SIMON LITMAN ECONOMICS COLLECTION 973.7 I i[ 1 CENTRAL CIRCULATION BOOKSTACKS The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its renewal or its return to the library from which it was borrowed on or before the Latest Date stamped below. You may be charged a minimum fee of $75.00 for each lost book. Theft# mutllatloit# and underlining of books ore reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University. TO RENEW CALL TELEPHONE CENTER# 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN APR 2 2 i336 MAY 1 0 2010 When renewing by phcme, write new due date below previous due date. L162 Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates https://archive.org/details/pictorialhistory00wils_0 . I: WT -K -5- '■ s ' <-< >■! •v.'^ ,r- - *v! y' ^ - i/. a '5:;; 4. sfe > V , , , ' - *■!'.' J "Tl A -■>. -^ .,■• THIE PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR: ^riiyin, j^amluvt and ^mdts. FiyLBRACINGr FULL AND AUTHENTIC ACCCOUNTS OF ITS BATTLES BY LAND AND SEA, GRAPHIC de:scriptions of heroic dl:eds achieved by armies and INDIVIDUALS; NARRATIVES OF PERSONAL ADVENTURE; THRILLING INCIDENTS; DARING EXPLOITS; WONDERFUL ESCAPES; LIFE IN (AMP, FIELD, AND HOSPITAL; ADVENTURES AT SEA; BLOCKADE LIFE, Etc., Etc. c;oNu:^iNiMGi- CAREFULLY PREPARED BIOGRAPHIES OF Ihe leading Generals and Nairal Commanders of both the North and the South, BY John Laird Wilson, Special Correspondent of the New York Herald. EMBELLISHED WITH NUMEROUS FINE STEEL-PLATE ENGRAVINGS OF BATTLE-SCENES, AND WITH PORTRAITS OF A HUNDRED LEADING GENERALS. PUBLISHED BY THE TT^TIOISr^IL. ETJELISEIIIsra- GO., Philadelphia, Pa. ; Chicago, 111. ; St. Louis, Mo. ; and Atlanta, Ga. Copyright, 1878, by John Laird Wilson. Copyright, 1881, by J. R. JONKS. PREFACE. I N oflfering to the public a new History of the Great Civil War, a few words of explanation are necessary. Of histories, general and special, relating to the late struggle a number have been published, but they were nearly all written at a ’ period so close to the war that the writers were unconsciously biassed by the strong feelings which they shared in common with their fellow-citizens during the occur- rence of the events they relate. Time had not softened their prejudices sufficiently to enable them to write with the judicial calmness necessary to the proper treat- ment of such a subject. It is hoped that in the long years that have elapsed since the return of peace enough has been made plain, and sufficient calmness has been gained, to enable the writer to prepare a history which shall do impartial justice to the struggle itself and to the actors engaged in it. It has been my aim to present a continuous narrative covering the entire area of operations, both military and naval, and free from those interruptions which in general history are unavoidable. I have endeavored to carry the reader with me over sea and land, wherever the sounds of war were heard, and to present to him in a series of vivid and faithful pictures the events which marked the progress of the great struggle. Of the movements of the hostile forces, and of the commanders under whom at different times and at different places these movements were made, I have expressed my opinion with great freedom, awarding praise or ^ blame as truth or justice seemed to call for the one or the other. I do not expect ^ that my judgments will find favor from all classes of readers, but I know that ^ they are the judgments of an unbiassed mind, solicitous for the truth and con- I strained only by the irresistible logic of facts. ^ My information I have drawn from sources too numerous to be mentioned in ^ Retail. Contemporary magazines and pamphlets, private letters and documents of various kinds which have been kindly placed at my disposal, — all have been consulted with more or less profit. In cases of doubt, where testimony was absent or confiicting, I have corresponded with some of the principal leaders in the IV PREFACE. strife ; and the information thus derived from both Northern and Southern sources has been to me of incalculable value. Of the results of the labors of others in the same field, it is hardly necessary to say, I have taken full advantage. To the exhaustive history of the war by Dr. Lossing, and to the scarcely less exhaustive, but in some respects more philosophical, work of Dr. Draper, I confess myself under great obligations. I have perused with profit and with pleasure Prof. Wil- liam Swinton’s ** Decisive Battles of the War and in his “ Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac ” I have found much with which to illumine and adorn these pages. Of the ‘‘ History of the Civil War in America,^’ by the Comte de Paris, so far as it has advanced, I cannot speak too highly ; and in the preparation of some of the earlier chapters of this work I have found it a useful book of reference. In terms of similar praise I desire to speak of the “ Memoirs of Gen- eral Sherman ” and of Badeau's “ Military Life of General Grant.” From among the many other works which I have consulted with advantage, and to which I cannot refuse to admit my indebtedness, I would mention the “ Bebellion Kecord,” '‘The Great Civil War” by Tomes and Smith, “Grant and his Campaigns” by Dr. Henry Copp^e, Tenney’s “Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,” “ The Battle of Gettysburg ” by Samuel P. Bates, Pollard’s “ Lost Cause,” and “ Chancellorsville ” by Hotchkiss and Allan. As it is, this work is now given to the public ; and if it shall be found that, while doing reasonable justice to all the parties concerned, I have in any degree been able to render such disastrous struggles impossible for the future, I shall feel , that the hours spent over these pages have not been spent in vain. J. L. W. V V..- • ^.-V' 0 .^ If. ■■tTv" ‘ m r .V* r i' V, -■S >■ . 'v-V' • '. •S.'?.‘| .■'it- - • ■ >’ ,T; ,-Itr ’ : '4 , J ' 1 . ^ ». '■*-'■, ^■.r* A' . , V v.,,^,. ,v.; ' ■:.. V -y. ■' ; .if v'l; 4 f T. 4 I'rli f V'Vv' 7.;^1 "IS ■ I'Sif: -t. ®v- W ''V PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE GKEAT CIYIL WAR. CHAPTER I. The Aim and Object of this History. — The Causes of the War. — State Eights. — The Tariff and Slavery. — Diverg- ing Interests of North and South. — Effect of the Abolition of Slavery in the British Colonies on American Sentiment. — The Missouri Compromise. — The Fugitive Slave Bill. — Repeal of the Missouri Compromise. — Formation of the Republican Party. — Kansas Struggle. — Triumph of the Anti-Slavery Party. — The Campaign of 1856. — Buchanan elected President. — The Kansas-Nebraska Struggle. — Buchanan’s Unfortunate Admin- istration.— The Dred Scott Decision. — The John Brown Raid. — The Sale of Arms to the South. — Secession and Organization of the Confederacy. — Election and Inauguration of President Lincoln. — His Address. — The Firing upon Fort Sumter. In many respects the American Civil War was the most momentous struggle that ever marked the history of the world. Not only did it employ larger armies and fleets than were ever called for by other combatants; not only did it exceed the immortal campaigns of Frederick and Napoleon in the magni- tude and brilliancy of its operations; not only did its theatre comprise an area larger than the whole continent of Europe, embracing as many varieties of climate, and presenting as many natural obstacles to be overcome ; not only did it inaugurate a new era and a new mode of warfare, — but it also served to develop the strength and resources of the coun- try it was supposed to be wasting, and to make plain to the world the true character, the immense resources, and the especial genius for war of the Amer- ican people, and to offer a convincing proof of the imperishable nature of free institutions when entrusted to the keep- ing of a race of men trained to under- stand and value them — men willing and resolved to maintain them even at the cost of their lives. The magnitude and grandeur of the events of this great struggle give to them a picturesqueness, so to speak, which must make a faithful account of them deeply interesting to our people. To write the history of such a struggle must be no easy task, for while lauding the glory of the conqueror the virtues of the vanquished must not be for- gotten. In such a task passion and prejudice, sectional pride and intoler- ance of opposition, have no place; the faithful historian must record events as they occurred. Such a task we propose to ourselves in the work now before us. In the following pages it will be our 6 CAUSES OF THE WAR. aim and endeavor to carry the reader with us, as we follow the contending armies and mark the progress of the conflict ; to halt, from time to time, as the embattled hosts confront each other, listening to the roar of battle and wit- nessing the wild work of war — the de- vastation of fields, the desolation of homes, the carnage, the slaughter, the tortured agony of the wounded, and the ghastly features of the dead ; to rejoice with the triumphant defenders of the right, without being ungenerous to the erring and the vanquished ; and finally, to point out the blessed results which flowed out of the terrible struggle, not to the United States alone, but to all nations and to all peoples. Preliminary to this, however, and in order to enable the reader intelligently to .follow us in our descriptions of the different battle scenes, it is necessary to recount briefly, but clearly and im- partially, the remote and proximate causes of the rebellion and the events which immediately preceded the out- break of hostilities. The antao^onism between North and South which came 1860 ^ December, 1860 , in the secession of South Carolina from the Union was not new. It was old almost as the Union itself. It had its roots deep down in the nation’s his- tory. It might be interesting, if it lay within the scope of this work, to show how much of this antagonism was due to race, how much was due to climate, how much was due to interest, and the pursuits of life. In all these par- ticulars, it could be easily shown, there was difference between North and South. But to enter into these details with any degree of fulness would be foreign to our plan. From the very commencement of our national history difference of opinion prevailed as to the nature of the bond which held the States together. It was held by one class of statesmen, that the Federal Union was a league or confederation which might be dissolved at will by any of the States. It was held by an- other class of statesmen that the Fed- eral Union constituted a nation, with a national government, and that no one State could secede from the Union without .the consent of all the others. This was the radical difference out of which ultimately grew tlie rebellion. It was not until certain material ques- tions arose that any serious j^ractical point was given to this difference of opinion. In course of time such ques- tions did arise. Chief among these * were those which related to the tariff and to slavery. The South, which de- pended on the products of the soil, de- manded free trade. The North, which derived its wealth from the manufac- turing industries, called for protection. And while great statesmen advocated these conflicting views, Congress wit- nessed many a stormy scene. The ques- tion, however, which was a permanent source of division, and on which agree- ment was found to be impossible, was that of slavery. At the time of the formation of the Union, slavery was more or less common in all the States. It was more common in the South than in the North, but it existed in all the States. The invention THE MISSOUKI COMPROMISE, 7 of the cotton-gin by Whitney, in 1793, rendering, as it did, the cultivation of cotton the leading branch of Southern industry, largely increased the demand for slave labor. While slavery, for a variety of reasons, had ceased to be a source of v^ealth in the North, and was gradually dying out, it had become a source of great wealth to the Southern planters and a conspicuous feature of Southern life. In the year 1860, the negro population of the Southern States had increased to about four millions. In the North, slavery had completely died out, and in the States of the North- west, which were now being rapidly fdled up with free immigrants, it never found a place. Slavery was thus found to be a root of bitterness. It deter- mined and rendered permanent the nat- ural antagonism between North and South. Year by year the gulf was Avidening; and it became more and more apparent that if the South were not to l)e allowed to maintain its peculiar and favorite institution, and would not be permitted to secede, a gigantic civil Avar Avas one of the certainties of the not distant future. The slavery question, as we have said, was a cause of division from the beginning of our history. The anti- [ la very agitation in England, and the passing of the memorable law in 1807, cabolishing the slave trade in the Britisli colonies, had naturally enough a pow- erful influence on this side of the At- lantic. It helped to determine the pur- pose of the North, and it infused neAV life into all those who were in favor of abolition. It was not, however, until about the year 1820 that the real po- litical struggle began. With the famous Missouri Compromise began that polit- ical contest out of which grew the civil war. It was the first of a series of steps which led up to the act of seces- sion and the firing on Fort Sumter. The Missouri Compromise, it was supposed, was a complete and satisfactory settle- ment of the dispute between the North and the South. It turned out to be a great source of trouble. Its history is as follows : Missouri formed part of the Louisiana purchase. After the organ- ization of the ‘‘ Territory of Orleans,” in 1803, Missouri formed part of the “District of Louisiana.” Later it took the name of “ Missouri Territory.” The State of Missouri was a part of that Teri’itory. In 1820, Missouri applied to Congress for admission into the Union as a State. It was proposed that the application be granted only on condi- tion that slaA^ery be prohibited in the new State. The pro-slaA^ery party were indignant. Both in and out of Congress party feeling ran high. The discussion, which was conducted with great bitter- ness, resulted in what was called a com- promise. It Avas agreed that slavery be allowed in Missouri, but prohibited in all the territory of the United States north and AA^est of the northern bound- ary of Arkansas. On these terms Mis- souri entered the Union as a State. The compromise, from which so much Avas expected, settled nothing. The Southern people continued to feel and act as if they had been hindered in the exercise of their rights. In 1850, they succeeded in passing the 8 CAUSES OF THE WAR. Fugitive Slave Bill, whicli enabled mas- ters to recover their slaves who might have escaped to a free State. This act gave gi*eat umbrage to the North. In 1854 the South gained another triumph by the repeal of the Mis- souri Compromise. This act, which had for its object the organization of a ter- ritorial government in Kansas and Ne- braska, pi’ovided that the people of the Territories should be at liberty to adopt or exclude slavery, as they thought lit. State Bights were thus again in the as- cendant; and the Southern planters were left at li])erty to establish their favor- ite institutions all over the Southwest. At this juncture was formed the Be- publican party — a 'party whose princi- pal doctrine was opposition to the ex- tension of slavery. The organization of the Bepublican party made it plain to all the world that the struggle between the South and the North — between the pro-slavery party on the one hand and the anti-slavery party on the other — meant war to the knife. A truce was now no longer possible. These preliminary remarks would be incomplete without a passing reference to what is known as the Kansas struggle. Kansas, like Missouri, originally formed part of that immense territory which went by the name of Louisiana. It will be remembered by the reader that the Missouri Compromise left the south- western provinces open for the introduc- tion of slavery. The repeal of that act by Mr. Douglas’s bill did not destroy the hopes of the southern planters with re- gard to Kansas. From the date of the Missouri Compromise it had been the battle-ground of the two contending parties. Both the pro-slavery party and the anti-slavery party did their best to colonize it. From the East and the Northwest freemen poured into the new territory, and emigrant aid soci- eties” were formed in all the Free States to lend the freemen a helping hand. The South was not less indus- trious in its elforts. “ Border ruffians,” as they were called, rushed in from the neighboring State of Missouri, and a reign of violence ensued almost if not entirely unparalleled in the history of the country. The Kansas struggle, as can easily be imagined, deeply embit- tered feeling on both sides, and had a powerful influence in hastening the “irrepressible conflict.” At last, after some years of weary fighting, the anti- slavery party triumphed, and Kansas was admitted a free State 30th January, 1861. While this struggle was at its height, took place the presidential elec- tion of 1856. It was one of the keenest contests in the history of the country. Mr. Fremont, the Bepub- lican candidate, polled a large number of votes; but the Democrats carried the day, and Mr. Buchanan, a warm friend of the South, came into power. The election of a Democratic president was more an apparent than a real gain to the South. Mr. Buchanan, with all his immense influence, could not hinder the admission of Kansas as a free State ; and the settlement of the Kansas diffi- culty was justly regarded as an anti- slavery triumph. “ The Kansas-Nebras- ka struggle,” as Dr. Draper well jmts it, “ marks an epoch in the great contro- BUCHANAN’S ADMINISTRATION. 9 versy between the North and the South. It closes the period of parliamentary or congressional debate between them, and introduces one of violence and open war. The South clearly perceived that nothing more was to be hoped for from peaceful measures, and that, if it were its intention to perpetuate or even to protect African slavery, it could do so only by force.” The history of the next four years is the history of a war of opposing views and conflicting aims. The South was becoming more embittered, the North more resolute. The Buchanan admin- istration was in fact a great misfortune to the country. Of all the public men of his time, he was perhaps least fitted for the stern duties which devolved up- on the chief of the State. Men like Cromwell or Napoleon or General Jack- son would have been equal to the sit- uation ; but Buchanan was neither a Cromwell nor a Napoleon, nor is he to be mentioned in the same breath with General Jackson. Admirably adapted for the high position in times of peace, he was altogether unequal to the stirring times in which he found himself. A strong hand would have seized the helm and acted with decision. The prospect (J war unnerved him; he hesitated, and the vessel floated to destruction. His term of office was marked by four great events — the Dred Scott decision in 18') 7 ; tile John Brown laid in the fall of 1850; the sale of arms to the South, and the oi-ganization and re- tirement from the Union of the Southern Confederacy. The Dred Scott decision was very properly regarded in tlie North as the virtual establishment of slavery throughout all the States of the Union, and converting it from a local into a national institution. Accoixlimr to the decision given by Judge Tanev of the Supreme Court in this case, a slave owner might carry his slaves with him into any State of the Union. Some of the Northern States resented this decision by yiassing Personal Liberty Laws,” declaring freedom to every slave who came within their borders. The bitter feelings engendered on both sides by the Dred Scott affair were ag- gravated by the John Brown I'aid. It was no doubt a foolish affair, which never had the appi’oval of any large or influential section of the Northern peo- ple ; but it was felt by the South to be a demonstration of Northern sentiment, and it was treated accordingly. The execution of Brown and his associates was no doubt justified by the law of the land, but it was nevertheless a gi’eat blunder. It exalted a foolish filibus- tering raid into the character of a cru- sade for liberty, and it transformed a crazy old man into a hero and a martyr. Blood had now been shed, and recon- ciliation had become impossible. In the midst of the heat and excite- ment occasioned by the Dred Scott de- cision and the John Brown raid, the South was secretly and busily ])re])ar- ing for war. Through the indifference of the government at Washington, and through the treachery of the secretary of war, lai’ge stores of arms and am- munition were transferred to the South; and while the North was dreaming of war only as a prol)ability, the South 10 CAUSES OF THE WAR. t was armed to the teeth. Such was the condition of things North and South when the time came to nominate a can- didate for the presidency in the spring of 1860. The people were di- vided into four parties. Each party had its own candidate, and each candidate had his own platform. The candidates were Breckenridge, of the Southern Democracy ; Douglas, of the Northern Democracy ; Lincoln, of the Kepublican party; and Bell, of the Union Constitutional party. On the platform that “there is no law for slavery in the Territories, and no power to enact one ; and that Congress is bound to prohibit it in or exclude it fi’om every Federal Territory,” the Bepublicans carried the day. The elec- Nov. Lincoln on the 6th of No- vember, 1860, crushed the hopes of the South. It was the signal for secession. South Carolina was the first to move. At a special convention, held Dec. on the 20th of December, I860-, 20* her connection with the Union was dissolved by an unanimous vote. The example of South Carolina was promptly followed by Mississippi, Ala- bama, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, and later by Texas. As Buchanan held the opinion that neither he nor Con- gress had the right to coerce a State into submission, nothing was done to hinder the progress of seces- sion. On the 4th of February, 1861, a Feb. convention of the seceded States 4* was held at Montgomery, Alaba- ma; and there a constitution was adopt- ed and a government organized, under the name of the Confederate States of America. Jefferson Davis, late United States senator from Mississippi, was elected president, and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia vice-president. The seceders took possession of all the forts, arsenals, custom-houses, ships, and all other Federal property within their boundaries. In the South, in the possession of the United States there remained only Fort Sumter, in Charles- ton Harbor, Fort Pickens, near Pensa- cola, and the forts off the southern extremity of Florida. On Marcli 4th, 1861, Abraham Lin- coln was inaugurated. In his ad- j^jar. di •ess, the president declared it to 4. be his duty to “hold, occupy and pos- sess the places and property ” belong- ing to the Federal government in the South. This was accepted by the South- ern leaders as a declaration of war. Several of the southern-born officers in the United Stares army and navy, who had not yet declared themselves, now entered the Confederate service. With- out delay, General Beauregard was placed at the head of the forces, about four thousand men, who were already investing Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor. Fort Sumter Avas held by a garrison of about eighty men under Major Anderson, whose name will be memorable in American history. At the time of the secession of South Caro- lina, in December, 1860, Anderson was stationed at Fort Moultrie, but for greater security he removed to Fort Sumter. It was known that the garri- son was reduced to great straits, and must soon surrender, unless supplies and reinforcements came from Washing- CHARLESTON HARBOR. 11 ton. It was believed that the president and his advisers were disposed to with- 'draw the garrison. Early in April, however, it became known that the government had decided to send a fleet with supplies to Major Anderson and his garrison. Beauregard received in- structions from the authorities at Mont- gomery to demand the surrender of the fort; and, if his demand was not com- plied with, he was to reduce it by force. On the afternoon of the April 11th of April, 18^1, the demand to surrender was made. Major Ander- son refused to comply. Early on the following morning the threat which was made was carried out, and Are was opened on Fort Sumter by the Confed- erate land batteries. The American Civil War had commenced. CHAPTER II. Charleston Harbor — Fort'Sumter, — Gardiner and Floyd, — Major Anderson. — Adjutant-General Cooper. — Evidence of Conspiracy. — Transfer of Arms from Northern to Southern Arsenals. — Jefferson Davis’ “Little Bill,” — Captain Foster's Workmen. — General Scott becoming alarmed. — Conspirators in the Cabinet. — Anderson moves from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter. — Great Excitement ail over the Country. — Indignation in the South. — Kesignation of Floyd. — Action of the Secession Convention. — Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie occupied by the Secessionists. — Seizure of the Custom House and Post-Office. — The Southern Commissioners in Washington. — Their Extraordinary Demands Defused. — President Buchanan Aroused. — More Energy on the part of the Government. — The Star of the West. — Preparations for Attacking Fort Sumter, — The Star of the West seen in the Outer Harbor — Fired upon — Compelled to Betire. — Anderson called upon to Surrender Fort Sumter. — Secession Spreading. — The Peace Conference. — Election of Lincoln. — His Journey to Wash- ington. — His Life in Danger, — His Inauguration. — His Address. — Anderson more Hopeful. — Disappointment. — Lincoln “Putting His Foot Down Firmly.” — The Belief Squadron. — Anderson again called upon to Surrender the Fort. — His Beply. — The First Shot. — The Bombardment. — The Belief Squadron Sighted. — Hope. — The Garrison Deduced to Extremities. — Bed-Hot Shot. — Fort Sumter in Flames. — The Last Three Cartridges. — The Flag Staff Shot Down. — The notorious Wigfall. — Wigfall’s Deception Discovered. — Anderson Indignant. — Surrenders on his own Terms. — Anderson and his Men safe on board the Baltic. Before the close of 1860, public at- tendon was centered on Charles- ton Harbor. It was here that the first indications of actual war were re- vealed. The harbor of Charleston is one of the finest on the South Atlantic seaboard. During the years of peace and prosperity, great care had been taken of it by the State and Federal authorities ; and when South Carolina, yielding to the fierce impulses of reiiel- lion, took the bold step of retiring from the Union, it was one of the best guarded harbors in the States. It had the advantage of four powerful fort- resses — Castle Pinckney, Fort Moul- trie, Fort Johnson, and Fort Sumter- Castle Pinckney was situated upon the soutliern extremity of a tract of marshy land known as, Shute’s Folly Island, and was near the city of Charleston. Fort Moultrie stood on Sullivan’s Island, distant from Charleston between three and four miles, and not far removed 12 FORT SUMTER. from the famous little palmetto-log fort of that name, made memorable during the War of Independence by its heroic defiance of the British fleet in 1776. Fort Johnson stood on James Island, and to the west of Fort Sumter. As a forti- fication it was of comparatively little account. Fort Sumter was by far the lai’gest and most important of these strongholds. Its position gave it an immense advantage over all the others. It was built in the middle of the en- trance to the harbor prope ■; and its walls of defiance towered up on the southwestern edge of the ship channel. Fort Sumter was about three and a half miles from the city. A truncated pen- tagonal in form, its walls were of solid brick and concrete masonry. The island on which the fort was erected rested on a mud bank. The materials of which the island was composed were chips of granite from the quarries of New Eng- land. In the conveyance of these ma- terials and in the construction of the island ten years were consumed, and the actual cost amounted to over half a million of dollars. The fort itself cost another half million. The walls, which were sixty feet high and from eight to twelve feet thick, were pierced for three tiers of guns on the north, east and west sides. The two lower tiers were under bomb-proof casemates. The first tier was intended for forty-two-pounder Paixhans, the other two were intended for eight and ten-inch columbiads. The full complement of guns was one hundred and forty, but when the war broke out there were only seventy-five guns in the work. In 1860 Colonel Gardiner was com- mander in Charleston Harbor. A va- riety of circumstances encouraged the belief that Gardiner was in league with the enemy. The strange conduct of War Secretary Floyd and the cunning efforts of Jefferson Davis to secure arms for the South, had created a spirit of watchfulness, and Gardiner havins: re- vealed an inordinate amount of anxiety to have his supply of ammunition in- creased, incurred the displeasure of the government and was removed. The va- cant place was filled without delay by Major Eobert Anderson, a native of Ken- tucky, and an oificer who had won some distinction in the Mexican campaigns. On the 20th November Anderson arrived and assumed the com- 20. mand, his head-quarters being at Fort Moultrie. It would have been strange if a man of his discernment had been deceived by the peculiar state of things which prevailed all around him. An- derson was not deceived. On the 23d of November he wrote to Adju- tant-General Cooper, describing 23. the situation. In that letter he uses the following remarkable words : “That there is,” he says, “a settled determina- tion to leave the Union and to obtain possession of this fort is apparent to all.” All the forts in the harbor, he assured General Cooper, were in a wretched condition, Foi*t Moultrie par- ticularly inviting attack by its weak- ness. “ Fort Sumter and Castle Pinck- ney,” he went on to say, “must be gar- risoned immediately, if the government determines to keep command of this harbor.” Major Anderson’s letter to SALE OF AKMS TO THE SOUTH. 13 General Cooper, which contained much more to the same effect, must ever be legarded as one of the most impoibant official documents connected with the early history of the Civil War. Anderson did not know — did not even suspect — that the ears to which he addressed his appeals were deaf, and that the heart which he hoped to touch was callous, by reason of rank treason. Adjutant-General Cooper, who w'as a native of the State of New York, but who had married a sister of Senator Ma-on of Virginia, was already sold to the Confederate cause. At the very moment that Major Anderson was writ- ing his memorable letter. Cooper was making use of his position to obtain and communicate valuable information to the autliorities at Southern head- quarters. Three months later, he left his office at Washington, hastened to Montgomery, Alabama, and was made adjutant -general of the Confederate forces, then busily preparing for war. Cooper, howevei', was not alone in his iniquity. The national capital had be- come a hotbed of treachery. Weak, undecided, and in the last months of his four years of office, the president would do nothing. The people of the North little imagined that the entire machinery of the government at Wash- ington had been worked for an entire year in the interests of the Southern Doc. malcontents. On the 31st of De- cember. Senator Wilson of Mas- sachusetts offered a resolution in the Senate, asking the secretary of war to furnish information concerning the dis- position of arms manufactured in the national armories or purchased for the use of the government during the past year. Mr. Holt tvas now at the head of the War Department, and the need- ed information was not long delayed. From the report submitted to the Sen- ate, it appeared that as early as the 2Dth of December, 1859, Sec- ^ retary Floyd had ordered the transfer of seventy-five thousand percussion mus- kets, forty thousand muskets altered to percussion, and ten thousand percus- sion rifles from the armory at Spring- field, Massachusetts, and the arsenals at Watervliet, New York, and Watertown, Massachusetts, to the arsenals at Fay- etteville in North Carolina, Charleston in South Carolina, Augusta in Georgia, Mount Vernon in Alabama, and Baton Rouge in Louisiana. These arms, it appeared, were distributed in the spring of 1860. Only eleven days after this order had been issued by Floyd, Jefferson Davis introduced into the Senate a bill “ to authorize the sale of public arms to the sevei*al States and Territories, and to regulate the ap- pointment of superintendents of the national armories.” The real object of this bill was not at first or at all gen- erally perceived. It was not until the Senate was asked by Davis, on Feb. the ’21st of February, to take up 21. what he called a little bill,” which he hoped would ‘‘excite no discussion,” that treachery began to be suspected. On the 23d, two days afterward, Mr. Feb. Fessenden, senator from Maine, 23. asked for some explanations on the sub- ject. Davis was i-eady with his reply. “The secretary of war,” he said, “ had 14 FORT SUMTER. recommended an increase of the appro- priation for arming the militia of the country, and he thought it best for vol- unteers to have arms made by the government, so that in case of war the weapons would all be uniform.” Fessen- den offered an amendment, but the bill was canicd by a strict party vote. It was smothered, however, in the House of Kepresentatives. The southerners were not to be driven from their pur- pose. An old law, bearing the date of March 3d, 1825, authorized the secre- tary of war to sell arms, ammunition, and other military stores which were no longer suitable for the public ser- vice. Under cover of this law, Floyd sold to States and individuals over thir- ty-one thousand muskets, altered from flint to percussion, for two dollars and fifty cents each. On the very day Major Anderson addressed the letter pre- viously mentioned to Adjutant-General Cooper, Floyd sold ten thousand of these muskets to G. B. Lamar of Geor- gia; and, some eight days before, he had sold five thousand of them to the State of Virginia. It was openly boast- ed by a Southern newspaper that during the year which preceded the outbreak of hostilities, one hundred and thirty- five thousand four hundred and thirty muskets had been quietly transferred from the northern arsenal at Springfield alone to the Southern States ; and Sec- retary Floyd was thanked for the fore- sight he had displayed in thus disarm- ing the North and equipping the South for the emergency. A similar boast was made by a prominent Virginian, 'who declared that, what with the arms distributed by the Federal government to the States in preceding years and those purchased by the States and by private citizens, the South entered upon the war with one hundred and fifty thousand small arms of the most ap- proved modern pattern, and the best in the world. According to a statement made by General Scott, Khode Island, Delaware, and Texas liad not dsawn, at the close of 1860, their annual quota of arms, and Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Kentucky had drawn only in part; while Virginia, South Carolina, Geor- gia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mis- sissippi, and Kansas were, by order of the secretary of war, supplied with their quotas for 1861 in advance. For some reason, possibly as a blind, partial advances had also been made to Penn- sylvania and Maryland. This, however, did not exhaust the demands of the South, nor the intentions of the secretary of war. On the 20th of Decern- pec. ber, I860; Floyd ordered forty 20. columbiads and four thirty-two pound- ers to be sent immediately from the arsenal at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to the unfinished fort on Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi ; and seventy- one columbiads and seven thirty-two- pounders were ordered to be sent from the same arsenal to the embryo fort at Galveston, which could not be ready for its armament in less than five years. Th’s bold attempt was happily frus- trated by the vigilance and prompt ac- tion of the people of Pittsburg. FloyM ho )ii afterwards fled to Virginia, and the order was countermanded by his suc- cessor, Joseph Holt. EFFORTS AT REINFORCEMENT. 15 Such being the state of things general- ly, it is not difficult to understand the despei ate situation in which Anderson was placed. From such men as Floyd and Cooper he had certainly small hope of succor. The reply given to his letter was worthy of men who had been work- ing so zealously in the interests of the South. It was contained in fewer than a dozen lines, and permission was given him to send a few workmen to repair Castle Pinckney. In the future, he was told, he was to be careful to ad- dress all communications to the ad- jutant-general’s office or to the secretary of war. Anderson, as we have seen, had his head-quarters in Fort Moultrie. It became daily more manifest that, unless some unexpected aid arrived, he would be entirely at the mercy of the enemy. He had abundant evidence that the Carolinians regarded the forts as their own, and that they were making vigorous preparations to get ready for the attack. In a conference which he had with some of the leadins^ citizens of Charleston, he was assured that the forts “ must be theirs after secession.” Secretary Floyd was still playing into the hands of the enemy. One of his latest orders to Anderson was that he should deliver over any of Captain Foster’s workmen, should a demand be made for them.” The avowed reason for this order was that “they had been enrolled into the service of the State.” The actual reason was that the conspir- ators might have the benefit of the ex- perience of men who thoroughly under- stood the forts. Anderson felt that his position was becoming daily more des- perate. His communications to the gov- ernment were frequent, and his calls for help were urgent. To his entreaties were now added the recommendations of General Scott, who had become fully alive to the perils of the situa- tion. While Anderson was informing: the government that “ Fort Sumter was certain to be attacked on an eai'ly da}’, and that if Fort Sumter was lost all was lost,” the commander-in-chief of the army urged the president to “rein- force the forts on the coasts of the slave-labor States.” On the 31st oct, of October, he asked permission to admonish the commanders of south- ern forts to be on their guard against surprise or sudden assault. All was in vain. It seemed as if nothing could arouse the government to a sense of the imminence of the danger. General Scott’s advice was unheeded; his re- quest was disregarded ; and Anderson was advised to be prudent — to avoid any attempt which might seem like forcing hostilities, but “to hold posses- sion of the forts, and, if attacked, to defend himself to the last extremity.” Poor comfort, certainly, in the circum- stances ! After long and vexatious de- lays, and after a treacherous attempt had been made by Floyd to weaken the garrison at Fortress Monroe, under the guise of strengthening the forts at Charleston, the authorities began to feel that the situation was critical. The president, however, was weak as water; the Cabinet was full of conspir- ators; and so resistance was made in every conceivable way to prompt and effective action. At this moment Gen- 16 FORT SUMTER. eral Cass, who will ever be honorably mentioned in American history for the bold stand he made at this particular juncture, urged the president to order reinforcements to be sent at once, not only to Charleston but to other menaced points. His advice was not taken, and be retired from the Cabinet. During the night of December 2G, Dec. Anderson, with his small garri- 20. son, moved into Fort Sumter. Of his own volition, Anderson undertook the responsibility of abandoning the weaker and of occupying the stronger fort. As commander of all the forts, he had a perfect right to do so. It was a difficult task to perform, but it was done wdth skill and caution, and with complete success. His first care was bestowed on the women and children. It was given out that they were to be removed to Fort Johnson, because he \Hshed the helpless ones, with sufficient food, to be in a place of safety. The stratagem was successful. The susj:)!- cions of the people of Charleston were disarmed. Anderson’s course was ap- proved of as wise and prudent. Secret instructions had been given that the women and children w^ere not to be landed at Fort Johnson, but, at a given signal, to join the remainder of the gar- rison and enter Fort Sumter. The eve- ning twilight was just passing away, and the full-orbed moon had scarcely taken her place as Queen of the Night when the evacuation began. At the proper time the signal was given, and the vessels containing the women and children moved away from before Fort Johnson, the entire garrison being | quickly and without any mishap landed at Fort Sumter. At eight o’clock the same evening, Anderson wrote to the adjutant-general, ^‘I have the honor to report that I have just completed, by the blessing of God, the removal to this fort of all my garrison, except the sur- geon, four North Carolina officers, and seven men.” Long, however, before this letter arrived, the intelligence had passed along the wires ; and while dismay, indignation, wrath filled the minds of all conspirators, the hearts of loyal men everywhere were thrilled with delight. Of course Secretary Floyd was indignant. A telegraphic message was sent to Anderson, asking him to explain. The reply was prompt and to the point. ‘‘ The report quoted,” said Anderson, “is correct. I aban- doned Fort Moultrie because I was cer- tain that, if attacked, my men must have been sacrificed, and the command of the harbor lost. I spiked the guns and destroyed the carriages, to keep the guns from being turned against us. If attacked, the garrison would never have surrendered without a fight.” Excitement now ran hio^h. The con- spirators at Charleston and at Washing- ton were filled with rage. Floyd de- clared that “ the solemn pledges of the government had been violated,” and demanded permission of the president to withdraw the garrison from Charles- ton Harbor. The president refused, and Floyd resigned. Postmaster-Gen- eral Holt assumed the duties of the War Office, and telegraphed to Ander- son without delay that his movement in transferring the garrison from Moul- EXCITEMENT IN CHARLESTON. 17 trie to Sumter was in every way ad- mirable, alike for its humanity and patriotism, as for its soldiership.” In all parts of the loyal North, Anderson’s conduct was warmly and loudly ap- proved ; and five days after the flag had been raised over Fort Sumter, the Legislature of Nebraska, two thousand miles away, greeted him by telegraph with a ‘‘Happy New Year.” Praise of Anderson was on every lip; and it is not too much to say that no public ser- vant ever received more spontaneous praise from a grateful people. Anderson’s position, from the mo- ment he entered Fort Sumter with his lit- tle band, was one of extreme peril. The brief visit made to him at this period by his heroic wife, who brought to him his old and faithful servant, Peter Hart, forms one of the most agreeable episodes in the early history of the war. The people of Charleston became wild with rage when they learned what had hap- pened. The fire and smoke which they saw arising from the burning material in Fort Moultrie, on the morning of Dec. the 27th, avas to them a mystery, 2L which was quickly dispelled by the arrival of some workmen from the neighborhood of the abandoned fort. The truth was out. Anderson was safe with his garrison, including even the women and children, in Fort Sumter. What was to be done ? The cry for immediate action was loud and general. Some of the more excited of the multi- tude wished to be led immediately to the attack of Fort Sumter. Governor Pickens was at once requested by the South Carolina Convention to take pos- session of Forts Moultrie and Johnson and Castle Pinckney. The order was speedily given. Meanwhile the public squares of Charleston were filled with armed men. An excited populace thronged the streets. The Citadel Academy, the great military school of the State, opening as it did on one of the squares, was made the place of ren- dezvous. The government arsenal, con- taining some seventy thousand stands of arms and a vast amount of militaiy stores taken from Massachusetts and New York, was seized in the name of the State. Within three hours after the old banner of the republic had been raised over Fort Sumter, two armed steamers, the General Clinch and the Nina, with about four hundred men on board, left the city for the purpose of taking possession of Castle Pinckney and Fort Moultrie. One half of these, led by Colonel J. J. Pettigrew, made for Castle Pinckney. A landing was easily effect- ed. The garrison, the commander of which fled to Fort Sumter, made but little resistance. On entering the fort, it was found that it was worthless alike for attack or defence. The guns were spiked, the carriages were ruined, the ammunition removed, and the flag-staff laid prostrate. A palmetto flag was brought from one of the steamers, and Pettigrew unfurled it over the Castle. It was the first secession flag which waved over a national fortification. The remainder of the troops, about two hun- dred and twenty-five in number, under the command of Colonel Wilmot G. DeSaussure, proceeded towards Fort Moultrie. Of course there was no re- 18 rOET SUMTER. sistance. The sentinel, following instruc- tions, surrendered tlie fort at once. Here again the palmetto flag was raised ; but as the darkness rendered it invisible, the ascent of three rockets intimated to the people of Charleston that the ex- pedition had been a success. Ander- Gon’s position was one of peculiar deli- cacy. He might have opened fire upon the insurgents when they landed on Sullivan’s Island; and a few shots from the guns at Fort Sumter would have been sufficient to drive DeSaussure and his men out among the sand-hills. But his hands were tied. He could not open fire without incurring grave re- sponsibilities. It was well, as the result proved, that he acted as he did. On the same day that Fort Moultrie was seized, Anderson had. the further humil- iation to learn that the revenue emitter William Aiken, then lying in Chailes- ten Harbor, had been surrendered to the insurgents by its faithless command- er, N. L. Coste. His suboi*dinate offi- cers, l)ehaving like true men, I'efused to | follo^v him, and at once reported them- | selves for duty at Washington. This ; was the defection of a naval officer [ who had been born in the slave-labor States. On the afternoon of the 2 7th, Governor i Pickens sent a message to Anderson, requiring him to leave Sumter and re- turn to Moultrie. Anderson refused. On the day following, he sent his post- adjutant to Fort Moultrie to ascertain from the commander there by what authority he and armed men were in that fort of the United States. The I answer was, By the authority of the | sovereign State of South Carolina, and by command of her government.” Governor Pickens henceforth treated Anderson as a'public enemy within the domain of South Carolina. It was bold- ly declared by the Charleston press that the ‘folding of Fort Sumter by United States troops was an invasion of South Carolina.” In a letter written to Adju- tant-General Cooper on the 28th, Dec, Anderson expressed regret at the 28. course the governor had taken. ‘‘He knows,” he said, “ how entirely the city of Charleston is in my power. I can cut his communication off from the sea, and thereby prevent his reception of supplies, and close the harbor, even at night, by destroying the light-houses. These things, of course, I would never do, unless compelled to do so in self- defence.” On the same day the South Carolina authorities seized the custom- house and the post-office. For three weary months more, until the close of Buchanan’s administration, Anderson and his little band remained locked up in Fort Sumter, not permitted to fire a shot, although he knew the insurgents were gathering by thousands in Charles- ton, and saw daily fortifications rising up a’*ound him, and other works intend- ed for his destruction. So much self- denial has rarely been exercised. During the interval from the close of December, 1860, to the first week of April, 1861, the struggle was going on; but the fighting was done in Washing- ton rather than in Charleston Harbor. The secession contaffion continued to o spread; a great defalcation had been discovered in the Indian trust fund of SOUTH CAROLINA COMMISSIONERS. 19 $830,000, and Thompson, secretary of the interior, and Floyd, secretary of war, were openly charged as accomplices in the fraud, if not for personal advan- tage, at any rate for the advancement of southern interests ; but the most im- portant event of that period was the aiTival in W ashin^ton of the “ commis- ® . I sioners ” from South Carolina, Messrs. I]!ec. Barnwell, Adams, and Orr. On the 28th of December, 1860, they addressed a formal diplomatic note to i the president, claiming that they were authorized and empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and their real estate, with | their appurtenances, in the limits of I South Carolina; and also for an appor- | tionment of the public debt, as well as for a division of all other propei ty held by the government of the United States as agent of the confederated States of | which South Carolina was recently a member. In brief, they claimed to act as plenipotentiaries having the right to negotiate as to all measures and ar- rangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relations of the parties. They furnished the president with a copy of the Ordinance of Seces- sion. They loudly complained of Ander- son’s conduct in transferring his garri- son from Moultrie to Sumter — an event, they said, which had seriously altered the condition of affairs under which they came. They urged the president to withdraw immediately all the na- tional troops from Charleston Harboi’, as, under present circumstances, they were “a standing menace,” rendering negotiations impossible, and threaten- ing to bring to a bloody issue ques- tions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment.” The letter was felt to be arrogant and insulting in the last degree. The president, in his reply, was firm ; but he was can- j)ec, tious, perhaps, to a fault. He referred them to his Message for a defi- nition of his policy, to the instructions given to Major Anderson, to the fact that the South Carolinians had al- ready committed an act of w^ar by seiz- ing two forts and by supplanting the old flag of the Union. “It is under all these circumstances that I am urged to immediately withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am in- formed that without this negotiation is impossible. This I cannot do; this I will not c/o.” To this the com- missioners replied by a letter more arrogant and more insulting than the first. It concluded as fob jan, low^s : “ By your course you have B probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Caro- lina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of Justice as well as Lord of Hosts, will endeavor to per- form the great duty which lies before her bravely and thoroughly.” This let- ter was returned to the “ commission- ers,” endorsed with these words, “ This paper, just presented to the president, is of such a character that he declines to receive it.” The year 1861 opened gloomily on the land, and perhaps New Year’s Day never was so dull. On the 5th of Jan- 20 FORT SUMTER. nary the “commissioners,” crestfallen and enraged, left Washington. War, it was now felt, was all but inevitable. The loyal people of the North, however, began to have more faith in the govern- ment. Under wiser and more patriotic counsellors, the president seemed to have gathered courage. It was resolved to strengthen the garrisons of the forts on the coasts of the slave-labor States, and particularly those in the forts of Charleston Harbor. With this end in | view, it was agreed to send south the | steam-corvette Brooklyn, which had | just ariaved at Norfolk after a three | years cruise. It is said that the secre- tary of the navy refused to give the order, and that the president yielded. Under the influence of General Scott and Secretary Holt, the president was aroused again, and orders were given ; that the Brooklyn should be ready to j start at a moment’s notice. The secret , was betrayed. Information was re- ceived that the Virginians were pre- pared to seize any vessel which might attempt to leave Norfolk with troops. It was reported at the same time that the lights of the shore-beacons in Charleston Harbor were extinguished, I and that the channel buoys had been removed. The order was, in conse- , cpience, countermanded. There was | treachery committed by some one. | General Scott and Secretary Holt con- | tinned to urge the president. If the Brooklyn could not be sent, some other means must be adopted to accomplish the end in view. The Star of the West, Captain John McGowan, a well-known merchant steamer, was chartered by the government and quickly laden with supplies. To prevent suspicion, she w'as cleared for New Orleans and Ha- vana. At sundown on the 5 th jan, of January she left her wharf at New York, and when well down the bay she took on boai d, under cover of the night, four officers and two hundred and fifty artillerists and marines, with their arms and ammunition. At nine o'clock the same evening she crossed the bar at Sandy Hook, and proceeded to sea. Government purposes were des- tined once more to be disturbed, and the fates seemed to stand in the way of the mission of the Star of the West. Intelligence was received from Ander- son that he regarded his position as se- cure, and that the insurgents had erect- ed at the mouth of Charleston Harbor powerful batteries, which made it un- safe for an unarmed vessel to enter. In consequence of this intelligence, the order for the sailing of the Star of the West was countermanded. It was too late ; the vessel was well on her voy- age. Meanwhile every preparation was be- ing made by the insurgents for an early attack on Fort Sumter. Every able- bodied man in Charleston, liable to do military duty, was put under arms. Fort Moultrie was strengthened. Fort Johnson was garrisoned by a company of the Charleston Bifles. New batteries were hurried forward, commanding the ship channel and bearing heavily on Fort Sumter. No boat was allowed to approach the whai*f-head except by per- mission. The city was placed under military control ; lookout boats scouted THE STAR OF THE WEST. 21 the outer harbor at night; the tele- graph was placed under the strictest surveillance, and Anderson for the first time found him?e^f cut off from all communication with his govern uient. Vhe news that the commissioners ” had completely failed in their mission had roused the people to the highest pitch of furious excitement; and the wildest language was used and the wildest schemes for revenge were sug- gested and encouraged. On the morning of the 9th of January Jan. West was seen by the imprisoned garrison of Fort Sumter, coming over the bar and mak- ing her way toward the fort. It was a gladsome sight to Anderson and his little company; for now, as we have seen. Fort Sumter was completely iso- lated. Anderson, however, had no means of knowing whether his appeals for supplies and reinforcements had reached the government, or whether they had been heeded. The appear- ance of this vessel inspired hope ; but it was hope clouded by despair, for An- derson knew well the 'difficulties which lay in her way before she could bring him any relief. Having reached the bar and found all the lights extinguished, the Star of the West extinguished her own, and lay there until the morning. As the day broke she w^as sighted by the scouting steamer General Clinch, which at once burned colored lights as sig- nals, and ran for the inner harbor. McGowan ordered all his men below, and steered after the little steamer, hoj)- ing that the Star of the West might be regarded as a mere merchant vessel. lOG It was a vain hope. The authorities at Charleston were well informed. The name of the vessel was known, nor was the object of her visit any secret. Thompson, secretary of tlie interior, a man whose character was afterwards fully revealed, had telegraphed to one of his friends, “The Star of the West is coming with reinforcements.” It is said that Thompson ordered another de- spatch to be sent, in these words, “Blow the Star of the West out of the water.” This despatch was prudently withheld. The General Clinch was moving on, about two miles ahead, the Star of the West following. When the latter was a little short of two miles from Fort Moultrie and about the same distance from Fort Sumter, a masked battery on Morris Island, from which a palmetto hag was hying, opened hre; and a shot came ricochetting across her bow. The national hrg was hj ing over the Star of the West at the time the hrst shot was hred. Quick as lightning McGowan hoisted, in addition, a large American ensign. It was no use ; these emblems were no longer respected. The shot from Morris Island fell thick and fast. Several balls passed clear over the steamer; one passed between the smoke-stack and the walking-beam ; one struck the ship just abaft the fore- rigging, and stove in the planking ; and “one,” said the captain, “came within an ace of carrying away our rudder.” Some shots were hred from Fort Moul- trie, but without producing any serious damage. During the few minutes this hrino lasted, McGowan saw moving out from Fort Moultrie two steam-tugs, one 22 FORT SUMTER. of them with an armed schooner in tow. The purpose was unmistakable. McGowan perceived that his position was one of imminent peril. Hemmed in by the forts and about to be overhauled by an armed vessel, his own unarmed, there was no prospect for him, if he persevered in his course, but capture or destruction. After seventeen shots had been fired at the Star of the West, the captain steered the vessel around, put to sea, and returned to New Yoi*k. It was only seven days since she had cleared from the same harbor. It was in some respects an inglorious voyage ; yet it cannot be said that the captain or his crew were to blame. If there was fault or guilt anywhere, it lay with the government. It would have certainly been a nobler and more dignified poli- cy to send a war vessel to reinforce h'ort Sumter. Such a course would no doubt have been resented by the South, and it might have given a different shape to the “ irrepressible conflict ; ” ibut it might also have been better for all .concerned. Anderson’s conduct in the matter is above all reproach. He was ignorant of the character of the vessel when he first saw her in the har- bor. He was equally ignorant of her : inside the fort. For t^vo lioiirs this firing contin- ued, Fort Sumter remaining silent as the grave. At half-jiast six the men were summoned to breakfast, which they ate “leisurely and calmly,” as if undisturbed by the terrible uproar around them. It was now broad daylight. Break- fast over, Anderson arranged the officers and men, about eighty in all, into three reliefs. The first was under the com- mand of Captain Doubleday, the second was under Surgeon Crawford, and the third under Lieutenant Snyder. The garrison labored under many serious disadvantages. They had plenty of powder, but few cartridges. They had no scales for weighing the powder, and only some six needles for sewing cart- ridge bags. They were also without instruments for sighting the guns. The first gun Avas fired at seven o’clock in the morning, by Captain Doubleday. It was followed immediately by a general firing from the fort on all the principal attacking batteries. For four hours the firing was kept up so vigorously by Fort Sumter that the enemy for a time suspected that it had been reinforced during the night. The fire told with effect on Fort Moultrie, the embrasures of which were considerably damaged. On the battery on Cumming’s Point, which seemed invulnerable, it had little effect, the shot and shell glancing harm- lessly off. As the hours rolled on, the firing oi the assailants Avas becoming more effect- ive. Their guns Avere under complete control. Every shot told. The Avails and parapets of Fort Sumter began to give evidence of their destructive work. It seemed to be the purpose of the ene- my to destroy the barbette guns. W ith this end in view, they poured their heaviest fire on the parapet of the fort. A large portion of the j)arapet was car- ried away; several of the heavy guns were dismounted or otheiwise disabled, and the garrison was thus limited to the use of the two lower tiers of guns, which were protected by casemates. About the same moment it Avas discov- ered that the barracks were on fire. It Avas now about noon. Surgeon CraAA^- ford, Avho had volunteered to ascend NO HOPE. 29 the parapet for the purpose of making observations, and who had succeeded, in spite of the tempest of shot and shell which raged around him, on returning below reported, to the delight o:^ the now almost despairing garrison, that through the fog and blinding rain he saw two vessels, bearing the dear old flag. It was part of Fox’s relief squad- ron. The Pawnee, ten guns, the Har- riet Lane, five guns, and the transport Baltic, were lying outside the bar. They could not cross. The buoys had been removed, and ships laden with stones had been sunk in the channel. The vessels dipped their flags by way of greeting; but Sumter could not re- spond. Its ensign was still flying, but it was entangled in the halyards, which had been cut by the enemy’s shot. In the afternoon the enemy’s fire had been particularly severe; shot came rattling into the embrasures ; and severe injuries were inflicted by flying splinters of ma- sonry. The shells bursting in rapid succession against all parts of the fort, scattered the loosened brick and stone in every direction, broke the windows, and set fire to the woodwork. The men ill the fort worked with a will. The day, however, had told sadly on their strength. Their firing had become less rapid. Their cartridges were now well- nigh exhausted; and before sunset it had been found necessary to abandon all the guns but six. When darkness came on, Anderson ordered the port-holes to be closed. Some of the men were per- mitted to rest while others watched. So ended the first day of the war. The storm, which had lasted all da}^. continued throughout the night. The firing of the insurgents was maintained at intervals, until the morning. Every fifteen minutes the little garrison cooped up in Fort Sumter heard another shot or shell rattling against their shattered walls. It was a w'eary night for An- derson and his men. But there was no murmur, no complaint. The provisions were all but exhausted. In a few hours more the last parcel of rice would be cooked, and nothing would be left for the garrison but salt pork. The relief ships were outside the bar ; but the storm made it impossible for them to complete their mission of mercy. The sun of Saturday morning rose in splendor. The storm had ceased April before the early dawn. The bom- bardment was resumed with tremen- dous energy. It seemed to be the pur- pose of the assailants to force matters to an early conclusion. Bed-hot shot was now freely used. On Friday the buildings in the fort had been on fire four times. Four times the flames had been extinguislied. Now the barracks and the officers’ quarters were again on Are. The situation of Anderson had become desperate. Yet he clung to the skirts of liope^ with undying tenacity. There was provision to last for three days, and for three days more he was anxious to hold out. With the excep- tion of the magazine, the buildings were left to their fate. No attempt was made to extinguish the flames. The red-hot shot which the enemy were pouring in upon them made such efforts useless. The conflagration spread raj)- idly. It was feared that the magazine 30 FORT SUMTER. might explode, and its doors were locked. The main gate took fire and was soon destroyed; and the sail} -port was now open to the besiegers. The heat had become intolerable; and the clouds of smoke were suffocating. The crashing of the shot, the bursting of the shells, the falling of walls, and the roaring of the flames were terrific, and made, says an eye-witness, “ a pande- monium of the fort.” The garrison was now reduced to its last three cart- ridges. Still no thought of surrender. The flag still waved. Eight times its staff had been hit by the enemy’s shot, without serious injury. At twenty min- utes before one o’clock it was hit again, and this time with success. “ The flag is down — it has been shot away,” was the cry, when Lieutenant Hall rushed out and snatched it fi*om the glowing embers, before it could take fire. Car- ried immediately by Lieutenant Snyder to the ramparts, he handed it to Sergeant Hart, who, sj)ringing upon the sand- bags, and with the assistance of one Lyman, a mason from Baltimore, plant- ed again the broken staff, and left the soiled banner flying proudly and defi- antly, in spite of the shot and shell which fell like hail aroi^nd. Soon after the flag had fallen, and towards the close of the day, a man presented himself at one of the embra- sures of the fort, with a white handker- chief tied to the point of his sword. Pri- vate Thompson of the fort was the first to whom he addressed himself. I am General Wigf all,” he said, ^‘and I want to see Major Anderson. For God’s sake,” he added, as Thompson left him to find his commander, “let mein. I can’t stand it out here in the firing.” o On being admitted, he met Captain J. G. Foster, Lieutenant J. C. Davis, Siir- geoi) J. W. Crawford, and Lieutenant B. K. Meade. “ I am General Wigfall,” he repeated, under great excitement; “ I come from General Beauregard, who wants to stop this bloodshed. You are on fire, and your flag is down ; let us stop this firing.” “Our flag is not down,” was the reply. “ It is yet flying from the ramparts.” ‘Well, I want to stop this,” he said; and holding out his sword and handkerchief to one of the officers, he added, “will you hoist this?” “No, sii’,” was the answer. “Will any of you hold this out of the embrasure?” he asked. Beceiving no reply, he asked, “ May I hold it, then ? ” “If you wish.” Springing into the embrasure, he waved tlie white flag several times. The firing did not abate ; and Wigfall, frightened out of his wits by a shot which struck near him, abandoned his position. The handkerchief was taken up and waved out of the port-hole by Corporal Bring- hurst ; but he, too, finding that no heed was paid to it, sprang from the peril- ous ] ost. Addressing Lieutenant Davis, Wigfall said, “If you will show a white flag from your ramparts, they will cease firing.” “It shall be done,” said Davis, “ if your object is to hold a conference with Major Anderson.” At this point Anderson appeared. “ I come from General Beauregard, who wishes to stop this, sir.” “Well, sir, ’ said Anderson, eyeing Wigfall keenly. “You have defended your flag nobly, sir,” continued Wii^fall. “ You have / O FALL OF SUMTER. 31 done all that can be done, sir. Your fort is on hre. Let us stop this. On what terms will you evacuate the fort, sir?” “My terms are already known to General Beauregard,” replied the Major. “Instead of noon on the 15th, I will go now.” “ I understand you to say,” said Wigfall, “that you will evac- uate the fort now, sir, upon the terms proposed the other day.” “Yes, sir, on those terms only.” Then said Wig- fall, “I understand the fort is to be ours.” “Yes, sir,” said Anderson, “on those conditions only.” “Very well,” said Wigfall, “ I will return to General Beauregard.” Believino: that Wmfall was telling the truth, Anderson caused a white has: to be hoisted over the fort. The Major was not undeceived until' a little before two o’clock, when Colonels Chesnut, Pryor, Miles, and Lee arrived at Fort Sumter, with instructions from their chief to ascertain the meaning of the white flag. When they stated the ob- ject of their mission, Anderson observed that there Avas somethino; wronof. There was confusion on both sides. AVigfall, it appeared, had not seen Beauregard in two days. He had no instructions from him. He had acted on his own responsibility. Having been on Morris Island, he had, by false misrepresenta- tions, obtained leave from the command- er there, to visit the beleaguered fort. Anderson, fired Avith indignation, at the deception played upon him, threat- ened to haul doAvn the Avhite flag. “That Avliite tlag,” he said, “shall come doAvn immediately.” He AAms entreated, howeA^er, to leave matters as they AA^ere, to put ill writing what AVigfall had said, and to wait till they saw Beaure- gard. This he consented to do; anJ the flring ceased. Several deputations waited upon Anderson during the course of the afternoon, to obtain, if possible, better terms. He was not to be moved. At last, between seven and eight o’clock. Major D. B. Jones, ac- companied by Colonels Miles and Pryor and Captain Hartstene, arrived at the fort and announced that Beauregard had accepted Anderson’s terms. The garrison Avas to be allowed to depart, with company arms and property, Avith all private property, and Avilh the priAU- lege of saluting and retaining their flag. Thus ended the bombardment of Fort Sumter. One of the most extraordinary cir- cumstances connected Avith this remark- able siege was that not a single man had lost his life either at Fort Sumter or in the ranks of the Confederates. It de- serves to be remembered, too, that the fort had been evacuated, not surren- dered. Anderson retained the flag, and exactly four years afterAvards, as Alajor- General in the armies of the United States, raised the same old tattered flaor OAmr the fortress, then a heap of ruins. On Sunday morning, the Isabel came doAvn from Charleston and an- April chored near Fort Sumter. The H. steamer Clinch lay alongside the Avharf, to convey Anderson and his men to the larerer Amssel. An unfortunate circum- stance occurred at the last moment. The baggage had all been put on board the Clinch. Of the soldiers Avho were still inside the fort, a number Avere de- tailed to salute the flag of the United 32 BULL EUN. States. At the firing of the fifteenth gun, a premature explosion took place, killing one man, seriously wounding an- other, and inflicting upon other two inju- ries more or less dangerous. They were the first casualties of any moment from the beginning of the conflict. On Mon- day Anderson and his men were trans- ferred to the Baltic and sailed for April New York, where they were des- 15* tined to receive the plaudits and the hon- ors of a delighted and grateful people. CIIAPTEB III. The Fall of Fort STimter the First Link in a Chain of Great Events, — War now a Necessity. — The Grief and Rage of the North. — Lincoln's Proclamation. — Congress Summoned to Meet. — Secession Sentiments finding Expres- sion. — The probable Theatre of War. — Conspiracy to Seize Washington. — Confederate Troops on the March. — Manassas Junction. — Arlington Heights. — What the President could see from the White House. — Military Movements. — Delay. — The Impatience of the People of the North. — “On to Richmond.” — General Irwin McDowell, — The two Armies. — General Joseijh E. Johnston. — General Beauregard. — Centreville. — The On- ward Movement, — Tyler’s Mistake. — McDowell's Delay. — The Three Months’ Term of Service Expiring. — The Battle Ground. — The Relative Strength of the two Armies. — McDowell’s Plan. — Sunday Morning. — The Battle Begun. — The First Hour of the Fight. — The Confederates Driven Back. — McDowell's Mistake. — “ Stone- wall” Jackson. — The Tide of Battle Tiirned. — Noon. — The Second Phase of the Battle. — The Confederate Position. — The Rising Ground near the Henry House. — Terrific Struggle for the Plateau. — Ellsworth's Zouaves. — The Seventy-Ninth and Sixty-Ninth Regiments. — Death of Colonel Cameron, — The Critical Mo- ment. — Arrival of Kirby Smith. — Panic among the National Troops. — The Battle Lost. — A Rout. — Terrible Losses. — Reflections. — The Victory Complete, but the Battle not Decisive. — Effects of the Battle North and South. — The President’s Call for Half a Million of Men. — McDowell Superseded by McClellan. It is useless now to discuss the cpies- tion whether Fort Sumter could 1861 or could not have been reinforced. Our experience to-day is very different to what it ^vas when the relief ships anchored in the outer harbor ; and the presumption is that if the attempt at reinforcement had to be made now, it would be made with more daring and perhaps with complete success. As it was, the fall of Fort Sumter constituted the first link in a chain of great events which culminated in one of the most gigantic revolutions in mod- ern times. Its immediate effect was to make an end of all possibility of com- promise. War ’was now a necessity. There was but one arbiter possible ; and that was the sword. In the South the intelligence was received with a wild yell of delight. In the North, the news produced generally a feeling of sadness. Momentarily there was si- lence — not the silence of despair, but that silence which comes from surprise, from vexation, from an overburdened heart. Soon, however, the strong man recovered himself; and from the con- fines of the British provinces to the waters of the broad Ohio there arose SECESSIO^^ SPREADIXG. 33 that hearty cheer — a cheer which can only come from Anglo-Saxon throats and from men devoted to truth, to right, to liberty — a cheer deep-toned and firm, full of hope and full of confidence. Henceforth the division was complete. Minor differences among the population on either side w^ere overlooked ; and the waters of the Ohio rolled between two powerful confederations, united and prepared for battle. On Sunday, the 14th day of April, April garrison of Fort Sumter low- 14* ered their fiag and marched out of the work. On the day following, April President Lincoln issued a pro- 1^* clamation calling for seventy-five thousand men to serve for three months. At the same time, in consideration of the gravity of the situation, he sum- moned an extra session of Confess — o senators and representatives being in- structed “ to assemble at their resj^ect- ive chambers in Washington City, at noon on Thursday, the 4th day of July next ensuing, then and there to con- sider and determine such measures, as in their wisdom the public safety might seem to demand.” The authorities at Montgomery were equally active. A call Avas made for thirty-five thousand additional troops ; and the call was re- sponded to Avith alacrity and enthusi- asm. Up until the date of the bom- bardment of Fort Sumter, the Southern Confederacy consisted only of the seA^en cotton States. The other eight slave States — \ irginia, Maryland, Delaware, ^orth Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri and Arkansas, embracing the larger half of the population of the South, had stood aloof from the seces- sion mo Axemen t. Their sympathies Avere illy concealed; but they had resolved not to declare themseU^es until circum- stances rendered a decision necessary. The proclamation of President Lincoln left them no choice. Being still in the Union, these several States Avere called upon to furnish their proportion of troops. From almost all of them came replies of the most defiant kind. Mary- land and Delaware AA^ere less pronounced than some of the others. Secession went on apace. Virginia openly joined the Confederacy on the 17th of April, two days after the proclamation ; she Avas folloAved by Arkansas on the 6th of May; by North Carolina on May the 20th ; and by Tennessee on the 8th of June. In the remaining slaA^e States — Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Mis- souri — sentiment Avas divided ; and al- though the contest was protracted and keen, it was found possible to retain them in the Union. The cause of the South Avas immensely strengthened by the ad- hesion of the above-mentioned States; and Virginia was justly regarded as a great acquisition. As soon as that State withdrew from the Union, Bichmond Avas made the head-quarters of the Confederate government. In the loyal States of the North the proclamation of President Lincoln Avas hailed A\dth rapturous enthusiasm ; from the pulpit, from the platform, and through the press burning Avords Avent forth to the j^eople ; and, within a few days, the militia of the different States were out in force, and large bodies of men were converg- ing toAvards the national capital. 34 BULL RUX. It soon became manifest that Virginia in the east, and the border States, Ken- tucky and Missouri in the west, would 1)0 the principal theatre of the w^ar. Towards those States a general move- ment was made by the forces of both Korth and South. From the moment that Virginia joined the Southern Con- federacy, and that Richmond became the rival capital, it was seen and felt that the war struggle in the first instance at least, would be limited to a compara- tively narrow area. Tlie fall of Fort Sumter inspired the South with, per- haps, a little too much confidence. ‘‘No man,” said Walker, the Confederate war secretary, “ can foretell the events of the war now inaugurated ; l)ut this, I will venture to predict that the Confederate fiag will, l)efore the 1 st of May, fioat over the dome of the capitol at Wasliing- ton.” Walker was not ignorant of the fact that a conspiracy existed having for its object the capture of Washing- ton, the seizure of the government ofli- cers, and the inauguration of a provis- ional government, in the interests of the South. Of the existence of some such conspiracy there can be no doubt. Southern men, supposed to be in the secret, have since confessed that if Washington could not be held, after it fell into their hands, the intention was to fire it, destroy the national archives and leave the city a mass of ruins. “If Maryland secedes,” said Alexander II. Stephens, “ the District of Columbia falls to her by reversionary right, as Sumter fell to South Carolina.” The designs of the Confederates on Wash- ington while they determined the move- ment of Southern forces, gave zeal and energy to the North. To protect W ashington became the great primary object of the North. Manassas Junc- tion, a point on the railroad between Washington and Richmond, where a branch comes in from the Shenandoah Valley, was singled out as the rendez- vous for the South ; and thither their troops were hurried forward with all possible rapidity. Manassas Junction is only thirty miles from Washington ; and it wms doubtless selected, because it threatened Washington, rather than because it miorht cover Richmond. It O was a daring movement on the part of the South. If they were able to make their position good at Manassas, their next move would have been to occupy Arlington Heights, which overlook and command the national capital. Arling- ton Ileiorhts secured, it was not unnatu- ral for them to conclude that Washing- ton might be in their hands, before the 4th of July, when Congress was sum- moned to meet. It was a splendid vision — it can hardly be called a dream; had it been realized, the Civil War, if not prematurely brought to a close, would certainly have rolled on in other channels, and the condition of the United States to-day would have been different. W hile the South was busy, the North was not idle. After not a little diffi- culty and some bloodshed, the loyal forces found themselves in considerable strength in Washington. Maryland had foolishly interfered with the passage of the loyal troops through her tenitory. It was a bad blunder; but force and TO EIOHMOND/’ 35 persuasion ultimately prevailed, and the right of way was resumed, not again to be called in question. Towards the end of May, a large army, under General Scott, was assembled in and around the capital. Notwithstanding all that had happened, Lincoln was ex- tremely unwilling to invade the South. Delay, however, had been perilous in the extreme. From the window of his chamber in the White House, the pres- ident could see, on the other side of the Potomac, the waving folds of the South- ern flag; and with the aid of his fleld- glass, he might observe the Confederate engineers at work. By night their camp-flres lit up with a lurid light the southern sky. A forward movement was resolved upon. On the 23d of May, f^fay a strong column, under the com- 23. mand of General McDowell, was thrown across the Potomac, and Ar- lington Heights and the town of Alex- andria were occupied. Before the end of the month. General Butler, with a body of twelve thousand men, held pos- session of Fortress Monroe ; General Patterson, with another column, was posted near Harper’s Ferry ; while Gen- eral G. B. McClellan, with another pow- erful body, had crossed the Ohio Eiver and taken a strong position in Western Virginia. The main body of the Con- federates was stationed at Manassas J unction, and was under the command of General Beauregard. General Ma- gruder held General Butler in check on the Peninsula. General J. E. Johnston confronted Patterson in the valley of the Shenandoah. Another strong force was posted in the high lands of West Virginia, prepared to meet any aggres- sive movement on the part of the Union soldiers. Such was the state of affairs in June and the early days of July, 1861. McClellan’s West Virginia campaign — including the battle at Philippi, June 3d, the later action at Eich Mountain, July 11th, and the subsequent encoun- ters at Carrack’s Ford and at Beverly — all-important as they were, must be re- garded as forming part of the prelude to the first great battle which was soon to be fought. The same may be said of General Butler’s less successful effort at Big Bethel, June lOth. Patterson was still idly confronting Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley. Public impatience, at length, reached a climax. The new regiments were coming in slowly ; and the term for^ which the three months’ troops had^ been called out would expire about the end of July. The people felt that if something was not done at once, the Confederates, having opposed to them only raw and undisciplined recruits, would have all things their own way. The soldiers themselves were disgusted with their life of inaction. The cry became general, ‘‘On to Eichmond”; and it was echoed as loudly by the men in the field as by the public. Arrans^ements had been made to make a forward movement on the 8th day of July; but it was deemed unsafe to break up the camp before the 15th. General Scott, the commander-in-chief, in consequence of age and infirmity, did not feel himself equal to the task of taking command in the field. For this 36 BULL EUU. highly responsible position, he select- ed Brigadier-General Irwin McDowell. McDowell was a native of Ohio, a graduate of West Point; he had seen service in Mexico under General Wool, and had acquired the reputation of be- ing an excellent soldier. He had al- ready been placed at the head of the Union forces in Virginia, and as we have seen had made himself master of Arlington Heights, where were his head-quarters. The forces on the one side and on the other were disposed as follows. The main body of tlie Northern -army, under IVIcDowell, numbering about for- ty-five thousand men, lay in front of Washington, its back upon the Poto- mac, and extended from Alexandria to the Chain Bridge. At Martinsburg, toward the northwest, and beyond the Blue Pidge, with its back also on the Potomac, there was the army of General Patterson, numbering some eighteen thousand men. The position was strong. The three bridges which span the Poto- mac at Washington City were well guarded by batteries and earthworks. The fortifications on Arlington Heights covered all the positions which com- manded Washington and Georgetown. The Confederate forces, numbering some twenty thousand, and under the com- mand cf Beauregard, already familiar to the reader as the commander-in-chief in Charleston Harbor, were strongly posted at Manassas Junction — a place of great natural strength, and made al- most impregnable by the Confederate engineers. Manassas is situated about half-way between the eastern spur of the Blue Pidge and the Potomac below Alexandria ; and it had the advantage of being connected by railroad with Pichmond and the valley of the Shenan- doah. Pegarding Manassas as their centre, the right swung out and rested on the Potomac, below Alexandria, hold- ing the forts which blockaded the river. Their left consisting of some eight thousand men under Joseph E. John- ston, lay at Winchester, confronting the Federal army under Patterson. Such were the relative positions of the rival armies on the eve of the battle of Bull Pun, or as the Southerners prefer to name it, the battle of Manassas. In point of numerical strength, the advan- tage most certainly lay with the North ; but the South had chosen a splendid position and made admirable use of its natural advantages. On the 15th of July McDowell re- ceived instructions to advance and jniy attack the Confederate position at Manassas Junction. It deserves to be remarked here that Patterson, who, as we have seen, was stationed at Mar- tinsburg, received strict orders not to abandon his position, but to hold the Confederates under Johnston in his grij3, and to prevent them by every possible means from coming to the aid of Beau- regard at Manassas. This was part of the battle-plan ; and although, as we shall see presently, it led to dis- astrous results, it was at once well- conceived and well-intended. On the 16th the forward movement be- July, gan. Leaving some fifteen thou- sand men to guard the seat of govern- ment, McDowell, at the head of some TYLER’S MISTAKE. 37 thirty thousand men, arranged in four divisions, and commanded respectively by Brigadier- General Taylor, Colonels Hunter, Heintzelman and Miles, ad- vanced towards Fairfax Court House. This place was about ten miles distant and was known to be in the possession of the Confederate forces. The army moved in four columns — Tyler with the right wing taking the Georgetown road ; Hunter with the centre taking the Leesburg and Centreville road ; Heintzelman with one portion of the left taking the Little Biver turnpike, and Miles with the remaining portion of the left proceeding along the old Braddock road, which, as it passes through Fairfax Court House and Cen- treville, becomes the Warrenton turn- pike. The movement was made in good order, and with complete success. It was a success, however, coupled with disappointment; for at Fairfax Court House, where they expected to find the enemy in strength and ready to offer battle, they found only a deserted camp and an almost ruined village. The Confederates, hearing of their approach, had retired hastily but in good order through Centreville to Bull Bun, a stream flowing in front of their position at Manassas Junction. The national forces were naturally enough elated with easy victory. Some little excesses were indulged in ; but they were promptly rebuked and they were not repeated. On hearing that the enemy had evac- uated Centreville, McDowell’s first in- tention was to make a vigorous demon- stration on their front with a view of turning their right. On a closer exam- ination of the situation, he saw that this course was beset with some peril. He deemed it expedient, therefore, to change his plan, and resolved to turn, if possible, the Confederate left, and seize the railroad in their rear. While thus engaged, McDowell’s plans were well-nigh frustrated by the rash enthu- siasm of one of his subordinates. About noon of the 18th, General Tyler, jujy believing that he could, without much difficulty, march directly on Man- assas, moved down from Centreville towards Blackburn’s Ford. He took with him Bichardson’s Brigade, a squad- ron of cavalry and Ayres’ battery, Sherman’s brigade being held in re- serve. Beauregard, who had been well advised of all that was taking place, was there in position and ready to re- ceive him. The ground was thickly wooded ; and the opposing forces were concealed from each other’s view. Open- ing an artillery Are on the forest in front, Tyler soon perceived the glitter- ing points of the bayonets of the ene- my; and a rattling discliarge of artillery and musketry taught him the danger of his position. The affair was brief ; but it was bloody. In vain Tyler attempted to dislodge the enemy. In vain he push- ed forward his regiments. In vain he brought up Sherman’s brigade. After- an hour’s ineffectual effcnds he was com- pelled to retire. The skirmish at Black- burn’s Ford, called by the Confederate^, the battle of Bull Bun, was justly claimed by them as a victory. The Nationals lost about one hundred men ; the Confederate loss was about twenty. The losses, it is true, were not great;; IDS 38 BULL RUN. hut the lesson was emphatic. It nat- urally enough emboldened the South; while it taught the military politicians and enthusiasts of the North that the putting down of the rebellion was not to be a mere holiday exercise. McDowell felt the necessity for im- mediate and vigorous action. The situ- ation had become critical. Every hour was increasingly precious. In a few days more, he knew he would lose the flower of his army. The three months’ term of service for which the first call of volunteers was made, had all but ex- pired. In his own report the General says, “In the next few days, day by day, I shall have lost ten thousand of the best anned, drilled, officered and disciplined troops in the army.” The Confederate army meanwhile was stead- ily increasing in numbers. Adhering to his plan to turn the Confederate left, he concentrated his forces at and around Centreville, and made instant preparations for an attack. In addition to a force of five thousand men within call, he had around him and ready for immediate action some twenty-eight or thirty thousand men, with forty-nine guns. On the 19th a reconnoissance July made ; and it was intended 1^* to make the attack on the follow- ing day. His supplies, however, came late ; and another day was lost. The July 50th was Saturday. On the eve- 20# mug of that day McDowell’s ar- my began to melt away. The term of service of the Fourth Pennsylvania and Varian’s Battery of the New York Eighth having expired, those troops could not be induced to remain; and the historian must regretfully chronicle the fact that on the following morning they “moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy’s cannon.” At this stage it is necessary for the reader to form something like a clear and accurate conception of the ground on which the impending conflict was to take place. Bull Bun, it is to be re- membered, flows from the northwest to the southeast. During a part of its course, it is equidistant about three miles from Centreville and Manassas Junction, the head-quarters respectively of the Union and Confederate armies. There are three roads running out of Centreville, which cross the stream at different points. There is the Warren- ton turnpike which crosses by the Stone Bridge. There is another road which crosses at Blackburn’s Ford. There is a third road further to the south, which crosses at Union Mills Ford. These are the three principal fords; and in the order in which we have named them, they mark consecutively the Con- federate left, centre and right. In ad- dition to these are Sudley’s Spring Ford about two miles to the northeast of the Stone Bridge, Bed Hill Ford, between the Stone Bridge and Sudley’s Spring, and McLean’s Ford, between Blackburn’s and Union Mills. Cub Bun, a branch of Bull Bun, and flow^ ing from north to south, is another feature of the landscape which deserves to be noted. Along the line of Bull Bun, over a distance of eight miles, the Confederates were posted as follows. There were six brigades — Ewell’s at Union Mills Ford; Jones’ at McLean’s EEADY FOE BATTLE. 39 Ford; Longstreet’s at Blackburn’s Ford; Bonham’s at Mitchell’s Ford; Cocke’s at Ball’s Ford ; and Evans’ at the Stone Bridge. The brigades of Holmes and Early v^ere held in reserve in the rear of the right, as were those of Jackson and Bee on the left. The total strength of the Confederate army was about twenty-two thousand men. In numeii- cal strength, it was inferior to the army under McDowell; but in the strength of their position and their thorough knowledge of the ground the Confede- rates had immeasurably the advantage. W e have seen already that Patterson was stationed in the valley of the Shen- andoah, and that it was his special busi- ness to hold Johnston at Winchester and prevent him from joining Beaure- gard at Manassas. When McDowell advanced to Fairfax Court House on the 17th, information of the fact was conveyed to the Confederate War De- partment ; and Johnston was immediate- ly telegraphed to join the army of the Potomac with all his forces. The de- spatch was received on the 18th in the morning; and by noon of the 20th, hav- ing eluded Patterson, Johnston reached Manassas Junction, with six thousand men. He had marched unmolested through Ashby’s Gap to Piedmont ; and thence by railroad he hurried forward his infantry to Manassas, leaving the cavalry and artillery to pursue their journey as before. The arrival of John- ston was an immense gain to the Con- federates. Being senior officer, he im- mediately took command of the army, without interfering in the least, how- ever, with Beauregard’s plans. The Confederates were now as eager to join battle as were the Unionists, because they feared that unless they struck at once, Patterson, discovering that John- ston had outgeneralled him and made good his escape, would hurry forward and reinforce McDowell. It was a groundless fear, as the result proved ; but it was surely most natural in the circumstances. McDowell’s plan, as we have seen, was to turn the Confederate left, drive them from the Stone Bridge and from the Warrenton turnpike, and so make himself master of the Manassas Gap railroad in their rear. By this means, he hoped to prevent the junction of the forces of Johnston and Beauregard. He did not know that through the blundering of Patterson the junction had already been effected. To carry out his plans, Tyler was instructed to move along the Warrenton turnpike and open tire on the Confederate left at Stone Bridge. Hunter and Heintzel- man were to follow him for a certain distance, then to make a detour north- ward, crossing Bull Bun near Sudley’s Spring, and fall upon the flank and rear of the Confederates, when already under Are from Tyler’s men. Miles with Bich- ardson’s brigade attached, was to remain at Centreville and guard the position. The movement was to commence at half-past two o’clock on the morning of Sunday, the 21st. By midnight every- thing was in readiness. The night had been more than ordinarily beautiful. The surrounding country was in all the glory of midsummer. Innumerable camp-fires shed a strange light on the 40 BULL EUU. dense foliage of the neighboring forests. The air was fresh, and not a breath rustled the lightest leaf. The moon was full; and from the blue vault of the cloudless heavens it diffused over the scene below a soft, mellow light. As night wore into early morn, and the summer sun began to gild the summits of the distant hills. Nature, beautiful in her brightest robes, seemed all-uncon- scious of the terrific struggle which was to disturb the stillness of that Sabbath day. The onward march of the three divis- ions from Centreville, was, as we have seen, to begin at half-past two o’clock on Sunday morning. It was calculated by McDowell that, if his orders were faithfully carried out, Tyler would reach the Stone Bridge about four, that Hunter and Heintzelman having: accom- plished their semicircular detoui’, would be at the appointed spot about six, and that when Tyler had fairly engaged the attention of the enemy in front, the other two divisions should unexpectedly make a vigorous attack on his flank and rear. That demon of delay which had prevented him reaching Centreville un- til the 18th, a day later than he had intended, and which hindered him from offering battle on the 20th, was again fatal to McDowell’s plans. It was six or a little later when Tyler reached the Stone Bridge; and it was nearly four hours later, the hot July sun be- ing already high in the heavens, when Hunter and Heintzelman arrived at their destination. McDowell, who was ill, had followed in a carriage; but im- patient of the ruinous delay, he mounted his horse, and, followed by a few at- tendants, was the first on the battle ground. Before the battle began, he saw that his plans had been frustrated. The discharge of a shell from a thirty- pounder Parrott gun, which fell among a band of Confederates, seen in a ja’y meadow below Bull Bun, and 21. scattered their ranks, was the signal for battle. Although other shells were fired in quick succession, the Confede- rates were slow to reply. McDowell dreaded that an attack was contem- plated on his left, further down the st]*eam. He therefore held in reserve one of Heintzelman ’s brigades (How- ard’s), in case, as he said, “he should have to send any troops back to rein- force Miles’ division.” Colonel Evans, who, with a very small force, held the Stone Bridge for the Confederates, nat- urally enough believed at first that the attack made in front by the force under Tyler was the real one. He was soon, however, undeceived. As early as half- past nine, he was mad-e aware that a large force of the enemy was passing through the woods on his left and tow- O ards his rear. By ten o’clock, the ad- vance brigade of Hunter’s column, com- manded by Burnside, had I’eached the open fields. In the interval, however, he had found time to send for reinforce- ments, to wheel around, making an en- tire change of front, and to post himself in a first class position to receive the enemy. His right rested in a long and narrow gi’ove in front of Young’s Bi’anch — a petty tributary of Bull Run ; his centre crossed the Sudley road to the north of the Warrenton turnpike; A FURIOUS STRUGGLE. 41 and his left was concealed among the outhouses, sheds, haystacks and fences of a neighboring farm. The position was somewhat elevated, enabling him to pour a destructive lire of artillery and musketry on the forces of the ene- my, as soon as they emerged from the woods, and while yet distant many hun- dred yards. The appearance of the head of Burn- side’s column at the edge of the wood was the signal for the opening of the Confederate lire. ■ It was sharp and severe, and well fitted to produce con- fusion among comparatively raw re- cruits, as yet but little experienced to the severities and sudden surprises of the battle field. But the men under Burnside were full of purpose; and having enjoyed half-an-hour’s rest at the ford, where they filled their can- teens with water, they were well re- freshed. Not waiting to form proper line of order, they sharply responded. The Second Bhode Island, under Colonel John Slocum, was the first under fire. Burnside was not slow in getting his troops in hand ; while Porter’s brigade, quickly emerging from the wood, form- ed on his right, Griffin’s battery also getting into position and replying with effect to the Confederate artillery. The battle was now fairly begun. Evans was already sorely pressed, when he received some welcome assistance. Gen- eral Bee, who was next in what had now become his rear, with detachments of his men and Burton’s Georffia bri- O gade, and carrying with him six guns of Imboden and Bichardson, rushed down the slope towards the turnpike. It was a critical moment for the National troops. Burnsicle, realizing the situa- tion, called for help. Sykes’ battalion was promptly hurried forward from Porter on the right. The national line was thereby greatly strengthened. The battle raged fiercely, the Confederate artillery, particularly from its superior position, telling with deadly effect on the Union ranks. Colonel Hunter fell, severely wounded, and had to be carried from the field. Colonel Slocum was mortally wounded; and his major, Sul- livan Ballou, had his horse killed under him, and his leg badly crushed by a cannon ball. The battle had lasted an hour ; and the result was still doubtful, when Porter, having arrived on the scene, poured a heavy fire on Evans’ left, making his whole column waver and bend. Almost at the same moment, Sherman’s brigade of Tyler’s division, which had been ordered forward, suc- cessfully crossed the ford just above the Stone Bridi^e, and added its strength to the Union forces. Hunter’s success, however, was already assured ; the Con- federates were in retreat ; and Sherman was ordered, his troops being still fresh, ^Ho join in the pursuit of the enemy, who was falling back towards the Sud- ley’s Spring road.” The first part of JMcDowell’s plan had been carried out with success. He had turned the ene- my’s left ; he had forced him from the Warrenton turnpike ; he had uncovered, the Stone Bridge ; he had pressed the opposing lines at least a mile and a half, and had occupied the vacated ground. At this stage occurred McDowell’s 42 BULL EUN". mistake — a mistake which, with the light we now enjoy, we can afford to call fatal. The left wing of the Con- federates had been turned and broken, and was now in full retreat. We have already given a general view of the ground on which the opposing forces were encamped ; and we have already, in a passing Avay, referred to Young’s Branch. At this point, it will be well for the reader to form an accurate con- ception of Young’s Branch or Creek and the plateau on which the final struggle took place. Young’s Branch Hows from the west in a valley which forms a cui-ve concave to the south, and joins Bull Bun a short distance below the Stone Bridge. It was down the northern slope of this valley that the national troops had descended. It was up the southern slope that the Confederates were being driven. On the summit of this southern slope, and about the height of a hundred feet, there is a j)iece of table land or plateau, oblong ill form, a mile in length from northeast to southwest and about half-a-niile in width. On the eastern and southern brows of this plateau, there is a pine forest; while to the west there is a broad belt of oaks through which runs the Sudley road. On the plateau there were three houses — Bobinson’s to the north, Henry’s to the southwest of Bob- inson’s, and Lewis’s or the “Portico,” as it was called, still 'further to the south. Across the Warrenton turnpike and up towards this plateau, the defeat- ed Confederates rushed ; and by the aid of Colonel Hampton’s splendid legion, which had come from Bichmond too late to take part in the furious struggle, the retreat was conducted in good or- der. Up towards the plateau McDowell pursued his fiying antagonists. When Bee’s discomfited troops reached the summit of the slope, there stood a full brigade, solid, strong and immovable, in line, and ready for battle. It was the brigade of General T. J. Jackson who had just arrived and taken a posi- tion behind Bee. “They are beating us back,” exclaimed Bee. “ Well, sir,” said Jackson, with the utmost coolness, “we will give them the bayonet.” Bee rallied his men. “ Form ! form ! ” he cried. “ There’s Jackson, standing like a stone wall.” The words were electric. “ Stonewall Jackson,” shouted the sol- diers. The name which was yet to be a watchword and a i*allying ciy on many a bloody battle field, was from that moment immortal. The circumstance turned the tide of battle. In the opin- ion of many, if McDowell, instead of pursuing the Confederates up to the hill forest, had moved direct for Manas- sas Junction, the day would have been decided and the victory his. This of course implies that the effect of “ Stone- wall” Jackson’s stubborn resistance checked the tide of victory which had already set in in McDowell’s favor, and gave. the Confederates tlie opportunity which they needed. We incline to this view of the case ; but we are unwilling to forget that we judge the situation with a larger knowledge than McDowell at the time possessed. He was ignor- ant of the position of General Jackson; and even if he had known that such a force under such a man stood firm and THE SECOND PHASE OF THE BATTLE. 43 fresh on the heights, he might have doubted whether a routed army could be so easily checked and forced to turn around and face the pursuing foe. ^ It was noon. The heat had become intense. Clouds of dust and smoke filled the air and blinded the assailants as they rushed up the sloping hillside. Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by the heavy firing, and by the intelligence which they had received of the success- ful movements of the national troop'^, ordered Generals Holmes, Early and Ewell to hurry forward with their troops in the direction of the sound of the battle, while they themselves gal- loped from their position, four miles distant, to the plateau. They found upon it a force of seven thousand men, with fourteen guns ; but they were well sheltered in a dense thicket of pines. The battle was all but lost; the situa- tion was desperate ; but the brigades of Holmes and Eai’ly and Ewell and Bonham, with the batteries of Pendle- ton and Alburtis, would soon be on hand. Johnston rallied the shattered regiments on the right ; Beauregard those on the left. This done and some- thing like order restored, Beauregard took command of the field, and John- ston retired and established his head- quarters at the house of Mr. Lewis, called “The Portico,” from which he had a full view of the entire field of battle, and where he could exercise a general supervision. When the battle entered upon its second phase and the struggle began for the possession of the plateau, the Confederate strength was increased to ten thousand men and twenty-two guns. It was discovered that at the lower fords nothing was in- tended by the enemy. Every available man was, therefore, hurried forward to the “focus of the fight.” On the national side, the most victor- ous measures were adopted to make the attack a success. It was felt that the Confederates had an immense advant- age in the position which they occupied. To drive them from that position was the task now on hand. The attacking force consisted of five brigades. Porter being in command on the right, Frank- lin and Wilcox in the centre, and Sher- man and Keyes on the left. Howard’s brigade was upon the Pun. Burnside’s brigade, whose ammunition had been exhausted in the morning battle, had been withdrawn into a wood for the purpose of being supplied, and had not yet returned to the scene of action. Schenck was on hand and ready to cross the bridge. With the attacking force were Griffin’s, Pickett’s and Arnold’s batteries, and a body of cavalry under Major Palmer. The entire strength was thirteen thousand men and sixteen guns. Eighteen thousand men still re- mained on the west side of Bull Pun. The five brigades, the batteries and the cavalry moved boldly and steadily up the slope south of the Warrenton turn- pike, McDowell being present in per- son, with Heintzelman, who acted as his chief lieutenant on the held. They were exposed to a raking hre from the Confederate batteries. Onward, how- ever, they pressed ; and having out- hanked the enemy, they were soon in possession of the western edge of the 44 BULL RUN. plateau. A little to the southeast of the Henry house, to which we have al- ready made reference, there was a swell of rising ground, which, it was seen, at once, commanded the field of action. It was the key of the position. Whoever held it had command of the entire pla- teau. Orders were given to E-ickett’s and Griffin’s batteries to advance and plant themselves upon it. The bat- teries were supported by the Eleventh New York, the Twenty-seventh New York, Fifth and Eleventh Massachu- setts, the Second Minnesota, and Cor- coran’s Sixty-ninth. The attack was bravely made. The artillery, with the New York Eleventh (Ellsworth’s Fire Zouaves), who were in immediate sup- port of the batteries, in the face of a terrific cannonade moved gallantly for- ward. All of a sudden, an Alabama regiment emerged from behind a clump of pines, and poured a deadly fire on their flank. This surprise was all the more demoralizing that the attacking regiment was mistaken at first for one of their own. When staggering under this deluge of fire in front and on hank, two companies of Stuart’s Black Horse Cavalry rushed furiously upon their rear. The reffiment was ruined. The O batteries, the horses of which had been killed, were in utmost peril. Other regiments were sent forward, but in vain. Three times were tlje batteries overrun by Confederates ; and three times were the troops of the enemy re- pulsed and the batteries reclaimed. While this struggle was raging with al- ternate success and defeat on the right, an attempt was also being made by McDowell’s left to carry the plateau. The fighting in this direction had been equally severe. Sherman had been or- dered to charge the batteries of the Confederates with his entire brigade, and sweep them from the hill. In the encounter the riflemen of Quimby’s Thirteenth New York, the Seventy- ninth (Scotch) New York, and the Sixty- ninth (Irish) New York, especially dis- tinguished themselves. The gallant Cameron of the Seventy-ninth was killed when, for the third time, he led his brave Highlanders to the charge. Corcoran, of the Sixty-ninth, had his horse shot under him, and was made prisoner. Keyes had little better suc- cess on the extreme leffc. He had forced his way up the slope, and reached the Bobinson house; but the fire from the enemy’s batteries was so severe that he was compelled to retire. The critical moment had arrived. The slaughter had been terrible on both sides. The Union advance had been checked; but the Confederate strength was well-nigh exhausted. Several of their best officers were killed, and not a few were disabled. Bee and Baxter had fallen in the heat of the fight, near the Henry house. Hampton and Jackson had been wounded. Beauregard had his horse shot under him. McDowell had still two brigades fresh, besides Burn- side’s, in reserve. It was now three o’clock, and there was no appearance of Early and his three fresh regiments. The order had been sent him at eleven, but by some mishap it had not reached him till two. “ Oh, for four regiments,” cried Johnston to Colonel Cocke. His AN INGLORIOUS ROUT. 45 wish was soon to be gratified. The mistake made by Patterson in allowing Johnston’s army to escape from Win- chester is now to be revealed. A cloud of dust was seen in the direction of Manassas Gap. Johnston’s first fear was that it might be Patterson ; but no; it was the remainder of his own army, Elzey’s brigade, led by Kirby Smith. They were about three thousand strong. Hearing the sound of battle, they had stopped the cars before they reached the Junction. Hurrying up at the supreme moment, they struck the National right full on its fiank. The fate of the day was decided. The bat- tle was won. The cross fire of the newly arrived troops was irresistible. The cry went up from the National ranks, ‘‘Here’s Johnston from the Val- ley.” In a moment the battle was ended. There was no more fight in the Union men. Helter skelter they ran down the plateau. It was not a repulse. It w^as a rout. Never was victory more com- plete. Never was rout more disgrace- ful. In vain did McDowell try to rally his men. They would not, they could not, hear. At Cub Run the rout be- came a panic. Arms and all encum- brances were flung away. Everything was left on the field. Soldiers, citizens and camp followers rushed to Centre- ville and thence on to Washington, there to describe to the astonished and bewil- dered multitude another than the holi- day scene which some of them had gone forth to witness. At night Jeffer- son Davis, who had witnessed the great- er part of the fight, telegraphed to his Congress, “Night has closed upon a hard fought field. Our forces were vic- torious. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a large amount of arms, ammunition, knapsacks and baggage. The ground was strewed for miles with those killed, and the farm houses around were filled with wounded Our force was fifteen thousand ; that of the enemy estimated at thirty thousand.” The report did not speak the truth ; but it bespoke the triumph of the situation — the pride and spirit of the man. The loss on the part of the Confede- rates was 378 killed, 1489 wounded. The national loss was 481 killed, 101 1 wounded, and 1460 prisoners. Not one of all the battles of the war has been so variously, and in some in- stances so unjustly, commented on as Bull Run. It is not our business in these pages to combat or endorse the opinions which have been expressed. There are, however, some things which, in justice to the one side and the other, must be said. It is not to be denied that on both sides there was displayed much bravery and not a little skill. Never, perhaps, before, in the whole history of the world, was such fighting done by comparatively raw and inexpe- rienced men. On the part of the South, the battle was skillfully fought and fair- ly won. In a better cause, Beauregard and Johnston would have covered them- selves with glory. On the part of the North, there was certainly bad manage- ment. Some serious blunders were made. General Scott blundered by the disposition he made of his forces. He had eighty thousand men at his dis- 46 MINOR BATTLES. posal ; he had divided them into three parts, and had foolishly allowed one of these parts to be flung unsustained on the enemy. Patterson blundered when he allowed Johnston to escape from him at Winchester. He blundered still more when he remained idle in his po- sition after he discovered that the ene- my had escaped. Patterson has since endeavored to explain ; but, in spite of all explanation, he will forever remain accused before the bar of history of culpable inaction. McDowell blundered by not taking pains to make himself master of the topographical features of the ground before he commenced his march fi'om before Washington. He blundered on three different occasions by losing time. He blundered most of ,all in not bringing his three fresh bri- gades into action before the arrival of Kirby Smith. Even at the last critical moment, the appearance of so many fresh troops might have prevented the rout, and nailed victory to the Union standards. The retreat was unusually well conducted ; but this was due large- ly to the fact that the Confederates were too exhausted and too fearful to con- tinue the pursuit. The battle of Bull Run, decisive as it was, settled nothing. The South gained the victory, but they failed in their purpose. Washington was more safe than before. The South was jubilant. The North was humbled ; but it was also more determined than ever to prosecute the war. It was evi- dent to all that a protracted struggle was before the country. Both sides began to raise and organize armies on a gigantic scale. President Lincoln called for half a million of men. General McDowell was removed ; and General George B. McClellan was placed in command of the army around W ashington. CHAPTER IV. • Importance of some of the Minor Battles. — Where they were Fought. — The Border States. — Armed Neutrality. — Lincoln’s Message. — Maryland and Delaware. — Virginia, the Focus of the Rebellion. — Occupation of Harper’s Ferry. — The Capture of Romney. — Beverley. — Carrack’s Ford. — Change of Commanders. — McClellan. — His Past Career. — Rosecrans. — Floyd. — Carnifex Ferry. — Drainsville. — Ball’s Blutf. — A Butchery. — Death of Colonel Baker. — Fremont in Missouri. — Dug Springs. — Lyon. — Sigel. — Lyon Wounded. — Colonel Mitchell Killed. — Battle of Wilson’s Creek. — Capitulation of Lexington. — Halleck Supersedes Fremont. — Kentucky. — Governor Magoffin. — Kentucky in favor of the Union. — Lincoln’s Reply to Magoffin. — The Young Men of Kentucky. — The Older Men. — Kentucky Forced into Secession. — General Polk. — Fort Columbus. — Polk’s Invasion of Kentucky. — Grant in Command at Cairo. — Grant’s Determination. — His Proclamation. — Battle of Belmont. — The Attack. — Terrible Fire from Fort Columbus. — The Victory of the Nationals. — The License of the Soldiers. — The Victors Compelled to Retreat. — Showers of Bullets. — The Retreat Successfully Made. — The Confederates Claim the Victory. — It Might Have Been Different. — General Grant Learns a Lesson. The year 1861, subsequent to the battle of Bull Run, was not mark- 1861 ( ^ ed by any great or decisive bat- tle. There were, however, numerous engagements of a minor character, each of which was attended wdth conse- quences of greater or less importance, and all of wRich tended to fan into ARMED NEUTRALITY. 47 more furious flame that growing war sentiment which was soon to And devel- opment on a more gigantic scale. These engagements can hardly be said to have been the result of any general plan, or to have formed essential links in the chain of events which were soon to cul- minate in what may be called the great campaigns. But because of the hero- ism with which they were illustrated, and the examples of self-sacrifice which they called forth, as well as for the in- fluence which they exerted in their sev- eral sections, they cannot, in a work like this, be passed over in silence. These minor battles occurred princi- pally in the border States, Kentucky, Missouri, and Virginia. We have seen already that the five border States, in- cluding, in addition to those just men- tioned, Maryland and Delaware, were eagerly coveted by both North and South. It was evident from the first that in those States the great struggle for supremacy should take place. With the border States secured, and bearing the principal burden of the war, it was the hope of the Southern leaders that the cotton crop might be raised without molestation. It might still be possible for the National government to establish a blockade by sea and by river; but England needed cotton ; and the South counted with confidence alike on En^- lish sympathy and on English necessity. Situated midway between the rival in- fluences of North and South, and placed necessarily in the very front of the conflict, it was very natural that among the inhabitants of those States there should be great division of sentiment. Every effort was made by the Southern leaders to excite the slaveholding inter- est, by making it appear that the North had at last entered upon a crusade against slavery, and that the Republican party, now in power at Washington, were bent upon the most tyrannical measures. The National government was just as anxious that the border States should remain steadfast in their loyalty. How to deal with slavery was the great difficulty which lay in the way of the North. To pronounce against slavery, it was felt, would be to fling the entire slaveholding interest into the arms of the Confederacy. All through the summer of 1861 every precaution was taken to avoid giving offence to the slaveholding interest. As the sit- uation became more pressing, different views began to be entertained and ex- pressed by those in power. General McClellan, who was in command in Northeastern Virginia, declared it to be his purpose not only not to interfere with the slaves, but to crush with a hand of iron any attempt made by them at insurrection. General Butler, on the other hand, who was in command at Fortress Monroe, decided, on the same day, to regard them as “ contraband ” of war. Armed neutrality found favor with not a few ; but President Lincoln, in his message to Congress at its extra session in July, clearly pointed out that armed neutrality would be more a gain to the South than to the North. “ In the Border States, so called, in fact, the Middle States,” he said, there are those who favor a policy which they call ‘ armed neutrality ’ ; that is, an arm- 48 MINOR BATTLES. ing of these States to prevent the Union forces passing one way or the disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking; it would be building an im- passable wall along the line of separa- tion — and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the hands of Union men, and freely pass supplies froQi among them to the insurrectionists, which could not be done if they were open enemies. At a stroke, it would take all trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the internal blockade. It would do for the disunionists that which of all things they most desire — feed them well, and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitu- tion, no obligation to maintain the Union.” The geographical positions of Mary- land and Delaware, as well as their special interests, prevented theui mak- ing any very strong demonstration of Southern sympathy. Delaware was too weak and too thoroughly hemmed in to be allowed to think either of secession or of neutrality ; and General Butler’s vigorous efforts, at the commencement of the war, had effectually secured Maryland to the Union. It was qtlite otherwise with Virginia, Missouri and Kentucky. Virginia, as we have seen, and as had been evident from the first, had become the focus of the rebellion. The Rich- mond authorities had seized Harper’s Ferry, immediately upon the passage of the ordinance of secession. Occupying it with as large a force as they could spare for the purpose, they held the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and thus cut off all communication be- tween Western Virginia and Washing- ton along that line. Ko movement was made by the National government until the ordinance of secession had been rat- ified, the general feeling at Wasliington being that every care should be taken to do nothing which was capable of being interpreted as interference with the Border States. Immediately after the ratification of the ordinance. General George B. Mc- Clellan, to whom had been as- May signed the command of the De- H. partment of the Ohio, including West- ern Viiginia, was ordered to cross the Ohio and advance along the line of the Baltimoi’e and Ohio Railroad, as far as Harper’s Ferry. Having issued ad- dresses to the people and to his soldiers, in one of which he denounced “ the in- famous attempt of the traitorous con- spiracy dignified by this name of the Southern Confederacy,” he moved for- ward and occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the railroad on the Ohio River. There was a Confederate force at Grafton Junction, not far distant. There was another Confederate force of 12,000 men at Romney. In addition to these. General Joseph E. Johnston, at the head of a large army, lay at Har- per’s Ferry. The force at Grafton was under the command of General G. A. Porterfield. On the appearance of McClellan at Par- kersburg, Porterfield issued an address in which he called on the people to arise CAREACK’S FORD. 49 and resist the intruders, who, coming from other States, sought to rule over them. McClellan having ordered an advance to Philippi, Porterfield was pressed back, first to Beverley and then to Huttonsville, where he was joined by Governor Wise, who came up with lar^e reinforcements and assumed com- mand. In this engagement at Philippi, Colonel Kelly, who performed deeds of great valor, was severely wounded. In the meantime an encounter took place at Romney, which shed some little glory on the National arms. Early in June General Patterson, who was in command of the Department of Penn- sylvania, was making preparations for an attack on Maryland Heights, which overlook and command Harper’s Ferry. Colonel Lewis Wallace had been di- rected to join Patterson. As he drew near the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, June Wallace learned that the Confed- H* erates were assembled in some strength at Romney. In twenty-four hours Wallace had accomplished a march of eighty-seven miles, forty-six of which were on foot. Coming up with the Confederates at Romney, some se- vere fighting took place. The Confed- erates were driven from the place; and Johnston was so alarmed that he evacu- ated Harper’s Ferry, having first burned the railroad across the Potomac, spiked the guns he could not carry off, and obstructed in every possible way the railroad and the canal. W hatever glory resulted from the capture of Romney must be set down to the credit of Colonel Lewis Wallace. It was he who conceived and carried out the enterprize. The evacuation of Harper’s Ferry, if not directly caused by it, was at least an almost immediate and perhaps neces- sary consequence. McClellan’s forces were still at Graf- ton. His army, since his encounter with Porterfield, had been greatly in- creased ; and by the 4th of July he had under him twenty thousand men. Por- terfield had been superseded by General Garnett, an officer who had won dis- tinction in the Mexican war. The Con- federates were afraid that McClellan might make an effort to push his way through some of the mountain passes which lead into the Shenandoah Valley, and so effect a junction with Patterson. Garnett was ordered so to dispose of his forces as to guard the mountain gaps and make this junction impossible. Garnett, with the main body of his ar- my, had taken a position at Laurel Hill, near Beverley. A detachment un- ju|y der Colonel Pegram was stationed at Rich Mountain. McClellan saw that his forces greatly outnumbered those of the enemy, and concluded to take action at once. On the 11th of July, jipy therefore, Rosecrans, with eight- H. een hundred men, fell upon the detach- ment, which was about nine hundred strong. Pegram was put to flight, and lost nearly half of his men. McClellan now came up with his main army. Garnett, who had been joined by some remnants of Pegram’s force, offered re- sistance ; but his rear being exposed to Rosecrans, he was speedily compelled to abandon his camp and his cannon and fall back towards Beverley. Mc- Clellan, however, had reached that place 50 MINOE BATTLES. before him ; and Garnett turned his face from the foe and made a precipi- tate flight toward the north. Pegram, cut olf from all support and reduced to great extremities, having been two days without food, surrendered with six hun- dred of his men. Garnett was pursued and overtaken by General Morris at Carrack’s Ford. Here the Confederates were brought to bay. Turning upon their pursuers, they offered a spirited resistance. It was impossible, however, to withstand the onward rush and the overwhelming numbers of the triumph- ant Nationals. General Garnett, who fought like a true hero, was shot through the heart while vainly attempting to rally his men. When the general fell, the Confederates broke and fled. The pursuit was continued for two miles, when the exhausted troops were re- called. Before proceeding with our narrative, it is necessary to notice certain changes which took place in the principal com- mands of the army. General George B. McClellan, in his campaign in Western Virginia, had been singularly successful. Hitherto he had been the most fortunate or the most skilful of all the generals of the North. After the battle of Bull Bun, there was a universal desire that he should take the place of McDowell and reorganize the shattered army which was principally depended upon for the protection of the capital. On the July 25th of July McClellan took com- 25. mand of the Departments of Washington and of Northeastern Vir- ginia, his head-quarters being at Wash- ington City. At the time of his ap- pointment to this high position McClel- lan was only thirty-five years of age. He was born in Philadelphia in 1826. At the age of sixteen he entered the Academy at West Point, where, among others who rose to distinction on both sides during the war, he had for fellow students Stonewall ” Jackson and A. P. Hill. After four years’ study at West Point, he graduated as second- lieutenant of engineers. Before the close of the Mexican war he had won his captaincy. His Manual for the Army, and his Introduction to the Bayonet Exercise, published a few years after- wards, and while stationed at West Point as director of field labors and in- structor of infantry, gave proof at once of his military skill and of his devotion to his profession. Having filled various military positions under the govern- ment, he was appointed in 1855 one of the United States Military Commission- ers to the Crimea. His report, which contained some sharp criticisms on the operations before Sevastopol, was gen- erally well received, and showed that he had studied the art of war to no small advantage. Some years before the war broke out he had resigned his commission, and occupied himself with the management of railroads. He had been three years vice-president of the Illinois Central ; and at the beginning of the year 1861 he was general super- intendent of the Ohio and Mississippi. The war furnished him the opportunity for which he had been longing. His successful career in Western Virginia fully justified his promotion in eluly; and his appointment a little later, on CARNIFEX FERRY. 51 the occasion of the resignation of Gen- eral Scott, as commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States, was hailed with universal satisfaction. After the encounter at Carrack’s Ford, McClellan in his despatch to the government was able to make the proud boast: ^^We have completely annihi- lated the enemy in Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more than 40 wounded, while the en- emy’s loss is not far from 200 killed ; and th§ number of prisoners we have taken will amount to at least 1000. We have captured seven of the enemy’s guns in all.” There was still, however, some hard work to be done before the campaign was completed. On the ap- pointment of General McClellan to the command of the Federal forces on the Potomac, General Rosecrans succeeded him and took charge of the troops which had done so well in W estern Vir- ginia. Rosecrans was a graduate of W est Point ; and for four years, from 1843 to 1847, he had filled some of the most important chairs at that institu- tion. At the outbreak of the war he was engaged in business; but he lost no time in volunteering his services ; and to his skill and energy not a little of the success which had attended the army of Western Virginia was due. General J. B. Floyd, formerly secre- tary of war under Buchanan’s adminis- tration, had, since the death of Garnett, who was killed at Carrack’s Ford, as- sumed the command of the Confederate forces. A plan of campaign had been agreed upon at Richmond ; and it was confidently expected that the Confede- rates would be able not only to drive the Federals out of Western Virginia, but to menace both Pennsylvania and Ohio. Floyd was to sweep down the Kanawha Valley and force Cox of Ohio beyond the border, while General Rob- ert E. Lee, who now appears for the first time prominently on the scene, was to scatter the Union army under Rose- crans. The plan was Lee’s ; and it has been admitted by the most competent strategists that the rules of war, as shown by the finished drawings, never found more perfect illustration. The scheme, however, was not to succeed. Floyd, who, as we have seen, had taken the command of the Confederate forces in Virginia after the death of Garnett, moved forward with a view to carry out the part of the plan assigned to him. He relied with confidence on be- ing joined by Wise before he encoun-^ tered the Federals in any force. He had encountered Tyler, and having han- dled him somewhat severely, scattered his forces. He had hoped to gain the rear of Cox, and inflict upon him simi- lar punishment. But Rosecrans was hurrying forward. Over the western spurs of the Alleghanies, through the ravines and iip the rugged hillsides, he had, with almost incredible rapidity, led his little band. At noon on Au?