K-lS;:-X'*rA'. 
 
 
 . ^ 
 
 ^«C«--. 
 
 
 4 >
 
 ARGUMENT. 
 
 The infinite variety in the local and otherwise peculiar 
 circumstances of different nations urged as a principal rea- 
 son for the wide discrepancies which exist between govern- 
 ments bearing a common appellation. Hence the difficulty 
 of pronouncing any general conclusion upon their power 
 and stability. 
 
 The nature of confederation commented upon ; and its 
 place among constitutions of government. 
 
 The argument against its capacity for power. 
 
 An objection, which might be raised from the fact of 
 the existence of great power in the United Provinces, 
 answered by an enquiry into the sources of that power, 
 shewing how it was affected by the peculiarity of their 
 constitution. 
 
 The stability of federative governments considered, and 
 shewn to be incompatible with power. 
 
 Examination of the principal features of the Helvetic 
 confederacy. 
 
 Sum of the Argument. 
 
 Brief review of the political circumstances of the 
 United States.
 
 The Power and Stability of Federative Governments. 
 
 Political Science, however founded upon the 
 experience of ages, and illustrated by the highest 
 efforts of human wisdom, is nevertheless of a doubtful 
 and ill ascertained character. This defect is in- 
 herent in its nature, and inseparable from its sub- 
 ject-matter, arising as well from the unceasing 
 fluctuation in the habits and circumstances, in the 
 moral and social relations of mankind, as from the 
 complex operation of external causes. There 
 exists indeed but little community of opinion or 
 uniformity of practice beyond the circumscribed 
 limits of those maxims in politics, which are de- 
 ducible by direct inference from moral truths ; for 
 the great mass of those rules and principles, which 
 have a more immediate influence upon practice, 
 and give to a government its tone and peculiar 
 organization, are of a description purely local ; 
 deriving their force from local circumstances and 
 local interests, and therefore, however just, are 
 only applicable in their full extent to the particular 
 case. Hence it is, that constitutions, nominally 
 and externally the same, have little or no interior
 
 6 
 
 resemblance, and in many instances only so far 
 correspond as to justify us in referring them to one 
 common standard. 
 
 Closely allied to the difficulties of the science are 
 those impediments to fair and candid investigation 
 which exist with different degrees of strength in 
 the mind of the enquirer. The voice of truth may 
 indeed be heard, but is far too feeble to be obeyed, 
 unless where reason has been enabled to establish 
 around her a calm and perfect silence by stilling the 
 angry and unruly feelings of the human breast. 
 The caution against any attempt to form a com- 
 prehensive theory, so just in reference to all sub- 
 jects which furnish but precarious grounds for 
 reasoning, applies with peculiar force to political 
 discussion, which involves too many questions of 
 interest and prejudice, not to provoke at every 
 step a ready appeal from the judgment to the 
 passions. 
 
 The boundaries, then, of this subject are vague 
 and undefined, but comprise in their extent a wide 
 field beaten and explored, and familiar to our 
 knowledge. There are principles of increase and 
 decay, of weakness and energy, common to all 
 governments whatever. Others again, which de- 
 velope themselves more fully and powerfully in 
 constitutions of a peculiar kind. The danger, for 
 instance, of an undue assumption of power by the 
 executive exists more or less in all governm ents ;
 
 while in republics more particularly we should 
 look for an excess of faction and party spirit. 
 
 In like manner, in all federative constitutions 
 there are many points of common origin, upon the 
 investigation of which we may arrive at a common 
 conclusion, to be subsequently modified by an 
 enquiry into the peculiar circumstances of each 
 separate example. 
 
 The system of federation may be partially re- 
 garded as a choice of evils, a species of compro- 
 mise between subjection and independence ori- 
 ginating in the inherent weakness of each member 
 of the confederacy. Advantages indeed it proposes 
 and secures, to which a number of small and un- 
 connected states could individually form no rea- 
 sonable pretension, but which involve in their 
 very attainment a sacrifice of free agency on the 
 part of the respective members. So far it bears a 
 close resemblance to the social compact, by which 
 every man surrenders a portion of his natural 
 rights in exchange for an assurance of a more 
 full and secure enjoyment of those he reserves. 
 But at this point the parallel must cease. In the 
 great system of society the objects of mutual 
 cooperation are infinite in number and extent ; 
 and we admire the peculiar beauty of an order of 
 things, which places its ultimate end in the ad- 
 vancement of human happiness, and furnishes us 
 with a means of attaining it at once the only one
 
 we can imagine, and in all its parts the most 
 admirably complete. In a federal union, on the 
 contrary, the immediate objects of cooperation are 
 necessarily fewer ; the means too for securing them 
 are not only precarious and incomplete, but in- 
 ferior in many principal points to others, which 
 have been devised for compassing the same end; 
 which are open to observation, and matter of 
 actual experience. 
 
 But the excellencies and deficiencies of federal 
 constitutions must be examined, not so much by a 
 comparison with those incident to other forms of 
 government, as by a separate and independent 
 process of investigation. Since it would seem a 
 fair assumption in the outset of our enquiry, 
 that, supposing it possible to consolidate any 
 system of confederated states into one single and 
 thoroughly compacted body, without depriving 
 them of any advantages, natural or acquired, which 
 they had previously enjoyed, the chances of pros- 
 perity, of power and stability, would be indefinitely 
 increased. In a word, any government, single 
 and indivisible, is surely preferable to one, whose 
 tendency, unless counteracted by the operation of 
 more prevaiUng causes, is disunion and decay. 
 Nor is it any answer to adduce examples of con- 
 federated states, which have attained ahigher degree 
 of glory and prosperity than nations possessing a 
 consolidated government ; since this would be 
 omitting to notice many important elements of
 
 9 
 
 consideration in the manners and habits, temper 
 and situation, of the people thus forced into com- 
 parison, all and each of which are to the full as 
 important as their form of government. That 
 there are real advantages belonging more pecu- 
 liarly to federative constitutions, when organized 
 upon just principles, is not wished to be denied : 
 but there are also countervailing obstacles to the 
 extension and durability of national power, which 
 may be said to form part of the essence of federa- 
 tion. Again, the advantages of any state or number 
 of states may be great and unquestionable, and yet 
 the government may be such as to check their 
 growth and increase, and disappoint the fair pro- 
 mise of national prosperity. It will be seen that 
 a federal government necessarily partakes more or 
 less of this character ; that it has, in short, a direct 
 tendency to defeat in the end the very object it was 
 devised to promote. 
 
 The question of government is a question of the 
 application of means to an end, that end being, in 
 general terms, the happiness and prosperity of the 
 people ; and this idea of government supposes a 
 power vested in the hands of a few or more indi- 
 viduals for the benefit of the community. Now it 
 is clear that delegated power ought in all cases to 
 be equal to its object ; since it is doubtless un- 
 reasonable to make men responsible for the discharge 
 of a sacred trust, while you deny them all adequate 
 means for its fulfilment and execution. It follows
 
 10 
 
 that a government, fettered and shackled in its ope- 
 rations by an ill-timed and improper jealousy, can- 
 not be expected to provide for the security, advance 
 the prosperity, or support the independent character 
 of the commonwealth. How indeed can its admi- 
 nistration be any thing else than a succession of 
 impotent and temporizing expedients ? How can 
 it undertake with confidence, or execute with 
 promptitude and success, any liberal or enlarged 
 plans for the public good ? 
 
 The public good cannot from its very nature 
 admit of precise and accurate definition. Nor is it 
 possible to assign to it at any given moment fixed 
 and certain limits which it may not be expedient 
 and even necessary to transgress at some future 
 period in order to its preservation. Those there- 
 fore who are entrusted with power for the protec- 
 tion and advancement of national interests, must 
 have full and unlimited scope for the exercise of 
 their functions. This power in a free government 
 (and it is such only we are considering) is lodged 
 in the legislature, composed either entirely, or in 
 part, of the representatives of the people ; and 
 he, who would give a constitution to his country, 
 prescribing bounds to the legislative authority, 
 would, in his anxiety to avoid an imaginary danger, 
 lay the foundation of practical and ej^tensive injury. 
 The true check and safeguard against the usurpa- 
 tion of the few lies not in controlling the operations 
 of the legislature, but in making it responsible to
 
 11 
 
 public opinion, and in giving the nation frequent 
 opportunities of marking that opinion, of testifying 
 their approbation or disavowal, their rejection or 
 support. 
 
