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 "LI B RARY 
 
 OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY 
 Of ILLINOIS
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 The Keform Bill which Mr. Gladstone has introduced is welcomed 
 almost unanimously by the Liberal party, because they believe that 
 the admission of c capable citizens ' to the franchise will add to the 
 strength and prosperity of the country. 
 
 The Conservative party, on the contrary, oppose the Bill, mainly, 
 I think it may be said, because they fear that the result would be 
 to place all political power in the hands of one class, the others being 
 silenced and excluded. 
 
 Is there any way by which we can reconcile these views, — by 
 which we can secure for the majority the power which is their right 
 and at the same time preserve for the minority that fair hearing to 
 which they are justly entitled ? 
 
 The solution of the problem is to be found in fhe adoption of 
 Proportional Kepresentation. This explains to a great extent the 
 very remarkable fact that, though the Proportional Eepresentation 
 Society has been in existence for only a few weeks, it has already 
 been joined by more than 170 members of Parliament, of whom 
 more than 90 are Liberals, but representing every section of the 
 House of Commons — with one significant exception ; that, namely, 
 which follows the lead of Mr. Parnell. It comprises prominent 
 members of the Government and of the front Opposition bench, 
 strong supporters of the Government, independent Conservatives, 
 staunch Radicals, and last, not least, the great majority of both 
 Liberal and Conservative members from Ireland. Moreover there 
 are many other members — I need only mention Mr. Forster and 
 Mr. Goschen — who have spoken strongly in favour of the principles 
 animating the Society, though they have not formally joined its ranks. 
 
 What is it, then, which brings together so remarkable an assem- 
 blage of members, who would perhaps agree on no other single ques- 
 tion of practical politics ? It is because proportional representation 
 would give us a system under which the electors as a whole, and not 
 merely a majority, would be represented ; under which the minority 
 J would always have a hearing, while the majority would be sure of 
 ) their just preponderance. These advantages the present system does
 
 not and cannot give, and I shall endeavour in the present article to 
 show — 
 
 Firstly, that injustice in one constituency is not counteracted by 
 corresponding inequality in another ; 
 
 Secondly, that the present mode of voting does not secure a 
 majority of representatives to the majority of voters ; and 
 
 Thirdly, that there is a simple system by which it is possible to 
 obtain a fair hearing for the minority and secure their just prepon- 
 derance to the majority. 
 
 The present system of mere majority voting is, even under exist- 
 ing circumstances, uncertain and defective in its operation. I believe 
 indeed its supporters are generally under the impression that, though 
 rudely, still surely, it secures to a majority of the electors a 
 majority of the representatives. This is, however, by no means the 
 case, and, as already mentioned, I shall hope to prove that, while it by 
 no means obtains for minorities that representation in the Legislature 
 to which their numbers justly entitle them, it altogether fails to secure 
 to majorities that preponderance to which they are justly entitled. 
 Even, therefore, under existing circumstances, the present system is 
 very imperfect ; but these drawbacks would, if mere majority voting 
 be generally adopted, be intensified under the new Bill, which more- 
 over will also tend to extinguish that variety in the representation 
 which has hitherto been considered essential to the constitution of the 
 House of Commons. 
 
 It is of course clear that additional members will be given to 
 our large cities. Liverpool, for instance, would be entitled to, say, 
 eight representatives. But if Liverpool is to remain an undivided 
 constituency returning eight members, it is of great importance that 
 we should know how the votes are to be given. 
 
 If every elector is to have a number of votes equal to the number 
 of members, with no form of proportional representation, then it is 
 obvious that the slightest majority on either side would return the 
 whole eight members. We know that in Liverpool the two great 
 parties are very evenly balanced, and the result would be that a 
 majority of a few hundreds, perhaps of even only a few units, would 
 return the whole eight members, counting sixteen votes on a division 
 in the House of Commons. 
 
 The journal published by the Electoral Keform Association of 
 Belgium gives a striking illustration of such a case. In the 1882 
 elections the Liberals carried their election in the city of Gfhent by 
 a majority of 40 only. Now Grhent returns 8 members to the 
 Chamber, out of 138. If, therefore, 21 electors had gone over to the 
 other side Grhent would have returned 8 Roman Catholics, counting 
 16 on a division, and there would have been a Eoman Catholic in- 
 stead of a Liberal majority in the Chamber, which would have led to 
 a complete change of government. 
 
 i
 
 Even with the present distribution of seats the system is very- 
 unsatisfactory and imperfect. In my own county of Kent we polled 
 in the three divisions at the last election over 13,000 votes, against 
 16,000 given to our opponents, and yet they have all the six seats. 
 Taking all the contested seats in the county, we polled 32,000 votes 
 against 36,000, and yet the Conservatives carried sixteen members 
 and we only two. 
 
 If we draw a line across England from Lincolnshire to Devonshire, 
 there are on the south-east side 99 county seats. In many of these 
 the Conservatives had no contest, but the majority of the seats were 
 fought, and the Liberals polled 96,000 votes against 116,000 given 
 to the Tories. On this basis therefore we ought to have had, say, 40 
 seats and the Conservatives 59. As a matter of fact, however, we 
 only secured 15 against 84. Moreover of our 15, 5 were minority 
 seats ; so that but for the introduction of the principle of minority 
 representation, limited though it was, we should have only had 10 
 seats in the whole district, while we were fairly entitled to 40. 
 
 Out of 60 members from Scotland and 28 from Wales, only 9 and 
 2 respectively are Conservatives. 
 