# the 9th of August he had reached the summit of Powell Mountain, which looks down upon one of the most beau- tiful scenes of that lovely region. It was no time, however, to halt and admire the beauties of nature. The two armies sighted each other. Aug. On the following day, about three LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA- CHAMPAIGN 52 MIXOR BATTLES. o’clock in the afterno3n, the firing com- menced. For nearly four hours the bat- tle r^ged, both sides performing deeds of great valor. The Federal forces suf- fered severely at the commencement of the conflict. Colonel Lytle of the Ohio Tenth was wounded in the leg and had his horse shot under him. Colonel Iiowe of the Ohio Twelfth, while hurry- ing forward his regiment, was shot through the head and killed instantly. Floyd, however, was outnumbered ; and Wise failing to come to his support, he was unable to do more than hold his ground. At twilight, when McCook’s German brigade, although exposed to a terrific fire, seemed on the point of carrying the Confederate batteries, Kose- crans, fearful for the safety of his men, ordered a i*ecall. The onward move- ment was thus checked in mid-career. It was the intention of Losecrans to re- sume the attack on the following morn- Aujr, ing. When the morning dawned the enemy was gone, Floyd hav- ing retired and taken a strong position on Big Sewell Mountain, some thirty miles distant from the battle held. But for the caution of Kosecrans the pre- vious evening, the Confederates might have been completely routed. As it w^as, the battle at Carnifex Ferry was a substantial victoiy to the Federal arms. Lee w^as not more successful in carry- ing out his part of the plan. At a critical moment, when the enemy, 25,000 strong, had entrenched themselves at Big Sewell and called it “ Camp Deh- ance,” and were threatening an aggres- sive movement, Kosecrans contrived to effect a retreat and was not pursued. After some other unimportant engage- ments, winter intervened and the cam- paign was ended. Lee was recalled and sent to take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina; Wise was ordered to report at Richmond, and Floyd was sent to the West. This campaign added fresh lustre to McClellan’s name, who, although he was not personally in com- mand at Carnifex Ferry, nor indeed since the encounter at Carrack’s Ford, was supposed to be giving a general direction. It was temporarily greatly discouraging to the Confederates, who had expected much from General Lee. Later in the year a serious disaster befell the National forces at Ball’s BlufP. The Nationals and Confederates were confronting each other on opposite sides of the Potomac between Washington and Harper’s Ferry. A slight skirmish had occurred at the latter place on the 8th of October. On that occasion oct. the Nationals, under Colonel J ohn W. Geary, gained a decided advantage. About the middle of the month. Gen- eral McClellan, deeming it desirable to ascertain the Confederate strength in the neighborhood of Drainsville, caused a reconnoisance to be made by General McCall. From Major-General Banks, whose troops held tbe river on the Maryland side, from Darnestown to Williamsport, McClellan received a despatch saying that the enemy had moved away from Leesburg, the capital of Loudon County, Virginia. On the strength of Banks’ despatch, McClellan notified General Stone, who was at Poolesville, of the movement of McCall, BALL’S BLUFF. 53 and suggested that while keeping “ a good lookout on Leesburg, a slight de- monstration on his part might have the effect of moving the enemy.” Both McCall and Stone acted promptly and I ft. desired. On the night of the 20th Stone telegraphed to the chief that he had made a feint of cross- ing the river during the afternoon, at two places, and that he had sent out a reconnoitering party toward Leesburg, adding, I have means of crossing one hundred and twenty-five men once in • ten minutes, at each of two points.” This despatch brought no reply. In obedience to instructions from Stone, Colonel Devins, in two flat-boats from the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, carried over to Harrison’s Island four j companies of his Massachusetts Fif- ! teenth. One company was on the island ! already. A reserve of about three thou- sand men, including what was called the First California Begiment, under Colonel E. D. Baker, was held in read- iness to co-operate, should any difficulty arise. After landing his troops, Devins sent a detachment to the Virginia shore to make an exploration towards Lees- burg. A scouting party of about twenty men, under Captain Philbrick, having ascended the steep bank on the Virginia side opposite the island, and known as Balks Bluff, believed they saw a small camp of Confederates, about a mile from Leesburg. This being made known to Stone, he ordered Devins to land on Ball’s Bluff, and proceed at dawn to surprise the camp. The order was promptly executed. He set out about midnight. By daylight his men had all wmrked their way up the wet and slippery sides of the bluff, and stood on the summit. Without delay, he ad- vanced towards Leesburg, in the direc- tion of the supposed camp; but no trace of the foe could be. seen; what seemed a camp in the distance was only an illusion due to certain openings in the woods. Here Devins halted his men and sent to Stone for orders. Meanwhile Devins’ movements had been carefully watched by the Confed- erates, who, under Evans, lay in consid- erable force on Goose Creek. It was not long until the National troops began to have glimpses of the Confederate cavalry and riflemen. Perceiving that the enemy were gathering around him, Devins, after a slight skirmish, fell back towards the bluff, and halted hiB men in an open field surrounded by woods. Here he received orders to re- main, Stone promising, at the same time, to hurry forward reinforcements. About noon a fierce attack was made upon Devins’ little band (about six hundred and fifty men) by the Confederates under Colonels Jenifer and Hunton.. Pressed by the cavalry in front and by the infant- ry on the left, Devins was compelled to= fall back towards the edge of the bluff.. He retired about sixty paces, and took a position about half a mile in front of’ Colonel Lee, who had advanced and occupied Harrison’s Island and the heights after the departure of Devine in the morning. Meanwhile Baker, who had been ordered forward to rein- force Devins, if he judged such a course desirable, otherwise to withdraw all the troops to the Maryland shore, had 200 54 MINOR BATTLES. arrived on the scene. In circumstances of almost unparalleled difficulty, he had succeeded in getting his men across the river. At a glance he saw that he had no choice. It was too late to attempt to withdraw the troops Outranking Devins, he immediately took command, and assumed the responsibility of carry- ing on the fight. He had reason to believe that McCall was close at hand ; and he naturally enough concluded that on hearing the sound of musketry he would hurry to the scene of action. He did not know that McCall, having been ordered to withdraw his troops from Drains ville, was already on his way back to his camp near the Chain Bridge, and that General Smith, who, with one of McCall’s divisions, was within supporting distance, was without any special instructions. Getting his men into battle order. Baker put forth almost superhuman efforts to resist the attack of the enemy. But the ground was unfavorable, and the opposing force was strong. About three o’clock in the afternoon the firing became gen- .eral. Brarnhall and French had scarcely ;got their guns into position when they were both wounded and carried from the field. Shortly afterwards a greater calamity followed. Baker, who seemed everywhere present, encouraging the men by word and deed, fell dead upon the field, pierced by many bullets. The battle had lasted two hours. On the death of Baker, first Lee, then Coggs- well, his superior, took the control of affairs. The situation had become des- perate ; and there was no sign of rein- forcements. Pressed on flank and front with an overwhelming force, and with the deep waters of the turbulent river in their rear, Coggswell resolved to move to the left and cut his way through to Edwards’ Ferry. At this moment, and just as the movement was about to be made, the Tammany Kegiment, mis- taking a Confederate officer for a Na- tional one, made a rush in the direction indicated by his signs. Thrown out of position, a decimating fire was poured upon the whole column by the Thir- teenth Mississippi. CoggswelTs plan was now impossible. The enemy was closing in upon them at every point. A retreat was now ordered to Harri- son’s Island and thence across to the Maryland shore. The retreat soon be- came a rout. The Confederates pressed forward, and driving the Nationals be- fore them with bayonet and bullet, they quickly took possession of the heights. Down the slippery sides of the bluff the Nationals rushed in the wildest con- fusion ; and while the struggling mass, crowding to the water’s edge^ sought for boats in vain, some of them plunging into the water and attempting to swim to the island, others floating on logs, the enemy continued to pour down up- on them the most destructive fire. It was no longer a battle. It was a butch- ery. Of the National troops at least 300 were killed; and more than 700 were wounded or made prisoners. At least one-half of Coggswell’s command, including himself and Colonel Lee, fell into the enemy’s hands. Colonel Devins escaped on horseback and swam across the river. Ball’s Bluff can only be regarded in the light of a temporary WILSON’S CREEK. 55 misfortune. It did not seriously atfect the future of the war. The mishap was brought about partly by the rash- ness of General Stone and partly by the imperfect arrangements made by General McClellan. It was a misfor- tune, however, redeemed by the bravery exhibited by the National troops. The army of the Potomac did much on that sad day to wipe out the disgrace in- curred by the battle of Bull Run. By the death of General Baker the Union cause lost one of its ablest men — a man as brave in the field as he was skilful at the bar and powerful in the Senate. While these events were taking place in Virginia, there was some severe fight- ing going on in Missouri. The Confed- erates had put forth their best efforts to secure the State. When the battle of Bull Run was fought, General Lyon, who had succeeded General Harney in the chief command of the National forces in the West, was lying at Springfield waiting for reinforcements. Meanwhile General John C. Fremont, who had been prominently before the people as the Republican candidate for the presi- dency in 1856, in obedience to a popu- lar call, had been appointed to the com- jiily mand of the W estern Department. Great things were expected from Fremont. It was the general belief that those qualities which he had revealed as an explorer would stand him in good stead on the battle field. Whether from incapacity or from radical differ- ence of opinion between himself and the government at Washington, Fre- mont proved a failure. The high hopes which had been formed of him were not to be fulfilled. Towards the close of July, Lyon, dreading that if he should wait longer he would soon be overwhelmed by the Confederate troops which were pouring over the southern frontier of Missouri, resolved to strike at once with the forces at his disposal. He had not more than five thousand five hundred men. The enemy num- bered at least twelve thousand. On the 1st of August a skirmish oc- curred at Dug Springs. Lyon L gained some slight advantage ; but he found it impossible to hinder the junc- tion of the two columns of the enemy. Retreat in the circumstances would have been attended with great peril. He therefore resolved to resume the offensive. Audacity he thought might compensate for the want of numbers. Ordering Colonel Sigel, with 1200 men and six guns, to gain the enemy’s rear by the right, he was ready by the early dawn to strike the meditated blow. Sigel was at the appointed place in time. It was the 10th of August. Au?. At five o’clock in the morning the line of battle was formed. The forward movement was towards the extreme northern point of the Confederate camp. The first onset was terrific. The Con- federates’ pickets were driven in ; and Totten’s battery being hurried forward, the enemy yielded and were driven by Lyon’s infantry to the adjoining heights. No such hand to hand fighting had oc- curred since the commencement of the war. But the enemy had the advantage in numbers. Lyon behaved admirabl}^ He was twice wounded, and his horse 56 MmOK BATTLES. was shot under him. Colonel Mitchell of the Second Kansas was killed when leading his men to the charge. As Mitchell fell, the cry was raised by his troops, Who shall lead us now ? ” ‘‘I will lead you. Come on, brave men,*’ said the wounded and bleeding Lyon. A few moments afterwards he was shot through the heart. The battle contin- ued to rage, Major Sturgis having taken command. Meanwhile Sigel’s brigade had been overwhelmed. He had lost five of his guns and more than one-half of his men. Like a rock in mid- ocean the Union men stood firm, the Confederate forces dashing against them in vain. At one moment, it seemed as if the line would break. But Dubois’ battery dashed forward from the rear, and poured a destructive volley into the Confederate right wing. The entire line was thrown into confusion ; and in broken masses they fell back to the shelter of the wood. At- the same time their wagon train was seen tc be on fire. It was now eleven o’clock. The battle had lasted nearly six hours. A retreat was ordered to Springfield, about nine miles distant. The em - my did not pursue. On the follow- ing morning at three o’clock the en- tire army under General Sigel retreat- ed to Holla, one hundred and twenty- five miles distant, in a government train. The battle of Wilson’s Creek, as thi fight was called, is claimed as a Confed- erate victory. It would be more cor- rect to call it a drawn battle. The Na- tionals lost 223 killed, 721 wounded, 292 missing. The Confederate loss was correspondingly great. The capitulation of Lexington, after a seige of eight days by General sep. Sterling Price, followed close up- . 20. on the battle of Wilson’s Creek ; and Fremont, partly because he failed to come to the aid of Colonel Mulligan and his heroic garrison at Lexington, and partly for other reasons, was relieved from his command. General IT. ]\^ov. W. Halleck arrived at St. Louis, *8. and took charge of the W estern Depart- ment on the IStli of November. Kentucky, as may readily be im- agined, was eagerly coveted by the Con- federacy. The slaveholding interests were large; and it was necessary for the welfare of the secession movement that they should be protected. The oc- cupation of this State was in fact con- sidered a military necessity. From the first, however, Kentucky had manifested great unwillingness to sever itself from the Union. But the governor, Magofifin, who had been elected as a Democrat in 1859, was a red-hot secessionist. To' President Lincoln’s call for troops he had rudely responded, refusing to fur- nish the quota required of the State. On two successive occasions — on Janu- ary 18th and on April 28th, 1861 — he •nimmoned an extra session of the Legis- lature for the purpose of calling a State Convention. On both occasions the Legislature refused to call a Convention or in any way comply witk his wishes ; on the latter occasion going so far as to resist his demand for three millions of dollars for the purpose of arniing the State, and even amending the militia laws so as to require the State Guard to take an oath of allegiance to the KENTUCKY AND MAGOFFIN. 57 Union. At a meeting held in Louisville April 18th, immediately after the cap- ture of Fort Sumter, it was resolved that Kentucky was in sympathy with those who have an interest in the pro- tection of slavery, but that she acknowl- edges her fealty to the United States, until its government becomes regardless of her rights in slave property. The loyal sentiments of Kentucky were still further manifested at the election of del- egates to the Peace Convention (May 4th). On this last occasion Kentucky gave a Union majority of fifty thousand votes. Kentucky, it is thus seen, had by large majorities, and on repeated occa- sions, declared her unwillingness to join in the secession movement ; but Gov- ernor Magoffin, being in perfect sympa- thy with the rebel cause, was the willing and useful instrument in the hands of the Confederate leaders. In a letter to President Lincoln, dated August 19th, he declared that the people of his State earnestly desired to avoid any war entanglements, that they had been guilty of no rebellion, and that therefore the National troops now en- camped on their soil ought at once to be removed. In his reply, the president, after reminding him that the troops complained of were all Kentuckians, said, “ I most cordially sympathize with your Excellency in the wish to preserve the peace of my own native State, Ken- tucky ; but it is with regret I search for and cannot find in your not very short letter any declaration or intima- tion that you entertain any desire for the preservation of the Federal Union.” On the 3d of September, in a message to the Legislature, the governor Sep, again complained of the aggres- sions of the North, and declared it to be his opinion that Kentucky would never renounce her sympathy with her aggrieved sister States of the South. The Les^islature was not to be moved. They resolved that the neutrality of Kentucky had been violated by the Confederate forces, requested the gov- (‘rnor to call out the militia to expel them, and at the same time invoked the United States to grant aid and assist- ance. These resolutions the governor had the hardihood to veto ; but the Legislature returned to the charge, and passed them over his veto by large and overwhelming majorities. The young men of the State had most of them, yielding to the enthusiasm of the moment, adopted the cause of seces- sion ; but the older men, the fathers of tlie State, true to the principles of their youth, and wisely fearful of the risks of rebellion, remained faithful to the Union. Crittenden, the United States senator from Kentucky, who had persist- ed so devotedly in his well-meant effort to avert civil war by conciliation and compromise, now that he despaired of peace, did not hesitate to take a firm stand for the Union. By this action his house was divided. One of his sons had taken up arms in behalf of the Southern Confederacy, a cause which his father proclaimed to be unholy, and its pro- moters deserving of the severest punish- ment. Prentiss, too, the veteran editor of the Louisville Journal^ while man- fully serving his country with all the 58 MINOR BATTLES. power of his vigorous pen, was forced into a conflict with his own child, who fought in the ranks of the Confederates. These are but two illustrations of the effects of the unhappy civil struggle in Kentucky, where it had not only de- stroyed political harmony, but domestic concord. ‘‘Thousands of other exam- ples,” wrote one who was deeply grieved by the state of things around him, “might be readily gathered in the Bor- der States. Those at the extreme North and South, though they may be suffer- ing from the ordinary evils of war, have no conception of its horrors as waged in Kentucky and Missouri.” As if impatient of further delay, the Confederates resolved to disregard the sentiments of the people of Kentucky, and take a Arm footing in the State. If they could not use it as a bulwark, they were resolved to use it as a battle field. It had always been the favorite plan of the Confederate General Pillow to seize Columbus, a commanding position about twenty miles below the mouth of the Ohio, and so fortify it as to make it command the Mississippi, and blockade that river completely. The position was all the more advantageous that from Columbus to Bowling Green there was a railroad connection. General Polk, who had formerly been a bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, but who had exchanged his ecclesiastical vestments for those of the soldier, and abandoned the crosier for the sword, resolved to carry out this plan. In his first general order he showed that, al- though he had temporarily retired from the sacred oflice, he had not forgotten how to use his spiritual weapons. “ The invasion of the South,” he said, “by the Federal armies has brought with it a contempt for constitutional liberty, and the withering influences of the infidelity of New England and of Germany com- bined.” Polk had previously been as- signed to the command of a department which extended from the mouth of the Arkansas northward on both sides of the Mississippi. On the 4th of gep. September he advanced and seized 4. Hickman and Columbus. A pretense of opposition was made by the Confed- erate secretary of war. Walker, who ordered Polk to withdraw his troops from Kentucky ; but from Jefferson Davis, whom Polk had notified of the movement, a telegram was received say- ing, “ The necessity justifies the act.” On the same day that Polk invaded Kentucky on the west. General Zollikof- fer entered it on the east, on the ground that the step Avas necessary for the safe- ty of Tennessee. In a brief space of time Polk w^as successful in converting Columbus into an almost impregnable fortress, having got into position not fewer than one hundred and twenty heavy guns, and having gathered around him from 25,000 to 30,000 men. At this time Anderson, of Fort Sumter re- nown, was in command of the army of the Cumberland. General William T. Sherman was Anderson’s lieutenant. It was the earnest desire and hope of the loyal people of Kentucky that An- derson would promptly come to their aid and drive out the invader. Neither Anderson nor Sherman came up to the requirements of the situation. Ander- BELMONT. 59 son fell sick ; and the command devolved upon Sherman, who brought upon him- self some ridicule by declaring that it would require an army of two hundred thousand men to expel the Confederates from Kentucky. An attempt at relief was to come fi’om another source. As soon as it became known that General Polk had invaded Kentucky with the troops of another State, General Ulysses S. Grant, then in command of the district around Cairo, made up his mind to disregard the delusive neutral- ity which had been so long maintained, and to take possession of Paducah, a town situated at the junction of the Ohio and Tennessee rivers, and some forty-seven miles east of Cairo. The strong position which the enemy had taken at Columbus and Hickman on the Mississippi, and the advance of troops from Tennessee into other parts of Kentucky, had rendered the posses- sion of Paducah absolutely necessary for the protection of Cairo. In his pro- clamation, Grant said he had come sole- ly for the purpose of defending the State from the aggressions of the Con- federate troops and to protect the rights of all citizens. If, however, it should be manifest that they were able them- selves to maintain the authority of the government, he promised to withdraw the forces under his command. The foresight and promptitude exhibited by Grant in making himself master of Pa- ducah were characteristic of the man. The same qualities were destined to se- cure him victory on many a battle field, and to carry him afterwards to the high- est position in the land. In obedience to instructions from General Fremont to make some co-operative movements. Grant, who had already greatly strength- ened Paducah by erecting fortifications, had thrown a pontoon bridge across the Ohio, half a mile below the town, had seized and occupied Smith Bend, and had thus cut the Confederates/ off fj’om two important sources of supply, resolved to threaten Columbus by at- tacking Belmont, a small village and landing place on the Missouri side of the river and directly opposite Colum- bus. He had learned that the Confed- erate General Price was receiving rein- forcements from Polk; and he hoped that, by making himself master of Bel- mont, he would break up the connection between them. Having arranged some side movements for the purpose of dis- tracting the attention of Polk, Grant, with about three thousand troops, in four steam transports, and having for convoy the two wooden gunboats Tyler and Lexington, commanded respectively by Captains Walke and Stemble, sailed down the Mississippi from Cairo on the evening of November 6. At ]Vov, Island No. 1, eleven miles above Columbus, they halted for the night. There Grant learned that Polk was sending troops across to cut off Oglesby, whom, in compliance with Fremont’s request, he had previously sent off to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas. At an early hour on the following morning he landed his ]Vov« forces at Hunter’s Point, on the 7. Missouri side of the river, and about three miles above Belmont. A battalion was left to guard the transports. The 60 MINOR BATTLES. remainder advanced and formed in line about two miles above the village. The gunboats meanwhile moved down and opened fire on the Confederate batteries on the Iron Banks. The centre of the attacking column was under Colonel Fouke, the right under Colonel Buford, the left under Colonel Logan. It was evident that Polk had been taken by surprise. General Smith, whom Grant had sent ahead the day before, was threatening him at Mayfield, in his rear, and he had been making his prepara- tions to resist an attack in that direction. Dollins and Delano’s cavalry were or- dered forward to scour the woods. It was not long before they encountered the enemy, in considerable force. About a mile and a half from the enemy’s camp the line of battle was fonued. Behind an abatis of felled trees which surround- ed the camp lay the Thirteenth Arkan- sas and Ninth Tennessee. There was also opposite Grant’s left a battery of seven guns, commanded by Colonel Beltzhoover. This batteiy was pro- tected by Colonel Wright’s Tennessee regiment. In the face of a desti'uctive fire, on the National forces rushed. Meanwhile the batteries of Columbus had shifted the heavy fire from the gun- boats to the advancing line. The guns, however, were not in range, and as yet they did no harm. Nothing daunted, Grant pressed forward his men. In spite of the galling fire, onw^ard they moved, charging over the fallen timber, capturing the battery and driving the enemy back across the low ground to- wards the river, and compelling some of them to take to their boats. In a brief space of time the heavy guns at Columbus were got into range, and the deadly bullets crashed through the woods, over and among the advancing and triumphant Federals. A second and a third time was the retreating foe overtaken ; and although reinforced and disposed to resist to the last, they were ultimately routed, some of them seeking shelter behind buildings near the river, some in the woods above the camp, and others under cover of the batteries at Columbus. It was a complete victory. The National troops gave themselves up to the wildest excitement. As yet discipline in the army was loose. In the face of Polk’s batteries, three cheers were given for the Union; and while some of the soldiers were delivering stump speeches, others were rifling the baggage or supplying themselves with the arms which the discomfited rebels had thrown down in their flight. Although the victoiy was complete, the place was untenable, commanded as it was by the heavy guns of Colum- ])us. While these were brought to bear upon the National troops in the midst of their wild abandonment, Polk or- dered General Cheatham to cross the river above with his regiments, for the purpose of cutting Grant off from his flotilla. At the same time he himself crossed with two regiments to take part in the pursuit. Five thousand fresh men were thus at hand to hinder or harass the retreat. Grant, however, was equal to the situation. Getting his men in order, he pressed forward to the landing place. While compelled to cut his way through the ranks of the ene- GRANT’S LESSON. 61 my, he was exposed to a raking fire from the Confederate batteries on the Iron Banks. The fighting was terrific. After severe suffering, the landing place was reached; and under cover of the gunboats, which had come up, and which kept the enemy at bay, the embarkation was completed. By five o’clock in the afternoon, the flotilla, with the entire force on board, was on its way back to Cairo. Grant carried with him, in ad- dition to all his own men, two of Beltz- hoover’s heavy guns. The estimated National loss was 480 men in killed, wounded and missing. That of the ene- my was 642. The Confederates claimed the victory at Belmont, and exulted accordingly. “ Accept for yourself,” wrote Jefferson Davis to General Polk, ‘‘ and the officers and men under your command, my sincere thanks for the glorious contribution you have just made to our common cause.” Belmont was nevertheless abandoned as untena- ble the day after the battle. It is no disparagement to the men who fought on the Confederate side to say that if the opposing forces had been equal, the result might have been different. Belmont taught General Grant a lesson which he never afterwards forgot — the value of numbers. CHAPTER V. Blockade of the Southern Ports. — Naval and Coast Operations. — General Butler. — Big Bethel and Little Bethel. — Death of Winthrop and Greble. — Butler Believed of his Command. — General John E. Wool. — The Hatteras Expedition. — Butler and Stringham in Command. — Forts Hatteras and Clark. — Landing the Troops. — The Bom- bardment. — The Monticello Aground. — The Nationals in Fort Clark. — The Mistake. — The Second Day. — Decep- tion on the part of the Confederates. — The Bomb-Proof. — The White Flag. — The Forts Occupied by the Nation- als. — Great Joy in the North. — Colonel Hawkins Closing up the Passages to the Sound. — RoanokeTsland. — The Scheme of the Ocracoke. — Chicamacomico. — The Steamtug Fanny.— Capture of the Fanny by the Confede- rates. — The Failure of the Expedition to Chicamacomico. — The Confederates Land on Hatteras Island. — Brown’s Retreat. — The Confederates Driven from Hatteras Island. — Gulf of Mexico. — Fort Pickens. — “Billy” Wilson end His Zouaves. —Warrington Navy Yard. — Burning of the Dry Dock. — Burning of the Juda. — Battle of Santa Rosa. — “Death to Wilson.” — The Confederates Defeated. — “Billy” Wilson’s Letter. — Fort McRae. — General Braxton Bragg. — Fort Pickens Opens Fire on Bragg’s Works. — Two Days’ Bombardment. — The Mouths of the Mississippi. — The Southwest Pass. — The Boast of Hollins. — The Manassas. — Her Attack on the Rich- mond. — What She Might Have Done. — The Port Royal Expedition. — General T. W. Sherman. — Samuel F. Dupont. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Roads. — A Magnificent Spectacle. — Sealed Orders. — The Storm. — The Fleet Dispersed. — Saved from the Perils of the Deep. — Place of Destination Known. — The Confederates Forewarned. — Port Royal. — Forts Walker and Beauregard. — Preparations for the Attack. — The Plan. — The Attack. — The Forts Abandoned. — A Great Victory. — Negro Misrule. — Bay of St. Helena. — Warsaw Sound. — The Union Flag floating over Georgia. — Port Royal Ferry. — Naval and Land Expedition to Port Royal, Ferry. — Heavy Cannonading by the Gunboats. — The Fort Abandoned. — The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders. — The Eighth Michigan. —A Flag of Truce. — Sunset. — The End of the First Day. — The Enemy Reappears in the Morning. — The Gunboats Rake the Woods. — The Battle Ended. — The Coast Expeditions so far Successful.*^ Almost immediately after the inau- 1861 President Lincoln, the attention of the government was directed to the necessity of blockading the southern ports. A proclamation was accordingly issued, announcing that 62 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. an insurrection had broken out in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, that in those States the revenue dues could no longer be collected, that the persons combined in this insurrection had threat- ened to grant letters of marque against the commerce of the United States, and that therefore the ports of the aforesaid States were forthwith blockaded. A April little later, on the 27th of April, 27. another proclamation was issued ; and the ports of Virginia and North Carolina wei*e included. This was fol- lowed on the part of the South by the authorization of privateers. The at- tempt to effect a blockade on the part of the North, and the authorization of privateers on the part of the South, necessarily gave birth to land and naval encounters of greater or lesser import- ance. In a history of the Battles of the Civil War, these cannot be omitted without marring the completeness of the woi*k. It will, therefoi'e, be our ob- ject in this chapter to group together a few of the more important of these na- val and coast operations. Attention is first called to the coast of North Carolina. At the commence- ment of the war, General Butler made himself conspicuous by his vigorous conduct in suppressing the Baltimore riots, and by so establishing order in Maryland that that State never again wavered in its loyalty to the government at Washington. Butler’s conduct of affairs at Baltimore, successful as it was, did not meet the approval of General Scott. It could hardly have been other- wise. General Scott had spent a long lifetime in camp and field. He was a strict disciplinarian, and, from natural instinct as from training and lifelong habit, a man of order. General Butler had purpose and will ; but he was to- tally without military experience ; and it was of all things the most natural that, judged by the high standard of such a man as General Scott, he should be found wanting. Butler was or- dered to take command at Fort- 22. ress Monroe. Soon after his arrival there, he found himself at the head of twelve thousand troops. Magruder lay in front of him at Yorktown, having outposts at Big Bethel and Little Bethel, with a force amounting in all to not more than eight thousand. With the exception of the fortress, the entire pen- insula was in the hands of the Confed- erates. Butler being considerably rein- forced, resolved to extend the area 'of liis authority. He had but litfle difficul- ty in making himself master of Hampton and Newport News. His subse- May quent efforts against Little Bethel 27. and Big Bethel were less fortunate. Little acquainted with the ground — lit- tle acquainted, indeed, with the art of war, and influenced by the counsels of men who were less experienced than himself, he fell into a series of blunders, the very reverse of creditable to the National army. There was no lack of heroism on the part of the troops; but the management was wretched. In Major Theodore W inthrop and in June Lieutenant Greble, both of whom were killed, the North lost two promis- ing young officers ; but Big Bethel and Little Bethel will be remembered in HATTERAS INLET. 63 connection with National disaster and National disgrace. It was an ill-fated expedition ; and it was visited with the worst of all kinds of punishment — con- demnation by the whole people. Butler was relieved of his command, Major-General John E. Wool having been appointed to take his place. Butler had no duty assigned to him. Wool, as generous as he was far-seeing, gave him command of all the volunteer troops outside the fortress. Butler again found his opportunity. Informa- tion had, some short time before, been conveyed to Commodore Stringham, then commanding at Hampton Boads, that Hatteras Inlet was being freely used by English blockade runners, which were supplying the Confederates with arms, ammunition, and clothing. Stringham communicated the fact to Butler; and Butler reported to Wash- ington, suggesting that land and naval forces should be sent to capture the forts at the inlet, and close up the pass- age. The suggestion was acted upon ; and a squadron of vessels, on which were to be conveyed some nine hundred men, now lying in Hampton Koads, was got in immediate readiness. To General Butler was assigned the com- mand of the troops. Commodore String- ham took command of the squadron. Silas H. Stringham was born at New- burg. New York, in the year 1796. His first naval service was as midship- man, on board the frigate President, Commodore Kodgers, in 1809. In 1830 he commanded on the West India sta- tion. From 1835 to 1837 he held a command in the Mediterranean. He subsequently commanded the Porpoise, the Independent, and the Ohio. When the Mexican war broke out, he was in command at the Brooklyn Navy Yard. He again took charge of the Ohio ; and in the successful bombardment of Vera Cruz and in the capture of the Castle of San Juan d’Ulloa, it was he who led the squadron. From 1852 to 1855 he was in command of the Mediterranean squadron. From the time of his return to the commencement of the war, he was in charge of the Charlestown Navy Yard, Massachusetts. He left that post to take chief command of the naval force blockading the hostile States. While on this service, he was called to take charge of the first naval expedi- tion. Stringham, it will thus be seen, was a man of large experience ; and it was everywhere felt that the expedition was safe in his hands. Butler took passage by the Minne- sota. His troops were on the transports George Peabody and Adelaide. In addi- tion to these vessels there were the Paw- nee, Monticello, and Harriet Lane. The frigate Cumberland also was ordered to join the squadron. On the afternoon of Tuesday, August 27th, the Au?. ships w^ere brought to anchor, about eighteen miles from the cape; and preparations were made for land- ing the troops early on the following morning. On the west end of Hat- teras Island, and commanding the in- let, were two forts, named respectively Hatteras and Clark. It was arranged that the troops should land a short dis- tance up the beach, so as to be able to attack the forts in the rear, while the 64 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. vessels should advance and assail them in front. Breakfast was served at four o’clock. The Cumberland, a sailing vessel, was taken in tow by the Wabash and dragged to her position. Both vessels opened fire about a quarter to ten o’clock. The flag-ship Minnesota shortly afterwards passed inside the other two and joined in the fight. Later, the Susquehanna, which had also joined the expedition, came up and opened fire. Great difficulty was experienced in landing the troops. The breakers were high and beating heavily. The boats were dashed against the beach with great violence ; and one of them, belonging to the Pawnee, was actual- ly capsized. Fortunately no one was drowned. About three hundred men succeeded in effecting a landing, under cover of the guns of the Monticello and Harriet Lane. After four hours con- tinuous work, the firing ceased on both sides. The flags of the forts were taken down. It was believed by the Nation- als that both works were about to be surrendered. The Monticello moved cautiously into the inlet, followed by the Harriet Lane. As they entered, fire was immediately opened by Fort Hatteras; and it fell heavily on the Monticello. The other vessels, the Min- nesota, Susquehanna, and Pawnee now reopened fire. The contest was contin- ued until half-past six o’clock, when the whole squadron, with the exception of the Harriet Lane and the Pawnee, was withdrawn for the night. During the fight the Monticello unhappily ran aground; and although she kept up a most vigorous fire on Fort Hatteras, dis- charging fifty-five shells in fifty minutes, it seemed for a time as if she could not escape destruction. At the close of the day’s struggle she got off, and floated out of range of the guns. She had re- ceived seven eight-inch shot in her hull. The damage done, however, was not serious ; nor had she sustained the loss of a single man. Meanwhile some of the troops who had got on shore had had a singular experience. When the forts ceased firing, and the flags were taken down, they discovered that Fort Clark was abandoned, the men having fled to Fort Hatteras. Taking posses- sion of the abandoned fort, they raised over it the Union flag. Seeing the flag again raised, but unable to recog- nize it as their own, the war ships re- opened fire upon Fort Clark, and the National troops were compelled to re- tire to the landing. There they spent the night as best they were able. In the morning they did some good service by turning their rifled howitzer, which they had managed to carry with them, on some Confederate steamers which were lying off in the bay, compelling them to retire, and thus preventing any other than signal communications with Fort Hatteras. They were again placed in peril by the firing of the Pawnee ; and it was not until the white flag was hoisted that they were perfect- ly safe. In the morning the ships resumed the bombardment. An eleven- inch shell was flung from the 29. Susquehanna. Her example was fol- lowed by the Minnesota and the Wa- bash. The guns were admirably man- BUTLER^S SUCCESS. 65 aged ; and it was seen that every shell was falling and exploding inside Fort Hatteras. The Harriet Lane and the Cumberland came up a little later, and, taking part in the fight, greatly added to the severity of the fire. For a time the Confederates continued to resist with great spirit. Once again they at- tempted to deceive by hauling down the flag. This time, however, the Na- tionals were not to be caught. The fir- ing from the ships continued, the shell falling thick and fast within the fort, and working terrible destruction. The garrison, unable any longer to endure the tremendous punishment they were receiving, had taken refuge inside the bomb-proof. Here, however, they were not long to be safe. An eleven-inch shell found its way through the ventila- tor and exploded in the midst of them. This was the determining shot of the day. Kesistance now was no longer pos- sible. The white flag was raised and the firing ceased. General Butler, on board the tug Fanny, landed at the fort and demanded an unconditional surren- der. To this the Confederate command- er, Commodore Barron, objected, and Butler yielded so far as to agree that the officers and men should be treated as prisoners of war. A treaty was signed by Commodore Stringham and General Butler on the one hand and by Commodore Barron, Colonel Martin, and Major Andrews on the other; and the Union flag floated once more over the forts commanding Hatteras Inlet. Although the firing had been severe, there was little loss of life. The loss was all on the side of the Confederates. On the National side, according to Gen- eral Butler’s report, not a man was killed or injured. The result of the Hatteras expedition was a great triumph for the North. All over that section the intelligence was received with transports of delight. It had, as was natural, a correspondingly depressing influence on the South. It was a gain to General Butler. He had redeemed his reputation, or rather he had made it. His instructions were to destroy the forts and not to hold them. Convinced that the forts should be held, he hurried to Washington, and explain- ed his views to the government in per- son. The forts were held ; and Butler was commissioned by the secretary of war to go to New England and “raise, arm, uniform, and equip a volunteer force for the war.” It was confidently expected that the success of the Hatteras expedition would enable the Nationals to seize and hold the whole coast of North Car- olina washed by the waters of Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. This expecta- tion was not to be realized. On Butler’s departure for W ashington Colonel Haw- kins was left in charge of the post at Hatteras. He had with him a portion of the Ninth New York, a Zouave regi- ment. In September he was joined by Colonel Brown and the Twentieth Indi- ana regiment. Hawkins held the island of Hatteras and guarded the inlet. He proceeded to close up the passages from the sea to the two sounds. Attention was first given to Ocracoke Inlet, a few miles down the coast from Hatteras. Lieutenant J. T. Maxwell was sent 66 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. thither, with a detachment of marines and soldiers, on board the tugboat Fanny. An earthwork called Fort Ocracoke and the older Fort Morgan had been abandoned. Maxwell de- stroyed the forts and returned. Another expedition, to which even Sep. greater importance was attached, 29* was sent up the island to a ham- let named Chicamacomico. It had be- come known that the Confederates had taken possession of Roanoke Island with three thousand men, and it was believed that their intention was to land on Hat- teras and make an attempt to recover what they had lost. Colonel Brovm, with his Twentieth Indiana, was ordered to Chicamacomico to hold the enemy in check. The regiment, which was land- ed in small boats, was destitute of eve- rything except a small quantity of pro- visions. All the supplies, camp equip- age, and intrenching implements had been put on board the steamtug Fanny. This vessel was detained at the forts a day beyond the appointed time. She Oft, did not sail before the 1st of Oc- b tober. On the evening of that day she appeared off the point; and when she was about to land her stores, three gunboats hove in sight and opened fire upon her. The Fanny had time neither to land her stores nor to make her escape. One boat only, with ten persons on board, had put off for land. These ten escaped. All the others, to the number of thirty-one, including sol- diers and sailors, together with the tug- boat and its precious freight, the latter equal in value to one hundred and fifty thousand dollars, fell into the hands of the Confederates. The enterprise was completely defeated. Encouraged by this success, the enemy grew more bold ; and on the 4th of October o’ft, a squadron of six steamers, hav- 4. ihg on board over two thousand men, appeared off Chicamacomico. Shells were immediately flung into the N’ation- al camp ; and under cover of the fire, two bodies of men were landed, one above and one below the encampment, the object evidently being to surround the regiment and cut off its retreat. Brown succeeded in eluding the vigi- lance of the enemy and carried off his men ; but it was not until he had reach- ed the lighthouse at Cape Hatteras, after having marched twenty-eight miles and experienced great privation, that he felt himself perfectly safe. It was not without good reason that the Con- federates boasted loudly of this victory. It was a real victory, and was, besides, a positive gain. It enabled them to hold on to Roanoke Island — a posses- sion which, so long as they held it, gave them control of Loggerhead and Oregon Inlets, and thus neutralized to a large extent the victory won by Stringham and Butler. They were not, however, long permitted to remain on the island of Hatteras. Under the heavy firing of the Monticello and Susquehanna, they were soon compelled to take to their boats and fly for their lives. The great mistake committed in this expedition was in allowing l^e steamtug Fanny to sail without a proper convoy. Skilful management should have made such a disaster impossible. Movements of this description were SAXTA ROSA. 67 not confined to the coast of North Caro- lina. Events quite as thrilling were taking place in the neighborhood of Fort Pickens, on the waters of the gulf of Mexico. That place had narrowly escaped being seized by the Pensacola insurgents in the spring ; and the island of Santa Posa, on which Fort Pickens i ; built, had since June been guarded l)y the New York Sixth, known as Wil- son’s Zouaves. Besides these troops there was a small blockading squadron, with a garrison ixi the fort. Colonel “ Billy ” Wilson was somewhat of a character. His regiment, which had been raised almost entirely in New York, was composed of men who were never indisposed to a little riotous sport, and who knew nothing of fear. For some months life was rather tame at Santa Rosa. Wilson and his men had, however, contrived to make themselves specially obnoxious to the Confederates on the mainland. Descents on the coast were frequently threatened; and the Confederate supply boats were al- ways in danger. It was not till the Sep. night of the 2d of September that 2* anything of a serious nature oc- curred. On that night a party from Fort Pickens, under Lieutenant Shepley, crossed over and burned the dry dock at the navy yard at Warrington. On Sep. fiiG night of the 13th the experi- ment was repeated. At the head of about one hundred men. Lieutenant John H. Russel, of Commodore Mer- win’s flag-ship Colorado, reached the y^^^i ^nd before morning had boarded a large schooner called the Juda, then being fitted out as a pri- vateer, had spiked a ten-inch colum- biad with which she was armed, and burned the vessel to the water’s edge. With the help of mufided oars, they managed to reach the ship, accomplish their purpose, and get out of the reach of danger before tlie Confederates were aware of what had happened. Naturally enough, these repeated acts of daring and of violence roused the Confederates to a high pitch of excite- ment and of indignation. Such doings were no longer to be tolerated. The Nationals must be driven from Santa Rosa. Wilson’s troops especially must be captured or destroyed. With this end in view. General Anderson, assisted by General Ruggles, gathered together about fifteen hundred men, mostly vol- unteers for this special service, from the various camps in the neighborhood of Pensacola. Embarking this force on^ the night of October 8th, on sev- oct. eral steamers, Anderson landed 8. next morning at Deer Point, Santa Rosa Island, some four or five miles to the east of the Zouave encampment. Ar- ranging his force into three divisions, he marched immediately upon the camp. The pickets were driven in; and the Zouaves, little dreaming of their danger, found themselves beset by their furious antagonists. Death to Wilson,” “No quarter” — such were the cries which intimated too plainly the near presence and the deadly purpose of the Confed- erates. The night was unusually dark. The Zouaves, however, were not found wanting. Offering a stout resistance, and contesting the ground as they re- tired, they fell back in good order, 68 XAVAL AXD COAST ‘OPEEATIOXS. under cover of the two batteries Lincoln and Totten, situated on either side of the island, and about four hundred yards from Fort Pickens. Here they were met by reinforcements from Fort Pickens — two companies under Major Vogdes and other two under Major Arnold; and the combined force turned and charged upon the Confederates. The latter, meanwhile, had been rifling the camp and setting Are to the tents and the ban*acks. Not susj)ecting the sudden re- turn of the Nationals, Anderson’s men were somewhat disorganized. It was their turn now to be taken by surprise. In the wildest confusion they rushed towards the boats, the Nationals pursu- ing and pouring volley upon volley into their disordered ranks. While embark- ing and making sail they sutfered se- verely, one of their launches, loaded with men, being so riddled with bullets that it sank. The Confederates, it was estimated, lost by this affair about one hundred and flfty men. The National ' loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, amounted to sixty-four men. Among the prisoners carried off was Major Vogdes. In a characteristic letter, sent to General Arthur of New York, Billy ” Wilson says, “ They are exhibiting my head and hair in Pensacola. The re- ward is already claimed ; also, an old flag which I nailed to a flagstaff on the Fourth of July, which has been left there ever since; nothing left, however, but the stars. The ladies have cut it up in pieces, and have it pinned on their bosoms as a trophy. Every one in Pensacola has my sword and uniform. I must have had a large quantity of hair, plenty of swords and uniforms. They say if I was to be taken alive, I was to be put in a cage and exhibited.” Such was the battle of Santa Rosa. During the course of the next month Colonel Harvey Brown, who had charge of the garrison at Fort Pickens, acting in conjunction with flag-officer McKean, who was in command of the little block- ading squadron in the neighborhood, opened fire upon the Confederate works which lined the shore from the navy yard to Fort McRae. After a bom- bardment of two days, November 22-23, the firing ceased, but not 22. until the village of Warrington was burned. Fort McRae practically silenced, and great damage done to ^ the navy yard. The Confederate fortifications on the mainland surroundino^ the harbor of Pensacola and in front of Fort Pick- ens were in charge of General Braxton Bragg. Still following along the coast in a westerly direction, we come to the mouths of the Mississippi. Here, late in the year 1861, occurred one of the most memorable, if not one of the most im- portant, of those coast engagements to which in this chapter we have been con- fining our attention. On the 12th oct. of October the following despatch 12. startled alike North and South : ‘‘Fort Jacksox, October 12, 1861. ‘‘ Last night I attacked the blockaders with my little fleet. I succeeded, after a very short struggle, in driving them all aground on the Southwest Pass bar, except the Preble, which I sunk. I captured a prize from them, and after HOLLINS’ BOAST. CO fliey were fast in the mud, I peppered them well. There were no casualties on our side. It was a complete suc- cess. Hollins.” What were the facts in this case? The Confederates had exteuiporized a flotilla, consisting of a steam-ram called the Manassas, mounted with one sixty- four-pounder Dahlgren ; the steamer Calhoun, with one twenty-four-pounder Dahlgren ; the steamer Ivy, ^\dth an eight-inch thirty-two-pounder, rifled ; the steamer Jackson, with two eight- inch columbiads ai^d a twenty-four- pounder, rifled ; and the cutter Pickens, with an eight-inch columbiad and four twenty-four-pound carronades. The Ma- nassas was originally the steamer Enoch Train, but had been completely recon- structed. In her new form she had a pe- culiar “ram”-like shape, and altogether had a formidable appearance. She was double planked all over with wood of six feet in thickness. Her bow extended to a length of nine feet, and vras made of the thickest and the strong^est oak. The whole surface of the vessel was covered with iron plates two inches thick. Her hull rose above the water only about two feet and a quarter; and her deck was covered in with a slanting roof of heavy wood covered with iron plates. Below the water-mark, and pro- jecting from her bow, was an iron prow or borer, as thick as a man’s arm, in- tended to pierce and sink any vessel she might choose to strike. She was one of the first of the ironclads ; and to the only ships which the National gov- ernment could as yet oppose to her, she was most undoubtedly a dangerous an- tagonist. This flotilla was put under the com- mand of Captain Hollins, an officer of immense pretension, but one who was remembered chiefly in connection with an exploit at San Juan, where he had indulged his vanity and passion for au- thority by burning an unoffending town. The blockade fleet on which Hollins intended to operate was composed of the war steamer Richmond, fourteen, guns; of the Vincennes, a sloop-of-war, twenty-one guns ; of the Preble, another sloop-of-war, sixteen guns; and of the Water-Witch and Nightingale, both small steamers of one gun each. Hollins chose a dark night for his experiment. The Manassas was close to ilie Richmond before she was discovered ; and by the time the watch could give the alarm, lier iron prow struck the Richmond “abreast the port fore-channels,” tear- ing a coal schooner that was alongside from her fastenings, and penetrating the ship’s side, making a hole about five inches in circumference and about two feet below the water-line. The ram drew off, and falling aft, made an attempt to strike with her prow the Richmond’s stern. The attempt was. unsuccessful. Meanwhile, as the mon- ster passed, the Richmond gave it a volley from the port battery. The other sloops had been notified of the appearance of the Manassas; and hav- ing slipped their cables, they ran down to the Pass, the Richmond covering their retreat. At about eight o’clock in the morning, the other vessels being inside, the Richmond and Vincennes grounded 202 70 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. while attempting to pass the bar. There they were bombarded by the Manassas ; and fire rafts were sent down to burn them. The fire rafts proved perfectly harmless; and at ten o’clock the Con- federate commodore withdrew, ran up to Fort Jackson, and sent news of his splendid victory to Richmond. After a fashion, Hollins had no doubt won a victory ; but he had done little damage to the National ships. A coal schooner had been bruised; a boat had been sunk ; and Captain Pope’s gig had been staved in. That was all. It was not wonderful, therefore, that when the true facts of the case became known, Hollins’ famous exploit was made the subject of much merriment and ridicule. The Manassas, at this date, was by far the most powerful and efficient ship of war in North American waters; and, in capable hands, she might have anni- hilated the small blockading squadron, cleared the gulf, and swept the coast from Florida to Maine. As it was, she did little harm and some good. She taught the government at Washing- ton that other than wooden walls were now necessary, and that if the battle was to be fought at sea with any hope of success, ironclad must be confronted by ironclad, if not of equal tonnage, at least of equal power for resistance and attack. Later, in the fall, Hampton Roads presented a spectacle not unlike, but in some respects more imposing than, that witnessed towards the close of August, when Butler and Stringham set sail for Hatteras. It was also a land and naval armament, but on a grander scale, and was fitted out for the purpose of mak- ing a descent on the borders of lower South Carolina. The land force of the expedition had been assembled at An- napolis, in Maryland. It was about fifteen thousand strong, and was placed in charge of Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman. The fleet, which consisted ( t some seventy-seven vessels in all, in- cluding fourteen gunboats, thirty-four steamers, and twenty-six sailing vessels, was placed under the command of Com- modore S. F. Dupont. The commanders to wffiom this expe- dition was entrusted were well chosen. Thomas W. Sherman, not to be con- founded with W. T. Sherman, was a native of Rhode Island. He graduated at West Point in 183G, taking a high place in his class, and was appointed second lieutenant in the Third U. S. Artillery in July of the same year. In 1837 he was promoted to a first lieuten- ancy; and on May 28th, 1846, on the outbreak of the Mexican war, he was made captain. For his gallant conduct at Buena Vista, February 23d, 1847, he was brevetted major. On the form- ation of the Fifth Artillery, he was ap- pointed lieutenant-colonel, and in this capacity took part in the battle of Bull Run. He was advanced to the rank of brigadier-general May 17th, 1861. Commodore Samuel F. Dupont was born at Bergen Point, New Jersey, in 1803. His father, a Frenchman, as the name indicates, came to the United States in 1799. The Delaware Mills, where is manufactured the famous “Dupont powdei*,” were founded by an uncle ; and the works still remain in “THE GREAT ARMADA” n the possession of the family. Young Dupont entered the United States navy December 19th, 1815, having received from President Madison his warrant as a midshipman. His first cruise was in the Franklin. When the Mexican war broke out, he was in command of the frigate Congress, but was transferred to the Cyane. It was he who transported Colonel Fremont, with his band of trap- pers and Indians, to San Diego, the Cyane being the first United States man-of-war to enter that harbor. After his return from the Pacific, he was em- ployed in various ways and in different capacities, his high character, his knowl- edge of his profession, his powers of organization, and his business habits always revealing themselves and justi- fying the confidence reposed in him. In 1857 he sailed for China in the Min- nesota ; in 186Q he was placed in charge of the navy yard at Philadelphia ; and now, at the close of 1861, we find him at the head of this great naval expedi- tion. The fleet, with the troops on board, sailed out of Hampton Roads and pro- 0ft. ceeded to sea on the morning of 29* the 29th of October. Never did any such expedition leave port under auspices, to outward appearances, more favorable. The sun rose and shone with unusual splendor, revealing the rich robes with which, in the late fall, na- ture in those regions clothes herself. From an early hour the ramparts at Fortress Monroe were crowded with sol- diers ; hearty hurrahs greeted each vessel as it took its position ; while the military bands on the transports, striking up a succession of favorite tunes, intensified the general excitement and inspired all with hope. Sherman’s troops were di- vided into three brigades, and were com- manded respectively by Generals Egbert L. Viele, Isaac I. Stevens, and Horatio G. Wright, each of the commanders, like Sherman himself, being a graduate ‘ of West Point Military Academy. The flag-ship Wabash led the way, the others following in three parallel lines, and from the vast space which they covered, as well as from the order which they preserved, presenting a most magnificent spectacle. The weather continued good all day. It was a glorious night. The next day was all that could be wished. The vessels were still in the same order in which they started. On the second night it was still calm. There was no moon ; but the stars shining bright and clear, looked down upon a scene of rare and matchless beauty. With such weather dawned the mornins: of the third day ; and so clear was the atmos- phere and so unruffled the water, that a passenger on the Atlantic was able to count no fewer than thirty-eight of the vessels of the fleet. The objective point of the expedition had been studiously concealed from the public ; and it was unknown to the mas- ters and men of the different ships. It was known only to the government and to those in immediate command. To provide against mishap, however, sealed orders were on board every vessel. The great object of this secrecy was to ena- ble them to strike the intended point by surprise, and to accomplish their mission before the Confederates should NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. 72-‘ have time to make preparations for their arrival. Such a course had been deemed advisable ; as recent experi- ence had shown that, from the number and efficiency of Southern spies, male and female, in the National capital, the plans of government were known to the authorities at Richmond before they were known to the public at Washing- ton. It even seemed as if the Richmond spy had found his w^ay into the very council chamber of the president and his ministers. The precaution unfor- tunately was doomed to fail of its pur- pose; but the failure itself disclosed the wisdom and foresight with which all the arrangements had been made. Toward the evening of the third day heavy clouds gathered and darkened the face of the sky, the wind began to rise, and everything indicated a coming storm. Come it did, and quickly; and such a storm as* has seldom raged along the southern coast. It literally scat- tered the fleet to the winds; and for a time it was feared that the “ Great Ar- mada,” as it was fondly but somewhat ominously called, had been completely destroyed. On the morning of the 2d of November only one vessel could be seen from the deck of the Wabash. The first intelligence of the disaster reached the North through Southern sources, and, of course, was highly colored. The South was jubilant. The North, it was said, was opposing it- self to fate. The elements were fighting in the interests of the Southern cause. “The stars in their courses fought against Sisera. The winds of heaven were now fighting for the good cause of Southern independence. Let the Debo- rahs of the South sing a song of deliv- erance.” Such was the highly- wrought style in which Southern enthusiasm found expression. Affairs, however, were not quite so desperate as they seemed. The fleet, although dispersed, was not ruined. In the isolated state in which the different vessels found them- selves, the sealed orders were opened ; and it was found that Port Royal was the place of rendezvous. On Sunday morn- ing, the 3d of November, the storm be- gan to abate ; and the scattered vessels one by one gathered around the flag- ship. On the following morning, jfov. as early as eight o’clock, the Wa- bash anchored off Port Royal, accom- panied by twenty-five vessels, and being rapidly joined by the rest of the fleet. It was found that, during that fearful storm, some of the war-ships were saved by throwing their heavy guns over- board, that four transports went down, but that, happily, not more than a dozen persons lost their lives. Saved from the perils of the deep, they were now to encounter perils of a different but not less alarming kind. The Confederates had done their best to make the navigation of the coast dif- ficult, if not impossible. All the light- houses were destroyed ; and all the beacons and buoys had been removed. Scientific skill, however, soon overcame these difficulties; and with the help of Commander Charles H. Davis, the chief of staff, and Mr. Boutelle of the Coast Survey, the entrance to Port Royal Sound was found, and so marked off with buoys that Dupont was able to POUT ROYAL. 73 enter with his fleet. He was told that he could count with confidence on eight- een feet of water. The movement com- menced shortly after three o’clock ; and Ly twilight all the vessels, which had arrived, were, with the exception of the Wabash, over the bar and anchored in the roadstead of Port Royal. Other difiiculties, however, had to be encoun- tered. The Confederates, in conse- quence of the mishap which had be- fallen the fleet, had had ample time, after they became aware of the destina- tion of the expedition, to strengthen the works in the neighborhood of Port Royal, and otherwise to prepare them- selves for a vigorous and stubborn re- sistance. The time had not been lost. On the right of the entrance, on St. Philip’s Island, at what is called Bay Point, stood Fort Beauregard. This was an earth \vork ; but it was carefully built, and mounted some twenty guns, several of them heavy rifles. It had an outwork, toward the sea, mounting five guns. On the left, on Hilton Head, stood Fort Walker. This was a regular- work, with bastions and curtains. Built upon a blutf eight feet high, and mount- ing twenty-three guns, with an outwork on the sea front having a rifled gun. Fort Walker commanded not only Port Royal entrance, but the approach to the town of Beaufort by the Beau- fort River. Of the two works, it was by far the more formidable. When the expedition arrived. Fort Walker was manned by some six hundred and twenty men, and was in charge of Gen- ei-al T. F. Drayton, a rich land-owner of the neighborhood. At Camp Look- out, about six miles from Fort Walker, was a small body of Scriven’s guer- rillas, which was ultiiuately increased in strength to the number of nearly two thousand men. There were over six hundred men at Bay Point, under Colonel R. G. M. Dunovant. Of this force one hundred and forty-nine garri- soned Fort Beauregard, under the com- mand of Captain Stephen Elliott, jr., of Beaufort. Two miles further up, at the junction of the Beaufort and Broad Rivers, there was a fleet of five or six gunboats, under Commodore Josiah Tat- nall, a veteran of the war of 1812. A reconnoisance of the Confederate works was made on the 5th by the jvov, Ottawa, supported by the Curlew, Seneca, and Smith, when it was ascer- tained that of the two forts. Fort Walker was greatly the more powerful. The Wabash, which had been unable to cross with the other vessels, was now safely over the bar, and everything was ready for a movement against the enemy and his works. ‘‘The order of battle,” to quote from Dupont’s report, “comprised a main squadron, ranged in a line ahead, and a flanking squadron, which was to be thrown off on the northern section of the harbor, to engage the enemy’s flotilla, and prevent them taking the rear ships of the main line, when it turned to the southward, or cutting off a disabled vessel.” If this plan could be carried out, it would be impossible for Tatnall with his gunboats to hinder or in any way annoy the main body while carrying out instructions. “ The plan of attack,” to quote from the same authority, “ was to pass up midway be- 74 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. tween Forts Walker and Beauregard, receiving and returning the fire of both, to a distance about two and a half miles north of the latter. At that point, the line was to turn to the south around by the west and close in with Fort Walker, encountering it on its weakest flank, and at the same time enfilading in near- ly a direct line its two water faces.” “ When abreast of the fort, the engine w^as to be slowed, and the movement reduced to only as much as would be just sufficient to overcome the tide, to preserve the order of battle, by passing the batteries in slow succession, and to avoid becoming a fixed mark for the enemy’s fire. On reaching the extrem- ity of Hilton Head, the line was to turn to the north by the east, and pass- ing to the northward, to engage Fort Walker with the port battery nearer than when first on the same course. These evolutions were to be repeated.” The ships were to pass the forts at eight hundred yards when moving to the south for the first time, but when mak- ing the second circuit they were to sight their guns for five hundred and fifty yards. This arrangement would make it next to impossible for the guns of the fort to strike the vessels. The latter would be in motion ; and they would be three hundred yards nearer than when they passed at first. The caj)tains were summoned on board the Wabash and received their I^ov. instructions. It was the 7th of November. At eight o’clock the signal was made to get under way. At nine o’clock the signal was made for close order.” At about half-past nine the action was commenced, the first shot being fired from Fort Walker. The W abash responded promptly. The Susquehanna quickly followed. The first prescribed turn having been made, the signal was given at a quarter past ten for “closer action.” The Wabash came up, and passed Fort Walker at the distance, when abreast, of eight hundred yards. The Susquehanna and the others followed. A second time was the elliptical movement performed, the ships this time passing the fort and firing at a distance of less than six hun- dred yards. About this time, half-past eleven, the enemy’s flag was shot away. Meanwhile good and effective work was being done by some of the smaller ves- sels, which had taken their stations at the enfilading point. It was evident that the garrison was becoming exhaust- ed. The firing was already feeble, from few guns, and at long intervals. After the third circuit, “the enemy had en- tirely ceased to reply, and the battle was ended.” At a quarter past one P. M. the Ottawa signalled that the fort was abandoned. It was discovered a little later in the day that Fort Beau- regard, whose guns had been silent for some time, was also abandoned. At twenty minutes past two o’clock, Cap- tain John Kodgei s, who had been sent on shore with a flag of truce, hoisted the Union flag over the abandoned work. At sunrise on the following mornim^ the old flag was raised also over Fort Beauregard. The National loss during the engagement was thirty-one, of whom eight were killed. The Confederates reported a loss of fifty in all, of whom PORT ROYAL FERRY. 75 ten were killed. No life was lost in Fort Beaureo^ard. Both forts were form- ally taken possession of, Fort Walker on the day of the battle by General Wright’s brigade, Fort Beauregard on the morning of the 8th by the brigade of General Stevens. The great object of the expedition had thus been accom- plished. It was of all things most natural that there should be great joy and rejoicing in the North. Over the soil of South Carolina, which was the first State to raise the standard of rebellion, the Union flag was again floating. It was just as natural that the loss of Port Royal should have been felt to be an irreparable blow by the South. The feeling was universal that an important step had been taken on the part of the Nationals towards the recovery of the entire southern coast. General Sherman was not slow to take advantage of his victory. Hilton Head was greatly strengthened, and made a depot for supplies. An im- mense wharf was constructed; build- ings of various kinds were multiplied ; and Flilton Head and Port Royal Island ^oon became great centres of life and industry. Beaufort, a delightful little town on Port Royal Island, and the fa- vorite summer retreat of the aristocracy of South Carolina, where some of them had built luxurious homes, hid fi'om view by vine-covered verandahs^ em- bosomed in groves of orange and lemon, and surrounded on all sides by the gor- geous plants and rich fruitage of the tropics, was entirely abandoned by the white population. For a few days Beaufort was entirely at the mercy of the negroes, who, in the homes of their former masters, gave themselves up to all manner of licentiousness, indulging in scenes of wildest revelry and waste- fulness. Beaufort was soon occupied by the National troops; and military order was substituted for barbarous li- cense. Meanwhile Dupont had sent his vessels in various directions, up the riv- ers, among the islands, and along the coast. Everywhere, it was found, the whites had fled, the slaves who had re- fused to accompany them remaining behind and occupying the plantations and houses. Expeditions were sent north towards the bay of St. Helena and south towards Warsaw Sound. Both were completely successful. The Confederates in truth having disappear- ed, there was no one to offer resistance. Both positions were of great strategic value, in view of future operations. The possession of the bay of St. Helena secured the command of large rivers communicating with the interior of South Carolina, as well as an excellent harbor — a harbor almost equal to that of Charleston itself. The possession of Warsaw Inlet and Sound secured the command of an entrance to the Savan- nah River, with a passage little inferior to that of Tybee, a little more to the north. Some days later, on the ]Vov, 25th, Big Tybee Island was also 25. seized ; and Dupont was able to write to the secretary of war : “The flag of the United States is flying over the ter- ritory of the State of Georgia.” All along the coast, from Warsaw Sound, below the mouth of the Savannah, 76 NAVAL AND COAST OPERATIONS. northward as far as the North Edisto River, the National authority was su- preme. With but two exceptions, every fort on the islands throughout that re- gion had been abandoned. Forts Pu- laski and Jackson, the one on Cockspur Island, at the mouth of the entrance, the other on the mainland of Georgia and above the other approaches from the sea, still remained in the hands of the Confederates, and effectually guard- ed the river and city of Savannah. At one place only did the Confede- rates make a stand in defence of the islands off the coast of South Carolina and Georgia. It was known that they had a fortified camp at Port Royal Ferry, on the Coosa w, and that they had collected a force there, under Gen- erals Gregg and Pope, some eight thou- sand strong. It was evidently their intention to shut up the Nationals in Port Royal Island — at least so to shut them up as to prevent them crossing to the mainland in the direction of Savan- nah. To this end they had placed ob- structions in the Coosaw River and the other streams and creeks which sep- arate the island from the mainland, and erected batteries at Seabrook, at Boyd’s Creek, at Port Royal Ferry, and at other commanding positions. Dupont had already made an unsuc- cessful attempt to reach the Savannah River by way of Augustine Creek, in the rear of Fort Pulaski. This accomplished, he might have been able to cut off all communication with the fort, and take possession of the city .of Savannah. The Confederates, how- .ever, had been on their guard ; and the expedition failed. It was felt to be necessary to break up the fortified camp at Port Royal Ferry; and with this end in view a joint land and naval force, un- der Brigadier-General Stevens and Com- mander C. R. P. Rodgers was organized. The troops under Stevens consisted of Colonel Frazier’s Forty-Seventh and Colonel Perry’s Forty-Eighth New York regiments ; the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders, Major Morrison ; the Fiftieth Pennsylvania, Colonel Crist; the Eighth Michigan, Colonel Fenton; and the One Hundredth Pennsylvania (Roundheads), Colonel Leasure ; in all about five thousand men. The naval force assembled at Beaufort, and was composed of the Ottawa, Seneca, Pem- bina, and Hale, with the ferryboat Helen and four boats belonging to the Wa- bash, each of these last carrying a P- pound howitzer. The expedition moved on the evening of the 31st of December. The Dec. greater portion of this fleet went up the Broad River, on the west side of Port Royal Island, their purpose being to approach the ferry by Whale Creek. The land forces made their way to a point where the Brick-Yard Creek, a continuation of the Beaufort River, unites with the Coosaw. There Com- mander Rodgers met Stevens with launches ; and the troops were embark- ed. It was the first morning of the new year 1862. Some of the troops landed at Haywood’s plantation, and the remainder at Adams’ plantation, the next landing. A forward march against the Confederates was at once begun. The Eighth Michigan were thrown out A FLAG OF TRUCE. 77 as skirmisliers, the gunboats opening a brisk fire into the woods in their front. The Seventy-Ninth New York (High- landers) were in front of the main body. They were now near the ferry, when a concealed battery opened upon them with grape and cannister. The brunt of this fire was borne by the Highland- ers and the Eighth Michigan. The Fif- tieth Pennsylvania rushed forward to their support. The boats, coming up one after the other, brought so heavy a fire to bear on the works that they were soon abandoned. Immediately after the Ottawa was anchored the ferry was opened ; and the Pennsylvania Koundheads passed over and took pos- session of the abandoned fort. At four o’clock they were joined by General Stevens with the advance guard. About this time the Confederates appeared in force and in line of battle on the Na- tional right. The Ottawa and the Pem- bina were ordered to move a short dis- tance down the river, where they opened fire with their 11-inch and Parrott guns, flinging their shells into the midst of the Confederates, driving them through the woods and clearing the National flank. It was now sunset. There was a pause in the battle. A messenger from the Confederates appeared at one of the outposts, bearing a flag of truce, and asking permission to carry off their dead and wounded. At this moment the gunboats reopened fire ; and before General Stevens’ mes- senger could convey his reply, granting one hour to carry off the wounded, the offiicer who brought the flag of truce had galloped off. The enemy reappeared in the morning, when the gunboats Ottawa, Seneca, Pembina, Helen, and Hale all opened fire, flinging shot and shell into the woods. It was, however, but of short duration. At forty minutes past nine o’clock the troops, having demolished the works and fired some houses in the neighborhood, began to recross the ferry. The Confederates made no further demonstration. By noon the troops were all over ; and the field guns, at the request of General Stevens, were landed for the purpose of covering the rear of the returning column. So ended the attack on Port Boyal Ferry. General Stevens lost nine men. Major Watson of the Eighth Michigan was mortally wounded. So far these coast expeditions had been successful. The Nationals were masters of Hatteras Inlet ; and on the southern borders of South Carolina and the northern borders of Georgia the Confederates had been driven from every stronghold, with the two exceptions. Fort Jackson and Fort Pu- laski. 78 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. CHAPTER VI. The Beginning of 1862. — State of Public Feeling. — The Army of the Potomac a Splendid Toy. — McClellan’s Keasons for Delay. — Kesignation of General Scott. — The War Office. — Stanton succeeds Cameron. — New Lite in the Government. — The Army Ordered to Move. — The Protection of Washington. — The West. — Halleck and Buell. — Sidney Johnston. — Mill Spring. — Zollikofifer Killed. — General Thomas. — The Confederate Line of Defense. — Halleck's Plan of Attack. — Where to Strike. — The Army at Cairo. — General Grant in Command. — Fort Henry. — Foote and His Flotilla. — The Army in Motion. — A Thunder-Storm. — Fire Opened upon the Fort by the Gunboats. — Tilghman Lowers His Flag. — Fort Henry Occupied by the Nationals. — The Union Flag Floats again over the Soil of Tennessee. — The Fall of Fort Henry a damaging Blow to the South. — Joy in the North. — Fort Donelson. — Its Position. — Its Strength. — General Albert Sidney Johnston. — Pillow, Floyd, and Buckner. — The March on Donelson. — Foote's Flotilla on the Cumberland. — Fire Opened upon the Fort. — The Nationals Repulsed. — The Night of the Thirteenth of February. — Two separate Attacks and Two Failures. — The Confederates full of Confidence. — Sally of the Garrison. — McClernand vigorously Attacked. — The Nationals Forced Back. — General Lewis Wallace makes a determined Stand. — A Lull. — Grant Arrives. — A general Attack ordered. — The Confederates Driven Back within their Entrenchments. — Lost Ground Re- claimed. — A Fearful Night. — Humanity of Wallace. — Floyd and Pillow make their Escape. — Buckner Proposes to Surrender. — Grant’s Terms. — “Unconditional and Immediate Surrender.” — Buckner Indignant. — Fall of Donelson. — A Great Victory and Great Rejoicing. " The year 1862 opened rather gloom- 1862 campaigns of the pre- vious year had not been particu- larly encouraging to the Northern cause. At Washington there was much excite- ment, not a little activity, but no re- joicing. The army of the Potomac had been reconstructed and put in splendid condition. Never was army more thor- oughly drilled or more perfectly equip- ped for battle. It reflected the highest credit on General McClellan, and gave abundant evidence that, whatever might be his qualities on the field of actual warfare, he had as a military organizer few, if any, equals among the command- ers of his time. But armies are not intended to be splendid toys, magnifi- cent playthings. When the army of the Potomac was brought up to a fight- ins: condition, no haste was made to turn it to account. The enemy, who had mightily increased his strength, was all but knocking at the gates of the capital ; but the general-in-chief seemed to have no other use for his well trained and gorgeously equipped army than to exhibit its skill in evolution, to the daily delight of the people of Washington. The toy was splendid ; McClellan seem- ed unwilling to mar its beauty. It was not all at once that these thoughts entered the minds of even the more thoughtful and reflective of the people of the North. For a time they approved and applauded. As the army of the Potomac grew in beauty and in strength, it was as much a source of delight and hope to them as it was evidently a pride to its commander. Hope deferred, how- ever, maketh the heart sick. Delay gave birth to impatience. Before the EDWIN M. STANTON. 79 end of October the previous year, the army under the immediate care of McClellan had reached a strength of nearly one hundred and twenty thou- sand men. It was his opinion that the advance upon Manassas should not be postponed beyond the 25th of Novem- ber ; and it was his desire that, as far as was possible, all the other armies should make sacrifices, so as to add to the actual strength under his command. In the interval, on the 31st of October, he was made commander-in-chief, on the resignation of Genei^al Scott. With the change in his position there came a change in his views. Up until this time he had undervalued the importance of possible effort in the West. Now he wished to make a simultaneous move- ment in East Tennessee and Virginia, and capture Nashville contemporane- ously with Richmond. In order to bring up the armies of the West to the same high standard with the army of the Potomac, further delay was neces- sary. So the month of November rolled past, the weather having been fine and the roads in excellent condition for mil- itary movements ; and to the impatient millions scattered over the Northern States, who hourly expected to hear of a dashing movement and a brilliant victory, no other message came but the same wearisome iteration, ^‘All quiet on the Potomac.” Impatience at last reached its height. ‘‘When will McClellan move?” “What does he mean to do ? ” These and such like ques- tions were in every mouth; and by many the opinion began to be enter- tained that the commander-in-chief either had no plan or was afraid to move. Such was the state of things in the opening weeks of the second year of the war. In the second week of January an important change was made in the War Office. On the 13th Mr. jan, Edwin M. Stanton took the place of Mr. Secretary Cameron, who was offered the position of Minister to Russia. The change was not intended in any way to reflect on Secretary Cameron. On the contrary, it was his own desire, as well as the desire of the other members of the government, that the position, which was onerous and exacting in the extreme, should be filled by some man who to more than ordinary intellectual ability and force of character added great powers of endurance. Of all the available men at that moment, as the result proved, Stanton was the man in whom those qualities were most united. He had already made himself conspicu- ous, during the administration of Bu- chanan, by exposing and defeating the schemes of the conspirators who plotted the seizure of Washington. It was said of Stanton by some of his jealous rivals that he was a man of only one idea. The remark, though otherwise intended, actually conveyed a compli- ment. The times preeminently required concentration of thought and purpose; and if Stanton was a man of one idea, his idea was the preservation of the Union — the grandeur and immortality of the Republic. Stanton was one of those whose patience was completely exhausted by the inactivity of McClel- lan. It was at his suggestion that the 80 FORTS HENRY president issued the order that on the 22d of February a general forward move- ment of the land and naval forces of the Union should take place ; that “especial- ly the army at or about Fortress Monroe, the army of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Miim- fordsville, Kentucky, the army and flo- tilla near Cairo, and the naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day ; that all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey addi- tional orders when duly given ; that the heads of departments, and especially the secretaries of war and the navy, with all their subordinates, and the gen- erals-in-chief, with all other command- ers and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.” A special order, which in some particulars was afterwards modified, was issued on Jau. ^Ist of January, to the effect ^Ghat all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after provid- ing safely for the defense of Washing- ton, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction ; all de- tails to be in the discretion of the corn- man der-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 2 2d day of Feb- ruary next.” These orders were too jdain to be misconstrued. If they did not imply mistrust of McClellan, they certainly contained a rebuke. His dila- tory conduct had not only disappointed lND DONELSON. — it had disgusted all ranks and classes of the people. The war, in what might be called systematic form, was now about to be- gin. Hitherto the forces had been scat- tered, and the battles fruitless of result as they had been without plan or pur- pose. Now there was a recognized central authority, there was a genei’al plan, and arrangements were made for concerted action. A variety of circum- stances had made it evident as well as necessary that the first battles of 1862 should be fought in the West. General Halleck, as we have seen already, was now in command in Missouri, and Gen- eral Buell had charge of the Department of the Ohio. The Confederates, under Albert Sidney Johnston, held a strong defensive line running from the Missis- sippi Biver eastward to the Cumberland Mountains. The left was at Columbus on the Mississippi. Forts Henry and Donelson guarded the Cumberland and Tennessee Fivers. An intrenched camp at Bowling Green, with a considerable army, covered the great railroad lines southward to Nashville. The right flank was held by a force posted at Mill Spring, Kentucky. General Halleck, who had divided his large command into districts, had assigned to General Grant the District of Cairo, which included Paducah, in Kentucky. General Buell, who had a large force under him, ar- ranged it into four grand divisions, himself, with a portion of his troops, threatening Bowling Green, and General George H. Thomas, one of his subordi- nates, threatening the Confederate force at Mill Spring. A glance at the map MILL SPRING. 81 will stow that on the part of the Con- federates these positions were singu- larly well chosen. If they could hold this line, the great cotton-producing States w^ould be comparatively safe; and while the sinews of war would thus be provided for another year, they would be the more easily able to con- centrate their strength against the army which threatened them in the east. Early in the month of January, Gen- eral Thomas came into collision with the Confederate forces stationed at Mill Spring. The battle lasted the greater Jan* of Sunday, the 18th, and was 18 . fought with great spirit on both sides. Early in the fight the Confede- rate General Zollikoffer was killed, and before the close of the day the National arms were completely victorious, the Confederates being driven from their position and compelled to retreat to- wards their camp in the wildest confu- sion. In the struggle the Nationals lost two hundred and forty-seven men, of whom thirty-nine were killed, the re- mainder wounded; the Confederates lost three hundred and forty-nine, of w'hom one hundred and ninety-two were killed, sixty-two wounded, and the re- mainder made prisoners. As the spoils of victory, General Thomas captured • and carried wuth him twelve pieces of artillery, with their caissons packed, two army forges, one' battery wagon, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, over a thousand horses and mules, to- gether with wagons, commissary stores, intrenching tools, and a considerable amount of camp equipage. It was felt to be a damaging blow by the South, as it broke their line in Kentucky and opened a door of deliverance for East Tennessee. It was hailed as a great victory by the North, and called forth a spirited proclamation from the secre- tary of war, who declared it to be the purpose of the war “ to pursue and destroy a rebellious enemy, and to de- liver the country from danger.” In the prompt and spirited movements and daring at Mill Spring,” he said, “ the nation will realize its hopes. It will also delight to honor its brave soldiers.” In Zollikoffer the Confederates lost one of their ablest generals. Of Swiss origin, he was born in North Carolina in 1812. At an early age he emigrated to Tennessee, where he worked as a printer and afterwards became an ed- itor. In 1834 he edited and published the Columbian Observer; and from 1835 to 1837 he held the profitable place of state printer of Tennessee. In 1842 he had editorial charge of the Nashville Banner ; and through the influence of that partisan journal he succeeded in ob- taining several political offices. At the beginning of the secession movement in Tennessee, Zollikoffer was opposed to it ; but he was finally induced to yield ; and on joining the army he was ap- pointed a brigadier-general. He had only joined the secession force at Mill Spring a few hours before the battle. The chief in command was General Crittenden ; but the attack at Mill Spring -has generally been attributed to Zollikoffer, who was a man of great energy and courage. 82 FORTS HE^^RY AND DONELSON. General George H. Thomas, who on that day at Mill Spring first chained victory to the Union standard, and be- gan that series of brilliant and substan- tial achievements with which his name is associated, was a man of another mould. A Virginian by birth, he was educated at West Point, and in 1841 was appointed a lieutenant of artillery. During the Mexican war he rose to the rank of major. In 1850 he accepted the position of teacher of artillery and cavalry at West Point. At the begin- ning of the war, Thomas, who held the rank of major of the Second Cavalry, was promoted to the lieutenant-colonel- cy of his regiment, and a little later he became colonel. On the 1 7th of August, 1861, he was made brigadier-general; and after having served under Generals Anderson and Sherman, he was appoint- ed by General Buell to the command of the Tenth Division. It will be observed that the battle of Mill Spring was fought and won before the date of the president’s general order for the forward movement of all the ar- mies ; and there can be little doubt that the spirited conduct of the National troops on that occasion gave the spur to that impatience of further delay which President Lincoln shared with the rest of the Northern people. The president was not more anxious for immediate action than were the officers in the field and the rank and file under their care. We have seen that the victory at Mill Spring broke the Confederate right, and by opening a door of deliverance for East Tennessee, prepared the way for the aggressive and successful efforts which were to follow. The Confede- rate line, however, remained strong and intact from Bowling Green to Colum- bus. The ground was also well guarded from Bowling Green to Nashville, fur- ther to the south. At Bowling Green there was an intrenched camp. Fort Henry, on the east bank of the Tennes- see, and Fort Donelson, on the west bank of the Cumberland, were bastioned earthworks, about twelve miles apart and connected by a well constructed road. There were redoubts on Island No. 10, in the Mississippi Eiver; and Columbus, which was still in charge of General Polk, had been so strengthened as to be proudly spoken of as the Gib- raltar of America. To defend this line the Confederate commander had under him at least 60,000 men. The forcing of this line by the National armies had become a necessity, if any serious effort was to be made to bring the South back to its allegiance. The question was how to strike and where. Various plans had already been suggested ; but there is some difference of opinion as to who is entitled to credit for the plan which was ultimately adopted, and which proved completely successful. It is known that General Buell had suggest- ed some such plan as that adopted, in a communication made to General Hal- leck early in the month of January, 1862. It is also known that about "the same time or shortly afterwards. Gene- ral Grant, without any knowledge of what Buell. had done, wrote to Halleck and asked permission to carry out the plan which was afterwards accomplish- ed. It is recorded that one evening THE FLOTILLA AND ARMY IN MOTION. 83 late in December, 1861, Generals Hal- leck, Sherman, and Cullum were to- gether at the Planters’ Hotel in St. Louis, when the conversation turned up- on the proper line of invasion. “ Where is their line ? ” asked Halleck. “ Why, from Bowling Green to Columbus,” re- plied Sherman. ^‘Well, then, where is the true point of attack? ” “Natu- rally the centre.” “ Then let us see in what direction it should be made.” A map was at hand. With a blue pencil Halleck drew a line from Bowling Green to Columbus, past Forts Donel- son and Henry. He drew another line perpendicular to its centre. The latter line coincided nearly with the Tennessee River. “There,” said Halleck, “that is the true line of attack.” After all, it was the natural and obvious course to follow ; and it is more than probable that to the minds of each of these men, educated in military tactics and expe- rienced in military affairs, the same plan at the same time was independently suggested. One thing is absolutely certain regarding this matter : Grant had written his second letter to Hal- leck, urging the propriety of his allow- ing him to proceed at once by land and water against Fort Henry, to take and hold it as a base for other operations, before the order of the 30th came au- thorizing the desired movement. It has already been shown that the Confederate line stretched from Bow- ling Green to Columbus, and that the strength of the entire force holding the line was about sixty thousand men. The Confederate general in command was Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the oldest and most experienced officers on the American continent. The garri- son of Fort Henry, which was 2734 strong, was under the immediate charge of General Tilghman. The armament of the fort consisted of seventeen guns. Johnston’s headquarters were at Bow- ling Green, where he was confronted and held in check by General Buell, an able officer, who held the chief command of the army of the Cumber- land. Immediately on receiving permission from Halleck to proceed with his pro- posed plan, Grant made arrangements for the attack on Fort Henry. He had at his disposal some seventeen thousand men. It was arranged that flag-officer Foote, with a flotilla of seven gunboats, should move along the Ohio, steer up the Tennessee, and open the attack, while Grant, on the land side, should render what assistance was necessary and cut off all retreat. On Mon- pei), day, the 2d of February, Foote 2. left Cairo, and on the morning of Tues- day he was a few miles below Fort Henry. Grant, in the meantime, with the divisions of McClernand and C. F. Smith, had embarked in transports which were convoyed by the flotilla. These landed a few miles below the fort ; and Foote proceeded up the river, having orders from Grant to move slow- ly and shell the woods, in order to dis- cover whether there were any concealed batteries. On the morning of the pebi 6th it was understood that every- thing was in readiness for the attack, which was to be made simultaneously I on land and water. A heavy thunder- 84 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. storm had raged the previous night; and, as a consequence, the roads were heavy and the streams so swollen that bridges had to be built for the passage of the artillery. The land forces, thus encountering unlooked-for obstacles, were considerably delayed. Shortly after 12 o’clock Foote op?ned fire upon the fort. Beginning at a thousand yards distance, he gradually ran his vessels to within six hundred yards of the enemy. The firing for a time was vigorously returned ; but Foote pressed forward with irresistible bravery, and his men worked with a will and as if they meant to win. It was evident to Tilghman from the first that it was next to impos- sible for him to hold the fort. He nev- ertheless exerted himself to the utmost, encouraging his men alike by word and example, going so far as to work one of the guns himself. A series of accidents, meanwhile, occurred inside the fort. A rified 24-pounder burst, killing and wouncfing a number of the men. A 42-pounder burst prematurely, and kill- ed three of the gunners. In a short time the well-directed fire from the gunboats had dismounted seven of the guns and made them useless; the flag- staff also was shot away. The garrison became completely demoralized. It was in vain that Tilghman attempted to replace the exhausted gunners. The troops^ in the camp outside the fort made good their escape, some by the Dover road, leading to Fort Donelson, others on board a steamer which was lying a little above Fort Henry. Foote had promised to reduce the foi t within an hour. When he made that promise he counted on assistance from the forces on the land side. Without any such aid — for the land forces had not yet arrived on the scene — he made good his word; for the hour had scarcely expired when the white flag was raised. There was no unnecessary delay. The main body of his troops having made good their escape, Tilghman, with his staff and some sixty artillerists, surren- dered to the victorious Foote. In killed and wounded the Confederate loss was twenty-one men. The only serious dam- age sustained by the fleet in the river was on board the ironclad Essex. A shot from the enemy had penetrated her boiler ; and some twenty-nine officers and men, including Commander Porter, were seriously scalded. The capture of Fort Henry was felt by the South to be a damaging blow; and it led to bitter murmuring and even loud complaints against the author- ities at Bichmond. It was justly re- garded by the North as a victory of great importance. It was full of in- struction, inasmuch as it proved the value of gunboats on the narrow rivers of the West, especially when acting in conjunction with land forces. It in- spired hope, inasmuch as it reclaimed lost territory and restored the old flag. “ Fort Henry is ours ! ” said Halleck in his despatch to McClellan. ^‘The flag of the Union is re-established on the soil of Tennessee. It will never be re- moved.” Foote was formally thanked by the secretary of the navy. ‘‘The country,” he was told, “ appreciates your gallant deeds, and this Depart- ment desires to convey to you and your A COUNCIL OF WAR. 85 brave associates its profound thanks for the service you have rendered.” After the fall of Fort Henry, prepara- tions were made for an attack on Fort Donelson with as little delay as possi- ble. General Halleck felt it to be his duty to do his utmost to strengthen the army under Grant’s command ; and ac- cordingly reinforcements were hurried forward from Buell’s army, from St. Louis, Halleck’s headquarters, from Cincinnati, and from Kansas. Fort Donelson, as has already been stated, was distant from Fort Henry about twelve miles, and was situated near the town of Dover, on the west bank of the Cumberland, on a platform of elevated ground, which at its highest point rises from the river about one hundred feet. It was about forty mJes above the point where the Cumberland, after draining the highlands of south- eastern Kentucky and northeastern Tennessee, empties its waters into the Ohio. The entire work covered one hundred acres. The country around was rugged and heavily wooded. Nat- urally a strong position, everything had been done which art and science could accomplish to make it impregna- ble. On the water side it was especially strong, the batteries being admirably planted and well mounted. Including the light artillery, there were in the fort at the moment of the attack not fewer than ninety-five pieces. With the men who had made good their escape thither from Fort Henry, the strength of the garrison amounted to twenty-one thousand men. All around the works on the land side, abatis had been formed hj felling timber and half chopping otf the smaller trees. As soon as it became evident that Fort Donelson was likely to be attacked, Johnston exerted himself to the utmost to make the position invulnerable. Ee- inforcements were hurried forward from Bowling Green ; the work was pushed day and night ; and a fortified line two and a half miles in length, enclosing the town of Dover, was drawn along the high ground, which commanded the avenues of approach. Gideon J. Pillov/' arrived with his command on the peb 10th ana took control. Simeon B. Buckner, at the head of the rein^ foi cements from Bowling Green, arrived on the 11th. On the 13tli John E, Floyd, who had fied from Virginia with his followers, in obedience to orders re- ceived from Johnston, appeared upon the scene, and, outranking Pillow, took the chief command. * Meanwhile Grant was not idle. On the evening of the day which witnessed the capture of Fort Henry, a flotilla under Lieutenant Phelps sailed up the Tennessee Eiver, for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the banks in the upper waters. The reconnoisance was completely successful. It was found that there was no real hindrance to a southward movement. The country was comparatively unprotected ; and the people seemed impatient to be de- livered from the dreadful tyranny under which they were groaning. On peb, the 11th a council of war was H. held ; and the question was put, “ Shall we march on Donelson, or shall we wait for further reinforcements?” The de- S04 86 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. cision was in favor of immediate action. Foote was busy getting ready with his gunboats; and the delay hitherto was mainly on that account. It was all-im- portant that the gunboats should parti- cipate in the attack ; but it was felt that every hour was adding to the enemy’s strength. At the head of fifteen thou- Peb, sand men, on Wednesday, the 12. 12th, Grant moved from Fort Henry upon Donelson. The foremost brigade advanced by the telegraph road ; the others moved by the road which leads to Dover. For the month of Feb- ruary, the day was beautiful. The atmos- phere was warm and balmy, like a day in f-pring. In their march over the hilly country, the advancing troops experi- enced but little difficulty. Before sun- down Grant was before the fort; and what remained of daylight he spent in bringing his troops into position. During the night there was little idle- ness. Batteries were posted, and the line of battle was formed. Meanwhile Foote was moving up the Cumberland with his gunboats, convoying transports which were to constitute Lewis Wal- lace’s Thii*d Division. It was Grant’s intention, should the gunboats arrive, to begin the attack in the morning. McClernand’s Division, consisting of the four brigades of Oglesby, Wallace, McArthur, and Morrison, was posted on the right. C. F. Smith’s Division, composed of the brigades of Cook, Lan- man, and M. L. Smith, was posted on the left. Lewis Wallace’s Division, so soon as it arrived, was to take its posi- tion in the centre. The line extended some four miles, the right sweeping round almost to Dover, the left resting’ on Hickman’s Creek, where, at the house of a Mrs. Crisp, Grant established his headquarters. Morning dawned, but there was no sign of the gunboats. Grant was p^b, unwilling to hazard a general en- gagement until the expected forces ar- rived. Early in the forenoon, however, a cannonade was opened ; and some lively work was done by Berge’s sharp- shooters, who, concealed behind the trees, picked off not a few of the Con- federate gunners. About noon an at- tempt was made to effect a lodgment upon the Confederate intrenchments. McClernand ordered Colonel Wallace to capture a formidable battery, known as the Middle Redoubt. The troops employed for this purpose were Illi- nois regiments — the Seventeenth, Major Smith; the Forty -Eighth, Colonel Hayn ; and the Forty-Ninth, Colonel Morrison, McAllister’s battery covering them. Hayn, being the senior colonel, took command of the attacking party. The attack was made in the most spirited manner. But the enemy was strongly posted ; and although the National troops behaved with the utmost gal- lantry in the presence of overwhelming numbers and under a most galling fire, they were ultimately repulsed. An equally unsuccessful effort was made on the left by a portion of Lanman’s bri- gade. In both cases the National loss was heavy. When the darkness came on, the troops, not a little dispirited, had fallen back to the ground occupied by them in the morning. The night of the 13th presented a ARRIVAL OF REINFORCEMEXTS. 87 striking contrast to the beautiful spring- like morning. The afternoon had be- come chilly ; and towards evening rain fell in torrents. The rain was succeed- ed by sleet and snow ; and at midnight a severe frost set in, the mercury falling to ten degrees below zero. The be- sieging force was without tents; and many of the soldiers were not even pro- vided with Idankets. Fires were not permitted, as they would prove marks for the enemy’s guns. Scantily supplied with food, and with the pitiful cries of the wounded calling for water resound- ing in their ears, they were compelled to spend the weary hours, resting on their arms. It was one of those sad nights, often, alas ! repeated before the war reached its close. The morning of the 14th dawned Feb. with apparently brightening pros- 14* pects for the Federal arms. Fully realizing the peril of the situation and the necessity of using every available man. Grant had, at the close of the con- test the night previous, sent a courier to General Lewis Wallace, who had been left behind with a small garrison at Fort Henry, commanding him to hasten at once to the scene of action. Wallace, with his garrison, which con- sisted of the Eleventh Indiana, the Eighth Missouri, and Company A, Chi- cago Artillery, in charge of a battery, was ready by the break of day. After such a night, the ground was not in the best condition for the movement of in- fantry and artillery ; but the men were in excellent spirits ; and in spite of the drifting frost which blew in their faces, they made good time, Wallace being able to report at Grant’s headquarters before the hour of noon. On their arrival Lewis Wallace’s little band found the Union soldiers in high hope and expecta- tion. During the course of the night Foote, with the gunboats and trans- ports, tlie latter bringing the Third oi' Wallace’s Division, about ten thousand strong, had arrived. Their landing had been safely effected ; they were already around Grant’s headquarters ; and when Wallace appeared on the scene he was immediately placed in command and took his position in the centre, mth Smith on the left and McClernand on the right. By this fresh accession of strength. Grant was enabled to com- plete the investment of the fort and its outworks ; and for the first time since he commenced to grapple with the ene- my, he had the advantage of superior numbers. Supplies having arrived in abundance, rations were liberally sup- plied to the half-famished men, and preparations were made for a general assault. The experience of the previous day had been such that, even with largely increased forces. General Grant was un- willing to make any rash attack from the laud side. The fort was powerfully mounted ; and without the aid of earth- works and trenches, an attack • made from the land side, whether upon a par- ticular point or on the entire enemy’s works, however it might result finally, could not fail to be attended by an enor- mous sacrifice of life. Grant’s instruc- tions to his generals were that they should preserve the line of investment intact, being ready to repel any attempt 88 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. which the enemy might make, either in the way of assault or escape. The gunboats had done so well at Fort Henry that perhaps too much was expected of them at Fort Donelson. At all events, it was arranged that the gun- boats should have the honor of opening the assault. At three o’clock in the afternoon Foote moved forward with four ironclads and two wooden boats. In addition to these, there was the gun- boat Carondelet, Commander AV alke, which had arrived two days before. The armored vessels moved in front. While yet a mile and a half distant, the gunboats opened fire, the batteries on the fort remaining perfectly silent. It was not the silence of a helpless, par- alyzed foe : it was the silence of con- scious strength — of a determined and deadly purpose. Onward the little fleet moved, still belching forth destruction, but meeting with no response. Sud- denly, however, when within four hun- dred yards of the batteries, a plunging fire was opened upon it by twenty heavy guns, placed high on the hillside, the shot falling with dreadful precision and effect. In face of this terrific fire, Foote pressed closer and closer. The well- directed fire of the gunboats had silenced the upper battery of four guns. The fighting, 'however, was not equal. The columbiad and 32-pound rifle now told with fatal effect on the ironclads ; while the shot and shell from the ships fell powerless on the heavy sand-banks which protected the enemy’s guns. A heavy shot had cut away the rudder- chains of the Louisville, and she drifted helplessly down the current. The flag- ship St. Louis was soon in a similar plight. Commodore Foote himself being wounded. The other two armored Ves- sels had suffered severely, a heavy rifled cannon having burst on board the Car- ondelet. The battle had lasted one hour and a half. It was useless to pro- long the struggle. Orders were given to Avithdraw ; and as the flotilla moved back down the river, it received some severe parting blows from the shore batteries, some of the fugitives from which had returned and resumed their guns. It was another failure. The strength of the place had not been prop- erly gauged. What Avas practicable and easy at Fort Henry was impossible at Fort Donelson. In the attack the Na- tionals lost fifty-four men in killed and wounded. The Confederates lost not a man, nor were their batteries in any way injured. Fifty-nine shots had struck the St. Louis ; thirty -five the Louisville ; thirty -five the Carondelet, and twenty^ one the Pittsburg. T wo days had now been wasted ; and two experiments in the way of attack had been made, Avith signal want of success. All had been done on the riA^er side Avhich could be done Avith the means now at Grant’s command. Any fresh attempt made on the land side was certainly as perilous as ever ; nay, it seemed to involve even greater risks, for the Union commander could no longer count with confidence on the gunboats, which he had hoped AA^ould greatly aid him in the accomplishment of his diflicult task. The original plan had failed. A new plan had become necessary. It was accordingly arranged ATTACK OK THE NATIONAL EIGHT. 89 in a conference between Grant and Foote, on the evening of Friday, that the Commodore should return to Cairo, repair and augment his fleet, and return with a naval force adequate to the re- quirements of the situation. Grant re- solved meanwhile to go on perfecting his line of investment, so strengthening his weak points as to shut the Confede- rates effectually within their intrench- ments, and so cutting off their supplies as possibly to starve or frighten them into a suri'ender. While the Union commanders were thus deploring their ill fortune and making arrangements for future and more effective operations, events had taken a peculiar turn inside the Confed- erate lines. Floyd, the commander-in- chief, was not in the least elated by the effective resistance which he had been able to offer to McClernand’s attack on the 13th, or by the defeat of the gun- boats on the 14th. He felt that, in spite of his strength, he was effectually hemmed in. There was not a point within the intrenchments which might not be reached by the enemy’s artillery from the boats on the river or from the batteries on land. It would be easy, by passing a column above him on the river, to cut off at once his only source of supply and his only means of egress. Moreover, he had seen that day a fleet of transports arrive, bringing a power- ful addition to the ranks of the enemy ; and he knew that the whole available Union force in the Western States could be speedily concentrated against Fort Donelson. It was Floyd’s opinion that the fort could not be held with a gar- rison of less than fifty thousand men. At a council of war, held on the evening of the 14th, it was unanimously resolved to abandon the place, force a way past Grant’s right, and pass into the open country around Nashville. From the position enclosed within the Confederate lines two roads led to- wards Nashville — the Wynn’s Ferry road, running from Dover through Charlotte ; and the other an obscure and at best an undesirable road, cross- ing the flats of the Cumberland. The latter road was submerged by the over- flow of the river. There remained, therefore, but the one way of escape, if escaj)e was to be attempted, and that was the Wynn’s Ferry road. But this road was effectually covered by McCler- nand’s Division, the right wing of the Union army. What was the Confede- rate plan of attack ? Pillow’s Division, which formed the Confederate left, was to make a vigorous attack upon the Union right flank; and Buckner’s Di- vision, drawn from the right, a few men being left in the intrenchments to main- tain an appearance, was to strike at the same time the right flank of the Union centre, which rested upon the Wynn’s Ferry road. It was hoped that if Pil- low’s attack should prove successful, McClernaiid’s Division, the Union right, would be forced back upon Wallace’s Division, the Union centre, and that Buckner, striking the divided masses in flank, would roll both divisions back in confusion on that of Smith, the Union left. In such a case, the Wynn’s Ferry road would be effectually opened as a way of escaj^e, and possibly Grant’s 90 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. forces might be routed and driven to I their transports. It was a daring and well-conceived plan; and, as we shall by and by see, so far as it was faithfully executed, it was a complete success. On the morning of Saturday, the Feb, 15th, at the early hour of live o’clock, Pillow’s column, eight thousand strong, accompanied by For- rest’s cavalry, thirty heavy guns, and a full complement of artillery, was al- ready in motion. Pillow was resolved, as he said in his high-sounding style, to roll the enemy in full retreat over upon General Buckner,” and then, by an attack in flank and rear, to cut up the enemy and put him completely to rout.” He went to his work with a will, and as if he meant to make his purpose good. McClernand was well posted to resist the assailants; but, al- though this point has been disputed, there can be no reasonable doubt that he was taken by surprise. His division was arranged in tliree brigades — McAr- thur’s on the right, Oglesby’s in the centre, W. H. L, Wallace’s on the left. Pillow’s onslaught was swift and furi- ous. It fell mainly upon the two right brigades, McArthur’s and Oglesby’s. The Confederate line covered the front of these brigades, and extended some distance beyond the right flank. In the struggle which ensued, there was no lack of heroism on either side. At a critical moment, timely and effective assistance was rendered by the sister bri- gade of W. H. L. Wallace, Colonel John A. Logan, at the head of his brave regi- ment, the Thirty-First Illinois, exerting himself by word and deed to sustain I and cheer the men. In such a strug- gle, however, enthusiasm is but a sor- ry compensation for lack of numbers. The soldiers did their best. Inch by inch the ground was contested. Over- powered, however, and outflanked, the two brigades were turned and forced from their position. Meanwhile Buck- ner, who had moved his troops over from the extreme Confederate right, formed them in front of McClernand’s left brigade. Colonel W. H. Wallace. It will thus be seen that the whole hostile mass — the entire concentrated strength of the Confederate army — was pressing upon McClernand’s Division, the right wing of the Union army. The left brigade soon followed the example of the other two — it fell back from its position ; and by nine o’clock the entire position occupied in the beginning of the contest by the right wing of the National army was in the possession of the Confederates. The Wynn’s Ferry road was open. The tide was still in favor of the Confederates. So far they had boldly carried out their plan, and successfully accomplished their purpose. The Na- tional army was, indeed, at this partic- ular moment in a very critical condition. The situation was all the more alarming that the general-in-chief, who had not been present all the morning, was not yet on the field. At 2 A. M. he had gone on board a gunboat to hold a con- sultation with Commodore Foote, who, it will be remembered, was wounded in the struggle the day previous. It is more than possible that if Grant had been on the field fi*om the commence- GRANT ON THE FIELD. 91 ment of the contest, McClernand would have been able to hold his ground. In the absence of the general-in-chief there was no officer, during all those preg- nant hours, who could assume the right to combine and direct the entire forces in the field. The division next to McClernand was that of Lewis Wallace. When Wallace first heard the firing, he concluded that McClernand had re- sumed the attack. At about 8 A. M. he received a message from McClernand asking assistance. Not knowing'What to do, he sent the message to headquar- ters; but General Grant was still ab- sent. Later he received another mes- sage from McClernand, disclosing the fact that his men were being pressed back by overwhelming numbers. There- upon Wallace detached two brigades, and sent them under Colonel Cruft. Cruft, however, was in some way misled too far to the right, and being forced to fight his way, he arrived only in time to share the fate of the whole right wing. Seeing flocks of fugitives crowd- ing up in the rear of his own line, Wal- lace promptly put in motion his remain- ing brigade under Colonel Thayer. The column had marched but a short dis- tance when McClernand’s brigades were met, retiring to the left — retiring in good order and slowly, complaining of many things, but complaining most of all that their ammunition was exhausted. The brave fellows seemed to feel as if they had no right to be in that position. The enemy was following but slowly. Wallace had time to deploy his brigade on the crest of a hill which crossed the line along which the enemy was moving towards the left. Here he presented a firm front at right angles to his former front, and behind him the defeated troops of the right wing rallied and re- formed. In this position they awaited the approach of Pillow and Buckner. Mortified with the defeat of the morn- ing, the troops of the right wing had no sooner filled their cartridges than they took their places and were ready for action. When, therefore, the Con- federates advanced and began to ascend the crest, so terrific was the fire that they reeled and staggered and broke, falling back in wild confusion. A sec- ond time they attempted to charge; but the second repulse was more disas- trous than the first. The men could not aQ:ain be brought into line. Some of them fled precipitately to their works ; the remainder were brought to a stand on the ground occupied by the National right wing in the early morning. Grant had now appeared on the field. It was about noon when the Confede- rates were driven back to their trenches. The battle had lulled ; but everything was yet in confusion. The chief must have bitterly regretted the fact of his own absence from the scene of action in the early part of the day. But it was no time now for idle and worthless lament- ation. It was action that was needed — prompt, decided, vigorous action. Grant was not slow to come to a conclusion, although it is simply absurd to say that in this instance he made up his mind at once. About three o’clock in the afternoon he called McClernand and Wallace aside for consultation. They were all on horseback. Grant held in 92 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. his hand some despatches, to which now and then he nervously turned his eyes. His face was flushed and revealed high excitement. He was evidently swayed by strong emotions. He said something about the necessity of falling back and intrenching — about waiting for rein- forcements and Foote’s new flotilla. It was suggested by one of the other two that in consequence of McClernand’s defeat the road to Clarksville was un- covered, and that the enemy might es- cape if he chose. Whether Grant had merely been sounding the opinions of his subordinates, or whether new light at the moment dawned upon him, we know not ; but all of a sudden he gave orders that the right wing should re- take the ground which it had lost in the morning, and that the left wing, under Smith, should make a simultane- ous attack on the Confederate right. General Grant has since given us his own reason for the course which he re- solved to pursue. “ On riding upon the field,” he says, “ I saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. I took the oppor- tunity, and ordered an advance of the whole line.” The orders were promptly executed. Wallace took charge of the troops which had been engaged and which had suf- fered so much in the morning and early part of the day, and whose duty it was to resume lost ground. The ground was rough and badly blocked with wood. There were, besides, bloody memorials of the morning’s struggle. The Nationals, however, pressed on, the Confederates vigorously resisting. For more than an hour the conflict raged fiercely, and the result seemed doubtful. Ultimately, however, the Confederates yielded to the fierce energy of their as- sailants, and were compelled to retire within their own intrenchments. In the hour of victory almost complete, when wdthin one hundred and fifty yards of the enemy’s works, Wallace was astonished by an order from the gen- eral-in-chief, commanding him to halt and retire his troops, as a new plan of operations had been arranged for the morrow. He felt satisfied that Gi'ant was ignorant of the success which had attended his movement. Darkness, however, was at hand. He contented himself, therefore, with hold- ing the ground he had taken, and dis- obeyed orders only to the extent of bi- vouacking on the field of victory. Smith was equally successful in his attack on the Confederate right. Buckner, who in abandoning the left made it the easy |)rey of Wallace, arrived too late at his old position on the right to save it from the dashing energy of Smith. In spite of all that he could do, the Confederates were forced from their intrenchments and driven inside the work. All along the line, the ground lost in the morning had been reclaimed. Nay, more : — On both the left and the right the enemy had found it necessary to abandon his own chosen ground and to retire more and more under the works of the fort. When darkness fell. Grant had reason to feel satisfied. He had by his single will converted a day of dis- aster into a day of triumph. The fruit of victory was not yet in his hands, but THE SURRENDER. 93 it was ripe and ready to fall. So ended tlie third day at Fort Donelson. The night which followed was one of the saddest yet experienced in the his- tory of the war. The cold was intense, the thermometer indicating more than twenty degrees below the freezing point. The ice-covered branches of the trees swayed and crackled in the night breeze. Camp life had not yet become a luxury. There were no tents, and even the blanket had not become a necessary part of the soldier’s equipage. General Grant found a sleeping-place in a negro hut. General Smith lay down on the frozen ground. The soldier slept as he best might, leaning on his musket or I’esting on his knapsack. Four thousand brave Americans lay scattered over the battle field, many of them dead, some of them freezin^: to death, the feeble but piteous cries of the latter filling the weary hours with woe. It is in scenes such as these that true humanity stands forth conspicuous and commands universal admiration. With such a background, goodness, pure, true, and unselfish, shines as if with a heavenly light. General Lewis Wallace, to his honor be it said, with many of his men, who, filled with his spirit and fired by his example, worked far into the morning hours, ministering to the wounded on both sides, and with kindly hands burying the dead. Grant had made all necessary arrange- ments for resuming the attack along the whole line on the following (Sunday) morning. Such attack, however, was not to be necessary. A council of war was held at Pillow’s headquarters, late ap — on Saturday night. Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and their staff-officers were all present. Some bad temper w^as reveal- ed ; and on many points there was dif- ference of opinion. On one point they were agreed — that another sortie would be absolutely disastrous. Buckner did not believe that he could hold his posi- tion half an hour after daylight. In his judgment there was no escape from a suiTender. Floyd and Pillow were equally of opinion that the situation was desperate, and that there was noth- ing for them but immediate capitulation. The one absorbing question with Floyd and Pillow was ‘‘How shall we es- cape ? ” Floyd knew wLat he had done, and he trembled to fall into the hands of the enemy. “You know,” he said, “the position in which I stand.” Pil- low seemed to feel himself in a similar plight, although he perhaps somewhat overestimated his individual importance. It was ultimately agreed that Buckner should assume the command, and that Floyd and Pillow should be allowed to make their escape, Floyd taking with him his Virginia brigade. Floyd sur- rendered the command. Pillow, who was next in rank, said “I pass it.” Buckner called for writing materials and a bugler; and Floyd and Pillow hastened off to save their precious lives. Pillow crossed the river in a scow. Floyd and his men went on board a steamer at the wharf, and steered off amid the curses and hisses of their former com- panions in arms. It was a shameful transaction ; but Buckner’s conduct was honorable throughout. Floyd had now appeared in his true character. 