THE H008AC TUNNEL 
 
 OUR FINANCIAL MAELSTROM. 
 
 By F. W . BIRD. 
 
 “ Beyond the lowest depth , a lower deep.” 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 WRIGHT & POTTER, PRINTERS, No. 4 SPRING LANE. 
 
 1 8 6 6 . 
 
T T 5 t-Sk 
 
 c-A x - 
 
 THE HOOSAC TUNNEL. 
 
 Before discussing the management and condition of the 
 Hoosac Tunnel, and the policy and duty of the State, we present 
 a brief historical sketch of the legislation relating to the 
 enterprise. We shall see how it commenced as an ordinary and 
 harmless railroad corporation, asking only, in the language of 
 the petitioners to the legislature of 1848 in aid of the enterprise, 
 “ for the privilege of building their own road with their own 
 money next, it asked a loan of the State credit for two millions 
 of dollars, accompanying the petition with the most positive and 
 confident assurances that, with that assistance, the friends of 
 the work could and would furnish abundant means to complete 
 it; and asking only that the scrip should be delivered in instal¬ 
 ments, as the work progressed, so that the last instalment 
 should not be delivered till the work was finished ; next, asking 
 a modification of those conditions more favorable to the projec¬ 
 tors ; next, asking of the State, with other favors, as advance or 
 gratuity or both, some four hundred thousand dollars ; at every 
 successive step more and more confident that with the help 
 asked at that time, the work could be completed ; and proving 
 this every time to the satisfaction of packed committees, and 
 deceived legislatures, until at length the scheme was saddled 
 upon the State treasury, with less than one one-tenth of 
 the actual work done at a cost already nearly equal to the 
 , original estimates for the entire work. Let these facts be 
 borne in mind that we may know what, confidence can be 
 Q placed in the statements of the same parties as to the condition, 
 £ or in their estimates as to the cost of the completion of the 
 ^ work. 
 
 The Troy and Greenfield Railroad Company was chartered in 
 1848. The petitioners asked for an ordinary charter, simply 
 for the privilege, to use their own language, of “ building their 
 
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4 
 
 own road with their own money.” The majority of the com¬ 
 mittee reported adversely ; but the minority reported favorably, 
 placing the claims solely on the ground of the necessity for 
 additional railroad accommodations for the western part of 
 Franklin County, and the northern part of Berkshire County, 
 and that the people of that section of the State were entitled 
 to the same facilities for building a railroad as had been granted 
 to other sections of the State. The estimated cost was $3,500,000, 
 and the petitioners proved (!) that the entire road from Troy to 
 Greenfield (exclusive of the tunnel,) would be built in eigh¬ 
 teen months, and the tunnel itself, without any shafts, in fifteen 
 hundred and fifty-six days, just five years. Three years after, 
 in 1851, the corporation applied to the legislature for a loan of 
 the State credit for two millions of dollars. Instead of having 
 road and tunnel completed, they stated at that time, that 
 “ three hundred thousand dollars have been subscribed to the 
 capital stock, and about three thousand dollars paid in. The 
 work of construction has been commenced in the present 
 month, but little has been done—nothing completed.” The 
 committee reported a Bill which passed the Senate but was 
 defeated in the House. 
 
 In 1853, the application for a loan was renewed ; a majority 
 of the committee reported favorably. The Bill passed the 
 House, but was defeated in the Senate. The amount of stock 
 paid in at this time was $88,831. 
 
 In 1854 the application was renewed, and was successful. 
 The Bill was based upon the representation of the petitioners 
 that the whole cost was to be between three and a half and four 
 millions; the State was to furnish the two millions to build 
 the tunnel, estimated by their engineer to cost about two 
 millions, and the corporation was to furnish the balance neces¬ 
 sary to finish the road, the whole to be mortgaged to the State 
 as security for its advances, and “ the different portions of the 
 road and sections of the tunnel to be advanced together.” At 
 this time the amount of capital stock paid in was ninety-four 
 thousand dollars. Soon after the passage of this Act, desperate 
 appeals were made for subscriptions to the capital stock, the 
 result of which appears in their annual report, made in 1856, 
 giving the amount of capital stock paid in as $121,412, showing 
 
5 
 
 an addition of $27,412 to the amount of stock paid in during 
 two years. 
 
 In 1855 an Act was passed authorizing certain towns on the 
 line to subscribe three per cent, on their valuation respectively 
 to the capital stock. If all the towns had subscribed the full 
 amount, it would have given $259,283. The amount actually 
 paid in was $125,000. 
 
 In 1856 they asked the legislature to subscribe for $150,000 
 of the stock. The proposition was rejected in the House by a 
 vote of 83 to 192. 
 
 In 1857, an Act modifying the provisions of the Loan Act 
 passed both branches, but was vetoed by Governor Gardner, 
 passed in the House over the veto, but failed of a two-thirds 
 vote in the Senate. This year the parties abandoned the idea 
 of a local road, and for the first time raised the cry of a great 
 commercial road, which was to pour the wealth of the West into 
 Massachusetts and Boston. 
 
 In 1859 another modification of the Loan Act making still 
 further concessions to the corporation was passed, but during 
 this year very little was done. 
 
 Up to this time the legislature had adhered firmly to the 
 policy of the original Loan Act, which was, that the advances 
 by the State should be made pari passu with the progress of 
 the work, requiring bona fide subscriptions to the amount of 
 $600,000, with other conditions furnishing something like 
 security that the work should be completed before the whole 
 amount of the loan was advanced. 
 
 The Act of 1860 took a long step downwards. It released 
 the corporation from the $600,000 subscription, (up to this 
 time they had actually raised in cash, according to Mr. Kim¬ 
 ball’s report,—House Doc. No. 185, 1860,—$66,058.28 !) and 
 made other concessions to the corporation ; but the legislature 
 still adhered to conditions which, if they had been honestly 
 interpreted, would have secured deliveries of the scrip in pro¬ 
 portion to the work done , and the delivery of the last scrip only 
 when the work was completed. Unfortunately for the State, 
 the governor at that time, and the State engineers appointed 
 by him, adopted the constructions put upon the Act by the 
 contractor, (Herman Ilaupt,) the result of which would have 
 been that the whole amount of State scrip would have been 
 
6 
 
 delivered before the road and tunnel were half completed . In 
 May, 1861, William S. Whitwell was appointed State engineer, 
 and adopted the only fair and honest construction of the Act. 
 The result was, that in the summer of 1861, the contractor 
 abandoned the work. 
 
 The action of the executive council of that year shows, 
 strikingly and sadly, how completely, for the previous three 
 years, the tunnel had dominated the legislative and executive 
 departments of the State. (See Appendix A.) 
 
 Legislation of 1862. 
 
 We come now to the most extraordinary of the acts in this 
 wretched drama. Mr. Haupt could not go on under Mr. 
 WhitwelFs construction of the Act of 1860, and the corporation 
 nominally, Mr. Haupt really, came to the legislature of 1862, 
 asking additional favors. As usual, a committee was packed in 
 his favor, and reported all he asked. Among other things, they 
 recommended the payment of $150,000 to the corporation, 
 (Haupt was the corporation,) in reality, to pay Haupt’s debts, 
 on account of alleged injustice done to him in the construction 
 put by Mr. Whitwell upon the Act of 1860. The bill was 
 defeated. Then occurred the most remarkable trick of legisla¬ 
 tive legerdemain ever performed, I think — at least, in this 
 State. 
 
 The farce of a hearing had been played before the committee 
 on this subject. A few gentlemen appeared before the com¬ 
 mittee for the purpose of aiding in investigating the condition 
 and character of the enterprise. It was very soon found that 
 the conclusions of the committee were already foregone. With 
 perhaps a single exception, the committee was completely con¬ 
 trolled by the tunnel interest, or rather by Mr. Haupt. Indeed, 
 so perfectly did he dominate the committee that, at first, the 
 chairman habitually refused to allow us to open any matter 
 without his consent. The result was what we expected—a 
 unanimous report, giving Mr. Haupt all he demanded. Pre¬ 
 cluded from any expression of facts through a minority report, 
 we were forced to make our appeal to the legislature through 
 other channels. 
 
 The report of the committee proceeded upon the assumption 
 that Mr. Haupt had been wronged by Governor Andrew and 
 
7 
 
 the State engineer, and their whole purpose was to give him 
 redress. Accordingly, they recommended the payment, (nom¬ 
 inally to the corporation, really to Haupt,) of $150,000 and 
 an advance of $195,000, for work to be done, and, also, the 
 payment to him of all sums he should expend for machinery, 
 Ac., (including pneumatic drills, <fcc., &c.!) The bill was 
 reported on the 24th of March. Various substitutes, amend¬ 
 ments, &c., were proposed. Among these was one offered 
 by Mr. Swan, of Norfolk, proposing the appointment of com¬ 
 missioners to investigate the whole matter of the tunnel, and 
 report to the next legislature. Another section required the 
 attorney-general to take possession of the railroad under 
 the mortgages to the State. Another authorized the governor 
 and council to finish the railroad from Greenfield to the moun¬ 
 tain. The latter provision was considered of no practical 
 importance as, first, it was not considered possible that the gov¬ 
 ernor and council could do so foolish a thing as authorize the 
 building of a railroad into a cul-de-sac , with no prospect of its 
 being wanted for a through line for ten years ; and second, the 
 rails were all bought and paid for, the road was said to be very 
 nearly finished, and such glowing accounts had been given of 
 the local business, that it was supposed that the traffic would 
 partially, perhaps wholly, pay the interest on the trifling addi¬ 
 tional cost of completing the road. How we were humbugged 
 in this matter, as well as in all others, the sequel will show. 
 
 After a protracted fight, in which all the log-rolling tactics, 
 so long successful, were brought into action, and after full dis¬ 
 cussion, on the 21st of April, Mr. Swan’s substitute was 
 adopted by a vote of 18 to 17. This result was regarded by 
 the plunderers as a Waterloo defeat,—for all was lost, even 
 honor. 
 
 The next morning, an act of inexplicable stupidity, or tim¬ 
 idity, robbed us of all the fruits of the hard-won victory. Mr. 
 Plunkett, of Pittsfield, moved to recommit the bill to a special 
 committee of the Senate ! We had the winning cards in our 
 hands. Several senators, who had voted against Mr. Swan’s 
 bill under pledges the day before, would thenceforth, it was 
 well known, support this bill. But—under what influences I 
 know not—perhaps when the secrets of the club-room at the 
 
8 
 
 United States hotel are revealed, we shall know—the fatal 
 motion was made. We protested—but it was too late. 
 
 No, it was not entirely too late. By long-settled parliament¬ 
 ary rule, the bill was entitled to have a majority of its friends 
 on the committee. Through an excess of courtesy, which 
 aimed to represent all parties on the committee, the President 
 of the Senate placed on the committee two friends of the bill— 
 Messrs. Plunkett, (his motion made him at least a doubtful 
 friend,) and Swan; two opponents, Messrs. Crocker and Rich¬ 
 ardson ; and, for the fifth, Mr. Williams, of Worcester. This 
 gentleman had introduced a substitute, which was ostensibly 
 opposed by the tunnelites proper, as strenuously as Mr. Swan’s 
 bill, and he was supposed to occupy a position of neutrality. 
 We had not learned then, what we afterwards discovered to 
 our sorrow, that there was no more unconditional tunnel man 
 in the Senate than he.* 
 
 In the afternoon of the same day, the committee reported a 
 new bill, substantially as it finally passed. The two tunnel 
 men, Messrs. Crocker and Richardson, refused to join in the 
 report! It was afterwards found that they had got more than 
 they had dreamed of asking. The most important change in. 
 the bill as originally reported was, that no portion of the road 
 should be constructed “ without the approval of the governor 
 and council.” This restriction was in Mr. Swan’s bill, but was 
 not in Mr. Williams’ substitute, nor in the bill reported by the 
 special committee, but was afterwards inserted. This amend¬ 
 ment prevented the supreme folly of building the road on the 
 contractor’s wretched location, as Mr. Brooks would have done 
 without this restriction, and thus saved the State a million or 
 so of dollars, and the discredit of building a road entirely 
 unfitted for a great traffic, and which would ultimately have 
 been abandoned. 
 
 The Bill passed to be engrossed in the Senate on the 23d, 
 
 * We did not then know of the existence of a disturbing element in the 
 shape of that phantom railroad corporation, the Worcester, Barre, and Gard¬ 
 ner Railroad, the design of which is to tap the Vermont and Massachusetts 
 Railroad at Gardner, and bring all the tunnel traffic through Worcester to the 
 Boston and Worcester railroad. Atrocious as is the bad faith of this scheme 
 towards Fitchburg and the Fitchburg Railroad, it answered its purpose ; and, 
 without alienating the allies it was designed to cheat, it brought to the aid of 
 the tunnel a reserve which alone turned the tide of battle against us. 
 
9 
 
 ( nem . dis .), was taken up in the House on the 24th, and after 
 a very brief discussion, and the adoption of amendments, was 
 passed and sent back to the Senate. On the 25th the House 
 amendments were concurred in, the tunnel men voting solid 
 against them, including all the leaders, Messrs. Crocker, Gris¬ 
 wold, Richardson, Smith, Stevens, and Williams. 
 
 Up to this time, the substantial victory was with us. 1st. 
 We had taken steps to rescue the enterprise from the utterly 
 bankrupt and powerless corporation which had ceased to 
 exist. 2d. We had defeated the attempt to swindle the State 
 out of three or four hundred thousand dollars, and had ousted 
 Mr. Haupt from all connection with the enterprise. 3d. We 
 had secured the appointment of commissioners by Governor 
 Andrew , (the Act required that they should be “ able, impar¬ 
 tial , and skilful,”) to make a thorough investigation of the 
 whole matter; and though the Act did not require that 
 they should report “ to the next legislature,” we knew full well 
 that such a commission could not report before another legisla¬ 
 ture should meet. 4th. Although the Act nominally seemed to 
 contemplate the prosecution of the work on the road and tunnel 
 by the State, yet it made such prosecution subject, in both cases, 
 “ to the approval of the governor and council; ” and as it was 
 well known that for the last eleven months Governor Andrew 
 had been the object of the bitterest and most unsparing hostility 
 from the tunnelites proper, and as the universal impression 
 entertained by his most intimate friends, was that he was 
 opposed to the tunnel, the argument addressed to the opponents 
 of the tunnel “ Are you afraid to trust this matter with Gover¬ 
 nor Andrew ? ” was unanswerable. 5th. Although the Act con¬ 
 tained provisions for the payment of certain claims which it was 
 well known, were intended to cover Mr. Haupt’s debts, yet it 
 expressly limited the payment to “ just claims ; ” and as we did 
 not for a moment dream that this would be interpreted to mean 
 anything but “just claims” against the State, and as this too 
 was under the control of the governor and council, it was con¬ 
 sidered an entirely harmless provision. Under these considera¬ 
 tions, though the Act was not all we aimed at, we accepted it, as 
 did the tunnel men , as a substantial defeat of the scheme. Had 
 it been supposed at the time that the result would be, the adop¬ 
 tion and prosecution of the tunnel as a State work, not one- 
 2 
 
10 
 
 third of either House would have dared to go before their 
 constituents on a vote in its favor. 
 
 The key to the whole problem was now in the hands of the 
 governor and council. The Act required the commissioners to 
 “ report to the governor and council what, in their judgment, 
 will be the most economical, practical, and advantageous 
 method of completing said road and tunnel, the estimated cost 
 of fitting the same for use, the time within which the tunnel 
 can be completed, and what contracts can be effected, and with 
 what parties, for completing said tunnel and road, and the 
 probable cost of the same , the probable pecuniary value of the 
 road and tunnel when completed , the sources and amount of 
 traffic and income , and all other facts, <fcc., &c.” We felt per¬ 
 fectly confident that if we could secure a report faithfully 
 fulfilling those requirements, especially the clauses which we 
 have italicized, no sane man could ever recommend the prose¬ 
 cution of the work by the State. We thought we should get 
 such a report. We shall see. 
 
 More than all their accustomed audacity, persistency, and 
 adroitness was thenceforth devoted by the tunnelites to procur¬ 
 ing the right kind of commission. Of the influences which led 
 to the selection of the gentlemen who composed the commis¬ 
 sion, we do not propose to speak, except to express our 
 undoubting confidence that Governor Andrew intended to 
 secure, and thought he had secured the services of “ three 
 able, impartial and skilful commissioners.” 
 
 Change of Front. 
 
 Let us pause for a moment to consider the extraordinary 
 character of this transaction. The whole purpose of the hear¬ 
 ing before the committee had been to show that Mr. Haupt had 
 been aggrieved, and the whole object of the committee’s bill was 
 to remunerate him for losses sustained by the action of the 
 executive. Defeated in this, and reinforced at the critical 
 moment by unexpected allies, the whole line changed front, 
 deserted their leader, General Haupt, sneaked into the enemy’s 
 camp and laid down their arms; and, after the smoke cleared 
 away, it was found that they had seized our guns and turned 
 them upon us, taken possession of our treasure-chest, and added 
 to their audacity the impudence of asserting that all this was 
 
11 
 
 stipulated in the terms of their surrender! The annals of 
 legislative history will be searched in vain for a parallel. 
 
 We were outwitted. There is always a sort of credit 
 attached to success, however won ; but nothing can justify or 
 extenuate the treachery which attended this transaction. Mr. 
 Haupt was basely and shamelessly, even exultingly and remorse¬ 
 lessly betrayed. Whatever may have been our opinions of his 
 conduct, they, upon their own showing, were bound by every 
 consideration of interest, of gratitude and of honor, to stand 
 by him to the bitter end. He had shouldered the enterprise, 
 and for three years had been corporation, board of directors, 
 engineer, contractor—everything. They had uniformly avowed 
 that, with the bare payment of the sums justly due to him, 
 he could and would complete the work. But the very moment 
 the prospect opened of saving themselves by sacrificing him, 
 they turned their backs upon him as shamelessly as ever a 
 gang of burglars abandoned a stool-pigeon who could no longer 
 serve them. The old adage—honor among thieves—was for¬ 
 gotten. Well might Mr. Haupt exclaim in the language of 
 Woolsey (slightly altered,) 
 
 “ Had I but served the State with half the zeal 
 I served ray friends, she would not, in my need, 
 
 Have left me naked to mine enemies.” 
 