 The impossibility of avoiding in a federal con- 
 stitution the defect which necessarily attaches to a 
 limitation of the legislative authority, is placed in a 
 clear point of view by the practice of the United 
 States, which have an unquestionable title to be 
 regarded as the best model of that form of govern- 
 ment, whether in ancient or modern times. With 
 a view to balance the powers of the central and the 
 state governments, and to prevent the former from 
 overstepping its proper limits, a power has been 
 there conceded to the judiciary, which has in no 
 other instance, we believe, been vested in that de- 
 partment. Thus if the American legislature should 
 in the passing of any law have transgressed its- 
 legitimate bounds, the citizen, who is prosecuted 
 for the violation of that law, may defend himself on 
 the plea of its being at variance with the principles 
 or practice of the constitution ; and, notwithstand- 
 ing the Act may have passed both Houses of the 
 legislature, and have been ratified by the chief 
 Magistrate in accordance with all the usual forms, 
 should the supreme court of judicature find that it 
 contravened the constitution, it would be pro- 
 nounced null and of no authority. In this manner 
 state laws, even upon matters overwhich Congress has 
 exclusive jurisdiction, have actually been abrogated.
 
 12 
 
 It does not appear necessary to consider here 
 in what manner the due exercise of the several 
 branches of legislative authority conduces to the 
 vigour and stability of government ; but we may 
 safely conclude upon the evidence of reason and con- 
 firmation of history, that a supremacy of authority, 
 undivided and uncontrolled in the exercise of its 
 delegated powers, must be lodged in some quarter, 
 and that that quarter can be no other than the legis- 
 lature. 
 
 In the application of this principle to the ques- 
 tion of the power of a federative constitution, the 
 enquiry naturally presents itself in two distinct 
 points of view. 1. Can a power of this nature, 
 fully competent to its object, exist at all in a 
 confederacy? 2. Is it in the nature of things to 
 expect that confederate states will be inclined to 
 concede even that full degree of power to the 
 federal head, which is compatible with the prin- 
 ciples of their constitution ? 
 
 Now to both these questions the answer is in 
 the negative. To suppose indeed the existence of 
 such a power in a confederacy involves a contra- 
 diction of terms. A supremacy of general autho- 
 rity admits of no participation or interference, and 
 is therefore incompatible with the rights of sovereign 
 and independent states. On the other hand, if we 
 suppose all idea of local administration to be 
 abandoned, and every power, executive, legisla-
 
 i: 
 
 tive, and judicial, lodged in the component parts 
 of the federal head, the confederacy would no 
 longer exist in any shape but in that of a mere 
 territorial division. We may add, that however 
 slight might be the influence of these divisions 
 on the national administration, in the event of so 
 entire a consolidation of the states, yet would they 
 be quite sufficient to foster old prejudices, to give 
 frequent occasion for umbrage and jealousy, and thus 
 keep alive the embers of dissension and disunion 
 in the very heart of the community. 
 
 The denial of the latter of the above questions 
 is grounded upon the acknowledged principles of 
 human nature. The grand and primary object of 
 an association of states under one government 
 consists in the improved relations of security, of 
 dignity, and independence, in which they will there- 
 by stand to foreign nations. In the same propor- 
 tion, therefore, as these interests come less home 
 to the breasts of the greater portion of the com- 
 munity than such as are domestic and of daily 
 recurrence, will the desire of giving efficiency and 
 vigour to the power employed upon them be weak 
 and transient. In the same proportion will the 
 citizens of each separate state repose their con- 
 fidence in the members, and interest themselves 
 in the measures, of their own government, while 
 they are either inattentive to the concerns of the 
 federal administration, or regard its conduct with 
 jealousy and suspicion.
 
 14 
 
 If again by a confederacy is meant an assemblage 
 of independent states into one great state for 
 national purposes, it follows, that all the powers, 
 not ceded by them severally, and delegated in 
 express terms to the federal head, must continue 
 to reside in their own respective administrations. 
 These therefore being, in a peculiar manner, the 
 guardians of local interests, and protectors against 
 the encroachments of the federal head, will always 
 possess a higher relative degree of influence over 
 the people of their respective states : "a circum- 
 stance, "says a celebrated republican*, ' ' which teaches 
 us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness 
 in all federal constitutions, and that too much pains 
 cannot be taken in their organization to give them 
 all the force consistent and compatible with the 
 principles of liberty." 
 
 This division of authority involves, among many 
 other sources of inconvenience and danger, the very 
 difficult and delicate question of a concurrent juris- 
 diction. Thus, w^here funds are to be provided 
 as well for the maintenance and purposes of the 
 federal administration, as for those of the state 
 governments, there must not only exist a necessity 
 for an extreme care and prudence in regulating the 
 collection of imposts, and defining the precise pro- 
 vince of each jurisdiction, but also for a degree of 
 
 * Mr. Hamilton, one of the most distinguished advocates of 
 the present constitution of the United States.
 
 15 
 
 moderation and mutual forbearance in enforcing 
 these regulations, which is seldom to be met with 
 amid the eager passions and jarring interests of 
 numerous societies. 
 
 On referring to the history of confederate states, 
 as well ancient as modern, we shall find ample 
 cause for assenting to the proposition, which asserts 
 the power of such governments to be in exact 
 proportion to the weakness or efficiency of the 
 federal head. The denial of supreme authority 
 to this body has in most cases been attended with 
 fatal results, inasmuch as it comprises, among 
 various other sources of evil, one great radical and 
 vital error, in the principle which assigns to the 
 national council under a federative constitution the 
 power of legislating for its members in their collec- 
 tive capacities of states, but denies them all power 
 over the individuals composing those states. Now 
 supposing a demand to be made by this body upon 
 the members of their confederacy for supplies of 
 men, a demand coupled with no constitutional 
 authority for the actual levying of those supplies, 
 the requisition will have practically the force of a 
 mere recommendation, and not of law. The states, 
 on their part, will observe or disregard it at their 
 option, in compliance with the dictates of local 
 interests, or of any faction which may chance to 
 prevail, and accordingly as they shall deem them- 
 selves capable or not of prescribing their own 
 terms. For this state of anarchy and disobedience
 
 16 
 
 the sole remedy is force ; the sole result of such 
 a species of coercion is commonly the aggrandise- 
 ment of the more powerful states at the expence of 
 their refractory associates. 
 
 These remarks are confirmed by observing, that 
 wheresoever a confederacy has been partially '' free 
 from this error, the result has been favourable to 
 its political existence. Thus the common council 
 of the Lycian confederacy, which is instanced by 
 Montesquieu *^ as the best model of that form of 
 government with which he was acquainted, was 
 entrusted with a very delicate species of interference 
 in the appointment of the officers and magistrates 
 of the various cities composing the confederacy. 
 This concession of authority justifies us in conclud- 
 ing, that a union of a very intimate nature ^ subsisted 
 between these cities ; one indeed approaching as 
 nearly as possible to a consolidated government. 
 
 Again, in the Achaean league, which has shared 
 with the Lycian the applause of political writers, 
 
 '' We say ' partially,' because there has never been an instance 
 (the United States, as we shall see hereafter, possessing a con- 
 stitution of a mixed character) of the investment of sovereign 
 power in the federal head; and for the plain reason, that such a 
 government would not be a confederacy, but a consolidation of 
 states. 
 
 * Esprit des Loix, ix. 3. 
 
 '' See the character given of the Lycians, and the account of 
 their constitution. Strabo, 1. xiv.
 
 1 
 
 the federal head possessed very ample powers ; 
 while so closely drawn were the bonds of union, 
 that all the cities had the same laws and usages '", 
 the same w^eights and measures, and the same 
 money. Thus, when Lacedtemon was brought into 
 the league b>' Philopoemen, the change was attended 
 by an abolition of the laws and institutions of 
 Lycurgus, and an adoption of those of the Achseans. 
 The natural result of this wise organization was the 
 attainment of great ^ power and consideration ; how- 
 ever little calculated to withstand the force of 
 internal jealousies, fostered and promoted by the 
 ambition and ascendancy of Rome. 
 
 It can hardly be necessary to instance the pre- 
 tence of union among the Greeks under the feeble 
 and inefficient sanction of the Amphictyonic coun- 
 cil. They had scarcely any claim to the title of 
 a confederacy ; none certainly, if the distinction be 
 allowed, to that of a federative government. The 
 notorious vices and imperfections of their union, 
 with all its attendant anarchy and bloodshed, may, 
 nevertheless, be easily referred to the operation 
 of the same mistaken principle, when taken in 
 connection with the impossibility of harmonizing 
 the discordant elements of oligarchy and democracy, 
 
 * Plutarch, Life of Philopoemen, ch. 16. Also c. 8. and Life of 
 Aratus, c. 9. 
 
 Ili^i ai Toll'; A^xiovi TTX^udo^oi ccu^Yia-ti icxt a-vft<ppivvi(7-ii to7i; Kuf 
 
 tilAKi Kxi^oii yiyovi, x.,r.x. Pol^fbius ii. 37. Idem iv. 1, 
 
 B
 
 18 
 
 of popular licence and stern republicanism, both of 
 which exercised at the same moment their uncon- 
 trolled influence within the narrow limits of ancient 
 Greece. 
 