 The Roman Catholics are a very large and respectable portion of 
 the nation ; yet in the whole of England and Scotland they have 
 never, I believe, for years past secured more than a single seat at any 
 one time. 
 
 The case of Ireland is the most serious of all. Certainly one- 
 third of the population is moderate, loyal, and deSires to maintain 
 the integrity of the Empire. But we are told on high authority 
 that under this Bill, unless some system of proportional representa- 
 tion be adopted, the Home Rulers will secure over 90 seats out of 
 100, leaving only half-a-dozen to the Liberals and Conservatives 
 together, whereas it is clear that under any just system of represen- 
 tation they ought to have over 30. The result of such a system would 
 be that Ireland would be entirely misrepresented, and that we should 
 gratuitously create serious and unnecessary difficulties for ourselves. 
 
 To adopt a system by which we should exclude from the repre- 
 sentation of Ireland one-third of the electors, and give the whole 
 power to two-thirds, would, under any circumstances, be unjust; but 
 to do so when the one-third comprise those who are moderate and 
 loyal, while the two-thirds are led by men not only opposed to the 
 Union, but in many cases animated by a bitter and extraordinary 
 hatred of this country, would be an act of political madness. 
 
 To tell the Liberals of Kent and Surrey that they are represented by 
 the Liberal members for Scotch and Welsh counties is just the old 
 and exploded argument which used to maintain that the people of 
 Birmingham and Manchester were really represented by the Liberal 
 members of some other borough. We are glad, no doubt, that Scot- 
 land and Wales send us such admirable colleagues ; it is a consolation, 
 
 a2
 
 but it is not the same thing. Perhaps the one question about which 
 our farmers in Kent care most is the subject of extraordinary tithes. 
 Mr. Gladstone will sympathise with us, because he has so powerfully 
 advocated the cultivation of vegetables and the growth of fruit. He 
 has raised the question of jam to a dignity which it never before 
 attained. But while the extraordinary tithe question remains in its 
 present position I fear it will long be with us a case of jam every other 
 day. But the farmers of Kent cannot expect the Liberal members 
 from Scotland to help them as regards extraordinary tithes. It is 
 conceivable that they do not even know what extraordinary tithes are. 
 
 It would not then be satisfactory, even if it were true, that in- 
 equalities in one district are made up for by those in another. But 
 it is not true. Let us look for instance at the elections of 1874 
 and 1880. In the former, as Mr. Hay ward has shown in this Review, 
 the Conservatives had a majority of 50 over the Liberals and Home 
 Rulers put together, while in 1880 the Liberals had a majority over 
 the Conservatives and Home Rulers of more than 50. Of course if 
 this change were due to a corresponding alteration in public opinion, 
 then, however much each side of the House might regret its defeat 
 in the one case and rejoice over its victory in the other, there would 
 be nothing to be said as regards the system. 
 
 But what are the facts? In 1874 the Conservatives polled 
 1,200,000 votes against 1,400,000 given to the Liberals and Home 
 Rulers ; so that, though they were in a majority of 50 in the House of 
 Commons, they actually polled 200,000 votes in the country less than 
 their opponents. Perhaps I shall be told that this was due to the 
 small boroughs. But the experience of 1880 proves that this was not 
 so, or only to a certain extent. In 1880 Liberals and Home Rulers 
 together polled 1,880,000 votes against 1,420,000 given to Conserva- 
 tive candidates. The proportions ought then to have been 370 
 Liberal and Home Rule members to 280 Conservatives, whereas they 
 really were 414 to 236. In 1874 therefore the Liberals and Home 
 Rulers had 56 members too few in relation to their total poll, while 
 on the contrary in 1880 they secured 43 too many. The difference 
 between the two elections was therefore enormous — namely, 99 out of 
 a total of 650. 
 
 The present system, then, renders the result of a general election 
 uncertain, and to a large extent a matter of chance ; it leads to 
 violent fluctuations in the balance of political power, and conse- 
 quently in the policy of the country. In fact the present system may 
 be good or may be bad, but it is not representation ; and the question 
 is whether we wish for representation in fact or in name only. 
 
 The adoption of proportional representation moreover would raise 
 and purify the whole tone of political contests. What do we see 
 now when there is a contest in any of our great northern cities ? 
 The majority of the Irish electors, instructed by the honourable 
 
 _ UIUC
 
 member for Cork, withhold their votes. They do not consider the 
 prosperity of the Empire as a whole, but what they regard as the 
 advantage of Ireland. I do not blame them. They do not seem to 
 me wise : yet I can sympathise with their devotion, mistaken though 
 I think it is, to their own island. Then some deputy in the confi- 
 dence of the Home Eule party has more or less clandestine and secret 
 interviews with the candidates or their leading supporters. We hear 
 the most opposite accounts of what has occurred. Each side accuses 
 the other of truckling to the Home Eule party and selfishly impe- 
 rilling the integrity of the Empire. It must be very unsatisfactory 
 to all concerned ; and it would be far better if Liverpool had eight 
 votes, and the Home Eulers there are sufficiently strong to return a 
 Home Eule member, than that they should extract doubtful pledges 
 from reluctant candidates. 
 
 Moreover the geographical differentiation of political views tends 
 to become more and more accentuated, and might, I think, constitute 
 a real danger. At present Scotland is overpoweringly Liberal, while 
 the south-eastern counties of England, with scarcely an exception, 
 are represented by honourable members sitting on the opposite side 
 of the House. It is but a small consolation to the unrepresented 
 Liberals of Kent to be told that the Conservatives of Scotland share 
 the same grievance, and are as badly off as they are. 
 