 We had hoped that when the rogues fell out, honest men 
 would get their dues. The sequel proved that we were 
 mistaken. 
 
 The Commissioners. 
 
 We have now reached a new stage. The commissioners 
 appointed under the Act were John W. Brooks, Samuel M. 
 Felton, and Alexander Holmes. Mr. Brooks was unknown out¬ 
 side of a very narrow circle in Boston. He had been brought 
 into notice by a master, a much abler man than himself, John 
 M. Forbes, Esq., to whom he had made himself eminently ser¬ 
 viceable in certain extensive railroad operations at the West. 
 Arrogant, insolent, and domineering towards those whom he 
 considered his inferiors, or over whom circumstances gave him 
 the advantage; plausible, deferential and obsequious towards 
 those whom he could not browbeat or cajole ; incapable, from 
 
12 
 
 early training and pursuits, of liberal and comprehensive poli¬ 
 cies ; made by his master, president and director in several impor¬ 
 tant railroads at the West, but in no respect identified with 
 Massachusetts interests, he entered upon this work, (even cred¬ 
 iting him with good intentions up to his capacities,) under the 
 natural bias of Western interests, with the aim of benefiting 
 those interests, by opening another avenue for his Western traffic 
 to Boston. Had he been generally and well known in Massa¬ 
 chusetts, I venture the assertion that he could never have been 
 placed at the head of a commission requiring the highest quali¬ 
 ties of “able, impartial, and skilful men.” In his case the old 
 proverb, “ like master, like man,” failed. His character is well 
 described in the saying of a courtier of Louis XIY.:— 
 
 II eut cent vertus de valet f 
 Et pas une de maitre. 
 
 We needed a master; we got a lackey. And yet, as we shall 
 see, he assumed the airs of a master, well illustrating a striking 
 remark made by the elder Dana in a lecture many years ago,— 
 “ What more unsparing tyrant than a despot ? Always, always 
 that despot’s slave! ” 
 
 Mr. Felton was at that time president of the Philadelphia, 
 Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad ; a gentleman of experience, 
 ability, and character. But, residing at such a distance, it was 
 impossible that he should give that attention to this work which, 
 especially with such a chairman, its importance demanded. 
 Indeed, his labors, increased many fold by the exigencies of the 
 war, broke down his health, so that he was obliged to resign 
 both the presidency of that road, and his place on this commis¬ 
 sion. Mr. Felton, too, was a tunnel man from the start. For 
 many years before he went to Baltimore, he was superintendent 
 of the Fitchburg Railroad, and of course, as was well known at 
 the time of his appointment, all his sympathies and preposses¬ 
 sions were with the tunnel. Mr. Holmes had been long and 
 favorably known as a railroad manager of large experience, of 
 great capacity, independence and integrity ; but he too was so 
 engrossed with the large and extending enterprises entrusted to 
 his direction that he has been able to give but the slightest 
 personal supervision to this work. 
 
13 
 
 It thus appears that two of the commissioners were so fully 
 committed, by interests and sympathies, to the Tunnel, that 
 but one conclusion could be expected. It also appears that an 
 unfortunate combination of circumstances in the relations of two 
 of the commissioners to other enterprises, which properly had 
 the first demands upon them, practically left the whole con¬ 
 trol of the commission with Mr Brooks. We have given more 
 space to these details than would seem to be necessary; but 
 without them, the partisan character of Mr. Brooks’ first report, 
 and the discreditable mismanagement of the work, would be 
 utterly inexplicable. 
 
 Mr. Brooks’ First Report. 
 
 We shall not attempt a minute exposure of the shallowness 
 and the inconsequential conclusions of this “ big pamphlet. ” It 
 would require a volume. We content ourselves, for the present, 
 with this general statement, which a careful examination of this 
 report and of their subsequent reports, together with the devel¬ 
 opments of nearly three years of work will fully warrant, that 
 the cost of the work will immeasurably exceed their estimates, 
 the time of completion will be extended many years, and the 
 estimates of traffic, which are mainly based upon trumpery tables 
 of Western business and of the traffic on other roads without the 
 slightest proof that the opening of the tunnel will considerably 
 increase the amount of this traffic to Boston, are utterly falla¬ 
 cious and delusive. We shall refer to some of these topics again. 
 For the present, we copy some extracts from the very able arti¬ 
 cles of “Civil Engineer” in the Boston “ Daily Advertiser.” 
 These articles are the more valuable as coming from a gentleman 
 recently from another state, without interest or prejudice in the 
 premises, but who wrote solely as an engineer and an unbiassed 
 expert. Referring to the commissioners’ report and to those of 
 the engineers accompanying it, he says:— 
 
 I must repeat that I have looked in vain through these reports for the 
 reasons that prompted the State of Massachusetts to embark in this stu¬ 
 pendous folly, for I find only reasons why it should not be undertaken. 
 Their engineer tells us, p. 210, that “ New York city possesses advantages 
 for exporting breadstuffs that no railroad can neutralize” That not only 
 are her facilities for transportation by canal and river such that “ no 
 
14 
 
 railroad can compete with them, ” but “ her railroad connections with 
 the West are also shorter, ” the difference being “ from 50 to 75 miles 
 in favor of New York; ” and that, though Boston is 200 miles nearer 
 Liverpool, New York has the greater advantage for obtaining return 
 freights. He thinks that the failure, for the twelve years that the pro¬ 
 ject was before the public, to raise the necessary means for its con¬ 
 struction is “ evidence of the want of commercial value in the project, ” 
 p. 212, and yet he considers “ the question of its commercial value” and 
 the “ benefits to the State the ruling or main consideration which should 
 determine the advisability of its construction,” p. 213. This is good 
 reasoning, and the conclusion is logically inevitable that as the main 
 consideration is wanting, its construction is not advisable. If it is not a 
 good financial investment, and has no commercial value, why persist 
 longer in such an extravagant, wastful and wanton delusion ? But look 
 further, and and on page 122 we find Mr. Storrow’s opinion very faintly 
 disguised in the concluding sentences of his report. After alluding to 
 the uncertain and unsatisfactory nature of all estimates of this kind, and 
 to the many contingencies which experience has shown go to swell the 
 cost, he says, “ If the advantages to be derived from the tunnel are not 
 an equivalent for an expenditure of $3,000,000 thereon, exclusive of 
 interest, it is not worth while to pursue the undertaking ; ” and then, 
 with great tact, he adds, “ Whether the very great advntages anticipated 
 from the opening of this new avenue to the great West, with diminished 
 distance and diminished grades,” (!) &c*, “ are sufficient to warrant the 
 construction of this work, at such an expenditure of time and money, is a 
 matter which it is not for me to discuss, but remains for the considera¬ 
 tions of the commissioners.” 
 
 Look again, and on p. 138, what does Mr. Latrobe say ? “ It is 
 
 manifest that if, even in the somewhat distant future, may be discerned 
 a prospect of public benefit, &c. ” Is it possible for words to express 
 more delicately the doubts which, in spite of himself, shook his faith in 
 the policy and expediency of the project ? But he adds, “ if the enter¬ 
 prise really possesses the merits claimed for it, (which I cannot doubt,) 
 half a million, more or less, should not stay its progress. ” 
 
 So far we have found little encouragement and no arguments in favor 
 of the adopted policy. But we shall certainly find in the report of the 
 commissioners, reasons so cogent and conclusive as to override all these 
 doubts, and force conviction upon every mind. For in so important an 
 undertaking as this there should be most satisfactory and conclusive 
 evidence adduced of its vital necessity, and of the great superiority of 
 this new route, before involving the State in such an enormous expen¬ 
 diture. 
 
15 
 
 We begin the search, and find first, that they commend Mr. Storrow’s 
 “ interesting and instructive report to the most careful and attentive 
 perusal. ” We peruse it, and learn all about European tunnels, but he 
 declines to give any opinion about the Hoosac Tunnel. They tells us 
 that “ Mr. Latrobe’s authority is quite as good as that of any other 
 engineer, and that his report will repay a careful reading.” We read it 
 carefully, and learn from him how a tunnel ought to be built, but see no 
 reasons advanced for building the Hoosac Tunnel. They tell us that 
 Mr. Laurie’s “ valuable discussion of the subject will be found in his 
 General Report. ” As Mr. Storrow had said, “ it is not for me to dis¬ 
 cuss it, ” we suppose it was left for Mr. Laurie. And so we wade 
 through Mr. Laurie’s 87 closely printed octavo pages, and find that the 
 scheme has labored through 12 long years without finding anybody to 
 appreciate it,—that it will cost a great deal of money,—that the route 
 has such and such grades, and a great deal of unsafe curvature,—that if 
 built it will divide the business with the Western Railroad, to which as 
 a passenger road it is inferior,—that Boston cannot compete with New 
 York city in the exportation of breadstuff's,—that he sees evidences of 
 the want of commercial value in the project,—but that he has “ neither 
 data, time nor ability to go fully into these subjects, ”—and so ends his 
 valuable discussion of the subject. 
 
 Well, we return to the report of the commissioners, which from the 
 beginning has read as though written on the assumption, the foregone 
 conclusion, that the tunnel shall be built at all hazards, and we read all 
 their speculations about how the tunnel should be worked, with wdiat 
 faces and headings, how long it will take to build it, “ that great waste 
 is the inevitable result of works constructed by States, ” that this route 
 will help build up Manchester and Portsmouth, N. H., and Portland, 
 away down in Maine, that the Boston and Albany is the best freight 
 line between Boston and the West, and that the tunnel route is about 
 as good ! but that there is “ a margin in favor of New York ” over either; 
 that, a\vare the thing would not pay as an investment, they have made 
 a contract with the Fitchburg and other roads to help the State out by 
 throwing in one-fifth of their hard earnings, (as though it did not 
 come out of the people after all;) that the town of North Adams would 
 “ furnish the line considerable businessand, finally, that, “ considering 
 the large sum which the Commonwealth has already invested in this 
 work, which would be lost if it is not completed,” &c., “ the work should 
 be undertaken and completed by the Commonwealth.” Oh ! most lame 
 and impotent conclusion! 
 
 This is a brief but fair and honest synopsis of the whole subject, as set 
 forth in that great report of February, 1863, when the legislature, 
 after a show of thorough investigation, deliberately determined to put 
 
16 
 
 this thing through, and the governor deliberately sanctioned it. (I hope 
 I may not be charged with disrespect in calling it a “ thing. ” It is not 
 a tunnel, nor is it likely to be, nor a road, nor a line. It has been 
 called an enterprise, a project, an undertaking, a scheme, a work, a new 
 avenue, a feature, a route, for, like certain other rough subjects, it has 
 many aliases , and perhaps one is as good as another.) It is true an 
 attempt is made to prove that there is business enough to justify its 
 prosecution, by showing that the total amount received for freight between 
 Boston and Albany during the last twenty years was $7,636,206, 
 (an amount but little more than half the receipts on the Pennsylvania 
 Railroad alone the last year,) but that this business will probably be 
 largely increased, and that “ it would seem as if the increased facilities 
 offered by the tunnel line, ” which we have failed to discover, “ should 
 put it in the power of the Boston merchants to build up a large and 
 profitable trade from this source. ” (Page 88.) First build the tunnel, 
 and then build up the trade ! Truly the present generation of Boston 
 merchants have a glorious prospect in store for their successors. A 
 legacy of debt and taxation, and the privilege of building up a trade by 
 means of a line connecting them with the West in every respect inferior 
 to the one already constructed. 
 
 It will not by pretended that the Western road is worked up to its full 
 capacity, in the face of the statement on page 99 that the through ton¬ 
 nage on the New York Central Railroad for the year 1862 amounted to 
 770,190 tons, while upon the Western road, for the five years preceding, 
 it amounted only to 672,737 tons, an average of 134,547 tons a year, or 
 about one-sixth of that upon the New York Central. It is difficult to 
 belive that intelligent men can be sincere in a proposition to expend so 
 many millions of dollars to construct another line to divide this compara¬ 
 tively trifling business with the Western road. 
 
 No one questions the possibility of tunnelling the Hoosac Mountain. 
 Mr. Storrow says, page 117: “As regards the feasibility of completing 
 such a work, I entertain no doubt whatever. ” Mr. Latrobe says, page 
 126, “ that any work, of whatever magnitude, must be pronounced practic¬ 
 able, if the means for its accomplishment are within the reach of human 
 power. ” Mr. Laurie says, p. 213, “ the tunnel is perfectly practicable ; ” 
 and the joint special committee of the legislature in their report of Feb. 
 1865, p. 37, say “that do doubt remains in the minds of any as to the 
 entire feasibility of the scheme. ” And because it is practicable, for¬ 
 sooth, it is therefore expedient! No matter what it cost, no matter 
 whether it will be of any economical or commercial value when finished, 
 because everybody says it is possible to do it, it must be done. Plenty 
 of time and plenty of money, and surely the great State of Massachu- 
 
17 
 
 setts lias both, is all that is necessary. ' We must not investigate too 
 closely the expediency, nor question the policy recommended by the 
 commissioners, of the Commonwealth’s undertaking and carrying on to 
 completion this Quixotic scheme. The legislative committee quoted 
 above, say, p. 37, “ It is not within their province to discuss the merits 
 of the tunnel enterprise,” and so say all the engineers. Everybody seems 
 afraid to discuss its merits but one man. 
 
 And here I may be allowed to say that I not the slightest acquaintance 
 with that gentleman, even by sight, and the same remarks will apply to 
 the commissioners. If I have any prejudice or bias, it is that which every 
 engineer must feel professionally, a desire to see so great and scientifi¬ 
 cally interesting a work carried successfully through. But I cannot, on 
 the grounds of political or domestic economy, nor as a financial operation, 
 nor as a valuable commercial enterprise, see any reason for its further pro¬ 
 secution. I admit that the State of Massachusetts and the city of Boston 
 should not shrink from any enterprise that will materially shorten the 
 distance or increase the facilities of transportation to the great West, but 
 I deny most emphatically that it has been shown that the Boston and 
 Troy route by the Hoosac Tunnel does accomplish these results, and 
 insist that a wise and sensible policy dictates the immediate abandon-, 
 ment of this, the greatest folly of the age. If we would participate 
 more fully in the great and increasing trade of the West, we must look 
 in some other direction, or find out some other route which will unques¬ 
 tionably secure to us the facilities and advantages which the tunnel route 
 utterly fails to afford. 
 
 We remark, in passing, that the language of this report, the 
 acts of the commissioners, and the phraseology of the Act 
 of 1863, all agree in refuting the claim set up by the 
 tunnelites that the Act of 1862 was intended to authorize or, 
 fairly interpreted, did authorize the resumption of work on the 
 tunnel by the State. The commissioners say, “ We are of 
 opinion that the work should be undertaken by the State.” 
 They would hardly recommend that to be done which the State 
 had already determined to do. Until action by the legislature- 
 of 1863, they had not struck a blow or spent a dollar on the 
 work, but referred the matter to the legislature. The gover¬ 
 nor, in his message transmitting their report to the legislature, 
 endorsed this reference. The legislature in the first section of 
 the Act, chap. 214, of 1863, declared, “ The commissioners 
 are hereby authorized, subject to the advice and approval of the 
 3 
 
18 
 
 governor and council, to construct, &c., &c.” It was alone tlie 
 recommendation of the commissioners that the work should be 
 undertaken by the State, that revived the dead enterprise and 
 led the legislature to authorize the resumption of the work. 
 
 In the order of history, we come to the system adopted in the 
 disbursement of the money of the State. Early in the year 
 1863 it was thought desirable by the executive department, to 
 establish a plan for accountability and economy in the disburse¬ 
 ments and expenditures of the large amounts which would be 
 required. Bills were coming in, and larger were expected. 
 Accordingly a plan was embodied in the following Order:— 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 Executive Department, Council Chamber, I 
 Boston, February 2, 1863. \ 
 
 Questions having arisen as to the practical administration of that part 
 of the existing statute concerning the Troy and Greenfield Railroad, 
 appropriating money, in reference to the proper method of auditing 
 accounts and claims payable thereunder, it is therefore, 
 
 Ordered, By the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Council. 
 That all bills for expenses incurred, for service rendered, or for awards and 
 allowances made, by direction of the Commissioners on the Troy and 
 Greenfield Railroad, under authority of chap. 156 of the Acts of 1862, 
 shall be accompanied by satisfactory vouchers, and shall be required to 
 specify dates and amount of expense, time of service and rate of compen¬ 
 sation, and all other details necessary to a full and proper understanding 
 and adjustment of the claims which they represent. And it is further 
 ordered, that all bills and and claims accruing under authority of said 
 Act, shall be first examined and approved by not less than two of the 
 Commissioners aforesaid, except, when this is inconvenient or impracti¬ 
 cable, the approval of the chairman of the Commissioners shall suffice 
 for accounts not exceeding fifty dollars respectively, and that said Com¬ 
 missioners shall certify in their approval that the charges and allowances 
 are just and reasonable. 
 
 The accounts when thus rendered to the Governor, and by him sub¬ 
 mitted to the Council Committee of Accounts for examination, shall, if 
 found correct by them, be returued to the Governor, who will transmit 
 the same to the Auditor of Accounts, and if found by him to be in con¬ 
 formity with the statutes of the Commonwealth and with this Order, he 
 will certify the same for allowance. The Secretary of the Common¬ 
 wealth will send to the Auditor of Accounts a copy of this Order for his 
 
19 
 
 guidance, and a copy also to the chairman of the Commissioners on the 
 Troy and Greenfield Railroad. 
 
 Order adopted February 3, 1863. 
 
 Oliver Warner, Secretary 
 Secretary’s Department, Boston, Feb. 4, 1863. 
 