 In more modern times, the most remarkable 
 example of federation, as well from its extent, as 
 from its general influence upon the aflfairs of Europe, 
 was the Germanic body. This curious political 
 fabric, which, it may be remarked, bore no unin- 
 structive analogy to the Amphictyonic league, had 
 its foundation and origin in the feudal system, 
 which succeeded to the reality of imperial power 
 enjoyed by the immediate descendants of Charle- 
 magne^. We find accordingly that it laboured 
 under the feeble and confused organization of an 
 imperfect '' confederacy, engrafted upon all the vices 
 and anomalies of that system. 
 
 6 Vers le milieu de 13 siecle, la dignite imperiale perdit son 
 eclat, soit par les brouilleries avec le cour de Rome, soit par les 
 abus toujours croissans du regime feodal. Avec le pouvoir des 
 empereurs la constitution de I'empire fut alteree. Ce vaste etat 
 degenera insensiblemcnt en unc sorte du sysUme fid^ratif, et 
 I'empereur ne fut plus par le suite du temps, que le chef 
 commun et le Seigneur Suzerain des vastes etats, dont ce 
 systeme etait compose. Tableau des Revolutions, vol. i, p, 
 173. 
 
 '' Imperfect both in principle and practice, and faulty in 
 the extreme from the admission of many members to a share in 
 the confederacy, who possessed dominions not included under 
 the provisions of the federal compact in other countries of 
 Europe,
 
 19 
 
 "Were we to judge indeed from the parade of 
 constitutional powers vested by the Germanic union 
 in the federal head, from the ample authority 
 entrusted to the Diet, and from the extensive 
 influence enjoyed by the executive Magistrate in 
 virtue of his numerous prerogatives, we should arrive 
 at no conclusion, but one favourable to the domestic 
 tranquillity and power of the empire. But the 
 facts of the case are far otherwise : the principle, 
 which formed the basis of this confederacy, that the 
 empire was a community of sovereigns, that the 
 Diet was a representation of sovereigns, and that 
 the laws were addressed to sovereigns, rendered 
 it a nerveless and unwieldy body ; equally incapa- 
 ble of internal regulation, and of security from 
 the pressure of external danger. So far indeed was 
 it from presenting any appearance of concert 
 and unanimity, that the generality of its wars were 
 waged between its own members ; nor is there 
 any one instance throughout its whole history 
 in which it can be said to have united in offering 
 a steady resistance to foreign arms. 
 
 The history of Germany is a history of wars and 
 tumults, of foreign interference and foreign intrigue, 
 of violence, rapine, and oppression, of refusals to 
 comply with the decisions of the Diet, and of at- 
 tempts to enforce them either abortive, or attended 
 with bloodshed and civil war. In the 16th century 
 the emperor, with one half of the empire, was
 
 20 
 
 engaged against the princes and states composing 
 the remainder. Again, previously to the peace of 
 WestphaMa, Germany was desolated by a war of 
 thirty years, in which the emperor and part of the 
 empire were opposed to Sweden, aided by many 
 members of the confederacy. Peace was at length 
 negociated and dictated by foreign powers ; and 
 the articles of it, to which foreign powers were 
 parties, became fundamental principles of the Ger- 
 manic constitution. 
 
 Hence it is that we look in vain for the power 
 which ought naturally to have followed upon the 
 organization of so extensive a confederacy ; for 
 allowing the existence of great strength and 
 abundant resources in the Germanic body, yet 
 we find them seldom or never called into united 
 action, from the prevalence of conflicting interests, 
 without any adequate means of adjustment ; from 
 the want of substantial authority in the Diet ; 
 and the consequent necessity of referring all dis- 
 putes of moment to the decision of the sword. 
 
 Now it would seem, that as all questions of 
 the power of federative governments may be re- 
 solved into that of the efficiency of the federal 
 head, and as we have shewn this to be more 
 or less incompatible with the principles and feelings 
 of all confederacies ; the conclusion must be unfa- 
 vourable to their capacity for power.
 
 21 
 
 But the reserve necessary in the admission of 
 any rule in the science of poUtics, and the caution 
 with which we must examine all the circumstances 
 in the history of a nation, before we pronounce its 
 constitution to be incapable of a high degree of 
 political power, is no where more strongly forced 
 upon our consideration than in the present case. 
 
 It is quite true that in the great majority both of 
 ancient and modern confederacies we have a strik- 
 ing picture of weakness and instability. There are 
 some, however, which bear a contrary aspect ; and 
 one in particular, which, although in a certain de- 
 gree exposed to the latter of these imputations, can- 
 not certainly be taxed with a want of power''. It 
 will easily be understood that allusion is here made 
 to the United Provinces. 
 
 In order to understand in what manner the ex- 
 traordinary power enjoyed by this nation during a 
 great portion of the 17th century was affected by 
 the constitution of their government, we must recur 
 to the origin of their political existence ; since 
 our question is not so much whether the fact of a 
 people possessing a federal constitution is of itself 
 sufficient to account for the presence or absence of 
 power, as how far such a constitution may affect 
 
 '' We may instance also the Hanseatic league, which took its 
 rise in the 13th century, and which may justly be considered to 
 have given the first great impulse to the commerce of modern 
 Europe.
 
 22 
 
 the existing causes of weakness or prosperity. A 
 free government is but an epitome of the nation 
 where it exists ; and the real springs of power have 
 their source in the pecuUar circumstances, princi- 
 ples, habits, and feelings of the people. Good go- 
 vernment will develope and assist these in their 
 course ; bad government will choke and exhaust 
 them. 
 
 The power of the United Provinces derived both 
 its origin and subsequent support from their exten- 
 sive commerce ; and this, although it arose at an 
 early period of their independence, and prior to the 
 existence of their federative government, was in 
 after times much indebted to the peculiarity of their 
 constitution. History indeed teaches us, that in all 
 ages free governments have been the most favour- 
 able to commerce. Nor is the fact more evident, 
 than the reasons and principles upon which it might 
 be estabUshed : but this would lead us into a digres- 
 sion foreign to our purpose. 
 
 The federal constitution, which had for its basis 
 the union of Utrecht in 1579, found in the 'four 
 maritime provinces of the league, in those which 
 have from the earliest times been the depositories 
 of the strength and riches of the Netherlands, a 
 people, whose whole thoughts and feelings were 
 centered in two grand objects, and these identified 
 
 ' Holland, Zealaml, Friesland, Groningen.
 
 23 
 
 the one with the other, their independence and their 
 commerce. The religious persecutions which raged 
 in France, England, and Germany, during the course 
 of the 16th century, had compelled multitudes of 
 those professing the reformed discipline to take 
 shelter in the low countries, where the government 
 had long been of a milder character, and the privi- 
 leges of the cities inviolate. The course of these 
 emigrations took a natural direction towards such 
 of the provinces, as held out the fairest prospect of 
 success in the consolidation of their independence ; 
 and thus the above-mentioned provinces became 
 the seat of a redundant, but wealthy and enterpris- 
 ing population. The result in favour of commerce 
 was powerful and immediate; and with the growth 
 of their commerce their independence may be fairly 
 said to have been identified, since it was com- 
 merce alone which supplied them with the means 
 of a protracted resistance to the Spanish power. 
 Further still, it afforded them so great facilities for 
 the destruction of the Spanish wealth derived from 
 her East Indian ^ possessions, that the desire to put 
 a stop to their further successes and depredations 
 in that quarter was among the chief reasons which 
 extorted from Spain the first recognition of their 
 independence in 1609. 
 
 ** Portugal and her Indian dependencies had been subdued by 
 Philip II. in 1580, She did not recover her independence till 
 1640.
 
 24 
 
 Under such circumstances it was plainly impos- 
 sible for the federal government to close its eyes to 
 the importance of trade, even had it wished to 
 give a different direction to the current of popular 
 feeling. Fortunately, however, the members of 
 that government were themselves engaged in the 
 same pursuits with the great body of the nation. 
 They were sensible how much depended upon the 
 encouragement of commerce ; and therefore fell in 
 entirely with its habits, and with its consequences 
 upon society. It is to these causes that we may in 
 great measure attribute the traits of frugality, of 
 industry and perseverance, so indelibly stamped 
 upon the character both of the administration and 
 the people. 
 
 But the operation of the federal government 
 upon commerce, although at first silent and second- 
 ary, became in after times its main spring and 
 support, as will easily appear from a brief review 
 of certain results of that singular constitution. 
 