 But further than this, it will be a great misfortune to the country 
 if one part becomes and continues overwhelmingly Liberal and 
 another Conservative — if their distinctive differences become questions 
 of geography and locality rather than of opinion. The different por- 
 tions of our Empire are not yet so closely fused that we can afford to 
 despise this danger. In my own county we look on the shires as 
 distinctly lower and less civilised than we are. 
 
 America might have been spared a terrible civil war if the prin- 
 ciple of proportional representation had been recognised in the com- 
 position of the House of Eepresentatives. This was forcibly pointed 
 out in the report unanimously adopted by the Committee of the 
 United States Senate appointed in 1869 to consider the question of 
 representative reform. 
 
 The absence (they say) of any provision for the representation of minorities in 
 the States of the South when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were 
 taken to break the Union, was unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men 
 of those States together, and have given them voice in the electoral colleges and in 
 Congress. But they were fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elections, and 
 were swept forward by the course of events into impotency or open hostility to our 
 cause. By that rule they were shut out of the electoral colleges. Dispersed, un- 
 organised, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no 
 1 effectual resistance to secession and to civil war. 
 
 We shall ourselves make the same mistake and run the same risk 
 ') of civil war if we neglect all warning, and allow the loyal minority in
 
 6 
 
 Ireland to be altogether silenced and excluded. This is in my humble 
 judgment perhaps the greatest danger with which England is now 
 threatened. 
 
 The reasons hitherto given against proportional representation 
 are based on an entire misapprehension of its effect. For instance, 
 the Liberal Conference at Leeds resolved almost unanimously 
 
 That, in the opinion of this Conference, the attempt to secure the representation 
 of minorities by special legislative enactments is a violation of the principle of 
 popular representative government. 
 
 This was of course a severe and unexpected blow to the friends 
 of proportional representation. But they did not despair. It is 
 obvious indeed from the very terms of the resolution that it is 
 based on an entire misapprehension. One of the ablest supporters 
 of mere majority election, in advocating the resolution, expressed him- 
 self as follows : — 
 
 What they desired was to remove the anomaly whereby the minorities in the 
 counties and boroughs really ruled the majority. By a notorious artifice the 
 House of Lords' territorial majority adopted the minority clause for the avowed 
 purpose of acting as a brake upon the democracy. Any attempt to place the 
 minority in possession of the power of the majority was treason to the principle of 
 popular representation. 
 
 But who has proposed anything of the kind? The argument 
 clearly shows that the speaker entirely misunderstood the object and 
 effect of the system which we advocate. Another leading opponent 
 of proportional representation once characterised it as ' a pernicious 
 restriction on free voting,' when in fact the very reverse is the case. 
 It would increase the power of free voting ; what it would diminish 
 would be the power of wirepullers. 
 
 But then it is often said that the minority system, as adopted, 
 say, in Liverpool, reduces that great city to the level of a town return- 
 ing a single member. Well, but that is only because parties are 
 evenly balanced there. If one-third of the voters are Conservatives, 
 why should they not have one-third of the members ? Why should 
 two-thirds of the constituency monopolise the whole of the representa- 
 tives ? Birmingham and Glasgow, where the Liberals are strong 
 enough to do so, return, we know, three Liberal members. We shall 
 give Liverpool, say, eight members because it has 63,000 electors, of 
 whom perhaps 30,000 are Liberals, 30,000 Conservatives, 2,000 Irish 
 Home Rulers, and 1 ,000 without distinctive political opinions ; and I 
 do not understand how any one can really wish that these 3,000 
 should practically return all the members. We know that generally 
 they join the Conservatives, and the result would be that 30,000 
 Liberals would be unrepresented. But if it were not for the 30,000 
 Liberals, Liverpool would have had only four members. It comes, 
 therefore, to this : that because there are 30,000 Liberals in Liverpool 
 you give the Conservatives twice as many members as they would
 
 otherwise have had. If we are told that any proportional system is 
 objectionable because it might reduce Liverpool to a single vote, then 
 I ask, How far are you going to carry this principle ? In Lancashire 
 at the last general election the Conservatives polled 38,000 votes, 
 the Liberals 36,000, and the members are four to four. This seems 
 as it should be. The votes were nearly equal, and the members are 
 equal. But shall we be told that Lancashire is unrepresented ? 
 Would any one propose that the 36,000 Conservative electors should 
 have returned the whole eight members, and the 34,000 Liberals none 
 at all? Yet this is what we are told is the just system in great 
 cities such as Liverpool and Manchester. 
 
 It is possible that her Majesty's Government may propose to 
 divide our cities into wards or districts, and there is much to be 
 said in favour of single seats. I will not now discuss that system, 
 but while no doubt it tends to the protection of minorities it does 
 so very imperfectly ; the districts themselves, moreover, soon become 
 very unequal and require continual rectification, giving a great tempta- 
 tion to ' gerrymandering.' Indeed, the Committee of the United 
 States Senate which reported on this subject states that ' there is 
 hardly a State in our Union in which the Congressional districts are 
 not gerrymandered in the interests of party.' 
 
 Single districts (they continue) will almost always be unfairly made. They must 
 be formed in the interest of party, and to secure an unjust measure of power to 
 their authors, and it may be expected that each successive district apportionment 
 will be more unjust than its predecessor. Parties will retaliate upon each other 
 whenever possible. The disfranchisement suffered through one decade by a political 
 party may be repeated upon it in the next with increased severity ; but if it shall 
 happen to have power in the Legislature when the new apportionment for the State 
 is to be made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and in its turn indulge 
 in the luxury of persecution. 
 