 A true Copy. Attest: 
 
 Oliver Warner, 
 
 Secretary of the Commonwealth. 
 
 In July Mr. Brooks presented to the governor a requisition 
 for twenty-five thousand dollars. An Order was laid before the 
 council in the following terms:—“ Ordered, that $25,000 be 
 paid to the commissioners, &c., to enable them to carry out the 
 provisions of chap. 214, sect. 2,1863.” Mr. Brooks submitted no 
 bills, no statement of the purposes for which the money was 
 needed ; hut autocratically demanded it, and threatened to 
 resign unless it was voted unconditionally. It was argued that 
 the Act of 1863 made it the duty of the council to vote what¬ 
 ever money was “ required ” by the commissioners. To this it 
 * was replied that the phraseology of the Act of 1863 was pre¬ 
 cisely the same, upon this point, as that of 1862. In both 
 cases the language was, (sect. 7 of 1862, and sect. 2 of 1863,) 
 “ The governor is hereby authorized to draw his warrant on the 
 treasurer of the Commonwealth for such sums as may be 
 required, <fcc., &c .and if the council were justified by 
 the Act of 1862 in passing the Order of Feb. 3,1863, they would, 
 unless they rescinded that Order, have stultified themselves in 
 voting this sum after the legislature of 1863 had used the same 
 language under which that Order was passed. Besides, the Act 
 of 1863 went further than that of 1862 in placing with the council 
 the control of this matter, by providing that the commissioners, 
 when required, “ shall present to the governor and council an 
 account of all contracts entered into by them as such commis¬ 
 sioners, and of all payments and charges by them made, with 
 their vouchers therefor, which vouchers and accounts shall be 
 examined, and if found correct and in good faith, shall he 
 allowed by the governor and council; but no lease of any part 
 of said railroad, nor any contract amounting to more than ten 
 thousand dollars shall be made by said commissioners without 
 the consent of the governor and council.” Thus carefully did 
 
20 
 
 the legislature guard the treasury from the drafts of Mr. 
 Brooks, and thus clearly was the duty of the council defined. 
 The council, after a long and sharp discussion, rejected the 
 Order, advancing the $25,000 to Mr. Brooks, one councillor 
 only and the lieutenant-governor, voting in the affirmative. 
 Mr. Brooks did not resign ! 
 
 The whole matter was then referred to a committee who 
 submitted the following report:— 
 
 “ The undersigned, to whom was referred the communication of the 
 Commissioners of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad and Hoosac Tunnel 
 of July 20th, 1863, have conferred with J. W. Brooks, Esq., Chairman 
 of said Commissioners:—The Committee find that Mr. Brooks has 
 already used several thousand dollars for drills, &c., and will be 
 obliged to use [several thousand more for other purposes, the details 
 of which cannot now be given; but Mr. Brooks promises that a full 
 detailed report shall be given to the governor and council in thirty days 
 from this date, and every thirty days thereafter. 
 
 “ Your Committee would therefore recommend that an Order be passed 
 placing to the credit of said Commissioners, the sum of fifteen thou¬ 
 sand dollars, agreeably to 2d section of the 214th chap, of the Acts of 
 the current year.” 
 
 An Order in accordance with the recommendation of this 
 report was adopted, and Mr. Brooks pocketed the money and 
 the affront. After this resistance by the council to his insolence, 
 Mr. Brooks mended his manners. 
 
 Immediately after the passage of the Act of 1863, it was 
 found that Mr. Brooks was determined to proceed immediately 
 to the construction of the road from Greenfield to the tunnel, 
 on the location made by Mr. Haupt. Members of the coun¬ 
 cil thought that if the road were to be built by the State, it 
 should be of a character* worthy of the State. Without a dis¬ 
 senting voice all the members of the council accepted the Act 
 of the legislature of 1863, as conclusive of its purpose to 
 complete the work; but a majority of the council insisted that 
 the location should be revised with the view of adopting a route 
 with engineering characteristics fitting it for a great commercial 
 road. To secure this, the following Order was passed :— 
 
21 
 
 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS. 
 
 Council Chamber, Boston, June 2d, 1863. 
 
 Ordered , That the Commissioners cause Mr. Laurie forthwith to 
 survey the route between the east end of the tunnel, and Bardwell’s 
 Ferry, with a view to ascertaining what changes of location ought to be 
 made, and in directing the route thus obtained and giving the data for a 
 reliable comparison of the cost and of the engineering characteristics of 
 of the present line, and the line thus obtained, as parts of a great com¬ 
 mercial road. The report to be made before the first day of July next. 
 
 It was apparent that the time was too short to make proper 
 surveys; but, determined to show no factious opposition, all the 
 members acquiesced. Without consulting Mr. Brooks—for the 
 obvious reason that the Act of 1863, sect. 1, placed this matter of 
 alterations in the line of the road entirely under the control of 
 the governor and council—Mr. Laurie was immediately tele¬ 
 graphed to by the governor, and directed to commence the 
 surveys forthwith. 
 
 Mr. Laurie reported at once to Mr. Brooks. “ I am here, 
 Mr. Brooks, to make the surveys ordered.” “ What order ? 
 what surveys ? ” replied the autocrat. “ The surveys ordered 
 by the governor and council.” “ I have ordered no surveys and 
 want none. When I need your services, I will send for you. 
 Go about your business! ” and he went, and thus closed his ser¬ 
 vice under Mr. Brooks. The result was, that the Order of the 
 council was defied ; no surveys were made, but the work on the 
 road was, for the time, abandoned. It was probably Mr. Brooks’ 
 impunity in repudiating the authority of the governor and 
 council that emboldened him in his attempt, in July following, 
 to seize the key of the State treasury, uncontrolled by the 
 governor and council. 
 
 Mr. Laurie’s sturdy Scotch integrity disqualified him for Mr. 
 Brooks’ purposes. When Mr. Laurie presented to Mr. Brooks 
 his report published with the first report of the commissioners, 
 it contained statements and conclusions unsatisfactory to Mr. 
 Brooks, and the railway king, who was determined that the 
 reports should justify his foregone conclusions, demanded the 
 suppression of some portions of the report and the modification 
 of others. Mr. Laurie, with a professional reputation of the 
 
22 
 
 highest character at stake, after making such concessions as he 
 could honestly make, resolutely refused to yield to Mr. Brooks’ 
 imperious demands upon material points. Then “ never more 
 be officer of mine.” But his report, when carefully read, is a 
 practical condemnation of the whole project. We have no time 
 to examine it in detail; nor is this hardly necessary, after the 
 extracts we have given from “ Civil Engineer’s ” article. If 
 one will read the concluding pages of Mr. Laurie’s report, 
 commencing with the “ Comparison with other routes,” he will 
 have no doubt as to Mr. Laurie’s real judgment. Undoubt¬ 
 edly, had the report contained a full expression of his views, 
 it would have been impossible to torture from it any other 
 conclusions than those which, it is well known, he entertains. 
 
 The head and front of Mr. Laurie’s offending are found in the 
 following passages from his report on the “ Deerfield Route,” 
 (pp. 170 et seq.') “ It (the Deerfield route) has 489 degrees less 
 curvature, 150 feet less rise and fall, and reduces the maximum 
 grade on the T. & G. Railroad ascending w r est, from 58.6 to 
 50.16 feet per mile. The length of the through route is 
 reduced by this line t 9 q 2 0 of a mile.” He then shows that the 
 Deerfield route would cost $97,975 more than the Greenfield— 
 a sum which, taking into account the saving of distance by the 
 Deerfield route, and its superior engineering characteristics, is 
 entirely insignificant in locating a great commercial road. We 
 quote again : “ The Deerfield route is much superior to the 
 present road as a through line; but it will not accommodate 
 Greenfield nor the local business of the Deerfield Valley with 
 that town so well.” Considering that Greenfield has already 
 two railroads passing through the village, connecting with Bos¬ 
 ton and New York on the east and south, and with Vermont 
 and Montreal on the north, it would hardly seem that her 
 claims should offset all the advantages of the Deerfield route 
 for a through road. “ The nearest suitable depot is two-thirds 
 of a mile further from the village than the present junction.” 
 He concludes: “ Viewed as a through line, the saving of 
 
 nearly a mile in distance, 489 degrees of curvature, the reduc¬ 
 tion of the maximum grade, and the avoidance of the Green 
 River bridge, with its sharp curve, would be of considerable 
 importance.” 
 
23 
 
 And yet Mr. Brooks persists in his determination, though 
 checked by the action of the governor and council, to build the 
 road on the Greenfield route. In addition to the increased 
 distance and the heavier grades, every ton of the immense 
 traffic which he fancies is coming over his road would be 
 obliged to describe one entire circle and a third of another 
 more by the Greenfield than by the Deerfield route in passing 
 over eight miles of road. Still Mr. Brooks persists ; and only 
 last summer he ordered new surveys with a view to resuming 
 work on the road. And whom did he employ as engineer ? 
 A man of unbiassed judgment, of recognized integrity (I mean 
 professional,) of large engineering experience and capacity ? 
 No, but Alfred R. Field, of Greenfield ! I say nothing of Mr. 
 Field’s personal character ; but I affirm that any fair-minded 
 man who will make himself familiar with Mr. Field’s conduct 
 in connection with this enterprise, especially if he will read 
 pages 25, 26 and 27 of Mr, Kimball’s report (House Doc¬ 
 ument 185, I860,) and pages 81 and 82 of the appendix, 
 can come to no other conclusion than that Mr. Field was 
 the very last man in the State to have been appointed engi¬ 
 neer. But he was just the man for Mr. Brooks, and he was set 
 to work. Luckily for the State, Mr. Felton resigned last sum¬ 
 mer, and James M. Shute was appointed as his successor. 
 Mr. Shute is well known as a “ tunnel man ; ” but he is a gentle¬ 
 man of the most cautious and exact business habits, of inde¬ 
 pendence and integrity. He, as well as Mr. Holmes, saw the 
 folly of building the road ; and they voted Mr. Brooks down, 
 and stopped the waste of money on that wretched location. 
 
 We have brought the history of the tunnel down to 1863. 
 We are compelled to be brief, and have therefore exhibited 
 but a very small portion of the trickery and rascality of the 
 management. Following as closely as may be the order of time, 
 let us look next at the item of the amount of the people’s money 
 applied by Mr. Brooks to 
 
 The Payment of Mr. Haupt’s Debts. 
 
 I have not the data for giving the exact aggregate. It lies 
 somewhere between two hundred and three hundred thousand 
 dollars! It will be remembered that the Act of 1862 authorized 
 the commissioners to “ audit and allow all just claims for labor, 
 
24 
 
 service, land damages Ac., &c., and may procure the release of 
 all attachments and discharge all liens on said materials.” 
 Now, the only justification for the payment, by the commis¬ 
 sioners, of any claims was, first, that the legislature had 
 expressly specified the payment of certain claims ; or secondly 
 that there were valid liens on any of said materials which 
 it was the interest of the State to discharge; or thirdly, that 
 the claims were “just;” that is, of course, “just claims” 
 against the State. 
 
 It cannot be argued for a moment that the legislature 
 specified any of these claims as entitled to be paid. The 
 Senate, after full discussion, had rejected the bill which 
 appropriated $150,000 upon the very ground that the money was 
 intended to pay Mr. Haupt’s debts for “ labor, services, mate¬ 
 rials and land damages ” for every dollar of which the State had 
 already paid Mr. Haupt. If they had intended such payment 
 they would have said so; and the provision would have killed 
 this bill as it did the committee’s bill. They did not say so ; 
 and therefore the only inference is, that they intended that the 
 commissioners should pay only “ just claims ” against the 
 State. 
 
 Nor, secondly, can it it be maintained that any considerable 
 portion of the materials were subject to valid liens. With 
 regard to the whole of them, with a single inconsiderable excep¬ 
 tion, these pretended liens could not have stood an hour’s 
 investigation. We cannot examine them all. Take one : the 
 claim of the Rensellaer Iron Company. Mr. Haupt received 
 from the treasury State scrip as follows : on July 10th, 
 1861, $88,000 ; on July 11th, $55,000 ; and on the 12th, $500. 
 These sums included payment for iron sold to him by the 
 Rensellaer Iron Company, and the scrip was advanced to Mr. 
 Haupt upon his certificate that the iron had been delivered by 
 him to the Commonwealth. Mr. Haupt paid a part' of the 
 proceeds of this scrip to the agent of the company, and on the 
 same day , July 11th, this same agent attached the iron* for a 
 balance due the Rensellaer Iron Company ! And yet this claim 
 was allowed by the commissioners, and, I am sorry to add, 
 approved by the council in 1863. 
 
 Could such a claim be said, in any respect, to be a “just 
 claim ” against the State? Observe, that for these materials, as 
 
25 
 
 well as lor nearly, if not quite all the other claims allowed, and 
 paid by the commissioners, the State had once paid Mr. Haupt 
 in full. It might be a pardonable act of generosity for the 
 State to pay the claims for land-damages, though the parties all 
 had ample security against Mr. Haupt, under the laws, and 
 voluntarily relinquished it; but the second payment of these 
 large amounts to sub-contractors and to this company in another 
 State, which made the sale to Mr. Haupt with their eyes open, 
 was an absolutely inexcusable and wanton squandering of the 
 State’s money. It was not the business of the State to collect 
 the bills of the Iron Company. If they would dance in such 
 company, they must expect to pay the piper. We surely 
 ought not to have paid for heating the poker. 
 
 There never was a more atrocious swindle than the payment 
 of these claims, especially those of the sub-contractors and the 
 Iron Company. Of course, I do not put the whole responsibility 
 upon the commissioners. The majority of the council must 
 divide it with them. The only possible ground upon which 
 they could be affirmed to be just claims against the State, was, 
 that Mr. Haupt had been wronged to that extent by the action 
 of Governor Andrew and the State engineer in 1861, and 
 therefore the State ought to give him this money to enable 
 him to pay his debts. But neither the commissioners nor the 
 majority of the council will plead that defence. 
 
 Another item of reckless expenditure by Mr. Brooks, is that 
 for 
 
 Power-Drills. 
 
 From the day Mr. Brooks entered upon this work up to this 
 hour, he has cherished the delusion that he could successfully 
 operate power-drills in the Hoosac rock, and this against the 
 judgment of engineers and in the face of the uniform failure 
 of every trial he has made. At first, he was so perfectly confi¬ 
 dent that the machines used at Mount Cenis would work, that 
 he actually remitted the money abroad for the purchase of those 
 machines. For reasons which it would have been more credi¬ 
 table to have learned before he sent the money, he did not take 
 them. Next he tried other machines, equally confident of success. 
 Thus, in his report made in 1864, he says, “ Drilling machines 
 4 
 
26 
 
 will not be likely to be in operation at this place (the east end,) 
 before next midsummer.” Of the central shaft, he says, “ We 
 hope by the latter part of winter to get some automatic drills at 
 work in the shaft, Ac., Ac.” Of the west shaft, “ Machine-drills 
 are not likely to be used here before next spring, and perhaps 
 not till early summer.” All have failed. Now he tells us that 
 drills are being constructed at Fitchburg which are to work 
 beautifully. “ Confidence is a plant of slow growth.” I would 
 hardly set limits to the achievements of mechanical skill in 
 perfecting drills for this purpose; but the failures of the past 
 destroy all confidence in his predictions. And yet, he has the 
 hardihood to say in his last report, “ If machine labor comes up 
 to the estimate as well as hand labor lias done , the completion of 
 the whole work may be brought about somewhat within the time 
 estimated.” Why did he not say, “ If these machines work as 
 well as those whose success 1 have as confidently predicted, but 
 which have all failed, Ac., Ac.” We knew what hand labor 
 would do ; we don’t know what machines will do ; and there¬ 
 fore the comparison is defective and deceptive. 
 
 Mr. Brooks has taken care not to give us, in separate items, 
 the cost of his fruitless experiments with machine drills. In 
 Mr. Doane’s last report, the aggregate of the items of cost of 
 machinery is $108,661. What portion of this amount was for 
 drills we have no means of knowing. This omission seems 
 remarkable in a repor^which descends to such details as to give 
 the cost of drill-holes to the thousandth part of an inch, and of 
 candles to the thousandth part of a pound! We only know 
 that the cost of other machinery, in addition to what was on 
 hand when he commenced the work, has been small, and it is fair 
 to infer that a considerable portion of the above aggregate has 
 gone for power-drills. Whatever it has been, it has all been 
 wasted. 
 
 Another of Mr. Brooks’ pet schemes is 
 The Deerfield Dam. 
 
 Last year I published some statements relating to this folly, 
 and I reaffirm every one of them. First, as to the power. It 
 will be remembered that the engineer, in his report for 1864, 
 said,— 
 
27 
 
 “ After a thorough discussion of the comparative merits and cost of 
 steam and water-power, taking into account the fact that the required 
 power must be a continuous one , working through the twenty-four hours of 
 every day , it was determined to build a dam in the Deerfield River 
 which would furnish a power equal to about eight hundred horses.” 
 
 Eight hundred horse-power, where the power is required for 
 continuous working through twenty-four hours in a day, means 
 power to that amount for the whole of every day in the year. 
 Mr. Brooks says, in the same report:— 
 
 “ It is designed to use the water upon turbine wheels, one of which, 
 of about one hundred horse-power, is already upon the ground. This 
 will be put in operation upon air compressors, and its size and fitness 
 tested before others are procured.” 
 