94 FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON. When on the morning of Sunday, the Feb. February, the light broke along the lines, there was no con- viction more general among the Nation- al soldiers than that the stirring scenes of the previous day were about to be re- peated, and repeated, perhaps, in more aggravated and bloody form ; nor was there disposition anywhere to shirk the ordeal. Suddenly, however, the clear notes of the bugle were heard sounding a parley ; and as the gray dawn passed away before the brighter light of the opening day, a white flag was seen wav- ing over the fort. It was a token of a Avillingness to surrender. We can read- ily imagine that the altered situation was gladly welcomed by all. A letter was received by Grant from Buckner, asking for the appointment of commis- sioners to settle upon terms of capitula- tion, and suggesting an armistice till noon. To this Grant returned his char- acteristic reply, ^‘No terms other than an unconditional surrender can be ac- cepted. I propose to move immediately on your works.” Buckner regarded these terms as “ ungenerous and unchiv- alric”; but he was nevertheless obliged to accept them. The old flag was im- mediately raised ; and the stars and stripes floated over the stronghold of the Cumberland. About 15,000 pris- oners, 17. GOO small arms, and 65 guns constituted the prize which fell into the hands of the National commander. His losses were 2041, of whom 425 were killed. Grant paid a high compliment to his soldiers. He told them that for four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they had faced an enemy in large force, and in a posi- tion chosen by himself, and had com- pelled him to surrender without condi- tions, the victory achieved being not only great in the effect it must have in breaking down the rebellion, but also in this, that it had secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this continent.” The investment of Donelson had been followed by the evacuation of Bowling Green ; its fall was followed by the abandonment of Nashville. This, how- ever, w^as not all. Polk found it neces- sary to evacuate Columbus and fall back on Island No. 10. The so-called Gib- raltar of the West was forthwith occu- pied by National troops. The Southern line of defense was completely broken down. General Grant had nobly accom- plished the task which he had under- taken. Henceforward he was regarded as one of the strongest pillars of the National cause. ISLAND No. 10 SUERENDERS. 95 CHAPTER VII. The Effects of the Fall of Donelson. — Johnston’s Mistake. — The Enemy’s Centre Broken. — Evacuation of Coluro bus. — Island No. 10 and New Madrid. — Surrender of Island No. 10. — Vexation of the South. — National Victories in the West. — Popularity of Grant. — The Importance of Corinth. — Grant Preparing to Advance. — Grant Kemoved from Command. — C. F. Smith put in Charge of the Army. — Halleck Gives His Keasons. — ‘ Grant’s Answer. — Movement up the Tennessee. — Crump's Landing. — The Gunboats. — Sherman in Advance. — Pittsburg Landing. — The Confederates at Corinth. — Description of the Ground at Pittsburg Landing. — Shiloh Church. — The Illness of General Smith. — General Grant again in Charge. — Disposition of the National Troops. — The Confederates. — How Disposed. — Their Plans and Prospects. — General Beauregard. — Arrival of Johnston. — Buell Ordered to Join Grant. — Johnston’s Proclamation. — The Confederates Moving Forward. — Grant’s Plans Well Laid, but the Troops Scattered. — The Morning of the Sixth of April. — The Nationals Attacked. — A Tremendous Onslaught. — Grant not on the Field. — His Arrival. — Sherman's Bravery. — Sherman and Prentiss Driven from their Ground. — The Battle Doubtful. — The Confederates Gaining Ground. — The Ammunition Train. — Four Division Camps Plundered. — Three Divisions Routed. — W. H. L. Wallace Comes to the Rescue. — Wallace Mortally Wounded. — The Situation Desperate. — Neither Lewis Wallace nor Buell yet on the Field. — Driven to a Corner of the Field. — W 11 Grant Surrender? — Both Armies Exhausted. — Johnston Wounded and Carried from the Field. — A Lull in the Fight. — Beauregard in Command. — The Ravine. — The Battery on the Crest of the Hill. — The Gunboats. — The Terrible Struggle. — The Slaughter. — A Valley of Death. — End of the First Day. — The Second Day. — The Battle Resumed. — Wallace and Buell now on the Field. — Beauregard Attempts to Turn the National Left.- An Artillery Duel. — The Confederates Pressed Back. — The Nationals Gaining Ground all along the Line. — A Cheer of Victory. — The Battle Ended. — Re- flections. — Unexampled Bravery on Both Sides. — Magnanimity of General Grant. The fall of Fort Donelson, as we mentioned at the close of the last 1862 chapter, completely broke up that line of defense stretching from Bowling Green to Columbus — a line of defense which the Confederates fondly imag- ined to be invulnerable. It carried the whole Union front forward two hun- dred miles. It had the immediate effect of driving the insurgents completely out of Kentucky. It threw them back into the centre of Tennessee, and brought the capital of that State under Union authority. It practically unbound both ’ the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers — an immense gain to the Union com- manders, as they fully appreciated the great advantage of gunboats on those inland rivers. There can now be no doubt in any mind at all familiar with the subject, that the Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson were rendered compar- atively easy by the bad management of the Confederate commander-in-chief. Had General Johnston, in place of at- taching so much importance to the pro- tection of the two forts on the Tennes- see and the Cumberland respectively, concentrated his various armies and forced either Grant or Buell or both to risk the chances of battle in the open ground, the result might have been very different. Johnston saw this himself when it was too late ; and in a remark- able letter addressed from Murfrees- boro’ to Jefferson Davis, he said, ^‘If I join this corps to the forces of General SHILOH. 9G Beauregard, then those who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument.” Bowling Green had been evacuated before Fort Donelson fell ; for, believ- ing it to be untenable, Johnston had moved on towards the south. Nashville was thrown into a perfect panic by the report of the capture of Donelson ; and as Johnston had declared that he fouglit for that city while endeavoring to save this fort' on the Cumberland, the capital of Tennessee fell an easy prey to the troops of General Buell. Six days after j^ar. capture of Nashville, General Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan from St. Louis, “ Columbus, the Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and Kentucky is free. Thanks to the bril- liant strategy of the campaign by which the enemy’s centre was pierced at Forts Henry and Donelson, his wings isolated from each other and turned, compelling thus the evacuation of his stronghold of Bowling Green first, and now Colum- bus.” Driven from all these strong:- holds, it became necessary for the Con- federates to select some defensive posi- tion further to the south. In obedience to instructions from Bichmond, Polk fell back some miles, still clinging to the shores of the Mississippi, and estab- lished himself at Island No. 10 and at New Madrid. These places, although fortified with great strength, Island No. 10 particularly, having had the special attention of General Beauregard, and being deemed the most impregnable of all the posts on the Mississippi, the Confederates were compelled in succes- sion to evacuate. The attack on Island No. 10 reflected the highest credit on the skill of the Union commanders and on the bravery of the Union troops. It was not until a canal had been cut across Donaldson’s Point, bet^veen Isl- and No. 8 and New Madrid, that the Nationals had any hope of dislodging the enemy. The canal was twelve miles long and fifty feet wide ; and nineteen days were consumed in cutting it from j)oint to point and making it navigable for the largest of the gunboats. Com- mander Foote reported to his govern- ment that Island No. 10 was “harder to conquer than Columbus, its shores being lined with forts, each fort com- manding the one above it.” Beauregard telegraphed to Richmond that the Na- tional guns had “thrown three thousand shells and burned fifty tons of gunpow- der,” his batteries being uninjured and only one man killed. The canal made a complete change in the situation. New Madrid had been evacuated on the 12th of March; and on the April 8th of April, four days after the 8. completion of the canal, Island No. 10 had ceased to be a Confederate strong- hold. The defenders of the batteries had fled in confusion ; but they were pursued by Pope and compelled to sur- render. The garrison on the island, learning what had taken place and be- lieving the situation to be hopeless, sent a flag of truce to Commander Foote, offering to surrender. The immediate fruits of victory were some seven thou- sand prisoners, including three gene- rals and two hundred and seventy field and company officers, one hundred heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of PEA RIDGE. 97 field artillery, a large quantity of am- munition, several thousand stands of small arms, with tents, horses, and wag- ons innumerable. ‘‘No single battle field has yet afforded to the North such visible fruits of victory as have been srathered at Island No. 10.” Such was o the language used by the high officials at Kichmond. The Mississippi was now open as far south as Fort Pillow. While these events were following each other in rapid succession in Middle Tennessee and Western Kentucky, suc- cesses of a scarcely less substantial kind were attending the National arms in Arkansas, in the grand movement, con- ducted by Curtis, Sigel, and others, down the Mississippi valley toward the gulf. Early in February the Confede- rate General Price had been compelled to retreat from Missouri into Arkansas. Pel), On the 18th of that month he was 18. closely followed by the Nationals under General Samuel K. Curtis of Iowa. On the same day, joy was created throughout the Union by a telegram sent by General Halleck to General McClellan. “ The flag of the Union,’’ said Halleck, “ is floating in Arkansas. . . . The army of the Southwest is do- ing its duty nobly.” Curtis foresaw, however, that he was certain soon to be taken at a disadvantage, as the Confed- erates, in retreating, had really been falling back upon reinforcements. He therefore took post upon Sugar Creek. His entire force consisted of two thou- • sand five hundred men, with forty-nine guns. The enemy, under General Earl VanDorn, a dashing Confederate officer, was at least twenty thousand strong. On the morning of the 7th of March the two armies came into collision. There had been much previous manoeu- vreing ; and in consequence of a skilful and successful flank movement made by VanDorn, Curtis was compelled, almost at the last moment, to change his front. When the struggle began, the First and Second Divisions, under Sigel and As- both, were on the left, the Third, under Davis, was in the centre, and Carr’s Fourth Division formed the right. The line extended between three and four miles, from Sugar Creek to Elkhorn Tavern. On the opposite side of a ra- vine called Cross Timber Hollow, the Confederate line was stretched out be- fore them, with Price on the right, McIntosh in the centre, and McCulloch on the left. The attack fell heavily upon Carr’s Division, which during the course of the day was driven back near- ly a mile, but was not disorganized. An attempt was made by McCulloch, by a movement of his force to the left, to join VanDorn and Price in their at- tack on Curtis’ right. To arrest this movement, Sigel pushed forward three pieces of artillery, with a body of cav- alry to protect and support them. The cavalry were immediately overwhelmed and the guns captured. Davis hurried to the assistance of Sigel ; a desperate struggle followed, victory oscillating like a pendulum, the Nationals and Confederates recoiling and recovering alternately ; ultimately, however, the Confederate right was broken and rout- ed, and among those left on the field vrere Generals McCulloch and McIntosh, mortally wounded. At the close of the 98 SHILOH. fighting on the Tth, Price was on the Fayetteville road, in Curtis’ rear. Van- Dorn had his headquarters at Elkhorn Tavern. On the right the National ar- my had been defeated ; it was cut off from its line of communication ; its pro- visions were all but exhausted. The Confederates, however, had been de- feated on their right, and nearly driven from the field. During the night the Confederates united their forces on the ground held by their left wing. A change was also effected in the National line, Davis taking the right, Carr the centre, and Sigel the left. At sunrise the battle was resumed, Sigel opening a heavy cannonade, and advancing round the enemy’s right, Davis at the same time turning the enemy’s left. It was a daring and skilful movement, and had all the effects of a surprise. All at once the Confederates found them- selves exposed to a destructive cross fire. They made a brave resistance, but in two hours, such was the precision and rapidity of Sigel’s gunners, they were in full retreat throus-h the defiles O of Cross Timber Hollow. Thus ended what is known as the battle of Pea Ridge. In the two days the Nationals lost over thirteen hundred men. The Confederate loss must have been great- er. This battle had no direct connec- tion with the movements more immedi- ately under consideration. It did not result from the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson. It did not in any way affect the impending struggle at Pittsburg Landing. But inasmuch as the move- ments of the army under Curtis were part of Halleck’s general plan, as that plan contemplated quite as much the opening of the Mississippi from Cairo to the gulf as the driving of the enemy out of Kentucky and Tennessee, and as the battle of Pea Ridge was noted for skill on the part of the officers and bravery on the part of the men, it has been deemed wise, the more especially as it occurred simultaneously with the events now under review, to give it a place in these pages, which are intended to be preliminary to the most gigantic effort yet made on either side since the commencement of the war. After the fall of Donelson, it was only natural that General Grant should, for a time at least, become the popular favorite. All over the Union his praises were liberally sounded; and by not a few who had acquired an insight into his character he was hailed already as the coming man. His sphere of action had been greatly enlarged. General Halleck, as if to mark his appreciation of Grant’s noble services, had assigned him to the command of the new District of West Tennessee, a command wffiich extended from Cairo to the northern borders of Mississippi, and embraced the entire country between the Mississippi and Cumberland Rivers. General Grant took immediate steps to turn to account the victories which he had won, and to press the enemy still further to the south. He established his headquarters at Fort Henry, where General Lewis Wallace was in command. We have seen already that Foote’s flotilla was withdrawn from the Cumberland, that part of it had gone up the Tennessee River, and that Foote himself, with a GRANT REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 99 powerful naval armament, had gone down the Mississippi for the purpose of co-operating with the land troops r gainst Columbus, Hickman, Island No. 10, and New Madrid. It seems to have been the conviction of all the Union commanders — of Hal- leck, of Buell, of Grant — that a lodg- mtmt should be made at or near Corinth in Northern Mississippi. The posses- sion of Corinth or Florence or Tuscum- bia, but particularly Corinth, would give the National forces control of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the key to the great railway communica- tions between the Mississippi and the East, as well as the border slave States and the Gulf of Mexico. It would fa- cilitate the capture of Memphis, because it would place it more completely at the mercy of the troops now moving down the Mississippi ; and it would render effective assistance to General Curtis, who, as we have seen, was at this moment caiTying on important op- erations in Arkansas. While adopting vigorous measures for the purpose of giving effect to the general plan. Grant had the mortification to receive an order from Halleck, instructing him to turn over his command to General C. F. Smith, and to remain himself at Fort Henry. In such circumstances such an order must have been humiliating in the last degree to General Grant ; and it is not surprising that, stung to the quick as he must have been, he should have asked to be entirely relieved from duty. As a general rule, it is unwise to attach too much importance to individuals in a great national contest. No one man is absolutely indispensable. It is unde- niable, however, that the retirement of General Grant at this particular junc- ture might have materially affected the future history of the great national struggle now fairly begun, and already bearing upon it somewhat of the impress of his character and genius. The story of this short-lived difficulty is easily told. Complying with a request for an interview. Grant had on the 27th of February gone on a visit to Buell, up the Cumberland to Nashville. In the meantime Halleck had ordered him to ascend the Tennessee, then in full flood, and establish himself on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at or near Corinth. On the 1st of March, |^ar. Halleck ordered him to fall back 1* from the Cumberland to the Tennessee, with the view of carrying out the orders’* previously given. It was supposed at this moment that the Confederates had retreated to Chattanooga. Sherman meanwhile received orders to seize * all steamboats passing Paducah, and to send them up the Tennessee for the trans- portation of Grant’s army. On hearing that Grant had gone up the Cumberland, Halleck telegraphed to him : Why don’t you obey my orders ? Why don’t you answer my letters ? Turn over the command of the Tennessee expedition to General C. F. Smith, and remain yourself at Fort Henry.” At the same time Halleck wrote complainingly to McClellan at Washington, saying he could get no reports from Grant, whose troops were demoralized by their vic- tory. To Grant himself Halleck wrote, 100 SHILOH. stating that his repeated neglect of positive orders to report his strength had created great dissatisfaction, and sei'iously interfered with the general military arrangements ; and that his going to Nashville when he ought to have been with his troops, had given such offense at Washington that it had been considered advisable to arrest him on his return. It is possible that, judged by the highest forms of mili- tary law, Grant, in some of the particu- lars charged, was to blame. It is possi- ble, too, that Halleck, who was a man of the old school, and strict to the let- ter of the law, was officious overmuch. Grant, however, had his explanation ready. He had not received Halleck’s orders in time ; he had gone to Nash- ville for the good of the service, and not for personal pleasure or for any selfish motive; he had reported every day, had written on an average more than once a day, and had done his best to obey orders from headquarters; he had not permitted his troops to maraud ; on the contrary, he had sent the ma- rauders on to St. Louis. He submitted to instructions by turning the army over to General Smith. He asked, however, that he might be relieved. The ex- planations so far satisfied Halleck that he requested the authorities at Wash- ington to allow the matter to drop. Smith, however, remained in command, but, as the reader will soon discover, only for a brief period. The temporary change of command- ers did not allow any intermission of the work. The expedition up the Ten- nessee was hurried forward. An acqui- sition was found in Sherman, who, in compliance with orders from Halleck, reported to Smith. It was not many days until seventy transports, carrying over thirty thousand troops, were ready to move to the point agreed upon. As the boats steamed up to Savannah, where the depot of supplies was estab- lished, bands playing and banners fly- ing, it was perhaps the most splendid pageant seen since the commencement of the war. On the 11th of March lyjar, the greater portion of the army H. was debarked at Savannah in perfect safety. General Lewis Wallace, with his division, disembarked on the west bank of the river at Crump’s Landing, about four miles above Savannah, and took post on the road to Purdy. His instructions were to destroy the rail- road bridge in the immediate neighbor- hood of that village. This was a hazard- ous undertaking ; for the Confederates, as was afterwards learned, were lying close at hand ; but it was successfully accomplished, and that, too, under the inconvenience and discomfort of a series of heavy thunderstorms. A Confede- rate train approached while the bridge was burning, and narrowly escaped cap- ture by reversing the engine. Sherman was ordered by Smith to take his o^vn division and the two gunboats Tyler and Lexington, to proceed further up the river, and to strike the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Sherman went up as far as Tyler’s Landing, at the mouth of Yellow Creek, just within the bor- ders of Mississippi ; but the roads were so flooded by the heavy rains that he found it impossible to reach the rail- GRANT AGAIN IN COMMAND. 101 road. Had the enemy known bis op- portunity, Sherman’s division might liave been cut to pieces ; for it was with the utmost difficulty, and not until many men and horses had perished in iie swollen streams, that he got back to his boats. On his way up the stream, Sherman made one important discovery. On passing Pittsburg Landing the gun- boats were tired upon by a Confederate regiment. It had already become known that the Confederate army was concen- trating at Corinth, and that two batte- ries were already posted in advance, one at Eastport, the other just above the mouth of Bear Creek. Sherman learned that a road led from Pittsburg Landing to Corinth ; he conveyed the information at once to Smith, and de- clared it to be all-important, in his judg- ment, that Pittsburg Landing should be occupied. The advice was taken ; and the 23lace became sacred — the name immortal. After a personal examination of the ground, Smith was satisfied that Sher- man’s advice was sound ; and Hurlbut was ordered to occupy Pittsburg Land- ing ; while Sherman was directed to bring his division on the ground, but to take a position out from the river, leav- ing space enough behind him, as Smith put it, ^‘for a hundred thousand men.” Pittsburg Landing is about eight or nine miles above Savannah, and lies on the west side of the Tennessee. The river banks at the Landing rise about eighty feet, but are cloven by a number of ravines, through one of which runs the main road to Corinth to the south- west, and branching off to Purdy to the northwest. The Landing is fianked on the left by a short but precipitous ra- vine. On the right and left are Snake and Lick Creeks, streams which rise near each other and gradually diverge, fall- ing into the Tennessee some four or five miles apart on either side of the Land- ing. Between these streams, which form a good flanking arrangement, making attack possible only in the front, lies a plateau or table-land rising some eighty feet high, of irregular surface, cleared near the shores, but covered with tall oaks and thick brushwood further from the river. About three miles from the Landing, and embowered in trees, stood a little log building — a place used occa- sionally by the Methodists for holding cam^) meetings. It had neither doors nor wundows, and was only half -floored. Some corn in the husk lay piled on the floor. This was Shiloh Church, des- tined to give its name to the neighbor- hood and to the bloody contest which was so soon to disturb its quiet sur- roundin! 2 :s. The illness of General Smith, whicE resulted in death on the 25th of April, brought Grant again to the front. Mar,, On the 17th of March he arrived II* at Savannah, established his headquar- ters at the house of Mr. Cheney, and assumed the command. He found the army already in position, and made no radical change The Landing was- guarded by the gunboats Tyler and Lexington. Sherman’s Division, eight thousand strong, formed a sort of out- lying force, covering all the main roads, leading to the Landing. There was a gap between his centre and his right,, 20G 102 SHILOH. and a still wider gap of about two and a half miles between his centre and his left. Hurlbut’s Division was put in line on the left of the main Corinth road, and Smith’s own division, under General W. H. L. Wallace, was on Hurlbut’s right. Lewis Wallace’s Di- vision was detached and stationed at Crump’s Landing, to observe any move- ments which might be made by the Confederates at Purdy, and to cover the river communications between Pitts- burg Landing and Savannah. McCler- nand’s Division was about a mile in front of W. H. L. Wallace, with that of Prentiss to his right. These two di- visions — that of McClernand and that of Prentiss — formed the real line of battle. The entire force was about thirty- three thousand men. In estimat- ing the possible strength of the Union army, the aid which might come from Buell must be taken into ing been compelled to retreat, McCler- nand, too, and Sherman having both yielded on the right — the Confederates, apparently resolved to push matters to a crisis, rushed with tremendous fury upon Hurlbut, who still maintained his original position, and who had been joined by Prentiss and some two thou- sand of his men. W. H. L. Wallace fiew to the aid of Hurlbut, taking with him the Missouri batteries of Stone, Kichardson, and Webber. Hurlbut, who had hitherto been in the open fields, now fell back into the woods which lay between his camp and the river, and there, nobly aided by Wal- lace, who fought like a hero of old, gallantly resisted the foe for several weary hours. Upon this compact body of National troops, wffio knew that if they had death in front they had cer- tain death in the rear, three most des- perate charges were made, as if upon a wall of iron. In one of these encoun- ters General W. H. L. Wallace fell, mortally wounded. McArthur took the command ; but in spite of their best efforts, both he and Hurlbut were com- pelled to retire a little further down and towards the river. In the confu- sion, Prentiss and his company getting isolated, were captured, sent to the Con- federate rear, and finally marched to Corinth as prisoners of war. The situation now seemed desperate. It was between three and four o’clock. Sherman and McClernand, all but ufi 108 SHILOH. terly exhausted, and having lost many of their guns, had fallen back and taken a position in front of the bridge which crosses Snake Creek It was over this bridge that General Lewis Wallace was momentarily expected to come. Grant had been pressed into a corner of the bat- tle field, his army at this time occupying a space of not more than four hundred acres on the very verge of the river. As yet there were no signs of Wallace, nor any explanation of his delay. Buell, too, had failed to come to time. Five of the Union camps had been captured ; and many guns and prisoners had fallen into the enemy’s hands. Fatigue and disorder had done and were still doing their terrible work. Cooped up in this narrow corner of the field, with the tri- umphant enemy in front and the dark rolling waters of the Tennessee in the rear — death before and death behind — what more can Grant do? Will he sur- render ? No. The word had no place in his system of tactics. The Confederates, however, were less strong than they seemed. Success had broken their ranks ; and the hard work of the day had produced its natural fruit. The men were completely woi’n out. Some of their best men had per- ished. Generals Gladdon and Hindman had been killed; and about half-past two o’clock, when pressing his men to- wards the Landing, and almost reck- lessly exposing himself, Commander-in- chief Johnston received a rifle bullet in the leg, which proved fatal. There was a lull in the fight after Johnston fell; but Beauregard assumed command ; and the struggle for possession of Pittsburg Landing was resumed with fresh en- ergy. Beauregard felt that there was no time to lose ; for night and Buell were coming. The entire strength of the Confed- erate army was at this stage ^ being pressed against the National left. It seemed to be the object of Beauregard to turn the National line or force them into the river. In any case, he was de- termined to seize the Landing. Hap- pily, as the result proved, a deep ravine lay between the Confederates and the Nationals, who, cooped up as they were, still covered the Landing. This ravine was impassable for artillery and cavalry. In consequence of the heavy rains, the bottom was wet and the sides slippery. The ravine led down to the river ; and at its mouth the two gunboats Tyler and Lexington had taken position, their commanders having obtained permission from General Grant to exercise their discretion in shelling the woods and sweeping the ravine. On the brow of his side of the ravine General Grant had hastily flung up some earthworks in the form of a half-moon. To several siege guns which were parked there. Colonel Webster, Grant’s chief of staff, added a number of guns which had be- longed to light batteries, now broken up, and thus secured a semi-circular de- fense, of about fifty cannon. This hur- riedly-improvised battery reached round nearly to the Corinth road. The wretch- ed condition to which the National ar- my had been reduced may be gathered from the fact that it was with the ut- most difficulty men could be got to work the guns. The men were exhaust- A VALLEY OF DEATH. 109 ed and demoralized. Volunteers were called for ; and Dr. Cornyn, surgeon of the First Missouri Artillery, having offered his services, his example was quickly followed. The Confederate assault was led by Chalmers, Withers, Cheatham, Euggles, Anderson, Stuart, Pond, and Stevens. It was a perilous attempt, but it was bravely made. Down the steep sides of the ravine they rushed, uttering their favorite and familiar cry. For a moment it seemed as if all was lost, and as if Beauregard was about to crown the day’s work by a final crushing blow. But no. It was destined to be otherwise. The slippery sides of the ravine, and the slush and mud at the bottom, greatly hindered the movements of the attacking party. Once in the deadly hollow, there was literally no way of escape. At a signal given, Webster’s guns from their fifty mouths opened fire in front ; while the Tyler and Lexington, striking the Con- federates on the flank, swept the ravine with their eight-inch shells. It was now a most unequal contest. The Con- federates had fallen into a trap. Every onward movement was vigorously re- pulsed. The National troops began to rally, and finding position, contributed to the work of destruction by the un- erring aim of their rifles. Again and again and yet again did the Confede- rates face the terrible fire, rushing across the ravine as if they would storm the battery in front ; but it was only to be mowed down like grass or driven back like sheep. The ravine was filled with the wounded and the dead. So dense was the smoke that the entire scene was Avrapped in almost midnight darkness — a darkness relieved only by the swift- recurring rifle flash and the cannon’s blaze. It was a virtual hell — a real, a veritable valley of death itself. The tide had turned. The crisis was past. Beauregard, seeing that it was useless to prolong the struggle, withdrew his men. He professed himself satisfied with what he had done; and, as it was near nightfall, he thought he might rest for the night and give the finishing touch in the morning. The firing now ceased, and Grant was left master of the ground. Before the close of the struggle. Nelson, with Buell’s advance, had arrived on the field; and Xewis Wallace, having at last found his way, was coming up with his five thousand men. For the National cause, the first day at Shiloh had ended not inglorious- ly; and with these fresh accessions of strength, the prospect was bright for the coming day. The dreary hours of the night were sufficiently filled with horrors. The gunboats kept up an incessant cannon- ade, in some places setting the woods on fire. The wounded on both sides vainly sought to escape from the grasp of this new and terrible destroyer. Hap- pily a heavy rain-storm fell upon the scene of agony, and' the fire was extin- guished. Shortly after the firing had ceased, Grant visited Sherman ; and as it was the opinion of both that the Con- federates were exhausted, it was agreed that the attack should be resumed early in the morning. Subsequently Grant visited each of the division command- ers, giving the necessary instructions, no SHILOH. and then flung himself on the wet ground and snatched a few hours’ rest, with his head resting on the stump of a tree. During the night Lewis Wal- lace came up, and Buell arrived in per- son. All night through, steamboats kept busily plying between Savannah and Pittsburg Landing, bringing up the remaining divisions of Buell’s army. Nelson’s Division was all on the field by nine o’clock, P. M. Crittenden’s arrived a little later; and by five in the morning McCook’s division, which was the last to come up, having had to wait for boats, was all safely disembarked. Twenty-seven thousand men were thus added to the National army. With the early light of the morning of April which came in with a 7* drizzling rain, the troops w^ere in position and ready to make the attack. The fi’esh troops were placed in line, as they came upon the field, considerably in advance, and upon the ground aban- doned by Beauregard after the failure of his last attack. Nelson was on the left; then in order, Crittenden, McCook, Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and Lewis Wallace. Thomson, of Wallace’s division, with his field guns, was the first to disturb the silence of the morning and to awaken the echoes of the forest. The response w^as vigorous ; but the fresh troops of Wallace stood bravely to their work. At this moment Grant arrived, and ordered Wallace to press forw^ard and attack the Confederate left under Bragg, who, since the death of Johnston, w'as second in command. This was gallantly done, the Confede- rates being compelled to abandon the high ground, which was soon occupied by Wallace’s troops. Here a halt was made, Wallace expecting Sherman to come to his aid. Meanw^hile the two armies had come into collision at the other extremities of their lines. From what has been said above, it will be seen that Buell’s force, w^hich lay nearest to Pittsburg Landing, composed the centre and left of Grant’s new line of battle. The divisions of Nelson and Crittenden only were ready, wdien Wallace’s guns were heard boom- ing to the right. They moved forward at once. Nelson’s division leading. Their artillery had not yet arrived; but the batteries of Mendenhall and Terrill, of the regular service, were placed at their disposal. Nelson had moved half a mile, at least, before he felt the enemy. At the first touch he seemed to yield; but it was only for a moment. At this point Beaui'egard had gathered up his strength and was resolved to strike a deadly blow. If he could turn the National left, he might still accomplish his purpose of yester- day, and make himself master of the Landing. His onslaught was tremen- dous. For a second Nelson’s troops jwavered ; but it w^as only for a second. Mendenhall’s battery was hurried into action ; and the advancing Confederates were driven back in confusion by a tempest of grape and canister. Hazen’s brigade charged, captured one of Beau- regard’s batteries, and turned it with deadly effect on the foe. Once more the Confederates came up, with re- doubled strength, and Hazen fell back before the advancing tide. Terrill’s A WALL OF IRON. Ill battery of McCook’s division was now got into position. Pouring forth shell from his ten-pounders and grape and canister from his brass twelves, Terrill did splendid and effective work. For two hours the artillery conflict raged. Crittenden was on Nelson’s right, and McCook was to the right of Crittenden, fronting the Confederate centre. Buell had taken general command of his own troops. The terrible artillery duel be- gan to tell on the Confederate line. Nelson, becoming more daring, began to move forward. Crittenden and Mc- Cook advanced abreast at the same time; but every inch of ground was keenly contested ; and victory, now leaning to one side and now to the other, seemed undecided as to which to award the palm. Sherman’s captured camp was still in the Confederate rear ; and to this as an objective point the National line kept slowly but steadily advancing. Sher- man and Wallace, carrying out Grant’s instiTictions to the letter, have advanced under a terrible fire and have reached the ridge occupied by the former on Sunday morning. The little log church in Shiloh has again become a conspicu- ous object in the battle field. Around it the tempest of battle is again to rage. Beauregard, despairing of success on the left, had, by countermarching his troops, greatly strengthened himself in front of the enemy’s right. The strug- gle at this point was protracted and severe. Sherman and W allace held their ground ; and it soon became apparent that Beauregard’s strength was all but exhausted. At the same time that the Confede- rate general had concentrated his troops against the National right, he did not neglect an opportunity which i^eemed to present itself more towards what might be called the National centre. Noticing a slight gap between Critten- den and McCook, he endeavored to force a passage between them. Here he made his last effort — his last decided stand. It was all in vain. McCook’s division stood like a wall of iron. The Confederate centre now began to yield. All along the line from Nelson on the left to Sherman and Wallace on the right, the Nationals were pressing for- ward. Everywhere the enemy was seen retiring. Cheer after cheer,” says Wallace, ‘^rang through the woods, and every man felt that the day was ours.” The battle of Shiloh was ended. “Don’t,” said Beauregard to Brecken- ridge, as he ordered a retreat, “ don’t let this be converted into a rout.” It was now half-past five o’clock ; and the wearied National troops being in no mood to pursue the foe, the retreat was the more easily conducted. The two days’ fighting had resulted in the loss of over twenty thousand men — the Con- federate killed and wounded amounting to more than ten thousand, the Nation- als to nearly twelve thousand. General Halleck only did what was right when he thanked Generals Grant and Buell, “and the officers and men of their respective commands, for the bravery and endurance with which they sustained the general attack of the ene- my on the 6th, and for the heroic man- ner in which on the 7th they defeated 112 SHILOH. and routed the entire rebel army.” General Grant showed his magnanimity when, in writing to the War Depart- ment, ie said, “Sherman held with raw troops the key-point of the Landing. It is no disparagement to any other offi- cer to say that I do not believe there was another division commander on the field who had the skill and enterprise to have done it. To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of the battle.” Lewis Wallace was greatly blamed for his non-appearance on the field of battle on the 6th. It was not difficult, however, for that brave officer, who did such effective work on the 7th, to give sufficient and satisfactory explanations. He had, it appeared, obeyed his first orders, which were that he should join the right of the army, but not knowing that it had fallen back, he had wasted the whole afternoon in a fruitless march. There has been much useless discus- sion as to how much Grant was indebt- ed to Buell for the victory at Shiloh. What did happen we know. What might have been we cannot tell. Some of the facts of the case are j)lain, and admit of no double interpretation. Dur- ing the greater part of Sunday, the Con- federates marched triumphantly from point to point. The Nationals w^ere driven back entirely from their original ground; five of their division camps were overrun and captured ; and Grant, with his whole army, was pressed into a corner of the field. The situation was desperate. One blow more, and it seemed as if Beauregard would reap a glorious victory. Of all this there can be no doubt. It is as little to be denied, however, that at the last moment Grant snatched victory from his triumphant rival. The advancing Confederates were not only successfully resisted, but driv- en back in confusion and compelled to give up the struggle. All this Grant accomplished before any effective assist- ance anived from Buell. It would simply be absurd to deny that the ar- rival of reinforcements, which, includ- ing W allace’s division, amounted in all to twenty-seven thousand men, made victory on the following day compara- tively more easy. But we are not at liberty to say that, without the aid of Buell, Grant might not have accom- plished his purpose and driven the ene- my from the field. We simply cannot tell. We know that both Grant and Buell did their best, and that their best w^as needed. From earliest dawn till half-past five in the afternoon the battle raged without intermission. It was no easily won victory ; and if praise is due to the Union commanders, justice compels us to be equally generous to General Beauregard. If for the moment we could forget the cause, and think only of the skill and heroism displayed, we should say that on those two days he covered himself with glory. In Beau- res^ard the Union commanders found a foeman worthy of their steel. lie was by far the ablest general who had yet appeared in the Confederate ranks. There is one other ^loint on which it is necessary to make a remark before clos- ing this chapter. It is to be borne in mind that Grant was not responsible either for the selection of the battle THE THIRD LINE OF DEFENSE. 113 ground or for the disposition of the troops. Whatever praise or blame re- sulted from the one or the other was due to General C. F. Smith. When Grant was restored to the chief command of the ’hrmy of the Tennessee, it was only a few days before the commencement of the fight ; and any attempt to make radical changes in the arrangements, carried out, as these must have been, in the pre- sence of a vigilant and powerful enemy. would have been perilous in the ex- treme. If the battle of the 6th had ended differently, General Grant might have been justified in making some com- plaint as to the circumstances in which he found the enemy on resuming com- mand. As it is, his mouth has been shut. He has shown himself a true man by nobly respecting the memory of General Smith — a capable command- er and a brave man. CHAPTER VIII. The Confederate Lines of Defense. — The Second Line all bnt Abandoned. — Beauregard’s Eetreat to Corinth. — First-rate Strategy. — Beauregard Strengthening His Position. — Position and Importance of Corinth. — Mitchell at Shelby ville and Huntsville. — Stevenson, Decatur, and Tuscumbia. — Mitchell's Address to His Soldiers. — Mitchell Promoted to the Hank of Major-General. — Sherman at Bear Creek. — The Memphis and Charleston Kailroad. — Halleck at Corinth. — Grant Second in Command. — Halleck’s Complaint against Grant. — Halleck too Cautious. — The Position of the two Armies. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — The National Army Kesolved to Win. — The Composition of the National Army. — The Nationals Move Forward. — Marmaduke’s Eetreat. — Farmington Eeoccupied. — Kussell’s House. — The Nationals Win and Hold the Position. — The National Army in Line. — Beauregard's Delay. — Corinth Evacuated. — The Eetreat equal to a Victory. — The Pursuit. — Beauregard at Tupelo. — The Pursuit Abandoned. — The National Army in Corinth. — Eepairing the Eailroads. — Buell sent to Chattanooga. — Halleck the Eising Man. — Beauregard had Eeason to be Satisfied. — A good General, but given to Extravagance of Language. — Eemarks upon Shiloh and Corinth. — Their Import- ance. — Eemarks on some of the Principal Generals. — Beauregard, Halleck, Grant, and Sherman. The victory at Shiloh broke down the second line of Confederate de- fense, as the fall of Donelson had broken down the first. In view of the general plan of the campaign — which was to drive the enemy out of the val- ley of the Mississippi, and to reopen that river to the gulf — it will be seen that the National forces were steadily marching on toward the full accomplish- ment of their purpose. The first line of defense stretched from Columbus on the west, through Fort Henry, Fort Donelson and Nashville, including Bow- ling Green and Mill Spring, and east- ward toward the Alleghanies. That line broken, the Confederates had no choice but fall back on the line formed by the Memphis and Charleston Rail- road. There was still a third line on which it was possible for them to retire and make a resolute if not successful resistance. Of this third line the stra- tegic points were Vicksburg, Jackson, Meridian, and Selma. From all the points of the second line, with the ex- 114 CORINTH. ceptions of Corintli and Fort Pillow, the enemy had been forcibly driven or had voluntarily retired. Fort Pillow was now useless, and was soon abandoned. All over the North and throughout the army and navy there were enthusiastic demonstrations of joy and gratitude; and the action of the government at Washington was in perfect harmony with the sentiments of the people when it recommended a general thanksgiving for the victories gained at Pea Pidge, at New Madrid, at Island No. 10, and at Shiloh. After his defeat on the 7th of April, April Beauregard retired, and, as we have seen already, in good order, to Corinth. The retreat was conducted ill circumstances of great inconvenience and hardship ; and the successful man- ner in which it was accomplished will ever be regarded by impartial judges as a triumph of military genius on the part of the Confederate commander. The principal way of escape from the held was along a narrow and all but impassa- ble road, some seven or eight miles in length ; and all the difficulties insepara- ble from the attempt to preserve order in a routed army, burdened with the care of wagon-loads of wounded and dying men, were aggravated by a pit- iless storm, which, beginning about nightfall, raged with unrelenting sever- ity for several hours. It is not to be wondered at that many of the wounded perished by the way. The wonder rather is that the losses during the re- treat did not amount to several thou- sands in place of a few hundreds. The retreat from Shiloh on the night of the 7th furnished a strange commentary to Beauregard’s boastful language, on the night of the 5th ; but it is not the busi- ness of the historian to load with abuse a defeated general who narrowly es- caped reaping a great and signal victory, and who, in the hour of unlooked-for misfortune, proved himself equal to the emergency. Arrived at Corinth, Beauregard lost no time in making all needed 23repara- tions for whatever attack might be made upon him. If he could hold this posi- tion and successfully repel the onslaught of the National troops, he might even yet convert defeat into a victory, and re-establish in some form his second line of defense. If unable to hold Co- rinth, he had no choice but fall back upon his third line, thus leaving the entire valley of the Mississippi, as far south as Vicksburg, in the hands of his enemies. While Beauregard was busy strengthening his position, the Nationals were making all necessary preparations to advance upon the Confederate lines. Corinth, it thus became manifest, was to be the point' at which the armies of the North and South, each of them greatly increased in numbers and effi- ciency, were next to come into deadly collision. A small and insignificant village, and at that time unmarked on common maps, Corinth owed its mili- tary importance to the fact that it was situated at the intersection of two great arterial railroads — the ‘^Mobile and Ohio” and the ‘‘Memphis and Charles- ton.” The importance of these railroads is indicated by their names. Corinth was about forty miles east of the Grand HALLECK TAKES COMMAND. 115 Junction, and some twenty odd miles from the closing scenes of the last great struggle. It is built upon a low and clayey plain, but has for natural de- fenses ridges at some distance outside. The country beyond, to the banks of the Tennessee, is very much broken by ridges, valley streams, and marshes. The approach was rendered more diffi- cult from the fact that, in his retreat from Pittsburg, the bridges over the creeks had been destroyed by Beaure- gard, and the roads heavily obstructed by timber. Farmington, on the east, and College Hill, on the north, are the highest points in the immediate vi- cinity of Corinth ; and these were occu- pied by the enemy as the signal out- posts of his vast intrenchments, encir- cling the town. As a strategic point, for the South at least, Corinth had already been shorn of much of its value. When Buell set out from Nashville to reinforce Grant at Shiloh, he sent General Mitchell southward, with instructions to destroy, as far as possible, the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. On the 4th of April Mitchell was at Shelby ville, whence he hastened forward by forced marches to Huntsville, taking the town April surprise at an early hour on Hi the morning of the 1 1th, and cap- turing seventeen locomotives, more than one hundred passenger cars, a large amount of supplies of every kind, with about one hundred and sixty prisoners. At Huntsville the railroad lines were torn up both to the east and west of the town. . From Huntsville he sent one expedition eastward as far as S!:evenson, and another expedition westward as far as Decatur and Tuscumbia, the object of both expeditions being to capture what could be had and to destroy the railroads. On the 16th of April Mitchell could say to his soldiers : “You have struck blow after blow with a rapidity unparalleled. Stevenson fell, sixty miles to the east of Huntsville. Decatur and Tuscumbia have been in like manner seized and are now occupied. In three days you have extended your front of operations more than one hundred miles, and your morning guns at Tuscumbia may now be heard by your comrades on the battle field made glorious by their victory before Corinth.” Mitchell had placed his army midway between Corinth and Nashville, had opened com- munication with Buell, and had added another hundred miles of the Tennessee to the free navigation of the North. It was Mitchell’s intention to move east- ward as far as Chattanooga, to destroy the railroads there, especially that lead- ing to Atlanta, and to burn the foun- dries and machine shops at Home. This, however, he was unable to accomplish without reinforcements; and as these were not to be had, he was compelled to retire before the superior strength of General Kirby Smith. Mitchell, how- ever, had already done great things, and shown what might have been ac- complished if his spirit had been shared by some of his superiors. Under date of May 1st, writing to the secretary of war, he could say : “ The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security; wdiile all of Alabama north of the Tennessee Biver fioats no 116 CORIOTH. flag but that of the Union.” It was not without good reason that Mitchell was commissioned a major-general of volunteers. The importance of Corinth had been fully recognized by Halleck and Grant as well as by Buell and Mitchell. A few days after the battle of Shiloh, General Sherman, with some fresh troops from Buell’s army, moved up the Tennessee to the mouth of Bear Creek, and there destroyed the railroad bridge which spans the river at that place. It will thus be seen that before the struggle, suspended on the field of Shiloh, was resumed in the immediate neighborhood of Corinth, the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad, broken in many places, had ceased to be useful as a line of communication between the Mississippi and the Atlantic States. In proportion as Corinth became a railroad centre in name only and not in reality, so did it lose its value as a strategical point in the estimation of the Confede- rate general. A proper appreciation of this fact will help the reader to under- stand the issue of the siege. As soon as the battle of Shiloh had been fought and won, Halleck made up his mind that the occupation of Corinth was the next necessary step in the on- ward movement against the enemy. On the 9th of April he left St. Louis for the April scene of action. On the 12th he arrived at Pittsburg Landing and took command in person of the “ Grand Army of the Tennessee ” ; for such now was its style and title. Grant was placed second in command, without any real duty. The manner in whicb he had fought the battle of Shiloh was not satisfactory to his chief; and the great- est captain in the Northern army, as the result proved, was compelled for a second time to submit to uncalled-for humiliation. Grant bore his punish- ment — for punishment it was — with the best grace possible. Halleck, as if on second thoughts, did what he could to reassure him, informing him that no censure was intended, and that his strangely anomalous position was that which was due to his rank. Halleck’s objection to Grant’s conduct in the late contest was that he had not shown suf- ficient caution — that he had erred, in fact, in not throwing up whatever forti- fications were possible in the circum- stances between himself and the enemy. As if to justify his complaint, and to show what should have been done at Shiloh, Halleck moved forward with a caution which became painful, intrench- ing himself at every step. Blame now fell upon him in turn. He was cau- tious overmuch. It was tauntingly said that it took him six weeks to march fifteen miles ; and there are not a few who, to this day, incline to the opinion that Halleck’s excessive care robbed the National forces of the proper fruit of the victory at Shiloh. Let us see now what were the rela- tive positions of the two armies. The Confederate defenses were very strong ; and considering their strength, it was not wholly without reason that Halleck advanced with cautious and well-guard- ed steps. In one continuous line, and occupying the brow of the first ridge outside of the town, the intrencbments extended over fifteen miles. All the FARMINGTON AND RUSSEL’S HOUSE. n? roads and bridges which could facilitate the approach of the National troops had been destroyed. On the east there was a ravine, and Philip’s Creek in front. On the north there was a heavy abatis, \ 7 ith a cleared space in front. At every road-crossing, along their exterior lines there were either strong redoubts or bat- teries with massive epaulments. Beau- regard was nothing if not an engineer; and it is not at all unreasonable to con- clude that in throwing up those power- ful works around Corinth, he bore in mind that he was about to test the skill of an engineer like himself and a fellow W est-Pointer. The Confederate army concentrated at Corinth was composed of first class elements. There were the “ soldiers of Shiloh,” the -army which had fought at Pittsburg Landing; those of ‘^Elk- horn,” the combined army of VanDorn and Price, from Arkansas and Missouri ; and the forces under (xeneral Lovell, which had evacuated New Orleans vrhen, on the 28th of April, the gun- boats appeared before it. In addition to these, a large militia force had been hastily sent forward from Alabama, Mis- sissippi, and Louisiana. Bragg, as second in rank, had command of the ‘‘Army of the Mississippi.” The old organization of the corps — under Hardee, Bragg, Breckenricige, and Polk — was retained. Breckenridge commanded the reserve, and VanDorn the reinforcements. The whole force was about sixty-five thou- sand men, most of them the best troops in the Confederacy. The retreat from Shiloh had discouraged, no doubt, but it had not damped the hopes of the au- thorities at Bichmond ; neither had the Confederate soldiers lost their spirit, Pligh hopes, therefore, were entertained that the efforts about to be put forth at Corinth would turn the tide of battle and cloud, if not efface, the memory of Pittsburg Landing. Confronting this large and well-ap- pointed army, the very flower of the Confederacy, and resolved to expel it from its stronghold and to capture it, if possible. General Plalleck had under him over one hundred thousand men, not all of them experienced, but all of them imbued with the spirit which is inseparable from a righteous cause, and determined once again to chain victory to their standards. There were three armies — the army of the Tennessee, ori- ginally Grant’s, now confided to General George H. Thomas, and containing the divisions of Hurlbut, Sherman, Smith, and Davies ; the army of the Ohio, com- manded by Don Carlos Buell, and com- posed of the divisions of McCook, T. J. Wood, Nelson, and Crittenden; the army of the Mississippi, General John Pope, originally containing three divis- ions, and reinforced by one division from General Curtis. Thomas formed the right wing, Buell the centre, and Pope the left. Grant, being in orders second in command, had a general supervision of the right wing, under Thomas, and the reserves of McClernand and Wal- lace’s divisions, commanded by McCler- nand. On the 23d of April General Halleck commenced a cautious forward April movement. On the 3d of May 23. his advance under General Sherman^ 118 CORINTH. was in the vicinity of Monterey, within six or seven miles of Beauregard’s lines. May C)n the same day, Pope sent Paine’s division to reconnoitre, and, if possible, occupy Farmington, one of the most important outposts of the enemy. Marmaduke, who had un- der him some four thousand five hun- dred men, made but little resistance. On the contrary, he retired rapidly to Corinth, leaving his camp with all its supplies, and only thirty dead. At the time it seemed as though his orders had been to withdraw, but the subse- quent efforts of the Confederates to re- cover Farmington prove that this could not have been so. An artillery recon- noissance, well supported by cavalry, as far as Glendale, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, was successful in destroying the track and breaking up two important trestle-bridges. In tlie meantime, General Wallace bad sent out General Morgan L. Smith, with three battalions of cavalry and a brigade of infantry, upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. They met and fought the Confederates in a wood, destroying a brid 2 :e and the track not far from Pur- dy, and thus cut off Beauregard from Jackson, Tennessee, whence supplies and reinforcements were expected. Hal- leck’s scheme was working well; the National troops were gradually ap- proaching in front, and at the same time cutting and recutting the commu- nications on both flanks. Pope was not to be allowed to hold the position which he had so easily won. He had miscalculated the enemy’s vigi- lance, and underestimated the value which they attached to Farmington. Generals Paine and Palmer, who were left in charge, had under them only a single brigade. On the 9th of ]^ay May the Confederates, some twen- ty thousand strong, fell upon this ad- vanced brigade with terrific force. It resisted the attack for several hours, but at length fell back, because it was believed that General Halleck did not desire, by supporting it, to bring on a general engagement. The front attack of the enemy was conducted by VanDorn, while Price had been ordered early in the day to make a detour to the left, and get into the rear of these isolated troops. Either he was too late, or VanDorn too early. The combination was a failure ; they did not capture any portion of Pope’s army, although they occupied Farmington, and found a small quantity of baggage there. Eight days afterwards Pope reoccupied the post with his whole force. On the 17th, and while the army , was impatient to be led to the attack, ]^ay there was a lively fight for the H. capture of what was called Russel’s house, an important eminence command- ing the junction of the roads three hundred yards beyond, and only a mile and a quarter from the outer intrench- ments of the enemy. The project was Sherman’s. General Hurlbut sent for- ward two regiments and a battery under General Denver and General M. L. Smith. The attack was success- ful; and the position, which w^as one of great natural strength, was imme- diately fortified and occupied by a large force. BEAUREGARD RETREATS. 119 Gradually the National lines began to draw nearer the Confederate out- works, Halleck cautiously fortifying his May position as he advanced. On the 2b 21stof May the National army was fairly in line three miles from Corinth, with detached works in front, corre- sponding with the general direction of May those of the enemy. On the 28th, 28. still drawing closer and closer, it was within thirteen hundred yards of the enemy’s outer line. Heavy siege guns were now in position ; and recon- noisances in great force were being made on both flank and centre. On the May 29th Pope drove them from their 29 . advance batteries, and Sherman planted heavy guns within a thousand yards of Beauregard’s left. It was not possible now that the end could be long delayed. Beauregard’s position was such that his delay in making a vigorous attack was simply inexplicable. He had allowed the National troops, comparatively unmolested, to get within easy fighting distance of his lines, and to establish themselves behind fortifica- tions quite as strong as his own. He had allowed himself to be completely isolated from all possible sources of as- sistance. His railroad communications had been cut north, south, east, and west. It was General Halleck’s confi- dent belief on the night of the 29th that Beauregard would offer battle in the morning. The battle might be san- guinary, but he was confident of success; for he knew he had a superior force, and that retreat would be impossible, as all the railroad communications had been cut. He did not know that retreat had already been accomplished. In the early morning the skirmishers sought the foe in vain. Suddenly the earth was shaken as if by an earthquake; and dense clouds of smoke rolled up over Corinth. The enemy was gone. Beauregard had fled. For days ahead he had been sending on his sick and his most valuable stores towards Mobile. Some twenty-four hours before, a part of his effective force and nearly all his ordnance had been moved off in the same direction. The rear-guard had left for the south and west the night before. Some wretched creatures had willingly or unwillingly been left behind to fire the town. So ended the siege of Corinth. After all his labor and patience, Hal- leck reaped a bloodless but compara- tively barren victory. Beauregard was compelled to retire ; but he had the proud satisfaction of having saved his army and all his munitions of war. Flis retreat was in some respects equal to a victory. No time was lost in following up the retreating foe. At seven o’clock on the morning of the 30th, Pope’s ad- May vance drove the small rear-guard 39. of the Confederate cavalry through the town; while the brave Gordon Gran- ger, setting out with a brigade and a battery on the Boones ville road from Farmington at noon, pushed the flying foe through the former place, and keep- ing up the pursuit, crossed Twenty-mile Creek the following day, the main army being close upon his heels. On June the 10th of June the pursuit end- *9. ed, the National advance having reached Baldwin and Gumtown, and still on the 120 CORmTH. railroad. Beauregard had established himself at Tupelo, a few miles below, where the railroad is crossed by Old Tom Creek, an affluent of the Tombig- bee. Halleck, thinking that he had risked enough, and fearing for the safe- ty of his communications, ordered a halt ; and so the brief campaign of Co- rinth was brought to an end. The National army returned to Co- rinth, where it remained making busy preparations for a new movement. The waters of the Tennessee were already low ; and as for months to come they would become lower and lower, and therefore useless as a means of com- munication, the railroad was repaired and put in good condition as far as Columbus. General Buell, with the army of the Ohio, was sent on the 10th of June to Chattanooga, while General Grant, with the army of the Tennessee, held possession of the new strategic line of railroad between Memphis and luka. Halleck had already accom- plished much ; and at Washington, as we shall soon have occasion to see, he was regarded as the rising man. Much as he had done, he might have done more. We have already expressed the opinion that a little more dash and dar- ing, and a little less caution, when he took command in person after the battle of Shiloh, might have resulted in the complete defeat if not capture of Beau- regard’s army, before that general was able to surround himself with fortifica- tions at Corinth. As it was, the fate of the great States of Kentucky and Ten- nessee had to all appearance been de- cided ; and the entire northwest of the Confederacy, a vast space of many thou- sand square miles, had been wrenched away. The plan, the execution of which commenced with the attack on Fort Henry, had worked admirably; and although some hard fighting had yet to be done before the enemy was completely driven out of the valley of the Mississippi, and before the Father of Waters was open through to the sea, the North had reason so far to be well satisfied with Halleck’s services and success. Beauregard had much less reason to feel satisfied with the position in which he found himself. He had no doubt done his best. If he had not made at Corinth so bold and vigorous a stand as was expected by friend and foe alike, it was because he correctly measured his strength, and took in the true value of his position. If he had been better supported by the authorities at Rich- mond, the results might have been dif- ferent. Most unquestionably he showed greater wisdom in retreating as he did, than he would have done by risking a battle in the later days of the siege. His forces had not been sufficiently in- creased ; and Corinth had been rendered not only worthless but dangerous by the destruction of the railroads. For some time he had been ill ; and at Tu- pelo he took the liberty of retiring to Bladdon Springs, about twelve miles distant, for the purpose of recuperating, leaving General Bragg in command, with instructions to put the army in condition to take the field on his return. On hearing this, Davis became wild with rage, telegraphed Bragg to assume BEAUREGAKD, GRANT, AND SHERMAN. 121 permanent command, and declared that nothing could ever induce him again to entrust the army to Beauregard. It was not long until Davis had sufficient rea- son to alter his determination. While saying this much for Beauregard, we cannot afc all hold him excusable for the grossly exaggerated and sometimes false reports which he was in the habit of sending to his government. He claimed a great and glorious victory” when he had been defeated and driven from Shiloh. He declared Corinth to be the “strategic point of that cam- paign,” and assured his government that he was able to hold it; and yet from Tupelo, whither he had found it necessary to retreat, he could write that he had “ accomplished his purposes and ends.” Human nature often reveals such inconsistencies; and this weakness, on the part of the Confederate com- mander, stands out in striking contrast with other and unmistakably great qual- ities which the man possessed. This particular weakness is and i:\4ust ever remain a source of regret to all who, from any cause, learned to admire the better part of one of the greatest gene- rals produced on either side during the civil conflict. It would not be easy to overestimate the importance of Shiloh and Corinth on the general character of the struggle. Taken together, they constituted a turn- ing point in the progress of events. In retiring from Corinth, the enemy aban- doned his second line of defense. As he must now fall back upon his third line, it was manifest to all that the next great struggle would be around Vicks- burg. In consequence of events which will be detailed in a future chapter, this was now the one remaining strong- hold of the Confederates on the line of the Mississippi. Vicksburg captured, the great river would again be open to the sea. The capture of Vicksburg — this was the purpose which now filled the minds of Halleck and Grant, and to this end all their energies were hence- forth directed. Extensive preparations must be made, and some hard work must be done, before the next great struggle ; but Vicksburg became the objective point of all the efforts of the army of the Tennessee. At the close of this chapter, it can hardly be deemed out of place to notice the influence of Shiloh and Corinth on the fortunes of some of the principal actors. Among the Confederates, Beau- regard was the man principally affected. He had the greatest opportunity. He sustained the greatest loss. The effect of Shiloh and Corinth was undoubtedly injurious ; but it was not lasting. Beau- resrard suffered the less that neither at Shiloh nor at Corinth did any rival of equal capacity come to the front. On the National side three men shared largely of the favors of fortune — Hal- leck, Grant, and Sherman. Halleck reaped a glory which was scarcely all his own. Grant, in spite of a treat- ment which must be pronounced un- j ust, not only preserved his reputation, but secured the opportunity of making himself what he soon afterwards was recognized to be, the leading represent- ative on the field of the Northern cause. Sherman, in the one battle and in the 122 COAST OPEKATIOJ^S m 1862. other, surpassed himself in deeds of skill and daring, and earned his right and title to a place in the front rank of the great military men whom the war was gradually developing — a place which he never afterwards lost. CHAPTER IX. The Third Great Expedition. — Burnside and Goldsborough. — Departure of the Fleet from Hampton Eoads. — Ter- rific Storm. — Disaster to the Fleet. — Hatteras Inlet. — Roanoke Island. — Fort Barton. — The Bombardment. — The Confederate Flotilla. — Landing of the National Troops. — The Battle of Roanoke. — National Victory. — The Confederates Discouraged. — Albemarle Sound. — Elizabeth City Captured. — Edentown. — The Dismal Swamp Canal. — Winton. — Plymouth. — Burnside and Goldsborough’s joint Address to the People of North Carolina. — Governor Clark’s Counter-Proclamation. — New Berne. — Expedition against. — Landing Troops at Slocum’s Creek. — Disposition of the Forces. — The Battle of New Berne. — Severe Fighting. — The Confederate Right Driven in. — A Panic. — The Retreat of the Confederates. — Capture of New Berne. — Burnside’s Order. — His Report. — Compliment to McClellan. — Expedition against Fort Macon. — Preparations for Bombardment. — Arrival of Burnside. — Call for Surrender. — The Bombardment. — Splendid Work. — Description of the Fight. — The Fort Surrenders. — Beaufort. — Reno at South Mills. — Burnside’s Good Fortune. — He is Summoned to Washington. — The Savannah Blockade. — Dawfuskie Island. — Jones’ Island. — Big Tybee. — Fort Pulaski, — Preparations for the Bombardment. — Commander Dupont. — General Quincy A. Gillmore. — The Erection of Batteries on Venus Point and on Long Island. — The Siege Batteries on Big Tybee. — Colonel Olmstead called upon to Surrender. — General Hunter Supersedes Sherman. — The Opening of the Fire on the Fort, — The Walls of the Fort Honeycombed. — The White Flag. — The Surrender. — The Blockade of Savannah Com- plete. — Along the Florida Coast. — Commander Dupont and General Wright. — Fort Clinch. — Fernandina. — Brunswick. — Jacksonville. — Fort Marion and St. Augustine. — Pensacola. — Forts McRae and Barrancas. — On the Gulf and along the Atlantic Seaboard, the National Power Supreme. — New Orleans Expedition. In a previous chapter of this work 1862 described the character and traced the progress of two great naval and military expeditions, both of them fitted out in Hampton Roads, and both of them sent forth for the purpose of rendering more effective the blockade of the southern ports. One of these was under the command of General Butler and Commodore Stringham, and was successful in driv- ing the Confederates from Harrison’s Inlet, and in retaining possession of the inlet and of the island of the same name. The other, which ^vas fitted out somewhat later and on a larger scale. was entrusted to the care of General T. W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont. We have seen how, after a severe storm, that expedition succeeded in reaching Port Royal, capturing Forts Walker and Beauregard and taking possession of Warsaw Sound to the south and Big Tybee to the north, thus driving the Confederates from every stronghold on the southern shores of South Carolina, and on the northern shores of Georgia, with the exceptions of Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah, and Fort Jackson, further up the river. In the beginning of 1862 another ex- pedition was fitted out on a grand scale, THE THIRD GREAT EXPEDITION. 123 and was intended not only to operate on the southern coast, but to advance into the interior and act in conjunction mth the Federal armies. This expedi- tion was put in charge of General Am- brose Everett Burnside and Flag-officer Louis M. Goldsborough. The military force, like that of Butler, had been gathered at Annapolis. It was com- posed of fifteen regiments and a battal- ion of infantry, a battery of artillery, and a large number of gunners capable of serving either on land or sea. The whole force was divided into three bri- gades, which were commanded respect- ively by Generals John G. Foster, Jesse L. Beno, and John G. Parke. The fleet comprised over one hundred steam and sailing vessels, consisting of gunboats, transports, and tugs. It was divided into two columns for active service, in- trusted respectively to the care of Com- manders S. G. Hazard and Stephen H. Bowan. The troops to be conveyed in these vessels numbered in all about six- teen thousand. The commanders were well chosen ; and there could be no reason to doubt that, so far as their ability and fidelity were concerned, the expedition would not fail of success. General Burnside was born at Liberty, Union County, Indiana, on the 23d of May, 1824. In 1842, at the age of nineteen, he entered the Military Academy at West Point, and graduated in 1847, when he became a second-lieutenant in the United States Artillery. He served under General Patterson in Mexico, where he remained till the end of the war. In Aimnst, 1849, he distinguished himself in a skir- mish with the Apaches at Los Vegas; and for his gallantry on that occasion he was promoted to a first-lieutenancy. He was one of the commissioners ap- pointed to settle the boundary line be- tween Mexico and the United States; and in 1851 he performed, as the bearer of despatches from Colonel Graham to President Fillmore, the marvellous feat of riding on horseback, in seventeen days, over a space of one thousand two hundred miles, through a country beset with hostile Indians. Burnside, like many others of the military men of that day, grew tired of a life of inactivity ; and in 1853 he resigned his commission in the army. For some years he was engaged in railroad management. He was a trained child of the republic; and when the war broke out, he was naturally expected to give his country the benefit of his training and experi-. ence. Appointed by Governor Sprague to the command of the First Bhode Island Volunteers, he responded to the call of duty, and marched with his reg- iment to Washington. His conduct at Bull Bun won for him the highest praise both from the government and from the people. No fitter man could have been found for the leadership of such an expedition. Flag-officer Golds- borough was a man of equal worth and of even greater experience. He had been in the navy since 1812. He had been at sea for eighteen years ; had been on duty on shore for twelve years; and for some eighteen years he had been without active employment, when he was appointed to the command of the frigate Congress. From the Congress 124 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. he was transferred to the Minnesota, taking command of one-half of the At- lantic blockading squadron. Goldsbor- ough had been for some time stationed in Hampton Roads, when he was in- structed to take charge of the fleet in the third joint military and naval expe- dition. It is thus seen that the com- mand of the expedition was placed in thoroughly competent hands. On the Ilth of January, after two Jan, months’ preparation, with the troops all on board the transports, the magnificent fleet sailed out of Hamp- ton Roads, and proceeded to sea. It was Sunday; and the scene witnessed in the neighborhood of Fortress Monroe was much the same as that which had been witnessed in October of the pre- vious year, on the occasion of the de- parture of the expedition under Sher- man and Dupont. As in the former case, the destination of the fleet was kept a profound secret. The instruc- tions, which had been given to General Burnside on the 7th of January, were that he should unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet at Fortress Monroe, and proceed to cap- ture New Berne, seize the Weldon Rail- road, and reduce Fort Macon. It was not, however, deemed advisable that these instructions should have the effect of putting the Confederates on their guard ; and hence care was taken that the objective point of the expedition should be known only to the govern- ment and to the two commanders. The secret was well kept ; but the govern- ment at Richmond was not ignorant of the necessities of the situation or of the general policy in favor with the authori- ties at Washington. With characteristic shrewdness the Confederates divined the direction of the intended blow, and were not wholly unprepared for it when it fell. The public had not had time to forget the terrific storm which scat- tered Dupont’s fleet in the first days of November; and, considering the season of the year, there were many fears and some forebodings of evil. The fears, as the result proved, were not groundless. The forebodings w'ere too literally real- ized. No great difficulty was experi- enced dntil the vessels were off the stormy Hatteras. The advance had reached the stiller waters of the inlet, when, on Monday night, a dreadful storm broke out, striking the vessels in the rear with terrific fury. Four trans- ports, a gunboat, and a floating battery were wrecked. Among these the fine steamer City of New York, with four hundred barrels of gunpowder, one thousand five hundred rifles, eight hun- dred shells, and other stores and sup- plies, valued in all at about a quarter of a million dollars, went down in sight of the shore. Some of the vessels, which had been purchased in New York, were evidently unfit for such service; and the opinion was very generally enter- tained that the ship merchants of that city had taken advantage of the necessi- ties of the government to dispose of worthless stock. Happily, in the first instance at least, no human lives were lost. On the 1 4th, however, a jan. party went ashore from one of H. the transports, yet outside ; the boat, on returning, was capsized, and three of EOANOKE ISLAND. 125 the party were drowned. These were Colonel J. W. Allen of Burlington, New Jersey, commander of the Ninth Kegi- ment from that State; Surgeon F. S. Waller; and the mate of the transport. Great difficulty was experienced in get- ting the vessels through the inlet, as the weather continued boisterous, and the vessels crowded each other and ob- structed progress. It was the end of January before all the vessels were through the inlet ; and it was not until Feb. the Tth of February that the reor- 7* gauized expedition, having moved forward over the still waters of Pam- lico, had reached the entrance to Croa- tan Sound. It can readily be imagined of what advantage the storm proved to the Con- federates. It did seem once more as if the winds of heaven were enlisted on their side and fighting their battles. Information leaked out through the newsjoapers ; and what with their own knowledge of the coast and the general purpose of the government at Washing- ton, they had no great difficulty in ar- riving at the conclusion that Boanoke Island, which lay behind Bodies’ Island and between Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and about thirty miles from Hatteras Inlet, was to be the first point of attack. The island, which was well fortified and garrisoned, completely pro- tected the entire northeastern coast of North Carolina from invasion by sea; and it effectually guarded the rear ap- proaches to Norfolk and Portsmouth in Virginia. It was scarcely second in im- portance to Fortress Monroe. The isl- and and its vicinity were now under the command of Brigadier-General H. A. Wise, In consequence of the illness of Wise, Colonel H. M. Shaw, of the Eighth North Carolina Begiment, was performing the duties of commander-in- chief on the island. He had under him his own regiment; the Thirty-First North Carolina Volunteers, Colonel J. V. Jordan; three companies of the Sev- enteenth North Carolina, Major G. H. Hill ; and four hundred and fifty men, Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson. On all the prominent points of the shores of Boanoke, batteries had been erected commanding Croatan Sound on the one side and Pamlico Sound on the other. On the narrowest part of the island, between Shallowbag Bay and Croatan Sound, there was an intrenched camp with a strong redoubt, extending across the road which traversed the middle of the island. All these fortifications were well mounted and well manned. In addition to those on the island, there were powerful batteries on the main- land, commanding the channels of Croa- tan Sound. This, however, was not all. The principal channel of Croatan Sound was blocked with sunken vessels ; and the entire waters at Pork Point, from the island to the mainland, were filled with stakes and other obstructions. Above these, and towards Albemarle Sound, was a flotilla of small gunboats, eight in number and carrying eleven guns, under the command of Lieutenant W. F. Lynch, now charged with the defense of the coast of North Carolina. As early as the 5th of February Com- modore Goldsborough had made peb* a reconnoissance with thirty of his 5. 126 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1SG2. gunboats towards Croatan Sound ; and Feb. on the Tth he began to move on 7* the forts on either side. The morning of that day was dull and un- promisiog ; but later the sun burst forth in splendor ; and Goldsborough, at about ten o’clock, hoisted the signal, “This day our country expects every man to do his duty.” The gunboats advanced in three columns. The first was led by the Stars and Stripes, Lieu- tenant Worden; the second by the Louisiana, Commander Alexander Mur- ray ; and the third by the Hetzel, Lieu- tenant H. R. Davenport. Goldsborough was on board the Southfield, which he made his flag-ship, and was accompa- nied by the gunboat Underwriter. At eleven o’clock, a bombardment was opened on Fort Barton, on Pork Point ; and within thirty minutes afterwards the battle had become general. The Confederate gunboats took part in the fight; but they were soon driven be- yond the range of the National guns; and the Curlew, their largest steamer, was so badly damaged that she began to sink, and was saved by being beached under the guns of Fort Forrest on the mainland. The fleet thus put out of the way, Goldsborough concentrated his Are on Fort Barton, at a range of about three-quarters of a mile, as close as the depth of water would permit him to advance. Soon the flagstaff of the fort was shot away ; the barracks were set on Are ; and the entire works began to fall to pieces, under the weight of the shot and the terrific explosions of the shells. The transports were now brought forward; and preparations were made for landing the troops at Ashby’s Har- bor, on Roanoke Island, about two miles below Fort Barton. The Confed- erates had anticipated this movement ; and a force of two thousand men, with a battery of three pieces, lay concealed in the woods in front of the landing. In the meantime the Confederate flotilla returned to the attack. A shower of shot and shell from the National gun- boats quickly cleared the woods ; and, after an hour’s vigorous firing on both •sides, the Confederate flotilla again re- tired. About midnight the troops were got on shore. The landing, however, had been accomplished in circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty. The night was extremely cold; there was a heavy rain-storm ; and to add to the dis- comforts of the situation, such was the shallowness of the water that the boats could not effect a landing, and the men were compelled to wade w^aist-deep, for a quarter of a mile. Early on the peb, morning of the 8 th the troops, about eleven thousand in number, who had spent the dark hours as best they could without any shelter, were moved forward to attack the enemy’s intrench- ments in the interior of the island. The advancing column was under the com- mand of General Foster, the next in rank to General Burnside, who remained at the landing. The main body fol- lowed, and was led by Generals Reno and Parke. About eight o’clock Foster reached the enemy’s position. Their ground was well chosen. On either side was a morass. A narrow causeway was the only approach to their works ; THE ZOUAVES. 127 and this they had protected by an earth- work mounting three guns. Inside the intrenchments there were some three thousand troops, under command of Colonel Shaw. Foster had brought from the naval launches some six or eight boat-howitzers. These were un- der the immediate command of Mid- shipman B. F. Porter. Foster contin- ued to press forward ; but the ground being swampy and bordered with woods, the march was conducted slowly and with great caution. With musketry and cannon the battle was begun on both sides. The Twenty-Fifth Massa- chusetts, Colonel Upton, supported by the Twenty-Third Massachusetts, Col- onel Kurtz, were the first engaged. These were soon joined by the Twenty- Seventh Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, and the Tenth Connecticut, Colonel Russell. The battle now raged fiercely, the Confederates firmly holding their ground and making a most gallant de- fense. Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachusetts, Colonel Maggi, the Fif- ty-First New York, Colonel Ferrero, the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hartranft, and the Ninth New Jersey, now came up to the aid of Foster. Pushing through the tangled swamps, he took a position on Foster’s right. While Reno thus advanced to the right, Parke, with the Fourth Rhode Island, Colonel Rodman, the first battalion Fifth Rhode Island, the Eighth Con- necticut, and Ninth New York, the last under Colonel Hawkins, pressed to- wards the left. At this moment the fight- ing was terrific, both sides performing deeds of great valor; while among the Nationals, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsyl- vania, each emulous of all the others, strove for the prize of the day. Not- withstanding the immensely superior numbers by which they were attacked, the Confederates stubbornly held their ground. The Nationals, who had suf- fered severely from the Confederate fire, now began to experience a scarcity of ammunition. It was evident to Gen- eral Foster that a bold stroke must be made vigorously and at once. The main battery which commanded the causeway must be silenced. A bayonet charge was resolved upon. Major E. A. Kim- ball of Hawkins’ Ninth New York (Zouaves) volunteered to lead the at- tack. “ You are the man,” said Foster; ‘Hhe Ninth is the regiment; and this is the moment. Zouaves, storm the battery ! Forward ! ” With a leap and a yell, they went bounding across the causeway. ‘‘ Make way for the red- caps ! ” resounded on every side ; while the cry of “ Zou ! Zou ! ” rent the air. It was the work of a moment. The Zouaves rushed into the battery, fol- lowed closely by the Tenth Connecticut, the Fifty-First New York, and the Twenty-First Massachusetts. The col- ors of the Fifty-First and the State flag of Massachusetts, planted on the cap- tured battery, revealed the rapidity of the attack and the completeness of the victory. The Confederates, after the first shot, abandoned their guns and fled to the northern part of the island. Reno, with the Twenty-First Massachu- setts and Ninth New York, started off in vigorous pursuit. Foster, having 128 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. re-formed his men, quickly followed. Hawkins, with his Zouaves, hurried to- ward Shallowbag Bay, where, it was understood, the Confederates had a two- gun battery. After a chase of some five or six miles, Foster was met by a flag of truce in the hands of Colonel Pool, of the Eighth North Carolina, who bore a mes- sage from Colonel Shaw, the command- ant of the island, asking on what terms capitulation would be granted. There was but one answer possible. “ Uncon- ditional and immediate surrender,” was Foster’s prompt reply. Two thousand men laid down their arms and became prisoners of war. Among them was Colonel Shaw. Meanwhile Keno, who had turned toward W eir’s Point, forced the surrender of some eight hundred, who, with Colonel Jordan at their head, were vainly attempting to escape from the island ; while Hawkins found easy possession of the battery at Shallowbag Bay, and captured some two hundred who were seeking a chance to escape to Nag’s Head on the mainland. While success was thus attending: the land forces, Coldsborough was making good use of his gunboats. He had re- newed his Are on Fort Barton, at Pork Point. Towards the close of the day, and in order to complete the conquest of the island, Foster sent a detachment to capture the fort. The guns were al- ready silenced ; it was found that the garrison had retired ; and shortly after four o’clock, Coldsborough, on seeing the National colors floatina; over the stronghold, signalled to his fleet, “ The fort is ours.” About the same time the Confederate steamer Curlew, which had been beached under the guns at Bed- stone Point, was blown up ; and the barracks at that place were set on Are. The Confederate flotilla retired into the waters of Albemarle Sound ; and what is known as the battle of Eoanoke was ended. From Fort Barton, where he took up his headquarters. General Burnside sent a report of the day’s proceedings to Washington. He had captured six forts, forty guns, most of them of large calibre, three of them being 100- pounders, and about three thousand prisoners. With a magnanimity which is characteristic of true greatness, he gave all the credit of the victory to Generals Foster, Beno, and Parke. In Atting terms he lamented the deaths of Colonel Charles S. Bussell and Lieuten- ant-Colonel Vigeuf de Monteuil, both of whom fell when gallantly leading the attack in the centre of the island. His entire loss was Afty killed and two hundred and twenty-two wounded. The Confederate loss was much less, as they fought for the most part under breast- works. According to Pollard, there were twenty-three killed, Afty-eight wounded, and sixty-two missing. The capture of Boanoke was justly regarded by the South as a damaging blow to their cause. Pamlico Sound was now completely wrenched from their grasp ; Albemarle Sound must soon share a similar fate ; and tlijii nearly the entire seaboard of Virginia and the better part of that of North Carolina would be in the hands of the Nationals. This, however, was not all. Boanoke Island was indissolubly associated with ELIZABETH CITY 129 the early history of America. North Carolina was proud to own it. It was the scene of Sir Walter Kaleigh’s colo- nizing experiment in 1585; and it was here that the first attempt was made to establish a titled and privileged aris- tocracy in the New World. After two unsuccessful attempts at colonization, Manteo, a native chief, Avas, by com- mand of Raleigh, and with the approval of Queen Elizabeth, made Lord of Ro- anoke. The loss of the island implied the dismemberment of one of the oldest and proudest of the Southern States. The people of the South veiy properly complained that Roanoke was not bet- ter fortified, and that the island should have been allowed to fall so easily a prey to the enemy. General Huger, who had charge of that department, with his headquarters at Norfolk, and Secretary of War Benjamin, were both greatly blamed. Although the battle of Roanoke was won by the Nationals with comparative ease, and although there was no great loss of life on either side, few of the battles of the war were conducted, on the one side or the other, with more ability or with greater deter- mination. The Nationals were vastly superior in numbers; and for this reason the issue, from the commencement of the contest, was not doubtful. The Confederate flotilla had crossed Feb. Albemarle Sound, and had sailed up the Pasquotank River as far as Elizabeth City, in the neighborhood of the Great Dismal Swamp. Elizabeth City is the capital of Pasquotank Coun- ty, North Carolina. It is situated on the right bank of the Pasquotank River, about thirty miles from its mouth. It is a post town, and contains a court-house, jail, and several churches. Vessels drawing seven feet of water can come up close to the city with the greatest ease. It has a Avater communication with Norfolk by means of the Pasquo- tank River and the Dismal Swamp Canal. Into these waters the Nationals resolved to follow ; and Goldsboro ugh, the day after the capture of Roan- oke, detailed some fourteen vessels, under Commander Rowan, for that pur- pose. Rowan had some difficulty in get- ting his fleet past the sunken vessels, piles, and other obstructions in Croatan Sound ; but on the morning of the peb. 10th he had so far accomplished 1^* his purpose as to have his entire fleet in the harbor of Elizabeth City. There he found the Confederate fleet, consist- ing of seven steamers and a schooner armed with two 32-pounders. A four- gun battery had been planted on shore. There was also one heavy gun in the town, in front. The entire arrangement was in charge of Commander Lynch. Rowan lost no time in getting his ves- sels in order; and about nine o’clock he opened fire upon the enemy’s fleet and also upon the batteries. The fight was of short duration. The Confederate vessels were run aground. The one gun was silenced ; so also were tlie bat- teries. The vessels were set on fire and abandoned. The fight had lasted only forty minutes. Lynch fled, and was not again heard of during the war, until he reappeared at Smithfield, on the oc- casion of the capture of Fort Fisher, in 1865. In his report of the engagement, 130 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. Rowan said that he had destroyed or captured the entire naval force of the enemy, that he had silenced and de- stroyed his batteries, and that the only vessel saved was the Ellis* whose cap- tain, J. M. Cook, was wounded and a prisoner. His own loss was “two or three killed and some wounded.” Eliz- abeth City was promptly taken posses- sion of, but not before a most barbarous attempt had been made by the retreat- ing Confederates to destroy it by fire. Happily the flames were got under; and the lives of many helpless women and children were saved. Burnside did not allow himself to rest upon his laurels. The advantages gained, to be made secure, required that the Confederates be rendered powerless for evil all along the coast of North Carolina. The capture of Elizabeth City was followed by similar move- ments into the harbors and bays which branch off Albemarle Sound. The first movement was towards Edentown, a flourishing little place at the head of the bay of the same name, near the western end of the sound. It is a post town, a port of entry, and the capital of Chowan County. Edentown was Feb. settled as far back as 1716. On the day after the capture of Eliza- beth, Lieutenant A. Maury, with part of Rowan’s fleet, took possession of Eden- town, the Confederates offering no re- sistance. A body of flying artillery, as soon as they saw the gunboats, made a precipitate retreat, without firing a shot. Maury found a schooner on the stocks, and some cannon, which he destroyed, and passed on, capturing other vessels in the sound. Next day (February 13), Lieutenant Jeffers, with a portion of the fleet, proceeded to the 13* mouth of the Chesapeake and Albe^ marie Canal — the canal which traverses the Great Dismal Swamp, connecting the Pasquotank with the Elizabeth River. It was the intention of the Nationals to destroy the canal ; but when Jeffers arrived, he found that this work had already been accomplished by the Confederates themselves. He saw two small steamers and three schooners about a mile and a quarter up the canal. Some pickets stationed near the en- trance fired their muskets as a signal ; and what seemed a large body of men got under cover close by the vessels. At about a hundred yards from the mouth of the canal the National gun- boats grounded. The Whitehead w^as ordered to open fire with her nine-inch guns. After three shells had been flung at them, the Confederate troops fled precipitately, and the vessels moved further up the canal. On landing, Jef- fers found that a schooner had been sunk about fifty yards from the canal’s mouth, and that, to prevent it changing its position, it was well supported by piles,- logs, and other material. A large dredging machine had been left behind. This, after destroying its machinery, the Nationals sank diagonally across the canal, thus effectually blocking the way for even the smallest vessel. Still another movement of a similar kind was made before Burnside girt himself foi the heavier work which had to be peb. accomplished further to the south. On the 19th the combined fleet set out NEW BERNE. 131 from Edentown on a reconnoisance. One portion of the fleet sailed up the Chowan River as far as Winton, while another portion proceeded up the Roanoke to Plymouth. At neither place was any attempt made to land ; but as in both cases they were fired upon from the land, the gunboats responded with shells; and Winton was partially and Plymouth almost completely destroyed. In a joint address to the people of North Carolina, Burnside and Golds- borough stated the object of their mis- sion, and repelled the unfounded charges made against them by the Confederate leaders. After assuring them that they were Christians like themselves, and that they realized the obligations which that sacred name implied, they thus, concluded, “We invite you, in the name of the constitution, and in that of virtu- ous loyalty and civilization, to separate yourselves at once from these malign influences, to return to your allegiance, and not compel us to resort further to the force under our control. The gov- ernment asks only that its authority may be recognized ; and we repeat, in no manner or way does it desire to in- terfere with your laws, constitutionally established, your institutions of any kind whatever, your property of any sort, or your usages in any respect.” This document was signed by both corn- Feb. rnanders, and bore date February 18, 1862. Such a proclamation naturally enough alarmed and irritated the Confederate leaders; and on the Feb. 2 2d a violent counter-proclama- 22. tion was issued by Henry T. Clark, the governor of North Carolina. The tone of Governor Clark’s proclama- tion was as bellicose as that of Burnside and Goldsborough was peaceful. It denounced the expedition as an attempt to deprive the inhabitants of their most sacred rights. It proclaimed the war as waged by the North to be one of subjugation — “ a war forced tipon us in wrong, and prosecuted without right and in a spirit of vengeful wickedness, with- out a parallel in the history of warfare among civilized nations.” It was a war of “avarice and ambition.” “I call,” said the governor, “ upon the brave and patriotic men of our State to volunteer from the mountains to the sea.” Such were the sentiments which, at this stage of the war, prevailed respectively in the North and in the South. It was useless to cry “ Peace ” ; for there was none, and there was to be none for three weary and sadly eventful years. New Berne was the next place singled out for attack. For that purpose all necessary preparations were made. Ro- anoke Island was now the basis of ope- rations. There the troops concentrated ; and there the scattered vessels of the fleet congregated. As Goldsborough had been ordered back to Hampton Roads, the naval portion of the new expedition was entrusted to the care of Commodore Rowan. On the 11th ^jar, of March, after taking on board G. some fifteen thousand troops. Rowan, with Burnside on board, rendezvoused at Hatteras Inlet. Early the following morning the entire fleet, including the transports, sailed from the inlet, mak- ing for Slocum’s Creek, about twelve miles above which, on the Neuse River. 132 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. where it is joined by the Trent, stands the town of New Berne. New Berne is a small township, the capital of Craven County. It contained at that time about six thousand inhab- itants. It had a good harbor, leading to the Atlantic Ocean, through Ocracoke Inlet; and as it was connected with the great commercial centres by railroad, it did a good business both by land and sea. It was very justly regarded by the North as a point of considerable strategic importance. Early on the morning of the 13th, the War. entire force having arrived the 13 . night previous, the troops began to land off Slocum’s Creek, under cover of the gunboats. The landing was ef- fected “ with the greatest enthusiasm on the part of the troops,” wrote Burn- side in his report. ‘‘Many, too impa- tient for the boats, leaped into the water and waded waist-deep to the shore, and then, after a toilsome march through the mud, the head of the column marched within a mile and a half of the enemy’s stronghold, at eight P. M., a distance of twelve miles from the point of landing, where we bivouacked for the night, the rear of the column coming up with the boat howitzers about three o’clock next morning, the detention being caused by the shocking condition of the roads, consequent upon the heavy rain that had fallen during that day and the whole of the night, the men often wad- ing knee-deep in mud, and requiring a whole regiment to drag the eight pieces which had been landed from the navy and our own vessels.” The gunboats moved up the river abreast of the army, the flag-ship Delaware leading the way. The main body of the Confederates was under the command of General Branch, and consisted of eight regiments of in- fantry, five hundred cavalry, and three batteries of field artillery of six guns each. These were posted within a line of intrenchments, extending from near the river across the railroad and turnpike, of more than a mile in length. On their left they were protected by Fort Thomp- son, which was armed with thirteen heavy guns. This work commanded, also, the channel of the river. On the right there was a long succession of rifle-pits, curvettes and redans terminat- ing in a two-gun redoubt. These works were a little over four miles from the town of New Berne. Burnside marched his army in three divisions. General Foster, with the first brigade, marched along the main county road, to attack Fort Thompson and the Confederate left. General Reno, with the second brigade, followed more upon the line of railroad, with the view of striking the Confederate right. General Parke, with the third brigade, followed in such a manner that he might be able to at- tack in front or support either or both brigades, as circumstances might re- quire. About seven o’clock, on the morning of the 14th, the skirmishers of the i^ar. National army came into contact with the Confederate outposts. Gen- eral Burnside rode to the front with his staff. Scarcely had he appeared in view of the enemy’s breastwork, when a shell fell within a few feet of himself and party, splashing them with mud, but. NSW BERNE. 133 as it did not explode, doing no further damage. The regiments were quickly in their respective positions. General Foster arranged his brigade in line of battle alorn^ the frins^e of the woods, skirting the edge of the field before the breastwork. The Twenty-Fourth Mas- sachusetts, Colonel Stevenson, was on the extreme right. The Twenty-Fifth Massachusetts, Colonel Upton, was next, with its left resting on the road. Next to this again was the Twenty- Ninth Massachusetts, Colonel Lee, with its right resting on the road. The Twenty-third Massachusetts was on the extreme left of the brigade, with the Tenth Connecticut in reserve. The National artillery had only partially arrived on the battle-ground; and con- secpiently there were only a few pieces with which to oppose the numerous and powerful guns of the enemy. On the extreme right of Foster’s position was McCook’s battery of boat howitzers, manned by Lieutenants McCook, Ham- mond, Daniels, and Tillotson, with ma- rines and a detachment of the Union Coast Guard. In the centre, and near the road, was a 12-pounder steel gun from the Cossack, manned by Captain Bennett and twenty of his ship’s crew. On the left was Captain Dayton’s bat- tery, from the transport Highlander. The second brigade, under General Reno, and the third brigade, under General Parke, maintained the positions asdgned to them in the line of march, as above described. It was about eight o’clock when the battle was fairly begun. Foster’s bri- gade was the first to feel the effect of the enemy’s fire. After the first shot the Confederates ran their flag defiantly up over the ramparts; and from the many mouths of their powerful guns they poured forth a perfect storm of round-shot, grape, canister, and shell. Their infantry, which were stationed in fi’ont of the wwks, and extended the entire length between the river and the railroad, kept up a brisk and steady fire of musketry. The fight from the commencement was severe. It was not Ions: until several of the re Aments lost some of their principal officers. At the place where the Confederate intrench- raents crossed the railroad, the struggle, for a time, was terrific. For nearly four hours the brigade of Foster bore the brunt of the battle, the regiments one and all coverins; themselves with glory. General Parke, with his third brigade, following out the instructions of Burnside, had been supporting Fos- ter. It wms now evident that the latter could hold his'gi’ound against the ene- my; and Parke, still carrying out the original arrangement, withdrew his troops and moved to the support of Reno, who, with his brigade, was suc- cessfully carrying out his flank move- ment against the Confederate right. It deserves to be noted here that General Reno experienced unexpected difficulty in carrying out his part of the plan of attack. It was not known that the line of intrenchments extended beyond the railroad, at least to any distance. When, therefore, the National troops attempted to get to the rear of the enemy, they dis- covered not merely all but impassable swamps, but redoubts and rifle-pits 134 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. whicli temporarily checked their pro- gress. Happily, an attack on the right had not been suspected by the Confede- rates, their whole strength being centred on the left wing. As soon, however, as they discovered what was going on on the right, they hurried forward a suffi- cient number of men to reinforce the redoubts and to defend the rifle-pits. After he had been joined by Parke, Reno resolved to make a bold advance on the enemy’s works. The Twenty- First Massachusetts, Colonel Clarke, was ordered to charge. With the speed of lightning they rushed forward, and were soon inside the intrenchments. They had taken possession of the guns and were actually attempting to turn them against the enemy, when, the Con- federates being reinforced, they were driven back, with the loss of some of their men, who were made prisoners. The repulse, however, was but moment- ary. Re-forming, and being joined by the New York Fifty-First, the Fourth Rhode Island, and the Ninth New Jer- sey, with the Fifth Rhode Island in re- serve, they returned to the assault ; and after a terrible hand-to-hand fight, in which victory trembled in the balance, the works remained in the hands of the Nationals, the Confederates being com- pletely routed and chased at the point of the bayonet back out of sight. In the fierce struggle over the ramparts, the Twenty-First Massachusetts especially distinguished themselves; and in making the victory complete, gallant service was rendered by the Fifth Rhode Island and the Eighth and Eleventh Connecticut. While this struggle was going on, Reno was greatly annoyed by another battery which was doing most destructive work. Calling up his reserve regiment, the Fifty-First Pennsylvania, Colonel Hart- ranft, he ordered it to charge. The or- ders were promptly obeyed, and the work was gallantly done. Meanwhile the cheering on the National left had attracted the attention of Foster on the right. It was impossible for him any longer to restrain his men. Coming out from their position along the edge of the woods, they dashed across the fields and assailed the enemy at the very muz- zles of their guns. It was a perilous movement. It might have resulted in terrible slaughter. But the retreat on their right flank had created a panic in the Confederate ranks. There was no more fight in them. Leaving their guns unspiked, their caissons and their unex- pended ammunition, with a number of horses, they fled ingloriously towards the Trent. Foster pursued ; but when he reached the verge of the river, the enemy had crossed and burned both the railroad and turnpike bridges in their rear. Such was what is known as the battle of New Berne. The capture of the town of that name followed as a matter of course. The National squadron had taken an active part in the contest, and contrib- uted not a little towards securing the victory. It lent effective aid in driving the Confederates out of Fort Thompson and the other batteries on the shore. These being evacuated, and the National flag left floating over them, the gun- boats passed the obstructions in the river and moved up toward the town. FORT MACON. 135 On their arrival they found that it had been fired in no fewer than seven places by the fleeing Confederates, and that it was almost completely deserted. On the day of the battle the terror-stricken inhabitants had fled by the thousand. General Foster’s brigade was taken over to. the city wharves by some of Rowan’s gunboats. General Burnside established his headquarters at the fine old mansion of the Stanley family, in the suburbs Mar. town. On the following I'b day he issued an order appointing General Foster military governor of the place, and ordered that the churches be opened on Sunday, the 16 th, in order that the chaplains of the dilferent regi- ments might hold divine service therein. The bells were to ring as usual. On the same day he issued an order con- gratulating his troops on their ‘‘bril- liant and hard- won victory,” and di- recting every regiment to place the name of New Berne on its banner. In his report he gave General McClellan the credit of planning the expedition. “ I have endeavored,” he said, “ to carry out the very minute instructions given me by him before leaving Annapolis, and thus far events have been sins^u- larly coincident with his anticipations.” In a work in which McClellan’s conduct is fairly and candidly criticised, it gives us pleasure to be able to record this tribute to his genius. By this victory the Nationals not only captured New Berne, and secured all the advantages w^hich the possession of such a place implied, but eight batteries, mounting forty-six heavy guns, three batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores of all kinds. Burn- side’s loss was ninety-one killed and four hundred and sixty-six wounded. The Confederate loss, according to their own statement, was ninety-four killed, one Inmdred and one wounded, and four hundred and thirteen missing. Its moral effect on both sides was great. It cheered the hearts of the Northern people. It greatly discouraged the South. Burnside’s next movement was against Fort Macon. This was an old fortress of the United States. It had been seized by the authorities of North Caro- lina at the commencement of the war. It stands on a long ridge of sand, called Bogue Island, and is separated from the mainland by Bogue Sound, which is navigable for vessels of light ton- nage. On the side of Beaufort harbor, at the terminus of the railway from New Berne, is Morehead City. On the op- posite or northern side of the harbor is Beaufort, the capital of Carteret County, an old and pleasant town, and, as al- ready described, a favorite summer re- treat for the aristocracy of North Caro- lina. Fort Macon commanded the har- bor of Beaufort; and as the Confede- rates had been making free use of the harbor in introducing contraband goods by means of foreign vessels, it was deemed necessary, in order to the effi- ciency of the blockade, that that strong- hold should be reduced. Immediately after the capture of New Berne, Burnside made all necessary ar- rangements for the reduction of the fort. He placed the expedition in charge of General Parke, General Reno 136 COAST OPEEATIOXS IX 1863. jiaving been sent to make some further demonstrations in the rear of Norfolk. Mar. Nine days after the fall of New 2^* Berne, Parke having been con- veyed, with his troops, by water to Slocum’s Creek, and having marched thence across the country, proceeded to Mar. invest Morehead City. On the 25. 25th of March, a detachment com- posed of the Fourth Bhode Island and the Eighth Connecticut entered Beau- fort without opposition. A flag was sent to Fort Macon, demanding its sur- render. The place was in charge of Colonel Moses T. White, a nephew of Jefferson Davis. White declared that he would not yield until he had eaten his last biscuit and slain his last horse. Parke made immediate and vigorous preparations to take the fort by storm. A reconnoisance was made in force on April 11th of April; and suitable D. points were selected for planting siege guns. The garrison was closely watched, as it was feared that in their desperation they might make a fierce sortie. Ordnance and ordnance stores were brought over on rafts from Caro- lina City ; and batteries were construct- ed behind sand hills on Bogue Spit. Gunboats had been provided ; and it was arranged that they should co-operate with the batteries on the island. There were three batteries. The first was under Lieutenant Flagler of the New York Third Artillery. It was fourteen hundred yards from the fort, was well covered by a large sand hill, and mount- ed four ten-inch mortars. The second was under Captain Lewis J. Morris of the First Begular Artillery. It was about two hundred yards in advance of the first, and mounted three long thirty- pound Parrott guns. The third was in charge of Lieutenant Prouty of the Third New York Artillery. It was one hundred yards nearer the fort than the second, and mounted four ei^ht-inch mortars. Communications between the batteries were established by cutting trenches in the sand and skirting the hil- locks. To guard against any sortie which the garrison might be tempted to make, sharpshooters were posted in rifle-pits on both flanks and in front. The gunboats which were to take part in the attack were the Daylight (flag-ship). Command- er Lockwood ; the State of Georgia, Commander Armstrong; the Chippewa, Lieutenant Bryson ; and the barque Gemsbok, Lieutenant Cavendish. When the arrangements were com- pleted, Burnside came down from New Berne. On the 24th, under a flag April of truce, he had an interview with 24. Colonel White, and summoned him to surrender. White peremptorily refused, declaring that he had been placed in command of the fort, and that he would defend it to the extent of his abil- April ity. On the morning of the 25th, 25. at six o’clock, Burnside ordered the gunboats within range of the fort. Or- ders were then given for both gunboats and batteries to open fire. For half an hour no response came from the fort. Suddenly, however, there were a series of flashes, a succession of loud reports, and the deadly missiles fell thick and fast among the gunboats and close by the batteries. From that time till four o’clock in the afternoon the firing con- FORT PULASKI. 137 tinned on both sides without intermis- sion. For a time it was wild and inef- fective ; but gradually the range on either side was attained with increasing accuracy ; and the shot and shell began to strike more frequently in the near neighborhood of the hostile positions. By midday the effect of the fire from the batteries was distinctly visible on the fort. The gunboats, after the first hour and a half, were withdrawn, a southwest wind disturbing the waters and making it difiicult for them to ma- noeuvre with ease and accuracy. During the course of the day there was some splendid work done by the National gunners, Lieutenant Prouty, with his eight-inch mortar battery, particularly distinguishing himself by the accuracy of his aim. An eye-witness tells us that the scene was grandest about two o’clock. “ A flash and a puff of smoke betokened a discharge ; an interval elapsed, which terminated with the re- port of the piece ; then came the sonor- ous hum of the shell as it flew through the air; another puff of smoke, soon followed by a second report, and the deadly missile had exploded.” Shortly after four o’clock a vs^hite flag was dis- played on the foit ; and the firing ceas- ed. Before ten o’clock next morning Fort Macon was in the possession of the National forces, and General Burn- side had the double gratification of see- ing the old banner of the republic and the new colors of his own Fifth Rhode Islanders, just presented them by the women of Providence, unfurled over its battered walls. Burnside had, indeed, much to be proud of. For the present, at least, he seemed to be a favorite child of fortune. Since the day he left Annapolis every- thing had gone well with him. He had restored the supremacy of the Union in Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds, and in their adjoining creeks and bays ; he had captured New Berne, and, by the reduction of Fort Macon, he had destroyed the Confederate power in the harbor of Beaufort. Good luck seemed to attend his generals as well as him- self ; for while Parke was nailing vic- tory to the National standard at Bogue Island, Reno, equally successful, had won a splendid victory over the Con- federates at South Mills, near Camden Court House. The occupation of the different places from Beaufort and New Berne in the south to Winton and Ply- mouth and Washington, at the head of the Pamlico River, in the north, greatly scattered Burnside’s troops, and made it impossible for him, unless reinforced, to make any further aggressive efforts. In the present condition of things at Washington, reinforcement for such a purpose was out of the question. Mc- Clellan, who had been compelled to fall back from before Richmond, was lying at Harrison’s Landing; and such men as Burnside were needed nearer headquarters. He was summoned to Fortress Monroe, with all the forces he could collect, on July 17th. General Foster was left in command of the de- partment. In a previous chapter we have given an account of the expedition under General T. W. Sherman and Commodore Dupont. At first this expedition was 138 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. attended with great success. With the exception of tw^o forts — Fort Pulaski, at the mouth of the Savannah Piver, and Fort Jackson, up the river and near the town of Savannah — the entire coast fi’om Warsaw Sound below the Savan- nah River to the North Edisto, well up towards Charlestou, was, at the close of 1861 , under the control of the National forces. At the same time, this expedi- tion did not fulfill its high promise. In place^of moving against the enemy in the interior, and making a bold effort to capture Savannah and Charleston, Sherman remained in his encampments in the neighborhood of Port Royal, busying himself with the construction of intrenchments, as if defense had been the main object of the expedition. It is but just, however, to say in vindication of General Sherman that he had not been instructed to press his advantages, and that, with the forces at his com- mand, he was not in a position to attack, with any great hope of success, either Savannah or Charleston. Still, the panic which followed the fall of Port Royal and the victory at Port Royal Ferry was such that more daring meas- ures might have been crowned with greater victories. Dupont had made several unsuccess- ful attempts to reach Savannah by way of Warsaw Sound, and by means of the creeks which abound in that region. He had at last succeeded in getting possession of Dawfuskie Island, which, in its southeastern extremity, commands the entrance to the Savannah River. Here he had stationed some gunboats, with a detachment of troops. It was felt, however, that the one thing to be done was the reduction of Fort Pulaski. How was this to be accomplished ? It was, as we have had occasion to remark, in a previous chapter, one of the strong- est works on the Atlantic seaboard. Its peculiar position made bombard- ment extremely difficult. It was the opinion of General Quincy A. Gillmore, General Sherman’s chief ensrineer, that the place could be successfully attacked by batteries of rified guns and mortars placed on Big Tybee Island, which lies to the southeast of Cockspur, on which the fort stood, and on the opposite side of the narrow channel. It was also his opinion that very effective aid might be given from a battery on Venus Point, on Jones’ Island, two miles from Cock- spur in the opposite direction. Big Tybee Island, as we have already seen, ^vas occupied by the Nationals towards the close of 1861 . The question now was, how to get to Venus Point, on Jones’ Island, the entire entrance being so completely commanded by the guns of the fort. Information was given by some negroes to the effect that there was a channel which connected Cali- bogue Sound with the Savannah River. The information was found to be cor- rect, the two being connected by an artificial channel, some two hundred yards in length, called Wall’s Cut. This channel had been obstructed by three rows of piles and by a sunken brig. At high tide, however, the water rose above these obstructions some ten feet. The reconnoitring par- ty had, therefore, no difi&culty in get- ting over. Arrangements were imme- THE SURRENDER. 139 diately made for the removal of these obstructions. It was also ascertained that the Sa- vannah River might be reached by way of Warsaw Sound, Wilmington Nar- rows, and St. Augustine’s Creek, al- though the creek was greatly obstruct- ed. Means of access to the Savannah River, in the rear of Fort Pulaski, hav- ing thus been discovered, Sherman pro- ceeded at once to construct batteries on all the available points. A body of men under the immediate command of General Viele succeeded in reaching Jones’ Island by way of Wall’s Cut, and there, on Venus Point, they built an earthwork, mounting it with heavy guns, and giving it the name of Battery V ulcan. Jones’ Island is a mere marsh ; and the guns, which were three tons each, had to be brought across its entire width. It was a labor of extreme dif- hculty. The weather was stormy ; and the nights were dark. Not unfrequently did the men work waist-deep in the slushy morass ; and it was no uncommon thing for the guns to slip off the rough corduroy road and sink deep in the mire. In spite of all difficulties, how- ever, the work was completed at Venus Feb. Point, on the 11th of February, G* It was found that this single bat- tery did not completely command the Savannah River. Two other batteries were therefore erected — one on the northeast extremity of Long Island, and another on flats at the noi’th of Mud River. These batteries so com- manded the Savannah as to completely cut off all communications between Sa- vannah City and Fort Pulaski. The Confederate gunboats also found it con- venient to remain at a distance. As early as the 2 2d of February, when these works were all com- 22. pleted. Fort Pulaski was in a condition of absolute blockade. The next thing to be done was the erection of siege batteries on the north- west face of Big Tybee Island, opposite the fort. Tybee Island, like all the ground in the neighborhood, is a huge marsh. Its soil, where not actually un- der water, is a species of mud jelly. All the difficulties experienced on Jones Island were experienced here in an ag- gravated form. The guns, which were all heavy — eight and ten-inch colum- biads, ten and thirteen-inch mortars, and rifles of large calibre — had to be dragged two miles over such ground. Difficulties, however, did not hinder the progress of the work. On the 9th of April General Gillmore, who was in command, had completed his preparations. Eleven batteries, mount- ing in all some thirty-six guns, were in readiness to open fire on the fort ; and on that day the commanding general gave minute instructions as to the work- ing of the guns, and notified his troops that, if the garrison did not in the mean- time surrender, he should open fire at daybreak the following day. General Hunter had succeeded Gen- eral Sherman in command of the depart- ment. On the evening of the 8th he arrived at Tybee. On the morning of the 10th, at sunrise, Lieutenant j\prii J. H. Wilson was sent to the fort with a message from the general-im chief to the commander of the garrison. 140 COAST OPERATIONS IN 1862. Colonel Charles H. Olmstead, calling upon him to surrender. The answer was as prompt as it was brief. “ I am here,” said the colonel, ‘‘to defend this fort, not to surrender it.” At a quarter past eight o’clock the batteries opened fire. Fort Pulaski, as we have already said, had the reputation of being one of the strongest forts on the Atlantic coast. It was well mounted ; and its walls were seven and a half feet thick. The National batteries were planted at dif- ferent distances — the nearest being about a mile from the fort, the most distant about two miles. Three min- utes after the first shot was fired by the Nationals, the Confederates replied from a ten-inch barbette gun. The fir- ing then became general; and for the remainder of the day it was maintained with great spirit on both sides. The day was not far advanced when it be- came manifest that the masonry of the fort could not long resist the terrible pounding of the batteries. Long before night came on, the rifles had honey- combed the avails, the shot at sixteen hundred and fifty yards, the distance of the nearest rifle-battery, penetrating the walls to a depth of from twenty to twenty-six inches ; and the ten-inch sol- id shot, which struck with less velocity, fell, as an eye-witness puts it, like a trip-hammer, battering to pieces the damaged masonry. It was Gillmore’s opinion, after he had seen the effect of his guns, that, if he had known, he might have completed his preparations in one week instead of two, and con- tented himself with placing his nearest battery at twenty-five hundred yards. When darkness fell, five of the guns of the fortress were silenced, and the fir- ing generally had become feeble. All night long four of Gillmore’s guns fired at intervals of fifteen or twenty min- utes. On the morning of the 11th, April at sunrise, the firing from the bat- teries was commenced afresh, and con- tinued with great vigor. A yawning breach began to be visible in the south- east angle of the fort ; yet the garrison gallantly maintained the fight until two o’clock. A practicable breach had been made ; and Olmstead perceived that “ it was impossible to hold out any longer, as the rifle-shots were fast work- ing their way into the magazines, and as many of his guns were disabled.” He accordingly raised the white flag, and placed himself and garrison uncon- ditionally at the mercy of the conqueror. Forty-seven guns, a large supply of fixed ammunition, forty thousand pounds of powder, large quantities of commissary stores, and three hundred and ninety prisoners, constituted the spoils of victo- ry. The Nationals had one man killed. The Confederates had three wounded. At Fort Pulaski a striking illustration was given of the power and etficiency of modern artillery. It had always been supposed that such walls could not be successfully breached at distances great- er than eight hundred yards. The near- est battery, as we have seen, was dis- tant from the fort at least sixteen hun- dred and fifty yards. It was the general expectation at Savannah that Fort Jackson would be immediately attacked, and that the fort and Savannah itself would both be sur- THE NATIONAL POWER SUPREME. 141 rendered. Nothing of the kind was intended. It would have been a useless waste of the National forces to employ them in garrisoning Fort Jackson and in occupying Savannah. With Fort Pulaski in their possession, the Nation- als commanded the entrance to the river — the blockade of Savannah was complete ; and this was all that was im- mediately contemplated. While these events were progressing at the mouth of the Savannah, Commo- dore Dupont and General Wright were making rapid and easy conquests along the coast of Florida. Dupont had left Peb, Port Eoyal on the 28th of Feb- 28. ruary, with twenty armed vessels and six transports, tilled with troops; Mar, and on the 1st of March he ar- b rived in St. Andrew’s Sound, north of Cumberland and St. Andrew’s Islands. As but little if any resistance was offered, it is unnecessary in a work of this kind to do more than note the results of this expedition. Fort Clinch and the adjoining village were found deserted ; and Dupont was able to write to the secretary of the navy. “We cap- tured Port Royal, but Fernandina and Fort Clinch have been given to us.” Brunswick, the terminus of the Bruns- wick and Pensacola Railroad, were taken possession of with equal ease. Jacksonville followed, but not until a wicked attempt had been made by the Confederates to destroy it by tire. Fort Marion and the ancient city of St. Au- gustine, a little further down the coast, Mar. were surrendered to Commander lb C. R. P. Rodgers, on the 11th of March. Pensacola was soon after aban- doned by the Confederate General T. N. Jones, who burnt whatever he could at the navy yard, at the hospital, and in Forts McRae and Barrancas, before he retreated into the interior. On the 2 7th of March Dupont returned to Mar. Port Royal, when he found that 27. Skiddaway and Green Islands had been abandoned by the Confederates, thus leaving Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds and the Vernon and Wilmington Rivers open to the National forces. Edisto Island had been captured as early peb, as the 11th of February. Thus lb it was that on the first anniversary of the attack on Fort Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf coast, from Cape Hatteras to Perdido Bay, excepting only the harbor of Charleston and its imme- diate surroundings, had been abandoned by the Confederates, and that along that whole line the National power was supreme. In a previous chapter we have men- tioned the fact that .after the capture of Hatteras Island, General Butler hurried to Washington for the purpose of in- ducing the government not to abandon the conquest which he had made, but to leave a certain number of troops on the island. General Butler’s advice was taken, as we have seen ; and he himself was commissioned by the secretary of war to go to New England and “raise, arm and uniform a volunteer force for the war,” to be composed of six regi- ments. In this the general was com- pletely successful. As early as jan, the 13th of January, 1862, he had 1^» a conference with Secretary Stanton, then newly installed as war secretary in 142 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. room of Mr. Cameron. The result of this conference was a determination on the part of the government to make a vigorous effort to capture New Orleans, and so take possession of the Lower Pel), Mississippi. On the 25th of Feb- 25* ruary, General Butler embarked at Hampton Hoads, accompanied by his wife, his staff, and fourteen hundred troops, in the steamship Mississippi. On the 20th of March, after a stormy and perilous voyage, he reached ]^ar. Ship Island, and commenced those 2D. preparations which resulted, through the united efforts of himself and Com- modore Farragut, in the capture of the Queen City of the South. The story of the capture of New Orleans, how- ever, must be reserved for another chapter. CHAPTEH X. Memphis and New Orleans. — Island No. 10. — Confederate Grief. — Fort Pillow. — General Villepigne. — Jeff. Thompson. — Foote and His Flotilla. — General Pope. — Hollins. — Pope Recalled to Corinth. — Foote Left Alone at Fort Pillow. — Foote's Wonnd making Retirement Necessary. — C. H. Davis takes Command of the Flotilla. — Activity of Hollins. — The Fight Commenced. — The Boiler of the McRae Penetrated. — The White Flag. — The Losses on Both Sides. — Ellet and His “ Ram ’’rSquadron. — Flight of the Confederates. — The Effect of the Fal' of Corinth. — The Fort Occupied by the Nationals. — Occupation of Fort Randolph. — Memphis Unprotected on the North. — The Gunboats at the Levee. — The Memorable Sixth of June. — The National Fleet in Motion.