous scheme, which he pro- posed to Charles, in a letter from Valencia, of the 13th of March.* ‘I confess, Sir,” he says, “that I would have your Majesty, in the present ‘“¢ conjuncture, take a resolution as extraordinary ‘as that which brought you before Barcelona. I “would have your Majesty embark in some ships| «TI have prepared for that purpose, and with al ‘‘ fair wind endeavour to gain the first land you “can in Portugal, and then put yourself at the “head of our twenty-five thousand men (in good <‘ condition), on the borders of the kingdom. The «enemy have now but five thousand men in arms «on that side of Spain; and with this change o! «affairs in our favour, I doubt not but your Ma «< jesty will soon arrive at Madrid. Sir, at firs « this has an extraordinary appearance ; but thi «voyage from Denia to that part of Portugal may ‘‘ be performed in a week, without hazard ; no ves «sels of France being upon this coast. I se) “ nothing so great or so secure for your Majesty| < But, Sir, the utmost secrecy is necessary ; and ‘would have nobody trusted but the Portugues ‘ambassador, whose vanity would, perhaps, bi “ touched to see the finishing blow from his ow «¢ country. Meanwhile, I would undertake t « maintain Catalonia and Valencia, and possibl * Printed in Freind’s Account, p. 118. I have abridged it. | i: ; | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. iL | “open the way to Madrid. This, Sir, were per- h ‘ haps the finest stroke in politics that any age has I produced, as also the least expected; and it “might even give the quickest relief to Catalonia, “ which would not be so vigorously attacked if “€ your Majesty were in person elsewhere.” This splendid idea, whatever might be its other nerits, had one great disadvantage,—it required ‘or its execution a bold and active man, and Charles vas neither ; but, in place of these qualities, he had high degree of passive courage and insensibility ‘0 danger. Thus, though on the one hand, he did Vi 1 Se ES jot venture on Lord Peterborough’s scheme, he, on the other, firmly withstood his German minis- ii who, disguising their own cowardice under he convenient mask of loyalty, earnestly besought um to secure his precious person by flight. He letermined to remain at Barcelona, and share the i ‘ F j | A | ortune of the Catalans, who had hazarded theirs ‘ao his cause. Nor could he, at first, be induced to hink the siege so imminent as keener eyes dis- | “erned it to be; and when Peterborough sent | : Tessing orders for some of the troops in Lerida to | | 1arch out, and reinforce those at Barcelona, the Ain Prince, believing that Lerida would be first | tacked, was presumptuous enough to counter- | jtand them. Thus, the garrison, which, in any se must have been very inadequate, hardly mus- red two thousand regular soldiers, and was by no eans well provided with military stores. Some ‘me for preparation was, however, afforded them | N 2 hi | ' : “i - ps Vv i \ ; | ; 179 CHAP. V. Vereen 1706. 180 CHAP. by the valour of the Miquelets, who harassed the 1706. WAR OF THE . march and delayed the arrival of Tessé; defendec every pass where the advantage of the groun might atone for that of numbers; and, wheneve they retreated, wasted the country, drove away th cattle, and poisoned the springs behind them. In spite of these repeated obstacles, the Frenc army arrived, in the beginning of April, befor Barcelona, where it was joined by the Duke Noailles with some troops from Roussillon, and a squadron of thirty ships under the Comte Toulouse. The city was immediately investe both by sea and land, and with every prospect | success. In this emergency, Charles appealed and not in vain—to the religious enthusiasm the Catalans. Declaring that he would consult t Holy Virgin, and be guided by her judgment, ! prostrated himself before one of her images witl chaplet in his hand, and exhorted all the cro around him to do the same. Shortly afterwar he rose from his devotions with an air of joy; a: announced, in an inspired tone, that she had g: ciously manifested herself to him, attended by t) angels; had promised that his faithful Catale should never forsake him; and had command him to remain amongst them.* The cry of ‘ ‘s miracle” was now raised with great effect; a the monks and the women were, as might expected, the most eager in promoting it. ‘I x Mém. de Noailles, vol. ii. p. 348. | } SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. former even flew to arms, and served as soldiers, especially the Capuchins, who preserved their reli- gious dress, but tied their long beards with ribands of their party colour.