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UNIFORM LIBRARY EDITION OF THE MISCELLANEOUS 
 WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL, 
 
 Tinted and laid paper, 8vo, ^2.50 per vol. (except vol. cn Comte.) 
 
 Three Essays on Religion. 1 vol. 
 
 The Autobiography. 1 vol. 
 
 Dissertations and Discussions. 5 vols. 
 Considerations on Representative Government. 1 vol. 
 Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. 
 2 vols. 
 
 On Liberty ; The Subjection of Women. Bothinl voL 
 Comte’s Positive Philosophy. 1 voL $1.50. 
 
 CHEAP EDITIONS, 
 
 Principles of Political Economy. 12mo, $2.50. 
 
 The Subjection of Women. 12mo, plain, $1.25. 
 
 0 
 
 MEMORIAL VOLUME, 
 
 John Stuart Mill : His Life and Works. 
 
 Twelve sketches, as follows : His Life, by J. R. Fox Bourne ; His 
 Career in the India House, by W. T. Thornton ; His Moral Character, 
 by Herbert Spencer ; His Botanical Studies, by Henry Turner ; His 
 Place as a Critic, by W. Minto ; His Work in Philosophy, by J. H. 
 Levy ; His Studies in Morals and Jurisprudence, by W. A. Hunter ; 
 His Work in Political Economy, by J. E. Cairnes; His Influence at 
 the Universities, by Henry Fawcett ; His Influence as a Practical 
 Politician, by Mrs. Fawcett ; His Relation to Positiwsm, by Frederic 
 Harrison ; His Position as a Philosopher, by W. A. Hunter. 16mo, 
 price, $1.00. 
 
 HENRY HOLT & CO., Publis^Kers, N. Y. 
 
6/P7~ 
 
 ST03. 
 
 ON LIBERTY 
 
/ 
 
ON LIBERTY 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 
 
 BY 
 
 JOHN STHAET MILL 
 
 NEW YOEK 
 
 HENEY HOLT AND COMPANY 
 1879 
 

the beloved and deplored memory of 
 her who was the inspirer, and in part the 
 author, of all that is best in my writings — 
 the friend and wife whose exalted sense of 
 truth and right was my strongest incitement, 
 and whose approbation was my chief reward 
 — I dedicate this volume. Like all that I 
 have written for many years, it belongs as 
 much to her as to me ; but the work as it 
 stands has had, in a very insufficient degree, 
 the inestimable advantage of her revision 
 some of the most important portions having 
 been reserved for a more careful reexamina- 
 tion, which they are now never destined to 
 receive. Were I but capable of interpreting 
 to the world one half the great thoughts and 
 noble feelings which are buried in her grave, 
 I should be the medium of a greater benefit 
 to it, than is ever likely to arise from any- 
 thing that I can write, unprompted and un- 
 assisted by her all but unrivalled wisdom. 
 
The grand, leading pnnciple, towards which every argument 
 unfolded in these pages directly converges, is the absolute and 
 essential importance of human development in its richest dive> 
 sity. — Wilhelm von Humboldt: Sphere and Duties of Govern^ 
 tr£r4. 
 
> , ■ • • 
 
 ■ . ■• V ‘ i-W' ■ 
 
 • . . ,f. r 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PAai 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 9 
 
 CHAPTER H. 
 
 OP THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION 33 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS 
 
 OF WELL-BEING 100 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 OF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY 
 
 OVER THE INDIVIDUAL 183 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 APPLICATIONS ••• •#•••« •166 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 rpHE subject of this Essay is not the so* 
 J- called Liberty of the Will, so unfortunately 
 opposed to the misnamed doctrine of Philo- 
 sophical Necessity ; but Civil, or Social Lib- 
 erty : the nature and limits of the power which 
 can be legitimately exercised by society over 
 the individual. A question seldom stated, and 
 hardly ever discussed, in general terms, but 
 which profoundly influences the practical con- 
 troversies of the age by its latent presence, and 
 is likely soon to make itself recognized as the 
 vital question of the future. It is so far from 
 being new, that, in a certain sense, it has di- 
 vided mankind, almost from the remotest ages, 
 but in the stage of progress into which the 
 more civilized portions of the species have 
 now entered, it presents itself under new con- 
 ditions, and requires a different and more fun- 
 damental treatment. 
 
 The struggle between Liberty and Author- 
 ity is the most conspicuous feature in the por- 
 tions of history with which we are earliest 
 
 1 * 
 
10 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 familiar, particularly in that of Greece, Rome^ 
 and England. But in old times this contest 
 was between subjects, or some classes of sub- 
 jects, and the government. By liberty, was 
 meant protection against the tyranny of the 
 political rulers. The rulers were conceived 
 (except in some of the popular governments 
 of Greece) as in a necessarily antagonistic po- 
 sition to the people whom they ruled. They 
 consisted of a governing One, or a governing 
 tribe or caste, who derived their authority from 
 inheritance or conquest ; who, at all events, did 
 not hold it at the pleasure of the governed, and 
 whose supremacy men did not venture, per- 
 haps did not desire, to contest, whatever pre- 
 cautions might be taken against its oppres- 
 sive exercise. Their power was regarded as 
 necessary, but also as highly dangerous ; as 
 a weapon which they would attempt to use 
 against their subjects, no less than against ex- 
 ternal enemies. To prevent the weaker mem- 
 bers of the community from being preyed upon 
 by innumerable vultures, it was needful that 
 there should be an animal of prey stronger 
 than the rest, commissioned to keep them 
 down. But as the king of the vultures would 
 be no less bent upon preying on the flock than 
 any of the minor harpies, it was indispensable 
 to be in a perpetual attitude of defence against 
 his beak and claws. The aim, therefore, of 
 patriots, was to set limits to the power which 
 the ruler should be suffered to exercise over 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 11 
 
 the community ; and this limitation was what 
 tliey meant by liberty. It was attempted in 
 two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition 
 of certain immunities, called political liberties 
 or rights, which it was to be regarded as a 
 breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and 
 which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or 
 general rebellion, was held to be justifiable. A 
 second, and generally a later expedient, was 
 the establishment of constitutional checks ; by 
 which the consent of the community, or of a 
 body of some sort supposed to represent its 
 interests, was made a necessary condition to 
 some of the more important acts of the gov- 
 erning power. To the first of these modes of 
 limitation, the ruling power, in most European 
 countries, was compelled, more or less, to sub- 
 mit. It was not so with the second ; and to 
 attain this, or when already in some degree 
 possessed, to attain it more completely, be- 
 came everywhere the principal object of the 
 lovers of liberty. And so long as mankind 
 were content to combat one enemy by an 
 other, and to be ruled by a master, on condi- 
 tion of being guaranteed more or less effica- 
 ciously against his tyranny, they did not caiTy 
 their aspirations beyond this point. 
 
 A time, however, came, in the progress of 
 human affairs, when men ceased to think it a 
 necessity of nature that their governors should 
 be an independent power, opposed in interest 
 to themselves. It appeared to them much beb 
 
12 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 ter that the various magistrates of the State 
 should be their tenants or delegates, revoca- 
 ble at their pleasure. In that way alone, it 
 seemed, could they have complete security that 
 the powers of government would never be 
 abused to their disadvantage. By degrees, 
 this new demand for elective and temporary 
 rulers became the prominent object of the ex- 
 ertions of the popular party, wherever any such 
 party existed; and superseded, to a considera- 
 ble extent, the previous efforts to limit the 
 power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded 
 for making the ruling power emanate from the 
 periodical choice of the ruled, some persons 
 began to think that too much importance had 
 been attached to the limitation of the power 
 itself. That (it might seem) was a resource 
 against rulers whose interests were habitually 
 opposed to those of the people. What was 
 now wanted was, that the rulers should be 
 identified with the people ; that their interest 
 and will should be the interest and will of the 
 nation. The nation did not need to be pro- 
 tected against its own will. There was no 
 fear of its tyrannizing over itself. Let the 
 rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly 
 removable by it, and it could afford to trust 
 them with power of which it could itself dic- 
 tate the use to be made. Their power was 
 but the nation’s own power, concentrated, and 
 in a form convenient for exercise. This mode 
 of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, was 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 13 
 
 tommon among the last generation of Euro- 
 pean liberalism, in the Continental section of 
 which, it still apparently predominates. Those 
 who admit any limit to what a government 
 may do, except in the case of such govern- 
 ments as they think ought not to exist, stand 
 out as brilliant exceptions among the political 
 thinkers of the Continent. A similar tone of 
 sentiment might by this time have been preva- 
 lent in our own country, if the circumstances 
 which for a time encouraged it had continued 
 unaltered. 
 
 But, in political and philosophical theories, 
 as well as in persons, success discloses faults 
 and infirmities which failure might have con- 
 cealed from observation. The notion, that the 
 people have no need to limit their power over 
 themselves, might seem axiomatic, when pop- 
 ular government was a thing only dreamed 
 about, or read of as having existed at some 
 distant period of the past. Neither was that 
 notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary 
 aberrations as those of the French Revolution, 
 the worst of which were the vrork of an usurp- 
 ing few, and which, in any case, belonged, not 
 to the permanent working of popular institu- 
 tions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak 
 against monarchical and aristocratic despot- 
 ism. In time, however, a democratic republic 
 came to occupy a large portion of the earth’s 
 surface, and made itself felt as one of the 
 most powerful members of the community of 
 
14 
 
 ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 nations ; and elective and responsible govern- 
 ment became subject to the observations and 
 criticisms which wait upon a great existing 
 fact. It was now perceived that such phrases 
 as ‘‘self-government,” and “the power of the 
 people over themselves,” do not express the 
 true state of the case. The “ people ” who 
 exercise the power, are not always the same 
 people with those over whom it is exercised , 
 and the “ self-government ” spoken of, is not 
 the government of each by himself, but of each 
 by all the rest. The will of the people, more- 
 over, practically means, the will of the most 
 numerous or the most active part of the peo- 
 ple ; the majority, or those who succeed in 
 making themselves accepted as the majority : 
 the people, consequently, may desire to oppress 
 a part of their number ; and precautions are as 
 much needed against this, as against any other 
 abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, 
 of the power of government over individuals, 
 loses none of its importance when the holders 
 of power are regularly accountable to the com- 
 munity, that is, to the strongest party therein. 
 This view of things, recommending itself 
 equally to the intelligence of thinkers and to 
 the inclination of those important classes in 
 European society to whose real or supposed 
 interests democracy is adverse, has had no dif- 
 ficulty in establishing itself ; and in political 
 speculations “ the tyranny of the majority” is 
 now generally included among the evils against 
 which society requires to be on its guard. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 15 
 
 Like other tyrannies, the tyranny of the ma- 
 jority was at first, and is still vulgarly, held in 
 dread, chiefly as operating through the acts of 
 the public authorities. But reflecting persons 
 perceived that when society is itself the tyrant 
 — society collectively, over the separate indi- 
 viduals who compose it — its means of tyran- 
 nizing are not restricted to the acts which it 
 may do by the hands of its political function- 
 aries. Society can and does execute its own 
 mandates : and if it issues wrong mandates 
 instead of right, or any mandates at all in 
 things with which it ought not to meddle, it 
 practises a social tyranny more formidable than 
 many kinds of political oppression, since, though 
 not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, 
 it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating 
 much more deeply into the details of life, and 
 enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, 
 against the tyranny of the magistrate is not 
 enough ; there needs protection also against the 
 tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; 
 against the tendency of society to impose, by 
 other means than civil penalties, its own ideas 
 and practices as rules of conduct on those who 
 dissent from them ; to fetter the development, 
 and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any 
 individuality not in harmony with its ways, and 
 compel all characters to fashion themselves 
 upon the model of its own. There is a limit 
 to the legitimate interference of collective opin- 
 ion with individual independence ; and to find 
 
 C iCi-- f* t, n h 
 
16 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 that limit, and maintain it against encroach- 
 ment, is as indispensable to a good condition 
 of human affairs, as protection against political 
 despotism. 
 
 But though this proposition is not likely tc 
 be contested in general terms, the practical 
 question, where to place the limit — how to 
 make the fitting adjustment between individ- 
 ual independence and social control — is a sub- 
 ject on which nearly everything remains to be 
 done. All that makes existence valuable to 
 any one, depends on the enforcement of re- 
 straints upon the actions of other people. 
 Some rules of conduct, therefore, must be 
 imposed, by law in the first place, and by 
 opinion on many things which are not fit 
 subjects for the operation of law. What these 
 rules should be, is the principal question in 
 human affairs ; but if w^e except a few of the 
 most obvious cases, it is one of those which 
 least progress has been made in resolving. No 
 two ages, and scarcely any two countries, have 
 decided it alike ; and the decision of one age 
 or country is a wonder to another. Yet the 
 people of any given age and country no more 
 suspect any difficulty in it, than if it were a 
 subject on which mankind had always been 
 agreed. The rules which obtain among them- 
 selves appear to them self-evident and self-jus- 
 tifying. This all but universal illusion is one 
 of the examples of the magical influence of 
 custom, which is not only, as the proverb says, 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 17 
 
 a second nature, but is continually mistaken 
 for the first. The effect of custom, in prevent- 
 ing any misgiving respecting the rules of con- 
 duct which mankind impose on one another, is 
 all the more complete because the subject is 
 one on which it is not generally considered ne- 
 cessary that reasons should be given, either by 
 one person to others, or by each to himself. Peo- 
 ple are accustomed to believe, and have been 
 encouraged in the belief by some who aspire 
 to the character of philosophers, that their feel- 
 ings, on subjects of this nature, are better than 
 reasons, and render reasons unnecessary. The 
 practical principle which guides them to their 
 opinions on the regulation of human conduct, 
 is the feeling in each person’s mind that every- 
 body should be required to act as he, and those 
 with whom he sympathizes, would like them to 
 act. No one, indeed, acknowledges to himself 
 that his standard of judgment is his own liking ; 
 but an opinion on a point of conduct, not sup- 
 ported by reasons, can only count as one person’s 
 preference ; and if the reasons, when given, are a 
 mere appeal to a similar preference felt by other 
 people, it is still only many people’s liking in- 
 stead of one. To an ordinary man, however, 
 his own preference, thus supported, is not only 
 a perfectly satisfactory reason, but the only one 
 he generally has for any of his notions of mo- 
 rality, taste, or propriety, which are not express- 
 ly written in his religious creed ; and his chief 
 guide in the interpretation even of that. Men’s 
 
18 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable oi 
 b.aineable, are affected by all the multifarious 
 causes which influence their wishes in regard 
 to the conduct of others, and which are as nm 
 merous as those which determine their wishes 
 on any other subject. Sometimes their reason 
 — at other times their prejudices or supersti- 
 lions : often their social affections, not seldom 
 their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, 
 their arrogance or contemptuousness : but 
 
 most commonly, their desires or fears for them- 
 selves— their legitimate or illegitimate self-in- 
 terest. Wherever there is an ascendant class, 
 a large portion of the morality of the country 
 emanates from its class interests, and its feel- 
 ings of class superiority. The morality be- 
 tween Spartans and Helots, between planters 
 and negroes, between princes and subjects, be- 
 tween nobles and roturiers, between men and 
 women, has been for the most part the creation 
 of these class interests and feelings : and the 
 sentiments thus generated, react in turn upon 
 the moral feelings of the members of the as- 
 cendant class, in their relations among them- 
 selves. Where, on the other hand, a class, for- 
 merly ascendant, has lost its ascendency, or 
 where its ascendency is unpopular, the prevail- 
 ing moral sentiments frequently bear the im- 
 press of an impatient dislike of superiority 
 Another grand determining principle of the 
 rules of conduct, both in act and forbearance 
 which have been enforced by law or opinion, haa 
 
ON LIBEETY. 
 
 19 
 
 been the servility of mankind towards the sup 
 posed preferences or aversions of their tempr 
 ral masters, or of their gods. This servility 
 though essentially selfish, is not hypocrisy ; it 
 gives rise to perfectly genuine sentiments of 
 abhorrence; it made men burn magicians and 
 heretics. Among so many baser influences, 
 the general and obvious interests of society 
 have of course had a share, and a large one, in 
 the direction of the moral sentiments : less, 
 however, as a matter of reason, and on their 
 own account, than as a consequence of the 
 sympathies and antipathies which grew out of 
 them : and sympathies and antipathies which 
 had little or nothing to do with the interests of 
 society, have made themselves felt in the estab- 
 lishment of moralities with quite as great force. 
 
 The likings and dislikings of society, or 
 of some powerful portion of it, are thus the 
 main thing which has practically determined 
 the rules laid down for general observance, un- 
 der the penalties of law or opinion. And in 
 general, those who have been in advance of 
 society in thought and feeling, have left this 
 condition of things unassailed in principle, 
 however they may have come into conflict 
 with it in some of its details. They have 
 occupied themselves rather in inquiring what 
 things society ought to like or dislike, than in 
 questioning whether its likings or dislikings 
 should be a law to individuals. They pre- 
 ferred endeavoring to alter the feelings of man* 
 
20 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 kind on the particular points on which thej 
 were themselves heretical, rather than make 
 common cause in defence of freedom, with 
 heretics generally. The only case in which 
 the higher ground has been taken on principle 
 and maintained with consistency, by any but 
 an individual here and there, is that of relig- 
 ious belief: a case instructive in many ways, 
 and not least so as forming a most striking 
 instance of the fallibility of what is called the 
 moral sense : for the odium theologicum^ in a 
 sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal 
 cases of moral feeling. Those who first broke 
 the yoke of what called itself the Universal 
 Church, were in general as little willing to 
 permit difference of religious opinion as that 
 church itself. But when the heat of the con- 
 flict was over, without giving a complete vic- 
 tory to any party, and each church or sect was 
 reduced to limit its hopes to retaining posses- 
 sion of the ground it already occupied ; mi- 
 norities, seeing that they had no chance of 
 becoming majorities, were under the necessity 
 of pleading to those whom they could not con- 
 vert, for permission to differ. It is accordingly 
 on this battle-field, almost solely, that the rights 
 of the individual against society have been as- 
 serted on broad grounds of principle, and the 
 claim of society to exercise authority over 
 dissentients openly controverted. The grea1 
 writers to whom the world owes what relig- 
 ious liberty it possesses, have mostly asserted 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 2i 
 
 freedom of conscience as an indefeasible rij^;ht, 
 and denied absolutely that a human being is 
 accountable to others for his religious balief 
 Yet so natural to mankind is intoleran ;e in 
 whatever they really care about, that reli ^ious 
 freedom has hardly anywhere been prac^'ically 
 realized, except where religious indifference, 
 which dislikes to have its peace disturbed by 
 theological quarrels, has added its weight to 
 the scale. In the minds of almost all rebgious 
 persons, even in the most tolerant countries, 
 the duty of toleration is admitted with tacit 
 reserves. One person will bear with dissent 
 in matters of church government, but not of 
 dogma ; another can tolerate everybody, short 
 of a Papist or an Unitarian ; another, every 
 one who believes in revealed religion ; a few 
 extend their charity a little further, but stop 
 at the belief in a God and in a future state. 
 Wherever the sentiment of the majority is still 
 genuine and intense, it is found to have abated 
 little of its claim to be obeyed. 
 
 In England, from the peculiar circumstances 
 oZ our political history, though the yoke of opin- 
 ion is perhaps heavier, that of law is lighter, 
 than in most other countries of Europe ; and 
 there is considerable jealousy of direct interfer- 
 ence, by the legislative or the executive power 
 with private conduct ; not so much from any 
 just regard for the independence of the indi- 
 vidual, as from the still subsisting habit of 
 looking on the government as representing an 
 
22 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 opposite interest to the public. The majority 
 have not yet learnt to feel the power of the 
 government their power, or its opinions their 
 opinions. When they do so, individual liberty 
 will probably be as much exposed to invasion 
 from the government, as it already is from pub- 
 lic opinion. But, as yet, there is a consider- 
 able amount of feeling ready to be called forth 
 against any attempt of the law to control indi 
 viduals in things in which they have not hith- 
 erto been accustomed to be controlled by it ; 
 and this with very little discrimination as to 
 whether the matter is, or is not, within the 
 legitimate sphere of legal control ; insomuch 
 that the feeling, highly salutary on the whole, 
 is perhaps quite as often misplaced as well 
 grounded in the particular instances of its appli- 
 cation. There is, in fact, no recognized principle 
 by which the propriety or impropriety of govern- 
 ment interference is customarily tested. People 
 decide according to their personal preferences. 
 Some, whenever they see any good to be done, 
 or evil to be remedied, would willingly insti- 
 gate the government to undertake the busi- 
 ness ; while others prefer to bear almost any 
 amount of social evil, rather than add one to 
 the departments of human interests amena- 
 ble to governmental control. And men range 
 themselves on one or the other side in any par- 
 ticular case, according to this general direction 
 of their sentiments ; or according to the degree 
 of interest which they feel in the particular 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 23 
 
 filing which it is proposed that the government 
 Bhould do ; or according to the belief they en- 
 tertain that the government would, or would 
 not, do it in the manner they prefer ; but very 
 rarely on account of any opinion to which they 
 consistently adhere, as to what things are fit to 
 be done by a government. And it seems to 
 me that, in consequence of this absence of rule 
 or principle, one side is at present as often 
 wrong as the other ; the interference of gov- 
 ernment is, with about equal frequency, im- 
 properly invoked and improperly condemned. 
 
 The object of this Essay is to assert one 
 very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
 absolutely the dealings of society with the 
 individual in the way of compulsion and con- 
 trol, whether the means used be physical force 
 in the form of legal penalties, or the moral 
 coercion of public opinion. That principle is, 
 that the sole end for which mankind are war- 
 ranted, individually or collectively, in interfer- 
 ing with the liberty of action of any of their 
 number, is self-protection. That the only pur- 
 pose for which power can ^be rightfully exer- 
 cised over any member of a civilized commu- 
 nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
 others. His own good, either physical or moral, 
 is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot right- 
 fully be compelled to do or forbear because it 
 will be better for him to do so, because it will 
 make him happier, because, in the opinions of 
 others, to do so would be wise, or even right 
 
24 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 These are good reasons for remonstrating with 
 him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him 
 or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or 
 visiting him with any evil, in case he do other 
 wise. To justify that, the conduct from which 
 it is desired to deter him must be calculated to 
 produce evil to some one else. The only part 
 of the conduct of any one, for which he is j 
 amenable to society, is that which concerns \ 
 others. In the part which merely concerns j 
 himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. ^ 
 Over himself, over his own body and mind, the 
 individual is sovereign. 
 
 It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that 
 this doctrine is meant to apply only to human 
 beings in the maturity of their faculties. We 
 are not speaking of children, or of young per- 
 sons below the age which the law may fix as 
 that of manhood or womanhood. Those who 
 are still in a state to require being taken care 
 of by others, must be protected against their 
 own actions as well as against external injury. 
 For the same reason, we may leave out of con- 
 sideration those backward states of society in 
 which the race itself may be considered a« in 
 its nonage. The early difficulties in the way 
 of spontaneous progress are so great, that there 
 is seldom any choice of means for overcoming 
 them ; and a ruler full of the spirit of improve- 
 ment is warranted in the use of any expedients 
 that will attain an end, perhaps otherwise un- 
 attainable. Despotism is a legitimate mode of 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 25 
 
 government in dealing with barbarians, pro- 
 vided the end be their improvement, and the 
 means justified by actually effecting that end. 
 Liberty, as a principle, has no application to 
 any state of things anterior to the time when 
 mankind have become capable of being im- 
 proved by free and equal discussion. Until 
 then, there is nothing for them but implicit 
 obedience to an Akbar or a Charlemagne, if 
 they are so fortunate as to find one. But as 
 soon as mankind have attained the capacity 
 of being guided to their own improvement by 
 conviction or persuasion (a period long since 
 reached in all nations with whom we need 
 here concern ourselves), compulsion, either in 
 the direct form or in that of pains and penal- 
 ties for non-compliance, is no longer admis- 
 sible as a means to their own good, and justifi- 
 able only for the security of others. 
 
 It is proper to state that I forego any ad- 
 vantage which could be derived to my argu- 
 ment from the idea of abstract right, as a thing 
 independent of utility. I regard utility as the 
 ultimate appeal on all ethical questions ; but 
 it must be utility in the largest sense, ground- 
 ed on the permanent interests of man as a 
 progressive being. Those interests, I contend, 
 authorize the subjection of individual sponta- 
 neity to external control, only in respect to 
 those actions of each, which concern the inter- 
 est of other people. If any one does an act 
 
 hurtful to others, there is a primd facie case for 
 2 
 
26 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 punishing him, by law, or, where legal penal- 
 ties are not safely applicable, by general disap* 
 probation. There are also many positive acts 
 for the benefit of others, which he may right- 
 fully be compelled to perform ; such as, to give 
 evidence in a court of justice ; to bear his fair 
 share in the common defence, or in any otner 
 joint work necessary to the interest of the 
 society of which he enjoys the protection ; 
 and to perform certain acts of individual be- 
 neficence, such as saving a fellow creature’s 
 life, or interposing to protect the defenceless 
 against ill-usage, things which whenever it is 
 obviously a man’s duty to do, he may right- 
 fully be made responsible to society for not 
 doing A person may cause evil to others not 
 only by his actions but by his inaction, and in 
 either case he is justly accountable to them for 
 the injury. The latter case, it is true, requires 
 a much more cautious exercise of compulsion 
 than the former. To make any one answer- 
 able for doing evil to others, is the rule ; tc 
 make him answerable for not preventing evil, 
 is, comparatively speaking, the exception. Yet 
 there are many cases clear enough and grave 
 enough to justify that exception. In all things 
 which regard the external relations of the indi- 
 vidual, he is de jure amenable to those whose 
 interests are concerned, and if need be, to 
 society as their protector. There are often 
 good reasons for not holding him to the re 
 sponsibility ; but these reasons must arise from 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 27 
 
 the special expediencies of the case : either 
 
 because it is a kind of case in which he is on 
 the whole likely to act better, when left to his 
 own discretion, than when controlled in any 
 way in which society have it in their power to 
 control him ; or because the attempt to exer- 
 cise control would produce other evils, greater 
 than those which it would prevent. When 
 such reasons as these preclude the enforcement 
 of responsibility, the conscience of the agent 
 himself should step into the vacant judgment- 
 seat, and protect those interests of others which 
 have no external protection ; judging himself 
 all the more rigidly, because the case does not 
 admit of his being made accountable to the 
 judgment of his fellow-creatures. 
 
 But there is a sphere of action in which so- 
 ciety, as distinguished from the individual, has, 
 if any, only an indirect interest ; comprehend- 
 ing all that portion of a person’s life and con- 
 duct which affects only himself, or, if it also 
 affects others, only with their free, voluntary, 
 and undeceived consent and participation. 
 When I say only himself, I mean directly, and 
 in the first instance : for whatever affects him- 
 self, may affect others through himself ; and 
 the objection which may be grounded on this 
 contingency, will receive consideration in the 
 sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region 
 of human liberty. It comprises, first, the in- 
 ward domain of consciousness ; demanding 
 liberty of conscience, in the most comprehen- 
 
28 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 sive sense ; liberty of thought and feeling ; ab- 
 solute freedom of opinion and sentiment on 
 all subjects, practical or speculative, scientific, 
 moral, or theological. The liberty of express- 
 ing and publishing opinions may seem to fall 
 under a different principle, since it belongs to 
 that part of the conduct of an individual which 
 concerns other people ; but, being almost of as 
 much importance as the liberty of thought it- 
 self, and resting in great part on the same rea- 
 sons, is practically inseparable from it. Sec- 
 ondly, the principle requires liberty of tastes 
 and pursuits ; of framing the plan of our life 
 to suit our own character ; of doing as we like, 
 subject to such consequences as may follow; 
 without impediment from our fellow-creatures, 
 so long as what we do does not harm them, 
 even though they should think our conduct 
 foolish, perverse, or wrong. Thirdly, from this 
 liberty of each individual, follows the liberty, 
 within the same limits, of combination among 
 individuals ; freedom to unite, for any purpose 
 not involving harm to others : the persons com- 
 bining being supposed to be of full age, and 
 not forced or deceived. 
 
 No society in which these liberties are not, 
 on the whole, respected, is free, whatever may 
 be its form of government ; and none is com- 
 pletely free in which they do not exist abso- 
 lute and unqualified. The only freedom which 
 deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own 
 good in our own way, so long as we do not 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 29 
 
 attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede 
 their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper 
 guardian of his own health, whether bodily, or 
 mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater 
 gainers by suffering each other to live as seems 
 good to themselves, than by compelling each 
 to live as seems good to the rest. 
 
 Though this doctrine is anything but new, 
 and, to some persons, may have the air of a 
 truism, there is no doctrine which stands more 
 directly opposed to the general tendency of 
 existing opinion and practice. Society has 
 expended fully as much effort in the attempt 
 (according to its lights) to compel people to 
 conform to its notions of personal, as of so- 
 cial excellence. The ancient commonwealths 
 thought themselves entitled to practise, and 
 the ancient philosophers countenanced, the 
 regulation of every part of private conduct by 
 public authority, on the ground that the State 
 had a deep interest in the whole bodily and 
 mental discipline of every one of its citizens ; 
 a mode of thinking which may have been ad- 
 missible in small republics surrounded by pow- 
 erful enemies, in constant peril of being sub- 
 verted by foreign attack or internal common 
 tion, and to which even a short interval of 
 relaxed energy and self-command might so 
 easily be fatal, that they could not afford to 
 wait for the salutary permanent effects of free- 
 dom. In the modern world, the greater size 
 of political communities, and above all, the 
 
30 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 separation between the spiritual and temporal 
 authority (which placed the direction of men’s 
 consciences in other hands than those which 
 controlled their worldly affairs), prevented so 
 great an interference by law in the details 
 of private life; bat the engines of moral re- 
 pression have been wielded more strenuously 
 against divergence from the reigning opinion 
 in self-regarding, than even in social matters; 
 religion, the most powerful of the elements 
 which have entered into the formation of moral 
 feeling, having almost always been governed 
 either by the ambition of a hierarchy, seeking 
 control over every department of human con- 
 duct, or by the spirit of Puritanism. And 
 some of those modern reformers who have 
 placed themselves in strongest opposition to 
 the religions of the past, have been noway 
 behind either churches or sects in their asser- 
 tion of the right of spiritual domination : M. 
 Comte, in particular, whose social system, 
 as unfolded in his Traite de Politique Post* 
 tive-, aims at establishing (though by moral 
 more than by legal appliances) a despotism 
 of society over the individual, surpassing any- 
 thing contemplated in the political ideal of 
 the most rigid disciplinarian among the an- 
 cient philosophers. 
 
 Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual 
 thinkers, there is also in the world at large an 
 increasing inclination to stretch unduly the 
 powers of society over the individual, both by 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 31 
 
 the force of opinion and even by that of legis- 
 lation : and as the tendency of all the changes 
 taking place in the world is to strengthen so- 
 ciety, and diminish the power of the individual, 
 this encroachment is not one of the evils which 
 tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the 
 contrary, to grow more and more formidable. 
 The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers 
 or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opin- 
 ions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on 
 others, is so energetically supported by some 
 of the best and by some of the worst feelings 
 incident to human nature, that it is hardly ever 
 kept under restraint by anything but want of 
 power; and as the power is not declining, but 
 growing, unless a strong barrier of moral con- 
 viction can be raised against the mischief, we 
 must expect, in the present circumstances of 
 the world, to see it increase. 
 
 It will be convenient for the argument, if, 
 instead of at once entering upon the general 
 thesis, we confine ourselves in the first instance 
 to a single branch of it, on which the principle 
 here stated is, if not fully, yet to a certain 
 point, recognized by the current opinions. 
 This one branch is the Liberty of Thought : 
 from which it is impossible to separate the 
 cognate liberty of speaking and of writing. 
 Although these liberties, to some considerable 
 amount, form part of the political morality of 
 all countries which profess religious toleration 
 and free institutions, the grounds, both philo- 
 
32 
 
 ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 sophical and practical, on which they rest, are 
 perhaps not so familiar to the general mind, 
 nor so thoroughly appreciated by many even 
 of the leaders of opinion, as might have been 
 expected. Those grounds, when rightly under- 
 stood, are of much wider application than to 
 only one division of the subject, and a thorough 
 consideration of this part of the question will 
 be found the best introduction to the remain- 
 der. Those to whom nothing which I am 
 about to say will be new, may therefore, I 
 hope, excuse me, if on a subject which for now 
 three centuries has been so often discussed, 1 
 venture on one discussion more. / 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AND DISCUSSION. 
 
 'HE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by 
 
 when any defence would be necessary of 
 the “ liberty of the press ” as one of the secu- 
 rities agg,inst corrupt or tyrannical government. 
 No argument, we may suppose, can now be 
 needed, against permitting a legislature or an 
 executive, not identified in interest with the 
 people, to prescribe opinions to them, and de- 
 termine what doctrines or what arguments 
 they shall be allowed to hear. This aspect of 
 the question, besides, has been so often and so 
 triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, 
 that it needs not be specially insisted on in 
 this place. Though the law of England, on 
 the subject of the press, is as servile to this 
 day as it was in the time of the Tudors, there 
 is little danger of its being actually put in 
 force against political discussion, except during 
 some temporary panic, when fear of insurrec- 
 tion drives ministers and judges from their pro* 
 priety ; * and, speaking generally, it is not, in 
 
 * These words had scarcely been written, when, as if to give 
 them an emphatic contradiction, occurred the Government Prp-ss 
 2 * 
 
34 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 constitutional countries, to be apprehended* 
 that the government, whether completely re- 
 sponsible to the people or not, will often at- 
 tempt to control the expression of opinion, 
 except when in doing so it makes itself the 
 organ of the general intolerance of the public. 
 Let us suppose, therefore, that the government 
 is entirely at one with the people, and never 
 thinks of exerting any power of coercion un- 
 less in agreement with what it conceives to be 
 
 Prosecutions of 1858. That ill-judged interference with the lib- 
 erty ot public discussion has not, however, induced me to alter a 
 single word in the text, nor has it at all weakened my conviction 
 that, moments of panic excepted, the era of pains and penalties 
 for political discussion has, in our own country, passed away. For, 
 in the first place, the prosecutions were not persisted in; and, in 
 the second, they were never, properly speaking, political prosecu- 
 tions. The offence charged was not that of criticizing institutions, 
 or the acts or persons of rulers, but of circulating what was deem- 
 ed an immoral doctrine, the lawfulness of Tyrannicide. 
 
 If the arguments of the present chapter are of any validity, 
 there ought to exist the fullest liberty of professing and discussing, 
 as a matter of ethical conviction, any doctrine, however immoral it 
 may be considered. It would, therefore, be irrelevant and out of 
 place to examine here, whether the doctrine of Tyrannicide de- 
 serves that title. I shall content myself with saying, that the sub- 
 ject has been at all times one of the open questions of morals; that 
 the act of a private citizen in striking down a criminal, who, by 
 raising himself above the law, has placed himself be}"ond the 
 reach of legal punishment or control, has been accounted by whole 
 nations, and by some of the best and wisest of men, not a crime., 
 but an act of exalted virtue; and that, right or wrong, it is not of 
 the nature of assassination, but of civil war. As such, I hold that 
 the instigation to it, in a specific case, may be a proper subject of 
 punishment, but only if an overt act has followed, and at least a 
 probable connection can be established between the act and the in- 
 stigation. Even then, it is not a foreign government, but the very 
 government assailed, which alone, in the exercise of self-defencq 
 can legitimately punish attacks directed against its own existence. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 35 
 
 their voice. But I deny the right of the people 
 to exercise such coercion, either by themselves 
 or by their government. The power itself is 
 illegitimate. The best government has no 
 more title to it than the worst. It is as nox- 
 ious, or more noxious, when exerted in accord- 
 ance with public opinion, than when in oppo- 
 sition to it. If all mankind minus one, were 
 of one opinion, and only one person were of 
 the contrary opinion, mankind would be no 
 more justified in silencing that one person, 
 than he, if he had the power, would be justi- 
 fied in silencing mankind. Were an opinion a 
 personal possession of no value except to the 
 owner; if to be obstructed in the enjoyment 
 of it were simply a private injury, it would 
 make some difference whether the injury was 
 inflicted only on a few persons or on many. 
 But the peculiar evil of silencing the expres- 
 sion of an opinion is, that it is robbing the 
 human race ; posterity as well as the existing 
 generation ; those who dissent from the opin- 
 ion, still more than those who hold it. If the 
 opinion is right, they are deprived of the oppor- 
 tunity of exchanging error for truth : if wrong, 
 they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, 
 the clearer perception and livelier impression 
 of truth, produced by its collision with error. 
 
 It is necessary to consider separately these 
 two hypotheses, each of which has a distinct 
 branch of the argument corresponding to it. 
 We can never be sure that the opinion we are 
 
36 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion ; and if 
 we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still 
 
 First : the opinion which it is attempted tc 
 suppress by authority may possibly be true, 
 Those who desire to suppress it, of course 
 deny its truth ; but they are not infallible. 
 They have no authority to decide the question 
 for all mankind, and exclude every other per- 
 son from the means of judging. To refuse a 
 hearing to an opinion, because they are sure 
 that it is false, is to assume that their certainty 
 is the same thing as absolute certainty. All 
 silencing of discussion is an assumption of 
 infallibility. Its condemnation may be allow- 
 ed to rest on this common argument, not the 
 worse for being common. 
 
 Unfortunately for the good sense of man- 
 kind, the fact of their fallibility is far from 
 carrying the weight in their practical judg- 
 ment, which is always allowed to it in theory; 
 for while every one well knows himself to be 
 fallible, few think it necessary to take any 
 precautions against their own fallibility, oi 
 admit the supposition that any opinion, of 
 which they feel very certain, may be one of 
 the examples of the error to which they ac- 
 knowledge themselves to be liable. Absolute 
 princes, or others who are accustomed to un- 
 limited deference, usually feel this complete 
 confidence in their own opinions on nearly all 
 subjects. People more happily situated, whp 
 
ON LTBEIiTY. 
 
 37 
 
 sometimes hear their opinions disputed, and 
 are not wholly unused to be set right when 
 they are wrong, place the same unbounded 
 reliance only on such of their opinions as are 
 shared by all who surround them, or to whom 
 they habitually defer : for in proportion to a 
 man’s want of confidence in his own solitary 
 judgment, does he usually repose, with im- 
 plicit trust, on the infallibilty of “ the world ” 
 in general. And the world, to each individual, 
 means the part of it with which he comes in 
 contact ; his party, his sect, his church, his 
 class of society : the man may be called, by 
 comparison, almost liberal and large-minded 
 to whom it means anything so comprehensive 
 as his own country or his own age. Nor is 
 his faith in this collective authority at al 
 shaken by his being aware that other ages, 
 countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties 
 have thought, and even now think, the exact 
 reverse. He devolves upon his own world the 
 responsibility of being in the right against the 
 dissentient worlds of other people ; and it never 
 troubles him that mere accident has decided 
 which of these numerous worlds is the object 
 of his reliance, and that the same causes which 
 make him a Churchman in London, would 
 have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian 
 in Pekin. Yet it is as evident in itself, as any 
 amount of argument can make it, that ages 
 are no more infallible than individuals ; every 
 age having held many opinions which subse- 
 
38 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 quent ages have deemed not only false but 
 absurd ; and it is as certain that many opin- 
 ions, now general, will be rejected by futur 
 ages, as it is that many, once general, are re- 
 jected by the present. 
 
 The objection likely to be made to this argu- 
 ment, would probably take some such form as 
 the following. There is no greater assump- 
 tion of infallibility in forbidding the propaga- 
 tion of error, than in any other thing which is 
 done by public authority on its own judgment 
 and responsibility. Judgment is given to men 
 that they may use it. Because it may be used 
 erroneously, are men to be told that they ought 
 not to use it at all ? To prohibit what they 
 think pernicious, is not claiming exemption 
 from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent 
 on them, although fallible, of acting on their 
 conscientious conviction. If we were never to 
 act on our opinions, because those opinions 
 may be wrong, we should leave all our inter- 
 ests uncared for, and all our duties unperform- 
 ed. An objection which applies to all conduct, 
 can be no valid objection to any conduct in 
 particular. It is the duty of governments, and 
 of individuals, to form the truest opinions they 
 can ; to form them carefully, and never impose 
 them upon others unless they are quite sure 
 of being right. But when they are sure (such 
 reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness 
 but cowardice to shrink from acting on their 
 opinions, and allow doctrines which they hon 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 39 
 
 estly think dangerous to the welfare of man- 
 kind, either in this life or in another, to be 
 scattered abroad without restraint, because 
 other people, in less enlightened times, have 
 persecuted opinions now believed to be true. 
 Let us take care, it may be said, not to make 
 the same mistake : but governments and na 
 tions have made mistakes in other things, 
 which are not denied to be fit subjects for the 
 exercise of authority : they have laid on bad 
 taxes, made unjust wars. Ought we therefore 
 to lay on no taxes, and, under whatever pro- 
 vocation, make no wars? Men, and govern- 
 ments, must act to the best of their ability. 
 There is no such thing as absolute certainty, 
 but there is assurance sufficient for the pur 
 poses of human life. We may, and must, 
 assume our opinion to be true for the guidance 
 of our own conduct: and it is assuming no 
 more when we forbid bad men to pervert 
 society by the propagation of opinions which 
 we regard as false and pernicious. 
 
 I answer, that it is assuming very much 
 more. There is the greatest difference be- 
 tween presuming an opinion to be true, be- 
 cause, with every opportunity for contesting 
 it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its 
 truth for the purpose of not permitting its 
 refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting 
 and disproving our opinion, is the very con- 
 dition which justifies us in assuming its truth 
 for purposes of action ; and on no other terms 
 
40 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 can a being with human faculties have any 
 rational assurance of being right. 
 
 When we consider either the history of opin- 
 ion, or the ordinary conduct of human life, to 
 what is it to be ascribed that the one and the 
 other are no worse than they are ? Not cer- 
 tainly to the inherent force of the human un- 
 derstanding; for, on any matter not self-evi- 
 dent, there are ninety-nine persons totally in*- 
 capable of judging of it, for one who is capa- 
 ble ; and the capacity of the hundredth person 
 is only comparative; for the majority of the 
 eminent men of every past generation held 
 many opinions now known to be erroneous, 
 and did or approved numerous things which 
 no one will now justify. Why is it, then, that 
 there is on the whole a preponderance among 
 mankind of rational opinions and lational con- 
 duct ? If there really is this preponderance — 
 which there must be, unless human affairs are, 
 and have always been, in an almost desperate 
 state — it is owing to a quality of the human 
 mind, the source of everything respectable in 
 man either as an intellectual or as a moral be- 
 ing, namely, that his errors are corrigible. He 
 is capable of rectifying his mistakes, by discus- 
 sion and experience. Not by experience alone 
 There must be discussion, to show how expe 
 rience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions 
 and practices gradually yield to fact and ar- 
 gument : but facts and arguments, to produce 
 any effect on the mind, musfc be brought before 
 
ON LIBEETY. 
 
 41 
 
 it. Very few facts are able to tell their own 
 story, without comments to bring out theii 
 meaning. The whole strength and value, then, 
 of human judgment, depending on the one 
 property, that it can be set right when it is 
 wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when 
 the means of setting it right are kept constantly 
 at hand. In the case of any person whose 
 judgment is really deserving of confidence, how 
 has it become so ? Because he has kept his 
 mind open to criticism of his opinions and con- 
 duct. Because it has been his practice to lis- 
 ten to all that could be said against him ; to 
 profit by as much of it as was just, and ex- 
 pound to himself, and upon occasion to others, 
 the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because 
 he has felt, that the only way in which a hu- 
 man being can make some approach to know- 
 ing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what 
 can be said about it by persons of every va- 
 riety of opinion, and studying all modes in 
 which it can be looked at by every character 
 of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wis- 
 dom in any mode but this ; nor is it in the na- 
 ture of human intellect to become wise in any 
 other manner. The steady habit of correcting 
 and completing his own opinion by collating it 
 with those of others, so far from causing doubt 
 and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is 
 the only stable foundation for a just reliance on 
 it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least 
 obviously, be said against him, and having 
 
42 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 taken up his position against all gainsayers 
 knowing that he has sought for objec- 
 tions and difficulties, instead of avoiding thenic 
 and has shut out no light which can be thrown 
 upon the subject from any quarter — he has a 
 right to think his judgment better than that of 
 any person, or any multitude, who have not 
 gone through a similar process. 
 
 It is not too much to require that what the 
 wisest of mankind, those who are best entitled 
 to trust their own judgment, find necessary to 
 warrant their relying on it, should be submit- 
 ted to by that miscellaneous collection of a few 
 wise and many foolish individuals, called the 
 public. The most intolerant of churches, the 
 Roman Catholic Church, even at the canoni- 
 sation of a saint, admits, and listens patiently 
 i;o, a devil’s advocate.” The holiest of men, 
 it appears, cannot be admitted to posthumous 
 honors, until all that the devil could say against 
 him is known and weighed. If even the New- 
 tonian philosophy were not permitted to be 
 questioned, mankind could not feel as com- 
 plete assurance of its truth as they now do. 
 The beliefs which we have most warrant for, 
 have no safeguard to rest on, but a standing 
 invitation to the whole world to prove them 
 unfounded. If the challenge is not acc(?pted, 
 or is accepted and the attempt fails, we are 
 far enough from certainty still ; but we have 
 done the best that the existing state of human 
 reason admits of ; we have neglected nothing 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 43 
 
 that could give the truth a chance of reaching 
 us ; if the lists are kept open, we may hope 
 that if there be a better truth, it will be found 
 when the human mind is capable of receiving 
 it ; and in the mean time we may rely on hav- 
 ing attained such approach to truth, as is pos- 
 sible in our own day. This is the amount of 
 certainty attainable by a fallible being, and this 
 the sole way of attaining it. 
 
 Strange it is, that men should admit the 
 validity of the arguments for free discussion, 
 but object to their being ‘‘ pushed to an ex- 
 treme not seeing that unless the reasons are 
 good for an extreme case, they are not good 
 for any case. Strange that they should imag 
 ine that they are not assuming infallibility, 
 when they acknowledge that there should be 
 free discussion on all subjects which can pos- 
 sibly be doubtful^ but think that some particu- 
 lar principle or doctrine should be forbidden to 
 be questioned because it is so certain^ that is, 
 because they are certain that it is certain. To 
 call any proposition certain, while there is any 
 one who would deny its certainty if permitted, 
 but who is not permitted, is to assume that we 
 ourselves, and those who agree with us, are 
 the judges of certainty, and judges without 
 hearing the other side. 
 
 In the present age — which has been de- 
 scribed as “ destitute of faith, but terrified at 
 scepticism,” — in which people feel sure, not 
 so much that their opinions are true, as thal 
 
44 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 they should not know what to do without 
 them — the claims of an opinion to be pro- 
 jected from public attack are rested not so 
 much on its truth, as on its importance to so- 
 ciety. There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, 
 so useful, not to say indispensable to well- 
 being, that it is as much the duty of govern- 
 ments to uphold those beliefs, as to protect 
 any other of the interests of society. In a 
 case of such necessity, and so directly in the 
 line of their duty, something less than infalli- 
 bility may, it is maintained, warrant, and even 
 bind, governments, to act on their own opin- 
 ion, confirmed by the general opinion of man- 
 kind. It is also often argued, and still oftener 
 thought, that none but bad men would desire 
 to weaken these salutary beliefs ; and there can 
 be nothing wrong, it is thought, in restraining 
 bad men, and prohibiting what only such men 
 would wish to practise. This mode of think- 
 ing makes the justification of restraints on dis» 
 cussion not a question of the truth of doctrines, 
 but of their usefulness; and flatters itself by 
 that means to escape the responsibility of claim- 
 ing to be an infallible judge of opinions. But 
 <^hose who thus satisfy themselves, do not per- 
 ceive that the assumption of infallibility is 
 merely shifted from one point to another. The 
 usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of 
 opinion : as disputable, as open to discussion 
 and requiring discussion as much, as the opin- 
 *on itself. There is the same need of an in- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 45 
 
 fallible judge of opinions to decide an opinion 
 to be noxious, as to decide it to be false, un 
 ess the opinion condemned has full opportu- 
 nity of defending itself. And it will not do to 
 say that the heretic may be allowed to main- 
 tain the utility or harmlessness of his opinion, 
 though forbidden to maintain its truth. The 
 truth of an opinion is part of its utility. If 
 we would know whether or not it is desirable 
 that a proposition should be believed, is it pos- 
 sible to exclude the consideration of whether 
 or not it is true ? In the opinion, not of bad 
 men, but of the best men, no belief which is 
 contrary to truth can be really useful : and can 
 you prevent such men from urging that plea, 
 when they are charged with culpability for de- 
 nying some doctrine which they are told is 
 useful, but which they believe to be false ? 
 Those who are on the side of received opin- 
 ions, never fail to take all possible advantage 
 of this plea ; you do not find them handling 
 the question of utility as if it could be com- 
 pletely abstracted from that of truth : on the 
 contrary, it is, above all, because their doctrine 
 is ‘‘the truth,” that the knowledge or the be- 
 lief of it is held to be so indispensable. There 
 can be no fair discussion of the question of 
 usefulness, when an argument so vital may be 
 employed on one side, but not on the other. 
 And in point of fact, when law or public feel- 
 ing do not permit the truth of an opinion to 
 be disputed, they are just as little tolerant of a 
 
46 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 denial of its usefulness. The utmost they al- 
 low is an extenuation of its absolute necessity, 
 or of the positive guilt of rejecting it. 
 
 In order more fully to illustrate the mischief 
 ol denying a hearing to opinions because we, 
 in our own judgment, have condemned them, 
 it will be desirable to fix down the discussion 
 to a concrete case ; and I choose, by prefer- 
 ence, the cases which are least favorable to me 
 — in which the argument against freedom of 
 opinion, both on the score of truth and on that 
 of utility, is considered the strongest. Let the 
 opinions impugned be the belief in a God and 
 in a future state, or any of the commonly re- 
 ceived doctrines of morality. To fight the 
 battle on such ground, gives a great advantage 
 to an unfair antagonist ; since he will be sure 
 to say (and many who have no desire to be 
 unfair will say it internally). Are these the doc- 
 trines which you do not deem sufficiently cer- 
 tain to be taken under the protection of law ? 
 Is the belief in a God one of the opinions, to 
 feel sure of which, you hold to be assuming 
 infallibility ? But I must be permitted to ob- 
 serve, that it is not the feeling sure of a doc- 
 trine (be it what it may) which I call an as 
 sumption of infallibility. It is the undertaking 
 to decide that question for others^ without al- 
 lowing them to hear what can be said on the 
 contrary side. And I denounce and reprobate 
 this pretension not the less, if put forth on the 
 side of my most solemn convictions. How 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 47 
 
 ever positive any one’s persuasion may be, not 
 only of the falsity, but of the pernicious con- 
 sequences — not only of the pernicious conse- 
 quences, but (to adopt expressions which I al- 
 together condemn) the immorality and impiety 
 of an opinion ; yet if, in pursuance of that 
 private judgment, though backed by the pub- 
 lic judgment of his country or his cotempora- 
 ries, he prevents the opinion from being heard 
 in its defence, he assumes infallibility. And 
 so far from the assumption being less objec- 
 tionable or less dangerous because the opinion 
 is called immoral or impious, this is the case 
 of all others in which it is most fatal. These 
 are exactly the occasions on which the men of 
 one generation commit those dreadful mistakes, 
 which excite the astonishment and horror of 
 posterity. It is among such that we find the 
 instances memorable in history, when the arm 
 of the law has been employed to root out the 
 best men and the noblest doctrines ; with de- 
 plorable success as to the men, though some 
 of the doctrines have survived to be (as if in 
 mockery) invoked, in defence of similar con- 
 duct towards those who dissent from them^ or 
 from Iheir received interpretation. 
 
 Mankind can hardly be too often reminded, 
 that there was once a man named Socrates, be* 
 tween whom and the legal authorities and pub- 
 lic opinion of his time, there took place a mem- 
 orable collision. Born in an age and country 
 abounding in individual greatness, this man 
 
48 
 
 ON LIBEETY. 
 
 has been handed down to us by those who best 
 knew both him and the age, as the most vir- 
 tuous man in it ; while we know him as the 
 head and prototype of all subsequent teachers 
 of virtue, the source equally of the lofty inspi- 
 ration of Plato and the judicious utilitarianism 
 of Aristotle, “ i mmstri di color che sanno^'^ the 
 two headsprings of ethical as of all other phi- 
 losophy. This acknowledged master of all the 
 eminent thinkers who have since lived — wnose 
 fame, still growing after more than two thou- 
 sand years, all out outweighs the whole re- 
 mainder of the names which make his native 
 city illustrious was put to death by his 
 countrymen, after a judicial conviction, foi 
 impiety and immorality. Impiety, in denying 
 the gods recognized by the State ; indeed his 
 accuser asserted (see the “ Apologia’’) that he 
 believed in no gods at all. Immorality, in 
 being, by his doctrines and instructions, a 
 “ corruptor of youth.” Of these charges the 
 tribunal, there is every ground for believing, 
 honestly found him guilty, and condemned the 
 man who probably of all then born had de- 
 served best of mankind, to be put to death as 
 a criminal. 
 
 To pass from this to the only other instance 
 of judicial iniquity, the mention of which, after 
 the condemnation of Socrates, would not be 
 an anti-climax : the event which took place on 
 Calvary rather more than eighteen hundred 
 years ago. The man who left on the memory 
 
ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 49 
 
 ot those who witnessed his life and conversa- 
 tion, such an impression of his moral grandeur, 
 that eighteen subsequent centuries have done 
 homage to him as the Almighty in person, was 
 ignominiously put to death, as what ? As a 
 blasphemer. Men did not merely mistake their 
 benefactor ; they mistook him for the exact 
 contrary of what he was, and treated him as 
 that prodigy of impiety, which they themselves 
 are now held to be, for their treatment of him. 
 The feelings with which mankind now regard 
 these lamentable transactions, especially the 
 later of the two, render them extremely un 
 just in their judgment of the unhappy actors 
 These were, to all appearance, not bad men' — 
 lot worse than men commonly are, but rather 
 the contrary; men who possessed in a full, or 
 somewhat more than a full measure, the relig 
 ious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time 
 and people : the very kind of men who, in all 
 times, our own included, have every chance of 
 passing through life blameless and respected. 
 The high-priest who rent his garments when 
 the words were pronounced, which, according 
 to all the ideas of his country, constituted the 
 blackest guilt, was in all probability quite as 
 sincere in his horror and indignation, as the 
 generality of respectable and pious men now 
 are in the religious and moral sentiments they 
 profess ; and most of those who now shudder 
 at his conduct, if they had lived in his time, 
 
 and been born Jews, would have acted pre- 
 3 
 
50 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 cisely as he did. Orthodox Christians who are 
 tempted to think that those who stoned to death 
 the first martyrs must have been worse men 
 than they themselves are, ought to remember 
 that one of those persecutors was Saint Paul 
 Let us add one more example, the most 
 striking of all, if the impressiveness of an 
 error is measured by the wisdom and virtue of 
 him who falls into it. If ever any one, pos- 
 sessed of power, had grounds for thinking him- 
 self the best and most enlightened among his 
 cotemporaries, it was the Emperor Marcus 
 Aurelius. Absolute monarch of the whole civil- 
 ized world, he preserved through life not only 
 the ‘most unblemished justice, but what was 
 less to be expected from his Stoical breeding, 
 the tenderest heart. The few failings which 
 are attributed to him, were all on the side of 
 indulgence : while his writings, the highest 
 ethical product of the ancient mind, differ 
 scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from 
 the most characteristic teachings of Christ. 
 This man, a better Christian in all but the 
 dogmatic sense of the word, than almost any 
 of the ostensibly Christian sovereigns who have 
 since reigned, persecuted Christianity. Placed 
 at the summit of all the previous attainments 
 of humanity, with an open, unfettered intellect, 
 and a character which led him of himself to 
 embody in his moral writings the Christian 
 ideal, he yet failed to see that Christianity was 
 to be a good and not an evil to the world, with 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 51 
 
 his duties fco which he was so deeply pene- 
 trated. Existing society he knew to be in a 
 deplorable state. But such as it was, he saw 
 or thought he saw, that it was held together 
 and prevented from being worse, by belief and 
 reverence of the received divinities. As a rulei 
 of mankind, he deemed it his duty not to suffer 
 society to fall in pieces; and saw not how, if 
 Hs existing ties were removed, any others could 
 be formed which could again knit it together. 
 The new religion openly aimed at dissolving 
 these ties : unless, therefore, it was his duty to 
 adopt that religion, it seemed to be his duty to 
 put it down. Inasmuch then as the theology 
 of Christianity did not appear to him true or 
 of divine origin; inasmuch as this strange his- 
 tory of a crucified God was not credible to 
 him, and a system which purported to rest en- 
 tirely upon a foundation to him so wholly un- 
 believable, could not be foreseen by him to be 
 that renovating agency which, after all abate- 
 ments, it has in fact proved to be ; the gentlest 
 and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, 
 under a solemn sense of duty, authorized the 
 persecution of Christianity. To my mind this 
 is one of the most tragical facts in all history. 
 It is a bitter thought, how different a thing the 
 Christianity of the world might have been, if 
 the Christian faith had been adopted as the 
 religion of the empire under the auspices of 
 Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constan- 
 tine. But it would be equally unjust to him 
 
52 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 and false to truth, to deny, that no one plea 
 which can be urged for punishing anti-Chris- 
 tian teaching, was wanting to Marcus Aurelius 
 for punishing, as he did, the propagation of 
 Christianity. No Christian more firmly be- 
 lieves that Atheism is false, and tends to the 
 dissolution of society, than Marcus Aurelius 
 believed the same things of Christianity ; he 
 who, of all men then living, might have been 
 thought the most capable of appreciating it. 
 Unless any one who approves of punishment 
 for the promulgation of opinions, flatters him- 
 self that he is a wiser and better man than 
 Marcus Aurelius — more deeply versed in the 
 wisdom of his time, more elevated in his intel- 
 lect above it — more earnest in his search for 
 truth, or more single-minded in his devotion to 
 it when found; — let him abstain from that 
 assumption of the joint infallibility of himself 
 and the multitude, which the great Antoninus 
 made with so unfortunate a result. 
 
 Aware of the impossibility of defending the 
 use of punishment for restraining irreligious 
 opinions, by any argument which will not jus- 
 tify Marcus Antoninus, the enemies of religious 
 freedom, when hard pressed, occasionally ac- 
 cept this consequence, and say, with Dr. John- 
 son, that the persecutors of Christianity were 
 in the right ; that persecution is an ordeal 
 through which truth ought to pass, and always 
 passes successfully, legal penalties being, in the 
 end, powerless against truth, though sometime? 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 53 
 
 beneficially effective against mischievous errors, 
 This is a form of the argument for religious 
 intolerance, sufficiently remarkable not to be 
 passed without notice. 
 
