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A 
 
 TREATISE 
 
 CONCERNING TIIE 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 WHEREIN THE CHIEF CAUSES OF 
 
 ERROR AND DIFFICULTY IN THE SCIENCES, 
 
 WITH THE 
 
 GROUNDS OF SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRRELIGION, 
 ARE INQUIRED INTO. 
 
 A NEW EDITION. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 PRINTED BY J. F. DOVE, ST. JOHN’S SQUARE; 
 
 FOR RICHARD PRIESTLEY, HIGH HOLBORN. 
 
 1820. 
 
i 
 
 ,* ? • 
 
 
 
 r 
 
 K 
 
 
 
 
Y c ] 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I. P hilosophy being nothing else but the study of 
 wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected, that 
 those who have spent most time and pains in it, should 
 enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, a greater 
 clearness and evidence of knowledge, and be less dis- 
 turbed with doubts and difficulties, than other men ; 
 yet so it is we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that 
 walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are 
 ^ governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part 
 easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar 
 J appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They 
 complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, 
 and are out of all danger of becoming sceptics. But no 
 sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow 
 the light of a superior principle, to reason, meditate, 
 -and reflect, on the nature of things, but a thousand 
 scruples spring up in our minds, concerning those things 
 which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Preju- 
 dices and errors of sense do from all parts discover 
 themselves to our view ; and, endeavouring to correct 
 these by reason, vve are insensibly drawn into uncouth 
 paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which mul- 
 tiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation ; 
 till at length, having wandered through many intricate 
 mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or, which 
 is worse, sit down in a forlorn scepticism. 
 
 II. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity 
 of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of 
 our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have 
 
 469103 
 
4 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 are few, and those designed by nature for the support 
 and comfort of life, and not to penetrate into the inward 
 essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind 
 of man being finite, when it treats of things which par- 
 take of infinity, it is not to be wondered at, if it run 
 into absurdities and contradictions ; out of which it is 
 impossible it should ever extricate itself, it being of the 
 nature of infinite not to be comprehended by that which 
 is finite. 
 
 III. But perhaps we may be too partial to ourselves 
 in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not 
 rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is a hard 
 thing to suppose, that fight deductions from true prin- 
 ciples should ever end in consequences which cannot 
 be maintained or made consistent. We should believe 
 that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of 
 men, than to give them a strong desire for that know- 
 ledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. 
 This were not agreeable to the wonted, indulgent me- 
 thods of Providence, which, whatever appetites it may 
 have implanted in the creatures, doth Usually furnish 
 them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will 
 not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined 
 to think, that the far greater part, if not all, of those 
 difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, 
 and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing 
 to ourselves. That we have first raised a dust, and 
 then complain we cannot see. 
 
 IV. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover 
 what those principles are which have introduced all 
 that doubtfulness and uncertainty, those absurdities and 
 contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy ; in- 
 somuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance 
 incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural dul- 
 ness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it js a 
 work well deserving our pains, to make a strict inquiry 
 concerning the first principles of human knowledge, to 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 5 
 
 sift and examine them on all sides : especially since 
 there may be some grounds to suspect that those lets 
 and difficulties, which stay and emharrass the mind in 
 its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness 
 and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the un- 
 derstanding, so much as from false principles which have 
 been insisted on, and might have been avoided. 
 
 V. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt 
 may seem, when I consider how many great and extra- 
 ordinary men have gone before me in the same designs ; 
 yet I am not without some hopes, upon the consideration 
 that the largest views are not always the clearest, and 
 that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw th° 
 object nearer, and may, perhaps, by a close and narrow' 
 survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes. 
 
 VI. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for 
 the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise 
 somewhat, by way of introduction, concerning the na- 
 ture and abuse of language. But the unravelling this 
 matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design, 
 by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part 
 in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed, and to 
 have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in 
 almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the opinion 
 that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas or 
 notions of things. He who is not a perfect stranger to 
 the writings and disputes of philosophers, must needs 
 acknowledge that no small part of them is spent about 
 abstract ideas. These are, in a more especial manner, 
 thought to be the object of those sciences which go by 
 the names of logic and metaphysics, and of all that which 
 passes under the notion of the most abstracted and sub- 
 lime learning, in all which one shall scarcely find any 
 question handled in such a manner, as does not suppose 
 their existence in the mind, and that it is well acquainted 
 with them. 
 
 VII. It is agreed on all hands, that the qualities or 
 
6 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 modes of things do never really exist each of them apart 
 by itself, and separated from all others, but are mixed, as 
 it were, and blended together, several in the same object. 
 But we are told, the mind being able to consider each 
 quality singly, or abstracted from those other qualities 
 with which it is united, does by that means frame to 
 itself abstract ideas. For example, there is perceived 
 by sight an object extended, coloured, and moved : this 
 mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its sim- 
 ple, constituent parts, and viewing each by itself, exclu- 
 sive of the rest, does frame the abstract ideas of extension, 
 colour, and motion. Not that it is possible for colour 
 or motion to exist without extension ; but only that the 
 mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour 
 exclusive of extension, and of motion exclusi ve of both 
 colour and extension. 
 
 VIII. Again, the mind having observed that in the 
 particular extensions perceived by sense, there is some- 
 thing common and alike in all, and some other things 
 peculiar, as this or that figure or magnitude, which dis- 
 tinguish them one from another ; it considers apart or 
 singles out by itself that which is common, making there- 
 of a most abstract idea of extension, which is neither line, 
 surface, nor solid, nor has any figure or magnitude, but 
 is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise 
 the mind, by leaving out of the particular colours per- 
 ceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from 
 another, and retaining that only which is common to all, 
 makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red, 
 nor blue, nor white, nor any other determinate colour. 
 And in like manner, by considering motion abstractedly 
 not only from the body moved, but likewise from the 
 figure it describes, and all particular directions and velo- 
 cities, the abstract idea of motion is framed ; which 
 equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever 
 that may be perceived by sense. 
 
 IX. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 7 
 
 of qualities or modes, so does it, by the same precision 
 or mental separation, attain abstract ideas of the more 
 compounded beings, which include several coexistent 
 qualities. For example, the mind having observed that 
 Peter, James, and John, resemble each other, in certain 
 common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves 
 out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter, 
 James, and any other particular man, that which is 
 peculiar to each, retaining only what is common to all ; 
 and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars 
 equally partake, abstracting entirely from and cutting off 
 all those circumstances and differences, which might de- 
 termine it to any particular existence. And after this 
 manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, 
 or, if you please, humanity or human nature ; wherein 
 it is true there is included colour, because there is no 
 man but has some colour, but then it can be neither 
 white, nor black, nor any particular colour ; because 
 there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake. 
 So likewise there is included stature, but then it is nei- 
 ther tall stature nor low stature, nor yet middle stature, 
 but something abstracted from all these. And so of the 
 rest. Moreover, there being a great variety of other 
 creatures that partake in some parts, but not all, of the 
 complex idea of man, the mind leaving out those parts 
 which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only 
 which are common to all the living creatures, frameth 
 the idea of animal, which abstracts not only from all 
 particular men, but also all birds, beasts, fishes, and 
 insects. The constituent parts of the abstract idea of 
 animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous motion. 
 By body is meant, body without any particular shape or 
 figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all 
 animals, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or 
 scales, &c. nor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and 
 nakedness, being the distinguishing properties of par- 
 ticular animals, and for that reason left out of the ah~ 
 
8 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 struct idea . Upon the same account the spontaneous 
 motion must be neither walking, nor flying, nor creep- 
 ing : it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is 
 it is not easy to conceive. 
 
 X. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of 
 abstracting their ideas, they best can tell ; for myself, I 
 find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing 
 to myself the ideas of those particular things I have per- 
 ceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. 
 I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts 
 of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider 
 the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or 
 separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever 
 hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular 
 shape and colour. Likewise the idea of man that I frame 
 to myself, must be either of a white, or a black, or a 
 tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low, or a mid- 
 dle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought con- 
 ceive the abstract idea above described. And it is equally 
 impossible for me to form the abstract idea of motion 
 distinct from the body moving, and which is neither 
 swift nor slow, curvilinear nor rectilinear; and the like 
 may be said of all other abstract general ideas whatsoever. 
 To be plain, I own myself able to abstract in one sense, 
 as when I consider some particular parts or qualities se- 
 parated from others, with which, though they are united 
 in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist 
 without them. But I deny that I can abstract one from 
 another, or conceive separately, those qualities which 
 it is impossible should exist so separated ; or that I can 
 frame a general notion by abstracting from particulars in 
 the manner aforesaid. Which two last are the proper 
 acceptations of abstraction. And there are grounds to 
 think most men will acknowledge themselves to be in 
 my case. The generality of men which are simple and 
 illiterate never pretend to abstract notions. It is said, they 
 are difficult, and not to be attained without pains and 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 9 
 
 study. We may therefore reasonably conclude, that, if 
 such there be, they are confined only to the learned. 
 
 XI. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in de- 
 fence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can dis- 
 cover what it is that inclines the men of speculation to 
 embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as 
 that seems to be. There has been a late deservedly-es- 
 teemed philosopher, who no doubt has given it very much 
 countenance, by seeming to think, the having abstract 
 general ideas is what puts the widest difference in point of 
 understanding betwixt man and beast. “ The having of 
 general ideas (saith he) is that which puts a perfect dis- 
 tinction betwixt man and brutes , and is an excellency 
 which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. 
 For it is evident we observe no footsteps in them of 
 making use of general signs for universal ideas ; from 
 which we have reason to imagine that they have not the 
 faculty of abstracting or making general ideas, since they 
 have no use of words or any other general signs.” And 
 a little after : “ Therefore I think, we may suppose that 
 it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated 
 from men ; and it is that proper difference wherein they 
 are wholly separated, and which at last widens to so wide 
 a distance. For if they have any ideas at all, and are 
 not bare machines (as some would have them), we can- 
 not deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident 
 to me that they do some of them in certain instances 
 reason as that they have sense, but it is only in particular 
 ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They 
 are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, 
 and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by 
 any kind of abstraction .” Essay on Human Understand- 
 ing, b. ii. c. xi. sect. x. and xi. I readily agree with this 
 learned author, that the faculties of brutes can by no 
 means attain to abstraction. But then if this be made 
 the distinguishing property of that sort of animals, I fear 
 a great many of those that pass for men must be reck- 
 
10 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 oned into their number. The reason that is here as r 
 signed why we have no grounds to think brutes have 
 abstract general ideas, is, that we observe in them no use 
 of words or any other general signs ; which is built on 
 this supposition, to wit, that the making use of words, 
 implies the having general ideas. From which it fol- 
 lows, that men who use language are able to abstract or 
 generalize their ideas. That this is the sense and arguing 
 of the author will further appear by his answering the 
 question he in another place puts : “ Since all things 
 that exist are only particulars, how come we by general 
 terms?” His answer is, “Words become general by being 
 made the signs of general ideas.” Essay on Human Under- 
 standing, b. iii. c. iii. sect. vi. But it seems that a word 
 becomes general bybeingmadc the sign not of an abstract 
 general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of 
 which it differently suggests to the mind. For example, 
 when it is said the change of motion is proportional to the 
 impressed force, or that whatever has extension is divisible ; 
 these proportions are to be understood of motion and 
 extension in general, and nevertheless it will not follow 
 that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion 
 without a body moved, or any determinate direction and 
 velocity, or that I must conceive an abstract general idea 
 of extension, which is neither line, surface nor solid, 
 neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, nor of any 
 other determinate colour. It is only implied, that what- 
 ever motion I consider, whether it be swift or slow, per- 
 pendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or inwhatever object, 
 the axiom concerning it holds equally true. As does the 
 other of every particular extension, it matters not whe- 
 ther line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that mag- 
 nitude or figure. 
 
 XII. By observing how ideas become general, we 
 may the better judge how words are made so. And here 
 it is to be noted, that I do not deny absolutely there 
 are general ideas, but only that there are any abstract 
 
r 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 1 1 
 
 general ideas : for in the passages above quoted, wherein 
 there is mention of general ideas, it is always supposed 
 that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner 
 set forth in sect. viii. and ix. Now if we will annex a 
 meaning to our words, and speak only of what we can 
 conceive, I believe we shall acknowledge, that an idea, 
 which considered in itself is particular, becomes general, 
 by being made to represent or stand for all other parti- 
 cular ideas of the same sort. To make this plain by an 
 example, suppose a geometrician is demonstrating the 
 method of cutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, 
 for instance, a black line of an inch in length, this which 
 in itself is a particular line is nevertheless with regard 
 to its signification general, since, as it is there used, it 
 represents all particular lines whatsoever ; so that what 
 is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines, or, in 
 other words, of a line in general. And as that parti- 
 cular line becomes general by being made a sign, so 
 the name line, which taken absolutely is particular, by 
 being a sign is made general. And as the former owes 
 its generality, not to its being the sign of an abstract or 
 general line, but of all particular right lines that may 
 possibly exist ; so the latter must be thought to derive 
 its generality from the same cause, namely, the various 
 particular lines which it indifferently denotes, 
 
 XIII. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the 
 nature of abstract ideas, and the uses they are thought 
 necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the 
 Essay on Human Understanding, which is as follows. 
 “ Abstract ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, 
 or the yet unexercised mind, as particular ones. If they 
 seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant 
 and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely 
 reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are 
 fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry diffi- 
 culty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves 
 as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not 
 
12 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 require some pains and skill to form the general idea 
 of a triangle ? (which is yet none of the most abstract 
 comprehensive and difficult) ; for it must be neither 
 oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, 
 nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once. In 
 effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an 
 idea wherein some parts of several different and incon- 
 sistent ideas are put together. It is true, the mind in 
 this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes 
 all the haste to them it can, for the conveniency of com- 
 munication and enlargement of knowledge, to both 
 which it is naturally very much inclined. But yet one 
 has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imper- 
 fection. At least this is enough to shew, that the most 
 abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is 
 first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its 
 earliest knowledge is conversant about.” B. iv, c.vii. sect, 
 ix. If any man has the faculty of framing in his piind 
 such an idea of a triangle as is here described, it is in 
 vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go 
 about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully 
 and certainly inform himself, whether he has such an 
 idea or not. And this, methinks, can be no hard task 
 for any one to perform. What more easy than for any 
 one to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try 
 whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall 
 correspond with the description that is here given of the 
 general idea of a triangle, which is, neither oblique , nor 
 rectangle, equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all 
 and none of these at once ? 
 
 XIV. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract 
 ideas carry with them, and the pains and skill requisite 
 to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed 
 that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind, 
 to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects, and 
 raise them to those sublime speculations that are con- 
 versant about abstract ideas. From all which the na- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 13 
 
 fural consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a 
 thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary 
 for communication, which is so easy and familiar to all 
 sorts of men. But we are told, if they seem obvious 
 and easy to grown men, it is only because by constant 
 and familiar me they are made so. Now I would fain 
 know at what time it is, men are employed in surmount- 
 ing that difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those 
 necessary helps for discourse. It cannot be when they 
 are grown up, for then it seems they are not conscious 
 of any such pains-taking ; it remains therefore to be the 
 business of their childhood. And surely the great and 
 multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be 
 found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard 
 thing to imagine, that a couple of children cannot prate 
 together of their sugar-plums and rattles, and the rest of 
 their little trinkets, till they have first tacked together 
 numberless inconsistencies, and so framed in their minds 
 abstract general ideas, and annexed them to every com- 
 mon name they make use of ? 
 
 XV. Nor do I think them a whit more needful for 
 the enlargement of knowledge than for communication . 
 It is I know a point much insisted on, that all know- 
 ledge and demonstration are about universal notions, to 
 which I fully agree : but then it doth not appear to me 
 that those notions are formed by abstraction in the man- 
 ner premised ; universality, so far as I can comprehend, 
 not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or con- 
 ception of any thing, but in the relation it bears to the 
 particulars signified or represented by it : by virtue 
 whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in 
 their own nature particular, are rendered universal. 
 Thus when I demonstrate any proposition concerning 
 triangles, it is to be supposed that I have in view the 
 universal idea of a triangle ; which ought not to be un- 
 derstood as if I could frame an idea of a triangle which 
 was neither equilateral, nor scalenon, nor equicrural : but 
 
14 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 only that the particular triangle I Consider, whether of 
 this or that sort it matters not, doth equally stand for 
 and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and is 
 in that sense universal. All which seems very plain, and 
 not to include any difficulty in it. 
 
 XVI. But here it will be demanded, how we can 
 know any proposition to be true of all particular tri- 
 angles, except we have first seen it demonstrated of the 
 abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all ? 
 For because a property may be demonstrated to agree 
 to some one particular triangle, it will not thence follow 
 that it equally belongs to any other triangle, which in 
 all respects is not the same with it. For example, hav- 
 ing demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles 
 rectangular triangle are equal to two right ones, I can- 
 not therefore conclude this affection agrees to all other 
 triangles, which have neither a right angle, nor two 
 equal sides-. It seems therefore, that, to be certain this 
 proposition is universally true, we must either make a 
 particular demonstration for every particular triangle^ 
 which is impossible, or once for all demonstrate it of 
 the abstract idea of a triangle, in which all the parti- 
 culars do indifferently partake, and by which they are all 
 equally represented. To which I answer, that though 
 the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration 
 be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular tri- 
 angle, whose sides are of a determinate length, I may 
 nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear 
 triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And, that, 
 because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor 
 determinate length of the sides, is at all concerned in 
 the demonstration. It is true, the diagram I have in 
 view includes all these particulars, but then there is, not 
 the least mention made of them in the proof of the pro- 
 position. It is not said, the three angles are equal to 
 two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, 
 or because the sides comprehending it are of the same 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 K) 
 
 length : which sufficiently shews that the right angle 
 might have been oblique, and the sides unequal, and for 
 all that the demonstration have held good. And for 
 this reason it is, that I conclude that to be true of any 
 obliquangular or scalenon, which I had demonstrated of 
 a particular right-angled equicrural triangle ; and not 
 because I demonstrated the- proposition of the abstract 
 idea of a triangle. And here it must be acknowledged 
 that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, 
 without attending to the particular qualities of the 
 angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may ab- 
 stract : but this will never prove, that he can frame an 
 abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like 
 manner we may consider Peter so far forth as man, or 
 so far forth as animal, without framing the foremen- 
 tioned abstract idea, either of man or of animal, inas- 
 much as all that is perceived is not considered. 
 
 XVII. It were an endless, as well as a useless thing, 
 to trace the schoolmen, those great masters of abstrac- 
 tion, through all the manifold inextricable labyrinths of 
 error and dispute, which their doctrine of abstract na- 
 tures and notions seems to have led them into. What 
 bickerings and controversies, and what a learned dust, 
 have been raised about those matters, and what mighty 
 advantage hath been from thence derived to mankind, 
 are things at this day too clearly known to need being 
 insisted on. And it had been well if the ill effects of 
 that doctrine were confined to those only who make the 
 most avowed profession of it. When men consider the 
 great pains, industry, and parts, that have for so many 
 ages been laid out on the cultivation and advancement 
 of the sciences, and that notwithstanding all this, the far 
 greater part of them remain full of darkness and uncer- 
 tainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end ; 
 and even those that are thought to be supported by the 
 most clear and cogent demonstrations, contain in them 
 paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the un- 
 
1G 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 derstandings of men; and that taking all together, a 
 small portion of them doth supply any real benefit to 
 mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent diversion 
 and amusement : I say, the consideration of all this is 
 apt to throw them into a despondency, and perfect con- 
 tempt of all study. But this may perhaps cease, upon 
 a view of the false principles that have obtained in the 
 world, amongst all which there is none, methinks, hath 
 a more wide influence over the thoughts of speculative 
 men, than this of abstract general ideas. 
 