 Nor, again, would a division into wards by any means secure a ma- 
 jority of members to a majority of electors. Suppose, for instance, that 
 a constituency of 18,000 electors, 10,000 Liberal and 8,000 Conserva- 
 tives, is divided into three wards, each containing 6,000 electors. It is 
 quite possible that in one ward you might have 5,000 Liberals with 
 1,000 Conservatives, and in each of the others about 2,500 Liberals 
 and 3,500 Conservatives, the result of which would be that the latter, 
 though in a minority, would return two members out of three. 
 
 By the constitution of 1842 Geneva was divided into six colleges, 
 each returning one member. The result was that the Liberal electors, 
 being massed in two wards, only returned two members, and the Con- 
 servatives, though in a minority, secured six ; and the extreme dissatis- 
 faction thus created greatly contributed to the violent revolution of 
 1846. In fact, though it sounds a paradox, a majority of electors in 
 each constituency is by no means the same thing as a majority in all 
 the constituencies. 
 
 I do not deny that the three-cornered constituencies are somewhat
 
 awkward and cumbersome. The system there adopted is, I think, 
 not the most convenient application of the principle. But it must be 
 admitted that they have given a fair and just result, though perhaps 
 in a rather troublesome way. But shall we abandon the principle of 
 just representation because it gives us some inconvenience ? Is it not 
 worth a little trouble ? For my part I cannot abandon the substance 
 of justice to the shadow of simplicity ; to do so would be to sacrifice 
 the end to the means. 
 
 There are, I know, some who, while admitting the justice of our 
 principle, think there is no simple method by which it can be brought 
 into practical operation. But this is not so : on the contrary, there 
 are several. The cumulative vote and the limited vote are already 
 in operation. Mr. Westlake has recently described the Free List 
 system. On the whole, however, the system known as the single 
 transferable vote has perhaps the largest number of advocates. So 
 far from not being simple, it is even simpler than the mere majority 
 plan of voting would be in large constituencies. 
 
 Suppose, to take an example, some borough returning three 
 members and containing 20,000 electors, of whom 12,000 were 
 Liberals and 8,000 Conservatives, and that Mr. Gladstone and a 
 generally acceptable, but less known, Liberal candidate were op- 
 posed by two Conservatives. If every elector had one vote, but un- 
 transferable, it is clear that the two Conservatives might be elected. 
 Every Liberal would naturally wish to vote for Mr. Gladstone, so 
 that the second Liberal candidate might receive very few votes. 
 
 This result, however, might be avoided if the vote were transfer- 
 able ; that is to say, if the elector were allowed to indicate on his 
 paper the order of his preference. In that case we may assume that 
 the Liberal elector would mark his voting papers as follows : — 
 
 The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone . 
 
 1 
 
 Second Liberal Candidate 
 
 2 
 
 First Conservative Candidate . 
 
 
 Second Conservative Candidate 
 
 
 Voting papers, then, marked as above would be counted for Mr. 
 Gladstone until such a number of votes as would secure his election 
 had been recorded for him. After that the papers so marked would be 
 counted for the second Liberal candidate. The result of course would 
 be that the two Liberals and one Conservative must come in. If 
 the Conservatives divided their votes equally, the numbers would be — 
 
 The Rt. Hon. Gladstone . 
 The second Liberal candidate 
 
 The first Conservative „ 
 The second „ „ 
 
 6,001 
 5,999 
 4,001 
 3,999
 
 9 
 
 Let us take one other case, that of a borough returning six mem- 
 bers. Let us suppose the electors to be 72,000, of whom 42,000 were 
 Liberal and 30,000 Conservative. The Liberals would probably start 
 four candidates, and the Conservatives three. In this case it is clear 
 that under any circumstances a candidate receiving 10,286 votes 
 must be elected, because 10,286x6 = 61,716, leaving only 10,284 
 for any other candidate or candidates. Each Liberal elector would 
 place on his voting paper against the names of the Liberal candidates 
 1, 2, 3, and 4, in the order of his preference. 
 
 First Liberal Candidate 1 . 
 
 1 
 
 First Conservative Candidate . 
 
 
 Second Liberal Candidate . . .3 
 
 Third Liberal Candidate .... 
 
 2 
 
 Second Conservative Candidate 
 
 4 
 
 Fourth Liberal Candidate 
 
 Third Conservative Candidate . 
 
 » 
 
 
 The returning officer would count each vote for the candidate 
 against whose name the number 1 was placed, until a sufficient 
 number were recorded for him, after which they would be transferred 
 to the second, and so on. It is of course obvious that four Liberals 
 and two Conservatives would be elected. 
 
 Under this system all necessity for interference or dictation by 
 any caucus or agent is entirely obviated. The elector can freely vote 
 for whom he pleases, without any fear that his vote will be thrown 
 away. The most eminent and trusted leaders would be sure of 
 election, and we should not see Cabinet ministers in difficulties about 
 a seat. 2 
 
 So far as the elector is concerned nothing could be more simple. 
 
 No doubt, to provide for cases where the number of candidates is 
 more in excess of the number of seats, some further instructions to the 
 returning officer are needed, about which, however, there is no diffi- 
 culty. 
 
 The quota which would elect a member would be the number 
 next greater than that found by dividing the number of votes given 
 by one more than the number of vacancies. Suppose, for instance, 
 an election at which 24,000 votes were given for three candidates. 
 24,000 divided by 3 + 1 is 6,000, and the quota will accordingly 
 
 1 The names would be entered alphabetically. 
 
 2 Of course it would be possible to leave each elector in possession of several 
 votes. This could perfectly be done, but it would obviously give him no more power, 
 and would therefore introduce an unnecessary complexity. 
 