 A theory which maintains that truth may 
 justifiably be persecuted because persecution 
 cannot poi^sibly do it any harm, cannot be 
 charged with being intentionally hostile to the 
 reception of new truths ; but we cannot com- 
 mend the generosity of its dealing with the 
 persons to whom mankind are indebted for 
 them. To discover to the world something 
 which deeply concerns it, and of which it was 
 previously ignorant ; to prove to it that it had 
 been mistaken on some vital point of temporal 
 (,r spiritual interest, is as important a service as 
 a human being can render to his fellow-crea- 
 tures, and in certain cases, as in those of the 
 early Christians and of the Reformers, those 
 who think with Dr. Johnson believe it to have 
 been the most precious gift w^hich could be be- 
 stowed on mankind. That the authors of such 
 splendid benefits should be requited by martyr- 
 dom ; that their reward should be to be dealt 
 with as the vilest of criminals, is not, upon this 
 theory, a deplorable error and misfortune, for 
 which humanity should mourn in sackcloth 
 %nd ashes, but the normal and justifiable state 
 of things. The propounder of a new truth 
 according to this doctrine, should stand, as 
 stood, in the legislation of the Locrians, the 
 proposer of a new law, with a halter round his 
 
54 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 neck, to be instantly tightened if the public as- 
 sembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then 
 and there adopt his proposition. People who 
 defend this mode of treating benefactors, can- 
 not be supposed to set much value on the ben- 
 efit; and I believe this view of the subject is 
 mostly confined to the sort of persons who 
 think that new truths may have been desirable 
 once, but that we have had enough of them 
 now. 
 
 But, indeed, the dictum that truth always 
 triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleas- 
 ant falsehoods which men repeat after one 
 another till they pass into commonplaces, but 
 which all experience refutes. History teems 
 with instances of truth put down by persecu- 
 tion. If not suppressed forever, it may bo 
 thrown back for centuries. To speak only of 
 religious opinions: the Reformation broke out 
 at -least twenty times before Luther, and was 
 put down. Arnold of Brescia was put down 
 Fra Dolcino was put down. Savonarola was 
 put down.. The Albigeois were put down. 
 The Vaudois were put down. The Lollards 
 were put down. The Hussites were put down. 
 Even after the era of Luther, wherever perse- 
 cution was persisted in, it was successful. In 
 Spain, Italy, Flanders, the Austrian empire? 
 Protestanism was rooted out and, most likely, 
 would have been so in England, had Queen 
 Mary lived, or Queen Elizabeth died. Perse- 
 cution has always succeeded, save where the 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 52 
 
 heretics were too strong a party to be effectu- 
 ally persecuted. No reasonable person can 
 doubt that Christianity might have been ex- 
 tirpated in the Roman empire. It spread, and 
 became predominant, because the persecutions 
 were only occasional, lasting but a short time, 
 and separated by long intervals of almost un- 
 disturbed propagandism. It is a piece of idle 
 sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has 
 any inherent power denied to error, of prevail- 
 ing against the dungeon and the stake. Men 
 are not more zealous for truth than they often 
 are for error, and a sufficient application of 
 legal or even of social penalties will generally 
 succeed in stopping the propagation of either. 
 The real advantage which truth has, consists 
 in this, that when an opinion is true, it may 
 be extinguished once, twice, or many times, 
 but in the course of ages there will generally 
 be found persons to rediscover it, until some 
 one of its reappearances falls on a time when 
 from favorable circumstances it escapes perse- 
 cution until it has made such head as to with- 
 stand all subsequent attempts to suppress it. 
 
 It wDl be said, that we do not now put to 
 death t^'e introducers of new opinions : we are 
 not like our fathers who slew the prophets, we 
 even build sepulchres to them. It is true we 
 no longer put heretics to death ; and the 
 amount of penal infliction which modern feel- 
 ing wmuld probably tolerate, even against the 
 most obnoxious opinions, is not sufficient to 
 
56 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 extirpate them. But let us not flatter ourselves 
 that we are yet free from the stain even of legal 
 persecution. Penalties for opinioa, or at least 
 for its expression, still exist by law ; and their 
 enforcement is not, even in these times, so un- 
 exampled as to make it at all incredible that 
 they may some day be revived in full force. In 
 the year 1857, at the summer assizes of the 
 county of Cornwall, an unfortunate man,* said 
 to be of unexceptionable conduct in all rela- 
 tions of life, was sentenced to twenty-one 
 months imprisonment, for uttering, and writing 
 on a gate, some offensive words concerning 
 Christianity. Within a month of the same 
 time, at the Old Bailey, two persons, on two 
 separate occasions,! were rejected as jurymen, 
 and one of them grossly insulted by the judge 
 and by one of the counsel, because they hon- 
 estly declared that they had no theological be- 
 lief ; and a third, a foreigner, J for the same 
 reason, was denied justice against a thief. 
 This refusal of redress took place in virtue of 
 the legal doctrine, that no person can be al- 
 lowed to give evidence in a court of justice, 
 who does not profess belief in a God (any god 
 is sufficient) and in a future state ; which is 
 equivalent to declaring such persons to be out- 
 
 * Thomas Pooley, Bodmin Assizes, Jiih^ 31, 1857. In Decembei 
 lollowing, he received a free pardon from the Crown. 
 
 •t George Jacob Holyoake, August 17, 1857 ; Edward Truelove, 
 ?uly, 1857. 
 
 X Baron de Gleichen, Marlborough Street Police Court, August 
 4 , 1857. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 57 
 
 (awsj excluded from the protection of the tri- 
 bunals ; who may not only be robbed or as- 
 saulted with impunity, if no one but them- 
 selves, or persons of similar opinions, be present, 
 but any one else may be robbed or assaulted 
 with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends 
 on their evidence. The assumption on which 
 this is grounded, is that the oath is worthless, 
 of a person who does not believe in a future 
 state; a proposition which betokens much ig- 
 norance of history in those who assent to it 
 (since it is historically true that a large propor- 
 tion of infidels in all ages have been persons 
 of distinguished integrity and honor) ; and 
 would be maintained by no one who had the 
 smallest conception how many of the persons 
 in greatest repute with the world, both for vir- 
 tues and for attainments, are well known, at 
 least to their intimates, to be unbelievers. The 
 rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts away its own 
 foundation. Under pretence that atheists must 
 be liars, it admits the testimony of all atheists 
 who are willing to lie, and rejects only those 
 who brave the obloquy of publicly confessing 
 a detested creed rather than affirm a falsehood. 
 A rule thus self-convicted of absurdity so far 
 as regards its professed purpose, can be kept in 
 force only as a badge of hatred, a relic of per- 
 secution ; a persecution, too, having the pecu- 
 liarity, that the qualification for undergoing it, 
 is the being clearly proved not to deserve it. 
 The rule, and the theory it implies, are hardly 
 
58 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 less insulting to believers than to infidels. Fo^ 
 if he who does not believe in a future state 
 necessarily lies, it follows that they who do be- 
 lieve are only prevented from lying, if prevent- 
 ed they are, by the fear of hell. We will not 
 do the authors and abettors of the rule the in- 
 jury of supposing, that the conception which 
 they have formed of Christian virtue is drawli 
 from their own consciousness. 
 
 These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of 
 persecution, and may be thought to be not so 
 much an indication of the wish to persecute, 
 as an example of that very frequent infirmity 
 of English minds, which makes them take a 
 preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad 
 principle, when they are no longer bad enough 
 to desire to carry it really into practice. But 
 unhappily there is no security in the state of 
 the public mind, that the suspension of worse 
 forms of legal persecution, which has lasted 
 for about the space of a generation, will con- 
 tinue. In this age the quiet surface of routine 
 is as often ruffled by attempts to resuscitate 
 past evils, as to introduce new benefits. What 
 is boasted of at the present time as the revival 
 of religion, is always, in narrow and unculti- 
 vated minds, at least as much the revival of 
 bigotry ; and where there is the strong perma- 
 nent leaven of intolerance in the feelings of a 
 people, which at all times abides in the middle 
 classes of this country, it needs but little to 
 provoke them into actively persecuting those 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 59 
 
 vv^hom they have never ceased to think propei 
 objects of persecution.* For it is this — it is 
 the opinions men entertain, and the feelings 
 they cherish, respecting those who disown the 
 beliefs they deem important, which makes this 
 30 untry not a place of mental freedom. For a 
 long time past, the chief mischief of the legal 
 penalties is that they strengthen the social 
 stigma. It is that stigma which is really effec- 
 tive, and so effective is it, that the profession 
 of opinions which are under the ban of society 
 
 * Ample warning may be drawn fi'om the large infuvsiun of the 
 passions of a persecutor, which mingled with the general display 
 of the worst parts of our national character on the occasion of the 
 Sepoy insurrection. The ravings of fanatics or charlatans from 
 the palpit may be unworthy of notice; but the heads of the Evan- 
 gelical party have announced as their principle, for the govern- 
 ment of Hindoos and Mahomedans, that no schools be supported 
 by public money in which the Bible is not taught, and by neces- 
 sary consequence that no public employment be given to any but 
 raa,- of pretended Christians. An Under-Secretary of State, in & 
 speech delivered to his constituents on the 12th of November, 1857, 
 is reported to have said: “ Toleration of their faith” (the faith of a 
 hundred millions of British subjects), “ the superstition which they 
 called religion, b}^ the British Government, had had the effect of 
 retarding the ascendency of the British name, and preventing the 
 salutary growth of Christianity. . . . Toleration was the great 
 corner-stone of the religious liberties of this country; but do not 
 let them abuse that precious word toleration. As he understood 
 it, it meant the complete liberty to all, freedom of worship, among 
 Christians^ who worshipped upon the same foundation. It meant 
 lo/eration of all sects and denorainatiuns of Christians who believed 
 in the one mediation."’' I desire to call attention to the fact, that a 
 man who has been deemed fit to fill a high office in the gov- 
 ernment of this country, under a liberal Ministry, maintains the 
 doctrine that all who do not believe in the divinity of Christ arc 
 beyond the pale of toleration. Who, after this imbecile display 
 can indulge the illusion that religious persecution has passed away 
 never to return ? 
 
60 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 IS much less common in England, than is, ir. 
 many other countries, the avowal of those 
 which incur risk of judicial punishment. In 
 respect to all persons but those whose pecu- 
 niary circumstances make them independent 
 of the good will of other people, opinion, on 
 this subject, is as efficacious as law ; men 
 might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from 
 the means of earning their bread. Those 
 whose bread is already secured, and who de- 
 sire no favors from men in power, or from 
 bodies of men, or from the public, have noth- 
 ing to fear from the open avowal of any opin- 
 .ons, but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, 
 and this it ought not to require a very heroic 
 mould to enable them to bear. There is no 
 room for any appeal ad misericordiam in be- 
 half of such persons. But though we do not 
 now inflict so much evil on those who think 
 differently from us, as it was formerly our cus- 
 tom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as 
 much evil as ever by our treatment of them. 
 Socrates was put to death, but the Socratic 
 philosophy rose like the sun in heaven, and 
 spread its illumination over the whole intellec- 
 tual firmament. Christians were cast to the 
 lions, but the Christian Church grew up a 
 stately and spreading tree, overtopping the 
 older and less vigorous growths, and stifling 
 them by its shade. Our merely social intoler- 
 ance, kills no one, roots out no opinions, but 
 induces men to disguise the''n, or to abstain 
 
ON IIBERTY. 
 
 61 
 
 from any active effort for their diffusion. Witf 
 us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain, 
 or even lose, ground in each decade or genera 
 tion ; they never blaze out far and wide, but 
 continue to smoulder in the narrow circles ol 
 thinking and studious persons among whom 
 they originate, without ever lighting up the 
 general affairs of mankind with either a true 
 or a deceptive light. And thus is kept up a 
 state of things very satisfactory to some 
 minds, because, without the unpleasant proc- 
 ess of fining or imprisoning anybody, it main- 
 tains all prevailing opinions outwardly undis- 
 turbed, while it does not absolutely interdict 
 the exercise of reason by dissentients afflicted 
 with the malady of thought. A convenient 
 plan for having peace in the intellectual world, 
 and keeping all things going on therein very 
 much as they do already. But the price paid 
 for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the 
 sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the hu- 
 man mind. A state of things in which a large 
 portion of the most active and inquiring intel- 
 lects find it advisable to keep the genuine prin- 
 ciples and grounds of their convictions within 
 their own breasts, and attempt, in what they 
 address to the public, to fit as much as they 
 can of their own conclusions to premises 
 which they have internally renounced, cannot 
 send forth the open, fearless characters, and 
 logical, consistent intellects who once adorned 
 the thinking world. The sort of men who can 
 
62 
 
 ON LIBEETT. 
 
 be looked for under it, are either mere conform- 
 ers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth 
 whose arguments on all great subjects are 
 meant for their hearers, and are not those 
 which have convinced themselves. Those 
 who avoid this alternative, do so by narrow- 
 ing their thoughts and interest to things which 
 can be spoken of without venturing within 
 the region of principles, that is, to small prac- 
 tical matters, which would come right of them- 
 selves, if but the minds of mankind were 
 strengthened and enlarged, and which will 
 never be made effectually right until then ; 
 while that which would strengthen and en- 
 large men’s minds, free and daring specula- 
 tion on the highest subjects, is abandoned. 
 
 Those in whose eyes this reticence on the 
 part of heretics is no evil, should consider in 
 the first place, that in consequence of it there 
 is never any fair and thorough discussion of 
 heretical opinions ; and that such of them as 
 could not stand such a discussion, though they 
 may be prevented from spreading, do not dis- 
 appear. But it is not the minds of heretics 
 that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed 
 on all inquiry which does not end in the ortho- 
 dox conclusions. The greatest harm done is 
 fo those who are not heretics, and whose whole 
 mental development is cramped, and their rea- 
 son cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can 
 compute what the world loses in the multitude 
 of promising intellects combined with timid 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 63 
 
 chaiacters, who dare not follow out any bold^ 
 vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it 
 should land them in something which would 
 admit of being considered irreligious or im 
 moral? Among them we may occasionally 
 see some man of deep conscientiousness, and 
 subtile and refined understanding, who spends 
 a life in sophisticating with an intellect which 
 he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources 
 of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the 
 promptings of his conscience and reason with 
 orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to 
 the end succeed in doing. No one can be a 
 great thinker who does not recognize, that as a 
 thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect 
 to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth 
 gains more even by the errors of one who, with 
 due study and preparation, thinks for himself, 
 than by the true opinions of those who only 
 hold them because they do not suffer them- 
 selves to think. Not that it is solely, or chief- 
 ly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of 
 thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as 
 much, and even more indispensable, to enable 
 average human beings to attain the mental 
 stature which they are capable of. There have 
 been, and may again be, great individual think 
 ers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. 
 But there never has been, nor ever will be, in 
 that atmosphere, an intellectually active peo- 
 ple. Where any people has made a temporary 
 approach to such a character, it has been be- 
 
64 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 cause the dread of heterodox speculation was 
 for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit 
 convention that principles are not to be dis- 
 puted ; where the discussion of the greatest 
 questions which can occupy humanity is con- 
 sidered to be closed, we cannot hope to find 
 that generally high scale of mental activity 
 which has made some periods of history so 
 remarkable. Never when controversy avoided 
 the subjects which are large and important 
 enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of 
 a people stirred up from its foundations, and 
 the impulse given which raised even persons 
 of the most ordinary intellect to something of 
 the dignity of thinking beings. Of such we 
 have had an example in the condition of Eu- 
 rope during the times immediately following 
 the Reformation ; another, though limited to 
 the Continent and to a more cultivated class, 
 in the speculative movement of the latter half 
 of the eighteenth century ; and a third, of still 
 briefer duration, in the intellectual fermenta- 
 tion of Germany during the Goethian and 
 Fichtean period. These periods differed wide 
 ly in the particular opinions which they devel 
 oped ; but were alike in this, that during all 
 three the yoke of authority was broken. In 
 each, an old mental despotism had been throwii 
 off, and no new one had yet taken its place. 
 The impulse given at these three periods has 
 made Europe what it now is. Every single 
 improvement which has taken place either in 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 65 
 
 the human mind or in institutions, may be 
 traced distinctly to one or other of them. Ap- 
 pearances have for some time indicated that 
 all three impulses are well-nigh spent ; and we 
 can expect no fresh start, until we again assert 
 our mental freedom. 
 
 Let us now pass to the second division of 
 the argument, and dismissing the supposition 
 that any of the received opinions may be false, 
 let us assume them to be true, and examine 
 into the worth of the manner in which they 
 are likely to be held, when their truth is not 
 freely and openly canvassed. However un- 
 willingly a person who has a strong opinion 
 may admit the possibility that his opinion may 
 be false, he ought to be moved by the consid- 
 eration that however true it may be, if it is not 
 fully, frequently, and fearlessly discussed, it will 
 be held as a dead dogma, not a living truth. 
 
 There is a class of persons (happily not quite 
 so numerous as formerly) who think it enough 
 if a person assents undoubtingly to what they 
 think true, though he has no knowledge what 
 ever of the grounds of the opinion, and could 
 not make a tenable defence of it against the 
 most superficial objections. Such persons, if 
 they can once get their creed taught from au- 
 thority, naturally think that no good, and some 
 harm, comes of its being allowed to be ques- 
 tioned. Where their influence prevails, they 
 make it nearly impossible for the received opin- 
 ion to be rejected wisely and considerately^ 
 
66 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 though it may still be rejected rashly and ig 
 norantly ; for to shut out discussion entirely is 
 seldom possible, and when it once gets in, be- 
 liefs not grounded on conviction are apt to give 
 way before the slightest semblance of an argu- 
 ment. Waiving, however, this possibility — 
 assuming that the true opinion abides in the 
 mind, but abides as a prejudice, a belief inde- 
 pendent of, and proof against, argument — this 
 is not the way in which truth ought to be held 
 by a rational being. This is not knowing the 
 truth. Truth, thus held, is but one superstition 
 the more, accidentally clinging to the words 
 which enunciate a truth. 
 
 If the intellect and judgment of mankind 
 ought to be cultivated, a thing which Protes- 
 tants at least do not deny, on what can these 
 faculties be more appropriately exercised by 
 any one, than on the things which concern 
 him so much that it is considered necessary 
 for him to hold opinions on them ? If the cul- 
 tivation of the understanding consists in one 
 thing more than in another, it is surely in learn- 
 ing the grounds of one’s own opinions. What- 
 ever people believe, on subjects on which it is 
 of the first importance to believe rightly, they 
 ought to be able to defend against at least the 
 common objections. But, some one may say, 
 Let them be taught the grounds of their 
 opinions. It does not follow that opinions 
 must be merely parroted because they are 
 never heard controverted. Persons who learn 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 67 
 
 geometry do not simply commit the theorems 
 to memory, but understand and learn likewise 
 the demonstrations ; and it would be absurd to 
 say that they remain ignorant of the grounds 
 of geometrical truths, because they never hear 
 any one deny, and attempt to disprove them.’’ 
 Undoubtedly : and such teaching suffices on a 
 subject like mathematics, where there is noth- 
 ing at all to be said on the wrong side of the 
 question. The peculiarity of the evidence of 
 mathematical truths is, that all the argument 
 is on one side. There are no objections, and 
 no answers to objections. But on every sub- 
 ject on which difference of opinion is possi- 
 ble, the truth depends on a balance to be 
 struck between two sets of conflicting reasons. 
 Even in natural philosophy, there is always 
 some other explanation possible of the same 
 facts ; some geocentric theory instead of helio- 
 centric, some phlogiston instead of oxygen ; 
 and it has to be shown why that other theory 
 cannot be the true one : and until this is shown, 
 and until we know how it is shown, we do not 
 understand the grounds of our opinion. But 
 when we turn to subjects infinitely more com- 
 plicated, to morals, religion, politics, social re- 
 lations, and the business of life, three-fourths 
 of the arguments for every disputed opinion 
 consist in dispelling the appearances which 
 favor some opinion different from it. The 
 greatest orator, save one, of antiquity, has 
 'eft it on record that he always studied his 
 
68 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 adversary’s case with as great, if not with still 
 greater, intensity than even his own. Whai 
 Cicero practised as the means of forensic sue 
 cess, requires to be imitated by all who study 
 any subject in order to arrive at the truth. He 
 who knows only his own side of the case, 
 knows little of that. His reasons may be good; 
 and no one may have been able to refute them. 
 Bat if he is equally unable to refute the rea- 
 sons on the opposite side ; if he does not sc 
 much as know what they are, he has no ground 
 for preferring either opinion. The rational po- 
 sition for him would be suspension of judg- 
 ment, and unless he contents himself with 
 that, he is either led by authority, or adopts, 
 like the generality of the world, the side to 
 which he feels most inclination. Nor is it 
 enough that he should hear the arguments of 
 adversaries from his own teachers, presented 
 as they state them, and accompanied by what 
 they offer as refutations. That is not the way 
 to do justice to the arguments, or bring them 
 into real contact with his own mind. He 
 must be able to hear them from persons who 
 actually believe them; who defend them in 
 earnest, and do their very utmost for them. 
 He must know them in their most plausible 
 and persuasive form ; he must feel the whole 
 force of the difficulty which the true view of 
 the subject has to encounter and dispose of; 
 else he will never really possess himself of the 
 portion of truth which meets and removes that 
 
ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 69 
 
 difficulty. Ninety-nine in a hundred of whai 
 are called educated men are in this condition 
 even of those who can argue fluently for theii 
 opinions. Their conclusion may be true, but 
 it might be false for anything they know : they 
 have never thrown themselves into the mental 
 position of those who think differently from 
 them, and considered what such persons may 
 have to say ; and consequently they do not, in 
 any proper sense of the word, know the doc- 
 trine which they themselves profess. They do 
 not know those parts of it which explain and 
 justify the remainder; the considerations which 
 show that a fact which seemingly conflicts with 
 another is reconcilable with it, or that, of two 
 apparently strong reasons, one and not the 
 other ought to be preferred. All that part of 
 the truth which turns the scale, and decides 
 the judgment of a completely informed mind, 
 they are strangers to ; nor is it ever really 
 known, but to those who have attended equal- 
 ly and impartially to both sides, and endeav- 
 ored to see the reasons of both in the strongest 
 light. So essential is this discipline to a real 
 understanding of moral and human subjects, 
 that if opponents of all important truths do 
 not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them, 
 and supply them with the strongest arguments 
 which the most skilful devil’s advocate can 
 conjure up. 
 
 To abate the force of these considerations, 
 Qii enemy of free discussion may be supp(ised 
 
70 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 to say, that there is no necessity for mankind 
 in general to know and understand all that can 
 be said against or for their opinions by philoso- 
 phers and theologians. That it is not needful 
 for common men to be able to expose all the 
 misstatements or fallacies of an ingenious op- 
 ponent. That it is enough if there is always 
 somebody capable of answering them, so that 
 nothing likely to mislead uninstructed persons 
 remains unrefuted. That simple minds, hav- 
 ing been taught the obvious grounds of the 
 truths inculcated on them, may trust to au- 
 thority for the rest, and being aware that they 
 have neither knowledge nor talent to resolve 
 every difficulty which can be raised, may re- 
 pose in the assurance that all those which 
 have been raised have been or can be an- 
 swered, by those who are specially trained 
 to the task. 
 
 Conceding to this view of the subject the 
 utmost that can be claimed for it by those 
 most easily satisfied with the amount of un- 
 derstanding of truth which ought to accom- 
 pany the belief of it ; even so, the argument 
 for free discussion is no way weakened. For 
 even this doctrine acknowledges that mankind 
 ought to have a rational assurance that all 
 objections have been satisfactorily answered ; 
 and how are they to be answered if that which 
 requires to be answered is not spoken? or how 
 can the answer be known to be satisfactory, 
 if the objectors have no opportunity of show- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 71 
 
 uig that it is unsatisfactory ? If not the pub- 
 lic, at least the philosophers and theologians 
 who are to resolve the difficulties, must makf 
 themselves familiar with those difficulties in 
 their most puzzling form ; and this cannot be 
 accomplished unless they are freely stated, and 
 placed in the most advantageous light which 
 they admit of. The Catholic Church has its 
 own way of dealing with this embarrassing 
 problem. It makes a broad separation be- 
 tween those who can be permitted to receive its 
 doctrines on conviction, and those who must 
 accept them on trust. Neither, indeed, are al- 
 lowed any choice as to what they will accept ; 
 but the clergy, such at least as can be fully 
 confided in, may admissibly and meritoriously 
 make themselves acquainted with the argu- 
 ments of opponents, in order to answer them, 
 and may, therefore, read heretical books ; the 
 laity, not unless by special permission, hard to 
 be obtained. This discipline recognizes a 
 knowledge of the enemy’s case as beneficial 
 to the teachers, but finds means, consistent 
 with this, of denying it to the rest of the 
 world : thus giving to the elite more mental 
 culture, though not more mental freedom, than 
 it allows to the mass. By this device it suc- 
 ceeds in obtaining the kind of mental supe- 
 riority which its purposes require ; for though 
 culture without freedom never made a large 
 and liberal mind, it can make a clever nisi 
 prius advocate of a cause. But in countries 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 72 
 
 professing Protestantism, this resource is de- 
 nied ; since Protestants hold, at least in theory, 
 that the responsibility for the choice of a relig- 
 ion must be borne by each for himself, and 
 cannot be thrown off upon teachers. Besides, 
 in the present state of the world, it is practi- 
 cally impossible that writings which are read 
 by the instructed can be kept from the unin- 
 structed. If the teachers of mankind are to 
 be cognizant of all that they ought to know, 
 everything must be free to be written and pub- 
 lished without restraint. 
 
 If, however, the mischievous operation of 
 the absence of free discussion, when the re- 
 ceived opinions are true, were confined to 
 leaving men ignorant of the grounds of those 
 opinions, it might be thought that this, if an 
 intellectual, is no moral evil, and does not 
 affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in 
 their influence on the character. The fact, 
 however, is, that not only the grounds of the 
 opinion are forgotten in the absence of discus- 
 sion, but too often the meaning of the opinion 
 itself. The words which convey it, cease to 
 suggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion 
 of those they were originally employed to 
 communicate. Instead of a vivid conception 
 and a living belief, there remain only a few 
 )hrases retained by rote ; or, if any part, the 
 shell and husk only of the meaning is retained, 
 the finer essence being lost. The great chapter 
 in human history which this fact occupies and 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 73 
 
 fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and medi- 
 tated on. 
 
 It is illustrated in the experience of . almost 
 all ethical doctrines and religious creeds. They 
 are all full of meaning and vitality to those 
 who originate them, and to the direct disciples 
 of the originators. Their meaning continues 
 to be felt in undiminished strength, and is per- 
 haps brought out into even fuller conscious- 
 ness, so long as the struggle lasts to give the 
 doctrine or creed an ascendency over other 
 creeds. At last it either prevails, and becomes 
 the general opinion, or its progress stops ; it 
 keeps possession of the ground it has gained, 
 but ceases to spread further. When either of 
 these results has become apparent, controversy 
 on the subject flags, and gradually dies away. 
 The doctrine has taken its place, if not as a 
 received opinion, as one of the admitted sects 
 or divisions of opinion : those who hold it have 
 generally inherited, not adopted it ; and con- 
 version from one of these doctrines to another, 
 being now an exceptional fact, occupies little 
 place in the thoughts of their professors. In- 
 stead of being, as at first, constantly on the 
 alert either to defend themselves against the 
 world, or to bring the world over to them, they 
 have subsided into acquiescence, and neither 
 listen, when they can help it, to arguments 
 against their creed, nor trouble dissentients 
 (if there be such) with arguments in its favor. 
 From this time may usually be dated the de- 
 4 
 
74 : 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 dine in the living power of the doctrine. We 
 often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting 
 the difficulty of keeping up in the minds of 
 believers a lively apprehension of the truth 
 which they nominally recognize, so that it 
 may penetrate the feelings, and acquire a real 
 mastery over the conduct. No such difficulty 
 is complained of while the creed is still fighting 
 for its existence : even the weaker combatants 
 then know and feel what they are fighting for, 
 and the difference between it and other doc- 
 trines ; and in that period of every creed’s ex- 
 istence, not a few persons may be found, who 
 have realized its fundamental principles in all 
 the forms of thought, have weighed and con- 
 sidered them in all their important bearings, 
 and have experienced the full effect on the 
 character, which belief in that creed ought to 
 produce in a mind thoroughly imbued with it. 
 But when it has come to be an hereditary 
 creed, and to be received passively, not active- 
 ly — when the mind is no longer compelled, in 
 the same degree as at first, to exercise its vital 
 powers on the questions which its belief pre- 
 sents to it, there is a progressive tendency to 
 forget all of the belief except the formularies, 
 or to give it a dull and torpid assent, as if 
 accepting it on trust dispensed with the neces- 
 sity of realizing it in consciousness, or testing 
 it by personal experience ; until it almost 
 ceases to connect itself at all with the inner 
 life of the human being. Then are seen the 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 75 
 
 cases, so frequent in this age of the world as 
 almost to form the majority, in which the creed 
 remains as it were outside the mind, encrust- 
 ing and petrifying it against all other in- 
 fluences addressed to the higher parts of our 
 nature ; manifesting its power by not suffer- 
 ing any fresh and living conviction to get in, 
 but itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, 
 except standing sentinel over them to keep 
 them vacant. 
 
 To what an extent doctrines intrinsically fit- 
 ted to make the deepest impression upon the 
 mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, with- 
 out being ever realized in the imagination, the 
 feelings, or the understanding, is exemplified 
 by the manner in which the majority of be- 
 lievers hold the doctrines of Christianity. By 
 Christianity I here mean what is accounted 
 such by all churches and sects — the maxims 
 and precepts contained in the New Testament. 
 These are considered sacred, and accepted as 
 laws, by all professing Christians. Yet it is 
 scarcely too much to say that not one Chris- 
 tian in a thousand guides or tests his individ- 
 ual conduct by reference to those laws. The 
 standard to which he does refer it, is the cus- 
 tom of his nation, his class, or his religious 
 profession. He has thus, on the one hand, a 
 collection of ethical maxims, which he believes 
 to have been vouchsafed to him by infallible 
 wisdom as rules for his government ; and on 
 the other, a set of every-day judgments and 
 
76 
 
 ON LIBEETY. 
 
 practices, which go a certain length with some 
 of those maxims, not so great a length with 
 others, stand in direct opposition to some, and 
 are, on the whole, a compromise between the 
 Christian creed and the interests and sugges- 
 tions of worldly life. To the first of these 
 standards he gives his homage ; to the other 
 his real allegiance. All Christians believe that 
 the blessed are the poor and humble, and those 
 who are ill-used by the world ; that it is easier 
 for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle 
 than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of 
 heaven ; that they should judge not, lest they 
 be judged ; that they should swear not at all * 
 that they should love their neighbor as them- 
 selves ; that if one take their cloak, they should 
 give him their coat also ; that they should take 
 no thought for the morrow ; that if they would 
 be perfect, they should sell all that they have 
 and give it to the poor. They are not insin- 
 cere when they say that they believe these 
 things. They do believe them, as people be- 
 lieve what they have always heard lauded and 
 never discussed. But in the sense of that liv- 
 ing belief which regulates conduct, they be- 
 lieve these doctrines just up to the point to 
 which it is usual to act upon them. The doc- 
 trines in their integrity are serviceable to pelt ‘ 
 adversaries with ; and it is understood that they 
 are to be put forward (when possible) as the 
 reasons for whatever people do that they think 
 laudable. But any one who reminded them 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 77 
 
 that the maxims require an infinity of things 
 which they never even think of doing, would 
 gain nothing but to be classed among those 
 very unpopular characters who affect to be bet- 
 ter than other people. The doctrines have no 
 hold on ordinary believers — are not a power 
 in their minds. They have an habitual respect 
 for the sound of them, but no feeling which 
 spreads from the words to the things signified, 
 and forces the mind to take them in, and make 
 them conform to the formula. Whenever con- 
 duct is concerned, they look round for Mr. A 
 and B to direct them how far to go in obeying 
 Christ. 
 
 Now we may be well assured that the case 
 was not thus, but far otherwise, with the early 
 Christians. Had it been thus, Christianity 
 never would have expanded from an obscure 
 sect of the despised Hebrews into the religion 
 of the Roman empire. When their enemies 
 said, See how these Christians love one an- 
 other ’’ (a remark not likely to be made by any- 
 body now), they assuredly had a much livelier 
 feeling of the meaning of their creed than they 
 have ever had since. And to this cause, prob- 
 ably, it is chiefly owing that Christianity now 
 makes so little progress in extending its do- 
 main, and after eighteen centuries, is still near- 
 ly confined to Europeans and the descendants 
 of Europeans. Even with the strictly religious, 
 who are much in earnest about their doctrines, 
 and attach a greater amount of meaning to 
 
78 
 
 ON LIBERTY, 
 
 many of them than people in general, it com 
 monly happens that the part which is thus 
 comparatively active in their minds is that 
 which was made by Calvin, or Knox, or some 
 such person much nearer in character to them- 
 selves. The sayings of Christ coexist pas- 
 sively in their minds, producing hardly any 
 3ffect beyond what is caused by mere listen* 
 ng to words so amiable and bland. There 
 are many reasons, doubtless, why doctrines 
 which are the badge of a sect retain more of 
 their vitality than those common to all recog- 
 nized sects, and why more pains are taken by 
 teachers to keep their meaning ali\e; but one 
 reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines 
 are more questioned, and have to be oftener 
 defended against open gainsayers. Both teach- 
 ers and learners go to sleep at their post, as 
 soon as there is no enemy in the field. 
 
 The same thing holds true, generally speak- 
 ing, of all traditional doctrines — those of pru- 
 dence and knowledge of life, as well as of 
 morals or religion. All languages and litera- 
 tures are full of general observations on life, 
 both as to what it is, and how to conduct one- 
 self in it; observations which everybody knows, 
 which everybody repeats, or hears with acqui- 
 escence, which are received as truisms, yet of 
 which most people first truly learn the mean- 
 ing, when experience, generally of a painful 
 kind, has made it a reality to them. How 
 often, when smarting under some unforeseen 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 79 
 
 misfortune or disappointment, does a person 
 call to mind some proverb or common saying, 
 familiar to him all his life, the meaning of 
 which, if he had ever before felt it as he does 
 now, would have saved him from the calamity. 
 There are indeed reasons for this, other than 
 the absence of discussion : there are many 
 O’uths of which the full meaning cannot be real 
 ized, until personal experience has brought it 
 home. But much more of the meaning even 
 of these would have been understood, and what 
 was understood would have been far more deep- 
 ly impressed on the mind, if the man had been 
 accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by 
 people who did understand it. The fatal ten- 
 dency of mankind to leave off thinking about 
 a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the 
 cause of half their errors. A cotemporary au- 
 thor has well spoken of “ the deep slumber of 
 a decided opinion.” 
 
 But what! (it may be asked) Is the absence 
 of unanimity an indispensable condition of 
 true knowledge ? Is it necessary that some 
 part of mankind should persist in error, to en- 
 able any to realize the truth ? Does a belief 
 cease to be real and vital as soon as it is gen- 
 erally received — and is a proposition never 
 thoroughly understood and felt unless some 
 doubt of it remains ? As soon as mankind 
 have unanimously accepted a truth, does the 
 truth perish within them ? The highest aim 
 and best result of improved intelligence, it has 
 
80 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 hitherto been thought, is to unite mankirn’ 
 more and more in the acknowledgment of all 
 important truths : and does the intelligence 
 only last as long as it has not achieved its 
 object? Do the fruits of conquest perish bj 
 the very completeness of the victory ? 
 
 I affirm no such thing. As mankind im- 
 prove, the number of doctrines which are no 
 longer disputed or doubted will be constantly 
 on the increase : and the well-being of man- 
 kind may almost be measured by the number 
 and gravity of the truths which have reached 
 the point of being uncontested. The cessa- 
 tion. on one question after another, of serious 
 controversy, is one of the necessary incidents 
 of the consolidation of opinion ; a consolida- 
 tion as salutary in the case of true opinions, as 
 it is dangerous and noxious when the opinions 
 are erroneous. But though this gradual nar- 
 rowing of the bounds of diversity of opinion 
 is necessary in both senses of the term, being 
 at once inevitable and indispensable, we are 
 not therefore obliged to conclude that all its 
 consequences must be beneficial. The loss of 
 so important an aid to the intelligent and liv- 
 ing apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by 
 the necessity of explaining it to, or defending 
 it against, opponents, though not sufficient to 
 outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the 
 benefit of its universal recognition. Where 
 this advantage can no longer be had, I confess 
 I should like to see the teachers of mankind 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 81 
 
 endeavoring to provide a substitute for it ; 
 some contrivance for making the difficulties 
 of the question as present to the learner’s con- 
 sciousness, as if they were pressed upon him 
 by a dissentient champion, eager for his con- 
 version. 
 
 But instead of seeking contrivances for this 
 purpose, they have lost those they formerly had 
 The Socratic dialectics, so magnificently ex- 
 emplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a 
 contrivance of this description. They were 
 essentially a negative discussion of the great 
 questions of philosophy and life, directed with 
 consummate skill to the purpose of convincing 
 any one who had merely adopted the common- 
 places of received opinion, that he did not un- 
 derstand the subject — that he as yet attached 
 no definite meaning to the doctrines he pro- 
 fessed; in order that, becoming aware of his 
 ignorance, he might be put in the way to at- 
 tain a stable belief, resting on a clear appre- 
 hension both of the meaning of doctrines and 
 of their evidence. The school disputations of 
 the Middle Ages had a somewhat similar object. 
 They were intended to make sure that the pu- 
 pil understood his own opinion, and (by neces- 
 sary correlation) the opinion opposed to it, and 
 could enforce the grounds of the one and con- 
 fute those of the other. These last-mentioned 
 contests had indeed the incurable defect, that 
 the premises appealed to were taken from au 
 thority, not from reason ; and, as a discipline 
 4 * 
 
82 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 to the mind, they were in every respect inferioi 
 to the powerful dialectics which formed the 
 intellects of the “ Socratici viri : ” but the 
 modern mind owes far more to both than it 
 is generally willing to admit, and the present 
 modes of education contain nothing which in 
 the smallest degree supplies the place either of 
 the one or of the other. A person who derives 
 all his instruction from teachers or books, even 
 if he escape the besetting temptation of con- 
 tenting himself with cram, is under no compul- 
 sion to hear both sides ; accordingly it is far 
 from a frequent accomplishment, even among 
 thinkers, to know both sides ; and the weakest 
 part of what everybody says in defence of his 
 opinion, is what he intends as a reply to antag- 
 onists. It is the fashion of the present time to 
 disparage negative logic — that which points 
 out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, 
 without establishing positive truths. Such 
 negative criticism would indeed be poor enough 
 as an ultimate result ; but as a means to at- 
 taining any positive knowledge or conviction 
 worthy the name, it cannot be valued too 
 highly ; and until people are again systemati- 
 cally trained to it, there will be few great think- 
 ers, and a low general average of intellect, in 
 any but the mathematical and physical depart- 
 ments of speculation. On any other subject 
 no one’s opinions deserve the name of knowl- 
 edge, except so far as he has either had forced 
 upon him by others, or gone through of him 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 83 
 
 self, the same mental process which would 
 have been required of him in carrying on an 
 active controversy with opponents. That, 
 therefore, which when absent, it is so indis- 
 pensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse 
 than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously 
 offering itself! If there are any persons who 
 contest a received opinion, or who will do so 
 if law or opinion will let them, let us thank 
 them for it, open our minds to listen to them, 
 and rejoice that there is some one to do for us 
 what we otherwise ought, if we have any re- 
 gard for either the certainty or the vitality of 
 our convictions, to do with much greater labor 
 for ourselves. 
 
 It still remains to speak of one of the prin- 
 cipal causes which make diversity of opinion 
 advantageous, and will continue to do so until 
 mankind shall have entered a stage of intel- 
 lectual advancement which at present seems 
 at an incalculable distance. We have hitherto 
 considered only two possibilities: that the re- 
 ceived opinion may be false, and some other 
 opinion, consequently, true ; or that, the re- 
 ceived opinion being true, a conflict with the 
 opposite error is essential to a clear apprehen- 
 sion and deep feeling of its truth. But there 
 is a commoner case than either of these ; wher 
 the conflicting doctrines, instead of being one 
 true and the other false, share the truth between 
 them; and the nonconforming opinion is need- 
 
84 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 ed to supply the remainder of the truth, of 
 which the received doctrine embodies only a 
 part. Popular opinions, on subjects not pal- 
 pable to sense, are often true, but seldom or 
 never the whole truth. They are a part of the 
 truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller 
 part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined 
 from the truths by which they ought to be ac- 
 companied and limited. Heretical opinions, 
 on the other hand, are generally some of these 
 suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the 
 bonds which kept them down, and either seek- 
 ing reconciliation with the truth contained in 
 the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, 
 and setting themselves up, with similar exclu- 
 siveness, as the whole truth. The latter case 
 is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human 
 mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, 
 and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, 
 even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the 
 truth usually sets while another rises. Even 
 progress, which ought to superadd, for the most 
 part only substitutes one partial and incom- 
 plete truth for another; improvement consist- 
 ing chiefly in this, that the new fragment of 
 truth is more wanted, more adapted to the 
 needs of the time, than that which it displaces. 
 Such being the paj'tial character of prevailing 
 opinions, even when resting on a true founda- 
 tion ; every opinion which embodies somewhat 
 of the portion of truth which the common 
 opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 8£ 
 
 with whatever amount of error and confusion 
 that truth may be blended. No sober judge 
 of human affairs will feel bound to be indig- 
 nant because those who force on our notice 
 truths which we should otherwise have over- 
 looked, overlook some of those which we see. 
 Rather, he will think that so long as popular 
 truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than 
 otherwise that unpopular truth should have 
 one-sided asserters too ; such being usually the 
 most energetic, and the most likely to compel 
 reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom 
 which they proclaim as if it were the whole. 
 
 Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly 
 all the instructed, and all those of the unin- 
 structed who were led by them, were lost in 
 admiration of what is called civilization, and 
 of the marvels of modern science, literature, 
 and philosophy, and while greatly overrating 
 the amount of unlikeness between the men of 
 modern and those of ancient times, indulged 
 the belief that the whole of the difference was 
 in their own favor ; with what a salutary shock 
 did the paradoxes of Rousseau explode like 
 bombshells in the midst, dislocating the com- 
 pact mass of one-sided opinion, and forcing its 
 elements to recombine in a better form and 
 with additional ingredients. Not that the cur- 
 rent opinions were on the whole farther from 
 the truth than Rousseau’s were ; on the con- 
 trary, they were nearer to it; they contained 
 more of positive truth, and very much less of 
 
86 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 error. Nevertheless there lay in Rousseau’s 
 doctrine, and has floated down the stream of 
 opinion along with it, a considerable amount 
 of exactly those truths which the popular opin- 
 ion wanted ; and these are the deposit which 
 was left behind when the flood subsided. The 
 superior worth of simplicity of life, the ener- 
 vating and demoralizing effect of the tram- 
 mels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are 
 ideas which have never been entirely absent 
 from cultivated minds since Rousseau wrote ; 
 and they will in time produce their due effect, 
 though at present needing to be asserted as 
 much as ever, and to be asserted by deeds, for 
 words, on this subject, have nearly exhausted 
 their power. 
 
 In politics, again, it is almost a common- 
 place, that a party of order or stability, and a 
 party of progress or reform, are both necessary 
 elements of a healthy state of political life; 
 until the one or the other shall have so en- 
 larged its mental grasp as to be a party equally 
 of order and of progress, knowing and distin- 
 guishing what is fit to be preserved from what 
 ought to be swept away. Each of these modes 
 of thinking derives its utility from the deficien- 
 cies of the other ; but it is in a great measure 
 the opposition of the other that keeps each 
 within the limits of reason and sanity. Unless 
 opinions favorable to democracy and to aristoc- 
 racy, to property and to equality, to coopera- 
 tion and to competition, to luxury and to ab- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 87 
 
 Btinence, to sociality and individuality, to lib- 
 erty and discipline, and all the other standing 
 antagonisms of practical life, are expressed 
 with equal freedom, and enforced and defended 
 with equal talent and energy, there is no chance 
 of both elements obtaining their due ; one scale 
 is sure to go up, and the other down. Truth, 
 in the great practical concerns of life, is so 
 much a question of the reconciling and com- 
 bining of opposites, that very few have minds 
 sufficiently capacious and impartial to make 
 the adjustment with an approach to correct- 
 ness, and it has to be made by the rough proc- 
 ess of a struggle between combatants fighting 
 under hostile banners. On any of the great 
 open questions just enumerated, if either of 
 the two opinions has a better claim than the 
 other, not merely to be tolerated, but to be 
 encouraged and countenanced, it is the one 
 which happens at the particular time and 
 place to be in a minority. That is the opinion 
 which, for the time being, represents the ne- 
 glected interests, the side of human well-being 
 which is in danger of obtaining less than its 
 share. I am aware that there is not, in this 
 country, any intolerance of differences of opin- 
 ion on most of these topics. They are ad- 
 duced to show, by admitted and multiplied 
 examples, the universality of the fact, that 
 only through diversity of opinion is there, in 
 the existing state of human intellect, a chance 
 af fair play to all sides of the truth. When 
 
88 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 there are persons to be found, wno form an 
 exception to the apparent unanimity of the 
 world on any subject, even if the world is in 
 the right, it is always probable that dissentients 
 have something worth hearing to say for them- 
 selves, and that truth would lose something bj 
 their silence. 
 
 It may be objected, But some received prin- 
 ciples, especially on the highest and most vital 
 subjects, are more than half-truths. The Chris- 
 tian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on 
 that subject, and if any one teaches a morality 
 which varies from it, he is wholly in error.” 
 As this is of all cases the most important in 
 practice, none can be fitter to test the general 
 maxim. But before pronouncing what Chris- 
 tian morality is or is not, it would be desirable 
 to decide what is meant by Christian morality. 
 If it means the morality of the New Testa- 
 ment, I wonder that any one who derives his 
 knowledge of this from the book itself, can 
 suppose that it was announced, or intended, as 
 a complete doctrine of morals. The Gospel 
 always refers to a preexisting morality, and 
 confines its precepts to the particulars in which 
 that morality was to be corrected, or superseded 
 by a wider and higher ; expressing itself, more- 
 over, in terms most general, often impossible 
 to be interpreted literally, and possessing rath- 
 j?r the impressiveness of poetry or eloquence 
 than the precision of legislation. To extract 
 from it a body of ethical doctrine, has never 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 89 
 
 been possible without eking it out from the 
 Old Testament, that is, from a system elabo« 
 rate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, 
 and intended only for a barbarous people. St. 
 Paul, a declared enemy to this Judaical mode 
 of interpreting the doctrine and filling up 
 the scheme of his Master, equally assumes 
 a preexisting morality, namely, that of the 
 Greeks and Romans ; and his advice to Chris- 
 tians is in a great measure a system of accom- 
 modation to that ; even to the extent of giving 
 an apparent sanction to slavery. What is 
 called Christian, but should rather be termea 
 theological, morality, was not the work of 
 Christ or the Apostles, but is of much latei 
 origin, having been gradually built up by the 
 Catholic Church of the first five centuries, and 
 though not implicitly adopted by moderns and 
 Protestants, has been much less modified by 
 them than might have been expected. For the 
 most part, indeed, they have contented them- 
 selves with cutting off the additions which had 
 been made to it in the Middle Ages, each sect 
 supplying the place by fresh additions, adapt- 
 ed to its own character and tendencies. That 
 mankind owe a great debt to this morality, and 
 to its early teachers, I should be the last person 
 to deny ; but I do not scruple to say of it, that 
 it is, in many important points, incomplete and 
 one-sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, 
 not sanctioned by it, had contributed to the 
 formation of European life and character, hu* 
 
90 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 man affairs would have been in a worse con- 
 dition than they now are. Christian morality 
 (so called) has all the characters of a reaction 
 it is, in great part, a protest against Paganism, 
 its ideal is negative rather than positive ; pas- 
 sive rather than active ; Innocence rather than 
 Nobleness ; Abstinence from Evil, rather than 
 energetic Pursuit of Good : in its precepts (as 
 has been well said) “thou shalt not” predomi- 
 nates unduly over “thou shalt.” In its hor- 
 ror of sensuality, it made an idol of asceticism, 
 which has been gradually compromised away 
 into one of legality. It holds out the hope of 
 heaven and the threat of hell, as the appointed 
 and appropriate motives to a virtuous life : in 
 this falling far below the best of the ancients, 
 and doing what lies in it to give to human 
 morality an essentially selfish character, by dis- 
 connecting each man’s feelings of duty from 
 the interests of his fellow-creatures, except so 
 far as a self-interested inducement is offered to 
 him for consulting them. It is essentially a doc- 
 trine of passive obedience ; it inculcates sub- 
 mission to all authorities found established; 
 who indeed are not to be actively obeyed 
 when they command what religion forbids, but 
 who are not to be resisted, far less rebelled 
 against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves. 
 And while, in the morality of the best Pagan 
 nations, duty to the State holds even a dispro- 
 portionate place, infringing on the just liberty 
 of the individual ; in purely Christian ethics, 
 
ON LIBERTY- 
 
 91 
 
 that grand department of duty is scarcely no- 
 ticed or acknowledged. It is in the Koran, 
 not the New Testament, that we read the 
 maxim — ‘‘ A ruler who appoints any man to 
 an office, when there is in his dominions an 
 other man better qualified for it, sins against 
 God and against the State.” What little recog- 
 nition the idea of obligation to the public ob- 
 tains in modern morality, is derived from Greek 
 and Roman sources, not from Christian; as, even 
 in the morality of private life, whatever exists 
 of magnanimity, high-mindedness, personal dig- 
 nity, even the sense of honor, is derived from 
 the purely human, not the religious part of our 
 education, and never could have grown out of 
 a standard of ethics in which the only worth, 
 professedly recognized, is that of obedience- 
 I am as far as any one from pretending that 
 these defects are necessarily inherent in the 
 Christian ethics, in every manner in which it 
 can be conceived, or that the many requisites 
 of a complete moral doctrine which it does not 
 contain, do not admit of being reconciled with 
 it. Far less would I insinuate this of the doc- 
 trines and precepts of Christ himself. I be- 
 lieve that the sayings of Christ are all, that I 
 can see any evidence of their having been in- 
 tended to be ; that they are irreconcilable with 
 nothing which a comprehensive morality re- 
 quires ; that everything wffiich is excellent in 
 ethics may be brought within them, with no 
 greater violence to their language than ha? 
 
92 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 been done to* it by all who have attempted to 
 deduce from them any practical system of con- 
 duct whatever. But it is quite consistent with 
 this, to believe that they contain, and were 
 meant to contain, only a part of the truth; 
 that many essential elements of the highest 
 morality are among the things which are not 
 provided for, nor intended to be provided for 
 in the recorded deliverances of the Founder 
 of Christianity, and which have been entirely 
 thrown aside in the system of ethics erected 
 on the basis of those deliverances by the Chris- 
 tian Church. And this being so, I think it a 
 great error to persist in attempting to find in 
 the Christian doctrine that complete rule for 
 our guidance, which its author intended it to 
 sanction and enforce, but only partially to pro- 
 vide. I believe, too, that this narrow theory 
 is becoming a grave practical evil, detracting 
 greatly from the value of the moral training 
 and instruction, which so many well-meaning 
 persons are now at length exerting themselves 
 to promote. I much fear that by attempting 
 to form the mind and feelings on an exclu- 
 sively religious type, and discarding those sec- 
 ular standards (as for want of a better name 
 they may be called) which heretofore coexisted 
 \^'ith and supplemented the Christian ethics, 
 receiving some of its spirit, and infusing into 
 it some of theirs, there will result, and is even 
 now resulting, a low, abject, servile type of 
 character, which, submit itself as it may ta 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 93 
 
 what it deems the Supreme Will, is incapa- 
 ble of rising to or sympathizing in the concep 
 tion of Supreme Goodness. I believe that 
 other ethics than any which can be evolved 
 from exclusively Christian sources, must exist 
 side by side with Christian ethics to produce 
 the moral regeneration of mankind ; and that 
 the Christian system is no exception to the 
 rule, that in an imperfect state of the human 
 mind, the interests of truth require a diversity 
 of opinions. It is not necessary that in ceas- 
 ing to ignore the moral truths not contained 
 in Christianity, men should ignore any of 
 those which it does contain. Such prejudice, 
 or oversight, when it occurs, is altogether an 
 evil ; but it is one from which we cannot hope 
 to be always exempt, and must be regarded 
 as the price paid for an inestimable good. The 
 exclusive pretension made by a part of the 
 truth to be the whole, must and ought to be 
 protested against, and if a reactionary impulse 
 should make the protestors unjust in their 
 turn, this one-sidedness, like the other, may be 
 lamented, but must be tolerated. If Chris- 
 tians would teach infidels to be just to Chris- 
 tianity, they should themselves be just to in 
 fidelity. It can do truth no service to biink 
 the fact, known to all who have the most or- 
 dinary acquaintance with literary history, that 
 a large portion of the noblest and most valu- 
 able moral teaching has been the work, not 
 
94 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 only of men who did not know, but of men 
 who knew and rejected, the Christian faith. 
 
 I do not pretend that the most unlimited 
 use of the freedom of enunciating all possible 
 opinions would put an end to the evils of relig- 
 ous or philosophical sectarianism. Every truth 
 which men of narrow capacity are in earnest 
 about, is sure to be asserted, inculcated, and 
 in many ways even acted on, as if no other 
 truth existed in the world, or at all events 
 none that could limit or qualify the first. I 
 acknowledge that the tendency of all opinions 
 to become sectarian is not cured by the freest 
 discussion, but is often heightened and exacer- 
 bated thereby ; the truth which ought to have 
 been, but was not, seen, being rejected all the 
 more violently because proclaimed by persons 
 regarded as opponents. But it is not on the 
 impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and 
 more disinterested by-stander, that this collision 
 of opinions works its salutary effect. Not the 
 violent conflict between parts of the truth, but 
 the quiet suppression of half of it, is the for* 
 midable evil : there is always hope when peo 
 pie are forced to listen to both sides; it is 
 when they attend only to one that errors har- 
 den into prejudices, and truth itself ceases tc 
 have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated 
 into falsehood. And since there are few men- 
 tal attributes more rare than that judicial fac- 
 ulty which can sit in intelligent judgment be- 
 tween two sides of a question, of which only 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 95 
 
 one is represented by an advocate before 
 truth has no chance but in proportion as every 
 side of it, every opinion which embodies any 
 fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, 
 but is so advocated as to be listened to. 
 
 We have now recognized the necessity to 
 the mental well-being of mankind (on which 
 all their other well-being depends) of freedom 
 of opinion, and freedom of the expression of 
 opinion, on four distinct grounds ; which we 
 will now briefly recapitulate. 
 
 First, if any opinion is compelled to silence, 
 that opinion may, for aught we can certainly 
 know, be true. To deny this is to assume our 
 own infallibility. 
 
 Secondly, though the silenced opinion be an 
 error, it may, and very commonly does, contain 
 a portion of truth ; and since the general or 
 prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or 
 never the whole truth, it is only by the col 
 lision of adverse opinions that the remaindei 
 of the truth has any chance of being supplied. 
 
 Thirdly, even if the received opinion be not 
 only true, but the whole truth ; unless it is suf- 
 fered to be, and actually is, vigorously and 
 earnestly contested, it will, by most of those 
 who receive it, be held in the manner of a 
 prejudice, with little comprehension or feeling 
 of its rational grounds. And not only this, 
 but, fourthly, the meaning of the doctrine it- 
 self will be in danger of being lost, or en- 
 feebled, and deprived of its vital effect on the 
 
96 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 character and conduct : the dogma becoming a 
 mere formal profession, inefficacious for good, 
 but cumbering the ground, and preventing the 
 growth of any real and heartfelt conviction, 
 from reason or personal experience. 
 
 Before quitting the subject of freedom of 
 opinion, it is fit to take some notice of those 
 who say, that the free expression of all opin- 
 ions should be permitted, on condition that 
 the manner be temperate, and do not pass the 
 bounds of fair discussion. Much might be 
 said on the impossibility of fixing where these 
 supposed bounds are to be placed ; for if the 
 test be offence to those whose opinion is at- 
 tacked, I think experience testifies that this 
 offence is given whenever the attack is telling 
 and powerful, and that every opponent who 
 pushes them hard, and whom they find it dif- 
 ficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows 
 any strong feeling on the subject, an intem- 
 perate opponent. But this, though an impor- 
 tant consideration in a practical point of view, 
 merges in a more fundamental objection. Un- 
 doubtedly the manner of asserting an opinion, 
 even though it be a true one, may be very ob- 
 jectionable, and may justly incur severe cen- 
 sure. But the principal offences of the kind 
 are such as it is mostly impossible, unless by 
 accidental self-betrayal, to bring home to con 
 viction. The gravest of them is, to argue so- 
 ph istically, to suppress facts or arguments, to 
 misstate the elements of the case, or misrepre- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 97 
 
 sent the opposite opinion. Biic all this, even 
 to the most aggravated degree, is so continu- 
 ally done in perfect good faith, by persons who 
 are not considered, and in many other respects 
 may not deserve to be considered, ignorant or 
 incompetent, that it is rarely possible on ade- 
 quate grounds conscientiously to stamp the 
 misrepresentation as morally culpable ; and 
 still less could law presume to interfere with 
 this kind of controversial misconduct. With 
 regard to what is commonly meant by intem- 
 perate discussion, namely, invective, sarcasm, 
 personality, and the like, the denunciation of 
 these weapons would deserve more sympathy 
 if it were ever proposed to interdict them 
 equally to both sides ; but it is only desired 
 to restrain the employment of them against the 
 prevailing opinion : against the unprevailing 
 they may not only be used without general 
 disapproval, but will be likely to obtain for him 
 who uses them the praise of honest zeal and 
 righteous indignation. Yet whatever mischief 
 arises from their use, is greatest when they are 
 employed against the comparatively defence- 
 less ; and whatever unfair advantage can be 
 derived by any opinion from this mode of as- 
 serting it, accrues almost exclusively to re- 
 ceived opinions. The worst offence of this 
 kind which can be committed by a polemic, 
 is to stigmatize those wlio hold the contrary 
 opinion as bad and immoral men. To cal- 
 umny of this sort, those who hold any unpop- 
 
98 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 ular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because 
 they are in general few and uninfluential, and 
 nobody but themselves feels much interest in 
 &eeing justice done them ; but this weapon is, 
 from the nature of the case, denied to those 
 who attack a prevailing opinion : they can nei- 
 ther use it with safety to themselves, nor, if 
 they could, would it do anything but recoil on 
 their own cause. In general, opinions contrary 
 to those commonly received can only obtain a 
 hearing by studied moderation of language, 
 and the most cautious avoidance of unnecessa- 
 ry offence, from which they hardly ever deviate 
 even in a slight degree without losing ground : 
 while unmeasured vituperation employed on 
 the side of the prevailing opinion, really does 
 deter people from professing contrary opinions, 
 and from listening to those who profess them. 
 For the interest, therefore, of truth and jus- 
 tice, it is far more important to restrain this 
 employment of vituperative language than the 
 other; and, for example, if it were necessary 
 to choose, there would be much more need to 
 discourage offensive attacks on infidelity, than 
 on religion. It is, however, obvious that law 
 and authority have no business with restrain- 
 ing either, while opinion ought, in every in- 
 stance, to determine its verdict by the circum- 
 stances of the individual case ; condemning 
 every one, on whichever side of the argument 
 he places himself, in whose mode of advocacy 
 either want of candor, or malignity, bigotry. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 99 
 
 or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves ; 
 but not inferring these vices from the side 
 which a person takes, though it be the con- 
 trary side of the question to our own : and 
 giving merited honor to every one, whatever 
 opinion he may hold, who has calmness to see 
 and honesty to state what his opponents and 
 their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing 
 to their discredit, keeping nothing back which 
 tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor. 
 This is the real morality of public discussion ; 
 and if often violated, I am happy to think that 
 there are many controversialists who to a great 
 extent observe it, and a still greater number 
 who conscientiously strive towards it. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 OF INDIVIDUALITY, AS ONE OF THE ELEMENTS OF WELL- 
 BEING. 
 