 XVIII. I come now to consider the source of this 
 prevailing notion, and that seems to me to be language. 
 And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could 
 have been the source of an opinion so universally re- 
 ceived. The truth of this appears as from other reasons, 
 so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of 
 abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in 
 order to naming ; from which it is a clear consequence, 
 that if there had been no such thing as speech or uni- 
 versal signs, there never had been any thought of ab- 
 straction. See b. iii. c. vi. sect, xxxix. and elsewhere of the 
 Essay on Human Understanding. Let us therefore exa- 
 mine the manner wherein words have contributed to the 
 origin of that mistake. First then, it is thought that 
 every name hath, or ought to have, one only precise and 
 settled signification, which inclines men to think there 
 are certain abstract, determinate ideas, which constitute 
 the true and only immediate signification of each gene- 
 ral name. And that it is by the mediation of these ab- 
 stract ideas, that a general name comes to signify any 
 particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is no such 
 thing as one precise and definite signification annexed 
 to any general name, they all signifying indifferently 
 a great number of particular ideas. All which doth 
 evidently follow from what has been already said, and 
 will clearly appear to any one by a little reflection. To 
 this it will be objected, that every name that has a de- 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ti 
 
 finition, is thereby restrained to one certain significa- 
 tion. For example, a triangle is defined to be a plain 
 surface comprehended hy three right lines; by which 
 that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no 
 other. To which I answer, that in the definition it is 
 not said whether the surface be great or small, black or 
 white, nor whether the sides are long or short, equal 
 or unequal, nor with what angles they are inclined to 
 each other ; in all which there may be great variety, and 
 consequently there is no one settled idea : which limits 
 the signification of the word triangle. It is one thing 
 for to keep a name constantly to the same definition, 
 and another to make it stand every where for the same 
 idea : the one is necessary, the other useless and imprac- 
 ticable. 
 
 XIX. But to give a farther account how words 
 came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must 
 be observed that it is a received opinion, that language 
 has no other end but the communicating our ideas, and 
 that every significant name stands for an idea. This 
 being so, and it being withal certain, that names, which 
 yet are not thought altogether insignificant, do not ah 
 ways mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straight- 
 way concluded that they stand for abstract notion. That 
 there are many names in use amongst speculative men, 
 which do not always suggest to others determinate par- 
 ticular ideas, is what nobody will deny. And a little 
 attention will discover, that it is not necessary (even in 
 the strictest reasonings) significant names which stand 
 for ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the 
 understanding the ideas they are made to stand for : in 
 reading and discoursing, names being for the most part 
 used as letters are in algebra, in which though a par- 
 ticular quantity be marked by each letter, yet to proceed 
 right it is not requisite that in every step each letter 
 suggest to your thoughts that particular quantity it 
 was appointed to stand for. 
 
18 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 XX. Besides, the communicating of ideas marked by 
 words is not the chief and only end of language, as is 
 commonly supposed. There are other ends, as the rais- 
 ing of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from 
 an action, the putting the mind in some particular dis- 
 position ; to which the former is in many cases barely 
 subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these 
 can be obtained without it, as I think doth not unfre- 
 quently happen in the familiar use of language. I en- 
 treat the reader to reflect with himself, and see if it doth 
 not often happen, either in hearing or reading a dis- 
 course, that the passions of fear, love, hatred, admira- 
 tion, disdain, and the like, arise immediately in his mind 
 upon the perception of certain words, without any ideas 
 coming between. At first, indeed, the words might 
 have occasioned ideas that were fit to produce those 
 emotions; but, if I mistake not, it will be found that 
 when language is once grown familiar, the hearing of 
 the sounds or sight of the characters is oft immediate- 
 ly attended with those passions, which at first were wont 
 to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are 
 now quite omitted. May we not, for example, be af- 
 fected with the promise of a good thing, though we have 
 not an idea of what it is ? Or is not the being threat- 
 ened with danger sufficient to excite a dread, though 
 we think not of any particular evil likely to befall us, 
 nor yet frame to ourselves an abstract ? If any one shall 
 join ever so little reflection of his own to what has been 
 said, I believe it will evidently appear to him, that ge- 
 neral names are often used in the propriety of lan- 
 guage without the speaker’s designing them for marks 
 of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in 
 the mind of the hearer. Even proper names them- 
 selves do not seem always spoken with a design to 
 bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that 
 are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when 
 a schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said it, all I conceive 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 19 
 
 he means by it, is, to dispose me to embrace his opinion 
 with the deference and submission which custom has 
 annexed to that name. And this effect may be 60 in- 
 stantly produced in the minds of those who are accus- 
 tomed to resign their judgment to the authority of 
 that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of 
 his person, writings, or reputation, should go before. 
 Innumerable examples of this kind may be given ; but 
 why should I insist on those things which every one’s 
 experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto 
 him ? 
 
 XXI. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of 
 abstract ideas. We have considered what has been said 
 for them by their ablest patrons ; and endeavoured to 
 shew they are of no use for those ends to which they 
 are thought necessary. And, lastly, we have traced them 
 to the source from whence they flow, which appears 
 to be language. It cannot be denied that words are of 
 excellent use, in that by their means all that stock of 
 knowledge which has been purchased by the joint la- 
 bours of inquisitive men in all ages and nations, may be 
 drawn into the view and made the possession of one 
 single person. But at the same time it must be owned 
 that most parts of knowledge have been strangely per- 
 plexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general 
 ways of speech wherein they are delivered. Since there- 
 fore words are so apt to impose on the understanding, 
 whatever ideas I consider, I shall endeavour to take 
 them bare and naked into my view, keeping out of my 
 thoughts, so far as I am able, those names which long 
 and constant use hath so strictly united with them ; 
 from which I may expect to derive the following ad- 
 vantages. 
 
 XXII. First, I shall be sure to get clear of all con- 
 troversies purely verbal ; the springing up of which weeds 
 in almost all the sciences has been a main hinderance 
 
20 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 to the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, 
 this seems to.be asure way to extricate myself out of that 
 fine and subtile net of abstract ideas, which has so mi- 
 serably perplexed and entangled the minds of men, and 
 that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much 
 the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so 
 much the deeper was he like to be ensnared, and faster 
 held therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts 
 to my own ideas divested of words, I do not see how I 
 can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider, I clearly 
 and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking 
 I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for 
 me to imagine, that any of my own ideas are alike or 
 unlike, that are not truly so. To discern the agreements 
 or disagreements that are between my ideas, to see what 
 ideas are included in any compound idea, and what not, 
 there is nothing more requisite, than an attentive percep- 
 tion of what passes in my own understanding. 
 
 XXIII. But the attainment of all these advantages 
 doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the decep- 
 tion of words, which I dare hardly promise myself ; so 
 difficult a thing it is to dissolve a union so early begun, 
 and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words 
 and ideas. Which difficulty seems to have been very 
 much increased by the doctrine of abstraction. For so 
 long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to 
 their words, it doth not seem strange that they should 
 use words for ideas : it being found an impracticable 
 thing to lay aside the word, and retain the abstract idea 
 in the mind, which in itself was perfectly inconceivable. 
 This seems to me the principal cause, why those men 
 who have so emphatically recommended to others the 
 laying aside all use of words in their meditations, and 
 contemplating their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform 
 it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of 
 the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes, which 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 21 
 
 grow out of the abuse of words. And in order to re- 
 medy these evils they advise well, that we attend to the 
 ideas signified, and draw off our attention from the 
 words which signify them. But how good soever this 
 advice may be they have given others, it is plain they 
 could not have a due regard to it themselves, so long as 
 they thought the only immediate use of words was to 
 signify ideas, and that the immediate signification of 
 every general name was a determinate, abstract idea. 
 
 XXIV. But these being known to be mistakes, a 
 man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed on 
 by words. He that knows he has no other than par- 
 ticular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out 
 and conceive the abstract idea annexed to any name. 
 And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas, 
 will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where 
 there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wish- 
 ed, that every one would use his utmost endeavours to 
 obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider, se- 
 parating from them all that dress and incumbrance of 
 words which so much contribute to blind the judgment 
 and divide the attention. In vain do we extend our 
 view into the heavens, and pry into the entrails of the 
 earth; in vain do we consult the writings of learned men, 
 and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity ; we need only 
 draw the curtain of words to behold the fairest tree of 
 knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach 
 of our hand. 
 
 XXV. Unless we take care to clear the first princi- 
 ples of knowledge from the embarrass and delusion of 
 words, we may make infinite reasonings upon them to 
 no purpose ; we may draw consequences from conse- 
 quences, and be never the wiser. The farther we go, 
 we shall only lose ourselves the more irrecoverably, and 
 be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. 
 Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets. 
 
22 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his 
 own thinking, and endeavour to attain the same train of 
 thoughts in reading, that I had in writing them. By 
 this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth 
 or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger 
 of being deceived by my words, and I do not see how he 
 can be led into an error by considering his own naked, 
 undisguised ideas. 
 
OF THE 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF 
 
 HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 I. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the 
 objects of human knowledge, that they are either ideas 
 actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are 
 perceived by attending to the passions and operations 
 of the mind, or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory 
 and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely 
 representing, those originally perceived in the aforesaid 
 ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and colours 
 with their several degrees and variations. By touch I 
 perceive, for example, hard and soft, heat and cold, mo- 
 tion and resistance, and of all these more and less either 
 as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with 
 odours, the palate with tastes, and hearing conveys 
 sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and com- 
 position. And as several of these are observed to ac- 
 company each other, they come to be marked by one 
 name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for 
 example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and con- 
 sistence, having been observed to go together, are ac- 
 counted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. 
 Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a 
 book, and the like sensible things ; which, as they are 
 pleasing or disagreeable, excite the passions of love, 
 hatred, joy, grief, and so forth. 
 
24 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 II. But besides all that endless variety of ideas or ob- 
 jects of knowledge, there is likewise something which 
 knows or perceives them, and exercises divers opera- 
 tions; as willing, imagining, remembering about them. 
 This perceiving active being is what I call mind, spirit, 
 soul, or myself. By which words I do not denote any 
 one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, 
 wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby 
 they are perceived ; for the existence of an idea consists 
 in being perceived. 
 
 III. That neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor 
 ideas formed by the imagination, exist without the mind, 
 is what every body will allow’. And it seems no less 
 evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted 
 on the sense, however blended or combined together 
 (that is, whatever objects they compose), cannot exist 
 otherwise than in a mind perceiving them. I think an 
 intuitive knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one 
 that shall attend to what is meant by the term exist, 
 when applied to sensible things. The table I write on, 
 I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it ; and if I were out 
 of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby 
 that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that 
 some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was 
 an odour, that is, it was smelled ; there was a sound, 
 that is to say, it was heard ; a colour or figure, and it 
 was perceived by sight or touch. This is all that I can 
 understand by these and the like expressions. For as to 
 what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking 
 things without any relation to their being perceived, that 
 seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor 
 is it possible they should have any existence out of the 
 minds or thinking things which perceive them. 
 
 IV. It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing 
 amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a 
 word all sensible objects, have an existence natural or 
 real distinct from their being perceived by the under- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 25 
 
 standing. But with how great an assurance and acqui- 
 escence soever this principle may be entertained in the 
 world ; yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in 
 question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a 
 manifest contradiction. For what are the foremen- 
 tioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and 
 what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensa- 
 tions ; and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of 
 these or any combination of them should exist unper- 
 ceived ? 
 
 V. If we thoroughly examine this tenet, it will, per- 
 haps, be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of 
 abstract ideas. For can there be a nicer strain of ab- 
 straction, than to distinguish the existence of sensible 
 objects from their being perceived, so as to conceive 
 them existing unperceived ? Light and colours, heat 
 and cold, extension and figures, in a word the things we 
 see and feel, what are they but so many sensations, no- 
 tions, ideas or impressions on the sense ; and is it pos- 
 sible to separate, even in thought, any of these from 
 perception ? For my part I might as easily divide a 
 thing from itself. I may indeed divide in my thoughts 
 or conceive apart from each other those things which, 
 perhaps, I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus I 
 imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, 
 or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the 
 rose itself. So far I will not deny I can abstract, if that 
 may properly be called abstraction which extends only 
 to the conceiving separately such objects as it is pos- 
 sible may really exist or be actually perceived asunder. 
 But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend 
 beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. 
 Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel any thing 
 without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it im- 
 possible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible 
 thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception 
 of it. 
 
26 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 VI. Some truths there are So near and obvious to 
 the mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see 
 them. Such I take this important one to be, to wit, 
 that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, 
 in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty 
 frame of the world, have not any subsistence without 
 a mind, that their being is to be perceived or known ; 
 that consequently so long as they are not actually per- 
 ceived by me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any 
 other created spirit, they must either have no existence 
 at all, or else subsist in the mind of some eternal spirit : 
 it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the ab- 
 surdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of 
 them an existence independent of a spirit. To be con- 
 vinced of which, the reader need only reflect and try to 
 separate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible 
 thing from its being perceived. 
 
 VII. From what has been said, it follows, there is 
 not any other substance than spirit , or that which per- 
 ceives. But for the fuller proof of this point, let it be 
 considered, the sensible qualities are colour, figure, mo- 
 tion, smell, taste, and such like, that is, the ideas per- 
 ceived by sense. Now for an idea to exist in an un per- 
 ceiving thing, is a manifest contradiction ; for to have 
 an idea is all one as to perceive : that therefore wherein 
 colour, figure, and the like qualities exist, must perceive 
 them ; hence it is clear there can be no unthinking 
 substance or substratum of those ideas. 
 
 VIII. But say you, though the ideas themselves do 
 not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like 
 them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which 
 things exist without the mind, in an unthinking sub- 
 stance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an 
 idea ; a colour or figure can be like nothing but another 
 colour or figure. If we look but ever so little into our 
 thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive 
 a likeness except only between our ideas. Again, I ask 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 27 
 
 whether those supposed originals or external things, of 
 which our ideas are the pictures or representations, be 
 themselves perceivable or not ? if they are, then they 
 are ideas, and we have gained our point ; but if you say 
 they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense, 
 to assert a colour is like something which is invisible ; 
 hard or soft, like something which is intangible ; and so 
 of the rest. 
 
 IX. Some there are who make a distinction betwixt 
 primary and secondary qualities: by the former, they 
 mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impene- 
 trability, and number : by the latter they denote all other 
 sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. 
 The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be 
 the resemblances of any thing existing without the mind 
 or unperceived ; but they will have our ideas of the 
 primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which 
 exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which 
 they call matter. By matter therefore we are to under- 
 stand an inert, senseless substance, in which exten- 
 sion, figure, and motion, do actually subsist. But it is 
 evidentfrom vvha'c we have alreadyshewn, that extension, 
 figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, 
 and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, 
 and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes 
 can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence it is 
 plain, that the very notion of what is called matter or 
 corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it. 
 
 X. They who assert that figure, motion, and the 
 rest of the primary or original qualities, do exist without 
 the mind, in unthinking substances, do at the same time 
 acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold, and such- 
 like secondary qualities, do not, which they tell us are 
 sensations existing in the mind alone, that depend on 
 and are occasioned by the different size, texture, and mo- 
 tion, of the minute particles of matter. This they take 
 for an undoubted truth, which they can demonstrate 
 
23 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 beyond all exception. Now if it be certain, that those 
 original qualities are inseparably united with the other 
 sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of 
 being abstracted from them, it plainly follows, that they 
 exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect 
 and try, whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, 
 conceive the extension and motion ofa body, without all 
 other sensibles qualities. For my own part, I see evi- 
 dently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a 
 body extended and moved, but I must withal give it 
 some colour or other sensible quality which is acknow- 
 ledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, 
 figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, 
 are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible 
 qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the 
 mind, and no where else. 
 
 XI. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are al- 
 lowed to exist no where without the mind, being entirely 
 relative, and changing as the frame or position of the 
 organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which 
 exists without the mind, is neither great nor small, the 
 motion neither swift nor slow, that is, they are nothing 
 at all. But, say you, they are extension in general, and 
 motion in general : thus we see how much the tenet of 
 extended, moveable substances existing without the 
 mind, depends on that strange doctrine of abstract ideas. 
 And here I cannot but remark, how nearly the vague and 
 indeterminate description of matter or corporeal sub- 
 stance, which the modern philosophers are run into by 
 their own principles, resembles that antiquated and so- 
 much-ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with 
 in Aristotle and his followers. Without extension so- 
 lidity cannot be conceived. Since therefore it has been 
 shewn that extension exists not in an unthinking sub- 
 stance, the same must also be true of solidity. 
 
 XII. That number is entirely the creature of the 
 mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 29 
 
 exist without, will be evident to whoever considers, 
 that the same thing bears a different denomination of 
 number, as the mind views it with different respects. 
 Thus, the same extension is one or three or thirty-six, 
 according as the mind considers it with reference to a 
 yard, a foot, or an inch. 1S1 umber is so visibly relative, 
 and dependent on men’s understanding, that it is strange 
 to think how any one should give it an absolute exist- 
 ence without the mind. We say one book, one page, 
 one line ; all these are equally units, though some con- 
 tain several of the others. And in each instance it is 
 plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of 
 ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind. 
 
 XIII. Unity I know some will have to be a simple 
 or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas 
 into the mind. That I have any such idea answering 
 the word unity , I do not find ; and if I had, methinks I 
 could not miss finding it ; on the contrary it should be 
 the most familiar to my understanding, since it is said to 
 accompany ail other ideas, and to be perceived by all the 
 ways of sensation and reflection. To say no more, it is 
 an abstract idea. 
 
 XIV. I shall farther add, that after the same man- 
 ner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qua- 
 lities to have no existence in matter, or without the 
 mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other 
 sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is 
 said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, 
 and not at all patterns of real beings existing in the cor- 
 poreal substances which excite them, for that the same 
 body which appears cold to one hand seems warm to 
 another. Now why may we not as well argue that figure 
 and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qua- 
 lities existing in matter, because to the same eye at dif- 
 ferent stations, or eyes of a different texture at the same 
 station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the 
 images of any thing settled and determinate without the 
 
30 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 mind ? Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in 
 the sapid thing, because the thing remaining unaltered 
 the sweetness is changed into bitter, as in case of a fever 
 or otherwise vitiated palate. Is it not as reasonable to 
 say, that motion is not without the mind, since if the 
 succession of ideas in the mind becomes swifter, the mo- 
 tion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower, without 
 any alteration in any external object. 
 
 XV. In short, let any one consider those arguments, 
 which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and 
 tastes exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may 
 with equal force, be brought to prove the same thing of 
 extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be con- 
 fessed this method of arguing doth not so much prove 
 that there is no extension or colour in an outward ob- 
 ject, as that we do not know by sense which is the true 
 extension or colour of the object. But the arguments 
 foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour 
 or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever, 
 should exist in an unthinking subject without the mind, 
 or in the truth, that there should be any such thing as 
 an outward object. 
 