 A 3
 
 10 
 
 be 6,001. It is clear that any candidate receiving 6,001 votes must 
 be elected, because 6001 x 3 = 18003, leaving only 5,997 votes for 
 any other candidate or candidates. 
 
 Every candidate whose voting papers equal or exceed the quota 
 would be elected. When any candidate had secured the quota, the 
 remaining voting papers would be transferred to the next candidate 
 (if any) first designated on them, and counted for him after and 
 in addition to the voting papers originally given for him ; and any 
 candidate whose voting papers are by this means raised to the quota 
 would be elected. 
 
 The objection still remains that a party putting forward too many 
 candidates would run the risk of defeat. This difficulty, we know, 
 exists at present. Under the single transferable vote it might be 
 obviated by enacting further, that if after all the surplus votes of 
 the successful candidates have been thus transferred any vacancy still 
 remains unfilled, then the name of that candidate who has received 
 the smallest number of votes would be cancelled, and the votes given 
 to him would be transferred to, and counted for, the first of the 
 remaining candidates designated thereon ; and this would be repeated 
 until there were left no more than the number of candidates to be 
 elected. 
 
 These suggestions are mainly taken from the Bill introduced in 
 1872 by Mr. Morrison, with some modifications suggested by Mr. 
 Droop and Mr. Parker Smith : they may be said to be Mr. Hare's 
 celebrated scheme applied within the constituency. I suggest them 
 not as President of the Proportional Representation Society, but 
 merely in my individual capacity. 
 
 The Proportional Eepresentation Society has indeed hitherto con- 
 fined itself to the adoption as the basis of its constitution of the follow- 
 ing resolution : » That without prejudging how far the principle may 
 be subsequently carried out, it is indispensable, as a first step towards 
 securing the true representation of the electors, that whenever a con- 
 stituency returns more than two members some form of proportional 
 representation should be adopted.' 
 
 I regret that this question has been so often argued as if the 
 great or even the main reason for it was to admit representatives of 
 small minorities. Indeed, it is often said that any such system would 
 merely admit members who are in favour of crotchets. It is no doubt 
 difficult to say what is really a crotchet. When Mr. Ghrote brought 
 up the question of the Ballot was that a crotchet? When Mr. Villiers 
 brought forward Free Trade was that a crotchet ? Many and many of 
 the opinions now. generally entertained were regarded as crotchets when 
 things first made their appearance. Everything must have a be- 
 ginning, and almost everything, even proportional representation it- 
 self, has been at first regarded as a fad and a crotchet. 
 
 But in my humble judgment the representation of small sections
 
 11 
 
 is a very small part of the question. Whether small minorities re- 
 present the temporary delusion of the moment, or a great, although 
 as yet unrecognised truth, the House of Commons is scarcely the 
 proper sphere for their exertions. What I am much more anxious 
 about is that the great parties in the State should be adequately 
 represented in the different districts of the Empire. 
 
 Those who object to the fair representation of minorities do not 
 seem to realise the difference between an executive government and 
 a representative assembly. A government of course must be as far 
 as possible homogeneous and of one mind, but a representative 
 assembly should be a mirror of the nation. The exclusion of the 
 minority, which is a necessity in the one case, would be tyranny 
 and injustice in the other. We are told by those who have not 
 studied the question that we wish to give to minorities the power 
 which rightly belongs to majorities. The very reverse is the case. 
 An untrammelled system of proportional representation is, as Mr. Mill 
 has truly said, ' not only the most complete application of the demo- 
 cratic principle that has yet been made, but its greatest safeguard.' 
 I trust that under the new Bill we may secure for the new voters, as 
 well as those already on the register, the right not merely of recording 
 a vote, but of doing so in such a manner as may give to it all just 
 and reasonable effect. If this be done, the Parliament of 1880 will 
 have given effect to a great principle, and we shall have for the first 
 time a really representative assembly. I venture to recommend the 
 system of proportional representation to the House of Commons and to 
 the country because it would give its just political weight to the vote of 
 every elector ; it would insure the return of leading and trusted states- 
 men, as well as of those who are most favourably known in their own 
 districts ; it would elevate and purify the whole tone of electoral 
 contests ; would obtain for the minority a fair hearing ; and last, not 
 least, because it is the only mode of securing for the majority that 
 preponderance to which of course they are justly entitled. 
 
 The following Members of Parliament have already joined the 
 Proportional Representation Society : — 
 
 Col. Barne 
 The Earl of Bective 
 Michael Biddulph 
 Rowland P. Blennerhassett 
 Thomas William Boord 
 Charles Brad laugh 
 Henry A. Brassey 
 
 C. T. Dyke Acland 
 
 Henry Gr. Allen 
 
 R. L. Allman 
 
 Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett 
 
 John E. F. Aylmer 
 
 Arthur Jas. Balfour 
 
 Thomas C. Baring
 
 12 
 
 J. Brinton 
 
 Hon. St. John Brodrick 
 
 Alexander Brogden 
 
 M. Brooks 
 
 Sir H. Hervey Bruce 
 
 James E. Bulwer 
 
 Francis Wm. Buxton 
 
 James A. Campbell 
 
 William C. Cartwright 
 
 Lord E. Cecil 
 
 Sir Thomas Chambers, M.P. 
 