 There is perhaps no example in history, which 
 reads us a more forcible lesson upon the precarious 
 nature of political wisdom, or which can teach us by 
 a more striking appeal to facts, that the most 
 faultless and unexceptionable theories of govern- 
 ment are not always the best adapted to practice, 
 or the best calculated to insure the grand objects of 
 national happiness and national prosperity. A 
 plan for a constitution like that of the United
 
 25 
 
 Provinces, could hardly form any part of the 
 speculations of the politician, unless he were 
 desirous to demonstrate the probable consequences 
 of so glaring a perversion of the principles of his 
 science. It was indeed an edifice constructed to 
 all appearance of ill assorted and heterogeneous 
 materials ; a compound of monarchy, aristocracy, 
 and oligarchy; which has been dignified with the 
 title of a Republic, without the existence of one 
 particle of popular government throughout its whole 
 composition. 
 
 There were in this constitution four main ele- 
 ments. The first and most prominent was the 
 authority and influence of the House of Orange ; 
 the second, the federal provisions of the union ; 
 the third, the sovereignty of the provinces ; the 
 fourth, the freedom of the cities. The direct 
 tendency of the internal administration of the two 
 latter was oligarchical ; and as these, in conjunction 
 with the hereditary aristocracy, and the Princes of 
 Orange, made up the federative government, the 
 great majority of the people had no immediate 
 authority whatever. They exercised, nevertheless, 
 as will appear, a very considerable moral influence 
 over the minds of those in power; a species of 
 influence at once the most salutary and the most 
 efficacious that can be exercised by the bulk of the 
 community. 
 
 The political condition then of this people was in
 
 26 
 
 many respects of a very anomalous description. 
 Their liberty indeed was secure from the fact of the 
 balance of power between the monarchical and 
 oligarchical principles of the constitution being 
 placed in their hands ; but they were destitute of all 
 immediate authority and control over the affairs 
 of the league. It is therefore at first sight matter 
 of surprise that they acquiesced so wilUngly in this 
 form of government. But there is nothing more 
 remarkable in the history of these provinces than 
 the sterling good sense and moderation of the 
 people ; the result in a great measure of that slow 
 and cautious temperament, which has ever marked 
 their character, and still more perhaps of the pri- 
 vations and distress, through which during a long 
 course of years they struggled to the attainment of 
 a dear bought independence. Profiting by this 
 experience, the governors presided over the national 
 interests in an equitable and impartial spirit ; 
 dealing wisely and temperately with the people ; 
 without encroachment or oppression, and, if we may 
 judge from the insignificance of their ' emoluments, 
 without desire of advantage. They were well 
 aware that the surest way both to the attainment 
 and preservation of power lay through the medium 
 of those qualities, which secure the esteem, and 
 
 ' The salary of the Pensioner of Holland, the most influential 
 officer of the state, did not exceed £200 per annum ; and others 
 in proportion : naval and military officers were remunerated at 
 somewhat a higher rate.
 
 27 
 
 gain the confidence, of the people, and the use 
 they made of this conviction was wise and salutary. 
 The governed, on the other hand, beheld with 
 content and satisfaction the surrender of all 
 pretence to tyranny, and sacrificed all factious 
 opposition and interference to the public benefit, 
 which they knew to be identified with the vigour 
 and stability of government. 
 
 From this account of the general workings of the 
 constitution, it would appear, that although neces- 
 sarily imperfect from the circumscribed limits 
 assigned to the choice of those invested with power, 
 the oligarchical administration was yet free from 
 the odious vices which commonly attach to that 
 species of government, and met with a noble 
 recompence in the esteem and confidence of the 
 people. Hence it was enabled to adjust and 
 harmonize discordant views and principles, and to 
 preserve to the several elements of the con- 
 federacy a due proportion of constitutional au- 
 thority. 
 
 At this stage of our enquiry it will be evident in 
 what manner the existence of a federative govern- 
 ment was favourable to the commerce, and therefore 
 to the power of the United Provinces. Since the 
 influence of the oligarchy, however sure and well 
 founded, would have been little able to oppose a 
 permanent and effectual barrier to the encroach-
 
 28 
 
 ments of the House of Orange "", had it not derived 
 a very considerable assistance from the sovereignty 
 of the provinces and the freedom of the cities. The 
 one great security against the estabUshment of a 
 monarchy lay in the uncompromising and watchful 
 jealousy which must ever subsist among the 
 members of a confederacy : while the force and 
 spirit of this must have speedily evaporated, had 
 they been consoHdated into one single and undi- 
 vided state. 
 
 In order then to render the inference complete, 
 we must shew that under the circumstances of this 
 country, the operation of a monarchy upon com- 
 merce would have been the reverse of favourable. 
 
 It is not meant to be asserted, that a free 
 monarchy has a general tendency to depress com- 
 merce ; much less, that any republican constitu- 
 tion has advantages to offer comparable to those we 
 enjoy under a kingly government tempered with 
 all the principles of rational liberty. But where- 
 
 " The authority of their princes was imposing and extensive. 
 They were hereditary high admirals and captains general, and 
 had thereby the disposal of all naval and military commands. They 
 had the power of pardon ; the right of choosing the magistrates 
 from a certain number nominated by the towns ; with various 
 other privileges and prerogatives, besides an overwhelming 
 influence derived from their great patrimonial revenues, lordships, 
 and principalities.
 
 29 
 
 soever regal authority trenches upon these princi- 
 ples, and is enabled to pursue with advantage to 
 itself a separate and distinct interest from that of 
 the community, there is great danger lest it should 
 deaden, and eventually destroy the spirit and enter- 
 prise of the nation. It is not in human nature to 
 incur labour and risk in the pursuit of advantages, 
 for the enjoyment of which it can have no per- 
 manent security ; and this appears to be the main 
 reason why commerce has never reared her head 
 under the baneful influence of despotism. Con- 
 sequences the same in character, though differing 
 in degree, have place in all monarchies, which are 
 not founded upon the broad basis of freedom, and 
 the true principles of government. 
 
 What then, it will be asked, were the impedi- 
 ments to the establishment of a free monarchy in 
 the United Provinces ? The answer is easy. The 
 oligarchy were in direct opposition to the invest- 
 ment of the kingly office in the House of Orange". 
 
 " William II. who died in 1650, had shewn a strong dispo- 
 sition to arbitrary power. Upon the minority, therefore, of his 
 successor, the oligarchical party seized the opportunity to 
 abrogate all the public hereditary dignities of the House of 
 Orange. The states and cities assumed the last nomination of 
 their own magistrates, and there remained no right of pardon, 
 and no representation of the sovereign dignity of the state. 
 This state of things lasted twenty-two years, and hence the 
 division of the confederacy into two distinct and hostile parties 
 at the period of the French invasion in 1672.
 
 30 
 
 Any attempt therefore on the part of the latter to 
 ascend the throne must have been prefaced by a 
 complete overthrow and subjection of this powerful 
 body in the state. Regal authority pursued in 
 contradiction to the interests and opinions of so 
 important a body, as it must have been acquired by 
 violence and faction, so must it likewise have been 
 sustained by force, and must have rested upon a 
 foundation too unstable and insecure to be enabled 
 to dispense with arbitrary power. Even on the 
 supposition of a more fortunate event, and the 
 erection of a throne attended with little or no 
 invasion of the Uberties of the people, yet would 
 the change have still proved detrimental to the 
 interests of commerce ; since these would no longer 
 have preserved their paramount influence over the 
 minds of the entire community, but have given 
 way in great measure to other views and occupa- 
 tions, to other objects of enterprise and ambition. 
 In a word, the establishment of a monarchy would 
 have involved many consequences directly or in- 
 directly unfavourable to commerce, and none more 
 effectual than the introduction of feelings, habits, 
 and pursuits, subversive of those principles of 
 parsimony and frugality, so long a source of wealth 
 and means of power. 
 
 The argument then may be shortly recapitulated 
 as follows. 
 
 I. That the commerce of the United Provinces
 
 31 
 
 formed the very nerves and sinews of their 
 power. 
 
 II. That the strong monarchical principle of the 
 constitution, had it once been enabled to acquire the 
 ascendancy, must, from the nature of the case, have 
 assumed an absolute character, which could not 
 have failed to prove in the highest degree prejudicial 
 to commerce. 
 
 III. That the one effectual preventative against 
 the acquisition of any such ascendancy lay in the 
 operation of the federal government, which is there- 
 fore to be regarded as a necessary element of their 
 power. 
 
 Now it is plain, that the above example, however 
 it may exhibit an instance of great political power, 
 and that power mainly dependent upon the nature 
 of the constitution, is yet in no way sufficient to 
 constitute a valid objection to the general conclu- 
 sion, which asserts the prevaihng character of 
 federative governments to be weakness and in- 
 efficiency. It resulted from local and peculiar cir- 
 cumstances alone, that the operation of the federal 
 constitution was favourable to power ; and it was 
 from these, in connection with their commerce, and 
 the importance derived from their relative situation 
 to the nations of Europe, that this people attained a 
 height of consideration and influence, so dispropor- 
 tionate to their population and territorial extent.
 