 XVI. But let us examine a little the received opinion . 
 It is said, extension is a mode or accident of matter, and 
 that matter is the substratum that supports it. Now I 
 desire that you would explain what is meant by matter’s 
 supporting extension : say you, I have no idea of matter, 
 and therefore cannot explain it. I answer, though you 
 have no positive, yet if you have any meaning at all, 
 you must at least have a relative idea of matter: though 
 you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to 
 know what relation it bears to accidents, and what is 
 meant by its supporting them. It is evident support 
 cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense, as 
 when we say that pillars support a building : in what 
 sense therefore must it be taken ? 
 
 XVII. If we inquire into what the most accurate 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 31 
 
 philosophers declare themselves to mean by material 
 substance, we shall find them acknowledge, they have 
 no other meaning annexed to those sounds, but the idea 
 of being in general, together with the relative notion of 
 its supporting accidents. The general idea of being ap- 
 peared me to; the most abstract and incomprehensible 
 of all other ; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as 
 we have just now observed, cannot be understood in the 
 common sense of those words ; it must therefore be taken 
 in some other sense, but what that is they do not ex- 
 plain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches 
 which make the signification of the words material sub- 
 stance, I am convinced there is no distinct meaning an- 
 nexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves 
 any farther, in discussing this material substratum or 
 support of figure and motion, and other sensible qua- 
 lities ? Does it not suppose they have an existence with- 
 out the mind ? And is not this a direct repugnancy and 
 altogether inconceivable ? 
 
 XVIII. But though it were possible that solid, 
 figured, moveable substances may exist without the mind, 
 corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies, yet how is 
 it possible for us to know this ? Either we must know it 
 by sense, or by reason. As for our senses, by them we 
 have the knowledge only of our sensations, ideas, or 
 those things that are immediately perceived by sense, 
 call them what you will : but they do not inform us that 
 things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to 
 those which are perceived. This the materialists them- 
 selves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we 
 have any knowledge at all of external things, it must be 
 by reason, inferring their existence from what is imme- 
 diately perceived by sense. But what reason can induce 
 us .to believe the existence of bodies without the mind 
 from what we perceive, since the very patrons of matter 
 themselves do not pretend there is any necessary con- 
 nexion betwixt them and our ideas ? I say it is granted 
 
32 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 on all hands (and what happens in dreams, frenzies, and 
 the like, puts it beyond dispute), that it is possible we 
 might be affected with all the ideas we have now, though 
 no bodies existed without resembling them. Hence it 
 is evident the supposition of external bodies is not ne- 
 cessary for the producing our ideas : since it is granted 
 they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be pro- 
 duced always, in the same order we see them in at pre- 
 sent, without their concurrence. 
 
 XIX. But though we might possibly have all our 
 sensations without them, yet perhaps it may be thought 
 easier to conceive and explain the manner of their pro- 
 duction, by supposing external bodies in their likeness 
 rather than otherwise ; and so it might be at least pro- 
 bable there are such things as bodies that excite their 
 ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said ; for 
 though we give the materialists their external bodies, 
 they by their own confession are never the nearer know- 
 ing how our ideas are produced: since they own them- 
 selves unable to comprehend in what manner body can 
 act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint 
 any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production 
 of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why 
 we should suppose matter or corporeal substances, since 
 that is ackowledged to remain equally inexplicable with 
 or without this supposition. If therefore it were possi- 
 ble for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they 
 do so must needs be a very precarious opinion ; since it 
 is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has 
 created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and 
 serve to no manner of purpose. 
 
 XX. In short, if there were external bodies, it is im- 
 possible we should ever come to know it ; and if there 
 were not, we might have the very same reasons to think 
 there were that we have now. Suppose, what no one can 
 deny possible, an intelligence, without the help of ex- 
 ternal bodies, to be affected with the same train of sen- 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 33 
 
 sations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same or- 
 der, and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether 
 that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the 
 existence ofcoporeal substances, represented by his ideas, 
 and exciting them in his mind, that you can possibly 
 have for believing the same thing ? Of this there can be 
 no question ; which one consideration is enough to make 
 any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever 
 arguments he may think himself to have, for the exist- 
 ence of bodies without the mind. 
 
 XXI. Were it necessary to add any farther proof 
 against the existence of matter, after what has been said, 
 I could instance several of those errors and difficulties 
 (not to mention impieties) which have sprung from that 
 tenet. It has occasioned numberless controversies and 
 disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far greater mo- 
 ment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail 
 of them in this place, as well because I think, arguments 
 a posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, 
 if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated d priori , as 
 because I shall hereafter find occasion to say somewhat 
 of them. 
 
 XXII. I am afraid I have given cause to think me 
 needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For to what 
 purpose is it to dilate on that which may be demonstra- 
 ted with the utmost evidence in a line or two, to any one 
 that is capable of the least reflection ? It is but looking 
 into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can 
 conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion, or 
 colour, to exist without the mind, or unperceived. This 
 easy trial may make you see, that what you contend for, 
 is a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am con- 
 tent to put the whole upon this issue ; if you can but 
 conceive it possiblefor one extended moveable substance, 
 or in general, for any one idea or any thing like an idea, 
 to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall 
 readily give up the cause : and as for all that compages of 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 external bodies which you contend for, I shall grant you 
 its existence, though you cannot either give me any reason 
 why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it is 
 supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opi- 
 nion’s being true, shall pass for an argument that it is so. 
 
 XXIIl. But say you, surely there is nothing easier 
 than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books 
 existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I 
 answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it : but what 
 is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your 
 mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at 
 the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one 
 that may perceive them ? but do not you yourself per- 
 ceive or think of them all the while ? this therefore is 
 nothing to the purpose : it only shews you have the 
 power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind ; but 
 it doth not shew that you can conceive it possible the 
 objects of your thought may exist without the mind : 
 to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them 
 existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a mani- 
 fest repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive 
 the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only 
 contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no 
 notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth con- 
 ceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind ; 
 though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist 
 in itself. A little attention will discover to any one the 
 truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it un- 
 necessary to insist on any other proofs against the exist- 
 ence of material substance. 
 
 XXIV. It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry 
 into our own thoughts, to know w'hether it be possible 
 for us to understand what is meant, by the absolute ex- 
 istence of sensible objects in themselves , or without the 
 mind. To me it is evident those words mark out either 
 a direct contradiction, or else nothing at all. And to 
 convince others of this, I know no readier or fairer way, 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 35 
 
 than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own 
 thoughts: and if by this attention, the emptiness or re- 
 pugnancy of those expressions does appear, surely nothing 
 more is requisite for their conviction. It is on this there- 
 fore that I insist, to wit, that the absolute existence of 
 unthinking things are words without a meaning, or 
 which include a contradiction. This is what I repeat 
 and inculcate, and earnestly recommend to the attentive 
 thoughts of the reader. 
 
 XXV. All our ideas, sensations, or the things which 
 we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distin- 
 guished, are visibly inactive ; there is nothing of power 
 or agency included in them. So that one idea or ob- 
 ject of thought cannot produce, or make any alteration 
 in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there 
 is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our- 
 ideas. For since they and every part of them exist 
 only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them 
 but what is perceived. But whoever shall attend to his 
 ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in 
 them any power or activity ; there is therefore no such 
 thing contained in them. A little attention will dis- 
 cover to us that the very being of an idea implies pas- 
 siveness and inertness in it, insomuch that it is impos- 
 sible for an idea to do any thing, or, strictly speaking, 
 to be the cause of any thing : neither can it be the re- 
 semblance or pattern of any active being, as is evident 
 from sect. viii. Whence it plainly follows that extension, 
 figure and motion, cannot be the cause of our sensa- 
 tions. To say therefore, that these are the effects of 
 powers resulting from the configuration, number, mo- 
 tion, and size of corpuscles, must certainly be false. 
 
 XXVI. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, 
 some are anew excited, others are changed or totally 
 disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas 
 whereon they depend, and which produces and changes 
 them. That this cause cannot beany quality or idea, 
 
36 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding 
 section. It must therefore be a substance ; but it has 
 been shewn that there is no corporeal or material sub- 
 stance : it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an 
 incorporeal active substance or spirit. 
 
 XXVII. A spirit is one simple, undivided, active 
 being : as it perceives ideas, it is called the understand- 
 ing, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, 
 it is called the will. Hence there can be no idea formed 
 of a soul or spirit : for all ideas whatever, being passive 
 and inert, vide sect. xxv. they cannot represent unto us, 
 by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little 
 attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an 
 idea which shall be like that active principle of motion 
 and change of ideas, is absolutely impossible. Such is 
 the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be 
 of itself perceived, but only by the effects which it pro- 
 duceth. If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is 
 here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can 
 frame the idea of any power or active being ; and whe- 
 ther he hath ideas of two principal powers, marked by 
 the names will and understanding, distinct from each 
 other, as well as from a third idea of substance or being 
 in general, with a relative notion of its supporting or 
 being the subject of the aforesaid powers, which is sig- 
 nified by the name soul or spirit. This is what some 
 hold ; but so far as I can see, the words will, soul, spirit, 
 do not stand for different ideas, or in truth, for any idea 
 at all, but for something which is very different from 
 ideas, and which being an agent cannot be like unto, or 
 represented by, any idea whatsoever. Though it must 
 be owned at the same time, that we have some notion of 
 soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as will- 
 ing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we knpw or under- 
 stand the meaning of those words. * 
 
 XXVIII. I find I can excite ideas in my mind at 
 pleasure, and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 37 
 
 fit. It is no more than willing, and straightway this or 
 that idea arises in my fancy : and by the same power it 
 is obliterated, and makes way for another. This making 
 and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate 
 the mind active. Thus much is certain, and grounded 
 on experience : but when we talk of unthinking agents, 
 or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse 
 ourselves with words. 
 
 XXIX. But whatever power I may have over my 
 own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by 
 sense have not a like dependance on my will. When 
 in broad day-light I open my eyes, it is not in my power 
 to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what 
 particular objects shall present themselves to my view : 
 and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses, the 
 ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. 
 There is therefore some other will or spirit that produces 
 them. 
 
 XXX. The ideas of sense are more strong, lively, 
 and distinct than those of the imagination ; they have 
 likewise a steadiness, order and coherence, and are not 
 excited at random, as those which are the effects of hu- 
 man wills often are, but in a regular train or series, the 
 admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the 
 wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set 
 rules or established methods, wherein the mind we de- 
 pend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the 
 laws of nature : and these we learn by experience, which 
 teaches us that such and such ideas are attended wi th such 
 and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things. 
 
 XXXI. This gives us a sort of foresight, which 
 enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life. 
 And without this we should be eternally at a loss : we 
 could not know how to act any thing that might pro- 
 cure us the least pleasure, or remove the least pain of 
 sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and fire 
 warms us ; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to 
 
38 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 reap in the harvest, and, in general, that to obtain such 
 or such ends, such or such means are conducive, all this 
 we know, not by discovering any necessary connexion 
 between our ideas, but only by the observation of the 
 settled laws of nature, without which we should be all in 
 uncertainty and confusion, and a grown man no more 
 know how to manage himself in the affairs of life, than 
 an infant just born. 
 
 XXXII. And yet this consistent uniform working, 
 which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of 
 that governing Spirit whose will constitutes the laws of 
 nature, is so far from leading our thoughts to him, that 
 it rather sends them a wandering after second causes. 
 For when we perceive certain ideas of sense constantly 
 followed by other ideas, and we know that is not of our 
 own doing, we forthwith attribute power and agency 
 to the ideas themselves, and make one the cause of an- 
 other, than which nothing can be more absurd and un- 
 intelligible. Thus for example, having observed that 
 when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous 
 figure, we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or 
 sensation called heat , we do from thence conclude the 
 sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner per- 
 ceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended 
 with sound, we are inclined to think the latter an effect 
 of the former. 
 
 XXXIII. The ideas imprinted on the senses by the 
 Author of nature are called real things : and those ex- 
 cited in the imagination being less regular, vivid and 
 constant, are more properly termed ideas or images of 
 things, which they copy and represent. But then our 
 sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are never- 
 theless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are per- 
 ceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. 
 The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in 
 them, that is, to be more strong, orderly, and coherent 
 than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 39 
 
 that they exist without the mind. They are also less de- 
 pendent on the spirit, or thinking substance which per- 
 ceives them, in that they are excited by the will of ano- 
 ther and more powerful spirit : yet still they are ideas, 
 and certainly no idea, whether faint or strong, can exist 
 otherwise than in a mind perceiving it. 
 
 XXXIV. Before we proceed any farther, it is neces- 
 sary to spend some time in answering objections which 
 may probably be made against the principles hitherto 
 laid down. In doing of which, if I seem too prolix to 
 those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardon- 
 ed, since all men do not equally apprehend things of 
 this nature ; and I am willing to be understood by every 
 one. First then it will be objected that by the foregoing 
 principles, all that is real and substantial in nature is ba- 
 nished out of the world : and instead thereof a chime- 
 rical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, 
 exist only in the mind, that is, they are purely notional. 
 What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars ? 
 What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, 
 stones; nay, even of our own bodies ? Are all these but 
 so many chimeras and illusions on the fancy ? To all 
 which, and whatever else of the same sort may be ob- 
 jected, I answer, that by the principles premised, we are 
 not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we 
 see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, re- ^ 
 mains as secure as ever, and is as real a3 ever. There 
 is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities 
 and chimeras retains its full force. This is evident from 
 sect. xxix. xxx. xxxiii. where we have shewn what is meant 
 by real things in opposition to chimeras, or ideas of our 
 own framing ; but then they both equally exist in the 
 mind, and in that sense are like ideas. 
 
 XXXV. I do not argue against the existence of any* 
 one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or re- 
 flection. That the things I see with mine eyes and 
 touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the 
 
40 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 least question. The only thing whose existence we 
 deny, is that which philosophers call matter or corpo- 
 real substance. And in doing of this, there is no da- 
 mage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will 
 never miss it. The atheist indeed will want the colour of 
 an empty name to support his impiety ; and the philoso- 
 phers may possibly find, they have lost a great handle 
 for trifling and disputation. 
 
 XXXVI. If any man thinks this detracts from the 
 existence or reality of things, he is very far from under- 
 standing what hath been premised in the plainest terms 
 I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has 
 been said. There are spiritual substances, minds, or 
 human souls, which will or excite ideas in themselves at 
 pleasure : but these are faint, weak, and unsteady, in re- 
 spect of others they perceive by sense, which being im- 
 pressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of 
 nature, speak themselves the effects of a mind more 
 powerful and wise than human spirits. These latter 
 are said to have more reality in them than the former : 
 by which is meant that they are more affecting, or- 
 derly, and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the 
 mind perceiving them. And in this sense, the sun that 
 I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine 
 by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here 
 given of reality, it is evident that every vegetable, star, 
 mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, 
 is as much a real being by our principles as by any other. 
 Whether others mean any thing by the term reality , 
 different from what I do, I entreat them to look into 
 their own thoughts and see. 
 
 XXXVII. It will be urged that thus much at least 
 is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal sub- 
 stances. To this my answer is. That if the word sub- 
 $tqnce be taken in the vulgar sense, for a combination 
 of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, 
 and the like ; this we cannot be accused. df taking away. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 41 
 
 But if it be taken in a philosophic sense, for the sup- 
 port of accidents or qualities without the mind : then 
 indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may 
 be said to take away that which never had any existence, 
 not even in the imagination. 
 
 XXXVIII. But, say you, it sounds very harsh to 
 say we eat and drink ideas, and are clothed with ideas. 
 I acknowledge it does so, the word idea not being used 
 in common discourse to signify the several combina- 
 tions of sensible qualities, which are called things : and 
 it is certain that any expression which varies from the 
 familiar use of language, will seem harsh and ridiculous. 
 But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition, 
 which in other words is no more than to say, we are fed 
 and clothed with those things which we perceive imme- 
 diately by our senses. The hardness or softness, the 
 colour, taste, warmth, figure, and such like qualities, 
 which combined together constitute the several sorts of 
 victuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist only in 
 the mind that perceives them ; and this is all that is 
 meant by calling them ideas ; which word, if it was ^s 
 ordinarily used as thing , would sound no harsher nor 
 more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about 
 the propriety, but the truth of the expression. If there- 
 fore you agree with me that we eat and drink, and are 
 clad with the immediate objects of sense which cannot 
 exist unperceived or without the mind ; I shall readily 
 grant it is more proper or conformable to custom, that 
 they should be called things rather than ideas. 
 
 XXXIX. If it be demanded why I make use of the 
 word idea, and do not rather in compliance with custom 
 call them things ; I answer, I do it for two reasons : 
 First, because the term thing, in contradiction to idea , 
 is generally supposed to denote somewhat existing with- 
 out the mind : Secondly, because thing hath a more 
 comprehensive signification than idea, including spirits 
 or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the 
 
42 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal 
 thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the 
 word idea, which implies those properties. 
 
 XL. But say what we can, some one perhaps may be 
 apt to reply, he will still believe his senses, and never suf- 
 fer any arguments, how plausible soever, to prevail over 
 the certainty of them. Be it so, assert the evidence of 
 sense as high as you please, we are willing to do the 
 same. That what I see, hear, and feel, doth exist, that is 
 to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt than I do of 
 my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of 
 sense can be alleged, as a proof of the existence of any 
 thing, which is not perceived by sense. We are not 
 for having any man turn sceptic, and disbelieve his 
 senses ; on the contrary we give them all the stress and 
 assurance imaginable ; nor are there any principles more 
 opposite to scepticism, than those we have laid down, as 
 shall be hereafter clearly shewn. 
 
 XLI. Secondly, it will be objected, that there is a 
 great difference betwixt real fire, for instance, and the 
 idea of fire, betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself 
 burnt, and actually being so : this and the like may be 
 urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the 
 answer is evident from what hath been already said, and I 
 shall only add in this place, that if real fire be very dif- 
 ferent from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that 
 it occasions, very different from the idea of the same 
 pain : and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either 
 is, or can possibly be, in an unperc'eiving thing or with- 
 out the mind, any more than its idea. 
 
 XLII. Thirdly, It will be objected, that we see 
 things actually without or at a distance from us, and 
 which consequently do not exist in the mind, it being 
 absurd that those things which are seen at the distance 
 of several miles, should be as near to us as our own 
 thoughts. In answer to this, I desire it may be consi- 
 dered, that in a dream we do oft perceive things as exist 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 43 
 
 ing at a great distance off, and yet for all that, those 
 things are acknowledged to have their existence only in 
 the mind. 
 
 XLIII. But for the fuller clearing of this point, it 
 may be worth while to consider, how it is that we per- 
 ceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. 
 For that we should in truth see external space, and bo- 
 dies actually existing in it, some nearer, others farther 
 off, seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath 
 been said, of their existing no where without the mind. 
 The consideration of this difficulty it was, that gave 
 birth to my Essay towards a new Theory of Vision , 
 which was published not long since. Wherein it is shewn 
 that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself 
 perceived by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by 
 lines and angles, or any thing that hath a necessary con- 
 nexion with it: but that it is only suggested to our 
 thoughts, by certain visible ideas and sensations attend- 
 ing vision, which in their own nature have no manner 
 of similitude or relation, either with distance, or things 
 placed at a distance. But by a connexion taught us by 
 experience, they come to signify and suggest them to us, 
 after the same manner that words of any language sug- 
 gest the ideas they are made to stand for. Insomuch 
 that a man born blind, and afterwards made to see, 
 would not, at first sight, think the things he saw, to be 
 without his mind, or at any distance from him. See 
 sect. xli. of the forementioned treatise. 
 