* The women, too, were ‘ormed into companies : some working as pioneers ; ome guarding posts as sentinels; and others em- loyed, more suitably to their sex, in attendance on the wounded. An irresistible enthusiasm, in short, eemed to pervade all classes, to raise them above heir natural level, and to make them capable of ¢tions which, in calmer times, they would have rembled even to contemplate. | ' Meanwhile Lord Peterborough was hastening, by orced marches, from Valencia, at the head of all he forces he could muster, but which amounted nly to two thousand foot and six. hundred ca- alry. With these, and a large irregular body of Miquelets under Cifuentes, he took post in the 1ountains round Barcelona, a few miles in the ®ar of the French encampment, and began what as since been termed in that country a GuERRILLA farfare. It was particularly suited to the tastes ad talents of that enterprising general, who was dle to boast that in two whole campaigns he had zarcely ever sent a party of thirty horse upon jy action without heading them in person.t He arassed the French army with perpetual alarms id frequent attacks; cut off stragglers, inter- »pted communications, and kept them almost be- ; * San Phelipe, Coment. vol.i. p. 191. ‘T Freind’s Account, p. 278. | nN 3 181 CHAP. V. a 1706. 182 CHAP. Reno 1706. WAR OF THE sieged within their lines. All this time he himself was tormented with absurd and capricious orders from the Court of Barcelona, desiring him to force his way into the city, and join the garrison. But though he refused to make this desperate attempt. he contrived —which the other officers had thought impracticable — to introduce some succours both of men and of provisions. Marshal Tessé first turned his arms agains! Montjuich, whose late breaches had been but il repaired; yet, instead of reducing it, as Loré Peterborough had so unexpectedly done, in 4 few hours, he did not succeed till the twenty-thirc day, when its brave commander, Lord Donegal was killed, and its garrison compelled to withdray into the city. Batteries were then opened agains Barcelona itself, and played with great effect upo| its walls. A general assault was soon expected and Peterborough, finding his army far too weal either to raise the siege or do more than m¢ lest the besiegers, looked forward with the mo: anxious impatience for the arrival of Stanhope reinforcements. Unfortunately, the authority ¢ that general, during his voyage, was controlled F that of Sir John Leake, Admiral of the fleet whic conveyed him. An express from him reached Loi Peterborough, stating that the fleet was then c the Spanish coast; that he had used all possib endeavours to prevail upon the Admiral to mall the best of his way to Barcelona; but that Leal persisted in a positive resolution not to approa‘ : \ } i SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. lj 183 the French fleet until the English (though alr eady CHAP. ! ‘more than equal to it) had been joined by some more ships, which were daily expected from Ire- dand, under Admiral Byng. Stanhope added, that He would use every exertion to let Lord Peter- borough have timely intelligence of the junction, and to urge despatch upon the Admirals. Lest, Riotrever the communication should be stopped py the enemy, he stated, that if the Earl should at any time receive a cover, without either address ar enclosure beyond a blank page cut in the middle, ae might consider this as a certain announcement chat the two squadrons had met, and were pro- seeding together towards Barcelona. This pre- -aution proved very fortunate, as it was afterwards “ound impossible, on account of the French cruisers ty or outposts, to send letters to shore from the fleet nthe former manner; but a Spaniard was easily sersuaded by Stanhope that he ran no hazard in sonveying a piece of blank paper. Accordingly, re passed without suspicion, and himself not at all ware of the tidings he carried ; and reached Lord Peterborough at the time when the danger of Bar- belona seemed at its height, and when his desire to wert it might soon have hurried him to some fatal enterprise. Never, probably, did a mere sheet of slank paper produce so strange and sudden an fect. The troops were instantly ordered to arms, ‘nd marched that very night to Sitges, a small own on the sea-shore, where Peterborough gave orders for seizing and collecting all the fishing- | | N 4& ¥. 1706. 