 This means that there must be a continuous power of over one 
 hundred horses. I stated that I learned on the ground from 
 one who knew , that the last time the water was measured, it 
 gave about fifty horse-power; and that, in my judgment, when 
 we were there in September, the amount was much less than 
 that. No authentic contradictions to these statements have 
 been made. Mr. Doane, in his report this year, gives measure¬ 
 ments of the flow of water over the crest of the dam in August, 
 October, November, and December; but no measurements are 
 given for September, and of course the measurements given 
 do not affect my statements as to the quantity of water in that 
 month. But he does give a statement of the amount of rain 
 falling in August as 2 t 4 q 2 q inches, and in September as of 
 an inch, the amount in September being a trifle less than 
 -j 4 y of that in August. Now his measurements for the last 
 ten days in August give of a foot as the average flow 
 
 of water over the dam, for each of those days. Reducing 
 this in the same proportion as the amount of rain in September 
 fell short of that in August, and we have of a foot as the 
 daily average flow of water ih September. Mr. Doane furnishes 
 us with a table giving the horse-power to each tenth of a foot 
 of water over the crest. One-tenth of a foot gives 42.5 theo¬ 
 retical horse-power ; which, two-thirds being “ effective ” power, 
 (and that is more than he will ever get out of Mr. Brooks’ 
 turbine wheels,) gives 28.3, as the effective horse-power to each 
 
28 
 
 tenth of a foot of flow. The average flow in September we 
 have found to have been of a foot.. This is equivalent to 
 a theoretical power of 22.5 horses, or an effective power of 
 fifteen horses; that is, in September they had a continuous 
 power of fifteen horses! If this is not hoisting the engineer 
 with his own petard, I don’t know when the sport was enjoyed. 
 I gave it as my opinion last year that the water, when I was 
 there, would not give “ ten horse-power for twenty-four hours 
 in the day; ” and Mr. Doane’s own figures show that I set the 
 amount above the actual measurements.* 
 
 What Mr. Doane means when he says, “ it was measured 
 during the season several times, and the least quantity found 
 gave a theoretical power of'one hundred and sixteen horses,” I 
 cannot imagine ; when his own measurements give two days 
 of less than fifty theoretical horse-power, and several of less 
 than a hundred. We are left t6 guess why no measurements 
 are given for September. 
 
 It has been alleged that the past season has been one of 
 unprecedented dryness for these months ; but Mr. Doane makes 
 the statement that last year the amount of rain in those four 
 months was 7^ 9 0 V inches, and in 1829, it was 8^^ inches, and 
 in 1846, 9 t 4 q 2 o inches. The difference—being in one year 
 of an inch, and in the other, inches—if averaged over 
 four months of each year, would hardly give Mr. Brooks a 
 continuous power of eight hundred horses ! 
 
 But, it seems from the last report, that Mr. Brooks is not 
 sure of even this insignificant power. Mr. Doane says :— 
 
 “ The canal is finished, and water was let in on the 24th of November; 
 but on account of the porous nature of the natural banks, it has been 
 
 * Strictly speaking, the actual power in September was much less than the 
 above calculation gives. It will be seen from Mr. Doane’s tables, that as the 
 flow of water decreases, the power diminishes relatively, much more rapidly; 
 thus, five-tenths of a foot of flow of water gives 917 theoretical horse-power; 
 four-tenths gives 629; three-tenths, 380; tfao-tenths, 176; one-tenth, 42 theo¬ 
 retical horse-power; at this rate of diminution, t °^ 8 o 2 jt °f a f°°t °f flow °f water 
 would give theoretically two horse-power; effectively, nothing. As a matter 
 of fact, any amount of power less than a hundred horse continuous power, is 
 equivalent, for use at the Tunnel, to no power at all; for any power much less 
 than a hundred horses, will not start a turbine wheel of a hundred horse¬ 
 power ; of course, any less power will not drive it up to speed to do the 
 work of a hundred horses. 
 
29 
 
 filled gradually, and has as yet only been raised seven feet, or to a level 
 one foot below the crest of the dam. 
 
 “ The banks leak very considerably, but no giving away is looked 
 for. By putting in sawdust, and stirring the silt of the canal, they 
 will no doubt by-and-by become tight.” 
 
 Any experienced owner of water-power will doubt the last 
 prediction. I never before heard of stopping a leak in a dam 
 or canal, with sawdust, except as a temporary expedient; and 
 if the natural banks are of so porous a nature as to “ leak 
 considerably,” Mr. Brooks will find that he can only get a 
 tight canal by building bottom and sides of stone laid in cement. 
 Here goes I know not how many thousand dollars more. 
 Meantime this “ considerable leak ” will still further reduce his 
 power. 
 
 It is upon such a stream as this that Mr. Brooks has built his 
 magnificent structure. 
 
 Cost of the Deerfield Dam. 
 
 Last year I estimated the cost of the water-power at 1200,000. 
 We have now Mr. Brooks’ figures of cost up to the date of the 
 report . The final cost remains to be known, as it seems that 
 they are still at work on the buildings and the wheel-pits, “ a 
 fourth being just begun.” The leaks in the canal, too, are yet 
 to be stopped. But we will take the figures as they are given. 
 
 The items of the cost of the dam, including waste-gates, canal 
 and wheel-pits, are separately given; so also is the machinery 
 at the dam. The cost of “engineering and superintendence” 
 for the whole work is put in gross at $59,999.90. The cost of 
 all the buildings at the east end is put at $27,851.65. It will 
 not be unfair to charge one-third of the engineering and super¬ 
 intendence, and one-third of the buildings at the east end, to 
 the dam. We have then the following items of the cost of the 
 dam and appurtenances, as given on page 52 of the report:— 
 
 Deerfield dam,.$125,919 74 
 
 Excavation and masonry at east end of dam, . . . 12,535 86 
 
 Wheel-pits, . 45,878 09 
 
 Gates and overflow, . . . . . . 9,419 73 
 
 Race or canal,. 21,353 03 
 
30 
 
 One-third engineering and superintendence, . . . $19,999 97 
 
 One-third buildings east end, ...... 9,283 88 
 
 Machinery at Deerfield dam, ..... 10,297 92 
 
 Total cost of dam, buildings and machinery, . $254,688 22 
 
 Probably a part of these buildings might be used for steam- 
 power whenever they introduce it, as they must before their 
 operations require a continuous power of fifty horses. Strike 
 off the odd thousands, and we have the round sum of $250,000 
 as the cost of the water-power and appurtenances up to last 
 December! 
 
 It seems absolutely incredible that any man in his senses 
 could have committed this folly. I think too highly of even Mr. 
 Brooks’ business capacity to believe that he could have done it 
 with his own money. But it is a State work, and there is plenty 
 of money, and Mr. Brooks would immortalize himself by build¬ 
 ing a dam compared with which Holyoke and Lawrence should 
 be but boys’ play. Accordingly he spends an hour or two of a 
 pleasant spring day, when the stream was full, in an explora¬ 
 tion ; listens to the statements of the “ oldest inhabitant,” as to 
 the permanence of the power, orders surveys to be made, and, 
 sitting comfortably in his office in Merchants’ Exchange, adopts 
 his plan and gives his orders —sic volo , sicjubeo, and the State 
 pays over a quarter of a million of dollars, nearly every dollar 
 of which has been thrown away. For remember, they must 
 introduce steam-power; and the fixed investment for this power 
 must be just as great, and of course the interest on this invest¬ 
 ment the same as if there had not been a dollar spent for 
 water-power. It follows that the only return the State will get 
 for this enormous cost of water-power will be the saving of the 
 fuel which would be used for steam-power during those portions 
 of the year when water-power shall be used. 
 
 Let us figure the cost of this power. I avoid the domain of 
 poetry. I do not criticize Mr. Doane’s graphic sketch on page 
 23 of his report. I can well understand how natural it is that 
 he should seek to forget ugly facts, and enjoy the artistic beauty 
 of Mr. Brooks’ cascades. But we must deal with jprosaic 
 figures and facts. The dam will have cost when finished, at 
 least $275,000. I repeat what I said last year, that as a water- 
 
31 
 
 power for use, after Mr. Brooks has done with it, no business 
 man would pay for it and use it there, $10,000. He might get 
 that worth of material out of it to carry away ; but it would 
 not be worth that to use there. Ten thousand dollars will buy 
 a larger continuous water-power than that, within twenty miles 
 of Boston. The loss, when it comes to a sale, will be 
 $265,000. Mr. Brooks says he shall finish the tunnel in seven 
 years. This gives an annual depreciation of $87,855. The 
 interest on the cost will be $16,500. But they must have 
 steam-power too, and use it, at least for six months of the year ; 
 for Mr. Doane’s measurements will show that they have had 
 less power this winter than they had last summer. The power 
 then averaged, for August, seventy horse effective power; for 
 September, calculated from his statement, fifteen ; for October, 
 from his measurement, 105. These figures show that they 
 must have auxiliary power for three or four months in summer 
 and fall, and nearly as long in winter. We make the calculations 
 for two hundred horse-power. Two steam-engines of a hundred 
 horse-power each, with boilers and all appurtenances, will cost 
 at the outside $20,000 each. The fuel to run them six months 
 will cost $9,000. Depreciation, ten per cent, of cost. We 
 have then the following as the annual cost of water-power with 
 steam as auxiliary:— 
 
 Interest on cost of dam and fixtures, . 
 Depreciation, ^ of $265,000, 
 
 Interest on cost of steam-power,. 
 
 Fuel for six months, . . . . 
 
 Depreciation, . . . . . 
 
 $16,500 00 
 37,855 00 
 2,400 00 
 9,000 00 
 4,000 00 
 
 Annual cost of mixed power, 
 
 $69,755 00 
 
 Cost for seven years, . 
 
 . $488,285 00 
 
 If Mr. Brooks had used steam-power instead of water, the 
 annual cost would have been— 
 
 Interest on cost of engines, 
 Fuel, .... 
 Depreciation, . 
 
 $2,400 00 
 18,000 00 
 4,000 00 
 
 Annual cost of steam-power, . 
 
 $24,400 00 
 
32 
 
 Cost for seven years,.$170,800 00 
 
 Excess of cost of mixed power, . . . 317,485 00 
 
 So much for Mr. Brooks’ theorizing. True, this sum is a 
 mere trifle in the grand total of millions which the whole work 
 involves; but such as it is, a man of common sense would 
 have saved every dollar. 
 
 Mr. Brooks can look sharply after other people. He saw 
 very clearly the mote in Mr. Haupt’s eye, in the shape of forty 
 or fifty cents in the value at which the pound sterling was 
 computed below the legal rate, amounting, on the whole 
 amount of sterling scrip issued to Mr. Haupt, to some forty 
 thousand dollars. In equity, the claim of the State against 
 Mr. Brooks for this sum of $289,485, ultimately lost by build¬ 
 ing the Deerfield dam, stands on a better foundation than the 
 claim on which judgment has been rendered against Mr. Haupt. 
 But Mr. Haupt’s friends had deserted him, and Mr. Brooks’ 
 haven’t— yet. 
 
 We come now to a piece of folly in comparison with which 
 the transactions thus far examined have been the perfection of 
 wisdom. 
 
 The West Approach, or the Demoralized Rock. 
 
 The work here was suspended last September, and nothing 
 has since been done. Mr. Doane treads very gingerly over this 
 ground. His account of last year’s operations is so excellent a 
 specimen of how not to tell the whole truth, and yet not tell 
 a lie, that I copy it entire. 
 
 “In December, 1864, the heading was begun, and in a few weeks 
 reached a distance of one hundred and eleven feet, part of the distance 
 having been driven and timbered up at the rate of six feet per day. It 
 was very dry nearly all the way, and did not trouble the workmen by 
 caving, except when entering the face of the rock, and before the timber 
 support could reach the roof. 
 
 “ One Monday morning, it was found that the perpendicular forward 
 face of the heading had caved in, some time during Sunday, and that a 
 great deal of water was being discharged. The caving continued till it 
 reached the surface , forty feet overhead , so the heading was stopped .” 
 (Well it might be—forty feet of porridge!) 
 
33 
 
 u The thorough cut was afterwards extended by its different levels 
 • further east, and in June and July, 1865, some cribs were sunk down at 
 the forward end of the heading, advancing it about twenty-eight feet. 
 It was discovered that a large stream, coming up through a hole some 
 ten feet deep, was what stopped the heading in December. This is now 
 passed, but there is more or less water in front still, which makes it 
 somewhat difficult to get underground again by the ordinary methods, 
 though, I think, not impracticable. 
 
 “ But about the time these cribs had been sunk to grade, came the 
 west shaft developments, which, in connection with the facts learned by 
 sinking the wells, indicated the necessity of a change of plan. It was 
 found that there was little hope of reaching solid rock. Though a 
 heading could be driven through this material easier than the full-size 
 tunnel, it would have a tendency, if the enlargement did not at once 
 follow, to injure the texture and firmness of the rock, to enlarge the 
 water-filled fissures cut by the passage of the heading, and make the 
 enlargement of the tunnel more difficult. 
 
 “ It seemed evident enough that simple heading had better be aban¬ 
 doned ; that the tunnel should be commenced full size and permanently 
 lined either with brick or iron, as fast as the work advanced. As it 
 would require some time to choose between the methods of proceeding, 
 and as the season was so far advanced as to render it impossible to 
 make or get bricks in sufficient quantities, I thought it wise to stop fur¬ 
 ther work at once, and to send the men to the east end, where they 
 could profitably be employed in completing before winter what work 
 was there to be done.” 
 
 He then tries to convince himself that if he can get along 
 until he passes a brook overhead, he shall find better material; 
 and this in face of the fact that he has got to pass under a valley 
 which is the receptacle of all the water of the western slope of 
 the mountain ; that the time at which he was driven off by the 
 water was, according to his own statements, the driest month 
 ever known there; that all his test wells towards the west shaft, 
 up to the date of the report, reveal the same demoralized rock, 
 with large quantities of water; and that in the west heading 
 of the west shaft he encountered the same material, as related 
 in the following paragraph :— 
 
 “ In the last week of July, there was noticed a marked change in the 
 character of the rock. It began to look rusty in color, or sappy, as if 
 approaching the outside of the ledge. The drill-bits cutting before only 
 5 
 
34 
 
 three and three-fourths inches each, now cut ten inches each. Some 
 pieces of rock fell from the roof, which was a very unusual thing, and 
 large seams, filled with a decomposed rock, very much like that at the 
 west end began to appear. These seams also discharged very much 
 water. Fearing that further progress might reach ground that would 
 break in from above, and flood both headings, and it being especially 
 important that the east heading, having so far to penetrate, should not 
 be hindered, a discontinuance of the work in the west heading was 
 ordered on the 2d of August.” 
 
 And yet he thinks it “ not impracticable to get under¬ 
 ground.The difficulty is not so much in getting underground, 
 as in keeping on after he gets there. Nobody supposes it is 
 impracticable, with time and money; but the questions are,— 
 
 What will it Cost ? 
 and will it be worth the cost ? 
 
 The distance from the west shaft to the west face is 2,300 
 feet,—all demoralized rock. The only data we can gather from 
 Mr. Brooks’ reports upon which to estimate the cost of tunnel¬ 
 ling this 2,300 feet, are found in the cost of the work thus far 
 done at the west approach. The whole amount expended by 
 Mr. Brooks at the west approach has been $134,794. How 
 much advance has been made with this sum it is difficult to 
 ascertain. On page twenty-four of the report for 1864, (House 
 Document No. 3,1865,) he says, “ we have made an open cut at 
 this point,” (that is, the point where Mr. Haupt left off,) * * * 
 “ until we are arrived at the point where tunnelling is begun. 
 The first timbering was set up about twenty days ago, and some 
 progress has been made in penetrating towards the west shaft.” 
 How far the open cut was carried, or what progress was made 
 in tunnelling in twenty days, we have no means of knowing. 
 Both, in that bad material, could have amounted to but a few 
 feet. In his report this year Mr. Doane says, that “ in Decem¬ 
 ber, 1864, the heading was begun, and in a few weeks reached 
 a distance of 111 feet,” when, one Sunday, in utter contempt 
 of the fourth commandment, it caved in. “The thorough cut 
 was afterwards extended,” (how far, we don’t know,) and in 
 June and July cribs were sunk, “advancing the heading about 
 twenty-eight feet.” This,too, has now caved; and cribs, walls, 
 
35 
 
 timbers and all are submerged in porridge. From the best 
 information I can get, the actual progress from the point where 
 Mr. Haupt stopped is about 125 feet. But they have spent here 
 $134,794. A small portion of this has probably been spent in 
 repairing Mr. Haupt’s heading. Allowing $9,794 for that, (and, 
 from appearances, this is a liberal allowance,) and the cost of 
 this progress has been $125,000, or a thousand dollars a lineal 
 foot. At this rate, the 2,300 feet remaining will cost 
 $2,300,000! 
 
 But all experience thus far at this point proves that the 
 remainder of *the work will be much more difficult and 
 expensive than the commencement. The west heading of the 
 west shaft was stopped because they dared not go further for 
 fear of an inundation of porridge. The west face was 
 abandoned because of such inundation. Now let it be borne in 
 mind that the work was stopped by this irruption of water, in 
 September, the month in which the smallest amount of rain 
 fell of which we have any record. At Lowell, T 5 o 6 ^ of an inch; 
 at Amherst, in the tunnel region, t 3 q 8 ^. The amount of rain in 
 each of three other months—the driest months of the year 
 —was five times that in September. 1 have before me records 
 kept at several points in Massachusetts of the amount of rain 
 for each month, for several years ; and one of these gives the 
 fall of rain at Springfield, as follows :— 
 
 
 I860. 
 
 1861. 
 
 1863. 
 
 1863. 
 
 1864. 
 
 1865. 
 
 June, 
 
 4.12 
 
 3.31 
 
 10.04 
 
 1.70 
 
 0.56 
 
 3.74 
 
 July, 
 
 5.32 
 
 3.94 
 
 6.54 
 
 9.77 
 
 1.22 
 
 3.86 
 
 August, . 
 
 4.98 
 
 5.35 
 
 3.25 
 
 3.35 
 
 2.54 
 
 1.67 
 
 September, 
 
 4.93 
 
 3.36 
 
 1.83 
 
 2.44 
 
 2.61 
 
 .65 
 
 October,. 
 