 XLIV. The ideas of sight and touch make two spe- 
 cies, entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former 
 are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the pro- 
 per objects of sight neither exist without the mind, nor 
 are the images of external things, was shewn even in 
 that treatise. Though throughout the same, the con- 
 trary be supposed true of tangible objects : not that to 
 suppose that vulgar error, was necessaay for establishing 
 the notions therein laid down ; but because it was be- 
 
u 
 
 OF THE PKINCIPLES 
 
 side my purpose to examine and refute it in a discourse 
 concerning vision. So that in strict truth the ideas of 
 sight, when we apprehend by them distance, and things 
 placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark out to us 
 things actually existing at a distance, but only admo- 
 nish us what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our 
 minds at such and such distances of time, and in conse- 
 quence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident 
 from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this 
 treatise, and in sect, cxlvii. and elsewhere of the Essay 
 concerning Vision, that visible ideas are the language 
 whereby the governing spirit, on whom we depend, in- 
 forms us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint 
 upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our 
 own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point, 
 I refer to the Essay itself. 
 
 XLV. Fourthly, it will be objected, that from the 
 foregoing principles it follows, things are every moment 
 annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense ex- 
 ist only when they are perceived : the trees therefore are 
 in the garden, or the chairs in the parlour, no longer 
 than while there is somebody by to perceive them. 
 Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is 
 reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it is 
 again created. In answer to all which, I refer the rea- 
 der to what has been said in sect. iii. iv. &c. and desire 
 he will consider whether he means any thing by the ac- 
 tual existence of an idea, distinct from its being per- 
 ceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could 
 make, I am not able to discover that any thing else is 
 meant by those words. And I once more entreat the 
 reader to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer him- 
 self to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it 
 possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to ex- 
 ist without being perceived, then I give up the cause : 
 but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable 
 for him to stand up in defence of he knows not what, 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 41 
 
 and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity, the not 
 assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no 
 meaning in them. 
 
 XLVI. It will not be amiss to observe, how far the 
 received principles of philosophy are themselves charge- 
 able with those pretended absurdities. It is thought 
 strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids, all the 
 visible objects round me should be reduced to nothing ; 
 and yet is not this what philosophers commonly acknow- 
 ledge, when they agree on all hands, that light and co- 
 lours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects 
 of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than 
 they are perceived ? Again, it may to some perhaps seem 
 very incredible, that things should be every moment 
 creating, yet this very notion is commonly taught in 
 the schools. For the schoolmen , though they acknow- 
 ledge the existence of matter, and that the whole mun- 
 dane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opi- 
 nion that it cannot subsist without the Divine conserva- 
 tion, which by them is expounded to be a continual 
 creation. 
 
 XLVlI. Farther, a little thought will discover to us, 
 that though we allow the existence of matter or corpo- 
 real substance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the 
 principles which are now generally admitted, that the 
 particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none of them 
 exist whilst they are not perceived. For it is evident 
 from sect. xi. and the following sections, that the mat- 
 ter philosophers contend for, is an incomprehensible 
 somewhat which hath none of those particular qualities, 
 whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distin- 
 guished one from another. But to make this more 
 plain, it must be remarked, that the infinite divisibility 
 of matter is now universally allowed, at least by the 
 most approved and considerable philosophers, who on 
 the received principles demonstrate it beyond all excep- 
 tion. Hence it follows, that there is an infinite num- 
 
46 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 ber of parts in each particle of matter, which are not 
 perceived by sense. The reason therefore, that any 
 particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or ex- 
 hibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, not be- 
 cause it contains no more, since in itself it contains an 
 infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not 
 acute enough to discern them. In proportion there- 
 fore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a 
 greater number of parts in the object ; that is, the ob- 
 ject appears greater, and its figure varies, those parts in 
 its extremities which were before unperceivable, ap- 
 pearing now to bound it in very different lines and an- 
 gles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at 
 length, after various changes of size and shape, when 
 the sense becomes infinitely acute, the body shall seem 
 infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the 
 body, but only in the sense. Each body therefore con- 
 sidered in itself, is infinitely extended, and consequently 
 void of all shape or figure. From which it follows, that 
 though we should grant the existence of matter to be 
 ever so certain, yet it is withal as certain the material- 
 ists themselves are by their own principles forced to ac- 
 knowledge, that neither the particular bodies perceived 
 by sense, nor any thing like them, exists without the 
 mind. Matter, I say, and each particle thereof, is ac- 
 cording to them infinite and shapeless, and it is the 
 mind that frames all that variety of bodies which com- 
 pose the visible world, any one whereof does not exist 
 longer than it is perceived. 
 
 XLVIII. If we consider it, the objection proposed in 
 sect. xlv. will not be found reasonably charged on the 
 principles we have premised, so as in truth to make any 
 objection at all against our notions. For though we hold 
 indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas 
 which cannot exist unperceived ; yet we may not hence 
 conclude they have no existence except only while they 
 are perceived by us, since there may be some other spi- 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 47 
 
 rit that perceives them, though we do not. Wherever 
 bodies are said to have no existence without the mind, I 
 would not be understood to mean this or that particular 
 mind, but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore 
 follow from the foregoing principles, that bodies are 
 annihilated and created every moment, or exist not 
 at all during the intervals between our perception in 
 them. 
 
 XLIX. Fifthly, It may perhaps be objected, that if 
 extension and figure exist only in the mind, it follows 
 that the mind is extended and figured ; since extension 
 is a mode or attribute, which (to speak with the schools) 
 is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer, 
 Those qualities are in the mind only as they are per- 
 ceived by it ; that is, not by way of mode or attribute, 
 but only by way of idea ; and it no more follows, that the 
 soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it 
 alone, than it does that it is red or blue, because those 
 colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist in it, and 
 no where else. As to what philosophers say of subject 
 and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligi- 
 ble. For instance, in this proposition, a die is hard, ex- 
 tended and square ; they will have it that the word die 
 denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hard- 
 ness, extension, and figure, which are predicated of it, 
 and in which they exist. This I cannot comprehend : 
 to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those 
 things which are termed its modes or accidents. And 
 to say a die is hard, extended, and square, is not to at- 
 tribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and sup- 
 porting them, but only an explication of the meaning of 
 the word die. 
 
 L. Sixthly, You will say there have been a great ma- 
 ny things explained by matter and motion : take away 
 these and you destroy the whole corpuscular philosophy, 
 and undermine those mechanical principles which have 
 been applied with so much success to account for the 
 
48 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 phenomena. In short, whatever advances have been 
 made, either by ancient or modern philosophers, in the 
 study of nature, do all proceed on the supposition, that 
 corporeal substance or matter doth really exist. To 
 this I answer, that there is not any one phenomenon ex- 
 plained on that supposition, which may not as well be 
 explained without it, as might easily be made appear by 
 an induction of particulars. To explain the phenomena 
 is all one as to shew, why upon such and such occa- 
 sions we are affected with such and such ideas. But how 
 matter should operate on a spirit, or produce any idea 
 in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain. It 
 is therefore evident, there can be no use of matter in na- 
 tural philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account 
 for things, do it not by corporeal substance, but by 
 figure, motion, and other qualities, which are in truth 
 no more than mere ideas, and therefore cannot be the 
 cause of any thing, as hath been already shewn. See 
 sect. xxv. 
 
 LI. Seventhly, It will upon this be demanded, whe- 
 ther it does not seem absurd to take away natural causes, 
 and ascribe every thing to the immediate operation of 
 spirits ? We must no longer say upon these principles 
 that fire heats, or water cools, but that the spirit heats, 
 and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly laughed 
 at who should talk after this manner ? I answer, he 
 would so ; in such things we ought to think with the 
 learned, and speak with the vulgar. They who to de- 
 monstration are convinced of the truth of the Coperni- 
 can system, do nevertheless say the sun rises, the sun 
 sets, or comes to the meridian : and if they affected a 
 contrary style in common talk, it would without doubt 
 appear very ridiculous. A little reflection on what is 
 here said will make it manifest, that the common use of 
 language would receive no manner of alteration or dis- 
 turbance from the admission of our tenets. 
 
 LII. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 49 
 
 be retained so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, 
 or dispositions to act in such a manner as is necessary 
 for our well-being, how false soever they may be if 
 taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay, this is un- 
 avoidable, since propriety being regulated by custom, 
 language is suited to the received opinions, which are 
 not always the truest. Hence it is impossible, even in 
 the most rigid philosophic reasonings, so far to alter the 
 bent and genius of the tongue we speak, as never to 
 give a handle for cavillers to pretend difficulties and in- 
 consistencies. But a fair and ingenuous reader will col- 
 lect the sense from the scope and tenor and connexion 
 of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate 
 modes of speech which use has made inevitable. 
 
 LIII. As to the opinion that there are no corporeal 
 causes, thishas been heretofore maintained by someof the 
 schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modem 
 philosophers, who, though they allow matter to exist, 
 yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient 
 cause of all things. These men saw, that amongst all 
 the objects of sense there was none which had any 
 power or activity included in it, and that by consequence 
 this was likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed 
 to exist without the mind, like unto the immediate ob- 
 jects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an 
 innumerable multitude of created beings, which they 
 acknowledge are not capable of producing any one effect 
 in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner 
 of purpose, since God might have done every thing as 
 well without them ; this I say, though we should allow 
 it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extra- 
 vagant supposition. 
 
 LIV. In the eighth place. The universal concurrent 
 assent of mankind may be thought by some, an invinci- 
 ble argument in behalf of matter, or the existence of ex- 
 ternal things. Must we suppose the whole world to be 
 mistaken ; and if so, what cause can be assigned of so 
 
 E 
 
30 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 wide-spread and predominant an error ? I answer, First, 
 That, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be 
 found, so many as is imagined do really believe the exist- 
 ence of matter or things without the mind. Strictly 
 speaking, to believe that which involves a contradiction, 
 or has no meaning in it, is impossible : and whether 
 the foregoing expressions are not of that sort, I refer it 
 to the impartial examination of the reader. In one sense 
 indeed men may be said to believe that matter exists, 
 that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sen- 
 sations, which affects them every moment, and is so 
 nearly present to them, were some senseless unthinking 
 being. But that they should clearly apprehend any 
 meaning marked by those words, and form thereof a 
 settled speculative opinion, is what I am not able to con- 
 ceive. This is not the only instance wherein men im- 
 pose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those 
 propositions they have often heard, though at bottom 
 they have no meaning in them. 
 
 LV. But, Secondly, Though we should grant a notion 
 to be ever so universally and steadfastly adhered to, yet 
 this is but a weak argument of its truth, to whoever con- 
 siders what a vast number of prejudices and false opinions 
 are every where embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, 
 by the unreflecting (which are the far greater) part of 
 mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and mo- 
 tion of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurd- 
 ities, even by men of learning : and if it be considered 
 what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, 
 we shall find that at this day those notions have gained 
 but a very inconsiderable footing in the world. 
 
 LVI. But it is demanded, that we assign a cause of 
 this prejudice, and account for its obtaining in the world. 
 To this I answer. That men knowing they perceived se- 
 veral ideas, whereofthey themselveswere not the authors, 
 as not being excited from within, nor depending on the 
 operation of their wills, this made them maintain, those 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 51 
 
 ideas or objects of perception had an existence indepen- 
 dent of, and without the mind, without ever dreaming 
 that a contradiction was involved in those words. But 
 philosophershaving plainly seen, that the immediate ob- 
 jects of perception do not exist without the mind, they 
 in some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar, but 
 at the same time run into another which seems no less 
 absurd, to wit, that there are certain objects really existing 
 without the mind, or having a subsistence distinct from 
 being perceived, of which our ideas are only images or 
 resemblances, imprinted by those objects on the mind. 
 And this notion of the philosophers owes its origin to 
 the same cause with the former, namely, their being con- 
 scious that they were not the authors of their own sen- 
 sations, which they evidently knew were imprinted from 
 without, and which therefore must have some cause dis- 
 tinct from the minds on which they are imprinted. 
 
 LVII. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense 
 to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and not 
 rather have recourse to spirit which alone can act, may 
 be accounted for, first, because they were not aware of 
 the repugnancy there is, as well in supposing things like 
 unto our ideas existing without, as in attributing to them 
 power or activity. Secondly, because the supreme Spirit 
 which excites those ideas in our minds, is not marked 
 out and limited to our view by any particular finite col- 
 lection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their 
 size, complexion, limbs, and motions. And thirdly* 
 because his operations are regular and uniform. When- 
 ever the course of nature is interrupted by a miracle, 
 men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. 
 But when we see things go on in the ordinary course, 
 they do not excite in us any reflection : their order and 
 concatenation, though it be an argument of the greatest 
 wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet so 
 constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them 
 the immediate effects of a free Spirit : especially since in*- 
 
52 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 constancy and mutability in acting, though it be an im- 
 perfection, is looked as a mark of freedom. 
 
 LVIII, Tenthly, It will be objected, that the notions 
 we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths 
 in philosophy and mathematics. For example, the mo- 
 tion of the earth is now universally admitted by astro- 
 nomers, as a truth grounded on the clearest and most 
 convincing reasons; but on the foregoing principles, 
 there can be no such thing. For motion being only an 
 idea, it follows that if it be not perceived, it exists not ; 
 but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I 
 answer, that tenet, if rightly understood, will be found 
 to agree with the principles we have premised : for the 
 question, whether the earth moves or not, amounts in 
 reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have 
 reason to conclude from what hath been observed by as- 
 tronomers, that if we were placed in such and such cir- 
 cumstances, and such or such a position and distance, 
 both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the for- 
 mer to move among the choir of the planets, and ap- 
 pearing in all respects like one of them : and this, by 
 the established rules of nature, which we have no reason 
 to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the phenomena. 
 
 LIX. We may, from the experience we have had of 
 the train and succession of ideas in our minds, often 
 make, I will not say uncertain conjectures, but sure and 
 well-grounded predictions, concerning the ideas we shall 
 be affected with, pursuant to a great train of actions, and 
 be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have 
 appeared to us, in case we were in circumstances very 
 different from those we are in at present. Herein con- 
 sists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve its 
 use and certainty very consistently with what has been 
 said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections 
 of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the 
 stars, or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature. 
 
 LX. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded, to 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 53 
 
 what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, 
 and the admirable mechanism in the parts of animals ; 
 might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth leaves and 
 blossoms, and animals perform all their motions, as well 
 without as with all that variety of internal parts so ele- 
 gantly contrived and put together, which being ideas 
 have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have 
 any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to 
 them ? If it be a spirit that immediately produces every 
 effect by a Jiat, or act of his will, we must think all that 
 is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or na- 
 ture, to be made in vain. By this doctrine, though an 
 artist hath made the spring and wheels, and every move- 
 ment of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner 
 as he knew would produce the motions he designed ; yet 
 he must think all this done to no purpose, and that it is 
 an intelligence which directs the index, and points to the 
 hour of the day. If so, why may not the intelligence do 
 it, without his being at the pains of making the move- 
 ments, and putting them together ? Why does not an 
 empty case serve as well as another ? And how comes it 
 to pass, that whenever there is any fault in the going of 
 a watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be 
 found in the movements, which being mended by a skil- 
 ful hand, all is right again ? The like may be said of all 
 the clock-work of nature, great part whereof is so won- 
 derfully fine and subtile, as scarce to be discerned by the 
 best microscope. In short it will be asked, how upon 
 our principles any tolerable account can be given, or any 
 final cause assigned, of an innumerable multitude of bo- 
 dies and machines framed with the most exquisite art, 
 which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses 
 assigned them, and serve to explain abundance of phe- 
 nomena. 
 
 LXI. To all which I answer, first, that though there 
 were some difficulties relating to the administration of 
 Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several 
 
54 OP THE PKINCIPLES 
 
 parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing 
 principles, yet this objection could be of small weight 
 against the truth and certainty of those things which may 
 be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence. Secondly, 
 But neither are the received principles free from the like 
 difficulties ; for it may still be demanded, to what end 
 God should take those round-about methods of effecting 
 things by instruments and machines, which no one can 
 deny might have been effected by the mere command of 
 his will, without all that apparatus ; nay, if we narrowly 
 consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted 
 with great force on those who hold the existence of those 
 machines without the mind ; for it has been made evi- 
 dent, that solidity, bulk, figure, motion, and the like, 
 have no activity or efficacy in them, so as to be capable 
 of producing any one effect in nature. See sect. xxv. 
 Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing the 
 supposition possible) when they are not perceived, does 
 it manifestly to no purpose ; since the only use that is 
 assigned to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they 
 produce those perceivable effects, which in truth cannot 
 be ascribed to any thing but spirit. 
 
 LXII. But to come nearer the difficulty, it must be 
 observed, that though the fabrication of all those parts 
 and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing 
 any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things 
 in a constant, regular way, according to the laws of na- 
 ture. There are certain general laws that run through 
 the whole chain of natural effects : these are learned by 
 the observation and study of nature, and are by men 
 applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use 
 and ornament of life, as to the explaining the various 
 phenomena: which explication consists only in shewing 
 the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the 
 general laws of nature, or which is the same thing, in 
 discovering the uniformity there is in the production of 
 natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall at- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 55 
 
 tend to the several instances, wherein philosophers pre- 
 tend to account for appearances. That there is a great 
 and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods 
 of working observed by the supreme Agent, hath been 
 shewn in sect. xxxi. And it is no less visible, that a par- 
 ticular size* figure, motion, and disposition of parts, are 
 necessary, though not absolutely to the producing any 
 effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing 
 mechanical laws of nature. Thus for instance, it can- 
 not be denied that God, or the intelligence which sus- 
 tains and rules the ordinary course of things, might, if ha 
 were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions 
 on the dial-plate of a watch, though nobody had ever 
 made the movements, and put them in it : but yet if he 
 will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism, by him for 
 wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it 
 is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, where- 
 by he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, 
 precede the production of the aforesaid motions ; as also 
 that any disorder in them be attended with the percep- 
 tion of some corresponding disorder in the movements, 
 which being once corrected all is right again. 
 
 LXIII. It may indeed on some occasions be neces- 
 sary, that the Author of nature display his overruling 
 power in producing some appearance out of his ordinary 
 series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules 
 of nature are proper to surprise and awe men into an 
 acknowledgment of the Divine Being : but then they are 
 to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason 
 why they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems 
 to choose the convincing our reason of his attributes by 
 the works of nature, which discover so much harmony 
 and contrivance in their make, and are such plain indica- 
 tion of wisdom and beneficence in their author, rather 
 than to astonish us into a belief of his being by anoma- 
 lous and surprising events. 
 
 LXIV. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I 
 
56 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 shall observe that what has been objected in sect. lx. 
 amounts in reality to no more than this : ideas are not 
 any how and at random produced, there being a certain 
 order and connexion between them, like to that of cause 
 and effect : there are also several combinations of them, 
 made in a very regular and artificial manner, which seem 
 like so many instruments in the hand of nature, that, 
 being hid as it were behind the scenes, have a secret 
 operation in producing those appearances which are seen 
 on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible 
 only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But since 
 one idea cannot be the cause of another, to what pur- 
 pose is that connexion ? And since those instruments, 
 being barely inefficacious perceptions in the mind, are not 
 subservient to the production of natural effects ; it is 
 demanded why they are made, or, in other words, what 
 reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon 
 a close inspection into his works, behold so great variety 
 of ideas, so artfully laid together, and so much accord- 
 ing to rule ; it not being credible, that he would be at 
 the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and re- 
 gularity to no purpose ? 
 