 S UCH being the reasons which make it iim 
 perative that human beings should be free 
 to form opinions, and to express their opinions 
 without reserve ; and such the baneful conse- 
 quences to the intellectual, and through that to 
 the moral nature of man, unless this liberty is 
 either conceded, or asserted in spite of prohibi- 
 tion ; let us next examine whether the same 
 reasons do not require that men should be free 
 to act upon their opinions — to carry these out 
 in their lives, without hindrance, either physical 
 or moral, from their fellow-men, so long as it 
 is at their own risk and peril. This last pro- 
 viso is of course indispensable. No one pre- 
 tends that actions should be as free as opinions. 
 On the contrary, even opinions lose their im- 
 munity, when the circumstances in which they 
 are expressed are such as to constitute their 
 expression a positive instigation to some mis- 
 chievous act. An opinion that corn-dealers 
 are starvers of the poor, or that private prop- 
 erty is robbery, ought to be unmolested when 
 simply circulated through the press, but may 
 
ON LIBEETY. 
 
 101 
 
 justly incur punishment when delivered orally 
 to an excited mob assembled before the house 
 of a corn-dealer, or when handed about among 
 the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, 
 of whatever kind, which, without justifiable 
 cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the 
 more important cases absolutely require to be, 
 controlled by the unfavorable sentiments, and, 
 when needful, by the active interference of 
 mankind. The liberty of the individual must 
 be thus far limited ; he must not make himself 
 a nuisance to other people. But if he refrains 
 from molesting others in what concerns them, 
 and merely acts according to his own inclina- 
 tion and judgment in things which concern 
 himself, the same reasons which show that 
 opinion should be free, prove also that he 
 should be allowed, without molestation, to 
 carry his opinions into practice at his own 
 cost. That mankind are not infallible ; that 
 their truths, for the most part, are only half- 
 truths ; that unity of opinion, unless resulting 
 from the fullest and freest comparison of op- 
 posite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity 
 not an evil, but a good, until mankind are 
 much more capable than at present of recog- 
 nizing all sides of the truth, are principles ap- 
 plicable to men’s modes of action, not less than 
 to their opinions. As it is useful that while 
 mankind are imperfect there should be different 
 opinions, so is it that there should be different 
 experiments of living ; that free scope should 
 
102 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 be given^to varieties of character, short of in- 
 jury to others ; and that the worth of different 
 modes of life should be proved practically, 
 when any one thinks fit to try them. It is de- 
 sirable, in short, that in things which do not 
 primarily concern others, individuality should 
 assert itself. Where, not the person’s ow'n 
 character, but the traditions or customs of other 
 people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting 
 one of the principal ingredients of human hap- 
 piness, and quite the chief ingredient of indi- 
 vidual and social progress. 
 
 In maintaining this principle, the greatest 
 difficulty to be encountered does not lie in the 
 appreciation of means towards an acknowl- 
 edged end, but in the indifference of persons in 
 general to the end itself. If it were felt that 
 the free development of individuality is one of 
 the leading essentials of well-being ; that it is 
 not only a coordinate element with all that is 
 designated by the terms civilization, instruc- 
 tion, education, culture, but is itself a neces- 
 sary part and condition of all those things; 
 there wmuld be no danger that liberty should 
 be undervalued, and the adjustment of the 
 boundaries betw^een it and social control would 
 present no extraordinary difficulty. But the 
 evil is, that individual spontaneity is hardly 
 recognized by the common modes of thinking 
 as having any intrinsic worth, or deserving any 
 regard on its ow^n account. The majority, be 
 ing satisfied with the ways of mankind as they 
 
ON LIBEETY. 
 
 103 
 
 now are (for it is they who make them what 
 they are), cannot comprehend why those ways 
 should not be good enough for everybody ; ana 
 what is more, spontaneity forms no part of the 
 ideal of the majority of moral and social re- 
 formers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, 
 as a troublesome and perhaps rebellious ob- 
 struction to the general acceptance of what 
 these reformers, in their own judgment, think 
 would be best for mankind. Few persons, out 
 of Germany, even comprehend the meaning of 
 the doctrine which Wilhelm von Humboldt, 
 so eminent both as a savant and as a politi- 
 cian, made the text of a treatise — that “the 
 end of man, or that which is prescribed by the 
 eternal or immutable dictates of reason, and 
 not suggested by vague and transient desires, 
 is the highest and most harmonious develop- 
 ment of his powers to a complete and consist- 
 ent whole that, therefore, the object “ towards 
 which every human being must ceaselessly 
 direct his efforts, and on which especially those 
 who design to influence their fellow-men must 
 ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of 
 power and development;’^ that for this there 
 are two requisites, “ freedom, and a variety of 
 situations ; ” and that from the union of these 
 arise “ individual vigor and manifold diversity,” 
 which combine themselves in “ originality.”* 
 Little, however, as people are accustomed 
 to a doctrine like that of Von Humboldt, and 
 
 * The Sphere and Duties of Government^ from the Germaa o/ 
 Baron Wilhilm von Humboldt, pp. 11-13. 
 
104 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 surprising as it may be to them to find so 
 high a value attached to individuality, the 
 question, one must nevertheless think, can 
 only be one of degree. No one’s idea of ex- 
 cellence in conduct is that people should do 
 absolutely nothing but copy one another. No 
 one would assert that people ought not to 
 put into their mode of life, and into the con- 
 duct of their concerns, any impress whatever 
 of their own judgment, or of their own indi- 
 vidual character. On the other hand, it would 
 be absurd to pretend that people ought to 
 live as if nothing whatever had been known 
 in the world before they came into it ; as if 
 experience had as yet done nothing towards 
 showing that one mode of existence, or of 
 conduct, is preferable to another. Nobody 
 denies that people should be so taught and 
 trained in youth, as to know and benefit by 
 the ascertained results of human experience. 
 But it is the privilege and proper condition 
 of a human being, arrived at the maturity of 
 his faculties, to use and interpret experience 
 in his own way. It is for him to find out 
 what oart of recorded experience is proper- 
 ij applicable to his own circumstances and 
 character. The traditions and customs of oth- 
 er people are, to a certain extent, evidence of 
 what their experience has taught them ; pre- 
 sumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim 
 to his deference : but, in the first place, their 
 experience may be too narrow ; or they may 
 
ox LIBERTY. 
 
 105 
 
 not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, theh 
 interpretation of experience may be correct 
 but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for 
 customary circumstances, and customary char- 
 acters: and his circumstances or his character 
 may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the 
 customs be both good as customs, and suitable 
 to him, yet to conform to custom, merely as 
 custom, does not educate or develop in him 
 any of the qualities which are the distinctive 
 endowment of a human being. The human 
 faculties of perception, judgment, discrimina- 
 tive feeling, mental activity, and even moral 
 preference, are exercised only in making a 
 choice. He who does anything because it is 
 the custom, makes no choice. He gains no 
 practice either in discerning or in desiring what 
 is best. The mental and moral, like the mus- 
 cular powers, are improved only by being used. 
 The faculties are called into no exercise by do- 
 ing a thing merely because others do it, no more 
 than by believing a thing only because others 
 believe it. If the grounds of an opinion are 
 not conclusive to the person’s own reason, his 
 reason cannot be strengthened, but is likely to 
 be weakened by his adopting it : and if the in- 
 ducements to an act are not such as are con- 
 sentaneous to his own feelings and character 
 (where affection, or the rights of others, are not 
 concerned), it is so much done towards render- 
 ing his feelings and character inert and torpid, 
 instead of active and energetic. 
 
106 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 He who lets the world, or his own portion 
 of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need 
 of any other faculty than the ape-like one of 
 imitation. He who chooses his plan for him- 
 self, employs all his faculties. He must use 
 observation to see, reasoning and judgment to 
 foresee, activity to gather materials for decis- 
 ion, discrimination to decide, and when he has 
 decided, firmness and self-control to hold to 
 his deliberate decision. And these qualities 
 he requires and exercises exactly in proportion 
 as the part of his conduct which he determines 
 according to his own judgment and feelings is 
 a large one. It is possible that he might be 
 guided in some good path, and kept out of 
 harm’s way, without any of these things. But 
 what will be his comparative worth as a human 
 being? It really is of importance, not only 
 what men do, but also what manner of men 
 they are that do it. Among the works of man, 
 which human life is rightly employed in per- 
 fecting and beautifying, the first in importance 
 surely is man himself. Supposing it were pos- 
 sible to get houses built, corn grown, battles 
 fought, causes tried, and even churches erected 
 and prayers said, by machinery — by automa- 
 tons in human form — it would be a consider- 
 able loss to exchange for these automatons 
 even the men and women who at present in- 
 habit the more civilized parts of the world, and 
 who assuredly are but starved specimens of 
 what nature can and will produce. Human 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 107 
 
 nature is not a machine to be built after a 
 model, and set to do exactly the work pre- 
 scribed for it, but a tree, which requires to 
 grow and develop itself on all sides, accord- 
 ing to the tendency of the inward forces which 
 make it a living thing. 
 
 It will probably be conceded that it is de 
 sirable people should exercise their under- 
 standings, and that an intelligent following 
 of custom, or even occasionally an intelligent 
 deviation from custom, is better than a blind 
 and simply mechanical adhesion to it. To a 
 certain extent it is admitted, that our under 
 standing should be our own : but there is not 
 the same willingness to admit that our desires 
 and impulses should be our own likewise ; or 
 that to possess impulses of our own, and of 
 any strength, is anything but a peril and a 
 snare. Yet desires and impulses are as much 
 a part of a perfect human being, as beliefs and 
 restraints : and strong impulses are only peril- 
 ous when not properly balanced ; when one 
 set of aims and inclinations is developed into 
 strength, while others, which ought to coexist 
 with them, remain weak and inactive. It is 
 not because men’s desires are strong that they 
 act ill ; it is because their consciences are 
 vveak. There is no natural connection be- 
 tween strong impulses and a weak conscience. 
 The natural connection is the other way. To 
 say that one person’s desires and feelings are 
 stronger and more various than those of an- 
 
108 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 other, is merely to say that he has more of the 
 raw material of human nature, and is there- 
 fore capable, perhaps of more evil, but cer- 
 lainly of more good. Strong impulses are but 
 another name for energy. Energy may be 
 turned to bad uses ; but more good may al- 
 ways be made of an energetic nature, ihan of 
 an indolent and impassive one. Those who 
 have most natural feeling, are always those 
 whose cultivated feelings may be made the 
 strongest. The same strong susceptibilities 
 which make the personal impulses vivid and 
 powerful, are also the source from whence are 
 generated the most passionate love of virtue, 
 and the sternest self-control. It is through the 
 cultivation of these, that society both does its 
 duty and protects its interests : not by reject- 
 ing the stuff of which heroes are made, because 
 it knows not how to make them. A person 
 whose desires and impulses are his own — are 
 the expression of his own nature, as it has been 
 developed and modified by his own culture — 
 is said to have a character. One whose de- 
 sires and impulses are not his own, has no 
 character, no more than a steam-engine has a 
 character. If, in addition to being his own, 
 his impulses are strong, and are under the 
 government of a strong will, he has an ener- 
 getic character. Whoever thinks that individ- 
 uality of desires and impulses should not be 
 encouraged to unfold itself, must maintain 
 that society has no need of strong natures 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 109 
 
 — is not the better for containing many per 
 sons who have much character — and that a 
 high general average of energy is not desira- 
 ble. 
 
 In some early states of society, these forces 
 might be, and were, too much ahead of the 
 power which society then possessed of disci- 
 plining and controlling them. There has been 
 a time when the element of spontaneity and 
 individuality was in excess, and the social 
 principle had a hard struggle with it. The 
 difficulty then was, to induce men of strong 
 bodies or minds to pay obedience to any 
 rules which required them to control their im- 
 pulses. To overcome this difficulty, law and 
 discipline, like the Popes struggling against the 
 Emperors, asserted a power over the whole 
 man, claiming to control all his life in order to 
 control his character — which society had not 
 found any other sufficient means of binding. 
 But society has now fairly got the better of 
 individuality; and the danger which threatens 
 human nature is not the excess, but the defi- 
 ciency, of personal impulses and preferences. 
 Things are vastly changed, since the passions 
 of those who were strong by station or by per- 
 sonal endowment were in a state of habitual 
 rebellion against laws and ordinances, and re- 
 quired to be rigorously chained up to enable 
 the persons within their reach to enjoy any 
 particle of security. In oui times, from the 
 highest class of society down to the lowest 
 
110 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 every one lives as under the eye of a hostile 
 and dreaded censorship. Not only in what 
 concerns others, but in what concerns only 
 themselves, the individual, or the family, do 
 not ask themselves — what do I prefer ? or, 
 v/hat would suit my character and disposition ? 
 or, what would allow the best and highest in 
 me to have fair play, and enable it to grow and 
 thrive ? They ask themselves, what is suitable 
 to my position ? what is usually done by per- 
 sons of my station and ‘ pecuniary circum- 
 stances ? or (worse still) what is usually done 
 by persons of a station and circumstances 
 superior to mine ? I do not mean that they 
 choose what is customary, in preference to 
 what suits their own inclination. It does not 
 occur to them to have any inclination, except 
 for what is customary. Thus the mind itself is 
 bowed to the yoke : even in what people do for 
 pleasure, conformity is the first thing thought 
 of ; they like in crowds ; they exercise choice 
 only among things commonly done : peculiarity 
 of taste, eccentricity of conduct, are shunned 
 equally with crimes : until by dint of not fol- 
 lowing their own nature, they have no nature 
 to follow : their human capacities are withered 
 and starved : they become incapable of any 
 strong wishes or native pleasures, and are gen 
 erally without either opinions or feelings of 
 home growth, or properly their own. Now is 
 this, or is it not, the desirable condition of hu- 
 man nature ? 
 
, ON LIBERTY. 
 
 11 ] 
 
 It is so, on the Calvinistic theory. Accord 
 ing to that, the one great offence of man is 
 Self-will. All the good of which humanity is 
 capal3le, is comprised in Obedience. You have 
 no choice ; thus you must do, and no other- 
 wise : “ whatever is not a duty is a sin.” Hu- 
 man nature being radically corrupt, there is no 
 redemption for any one until human nature is 
 killed within him. To one holding this theory 
 of life, crushing out any of the human faculties, 
 capacities, and susceptibilities, is no evil : man 
 needs no capacity, but that of sun^endering 
 himself to the will of God : and if he uses any 
 of his faculties for any other purpose but to do 
 that supposed will more effectually, he is better 
 without them. That is the theory of Calvin- 
 ism ; and it is held, in a mitigated form, by 
 many who do not consider themselves Calvin- 
 ists ; the mitigation consisting in giving a less 
 ascetic interpretation to the alleged will of 
 God ; asserting it to be his will that mankind 
 should gratify some of their inclinations ; of 
 course not in the manner they themselves prefer, 
 but in the way of obedience, that is, in a way 
 prescribed to them by authority ; and, therefore, 
 by the necessary conditions of the case, the 
 same for all. 
 
 In some such insidious form there is at pres- 
 sent a strong tendency to this narrow theory 
 of life, and to the pinched and hidebound type 
 of human character which it patronizes. Many 
 persons, no doubt, sincerely think that human 
 
112 
 
 ON LIBERTY. ^ 
 
 beings thus cramped and dwarfed, are as then 
 Maker designed them to be ; just as many have 
 thought that trees are a much finer thing when 
 clipped into pollards, or cut out into figures of 
 animals, than as nature made them. But if it 
 be any part of religion to believe that man was 
 made by a good Being, it is more consistent 
 with that faith to believe, that this Being gave 
 all human faculties that they might be culti- 
 vated and unfolded, not rooted out and con- 
 sumed, and that he takes delight in every 
 nearer approach made by his creatures to the 
 ideal conception embodied in them, every in- 
 crease in any of their capabilities of compre- 
 hension, of action, or of enjoyment. There is 
 a different type of human excellence from the 
 Calvinistic ; a conception of humanity as hav- 
 ing its nature bestowed on it for other purposes 
 than merely to be abnegated. Pagan self- 
 assertion ’’ is one of the elements of human 
 worth, as well as ‘‘ Christian self-denial.’’ 
 There is a Greek ideal of self-development, 
 which the Platonic and Christian ideal of self- 
 government blends with, but does not super- 
 sede. It may be better to be a John Knox 
 than an Alcibiades, but it is better to be a 
 Pericles than either ; nor would a Pericles, if 
 we had one in these days, be without anything 
 good which belonged to John Knox. 
 
 It is not by wearing down into uniformit) 
 all that is individual in themselves, but by cul 
 
 Sterling’s Essays. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 113 
 
 (ivating it and calling it forth, within the limit? 
 imposed by the rights and interests of others, 
 that human beings become a noble and beauti- 
 ful object of contemplation ; and as the works 
 partake the character of those who do them, 
 by the same process human life also becomes 
 rich, diversified, and animating, furnishing more 
 abundant aliment to high thoughts and elevat- 
 ing feelings, and strengthening the tie which 
 binds every individual to the race, by making 
 the race infinitely better worth belonging to. 
 In proportion to the development of his indi- 
 viduality, each person becomes more valuable 
 to himself, and is therefore capable of being 
 more valuable to others. There is a greater 
 fulness of life about his own existence, and 
 when there is more life in the units there is 
 more in the mass which is composed of them. 
 4s much compression as is necessary to pre- 
 vent the stronger specimens of human nature 
 from encroaching on the rights of others, can- 
 not be dispensed with ; but for this there is 
 ample compensation even in the point of view 
 of human development. The means of devel 
 opment which the individual loses by being 
 prevented from gratifying his inclinations tc 
 the injury of others, are chiefly obtained at the 
 expense of the development of other people. 
 And even to himself there is a full equivaleni 
 in the better development of the social part of 
 his nature, rendered possible by the restraini 
 put upon the selfish part. To be held to rigid 
 
114 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 rules of justice for the sake of others, devel- 
 ops the feelings and capacities which have 
 the good of others for their object. But to be 
 restrained in things not affecting their good, by 
 their mere displeasure, developes nothing valu- 
 able, except such force of character as may 
 unfold itself in resisting the restraint. If ac- 
 quiesced in, it dulls and blunts the whole 
 nature. To give any fair play to the nature 
 of each, it is essential that different persons 
 should be allowed to lead different lives. In 
 proportion as this latitude has been exercised 
 in any age, has that age been noteworthy to 
 posterity. Even despotism does not produce 
 its worst effects, so long as Individuality exists 
 under it ; and whatever crushes individuality 
 is despotism, by whatever name it may be 
 called, and whether it professes to be enforc- 
 ing the will of God or the injunctions of 
 men. 
 
 Having said that Individuality is the same 
 thing with development, and that it is only the 
 cultivation of individuality which produces, or 
 can produce, well-developed human beings, I 
 might here close the argument : for what more 
 or better can be said of any condition of hu- 
 man affairs, than that it brings human beings 
 themselves nearer to the best thing they can 
 be? or what worse can be said of any ob- 
 struction to good, than that it prevents this ? 
 Doubtless, however, these considerations will 
 not suffice to convince those who most need 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 115 
 
 convincing; and it is necessary further to 
 show, that these developed human beings are 
 of some use to the undeveloped — to point out 
 to those who do not desire liberty, and would 
 not avail themselves of it, that they may be in 
 some intelligible manner rewarded for allow- 
 ing other people to make use of it without 
 hindrance. 
 
 In the first place, then, I would suggest that 
 they might possibly learn something from 
 them. It will not be denied by anybody, that 
 originality is a valuable element in human 
 affairs. There is always need of persons not 
 only to discover new truths, and point out 
 when what were once truths are true no longer, 
 but also to commence new practices, and set 
 the example of more enlightened conduct, and 
 better taste and sense in human life. This 
 cannot well be gainsaid by anybody who does 
 not believe that the world has already attained 
 perfection in all its ways and practices. It is 
 true that this benefit is not capable of being 
 rendered by everybody alike : there are but few 
 persons, in comparison with the whole of man- 
 kind, whose experiments, if adopted by others, 
 would be likely to be any improvement on 
 established practice. But these few are ths 
 salt of the earth; without them, human life 
 would become a stagnant pool. Not only is 
 it they who introduce good things which did 
 not before exist ; it is they who keep the life 
 in those which already existed. If tliere were 
 
116 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 nothing new to be done, would human intel- 
 lect cease to be necessary? Would it be a 
 reason why those who do the old things should 
 forget why they are done, and do them like 
 cattle, not like human beings ? There is onij 
 too great a tendency in the best beliefs and 
 practices to degenerate into the mechanical; 
 and unless there were a succession of persons 
 whose ever-recurring originality prevents the 
 grounds of those beliefs and practices from be- 
 coming merely traditional, such dead matter 
 would not resist the smallest shock from any- 
 thing really alive, and there would be no rea- 
 son why civilization should not die out, as in 
 the Byzantine Empire. Persons of genius, it 
 's true, are, and are always likely to be, a small 
 minority; but in order to have them, it is 
 necessary to preserve the soil in which they 
 grow. Genius can only breathe freely in an 
 atmosphere of freedom. Persons of genius are, 
 ex vi termini^ more individual than any other 
 people — less capable, consequently, of fitting 
 themselves, without hurtful compression, into 
 any of the small number of moulds which 
 society provides in order to save its members 
 the trouble of forming their own character. If 
 from timidity they consent to be forced into 
 one of these moulds, and to let all that part 
 of themselves which cannot expand under the 
 pressure remain unexpanded, society will be 
 little the better for their genius. If they are 
 of a strong character, and break their fetters, 
 
ON LIBERl’Y. 
 
 117 
 
 they become a mark for the society which has 
 not sQCceeded in reducing them to common- 
 place, to point at with solemn warning as 
 ‘‘ wild,’’ “ erratic,” and the like ; 'much as if 
 one should complain of the Niagara river for 
 not flowing smoothly between its banks like a 
 Dutch canal. 
 
 I insist thus emphatically on the importance 
 of genius, and the necessity of allowing it to 
 unfold itself freely both in thought and in 
 practice, being well aware that no one will 
 deny the position in theory, but knowing also 
 that almost every one, in reality, is totally in- 
 different to it. People think genius a fine 
 thing if it enables a man to write an exciting 
 poem, or paint a picture. But in its true 
 feense, that of originality in thought and ac- 
 tion, though no one says that it is not a thing 
 to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that 
 they can do very well without it. Unhappily 
 this is too natural to be wondered at. Origi- 
 nality is the one thing which unoriginal minds 
 cannot feel the use of. They cannot see what 
 it is to do for them : how should they ? If 
 they could see what it would do for them, it 
 would not be originality. The first service 
 which originality has to render them, is that 
 of opening their eyes : which being once fully 
 done, they would have a chance of being them- 
 selves original. Meanwhile, recollecting that 
 nothing was ever yet done which some one 
 was not the first to do, and that all good things 
 
118 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 which exist are the fruits of originality, lei 
 them be modest enough to believe that there 
 is something still left for it to accomplish, and 
 assure themselves that they are more in need 
 of originality, the less they are conscious of 
 the want. 
 
 In sober truth, whatever homage may be 
 professed, or even paid, to real or supposed 
 mental superiority, the general tendency of 
 things throughout the world is to render me- 
 diocrity the ascendant power among mankind. 
 In ancient history, in the Middle Ages, and in 
 a diminishing degree through the long transi- 
 tion from feudality to the present time, the in- 
 dividual was a power in himself; and if he 
 had either great talents or a high social posi- 
 tion, he was a considerable power. At present 
 individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics 
 it is almost a triviality to say that public opin- 
 ion now rules the world. The only power de- 
 serving the name is that of masses, and of gov- 
 ernments while they make themselves the organ 
 of the tendencies and instincts of masses. This 
 is as true in the moral and social relations of 
 private life as in public transactions. Those 
 whose opinions go by the name of public opin- 
 ion, are not always the same sort of public : in 
 America, they are the whole white population 
 in England, chiefly the middle class. But they 
 are always a mass, that is to say, collective me- 
 diocrity. And what is a still greater novelty, 
 the mass do not now take their opinions from 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 119 
 
 dignitaries in Church or State, from ostensible 
 leaders, or from books. Their thinking is done 
 for them by men much like themselves, address- 
 ing them or speaking in their name, on the spur 
 of the moment, through the newspapers. I am 
 not complaining of all this. I do not assert 
 that anything better is compatible, as a gen- 
 eral rule, with the present low state of the 
 human mind. But that does not hinder the 
 government of mediocrity from being medio- 
 cre government. No government by a democ- 
 racy or a numerous aristocracy, either in its 
 political acts or in the opinions, qualities, and 
 tone of mind which it fosters, ever did or could 
 rise above mediocrity, except in so far as the 
 sovereign Many have let themselves be guided 
 (which in their best times they always have 
 done) by the counsels and influence of a more 
 highly gifted and instructed One- or Few. The 
 initiation of all wise or noble things, comes and 
 must come from individuals ; generally at first 
 from some one individual. The honor and 
 glory of the average man is that he is capable 
 of following that initiative ; that he can re- 
 spond internally to wise and noble things, and 
 be led to them with his eyes open. I am not 
 countenancing the sort of hero-worship ’’ 
 which applauds the strong man of genius for 
 forcibly seizing on the government of the 
 world and making it do his bidding in spite 
 of itself. All he can claim is, freedom to point 
 out the way. The power of compelling others 
 
120 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 into it, is not only inconsistent with the free- 
 dom and development of all the rest, but cor- 
 rupting to the strong man himself. It does 
 seem, however, that when the opinions of 
 masses of merely average men are every- 
 where become or becoming the dominant 
 power, the counterpoise and corrective to 
 that tendency would be, the more and more 
 pronounced individuality of those who stand 
 on the higher eminences of thought. It is in 
 ./hese circumstances most especially, that ex- 
 ceptional individuals, instead of being deter- 
 ed, should be encouraged in acting different- 
 ly from the mass. In other times there was 
 no advantage in their doing so, unless they 
 acted not only differently, but better. In this 
 age the mere example of non-conformity, the 
 mere refusal to bend the knee to custom, is it- 
 self a service. Precisely because the tyranny of 
 opinion is such as to make eccentricity a re- 
 proach, it is desirable, in order to break through 
 that tyranny, that people should be eccentric. 
 Eccentricity has always abounded when and 
 where strength of character has abounded ; 
 and the amount of eccentricity in a society 
 has generally been proportional to the amount 
 .^f genius, mental vigor, and moral courage 
 which it contained. That so few now dare 
 to be eccentric, marks the chief danger of the 
 time. 
 
 I have said that it is important to give the 
 freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 121 
 
 order that it may in time appear which of these 
 are fit to be converted into customs. But inde- 
 pendence of action, and disregard of custom 
 are not solely deserving of encouragement for 
 the chance they afford that better modes of 
 action,, and customs more worthy of general 
 adoption, may be struck out ; nor is it only 
 persons of decided mental superiority who have 
 a just claim to carry on their lives in their own 
 way. There is no reason that all human exist- 
 ences should be constructed on some one, or 
 some small number of patterns. If a person 
 possesses any tolerable amount of common 
 sense and experience, his own mode of laying 
 out his existence is the best, not because it is 
 the best in itself, but because it is his own 
 mode. Human beings are not like sheep ; and 
 even sheep are not undistinguishably alike. A 
 man cannot get a coat or a pair of boots to fit 
 him, unless they are either made to his meas- 
 ure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose 
 from : and is it easier to fit him with a life than 
 with a coat, or are human beings more like 
 one another in their whole physical and spirit- 
 ual conformation than in the shape of their 
 feet ? If it were only that people have diver- 
 sities of taste, that is reason enough for not at- 
 tempting to shape them all after one model. 
 But different persons also require different con- 
 ditions for their spiritual development ; and can 
 no more exist healthily in the same moral, than 
 all the variety of plants can in the same physi 
 6 
 
122 
 
 OK LIBERTY. 
 
 cal, atmosphere and climate. The same things 
 which are helps to one person towards the cul- 
 tivation of his higher nature, are hindrances 
 to another. The same mode of life is a healthy 
 excitement to one, keeping all his faculties of 
 action and enjoyment in their best order, while 
 to another it is a distracting burden, which sus- 
 pends or crushes all internal life. Such are the 
 differences among human beings in their sources 
 of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and 
 the operation on them of different physical and 
 moral agencies, that unless there is a corre- 
 sponding diversity in their modes of life, they 
 neither obtain their fair share of happiness, 
 nor grow up to the mental, moral, and aesthetic 
 stature of which their nature is capable. Why. 
 then should tolerance, as far as the public sen- 
 timent is concerned, extend only to tastes and 
 modes of life which extort acquiescence by the 
 multitude of their adherents ? Nowhere (ex- 
 cept in some monastic institutions) is diversity 
 of taste entirely unrecognized ; a person may 
 without blame, either like or dislike rowing, or 
 smoking, or music, or athletic exercises, or 
 chess, or cards, or study, because both those 
 who like each of these things, and those who 
 dislike them, are too numerous to be put down. 
 But the man, and still more the woman, who 
 can be accused either of doing “ what nobody 
 does,” or of not doing “ what everybody does,” 
 is the subject of as much depreciatory remark 
 as if he or she had committed some grave 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 123 
 
 moral delinquency. Persons require to possess 
 a title, or some other badge of rank, or the 
 consideration of people of rank, to be able to 
 indulge somewhat in the luxury of doing as 
 they like without detriment to their estimation. 
 To indulge somewhat, I repeat : for whoever 
 allow themselves much of that indulgence, in- 
 cur the risk of something worse than disparag- 
 ing speeches — they are in peril of a commis- 
 sion de lunatico^ and of having their property 
 taken from them and given to their rela- 
 tions.^ 
 
 * There is something both contemptible and frightful in the sort 
 of evidence on which, of late years, any person can be judicially 
 declared unfit for the management of his affairs; and after his 
 death, his disposal of his property can be set aside, if there is 
 enough of it to pay the expenses of litigation — which are charged 
 on the property itself. All the minute details of his daily life are 
 pried into, and whatever is found which, seen through the medium 
 of the perceiving and describing faculties of the lowest of the low, 
 bears an appearance unlike absolute commonplace, is laid before 
 the jury as evidence of insanit}^ and often with success; the ju- 
 rors being little, if at all, less vulgar and ignorant than the wit- 
 nesses; while the judges, with that extraordinary want of knowl- 
 edge of human nature and life which continually astonishes us in 
 English lawyers, often help to mislead them. These trials speak 
 volumes as to the state of feeling and opinion among the vulgar 
 with regard to human liberty. So far from setting any value on 
 individuality — so far from respecting the rights of each individual 
 to act, in things indifferent, as seems good to his own judgment 
 and inclinations, judges and juries cannot even conceive that a 
 person in a state of sanity can desire such freedom. In former 
 da}^s, when it was proposed to burn atheists, charitable people 
 used to suggest putting them in a madhouse instead: it would 
 oe nothing surprising now-a-daj^s were we to see this done, and 
 vhe doers applauding themselves, because, instead of persecuting 
 for religion, they had adopted so humane and Christian a mode of 
 treating these unfortunates, not without a silent satisfaction at then 
 having thereby obtained their deserts. 
 
124 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 There is one characteristic of the present di- 
 rection of public opinion, peculiarly calculated 
 to make it intolerant of any marked demonstra- 
 tion of individuality. The general average of 
 mankind are not only moderate in intellect, but 
 also moderate in inclinations : they have no 
 tastes or wishes strong enough to incline them 
 to do anything unusual, and they consequently 
 do not understand those who have, and class 
 all such with the wild and intemperate whom 
 they are accustomed to look down upon. 
 Now, in addition to this fact which is general, 
 we have only to suppose that a strong move- 
 ment has set in towards the improvement of 
 morals, and it is evident what we have to ex- 
 pect. In these days such a movement has set 
 in ; much has actually been effected in the way 
 of increased regularity of conduct, and discour 
 agement of excesses; and there is a philan- 
 thropic spirit abroad, for the exercise of whi jh 
 there is no more inviting field than the moral 
 and prudential improvement of our fo-llow- 
 creatures. These tendencies of the times 
 cause the public to be more disposed than 
 at most former periods to prescribe general 
 rules of conduct, and endeavor to make every 
 one conform to the approved standard. And 
 that standard, express or tacit, is to desire 
 nothing strongly. Its ideal of character is to 
 be without any marked character ; to maim by 
 compression, like a Chinese lady’s foot, every 
 part of human nature which stands out promi- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 125 
 
 nently, and tends to make the person mark- 
 edly dissimilar in outline to commonplace 
 humanity. 
 
 As is usually the case with ideals which ex- 
 clude one half of what is desirable, the present 
 standard of approbation produces only an in- 
 ferior imitation of the other half. Instead of 
 great energies guided by vigorous reason, and 
 strong feelings strongly controlled by a con- 
 scientious will, its result is weak feelings and 
 weak energies, which therefore can be kept 
 in outward conformity to rule without any 
 strength either of will or of reason. Already 
 energetic characters on any large scale are 
 becoming merely traditional. There is now 
 scarcely any outlet for energy in this country 
 except business. The energy expended in that 
 may still be regarded as considerable. What 
 little is left from that employment, is expended 
 on some hobby ; which may be a useful, even 
 a philanthropic hobby, but is always some one 
 thing, and generally a thing of small dimen- 
 sions. The greatness of England is now all 
 collective : individually small, we only appeal 
 capable of anything great by our habit of com- 
 bining ; and with this our moral and religious 
 philanthropists are perfectly contented. But it 
 was men of another stamp than this that made 
 England what it has been ; and men of an- 
 other stamp will be needed to prevent its de- 
 cline. 
 
 The despotism of custom is everywhere the 
 
126 
 
 ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 standing hindrance to human advancement, 
 being in unceasing antagonism to that dispo- 
 sition to aim at something better than cus- 
 tomary, which is called, according to circum- 
 stances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress 
 or improvement. The spirit of improvement 
 is not always a spirit of liberty, for it may aim 
 at forcing improvements on an unwilling peo- 
 ple ; and the spirit of liberty, in so far as it re- 
 sists such attempts, may ally itself locally and 
 temporarily with the opponents of improve- 
 ment ; but the only unfailing and permanent 
 source of improvement is liberty, since by it 
 there are as many possible independent centres 
 of improvement as there are individuals. The 
 progressive principle, however, in either shape, 
 whether as the love of liberty or of improve- 
 ment, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom, 
 involving at least emancipation from that yoke ; 
 and the contest between the two constitutes the 
 chief interest of the history of mankind. The 
 greater part of the world has, properly speak- 
 ing, no history, because the despotism of Cus- 
 tom is complete. This is the case over the 
 whole East. Custom is there, in all things, 
 the final appeal ; justice and right mean con- 
 formity to custom ; the argument of custom no 
 one, unless some tyrant intoxicated with pow- 
 er, thinks of resisting. And we see the result. 
 Those nations must once have had originality; 
 they did not start out of the ground populous, 
 lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 127 
 
 they made themselves all this, and were then 
 the greatest and most powerful nations in the 
 world. What are they now ? The subjects or 
 dependents of tribes whose forefathers wan- 
 dered in the forests when theirs had magnifi 
 cent palaces and gorgeous temples, but over 
 whom custom exercised only a divided rule with 
 liberty and progress. A people, it appears, may 
 be progressive for a certain length of time, and 
 then stop: when does it stop? When it ceases 
 to possess individuality. If a similar change 
 should befall the nations of Europe, it will not 
 be in exactly the same shape : the despotism 
 of custom with which these nations are threat- 
 ened is not precisely stationariness. It pro- 
 scribes singularity, but it does not preclude 
 change, provided all change together. We 
 have discarded the fixed costumes of our fore- 
 fathers ; every one must still dress like other 
 people, but the fashion may change once or 
 twice a year. We thus take care that when 
 there is change, it shall be for change’s sake, 
 and not from any idea of beauty or conven- 
 ience ; for the same idea of beauty or con- 
 venience would not strike all the world at the 
 same moment, and be simultaneously thrown 
 aside by all at another moment. But we are 
 progressive as well as changeable : we continu- 
 ally make new inventions in mechanical things, 
 and keep them until they are again superseded 
 by better ; we are eager for improvement in 
 politics, in education, even in morals, though 
 
128 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 in this last our idea of improvement chief!} 
 consists in persuading or forcing other people 
 to be as good as ourselves. It is not progress 
 that we object to ; on the contrary, we flattei 
 ourselves that we are the most progressive peo- 
 ple who ever lived. It is individuality that we 
 war against : we should think we had done 
 v/onders if we had made ourselves all alike ; 
 forgetting that the unlikeness of mne person to 
 another is generally the first thing which draws 
 the attention of either to the imperfection of 
 his own type, and the superiority of another, 
 or the possibility, by combining the advantages 
 of both, of producing something better than 
 either. We have a warning example in China 
 — a nation of much talent, and, in some re- 
 spects, even wisdom, owing to the rare good 
 fortune of having been provided at an early 
 period with a particularly good set of customs, 
 the work, in some measure, of men to whom 
 even the most enlightened European must ac- 
 cord, under certain limitations, the title of sages 
 and philosophers. They are remarkable, too, 
 in the excellence of their apparatus for im- 
 pressing, as far as possible, the best wisdom 
 they possess upon every mind in the commu- 
 nity, and securing that those who have appro- 
 priated most of it shall occupy the posts of 
 honor and power. Surely the people who did 
 this have discovered the secret of human pro- 
 gressiveness, and must have kept themselves 
 steadily at the head of the movement of the 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 129 
 
 world. On the contrary, they have become 
 stationary — have remained so for thousands 
 of years ; and if they are ever to be farther im- 
 proved, it must be by foreigners. They have 
 succeeded beyond all hope in what English 
 philanthropists are so industriously working at 
 — in making a people all alike, all governing 
 their thoughts and conduct by the same max- 
 ims and rules ; and these are the fruits. The 
 modern regime of public opinion is, in an un- 
 organized form, what the Chinese educational 
 and political systems are in an organized ; and 
 unless individuality shall be able successfully 
 to assert itself against this yoke, Europe, not- 
 withstanding its noble antecedents and its pro- 
 fessed Christianity, will tend to become another 
 China. 
 
 What is it that has hitherto preserved Eu- 
 rope from this lot? What has made the Eu- 
 ropean family of nations an improving, instead 
 of a stationary portion of mankind ? Not any 
 superior excellence in them, which when it 
 exists, exists as the effect, not as tne cause ; 
 but their remarkable diversity of character and 
 culture. Individuals, classes, nations, have been 
 extremely unlike one another: they have struck 
 out a great variety of paths, each leading to 
 something valuable; and although at every 
 period those who travelled in different paths 
 have been intolerant of one another, and each 
 would have thought it an excellent thing if ah 
 the rest could have been compelled to travel 
 G* 
 
130 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 his road, their attempts to thwart each other’s 
 development have rarely had any permaneni 
 success, and each has in time endured to re- 
 ceive the good which the others have offered. 
 Europe is, in my judgment, wholly indebted 
 to this plurality of paths for its progressive and 
 many-sided development. But it already be- 
 gins to possess this benefit in a considerably 
 less degree. It is decidedly advancing towards 
 the Chinese ideal of making all people alike. 
 M. de Tocqueville, in his last important work, 
 remarks how much more the Frenchmen of 
 the present day resemble one another, than did 
 those even of the last generation. The same 
 remark might be made of Englishmen in a far 
 greater degree. In a passage already quoted 
 from Wilhelm von Humboldt, he points out 
 two things as necessary conditions of human 
 development, because necessary to render peo- 
 ple unlike one another; namely, freedom, and 
 variety of situations. The second of these two 
 conditions is in this country every day dimin- 
 ishing. The circumstances which surround 
 different classes and individuals, and shape 
 their characters, are daily becoming more as- 
 similated. Formerly, different ranks, different 
 neighborhoods, different trades and professions, 
 lived in what might be called different worlds 
 at present, to a great degree in the same 
 Comparatively speaking, they now read the 
 same things, listen to the same things, see 
 the same things, go to the same places, have 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 13J 
 
 their hopes and fears directed to the same ob- 
 jects, have the same rights and liberties, and 
 the same means of asserting them. Great as 
 are the differences of position which remain, 
 they are nothing to those which have ceased. 
 And the assimilation is still proceeding. All 
 the political changes of the age promote it, 
 since they all tend to raise the low and to 
 lower the high. Every extension of education 
 promotes it, because education brings people 
 under common influences, and gives them 
 access to the general stock of facts and 
 sentiments. Improvements in the means of 
 communication promote it, by bringing the 
 inhabitants of distant places into personal con- 
 tact, and keeping up a rapid flow of changes 
 of residence between one place and another. 
 The increase of commerce and manufactures 
 promotes it, by diffusing more widely the ad- 
 vantages of easy circumstances, and opening 
 all objects of ambition, even the highest, to 
 general competition, whereby the desire of 
 rising becomes no longer the character of a 
 particular class, but of all classes. A more 
 powerful agency than even all these, in bring- 
 ing about a general similarity among mankind, 
 is the complete establishment, in this and other 
 free countries, of the ascendency of public opin- 
 ion in the State. As the various social emin- 
 ences which enabled persons entrenched on 
 them to disregard the opinion of the multitude^ 
 gradually become levelled ; as the very idea of 
 
132 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 resisting the will of the public, when it is posi* 
 tively known that they have a will, disappears 
 more and more from the minds of practical 
 politicians ; there ceases to be any social sup- 
 port for non-conformity — any substantive 
 power in society, which, itself opposed to the 
 ascendancy of numbers, is interested in taking 
 under its protection opinions and tendencies at 
 variance with those of the public. 
 
 The combination of all these causes forms so 
 great a mass of influences hostile to Individu- 
 ality, that it is not easy to see how it can 
 stand its ground. It will do so with increas- 
 ing difficulty, unless the intelligent part of the 
 public can be made to feel its value — to see 
 that it is good there should be differences, even 
 though not for the better, even though, as it 
 may appear to them, some should be for the 
 worse. If the claims of Individuality are ever 
 to be asserted, the time is now, while much is 
 still wanting to complete the enforced assimi 
 lation. It is only in the earlier stages that any 
 stand can be successfully made against the en- 
 croachment. The demand that all other people 
 shall resemble ourselves, grows by what it feeds 
 on. If resistance waits till life is reduced near- 
 ly to one uniform type, all deviations from that 
 type will come to be considered impious, im- 
 moral, even monstrous and contrary to nature. 
 Mankind speedily become unable to conceive 
 diversity, when they have been for some time 
 unaccustomed to see it. 
 
CHAPTER lY. 
 
 OF THE LIMITS TO THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY OVER THE 
 INDIVIDUAL. 
 
 HAT, then, is the rightful limit to the 
 
 sovereignty of the individual over him- 
 self ? Where does the authority of society 
 begin? How much of human life should be 
 assigned to individuality, and how much to 
 society ? 
 
 Each will receive its proper share, if each 
 has that which more particularly concerns it. 
 To individuality should belong the part of life 
 in which it is chiefly the individual that is 
 interested ; to society, the part which chiefly 
 interests society. 
 
 Though society is not founded on a con- 
 tract, and though no good purpose is answered 
 by inventing a contract in order to deduce 
 social obligations from it, every one who re- 
 ceives the protection of society owes a return 
 for the benefit, and the fact of living in society 
 renders it indispensable that each should be 
 bound to observe a certain line of conduct tow- 
 ards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in 
 not injuring the interests of one another; or 
 rather certain interests, which, either by express 
 
134 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 legal provision or by tacit understanding, ough 
 to be considered as rights ; and secondly^ in 
 each person’s bearing his share (to be fixed on 
 some equitable principle) of the labors and sac- 
 rifices incurred for defending the society or its 
 members from injury and molestation. These 
 conditions society is justified in enforcing, at 
 all costs to those who endeavor to withhold 
 fulfilment. Nor is this all that society may do. 
 The acts of an individual may be hurtful to 
 others, or wanting in due consideration for 
 their welfare, without going the length of vio- 
 lating any of their constituted rights. The 
 offender may then be justly punished by opin- 
 ion, though not by law. As soon as any part 
 of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially 
 the interests of others, society has jurisdiction 
 over it, and the question w^hether the general 
 welfare will^or will not be promoted by inter- 
 fering with it, becomes open to discussion. 
 But there is no room for entertaining any such 
 question when a person’s conduct affects the 
 interests of no persons besides himself, or 
 needs not affect them unless they like (all the 
 persons concerned being of full age, and the 
 ordinary amount of understanding). In all 
 such cases there should be perfect freedom, 
 legal and social, to do the action and stand 
 the consequences. 
 
 It would be a great misunderstanding of 
 this doctrine, to suppose that it is one of self- 
 ish indifference, which pretends that human 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 135 
 
 beings have no business with each other’s con- 
 duct in life, and that they should not concern 
 themselves about the well-doing or well-being 
 of one another, unless their own interest is in- 
 volved. Instead of any diminution, there is 
 need of a great increase of disinterested exer- 
 tion to promote the good of others. But dis- 
 interested benevolence can find other instru- 
 ments to persuade people to their good, than 
 whips and scourges, either of the literal or the 
 metaphorical sort. I am the last person to 
 undervalue the self-regarding virtues ; they are 
 only second in importance, if even second, to 
 the social. It is equally the business of educa- 
 tion to cultivate both. But even education 
 works by conviction and persuasion as well as 
 by compulsion, and it is by the former only 
 that, when the period of education is past, the 
 self- regarding virtues should be inculcated 
 Human beings owe to each other help to dis- 
 tinguish the better from the worse, and encour- 
 agement to choose the former and avoid the 
 latter. They should be forever stimulating 
 each other to increased exercise of their higher 
 faculties, and increased direction of their feel- 
 ings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, 
 elevating instead of degrading, objects and 
 contemplations. But neither one person, nor 
 any number of persons, is warranted in saying 
 to another human creature of ripe years, that 
 he snail not do with his life for his own ben- 
 efit what he chooses to do with t. He is the 
 
13 ) 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 person most interested in his own well-being 
 the interest which any other person, except ir 
 cases of strong personal attachment, can have 
 in it, is trifling, compared with that which he 
 himself has ; the interest which society has in 
 him individually (except as to his conduct to 
 others) is fractional, and altogether indirect: 
 while, with respect to his own feelings and cir- 
 cumstances, the most ordinary man or woman 
 has means of knowledge immeasurably sur- 
 passing those that can be possessed by any 
 one else. The interference of society to over- 
 rule his judgment and purposes in what only 
 regards himself, must be grounded on general 
 presumptions; which maybe altogether wrong, 
 and even if right, are as likely as not to be 
 misapplied to individual cases, by persons no 
 better acquainted with the circumstances of 
 such cases than those are who look at them 
 merely from without. In this department, 
 therefore, of human affairs, Individuality ha& 
 its proper field of action. In the conduct of 
 human beings towards one another, it is neces- 
 sary that general rules should for the most 
 part be observed, in order that people may 
 know what they have to expect ; but in each 
 person’s own concerns, his individual sponta- 
 neity is entitled to free exercise. Considera- 
 tions to aid his judgment, exhortations to 
 strengthen his will, m^y be offered to him, even 
 obtruded on him, by others ; but he, himself, is 
 the final judge. All errors which he is likely 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 137 
 
 to commit against advice and warning, are fai 
 outweighed by the evil of allowing others to 
 constrain him to what they deem his good. 
 
 I do not mean that the feelings with which 
 a person is regarded by others, ought not to be 
 in any way affected by his self-regarding quali- 
 ties or deficiencies. This is neither possible 
 nor desirable. If he is eminent in any of the 
 qualities which conduce to his own good, he 
 is, so far, a proper object of admiration. He 
 is so much the nearer to the ideal perfection 
 of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in 
 those qualities, a sentiment the opposite of ad- 
 miration will follow. There is a degree of 
 folly, and a degree of what may be called 
 (though the phrase is not unobjectionable) 
 lowness or depra ation of taste, which, though 
 it cannot justify doing harm to the person 
 who manifests it, renders him necessarily and 
 properly a subject of distaste, or, in extreme 
 cases, even of contempt: a person could not 
 have the opposite qualities in due strength 
 without entertaining these feelings. Though 
 doing no wrong to any one, a person may so 
 act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to 
 him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior 
 order : and since this judgment and feeling 
 are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it 
 is doing him a service to warn him of it before- 
 hand, as of any other disagreeable consequence 
 to which he exposes himself. It would be well, 
 indeed, if this good office were much more 
 
138 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 freely rendered than the common notions of 
 politeness at present permit, and if one person 
 could honestly point out to another that he 
 thinks him in fault, without being considered 
 unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, 
 also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavor- 
 able opinion of any one, not to the oppression 
 of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. 
 Wo are not bound, for example, to seek his 
 society ; we have a right to avoid it (though 
 not to parade the avoidance), for we have a 
 right to choose the society most acceptable to 
 us. We have a right, and it may be our duty 
 to caution others against him, if we think his 
 example or conversation likely to have a per- 
 nicious effect on those with whom he asso- 
 ciates. We may give others a preference over 
 him in optional good offices, except those 
 which tend to his improvement. In these 
 various modes a person may suffer very severe 
 penalties at the hands of others, for faults 
 which directly concern only himself; but he 
 suffers these penalties only in so far as they 
 are the natural, and, as it were, the spontane- 
 ous consequences of the faults themselves, not 
 because they are purposely inflicted on him for 
 the sake of punishment. A person who shows 
 rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit — who cannot 
 live within moderate means — who cannot 
 restrain himself from hurtful indulgences — 
 who pursues anima^ pleasures at the expense 
 of those of feeling and intellect — must expect 
 
ON LIBEKTT. 
 
 139 
 
 to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to 
 have a less share of their favorable sentiments , 
 but of this he has no right to complain, unless 
 he has merited their favor by special excellence 
 in his social relations, and has thus established 
 a title to their good offices, which is not af- 
 fected by his demerits towards himself. 
 
 What I contend for is, that the inconven- 
 iences which are strictly inseparable from the 
 unfavorable judgment of others, are the only 
 ones to which a person should ever be subject 
 ed for that portion of his conduct and character 
 which concerns his own good, but which does 
 not affect the interests of others in their rela- 
 tions with him. Acts injurious to others re- 
 quire a totally different treatment. Encroach- 
 ment on their rights ; infliction on them of any 
 loss or damage not justified by his own rights ; 
 falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them ; 
 unfair or ungenerous use of advantages over 
 them ; even selfish abstinence from defending 
 them against injury — these are fit objects of 
 moral reprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral 
 retribution and punishment. And not only 
 these acts, but the dispositions which lead to 
 them, are properly immoral, and fit subjects of 
 disapprobation which may rise to abhorrence. 
 Cruelty of disposition ; malice and ill-nature ; 
 that most anti-social and odious of all pas- 
 sions, envy ; dissimulation and insincerity ; 
 irascibility on insufficient cause, and resent- 
 ment disproportioned to the provocation ; the 
 
140 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 love of domineering over others ; the desire to 
 engross more than one’s share of advantages 
 (the TrXeoveita of the Greeks) ; the pride which 
 derives gratification from the abasement of 
 others; the egotism which thinks self and its 
 concerns more important than everything else, 
 and decides all doubtful questions in his own 
 favor; — these are moral vices, and consti- 
 tute a bad and odious moral character : unlike 
 the self-regarding faults previously mentioned, 
 which are not properly immoralities, and to 
 whatever pitch they may be carried, do not 
 constitute wickedness. They may be proofs 
 of any amount of folly, or want of personal 
 dignity and self-respect ; but they are only a 
 subject of moral reprobation when they in- 
 volve a breach of duty to others, for whose 
 sake the individual is bound to have care for 
 himself. What are called duties to ourselves 
 are not socially obligatory, unless circumstances 
 render them at the same time duties to others. 
 The term duty to oneself, when it means any- 
 thing more than prudence, means self-respect 
 or self-development ; and for none of these is 
 any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, 
 because for none of them is it for the good of 
 mankind that he be held accountable to them. 
 
 The distinction between the loss of consider- 
 ation which a person may rightly incur by de- 
 fect of prudence or of personal dignity, and 
 the reprobation which is due to him for an 
 offence against the rights of others, is not a 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 141 
 
 merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast 
 difference both in our feelings and in our con- 
 duct towards him, whether he displeases us in 
 things in which we think we have a right to 
 control him, or in things in which we know 
 that we have not. If he displeases us, we may 
 express our distaste, and we may stand aloof 
 from a person as well as from a thing that dis- 
 pleases us ; but we shall not therefore feel 
 called on to make his life uncomfortable. We 
 shall reflect that he already bears, or will bear, 
 the whole penalty of his error ; if he spoils his 
 life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that 
 reason, desire to spoil it still further : instead 
 of wishing to punish him, we shall rather en- 
 deavor to alleviate his punishment, by showing 
 him how he may avoid or cure the evils his 
 conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be 
 to us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but 
 not of anger or resentment ; we shall not treat 
 him like an enemy of society : the worst we 
 shall think ourselves justified in doing is leav- 
 ing him to himself, if we do not interfere be- 
 nevolently by showing interest or concern for 
 him. It is far otherwise if he has infringed 
 the rules necessary for the protection of his fel- 
 low-creatures, individually or collectively. The 
 evil consequences of his acts do not then fall 
 on himself, but on others ; and society, as the 
 protector of all its members, must retaliate on 
 him ; must inflict pain on him for the express 
 purpose of punishment, and must take care 
 
142 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, 
 he is an offender at our bar, and we are called 
 on not only to sit in judgment on him, but, in 
 one shape or another, to execute our own sen- 
 tence : in the other case, it is not our part to 
 inflict any suffering on him, except what may 
 incidentally follow from our using the same 
 liberty in the regulation of our own affairs, 
 which we allow to him in his. 
 
 The distinction here pointed out between 
 the part of a person’s life which concerns only 
 himself, and that which concerns others, many 
 persons will refuse to admit. How (it may be 
 asked) can any part of the conduct of a mem- 
 ber of society be a matter of indifference to 
 the other members ? No person is an entirely 
 isolated being; it is impossible for a person to 
 do anything seriously or permanently hurtful 
 to himself, without mischief reaching at least 
 to his near connections, and often far beyond 
 them. If he injures his property, he does harm 
 to those who directly or indirectly derived sup- 
 port from it, and usually diminishes, by a 
 greater or less amount, the general resources of 
 the community. If he deteriorates his bodily 
 or mental faculties, he not only brings evil 
 upon all who depended on him for any portion 
 of their happiness, but disqualifies himself for 
 rendering the services which he owes to his 
 fellow-creatures generally ; perhaps becomes a 
 l>urden on their affection or benevolence ; and 
 if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 143 
 
 offence that is committed would detrac.t more 
 from the general sum of good. Finally, if by 
 his vices or follies a person does no direct harm 
 to others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) 
 injurious by his example ; and ought to be 
 compelled to control hirnself, for the sake of 
 those whom the sight or knowledge of his coE"* 
 duct might corrupt or mislead. 
 
 And even (it will be added) if the conse- 
 quences of misconduct could be confined to 
 the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought 
 society to abandon to their own guidance those 
 who are manifestly unfit for it ? If protection 
 against themselves is confessedly due to chil- 
 dren and persons under age, is not society 
 equally bound to afford it to persons of mature 
 years who are equally incapable of self-govern- 
 ment ? If gambling, or drunkenness, or incon- 
 tinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as in- 
 jurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance 
 to improvement, as many or most of the acts 
 prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should 
 not law, so far as is consistent with practica- 
 bility and social convenience, endeavor to re- 
 press these also ? And as a supplement to the 
 unavoidable imperfections of law, ought not 
 opinion at least to organize a powerful police 
 against these vices, and visit rigidly with social 
 penalties those who are known to practise 
 them ? There is no question here (it may be 
 said) about restricting individuality, or imped- 
 ing the trial of new and original experiments 
 
144 : 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 in living. The only things it is sought to pre- 
 vent are things which have been tried and con- 
 demned from the beginning of the world unth 
 now; things which experience has shown not to 
 be useful or suitable to any person’s individual- 
 ity. There must be some length of time and 
 amount of experience, after which a moral or 
 prudential truth may be regarded as established: 
 and it is merely desired to prevent generation af- 
 ter generation from falling over the same preci- 
 pice which has been fatal to their predecessors. 
 
 I fully admit that the mischief which a per- 
 son does to himself, may seriously affect, both 
 through their sympathies and their interests, 
 those nearly connected with him, and in a mi- 
 nor degree, society at large. When, by con- 
 duct of this sort, a person is led to violate a 
 distinct and assignable obligation to any other 
 person or persons, the case is taken out of the 
 self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to 
 moral disapprobation in the proper sense of 
 the term. If, for example, a man, through in- 
 temperance or extravagance, becomes unable to 
 pay his debts, or, having undertaken the moral 
 responsibility of a family, becomes from the 
 same cause incapable of supporting or edu- 
 cating them, he is deservedly reprobated, and 
 might be justly punished ; but it is for the 
 breach of duty to his family or creditors, not 
 for the extravagance. If the resources which 
 ought to have been devoted to them, had been 
 diverted from them for the most prudent in- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 145 
 
 vestment, the moral culpability would have 
 been the same. George Barnwell murdered 
 his uncle to get money for his mistress, but if 
 he had done it to set himself up in business, 
 he would equally have been hanged. Again, 
 in the frequent case of a man who causes grief 
 to his family by addiction to bad habits, he 
 deserves reproach for his unkind ness or ingrat- 
 itude; but so he may for cultivating habits 
 not in themselves vicious, if they are painful 
 to those with whom he passes his life, or who 
 from personal ties are dependent on him for 
 their comfort. Whoever fails in the consider- 
 ation generally due to the interests and feel- 
 ings of others, not being compelled by some, 
 more imperative duty, or justified by allowable 
 self-preference, is a subject of moral disappro- 
 bation for that failure, but not for the cause of 
 it, nor for the errors, merely personal to him- 
 self, which may have remotely led to it. In 
 like manner, when a person disables himself, 
 by conduct purely self-regarding, from the per- 
 formance of some definite duty incumbent on 
 him to the public, he is guilty of a social of- 
 fence. No person ought to be punished sirn 
 ply for being drunk ; but a soldier or a police- 
 man should be punished for being drunk on 
 duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite 
 damage, or a definite risk of damage, either to 
 an individual or to the public, the case is taken 
 out of the province of liberty, and placed in 
 that of morality or law. 
 