— The Opening of the Fight. — The Queen cf the West. — The Monarch. — The Queen and the Price. — The Fighting General. — The Queen badly Injured. — The Lovell Shattered to Pieces and Sunk.— One Half-Hour’s Work. — A Grand and Impressive Scene. — The Last Hope of Memphis Perished. — Surrender of Memphis. — Memphis Occupied by the Union Troops. — Fitch Appointed Provost-Marshal. — Another Obstruction. — New Orleans. — The Key-Position of the Great Valley. — Naval Expedition. — David G. Farragut. — Stanton’s Energy. — Farragut at Ship Island. — His Instructions. — Butler and the Land Force. — Porter and" His Gunboats. — All things Ready for a Combined Movement. — The Difficulties. — Forts St. Philip and Jackson. — The River Chain. — The Louisiana. — The Manassas. — Twiggs and Lovell — Higgins. — The Confidence of the South. — All things in Readiness for an Assault. — The Plan. — Porter’s Device. — The Bombardment Commenced. — Fort Jackson Fires the First Shot. — Terrible Fighting. — Farragut's Resolve. — The Chain Across the River Cut. — One Thou- sand Shells. — The Fleet Passes the Obstructions. — Farragut on the Fore-Rigging of the Hartford. — Passing the Forts. — The Ram Manassas. — The Fire-Rafts. — Bailey and Boggs. — The Vanina. — The Battle Ended. — • Brief, but Desperate and Destructive. — The Evacuation of the Forts. — The Louisiana Set on Fire by Her Commander. — The Intention. — The River in Flames. — New Orleans Hemmed In. — A Thunder-Storm. — Call for Surrender. — The Mayor’s Reply. — Landing of the Marines. — The National Flag Waving over Neu Orleans. — Butler in Charge of the City. — Honor to the Brave. Hightly to appreciate tbe actual state 1862 in the valley of the- Mis- sissippi, and intelligently to fol- low the events which will be recorded in the immediately succeeding chapters, the reader must now give his attention to certain naval operations which, in the interest of the National cause, had been successfully conducted on two separate portions of the lower section of the great western river. Memphis, as we have already had occasion to remark. FORT PILLOW. 143 had fallen ; and General W allace had l^jay there established his headquarters. h On the 1st of May, two days after the occupation of Corinth by the Nation- al troops, New Orleans had yielded to the strategy and daring of Farragut ; and the old flag was floating over the largest and in some respects most important city of the Confederacy. After the capture of New Orleans and the fall of Mem- phis, Vicksburg was the one remaining stronghold of any importance which obstructed the free navigation of the Mississippi from St. Louis to the sea. Let us see how it came to pass that both Memphis and New Orleans were wrenched from the hands of the Con- federates. In a previous chapter we have given a somewhat detailed account of the op- erations, by land and water, which re- sulted in the capture and occupation of Island No. 10. The fall of that island was felt by the Confederates to be one of the deadliest blows which they had yet received. It was one of the strong- est places on the river, richly supplied with all the material of war ; and every- thing fell into the victors’ hands. It was openly confessed by the Confede- rates themselves, amid much grief and lamentation, that no single battle had yet afforded the North such visible fruits of victory as had been gathered at Island No. 10. It was not, however, solely on account of the number of men who had been made prisoners, or be- cause of the vast quantity of arms and ammunition which had become the spoil of the victorious Nationals, that the Con- federates were filled with grief. They had another cause for sorrow. Memphis, the most important city on the Mississip- pi between St. Louis and New Orleans, was virtually left undefended. Fort ♦Pillow, it is true, remained; but Fort Pillow, strong as it was, could scarcely be expected long to resist the captors of Forts Henry and Donelson and Co- lumbus, now flushed with success from their fresh triumph at Island No. 10. The Confederates, however, were nei- ther without the means nor without the spirit to offer the invaders a stubborn resistance. Fort Pillow, whose works occupied a line of seven miles in cir- cumference, was very strong, and was under the excellent superintendence of General Villepigue, a New Orleans creole, a West-Pointer, and, as an en- gineer, regarded second only to Beau- regard himself. It had forty heavy guns in position. There were nine gun- boats under Hollins ; and J eff. Thomp- son was there with about six thousand troops. After the fall of Island No. 10, Com- modore Foote lost no time in pushing his way down the Mississippi. General Pope followed, in transports, with his army, numbering some twenty thousand men. Pope arrived on the 13th April of April; and preparations were immediately made for an attack. Foote opened fire and moved against the gun- boats on the following day, and with such vigor that Hollins found it neces- sary to seek the shelter of the fort. Pope had landed his troops on the Arkansas shore, but so greatly was the land overflowed with water that he could render no assistance. On the 144 MEMPHIS AND NEW OELEANS. ITtli he was recalled with his entire force, to join Halleck, who was then advancing on Corinth. Foote was thus left to prosecute the work alone; and soon afterwards, in consequence of the painfulness of the wound which he had received in his ankle at Fort Donelson, he was compelled to retire from active duty, leaving the command in the hands of Captain C. H. Davis. Hollins, meanwhile, had not been i^Iay idle ; and on the 10th of May, having re-formed his flotilla, he came out from under the guns of the fort, sweeping around Point Craighead, on the Arkansas shore, with armored steamers. Some of the steamers were fitted \vith strong bows, plated with iron. Davis was ready to receive him. The fight was commenced by Hollins’ largest gunboat, the McKae, which, armed with a strong iron prow, rushed at the moi’tar boat No. 16. The com- mander of the mortar boat, Acting- Master Gregory, made a gallant fight, firing his single mortar no fewer than eleven times. The gunboats Cincinnati and Mound City came to Gregory’s as- sistance, when the fighting became gen- eral. The fight had lasted the better part of an hour, when a shell from the Boston penetrated the boiler of the McRae. This was the end. Clouds of steam enveloped the ill-fated vessel, and torrents of boiling water were doing more effective work among the men on board than the shells from the National | gunboats. The flag was raised in token of surrender. The National gunboats were in no condition to pursue and cap- ture. Some of them were much injured. the Cincinnati particularly, which soon went to the bottom of the river. As their steam power was too weak to enable them to resist the powerful cur- rent of tbe river, it was wisely con- cluded not to grapple the disabled ves- sels of the enemy, lest by so doing they might be dragged under tbe guns of the fort. The National loss was four men wounded. The Confederate loss must have been considerably greater. The damage sustained by tbe McRae alone, through tbe bursting of her boil- er, must have exceeded that sustained by tbe entire National fleet. In some respects it was a barren victory ; but it afterwards proved more fruitful than at first it seemed. Three weeks were allowed to pass without any attempt being made, on either side, to renew the conflict. About the beginning of June, Davis was rein- forced by Colonel Charles Ellet, jr., with his famous “ ram ’’-squadron — a I fleet of boats of a peculiar model, of which he was the inventor. Thus j strengthened, Davis concluded to re- I peat the trial of strength. It was too I late. The enemy had fled. Fort Pillow I was deserted. Hearing of the disaster i which had befallen Beauregard, and of ; his flight from Corinth, the garrison, ^ officers and men, were filled with alarm ; ' and having first blown up their maga- “ zines and fired their barracks and stores, they went down the river in transports, accompanied by the Confederate fleet. The evacuation and retreat took place under cover of the night of the juue 4th. On the following day the National flag floated over Fort Pillow A TEREIFIC SCENE. 145 and over Fort Kandolph, a place of some strength but of less importance, further down the river. Believing in the strength of the forts on the river above and below, the authorities had not I . ^ thought it necessary to fortify the town itself. On the northern side, Memphis was now entirely unprotected. The only defense that now remained was the flotilla of gunboats, now lying close to the levee. The situation of Memphis on the June morning of the memorable 6th of June was peculiar in the ex- treme. The inhabitants had before them a great sensation, and the al- most certain expectation of a great sor- row. In their immediate presence, in the broad sea-like waters which rolled past their city, a great naval engage- ment was about to take place ; and the result, which could hardly bring to them any permanent advantage, might in a few hours or minutes place them- selves, their property, and their institu- tions entirely at the mercy of the enemy. At the early dawn the National fleet, with the Cairo in advance, was moving in battle order toward the levee. The Confederate fleet, which, as we have seen, lay there, consisted of eight ves- sels. The National fleet, it will be re- membered, had been strengthened by four ram-boats under Ellet. While the National boats were moving forward, and only as yet within long range, the Confederate Little Bebel hurled a rifled shot at the Cairo. The Cairo replied with a broadside. Thus the conflict began. For a time the battle was con- fined to the gunboats. Suddenly, how- ever, two of the Confederate rams (Beau- regard and Price) pushed forward and joined in the fray. Ellet observed the movement ; and watching for his oppor- tunity, he brought the two rams Queen of the West (his flag-ship) and Monarch right in front of the gunboats. He made a dash at the Confederate rams, the Queen being brought down toward the Beauregard with tremendous force, but missing her. Bushing at the Price, the Queen struck the wheel-house of that vessel with her iron prow, and so damaged her that, to avoid sinking, she was compelled to seek the opposite shore. The Beauregard now turned upon the Queen ; and, both vessels, rushing together at full speed, the lat- ter received a crushing blow, which dis- abled her. The Monarch, hastening to the aid of the Queen, struck the Beau- regard fair in the bow, causing her to sink almost immediately. A white flag was raised on the Beauregard ; and the ram fight having ceased, the Monarch towed the badly wounded Queen of the West to a place of safety. Meanwhile the struggle was going on between the gunboats. The Confederates, being hard pressed by the Nationals, were steadily falling back. The fighting was conducted with great spirit, and the destruction was terrific. The Confede- rates, however, were the only suflcerers. The boilers on some of their boats were burst and the crews scalded. A fifty- pound ball, hurled from the Benton by a rifled Parrott gun, hit the Lovell with such force that she was shattered almost to pieces, and sunk in a few minutes, in seventy-five feet of water, 146 MEMPHIS AND NEW OPtLEANS. carrying with her the greater portion of her officers and crew. Such had been the destructive work done in the brief space of half an hour that only four Confederate vessels remained afloat — the Thompson, the Bragg, the Sumter, and the VanDorn; but these were all badly injured and made for the shore. They were all abandoned except the YanDorn, which made good its escape down the river. Not a man had been killed on board the National gunboats. When the brief conflict was at its height the scene Avas grand and impressive in a high degree. The battle had been AAutnessed by many thousands of the in- habitants of Memphis. The firing of the first gun had roused them from their slumbers; and anxious multitudes soon lined the shores and croAvded the roofs of the houses. The dense smoke, Avhich gathered cloud-like around the ships, concealed from AueAV much of the actual fighting; but the AAuld Avar of jarring sounds — the booming of cannon, the rattling of musketry, the bursting of shells, the explosion of boilers, the crasliing of timbers as the rams rushed together in fierce embrace — all attested the severity of the conflict which Avas raging behind. When the cloud of smoke arose and the Avreck Avas re- vealed, the last hope of Memphis had perished. There Avas no further resistance. To the request of Commodore Davis that he surrender the city, the mayor politely replied that he had no means of defense, and that the city was in his hands. Jeff. Thompson, who had command of the city, and who had witnessed the fight, when he found that the fleet was defeated, beat an immediate retreat. The ■ old Union flag was hoisted on the public buildings ; and Memphis was taken pos- session of by the National troops, Col- onel Fitch, of the Forty-Ninth Indiana, being appointed provost-marshal. The reader noAV knoAvs hoAV it came to pass that Memphis had been wrenched from the Confederates, and hoAV it Avas that General LeAvis Wallace, of Grant’s ar- my, entered and occupied that city Avith- out encountering any resistance. The fall of Memphis left the Mississippi comparatively unobstructed as far doAvn as Vicksburg. Let us noAv give our attention to AAffiat had happened on the same AAmters to the south of Vicksburg and nearer to the sea. Very early in the history of the war the attention of the National government had been directed to NeAV Orleans; and it was felt that so long as the city remained in the possession of the Confederates there could be no free naAugation of the Mississippi. It Avas the key-position ; and Avhoever Avas strong enough to hold that position was master of the great valley. In the au- tumn of 1861 it was resolved not to Avait until the military coml)inations had forced a passage down the river, but to send a naval expedition, which, fitted out in the Atlantic ports, should move up from the gulf. The command of this ex23edition was assigned to Ca^A- tain David G. Farragut, a Tennessean by birth, and an officer who had seen service and done good work both in the Mexican campaign and in the naval operations of 1812. It was not, how- READY FOR ATTACK. 147 ever, until early in 1862 that this expe- dition showed any signs of vitality. By that time Stanton had succeeded Came- ron as head of the War Department; and the energy of the new chief was making itself everywhere felt. On the 2d of February Farragut Febi sailed from Hampton Koads in the 2* armed steamer Hartford. Having been detained by sickness at Key West, he did not reach Ship Island, his point Feb. destination, until the 20th of 20# the same month. Farragut’s in- structions were of the most positive kind. He was to proceed with all pos- sible despatch to the Gulf of Mexico, and assume command of the western gulf squadron, relieving Flag-officer McKean. The gulf squadron, which was employed in enforcing the block- ade, was to be considerably strength- ened; and in addition, there was to be attached to the squadron a power- ful bomb flotilla, under Commander David Porter. With these mortar ves- sels, as soon as they were ready, and with such others as might be spared from the blockade, he was to reduce the defenses which guarded the ap- proaches to New Orleans, take posses- sion of that city, under the guns of the squadron, and hold it until troops should be sent to his aid. If the expedition from Cairo should not yet have got down the river so far, he was to push a strong force up the stream past the city, and destroy the defenses in the rear. Thus instructed, and having been pro- vided with plans of the principal works on the lower Mississippi, Farragut set about the accomplishment of his task. Arrangements had been made to back up the efforts of the fleet by a powerful land force. An army of eighteen thou- sand men was furnished and placed under the command of Major-General Butler. Farragut, we have seen, ar- rived at Ship Island on the 20th of February. On the 25th of the peb. same month. General Butler, his 25. troops on board five transports, sailed from Plampton Boads. Porter’s fleet of mortar boats, which were to rendez- vous at Key West, arrived in due time. It was a formidable fleet. Fitted up in the Brooklyn Navy Y^ard, it had for months been the subject of not a little speculation ; and it was generally ex- pected that with such instruments Por- ter and Farragut would be able to do some effective work. There were in all twenty-one vessels, of from two hun- dred to three hundred tons each, of great strength, and constructed so as to draw as little water as possible. They were armed with mortars eight and a half tons in weight, and capable of throwing a 15-inch shell. Each vessel carried also a 82-pounder rifled cannon. Before the middle of April the fleet was in perfect order; Butler, too, had arrived ; and all necessary preparations had been made for a combined move- ment against the enemy. Strong as the National forces now undoubtedly were, Farragut had a task on hand fitted to unnerve the strongest arm and to appal the stoutest heart. New Orleans was well fortified ; and the numerous narrow and, in some places, shallow outlets by which the Alissis- sippi seeks the sea, make its approaches 148 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. exceedingly perilous to ships of heavy tonnage. These outlets are five in num- ber, and are named respectively Pass d r Outre, Northeast Pass, Southeast Pass, South Pass, and Southwest Pass. At a bend about thirty miles up the river there were two powerful forts — one on the right or south bank. Fort Jackson, and the other on the left or north bank. Fort St. Philip. These barred the ap- proach to the city from the gulf ; and the Confederates had armed them with one hundred and twenty-six guns of long range and large calibre. At this point a large chain, sustained upon eight hulks, was stretched across the river. Close to Fort Jackson there was a for- midable water-batter^^ ; and under the guns of the forts tliere was a fleet of thirteen gunboats, a powerful ironclad floating battery, called the Louisiana, carrying sixteen guns, and the steam- I’ani Manassas. In addition to all these tremendous war appliances, there were numerous rafts and fire-ships. Further up the river and to the southwest of the town, on the bayous and lakes, there were elaborate and powerful works, which Beauregard had greatly strength- ened. In and around the city of New Orleans there was a force of at least ten thousand men. General Twiggs, of somewhat questionable reputation as a soldier, had been entrusted by the Con- federates with the defense of the city. Plis position, by this time, however, had been assumed by Mansfield Lovell, formerly a politician and ofiice-holder in New York. Lovell had for his as- sistant General Buggies, a man of abil- ity and energy. The general command of the river defenses was entrusted to General J. K. Duncan, another New York office-holder. Forts Jackson and St. Philip being under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ed- ward Higgins. Lovell had made appli- cation to the governor of the State for ten thousand men ; but such had been the drain upon the army by the neces- sities of the Border States that not more than three thousand could be spared him as a reinforcement. As it was, however, it was not wholly with- out reason that the Confederate strength around New Orleans was believed by some to be sufficient to “ beat off any navy in the world.” “ Our only fear,” said one of the New Orleans journals, is that the Northern invaders may not appear. We have made such exten- sive preparations to receive them that it were vexatious if their invincible ar- mada escapes the fate we have in store for it.” On the 8th of April the National fleet, consisting of four sloops-of- April war, seventeen gunboats, twenty- 8. one mortar schooners, and two sailing vessels, but having no ironclads, had been, with great labor, carried over the bar. The Brooklyn had been dragged through the mud of the Southwest Pass. At the shallowest part, the water was barely fifteen feet deep, the mud having greatly increased in the channel since the commencement of the blockade. By the 17th all things were in April readiness for an attack. Not only were the two fleets now fully in the river: Butler, with his troops, was at the Southwest Pass, immediately below, THE « CHAIN” CUT. 149 ready to take what action might be ne- cessary. A fire-raft, which came sailing down .the river, gave the Nationals an idea of the species of tactics the enemy April was disposed to adopt. On the following day the movement be- gan in earnest. According to the plan agreed upon at Washington, and which formed part of the instructions given to Farragut, Porter was to attempt to re- duce the forts by his mortars, and if he failed, Farragut was to run past them with his heavy vessels. In the event of the latter course being attended with success, Butler was to land his troops in the rear of St. Philip and carry it by assault. The south bank of the river for sev- eral miles below Fort Jackson was thickly wooded. At some distance be- low the bend, and in order to enable the guns of the fort to sweep the river and prevent the vessels from ascending, a large opening was cut through the wood. It was impossible, however, to rob the Nationals of all the advan- tages which the trees afforded. Under cover of the woods, fourteen of the mortar boats, their masts and rigging being clothed with leafy boughs, to make them indistinguishable from trees, moved up the river and were moored at desirable points without being dis- covered. The remainder of Porter’s boats were on the other side of the river; but as it was found that they were within the range of the guns of the forts, they too were brought, on the morning of the second day, under cover of the woods. Early on the morning of the 18 th the bombardment com- menced. The first shot was fired from Fort Jackson. Porter was ready co re- ply ; the mortar vessels opened fire im- mediately ; and the effect was terrific. From a position on board the Harriet Lane, Porter watched the effect ol the shells, and directed their range accord- ingly. In Fort Jackson the barracks were set on fire soon after the bom- bardment opened. The guns were fre- quently silenced, the men being terror- stricken by the shells which were ex- ploding all around them. It was ob- served that the shells were bursting in the air, in consequence of the badness of the fuses. The fuses were, therefore, put in full length, to delay the explo- sion. The change had the desired ef- fect. The shells, penetrating the earth eighteen or twenty feet, and then ex- ploding, tearing up the ground and scattering it all around, had the effect of a constantly repeating earthquake. The firing from the forts, in spite of all this, was kept up with great energy, shot and shell coming crashing through the woods and tearing up the trees by the roots. During the first twenty-four hours fifteen hundred bombs must have been flung by Porter’s mortars, the en- emy replying with equal spirit ; and for six weary days and nights this ter- rible work^went on. No such continued and heavy fighting had been witnessed since the days of Nelson. At the dis- tance of thirty miles from the scene of action, window panes were broken by the concussion ; and fish, stunned by the dreadful explosions, were floating about on the surface of the water. On the third day of the bombard- 212 150 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. ment, Farragiit, seeing that no decisive results were likely to be attained unless bolder measures were adopted, called a council and announced his determina- tion to cut the barricade, run the gaunt- let of the forts, and pass up to the city of New Orleans in spite of their guns. Butler was at hand, with at least ten thousand troops, ready to land and as- sist in the capture of the forts, all his transports, with the exception of the Great Bepublic, having entered the Mississippi on the 18th. If this move- ment was to be carried out, the first thing to be done was to remove the obstructions from the river. On the April night of the 20th, therefore, un- 20. der cover of the darkness, a fierce north vdnd blowing at the time, Com- mander Bell, with the Pinola and Itaska, supported by the Iroquois, Kennebec, and AVinona, ran up to the boom. The Pinola attempted, but unsuccessfully, to blow up one of the hulks, by means of a petard. The Itaska was lashed to the hulk adjoining. A rocket thrown up from Fort Jackson revealed her pres- ence, and a heavy fire was immediately opened upon her from the fortress. Nothing daunted, the men kept at their Avork ; and by means of cold-chisels, hammers, sledges, and saws, the chain was cut. The river being in. full flood, the powerful current swung around both hulk and gunboat, the latter being grounded in the mud in shallow water. The Pinola came promptly to the res- cue, and, after some difificulty, succeeded in carrying her consort back in safety to the fleet. Some two hours after- Avards a fire-raft came blazins^ doAvn the stream. It was caught, however, in time, and rendered harmless. Mean- time the firing neA^er ceases, either on board the mortar boats or in the forts ; and night after night those blazing fire- rafts are let loose on their errands of destruction. There were no signs as yet that the forts would surrender. One thousand shells at least had burst within Fort Jackson ; twenty-five thou- sand had been hurled against it; yet General Duncan could say : “ God is certainly protecting us. AVe are still cheerful, and have an abiding faith in our ultimate success.” The arrangements for the onward movement up the river Avere now com- pleted. The chain was broken ; and Farragut was ready. On the April night of the 23d the Itaska, which 23. had run up to the boom, signalled that all was right — that the channel was clear, Avith the exception of the hulks, which, with care, might be easily passed. The fleet had been arranged in three divisions, under Farragut, Captain Bell, and Captain Theodor us Bailey. Six gunboats were to engage the water- battery below Fort Jackson, but were not to proceed further. Farragut had charge of the first division, which con- sisted of the three large ships, the Hart- ford (flag-ship), the Bichmond, and the Brooklyn. This division was to keep to the right bank of the river and fight Fort Jackson. The second division was under Bailey, and Avas composed of the Pensacola, Mississippi, Oneida, Varu- na, Katahdin, Kineo, AV^issahickon, and Portsmouth. This division Avas to keep to the left bank and fight Fort St. Philip. THE ‘^MANASSAS/’ 151 The third division, which comprised the Scioto, Winona, Iroquois, Pinola, Itaska, and Kennebec, and was under Bell, v/ho was ordered to press on neg- lectful of the forts, and attack the Con- federate fleet above. At one o’clock on April morning of the 24th all hands 24. were called, hammocks stowed, and everything put in readiness to weigh anchor at two o’clock. The night was dark, and a heavy fog rested upon the river. At two o’clock precisely, two red lights were hung out. They were the signal for going into action. In less than an hour, the whole fleet was un- der way. There was an ominous si- lence at the forts, as if they were fully aware of what was going on, and were preparing to give the fleet a warm re- ception. Meanwhile Porter’s boats had opened a terrific fire, literally filling the air with shells, and making night hid- eous with their noise. As if redoubling their efforts, the men kept up the firing with unceasing vigor until Farragut’s vessels were all fairly in the heat of the conflict. The waning crescent of the moon revealed itself just as Far- ragut, struggling with the fierce current, safely passed the broken chain, its pale light blending strangely with the fierce glare of the hissing shells. As the ves- sels under his care slowly but steadily approached Fort Jackson, Farragut, from the fore-rigging of the Hartford, eagerly watched, with the help of his night-glass, the movements of Bailey and Bell. When within a little over a mile of Fort Jackson, the guns of both forts opened upon him with great force and with singular precision of aim. Farragut was in no haste to reply, al- though the Hartford was hit several times. Drawing closer and closer, and waiting fully fifteen minutes after the first volley had been aimed at him, he began with two heavy guns which he had mounted on the forecastle ; and then, when within half a mile of Fort Jackson, and having that work fairly within range, he sheered around and poured forth such broadsides of grape and canister that no living thing could stand before them. The men were driven from the barbette guns, and the wildest confusion prevailed. The firing from the casemates continued ; and the conflict raged with tremendous fury. The Bichmond, which had successfully passed the barricade, soon came up and took part in the fight. The Brooklyn had been less fortunate. In passing through the opening made by the breaking of the chain, she became en- tangled with one of the hulks; and while in this position she was exposed at once to the fire of the forts and to attacks from the Confederate ironclads. Scarcely was the Brooklyn extricated from this peril when the iron ram Ma- nassas came down upon her with great fury, firing from the trap-door a heavy bolt at the Brooklyn’s steam drum. Happily the shot lodged in some sand- bags and did no harm. The next mo- ment the ram butted into the sliip’s starboard ; but the impetus was insufii- eient to make any impression on the Brooklyn, whose sides were bound round and round with chain armor. As the Manassas glided away and was 152 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. lost in the darkness, and while still under the lire of Fort Jackson, the Brooklyn encountered another steamer. Tha struggle with this one was short and sharp. One hearty broadside, at the distance of fifty or sixty yards, and the strange vessel was no more. The Brooklyn was then abreast of Foi’t St. Philip, and her guns were within easy range. “ I had the satisfaction,” said Captain Craven, in his report, “of com- pletely silencing that work before I left it, my men in the tops witnessing, in the flashes of the bursting shrapnel, the enemy running like sheep for more com- fortable quarters.” Farragut, meanwhile, was having enough to do on board the Hartford. While engaged with the forts, a huge fire-raft was pushed against him by the Manassas. In attempting to avoid the blazing raft, the Hartford ran aground ; and in a moment, the incendiary having come crashing alongside of her, the ship was in flames on the port side and half- way up to the main and mizzen-tops. While the flames raged, the Hartford did not discontinue her cannonading. “ All the time,” says Farragut, “we were pour- ing shells into the forts, and they into us, and now and then a rebel steamer would get under our fire and receive our salutation of a broadside.” The flames were soon extinguished ; and the Hartford, being released, sailed up the stream. Half an hour more and Farra- gut had successfully passed through the fiery storm, having done his work ef- fectually as he moved along. Bailey, with his second division, had had, if possible, even a harder experi- ence ; but his success was scarcely less marked. In crossing the river obstruc- tions he encountered the fire of both forts ; and scarcely had he passed through, when, owing to the great speed of the Cayuga, he found himself ahead of his friends and alone in the midst of the Confederate fleet. His situation was one of extreme peril. The Manassas, the floating battery Lou- isiana, and at least sixteen other armed vessels, all turned upon him; and his vessel seemed doomed. The swiftness of the ship came to his aid ; and he handled her with exquisite skill. While completely successful in so keeping out of the way of the Confederate ironclads that they could neither butt nor board him, he so used his guns that he com- pelled three of them to surrender before any aid came to him. Meanwhile the Vanina, Captain Boggs, and the Oneida, Captain Lee, came up and engaged the enemy. The Cayuga had been hit forty- two times, and was so damaged that Bailey deemed it prudent to retire. The Varuna was the next object of at- tack. Boggs found himself, all at once, after passing the forts, as he said in his report, “ amid a nest of rebel steamers.” The brave captain did not hesitate as to what he should do. Bushing at once into the midst of them, he “worked both his sides, loaded with grape,” pro- ducing terrible havoc among the Con- federate ships, which were strangely overcrowded. “An explosion, terrific yells, a careen, and that fellow is done for.” Such is the language of an eye- witness. And so the fearful work goes on, until the Varuna has sunk, one after PAST THE FORTS. 153 another, six of the enemy’s vessels. Meanwhile she was badly hurt herself. The heavy shot of the ironclads had told on her rigging and on her timbers. One raking discharge from one of them had killed four and wounded nine of her men. Four times she had been butted by the powerful rams of her an- ta 2 :onists. The last time she was struck, her side was crushed in ; but before the ram could get out of her way, she put through her unarmored stern five 8-inch shells ‘‘ that settled her, and she went ashore in flames.” In fifteen minutes after she was struck the Varuna went to the bottom; but in the interval she had settled her antagonist. It was no- ble fighting, conducted in the true spirit of the sea kings of ancient times. The Moore was the last vessel which the Varuna had to encounter. Badly disabled as the Varuna was, Boggs kept up the fight, with his vessel aground and her bow tied to the trees. It was not until the water was up over the gun-trucks that the captain gave his attention to the saving of his men. Happily all the survivors, including the wounded, were got out and saved be- fore the vessel went down. At the last moment the Oneida, Captain Lee, came up to the aid of the sinking Varuna. Boggs waved him on” after the Moore, which was in fiames but trying to get away. In a little while the Moore was suiTendered to the Oneida by the second officer, the captain hav- ing fled, after setting the vessel on fire. But for her timely capture, fifty of her men, maimed and wounded, must have perished in the flames. Bell had been less fortunate than either Farragut or Bailey in bringing his ships into action and accomplishing the task assigned him. The Scioto, Iroquois, and Pinola passed the forts; but the Itaska, being disabled, drifted down the river. The Winona recoiled from the terrible fire which had proved fatal to her companion. The Kennebec got entangled in attempting to pass the obstructions, and finally, having lost her way in the darkness, returned to her moorings. The fight was now ended. It had been as brief as it had been desperate. It was little more than an hour and a half since the fleet had left its moor- ings; and in that brief space of time all that it was intended to do had been successfully accomplished. The forts had been passed and the Confederate navy was destroyed. The ironclad Ma- nassas, from which such great things were expected, shared the fate of the smaller vessels. Commander Porter’s description of the last moments of this naval monster are well deserving of re- production. W e have seen that he kept up a continuous fire from the mortar boats while Farragut was pressing on his way. ‘Mt was reported to me,” he says, ‘That the celebrated ram Manas* sas was coming out to attack us, and sure enough, there she was, apparently steaming along shore, ready to pounce upon the defenseless mortar vessels ; but I soon discovered that she could harm no one again. She was beginning to emit smoke from her ports or holes; she was on fire and sinking. Her pipes were twisted and riddled with shot ; ^54 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. her hull was cut up. She had evidently been used up by the squadron as she passed along. I tried to save her as a curiosity by getting a hawser around her and securing her to the bank; but just after doing so, she faintly exploded. Her only gun went off, and, emitting flames from her bow-port, like some huge animal she gave a plunge and dis- appeared under the water.” The de- scription of the closing scenes of the contest, from the same pen, is equally graphic. After the Manassas had gone down, there came a steamer on Are ; after her, tw^o others, burning and float- ing down the stream. Fires seemed to be raging all along the ‘up river,’ and we supposed that our squadron was burning and destroying the vessels as they passed along. The sight of this night attack was awfully grand. The river was lit up by rafts filled Avith pine knots; and the ships seemed to be literally fighting among flames and smoke.” The Cayuga, Captain Bailey’s flag- ship, had, as we have seen, when re- lieved by the Vainna and the Oneida, and after having been struck at least forty-two times, and consequently been considerably damaged, sailed up the river. It was the advance boat. It had not sailed far when Bailey discovered the camp of the famous Chalmette regi- ment. On the approach of the Cayuga, the regiment attempted to effect its es- cape. Bailey opened fire ; a volley of canister was sufficient to compel a halt, which was soon followed by an uncon- ditional surrender. By this time Bailey was joined by Farragut; and the Na- tional fleet, consisting of thirteen ves- sels, was ready to steam up to New Orleans. On reaching the quarantine ground, Farragut concluded to halt for the night, and to move on the city on the following morning. Let us see what was taking place in the rear of the National fleet. Farragut had passed the forts, but he had not silenced them. Where was Porter, with his mortar boats; and what was General Butler doing with his soldiers? We shall see. Butler, with his staff, had witnessed from the deck of the Saxon the contest between the fleet and the forts. Half an hour after he had reached the quarantine, Farragut sent Captain Boggs in a smallboat, through the bayous, with despatches for Butler and Porter. Butler had already joined his transports. With the least delay possible they were moved to Sable Island, whence the troops were, with very considerable difficulty, conveyed in smallboats and landed successfully a short distance above Fort St. Philip, and under cover of the guns of the Mis- sissippi and Kineo. A portion of them w^ere sent across the river, to be ready to take possession of Fort Jackson. Meanwhile Porter, who had remained behind the fleet, had not been idle. On Fort Jackson particularly he had kept up an incessant fire ; the shells from his mortars giving terrible annoyance to the enemy, although not producing any visible impression on the works. On the 2Gth he sent a flag of truce, April demanding its surrender, stating 26, that he had information of the capture of New Orleans. Colonel Higgins, who FARKAGUT AT NEW ORLEANS. 155 had command of the forts, refused to surrender, stating that he had no in- formation of the fall of New Orleans, and that until he had such information, from what he should consider a reliable source, the thought of surrender was not for a moment to be entertained. Meantime it began to be known to the soldiers that Butler was in the rear of Fort St. Philip; and in spite of the en- couraging words of General Duncan, the commander of the coast defenses, then in Fort Jackson, that they were as capable of repelling the enemy to-day as they were before the bornbardment, the garrison began to mutiny. Spiking their guns, some of them sallied out and surrendered to Butler’s pickets, stating that they had been impressed and com- pelled to fight against their will. It was now evident to the Confederate officers that it was useless to prolong the struggle; and Colonel Higgins, feel- ing that he had done his best, accepted Porter’s not ungenerous terms. While the treaty w^as being signed on board the Harriet Lane, the huge battery, the Lou- isiana, was set on fire by its commander, and let loose in the strong current of the river, with all its guns shotted. It was the evident intention of its officers to destroy by this means Porter’s fleet of mortar boats. Their calculation proved a failure. The monster blew up when abreast of Fort St. Philip, a flying frag- ment killing one of its garrison. It was a barbarous proceeding ; and it was with great propriety that Mitchell and his subordinates were sent close pris- oners to the North. The treaty of sur- render being completed, the forts were turned over by Porter to General Phelps. It was found that the works were comparatively uninjured. The actual number of the Confederate killed and wounded has never been correctly given. The whole number of prisoners surrendered, including those of the Chalmette regiment and the men from the gunboats, amounted to nearly one thousand. On the morning of the 25th, Farragut proceeded up the river with nine April vessels. Owing to the slowness of 25. some of the boats, and to a want of knowledge of the river, it was 10.30 A. M. before the fleet had reached what is called the English Turn. All the morning,” says Farragut in his official report, ‘‘ I had seen abundant evidence of the panic which had seized the people in New Orleans. Cotton-loaded ships on fire came floating down, and working in- struments of every kind, such as are used in shipyards. The destruction of prop- erty was awful. The levee in New Orleans was one scene of desolation. Ships, steamers, cotton, coal were all in one common blaze, and our ingenuity was much taxed to avoid the floating conflagration.” On his way up, and when about three miles from the city, fire was opened upon him by the Chal- mette batteries, one being on each side of the river ; but the vessels were now well together, and a few vigorous and well directed broadsides soon silenced the guns and scattered the men in all directions. New Orleans was now ut- terly defenseless ; and the water in the river was so high that a gunboat could easily be taken up as far as Benner’s 156 MEMPHIS AND NEW ORLEANS. plantation, ten miles above the city, and thus, by commanding the narrow neck of land across which the railroad passes, and which connects the river and the swamp, completely enclose the city, shutting off all means of egress and every source of supply. In the cir- cumstances, and seeing that he had no hope of saving the city, Lovell, with the sanction of the municipal authori- ties, who were anxious to avoid the hor- rors of a bombardment, sent off his mu- nitions and a large portion of his troops, and, having disbanded the rest, turned the city over to the mayor. At one o’clock, on the afternoon of the 25th, and in the midst of a fierce thunder-storm, Farragut anchored his squadron off New Orleans. The excite- ment was tremendous. The inhabitants, who believed that the defenses of the city were invulnerable, gave way to the most frantic rage, invoked venge- ance on Higgins and Lovell, and de- manded that the city be given to the fiames rather than sui*i-endei’ed. On board the National ships the sailors were wild with delight. They had seen the end of their mission ; they had nobly and successfully done their work ; and cheer after cheer went sounding: from the ships to the shore. Farragut sent Bailey to the city authorities, with a flag, demanding the immediate sur- render of the city, and infoiming them that no flag but that of the United States would be allowed to float in presence of the fleet. The mayor, John T. Monroe, in a foolish letter, refused to surrender or take down the Confede- rate flag, declaring that the city was defenseless, that he was no military man, and knew neither how to com- mand an army nor to surrender an un- protected place; that there was not a man in the city whose heart would not be palsied by the mere thought of hoisting any flag but the flag of their adoption ; and that he would seek in vain for so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our as- pirations.” In the meantime a party had landed from the Pensacola and hoisted the National flag over the gov- ernment mint ; but it was quickly torn down and dragged in derision through the streets. A gambler named Mum- ford, who was chiefly responsible for this rash act, afterwards paid the pen- alty with his life. Farragut, patient as he was, and merciful as he wished to be, was not to be hindered in the dis- charge of his duty by the querulous protestations of the mayor. He notified the mayor to remove the women and children from the city within forty-eight hours, as he had no desire that the in- nocent and the helpless should suffer, in the event of a bombardment. An- other letter, more ridiculous than the former, came back from the mayor. “Do your worst, but don’t speak about humanity. If the Confederate flag must be taken down, and the National flag raised, the work must be done by other hands than ours.” Such was the bur- den of the mayoi‘’s reply. Farragut, having learned of the surrender of the forts below, and knowing that General Butler would soon be on hand and ready to take possession, felt that, not- BUTLER IN CHARGE. 157 withstanding the irritating conduct of Mayor Monroe, he could afford to act with caution and patience. Next day April Captain Bell landed with a hun- 26* dred marines; and the National fla^r was raised over the mint and the custom-house. To these no violence was offered. The people had become aware of the fact that Butler was com- ing up the river with his transports. April Cn the 30th,- Farragut informed the city authorities that he should hold no more intercourse with them, and that as soon as General Butler arrived he should turn over the charge Ifjay of the city to him. On the 1st b of May, General Butler, with his transports, bearing two thousand armed men, appeared off the levee in front of New Orleans. On the afternoon of the same day the debarkation took place, and New Orleans was formally occupied by United States troops. Be- fore the middle of the month. Baton Bouge and Natchez had also been occu- pied ; and the Mississippi was free both above and below Vicksburg. The cap- ture of New Orleans, which was accom- plished at the small sacrifice of 40 killed and 177 wounded, was justly regarded as one of the greatest victories yet achieved by the North. The people were jubilant; and President Lincoln, in a cheerful proclamation, and as if to give the world assurance of the com- pleteness of the National victories, de- June clared the termination, on June b 1st, of the blockade of the ports of Beaufort, of Port Boyal, and of New Orleans. It was j ustly felt to be a heavy loss to the South. “It annihilated us in Louisiana,” says Pollard, “diminished our resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest grain and cattle countries within the limits of the Con- federacy ; gave to the enemy the Missis- sippi liiver, with all its means of naviga- tion, for a base of operations, and finally led by plain and irresistible conclusion to our virtual abandonment of the great and fruitful valley of the Mississippi.” We have thus answered the questions which we put to ourselves at the com- mencement of this chapter. We have told the story of the occupation of Memphis and the story of the capture of New Orleans, and have explained why it w^as that at the date of the Confederate retreat from Corinth and its occupation by General Halleck and the National forces, Vicksburg alone remained to ob- struct the free navigation of the waters of the Mississippi. We leave General Butler in possession of New Orleans; but the consideration of his adminstra- tion of the affairs of that city forms no essential part of the plan of this work. The naval operations wBich resulted in the occupation of Memphis on the one hand and the capture of New Orleans on the other, were in the highest degree creditable to the officers of the North. Farragut covered himself with glory; so did Bailey; so did Boggs; but where all did so well, it is invidious to singlet out and bestow special praise. 158 lUKA AND COEINTH. CHAPTEE XI. The Army of the West. — The Army Inactive. — Halleck made Commander-in-Chief. — Buell Sent to Chattanooga, — The Army of the West Weakened. — Grant in Command. — Pope Sent to Virginia. — Rosecranz takes Pope’s place under Grant. — The Position of the Array of the West. — Price and VanDorn. — The Confederate Array Preparing to Strike. — Grant’s Caution. — The Object of the Confederates. — luka. — Armstrong’s Raids. — Colonel Murphy in Command at luka. — Price at luka. — Grant Watchful and Ready. — Time Precious. — Generals Ord and Ross. — Rosecranz’s Army in Motion. — The Confederates Well Posted. — The Battle-Ground at luka. — The Battle Begun. — The Battery of the Eleventh Ohio. — Fearful Fighting. — Colonel Eddy Killed. — The Battery Captured. — Ord Deceived. — Too Late on the Field. — A Great Misfortune. — Defeat and Retreat of the Confederates. — Corinth. — Preparations for another Fight. — The Old Battle-Ground. — The Place Greatly Strengthened. — Major Prime. — Chewalla Road. — Beginning of the Fight. — Terrific Onslaught of the Confede- rates. — The First Day a Victory for the Confederates. — The Confederates Reinforced. — Resolved to Capture Corinth. — The Confederates Open Fire. — A Deceptive Movement. — The Movement Defeated. — The Confede- rates Come Up in Force. — Great Bravery and Great Slaughter. — A Temporary Panic among the Nationals. — Fort Powell Captured. — At Rosecranz's Headquarters. — Are they to Win? — Victory turned into Defeat. — The Confederate Right Driven Back to the Woods. — The Confederate Left. — Their Advance on the National Works. — A Terrible Reception. — “ Gorgeous Pyrotechnics.” — A Murderous Fire. — The Confederates Fall Back. — Another Attack. — The Battle Ended. — A National Triumph. — The Pursuit. — The Battle of the Hatchie. — The Confetlr- rates Defeated. — Iluribut and Ord. — Ord Wounded. — Pursuit Discontinued. — Promotion of Rosecranz. — Ills Order of the Tw'enty-Fourth of October. — The First Praise Due to Grant. — Grant’s Command Enlarged. Before proceeding to call the read- 1862 attention to the important events which were already taking place on the Atlantic coast, we have deemed it advisable, for the sake of unity, to remain a little longer with the army of the West, and to describe somewhat in detail the operations of that army, and the work generally which had to be done after the capture of Corinth and before General Grant was in a fit condition to march upon Vicksburg. Corinth was evacuated on the 30th ]>Iay cf May, and on the same day was occupied by the National troops. From a variety of causes, the conquer- ors of Shiloh remained comparatively inactive from June to September. Ilal- leck remained in command until the 11th of August, when he was summoned to Washington, and by general orders from the War Department G. assigned to the command of ‘‘the whole land forces of the United States, as general-in-chief.” During that time ho employed himself in strengthening tho fortifications of Corinth and repairing the railroads between that jdace and Columbus. General Buell was detached on the 10th of June, and sent to June Chattanooga to oppose Bragg ; for the Confederates, encouraged by the success w^hich had attended their arms in the East, were making super- human efforts, not only with the view of marching upon Washington, but for the purpose, also, of recovering what they had lost in Tennessee and Ken- tucky. Should Bragg succeed in moving GRANT’S PLAN. 159 along the west flank of the Cumberland Mountains and in capturing Louisville, he would undo all that Halleck had done in his southward march along the Tennessee. In order to strengthen Buell, and so enable him to counter- check Bragg, the Shiloh army was robbed of some of its ablest and most experienced soldiers. On the departure of Halleck for Washington, General Grant succeeded to the chief command of his old army; but, from the causes above mentioned, its ranks were consid- erably thinned. When Grant assumed the command. General Pope had been ordered to Vir- ginia, and General Bosecranz had taken charge of that leader’s forces under Grant. Bosecranz’s division was known as the army of the Mississippi, and was charged with the occupation of Northern Mississippi and Alabama, in the vicin- ity of Corinth and eastward to Tus- cumbia. The entire army under Grant was stationed from Memphis to Bridge- port, Tennessee, along the Memphis and Charleston Bailroad. His headquar- ters were at Jackson, Tennessee, where the Central Mississippi Bailroad unites with the Mobile and Ohio. In conse- quence of the low water of the Tennes- see, it was necessary for him to hold the railroads from Corinth and Bolivar north to Columbus. In Grant’s immediate front lay the Confederates, in considerable force, un- der Price and VanDorn. Becoming aware of the fact that Grant’s army had been greatly weakened by the transfer of troops to Buell, these officers moved their armies toward the Ten- nessee Biver at the beginning of Sep- tember. Of this forward movement General Grant was fully aware; but with a caution which was fully justified by the result, he refrained from any precipitate action, his attention being mainly devoted to ascertain the plans of his opponents. It was evidently the object of the Confederate generals to get possession of Corinth, the key to the military possession of Tennessee. This in their hands, they could render effective aid to Bragg; they might even resume possession of their lost territory, and bring Kentucky and Tennessee once more within the limits of the Con- federacy. There can be little doubt that Bragg expected Price and VanDorn to follow him; and there is every reason to believe that these two ofiicers felt confident of their ability to measure swords with Grant and Bosecranz. They hoped, however, that Grant would be tempted to abandon Corinth ; in this showing that they shared the feeling which was commonly entertained at Bichmond, that Bragg’s march on Lou- isville would compel the National com- mander to release his hold on the Mis- sissippi. They did not know their man. Grant’s character, in fact, was not yet fully understood. Of the approach of the enemy, and of two unsuccessful raids made by a cavalry force under General Armstrong, Grant duly informed Bosecranz, who was at the time at Tuscumbia. Bose- cranz hastened to luka, a sweet village on the Memphis and Charleston Bail- road, in Tishamingo County, Missis- sippi, noted for its mineral springs and 160 lUKA AND CORINTH. the beauty of its suiToun dings. At luka there was collected a large amount of stores. Leaving the place in charge of Colonel K. C. Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin, with orders to remove the property to Corinth or destroy it, Kose- cranz hurried westward, with Stanley’s division, to Clear Creek, some seven miles east of Corinth, and there en- Sfp, camped. On the 1st of Septem- b her. Price, with twelve thousand men, reached Jacinto, when the small National force stationed there retired and fled to Corinth. Tuscumbia and luka were in like manner abandoned ; and Price, unresisted, established his headquarters at the latter place, taking possession of the National property which Murphy had failed to destroy. The time had now come for Grant to act. He had watched the movements of the enemy with great earnestness. He had now divined their meaning. He had also found his opportunity. What the Confederate leaders intended was now clear. Price wished so to en- gage the attention of Grant as to tempt him to draw his forces out of Corinth. VanDorn, meanwhile, was to be ready to spring upon the abandoned or poorly garrisoned stronghold, and secure it for the Confederacy. From his scouts Grant had learned that VanDorn could not reach Corinth for at least four days. Price, as we hav^e seen, had established his headquarters at luka ; and VanDorn was at Holly Springs. There was time, therefore, to punish Price, and to be back at Corinth ready to give Van- Dorn a warm reception. But the time was precious. Not an hour was to be lost. Every second delayed was a pos- itive gain to the enemy. The instruc- tions were promptly given. General Ord was directed to move on the left of the railroad, through Burnsville, to luka, taking care, of course, to leave garrisons at Corinth and other points that required protection. General Boss was ordered by telegraph to come at full speed from Bolivar on the same route, and, leaving a small rearguard at Burnsville, to join Ord with three thou- sand four hundred men. This force, six thousand five hundred in all, was to attack Price from the north. Rosecranz was ordered to send one division of Stanley’s, with Mizner’s cavalry, by way of Jacinto, to strike the enemy’s flank, while Hamilton should move round by the Fulton road, to cut olf his southward retreat or turn it into a rout. The force under Rosecranz amounted to nine thousand. This, with the three thousand under Ord and the three thou- sand four hundred under Ross, made the army of Grant in the field larger, by three thousand, than that of Price. The choice of position made by the Confederates more than compensated for the difference in actual strength. The combined movement of the Na- tional troops began at four o’clock in the morning of the 18th of Sep- Sep, tember. That night, after having 18. marched through a terrible rain-storm, the troops of Rosecranz bivouacked at Jacinto, about twenty miles south of luka. On the following morning they push- ed on in light marching order to- Sep. ward luka, with Mizner’s cavalry. DEFEAT OF PEICE. 161 At Barnett’s Corners they encountered some Confederate outposts, driving them in, after a sharp skirmish. Early in the afternoon, when about two miles from luka, Hamilton’s division, while mov- ing cautiously and expecting every mo- ment to hear the guns of Ord, came suddenly upon the enemy, in strong force and well posted on the side of a hill which flanked a deep ravine. Ham- ilton immediately formed line of battle. The ground was so broken, so tangled with thickets, so interlaced with creeks and ravines, that it was impossible to bring the troops into action in large bodies. The men formed themselves wherever the ground would permit them. The line was thus broken at frequent intervals ; and the fighting seemed to be done by a number of small armies. The fighting, however, was severe. After much exertion, and in spite of a most destructive fire of grape, canister and shell from the ene- emy’s guns, the Eleventh Ohio battery was put in position on the crest of the hill. This battery was supported by the Fifth Iowa, Colonel Matthias, and the Twenty-Sixth Missouri, Colonel Boomer ; and commanding the road in front, it did excellent and effective work. Colonel Eddy, with the Forty- Eighth Indiana, was holding ground a little in front of the battery, where the fighting was most fierce, and where the Confederates were led by General Price in person ; and although assistance was given him by the Fourth Minnesota, Captain LeGro, and by the Sixteenth Iowa, Colonel Chambers, he was driven again and again back upon the battery. Around the battery of the Eleventh Ohio, the battle raged most fiercely. Three or four times the guns of this battery were taken and retaken. The commander of the battery, Lieutenant Sears, did noble work. At length Cob onel Eddy fell mortally wounded ; and his regiment being hurled back in dis- order, the guns — every horse having been killed, seventy-two of the men and nearly all the officers either killed or wounded — were seized and carried off by the Confederates. While this strug- gle lasted, Stanley’s division came up; but such was the nature of the ground that only the Eleventh Missouri could be pushed to the front. This regiment rendered most effective assistance, and helped to drive the Confederates back into the ravine. The fight lasted until nightfall ; and, the Confederates having been compelled to take shelter in the hollow toward the village, darkness fell upon the combatants and made an end of the carnage. The reader will observe that Ord was not present to take any part in the con- test. Why was this? He had, it seems, spent the greater part of the day watch- ing the movements of a Confederate force which appeared to be advancing in the direction of Corinth. This proving to be only a feint, he hastened to Burns- ville, where he found Boss waiting with his three thousand men. Grant ordered him forward, with five thousand men, with directions to halt within four miles of Tuka until he should hear Bosecranz’s guns. A high north wind, which blew all the afternoon, prevented him from hearing the sound of the cannon. It 162 lUKA AND CORmTH. was not until next morning that he heard the expected signal; but it was too late. When he reached luka, the en- emy had disappeared. As illustrative of the difficulties of the situation, it de- serves to be noted that, at half-past ten o’clock on the night of the 19th, Rose- cranz sent a dispatch to General Grant, stating that he had been engaged for several hours, and had lost three pieces of artillery, and requesting the assist- ance and co-operation of the troops un- der Ord. This dispatch should have been in Grant’s hands within two hours. It did not reach him until thirty-five minutes past eight the next morning. Mortified by ‘the delay, and dreading the possible result. Grant wrote to Ord in the most urgent language. “ Rose- c -anz,” he said, “ may find his hands full. Hurry up your troops — all possi- ble.” Happily, the character of Ord was well known, and there was no rea- son to suspect his bravery or his willing- ness to take part in the fight. The Fulton road had not been cov- ered, as Grant had ordered, and Price was able during the night to make good his escape. As soon as his flight was known, a pursuit was made ; but Price had too much the start to be overtaken. Although Grant had reason to sympa- thize with Rosecranz, in consequence of the nonappearance of Ord, he was ill satisfied with the result of the fight. He had counted on the destruction or capture of Price’s army. As it was, luka was a victory, and his plan had been amply justified. Price lost one of his best generals. Little, who was killed. At least a thousand of his men were made prisoners; the number of his killed and wounded was large; and he was unable to carry with him the captured guns. The National loss was about seven hundred and thirty men killed and wounded. On the 22d Grant sep. withdrew his forces and returned 22. to Corinth to prepare for the reception of VanHorn. Corinth again comes prominently into the foreground. In May it was the theatre of great and stirring events which commanded the attention of both continents; and now, in October, it is to be the theatre of events even more momentous and greatly more enduring in their results. Price joined VanDorn at Ripley; and, little daunted at the failure of their plan to get hold of Co- rinth by stratagem, they made up their minds to take it by force. It was known that VanDorn was already approaching from the west ; but it was not known what point he might first attack. It might be Jackson ; it might be Bolivar ; it might be Corinth — the latter most likely. Grant took all needful precau- tion to make his different points of strength secure, knowing that it would not be difficult to concentrate, once the enemy was encountered and his pur- pose fully understood. Rosecranz was marched back through Jacinto to Co- rinth, which he reached on the sep» 26th. Ord was stationed at Boli- 26. var; and Grant returned to his head- quarters at Jackson. General Huiibut was thrown out with his division to- wards Pocahontas. The united Con- federate forces moved northward to Pocahontas, striking the Memphis and THE FIRST DAY AT CORINTH. 163 Charleston Railroad about halfway be- tween Corinth and Grand Junction. There they met the troops of Mansfield Lovell, whose acquaintance, the reader will remember, we made in the last chapter, when describing the capture of New Orleans. Thus strengthened, the Confederate army numbered about twenty-two thousand men, and was un- der the immediate command of General VanDorn, who ranked both Price and Oct. Lovell. On the night of the 2d 2* of October, the united forces bi- vouacked at Chewalla, ten miles from Corinth. Early on the morning of the Oct, «^d, the Confederates came up in force ; and Rosecranz had no lon- ger any reason to doubt that the object- ive point aimed at by VanDorn was Corinth. Rosecranz disposed of his troops accordingly. Hamilton he placed on the right, Davis in the centre, and McKean on the left; while Colonel Oliver, with three regiments and a sec- tion of artillery, was stationed on the Chewalla road, beyond the old works of Beauregard. Mizner’s cavalry was disposed in every direction around the town, watching the roads at Burnsville, Boneyard, Kossuth, and also in the front. On the Confederate side, the left, under Price, was on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, to the north of Co- rinth. VanDorn had charge of the centre, a little more to the west, on the Chewalla road ; and the right was held by Lovell. It was evident that the attack was to be made upon the north- west side of Corinth — the point which VanDorn had been led to understand was the most vulnerable. He did not know that this defect in the original fortifications of Beauregard had been completely obviated. Grant having caus- ed to be constructed here four powerful redoubts. Corinth, in truth, was a very different place in these first days of October to what it was when Beaure- gard abandoned it in May. When the National forces, after the retreat of Beauregard, entered Co- rinth, the defenses, which had been con- structed by the Confederate chief, were found to extend fifteen miles. To de- fend so extended a line would have required an enormous army. To obvi- ate this difficulty, and in order to make the place defensible by a much smaller force. General Halleck had constructed an inner line of defenses. Grant, how- ever, was not satisfied with these. Ma- jor F. E. Prime, the chief engineer of General Grant, under his direction, threw up a line of batteries on the north front, far inside of Halleck’s line, and close to the town of Corinth, having an enfilading fire uj^on the Bolivar and Chewalla roads, and a sweeping cross- fire upon all assailable parts of the en- tire front. On the extreme right were the old works of Beauregard ; and from that point the chain of forts reached to the extreme left. On succeeding to the command of all the forces in the District of West Tennessee and North- ern Mississippi, Grant examined the de- fenses of Corinth, which were then be- ing constructed under the superintend- ence of General Cullum, and expressed the opinion to General Halleck that they wmuld be appropriate if there was an army of one hundred thousand men 164 lUKA AND CORINTH. to defend them, but that they were of too great extent for the force at his dis- posal. Immediately upon General Hal- leck’s departure for Washington, Prime’s works were pushed forward with ener- gy, and by the 25th of Septembei’, when liosecranz took command, they were nearly completed. To Major Prime, under General Grant’s orders, belongs the credit of laying out and construct- ing the fortifications against which the enemy was now about to hurl his masses with impetuous but unavailing valor. The first pressure of the Confederates was felt by Colonel Oliver, who, as we liave seen, was somewhat in advance on the Chewalla road. It was the van- guard of the Confederate army, under Mansfield Lovell. Lovell pushes his men forward with such energy that Oliver finds his position one of consid- erable difficulty. Hard pressed, he is joined by General McArthur, who in turn finds himself overmatched and in danger of being outflanked. McAr- thur is strengthened by four regiments from McKean’s division. In spite of this assistance, McArthur is pushed back, as Oliver had been before him. The battle now becomes general. Davis is hard pressed; and, an interval ap- pearing between him and McArthur, the Confederates make a desperate rush to All up the gap. The onslaught was tremendous. Davis, to save his flank, was compelled to retire a thousand yards, and in so doing lost two guns. It was evident that the Confederates were in earnest, and that they meant to capture Corinth. New dispositions were therefore made of the National troops, bringing them nearer the town. These were being carried out when the darkness ended the conflict. The strue- gle had been severe ; and not a few brave men on the National side had fallen. General Oglesby was severely wounded ; and General Hackelman was killed. It was not without reason that VanDorn was jubilant. He had pressed the National army back wdth compara- tive ease. When night fell, he had en- veloped Kosecranz’s front. If he tele- graphed to Richmond, announcing a victory, he was only stating what was a fact. Perhaps he was too jubilant, and too confident that Corinth would be his before the rising of the sun on the following morning; but this was because he was ignorant of the strength of the works behind which the National forces were able to entrench themselves. By the break of day on the morning of the 4th of October, the battle oct. w^as resumed. The Confederate L line was closed up to within a thousand yards of the outer works which guarded the town. The night had not been spent by them in slumber; for it was observed that they had thrown up sev- eral batteries in front of the National line. Besides VanDorn, Price, and Lovell, there were present on the Con- federate side Generals Villepigue, Rust, Maury and L. Hebert ; and the troops were of the best possible material. The Nationals had been equally on the alert. All the batteries around the town were well manned; and a new one, called Fort Richardson, and mounting five guns, had been constructed by the sap- pers and miners during the dark hours TEMPESTS OF IPON. 165 of the night. The ground which lay between the combatants was of a varied, irregular character. Hill and swampy land alternated; and the whole was covered by forest trees and brushwood. On the north and west there were fields interspersing the woods ; in front of the right centre, a swamp; and in front of the left centre, impracticable hills. The National left, held by Stanley’s di- vision, was protected by Battery Rob- inett on the left and Battery Williams on the right. The centre was on a slight ridge, just north of the houses of Corinth, and consisted of Davies’ divis- ion, slightly retired, with sharp-shooters in front, and having Battery Powell on the right. Hamilton’s division was on the right, with Dillon’s battery, ad- vanced beyond Davies, and having two regiments in rear of his left. The first shot was fired from one of the newly erected Confederate batte- ries, the one most in advance, and dis- tant only from Battery Bobinett some two hundred yards. This was the open- ing of the fight. The shells fell in the streets of Corinth, producing the wild- est consternation among the inhabitants. For a time this battery was unanswered. It was not until daylight when Captain Williams, of Battery Williams, opened his 20-pounder Parrott guns upon it, silencing it in three minutes. Clearly it was the intention of the Confederate commander to attract the attention of the Nationals by this cannonading ; and, by keeping them employed in this di- rection, to give Lovell an opportunity to storm the works on their left. The silencing of this advanced battery ne- cessitated a change of plan. There was, however, no delay. Shortly after nine o’clock. Price came down on Bosecranz’s centre with tremendous force. Moving in heavy masses,* and marching rapidly along the Bolivar road, the Confederates came up in wedge-like form, and fell fiercely upon Davies and Fort Powell. Never was advancino: column more O warmly received. The road was swept by a direct, cross and enfilading fire. As the column advanced, it was literal- ly torn through and through. At each successive volley, huge gaps appeared in the ranks. The men were mowed down like grass. There had been no such destruction of human life since the commencement of tlie war. It put into the shade the massacre at Ball’s Bluff and the Valley of the Shadow of Death at Pittsburg Landing. Undismayed by this storm of grape and canister, which covered the ground with the bodies of their comrades, the Confederates pressed gallantly on. An eye-witness of this attack has told us that they came up bending their necks downward, and with their, faces averted, like men striv- ing to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail.” Are they to win the day ? Davies’ division yields ; and there is a temporary panic. On- wmrd push the brave Confederates. They capture Fort Powell ; and, in spite of the guns of Fort Bichardson, they penetrate to the public square and make themselves masters of the head- quarters of Bosecranz. In a better cause, such bravery ought to have been rewarded with victory.* As it was, the triumph was short-lived. Bosecranz, see- !814 166 lUKA AND CORINTH. ing the panic which had seized Davies’ men, rushed into the midst of the wa- vering battalions; and, what with en- treaty and threats and the flat of his sabre, he succeeded in restoring order. ‘'The ragged head of the column” vchich had forced its way into the town, v'as assailed by a section of Immers battery, supported by the Tenth Ohio and the Fifth Minnesota, and driven to- Avard the forest. Fort Powell was re- taken by a splendid charge of the Fifty- Sixth Illinois. Meanwhile, the guns of Hamilton, who had fallen back with Davies, being in full command of the avenues of advance and retreat, were i spreading death and destruction in the ' Oonfederate ranks. AVhat for a mo- | ment seemed a victory was now con- verted into a rout. Price’s men were driven back at all points. In the wild- est confusion, they fled to the shelter of the woods, the victorious Nationals closely pursuing. Price’s attack tlius ])roved a complete failure. The attack on the left was conducted by VanDorn in person. It was intended that the attack on the right and that on the left should be made at the same moment. VanDorn, however, was de- layed by the difficulties of the ground; and Price had been engaged some twen- tv minutes before he Avas able to bring his men into action. Arranging his regiments in four columns, and placing piis heavy artillery in the rear, VanDorn marched forward under the fire of the guns of the two forts, Hobinett and Williams. From the moment they came in sight, they wete mowed and torn and shattered by grape and shell and canis- ter. On, however, they moved, with an audacity which compelled the ad- miration of the National troops. Now Avere Avitnessed those gorgeous pyro- technics,” of AAffiich Kosecranz speaks in bis official despatch, and the description of AAffiich he leaA^es “to pens dipped in poetic ink.” Never in the history of Avarlike movements was there exhibited cooler determination or greater bravery on the part of the rank and file. On they move, in spite of the tempest of iron. It seems as if nothing Avill hinder them. They are now within fifty yards of Fort Robinett. Suddenly the Ohio brigade, Avhich has been lying fiat, rises at a signal and pours so murderous a lire upon the advancing columns that they stagger, break, and fall back into the AA'oods. The battle, however, is not yet ended. The Confederates re-form ; and again, as if convinced that a more daring effort will giA^e them the victory, tliey come up gallantly to the charge, led by Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas. This time they succeed in reach- ing the ditch. Rogers, revolver in hand, has leaped the ditch and scaled the par- apet. At this moment the Ohio bri- gade, again springing up, pours its mur- derous volleys upon the assailants. The effect Avas terrific. Rogers, Avith five equally brave companions, falls inside the fort. The Avord “ charge ” is given by the National brigade commander. Taken up and repeated by the men, it rings loud above the din of battle ; and the Eleventh Missouri and the Twenty-SeA^enth Ohio rush bounding over the parapet, and, after a severe hand to hand fight Avith the assailants. BATTLE OF THE HATCHIE. 167 chase “their broken fragments back to the woods.” By noon the battle was ended. It was, beyond all question, one of the bloodiest contests since the commencement of the war. On both sides the greatest bravery was exhib- ited ; and although the Nationals were victorious, they had little cause to dis- esteem the prowess of their opponents. On the morning of the 5th, the men Oct, having been allowed to rest for the night, the pursuit of the Con- federate army was begun. It was con- tinued for forty miles by the infantry, and for sixty miles by the cavalry. During the course of that day, a severe engagement took place between a body of the Nationals and a detachment of Confederates who had been sent to guard the crossing of the Hatchie. In this engagement, which is known as the battle of the Hatchie, the Confederates had a largely superior force ; but they were broken in spirit, battle- worn and weary, and made, in consequence, but a poor resistance. Driven back across the river toward Corinth, they were compelled to make a wide circuit, and recross the Hatchie at Crum’s Mill, six miles above. In their retreat they left behind them two guns; and three hun- dred of their men were made prisoners. The glory of this victory must be di- vided between Huribut and Ord, who in succession held the chief command. In the course of the struggle Ord was severely wounded, and Huribut resumed the command, which he had relinquished in the early part of the day, on the arrival of his superior. At whither the great body of the National army had pursued the retreat- ing Confederates, the pursuit was dis- continued, Grant deeming it advisable not to advance further for the present. Bosecranz was justly proud of the vic- tory which he had won ; and it was only a just reward for the services which he had rendered at luka and Co- rinth, when, a few days after his return, he was promoted to the chief command of the army of the Ohio, now called the army of the Cumberland, thus super- seding Buell. In an order issued to his troops on the 24th of Octo- oct. ber, E-osecranz said : “ The enemy 24. numbered, according to their own au- thorities, nearly 40,000 men — almost double your own numbers. You fought them in the position we desired on the 3d, punishing them terribly; and on the 4th, in three hours after the infantiy entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four officers and men. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom were one hundred and thirty-seven field offi- cers, captains, and subalterns, represent- ing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battal- ions, making sixty-nine regiments, thir- teen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty stand of small arms, fourteen stand of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quan- tity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force 168 lUKA AND CORINTH. witli infantry, and sixty miles with cav- alry.” The entire National loss, including, of course, luka and Corinth, was 315 killed, 1812 wounded, and 232 prison- ers and missing. General Grant, although he had some reason to complain that the army of VanDorn had not been completely de- stroyed, had just cause to be gratified with these fresh successes. His plans had worked admirably. His calcula- tions had been perfect. It was a piece of great daring, and, in other hands, would have implied tremendous risks, to march first on luka to whip Price, and then to find time to return to Co- rinth to demolish VanDorn. His suc- cess must have strengthened his faith in his own judgment. It certainly con- vinced the authorities at Washington and the people at large that in Grant the National cause had found a defender whose ability was equal to his daring, and whose judgment was thoroughly to be trusted. His abilities did not find full scope, nor did he get credit for what he actually accomplished, so long as Halleck held the chief command. Now that he was free to act on his own responsibility, the true character of the man revealed itself ; and it besran to be seen that it was to General Grant, more than to any other man, that the nation was indebted for that series of brilliant victories which, begun at Forts Henry and Donelson, had swept the Confede- rates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. Too much praise can hardly be bestowed on General Kosecranz; nor can it bo denied that Ord did well according to his limited opportunity. Price and Van- Dorn revealed all the qualities of brave and dashing generalship ; but there was a visible absence from the management of the Confederate troops of that cool and calculating head which directed the movements of the Nationals. By a general order of the 16th of October, the department of which oct. General Grant had command was largely extended and named the Depart- ment of the Tennessee, with the head- quarters at Jackson. The Confederates having been again repulsed, and the course so far cleared. Grant began to make vigorous preparations for the car- lying out of the original intention of the campaign inaugurated at Donelson, but brought into temporary abeyance by the abstraction of so many of his troops. Vicksburg remained the chief obstacle to the free navigation of the Missis- sippi; and to the reduction of Vicks- burg all the energies of Grant were now directed. KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE. 1C9 CHAPTER XII. The Army of the Ohio. — Buell Sent to Chattanooga. — Vicksburg. — Delay in Marching on. — The Keason. — Con- federate Boldness. — The Invasion of Maryland and Kentucky. — General Bragg. — Kirby Smith. — Cumberland Gap. — Smith’s Raid through Kentucky. — Excitement in Ohio. — The Importance of Chattanooga. — The Race for Chattanooga. — Bragg Wins. — Bragg’s Army. — Buell Follows Bragg. — Intercepted Despatches. — Buell First at Louisville. — Reinforcements from Grant. — Buell’s Blunder. — Relieved of His Command. — The Order Recalled. — Bragg's Proelam ition. — The Confederate Committee on Foreign Affairs. — A Bribe to the North- west. — Attempt to Inaugurate a Confederate Government in Kentucky. — A Political Failure but a Successful Raid. — Bragg’s Retreat with His Booty. — Buell Pursues. — Concentration at Perryville. — Scarcity of Water. — Preparing for Battle. — Bragg Preparing to Retreat. — He Resolves to give Battle. —The Battle of Perryville Commenced. — Severe Fighting. — Colonel McCook Sorely Pressed. — Reinforced. — The Confederates Pressed Back into the Woods. — Major-General McCook Comes Up. — He Takes Position. — Advance of Rousseau. — Chaplin’s Creek. — A Commanding Position. — General McCook Surprised. — A Terrific Blow Dealt by the Con- federates. — Death of Jackson. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Terrill Mortally Wounded. — Rousseau also Falls Back. — Mitchell and Sheridan. — Sheridan’s Opportunity. — Terrific Slaughter. — Reinforcements Wanted. — Crittenden Ordered Forward. — The Battle of Perryville Ended. — Retreat of Bragg. — Bragg and Buell both Blamed. — Buell Removed. — Rosecranz takes His Place. — His Promptitude. — Preparations for another Strug- gle. — Murfreesboro’. — Rejoicings at Bragg’s Headquarters. — Bragg Over-Confident. — Trying to Annoy Grant. — Rosecranz Moves Southward. — The Battle-Ground. — Stone River. — The Two Armies in Position. — Bragg's Army the Stronger. — Rosecranz's Plan of Attack. — Bragg's Plan. — The Battle Begun. — A Terrific Onslaught. — A Temporary Defeat. — Plan of Battle Changed. — Critical Position of Sheridan. — Terrible Loss of Life. — Sheridan Exhausted. — Negley and Thomas. — The Battle all but Lost. — Hazen and His Brigade. — Rosecranz’s new Arrangements Completed — A Tempest of “Double-Shotted Iron Fire.” — The Tide of Battle Turned. — Stubbornness of the Confederates. — Rosecranz in the Front. — “ Forward Now.” — Darkness. — A Drawn Battle. — Burying the Dead. — The Battle Resumed on the Third of January. — The Confederates Driven Back. — Terrible Havoc. — Rosecranz in Murfreesboro’. — A Great National Victory. — Rosecranz Complimented. On the 10th of June, as we have seen 1862 ^ previous chapter, General Buell, at. the head of his old army — the army of the Ohio — was ordered by General Halleck to move towards Chattanooga. This was almost imme- diately after the retirement of Beaure- gard from Corinth and the occupation of the same by the National troops. What was it that rendered necessary this breaking up of the army of the West at this particular juncture? In a space of time which hardly justified the result, that army had marched from Henry to Donelson, from Donelson to Shiloh, from Shiloh to Corinth, had opened the Mississippi* as far south as Memphis, and had swept the Confede- rates out of Kentucky and Tennessee. Farragut had already pushed his way beyond New Orleans ; and that city had been restored to the Union. At the time that the victorious army was divided, and Buell with his forces was sent towards Chattanooga, it seemed to be the plain duty of Halleck to move southward and capture Vicksburg, the one remaining barrier of any conse- quence to the free and unrestricted navi- gation of the great river from St. Louis to the sea. Moreover, the capture of Vicksburg formed part of that grand 170 PERRYVILLE AKD MURFREESBORO’. plan which was inaugurated at Forts Henry and Donelson. There must have been good and substantial reasons why this plan was not followed out — why what seemed a plain duty was not per- formed, What w^ere those reasons? To answer this question, it will be necessary for us to take a brief retro- spect of the situation. It deserves here to be noted that the successes of Hal- leck, Grant and Buell in the West had been more than counterbalanced by the victories of the Confederates in the East. The government at Bichmond had made tremendous efforts to strengthen their armies ; and conscription had suc- cessfully accomplished their purpose. McClellan, as we shall see more fully in the next chapter, had been driven back from Bichmond ; and his peninsu- lar campaign had totally failed. Noth- ing daunted by the succession of defeats sustained in the West, it was resolved by the Confederate authorities to give effect to the clamor of the South, ‘Go carry war into* the enemy’s country, and relieve us from its intolerable bur- dens.” With this end in view, Lee was directed to move into Maryland; and Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard in command, was ordei'ed into Ken- tucky. It was believed that these slave- holding States would be easily reclaim- ed, and that from them it would be easy to invade the North, and wring peace from it in one or other of the irreat cities. Of Lee and his movements o we shall have occasion to treat in a sub- sequent chapter. Our attention for the present must be given to Bragg, and to the events which were taking place. or were about to take place, in Ken- tucky. The southward movement of the Na- tional forces, and their concentration for a time at Shiloh and Corinth, had left Kentucky and Tennessee to a large ex- tent unprotected. Taking advantage of this, Morgan, Forrest, and other guerilla chiefs, had overrun those States, produc- ing terror and dismay among the inhab- itants and woiking terrible destruction. The successful raids by those bands greatly encouraged the Confederates in their determination to make bold and ag- gressive efforts in the North ; and Gene- ral Kirby Smith, an officer who, the read- er will remember, played an important part at the first battle of Bull Bun, con- trived to unite those irregular bands, and make use of their experience in fur- thering the plans of the Confederate government. At the head of these men, as the advanced guard of Bragg’s army, this general marched th’O’igh Bogeis’ and Big Creek Gaps of the Cumberland Mountains into Kentucky. At Bich- mond, ill this Slate, he encountered a body of Unionists under the command of Major-General Nelson, and defeated them, two thousand of the Union troops being captured and two hundred killed and wounded. Among the latter was General Nelson himself. After their success at Bichmond, they found little opposition at Lexington, at Frankfort, at Shelby ville, at Paris, and at Cynthh ana. It was not long until they were on the banks of the Ohio. The people of that State became wild with excite- ment; and the citizens of Cincinnati made vigorous efforts to be in readiness CHATTANOOGA. in for the daring invader. When within one day'^s march of the city, Kirby Smith, Sep. on the 12th of September, fell back on Frankfort and Lexing- ton. Later, having been reinforced by ti’oops fi'om Southwestern Virginia, un- der Humphrey Marshall, he manoeuvred so as to accomplish his original purpose, which was to effect a junction with Bragg. Chattanooga, the citadel of the moun- tain fastness of Tennessee, and the point iVappui for operations towards Atlanta, was justly regarded by Halleck as a strategic point of the tirst importance. Chattanooga held by a strong National force, it would be impossible for the Confederates to make any very effective i.iroad into Kentucky. But the import- ance of Chattanooga for certain pur- poses was as well known to Bragg as it was to Buell. It was the object of the Nationals to possess themselves of Chattanooga, and so prevent such in- vasion. It was the object of the Con- federates to enter Kentucky in force before Chattanooga was in the hands of their enemies. Hence Chattanooga was so far the objective point of both com- manders. The National commander de- sired to take advantage of the concen- tration of the Confederate forces on the Mississippi line by seizing Chattanooga; the Confederate commander desired to take advantage of the concentration of National forces on the same line by an .June advance towards the Ohio. On lb the 11th of June Buell commenced his march from Corinth. Following the route prescribed by Halleck, which was the direct route through North Alabama, by way of the Memphis and Charleston Kailroad, the divisions moved forward in close succession by marches of fourteen miles a day. The distance from Corinth to Chattanooga by this railroad is two hundred miles. When joined by Mitchell, whom he had left behind him to guard Middle Ten- nessee, and General Morgan, who had seized Cumberland Gap, Buell had un- der him some forty thousand men. Cau- tiously and carefully providing for all contingencies by the way, he had by the end of July thrown forward two divisions, under McCook and Critten- den, to Battle Creek, some twenty-live miles from Chattanooga ; and all pre- parations for an advance on the latter place were complete. Bragg, however, had reached Chat- tanooga in person on the 28th of jnjy July ; his troops were already 28. well in hand; and, what wdth the so- called army of East Tennessee, number- ing thirteen thousand men, and which, under the command of Kirby Smith, covered his right at Knoxville, he could count on an effective force, for immedi- ate use, of fifty thousand men. Bragg’s army was organized in three corps — one under Kirby Smith, as we have seen, at Knoxville, and the two others, under Hardee and Polk, at Chatta- nooga. With the two latter, Bragg moved northward, directing his march towards the Louisville and Nashville Kailroad. Forestalled in the occupation of Chattanooga, Buell was dependent upon Louisville for supplies, and hence had to guard nearly three hundred miles of railroad. As Bragg marched north- 172 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO^ ward, he had no choice but execute a parallel -march and fall back upon Nash- ville. Bragg, who had struck the rail- road at Mumfordsville, moved thence to Frankfort, where he was joined by Smith. Buell had by this time dis- covered, through some intercepted de- spatches, that their true object was Louisville, and not Nashville, as their movements seemed to indicate. Leav- ing a garrison at the latter place, he hurried on to Louisville, which he Sep. reached on the 25th of Septem- 25. ber. Bragg’s movements had been slow. It had taken him six weeks to march from Chattanooga to Frankfort. Slow, however, as his march had been, he would certainly have been first at Louisville, had it not been for a burnt bridge near Bardstown, which obstruct- ed his progress and caused considerable detention. As it was, Louisville was secure. The arrival of Buell was an immense relief to the panic-stricken cit- izens, who had become aware of the near approach of the Confederates. At Louisville Buell received large reinforcements. Some of these were in the shape of new levies ; but not a few of them were veterans, sent up the Mis- sissippi and the Ohio from the army of Grant. His entire force, after he had been joined by General Nelson, was estimated at about one hundred thou- sand men. The National force thus greatly outnumbered the Confederate force, which, including that of Kirby Smith, did not exceed sixty-five thou- sand men. Buell had conducted the retrograde movement from the Tennes- see to the Ohio with marked ability; he was entitled to no little praise for anticipating Bragg at Louisville; but he had made a grand mistake in not being first at Chattanooga. He had allowed the enemy to invade Kentucky by not being forward in time at that strategic pbint ; and considering the ir- ritable mood in which the Northern mind was at the moment, it is not won- derful that the cry of incapacity was loudly raised, and a demand made for his recall. This feeling being yielded to, Buell, just as he had got his army in order and was about to march from Louisville against the Confederates, re- ceived from Washington an order reliev- ing him of his command, and appointing General G. H. Thomas to act in his stead. Thomas, who had the highest respect for the military talent of Buell, refused to supersede him. At Thomas’s urgent request, the order Avas revoked and Buell remained in command. Bragg, meanwhile, had commenced to carry out his instructions in regard to the organization of Kentucky on Confederate principles. On the gep. 18th of September he issued a proclamation from Glasgow, declaring that the Confederate army had come as the liberators of Kentuckians ‘rtrom the tyranny of a despotic ruler, and not as conquerors or despoilers.” “Your gal- lant Buckner,” he said, “leads; Mar- shall is on the right; while Breckin- ridge, dear to us as you, is advancing with Kentucky’s radiant sons to receive the honor and applause due to their heroism.” He told them that he must have supplies for his army, but that they I would be faiily paid for. “Kentuck- CONFEDERATE CONCILIATION. 173 ians,” he concluded, ‘‘we have come with joyful hopes. Let us not depart in sorrow, as we shall if we find you wedded in your choice to your present lot. If you prefer Federal rule, show it by your frowns, and we shall retire whence we came. If you choose rather to come within the folds of our brother- hood, then cheer us by the smiles of your women, and lend your willing hands to secure yourselv^es in your her- itage of liberty. Women of Kentucky! your persecutions and heroic bearing have reached our ears. Banish hence- forth forever from your minds the fear of loathsome prisons or insulting visit- ations. Let your enthusiasm have free rein. Buckle on the armor of your kin- dred, your husbands, sons and brothers, and scotf to shame him who would prove recreant in his duty to you, his country, and his God.” Bragg was giving ex- pression to sentiments then common at Eichmond. It was evidently his opin- ion that the dominant feeling was in favor of the South, and that the Ken- tuckians would gladly welcome his ap- pearance as that of a friend and lib- erator. It would be absurd to deny that there were among these j)eople many who sympathized warmly with the Southern cause. But they were not the majority, nor were they as a rule the better class of citizens. Kentucky had fairly and squarely cast in her lot with the North, and she was not to be shaken in her purpose or tempted from the path of duty. At this juncture the Confederates, elated with their suc- cesses in the East, began to indulge in the wildest day dreams. It was not Kentucky or Tennessee alone that would gladly join and make common cause with the South. Why should not the Northwestern States do thj same? Duty and interest alike pointed them in that direction. On the same day that Bragg issued his proclamation, the Committee on Foreign Affairs made a report to the Confederate Congress with respect to the propriety of a pro- clamation with a view to influence the States of the Northwest. In the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, the Northwest and the South had a common interest. As a reward for the alliance of these North- western States, the Eichmond authori- ties were willing to cede the free navi- gation of the Mississippi and to open to them the markets of the South. The Northwest, however, equally with Ken- tucky and Tennessee, had decided upon their course of duty, and had such a proclamation been issued, the sturdy men of the West might have been justified in reminding their generous friends that the ownership of the Mis- sissippi and its tributaries was no longer an open question. Still further, in car- rying out the instructions he had re- ceived, Bragg, while with Kirby oct» Smith, at Frankfort, inaugurated L on the 4th of October, a provisional governor of the State of Kentucky. The Confederate commander, howev- er, had made good use of his time and opportunities for other purposes as well. His guerrillas and foraging par- ties had scoured the country round and round, and had carried off thousands of hogs and cattle, with bacon and bread- 174 PERRYVILLE AND MURrREESBORO\ stuffs of every kind. In every town the shops and stores were forced open, and whatever was wanted was taken and paid for in worthless Confederate mo- ney. A little later than this, when the Confederates were driven out of the State, the boast was made by the Rich- mond newspapers that “the wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by Kirby Smith was forty miles long. It brought a million yards of jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots and shoes, and two hundred wa^on- loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, eight thousand beeves, and a large lot of swine.” It ought to be added here that his tender feelings towards the un- fortunate Kentuckians did not prevent him from enforcing the Confederate conscription act wherever his influence extended, and thus largely increasing the effective strength of his army. Anticipate d in the occupation of Lou- isville, and feeling convinced that he was already defeated in the main purpose of his campaign, Bragg prepared to retreat and to protect the large booty which he had collected. It was certainly the next most important thing for him to do in the premises. He moved back- ward with great deliberation, his object being to cover his supply trains until they got a good start toward Tennessee. Ocf, On the 1st of October, Buell, his L army reinforced and reorganized, moved out of Louisville in pursuit of his antagonist. His army was arranged in three corps, commanded respectively by Generals Gilbert, Crittenden, and McCook. General George H. Thomas, who was Buell’s second in command, had charge of the right wing. It was known that Bragg was at Bardstown. Towards Bardstown, therefore, Buell directed his divisions. Crittenden, who was in immediate command of the iK^ht, marched by way of Shepherdsville. The left moved in a line nearer to Frankfort. The other columns, marching by differ- ent routes, fell respectively into the roads leading from Mt. Washington, Faiifleld and Bloomfield to Bardstown. Arrived at Bardstown, it was found that Bragg had retired some eight hours before, and that he had moved in a di- rection which suggested that he would probably concentrate at Harrodsburg. After leaving Bardstown, Buell learned that the force of Kirby Smith had crossed to the west side of the Kentucky River, and that the enemy was moving to concentrate either at Harrodsburs: or Perryville. The centre, under Gilbert, was accordingly ordered to march on Perryville, where it arrived late on the afternoon of the 7th, finding the oct. Confederates apparently assem- 7. bled in strength. Buell and his staff moved with this corps. “ The advanced guard,” General Buell tells us in his report, “ under Captain Gay, consisting of cavalry and artillery, supported to- wards evening by two regiments of in- fantry, pressed successfully upon the enemy’s rearguard to within two miles of the town, aerainst a somewhat stub- born opposition.” The National arm / had suffered greatly, for the three pre- vious days, from the scarcity of water. In the bed of Doctor’s Creek, a tribu- tary of Chaplin River, about two and a JACKSOX KILLED. 175 half miles from Perry ville, some pools of water were found; and the thirty- sixth brigade, from General Sheridan’s division, under Colonel D. McCook, was ordered to seize and hold a com- manding position which covered these pools. The order was promptly exe- cuted; and a supply of bad water, al- though the best that could be had, was obtained for the wants of the army. Deteiinined to offer battle early on the following morninc:, Buell sent orders to General McCook and General Critten- den to march at tliree o’clock in the morning, so as to close up on his right and left, and, if possible, surround the foe. McCook did not receive his orders until half-past two o’clock, and he marched at five. Crittenden, failing to find water, had gone off his path some six or seven miles ; and he was late, in consequence, several hours. Bragg had already seen the peril of his posi- tion, and had commenced to retreat. Perceiving, however, that the centre under Gilbert and McCook had out- marched Crittenden, he resolved to give battle at once. It was, at least, worth making the effort. If he could defeat Gilbert and McCook before the arrival of Crittenden, he might be able either to make good his retreat in the interval, or failing that, he could fall upon him in turn. . Bragg’s army was arranged in five divisions — two under Hardee, and one each under Anderson, Cheatham, and Buckner — the whole being under the immediate command of Major-Gen- eral Polk. Smith had already retreated further to the west, carrying with him the ‘‘provisional government,” in the person of Governor Hawes. Early in the morning of the 8th, the fight, which had been interrupted ocl. by the darkness of the night pre- ceding, was resumed. Colonel McCook, as we have seen, had taken a position on a height which commanded Doctor’s Creek ; and this secured a supply of water, such as it was, for the National army. At the break of day an attempt was made to draw Colonel McCook from his position. For a time he had to bear the whole weio:ht of the Con- federate attack alone. When beins: somewhat pressed, the Second Missouri, a regiment which did memorable service at Pea Bidge, with the Fifteenth Mis- souri as a support, came to his aid, and the Confederates were compelled to re- tire into the woods. While retiring, they were heavily smitten on the flank by the Second Minnesota battery. Buell, who, as we have seen, was with the central corps, under the immediate charge of General Gilbert, dreaded an attack on that body, all the more so that neither McCook nor Crittenden had yet arrived. The engagement with Colonel McCook’s brigade at Doctor’s Creek had, to all appearance, sufficiently engaged the attention of the Confede- rate chief ; and between ten and eleven o’clock, when Colonel McCook had re- pelled the enemy and firmly established himself, the first corps, under Major- General McCook, came up on the Max- ville road. After the arrival of this corps, no formidable attack was appre- hended. McCook was ordered to get promptly into position on the left of 176 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESRORO\ tlie centre corps, and to make a recon- noissance to his front and left. The reconnoissance was still being continued by Captain Gay toward his front and right, and sharp firing with artillery was going on. The head of McCook’s column reached the point designated shortly after ten o’clock. It was about three and a half miles from Perryville, his line being abreast of Gilbert’s corps. Only two of McCook’s three divisions — those, namely, of Rousseau and Jackson — were present, that of Sill having been sent toward Frankfort. Rousseau ad- vanced with his cavalry, and secured his ground, and the batteries of Loomis and Simonson were placed in commanding positions. General Jackson’s two bri- gades were stationed on high ground to the right of the Maxville and Perryville road, and his instructions were to hold them there in column so that they might be • easily moved in whatever direction the occasion might require. McCook was under orders to report to General Buell in person. Having made these dispositions, he rode off to Buell’s head- quarters. He was not long absent ; but when he returned he found that the Confederates had put in position three batteries, and that an ineffectual artil- lery duel was going on between them and the batteries of Loomis and Simon- son. Seeing no infantry near, he gave instructions to the commanders of these last mentioned batteries to discontinue firing and to husband their ammunition. Water was extremely scarce, and his men were suffering terribly in conse- quence. Following oat instructions re- ceived from Buell, McCook proceeded to make a reconnoissance toward Chap- lin’s Creek. Here he found high com- manding ground, altogether a better po- sition, and not far from the river. Hav- ing sent for Generals Jackson and Terrill,’ he showed them the water, marked their line of battle, and ordered a battery to be posted on this line, with strong supports. Terrill at the same time received instructions to advance a body of skirmishers cautiously down the slope of the hill to the water, as soon as his line was formed. Not ap- prehending any immediate danger at this point. General McCook now moved toward the right of his line. At this very moment the Confederate force was moving stealthily upon him. Cheat- ham’s division had stolen up to Jack- son’s left, which was under the imme- diate command of General Terrill, and which consisted chiefly of raw troops. McCook had scarcely completed his general arrangements, when the enemy fell upon him like a thunderbolt. The Confederate general had made himself familiar with the position of his antago- nist. McCook’s right rested firmly on Gilbert’s left ; but his left was compara- tively weak and altogether unprotected. It was on the left, therefore, that the Confederates fell with the greatest fury. Their charge was terrific ; and their horrid yells filled the air. At the first volley Jackson was killed, a bullet or a fragment of a shell having hit him in the breast. Terrill, who showed great bravery, did everything that man could do to steady his troops ; but, de- moralized by the fall of Jackson, and CHAPLIN’S HILLS. 177 being vastly outnumbered, they broke and fled in the wildest confusion. Ter- rill himself fell mortally wounded. He died the same evening. McCook’s left was thus driven back, and the Confede- rates fell with equal fury on Eousseau’s division. Starkweather’s brigade, aided by the batteries of Bush and Stone, made a gallant resistance, and held the enemy at bay for nearly three hours. It was found impossible, however, to repel the flerce and determined attack. Bush’s battery had lost thirty -five horses ; the ammunition of both infant- ry and artillery was all but exhausted ; and Bousseau’s left was compelled to fall back. On the Confederates pressed, Eousseau’s centre and right, commanded respectively by Colonels L. A. Harris and W. H. Lytle, yielding in succession. In the struggle, Lytle was seriously wounded, and, believing his wound to be mortal, refused to allow himself to be carried from the field. Gilbert’s left flank was now exposed, and Bragg was leading the attack in person. The situation had become critical in the ex- treme. The position here was held by E. P. Mitchell and Philip H. Sheridan. Sheridan had now a chance to show the metal of which he was made. He held the key of the National position, and he knew it. If he must relinquish the position, it will not be without a strug- gle. He had been more or less engaged all the forenoon, and had just repelled an assault oh his front. Turning his guns upon the victorious Confederates, who had just thrown back Eousseau’s right, he opened upon them a most ter- rific fire, which checked their advance ; and while fighting valiantly and hold- ing the enemy back, he was joined by Carlin’s brigade, which Mitchell pushed forward to the support of his right. This force, charging at the double quick, broke the line of the Confederates and drove them back through Perry ville, capturing two caissons, fifteen wagons of ammunition, with the guard, which consisted of three officers and one hundred and thirty-eight men. Mean- while Colonel Gooding, who had been sent to the aid of McCook, had for over two hours been fighting with great per- sistence against a superior force. He lost one third of his men ; and his horse having been shot under him, he was made prisoner. It was about four o’clock in the afternoon before General Buell became aware that a severe battle had been raging for hours. The fact was made known to him by General McCook's aide-de-camp, who came to him with a request for reinforcements. These were promptly sent. Orders were also sent to General Crittenden to hurry forward, and with all expedi- tion possible, to send one division to strengthen the centre, and “ to move with the rest of his corps energetically against the enemy’s left flank.” Such, however, was the distance from one flank of the army to the other — six miles — that before the orders could be delivered, and action taken, night came on and terminated the battle. Such was the battle of Perryville, or, as it is sometimes called, Chaplin’s Hills. All the necessary arrangements were made for resuming the contest early on the following morning. It was Buell’s 178 PERRYVILLE AKD MURFREESBORO\ expectation that the Confederate gen- eral would endeavor to hold his posi- tion. Orders, in consequ3nce, were given to the commanders of corps to be prepared to attack at daylight. Gilbert and Crittenden were to move forward at six o’clock and attack the Confed- erates on their front and also on their left flank. In obedience to orders these commanders moved early in the morn- ing; but Bragg, with his entire army, had fled. They retired first to Har- rodsburg, where they were joined by Kirby Smith and General Withers; thence they hurried to Camp Dick Rob- son; and from Camp Dick Robinson they hastened back to Chattanooga through Cumberland ,Gap. The retreat was conducted by General Polk, covered ])y the cavalry of Wheeler. At Hai- rodsburg they left behind them about twelve hundred sick and wounded. Buell pursued as far as London, and then returned. During the pursuit the Confederates were compelled to aban- don at various points as much as twenty- five thousand barrels of pork. ' The Confederate loss in this engagement must have amounted to 2500. Buell’s loss was 916 killed, 2943 wounded, 489 missing, and 10 guns. Eight of the captured guns were left behind. The Confederates had been driven out of Kentucky ; but they had re- treated with scarcely any loss, and they had carried off immense booty. The main body of the National army, under General Thomas, '“was moved towards Nashville. Buell went to Louisville. He had shown but little generalship in this campaign. His movements had been singularly and inexplicably slow. If he had been afraid or unwilling to fight, he could hardly have acted other- wise. He blundered, first of all, when he allowed Bragg to reach Chattanooga before him. He blundered again when, having reached Louisville before his an- tagonist, and been reinforced, he did not strike the Confederates at once, and before Kirby Smith had time to retire with his booty. He blundered in his arrangements at Perryville, where he ought to have cut Bragg’s army to pieces. He blundered worst of all when, after Perryville, he allowed the enemy to escape. It is not wonderful that his conduct gave great dissatisfac- tion at Washington, and that he was supplanted by General Rosecranz, who had covered himself with so much glory at luka and Corinth. Rosecranz took command on the 30th of October ; oct. and the army of the Ohio became, from that date, the army of the Cum- berland. The Confederate government was as little satisfied w'ith Bragg, as the gov- ernment at Washington was with Buell. His expedition had been a failure. He had, in reality, accomplished nothing. He had collected some valuable booty, it is true ; but that was a small result from a campaign from which such great things were so confidently expected. He had gained no brilliant victory. He had failed to make any impression on the Northwest; and but few Kentuck- ians had voluntarily joined his army. On the contrary, his seizure of their property had done more to alienate the people of Kentucky from the Confede- CHRISTMAS REJOICINGS. 179 rate cause than anything which had hitherto happened. Bragg was not re- moved from his command, but he was ordered, almost as soon as he reached Chattanooga, to return and move again to the north. On assuming the command of the army of the Cumberland, known also as the fourteenth army corps, Bose- cranz found that the task he had under- taken, while it involved serious respon- sibilities, was beset with difficulties of no ordinary kind. The army was in a dilapidated condition. Its ranks had been thinned. The men had to be clothed and supplied with all the neces- saries for another campaign. This, however, was not all. The railroad between Louisville and Nashville was badly injured, and could not be used for transport ; and, as was the case on the occasion of Bragg’s former march northward, the country was overrun by Confederate raiders, who, well mounted, spread everywhere terror among the inhabitants, and otherwise worked infi- nite inconvenience. Kosecranz knew well the temper of the government and the people. Both were impatient to see his army in motion. Nothing could justify delay. Out of the war levy of six hundred thousand men called out by the government, he received rein- forcements ; and the work of reorganiz- Oct. ation went rapidly on. It was on the 30th of October he assumed the command; and on the 7th of No- Jlov, vember the advance corps of his army was at Nashville, one hun- dred and eighty-three miles distant. Nashville, which had been held by General Negley, and which for a time had been in great peril, had been re- lieved ; and here Kosecranz established his headquarters. The work on the railroad was carried on with great ener- gy ; and by the 26th of November the connection was complete and the cars were running. From this date on to the 2Gth of December, Kosecranz tells us, every effort was bent to com- plete the clothing of the army, to pro- vide it mth ammunition, and replenish the depot at Nashville with needful supplies, to insure us against want from the longest possible detention likely to occur by the breaking of the Louisville and Nashville Kailroad ; and to insure this work, the road was guarded by a heavy force posted at Gallatin.” All this looked like business. It revealed a man of energy and activity, and pre- sented Kosecranz in striking contrast with Buell. Bragg evidently expected that Kose- cranz would take up his winter quarters at Nashville; and so he prepared his own winter quarters at Murfreesboro’. Possibly he hoped, as Kosecranz sug- gests, to make them at Nashville before the winter was ended. It was about the season of Christmas ; and there was evidently a feeling of security in the ranks of the -Confederates. The Con- federate president, Jefferson Davis, was on a visit to Bragg at his private resi- dence in the fine mansion of Major Manning. The occasion was celebrat- ed with much festivky and rejoicing. There was a famous wedding. Mor- gan, the guerrilla chief, was married to the daughter of Mr. Charles Keady, 180 PEREYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO’. who had been a member of Congress in 1853. Davis was at the wedding. Most of the principal army officers were present. The ceremony was performed by General Polk, who put on the cas- sock for the occasion ; and the merry party found a means of increasing their pleasure by dancing upon a floor car- peted with American flags. During the time that Posecranz was completing his arrangements, there oc- curred certain minor engagements, such as that at Lavergne and that at Harts- ville, but on these we cannot afford to dwell. They were but preliminaries to the great struggle which was now im- pending. Bragg, over-confident, had sent a large cavalry force into West Tennessee to annoy Grant, and another lai'ge force into Kentucky to break up tbe railroad. Evidently he had not formed a proper judgment on the man who was eagerly watching his every movement. In the absence of these forces, and now that he had abundant supplies in Nashville, the National com- mander deemed the moment opportune to make a dash on his antagonist. Ear- Dec. ly in the morning of the 26th of 26* December, and amid a heavy, chilling rain, the National army began its southward march. The Confederate outposts yielded as it advanced. It was not possible for them, so vigorous was the pressure of the National ad- vance, to destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesboro’ turnpikes. Dec. C)n the 80th, Bragg, finding he was about to be attacked, had concentrated his army some two miles in front of Murfreesboro’. Stone River, which rises in the high lands south of Murfreesboro’, flows towards the north- west, and passes that town about a mile to the west. A few miles above Nashville, it empties itself into the Cumberland. Bragg’s army, some six- ty-two thousand strong, was arranged in the following order. Four divisions — those of Withers, Cheatham, Cle- burne, and McCown — were on the west side of the river, the line running slio^ht- ly in a southwesterly direction. One division — that of Breckinridge — was on the east side of the river, and there held the approaches to the town. The Na- tional army, forty-three thousand strong, was arranged in a line as nearly as pos- sible parallel to that of Bragg, the en- tire force being on the west side of the river. The line extended between three and four miles. Crittenden was on the left, with three divisions — those of Wood, YanCleve, and Palmer. Thomas was in the centre, with two divisions — those of Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve. McCook was on the right, with three divisions — those of Sheridan, Davis, and Johnson. The left wing touched the river; the right stretched a little beyond the Franklin road. Such was the disposition of the rival forces on the morning of the last day of the year 1862. It was the intention of Rosecranz to attack with his left ; and consequently he had concentrated two-thirds of his force on that wing. His plan was to throw his left and centre hurriedly on Breckinridge at daybreak, to drive him from his position, to wheel rapidly round and strike the Confederates in DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLE OF MURFREESBORO’ OR STONE RIVER. /!• l if v^. ■ ?'- :?SU- Vi iiillP’-- ■ 1 s,W‘ '■ ^ -'''i^^itwV. •• ^ ;S •;W , 'A;- '-■■)!' ■■ . . . lIMv'Mj ■ ' i.A<- -..x, ■fli” • f . *■ ■«?li ' A'- > ;4,Nv»'' 'V . ’ 4^ ^ ri^wiamkz'^- ^ ‘ •. ^ ' vu’j . i-.^4 -'-t ;»r''--'' vSBiiii' " ;■ ^ J. .;.'^ Sii^ . f vv-y *. .^m . . y '. • .i ' j 4 1 •■v: '. m^r r^y -'i,£: ' - • '•■■ '' . ;'?ffli8Wife^''V , "’ • 'i'*; 4ib - v :V'v : '■ y-r ’ ^1^ "‘‘"'^'' ■ /Iv l THE CONFEDERATE ATTACK. 181 front and flank, and pressing through Murfreesboro’ to cut off their line of retreat, and so destroy their army in detail. The plan was bold and daring, and well fitted to inspire sanguine hopes. On the east side of the river are com- manding heights. These taken posses- sion of and covered with artillery, the Nationals would be able to strike in re- verse the works fronting the centre of their line ; and it was expected that the artillery fire would so shake the Con- federates that the rest of the plan would be easy of execution. While Thomas and Palmer were to open with skirmish- ing, and so engage the attention of the Confederate centre and left towards the river, VanCleve and Wood, of Critten- den’s division, were to cross the river further to the north, fall upon Breckin- ridge, and carry out the plan as pro- posed. The necessity to cross the river was the one disadvantage which Rose- cranz had to contend with. Meanwhile McCook, whose divisions, as we have seen, were on the right, was to maintain his position and hold the hostile left in check. Singularly enough, Bragg had also resolved to take the offensive ; and he, too, meant to deal the first effective blow with Ins strong left arm. There was thus on both sides a similar inten- tion and a not dissimilar disposition of force. Both were strongest on the left wing; and, as a natural consequence, each was weakest at the point of attack. It was Bragg’s plan to rest on Polk’s right, as on a pivot, and, by a constant wheeling of his whole line towards the light, to force the National right and centre back upon Stone River, and so make himself master of the turnpike and the railroad to Nashville, their lines of communication in the rear. The plan was not less daring — not less striking — than that of Rosecranz. It was evident that two capable generals were confronting each other, that each had found in the other a foeman worthy of his steel, and that each was mak- ing the best of his position and of the means at his command. On the night of the 30th both armies lay on their arms. On the following morning, before sun- rise — a mild and pleasant morn- Dgj;, ing for the season of the year — 31, the National movement began. Van- Cleve’s division took the lead, as di- rected. Two of his brigades had made the passage in safety and without any interruption. Wood, with his division, was ready to follow. While thus cross- ing the stream with haste and high hopes, and while the movement was making satisfactory progress, suddenly there burst forth the roar of battle on the far-off right, and so violent was the shock that it was felt by the moving column on the extreme left. Emerging from a thick fog which had settled over the ground, his troops massed in over- whelming force, Bragg had fallen furi- ously upon Johnson’s divuslon, which was on the extreme National right ; and so unexpected was the attack that two of its batteries were captured before a gun could be fired. It was a decisive blow. It came down like the crash of a thunderbolt. Johnson’s division was instantly swept aw’ay. One of his bri- siie 182 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO’. gade commanders, Kirk, was severely wounded; another, Willick, had his horse killed under him, and was made prisoner; and a large number of his men were surrounded and made prison- ers. Davis, whose division stood next, was assailed in front and on his uncov- ei-ed flank. The shock was irresistible. S[)ite of his bravery, he, too, was com- l)elled to give way, with the loss of many guns. Sheridan’s division was next to that of Davis, and still to the 1‘ight. On this the victorious Confede- rates fell with accumulated power, and with an energy and purpose increased and intensified with success. And now came the opportunity for a man who had in him the true military instinct. All was lost, if Sheridan could not prolong the resistance. But Sheridan again, as he had done before at Perry- ville, proved himself equal to the emer- gency and rose to the grandeur of the occasion. Kosecranz had been slow to abandon his plan or stop his aggressive move- ment. It was not until he had received a second message from McCook that he comprehended the gravity of the situa- tion. To the first call for help by that general, he returned for answer that he was to dispose his troops to the best advantage and hold his ground obsti- nately. ^‘Tell him,” said Rosecranz, “to contest every inch of the ground. If he holds them, we will swing into Murfreesboro’ with our left and cut them off.” The second message, which informed him that the right wing was being driven, “ a fact which was becom- ing apparent by the rapid movement of the noise of battle toward the north,” opened the eyes of the commander-in- chief ; and while General Thomas was ordered to, despatch Rousseau into the cedar brakes to the right and rear of Sheridan, and General Crittenden was ordered to suspend the movement across the river by VanCleve and Wood, Rose- cranz began to feel and confess that his forward movement on the foe was al- ready paralyzed, and that a change of plan was necessary. If he would save . his right and defend his communica- tions, he must withdraw his left — he must, in fact, establish a new line. Whether he could do this, depended much on Sheridan. Sheridan’s position had become criti- cal in the extreme. So, in truth, had that of the whole National army; for, if Sheridan had given way easily, the Confederates would have pressed up- on both flank and rear, driven it to- ward the river and cut it off from its lines of communication. In consequence of the defeat and overthrow of Johnson and Davis, Sheridan’s division was com- pletely uncovered on his right flank, and absolutely unprotected in front. On his front, therefore, he was attacked by the Confederate division of Withers, and on his right the victorious bands of McCown and Cleburne, flushed with success, rushed with tremendous fury. The first onslaught was made by With- ers. The approach was made over an open cotton field. Sheridan had three batteries advantageously posted along his line ; and as the Confederates came forward in column closed in mass seve- ral regiments deep, they were received ‘‘HERE’S ALL THAT IS LEFT” 183 with a destructive fire. Sevei;ie as was this fire, it was powerless to check the forward march of the foe. On, steadily on, came the mighty mass, until within fifty yards of the edge of the timber in which lay Sheridan’s troops. Springing to their feet, the infantry poured such a shower of bullets in the faces of the Confederates that they were compelled to halt. Volley succeeded volley in ever- increasing power and destructiveness. It was a very tempest of iron. The Confederates wavered, broke, and fled. Sheridan’s men charged and drove them across the open field and behind their intrenchments. The tide of battle had now turned. It was not, however, with- out great loss that this partial victory was won. The young and chivalrous Sill, one of the most promising officers in the National army, was killed while leading the charge. By this time the divisions of McCown and Cleburne were on Sheridan’s right ; and outflank- ing him, exposed him to attack in the rear. Sheridan was entitled to retire, on the ground that his flank was unpro- tected. But he did better. Retiring his right and reserve brigades, and charging with the left into the woods, he caused the Confederates to recoil, and thus found time to swing around so as to bring his line perpendicular to its former direction. He now faced south i istead of east, and his line ran parallel to the Wilkinson turnpike. He was row in a better position to withstand his opponents. But he was opposed by mighty odds; and the divisions which had driven Johnson and Dc.vis from the field oveidapped his right by nearly their whole length. It was not possible for Sheridan to repel them ; but he could hold them in check. To reach the Nashville road, they must put Sher- idan out of the way ; but to do this implied hard fighting and time ; and time was salvation. Doubling in to- wards their right, the Confederates rushed upon him with all their might. But it was all to little purpose. His troops and his batteries gathered around him ; there he stood like a rock in mid- ocean against which the tempestuous billows surge and foam and spend their fury in vain. An hour had now been saved. The Confederates crowded around him in increasing numbers. A change of front was again necessary. Pivoting, so to speak, on the right flank of Negley’s division, he wheeled round his line so as to face the w^est, and planted his batteries on the salient of his front. In his new position he cov- ered Negley^s rear, and with that com- mander he was now forming a wedge- shaped mass. Here again he w^as sav- agely assailed. The full w^eight of the four divisions of Hardee and Polk was hurled against him and Negley. Thrice they came forward with impetuous fury, and thrice were they received with a fire so biting and so merciless that they staggered and fell back. Another hour had been gained — another precious Iiour for Rosecranz. But Sheridan had done his utmost. His ammunition was spent ; and there were no means of ob- taining a fresh supply, as, in the dis- comfiture of the right, the ammunition train had faPen into the hands of the enemy. Nor was this all. Sill, Roberts, 184 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO’. Shaeffer, his three brigade commanders, had been killed. Even he now must fall back. But he must do so in a man- ner worthy of the glorious resistance he has been able to make; and, if he has not powder, he has steel. Covered, therefore, with the bayonets of his re- serve, he retired unconquered out of the cedar thicket toward the IN’ashville road. It was eleven o’clock when he went out of the fight. He had lost 1630 men; but with their heroic lives he had won three hours for Rosecranz, and turned the fortunes of the day. “Here’s all that is left,” he said sadly as he joined his chief. After the retirement of Sheridan, the brunt of the battle fell upon Thomas. His command was chiefly in and near the cedar brakes. He had done his best, as we have seen, through Negley’s division, to sustain Sheridan. Negley was now exposed to the attacks of the Confederates both in flank and rear. Rousseau, at the head of Thomas’ other division, was sent to the front to the assistance of Negley. The Confede- rates, however, continued to press fur- ther to the National rear; and by and by, having reached a commanding posi- tion, they poured a concentrating cross- fire on those two divisions. It was im- possible longer to resist the fury and concentrated strength of the enemy. Thomas, therefore, withdrew his troops from the cedar woods and formed his line between them and the Nashville turnpike. It was a perilous operation, and was attended with great loss of life, one brigade alone — that of Lieuten- ant-Colonel Shepherd — losing twenty- two ofiioers and five hundred and two men in killed and wounded. In his new position Thomas held his ground firmly. It seemed, however, as if the battle was lost. The right wing of the National army was gone. The centre had been dreadfully cut up and driven from the field. All now depended on the left. While these events were taking place on his right and centre, Rosecranz was not idle. The stubborn resistance of- fered by Sheridan and the two divisions of Thomas had given him time to make good use of his left wing, and to re- form his line of battle. We have seen that the National right had not only been turned, but driven off the field. We have seen that a similar fate had befallen the National centre. In their victorious march, therefore, describing, so to speak, a circle drawn to the right, the Confederates were moving steadily on to what would have been the rear of the National left, if the dispositions of the early morning had remained un- changed. It was the possibility of such a calamity that lent such importance to the heroic endurance of Sheridan and Negley and Rousseau and the men un- der their commands. It was this possi- bility which gave such value to those pi'ecioiis three hours which, so to speak, Jiad been arrested in their course. When the victorious Confederates had borne down all opposition, and reached the National left, Rosecranz had all but completed his new formation. On a commanding knoll which overlooks the plain west of the Mui'freesboro’ road, he had massed his batteries, somewhat HAZEX’S BRIGADE. 