 LXV. To all which my answer is, first, that the 
 connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause 
 and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing 
 signified. The fire which I see is not the cause of the 
 pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark 
 that forewarns me of it. In like manner, the noise that 
 I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision 
 of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, 
 the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, 
 artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that 
 for combining letters into words. That a few original 
 ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects 
 and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined 
 together : and to the end their use be permanent and 
 universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 57 
 
 with wise contrivance. By this means abundance of in- 
 formation is conveyed unto us concerning what we are 
 to expect from such and such actions, and what me- 
 thods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and 
 such ideas : which in effect is all that I conceive to be 
 distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the 
 figure, texture, and mechanism, of the inward parts of 
 bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to 
 know the several uses and properties depending thereon, 
 or the nature of the thing. 
 
 LXVI. Hence it is evident, that those things which 
 under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring 
 to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, 
 and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally 
 explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned 
 them, when they are considered only as marks or signs 
 for our information. And it is the searching after, and 
 endeavouring to understand, those signs instituted by 
 the Author of nature, that ought to be the employment 
 of the natural philosopher, and not the pretending to 
 explain things by corporeal causes ; which doctrine 
 seems to have too much estranged the minds of men 
 from that active Principle, that supreme and wise Spirit, 
 “ in whom we live, move, and have our being.” 
 
 LXVI I. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be ob- 
 jected, that though it be clear from what has been said, 
 that there can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, 
 extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing 
 without the mind, such as philosophers describe matter ; 
 yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of matter , the 
 positive ideas of extension, figure, solidity, and motion, 
 and say that he means only by that word, an inert 
 senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or 
 unperceived, which is the occasion of our ideas, or at 
 the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in 
 us ; it doth not appear, but that matter taken in this 
 sense may possibly exist. In answer to which I say, first, 
 
53 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 that it seems no less absurd to suppose a substance with- 
 out accidents, than it is to suppose accidents without a 
 substance. But secondly, though we should grant this 
 unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it 
 be supposed to be ? That it exists not in the mind is 
 agreed, and that it exists not in place is no less certain ; 
 since all extension exists only in the mind, as hath been 
 already proved. It remains therefore that it exists no 
 where at all. 
 
 LXVIII. Let us examine a little the description that 
 is here given us of matter. It neither acts, nor per- 
 ceives, nor is perceived : for this is all that is meant by 
 saying it is an inert, senseless, unknown substance; 
 which is a definition entirely made up of negatives, ex- 
 cepting only the relative notion of its standing under or 
 supporting : but then it must be observed, that it sup- 
 ports nothing at all ; and how nearly this comes to the 
 description of a nonentity, I desire may be considered. 
 But, say you, it is the unknown occasion , at the presence 
 of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. 
 Now I would fain know' how any thing can be present 
 to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflec- 
 tion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, 
 nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in 
 any place. The words to be present, when thus applied, 
 must needs be taken in some abstract and strange mean- 
 ing, and which I am not able to comprehend. 
 
 LXIX. Again, let us examine what is meant by oc- 
 casion : so far as I can gather from the common use of 
 language, that word signifies, either the agent which 
 produces any effect, or else something that is observed 
 to accompany, or go before it, in the ordinary course of 
 things. But when it is applied to matter as above de- 
 scribed, it can be taken in neither of those senses. For 
 matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be 
 an agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as 
 being devoid of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 59 
 
 the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense : as 
 when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of 
 the pain that attends it. What therefore can be meant 
 by calling matter an occasion ? this term is either used 
 in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its 
 received signification. 
 
 LXX. You will perhaps say that matter, though it be 
 not pereived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to 
 whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds. 
 For, say you, since we observe our sensations to be im- 
 printed in an orderly and constant manner, it is but rea- 
 sonable to suppose there are certain constant and regu- 
 lar occasions of their being produced. That is to say, 
 that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of 
 matter corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do 
 not excite them in our minds, or anyways immediately af- 
 fect us, as being altogether passive and unperceivable to 
 us, they are nevertheless to God, by whom they are per- 
 ceived, as it were so many occasions to remind him 
 when and what ideas to imprint on our minds : that so 
 things may go on in a constant uniform manner. 
 
 LXXI. In answer to this I observe, that as the no- 
 tion of matter is here stated, the question is no longer 
 concerning the existence of a thing distinct from spirit 
 and idea, from perceiving and being perceived : but 
 whether there are not certain ideas, of I know not what 
 sort, in the mind of God, which are so many marks or 
 notes that direct him how to produce sensations in our 
 minds, in a constant and regular method ; much after 
 the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes 
 of music to produce that harmonious train and composi- 
 tion of sound, which is called a tune ; though they who 
 hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be 
 entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of matter 
 seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Be- 
 sides, it is in effect no objection against what we have 
 advanced, to wit, that there is no senseless unperceived 
 substance. 
 
(50 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 LXXII. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, 
 from the constant uniform method of our sensations, 
 collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who ex- 
 cites them in our minds. But this is all that I can see 
 reasonably concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is 
 evident, that the being of a Spirit infinitely ivise, good, 
 and powerful, is abundantly sufficient to explain all the 
 appearances of nature. But as for inert senseless matter , 
 nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion 
 with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would 
 fain see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon 
 in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though 
 in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for 
 its existence ; or even make any tolerable sense or 
 meaning of that supposition. For as to its being an occa- 
 sion, we have, I think, evidently shewn, that with regard 
 to us it is no occasion : it remains therefore that it must 
 be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us ; 
 and what this amounts to we have just now seen. 
 
 LXXIII. It is worth while to reflect a little on the 
 motives which induced men to suppose the existence of 
 material substance ; that so having observed the gradual 
 ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons, we 
 may proportionably withdraw the assent that was ground- 
 ed on them. First therefore, it was thought that colour, 
 figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities or 
 accidents, did really exist without the mind ; and for 
 this reason, it seemed needful to suppose some unthink- 
 ing substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since 
 they could not be conceived to exist by themselves. 
 Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced 
 that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible secon- 
 dary qualities, had no existence without the mind, they 
 stripped this substratum or material substance of those 
 qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, 
 and such like, which they still conceived to exist with- 
 out the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a 
 material support. But it having been shewn, that none, 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 01 
 
 even of these, can possibly exist otherwise than in a 
 spirit or mind which perceives them, it follows that we 
 have no longer any reason to suppose the being of mat- 
 ter . Nay, that it is utterly impossible there should be 
 any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote 
 an unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents, 
 wherein they exist without the mind. 
 
 LXXIV. But though it be allowed by the materialists 
 themselves, that matter was thought of only for the 
 sake of supporting accidents ; and the reason entirely 
 ceasing, one might expect themind should naturally, and 
 without any reluctance at all, quit the belief of what was 
 solely grounded thereon; yet the prejudice is rivetted 
 so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how 
 to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing 
 itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name ; which 
 we apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite 
 notions of being or occasion, though without any show of 
 reason, at least so far as I can see. For what is there on 
 our part, or what do we perceive amongst all the ideas, 
 sensations, notions, which are imprinted on our minds, 
 either by sense or reflection, from whence may be inferred 
 the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occa- 
 sion ? and on the other hand, on the part of an all-suffi- 
 cient Spirit, what can there be that should make us be- 
 lieve, or even suspect, he is directed by an inert occasion 
 to excite ideas in our minds ? 
 
 LXXV. It is a very extraordinary instance of the 
 force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the 
 mind of man retains so great a fondness against all the 
 evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by 
 the interposition whereof it would, as it were, screen it- 
 self from the providence of God, and remove him far- 
 ther off from the affairs of the world. But though we 
 do the utmost we can, to secure the belief of matter, 
 though when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support 
 our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and 
 
OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 tn 
 
 though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an ima- 
 gination not regulated by reason, to make out that poor 
 possibility , yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain 
 unknoivn ideas in the mind of God; for this, if any thing, 
 is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard 
 to God. And this, at the bottom, is no longer contend- 
 ing for the thing, but for the name. 
 
 LXXVI. Whether therefore there are such ideas in 
 the mind of God, and whether they may be called by 
 name matter, I shall not dispute. But if you stick to the 
 notion of an unthinking substance, or support of exten- 
 sion, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it 
 is most evidently impossible there should be any such 
 thing. Since it is a plain repugnancy, that those qua- 
 lities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving 
 substance. 
 
 LXXVII. But, say you, though it be granted that 
 there is no thoughtless support of extension, and the 
 other qualities or accidents which we perceive ; yet there 
 may, perhaps, be some inert unperceiving substance, or 
 substratum of some other qualities, as incomprehensible 
 to us as colours are to a man born blind, because we 
 have not a sense adapted to them. But if we had a new 
 sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their exist- 
 ence, than a blind man made to see does of the existence 
 of light and colours. I answer, first, if what you mean 
 by the word matter be only the unknown support of un- 
 known qualities, it is no matter whether there is such a 
 thing or not, since it no way concerns us ; and I do not 
 see the advantage there is in disputing about we know 
 not what, and we know not tvhy. 
 
 LXXVIII. But secondly, if we had a new sense, it 
 could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations : and 
 then we should have the same reason against their ex- 
 isting in an unperceiving substance, that has been al- 
 ready offered with relation to figure, motion, colour, and 
 the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn, are nothing else 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 fl.1 
 
 but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a mind per- 
 ceiving them ; and this is true not only of the ideas we 
 are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all pos- 
 sible ideas whatsoever. 
 
 LXXIX. But you will insist, What if I have no rea- 
 son to believe the existence of matter, what if I cannot 
 assign any use to it, or explain any thing by it, or even 
 conceive what is meant by that word ? yet still it is no 
 contradiction to say that matter exists, and that this mat- 
 ter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas ; though, 
 indeed, to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere 
 to any particular explication of those words, may be at- 
 tended with great difficulties. I answer, when words are 
 used without a meaning, you may put them together as 
 you please, without danger of running into a contra- 
 diction. You may say, for example, that twice two is 
 equal to seven, so long as you declare you do not take 
 the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, 
 but for marks of you know not what. And by the same 
 reason you may say, there is an inert thoughtless sub- 
 stance without accidents, which is the occasion of our 
 ideas. And we shall understand just as much by one 
 proposition as the other. ' 
 
 LXXX. In the last place, you will say, What if we 
 give up the cause of material substance, and assert, that 
 matter is an unknown somewhat, neither substance nor 
 accident, spirit nor idea, inert, thoughtless, indivisible, 
 immoveable, unextended, existing in no place? for, say 
 you, whatever may be urged against substance or occasion, 
 or any other positive or relative notion of matter, hath no 
 place at all, so long as this negative definition of matter 
 is adhered to. I answer, you may, if so it shall seem 
 good, use the word matter in the same sense that other 
 men use nothing, and so make those terms convertible 
 in your style. For after all, this is what appears to me 
 to be the result of that definition; the parts whereof when 
 I consider with attention, either collectively or separate 
 
64 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 from each other, I do not find that there is any kind of 
 effect or impression made on my mind different from 
 what is excited by the term nothing. 
 
 LXXXI. You will reply, perhaps, that in the fore- 
 said definition is included, what doth sufficiently distin- 
 guish it from nothing, the positive, abstractidea of quid- 
 dity, entity , or existence. I own, indeed, that those who 
 pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas, 
 do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say they, 
 the most abstract and general notion of all, that is to me 
 the most incomprehensible of all others. That there 
 are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capa- 
 cities, whose faculties, both in number and extent, are 
 far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed 
 on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me to pretend to 
 determine by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of per- 
 ception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the su- 
 preme Spirit may imprint upon them, were certainly the 
 utmost folly and presumption. Since there may be, for 
 ought that I know, innumerable sorts of ideas or sensa- 
 tions, as different from one another, and from all that I 
 have perceived, as colours are from sounds. But how 
 ready soever I may be, to acknowledge the scantiness of 
 my comprehension, with regard to the endless variety of 
 spirits and ideas, that might possibly exist, yet for any 
 one to pretend to a notion of entity or existence ab- 
 stracted from spirit and idea, from perceiving and being 
 perceived, is, I suspect, a downright repugnancy, and 
 trifling with words. It remains that we consider the 
 objections, which may possibly be made on the part of 
 religion. 
 
 LXXXII. Some there are who think, that though 
 the arguments for the real existence of bodies, which 
 are drawn from reason, be allowed not to amount to de- 
 monstration, yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the 
 point, as will sufficiently convince every good Christian, 
 that bodies do really exist, and are something more than 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 65 
 
 mere ideas ; there being in holy writ innumerable facts 
 related, which evidently suppose the reality of timber 
 and stone, mountains and rivers, and cities, and human 
 bodies. To which I answer, that no sort of writings 
 whatever, sacred or profane, which use those and the 
 like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have a 
 meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth 
 called in question by our doctrine. That all those things 
 do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporeal sub- 
 stances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn 
 to be agreeable to our principles : and the difference be- 
 twixt things and ideas , realities and chimeras , has been 
 distinctly explained.* And I do not think, that either 
 what philosophers call matter, or the existence of objects 
 without the mind, is any where mentioned in Scripture. 
 
 LXXXIII. Again, whether there be or be not ex- 
 ternal things, it is agreed on all hands, that the proper use 
 of words, is the marking our conceptions, or things only 
 as they are known and perceived by us ; whence it plainly 
 follows, that in the tenets we have laid down, there is 
 nothing inconsistent with the right use and significancy 
 of language, and that discourse of what kind soever, so 
 far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this 
 seems so manifest, from what hath been set forth in the 
 premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it. 
 
 LXXXIV. But it will be urged, that miracles do, at 
 least, lose much of their stress and import by our prin- 
 ciples. What must we think of Moses’s rod, was it not 
 really turned into a serpent, or was there only a change 
 of ideas in the minds of the spectators ? And can it be 
 supposed, that our Saviour did no more at the marriage- 
 feast in Cana, than impose on the sight, and smell, and 
 taste, of the guests, so as to create in them the appearance 
 or idea only of wine ? The same may be said of all other 
 miracles: which, in consequence of the foregoing princi- 
 
 * Sect. xxix. xxx. xxxiii. xxxvi. &c. 
 
 F 
 
66 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 pies, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or 
 illusions of fancy. To this I reply, that the rod was 
 changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. 
 That this doth not, in the least, contradict what I have 
 elsewhere said, will be evident from sect, xxxiv. and 
 xxxv. But this business of real and imaginary hath been 
 already so plainly and fully explained, and so often re- 
 ferred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily an- 
 swered from what hath gone before, that it were an affront 
 to the reader’s understanding, to resume the explication 
 of it in this place. I shall only observe, that if at table 
 all who were present should see, and smell, and taste, and 
 drink wine, and find the effects of it, with me there could 
 be no doubt of its reality. So that at bottom, the scruple 
 concerning real miracles hath no place at all on ours, 
 but only on the received principles, and consequently 
 maketh rather for than against what hath been said. 
 
 LXXXV. Having done with the objections, which 
 I endeavoured to propose in the clearest light, and given 
 them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the 
 next place to take a view of our tenets in their conse- 
 quences. Some of these appear at first sight, as that se- 
 veral difficult and obscure questions, on which abundance 
 of speculation hath been thrown away, are entirely ba- 
 nished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance 
 can think ? whether matter be infinitely divisible ? and 
 how it operates on spirit ? these and the like inquiries 
 have given infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages. 
 But depending on the existence of matter , they have no 
 longer any place on our principles. Many other advan- 
 tages there are, as well with regard to religion as the 
 sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce from 
 what hath been premised. But this will appear more 
 plainly in the sequel. 
 
 LXXXVI. From the principles we have laid down, 
 it follows, human knowledge may naturally be reduced to 
 two heads , that of ideas, and that of spirits. Of each of 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 67 
 
 these I shall treat in order. And first as to ideas or un- 
 thinking things, our knowledge of these hath been very 
 much obscured and confounded, and we have been led 
 into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold ex- 
 istence of the objects of sense, the one intelligible or in 
 the mind, the other real and without the mind ; where- 
 by unthinking things are thought to have a natural sub- 
 sistence of their own, distinct from being perceived by 
 spirits. This which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn 
 to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very 
 root of scepticism ; for so long as men thought that real 
 things subsisted without the mind, and that their know- 
 ledge was only so far forth real as it was conformable to 
 real things, it follows, they could not be certain that they 
 had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known, 
 that the things which are perceived, are comformable to 
 those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind? 
 
 LXXXVII. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and 
 the like, considered only as so many sensations in the 
 mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them 
 which is not perceived. But if they are looked on as 
 notes or images referred to things or archetypes exist- 
 ing without the mind, then we are involved all in 
 scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the 
 real qualities, of things. What may be the exten- 
 sion, figure, or motion, of any thing really and abso- 
 lutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but 
 only the proportion or the relation they bear to our 
 senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and 
 which of them, or even whether any of them at all, re- 
 present the true quality really existing in the thing, it is 
 out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we 
 know, all we see, hear, and feel, may be only phantom 
 and vain chimera, and not at all agree with the real things 
 existing in rerum natura. All this scepticism follows, 
 from our supposing a difference between things and ideas, 
 and that the former have a subsistence without the mind, 
 
63 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject, 
 and shew how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages 
 depend on the supposition of external objects. 
 
 LXXXVIII. So long as we attribute a real existence 
 to unthinking things, distinct from their being perceived, 
 it is not only impossible for us to know with evidence 
 the nature of any real unthinking being, but even that 
 it exists. Hence it is, that we see philosophers dis- 
 trust their senses, and doubt of the existence of heaven 
 and earth, of every thing they see or feel, even of their 
 own bodies. And after all their labour and struggle of 
 thought, they are forced to own, we cannot attain to any 
 self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence 
 of sensible things. But all this doubtfulness, which so 
 bewilders and confounds the mind, and makes philosophy 
 ridiculous in the eyes of the world, vanishes if we annex 
 a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves 
 with the terms absolute, external, exist, and such-like, 
 signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of 
 my own being, as of the being of those things which I 
 actually perceive by sense : it being a manifest contra- 
 diction, that any sensible object should be immediately 
 perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have 
 no existence in nature, since the very existence of an un- 
 thinking being consists in being perceived. 
 
 LXXXIX. Nothing seems of more importance, to- 
 wards erecting a firm system of sound and real know- 
 ledge, which may be proof against the assaults of scep- 
 ticism, than to lay the beginning in a distinct explica- 
 tion of what is meant by thing, reality, existence : for in 
 vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of 
 things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as 
 we have not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing 
 or being is the most general name of all; it comprehends 
 under it two kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous, 
 and which have nothing common but the name, to wit, 
 spirits and ideas. The former are active indivisible, sub- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 69 
 
 stances : the latter are inert, fleeting , dependent beings, 
 which subsist not by themselves, but are supported by, or 
 exist in, minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend 
 our own existence by inward feeling or reflection, and 
 that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have 
 some knowledge or notion of our own minds, of spirits 
 and active beings, whereof in a strict sense we have not 
 ideas. In like manner we know and have a notion of 
 relations between things or ideas, which relations are 
 distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the 
 latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the 
 former. To me it seems that ideas, spirits, and relations, 
 are, all in their respective kinds, the object of human 
 knowledge and subject of discourse : and that the term 
 idea would be improperly extended to signify every thing 
 we know or have any notion of. 
 