 2.60 
 
 5.19 
 
 2.76 
 
 4.23 
 
 2.07 
 
 4.57 
 
 Aggregate for 5 m’ths, 
 
 DO O 7 
 
 21.95 
 
 21.15 
 
 24.42 
 
 21.49 
 
 9.00 
 
 14.49 
 
 It thus appears that the aggregate fall of rain in each of the 
 four years next preceding 1864, when they first struck the 
 demoralized rock, was from 133 to 170 per cent, greater than 
 
36 
 
 it was in 1864, and from 50 to 70 per cent, greater than it was 
 in 1865 ; that in the months of August and September of the 
 first four of these years, it was from two to four times greater 
 than in the same months of 1864 and 1865 ; and that in one 
 month it was sixteen times greater, and in others it was twelve 
 or fifteen times greater than in the month of September, when 
 they abandoned this work. 
 
 If the difficulties of penetrating this material were found 
 insurmountable last September, what will they be with five, ten, 
 sixteen times more water in the soil ? 
 
 With any appliances now at their command, they admit it to 
 be useless to attempt further progress. The practical 
 conclusion to which engineers have arrived, is that progress can 
 only be made by the use of shields similar to those used in the 
 Thames tunnel. Mr. Doane tries to think that a part of the work 
 may be done “ without the use of a shield ; ” but he discusses 
 the matter with the evident conviction that he will have to 
 use them. He says : 
 
 “Mr. Wm. C. Pickersgill, now of East Boston, an engineer who has 
 had experience in English tunnels, advises to put in a shield at once, 
 and has given me a plan of one. I do not think it exactly adapted to 
 our case. ” 
 
 Now, the only tunnel ever built through material at all 
 similar to this demoralized rock, is that under the Thames. 
 Generally the material in the Thames tunnel was much less 
 difficult of management than this porridge, as a large propor¬ 
 tion was a tenacious clay, nearly impervious to water. This 
 tunnel was commenced in March, 1825,and completed in August, 
 1842. Deducting seven years, during which the work was sus¬ 
 pended for want of means, the work occupied nearly eleven 
 years. The length is 1,300 feet. The cost was X614,000, or, 
 in round numbers, $3,070,000. This, remember, was at gold 
 prices for materials, with labor at “ starvation prices ”—sixty 
 cents a day, instead of two dollars, which is about the average 
 price at the Hoosac tunnel. The cost of the Thames tunnel 
 was $2,361 per lineal foot (!) in gold. At the same rate, the cost 
 of tunnelling the 2,300 feet of demoralized rock would be 
 $5,430,300 in gold! at prices prevailing here, at least double 
 
37 
 
 that amount. It is not strange that even Mr. Brooks hesitates 
 to attack it. 
 
 I see no reasons for inferring that this tunnel will cost less, 
 foot for foot, than did the Thames, unless Mr. Brooks’ friends 
 claim that he is a better engineer than Mr. Brunei. The 
 excavation for the Thames tunnel was 22J feet high and 38 
 feet wide ; after the masonry of the top and walls was built, 
 the clear area was about 15 feet high and 28 to 30 feet wide. 
 If walls of the same thickness as those in the Thames tunnel 
 will sustain this demoralized rock, the excavation here will be 
 a trifle less than there. But of that nobody can be sure. The 
 probability is that the masonry here must be thicker than was 
 necessary there, and that the original excavation must be even 
 larger than that. 
 
 Again, the irruptions of the river must have increased the 
 cost of the Thames tunnel. I cannot find, however, that these 
 casualties added largely to the cost. At the first irruption, 
 only 25,000 cubic feet of earth were thrown into the tunnel; 
 of course, the cost of removing this and pumping out the 
 water was an inconsiderable item. This occasioned a delay of 
 but a few weeks. The next irruption—the largest—occasioned 
 a delay of about three months. From the best information I 
 can get, the others were unimportant. The suspension of the 
 work for seven years, and the embarrassment for want of 
 means, also added somewhat to the cost. But all combined 
 make but a small amount in proportion to the whole cost,— 
 much less than the interest , which is not included in the 
 £614,000 given as the cost. 
 
 I repeat, then, we have n<* data for computing the cost of 
 this work, by comparison with similar works, so reliable as the 
 cost of the Thames tunnel, and these bring the cost of this up 
 to $5,430,300 in gold ! These figures seem fabulous; they 
 certainly are frightful. If Mr. Brooks can give any facts to 
 show their fallacy, let him produce them; but neither prophecy 
 nor rhetoric will do. And I undertake to say that responsible 
 contractors cannot be found who will guarantee to complete 
 this work for that sum. 
 
 With these facts before us, I hesitate to venture an estimate, 
 as a reliable one, of the 
 
38 
 
 Cost of completing the Tunnel. 
 
 Mr. Brooks says : 
 
 “ The original estimates contained in the Commissioners’ Report, 
 made in February, 1863, were based upon the cost of ordinary labor at 
 one dollar per day, and of materials at a corresponding rate. Since the 
 resumption of the work, so great has been the advance in every item of 
 expense incident to the prosecution of such an enterprise, that these 
 estimates must necessarily in that respect be modified. The Commis¬ 
 sioners feel confident that with such modification , the work may be 
 completed without any essential variation from the statements of cost 
 heretofore made.” 
 
 Ah, doubling the price of labor and materials is a very 
 “ essential variation.” 
 
 Mr. Brooks’ original estimates of cost were $5,719,330. 
 These estimates were based on the cost of ordinary labor at one 
 dollar per day of eleven hours. Mr. Doane says in his last 
 report— 
 
 “ Since December 10, 1864, wages have been unchanged. Outside 
 common laborers receive $1.50 per day of ten hours. Miners in the 
 enlargement of headings receive $2 per day of ten hours. Miners in 
 the east end and west shaft headings, as well as central shaft, receive 
 $2.25 per day of eight hours. So long as miners in the coal regions can 
 make from $5 to $8 per day, it is useless to think of reducing wages 
 upon the tunnel.” 
 
 The reduction of the hours of labor and the increase in price 
 makes the wages about double the rate upon which the original 
 estimates were based. Up to December 1,1864, wages of com¬ 
 mon laborers ranged from $1.25 to $1.75 per day, and of 
 miners, from $1.50 to $2.00. At no time have wages been as 
 low as one dollar per day ; so that all the work done up to 
 December 1864, cost from twenty-five to seventy-five per cent, 
 more than the original estimates. 
 
 We have no means of knowing the amount of money expended 
 in 1863, as Mr. Brooks' report for that year has never been 
 published , and after diligent search I have been unable to find it. 
 But in the report for 1864, the whole amount expended on the 
 work, since its assumption by the State up to December 1864, is 
 given as $415,483. Allowingone-halfofthis as expended in 1863 
 
39 
 
 and we have 8207,741, as the amount expended up to December, 
 1863, at prices on the basis originally assumed by Mr. Brooks. 
 We have then, (taken from first report, p. 57) :— 
 
 Advances made,.8968,862 00 
 
 Interest for eight years, . . * . . 462,585 00 
 
 Expended in 1863, . . . . . 207,741 00 
 
 Interest compounded, seven years at 5 per cent., 88,000 00 
 
 -:- 
 
 Amount expended to December, 1864, . . 81,727,188 00 
 
 Deducting this sum from the amount of Mr. Brooks’ original 
 estimates, 85,719,330, and we have 83,992,142 as the cost of 
 completing the work from December 1, 1864, on the original 
 basis of cost of labor and materials. At double the original 
 estimate for labor and materials, the cost would be 87,984,282. 
 
 But Mr. Brooks reckons interest at five per cent. The rate 
 for two years on our scrip, on account of the premium on gold, 
 has varied from seven to twelve per cent. Hereafter we cannot 
 expect to borrow a dollar for less than six per cent. This will 
 add, at least, another hundred thousand dollars to the estimate. 
 
 How much shall be added for the additional time which will 
 be necessary to complete it ? Three years of the eight which 
 Mr. Brooks allowed for completion, have already gone, and not 
 one-tenth of the work is done. How many years ? Three ? 
 five ? ten ? No sane man believes it will be completed in less 
 than ten years from this time. This adds interest for five 
 years ; say, (I will not stop to compute it,) a million of dollars. 
 
 How much shall be added for the cost of tunnelling the 
 demoralized rock ? Two ? three ? six millions ? The margin 
 is very wide. Call it three millions. We then have the follow¬ 
 ing as the cost of the whole work from its assumption by the 
 State:— 
 
 Cost to December, 1864, . 
 
 Mr. Brooks’ estimate from that date, 
 
 Extra interest, ...... 
 
 Interest on above for additional five years, 
 Demoralized rock, . . . 
 
 Interest on last item, averaging five years, 
 compounded at six per cent., 
 
 81,727,188 00 
 3,992,142 00 
 100,000 00 
 1,000,000 00 
 3,000,000 00 
 
 1,012,600 00 
 
 Total cost, . 
 
 .810,831,930 00 
 
40 
 
 Now, I am well aware to liow large an extent such estimates 
 must be conjectural; but I challenge exception to any of these 
 items as extravagant. We do know this, that hitherto actual 
 results have exhibited a cost very largely exceeding the esti¬ 
 mates. I say further, that not an unbiassed and competent 
 engineer can be found who will not give it as his judgment that 
 the cost will far exceed these estimates rather than fall short 
 at all; and I know, still further, that no responsible contrac¬ 
 tors .can be found who will guarantee to complete the work for 
 this sum; and that, after all, is the best practical test of the 
 cost. 
 
 We come now to the great question— 
 
 What is to be done ? 
 
 The State has expended thus far,— 
 
 Advances to January, 1863, and interest, 
 Expended in 1863 and 1864, 
 
 Expended in 1865, .... 
 
 $1,431,447 00 
 415,483 00 
 477,142 00 
 
 Total to December, 1865, 
 
 $2,324,072 00 
 
 If we stop now, we sink all this, except what the machines 
 would sell for. 
 
 The cost of machinery has been,— 
 
 In 1863 and 1864, . . 
 
 ... 
 
 $252,917 00 
 
 In 1865, .... 
 
 This might be sold, perhaps 
 
 , as follows : 
 
 241,600 00 
 
 $494,517 00 
 
 Deerfield Dam, . 
 
 . 
 
 $10,000 00 
 
 Machinery, say 20 per cent, on 
 
 cost, $484,517, 
 
 96,900 00 
 
 Iron on hand, say, 
 
 . 
 
 250,000 00 
 
 Tunnel effects in liquidation, 
 
 ... 
 
 $356,900 00 
 
41 
 
 Deducting this sum from total cost to December, 1865, and 
 we have $1,947,172 as the loss which the State must pocket, if 
 we stop now. 
 
 Will it pay to go on ? Let bygones be bygones; is it better 
 to sink what we have spent, or to send new dollars enough 
 after the old ones to finish the job ? I have made the 
 
 Total estimate of cost, .... $10,881,930 00 
 
 Expended up to this time, .... 2,324,072 00 
 
 Cost of completing, on this estimate, . . $8,507,858 00 
 
 We come then to the practical question : Is the Tunnel worth 
 completing at a cost of eight and a half millions of dollars ? 
 
 This question is to be viewed in two aspects: First, Will it 
 pay in the additional facility it gives for business with the West, 
 thus indirectly increasing the wealth of the State ? Second, 
 Will the traffic pay for the investment? These questions 
 are so closely related that they will, to some extent, be 
 considered together. 
 
 The Indirect Advantages. 
 
 Will the additional facilities which the tunnel route 
 will give to the business of the West with Massachusetts, 
 justify its completion ? At the start we throw out the 
 through passenger traffic; for Mr. Brooks admits, in his 
 first report, that “ the Western road will take the greater 
 part of the through Boston passengers,” though lie thinks the 
 Tunnel route will divide the Saratoga pleasure-passengers with 
 the Western Railroad. He says, “ If no bridge should be built 
 at Albany, and if no change of cars be required on the Tunnel 
 route east of Schenectady, the physical advantages of the 
 routes, so far as time is concerned, may be considered as nearly 
 balanced.” But the bridge at Albany is built, and though, of 
 course, it will not be impracticable to arrange for running 
 through from Schenectady to Boston without change of cars, 
 no man knows better than Mr. Brooks that the practical 
 difficulties of making such an arrangement are quite serious. 
 Between Schenectady and Boston, by the Tunnel route, there 
 are five different railroad corporations : the Schenectady and 
 6 
 
42 
 
 Troy, the Troy and Boston, (both in New York,) the 
 Troy and Greenfield, (or the tunnel, owned by the State,) 
 the Yermont and Massachusetts, and the Fitchburg. Between 
 Albany and Boston there are two, soon to be united 
 in one. He admits that the advantage which the Western road 
 has of a double track all the way, “ will more than compensate 
 for the difference in length, which must be computed from 
 Schenectady, where it is hut five miles.” He concedes another 
 great advantage to the Western road. “ The travel between 
 Springfield and Boston is very large ; this, added to the New 
 York travel through that city, renders it profitable to run two, 
 and sometimes three express passenger trains per day. By 
 taking the western passengers on these trains, they are enabled, 
 without any extra expense, to give them great dispatch over 
 this half of their line. ” He is therefore forced to admit that 
 “ the Western road will command the greater part of the 
 through Boston passengers.’’ We dismiss, therefore, the 
 passenger traffic from constituting an element of the exigency 
 for another route to the West. 
 
 We come, then, to the 
 
 Freight Traffic. 
 
 After examining other routes, Mr. Brooks admits that “ the 
 Boston and Albany road is the best freight line between Boston 
 and the West, and it is with this that the tunnel route should 
 be compared. ” 
 
 The Comparative Length of the Routes. 
 
 It seems to have been taken for granted that there is a large 
 saving in distance by the Tunnel route, over the Western. As 
 a specimen of these disingenuous—I will not say dishonest— 
 attempts to mystify the public on this point, look at a table of 
 distances given by Hon. Alvali Crocker, in a speech in the 
 Senate in 1862. True, he states that it is “ a table.of distances 
 from Troy; ” but the table is got up to show the advantage of 
 the Tunnel route over the Western, and the design is to give 
 the impression that it is a fair statement of the relative merits 
 of the two routes in this respect. Otherwise, the table has no 
 meaning. Thus he gives the distance “ to Boston, via Western 
 railroad, 208 miles; ” “ via Troy and Greenfield, 189 miles.” 
 
43 
 
 Most people would understand this to mean that Boston is 
 nineteen miles nearer to the West by the Tunnel route than by 
 the Western. The rest of his table is equally deceptive, or 
 more so.' 
 
 Now, the competing point is Schenectady. All the through 
 traffic for both these routes comes to that point. Thence it is 
 brought either by the New York Central road to Albany, for 
 the Western road, or by the local roads there diverging to 
 Troy, for the Tunnel route. The distances from Schenectady 
 to Boston are, 
 
 From Boston to Schenectady, by Tunnel line, . 212 miles. 
 From Boston to Schenectady, by Western line, . 217 miles. 
 
 The difference in the length of the lines is thus conceded to 
 be five miles. This is more than offset by the difference between 
 the distance of the Western Railroad freight depot and 
 the centre of business in Boston, and that of the Fitchburg 
 freight depot and the same centre, with the inconvenience to 
 the Fitchburg freight of the intervening drawbridge. Add to 
 this the consideration that the growth of Boston must be east 
 and south of the Western depot, bringing that still nearer the 
 centre of business. Now, though a truckman, in making a 
 contract to carry miscellaneous freight to and from all the 
 railroads in Boston, might not make any difference when the 
 Fitchburg freight forms a very inconsiderable portion of the 
 whole, yet when we are talking about hundreds of thousands of 
 tons, these considerations form quite a material element. For 
 all practical purposes, then, the distances between Boston and 
 Schenectady, by the two routes, may be considered equal. 
 
 Engineering Characteristics of the Routes. 
 
 The principal stock in trade of the tunnellites has been the 
 alleged superiority of the Tunnel route over the Western, in 
 the matter of grades. (They keep wisely silent about the 
 curvature.) So noisy and so persistent has been the clamor, 
 that the public has come almost to believe that the high grades 
 on the Western' road presented an insurmountable barrier to 
 their transporting the Western freight which is seeking an 
 avenue to Boston. Mr. Crocker says, in the speech before 
 
44 
 
 referred to, “ assuming grade and curvature to govern the 
 maximum load of a train, it is believed that an ordinary freight 
 engine of twenty-four tons will draw fifteen hundred barrels of 
 flour on the Tunnel line with the same facility as eight hundred 
 upon the Western! ” It is by such preposterous statements, 
 made by men whom the community are accustomed to believe 
 in other matters, that the exigency for another railroad to the 
 West has come to be regarded as proved. And yet it is just 
 such men as Mr. Crocker that the tunnel interest sends to the 
 general court to enlighten the legislative mind upon grave 
 questions of public policy, and they talk to me of “ tunnel on 
 the brain. ” I do not impugn their general honesty or common 
 sense ; but any statements coming from such partisans are enti¬ 
 tled to just as much credit as were the vagaries of honest old 
 Gabriel Thompson upon the quadrature of the circle. 
 
 Mr. Brooks, in his first report, makes the best case he can in 
 favor of the tunnel as a freight line, and his figures differ very 
 widely from Mr. Crocker’s. He says: “ It has been found that 
 the locomotive which would haul an average of 86 j 8 q 7 q- tons 
 upon the Western Railroad route, would take 102 tons, or 
 17 ^q per cent, more, upon the Tunnel route.” On this basis, 
 Mr. Crocker’s engine, which would take 1,500 barrels of flour 
 over the Tunnel route, would take 1,277 barrels, instead of 
 800, over the Western road. So widely do doctors disagree. 
 
 After the statement in the extract above quoted from Mr. 
 Brooks’ report, he goes on to say : “ A net saving is therefore 
 made of 28 per cent, of 17 t 4 q per cent., or about 5 per cent, of 
 the total cost of transportation, by reason of the easier con¬ 
 trolling grades of the Tunnel route.” He then says, “ This, 
 represented by miles, would reduce the distance from 189 to 
 179^ miles, or say 180 miles,” (he is very liberal in throwing 
 in this half mile, especially when he had put the distance 
 to Troy a mile and a half less than he had elsewhere stated 
 it to be,) “ and reduce the general cost of transportation 
 between Boston and the Hudson River ten per cent.” Now, it 
 does not follow that, because the distance is ten per cent, 
 less, the cost of freight will be ten per cent, less* for 
 everybody knows that the longer the line, the* less, relatively, 
 as compared with a shorter line, will be the cost of carrying 
 through freight. Again, in order to secure his ten per cent. 
 