 32 
 
 Their history is remarkable for many reasons ; for 
 no one more than the manner in which the very 
 defects of their constitution were turned to their ad- 
 vantage ; as well as for the spirit and decision with 
 which on great emergencies they" dispensed with 
 restrictive regulations, when a close adherence to 
 the letter of the constitution would have endangered 
 the best interests of the commonwealth. 
 
 The question of the stability of federative govern- 
 ments is made up of opposite considerations to 
 those insisted upon in the discussion of their power : 
 and here we cannot fail to observe the existence of 
 a very marked difference between the results of a 
 federal union and those of a national government. 
 In the latter, political power and internal stability 
 have a mutual and beneficial operation ; while 
 under a federal constitution, although it is quite 
 
 " The States General had no constitutional authority to de- 
 cide in questions of peace and war, of foreign alliances, of 
 raising or coining money, or of the privileges of the several 
 members of the confederacy, without previously sending to con- 
 sult the provincial states by their respective deputies. But in 
 concluding the treaties, which laid the foundation of the triple 
 alliance in 1688, they acted in direct contradiction to this 
 fundamental principle. Now it is clear that this assumption of 
 supreme authority by the federal head was the salvation of the 
 state. Since an attention to common forms would have given 
 time and opportunity to France to defeat the proposed measures 
 by tampering with the members of the league, any one of whom 
 might, by the provisions of the constitution, prevent a great 
 national object by a single veto.
 
 3r3 
 
 true that stability is essential to the successful 
 pursuit of power, yet is it also true, that accessions 
 of power have a direct and inevitable tendency to 
 impair the stabihty of the union. Whether then 
 we pursue an abstract enquiry into the principles of 
 federalism, or look to history for the evidence of 
 example, we shall arrive by distinct paths at a 
 common conclusion ; and the coincidence between 
 facts and theory would seem to be plain, striking, 
 and complete. 
 
 The most favourable instance of a federal con- 
 stitution will be found in the union of pure re- 
 publics. Unanimity can never be expected from 
 an association of monarchies, nor indeed from any 
 combination of monarchy with the forms either of 
 oligarchical or popular government: neither are the 
 two latter more easily reconcilable ; and although 
 the case of the United Provinces presents us w^ith 
 an illustrious exception in favour of an union of 
 ohgarchies, yet in the great majority of instances 
 the government of the few is of too selfish a cha- 
 racter to assimilate and harmonize with federal 
 principles. Good government, therefore, if it be 
 attainable at all under a confederacy, must have 
 for its basis an association of republics. Nor is the 
 process of negative reasoning the only one avail- 
 able to the establishment of this conclusion ; but 
 the positive arguments in its favour are sufficiently 
 obvious, to allow us to assume it as one which 
 requires no further proof.
 
 34 
 
 Associations of states, as of individuals, are 
 formed in pursuit of a definite object by an 
 identity of means : their stability, therefore, is liable 
 to be endangered by any change in either of these 
 two essentials. In the case of a confederacy, the 
 one grand object is the attainment of security ; 
 and, as subordinate to this, we might enumerate all 
 those political advantages which are inseparable 
 from an extended sphere of influence, of consider- 
 ation, and power. In an association of republics, 
 when organized upon just principles, the means in 
 order to the acquisition of these advantages would be 
 a close and intimate union, a general community of 
 rights and privileges, and, lastly, the delegation of 
 ample and efficient powers to the federal head. 
 It will hardly be matter of controversy, that a 
 union, established upon such principles as these, 
 would embrace very many requisites for good 
 government. But its excellencies and advantages 
 would not be confined to a mere guarantee of in- 
 ternal prosperity and peace ; but would comprise 
 exhaustless sources of energy and greatness, to 
 swell the stream in its onward course to political 
 power. 
 
 Montesquieu ^ treats of a confederate republic as 
 an expedient for extending the sphere of popular 
 government, and combining the advantages of 
 monarchy with those of republicanism ; the energy 
 
 •J Esprit des Loix, iii, 9.
 
 35 
 
 of supreme power with the hberties of the people. 
 This is obviously true of a confederacy in its most 
 perfect form ; which would allow little room among 
 its salutary jealousies for the abuses of corruption, 
 still less for any fatal burst of violence or faction, 
 and none for the apprehension of tyranny and 
 despotic power. And were there no adverse prin- 
 ciples in the essence of such a constitution, it 
 would not be presumptuous to prophesy in its 
 favour a lengthened political existence. But the 
 very prosperity of a federal government, how- 
 ever excellent in its organization, carries within 
 its bosom the germ of disunion and decay, in 
 the extreme difficulty of retaining for any very 
 lengthened period the unanimity of thought, and 
 singleness of purpose, which gave the first im- 
 pulse to the measures of the union : in the impos- 
 sibility (if the expression be allowed) of preserving 
 in their pristine vigour these essentials of a federal 
 constitution, and defending them against the secret, 
 but powerful and unceasing, workings of separate 
 and conflicting interests. In other words, al- 
 though the great object of national security 
 remain substantially the same, yet the circum- 
 stances, under which it is viewed by the mem- 
 bers of the confederacy, are exposed to continual 
 fluctuation ; and with them the means to its 
 attainment, originally assented to and pursued 
 by all, become a fruitful source of dissension and 
 dispute.
 
 36* 
 
 Now there is nothing which has a stronger and 
 a more direct tendency to elffect a change in the 
 relative views and feehngs of confederate states 
 than an increase and growth of power. If indeed 
 it were possible to assign to the several members 
 of a confederacy a due proportion of the political 
 advantages acquired by them in their collective 
 capacity, and thus to preserve them in a situation 
 similar or analogous to their original condition, the 
 stability of their league would be so far from incur- 
 ring any danger of a dissolution, as to acquire at 
 every step additional firmness and consistence. 
 But we may leave to the enthusiast the confident 
 expectation of so cheering a result ; and turning 
 our eyes from the fair, but fallacious, picture of 
 imaginary excellence, compel ourselves to regard 
 steadily those darker shades, which are the truer 
 representatives of human action, and which harmo- 
 nize so justly with the varied colours of historical 
 truth. 
 
 We will then assume a case of confederate re- 
 publics, wdiose several interests have been carefully 
 poised and adjusted in the outset of their national 
 career, and their relative share of influence assigned 
 with impartial justice. This arrangement w^ould 
 render imperative a great degree of mutual con- 
 cession, and a subservience of particular interests 
 to the general welfare. Now it is reasonable to 
 suppose, that certain of these states will possess 
 advantages in their situation and general circum-
 
 37 
 
 stances, which will enable them to outstrip with 
 ease their less fortunate associates. An augment- 
 ation of prosperity will beget, not merely a preten- 
 sion, but a right to an augmentation of power. 
 Power once acquired has a natural tendency to a 
 rapid increase ; and is unhappily so adverse to the 
 due exercise of equity and moderation, that it is 
 scarcely possible but that the change in the relative 
 situation of the confederates, which began in justice, 
 must end in encroachment and oppression. The 
 natural result of this state of things will be com- 
 binations among the weaker states for the purposes 
 of resistance ; and the aid of foreign powers will be 
 invoked to repel the threatened subjection, al- 
 though it is scarcely possible that this summons 
 can fail to involve a dissolution of the federal 
 compact. 
 
 We have a striking exemplification of these poli- 
 tical consequences in the history of the Acheean 
 league. The feeble tie of the Amphictyonic con- 
 federacy, over which Athens, Sparta, and Thebes 
 had exercised a successive sovereignty, was at 
 length effectually severed by the introduction of 
 the ' Macedonian power. A state of anarchy en- 
 sued, and all appearance of concert and unanimity 
 among the states of Greece was confined to a few 
 inconsiderable towns of Achaia. l^ven this had at 
 
 ' La Giece etait perdue, lorsque un roi de Macedon obtint unc 
 place parmi les Aniphictyons. Esprit dcs Loix, iii.
 
 38 
 
 one moment disappeared beneath the potent in- 
 fluence of the arts and arms of Macedon ; but it 
 had disappeared only to revive in a shape more 
 commanding and extensive. ' The disinterested 
 union of a few Achsean towns gave promise of such 
 inestimable advantages, that within a short time 
 from its formation the league embraced nearly the 
 entire * Peloponnesus. Even Athens united herself 
 to the common cause, and for a second time in the 
 history of Greece the selfishness of ambition gave 
 way before a generous enthusiasm for the common 
 liberty. Sparta, however, a solitary exception to 
 these sentiments, Sparta, who had reigned the 
 imperial mistress of a former league, in which the 
 Achaeans had made so inconsiderable a figure, be- 
 held their rapid progress with jealousy and discon- 
 tent. The Achseans, unable to cope single-handed 
 with the Spartan power, invoked the aid of Mace- 
 don, and were triumphant in the contest. But 
 they had escaped one danger only to incur another, 
 more fatal, because more concealed, and clothed in 
 the garb of friendship and aUiance. Macedon had 
 now attained a situation whence she could securely 
 foment the jealousies and discontent which had 
 already begun to manifest themselves among the 
 
 • In the second period of the league, about 280 B. C. 
 