184 CHAP. boats, sil other small craft that could be found. | V. yd 1706. WAR OF THE On the second evening, he himself, to the amaze- | ment and concern of all his officers, embarked | alone with a single aide-de-camp in an open felucca, : and put out tosea. He was apprehensive—and the | sequel proved how justly—that Admiral Leake | would make his appearance before Barcelona with | his whole fleet at once; and that his very far supe-| rior number of ships would naturally deter the Comte de Toulouse from engaging, and induce him to cut/ his cables, and steer away for France. If, on the) contrary, a part of the English fleet should keep| astern, or, rather, should sail beforehand to the! eastward of Barcelona, the superiority would, appear, at first, on the side of the French, and a) battle no longer be declined. And what could that battle prove, but a most secure and splendid triumph, when the enemy, thus tempted to engage, should find their retreat cut off, and themselves en-+ compassed with a fleet almost double of their own : To attain this glorious object, however, Lord Peterborough’s personal presence in the fleet was absolutely necessary ; since the Queen’s commissior for his full command by sea was limited to the occasions ‘‘ whenever he thought fit to go pn ‘¢ board.” He had therefore determined to brave the danger of the French cruisers, and attempt under cover of the darkness, to reach the Englis] fleet. During the first night, he rowed about i) his boat, without success, and was obliged to retur) to Sitges; but, on the second, he at length fell 1 } SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. ) a Re; with one of the men of war.“ When day dawned,” “says Carleton, ‘it was astonishing to the whole x | | “fleet to see the Union flag waving at the main-top- “mast head of this ship. Nobody at first could * trust his eyes, or guess at the meaning.” Yet, ‘notwithstanding all his exertions, Peterborough had arrived too late to prevent the disclosure he feared. The fleet had already come within sight of the French, and its strength been reported to the ‘Comte de Toulouse, who immediately raised the blockade, and put out to sea. Thus was lost the opportunity of a most decisive victory; but there ‘still remained the pleasure and the pride of re- lieving Barcelona. Peterborough had _ previously left directions with his troops at Sitges to embark ki the boats he had collected; and these, together with the English fleet, now entered the port of Bar- ‘celona, and poured forth fresh squadrons of soldiers ‘to its rescue. Their arrival might have been anticipated, had the French attempted to storm the city within the ‘last few days; for the breaches had become prac- ticable, and the soldiers clamorous for an assault. But the temper of Tessé was of that ill-omened kind which does not so much foresee disasters as ‘produce them, and which imprints its own weak- ness on every object around it. He paused, and ‘enumerated the difficulties and objections, until the entrance of Stanhope’s reinforcements settled his ‘doubts as to an assault; and though Philip and several Spanish officers were still anxious to main- tain their ground, they were over-ruled, as before, } | | | | 1 | 185 CHAP. V. dt 1706, 186 CHAP. Cian ered 1706. WAR OF THE by the timidity of Tessé. Next night they raised’ the siege; and, that they might not have to fight their way once more through an insurgent popula- | tion, they determined, instead of retracing their | steps to Zaragoza, to march northwards into Rous- | sillon. Here they arrived, after a hasty and} harassed retreat, and here Philip found himself almost an exile from his own dominions —almost a| suppliant in his grandfather’s. Their heavy cannon} and their sick and wounded were ignominiously left’ behind ; and they were still further disheartened, on the very first morning of their flight (the 11th of: May), by the gloom of a total eclipse. The sun had} been formerly chosen as the device of the House’ of Bourbon* ; and its dimness in the heavens at this’ critical period was generally thought to forebode) the decline of that haughty family on earth. As the French withdrew, the first care of Peter-| borough was directed to their sick and wounded ;| and his generous treatment has been recorded by| their gratitude. His next orders were for recasting] all the brass cannon which the enemy had spiked ;; and each new one was marked with the figure of| a sun eclipsed, together with the modest motto, | MaGNA PARVIS OBSCURANTUR. | The events before Barcelona, which forced King: Philip out of Spain, and shook his power to its) foundation, did not come singly: some blows; still more heavy, were struck from other quarters’ * This emblem was invented for Louis the Fourteenth by one L’Ouvrier, about 1662. See Voltaire, Siécle de Louis XIV.,! chap. 24. | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. — a his throne. In Flanders, the Duke of Marl: only turn to his own former achievements at