185 after the fashion of Napoleon at Auster- litz. With this as a point cTappui^ he was forming his new line, which was to face no longer to the west, as in the original disposition of the troops, bat to the southwest, with the Nashville turnpike in its rear. His object, of course, was to bring his army into such a position that he should be able to pre- sent his front to the enemy. It requires but little knowledge of the military art to understand how’ difficult, how peril- ous even, it is for an army in such cir- cumstances to pass from one formation to another. While the change is being made, it is necessarily disjointed and helpless. At the last moment it seemed as if the experiment of forming a new line might fail. Palmer’s division held the right of the National left wing. After Sheridan had been compelled to retire, and when Thomas’s two divisions under Negley and Rousseau had been driven through the cedar woods, the Confederates fell upon Palmer like an avalanche. His two right brigades w^ere swept away at once. If his left brigade could not prolong the resistance, Rose- cranz would be struck before his new line was completed ; and the day would in all probability be lost. But this brave brigade, with the gallant Colonel W. B. Hazen at its head, was equal to the emergency. The role of Sheridan was repeated. Once and again and yet again the foe came down upon this bri- gade with all its force, every time doing tremendous damage, but every time re- pulsed with terrible loss. Some twelve hundred men thus kept thousands at bay until Rosecranz, having adjusted his new front, was ready for the Con- federate charge. It is no disparagement to any of the other division or brigade commanders, or to the men whom they led, to say that to Hazen and his brigade must .be freely accorded the honor of having saved the day. It was not, however, without a great sacrifice; for nearly one half of the brigade had per- ished. The struggle, however, was not yet ended. Bragg’s entire army, with the exception of a portion of the division of Breckinridge, which was on the other side of the river, having issued from the cedar thickets which they had won, was advancing over the plain in one magnifi- cent column. Victory seemed to be in their shout, and triumph in their firm and steady footsteps. It was a glorious sight, but it lasted only for a moment. Rosecranz was fully prepared. There was the loud roar of artillery and the sharp rattling sound of musketry all along the National line. It was a tem- pest of “double-shotted iron fire.’’ It was “a sirocco of lead.” Deep lanes were cut in the Confederate ranks. The slaughter was terrible. Again and again the attempt was made to face the desolating storm of bullets ; but in vain. Blinded by the sulphurous smoke which, like a cloud-wall, rose up be- tween them and Rosecranz’s line, and exposed to a fire which was increasing in rapidity and becoming more deadly in its aim, the troops of Bi'agg, so re- cently so triumphant, staggered, broke and fell back in confusion to the shelter of the woods. Compelled to abandon all further 186 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESBORO^ attempts on the new and powerful front of his adversary, Bragg determined to make another attack on the left. With this end in view, he brought up the di- vision of Breckinridge, which, as we have seen already, was during the fore- noon on the east side of Stone River, and consequently not as yet in the fight. This force was seven thousand strong. The salient point of the National left was still held by the brave Hazen. His command, which had been so terribly cut up, was well supported now both on the right and left. About four o’clock in the afternoon the Confede- rates came down upon this point with tremendous energy. The attack, howev- er, was gallantly received and repelled. Rosecranz, when the fight was keenest, appeared on the scene, and hastened to animate the men by his voice and pres- ence. Dashing across the field of fire, a shell grazed his person and carried off the head of his chief of staff, Colonel Garesche, who was riding at his side. But it was no time for idle giief. Rushing to the front, he had words of advice and good cheer for the soldiers. “ Men,” said he, do you wish to know how to be safe ? Shoot low. Give them a blizzard at their shins ! Do you wish to know how to be safest of all ? Give them a blizzard, and then charge with cold steel ! Forward, now, and show what you are made of ! ” The encour- aging words were, of course, obeyed with a will. The first attack being re- pelled, Breckiniadge brought his second line into action. The result was the same. It broke to the rear, at the first volley. This was the last encounter of the day. The sun had gone down; and the two rival hosts, sick of the bloodshed and weary of the toil, rested on their arms. It was the last day of the year 1862. The night was unusu- ally beautiful. The stars shone bright in an almost cloudless sky. The silvery moon shed her pale beams over the cedar brake, where were many sad relics of the day’s struggle — thousands of brave men, stretched in the cold em- brace of death, thousands more wound- ed and helpless, piercing the night air with their cries of agony. There were, no doubt, many thoughts of home — pleasant memories and bitter recollec- tions of days that were gone ; but among those wounded men and those thousaqds of wairiors who, on both sides, were fighting for what they be- lieved to be the right, there were few of those joys which usually belong to a New Y^ear’s morning. The battle of the 31st of December was, however, only a drawn battle. The National troops still held the orig- inal ground on their left ; and their new position was strong. From all the other points, however, they had been driven back. Neither general had been able to carry out his original plan. Nothing was decided. Everything must depend on a subsequent effort. On New Year’s day, the two armies stood looking at each other, and but little was done in the way of fighting. Both, jan* however, were busy making pre- b parations for a fresh test of strength. Some slight fighting took place in the afternoon ; but it led to no result. There is good reason for believing that BRAGG’S RETREAT. 187 Bragg thought the National army would retreat; but in this he was mistaken. Retreat was not as yet any part of Rose- Jan. cranz’s plan. On the morning of 2* the 2d, Friday, the Confederates opened four batteries on the National centre ; but these were soon silenced. A similar demonstration was made a little more to the National right, with a like result. About three o’clock in the afternoon a spirited attack was made by Breckinridge. The position was held by VanCleve’s division, which showed a want of steadiness, and yield- ed to the force of the enemy. Critten- den came to his rescue, and posted his batteries in an advantageous position on the west side of the river, while two brigades of Negley’s division were or- dered up. ‘‘ The firing was terrific, and the havoc fearful. The enemy re- treated more rapidly than he had ad- vanced. In forty minutes they had lost two thousand men.” There was a re- treat and a pui'suit. But it was now after dark, and rain was falling heavily. The pursuit, therefore, was discontin- ued. As it was, the Confederates had been foiled in all their efforts, and the Nationals had gained some points of Jan. advantage. On the morning of the 3d it was still raining heav- ily, and nothing was attempted on either side. During the course of the day there was some skirmishing and picket-firing all along the lines ; but there was no serious effort, and but little change made in the relative posi- jan. tions of the two armies. On the morning of the 4th, Sunday, it was found that Bragg had retreated with his entire army during the pre- vious night. He had left behind him about two thousand of his sick and wounded, with attendant surgeons, in his hospitals. Nothing was done on that day ; but on Monday morn- jao, ing Thomas entered Murfreesboro’ and drove the Confederate cavalry some seven miles towards Manchester. On the same day Rosecranz established his headquarters in the village. Such was the end of the famous battle in the cedar brakes at Stone River — a battle in which were put hors de combat nearly thirty thousand men. The Confede- rates had lost over 14,000 and the Na- tionals over 15,000 men. More than one-third of the National artillery and a large portion of its train had been captured. Undecisive as had been the terrible struggle — one of the greatest in the war — it had at least determined this — that the Confederates could not break through the line of investment between the Cumberland Mountains and the Free States. Two desperate attempts had been made ; but both had failed. The result of the battle of Murfrees- boro’ filled the National heart with joy. It was natural that it should be so. On the first day Rosecranz was all but defeated, when he turned the tide of victory, saved his army, and compelled his antagonist to leave the field. If he had not completely accomplished his purpose — if the possession of Middle Tennessee would still have to be con- tested — the presumption now was that in the next struggle that important question would be settled in favor .f 188 PERRYVILLE AND MURFREESRORO’. the North. This, however, was not all. The victory, partial as it was, was sin- gularly opportune. The summer cam- paign had been, all over, the reverse of favorable to the National arms. The Confederates, both in the east and west, had been daringly aggressive ; and the successes which had attended and re- warded their efforts pained and dis- couraged the people of the North. Grant, after luka and Corinth, had sus- tained a series of checks in his onward movement towards Vicksburg ; and the disastrous battle of Fredericksburg, which was fought on the 13th of De- cember, had produced a shock from which neither the government nor the people had wholly recovered. Light seemed to break in upon the darkness when the tidings of Murfreesboro’ were flashed across the land. There was a general who knew how to handle his troopa. There were men who knew how to follow and obey. By their joir"; efforts they had snatched victory out of defeat. It was the grateful and delighted sentiments of an entire people which President Lincoln telegraphed to Rosecranz, “God bless you and all of you ; please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation’s gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage.” The words of the general-in-chief were equally expressive of the feeling of the Northern people. “ The victoiy,” he said in greeting Rose- cranz, “ was well earned, and one of the most brilliant of the war. You and your brave men have won the gratitud3 of the army and the admiration of the world.” During the time that the Confede- rates under Bragg were engaging the whole attention and all the available forces of Rosecranz, the superior cavalry of the South were scouring Tennessee and Kentucky, plundering the inhabit- ants and destroying the railroads. Of these marauding bands, the principal were under the lead of Forrest and Mor- gan. By and by they were compelled to desist ; and attention began to centre again on Chattanooga, near which, it was evident, another trial of arms must take place. Of this, however, we shall have occasion to treat in a subsequent chapter. Our attention, meanwhile, must be directed to certain important events which had already happened on the Atlantic border. WASHINGTON AND RICHMOND. 189 r CHAPTER XIII. The Armies of the — What They Have Done. — The Eastern Campaign. —The Object of the Eastern Cam- paign. — Too Much Importance Attached to Kichmond. — General Scott. — The Army of the Potomac, — McClellan Commander-in-Chief. — His Delay. — The Nation Impatient, — President Lincoln Urgent. — A Council of Gen- erals. — McClellan’s Secresy. — Had He a Plan? — War Order No. 1. — Edwin M. Stanton. — McClellan’s Plan. — New Army Arrangements. — Three Great Departments. — The West Under Halleck. — The Mountain Department Under Fremont. — The East Under McClellan. — Manassas Evacuated. — McClellan’s Promenade. —Quaker Guns, — The Office of Commander-in-Chief Abolished. — The Movement to the Peninsula Begun. — The Capital not Sufficiently Defended. — McDowell’s Command Detached and Detained. — McClellan Complains. — Lincoln Re- monstrates. — Before Yorktown. — Magruder. — The Nationals Brought to a Halt. — The Folly of Manassas Repeated. — McClellan Asks for More Troops. — Franklin’s Division Sent to His Aid. — The Firing Com- menced. — Charge of the Vermont Brigade. — Compelled to Fall Back. — Another Charge. — The First Assault on the Confederate Position Fails. — The Twenty-Sixth. — Another Assault, — A Redoubt Carried and De- stroyed. — Another Pause, — The Third of May. — All Things are Ready. — Further Delay. — Confederate Retreat. — Magruder’s Statement, — McClellan’s Great Mistake. — The Government Disappointed. — National Indigna- tion. — McClellan’s Excuses. — Lincoln’s Letter. — The Story of Manassas Repeated. For reasons already given, we have lingered a whole year with the armies of the West. We have followed Grant and his victorious le- gions from Cairo to Corinth, and seen them driving the Confederates before them, until Kentucky and Tennessee were secured to the Union, and un- til Vicksburg and Port Hudson alone barred the free navigation of the Missis- sippi. We have seen a National flotilla under Foote and Davis driving the en- emy from stronghold after stronghold on the great river until the National flag was again floating over the city of Mem- phis. We have followed Farragut and his fleet from the gulf to New Orleans, and seen that most important of south- ern cities wrenched from the grasp of the rebellious Confederacy. We have followed Buell from Coiinth to Chatta- nooga, and from Chattanooga to Louis- ville. We have returned with him on his backward march, and seen him suc- cessfully resist and even force the re- treat of the Confederates at Perryville. We have followed the same army under its new leader, Rosecranz, and witnessed the bloody and well-contested, though indecisive, battle of Murfreesboro’ — a battle in which, although neither side could justly claim the victory, the Na- tionals not only held their ground, but again compelled their antagonists to re- tire before them. During that time, important opera- tions had been going on in the East. It becomes a necessity, therefore, for us now to leave the valley of the Missis- sippi and return to the Atlantic border. The object of the western campaign, which was the opening of the Missis- sippi River, was in a fair way of being accomplished. The object of the east- ern or peninsular campaign was the capture of Richmond. It will be our business, in the chapters which imme- diately follow, to ascertain how this 190 YORKTOWN. campaign had been conducted, and with what success. There are certain vexed questions re- garding the management of the East- ern forces — questions the discussion of which has led to a large amount of ill- feeling without producing any satisfac- tory result. Into these questions we will not enter further than is necessary for the elucidation of our subject. It is quite possible that General McClellan attached too much importance to the capture of Kichmond. There can be no doubt, we think, that the strength of the Confederacy lay rather in the strength of its armies than in the pos- session of any particular locality, city, or stronghold. The capture of Wash- ington by the Confederates in the early stages of the Avar might have pi*oved fatal to the Union cause. But it would be absurd to say that Kichmond was to the South all that Washington AA’as U) the North and to the National cause generally. The capture of Washington, the seat of the National government, and where 'were treasured all the Na- tional archives, would certainly ha\^e been followed by the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign governments. It might have had another result equally bad, perhaps worse. The holders of the capital might have been regarded as the rightful rulers of the republic; and the hesitating democratic sentiment of the North might haA^e enabled them to impose their own terms on the nation, and so not only resist, but throAv back the revolution for an indefinite period. Even in a sectional point of view no such importance could attach to Kich- mond. It Avas the most influential town in the Confederacy ; that was all. The Confederate government could have been cariied on in any other town ; and the strength of the Confederacy Avould still have consisted in the streno^th of the army. The correctness of this prin- ciple was abundantly proved in the later stages of the war. .Charleston fell by the march of Sherman; Kichmond yielded to the persistent operations of Grant ; but neither the one general nor the other cared to enter the city which he had conquered. In the estimation of each the extermination of the army was more important than the occupation of the city. It had, however, been decided, or rather it was taken for granted, that the capture of Kichmond Avas a matter of primary importance. The question, therefore, was how it could be most easily and effectively accomplished. One thing, it was obvious from the out- set, must not be overlooked in any plan which might be adopted. Washington must not, in any case, be left unpro- tected. This condition complied with and a plan agreed upon, it was abso- lutely necessary that action be taken at once. General McClellan, as we have seen, was appointed to the command of the army of the Potomac in July, 1861. On tlie 1st of November, on the j^ov. resignation of General Scott, he was promoted to the chief command of the armies of the United States. No general, for the time being, so com- pletely commanded the confidence of the government and the people. He was by far the most popular and most McCLELLAN’3 INACTIO:!. 191 trusted man in the army. Although commander-in-chief, he still remained at the head of the army of the Potomac. At the date of his elevation, that army had an elTective strength of one hun- dred and thirty-four thousand two hun- dred and eighty-five men, with some three hundred guns. On the 1st of February the aggregate strength of the army had risen to two hundred and twenty-two thousand one hundred and ninety-six, there being present for duty over one hundred and ninety thou- sand men. The Confederate force in front of him at Manassas, where they had remained since the battle of Bull Bun, did not exceed fifty-five thousand. In regard to drill and equipment, no finer army than that under McClellan was ever held in readiness for battle. Abso- lutely trusted by the government, and permitted to mature his plans in secret, it was confidently expected that with such an army he would make such a dash upon his antagonist as would force the war to a hurried conclusion. For reasons best known to himself, McClellan was in no haste to put his army in motion. There was no end of parades — no end of magnificent manoeu- vre in g — which for a time delighted and astonished the people of Washington. Autumn was allowed to pass by, and the wdnter of 1861 ; and yet nothing was done. An excuse for delay was always at hand. It was too hot, or it was too cold. The foliage on the trees was as yet too thick, or the roads were too heavy for rapid and successful mili- tary operations. The people began to manifest impatience. News of the suc- cess of the army of the West began to arrive ; and the conduct of Halleck and Grant was contrasted with the persist- ent inaction of McClellan. The daily exhibitions of the army of the Potomac no longer pleased — they disgusted the populace. On to Bichmond,” became the popular and imperious cry. Through the press, from the platform and from the pulpit, the words rang out over the length and breadth of the North, finding a response in every loyal heart. There were many who did not hesitate to -af- firm that McClellan was at heart in sym- pathy with the rebellion. The govern- ment caught the contagion, and all the more readily that the president had for some time been dissatisfied with McClellan. He saw that the heart of the nation was sinking. Expenses had been frightful, and there had been no result. The treasury was all but ex- hausted ; and there was the danger of the loss of public credit. He could obtain no satisfactory explanation from the commander-in-chief. There were signs of disaffection in the ranks ; and the subordinate ofiScers were impatient and sick of their life of inaction. They were there to protect their country and to repel the foe; but they had been compelled to spend precious months in daily repetition of a meaningless show. In these circumstances the president summoned Generals McDowell and Franklin to a conference with himself and his cabinet. To them he frankly revealed his distress. ^‘If something is not soon done,” he said, ‘‘ the bottom will be out of the whole affair ; and if General McClellan does not want to use 192 YORKTOWj^. the army, I would like to horroiv it, pro- vided I can see how it could be made to do something.” He had been to the house of the commander-in-chief ; but he had not been admitted to his pre- sence. It was necessary that he should talk to somebody ; and therefore he had sent for them, to learn, if possi- ble, whether there was any probability of an early movement of the array. McDowell was in favor of immediate action. He would aJvance with a heavy force on the front and flanks of the Con- federates at Manassas. He believed that their numbers were greatly exag- gerated, and that it would not be diffi- cult to make an end of the disgraceful blockade, and drive the besieging army back upon Kichmond. Franklin, who was somewhat in the confidence of Mc- Clellan, and knew at least part of his plan, was in favor of something being done at once ; but he approved of a movement upon Kichmond by way of the lower Chesapeake and the Virginia peninsula. There were further confer- ences, McDowell and Franklin mean- while consulting with other prominent army officials. The result was that these two generals agreed as to the necessity of moving directly on Manassas; and they recommended such a movement. At this stage, however, the cabinet was somewhat divided; and it was agreed to hold another conference, and to ask General McClellan to be present and give his own views on the question. The meeting was held accordingly ; General McClellan appeared, but took no part in the discussion. He showed signs of being offended. To McDow^ell, who apologized for the position in which himself and Franklin were placed, he said haughtily that they could have any opinion they pleased. When asked by the president ^Svhat and when anything could be done,” his answer was ‘‘ that the case was so plain that a blind man could see it.” To the question of the secretary of the treasury as to where and how he proposed to use the ai-my, he gave for answer only that ‘The movements in Kentucky were to precede any from Washington.” At the same time he expressed his willing- ness to develop his plans, if he was ordered to do so, although he said it was his conviction that always, in mili- tary matters, the fewer who knew the plans to be carried out the better. A few days afterwards his plan, which was to abandon his present base and proceed towards Kichmond by way of the lower Chesapeake, was laid be- fore the president. The president liked it not. It implied further delay. It would, besides, be a tedious operation ; and, so far as he could see, it promised little. Determined to be done with this do-nothing policy, the president, on the 2Tth of January, issued his famous War Order No. 1, in which he directed the 2 2d of February fol- jan, lowing “to be the day for a gen- 27# eral movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.” Four days after- wards a special order was issued to McClellan, directing .him to form all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after providing for the safety of Washington, into an expedition for MANASSAS EVACUATED. 193 the immediate object of seizing and oc- cupying a point on the railroad south- east of Manassas Junction, the details of the movement to be left to the dis- cretion of the commander-in-chief. This dispatch on the part of the president has generally been attributed to the energy and firmness of Edwin M. Stanton, who had, a few weeks before, succeeded Cameron as secretary of war. Against this order McClellan remonstrated. This led to a correspondence between him and the president, each advocating his own plan in preference to that of the other. The result was that the whole question was submitted to a council of twelve officers, McClellan’s plan being approved of by eight out of the twelve. The president, of course, acquiesced ; and on the same day orders Were issued from the War Department for the procuring of transports for the troops and the other necessaries of war. Mar. On the 8th of March the presi- 8* dent issued a general order, direct- ing the army of the Potomac to be divid- ed into four corps, to be commanded re- spectively by Generals McDowell, Sum- ner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. A fifth corps, formed from his own and General Shields’ division, was under the com- mand of General Banks. The command of the National troops in the valley of the Mississippi and westward of the longitude of Knoxville in Tennessee, was assigned to General Halleck; and a Mountain Department, covering the region between McClellan and Halleck, was created and placed under the com- mand of General Fremont. The com- manders of departments were instructed to report directly to the secretary of war, and not, as formerly, through the commander-in-chief. This order gave great offense to McClellan. Later on the same day, another order directed that no change should be made in the base of operations without leaving a competent force for the protection of Washington; that not more than fifty thousand troops should be moved to- ward the scene of intended operations until the navigation of the Potomac should be freed from the enemy’s bat- teries and other obstructions” ; that the new movement on Chesapeake Bay should begin as early as the 18th of March, and that the general-in-chief should ‘‘be responsible that it moves so early as that day”; and that “the army and navy co-operate in an im- mediate effort to capture the enemy’s batteries upon the Potomac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.” On learning that McClellan was about to move, Johnston (March 9th) j^jar, evacuated Manassas, and hastened towards Bichmond, carrying everything with him. It was a timely and masterly retreat, and evinced that ability for which Johnston has obtained credit alike from friend and foe, and which stamjDed him as one of the greatest commanders developed on either side during the progress of the war. j^iar. On the ensuing morning McClel- Ian made a “promenade,” as it has been called, to the deserted position, when his soldiers were mortified to witness the miserable earthworks and Quaker guns — logs of wood shaped like cannon — by which an army little more 194 YORKTOWlSr. than one-fourth their own, had kept them so long at bay. Undoubtedly this discovery irritated the president greatly, Mid*went far to shake his faith in the ability or honesty of the general-in- chief. It is not wonderful, therefore, the day on which McClel- Ian returned from the “prome- nade,” he should have been relieved, by a special order from the president, of all » the military departments except that of the Potomac. The reason as- signed for this change was that the campaign on which the army of the Po- tomac was about to enter would require all the resources and all the attention of its commander. It is impossible, how- ever, not to perceive in each of these successive orders a manifestation of dis- trust — an increasing want of confidence in the commander-in-chief. The movement which had been agreed upon was carried out with all prompti- tude. There was no unnecessary de- lay. There were chartered one hundred and thirteen steamers, one hundred and eighty-eight schooners, eighty-eight barges; and by means of these there were transported, in thirty-seven days, to Fortress Monroe, one hundred and twenty-one thousand troops, fourteen thousand five hundred and ninety-two cattle, eleven hundred and fifty M^ag- ons, forty-four batteries, seventy-four ambulances, as well as a vast quantity of equipage. McClellan left Washing- April fc>n on the 1st of April. On the b same day he sent to the adjutant- general a detailed statement of the number and disposition of the forces which he had left behind. The number of men left for the avowed purpose of protecting the capital was about sev- enty-three thousand. These, however, were so disposed that not more than twenty thousand, and they but imper- fectly organized, were all that were left for the defense of Washington and Man- assas Junction. The president was indig- nant ; and General McDowell’s corps was detached from McClellan’s com- mand and detained at the capital. Mc- Clellan complained and delayed action. In a letter WTitten by him at the time to McClellan, Lincoln explained and fully justified the course which he had been forced to adopt. In the same letter, Lincoln forcibly reminded him that in- action was no longer to be tolerated. “It is indispensable to yo^^,” he wrote, “that you strike a blow. I am power- less to help this.” ^ “ The country will not fail to note,” he added, “is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched camp is but the story of Manassas repeated.” He wrote him, he assured him, in the ut- most kindness ; but his last words were “ You must act.” McClellan did not pay much atten- tion to the injunction. He seemed to feel that he was distrusted; and his hesitation to strike a blow that might be ineffectual, almost implied distrust in himself. When McClellan’s army fairly landed on the peninsula, there ought to have been no hesitation. A bold and vigorous blow promptly dealt could scarcely have failed to drive the enemy before him ; it would cer- tainly have redeemed his reputation for bravery. The Confederates under Gen- Ai'% '1, gir";,::' „ LEE’S MILLS. 195 eral Magruder did not exceed in number eleven thousand men. At the time of his landing, this was the only force opposed to him on the peninsula ; and he was aware of the possibility of Ma- gi’uder being reinforced by Johnston. This force was so divided by the neces- sity of placing fixed garrisons at York- town, on Gloucester Point, and on Mul- berry Island, on the James River, that the line in front of McClellan’s great army, and stretching thirteen miles from Yorktown across the peninsula, did not consist of more than five or six thousand men. On this point authori- ties differ, but the largest estimate does not give Magruder for this line more than eight thousand. Magruder’s own claim was that, exclusive of the garri- sons above named, he had only five thousand men. The National army April began to move forward from Fort- ress Monroe on the 3d of April. McClellan’s avowed object was to drive or capture Magruder’s army before it could be reinforced by Johnston. The Nationals moved steadily but slowly in two columns, the one column by the old Yorktown road, the other along the Warwick road. These columns were commanded respectively by Generals Heintzelman and Keyes, Heintzelman being on the right and Keyes on the April left. On the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of each column was compelled to halt by Magruder’s fortified lines — ^the right near Yorktown on the York River, and the left near Winn’s Mill on the Warwick River. What did McClellan now do ? Did he remember and seek to repair the blun- der he made at Manassas? Did he remember the kindly but withal sting- ing words of the president, “It is indis- pensable to you that you strike a blow.” “You must act”? Not at all. The same demon of delay had taken hold of him. The folly of Manassas was repeated, if possible, in more aggravated form. In place of acting at once, he commenced the tedious operations of a regular siege, casting up intrenchments and otherwise acting like a field officer of the middle ages, rather than a skilled and practical general of modern times. Meantime he wrote complaining letters to Washing- ton, declaring it to be his conviction that he would have to fight all the available troops of the Confederates not far from his present position. “ Do not force me to do so,” he said, “ with diminished numbers ; but, whatever your decision may be, I will leave noth- ing undone to obtain success.” At McClellan’s urgent request, Franklin’s division of McDowell’s corps was sent to his aid. Towards the end of April the National forces in front of York- town amounted to close upon one hun- dred and forty thousand men; and of these, one hundred and twelve thousand were ready for duty. In addition to these, McClellan could count on the co-operation and aid of Wool’s force, which was at Fortress Monroe. It was surely of all things the most natural that the government and people should expect that some prompt and effective work would be done with an army so large and so splendidly equip- ped. McClellan left Fortress Monroe, as we have seen, on the 3d of April. In- 196 YORKTOWN. stead of liastening forward and making a dash on the Confederate position, he occupied his time in throwing up earth- works and advantageously placing his April guns. It was the 16 th before any serious encounter took place. Ther^e had been cannonading on both sides, and some skirmishing ; but as yet no regular encounter. On the day just mentioned, McClellan discovered that the Confederates were strens^thenin^ their works at Lee’s Mills, on a stream- let of the Warwick Liver. On these he ordered fire to be opened. Captain Mott, with the New York battery, took a position on the left of the enemy’s works ; Captain Bartlett, with the Rhode Island Battery B, placed him- self on the right; the Third Vermont regiment, acting as skirmishers, were thrown out in front, while a force of some strength was posted in the rear as a reserve. About eight o’clock in the morning the first section of Mott’s battery, consisting of two ten-pounder Parrott guns, moved forward to within a thousand yards of the Confederate work, and took post under cover of a wood on the Warwick road. Fire was immedi- ately opened. The Confederates made a brisk response ; and such was the ac- curacy of their aim that three of Mott’s men were killed and four wounded. Mott brought up the remainder of his guns; and the cannonading which en- sued was kept up on both sides for two hours, when the Confederates were driven back. At this stage General Smith, who had charge of the Vermont brigade, attempted to throw a force across the stream, with a view to take the defenses by assault. It was now about three in the afternoon. Colonel Hyde took charge of the storming par- ty, which consisted of four companies, D, E, F, and K, of the Third Vermont regiment. These companies were fresh, not having taken any part in the en- gagement of the morning ; and to cover them as they advanced, four batteries of light artillery, commanded respect- ively by Ayres, Mott, Kennedy, and Wheeler were placed on advantageous ground. As the batteries opened a con- certed fire on the fort, throwing shot, shell and spherical case into it, in rapid succession, the four companies dashed forward, plunged into the water, which in some places reached to their arm-pits, and made for the work. While the men were still in the water, a terrific fire was opened upon them by a body of Confederates who had hitherto lain low and concealed themselves. On pushed the brave little band; and in spite of their soaked condition, and, what was still worse, their wet cart- ridge-boxes, they reached the fort and drove their antagonists out of the rifle- pit. Here they held their position for nearly half an hour. Strange to say, while thousands of men were close at hand, reinforcements failed to reach them in time. Observing the advance of two or three fresh Confederate regi- ments, the brave little battalion had no choice but fall back and recross the river. In crossing and recrossirg, they sustained very considerable loss. As soon as the remnant of these com- panies had returned wilhin their own lines, the National batteries, which for THE BOMBARDMENT. 197 a time had been silent, again opened fire. Orders were given to the Sixth Vermont regiment to resume the at- tack, and storm the work by the left fiank. Colonel Lord, at the head of his brave soldiers, dashed into the stream. Seven companies followed. The ad- vance had reached within three rods of the breastwork, when, being in three feet of water, they were fired upon by a long line of rifies which were popped above the parapets. A running fire from at least one thousand small arms kept pouring upon the Nationals as they pressed on to the fort. While the breastwork was lit up by a continuous sheet of flame, the National batteries kept up a steady fire, the shot and shell falling thick and fast inside the work. The Nationals were fighting at a great disadvantage ; but they kept tlieir ground and used their rifles with great effect, taking off their men as they raised their heads from time to time above the parapet. For a time the battle raged with great fury ; and the scene was grand and imposing in the extreme. The Confederates continued to increase in strength at the point of attack ; and as it was impossible, in the circumstances, to make any effective use of the bayonet, Lord ordered a . retreat, carrying his wounded with him. In this struggle the National loss was 35 killed, 120 wounded, and 9 miss- ing. Captain Mott, on whose battery the Confederates had concentrated theii* fire, had three men killed and seven wounded. Of his horses, seven were disabled. The Confederate loss was also considerable. Colonel McKinney, 218 of the Fifteenth North Carolina Hegi- ment, which bore the chief part in the fray, having been killed. After this ineffectual assault on the Confederate battery, ten days were al- lowed to elapse before any event of consequence occurred. General McClel- lan meanwhile busied himself in the perfecting of his siege arrangements. The Merrimac, of which we shall have something to say in our next chapter, gave him some uneasiness, and compelled him to be fearful for his gunboats. On the 26th of jvpri! April, the monotony of the siege was varied by a spirited attack which was made on a Confederate redoubt. This work stood in front of a wood near the Yorktown road, and was somewhat in advance of the main defenses. Sur- rounded by a ditch six feet deep, with a strong parapet, it was manned by two companies of infantry, but with no ar- tillery. It was resolved to take this redoubt, and ascertain the nature of the works behind. Five Massachusetts com- panies were detailed for the purpose. Three of these companies were from the First regiment, and were under Lieutenant-Colonel Wells. Two were from the Eleventh regiment, and were under Major Tripp. The attack was well planned. One company vv^as sent out to skirmish on the left, in the corn- field, with instructions to prevent a. flank movement of the enemy; another company was held in reserve toward the right, near a ravine; while a third com- pany, under Captain Carroll, made the assault. The assaulting party rushed across the cornfield at double-quick,, 198 YORKTOWK'. making straight for the Confederate re- doubt. A warm reception awaited them. As soon as they came in view, the Confederate infantry opened fire, and used their rifles to some purpose. Nothing daunted, the Massachusetts men pushed forward. Not one of them fired a shot until they were within a few yards of the ditch. Then halting, they let fly a full volley into the faces ( f their antagonists. On again they rushed, clearing the ditch and mounting the parapet. The Confederates fled be- fore them, and the redoubt was cap- tured. A working party came up with spades and shovels, and the woik was soon demolished. Thirteen Confede- rates were made prisoners. On the side of the Nationals there were three men killed and thirteen wounded. There was another pause. Nothing further was done in the way of direct ApriJ hostilities until the 30th. That day, General McClellan having ad- vanced his parallels, got one of his large batteries in position and opened fire on the Confederate works, at the distance of two miles. The first shot was fired f]‘om batteiy No. 1, at the mouth of Wormsley’s Creek. It was aimed at the Confederate shipping, and it suc- ceeded in scattering the vessels. The guns were now directed against the works at Yorktown and Gloucester. The Confederates replied with their large pivot gun, a rifled sixty-eight pounder, which was mounted on the heights of Yorktown. For some hours, the firing on both sides was maintained with great spirit. No result, however, was visible. During the night the Con- federates continued to fling shot and shell on McClellan’s advanced parallels, where the men were at work. Next morning they tried their columbiad, which was well posted on the heights, firing it with great rapidity ; but after the tweftty-third discharge, “ it went into a thousand pieces, tearing up the parapet, and making havoc with the crowd who were collected around it at the time.” This was the only gun which seemed capable of competing with McClellan’s heavy siege batteries. The National batteries maintained a continuous fire. Saturday arrived, the 3d day of May. Before the close of that day everything was in readiness for opening the bombard- ment — the huge siege batteries being all in position. Still McClellan is in no haste. To-morrow (Sunday) is to be given to sacred rest ; and on Mon- day the guns are to be opened all along the line. The general is confident of success, and believes in a triumphant victory. On that same Saturday night, the Confederates evacuated Yorktowm and Gloucester, carrying with them their sick, their hospital stores, their ammunition, and their camp equipage, and moved toward Williamsburg. So quietly and so skilfully was the retreat accomplished, that it was not until next morning the fact was known to the Nationals. McClellan on the j^jay morning of the 4th telegraphed to the Secretary of War that he was in possession of the abandoned fortress, and added, with an air of mightiness which ill became him in the circumstances, ‘‘No time shall be lost. I shall push LAME EXCUSES. 199 the enemy to the wall.” Such was the end of the siege of Yorktown — an end almost as disgraceful, all things con- sidered, as would have been a defeat. When the National troops entered the abandoned fortifications, they found fifty-two guns spiked, and some stores ; but such surely was a poor trophy for so great an army, and especially after such magnificent and costly prepa- rations for a successful siege. It was McClellan over again — all show and no work. The National army left Fortress Monroe, as we have seen, on the 3d of April. On the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of both columns halted in front of Magruder's fortifications. For nearly one month, therefore, McClellan with more than one hundred thousand men, and well supplied with all the ne- cessaries of war, lay before Yorktown. Doing what? Preparing for a great siege — when there was to be no siege. Constructing extensive and costly lines of defense — which were never needed. General Magruder’s account of McClel- lan’s conduct reads like a caricature; but we know nothing of those four weeks before Yorktown, which does not justify us in saying that Magruder’s account is the simple truth. To my utter surprise,” says that general, ^Gie (McClellan) permitted day after day to eiapse vvdthout an assault. In a few (lays the object of his delay became ap- parent. In every direction in front of our lines, through the intervening woods and in the open fields, earth- works began to appear.” Had McClel- lan moved on Yorktown and Gloucester at once, in place of halting for a whole four weeks, these places most undoubt- edly would have yielded to the first attack, and the waste of time, of labor, of money, of human life even, in that inhospitable region, would have been avoided. “With five thousand men,” adds Magruder, “ inclusive of the garri- sons, we had stopped and held in check over one hundred thousand of the ene- my.” Difference of opinion has existed as to the actual strength of the Confed- erates in and around Yorktown. The presumption is that when McClellan arrived and felt Magruder’s outer lines in front of Yorktown, the Confederate force did not exceed five thousand men, exclusive of the garrisons. It is now known that both Lee and Johnston wei'e opposed to holding the peninsula, their reasons being that in the event of the York and Janies rivers falling into the possession of the Nationals, as seemed probable, the Confederate army, on both flanks, would be exposed to the National gunboats. They had no doubt that McClellan would capture York- town. Johnston visited and inspected the works at Yorktown soon after McClellan’s arrival; and what he saw confirmed him in this opinion. His de- sire was to concentrate all his forces near Fichmond and offer there a deci- sive battle. These counsels, however, were overruled ; and it was decided to hold the peninsula, if possible, until the fortifications at Norfolk should be dismantled and the naval establishment at that place destroyed. In these cir- cumstances, and when it was known that McClellan, instead of pressing for- ward, was intrenching himself, rein- 200 YOPtKTOW^^. forcements were sent down fi*om Kich- mond; and, later, Johnston went to Yorktown and took command in per- son. Hence we find Magruder, in the same report from which we have already quoted, saying : “ Reinforcements be- gan to pour in, and each hour the army of the Peninsula grew stronger and stronger, until anxiety passed from my mind as to the result of an attack upon us.” The conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable — that McClellan lost his golden opportunity when he failed to make an attack on Magruder immedi- ately on his arrival at Yorktown, and that in place of the barren victory which he reaped after a month’s waiting, toil and terrible sacrifice, he might have won a fruitful victory by striking a })low at once with energy and determi- nation. A feeling began again to prevail all over the North, as soon as the details of the siege were made public, that nothing was to be expected from McClellan. Of course his friends still clung to him tenaciously ; but the earnest people of the North, who were bent on putting down the rebellion and preserving the Union intact, began to feel that, if the great task was to be accomplished, it must be by other hands than those of the brilliant but hesitating chief of the army of the Potomac. McClellan was not ignorant that the siege of Yorktown ^vas a blunder, and that it was generally so regarded. He had, of course, some- thing to say in his own defence. It was impossible, he said, to ascertain the exact strength of the enemy; and (here were many indications that they were behind the works in great force. It was his business to find out the facts, just as it was his misfortune to be out- generalled. Some of his excuses were very lame. Franklin’s division had been promptly sent him when asked for. Yet in his report he said that the non-arrival of that division was the cause of his failure to attack Yorktown, and that the same cause ‘‘made rapid and brilliant operations impossible.” The simple truth is that when Frank- lin’s division arrived, McClellan de- clared that he was not ready ; and, waiting for orders, these troops were detained on the river, in transports, for a whole fortnight. It was his intention, he said in his report, to turn Yorktown by an attack on Gloucester; and this attack was not made because Franklin’s division was not forward. What Mc- Clellan’s intention really was, it is diffi- cult to know. It does seem as if he was undecided, feeling afraid to attack in front and not daring to attack in flank. It certainly redounds to the credit of the Confederates that they were better posted regarding his movements than he was regarding theirs. The siege of Yorktown was no improvement on McClellan’s past record. It was the first tardy stej) in a series of tardy movements which distinguished his pe- ninsular campaign. Before the end of that disastrous campaign was I’eached, the storm of battle had done much to thin the ranks of his army ; but delay led to disease ; and disease proved more destructive than the bullets of the ene- my. The view taken by President Lin- coln, in his letter to McClellan dated PROPHETIC WORDS, 201 April 9th, 1862, was sustained in every particular. In that letter the president says: “You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, in- stead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty — that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal in- trenchments at either place. The coun- try will not fail to note — is now noting — that the present 'hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.” Head now, in the light of what took place, these words were really prophetic. \ CHAPTER XIV. The Importance of War Vessels on the Elvers and Gulfs. — The Merrimac. — Her original build. — Eeconstructed. — A Powerful Instrument of Destruction. — Confederate Cunning. — The Merrimac in her new Form said to be a Failure. — A Strange Sight. — The Merrimac at Hampton Eoads. — The National Fleet Attacked. — The Cumber- land and Congress. — The Merrimac Shot-Proof. — The Cumberland Laid Open. — Terrific Firing. — The Cumber- land Goes Down. — One Hundred Sick and Wounded. — The Patrick Henry. — The Congress Attacked. — Heavy Loss of Life. — The Congress on Fire. — Newport News. — The Flag of the Congress Hauled Down. — Ked Hot Shot. — Her Magazine Catches Fire. — Two Hours’ Work. — The Eoanoke and the Minnesota. — Hurrying to the Scene of Action. — The Minnesota Grounded. — The Merrimac unable to Approach. — The Guns of the Minnesota Skilfully Handled. — A Cheerless Prospect. — The Danger to New York. — Fortress Monroe. — What General Wool said. — Relief at Hand. — The Monitor. — Ericsson. — Description of the Monitor. — The great Purpose for whichit was Built. — A Novelty. — The Success of the Experiment Doubted. — Prophets of Evil. — The Launch. — The Trial Trip. — A Fearful Storm. — Terrific Experience of the Crew. — Lieutenant John L. Worden in Com- mand. — What Spies had Done. — What Might Have Been. — Rejoicing at Norfolk. — The Nationals Downcast. — A Night to be Remembered. — The Congress Explodes. — Sunday Morning. — Wreck and Ruin all around. — Reappearance of the Merrimac. — Worden Ready. — The Object of the Confederate Commander. — The Monitor alongside of the Merrimac. — A Contrast. — David and Goliath. — “ Pebbles thrown by a Child.” — A Battle of Mailed Giants. — The Merrimac Aground. — The Monitor Moving and Hitting like a Skilled Pugilist. — 1'he Merrimac shows Signs of Punishment. — Turns off and Renews the Attack on the Minnesota. — A Warm Re- ception. — A Tremendous Shot. — The Monitor again Comes to the Relief. — The Merrimac a Second Time Grounded. — The Merrimac Retreats. — The Monitor Pursues. — A Fierce Encounter. — Canister Shot Compara- tively Harmless. — The Merrimac Badly Punished. — Sagging at the Stern. — The Last and Most Effective Shot of the Merrimac. — Worden Wounded and Felled to the Ground. — The Merrimac Sheers Off. — The Battle Ended. — Worden’s Life Despaired Of. — “Did We Save the Minnesota?” — Saved. — A Great Victory. — Re- joicings in the North. — The “Little Wonder.” — Pilgrimage to Hampton Roads. — Profound Interest Abroad. — Lessons Read to the Nations. — Superiority of Turrets. — Honors to the Brave. — Ericsson Congratulated. — The Importance of the Victory. — Reflections. In tracing the history of the great 1862 campaign, we have seen how important was the part which was played by gunboats on the Tennes- see and Ohio rivers. It was naturally to be expected that war vessels, suitably constructed, would play an equally im- portant part in the bays and rivers more to the east, and which connect them- selves with the waters of the Atlantic. One of the great events of the early part of 1832 was the appearance in Hampton Hoads of the powerful iron- clad man-of-war Merrimac, which had 202 THE MERRIMAO AND THE MONITOR. been reconstructed by the Confederate government and named Virginia. When the Norfolk Navy Yard was abandoned by the Nationals, this vessel was scut- tled and sunk. In her original form she was a powerful steam frigate of forty guns ; and she had cost the gov- ernment, for building and furnishing her, a sum not less than a million and a quarter dollars. The Confederates found little difficulty in raising her ; and the hull being in perfect condition, a substantial basis existed for the con- struction of a gigantic and dangerous vessel. A plan was furnished by Lieu- tenant John M. Brooke, formerly of the National navy ; and, reconstructed after the fashion of the shot-proof raft which had been used in Charleston harbor, she became one of the strongest and most destructive engines of war which had ever been seen floating on any wa- ters. When properly cut down, she was covered with an iron roof project- ing into the water. At or below the water line the mail extended the oppo- site way, so that a shot striking above the water mark would glance upward, and below the water mark would glance downward. She was simply a broadside ironclad with sloping armor. Her great bulk enabled her to carry a formidable battery. She was armed with a power- ful steel beak, and carried eleven guns, with a one hundred-pound rifle^l Arms- trong at each end. Such a monster might well be a terror as well as a surprise. It was known that the vessel was un- dergoing reconstruction, and that it was intended to make her a terrible engine of war; but strange rumors were circu- lated to her disadvantage by the Con- federate authorities; and it is probable that, until she was seen at Hampton Roads, she was somewhat despised by the officers of the National navy. The Southern newspapers artfully circulated that the Memmac was a failure ; and, the wish being father to the thought, the statement was too readily believed. About noon, on Saturday, the 8th of March, observers at Fortress Mon- jjiar, roe saw a strange object, “ looking like a submerged house, with the roof only above water,” moving down the Elizabeth River toward Hampton Roads. It was the dreadful Merrimac ; and she was under the command of Franklin Buchanan, an officer who had abandoned the National navy. Two smaller armed steamboats accompanied her. Almost immediately after their appearance, two other Confederate gun- boats came down from Richmond and took positions in the James River, a bt- tle above Newport News. Signal guns were at once flred from the Union bat- teries and by the ships Cumberland and Congress, lying off and blockading the James River, to give warning to the rest of the National fleet. Accompanied by the two smaller vessels the Merrimac moved steadily on towards the Cumber- land and Congress. The Congress, a sailing frigate, was commanded by Lieu- tenant Joseph B. Smith. Tlie sloop of war, Cumberland, 24 guns and 376 men, was commanded temporarily by Lieu- tenant George Morris. Pursuing the Congress, and giving and receiving a broadside, the Merrimac made straight for the Cumberland. This vessel had THE CUMBERLAND SUNK. 203 been placed across the channel so as to bring her broadside to bear on her antagonist; and as the Merrimac ap- proached she opened upon the monster and poured forth a rapid fire. It was no use. The heavy shot from the nine and ten inch guns of the Cumberland glanced from her rival’s shield of iron, “like so many peas.” The Merrimac seemed stunned for an instant by the weight of the shot; but she quickly recovered ; and having increased her speed, she rushed against the Cumber- land, striking her with her steel prow about amidships, and “literally laying her open.” Before striking the Cumber- land, the Merrimac had received some seven or eight broadsides ; but they pro- duced no impression on her invulner- able coat of mail. As she struck, she opened her ports and poured in on the unfortunate Cumberland, now rapidly filling with water, a most destructive fire. The Cumberland fought well; but the combat was unequal. Buchanan gradually drew off the Merrimac ; and again opening his ports, he rushed against his disabled antagonist, this time completely crushing in her side. It was now all over with the Cumber- land. Giving a parting fire to the monster which was retiring from the ruin it had wrought, with apparent in- difference, Morris ordered his men to jump overboard and save themselves. This was quickly done; and in a few minutes afterwards, the vessel went down in fifty-four feet of water, carry- ing with her about one hundred of dead, sick and wounded, who could not be moved. The topmast of the Cum- berland remained partially above the water, with her flag flying from its peak. It was now nearly four o’clock in the afternoon. Having finished the Cum- berland, the Merrimac now turned her attention to the sailing frigate Congress. We have seen that just as the Merri- mac appeared by the way of the Eliza- beth Biver, two other vessels came down the James, as if by a preconcerted ar- rangement. These vessels were the Yorktown and the Jamestown, or, as the latter was now called, Patrick Henry. While the Merrimac was engaged with the Cumberland, the Yorktown and the Jamestown, which had successfully passed the National batteries at New- port News, had tackled the Congress. Until the Cumberland went down, the Congress made a gallant and success- ful resistance. With the help of the Zouave, she then managed to run aground under cover of the strong bat- teries just named. There she was be- yond reach of the Merrimac’s prow, but she was not beyond the range of her guns. As soon, therefore, as that vessel came up, she opened fire upon the unfortunate Congress, which could not reply with her stern guns, one of which was soon dismounted by the Merrimac’s shot, and the other had the muzzle knocked off. Lieutenant Smith, Acting-Master Moore, and Pilot Wil- liam Rhodes, with nearly half the crew, were killed or wounded. The Merri- mac moved backward and forward slow- ly, firing at a range of less than a hundred yards. The Congress now took fire in several places. Further resistance would have been worse than 204 : THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR. foolishness ; and so Lieutenant Prender- gast hauled down the flag. A tug came alongside to haul her off ; but the batteries on shore drove off the tug; and the Merrimac, despite the white flag which was. flying over her in token of surrender, again opened fire upon the battered and helpless vessel. Later in the day, the Merrimac returned and set the Congress on fire by red-hot shot. About midnight the fire caught her magazine ; and she exploded with a tremendous noise. Those of her crew which survived the first attack had meanwhile made good their escape. About one half of the whole, 218 out of 434, responded to the call of their names next morning at Newport News. In little more than two hours the Merri- mac had destroyed two of the best ships in the National service ; and Buchanan, her commander, had the satisfaction — if satisfaction it was — of killing or drowning more than three hundred of his old comrades. When the Merrimac first made her appearance in the early part of the day, the flag-ship of the National squadron, the Roanoke, Captain John Marston, and the steam frigate Minnesota, Cap- tain VanBrunt, were lying at Fortress Monroe, several miles distant. These were at once signalled to hurry forward to the assistance of the CumberkinJ, the Congress, and the other vessels now so sorely menaced. It was not possible for them to be forward in time to render any effective aid. Flag-officer Marston had responded to the signal as quickly as possible. His own ship was disabled in its machinery; but, with the help of two tugs, he set out for the scene of action. The Minnesota was ordered to hasten in the same direction. When passing Sewall’s Point, the Min- nesota came within range of a Confede- rate batteiy there, and had her main- mast crippled. This, however, was not the only misfortune which she was des- tined to experience ; she drew tw^enty- three feet of water; and although it was known that the water was danger- ously shallow, it was thought that, the bottom being soft, it would be possible to push her through. It was a mis- take. When within about a mile and a half of Newport News, the vessel grounded and stuck fast. While in this helpless condition, the Merrimac having destroyed the Cumberland, and having retired after her first attack on the Congress, came down upon her. Fortunately it was not possible for the Merrimac to get within a mile of her intended victim, her own heavy draught preventing a nearer approach. At this distance an ineffective fire was opened by both vessels. Some of the smaller armed steamboats ventured nearer, and with their rifled guns killed and wounded several men on board the Minnesota. Some of these, however, paid dearly for their rashness ; for, grounded as she was, her guns were ably handled, and with great rapidity. Ifc was now seven o’clock; and count- ing, no doubt, on an easy victory on the morrow, the Merrimac, with her companion ships, retired behind Sew- all’s Point. The Minnesota still lay fast in the mud ; and although during the night several attempts were made NAVAL ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE MERRIMAO AND MONiTOR RELIEF CAME. 205 to get her off, it was found impossible to move her. The Koanoke and the St. Lawrence, on their way to the scene of conflict, had both got aground ; but with the rising tide they were relieved, and moved down the Roads. It was Saturday night (March 8), and, when t he sun went down, the prospect for the following morning was the reverse of cheering to the National commanders. There could be no doubt that the Mer- rimac would renew the battle in the morning. In such a case, the result, unless some unexpected aid arrived, would be disastrous in the extreme. The Minnesota would be the flrst victim ; and, helpless as she was, her destruction was certain. If any of the other vessels were spared, they would surely endeavor to make their escape. The harbor of Hampton Roads would be lost. The Merrimac would be free to prosecute her work of destruction. Fortress Mon- roe would be in danger; and who could say that the harbor of New York was safe, while such a monster was afloat ? General Wool, commander of Fortress Monroe, telegraphed to Washington that the capture of the Minnesota was all but certain, and that it was thought the Merrimac, Jamestown, and York- town would pass the fort to-night.” It was the opinion of that oflhcer that if the Merrimac, instead of passing on, at- tacked the fortress, it would not be possible to hold the place for more than a few days. Happily relief was at hand. At nine o’clock that night, the Monitor, Erics- son's new iron-clad turret ship, arrived ‘•'t Fortress Monroe from New York. This vessel, which was a dwarf beside the Merrimac, and which was of novel form and appearance, had been built at Green Point, Lons; Island, New York, under the direction of its inventor. Captain John Ericsson — a Swede by birth, but who had been a resi- dent of the United States for twenty years. Ericsson had already won dis- tinction as a practical scientist in Sweden and in England; and in 1842, having come to the United States, he built for the government, the U. S. Steamer Princeton, the flrst screw-pro- peller in the world. The Monitor was one of three vessels — the other two were the Galena and the New Ironsides — which were constructed to meet the emergency, and by special requirement of the government. Ericsson’s plan was to secure the greatest possible power, both for attack and resistance, with the least possible exposure of surface. The hull of the Monitor admirably met all those requirements. It was buoyant, yet it was almost entirely under water. It presented to the enemy a target which was wonderfully small, but which because of the concentration of iron and timber was absolutely im- pregnable — proof against the heaviest artillery of the day. Concentration was Ericsson’s object in the construction of the hull, so far as defence or resistance was concerned. He followed the same plan in regard to the offensive part of the ship. In the centre of his raft-like vessel, he fixed a revolving cylinder of wrought-iron, of sufficient diameter to allow of two heavy guns, and just high enough to give the gunners stand- THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR. 206 iiig room. When finished, the total leno^th of the Monitor was 172 feet. This covered the armor and what is called the “ overhang.” The length of the hull proper was 124 feet. Her total beani over armor and backing was 41^ feet — the beam of the hull proper being 34 feet. Her depth was 11 feet; her draught 10 feet. The diameter of the turret inside was 20 feet; the height was 9 feet; the thickness, 8 inches, there being 5 inches of wrought- iron and 3 feet of oak. The total weight, with everything on board, was nine bundled tons. As an engine of war, the Monitor was in the strictest sense of the word a novelty. Nothing of the kind had ever before existed. Not unnaturally, therefore, very differ- ent opinions prevailed as to the fitness of the vessel for the purposes contem- plated. Had the Monitor gone ’ to the bottom as she slid from the stocks at Greenpoint, she would only have fulfilled the predictions and justi- fied the expectations of many prominent scientific men who were present when she was launched. The strange-looking little ship, as we shall presently see, was to have a different and more glori- ous future. According to the terms of the con- tract the Monitor was not to be accepted by the government until her sea-going powers were tested and until she had made trial of her strength with the heaviest guns of the enemy. This, therefore, was her trial trip ; and never, perhaps, in the history of any ship of war was a trial trip more severely tested or more completely successful. Lieuten- ant John L. Woi'den was in command. On her way from New York the weather was extremely rough. For three days the Monitor battled with the storm ; but more than once victory was doubtful. The sea rolled over her decks, the turret hlone being above the water. At one time the tiller-rope was thrown off the wheel, and the situation was really critical. The draft pipe was choked by the pouring down of the water; and but for the ventilation obtained through the turret, the men would have been suffocated. More than once during the voyage the fires were extinguished. After such a voy- age the crew, as was to be expected, were completely exhausted. We have seen that the Monitor reached Fortress Monroe at 9 o’clock, on the evening of Saturday, the 8th of March. But for this storm the Monitor might have been up in time to prevent the disaster of the previous day ; for it is now known that the Confederates, informed by spies of the forwardness of the Monitor, had made almost superhuman efforts to have the work on the Merrimac finished, so as to give her an opportunity of destroy- ing the National fleet at Hampton Hoads before her great rival could appear on the scene. As it was, LieutenantWorden lost no time after his arrival at Fortress Monroe. Within a few minutes he had reported to the flag officer in the Hoads, received orders and sailed to join the disabled fleet. Soon after mid- night, on the morning of the 9th, he anchored his little vessel alongside the Minnesota. Never did relief arrive more oppor- THE MINNESOTA. 207 tunely. It was a night to be remem- bered — that of the 8th of March, 1802, at Hampton Roads. The Confederates were Hushed with success. The Na- tionals were downcast, as well they might be, but by no means desperate. Norfolk was illuminated ; and the Con- federate officers and sailors were rejoic- ing and carousing with her grateful citizens. On the one side, there was the certain conviction that to-morrow would bring with it an easy victory. On the other side there was a sullen determination to resist to the last, and a dim, ill-defined hope that some effec- tive aid was to be expected from the strange little vessel which had just arrived. As the night wore on, the waters and the adjacent coast were brill- iantly lit up by the fiames of the burn- ing Congress ; and ever and anon, at irregular intervals, a shotted gun would boom over the dull waters and startle the quiet air, as the spreading fiames ignited its charge. The ship had been burning for ten hours, when, about one o’clock, the fire having reached the magazine, she blew up with a terrific noise, filling the air and strewing the waters far and wide with masses of burninof timber. Sunday morning broke beautiful and clear. The Congress had disappeared ; but the masts and yards of the Cumber- land projected above the water, and her ensign was fiying in its accustomed place. As sad evidences of the sudden- ness of her destruction, the dead bodies of her brave defenders fioated in large numbers around the ship. Before the sun had fully revealed himself, and paled by his brighter light the lurid fiames of the burninor fragments of the Con- gress, the Merrimac was seen coming down from Sew all’s Point. Evidently she was bent on completing the work of the previous day. The drums of the Merrimac beat to quarters. Word- en was ready. Taking his position at the peep-hole of the pilot-house of the Monitor, he gave orders for an im- mediate attack. The Merrimac made direct for the Minnesota ; and from the course she took it was apparently the intention of her commander to capture that vessel, if possible, and carry her back as a prize to Norfolk, where hun- dreds of people lined the shores, await- ing his triumphant return. As she approached, the stern guns of the Min- nesota opened upon- her, but to little purpose ; for the stacks and sloping sides of the huge monster had been smeared with tallow, and the shot, heavy as it was, glanced harmlessly off. Meanwhile, the little Monitor, to the astonishment of all who were privileged to witness the sight, ran out from under the Minnesota’s quarter and placed her- self alongside of the Merrimac, com- pletely covering the Minnesota ‘‘as far as was possible with her diminutive dimensions.” The contrast was striking. It was more — it was almost ridiculous. David and Goliath ! It seemed as if the Merrimac had but to move upon the insignificant, almost invisible thing, touch it with her iron prow, and make an end of it forever. But it was not so. This other giant had found more than a match in this other stiipling. The Merrimac let fly a broadside ; and THE MERRIMAO AND THE MONITOR. -^C8 the turret of the Monitor began to revolve. Both vessels, as we have shown already, were heavily armed. The Merrimac had on each side two 7^- inch rifles and four 9-inch Dahlgrens. The Monitor had in her turret two 11- inch guns, each capable of flinging a shot of 168 pounds. The turret kept revolving ; but the ponderous shot of the Monitor i‘attled in vain against the mail-clad sides of the Merrimac. Broad- side followed l)roadside in rapid suc- cession ; but the heavy metal discharged V)y the guns of the Merrimac made no impression on the wrought-iron citadel of the Monitor. Unlike as wei'e the two ships, it was really a battle of giants. “Gun after gun,” says Captain Van Brunt of the Minnesota, “ was tired by the Monitor, which was returned with whole broadsides from the rebels, with no more elfect apparently than so many pebble-stones thrown by a child ^ ^ ^ clearly establishing the fact that wooden vessels cannot contend with iron-clad ones ; for never before was anything like it dreamed of by the greatest en- thusiasts in maritime warfare.” After the first vigorous onset there was some manoeuvring for positions, the Monitor seeking the port holes of the Merrimac, the latter all the while pouring her heavy shot on the invulnerable turret of her plucky little antagonist. One bolt from a rifle-gun struck the turret squarely, and penetrated the iron. “It then broke short off and left its head sticking in.” Five times the Merrimac attempted to run the Monitor down ; but, on each occasion, she received, at the distance of a few feet, the heavy shot of the 11 -inch guns. In one of these encounters, the Merrimac got aground, and the Monitor, being light of draught, steamed easily around, mov- ing and hitting like a skilled pugilist, her lightning-like fire striking her an- tagonist at ‘ every vulnerable point. The Merrimac began to show signs of punishment. Her armor plate was bending and starting under the heavy blows. As if despairing of accomplishing any- thing definite or satisfactory with the Monitor, the Merrimac turned away from her agile and rather dangerous antagonist and renewed her attack on the Minnesota. Van Brunt, as he him- self tells us, was on his guard, and gave the monster a warm reception. He opened upon her all his broadside guns, with a ten-inch pivot gun besides. So terrific was the broadside that “ it was enough,” to quote Van Brunt’s lan- guage, “ to blow out of the water any timber built ship in the world.” It produced, however, but very little ef- fect. The Merrimac gave a hearty re- sponse. From her rifled bow gun she flung one of her terrible shells, which went crashing through the side of the Minnesota, exploding on its way two charges of powder, and finally bursting in the boatswain’s apartments, tearing four rooms into one and setting the ship on fire. Another shell burst the boiler of the tugboat Dragon, which lay alongside the Minnesota. During the encounter, which was brief, the guns of the Minnesota had hit the Mer- rimac at least fifty times, producing little or no impression. A DECIDED VICTORY. 209 A second time tlie Monitor comes to the aid of the Minnesota. The Merri- mac finds it necessary to change her po- sition, and in doing so, again gets grounded. The Minnesota again finds her opportunity; and her heavy guns are opened on her stranded foe. The broadsides are now telling on the thick armor-plates of the Merrimac. Catesby Jones, who was in command, Buchanan having been wounded the previous day, evidently regarded his situation as criti- cal; and, accordingly, as soon as he got the Merrimac afloat, he turned her prow toward Norfolk. The Monitor gave chase. Irritated by the pertinacity of the little ship, the Merrimac turned round on her pursuer and rushed upon her at full speed, as if resolved to run her down. It was a vain attempt, al- though, judging from the appearance of things, it was by no means either un- natural or unwise. The huge beak of the Merrimac grated on the deck of the Monitor and was wrenched. Such a blow had sent the Cumberland down on the Saturday. Such a blow, had it been possible to deal it, would doubtless have proved equally fatal to the Minnesota, or indeed to any wooden ship afloat. It left the Monitor un- injured. The little vessel glided nim- bly out from under her antagonist ; and in doing so, the two ships being almost in actual contact, she opened upon her with one of her heavy turret guns, strik- ing her with a force which seemed to crush in her armor. Quick as lightning the concentrated shot of the Merrimac rattled against the turret and pilot- house of the Monitor. The encounter was terrific; but the armor of both vessels was shot-proof, and for the first time in naval warfare, heavy and well- directed cannon were found to be com- paratively worthless. At this stage the Monitor hauled off for the purpose of hoisting more shot into her turret. Catesby Jones, imagining that he had silenced his small but formidable an- tasronist, made another move toward the Minnesota. Before he had time to open fire, the Monitor was steaming up towards him. He changed his course at once ; and it was now noticeable that the Merrimac was sagging at her stern. A well directed shot from the Monitor had hit the Merrimac at the junction of the casemate with the ship’s side, and caused a leak. Another shot about the same moment had penetrated the boiler of one of the Merrimac’s tenders, enveloping her in steam, and scalding a large number of her crew. Latterly the Monitor had been firing low, and every shot told with greater or less effect. The Monitor, however, was not to be allowed to escape unin- jured. The last shot fired by the Mer- rimac was the most effective. It struck the pilot-house of the Monitor opposite the peep-hole through which Worden at that moment was looking. It cut the iron plank in two, inflicted a severe wound on Worden, aud knocked him senseless to the floor. Lieutenant Green, who commanded the guns, and Chief- Engineer Steiners, who worked the tur- ret, being at the same moment stunned and stupefied, but not severely injured. Green and Steiners recovered quickly enough to keep the gunners at work; ^10 THE MERRIMAC AND THE MONITOR. but Worden did not for some time re- cover consciousness. Wlien he did so, I. is first question was, “Did we save the Minnesota ? ” The battle was now ended. The j^.Ierrimac steered at once for Norfolk. The Monitor soon afterwards steered for Fortress Monroe, the severe mishap which had befallen her commander pre- venting her from following up her vic- tory, and forcing the battle to a surrender. Worden was really badly injured. His face was much disfigured, and he was completely blind. Removed to the city of Washington, his life for a time was despaired of ; but he revived ; and, as we shall see hereafter, he ren- dered his country further good service before the war was ended. As soon as the Merrimac retired, the Minnesota was got afloat by throwing some of her heavy guns overboard. She was saved. The battle which began as early as eight o’clock in the morning was waged with great ferocity until after midday. The little Monitor did noble work and won a most decided victory. During the two days the Minnesota had fired 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and more than ten tons of powder. While struggling wdth the Merilmac, the Mon- itor fired 41 shots, and was struck 22 times. The only serious injury done to the Monitor was the shattering of her pilot-house. The Merrimac suffered considerably. On board two men were killed and some nineteen wounded. She had lost her iron prow, her star- board anchor and all her boats. Her armor was badly damaged ; her steam- pipe and smoke-stack were riddled ; the muzzles of two of her guns were shot away ; the wood work at one of her ports was so exposed that it took fire at every discharge ; and the water was rushing in upon her through one of the openings made by the shot of the Monitor. No battle by land or sea, during the whole war, created more excitement or evoked more enthusiasm than the battle at Hampton Roads. At the close of the first day, victory was clearly on the side of the South. In proportion to the joy that prevailed throughout the Confed- erate States — and the joy was great — there was depression of feeling in the North. At the close of the second day the situation was reversed. There was depression of feeling in the South — all the greater because of the previous joy. The hearts of the Confederates, in truth, sank within them. But there were great rejoicings in the North. Cheers and congratulations rose up on all sides. The glad intelligence of the success of the Monitor was flashed from State to State and from city to city ; and from the Cabinet, from Congress, from State Legislatures, from Town Councils, from Chambers of Commerce, from Boards of Trade, from public bodies of all kinds, as well as from special meetings of the peo- ple, thanks and praise were poured out up- on the Monitor, upon her inventor, upon her brave commander, and upon all the officers and men who took part in the heroic struggle and helped to bring about the glorious result. The rejoicing was universal; and the praise was as unstinted as the gratitude was genuine and profound. Hampton Roads became THE LESSON. 211 immortal ; and the little Monitor ac- quired a reputation such as was never before enjoyed by any ship of war. Pilgrimages were organized and under- taken to visit the scene of the conflict and the victory; and all ranks and classes of the people, from the President down- ward, rushed to see the “ little wonder ” — the strange vessel which had done such effective work. The excitement was not confined to this country alone. The success of the Monitor created a profound interest throughout the civil- ized world, and nowhere moi'e than in the British Isles. It w^'as felt and confessed not only that sea-girt nations must in future depend for protection on other than wooden walls, but that a new and terrible engine of war had been con- structed. The battle at Hampton Koads had read the world a lesson. It pro- claimed the superiority of such a vessel as the Merrimac with her sloping sides and inclined armor to the ordinary iron-clad. It also proclaimed the fact that inclined armor was inferior to a turret. The nations then busy with the reconstruction of their ships for war pur- poses, and spending millions upon mill- ions upon new models, felt it necessary to pause, to read the lesson which came from Hampton Koads, and to reflect. It would not be easy to overestimate the importance of these two days’ fight- ing on the general conduct of the war. The result was a heavy blow to the Confederates : it was a clear gain to the National cause. There was, no doubt, just cause for regret that the Merrimac was allowed to escape, and that she was not hotly pursued and compelled to surrender. There can be no doubt now that the Monitor was quite equal to such a task. It was developed in an investigation after the battle that the Monitor had on board wrought-iron shot, each weighing 184 pounds; but this shot was not used as the capacity and strength of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns were as yet imperfectly known. In answer to a question put by the War Committee, as to why the battle was not more promptly decided against the Merrimac, Mr. Newton, the Chief En- gineer of the Monitor, said : It was due to the fact that the power and endurance of the 11-inch Dahlgren guns, with which the Monitor was armed, w'ere not known at the time of the battle ; hence the commander would scarcely have been justified in increas- ing the charge of povv^der above that authorized in the Ordnance Manual. Subsequent experience developed the important fact that these guns could be fired with thirty pounds of common powder, with solid shot. If this had been known at the time of the action, I am clearly of opinion that from the close quarters at which Lieutenant Worden fought his vessel, the enemy would have been forced to surrender.” According to the same witness, if a 15- inch gun could possibly have been mounted in the turret, the action would have been short and decisive. Mr. Newton did not doubt that but for the injury received by Lieutenant Worden that oflfieer would have pursued and “badgered ” the Merrimac to surrender. These reasons, it must be admitted, are sufficiently satisfactory. If they do not 212 THE MERRIMAC AXD THE MONITOR. remove all cause of regret that the Merri- mac made her escape, they at least com- pletely exonerate theNational command- ers. Worden was irresponsible; and his subordinates, judging from the expe- rience they had had that Sunday fore- noon, thought it best to content them- selves with what they had actually ac- complished. If they missed a prize, posterity will not judge them harshly. As it was, the Nationals had won a great victory, and had just reason to be well pleased. Had the Merrimac been permitted to proceed unchecked in her work of destruction, the result could not but have been most disastrous to all the best interests of the North. It might have seriously affected the en- tire future of the war, and led to re- sults very different to what were de- sired and to what were ultimately achieved. But for the timely arrival of the Monitor, the Minnesota would have shared the fate of the Cumberland and the Congress; the entire Union fleet would have been destroyed or cap- tured ; the splendid harbor of Hampton Hoads would have been left in the un- disputed possession of the Confederates ; Fortress Monroe would have been im- perilled, and its fall would have been only a question of days. Such a loss, in itself considered, would have been great. But it would have been greater still in the consequences which must necessarily have resulted. The pos- session of Hampton Roads, implying of course the possession of Fortress Monroe, would have given the Con- federates absolute control of the James and York rivers, and by consequence would have upset all McClellan’s plans, and brought his projected campaign against Richmond to premature and in- glorious defeat. This, however, would not have been all. The possession of these waters by the Confederates would have made secure, as it would have given them the command of, the Pen- insula, and made impossible any attack by way of the James River. Worse even than this was possible. What would have hindered the Merrimac from running up Chesapeake Bay and steaming up the Potomac, to the terror of the National Capitol ? Or supposing she had put to sea, what was there to prevent her making her way to the harbor of New York, dealing de- struction among the shipping, and lay- ing under contribution the chief com- mercial city of the Union ? There were other possibilities equally if not even more alarming. One other we deem it proper to mention. The expulsion of th e National fleet from Hampton Roads, coupled as it would have been with the fall of Fortress Monroe, would have encouraged foreign governments in wliat they would have been pleased to call the interests of peace, to grant recog- nition and even support to the Con- federacy. In the spring of 1862 the Confederates were not without bright, and, as they thought, cheering pros- pects ; if they were not absolutely commanding confidence abroad, they were at least inspiring hope ; and such success as that which we have indicated, would have been quite suflicient to make ill-concealed foreign sympathy j assume an active form. THE ADVANCE. 213 It was a matter of some importance to the Union that all these evils were averted. It was something of greater importance still, that the Nationals had for the time being, at least, established their superiority in naval warfare, had effectually secured possession of one of the largest and most valuable land- locked bays on the Continent, with all the connected rivers of the Peninsula, and had rendered necessary the aban- donment of Norfolk. Now that the en- emy had been driven from all the neigh- boring waters, McClellan had a fair opportunity to carry out his projected plans on the Peninsula, with a view to the capture of Richmond. This happy state of things had been brought about mainly by the Monitor. It was not without good reason that Chief-En- gineer Steiner, on the day the battle had been fought, wrote to Ericsson in the fol- lowing terms : “ I congratulate you upon your great success. Thousands have this day blessed you. I have heard whole crowds cheer you. Every man feels that you have saved this place to the nation, by furnishing us with the means to whip an iron-clad frigate, that was, until our arrival, having it all her own way with our most powerful vessels.” The Merrimac was blown up by the Confederates May 11th, and, to- wards the close of the year, the Mon- itor foundered in a storm off Cape Hatteras. CHAPTER XV. Following np the Foe. — The Confederate Works at Williamsburg. — Fort Magruder. — Winn’s Mill Road. — Hooker and Kearney. — Couch and Casey. —Sumner in Command. — General Stoneman. — The 4th of May. — A Fearfiil Night. — Hooker Engages the Foe. — The Confederates Well Prepared. — Severe Fighting. — Fort Magruder Silenced. — Arrival of Longstreet. — A Cruel Piece of Deception. — Blaisdell’s Men. — Private Doherty. — The Seventeenth New York. — Bravery of Hooker. — The Pluck and Endurance of HisMen. — AnUnequal Struggle. — Kearney Comes Up. — General Hancock. — General Birney. — A Gallant Charge. — Hancock’s Advance. — Hancock Driven Back. — Falls Back in Good Order. — A Halt. — “Gentlemen, Charge!” — Retreat of the Confederates. — The Key of the Position. — The Heroes of Williamsburg. — An Unsatisfactory Fight. — The Great Bravery of the Troops. — Bad Generalship. — It Ought to Have Been Different. — Want of Unity. — McClellan’s Mistake. — Sumner not the Right Man in the Right Place. — Why was McClellan Absent? — Franklin’s Expedition. — The Prince de. Joinville. — McClellan on the Field. — ^His Appearance. — Enthusiasm of the Troops. — “ That Little Matter. “Bivouac in Front of Williamsburg.” — Other Battles to Fight. — More Delay. — What a Bold Stroke Might Have- Accomplished. — Promises Fair but Fruitless. — Lincoln’s Prophetic Words. — The Story of Manassas Repeated. — Would not Strike a Blow. After the evacuation of Yorktown, McClellan gave orders that the enemy should be followed up. The Confederates moved towards Will- iamsburg, where, some months before, they had constructed a line of strong works, some thirteen in number, on the rolling but elevated ground on which that city stands. These works were two miles in front of Williamsburg, at- 214 WILLIAMSBURG. the naiTowest part of the Peninsula. The line stretched from a deep ravine, near the James River on the right, to Queen’s Creek, near the York River on the left. The principal work was Fort Magruder, close to the junction of the Yorktown and Winn’s Mill Road. This was an earth- work, with bastion ed front. Its crest measured nearly half a mile. It was heavily armed and surrounded by a ditch. The others were redoubts not unlike those which were thrown up around Washington City. These works the Confederates placed under a strong guard for the purpose of holding the pursuers in check, while the main body pressed on so as to place the Chicka- hominy between them and the Na- tionals. The pursuing army was headed by General Stoneman, with his cavalry and horse artillery. Stoneman was followed along the Yorktown Road by the divi- sions of Generals Joseph Hooker and Philip Kearney, of Heintzelman’s corps, and along the Winn’s Mill Road by the divisions of Generals W. F. Smith, Darius N. Couch and Silas Casey, of Keyes’ corps. The commands of Rich- ardson, of Sedgwick, and of Fitz John Porter were left at Yorktown, with instructions to hold themselves in readi- ness to advance as a supporting force, if required, or, if deemed more important, to follow and co-operate with Franklin’s division, which was to move up the York River to West Point, and take posses- sion of the terminus of the Richmond and York River Railroad. General Edwin V. Sumner, McClellan’s second in command, was intrusted with the immediate direction of the pursuit. Me Clellan himself remained at Yorktown for the purpose of completing the arrangements necessary for the depart- ure of Franklin up the York River. General Stoneman, who moved some miles ahead of the rest of the army, touched the Confederate lines in the neighborhood of Fort Magruder. Ex- posed to the guns of the fort, and fiercely attacked by the Confederate cavalry, he was compelled to fall back. Meanwhile,' Hooker and Smith’s divisions, the latter ahead, were pressing forward with all haste on the Yorktown Road. On be- ing informed of Stoneman’s repulse, Hooker, feeling the necessity of despatch, obtained leave from General Heintzel- man to throw his division on the Hamp- ton or Warwick roads. Having Smith no longer in front, he was able to move with greater ease and rapidity. Sumner, having hurried forward with Smith’s division, reached the place where Stone- man was halting about five o’clock in the afternoon. By midnight. Hooker, who had made the best possible use of his time, had his men in position on Smith’s left. Here the troops rested on their arms until the morning. Maj The 4th of May, 1862, is one of the memorable Sundays of the war. It had rained all day, and the roads were almost impassable. At night the rain continued. That was a fearful night,” wrote one who was present with the army ; “ and that was a strange, eventful bivouac. The roads being in a dread- fully muddy condition, the troops had had a difficult march ; and then, at night, without shelter from the rain, which was CRUEL DECEPTION. 215 falling fast, without food or nourish- ment, they all, officers and soldiers, reposed that Sabbath night, as best they could, on the wet ground and among the forest trees.” The position of the army, as, in these circumstances, it sought rest for the night, was as follows : General Hooker’s division lay in front of the centre of the Confederate works ; Smith’s division and Stoneman’s cavalry and artillery lay to the right. The divisions of Kearney and Couch had halted in the rear. At break of day on the 5th, Hooker May up and in motion. Before the church clocks had struck six, he was in full view of the works which the Confederates had thrown up for defense ; and the towers and spires of Williams- burg were clearly revealed across the open level plains. For well nigh a mile in front, the ground was obstructed by trees which had been felled for the pur- pose ; and wherever the ground was open it was dotted with rifle-pits. Hooker lost no time in moving upon the foe. He knew that there were thirty thousand men within supporting distance, and that the bulk of the army of the Poto- mac was within four hours’ march. At half-past seven o’clock, he directed Gen- eral Grover, with his brigade, to make the attack. The First Massachusetts, the Second New Hampshire, the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-Sixth Penii: sylvania regiments were deployed in front, to the left of the Hampton Road, as skirmishers, with orders * to pi«k off the Confederate sharpshooters and artillerists, while Captain W eber, with liis battery, was pushed into the open field, until they were within seven hundred yards of Port Magruder. The Confederates were not found unpre- pared. Before the disposition of the National troops was completed, the guns of the fort and of one of the ad- joining redoubts opened a heavy fire, killing two of Weber’s officers and several of his men, and forcing the battery to fall back. The battery, however, was quickly re-manned by some volunteers from Osborn’s ; and the guns were soon in position and respond- ing to the fire of the enemy. Bram- hall’s New York battery came up opportunely and took a position to th« right of Weber’s. The two batteries were supported by the Fifth New Jersey regiment ; and while the batteries poured forth their shot and shell with terrible rapidity and with deadly aim, the rifle bullets of the infantry did scarcely less effective work. Within an hour and a half the Confederate troops which had appeared on the plain were dispersed, and the guns of their works apparently silenced. The battle, however, was as yet only beginning. The Confederates, at the very moment victory seemed secured by the Nationals, began to appear in great force. We have already seen that the main body of the Confederate army had left Williamsburg, and was on its way towards Richmond before Hooker came up. It was only, therefore, with the rear- guard of the retreating army, and with the troops which had been left behind to man the fort and the redoubts, that the Nationals had as yet been engaged. After Hooker had sent out his skirm- 216 WILLIAMSBURG. ishers, and the National batteries had opened fire, Johnston began to perceive that the pressure of the pursuers was much greater than he had been led to suspect from the ordinarily dilatory movements of McClellan. Longstreet’s division had already passed through Williamsburg. It was ordered back by Johnston to give its support to the rear- guard. It was this division which now appeared on the scene of conflict, and gave new life to the struggle. Long- street’s men were fresh and full of vigor ; and when they fell in force upon Patterson’s New Jersey brigade, which had been engaged all the morning, it was felt that the contest was unequal. Hooker, therefore, sent to Patterson’s assistance Brigadier-General Grover, with the First Massachusetts and two regiments of the Excelsior brigade, the Twentieth and Seventy-Second New York. At the same time the Eleventh Pennsylvania and Twenty-Sixth Massa- chusetts came up to the Yorktown Road ; and Colonel Blaisdell, who com- manded them, was ordered to clear the road and form a connection with Heint- zelman’s corps. Blaisdell promptly put the order in execution. His men marched steadily forward until they were within fifty yards of the enemy ; and here occurred one of those cruel pieces of deception to which the Confederates on more than one occasion resorted. “ Don’t fire on your friends,” shouted a Confederate officer, displaying a white flag. Blais- dell ordered his men to cease firing; and Private Doherty advanced to take the flag. “Now, give it them,” ex- claimed the same treacherous voice ; and on Blaisdell’s men, thus thrown off their guard, the Confederates opened a destructive fiie. Several of them were killed. Among them was poor Doherty, who, however, had managed, before he fell, to put a bullet through the head of the wretched traitor who had lured him to his death. Blaisdell’s men did good and effective work, maintaining the struggle until their ammunition was exhausted. They were relieved by the Seventy-Second New York. This regi- ment, after an unsuccessful attack on a battery to the left, and having been exposed to a raking fire from the ene- my’s guns, was compelled to give place to the Seventieth New York, Colonel Dwight. As this regiment came for- ward, it was supposed by the Confede- rates to be one of their own. The Confederate colonel displaying his own flag, asked for a similar display on the part of the Seventieth. Dwight un- furled the “stars and stripes.” It was the signal for a Confederate volley, which, of course, was promptly re- sponded to, and with energy and effect. The Seventieth fought like heroes ; and although pressed by greatly superior numbers, they held their ground till their cartridge boxes were empty. After a severe and unequal struggle, in which twenty-two of the thirty-three commissioned officers of the regiment were killed or wounded. Colonel Dwight, himself wounded, was made prisoner, with several of his men. The battle was now raging furiously all along the line ; the Confederates were continually being reinforced, Pickett HOOKER’S BRAVERY. 217 and Gholson, and Pryor and others, having hurried back from the direction of the Chickahominy ; and the increas- ing strength of Johnston’s army was steadily concentrating on Hooker’s left. The situation was becoming critical. The Confederates had three times charged the National centre ; they had made a bold dash from Fort Magruder, and captured five of Weber’s guns; they had worn out some of the best National regiments, and thinned several of the National brigades; but Hooker, still unaided against the superior and rapidly increasing strength of his an- tagonist, tenaciously held his ground. As early as half-past eleven o’clock. Hooker sent a despatch to the assistant- adjutant-general of General Heintzel- man, to whose corps his division be- longed. In that despatch he said : I have had a hard contest all the morning, but do not despair of success. My men are all at work, but a great deal exhaust- ed. It is reported to me that my com- munication with you by the Yorktown Eoad is clear of the enemy. Batteries, cavalry and infantry can take part by the side of mine and whip the enemy.” Later in the da}", and again and again, he addressed appeals for help to Sumner, but in vain. One o’clock, two o’clock, three o’clock struck, and still no help came, with the exception of Peck’s bri- gade, of Couch’s division, which arrived early in the afternoon, and was posted on his right, where it helped to repel several Confederate attacks. Later in the day two more of Couch’s brigades came up; but as Hooker’s men were completely exhausted, and their ammu- nition failing, it was too late to enable him to make any vigorous aggressive effort. Between four and five in the afternoon. General Philip Kearney, with his division, appeared on the scene of action, and, with characteristic energy, pressed to the front. Hooker, with his thinned ranks and worn-out men, with- drew from the fight and rested as a reserve. He had lost in the battle one thousand seven hundred men. We do not much wonder that Hooker was in- dignant that his morning efforts were not more effectively backed by the strength of the other divisions of the army, and that he was allowed, after victory had become impossible to him and his brave soldiers, to fight so long unaided against such fearful odds. ‘‘ History,” he after- wards wrote, ^‘will not be believed, when it is told that the noble officers and men of my division were permitted to carry on this unequal struggle from morning until night, unaided, in the presence of more than 30,000 of their comrades, with arms in their hands ; nevertheless, it is true.” Of this, how- ever, more anon. Kearney, as we have just said, pressed to the front. General Berry, whose brigade of Kearney’s division, followed by Thomson’s batteries, was the first to arrive on the ground, was immediately put into action. The brigade consisted of the Fifth Michigan, the Thirty- Seventh New York, and the Second Michigan. The Fifth Michigan was filed off into the woods to the left of the Hampton Hoad, and was supported V)y the Thirty-Seventh New York. A charge was ordered on the left ; and the 218 WILLIAMSBUEG. regiments just naijied advanced in splendid style, driving the enemy be- fore them, away from the fallen timber, and out of the rifle-pits beyond.” In this charge the Fifth Michigan suffered severely. Colonel Terry and nearly all his subordinate officers being wounded ; but they stoutly held the ground which they had so gallantly won. The Con- federates were now making vigorous and determined efforts on the National centre. They had captured some of Bramhall’s guns ; and they seemed re- solved to silence and capture the whole battery. To check these efforts, a bat- teiy in charge of Captain Smith was planted, m echelon^ on a rising knoll, to the rii’ht of the road. At the same o time, two companies of the Second Mich- igan were ordered to charge on the enemy’s skirmishers who were tlirong- ing about the coveted guns. The charge was gallantly made ; and what wflth the effective fire from Smith’s battery, the Confederates were driven back. Gen- eral Birney, who, with two regiments of his brigade — the Thirty-Eighth New York and the Fortieth New York — had been deployed on the right to relieve Hancock’s weary men, now came for- ward. The Confederates had resumed firing from their forts ; and they were again pressing forward with their troops. Colonel Ward, with two companies pf the Thirty-Eighth New York, made a brilliant dash down the road, taking the rifle-pits by the flank. The charge was completely successful ; and the Confederates were driven from their po- sition. Encouraged by Colonel Ward’s success, Kearney ordered a portion of the Fortieth New York to sustain him in another charge to the Confederate rear. This detachment was led by Captain Mindel, Birney’s chief of staff. The charge was gallantly made, and was even more effective than the preceding. The Coflfederates fell back ; and there was no more firing either from the rifle-pits or by the artillery. The rear- brigade of Kearney’s division, under General Jameson, now reached this por- tion of the field; a second line was at once formed ; and arrangements were made for further vigorous efforts. But darkness fell upon the scene ; and the wearied soldiers, seeking repose, stretch- ed themselves on the rain-soaked and blood-stained battle field. While these events were taking place on the National left, events of equal importance were occurring on the ex- treme right. At an early hour in the day, fears were entertained that the Confederates might make a dangerous movement in that direction; and in obedience to orders from Sumner, the general in command. General Smith sent Hancock, with about twenty-five hundred men, to hold the enemy in check, and, if possible, to make a flank movement upon the works. Hancock’s command consisted partly of his own and pai-tly of Davidson’s brigade. For the special duty assigned him, Hancock selected from his own brigade the Fifth Wisconsin, the Forty-Ninth Pennsylva- nia, and the Sixth Maine, and, from Davidson’s brigade, the Seventh Maine and Thirty-Ninth New York volunteers. These were accompanied by the batteries of Crowen and Wheeler. One of the HANCOCK’S SPLENDID CHARGE. 219 redoubts which had been thrown up by Magruder, and which was near to the extreme Confederate left, was discov- ered to be unoccupied. Its existence, it appears, had been unknown to Johnston and his officers. The redoubt occupied a conspicuous and important position. It stood upon a high bank, looking down upon a ravine, and commanded a dam on what is called Cut Dam Creek, a small tributary of Queen’s Creek, and was about a mile and a half eastward of the Yorktown Road. Having crossed this creek, Hancock experienced no difficulty in taking possession of the re- doubt. Another redoubt, about twelve hundred yards in advance, was found to be unoccupied. This, also, was taken possession of. Between the redoubts now occupied by Hancock’s men and Fort Magruder there were other two redoubts ; but these were manned by Confederate forces, more or less strong. A few shells were flung at these re- doubts, and a brisk fire was opened upon them at the same time by some sharp- shooters ; and they, too, were soon deserted. General Hancock had ac- complished; without the least difficulty, more, perhaps, than he had expected to accomplish by severe and protracted fighting. But the evil genius of that ill-starred day would not allow him to reap the full rewards of victory. He had not around him a sufficient number of men to warrant his occupation of the two deserted redoubts. There was no lack of men in the immediate neighbor- hood; but they were neither at hand nor in hand. It was Hooker’s experience over again. He could make no further aggressive efforts without reinforce- ments. Meantime, Johnston discovered the blunder he had made in not makinoc himself familiar with the ground. He ought to have known of the existence of these redoubts. They were all-im- portant ; for they were in the flank and rear of his line of defense. Unless speedily reclaimed, his line would be not only menaced in its integrity, but practically broken. By all means, the Nationals must be driven from this position. Such was the necessity which Johnston felt laid upon him. With this end in view, he gave instructions to General Hill to send a force of sufficient strength to expel Hancock from the redoubts and drive him back upon his own lines. The task was assigned to General Jubal Early, with a force of Virginia and North Carolina troops. Hancock, meanwhile, had been earnestly calling for reinforcements. It was all in vain. Sumner had been unable to send assistance to Hooker because of the number of men he had placed under Hancock ; and now he professes himself unable to succor and strengthen Hancock from a fear that he might thereby weaken his centre, and so place his whole army in peril. In place of re- ceiving reinforcements, Hancock was or- dered to abandon the redoubts and fall back upon his original position. It was a painful order to execute ; but he had no choice. W ith the small number of men at his command, it was impossible for him to retain the position he had taken in face of the overwhelmingly superior numbers of the enemy. If, however, he must fall back, he will fall back in 220 WILLIAMSBURG. good order, contesting every inch of ground and saving his command. About five o’clock in the afternoon, he saw the two redoubts nearest Fort Magruder reoccupied by the Confederates. Their forward movement was fairly begun. In the most perfect order, and keeping his ranks in line, Hancock drew back his brigade. Retiring regiment by reg- iment, and carrying his artillery back piece by piece, maintaining, meanwhile, a vigorous fire upon the advancing foe, he reached the crest of a ridge not far from the dam above mentioned. There he halted, and forming his men in line of battle, he calmly awaited Early’s approach. On came the Confederates in great force, firing as they advanced, shouting and yelling “ Bull Run,” Ball’s Bluff,” and other offensive ex- pressions. They had reached within thirty paces of his line, when Hancock, with as much politeness as bravery, ex- claimed, “ Gentlemen, charge !” With enthusiastic cheers, his gallant soldiers dashed down the slope. The attack was irresistible. The Confederates broke and fled at the first touch of the bayonet. The Nationals, halting, fired some ten or a dozen volleys into the broken ranks. When the smoke cleared off, some five hundred of Early’s men were found dead or wounded on the field. The remainder were in full re- treat towards the Confederate lines. The battle of Williamsburg was now practically ended. Hancock had won no great victory ; he had not dared to follow the retreating foe ; but he had secured the key of the position. Here he remained, waiting for reinforcements ; but when these were forwarded to him by special orders from McClellan him- self, w’ho had now arrived on the field, they were no longer necessary. The battle had ceased all along the line. There were other struggles during the day,‘ one particularly late in the afternoon, a little to the right of the Confederate works, on the Yorktown Road Here, in the open space. Peck’s brigade encountered the Confederates in force ; and after severe fighting they were compelled to fall back. Generals Kleirn and Devens, with their respect- ive brigades, of Casey’s division, coming to their relief. The two great features of the day’s contest were the heroic resistance of Hooker on the left and the splendid charge made by Hancock on the extreme right. Hooker and Han- cock, and after them Kearney — these were the men who won the laurels at Williamsburg.'^ ♦Joseph Hooker was born in 1819, in Hadley, Massa- chusetts. He was appointed a cadet at West Point in 1833. He took part in the Mexican war, serving in the same regiment with “Stonewall” Jackson, and becom- ing aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Hamer. In 1848, having passed through the various grades, he was pro- moted to a full colonelcy, and entered the Adjutant- General’s Department at Washington. In 18r)8 he resigned, went to California, and combined the duties of farmer with those of railroad constructor. He super- intended the building of the National road. When the war broke out in 1861, he returned and was present as a spectator at the battle of Bull Run. Soon afterwards we find him appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of a new regiment of regulars. Later he was made Brigadier-General of volunteers. His first active duties were in Maryland and Eastern Virginia. He made himself useful in help- ing to clear the Potomac of the Confederate blockading batteries. When McClellan moved to the Peninsula, Hooker’s brigade was added to the command, and he himself placed at the head of a division. At Williams- burg, as we have seen, he established his reputation as one of the first soldiers of the republic. His name will frequently again appear in these annals. THE EETREAT. 221 According to the official reports, the jUay National loss on Monday, May 5th, was 456 killed, 1411 wound- ed, and about 500 missing. The loss sustained by the Confederates was not quite so great ; but, including killed, wounded and missing, it could scarcely have been under one thousand men. Hooker’s division suffered most severe- ly of all, the loss being in the propor- tion of one to six — a proportion of loss equal to that of the allied armies at Alma, one of the bloodiest battles of which history has preserved any record. On the night after the battle, the Winfield Scott Hancock, a direct descendant of John Hancock who signed the Declaration of Independence, was born in Pennsylvania about 1824. He entered West Point in 1840, and graduated in 1844, receiving his commission of Second Lieutenant. One of his class- fellows at West Point was General Pleasonton. He served in the Mexican War, and was promoted for his gallantry. At the outbreak of the war he held the post of Assistant-Quartermaster-General. In 1861 he was appointed a Brigadier-General of volunteers. In this capacity he was attached to the army of the Potomac. We have seen what services he rendered before York- town and at Williamsburg. His gallant charge at the close of that day will be remembered with pride so long as the history of the Civil War is read. Hancock's name will appear in many subsequent struggles. “ When General Kearney’s troops were being brought into action, they met the lengthened files of General Hooker’s wounded being carried to the rear. The shrieks of the lacerated and bleeding soldiers, who had been fighting so long and so well, pierced the air ; and this, joined to the mud and rain, and the exhaustion of those who had come several miles with so much speed, was not calculated to produce a favorable impression on them as they were going into action. General Heintzel- man, however, ordered several of the bands to strike up national and martial airs ; and when the strains of the familiar tunes reached the ears of the wouuded, as they were being carried from the field, three cheers mingled with those of the soldiers who were just rushing into battle. The effect, too, was great on the other side ; for some of the prisoners state that when they heard the bands strike up the Star-Spangled Banner, and heard our soldiers cheer, they knew that the victory would be ours .” — Correspondent N. Y. Herald. soldiers of tbe National army rested on their arms on the ground 'where they fought during the day, some of them in front of the Confederate works, and not a few of them in close proximity to the bodies of their dead or wounded companions in arms. It was uncertain as yet what would be required of them on the following day. The Confede- rates still held their position ; and there was no good reason for believing that they would not renew the fight in the morning. Shortly after midnight it was rumored that the works were be- ing evacuated, and that according to appearances a retreat would be effect- ed during the night. When morning dawned, what was report was found to be a fact. The defenses were aban- doned ; and in their march to new ground beyond the Chickahominy, the Confederates were leaving behind them the town of Williamsburg. Fort Ma- gruder and the redoubts were speedily occupied by the Nationals; and the Confederate rear-guard had not yet left the city on the one side when General Jameson entered it on the other. Will- iamsburg was found to be deserted. Of all the battles fought during the continuance of the w^ar, none was more unsatisfactory, so far as the North was concerned, than the battle of Will'iams- buig. It was not that there was any lack of bravery on the part of the men. It was not that there was a want of pluck or skill on the part of those by whom they were immediately led. On the contrary, never was more heroism displayed than that exhibited by Hooker and the men of his division 222 WILLIAMSBURG. as, during the weary hours of that day, j they resisted, unaided, the vastly su- perior forces of the Confederates ; and certainly there never was a more gal- lant charge than that made by Hancock and his little band down the ridge by the dam at Queen’s Creek. Nor is it possible to speak in terms of too high commendation of the conduct of Kear- ney and his men when, after coming to the relief of Hooker, they charged the Confederates in front and flank and rear, driving them from their defenses, out of the redoubts, out of the rifle- pits, and out of the open ground, away into the woods beyond. From the actual work done by those commanders, and by the men who followed their lead, it is clear that the secret of the bungling inefficiency of that day on the outskirts of Williamsburg lay not with the army, properly so called, nor with the division leaders, but with those who were in supreme control. How Hooker could be left so long unaided, while whole divisions, not yet engaged or even menaced, were within easy distance, we confess we seek in vain for a satisfactory explanation. And why Hancock, after he had successfully captured the redoubts on the extreme right, should have been ordered to fall back; is to us beset with the same difficulties. The success which attended Kearney in his repeated aggressive efforts, and the comparative ease with which Han- cock forced a retreat, show that the foe was much less redoubtable than was imagined ; and there can be no doubt that, if timely and sufficient aid had I been sent to the one and the other, the battle would have been less enduring, and the victory more complete. The retreat of the Confederates from Will- iamsburg this second time ought to have been impossible. Their works, includ- ing Fort ^agruder, ought to have been cleared, and the Confederate rear-guard captured or destroyed, before Long- street could have had time to return to the aid of his comrades. In that case, the battle of Williamsburg would have been unnecessary. A little more energy on the part of the Nationals, with greater unity of action and com- munity of purpose, and Johnston would have found it impossible to do what he actually accomplished even after the battle of Williamsburg — to place the Chickahominy and its fever-breeding borders between himself and his op- ponents. A common purpose and unity of action were sadly and visibly wanting throughout the whole contest. How differently things were managed at Shiloh, and, later, at luka and Cor- inth ! How different at Perryville and Murfreesboro ! We have said that the secret of the mismanagement was to be sought not among the men, not among the sub- ordinate officers or generals of divi- sions, but in higher places. McClellan, it must be admitted, made a mistake in placing Sumner in chief command of the pursuing army. General Sumner was undoubtedly a brave and capable commander, as he showed subsequently at Antietain and at Fredericksburg; but it has been known in all time that men capable of great effort and great «THAT LITTLE MATTER” 223 enterprise, when acting in a secondary capacity, are not necessarily possessed of those qualities which enable them to force success, when acting on their own responsibility. Many first-rate corps commanders and generals of divisions have proved but sorry com- manders-in-chief. Our own Civil War, on the one side and the other, revealed many such ; and it is no serious charge to make asrainst General Sumner to O say that, in the battle before Williams- burg, he did not prove himself to be possessed of those higher qualities — that eagle eye for the situation, that promptitude in sending assistance to the weak and menaced points, that power of holding the army in hand and utilizing all its strength towards the desired result — which are absolutely essential in a general-in-chief on the field of battle. It appears that Mc- Clellan had some hesitation about the appointment. His first intention, we understand, was to appoint Heintzel- man. Heintzelman might have been a better appointment ; but he might not ; and what we do know for certain is that Sumner was a failure. This, how- ever, brings us to the real source of trouble — the principal cause of com- plaint. Why was not McClellan present in person ? Why was it necessary for him to delegate, on such an occasion, powers and responsibilities so import- ant ? He had wasted a month before Yorktown laboriously constructing ex- tensive and costly siege works. In spite of his vast preparations and cost- ly care, the enemy had escaped from his grasp before his works were finish- ed, or, at least, before they were turned to any practical account. It would surely not have been unnatural for him, yielding to feelings of mortifica- tion and disappointment, which most men would have felt in the circum- stances, to seize the opportunity so unexpectedly offered to follow the retreating hosts of the enemy, and to smite them hip and thigh before they had time to cross the Chickahominy. But McClellan did not so feel — did not so judge — did not so act. What did he do? He sent five divisions of his army, under Sumner, to pursue the Confederates. Ketaining three divi- sions with him, he remained at York- town, ostensibly for the purpose of superintending the arrangements neces- sary for the transport of Franklin’s division up the York Biver. It would not do to belittle Franklin’s expedition. It was, no doubt, all-important that West Point and the Kichmond and York Biver Bail way Terminus should be in the hands of the Nationals. That, however, is not the question. The question rather is, whether the general-in-chief was more needed at Yorktown or at the head of the army of pursuers. The mere statement of the actual facts of the case is the best answer which can be given to the question. While McClellan, with three divisions of his army, besides that of Franklin, was idling at Yorktown, Hooker was maintaining an unequal struggle, his men being cut to pieces in the very ‘‘presence of thirty thou- sand of their comrades,” and Hancock, 224 WILLIAMSBURG. after Laving won a substantial victory, was compelled to relinquish his prize and fall back, for the want of support which existed on the very skirts of the battle field in the shape of whole di- visions. Such was the wretched man- agement of the forces sent in pursuit that, when the battle was ended, the divisions of Smith and Couch and Casey had scarcely been called upon to act. It was near the close of the battle before McClellan appeared on the field. It was too late for him to contribute in any appreciable way to the result of the struggle. He gave orders to Smith, when made aware of Hancock’s position, to forward reinforcements at once; but Hancock had accomplished his task before the reinforcements arrived. The circumstances which brought McClellan to the field re- dound but little to his credit. General Sprague and the Prince de Joinville, during the confusion which prevailed in front in consequence of the absence of a skilful directing hand, rode in haste to Yorktown, and urged the general to hasten at once to the scene of action. The answer was as cold as it was curt. “I suppose those in front can attend to that little matter.” Ulti- mately, however, he was induced to mount his horse and hasten forward. It was about two o’clock when he started from Yorktown. It was five o’clock when he approached the field of action ; Kearney on the left and Han- cock on the right were just about to deal those final blows which deter- mined the issue of the contest; and the sounds of battle, as well as the evidences of hard work which were visible as he drew near the front, convinced him that the day's struggle had been something far other than a “skirmish with the rebel rear-guard,” His appearance on the field was the occasion of the wildest demonstration of applause. Regiment after regiment, as he was recognized, tendered him a welcome, than which none more hearty was ever given to the great Napo- leon himseK. Mounted on a splendid charger, which he gracefully rode, and dressed in a plain blue coat and glaze- covered cap, himself and horse literally covered with mud, his whole appear- ance was admirably suited to the situ- ation. It was, no doubt, the opinion of many of those brave men, who were willing to be led against the enemy, that if the general had been present, the day’s struggle would have had a different and more noble ending. The enthusiasm with which he was greeted ought to have been felt by him as a severe rebuke for his absence; for it testified to the existence on the part of his troops of a warm and deep-rooted affection, which he had but poorly rewarded. When the battle was ended, McClel- lan countermanded the order which he gave to Sedgwick and Richardson on leaving Yorktown ; and instead of ad- vancing, with their divisions, to the front, they were directed to accompany Franklin to West Point. From “Biv- ouac, in front of Williamsburg,” he telegraphed to the War Department that the Confederates were before him in great force, that they were probably PROPHETIC WORDS. 225 in point of numbers stronger than him- self, and in all likelihood well-entrench- ed. In the same message, he said he would “run the risk of holding them in check there.” On the following day he telegraphed to the secretary of war the particulars of the previous day’s struggle. He estimated his loss at two thousand two hundred and twenty- eight, of whom four hundred and fifty- six were killed and fourteen hundred wounded. He indicated no desire for a rapid forward movement. The last words of the despatch were, “We have other battles to fight before reaching Richmond.” It was not difficult to make such a prediction, especially as his dilatory movements were multi- plying the opportunities of the Con- federates, and enabling them so to concentrate their forces and so to en- trench themselves as to make their position almost invulnerable. It is only fifty miles from Williamsburg to Richmond. A bold and well-directed dash against the Confederate Capitol, and the fall of Richmond might have been antedated nearly three years.' The battle was fought on May 5th. i^ay It was not until the 8th that the march was resumed ; and when it was resumed, it was conducted in a manner so dilatory that it may justly be char- acterized as suicidal. Eleven days were consumed in accomplishing what might have been done in three. It is not wonderful that the people became impatient because of the slow execu- tion of their desire and will, and weary of promises always fair but always fruitless. The words of Presi- dent Lincoln were now seen to be more and more prophetic. After Williams- burg, as before Yorktown, it was “the story of Manassas repeated.” McClel- lan would not “strike a blow.” 226 FAIR OAKS. CHAPTER XVI. I Y^T’est Point. — York Eiver. — Franklin’s Command. — The Gunboats. — West Point Occupied. — Norfolk. — General Wool. — Lincoln, Stanton and Chase at Fortress Monroe. — Se wall's Point. — Colonel T. J. Cram. — Ocean View. — Surrender of Norfolk. — General Huger. — The Gunboats on the James Kiver. — Ward’s Bluff. — The James and York Kivers Both Open. — McClellan’s Position Advantageous. — William and Mary College. — The Na- tional Advance after Williamsburg. — Bad Roads. — The Pamunkey River. — Tunstah’s Station. — The Chicka- hominy. — Bottom Bridge. — The Railroad Bridge. — Gaines’ Mills. — New Bridge. — Hanover Court House. — Mechanicsville. — Peake’s Station. — Cool Arbor. — Ashland. — Vigorous Encounter Near Hanover Court House. — A National Victory. — The 30th of May. — The Williamsburg Road. — The Battle Ground. — Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. — McClellan’s Headquarters. — New Bridge. — General Casey. — General Keyes. — White Oak Swamp. — The Position of the Two Armies. — The Army of the Potomac. — Time Lost. — A Critical Position. — A Heavy Rain Storm. — Johnston’s Opportunities. — The Confederates March to the Attack. — The Attack. The National Advance Driven In. — The Battle of Fair Oaks or Seven Pines Begun. — Casey’s Division Fights Bravely, but Hard Pressed. — Compelled to Fall Back. — A Furious Charge. — The Battle Raging. — The Rail Fence. — General Rains. — The Nationals Fall Back upon the Second Line. — General Couch. — Couch Not Unprepared. — Heintzelman Comes Up and Takes Command. — Berry and Jameson. — Birney. — Heintzelman Sorely Pressed. — Couch’s Command Severed. — The Entire Left Wing of the National Army in Peril. — Couch Forms a Double Line of Battle. — Heintzelman ’s Promptitude. — McClellan and Sumner Warned. — The Chickahominy Flooded. — The Grapevine Bridge. — Sumner Moves to the Assistance of the Right Wing. — A Critical Moment. — Sumner on the Scene. — A Timely Arrival. — A Tremendous Volley. — Morgan, of Sedgwick’s Division. — Abercrombie in Difficulty. — Johnston Wounded. — Still the Battle Rages. — An At- tempt to Outflank Sumner’s Right. — Night and Rest. — The Second Day. — The Order of Battle. — The Battle Resumed. — Hooker. — Richardson. — Stoneman. — French. — Howard. — Meagher. — Roger A. Pryor. — Mahone Comes to the Aid of Pryor. — Meagher Ordered Up. — Barriers of Bristling Steel. — General Howard Wounded. — The Confederates Fall Back. — The Firing Ceases. — McClellan’s Purpose. — Fatal Delay. — Hooker Looking into Richmond. — Hooker Rebuked and Recalled. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. —No Glory to McClellan. On the evening of the day which 186‘> battle of Williams- burg, McClellan countermanded the orders w^hich he had given to Franklin, Sedgwick and Richardson. It was no longer necessary that they should advance towards the front. Franklin received instructions to pro- ceed to West Point, at the head of the York River; and Sedgwick, Richard- son and Fitz John Porter were to bear him company. During the night the transports reached their destination ; l^jay and early on the morning of May 6th, Newton’s brigade landed and took position on an open plain, on the right bank of the Pamunkey, one of the principal affluents of the York River. Within twenty-four hours Franklin’s whole division had encamp- ed, the gunboats had taken possession of West Point, and the National flag was floating over the little village. The other divisions were also promptly on hand. During the night of the 7th, the Confederate pickets ventured to May draw near the National encamp- 7. ment, and a guard belonging to the latter was shot Franklin was thus SEWALL’S POINT. 227 admonished that the enemy was not far off ; and preparations were made for a possible engagement on the fol- lowing morning. At early dawn, skirmishers were thrown out towards the edge of the woods; and the whole force was drawn up on the plains, ready to welcome the foe, should he make his appearance. As the Con- federates seemed in no haste to show themselves, the National troops were recalled to breakfast ; the Thirty- Second New York, and the Ninety- Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Pennsylvania regiments being left as an advanced guard near the skirts of the woods which, with the exception of the side to- wards the river, completely surrounded the plain. It was not long until the Confederates began to show themselves more openly and in greater strength. On the west side of the river, there appeared a considerable force; but a vigorous tire having been opened upon them by the gunboats, they were compelled to retire. No time was now lost in landing the troops from the transports ; and by nine o’clock in the morning General Dana had got his brigade ashore. The Confederate scouts were now becoming trouble- some; and the Sixteenth, Thirty-First and Thirty-Second New York, and the Ninety-Fifth and Ninety-Sixth Penn- sylvania were ordered to enter and clear the woods. The scouts retired at their approach ; but the Nationals soon found themselves opposed by large bodies of the retreating army; and, as these were advantageously posted, and well supplied with artillery, it was feared that the above-named regi- ments might be overwhelmed. They were therefore withdrawn. Mean- while, the Second United States battery, under Captain Arnold, and the First Massachusetts battery were ordered into position, the former on the right and the latter on the left; and so vigorous was the fire of shell, that the Confederates were dnven from their shelter in the woods and forced toward the river, where they came full under the fire of the gunboats. They had now no choice but to retire. In this encounter, the Nationals lost one hun- dred and ninety-four men — the Thirty- First and Thirty-Second New York having suffered most severely. The Confederate loss was not so great. The Nationals, however, had made them- selves masters of the position ; and secured the head of the York River as a base of supplies for the army of the Potomac. While Franklin was establishing himself at West Point, and while Mc- Clellan was slowly pressing forward with the view of establishing a com- munication between the main body of the army and the divisions at the head of the York River, events of the ut- most importance were taking place at Norfolk, far to the rear of the National army. From the time McClellan had decided to march to Richmond by way of the Peninsula, General Wool, who commanded at Fortress Monroe, saw the great advantages which would result from the possession of the James River. As a highway for the supplies of the army, it would be in- 228 FAIR OAKS. valuable. It would be all the more so if the York River was also wrenched from Confederate control. Influenced by these views, he had urged the gov- ernment to allow him to attempt the capture of Norfolk, and so break up the blockade of the James. It was not until the evacuation of Yorktown, and until he had renewed his request, that his suggestions were regarded with any degree of favor. The views of General Wool so impressed the gov- ernment, that a visit was made to Fortress Monroe by President Lincoln, and Secretaries Chase and Stanton. The shore was carefully reconnoitred ; and Lincoln, though he saw some dif- ficulties in the way of effecting a landing, in consequence of the shal- lowness of the water, warmly encour- aged the plan — overcoming objections by vigorous and practical suggestions, which showed that on the battle-field, as in the council chamber, he was capable of winning distinction. The order was given on the 8th of May May for an immediate attempt to be made on Sewall’s Point and a march on Norfolk. Arrangements were made with Commodore Goldsborough ; and a laige number of troops were embarked on transports then lying in Hampton Roads. Goldsborough moved towards Sewall’s Point, and opened fire upon the batteries ; but the batteries on the Point replied with such spirit, and the Merrimac having come to their aid, the National vessels withdrew, and the troops were disembarked. On the following day. General Wool, with Colonel T. J. Cram and Secretary Chase, made a reconnoissance along the shore, when it was decided to land five thousand troops at a place called Ocean View. A successful landing made at this point would enable the Nationals to strike Se wall’s Point in the rear, and would open up a direct road to Norfolk. The troops were again em- barked ; and while a bombardment was kept up on the Point from the Rip Raps, with the intention of convincing the Confederates that the purpose still was to move direct on Sewall’s Point, a landing was successfully made at Ocean View. Before dawn on May the 10th, Captain Davis’ com- 10. pany, of Richardson’s light artillery, followed by the Twentieth New York regiment, was safe on shore. General Weber pushed on with the advance; but no opposition was offered, the Con- federates having already abandoned the position. About 8 o’clock in the morn- ing, General Wool, accompanied by the president and by the two secretaries above named, together with Generals Mansfield and Viele, arrived on the scene, and took command in person. The infantry were now pushed on to- wards Turner’s Creek ; but the bridge had been set on fire by the Confede- rates ; and a circuitous route to reach Norfolk was rendered necessary. There was now a general advance ordered ; and at five o’clock in the afternoon, the lines of the Confederate intrenched camp were reached. Twenty-nine can- non were found in position, but there were no troops. On marched the Na- tionals; and just as they were about to enter the city, the mayor, preceded ASCENT OF THE JAMES KIVER. 229 by a flag of truce, and accompanied by several members of the Common Council, came out to meet them with a proposal of suiTender. Huger, it appears, who had charge of the city, had orders not to attempt to hold the city against any serious demonstration of National troops ; and when he was informed of the landing of General Wool at Ocean View, he turned over the city of Norfolk to Mayor Lamb, and fled, with his troops, towards Richmond. Having received the sur- render, General Wool issued an order from the City Hall, informing the in- habitants of what had taken place, appointing General Egbert Viele mili- tary governor, and directing that all peaceful citizens should be protected in the free use and exercise of their lawful rights and privileges. About midnight General Wool, who rode back to Ocean View, had crossed to Fortress Monroe with the pleasing intelligence that Norfolk had fallen. The president and Secretary Stanton were there to receive him. The Confederate commander, Huger, had evidently resolved to leave as little behind him as possible. The Navy Yard and works at Portsmouth were found to be on Are ; and al- though every effort was made to save the place, the fire gained the mastery, and ships, gunboats, workshops and machinery of various kinds were all destroyed. On the morning of the May 11th, the Merrimac, which, on H* the retirement of the Confede- rates, had had a slow match applied to her magazine, exploded with a tre- mendous noise, the huge monster being blown into a thousand fragments. All the defenses in and about the city, and all the formidable works on the Eliza- beth River and on the borders of Chesapeake Bay, including Sewall’s Point and Craney Island, were aban- doned ; and about two hundred cannon, with a large quantity of ammunition, were left as spoil for the victors. The destruction of the Merrimac, judged from a Confederate standpoint, seems to have been a great blunder; and it was so judged at the time. It was natural and proper enough for them, in the circumstances, to destroy the Navy Yard, and to put out of the way everything which should add to the strength of their enemy ; but the Merrimac was practically invulnerable ; and she might have been retained and used by the Confederates much to the inconvenience of the Nationals. As it was, the James River was free for the passage of the gunboats ; and without delay, and experiencing but little dif- ficulty, they were pushed forward, day by day, until they were brought to a halt at Ward’s Bluff. At this point, the river was too narrow and the Con- federate works too strong for the gun- boats to pass. A bold and vigorous attempt was made on the 15th, May on which day they had worked 15. their way so far up the windings of the- stream; but it was adjudged to be “impossible to reduce such works ex- cept with the aid of a land force,” and the vessels were withdrawn. Up to- this point the river was open ; and McClellan, in his advance up ther ^22 230 FAIR OAKS. Peninsula and towards Richmond, had now the full advantage of both the James and the York. W e have followed Franklin, with his own division and those of Sedgwick, Richardson and Fitz John Porter, up from Yorktown, along the York, to West Point. We have recounted the details of the encounter which they had with the Confederates shortly after their landing at w’hat was called Brick House Point. We have also described the surrender of Norfolk, the explosion of the Merrimac, the abandonment of the forts on the Elizabeth and, on the borders of the Chesapeake, and the other events which left the James River, like the York, in the possession of the Nationals. These two episodes form a natural, as they are a neces- sary, introduction to the battle of Fair Oaks,” or “ Seven Pines,” as it is sometimes called. McClellan now found himself in a really advanta- geous position. Had events resulted in perfect conformity with his own desires and interests, they could hardly have been other than they were. Free from all danger of attack in the rear, and having complete command of both great waterways, he had only to think of the foe in his front. Let us now^ return to the main army, wLich we left under the personal command of McClellan. Having made provision for his sick and wounded in the halls of the ven- erable college of William and Mary, he began to move forward on the 8th of May May, the third day after the bat- tie of Williamsburg. Stoneman w^as sent in advance to open a com- munication wuth Franklin and the other divisions which had accompanied or followed him up the York River. The roads were in a wretched con- dition ; and the march was conducted in circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty. It was one of the most beautiful and fertile portions of Vir- ginia; but the retreating army had spared no pains to injure the roads and to multiply obstructions. On the 15th, McClellan had advanced yjay to the neighborhood of White 15. House, at the head of the navigation of the Pamunkey, and some eighteen miles from Richmond. On the May 18th, he had reached Tunstall’s 18* Station, on the Richmond and York River Railroad; and on the 22d, May he established his headquarters 22. at Cool Arbor, not far from the Chick- ahominy, and between eight and nine miles from Richmond. His advanced light troops had already reached Bot- tom Bridge, on the Chickahominy, at the crossing of the New Kent Road. In their retreat, the Confederates had turned the bridge, but had left the point uncovered. Casey’s division, of Keyes’ corps, was soon across the river ; and the heights on the Richmond side were occupied. He was followed close by Heintzelman. Pressed by Stone- man, the Confederates had also re- treated across the railroad bridge which passes over the Chickahominy, a little to the north of Bottom Bridge — destroying it as they crossed. Stone- man halted and took a position at Gaines’ Mills, whence active and sue- HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 231 cessful reconnoissances were made, a number of the Confederate scouts and advance troops, after some skirmishing, being driven from their posts at New Bridge. While thus feeling his way, and get- ting his army into position, McClellan detached Fitz John Porter from the main body, which was still on the left of the Chickahominy, on an expedition to Hanover Court House. His object was to disperse the forces of the Con- federates concentrated at that point, and to cut otf their railroad com- munications between Kichmond and Fredericksburg. It was hoped, also, that he might facilitate the advance of McDowell’s corps, whose approach McClellan anxiously awaited ; but operations in the Shenandoah Valley, hereafter to be described, made Mc- Dowell’s advance in this direction impossible. This detachment moved, by way of Mechanicsville, early on ]^ay morning of the 27th. Gen- 271 eral Emory led the advance, with the Fifth and Sixth Regular Cavalry and Benson’s horse battery, supported by Morell’s division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butterfield and McQuade, with Berdan’s sharpshoot- ers and three batteries under Captain Griffin. Warren, with his provisional brigade, moved towards the same point by another road. The rain had fallen heavily during the early hours of the morning ; and the roads, in conse- quence, were in a fearful condition. The troops, however, bore bravely up. When about six miles from Hanover Court House, the mounted pickets of the Confederates came into view, but they speedily disappeared. The Na- tionals kept moving on until they were within about two miles of the Court House, when they were brought to halt by a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. The Twenty-Fifth New York suffered severely; two of their companies were cut off and captured ; and they were compelled to fall back. Meanwhile, the batteries were hurried forward; and the main body of the Nationals rushed to the aid of the advance. After holding the ground obstinately for two hours, the Con- federates were forced to retire, one of their guns being captured by the Seventeenth New York. They were vigorously pursued for some distance by the brigades of Butterfield and McQuade. Martindale’s brigade was pushed forward to Peake’s Station, on the Virginia Central Railroad, while Porter himself, with the rest of his force, advanced towards Hanover Court House. On his way to the railroad, Martindale encountered a Confederate force, and drove it towards Ashland. In the encounter, one of his mounted men was shot by a concealed foe ; but this was the only casualty. Having destroyed a portion of the railroad, burned the bridge, and cut the tele- graph wires, Martindale was on his way back to join the main body, when the Confederates, who had been rein- forced by fresh troops from Richmond, and had contrived secretly to regain the cover of the woods, fell upon him with tremendous fury. His men fought like true heroes, boldly maintaining 232 FAIR OAKS. tlieir ground for nearly an hour, in the face of superior numbers, when General Porter, who had reached the Court House, came back to their relief. Meanwhile, the brigades of Butterfield and McQuade, who had gone in pur- suit of the Confederates, arrived on the scene. So, also, did that of Warren, which had been delayed in repairing bridges. Porter was therefore able to meet his antagonist on equal terms. Planting his artillery to the right and left, and filling up the centre with his infantiy, he advanced and poured into the woods a diagonal fire of musketry and shell. This terrible work was kept up from five o’clock till dusk, when the Confederates retired — cling- ing, however, so close to the woods that they could not be pursued with any marked success. Bivouacking on the field he had won. Porter made preparations for a renewal of the at- tack in the morning. When morning dawned, it was found that the Con- federates had disappeared. Porter, however, had reason to be satisfied. The object of his expedition had been attained, so far as that was now possi- ble. He had occupied Hanover Court House ; and he had destroyed the track and bridges of the Virginia Central Railroad. In these various encounters the Confederates suffered heavily. In killed and wounded and absent, their loss could not have been less than one thousand. The National loss was between three hundred and may fifty and four hundred. On the 29. 29th, Porter returned to his original camp on the Chickahominy. The 30th of May arrived; and al- though the two great armies lay within easy distance of each other, no very seri- ous effort had been attempted on either side. The position of the National army was peculiar, and somewhat beset with peril. The ground occupied by the two rival armies has been compared not unaptly to the letter V. It might with equal propriety be described as bearing a general resemblance to an acute-angled triangle, of which the point, or apex, was at Bottom Bridge, and the two larger sides were formed respectively by the Chickahominy and Williamsburg Hoad. The Chicka- hominy forms a line which runs from Bottom Bridge towards the southwest. The Williamsburg Road forms a line which, from the same point, runs al- most due west. A little to the north of Bottom Bridge, the York River Railroad crosses the Chickahominy and runs towards Richmond in a line very nearly parallel with the Williamsburg Road. Inside of this angle, but towards Richmond, and with full com- mand of the country in the rear, lay the Confederate ai'inv. All the bridges in the neighborhood, it will be remem- bered, were destroyed by the Confede- rates before the Nationals came up. Outside of the angle, and along the left or northeast bank of the Chicka- hominy, was ranged the great bulk of the National army. Here, at Cool Arbor, near New Bridge, were the headquarters of General McClellan. Here, too, a little further down the stream, were Franklin, Fitz John Porter and others. And here, too, THE CHICKAHOMINY. 233 was General Sumner, further on still, towards the point of the angle, at Bottom Bridge. Bottom Bridge hav- ing been repaired, Keyes’ corps, as we ]|lay have seen, crossed the river on or 24 about the morning of the 24th. He was followed by Heintzelman, who took up ground in his rear. Casey’s division of the corps advanced as far as Fair Oaks Station, on the York River Railroad, where he took posi- tion, his line stretching from a point a little to the north of the railroad, southward as far as the Williamsburg Road. The ground was bounded on the left and front by dense woods. The edges of these woods were cut down to form abatis, in order to ob- struct the enemy. A line of earth- works was also thrown up, consisting of a redoubt and some rifle-pits. Be- hind these Casey posted his troops — his first brigade on the right, his second in the centre, his third on the left, his picket-guards being pushed forward into the woods in front. About half a mile to the rear of Casey, at a place called Seven Pines, Couch was simi- larly posted, his line lying across the Williamsburg turnpike, and stretching from a point slightly to the south of that road, northward towards the York River Railroad. His right was thus slightly in the rear of Fair Oaks Station. In front of him the Williams- burg Road is intersected by a circu- itous highway, called the “ Nine Mile Road.” Kearney’s division, of Heint- zelman’s corps, was further in the rear, on the York River Railroad, and in the neighborhood of Savage’s Station. Hooker, with his division, also of Heintzelman’s corps, was guarding the approaches to White Oak Swamp, which lay to the south of the Will- iamsburg Road, and stretched east- ward as far as the Chickahominy. Such was the position of the National army on the eve of the famous battle of Fair Oaks. We have already said that the position was one beset with con- siderable peril. One of the wings of that army, as we have shown, was on the right and the other was on the left side of the river. The right wing, which consisted of five divisions and the reserves, lay on the outside of the angle, on the side formed by the Chickahominy. The left wing, con- sisting of four divisions, lay, en echelon, along the line of the York River Rail- road. From the extreme point of one wing to that of the other, by way of Bottom Bridge, which was the only available connection, was a distance of more than twelve miles, although by an air line the two wings were not at any point very far apart. It is manifest at a glance that McClellan, by allowing himself to drift into the position, gave the Confederates an immense advantage. Until he should succeed in throwing up new bridges across the Chickahominy — and there was no evidence that such work was going on — it naturally enough seemed to the Confederates a possibility to strike the National left, drive it into the river or swamp, or both, and per- haps annihilate it before any assistance could be rendered by the right. This was the plan of action decided upon 234 FAIR OAKS. by the Confederate leader; and the delay of McClellan gave Johnston his opportunity. On the 24th, at the head of the advance, Keyes had crossed Bottom Bridge. It was now the 30th. Six days of comparative in- action had thus been allowed to elapse; and the National general-in- chief seemed as yet in no haste to adopt the initiative. He had told his troops, when giving instructions in re- May gard to the crossing of the river on 25. the 25th, to “go prepared for bat- tle at a moment’s notice.” He had, a day or two later, appealed to the pride of his soldiers, and reminded them “ that the army of tlie Potomac had never yet been checked.” Still, he seemed unwilling to strike the first blow, and so force the fight. This delay was all the more reprehensible, that the waters of the Chickahominy were already somewhat swollen, and the marshy ground around considerably flooded. A heavy rain storm, which might fall at any moment, would so flood the ground as to increase the peril which would attend the retreat of the National left, and would so swell the river as to make communica- tion between the two wings impossible. On this occasion, at least, the Fates seemed to be on the side of the Con- IHay federates. On the night of the 30th of May, there was a terrific rain storm in and around Richmond. It is described as resembling a tropical deluge. All the lower lands were flooded ; and the Chickahominy over- flowed its banks and washed away many of the bridges by which it was spanned. Johnston’s opportunity had come. He was not slow to see it. Everything was in readiness, and action was taken at once. Longstreet was ordered to go out by the Williamsburg Road, with his own and D. H. Hill’s division — Hill, with his division, to attack the Nationals in front; General Huger was ordered to move down the Charles City Road, and strike them on the left ; while General G. W. Smith was directed to follow the New Bridge Road towards the “ Old Tavern,” and then, by the Nine Mile Road, move towards their right at Fair Oaks. It was intended that all these troops should move simultaneously at dawn on the morning of the 31st; but ]^fay so heavy were the roads, in consequence of the extraordinary rain- fall, that it was ten o’clock before Hill’s division began to move. Gen- eral Casey was not ignorant of the responsible and perilous position which he occupied. He knew that an attack was meditated ; and he had every reason to believe that the first blow would fall upon his division. He had been busy all the morning making his ground secure. About eleven o’clock he was made aware that the Confede- rates were advancing in great force. He ordered his men to take to their arms. Almost as he gave orders, two shells came hissing along, too unmistakably announcing that the Confederates were close at hand. The spades and the axes with which the men bad been working were sj>eedily ex- changed for the weapons of war. It was not too soon. Shortly before one REPULSE OF GENERAL CASEY. 235 o’clock, the strength of the enemy and the violence of the attack were soon revealed by the appearance of the panic-stricken pickets of the National advance, who had been driven in. The One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania was sent forward to aid in resisting the attack. It was of no avail. At the first volley, two hundred men of this rec^iment were struck down. The re- mainder turned back and fled in a panic, exclaiming that they had been “ cut to pieces.” Casey’s entire divi- sion was now got into line. Colonel Bailey, Casey’s chief of artilleiy, soon had his batteries in action. Spratt’s battery was posted in a field to the right of the road, near the edge of a wood, through which the Confederates were advancing. Began ’s battery was stationed to the left of Spratt’s. The batteries were supported by a power- ful body of infantry, under General Naglee, consisting of the One Hun- dredth New York, the Eleventh Maine, the One Hundred and Fourth Penn- sylvania and the Ninety-Third New York. Bates’ battery, under Lieu- tenant Hart, was in the unfinished redoubt. Wessel’s brigade was in the rifle-pits. Palmer’s was held be- hind as a reserve. The batteries opened a vigorou^fire and were well served. The infantry fought bravely, firing with great spirit, and contest- iug every inch of ground; but they were compelled to fall back towards the rifle-pits. The batteries, however, con- tinued their fire, and succeeded for a time in holding the enemy at bay. Casey now began to perceive that the Confederates were gaining on his flanks. His artillery was in peril. With a view to prevent so great a disaster, he ordered a bayonet charge. This was gallantly performed by the regiments above named, in immediate charge of General Naglee. With a tremendous yell, the National troops sprang for- ward, and drove the enemy back to the adjacent woods. Here, however, they were assailed by a most murder- ous musket fire; and the Confederates rushed upon them, from the cover of the woods, in overwhelming numbers. The battle was now raging furiously. Spratt’s battery, which had long resist- ed the Confederate advance at a rail- fence, and had driven them back again and again, was under the necessity of falling back for the want of ammuni- tion. Began’s battery held out for a little while longer. It was now about three o’clock; and the conflict had been fierce since before one. About this time. General Bains forced his way to the rear of the redoubt ; and multitudes of Confederates appeared at the rifle-pits. Casey, unable any longer to offer anything like effective resistance, ordered his troops to fall back upon the second line, in possession of Couch. The retreat was well con- ducted. The Confederates halted not, but pressed vigorously forward. Two of Spratt’s guns fell into their hands, but happily they had been spiked ; the cannon in the redoubt were seized by General Bhodes and turned upon the fugitives; yet, in spite of the odds which were arrayed against them, and the terrific fire to which, in their 236 FAIR OAKS. retreat, they were exposed, Casey’s men carried off with them, and brought safe to the second line, three fourths of their guns. Couch was not unprepared for the stern duties which now devolved upon him. Several of his regiments had been ordered forward to Casey’s relief by his corps commander. General Keyes. Four of these regiments — the Fifty-Fifth New York, the Twenty- Third, Sixty-First and Ninety-Third Pennsylvania — had been in the thick of the fight, when it raged most vio- lently, and had been severely punished. These regiments, with the Seventh Massachusetts and Sixty-Second New York, which had been sent after them, were all pressed back again towards the right of the second line, which, it will be remembered, rested on the York Fiver Railroad, not far in the rear of Fair Oaks Station. Couch’s division, which, as we have already seen, lay across the Williamsburg Road, and reached northward to the York River Railroad, had its right considerably advanced, and presented to the approaching enemy an oblique front, nearly parallel to the Nine Mile Road. Rifle-pits were well arranged all along the line ; and the batteries of Flood and Brady and Miller, with battery C, of the First Pennsylvania artillery, were skilfully and advanta- geously posted. Heintzelman, whose corps lay con- siderably in the rear, had been notified by Keyes of the perilous position in which Casey’s division was placed, and urged to send forward reinforcements, was hurrying forward with all possible speed. Shortly after four o’clock, Heintzelman appeared on the field ; and, as he outranked Keyes, he as- sumed the command. About the same time, Kearney, of Heintzelman’s corps, came up with two of his brigades — those of Berry and Jameson. His other brigade, that of Birney, was also on its way. There was a pause in the fight, after the Confederates occupied the ground from which they had driven Casey’s division. It was brief, however; for before it was yet half- past four o’clock, they bore down with tremendous energy upon Couch’s line ; and from its oblique character, having its right advanced, they came first in collision with the Twenty-Third Penn- sylvania. The attack was gallantly met by that regiment. Reserving their fire until the Confederates were close upon them, they opened with deadly effect ; and while their opponents reeled and staggered, they charged them with the bayonet, and drove them back. The Twenty-Third paid dearly for their temerity. Advancing too far, they exposed themselves to the fire of the enemy’s artillery, and were driven back, in their turn, in dis- order, and with great loss. Colonel Niele, having retained his colors, rallied some one hundred of his men, fell back on the First Long Island, and re-formed. The struggle now became general on the right. Effort after effort was made to but little purpose. The First Long Island soon shared the fate of the Twenty-Third Pennsylvania. The Fifty-Seventh and Sixty-Third SUMNER TAKES COMMAND. 237 Pennsylvania were also compelled, in their turn, to yield to the pressure of the foe. The Tenth Massachusetts, after having been surrounded and broken, re-formed and moved to the right; but it was to little purpose. Heintzelman was not proving himself a match for Johnston, who was present with his army, and directing its every movement. All along the line on the right, in the centre and on the left, the Confederates were victorious. Couch’s command was severed ; the general himself, with a portion of his forces, was compelled to cross the railroad to the north, while the body of his divi- sion was driven back in the direction of the Williamsburg Road ; and Kearney was pressed towards the borders of the flooded White Oak Swamp. The day was advancing ; and as night drew on, the prospect was the reverse of cheer- ing for Heintzelman and Keyes. De- struction seemed to rest on the entire left wing of the National army. In his extremity, and not knowing which way retreat was possible, Couch formed two lines of battle — one toward the railroad, with a section of Brady’s battery, supported by the Seventh Massachusetts ; another toward the wood to the west, with the other sec- tion of the battery, supported by the Anderson Zouaves, with the Thirty- First Pennsylvania and the First Chas- seurs. This latter line was formed on the edge of the wood, under cover of a rail-fence. The situation had become perilous in the extreme. Happily, at this criti- cal moment, and when most needed, relief came. Heintzelman, when made aware of Casey’s perilous position, lost no time in conveying the information to Generals McClellan and Sumner. McClellan was at New Bridge, at the extreme point of the National right wing. Sumner was nearer the extrem- ity of the angle, in the neighborhood of the railroad bridge. Both were, as the reader has already been given to understand, on the further side of the now flooded Chickahominy. Sumner, fortunately, had been seeing dangers ahead ; and without any special in- structions from his chief, he had, i^ay as early as the 25th, commenced 25. to construct a bridge across the stream, in front of his position. The bridge was completed on the evening of yfay the 30th. It was known after- SO. wards as the Grape Vine Bridge. It was slender ; but it saved the army of the Potomac. As soon as the news reached McClellan of the danger which threatened his left wing, he ordered Sumner to be ready to move at a moment’s warning. Sumner was ready, when, at two o’clock the order reached him to cross the stream at once. The passage was diflicult ; but by caution and care it was successfully accom- plished. Sedgwick, with his division, crossed first, dragging with them a battery of twenty-four Napoleon guns. Richardson followed — Sumner last. At the moment when Couch and Ileintzel- man were separated, Sumner appeared on the field and assumed the command. No change was made in Sumner’s dis- positions. Sedgwick formed in line of battle at the edge of the wood, near 238 FAIR OAKS. Fair Oaks, with the First Minnesota on his right flank. The Confederates began to press on as if they meant to rush victoriously to Bottom Bridge. The Napoleon guns opened fire ; and a storm of canister mowed down their ranks and made them recoil. The Confederates made one more attempt to advance ; and as they came to the edge of the wood, they delivered a most effective volley at the Anderson Zouaves. Colonel Biker was killed, and the Zouaves broke and ran. Speedily rallied, they resumed their position. Just as the fatal volley was delivered by the Confederates, three regiments — the Thirty-First Pennsylvania, the First Chasseurs and the First Minne- sota — which were lying on their faces in front of the battery, sprang up, and poured their deadly fire into the very faces of the enemy. In front of that line the Confederates lay in heaps. Brigadier-General A. Davis was among the killed ; and Brigadier-General Pet- tigrew, who was wounded and had his horse killed under him, was taken prisoner. Morgan, of Sedgwick’s division, had meanwhile been sent to the relief of Abercrombie, who had been maintain- ing a protracted and unequal struggle on the extreme right. Morgan, in his turn, needed help ; and the gallant General Burns, with the Sixty-Nintli and Seventy-Second Pennsylvania, was sent to his support, while Sedgwick himself advanced for the same purpose, taking with him two other Pennsylva- nia regiments — the Seventy-Fir^t and the One Hundred and Sixth. At this time the fighting was severe. It re- quired all the nerve of Sedgwick and of Burns to keep the men at their work. The Confederates, resolved to win, seemed fearless of punishment. Again and again they attempted to advance, and as often were fearful lanes made in their compact ranks by the murderous fire of canister which was poured from the National battery. It was now sunset; and about this time General Johnston was wounded. The command devolved upon General Smith, who assumed its duties. The loss of their chief did not damp the purpose of the Confederates or lessen their energy. As darkness came on, a determined attempt was made to out- flank Sumner’s right. Sumner ordered a bayonet charge by five regiments. The charge was gallantly made, and was completely successful. The Confede- rate line was broken and thrown into confusion. It was now eight o’clock'; darkness was falling upon the scene; and the weary combatants on both sides, resting on their arms, fell asleep on the ground where so many of their comrades lay in the cold embrace jfjay of death. Such was the famous 31# battle at Fair Oaks, May 31st, 1862. On the following morning (Sunday, June 1st), both armies were ready June to resume the contest. The Na- tional army had been largely reinforced during the night by troops from the other side of the Chickahominy. Mc- Clellan was himself on the field and made the disposition for the day ; but with that habitual regard which he had for the Sabbath, he seemed un- THE BATTLE ENDED. 239 willing to provoke battle. Sickles’ New York brigade was posted on the left, and stretched across the Williams- burg turnpike, with Patterson and his New Jersey brigade on his right. Both were of Hooker’s division and of Heintzelman’s corps. To the right of Patterson, and slightly in advance, was Kichardson’s division, of Stoneman’s corps. Sedgwick’s division, also of Stoneman’s corps, and also slightly in advance, was on Bichardson’s right. The two last were so placed along the line of railroad that they lay almost at right angles to the brigades of Sickles and Patterson. Couch held the posi- tion which he had reclaimed the day before, and was supported by Sedgwick. Birney was also on the railroad, but more to the rear. The National line, it will thus be seen, formed a sort of triangle. Inside of the triangle were the Confederates, who occupied sub- stantially the ground which they had wrenched from the Nationals on the previous day. The main body of the Confederates faced the main body of the Nationals along the line of railroad. The Nationals were on the north of this line; the Confederates were on the south. McClellan, as we have said, w^as slow to provoke battle ; but his dispo- sitions were made, and he was ready for the attack which he had reason to expect the Confederates w^ould make. He had not long to wait. With the first streak of early dawn, the Con- federates were in motion. It ^vas evi- dent that they were nothing daunted by the experience of the previous day, and that they meant to complete what they doubtless regarded as their un- finished task. The Nationals were up and ready, when the Confederates fell upon Richardson’s division with tre- mendous fury. It was a cavalry attack ; and it was as warmly received as it was vigorously given. The cavalry were driven back upon their lines by a well-directed tire of artillery. It was, however, only for a moment ; for they returned in greater force, well sus- tained by companies of infantiy. The battle soon extended along the whole line. French’s, Howard’s and Meagher’s brigades were the first to engage the foe who was so resolute on battle. To protect an open field on his right front, Richardson had advantageously posted a battery of 10-pounder rifle Parrott guns, under Captain Hazard; and directly in front of his line he had placed the brigade of General French and a regiment of the brigade of General O. O. Howard. The re- maining regiments of Howard’s brigade formed a second line ; and the Irish brigade of Thomas F. Meagher, with eighteen pieces of artillery, formed the third. It was evidently the intention of the Confederates, in attacking Rich- ardson, to cut the National line in two ; and, by forcing their way between, to destroy the army in detail. If such was their purpose, they had sadly mis- calculated the strength and spirit of the National troops. General Roger A. Pryor, whose acquaintance, the reader will remember, we first made in Charleston Harbor, came up with a part of Huger’s division, which had 240 FAIR OAKS. taken no part in Saturday’s battle, and fell heavily upon French. Howard rushed forward to the support of French. The fighting was severe ; and under the vigorous assaults and well- directed fire of the Confederates, the National troops more than once waver- ed, but were quickly rallied by their officers. General Howard made him- self conspicuous at the head of his men, and did much to cheer and sustain | them, both by word and deed. Ma- hone now came up to the aid of Pryor; and Meagher, who had been impatient to join the fray, was ordered to the front. He fell upon the enemy with great vigor. For three hours the battle raged with great fierceness. The Confederates began to yield to the bold and impetuous attacks of the Nationals on the right. They had no better fortune on the left; for in that direction they became engaged with two brigades of Hooker’s division — Patterson’s New Jersey and Sickles’ New York; and, after sustaining a severe fire from those brigades, they were driven back at the point of the bayonet. All along the line, wherever they attempted to penetrate, they found barriers of bristling steel and hearts of iron. It was in vain to make any further attempt to drive the Nation- als back into the swollen waters of the Chickahominy and the adjoining swamps, or to force a way to Bottom Bridge. It was now nine o’clock ; and at this early hour, the Confede- rates, as if convinced of the fruitless- ness of further efforts, fell back, and the firing ceased. The battle was not renewed. Towards the close of the struggle. General Howard received those wounds which cost him his right arm. He did not, however, leave the field. Binding his shattered limb in his handkerchief, he remained at his post till* the battle was ended. Although they had failed in their second day’s efforts, the Confederates did not abandon the ground which they I had taken from Casey on Saturday. On this ground they remained during the whole of Monday, and some of them over Monday night. It was General McClellan’s purpose to pursue them on the third day and regain what had been lost. With this end in view, he had made all necessary arrange- ments to offer them battle. His line was drawn up, skirmishers were sent in advance, the artillery was posted, and the army began to move for\vard. It was all unnecessary work. Delay had given the Confederates sufficient time to move back their camp equi- pages and munitions of war to their lines at Eichmond. This being suc- cessfully accomplished, they themselves followed. When McClellan advanced there was no enemy to encounter. Fair Oaks and Seven Pines were reoccupied by the National troops; and the two armies resumed substantially their for- mer positions. Hooker, having been or- dered forward by Heintzelman, with a reconnoitering party toward Eichmond, advanced within four miles of the Con- federate capital. On hearing of his temerity, McClellan ordered him back. These are the words McClellan used : “ General Hooker will return from his THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 241 brilliant reconnoissance ; we cannot af- ford to lose his division.” Hooker re- turned to Casey’s camp, where, at the house of one George Turner, McClel- lan had established his headquarters. While McClellan busied himself again at his favorite work of throwing up entrenchments and constructing fortifi- cations, Hooker, yielding to the gentler impulses of a soldier’s nature, occupied his hours of enforced inactivity in the establishment of an hospital near Fair Oaks Station. In the two days’ fighting at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, both armies sustained heavy losses. It has been estimated that the loss on either side must have amounted to near seven thousand men — a heavy loss, when it is considered that in neither the one army nor the other were there more than fif- teen thousand engaged. Attempts have been made to give the actual figures ; but they cannot be regarded as reliable. The battle of Fair Oaks does not re- dound to the credit of General McClel- lan. It cannot be said that he was successful in his choice of battle ground or in the original disposition of his troops. He was neglectful in the matter of bridges. His long delay before the battle gave the enemy an opportunity; he ought to have placed more men at Sumner’s disposal, and most certainly he ought not to have been absent from the first day’s fight. His delay, after the battle, in pressing on toward Richmond has been severely condemned by competent military au- thorities. CHAPTER XVII. The Old Policy of Delfiy. — McClellan’s Army Still Inactive. — The Shenandoah Valley. — Jackson and Lander. — Blooming Gap. — Death of Lander. — General Banks at Harper’s Ferry. — General Shields. — Battle of Kerns- town. — Shields Wounded. — Conducting the Battle from his Bed. — Tyler’s Splendid Charge. — The “Stone- wall Brigade.” — Jackson’s Defeat. — General Banks in Pursuit. — Shields the Hero of the Fight at Kernstown. — Sketch of Shields. — Jackson Joined by Ewell. — Shields Detached from Banks and Sent to Join McDowell. — Banks Greatly Weakened Thereby. — Jackson Strikes Fremont. — Banks’ Retreat. — Jackson and Ewell in Pursuit. — Attack on Front Royal. — Kenly Overpowered. — Banks Continues his Retreat from Strasburg. — Overtaken by Ewell at Winchester. — Battle of Winchester. — Banks Compelled to Fall Back. — He Reaches the Potomac Opposite Williamsport. — An Almost Unparalleled March. — Safe Across the River. — Jackson’s Mistake. — Consternation at Washington. — McDowell’s Recall. — Fremont and Shields. — Jackson’s Retreat from Harper’s Ferry. — Ewell’s Demonstrations. — His Retreat. — The Race up the Shenandoah. — Jackson Eludes his Pursuers. — Burns the Bridges in his Rear. — Reaches Harrisonburg. — Followed Close by Fremont. — A Vigorous Encounter. — General Ashby Killed. — Capture of Colonel Wyndham. — Battle of Cross Keys. — Ewell Holds his Ground. — Port Republic. — Jackson Across the Bridge. — Arrival of Shields’ Advance. — Ewell Joins Jackson. — The Nationals Driven Back. — The Burning of the Bridge. — Jackson’s Success. — What He Had Done. — Sketch of Jackson. — Reflections. — The Mistake of the Government. Tete battle of Fair Oaks was fought 1862 first day of June. For three weeks the army of the Potomac lay quietly along the line of the Chicka- hominy — McClellan, pursuing his old JACXSOK’S CAMPAIGN. policy of delay, and occupying the thoughts of his men by throwing up fortifications and otherwise strengthen- ing his position. The three weeks’ delay proved fatal, as we shall soon see, to the Peninsular campaign — a campaign begun in splendor and pro- mise, but, having signally failed of its purpose, destined to end in gloom and disaster. In order, however, to an intelligent appreciation of what may be called the second period of the Peninsular cam- paign, it is necessary for the reader to carry with him a knowledge of the events which, at this date, were in progress in the Shenandoah V^alley and the adjacent regions on both sides of the Blue Ridge. While, therefore, McClellan waits for propitious weather, and for the advent of McDowell on the line of the Chickahominy and on the malarious borders of White Oak Swamp, let us follow the movements of the National armies a little further to the north and west, and witness their vain endeavors to check the triumphal progress of the Confederate general, “ Stonewall ” Jackson. In a previous chapter it has been shown that, when it was finally agreed that McClellan was to proceed to Richmond by way of the Peninsula, every precaution was taken for the protection of Washington. Early in January, General Lander, of General Banks’ corps, was placed in command of a force whose primary duty it was to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Floyd and Wise and Lee had each of them been com- pelled to retire from that neighbor- hood; and ‘‘Stonewall” Jackson, in whom Lander found a skilful and ener- getic opponent, was endeavoring to recover the ground which they had lost, and make himself master, if pos- sible, of the Shenandoah Valley. With a comparatively small force, not ex- ceeding four thousand men. Lander executed a series of brilliant move- ments in presence of the enemy ; and, on the night of February 14th, he made a dash, at the head of IL some four hundred horsemen, and, surprising Jackson at Blooming Gap, captured seventeen of his commissioned officers and about sixty of his rank and file, and compelled him to retire. Lander died soon after, from the effects of a wound which he had received in October of the previous year, a few days after the battle of Ball’s Bluff, in a skirmish at Edward’s Ferry. In Lander, the country lost a brave sol- dier, a capable general, and a truly loyal citizen. The troops commanded by Lander were placed under General Shields, another able ofiicer, who had already earned for himself a name by his services in Mexico. Early in February, General Banks, to whom had been assigned the duty of covering the line of the Potomac and Washington City, sent Colonel Geary forward with a force to occupy Harper’s Ferry. This task was easily accomplished ; and towards the end of the month, General Banks arrived and took command in person, occupying, with his troops, all the higher ground near the ferry, as well as Charleston and Leesburg. Jackson, after his en- BATTLE OF KERNSTOWN, 243 counter with Lander, had retired to Winchester, where he was lying, with his division of some eight thousand men, when, early in March, Johnston evacuated Manassas. On the 11th of I^Iar. March, two days later, Jackson also retired, moving further up the Shenandoah Valley, and keeping himself in ^ easy communication with Johnston. He halted at Mount Jack- son, some forty miles above Winches- ter. Thither Shields pursued him ; but finding Jackson well posted, and believing him to be too strong to warrant an attack, he fell back on Winchester for the double purpose of securing a place of safety, and of decoying Jackson from his position. After a march of thirty miles, which was accomplished in one day. Shields posted his division in a secluded place, about two miles from Winchester, on the Martinsburg Road, and about half a mile north of the village of Kerns- town. While the division under Shields was so occupied. General Banks, following out the arrangements agreed upon at Fairfax Court House, put the rest of his corps in motion towards Centreville, from which the Confederates had retired on March nth. In his backward march to- wards Winchester, Shields was fol- lowed closely by Ashby’s cavalry. IWan ftie 22d, about five o’clock 22* in the afternoon, Ashby’s horse- men attacked and drove in Shields’ pickets. Shields was well posted, and had under him a force of about 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry and 24 guns. By order of General Banks, who was on the ground, Shields pushed forward one brigade and two batteries of artil- lery; but the movement was so con- ducted that the enemy could only see a small portion of that force. While directing one of the batteries to its position. Shields was hit by the frag- ment of a shell, which fractured his arm above the elbow, bruised his shoulder and injured his side. Badly injured as he was, he was yet able to attend to his duty, so far as to make dispositions for the ensuing days. Under cover of the night, he pushed forward Kimball’s brigade, nearly three miles on the Strasburg Road. To support this brigade, if attacked, Daum’s artillery was placed in a strong position. In the rear of Kimball’s, and within supporting distance of it, covering all the approaches to the town, was placed Sullivan’s brigade, which, with Broadhead’s cavalry, was held in reserve. In that order the troops rested for the night. Early on the following morning a recon- |^ar. noissance was made. There was 23. no evidence of the presence in front of any Confederate force, except Ash- by’s cavalry. In the belief that such was the fact, and taking it for granted that Jackson would not be daring enough to attack Shields, Banks, in obedience to a summons from head- quarters, left at ten A. M. for Wash- ington. Shields was soon undeceived; and General Banks had only reached Har- per’s Ferry, on his way to Washington, when he heard the sounds of battle, and promptly retraced his steps. At 244 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. the time the reconnoissance was made,' and when the National scouts could see nothing but Ashby’s cavalry, JacI:- son’s whole army was posted in battle order, with artillery on each flank, about half a mile south of Kernstown, and completely under cover of the woods. Shortly after eleven o’clock, the Confederate cannon opened fire upon Kimball. Sullivan’s brigade was or- dered forward to his support ; and the fire of artillery on both sides became heavy, although as yet ineffective, because of the distance. Jackson seemed resolved to force the fighting. Pushing forward more guns to his right, and advancing to their support a considerable force of infantry and cavalry, he made a vigorous effort, as if he wished to enfilade and turn the National left. At this moment, an active body of skirmishers, under Col- onel Carrol, consisting of his own regi- ment — the Eighth Ohio — and three companies of the Sixty-Seventh Ohio, were thrown forward on both sides of the valley road, to check the enemy’s advance. These skirmishers were ad- mirably supported by four pieces of artillery, under Captain Jenks, and also by Sullivan’s gallant brigade. At every point the Confederates were repulsed ; and Jackson, as if despair- ing of any success against the National left, massed his forces, and flung him- self with great energy on the right. The movement was skilfully made, and very narrowly missed success. So fierce was the onslaught that Daum’s batteries, although worked with skill and energy, were powerless to offer any effective resistance. On rushed the Confederates, as if nothing could check them ; and for a time it seemed as if they were about to snatch the prize of victory. Shields, who was unable to be present on the field, was actually ' conducting the battle from his bed. Having been informed by a messenger from Kimball of the state of affairs, he saw at once that his army was in danger, and that not a moment was to be lost. He gave orders that all the disposable infantry should be immediately thrown forward on the right, and that thus massed, they should fall with all their might on Jackson’s batteries, capture them, then turn his left flank and hurl it ^ back on his centre. Kimball entrusted this movement to Colonel Tyler. It was admirably executed, the gallant Tyler and his splendid brigade marching forward with “ alacrity and enthusiastic joy to the performance of the most perilous duty of the day.” The Con- federate skirmishers yielded to the at- tack, and fell back to the main body, strongly posted on high ground, and behind a high and solid stone fence. Here the struggle became desperate, and, for a time, doubtful. Tyler’s bri- gade was soon joined by the Fifth and Sixty-Second Ohio and Thirteenth Indiana, of Sullivan’s brigade, and the Fourteenth Indiana, Eighty-Fourth Pennsylvania, and several companies of the Eighth and Sixty-Seventh Ohio, of Kimball’s brigade. This united force, with cheers and 3^ells, which rose high above the roar of battle, rushed upon the Confederates; and in spite of a MAP SHOWING THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY, THE SCENE OF SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAMPAIGNS. '' ' ' : ' ' . '■t'- 'I ■ ' V."' a r THE PURSUIT. 245 most heroic resistance, which was too well attested by the heaps of slain on the field, Jackson’s men were driven back through the woods. Resting upon the reserve, an attempt was again made, chieliy by the famous “Stonewall brigade,” to retrieve the fortunes of the day ; but it was of no avail. Nothing could resist the on- ward rush of the now triumphant Nationals, as they rent the air with their cheers, and poured forth their murderous volleys. This last attempt at resistance was but of brief dura- tion. The Confederates again broke; and this time they fled in disorder from the field, leaving, in addition to the multitude of killed and wounded, three hundred prisoners, two guns, four caissons, and a thousand stand of small arms. “Night alone,” said the gallant Shields, in his graphic and honest report, “ saved them from total destruction.” The Nationals rested on the battle field. On the following morning, in obedi- I^ar, ence to orders from General 24* Shields, the pursuit was com- menced, the National artillery opening fire upon the rear-guard of the retreat- ing foe. General Banks, when he halt- ed at Harper’s Ferry, ordered back Williams, with his whole division. The general himself lost no time in returning to Winchester ; and having made a hasty visit to General Shields, he assumed command of the forces in pursuit of the enemy. The pursuit was continued as far as Mount Jackson. It was there abandoned, in consequence of the utter exhaustion of the troops. This victory at Kernstown was due largely, no doubt, to the bravery of the rank and file of the National army and to the skill and intrepidity of its officers. It is doubtful, however, whether even such an army, in pres- ence of such a foe, could have nailed victory to its standard, without the clear head, the firm, decisive will and the prompt action of General Shields. No more skilful generalship than that displayed by General Shields on this occasion was exhibited during the en- tire progress of the war.*'^ Although Jackson had been defeated and held for a time in check, it was no part of the plan of the Confederates to abandon the Shenandoah Valley. They knew that so long as they were able to threaten Washington by main- taining a large force in the valley, they would embarrass the movements of McClellan in the Peninsula. It was not possible for Jackson to make any aggressive efforts, or even to maintain his position, if he was not considerably ♦General James Shields, the hero of Kernstown, was born in 1810, in the county of Tyrone, Ireland. In 182G, when at the age of sixteen, he emigrated to the United States. In 1832, he settled in Illinois, where he devoted himself to the profession of law. After hav- ing filled several offices, he became a judge of the Supreme Court. In 184.5, he was appointed by Presi- dent Polk, commissioner of the General Land Office, and removed to Washington. After serving in the Mexican War with distinction, he was elected United States Sen- ator from Illinois. He was living in Minnesota when that Territory was admitted a State of the Union, and was chosen United States Senator. When the war broke out, he had been for some years in California, living in comparative retirement. Congress made him a brigadier-general, with a commission bearing date August 10, 18(51. General Shields has always been a pronounced Democrat ; but his politics have never • tempted him to entertain views injurious to the unity and integrity of the National government. 224 246 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. reinforced. Accordingly, while he was lying at a point between the South Fork of the Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, after his retreat from Win- chester, he was joined by the divi- sion of General R. S. Ewell, and also two brigades under Edward J. Johnston. The entire force under Jackson was thus increased to about 15,000 men. They were surely all needed; for he was confronting three National armies — that of Fremont on his left; that of Banks in front, and that of McDowell on liis right. Fre- mont, it will be remembered, had charge of what was called the Moun- tain department; Banks had chai'ge of the Shenandoah department ; and Mc- Dowell had charge of the newly- created department of the Rappahan- nock. Towards the end of April, when Jackson was about to commence offensive operations, Fremont, in obedi- ence to orders given by the presi- dent, had come down to Franklin, in Pendleton County, near the mountains west of Harrisonburg, and had taken a position there with 15,000 men; General Banks was at Strasburg, in the valley, with about 16,000 men; and General McDowell was at Fred- ericksburg with 30,000 men. About the time Jackson began to move. Shields’ division was detached from Banks’ command and given to Mc- Dowell, who, as Washington was no longer menaced by Johnston, was on his march to McClellan, now at the head of some 41,000 men, with 100 guns. Such was the disposition and such the strength of the National forces in Virginia in the first weeks of May. Banks, it will be observed, after Shields’ division had been trans- ferred to McDowell, had not under him more than 6000 men. Jackspn’s great object was to pre- vent either McDowell or Fremont from forming a junction with Banks. Learning that Fremont was pressing on to join Banks at Harrisonburg, Jackson left Ewell to watch Banks, and advanced to meet Fremont. Coming up with his advance at Mc- Dowell, some thirty-six miles west of Staunton, a vigorous encounter took place. Both armies suffered severely, but the Nationals were compelled to retire. Jackson followed them up as far as Franklin, when, hearing from Ewell that Banks was evidently prepar- ing to make his escape from Harrison- burg, he hastened back to McDowell, recrossed the Shenandoah Mountains, rested for a little at Lebanon Sulphur Springs, and then pressed forward, with the view of falling upon Banks. Meanw^hile, Banks had fied to Stras- burg, pursued by Ewell. Jackson posted on to New Market, where he joined Ewell. The united forces moved up the Luray Valley, between the Massanutten Mountains and the Blue Ridge, towards Front Royal, their object being to cut off Banks’ retreat in that direction, and thus to prevent him joining McDowell by way of Manassas Gap. By this movement, Jackson accomplished a double object; he created a panic in Washington and, indeed, throughout the whole North ; and he fell with overwhelming force RETEEAT OF BANKS. 247 on Colonel Kenly and the little garri- son at Front Royal. Kenly made a spirited resistance ; but he was com- pletely overpowered, and, after being wounded, he himself and 700 of his men, with a section of rifled 10- pounders and his entire supply train, fell into the hands of the victorious Confederates. This affair happened iHay on the 23d of May. Banks was 23. still at Strasburg, when, on the evening of that day, he heard of the disaster at Front Roy ah Alarm fol- lowed vexation when he learned that Jackson, at the head of 20,000 men, was moving rapidly toward Winches- ter. With his reduced force, it was vain to think of offering resistance to an army so greatly* superior in num- bers. As he could not hope to win, his plain duty was to try to save his men and his war material. Early in May the morning of the 24th, Banks, 21. resolved to lose no time in put- ting distance between himself and his pursuers, hastened down the valley. By a forced march, he gained Winches- ter by midnight. The retreat was conducted in a masterly manner, and in circumstances of very great diflficulty. Banks, however, had little time to rest his weary troops. Ewell was already at his heels ; and Jackson was pressing forward in overwhelming strength, not far in the rear of Ewell. The Con- federate advance bivouacked within a mile and a half of Winchester. It was evidently their expectation that the next day would witness the cap- ture or destruction of their opponents. Banks, as we have seen, had only about 6000 men, with ten Parrott guns and a battery of six-pounder smooth bore cannon, with which to resist the pursuer and protect the valley. The Confederate force had been consider- ably strengthened, and must have numbered, all told, over 20,000 men. It was not possible to continue the retreat without showing front to the pursuers. By daylight on the 25th both armies were in battle order ; May and the fight opened furiously 25. in front of Winchester. Banks’ left was commanded by Colonel Donnelly, and his right by Colonel Gordon, while the troops in the centre were well protected by stone fences. Ewell made a bold endeavor to turn the Na- tional right, and to shut Banks off from Harper’s Ferry. The National soldiers, realizing their danger, fought with great bravery, and for some five hours held the Confederates in check. Jackson’s whole force was now seen to be moving forward. Banks, wise- ly concluding that further resistance might prove his ruin, issued orders for a retreat. He had already, in an- ticipation of such an emergency, sent his trains on to the Potomac. Under a most destructive fire, the troops formed into three parallel columns, and moved in the direction of Martins- burg, each column being protected by an eflicient rear-guard. In passing through Winchester, they were sub- jected to insults and violence, the women pouring upon them hot water from the windows and flinging other missiles. In the course of the after.* 248 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. noon Banks reached Martinsburg, hav- ing accomplished a march of twenty- two miles. There he rested his foot- sore and battle-worn troops for two and a half hours. At the end of that time the march was resumed ; the other twelve miles of the journey were accomplished ; and by sundown of the same day Banks, with his worn-out but not yet disorganized men, stood on the banks of the Potomac, direct!}^ opposite Williamsport. Forty-eight hours had just elapsed since the news had reached them of the disaster of Front Boyal. It was a march of fifty- three miles, thirty-five of which were performed in one day. ‘‘The scene at the river,” says General Banks, in his graphic report of that retreat, “ when the rear-guard arrived, was of the most animating and exciting description. A thousand camp fires were burning on the hill-side, a thousand carriac^es of every description were crowded upon the banks, and the broad river rolled between the exhausted troops and their coveted rest.” Some difficulty was experienced in getting across the river. The ferry was occupied by the ammunition trains — the ford by the wagons. The cav- alry was secure in its own power of crossing. But the infantry had to content themselves with some boats w^hich belonged to the pontoon train, and which had been brought along from Strasburg. With an ingenuous- ness which does no discredit to his well-tried soldierly qualities. General Banks tells us that “ there never were more grateful hearts in the same num- ber of men than when, at mid- day on the 26th, we stood on 26. the opposite shore.” In killed and wounded. Banks’ loss was about 200. Two guns, more than 9000 small arms, and some 8000 prisoners constituted Jackson’s prize. It would be unfair to refuse to Gen- eral Banks the highest praise for the orderly and successful manner in which he conducted this retreat from Stras- burg to the Potomac. At the same time it is undeniable that, if Jackson had pursued with the same vigor with which Banks conducted his retreat, the result might have been very dif- ferent. Jackson halted his infantry not far from Winchester ; and George H. Stewart, who .was sent after the fugitives, discontinued the pursuit at Martinsburg. In the latter part of his retreat, therefore. Banks’ danger was more in seeming than in reality; for Jackson, by giving up the pursuit, had flung away his opportunity. Superior numbers gave Jackson the victory ; but fortune smiled upon Banks, and enabled him to save his army. The National government had reason to honor Banks for saving his men and his ammunition trains. The Confede- rate government had reason to blame Jackson for not completing his victory by the annihilation of his antagonist. The reappearance of Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah, followed as that was by the attack on Front Royal and the retreat and pursuit from Stras- burg, naturally enough produced not a little consternation in Washington. We have seen that General Shields I THE CONFEDERATE RETREAT. 249 formerly of Banks’ corps, had been ordered to join the army of McDowell, taking with him his 11,000 men. We have also seen that thus reinforced, and with an army 41,000 strong, Mc- Dowell was under instructions to move toward Richmond on the 26th, for the purpose of co-operating with McClel- lan. Before McDowell began to move toward Richmond, tidings of what had happened in the Shenandoah Valley had, of course, reached Washington. The government was alarmed ; the National capital was considered to be in peril; and McDowell, in place of being allowed to carry out the orders received earlier on the same day, and proceed to aid McClellan before Rich- mond, was instructed to push 20,000 -men into the valley by way of Ma- nassas Gap, the object being to intercept Jackson, if he should attempt to re- treat. At the same time instructions were sent to Fremont by telegraph, commanding him to hasten, with his army, over the Shenandoah Mountain to Harrisonburg, the object being the same. It was hoped that both armies might effect a junction at Strasburg, and that they might do so in sufficient time to head off Jackson. Fremont lost no time in complying with the instructions which he had received; but, having taken a more northerly road across the mountain to Strasburg, June reach that place b till the evening of the 1st of June. Jackson had passed through the town a few houi’s before. McDowell was equally prompt, although, in let- ters addressed both to the president and, to the secretary of war, he ex- pressed his regret, in a dignified and soldierly manner, that it should have been necessary to countermand his orders and compel him to fall back. Shields’ division vcas pushed forward in advance. On the morning of June the 2d of June, Shields’ cavalry, 2. under General Bayard, reached Stras- burg — too late also to accomplish their intended purpose. In the meantime, the excitement and anxiety of the government were finding other channels of expression. Alarming despatches w^ere sent to the governors of the different States. They were informed that the enemy in great force was marching on Washington; and they were exhorted to organize, and forward immediately, all the militia and volunteer force in their respective States. On the same day on which . these despatches were forwarded, the president took military possession of all the railroads in the United States, ordering their officers and servants to hold themselves in readiness for the transportation of troops and munitions of war to the exclusion of all other business. It was evident that the government was really alarmed; but it was plain also that it knew its duty, and that it meant to perform it. Jackson had advanced, after the re- tirement of Banks, as far as Harper’s Ferry. There he became aware of the orders which had been given to Mc- Dowell and Fremont. He felt that he w'as in danger. If these generals should succeed in forming a junction at Strasburg before he reaches that 350 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. place, it will be necessary for him to offer battle to their combined forces ; arid the result, as he fears, will not be favorable. He deemed it wise to beat a hasty retreat. Leaving Ewell as a rear-guard, he moved back from Harper’s Ferry on the night of the 29 th of May. On the following night, IHay with a view to create a false impression, Ewell kept up a heavy cannonading, and otherwise acted as if a severe contest was going on. The night was favorable for his purpose. It* was “intensely dark; the hills around were alive with signal lights ; the rain descended in torrents ; vivid flashes of lightning illuminated, at intervals, the green and magnificent scenery, while the crash of the thunder, echoing among the mountains, threw into comparative insignificance the roar of the artillery.” When the sun rose ]Way on the morning of the 31st, there 3L were no traces of any Confede- rates in the neighborhood of Harper’s Ferry. Ewell was already far ad- vanced on his way to rejoin Jackson. It was a race, as if for sweet life, both with Jackson and with Ewell. In order to overtake Jackson, whom he rejoined at Middletown, Ewell marched in one day thirty-four miles. The race up the Shenandoah Valley was now fairly begun ; and the retreat of Jackson in the one direction was quite as hasty as that of Banks had been in the other. Jackson, in fact, had exhibited even more celerity in retreat than he had done in pur- suit. We have already mentioned that when Fremont reached Strasburg on the 1st of June, Jackson had passed through the town some hours before, and that the van-guard of Shields’ di- vision, which had been detached by McDowell, did not arrive at Strasburg until a flay later. A vigorous effort was now made by both of those offi- cers to intercept Jackson further to the south. Shields moved vigorously along the South Fork of the Shenan- doah, between the Massanutten and Blue Bidge Mountains, while Fremont, somewhat in his rear, and leaning on the North Fork, marched along the great turnpike to Harrisonburg. The mountain streams which flow into the Shenandoah were all swollen with the heavy rains — so swollen as to make it perilous in most places to attempt to ford them. Jackson, who was also on the South Fork, took the precaution of destroying the bridges as he passed, and, by means of his cavalry, of breaking down or burn- ing all those in the openings of the Massanutten range. By so doing, he greatly retarded the advance of his pursuers. On the 5th of June, June and after making the most vigor- ous efforts all along his line of march, he reached Harrisonburg. Jackson now saw that his one hope of safety was to cross the swollen Shenandoah at Port Bepublic, where there was a strong bridge. He would thus put the river between himself and Fremont. He would do more. It was all-im- portant that Shields, who was near at hand, on the east side of the river, should not be allowed to cross and BATTLE AT CROSS KEYS. 251 form a junction with the other National army. He would make this junction impossible. With these ends in view, and after allowing his wearied soldiers a brief period of repose, Jackson be- gan to move from Harrisonburg — his line of march being towards the river, in a southeasterly direction, by way of Staunton. Fremont’s advance entered Harrisonburg shortly after Jackson left it. They were not allowed to halt. Pushing on after the retreating army, a body of cavalry, under Colonel Percy Wyndham, came upon its rear-guard about two miles from Harrison bui’g. The Coufederate rear was covered by General Turner Ashby’s cavalry. With the speed of lightning, Ashby turned upon the Nationals and smote them with great severity. Wyndham was captured, together with some sixty- three of his men. At this critical moment, Bayard and Cluseret hurried forward cavalry and infantry. Among those engaged were Kane’s Bucktail Rifles. Ashby, feeling himself hard pressed, called for an infantry support. General Stewart rushed to his aid. Severe fighting ensued. Kane’s rifle- men, after performing deeds of great valor, were driven back with a loss of fifty -five men. Kane himself was wounded and made prisoner. During the brief encounter, in which both sides sustained heavy losses, General Ashby was killed. His horse had been shot under him ; and he was dis- mounted when the fatal bullet entered his body. General Ashby was one of the most brilliant generals developed on either side during the war. His death at this crisis was a great loss to the Confederate cause.* Jackson continued his march toward the Shenandoah with the view of at- tempting a passage at Port Republic. In the meantime he had left Ewell, with the three brigades of Elzy, Trimble and Stewart, well posted at a place called Cross Keys, near Union Church, about seven miles from Harri- sonburg, and about five miles from the river. Ewell’s force was about 5000 strong, and occupied a ridge which crossed the road near • the church. There were on either side dense woods which protected his flanks. Trimble was a little in advance, in the centre; Stewart was on the right; and Elzy on the left. On Sunday morn- jnne ing, the 8th of June, as early as six o’clock, Fremont marched out of Harrisonburg ; and by nine o’clock he had his army arranged in order of battle. Schenck was on the right; Milroy in the centre ; and Stahl on the left. Between Milroy and Schenck was Cluseret’s brigade, composed of the Sixtieth Ohio and the Eighth Virginia, supported by the Garibaldi guard, of Blenker’s division. Bohlen’s brigade supported Stahl ; and the remainder of Blenker’s division was held as a re- * Brigadier-General Turner Ashby was a middle-sized man, handsomely built, and very active. He was a dark- complexioned man— had dark eyes and tine features, and was distinguished by rather a benevolent counte- nance. He was a man of much piety. Although not a soldier by profession, he soon gave proof that he was possessed of all those qualities which secure distinction and success on the tield of battle. He was a splendid horseman ; and he had done good service to the cause which he had represented in many a hard-fought battle. He had been promoted to the rank of brigadier-gene- ral only three weeks before his death. 252 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. serve. The Nationals moved to the attack up the rising ground under a tremendous fire. By eleven o’clock the battle had become general. The fighting was particularly severe in the centre, where, in spite of the terrific fire of the Confederates, Milroy and Schenck were gaining ground. For hours the battle raged with great fury, Milroy and Stahl suffering most severe- ly. The Eighth New York alone had sixty-five killed. On the Confederate side, Trimble, who was the most ex- posed, had suffered the heaviest loss. For a time victory seemed doubtful. After having been driven back, the Nationals again pressed forward ; and Milroy had already penetrated Ewell’s centre, and forced his way up almost to his guns. It was now four o’clock ; and Stahl’s troops, at the supreme moment when Fremont seemed on the point of grasping victory, giving way, the order was given to fall back along the whole line. Thus ended the battle of Cross Keys — one of the best-contested, and, con- sidering the numbers engaged, severest struggles since the war commenced. It was fought with great bravery on both sides ; and if victory remained with the Confederates, it was because of the excellency of the position which they occupied, rather than because of the greater endurance of their troops, or the superior skill of their command- ers. On both sides the loss was heavy. It was particularly severe among the National officers. General Stahl had five killed and seventeen wounded. The Pennsylvania Bucktails lost all their officers — commissioned and non- commissioned. Both armies slept on the ground which they occupied in the morning before the battle commenced. Ewell was prepared to resume the con- jyn^ flict on the morning of the 9th ; but being called to aid Jackson at Port Republic, he began to move, as soon as day broke, towards the Shen- andoah — Fremont following in battle order. Shields’ advance, under Colonel Carroll, reached Port Republic on the 8th of June. There he found some of Jackson’s cavalry guard; and falling upon them with great force, he drove them out of the town and took posses- sion of the bridge. His true policy at that moment would have been to burn the bridge ; for by that means he might have ruined Jackson, by making it impossible for Ewell to come to his aid. This, however, he neglected to do, believing, perhaps, that he could hold it, and that it might still be use- ful in enabling the two National armies to form a junction. While waiting for the arrival of his infantry, he was joined by General E. B. Tyler, who took command. After assuming com- mand, Tyler was unwilling to act until he had received instructions from Shields. Ewell, meanwhile, had man- aged to escape from Fremont, had brought his troops across the river, and had so strengthened Jackson that the Confederate had no reason any longer to fear his enemy. Discovering that an attempt was being made by the Con- federates in great strength to outflank his left, Tyler made a vigorous show PORT REPUBLIC. 253 of resistance. Counteracting the flank- ing movement by employing his whole force, Tyler drove back into the woods about 8000 Confederates. The battle raged for some time with great sever- ity. It was impossible, however, for Tyler to maintain the struggle against the fearful odds which were now ar- rayed against him. Fremont, when he heard the sounds of battle and saw the clouds of smoke, had hastened towards Port Republic. When he reached the bridge he found it in flames, the water too deep to be forded, and the enemy safe beyond his reach. Tyler had no choice but to order a retreat, which, covered by Carroll and his cavalry, was conducted in good order. The Confederates pursued the retreat- ing forces some five miles, the “ boys preserving their places in the ranks, and fighting every inch of the way.” Port Republic added another laurel to the victorious wreath which en- circled the brow of General Jackson. His campaign in the Shenandoah Val- ley bad been conducted with wonder- ful skill and with great success. He had not won, it is true, any great vic- tory, but he certainly enjoyed its fruits. He had, by the pursuit of Banks, al- most threatened the National capital. By his rapidity and dexterity of move- ment he had bafiled all the skill of three major-generals. At the last mo- ment, when he seemed to be shut in between two forces, he paralyzed Fre- mont with one blow and Shields with another, and finally, by the destruction of the bridge, made their junction im- possible. This, however, was not all. lie had diverted large reinforcements from McClellan, and, while he had given that general a cause for indulg- ing in his “masterly inactivity,” he had otherwise neutralized the influence of 60,000 men. He had taught the National government that it w^ould never again be safe, while the war lasted, to leave Washington unpro- tected. That lesson, taught at that time, was equal to the adding of many thousands of men to the Confederate armies. This chapter would be incomplete without a brief sketch of the man who is really its hero."^ The National government was un- doubtedly primarily to blame for the * Thomas Jefferson Jackson was born in Western Virginia, in January, 1824. His family was respect- able ; but in his boyhood he received only a limited edu- cation. At the age of nineteen, he entered, as student, the military academy of West Point, where, in spite of his homely dress and uncouth manners, he distanced many of his competitors, taking a prominent place in several of his classes. He served in the Mexican War as an artillery officer under Magruder, and acquired the reputation of being a good gunner. Toward the close of that war he was brevetted a major. He afterwards held for ten years the chair of chemistry at the military academy of Virginia, at Lexington. On the death of his first wife he visited Europe ; and during his stay in England, he took great delight in visiting the cathe- drals. York Minster being his special favorite. When the Civil War broke out, he had married a lady of a Northern family; and it is said he was for some short time in doubt as to what course he should follow. He had, in 18o2, resigned his rank in the army. Ultimate- ly he offered his sword to his native State, and received a commission. It was he who turned the tide of affairs at Bull Run, and secured the victory for the Confede- rates. His exploits in the Shenandoah Valley speak for themselves. Jackson’s life was destined to be brief; but, as we shall see while this history progresses, be filled it with noble deeds, and left behind him a name which the world will not willingly let die. “Stonewall” Jackson will ever be the symbol of a chivalry equal to that of a Bayard, and of a piety equal to that of a saint. In his life, he commanded the love and confidence of his men. In his death, he was mourned by the world. 254 JACKSON’S CAMPAIGN. humiliation brought upon the Northern aimies by Jackson’s raid. The action at Winchester showed what could be done, even against such a man, with a force of reasonable strength. It was the weakening of Shields, by the re- moval of so many troops to Centre- ville, which provoked the battle of Winchester. In the presence of so watchful an antagonist as Jackson, the lesson ought not to have been lost. When, therefore, the government de- tached Shields from Banks, and sent him, with his division, to swell the army of McDowell, leaving Banks with only some 6000 men, a grave blunder was committed. It was not possible for Jackson to resist the temptation which was thus offered. But for that temptation, Jackson certainly would not at that time have ventured to at- tack Banks ; and probably the famous race through the Shenandoah Valley would never have taken place. This, however, was not all. The blunder committed by the government had an- other result. It hindered the very purpose for which Shields had been detached from Banks — it prevented McDowell from joining McClellan be- fore Richmond. It is not wonderful that McDowell, when commanded to fall back and take part with Banks and Fremont in the interception of Jackson, should have done so reluctant- ly, exclaiming, with a heavy heart, as he repeated the order : It is a crush- ing blow to us all.” It was unfortu- nate that Shields and Fremont did not meet at Strasburg ; and the latter gen- eral, though assuming a responsibility which success would have justified, un- doubtedly' made a mistake in not tak- ing the route across the mountains which he was ordered to take. If he had taken the appointed route, he might have intercepted Jackson; but he might not, for the mountain roads were in a wretched condition, in con- sequence of the heavy rains, which had soaked the soil and swollen the streams. As it was, Jackson had passed through Strasburg only a few hours before he arrived. Supposing Fremont had been up in time to meet the retreating army, it is by no means certain that he could have hindered Jackson’s onward march. Shields did not arrive at Strasburg till the follow- ing day; and it is by no means im- probable, judging from what actually did happen, that Jackson, in the interval, could have found time to punish Fremont and proceed on his journey. Fremont and Shields no doubt did their best ; and if they were outrun, and finally defeated, they had the satisfaction of knowing that the task had been accomplished by a general who was without a superior, either in the armies of the South or in the armies of the North. ON THE CHICKAHOMINY. 255 CHAPTER XVIII. The Army of the Potomac. — A Critical Period. — McClellan Still on the Chickahominy. — Masterly Inactivity. — Quiet Siege of Richmond. — Stuart's Raid. — A Confederate Council of War. — McClellan's Difficulty. — Fight or Retreat. — He Might Have Fought and Won. — Retreat to the James River Resolved Upon. — The Confederates Move on Mechanicsville. — The Nationals Well Posted at Beaver Dam Creek. — The Confede- rate Attack at Mechanicsville. — Night Closes the Struggle. — The Result a National Victory. — McClellan Hastens his Retreat — The Second Day. — The Nationals Still Well Posted. — The Brave Confederates. — “Thundering Hurrahs.’' — 'Repeated, but Vain Attempts. — Porter Calls for Help. — Slocum Sent to his Aid. — Porter Again Calls for Help.— Butterfield Sorely Pressed. — St. George Cooke. — A Pause. — The Nationals Falling Back to the River. — Arrival of Meagher and French. — The' Day Saved. — White Oak Swamp. — The Confederates Deceived. — White House Evacuated. — The Pursuit. — McClellan’s Despatch. — Savage’s Station. — Fair Oaks Abandoned. — Battle of Savage’s Station. — McClellan at Malvern Hills. — The Battle at White Oak Swamp Bridge. — The Confederates in High Hopes. — Grand Massing of Troops. — Jackson at White Oak Swamp Bridge. — Frazier's Farm. — Willis’s Road. — Battle of Glendale. — Determined Fighting on Both Sides. — Arrival of Hooker and Kearney. — A Drawn Battle. — Meade Wounded and McCall Captured. — Inci- dents of the Two Battles. — White Oak Swamp and Glendale. — The Retreat Continued. — Malvern Hills. — A Strong Position. — The Hills Covered -with Artillery and Infantry. — Lee's Plan. — Hill’s Opinion. — A Bold Attack and a Fearful Cannonade. — The Confederates Repulsed. — A Lull in the Fight. — The Attack Re- newed. — The Quivering Hills. — Terrible Slaughter. — Hand-to-Hand Fighting. — The Nationals Hold Their Position. — A Fearful Night. — The Retreat Continued. — Vexation of the National Officers. — Fitz John Porter. — Philip Kearney. — The Circumstances Depressing. — McClellan’s Address to his Soldiers. — Address of Jeffer- son Davis to the Army of Virginia. — Committee of Congress. — Heavy Loss of Men. — Poor Results. — McClellan and Lincoln. — McClellan and Halleck. — Correspondence. — Reluctance of McClellan to Leave Harrison’s Lauding. — His Demand for More Troops. — End of the Peninsular Expedition. — Reflections. We have now arrived at the most 1862 most perilous, period in the entire history of the war. Since the disastrous battle of Bull Run, the National armies had ex- perienced no very st rious reverse. On the contrary, in many a hard-contested fight, and on many a blood-stained battle field, victory had rewarded the bravery and crowned the efforts of the Union troops. In the West they had marched in triumph from Cairo to the neighborhood of Vicksburg; and such names as Henry and Donelson, and Shiloh and Corinth, and Perry ville and Murfreesboro had become separate sources of National pride. Along the coast and on the inland waters, they had been even more successful than they had been on land ; and it was with feelings of equal pride they could reflect that the entire seaboard, both of the Atlantic and of the Gulf, had been restored to Federal authority. It was only in the Peninsula and over the army of the Potomac that the cloud of darkness hovered. Here alone fortune seemed to be chary of her favors. The siege of Yorktown, the battle of Williamsburg and the battle of Fair Oaks had shed but little lustre on the Federal arms. The army of the Poto- mac — so imposing in its strength, so 256 McCLELLAN’S RETREAT. splendid in its equipment, so perfect in its training, the pride of its chief, the hope of the nation — had not yet given any earnest /of the fulfillment of its higli promise. We have fol- lowed it from Manassas to Yorktown, from Yorktown to Williamsburg, from AYilliamsburg to the swamps of the Chickahominy ; and, although we have no reason to blame either officers or men for lack of bravery, we have seen precious time waited, blunder after blunder committed, and opportunity after opportunity flung to the winds of heaven. A month had elapsed since the battle of Fair Oaks, and Mc- Clellan was still lying inactive along the line of the Chickahominy. While he waited for reinforcements, and oc- cupied himself and his men in the construction of bridges and batteries, the enemy was multiplying his own forces, and mightily increasing the dif- ficulties of the National commander. Had McClellan moved on Richmond immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks, the presumption is that he would have won an easy victory. As it was, he gave General Jackson abundant time, after his brilliant cam- paign in the valley, to come up and, with his army of 35,000 men, to join General Lee, who had succeeded General Joseph E. Johnston in the supreme command. This, however, was not all. Time was given the gov- ernment at Richmond to reap the full benefit of the new Conscription Act, and to huriy forward, at the same time, detachments from the West. Mc' Clellan’s army had no doubt suffered since it first landed on the Peninsula. The ranks of the regiments had been thinned. Some had died in battle; and not a few had perished from the malarious fevers of the swamps. De- tachments, too, had been left respective- ly at Yorkitown and at Williamsburg. But he had been joined by five regi- nijiits fi’oni Baltimore; General Wool's disposable force at Fortress Monroe was at his call; McCall’s division, of McDowell’s corps, had already arrived from Fredericksburg; and if McDowell himself, with the remainder of his army, had been prevented from coming to his aid, McClellan had the less rea- son to complain that his own dilatory conduct had given Stonewall Jackson the opportunity of teaching the Fede- ral authorities the propriety of securely guarding the National capital. A vail of mystery hangs over some of the doings of this period; and it may be that there are some things which will yet find a fuller explanation ; but in the meantime, with all the light we now enjoy, the evidence seems conclusive that McClellan sacrificed his chances by his habitual caution, or rather by his incorrigible habit of delay. The National army was strongly fortified on the Chickahominy. The left wdiig w^as on the south of that stream, between White Oak Swamp and New Bridge. The roads towards Richmond were commanded by heavy guns. The right wing was north of the Chickahominy, and extended be- yond Mechanicsville. Several solid bridsres had been thrown over the stream, thereby bringing the two HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 257 wings into easier communication. The one fault of McClellan’s arrangement was that his line was too long, and, consequently, greatly attenuated. The Confederates were not slow to dis- cover this weakness of their adversary. June 1^6 1^^^ June, General J. E. B. Stuart, with some 1500 cav- alry and four pieces of horse artillery, made a bold dash on the National right, and, after some severe fight- ing at Hanover Court House, swept around the entire army, working terri- ble destruction, and capturing 1G5 prisoners and 260 mules and horses. After resting three hours at Talley s- ville, he returned next morning to Richmond, unopposed. This audacious movement of Stuart actually created great commotion in the army of the ’Potomac. For some days more all was quiet on the Chickahominy. On June 25th of June the army, then 25* numbering 115,000 men present for duty, heard with delight that they were to be led out of the pestilential swamps. On that day a forward movement was made by Heintzelman’s corps, with a part of Keyes’ and Sumner’s, on the Williamsburg Road. At a place called Oak Grove the enemy was encountered in considerable strength, when a severe fight ensued, the Nationals losing some 516 men in killed and wounded. The coveted point was gained, but it was not to be turned to much account. On that very night the unwelcome tidings arrived that Stonewall Jackson was at Han- June c)ver Court House. On the fol- 26. lowing morning the advance was recalled ; and for the army of the Po- tomac there was something else to do than to march in triumph to the Con- federate capital. On the same day on which the above- mentioned encounter took place, June a Confederate council of war was 25. held, and it was resolved that, as the Confederate lines around the city were now completed, the greater portion of the army might now be spared for a forward movement on the National line. Jackson was to cross to the north of the Chickahominy, and move on the right flank of the National army ; and in the event of McDowell remaining inactive at Fredericksburg, a general and simultaneous attack was to be made along McClellan’s whole line. The National army was now in a peril- ous position. It was evident that the object was to cut McClellan off from his communications with the York River. He must either retreat or give battle out of his intrench ments. Mc- Clellan had now to resolve what he would do. There was no time for de- lay. His decision was quickly taken. The bridge which he had thrown across the Chickahominy gave him the oppor- tunity of throwing over either wing to the assistance of the other. He might concentrate on the north side or the south side, as he thought fit. But if he concentrated on the north bank, it implied an abandonment of the idea of capturing Richmond, and exposed him to the risk of an unsupported retreat to Yorktown. If he concentrated on the south bank, he lost his communica- tions with White House, and he would 258 McClellan’S retreat. have to execute the perilous operation of changing his base by a flank move- ment It was seventeen miles from Fair Oaks to James River, and there was only one road — a road which was exposed to many others radiating from Richmond. The southern movement had this one advantage: that since the destruction of the Merrimac, the James River was open, and some transports had already found their way to City Point. The movement to James River was determined upon ; and arrange- ments for a retreat were made at once. Happily, the only bridges in possession of the Confederates were about ten miles above, at Mechanicsville. As the Confederates must needs go round by that way, time would be gained by the Nationals to make good their re- treat to Harrison’s Landing, where they would come under the shelter of the gunboats. Military writers have expressed the opinion that a more daring general might, by a judicious concentration of his troops on the south side of the Chickahominy, have marched in triumph to Richmond. It is true that the Confederate capital was left comparatively unprotected ; and it is undeniable that the bravery of the troops and the skill of the officers, from the commander-in-chief downward, as displayed in the retreat, encourage the belief that if the at- tempt had been made, it might have resulted in complete success. Such a course, however, necessarily implied a great risk. Defeat was not impossi- ble ; and defeat in such circumstances would have been ruinous to the Na- tional army. True to his instincts, faithful to the character which he had already established, McClellan ch(5se, as might have been predicted, the less hazardous course. On the, afternoon of the 26th began that series of engagements which June culminated in retreat — a retreat 26. which, whether regard be had to the protracted character of the struggle, the severity of the fighting, or the skill with which it was conducted, must be considered one of the most memo- rable in history. Shortly after two o’clock on that day, the Confederate general, A. P. Hill, crossed to the north side of the Chickahominy and moved on Mechanicsville. The right wing of McClellan’s army which, as we have seen, stretched beyond Me- chanicsville, was under the command of General Fitz John Porter, and con- sisted of the divisions of Morell, Sykes and McCall. McClellan had long be- fore seen and recogriiz-d the strategic importance of Beaver Dam Creek, near Mechanicsville. The place was natu- rally strong ; and its strength had been increased by some rifle-pits and abatis. Here were posted McCall’s Pennsylva- nia reserves, 8500 strong, with five batteries. The batteries were so dis- posed as to command the stream and the open fields beyond, through which the Confederates must approach. In the face of a heavy fire from the bat- teries and from the infantry. Hill’s brigades, followed by those of Long- street, advanced to the attack. They fell with tremendous force upon Mc- Call’s division. Making but little im- MECHANICSVILLE. 259 pression at first, they massed and fell successively on his right and on his left, doing terrible damage ; but it was all of no avail. The Nationals stood firm. McCall, receiving some effective aid from Martindale and Griffin, of the division of Morell, and his orders be- ing admirably carried out by Generals Reynolds and Seymour, repelled the enemy at every point. From their superior position, the National guns did terrible execution. The battle lasted until nine o’clock, when the Confede- rates were driven back with a loss of 1500 men. The National loss was trifling; and, at the close of the fight, McClellan’s men were in full posses- sion of every point of the battle field. The fight of the 26th is known as the battle of Mechanicsville. McClellan had won the battle of Me- chanicsville ; but he felt, even more than before, the necessity of making a hurried retreat to the James River. Jackson had at last come up. He had already crossed Beaver Dam Creek ; and he was moving down towards the National right. McClellan could no longer doubt that it was Lee’s inten- tion to cut him off from his communi- cations at the White House. Retreat, in his judgment, must be commenced at once ; and, in his own words, ‘‘ to that end, from the evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent.” Quarter-master Ingalls was ordered to forward the stores and munitions of war to Savage’s Station, to burn what he could not remove, and to do his utmost to have supplies sent up the James. Having sent his wounded also to Sa- vage’s Station, he prepared to cross the Chickahominy with his right wing, for the flight. During the night most of the heavy guns and wagons were thrown across the river, and shortly before dawn the troops were skilfully withdrawn to a strong position near Gaines’ Mills, between Cool Arbor and the Chickahominy. There, in the form of an arc of a circle, the left resting on the Chickahominy, the right to- wards Cool Arbor, and covering the two bridges — Woodbury’s and Alex- ander’s — the Fifth corps on the jnne morning of the 27th awaited the 27. attack. Some of the siege guns were yet in position there ; and those which had been taken over the stream were planted so as to cover the approaches to the bridges. Morell ’s division was on the left; and Sykes’ division of Regulars and Duryea’s Zouaves were on the right, extending towards Cool Arbor. The extreme point of the right wing, which rested on a swamp on the Cool Arbor Road, was held by Battery I, Fifth United States ar- tillery, Captain J. H. Weed. Mean- while, Stoneman had been sent to the White House with a column of cavalry, to evacuate the depot and to destroy there what could not be used. About noon the Confederates were discovered approaching in force, under A. P. Hill ; and soon the artillery opened a heavy fire. Sykes was the first to feel the severity of the ene- my’s attack ; but he rose upon them in his might and hurled them back in confusion, and with heavy loss. Long- street n©w came forward to the relief 260 McCLELLAN’S RETREAT. of Hill. His first intention was to make a feint on Porter’s left; but the situation was too serious; and he was compelled to make a real attack, or do nothing at all. He resolved, therefore, to carry the heights on which the Nationals were posted; and while he was preparing to do so, Jackson and E). H. Hill arrived and took positions. The order w^as now given for the whole Confederate line to advance, except the right wing under Magruder, which was confronting McClellan on the right bank of the Chickahominy. The brave masses rushed, with ‘thundering hur- rahs,” upon the musketry of Porter’s troops ; and whole ranks went down under the terrible fire. After a tre- mendous struggle, in which the Con- federates vainly attempted to get pos- session of the rising ground on which the Nationals were posted, the former began to give way. They were al- ready falling back in disorder. At this critical juncture. General Cobb appeared on the field with his legion, together with the Fourteenth Virginia and the Nineteenth North Carolina, and vainly attempted to renew the fight. His legion was sent rolling back in broken fragments from the charge ; and the Nineteenth North Carolina lost eight standard bearers, with most of their officers killed or wounded. At two o’clock. Porter, feeling the pressure which was brought to bear upon him, sent to McClellan for rein- forcements. McClellan, dreading the army under Magruder in his immediate front, could only spare Slocum’s divi- sion, of Franklin’s corps. He did not know that Magruder had not more than 25,000 to oppose to his 60,000, all of whom were well entrenched. Slocum arrived about half-past three, when the battle was raging most fierce- ly. Porfer’s force now amounted to 35,000 men. For hours afterwards the fighting was desperate, and the issue doubtful. The Confederates continued to hurl brigade after brigade against the National line ; but tliey came up, one after another, only to be broken like the angry waves on the rock- bound shore. Later in the day Porter again sent for reinforcements ; and the brigades of French and Meagher, of Richardson’s division, were sent to his aid. They arrived just in time. Jack- son, with the divisions of Longstreet and Whiting, had fallen with terrific energy on the National left. With fierce yells they crossed the interven- ing swamp, and rushed up to the very muzzles of Porter’s guns. Cut down like grass before the scythe, the surviv- ors nevertheless still pressed forward over the dead bodies of their comrades. It seemed as if nothing could check their advance. Butterfield’s gallant brigade, which had been repelling the heaviest attacks of the Confederates for more than an hour without any assistance, was no longer able to resist those furi- ous onsets. Sorely pressed, it yielded, and fell back to the woods. By this movement, the batteries of Allen, Weedon, Hart and Edwards were left exposed. In spite of a most heroic re- sistance, they, too, were forced to fall back, with the loss of several guns. At five o’clock. Porter reported his GAINES’ MILL. 261 position as critical. His opponents had now double his streno:th. At this supreme moment an untoward circum- stance aggravated the difficulties of his position. Porter was calling up all his reserved artillery — about eighty guns in all — and was effectually covering the retreat of his infantry, when Gen- eral St. George Cooke, acting without orders, attacked the Confederates on their flank with his cavalry, repulsing them in great disorder. His horses, terrified by the roar of two hundred guns and the shrill, sharp sounds of thousands of muskets, rushed back through the Union batteries, giving the impression that it was an attack of Confederate cavalry, and producing all the effects of a panic. But for this unhappy circumstance, Porter might have been able to hold the field and get all his guns across the river. As it was, his entire force was pressing towards the bridges, the Confederates, in great force, close upon their heels. It had almost become a rout. At this extreme moment, when all seemed lost, the brigades of French and Meagher, who had crossed from the other side, came rushing up from the bridges and dashed to the front. Wild hurrahs rent the air as they appeared on the field. The retreating Nationals halted and re-formed. The Confederates, see- ing fresh troops, and ignorant of their number, paused, and rested on the field they had won. It was now after sunset; and darkness soon fell upon the scene of carnage. Such was the battle of Gaines’ Mill. Prodigies of valor were performed by both armies. Weed’s battery, above referred to, was under fire for eight and a half hours ; and it was only when some of the guns were disabled, and when pressed by the overwhelming masses of the enemy, that the position was aban- doned. On both sides the losses were heavy. The Confederate loss must have been great; for in Jackson’s corps alone there were 589 killed and 2671 wounded. McClellan’s loss was 9000 men and twenty-two guns. Although he had suffered severely, and been driven from his position. Porter had yet won a substantial vic- tory. He had accomplished the great purpose for which he fought. He was still master of the position in front of the bridges. During the night, carried his thinned and exhausted regi- ments across the Chickahominy, and destroyed the bridges in his rear. It was found impossible to care for the dead and the seriously wounded ; and a few guns and some prisoners were left behind. McClellan applied his whole energies more and more towards the successful accomplishment of his retreat. Flight, not fight, was now his fixed purpose. General Keyes was ordered forward to take possession of the road across the White Oak Swamp, ^ and of all communicatory approaches. By noon of the 28th Keyes was juue* in the position prescribed. Dur- 28. ing the day Porter and McCall, with; their shattered bands, took positions on the roads leading from Bichmond to* White Oak Swamp and Long Bridge. Sumner and Heintzelman, with Smith’s, division, of Franklin’s corps, formed 262 McClellan’S eetreat. an interior line, guarding the Rich- mond roads. Slocum’s division was left as a reserve at Savage’s Station. While the troops were in this posi- tion, 5000 wagons, a siege train, a herd of 2500 oxen and vast quantities of material were successfully moved across the swamp, on the way towards the James River. It was not until the afternoon of the 28th that the Confederates fully under- stood the situation. They had sup- posed, from the manner in which the ground had been vacated, that McClel- Ian had been cut oif from his line of retreat ; and the capture or destruction of the entire National army was re- garded as certain. The Confederates were wild with delight. The day was spent in burying the dead and caring for the wounded. A demonstration was made towards White House, where it w'as expected immense stores of all kinds would be found. But Stoneman and Emory had already done their work, and proceeded by way of York- town to rejoin the army on the James River. In place, therefore, of finding rich and abundant supplies at White House, the Confederates found nothing but blackened ruins. What the Na- tionals had not been able to carry off, they had committed to the flames. When the state of things at White House was reported to General Lee, he at once comprehended the situation. McClellan, he knew, was on his way to the James River, to form a junction with the fleet. Singularly enough, it does not appear that the plan of. re- treat conceived and carried out by McClellan had, up to that moment, entered the minds of the Confederate leaders. When it became known to them, they did not dream of the pos- sibility of its success. It was their decided conviction that, as he had been driven from all his strongholds on the north side of the Chickahominy, and been cut off from all communications with White House, his base of sup- plies, the Chickahominy in his rear, and the divisions of Magruder, Long- street and Huger in his front, it would be impossible for the National com- mander to save his army. Arrange- ments were made at once for a vigorous pursuit. McClellan, not unnaturally, was greatly elated by the success which had so far attended the retreat. His despatch to the secretary of war, bear- ing date June 28th, was boastful and extravagant. He truly declared that no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. It was a little absurd, how- ever, for him to say, considering the many opportunities he had flung away, that with 10,000 additional men he could take Richmond to-morrow ; and surely his better sense had deserted him when he allowed himself to write to the secretary of war: ‘‘If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other person in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.” McClellan had spent the whole of the 28th at Savage’s Station, superin- tending the retreat, and so disposing his troops as effectually to block the 1 way of his pursuers. Early on the SAVAGE’S STATION. 263 June raorning of tbe 29th, he caused 29. to be destroyed all that could not be carried away from the camps. A complete railroad train, locomotive, tender and cars, which had been left on the track, the cars filled with sup- plies and shells, was turned loose, and went rolling headlong over the broken bridge into the Chickahominy. The train had been set on fire at starting ; and, as car after car went crashing over the broken bridge, the shells bursting in rapid succession, added grandeur to the work of destruction. This done, the general-in-chief moved across the White Oak Swamp towards the front of his retreating columns. About the same hour that McClellan left Savage’s Station, Lee commenced his pursuit. In the race, McClellan had the advantage of twenty-four hours. Magruder and Huger, who, as we have seen, were posted south of the Chick- ahominy and in front of the works at Fair Oaks, were ordered to push along the Williamsburg and Charles City Roads; Longstreet and Hill were to cross the Chickahominy at New Bridge; and Jackson was to cross at the Grape Vine Bridge, and sweep down the right bank of the river. Provision was thus made to intercept the retreating army if possible ; and, in any case, to fall with great force on both fianks, and on the rear. Magruder, as he moved along the Williamsburg Turn- l)ike, found that the works at Fair Oaks liad been abandoned. Sumner and Ileintzelman, with Smith’s division, of Franklin’s corps, had fallen back to- ward Savage’s Station. Made aware of the approach of Magruder, Sumner prepared to offer resistance. The di- visions of Richardson and Sedgwick were formed on the right of the rail- road — Sedgwick’s right touching Heint- zelman’s left. Magruder fell with great fury on Sedgwick as early as nine o’clock, but he was compelled to fall back. Unfortunately at this stage Heintzelman, giving way to some mis- apprehension of the orders given him, moved towards White Oak Swamp, and crossed the bridge, thus leaving a gap of some three-quarters of a mile between Sumner and Smith. ' Magru- der saw his opportunity; and, after some manoeuvreing, rushed upon the Nationals with tremendous violence. The brigades of Generals Burns, Brooke and Hancock were soon engaged. The New York Sixty-Ninth came to their aid; while splendid service was ren- dered by the batteries of Pettit, Osborn and Bramhall, who promptly took part in the action. Magruder was thus kept at bay, the National troops hold- ing their ground until darkness fell upon the scene and made an end of the battle. Magruder had counted with confidence on being joined by Jackson, but that officer had been too long de- layed in rebuilding Grape Vine Bridge. During the night Sumner, leaving be- hind him in the hospitals some 2500 sick and wounded, moved towards White Oak Swamp ; and before sun- rise on the following morning, the Na- tional troops had passed over White Oak Bridge, and the bridge had been destroyed. Over this one bridge had passed almost the entire army of the 364 MCCLELLAN’S RETREAT. Potomac, witL all its trains and herds of cattle. By its destruction, a fresh obstacle was placed in the way of the pursuing army. The fight of the 29th is known as the battle of Savage’s Station. The one sad feature of the day was the leaving behind so many sick and wounded. It was one of those terrible necessities which bring out into striking relief the horrors of war. On Monday morning, the 30th of June June, McClellan had reached Malvern Hills. This is “ an ele- vated plateau, cleared of timber, about a mile and a half long by three-fourths of a mile wide, with several converg- ing roads running over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, the ground sloping gradually toward the north and east to the woodland, giv- ing clear ranges for the artillery in those directions. Towards the north- west, the plateau falls off more abrupt- ly to a ravine which extends to James River. From the position of the ene- my, his most obvious lines of attack were from the direction of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would almost of necessity strike the Na- tional army on its left wing.” This place McClellan regarded as the key to his contemplated new position. Here, therefore, in the mansion house of the estate, he established his headquarters ; and here he resolved to mass his troops and collect his artillery. He lost no time in establishing communication between the army and the gunboats, which were in charge of Commodore Rodgers. Meanwhile a large part of ^he army, having emerged from White Oak Swamp, were beginning to appear on the high, open ground of Malvern Hills, the van reaching as far forward as Turkey Bend. It was not, however, without a severe struggle that this position ihad been gained. The morn- ing of the 30th was exceedingly hot; but there was to be no rest for the weary and foot-sore men on either side. The retreating army must con- tinue its retreat : the pursuing army must continue its pursuit. Generals Sumner and Franklin were left to act as a rear-guard, and to hold the pas- sage of White Oak Swamp Biidge. General Heintzelman, with the divi- sions of Hooker, Kearney, Sedgwick and McCall, took a position at the point of intersection of the roads which lead from Richmond, called Charles City Cross Roads. The Confederates re- sumed the advance the following morn- ing. Generals D. H. Hill, Whitney and Ewell, with their divisions, un- der command of Jackson, had crossed the Chickahominy by the Grape Vine Bridge, and followed the retreating Nationals by the Williamsburg Road and Savage’s Station. Generals Long- street and A. P. Hill had crossed at New Bridge, and, having moved around the head of the swamp, made a rapid march down the Central Road, in the hope of being able to strike McClel- lan’s flank. Meanwhile, Magruder and Huger had been marching on a parallel line with Longstreet along the New Market Road. The Confederates were in high hopes that they would be able to penetrate McClellan’s line; and to make matters absolutely certain, a bri- WHITE OAK SWAMP AND GLENDALE. 265 gade had been ordered to come across the James River from Fort Darling. It was expected that at least 80,000 Confederates would be brought into action ; and Jefferson Davis had come on from Richmond to witness the cap- ture or destruction of the army of the Potomac. About noon Jackson came up to White Oak Swamp and found the bridge destroyed. Sumner and Franklin were there in force. A fierce artillery fight commenced at once. It lasted during the entire day, the Con- federates massing their forces and put- ting forth almost superhuman efforts to force a passage. It was found to be impossible, however, to make any lieadway against the batteries of Ayres and Hazard. During the struggle Hazard was mortally wounded, and his force was so cut up that his bat- tery had to be withdrawn. Ayres continued the fire without intermission until night closed upon the scene. The Confederates failed in their purpose to force a passage across the swamp. During the night the Nationals retired, leaving on the ground some 350 sick and wounded, and several disabled guns. While the contest was raging at the broken bridge, and the Confederates were prevented from crossing or making any attempt at reconstruction, another and even more fearful battle was raging in another direction, although at no great distance. Later on the same day, about four o’clock in the afternoon, Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who had been waiting for Magruder and Huger, fell upon Heintzelman and his forces at the point where the Long Bridge Road intersects the Quaker or Willis Road, not far from Willis Church. There were two farms in the immediate neighborhood, one called Frazier’s and the other called Nelson’s, both of which have given names to the battle. The Nationals were strongly posted, their heavy guns particularly being in good position. Longstreet having been called away, the Confederate command devolved upon A. P. Hill. It seemed to be Hill’s intention to drive the Nationals before him by the first onslaught. Massing his forces, therefore, on he came, as if with the speed of the whirlwind and the force of the ava- lanche. He had not properl}^ reckoned regarding his foe. A terrific ' shower of artillery and musketry decimated his ranks and threw his troops into disorder. The crushing blow dealt by the Confederates fell most heavily upon McCall. His division — the Penn- sylvania Reserves — originally 10,000 strong, had been reduced since he reached the Pamunkey to 6000. But the men were in excellent trim, and full of spirit. Colonel Simmons, with the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Reserves, rushed upon the Confederates, when reeling and broken under the terrific fire, driving them back to the woods and making 200 of them pris- oners. Lee hurried forward reinforce- ments; and the victorious Nationals were driven back to their original ground with terrible slaughter, Sim- mons himself being mortally wounded. For two hours more the battle rasred, victoiy yielding now to the one side 266 McCLELLAITS RETREAT. and now to the other. It seemed to be the determined purpose of the Con- federates to break the National line and to capture its batteries. At one time Cooper’s battery in the centre was captured. By a dashing effort it was retaken, together with the stand- ard of an Alabama regiment. At a critical moment Meagher rushed for- ward with his Irish brigade ; and such was the fury of the onset that the Confederates were driven back again to the woods. One of the most brill- iant charges of the day was made by the Fifty-Fifth and Sixtieth Virginia. They captoed Randall’s battery, and drove back in confusion the supporting regiments. Determined to recapture it, McCall and Meade rallied their in- fantry. A terrific and protracted hand- to-hand fight ensued ; and, although the reserves were repulsed, they car- ried back with them the recaptured guns. The darkness was setting in. During the fierce struggle, the officers had recklessly exposed themselves. Meade was severely wounded, and a little later McCall was captured. Sey- mour assumed command, and the bat- tle continued. The sounds of battle had attracted the attention of Hooker and Kearney ; and as night was clos- ing upon the scene, their divisions arrived upon the field. They were soon joined by the First New Jersey bi igade. Some of the lost ground was immediately reclaimed. Joyful shouts arose from the National ranks. The Confederates, worn out and perplexed by this fresh accession of strength on the part of the Nationals, retired to the shelter of the woods. It was not an- other victory to either side; but it was another great battle; and to the Nationals it was equal to a victory, for it was a successful resistance. On this day, as the reader now knows, there were two separate fights. The one is best known as the battle of White Oak Swamp ; the other as . the battle of Glendale. The latter is known also as the battle of Frazier’s Farm. In no previous battle of the war, perhaps, was the martial spirit so keen- ly and so bitterly developed as on this day, and particularly at the battle of Glendale. The wounding of Meade and the capture of McCall give evi- dence of the feeling on the National side. On the 30th of June, the real sentiment of the rank and file of the Nationals was several times revealed by the loud and universal cry, “ On to Richmond.” On the Confederate side there was equal determination and more bitterness. It was no uncommon thing on that day for cavalry ofiScers to leap from their saddles and lead to the charge infantry regiments who had lost their commanders. At one time Gen- eral Hill, when the Confederates were in full retreat, seized the standard of the Fourth North Carolina, a regiment which he had formerly commanded, and shouted to the retreating soldiers : “ If you will not follow, I will perish alone.” ‘‘Lead on. Hill: head your old North Carolina boys !” rang over the field, while fifty ofiicers dashed to his side. The result was that the Con- federates halted and turned, and the MALVERN HILLS. 267 pursuit was checked. Major Peyton had a son who had both his legs shat- tered. ^ He called to his father for help. ^‘When we have beaten the enemy, then I will help you. 1 have other sons to lead to glory. Forward.” Such was the answer. In a few sec- onds more the father was dead. Such incidents might easily be multiplied on both sides ; but these are sufficient to show the intensity of feeling which influenced both armies at this particu- lar juncture. Of McCall’s division, nearly one-fourth had been killed or wounded ; and General Pryor tells us that he crossed the Chickahominy with 1400 men, and that in the flghts that followed he suffered a loss of 859 killed and wounded, and eleven miss- ing. It was the confident expectation of the Confederates that the battle would be resumed next day. In this, however, they were doomed to disappointment. During the darkness the retreat was July continued ; and on the morning b of the 1st of July, the army of the Potomac was again a unit, and strongly posted — infantry, cavalry and artillery — on the high grounds of Mal- vern Hills, the James Kiver in view, and its communication with that river secured. The character of that ground has been already described. The posi- tion was naturally strong, and Mc- Clellan had arrayed his forces with admirable skill. Both flanks of the army rested on James Biver, under protection of the gunboats. The ar- rangement of the troops from left to right was thus: Porter, Heintzelman, Sumner, Franklin, Keyes. The ap- proaches to the position were com- manded by about seventy guns, several of them heavy siege cannon. “ There were crouching cannon waiting for the enemy, and ready to defend all the approaches. Sheltered by fences, ditches, ravines, were swarms of in- fantry. There were horsemen pictur- esquely careering over the noon-tide and sun-scarred field. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible upon the slope which rose in the form of an am- phitheatre. With a fan-shaped sheet of fire, they could sweep the incline — a sort of natural glacis — up which the assailants must advance. A crown of cannon was on the brow of the hill. The first line of batteries could only be reached by traversing an open space of from three to four hundred yards, exposed to grape and canister from the artillery, and musketry from the infantry. If that were carried, another and still another more difficult re- mained in the rear.” Such was the position, and such were the forces against which Lee was now to direct all his strength. It was not without reason that, when the attack was about to be made. Hill expressed to Lee his strong disapproval. Lee, however, had made up his mind to take the position by storm; and he gave his orders accordingly. The Confederate chief had massed his troops on the right; and he so posted his artillery as to be able to bring upon the National batteries a concentrated fire. It was his belief that by this means he would silence 268 McCLELLAN’S RETREAT. the guns of McClellan ; and be had given orders that, whenever the expect- ed result was produced, Armistead’s brigade, of Huger’s division, should advance with a shout and capture the battery immediately before it. This shout was to be the signal for a gen- eral advance with fixed bayonets to “drive the invaders into the James.” Lee found more difiiculty in carrying out his plan than he had anticipated. The day was far advanced before the first gun was fired. Between three and four o’clock a heavy artillery fire was opened upon Couch, of Keyes’ division, and Kearney, of Heintzelman’s. A little later D. H. Hill, believing that he heard the preconcerted signal for a general advance, made a vigorous rush towards Couch’s front. Instead of being supported by one hundred guns, as he had expected, only a single battery was ordered up — that of Moorman ; and it was knocked to pieces in a few min- utes. One or two others shared the same fate — that of being beat in detail. Hill was driven back in confusion to the woods near the Quaker Road. On his retreating, the National right ad- vanced several hundred yards and took a stronger position. Magruder, mean- while, had made a furious attack on Porter, who commanded on the Na- tional left. Two brigades of McLaws’ division, charging through a dense wood, rushed up to the very muzzles of Porter’s guns. Attacks equally furious were made a little further to the right, and also on the centre. It was to no purpose. The attacking col- umns, one and all, shared the same fate. They were driven back in con- fusion, and with heavy loss. Nothing could withstand the terrific fire of the National batteries. Malvern Hills lit- erally blazed, as if one sheet of solid fiame; and the guns, which crowned every rising knoll, from their many mouths belched forth shot and shell which fell in showers on the bewil- dered masses who from time to time pressed forward, only to be torn to pieces, or to be driven back in wildest confusion. There was a lull in the battle. The fighting ceased for a time, the Confederates having all fallen back and taken shelter in the pine forest. Lee, however, was not to be driven from his purpose. He had made up his mind that Malvern Hills must be taken by storm ; and no matter what the cost, no matter how great the sacri- fice, the attempt must be repeated. He spent the interval in re-forming his battalions ; and at about six o’clock he opened a general artillery fire on the right and left of the National position, bis infantry rushing from their cover- ing at the double-quick, sweeping over the undulating fields and boldly up the hill in the direction of the batteries. As they advanced, their ranks were torn and ploughed by musketry as well as by the heavy guns. Brigade after brigade was cut up and driven back; but their places were speedily filled, with a like result. As the even- ing advanced, the fighting became at once more general and more severe. The batteries on the hill redoubled their fire, the Confederates replying with equal boldness. The gunboats on the AN OPPORTUNITY LOST. 269 river now began to fling shot and shell, which fell with deadly effect on the Confederate masses. For two hours the hills absolutely shook under the fierce cannonade. It was not until nine o’clock that the attempt to cap- ture the National position was aban- doned, and that the firing ceased. In his report of the engagement at Mal- vern Hills, General McClellan gives a graphic picture of the struggle when it was most fierce. Brigade after bri- gade,” he says, “formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our bat- teries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reel- ing back to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry with- held their fire until the attacking col- umns — which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery — had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in con- fusion from the field.” Such was the battle of Malvern Hills. It was, al- though not in any sense decisive, one of the bloodiest and most fiercely con- tested battles of the war. The night that followed was dark and stormy. The rain fell in absolute torrents. During such a night the sufferings of the wounded must have been fearful. The wearied Confede- rates sought a brief repose on the rain- soaked and blood-stained soil, some of them lying within one hundred yards of the National batteries. When the morning of the 2d of July dawned, and the half-slept Con- jujy federates began to open their 2. eyes, they discovered with some amaze- ment that the Nationals were gone, and that Malvern Hills, the scene the evening before of so much tempestuous life — their heights crowned with frown- ing cannon, brilliant with gay uniforms, and refulgent with thousands of bay- onets, which caught on their glittering points the rays of the setting sun — were deserted and silent as the grave. In the Confederate camp all was dire con- fusion. The following picture is by one of their own generals : “ The next morning, by dawn,” he says, “I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thousands of straggling men were ask- ing every passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, wagons and artillery ob- structing every road, and all together in a drenching rain presenting a scene of the most woful and heart-rending confusion.” It is not wonderful, when these things are known to us, that many competent critics have ques- tioned the propriety of McClellan’s conduct in continuing the retreat. The words, “ On to Bichmond,” if uttered by him, wmuld have been gladly obeyed by most of his officers, and by thou- sands of his men. This perpetual fighting, with no result but further retreat, was breaking the spirits of his soldiers. Such an order on the morn- ing of the 2d would have filled them with newness of life ; and even at the 270 McClellan’S retreat. last, worn and weary as they were, they might have marched in triumph to the Confederate capital. McClellan thought otherwise; and he otherwise ordered. It is hardly possible to conceive of circumstances more depressing, than those in which McClellan’s army was placed on the night of the 1st of July, 1862. For six days they had been struggling with a powerful foe, each successive fight being fol- lowed by a fresh retreat. During three days it had been continuous fighting and marching. The men had had no rest. Foot-sore and battle- worn, they were not to be allowed even on this night even an hour’s repose. The roar of the conflict had not ceased more than two hours, when orders were given to resume the retreat. The night, as we have said, was dark, and the storm raged fiercely. We cannot wonder that the order gave general dissatisfaction. Some of them openly and loudly protested. Fitz John Porter was indignant ; and his faith in his chief was at least temporarily shaken. Phil. Kearney was more plain-spoken than most of his brother-officers. “I, Philip Kearney,” he said, “an old sol- dier, enter my solemn protest against this order for a retreat. We ought, instead of retreating, to follow up the enemy, and take Kichmond; and in full view of all the responsibilities of such a declaration, I say to you all, such an order can only be prompted by cowardice or treason.” The order, ju’y however, was obeyed ; and by midnight the utterly exhausted soldiers were groping their way along a road which is described as desperate. There was only a narrow pass along which the army could retreat. The mud was ankle deep all over the ground. It was only seven miles to Harrison’s Landing ; and yet such was the nature of the road and the condition of the ground, that it was not till the middle jniy of the next day that the landing 2. was reached. It was the evening of the 3d before the wagons were all for- jnjy ward and in their places. The Con- federates, after a fourth attempt at pur- suit, turned their backs on the National army and on they moved to Richmond. On the 4th of July General Me- jniy Clellan issued the following ad- 4. dress to his army : “Soldiers of the army of the Potomac — Your achievements of the past ten days have illustrated the valor and endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by superior forces, and with- out hopes of reinforcements, you have succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of mil- itary operations. You have saved all your guns, except a few lost in battle. Upon your march you have been as- sailed, day after day, with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation, skilfully massed and led. Un- der every disadvantage of number, and necessarily of position also, you have in every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaughter. Your con- duct ranks you among the celebrated armies of history. None will now ques- tion what each of you may always, wkh NATIONAL DISAPPOINTMENT. 