 W. L. Christie 
 
 Edward Clarke 
 
 Arthur Cohen 
 
 Sir E. Colebrooke 
 
 Eugene Collins 
 
 Thomas Collins 
 
 Colonel Colthurst 
 
 James Porter Corry 
 
 Alderman Cotton 
 
 George Courtauld 
 
 Leonard Henry Courtney 
 
 Joseph Cowen 
 
 Hon. H. F. Cowper 
 
 Ealph Creyke 
 
 Viscount Crichton 
 
 James Cropper 
 
 C. Dalrymple 
 David Davies 
 James Dickson 
 Thomas A. Dickson 
 
 Hon. John Charles Dundas 
 
 Viscount Ebrington 
 
 Henry Edwards 
 
 Lord Elcho 
 
 Hon. A. D. Elliott 
 
 George Errington 
 
 T. W. Evans 
 
 Wm. Ewart 
 
 Archibald Orr Ewing 
 
 Et. Hon. Henry Fawcett 
 
 William Findlater 
 
 Sir W. H. B. Ffolkes 
 
 Viscount Folkestone 
 
 R. N. Fowler (Lord Mayor) 
 
 D. F. G-abbett 
 
 Eight Hon. Edward Gibson 
 
 Sir A. Gordon 
 
 Daniel Grant 
 
 William Grantham 
 
 T. Greer 
 
 G. B. Gregory 
 
 Albert H. G. Grey 
 
 Montague John Guest 
 
 Eobert Thornhagh Gurdon 
 
 Lord G. Hamilton 
 
 Mitchell Henry 
 
 The Hon. Sidney Herbert 
 
 J. M. Maxwell Heron 
 
 Lord A. Hill 
 
 Sir H. T. Holland 
 
 Lieut.-Col. D. Milne Home 
 
 William H. Houldsworth 
 
 E. Stafford Howard 
 William Lawies Jackson 
 Sir J. J. Jenkins 
 Hubert E. H. Jerningham 
 Coleridge J. Kennard 
 Colonel Kennard 
 
 Sir John Kennaway 
 Edward E. King-Harman 
 Colonel Kingscote 
 Dr. Kinnear 
 
 F. Winn Knight 
 
 Sir Eainald Knightley 
 
 Samuel Laing 
 
 Hon. F. W. Lambton 
 
 Sir J. Clarke Lawrence 
 
 Thomas Lea 
 
 Sir E. A. H. Lechmere 
 
 Hon. G. Leigh 
 
 Sir Baldwin Leighton 
 
 Stanley Leighton 
 
 Lord H. Lennox 
 
 Lord Lewisham 
 
 Sir Eobert Loyd Lindsay 
 
 Morgan Lloyd 
 
 Eobert Loder 
 
 Et. Hon. J. Lowther 
 
 Hon. W. Lowther 
 
 J. W. Lowther 
 
 Sir John Lubbock
 
 13 
 
 Sir AndrewLusk 
 Sir W. McArthur 
 Sir Thos. McClure 
 James Carlile M'Coan 
 Sir J. McGarel-Hogg 
 David Maclver 
 Colonel Makins 
 R. B. Martin 
 T. W. Master 
 Charles Henry Meldon 
 Sir Charles Henry Mills 
 Sir F. G. Milner 
 
 F. Monckton 
 Samuel Morley, M P. 
 Arthur Moore 
 
 J. Mulholland 
 
 P. H. Muntz 
 
 E. Noel 
 
 J. S. North 
 
 Charles Morgan Norwood 
 
 Colonel O'Beirne 
 
 R. H. Paget 
 
 Robert William C. Patrick 
 
 Arthur Pease 
 
 Sir Henry Peek 
 
 E. L. Pemberton 
 
 John Pender 
 
 Frederick Pennington 
 
 Earl Percy 
 
 Lord Algernon Percy 
 
 Rt. Hon. Sir Lyon Play fair 
 
 Rt. Hon. David R. Plunket 
 
 Hon. W. Henry B. Portman 
 
 G. E. Price 
 
 John Henry Puleston 
 
 Pandeli Ralli 
 
 Sir John Ramsden 
 
 James Rankin 
 
 William Rathbone 
 
 Sir E. J. Reed 
 
 Sir Matthew W. Ridley 
 
 Chas. Campbell Ross 
 
 J. Round 
 
 Lord Arthur Russell 
 
 Thomas Salt 
 
 Bernhard Samuelson 
 
 Chas. Seeley 
 
 William Shaw 
 
 Henry B. Sheridan 
 
 Sir J. G-. T. Sinclair 
 
 Rt. Hon. Wm. H. Smith 
 
 P. J. Smyth 
 
 Marquis of Stafford 
 
 C. H. Strutt 
 
 Henry Villiers Stuart 
 
 Charles Beilby Stuart- Wortley 
 
 Christopher Sykes 
 
 John Gilbert Talbot 
 
 John Pennington Thomasson 
 
 W. E. Murray Tomlinson 
 
 W. T. M. Torrens 
 
 Colonel Tottenham 
 
 Sir Richard Wallace 
 
 Sir S. H. Waterlow 
 
 Sir E. Watkin 
 
 Benjamin Whit worth 
 
 E. W. Brydges Willyams 
 
 Chas. H. Wilson 
 
 Henry De Worms 
 
 R. J. Yorke 
 
 John Lubbock.
 
 14 
 
 II. 
 
 A TEST ELECTION. 
 