45 
 
 saving, he is obliged to assume that the New York Central 
 Boad will always deliver freight at Troy, four miles further, at 
 the same rates as at Albany ; and he argues that “ even should 
 a bridge be built across the river at Albany, it will probably be 
 as cheap for that company to send a part of its business to 
 Troy, as to incur the inconvenience of passing it through the 
 crowded Albany terminus.” And he supposes anybody will 
 believe this, when, with the bridge built, there will be a con¬ 
 tinuous track from Buffalo to Boston, and Albany is no more 
 the terminus for through freight than is Schenectady, or Utica, 
 or any other point on the line. Besides, as I have shown, the 
 inconvenience of diverging, at Schenectady, from the natural 
 line of traffic, and passing four miles further over a local road, 
 and the increased distance of the Fitchburg freight depot from 
 the centre of business i$ Boston, more than compensate for the 
 difference in length between the Tunnel and the Western 
 routes. However, for present purposes, it is not necessary to 
 split hairs, and the results will show that we can afford to be 
 liberal. We will therefore proceed upon the basis that the 
 Tunnel route will save ten per cent, of the cost of trans¬ 
 portation. 
 
 Mr. Brooks, in his first report, (pp. 82-85) states his claim 
 for the amount of through freight business for the Tunnel 
 route at its opening at the end of eight years. The basis of his 
 whole estimate is a “ statement (on page 82) of the freight 
 business between Albany, Boston and Brighton, from 1843 to 
 1862, inclusive.” Pray, what has he to do with the freight 
 between Boston, Albany and Brighton, in estimating the traffic 
 for the Tunnel route ? He might as well have got up a table 
 of freight between Boston, Albany and Springfield. Not a ton 
 of freight between the West and Brighton will pass over the 
 Tunnel route ; and no man knows this better than Mr. Brooks. 
 The statement is of the same character as the rest of the Tun¬ 
 nel statistics—thoroughly dishonest, and intended to deceive. 
 Adopting the false data of this table, Mr. Brooks, on page 
 84, boldly states the following : 
 
 “ Boston and Albany through freight for 1862 was 176,805 
 tons.” He knew that that included all the live stock to 
 Brighton, for he had before him the returns of the Western 
 
46 
 
 Railroad for 1862, which 
 as follows— 
 
 From Boston to Albany, . 
 From Albany to Boston, . 
 
 Total, 
 
 gave the actual through freight 
 
 . 22,785 tons. 
 
 . 118,040 “ 
 
 . 135,825 tons, 
 
 instead of 176,805 tons, as he states it. He included 41,000 
 tons of Brighton local freight as through freight to Boston. I 
 fully believe, at least I devoutly hope, that no such discredita¬ 
 ble deception can be found in any other public document in 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 The result is still more deceptive when the receipts for this 
 Brighton freight are included in the item of receipts for through 
 freight; as the freight on live stock is myicli larger per ton than 
 on any other class of freight. 
 
 This error vitiates his whole calculation ; for he makes it the 
 basis of his estimate of the traffic of other connecting lines. 
 In correcting his table, I will, however, deduct only the 
 Brighton freight, and his table on page 84 will stand as follows : 
 
 Boston and Albany through freight for 1862, . 185,825 tons. 
 
 Freight of competing lines, .... 103,258 “ 
 
 Total, . . . . 
 
 Add 60 per cent, for increase, . 
 
 239,083 tons. 
 143,450 “ 
 
 Total 8 years hence, . 
 
 382,533 tons. 
 
 The Tunnel line he claims one-third of this, 
 And receive for through freight, 
 
 Which would be, per mile, 
 
 127,511 tons. 
 1438,383 00 
 2,295 00 
 
 • In this table, Mr. Brooks figures for 189 miles as the length 
 of his road; I have figured on its true length, 191 miles, as 
 Mr. Brooks elsewhere makes it. Giving to the Tunnel the 
 proportion which belongs to its 43f miles, and we have 
 $100,223.00 as the gross earnings for through freight the first 
 year of its working. 
 
 We will now examine Mr. Brooks’ table of “ Estimated 
 Earnings” on page 95 of his first report. For the local 
 
47 
 
 business, this is based on calculations made on pages 65, 66 
 and 67. As a curiosity, I copy a part of this table. 
 
 Estimated Earnings. 
 
 From local passengers, #1,382.00 per mile for 44 
 
 miles,.#60,808 00 
 
 From local freight, #2,140 per mile for 44 miles, 94,160 00 
 
 From through passengers, #400.00 per mile for 
 
 44 miles, . .. 17,600 00 
 
 From through freight, #2,716.00 per mile for 44 
 
 miles,. 119,504 00 
 
 Mails and express, &c.,. 10,000 00 
 
 Total earnings on line, .... #302,072 00 
 Deduct 55 per cent, for operating expenses, . 166,139 00 
 
 Net earned on road, ..... #135,933 00 
 
 Now, on page 65, Mr. Brooks has a statement made to a 
 committee of the legislature in 1861, giving the entire receipts 
 for a year, for freight and passengers, on the line between 
 Greenfield and North Adams. Everybody knows that these 
 estimates are always put up to the utmost limit of truth. The 
 total receipts are #41,911.00, and this, too, at prices more than 
 double railroad rates. Fifteen thousand dollars would be a 
 large figure for this traffic on the railroad. And yet Mr. 
 Brooks claims from this local traffic, the first year the tunnel 
 opens , #154,968.00 ! How does Mr. Brooks figure this ? He 
 says, (p. 67,) 
 
 “ The local business of the Western Railroad, between Springfield 
 and Albany, for the year ending November 30, 1861, was,— 
 
 For local passengers,.$1,589 00 per mile. 
 
 For local freight,. 2,460 00 “ “ 
 
 “ Estimating that for the Troy and Greenfield at 87 per cent, of this, 
 it will be,— 
 
 For local passengers, . . . . $1,382 00 per mile. 
 
 For local freight,. 2,140 00 per mile.” 
 
48 
 
 That is, the Tunnel line will have, between Greenfield and 
 Troy, the first year it is opened , 87 per cent, of the same 
 amount of business that the Western Railroad has between 
 Springfield and Albany, after having been twenty years devel¬ 
 oping the resources of its line! The whole argument under 
 the head of “ earnings ” is thoroughly illogical, Jesuitical and 
 insulting to the intelligence of the legislature to which it was 
 addressed. Talk of the undeveloped water-power on this 
 line ! Why, there is ten times more unemployed water-power 
 between Westfield and Pittsfield, within twenty rods of the line 
 of a railroad which has been “ developing ” this power for 
 twenty years, than there is on the entire Tunnel line between 
 Deerfield and North Adams. 
 
 Let us return to Mr. Brooks’ table of “ estimated earnings.” 
 We have seen that he claimed for through freight, “ 12,716.00 
 per mile for 44 miles, 1119,504.00.” But deducting Brighton 
 freight, he is entitled, on this basis, to 12,295.00 per mile s 
 total, $100,980.00. This amount, deducted from $119,504.00, 
 gives $18,524.00 as the amount of Mr. Brooks’ over claim for 
 the Brighton freight. Deducting this from Mr. Brooks’ gross 
 earnings, $802,072.00, and we have $283,548.00 as the gross 
 earnings. Deducting 55 per cent, of this for working expenses, 
 ($155,951.00,) and we have $127,597.00 as the net earnings 
 he claims. This is 2 T 2 F per cent, on the whole estimated cost 
 of the road, $5,719,330.00, or 2 t 9 q per cent, on $4,287,883.00, 
 which he estimated it would then cost to finish the road. And 
 this is the best result Mr. Brooks can conjure out of his 
 extravagant estimates of the traffic. 
 
 How, then, does Mr. Brooks foot up a remunerating income ? 
 He rests in a contract by which the Troy and Boston, the 
 Vermont and Massachusetts, and the Fitchburg Railroad 
 Companies agree to pay to the State of Massachusetts one-fifth 
 of the gross receipts from all their freight and passenger traffic 
 which passes over any part of the Troy and Greenfield Railroad, 
 until the tunnel earns six per cent, net on its final cost! To 
 this humiliation has Mr. Brooks reduced the State of Massa¬ 
 chusetts. He must get the tunnel built; he must commit the 
 State to the work ; he knew it would not pay ; and he applies 
 to the soulless corporations which the State created, to keep 
 
49 
 
 the State out of the folly into which he was determined to 
 plunge her. 
 
 Let us see what these corporations have agreed to do. 
 Suppose their gross receipts in a given traffic are $1,000. 
 Fifty-five per cent, of this goes to working expenses, leaving 
 $450 as their net earnings. Twenty per cent, of the gross 
 sum, that is, $200, goes to the State of Massachusetts; 
 leaving $250 as their net earnings on this traffic. And this 
 contract is made by one road which pays no dividends and has 
 no surplus ; which has not added a dollar to its equipment for 
 I don’t know how many years ; and whose stock is selling at 
 forty cents on the dollar; and they thus fling away nearly one- 
 lialf of the net profits of their whole through traffic until the 
 tunnel pays six per cent, on its cost, from the profits of its 
 legitimate business; that is, for all time. Is anybody so 
 verdant as to suppose such a contract will be kept ? Does 
 anybody think so meanly of Massachusetts as to suppose she 
 would ever attempt to enforce it ? Nobody but Mr. Brooks. 
 He, it is understood, chuckles over it as the smartest act of his 
 life. 
 
 A rich English railway contractor was asked how he made so 
 much money, while others were ruined. “Oh, I never sign 
 a contract until my lawyer assures me there is a loophole ! ” 
 There will be loopholes found in this contract bigger than the 
 Hoosac bore. 
 
 But admitting that this contract will be fulfilled ; what does 
 Mr. Brooks figure up for net income ? He claims,— 
 
 “ Net earnings of his road, .... $135,933 00 
 Receivable under contract with other roads, . 124,336 00 
 
 Total net earnings and receipts, . . . $260,269 00 
 
 This is 4 t 5 q 5 £- per cent, on the whole estimated capital and 
 interest of . . . . . . . $5,719,330 00 
 
 It is 6 t per cent, upon the estimated capital 
 and interest required to complete the road and 
 tunnel, which is.$4,287,833 00.” 
 
 Remember, nearly half of his net income is to come from 
 this contract; if this fails, where is his income? Again, he 
 puts the cost of completing at $4,287,833 ; I think I have 
 7 
 
50 
 
 shown that it must cost double that; and it may cost four 
 times that. Where, then, will be his income ? 
 
 The truth is, the attempt to prove that this concern will ever 
 produce a remunerating income, is thoroughly dishonest. If 
 Mr. Brooks believed it, he would put his own money into it; 
 the blatant advocates of the enterprise would invest theirs in 
 it. They know better. For ten or fifteen years these disinter¬ 
 ested gentlemen have exhausted their powers in trying to 
 induce others to invest in this thing. Boston capitalists were 
 deluged with statistics ; but no subscriptions were forthcoming. 
 Frantic appeals were made to individuals and towns on the 
 line, the result of which was quite a number of subscriptions 
 from men of small means, with but very few, (and those very , 
 small,) from the wealthy ; the general rule being that, the 
 larger the subscriptions, the smaller the percentage paid in. 
 The rich ones and the knowing ones were shy. Through the 
 press, in the legislature, on the stump, they urged others to 
 “ go in. ” “ They bind heavy burdens and grievous to be 
 
 borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders, but they themselves 
 will not move them with one of their fingers. ” 
 
 They inveigled many a hard-earned fifty or hundred dollars 
 out of the farmers ; but where are their own thousands ? 
 Let us look at some names on the list of subscriptions. 
 
 
 Number of 
 
 Shares. 
 
 Paid in. 
 
 D. N. Carpenter,. 
 
 30 
 
 $780 00 
 
 Otis Clapp, “ services, ”. 
 
 2 
 
 200 00 
 
 Alvah Crocker, “ services, ” . 
 
 15 
 
 1,500 00 
 
 George T. Davis,. 
 
 20 
 
 460 00 
 
 W. T. Davis,. 
 
 20 
 
 430 00 
 
 H. L. Dawes,. 
 
 27 
 
 135 00 
 
 E. fj. Derby, “ services, ” .... 
 
 1 
 
 100 00 
 
 W. T. Davis,. 
 
 10 
 
 000 00 
 
 Whiting Griswold,. 
 
 5 
 
 60 00 
 
 John W. Griswold, (Troy,) .... 
 
 1 
 
 80 00 
 
 Lamson, Goodnow & Co.,. 
 
 50 
 
 2,275 00 
 
 u u « 
 
 50 
 
 000 00 
 
 George Millard, . ; 
 
 11 
 
 1,100 00 
 
 H. Smith, . . . 
 
 2 
 
 190 00 
 
 E. R. Tinker, ....... 
 
 2 
 
 120 00 
 
 Daniel S. Richardson,. 
 
 0! 
 
 00 00! 
 
 Total,. 
 
 246 
 
 $7,430 00 
 
51 
 
 Of the sum actually paid in, $1,800 is put down as paid 
 in “ services,” leaving $5,630 paid in cash. I presume that 
 Messrs. Lamson, Goodnow & Co. paid their assessments in land 
 damages, as they settled with Mr. Brooks for $3,000 in that 
 way ; and that Messrs. George T. and W. T. Davis, and D. 
 N. Carpenter, paid theirs also in “ services.” But letting these 
 stand as cash payments, and we have the pitiful sum of $5,630 
 as the contribution of the leaders to this great enterprise. For 
 this list comprises the names of the men who have “ run this 
 machine” for the last fifteen years. Look at them. E. H. 
 Derby, president of the Fitchburg Railroad—a road which 
 would derive immense benefit from the completion of the 
 • tunnel; who poured out such streams of honeyed eloquence to 
 persuade others into investment,—he risked $100 in “ services.” 
 Otis Clapp, the only Boston “ capitalist ” on the list, who has 
 got up volumes of statistics to prove the profitableness of 
 the investment—he invested $200 in “ services.” Alvah 
 Crocker, the Ajax Telamon of the enterprise, who, in addition 
 to his other herculean labors, has neglected his private interests 
 for I don’t know how many winters, and labored as a lobby 
 member, and even submitted to the sacrifice of accepting 
 repeatedly a seat in the Senate ; with large investments in the 
 Fitchburg Railroad to be doubled in value by the success of 
 this work—he contributed $1,500 in “services!” Whiting 
 Griswold has devoted the vigorous powers of ingenuous youth 
 to this great work, and has shown his faith in its success 
 by contributing—$60! in “ services ” ? These last two 
 gentlemen have done more than all others combined, in 
 saddling this load upon the State, and their joint contribu¬ 
 tions in cash are $60! John W. Griswold, (I suppose this 
 means John A.; if not, he subscribed nothing!) of Troy—a 
 city which is to surpass its rival, Albany, when this road is 
 opened—at the head of the Iron Company, which received 
 seventy odd thousand dollars from the State treasury in 
 payment for iron sold to Mr. Haupt, and which the State had 
 once paid for—he paid $80. Surely, it requires more than 
 the exercise of the charity which believeth all things, to give 
 to these gentlemen the slightest credit for sincerity in their 
 noisy professions of faith in the pecuniary results of this 
 enterprise. 
 
52 
 
 But, waiving all considerations of dividends, will the great 
 indirect advantages of the tunnel route, in opening another 
 avenue for Western trade, justify the State in prosecuting the 
 work ? 
 
 One important question in considering this matter, is—Will 
 the tunnel route open a new traffic ? Will it tap the West at 
 a different point from existing routes ? If it established a 
 better connection with the Erie Railroad than now exists, or 
 with the traffic which reaches the seaboard by way of Lake 
 Ontario, it would be a great point in its favor. But, 
 confessedly, it does nothing of the kind. It simply goes to 
 Schenectady, and then asks the New York Central road for a 
 share in the traffic which otherwise would come to Albany, f 
 and such portion of it as the Western Railroad could accommo¬ 
 date, to Boston. Clearly, then, the tunnel can make, no 
 pretensions that it will bring an additional ton of Western 
 freight to Boston, provided the Western road has capabilities 
 for bringing all that offers. 
 
 In dealing with this matter, we are to consider only the 
 question whether the Western road is capable of bringing 
 eastward , from Albany, all the traffic that seeks Boston. 
 Within the last five years, that road has carried 130,000 tons 
 of through freight, and 700,000 tons of local freight westward, 
 and it has brought 532,000 tons of through freight, and 
 1,700,000 tons of local freight, eastward. These figures show 
 that it can fully accommodate all westward-bound freight. 
 We come then to the pivotal question ? 
 
 What are the Capabilities of the Western Railroad for 
 Eastward-bound Freight ? 
 
 I shall not waste time in repelling the charge that I write 
 in the interests of the Western Railroad. I have not spoken 
 to the president of that road since I met him in the Constitu¬ 
 tional Convention in 1852 until five months ago, when I met 
 him and was introduced to him in the cars. I never saw the 
 superintendent until within four months, when I had occasion 
 to call at his office to inquire whether I would be sure of fifteen 
 minutes before the Albany train started eastward. I never 
 knew the attorney of the road until he was appointed supreme 
 judge ; and I never had any communication or correspondence 
 
53 
 
 with any of these gentlemen or with any person connected with 
 the road, (except that I applied for and received within ten 
 days some statistics of traffic,) except once or twice to complain 
 of misconduct on the part of their employees. I have never 
 received a dollar, directly or indirectly, from any person con¬ 
 nected with the road towards the expenses I have incurred in 
 “ fighting the tunnel,” or for any purpose whatever, except, 
 (if it be an exception) half a dozen free passes from personal 
 friends. I would not refer to this, were it not for the shame¬ 
 less insinuations freely circulated by men who are incapable 
 of conceiving that any man can perform a public duty from 
 any but mercenary motives. 
 