 XC. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, 
 or do really exist ; this we do not deny, but we deny 
 they can subsist without the minds which perceive 
 them, or that they are resemblances of any archetypes 
 existing without the mind : since the very being of a 
 sensation or idea consists in being perceived, and an 
 idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the 
 things perceived by sense may be termed external, with 
 regard to their origin, in that they are not generated 
 from within, by the mind itself, but imprinted by a spi- 
 rit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible 
 objects may likewise be said to be without the mind, in 
 another sense, namely, when they exist in some other 
 mind. Thus when I shut my eyes, the things I saw 
 may still exist, but it must be in another mind. 
 
 XCI. It were a mistake to think, that what is here 
 said derogates in the least from the reality of things. It 
 is acknowledged on the received principles, that exten- 
 sion, motion, and in a word all sensible qualities, have 
 need of a support, as not being able to subsist by them- 
 selves. But the objects perceived by sense, are allowed 
 
70 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 to be nothing but combinations of those qualities, and 
 consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far 
 it is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things 
 perceived by sense, an existence independent of a sub- 
 stance, or support wherein they may exist, we detract 
 nothing from the received opinion of their reality , and 
 are guilty of no innovation in that respect. All the 
 difference is, that according to us the unthinking beings 
 perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being 
 perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other sub- 
 stance, than those unextended, indivisible substances, or 
 spirits, which act, and think, and perceive them : 
 whereas philosophers vulgarly hold, that the sensible 
 qualities exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving sub- 
 stance, which they call matter, to which they attribute a 
 natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or 
 distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, 
 even the eternal mind of the Creator, wherein they sup- 
 pose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by 
 him : if indeed they allow them to be at all created. 
 
 XCII. For as we have shewn the doctrine of matter 
 or corporeal substance, to have been the main pillar and 
 support of scepticism, so likewise upon the same foun- 
 dation have been raised all the impious schemes of 
 Atheism and irreligion. Nay, so great a difficulty hath 
 it been thought, to conceive matter produced out of no- 
 thing, that the most celebrated among the ancient phi- 
 losophers, even of these who maintained the being of a 
 God, have thought matter to be uncreated, and coeter- 
 nal with him. How great a friend material substance 
 hath been to Atheists in all ages, were needless to relate. 
 All their monstrous systems have so visible and neces- 
 sary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone 
 is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but 
 fall to the ground ; insomuch that it is no longer worth 
 while to bestow a particular consideration on the ab- 
 surdities of every wretched sect of Atheists. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 71 
 
 XCfll. That impious and profane persons should 
 readily fall in with those systems which favour their in- 
 clinations, by deriding immaterial substance, and sup- 
 posing the soul to be divisible and subject to corruption 
 as the body ; which exclude all freedom, intelligence, 
 and design, from the formation of things, and instead 
 thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking sub- 
 stance, the root and origin of all beings : — that they 
 should hearken to those who deny a Providence or in- 
 spection of a superior mind over the affairs of the world, 
 attributing the whole series of events either to blind 
 chance or fatal necessity, arising from the impulse of 
 one body on another : — all this is very natural. And 
 on the other hand, when men of better principles ob- 
 serve the enemies of religion lay so great a stress on un- 
 thinking matter, and all of them use so much industry 
 and artifice to reduce every thing to it ; methinks they 
 should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand sup- 
 port, and driven from that only fortress, without which 
 your Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even 
 the shadow of a pretence, but become the most cheap 
 and easy triumph in the world. 
 
 XCIV. The existence of matter, or bodies unper- 
 ceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists 
 and fatalists, but on the same principle doth idolatry 
 likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but 
 consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and every other 
 object of the senses, are only so many sensations in their 
 minds, which have no other existence but barely being 
 perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and 
 worship their own ideas ; but rather address their ho- 
 mage to that eternal invisible Mind which pro- 
 duces and sustains all things. 
 
 XCV. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself 
 with the articles of our faith, hath occasioned no small 
 difficulties to Christians. For example, about the re- 
 surrection, how many scruples and objections have been 
 
72 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 raised by Socinians and others ! But do not the most 
 plausible of them depend on the supposition, that a 
 body is denominated the same , with regard not to the 
 form or that which is perceived by sense, but the ma- 
 terial substance which remains the same under several 
 forms ? Take away this material substance, about the 
 identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body 
 what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to 
 wit, that which is immediately seen and felt, which is 
 only a combination of sensible qualities, or ideas ; and 
 then their unanswerable objections come to nothing. 
 
 XCVI. Matter being once expelled out of nature, 
 drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, 
 such an incredible number of disputes and puzzling 
 questions, which have been thorns in the sides of di- 
 vines as well as philosophers, and made so much fruit- 
 less work for mankind ; that if the arguments we have 
 produced against it, are not found equal to demonstra- 
 tion (as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all 
 friends to knowledge, peace, and religion, have reason to 
 wish they were. 
 
 XCVII. Beside the external existence of the ob- 
 jects of perception, another great source of errors and 
 difficulties, with regard to ideal knowledge, is the doc- 
 trine of abstract ideas, such as it hath been set forth in 
 the Introduction. The plainest things in the world, 
 those we are most intimately acquainted with, and per- 
 fectly know, when they are considered in an abstract 
 way, appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. 
 Time, place, and motion, taken in particular or concrete, 
 are what every body knows ; but having passed through 
 the hands of a metaphysician, they become too abstract 
 and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. 
 Bid your servant meet you at such a time, in such a 
 place, and he shall never stay to deliberate on the mean- 
 ing of those words : in conceiving that particular time 
 and place, or the motion by which he is to get thither. 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 73 
 
 he finds not the least difficulty. But if time be taken, 
 exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that di- 
 versify the day, merely for the continuation of existence, 
 or duration in abstract, then it will perhaps gravel even 
 a philosopher to comprehend it. 
 
 XCVIII. Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea 
 of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my 
 mind, which flows uniformly, and is participated by all 
 beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable diffi- 
 culties. I have no notion of it at all, only I hear others 
 say, it is infinitely divisible, and speak of it in such a 
 manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my ex- 
 istence : since that doctrine lays one under an absolute 
 necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innu- 
 merable ages without a thought, or else that he is an- 
 nihilated every moment of his life : both which seem 
 equally absurd. Time therefore being nothing, abstract- 
 ed from the succession of ideas in our minds, it follows 
 that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated 
 by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other 
 in that same spirit or mind. Hence it is a plain conse- 
 quence that the soul always thinks : and in truth who- 
 ever shall go about to divide in his thoughts, or abstract 
 the existence of a spirit from its cogitation , will, I believe, 
 find it no easy task. 
 
 XCIX. So likewise, when we attempt to abstract ex- 
 tension and motion from all other qualities, and consi- 
 der by themselves, we presently lose sight of them, and 
 run into great extravagances ; all which depend on a 
 twofold abstraction : first, it is supposed that extension, 
 for example, may be abstracted from all other sensible 
 qualities ; and, secondly, that the entity of extension may 
 be abstracted from its being perceived. But whoever shall 
 reflect, and take care to understand what he says, will, 
 if I mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities 
 are alike sensations, and alike real ; that where the ex- 
 tension is, there is the colour too, to wit, in his mind, 
 
74 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 and that their archetypes can exist only in some other 
 mind : and that the objects of sense are nothing but 
 those sensations combined, blended, or (if one may so 
 speak) concreted together : none of all which can be 
 supposed to exist unperceived. 
 
 C. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object of 
 good, every one may think he knows. But to frame an 
 abstract idea of happiness, prescinded from all particular 
 pleasure, or of goodness, from every thing that is good, 
 this is what few can pretend to. So likewise, a man 
 may be just and virtuous, without having precise ideas 
 of justice and virtue. The opinion that those and the 
 like words stand for general notions abstracted from all 
 particular persons and actions, seems to have rendered 
 morality difficult, and the study thereof of less use to 
 mankind. And in effect, the doctrine of abstraction has 
 not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful 
 parts of knowledge. 
 
 Cl. The two great provinces of speculative science, 
 conversant about ideas received from sense and their 
 relations, are natural philosophy and mathematics ; with 
 regard to each of these I shall make some observations. 
 And first, I shall say somewhat of natural philosophy. 
 On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph : all that 
 stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our fa- 
 culties, and make mankind appear ignorant and low, are 
 drawn principally from this head, to wit, that we are un- 
 der an invincible blindness as to the true and real nature 
 of things. This they exaggerate, and love to enlarge 
 on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, 
 and amused only with the outside and show of things. 
 The real essence, the internal qualities, and constitution 
 of every the meanest object, is hid from our view ; some- 
 thing there is in every drop of water, every grain of 
 sand, which it is beyond the power of human understand- 
 ing to fathom or comprehend. But it is evident from 
 what has been shewn, that all this complaint is ground- 
 
GP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 75 
 
 less; and that we are influenced by false principles to 
 that degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know 
 nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend. 
 
 CII. One great inducement to our pronouncing our- 
 selves ignorant of the nature of things, is the current 
 opinion that every thing includes within itself the cause 
 of its properties : or that there is in each object an in- 
 ward essence, which is the source whence its discernible 
 qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some have 
 pretended to account for appearances by occult quali- 
 ties, but of late they are mostly resolved into mechani- 
 cal causes ; to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and such- 
 like qualities, of insensible particles : whereas in truth, 
 there is no other agent or efficient cause than spirit, it be- 
 ing evident that motion, as well as all other ideas, is per- 
 fectly inert. (See sect. xxv.J Hence, to endeavour to ex- 
 plain the production of colours or sounds by figure, mo- 
 tion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in 
 vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind 
 are not at all satisfactory. Which may be said in gene- 
 ral of those instances, wherein one idea or quality is as- 
 signed for the cause of another. I need not say how 
 many hypotheses and speculations are left out, and how 
 much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine. 
 
 CIII. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is 
 attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea 
 swells towards the moon, may to some appear suffi- 
 ciently explained thereby. But how are we enlightened 
 by being told this is done by attraction ? Is it that that 
 word signifies the manner of the tendency, and that it 
 is by the mutual drawing of bodies, instead of their 
 being impelled or protruded towards each other ? But 
 nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it 
 may as truly (for aught we know) be termed impulse or 
 protrusion as attraction. Again, the parts of steel we 
 see cohere firmly together, and this also is accounted for 
 by attraction ; but in this, as in the other instances, I do 
 
76 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 not perceive thatany thing is signified besides the effect 
 itself ; for as to the manner of the action whereby it is 
 produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not 
 so much as aimed at. 
 
 CIV. Indeed if we take a view of the several pheno- 
 mena, and compare them together, we may observe some 
 likeness and conformity between them. For example, 
 in the falling of a stone to the ground, in the rising of 
 the sea towards the moon, in cohesion and crystalization, 
 there is something alike, namely a union or mutual 
 approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the 
 like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to 
 a man who hath nicely observed and compared the ef- 
 fects of nature. For that only is thought so which is 
 uncommon, or a thing by itself, and out of the ordinary 
 course of our observation. That bodies should tend 
 towards the centre of the earth, is not thought strange, 
 because it is what we perceive every moment of our 
 lives. But that they should have a like gravitation to- 
 wards the centre of the moon, may seem odd and unac- 
 countable to most men, because it is discerned only in 
 the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts take in a 
 larger compass of nature, having observed a certain simi- 
 litude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, 
 that argue innumerable bodies to have a mutual tend- 
 ency towards each other, which he denotes by the general 
 name attraction, whatever can be reduced to that he thinks 
 justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the 
 attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, 
 which to him doth not appear odd or anomalous, but only 
 a particular example of a general rule or law of nature. 
 
 CV. If therefore we consider the difference there is 
 betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard 
 to their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it 
 consists, not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient 
 cause that produces them, for that can be no other than 
 the will of a spirit , but only in a greater largeness of 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 77 
 
 comprehension ; whereby analogies, harmonies, and 
 agreements, are discovered in the works of nature, and 
 the particular effects explained ; that is, reduced to ge- 
 neral rules, (see sect. Ixii.) which rules, grounded on the 
 analogy and uniformness observed in the production of 
 natural effects, are most agreeable, and sought after by 
 the mind ; for that they extend our prospect beyond 
 what is present and near to us, and enable us to make 
 very probable conjectures touching things that may 
 have happened at very great distances of time and place, 
 as well as to predict things to come ; which sort of en- 
 deavour towards omniscience, is much affected by the 
 mind. 
 
 CVI. But we should proceed warily in such things : 
 for we are apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, 
 to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of mind 
 whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into ge- 
 neral theorems. For example, gravitation or mutual 
 attraction, because it appears in many instances, some 
 are straightway for pronouncing universal ; and that to 
 attract, and be attracted by every other body, is an essen- 
 tial quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it 
 appears the fixed stars have no such tendency towards 
 each other : and so far is that gravitation from being 
 essential to bodies, that in some instances a quite con- 
 trary principle seems to shew itself : as in the perpen- 
 dicular growth of plants and the elasticity of the air. 
 There is nothing necessary or essential in the case, but 
 it depends entirely on the will of the governing spirit, 
 who causes certain bodies to cleave together, or tend 
 towards each other, according to various laws, whilst he 
 keeps others at a fixed distance ; and to some he gives 
 a quite contrary tendency to fly asunder, just as he sees 
 convenient. 
 
 CVII. After what has been premised, I think we may 
 lay down the following conclusions. First, it is plain 
 philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they in- 
 
78 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 quire for any natural efficient cause distinct from a mind 
 or spirit. Secondly, considering the whole creation is 
 the workmanship of a wise and good agent , it should 
 seem to become philosophers, to employ their thoughts 
 (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of 
 things : and I must confess, I see no reason, why point- 
 ing out the various ends to which natural things are 
 adapted, and for which they were originally with un- 
 speakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought 
 one good way of accounting for them, and altogether 
 worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what hath been 
 premised no reason can be drawn, why the history of 
 nature should not still be studied ; and observations and 
 experiments made, which, that they are of use to man- 
 kind, and enable us to draw any conclusions, is not the 
 result of any immutable habitudes, or relations between 
 things themselves, but only of God’s goodness and kind- 
 ness to men in the administration of the world. (See sect, 
 xxx. and xxxi.) Fourthly, by a diligent observation of 
 the phenomena within our view, we may discover the 
 general laws of nature, and from them deduce the other 
 phenomena, I do not say demonstrate ; for all deduc- 
 tions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Au- 
 thor of nature always operates uniformly, and in a con- 
 stant observance of those rules we take for principles : 
 which we cannot evidently know. 
 
 CVTII. Those men who frame general rules from the 
 phenomena, and afterwards derive the phenomena from 
 these rules, seem to consider signs rather than causes. 
 A man may well understand natural signs without know- 
 ing their analogy, or being able to say by what rule a 
 thing is so or so. And as it is very possible to write im- 
 properly, through too strict an observance of general 
 grammar-rules ; so in arguing from general rules of 
 nature, it is not impossible we may extend the analogy 
 too far, and by that means run into mistakes. 
 
 CIX. As in reading other books, a wise man will 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 79 
 
 choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to 
 use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks 
 on the language ; so in perusing the volume of nature, 
 it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an 
 exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to ge- 
 neral rules, or shewing how it follows from them. We 
 should propose to ourselves nobler views, such as to re- 
 create and exalt the mind, with a prospect of the beauty, 
 order, extent, and variety, of natural things : hence, by 
 proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the gran- 
 deur, wisdom, and beneficence, of the Creator: and 
 lastly, to make several parts of the creation, so far as in 
 us lies, subservient to the ends they were designed for ; 
 God’s glory, and the sustentation and comfort of our- 
 selves and fellow-creatures. 
 
 CX. The best key for the aforesaid analogy, or na- 
 tural science, will be easily acknowledged to be a certain 
 celebrated treatise of mechanics : in the entrance of 
 which justly-admired treatise, time, space, and motion, 
 are distinguished into absolute and relative, true and ap- 
 parent, mathematical and vulgar : which distinction, as 
 it is at large explained by the author, doth suppose those 
 quantities to have an existence without the mind : and 
 that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sen- 
 sible things, to which nevertheless, in their own nature, 
 they bear no relation at all. 
 
 CXI. As for time, as it is there taken in an absolute 
 or abstracted sense, for the duration or perseverance of 
 the existence of things, I have nothing more to add con- 
 cerning it, after what hath been already said on that sub- 
 ject, sect, xcvii. and xcviii. For the rest, this celebrated 
 author holds there is an absolute space, which, being 
 unpereeivable to sense, remains in itself similar and im- 
 moveable : and relative space to be the measure thereof, 
 which being moveable, and defined by its situation in 
 respect of sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immove- 
 able space. Place he defines to be that part of space 
 
80 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 which is occupied by any body. And according as the 
 space is absolute or relative, so also is the place. Ab- 
 solute motion is said to be the translation of a body from 
 absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is 
 from one relative place to another. And because the 
 parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses, in- 
 stead of them we are obliged to use their sensible mea- 
 sures : and so define both place and motion with respect 
 to bodies, which we regard as immoveable. But it is 
 said, in philosophical matters we must abstract from our 
 senses, since it may be, that none of those bodies which 
 seem to be quiescent, are truly so : and the same thing 
 which is moved relatively, may be really at rest. As 
 likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest 
 and motion, or even moved with contrary relative mo- 
 tions at the same time, according as its place is vari- 
 ously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in 
 the apparent motions, but not at all in the true or ab- 
 solute, which should therefore be alone regarded in phi- 
 losophy. And the true, we are told, are distinguished 
 from apparent or relative motions by the following pro- 
 perties. First, in true or absolute motion, all parts 
 which preserve the same position with respect to the 
 whole, partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, 
 the place being moved, that which is placed therein is 
 also moved : so that a body moving in a place which is 
 in motion, doth participate the motion of its place. 
 Thirdly, true motion is never generated or changed, 
 otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself. 
 Fourthly, true motion is always changed by force im- 
 pressed on the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion 
 barely relative, there is no centrifugal force, which never- 
 theless in that which is true or absolute, is proportional 
 to the quantity of motion. 
 
 CXII. But notwithstanding what hath been said, it 
 doth not appear to me, that there can be any motion 
 other than relative : so that to conceive motion, there 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 81 
 
 must be at least conceived two bodies, whereof the dis- 
 tance or position in regard to each other is varied. 
 Hence, if there was one only body in being, it could not 
 possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea 
 I have of motion doth necessarily include relation. 
 
 CXIII. But though in every motion it be neces- 
 sary to conceive more bodies than one, yet it may be 
 that one only is moved ; namely, that on which the 
 force causing the change of distance is impressed, or, 
 in other words, that to which the action is applied. 
 For however some may define relative motion, so as to 
 term that body moved, which changes its distance from 
 some other body, whether the force or action caus- 
 ing that change were applied to it or no : yet, as relative 
 motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded 
 in the ordinary affairs of life, it should seem that every 
 man of common sense knows what it is, as well as the 
 best philosopher : now I ask any one, whether, in his 
 sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones 
 he passes over may be said to move, because they change 
 distance with his feet ? To me it seems, that though mo- 
 tion includes a relation of one thing to another, yet it is 
 not necessary that each term of the relation be denomi- 
 nated from it. As a man may think of somewhat which 
 doth not think, so a body may be moved to or from an- 
 other body, which is not therefore itself in motion. 
 