 ' The expressions of Polybius are remarkable. Tovtm §g fcit>» 
 idoKii ^ixXXxTTitv Toy fiii fciSig TToMuf ^idSio-iv E^so o-^iTov TKV (rvfCTTXtrcc* 
 IliXo7rovnj(roy , tm (Mi Ton avTOi 5Teg</3flAa> vTfoc^^iiv roTi ivoiKovTif avrnf, 
 ii. 37.
 
 39 
 
 members of the league : nor was this a task of 
 difficulty. Achaia, as the centre of the union, had 
 acquired by her conduct and good fortune a very 
 considerable share of influence and power. The 
 same fears, therefore, which first gave birth to the 
 confederacy, w^ere again revived ; but their direc- 
 tion was changed. Many of the confederates be- 
 came distracted between their fears of Macedon, 
 and their jealousy of Achaia ; and the harmony, so 
 necessary to the very being of the confederacy, was 
 lost for ever. 
 
 During this crisis the Romans had appeared 
 upon the stage of Greece. Rome, however, was 
 content to forego an immediate for a future, but 
 more easy and certain, conquest. And, foreseeing 
 the ultimate fate which awaited a divided people, 
 she" employed the intermediate time in secretly 
 undermining the few remaining props and bulwarks 
 of Grecian liberty. This insidious forbearance did 
 not long pass unrewarded. Opportunities speedily 
 arose for a more direct and effectual interference ; 
 and Achaia, in common with the rest of Greece, 
 submitted to a yoke of hopeless slavery, the more 
 galling, because attended with a conviction, when 
 
 " Nee aliud adversus validissimas gentes nobis utilius quam 
 quod in commune non consulunt. Rarus duabus tribusve civi- 
 tatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus. Ita, 
 dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur. Tacitus vit. Agricoloe, 
 0.9.
 
 40 
 
 too late, that their own errors had mainly con- 
 tributed to strengthen the hands and smooth the 
 path of the haughty conqueror". 
 
 The objection furnished by the example of the 
 United Provinces, which may seem to have com- 
 bined stability with power, is easily met by an 
 enquiry into the real merits of the case. Their 
 confederacy subsisted, it is true, for upwards of 
 two hundred years ; but the duration of its pre- 
 eminence in power did not embrace a sixth part 
 of that period. The spirit of faction, together with 
 other consequences of their brief though extra- 
 ordinary career of prosperity, exposed them in a 
 naked and defenceless state to the ambition of 
 France at the commencement of the w^ar in 1672. 
 Since the era of that struggle they no longer oc- 
 cupied the same high station among the nations 
 of Europe ; and the stability of their union, up 
 to the period of the French revolution, was owing 
 to the interest of foreign powers in its preservation, 
 and still more perhaps to their own comparative 
 weakness and insignificance. 
 
 We have seen in all the instances examined 
 the obstacles to the permanency of a federal union, 
 
 * The history of the Olynthian confederacy, as detailed by 
 Mitford, c. xxxvi. sect. 2. will furnish us with another proof of 
 the certain operation of prosperity and power in loosening, and 
 finally in dissevering the ties, of federal union.
 
 41 
 
 which result from the acquisition of power of a 
 purely defensive character ; we are justified then 
 in ascribing no less certain consequences to the 
 power of a confederacy, which may have been 
 fortunate enough to escape the influence of internal 
 jealousies, and have proceeded through a long 
 course of prosperity and riches, first to secruity, 
 and then to conquest. The military talents of a 
 single chief, the devotion of his victorious soldiers, 
 the introduction of standing armies, a necessary 
 accompaniment of conquest, must involve con- 
 sequences so directly hostile to the stabihty of 
 the confederacy where they exist, that it is need- 
 less to enlarge upon their inevitable operation. 
 
 If then the acquisition of power has a certain 
 tendency to weaken the ties of federal union, we 
 should expect that a confederacy, deprived, by 
 natural, as well as adventitious, circumstances, of 
 all pretension to political power, would, for that 
 reason, possess in a superior degree the merit of 
 stability. This position is throughout illustrated 
 by the history of Switzerland, which, prevented 
 by concurrent causes from occupying a high place 
 in the scale of nations, preserved with few varia- 
 tions, during the lapse of five centuries, the original 
 constitution and character of her league. 
 
 The revolt of the Waldstetten at the close of 
 the 13th century originated in an unmixed feehng 
 of resistance to oppression : nor can we reasonably
 
 42 
 
 imagine that any idea of national power was at that 
 moment entertained by these petty communities. 
 This observation will apply in a no less degree 
 to their subsequent history ; for it is a remarkable 
 fact, and one which places in a clear light the 
 general character and complexion of the Helvetic 
 league, that the same free and jealous people, who 
 flew to arms in vindication of their title to free- 
 dom in 1298, did not claim an entire exemption 
 from the feudal sovereignty of the empire - , until 
 upwards of three centuries had elapsed from the 
 date of their independence. The Cantons acceded 
 slowly to the league, accordingly as they severally 
 felt themselves aggrieved by the Austrian dominion ; 
 and, content w^ith having emancipated themselves 
 from the yoke of servitude, seemed to pay but 
 little regard to the dictates of ambition. During 
 the course of the 14th century, their history is 
 one strain of well merited panegyric ; and the 
 mind, wearied with the foUies and disgusted with 
 the crimes of the rest of Europe, reposes with 
 pleasure on a scene, where she can find so little 
 to condemn ; nothing at least sufficient to obscure 
 the bright example of public and private virtue. 
 
 Happy had it been for Switzerland, had she 
 continued to cherish these pure and healthful 
 feelings ; happy had it been, had she gained 
 nothing beyond simple liberty in her contest with 
 
 y i. e. Until the peace of Westphalia, A. D. 1648.
 
 43 
 
 her ancient masters. But the cravings of avarice 
 and the thirst of plunder are inseparable from 
 the pride of victory ; and while the hardy moun- 
 taineer exulted in the defeat and humiliation of 
 the Austrian chivalry, he purchased his triumph 
 at the expence of his integrity and the simplicity 
 of his nature. The sudden influx of wealth into 
 the valleys and fastnesses of the Alps wrought a 
 melancholy change in the character of the inha- 
 bitants. The peaceful occupations of the peasant 
 and the citizen were gladly exchanged for the 
 dangers and privations of the soldier ; and the 
 love of freedom, which had first awakened their 
 warlike energies, degenerated into an undistin- 
 guishing thirst for gain and desire of advantage. 
 
 Under circumstances too favourable for the deve- 
 lopement of the military character, the Swiss were 
 not slow to attain a prominent rank among the 
 nations of Europe. Their situation, however, pre- 
 cluded them from exerting this means of power 
 in their own behalf, and for the purposes of conquest ; 
 and they thus became the ready agents of the 
 highest paymaster ; content to substitute for the 
 disinterested enthusiasm of the patriot and the 
 hero, the rapacity of the hireling and the devotion 
 of the slave. On the other hand, the comparative 
 tranquillity, which was in some measure ensured 
 to the internal relations of the confederacy by the 
 constant occupation of these turbulent and licen- 
 tious spirits, was a great, but a solitary, advantage.
 
 44 
 
 Such was the condition of Switzerland, when 
 the dawn of the Reformation gave promise of better 
 hopes. It produced indeed a very material change 
 in the character and circumstances of the Swiss ; 
 and its effects are chiefly visible in the improved 
 tone of moral feeling, and in the introduction of 
 better habits, and a growing aversion to mercenary 
 service, as the leading features of this improvement. 
 But in another point of view, the Reformation was 
 unavoidably attended with disastrous consequences ; 
 and the history of Switzerland, during the latter 
 part of the 16th and the whole of the 17th century, 
 is crowded with endless details of controversies and 
 bloodshed ; of that violence and those animosities, 
 which are found so terribly to prevail, where re- 
 ligious zeal has been abused to the purposes of 
 intolerance, or assumed as a passport for the un- 
 restrained indulgence of evil passions. It was not 
 until the commencement of the 18th century, that 
 the mutual exhaustion of the conflicting Cantons 
 put an end to a contest which had seemed intermin- 
 able, but the tranquillity then established was 
 founded upon a secure basis ; and up to the period 
 of the French revolution, Switzerland enjoyed 
 an uninterrupted course of prosperity and peace. 
 