Blen- heim. Antwerp, Brussels, and many other cities, immediately opened their gates; and, within a few weeks, nearly the whole Spanish Netherlands acknowledged Charles the Third for their sove- ‘reign, and Marlborough for their governor. In Italy, the campaign of the French, from which ithey had expected great successes, was closed by ‘the disastrous battle of Turin, in which their brave leader, Marsin, and their ambitious hopes, fell together. ‘They were driven in confusion be- yond the Alps; and the victorious party took pos- Wesion of the Milanese, as of the Netherlands, in ‘the name of Charles. On the side of Portugal, ; military operations were not less important ; | and these—a part of my subject — must not be ‘so lightly passed over. ‘The Spanish force on this frontier had been reduced to five thousand men ; whilst Galway and Das Minas were at the head of more than twenty. ‘The two latter were, however, embroiled by a discussion of military punctilio. ‘According to the treaty with Portugal, the troops ‘of that crown were to have the right in their own country; and now they positively refused to move one step into Spain, unless the same ‘honour were allowed them there. Sooner than lose their co-operation, the English General com- | | h | | | 187 CHAP. ‘borough gained a victory over Marshal Villeroy , a at Ramillies, so splendid and so complete, that, if 1706. we wish to find a parallel to it in that age, we can May 23. Sept. 7 188 CHAP, Aeon 1706. WAR OF THE plied; yet his conduct, though justified by the) exigency of the service, was afterwards voted, in the House of Lords, “ contrary to the honour of ‘‘ the imperial crown of Great Britain.” On the part of the Spaniards, the Duke of Berwick assumed the chief command at the end of March; but could only look on whilst the Allies) besieged and took Alcantara, into which he had thrown his best infantry, and then advanced along| the Tagus. He gave way before them, till they reached the bridge of Almaraz, nearly half way between the frontier and Toledo, and within a few! marches of Madrid. Here, however, they halted, because, having received no intelligence of the state of things at Barcelona, they were apprehensive lest! Philip, after reducing that city, should turn round) and encompass them with his victorious army.) Galway wished, nevertheless, to push forwards 5) but the Portuguese officers thought it imprudent to proceed beyond Almaraz, and useless to remam there ; and at last they determined, whilst awaiting) the news from Barcelona, to reduce some fortress on) the frontier.* Accordingly, they began their retreat! on the 11th of May, —the very time when Philip) was beginning his from Barcelona, — and, march- ing to the northward, invested Ciudad Rodrigo, It held out for seven days ; and, the Allies having soon afterwards been apprised of Lord Peterbo- rough’s great. success, took heart, and pushed for- _ * See Lord Galway’s Narrative, Parl, Hist., vol. vi. p.943. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. - Se = iva to Salamanca, which Berwick left on their ‘approach. They then, after some further delay*, jbegan their march upon Madrid. Berwick per- ered that, with his handful of men, it would be quite impracticable to withstand them; and he gperefore most earnestly besought the ar in his despatches, not to return from Bed feet to his capital, which he could only maintain for a few days, and must then forsake as a fugitive; but rather to fix his station at once in Burgos, formerly ‘the chief city in Castille, where he might be joined by his council and his Court. But Philip showed himself regardless of this advice, as of Tessé’s, ‘who wished him to retire from Perpignan to Paris ; \—the object of the French being, it is supposed, to have him more completely at ies disposal, in case of negotiations for a peace t; and we might admire the bravery of the young monarch in rushing so eagerly to what was represented to him as the post of danger, did not History disclose his real mo- tive, —an uncontrollable impatience to rejoin his Queen.t Making his way through Pamplona, and , | * This delay is severely animadverted upon in Lord Peter- ‘borough’s letters to General Stanhope. “ You told me once “you wondered at my temper at the retreat of the Portuguese (from Almaraz). Though it may seem strange to retire when ““ there is no pany, I think it more extraordinary not to advance i towards a crown.” Valencia, July 13, 1706. MS. + San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol.i. p. 196. Louis wrote to his grandson, advising him to proceed to Pamplona, and no further , but this letter was not dated till the 29th of May, and Philip is ed it at Madrid. i t Mém. de Berwick, vol. i. p. 210. : | | 189 CHAP. Nec Sl 1706. 