 7 
 
146 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 But with regard to the merely contingent, 
 or, as it may be called, constructive injury 
 which a person causes to society, by conduct 
 which neither violates any specific duty to the 
 public, nor occasions perceptible hurt to any 
 assignable individual except himself ; the in- 
 convenience is one which society can afford to 
 bear, for the sake of the greater good of human 
 freedom. If grown persons are to be punished 
 for not taking proper care of themselves, I 
 would rather it were for their own sake, than 
 under pretence of preventing them from im- 
 pairing their capacity of rendering to society 
 benefits which society does not pretend it has 
 a right to exact. But I cannot consent to ar- 
 gue the point as if society had no means of 
 bringing its weaker members up to its ordi- 
 nary standard of rational conduct, except wait- 
 ing till they do something irrational, and then 
 punishing them, legally or morally, for it. So- 
 ciety has had absolute power over them during 
 all the early portion of their existence : it has 
 had the whole period of childhood and nonage 
 in which to try whether it could make them 
 capable of rational conduct in life. The ex- 
 isting generation is master both of the train- 
 ing and the entire circumstances of the gener- 
 ation to come ; it cannot indeed make them 
 perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so 
 lamentably deficient in goodness and wisdom ; 
 and its best efforts are not always, in individ- 
 ual cases, its most successful ones ; but it is 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 147 
 
 perfectly well able to make the rising genera- 
 tion, as a whole, as good as, and a little beb 
 ter than, itself. If society lets any consider- 
 able number of its members grow up mere 
 children, incapable of being acted on by ra- 
 tional consideration of distant motives, so- 
 ciety has itself to blame for the consequences. 
 Armed not only with all the powers of educa- 
 tion, but with the ascendency which the au- 
 thority of a received opinion always exercises 
 over the minds who are least fitted to judge 
 for themselves ; and aided by the natural pen- 
 alties which cannot be prevented from falling 
 on those who incur the distaste or the con 
 tempt of those who know them ; let not so- 
 ciety pretend that it needs, besides all this, the 
 power to issue commands and enforce obedi- 
 ence in the personal concerns of individuals, 
 in which, on all principles of justice and pol- 
 icy, the decision ought to rest with those who 
 are to abide the consequences. Nor is there 
 anything which tends more to discredit and 
 frustrate the better means of influencing con- 
 duct, than a resort to the worse. If there be 
 among those whom it is attempted to coerce 
 into prudence or temperance, any of the mate- 
 rial of which vigorous and independent charac- 
 ters are made, they will infallibly rebel against 
 the yoke. No such person will ever feel that 
 others have a right to control him in his con- 
 cerns, such as they have to prevent him from 
 injuring them in theirs ; and it easily comes tc 
 
148 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 be considered a mark of spirit and courage to 
 fly in the face of such usurped authority, and 
 do with ostentation the exact opposite of what 
 it enjoins ; as in the fashion of grossness which 
 succeeded, in the time of Charles IL, to the 
 fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans 
 With respect to what is said of the necessity 
 of protecting society from the bad example set 
 to others by the vicious or the self-indulgent ; 
 it is true that bad example may have a perni- 
 cious effect, especially the example of doing 
 wrong to others with impunity to the wrong- 
 doer. But we are now speaking of conduct 
 which, while it does no wrong to others, is 
 supposed to do great harm to the agent him- 
 self : and I do not see how those who believe 
 this, can think otherwise than that the exam- 
 ple, on the whole, must be more salutary than 
 hurtful, since, if it displays the misconduct, it 
 displays also the painful or degrading conse- 
 quences which, if the conduct is justly cen- 
 sured, must be supposed to be in all or most 
 cases attendant on it. 
 
 But the strongest of all the arguments 
 against the interference of the public with 
 purely personal conduct, is that when it does 
 interfere, the odds are that it interferes wrong- 
 ly, and in the wrong place. On questions of 
 social morality, of duty to others, the opinion 
 of the public, that is, of an overruling ma- 
 jority, though often wrong, is likely to be still 
 oftener right ; because on such questions they 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 149 
 
 are only required to judge of their own inter- 
 ests ; of the manner in which some mode of 
 conduct, if allowed to be practised, would 
 affect themselves. But the opinion of a sim- 
 ilar majority, imposed as a law on the minor- 
 ity, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is 
 quite as likely to be wrong as right ; for in 
 these cases public opinion means, at the best, 
 some people’s opinion of what is good or bad 
 foi other people ; while very often it does not 
 even mean that ; the public, with the most per- 
 fect indifference, passing over the pleasure or 
 convenience of those whose conduct they cen- 
 sure, and considering only their own prefer- 
 ence. There are many who consider as an 
 injury to themselves any conduct which they 
 have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage 
 to their feelings ; as a religious bigot, when 
 charged with disregarding the religious feel- 
 ings of others, has been known to retort that 
 they disregard his feelings, by persisting in 
 their abominable worship or creed. But there 
 is no parity between the feeling of a person 
 for his own opinion, and the feeling of another 
 who is offended at his holding it ; no more 
 than between the desire of a thief to take a 
 purse, and the desire of the right owner to 
 keep it. And a person’s taste is as much his 
 own peculiar concern as his opinion or his 
 purse. It is easy for any one to imagine an 
 ideal public, which leaves the freedom and 
 choice of individuals in all uncertain matters 
 
150 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 undisturbed, and only requires them to abstaui 
 from modes of conduct which universal experi- 
 ence has condemned. But where has there been 
 seen a public which set any such limit to its cen- 
 sorship ? or when does the public trouble itself 
 about universal experience ? In its interferen- 
 ces with personal conduct it is seldom thinking 
 of anything but the enormity of acting or feel- 
 ing differently from itself; and this standard of 
 judgment, thinly disguised, is held up to man- 
 kind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, 
 by nine tenths of all moralists and speculative 
 writers. These teach that things are right be- 
 cause they are right ; because we feel them to 
 be so. They tell us to search in our own minds 
 and hearts for laws of conduct binding on our- 
 selves and on all others. What can the poor 
 public do but apply these instructions, and 
 make their own personal feelings of good and 
 evil, if they are tolerably unanimous in them, 
 obligatory on all the world ? 
 
 The evil here pointed out is not one which 
 exists only in theory ; and it may perhaps 
 be expected that I should specify the in- 
 stances in which the public of this age and 
 country improperly invests its own preferences 
 with the character of moral laws. I am not 
 writing an essay on the aberrations of existing 
 moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject 
 to be discussed parenthetically, and by way of 
 illustration. Yet examples are necessary, to 
 show that the principle I maintain is of seri 
 
ON LIBEETY. 
 
 151 
 
 JUS and practical moment, and that I am not 
 endeavoring to erect a barrier against imagin- 
 ary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by 
 abundant instances, that to extend the bounds 
 of what may be called moral police, until it 
 encroaches on the most unquestionably legiti- 
 mate liberty of the individual, is one of the 
 most universal of all human propensities. 
 
 As a first instance, consider the antipathies 
 which men cherish on no better grounds than 
 that persons whose religious opinions are dif- 
 ferent from theirs, do not practise their relig- 
 ious observances, especially their religious ab- 
 stinences. To cite a rather trivial example, 
 nothing in the creed or practice of Christians 
 does more to envenom the hatred of Mahome- 
 dans against them, than the fact of their eat- 
 ing pork. There are few acts which Christians 
 and Europeans regard with more unaffected 
 disgust, than Mussulmans regard this partic- 
 ular mode of satisfying hunger. It is, in the 
 first place, an offence against their religion ; 
 but this circumstance by no means explains 
 either the degree or the kind of their repug- 
 nance ; for wine also is forbidden by their 
 religion, and to partake of it is by all Mussul- 
 mans accounted wrong, but not disgusting. 
 Their aversion to the flesh of the ‘‘unclean 
 beast ” is, on the contrary, of that peculiai 
 character, resembling an instinctive antipathy, 
 which the idea of uncleanness, when once it 
 thoroughly sinks into the feelings, se(;ms a! 
 
152 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 Ways to excite even in those whose persona] 
 habits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, 
 and of which the sentiment of religions im- 
 purity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remark- 
 able example. Suppose now that in a people, 
 of whom the majority were Mussulmans, that 
 majority should insist upon not permitting 
 pork to be eaten within the limits of the coun- 
 try. This would be nothing new in Mahome- 
 dan countries.* Would it be a legitimate ex- 
 ercise of the moral authority of public opinion? 
 and if not, why not ? The practice is really 
 revolting to such a public. They also sincerely 
 think that it is forbidden and abhorred by the 
 Deity. Neither could the prohibition be cen- 
 sured as religious persecution. It might be re- 
 ligious in its origin, but it would not be per- 
 secution for religion, since nobody’s religion 
 makes it a duty to eat pork. The only tena- 
 ble ground of condemnation would be, that 
 with the personal tastes and self-regarding 
 concerns of individuals the public has no busi- 
 ness to interfere. 
 
 ^ The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instauce in point. 
 When this industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of 
 the Persian fire-worshippers, flying from their native country be- 
 fore the Caliphs, arrived in Western India, they were admitted to 
 toleration by the Hindoo sovereigns, on condition of not eating 
 beef. When those regions afterwards fell under the dominion of 
 Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees obtained from them a con- 
 tinuance of indulgence, on condition df refraining from pork. 
 What was at first obedience to authority became a second na- 
 ture, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and pork. 
 Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has 
 iiad time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the 
 Ea.^t, is a religion. 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 153 
 
 To come somewhat nearer home : the major- 
 ity of Spaniards consider it a gross impiety, 
 offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme 
 Being, to worship him in any other manner than 
 the Roman Catholic ; and no other public wor^ 
 ship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of 
 all Southern Europe look upon a married clergy 
 as not only irreligious, but unchaste, indecent, 
 gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think 
 of these perfectly sincere feelings, and of the 
 attempt to enforce them against non-Catho- 
 lics ? Yet, if mankind are justified in inter- 
 fering with each other’s liberty in things which 
 do not concern the interests of others, on what 
 principle is it possible consistently to exclude 
 these cases ? or who can blame people for de- 
 siring to suppress what they regard as a scan- 
 dal in the sight of God and man ? No stronger 
 case can be shown for prohibiting anything 
 which is regarded as a personal immorality, 
 than is made out for suppressing these prac- 
 tices in the eyes of those who regard them as 
 impieties ; and unless we are willing to adopt 
 the logic of persecutors, and to say that we 
 may persecute others because we are right, 
 and that they must not persecute us because 
 they are wrong, we must beware of admitting 
 a principle of which we should resent as a gross 
 injustice the application to ourselves. 
 
 The preceding instances may be objected to, 
 all hough unreasonably, as drawn from contin- 
 gencies impossible among us : opinion, in this 
 
154 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 country, not being likely to enforce abstinence 
 from meats, or to interfere with people for wor- 
 shipping, and for either marrying or not marry- 
 ing, according to their creed or inclination. 
 The next example, however, shall be taken 
 from an interference with liberty which we 
 have by no means passed all danger of. 
 Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently 
 powerful, as in New England, and in Great 
 Britain at the time of the Commonwealth, 
 they have endeavored, with considerable suc- 
 cess, to put down all public, and nearly all 
 private, amusements: especially music, danc- 
 ing, public games, or other assemblages for 
 purposes of diversion, and the theatre. There 
 are still in this country large bodies of persons 
 by whose notions of morality and religion these 
 recreations are condemned : and those persons 
 belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are 
 the ascendant power in the present social and 
 political condition of the kingdom, it is by no 
 means impossible that persons of these senti- 
 ments may at some time or other command a 
 majority in Parliament. How will the remain 
 ing portion of the community like to have the 
 amusements that shall be permitted to them 
 regulated by the religious and moral senti- 
 ments of the stricter Calvinists and Method- 
 ists ? Would they not, with considerable 
 peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious 
 members of society to mind their own busi- 
 ness ? This is precisely what should be said 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 155 
 
 to every government and every public, who 
 have the pretension that no person shall enjoy 
 any pleasure which they think wrong. But if 
 the principle of the pretension be admitted, no 
 one can reasonably object to its being acted on 
 in the sense of the majority, or other prepon- 
 derating power in the country ; and all persons 
 must be ready to conform to the idea of a 
 Christian commonwealth, as understood by the 
 early settlers in New England, if a religious 
 profession similar to theirs should ever succeed 
 in regaining its lost ground, as religions sup 
 posed to be declining have so often been known 
 to do. 
 
 To imagine another contingency, perhaps 
 more likely to be realized than the one last 
 mentioned. There is confessedly a strong ten- 
 dency in the modern world towards a demo- 
 cratic constitution of society, accompanied or 
 not by popular political institutions. It is af- 
 firmed that in the country where this tendency 
 is most completely realized — where both so- 
 ciety and the government are most democratic 
 — the United States — the feeling of the ma- 
 jority, to whom any appearance of a more 
 showy or costly style of living than they can 
 hope to rival is disagreeable, operates as a tol- 
 erably effectual sumptuary law, and that in 
 many parts of the Union it is really difficult 
 for a person possessing a very large income, to 
 find any mode of spending it, which will not 
 incur popular disapprobation. Though such 
 
156 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 statements as these are doubtless much exag- 
 gerated as a representation of existing facts, 
 the state of things they describe is not only a 
 conceivable and possible, but a probable result 
 of democratic feeling, combined with the no- 
 tion that the public has a right to a veto on 
 the manner in which individuals shall spend 
 their incomes. We have only further to sup- 
 pose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opin- 
 ions, and it may become infamous in the eyes 
 of the majority to possess more property than 
 some very small amount, or any income not 
 earned by manual labor. Opinions similar in 
 principle to these, already prevail widely among 
 the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on 
 those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly 
 of that class, namely, its own members. It is 
 known that the bad workmen who form the 
 majority of the operatives in many branches 
 of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad 
 workmen ought to receive the same wages as 
 good, and that no one ought to be allowed, 
 through piecework or otherwise, to earn by 
 superior skill or industry more than others can 
 without it. And they employ a moral police, 
 which occasionally becomes a physical one, to 
 deter skilful workmen from receiving, and em- 
 ployers from giving, a larger remuneration for 
 a more useful service. If the public have anj 
 jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see 
 that these people are in fault, or that any indi- 
 riduaPs particular public can be blamed for as- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 157 
 
 serting the same authority over nis individual 
 conduct, which the general public asserts over 
 people in general. 
 
 But, without dwelling upon supposititious 
 cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpa- 
 tions upon the liberty of private life actually 
 practised, and still greater ones threatened with 
 some expectation of success, and opinions pro- 
 posed which assert an unlimited right in the 
 public not only to prohibit by law everything 
 which it thinks wrong, but in order to get at 
 what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number 
 of things which it admits to be innocent. 
 
 Under the name of preventing intemperance, 
 the people of one English colony, and of 
 nearly half the United States, have been inter- 
 dicted by law from making any use whatever 
 of fermented drinks, except for medical pur- 
 poses: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, 
 as it is intended to be, prohibition of their use. 
 And though the impracticability of executing 
 the law has caused its repeal in several of the 
 States which had adopted it, including the one 
 from which it derives its name, an attempt has 
 notwithstanding been commenced, and is pros- 
 ecuted wdth considerable zeal by many of the 
 professed philanthropists, to agitate for a simi- 
 lar law in this country. The association, or 
 
 Alliance ” as it terms itself, which has been 
 formed for this purpose, has acquired some 
 notoriety through the publicity given to a cor- 
 respondence between its Secretary and one of 
 
158 
 
 ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 the very few English public men who hold that 
 a politician’s opinions ought to be founded on 
 principles. Lord Stanley’s share in this cor- 
 respondence is calculated to strengthen the 
 hopes already built on him, by those who know 
 how rare such qualities as are manifested in 
 some of his public appearances, unhappily are 
 among those who figure in political life. The 
 organ of the Alliance, who would deeply 
 deplore the recognition of any principle which 
 could be wrested to justify bigotry and perse- 
 cution,” undertakes to point out the “ broad 
 and impassable barrier” which divides such 
 principles from those of the association. “ All 
 matters relating to thought, opinion, con- 
 science, appear to me,” he says, to be with- 
 out the sphere of legislation ; all pertaining to 
 social act, habit, relation, subject only to a dis- 
 cretionary power vested in the State itself, and 
 not in the individual, to be within it.” No 
 mention is made of a third class, different from 
 either of these, viz., acts and habits which are 
 not social, but individual; although it is to 
 this class, surely, that the act of drinking fer- 
 mented liquors belongs. Selling fermented 
 liquors, however, is trading, and trading is a 
 social act. But the infringement complained 
 of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on 
 that of the buyer and consumer; since the 
 State might just as well forbid him to drink 
 wine, as purposely make it impossible for him 
 to obtain it. The Secretary, however, says, 7 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 159 
 
 claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate when- 
 ever my social rights are invaded by the social 
 act of another.” And now for the definition 
 of these “ social rights,” If anything invades 
 my social rights, certainly the traffic in strong 
 drink does. It destroys my primary right of 
 security, by constantly creating and stimulating 
 social disorder. It invades my right of equal- 
 ity, by deriving a profit from the creation of a 
 misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my 
 right to free moral and intellectual develop- 
 ment, by surrounding my path with dangers, 
 and by weakening and demoralizing society, 
 from which I have a right to claim mutual aid 
 and intercourse.” A theory of ‘‘ social rights,” 
 the like of which probably never before found 
 its way into distinct language — being nothing 
 short of this — that it is the absolute social 
 right of every individual, that every other in- 
 dividual shall act in every respect exactly as 
 he ought; that who >oever fails thereof in the 
 smallest particular, violates my social right, 
 and entitles me to demand from the legislature 
 the removal of the grievance. So monstrous 
 a principle is far more dangerous than any 
 single interference with liberty; there is no 
 violation of liberty which it would not justify; 
 it acknowledges no right to any freedom what- 
 ever, except perhaps to that of holding opin- 
 ions in secret, without ever disclosing them ; 
 for the moment an opinion which I consider 
 noxious, passes any one’s lips, it invades all 
 
160 
 
 ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 the “ social rights ” attributed to me by the 
 Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind 
 a vested interest in each other’s moral, intel- 
 lectual, and even physical perfection, to be de- 
 fined by each claimant according to his own 
 standard. 
 
 Another important example of illegitimate 
 interference with the rightful liberty of the in- 
 dividual, not simply threatened, but long since 
 carried into triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian 
 legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one 
 day in the week, so far as the exigencies of 
 life permit, from the usual daily occupation, 
 though in no respect religiously binding on 
 any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. 
 And inasmuch as this custom cannot be ob- 
 served without a general consent to that effect 
 among the industrious classes, therefore, in so 
 far as some persons by working may impose 
 the same necessity on others, it may be allow- 
 able and right that the law should guarantee 
 to each, the observance by others of the cus- 
 tom, by suspending the greater operations of 
 industry on a particular day. But this justi- 
 fication, grounded on the direct interest which 
 others have in each individual’s observance of 
 the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen 
 occupations in which a person may think fit 
 to employ his leisure ; nor does it hold good, 
 in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions on 
 amusements. It is true that the amusement 
 of some is the day’s work of others ; but the 
 
ON LIBEPwTY. 
 
 16 ] 
 
 pleasure, not to say the useful recreation, ot 
 many, is worth the labor of a few, providee 
 the occupation is freely chosen, and can be 
 freely resigned. The operatives are perfectl) 
 right in think mg that if all worked on Sunday 
 seven days’ work would have to be given foi 
 six days’ wages : but so long as the great mass 
 of employments are suspended, the small num- 
 ber who for the enjoyment of others must still 
 work, obtain a proportional increase of earn- 
 ings ; and they are not obliged to follow those 
 occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolu- 
 ment. If a further remedy is sought, it might 
 be found in the establishment by custom of a 
 holiday on some other day of the week for 
 those particular classes of persons. The only 
 ground, therefore, on which restrictions on 
 Sunday amusements can be defended, must be 
 that they are religiously wrong; a motive of 
 legislation which never can be too earnestly 
 protested against. ‘‘ Deorurn injuriae Diis 
 curae.” It remains to be proved that society 
 or any of its officers holds a commission from 
 on high to avenge any supposed offence to 
 Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to our 
 fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one 
 man’s duty that another should be religious, 
 was the foundation of all the religious perse- 
 cutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, 
 would fully justify them. Though the feeling 
 which breaks out in the repeated attempts to 
 fitop railway travelling on Sunday, in the re* 
 
162 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 sistance to the opening of Museum?, and the 
 like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, 
 the state of mind indicated by it is fundamen- 
 tally the same. It is a determination not to 
 tolerate others in doing what is permitted by 
 their religion, because it is not permitted by 
 the persecutor’s religion. It is a belief that 
 God not only abominates the act of the mis- 
 believer, but will not hold us guiltless if wt 
 leave him unmolested. 
 
 I cannot refrain from adding to these ex- 
 amples of the little account commonly made 
 of human liberty, the language of downright 
 persecution which breaks out from the press 
 of this country, whenever it feels called on to 
 notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mor- 
 monism. Much might be said on the unex- 
 pected and instructive fact, that an alleged 
 new revelation, and a religion founded on it, 
 the product of palpable imposture, not even 
 supported by the prestige of extraordinary 
 qualities in its founder, is believed by hun- 
 dreds of thousands, and has been made the 
 foundation of a society, in the age of news- 
 papers, railways, and the electric telegraph. 
 What here concerns us is, that this religion, 
 like other and better religions, has its martys ; 
 that its prophet and founder was, for his teach- 
 ing, put to death by a mob ; that others of its 
 adherents lost their lives by the same lawless 
 violence ; that they were forcibly expelled, in 
 a body, from the country in which they first 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 163 
 
 grew up ; while, now that they have been 
 chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a 
 desert, many in this country openly declare 
 that it would be right (only that it is not con- 
 venient) to send an expedition against them, 
 and compel them by force to conform to the 
 opinions of other people. The article of the 
 Mormonite doctrine which is the chief provo- 
 cative to the antipathy which thus breaks 
 through the ordinary restraints of religious 
 tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy ; which, 
 though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hin- 
 doos, and Chinese, seems tr excite unquench- 
 able animosity when practised by persons who 
 speak English, and profess to be a kind of 
 Christians. No one has a deeper disapproba- 
 tion than I have of this Mormon institution ; 
 both for other reasons, and because, far from 
 being in any way countenanced by the prin- 
 ciple of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that 
 principle, being a mere riveting of the chains 
 of one half of the community, and an emanci- 
 pation of the other from reciprocity of obliga- 
 tion towards them. Still, it must be remem- 
 bered that this relation is as much voluntary 
 on the part of the women concerned in it, and 
 who may be deemed the sufferers by it, as is 
 the case with any other form of the marriage 
 institution ; and however surprising this fact 
 may appear, it has its explanation in the com- 
 mon ideas and customs of the world, which 
 teaching women to think marriage the one 
 
164 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 thing neeclfu., make it intelligible that rnanj 
 a woman should prefer being one of severa. 
 wives, to not being a wife at all. Other coun- 
 tries are not asked to recognize such unions, 
 or release any portion of their inhabitants from 
 their own laws on the score of Mormonite 
 opinions. But when the dissentients have 
 conceded to the hostile sentiments of others, 
 far more than could justly be demanded ; 
 when they have left the countries to which 
 their doctrines were unacceptable, and estab 
 lished themselves in a remote corner of the 
 earth, which they have been the first to render 
 habitable to human beings ; it is difficult to 
 see on what principles but those of tyranny 
 they can be prevented from living there under 
 what laws they please, provided they commit 
 no aggi'ession on other nations, and allow per- 
 fect freedom of departure to those who are 
 dissatisfied with their ways. A recent writer, 
 in some respects of considerable merit, pro- 
 poses (to use his own words,) not a crusade, 
 but a civilizade^ against this polygamous com- 
 munity, to put an end to what seems to him a 
 retrograde step in civilization. It also appears 
 so to me, but I am not aware that any com- 
 munity has a right to force another to be civ- 
 ilized. So long as the sufferers by the bad lav/ 
 do not invoke assistance from other commu- 
 nities, I cannot admit that persons entirely 
 unconnected with them ought to step in and 
 require that a condition of things with which 
 
ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 165 
 
 all who are directly interested appear to be 
 satisfied, should be put an end to because it 
 is a scandal to persons some thousands of 
 miles distant, who have no part or concern in 
 it. Let them send missionaries, if they please, 
 to preach against it; and let them, by any 
 fair means (of which silencing the teachers is 
 not one,) oppose the progress of similar doc- 
 trines among their own people. If civilization 
 has got the better of barbarism when bar- 
 barism had the world to itself, it is too much 
 to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after 
 having been fairly got under, should revive 
 and conquer civilization. A civilization that 
 can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy 
 must first have become so degenerate, that 
 neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor 
 anybody else, has the capacity, or will take 
 the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, 
 the sooner such a cizilization receives notice 
 to quit, the better. It can only go on from 
 bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated 
 (like the Western Empire) by energetic bar- 
 barians. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 APPLICATIONS. 
 
 ^pHE principles asserted in these pages must 
 A bo more generally admitted as the basis for 
 discussion of details, before a consistent appli- 
 cation of them to all the various departments 
 of government and morals can be attempted 
 with any prospect of advantage. The few ob- 
 servations I propose to make on questions of 
 detail, are designed to illustrate the principles, 
 rather than to follow them out to their conse- 
 quences. I offer, not so much applications, as 
 specimens of application ; which may serve to 
 hring into greater clearness the meaning and 
 limits of the two maxims which together form 
 the entire doctrine of this Essay, and to assist 
 the judgment in holding the balance between 
 them, in the cases where it appears doubtful 
 which of them is applicable to the case. 
 
 The maxims are, first, that the individual is 
 not accountable to society for his actions, in so 
 far as these concern the interests of no person 
 but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, 
 and avoidance by other people, if thought ne« 
 cessary by them for their own good, are the 
 only measures by which society can justifiably 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 167 
 
 express its dislike or disapprobation of his con- 
 duct. Secondly, that for such actions as are 
 prejudicial to the interests of others, the indh 
 vidual is accountable, and may be subjected 
 (‘.ither to social or to legal punishments, if so- 
 ciety is of opinion that the one or the other is 
 requisite for its protection. 
 
 In the first place, it must by no means be 
 supposed, because damage, or probability of 
 damage, to the interests of others, can alone 
 justify the interference of society, that there- 
 fore it always does justify such interference. 
 In many cases, an individual, in pursuing a 
 legitimate object, necessarily and therefore le- 
 gitimately causes pain or loss to others, or 
 intercepts a good which they had a reasonable 
 hope of obtaining. Such oppositions of inter- 
 est between individuals often arise from bad 
 social institutions, but are unavoidable while 
 those institutions last ; and some would be 
 unavoidable under any institutions. Whoever 
 succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a 
 competitive examination ; whoever is preferred 
 to another in any contest for an object which 
 both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of oth- 
 ers, from their wasted exertion and their disap- 
 pointment. But it is, by common admission, 
 better for the general interest of mankind, that 
 persons should pursue their objects undeterred 
 by this sort of consequences. In other words, 
 society admits no right, cither legal or moral, in 
 the disappointed competitors, to immunity from 
 
168 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 this kind of suffering; and feels called on to in- 
 terfere, only when means of success have been 
 employed which it is contrary to the general 
 interest to permit — namely, fraud or treachery 
 and force. 
 
 Again, trade is a social act. Whoever un- 
 dertakes to sell any description of goods to the 
 public, does what affects the interest of other 
 persons, and of society in general ; and thus 
 his conduct, in principle, comes within the ju- 
 risdiction of society : accordingly, it was once 
 held to be the duty of governments, in all cases 
 which were considered of importance, to fix 
 prices, and regulate the processes of manu- 
 facture. But it is now recognized, though not 
 till after a long struggle, that both the cheap- 
 ness and the good quality of commodities are 
 most effectually provided for by leaving the 
 producers and sellers perfectly free, under the 
 sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for 
 supplying themselves elsewhere. This is the 
 so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests 
 on grounds different from, though equally solid 
 with, the principle of individual liberty asserted 
 in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or on 
 production for purposes of trade, are indeed 
 restraints ; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an 
 evil: but the restraints in question affect only 
 that part of conduct which society is competent 
 to restrain, and are wrong solely because they 
 do not really produce the results which it is de- 
 sired to produce by them. As the principle of 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 169 
 
 individual liberty is not involved in the doc- 
 trine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of 
 the questions which arise respecting the limits 
 of that doctrine ; as for example, what amount 
 of public control is admissible for the preven- 
 tion of fraud by adulteration ; how far sanitary 
 precautions, or arrangements to protect work- 
 people employed in dangerous occupations, 
 should be enforced on employers. Such ques- 
 tions involve considerations of liberty, only in 
 so far as leaving people to themselves is always 
 better, cceteris paribus^ than controlling them : 
 but that they may be legitimately controlled 
 for these ends, is in principle undeniable. On 
 the other hand, there are questions relating to 
 interference with trade, which are essentially 
 questions of liberty ; such as the Maine Law, 
 already touched upon ; the prohibition of the 
 importation of opium into China ; the restric- 
 tion of the sale of poisons ; all cases, in short, 
 where the object of the interference is to make 
 it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular 
 commodity. These interferences are objection- 
 able, not as infringements on the liberty of the 
 producer or seller, but on that of the buyer. 
 
 One of these examples, that of the sale of 
 poisons, opens a new question ; the proper 
 limits of what may be called the functions of 
 police ; how far liberty may legitimately be in- 
 vaded for the prevention of crime, or of acci- 
 dent. It is one of the undisputed functions of 
 government to take precautions against crime 
 8 
 
170 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 before it has been committed, as well as to de- 
 tect and punish it afterwards. The preventive 
 function of government, however, is far more 
 liable to be abused, to the prejudice of liberty, 
 than the punitory function ; for there is hardly 
 any part of the legitimate freedom of action 
 of a human being which would not admit of 
 being represented, and fairly too, as increasing 
 the facilities for some form or other of delin- 
 quency. Nevertheless, if a public authority, or 
 even a private person, 'sees any one evidently 
 preparing to commit a crime, they are not 
 bound to look on inactive until the crime is 
 committed, but may interfere to prevent it. If 
 poisons were never bought or used for any pur- 
 pose except the commission of murder, it would 
 be right to prohibit their manufacture and sale 
 They may, however, be wanted not only foi 
 innocent but for useful purposes, and restric- 
 tions cannot be imposed in the one case with- 
 out operating in the other. Again, it is a 
 proper office of public authority to guard 
 against accidents. If either a public officer 
 or any one else saw a person attempting to 
 cross a bridge which had been ascertained to 
 be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him 
 of his danger, they might seize him and turn 
 him back, without any real infringement of his 
 liberty ; for liberty consists in doing what one; 
 desires, and he does not desire to fall into the 
 river. Nevertheless, when there is not a cer- 
 tainty, but only a danger of mischief, no one 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 171 
 
 but the person himself can judge of t’ne suffi- 
 ciency of the motive which may prompt him 
 to incur the risk : in this case, therefore, (unless 
 he is a child, or delirious, or in some state of 
 excitement or absorption incompatible with the 
 full use of the reflecting faculty), he ought, I 
 conceive, to be only warned of the danger ; not 
 forcibly prevented from exposing himself to it 
 Similar considerations, applied to such a ques 
 tion as the sale of poisons, may enable us to 
 decide which among the possible modes of reg- 
 ulation are or are not contrary to principle. 
 Such a precaution, for example, as that of la- 
 belling the drug with some word expressive of 
 its dangerous character, may be enforced with- 
 out violation of liberty : the buyer cannot wish 
 not to know that the thing he possesses has 
 poisonous qualities. But to require in all cases 
 the certificate of a medical practitioner, would 
 make it sometimes impossible, always expen- 
 sive, to obtain the article for legitimate uses. 
 The only mode apparent to me, in which diffi- 
 culties may be thrown in the way of crime 
 committed through this means, without any 
 infringement, worth taking into account, upon 
 the liberty of those who desire the poisonous 
 substance for other purposes, consists in pro- 
 viding what, in the apt language of Bentham, 
 is called ‘‘preappointed evidence.” This pro- 
 vision is familiar to every one in the case of 
 contracts. It is usual and right that the law, 
 when a contract is entered into, should require 
 
172 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 as the condition of its enforcing performance, 
 that certain formalities should be observed, 
 such as signatures, attestation of witnesses, 
 and the like, in order that in case of subse- 
 quent dispute, there may be evidence to prove 
 that the contract was really entered into, and 
 that there was nothing in the circumstances to 
 render it legally invalid : the effect being, to 
 throw great obstacles in the way of fictitious 
 contracts, or contracts made in circumstances 
 which, if known, would destroy their validity. 
 Precautions of a similar nature might be en- 
 forced in the sale of articles adapted to be in- 
 struments of crime. The seller, for example, 
 might be required to enter in a register the ex- 
 act time of the transaction, the name and ad- 
 dress of the buyer, the precise quality and 
 quantity sold ; to ask the purpose for which it 
 was wanted, and record the answer he received. 
 When, there was no medical prescription, the 
 presence of some third person might be re- 
 quired, to bring home the fact to the purchaser, 
 in case there should afterwards be reason to 
 believe that the article had been applied to 
 criminal purposes. Such regulations would in 
 general be no material impediment to obtain- 
 ing the article, but a very considerable one to 
 making an improper use of it without detec- 
 tion. 
 
 The right inherent in society, to ward off 
 crimes against itself by antecedent precautions, 
 suggests the obvious limitations to the maxim, 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 173 
 
 that purely self-regarding misconduct cannot 
 properly be meddled with in the way of pre* 
 vention or punishment. Drunkenness, for ex- 
 ample, in ordinary cases, is not a fit subject 
 for legislative interference ; but I should deem 
 it |)erfectly legitimate that a person, who had 
 once been convicted of any act of violence to 
 others under the influence of drink, should be 
 placed under a special legal restriction, per 
 sonal to himself; that if he were afterwards 
 found drunk, he should be liable to a penalty, 
 and that if when in that state he committed 
 another offence, the punishment to which he 
 would be liable for that other offence should 
 be increased in severity. The making himself 
 drunk, in a person whom drunkenness excites 
 to do harm to others, is a crime against others. 
 So, again, idleness, except in a person receiv- 
 ing support from the public, or except when it 
 constitutes a breach of contract, cannot with- 
 out tyranny be made a subject of legal punish- 
 ment ; but if either from idleness or from any 
 other avoidable cause, a man fails to perform 
 his legal duties to others, as for instance to 
 support his children, it is no tyranny to force 
 him to fulfil that obligation, by compulsory 
 labor, if no other means are available. 
 
 Again, there are many acts which, being 
 directly injurious only to the agents them- 
 selves, ought not to be legally interdicted, but 
 which, if done publicly, are a violation of good 
 manners, and coming thus within the category 
 
174 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 of ofibnces against others, may rightfully l)e 
 prohibited. Of this kind are offences against 
 decency; on which it is unnecessary to dwell, 
 the rather as they are only connected indirectly 
 with our subject, the objection to publicity be- 
 ing equally strong in the case of many actions 
 not in themselves condemnable, nor supposed 
 to be so. 
 
 There is another question to which an an- 
 swer must be found, consistent with the prin- 
 ciples which have been laid down. In cases 
 of personal conduct supposed to be blaraeable, 
 but which respect for liberty precludes society 
 from preventing oi punishing, because the evil 
 directly resulting falls wholly on the agent; 
 what the agent is free to do, ought other per- 
 sons to be equally free to counsel or instigate ? 
 This question is not free from difficulty. The 
 case of a person who solicits another to do an 
 act, is not strictly a case of self-regarding con- 
 duct. To give advice or offer inducements to 
 any one, is a social act, and may therefore, 
 like actions in general which affect others, be 
 supposed amenable to social control. But a 
 little reflection corrects the first impression, by 
 showing that if the case is not strictly within 
 the definition of individual liberty, yet the 
 reasons on which the principle of individual 
 liberty is grounded, are applicable to it. If 
 people must be allowed, in whatever concerns 
 only themselves, to act as seems best to them- 
 selves at their own peril, they must equally be 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 175 
 
 free to consult with one another about what is 
 fit to be so done ; to exchange opinions, and 
 give and receive suggestions. Whatever it is 
 permitted to do, it must be permitted to ad- 
 vise to do. The question is doubtful, only 
 when the instigator derives a personal benefit 
 from his advice ; when he makes it his occu- 
 pation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to 
 promote what society and the State consider 
 to be an evil. Then, indeed, a new element 
 ol complication is introduced ; namely, the ex- 
 istence of classes of persons with an interest 
 opposed to what is considered as the public 
 weal, and whose mode of living is grounded ^ 
 on the counteraction of it. Ought this to be 
 interfered with, or not? Fornication, for ex- 
 ample, must be tolerated, and so must gam- 
 bling ; but should a person be free to be a 
 pimp, or to keep a gambling-house ? The 
 case is one of those which lie on the exact 
 boundary line between two principles, and it 
 is not at once apparent to which of the two it 
 properly belongs. There are arguments on 
 both sides. On the side of toleration it may 
 be said, that the fact of following anything as 
 an occupation, and living or profiting by the 
 practice of it, cannot make that criminal which 
 would otherwise be admissible; that the act 
 should either be consistently permitted or con- 
 sistently prohibited; that if the principles which 
 we have hitherto defended are true, society has 
 no business, as society, to decide anything to 
 
176 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 be wrong which concerns only the individual; 
 that it cannot go beyond dissuasion, and that 
 one person should be as free to persuade, as 
 another to dissuade. In opposition to this it 
 may be contended, that although the public, 
 or the State, are not warranted in authorita- 
 tively deciding, for purposes of repression or 
 punishment, that such or such conduct affect- 
 ing only the interests of the individual is good 
 or bad, they are fully justified in assuming, if 
 they regard it as bad, that its being so or not 
 is at least a disputable question : That, this 
 being supposed, they cannot be acting wrong- 
 ly in endeavoring to exclude the influence of 
 solicitations which are not disinterested, of 
 instigators who cannot possibly be impartial 
 — who have a direct personal interest on one 
 side, and that side the one which the State 
 believes to be wrong, and who confessedly pro- 
 mote it for personal objects only. There can 
 surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no 
 sacrifice of good, by so ordering matters that 
 persons shall make their election, either wisely 
 or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as 
 possible from the arts of persons who stimu- 
 late their inclinations for interested purposes 
 of their own. Thus (it may be said) though 
 the statutes respecting unlawful games are 
 utterly indefensible — though all persons should 
 be free to gamble in their own or each other’s 
 houses, or in any place of meeting established 
 by their own subscriptions, and open only to 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 177 
 
 the members and their visitors — yet public 
 gambling-houses should not be permitted. It 
 is true that the prohibition is never effectual, 
 and that whatever amount of tyrannical power 
 is given to the police, gambling-houses can al- 
 ways be maintained under other pretences • 
 but they may be compelled to conduct their 
 operations with a certain degree of secrecy 
 and mystery, so that nobody knows anything 
 about them but those who seek them ; and 
 more than this, society ought not to aim at. 
 There is considerable force in these arguments. 
 I will not venture to decide whether they are 
 sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of pun- 
 ishing the accessary, when the principal is 
 (and must be) allowed to go free ; of fining or 
 imprisoning the procurer, but not the forni- 
 cator, the gambling-house keeper, but not the 
 gambler. Still less ought the common opera- 
 tions of buying and selling to be interfered 
 with on analogous grounds. Almost every 
 article which is bought and soxd may used in 
 excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary in- 
 terest in encouraging that excess ; but no argu- 
 ment can be founded on this, in favor, for in- 
 stance, of the Maine Law ; because the class 
 of dealers in strong drinks, though interested 
 in their abuse, are indispensably required for 
 the sake of their legitimate use. The interest 
 however, of these dealers in promoting intern* 
 perance is a real evil, and justifies the State in 
 imposing restrictions and requiring guarantees 
 8 * 
 
178 
 
 ON LIBERTY, 
 
 which but for that justification would be in» 
 fringements of legitimate liberty. 
 
 A further question is, whether the State, 
 while it permits, should nevertheless indirectly 
 discourage conduct which it deems contrary to 
 the best interests of the agent; whether, for 
 example, it should take measures to render the 
 means of drunkenness more costly, or add to 
 the difficulty of procuring them, by limiting 
 the number of the places of sale. On this as 
 on most other practical questions, many distinc- 
 / tions require to be made. To tax stimulants for 
 the sole purpose of making them more difficult 
 to be obtained, is a measure differing only in 
 degree from their entire prohibition ; and would 
 be justifiable only if that were justifiable. 
 ^ Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those 
 / whose means do not come up to the augmented 
 \ price ; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid 
 ^ on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their 
 \ choice of pleasures, and their mode of expcmd- 
 I ing their income, after satisfying their legal and 
 I moral obligations to the State and to individ 
 uals, are their own concern, and must rest with 
 their own judgment. These considerations 
 may seem at first sight to condemn the selec- 
 tion of stimulants as special subjects of taxation 
 for purposes of revenue. But it must be re- 
 membered that taxation for fiscal purposes is 
 absolutely inevitable ; that in most countries 
 it is necessary that a considerable part of that 
 taxation should be indirect; that the State, 
 
 
 / 
 
 'I - . 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 179 
 
 therefore, cannot help imposing penalties, which 
 to some persons may be prohibitory, on the use 
 of some articles of consumption. It is hence 
 the duty of the State to consider, in the impo- 
 sition of taxes, what commodities the consum- 
 ers can best spare ; and d fortiori^ to select in 
 preference those of wdiich it deems the use, be- 
 yond a very moderate quantity, to be positively 
 injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, 
 up to the point which produces the largest 
 amount of revenue (supposing that the State 
 needs all the revenue which it yields) is not 
 only admissible, but to be approved of. 
 
 The question of making the sale of these 
 commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, 
 must be answered differently, according to the 
 purposes to which the restriction is intended 
 to be subservient. All places of public resort 
 require the restraint of a police, and places of 
 this kind peculiarly, because offences against 
 society are especially apt to originate there. It 
 is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling 
 these commodities (at least for consumption 
 on the spot) to persons of known or vouched- 
 for respectability of conduct ; to make such 
 regulations respecting hours of opening and 
 closing as may be requisite for public surveil- 
 lance, and to withdraw the license if breaches 
 of the peace repeatedly take place through the 
 connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the 
 house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for con- 
 cocting and preparing offences against the law 
 
180 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 Any further restriction I do not conceive to 
 be, in principle, justifiable. The limitation in 
 number, for instance, of beer and spirit-houses, 
 for the express purpose of rendering them more 
 difficult of access, and diminishing the occa- 
 sions of temptation, not only exposes all to 
 an inconvenience because there are some by 
 whom the facility would be abused, but is 
 suited only to a state of society in which the 
 laboring classes are avowedly treated as chil- 
 dren or savages, and placed under an educa- 
 tion of restraint, to fit them for future admis- 
 sion to the privileges of freedom. This is not 
 the principle on which the laboring classes are 
 professedly governed in any free country ; and 
 no person who sets due value on freedom will 
 give his adhesion to their being so governed, 
 unless after all efforts have been exhausted to 
 educate them for freedom and govern them as 
 freemen, and it has been definitively proved 
 that they can only be governed as children. 
 The bare statement of the alternative shows 
 the absurdity of supposing that such efforts 
 have been made in any case which needs be 
 considered here. It is only because the insti- 
 tutions of this country are a mass of incon- 
 sistencies, that things find admittance into our 
 practice which belong to the system of des- 
 potic, or what is called paternal, government, 
 while the general freedom of our institutions 
 precludes the exercise of the amount of con- 
 
ON LIBEKTY. 
 
 181 
 
 trol necessary to render the restraint of any 
 real efficacy as a moral education. 
 
 It was pointed out in an early part of this 
 Essay, that the liberty of the individual, in 
 things wherein the individual is alone con- 
 cerned, implies a corresponding liberty in any 
 number of individuals to regulate by mutual 
 agi'eement such things as regard them jointly, 
 and regard no persons but themselves. This 
 question prese .its no difficulty, so long as the 
 will of all the persons implicated remains un- 
 altered ; but since that will may change, it is 
 often necessary, even in things in which they 
 alone are concerned, that they should enter into 
 engagements with one another; and when they 
 do, it is fit, as a general rule, that those en- 
 gagements should be kept. Yet in the laws, 
 probably, of every country, this general rule 
 has some exceptions. Not only persons are 
 not held to engagements which violate the 
 rights of third parties, but it is sometimes con- 
 sidered a sufficient reason for releasing them 
 from an engagement, that it is injurious to 
 themselves. In this and most other civilized 
 countries, for example, an engagement by 
 which a person should sell himself, or allow 
 himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null 
 and void ; neither enforced by law nor by opin- 
 ion. The ground for thus limiting his power 
 of voluntarily disposing of his own lot in life, 
 is apparent, and is very clearly seen in this ex- 
 treme case. The reason for not interfering, 
 
182 
 
 ON LIBEET\. 
 
 unless for the sake of others, with a person a 
 voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty 
 His voluntary choice is evidence that what he 
 so chooses is desirable, or at the least endur- 
 able, to him, and his good is on the whole best 
 provided for by allowing him to take his own 
 m()ans of pursuing it. But by selling himself 
 for a slave, he abdicates his liberty ; he fore- 
 goes any future use of it, beyond that single 
 act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the 
 very purpose which is the justification of al 
 lowing him to dispose of himself. He is no 
 longer free ; but is thenceforth in a position 
 which has no longer the presumption in its 
 favor, that would be afforded by his voluntarily 
 remaining in it. The principle of freedom 
 cannot require that he should be free not to be 
 free. It is not freedom, to be allowed to alien- 
 ate his freedom. These reasons, the force of 
 which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, 
 are evidently of far wider application ; yet a 
 limit is everywhere set to them by the necessi- 
 ties of life, which continually require, not in- 
 deed that we should resign our freedom, but 
 that we should consent to this and the other 
 limitation of it. The principle, however, 
 which demands uncontrolled freedom of ac- 
 tion in all that concerns only the agents them- 
 selves, requires that those who have become 
 bound to one another, in things which concern 
 no third party, should be able to release one 
 another from the engagement : and even with- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 183 
 
 out such voluntary release, there are perhaps 
 no contracts or engagements, except those that 
 relate to money or money’s worth, of which one 
 can ventme to say that there ought to be no 
 liberty whatever of retractation. Baron Wil- 
 helm von Humboldt, in the excellent Essay 
 from which I have already quoted, states it as 
 las conviction, that engagements which involve 
 personal relations or services, should never be 
 legally binding beyond a limited duration of 
 time ; and that the most important of these 
 engagements, marriage, having the peculiarity 
 that its objects are frustrated unless the feel- 
 ings of both the parties are in harmony with 
 it, should require nothing more than the de- 
 clared will of either party to dissolve it. This 
 subject is too important, and too complicated, 
 to be discussed in a parenthesis, and I touch 
 on it only so far as is necessary for purposes of 
 illustration. If the conciseness and generality 
 of Baron Humboldt’s dissertation had not ob- 
 liged him in this instance to content himself 
 with enunciating his conclusion without dis- 
 cussing the premises, he would doubtless have 
 recognized that the question cannot be decided 
 on grounds so simple as those to which he con- 
 fines himself. When a person, either by ex- 
 press promise or by conduct, has encouraged 
 another to rely upon his continuing to act in a 
 certain way — to build expectations and calcu- 
 lations, and stake any part of his plan of life 
 upon that supposition, a new series of moral 
 
184 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 obligations arises on his part towards that per- 
 son, which may possibly be overruled, but can- 
 not be ignored. And again, if the relation 
 between two contracting parties has been fol- 
 lowed by consequences to others ; if it has 
 placed third parties in any peculiar position, 
 or, as in the case of marriage, has even called 
 third parties into existence, obligations arise on 
 the part of both the contracting parties towards 
 those third persons, the fulfilment of which, or 
 at all events the mode of fulfilment, must be 
 greatly affected by the continuance or disrup- 
 tion of the relation between the original par- 
 ties to the contract. It does not follow, nor 
 can I admit, that these obligations extend to 
 requiring the fulfilment of the contract at all 
 costs to the happiness of the reluctant party ; 
 but they are a necessary element in the ques- 
 tion ; and even if, as Von Humboldt main- 
 tains, they ought to make no difference in the 
 legal freedom of the parties to release them- 
 selves from the engagement (and I also hold 
 that they ought not to make much difference), 
 they necessarily make a great difference in the 
 moral freedom. A person is bound to take ah 
 these circumstances into account, before resolv- 
 ing on a step which may affect such important 
 interests of others ; and if he does not allow 
 proper weight to those interests, he is morally 
 responsible for the wrong. I have made these 
 obvious remarks for the better illustration of 
 the general principle of liberty, and not be* 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 185 
 
 cause they are at all needed on the particuia/ 
 question, which, on the contrary, is usually 
 discussed as if the interest of children was 
 everything, and that of grown persons noth- 
 ing. 
 
 I have already observed that, owing to the 
 absence of any recognized general principles, 
 liberty is often granted where it should be 
 withheld, as well as withheld where it should 
 be granted ; and one of the cases in which, in 
 the modern European world, the sentiment of 
 liberty is the strongest, is a case where, in my 
 view, it is altogether misplaced. A person 
 should be free to do as he likes in his own con- 
 cerns ; but he ought not to be free to do as he 
 likes in acting for another under the pretext 
 that the affairs of another are his own affairs. 
 The State, while it respects the liberty of each 
 in what specially regards himself, is bound to 
 maintain a vigilant control over his exercise 
 of any power which it allows him to possess 
 over others. This obligation is almost entirely 
 disregarded in the case of the family relations, 
 a case, in its direct influence on human happi- 
 ness, more important than all others taken to- 
 gether. The almost despotic power of hus- 
 bands over wives needs not be enlarged upon 
 here, because nothing more is needed for the 
 (‘omplete removal of the evil, than that wives 
 should have the same rights, and should receive 
 the protection of law in the same manner, as 
 all other persons ; and because, on this subject 
 
186 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 the defenders of established injustice do nol 
 avail themselves of the plea of liberty, but 
 stand forth openly as the champions of power. 
 It is in the case of children, that misapplied 
 notions of liberty are a real obstacle to the ful- 
 filment by the State of its duties. One would 
 almost think that a man’s children were sup- 
 posed to be literally, and not metaphorically, a 
 part of himself, so jealous is opinion of the 
 smallest interference of law with his absolute 
 and exclusive control over them ; more jealous 
 than of almost any interference with his own 
 freedom of action : so much less do the gen- 
 erality of mankind value liberty than power. 
 Consider, for example, the case of education. 
 Is it not almost a self-evident axiom, that the 
 State should require and compel the educa- 
 tion, up to a certain standard, of every human 
 being who is born its citizen ? Yet who is 
 there that is not afraid to recognize and assert 
 this truth ? Hardly any one indeed will deny 
 that it is one of the most sacred duties of the 
 parents (or, as law and usage now stand, the 
 father), after summoning a human being into 
 the world, to give to that being an education 
 fitting him to perform his part well in life to- 
 wards others and towards himself. But while 
 this is unanimously declared to be the father’s 
 duty, scarcely anybody, in this country, will 
 bear to heai of obliging him to perform it. In- 
 stead of his being required to make any exer 
 tion or sacrifice for securing education to the 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 187 
 
 child, it is left to his choice to accept it or not 
 when it is provided gratis ! It still remains 
 unrecognized, that to bring a child into exist- 
 ence without a fair prospect of being able, not 
 only to provide food for its body, but instruc- 
 tion and training for its mind, is a moral crime, 
 both against the unfortunate offspring and 
 against society; and that if the parent does 
 not fulfil this obligation, the State ought to see 
 it fulfilled at the charge, as far as possible, of 
 the parent. 
 
 Were the duty of enforcing universal educa- 
 tion once admitted, there would be an end to 
 the difficulties about what the State should 
 teach, and how it should teach, which now 
 convert the subject into a mere battle-field foi 
 sects and parties, causing the time and labor 
 which should have been spent in educating, to 
 be wasted in quarrelling about education. If 
 the government would make up its mind to 
 require for every child a good education, it 
 might save itself the trouble of providing one. 
 It might leave to parents to obtain the educa- 
 tion where and how they pleased, and content 
 itself with helping to pay the school fees of the 
 poorer classes of children, and defraying the 
 entire school expenses of those who have no 
 one else to pay for them. The objections 
 which are urged with reason against State 
 education, do not apply to the enforcement of 
 education by the State, but to the State’s tak- 
 ing upon itself to direct that education : which 
 
188 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 is a totally different thing. That the whole oi 
 any large part of the education of the people 
 should be in State hands, I go as far as any 
 one in deprecating. All that has been said of 
 the importance of individuality of character, 
 and diversity in opinions and modes of con- 
 duct, involves, as of the same unspeakable im- 
 portance, diversity of education. A general 
 State education is a mere contrivance foi 
 moulding people to be exactly like one an- 
 other: and as the mould in which it casts 
 them is that which pleases the predominant 
 power in the government, whether this be a 
 monarch, a priesthood, an aristocracy, or the 
 majority of the existing generation, in propor- 
 tion as it is efficient and successful, it estab- 
 lishes a despotism over the mind, leading by 
 natural tendency to one over the body. An 
 education established and controlled by the 
 State, should only exist, if it exist at all, as 
 one among many competing experiments, car- 
 ried on for the purpose of example and stimu 
 lus, to keep the others up to a certain standard 
 of excellence. Unless, indeed, when -^lociety in 
 general is in so backward a state that it could 
 not or would not provide for itself any proper 
 institutions of education, unless the govern- 
 ment undertook the task ; then, indeed, the 
 government may, as the less of two great evils, 
 take upon itself the business of schools and 
 universities, as it may that of joint-stock com- 
 panies, when private enterprise, in a shape fit^ 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 18S 
 
 f:ed for undertaking great works of industry 
 does not exist in the country. But in general, 
 if the country contains a sufficient number of 
 persons qualified to provide education under 
 government auspices, the same persons would 
 be able and willing to give an equally good 
 education on the voluntary principle, under 
 the assurance of remuneration afforded by a 
 law rendering education compulsory, combined 
 with State aid to those unable to defray the 
 expense. 
 
 The instrument for enforcing the law could 
 be no other than public examinations, extend- 
 ing to all children, and beginning at an early 
 age. An age might be fixed at which every 
 child must be examined, to ascertain if he (or 
 she) is able to read. If a child proves unable, 
 the father, unless he has some sufficient ground 
 of excuse, might be subjected to a moderate 
 fine, to be worked out, if necessary, by his 
 labor, and the child might be put to school at 
 his expense. Once in every year the examina- 
 tion should be renewed, with a gradually ex- 
 tending range of subjects, so as to make the 
 universal acquisition, and what is more, reten- 
 tion, of a certain minimum of general knowl- 
 edge, virtually compulsory. Beyond that min- 
 imum, there should be voluntary examinations 
 on all subjects, at which all who come up to 
 a certain standard of proficiency might claim 
 a certificate. To prevent the State from exer- 
 cising through these arrangements, an impropei 
 
190 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 influence over opinion, the knowledge required 
 for passing an examination (beyond the merely 
 instrumental parts of knowledge, such as lan- 
 guages and their use) should, even in the high- 
 er class of examinations, be confined to facts 
 and positive science exclusively. The exami- 
 nations on religion, politics, or other disputed 
 topics, should not turn on the truth or false- 
 hood of opinions, but on the matter of fact 
 that such and such an opinion is held, on 
 such grounds, by such authors, or schools, oi 
 churches. Under this system, the rising gen- 
 eration would be no worse off* in regard to all 
 disputed truths, than they are at present ; they 
 would be brought up either churchmen or dis- 
 senters as they now are, the State merely tak 
 ing care that they should be instructed church- 
 men, or instructed dissenters. There would 
 be nothing to hinder them from being taught 
 religion, if their parents chose, at the same 
 schools where they were taught other things. 
 All attempts by the State to bias the conclu- 
 sions of its citizens on disputed subjects, are 
 evil ; but it may very properly offer to ascer- 
 tain and certify that a person possesses the 
 knowledge, requisite to make his conclusions, 
 on any given subject, worth attending to. A 
 student of philosophy would be the better for 
 being able to stand an examination both in 
 Locke and in Kant, whichever of the two he 
 takes up with, or even if with neither : and 
 there is no reas\:)nable objection to examining 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 191 
 
 an atheist in the evidences of Christianity, pro- 
 vided he is not required to profess a belief in 
 them. The examinations, however, in the 
 higher branches of knowledge should, I con- 
 ceive, be entirely voluntary. It would be giv- 
 ing too dangerous a power to governments, 
 were they allowed to exclude any one from 
 professions, even from the profession of teach- 
 er, for alleged deficiency of qualifications : and 
 I think, with Wilhelm von Humboldt, that de- 
 grees, or other public certificates of scientific 
 or professional acquirements, should be given 
 to all who present themselves for examination, 
 and stand the test ; but that such certificates 
 snould confer no advantage over competitors, 
 other than the weight which may be attached 
 to their testimony by public opinion. 
 
 It is not in the matter of education only, 
 that misplaced notions of liberty prevent moral 
 obligations on the part of parents from being 
 recognized, and legal obligations from being 
 imposed, where there are the strongest grounds 
 for the former always, and in many cases for 
 the latter also. The fact itself, of causing the 
 existence of a human being, is one of the most 
 responsible actions in the range of human life. 
 To undertake this responsibility — to bestow a 
 life which may be either a curse or a blessing 
 — unless the being on whom it is to be be- 
 stowed will have at east the ordinary chances 
 of a desirable existence, is a crime against tnat 
 being. And in a country either over-peopled. 
 
192 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 or threatened with being so, to produce ciiil 
 dren, beyond a very small number, with the 
 effect of reducing the reward of labor by their 
 competition, is a serious offence against all 
 who live by the remuneration of their labor. 
 The laws which, in many countries on the 
 Continent, forbid marriage unless the parties 
 can show that they have the means of sup- 
 porting a family, do not exceed the legitimate 
 powers of the State : and whether such laws 
 be expedient or not (a question mainly depen 
 dent on local circumstances and feelings), they 
 are not objectionable as violations of liberty. 
 Such laws are interferences of the State to pro- 
 hibit a mischievous act — an act injurious to 
 others, which ought to be a subject of reproba- 
 tion, and social stigma, even when it is not 
 deemed expedient to superadd legal punish- 
 ment. Yet the current ideas of liberty, which 
 bend so easily to real infringements of the 
 freedom of the individual, in things which 
 concern only himself, would repel the attempt 
 to put any restraint upon his inclinations when 
 the consequence of their indulgence is a life, 
 or lives, of wretchedness and depravity to the 
 offspring, with manifold evils to those suffi- 
 ciently within reach to be in any way affected 
 by their actions. When we compare the 
 strange respect of mankind for liberty, with 
 their strange want of respect for it, we might 
 imagine that a man had an indispensable 
 right to do harm to others, and no right at 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 193 
 
 all to please himself without giving pain to 
 any one. 
 
 I have reserved for the last place a large class 
 of questions respecting the limits of govern- 
 ment interference, which, though closely con- 
 nected with the subject of this Essay, do not, 
 in strictness, belong to it. These are cases in 
 which the reasons against interference do not 
 turn upon the principle of liberty: the question 
 is not about restraining .the actions of individ- 
 uals, but about helping them : it is asked 
 whether the government should do, or cause to 
 be done, something for their benefit, instead of 
 leaving it to be done by themselves, individu- 
 ally, or in voluntary combination. 
 
 The objections to government interference, 
 when it is not such as to involve infringement 
 of liberty, may be of three kinds. 
 
 The first is, when the thing to be done is 
 likely to be better done by individuals than by 
 the government. Speaking generally, there is 
 no one so fit to conduct any business, or to de- 
 termine how or by whom it shall be conducted, 
 as those who are personally interested in it. 
 This principle condemns the interferences, once 
 so common, of the legislature, or the officers of 
 government, with the ordinary processes of in- 
 dustry. But this part of the subject has been 
 sufficiently enlarged upon by political econo- 
 mists, and is not particularly related to the 
 principles of this Essay. 
 