 CXIV. As the place happens to be variously defined, 
 the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship 
 may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of 
 the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land : or 
 he may move eastward in respect of the one, and west- 
 ward in respect of the other. In the common affairs of 
 life, men never go beyond the earth to define the place 
 of any body : and what is quiescent in respect of that, is 
 accounted absolutely to be so. But philosophers who 
 have a greater extent of thought, and juster notions of 
 the system of things, discover even the earth itself to be 
 
 G 
 
82 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 moved. In order therefore to fix their notions, they 
 seem to conceive the corporeal world as finite, and the ut- 
 most unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place, 
 whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound our 
 own conceptions, I believe we may find all the absolute 
 motion we can frame an idea of, to be at bottom no other 
 than relative motion thus defined. For as hath been 
 already observed, absolute motion exclusive of all external 
 relation is incomprehensible : and to this kind of re- 
 lative motion all the abovementioned properties, causes, 
 and effects, ascribed to absolute motion, will, if I mistake 
 not, be found to agree. As to what is said of tjae centri- 
 fugal force, that it doth not at all belong to circular rela- 
 tive motion ; 1 do not see how this follows from the ex- 
 periment which is brought to prove it. See Philosophise 
 Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in Schol. Def. viii. 
 For the water in the vessel, at that time wherein it is 
 said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, 
 I think, no motion at all : as is plain from the foregoing 
 section. 
 
 CXV. For to denominate a body moved, it is requi- 
 site, first, that it change its distance or situation with re- 
 gard to some other body ; and, secondly, that the force 
 or action occasioning that change be applied to it. If 
 either of these be wanting, I do not think that agreeable 
 to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, 
 a body can be said to be in motion. I grant, indeed, 
 that it is possible for us to think a body, which we see 
 change itsdistance from some other, to be moved, though 
 it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may 
 be apparent motion) ; but then it is, because the force 
 causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be 
 applied or impressed on that body thought to move : 
 which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing 
 to be in motion which is not, and that is all. 
 
 CXVI. From what hath been said, it follows that 
 the philosophic consideration of motion doth not imply 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 83 
 
 the being of an absolute space, distinct from that which 
 is perceived by sense, and related to bodies : which that 
 it cannot exist without the mind, is clear upon the same 
 principles, that demonstrate the like of all other objects 
 of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall 
 find we cannot even frame an idea or pure space, exclu- 
 sive of all body. This I must confess seems impossible, 
 as being a most abstract idea. When I excite a motion 
 in some part of my body, if it be free or without resist- 
 ance, I say there is space: but if I find a resistance, then I 
 say there is body : and in proportion as the resistance to 
 motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is more or 
 less pure. So that when I speak of pure or empty space, 
 it is not to be supposed that the word space stands for 
 an idea distinct from, or conceivable without, body and 
 motion. Though indeed we are apt to think every noun 
 substantive stands for a distinct idea, that may be sepa- 
 rated from all others : which hath occasioned infinite 
 mistakes. When therefore supposing all the world to 
 be annihilated besides my own body I say there still 
 remains pure space : thereby nothing else is meant, but 
 only that I conceive it possible, for the limbs of my body 
 to be moved on all sides without the least resistance : 
 but if that too were annihilated, then there could be no 
 motion, and consequently no space. Some, perhaps, may 
 think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the 
 idea of pure space ; but it is plain from what we have 
 elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance 
 are not obtained by that sense. See the Essay concern- 
 ing ^Vision. 
 
 CXVII. What is here laid down seems to put an 
 end to all those disputes and difficulties, which have 
 sprung up among the learned concerning the nature of 
 pure space. But the chief advantage arising from it, is, 
 that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma, to which 
 several, who have employed their thoughts on this sub- 
 ject, imagine themselves reduced; to wit, of thinking 
 
84 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 either that real space is God, or else that there is 
 something beside God which is eternal, uncreated, infi- 
 nite, indivisible, immutable : both which may justly be 
 thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is certain 
 that not a few divines, as well as 'philosophers of great 
 note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving 
 either limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must 
 be Divine. And some of late have set themselves parti- 
 cularly to shew, that the incommunicable attributes of 
 God agree to it. Which doctrine, how unworthy soever 
 it may seem of the Divine nature, yet I do not see how 
 we can get clear of it, so long as we adhere to the re- 
 ceived opinions. 
 
 CXVIII. Hitherto of natural philosophy : we come 
 now to make some inquiry concerning that other great 
 branch of speculative knowledge ; to wit, mathematics. 
 These, how celebrated soever they may be for their clear- 
 ness and certainty of demonstration, which is hardly any 
 where else to be found, cannot nevertheless be supposed 
 altogether free from mistakes ; if in their principles there 
 lurks some secret error, which is common to the pro- 
 fessors of those sciences with the rest of mankind. Ma- 
 thematicians, though they deduce their theorems from 
 a great height of evidence, yet their first principles are 
 limited by the consideration of quantity: and they do not 
 ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental 
 maxims, which influence all the particular sciences; each 
 part whereof, mathematics not excepted, doth conse- 
 quently participate of the errors involved in them. That 
 the principles laid down by mathematicians are true, and 
 their way of deduction from those principles clear and 
 incontestable, we do not deny. But we hold, there may 
 be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the 
 object of mathematics, and for that reason not expressly 
 mentioned, though tacitly supposed throughout the 
 whole progress of that science ; and that the ill effects of 
 those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 85 
 
 the branches thereof. To be plain, we suspect the ma- 
 thematicians are, as well as other men, concerned in the 
 errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas, 
 and the existence of objects without the mind. 
 
 CXIX. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its 
 object abstract ideas of number. Of which, to under- 
 stand the properties and mutual habitudes is supposed 
 no mean part of speculative knowledge. The opinion of 
 the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract, 
 hath made them in esteem with those philosophers, who 
 seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and ele- 
 vation of thought. It hath set a price on the most 
 trifling numerical speculations, which in practice are of no 
 use, but serve only for amusement ; and hath therefore 
 so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamt 
 of mighty mysteries involved in numbers, and attempted 
 the explication of natural things by them. But if we in- 
 quire into our own thoughts, and consider what hath 
 been premised, we may perhaps entertain a low opinion 
 of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all in- 
 quiries about numbers, only as so many difficilis nugce, 
 so far as they are not subservient to practice, and pro- 
 mote the benefit of life. 
 
 CXX. Unity in abstract we have before considered 
 in sect, xiii, from which and what hath been said in the 
 introduction, it plainly follows there is not any such idea. 
 But number being defined a collection of unites, we may 
 conclude that, if there be no such thing as unity or unit 
 in abstract, there are no ideas of number in abstract de- 
 noted by the numeral names and figures. The theories 
 thereof in arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the 
 names and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, 
 as well as from the particular things numbered, can be 
 supposed to have nothing at all for their object. Hence 
 we may see, how entirely the science of numbers is sub- 
 ordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling it be- 
 comes, when considered as a matter of mere speculation. 
 
86 
 
 OF THE PK1NCIPLES 
 
 CXXI. However, since there may be some, who, 
 deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted 
 verities, waste their time in arithmetical theorems and 
 problems, which have not any use : it will not be amiss, 
 if we more fully consider, and expose the vanity of that 
 pretence; and this will plainly appear, by taking a view 
 of arithmetic in its infancy, and observing what it was 
 that originally put men on the study of that science, and 
 to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think 
 that, at first, men, for ease of memory and help of com- 
 putation, made use of counters, or in writing of single 
 strokes, points or the like, each whereof was made to 
 signify a unit ; that is, some one thing of whatever 
 kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they 
 found out the more compendious ways, of making one 
 character stand in place of several strokes, or points. 
 And lastly, the notation of the Arabians or Indians came 
 into use; wherein, by the repetition of a few characters or 
 figures, and varying the signification of each figure ac- 
 cording to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most 
 aptly expressed : which seems to have been done in imi- 
 tation of language, so that an exact analogy is observed 
 betwixt the notation by figures and names, the nine sim- 
 ple figures answering the nine first numeral names and 
 places in the former, corresponding to denominations in 
 the latter. And agreeably to those conditions of the 
 simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods 
 of finding from the given figures or marks of the parts, 
 what figures and how placed, are proper to denote the 
 whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought 
 figures, the same rule or analogy being observed through- 
 out, it is easy to read them into words ; and so the num- 
 ber becomes perfectly known. For then the number of 
 any particular things is said to be known, when we know 
 the name or figures (with their due arrangement), that, 
 according to the standing analogy, belong to them. For 
 these signs being known, we can, by the operations of 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 87 
 
 arithmetic, know the signs of any part of the particular 
 sums signified by them ; and thus computing in signs 
 (because of the connexion established betwixt them and 
 the distinct multitudes of things, whereof one is taken 
 for a unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide, 
 and proportion the things themselves that we intend to 
 number. 
 
 CXXII. In arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the 
 things but the signs , which nevertheless are not regarded 
 for their own sake, but because they direct us how to 
 act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. 
 Now agreeably to what we have before observed of words 
 in general, (sect. xix. Jntrod.) it happens here, likewise, 
 that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by nume- 
 ral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas 
 of particular things to our minds. I shall not at pre- 
 sent enter into a more particular dissertation on this sub- 
 ject ; but only observe, that it is evident from what hath 
 been said, those things which pass for abstract truths 
 and theorems concerning numbers, are, in reality, con- 
 versant about no object distinct from particular nume- 
 rable things, except only names and characters ; which 
 originally came to be considered, on no other account 
 but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly, what- 
 ever particular things men had need to compute. Whence 
 it follows, that to study them for their own sake would 
 be just as wise, and to as good purpose, as if a man, 
 neglecting the true use or original intention and sub- 
 serviency of language, should spend his time in imperti- 
 nent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and contro- 
 versies purely verbal. 
 
 CXXIII. From numbers we proceed to speak of 
 extension, which considered as relative, is the object of 
 geometry. The infinite divisibility of finite extension, 
 though it is not expressly laid down, either as an axiom 
 or theorem in the elements of that science, yet is through- 
 out the same every where supposed, and thought to 
 
88 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the 
 principles and demonstrations in geometry, that ma- 
 thematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the 
 least question of it. And as this notion is the source 
 from whence do spring all those amusing geometrical 
 paradoxes, which have such a direct repugnancy to the 
 plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with 
 so much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by 
 learning; so is it the principal occasion of all that nice 
 and extreme subtilty, which renders the study of ma- 
 thematics so difficult and tedious. Hence if we can 
 make it appear, that no finite extension contains innu- 
 merable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows, that 
 we shall at once clear the science of geometry from a 
 great number of difficulties and contradictions, which 
 have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, 
 and withal make the attainment thereof a business of 
 much less time and pains, than it hitherto hath been. 
 
 CXXIV. Every particular finite extension, which 
 may possibly be the object of our thought, is an idea 
 existing only in the mind, and consequently each part 
 thereof must be perceived. If therefore I cannot per- 
 ceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I 
 consider, it is certain they are not contained in it : 
 but it is evident, that I cannot distinguish innumerable 
 parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I 
 either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my 
 mind : wherefore I conclude they are not contained in 
 it. Nothing can be plainer to me, than that the exten- 
 sions I have in view are no other than my own ideas, 
 and it is no less plain, that I cannot resolve any one of 
 my ideas into an infinite number of other ideas, that is, 
 that they are not infinitely divisible. If by finite exten- 
 sion be meant something distinct from a finite idea, I 
 declare I do not know what that is, and so cannot affirm 
 or deny r any thing of it. But if the terms extension, 
 parts, and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable. 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 89 
 
 that is, for ideas ; then to say a finite quantity or ex- 
 tension consists of parts infinite in number, is so ma- 
 nifest a contradiction, that every one at first sight ac- 
 knowledges it to be so. And it is impossible it should 
 ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature, who is 
 not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a con- 
 verted gentile to the belief of transubstantiation. An- 
 cient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles : 
 and those propositions which once obtain the force and 
 credit of a principle, are not only themselves, but like- 
 wise whatever is deducible from them, thought privi- 
 leged from all examination. And there is no absurdity 
 so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may 
 not be prepared to swallow. 
 
 CXXV. He whose understanding^ prepossessed with 
 the doctrine of abstract general ideas, may be persuaded, 
 that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) exten- 
 sion in abstract is infinitely divisible. And one who 
 thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind, will 
 perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit, that a 
 line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts 
 really existing, though too small to be discerned. These 
 errors are grafted as well in the minds of geometricians 
 as of other men, and have a like influence on their 
 reasonings; and it were no difficult thing, to shew how 
 the arguments from geometry, made use of to support 
 the infinite divisibility of extension, are bottomed on 
 them. At present we shall only observe in general, 
 whence it is that the mathematicians are all so fond and 
 tenacious of this doctrine. 
 
 CXXVI. It hath been observed in another place, 
 that the theorems and demonstrations in geometry are 
 conversant about universal ideas ; (sect.xv. Introd.) where 
 it is explained in what sense this ought to be under- 
 stood ; to wit, that the particular lines and figures in- 
 cluded in the diagram, are supposed to stand for innu- 
 
00 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 merable others of different sizes ; or in other words, the 
 geometer considers them abstracting from their mag- 
 nitude : which doth not imply that he forms an abstract 
 idea, but only that he cares not what the particular 
 magnitude is, whether great or small, but looks on that 
 as a thing indifferent to the demonstration : hence it 
 follows, that a line in the scheme, but an inch long, 
 must be spoken of, as though it contained ten thousand 
 parts, since it is regarded not in itself, but as it is uni- 
 versal ; and it is universal only in its. signification, 
 whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than 
 itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts 
 or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. 
 After this manner, the properties of the lines signified 
 are (by a very usual figure) transferred to the sign, and 
 thence, through mistake, thought to appertain to it con- 
 sidered in its own nature. 
 
 CXXVII. Because there is no number of parts so 
 great, but it is possible there may be a line containing 
 more, the inch-line is said to contain parts more than 
 any assignable number ; which is true, not of the inch 
 taken absolutely, but only for the things signified by it. 
 But men not retaining that distinction in their thoughts, 
 slide into a belief that the small particular line described 
 on paper contains in itself parts innumerable. There is 
 no such thing as the ten-thousandth part of an inch ; 
 but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth, which 
 may be signified by that inch. When therefore I de- 
 lineate a triangle on paper, and take one side not above 
 an inch, for example, in length, to be the radius : this I 
 consider as divided into ten thousand, or a hundred 
 thousand parts, or more. For though the ten-thou- 
 sandth part of that line considered in itself is nothing 
 at all, and consequently may be neglected without any 
 error or inconveniency ; yet these described lines being 
 only marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 91 
 
 may be the ten-thousandth part is very considerable, it 
 follows, that to prevent notable errors in practice, the 
 radius must be taken of ten thousand parts, or more. 
 
 CXXVIII. From what hath been said, the reason is 
 plain, why, to the end any theorem may become uni- 
 versal in its use, it is necessary we speak of the lines 
 described on paper, as though they contained parts 
 which really they do not. In doing of which, if we 
 examine the matter thoroughly, we shall perhaps dis- 
 cover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consist- 
 ing of, or being divisible into, a thousand parts, but only 
 some other line which is far greater than an inch, and 
 represented by it. And that when we say a line is infi- 
 nitely divisible , we must mean a line which is infinitely 
 great. What we have here observed seems to be the 
 chief cause, why to suppose the infinite divisibility of 
 finite extension hath been thought necessary in geo- 
 metry. 
 
 CXXIX. The several absurdities and contradictions 
 which flowed from this false principle might, one would 
 think, have been esteemed so many demonstrations 
 against it. But, by I know not what logic, it is held, 
 that proofs d posteriori are not to be admitted against 
 propositions relating to infinity. As though it were 
 not impossible even for an infinite mind to reconcile 
 contradictions: or as if any thing absurd and repug- 
 nant could have a necessary connexion with truth, or 
 flow from it. But whoever considers the weakness of 
 this pretence, will think it was contrived on purpose to 
 humour the laziness of the mind, which had rather 
 acquiesce in an indolent scepticism, than be at the pains 
 to go through with a severe examination of those prin- 
 ciples it hath ever embraced for true. 
 
 CXXX. Of late the speculations about infinites 
 have run so high, and grown to such strange notions, 
 as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among 
 the geometers of the present . age. Some there are of 
 
92 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 great note, who, not content with holding that finite 
 lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, 
 do yet farther maintain, that each of those infinitesimals 
 is itself subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or 
 infinitesimals of a second order, and so on ad irfinitum. 
 These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesi- 
 mals of infinitesimals, without ever coming to an end. 
 So that, according to them, an inch doth not barely 
 contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of 
 an infinity of an infinity, ad infinitum, of parts. Others 
 there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the 
 first to be nothing at all, thinking it with good reason 
 absurd, to imagine there is any positive quantity or part 
 of extension, which, though multiplied infinitely, can 
 ever equal the smallest given extension. And yet on 
 the other hand it seems no less absurd, to think the 
 square, cube, or other power, of a positive real root, 
 should itself be nothing at all ; which they who hold 
 infinitesimals of the first order, denying all of the sub- 
 sequent orders, are obliged to maintain. 
 
 CXXXI. Have we not therefore reason to conclude, 
 that they are both in the wrong, and that there is in 
 effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or an infi- 
 nite number of parts contained in any finite quantity ? 
 But you will say, that if this doctrine obtains, it will 
 follow the very foundations of geometry are destroyed : 
 and those great men who have raised that science to so 
 astonishing a height, have been all the while building 
 a castle in the air. To this it may be replied, that what- 
 ever is useful in geometry, and promotes the benefit of 
 human life, doth still remain firm and unshaken on our 
 principles. That science, considered as practical, will 
 rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what 
 hath been said. But to set this in a due light, may be 
 the subject of a distinct inquiry. For the rest, though 
 it should follow that some of the more intricate and 
 subtile parts of speculative mathematics may be pared off 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 83 
 
 without any prejudice to truth ; yet I do not see what 
 damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the 
 contrary, it were highly to be wished, that men of great 
 abilities and obstinate application, would draw off their 
 thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in 
 the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of 
 life, or have a more direct influence on the manners. 
 
 CXXXII. If it be said that several theorems un- 
 doubtedly true, are discovered by methods in which 
 infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have 
 been, if their existence included a contradiction in it ; 
 I answer, that upon a thorough examination it will not 
 be found, that in any instance it is necessary to make 
 use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or 
 even quantities less than the minimum sensible : nay, it 
 will be evident this is never done, it being impossible. 
 