190 CHAP. ¥. 1706. ness than to augment its resources. -* with the dust, and having rested only in the most: WAR OF THE travelling with the utmost haste, he arrived at | Madrid early in June, and found almost his first business there to be the preparations for quitting | it again. Money above all was wanted, the trea- sury being utterly exhausted. ‘The grandees were called upon for a free gift; and many of them de-| clared their loyalty in words, but contributed. so| sparingly, that they clearly showed their intention | of keeping well, if possible, with both sides; and, | according to the witty remark of a Spanish lady at| that time, resembled that wary devotee, who offered | one wax candle to St. Michael, and another to the devil.* The Queen went in person to the Ayun-| tamiento or town-hall, and made an appeal to the magistrates; but could only wring from them six! thousand pistoles. In fact, it will be found that’ new demands or taxes imposed by a government in| moments of extraordinary peril, are almost always| unproductive, and serve rather to betray its weak-| The councils of state and public tribunals now set out on their journey to Burgos, where it: had been determined to fix the royal residence. The Queen, too, proceeded to that city. ‘‘ After a| ‘‘ journey of eighteen days,” she wrote to Madame de Maintenont, ‘‘ I arrived at Burgos yesterday ‘‘ evening, much fatigued with rising before day- ‘‘ break, overpowered with the heat, almost stifled * Mém. de Noailles, vol. ii. p. 359. + Letter in the Mém. de Noailles, dated July 6, 1706. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. a wall fell down, and put many people to great “hoped, on arriving here, to be more comfortably i lodged, but oo hitherto been greatly disap- ‘pointed. Notwithstanding these hardships, we ; shall not complain, so that, the King can but pre- “vail over his enemies. Unhappily, however, f * scarcely a day passes without bringing us the news f of some fresh disaster.” Philip himself remained t his capital a few days longer, and then joined the ioree of Berwick at Sopetran, on the ridge of the p uadarrama mountains. He was attended by nearly ‘Il the nobles able to bear arms; even by those whose idelity had lately seemed the most precarious ; and vet a decree had been published, permitting all such s held no public office to stay at Madrid if they dleased. But some men are so fond of bustle and igitation, or so proud of trust, that their Prince can nore surely rely upon them, in the most dangerous isis, than in his fulness of power and prosperity. Madrid was now left open to the allied army, vhich had, without opposition, crossed the high ‘aountains which line that city on the north, and livide the two Castilles. Their light troops were jready hovering before it; and, on the 25th of on the advanced guard of cavalry, under the Marquis of Sic erde:, took possession of it. Gal- vay and Das Minas made their triumphal entry he days afterwards; but their reception by the ! ahabitants was cold and sullen. To the Por- 191 “wretched and ruinous hovels. In one instance, CHAP. “danger. From this you may judge of the rest. We 1706. 192 CHAP. Reece 1706. WAR OF THE. tuguese, especially, it was a- glorious hour,—that they who but seventy years ago were the subjects and vassals of Spain, should now not only assert their independence, but enter, as conquerors, the very capital of their haughty tyrant! Unfortunately for them, their elation at this honour, togethe with the incapacity of Lord Galway, prevented them from pushing forward and securing thew success. It was evidently their part to give Philip no respite; to pursue, overtake, and crush his scanty forces; and then, if they pleased, sit dowr and enjoy their laurels at leisure. Instead of this| the Generals took up their own quarters at ease il the palace of the Pardo, encamped their troop! along the Manzanares, had King Charles the ‘Thirc proclaimed in the streets, attempted to re-organiz the public tribunals ; and, in short, wasted a whol: month in inaction; ‘a halt,” says Lord Peter borough, in one of his letters, ‘‘as fatal as Han <* nibal’s at Capua.” * The evil consequences of their delay did not however, by any means, appear at first. Severe men of rank and influence declared in their fa vour, and the discontent of the people was as ye only silently fermenting. ‘The Conde de Oropese who had been twice prime minister under Charle the Second, together with his son-in-law, the Cond * To General Stanhope, Aug. 1, 1706. MS. This is also Be. wick’s opinion :— “ Si, au lieu de s’amuser 4 Madrid, ils eusset «“ marché tout de suite aprés moi, ils m’auroient infalliblemey| “ chassé au de-la de l’Ebre.” (Mém. vol. i. p. 222 ) i. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 193 de Haro, allowed themselves to be captured and CHAP. such as the Conde de Lemos, a the Patriarch of the Indies, who had remained at Madrid, openly espoused the cause of Charles. Amongst these lg the Marquis of Rivas, late secretary to the ‘Despacno; and it deserves to be recorded to his hawourt that, in spite of the most eager solicit- ations, and the highest promises, he would never swerve from his statement with respect to Charles the Second’s will, nor impeach its authenticity ac- cording to the wish of the Allies. But it was from Toledo that they received their most important iecssion of weight, if not of numbers. Toledo had for some time been the retreat of the Queen- dowager and of Cardinal Portocarrero, those two turbulent spirits, who, in the late reign, had stood at the head of opposite and angry parties. In their exile and retirement, however, their ancient sivalry ceased, and they became united together by one of the strongest of all human bonds—a sommon hatred. The Queen had always been in aeart, as in kindred, a German ; and Portocarrero, since his disgrace, had loudly inveighed against the tyranny of the French agents and the ingrati- ‘ude of Philip. He forgot that, in thus giving way “0 passion, he was demolishing the structure which 1is own hands had chiefly raised, and, by counter- icting the great aim and object of his political life, Past destroy its reputation with posterity. Every 20 | | fl | off from Guadalaxara; whilst a few others, : f onsideration yielded to his thirst for vengeance. 0 i : | 1706. 194 CHAP. ¥. 1706. June. WAR OF THE No sooner, therefore, did Das Minas send out; towards Toledo a squadron of horse, under the Conde de Atalaya, than they were eagerly wel-| comed by the Cardinal and the Queen. The latter cast aside the perpetual sables to which etiquette condemns the widowed Queens of Spain, and, together with all her household, appeared in festival attire. She wrote a warm letter of con- gratulation to her nephew Charles, whilst a still more solid proof of her regard was conveyed in a present of jewels. On his part, Portocarrero, after performing a ‘solemn Tr pEum in the Cathedral, blessed the Austrian standards in person ; and at night the archiepiscopal palace blazed with a joyful illumination, and spread forth a costly banquet 1 honour of the day. Thus might Charles number amongst his partisans the powerful primate of Spain, and the last link from the long chain of Austrian princes. A defection in another quarter obtained for Charles the best arsenal of Spain, and the last rem- nant of its fleets. Oran being then closely pressed by the Moors, the Conde de Santa Cruz, who com- manded for Philip in Carthagena, had been or- dered to proceed thither with two galleys, convey- ing a supply of provisions, and above fifty thousand dollars in money. But Santa Cruz, already won| over by the Austrian party, seized this opportunity of betraying his trust, and steered to Barcelona with the treasure. Through his persuasion the English were induced to send some ships against! 2 a ae re Ls re SS See ge egy ee emees i SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 195 Carthagena, and the French garrison to surrender CHAP. it without a blow. Soon afterwards, Oran, de- ‘prived of its expected supplies, yielded to the Moors. Thus was lost to both parties of the ie a fortress, which they had gained by a the genius of Cardinal Ximenes, and which was ~ endeared to them by his memory.* On another _ side, Zaragoza, and indeed, all Aragon, mindful | of Tessé’s misconduct, threw off their allegiance to Philip, with so much unanimity and quiet, as to afford hardly any particulars to history. . The Spanish monarchy seemed now within the grasp of Charles, although he was very far from seizing his advantages with sufficient energy and quickness. It appeared as if his late heavy blow on the French before Barcelona had been struck upon a torpedo, and bereaved not them, but him- self, of sense and motion. It was found as difficult to make him leave Barcelona, now that it had be- come the seat of indolence, as whilst it had been the post of danger; yet his continued residence there was evidently useless, if not injurious, to his service. At first, indeed, there was some report of an intended siege of Gerona by the Duke de Noailles; and Stanhope was sent to secure what he himself truly called ‘“ the barrier and key _ * Mariana, Hist. Hisp. lib. xxix. c.18. In his account of Oran I am surprised to find this great historian undervaluing the gens Maurica edificandi minime curiosa. Had he never heard of the Alhambra ? Oe V. 1706. . 