 Among the assertions which do duty as arguments against the adop 
 tion of proportional representation, none is more plausible, or is 
 more frequently used, than that which declares that the inevitable 
 complication of the system must be a fatal bar to its use in popular 
 elections. Being anxious to test the real value of this contention, 
 I recently made an experiment, the result of which may, I think, be 
 of interest to readers of this Eeview, and which certainly goes some 
 way to prove that the argument referred to is about as conclusive 
 as most others put forward by the advocates of pure majority repre- 
 sentation. It occurred to me that if it could be shown that the 
 system of proportional voting might be easily understood and made use 
 of by children under fourteen years of age, and if the process of 
 counting the votes recorded could be successfully and rapidly con- 
 ducted by persons of ordinary intelligence, unaided by previous prac- 
 tice or mechanical appliances, a great step would have been made 
 towards proving that the plan might be attempted on a large scale 
 with a fair hope of success. I admit, at the outset, that the average 
 intelligence of children in the upper standards of a good elementary 
 school is probably higher than that of a large number of voters at the 
 present time. Still, inasmuch as the scholars of to-day must be the 
 voters of to-morrow, the comparison cannot be said to be unfair. The 
 following is a brief account of the experiment I made : — By the kind 
 permission of the Rev. William Sinclair, of St. Stephen's, Westminster, 
 I was permitted to conduct a test election in the elementary school 
 attached to his church. I selected seven candidates whose names were 
 likely to be familiar to the children. The following is the order in 
 which they were placed upon the voting paper: — King Charles I., Queen 
 Elizabeth, King Henry VIII., Mary Queen of Scots, Oliver Cromwell, 
 the Duke of Wellington, and William the Conqueror. The electors 
 numbered 184, of whom 131 were boys, and 53 girls. 
 
 Three members were to be elected. It was plainly necessary to
 
 15 
 
 supply a certain amount of information to take the place of com- 
 mon knowledge. The work of newspaper articles, political agencies, 
 and current conversation had to be taken into account. In order, 
 therefore, to put the children upon a level with the ordinary voter, 
 Mr. Sinclair in a few words explained to them the following 
 facts : — 
 
 1. That they were supposed to be voting for members of Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 2. That each voter had only one vote, which, however, might 
 be transferred according to the numbers marked upon the voting 
 papers. 
 
 3. That there were two parties, Liberal and Conservative. The 
 boys were to be Liberals, with the following candidates, Henry VIIL, 
 Oliver Cromwell, the Duke of Wellington, and William the Conqueror. 
 The girls were to be Conservatives, and their candidates were to be 
 Charles L, Elizabeth, and Mary Queen of Scots. 
 
 4. Anybody might vote for one of the other party if he or she 
 very much wished it. 
 
 As a supplement to the verbal explanation, a placard to the follow- 
 ing effect was posted in the room : — 
 
 Instructions to Voters. 
 
 Each voter has one vote. 
 
 That vote will be given first to the candidate against whose* name you put 1. 
 
 If that candidate has enough votes to secure his election without your vote, it 
 will be given to the candidate against whose name you put 2. 
 
 If the candidate against whose name you put 2 has enough votes without your 
 vote, it will be given to the candidate against whose name you put 3. 
 
 And so on. 
 
 It is not necessary to put numbers against more names than you wish. 
 
 This form of instruction, for which I am indebted to a friend, 
 appears to me an almost ideally concise and complete formula for the 
 purpose. The voting was conducted by Mr. Blennerhasset, M.P., and 
 myself, first in the boys' schoolroom, then in that of the girls. There 
 were two polling stations, and the votes were recorded with perfect 
 order and in a very short time. 
 
 At first the boys' votes were received at one polling station only ; 
 about halfway through the process a second was added. The opera- 
 tion took about thirty-five minutes. The fifty-three girls voted in 
 twelve minutes. There seemed no hesitation nor difficulty on the 
 part of any of the voters. No questions were asked, and no help was 
 given. The children belonged to the three upper standards, and varied 
 in age from ten to fourteen years. 
 
 For the sake of perfect clearness I here reproduce four specimens 
 of the actual voting papers, as filled up in various ways : —
 
 16 
 
 Liberal Vote showing 3 Transfers. 
 
 King Charles I 
 
 
 Queen Elizabeth 
 
 
 King Henry VIII. 
 
 
 Mary Queen of Scots . 
 
 2 
 
 Oliver Cromwell 
 
 The Duke of Wellington . 
 
 1 
 3 
 
 "William the Conqueror 
 
 Conservative Vote with 7 Transfers, 
 
 King Charles I 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 6 
 
 7 
 
 Queen Elizabeth 
 
 King Henry VIII. 
 
 Mary Queen of Scots . 
 
 Oliver Cromwell 
 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 
 The Duke of Wellington . 
 
 William the Conqueror 
 
 Liberal Vote showing Plunder, 
 
 Conservative Vote showing Cross- Transfers* 
 
 King Charles I 
 
 
 Queen Elizabeth 
 
 King Henry VIII. 
 
 Mary Queen of Scots . 
 
 Oliver Cromwell 
 
 The Duke of Wellington . 
 
 1 
 
 William the Conqueror 
 
 King Charles 1 1 1 
 
 Queen Elizabeth 
 
 3 
 
 King Henry VIII. 
 
 Mary Queen of Scots . 
 
 
 Oliver Cromwell 
 
 
 The Duke of Wellington . .2 
 
 William the Conqueror 
 
 
 • 
 
 The next process was the examination and counting of the votes. 
 This was done by Mr. Bompas, Q.C., and myself, the results being 
 recorded by Mr. White, secretary to the Proportional Eepresentation 
 Society. 
 