 The second objection is more nearly allied to 
 9 
 
194 : 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 our subject. In many cases, though individu- 
 als may not do the particular thing so well, on 
 the average, as the officers of government) it is 
 nevertheless desirable that it should be done by 
 them, rather than by the government, as a 
 means to their own mental education — a mode 
 of strengthening their active faculties, exercis- 
 ing their judgment, and giving them a familiar 
 knowledge of the subjects with which they are 
 thus left to deal. This is a principal, though 
 not the sole, recommendation of jury trial (in 
 cases not political) ; of free and popular local 
 and municipal institutions ; of the conduct of 
 industrial and philanthropic enterprises by vol- 
 untary associations. These are not questions 
 of liberty, and are connected with that subject 
 only by remote tendencies ; but they are ques- 
 tions of development. It belongs to a different 
 occasion from the present to dwell on these 
 things as parts of national education ; as being, 
 in truth, the peculiar training of a citizen, the 
 practical part of the political education of a 
 free people, taking them out of the narrow cir- 
 cle of personal and family selfishness, and ac- 
 customing them to the comprehension of joint 
 interests, the management of joint concerns — 
 habituating them to act from public or semi- 
 public motives, and guide their conduct by 
 aims which unite instead of isolating them 
 from one another. Without these habits and 
 powers, a free constitution can neither be 
 worked nor preserved, as is exemplified by fhe 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 195 
 
 too-often transitory nature of political freedom 
 in countries where it does not rest upon a suffi- 
 cient basis of local liberties. The management 
 of purely local business by the localities, and 
 of the great enterprises of industry by the 
 union of those who voluntarily supply the pe- 
 cuniary means, is further recommended by all 
 the advantages which have been set forth in 
 this Essay as belonging to individuality of de- 
 velopment, and diversity of modes of action. 
 Government operations tend to be everywhere 
 alike. With individuals and voluntary asso- 
 ciations, on the contrary, there are varied ex- 
 periments, and endless diversity of experience. 
 What the State can usefully do, is to make 
 itself a central depository, and active circulator 
 and diffuser, of the experience resulting from 
 many trials. Its business is to enable each ex- 
 perimentalist to benefit by the experiments of 
 others, instead of tolerating no experiments but 
 its own. 
 
 The third, and most cogent reason for re- 
 stricting the interference of government, is the 
 great evil of adding unnecessarily to its power. 
 Every function superadded to those already ex- 
 ercised by the government, causes its influence 
 over hopes and fears to be more widely diffused, 
 ani converts, more and more, the active and 
 arr.bitious part of the public into hangers-on 
 of the government, or of some party which 
 aims at becoming the government It the 
 roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance 
 
196 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 offices, the gi-eat joint-stock companies, the 
 universities, and the public charities, were all 
 of them branches of the government; if, in 
 addition, the municipal corporations and loca) 
 boards, with all that now devolves on them, be- 
 came departments of the central administration; 
 if the employes of all these different enterprises 
 were appointed and paid by the government, 
 and looked to the government for every rise in 
 life ; not all the freedom of the press and popu- 
 lar constitution of the legislature would make 
 this or any other country free otherwise than 
 in name. And the evil would be greater, the 
 more efficiently and scientifically the adminis- 
 trative machinery was constructed — the more 
 skilful the arrangements for obtaining the best 
 qualified hands and heads with which to work 
 it. In England it has of late been proposed 
 that all the members of the civil service of 
 government should be selected by competitive 
 examination, to obtain for those employments 
 the most intelligent and instructed persons pro- 
 curable ; and much has been said and written 
 for and against this proposal. One of the 
 arguments most insisted on by its opponents, 
 is that the occupation of a permanent official 
 servant of the State does not hold out suffic- 
 ient prospects of emolument and importance to 
 attract the highest talents, which will always 
 be able to find a more inviting career in the 
 professions, or in the service of companies and 
 other public bodies. One would not have been 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 197 
 
 surprised if this argument had been used by 
 the friends of the proposition, as an answer to 
 its principal difficulty. Coming from the op- 
 ponents it is strange enough. What is urged 
 as an objection is the safety-valve of the pro- 
 posed system. If indeed all the high talent of 
 the country could be drawn into the service of 
 the government, a proposal tending to bring 
 about that result might well inspire uneasiness. 
 If every part of the business of society which re- 
 quired organized concert, or large and compre 
 hensive views, were in the hands of the govern- 
 ment, and if government offices were univer- 
 sally filled by the ablest men, all the enlarged 
 culture and practised intelligence in the country, 
 except the purely speculative, would be concen- 
 trated in a numerous bureaucracy, to whom 
 alone the rest of the community would look 
 for all things : the multitude for direction and 
 dictation in all they had to do; the able and 
 aspiring for personal advancement. To be ad- 
 mitted into the ranks of this bureaucracy, and 
 when admitted, to rise therein, would be the 
 sole objects of ambition* Under this regime, 
 not only is the outside public ill-qualified, for 
 want of practical experience, to criticize or 
 check the mode of operation of the bureau- 
 cracy, but even if the accidents of despotic or 
 the natural working of popular institutions oc- 
 casionally raise to the summit a ruler or rulers 
 of reforming inclinations, no reform can be 
 effected which is contrary to the interest of 
 
198 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 the bureaucracy. Such is the melancholy con 
 dition of the Russian empire, as is shown in 
 the accounts of those who have had sufficient 
 opportunity of observation. The Czar himself 
 is powerless against the bureaucratic body ; he 
 can send any one of them to Siberia, but he 
 cannot govern without them, or against their 
 will. On every decree of his they have a tacit 
 veto, by merely refraining from carrying it into 
 effect. In countries of more advanced civiliza- 
 tion and of a more insurrectionary spirit, the 
 public, accustomed to expect everything to be 
 done for them by the State, or at least to do 
 nothing for themselves without asking from 
 the State not only leave to do it, but even 
 how it is to be done, naturally hold the State 
 responsible for all evil which befalls them, 
 and when the evil exceeds their amount of 
 patience, they rise against the government and 
 make what is called a revolution ; whereupon 
 somebody else, with or without legitimate au 
 thority from the nation, vaults into the seat, 
 issues his orders to the bureaucracy, and every- 
 thing goes on much as it did before ; the bu- 
 reaucracy being unchanged, and nobody else 
 being capable of taking their place. 
 
 A very different spectacle is exhibited among 
 a people accustomed to transact their own busi- 
 ness. In France, a large part of the people 
 having been engaged in military service, many 
 of whom have held at least the rank of non- 
 commissioned officers, there are in every pop- 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 199 
 
 ular insurrection several persons compe ent tc 
 take the lead, and improvise some tolerable 
 plan of action. What the French are in mili- 
 tary affairs, the Americans are in every kind 
 of civil business; let them be left without a 
 government, every body of Americans is able 
 to improvise one, and to carry on that or any 
 other public business with a sufficient amount 
 of intelligence, order, and decision. This 
 what every free people ought to be : and a 
 people capable of this is certain to be free ; it 
 will never let itself be enslaved by any man oi 
 body of men because these are able to seize 
 and pull the reins of the central administration. 
 No bureaucracy can hope to make such a peo- 
 ple as this do or undergo anything that they 
 do not like. But where everything is done 
 through the bureaucracy, nothing to which the 
 bureaucracy is really adverse can be done at all. 
 The constitution of such countries is an organ- 
 ization of the experience and practical ability 
 of the nation, into a disciplined body for the 
 purpose of governing the rest ; and the more 
 perfect that organization is in itself, the more 
 successful in drawing to itself and educating 
 for itself the persons of greatest capacity from 
 all ranks of the community, the more complete 
 is the bondage of all, the members of the bu- 
 reaucracy included. For the governors are as 
 much the slaves of their organization and dis- 
 cipline, as the governed are of the governors. 
 A Chinese mandarin is as much the tool and 
 
200 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 creature of a despotism as the humblest culti- 
 vator. An individual Jesuit is to the utmost 
 degree of abasement the slave of his order 
 though the order itself exists for the collective 
 power and importance of its members. 
 
 It is not, also, to be forgotten, that the ab- 
 sorption of all the principal ability of the coun- 
 try into the governing body is fatal, sooner or 
 later, to the mental activity and progressiveness 
 of the body itself. Banded together as they 
 are — working a system which, like all sys- 
 tems, necessarily proceeds in a great measure 
 by fixed rules — the official body are under the 
 constant temptation of sinking into indolent 
 routine, or, if they now and then desert that 
 mill-horse round, of rushing into some half- 
 examined crudity which has struck the fancy 
 of some leading member of the corps : and the 
 sole check to these closely allied, though seem- 
 ingly opposite, tendencies, the only stimulus 
 which can keep the ability of the body itself 
 up to a high standard, is liability to the watch- 
 ful criticism of equal ability outside the body. 
 It is indispensable, therefore, that the means 
 should exist, independently of the government, 
 of forming such ability, and furnishing it with 
 the opportunities and experience necessary for 
 a correct judgment of great practical affairs. 
 If we would possess permanently a skilful and 
 efficient body of functionaries — above all, a 
 body able to originate and willing to adopt 
 improvements ; if we would not have our bu 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 201 
 
 reaucracy degenerate into a pedantocracy, this 
 body must not engross all the occupations 
 which form and cultivate the faculties required 
 for the government of mankind. 
 
 To determine the point at which evils, so for- 
 midable to human freedom and advancement, 
 begin, or rather at which they begin to predo- 
 minate over the benefits attending the collec- 
 tive application of the force of society, under 
 its recognized chiefs, for the removal of the 
 obstacles which stand in the way of its well- 
 being , to secure as much of the advantages 
 of centralized power and intelligence, as can 
 be had without turning into governmental 
 channels too great a proportion of the gen- 
 eral activity, is one of the most difficult and 
 complicated questions in the art of govern- 
 ment. It is, in a great measure, a question of 
 detail, in which many and various considera- 
 tions must be kept in view, and no absolute 
 rule can be laid down. But I believe that the 
 practical principle in which safety resides, the 
 ideal to be kept in view, the standard by which 
 to test all arrangements intended for overcom- 
 ing the difficulty, may be conveyed in these 
 words : the greatest dissemination of power 
 consistent with efficiency ; but the greatest 
 possible centralization of information, and 
 diffusion of it from the centre. Thus, in 
 municipal administration, there would be, as 
 in the New England States, a very minute 
 division among separate officers, chosen by the 
 
202 
 
 ON LIBERTY. 
 
 localities, of all business which is not better 
 left to the persons directly interested ; but be^ 
 sides this, there would be, in each department 
 of local affairs, a central superintendence, form- 
 ing a branch of the general government. The 
 organ of this superintendence would concen- 
 trate, as in a focus, the variety of information 
 and experience derived from the conduct of that 
 branch of public business in all the localitieSj 
 from everything analogous which is done in 
 foreign countries, and from the general princi- 
 ples of political science. This central organ 
 should have a right to know all that is done, 
 and its special duty should be that of making 
 the knowledge acquired in one place available 
 for others. Emancipated from the petty prej- 
 udices and narrow views of a locality by its 
 elevated position and comprehensive sphere of 
 observation, its advice would naturally carry 
 much authority ; but its actual power, as a per- 
 manent institution, should, I conceive, be limit- 
 ed to compelling the local officers to obey the 
 laws laid down for their guidance. In all 
 things not provided for by general rules, those 
 officers should be left to their own judgment, 
 under responsibility to their constituents. For 
 the violation of rules, they should be responsi- 
 ble to law, and the rules themselves should be 
 laid down by the legislature ; the central ad- 
 ministrative authority only watching over their 
 execution, and if they were not properly carried 
 into effect, appealing, according to the nature 
 
ON LIBERTY. 
 
 203 
 
 of the case, to the tribunal to enforce the laW; 
 or to the constituencies to dismiss the function^ 
 aries who had not executed it according to its 
 spirit. Such, in its general conception, is the 
 central superintendence which the Poor Law 
 Board is intended to exercise over the adminis- 
 trators of the Poor Rate throughout the coun« 
 try. Whatever powers the Board exercises 
 beyond this limit, were right and necessary in 
 that peculiar case, for the cure of rooted habits 
 of mal-administration in matters deeply aflFect- 
 ing not the localities merely, but the whole 
 community; since no locality has a moral 
 right to make itself by mismanagement a nest 
 of pauperism, necessarily overflowing into other 
 localities, and impairing the moral and physical 
 condition of the whole laboring community. 
 The powers of administrative coercion and 
 subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor 
 Law Board (but which, owing to the state of 
 opinion on the subject, are very scantily exer- 
 cised by them), though perfectly justifiable in 
 a case of a first-rate national interest, would 
 be wholly out of place in the superintendence 
 of interests purely local. But a central organ of 
 information and instruction for all the localities, 
 would be equally valuable in all departments 
 of administration, A government cannot have 
 too much of the kind of activity which does 
 Jiot impede, but aids and stimulates, individual 
 exertion and development. The mischief be- 
 gins when, instead of calling forth the activity 
 
204 : 
 
 OlSr LIBERTY. 
 
 and powers of individuals and bodies, it sub* 
 stitutes its own activity for theirs ; when, in* 
 stead of informing, advising, and, upon occa- 
 sion, denouncing, it makes them work in fetters, 
 or bids them stand aside and does their worl 
 instead of them. The worth of a State, in the 
 long run, is the worth of the individuals com- 
 posing it ; and a State wh^ch postpones the 
 interests ol their mental expansion and eleva 
 tion, to a little more of administrative skill, oj 
 that semblance of it which practice gives, ii 
 the details of business ; a State which dwarfs 
 its men, in order that they may be more docile 
 instruments in its hands even for beneficial 
 purposes, will find that with small men no 
 great thing can really be accomplished ; and 
 that the perfection of machinery to which it 
 has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail 
 it nothing, for want of the vital power which, 
 in order that the machine might work more 
 smoothly, it has preferred to banish. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, 
 
CHAPTEE L 
 
 ^HE object of this Essay is to explain as 
 clearly as I am able^ the grounds of an 
 opinion wbicb I have held from the very earliest 
 period when I had formed any opinions at all on 
 social or political matters, and which, instead of 
 being weakened or modified, has been constantly 
 growing stronger by the progress of refiection 
 and the experience of life : That the principle 
 
 which regulates the existing social relations 
 between the two sexes — the legal subordination of 
 one sex to the other — is wrong in itself, and now 
 one of the chief hindrances to human improve- 
 ment ; and that it ought to be replaced by a 
 principle of perfect equality, admitting no power 
 or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the 
 other. 
 
 The very words necessary to express the task 
 I have undertaken, show how arduous it is. 
 But it would be a mistake to suppose that the 
 diflBculty of the case must lie in the insufficiency 
 or obscurity of the grounds of reason on which 
 
208 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 my conviction rests. The difficulty is that which 
 exists in all cases in which there is a mass of 
 feeling to be contended against. So long as 
 an opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings^ 
 it gains rather than loses in stability by having 
 a preponderating weight of argument against 
 it. For if it were accepted as a result of 
 argument^ the refutation of the argument might 
 shake the solidity of the conviction ; but when it 
 rests solely on feelings the worse it fares in argu- 
 mentative contest, the more persuaded its adhe- 
 rents are that their feeling must have some deeper 
 ground^ which the arguments do not reach ; 
 and while the feeling remains, it is always throw- 
 ing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair 
 any breach made in the old. And there are so 
 many causes tending to make the feelings con- 
 nected with this subject the most intense and 
 most deeply-rooted of all those which gather 
 round and protect old institutions and customs, 
 that we need not wonder to find them as yet less 
 undermined and loosened than any of the rest 
 by the progress of the great modern spiritual and 
 social transition ; nor suppose that the barbarisms 
 to which men cling longest must be less bar- 
 barisms than those which they earlier shake off. 
 
 In every respect the burthen is hard on those 
 who attack an almost universal opinion. They 
 must be very fortunate as well as unusually 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 209 
 
 capable if they obtain a hearing at all. They 
 have more difficulty in obtaining a trials than 
 any other litigants have in getting a verdict. If 
 they do extort a hearings they are subjected to a 
 set of logical requirements totally dilferent from 
 those exacted from other people. In all other 
 cases^ the burthen of proof is supposed to lie with 
 the affirmative. If a person is charged with a 
 murder, it rests with those who accuse him to 
 give proof of his guilt, not with himself to prove 
 his innocence. If there is a difference of opinion 
 about the reality of any alleged historical event, 
 in Avhich the feelings of men in general are not 
 much interested, as the Siege of Troy for 
 example, those who maintain that the event took 
 place are expected to produce their proofs, before 
 those who take the other side can be required to 
 say anything; and at no time are these re- 
 quired to do more than show that the evidence 
 produced by the others is of no value. Again, in 
 practical matters, the burthen of proof is sup- 
 posed to be with those who are against liberty ; 
 who contend for any restriction or prohibi- 
 tion ; either any limitation of the general freedom 
 of human action, or any disqualification or dis- 
 parity of privilege affecting one person or kind 
 of persons, as compared with others. The 
 a priori presumption is in favour of freedom 
 and impartiality. It is held that there should 
 
210 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 be no restraint not required by the general good, 
 and that the law should be no respecter of persons, 
 but should treat all alike, save where dissimilarity 
 of treatment is required by positive reasons, eitlicr 
 of justice or of policy. But of none of these rules 
 of evidence will the benefit be allowed to those 
 who maintain the opinion I profess. It is use- 
 less for me to say that those who maintain the 
 doctrine that men have a right to command and 
 women are under an obligation to obey, or that 
 men are lit for government and women unfit, are 
 on the affirmative side of the question, and that 
 they are bound to show positive evidence for the 
 assertions, or submit to their rejection. It is 
 equally unavailing for me to say that those who 
 deny to women any freedom or privilege rightly 
 allowed to men, having the double presumption 
 against them that they are opposing freedom 
 and recommending partiality, must be held to 
 the strictest proof of their case, and unless their 
 success be such as to exclude all doubt, the judg- 
 ment ought to go against them. These would be 
 thought good pleas in any common case ; but 
 they will not be thought so in this instance. 
 Before I could hope to make any impression, 
 I should be expected not only to answer 
 all that has ever been said by those who take 
 the other side of the question, but to imagine 
 aU that could be said by them — ^to find them 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 211 
 
 in reasons, as well as answer all I find: and 
 besides refuting all arguments for tbe affirmative, 
 I shall be called upon for invincible positive 
 arguments to prove a negative. And even if 1 
 could do all this, and leave the opposite party 
 with a host of unanswered arguments against 
 them, and not a single unrefuted one on their side, 
 I should be thought to have done little ; for 
 a cause supported on the one hand by universal 
 usage, and on the other by so great a preponde- 
 rance of popular sentiment, is supposed to have a 
 presumption in its favour, superior to any con- 
 viction which an appeal to reason has power to 
 produce in any intellects but those of a high class. 
 
 I do not mention these difiiculties to complain 
 of them ; first, because it would be useless ; they 
 are inseparable from having to contend through 
 people^s understandings against the hostility 
 of their feelings and practical tendencies : and 
 truly the understandings of the majority of man- 
 kind would need to be much better cultivated than 
 has ever yet been the case, before they can be 
 asked to place such reliance in their own power 
 of estimating arguments, as to give up practical 
 principles in which they have been born and bred 
 and which are the basis of much of the existing 
 order of the world, at the first argumentative 
 attack which they are not capable of logically 
 resisting. I do not therefore quarrel with them 
 
212 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 for having too little faith in argument, but for 
 having too much faith in custom and the general 
 feeling. It is one of the characteristic preju- 
 dices of the reaction of the nineteenth century 
 against the eighteenth, to accord to the unrea- 
 soning elements in human nature the infallibility 
 which the eighteenth century is supposed to have 
 ascribed to the reasoning elements. For the 
 apotheosis of Reason we have substituted that of 
 Instinct ; and we call everything instinct which 
 we find in ourselves and for which we cannot 
 trace any rational foundation. This idolatry, 
 infinitely more degrading than the other, and 
 the most pernicious of the false worships of 
 the present day, of all of which it is now the 
 main support, will probably hold its ground until 
 it gives way before a sound psychology, laying 
 bare the real root of much that is bowed down 
 to as the intention of Nature and the ordinance 
 of God. As regards the present question, I am 
 willing to accept tbe unfavourable conditions 
 which the prejudice assigns to me. I consent 
 that established custom, and the general feeling, 
 should be deemed conclusive against me, unless 
 that custom and feeling from age to age can be 
 shown to have owed their existence to other 
 causes than their soundness, and to have derived 
 their power from the worse rather than the better 
 parts of human nature. I am willing that judg- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 213 
 
 ment should go against me^ unless I can slio^ 
 that my judge has been tampered with. The con- 
 cession is not so great as it might appear ; for to 
 prove this^ is by far the easiest portion of my task. 
 
 The generality of a practice is in some cases a 
 strong presumption that it is^ or at all events 
 once w^s^ conducive to laudable ends. This is 
 the case^ when the practice was first adopted^ or 
 afterwards kept up^ as a means to such ends^ and 
 was grounded on experience of the mode in which 
 they could be most effectually attained. If the 
 authority of men over women^ when first esta- 
 blished^ had been the result of a conscientious 
 comparison between different modes of consti- 
 tuting the government of society ; if^ after trying 
 various other modes of social organization — ^the 
 government of women over men^ equality between 
 the two^ and such mixed and divided modes of 
 government as might be invented — it had been 
 decided^ on the testimony of experience, that the 
 mode in which women are wholly under the rule 
 of men, having no share at all in public concerns, 
 and each in private being under the legal ob- 
 ligation of obedience to the man with whom she 
 has associated her destiny, was the arrangement 
 most conducive to the happiness and well being of 
 both ; its general adoption might then be fairly 
 thought to be some evidence that, at the time 
 when it was adopted, it was the best : though even 
 
214 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 then the considerations which recommended it 
 may^ like so many other primeval social facts of 
 the greatest importance^ have subsequently, in the 
 course of ages, ceased to exist. But the state of 
 the case is in every respect the reverse of this. 
 In the first place, the opinion in favour of the 
 present system, which entirely subordinates the 
 weaker sex to the stronger, rests upon theory 
 only ; for there never has been trial made of 
 any other : so that experience, in the sense in 
 which it is vulgarly opposed to theory, cannot be 
 pretended to have pronounced any verdict. And 
 in the second place, the adoption of this system 
 of inequality never was the result of deliberation, 
 or forethought, or any social ideas, or any notion 
 whatever of what conduced to the benefit of 
 humanity or the good order of society. It arose 
 simply from the fact that from the very earliest 
 twilight of human society, every woman (owing 
 to the value attached to her by men, combined 
 with her inferiority in muscular strength) was 
 found in a state of bondage to some man. 
 Laws and systems of polity always begin by 
 recognising the relations they find already exist- 
 ing between individuals. They convert what 
 was a mere physical fact into a legal right, give 
 it the sanction of society, and principally aim at 
 the substitution of public and organized means 
 of asserting and protecting these rights, instead 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 215 
 
 of tlie irregular and lawless conflict of physical 
 strength. Those who had already been compelled 
 to obedience became in this manner legally bound 
 to it. Slavery^ from being a mere afiair of force 
 between the master and the slave^ became regu- 
 larized and a matter of compact among the 
 masters,, who^ binding themselves to one another 
 for common protection, guaranteed by their 
 collective strength the private possessions of 
 each, including his slaves. In early times, 
 the great majority of the male sex w^ere slaves, 
 as well as the whole of the female. And many 
 ages elapsed, some of them ages of high culti- 
 vation, before any thinker was bold enough to 
 question the rightfulness, and the absolute social 
 necessity, either of the one slavery or of the 
 other. By degrees such thinkers did arise: and 
 (the general progress of society assisting) the 
 slavery of the male sex has, in all the countries 
 of Christian Europe at least (though, in one of 
 them, only wdthin the last few years) been at 
 length abolished, and that of the female sex has 
 been gradually changed into a milder form of 
 dependence. But this dependence, as it exists 
 at present, is not an original institution, taking 
 a fresh start from considerations of justice and 
 social expediency — it is the primitive state of 
 slavery lasting on, through successive mitigations 
 and modifications occasioned by the same causes 
 
216 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 which have softened the general manners, and 
 brought all human relations more under the 
 control of justice and the influence of humanity. 
 It has not lost the taint of its brutal origin. 
 No presumption in its favour, therefore, can be 
 drawn from the fact of its existence. The 
 only such presumption which it could be sup- 
 posed to have, must be grounded on its having 
 lasted till now, when so many other things which 
 came down from the same odious source have 
 been done away with. And this, indeed, is what 
 makes it strange to ordinary ears, to hear it 
 asserted that the inequality of rights between 
 men and women has no other source than the 
 law of the strongest. 
 
 That this statement should have the efiect of 
 a paradox, is in some respects creditable to the 
 progress of civilization, and the improvement of 
 the moral sentiments of mankind. We now live 
 — that is to say, one or two of the most ad- 
 vanced nations of the world now live — in a state 
 in which the law of the strongest seems to be 
 entirely abandoned as the regulating principle 
 of the world^s affairs : nobody professes it, and, 
 as regards most of the relations between human 
 beings, nobody is permitted to practise it. When 
 any one succeeds in doing so, it is under cover of 
 some pretext which gives him the semblance of 
 having some general social interest on his side. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 217 
 
 This being the ostensible state cf things, people 
 flatter themselves that the rule of mere force is 
 ended; that the law of the strongest cannot be the 
 reason of existence of anything which has remained 
 in full operation down to the present time. How- 
 ever any of our present institutions may have be- 
 gun, it can only, they think, have been preserved 
 to this period of advanced civilization by a well- 
 grounded feeling of its adaptation to human na- 
 ture, and conduciveness to the general good. They 
 do not understand the great vitality and dura- 
 bility of institutions which place right on the side 
 of might ; how intensely they are clung to ; how 
 the good as well as the bad propensities and senti- 
 ments of those who have power in their hands, 
 become identified with retaining it ; how slowly 
 these bad institutions give way, one at a time, 
 the weakest first, beginning with those which are 
 least interwoven with the daily habits of life ; and 
 how very rarely those who have obtained legal 
 power because they first had physical, have ever 
 lost their hold of it until the physical power had 
 passed over to the other side. Such shifting of 
 the physical force not having taken place in the 
 case of women ; this fact, combined with all the 
 peculiar and characteristic features of the parti- 
 cular ^case, made it certain from the first that this 
 branch of the system of right founded on might, 
 though softened in its most atrocious features at an 
 10 
 
218 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 earlier period than several of the others, would be 
 the very last to disappear. It was inevitable that 
 this one case of a social relation grounded on foreej 
 would survive through generations of institutions 
 grounded on equal justice, an almost solitary 
 exception to the general character of their laws 
 and customs ; but which, so long as it does not 
 proclaim its own origin, and as discussion has 
 not brought out its true character, is not felt to 
 jar with modern civilization, any more than 
 domestic slavery among the Greeks jarred with 
 their notion of themselves as a free people. 
 
 The truth is, that: people of the present and 
 the last two or three generations have lost all 
 practical sense of the primitive condition of 
 humanity; and only the few who have studied 
 history accurately, or have much frequented the 
 parts of the world occupied by the living repre- 
 sentatives of ages long past, are able to form any 
 mental picture of what society then was. People 
 are not aware how entirely, in former ages, the 
 law of superior strength was the rule of life ; how 
 publicly and openly it was avowed^ I do not say 
 cynically or shamelessly — for these words imply 
 a feeling that there was something in it to be 
 ashamed of, and no such notion could find a 
 place in the faculties of any person in those ages, 
 except a philosopher or a saint. History gives a 
 cruel experience of human nature, in shewing 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 219 
 
 how exactly the regard due to the life^ possessions, 
 and entire earthly happiness of any class of per- 
 sons, was measured by what they had the power 
 of enforcing; how all who made any resistance 
 to authorities that had arms in their hands, how- 
 ever dreadful might be the provocation, had not 
 only the law of force but all other laws, and all 
 the notions of social obligation against them; and 
 in the eyes of those whom they resisted, were 
 not only guilty of crime, but of the worst of all 
 crimes, deserving the most cruel chastisement 
 which human beings could inflict. The first 
 small vestige of a feeling of obligation in a 
 superior to acknowledge any right in inferiors, 
 began when he had been induced, for convenience, 
 to make some promise to them. Though these 
 promises, even when sanctioned by the most 
 solemn oaths, were for many ages revoked or 
 violated on the most trifling provocation or 
 temptation, it is probable that this, except by 
 persons of still worse than the average morality, 
 was seldom done without some twinges of con- 
 science. The ancient republics, being mostly 
 grounded from the first upon some kind of 
 mutual compact, or at any rate formed by an 
 union of persons not very unequal in strength, 
 afforded, in consequence, the first instance of a 
 portion of human relations fenced round, and 
 placed under the dominion of another law than 
 
220 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 that of force. And though the original law of 
 force remained in full operation between them 
 and their slaves^ and also (except so far as limited 
 by express compact) between a commonwealth 
 and its subjects^ or other independent common- 
 wealths ; the banishment of that primitive law 
 even from so narrow a fields commenced the re- 
 generation of human nature^ by giving birth to 
 sentiments of which experience soon demon- 
 strated the immense value even for material in- 
 terests^ and which thenceforward only required 
 to be enlarged^, not created. Though slaves were 
 no part of the commonwealth^ it was in the free 
 states that slaves were first felt to have rights as 
 human beings. The Stoics were^ I believe^ the 
 first (except so far as the Jewish law constitutes 
 an exception) who taught as a part of morality 
 that men were bound by moral obligations to 
 their slaves. No one^ after Christianity became 
 ascendant^ could ever again have been a stranger 
 to this belief^ in theory ; nor^ after the rise of the 
 Catholic Churchy was it ever without persons to 
 stand up for it. Yet to enforce it was the most 
 arduous task which Christianity ever had to per- 
 form. For more than a thousand years the 
 Church kept up the contest^ with hardly any per- 
 ceptible success. It was not for want of power 
 over men'^s minds. Its power was prodigious. 
 It could make kings and nobles resign theii most 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 221 
 
 valued possessions to enrieh the Chureh. It 
 could make thousands, in the prime of life and 
 the height of worldly advantages, shut themselves 
 up in convents to work out their salvation by 
 poverty, fasting, and prayer. It could send 
 hundreds of thousands across land and sea, 
 Europe and Asia, to give their lives for the de- 
 liverance of the Holy Sepulchre. It could make 
 kings relinquish wives who were the object of 
 their passionate attachment, because the Church 
 declared that they were within the seventh (by our 
 calculation the fourteenth) degree of relationship. 
 All this it did ; but it could not make men fight 
 less with one another, nor tyrannize less cruelly 
 over the serfs, and when they were able, over 
 burgesses. It could not make them renounce 
 either of the applications of force ; force militant, 
 or force triumphant. This they could never 
 be induced to do until they were themselves in 
 their turn compelled by superior force. Only 
 by the growing power of kings was an end put to 
 fighting except between kings, or competitors for 
 kingship; only by the growth of a wealthy and 
 warlike bourgeoisie in the fortified towns, and of a 
 plebeian infantry which proved more powerful 
 in the field than the undisciplined chivalry, was the 
 insolent tyranny of the nobles over the bour- 
 geoisie and peasantry brought within some bounds. 
 It was persisted in not only until, but long after. 
 
222 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 the oppressed had obtained a power enabling 
 them often to take conspicuous vengeance; and 
 on the Continent much of it continued to the 
 time of the French Revolution,, though in England 
 the earlier and better organization of the demo- 
 cratic classes put an end to it sooner, by establish- 
 ing equal laws and free national institutions. 
 
 If people are mostly so little aware how com- 
 pletely^ during the greater part of the duration 
 of our species,, the law of force was the avowed 
 rule of general conduct^ any other being only 
 a special and exceptional consequence of peculiar 
 ties — and from how very recent a date it is that 
 the affairs of society in general have been even 
 pretended to be regulated according to any 
 moral law ; as little do people remember or 
 consider, how institutions and customs which 
 never had any ground but the law of force, last 
 on into ages and states of general opinion which 
 never would have permitted their first establish- 
 ment. Less than forty years ago, Englishmen 
 might still bylaw hold human beings in bondage 
 as saleable property : within the present century 
 they might kidnap them and carry them off, and 
 work them literally to death. This absolutely 
 extreme case of the law of force, condemned by 
 those who can tolerate almost every other form 
 of arbitrary power, and which, of all others, pre- 
 sents features the most revolting to the feelings 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 223 
 
 of all who look at it from an impartial position, 
 was the law of civilized and Christian England 
 within the memory of persons now living : and 
 in one half of Anglo-Saxon America three or 
 four years ago, not only did slavery exist, but 
 the slave trade, and the breeding of slaves ex- 
 pressly for it, was a general practice between 
 slave states. Yet not only was there a greater 
 strength of sentiment against it, but, in England 
 at least, a less amount either of feeling or of in- 
 terest in favour of it, than of any other of the 
 customary abuses of force : for its motive was 
 the love of gain, un mixed and undisguised ; and 
 those who profited by it were a very small nu- 
 merical fraction of the country, while the natural 
 feeling of all who were not personally interested 
 in it, was unmitigated abhorrence. So extreme 
 an instance makes it almost superfluous to refer 
 to any other : but consider the long duration of 
 absolute monarchy. In England at present it 
 is the almost universal conviction that military 
 despotism is a case of the law of force, having 
 no other origin or justification. Yet in all the 
 great nations of Europe except England it either 
 still exists, or has only just ceased to exist, and 
 has even now a strong party favourable to it in 
 all ranks of the people, especially among persons 
 of station and consequence. Such is the power 
 of an established system, even when far from 
 
224 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 universal ; when not only in almost every period 
 of history there have been great and well-known 
 examples of the contrary system, but these have 
 almost invariably been afforded by the most 
 illustrious and most prosperous communities. In 
 this case, too, the possessor of the undue power, 
 the person directly interested in it, is only one 
 person, while those who are subject to it and 
 suffer from it are literally all the rest. The 
 yoke is naturally and necessarily humiliating to all 
 persons, except the one who is on the throne, 
 together with, at most, the one who expects to 
 succeed to it. How different are these cases 
 from that of the power of men over women ! I 
 am not now prejudging the question of its justifi- 
 ableness. I am showing how vastly more perma- 
 nent it could not but be, even if not justifiable, 
 than these other dominations which have never- 
 theless lasted down to our own time. What- 
 ever gratification of pride there is in the posses- 
 sion of powder, and whatever personal interest in 
 its exercise, is in this case not confined to a 
 limited class, but common to the whole male 
 sex. Instead of being, to most of its supporters, 
 a thing desirable chiefly in the abstract, or, like 
 the political ends usually contended for by fac- 
 tious, of little private importance to any but the 
 leaders ; it comes home to the person and hearth 
 of every male head of a family, and of every one 
 
THK SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 225 
 
 who looks forward to being so. The clodhopper 
 exercises^ or is to exereise, his share of the power 
 equally with the highest nobleman. And the 
 case is that in which the desire of power is the 
 strongest: for every one who desires power^ desires 
 it most over those who are nearest to him^ with 
 Vfhom his life is passed^ with whom he has most 
 coneerns in common, and in whom any inde- 
 pendence of his authority is oftenest likely to 
 interfere with his individual preferenees. If, iu 
 the other cases specified, powers manifestly 
 grounded only on force, and having so much less 
 to support them, are so slowly and with so much 
 difficulty got rid of, much more must it be so 
 with this, even if it rests on no better foundation 
 than those. We must consider, too, that the 
 possessors of the power have facilities in this 
 case, greater than in any other, to prevent any 
 uprising against it. Every one of the subjects 
 lives under the very eye, and almost, it may be 
 said, in the hands, of one of the masters — in 
 closer intimacy with him than with any of her 
 fellow-subjects ; with no means of combining 
 against him, no power of even locally over- 
 mastering him, and, on the other hand, with the 
 strongest motives for seeking his favour and 
 avoiding to give him offence. In struggles for 
 political emancipation, everybody knows how often 
 its champions are bought off by bribes, or daunted 
 10 * 
 
226 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 by terrors. In the case of women^ each indi- 
 vidual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of 
 bribery and intimidation eombined. In setting 
 up the standard of resistance^ a large number of 
 the leaders^ and still more of the followers^ must 
 make an almost complete sacrifice of the plea- 
 sures or the alleviations of their own individual 
 lot. If ever any system of privilege and en- 
 forced subjection had its yoke tightly riveted 
 on the necks of those who are kept down by it, 
 this has. I have not yet shown that it is a 
 wrong system : but every one who is capable of 
 thinking on the subject must see that even if it 
 is, it was certain to outlast all other forms of 
 unjust authority. And when some of the grossest 
 of the other forms still exist in many civilized 
 countries, and have only recently been got rid 
 of in others, it would be strange if that which 
 is so much the deepest -rooted had yet been 
 perceptibly shaken anywhere. There is more 
 reason to wonder that the protests and testi- 
 monies against it should have been so numerous 
 and so weighty as they are. 
 
 Some will object, that a comparison cannot 
 fairly be made between the government of the 
 male sex and the forms of unjust power which I 
 have adduced in illustration of it, since these are 
 arbitrary, and the effect of mere usurpation, 
 while it on the contrary is natural. But was 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 221 
 
 fcliere ever any domination which did not appeal 
 natural to tliose*^ who possessed it ? There was 
 a time when the division of mankind into two 
 classes^ a small one of masters and a numerous 
 one of slaves^ appeared^ even to the most culti- 
 vated minds^ to be a natural^ and the only natural^ 
 condition of the human race. No less an in- 
 tellect^ and one which contributed no less to the 
 progress of human thought^ than Aristotle^ held 
 this opinion without doubt or misgiving ; and 
 rested it on the same premises on which the 
 same assertion in regard to the dominion of men 
 over women is usually based^ namely that there 
 are different natures among mankind, free na- 
 tures, and slave natures ; that the Greeks were 
 of a free nature, the barbarian races of Thracians 
 and Asiatics of a slave nature. But why need I 
 go back to Aristotle ? Did not the slaveowners 
 of the Southern United States maintain the same 
 doctrine, with all the fanaticism with which men 
 cling to the theories that justify their passions 
 and legitimate their personal interests ? Did 
 they not call heaven and earth to witness that 
 the dominion of the white man over the black is 
 natural, that the black race is by nature inca- 
 pable of freedom, and marked out for slavery? 
 some even going so far as to say that the freedom 
 of manual labourers is an unnatural order of 
 things anywhere. Again, the theorists of abso- 
 
228 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 lute luonarcLy have always affirmed it to he the 
 only natural form of government ; issuing from 
 the patriarchal which was the primitive and 
 spontaneous form of society, framed on the 
 model of the paternal, which is anterior to society 
 itself, and, as they contend, the most natural 
 authority of all. Nay, for that matter, the law 
 of force itself, to those who could not plead any 
 other, has always seemed the most natural of all 
 grounds for the exercise of authority. Conquer- 
 ing races hold it to be Nature^s own dictate that 
 the conquered should obey the conquerors, or, as 
 they euphoniously paraphrase it, that the feebler 
 and more unwarlike races should submit to the 
 braver and manlier. The smallest acquaintance 
 with human life in the middle ages, shows how 
 supremely natural the dominion of the feudal 
 nobility over men of low condition appeared to 
 the nobility themselves, and how unnatural the 
 conception seemed, of a person of the inferior 
 class claiming equality with them, or exercising 
 authority over them. It hardly seemed less so 
 to the class held in subjection. The emanci- 
 pated serfs and burgesses, even in their most 
 vigorous struggles, never made any pretension to 
 a share of authority ; they only demanded more 
 or less of limitation to the power of tyrannizing 
 over them. So true is it that unnatural gene- 
 rally means only uncustomary, and that every- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 229 
 
 thing which is usual appears natural. The sub- 
 jection of women to men being a universal 
 custom^ any departure from it quite naturally 
 appears unnatural. But how entirely, even in 
 this case, the feeling is dependent on custom, 
 appears by ample experience. Nothing so much 
 astonishes the people of distant parts of the 
 world, when they first learn anything about 
 England, as to be told that it is under a queen : 
 the thing seems to them so unnatural as to be 
 almost incredible. To Englishmen this does not 
 seem in the least degree unnatural, because they 
 are used to it ; but they do feel it unnatural that 
 women should be soldiers or members of parlia- 
 ment. In the feudal ages, on the contrary, war 
 and politics were not thought unnatural to 
 women, because not unusual ; it seemed natural 
 that women of the privileged classes should be 
 of manly character, inferior in nothing but bodily 
 strength to their husbands and fathers. The 
 independence of women seemed rather less un- 
 natural to the Greeks than to other ancients, on 
 account of the fabulous Amazons (whom they 
 believed to be historical), and the partial example 
 afforded by the Spartan women ; who, though no 
 less subordinate by law than in other Greek 
 states, were more free in fact, and being trained 
 to bodily exercises in the same manner with 
 men, gave ample proof that they were not natu-* 
 
230 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 rally disqualified for them. There can be little 
 doubt that Spartan experience suggested to Plato, 
 among many other of his doctrines^ that of the 
 social and political equality of the two sexes. 
 
 But, it will be said, the rule of men over women 
 diiffers from all these others in not being a rule 
 of force : it is accepted voluntarily ; women make 
 no complaint, and are consenting parties to it. 
 In the first place, a great number of women do 
 not accept it. Ever since there have been women 
 able to make their sentiments known by their 
 writings (the only mode of publicity which society 
 permits to them), an increasing number of them 
 have recorded protests against their present social 
 condition : and recently many thousands of them, 
 headed by the most eminent women known to 
 the public, have petitioned Parliament for their 
 admission to the Parliamentary Suffrage. The 
 claim of women to be educated as solidly, and in 
 the same branches of knowledge, as men, is urged 
 with growing intensity, and with a great prospect 
 of success ; while the demand for their admission 
 into professions and occupations hitherto closed 
 against them, becomes every year more urgent. 
 Though there are not in this country, as there 
 are in the United States, periodical Conventions 
 and an organized party to agitate for the Bights 
 of Women, there is a numerous and active Society 
 organized and managed by women, for the more 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 231 
 
 limited object of obtaining the political franchise. 
 Nor IS it only in our own country and in America 
 that women are beginning to protest, more or 
 less collectively, against the disabilities under 
 which they labour. France, and Italy, and 
 Switzerland, and Russia now afford examples of 
 the same thing. How many more women there 
 are who silently cherish similar aspirations, no 
 one can possibly know ; but there are abundant 
 tokens how many would cherish them, were they 
 not so strenuously taught to repress them as con- 
 trary to the proprieties of their sex. It must be 
 remembered, also, that no enslaved class ever 
 asked for complete liberty at once. When Simon 
 de Montfort called the deputies of the commons 
 to sit for the first time in Parliament, did any 
 of them dream of demanding that an assembly, 
 elected by their constituents, should make and 
 destroy ministries, and dictate to the king in 
 affairs of state? No such thought entered into 
 the imagination of the most ambitious of them. 
 The nobility had already these pretensions ; the 
 commons pretended to nothing but to be exempt 
 from arbitrary taxation, and from the gross indi- 
 vidual oppression of the king^s officers. It is a 
 political law of nature that those who are under 
 any power of ancient origin, never begin by 
 complaining of the power itself, but only of its 
 oppressive exercise. There is never any want of 
 
232 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 women who complain of ill usage by their hus« 
 bands. There would be infinitely more^ if com- 
 plaint were not the greatest of all provocatives 
 to a repetition and increase of the ill usage. It 
 is this which frustrates all attempts to maintain 
 the power but protect the woman against its 
 abuses. In no other case (except that of a child) 
 is the person who has been proved judicially to 
 have suflPered an injury^ replaced under the phy- 
 sical power of the culprit who infiicted it. 
 Accordingly wives, even in the most extreme and 
 protracted cases of bodily ill usage, hardly ever 
 dare avail themselves of the laws made for their 
 protection : and if, in a moment of irrepressible 
 indignation, or by the interference of neighbours, 
 they are induced to do so, their whole effort after- 
 wards is to disclose as little as they can, and to 
 beg off their tyrant from his merited chastisement. 
 
 All causes, social and natural, combine to 
 make it unlikely that women should be col- 
 lectively rebellious to the power of men. They 
 are so far in a position different from all other 
 subject classes, that their masters require some- 
 thing more from them than actual service. Men 
 do not want solely the obedience of women, they 
 want their sentiments. All men, except the most 
 brutish, desire to have, in the woman most nearly 
 connected with them, not a forced slave but a 
 willing one, not a slave merely, but a favourite. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 233 
 
 They have therefore put everything in practice 
 to enslave their minds. The masters of all 
 other slaves rely, for maintaining obedience, on 
 fear ; either fear of themselves, or religions fears. 
 The masters of women wanted more than simple 
 obedience, and they turned the whole force of 
 education to effect their purpose. All women 
 are brought up from the very earliest years in 
 the belief that their ideal of character is the very 
 opposite to that of men; not self-will, and govern- 
 ment by self-control, but submission, and yielding 
 to the control of others. All the moralities tell 
 them that it is the duty of women, and all the 
 current sentimentalities that it is their nature, to 
 live for others; to make complete abnegation of 
 themselves, and to have no life but in their 
 affections. And by their affections are meant 
 the only ones they are allowed to have — those to 
 the men with whom they are connected, or to 
 the children who constitute an additional and 
 indefeasible tie between them and a man. When 
 we put together three things — first, the natural 
 attraction between opposite sexes ; secondly, the 
 wife’s entire dependence on the husband, every 
 privilege or pleasure she has being either his 
 gift, or depending entirely on his v/ill ; and lastly, 
 that the principal object of human pursuit, consi- 
 deration, and all objects of social ambition, can in 
 general be sought or obtained by her only through 
 
23-Jr 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 him^ it would be a miracle if the object of being 
 attractive to men had not become the polar star 
 of feminine education and formation of character. 
 And^ this great means of influence over the minds 
 of women having been acquired^ an instinct of 
 selfishness made men avail themselves of it to 
 the utmost as a means of holding women in 
 subjection^ by representing to them meekness^ 
 submissiveness^ and resignation of all individual 
 will into the hands of a man, as an essential 
 part of sexual attractiveness. Can it be doubted 
 that any of the other yokes which mankind have 
 succeeded in breaking, would have subsisted till 
 now if the same means had existed, and had been 
 as sedulously used, to bow down their minds to it ? 
 If it had been made the object of the life of every 
 young plebeian to find personal favour in the 
 eyes of some patrician, of every young serf with 
 some seigneur ; if domestication with him, and 
 a share of his personal affections, had been held 
 out as the prize which they all should look out 
 for, the most gifted and aspiring being able to 
 reckon on the most desirable prizes ; and if, when 
 this prize had been obtained, they had been shut 
 out by a wall of brass from all interests not 
 centering in him, all feelings and desires but 
 those which he shared or inculcated ; would not 
 Rerfs and seigneurs, plebeians and patricians, have 
 teen as broadly distinguished at this day as men 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 235 
 
 and women are ? and would not all but a 
 thinker here and tliere^ have believed the dis- 
 tinction to be a fundamental and unalterable fact 
 in human nature ? 
 
 The preceding considerations are amply suffix 
 cient to show that custom^ however universal it 
 may be, affords in this case no presumption, and 
 ought not to create any prejudice, in favour of 
 the arrangements which place women in social 
 and political subjection to men. But I may go 
 farther, and maintain that the course of history, 
 and the tendencies of progressive human society, 
 afford not only no presumption in favour of this 
 system of inequality of rights, but a strong one 
 against it ; and that, so far as the whole course of 
 human improvement up to this time, the whole 
 stream of modern tendencies, warrants any in- 
 ference on the subject, it is, that this relic of the 
 past is discordant with the future, and must 
 necessarily disappear. 
 
 For, what is the peculiar character of the 
 modern world — the difference which chiefly dis- 
 tinguishes modern institutions, modern social 
 ideas, modern life itself, from those of times long 
 past ? It is, that human beings are no longer 
 born to their place in life, and chained down by 
 an inexorable bond to the place they are born to, 
 but are free to employ their faculties, and such 
 favourable chances as offer, to achieve the lot which 
 
236 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 may appear to them most desirable. Human 
 society of old was constituted on a very different 
 principle. All were born to a fixed social posi- 
 tion^ and were mostly kept in it by law^ or inter- 
 dicted from any means by which they could 
 emerge from it. As some men are born white 
 and others blacky so some were born slaves and 
 others freemen and citizens ; some were born 
 patricians^ others plebeians; some were born feudal 
 nobles^ others commoners and roturiers, A slave 
 or serf could never make himself free^ nor, 
 except by the will of his master, become so. 
 In most European countries it was not till 
 towards the close of the middle ages, and as a 
 consequence of the growth of regal power, that 
 commoners could be ennobled. Even among nobles, 
 the eldest son was born the exclusive heir to the 
 paternal possessions, and a long time elapsed before 
 it was fully established that the father could dis- 
 inherit him. Among the industrious classes, only 
 those who were born members of a guild, or were 
 admitted into it by its members, could lawfully 
 practise their calling within its local limits ; and 
 nobody could practise any calling deemed im- 
 portant, in any but the legal manner — by pro- 
 cesses authoritatively prescribed. Manufacturers 
 have stood in the pillory for presuming to carry 
 on their business by new and improved methods. 
 In modern Europe, and most in those parts of 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 231 
 
 It which have participated most largely in all 
 other modern improvements^ diametrically op- 
 posite doctrines now prevail. Law and govern- 
 ment do not undertake to prescribe by whom 
 any social or industrial operation shall or shall 
 not be conducted, or what modes of conducting 
 them shall be lawful. These things are left to 
 the unfettered choice of individuals. Even the 
 laws which required that workmen should serve 
 an apprenticeship, have in this country been 
 repealed : there being ample assurance that in 
 all cases in which an apprenticeship is necessary, 
 its necessity will suffice to enforce it. The old 
 theory was, that the least possible should be left 
 to the choice of the individual agent; that all 
 he had to do should, as far as practicable, be laid 
 down for him by superior wisdom. Left to 
 himself he was sure to go wrong. The modern 
 conviction, the fruit of a thousand years of 
 experience, is, that things in which the individual 
 is the person directly interested, never go right 
 but as th^y are left to his own discretion ; and 
 that any regulation of them by authority, exeept 
 to protect the rights of others, is sure to be mis- 
 chievous. This conclusion, slowly arrived at, and 
 not adopted until almost every possible applica- 
 tion of the contrary theory had been made with 
 disastrous result, now (in the industrial depart- 
 ment) prevails universally in the most advanced 
 
238 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 countries^ almost universally in all that have 
 pretensions to any sort of advaneement. It is 
 not that all processes are supposed 1po be equally 
 good^ or all persons to be equally qualified for 
 everything ; but that freedom of individual 
 choice is now known to be the only thing 
 which procures the adoption of the best pro- 
 cesses^ and throws each operation into the hands 
 of those who are best qualified for it. Nobody 
 thinks it necessary to make a law that only a 
 strong-armed man shall be a blacksmith. Free- 
 dom and competition suffice to make blacksmiths 
 strong-armed men^ because the weak-armed can 
 earn more by engaging in occupations for which 
 they are more fit. In consonance with this 
 doctrine^ it is felt to be an overstepping of the 
 proper bounds of authority to fix beforehand, 
 on some general presumption, that certain per- 
 sons are not fit to do certain things. It is now 
 thoroughly known and admitted that if some 
 such presumptions exist, no such presumption is 
 infallible. Even if it be well grounded in a 
 majority of cases, which it is very likely not 
 to be, there will be a minority of exceptional 
 eases in which it does not hold : and in those 
 it is both an injustice to the individuals, and 
 a detriment to society, to place barriers in the 
 w^ay of their using their faculties for their own 
 benefit and for that of others. In the cases, 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 239 
 
 on tlie other hand^ in which the unfitness is 
 real, the ordinary motives of human conduct 
 will on the whole suffice to prevent the incom- 
 petent person from making, or from persisting 
 in, the attempt. 
 
 If this general principle of social and econo- 
 mical science is not true; if individuals, witli 
 such help as they can derive from the opinion 
 of those who know them, are not better judges 
 than the law and the government, of their 
 own capacities and vocation ; the world cannot 
 too soon abandon this principle, and return to 
 the old system of regulations and disabilities. 
 But if the principle is true, we ought to act 
 as if we believed it, and not to ordain that to 
 be born a girl instead of a boy, any more 
 than to be born black instead of white, or a 
 commoner instead of a nobleman, shall decide 
 the personas position through all life — shall 
 interdict people from all the more elevated 
 social positions, and from all, except a few, 
 respectable occupations. Even were we to admit 
 the utmost that is ever pretended as to the 
 superior fitness of men for all the functions now 
 reserved to them, the same argument applies 
 which forbids a legal qualification for members oi 
 Parliament. If only once in a dozen years the 
 conditions of eligibility exclude a fit person, 
 there is a real loss, while the exclusion of thou* 
 
240 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 sands of unfit persons is no gain ; for if the con- 
 stitution of the electoral body disposes them to 
 choose unfit persons^ there are always plenty of 
 such persons to choose from. In all things of 
 raiy difficulty and importance^ those who can do 
 them well are fewer than the need, even with 
 the most unrestricted latitude of choice : and any 
 limitation of the field of selection deprives society 
 of some chances of being served by the competent, 
 without ever saving it from the incompetent. 
 
 At present^ in the more improved countries, 
 the disabilities of women are the only case, save 
 one, in which laws and institutions take persons 
 at their birth, and ordain that they shall never in 
 all their lives be allowed to compete for certain 
 things. The one exception is that of royalty. 
 Persons still are born to the throne ; no one, not 
 of the reigning family, can ever occupy it, and 
 no one even of that family can, by any means 
 but the course of hereditary succession, attain it. 
 All other dignities and social advantages are open 
 to the whole male sex : many indeed are only 
 attainable by wealth, but wealth may be striven 
 for by any one, and is actually obtained by many 
 men of the very humblest origin. The difficulties, 
 to the majority, are indeed insuperable without 
 the aid of fortunate accidents ; but no male 
 human being is under any legal ban : neither 
 law nor opinion superadd artificial obstacles to 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 241 
 
 the natural ones. Royalty^ as I have said^ is 
 excepted ; but in this case every one feels it to be 
 an exception — an anomaly in the modem worlds 
 in marked opposition to its customs and princi- 
 ples^ and to be justified only bj^ extraordinary 
 special expediencies^ which^ though individuals 
 and nations differ in estimating their weighty 
 unquestionably do in fact exist. But in this 
 exceptional case, in which a high social function 
 is, for important reasons, bestowed on birth instead 
 of being put up to competition, all free nations 
 contrive to adhere in substance to the principle 
 from which they nominally derogate ; for they 
 circumscribe this high function by conditions 
 avowedly intended to prevent the person to whom 
 it ostensibly belongs from really performing it ; 
 while the person by whom it is performed, the 
 responsible minister, does obtain the post by a 
 competition from which no full-grown citizen of 
 the male sex is legally excluded. The disabilities, 
 therefore, to which women are subject from the 
 mere fact of their birth, are the solitary examples 
 of the kind in modern legislation. In no 
 instance except this, which comprehends half the 
 human race, are the higher social functions 
 closed against any one by a fatality of birth which 
 no exertions, and no change of circumstances, 
 can overcome ; for even religious disabilities 
 (besides that in England and in Europe they 
 11 
 
242 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 have practically almost ceased to exist) do not 
 close any career to the disqualified person in case 
 of conversion. 
 
 The social subordination of women thus stands 
 out an isolated, fact in modern social institutions ; 
 a solitary breach of what has become their funda- 
 mental law ; a single relic of an old world of 
 thought and practice exploded in everything else^ 
 but retained in the one thing of most universal 
 interest ; as if a gigantic dolmen^ or a vast temple 
 of Jupiter Olympius^ occupied the site of St. 
 PauFs and received daily worship^ while the sur- 
 rounding Christian churches were only resorted to 
 on fasts and festivals. This entire discrepancy 
 between one social fact and all those which 
 accompany it^ and the radical opposition between 
 its nature and the progressive movement which is 
 the boast of the modern worlds and which has 
 successively swept away everything else of an 
 analogous character^, surely affords^ to a con- 
 scientious obsejwer of human tendencies^ serious 
 matter for reflection. It raises a prima facie pre- 
 sumption on the unfavourable side^ far outweigh- 
 ing any which custom and usage could in such 
 circumstances create on the favourable ; and 
 should at least suffice to make this^ like the 
 choice between republicanism and royalty^ a 
 balanced question. 
 
 The least that can be demanded is, that the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 243 
 
 question should not be considered as prejudged 
 by existing fact and existing opinion^ but open to 
 discussion on its merits^ as a question of justice 
 and expediency : the decision on this^ as on 
 any of the other social arrangements of mankind, 
 depending on what an enlightened estimate of 
 tendencies and consequenees may show to be 
 most advantageous to humanity in general, with- 
 out distinetion of sex. And the discussion must 
 be a real discussion, descending to foundations, 
 and not resting satisfied with vague and general 
 assertions. It will not do, for instance, to assert 
 in general terms, that the experience of mankind 
 has pronounced in favour of the existing system. 
 Experienee cannot possibly have decided between 
 two courses, so long as there has only been expe- 
 rience of one. If it be said that the doetrine of 
 the equality of the sexes rests only on theory, it 
 must be remembered that the contrary doctrine 
 also has only theory to rest upon. All that is 
 proved in its favour by direct experience, is that 
 mankind have been able to exist under it, and to 
 attain the degree of improvement and prosperity 
 which we now see ; but whether that prosperity 
 has been attained sooner, or is now greater, than 
 it would have been under the other system, ex- 
 perience does not say. On the other hand, ex- 
 perience does say, that every step in improvement 
 has been so invariably accompanied by a step 
 
244 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 made in raising the social position of women, 
 that historians and philosophers have been led to 
 adopt their elevation or debasement as on the 
 whole the surest test and most correct measure of 
 the civilization of a people or an age. Through 
 all the progessive period of human history, the 
 condition of women has been approaching nearer 
 to equality with men. This does not of itself 
 prove that the assimilation must go on to complete 
 equality ; but it assuredly affords some presump- 
 tion that such is the case. 
 
 Neither does it avail anything to say that the 
 nature of the two sexes adapts them to their 
 present functions and position, and renders these 
 appropriate to them. Standing on the ground of 
 common sense and the constitution of the human 
 mind, I deny that any one knows, or can know, 
 the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have 
 only Deen seen in their present relation to one 
 another. If men had ever been found in soeiety 
 without women, or women without men, or if 
 there had been a society of men and women in 
 which the women were not under the control of 
 the men, something might have been positively 
 known about the mental and moral differences 
 which may be inherent in the nature of each. 
 What is now called the nature of women is an 
 eminently artificial thing — the result of forced 
 repression in some directions, unnatural stimula* 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 245 
 
 tion in others. It may be asserted without 
 scruple^ that no other class of dependents have 
 had their character so entirely distorted from its 
 natural proportions by their relation with theii 
 masters ; for, if conquered and slave races have 
 been, in some respects, more forcibly repressed, 
 whatever in them has not been crushed down by an 
 iron heel has generally been let alone, and if left 
 with any liberty of development, it has developed 
 itself according to its own laws; but in the case 
 of women, a hot-house and stove cultivation has 
 always been carried on of some of the capabilities 
 of their nature, for the benefit and pleasure of 
 their masters. Then, because certain products of 
 the general vital force sprout luxuriantly and 
 reach a great development in this heated atmo- 
 sphere and under this active nurture and water- 
 ing, while other shoots from the same root, which 
 are left outside in the wintry air, with ice pur- 
 posely heaped all round them, have a stunted 
 growth, and some are burnt off with fire and 
 disappear; men, with that inability to recognise 
 their own work which distinguishes the un- 
 analytic mind, indolently believe that the tree 
 grows of itself in the way they have made it 
 grow, and that it would die if one half of it 
 were not kept in a vapour bath and the other 
 half in the snow. 
 