196 CHAP. 1706. May 29. _ design, and Stanhope hastened back to his diplo- | WAR OF THE “of this country*;” but the enemy had no such | matic and military duties. On the retreat of Philip, Peterborough had urged the policy of an imme- diate advance upon Madrid, whilst it yet lay open and defenceless; and he strongly recommended the route of Valencia, because that province, being already in possession of the Allies, could present no difficulties, and cause no delay. A council of war, held on the 18th of May, had agreed to this project; and it had been determined that_Peter- borough and the infantry should proceed by sea, and the cavalry by land, to Valencia ; that Charles, with his escort, should transfer his head-quarters to Tortosa; remain there till the road to Madrid was opened to him by Peterborough; and then, joining that general, advance with him to the ca- pital. In pursuance of this plan, Peterborough shortly afterwards embarked, and sailed to Va- lencia. On his arrival, the Spaniards, who had been making some attempts upon the fortress of Xativa, hastily withdrew; but the conduct of the Governor-General Basset y Ramos, together with his apology for it, are mentioned by the Earl with his usual biting irony : — *‘ The English came in ‘‘ good time: Basset had already two officers of Las ‘‘ Torres in the place; to be sure, it was only te ‘let them know how vigorously he would defenc * Letter to Secretary Sir Charles Hedges, May 31, 1706 MS. SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. ee wer me “it.’* The English general next sent a detach- | iment to reduce Requena, the frontier town on the road to Madrid, and almost the only obstacle to “rea aching it. Requena surrendered, after a short “resistance ; ; but all this while Peterborough was harassed with absurd and fluctuating instructions from the Court of Barcelona, — “‘ a fate,” he after- “wards observed, ‘‘ never to be avoided in this “service, of which I am more weary than a galley _** slave of his oar.” t+ On the other hand, it cannot, in truth, be denied that his own fiery and fretful _ temper gave others infinite trouble, and raised | against himself a host of personal resentments. In ‘his own words, he ** would be commanded by no- id body, and had as little mind to command.” ¢ | Want of money, too, added to the difficulties of his ‘situation, and to the impatience of his temper. « I | “see no remedy,” he writes to Stanhope, “ unless «TJ can find some way, upon my own credit, to | “procure money for the King. I am sure he shall ) “change his note before I make the experiment, “and not use me with such foolish ill-breeding. I ‘desire you will make him sensible of his usage to “me upon this head.”§ Soon afterwards, how- heer we find his public spirit predominant. <‘ I “am resolved to make one effort more, to see if 4 any thing can touch a German heart. I have 4 er remer regain —eemenn | * Letter to General Stanhope, June 1706. MS. | t To Do. July 24, 1706. MS. a , t To Do. Aug. 1, 1706. MS. : if Qo O 9 197 CHAP. eenssoell 1706. 198 CHAP. 1706. WAR OF THE ‘“‘ received a good sum of my own: the King and ‘his troops shall have every farthing of it, and I | ‘¢ will send it in gold with all expedition.”* | Peterborough was now in constant expectation of being joined by Charles; but the imsurrection of Zaragoza had given a new turn to that prince, or | rather to his German advisers, who determined to proceed to Madrid, not through Valencia, but through Aragon. General Stanhope and the Por- tuguese ambassador ‘‘ represented in the strongest ‘manner we could,” says the formerf, ‘ the ‘¢ certain delay this must occasion, at a time when | ‘‘the Portuguese army, and all that wished his| ‘«¢ Majesty well in Castille, were in the utmost im- “‘ patience for his arrival at Madrid; besides the ‘‘ danger there might be for his Majesty, with so) “small a force, to march three hundred miles ‘‘ through a country which had not declared they | “‘ were ready to receive him, and the enemy having “ still a great body of horse in Castille.” Lord Peterborough wrote to the same effect, but with as little success: Charles persisted in his scheme; | and from the delay of the land journey, superadded to that which had already taken place, did not'| * Letter from Valencia, of July 8, 1706. MS. In another | letter of July 2, he says, “I think our business done, and to ‘¢ some purpose,—to put one King out and another in within the “year! I want only to relieve the Duke of Savoy, and then “to Wills’s Coffee-house in winter!” MS. + Letter to the Lord Treasurer Godolphin, July 3, 1706. MS. | SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. 