 From this brief and very imperfect sketch of the 
 history of the Helvetic league, it is clear, that the 
 stabihty of the confederacy during five centuries 
 can in no wise be imputed to the absence of 
 motives to disunion among the Cantons, or to
 
 45 
 
 their freedom from intestine divisions and social 
 war. The annals of few nations are more deeply 
 tinged with blood ; few, like Switzerland, can pre- 
 sent to us in the same page the evidences of the 
 most determined hostility, and the semblance of 
 union. But these apparent anomalies are easily 
 reconciled by a slight consideration of the nature of 
 her league, of its original purpose, and subsequent 
 operation. 
 
 First then, from the earliest ages ^ down to our 
 own times, the union between the various tribes or 
 communities occupying the extent of modern 
 Switzerland has been restricted to the simple 
 principle of mutual defence. At no period does 
 the federal constitution appear to have comprised 
 any thing of importance beyond a general guarantee 
 of independence, and a right of arbitration in 
 disputes between the members of the league, vested 
 by the constitution in the neutral Cantons. But we 
 find no marks or traces of common sovereignty, no 
 common treasury, no common troops, even in time 
 of war, no common coin, or courts of judica- 
 ture. 
 
 The second peculiarity, which resulted imme- 
 diately from the foregoing, was the extreme feeble- 
 
 * We learn from Caesar, that ancient Helvetia was divided into 
 four communities called ' Pagi,' between whom there subsisted a 
 defensive alliance, but no other sign of a federal union.
 
 46 
 
 ness, and singularly ill-defined character, of the ties 
 of federal association. Indeed, since the era of the 
 Reformation, this confederacy existed rather as a 
 consequence of geographical position than of poli- 
 tical combination. Before that period, their com- 
 mon interest, their military glory, together with the 
 pressure of a neighbouring and hostile empire, 
 preserved them in a state of union, of which they 
 had too recently experienced the unmixed benefit, 
 to be disposed to question its utility and advantage. 
 
 Now it is precisely to this feebleness and in- 
 efficiency of the federal ties, that we are to look for 
 the main cause of the permanence of the league. 
 An association, which imposed upon its members^ 
 no perceptible restraint, which called upon them 
 for no sacrifices, and made no demands upon their 
 individual interests, which might, we may almost 
 say '', be entered into at pleasure, and at pleasure 
 relinquished, was surely well calculated to survive 
 under circumstances, which must have proved fatal 
 
 * For instance, the articles of confederation forbade the con- 
 cluding of any foreign alliance without the consent of the Diet. 
 But, after the Reformation, we find Berne at the head of the 
 Protestant interest in treaty with the United Provinces; and 
 Lucerne as the head of the Catholic interest, in treaty with 
 France. 
 
 ^ We find Berne refusing to take any part in the war against 
 Leopold of Austria, in which was fought the battle of Sempach ; 
 but this contempt of federal principles seems to have caused little 
 surprise, and to have given birth to no bints at a separation.
 
 47 
 
 to any system of federation constructed upon better- 
 ascertained principles, and possessing a vested right 
 to interpret and assert the provisions of its con- 
 stitution. 
 
 It would be unjust to Switzerland to omit in this 
 place all notice of the remarkable excellence of her 
 internal government. The absence of power, and 
 the division of the country into petty communities, 
 appear to have exercised a very beneficial influence 
 upon the "^ various forms of administration which 
 are found to have prevailed among the members of 
 the league. The Swiss unquestionably enjoyed 
 during far the greater part of the 18th century a 
 very high degree of happiness and prosperity. 
 Their simplicity and singleness of character ; their 
 disposition, bold and uncompromising, yet peace- 
 able and industrious ; their steady neutrality amid 
 all the wars of conflicting Europe ; are worthy 
 objects of contemplation to the moralist, and of 
 panegyric to the historian. The praises indeed, 
 they so fully merit, have never been denied them, 
 but ratified by the concurrent testimony of all 
 nations ; and, to select an evidence of high autho- 
 
 «^ We should perhaps confine tliis praise chiefly to the 
 aristocratical Cantons ; for it cannot be denied, that in those 
 possessing a democratical form of government, the administration 
 of justice was extremely corrupt. This is perhaps attributable in 
 some measure to their uniform practice of compounding for 
 offences by a fine, which speedily confounds together the ideas of 
 private gain and public justice.
 
 48 
 
 rit5^ we find it declared by Burke, " that he had 
 beheld throughout Switzerland, and above all in 
 the Canton of Berne, a people at once the happiest 
 and the best governed upon earth." 
 
 To sum up the argument. It would seem that 
 the advantages of federation are more than counter- 
 balanced by its defects. The former indeed are 
 calculated to promote good internal government ; 
 but as this is not the great object of a federal union, 
 so neither can it be much insisted upon as a pecu- 
 liar benefit. On the other hand, in the pursuit of 
 political po"wer, which is the ultimate object of the 
 association, the defects come immediately into play, 
 and their tendency is not more uniform and certain, 
 than it is powerful and destructive. Now it is true, 
 that these last could certainly have no place in a 
 perfect confederacy, which w^ould therefore rank 
 very liigh among systems of government. But 
 political and moral perfection are equally unattain- 
 able ; and human nature must indeed change, before 
 a regard for remote and widely-diffused interests 
 can be reasonably expected to stifle the voice of 
 passion, of prejudices, and local feeling. Men, 
 either in their private capacities, or as members of 
 a community, are chiefly swayed by motives, which 
 have the closest and most immediate connection 
 with their own advantage : and although in the 
 majority of cases the interests of the confederate 
 members and those of the collective body will 
 coincide, it is, nevertheless, certain, that oppor-
 
 49 
 
 tunities will frequently arise to give grounds for a 
 real, or imaginary, opposition and hostility between 
 them. Hence will result a division of authority, 
 and a denial of supremacy to the federal head, 
 which, however it may differ in degree under dif- 
 ferent circumstances, cannot fail to prove injurious, 
 not merely to the increase, but even to the preserv- 
 ation, of political power. 
 
 On the other hand, should the good fortune, the 
 conduct, or the peculiar advantages of any confe- 
 deracy have been sufficient to counteract the evil 
 influences of a partial and inefficient union, the 
 growth of power will be vigorous and rapid, but its 
 decay will be rapid also. Its maturity will give 
 birth to jealousies and faction, to oppression and 
 resistance ; and from the moment when these 
 principles assume a decided shape, from that moment 
 will national power cease, and the spectacle of a 
 mighty and united people give place to one of petty 
 and conflicting states. The stabihty therefore -of 
 confederacies, however it may subsist entire and 
 unimpaired in the absence of all means of aggran- 
 disement, may be pronounced to be incompatible 
 with the possession of power. 
 
 We turn our eyes as well from the examples of 
 antiquity, as from those of more recent ages, to the 
 great political phenomenon of our own times. It 
 has been reserved for America to call into renewed 
 existence a form of government, which, among the 
 
 D
 
 50 
 
 multiplied parallels of history, has scarcely one to 
 command onr unmixed approval, or challenge our 
 unqualified applause. But it would be a most 
 uncandid perversion of the truth, were we to extend 
 to the confederacy of the western hemisphere those 
 censures, which are in different degrees applicable 
 to the federal systems of the old world. 
 
 In premising, that the constitution of the United 
 States differs most essentially from that of any 
 ancient or modern confederacy, we shall at once 
 perceive, that any judgment respecting its future 
 prospects must be attended with great and peculiar 
 difficulties. We shall perceive, that we possess no 
 standard of reference ; no examples, by which to 
 try the validity of our conclusions ; no analogous 
 cases, to which we may turn for illustration or autho- 
 rity. Their government is a new creation in politics, 
 and must be tried solely and singly upon its own 
 merits. But the experience of less '^ than half a 
 century, replete as it is with matter for reflection, 
 for admiration, and for hope, is far too scanty to 
 allow us to appeal with confidence to its I'esults, or 
 to regard them as even tolerably certain indications 
 of what is yet to come. 
 
 It is a presumption indeed prior to all positive 
 argument in favour of the American union, that 
 it has avoided the glaring errors of former confe- 
 
 ^ i. e. from the date of the present constitution in 1787.
 
 51 
 
 deracies. The free and enlightened framers of the 
 constitution of 1787 appear to have studied the 
 models of antiquity in the true spirit of political 
 wisdom. Uniting their own experience of the mani- 
 fold and incurable evils of a partial union to the 
 lessons of history, they directed their whole ener- 
 gies to the establishment of a permanent and 
 effective government. They considered, that if the 
 association of the states were at all an object, it was 
 clearly one of the most vital and paramount 
 importance. That in all questions, therefore, of 
 coexisting powers, the first point was to settle the 
 national authority upon a secure basis, by placing 
 in its hands every thing which could be conceded 
 consistently with the preservation of the indepen- 
 dence of the states. With this principle for their 
 guide, they proceeded with deliberate caution and 
 consummate sagacity to blend together and adjust 
 an immense mass of complicated and partly con- 
 flicting interests. The result of their patriotic 
 labours was that constitution, which, if they never 
 considered it as perfect, as indeed may easily be 
 gathered from their speeches and recorded opinions, 
 was still unquestionably the best that the views 
 and circumstances of the country would permit ; and 
 few men, we should conceive, however they may 
 doubt its ultimate success, can refuse to it the 
 tribute of admiration and respect. 
 