 Of all difficulties which impede the progress 
 
246 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 of thought, and the formation of well-grounded 
 opinions on life and social arrangements, the 
 greatest is now the unspeakable ignorance and 
 inattention of mankind in respect to the in- 
 fluences which form human character. Whatever 
 any portion of the human species now arc, or 
 seem to be, such, it is supposed, they have a 
 natural tendency to be : even when the most 
 elementary knowledge of the circumstances in 
 which they have been placed, clearly points out 
 the causes that made them what they are. 
 Because a cottier deeply in arrears to his land- 
 lord is not industrious, there are people who 
 think that the Irish are naturally idle. Because 
 constitutions can be overthrown when the autho- 
 rities appointed to execute them turn their arms 
 against them, there are people who think the 
 French incapable of-free government. Because 
 the Greeks cheated the Turks, and the Turks only 
 plundered the Greeks, there are persons Avho 
 think that the Turks are naturally more sincere : 
 and because women, as is often said, care nothing 
 about politics except their personalities, it is 
 supposed that the general good is naturally less 
 interesting to women than to men. History, 
 which is now so much better understood than 
 formerly, teaches another lesson : if only by show- 
 ing the extraordinary susceptibility of human 
 nature to external influences, and the extreme 
 
THE SUBJIi:CTIOH OF WOMEN. 
 
 247 
 
 variableness of those of its manifestations whieli 
 are supposed to be most universal and uniform. 
 But in history^ as in travelling, men usually see 
 only what they already had in their own minds ; 
 and few learn much from history, who do not 
 bring much with them to its study. 
 
 Hence, in regard to that most difficult ques- 
 tion, what are the natural differences between 
 the two sexes — a subject on which it is impossible 
 in the present state of society to obtain com- 
 plete and correct knowledge — while almost every- 
 body dogmatizes upon it, almost all neglect and 
 make light of the only means by which any 
 partial insight can be obtained into it. This is, 
 an analytic study of the most important de- 
 partment of psychology, the laws of the influence 
 of circumstances on character. For, however 
 great and apparently ineradicable the moral and 
 intellectual differences between men and women 
 might be, the evidence of their being natural 
 differences could only be negative. Those only 
 could be inferred to be natural wdiich could not 
 possibly be artificial — the residuum, after de- 
 ducting every characteristic of either sex which 
 can admit of being explained from education or 
 external circumstances. The profoundest know- 
 ledge of the laws of the formation of character 
 is indispensable to entitle any one to affirm even 
 that there is any difference, much more what 
 
248 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 the difference is^ between tbe two sexes con- 
 sidered as moral and rational beings ; and since 
 no one^ as yet^ has that knowledge^ (for there is 
 hardly any subject which^ in proportion to its 
 importance, has been so little studied), no one is 
 thus far entitled to any positive opinion on the 
 subject. Conjectures are all that can at present 
 be made; conjectures more or less probable, 
 according as more or less authorized by such 
 knowledge as we yet have of the laws of psy- 
 chology, as applied to the formation of character. 
 
 Even the preliminary knowledge, what the 
 differences between the sexes now are, apart 
 from all question as to how they are made what 
 they are, is still in the crudest and most incom- 
 plete state. Medical practitioners and physio- 
 logists have ascertained, to some extent, the 
 differences in bodily constitution; and this is an 
 important element to the psychologist : but 
 
 hardly any medical practitioner is a psychologist. 
 Respecting the mental characteristics of women ; 
 their observations are of no more worth than 
 those of common men. It is a subject on which 
 nothing final can be known, so long as those 
 who alone can really know it, women themselves, 
 have given but little testimony, and that little, 
 mostly suborned. It is easy to know stupid 
 women. Stupidity is much the same all the 
 world over, A stupid personas notions and feel- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 249 
 
 ings may confidently be inferred from those which 
 prevail in the circle by which the person is sur- 
 rounded. Not so with those whose opinions and 
 feelings are an emanation from their own nature 
 and faeulties. It is only a man here and there 
 who has any tolerable knowledge of the character 
 even of the women of his own family. I do 
 not mean^ of their capabilities; these nobody 
 knows^ not even themselves^ because most of 
 them have never been called out. I mean their 
 actually existing thoughts and feelings. Many 
 a man thinks he perfectly understands women^ 
 because he has had amatory relations with 
 several^ perhaps with many of them. If he is 
 a good observer^ and his experience extends to 
 quality as well as quantity, he may have learnt 
 something of one narrow department of their 
 nature — an important department, no doubt. 
 But of all the rest of it, few persons are gene- 
 rally more ignorant, because there are few from 
 whom it is so carefully hidden. The most 
 favourable case which a man can generally have 
 for studying the character of a woman, is that 
 of his own wife : for the opportunities are greater, 
 and the cases of complete sympathy not so un- 
 speakably rare. And in fact, this is the source 
 from which any knowledge worth having on the 
 subject has, I believe, generally come. But most 
 men have not had the opportunity of studying in 
 11 * 
 
250 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 this way more ttan a single case : accordingly 
 one can^ to an almost laughable degree^ infer 
 what a man^s wife is like^ from his opinions 
 about women in general. To make even this 
 one case yield any result^ the woman must be 
 worth knowings and the man not only a compe- 
 tent judge^ but of a character so sympathetic in 
 itself^ and so well adapted to hers^ that he can 
 either read her mind by sympathetic intuition, 
 or has nothing in himself which makes her shy 
 of disclosing it. Hardly anything, I believe, 
 can be more rare than this conjunction. It 
 often happens that there is the most complete 
 unity of feeling and community of interests as 
 to all external things, yet the one has as little 
 admission into the internal life of the other as 
 if they were common acquaintance. Even with 
 true affection, authority on the one side and sub- 
 ordination on the other prevent perfect confi- 
 dence. Though nothing may be intentionally 
 withheld, much is not shown. In the analogous 
 relation of parent and child, the corresponding 
 phenomenon must have been in the observation 
 of every one. As between father and son, how 
 many are the cases in which the father, in spite 
 of real affection on both sides, obviously to all 
 the world does not know, nor suspect, parts of 
 the son^s character familiar to his companions 
 and equals. The truth is, that the position of 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 251 
 
 looking up to another is extremely unpropitious 
 to complete sincerity and openness with him. 
 The fear of losing ground in his opinion or in his 
 feelings is so strong_, that even in an upright cha- 
 racter^ there is an unconscious tendency to show 
 only the best side^ or the side which^ though not 
 the best, is that which he most likes to see : and it 
 may be confidently said that thorough knowledge 
 of one another hardly ever exists, but between 
 persons who, besides being intimates, are equals. 
 How much more true, then, must all this be, 
 when the one is not only under the authority of 
 the other, but has it inculcated on her as a duty 
 to reckon everything else subordinate to his 
 comfort and pleasure, and to let him neither see 
 nor feel anything coming from her, except what 
 is agreeable to bim. All these difficulties stand 
 in the way of a man'^s obtaining any thorough 
 knowledge even of the one woman whom alone, 
 in general, he has sufficient opportunity of study- 
 ing. When we further consider that to under- 
 stand one woman is not necessarily to understand 
 any other woman; that even if he could study 
 many women of one rank, or of one country, he 
 would not thereby understand women of other 
 ranks or countries ; and even if he did, they are 
 still only the women of a single period of history; 
 we may safely assert that the knowledge which 
 men can acquire of women, even as they have 
 
252 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 been and are, witliout reference to what they 
 might be, is wretchedly imperfect and superficial, 
 and always will be so, until women themselves 
 have told all that they have to tell. 
 
 And this time has not come ; nor will it come 
 otherwise than gradually. It is but of yesterday 
 that women have either been qualified by literary 
 accomplishments, or permitted by society, to tell 
 anything to the general public. As yet very 
 few of them dare tell anything, which men, on 
 whom their literary success depends, are un- 
 willing to hear. Let us remember in what manner, 
 up to a very recent time, the expression, even 
 by a male author, of uncustomary opinions, or 
 what are deemed eccentric feelings, usually was, 
 and in some degree still is, received ; and we may 
 form some faint conception under what impedi- 
 ments a woman, who is brought up to think 
 custom and opinion her sovereign rule, attempts 
 to express in books anything drawn from the 
 depths of her own nature. The greatest woman 
 who has left writings behind her sufficient to 
 give her an eminent rank in the literature of her 
 country, thought it necessary to prefix as a motto 
 to her boldest work, Un homme pent braver 
 Topinion; une femme doit s^y soumettre.'^'^^ The 
 greater part of wLat women vrrite about women 
 is mere sycophancy to men. In the case of an« 
 
 * Title-page of Mme. de Stael’s “ Delpbiue.’* 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 253 
 
 married women^ mncli of it seems only intended 
 to increase their chance of a husband. Many, 
 both married and unmarried^ overstep the mark, 
 and inculcate a servility beyond what is desired 
 or relished by any man, except the very vulgarest. 
 But this is not so often the case as, even at a 
 quite late period, it still was. Literary women 
 are becoming more freespoken, and more willing 
 to express their real sentiments. Unfortunately, 
 in this country especially, they are themselves 
 such artificial products, that their sentiments are 
 compounded of a small element of individual 
 observation and consciousness, and a very large 
 one of acquired associations. This will be less 
 and less the case, but it will remain true to a 
 great extent, as long as social institutions do not 
 admit the same free development of originality 
 in women which is possible to men. When that 
 time comes, and not before, we shall see, and 
 not merely hear, as much as it is necessary to 
 know of the nature of women, and the adaptation 
 of other things to it. 
 
 I have dwelt so much on the difficulties which 
 at present obstruct any real knowledge by men 
 of the true nature of women, because in this as 
 in so many other things opinio copiae inter 
 maximas causas inopiae est and there is little 
 chance of reasonable thinking on the matter, 
 while people flatter themselves that they perfectly 
 
254 : 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 understand a subject of whicli most men kno\^ 
 absolutely nothings and of wbicb it is at present 
 impossible that any man^ or all men taken toge- 
 ther^ should have knowledge which can qualify 
 them to lay down the law to women as to what 
 is^ or is not^ their vocation. Happily^ no such 
 knowledge is necessary for any practical purpose 
 connected with the position of women in relation 
 to society and life. For^ according to all the 
 principles involved in modern society^ the question 
 rests with women themselves — to be decided by 
 their own experience^ and by the use of their 
 own faculties. There are no means of finding 
 what either one person or many can do^ but by 
 trying — and no means by which any one else can 
 discover for them what it is for their happiness 
 to do or leave undone. 
 
 One thing we may be certain of — that what is 
 conti^ary to women^s nature to do^ they never 
 will be made to do by simply giving their nature 
 free play. The anxiety of mankind to interfere 
 in behalf of nature^ for fear lest nature should 
 not succeed in effecting its purpose, is an alto- 
 gether unnecessary solicitude. What women by 
 nature cannot do, it is quite superfluous to forbid 
 them from doing. What they can do, but not 
 so well as the men who are their competitors, 
 competition suffices to exclude them from ; since 
 nobody asks for protective duties and bounties 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 255 
 
 in favour of women; it is only asked that the 
 present bounties and protective duties in favour 
 of men should be recalled. If women have a 
 greater natural inclination for some things than 
 for others^ there is no need of laws or social 
 inculcation to make the majority of them do 
 the former in preference to the latter. What- 
 ever women’s services are most wanted for^ the 
 free play of competition will hold out the 
 strongest inducements to them to undertake* 
 And, as the words imply, they are most wanted 
 for the things for which they are most fit ; by 
 the apportionment of which to them, the col- 
 lective faculties of the two sexes can be applied 
 on the whole with the greatest sum of valuable 
 result. 
 
 The general opinion of men is supposed to be, 
 that the natural vocation of a woman is that of 
 a wife and mother. I say, is supposed to be, 
 because, judging from acts — from the whole of 
 the present constitution of society — one might 
 infer that their opinion was the direct contrary. 
 They might be supposed to think that the 
 alleged natural vocation of women was of all 
 things the most repugnant to their nature ; 
 insomuch that if they are free to do anything 
 else — if any other means of living, or occupation 
 of their time and faculties, is open, which has 
 any chance of appearing desirable to them—there 
 
256 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 will not be enough of them who will be willing 
 to accept the condition said to be natural to 
 them. If this is the real opinion of men in 
 general, it would be well that it should be 
 spoken out. I should like to hear somebody 
 openly enunciating the doctrine (it is already 
 implied in much that is written on the sub- 
 ject) — It is necessary to society that women 
 should marry and produce children. They will 
 not do so unless they are compelled. Therefore 
 it is necessary to compel them.^”^ The merits of 
 the case would then be clearly defined. It 
 would be exactly that of the slaveholders of 
 South Carolina and Louisiana. It is necessary 
 that cotton and sugar should be grown. White 
 men cannot produce them. Negroes will not, 
 for any wages which we choose to give. Ergo 
 they must be compelled. An illustration still 
 closer to the point is that of impressment. 
 Sailors must absolutely be had to defend the 
 country. It often happens that they will not 
 voluntarily enlist. Therefore there must be 
 the power of forcing them. How often has 
 this logic been used ! and, but for one flaw 
 in it, without doubt it would have been suc- 
 cessful up to this day. But it is open to the 
 retort — First pay the sailors the honest value 
 of their labour. When you have made it as 
 well worth their while to serve you, as to work for 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 257 
 
 other employers^ you will have ho more difficulty 
 than others have in obtaining their services* 
 To this there is no logical answer except I will 
 not and as people are now not only ashamed^ 
 but are not desirous^ to rob the labourer of his 
 hire^ impressment is no longer advocated. Those 
 who attempt to force women into marriage by 
 closing all other doors against them^ lay them- 
 selves open to a similar retort. If they mean 
 what they say^ their opinion must evidently be, 
 that men do not render the married condition 
 so desirable to women^ as to induce them to 
 accept it for its own recommendations. It is 
 not a sign of one'’s thinking the boon one offers 
 very attractive^ when one allows only Hobson^s 
 choice, that or none.*^^ And here, I believe, 
 is the clue to the feelings of those men, who 
 have a real antipathy to the equal freedom of 
 women. I believe they are afraid, not lest 
 women should be unwilling to marry, for I 
 do not think that any one in reality has that 
 apprehension ; but lest they should insist that 
 marriage should be on equal conditions ; lest 
 all women of spirit and capacity should prefer 
 doing almost anything else, not in their own 
 eyes degrading, rather than marry, when marry^ 
 ing is giving themselves a master, and a master 
 too of all their earthly possessions. And truly, 
 if this consequence were necessarily incident to 
 
!-/58 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 marriage, I think that the apprehension would 
 be very well founded. I agree in thinkiug it 
 probable that few women, capable of anything 
 else, would, unless under an irresistible entraine- 
 merit y rendering them for the time insensible 
 to anything but itself, choose such a lot, when 
 any other means were open to them of tilling 
 a conventionally honourable place in life : and 
 if men are determined that the law of marriage 
 shall be a law of despotism, they are quite right, 
 in point of mere policy, in leaving to women 
 only Hobson'^s choice. But, in that case, all 
 that has been done in the modern world to 
 relax the chain on the minds of women, has 
 been a mistake. They never should have been 
 allowed to receive a literary education. Women 
 who read, much more women who write, are, 
 in the existing constitution of things, a con- 
 tradiction and a disturbing element : and it was 
 wrong to bring women up with any acquire- 
 ments but those of an odalisque, or of a domestic 
 servant. 
 
CHAPTER IL 
 
 I T will be well to commence the detailed dis- 
 cussion of the subject by the particular 
 branch of it to which the course of our observa- 
 tions has led us ; the conditions which the laws 
 of this and all other countries annex to the 
 marriage contract. Marriage being the destina- 
 tion appointed by society for women^ the prospect 
 they are brought up to^ and the object which it 
 is intended should be sought by all of them^ ex- 
 cept those who are too little attractive to be 
 chosen by any man as his companion ; one might 
 have supposed that everything would have been 
 done to make this condition as eligible to them 
 as possible^ that they might have no cause to 
 regret being denied the option of any other. 
 Society^ however, both in this^ and^ at firsts in all 
 other cases^ has preferred to attain its object by 
 foul rather than fair means : but this is the only 
 case in which it has substantially persisted in 
 them even to the present day. Originally women 
 were taken by force^ or regularly sold by their 
 father to the husband. Until a late period in 
 
260 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 European history, the father had the power to 
 dispose of his daughter in marriage at his own 
 will and pleasure, without any regard to hers. 
 The Church, indeed, was so far faithful to a better 
 morality as to require a formal yes^^ from the 
 woman at the marriage ceremony ; but there was 
 nothing to shew that the cousent was other than 
 compulsory; and it was practically impossible for 
 the girl to refuse compliance if the father perse- 
 vered, except perhaps when she might obtain the 
 protection of religion by a determined resolution 
 to take monastic vows. After marriage, the man 
 had anciently (but this was anterior to Christi- 
 anity) the power of life and death over his wife. 
 She could invoke no law against him ; he was 
 her sole tribunal and law. For a long time 
 he could repudiate her, but she had no corre- 
 sponding power in regard to him. By the old 
 laws of England, the husband was called the lord 
 of the wife; he was literally regarded as her 
 sovereign, inasmuch that the murder of a man 
 by his wife was called treason {'petty as distin- 
 guished from high treason), and was more cruelly 
 avenged than was usually the case with high 
 treason, for the penalty was burning to death. 
 Because these various enormities have fallen into 
 disuse (for most of them were never formally 
 abolished, or not until they had long ceased to 
 be practised) men suppose that all is now as it 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 261 
 
 should be in regard to the marriage contract; 
 and we are continually told that civilization and 
 Christianity have restored to the woman her just 
 rights. Meanwhile the wife is the actual bond- 
 servant of her husband : no less so^ as far as legal 
 obligation goes^ than slaves commonly so called. 
 She vows a lifelong obedience to him at the 
 altar^ and is held to it all through her life by 
 law. Casuists may say that the obligation of 
 obedience stops short of participation in crime, 
 but it certainly extends to everything else. She 
 can do no act whatever but by his permission^ at 
 least tacit. She can acquire no property but for 
 him ; the instant it becomes hers, even if by 
 inheritance, it becomes i^so facto his. In this 
 respect the wife^s position under the common 
 law of England is worse than that of slaves in 
 the laws of many countries : by the Roman law, 
 for example, a slave might have his peculium, 
 which to a certain extent the law guaranteed to 
 him for his exclusive use. The higher classes 
 in this country have given an analogous advan- 
 tage to their women, through special contracts 
 setting aside the law, bj^ conditions of pin-money, 
 &c. : since parental feeling being stronger with 
 fathers than the class feeling of their own sex, a 
 father generally prefers his own daugliter to a 
 son-in-law who is a stranger to him. By means 
 of settlements, the rich usually contrive to with- 
 
262 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 draw the whole or part of the inherited property 
 of the wife from the absolute control of the 
 husband : but they do not succeed in keeping it 
 under her own control ; the utmost they can 
 do only prevents the husband from squandering 
 it_, at the same time debarring the rightful owner 
 from its use. The property itself is out of the 
 reach of both ; and as to the income derived from 
 it^ the form of settlement most favourable to the 
 wife (that called to her separate use’^) only 
 precludes the husband from receiving it instead 
 of her : it must pass through her hands^ but if 
 he takes it from her by personal violence as soon 
 as she receives it. he can neither be punished, 
 nor compelled to restitution. This is the amount 
 of the protection which, under the laws of this 
 country, the most powerful nobleman can 
 give to his own daughter as respects her hus- 
 band. In the immense majority of cases there 
 is no settlement : and the absorption of all rights, 
 all property, as well as all freedom of action, 
 is complete. The two are called one person in 
 law/^ for the purpose of inferring that whatever 
 is hers is his, but the parallel inference is never 
 drawn that whatever is his is hers ; the maxim is 
 not applied against the man, except to make him 
 responsible to third parties for her acts, as a 
 master is for the acts of his slaves or of his cattle. 
 I am far from pretending that wives are in 
 
263 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OU WOMEN. 
 
 general no better treated than slaves ; but no 
 slave is a slave to the same lengths^ and in so 
 full a sense of the word^ as a wife is. Hardly 
 any slave^ except one immediately attached to the 
 master^s person^ is a slave at all hours and all 
 minutes; in general he has^ like a soldier^ his 
 fixed task^ and when it is done^ or when he is off 
 duty^ he disposes^ within certain limits, of his 
 own time^ and has a family life into which the 
 master rarely intrudes. Uncle Tom^^ under his 
 first master had his own life in his cabin/^ 
 almost as much as any man whose work takes 
 him away from home^ is able to have in his own 
 family. But it cannot be so with the wife. Above 
 alb a female slave has (in Christian countries) an 
 admitted right, and is considered under a moral 
 obligation, to refuse to her master the last fami- 
 liarity. Not so the wife : however brutal a tyrant 
 she may unfortunatelj^ be chained to — though she 
 may know that he hates her, though it may be 
 his daily pleasure to torture her, and though she 
 may feel it impossible not to loathe him — he can 
 claim from her and enforce the lowest degrada- 
 tion of a human being, that of being made the 
 instrument of an animal function contrary to her 
 inclinations. While she is held in this worst de- 
 scription of slavery as to her own person, what 
 is her position in regard to the children in 
 whom she and her master have a joint interest ? 
 
264 : 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF V/OMEN. 
 
 They are by law his children. He alone has any 
 legal rights over them. Not one act can she do 
 towards or in relation to them, except by delega- 
 tion from him. Even after he is dead she is 
 not their legal guardian, unless he by will has 
 made her so. He could even send them away 
 from her, and deprive her of the means of seeing 
 or corresponding with them, until this power was 
 in some degree restricted by Serjeant Talfourd’s 
 Act. This is her legal state. And from this state 
 she has no means of withdrawing herself. If she 
 leaves her husband, she can take nothing with 
 her, neither her children nor anything which is 
 rightfully her own. If he chooses, he can compel 
 her to return, by law, or by physical force ; or he 
 may content himself with seizing for his own use 
 anything which she may earn, or which may be 
 given to her by her relations. It is only legal 
 separation by a decree of a court of justice, which 
 entitles her to live apart, without being forced 
 back into the custody of an exasperated jailer — or 
 w^hich empowers her to apply any earnings to her 
 own use, without fear that a man whom perhaps 
 she has not seen for twenty years will pounce 
 upon her some day and carry all off. This legal 
 separation, until lately, the courts of justice would 
 only give at an expense which made it inacces- 
 sible to any one out of the higher ranks. Even 
 now it is only given in cases of desertion, or of 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 265 
 
 the extreme of cruelty ; and yet complaints ar« 
 made every day that it is granted too easily. 
 Surely^ if a woman is denied any lot in life but 
 that of being the personal body-servant of a 
 despot^ and is dependent for everything upon the 
 chance of finding one who may be disposed to 
 make a favourite of her instead of merely a 
 drudge^ it is a very cruel aggravation of her fate 
 that she should be allowed to try this chance only 
 once. The natural sequel and corollary from 
 this state of things would be^ that since her all in 
 life depends upon obtaining a good master, she 
 should be allowed to change again and again 
 until she finds one. I am not saying that she 
 ought to be allowed this privilege. That is a 
 totally different consideration. The question of 
 divorce,inthe sense involving liberty of remarriage, 
 is one into which it is foreign to my purpose to 
 enter. All I now say is, that to those to whom 
 nothing but servitude is allowed, the free choice 
 of servitude is the only, though a most insufficient, 
 alleviation. Its refusal completes the assimila- 
 tion of the wife to the slave — and the slave 
 under not the mildest form of slavery : for ir 
 some slave codes the slave could, under certaii 
 circumstances of ill usage, legally compel thv 
 master to sell him. But no amount of ill usage 
 without adultery superadded, will in Englant 
 free a wife from her tormentor. 
 
 12 
 
26G 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 I have no desire to exaggerate^ nor does the 
 ease stand in any need of exaggeration. I have 
 described the witVs legal position^ not her actual 
 treatment. The laws of most countries are far 
 worse than the people who execute them, and 
 many of them are only able to remain laws by 
 being seldom or never carried into effect. If 
 married life were all that it might be expected 
 to be, looking to the laws alone, society would 
 be a hell upon earth. Happily there are both 
 feelings and interests which in many men 
 exclude, and in most, greatly temper, the im- 
 pulses and propensities which lead to tyranny : 
 and of those feelings, the tie which connects 
 a man with his wife affords, in a normal 
 state of things, incomparably the strongest 
 example. The only tie which at all approaches 
 to it, that between him and his children, tends, 
 in all save exceptional cases, to strengthen, 
 instead of conflicting with, the first. Because 
 this is true ; because men in general do not 
 inflict, nor women suffer, all the misery which 
 could be inflicted and suffered if the full power 
 of tyranny with which the man is legally in- 
 vested were acted on ; the defenders of the 
 existing form of the institution think that all 
 its iniquity is justified, and that any complaint 
 is merely quarrelling with the evil which is the 
 price paid for every great good. But the miti* 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 267 
 
 gations in practice^ which are compatible with 
 maintaining in full legal force this or any other 
 kind of tyranny^ instead of being any apology 
 for despotism, only serve to prove what power 
 human nature possesses of reacting against the 
 vilest institutions, and with what vitality the 
 seeds of good as well as those of evil in human 
 character diffuse and propagate themselves. Not 
 a word can be said for despotism in the family 
 which cannot be said for political despotism. 
 Every absolute king does not sit at his window 
 to enjoy the groans of his tortured subjects, nor 
 strips them of their last rag and turns them 
 out to shiver in the road. The despotism of 
 Louis XYI. was not the despotism of Philippe 
 le Bel, or of Nadir Shah, or of Caligula; but 
 it was bad enough to justify the French Revolu- 
 tion, and to palliate even its horrors. If an 
 appeal be made to the intense attachments 
 which exist between wives and their husbands, 
 exactly as much may be said of domestic slavery. 
 It was quite an ordinary fact in Greece and 
 Rome for slaves to submit to death by torture 
 rather than betray their masters. In the pro- 
 scriptions of the Roman civil wars it was 
 remarked that wives and slaves were heroically 
 faithful, sons very commonly treacherous. Yet 
 we know how cruelly many Romans treated 
 their slaves. But in truth these intense in<« 
 
268 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 dividual feelings nowhere rise to snch a luxuriant 
 height as under the most atrocious institutions. 
 It is part of the irony of life^ that the strongest 
 feelings of devoted gratitude of which human 
 nature seems to be susceptible^ are called forth 
 in human beings towards those who^ having the 
 power entirely to crush their earthly existence, 
 voluntarily refrain from using that power. How 
 great a place in most men this sentiment fills, even 
 in religious devotion, it would be cruel to inquire. 
 We daily see how much their gratitude to 
 Heaven appears to be stimulated by the con- 
 templation of fellow-creatures to whom God 
 has not been so merciful as he has to themselves. 
 
 Whether the institution to be defended is 
 slavery, political absolutism, or the absolutism of 
 the head of a family, we are always expected to 
 judge of it from its best instances ; and we are 
 presented with pictures of loving exercise of 
 authority on one side, loving submission to it on 
 the other — superior wisdom ordering all things 
 for the greatest good of the dependents, and sur- 
 rounded by their smiles and benedictions. All 
 this would be very much to the purpose if any 
 one pretended that there are no such things as 
 good men. Who doubts that there may be great 
 goodness, and great happiness, and great affection, 
 under the absolute government of a good man? 
 Meanwhile, laws and institutions require to be 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 269 
 
 adapted, not to good men, but to bad. Marriage 
 is not an institution designed for a select few. 
 Men are not required, as a preliminary to tbe 
 marriage ceremony, to prove by testimonials that 
 they are fit to be trusted with the exercise of 
 absolute power. The tie of affection and obliga- 
 tion to a wife and children is very strong with 
 those whose general social feelings are strong, 
 and with many who are little sensible to any 
 other social ties ; but there are all degrees of 
 sensibility and insensibility to it, as there are all 
 grades of goodness and wickedness in men, down 
 to those whom no ties will bind, and on whom 
 society has no action but through its ultima ratioy 
 the penalties of the law. In every grade of this 
 descending scale are men to whom are committed 
 all the legal powers of a husband. The vilest 
 malefactor has some wretched woman tied to 
 him, against whom he can commit any atrocity 
 except killing her, and, if tolerably cautious, can 
 do that without much danger of the legal penalty. 
 And how many thousands are there among the 
 lowest classes in every country, who, without 
 being in a legal sense malefactors in any other 
 respect, because in every other quarter their 
 aggressions meet with resistance, indulge the 
 utmost habitual excesses of bodily violence to- 
 wards the unhappy wife, who alone, at least o 
 grown persons, can neither repel nor escape from 
 
270 
 
 TUE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 their brutality; and towards whom the excess 
 of dependence inspires their mean and savage 
 natures, not with a generous forbearance, and a 
 point of honour to behave well to one whose lot 
 in life is trusted entirely to their kindness, but 
 on the contrary with a notion that the law has 
 delivered her to them as their thing, to be used 
 at their pleasure, and that they are not expected 
 to practise the consideration towards her which 
 is required from them towards everybody else. 
 The law, which till lately left even these atrocious 
 extremes of domestic oppression practically un- 
 punished, has within these few years made some 
 feeble attempts to repress them. But its attempts 
 have done little, and cannot be expected to do 
 much, because it is contrary to reason and expe- 
 rience to suppose that there can be any real check 
 to brutality, consistent with leaving the victim 
 still in the power of the executioner. Until a 
 conviction for personal violence, or at all events 
 a repetition of it after a first conviction, entitles 
 the woman ipso facto to a divorce, or at least to 
 a judicial separation, the attempt to repress these 
 aggravated assaults^^ by legal penalties will 
 break down for want of a prosecutor, or for want 
 of a witness. 
 
 When we consider how vast is the number of 
 men, in any great country, who are little higher 
 than brutes, and that this never prevents them 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 271 
 
 from being able^ tbrongb the law of marriage^ 
 to obtain a victim^, the breadth and depth of 
 human misery caused in this shape alone by the 
 abuse of the institution swells to something ap- 
 palling. Yet these are only the extreme cases. 
 They are the lowest abysses^ but there is a sad 
 succession of depth after depth before reaching 
 them. In domestic as in political tyranny^ the 
 case of absolute monsters chiefly illustrates the 
 institution by showing that there is scarcely any 
 horror which may not occur under it if the 
 despot pleases^ and thus setting in a strong light 
 what must be the terrible frequency of things 
 only a little less atrocious. Absolute fiends are 
 as rare as angels^ perhaps rarer : ferocious 
 
 savages^ with occasional touches of humanity^ are 
 however very frequent : and in the wide interval 
 which separates these from any worthy represen- 
 tatives of the human species^ how many are the 
 forms and gradations of animalism and selfish- 
 ness^ often under an outward varnish of civiliza- 
 tion and even cultivation^ living at peace with 
 the law^ maintaining a creditable appearance to 
 all who are not under their power, yet sufficient 
 often to make the lives of all who are so, a 
 torment and a burthen to them ! It would be 
 tiresome to repeat the commonplaces about the 
 unfitness of men in general for power, which, 
 after the political discussions of centuries, every 
 
272 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 one knows by heart, were it not that hardly any 
 one thinks of applying these maxims to the case 
 in which above all others they are applicable, 
 that of power, not placed in the hands of a man 
 here and there, but offered to every adult male, 
 down to the basest and most ferocious. It is 
 not because a man is not known to have broken 
 any of the Ten Commandments, or because he 
 maintains a respectable character in his dealings 
 with those whom he cannot compel to have 
 intercourse with him, or because he does not fly 
 out into violent bursts of ill-temper against those 
 who are not obliged to bear with him, that it is 
 possible to surmise of what sort his conduct will 
 be in the um^estraint of home. Even the com- 
 monest men reserve the violent, the sulky, the 
 undisguisedly selfish side of their character for 
 those who ha.ve no power to withstand it. The 
 relation of superiors to dependents is the nursery 
 of these vices of character, w^hich, wherever else 
 they exist, are an overflowing from that source. 
 A man who is morose or violent to his equals, 
 is sure to be one who has lived among inferiors, 
 whom he could frighten or worry into submis- 
 sion. If the family in its best forms is, as it is 
 often said to be, a school of sympathy, tenderness, 
 and loving forgetfulness of self, it is still oftener, 
 as respects its chief, a school of wilfulness, over- 
 bearingness, unbounded self-indulgence, and a 
 
THE SUBJECTION OP WOMEN. 273 
 
 double-dyed and idealized selfishness^ of which 
 sacrifice itself is only a particular form : the care 
 for the wife and children being only care for 
 them as parts of the man^s own interests and 
 belongings^ and their individual happiness being 
 immolated in every shape to his smallest pre- 
 ferences. What better is to be looked for under 
 the existing form of the institution? We know 
 that the bad piopensities of human nature are 
 only kept within bounds when they are allowed 
 no scope for their indulgence. We know that 
 from impulse and habit^ when not from delibe- 
 rate purpose, almost every one to whom others 
 yield, goes on encroaching upon them, until a 
 point is reached at which they are compelled to 
 resist. Such being the common tendency of 
 human nature ; the almost unlimited power which 
 present social institutions give to the man over 
 at least one human being — the one with whom 
 he resides, and whom he has always present — 
 this power seeks out and evokes the latent germs 
 of selfishness in the remotest corners of his 
 nature — fans its faintest sparks and smouldering 
 embers — oflfers to him a license for the indulgence 
 of those points of his original character which 
 in all other relations he would have found it ne* 
 cessary to repress and conceal, and the repression 
 of which would in time have become a second 
 nature. I know that there is another side to 
 
 12 * 
 
274 : 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 the question. I grant that the wife, if she 
 cannot effectually resist, can at least retaliate ; 
 she, too, ean make the man^s life extremely un- 
 comfortable, and by that power is able to carry 
 many points which she ought, and many which 
 she ought not, to prevail in. But this instru- 
 ment of self-proteetion — which may be called 
 the power of the scold, or the shrewish sanetion 
 — has the fatal defeet, that it avails most against 
 the least tyrannical superiors, and in favour of 
 the least deserving dependents. It is the weapon 
 of irritable and self-willed women ; of those who 
 would make the worst use of power if they them- 
 selves had it, and who generally turn this power 
 to a bad use. The amiable cannot use such an 
 instrument, the highminded disdain it. And on 
 the other hand, the husbands against whom it is 
 used most effeetively are the gentler and more 
 inoffensive; those who cannot be induced, even 
 by provocation, to resort to any very harsh exer- 
 cise of authority. The wife^s power of being 
 disagreeable generally only establishes a counter- 
 tyranny, and makes vietims in their turn chiefly 
 of those husbands who are least inclined to be 
 tyrants. 
 
 What is it, then, whieh really tempers the 
 corrupt ng effects of the power, and makes it 
 compatible with sueh amount of good as we 
 actually see? Mere feminine blandishments. 
 
THE STJBJECTIOlSr OF WOMEN. 
 
 275 
 
 though of great effect in individual instances, 
 have very little eflPect in modifying the general 
 tendencies of the situation ; for their power only 
 lasts while the woman is young and attractive, 
 often only while her charm is new, and not 
 dimmed by familiarity ; and on many men they 
 have not much influence at any time. The real 
 mitigating causes are, the personal affection 
 which is the growth of time, in so far as the man^s 
 nature is susceptible of it, and the womaii'^s 
 character sufficiently congenial with his to excite 
 it j their common interests as regards the chil- 
 dren, and their general community of interest 
 as concerns third persons (to which however there 
 are very great limitations) ; the real importance 
 of the wife to his daily comforts and enjoyments, 
 and the value he consequently attaches to her 
 on his personal account, which, in a man capable 
 of feeling for others, lays the foundation of caring 
 for her on her own ; and lastly, the influence na- 
 turally acquired over almost all human beings by 
 those near to their persons (if not actually disagree- 
 able to them) : who, both by their direct entreaties, 
 and by the insensible contagion of their feelings 
 and dispositions, are often able, unless counter- 
 acted by some equally strong personal influence, 
 to obtain a degree of command over the conduct 
 of the superior, altogether excessive and un- 
 reasonable. Through these various means, the 
 
276 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 wife frequently exercises even too mncli power 
 over the man ; she is able to aflPect his conduct 
 in things in which she may not be qualified to 
 influence it for good — in which her influence may 
 be not only unenlightened, but employed on the 
 morally wrong side; and in which he would act 
 better if left to his own prompting. But neither 
 in the affairs of families nor in those of states 
 is power a compensation for the loss of freedom. 
 Her power often gives her what she has no right 
 to^ but does not enable her to assert her own 
 rights. A Sultanas favourite slave has slaves 
 under her^ over whom she tyrannizes; but the 
 desirable thing would be that she should neither 
 have slaves nor be a slave. By entirely sinking 
 her own existence in her husband ; by having no 
 will (or persuading him that she has no will) but 
 his^ in anything which regards their joint rela- 
 tion^ and by making it the business of her life 
 to w ork upon his sentiments^ a wife may gratify 
 herself by influencing^ and very probably per- 
 verting, his conduct^ in those of his external re- 
 lations which she has never qualified herself to 
 judge of, or in which she is herself wholly in- 
 fluenced by some personal or other partiality or 
 prejudice. Accordingly^ as things now are, 
 those who act most kindly to their wives, are 
 quite as often made worse, as better, by the wife^s 
 influence, in respect to all interests extending 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 277 
 
 beyond the family. She is taught that she has 
 no business with things out of that sphere ; and 
 accordingly she seldom has any honest and con- 
 scientious opinion on them ; and therefore hardly 
 ever meddles with them for any legitimate pur- 
 pose^ but generally for an interested one. She 
 neither knows nor cares which is the right side in 
 politics^ but she knows what will bring in money 
 or invitations^ give her husband a title, her son 
 a place, or her daughter a good marriage. 
 
 But how, it will be asked, can any society 
 exist without government ? In a family, as in a 
 state, some one person must be the ultimate 
 ruler. Who shall decide when married people 
 differ in opinion ? Both cannot have their way, 
 yet a decision one way or the other must be 
 come to. 
 
 It is not true that in all voluntary association 
 between two people, one of them must be absolute 
 master ; still less that the law must determine 
 which of them it shall be. The most frequent 
 case of voluntary association, next to marriage, 
 is partnership in business : and it is not found or 
 thought necessary to enact that in every partner- 
 ship, one partner shall have entire control over 
 the concern, and the others shall be bound to 
 obey his orders. No one would enter into part- 
 nership on terms which would subject him to the 
 responsibilities of a principal, with only tho 
 
278 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OB' WOMEN. 
 
 powers and privileges of a clerk or agent. li 
 the law dealt with other contracts as it does with 
 marriage, it would ordain that one partner should 
 administer the common business as if it was his 
 private concern ; that the otliers should have only 
 delegated powers ; and that this one should be 
 designated by some general presumption of law, 
 for example as being the eldest. The law never 
 does this : nor does experience show it to he 
 necessary that any theoretical inequality of power 
 should exist between the partners, qr that the 
 partnership should have any other conditions than 
 what they may themselves appoint by their articles 
 of agreement. Yet it might seem that the ex- 
 clusive power might be conceded with less danger 
 to the rights and interests of the inferior, in the 
 case of partnership than in that of marriage, 
 since he is free to cancel the power by with- 
 drawing from the connexion. The wife has no 
 such power, and even if she had, it is almost 
 always desirable that she should try all measures 
 before resorting to it. 
 
 It is quite true that things which have to 
 be decided every day, and cannot adjust them- 
 selves gradually, or wait for a compromise, ought 
 to depend on one will : one person must have 
 their sole control. But it does not follow that 
 this should always be the same person. The 
 natural arrangement is a division of powers 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 279 
 
 between tte two; each being absolute in the 
 executive branch of their own department, and 
 any change of system and principle requiring the 
 consent of both. The division neither can nor 
 should be pre-established by the law, since it 
 must depend on individual capacities and suita- 
 bilities. If the two persons chose, they might 
 pre-appoint it by the marriage contract, as pe- 
 cuniary arrangements are now often pre-ap- 
 pointed. There would seldom be any difficulty 
 in deciding such things by ihutual consent, unless 
 the marriage was one of those unhappy ones in 
 which all other things, as well as this, become 
 subjects of bickering and dispute. The division 
 of rights would naturally follow the division of 
 duties and functions ; and that is already made 
 by consent, or at all events not by law, but by 
 general custom, modified and modifiable at the 
 pleasure of the persons concerned. 
 
 The real practical decision of affairs, to which- 
 ever may be given the legal authority, will greatly 
 depend, as it even now does, upon comparative 
 qualifications. The mere fact that he is usually 
 the eldest, will in most cases give the prepon- 
 derance to the man ; at least until they both 
 attain a time of life at which the difference 
 in their years is of no importance. There will 
 naturally also be a more potential voice on the 
 eide, whichever it is, that brings the means of 
 
280 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 support. Inequality from this source does not 
 depend on the law of marriage^ but on the 
 general conditions of human society^ as now 
 constituted. The influence of mental supe- 
 riority^ either general or special, and of superior 
 decision of character, will necessarily tell for 
 much. It always does so at present. And this 
 fact shows how little foundation there is for the 
 apprehension that the powers and responsibilities 
 of partners in life (as of partners in business), 
 cannot be satisfactorily apportioned by agree- 
 ment between themselves. They always are so 
 apportioned, except in cases in which the mar- 
 riage institution is a failure. Things never 
 come to an issue of downright power on one 
 side, and obedience on the other, except where 
 the connexion altogether has been a mistake, 
 and it would be a blessing to both parties to 
 be relieved from it. Some may say that the 
 very thing by which an amicable settlement of 
 differences becomes possible, is the power of 
 legal compulsion known to be in reserve ; as 
 people submit to an arbitration because there 
 is a court of law in the background, which they 
 know that they can be forced to obey. But 
 to make the cases parallel, we must suppose 
 that the rule of the court of law was, not to 
 try the cause, but to give judgment always for 
 the same side, suppose the defendant. If so, 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMl^N. 
 
 281 
 
 tlie amenability to it would be a motive with 
 the plaintiff to agree to almost any arbitration, 
 but it would be just the reverse with the 
 defendant. The despotic power which the law 
 gives to the husband may be a reason to make 
 the wife assent to any compromise by which 
 power is practically shared between the two, 
 but it cannot be the reason why the husband 
 does. That there is always among decently 
 conducted people a practical compromise, though 
 one of them at least is under no physical or 
 moral necessity of making it, shows that the 
 natural motives which lead to a voluntary 
 adjustment of the united life of two persons 
 in a manner acceptable to both, do on the 
 whole, except in unfavourable cases, prevail. The 
 matter is certainly not improved by laying down 
 as an ordinance of law, that the superstructure of 
 free government shall be raised upon a legal 
 basis of despotism on one side and subjection 
 on the other, and that every concession which 
 the despot makes may, at his mere pleasure, 
 and without any warning, be recalled. Besides 
 that no freedom is worth much when held on 
 so precarious a tenure, its conditions are not 
 likely to be the most equitable when the law 
 throws so prodigious a weight into one scale ; 
 when the adjustment rests between two persons 
 one of whom is declared to be entitled to 
 
282 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 everything, the other not only entitled to 
 nothing except during the good pleasure of 
 the first, but under the strongest moral and 
 religious obligation not to rebel under any excess 
 of oppression. 
 
 A pertinacious adversary, pushed to extremi- 
 ties, may say, that husbands indeed are willing 
 to be reasonable, and to make fair concessions 
 to their partners without being compelled to it, 
 but that wives are not : that if allowed any rights 
 of their own, they will acknowledge no rights at 
 all in any one else, and never will yield in any- 
 thing, unless they can be compelled, by the 
 man^s mere authority, to yield in everything. 
 This would have been said by many persons some 
 generations ago, when satires on women were in 
 vogue, and men thought it a clever thing to in- 
 sult women for being what men made them. 
 But it will be said by no one now who is worth 
 replying to. It is not the doctrine of the present 
 day that women are less susceptible of good 
 feeling, and consideration for those wdth whom 
 they are united by the strongest ties, than men 
 are. On the contrary, we are perpetually told 
 that women are better than men, by those who 
 are totally opposed to treating them as if they 
 were as good ; so that the saying has passed into 
 a piece of tiresome cant, intended to put a com- 
 plimentary face upon an injury, and resembling 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 283 
 
 those celebrations of royal clemency which, ac- 
 cording to Gulliver, the king of Lilliput always 
 prefixed to his most sanguinary decrees. If 
 women are better than men in anything, it surely 
 is in individual self-sacrifice for those of their 
 oVn family. But I lay little stress on this, so 
 long as they are universally taught that they 
 are born and created for self-sacrifice. I believe 
 that equality of rights would abate the exagge- 
 rated self-abnegation which is the present arti- 
 ficial ideal of feminine character, and that a good 
 woman would not be more self-sacrificing than 
 the best man : but on the other hand, men 
 would be much more unselfish and self-sacrificing 
 than at present, because they would no longer 
 be taught to worship their own will as such a 
 grand thing that it is actually the law for another 
 rational being. There is nothing which men so 
 easily learn as this self- worship : all privileged 
 persons, and all privileged classes, have had it. 
 The more we descend in the scale of humanity, 
 the intenser it is ; and most of all in those who 
 are not, and can never expect to be, raised above 
 any one except an unfortunate wife and children. 
 The honourable exceptions are proportionally 
 fewer than in the case of almost any other hu- 
 man infirmity. Philosophy and religion, instead 
 of keeping it in check, are generally suborned to 
 defend it ; and nothing controls it but that 
 
284 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 practical feeling of tlie equality of human beings, 
 which is the theory of Christianity^ but which 
 Christianity will never practically teach, while 
 it sanctions institutions grounded on an arbitrary 
 preference of one human being over another. 
 
 There are, no doubt, women, as there are 
 men, whom equality of consideration will not 
 satisfy ; with w horn there is no peace while any 
 will or wish is regarded but their own. Such 
 persons are a proper subject for the law of 
 divorce. They are only fit to live alone, and 
 no human beings ought to be compelled to asso- 
 ciate their lives wdth them. But the legal sub- 
 ordination tends to make sueh characters 
 among women more, rather than less, frequent. 
 If the man exerts his whole power, the woman 
 is of course crushed ; but if she is treated with 
 indulgence, and permitted to assume power, 
 there is no rule to set limits to her encroach- 
 ments. The law, not determining her rights, but 
 theoretically allowing her none at all, practically 
 declares that the measure of what she has s 
 right to, is what she can contrive to get. 
 
 The equality of married persons before the 
 law, is not only the sole mode in which that 
 particular relation can be made consistent with 
 justice to both sides, and conducive to the 
 happiness of both, but it is the only means 
 of rendering the daily life of mankind, in any 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 285 
 
 high sense, a school of moral cnltivation. Though 
 the truth may not be felt or generally acknow- 
 ledged for generations to come, the only school 
 of genuine moral sentiment is society between 
 equals. The moral education of mankind has 
 hitherto emanated chiefly from the law of force, 
 and is adapted almost solely to the relations 
 which force creates. In the less advanced 
 states of society, people hardly recognise any 
 relation with their equals. To be an equal is 
 to be an enemy. Society, from its highest place 
 to its lowest, is one long chain, or rather ladder, 
 where every individual is either above or below 
 his nearest neighbour, and wherever he does 
 not command he must obey. Existing moralities, 
 accordingly, are mainly fitted to a relation of 
 command and obedience. Yet command and 
 obedience are but unfortunate necessities of 
 human life : society in equality is its normal 
 state. Already in modern life, and more and 
 more as it progressively improves, command 
 and obedience become exceptional facts in life, 
 equal association its general rule. The morality 
 of the first ages rested on the obligation to 
 submit to power ; that of the ages next following, 
 on the right of the weak to the forbearance and 
 protection of the strong. How much longer is 
 one form of society and life to content itself with 
 the morality made for another? We have had 
 
28G 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 the morality of submission^ and the morality 
 of chivalry and generosity ; the time is now 
 come for the morality of justice. Whenever^ 
 in former ages^ any approach has been made 
 to society in equality^ Justice has asserted its 
 claims as the foundation of virtue. It was 
 thus in the free republics of antiquity. But 
 even in the best of these, the equals were limited 
 to the free male citizens; slaves, women, and 
 the unenfranchised residents were under the 
 law of force. The joint influence of Homan 
 civilization and of Christianity obliterated these 
 distinctions, and in theory (if only partially in 
 practice) declared the claims of the human 
 being, as such, to be paramount to those of 
 sex, class, or social position. The barriers which 
 had begun to be levelled were raised again by 
 the northern conquests ; and the whole of modern 
 history consists of the slow process by which 
 they have since been wearing away. We are 
 entering into an order of things in which justice 
 will again be the primary virtue ; grounded as 
 before on equal, but now also on sympathetic 
 association ; having its root no longer in the 
 instinct of equals for self-protection, but in a 
 cultivated sympathy between them ; and no one 
 being now left out, but an equal measure being 
 extended to all. It is no novelty that mankind 
 do not distinctly foresee their own changes, 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 287 
 
 and that their sentiments are adapted to past, 
 not to coming ages. To see the futurity of the 
 species has always been the privilege of the intel- 
 lectual elite, or of those who have learnt from 
 them ; to have the feelings of that futurity has 
 been the distinction, and usually the martyrdom, 
 of a still rarer elite. Institutions, books, edu- 
 cation, society, all go on training human beings 
 for the old, long after the new has come ; much 
 more when it is only coming. But the true 
 virtue of human beings is fitness to live together 
 as equals ; claiming nothing for themselves but 
 what they as freely concede to every one else ; 
 regarding command of any kind as an excep- 
 tional necessity, and in all cases a temporary 
 one ; and preferring, whenever possible, the 
 society of those with whom leading and fol- 
 lowing can be alternate and reciprocal. To 
 these virtues, nothing in life as at present con- 
 stituted gives cultivation by exercise. The 
 family is a school of despotism, in which the 
 virtues of despotism, but also its vices, are largely 
 nourished. Citizenship, in free countries, is partly 
 a school of society in equality ; but citizenship fills 
 only a small place in modern life, and does not 
 come near the daily habits or inmost sentiments. 
 The family, justly constituted, would be the real 
 school of the virtues of freedom. It is sure to 
 oe a sufficient one of everything else. It will 
 
288 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 alvrays be a school of obedience for the children, 
 of command for the parents. What is needed 
 is, that it should be a school of sympathy in 
 equality, of living together in love, without 
 power on one side or obedience on the other. 
 This it ought to be between the parents. It 
 would then be an exercise of those virtues which 
 each requires to fit them for all other associa- 
 tion, and a model to the children of the feelings 
 and conduct which their temporary training by 
 means of obedience is designed to render habitual, 
 and therefore natural, to them. The moral train- 
 ing of mankind will never be adapted to the 
 conditions of the life for which all other human 
 progress is a preparation, until they practise in 
 the family the same moral rule which is adapted 
 to the normal constitution of human soci';ty. 
 Any sentiment of freedom which can exist in 
 a man whose nearest and dearest intimacies are 
 with those of whom he is absolute master , is 
 not the genuine or Christian love of freed >m, 
 but, what the love of freedom generally v\as 
 in the ancients and in the middle ages- -an 
 intense feeling of the dignity and importance 
 of his own personality; making him disdain a 
 yoke for himself, of which he has no abhorrence 
 whatever in the abstract, but which he is abun- 
 dantly ready to impose on others for his own 
 interest or glorification. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 289 
 
 I readily admit (and it is the very foundation 
 / my hopes) that numbers of married people 
 ven under the present law^ (in the higher classes 
 of England probably a great majority^) live in 
 the spirit of a just law of equality. Laws never 
 would be improved^ if there were not nume- 
 rous persons whose moral sentiments are better 
 than the existing laws. Such persons ought 
 to support the principles here advocated; of 
 which the only object is to make all other 
 married couples similar to what these are now. 
 But persons even of considerable moral worth, 
 unless they are also thinkers^ are very ready 
 to believe that laws or practices^ the evils of 
 which they have not personally experienced, 
 do not produce any evils, but (if seeming to 
 be generally approved of) probably do good, 
 and that it is wrong to object to them. It 
 would, however, be a great mistake in such 
 married people to su^^pose, because the legal con- 
 ditions of the tie which unites them do not occur 
 to their thoughts once in a twelvemonth, and be- 
 cause they live and feel in all respects as if they 
 were legally equals, that the same is the case with 
 all other married couples, wherever the husband is 
 not a notorious ruffian. To suppose this, would 
 be to show equal ignorance of human nature and 
 of fact. The less fit a man is for the possession 
 of power — the less likely to be allowed tr exercisf 
 
290 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 it over any person with that personas voluntary 
 consent — the more does he hug himself in the 
 consciousness of the power the law gives him^ 
 exact its legal rights to the utmost point which 
 custom (the custom of men like himself) will 
 tolerate^ and take pleasure in using the power, 
 merely to enliven the agreeable sense of possess- 
 ing it. What is more ; in the most naturally 
 brutal and morally uneducated part of the lower 
 classes, the legal slavery of the woman, and some- 
 thing in the merely physical subjection to their 
 will as an instrument, causes them to feel a 
 sort of disrespect and contempt towards their 
 own wife which they do not feel towards any 
 other woman, or any other human being, with 
 whom they come in contact ; and which makes 
 her seem to them an appropriate subject for any 
 kind of indignity. Let an acute observer of the 
 signs of feeling, who has the requisite opportuni- 
 ties, judge for himself whether this is not the case : 
 and if he finds that it is, let him not wonder at 
 any amount of disgust and indignation that can 
 be felt against institutions which lead naturally 
 to this depraved state of the human mind. 
 
 We shall be told, perhaps, that religion imposes 
 the duty of obedience ; as every established fact 
 which is too bad to admit of any other defence, 
 is always presented to us as an injunction of 
 religion. The Church, it is very true, enjoins it 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 291 
 
 in her formularies^ but it would be difficult to 
 derive any such injunction from Christianity. 
 We are told that St. Paul said^ ^^Wives^ obey 
 your husbands but he also said., Slaves^ obey 
 your masters.^^ It was not St. PauPs business^ 
 nor Avas it consistent with his object, the propa- 
 gation of Christianity, to incite any one to rebel- 
 lion against existing laws. The apostle^s aceep- 
 tance of all social institutions as he found them, 
 is no more to be construed as a disapproval of 
 attempts to improve them at the proper time, 
 than his declaration, The powers that be are 
 ordained of God,^^ gives his sanction to mili- 
 tary despotism, and to that alone, as the 
 Christian form of political government, or com- 
 mands passive obedience to it. To pretend 
 that Christianity was intended to stereotype 
 existing forms of government and society, and 
 protect them against change, is to reduce it to 
 the level of Islam! sm or of Brahminism. It is 
 precisely because Christianity has not done this, 
 that it has been the religion of the progressive 
 portion of mankind, and Islamism, Brahminism, 
 &c., have been those of the stationary portions ; 
 or rather (for there is no such thing as a really 
 stationary society) of the declining portions. 
 There have been abundance of people, in all ages of 
 Christianity, who tried to make it something of the 
 same kind ; to convert us into a sort of Christian 
 
292 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 Mussulmans^ the Bible for a Koran, prohi- 
 biting all improvement : and great has been theif 
 power, and many have had to sacrifice their lives 
 in resisting them. But they have been resisted, 
 and the resistance has made us what we are, and 
 will yet make us what we are to be. 
 
 After what has been said respecting the ob- 
 ligation of obedience, it is almost superfluous to 
 say anything concerning the more special point 
 included in the general one — a woman^s right 
 to her own property; for I need not hope that 
 this treatise can make any impression upon those 
 who need anything to convince them that a 
 woman^s inheritance or gains ought to be as 
 much her own after marriage as before. The 
 rule is simple : whatever would be the husband^s 
 or wife^s if they were not married, should be 
 under their exclusive control during marriage; 
 which need not interfere with the power to tie 
 up property by settlement, in order to preserve 
 it for children. Some people are sentimentally 
 shocked at the idea of a separate interest in 
 money matters, as inconsistent with the ideal 
 fusion of two lives into one. For my own part, 
 I am one of the strongest supporters of community 
 of goods, when resulting from an entire unity of 
 feeling in the owners, which makes all things 
 common between them. But I have no relish 
 for a community of goods resting on the doc- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 293 
 
 trine^ that what is mine is yours but what is 
 yours is not mine ; and I should prefer to de- 
 cline entering into such a compact with any 
 one^ though I were myself the person to profit 
 by it. 
 