 CXXXII I. By what we have premised, it is plain 
 that very numerous and important errors have taken 
 their rise from those false principles, which were im- 
 pugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise. And the 
 opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time 
 appear to be most fruitful principles, from whence do 
 flow innumerable consequences highly advantageous to 
 true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly 
 matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal objects , hath 
 been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and 
 pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human 
 or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and con- 
 fidence. And surely, if by distinguishing the real ex- 
 istence of unthinking things from their being perceived, 
 and allowing them a subsistence of their own out of the 
 minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature ; 
 but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties 
 arise : if the supposition of matter is barely precarious, 
 as not being grounded on so much as one single reason : 
 if its consequences cannot endure the light of examin- 
 ation and free inquiry, but screen themselves under 
 
94 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 the dark and general pretence of infinities being incom- 
 prehensible : if withal the removal of this matter be not 
 attended with the least evil consequence, if it be not 
 even missed in the world, but every thing as well, nay 
 much easier conceived without it : if, lastly, both scep- 
 tics and atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing 
 only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is per- 
 fectly agreeable both to reason and religion : methinks 
 we may expect it should be admitted and firmly em- 
 braced, though it were proposed only as an hypothesis, 
 and the existence of matter had been allowed possible, 
 which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that 
 it is not. 
 
 CXXXIV. True it is, that, in consequence of the 
 foregoing principles, several disputes and speculations, 
 which are esteemed no mean parts of learning, are re- 
 jected as useless. But how great a prejudice soever 
 against our notions, this may give to those who have al- 
 ready been deeply engaged, and made large advances in 
 studies of that nature : yet, by others, we hope it will 
 not be thought any just ground of dislike to the prin- 
 ciples and tenets herein laid down, that they abridge the 
 labour of study, and make' human sciences more clear, 
 compendious, and attainable, than they were before. 
 
 CXXXV. Having dispatched what we intended to 
 say concerning the knowledge of ideas, the method we 
 proposed, leads us in the next place to treat of spirits : 
 with regard to which, perhaps human knowledge is not 
 so deficient as is vulgarly imagined. The great reason 
 that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the 
 nature of spirits, is our not having an idea of it. But 
 surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a hu- 
 man understanding, that it does not perceive the idea of 
 spirit, if it is manifestly impossible there should be any 
 such idea. And this, if I mistake not, has been demon- 
 strated in sect, xxvii. to which I shall here add, that a 
 spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or sup- 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 95 
 
 port, wherein the unthinking beings or ideas can exist : 
 but that this substance which supports or perceives ideas 
 shoulditselfbe an idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd. 
 
 CXXXVI. It will perhaps be said, that we want a 
 sense (as some have imagined) proper to know sub- 
 stances withal, which if we had, we might know our own 
 soul, as we do a triangle. To this I answer, that in 
 case we had a new sense bestowed upon us, we could 
 only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of 
 sense. But I believe nobody will say, that what he 
 means by the terms soul and substance, is only some 
 particular sort of idea or sensation. We may therefore 
 infer, that, all things duly considered, it is not more rea- 
 sonable to think our faculties defective, in that they do 
 not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking 
 substance, than it would be if we should blame them 
 for not being able to comprehend a round square. 
 
 CXXXVII. From the opinion that spirits are to be 
 known after the manner of an idea or sensation, have 
 risen many absurd and heterodox tenets, and much 
 scepticism about the nature of the soul. It is even pro- 
 bable, that this opinion may have produced a doubt in 
 some whether they had any soul at all distinct from 
 their body, since upon inquiry they could not find they 
 had an idea of it. That an idea which is inactive, and 
 the existence whereof consists in being perceived, should 
 be the image or likeness of an agent subsisting by itself, 
 seems to need no other refutation, than barely attend- 
 ing to what is meant by those words. But perhaps you 
 will say, that though an idea cannot resemble a spirit 
 in its thinking, acting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may 
 in some other respects : and it is not necessary that an 
 idea or image be in all respects like the original. 
 
 CXXXVIII. I answer, if it does not in those men- 
 tioned, it is impossible it should represent it in any other 
 thing. Do but leave out the power of willing, think- 
 ing, and perceiving ideas, and there remains nothing 
 
90 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 else wherein the idea can be like a spirit. For by the 
 word spirit we mean only that which thinks, wills, and 
 perceives ; this, and this alone, constitutes the signifi- 
 cation of that term. If therefore it is impossible that 
 any degree of those powers should be represented in an 
 idea, it is evident there can be no idea of a spirit. 
 
 CXXXIX. But it will be objected, that if there is 
 no idea signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, 
 they are wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in 
 them. I answer, those words do mean or signify a real 
 thing, which is neither an idea or like an idea, but that 
 which perceives ideas, and wills and reasons about them. 
 What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, 
 is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual sub- 
 stance. If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a 
 word, and that since the immediate significations of 
 other names are by common consent called ideas, no 
 reason can be assigned, why that which is signified by 
 the name spirit or soul may not partake in the same 
 appellation : I answer, all the unthinking objects of the 
 mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their 
 existence consists only in being perceived : whereas a 
 soul or spirit is an active being, whose existence con- 
 sists not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas and 
 thinking. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent 
 equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disa- 
 greeing and unlike, that we distinguish between spirit 
 and idea. See sect, xxvii. 
 
 CXL. In a large sense, indeed, we may be said to have 
 an idea, or rather a notion, of spirit ; that is, we under- 
 stand the meaning of the word, otherwise we could not 
 affirm or deny any thing of it. Moreover, as we con- 
 ceive the ideas that are in the minds of other spirits by 
 means of our own, which we suppose to be resem- 
 blances of them : so we know other spirits by means 
 of our own soul, which in that sense is the image or 
 idea of them, it having a like respect to other spirits, 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 97 
 
 that blueness or heat by me perceived hath to those ideas 
 perceived by another. 
 
 CXLI. It must not be supposed, that they who as- 
 sert the natural immortality of the soul are of opinion 
 that it is absolutely incapable of annihilation even by the 
 infinite power of the Creator who first gave it being : 
 but only that it is not liable to be broken or dissolved 
 by the ordinary laws of nature or motion. They, in- 
 deed, who hold the soul of a man to be only a thin vital 
 flame, or system of animal spirits, make it perishing and 
 corruptible as the body, since there is nothing more 
 easily dissipated than such abeing, which it is naturally im- 
 possible should survive the ruin of the tabernacle, where- 
 in it is enclosed. And this notion hath been greedily 
 embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind, 
 as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of 
 virtue and religion. But it hath been made evident, 
 that bodies of what frame or texture soever, are barely 
 passive ideas in the mind, which is more distant and he- 
 terogeneous from them, than light is from darkness. 
 We have shewn that the soul is indivisible, incorpo- 
 real, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible. 
 Nothing can be plainer, than that the motions, changes, 
 decays, and dissolutions which we hourly see befal na- 
 tural bodies (and which is what we mean by the course 
 of nature ) cannot possibly affect an active, simple, un- 
 compounded substance : such a being therefore is in-> 
 dissoluble by the force of nature, that is to say, the soul 
 of man is naturally immortal. 
 
 CXLII. After what hath been said, it is I suppose 
 plain, that our souls are not to be known in the same 
 manner as senseless, inactive objects, or by way of idea. 
 Spirits and ideas are things so wholly different, that when 
 we say they exist, they are known, or the like, these words 
 must not be thought to signify any thing common to 
 both natures. There is nothing alike or common in 
 them : and to expect that by any multiplication or en- 
 
 H 
 
90 
 
 OP THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 largement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know 
 a spirit as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we 
 should hope to see a sound. This is inculcated because 
 I imagine it may be of moment towards clearing seve- 
 ral important questions, and preventing some very dan- 
 gerous errors concerning the nature of the soul. We 
 may not I think strictly be said to have an idea of an 
 active being, or of an action, although we may be said 
 to have a notion of them. I have some knowledge or 
 notion of my mind, and its acts about ideas, inasmuch 
 as I know or understand what is meant by those words. 
 What I know, that I have some notion of. I will not 
 say that the terms idea and notion may not be used con- 
 vertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it con- 
 duceth to clearness and propriety, that we distinguish 
 things very different by different names. It is also to 
 be remarked, that all relations including an act of 
 the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, 
 but rather a notion of the relations or habitudes between 
 things. But if in the modern way the word idea is ex- 
 tended to spirits, and relations and acts ; this is after all 
 an affair of verbal concern. 
 
 CXLIII. It will not be amiss to add, that the doctrine 
 of abstract ideas hath had no small share in rendering 
 those sciences intricate and obscure, which are particularly 
 conversant about spiritual things. Men have imagined 
 they could frame abstract notions of the powers and 
 acts of the mind, and consider them prescinded, as well 
 from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respective 
 objects and effects. Hence a great number of dark and 
 ambiguous terms presumed to stand for abstract no- 
 tions, have been introduced into metaphysics and mora- 
 lity, and from these have grown infinite distractions and 
 disputes amongst the learned. 
 
 CXLIV. But nothing seems more to have contri- 
 buted towards engaging men in controversies and mis- 
 takes, with regard to the nature and operations of the 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 $9 
 
 mind, than the being used to speak of those things in 
 terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For example, the 
 will is termed the motion of the soul : this infuses a be- 
 lief, that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, im- 
 pelled and determined by the objects of sense, as neces- 
 sarily as that is by the stroke of a racket. Hence arise 
 endless scruples and errors of dangerous consequence in 
 morality. All which I doubt not may be cleared, and 
 truth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could but 
 philosophers be prevailed on to retire into themselves, 
 and attentively consider their own meaning. 
 
 CXLV. From what hath been said, it is plain that we 
 cannot know the existence of other spirits, otherwise 
 than by their operations, or the ideas by them excited 
 in us. I perceive several motions, changes, and com- 
 binations of ideas, that inform me there are certain par- 
 ticular agents like myself, which accompany them, and 
 concur in their production. Hence the knowledge I 
 have of other spirits is not immediate, as is the know- 
 ledge of my ideas ; but depending on the intervention 
 of ideas, by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from 
 myself, as effects or concomitant signs. 
 
 CXLVI. But though there be some things which 
 convince us, human agents are concerned in producing 
 them ; yet it is evident to every one, that those things 
 which are called the works of nature, that is, the far 
 greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us, 
 are not produced by, or dependent on the wills of mer. 
 There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them, 
 since it is repugnant that they should subsist by them- 
 selves. See sect. xxix. But if we attentively consider the 
 constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural 
 things, thesurprising magnificence, beauty, and perfection 
 of the larger, and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller 
 parts of the creation, together with the exact harmony 
 and correspondence of the whole, but above all, the 
 never enough admired laws of pain and pleasure, and the 
 
100 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and passions 
 of animals ; I say if we consider all these things, and at 
 the same time attend to the meaning and import of 
 the attributes, one, eternal, infinitely wise, good, and per- 
 fect, we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the 
 aforesaid Spirit, who works all in all , and by whom all 
 things consist. 
 
 CXLVII. Hence it is evident, that God is known as 
 certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit 
 whatsoever, distinct from ourselves. We may even as- 
 sert, that the existence of God is far more evidently per- 
 ceived than the existence of men ; because the effects of 
 nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable, 
 than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any 
 one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, 
 which doth not more strongly evince the being of that 
 Spirit who is the author of nature. For it is evident 
 that in affecting other persons, the will of man hath no 
 other object, than barely the motion of the limbs of his 
 body ; but that such a motion should be attended by, or 
 excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly 
 on the will of the Creator. He alone it is who “ uphold- 
 ing all things by the word of his power,” maintains that 
 intercourse between spirits, whereby they are able to per- 
 ceive the existence of each other. And yet this pure and 
 clear light which enlightens everyone, is itself invisible. 
 
 CXLVIII. It seems to be a general pretence of the 
 unthinking herd, that they cannot see God. Could we 
 but see him, say they, as we see a man, we should be- 
 lieve that he is, and believing obey his commands. But 
 alas, we need only open our eyes to see the sovereign 
 Lord of all things with a more full and clear view, than 
 we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine 
 we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and imme- 
 diate view, or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but 
 by seeing that which represents them in the essence of 
 God, which doctrine is I must confess to me incompre- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, 
 
 101 
 
 hensible. But I shall explain my meaning. A human 
 spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being 
 an idea ; when therefore we see the colour, size, figure, 
 and motions of a man, we perceive oidy certain sensa- 
 tions or ideas excited in our own minds : and these being 
 exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve 
 to mark out unto us the existence of finite and created 
 spirits like ourselves. Hence it is plain, we do not see 
 a man, if by man is meant that which lives, moves, per- 
 ceives and thinks as we do : but only such a certain col- 
 lection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct 
 principle of thought and motion like to ourselves, ac- 
 companying and represented by it. And after the same 
 manner we see God ; all the difference is, that whereas 
 some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a 
 particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our 
 view, we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest 
 tokens of the Divinity : every thing we see, hear, feel, or 
 anywise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the 
 power of God ; as is our perception of those very mo- 
 tions, which are produced by men. 
 
 CXLIX. It is therefore plain, that nothing can be 
 more evident to any one that is capable of the least re- 
 flection, than the existence of God, or a spirit who is in- 
 timately present to our minds, producing in them all 
 that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually af- 
 fect us, on whom we have an absolute and entire depend- 
 ance, in short, “ in whom we live, and move, and have 
 our being.” That the discovery of this great truth which 
 lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained 
 to by the reason of so very few, is a sad instance of the 
 stupidity and inattention of men, who, though they are 
 surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Deity, 
 are yet so little affected by them, that they seem as it 
 were blinded with excess of light. 
 
 CL. But you will say, hath nature no share in the 
 production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed 
 
102 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 to the immediate and sole operation of God ; I answer, 
 if by nature is meant only the visible series of effects, or 
 sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain 
 fixed and general laws : then it is plain, that nature 
 taken in this sense cannot produce any thing at all. But 
 if by nature is meant some being distinct from God, as 
 well as from the laws of nature and things perceived by 
 sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound, 
 without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature 
 in this acceptation is a vain chimera introduced by those 
 heathens, who had not just notions of the omnipresence 
 and infinite perfection of God. But it is more unac- 
 countable, that it should be received among Christians 
 professing belief in the holy Scriptures, which constantly 
 ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God, that 
 heathen philosophers are wont to impute to nature. 
 The Lord, he causeth the vapours to ascend ; he 
 maketh lightnings with rain ; he bringeth forth the wind 
 out of his treasures.” Jer. x. 13 . “ He turneth the 
 
 shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day 
 dark with night.” Amos v. 8. “ He visiteth the earth, 
 
 and maketh it soft with showers : he blesseth the spring- 
 ing thereof, and crowneth the year with his goodness ; 
 so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the 
 valleys are covered over with corn.” See Psalm Ixv. But 
 notwithstanding that this is the constant language of 
 Scripture ; yet we have I know not what aversion from 
 believing, that God concerns himself so nearly in our 
 affairs. Fain would we suppose him at a great distance 
 off, and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in his 
 stead, though (if we may believe St. Paul) “ he be not 
 far from every one of us.” 
 
 CLI. It will I doubt not be objected, that the slow 
 and gradual methods observed in the production of na- 
 tural things, do not seem to have for their cause the im- 
 mediate hand of an almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, 
 untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains fall- 
 
OP HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 103 
 
 ing in desert places, miseries incident to human life, are 
 so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not 
 immediately actuated and superintended by a Spirit of 
 infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this 
 objection is in a good measure plain from sect, lxii, it 
 being visible, that the aforesaid methods of nature are 
 absolute necessary, in order to working by the most sim- 
 ple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent 
 manner ; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of 
 God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty 
 machine of nature, that whilst its motions and various 
 phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which 
 actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of 
 flesh and blood. “ Verily (saith the prophet) thou art 
 a God that hidest thyself.” Isaiah xlv. 15. But though 
 God conceal himself from the eyes of the sensual and 
 lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought ; 
 yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be 
 more plainly legible, than the intimate presence of an 
 all-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates, and sustains the 
 whole system of being. It is clear from what we have 
 elsewhere observed, that the operating according to gene- 
 ral and stated laws, is so necessary for our guidance in 
 the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, 
 that without, it, all reach and compass of thought, all 
 human sagacity and design could serve to no manner of 
 purpose : it were even impossible there should be any 
 such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. xxxi. 
 Which one consideration abundantly outbalances what- 
 ever particular inconveniences may thence arise. 
 
 CLII. We should further consider, that the very 
 blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, 
 in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and aug- 
 ment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades 
 in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlight- 
 ened parts. We would likewise do well to examine, 
 whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and 
 
104 OP THJE PRINCIPLES 
 
 accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they 
 come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author 
 of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by 
 our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In 
 man indeed a thrifty management of those things, which 
 he cannot procure without much pains and industry, may 
 be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine, that the 
 inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable, costs 
 the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its pro- 
 duction than a pebble doth : nothing being more evi- 
 dent, than that an omnipotent Spirit can indifferently 
 produce every thing by a mere fiat or act of his will. 
 Hence it is plain, that the splendid profusion of natural 
 things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality 
 in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked 
 on as an argument of the riches of his power. 
 
 CLIII. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness 
 which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of na- 
 ture, and the actions of finite imperfect spirits : this, in 
 the state we are in at present, is indispensibly necessary 
 to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow : 
 we take, for instance, the idea of some one particular 
 pain into our thoughts, and account it evil ; whereas if 
 we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various 
 ends, connexions, and dependences of things, on what 
 occasions and in what proportions we are affected with 
 pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the 
 design with which we are put into the world ; we shall 
 be forced to acknowledge that those particular things, 
 which considered in themselves appear to be evil, have 
 the nature of good, when considered as linked with the 
 whole system of beings. 
 
 CLIV. From what hath been said it will be manifest 
 to any considering person, that it is merely for want of 
 attention and comprehensiveness of mind, that there are 
 any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean heresy to be 
 found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed bur- 
 
OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 105 
 
 lesque the works of Providence, the beauty and order 
 whereof they have not capacity, or will not be at the 
 pains to comprehend. But those who are masters of 
 any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used 
 to reflect, can never sufficiently admire the Divine traces 
 of wisdom and goodness that shine throughout the eco- 
 nomy of nature. But what truth is there which shineth 
 so strongly on the mind, that by an aversion of thought, 
 a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may not escape seeing 
 it ? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the generality of 
 men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and 
 little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should 
 not have all that conviction and evidence of the being of 
 God, which might be expected in reasonable creatures ? 
 
 CLV. We should rather wonder, that men can be 
 found so s tupid as to neglect, than that neglecting they 
 should be unconvinced of such an evident and momen- 
 tous truth. And yet it is to be feared that too many of 
 parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are 
 merely through a supine and dreadful negligence sunk 
 into a sort of Atheism. Since it is downright impossible, 
 that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough sense 
 of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that al- 
 mighty Spirit, should persist in a remorseless violation 
 of his laws. We ought therefore earnestly to meditate 
 and dwell on those important points ; that so we may 
 attain conviction without all scruple, “that the eyes of the 
 Lord are in every place beholding the evil and the good ; — 
 that he is with us and keepeth us in all places whither we 
 go, and givethus bread to eat, and raiment to put on;” that 
 he is present and conscious to our innermost thoughts : 
 and that we have a most absolute and immediate depend- 
 ance on him. A clear view of which great truths can- 
 not choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspec- 
 tion and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to 
 virtue, and the best guard against vice. 
 
 CL VI. For after all, what deserves the first place in 
 
106 OF THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 our studies, is the consideration of God, and our duty ; 
 which to promote, as it was the main drift and design of 
 my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless 
 and ineffectual, if by what I have said I cannot inspire 
 my readers with a pious sense of the presence of God : 
 and having shewn the falseness or vanity of those bar- 
 ren speculations, which make the chief employment of 
 learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and 
 embrace the salutary truths of the gospel, which to 
 know and to practise is the highest perfection of human 
 nature. 
 


 
 
 
 
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