 We cannot attempt to ofter in this place any 
 detailed account of the provisions of this famous
 
 52 
 
 constitution ; but must content ourselves with ob- 
 serving, that it partakes largely of the national as 
 well as of the federative character. A government 
 purely federal, would have no vested power of con- 
 trol over the individual citizens of the several states 
 composing the confederacy, but simply over the 
 legislatures of those states. Now an adherence to 
 this principle is clearly incompatible with a due 
 regard for effective government ; and the American 
 acted with temperance and true wisdom, in aban- 
 doning an unprofitable independence for the real and 
 tangible advantages of national union. 
 
 Again, it is hardly necessary to employ discus- 
 sion to prove the existence of political power in the 
 United States. If w^e look around the world, where 
 shall we find a people who have made within the 
 same period the same advances in all the essentials 
 of national greatness and national prosperity ? And 
 although we must in fairness assign a large portion 
 of what is enjoyed by them as a nation to the 
 century which elapsed prior to the date of their 
 independence, when, to use the words of Burke, 
 " a free and generous nature was left to take 
 its own course to perfection," there will still remain 
 a vast aggregate of national advantages, which can 
 only be referred to their form of government, to 
 its admirable adaptation to^the spirit of enterprise 
 and the love of freedom. 
 
 It w^ould evince a high degree of presumption
 
 53 
 
 in the writer of these pages, if with his very 
 Hmited acquaintance Avith the social and poUtical 
 circumstances of the United States, he were to 
 offer any positive opinion upon the probable for- 
 tunes of that great confederacy. But there are 
 certain considerations, arising immediately from 
 the nature of the case, which indeed can have 
 escaped no one, who has at all interested himself 
 in the liistory of America ; but which appear too 
 important to pass unnoticed, since they relate to 
 principles, upon which the permanence of the exist- 
 ing union would seem mainly to depend. 
 
 The old confederation, under which the United 
 States had achieved their independence, ceased 
 naturally with the conjunctures of the revolution, 
 which had first called it into existence. It was 
 not, it is true, annulled by any formal act ; but 
 its insufficiency to answer any good end in time of 
 peace had become so manifest, that no alternative 
 remained, but a dissolution of the (fOnfederacy, on 
 the one hand, or a union constructed upon entirely 
 new principles, on the other. It was fortunate for 
 America, that the sound views and enlightened 
 patriotism of the friends of union prevailed over the 
 selfish ambition of men, who would fain have reared 
 the edifice of their own power upon the ruins of the 
 confederacy. 
 
 The constitution then of 1 787 commenced its career 
 under the happiest auspices. The circumstances
 
 54 
 
 of the country and the people were all favourable 
 to a republican form of government, and the con- 
 solidation of civil and religious liberty. But the 
 extreme difficulty of providing for an ever varying 
 and increasing country a permanent and settled 
 government could not escape the statesmen of Ame- 
 rica. They were well aware, that the peculiar 
 advantage at that time enjoyed by their republic 
 in the absence of an impoverished and idle popula- 
 tion, could not in the nature of things continue, 
 for any very lengthened period, the same and 
 unimpaired. And although the facilities for ob- 
 taining subsistence, and many of the comforts of 
 life, have as yet prevented any very serious evil 
 from the rapid increase of the population, coupled 
 with the extended principle of the elective fran- 
 chise, it is impossible not to foresee, that sooner 
 or later the time must come, when the antidote will 
 cease to operate, and the poison begin to work ; 
 when the republican constitution, founded upon 
 the basis of equal representation, will degenerate 
 into the turbulent and ungovernable licentiousness 
 of a wild democracy. It will then remain to be 
 seen how far the popular election of the chief magis- 
 trate is compatible with the internal quiet and 
 stability of the union. Even at the present day 
 these elections give occasion for a display of 
 faction and party-hostility, which in any country 
 of Europe possessing a more condensed population 
 and a standing army, would inevitably terminate in 
 a civil war. In America the spirit evaporates and
 
 55 
 
 dies away, owing to the absence of these motives to 
 excitement. 
 
 The distinction between the manufacturing and 
 commercial interests, so long as a due mean and 
 equitable proportion is preserved in their adjustment, 
 would rather tend to unite more closely the mem- 
 bers of the confederacy, than permit any adequate 
 reasons for a separation. But if the spirit of legis- 
 lation, which prescribed the adoption of the tariff 
 of 1824, continue to exert its influence, the ground- 
 work will be laid for substantial differences between 
 the states ; and these again, promoted, as they 
 cannot fail to be, by geographical (or in the lan- 
 guage of America, by territorial) distinctions, may 
 pave the w% for a premature dissolution of the 
 confederacy. This unwise measure has excited, 
 especially among the southern states, an extreme 
 degree of dissatisfaction. Hints at further and 
 more important consequences have been loud and 
 frequent ; and the wound must indeed have sunk 
 deep into the vitals of the constitution, when we 
 find one'' of the most distinguished advocates of 
 the existing union declaring, "that a dissolution 
 of the confederacy would be a preferable alternative 
 to the endurance of evils, which must spring from 
 this odious act of the federal legislature." 
 
 ' Mr. Jefferson. Vide Edinburgh Review, No. XCVI. p. 488, 
 489.
 
 56 
 
 There is yet another danger arising from the rapid 
 acquisition of new territory, and the consequent ac- 
 cumulation of local interests. These are every day 
 increasing ; and it cannot be denied, that there is a 
 prospect of their becoming too numerous and too 
 widely diffused to admit of regulation by one central 
 congress. It is important also to bear in mind, 
 that the final decision of any question, which may 
 involve the stability of the confederacy, must al- 
 most entirely depend upon the light in which a 
 national union is regarded by the several states as 
 a source of domestic benefits, and a means of 
 promoting and securing their internal prosperity. 
 External pressure there can be none ; for they are 
 happily placed in circumstances, in which, even 
 supposing them dissevered into two or more con- 
 federacies, they may bid defiance to foreign arms ; 
 and thus it is, that the strongest inducement to the 
 preservation of a federal union, that of mutual 
 defence, so far from being constantly present to the 
 mind of the American, is in danger of being over- 
 looked or disregarded in the eager pursuit of local 
 interests. There is indeed room for apprehension, 
 least their security at home should prompt them to 
 an undue interference in the aflfairs of Europe. But 
 if there be any one line of policy which is clearly 
 marked out for the United States, it is unquestion- 
 ably that of peace. Should it be their ill fortune or 
 ill conduct to plunge themselves into a protracted 
 war, the high wages of labour would necessarily 
 render the expence of an extensive naval and
 
 57 
 
 military establishment very great ; and the antipathy 
 to taxes would beget a still more alarming difficulty 
 in defraying that expence. It is a disadvantage 
 also, which is inseparable from the constitution of 
 a federal government, that as it possesses no strong 
 hold upon the affections of the people, the slightest 
 disaster is sufficient to ensure its unpopularity, and 
 give the signal for its overthrow. 
 
 The causes, however, which may create hostility 
 between the people of the United States and the 
 nations of continental Europe are too remote to 
 excite apprehension, and can hardly indeed be said 
 to possess any separate existence. On one fair land 
 alone, which the voice of nature and of interest unite 
 in declaring the fitting object of friendship and 
 alliance, the western horizon at times appears to 
 lower with the signs of tempest. But while we fear 
 no consequences in the defence or assertion of our 
 rights, we acknowledge with gratitude and hope 
 that there exist but few and decreasing indications 
 of an approaching storm. England and America 
 are both too wise, and one at least swayed by 
 councils too moderate, to allow the prosecution of a 
 spirit of rivalry and petty jealousies to disturb the 
 harmony of the Christian world. Let us not in- 
 dulge in gloomy anticipations, or torment ourselves 
 with imagining the possible occurrence of more 
 serious causes for offence. England may justly be 
 proud of her child : America may regard her 
 parent with affection and respect : both may concur 
 
 £
 
 58 
 
 in displaying to the world the power of enterprise 
 and active industry ; the inestimable benefits of 
 popular representation in government, of equal and 
 impartial laws : both may diffuse over either hemi- 
 sphere, and, if united, with tenfold power, the light 
 of Civihzation and the blessings of Freedom. 
 
 GEORGE ANTHONY DENISON, 
 
 FELLOW OF ORIEL. 
 
 BAXTER, PniNTER, OXFORD.
 
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