 What are the capabilities of the Western Railroad for traffic 
 eastward from Albany ? In 1864 it brought the largest amount 
 of through freight ever brought to Boston in one year, 116,974 
 tons ; in 1865, 87,254 tons.* Now I am not considering what 
 
 ♦The following is among the statistics referred to as having been received 
 from Springfield : 
 
 To the inquiry as to the cause for the falling off in the number of tons of 
 through freight in 1865, as compared with that in 1864, no satisfactory answer 
 can be given. In the item of flour, however, the falling off is especially to be 
 seen. Thus: 
 
 In 1864, number of bbls. of flour carried to Boston was . . 590,265 bbls. 
 
 In 1865, “ “ “ “ “ “ . . 363,844 “ 
 
 A falling off of. 226,421 bbls. 
 
 Or, estimating 10 bbls to a ton, .... 22,642 tons. 
 We find upon inquiry, that the New York Central Railroad brought this year 
 to tide water (viz Albany and Troy) over 800,000 bbls of flour less than in 
 1864. Furthermore, 
 
 The Canal brought to tide water in 1864, . . • 1,190,000 bbls. 
 
 “ “ “ “ 1865, . . . 1,014,600 “ 
 
 Less in 1865 than 1864, .... 176,400 bbls. 
 
 Add to this, 
 
 Falling off on the New York Central, .... 800,000 bbls. 
 
 And there results, 
 
 Less in 1865 than 1864,. 975,400 bbls. 
 
 The following figures which I have taken from the Report of the New York 
 Central Railroad, will show the amount of their freight business this year as 
 compared with that of 1864 : 
 
 
 Tons going 
 West. 
 
 Tons going 
 
 East. 
 
 Tons 
 
 Through. 
 
 Tons Way. 
 
 1864, . 
 
 1865, . 
 
 412,986 
 
 382,762 
 
 1,144,162 
 
 892,537 
 
 766,569 
 
 640,575 
 
 790,579 
 
 634,724 
 
 Decrease, .... 
 
 30,224 
 
 251,625 
 
 126,094 
 
 155,855 
 
54 
 
 the Western Railroad has done with a ferry at Albany, with 
 forty miles of single track, with its present equipment and 
 under its present management; but what it is capable of doing 
 with a bridge over the Hudson, with a double track all the 
 way, and under a management fully alive to the duty of 
 making available the highest resources of modern railroad 
 science and of meeting the commercial exigencies of the day. 
 
 It is discreditable that our great thoroughfare to the West is 
 still hampered in its resources by forty miles of single track. 
 But surely the State which owns eleven thousand shares of the 
 stock and holds 14,000,000 in its bonds, and has four directors 
 on its Board, must share the responsibility of this state of things 
 with the directors elected by the stockholders. At any rate, 
 the remedy is in the hands of the State, as she can at any 
 moment take the road out of the hands of the corporation. 
 
 A million of dollars will lay another track over the deficient 
 section. Another million expended for freight locomotives and 
 cars will quadruple its capacity for through freight. Two mil¬ 
 lions thus expended will give the road six or eight times its 
 present capacity. With a double track, and with such an 
 equipment there is hardly a limit to the capabilities of a rail¬ 
 road. Thus, the Pennsylvania Railroad is to-day taking 
 freight trains of two hundred and forty tons each over its 
 road with a grade of 95 feet to the mile for fifteen miles; 
 whereas, the maximum grade on the Western road eastward is 
 75^- feet to the mile for seven miles. This load of 240 tons is 
 the gross weight of cars and freight, exclusive of engine and 
 tender. Freight cars, well filled as through cars always are, 
 constitute something less than fifty per cent, of the gross 
 weight of the train. This will give something over fifty per 
 cent, as the proportion of paying freight.* Calling the net 
 
 *1 am indebted to a friend for the following statement: 
 
 In 1864 for each ton of merchandise carried one mile the 
 Boston & Lowell Railroad carried in weight of freight cars (as esti¬ 
 
 mated per Reports,).15 tons. 
 
 Boston & Maine Railroad,.1.33 “ 
 
 Boston & Providence Railroad,.1.5 “ 
 
 Boston & Worcester Railroad,.138 “ 
 
 Western Railroad,. 1.398 “ 
 
 Average,.. . .1.42 tons. 
 
 That is to say, for a gross load, exclusive of engine and tender of 100 tons, 
 but 41.3 tons of paying freight. 
 
 When the cars are full, as to weight, 100 tons gross load would contain 55.5 
 tons of paying freight, showing how much the cost of motive power is affected 
 by the nature of the traffic, independently of the profits of the line. 
 
55 
 
 freight as fifty per cent, of the whole load, and we have 120 
 tons of paying freight to each train. On a double track road, 
 with double the number of passenger trains now run by the 
 Western road, freight trains can be run every twenty minutes 
 and keep out of the way of passenger trains. We will esti¬ 
 mate for a freight train each half hour. This will give 240 
 tons of freight per hour, 5,760 tons per day, and 1,797,120 
 tons in the year of 812 working days. This is twenty times 
 the amount of freight brought eastward by the Western road 
 last year. Mr. Brooks, (First Report, p. 84,) figures the total 
 freight from the West to Boston eight years hence at 448,101 
 tons, which his road is going to help the Western road to bring. 
 My calculation proves that the Western road alone can bring 
 1,797,120 tons—more than four times his estimates of the 
 whole freight eight years hence. 
 
 But this calculation assumes that freight engines are used of 
 the same size, or but a trifle larger than those now used on the 
 Western road ; whereas, engines are now built, specially 
 adapted to heavy traffic, which will carry nearly double the load 
 above stated. The introduction of them would increase the 
 capacity of the Western road to over three millions of tons 
 eastward annually. Practically, there is hardly a limit to the 
 freighting capabilities of a double track road with adequate 
 equipment. 
 
 But cavillers may say, “ These are estimates ; give us results 
 actually accomplished.” They are estimates; but their cor¬ 
 rectness cannot be disputed. However, here are facts. The 
 New York Central road, with a local traffic probably three 
 times as large as that of the Western Railroad, brought to 
 Albany last year 600,000 tons of through freight. What 
 hinders the Western road, with double track and fully equip¬ 
 ped, bringing the same amount of freight to Boston ? The 
 Pennsylvania railroad, with ninety-five feet grade, carried 
 147,978 tons from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, and from Pitts¬ 
 burg to Philadelphia 382,000 tons up lighter grades. These 
 are facts; and what this road can do, the Western can do. 
 
 But the old bugbear of the high grade on the Western road. 
 Of course, no one denies that the Tunnel line has this advan¬ 
 tage ; that its maximum grade going east is 52^- feet, while 
 that of the Western is 75J feet. But this is only a question of 
 
56 
 
 increased cost of freight. With auxiliary power used on the 
 five miles of maximum grade near Pittsfield, this disadvantage 
 would be entirely overcome. With this overcome, the Western 
 line is exactly equal as to grades, (in curves it has the advan¬ 
 tage,) to the Tunnel line. What will it cost to put these two 
 roads on a par in this respect ? 
 
 But first, let us see what Mr. Brooks figures out as the saving 
 on freight by his road over the Western. He claims that the 
 whole through freight from the West to Boston, eight years 
 hence, will be 448,101 tons, say 448,000 tons. The average 
 price per ton received for through freight last year by the West¬ 
 ern road was 14.88. At this rate the gross receipts for 448,000 
 tons would be $2,186,240. Mr. Brooks claims that his road 
 can carry freight five per cent, cheaper than the Western. 
 This would amount to $109,812. Assuming that the Tunnel 
 will cost ten millions, we have a saving of a fraction over one 
 per cent, on the cost of his road. And for this insignificant 
 item Mr. Brooks would commit the State to an expenditure of 
 ten millions of dollars. 
 
 But the additional cost of carrying this freight over the West¬ 
 ern road will fall far short of this. It reduces itself simply to 
 the cost of auxiliary power to haul the freight up the five miles 
 of maximum grade. Throughout the rest of its entire line the 
 Western road is in every respect equal, and, as to curves, supe¬ 
 rior to the Tunnel line. What, then, will be the 
 
 Annual Cost of Auxiliary Power 
 for these five miles ? 
 
 I submitted this problem to a friend who is an accomplished 
 engineer, who replied as follows :— 
 
 “ The problem given by you, if I understand it aright, was to deter¬ 
 mine the cost of an assistant engine on five miles of 75 feet grade, and 
 the number of tons that could be passed, allowing thirty minutes between 
 trains. The cost of a first class engine, with engineer, fireman, fuel, and 
 repairs, was formerly covered by about $20 per day. Owing to the 
 large increase in all expenses we will call it $40. 100 miles per day at 
 
 an average of 10 miles per hour is a full day’s work for a freight engine. 
 If trains run day and night there will be 48 trains in the 24 hours with 
 30 minutes intervals. One engine can make ten round trips over the 
 
57 
 
 grade ; 48 trips will require five engines on road, and a reserve of two 
 engines in shop,—in all seven. Cost per day of engines $5X40=$200. 
 An engine weighing thirty tons will haul fourteen cars, weighing seven 
 tons each, with a load of ten tons on a grade of 75 feet to the mile. 
 
 “ If on other parts of the line the maximum grade eastward be assumed 
 at 50 feet, an engine can haul on this grade twenty cars, and, aided by 
 the assistant engine on the steep grade, twenty cars to a train, would 
 measure the capacity of the road. 48 trains in 24 hours, 200 tons to a 
 train, 300 days to a year, would give a capacity for eastward freights 
 uniformly distributed, and all the cars fully loaded, of 2,880,000 tons ; 
 but this regularity of movement is unattainable ; it may be calculated, 
 however, that the capacity would not be less than 1,500,000 tons. 
 
 “The cost of the assistant engines would be $200X300=$60,000 
 allowing for interest on cost of reserve engines, extra wear of track, &c., 
 $20,000 ; total, $80,000 to cover all contingencies. This is equivalent 
 to 5^ cents per ton; or one cent per ton per mile on the steep grade 
 will cover the cost of assistant power, and add 50 per cent, to the capacity 
 of the road. 
 
 “ To get a clear idea of the advantage of this arrangement, suppose that 
 the working division of the road on which the high grade occurs is fifty 
 miles, that, without the assistant engine the load over the whole division 
 would be fourteen cars, with the assistant engine twenty cars. 500,000 
 tons would then be carried over the fifty miles for very little more than 
 the cost of the extra power on the five miles ; say $100,000 would cover 
 it, which is only four mills per ton per mile as the whole cost of the last 
 500,000 tons.” [Appendix, D.] 
 
 If any proposition can be demonstrated, I think I have 
 demonstrated that there is no inferiority in the Western road, 
 as compared with the Tunnel line, which justified the State in 
 assuming, or which now justifies it in completing the Tunnel . 
 I cannot close this topic better than by copying the following 
 extracts from an article by “ Civil Engineer : ”— 
 
 “ But it is objected that our present railroad facilities are inadequate 
 to the wants of the community. Then let them he increased. You do 
 not help the matter by opening another route, no better than the exist¬ 
 ing one, and, if finished, equally wanting in facilities. For it is not 
 roadway that is needed , it is cars and motive power. And if the Tunnel 
 route were finished to-day, who will furnish these? Neither the Fitch¬ 
 burg nor the Vermont and Massachusetts roads are any better equipped 
 than the Western, for so immense a traffic as is anticipated, and there is 
 no guarantee, in fact there is not the least probability, that they could or 
 8 
 
58 
 
 would increase their equipment, while the State stood between them and 
 the West. So that, after all is done, the State, owning the Tunnel and 
 the Troy and Greenfield road, must invest another million or two for 
 the benefit of these roads. Better do it now for the Boston and Albany; 
 this would be a good investment, for the Western road would gladly pay 
 for the use of the cars at a rate which would quickly reimburse the 
 State both principal and interest. And this result would be reached in 
 one year instead of ten, and at a cost of one million of dollars instead of 
 ten or more. 
 
 “ In a few weeks the bridge at Albany will be finished, and Boston will 
 have as good a railroad connection with the New York Central Railroad 
 as she can desire. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, with its maximum 
 grade of 116 feet to the mile, is the one sufficient avenue to Baltimore 
 from the West, and the Pennsylvania railroad, with its maximum grade 
 of 95 feet to the mile, is the only direct connection that Philadelphia 
 has with the West, and both are contented ; but Boston, with a better 
 road than either, and which has never yet been taxed to one-sixth of 
 its capacity, not satisfied with one, must waste her energies in attempting 
 to construct a second.” 
 
 Time of Completing the Tunnel. 
 
 Mr. Brooks estimated eight years from his commencement. 
 He has been at work “ vigorously ” for two years, with the 
 State treasury at his command. What has he done ? We 
 give Mr. Brooks’ statement of progress made. In his report 
 for 1864, he says,— 
 
 “East End of the Tunnel. 
 
 “ The work here has thus far been confined to bringing the bottom of 
 the old cutting down to a regular grade, and such side cutting as was 
 necessary to make room for the drain in the centre of the tunnel. The 
 extreme depth of cutting has been about five and a half feet. This 
 work has been completed as far as the breast of the old cut, work upon 
 which has lately been commenced.” 
 
 At the West shaft no progress had been made at this time. 
 In his report for 1865, he says,— 
 
 “ East End. 
 
 “ On the first of December, 1864, the work of cutting down the bottom 
 to bring it to an even grade had been completed to the 12 feet breast of 
 the old cut, and the work of reducing this had just commenced, reaching 
 at that date a point 2,145.9 feet from the portal. On the 15th of March 
 
59 
 
 last, this breast had been removed, and a heading, 15 feet wide and 6 
 feet high, commenced, 2,399 feet from the portal. The heading on the 
 first of December was 2,904 feet from the portal.” 
 
 Of the west shaft he says, “ the heading is 15 feet wide and 
 6 feet high,” and “ has reached a point 414 t 4 q- feet from the 
 shaft, averaging for the six months ending December 1st, 41 
 feet per month.” Forty feet of this heading was done by Mr. 
 Haupt. From these data we get the actual progress. Oil 
 March 15tli, he commenced at the east end 2,399 feet from 
 the portal. On the first of December he had reached 2,904 
 feet, showing an advance of 505 feet, averaging 59 T 7 T feet per 
 month. These give an aggregate advance of lOO^y feet per 
 month. Mr. Haupt advanced at east end 2,399 feet; at west 
 shaft, 40 feet; total, 2,439 feet. Mr. Brooks has advanced at 
 east end 505 feet; at east face of west shaft, 375 feet; and at 
 west face,265 feet; total, 1,145 feet; say 880 feet. The whole 
 length of the tunnel is 24,586 feet. We have then the follow¬ 
 ing table:— 
 
 Total length of Tunnel, 
 Done by Mr. Haupt, 
 Done by Mr. Brooks, . 
 Total to December 1, . 
 
 Remaining to be done, . 
 
 . 24,586 feet. 
 . 2,439 feet. 
 
 . 1,145 “ 
 
 - 3,584 feet. 
 
 . 21,002 feet. 
 
 Remember that the rate of progress for the last six months 
 has been much larger than it has been or can hereafter be for 
 an entire year, for it embraced the best portions of the year for 
 work. But allowing Mr. Brooks the full benefit of this aver¬ 
 age, that is, 100 feet per month, and it will take him two hun¬ 
 dred and twelve months, or seventeen years and eight months 
 to complete the tunnel! 
 
 But he is going to do great things after he reaches grade 
 with the central shaft. Let us see. The shaft is to be 1,050 
 feet deep. On December 1st, he had sunk it 220, at an aver¬ 
 age of 18 T 6 ^ feet per month, the last six months (the best season 
 of the year and the driest ever known.) He has now 830 feet 
 to go to grade. At an average of 18-^ feet per month, this 
 will take him 44 months. At the end of this time he will open 
 two new faces. In these 44 months he will have advanced 
 
60 
 
 4,400 feet at the present working faces. Deducting this amount 
 from 21,002 feet, which was the whole amount to be done last 
 December, and there will remain, at the end of 44 months, 
 16,002 feet to be bored. We will suppose that he can advance 
 each of his headings at the central shaft 35 feet per month, 
 (and this will be much more difficult at a depth of 1,050 feet 
 than his present advance of 41 feet at the west shaft, which is 
 325 feet deep.) This gives him 70 feet per month at the cen¬ 
 tral shaft. He will then make the following monthly progress : 
 
 At east end, . 
 west shaft, 
 
 central shaft, two faces, 
 
 . 59 feet. 
 . 41 “ 
 
 . 70 “ 
 
 Total per month, 
 
 170 feet. 
 
 At this rate, the 16,602 feet remaining to be done when the 
 central shaft shall be finished, will require 99 months. Adding 
 this to the 44 months during which he will have worked at two 
 faces, t and we have a total for completing the tunnel, by work 
 upon all four faces, 133 months, or 11 years from December, 
 1865 ! And this assumes that every month of that eleven years 
 will give as good progress as the best six months of last year. 
 It allows nothing for “ hidden difficulties.” It includes nothing 
 for the 2,300 feet of demoralized rock. During this period, at 
 least, the immense traffic of the West must wait! 
 
 But this is not all. The size of the tunnel, when completed 
 as recommended by Mr. Brooks, is to be 22 feet wide at the 
 bottom, 24 feet wide at the widest part, and 21 feet high above 
 the track, giving a sectional area of 433 square feet, or 16 
 cubic yards per linear foot. Mr. Brooks, in his first report, 
 argues that Mr. Haupt was all wrong in not commencing the 
 tunnel of its full size, and he comes to the conclusion that the 
 suggestion that “ a small tunnel be first built and then 
 enlarged,” is “ entirely out of the question in this case.” Of 
 course, he intended then to commence and carry through a 
 tunnel of full size. Mr. Doane, in his last report, gives the 
 actual figures of the comparative cost of the work of men on 
 small sections and on larger ones, showing that the larger the 
 section, the smaller, relatively, the cost. And yet, will it be 
 
61 
 
 believed that Mr. Brooks commenced and is carrying on the 
 tunnel with a smaller section than Mr. Haupt’s ? He is working 
 his heading 6x15 feet, giving an area of 90 square feet, (Mr. 
 Haupt’s smallest area was more than double this,) or 3J cubic 
 yards per linear foot. The whole advance made by Mr. Brooks 
 (besides finishing Mr. Haupt’s work,) has been 1,145 feet. At 
 3|- cubic yards per foot, he has removed 3,817 cubic yards of 
 rock, equal to 239 feet of full sized tunnel. Two years work! 
 Again, when Mr. Brooks commenced, he had 22,147 feet of 
 tunnel to bore. At 16 cubic yards to a foot of completed 
 tunnel, this would require the excavation of 354,352 cubic 
 yards of rock. He has excavated 3,817 cubic yards ; this is 
 the one ninety-third part of the whole! or 1.07 per cent. 
 