271 pride, say : ‘ I belonged to the army of the Potomac.’ You have reached this new’ base complete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The enemy may at any time attack you — we are prepared to meet them. I have personally es- tablished your lines. Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a final defeat. “ Your government is strengthening you wdth the resources of a great people. On this, our nation’s birthday, we de- clare to our foes, who are rebels against the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter the capital of the so- called Confederacy ; that our National constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can alone insure internal peace and external security to each State, must and shall be preserved, cost w’hat it may in time, treasure and blood. ‘‘ Geo. B. McClellan, Major-General Commanding.” On the 5th, President Davis issued July the following address to the army in Eastern Virginia : “ Soldiers — I congratulate you on the series of brilliant victories which, under the favor of Divine Providence, you have lately won, and, as the presi- dent of the Confederate States, do heartily tender to you the thanks of the country, whose just cause you have so skilfully and heroically served. Ten days ago an invading army, vastly superior to you in numbers and the material of war, closely beleaguered your capital and vauntingly proclaimed its speedy conquest ; you marched to attack the enemy in his intrenchments ; with well-directed movements and death-defying valor, you charged upon him in his strong positions, drove him from field to field over a distance of more than thirty-five miles, and, despite his reinforcements, compelled him to seek safety under the cover of his gun- boats, where he now lies cowering before the army so lately derided and threatened with entire subjugation. The fortitude wdth which you have borne toil and privation, the gallantry wdth which you have entered into each successive battle, must have been wit- nessed to be fully appreciated; but a grateful people will not fail to recog- nize you, and to bear you in loved re- membrance. Well may it be said of you that you have ‘done enough for glory’; but duty to a suffering country and to the cause of constitutional lib- erty, claims from you yet further effort. Let it be your pride to relax in nothing which can promote your future efifi- ciency ; your one great object being to drive the invader from your soil, and, carrying your standards beyond the outer boundaries of the Confederacy, to wring from an unscrupulous foe the recognition of your birthright, com- munity and independence. “Jefferson Davis.” Cheery and hopeful as were General McClellan’s words, the complete failure of the Peninsular expedition filled the nation with sorrow’. There was gen- eral gloom ; and but for the successes which had attended the armies in the West, the situation would have been desperate enough. The Confederates, of course, were jubilant; and there were many who thought that they had 272 McClellan’S retreat. good reason for their joy. In his re- port, General Lee said: “The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign which had been prose- cuted after months of preparations, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated. More than ten thousand prisoners, including officers of rank, fifty-two pieces of artillery and upwards of thirty-five thousand stand of small arms, were captured. The stores and supplies, of every description, which fell into oui* hands were great in amount and value, but small in comparison with those destroyed by the enemy. His losses in battle exceeded our own, as attested by the thousands of dead and wounded left on every field, which his subse- quent inaction shows in what condition the survivors reached the protection to which they fled.” Boastful and oifen- sive as this report was felt to be at the time, it was nevertheless admitted to be a not distant approximation to the truth. The committee of Congress on the conduct of the war gave in a re- port which was not altogether favor- able to McClellan. “The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison’s Bar,” it declared, “was very precipi- tate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being col- lected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain. thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army from destruction.” There had been sent to the Peninsula from first to last about 160,000 men. On the 3d of July, when this army had reached Han ison^s Landing and was under the protection of the gunboats, McClellan telegraphed to the president that he had not “over 50,000 left with their colors.” The actual number, however, was about 86,000, as was found on close inspection, when President Lincoln, on July the 7th, made a visit to McClellan’s headquarters. These figures speak vol- umes. So large a sacrifice of human life ought to have produced greater and more beneficial results. This chapter would be incomplete without a reference to the correspond- ence which took place between General McClellan and the government, in re- gard to his future movements and the use to be made of his army. On the morning of the day on which was fought the battle of Malvern June Hills, McClellan telegraphed to Washington for fresh troops, adding that it might be necessary for him to fall back to the river. The president promptly replied that he had no men to send, but that if he had a million at his disposal, it would be impossible to forward them in time to meet the emergency, urging him at the same time to save his army, even if he should be compelled to fall back to Fort- ress Monroe. The president added.: “ We still have strencrth enoimh in the country, and will bring it oifi.” jul} 1 On the following day McClellan DEMAND FOR MORE TROOPS. 2?3 asked for 50,000 troops, when he had for reply that the demand could not be complied with, as 15,000 more men were needed to defend the National capital. If he was not strong enough to take Richmond, the president did not ask him to attempt an impossi- bility. Strange to say, in spite of all jnjy this, McClellan made a demand on the 3d for 100,000 men — a demand which he repeated on the July 4th, that he might, as he said, take Richmond and the re- bellion.” It was at this time, too, that he wrote that foolish letter which is destined to be remembered against him, offering the president political advice, particularly in the matter of slavery. McClellan could not bear the idea of being overruled in his plans — if Rich- mond was to be captured, he must have the glory ; nor could he for one moment find a place for the thought that he should cease to be the chief of July the army of the Potomac. On 23* the 23d of July, General Halleck, having resigned his command of the army of the West, assumed the duties of general-in-chief of the entire army of the United States. The first thin«: to which his attention was called, was the condition of the army of the Po- tomac. Halleck, without delay, visited Harrison’s Landing. Lincoln had been there on the 7th. McClellan was thus receiving sufficient attention. Halleck found McClellan bent on moving to Richmond, but imperious in his de- mands for more troops. To accomplish his purpose, he would require at least 50,000 additional troops. So large a number, Halleck assured him, was altogether out of the question. He was not authorized to promise more than 20,000, and to let him have even that number implied the weak- ening of other places. McClellan took the night to consider the matter. In the morning he had come to the conclusion that he would make an at- tempt on Richmond with the ad- ditional 20,000. With this under- standing Halleck left for Washington. Almost immediately after his arrival there, he received from McClellan a telegram, stating that he could not undertake a movement upon Richmond with any hope of success, unless he was reinforced to the extent of 35,000 men. So large a body of men was not at the moment disposable. It was re- solved, therefore, to withdraw the army of the Potomac to some position where it could unite with that of Gen- eral Pope, and cover Washington at the same time that it operated against the enemy. On the 30th of July, ju]y McClellan received instructions 30. to send'' away his sick as quickly as possible, and to prepare for a movement of his troops. On the 3d of A u- Auj. gust he was ordered by telegraph to withdraw his entire army to Acquia Creek. This he most reluctantly proceeded to do. On the 4th Ah,?, he wrote to Halleck, protesting 4. against the withdrawal of his army. The telegram of the commander-in-chief had given him great pain. The with- drawal of the army to Acquia Creek could not but prove disastrous. It w^us 274 MCCLELLAN’S RETREAT. removing the army further from Rich- mond, and from a base of operations ^vhich had all the advantage of the co- operation of the gunboats on the river. I: would prove demoralizing to the army — both men and officers ; it would 1 ave a depressing effect upon the peo- ple-; and it would have a powerful influence in inducing foreign govern- ments to recognize the independent sovereignty of the Southern Confede- racy. By implication he denied that the government was unable to send him reinforcements. “I point you,” he said, ‘‘to General Burnside’s force, to that of General Pope — not necessary to maintain a strict defense in front of Washington and Harper’s Ferry; to those portions of the army of the West — not required for a strict defense there. Here, directly in front of the army, is the heart of the rebellion. It is here that all our resources should be col- lected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of this nation. All points of secondary importance else- where should be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A decided victory here, and the military strength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what reverses we may meet with elsewhere — here is the true defense of Washington ; it is here, on the bank of the James River, that the fate of the Union should be decided.” There were both truth and eloquence in Mc- Clellan’s words ; but coming from him at this particular juncture, they were powerless and without effect. They failed to convince Halleck. They equally failed to make any change in | the purpose of the government. Hal- leck’s reply was vigorous. It left un- heeded none of the points which Mc- Clellan had raised. He differed fi*om McClellan entirely as to the value of his position, at least in the circum- stances in which the National army, as a whole, found itself. He made a strong point of the fact that he found, on his arrival at Washington, the orig- inal army of the Potomac split into two parts, with the entire force of the enemy directly between them. It was desirable — it was necessary — that they be again united ; and, as this union could not be effected on the banks of the James, it must be attempted in the neighborhood of Fredericksburg. The question of demoralization was easily disposed of. “Your change of front,” said Halleck, “from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your pres- ent position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in effecting it.” He referred with effect to McClellan's fickleness of purpose, now demanding 50,000 men, now 20,000, and then dis- covering that nothing could be done without an addition of at least 35,000. He reminded him also of the dangerous character of the climate on the James River — a climate fatal to whites in the months of August and September. He finally assured him that no change could be made in the orders issued, and that the wishes of the govern- ment must be carried out. Hal- leek’s letter was written on the I Gth of August. It was not until the INEXCUSABLE DELAYS. 275 An^. 14 til that the evacuation of Har- 14. rison’s Landing commenced. Mc- Clellan left himself on the 23d, and arrived at Acquia Creek on the 23. day following. Thus ended the ill-starred Peninsular expedition. From first to last it had been unfortunate. Whatever the cause, that magnificent army which liad been organized with so much pomp and pageantry at Washington, and from which so great things were expected, had virtually exhausted itself and ac- complished nothing. No finer soldiers ever went to give battle to an enemy. But they were allowed to sicken in the trenches at Yorktown, and to perish by thousands in the woods and swamps of the blood-stained Chickahominy. Once only during the campaign was the government, in our judgment, to blame. It might have given an entire- ly new feature to the campaign if, on the eve of the battle of Mechanicsville, McDowell had been ordered to make a demonstration along the Richmond Road. Such a demonstration, as we have already had occasion to observe, was dreaded by Lee,* as it would have rendered entirely impracticable the flank movement of General Jackson. In the circumstances, however, and after the experience it had had, the * General Robert Edmund Lee, to whom belongs the chief glory of this campaign, and who had already proved himself one of the greatest commanders devel- oped by the war on either side, was son of General Henry Lee, and was bom in Washington, in 1808. Graduating at West Point, he entered the army in 1829 ; rising to the rank of captain in 1838 ; major in 1846 ; and lieu- tenant-colonel in 1847. He was promoted to the post of superintendent of the West Point Military Academy in 1852. In 1854, he accompanied General George B. McClellan on the commission sent by the United States government was not without abundant reason for the justification of its con- duct. It trembled for the safety of Washington, and it called McDowell to its protection. McClellan, however, was to blame throuj^hout. We have no desire to repeat w^hat we said when treating of Yorktown and of Williams- burg and of Fair Oaks, and what we said over again at the commencement of this chapter. The army of the Po- tomac, as one has well put it, was without a presiding genius — a control- ling mind. The delays, w'hich proved ruinous, were absolutely inexcusable. It would be ungenerous to say that Mc- Clellan was wanting in bravery, or that he lacked the higher qualities essential in a great commander. But it is noto- rious that he lingered at Yorktown when he had no enemy to oppose his advance, that he was not present till the battle of Williamsbursr was fous^ht and won, that he w^as not present at all at the battle of Fair Oaks, that when the great battle was fought at Gaines’ Mill he was on the south side of the Chickahominy, that he was not present at White Oak Swamp or at Glendale, and that when Malvern Hills were shaking as if to their foundations with the thunder of cannon, he was safe on board the gunboats on James River. Government to the seat of war in the Crimea. On the 25th of April, 1861, he resigned his commission in the United States army, and offered his sword to his native State of Virginia. During that summer, he conducted the military operations in the mountain regions of Vir- ginia. Returning to Richmond, he was occupied till June, 1862, with the general disposition and equipment of the Confederate forces. When Johnston was wound- ed at Fair Oaks, Lee assumed command of the army, and pressed McClellan from point to point, until he took his ffnal stand at Malvern Hills and Harrison’s Landing. POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. 276 CHAPTER XIX. The Army of Virginia. — Pope in Command. — Fremont Resigns. — Burnside Ordered to Alexandria. — Pope’s In- structions. — Pope Opposed to McClellan’s Retreat. — Pope’s Address to his Soldiers — He Asks to be Re- lieved of his Command. — McClellan at Acquia Creek. — The Plans of the Confederates. — Pope’s Orders, — Measures of Retaliation by the Confederates. — A Call for Militia. — The Unpopular Orders Modified. — The Confederates at the Rappahannock. — Pope’s Army Begins to Move. — Position of the Nationals. — Pope at Culpepper Court House. — Banks at Cedar Mountain. — The Confederates Approaching. — Battle of Cedar Mountain. — Banks Begins the Attack. — Pope on the Ground. — A Severe Encounter. — Banks Driven Back. — American Obstinacy. — The Losses on Both Sides. — The Confederates Fall Back. — Intercepted Letters. — Lee’s Plan. — Pope Reinforced. — A Retreat Ordered. — The Retreat Successfully Conducted. — No Rest for the Wearied Army. — The Confederates at the Heels of the Nationals. — Across the Rappahannock. — Fight- ing at the Bridges and the Fords. — Stuart’s Raid. — The Nationals Humiliated. — Character of the Retreat. — The Object of the Confederates. — Pope’s Danger. — McClellan’s Delay. — Warren ton Evacuated. — Pope’s Dis- position of his Troops. — Jackson Across the Rappahannock. — Jackson Through Thoroughfare Gap. — At Bristow Station. — Capture of Manassas Junction. — Pope’s Communication Intercepted. — Activity of Jackson. — Both Armies in Critical Circumstances. — Pope Prepares to Strike Jackson Before the Arrival of Long- street. — Movement Toward Gainesville. — An Encounter at Bristow Station. — Hooker Successful. — Retreat of Ewell. — Jackson Evacuates Manassas. — Delays Again. — Porter at Bristow Station. — His Troops Need Rest. — Merritt at Warrenton Junction. — McClellan’s Officers Lukewarm. — Pope at Manassas. — Jackson’s Retreat by Way of Centreville. — The Pursuit. — Kearney at Centreville. — Bull Run. — The Old Battle- Ground. — Jackson Pressing Toward Thoroughfare Gap. — King's Division. — Gallantry of Gibbons and Doubleday. — A Severe Encounter. — Ewell Loses a Leg. — King Holds his Ground. — Ricketts’ Division at Thoroughfare Gap. — Arrival of Longstreet. — Ricketts’ Division Driven Back. — King Falls Back. — The Situ- ation Changed. — A New Disposition of the Nationals — Battle of Groveton or Gainesville. — The Confede- rates Well Posted. — Arrival of Pope. — Severe Fighting in the Morning. — Pause in the Battle. — Pope Waits for Reinforcements. — Battle Resumed. — Terrific Fighting. — The Confederate Left Doubled Back on the Centre. — The Nationals Hold the Ground. — Remarks on the Battle. — Porter Blamed. — The National Army Exhausted. — Ammunition Scarce. — Pope Calls for Supplies. — McClellan’s Reply. — Pope Resumes the At- tack. — Porter Arrives. — A Tempest of Shot and Shell. — Porter Driven Back. — A Severe Attack on the Na- tional Left. — The Nationals Forced Back. — Pope Retires Across Bull Run. — Destruction of the Stone Bridge. — The Nationals at Centreville. — Reports of Lee and Pope. — Preparations for Another Engage- ment. — Excitement in Washington. — Lee’s Purpose. — The First of September. — Battle of Chantilly. — A Severe Thunder Storm. — Bravery of Stevens and Kearney. — Death of Stevens. — Death of Kearney. — The Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — The Brave Birney. — Kearney’s Body Sent to Pope’s Headquarters. — The Losses During the Campaign. — Difficult Creek. — The National Army Ordered Inside the Fortifications at Washing- ton. — Resignation of Pope. — Disappearance of the Army of Virginia. — ^Restoration of the Army of the Po- tomac. — Reappointment of McClellan. — ^Vindication of Pope. At the time McClellan was continu- ing his disastrous retreat towards 1862 * ^ . Harrison’s Landing, important events were taking place in the nearer I neighborhood of the National capital; and public interest and expectation were both excited by the active and vigorous measures of General Pope, who had been called from the West and placed in command of the army of Virginia. As early as the 27th June I of June, 1862, the following or- 27. der had been issued by the president : “ 1. The forces under Major-Generals Fremont, Banks and McDowell, includ- ing the troops now under Brigadier* GENERAL JOHN POPE. 277 General Sturgis, at Washington, shall be consolidated and form one ai*my, to be called the army of Virginia. ‘^II. The command of the army of Virginia is specially assigned to Major- General John Pope, as commanding general. “The troops of the Mountain Depart- ment, heretofore under command of General Fremont, shall constitute the First army corps, under the command of General IVemont. “The troops of the Shenandoah De- partment, now under General Banks, shall constitute the Second army corps, and be commanded by him. “The troops under the command of General McDowell, except those within the fortifications and the city of Wash- ington, shall form the Third army corps, and be under his command.” Major-General Pope, who now comes prominently to the front, had, as the reader already knows, won some dis- tinction in the West. He was a native of Illinois, having been born at Kas- kaskia, in that State, in March, 1823. His father was Judge Pope, of Illinois. Having received a liberal education, the younger Pope entered West Point in 1838. He graduated with Rose- cranz in 1842, and in August, 1846, joined the army, under General Taylor, in Mexico. From the close of the Mexican War up until 1861, he was engaged chiefly in surveying expedi- tions. When the Civil War broke out, he held only the rank of captain. He was soon, however, appointed briga- dier-general of volunteers. In De- cember of 1861, he was despatched by General Halleck into central and west- ern Missouri, then being harassed by Confederate raiders. In this mission Pope was completely successful. Sub- sequently, in March, 1862, he was appointed major-general of volunteers, and soon afterwards captured New Madrid and Island No. 10. He took part, also, in tbe siege of Corinth, and followed up the retreating Confede- rates. The consolidation of these various forces into one command was favorably regarded by the public. It was be- lieved that the combination would con- duce alike to strength and usefulness. The new aiTangement did not prove agreeable to General Fremont, as Pope had been his junior in Missouri. It was Fremont’s opinion that the effect of the appointment of Pope to the su- preme command, while he himself re- mained in a subordinate position, would be greatly to reduce his rank and con- sideration in the service ; and conse- quently he asked to be relieved from command. He was relieved according- ly; and his corps was given first to General King, and then to General Sigel. In addition to these three corps, a small and unorganized force, under Brigadier-General Sturgis, was posted in the neighborhood of Alexandria; and thither, also, Burnside, who had arrived at Newport News from Roan- oke, was ordered to proceed with his troops. The disposable movable forces, consisted of the three corps first named — that of Sigel; that of Banks; and that of McDowell ; — about 40,000 in all. The cavalry numbered about 5000 928 278 POPE AXD LEE IX VIRGINIA. but the horses were in wretched con- dition, and the men were poorly pro- vided with arms. These forces were scattered over a wide surface, and along a line which extended from Fredericks- burg to Winchester and Harper’s Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley ; and General Pope was charged with the three-fold duty of covering the National capital, of guarding the valley entrance to Mary- land, in the rear of Washington, and of menacing Kichmond from the North, as a diversion in favor of McClellan. Pope assumed command on the 28th June June, Colonel George D. Pug- 28* gles being his chief of staff. Having disposed of his troops as he best could, for the purpose of carrying out the ^wishes of the government, he was prepared to move toward Rich- mond with the view of aiding McClel- lan when began that series of battles which preceded and attended the re- treat of the army of the Potomac from the Chickahominy to Harrison’s Land- ing. It was Pope’s intention to ad- vance by way of Charlottesville upon the James River, above Richmond, compelling Lee to detach a part of his army from the front of Richmond, and thus enabling McClellan to complete his movement successfully. McClel- lan’s retreat changed the entire plan of the campaign. A cabinet council was called; and Pope was summoned be- fore it. Pope was seriously opposed to McClellan’s retreat ; and strongly urged its impolicy upon the president and the secretary of war. He offered to march from Fredericksburg upon Richmond direct with his whole force, insisting only on one condition — that peremptory orders should be sent to McClellan, and such measures taken in advance, that it would not be possible for him to evade, on any pretext, making a vigorous at- tack upon the enemy with his whole army th^ moment he heard that Pope was engaged. This proposal of Pope was the more honorable that it implied a very considerable risk : it would have placed Lee between the two National armies, and given him the opportunity of striking each in turn, with the pos- sibility of destroying both. After Mc- Clellan arrived at Harrison’s Landing, Pope clung to his conviction that it would be impolitic for him to abandon the Peninsula, and wrote to him a per- sonal note, offering every assistance in his power, and inviting a free exchange of opinions. To this letter McClellan returned a chilling reply. On jujy the 14th of July, when about H. to commence active operations. Pope issued to his soldiers an address which revealed something like vanity, with not a little irritation of feeling — an ad- dress which could not have been other- wise conceived and expressed if the object had been to embitter sentiment already known to exist, and to di- vide the discordant s}Tnpathies of the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia. “ By special assignment of the president,” said Pope, “ I have as- siuned command of this army. I have spent two weeks in learning your whereabouts, your condition and your wants, in prepai’ing you for active oper- ations, and in placing you in positions from which you can act promptly and POPE’S ADDRESS. 579 to the purpose. These labors are near- ly completed, and I am about to join you in the field. Let us understand each other. I have , come to you from the West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies — from an army whose business it has been to seek the adversary, and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack, and not defense. In but one instance has the enemy been able to place our W estern armies in a defensive attitude. I pre- sume I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. It is my purpose to do so, and that speedily. I am sure you long for an opportunity to win the distinction you are capable of achiev- ing; that opportunity I shall endeavor to give you. In the meantime I desire you to dismiss certain phrases I am sorry to find much in vogue amongst you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions, and holding them — of lines of retreat and bases of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest po- sition a soldier should desire to occupy is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable line of retreat of om' opponents, and leave our own to take care of itself. Let us look before us, and not behind. Success and glory are in the advance — disaster and shame lurk in the rear. Let us act on this understanding, and it is safe to predict that your banners shall be inscribed with many a glorious deed, and that your names will be dear to your countrymen forever.” Such lan- guage was certainly not fitted to en- f courage good feeling and unity of purpose. It is painful to have to al- lude to these personal differences ; but it is useless to make any attempt to conceal the fact that these same differ- ences had much to do with the disas- ters which had befallen, and which were soon again to befall, the National arms — disasters which for a time threat- ened the ruin of the Union cause. These difiiculties showed the govern- O ment the necessity for a commander-in- chief of all the forces of the Union ; and on the 23d of July Gieneral juiy Halleck, having resigned -his com- 23. mand of the army of the West, as- sumed, in obedience to an order from the president, the duties of this high and res 2 :>onsible position. Pope, foreseeing the inconveniencies, not to say injuries to the Union cause, which must inevita- bly result from the inharmonious action already manifest on the part of the dif- ferent generals, asked to be relieved from his command in Virginia and returned to the Western country. His request, however, was not complied with. In such circumstances began Pope’s cam- paign in northeastern Virginia — ground made memorable by the fii’st battle of Bull Run, and, more recently, by the successful raid of General Jackson and by the comparatively unsuccessful efforts of Banks, Fremont and Shields. We have seen in a previous chapter that the withdrawal of McClellan’s army was definitely decided upon at Washington. It had become a neces- sity. On the 14th of August, therefore, that army began to H. ' move towards Acquia Creek, with a 280 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. view to reinforce General Pope, and to act under his command. It was Pope’s object, therefore, so to act that, while he would cover Washington and assure the safety of the Shenandoah Valley, he would also facilitate the Aug, movements of McClellan. On 23* the 23d McClellan himself left the landing ; and on the following day he reached Acquia Creek. It is not much to be wondered at that the Confederate government had found great encouragement from the failure of the Peninsular campaign, and had, in consequence, resolved to aban- don the merely defensive attitude with which hitherto they had for the most part contented themselves, and to push forward upon the foe, striking him boldly in his own territory. The conscription had proved singularly suc- cessful; their armies had been largely increased ; and victory had wonderfully improved the spirits of their men. Conscious of sti’ength and full of high hopes, the Richmond authorities made up their minds that the time had come for the adoption of vigorous, aggressive, measures. It was resolved that Bragg should push his way through Kentucky, and capture Louisville and Cincinnati, while Lee should make a rush through the Shenandoah Valley, cross Maryland, and make himself master of Philadel- phia in the hope that, by two simultane- ous movements, both of them proving eminently successful, they would be able to compel the government at Washington to come to terms. In a previous chapter, when treating of some of the important operations in the West, we have shown what success at- tended the sortie of General Bragg. We have now to consider the success which attended that of General Lee. As soon as it became known at Rich- mond that an attempt was about to be made to unite the forces of McClellan to the command of Pope, it was de- termined to act at once, and to make a bold attempt to force a way to Wash- ington before the junction of the two armies could be effected. The exploit of Jackson in the Shenandoah Valiev «/ was to be repeated on a grander scale. There was much high-sounding talk at the time. All that was predicted was not destined to be fulfilled ; but for a time matters looked black enough for the Nationals; and the Confederates were not wholly vdthout reason for the hopes which they indulged and for the lan- guage which they used. There were at least 150,000 fighting men centred at and around Richmond. With the ex- ception of a strong corps of observation, all these were at once to be precipitated upon Maryland. At this stage of our narrative, and while the armies of Lee and the armies of Pope are preparing to rush into deadly collision — the first resolute for attack, the second resolute for resist- ance — it is necessary to pause and di- rect the attention of the reader to certain measures which had been adopt- ed for the more successful prosecution of the war — measures which at this very moment were largely occupying the public mind. We refer to the orders of General Pope, dated July 18th, 1862, and the orders of the War Department, SEVERE MEASURES. 281 bearing date August 4tli, August 8th and August 11th. On the 18th of J uly Pope issued the following orders : “ Headquarters of the Army of Yihqinia, ) Washington, July 18, 1862. ) General Orders^ No, 5. “ Hereafter, as far as practicable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their oper- ations are carried on. In all cases, sup- plies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouch- ers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war upon sufficient testimony being fur- nished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. ^‘Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsist- ence will be dispensed with as far as possible. “By command of “ Major-Gei^^eral Pope. “Geo. D. K-uggles, “ Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff.” “ Headquarters of the Army of Virginia, ) Washington, July 18, 1862. ) “ General Orders, No, 6. “ Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command no sup- ply or baggage trains of any descrip- tion will be used, unless so stated especially in the order for the move- ment. Two days’ cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men ; and all villages and neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specb fied by General Orders, No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. “ Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity, and no delay in such movements will be excused here- after on any pretext. “ Whenever the order for the move- ment of any portion of the army ema- nates from these headquarters, the time of marching, and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty, will be specifically designated, and no de- parture therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed without the gi*avest and most conclusive reasons. “ Commanding officers will be held re- sponsible for strict and prompt compli- ance with every provision of this order. “ By command of “Major-General Pope. “ Geo. D. Buggles, “ Col. A. A.-G. and Chief of Staff.” On the same day was issued another order, declaring that the inhabitants along the lines of railroads and tele- graphs and the routes of travel would be held responsible for any injury done to track, line or road, or for any at- tacks on trains or stragglers by bands of guerrillas in their neighborhood. In cases of damage to roads, the citizens within five miles would be turned out in mass to repair the damage. If a soldier or legitimate follower of the army was fired upon from any house, the same should be razed to the ground. 282 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. By anotlier order, all disloyal citizens within the lines of the army or within the reach of its respective officers, were to be arrested at once. Those taking the oath of allegiance, and giving suffi- cient security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain ; all others were to be conducted to the South, be- yond the extreme pickets, and if again found anywhere within the lines, were to be treated as spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. These orders of General Pope were followed by the pillaging of private property, and by insults to females, to a degree unknown heretofore during the war. The Confederate government, by way of retaliation, issued an order de- claring that General Pope and the commissioned officers serving under him were “not entitled to be con- sidered as soldiers, and therefore not entitled to the benefit of cartel for the parole of future prisoners of war. Or- dered, further, that in the event of the capture of Major-General Pope, or any commissioned officers serving under him, the captive so taken shall be held in close confinement so long as the orders aforesaid shall continue in force and unrepealed by the competent mili- tary authonty of the United States, and that in the event of the murder of an unarmed citizen or inhabitant of this Confederacy, by virtue or under pre- tense of the order hereinbefore recited, it shall be the duty of the commanding general of the forces of this Confede- racy to cause immediately to be hung, out of commissioned officers, prisoners as aforesaid, a number equal to that of our own citizens thus murdered by the enemy.” It was manifest from the orders of General Pope that he meant to conduct the war on very different principles from those which had guided Generah McClellan. The action taken by the Confederate government showed, on the other hand, that through them Pope had added bitterness to the con- test. Pope’s orders were afterwards considerably modified. After the failure of the Peninsular campaign became fully apparent, and McClellan had commenced his retreat, the government at Washington natural- ly enough felt the danger to which the country was in consequence exposed, and proceeded to do their utmost to provide against the emergency. A call had just been made for 300,000 volun- teers. It was now deemed necessary to call upon the several States to furnish an equal number of militia, to serve for nine months. . It was found extremely difficult to raise by voluntary enlist- ment as many as 600,000 men. Great efforts were therefore made to arouse the enthusiasm of the people. Burning words went forth from pulpit and plat- form ; and the press lent the weight of its mighty influence to the advancement of the common cause. Liberal bounties were offered by the government; and large sums of money were contributed from private sources for the purpose of promoting enlistment. All these efforts, however, were found to be insufficient ; and the president at last found himself under the necessity of having recourse to a draft. The fol- lowing orders were, therefore, issued: GENERAL ORDERS. 283 “ War Department, j Washington, August 4, 1862. ) ‘‘Ordered, First — That a draft of 300,000 militia be immediately called into the service of the United States, to serve for nine months, unless sooner discharged. The secretary of war will assign the quotas to the States, and establish regulations for the draft. Second — That if any State shall not, by the 15th of August, furnish the quota of the additional 300,000 volun- teers authorized by law, the deficiency of volunteers in that State will also be made up by a special draft from the militia. The secretary of war will establish regulations for this purpose. “ Third — Regulations will be pre- pared by the War Department, and presented to the president, with the object of securing the promotion of ofiicers of the army and volunteers for meritorious and distinguished services, and of preventing the nomination and appointment in the military service of incompetent or unworthy officers. The regulations will also provide for ridding the service of such incompetent persons as now hold commissions. “By order of the president. “ Edwin M. Stanton, “Secretary of War.” These orders were submitted to with a reasonably good grace, considering the natural repugnance of the Ameri- can citizen to compulsory military ser- vice. Subsequent orders, however, Aug, dated the 8th of August, and seriously interfering with the principles involved in the writ of habeas corpus — orders, for example, authorizing the arrest and imprison- ment of any person or persons who should by act, speech or writing dis- courage volunteer enlistments, or who should aid and comfort the enemy, or who should be discovered in any other disloyal practice ; authorizing, also, the arrest and imprisonment of any person or persons who should attempt to leave the United States, and thus seek to avoid military duty — these raised a perfect tempest of excitement. They placed the foreigner resident on these shores under great inconveniences ; and they forbade the American citizen, who was liable to be drafted, to go out of the country or even to absent himself from his State or county. It was found to be impossible to carry out these orders according to the strict letter; and, consequently, another order from the War Department, dated the Au^. 11th of August — some days after D. the fighting between Pope and Lee had fairly commenced — took the edge off their offensiveness, by advising the ex- ercise of great caution and sound judg- ment in carrying them into execution. The difficulty was thus got over; and the manifestations of patriotism on the part of the people were such as to teach the government that such measures were as unnecessary as they were un- wise The reader is now in a position in which he can comprehend the state of thiiiofs North and South at this critical moment in the history of the war. With a knowledge of these details, he will be able the more easily to enter into the feelings of the rival armies 284 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. which now confronted each other and were ready to rush into deadly strife, as well as to appreciate the special ad- vantages which belonged to each. It is important, also, for the reader to re- member that, at this particular junc- ture, McClellan had not yet left Harri- son’s Landing. Early in the month of August the divisions of Ewell, Hill and Jackson were hurried forward to the Rapi- dan River, which is the south fork of the Rappahannock. General Pope made immediate preparations to meet the enemy, and to hinder his ad- vance. Hitherto he had been giv- ing his instructions from Washington, the capital of Rappahannock County. General Rufus King had been ordered to send forward detachments of cavalry, and break up, if possible, the Virginia Central Railroad. In this mission King had been successful ; and the road was broken up in several places. General Banks had been instructed to move forward and take post where the turn- pike from Sperryville to Culpepper crosses Hazel River. Previous to this. Banks had been instructed to send General Hatch, with some 2000 of his best mounted men, to proceed from Madison Court House around the west side of the Blue Ridge, and make a descent upon Gordonsville and destroy the railroad leading to Richmond, and then to push forward to Charlottesville and break up the railroad between that place and Lynchburg. Hatch was despatched accordingly. But both movements failed. Platch was dis- graced; and the cavalry of General Banks was placed in charge of General John Buford. McDowell had been ordered from Waterloo Bridge to Cul- pepper Court House ; and General Sigel was already encamped at Sperry- ville, soipe twenty miles from Cul- pepper. On the 7th of August, Pope himself tells us, all the in- 7. fan try and artillery forces of the orig- inal army of Virginia were assembled along the turnpike from Sperryville to Culpepper, and numbered about 28,000 men. The cavalry were well arranged, both for observation and de- fense. Buford, with five regiments, was posted at Madison Court House, with his pickets stretching along the line of the Rapidan from Barnett’s Ford to the Blue Ridge. Sigel, ac- cording to instructions, had posted a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery at the point where the road from Madison Court House to Sperry- ville crosses the Robertson River. These were intended as a support for Buford. Bayard, with four regiments of cavalry, was posted near Rapidan Station, at the point where the Orange and Alexandria Road crosses the Rapi- dan, his pickets extending as far east as Racoon Ford, and connecting with Buford at Barnett’s Ford. There was a signal station on the suimnit of Thoroughfare Mountain, commanding a view of the entire country as far south as Orange Court House. Having com- mand of this station. Pope could count with confidence on being informed of the first appearance of the enemy, as well as of the direction of his move- ments. Burnside and his troops, of CEDAR MOUNTAIN. 285 which no account is here taken, were left in charge of Fredericksburg. The two main points of Pope’s line of de- fense were thus Fredericksburg and Culpepper Court House. Culpepper is about seventy miles from Washing- ton. The route crosses the Long Bridge at Washington, thence through Alex- andria, Fairfax, Manassas and Warren- ton. It is equally distant from Rich- mond. Fredericksburg is connected with Washington by steamboat naviga- tion on the Potomac to Acquia Creek, thence, by railroad, fifteen miles to Fredericksburg, which is sixty miles by railroad from Richmond. On the morning of the 8th of Au- Aug. gusb after having inspected the 8* different corps, and seen and given orders to the different generals, Pope arrived in person at Culpepper. Here he found that his orders had been attended to, and that all things were in a satisfactory condition. Craw- ford’s brigade, of General Banks’ corps, had already arrived. So, too, had Ricketts’ division, of General. McDow- ell’s corps. At an early hour he had learned from General Bayard, who was slowly falling back towards Culpepper, that the enemy was approaching. The same information came from General Buford, who was stationed more to the west. It was impossible during the whole of the 8th to decide whether the intended movement of the enemy was in the direction of Culpepper or Madison Court House. As he had been specially instructed to preserve his communication with the Rappahan- nock at Fredericksburg, he regulated his movements with that end in view. Early in the day he pushed forward Crawford’s brigade in the direction of Cedar or Slaughter Mountain, to the support of Bayard, who was falling back in that direction. Meanwhile he concentrated his forces, bringing them closer toocether in the neighborhood of Culpepper. Banks was summoned to that place from Hazel River. Sigel was ordered to hurry forward from Sperryville. Banks arrived in good time ; but Sigel, from some cause, blundered as to the road he should take, and was by that means prevented from coming up until late in the after- noon of the following day. On the morning of the 9th, Pope ordered General Banks, with the remain- der of his corps, to advance towards Cedar Mountain — a sugar-loaf eminence about seven miles south of Culpepper, and about two miles west of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. Banks was to join Crawford, who was stationed in the rear of Bayard, and to take com- mand of all the forces present. He had special instructions to check the ad- vance of the enemy and to ascertain his strength, as well as, if possible, to dis- cover his immediate purpose. The Confederates had, meanwhile, been pressing forward in very consider- able strength; and before Banks ar- rived, Jackson had taken possession of Cedar Mountain, and, from that com- manding eminence, had taken in the entire view and made himself acquaint- ed with the position and strength of the National army. Ewell was thrown forward with his division ; and care 286 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. was taken to conceal the troops as much as possible under the cover of the woods. Early’s brigade, of Ewell’s division, was posted on the road lead- ing from Culpepper. The other divi- sions took position on the western slope of the mountain, and planted batteries on every available spot. Some of the batteries were as high as a hundred feet above the common level of the ground. Four guns were advanced to the front ; and these, with some of the more ele- vated batteries, opened fire upon Craw- ford’s batteries. Simultaneously with the opening of this fire on Crawford, General Winder, with a portion of Jackson’s corps, moved out towards the left, carefully keeping under cover. A little later in the day. Hill came up with his division ; and when about five o’clock they began to throw out skirm- ishers, the Confederates, strongly post- ed, numbered about 20,000 veterans. It was about five o’clock in the after- noon when General Banks advanced to the attack. Up to that hour he did not believe that the enemy were in sufficient force to make any vigorous demonstration; and he so reported to General Pope. The battle at once be- came general ; it began to rage more fiercely after six o’clock ; and from that time till darkness came on the fighting was furious and incessant. About seven o’clock Pope himself came on the field, bringing with him Ricketts’ division. On his arrival on the ground, Pope saw at once that Banks’ right wing was too much ex- tended. Directing Banks to draw in his right wing and mass it upon his centre, he pushed forward Ricketts’ division to occupy the ground thus vacated. As Banks retired his men with great caution, the Confederates pressed close upon them and began to emerge from the woods. The batteries of Ricketts’ division opened upon them a tremendous fire, and compelled them to fall back under cover. Night now fell upon the scene ; and the close, and, in some cases, hand-to-hand fighting ceased; but the artillery firing was kept up until near midnight. General Sigel did not arrive in time to take any active part in the fight ; but his ap- pearance helped to give courage against the possibilities of the coming day. General Banks held the ground he took early in the morning. His mis- take, if he made any, was that he ad- vanced against a foe whose strength he had no means of knowing. He had been driven back one mile from the spot where the fighting commenced. Such was the battle of Cedar Mountain, or, as it is named by the Confederates, Cedar Run. Not on so large a scale, or so protracted as some of the battles which we have described, it was yet one of the bloodiest and most keenly contested. ‘‘I have witnessed,” writes one who was present, “many battles during the war; but I have seen none where the tenacious obstinacy of the American character was so fully dis- played.” It was a fight of one against two. The Nationals w^ere in the mi- nority ; but it can hardly be said that they were robbed of the honors of the day. The loss on both sides ^vas very heavy. General Banks’ corps was so THE RETREAT. 287 cut up as to be reduced at least oue- half. Brigadier-Generals Geary, Augur and Carroll were badly wounded, and Brigadier-General Prince was captured. Pope estimated his entire loss at 1800 men. The confederate loss was heavy, and included some of the best officers. The 10th was Sunday. At day- Aug, break the Confederates fell back 10. about two miles. The National pickets advanced and occupied the ground. During the remainder of the day the army rested. The day D* following was spent in burying the dead ; and on the same night the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead unburied, and his wounded to the mercy of the Nationals. On the 16th a party of Confederate Aug. cavalry were surprised and cap- 10* tured at Louisa Court House. On their persons were found some im- portant letters, one of them being an autograph letter from Lee, intimating that he was moving the main body of his army, by forced marches, to attack General Pope before a junction could be formed between him and the army of the Potomac. This information hav- ing been sent to Washington, Pope received instructions from the com- mander-in-chief not to cross the Kapi- dan, but to fall back and take post behind the north fork of the Bappa- hannock, where reinforcements could be more easily sent him. This move- Aug, ment was commenced on the 18. 18th. On the following day Lee, with a large force, crossed the Bapidan. Meanwhile Pope had been consider- ably reinforced. He had been joined by 8000 of Burnside’s soldiers, under General Beno ; by ten regiments, under General Stevens, which had just re- turned from Port Boyal ; and by Gen- eral King, with some regiments from McDowell’s corps. He was also author- ized to call the main portion of General Cox’s forces from Western Virginia. With the greater portion of these forces already on hand — about forty regi- ments in all — the retreat began. Gen- eral Sigel led the advance; General Beno had charge of the left ; and Gen- eral McDowell, supported by General Banks, occupied the centre. In this order the retreat was commenced on the night of the 18th of August. The night was dark and cold for the season of the year. The usual camp fires were extinguished, and all unnecessary noise was avoided. Considering the immense train of wagons in advance of the troops, the progress made during the night was marvellous. On the morning of Tuesday the 19th a large portion of the army had 1^* passed through Culpepper. The sight presented by the moving masses of in- fantry, cavalry and artillery, together with the multitudes of white-covered wagons winding slowly up the distant hills, was imposing in the extreme, and one which it rarely falls to the lot of even military men to witness. It was unfortunate for the country, however, that two such spectacles should have been witnessed by the same men within so limited a period. By noon on the 19th the advance had reached the one bridge — the railroad bridge at the Bap- pahannock Station — over which th.e 288 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. entire army must pass. All day long, and all night through, this gi*eat army, with all its encumbrances, continued to pass over the bridge; and by one o’clock on the 20th, the mighty 20. moving mass was, if not absolute- ly safe, at least on the other side of the North Fork. They were not a moment too soon across; for the Confederates were already in great force at their heels. Bayard, who had charge of the rear, had been skirmishing with their advance since he had passed Cedar Mountain. At the last moment the Confederate cavalry made a vigorous charge on the National rear; a few men were killed; but the complete success of the retreat was not hindered. It was with good reason that Pope was proud of the manner in which the re- treat had been conducted. After an etfort so exhaustive, it might be expected that the army would need j’est. But there was to be no rest : the toil must be severe and continuous for days and weeks to come. Pope posted his army along the line of the Rappahannock, so as to guard the rail- j*oad bridge and all the fords. On the Aug, morning of the 21st, the Confede- 21* rates were forward in full force ; and a series of attempts at different places were made to cross the river. There were, in consequence, a number of fierce artillery duels. But the bridge and all the fords were well guarded ; and every attempt at forcing a passage completely failed. These attempts were repeated, and heavy artillery firing was maintained at the different fords on the 23d and 24th, but with no special results. On Aug. the 23d Ricketts destroyed by fire 23. the bridge at the Rappahannock. Lee now resolved on a flank movement ; and, with this end in view, he advanced about twelve miles further up the river, and made a bold attempt to cross at Waterloo Bridge. This attempt was also resisted ; but it was only par- tially defeated. Meanwhile, General Stuart, at the head of a body of Con- federate cavalry, had succeeded in crossing the river, and, haviug made a bold dash on Catlett’s Station, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, some thirty -five miles from Washington and some thirteen miles in the rear of the Rappahannock Station, where he ran- sacked Pope’s army trains, seized his baggage, with the property of his staff officers, captured more than two hun- dred horses, and destroyed much that he could not carry away, then found his way back again to the Confederate lines with all his booty, encountering during the entire raid almost no oppo- sition. This raid of Stuart was ex- tremely discouraging to the people of the North, and to the government at Washington. It was not less dis- couraging to the National army, and to Pope himself. It revealed to the world what Pope and many of his officers well knew — that but little was accom- plished when, after his retreat from Cedar Mountain, he had put the Rap- pahannock between his own army and that of General Lee. It showed that Washington, unless some manifestation of strength was quickly made, was again at the mercy of the Confederacy, REINFORCEMENTS. 289 and that General Lee was not ignorant of the way by which he might pass through Maryland and dictate terms of peace in the city of Brotherly Love. The retreat across the Bappahannock was, in fact, partly a temporary expedi- ent and partly a military necessity. It was a military necessity because Pope, with the forces at his command, could not continue the struggle so far from his base of supplies, and against such fearful odds. It was a temporary ex- pedient because it was believed that, by putting the Rappahannock between the two opposing armies, Lee would be so hindered in his operations that he would be unable to strike with his su- perior numbers before the proposed junction had been effected between the army of the Potomac and the army of Virginia. Pope was not ignorant of the danger to which he was exposed from an attack on his right flank, un- less he were speedily reinforced — a danger greatly aggravated by the fact that he was bound by strict orders to preserve intact his communication with Fredericksburg. Pope had now become fully alive to the danger of his position. Convinced that the main body of Lee’s army was being moved further up the liver, where there was little difficulty in crossing, and that the object was to turn his right, get in his rear, and cut off his supplies from Washington, he tele- graphed again and again that, if not reinforced, he would be compelled to retreat; that, with the enemy moving in force to his right, it was impossible for him to offer effective resistance without abandoning Fredericksburg. He was assured that if he could only hold on two days longer, he would be so reinforced that he would be able to resume the offensive. Day after day from the 21st of August were these as- surances repeated. On the 25th, of the 30,000 or 40,000 men 25. promised him, only 7000 had yet got forward so far as Warrenton Junction. It was out of the question to think of waiting any longer. The situation was pregnant with peril. Delay one day more might be attended with the most disastrous consequences. Ar- rangements were, in consequence, made for immediate retreat. Breaking up his camp at Warrenton and Warrenton Junction, Pope began to march rapidly back in three columns. General Heint- zelman, from McClellan’s army, had arrived; but he was without wagons, without artillery, without even horses for the general and field officers, with- out provisions, and with only forty rounds of ammunition to the man. Porter, too, had arrived at Bealston with a portion of his division. His men were fresh, but poorly provided either with provisions or with ammuni- tion. Sturgis and Cox were hourly expected at Warrenton Junction — the former with 10,000, the latter with 7000 men. Franklin, too, was on his way with 10,000 more. Before the arrival of Heintzelman, Pope estimated his entire force at about 40,000. The Confederate force amounted to at least 80,000. On evacuating Warrenton, Pope resolved to offer the enemy battle in the neighborhood of Gainesville, the 290 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. first station to the west of Manassas Junction, on what is called the Gap Eailroad. With this end in view, he disposed his forces, sending McDowell, with his own corps and that of Sigel, by the turnpike toward Gainesville, Reno toward Sudley Springs, and Heintzelman toward Greenwich, assign- ing at the same time suitable positions to the expected reinforcements as they should come up. Porter was to push forward and join Reno ; Franklin was to push forward with all possible speed to Gainesville ; and Haupt, who com- manded at Manassas Junction, was authorized to retain one of the strong- est divisions that should arrive, for the protection of the works, and to push forward its cavalry to Thoroughfare Gap. General Sturgis, also, received instructions to post strong guards along the railroad from Manassas Junction to Catlett’s Station, and to superintend them in person. Pope’s command, in- cluding all these expected reinforce- ments, now amounted to 60,000 men. While Pope’s forces are moving steadily to the positions assigned them, the Confederates are not idle. Jack- son has crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson’s Mill, four miles above Water- loo Bridge, has rested his men for the night at Salem ; and before to-morrow at noon he will have crossed the Bull Run Ridge, at Thoroughfare Gap, and forced his way to Gaines^dlle. In point of fact he reached Gainesville when the day was yet young, and was joined by Stuart, with two cavalry bri- gades ; and before midnight, while he was destroying Bristow Station, where he had arrived a little after sundown, Stuart, in obedience to his instructions, had surprised the post at Manassas Junction, captured 300 men, eight guns, stores in large quantity, and much pub- lic property. Intelligence of what had happened* at the Junction reached Col- onel Scammon, at Union Mills, on Bull Run, who was stationed there with the Eleventh and Twelfth Ohio, of General Cox’s division. Scammon hasted to the Junction; a severe skirmish en- sued at dawn on the 27th; but 27. he was driven back and compelled to retreat toward Alexandria. Brigadier- General Taylor, with the Second, Third and Fourth New Jersey Infantry, hur- ried from Alexandria by railroad to the assistance of Scammon ; but these, too, were soon routed ; and in the brief conflict Taylor lost a leg. It is quite manifest that Pope had not counted on the appearance of the enemy on the eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap so early, and in so great numbei’s. Jack- son had, in reality, effected a surpi-ise. It is true that Pope’s report says : “ The movement of General Jackson in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, while the main body of the enemy confronted me at Sulphur Springs and Waterloo Bridge, was well known to me, but I had relied confidently on the forces which I had been assured would be sent from Alexandria, and one strong division of which I had ordered to take post on the works at Manassas Junc- tion. I was entirely under the belief that these would be there, and it was not until I found my communication intercepted that I was undeceived. I BRISTOW STATION. 291 knew that this movement was no raid, and that it was made by not less than 25,000 men.” It is also true, however, that when Jackson was reposing a.t Salem, between Thoroughfare and Ma- nassas Gaps, Pope sent word to Mc- Dowell at Warrenton that he believed “the whole force of the enemy had marched for the Shenandoah Valley by way of Luray and Front Royal.” Banks, it would seem, was of the same opinion. So thoroughly ignorant were the Na- tionals of the whereabouts of Jackson that, when he was already at Bristow Station, a train of cars came up and, of course, was captured — a train on which a short time before Hooker and his division had passed for Warrenton. On the 27th of August, the army of Pope and the army of Lee were both in critical circumstances. Pope was cut off from his supplies and reinforcements. This was serious enough in the presence of such a general as Jackson, and in view of the speedy arrival of Longs tree t and Lee. On the other hand, however. Pope had a splendid opportunity — an opportunity which, if it could be seized and acted upon in time, might prove the ruin not only of Jackson, but of the whole Confederate army. If he could block Thoroughfare Gap, and thus prevent the passage of Longstreet, he might fall with overwhelming force upon Jackson. Pope saw his opportu- nity, and began to turn it to account. The instructions already given in re- gard to Gainesville were repeated and emphasized. He ordered McDowell, with Sigel and Reynolds, to hasten to Gainesville that night, and there inter- cept Longstreet at the head of Lee’s main column. Reno was to hurry for- ward to Greenwich with his corps and with Kearney’s division, of Heintzel- man, to report to and assist McDowell, if necessary. Porter was to remain at Warrenton Station until the arrival of Banks, who was marching to that place from Fayetteville. So soon as he was relieved, he was to push forward to Gainesville. Pope himself, with Hook- er’s division, of Hein tzel man’s corps — a division which had now become famous, and which could always be relied upon — proceeded along the rail- road to Manassas Junction. McDowell reached his destination without the necessity of fighting. Hooker had been less fortunate. On approaching Bristow Station, somewhat late in the afternoon, he came into contact with Ewell. It was the advance of the same force, a portion of which had attacked Scammon and Taylor in the forenoon. A vigorous action ensued, with a loss to each of about 300 men. Ewell was driven from the field with the loss of all his camp equipage ; but he succeed- ed in destroying the bridge and railroad track, and thus hindered pursuit. He hastened to join Jackson at Manassas. When this action commenced. Hooker had only forty rounds of ammunition to each man. When it ended, the forty had been reduced to four. Pope was put in high spirits by the success of Hooker. He believed that, by a vigor- ous effort on the morning of the 28th, he might “ bag the whole crowd ” at Manassas Junction. Jackson was al- ready, after the defeat of Ewell, in a 292 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. tight place. There were but two routes by which he could retreat — the one through Gainesville and the other through Centreville. Retreat by Gainesville was impossible ; for Mc- Dowell was there with a force equal, if not superior, to his own. He must, therefore, retreat through Centreville, or mass his forces and attack Pope, with the view of turniim the National O right at Bristow Station. Jackson chose the former course, and proceeded to retire through Centreville. Meanwhile, in consequence of the exhausted con- dition of Hooker’s troops, and knowing that they were without ammunition. Pope had sent special orders to Porter on the evening of the 27th, instructing him to move forward at one o’clock in the morning, and to report at Bristow by daylight. In the event of Banks not having yet arrived, he was to leave him some instructions in detail. This order was not obeyed. If Jackson had not retired — if, on the contrary, he had massed his men and offered fight — the consequences might have been dis- Aug, astrous. At three o’clock on the 28. morning of the 28th Jackson, believing himself to be in danger, evacuated Manassas, and sought to effect a junction with Lee by way of Centreville. As it was. Pope resolved to pursue the retreating foe with all the forces at his command. McDowell had been ordered on the evening of the 27th to push forward, at the very earliest dawn, from Gaines- ville toward Manassas Junction. He was to rest his right on Manassas Gap Railroad, and throw his left to the west. Reno had orders to march at the same hour from Greenwich, also upon Manassas; and Kearney was to march upon Bristow. Kearney was promptly on hand, and, with Hooker following, was pushed forward to Ma- nassas in 'pursuit of Ewell. Sigel, with McDowell’s advance, was not forward until three hours after the time ap- pointed. Porter did not arrive at Bristow Station until after ten o’clock, when, instead of being willing and anxious to push forward, he asked permission to halt and rest his men. Sykes’ division, of Porter’s corps, had spent the whole day of the 27th, from ten o’clock in the morning until day- light of the 28th, in camp at Warren- ton Junction. Merritt’s division, of the same corps, arrived at Warrenton Junction later on the day of the 27th, and also remained there during ' the whole of the night. It was Pope’s opinion that Porter’s troops were the freshest in the whole army. It is, it must be confessed, exceedingly difficult for the impartial mind to take in all the facts, even at this early stage of the campaign, and yet resist the conviction that, in the service of Pope, some of McClellan’s officers were not only want- ing in enthusiasm, but haK- hearted, lukewarm, indifferent. Either that, or the demon of delay, which held their former master in bondage, bad extend- ed its baleful influence to them. Pope arrived at Manassas Junction about noon of the 28th, shortly after Jackson in person bad left. He immediately pushed forward Hooker, Kearney and Reno upon Centreville. McDowell, WARRENTON" TURNPIKE. 293 also, was ordered to recall that portion of his force which had moved in the direction of Manassas Junction, and to march with his whole strength towards Centreville. McDowell had, unfortu- nately, sent Ricketts’ division toward Thoroughfare Gap. For this new move- ment it was not, therefore, available. Instructions were sent to Porter to take post at Manassas J unction. Late in the afternoon of the 28th, Kearney came up with the rear-guard of Jackson’s retreating columns, and drove them out of Centreville, one por- tion of the Confederates falling back by the Sudley Springs Road, the other portion ^by the Warrenton Turnpike, toward Gainesville. Kearney remained in occupation of Centreville. The Con- federates destroyed the bridges over the streams as they passed. The ground which the pursued and the pursuers were now treading was that made famous by the first great battle of the war. They were passing over Bull Run. In spite of the eager anx- iety of the moment and the all-absorb- ing interest of the situation, stirring memories must have been awakened in the minds of the rank and file, as well as of the officers, of both armies. After more than a year’s incessant fighting, the two great representative armies of the divided nation were again in bloody conflict on the same battle field, about to attempt to settle the question whether freedom should or should not be the inalienable birthright of all the child- ren of the Republic. The Confede- rates had their faces turned toward Thoroughfare Gap, where they knew Longstreet was coming to their aid. Suddenly Jackson’s advance came into contact, on the Warrenton Turnpike, with King’s division, of McDowell’s corps, which was p:ess‘ing vigorously forward to intercept the retreat. It was about six o’clock in the evening. The struggle which ensued was severe and sanguinary, and was terminated only by the darkness. In this action noble work was done by the brigades of Gibbon and Doubleday, both of the gallant commanders covering them- selves with glory. The Confederate general, Taliaferro, was badly wound- ed; and Ewell, who was in the thick of the fight, lost a leg. Made aware of this engagement that evening about ten o’clock. Pope concluded that he had caught Jackson in a trap, and that if King, McDowell with his other divisions sustaining him, could hold out till the morning, he would be able so to concentrate his forces as to crush and destroy the Con- federate army before Longstreet could arrive with the expected relief. Mc- Dowell and King were accordingly urged to hold on, at all hazards, and by no means to allow Jackson to pass to the west through Thoroughfare Gup, Pope assuring them that by daylight the entire National forces would be forward both from Centreville and Ma- nassas, and that the enemy must be crushed between them. Kearney was ordered to move cautiously, after mid- night, from Centreville along the War- renton Turnpike, to keep close to the enemy’s lines, resting his left on the Warrenton Turnpiku, and throwing hii 230 294 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. right well to the north, and, at daylight, to assault him vigorously with his right advance. Reno and Hooker, he was told, would join him shortly after dawn. Pope’s instructions to Kearney were even more than usually particular, be- cause he dreaded lest Jackson should make an attempt to retreat to the north in the direction of Leesburg. Porter, who was supposed to be at Manassas Junction, was ordered to move upon Centreville at the earliest dawn. On the night of the 28th, therefore, Mc- Dowell, Sigel and Reynolds, whose united strength was 2."), 000 men, were immediately west of Jackson, and be- tween him and Thoroughfare Gap. On the following morning, as soon as it was light, Porter’s corps and Heintzel- man, with Kearney, Hooker and Reno, were simultaneously to fall upon him from the east. Such was the dispo- sition Pope had made of his forces ; and it was his conviction that Long- street was, as yet, so far off that he would be able to defeat Jackson before the former could come to his aid. Longstreet, however, was fully aware of the perilous situation of his compan- ion in arms; and, by forced marches, made with almost incredible activity, he had, on the evening of the 28th, reached Thoroughfare Gap. There he encountered Ricketts’ division, of Mc- Dowell’s corps ; and, after some sharp fighting, drove it back in the direction of Manassas Junction. The gap was, therefore, left undefended, and Long- street was able to pass through without further hindrance. Prior to this, on dis- covering that Thoroughfare Gap was well guarded, he had sent a portion of his troops up to Hopeville Gap, a little further to the north, about three miles above White Plains. Through both these gaps, therefore, Lee’s men were rushing j to the assistance of Jackson. This, however, was not the only calam- ity which, at this critical moment, oc- curred to thwart Pope’s designs, Early on the morning of the 29th, 29. before daybreak, the National com- mander, greatly to his mortification, learned that King, unable to resist the pressure brought to bear upon him by Jackson, had fallen back in the same direction vdth Ricketts. A new dispo- sition of his forces was, therefo^’e, neces- sary. Pope lost no time in endeav- oring to meet the emergency. Sigel, supported by Reynolds, was ordered to advance from Groveton and at- tack Jackson in the wooded heights close bv, while the remainder of the forces were being got well in hand. Quickly thereafter Heintzelman, with the divisions of Hooker and Kearney, was pushed forward from Centreville toward Gainesville. Reno was to fol- low. Their instructions were to strike promptly, and with all their weight. Porter, with his own corps and the di- vision of King, was ordered to move from Manassas toward the same plac43. Porter’s instructions were to strike Jackson’s flank at the point where the Warrenton Turnpike is intersected by the road from Manassas Junction to Gainesville, to turn it, and then fall heavily upon his rear. Pope’s instructions, with one excep- tion, were well carried out. Sigel, with GAINESVILLE. 295 the division of Carl Schurz on his right, that of Schenck on his left, and the division of Milroy in the centre, about five o’clock on the morning of the 29th, fell heavily on the Confede- rates, a mile or two east of Groveton. They were soon joined by Hooker and Kearney. The battle became furious all at once. Jackson, feeling the weight of the onset, fell back some dis- tance; but he was so closely pressed, that he was compelled to halt and make the best defense possible. Ac- cordingly he took up a position with his left on Sudley Springs, his right a little to the south of the Warrenton Turnpike, his line being covered by an old railroad grade w’hich leads from Gainesville in the direction of Lees- burg. His batteries were numerous ; and some of them were of heavy cali- bre. They were for the most part behind ridges in the open ground on both sides of the turnpike. His troops, too, were well sheltered in dense woods behind the railroad embankment. It was about noon when Pope appeared on the field. He had hurried forward from Centre ville with all possible de- spatch. He found both armies much cut up by the sharp action in which they had been engaged since daylight. Heintzelman was on the risrht of the O line, in front of Sudley Springs Load. Sigel was on Heintzelman’s left, with his line extended a short distance south of the Warrenton Turnpike, Schenck’s division occupying the high ground to the left of that road. Reynolds was on the extreme left. Reno’s corps had reached the field, and some of his regi- ments had already been pushed into action. Four regiments of this corps, however, were held in reserve in the rear of the centre. Heintzelman in- formed Pope that his line was weak, and that two of his divisions — those of Schurz and Steinwehr — were so cut up that they ought to be drawn back from the front. To this Pope could not con- sent, but he cheered him with the in- formation that McDowell and Porter ,were both on the road to Gainesville, and would soon be in position to fall upon Jackson’s right flank, and prob- ably also on his rear. Riding along the whole front of his line, he cheered the different commanders by the same comforting assurance. From twelve until four o’clock, the skirmishing was frequent and severe, but the fighting was neither general nor continuous. About two o’clock, firing was heard in the direction of Jackson’s right; and Pope naturally supposed that Mc- Dowell and Porter had reached their position. The firing, however, was not long continued. Soon afterwards, he learned that McDowell was advancing by the Sudley Springs Road, and that he would probably be up in two hours. As yet there was no information regard- ing Porter. At half-past four o’clock Pope, utterly impatient, sent him per- emptory orders to push forward at once into action on the enemy’s light, and, if possible, turn. his rear. He at the same time stated to him generally the condition of things on the field. After allowing what he thought a sufiicient time for the execution of these orders by Porter, and knowing that McDowell 296 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. was close at hand, the order was given to Heintzelman and Reno to make the attack in front. It was half-past live o’clock. The order was promptly obeyed, and with a will. Never was onslaught more vigorous or more gal- lantly made. They fell upon the ene- my with the swiftness of lightning and with the force of an avalanche. Jack- son’s men could not resist the fury of the onset. Fighting bravely, and con- testing every inch of ground, they were yet steadily pressed back into the woods. On both sides the fighting was desperate and gallant. Regiment vied with regiment, and soldier with soldier. Nor did the ofiScers spare themselves. Everywhere they were seen in the front, in the thickest of the fight, urging the contest by voice and gesture. Hooker and Kearney, of Heintzelman’s corps, justified the con- fidence reposed in them, and established on a firmer basis their well-won fame. One of the most brilliant efforts of the day was made by Grover’s brigade, of Hooker’s division. In the fury of the first onset this brigade penetrated, by a bayonet charge, first one, then another of Jackson’s lines, and was well up to the third line before it could be checked. After a severe hand-to-hand struggle, it got possession of the rail- way embankment on the Confederate left, but not until it had sacrificed thirty per cent, of its strength. Hook- er’s other brigades gallantly joined in the struggle. Meanwhile, Kearney had struck Jackson’s left at the point occu- pied by A. P. Hill ; and, by the joint efforts of the two divisions, Jackson’s left was doubled back upon his centre, and the railway entrenchment was se- cured. While Heintzelman was thus pressing back the enemy’s extreme left, Reno was fii-mly holding his position more to the centre ; and after an hour and a half from the first onset, this portion of the Confederate army was driven off the original battle ground — the dead and wounded being left in the hands of the Nationals. It was now sunset. McDowell had arrived on the field. His corps was pushed to the front along the Warrenton Turnpike, his instructions being to fall upon the enemy who was retr ating to- wards the turnpike from Sudley Spi*ings. With this end in view, King’s division, of McDowell’s corps, advanced beyond the general line of the Nationals. The advance of the main body of the enemy, under Longstreet, had begun to reach the field. With these King came into contact about three cpiarters of a mile in front of the line of battle. Some severe fighting ensued, but neither gained upon the other. With this advance of Longstreet, Kearney, who had pressed back the Confederate left toward the Warrenton Turnpike, also came into collision. Kearney was com- pelled to fall back with the loss of a gun, four flags, and 100 men made prisoners. Porter now came up, and made a disposition for attack; but it wa§ too late. Darkness fell upon the scene ; and the battle of Groveton, or, as it is more generally called, the battle of Gainesville, was ended. On the whole, it was a victory for Pope ; for he had driven the enemy back from his PORTER BLAMED. 297 original position; and almost the en- tire battle field was occupied by the National troops. The loss on either side was about 7 000 men. Both armies slept that night on their arms, near the old battle ground of Bull Bun. Judged from a National standpoint, the battle of the 29th of August, at Gainesville, must be pronounced in the last degree unsatisfactoiy. There was no lack of bravery on the part of the men. In the conflict, both bravery and ability were displayed by the officers, higher and lower. But somehow there was a want of harmony on the part of the higher officials. Either there was a defect in the orders, or time was badly kept. The result certainly might have been different if McDowell and Porter had come up at an earlier hour. Those precious hours — from noon to half -past five — during which Pope waited to hear from those two gen- erals, saved Jackson’s army, and ruined the National prospect. They allowed Longstreet to come up and unite with Jackson, thus making the Confederate araiy greatly superior to that of Pope. The battle, it is true, was not lost ; but it was indecisive. It settled nothing. It was already manifest that Pope must retreat, and that Lee would be able to carry out his purpose of driving the Nationals inside of the fortifica- tions at Washington, of passing across through Maryland, and of entering Pennsylvania. In his report. Pope greatly blamed Porter. “I do not hesitate to say,” he says, “ that if he had discharged his duty, as became a soldier under the circumstances, and had made a vigorous attack on the ene- my, as he was expected and directed to do, at any time up to eight o’clock that night, we should have utterly crushed and captured the larger por- tion of Jackson’s force before he could have been by any possibility sufficient- ly reinforced to have made an effective resistance.” Porter says he did not receive the order until it was dusk, and that he had not time to come up. The evidence is, no doubt, conflicting. In our judgment, the balance of the evi- dence is against Porter ; and we do not see how, when subsequently he was tried on the charges preferred against him by Pope, found guilty, and dis- missed the service, the verdict or the punishment could have been other than they were. His dilatory conduct, as we have seen, had become painfully conspicuous, even before the battle of Gainesville. His particular defense — that it was dusk on the evening of the 29th, when he received the order — is weak in view of all the facts of the case. On the afternoon of the 28th, he was ordered to move from Manassas to Centreville at the earliest dawn, Pope assuring him that a battle would un- doubtedly be fought on the following morning. Early on the morning of the 29th, on hearing of the withdrawal of Ricketts and King, and the con- sequent opening of Thoroughfare Gap, and before Porter had time to leave Manassas Junction, he was ordered to move forward from that place by the direct road to Gainesville. The order was repeated in the most urgent man- ner at half-past four o’clock, on the 298 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. afternoon of the 29 th. His explana- tion, even if it covers the last order, does not certainly touch the other two. His apologists have endeavored to vin- dicate him, by saying that nearly the whole of Longstreet’s corps had been directly in front of him for several hours when Pope’s last order reached him. This, we think, creates diffi- culties, rather than removes them. It is not claimed that Porter was engaged with any portion of Longstreet’s corps — only that this corps was lying in front of him. If Longstreet was so early on tlie ground, it is natural to conclude that he would have heard the sounds of battle in the forenoon, and, instead of moving so far to the south, would have moved in the direction whence these sounds came. It is notorious, too, that although after twelve o’clock there was a lengthened pause in the fight, there were between that hour and four in the afternoon frequent skirm- ishes — skirmishes no doubt noisy and demonstrative enough to indicate to Longstreet where he was most needed. And is it conceivable that Longstreet could have been for several hours so far on the eastern side of Thoroughfare Gap, and Jackson not have known it ? How, in fact, on the supposition that Longstreet was already in force on the held, are we to account for the prac- tical suspension of hostilities which existed from twelve noon until half- past five o’clock, when Heintzelman and Peno resumed the attack ? After the battle of the 29th, Pope’s army was in no fit condition to resume the struggle with fresh and vastly superior forces. For the last fortnight his men had been continually marching or fighting. There had been positively no rest. The cavalry and artillery had been ten days in harness ; and the entire army had been two days with- out food. On the 28th, Pope had tele- graphed to the commander-in-chief to have rations and forage sent forward from Alexandria with all despatch. Halleck communicated with McClellan, who was then at Alexandria, ordering him to send the needed supplies at once. On the morning of the Au^. 30th, the day after the first bat- tie, about daylight. Pope received from McClellan a letter, dated at eight o’clock, P. M., on the 29th, stating that “rations and forage would be loaded into the available wagons ” as soon as he would send a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. It is not wonderful that Pope should thus express himself in his report: “I do not see,” he says, “ what service cavalry could have ren- dered in guarding railroad trains. It was not until I received this letter that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the op- erations with which I was charged.” On the 30th, Pope made a request for more ammunition — a request which, strange to say, had to go the same round ; and the answer which was given by McClellan was, “I know nothing of the calibres of Pope’s artillery.” There is one other story, which strikingly illustrates the want of harmony among some of the leading National commanders at this critical juncture. On the afternoon of the 29th, at the time Pope was MANASSAS. 299 heroically engaged with Jackson, and dreading the arrival of Longstreet, Mc- Clellan, in a communication to the government, suggested that one of the best things to do in the circumstances would be “to leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capital perfectly safe.” Anything more heartless than this suggestion could hardly be con- ceived. It is said that when President Lincoln had read the despatch which contained it, he fell back horror- stricken in his chair. It is not won- derful that Pope’s campaign proved a failure. The wonder rather is that the National cause, whose representatives on the held were so divided in sympa- thy, did not utterly perish. In these circumstances, on the morn- ing of the 30th, Pope found himself in presence of the enemy. Lee’s forces had been coming up in great numbers during the night and early morning from the direction of Thoroughfare Gap. By noon the Confederates great- ly outnumbered the Nationals. To confront the mighty and rapidly in- creasing forces of Lee, Pope had not more than 40,000 men ; and many of them were comparatively useless from fatigue and want of food. It seemed to him, however, that he had no choice but fight. He could hardly hope to win ; but he “ determined to give bat- tle to the enemy, and at least to lay on such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any further advance toward the capital.” Pope felt the necessity of immediate and vigorous action ; for every moment of delay was increasing the odds against him. It was his in- tention to attack the Confederate left ; and he had made his disposition ac- cordingly. It soon became apparent, however, that the Confederate general was massing his troops on his right, as fast as they arrived on the field, and that his purpose was to fall back, and, if possible, turn the National left. It would appear as if, for a moment. Pope had been deceived by the movement of the Confederates towards their own right. In the moment of exultation, he telegraphed to W ashington that the Confederates were “retreating to the mountains.” He quickly, however, discovered his mistake, and arranged his troops as he best could to meet the requirements of the situation. Mc- Dowell was ordered forward with three corps. Porter’s in advance, along the Warrenton Turnpike; and Picketts’ division, which had been sent to the right, was brought back and posted on the left of the National line. As Porter moved forward, his advance was re- ceived by a perfect tempest of shot, shell and bullet, which came from the wooded eminence near Groveton, where the Confederates were swarming in thousands. Porter’s men, unable to face this terrific storm, reeled, stag- gered, and fell back. At the same moment almost, the Confederates fell with tremendous force on the National left. Recognizing the fact that the main attack was to be made' in this direction, McDowell ordered Reynolds from Porter’s left to the assistance of Schenck and Milroy, on whose divisions 300 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. the blow was' about to fall. This movement was attended with consider- able peril, as it exposed Porter’s key- point; but, with singular presence of mind, and with great promptitude of action. Colonel G. K. Warren, seeing the danger, pushed forward his little brigade of a thousand men and occu- pied the vacant place. Had he waited for orders, the National line might have been cut in two. The battle was already raging furiously on the Na- tional left, Schenck, Milroy and Reyn- olds, in spite of superior numbers, offering a gallant and stubborn resist- ance. Porter’s men were rallied and brought to a halt as they were retiring to the rear ; and as soon as order was restored among them, they were pushed forward to the support of the left, where they rendered splendid service, Warren’s little band of Volunteers and Buchanan’s brigade of Regulars particularly distinguishing themselves. Ricketts’ division had also gone to the assistance of Schenck, Milroy and Reynolds, and had greatly strengthened them, both on their left and in their rear. Towers, of Ricketts’ division, who went to the support of Reynolds, and led his brigade in person, made himself conspicuous alike by his skill and by his daring. Such was the con- duct of this brigade that it drew forth enthusiastic and repeated cheers. “ Its example,” says Pope, “was of great service, and infused new spirit into all the troops who witnessed their intrepid conduct.” For a time it seemed as if the Nationals might carry the day. In spite of all his strength and the pertina- city of his attack, Jackson’s advanced line was being steadily pushed back. It was not until five o’clock that the tide began to turn. About that hour the battle commenced to rage more furiously than before. Longs treet had found a commanding position on Jack- son’s right; and with four batteries he poured a most destructive fire upon the National troops. Line after line was cut down by the raking fire, like grass by the scythe of the mower. The slaughter on both sides was terrific. Late in the afternoon, Reno’s corps was withdrawn from its position on the right centre and thrown into the action on the left. This corps, coming up as the tide of battle began to turn, behaved with great gallantry. For hours this mutual slaughter con- tinued, the Confederates showing their superior strength by falling hea\dly on the National right as well as upon the left, the latter presenting a bold and determined front, gallantly contesting every inch of ground, but gradually yielding to the fierce onsets and tre- mendous pressure of the foe. The contest ended only when darkness fell upon the scene. The losses on both sides had been very severe. The Na- tional left had been pushed back well nigh three quarters of a mile ; but its ranks were unbroken, and it still held the Warrenton Turnpike. The Na- tional right, on which the pressure had been less heavy, still held its ground. Pope had now no choice but fall back upon Washington. Happily he had been able to hold command of the turnpike in his rear. At about six THE RETREAT. 301 o’clock in the evening, he had- acci- dentally learned that Franklin was approaching Centreville, about four miles to the east of that place, and that Sumner was about four miles in the rear of Franklin. To Centreville he resolved to fall back. At eight o’clock, he accordingly issued an order to the effect that the whole anny should withdraw during the night across Bull Bun, and take position on the heights of Centreville. The retreat was conducted for the most part by way of the Stone Bridge. When the passage was completed, the bridge was destroyed. The night was excessively dark ; and Lee did not pursue. When Anw, daylight broke on the morning of 3b the 3ist, Bull Bun once more di- vided the two great armies. The engage- ment of the 30th is sometimes spoken of as the second battle of Bull Bun."^ On the morning of the 31st, the en- tire Union army, under General Pope, was at or near Centreville, with the exception of two brigades, about 4000 strong, which had been sent on to Fair- fax Station to guard the train and the * In his report of the second day’s fighting in the neighborhood of Gainesville and Groveton, General Lee says : “ The enemy, being reinforced, renewed the attack on the afternoon of the 30th, when a general advance of both wings of the army was ordered, and after a fierce combat, which raged until after nine o’clock, he was completely defeated, and driven be 3 'ond Bull Kun. The darkness of the night, his destruction of the Stone Bridge after crossing, and the uncertainty of the fords, stopped the pursuit.” The following is Pope’s account of the doings of the 30th: “The enemy’s heavy reinforcements, ” he says, “ having reached him on Friday afternoon and night, he began to mass on his right for the purpose of crush- ing our left, and occupying the road to Centreville in our rear. His heaviest assault was made about five o’clock in the forenoon, when, after overwhelming Fitz depot. Generals Franklin and Sumner had arrived ; and General Banks, after destroying a large amount of property which he could not bring with him, was pressing forward from Bristow Station. On the following day Burn- side evacuated Fredericksburg; and Falmouth Station, with all the bridges, was destroyed by tire. Acquia Creek was soon also deserted. The Nationals from all points were pressed back to- wards Washington. The strength of the army, as reported by the different corps commanders, was as follows : Mc- Dowell’s corps, 10,000; Sigel’s corps, about 7000; Heintzelman’s, 6000; Be- no’s, 6000 ; Banks’, 5000 ; Sumner’s, 11,000; Franklin’s, 8000. Large num- bers had straggled from •the ranks; and many had been left on the battle field. The retreat of Pope behind Bull Bun created the wildest excite- ment throughout the North. It was matter of universal regret and humili- ation that so many of the wounded brave should be left on the battle field to the tender mercy of the Con- federates, and so near the National John Porter, and driving his forces back in the centre and left, mass after mass of his forces was pushed against our left. A terrible contest, with great slaugh- ter, was carried on for several hours, our men behaving with firmness and gallantry, under the immediate com- mand of General McDowell. When night closed, our left had been forced back about half a mile, but still remained firm and unshaken, while our right held its ground. General Franklin, with his corps, arrived after dark at Centreville, six miles in our rear, while Sumner was four miles behind Franklin. I could have brought up three corps in the morning in time to renew the action, but starvation stared both men and horses in the face ; and, broken and exhausted as they were, they were in no condition to bear hunger also. I accordingly retired to Centreville that night in per- fect order. ” 302 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. capital. An invitation was issued by the War Department, calling on citizens to go out to the battle field and assist in taking care of the wounded. On the afternoon of the 30th, the streets of Washington were crowded with people and conveyances loaded with blankets and baskets and rolls of lint, all pressing forward to the scene of distress. In some respects the move- ment was ill-advised ; for very few of those who went out were allowed to get near the wounded, and some were made prisoners by the Confederates. On the following morning the invita- tion vras recalled. At the same time, the movement thus begun at Washing- ton, although not immediately of any practical value, produced good and wholesome fruit. The example set by the capital was imitated by Boston, by Philadelphia, by New York, and by all the cities of the North ; and from that day until the close of the war, the wounded soldier became more and more the object of the nation’s care. It is only just to remark that, while General Lee w’ould not consent to a truce or a suspension of military opera- tions, he interposed no obstacles to the removal of the wounded. The 31st was Sunday. On that day the Confederate army began to move forward. It was evident to Pope, from the direction in which the enemy was moving, that it was Lee’s intention to fall wdth force on his right flank. At an early hour in the morning Jackson, taking with him his own and Ewell’s divisions, crossed Bull Run at Sudley Springs, and pushed towards the Little River Turnpike. His object clearly was to cut the rear of Pope in the direction of Fairfax Court House. Pope, not unprepared for some such movement, disposed his forces so as to meet the requirements of the situation. Chauging‘his entire front, and flinging his right wing back to the heights of Germantown, he occupied, on the sept. morning of the 1st of September, L when the Confederates came up, an entirely new position. Pope had no intention to strike the enemy until the morning of the 2d ; but Lee’s purpose became so developed by the afternoon of the 1st, that he resolved to hazard a battle between the Little River Turn- pike and the road from Centre ville to Fairfax Court House. Hooker was ordered forward to the latter place, to assemble the troops there and to move towards Germantown. McDowell was directed to take a position on the War- ren ton Turnpike, about two miles west of Fairfax. He was to connect with Hooker by his right. Reno was pushed forward to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of Chantilly, about two and a half miles east of Centre- ville. Heintzelman was posted in the rear of Reno; Franklin was on Me- Dow^ell’s left and rear ; Sumner was on the left of Heintzelman ; while Sigel and Porter had orders to unite with Sumner’s right. Banks, who had charge of the wagon trains, was to come by the old Braddock Road into the Alexandria Turnpike, in rear of Fairfax Court House. Just before sunset, Hooker and Reno came simul- taneously in contact with the enein^ CHANTILLY. 303 advance — the one on the Little River Turnpike, close by Germantown, the other a little more to the west, near Chantilly. The day was in the last degree unfavorable for warlike oper- ations. The wind was cold, and a drenching rain was falling. But neither wind nor rain could now deter the com- batants. The battle became furious all at once. After it had raged for nearly an hour, the Confederates con- centrated on Reno’s left, and fell heavily on his second division, which was commanded by General Isaac I. Stevens, of Port Royal Ferry fame. Hooker, McDowell and Kearney, of Heintzelman’s, rushed to Reno’s assist- ance. At this point the battle was raging with tremendous fury, when General Stevens, who had ordered a charge, and was leading it in person, was shot dead. When their general fell, this division fell back in disorder. The remainder of Reno’s force were showing signs of confusion, when Kear- ney, descrying the danger, advanced with his division, and, sending Birney’s brigade to the front, boldly renewed the action. A thunderstorm, which had for some time been raging, had now reached its height. It was dan- gerous to expose the ammunition ; but Kearney, personally regardless of con- sequences, brought forward a battery and put it in position himself. It was the last heroic act of a brave life. Dark- ness was now setting in. As if anxious to know the character of the ground, he pushed forward to reconnoitre ; and having inadvertently passed beyond the line of his own pickets, and ap- proached too close to those of the enemy, a Confederate bullet laid him low. As soon as he was missed, the gallant Birney assumed command of the division ; and by means of a bay- onet charge of his own brigade, com- posed of the First, Thirty-Eighth and Fortieth New York, and led by Col- onel Egan, he drove the Confederates back for a considerable distance, and held the field for the night. The dark hours were spent in burying the dead. Such was the battle of Chantilly — the last battle of Pope’s unfortunate cam-‘ paign. It was a battle by no means inglorious to the National arms; but, like all the other battles of the cam- paign, it was fruitless of good. It was the last of a series of disasters. In the battle of Chantilly many precious lives were lost. Kearney and Stevens left behind them vacant places which could not be easily filled. In the charge in which he fell, shot through the head, Stevens led the attack in person at the head of the brave Sev- enty-Ninth (Highlanders) New York, bearing with him the colors of that regiment, which had fallen from the hands of a wounded sergeant. The army had no braver officer. Kearney had already won great distinction and become a popular favorite. He was one of the few men on whom the hopes of the North were centred. He had often been tried : he had never been found wanting. ‘‘Words,” said Pope, “cannot express my sense of the zeal, the gallantry, and the sympathy of that most earnest and accomplished soldier, Major-General Kearney. He died as 304 POPE AND LEE IN VIRGINIA. lie would have wished to die, and as became his heroic character.” Kearney was well known to General Lee ; and next morning the Confederate com- mander sent the body of the unfortu- nate general, with a flag of truce, to the headquarters of Pope. Kearney’s body was conveyed to New York, where it was deposited in the family vault in the quiet church-yard of old Trinity. The same terriflc encounter in which Kearney and Stevens lost their lives, proved fatal, also, to Major Tilden, of the Thirty-Eighth New York — a brave soldier and a gallant and skilful oflicer. Pope’s losses, since the commence- ment of the campaign, were about 30,000 men, 30 guns, 20,000 small arms, and vast quantities of supplies and war material. Lee must have lost at least 15,000 men. On the morning Sept, of the 2d of September, Pope’s army was massed behind Difiicult Creek, between Germantown, Flint Hill and Fairfax. It was a strong position; but, exhausted with continu- ous marching and fighting for three weary weeks, broken and demoral- ized, it would have been cruel, as well as impolitic, to prolong the contest. About noon of that day, therefore, orders were given by General-in-Chief Halleck for the army of Virginia to fall back within the defenses of Wash- ington. McClellan had the proud sat- isfaction of seeing the fortifications on which he had spent so much time, labor and care — works of which he was per- sonally so proud, but which had been made the subject of so much ridicule — at last protecting the National capital, and shielding a National army. At his own request, Pope was relieved from the command, and allowed to return to the West. The army of Virginia dis- appeared as a separate and distinct organization, and was merged in the army of the Potomac ; and, in compli- ance with the wishes of a large body of the people, as well as with the wishes of his surviving officers and men, by whom he was greatly beloved. General McClellan was placed in com- mand of all the troops entrusted with the defense of Washington. It would not be difficult for the mili- tary critic to point out professional mis- takes in Pope’s campaign. It is possible that he might have done better with the forces at his command. It is ungen- erous, however, to judge him harshly, in view of the disappointments he was from first to last called upon to endure. He was certainly most unfortunate; but his misfortunes were not always of his own creating. It was natural, after the high expectations which had been formed, first of the army of the Potomac, and then of the army of Vir- ginia, and after the disastrous failure of both, that popular indignation should have been aroused, and that Pope should come in for a share of that abuse at the beginning of September, which was heaped upon McClellan at the be- ginning of August. To this day Pope has not received justice. We have al- ready called the reader’s attention to the feelings of jealousy and dislike which McClellan entertained towards Pope, to the want of sympathy between McClellan’s officers and the commander POPE’S COMPLAINT. 305 in the field, to McClellan’s “Leave Pope to get out of his scrape,” and his “ I know nothing of the calibres of Pope’s artillery,” to the failure of the army of the Potomac to join Pope in time, to the dilatory conduct of most of McClellan’s ofiicers, and to the posi- tive refusal of some of them to obey orders ; and having done so once, it is unnecessary again to enter into details. The charges made by Pope have not yet been refuted. Where they have been brought to the test, they have been sustained, rather than disproved. “The small fraction of 20,500 men,” says Pope, “was all of the 91,000 veteran troops from Harrison’s Land- ing who ever drew trigger under my command, or in any way took part in this campaign. Some of the corps,” he goes on to say, “moved with becom- ing activity, but the delays of others were neither creditable nor excusable.” Most of the troops actually engaged in these battles fought with great bravery, but some of them could not be brought into action at all. Many thousands straggled away from their commands ; and it is said that not a few voluntarily surrendered to the enemy, so as to be paroled prisoners of war. These are serious charges ; and until they are dis- proved the presumption must remain that the judgment of history will coin- cide with that which Pope himself has pronounced — that “the complete over- throw of Lee’s army, or, at least, the entire frustration of his movement towards the Potomac, was defeated by the failure of the army of the Potomac to effect a junction in time with the army of Virginia on the line of the Rappahannock, or even so far back as the line of Bull Run.” The battle of Chantilly will be remembered in con- nection with the loss of Generals Kearney and Stevens. Philip Keakney was l^orn in New York, June 21, 1815. In 1837 he was commissioned second lieutenant in the First Dragoons. Shortly afterwards he was sent to Euro[)e by the government to study and report upon French military tactics. For a time he pursued his studies in the military school at Saumur. He went thence to Algeria, joined the First Chasseurs d'Afrique. and, for his services, received the Cross of the Lemon of Honor. He returned to his home in 1810. During the Mexican War he was brevet ted major for gallant conduct at Contreras and Churul)usco ; and, in a charge at the San Antonio Gate, he lost his left arm. In 1841, having resigned his position in the army, he went again to Europe, with the view of resuming his military studies When the Italian War broke out, in 1850, Kearney took a position on the staff of General Maurier, and was present at the battles of Magenta and Solferino, receiving for his services, a second time, the Cross of the Legion of Honor. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he hurried home, and offered his sword to his country. His sub- sequent career was rendered famous by his actions in the engagements at Williamsburg, at Fair Oaks, at Frazier's Farm, and at Chantilly, where he met his un- timely death. Isaac Ingalls Stevens was born in Andover, Mass., in 1817, and graduated at West Point in 1839. As an engineer, he had few equals in the service. When the Mexican War broke out, he was employed in the fortifications of the New England Coast. During the Mexican War he served on the staff of General Scott, who pronounced him “the most promising officer of his age.” In the organization of Washington Territory he took an active part, first in the capacity of gover- nor, and later as delegate to Congress. A sincere friend of President Buchanan, he was yet opposed to the policy he pursued towards the South; and, when the war broke out, he hurried from the Territory, and offered his sword to his country. Appointed colonel of the Seventy-ninth New Y^ork Highlanders after the death of Cameron, he was soon afterwards com- missioned brigadier-general c f volunteers. He accom- panied Gen. Thos. W. Sherman to Port Koyal in the fall of 18G1. Having been transferred to North Caro- lina, we soon find him in Virginia, in the corps of General Keno; and, as major-general, he figured prominently in Pope’s famous but unfortunate cam- paign. At Centreville, where he was shot through the head by a Minie ball, he was leading a charge, and bearing aloft the colors of his favorite Seventy- ninth. 306 ANTIETAM. CHAPTER XX. State of Feeling in the North. — The Army of the Potomac and the ‘Army of Virginia. — Lee’s Opportunity. — His Plan. — Invasion of Maryland. — His Address to the People of Maryland. — Disappointment. — Excitement in Pennsylvania and in Maryland. — High Hopes of the South. — McClellan’s Army in Motion. — Lee's Order. — Important Discovery. — Lee’s Blunder. — McClellan Hurries Forward. — Catoctin Range.— The Catoc- tin Valley. — Turner’s Gap. — Crampton Gap. — Harper’s Ferry. — McClellan’s Advice Regarding it. — D. S. Miles. — Thomas H. Ford. — Jackson at Harper’s Ferry. — McLaws and Walker — Ford Falls Back. — Maryland Heights Captured. — Miles’ Difficulty. — McClellan’s Advice. — The White Flag. — Death of Miles. — The CapiL ulation. — A Disgraceful Affair. — The Committee of Investigation. — The Two Armies Come into Collision. — D. H. Hill Retires up the Mountain. — Turner’s Gap. — The Battle of South Mountain Begun. — Hooker on the Right. — Reno on the Left. — Longstreet Arrives and Takes Command of the Confederates. — National Victory. — Death of Reno. — Franklin at Crampton’s Gap. — Howell Cobb. — A Three Hours’ Fight. — The Na- tionals Victorious. — Lee’s Purpose Accomplished. — A Great R.sk. — Lee Falls Back. — Antietam Creek. — Sharpsburg. — The Heights. — The Battle Ground. — The Potomac. — The Shepherdstown Ford. — Lee’s Po- sition. — His Reasons for Offering Battle. — McClellan Advances. — His Line of Battle. — Time Lost. — Lee Reinforced. — Arrival of “Stonewall” Jackson. — The Confederate Line. — The Three Stone Bridges. — McClellan’s Plan of Attack. — Lee Strongly Posted. — The Dunker Church. — The Woods. — The Open Ground. — The Battle Area. — Hooker Advances by Bridge No. 1. — The Battle of Antietam Begun. — The Darkness. — The Battle Resumed. — The Confederates Driven Back. — A Fearful Struggle. — Hartsulf Wound- ed. — Terrible Slaughter. — Mansfield Comes Up. — A Pandemonium. — Mansfield Killed. — Hooker Sorely Pressed, but Hopeful. — The Key of the Position. — Hooker’s Reckless Daring. — The Air Alive with Bul- lets. — Hooker Shot in the Foot. — Sumner Arrives and Takes Command. — General Sedgwick Advances. — French and Richardson. — Sedgwick Wounded. — Struggle at the Dunker Church. — The Nationals Again Driven Back. — Arrival of Franklin. — Irwin’s Brigade, of Smith’s Division. — Gallant Efforts. — The Maine and Vermont Regiments. — Havoc.— A Ghastly Spectacle. — Sumner’s Bravery. — Fighting on Sumners Left. — Gallant Movement of Meagher. — Colonel Cross. — The “Fighting” Fifth New Hampshire. — The Confederates Driven Back. — Death of Richardson. — Meagher Wounded — The National Right at Last Vic- torious. — Porter and Burnside. — Burnside Ordered to Attack. — His Delay. — The Attack Succes:>fulh' Made. — Burnside’s Blunder. — Arrival of A. P. Hill. — Burnside Driven Back to the Bridge. — Darkness. — The Battle Ended. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — A National Victory. — Lee’s Plan had Failed. — The Battle Ought to Have Been More Decisive. — The Comte de Paris. — McClellan’s Mistakes. — The Morale of Lii Men. — Burn- side to Blame — McClellan Vindicated. — Reinforcements. — The 18th of September. — The BaTle Field. — A Sad Picture. — The 19th. — Preparations for an Advance. — Lee’s Retreat. — Porter in Pursuit. — The Pursuit Feeble and Ineffective. Lincoln Visits the Army. — McClellan’s Inactivity. — The Government Impatient. — Stuart’s Raid. — The People Indignant. — The 1st of October. — The Army in Motion. — McClellan Removed from Command. — The Proclamation of Emancipation. — The President’s Purpose. — Secretary Seward. In the first week of September, 1862, 1862 state of affairs at Washington was not encouraging. A shadow of gloom seemed to rest on the National cause. There were many men loyal and true to the Union — men who, for its preservation, had given their best, their means, their strength, the fruit of their bodies, everything which they held most dear — who had come to the conclusion that the war which had now extended over the better part of two years, and, to outward appearance, accomplished nothing, should be abandoned. If the South could not be subdued, it was useless, they thought, to prolong the contest. If they could not live together in the same household, surely there was “ MY MARYLAND ” 307 no reason why North and South should not get along as neighbors. These sentiments prevailed exten- sively throughout the North ; and it is not wonderful that they should have prevailed. Within a few weeks the hopes of the people had twice been raised to the highest point, only to be rewarded with the bitterest disappoint- ment. The army of the Potomac, in many respects one of the finest armies the v/orld had ever witnessed, had not only failed of its purpose, but had prac- tically ceased to exist as a separate organization. The army of Virginia had similarly inspired hope, and similarly failed'. After well-nigh two years of costly and bloody warfare, the enemy was literally knocking at the gates of the capital. Two months before, the army of the Potomac was lying in strength before Richmond ; one month before, the army of Virginia promised to do what the army of the Potomac had failed to accomplish ; but now, after having been driven, inch by inch, from the soil of Virginia, all that re- mained of those two magnificent armies was sheltered behind the fortifications at Washington. Widely as these sentiments prevailed, they were not by any means universal ; nor did they represent the pith and backbone of the North. There were still men who were willing to fight; there were still sources of revenue which had been left untouched; and while money could be had, and men could be found, the Union cause was not to be regarded as desperate. The withdrawal of the army of Pope left the field clear for the Confederates. Lee had a choice of two courses. He might assault the fortifications of W ash- ington, or cross the Potomac and enter into Maryland. The first course was not to be thought of. It would con- sume too much time, and, besides, there was but small hope of success. The invasion of Maryland promised richer results. It was known that in that State there were many who, at heart, were deeply in sympathy with the Southern cause. It was believed by many in the South that Maryland was held in the Union by sheer force, and that the appearance of Confederate troops on her soil would be the signal for a gen- eral uprising of the people. “Mary- land ! my Maryland ! ’’ was the burden of one of the most beautiful lyrics of the time ; it was supposed to express the sentiments of the entire South — Maryland included ; and nowhere was that song more rapturously sung than at the firesides of Virginia. Lee con- fidently expected that he would be warmly received by the people of Mary- land, and that once firmly established in that State, he would be able to at- tack Washington in the rear, and pos- sibly invade Pennsylvania. In any case, such a movement could not fail to be productive of good fruit. It would demonstrate to the governments of Europe the inherent strength of the Confederacy ; and, if it did not compel recognition, it would, at least, command sympathy and encouragement. On the 2d of September, D. H. Hill came up with his fresh divisions gepf. from Richmond. He was imme- 2* 308 ANTIETAM. diately sent forward as a vanguard to Leesburg. Between the 4th and the Sept, ^th, the entire Confederate army 5* had crossed the Potomac by the fords, in the neighborhood of what is called Point of Rocks, and encamped near the city of Frederick, on the Mono- cacy River. The Confederate general lost no time in bringing to a test the sentiments of the Marylanders. On the 8th of September he issued the following address : “Headquarters Army of Northern Yirginia, 1 Near Frederick, September 8, 1862. f To THE People of Maryland : “ It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your State, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves. “ The people of the Confederate States have long watched with the deepest sympathy the wrongs and out- rages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strong- est social, political and commercial ties, and reduced to the condition of a con- quered province. ‘‘Under the pretense of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned, upon no charge, and contrary to all the forms of law. “A faithful and manly protest against this outrage, made by a venerable and illustrious Marylander, to whom, in his better days, no citizen appealed for right in vain, was treated with scorn and contempt. “ The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers ; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of the press and of speech has been suppressed ; words have been de- clared offenses by an arbitrary decree of the Federal executive; and citizens ordered to be tried by military com- missions for what they may dare to speak. “Believing that the people of Mary- land possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to en- able you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the in- dependence and sovereignty of your State. “In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled. “This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No restraint upon your free-will is intended, no intimidation will be allowed, within the limits of this army at least. Marylanders shall once more enjoy their ancient freedom of thought and speech. We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you in every opinion. “ It is for you to decide your destiny, freely and without restraint. This arm^y will respect your choice, whatever r may be ; and, while the Southern pec pie will rejoice to welcome you to you natural position among them, they will EXCITEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA. 309 only welcome you when you come of youi' own free will. “R. E. Lee, General Commanding.” Lee had counted too confidently on Maryland sympathy. His expectations were not realized. His address, which was well conceived and carefully ex- pressed, fell flat on the people. A few Southern sympathizers joined his ranks ; but he soon discovered that his recruits were few in comparison with the num- bers who took advantage of the circum- stances in which they found themselves, to reclaim that liberty of which, by the conscription, they had been deprived. Maryland, in fact, was lukewarm ; and Lee was too sharp not to see that the invasion of Pennsylvania would not be free from peril, with a doubtful or hostile State in his rear. His appear- ance in Maryland, however, naturally enough created the wildest excitement in Pennsylvania. In York and Adams counties, and in the valleys of the Sus- quehanna and the Cumberland, the peo- ple were seized with a panic; but it was not the panic which comes of fear or cowardice. The farmers and vil- lagers realized their difficulty, and pre- pared to meet it. Sending away their wives and children, and removing their cattle to regions where they would be less at the mercy of the enemy, they themselves hastened to take up arms. In many of the townships of the State the stores were closed, bells were rung, guns were fired, public meetings were held, and citizens assembled in large masses to drill. Governor Curtin issued an order, calling upon all the able-bodied men of Pennsylvania to organize im- mediately for the defense of the State, and to be ready for marching orders upon an hour’s notice. On the gept. 11th, he issued a call for 50,000 H# of the freemen of the State to enter immediate service, in order to repel the imminent danger of invasion. On the same day he transmitted the following despatch to the mayor of Philadelphia : “We have,” he said, “reliable informa- tion this evening that the rebel gen- erals have moved their entire army from Frederick to Cumberland Valley, and their destination is now Harrisburg and Philadelphia. We need every available man immediately. Stir up your population to-night. Form them into companies, and send us 20,000 to- morrow. No time can be lost in mass- ing a force on the Susquehanna to de- fend the State and your city. Arouse every man possible, and send him here.” The governor of Maryland followed a similar course. To these appeals the people made hearty response. Penn- sylvania acted nobly. The excitement produced by the governor’s words knew no bounds. Seventy-five thousand men were soon converging from all parts of the State to Harrisburg. Volunteers, came pouring in from the adjacent States ; and in a brief space both Harrisburg and Washington were overflowing with, troops. The Confederates were still in high spirits ; and some of them openly' expressed their belief that in a few days- they would be able to dictate terms of peace in the city of Philadelphia. The same old hall which had witnessed the; signing of the Declaration of Inde? 232 310 ANTIETAM. pendence of the United States was to witness the signing of a treaty ac- knowledging the independence of the South. General Lee had already ar- rived at a different conclusion ; but these sentiments were largely shared by the rank and file of the Confederate army. We have already seen McClellan placed at the head of the reconstructed army of the Potomac, or rather, as it was now called, the army of Northern Virginia. McClellan had always been a great favorite with the men, from the ofiScers down to the common sol- dier. His reappearance among them was hailed with enthusiasm. The army was in a wretched condition. It was not slow, however, to assume something like order. The absentees, in great numbers, rallied to their standards ; discipline recovered its sway; and the shapeless, disorganized mass became once again the army of the Potomac. As soon as it became known that Gen- eral Lee had crossed into Maryland, McClellan was ordered to follow him with all the troops not needed for the Sept, defense of Washington. On the following day, he set his troops in motion ; and on the 7th, leaving Sept. General Banks in command at L the National capital, he hastened to the field, and made his headquarters that night with the Sixth corps at Rockville. His army, comprising his own old forces and those of Pope and Burnside, numbered over 87,000 effect- ive men. On the morning of the 10th Sept. McClellan was at Damascus ; and 12. on the 12th, his army having marched by five parallel roads, he had reached Fi’ederick. The first move- ments of McClellan were conducted with a view to command all the lower fords of the Potomac, thus giving Lee the choice of meeting him in bat- tle, or of retiring before him and crossing the river further up, with the view of retreating through the Shen- andoah Valley. Great caution was necessary, as the real intentions of Lee were not known. Happily, however, a copy of his order of march, issued on the 9th, was found at Fred- sppt, erick on the 13th. The follow- ing is the order : “ Headquarters Army of Northern ) Virginia, Se2)t. 9, 18G2. j Special Order ^ No. 119. “ III. The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown Road. General Jackson’s command will form the advance, and, after passing Middle- ton with such portion as he may select, take the route toward Sharpsburg, cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday morning, take pos- session of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road, capture such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Harper’s Ferry. “IV. General Longstreet’s command will pursue the main road as far as Boonsboro’, where it will halt with re- serve, supply and baggage trains of the army. “ V. General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. An- derson, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middleton, will take the LEE’S PLAN DISCOVERED. 317 route to Harper’s Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Mary- land Heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper’s Ferry and vi- cinity. “VI. General Walker, vrith his divi- sion, after accomplishing the object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Check’s Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take posses- sion of Loudon Heights, if practicable, by Friday morning, keep the ford on his left, and the road between the end of the mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the re- treat of the enemy. “VIL General D. H. Hill’s division will form the rear-guard of the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains will precede General Hill. “VHI. General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the commands of Generals Longstreet, Jack- son and McLaws, and, with the main body of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have been left be- hind. “IX. The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accomplishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro’ or Hagerstown. “X. Each regiment on the march, will habitually carry its axes in the regimental ordnance wagons for use of the men at their encampments to pro- cure wood, &c. “ By command of “ General R. E. Lee. “ R. H. Chilton, A.-A.-General, “ For Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, Comd’g, Division.” The secret which this document re- vealed was of priceless value to Mc- Clellan. It was evident that Lee had no intention to leave Maryland until necessity compelled him. His object,’ as he himself afterwards put it, was “to move the army into Western Mary- land, establish our communications with Richmond through the valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Penn- sylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and draw him back from his base. Now, it had been supposed that the advance upon Frederick would lead to the evacuation of Martinsburg and Harper’s Ferry, thus opening the line of communication through the valley. But this not having occurred, it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from these positions, before concentrating the army west of the mountains. To ac- complish this with the least delay. Gen- eral Jackson was directed to proceed with his command to Martinsburg, and, after driving the enemy from that place, to move down the south side of the Potomac upon Harper’s Ferry. Gen- eral McLaws, with his own and R. H. Anderson’s divisions, was ordered to besiege Maryland Heights, on the north side of the Potomac, opposite Harper’s Ferry, and Brigadier-General Walker to take possession of Loudon Heights, on the east side of the Shenandoah, where it unites with the Potomac. 