7 his public entry into Zaragoza till the 18th of July. He ought to have been, nearly a month before, not at Zaragoza, but at Madrid. So ; Strange, indeed, did his absence from thence appear ‘at such a crisis, that it gave rise to a report of his having died suddenly ; and there were even some persons in Castille ready to make oath cf his being already embalmed and interred!* It is much to be wished that men were as careful and cautious in swearing as they usually are in betting on a fact! hashes excused his delay to Stanhope by alleging that his equipage was not feady to enter the capital with becoming state. <‘‘ Sir,” replied the General, with great animation, “our William -“ the Third entered London in a hackney with a « cloak-bag behind it, and was made King not ““ many weeks after.”t On the other hand, Lord ‘Peterborough also seems by no means free from ‘blame for remaining so much longer at Valencia, when he knew the English army to be already at ‘Madrid. We afterwards, it is true, find him assert- ing that he had received no regular and direct com- / munication to that effect from Galway or Das |Minas; but it can scarcely be doubted that a man “$0 distinguished for his early and sure intelligence must have very soon known-the occupation of the Fire ee ' * Somerville’s Queen Anne, p. 141. The prevalence of this _ report is mentioned by Lord Peterborough, in a letter to General Stanhope, of July 20, 1706. MS. ; . t Letter from Mr. Walpole to Mr. Robert Walpole, June 23, 1706. , | o 4 199 CHAP. Vv. Naini lid 1706. 200 CHAR. en 1706. WAR OF THE capital; nor is it denied that, so early as the 6th o July, a Spanish officer, despatched by Lord Gal- way, passed through Valencia on his way to Bar- celona, — without, indeed, any letters to Lord Peterborough, but announcing, by word of mouth, the taking of Madrid.* However much, therefore, Galway’s silence might give ground for sub- sequent accusation, it hardly warranted Peter- borough’s inactivity and affectation of ignorance, at such a crisis, nor ought he to have permitted personal slights to overcome his sense of public duty. | These errors, however, would have weighed but lightly in the scale, had not a new and uncon- querable spirit of loyalty burst forth in Castille. Throughout all history there are few national movements more beautiful and striking than the manner in which a prince, by no means popular when firmly seated on the throne, rallied round him the hearts of his subjects by that very evil fortune which would commonly have lost them. The Spaniards are, indeed, embued more, perhaps, than any other nation, with that romantic gene- rosity which makes them naturally incline to the weak and fallen, and prefer him who must beseech, to him who can bestow protection. Their re- verence towards the man, once acknowledged as their King, is also of a higher and more sacred * See Freind’s Account, p- 104; Lord Peterborough’s answers, in the Parliamentary History, vol. vi. p. 949.; and Mr. Furly’s Journal. MS. \ SUCCESSION IN SPAIN. pens than ours. The same title, ‘‘ His Majesty,” CHAP. is applied by the Spaniards to their God, as to ‘heir sovereign* : their feeling towards the former, is a sort of loyalty ; their feeling towards the latter, ‘a sort of devotion; and both are inseparably mingled in their minds. In addition to these ‘causes, there was amongst the Castillians (as the ‘Admiral of Castille had foreseen there would bet), a great aversion to any monarch who came to them, either from the Catalans, or the Valencians. The former they hated, as fierce, and frequent in rebellion ; ; and as to the latter, their delicious climate and enervating luxuries only excited their contempt. It had even become proverbial amongst them to say, in a sort of couplet, that at Valencia the meat is grass, and the grass water; the men are women, and the women — nothing. “The __ * Doblado’s (Mr. White’s) Letters from Spain, p.11. The ‘loyalty of Spanish poets also takes extraordinary flights. When ‘L was in Spain, I saw in the official Gaceta de Madrid (of Nov. 3, 1827), an ode commemorating the recent visit of King Fer- dinand VII. to Valencia, and declaring that it would be remem- ‘bered even when Marathon and Salamis should be for gotten | ae ee *‘ de Salamina ’ Maraton y Platea, Los destructores heroes celebrados, Que hoy la fama pregona, Al fin succumbiran, y en el olvido p Yaceran sepultados ; Y en tanto con aplauso repetido, Por siempre sonara de gente en gente El nombre de FERNANDO esclarecido !” } San Phelipe, Comentarios, vol. i. p. 169. 4 Co. ——_— - i |