 Again, Mr. Brooks has received from the State, as follows: 
 (not including 1175,000 paid for services and materials, under 
 the Act of 1862:) 
 
 Gash from State Treasurer, to December, 1864, $450,000 00 
 Cash from State Treasurer from December, ’64 
 
 to December, ’65,. 505,000 00 
 
 Commissioners’ salaries, two years, . . . 12,000 00 
 
 Total receipts from the State, . . . $967,000 00 
 
 Deduct cash on hand Dec. 1, 1865, $12,491 00 
 Deduct value of supplies, &c., on hand 
 
 and not sold to the men, . . 35,447 00 
 
 - 47,938 00 
 
 Expended in work, dam, &c., Ac., . . . $919,062 00 
 
 He has removed 3,817 cubic yards of rock at the headings, 
 and about 2,000 atthe central shaft and, say 1,000 in finishing 
 Mr. Haupt’s work; total, 6,817 cubic yards, at a cost of $135 
 per cubic yard! ; or ^including all the above items of excava¬ 
 tion, he has removed rock equal to 426 feet of completed 
 tunnel at a cost of $2,157 per linear foot! The old price for 
 ordinary rock excavations was one dollar per cubic yard ; for 
 rock tunnelling, say three dollars ; present price, double that, 
 six dollars per cubic yard. Mr. Brooks has made it cost the 
 State $135 per cubic yard. Mr. Haupt received, for a tunnel 
 with a sectional area of 252 square feet, a little more than half 
 
62 
 
 the size of Mr. Brooks’ area, $30 per linear foot; Mr. Brooks’ 
 tunnel cost the State, $2,157 per linear foot. 
 
 But we shall be told that a large portion of Mr. Brooks’ 
 expenditures has been for the dam, machinery, &c., and that 
 this will now cease. Who can be sure of that ? With the 
 exception of the dam,—and it is hardly credible that Mr. 
 Brooks can repeat that folly; and yet I do not know what 
 guaranty we can have that the man who could commit one 
 such blunder will not commit another equally stupendous:— 
 with this exception, the history of the past affords no assurance 
 that the expenditures hereafter for machinery will not be 
 equally large. I have not referred to his performances at 
 Tunnel Brook, which have been absolutely puerile. He is 
 spending I don’t know how many thousands of dollars on 
 pneumatic drills whose success is just as problematical as 
 were the experiments for the last two years from which, he 
 predicted the most brilliant results. All his schemes for 
 ventilation have hitherto resulted in furnishing barely enough 
 air for eight or ten men to breathe. How these contrivances 
 will work when he gets four times as far into the mountain as 
 he now is, operating the drills by machines which will require a 
 much larger number of lamps, (two of which consume as much 
 air as one man,) and of workmen, nobody can tell. The engi¬ 
 neering science of Europe has failed at Mont Cenis: Will Mr. 
 Brooks’ admirers guarantee his success? (Appendix, B.) 
 
 I cannot dwell on these topics. This we know: Not the 
 slightest reliance can be placed on Mr. Brooks’ estimates. 
 Every step of progress has cost five, ten, twenty times as much 
 as he estimated. What has been will be. 
 
 What is to be Done? 
 
 Wiser heads than mine must answer this question. My own 
 judgment leads to but one conclusion: abandon the work, 
 pocket the loss, and let the resources of the State be henceforth 
 applied to legitimate functions. Various suggestions have 
 been made. One is, to let out the work to private parties, 
 who, with additional aid from the State if need be, would 
 complete it. Another is, that the railroad companies to be 
 benefited by the opening of this route should be helped to 
 finish it. Either of them, objectionable as they are, would be 
 
63 
 
 infinitely preferable to going on under the present system. 
 Still another suggestion is,—and I understand gentlemen have 
 been investigating this,—to carry the road over the mountain. 
 I am informed that this examination shows that such a road can 
 be built for a tithe of what the tunnel will cost, with engineering 
 characteristics entirely fitting it for a great commercial road. 
 I throw out these hints for what they are worth. Of this only 
 am I sure: no change can be for the worse. 
 
 One duty, it seems to me, is imperative. There should be 
 an investigation which shall settle the question whether it is 
 the policy of the State to go on. The suspension of the work 
 for a year, for this purpose, is of no account, compared with 
 the importance of an investigation of such a character as to 
 command the confidence of the people of the State. There 
 has been no such investigation, and the public opinion of the 
 State is perplexed. The commission should have on it one 
 able man who fully represents the friends of the tunnel, another 
 who fully represents the opponents of the tunnel. Each of 
 these men would enter, con amove , into the work of bringing 
 out all the facts and arguments in favor of his side, and of 
 criticizing the views of his opponent. “ Impartial ” men will 
 not and cannot do this as thoroughly as partisans will. The 
 third man should be the ablest that can be found in the wide 
 world , and as “ impartial ” as human nature will allow. 
 
 Another point, I think, is equally settled. The system must 
 be changed, and also the head-manager. First, the system is 
 wrong. The shrewd, intelligent capitalists of the world, after 
 an experience of a generation in building railroads, have come 
 to this conclusion: that the true system, for efficiency and 
 economy, is to place the construction of railroads in the charge 
 of an advisory board, with an executive head, either from 
 their own number or from the outside. This system secures 
 wisdom of counsel and executive efficiency. The State, disre¬ 
 garding these conclusions of business men, has entrusted this 
 gigantic work to one man, and has failed. 
 
 My own construction of the Acts of 1862 and 1863 was, that 
 the intention of the legislature was to make the executive 
 council such an advisory board. Unfortunately, disastrously, 
 another interpretation of those Acts prevailed, and Mr. Brooks 
 was left dictator. 
 
64 
 
 Even if the present system is to continue, I think all will 
 agree that the managing head must, be changed. At least, if 
 the advisory, organizing, and executive capacities are to be 
 united in one man, he should devote his whole time and 
 capacities to the State. Mr. Brooks can give to this task only 
 the fragments of time and ability, which belong, primarily and 
 entirely to other enterprises. Again, conceding to Mr. Brooks 
 large executive ability, he has shown himself utterly deficient in 
 organizing 1 powers. Hence, although reasonably successful in 
 details,—and for this success he is largely indebted to the 
 resident engineer and his assistants,—Mr. Brooks has lamenta¬ 
 bly failed in planning and organizing the enterprise. He is 
 not an educated engineer; he has had no practical experience 
 in works of this kind; and, to sum it all up in one word, 
 nature did not endow him with the organizing capacity. The 
 disadvantages attending the prosecution of works of this kind 
 by the State are large enough, even when they are prosecuted in 
 accordance with the long-settled rules of individual action. If 
 these are still to be set at naught, the future can bring forth only 
 a repetition and aggravation of past failures. 
 
 In this discussion I have omitted entirely one most important 
 topic—tile mischievous influence of public works upon the poli¬ 
 tical morality of a State. I cannot here enter this field, inviting 
 as it is. May a Merciful Heaven save old Massachusetts from 
 the demoralizing influences which have so debauched the politics 
 of Pennsylvania and New York! (Appendix, C.) 
 
 My appeal is founded on material considerations. I trust it 
 will not be deemed improper for me to implore the legislature to 
 sound this wretched business to the bottom. There is a large 
 class of men living on the tunnel line, who go first, last and 
 always for any management, wise or foolish, which looks to the 
 completion of the work. They stood by Mr. Haupt, until they 
 saw a shorter cut to their end, when they remorselessly deserted 
 him. They stand by Mr. Brooks in mismanagement infinitely 
 more disastrous, and they will desert him too, when they find 
 he can no longer serve them. Well knowing the abuses that 
 now prevail, they close their eyes and forbear to look, and they 
 will resolutely discountenance investigation. They reason that 
 every additional dollar spent in connection with the enterprise, 
 increases the guarantee that it will be completed. The interests 
 
65 
 
 of the State do not come within their range of vision. But the 
 responsible guardians of the interests and good name of the 
 State act from higher motives. They are relied upon to inquire 
 diligently whether “ these things be so.” Of one thing they 
 may, I think, be certain, that if the wisdom and courage of the 
 general court shall prove unequal to the occasion, and the 
 tunnel is left to go on under Mr. Brooks at an expense so many 
 times greater than the cost of the same work under his prede¬ 
 cessor, the prayer will soon come up from an abused people, 
 
 0//, for one year of Herman Haupt! 
 
 9 
 
66 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 [A.] 
 
 I had intended to have made a record of the ex parte proceedings of 
 the executive council of 1861; but I have mislaid the documents, 
 which it cost a good deal of pains to hunt up. Perhaps it is as well. 
 The pillory in which it would have placed those seven gentlemen, (Hon. 
 Jacob Sleeper did not join them,) would have been anything but com¬ 
 fortable. It was a disorganizing and discreditable conspiracy to usurp 
 the prerogatives of the governor and dictate his official duties. The day 
 will come, if it has not already come, when most of those gentlemen 
 will desire that the whole record might be expunged. 
 
 [B.] 
 
 The following from the London “ Mining Journal,” shows that blun¬ 
 ders are committed abroad as well as here, and suggests the possibility 
 of the failure of Mr. Brooks’ contrivances for ventilation :— 
 
 “ In a communication from Pico Mulera, Italy, dated January 4, Mr. 
 H. Hoskings, whose name is well known to the readers of the London 
 Mining Journal, writes,—‘The mortality amongst the workmen em¬ 
 ployed in the Mount Cenis Tunnel is so great, in consequence of powder 
 smoke and bad ventilation, that they have refused to work any more. 
 The work is now at a standstill; ’ and the statement is especially inter¬ 
 esting, from the precise manner in which it confirms the opinion 
 expressed in the Mining Journal of January 2, 1864, by our esteemed 
 correspondent, Mr. Nicholas Ennor, in the account of his visit to the 
 tunnel. He then stated,—‘ I next turn to the air department. . The 
 moment I came to the tunnel I looked to its mouth; to my surprise I 
 could not discover the least sign of smoke or gas emerging from it, 
 which instantly convinced me that something was wrong. I had not 
 entered the tunnel two hundred yards before I met a still, dense smoke ; 
 it soon become so dense that I could not see a lamp on the opposite 
 
67 
 
 side, which, of course, was only twenty-six feet distant. The horses 
 and wagons passed, but I could not see them. This continued up to 
 within one hundred yards of the end, when a light could be seen for 
 twenty yards. Here air was liberated sufficient to support the men 
 with the machine; but as it passed back, where the side men were at 
 work, it was all devoured by the men and lamps. 
 
 “I was in about an hour, and when I came out I spit as black as 
 though I had dined on lampblack; so did the gentleman that accom¬ 
 panied me. I think I have had over fifty-five years’ actual mine prac¬ 
 tice, and I have come to the conclusion that this work will never be 
 accomplished without other means than the present be adopted. I am 
 satisfied that there is nothing deserving or eulogizing to the French or 
 Italian engineering for what is doing to carry out this undertaking, not¬ 
 withstanding that they have an abundance of water-power at command, 
 and machinery that, I should judge from a momentary glance, cost 
 £40,000.’ ” 
 
 Mr. Brooks beats them “ all hollow.” His machinery has already 
 cost $500,000, not including the drills now being made at Fitchburg, 
 air-compressors, &c., &c. 
 
 [C.] 
 
 It would be instructive to show how mischievously the tunnel has 
 interfered in the politics of the State, especially as illustrated in its con¬ 
 trol of state, senatorial and councillor conventions, legislative caucusses, 
 &c. But these topics open too wide a field. One instance must suffice. 
 
 My own attention was first directed to the disturbing agency of this 
 selfish and malignant element by the election of 1861. In the summer 
 of that year, the controversy arose between Governor Andrew and Mr. 
 Haupt, which resulted in the suspension of the work. The following 
 tables of the votes of the tunnel towns proper in 1860 and 1861, will 
 show perfectly that the people of that region considered the tunnel ques¬ 
 tion paramount to all political issues. It will be seen that these towns, 
 which in 1860 gave a vote of nearly five to one for Andrew over Beach, 
 in 1861 gave an actual majority to Mr. Davis. So debauched had this 
 section become, that if the State had followed their lead, the State 
 administration would have been delivered over to the enemy, and the 
 glorious war record of old Massachusetts would have been lost forever. 
 
 I give the votes also for lieutenant-governor in 1861, to show that 
 the hostility was to Governor Andrew* 
 
68 
 
 
 Governor, 1860. 
 
 Governor and Lieut. Gov., 1861. 
 
 
 Andrew. 
 
 i Beacli. 
 
 Andrew. 
 
 Davis. 
 
 Nesmith. 
 
 Bailey. 
 
 Franklin County. 
 Buckland,. 
 
 178 
 
 68 
 
 10 
 
 138 
 
 133 
 
 28 
 
 Charlemont, .... 
 
 157 
 
 1 
 
 21 
 
 3 
 
 84 
 
 1 
 
 Colrain, ..... 
 
 214 
 
 61 
 
 86 
 
 89 
 
 97 
 
 91 
 
 Deerfield, ..... 
 
 335 
 
 120 
 
 140 
 
 111 
 
 156 
 
 111 
 
 Erving,. 
 
 63 
 
 19 
 
 36 
 
 20 
 
 47 
 
 11 
 
 Greenfield,. 
 
 321 
 
 114 
 
 196 
 
 144 
 
 266 
 
 106 
 
 Hawley,. 
 
 118 
 
 3 
 
 - 
 
 64 
 
 81 
 
 - 
 
 Heath,. 
 
 87 
 
 - 
 
 37 
 
 18 
 
 64 
 
 10 
 
 Leyden,. 
 
 Monroe, . . . . . 
 
 75 
 
 15 
 
 41 
 
 18 
 
 41 
 
 18 
 
 30 
 
 3 
 
 17 
 
 18 
 
 38 
 
 2 
 
 Montague,. 
 
 206 
 
 28 
 
 125 
 
 17 
 
 150 
 
 17 
 
 Orange,. 
 
 202 
 
 79 
 
 129 
 
 89 
 
 133 
 
 87 
 
 Rowe,. 
 
 75 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 23 
 
 58 
 
 _ 
 
 Shelburne,. 
 
 256 
 
 31 
 
 39 
 
 111 
 
 134 
 
 25 
 
 Wendell, . . . . . j 
 
 77 
 
 26 
 
 64 
 
 38 
 
 67 
 
 35 
 
 Berkshire County. 
 Clarksburg, 
 
 57 
 
 13 
 
 3 
 
 18 
 
 8 
 
 16 
 
 Florida, 
 
 70 
 
 9 
 
 3 
 
 55 
 
 58 
 
 8 
 
 Savoy,. 
 
 91 
 
 41 
 
 54 
 
 37 
 
 48 
 
 37 
 
 Totals,.! 
 
 2,612 
 
 634 
 
 1,005 
 
 1,011 
 
 1,663 
 
 605 
 
 [D.] 
 
 Mr. Brooks estimates the total amount of through freight from the 
 West, to Boston, eight years hence, at 448,000 tons. The calculation 
 on pages 56 and 57 shows that 1,500,000 tons can be carried annually, 
 at a cost, for auxiliary power, up the high grade, of $100,000. For a 
 materially smaller amount, the cost would decrease in the same propor¬ 
 tion. I am informed, by my friend who made the calculation in the 
 text, that 500,000 tons could be carried annually, at a cost, for auxiliary 
 power, up this high grade, of $50,000. This sum, then, is the entire 
 saving which the tunnel would make, if completed eight years hence, 
 even if the entire freight from the West passed over that line. Fifty 
 thousand dollars, then, annually, which is the interest of $1,000,000 at 
 five per cent., is the sum total of the exigency for the tunnel, for 
 through freight. But Mr. Brooks claims only one-third of this freight 
 for his line, so that the saving is reduced to one-third of $50,000, or 
 
69 
 
 $16,GG7 annually, and this, from Mr. Brooks’ own figures, is absolutely 
 the whole exigency, so far as the great grievance of the incapacity of 
 the Western Railroad is concerned, for the expenditure by the State of 
 ten millions of dollars, for another great commercial avenue to the 
 West. 
 
 ADDENDUM. 
 
 THE DEERFIELD DAM. 
 
 To illustrate the extravagant outlay for this dam, I have taken some 
 pains to ascertain the cost of the Holyoke dam. This dam crosses the 
 Connecticut River; is 1,017 feet long, SO feet high, and cost about 
 $115,000. I have been unable to get the exact figures, but I am 
 informed on the best authority, that the cost was within that sum. It 
 has stood over sixteen years, and has at times delivered a volume of 
 water twelve and a half feet deep over its entire length. Mr. Brooks’ 
 dam is 250 feet long, 20 feet high, and the largest volume of water ever 
 delivered over it has been thirty-three inches. The cost, when com¬ 
 pleted, including canal, will be $275,000. The volume of water deliv¬ 
 ered over the Holyoke dam is nineteen times greater than the largest 
 ever delivered over the Deerfield dam. 
 
 If a dam was to be built at all at the tunnel, it should have been built 
 lower down, at the point where the power is to be applied,—thus saving 
 the great cost of rock excavation for canal, waste-way, &c. A dam 
 could have been built there, upon the same plan as the Holyoke, which 
 would have been perfectly safe for twenty years, at an outside cost of 
 $25,000. 
 
/ 
 / 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
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