 This particular injustice and oppression to 
 women^ which is^ to common apprehensions^ more 
 obvious than all the rest^ admits of remedy 
 without interfering with any other mischiefs : and 
 there can be little doubt that it will be one of 
 the earliest remedied. Already^ in many of the 
 new and several of the old States of the Ame- 
 rican Confederation^ provisions have been in- 
 serted even in the written Constitutions, securing 
 to women equality of rights in this respect : and 
 thereby improving materially the position, in 
 the marriage relation, of those women at least 
 who have property, by leaving them one instru- 
 ment of power which they have not signed 
 away ; and preventing also the scandalous abuse 
 of the marriage institution, which is perpetrated 
 when a man entraps a girl into marrying him 
 without a settlement, for the sole purpose of 
 getting possession of her money. When the 
 support of the family depends, not on property, 
 but on earnings, the common arrangement, by 
 which the man earns the income and the wife 
 superintends the domestic expenditure, seems to 
 me in general the most suitable division of 
 
294 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 labour between the two persons. If, in addition 
 to the physical suffering of bearing children, 
 and the whole responsibility of their care and 
 education in eaidy years, the wife undertakes 
 the careful and economical application of tlie 
 husband^s earnings to the general comfort of the 
 family ; she takes not only her fair share, but 
 usually the larger share, of the bodily and mental 
 exertion required by their joint existence. If 
 she undertakes any additional portion, it seldom 
 relieves her from this, but only prevents her 
 from performing it properly. The care which 
 she is herself disabled from taking of the chil- 
 dren and the household, nobody else takes; 
 those of the children who do not die, grow up 
 as they best can, and the management of the 
 household is likely to be so bad, as even in point 
 of economy to be a great drawback from the 
 value of the wife^s earnings. In an otherwise 
 just state of things, it is not, therefore, I think, 
 a desirable custom, that the wife should con- 
 tribute by her labour to the income of the family. 
 In an unjust state of things, her doing so may 
 be useful to her, by making her of more value 
 in the eyes of the man who is legally her master ; 
 but, on the other hand, it enables him still farther 
 to abuse his power, by forcing her to work, and 
 leaving the support of the family to her exer- 
 tions, while he spends most of his time in drink- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 295 
 
 ing and idleness. The power of earning is essen- 
 tial to the dignity of a woman^ if she has not 
 independent property. Bnt if marriage were an 
 equal contract, not implying the obligation of 
 obedience ; if the connexion were no longer en- 
 forced to the oppression of those to whom it ia 
 purely a mischief, but a separation, on just 
 terms (I do not now speak of a divorce), could 
 be obtained by any woman who was morally 
 entitled to it ; and if she would then find all 
 honourable employments as freely open to her as 
 to men ; it would not be necessary for her pro- 
 tection, that during marriage she should make 
 this particular use of her faculties. Like a man 
 when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman 
 marries, it may in general be understood that 
 she makes choice of the management of a house- 
 hold, and the bringing up of a family, as the 
 first call upon her exertions, during as many 
 years of her life as may be required for the pur- 
 pose ; and that she renounces, not all other ob- 
 jects and occupations, but all which are not 
 consistent with the requirements of this. The 
 actual exercise, in a habitual or systematic 
 manner, of outdoor occupations, or such as 
 cannot be carried on at home, would by this 
 principle be practically interdicted to the greater 
 number of married women. But the utmost 
 latitude ought to exist for the adaptation of 
 
296 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 general rules to individual suitabilities; and there 
 ought to be nothing to prevent faculties excep- 
 tionally adapted to any other pursuit^ from 
 obeying their vocation notwithstanding mar- 
 riage : due provision being made for supplying 
 otherwise any falling-short which might become 
 inevitable^ in her full performance of the ordinary 
 functions of mistress of a family. These things, 
 if once opinion were rightly directed on the 
 subject, might with perfect safety be left to be 
 regulated by opinion, without any interfenence 
 of law# 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 N tlie other point which is involved in the 
 
 just equality of women^ their admissibility 
 to all the functions and occupations hitherto 
 retained as the monopoly of the stronger sex, 
 I should anticipate no difficulty in convincing 
 any one who has gone with me on the subject of 
 the equality of women in the family. I believe 
 that their disabilities elsewhere are only clung to 
 in order to maintain their subordination in do- 
 mestic life; because the generality of the male 
 sex cannot yet tolerate the idea of living with 
 an equal. Were it not for that, I think that 
 almost every one, in the existing state of opinion 
 in politics and political economy, would admit 
 the injustice of excluding half the human race 
 from the greater number of luerative occupations, 
 and from almost all high social functions ; or- 
 daining from their birth either that they are not, 
 and cannot by any possibility become, fit for 
 employments which are legally open to the 
 stupidest and basest of the other sex, or else that 
 however fit they may be, those employments shaU 
 
 13 * 
 
298 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 be interdicted to tbem, in order to be preserved 
 for the exclusive benefit of males. In the last 
 two centuries^ when (which was seldom the case) 
 any reason beyond the mere existence of the fact 
 was thought to be required to justify the disabili- 
 ties of women^ people seldom assigned as a reason 
 their inferior mental capacity ; which^ in times 
 when there was a real trial of personal faculties 
 (from which all women were not excluded) in the 
 struggles of public life^ no one really believed in. 
 The reason given in those days was not women^s 
 unfitness^ but the interest of society, by which was 
 meant the interest of men : just as the raison d’etat y 
 meaning the convenience of the government^ and 
 the support of existing authority, was deemed a 
 sufficient explanation and excuse for the most flagi- 
 tious crimes. In the present day, power holds 
 a smoother language, and whomsoever it oppresses, 
 always pretends to do so for their own good : 
 accordingly, when anything is forbidden to women, 
 it is thought necessary to say, and desirable to 
 believe, that they are incapable of doing it, and 
 that they depart from their real path of success 
 and happiness when they aspire to it. But to 
 make this reason plausible (I do not say valid), 
 those by whom it is urged must be prepared to 
 carry it to a much greater length than any one 
 ventures to do in the face of present experience. 
 It is not sufficient to maintain that women on 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 299 
 
 the average are less gifted than men on the 
 average^ with certain of the higher mental 
 faeulties^ or that a smaller number of women 
 than of men are fit for occupations and functions 
 of the highest intellectual character. It is 
 necessary to maintain that no women at all are 
 fit for them^ and that the most eminent women 
 are inferior in mental faculties to the most 
 mediocre of the men on whom those functions 
 at present devolve. For if the performance of the 
 function is decided either by competition^ or by any 
 mode of choice which secures regard to the public 
 interest^ there needs be no apprehension that any 
 important employments will fall into the hands of 
 women inferior to average men^ or to the average 
 of their male competitors. The only result would 
 be that there would be fewer women than men 
 in such employments ; a result certain to happen 
 in any case^ if only from the preference always 
 likely to be felt by the majority of women for the 
 one vocation in which there is nobody to compete 
 with them. Now^ the most determined depre- 
 ciator of women will not venture to deny^ that 
 when we add the experience of recent times to 
 that of ages past^ women, and not a few merely, 
 but many women, have proved themselves capable 
 of everything, perhaps without a single excep- 
 tion, which is done by men, and of doing it suc- 
 cessfully and creditably. The utmost that can be 
 
300 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 said is, that there are many things which none ol 
 them have succeeded in doing as well as they 
 have been done by some men — many in which 
 they have not reached the very highest rank. 
 But there are extremely few, dependent only on 
 mental faculties, in which they have not attained 
 the rank next to the highest. Is not this enough, 
 and much more than enough, to make it a 
 tyranny to them, and a detriment to society, that 
 they should not be allowed to compete with men 
 for the exercise of these functions ? Is it not a 
 mere truism to say, that such functions are often 
 filled by men far less fit for them than numbers 
 of women, and who would be beaten by women 
 in any fair field of competition ? What difference 
 does it make that there may be men somewhere, 
 fully employed about other things, who may be 
 still better qualified for the things in question 
 than these women ? Does not this take place 
 in all competitions? Is there so great a super- 
 fiuity of men fit for high duties, that society can 
 afford to reject the service of any competent 
 person ? Are we so certain of always finding a 
 man made to our hands for any duty or function 
 of social importance which falls vacant, that we 
 lose nothing by putting a ban upon one-half of 
 mankind, and refusing beforehand to make their 
 faculties available, however distinguished they 
 may be ? And even if we could do without 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 301 
 
 them, would it be consistent with justice to refuse 
 to them their fair share of honour and distinction, 
 or to deny to them the equal moral right of all 
 human beings to choose their oceupation (short 
 of injury to others) according to their own 
 preferences, at their own risk? Nor is the in- 
 justice confined to them : it is shared by those 
 who are in a position to benefit by their services. 
 To ordain that any kind of persons shall not be 
 physicians, or shall not be advocates, or shall not 
 be members of parliament, is to injure not them 
 only, but all who employ physicians or advocates, 
 or elect members of parliament, and who are 
 deprived of the stimulating effect of greater com- 
 petition on the exertions of the competitors, as 
 well as restricted to a narrower range of indi- 
 vidual choice. 
 
 It will perhaps be sufficient if I confine 
 myself, in the details of my argument, to func- 
 tions of a public nature : since, if I am successful 
 as to those, it probably will be readily granted 
 that women should be admissible to all other 
 occupations to which it is at all material whether 
 they are admitted or not. And here let me 
 begin by marking out one function, broadly dis- 
 tinguished from all others, their right to which is 
 entirely independent of any question which can 
 be raised concerning their faculties. I mean the 
 suffrage, both parliamentary and municipal. The 
 
302 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 right to share in the choice of those who are to 
 exercise a public trusty is altogether a distinct 
 thing from that of competing for the trust itself. 
 If no one could vote for a member of parliament 
 who was not fit to be a candidate^ the govern- 
 ment would be a narrow oligarchy indeed. To 
 have a voice in choosing those by whom one is 
 to be governed^ is a means of self-protection due 
 to every one^ though he were to remain for ever 
 excluded from the function of governing : and 
 that women are considered fit to have such 
 a choice^ may be presumed from the fact^ that 
 the law already gives it to women in the 
 most important of all cases to themselves : for 
 the choice of the man who is to govern a 
 woman to the end of life^ is always supposed 
 to be voluntarily made by herself. In the case 
 of election to public trusts^ it is the business 
 of constitutional law to surround the right of 
 suffrage with all needful securities and limita- 
 tions; but whatever securities are sufficient in 
 the case of the male sex^ no others need be 
 required in the case of women. Under whatever 
 conditions, and within whatever limits, men are 
 admitted to the suffrage, there is not a shadow of 
 justification for not admitting women under the 
 same. The majority of the women of any class 
 are not likely to differ in political opinion from 
 the majority of the men of the same class, unless 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 303 
 
 tlie question be one in which the interests of 
 women, as such, are in some way involved ; and if 
 they are so, women require the suffrage, as their 
 guarantee of just and equal consideration. This 
 ought to be obvious even to those who coincide 
 in no other of the doctrines for which I contend. 
 Even if every woman were a wife, and if every 
 wife ought to be a slave, all the more would 
 these slaves stand in need of legal protection : and 
 we know what legal protection the slaves have, 
 where the laws are made by their masters. 
 
 With regard to the fitness of women, not only 
 to participate in elections, but themselves to 
 hold offices or practise professions involving 
 important public responsibilities ; I have already 
 observed that this consideration is not essential 
 to the practical question in dispute : since any 
 woman, who succeeds in an open profession, 
 proves by that very fact that she is qualified for 
 it. And in the case of public offices, if the political 
 system of the country is such as to exclude 
 unfit men, it will equally exclude unfit women : 
 while if it is not, there is no additional evil in the 
 fact that the unfit persons whom it admits may 
 be either women or men. As long therefore as 
 it is acknowledged that even a few women may 
 be fit for these duties, the laws which shut the 
 door on those exceptions cannot be justified by 
 any opinion which can be held respecting the 
 
301 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 capacities of women in general. But, though th is 
 last consideration is not essential^ it is far from 
 being irrelevant. An unprejudiced view of it 
 gives additional strength to the arguments against 
 the disabilities of women, and reinforces them by 
 Jiigh considerations of practical utility. 
 
 Let us at first make entire abstraction of all 
 psychological considerations tending to show, that 
 any of the mental differences supposed to exist 
 between women and men are but the natural 
 effect of the differences in their education and 
 circumstances, and indicate no radical difference, 
 far less radical inferiority, of nature. Let us 
 consider women only as they already are, or as 
 they are known to have been ; and the capacities 
 which they have already practically shown. 
 What they have done, that at least, if nothing 
 else, it is proved that they can do. When we 
 consider how sedulously they are all trained away 
 from, instead of being trained towards, any of 
 the occupations or objects reserved for men, it is 
 evident that I am taking a very humble ground 
 for them, when I rest their case on what they 
 have actually achieved. For, in this case, negative 
 evidence is worth little, while any positive evi- 
 dence is conclusive. It cannot be inferred to be 
 impossible that a woman should be a Homer, or 
 an Aristotle, or a Michael Angelo, or a Beet- 
 hoven, because no woman has yet actually pro- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 305 
 
 duced works comparable to theirs in any of those 
 lines of excellence. This negative fact at most 
 leaves the question uncertain^ and open to 
 psychological discussion. But it is quite certain 
 that a woman can be a Queen Elizabeth^, or a 
 Deborah^ or a Joan of Arc^ since this is not 
 inference^ but fact. Now it is a curious consi- 
 deration^ that the only things wdiich the existing 
 law excludes women from doings are the things 
 which they have proved that they are able to do. 
 There is no law to prevent a woman from having 
 written all the plays of Shakspeare^ or composed 
 all the operas of Mozart. But Queen Elizabeth 
 or Queen Victoria^ had they not inherited the 
 throne^ could not have been intrusted with the 
 smallest of the political duties^ of which the 
 former showed herself equal to the greatest. 
 
 If anything conclusive could be inferred from 
 experience^ without psychological analysis^ it 
 would be that the things which women are not 
 allowed to do are the veny ones for which they 
 are peculiarly qualified ; since their vocation for 
 government has made its way^ and become con- 
 spicuous^ through the very few opportunities 
 which have been given ; while in the lines of 
 distinction which apparently were freely open to 
 them^ they have by no means so eminently dis- 
 tinguished themselves. We know how small a 
 number of reigning queens history presents^ in 
 
306 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 comparison with that of kings. Of this smaller 
 number a far larger proportion have shown 
 talents for rule; though many of them have 
 occupied the throne in diffieult periods. It is 
 remarkable^ too^ that they have, in a great 
 number of instances, been distinguished by merits 
 the most opposite to the imaginary and conven- 
 tional character of women : they have been as 
 mueh remarked for the firmness and vigour of 
 their rule, as for its intelligenee. When, to 
 queens and empresses, we add regents, and vice- 
 roys of provinces, the list of women who have 
 been eminent rulers of mankind swells to a great 
 length.”^ This fact is so undeniable, that some 
 one, long ago, tried to retort the argument, and 
 turned the admitted truth into an additional 
 insult, by saying that queens are better than 
 
 * Especially is this true if we take into consideration Asia 
 as well as Europe. If a Hindoo principality is strongly, vigi- 
 lantly, and economically governed ; if order is preserved without 
 oppression ; if cultivation is extending, and the people prosperous, 
 in three cases out of four that principality is under a woman’s 
 rule. This fact, to me an entirely unexpected one, I have col- 
 lected from a long official knowledge of Hindoo governments. 
 There are many such instances : for though, by Hindoo institutions, 
 a woman cannot reign, she is the legal regent of a kingdom during 
 the minority of the heir ; and minorities are frequent, the lives of 
 the male rulers being so often prematurely terminated through 
 the effect of inactivity and sensual excesses. When we consider 
 that these princesses have never been seen in public, have never 
 conversed with any man not of their own family except from be- 
 hind a curtain, that they do not read, and if they did, there is no 
 book in their languages which can give them the smallest in- 
 struction on political affairs; the example they afford of the na* 
 tural capacity cf women for government is very striking. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 307 
 
 kirigs^ because under kings women govern^ but 
 under queens^ men. 
 
 It may seem a waste of reasoning to argue 
 against a bad joke ; but such things do affect 
 people^s minds ; and I have heard men quote this 
 sayings with an air as if they thought that there 
 was something in it. At any rate^ it will serve 
 as well as anything else for a starting point in 
 discussion. I say, then, that it is not true that 
 under kings, women govern. Such cases are 
 entirely exceptional : and weak kings have quite 
 as often governed ill through the influence of 
 male favourites, as of female. When a king 
 is governed by a woman merely through his 
 amatory propensities, good government is not 
 probable, though even then there are exceptions. 
 But French history counts two kings who have 
 voluntarily given the direction of affairs during 
 many years, the one to his mother, the other to 
 his sister : one of them, Charles VIII., was a 
 mere boy, but in doing so he followed the inten- 
 tions of his father Louis XI., the ablest monarch 
 of his age. The other. Saint Louis, was the 
 best, and one of the most vigorous rulers, since 
 the time of Charlemagne. Both these princesses 
 ruled in a manner hardly equalled by any 
 prince among their cotemporaries. The emperor 
 Charles the Fifth, the most politic prince of his 
 time, who had as great a number of able men in 
 
308 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 his service as a ruler ever had, and was one of the 
 least likely of all sovereigns to sacrifice his interest 
 to personal feelings, made two princesses of his 
 family successively Governors of the Netherlands, 
 and kept one or other of them in that post during 
 his whole life, (they were afterwards succeeded 
 by a third). Both ruled very successfully, and 
 one of them, Margaret of Austria, was one of 
 the ablest politicians of the age. So much for 
 one side of the question. Now as to the other. 
 When it is said that under queens men govern, 
 is the same meaning to be understood as when 
 kings are said to be governed by women ? Is it 
 meant that queens choose as their instruments 
 of government, the associates of their personal 
 pleasures? The case is rare even with those 
 who are as unscrupulous on the latter point as 
 Catherine II. : and it is not in these cases that 
 the good government, alleged to arise from male 
 infiuence, is to be found. If it be true, then, that 
 the administration is in the hands of better men 
 under a queen than under an average king, it 
 must be that queens have a superior capacity 
 for choosing them ; and women must be better 
 qualified than men both for the position of sove- 
 reign, and for that of chief minister ; for the 
 prineipal business of a prime minister is not to 
 govern in person, but to find the fittest persons 
 to conduct every department of public aflfairsL 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 309 
 
 The more rapid insight into character^ which 
 is one of the admitted points of superiority 
 in women over men^ must certainly make them, 
 with anything like parity of qualifications in 
 other respects, more apt than men in that choice 
 of instruments, which is nearly the most im- 
 portant business of every one who has to do with 
 governing mankind. Even the unprincipled 
 Catherine de^ Medici could feel the value of a 
 Chancellor de FHopital. But it is also true 
 that most great queens have been great by their 
 own talents for government, and have been 
 well served precisely for that reason. They 
 retained the supreme direction of affairs in their 
 own hands : and if they listened to good advisers, 
 they gave by that fact the strongest proof that 
 their judgment fitted them for dealing with the 
 great questions of government. 
 
 Is it reasonable to think that those who are 
 fit for the greater functions of politics, are in- 
 capable of qualifying themselves for the less? 
 Is there any reason in the nature of things, that 
 the wives and sisters of princes should, whenever 
 called on, be found as competent as the princes 
 themselves to their business, but that the wives 
 and sisters of statesmen, and administrators, and 
 directors of companies, and managers of public 
 institutions, should be unable to do what is done 
 by their brothers and husbands ? The real 
 
310 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 reason is plain enongli; it is that princesses, 
 being more raised above the generality of men 
 by their rank than placed below them by their 
 sex^ have never been taught that it was improper 
 for them to concern themselves with politics ; 
 but have been allowed to feel the liberal interest 
 natural to any cultivated human being, in the 
 great transactions which took place around them, 
 and in which they might be called on to take a 
 part. The ladies of reigning families are the 
 only women who are allowed the same range of 
 interests and freedom of development as men ; 
 and it is precisely in their case that there is not 
 found to be any inferiority. Exactly where and 
 in proportion as women^s capacities for govern- 
 ment have been tried, in that proportion have 
 they been found adequate. 
 
 This fact is in accordance with the best 
 general conclusions which the world^s imperfect 
 experience seems as yet to suggest, concerning 
 the peculiar tendencies and aptitudes charac- 
 teristic of women, as women have hitherto been. 
 I do not say, as they will continue to be ; for, as 
 I have already said more than once, I consider 
 it presumption in any one to pretend to decide 
 what women are or are not, can or cannot be, by 
 natural constitution. They have always hitherto 
 been kept, as far as regards spontaneous develop- 
 ment, in so unnatural a state, that their nature 
 
THE SUBJECnON OF WOMEN. 
 
 31l 
 
 cannot but bave been greatly distorted and dis- 
 guised ; and no one can safely pronounce that if 
 women^s nature were left to choose its direction as 
 freely as men^s, and if no artificial bent were at- 
 tempted to be given to it except that required by 
 the conditions of human society^ and given to both 
 sexes alike, there would be any material diffe- 
 rence, or perhaps any difference at all, in the 
 character and capacities which would unfold 
 themselves. I shall presently show, that even 
 the least contestable of the differences which 
 now exist, are such as may very well have been 
 produced merely by circumstances, without any 
 difference of natural capacity. But, looking at 
 women as they are known in experience, it may 
 be said of them, with more truth than belongs 
 to most other generalizations on the subject, that 
 the general bent of their talents is towards the 
 practical. This statement is conformable to all 
 the public history of women, in the present and 
 the past. It is no less borne out by common 
 and daily experience. Let us consider the 
 special nature of the mental capacities most 
 characteristic of a woman of talent. They are 
 all of a kind which fits them for practice, and 
 makes them tend towards it. What is meant 
 by a woman^s capacity of intuitive perception ? 
 It means, a rapid and correct insight into present 
 fact. It has nothing to do with general prin- 
 
312 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 ciples. Nobody ever perceived a scientific law 
 of nature by intuition, nor arrived at a general 
 rule of duty or prudence by it. These are 
 results of slow and careful collection and com- 
 parison of experience ; and neither the men noi 
 the women of intuition usually shine in this de- 
 partment, unless, indeed, the experience necessary 
 is such as they can acquire by themselves. For 
 what is called their intuitive sagacity makes 
 them peculiarly apt in gathering such general 
 truths as can be collected from their individual 
 means of observation. When, consequently, they 
 chance to be as well provided as men are with 
 the results of other people^s experience, by 
 reading and education, (I use the word chance 
 advisedly, for, in respect to the knowledge that 
 tends to fit them for the greater concerns of 
 life, the only educated women are the self- 
 educated) they are better furnished than men 
 in general with the essential requisites of skilful 
 and successful practice. Men who have been 
 much taught, are apt to be deficient in the 
 sense of present fact; they do not see, in the 
 facts which they are called upon to deal with, 
 what is really there, but what they have been 
 taught to expect. This is seldom the case with 
 women of any ability. Their capacity of ^^in- 
 tuition preserves them from it. With equality 
 of experience and of general faculties, a woman 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 313 
 
 usually sees mucli more than a man of what 
 is immediately before her. Now this sensibility 
 to the present,, is the main quality on which the 
 capacity for practice^ as distinguished from theory, 
 depends. To discover general principles, belongs 
 to the speculative faculty : to discern and dis- 
 criminate the particular cases in which they are 
 and are not applicable, constitutes practical talent : 
 and for this, women as they now are have a 
 peculiar aptitude. I admit that there can be 
 no good practice without principles, and that 
 the predominant place which quickness of obser- 
 vation holds among a woman^s faculties, makes 
 her particularly apt to build over-hasty gene- 
 ralizations upon her own observation ; though at 
 the same time no less ready in rectifying those 
 generalizations, as her observation takes a wider 
 range. But the corrective to this defect, is access 
 to the experience of the human race ; general 
 knowledge — exactly the thing which education, 
 can best supply. A woman^s mistakes are spe- 
 cifically those of a clever self-educated man, who 
 often sees what men trained in routine do not 
 see, but falls into errors for want of knowing 
 things which have long been known. Of course 
 he has acquired much of the pre-existing know- 
 ledge, or he could not have got on at all; but 
 what he knows of it he has picked up in frag- 
 ments and at random, as women do. 
 
 14 
 
314 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 Bnt this gravitation of women’s minds to 
 the present^ to the real, to actual fact, while 
 in its exclusiveness it is a source of errors, is 
 also a most useful counteractive of the contrary 
 error. The principal and most characteristic 
 aberration of speculative minds as such, consists 
 precisely in the deficiency of this lively per- 
 ception and ever-present sense of objective fact 
 Tor want of this, they often not only overlook 
 the contradiction which outward facts oppose 
 to their theories, but lose sight of the legiti- 
 mate purpose of speculation altogether, and let 
 their speculative faculties go astray into regions 
 not peopled with real beings, animate or inani- 
 mate, even idealized, but with personified shadows 
 created by the illusions of metaphysics or by the 
 mere entanglement of words, and think these 
 shadows the proper objects of the highest, the most 
 transcendant, philosophy. Hardly anything can 
 be of greater value to a man of theory and 
 speculation who employs himself not in col- 
 lecting materials of knowledge by observation, 
 but in working them up by processes of thought 
 into comprehensive truths of science and laws of 
 conduct, than to carry on his speculations in the 
 companionship, and under the criticism, of a really 
 superior woman. There is nothing comparable 
 to it for keeping his thoughts within the limits 
 of real things, and the actual facts of nature. 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 315 
 
 A woman seldom runs wild after an abstraction. 
 The habitual direction of her mind to dealing 
 with things as individuals rather than in groups, 
 and (what is closely connected with it) her more 
 lively interest in the present feelings of persons, 
 which makes her consider first of all, in anything 
 which claims to be applied to practice, in what 
 manner persons will be afiected by it — these two 
 things make her extremely unlikely to put faith 
 in any speculation which loses sight of individuals, 
 and deals with things as if they existed for the 
 benefit of some imaginary entity, some mere 
 creation of the mind, not resolvable into the 
 feelings of living beings. Women^s thoughts 
 are thus as useful in giving reality to those of 
 thinking men, as men'^s thoughts in giving width 
 and largeness to those of women. In depth, as 
 distinguished from breadth, I greatly doubt if 
 even now, women, compared with men, are at 
 any disadvantage. 
 
 If the existing mental characteristics of women 
 are thus valuable even in aid of speculation, they 
 are still more important, when speculation has 
 done its work, for carrying oufc the results of 
 speculation into practice. For the reasons already 
 given, women are comparatively unlikely to fall 
 into the common error of men, that of sticking 
 to their rules in a case whose specialities either 
 take it out of the class to which the rules are 
 
316 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 applicable^ or require a special adaptation of 
 them. Let us now consider another of the 
 admitted superiorities of clever women, greater 
 quickness of apprehension. Is not this pre- 
 
 eminently a quality whieh fits a person for 
 praetice ? In action, everything continually 
 depends upon deciding promptly. In specula- 
 tion, nothing does. A mere thinker can wait, 
 can take time to consider, can collect additional 
 evidence; he is not obliged to complete his 
 philosophy at once, lest the opportunity should 
 go by. The power of drawing the best con- 
 clusion possible from insufficient data is not 
 indeed useless in philosophy ; the construetion 
 of a provisional hypothesis consistent with all 
 known facts is often the needful basis for further 
 inquiry. But this faculty is rather serviceable 
 in philosophy, than the main qualification for it : 
 and, for the auxiliary as well as for the main 
 operation, the philosopher can allow himself any 
 time he pleases. He is in no need of the capa- 
 city of doing rapidly what he does ; what he rather 
 needs is patience, to work on slowly until imper- 
 fect lights have become perfect, and a conjecture 
 has ripened into a theorem. For those, on the 
 contrary, whose business is with the fugitive and 
 perisha!)le — with individual facts, not kinds of 
 facts — rapidity of thought is a qualification next 
 only in importance to the power of thought itselfi 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 317 
 
 He wlio has not his faculties under immediate 
 command^ in the contingencies of action^ might 
 as well not have them at all. He may he fit to 
 criticize^ but he is not fit to act. Now it is in 
 this that women^ and the men who are most like 
 women^ confessedly excel. The other sort of man, 
 however pre-eminent may be his faculties, arrives 
 slowly at complete command of them : rapidity of 
 judgment and promptitude of judicious action, 
 even in the things he knows best, are the gradual 
 and late result of strenuous effort grown into 
 habit. 
 
 It will be said, perhaps, that the greater 
 nervous susceptibility of women is a disqualifica- 
 tion for practice, in anything but domestic life, 
 by rendering them mobile, changeable, too 
 vehemently under the infiueace of the moment, 
 incapable of dogged perseverance, unequal and 
 uncertain in the power of using their faculties. 
 I think that these phrases sum up the greater 
 part of the objections commonly made to the 
 fitness of women for the higher class of serious 
 business. Much of all this is the mere overflow 
 of nervous energy run to waste, and would cease 
 when the energy was directed to a definite end. 
 Much is also the result of conscious or un- 
 conscious cultivation; as we see by the almost 
 total disappearance of hysterics^^ and fainting 
 fits, since they have gone out of fashion. More* 
 
318 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 over, when people are brought up, like many 
 women of the higher classes (though less so in 
 our own country than in any other) a kind of hot- 
 house plants, shielded from the wholesome vicissi 
 tudes of air and temperature, and untrained in 
 any of the occupations and exercises which give 
 stimulus and development to the circulatory and 
 muscular system, while their nervous system, 
 especially in its emotional department, is kept in 
 unnaturally active play; it is no wonder if those 
 of them who do not die of consumption, grow 
 up with constitutions liable to derangement from 
 slight causes, both internal and external, and 
 without stamina to support any task, physical or 
 mental, requiring continuity of effort. But 
 women brought up to work for their liveli- 
 hood show none of these morbid characteristics, 
 unless indeed they are chained to an excess of 
 sedentary work in confined and unhealthy rooms. 
 Women who in their early years have shared in 
 the healthful physical education and bodily free- 
 dom of their brothers, and who obtain a suffi- 
 ciency of pure air and exercise in after-life, very 
 rarely have any excessive susceptibility of nerves 
 which can disqualify them for active pursuits. 
 There is indeed a certain proportion of persons, 
 in both sexes, in whom an unusual degree of 
 nervous sensibility is constitutional, and of so 
 marked a character as to be the feature of their 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 319 
 
 organization which exercises the greatest influence 
 over the whole character of the vital phenomena. 
 This constitution^ like other physical conformations^ 
 is hereditary^ and is transmitted to sons as well 
 as daughters ; but it is possible^ and probable^ that 
 the nervous temperament (as it is called) is in- 
 herited by a greater number of women than of 
 men. We will assume this as a fact : and let me 
 then ask^ are men of nervous temperament found 
 to be unfit for the duties and pursuits usually 
 followed by men ? If not^ why should women of 
 the same temperament be unfit for them ? The 
 peculiarities of the temperament are^ no doubt, 
 within certain limits, an obstacle to success in 
 some employments, though an aid to it in 
 others. But when the occupation is suitable to 
 the temperament, and sometimes even when it is 
 unsuitable, the most brilliant examples of success 
 are continually given by the men of high nervous 
 sensibility. They are distinguished in their prac- 
 tical manifestations chiefly by this, that being 
 susceptible of a higher degree of excitement than 
 those of another physical constitution, their powers 
 when excited differ more than in the case of other 
 people, from those shown in their ordinary state : 
 they are raised, as it were, above themselves, 
 and do things with ease which they are wholly 
 incapable of at other times. But this lofty excite- 
 ment is not , except in weak bodily constitutionsj 
 
320 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 a mere flashy which passes away immediately, 
 leaving no permanent traces, and incompatible 
 with persistent and steady pursuit of an object. 
 It is the character of the nervous temperament 
 to be capable of sustained excitement, holding 
 out through long continued efforts. It is what 
 is meant by spirit. It is what makes the high- 
 bred racehorse run without slackening speed till 
 he drops down dead. It is what has enabled so 
 many delicate women to maintain the most sub- 
 lime constancy not only at the stake, but through 
 a long preliminary succession of mental and 
 bodily tortures. It is evident that people of this 
 temperament are particularly apt for Avhat may 
 be called the executive department of the leader- 
 ship of mankind. They are the material of 
 great orators, great preachers, impressive diffusers 
 of moral influences. Their constitution might 
 be deemed less favourable to the qualities re- 
 quired from a statesman in the cabinet, or from 
 a judge. It would be so, if the consequence 
 necessarily followed that beeause people are ex- 
 citable they must always be in a state of excite- 
 ment. But this is wholly a question of training. 
 Strong feeling is the instrument and element of 
 strong self-control : but it requires to be cultivated 
 in that direction. When it is, it forms not the 
 heroes of impulse only, but those also of self- 
 conquest. History and experience prove that 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 321 
 
 the most passionate characters are the most fana- 
 tically rigid in their feelings of duty^ when their 
 passion has been trained to act in that direction. 
 The judge who gives a just decision in a case 
 where his feelings are intensely interested on the 
 other side^ derives from that same strength of 
 feeling the determined sense of the obligation of 
 justice^ which enables him to achieve this victory 
 over himself. The capability of that lofty en- 
 thusiasm which takes the human being out of 
 his every-day character^ reacts upon the daily 
 character itself. His aspirations and powers when 
 he is in this exceptional state^ become the type 
 with which he compares^ and by which he esti- 
 mates^ his sentiments and proceedings at other 
 times : and his habitual purposes assume a cha- 
 racter moulded by and assimilated to the mo- 
 ments of lofty excitement^ although those,, from 
 the physical nature of a human beings can only 
 be transient. Experience of races^ as well as of 
 individuals^ does not show those of excitable tem- 
 perament to be less fit^ on the average^ either 
 for speculation or practice^ than the more unex- 
 citable. The French^ and the Italians,, are un- 
 doubtedly by nature more nervously excitable 
 than the Teutonic races^ aiid^ compared at least 
 with the English^ they have a much greater 
 habitual and daily emotional life : but have they 
 been less great in science, in public business, in 
 14 * 
 
322 
 
 THE SUBJECTIOK OF WOMEN. 
 
 legal and judicial eminence, or in war ? There 
 is abundant evidence that the Greeks were of 
 old, as their descendants and successors still are, 
 one of the most excitable of the races of man- 
 kind. It is superfluous to ask, what among the 
 achievements of men they did not excel in. The 
 Romans, probably, as an equally southern people, 
 had the same original temperament : but the 
 stern character of their national discipline, like 
 that of the Spartans, made them an example of 
 the opposite type of national character ; the 
 greater strength of their natural feelings being 
 chiefly apparent in the intensity which the same 
 original temperament made it possible to give to 
 the artificial. If these cases exemplify what a 
 naturally excitable people may be made, the Irish 
 Celts afibrd one of the aptest examjfles of what 
 they are when left to themselves ; (if those can 
 be said to be left to themselves who have been 
 for centuries under the indirect influence of bad 
 government, and the direct training of a Catholic 
 hierarchy and of a sincere belief in the Catholic 
 religion.) The Irish character must be considered, 
 therefore, as an unfavourable case : yet, whenever 
 the circumstances of the individual have been at 
 all favourable, what people have shown greater 
 capacity for the most varied and multifarious in- 
 dividual eminence ? Like the French compared 
 with the English, the Irish with the Swiss, the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 323 
 
 Greeks or Italians eompared with the German 
 races^ so women compared with men may be 
 founds on the average^ to do the same things 
 with some variety in the particular kind of ex- 
 cellence. Butj that they would do them fully 
 as well on the whole^ if their education and 
 cultivation were adapted to correcting instead of 
 aggravating the infirmities incident to their tem- 
 perament^ I see not the smallest reason to doubt. 
 
 Supposing it^ however^, to be true that wonien^s 
 minds are by nature more mobile than those 
 of men^ less capable of persisting long in the 
 same continuous effort, more fitted for dividing 
 their faculties among many things than for 
 travelling in any one path to the highest point 
 which can be reached by it : this may be 
 true of women as they now are (though not 
 without great and numerous exce[)tions), and 
 may account for their having remained behind 
 the highest order of men in precisely the things 
 in which this absorption of the whole mind in 
 one set of ideas and occupations may seem to 
 be most requisite. Stilly this difference is one 
 which can only affect the kind of excellence^ not 
 the excellence itself^ or its practical worth : and 
 it remains to be shown whether this exclusive 
 working of a part of the mind^ this absorption of 
 the whole thinking faculty in a single subject, 
 and concentration of it on a single work, is the 
 
324 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 normal and healthful condition of the human 
 faculties, even for speculative uses. I believe 
 that what is gained in special development by 
 this concentration, is lost in the capacity of the 
 mind for the other purposes of life ; and even in. 
 abstract thought, it is my decided opinion that 
 the mind does more by frequently returning to 
 a difficult problem, than by sticking to it with- 
 out interruption. For the purposes, at all events, 
 of practice, from its highest to its humblest de- 
 partments, the capacity of passing promptly from 
 one subject of consideration to another, without 
 letting the active spring of the intellect run 
 down between the two, is a power far more 
 valuable ; and this power women pre-eminently 
 possess, by virtue of the very mobility of which 
 they are accused. They perhaps have it from 
 nature, but they certainly have it by training 
 and education ; for nearly the whole of the occu- 
 pations of women consist in the management of 
 small but multitudinous details, on each of which 
 the mind cannot dwell even for a minute, but 
 must pass on to other things, and if anything 
 requires longer thought, must steal time at odd 
 moments for thinking of it. The capacity indeed 
 which women show for doing their thinking in 
 circumstances and at times which almost any 
 man would make an excuse to himself for not 
 attempting it, has often been noticed ; and a 
 
THE SUBuECTION OF W0:MEN. 
 
 325 
 
 woman’s mind^ thongli it may be occupied only 
 with small things^ can hardly ever permit itself 
 to be vacant^ as a man^s so often is when not 
 engaged in what he chooses to consider the 
 business of his life. The business of a woman^s 
 ordinary life is things in general^ and can 
 as little cease to go on as the world to go 
 round. 
 
 But (it is said) there is anatomical evidence 
 of the superior mental capacity of men compared 
 with women : they have a larger brain. I reply, 
 that in the first place the fact itself is doubtful. 
 It is by no means established that the brain of a 
 woman is smaller than that of a man. If it is 
 inferred merely because a woman^s bodily frame 
 generally is of less dimensions than a man^s, this 
 criterion would lead to strange consequences. 
 A tall and large-boned man must on this showing 
 be wonderfully superior in intelligence to a small 
 man, and an elephant or a whale must prodi- 
 giously excel mankind. The size of the brain in 
 human beings, anatomists say, varies much less 
 than the size of the body, or even of the head, 
 and the one cannot be at all inferred from the 
 other. It is certain that some women have as 
 large a brain as any man. It is within my 
 knowledge that a man who had weighed many 
 human brains, said that the heaviest he knew of, 
 heavier even than Cuvier’s (the heaviest pre- 
 
226 
 
 llIE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 viously recorded,) was that of a woman. Next, 
 
 I must observe that the precise relation which 
 exists between the brain and the intellectual 
 powers is not yet well understood, but is a 
 subject of great dispute. That there is a very 
 close relation we cannot doubt. The brain is 
 certainly the material organ of thought and 
 feeling : and (making abstraction of the great 
 unsettled controversy respecting the appropriation 
 of different parts of the brain to different mental 
 faculties) I admit that it would be an anomaly, 
 and an exception to all we know of the general 
 laws of life and organization, if the size of the 
 organ were wholly indifferent to the function ; if 
 no accession of power were derived from the 
 greater magnitude of the instrument. But the 
 exception and the anomaly would be fully as 
 great if the organ exercised influence by its 
 magnitude only. In all the more delicate opera- 
 tions of nature — of which those of the animated 
 creation are the most delicate, and those of the 
 nervous system by far the most delicate of these 
 — differences in the effect depend as much on 
 differences of quality in the physical agents, as 
 on their quantity ; and if the quality of an in- 
 strument is to be tested by the nicety and deli- 
 cacy of the work it can do, the indications point 
 to a greater average fineness of quality in the 
 brain and nervous system of women than of men. 
 
THE SHEJECTION OF WOIklEN. 
 
 327 
 
 Dismissirig abstract difference of quality^ a tbiog 
 difficult to verify^ the efficiency of an organ is 
 known to depend not solely on its size but on its 
 activity : and of this we have an approximate 
 measure in the energy with which the blood 
 circulates through it^ both the stimulus and the 
 reparative force being mainly dependent on the 
 circulation. It would not be surprising — it is 
 indeed an hypothesis which accords well with the 
 differences actually observed between the mental 
 operations of the two sexes — if men on the 
 average should have the advantage in the size of 
 the brain^ and women in activity of cerebral cir- 
 culation. The results which coujecture^ founded 
 on analogy^ would lead us to expect from this 
 difference of organization^ would correspond to 
 some of those which we most commonly see. In 
 the first place^ the mental operations of men 
 might be expected to be slower. They would 
 neither be so prompt as women in thinkings nor 
 so quick to feel. Large bodies take more time 
 to get into full action. On the other hand, 
 when once got thoroughly into play, men'^s brain 
 would bear more work. It would be more per- 
 sistent in the line first taken; it would have 
 more difficulty in changing from one mode of 
 action to another, but, in the one thing it was 
 doing, it could go on longer without loss of 
 power or sense of fatigue. And do we not find that 
 
328 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 tlie tilings in which men most excel women ain 
 those which require most plodding and long 
 hammering at a single thought^ while women do 
 best what must be done rapidly? A woman-^s 
 brain is sooner fatigued^ sooner exhausted; but 
 given the degree of exhaustion^ we should expect 
 to find that it would recover itself sooner. I 
 repeat that this speculation is entirely hypo- 
 thetical ; it pretends to no more than to suggest 
 a line of enquiry. I have before repudiated the 
 notion of its being yet certainly known that 
 there is any natural difference at all in the 
 average strength or direction of the mental ca- 
 pacities of the two sexes^ much less what that 
 difference is. Nor is it possible that this should 
 be known^ so long as the psychological laws of the 
 formation of character have been so little studied^ 
 even in a general way, and in the particular 
 case never scientifically applied at all; so long 
 as the most obvious external causes of difference 
 of character are habitually disregarded — left un- 
 noticed by the observer^ and looked down upon 
 with a kind of supercilious contempt by the 
 prevalent schools both of natural history and of 
 mental philosophy : who^ whether they look for 
 the source of what mainly distinguishes human 
 beings from one another, in the world of matter 
 or in that of spirit, agree in running down those 
 who prefer to explain these differences by the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 329 
 
 different relations of human beings to society 
 and life. 
 
 To so ridiculous an extent are the notions 
 formed of the nature of women^ mere empirical 
 generalizations^ framed^ without philosophy or 
 analysis^ upon the first instances which present 
 themselves^ that the popular idea of it is different 
 in different countries^ according as the opinions 
 and social circumstances of the country have given 
 to the women living in it any speciality of develop- 
 ment or non-development. An Oriental thinks 
 that women are by nature peculiarly voluptuous ; 
 see the violent abuse of them on this ground in 
 Hindoo writings. An Englishman usually thinks 
 that they are by nature cold. The sayings about 
 women'^s fickleness are mostly of French origin ; 
 from the famous distich of Francis the First,, up- 
 ward and downward. In Enghand it is a common 
 remark^ how much more constant women are than 
 men. Inconstancy has been longer reckoned dis- 
 creditable to a woman^ in England than in France ; 
 and Englishwomen are besides, in their inmost 
 nature, much more subdued to opinion. It may 
 be remarked by the way, that Englishmen are in 
 peculiarly unfavourable circumstances for attempt- 
 ing to judge what is or is not natural, not merely 
 to women, but to men, or to human beings alto- 
 gether, at least if they have only English expe- 
 rience to go upon : because there is no place where 
 
330 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 human nature shows so little of its original linea-' 
 ments. Both in a good and a bad sense^ the Eng- 
 lish are farther from a state of nature than any 
 other modern people. They are^ more than any 
 other people, a product of civilization and discipline. 
 England is the country in which social discipline 
 has most succeeded, not so much in conquering, as 
 in suppressing, whatever is liable to conflict with 
 it. The English, more than any other people, not 
 only act but feel according to rule. In other 
 countries, the taught opinion, or the requirement 
 of society, may be the stronger power, but the 
 promptings of the individual nature are always 
 visible under it, and often resisting it : rule may 
 be stronger than nature, but nature is still there. 
 In England, rule has to a great degree substituted 
 itself for nature. The greater part of life is 
 carried on, not by following inclination under the 
 control of rule, but by having no inclination but 
 ’that of following a rule. Now this has its good 
 side doubtless, though it has also a wretchedly 
 bad one ; but it must render an Englishman 
 peculiarly ill-qualified to pass a judgment on the 
 original tendencies of human nature from his own. 
 experience. The errors to which observers else- 
 where are liable on the subject, are of a different 
 character. An Englishman is ignorant respecting 
 human nature, a Frenchman is prejudiced. An 
 Englishman"^s errors are negative, a Frenchman's 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 331 
 
 positive. An Englisliman fancies that things do 
 not exist^because he never sees them; arrenchman 
 thinks they must always and necessarily exist, 
 because he does see them. An Englishman does 
 not know nature, because he has had no oppor- 
 tunity of observing it; a Frenchman generally 
 knows a great deal of it, but often mistakes it, 
 because he has only seen it sophisticated and dis- 
 torted. For the artificial state superinduced by 
 society disguises the natural tendencies of the 
 thing which is the subject of observation, in two 
 difiFerent ways : by extinguishing the nature, or by 
 transforming it. In the one case there is but 
 a starved residuum of nature remainiDg to be 
 studied ; in the other case there is much, but it 
 may have expanded in any direction rather than 
 that in which it would spontaneously grow. 
 
 I have said that it cannot now be known how 
 much of the existing mental differences between 
 men and women is natural, and how much arti- 
 ficial ; whether there are any natural difierences at 
 all ; or, supposing all artificial causes of difference 
 to be withdrawn, w^hat natural character would 
 be revealed. I am not about to attempt what I 
 have pronounced impossible : but doubt does not 
 forbid conjecture, and where certainty is unat- 
 tainable, there may yet be the means of ar- 
 riving at some degree of probability. The first 
 point, the origin of the differences actually 
 
332 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 observed, is tbe one most accessible to specula- 
 tion ; and I shall attempt to approach it, by the 
 only path by which it can be reached ; by tracing 
 the mental consequences of external influences. 
 We cannot isolate a human being from the cir- 
 cumstances of his condition, so as to ascertain ex- 
 perimentally what he would have been by nature ; 
 but we can consider what he is, and what his cir- 
 cumstances have been, and whether the one would 
 have been capable of producing the other. 
 
 Let us take, then, the only marked case which 
 observation affords, of apparent inferiority of 
 women to men, if we except the merely physical 
 one of bodily strength. No production in philo- 
 sophy, science, or art, entitled to the first rank, 
 has been the work of a woman. Is there any 
 mode of accounting for this, without supposing 
 that women are naturally incapable of producing 
 them? 
 
 In the first place, we may fairly question 
 whether experience has aflPorded sufficient grounds 
 for an induction. It is scarcely three generations 
 since women, saving very rare exceptions, have 
 begun to try their capacity in philosophy, science, 
 or art. It is only in the present generation that 
 their attempts have been at all numerous ; and 
 they are even now extremely few, everywhere but 
 in England and France. It is a relevant ques- 
 tion, whether a mind possessing the requisites of 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 333 
 
 / 
 
 first-rate eminence in speculation or creative art 
 could have been expected^ on the mere calculation 
 of chances^ to turn up during that lapse of time, 
 among the women whose tastes and personal 
 position admitted of their devoting themselves to 
 these pursuits. In all things which there has yet 
 been time for — in all but the very highest grades 
 in the scale of excellence, especially in the depart- 
 ment in which they have been longest engaged, 
 literature (both prose and poetry) — women have 
 done quite as much, have obtained fully as high 
 prizes and as many of them, as could be expected 
 from the length of time and the number of com- 
 petitors. If we go back to the earlier period 
 when very few women made the attempt, yet some 
 of those few made it with distinguished success. 
 The Greeks always accounted Sappho among 
 their great poets ; and we may well suppose that 
 Myrtis, said to have been the teacher of Pindar, 
 and Corinna, who five times bore away from liim 
 the prize of poetry, must at least have had sufficient 
 merit to admit of being compared with that great 
 name. Aspasia did not leave any philosophical 
 writings ; but it is an admitted fact that Socrates 
 resorted to her for^instruction, and avowxd himself 
 to have obtained it. 
 
 If we consider the works of women in modern 
 times, and contrast them with those of men, 
 either in the literary or the artistic department, 
 
334 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 sncli inferiority as may be observed resolves 
 itself essentially into one tiling : but that is a 
 most material one ; deficiency of originality. Not 
 total deficiency ; for every production of mind 
 which is of any substantive value, has an origi- 
 nality of its own — is a conception of the mind 
 itself, not a copy of something else. Thoughts 
 original, in the sense of being unborrowed — of 
 being derived from the thinker^s own observations 
 or intellectual processes — are abundant in the 
 writings of women. But they have not yet 
 produced any of those great and luminous new 
 ideas which form an era in thought, nor those 
 fundamentally new conceptions in art, which 
 open a vista of possible effects not before thought 
 of, and found a new school. Their compositions 
 are mostly grounded on the existing fund of 
 thought, and their creations do not deviate widely 
 from existing types. This is the sort of inferiority 
 which their works manifest ; for in point of exe- 
 cution, in the detailed application of thought, 
 and the perfection of style, there is no inferiority. 
 Our best novelists in point of composition, and 
 of the management of detail, have mostly been 
 women ; and there is not in all modern literature 
 a more eloquent vehicle of thought than the style 
 of Madame de Stael, nor, as a specimen of purely 
 artistic excellence, anything superior to the prose 
 of Madame Sand, whose style acts upon the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF vVOMEN. 
 
 335 
 
 nervous system like a symphony of Haydn or 
 Mozart. High originality of conception is^ as I 
 have said^ what is chiefly wanting. And now to 
 examine if there is any manner in which this 
 deficiency can be accounted for. 
 
 Let us remember^ then^ so far as regards 
 mere thought, that during all that period in the 
 world^s existence, and in the progress of cultiva- 
 tion, in which great and fruitful new truths 
 could be arrived at by mere force of genius, 
 with little previous study and accumulation of 
 knowledge — during all that time women did not 
 concern themselves with speculation at all. From 
 the days of Hypatia to those of the Reformation, 
 the illustrious Heloisa is almost the only woman 
 to whom any such achievement might have been 
 possible ; and we know not how great a capacity 
 of speculation in her may have been lost to 
 mankind by the misfortunes of her life. Never 
 since any considerable number of women have 
 began to cultivate serious thought^ has origi- 
 nality been possible on easy terms. Nearly all 
 the thoughts which can be reached by mere 
 strength of original faculties, have long since 
 been arrived at ; and originality, in any high 
 sense of the word, is now scarcely ever attained 
 but by minds which have undergone elaborate 
 discipline, and are deeply versed in the results 
 of previous thinking. It is Mr. Maurice, I thinks 
 
336 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 wlio tas remarked on tlie present age, that its 
 most original thinkers are these who have known 
 most thoroughly what had been thought by their 
 predecessors : and this will always henceforth be 
 the case. Every fresh stone in the edifice has 
 now to be placed on the top of so many others, 
 that a long process of climbing, and of carrying 
 up materials, has to be gone through by whoever 
 aspires to take a share in the present stage of 
 the work. How many women are there who 
 have gone through any such process ? Mrs. 
 Somerville, alone perhaps of women, knows as 
 much of mathematics as is now needful for 
 making any considerable mathematical discovery: 
 is it any proof of inferiority in women, that she 
 has not happened to be one of the two or three 
 persons who in her lifetime have associated their 
 names with some striking advancement of the 
 science? Two women, since political economy 
 has been made a science, have known enough of 
 it to write usefully on the subject : of how many 
 of the innumerable men who have wTitten on it 
 during the same time, is it possible with truth to 
 say more? If no woman has hitherto been a 
 great historian, what woman has had the neces- 
 sary erudition ? If no woman is a great philo- 
 logist, what w^oman has studied Sanscrit and 
 Slavonic, the Gothic of Ulphila and the Persic 
 of the Zendavesta ? Even in practical matters 
 
THE $UIiJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 337 
 
 we all know what is the value of the originality 
 of untaught geniuses. It means^ inventing 
 over again in its rudimentary form something 
 already invented and improved upon by many 
 successive inventors. When women have had 
 the preparation which all men now require to be 
 eminently originab it will be time enough to 
 begin judging by experience of their capacity for 
 originality. 
 
 It no doubt often happens that a person^ who 
 has not widely and accurately studied the thoughts 
 of others on a subject^ has by natural sagacity a 
 happy intuition^ which he can suggest^ but cannot 
 prove^ wdiich yet when matured may be an im- 
 portant addition to knowledge ; but even then, 
 no justice can be done to it until some other 
 person, who does possess the previous acquire- 
 ments, takes it in hand, tests it, gives it a scientific 
 or practical form, and fits it into its place among 
 the existing truths of philosophy or science. Is 
 it supposed that such felicitous thoughts do not 
 occur to women ? They occur by hundreds to 
 every woman of intellect. But they are. mostly 
 lost, for want of a husband or friend who has the 
 other knowledge which can enable him to estimate 
 them properly and bring them before the world : 
 and even when they are brought before it, they 
 generally appear as his ideas, not their real 
 author^s. Who can teU how many of the most 
 15 
 
338 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 original thonglits put fortli by male writers^ 
 belong to a woman by suggestion, to themselves 
 only by verifying and working out ? If I may 
 judge by my own case^ a very large proportion 
 indeed. 
 
 If we turn from pure speculation to literature 
 in the narrow sense of the term, and the fine arts, 
 there is a very obvious reason why women^s 
 literature is, in its general conception and in its 
 main features, an imitation of menu’s. Why is the 
 Roman literature, as critics proclaim to satiety, 
 not original, but an imitation of the Greek ? 
 Simply because the Greeks came first. If women 
 lived in a different country from men, and had 
 never read any of their writings, they would have 
 had a literature of their own. As it is, they have 
 not created one, because they found a highly ad- 
 vanced literature already created. If there had 
 been no suspension of the knowledge of antiquity, 
 or if the Renaissance had occurred before the 
 Gothic cathedrals were built, they never would 
 have been built. We see that, in France and 
 Italy, imitation of the ancient literature stopped 
 the original development even after it had com- 
 menced. All women who write are pupils of the 
 great male writers. A painteFs early pictures, 
 even if he be a Raffaelle, are undistinguishable in 
 style from those of his master. Even a Mozart 
 does not display his powerful originality in hia 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 339 
 
 earliest pieces. What years are to a gifted indi- 
 vidual^ generations are to a mass. If women^s 
 literature is destined to have a different collective 
 character from that of men^ depending on any 
 difference of natural tendencies^ much longer 
 time is necessary than has yet elapsed^ before it 
 can emancipate itself from the influence of ac- 
 cepted models^ and guide itself by its own im- 
 pulses. But if^ as I believe^ there will not prove 
 to be any natural tendencies common to women^ 
 and distiuguishing their genius from that of men, 
 yet every individual writer among them has her 
 individual tendencies, which at present are still 
 subdued by the influence of precedent and ex- 
 ample : and it will require generations more, before 
 their individuality is sufficiently developed to make 
 head against that influence. 
 
 It is in the flne arts, properly so called, that 
 the primd facie evidence of inferior original 
 powers in women at first sight appears the 
 strongest : since opinion (it may be said) does not 
 exclude them from these, but rather encourages 
 them, and their education, instead of passing over 
 this department, is in the affluent classes mainly 
 composed of it. Yet in this line of exertion they 
 have fallen still more short than in many others, 
 of the highest eminence attained by men. This 
 shortcoming, however, needs no other explana- 
 tion than the familiar fact, more universally true 
 
340 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 in tlie fine arts than in anything else ; the vast 
 superiority of professional persons over amateurs. 
 Vfomen in the educated classes are almost uni- 
 versally taught more or less of some branch or 
 other of the fine arts^ but not that they may gain 
 their living or their social consequence by it. 
 Women artists are all amateurs. The exceptions 
 are only of the kind which confirm the general 
 truth. Women are taught music^ but not for 
 the purpose of composing^ only of executing it : 
 and accordingly it is only as composers, that 
 men, in music, are superior to women. The only 
 one of the fine arts which women do follow, to 
 any extent, as a profession, and an occupation 
 for life, is the histrionic ; and in that they are 
 confessedly equal, if not superior, to men. To 
 make the comparison fair, it should be made 
 between the productions of women in any branch 
 of art, and those of men not following it as a 
 profession. In musical composition, for example, 
 women surely have produced fully as good things 
 as have ever been produced by male amateurs. 
 There are now a few women, a very few, who 
 practise painting as a profession, and these are 
 already beginning to show quite as much talent 
 as could be expected. Even male painters {pace 
 Mr. Ruskin) have not made any very remarkable 
 figure these last centuries, and it will be long 
 before they do so. The reason why the old painters 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 341 
 
 were so greatly superior to the modern, is that 
 a greatly superior class of men applied themselves 
 to the art. In the fourteenth and fifteenth cen- 
 turies the Italian painters were the most accom- 
 plished men of their age. The greatest of them were 
 men of encyclopserlical acquirements and powers, 
 like the great men of Greece. But in their 
 times fine art was, to men^s feelings and conce])- 
 tions, among the grandest things in which a human 
 being could excel ; and by it men were made, what 
 only political or military distinction now makes 
 them, the companions of sovereigns, and the equals 
 of the highest nobility. In the present age, men 
 of anything like similar calibre find something 
 more important to do for their own fame and 
 the uses of the modern world, than painting : 
 and it is only now and then that a Reynolds or 
 a Turner (of whose relative rank among eminent 
 men I do not pretend to an opinion) applies himself 
 to that art. Music belongs to a different order 
 of things ; it does not require the same general 
 powers of mind, but seems more dependant on a 
 natural gift : and it may be thought surprising 
 that no one of the great musical composers has 
 been a woman. But even this natural gift, to be 
 made available for great creations, requires study, 
 and professional devotion to the pursuit. The only 
 countries which have produced first-rate com posers, 
 even of the male sex, are Germany and Italy — ■ 
 
342 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 countries in wtich^ both in point of special and 
 of general cultivation^ women have remained fai 
 behind France and England^ being generally (it 
 may be said without exaggeration) very little edu- 
 cated^ and having scarcely cultivated at all any 
 of the higher faculties of mind. • And in those 
 countries the men who are acquainted with the 
 principles of musical composition must be counted 
 by hundreds^ or more probably by thousands^ the 
 women barely by scores : so that here again^ on 
 the doctrine of averages, we cannot reasonably 
 expect to see more than one eminent woman to 
 fifty eminent men ; and the last three centuries 
 have not produced fifty eminent male composers 
 either in Germany or in Italy. 
 
 There are other reasons, besides lliose which we 
 have now given, that help to explain why women 
 remain behind men, even in the pursuits which are 
 open to both. For one thing, very few women 
 have time for them. This may seem a paradox ; 
 it is an undoubted social fact. The time and 
 thoughts of every woman have to satisfy great 
 previous demands on them for things practical. 
 There is, first, the superintendence of the family 
 and the domestic expenditure, which occupies at 
 least one woman in every family, generally the one 
 of mature years and acquired experience ; unless 
 the family is so rich as to admit of delegating that 
 task to hired agency, and submitting to all the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 343 
 
 waste and malversation inseparable from that mode 
 of conducting it. The superintendence of a house- 
 hold^ even when not in other respects laborious^ is 
 extremely onerous to the thoughts ; it requires 
 incessant vigilance^ an eye which no detail escapes^ 
 and presents questions for consideration and solu- 
 tion^ foreseen and unforeseen^ at every hour of the 
 day^ from which the person responsible for them 
 can hardly ever shake herself free. If a woman 
 is of a rank and circumstances which relieve her in 
 a measure from these cares^ she has still devolving 
 on her the management for the whole family of its 
 intercourse with others — of what is called society^ 
 and the less the call made on her by the former 
 duty, the greater is always the development of the 
 latter : the dinner parties, concerts, evening parties, 
 morning visits, letter writing, and all that goes with 
 them. All this is over and above the engrossing 
 duty which society imposes exclusively on vromen, 
 of making themselves charming. A clever woman 
 of the higher ranks finds nearly a suflicient em- 
 ployment of her talents in cultivating the graces 
 of manner and the arts of conversation. To look 
 only at the outward side of the subject : the great 
 and continual exercise of thought which all women 
 who attach any value to dressing well (I do not 
 mean expensively, but with taste, and perception 
 of natural and of artificial convenance) must 
 bestow upon their own dress, perhaps also upon 
 
344 : 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 that of their daughters^ would alone go a great 
 way towards achieving respectable results in art, 
 or science^ or literature^ and does actually exhaust 
 much of the time and mental power they might 
 have to spare for either."^ If it were possible 
 that all this number of little practical interests 
 (which are made great to them) should leave 
 them either much leisure^ or much energy and 
 freedom of mind, to be devoted to art or specula- 
 tion, they must have a much greater original 
 supply of active faculty than the vast majority of 
 men. But this is not all. Independently of the 
 regular offices of life which devolve upon a woman, 
 she is expected to have her time and faculties 
 always at the disposal of everybody. If a man 
 has not a profession to exempt him from such 
 demands, still, if he has a pursuit, he offends 
 nobody by devoting his time to it ; occupation is 
 
 * ‘*It appears to be the same right turn of mind which enables 
 a man to acquire the truths or the just idea of what is right, in 
 the ornaments, as in the more stable principles of art. It hag 
 still the same centre of perfection, though it is the centre of a 
 smaller circle. — To illustrate this by the fashion of dress, in 
 which there is allowed to be a good or bad taste. The component 
 parts of dress are continually changing from great to little, from 
 short to long ; but the general form still remains : it is still the 
 same general dress which is comparatively fixed, though on a very 
 slenderfoundation; butitison this which fashion must rest. He who 
 invents with the most success, or dresses in the best taste, would 
 probably, from the same sagacity employed to greater purposes, 
 have discovered equal skill, or have formed the same correct taste, 
 in the highest labours of art .” — Sir Joshua Reynolds' Discourses^ 
 Disc. vii. 
 