 Two methods of counting were adopted — the first that suggested 
 by Mr. Bompas; the second, I believe, by Mr. Parker Smith. 
 Mr. Bompas' plan is as follows: — The votes are kept in their 
 registered order as received from the polling stations, and the first 
 votes of each candidate are then sorted and placed in separate heaps 
 or files. This done, and the spoiled votes rejected, the quota is 
 calculated, and any candidate who has already more first votes than 
 the quota is declared elected. The exact number of votes required is 
 then deducted from the file of the successful candidates, the lowest 
 registered numbers being first removed. The surplus votes are then 
 distributed according to the preferences marked upon them. When 
 these votes are exhausted the candidate lowest on the list is declared 
 ' not elected,' and his votes are in turn distributed among any can- 
 didates still requiring them. This process of elimination is carried 
 on until all the vacancies have been filled. Mr. Parker Smith's 
 plan of counting differs from that just explained merely in this one 
 particular, that no attention is paid to the registered numbers, but 
 the votes forming the quota of an elected candidate are deducted 
 
 I
 
 17 
 
 merely in the order in which they happen to have been collected after 
 the papers have been mixed and sorted. It is contended that the first 
 plan has some advantages in case of a scrutiny being necessary, though 
 probably by a very simple method the second plan might be made 
 to afford the same facilities. This, however, is a question of detail. 
 
 As a matter of fact we counted our votes in both ways. The first 
 counting gave the following results. First votes — Charles the First, 
 32 ; Elizabeth, 16 ; Henry the Eighth, 6 ; Mary Queen of Scots, 1 ; 
 Oliver Cromwell, 15 ; the Duke of Wellington, 112 ; and William the 
 Conqueror, ; making a total of 182. Two votes were rejected, the 
 names of the candidates having been written upon them as well as 
 the numbers. All the other papers were clearly and correctly filled 
 up. One or two votes were plumpers. Several of the girls had given 
 a second vote to a boys' candidate — Henry the Eighth and the 
 Duke both receiving support in this way. One or two boys had also 
 gone outside party lines to vote for Charles the First. One girl had 
 numbered her vote up to seven, but nearly all the other voters had 
 been contented with three or four transfers. 
 
 The quota was now calculated according to the rule, divid- 
 ing the number of good votes by the number of seats plus one, 
 and taking the next integer above the quotient obtained. Thus 
 182 -=-4 = 45 + 1 = 46.* Forty-six was thus the quota required to 
 insure election. The Duke having more than the required amount 
 was declared elected ; and the forty-six votes received by him bearing 
 the lowest registered numbers were removed. His remaining votes 
 were then distributed according to the second preferences marked on 
 them. 
 
 On the second counting William the Conqueror came to the 
 front, receiving no less than twenty-six votes. Mary Queen of Scots 
 still having only one vote was then declared 6 not elected,' and her 
 vote was transferred to Charles the First. Henry the Eighth having 
 only fifteen was the next to go, and his votes were in turn trans- 
 ferred. Queen Elizabeth now went out of the competition, and 
 Oliver Cromwell having obtained the quota and been declared elected, 
 the struggle lay between William the Conqueror and Charles the 
 First. The latter, a Conservative candidate, was evidently most 
 
 1 This calculation looks complicated. It is not so in fact. The quota is simply 
 the number which, if obtained by any single candidate, will leave a remainder 
 which, however divided, will not admit more additional members than there are 
 vacancies. A simple example will show this. Suppose there are 12,000 voters and 
 three seats. Apply the rule given above : 12000 -f- 4 = 3000 + 1 = 3001 . Brown obtains 
 3,001 votes ; Smith, Jones, and Kobinson, the remaining three candidates, have 
 8,999 votes to divide between them. There are only vacancies for two of them, and 
 it will be seen that only two of them can get the quota. For it is impossible to 
 divide 8,999 into three equal parts, each part to be equal to or more than the quota 
 given, namely 3,001. Thus 8999-7-3 = 2999. It is true that Smith and Jones may 
 get more than 3,001, but then Robinson must get less ,- and accordingly it is true 
 to say that a candidate who gets 3,001 votes must be elected. Q. E. d.
 
 18 
 
 popular, and almost all the second votes of his party were given to 
 him, the result being his final election by forty-seven votes, or 
 exactly one more than the quota, his opponent failing with thirty- 
 three. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the two Liberal candidates, the Duke 
 and Oliver Cromwell, were elected ; the minority, by sticking to their 
 candidates and voting solid, succeeded, as they were entitled to succeed, 
 in returning one member. A second counting was made, according to 
 Mr. Parker Smith's directions. It is not necessary to follow it in 
 detail. The same candidates were elected, and on the whole it 
 seemed a somewhat more expeditious process than the other. In 
 neither case was there the slightest difficulty in counting and appor- 
 tioning the votes. In fact, I may say that the whole experiment 
 succeeded perfectly. I do not profess to attach much value to it as 
 far as the counting of the votes is concerned. How far this process 
 will present any difficulties when the number of votes is very great 
 can only be decided by a trial on a much larger scale. It is intended 
 shortly to make such a trial with 20,000 votes. 
 
 But one point of the first importance I do claim to have esta- 
 blished, namely, that the idea of proportional representation and the 
 method of recording transfer votes may be easily understood by 
 children in an elementary school. The instruction given to our 
 voters was conveyed in a few sentences. 
 
 If the plan be tried throughout the country, there are a hundred 
 sources from which information of the same kind will be forthcoming. 
 I entirely refuse therefore to believe that proportional representation 
 can with any show of reason be rejected on the ground of its being 
 too complicated for the electorate. The apologists for our existing 
 plan of misrepresentation must fall back upon other arguments not 
 yet made public for the defence of the inequitable system to which 
 they are pledged.' 
 
 H. 0. Aenold-Foester. 
 
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