TUE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 345 
 
 received as a valid excuse for his not answering 
 to every casual demand which may be made on 
 him. Are a woman'^s occupations, especially her 
 chosen and voluntary ones, ever regarded as excus- 
 ing her from any of what are termed the calls of 
 society ? Scarcely are her most necessary and 
 recognised duties allowed as an exemption. It 
 requires an illness in the family, or something 
 else out of the common way, to entitle her to 
 give her own business the precedence over other 
 people^s amusement. She must always be at the 
 beck and call of somebody, generally of everybody. 
 If she has a study or a pursuit, she must snatch 
 any short interval which accidentally occurs to be 
 eipployed in it. A celebrated woman, in a work 
 which I hope will some day be published, remarks 
 truly that everything a woman does is done at odd 
 times. Is it wonderful, then, if she does not attain 
 the highest eminence in things which require con- 
 secutive attention, and the concentration on them 
 of the chief interest of life ? Such is philosophy, 
 and such, above all, is art, in which, besides the 
 devotion of the thoughts and feelings, the hand 
 also must be kept in constant exercise to attain 
 high skill. 
 
 There is another consideration to be added to 
 all these. In the various arts and intellectual 
 occupations, there is a degree of proficiency suffi- 
 cient for living by it, and there is a higliei 
 15 * 
 
f)4G THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 degree on wliich depend the great productions 
 which immortalize a name. To the attainment 
 of the former^ there are adequate motives in the 
 case of all who follow the pursuit professionally : 
 the other is hardly ever attained where there is 
 not^ or where there has not been at some period 
 of life^ an ardent desire of celebrity. Nothing 
 less is commonly a sufficient stimulus to undergo 
 the long and patient drudgery, which, in the case 
 even of the greatest natural gifts, is absolutely 
 required for great eminence in pursuits in which 
 we already possess so many splendid memorials 
 of the highest genius. Now, whether the cause 
 be natural or artificial, women seldom have this 
 eagerness for fame. Their ambition is generally 
 confined within narrower bounds. The influence 
 they seek is over those who immediately surround 
 them. Their desire is to be liked, loved, or ad- 
 mired, by those whom they see with their eyes : 
 and the proficiency in knowledge, arts, and ac- 
 complishments, which is sufficient for that, almost 
 always contents them. This is a trait of cha- 
 racter which cannot be left out of the account 
 in judging of women as they are. I do not at 
 all believe that it is inherent in women. It is 
 only the natural result of their circumstances. 
 The love of fame in men is encouraged by edu- 
 cation and opinion : to scorn delights and live 
 laborious days for its sake, is accounted the part 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 347 
 
 of noble minds/^ even if spoken of as their 
 ^Hast infirmity/'^ and is stimulated by the access 
 which fame gives to all objects of ambition^ in- 
 cluding even the favour of women; while to 
 women themselves all these objects are closed, 
 aud the desire of fame itself considered daring 
 and unfeminine. Besides, how could it be that 
 a woman^s interests should not be all concen- 
 trated upon the impressions made on those who 
 come into her daily life, when society has or- 
 dained that all her duties should be to them, and 
 has contrived that all her comforts should depend 
 on them ? The natural desire of consideration 
 from our fellow creatures is as strong in a woman 
 as in a man ; but society has so ordered things 
 that public consideration is, in all ordinary cases, 
 only attainable by her through the consideration 
 of her husband or of her male relations, while 
 her private consideration is forfeited by making 
 herself individually prominent, or appeariug in 
 any other character than that of an appendage 
 to men. Whoever is in the least capable of 
 estimating the influence on the mind of the 
 entire domestic and social position and the whole 
 habit of a life, must easily recognise in that in- 
 fluence a complete explanation of nearly all the 
 apparent diff‘erences between women and men, 
 including the whole of those which imply any 
 inferiority. 
 
348 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 As for moral differences^ considered as dis. 
 tinguished from intellectual^ tlie distinction com- 
 monly drawn is to the advantage of women. 
 They are declared to be better than men , an 
 empty compliment^ which must provoke a bitter 
 smile from every woman of spirit^ since there is 
 no other situation in life in which it is the esta- 
 blished order, and considered quite natural and 
 suitable, that the better should obey the w^orse. 
 If this piece of idle talk is good for anything, it 
 is only as an admission by men, of the coiTupting 
 influence of power ; for that is certainly the 
 only truth which the fact, if it be a fact, either 
 proves or illustrates. And it is true that servi- 
 tude, except when it actually brutalizes, though 
 corrupting to both, is less so to the slaves than 
 to the slave-masters. It is wholesomer for the 
 moral nature to be restrained, even by arbitrary 
 power, than to be allowed to exercise arbitrary 
 power without restraint. Women, it is said, 
 seldomer fall under the penal law — contribute a 
 much smaller number of offenders to the criminal 
 calendar, than men. I doubt not that the same 
 thing may be said, with the same truth, of negro 
 slaves. Those who are under the control of 
 others cannot often commit crimes, unless at the 
 command and for the purposes of their masters. 
 I do not know a more signal instance of the 
 blindness with which the world, including the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 84:9 
 
 herd of studious men^ ignore and pass over all 
 the influences of social circumstances^ than their 
 silly depreciation of the intellectual^ and silly 
 panegyrics on the morale nature of women. 
 
 The complimentary dictum about women^s 
 superior moral goodness may be allowed to pair 
 off with the disparaging one respecting their 
 greater liability to moral bias. Women^ we are 
 told^ are not capable of resisting their personal 
 partialities : their judgment in grave affairs is 
 warped by their sympathies and antipathies. 
 Assuming it to be so^ it is still to be proved that 
 women are oftener misled by their personal 
 feelings than men by their personal interests. 
 The chief difference would seem in that case to 
 be^ that men are led from the course of duty 
 and the public interest by their regard for them- 
 selves, women (not being allowed to have private 
 interests of their own) by their regard for some- 
 body else. It is also to be considered, that all 
 the education which women receive from society 
 inculcates on them the feeling that the individuals 
 connected with them are the only ones to whom 
 they owe any duty — the only ones whose interest 
 they are called upon to care for ; while, as far as 
 education is concerned, they are left strangers 
 even to the elementary ideas which are presup- 
 posed in any intelligent regard for larger in- 
 terests or higher moral objects. The complaint 
 
350 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 agninst ttem resolves itself merely into tliis^ 
 that they fulfil only too faithfully the sole duty 
 which they are taught^ and almost the only one 
 which they are permitted to practise. 
 
 The concessions of the privileged to the un- 
 privileged are so seldom brought about by any 
 better motive than the power of the unprivileged 
 to extort thenij that any arguments against the 
 prerogative of sex are likely to be little attended 
 to by the generality, as long as they are able to 
 say to themselves that women do not complain 
 of it. That fact certainly enables men to retain 
 the unjust privilege some time longer ; but does 
 not render it less unjust. Exactly the same 
 thing may be said of the women in the harem of 
 an Oriental : they do not complain of not being 
 allowed the freedom of European women. They 
 think our women insufferably bold and unfemi- 
 nine. How rarely it is that even men complain 
 of the general order of society ; and how much 
 rarer still would such complaint be, if they did 
 not know of any different order existing any- 
 where else. Women do not complain of the 
 general lot of women; or rather they do, for 
 plaintive elegies on it are very common in the 
 writings of women, and were still more so as 
 long as the lamentations could not be suspected 
 of having any practical object. Their complaints 
 are like the complaints which men make of the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 351 
 
 general nnsatisfaetoriness of haman life; they 
 are not meant to imply blame^ or to plead for 
 any change. But though women do not com- 
 plain of the power of husbands^ each complains 
 of her own husband^ or of the husbands of her 
 friends. It is the same in all other cases of 
 servitude^ at least in the commencement of the 
 emancipatory movement. The serfs did not at 
 first complain of the power of their lords^ but 
 only of their tyranny. The Commons began by 
 claiming a few municipal privileges; they next 
 asked an exemption for themselves from being 
 taxed without their own consent ; but they would 
 at that time have thought it a great presumption 
 to claim any share in the king^s sovereign autho- 
 rity. The case of women is now the only case 
 in which to rebel against established rules is still 
 looked upon with the same eyes as was formerly 
 a subject’s claim to the right of rebelling against 
 his king. A woman who joins in any movement 
 which her husband disapproves^ makes herself a 
 martyr^ without even being able to be an apostle, 
 for the husband can legally put a stop to her 
 apostleship. Women cannot be expected to 
 devote themselves to the emancipation of women, 
 until men in considerable number are prepared 
 to join with them in the undertaking. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 HERE remains a question^ not of less im- 
 
 portance than those already discussed^ and 
 which will be asked the most importunately by 
 those opponents whose conviction is somewhat 
 shaken on the main point. What good are we 
 to expect from the changes proposed in onr 
 customs and institutions? "Would mankind be 
 at all better off if women were free ? If not, 
 why disturb their minds, and attempt to make 
 a social revolution in the name of an abstract 
 right ? 
 
 It is hardly to be expected that this question 
 will be asked in respect to the change proposed 
 in the condition of women in marriage. The 
 sufferinj^t^, immoralities, evils of all sorts, produced 
 in innumerable cases by the subjection of indi- 
 vidual women to individual men, are far too 
 terrible to be overlooked. Unthinking or un- 
 candid persons, counting those cases alone which 
 are extreme, or which attain publicity, may say 
 that the evils are exceptional ; but no one can 
 be blind to their existence, nor, in many cases. 
 
THE SUBJECTIOJSr OF WOMEN. 
 
 353 
 
 to tli^ir intensity. And it is perfectly o6vions 
 tliat the abuse of the power cannot be very much 
 checked while the power remains. It is a power 
 given^ or offered^ not to good men_, or to decently 
 respectable men^ but to all men ; the most brutal, 
 and the most criminal. There is no check but 
 that of opinion, and such men are in general 
 within the reach of no opinion but that of men 
 like themselves. If such men did not brutally 
 tyrannize over the one human being whom the 
 law compels to bear everything from them, society 
 must already have reached a paradisiacal state. 
 There could be no need any longer of laws to 
 curb men^s vicious propensities. Astrsea must 
 not only have returned to earth, but the heart of 
 the worst man must have become her temple. The 
 law of servitude in marriage is a monstrous con- 
 tradiction to all the principles of the modern world, 
 and to all the experience through which those 
 principles have been slowly and painfully worked 
 out. It is the sole case, now that negro slavery has 
 been abolished, in which a hum an being in the pleni- 
 tude of every faculty is delivered up to the tender 
 mercies of another human being, in the hope 
 forsooth that this other will use the power solely 
 for the good of the person subjected to it. 
 Jlarriage is the only actual bondage known to 
 our law. There remain no legal slaves, except 
 the mist^^'^ss of every house. 
 
354 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 It is not^ therefore, on this part of the subject, 
 that the question is likely to be asked, Cui bono ? 
 We may be told that the evil would outweigh 
 the good, but the reality of the good admits of 
 no dispute. In regard, however, to the larger 
 question, the removal of women^s disabilities — 
 their recognition as the equals of men in all that 
 belongs to citizenship — the opening to them of 
 all honourable employments, and of the training 
 and education which qualifies for those employ- 
 ments — there are many persons for whom it is 
 not enough that the inequality has no just or 
 legitimate defence ; they require to be told 
 what express advantage would be obtained by 
 abolishing it. 
 
 To which let me first answer, the advantage of 
 having the most universal and pervading of all 
 human relations regulated by justice instead of 
 injustice. The vast amount of this gain to 
 human nature, it is hardly possible, by any expla- 
 nation or illustration, to place in a stronger light 
 than it is placed by the bare statement, to any one 
 who attaches a moral meaning to words. All the 
 selfish propensities, the self-worship, theunjustself- 
 preference, which exist among mankind, have their 
 source and root in, and derive their principal 
 nourishment from, the present constitution of the 
 relation between men ard women. Think what 
 it is to a boy, to grow up to manhood in the 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 355 
 
 belief that without any merit or any exertion of 
 his own, though he may he the most frivolous 
 and empty or the most ignorant and stolid of 
 mankind, by the mere fact of being born a male 
 he is by right the superior of all and every one 
 of an entire half of the human race : including 
 probably some whose real superiority to himself 
 he has daily or hourly occasion to feel ; but even 
 if in his whole conduct he habitually follows 
 a woman^s guidance, still, if he is a fool, she 
 thinks that of course she is not, and cannot be, 
 equal in ability and judgment to himself ; and if 
 he is not a fool, he does worse — ^he sees that she 
 is superior to him, and believes that, notwithstand- 
 ing her superiority, he is entitled to command and 
 she is bound to obey. "What must be the efPect 
 on his character, of this lesson ? And men of the 
 cultivated classes are often not aware how deeply 
 it sinks into the immense majority of male minds. 
 For, among right-feeling and well-bred people, the 
 inequality is kept as much as possible out of sight ; 
 above all, out of sight of the children. As much 
 obedience is required from boys to their mother 
 as to their father : they are not permitted to 
 domineer over their sisters, nor are they accus- 
 tomed to see these postponed to them, but the 
 contrary; the compensations of the chivalrous 
 feeling being made prominent, while the servitude 
 which requires them is kept in the background. 
 
356 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 Well bronglifc-up youths in the higher classes 
 thus often escape the bad influences of the situa- 
 tion in their early years^ and only experience them 
 when^ arrived at manhood^ they fall under the 
 dominion of facts as they really exist. Such 
 people are little aware^ when a boy is differently 
 brought up^ how early the notion of his inherent 
 superiority to a girl arises in his mind ; how it 
 grows with his growth and strengthens with his 
 strength ; how it is inoculated by one schoolboy 
 upon another ; how early the youth thinks him- 
 self superior to his mother^ owing her perhaps 
 forbearance^ but no real respect ; and how sublime 
 and sultan-like a sense of superiority he feels^ 
 above all, over the woman whom he honours by 
 admitting her to a partnership of his life. Is it 
 imagined that all this does not pervert the whole 
 manner of existence of the man^ both as an in- 
 dividual and as a social being? It is an exact 
 parallel to the feeling of a hereditary king that 
 he is excellent above ‘others by being born a king, 
 or a noble by being born a noble. The relation 
 between husband and wife is very like that 
 between lord and vassal, except that the wife is 
 held to more unlimited obedience than the vassal 
 was. However the vassaks character may have 
 been affected, for better and for worse, by his 
 subordination, who can help seeing that the lord'^s 
 was affected greatly for the worse ? whether he was 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN, 
 
 357 
 
 led to believe that his vassals were really superior 
 to himself, or to feel that he was placed in com^ 
 mand over people as good as himself, for no merits 
 or labours of his own, but merely for having, as 
 Figaro says, taken the trouble to be born. The 
 self-worship of the monarch, or of the feudal supe- 
 rior, is matched by the self-worship of the male. 
 Human beings do not grow up from childhood in 
 the possession of unearned distinctions, without 
 pluming themselves upon them. Those whom 
 privileges not acquired by their merit, and which 
 they feel to be disproportioned to it, inspire with 
 additional humility, are always the few, and the 
 best few. The rest are only inspired with pride, 
 and the worst sort of pride, that which values 
 itself upon accidental advantages, not of its own 
 achieving. Above all, when the feeling of being 
 raised above the whole of the other sex is com- 
 bined with personal authority over one individual 
 among them ; the situation, if a school of con- 
 scientious and affectionate forbearance to those 
 whose strongest points of character are conscience 
 and affection, is to men of another quality a re- 
 gularly constituted Academy or Gymnasium for 
 training them in arrogance and over! )earingn ess ; 
 which vices, if curbed by the certainty of resistance 
 in their intercourse with other men, their equals, 
 break out towards all who are in a position to be 
 obliged to tolerate them, and often revenge them- 
 
358 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF AVOMEN. 
 
 selves upon the unfortunate wife for the involun- 
 tary restraint which they are obliged to submit to 
 elsewhere. 
 
 The example afforded^ and the education given 
 to the sentiments^ by laying the foundation of 
 domestic existence upon a relation contradictory 
 to the first principles of social justice^ must^ from 
 the very nature of man_, have a perverting influ- 
 ence of such magnitude, that it is hardly possible 
 with our present experience to raise our imagi- 
 nations to the conception of so great a change 
 for the better as would be made by its removal. 
 All that education and civilization are doing to 
 efface the influences on character of the law of 
 force^ and replace them by those of justice; remains 
 merely on the surface, as long as the citadel of 
 the enemy is not attacked. The principle of the 
 modern movement in morals and politics, is that 
 conduct; and conduct alone, entitles to respect : 
 that not what men are, but what they do, con- 
 stitutes their claim to deference ; that, above all, 
 merit, and not birth, is the only rightful claim to 
 power and authority. If no authority, not in its 
 nature temporary, were allowed to one human 
 being over another, society would not be em- 
 ployed in building up propensities with one hand 
 which it has to curb with the other. The child 
 would really, for the first time in man^s existence 
 on earth, be trained in the way he should go, and 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 359 
 
 when he was old there would be a chance that 
 he would not depart from it. But so long as the 
 right of the strong to power over the weak rules 
 in the very heart of society^ the attempt to make 
 the equal right of the weak the principle of its 
 outward actions will always be an uphill struggle ; 
 for the law of justice^ which is also that of 
 Christian ity_, will never get possession of men^s 
 inmost sentiments ; they will be working against 
 it^ even when bending to it. 
 
 The second benefit to be expected from giving 
 to women the free use of their faculties^ by leav- 
 ing them the free choice of their employments, 
 and opening to them the same field of occupation 
 and the same prizes and encouragements as to 
 other human beings, would be that of doubling 
 the mass of mental faculties available for the 
 higher service of humanity. Where there is now 
 one person qualified to benefit mankind and 
 promote the general improvement, as a public 
 teacher, or an administrator of some branch of pub- 
 lic or social affairs, there would then be a chance of 
 two. Mental superiority of any kind is at present 
 everywhere so much below the demand ; there is 
 such a deficiency of persons competent to do 
 excellently anything which it requires any con- 
 siderable amount of ability to do ; that the loss 
 to the world, by refusing to make use of one-half 
 of tlie whole quantity of talent it possesses, is 
 
360 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 extremely serious. It is true tliat this amount 
 of mental power is not totally lost. Much of 
 it is employed^ and would in any case be em- 
 ployed^ in domestic management, and in the few 
 other occupations open to women; and from the 
 remainder indirect benefit is in many individual 
 cases obtained, through the personal influence 
 of individual women over individual men. But 
 these benefits are partial ; their range is extremely 
 circumscribed ; and if they must be admitted, on 
 the one hand, as a deduction from the amount 
 of fresh social power that would be acquired by 
 giving freedom to one-half of the Avhole sum of 
 human intellect, there must be added, on the 
 other, the benefit of the stimulus that would be 
 given to the intellect of men by the competition ; 
 or (to use a more true expression) by the necessity 
 that would be imposed on them of deserving 
 precedency before they could expect to obtain it. 
 
 This great accession to the intellectual power 
 of the species, and to the amount of intellect 
 avails ble for the good management of its affairs, 
 would be obtained, partly, through the better and 
 more complete intellectual education of women, 
 which would then improve pari passu with that 
 of men. Women in general would be brought up 
 equally capable of understanding business, public 
 aflhirs, and the higher matters of speculation, with 
 men in the same class of society ; and the select 
 
THE SUBJECTIO^T OF WOMEN. 
 
 361 
 
 few of the one as well as of the other sex^ who 
 were qualified not only to comprehend what is 
 done or thought by others^ but to think or do 
 something considerable themselves^ would meet 
 with the same facilities for improving and training 
 their capacities in the one sex as in the other. 
 In this way^ the widening of the sphere of action 
 for women would operate for good^ by raising 
 their education to the level of that of men^ and 
 making the one participate in all improvements 
 made in the other. But independently of this^ 
 the mere breaking down of the barrier would of 
 itself have an educational virtue of the highest 
 worth. The mere getting rid of the idea that all 
 the wider subjects of thought and action, all the 
 things which are of general and not solely of 
 private interest, are men^s business, from which 
 women are to be warned oflF — positively interdicted 
 from most of it, coldly tolerated in the little 
 w^hich is allowed them — the mere consciousness a 
 woman would then have of being a human being 
 like any other, entitled to choose her pursuits^ 
 urged or invited by the same inducements as any 
 one else to interest herself in whatever is in- 
 teresting to human beings, entitled to exert the 
 share of influence on all human concerns which 
 belongs to an individual opinion, whether she 
 attempted actual participation in them or not-^ 
 tliis alone would effect an immense expansion of 
 16 
 
562 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 the faculties of women^ as well as enlargement oi 
 the range of their moral sentiments. 
 
 Besides the addition to the amount of indi- 
 vidual talent available for the conduct of human 
 affairs, which certainly are not at present so 
 abundantly provided in that respect that they 
 can aflPord to dispense with one-half of what 
 nature proffers ; the opinion of women would then 
 possess a more beneficial, rather than a greater, 
 influence upon the general mass of human belief 
 and sentiment. I say a more beneficial, rather 
 than a greater influence; for the influence of 
 women over the general tone of opinion has 
 always, or at least from the earliest known period, 
 been very considerable. The influence of mothers 
 on the early character of their sons, and the 
 desire of young men to recommend themselves to 
 young women, have in all recorded times been 
 important agencies in the formation of cha- 
 racter, and have determined some of the chief 
 steps in the progress of civilization. Even in 
 the Homeric age, atSwc towards the TpcjaSa^ 
 iXKEaiTTtTrXoij^ is an acknowledged and powerful 
 motive of action in the great Hector. The moral 
 influence of women has had two modes of opera- 
 tion. First, it has been a softening influence. 
 Those who were most liable to be the victims 
 of violence, have naturally tended as much as they 
 could towards limiting its sphere and mitigating 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 363 
 
 its excesses. Those who were not taught to fight, 
 have naturally inclined in favour of any other 
 mode of settling differences rather than that ol 
 fighting. In general^ those who have been the 
 greatest sufferers by the indulgence of selfish 
 passion^ have been the most earnest supporters of 
 any moral law which offered a means of bridling 
 passion. Women were powerfully instrumental 
 in inducing the northern conquerors to adopt 
 the creed of Christianity^ a creed so much more 
 favourable to women than any that preeeded it. 
 The conversion of the Anglo-Saxons and of the 
 Franks may be said to have been begun by the 
 wives of Ethelbert and Clovis. The other mode 
 in which the effect of women^s opinion has been 
 conspicuous^ is by giving a powerful stimulus to 
 those qualities in men, which, not being them- 
 selves trained in, it was necessary for them that 
 they should find in their protectors. Courage, 
 and the military virtues generally, have at all 
 times been greatly indebted to the desire which 
 men felt of being admired by women : and the 
 stimulus reaches far beyond this one class of 
 eminent qualities, since, by a very natural effect 
 of their position, the best passport to the ad- 
 miration and favour of women has always been 
 to be thought highly of by men. From the 
 combination of the two kinds of moral in- 
 fluence thus exercised by women, arose the spirit 
 
364 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 of chivalry : the peculiarity of which is^ to aim at 
 combining the highest standard of the warlike 
 qualities with the cultivation of a totally different 
 class of virtues — those of gentleness, generosity, 
 and self-abnegation, towards the non-military and 
 defenceless classes generally, and a special sub- 
 mission and worship directed towards women; who 
 were distinguished from the other defenceless 
 classes by the high rewards which they had it 
 in their power voluntarily to bestow on those 
 who endeavoured to earn their favour, instead of 
 extorting their subjection. Though the practice of 
 chivalry fell even more sadly short of its theoretic 
 standard than practice generally falls below theory, 
 it remains one of the most precious monuments of 
 the moral history of our race ; as a remarkable in- 
 stance of a concerted and organized attempt by a 
 most disorganized and distracted society, to raise 
 up and carry into practice a moral ideal greatly 
 in advance of its social condition and institutions ; 
 so much so as to have been completely frustrated 
 in the main object, yet never entirely inefficacious, 
 and which has left a most sensible, and for the 
 most part a highly valuable impress on the ideas 
 and feelings of all subsequent times. 
 
 The chivalrous ideal is the acme of the 
 influence of women’s sentiments on the moral 
 cultivation of mankind : and if women are to 
 remain in their subordinate situation, it were 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 365 
 
 greatly to be lamented that tlie cliivalrons stan- 
 dard should have passed away^ for it is the only 
 one at all capable of mitigating the demoralizing 
 influences of that position. But the changes in 
 the general state of the species rendered inevi- 
 table the substitution of a totally different ideal of 
 morality for the chivalrous one. Chivalry was 
 the attempt to infuse moral elements into a state 
 of society in which everything depended for good 
 or evil on individual prowess^ under the softening 
 influences of individual delicacy and generosity. 
 In modern societies, all things, even in the military 
 department of affairs, are decided, not by indi- 
 vidual efi^ort, but by the combined operations of 
 numbers; while the main occupation of society 
 has changed from fighting to business, from mili- 
 tary to industrial life. The exigencies of the 
 new life are no more exclusive of the virtues of 
 generosity than those of the old, but it no 
 longer entirely depends on them. The main foun- 
 dations of the moral life of modern times must 
 be justice and prudence; the respect of each 
 for the rights of every other, and the ability 
 of each to take care of himself. Chivalry left 
 without legal check all forms of wrong which 
 reigned unpunished throughout society ; it only 
 encouraged a few to do right in preference to 
 wrong, by the direction it gave to the instruments 
 of praise and admiration. But the real depen- 
 
366 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 dence of morality must always be upon its penal 
 sanctions — its power to deter from evil. The 
 security of society cannot rest on merely rendering 
 honour to rights a motive so comparatively weak in 
 all but a few, and which on very many does not 
 operate at all. Modern society is able to repress 
 wrong through all departments of life, by a fit 
 exertion of the superior strength which civiliza- 
 tion has given it, and thus to render the exis- 
 tence of the weaker members of society (no 
 longer defenceless but protected by law) tole- 
 rable to them, without reliance on the chivalrous 
 feelings of those who are in a position to tyran- 
 nize. The beauties and graces of the chivalrous 
 character are still what they were, but the rights 
 of the weak, and the general comfort of human 
 life, now rest on a far surer and steadier support; 
 or rather, they do so in every relation of life 
 except the conjugal. 
 
 At present the moral influence of women is 
 no less real, but it is no longer of so marked 
 and definite a character : it has more nearly 
 merged in the general influence of public opinion. 
 Both through the contagion of sympathy, and 
 through the desire of men to shine in the eyes 
 of women, their feelings have great effect in 
 keeping alive what remains of the chivalrous 
 ideal — in fostering the sentiments and continuing 
 the traditions of spirit and generosity. In these 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 367 
 
 points of character^ their standard is higher than 
 that of men ; in the quality of justice, somewhat 
 lower. As regards the relations of private life 
 it may be said generally, that their influence is, 
 on the whole, encouraging to the softer virtues, 
 discouraging to the sterner : though the state- 
 ment must be taken with all the modifications 
 dependent on individual character. In the 
 chief of the greater trials to which virtue is 
 subject in the concerns of life — the conflict be- 
 tween interest and principle — the tendency of 
 women^s influence is of a very mixed character. 
 When the principle involved happens to be one 
 of the very few which the course of their reli- 
 gious or moral education has strongly impressed 
 upon themselves, they are potent auxiliaries to 
 virtue : and their husbands and sons are often 
 prompted by them to acts of abnegation which 
 they never would have been capable of without 
 that stimulus. But, with the present education 
 and position of women, the moral principles 
 which have been impressed on them cover but a 
 comparatively small part of the field of virtue, 
 and are, moreover, principally negative; forbid- 
 ding particular acts, but having little to do with 
 the general direction of the thoughts and pur- 
 poses. I am afraid it must be said, that disinte- 
 restedness in the general conduct of life — the 
 devotion of the energies to purposes which hold 
 
368 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 out no promise of private advantages to the 
 family — is very seldom encouraged or supported 
 by women^s influence. It is small blame to them 
 that they discourage objects of which they have 
 not learnt to see the advantage, and which with- 
 draw their men from them, and from the interests 
 of the family. But the consequence is that 
 women^s influence is often anything but favour- 
 able to public virtue. 
 
 Women have, however, some share of influence 
 in giving the tone to public moralities since their 
 sphere of action has been a little widened, and 
 since a considerable number of them have occupied 
 themselves practically in the promotion of objects 
 reaching beyond their own family and household. 
 The influence of women counts for a great deal 
 in two of the most marked features of modern 
 European life — its aversion to war, and its addic- 
 tion to philanthropy. Excellent characteristics 
 both j but unhappily, if the influence of women 
 is valuable in the encouragement it gives to these 
 feelings in general, in the particular applications 
 the direction it gives to them is at least as often 
 mischievous as useful. In the philanthropic de- 
 partment more particularly, the two provinces 
 chiefly cultivated by women are religious prose- 
 lytism and charity. Beligious p/oselytism at 
 home, is but another word for embittering of 
 religious animosities : abroad, it is usually a 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 369 
 
 blind running at an object, Mitbout either know- 
 ing or heeding the fatal mischiefs — fatal to the 
 religions object itself as well as to all other 
 desirable objects — ^which may be produced by the 
 means employed. As for charity, it is a matter 
 in which the immediate effect on the persons 
 directly concerned, and the ultimate consequence 
 to the general good, are apt to be at complete 
 war with one another : while the education given 
 to women — an education of the sentiments rather 
 than of the understanding — and the habit incul- 
 cated by their whole life, of looking to imme- 
 diate effects on persons, and not to remote effects 
 on classes of persons — make them both unable 
 to see, and unwilling to admit, the ultimate evil 
 tendency of any form of charity or philanthropy 
 which commends itself to their sympathetic feel- 
 ings. The great and continually increasing mass 
 of unenlightened and shortsighted benevolence, 
 which, taking the care of people^s lives out of 
 their own hands, and relieving them from the 
 disagreeable consequences of their own acts, saps 
 the very foundations of the self-respect, self-help, 
 and self-control which are the essential condi- 
 tions both of individual prosperity and of social 
 virtue — this waste of resources and of benevolent 
 feelings in doiug harm instead of good, is im- 
 mensely swelled by women^s contributions, and 
 stimulated by their influence. Not that this is 
 16 * 
 
370 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 a mistake likely to be made by women, where 
 they have actually the practical management of 
 schemes of beneficence. It sometimes happens 
 that women who administer public charities — with 
 that insight into present fact, and especially into 
 the minds and feelings of those with whom they 
 are in immediate contact, in which women gene- 
 rally excel men — recognise in the clearest manner 
 the demoralizing infiuence of the alms given or 
 the help afforded, and could give lessons on the 
 subject to many a male political economist. But 
 women who only give their money, and are not 
 brought face to face with the effects it produces, 
 how can they be expected to foresee them ? A 
 woman born to the present lot of women, and 
 content with it, how should she appreciate the 
 value of self-dependence? She is not self-de- 
 pendent; she is not taught self-dependence ; her 
 destiny is to receive everything from others, and 
 why should what is good enough for her be bad 
 for the poor ? Her familiar notions of good are 
 of blessings descending from a superior. She 
 forgets that she is not free, and that the poor 
 are ; that if what they need is given to them un- 
 earned, they cannot be compelled to earn it : that 
 everybody cannot be taken care of by everybody, 
 but there must be some motive to induce people 
 to take care of themselves ; and that to be helped 
 to help themselves, if they are physically capable 
 
THE SUBJEOTIOK OF WOMEN*. 
 
 371 
 
 of it^ is the only charity which proves to be 
 charity in the end. 
 
 These considerations shew how nsefully the 
 part which women take in the formation of 
 general opinion^ would be modified for the better 
 by that more enlarged instruction^ and practical 
 conversancy with the things which their opinions 
 influence^ that would necessarily arise from their 
 social and political emancipation. But the im- 
 provement it would work through the influence 
 they exercise^ each in her own family, would be 
 still more, remarkable. 
 
 It is often said that in the classes most ex- 
 posed to temptation, a man^s wife and children 
 tend to keep him honest and respectable, both by 
 the wife^s direct influence, and by the concern he 
 feels for their future welfare. This may be so, 
 and no doubt often is so, with those who are 
 more weak than wicked; and this beneficial in- 
 fluence would be preserved and strengthened 
 under equal laws ; it does not depend on the 
 woman'^s servitude, but is, on the contrary, dimi- 
 nished by the disrespect which the inferior class 
 of men always at heart feel towards those who 
 are subject to their power. But when we ascend 
 higher in the scale, we come among a totally 
 different set of moving forces. The wife^s in- 
 fluence tends, as far as it goes, to prevent the 
 husband from falling below the common standard 
 
372 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 of approbation of tbe country. It tends quite as 
 strongly to hinder him from rising above it. 
 The wife is the auxiliary of the common public 
 opinion. A man who is married to a woman 
 his inferior in intelligence^ finds her a perpetual 
 dead weighty or^ worse than a dead weighty a 
 drag^ upon every aspiration of his to be better 
 than public opinion requires him to be. It is 
 hardly possible for one who is in these bonds^ to 
 attain exalted virtue. If he differs in his opinion 
 from the mass — if he sees truths which have not 
 yet dawned upon them^ or if, feeling in his heart 
 truths which they nominally recognise^ he would 
 like to act up to those truths more conscien- 
 tiously than the generality of mankind — to all 
 such thoughts and desires^ marriage is the heaviest 
 of drawbacks^ unless he be so fortunate as to 
 have a wife as much above the common level as 
 he himself is. 
 
 Foi% in the first place^ there is always some 
 sacrifice of personal interest required ; either of 
 social consequence^ or of pecuniary means ; per- 
 haps the risk of even the means of subsistence. 
 These sacrifices and risks he may be willing to 
 encounter for himself; but he will pause before 
 he imposes them on his family. And his family 
 in this case means his wife and daughters ; for 
 he always hopes that his sons will feel as he feels 
 himself^ and that what he can do without, they 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 373 
 
 will do without, willingly, in the same cause. 
 But his daughters — their marriage may depend 
 upon it: and his wife, who is unable to enter 
 into or understand the objects for which these 
 sacrifices are made — who, if she thought them 
 worth any sacrifice, would think so on trust, and 
 solely for his sake — ^who can participate in none 
 of the enthusiasm or the self- approbation he 
 himself may feel, while the things which he is 
 disposed to sacrifice are all in all to her; will 
 not the best and most unselfish man hesitate 
 the longest before bringing on her this conse- 
 quence ? If it be not the comforts of life, but 
 only social consideration, that is at stake, the 
 burthen upon his conscience and feelings is still 
 very severe. Whoever has a wife and children 
 has given hostages to Mrs. Grundy. The appro- 
 bation of that potentate may be a matter of in- 
 diflFerence to him, but it is of great importance 
 to his wife. The man himself may be above 
 opinion, or may find sufficient compensation in 
 the opinion of those of his own way of thinking. 
 But to the women connected with him, he can 
 ofier no compensation. The almost invariable 
 tendency of the wife to place her infiuence in the 
 same scale with social consideration, is sometimes 
 made a reproach to women, and represented as 
 a peculiar trait of feebleness and childishness of 
 character in them : surely with great injustice. 
 
374 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 Society makes the whole life of a woman^ in the 
 easy classes, a continued self-sacrifice; it exacts 
 from her an unremitting restraint of the whole 
 of her natural inclinations, and the sole return it 
 makes to her for what often 'deserves the name 
 of a martyrdom, is consideration. Her conside- 
 ration is inseparably connected with that of her 
 husband, and after paying the full price for it, she 
 finds that she is to lose it, for no reason of which 
 she can feel the cogency. She has sacrificed her 
 whole life to it, and her husband will not sacri- 
 fice to it a whim, a freak, an eccentricity ; some- 
 thing not recognised or allowed for by the world, 
 and which the world will agree with her in 
 thinking a folly, if it thinks no worse ! The 
 dilemma is hardest upon that very meritorious 
 class of men, who, without possessing talents 
 which qualify them to make a figure among those 
 with whom they agree in opinion, hold their 
 opinion from conviction, and feel bound in 
 honour and conscience to serve it, by making 
 profession of their belief, and giving their time, 
 labour, and means, to anything undertaken in its 
 behalf. The worst case of all is when such men 
 happen to be of a rank and position which of 
 itself neither gives them, nor excludes them 
 from, what is considered the best society ; when 
 their admission to it depends mainly on what is 
 thought of them personally — and however unex- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 375 
 
 ceptionable their breeding and habits^ tbeir being 
 identified with opinions and public conduct un- 
 acceptable to those wlio give the tone to society 
 would operate as an effectual exclusion. Many 
 a woman flatters herself (nine times out of ten 
 quite erroneously) that nothing prevents her and 
 her husband from moving in the highest society 
 of her neighbourhood — society in which others 
 well known to her^ and in the same class of life^ 
 mix freely — except that her husband is unfortu- 
 nately a Dissenter^ or has the reputation of 
 mingling in low radical politics. That it is, she 
 thinks, which hinders George from getting a 
 commission or a place, Caroline from making an 
 advantageous match, and prevents her and her hus- 
 band from obtaining invitations, perhaps honours, 
 which, for aught she sees, they are as well entitled 
 to as some folks. With such an influence in 
 every house, either exerted actively, or operating 
 all the more powerfully for not being asserted, is 
 it any wonder that people in general are kept 
 down in that mediocrity of respectability which 
 is becoming a marked characteristic of modern 
 times ? 
 
 There is another very injurious aspect in which 
 the effect, not of women^s disabilities directly, but 
 of the broad line of difference which those dis- 
 abilities create between the education and cha- 
 racter of a woman and that of a man, requires to 
 
376 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 be considered. Nothing can be more unfavour^ 
 able to that union of thoughts and inclinations 
 which is the ideal of married life. Intimate 
 society between people radically dissimilar to one 
 another^ is an idle dream. Unlikeness may attract^ 
 but it is likeness which retains ; and in proportion 
 to the likeness is the suitability of the individuals 
 to give each other a happy life. While women 
 are so unlike men^ it is not wonderful that selfish 
 men should feel the need of arbitrary power in 
 their own hands^ to arrest in limine the life-long 
 conflict of inclinations^ by deciding every question 
 on the side of their own preference. When people 
 are extremely unlike^ there can be no real identity 
 of interest. Very often there is conscientious 
 difference of opinion between married people^ on 
 the highest points of duty. Is there any reality 
 in the marriage union where this takes place? 
 Yet it is not uncommon anywhere^ when the 
 woman has any earnestness of character ; and it 
 is a very general case indeed in Catholic countries, 
 when she is supported in her dissent by the only 
 other authority to which she is taught to bow, the 
 priest. With the usual barefacedness of power 
 not accustomed to find itself disputed, the in- 
 fluence of priests over women is attacked by Pro- 
 testant and Liberal writers, less for being bad in 
 itself, than because it is a rival authority to the 
 husband, and raises up a revolt against his infal- 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 377 
 
 fibility. In England^ similar differences occa* 
 sionally exist when an Evangelical wife has allied 
 herself with a husband of a diflPerent quality ; but 
 in general this source at least of dissension is got 
 rid of, by reducing the minds of women to such a 
 nullity^ that they have no opinions but those of 
 Mrs. Grundy, or those which the husband tells 
 them to have. When there is no difference of 
 opinion, differences merely of taste may be suffi- 
 cient to detract greatly from the happiness of 
 married life. And though it may stimulate the 
 amatory propensities of men, it does not conduce 
 to married happiness, to exaggerate by differences 
 of education whatever may be the native diffe- 
 rences of the sexes. If the married pair are 
 well-bred and well-behaved people, they tolerate 
 each other^s tastes ; but is mutual toleration what 
 people look forward to, when they enter into 
 marriage ? These differences of inclination will 
 naturally make their wishes different, if not 
 restrained by affection or duty, as to almost all 
 domestic questions which arise. What a diffe- 
 rence there must be in the society which the two 
 persons will wish to frequent, or be frequented 
 by ! Each will desire associates who share their 
 own tastes : the persons agreeable to one, will be 
 indifferent or positively disagreeable to the other ; 
 yet there can be none who are not common to 
 both, for married people do not now live in dif- 
 
378 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 ferent parts of the house and have totally diffe* 
 rent visiting lists^ as in the reign of Louis XV. 
 They cannot help having different wishes as to 
 the bringing up of the children : each will wish to 
 see reproduced in them their own tastes and senti- 
 ments : and there is either a compromise, and only 
 a half-satisfaction to either, or the wife has to 
 yield — often with bitter suffering ; and, with or 
 without intention, her occult influence continues 
 to counterwork the husband^s purposes. 
 
 It would of course be extreme folly to suppose 
 that these differences of feeling and inclination 
 only exist because women are brought up diffe- 
 rently from men, and that there would not be 
 differences of taste under any imaginable circum- 
 stances. But there is nothing beyond the mark 
 in saying that the distinction in bringing-up 
 immensely aggravates those differences, and 
 renders them wholly inevitable. While women 
 are brought up as they are, a man and a woman 
 will but rarely find i"" one another real agree- 
 ment of tastes and wishes as to daily life. They 
 will generally have to give it up as hopeless, and 
 renounce the attempt to have, in the intimate 
 associate of their daily life, that idem velle, idem 
 nolle, which is the recognised bond of any society 
 that is really such : or if the man succeeds in 
 obtaining it, he does so by choosing a woman 
 who is so complete a nullity that she has no 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 379 
 
 vielle or nolle at all^ and is as ready to comply 
 with one thing as another if anybody tells her to 
 do so. Even this calculation is apt to fail ; dul- 
 ness and want of spirit are not always a guarantee 
 of the submission which is so confidently expected 
 from them. But if they were^ is this the ideal 
 of marriage? What^ in this case^ does the man 
 obtain by it^ except an upper servant^ a nurse^ 
 or a mistress? On the contrary^ when each 
 of two persons^ instead of being a nothings is 
 a something; when they are attached to one 
 another^ and are not too much unlike to begin 
 with ; the constant partaking in the same things, 
 assisted by their sympathy^ draws out the latent 
 capacities of each for being interested in the 
 things which were at first interesting only to the 
 other; and works a gradual assimilation of the 
 tastes and characters to one. another^ partly by 
 the insensible modification of each^ but more by 
 a real enriching of the two natures, each ac- 
 quiring the tastes and capacities of the other in 
 addition to its own. This often happens between 
 two friends of the same sex^ who are much asso- 
 ciated in their daily life : and it would be a 
 common^ if not the commonest, case in marriage, 
 did not the totally diflferent bringing-up of the 
 two sexes make it next to an impossibility to 
 form a really well- assorted union. Were this 
 remedied, whatever differences there might still 
 
380 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 be in individual tastes^ there would at least be, 
 as a general rule, complete unity and unanimity as 
 to the great objects of life. When the two per- 
 sons both care for great objects, and are a help 
 and encouragement to each other in whatever 
 regards these, the minor matters on which their 
 tastes may differ are not all-important to them ; 
 and there is a foundation for solid friendship, of 
 an enduring character, more likely than anything 
 else to make it, through the whole of life, a greater 
 pleasure to each to give pleasure to the other, 
 than to receive it. 
 
 I have considered, thus far, the effects on the 
 pleasures and benefits of the marriage union which 
 depend on the mere unlikeness between the wife 
 and the husband : but the evil tendency is pro- 
 digiously aggravated when the unlikeness is in- 
 feriority. Mere unlikeness, when it only means 
 difference of good qualities, may be more a 
 benefit in the way of mutual improvement, than 
 a drawback from comfort. When each emulates, 
 and desires and endeavours to acquire, the other^’s 
 peculiar qualities, the difference does not produce 
 diversity of interest, but increased identity of it, 
 and makes each still more valuable to the other. 
 But when one is much the inferior of the two in 
 mental ability and cultivation, and is not actively 
 attempting by the other^s aid to rise to the other^s 
 level, the whole influence of the connexion upon 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 381 
 
 the development of the superior of the two u 
 deteriorating : and still more so in a tolerably 
 happy marriage than in an unhappy one. It is 
 not with impunity that the superior in intelleet 
 shuts himself up with an inferior^ and elects 
 that inferior for his chosen^ and sole completely 
 intimate^ associate. Any society which is not im- 
 proving^ is deteriorating : and the more so^ the 
 closer and more familiar it is. Even ^ really 
 superior man almost always begins to deteriorate 
 when he is habitually (as the phrase is) king of his 
 company : and in his most habitual company the 
 husband who has a wife inferior to him is always so. 
 While his self-satisfaction is incessantly ministered 
 to on the one hand^ on the other he insensibly 
 imbibes the modes of feelings and of looking at 
 things^ which belong to a more vulgar or a more 
 limited mind than his own. This evil difiers 
 from many of those which have hitherto been 
 dwelt on, by being an increasing one. The 
 association of men with women in daily life is 
 much closer and more complete than it ever was 
 before. Men’s life is more domestic. Formerly, 
 their pleasures and chosen occupations were 
 among men, and in mefos company : their wives 
 had but a fragment of their lives. At the present 
 time, the progress of civilization, and the turn of 
 opinion against the rough amusements and con- 
 vivial excesses which formerly occupied most men 
 
382 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 in their hours of relaxation — together with (it 
 must be said) the improved tone of modern feel- 
 ing as to the reciprocity of duty which binds 
 the husband towards the wife — have thrown the 
 man very much more upon home and its inmates, 
 for his personal and social pleasures : while the 
 kind and degree of improvement which has been 
 made in women^s education, has made them in 
 some degree capable of being his companions in 
 ideas and mental tastes, while leaving them, in 
 most cases, still hopelessly inferior to him. His 
 desire of mental communion is thus in general 
 satisfied by a communion from which he learns 
 nothing. An unimproving and unstimulating 
 companionship is substituted for (what he might 
 otherwise have been obliged to seek) the society 
 of his equals in powers and his fellows in the 
 higher pursuits. We see, accordingly, that young 
 men of the greatest promise generally cease to 
 improve as soon as they marry, and, not im- 
 proving, inevitably degenerate. If the wife does 
 not push the husband forward, she always holds 
 him back. He ceases to care for what she does 
 not care for; he no longer desires, and ends by 
 disliking and shunning, society congenial to his 
 former aspirations, and which would now shame 
 his falling-oft‘ from them ; his higher faculties 
 both of mind and heart cease to be called into acti- 
 vity. And this change coinciding with the new and 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 383 
 
 tselfish interests wtich are created by the family, 
 after a few years he differs in no material respect 
 from those who have never had wishes for any. 
 thing but the common vanities and the common 
 pecuniary objects. 
 
 What marriage may be in the case of two 
 persons of cultivated faculties^ identical in opi- 
 nions and purposes^ between whom there exists 
 that best kind of equality^ similarity of powers 
 and capacities with reciprocal superiority in them 
 — so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up 
 to the other^ and can have alternately the pleasure 
 of leading and of being led in the path of develop- 
 ment — I will not attempt to describe. To those 
 who can conceive it, there is no need ; to those 
 who cannot, it would appear the dream of an 
 enthusiast. But I maintain, with the profoundest 
 conviction, that this, and this only, is the ideal of 
 marriage ; and that all opinions, customs, and in- 
 stitutions which favour any other notion of it, or 
 turn the conceptions and aspirations connected 
 with it into any other direction, by whatever pre- 
 tences they may be coloured, are relics of primitive 
 barbarism. The moral regeneration of mankind 
 will only really commence, when the most funda- 
 mental of the social relations is placed under the 
 rule of equal justice, and when human beings 
 learn to cultivate their strongest sympathy with 
 an equal in rights and in cultivation. 
 
384 
 
 TilE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 Tims far^ the benefits which it has appeared 
 that the world would gain by ceasing to mak® 
 sex a disqualification for privileges and a badge 
 of subjection^ are social rather than individual ; 
 consisting in an increase of the general fund of 
 thinking and acting power^ and an improvement 
 in the general conditions of the association of 
 men with women. But it would be a grievous 
 understatement of the case to omit the most 
 direct benefit of all^ the unspeakable gain in 
 private happiness to the liberated half of the 
 species ; the difference to them between a life of 
 subjection to the will of others^ and a life of 
 rational freedom. After the primary necessities 
 of food and raiment^ freedom is the first and 
 strongest want of human nature. While man- 
 kind are lawless^ their desire is for lawless free- 
 dom. When they have learnt to understand the 
 meaning of duty and the value of reason^ they 
 incline more and more to be guided and restrained 
 by these in the exercise of their freedom ; but 
 they do not therefore desire freedom less ; they 
 do not become disposed to accept the will of 
 other people as the representative and inter- 
 preter of those guiding principles. On the con- 
 trary, the communities in which the reason has 
 been most cultivated, and in which the idea of 
 social duty has been most powerfid, are those 
 which have most strongly asserted the freedom 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 385 
 
 of action of the individual — the liberty of each to 
 govern his conduct by his own feelings of duty, 
 and by such laws and social restraints as his own 
 conscience can subscribe to. 
 
 He who would rightly appreciate the worth of 
 personal independence as an element of happi- 
 ness, should consider the value he himself puts 
 upon it as an ingredient of his own. There is no 
 subject on which there is a greater habitual diffe- 
 rence of judgment between a man judging for 
 himself, and the same man judging for other 
 people. When he hears others complaining that 
 they are not allowed freedom of action — that their 
 own will has not sufficient influence in the regu- 
 lation of their affairs — his inclination is, to ask, 
 what are their grievances ? what positive damage 
 they sustain? and in what respect they consider 
 their affairs to be mismanaged ? and if they fail 
 to make out, in answer to these questions, what 
 appears to him a sufficient case, he turns a deaf 
 ear, and regards their complaint as the fanciful 
 querulousness of people whom nothing reasonable 
 will satisfy. But he has a quite different standard 
 of judgment when he is deciding for himself. 
 Then, the most unexceptionable administration of 
 his interests by a tutor set over him, does not 
 satisfy his feelings : his personal exclusion from 
 the deciding authority appears itself the greatest 
 grievance of all, rendering it superfluous even to 
 17 
 
380 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 enter into the question of mismanagement. It is 
 the same with nations. What citizen of a free 
 country would listen to any offers of good and 
 slulful administration^ in return for the abdica- 
 tion of freedom ? Even if he cculd believe that 
 good and skilful administration can exist among 
 a people ruled by a Avill not their own, would 
 not the consciousness of working out their 
 own destiny under their own moral respon- 
 sibility be a compensation to his feelings for 
 great rudeness and imperfection in the details of 
 public affairs? Let him rest assured that what- 
 ever he feels on this point, women feel in a fully 
 equal degree. Whatever has been said or written, 
 from the time of Herodotus to the present, of the 
 ennobling influence of free government — the nerve 
 and spring which it gives to all the faculties, the 
 larger and higher objects which it presents to the 
 intellect and feelings, the more unselfish public 
 spirit, and calmer and broader views of duty, 
 that it engenders, and the generally loftier plat- 
 form on which it elevates the individual as a moral, 
 spiritual, and social being — is every particle 
 as true of women as of men. Are these things 
 no important part of individual happiness ? Let 
 any man call to mind what he himself felt on 
 emerging from boyhood — from the tutelage and 
 control of even loved and aflectionate elders — and 
 entering upon the responsibihties of manhood# 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 387 
 
 Was it not like the physical effect of taking off a 
 heavy weighty or releasing him from obstmetive^ 
 even if not otherwise painful, bonds ? Did he 
 not feel twice as much alive, twice as much a 
 human being, as before ? And does he imagine 
 that women have none of these feelings ? But it 
 is a striking fact, that the satisfactions and 
 mortifications of personal pride, though all in all 
 to most men when the case is their own, have 
 less allowance made for them in the case of other 
 people, and are less listened to as a ground or a 
 justification of conduct, than any other natural 
 human feelings ; perhaps because men compliment 
 them in their own case with the names of so 
 many other qualities, that they are seldom 
 coTiscious how mighty an influence these feelings 
 exercise in their own lives. No less large and 
 powerful is their part, we may assure ourselves, in 
 the lives and feelii-gs of women. Women are 
 schooled into suppressing them in their most 
 natural and most healthy direction, but the in- 
 ternal principle remains, in a different outward 
 form. An active and energetic mind, if denied 
 liberty, will seek for power : refused the com- 
 mand of itself, it will assert its personality by 
 attempting to control others. To allow to any 
 human beings no existence of their own but 
 what depends on others, is giving far too 
 high a premium on bending others to their pur- 
 
3SS 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 poses. Where liberty cannot be hoped for, and 
 power can^ power becomes the grand object of 
 human desire ; those to whom others will not 
 leave the undisturbed management of their own 
 affairs^ will compensate themselves^ if they can^ by 
 meddling for their own purposes with the affairs 
 of others. Hence also women^s passion for per- 
 sonal beauty,, and dress and display ; and all the 
 evils that flow from it^ in the way of mischievous 
 luxury and social immorality. The love of power 
 and the love of liberty are in eternal antagonism. 
 Where there is least liberty^ the passion for power 
 is the most ardent and unscrupulous. The desire 
 of power over others can only cease to be a de- 
 praving agency among mankind,, when each of 
 them individually is able to do without it ; which 
 can only be w^here respect for liberty in the per- 
 sonal concerns of each is an established principle. 
 
 But it is not only through the sentiment of 
 personal dignity^ that the free direction and dis- 
 posal of their own faculties is a source of indi- 
 vidual happiness, and tobe fettered and restricted in 
 it,, a source of unhappiness^ to human beings^ and 
 not least to women. There is nothing, after disease, 
 indigence, and guilt, so fatal to the pleasurable 
 enjoyment of life as the want of a worthy outlet 
 for the active faculties. Women who have the 
 cares of a family, and while they have the cares 
 of a family, have this outlet, and it generally 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 389 
 
 suffices for them : but what of the greatly in- 
 creasing number of women, who have had no 
 opportunity of exercising the vocation which 
 they are mocked by telling them is their proper 
 one ? What of the women whose children have 
 been lost to them by death or distance^ or have 
 grown up, married, and formed homes of their 
 own? There are abundant examples of men 
 who, after a life engrossed by business, retire with 
 a competency to the enjoyment, as they hope, of 
 rest, but to whom, as they are unable to acquire 
 new interests and excitements that can replace 
 the old, the change to a life of inactivity brings 
 ennui, melancholy, and premature death. Yet 
 no one thinks of the parallel case of so many 
 worthy and devoted women, who, having paid what 
 they are told is their debt to society — having 
 brought up a family blamelessly to manhood and 
 womanhood — having kept a house as long as they 
 had a house needing to be kept — are deserted by 
 the sole occupation for which they have fitted 
 themselves ; and remain with undiminished activity 
 but with no employment for it, unless perhaps a 
 daughter or daughter-in-law is willing to abdicate 
 in their favour the discharge of the same func- 
 tions in her younger household. Surely a hard 
 lot for the old age of those who have worthily 
 discharged, as long as it was given to them to 
 discharge, what the world accounts their only 
 
390 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 social duty. Of such women, and of those others 
 to whom this duty has not been committed at 
 all — many of whom pine through life with the 
 consciousness of thwarted vocations, and acti- 
 vities which are not suffered to expand — the 
 only resources, speaking generally, are religion 
 and charity. But their religion, though it may 
 be one of feeling, and of ceremonial observance, 
 cannot be a religion of action, unless in the 
 form of charity. For charity many of them are 
 by nature admirably fitted ; but to practise it 
 usefully, or even without doing mischief, requires 
 the education, the manifold preparation, the know- 
 ledge and the thinking powers, of a skilful ad- 
 ministrator. There are few of the administrative 
 funetions of government for whieh a person would 
 not be fit, who is fit to bestow charity usefully. 
 In this as in other cases (pre-eminently in that 
 of the education of children), the duties per- 
 mitted to women cannot be performed properly, 
 without their being trained for duties whieh, to 
 the great loss of society, are not permitted to 
 them. And here let me notice the singular way 
 in which the question of women’s disabilities is 
 frequently presented to view, by those who find 
 it easier to draw a ludicrous picture of what they 
 do not like, than to answer the arguments for it. 
 When it is suggested that womeu^s executive 
 capacities and prudent counsels might sometimes 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 391 
 
 be found valuable in affairs of state, these lovers 
 of fun hold up to the ridicule of the world, as 
 sitting in parliament or in the cabinet, girls in 
 their teens, or young wives of two or three and 
 twenty, transported bodily, exactly as they are, 
 from the drawing-room to the House of Com- 
 mons. They forget that males are not usually 
 selected at this early age for a seat in Par- 
 liament, or for responsible political functions. 
 Common sense would tell them that if such 
 trusts were confided to women, it would be 
 to such as having no special vocation for mar- 
 ried life, or preferring another employment of 
 their faculties (as many women even now prefer 
 to marriage some of the few honourable occupa- 
 tions within their reach), have spent the best 
 years of their youth in attempting to qualify 
 themselves for the pursuits in which they desire 
 to engage; or still more frequently perhaps, 
 widows or wives of forty or fifty, by whom the 
 knowledge of life and faculty of government 
 which they have acquired in their families, could 
 by the aid of appropriate studies be made avail- 
 able on a less contracted scale. There is no 
 country of Europe in which the ablest men have 
 not frequently experienced, and keenly appreciated, 
 the value of the advice and help of clever and 
 experienced women of the world, in the attain- 
 ment both of private and of public objects ; and 
 
392 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 there are important matters of public administra* 
 tion to which few men are equally competent 
 with such women ; among others^ the detailed 
 control of expenditure. But what we are now 
 discussing is not the need which society has of 
 the services of women in public business, but the 
 dull and hopeless life to which it so often con- 
 demns them, by forbidding them to exercise the 
 practical abilities which many of them are con- 
 scious of, in any wider field than one which to 
 some of them never was, and to others is no 
 longer, open. If there is anything vitally im- 
 portant to the happiness of human beings, it is 
 that they should relish their habitual pursuit. 
 This requisite of an enjoyable life is very imper- 
 fectly granted, or altogether denied, to a large 
 part of mankind ; and by its absence many a life 
 is a failure, which is provided, in appearance, with 
 every requisite of success. But if circumstances 
 which society is not yet skilful enough to over- 
 come, render such failures often for the present 
 inevitable, society need not itself inflict them. 
 The injudiciousness of parents, a youtVs own 
 inexperience, or the absence of external oppor- 
 tunities for the congenial vocation, and their 
 presence for an uncongenial, condemn numbers 
 of men to pass their lives in doing one thing reluc- 
 tantly and ill, when there are other things which 
 they could have done well and happily. But on 
 
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 393 
 
 women tliis sentence is imposed by actual law, 
 and by customs equivalent to law. Wliat, in 
 unenlightened societies, colour, race, religion, or 
 in the case of a conquered country, nationality, 
 are to some men, sex is to all women ; a 
 peremptory exclusion from almost all honourable 
 occupations, but either such as cannot be fulfilled 
 by others, or such as those others do not think 
 worthy of their acceptance. Sufferings arising 
 from causes of this nature usually meet with so 
 little sympathy, that few persons are aware of the 
 great amount of unhappiness even noY/ pro- 
 duced by the feeling of a wasted life. The case 
 will be even more frequent, as increased cultiva- 
 tion creates a greater and greater disproportion 
 between the ideas and faculties of women, and 
 the scope which society allows to their activity. 
 
 When we consider the positive evil caused to 
 the disqualified half of the human race by their 
 disqualification — first in the loss of the most in- 
 spiriting and elevating kind of personal enjoy- 
 ment, and next in the weariness, disappointment, 
 and profound dissatisfaction with life, which are 
 so often the substitute for it ; one feels that 
 among all the lessons which men require for 
 carrying on the struggle against the inevitable 
 imperfections of their lot on earth, there is no 
 lesson which they more need, than not to add to 
 the evils which nature inflicts, by their jealous 
 17 * 
 
394 
 
 THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN. 
 
 and prejudiced restrictions on one another. 
 Their vain fears only substitute other and worse 
 evils for those which they are idly apprehensive 
 of: while every restraint on the freedom of 
 conduct of any of their human fellow creatures, 
 (otherwise than by making them responsible for 
 any evil actually caused by it), dries up pro tanto 
 the principal fountain of human happiness, and 
 leaves the species less rich, to an inappreciable 
 degree, in all that makes life valuable to the 
 individual human being. 
 
 THE END, 
 
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