312 ANTIETAM. These several commands were directed, after reducing Harper’s Ferry and clear- ing the valley of the enemy, to join the rest of the army at Boonsboro’ or Hagerstown.” Lee’s plan was undoubtedly bold. It cannot, however, be called wise. He was far away from his supplies; and yet he was cutting his army into two parts, and placing between those parts a river which was liable to be made impassable in a few hours by a heavy rain. In addition to all this, he was closely pursued by an enemy who was considerably superior in numbers. It is difficult to acquit Lee of the charge of having, at this particular crisis, com- mitted a grave blunder. He has him- self tried to explain what seemed a gross violation of the fundamental prin- ciples of military tactics. The advance of the Federal army,” he says, “was so slow, at the time we left Frederick, as to justify the belief that the reduction of Harper’s Ferry would be accom- plished, and our troops concentrated before they would be called to meet it. In that event, it was not intended to oppose its passage through the South Mountain, as it was desired to engage it as far from its base as possible.” Lee was evidently judging McClellan by his experience in the Peninsula. On this occasion, however, the National com- mander had made good use of his time. The discoveiy of Lee’s purpose had led Sept, to both vigor and promptitude of H. action; and on the 14th, the Confederates were startled to perceive the Nationals, in great force, coming streaming down the western sides of the Catoctin Hills. Such an apparition was all the more alanning that the operations at Harper’s Ferry had not yet been crowned with success; and that, if the National forces should pene- trate the ^South Mountain, they would find themselves in Pleasant Valley, di- rectly in the rear of McLaws, who, from the side of the Maiyland Heights, was co-operating with Jackson in the reduc- tion of Harper’s Ferry. This was not a state of things which Lee could have any special desire to see brought about. It could hardly fail to prove destructive of his whole plan of campaign. The Catoctin range is a continuation of the Blue Kidge. On the south, it terminates in Maryland at the Point of Bocks. On the north, it unites at the Pennsylvania State line with the South Mountain range which, trending to the southwest, slopes down to the Potomac at Knoxville, about four miles to the east of Harper’s Ferry. Between these two ranges nestles the most beautiful valley in Maryland — the valley of Ca- toctin. In the centre of the valley, and about ten miles from Frederick, is the village of Middletown. Few vil- lages in the whole world are more high- ly favored for situation than the village of Middletown. At this season of the year Nature, clad in her rich, autumnal robes, presents in this region unusual attractions. To prevent any possibility of disaster resulting from the unfortu- nate division of his army, Lee made such disposition of his forces as would cover the siege of Harper’s Ferry. He had fallen back upon South Mountain, which running north, as it does from HARPER’S FERRY. 313 the ferry, forms a sort of natural cur- tain and furnishes an excellent line of defense. This line can only be pene- trated by Turner’s Gap, in front of Middletown, and by Crampton’s Gap, some five miles further to the south. Master of these natural passes, Lee could hold back the Union army with one hand, while with the other he was securing the rich prize of Harper’s Ferry. Here, therefore, he posted his troops. Meanwhile, the Nationals, whom we have just seen streaming down the western slopes of the Catoc- tins, were moving in two columns across the valley — the right and centre — to- wards Turner’s Gap, Burnside leading the way ; and the left, composed of Franklin’s corps, towards Crampton’s Gap, more to the south. While the forces of North and South are thus nearing each other at South Mountain, and while a great battle is hourly becoming more imminent, let us see what is taking place in the immediate neighborhood of Harper’s Ferry. This place is highly favored by nature, the entire hollow being commanded by the three mountains, named, respectively, Bolivar, Maryland and Loudon Heights. A large amount of artillery and stores had been collected at Harper’s Ferry by the Federal government. In the event of its being found necessary to evacuate the ferry, it would be neces- sary to destroy all the stores and other property, or leave them to the enemy. It was McClellan’s opinion, when he started to follow Lee into Maryland, that Harper’s Ferry could not be held. He therefore advised its evacuation. and the employment of its garrison in co-operation with his army. Four days later he repeated the same advice to Halleck. But Halleck was unwilling to make so great a sacrifice. He re- solved, therefore, to hold the position until McClellan should be able to re- lieve it, or until communication would be open, so that it could be evacuated in safety. The place had been, since the 15th of August, in charge of D. S. Miles, who had been sent thither by General Wool, with special instructions to fortify Maryland Heights — the key of the position. Miles had been singu- larly remiss in the discharge of his duty. He had done nothing to strengthen the position. On the 5th of September, Colonel Thomas H. Ford w^as placed by Miles in command of the heights. Ford saw the danger to which the Na- tionals were exposed from the unpro- tected nature of the position. He therefore called for reinforcements, and for intrenching tools. The reinforce- ments came, but not the tools. With a few borrowed axes and other imple- ments, Ford went to work, and was successful in constructing a slight breast- work of trees near the crest of the hill. This was finished the very day that Jackson appeared with his advance. Miles had fortified Bolivar Heights behind the town; but these are com- manded by both Loudon and Maryland Heights. The garrison at Harper’s Ferry had been increased to about 13,000 men by the arrival of General Julius White with the garrison from Martinsburg. At noon of the 13th, Jackson was in full force in the rear of 314 ANTIETAM. Harper’s Ferry, and at once put him- self in communication with Walker and McLaws. Walker was already in pos- session of Loudon Heights; and Mc- Laws was exerting himself to the utmost to get hold of the Maryland Heights on the other side of the Po- tomac. The summits of these ditferent mountains are within cannon shot of each other. Ford had been attacked on the 12th, but had managed to hold his ground. On the 13th again, early in the day, he had repelled a fierce as- sault ; but later on the same day, the attack was resumed by Kershaw, and the Nationals were driven back in some confusion. At two o’clock next morn- ing Ford, hopeless of aid from Miles, spiked his guns, and, under cover of the darkness, retired to Harper’s Ferry. All now depended upon Miles. Could he hold out till McClellan should be able to send him aid? It was a difficult and dangerous task. But with the forces at his command, and considering the advantages of the position, it was not by any means impossible of ac- complishment. Early on the 14th, Har- per’s Ferry was completely invested, the Confederates being in command of both Loudon and Maryland Heights. At the foot of the latter, GeneralWright was Avell posted with artillery; and McLaws, who had pushed forward to the Potomac, at Sandy Hook, was bar- ling all way of escape down the river. In the afternoon an artilleiy fire was opened. On the same day a message came from McClellan to Miles, saying, “ Hold on to the last extremity, and, if possible, reoccupy Maryland Heights with your whole force. The Catoctin Valley is in our possession, and you can safely cross the river at Berlin.” This Miles could not or would not do. At nine o’clock that night he allowed his cavalry, 2000 strong, under Col- onel Dav^is, to depart. When morning dawned, it was found that Bolivar Heights were also in the hands of the Confederates. With the early light, no fewer than nine batteries opened fire upon the now comparatively help- less garrison. Miles could not prolong the resistance. He soon hoisted a white flag ; but as it was not perceived by the Confederates, the firing con- tinued for some thirty or forty minutes afterwards. During this time Miles was mortally wounded by the fragment of a shell. The duty of surrendering devolved upon General White. Eleven thousand five hundred and eighty-three men were made prisoners of war ; and 73 guns, 13,000 small arms, 200 wagons, and large quantities of supplies fell into the hands of the’ Confederates. The officers were allowed to go on parole with their side arms and private property. The private soldiers were permitted to take everything with them except their equipments and guns. The surrender of Harper’s Ferry was felt to be a disgrace to the National arms. Later in the year it was made the sub- ject of examination by a Court of In- quiry at Washington. The evidence produced was of the most damning kind. Ford and other officers were dis- missed from the army of the United States ; and a lasting stigma was affixed to the name and memory of Miles, who SOUTH MOUNTAm. no was declared to have exhibited ‘^an incapacity amounting almost to imbe- cilit}^.” Let us now see what was taking place a little further to the northeast. We left the National army under Mc- Clellan marching across the beautiful valley through which, as seen from the neighboring heights, runs, like a silver thread, the little river Catoctin. They were moving towards the two passes which lead through the South Moun- tain — Turner’s Gap and Crampton’s Gap — both of which the Confederates had carefully guarded, and each of which they were resolved to defend to the very uttermost. McClellan knew that the garrison at Harper’s Ferry was reduced to great straits ; and being eager to afford relief, he pressed forward wuth unwonted speed. On the morn- ing of Sunday, the 14th of September, the two rival armies came into collision at a bridge which traverses the Catoc- tin about half a mile west of Middle- town, and where the Confederates had posted some artillery. Finding it im- possible to resist the heavy and resolute pressure of the Nationals, D. H. Hill, who was in command, fell back, retiring further up the mountain, and posting his men on the three roads which lead through Turner’s Gap. In addition to the main road, there are two country roads — one to the right and one to the left. All these approaches were well guarded by artillery. Cox’s Kanawha division, of Keno’s corps of Burnside’s column, moved along the road to the left or south of the gap. They soon discovered that the Confederates occu- pied the crest in their front in great force. Reno immediately ordered an advance, promising the support of his whole corps. Cox was promptly sup- ported by Wilcox, Rodman and Stur- gis. At this point, the battle now began to rage with great fierceness, the Nationals not only holding their own, but gradually pressing the enemy back- ward, and gaining a foothold on the crest. Between two and three o’clock. Hooker’s corps, of Burnside’s column, moved along the road to the right, his object being to crush the Confederate left at the higher crest. Meade pressed toward the eminence on the one side of this road ; and Patrick, supported by Houbleday and Phelps, was pressing toward the eminence on the other side. Duryee advanced to the assistance of Meade with his fine brigade, of Rick- etts’ division, arriving just in time to witness the close of the contest. About four o’clock,, when the battle had reached a climax, Longstreet came up from Hagerstown with reinforcements ; and, as he outranked Hill, he assumed the command. While victory wsis crowning the efforts of Reno on the left, and those of Hooker on the right, Burnside, somewhat late in the after- noon, pushed Gibbon’s brigade forward on the main road which leads along through the gap. This brigade, com- ing into contact with the Confederate centre, encountered a stubborn resist- ance; but they pressed on, fighting bravely, and steadily gaining ground. At nine o’clock, when they had all but reached the summit of the pass, their ammunition failed them ; but the vie- bl6 ANTIETAM. tory was secure ; and they were soon afterwards relieved. When the contest closed, the Nationals had carried the mountain sides on the right and left of the gap; and the main road or turnpike was also in their hands. Such was the battle of South Mountain. It was a decided victory for the National arms. It was not won, however, with- out very considerable loss — a loss in killed and wounded amounting to 2325 men. Among the killed was General Reno — one of the bravest of the brave — a soldier who had done much during the dark hours of adversity to sustain the sinking spirit of the North. Simultaneously with this struggle at Turner’s Gap, the Nationals, under Franklin, were making a bold effort to secure possession of Crampton’s Gap, some six miles further to the south. The position was held by Howell Cobb, who, the reader will remember, was secretary of the treasury under Bu- chanan. Cobb had under him three of McLaws’ brigades. Franklin, follow- ing out McClellan’s instructions, ap- peared at Barkittsville, in front of the pass, at noon on the 14th, with a fine body of men from New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. He found the Confederates well posted behind stone-wall defenses. Forming his line of battle with Slocum’s division on the right of the road running through the gap, and with Smith’s on the left, he advanced upon Cobb, steadily driving him back from his defenses up the slope ; and after an action which lasted some three hours, he gained the crest of the hilL The Confederates fled down the western side of the mountain, leaving 400 prisoners, three regimental colors, two pieces of artillery and 3000 stand of arms. Franklin was now only six miles from Harper’s Ferry. He was in a position to go to the assistance of Miles.* But, as the reader has al- ready learned, it was too late. In this engagement, Franklin lost 115 killed and 418 wounded and missing. In the two engagements, the Nationals had actually come off victorious ; but Lee had accomplished his purpose — he had secured time for Jackson to complete the enterprise at Harper’s Ferry. Maryland Heights and Harper’s Ferry, with its stores, were in the hands of the Confederates. In one sense it was a great prize which Lee had won. It was a prize, however, more in seeming than reality. To gain it he had divided his army into two parts, in presence of united and power- ful forces, and had thereby exposed himself to the terrible risk of being cut up in detail. This danger was im- minent on the 14th, when Harper’s Ferry was still engaging Jackson’s at- tention, and employing all his strength. It was still imminent on the morn- sept. ing of the 15th, when Franklin, 15. having forced his way through Cramp- ton’s Gap, appeared, like a spectre, in Pleasant Valley. Jackson had hurried off that morning from Harper’s Ferry, leaving A. P. Hill to carry out the ar- rangements rendered necessary by the surrender ; but some time must elapse before Lee could count on Jackson’s presence with any number of his troopa The Confederate commander lost no THE BATTLE GROUND. 317 time in making the necessary disposi- tion of his forces. Withdrawing from South Mountain, he crossed Pleasant Valley, and took position on the slop- ing ground to the west of Antietam Creek, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg. Sept. 16th, the larger portion of the Confederate forces left Har- per’s Ferry in great haste, crossed the pontoon bridge into Maryland, and, by forced marches, succeeded in joining Lee at Antietam in time for the great battle of the 17th. Jackson, who, as has been mentioned, left on the 16th, rejoined Lee on the 16th. McLaws had abandoned the Maryland Heights when he became aware of the near presence of Franklin. Walker at the same time abandoned Loudon Heights. These last reached Lee by way of Shep- herdstown, about nine o’clock on the morning of the 17th. On the night of the 16th, the Confederates were well posted on the heights near Sharpsburg. A few words here, descriptive of the ground on which two great armies were about to come into deadly collision, will enable the reader to understand more clearly the battle picture which follows. As the traveler, after reach- ing the summit of South Mountain, be- gins to descend the western slope, there bursts upon his view one of the love- liest landscapes in the United States— a scene quite as attractive as the valley of the Catoctin which he has just left behind. In the distance, some eight or twelve miles in front of him, rolls lazily along on its tortuous bed the dark current of the Potomac. On this side of the Potomac, and fi’om six to eight miles from the mountain passes runs the drowsy stream called Antietam Creek. This creek, which, flowing al- most due south and falling into the Potomac some eight miles above Har- per’s Ferry, forms with that river a sort of irregular acute angle. Between these two streams there is an enclosed space which, of course, widens consider- ably towards the north, but which, at this point nov/ particularly claiming attention is from two to three miles broad, and about seven or eight miles long. From the western margin of the Antietam the ground rises until it be- comes a bold crest, the entire slope being covered by woods and cultivated fields; it then falls back to the Po- tomac in rugged and broken outlines of rock. Almost in the centre of this space, and just behind the ridge to the west, nestles the town of Sharpsburg; and behind Sharpsburg, a little to the south, is the Shepherdstown Ford across the Potomac. Such was the position which the Confederate general had chosen, and on which he proposed to await the attack of McClellan. The creek was in his front; the Potomac was in his rear; and behind and near the middle of his line was the little town of Sharpsburg, about a mile from the creek. The position unquestionably offered several advantages; but it is always dangerous to hazard — what in the circumstances this could not but be — a great and pos- sibly decisive battle, with a river in the rear. The truth is, Lee’s original plan had failed. He was no longer offensive, but defensive. His great object, from 318 ANTIETAM. the failure at South Mountain, had been to gain time for the concentration of his troops. This, however, he could have accomplished with equal ease on the other side of the Potomac. Why, then, did he remain on the Maryland side ? The answer is simple. He could not have recrossed the Potomac without covering himself with odium — without making his expedition to a certain ex- tent ridiculous. He had marched North wdth a great flourish of trumpets; his plans and purposes had become known ; it was absolutely necessary, in short, that in a fair fight he should test the skill and strength of his antagonist; and judging from the past, he was not without reason to hope that victory might crown his effort. If defeated, he might still be able to make good his retreat across the Potomac. If success- ful, he might yet march in triumph to Baltimore and Washington. On the morning of the 15th, the Na- tional army had defiled from the South Mountain, and moved in long, shining- columns athwart the valley. By the evening of that day, the advance had arrived at Antietam Creek; and the enemy was discovered well posted be- hind the crest of the opposite slope. There was some slight skirmishing with cavalry ; but neither of the com- manders was quite willing to open the fight. Lee, while actually waiting for the arrival of reinforcements from Har- per’s Ferry, made such a show of strength as imposed upon McClellan. The National forces were not well for- ward, when darkness set in. There had been on the part of some of the commands unnecessary delay — a delay but for which McClellan might have been able to attack Lee with success on the afternoon of the 15th. During the morning of the 16th, the whole of the National army arrived, with the exception of Franklin’s command, which was still in Pleasant Valley. By that time, however, Lee was equally pre- pared for battle; for Jackson had al- ready arrived, and with him almost the entire Confederate strength from Har- per’s Ferry. On the morning of the 16th, there was some artillery firing; but it did not seem to indicate that either side was yet fully ready for the fight. Both armies, however, were busy making preparations for the attack which could not now be long delayed. The Con- federates were so arranged that Long- street w’as on the right, with his right flank resting on a curve of the Antie- tam, D. H. Hill being on his left, and one of Longstreet’s divisions, com- manded by Hood, being on the left of Hill. In a general manner their line stood north and south; but Hood’s division made an angle with the rest, and, facing northward, stood across the Hagerstown Boad. The object of this arrangement was to oppose any flank movement which might be made in that direction. Close to that point, and in the rear of Hood, Jackson’s exhaust- ed troops, which had just arrived from Haiq^er’s Ferry, were posted in reserve, his line stretching: from the Has-erstown Road toward the Potomac, and pro- tected by Stuart, with cavalry and artillery. Walker was posted on Long- THE BUNKER CHURCH. 319 street’s right with two brigades, near what was called Shaveley’s Farm. Lee had his headquarters in a tent on the hill where the National cemetery now is. McClellan’s forces, on the morning of that day, were posted along the eastern bank of the Antietam. Hooker’s corps was placed on the extreme right. Next to him was Sumner, with his corps. Porter was placed in the centre, and Burnside on the left. Mansfield was stationed in the rear of Hooker. Frank- lin had not yet come up from Pleasant Valley. General McClellan’s head- quarters were at the fine brick mansion of Philip Pry, on the east side of the Antietam, and about two miles north- east of Sharpsburg. From this point he had a commanding view of the en- tire line of battle. In front of the Na- tional line were three stone bridges. These bridges have been described as Nos. 1,2 and 3. No. 1 was in front of the National right, near which were stationed Hooker, Sumner and Mans- field. No. 2 was in front of Porter, who commanded the National centre. No. 3 was opposite Burnside, v^ho had charge of the National left. Near bridge 1 was a ford, which was turned to good account during the progress of the fight. McClellan’s plan was to at- tack the enemy’s left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner’s, and, if necessary, by Frank- lin’s; and, as soon as matters looked favorable in that direction, to move the corps of Burnside against the enemy’s extreme right, upon the ridge running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and, having carried that position, to press along the crest toward his left. Whenever either of these fiank move- ments should be successful, he proposed to advance the centre with all the forces then disposable. We have already referred to the careful disposition which Lee had made of his troops on his own left, on and around the Hagerstown Hoad. On the west side of that road, about a mile from Sharpsburg, and about half a mile from the rear of the Confederate left, there was a small meeting-house, known as the Hunker Church. This church was enveloped in woods. In the immediate neighborhood of the church there was an open, cultivated area, extending from the north, for the most part skirted with woods, but part of which was traversed by the Hagerstown Road. In the woods near the church were numerous ledges of limestone, which atforded an excellent cover for troops. It was here, among these limestone ledges, where Jackson had posted his men. The middle part of this open ground was a cornfield. A portion of it toward the east had been recently ploughed. It was in the woods, near the church, and in that open ground, that the battle of Antietam most fierce- ly raged and was principally fought. This was the focus of the fight. On the afternoon of the 16th, about two P. M., General McClellan began to put his plans into operation. General Hooker, ever ready and always equal to the situation, with his corps, consist- ing of Ricketts’, Meade’s and Double- day’s divisions, in prompt obedience to orders, crossed the Antietam at bridge 320 ANTIETAM. No. 1, and by the adjoining ford. Gen- eral Mansfield was to follow Hooker during the night, and to be in a posi- tion to render him assistance by day- break. Sumner was to follow in the same direction in the morning. Hooker, encountering no opposition in crossing the river, advanced in a southward di- rection, and came to the eastern edge of what we have described as the battle area. As he approached the house of a Mr. D. Miller, his advance — Meade’s Pennsylvania Peserves — came into con- tact with a portion of the enemy’s left. The contest thus begun was sharp and severe, and lasted until dark, when the Confederates fell back. Hooker’s men rested that night on their arms on the ground they had won. Mansfield’s corps, consisting of the divisions of Williams and Green, were also success- ful in crossing the Antietam ; and upon the farm of Poffenberger, about a mile in Hooker’s rear, they bivouacked till dawn. Hooker, impatient to resume the Sept, attack, was ready and in action H. by the first streak of early day. The Pennsylvania Reserves were again the first to be engaged. Soon, how- ever, the whole of his corps were in deadly conflict with the enemy, Jackson being in command. Hooker advanced, with Doubleday on his right, Meade on his left, and Ricketts in the centre. Such was the vigor of the onslaught, and so effective was the assistance ren- dered by the batteries on the east side of the Antietam, that Jackson’s brigades, terribly cut up, were driven across the cornfield, in the open ground, over the Hagerstown Road, and into the woods beyond the Dunker Church, where were their reserves. Eager to accomplish his purpose, and to obtain possession of the woods beyond. Hooker now pushed forward his left and centre. At this point, where the ground rises to some- what of an elevation, they were met by a murderous fire. The broken bat- talions were re-formed ; and Jackson brought forth his reserves. A fearful struggle ensued. At short range, and in the open ground, and with the ardor of desperation, they plied their deadly work. It was a fight in which there was no desire for quarter — no wish to save or be saved. Two great com- manders were pitted against each other; and the men were animated by the spirit of their chiefs. In his extremity, Hooker called on Doubleday for aid; and a brigade under Hartsuff was for- warded at the double-quick. This bri- gade was terribly punished in pushing its way across the cornfield. It offered a gallant resistance; but it could not turn the tide of battle. In the brief struggle of half an hour Hartsuff fell, severely wounded. The opposing forces were literally torn to shreds. In his official report of this fierce encounter. General Jackson says: “The carnage on both sides was terrific. At an early hour. General Starke, command- ing the Stonewall division, was killed ; Colonel Douglas, commanding Law- ton’s brigade, was also killed. Gen- eral Lawton, commanding division, and Colonel Walker, commanding brigade, were severely wounded. More than half the brigades of Lawton and Hays THE AIR ALIVE WITH BULLETS. 321 were either killed or wounded, and more than a tliird of Trimble’s. All the regimental commanders in those brigades, except two, were either killed or wounded. Thinned in their ranks, and their ammunition exhausted,” it was necessary to withdraw the shattered regiments to tlie rear, when ‘‘Hood’s di- vision, of Longstreet’s command, took their place.” Hooker’s corps had simi- larly sulfered. Indeed, General Sum- ner, who arrived on the field a little later, testified that when he came up he “ saw nothing of Hooker’s corps at all.” It was now half-past seven o’clock. Mansfield had just come up to the sup- port of Hooker. He had pushed his way to the Hagerstown Road. At that moment the battle din was fearful. What with the yells of the Confede- rates, the ringing cheers of the Na- tionals, the shaj*p, penetrating fire of musketry, the loud booming of can- non, and the ghastly procession of the wounded as they came out from the thick of the fight, it seemed a very pan- demonium. But it was no time for idle moralizing. While attempting to de- ploy his corps — the divisions of Will- iams and Green — Mansfield was fiercely set upon by the division of D. H. Hill, which had just come out of the woods at the Dunker Church. In the struggle which ensued, and in which his corps were driven back to the woods, brave old Mansfield was killed. His com- mand devolved on General Williams, who left his division to the care of General Crawford, one of his brigade commanders. Hooker, nothing daunted by his terrible losses, was still hopeful of success. Ricketts was unable to ad- vance ; but he assured the general that he could hold his ground. Doubleday had succeeded in silencing a battery which for half an hour had been pour- ing enfilading fire on Hooker’s central line. Near the Dunker Church was a wood-crowned elevation, which was really the key of the position. This Hooker determined to take. With this end in view, he ordered forward two of the Mansfield brigades — Crawford and Gordon — Hooker himself advancing to the front, and recklessly exposing him- self to the enemy’s bullets, which fell in showers around him. For a time he moved about on foot, examining the ground in his front, and seeking a favorable site for a battery. As he remounted on a piece of rising ground, the air was literally alive with bullets. He was scarcely in the saddle when three men were shot by his side, and when he himself was shot in the foot. Suffering dreadfully from the wound, and sitting unsteadily in his saddle, he turned and fixed his eyes on the coveted position. “There is a regiment to the right,” said he; “order it forward. Crawford and Gordon are coming up; tell them to carry these works, and hold them, and it is our fight.” On exam- ination, it was found that the bullet had completely passed through his foot. Soon afterwards he was carried off the field to McClellan’s headquarters at Pry’s, but not until he felt satisfied that he had won the field, so far as it was the duty or in the power of the National right to win it. In carrying 322 ANTIETAM. out the orders given them, Crawford and Gordon were fairly successful. They had reached the woods, and were holding them against heavy odds. It was only nine o’clock. It seemed as if the battle had been raging for the greater part of a day. Just as Hooker was leaving the field, Sumner arrived and assumed command. Discovering at once the dangerous position held by the two Mansfield brigades, Sumner ordered Sedgwick, whose division was in advance, to move forward to their support. It was a hazardous operation. It was necessary to cross the cornfield ; and if the enemy’s line was complete, he was in immediate danger of being flanked. Simultaneously, with the ad- vance of Sedgwick, French and Rich- ardson, who had also arrived on the field, moved down upon the foe a little more to the left. Sedgwi(;k suffered terribly; but the Nationals, having again pressed across the open and now blood-stained area, were holding the ground around the Dunker Church. It seemed for a moment as if victory had pronounced in their favor. But no. The backward and forward struggle must be repeated. The blood-stained field must be crossed and recrossed. McLaws and Walker, who had arrived with their troops from Harper’s Ferry, were moved at once to Jackson’s sup- port, with Early on their left. Posted behind the rocky bulwarks, they await- ed the approach of the Nationals; and, as they drew near, they leaped from their hiding-places and fell upon them with tremendous fury, forcing them from the Dunker Woods, and driving them across the cornfield, and into the woods beyond. At this moment, affairs looked sufficiently gloomy for the Na- tional right. Sumner’s headquarters were now in the narrow field where Hooker in Jhe morning had begun the fight. Sedgwick, who had been three times wounded, was at last obliged to leave the field. Dana, Crawford and other officers had been wounded. What remained of Hooker’s troops were terribly exhausted ; and their general was off the field. Mansfield was gone; and what remained of his troops were in little better condition than those of Hooker. It was Sum- ner’s conviction that further aggressive effort without reinforcements was im- possible. He might hold his own ; but he could do no more. The Confede- rates at this stage did not seem to be in any better plight, than their antago- nists. They had suffered terribly from the National artillery; and as they were exposed in their advanced position to the batteries of Doubleday, who held his place on the right with in- flexible tenacity, they fell back to their original ground near the Dunker Church. Some of them, however, were still engaged ; nor was there any evidence that they were unwill- ing to continue the fight. It was now shortly after midday. Franklin, who had left Crampton’s Pass in the morning about six o’clock, had just arrived on the field. It was Mc- Clellan’s intention to retain that corps on the east side of the Antietam, to be ready to operate on either flank or on the centre, as cii'cumstances might re- ARRIVAL OF FRANKLIN. 323 quire. The terrible condition of the National right, however, left the gen- eral-in-chief no choice. McClellan had been an anxious spectator of the fight all the morning and forenoon. He knew how critical was the situation in which Sumner found himself. Franklin was, therefore, ordered at once to his assistance. He made no delay. Hast- ening forward, he reached the point of danger not a moment too soon. An attack was being made on battery A, Fourth United States Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas. Smith’s division led the column, fol- lowed by Slocum’s. Smith received general instructions to retake the ground on which the battle had all day long raged so fiercely. Slocum was ordered to move more to the centre. The or- ders were promptly executed. Smith’s men were soon in the thick of the fight. Battery A was immediately relieved by Hancock’s brigade ; and, as he observed that the enemy was still disposed to advance. Smith ordered up his third brigade, commanded by Colonel Irwin. Passing through Thomas’s battery, this brigade rushed upon the foe wdth in- trepid energy, and with a violence which was irresistible ; and by a series of gallant charges, made in the face of a most destructive fire, which ploughed through their ranks, the men cheering as they advanced on the run, they drove the Confederates across the open field, and beyond the Hagerstown Road, compelling them to seek shelter in the woods to the west of the Hunker Church. On this day of brilliant effort and heroic self-sacrifice, nothing was more brilliant, more heroic or more full of self-sacrifice than this last and crown- ing effort of Smith’s division, of Frank- lin’s corps. The grandest work was done by the Maine and Vermont regi- ments. They literally covered them- selves with glory. It was only fifteen minutes from the time the order was given, when the field was reclaimed, and the work was done. “The field and its ghastly harvest,” says an eye- witness, “which the reaper had gath- ered in those fatal hours, remained finally with the Nationals. Four times it had been lost and won. The dead are strewn so thickly that, as you ride over it, you cannot guide your horse’s steps too carefully. Pale and bloody faces are everywhere upturned. They are sad and terrible ; but there is noth- ing which makes one’s heart beat so quickly as the imploring looks of some sorely- wounded men, who beckon weari- ly for help which you cannot stay to give.” The arrival of Franklin on the field was singularly opportune. A few minutes later, the Confederates might have penetrated the National line be- tween the division of Sedgwick and that of French. Such a result would have been disastrous in the extreme. His efforts had been attended with so much success, that he felt emboldened to assault the woods near the Hunker Church, where the Confederate left had again sought shelter — a position which had been vainly assaulted by both Hooker and Sumner. Franklin had given the order ; but Sumner having come up, it was countermanded. It 324 ANTIETAM. was Slocum’s brigade that was to make the intended assault. Franklin, confi- dent of success, was anxious that it should be made; but Sumner, “the old bull of the woods,” as they called him at Fair Oaks, who was as stubborn as he was brave, and as cautious as he was daring, could not be persuaded to give his consent. Franklin’s was the only remaining corps available for at- tack. In the meditated assault on the enemy, strongly posted on ground which hitherto had proved impregna- ble, a repulse was at least possible; and a repulse, in Sumner’s judgment, would peril the safety of the whole army. Sumner’s caution at this crisis of the fight was the more entitled to respect that that day he proved himself to be the bravest of the brave. He was ever at the post of danger, and where the battle raged most fiercely. Mounted on his spirited charger, and careering through the woods, his head bare, his white hair streaming in the wind, the fire of battle in his eye, he seemed the very impersonation of the god of war. Few that saw him that day in the thick of the fight believed he could leave the field alive. But the bullets fell mercifully around the brave old warrior. While these events were taking place on Sumner’s right, severe fighting was going on also on his left. French and Richardson had not been idle. The for- mer, with the brigades of Weber, Kim- ball and Morris, pushed on where the Confederate general, D. H. Hill, was posted in considerable strength. Weber led the advance, while hotly engaged with the enemy. French received orders to press on with the utmost vigor, and make a diversion in favor of the rio-ht. o The Confederates were pressed back towards a hollow or sunken road in much disorder. At this point, Rich- ardson came up, with the brigades of Meagher, Caldwell and Brooks, and took position on the left of French. Meagher fought his way to the crest of a hill which overlooked the Confede- rate position. The battle now raged furiously. A vigorous effort was made by the Confederates, who at this time were reinforced by about 4000 men under R. H. Anderson, to obtain possession of a piece of rising ground on the left of the National right wing, with the view of turning that flank. The ground, however, after what might be called a fighting race, was seized and held by Colonel Cross and his famous “fighting” Fifth New Hampshire. Cross was speedily joined by the Eighty-First Pennsylvania ; and the Confederates were driven back, leaving: f O behind them the colors of the Fourth North Carolina. An effort was made at the same time to push towards and flank the National right. It was made with great energy and stubbornness. Resisted, however, by French and by Richardson, the Confederates were brought to a standstill, and finally driven back to Dr. Piper’s house, near the Sharpsburg Road. There they came to a halt, and made an obstinate attack. Richardson now brought up his artil- lery. It was at this moment, and while directing one of the batteries, that this brave officer was felled to the « tattered fragments.” 325 earth by a cannon ball. General Han- cock immediately took command ; and, by a desperate charge, he drove the Confederates from Dr. Piper’s house, and pressed them so closely that it was only by the merest chance that Lee’s line was not completely severed. A .vigorous and more general effort at this moment might have given a new aspect to the entire struggle, and even crowned the day with a decisive vic- tory. As it was, the Nationals held the ground on the right and toward the centre when darkness fell. In this closing struggle. General Meagher, who performed deeds of valor, was wounded and carried from the field. Thus far our attention has been di- rected exclusively to the operations on the National right. This has been un- avoidable. It was by his right wing McClellan intended to fight the battle of Antietam ; and it was by that wing the battle was really fought. It was not the general’s intention, however, that either the centre or the left, or both, should be mere armed spectators of the scene. The reader will remem- ber that General Fitz John Porter, who had command of the National centre, occupied a position on the east of Antie- tam, commanding bridge No. 2. The left wing, it will also be remembered, was under General Burnside, and held a position also on the east side of the creek, commanding bridge No. 3. While this murderous work was going on to the right of the National line, what was being done by the centre and left ? Let us see. McClellan deemed the position held by Porter of the utmost importance; and, consequently, it was not until the afternoon was somewhat advanced that he could be induced to take any steps which should have the effect of weak- ening his centre. Hooker had been taken from the .field wounded; his corps had been cut to pieces. Mansfield had fallen in battle ; and there remained but tattered fragments of his once splendid regiments. Sumner was still giving directions in the field ; but his own corps had shared the fate of those of Hooker and Mansfield. It was “towards the middle of the afternoon,” McClellan tells us, that, discovering the desperate state of things on his right, he detached two of Porter’s bri- gades, and sent them to Sumner’s assist- ance. About the same time he caused six battalions, of Sykes’ regulars, to be thrown across bridge No. 2, in order to attack and drive away the Confederate sharpshooters, who were giving great annoyance to Pleasonton’s horse bat- teries, which were stationed a little in advance of the bridge. At the same time, also, he detached Warren’s bri- gade from the same corps, and sent them to hold a position on the right and rear of Burnside. In consequence of these repeated withdrawals of troops. Porter’s corps was, at one time during the day, reduced to fewer than 4000' men. And what was taking place on the left? It was McClellan’s design, as has been indicated, to support his right by making an attack on the enemy with his left. With this end in view, Burn- side’s corps, on the evening of the IGth,. H34 326 ANTIETAM. was moved into position near the bridge. On that day McClellan visited Burnside, and, after pointing out the proper dis- position to be made of his troops, in- formed him that he would probably be required to make an attack on the enemy’s right on the following morning. He was instructed, also, to make care- ful reconnoissances. Burnside’s corps consisted of the divisions of Generals Cox, Wilcox, Rodman and Sturgis. Col- onel Brooks’ brigade, of Cox’s divi- sion, was on the right; Sturgis’ divi- sion was immediately in the rear; while Rodman’s division, with Scammon’s brigade, of Cox’s division, in support, was stationed on the left. The division of Wilcox was held in reserve. On the night of the 16th the corps bivouacked in position. At eight o’clock on the morning of the 17th, McClellan sent instructions to Burnside to force the lower stone bridge, to gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. The position was held by Toombs’ brigade, supported by sharp- shooters and batteries, under the com- mand of D. R. Jones. Burnside was singularly tardy in carrying out the instructions given him. It is to be ad- mitted that the task imposed upon him was one of more than ordinary diffi- culty. The approaches to the bridge partook of the character of a defile, which was completely commanded by the Confederate batteries. Burnside made repeated attempts ; but they were feeble, and without effect. He was evidently impressed with the idea that, however important it might be to cap- ture the bridge and the heights beyond, the risk to be run was too great. Again and again imperative orders were sent to him to push forward his troops with- out delay, and, if necessaiy, to carry the bridge at the point of the bayonet. It was ‘not until about one o’clock, when Colonel Sackett had been sent to Burnside with instructions to remain and see the order executed, that a really vigorous effort was made. The Fifty-First New York and the Fifty- First Pennsylv^ania charged with tre- mendous energy, driving the Confede- rates from the bridge, and back to the heights in their rear. Other troops fol- lowed, and the position was secured. Unhappily, however, Burnside did not pursue the advantage thus gained. In getting his troops and batteries across the bridge, and putting them in order, he wasted two precious hours — the most precious hours of the day ; for, as we now know, Longstreet had so ex- hausted his strength by sending rein- forcements to the Confederate left, that he had only some two thousand men with whom to oppose Burnside’s ad- vance. It is impossible not to admire the skill with which, on this and other occasions, the Confederate generals con- trived to make an imposing and de- ceptive show of their forces, when they were really weak and in distress. At three o’clock, Burnside was in the same position. McClellan, becoming impa- tient, sent Colonel Key to him, with the most urgent entreaties to push on without a moment’s delay. The move- ment, he assured him, was vital to suc- cess. It w'as no time to halt or hesitate TEE BATTLE ENDED. 327 because of the value of life. With a considerateness which seems strange to those accustomed to the stern military orders of older nations, McClellan again sends Key to Burnside, telling him that if, on experiment, he finds that he cannot flank or storm the battery, and carry the heights, he is to inform him, so that he may be able to recall the troops. The advance is now resumed ; the attack is gallantly made ; the guns are abandoned by the fleeing Confede- rates ; the heights are carried ; and the victorious Nationals, in considerable force, are already at the outskirts of Sharpsburg. At this supreme moment, when victory seems at last about to crown the labors and sacrifices of the day, the Nationals are brought to a standstill. A new army appears to have arisen out of the ground. It is A. P. Hill, who, with his division, has just come up from Harper’s Ferry. Gietting his men into order on the brow of a ridge to the left, he falls heavily on Burnside’s troops, as they press eagerly forward, apparently with vic- tory in their grasp. The blow is all the more stunning that it is unexpected. Under cover of a tremendous fire of artillery, the Confederates charge upon Burnside’s left flank. The National troops offer a stubborn resistance. But they cannot hold their ground. Step by step they are forced back to the bridge over the Antietam, where they are protected by the batteries on the other side of the creek. Here Burnside had instructions to make a determined stand. It was unnecessary, as the Con- federates did not venture to pursue. In this last struggle there was a heavy loss of life. The Confederate general, Branch, was killed ; and General Rod- man was mortally wounded. The last shot was fired as night spread her mantle of gloom over that field of blood and agony. The battle of Antietam was ended. It was not the most de- cisive, but it was the bloodiest battle since the commencement of the Civil War. On that narrow piece of ground lay dead, or bleeding to death, twenty thousand men, their comrades so com- pletely outworn by continuous march- ing and fighting, without sleep and without food, that they could not give burial to the one or succor to the other. The National loss in this battle was 2010 killed, 9416 wounded, and 1043 missing; a total of 12,469. Lee’s losses were correspondingly heavy. About 2700 were buried by McClellan. His wounded numbered about 7000, not in- cluding those which had fallen into the hands of the Nationals. In that single day his army must have been reduced by at least 10,000 men. Lee himself acknowledged that, in the different en- gagements at Crampton’s Gap, Tur- ner’s Gap, Harper’s Ferry and Antietam, he sustained a loss of 1567 killed, and 8724 wounded. Most undoubtedly Lee, from some cause or other, under- estimated his loss. It does not appear possible to get at the exact figures; but it is not an overestimate to say that Lee’s loss, during his brief campaign in Maryland, was from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Although Antietam could not be called a National victory, it was un- questionably a gain to the National 328 ANTIETAM. cause ; and McClellan was hardly to be blamed if he felt some self-satisfaction in being able to say that ^Hhirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 15,000 stand of small arms, and more than 6000 prisoners are the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton’s Gap and Antietam,” and that “not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles.” Lee could, no doubt, boast that he had not been defeated, although he had fought with inferior numbers, and that McClellan did not venture to resume the battle on the following day; but he had lost ground along the whole line, and his army was so broken down that a retreat to Virginia was now an absolute necessity. His whole plan of campaign had failed. It is fair, here, to ask the reader to bear in mind that Lee, although repeatedly reinforced, was not able to bring into the field on that day more than 40,000 or 45,000 men ; whereas, McClellan’s elfective strength was over 87,000. It would not be difiicult to show that greater results ought to have been achieved by the noble army of the Po- tomac. The discipline was defective. The generalship ^ was not good. The commanding mind which gives unity of j)urpose and unity of movement to a great army was wanting. McClellan repeated his characteristic blunder. In place of combining his forces, and at- tacking with an overwhelming mass, he used them too much in driblets, and worked too much in detail. In his history of the Civil War, tlie Comte de | Paris very clearly puts the merits and demerits of the fight. "‘The error,” he says, “which Lee expiated by this great defeat is evident. This error was in dividing his army for the pur- pose of capturing Harper’s Ferry in the presence of McClellan, and in counting too much upon the tardiness of his ad- versary. If he had not made such a division of his forces, he would have had the choice either to hght a decisive battle under much more favorable cir- cumstances, upon the steej,^ acclivities of South Mountain, or of continuing the campaign on the upper Potomac with all his troops. The mistakes of his enemies repaired to some extent those committed by himself. Through the disgraceful capitulation of Miles, the slow movements of Franklin on the 14th and 15th, and the delays MLich prevented McClellan from attacking him on the 16th, he was enabled on the 17th to mass all his troops on the field of battle. The issue of the contest, however, would probably have been different if A. P. Hill, instead of arriv- ing at three o’clock in the afternoon, had been able to take part in the strug- gle early in the morning, and add his efforts to those which kept the Federal right so long in check. There were, however, many other causes which pre- vented McClellan from achieving a more complete victory, and taking ad- vantage of the opportunity to strike an irreparable blow at Lee. The first is to be found in the moral condition of his troops. The army which had been en- trusted to him was partly composed of the van(|uished soldiers of Manassa-, A WISE DISCEETION. 329 and the remainder consisted of soldiers who had been only one or two weeks in the service, who had never marched, never been under lire, and knew neither their commanders nor their comrades. They fought with great bravery; but they could not be expected to perform what Lee easily obtained from his men. Their ranks had not that cohesion which enables a commander to follow up a first success without interruption. The Union generals may be censured for having divided their efforts on the right in successive attacks, and thereby impaired their effectiveness. The corps of Hooker, Mansfield and Sumner — in all from 40,000 to 44,000 men — instead of being brought into action one after the other for the space of four hours, might have been united so as together to strike the Confederate left, which they would, no doubt, have crushed. McClellan and several of his lieuten- ants, as we have said, had also overrated the number of their adversaries — an error which had the effect of keeping back Franklin and Porter, whose co- operation at the close of the battle would have been decisive. Finally Burnside, by his long inaction, upset all McClellan’s plans, enabled Lee to mass all his forces on his left, and thus deprived the Federals of the principal advantages which a more energetic action on his part would certainly have f'Ccured.” These are sensible words; and they justify the tone which per- vades this narrative. McClellan himself tells us that the night of the 17th brought with it grave responsibilities. The question was seri- ously revolved in his own mind, and discussed with his generals, ‘^whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to , defer it, even with the risk of the ene- my’s retirement.” Some of the gen- erals, Franklin among the rest, urged immediate action. Others again, Sum- ner included, opposed such a course. McClellan concluded to wait a day, to give his army rest, and to prepare for the renewal of the battle on the 19th. For this McClellan has been greatly blamed by many. We cannot join with them. Discretion is, sometimes at least, the better part of valor. McClellan, we think, showed a wise discretion. It may be true that, if he had resumed the attack on the morning of the 18th, he could easily have captured or ruined Lee’s army. It ought not to be forgot- ten, however, that we judge the situa- tion now with a fuller knowledge than McClellan then possessed. There were certainly grave reasons why he should act with caution. As he himself has said : At that moment — V irginia lost, Washington menaced, Maiyland invad- ed — the National cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and all would have been lost.” During the course of the 18th, he was joined by 14,000 fresh troops, under Couch and Humphrey. Thus strengthened, he felt that he could strike the enemy on the following morning with assured hope of victory. Meanwhile, the 18th Avas spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, removing the wounded, burying the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the battle. ;530 ANTIETAM. The 18th of September, 1862, will Sept. soon be forgotten by any who spent that day on the battle field of Antietam. Sad duties had to be performed; and sad sights had to be witnessed. In battle histories, it is too much the habit to confine the reader’s attention to the stirring scenes of actual conflict — too little the habit to linger with him in the battle’s rear, and wit- ness the scenes of woe. Yet it is on the blood-soaked field, when the din of battle has ceased, among the dead and the wounded, that the true lesson is to be learned. Happily, a picture of the field of Antietam after the battle has been preserved to us by a competent eye-witness. “My route,” says Captain Noyes, “ carried me over the late battle field, and I spent much of the afternoon, in company wdth a friend, in visiting some of the most severely-contested points, to be awe-struck, sickened, al- most benumbed wdth its sights of horror. Within this space of little more than a mile square — this spot once beautiful with handsome residences and well- cultivated farms, isolated, hedged in with verdure, sacred to quiet, calm con- tent — the hottest fury of man’s hottest wrath had expended itself, burning residences and well-filled barns, plough- ing fields of ripened grain with artillery, scattering everywhere through corn- field, wood and valley the most awdul illustrations of war. Not a building about us which was not deserted by its occupants, and rent and torn by shot and shell; not a field which had not witnessed the fierce and bloody en- counter of armed and desperate men. Passing through the cornfield, with the dead lying all through its aisles, out into an uncultivated field, I saw bodies, attired mainly in gray, lying in ranks so regular that Death, the Reaper, must have njowed them down in swaths. Our burying parties were already busi- ly engaged, and had put away to rest many of our own men; still here, as eveiywhere, I saw them scattered over the field. The ground was strewn wdth muskets, knapsacks, cartridge-boxes and articles of clothing; the carcasses of horses, and thousands of shot and shell. And so it was on the other side of the turnpike — nay, in the turnpike itself. Ride where we may, through cornfield wood or ravine, and our ride will be among the dead, until the heart grows sick and faint with horror. Just in front of these hay-stacks, where our general and his staff paused for a while during the heat of the battle, was the only pleasing picture on this battle field — a fine horse struck with death. At the instant when cut down by his wound, he was attempting to rise from the ground. His head was half lifted ; his neck proudly arched ; every muscle seemed replete with animal life. The wound which killed him was wholly concealed from view, so that I had to ride close up before I could believe him dead. He w^as the admired of every passer-by. Two weeks after- ward, I found myself pausing to gaze upon him, and always with the wish that some sculptor would immortalize in stone this magnifi?ent animal, in the exact pose of his death-hour. One would like to see something from a LEE’S RETEEAT. 331 battle field not wholly terrible. One more scene in this battle picture, and our ride may end. It is a narrow country lane, hollowed out somewhat between the fields, partially shaded, and now literally crowded with the Confederate dead. Here they stood in line of battle, and here, in the length of five hundred feet, I counted more than two hundred of their dead in every attitude conceivable — some piled in groups of four or six ; some grasping their muskets, as if in the act of dis- charging them ; some, evidently offi- cers, killed while encouraging their men ; some lying in the position of calm repose, all black and swollen, and ghastly with wounds. This battalion of the dead filled the lane with horror. As we rode beside it — we could not ride in it — I saw the field all about me black with corpses ; and I was told that the cornfield beyond was equally crowded. It was a place to see once, to glance at, and then to ride hurriedly away; for strong-hearted as was then my mood, I had gazed upon as much horror as I was able to bear.” Such is war, when stripped of the pomp and the splendor and the show, and seen in its naked reality. On the morning of the 19th, accord- Sept. instructions given the day before, preparations were made for an advance. The cavalry were sent forward to reconnoitre the ground. What has happened? Mounted mes- sengers return at full speed to McClel- lan’s headquarters. There is no longer any enemy in front. Taking advantage of the darkness of the night, Lee had taken his entire army across the Po- tomac by the Shepherdstown Ford, and escaped, unmolested, into Virginia. He had left eight batteries, under Pendle- ton, on the river bluffs, for the purpose of checking the pursuit. This, then, was the end of all that blood and sac- rifice. Justified, as McClellan was, in resting on the 18th, it must be regard- ed, from a National point of view, as a great misfortune that Lee should have been able, without let or hin- drance, to cross the Potomac, carrying with him his entire army, with all the supplies, material and impedimenta of war generally. It is no matter of won- der if many a soldier’s heart sank within him, when he learned that the enemy had escaped. Good generalship was again on the side of the Confede- rates. An attempt at pursuit was made by a portion of Porter’s corps; but it was a feeble attempt, and tended to reveal the indecision and want of pur- pose on the part of the National com- mander. Porter’s men, under General Griffin, captured four of the enemy’s guns ; but on the morning of the Sept, 20th, when making a reconnois- sance in force, and when about a mile from the ford, they were . surprised by A. P. Hill, who lay in ambush, and driven back into and across the river in great disorder, with the loss of 200 men made prisoners. The Confederates held the river for the remainder of that day. On the 21st, Lee moved sept. leisurely toward Martinsburg, de- stroying, as he moved along, the Balti- more and Ohio Bailroad. Stuart lin- gered behind to make a show of numbers 332 ANTIETAM. and strength ; and on the same day that Lee marched to Martinsburg, he was daring enough to recross the river at Williamsport. He was met by Couch, who compelled him to make a precipi- tate retreat. Two days later, Mary- land Heights were retaken by the Na- tionals ; Harper’s Ferry was reoccupied, and in charge of General Sumner ; and pontoon bridges were thrown across both the Potomac and the Shenandoah Fivers. The Maryland campaign was ended. The great battle of Antietam had been fought; blood and treasure had been liberMly spent on both sides ; yet both armies had substantially re- sumed the positions which they occupied some three weeks before.^ McClellan’s besetting sin again be- came a source of disquietude to the coun- tiy and the government. There was an earnest and general desire that he * The battle of Antietam, it is but just to notice, had a most important effect in determining the promulga- tion of the war policy which the National government had at this time under consideration. President Lin- coln himself tells the story. “It had got to be,” said he, “midsummer, 18G2. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we were pursu- ing : that we had about played our last card, and must change our tactics, or lose the game. I now deter- mined upon the emancipation policy; and without consulting with, or the knowledge of, the cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a cabinet meeting on the subject. This was the last of July or the first part of the month of August, 1862. This cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. ♦ ♦ Nothing was offered that I had not already fully antici- pated and settled in my mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: ‘Mr. President, I ap- prove of the proclamation, but I question the expedi- ency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government — a cry for help ; the government stretching should pursue Lee, and force matters to a crisis before the winter should set in. Lincoln visited the army oct. on the 1st of October, and re- mained with it several days. His en- treaties were urgent that McClellan should advance. The general was full of promises; but his wants were many. He needed reinforcements, horses, cloth- ing, shoes, supplies of all kinds. Lee had moved to Winchester. His army was in a wretched condition. McClellan’s army had increased to 150,000 strong. Yet day follows day, and nothing is done. On the 6th of October, Hal- leck telegraphed to the general: ‘^The president directs that you cross the Potomac, and give battle to the ene- my, or drive him South. Your army must move now, while the roads are good.” On the 10th, General J. E. B. Stuart made a raid into Pennsylvania. forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretch- ing forth her hands to the government.’ His idea,” said the president, “was that it would be considered our last shriek on the retreat. ‘Now,’ continued Mr. Seward, ‘ w’hile I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issu- ing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest dis- asters of the war.’” Mr. Lincoln continued: “The wisdom of the view of the secretary of state struck me with great force. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, waiting for a victory. Well, the next news we had was of Pope’s disaster at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever. Finally came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednes- day, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers’ Home. Here I finished writing the second draft of the proclamation ; came up on Saturday ; called the cabinet together to hear it, and it was published the following Monday. I made A SOLEMN vow BEFORE GoD THAT, IP GENERAL LeE WAS DRIVEN BACK FROM MARYLAND, I WOULD CROWN THE RESULT BY THE DECLARATION OF FREEDOM TO THE SLAVES.” — Carpenter'* Six Months in the White House. STUART’S RAID. 333 Capturing Chambersburg in that State, he destroyed a large quantity of sup- plies, burning machine shops, trains of cars, and other property; and then, having made a complete circuit around McClellan’s army, he re-entered Vir- ginia by crossing the Potomac below him. This raid of Stuart roused public indignation to its highest pitch. It was regarded as an open insult to the National army; and it was felt that the Confederates had made good their boast, by carrying war into the free States. Still McClellan remained inactive. There was no forward move- ment. Again, on the 21st, Halleck telegraphed : The president does not expect impossibilities, but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity.*’ McClellan could not move before the 1st of November. Then he did move; but it was too late. On the 7th of that month there was a heavy snow-storm. It was a sure sio:n that winter was at hand. Lincoln’s patience was at last exhausted — his forbearance had given way; he had already taken action; and on the night of that day, while at Pectortown, on his southward march towards Gordonsville, McClellan re- ceived instructions to tarn over the command of the army to General Burn- side. i 334 FREDERICKSBUKG. CHAPTER XXI. McClellan and the National Government. — Bad Blood. — Blame on Both Sides. — McClellan’s Love for the Army of the Potomac. — The Army Again on the March. — McClellan’s Plan. — A Storm. — McClellan’s Bemoval. — Burnside in Command, — Keconstruction of the Army. — Burnside’s Order. — His Plau. — McClellan’s Plan Abandoned. — On to Fredericksburg. — Halleck and Meigs. — The Pontoon Difficulty. — Who Were to Blame? — Falmouth. — Fredericksburg. — Stafford Heights. — Marye’s Heights. — Description of the Country. — Topogra- phy of the Position. — Acquia Creek. — Sumner at Falmouth. — The Kiver Impassable. — No Pontoons. — An Unfortunate Delay. — Lee’s Activity. — Position of the Confederate Army. — Marye’s Heights Impreg- nable. — Arrival of the Pontoons. — Precious Time Lost. — Five Bridges. — The Morning of the 11th. — The Confederate Sharpshooters and the Pontoniers. — Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Construct the Bridges. — A Cannonade. — The Sharpshooters Dislodged. — The Bridges Completed. — The National Army Across the Kappahannock. — Preparations for Battle. — Both Armies in Line. — A Glance at Lee’s Position. — The Dis- position of his Troops. — Burnside’s Position. — His Plan of Attack. — The Night of the 12th. — Burnside Changes his Mind. — His Delay in Giving Orders. — His Order to Franklin. — Franklin Perplexed, but Obe- dient, — The Attack on the Left. — The Gallantry of Meade and his Pennsylvanians. — Gibbon and Double- day. — An Artillery Duel. — Meade Penetrates the First Confederate Line. — His Difficulty. — A Terrific Strug- gle. — Fearful Slaughter. — Meade Driven Back. — Arrival of Birney. — The Confederate Line Closed. — Miracles of Valor. — Bad Management. — The Attack on the Bight. — General Sumner Advances. — French and Han- cock. — Marye’s Hill. — The Plank Koad. — The Stone Wall. — Bravery of the National Troops. — Terrific Slaughter. — The Jaws of Death. — French’s and Hancock’s Divisions Cut to Pieces. — The Confederate Po- sition Impregnable. — Burnside Orders Hooker to Advance. — Hooker Kemonstrates. — Burnside Obstinate. — “That Crest Must be Taken To-Night.” — Useless Slaughter. — Hooker’s Own Account. — The Darkness. — The Battle of Fredericksburg Ended. — A Confederate Victory. — Burnside’s Blunders. — He Alone Besponsi- ble. — Betreats Across the Biver. — Preparations for Another Attack. — Disaffection and Distrust. — The Pro- posed Attack Countermanded. — Burnside Offers to Besign. — The Besignation Not Accepted. — Change of Plan. — Another Attack About to be Made. — A Fearful Storm. — The Elements. — The “Mud March.” — The Enterprise Abandoned. — The Army Back in the Old Camps. — Public Indignation. — Burnside Dissatisfied with his Subordinates. — Believed of Command. — Franklin Bemoved. — Sumner Believed. — Hooker in Com- mand. The battle of Antietam was fought 1862 September. It was not until the beautiful month of October was all but passed that any active, forward movement was made by the army of the Potomac. It is not necessary to dwell at any length on the causes of this extraordinary and, as the result proved, unfortunate de- lay. It is probable that the exact truth concerning this matter will never be known. It is certain that much precious time was wasted in useless cor- respondence between the National com- mander and the authorities at Washing- ton. Bad blood most unquestionably existed ; and the ill-concealed jealousies and enmities of individuals contributed not a little to increase that burden of sorrow and suffering under which the people were already groaning. We are not disposed to entirely acquit Mc- Clellan. But we are as little disposed to acquit the National government. The former was, no doubt, too exacting in his demands for supplies and rein- McClellands love for his army. 335 forcements. Poorly equipped as his army was at this period, it was not for a moment to be put in comparison in this respect with the army of Lee, whose men were shoeless and half-naked. Nor was there any good reason for in- sisting that the reinforcements and sup- plies should be forwarded at once, and before the onward movement com- menced ; for surely they could be sent after him. On the other hand there was, on the part of the Washington officials, a too manifest disposition to dictate, to disregard the demands and to ignore the wishes of the commander in the held. There was, in fact, a mutual distrust, which had grown into dislike. There was blame on both sides. McClellan was self-willed ; and the authorities were officious. It might have been better for McClellan’s fame to-day if, when at this stage, he found that he could not get on amicably with the War Department, he had resigned his position. It was known that he was deeply attached to the army of the Potomac, and that he was proud to be its chief. It had grown up under his own eye ; it had reached maturity and attained perfection under his own watch- ful care. His Gallic legions were not more dear to Caesar; the grand army of the empii'e was not more dear to Napoleon, than was the army of the Potomac to McClellan. His resigna- tion would have fallen like a thunder- clap on the army and on the people. It would have disarmed suspicion wherever suspicion existed ; and it would have proclaimed to all the world that his motives were pure and noble. and his actions disinterested. As it was, patriotism or ambition impelled him in a different course. On the 6th of October, instructions were recei ved from W ashington to oct. the effect that McClellan should move at once. He was to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South. “ Your army must now move, while the roads are good.” It was the 26th, when the first Octo movement was made in obedience 26. to this order; and it was not until the 2d of November that McClellan was able to announce that his whole army was once more in Virginia, prepared to move southward on the east side of the Blue Kidge, instead of pursuing Lee up the Shenandoah Valley, on the western side of those mountains. By the 4th the National army, reinforced by the divisions of Generals Sigel and Sickles from Washington, were in possession of the entire region east of the Blue Bidge, with several of the passes through the mountains, from Harper’s Ferry to Paris. On the 6th, Me- pfov. Clellan’s headquarters were at Bectortown, near Front Boyal. The Confederates, meanwhile, were steadily falling back. The spectacle, at this time presented, was that of two great annies moving in parallel lines, the mountain chain of the Blue Bidge be- tween them, the objective point in both cases being the same. It was a race for Bichmond. Everything depended on despatch. The race was eagerly watched. Would not McClellan, with his superior force and ample supplies, outrun his opponent, and, by gaining S36 FREDERICKSBURG. his front, strike him there and also on the flank, through the gaps in the hills ? Such was the question put by many. As usual, Lee was too quick for his opponent. Anticipating some such movement, he had hurried Longstreet forward ; and on the very day that Mc- Clellan’s army crossed the Potomac, that general, having pushed his way over the Blue Ridge, was at Culpepper Court House, and ready to resist the advance of the Nationals on the Con- federate capital. There was still an opportunity for McClellan. By a rapid and vigorous movement, he might cut Lee’s army in two, and destroy it in detail. But there was distrust of Mc- Clellan at Washington; and at this critical moment it was determined to displace him. On the 5th of Novem- ber, an order was issued from the War Department, relieving him of the com- mand of the army of the Potomac, and appointing General Burnside in his place — McClellan being required to re- port himself at Trenton, New Jersey. This order was placed in the hands of General Buckingham. On the night of the 7th, during a heavy snow-storm, when General Burnside happened to be in McClellan’s tent at Rectortown, Buckingham arrived, and placed the despatch in McClellan’s hands. After reading it, and without betraying any emotion, he handed it to Burnside, simply remarking, “ Burnside, you com- mand the army.” The news was as unwelcome to Burnside as it was to Mc- Clellan. The position had been offered him twice before; but Burnside, hav- ing, as we have seen in a previous chapter, a high opinion of McClellan's ability, being a warm, personal friend, and being, besides, distrustful of him- self, had, in both instances, modestly declined the proffered honor. He had not changed his mind. It was not until the ‘10th,. after having received peremptory orders from Washington, and being warmly encouraged by his friends, that he consented to assume the responsibilities of general-in-chief of the army of the Potomac. “I’ll try,” he said, evidently intimating that he had a secret distrust of his own fltness for so responsible a position. In view of the actual situation, and with- out having any regard to the disasters which so speedily followed, the removal of General McClellan, at this particular juncture, must be pronounced unfortu- nate and ill-timed. He ought to have been removed at an earlier date, or not until he had had another opportunity of measuring his strength with his an- tagonist. McClellan made immediate prepara- tions for departure. He took leave of his troops in the following words : “ Headquarters of the Army op the Potomac, ) Camp near Rectortown, Va., Nov. 7, 1862. j “ Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac : “An order of the president devolves upon Major-General Burnside the com- mand of this army. In parting from you, I cannot express the love and grati- tude I bear to you. As an army, you have grown up in my care. In you I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles you have fought under my command will probably live in our na- tion’s history. The glory you have BURNSIDE IN COMMAND. 337 achieved over mutual perils and fa- tigues; the graves of our comrades fallen in battle and by disease; the broken forms of those whom wounds and sickness have disabled — the strong- est associations which can exist among men unite us by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in support- ing the Constitution of our country and the nationality of its people. ^‘Geo. B. McClellax, ‘‘Major-General U. S. A.” On Monday, the 9th, General McClel- ]Voy, Ian visited the different camps, reviewed the troops, and took a final leave of officers and men. The leave-taking showed that, whatever his defects of character, or whatever were the blunders he committed, he had not lost the respect and confidence of his ’men. As the general, “ mounted upon a fiiK; horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military men, riding rapid- ly through the ranks, gracefully recog- nized and bade a farewell to the army, the cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond bounds — wild, impas- sioned, and unrestrained. Disregarding all military forms, they rushed from their ranks and thronged around him, with the bitterest complaints against those who had removed from command their beloved leader.” On the next day he withdrew, taking the cars to Warrenton. On reaching the junction, a salute was fired. The troops assem- bled at that point actually broke their ranks, through their eagerness to see him and to obtain a few parting words. While on the platform, he said, “I wish you to stand by General Burnside, as you have stood by me, and all will be well. Good-bye.” At Bristow Sta- tion and at Manassas Junction, the same scenes were repeated ; and the cheering was loud and enthusiastic. On assuming the duties of general- in-chief, Burnside issued the following order : “ Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) Nov . 10, 1862. j “In accordance with General Orders No. 182, issued by the president of the United States, I hereby assume com- mand of the army of the Potomac. Patriotism, and the exercise of my every energy in the direction of this army, aided by the full and hearty co-opera- tion of its officers and men, will, I hope, under the blessing of God, insure its success. “ Having been a sharer of the priva> tions, and a witness of the bravery ot the old army of the Potomac in the Maryland campaign, and fully identi fied with them in their feelings of re spect and esteem for General McCleh Ian, entertained through a long an wards the railroad which, at this point, skirts the edge of the wooded heights. Meade’s progress was uninterrupted. All was quiet on the heights and in the woods beyond. Not a sign of the foe was visible. The National artillery poured shell into the woods occupied by the division of A. P. Hill ; but there was no response. Jackson was evidently reserving his fire until his antagonist came fully under his guns. Everything now depended upon dash and daring. Meade urged forward his men. On rushed the brave Pennsyl- vanians — troops which had covered themselves with glory at Beaver Dam and on the blood-stained field of Glen- dale. They rapidly approached the position occupied by Walker’s artillery at Prospect Hill. Suddenly these guns open fire ; the twelve guns at the Con- federate left centre open fire at the same moment ; and Meade finds himself alone, in the open space, exposed to the fire of two concentric batteries, the pro- jectiles actually crossing each other in his ranks. The situation is perilous. There is a halt ; and an attempt is made to silence the enemy’s guns. Gibbon deploys to the right of Meade. Birney, with his division, of Stoneman’s corps, is hurried forward to the relief of both. After a fearful artillery duel, the Con- federate fire from the batteries on Prospect Hill, and those more to their left centre in front of the railroad, is considerably slackened. A decided ad- vantage has been gained by the Na- tionals. Beynolds now gives Meade the signal for attack. Though the ground is cover- ed with dead and wounded, there is no time to halt and consider. On rush the Pennsylvanians — on in the face of the most destructive fire of shell and canis- ter. The Confederate general, Brock- enborough, is compelled to fall back. A powerful battery is silenced, and hurried to the rear. Bushing bravely on, Meade soon finds himself across the railroad, over the crest of the hill, with his advance, under Sinclair, as far as the new military road, which Lee had constructed for the purpose of uniting the Avings of his army. The first line of the Confederates had been pierced. On the military road, the victorious Nationals come into contact with Gregg and his South Carolina veterans. Un- prepared for so vigorous an attack, and mistaking Meade’s men for Confederate soldiers, Gregg forbids his own men to fire. In a moment he is undeceived. There is a terrific discharge of mus- ketry. Orr’s rifles, the most exposed regiment of the Confederate line, is al- most annihilated ; and Gregg himself has fallen, mortally wounded. It is a critical moment. If Meade is well sustained, he may succeed in pene- trating the second line of the enemy — thus cutting the Confederate army in two. In such a case, Burnside’s first object will have been accomplished; MEADE REPULSED. 347 and victory, it is not improbable, may crown his efforts. But Meade has been brave almost overmuch ; he is far in advance of his supports; and his brave Pennsylvanians are utterly ex- hausted. No help is within reach. Doubleday is on the Richmond Road ; Gribbon has allowed himself to be stopped at the left of Hill’s line, near the railroad ; and Birney still lingers in the rear. Franklin’s headquarters are far distant from the scene of action : and being desirous to carry out the in- structions he has received, he is fearful to engage the greater portion of his forces. Left thus to himself, Meade is unable to make good the advantage he has gained. The Confederates, having re-formed, fall upon his wearied troops in front with great weight, and with tremendous fury. It was already a most unequal combat. While thus at- tacked in front, and while his men were reeling and staggering under the vigor- ous onslaughts of the rapidly multiply- ing Confederates, Early came dashing up, with Ewell’s division, and struck Meade’s flank as if with a thunderbolt. Resistance was no longer possible. The Nationals were driven back over the railroad in confusion, and with great loss, the Confederates pursuing, with loud yells, and flinging themselves on the guns which covered the retreat. Birney came forward in time to save Meade from destruction. The Confede- rates were forced back into the woods, with the loss of 500 men in killed and wounded. Birney, however, could not reopen the breach in the Confederate line. Meade could render no assist- ance ; Gibbon’s men had suffered terri- bly, and he himself had been wounded ; while Smith, who had been advanced more to the right, was too far removed to render any efficient aid. At two o’clock Reynolds held the railroad ; but he was not strong enough to make any attempt upon the woods. All that Meade had won was lost — hopelessly lost; and yet Franklin had under him some 30,000 men who had never been engaged. Never, during the world’s history, was there displayed more gal- lantry; but never was gallantry dis- played to so little purpose. Meade performed miracles of valor; and the future hero of Gettysburg was already revealed. Franklin, overfaithful, and too rigidly obedient to rule, lost his op- portunity — an opportunity which rare- ly falls to the lot of a division com- mander, and which was never to be his again. In strictly adhering to his orders, he did that which was right; but a little more willingness to incur risk, and to share responsibility, might have made him the hero of Fredericks- burg, and the future captain of the Northern hosts. Let us now see what was taking place on the right. While the thick fog was still resting heavily on the valley, Sum- ner’s forces were already moving to- wards the artillery-crowned heights in the rear of the city. Marye’s Heights we have already described. There were three prominences, all of which were well mounted with cannon — Marye’s Hill to the south, and commanding the Plank Road; Cemetery Hill towards the centre; and Stansbury Hill further 348 FREDERICKSBURG. to the north. Burnside’s plan, it will be remembered, was to throw upon the Plank Eoad and Telegraph Road a col- umn of equal strength with that which was to make the attack on the left, his expectation being that he would thus make himself master of the entire range of hills, those on his right as well as those on his left. Of Sumner’s grand division, Couch’s corps (the Second) occupied the town of Fredericksbui*g ; and Wilcox’s (the Ninth) occupied the interval between Couch and Franklin. Couch was to have the honor of making the first attack. It was now nearing the noontide. The mist had just cleared off the valley. Burnside, who was still at the Phillips House, on the northern side of the river, and who had reserved to himself the direction of the battle on his right, gave the signal for attack; and French’s division, of Couch’s corps, composed of the brigades of Kimball, Anderson and Palmer, was seen to emerge from Fredericksburg into the open plain. The Confederate batteries on Marye’s Hill had already opened fire upon the town. As French’s col- umns advanced, the Confederate guns on the heights were lowered ; and the shot and shell fell thick and fast into his serried ranks. French’s division was followed at some little distance by that of Hancock; and Howard’s divi- sion was held in reserve. An attempt was made by the National artillery on Stafford Heights to silence the batteries on Marye’s Hill ; but the distance was so great that the shot fell short, and threatened to do more damage to friend than foe. The firing on the part of the National artillery on the northern side of the river was, therefore, discontin- ued. So terrific was the fire from Marye’s Hill that Couch’s field-pieces could not be advanced. On, however, rushed the brave Nationals — French in front, Hancock following close behind. It was a rush into the jaws of death. Longstreet has told us that the gaps made by the artillery could be seen half a mile away. French’s soldiers had approached within fifty paces of the stone wall at the base of Marye’s Hill. As they rushed forward, they were received with a murderous volley. The first line was reduced to a handful of men. The two brigades which fol- lowed were brought to a standstill; and, after a single discharge, they re- tired, leaving nearly one half of their comrades on the ground. Hancock was now in the front ; and, being joined by such portions of French’s command as had not been broken and disorganized, he rushed towards the stone wall. It was a teiTific struggle Bullet, ball and shell, like a tempest of iron, mowed down his ranks, while the triumphant Confederates, safe behind their strong bulwark, shouted and yelled in fierce delight. Again and again did Meagher dash his gallant Irishmen against the stone wall. As often, torn and bleed- ing and reduced in numbei's, were they driven back. Fifteen minutes had elapsed since Hancock advanced to the front. His division, like that of French, had been cut to pieces. Of 5600 vet- erans whom he led into action, he had lost over 2000, of whom 156 were offi- cers. The slaughter was terrible. HOOKER’S ATTACK. 349 Hancock in turn was compelled to fall back ; but the battle was not dis- continued. Howard hurried forward to lend what aid he could on Hancock’s right. Sturgis and Getty crossed Hazel Run, with two brigades, and endeav- ored to divert the attention of the ene- my by an attack on the right of his position. It was all in vain. These attempts only increased the number of victims. They did not in any material way affect the enemy. It was now about half-past one. On the left, Meade had just been driven out of the Hamilton Wood, and back over the railroad. Burnside’s plan had failed. The two independent attacks had been made; they had been sustained with great vigor, and with indomitable pluck; but they had only revealed the strength of the enemy’s position. It was time to desist. To prolong the struggle was useless. It was worse than useless — it was murder. Such, however, was not- the opinion of Burnside. Orders were sent to Franklin to renew the assault, and this time with all his forces, the avowed object being so to engage the enemy’s attention as to facilitate a new attack on the right. Hooker, at the same time, was ordered forward to repeat the attack where French and Hancock had vainly sacrificed their splendid di- visions. The experience of that morn- ing had irritated, not enlightened, the general in command. Burnside, in fact, was ignorant of the situation. . He was still at the Phillips House. He saw the battle only from afar ; and he had but a dim notion of the strength of the enemy’s position, and of the terrible sacrifices which he himself had uselessly made. His eye was fixed on Marye's Hill — alternately girt with flame, and wreathed with smoke. He knew the importance of the position ; but he forgot, for the time, the deadly havoc which that incessant and well-directed fire was producing among his troops. Striding up and down the terrace, proof against all advice, and as if lost to all reason, he kept repeating, mechanically, “That crest must be carried to-night.” No one has ever had the hardihood to accuse Hooker of cowardice. Dur- ing the peninsular campaign at Will- iamsburg, and in all the subsequent bat- tles before Richmond, in almost every one of which he performed a brilliant part, he had acquired the name of “ Fighting Joe.” Hooker did not hesi- tate to obey the orders he had received from his chief. Taking with him the divisions of Sykes and Humphreys, of Butterfield’s corps, he advanced to the attack. As soon, however, as he saw the positions he was ordered to take, and heard from their own lips the ex- perience of French and Hancock, he became convinced that the attempt was vain, and sent an aide-de-camp to the general-in-chief for a counter-or- der. Burnside, however, was inflexible. “That crest must be carried to-night.” Hooker, unwilling to fling away the lives of his brave men, hurried across the river, and saw his chief in person. It was all in vain. Burnside would listen to no advice. The only answer w^ljich Hooker could get from him was, “That height must be carried this evening.” 350 FREDERICKSBURG. An hour and a half had thus been lost. On the National left, the fighting had not been resumed with any degree of vigor. Franklin’s forces were scat- tered over an extended line. It would be dangerous to leave any one point undefended. Even if it were safe to concentrate, it would be night before it could be accomplished; and to make any fresh attack with a portion of his forces would only be useless slaughter. About three o’clock, the Confederates made a vigorous attack on the left of Howe’s division, which was posted along the railroad. The attack was speedily repulsed, one of the Con- federate regiments — the Fifty-Seventh North Carolina — being almost annihi- lated. With this exception, the fight- ing was virtually ended on the National left, when Birney came to the relief of Meade, and reclaimed the railroad. Musketry firing was kept up along the whole line; but there was no engage- ment. It was now four o’clock. The brief December daylight would soon be suc- ceeded by the dense December dark- ness. Hooker had returned to the field. Burnside’s orders were positive. The attack must be made at once. How the attack was made, and with what suc- cess, Hooker has told us himself. ‘‘I proceeded,” he says, “against the bar- rier as I would against a fortification, and endeavored to breach a hole suffi- ciently large for a ‘forlorn hope’ to enter. Before that, the attack along the line, it seemed to me, had been too general — not sufficiently concentrated. I had two batteries posted on the left of the road, within four hundred yards of the position upon which the attack was to be made, and I had other parts of batteries posted on the right of the road, at the distance of five hundred or six hundred yards. I had all these batteries playing with great vigor until sunset upon that point, but with no apparent effect upon the rebels or upon their works. During the last part of the cannonading, I had given directions to General Humphrey’s division to form under the shelter, which a small hill afforded, in column for assault. When the fire of the artillery ceased, I gave directions for the enemy’s works to be assaulted. General Humphrey’s men took off their knapsacks, overcoats and haversacks. They were ordered to make the assault with empty muskets, for there was no time then to load and fire. When the word was given, the men moved forward with great impetu- osity. They ran and hurrahed, and I was encouraged by the great good feel- ing that pervaded them. The head of General Humphrey’s column advanced to perhaps within fifteen or twenty yards of the stone wall, which w^as the ad- vanced position held by the rebels, and then they were thrown back as quickly as they had advanced. Probably the whole of the advance, and the retiring, did not occupy fifteen minutes. They left behind, as was reported to me, 1760 of their number, out of 4000.” It was now twilight. Hooker, to use his own words, having lost “about as many men as he was ordered to sacrifice,” gave the signal for retreat. Darkness came and prevented a further useless DEFEAT. 351 sacrifice of life. A few hours more of daylight, and Jackson might have fallen upon Franklin with tremendous energy. It is hardly possible that he could have won ; but the attack must have resulted in a heavy loss of life. The battle of Fredericksburg was ended. To the National cause, it was one of the most disastrous battles of the war. To the Confederate cause, it was a great tri- umph ; but the triumph was more in seeming than in reality, for Lee, either from inability or- from fear, failed to turn it to account. According to the reports of the divi- sion commanders, the National loss was over 13,000. Franklin had lost 4679. Sumner had lost 5494, and Hooker’s loss was 3548. The killed numbered 1152; the wounded 9101; and there were 3234 missing. The Confederate loss did not exceed one half of these enormous figures. The battle of Fredericksburg must ever be regarded as one huge blunder, so far as Burnside is concerned. For the battle ground chosen he, and he alone, was responsible. The plan he followed was not McClellan’s plan ; it was not the plan approved and recommended by the authorities at W ashington ; it was his own. He might have done better by pursuing Lee towards the Rapidan, than by occupying the heights of Falmouth. * He gave the enemy his opportunity ; and circumstances enabled the enemy to seize it. The pontoon mismanagement was the second grand blunder. It was the opinion of Burn- side himself, and all his subordinates, that if the pontoons had arrived in time to allow him' to transfer his army to the south side of the Rappahannock, before Lee had time to concentrate his forces and fortify the heights, the battle of Fredericksburg might never have been fought, or, if fought, the result would have been entirely different. For the pontoon mismanagement Burn- side was not wholly responsible ; but it was his business more than that of any other. On the prompt arrival of the pontoons everything depended ; yet he treated this as a secondary matter, and left it entirely for some days in the hands of Halleck and Meigs, who regarded themselves as irresponsible. The non-arrival of the pontoons in time gave the Confederates the full advan- tage of a splendid position, and brought about the necessity that if a battle were to be fought at all on the chosen ground, it must be fought by the Na- tionals at a terrible disadvantage. It would have been better far, however humiliating for the moment it might have seemed, if Burnside, after he knew that the heights on the opposite side of the river were all but, if not abso- lutely, impregnable, had entirely aban- doned his plan, and sought to meet the foe by a different course. Having de- cided to make the attack, he ought to have done it differently. His plan on the evening of the 12th was better than that on the morning of the 13th. He had changed his mind in the interval ; but he had changed it for the worse. A general attack was hazardous. A partial attack was folly. The temporary suc- cess of Meade showed what might have been done if he had massed his troops S52 FREDERICKSBURG. on his left, and encouraged Franklin to put forth his entire strength in one bold, dashing effort. He blundered ao:ain when he ordered Sumner to ad- vance before he knew what success had attended Franklin on the left. He sinned against reason and common-sense when he forced Hooker to make the final attack. History will say that the army of the Potomac — one of the finest armies the world has ever known — was literally slaughtered through the in- competency of its chief. The 14th was Sunday. It had been Dec, Burnside’s intention to renew the attack in the morning. He found it impossible, however, to overcome the opposition of his chief officers, who re- garded the enemy’s lines as impreg- nable; and the order which had already been given was countermanded. Dur- ing that day, and the next, the Na- tional army lay on the Fredericksburg side of the Rappahannock ; but on neither side was any evidence given of a disposition to attack. During the night of the 15th, Burnside Dec. quietly withdrew his entire army, with his guns, to the Falmouth side of the river ; the pontoon bridges were also taken up ; and Lee was permitted to enter and occupy Fredericksburg. It was not to be wondered at that Lee took advantage of the circumstance, to boast of a great victory. On the 16th, Dec. Burnside wrote to Halleck, the commander-in-chief, that the army was withdrawn to the Falmouth side of the river, because he felt that the posi- tion in front could not be carried, and because it was a military necessity either to attack or retire. A repulse, he said, would have been disastrous. The army was withdrawn at night without the knowledge of the enemy, and without loss either of property or men. Burnside was still hopeful that he might be able to redeem the disaster which had befallen the National army. He had another plan ready. He pro- posed to make an immediate advance on Richmond. His plan was to make a feint above Fredericksburg, and to cross with the main body of the army about six miles below. Twenty-five thousand cavalry, with four guns, were to cross at Kelley’s Ford, push towards the Rapidan, destroy the railroad tracks and bridges in the rear of Lee’s army, destroy, also, the locks on the James River Canal, traverse Virginia, raiding as they advanced, and finally join the National garrison, then under Peck at Suffolk. Such was Burnside’s plan. Unhappily for him and his plan, how- ever, there was dissatisfaction among his subordinate officers. The bad man- agement at Fredericksburg had pro- duced a feeling of general distrust ; and this distrust found free and full expres- sion at Washington. Representations had been made to the president by Franklin and Smith, showing the utter folly and uselessness of any further attempts to cross the Rappahannock. They could only, they said, result in disaster. At the same time, two other generals — Newton and Cochrane — who happened to be in Washington, fully convinced the president of the bad tem- per which prevailed in the army of the THE «MUD MARCH” 353 Potomac — a temper wMch did not jus- tify any farther movement for the pres- ent. A fortnight had now elapsed since the battle of Fredericksburg. On the Dec. 2C)th of December, Burnside had completed his preparations for the onward movement ; his cavalry were al- ready at Kelley’s Ford, and his infantry were ready to start. The whole move- ment was suddenly stopped by an order from the president. Burnside hastened to Washington to demand an explana- tion. From the commander-in-chief and the secretary of war he could learn nothing. Ignorant of the cause them- selves, they could not explain. The president, however, did not conceal his reasons for acting as he had done. Complaints against the general had been made by several prominent officers in the army. The complaints of these men were such that the president could not afford to ignore them. It was no- torious that bad feeling existed among the officers and men ; and while such was the state of things, he did not feel justified in sanctioning a forward move- ment. Burnside tendered his resigna- tion ; but this the president, having perfect faith in his loyalty and patriot- ism, refused to accept. The president desired him to remain in command of the army, but he was not to renew the campaign without his knowledge and consent. All these things led to delay. Much precious time was wasted; and what was even more to be lamented, the secret of Burnside’s plans had leaked out, and Lee was no longer ignorant of the intentions of his antagonist. Burnside changed his plan. He now proposed to cross the Bappahan- nock above Fredericksburg, at Banks’ and United States Fords, hop- ing to flank the enemy, and to force a battle. Permission was given him by the president to renew the campaign. It was now the 20th of January, jan. 1863. Franklin and Hooker were 20. at Banks’ Ford. At that point the river is not passable in winter time. The pontoons, however, had been brought up; and preparations were being made for throwing bridges across the swollen waters. It seemed, for the moment, as if fortune were smiling on Burnside. Some demonstrations made at a point a little further down had been attended with complete success. The weather, too, was good; and the roads were in excellent condition. On the night of the 20th, all these hopes were dis- sipated. A fearful storm of wind, snow, sleet and rain came on, such as is seldom seen in that region; it contin- ued all night ; and when morning dawned, the entire conntry was con- verted into a huge quagmire. The troops were for some hours hopelessly mired. They could neither retreat nor advance. Lee had already become aware of Burnside’s intention to cross the river, and was at the point of dan- ger, ready to meet hina. Burnside was not unwilling even yet to cross the river, and offer the enemy battle. It was found impossible, however, to con- struct the bridges. The greater the effort made by men and horses to push forward the vehicles containing the boats, the more hopelessly did they 354 FREDERICKSBURG. eink in the soft, paste-like mud, with which the roads were covered. The rain continued during the whole of the 21st. It was still raining on the morn- ing of the 2 2d. The three days’ ra- tions, with which the men had been supplied, were all but exhausted. The game was already lost; and the Con- federates could again make the boast that the elements fought in their favor. Jan# 23d, the army of the 23# Potomac was in its former en- campments, and in winter quarters. What was known at the time as the “Mud March” was ended. At this crisis, the public mind was filled with indignation and sorrow. Not a little blame was attached to the president and his cabinet. The com- mander-in-chief was not held guiltless. The revelations made throus^h the court of inquiry in the case of General Mc- Dowell, and the court martial on Gen- eral Porter, had convinced the public that the government had intermeddled too much with the plans of the military leaders. Burnside had done much to save the president and his cabinet by publishing a letter, in which he assumed the entire responsibility of the plan, and the conduct of the attack on Fred- ericksburg. Some of the old feeling, however, still remained. At this time, Burnside became ill-satisfied with his generals ; and, irritated and discouraged by this latest failure, and by the ad- verse criticisms which were freely made both by men and officers, he resolved to rid the army of the fomenters of dis- cord. Among the officers aimed at were Generals Hooker, Brooks, New- ton and Cochrane, whom he wished to be dismissed from the service of the United States ; and Generals Franklin, Smith, Sturgis and Ferrers, with Col- onel Taylor, whom he wished to be deprived of their respective commands. Hurrying to Washington, he asked the president to sign the order which he had already prepared. Of course the president refused. To have signed such an order would have ruined the army. It would have deprived it of some of its trusted and most competent leaders. Burnside then tendered his resignation of the command of the army of the Po- tomac, and also of his rank of major- general. He was relieved of command at his own request, but he retained his rank in the army. The same order which relieved Burnside, also relieved Franklin and Sumner. Franklin, some- what unjustly, we think, had come under suspicion; and Sumner, who was broken down by age and infirmity, was relieved at his own request. Hooker was now the senior general of the army of the Potomac. He had shared its for- tunes from the first. By his courage, skill and promptitude, he had won not a little renown. To him, therefore, was now assigned the dangerous honor of being its chief. The appointment was generally approved; and Hooker was well received by both officers and men. How the army fared under his com- mand will form the subject of another chapter. BATESVILLE. 353 CHAPTER XXII. Guerrilla Movements in the West. — General Curtis at Batesville. — Moving Eastward. — At Jacksonport. — Na- tional Gunboats. — White River. — St. Charles. — Clarendon. — Encounter with General Rust. — Condition of the National Army. — Sad Disappointment. — What was to be Done? — The March to Helena. — At Helena. — Arkansas and Missouri Unprotected. — General J. M. Schofield in Command in Missouri. — Attacks of the Guerrillas. — Political Feuds in Missouri. — Lincoln Complains. — Guerrilla Leaders. — Porter. Poindexter and Cobb. — General McNeil. — McNeil Attacked by Porter and Cobb. — Colonel Merrill. — Newark Captured. — Battle of Kirksville. — Poindexter Caught in a Trap. — Defeat of Cobb. — National Supremacy Restored North of the Missouri. — Capture of the Garrison at Independence. — Battle of Cross Roads. — Defeat of Foster.— Coffee’s Retreat. — The Guerrillas in Arkansas. — Rains, Parsons, Cooper and McBride. — Hindman in Com- mand of the Guerrillas. — The Ozark Mountains. — Schofield Takes the Field in Person. — The “Army of the Frontier.” — Sarcoxie. — Blunt and Totten. — Fort Wayne. — The Confederates Attacked. — Fayetteville. — Boston Mountains. — Hindman Preparing to Attack the Nationals. — Cane Hill. — Illness of Schofield. — Blunt in Command. — Blunt About to be Attacked. — Herron Sent For. — Prairie Grove. — Battle of Prairie Grove. — Terrible Fighting. — Herron in Peril. — Arrival of Blunt. — The Confederates Defeated. — Hindman's Mistakes. — Blunt’s Ride to Van Buren. — The Guerrillas in Texas. — The Loyalty of the Texans. — The Texan Martyrs. — Among the Indians. — Ta-le-Quah. — Forts Davis and Gibson. — The Indian Encampments — Colonel Phillipps. — Phillipps Attacked by Taylor. — Bayou Barnard. — Taylor Killed.— Attack by the Indians on New Ulra and the Agencies. — Horrible Butchery. — Swift Punishment. — Peace Established on the Frontier of Minnesota. Towards the close of 1862, there 1862 some engagements, in the ’western country, beyond the Mis- sissippi, and east of the Rocky Moun- tains — engagements ’which, although not of first-class importance, or directly con- nected with any of the great, leading military movements, cannot, in a work of this kind, be passed over in silence. After the battle of Pea Ridge, described in a previous chapter, the Confederate general. Van Dorn, who, as we have seen, made a skilful and successful re- treat, moved with the greater portion of his army down the Arkansas River as far as Little Rock, marched in an eastward direction, crossed the Missis- sippi at Helena, and joined the army of Beauregard almost in time to take part in the battle of Shiloh. General Curtis made no haste to pursue. On the field of victory he rested his men ; and then, finding no foe in that part of Arkansas, he descended from the highlands into the vast plains below, and, moving in a southeasterly direction, reached, on the 6th of May, Batesville, a large village on the White River. Here he expected to find gunboats and supplies in charge of Colonel Fitch. But the siege of Corinth had not yet ended; and, in consequence, the White River and its tributaries were not yet open to the Federal flotilla. Curtis, not a little disappointed, remained at Batesville until the 24th of June, depending for his supplies by wagon trains from Rolla, far up in Missouri, and thus very much at the mercy of the guerrilla bands which infested the country. After the evacuation of Corinth, and the capture of Memphis, the Arkansas waters were 356 THE GUERRILLAS. open to navigation ; and several Federal gunboats proceeded up the White River. June C)n the 25th of June, Curtis, learning that the gunboats were coining up the river, started for Jack- sonport. Here he was joined by Gen- eral C. C. Washburne, with the Third Wisconsin cavalry, which had come down from Springfield, Missouri, with- out encountering any opposition. The gunboats, however, had not yet made their appearance. They had been de- tained further down the river, by an encounter with some Confederate bat- teries near St. Charles; and, although these works had been carried, the gun- boats had been so damaged that they were unable to proceed further upl To add to their difficulties, the water in the river had become very low. Still hopeful that, if he could reach the gun- boats, he might be able to turn them to some account in a joint movement against Little Rock, Curtis, with his whole army, pressed on towards Claren- don. He was the more anxious to reach the gunboats, that he knew they were accompanied by a brigade of in- fantry from Indiana. It was a wretch- ed country through which they had to pass — a low, swampy region, intersected by canals or bayous, covered with cane- brakes, and inhabited by a white popu- lation, who were entirely in sympathy Ju'y with the Southern cause. On the 7th of July, while still in this inhospitable region, the advance (Thir- ty-Third Illinois) under Colonel A. P. Hovey, was attacked by some 1500 Texan cavalry, under General Albert Rust. Hovey was soon joined by W ood, who came up with the First Indiana cavalry and two howitzers, when a vig- orous charge was made, and Rust was compelled to beat a hasty retreat, leav- ing 110 of his men dead on the field. The National loss was 8 killed and 45 wounded.’ The march was continued to Clarendon; but, on reaching that place, it was found that the gunboats had departed some twenty-four houi'S before. It was a sad disappointment. Curtis’ condition was a thousand times worse than it had been before. It would have been better far for him to have remained at Pea Ridge or at Bates ville. He had not only made a long and fa- tiguing march : he had lost all the ad- vantages of these positions, without ob- taining any compensation. What was now to be done ? Retrace his steps ? That was not to be thought of. Remain where he was? That would be suici- dal ; for the region was unhealthful, and he was without food, without ammunition, without supplies of any kind, and without the means of com- municating with any base of operations. There was but one course open to him, and that was to reach the waters of the Mississippi as quickly as possi- ble. It was an ungrateful task, con- sidering the exhausted condition of his men. But there was no choice. No delay was permitted. It was sixty-five miles to Helena, the nearest point of any importance. Washburne, with all the cavalry, numbering some 2500 horses, and with five ho.witzers, set out at once. Although he had to make the roads as he advanced, bridging the bay- DIVISION OF SENTIMENT. 35T ous, and cutting his way through the I tangled and almost impenetrable copse, Helena was reached in twenty-four hours. Curtis followed, with the in- fantry, taking with him a few Arkansas volunteers and a large number of ne- groes, and, proceeding by long marches, July arrived at the same place on the 12th and 13th of July. At He- lena, Curtis found his much-needed sup- plies; but for the remainder of the summer he was fastened to the Missis- sippi, having no other duty to perform than that of guarding its western banks, and thus covering the right of the Na- tional army, which was operating on the other side. The retirement of Curtis to the Mis- sissippi left Arkansas very much un- cared for. The result was that large guerrilla bands were organized in that State and the neighboring State of Mis- souri. They gradually united and as- sumed the proportions of a formidable ai-my. In April, 1862, Missouri was in charge of General J. M. Schofield, an officer of decided ability, who had served on the staff of the lamented Lyon. All the militia of the State, numbering some 14,000 men, and large- ly composed of cavalry, were assigned to his command. To this was attached a volunteer force of considerable strength, and drawn from almost all sections of the State. In June, at the request of Curtis, Missouri was created into a separate military district; and Schofield was placed in command. About this time the guerrilla bands began to be a terrible source of annoy- ance. Every device was resorted to I by the Confederates to organize armed opposition in the State. Whole Mis- souri regiments,, including officers and men, were furloughed; they returned to their homes in citizens’ clothes, carry- ing with them secret instructions to recruit and organize bands in all direc- tions, and then, at a given signal, to meet in the heart of the State, and de- stroy the militia enrolled under the Federal flag. Schofield, however, was vigilant, active and energetic, and spared no efforts to overcome these cunning devices of the foe. Fresh ap- peals were made to the militia and to the volunteers ; and, on the 22d of June, he issued an order holding all rebels and rebel sympathizers responsible in their property, and, if need be, in their persons, for damages thereafter com- mitted by guerrillas or marauding par- ties. His appeals to the militia and the volunteers were only partially suc- cessful ; and his order did not produce the effect which he probably expected. At the close of July he had on his roll 50,000 men, of whom 20,000 were ready for effective service ; but the failure of the campaign against Kich- mond greatly encouraged the rebel spirit, and i*endered his position one of extreme difficulty. The people of Mis- souri were greatly divided in sentiment as to the political issues before the country. Emancipation found favor with one party : it was bitterly op- posed by another. Such were the wranglings and contentions that Lin- coln, on one occasion, wrote to them in bitter complaint. “It is painful to me,” he said, “ that you in Missouri •JSS 358 THE GUERRILLAS. cannot or will not settle your factional quarrels among yourselves. I have been tormented Muth them beyond en- durance for months, by both sides. Neither side pays the least respect to my appeals to your reason.” Schofield’s army of militia and volun- teers was distributed over the State in six divisions, under competent officers. Towards the end of July, the guerrillas be^an to reveal their strencrth and their purpose. The northeastern division of the State, above the Missouri River, and bordering on the Mississippi, was under the command of Colonel McNeil. This was the principal theatre of opei’- ations. Here the guerrilla bands were strong, and under the leadership of such men as Porter, Poindextei* and Cobb, jniy On the 28th of July, Porter and 28. Cobb came into contact with a portion of McNeil’s command, under Colonel Merrill. In this encounter, Merrill revealed those rare qualities which mark a first-class cavalry officer. Porter and Cobb were compelled to re- treat. Three days afterwards. Porter .captured Newark and two companies of National troops. Merrill renewed the pursuit, which lasted for twelve days, ultimately coming up with the Aug. Confederates on the 6th of Au- gnst, at Kirksville, in Adair County. Here a desperate fight en- sued. McNeil’s entire force at this point did not exceed 1000 men, all mounted, with six guns. Porter had under him at least 2500 men of all arms. Porter, however, was defeated, with a loss of 180 killed, about 500 wounded, and several wagon loads of arms. McNeil’s loss was 28 killed and 60 wounded. Porter’s power was com- pletely broken. Poindexter’s gang, meanwhile, had increased to at least 1200 men. Early in August, Colonel Guitar, with 600 men, and two pieces of artillery, went in pursuit of the guer- rilla captain, and fell upon him while crossing the Chariton River, on the Aug. night of the 1 0th. Poindexter was caught in a trap. A large number of his men fell a prey to the bullets and sabres of the Nationals ; not a few were driven into the river and drowned. A consid- erable quantity of his supplies was cap- tured. With what remained of his band, Poindexter hastened north to effect a junction with Porter ; but, com- ing into contact with Ben Loan, he was forced back again upon Guitar. He was thus caught between two fires. His men fled for their lives, and he himself was made prisoner. Cobb soon after- wards shared the fate of his brother bandits ; and to the north of the Mis- souri River, the National supremacy was restored. • In his report, Schofield tells us that, from the 1st of April to the 20th of September, there were more than one hundred engagements. The National loss was 3000. The loss on the other side was not less than 10,000 men. Some terrible stories are told, illustrative of the vengeful spirit with which, on both sides, this guerrilla war- fare was conducted. It is quite possi- ble that the stories are exaggerated reports of the facts in the case; but there can be no doubt that the cold- blooded murder of Colonel McCullough, the day after Kirksville, and what COFFEE AND HUGHES. 359 were called the Palmyra massacres, threw a dark cloud over the name of McNeil, and damaged the reputation of a loyal and patriotic soldier. The guerrilla bands to the south of the Missouri River were scarcely less asrerressive than their brethren further north. These bands, having been or- ganized under a chief of the name of Hughes, when they heard of the out- break in the north, resolved to take the initiative, and, if possible, open com- munication with their friends across the An?, river. On the 11th of August H* Hughes, with about 1000 com- batants, surprised the garrison at Inde- pendence. He encountered some severe opposition from them inside the garri- son ; but he had no great difficulty in making himself master of the place. About the same time the Confederate general. Coffee, who had moved from the interior of Arkansas with 1500 horse, was pushing on rapidly for the purpose of forming a junction with Hughes. A combination of National troops was formed to prevent this junc- tion. Coffee, as he moved north, was being pressed by 1200 cavalry sent by Brown. General Blunt, commanding on the west of Kansas, detached some troops for the same purpose. General Totten was ordered by Schofield to attack Hughes at once, before he could be joined by Coffee. Unhappily, Tot- ten’s forces were divided; 800 horse and two guns, commanded by Major Foster, being at Lexington, on the Mis- souri, east of Independence, and 1500 men, under Colonel Warren, being at Clinton, more to the southeast. Both had started for Independence. Foster, who had the shorter journey to make, encountered the enemy at the Cross Roads, called Lone Jack, on the Au?. 15th of August. Coffee and 15. Hughes had formed a junction; and their united forces amounted to 4000 or 5000 men. Foster’s band was de- feated, and driven back to Lexington. In the struggle, Foster himself was wounded. At this moment Coffee, who was free in his movements, would not have shown bad generalship, if he had crossed the river and joined his friends, who were waiting for him on the other side ; but he was so pressed in his rear, that he deemed it best to make a detour and find his way, as quickly as possible, back into Arkan- sas. Blunt was already upon his heels ; but Coffee, who knew the country thoroughly, and whose men were well trained in that kind of warfare, con- trived to make his escape. Robbed of their strength, if not com- pletely driven out of Missouri, the guerrillas were still powerful in Ar- kansas; nor was it any part of their plan that their adversaries should re- main masters in Missouri. At the be- ginning of September, the united Con- federate forces in Arkansas amounted to nearly 50,000 men. They were under the command of General T. C. Hindman, who was assisted by Gen- erals Rains, Parsons, Cooper, McBride and others. Hindman had been a mem- ber of Congress; but he had warmly espoused the Confederate cause,* and gone into the war with all the bitterness of a partisan. Under the plea of mill- 360 THE GUERRILLAS. tary necessity, he had arrogated to him- self excessive powers in the State, exer- cising an arbitrary authority, and allow- ing his soldiers a license in the last degree offensive to all peaceful citizens. Living on the country wherever he hap- pened to be, and rigidly enforcing the conscription law, he was enabled to gather together and to maintain a large body of men. Hindman was complete- ly master of Arkansas. Indeed, there were no Federal soldiers in that State to dispute his authority. Nestling in the recesses of the Ozark Mountains, among which the battle of Pea Kidge had been fought, he could sweep the vast and fertile plains which lay around him on every side, and carry off what- ever he thought his army needed. In one thing only was that army found wanting. It was well provisioned, but poorly supplied with arms. This was the less an inconvenience that there was no foe against which the arms could be used. So much was this the case that General J. Johnston, who had just been placed in command of the armies of the West, added his solicitations to those of General Randolph, that the forces under Hindman should be turned to some account, by being sent across the Mississippi to strengthen the forces under Pemberton. Davis, however, would not give his consent. Randolph, in consequence, retired from the Con- federate cabinet, and Hindman de- termined to make a fresh invasion of the^ State of Missouri. His forces were divided as follows: Rains, with GOOO infantry, occupied the heights in the neighborhood of Pea Ridge; Cooper, with 7000 horse and some artillery, had advanced into the valley of Neosho, as far as Newtonia, thus menacing the National troops, who were stationed at Springfield ; while another body of 4000 men, massed on the White River, seemed to be making ready for a march on Roll a, the most important of the National depots in the Western country. Schofield now resolved to take the field in person, and, if possible, strike the enemy before he was in a fit condi- tion to take the offensive. He had shortly before, on the 26th of Septem- ber, been appointed to the command of what was called the army of the fron- tier,” General Curtis having superseded him by taking command of the depart- ment. Steele was put in command of the forces which remained stationary at Helena. The army under Schofield has been variously estimated at from 12,000 to 15,000 men, of whom about 8000 were available for active operations. There were about 5000 cavalry and some sixteen pieces of artillery, with a complement of men and horses. The largest portion of this army was at Springfield ; two brigades, all mounted, were at Sarcoxie ; and General Blunt was known to be coming up from Kan- sas. Schofield took up his line of march for Sarcoxie with 6000 men, leav- ing some 5000 to guard Springfield and his long line of communication with St. Louis. On the 30th, a reconnois- sance was made in the direction 30. of Newtonia by some of the troops which were already at Sarcoxie. Com- ing into contact with Cooper’s cavalry. COOPER AND RAINS DEFEATED. 361 they were, after a lively engagement, driven back to their encampments. On the 1st or 2d of October, the troops, which had left Springfield, arrived in the neighborhood of Sarcoxie, and, form- ing a division under General Totten, were joined by those commanded by Blunt. On the following day, the en- tire National army set out for Newtonia. Blunt and Totten approached at differ- ent points. The Confederates evident- ly were taken by surprise ; and Bains and Cooper, who had not been able to form a junction, both took to flight, the one towards Huntsville, the other to- wards Maysville. Schofield marched Oct. steadily onward ; and, on the 17th of October, he was on the old battle ground of Pea Bidge. The Confederates, as we^ have seen, were divided. Cooper evidently intended to take possession of Maysville, and cut off communication with Fort Scott. Bains, with the main body of the troops, covered by about 3000 cavalry, was still moving in the direction of Hunts- ville. Blunt, with two brigades, went off in pursuit of Cooper; while Scho- field, with the main army, pushed over the White Biver Mountains, in the track of Bains. Blunt, who did not allow his men to halt by the way, reached the outskirts Oct. of Maysville before daylight on 22. the morning of the 2 2d of Octo- ber. He felt satisfied that the enemy could not be far off. Disguising him- s df, and entering into conversation with some of the villagers, he soon dis- covered that Cooper was encamped on prairie ground in the vicinity of an old military post, called Fort Wayne. As soon as day broke, Blunt, although his men were not all forward, resolved to make the attack. It was important to strike a blow before his presence was discovered by the enemy. His van- guard, therefore, dismounted and com- menced firing. The Confederates were quite unprepared for the attack; and, before they thoroughly understood their position, the main body of Blunt’s troops came up at a gallop from Mays- ville, and deployed on the prairie. A few shells were flung into the encamp- ment, and then the whole line advanced. The Confederates, making but little re- sistance, fled precipitately towards Fort Gibson in the Indian Territory, leaving their four guns behind them. There was but little loss of life on the part of the Confederates; and the Nationals had only three men disabled. Schofield had been not less successful in his pursuit of Bains. The enemy had escaped from Huntsville, and sought shelter once more in the neighborhood of the Ozark Mountains. It was evi- dently Hindman’s intention to avoid battle until his troops were collected in greater force. Beturning to a posi- tion not far from Pea Bidge, Schofield learned that some 3000 or 4000 cavalry were encamped on White Biver, about eight miles from Fayetteville. Totten was ordered to advance and attack them in front, while Francis J. Herron was instructed to proceed immediately with about 1000 cavalry, and strike them in the rear. Herron was the first to reach the enemy. On the morn- ort. ing of the 28th of October, afttr 28. 362 THE GUERRILLAS. a rapid night march, he found him- self close upon the encampment. With- out waiting for the arrival of the in- fantry, he fell upon the foe with the rapidity of lightning. The surprise was complete ; and such was the vigor of the onslaught that the Confederates fled to the mountains, leaving every- thing behind them. Comparative quiet reigned in those regions for nearly a month. On the 26th of November, however, it became known to Schofield that Hindman had made up his mind to resume the oifen- sive. The Confederate general, Mar- maduke, had arrived at Cane Hill with 7000 or 8000 men ; and it was natural to conclude that Hindman was about to follow. Schofield, who had for some time previous to this been in poor health, deemed it necessary to resign his command. General Blunt imme- diately accepted the responsibilities of the situation. He set out at once in quest of the enemy. So rapid were his movements that, on the morning of PfoY, the 28th, he found himself in 28. presence of his antagonist. Blunt had advanced with 5000 men and thirty pieces of artillery. He had taken with him provisions for four days. In one day he had marched twenty-seven miles. Only some 200 men were forward when he encoun- tered resistance. The main body, how- ever, soon came up, when Marinaduke fell back upon his reserves on the Bos- ton Mountains, and took a good position on the heights. Blunt now assailed him with his entire strength ; and a vigorous charge having been made by the Second Kansas Cavalry, the Third Cherokee Indians, and the Eleventh Kansas Infantry, the Confederates were driven back, but not in disorder, in the direction of Van Buren. Blunt re- turned and took up a position at Cane Hill, in this engagement, which is known as the battle of Boston Moun- tains, the Nationals had four killed, and 36 wounded. The Confederate loss was 75 killed. The number of wound- ed was not reported. Hindman was not disposed to give the Nationals any rest. He seemed re- solved to recover his State. In order to do this, it was necessary to give a crushing blow to Blunt. Hindman, no doubt, was encouraged in this determin- ation by the knowledge that Schofield, who had been his great terror, was no longer in command. He might also have been emboldened in his purpose by the fact that the National army was divided into two parts, at that time far from each other. Blunt, with the first division, composed of three brigades, numbering about 6000 or 7000 men, was at Cane Hill and the village called Khea’s Mills, on the Fayetteville Koad. Herron, with the remainder of the army, comprising 6000 infantry, 8000 horse, and 20 guns, was at Wil- son’s Creek, many miles away. On the 1st of December, Hindman, who pec. had been hastening to Marma- duke’s relief, crossed the Arkansas Kiver at Van Buren with 9000 infantry and 3000 cavalry; and the two forces were united at a point some fifteen miles further up. Made aware of this fact, Blunt sent to Herron, requesting him PRAIRIE GROVE. 363 to hurry to his assistance. That excel- lent officer lost no time in coming to the relief of his chief. His cavalry he hur- ried forward under Colonel Wicker- sham, while he himself advanced with the main army. Fayetteville was reached Dec. morning of the 7th. He had marched all night. Resting his men for an hour, he pushed on in the direction of Cane Hill. He had advanced to within ten or eleven miles of that place, when he met a portion of his own cavalry, despatched by him in advance, fleeing from the enemy. They had been attacked and broken by Mar- maduke’s horsemen. Herron was in a position of very considerable danger. The Confederate general had been ap- prised of the approach of Herron ; and his purpose was, if possible, to inter- pose between him and Blunt. He had left a few troops, with a field battery, in a strong position on the Cane Hill Road, at the culminating point of the pass of the Boston Mountains, his ob- ject being to mask his movement and detain Blunt. With the rest of his army, he had moved along the Fayette- ville Road. This was the condition of things when, about eight o’clock, Her- ron’s advance, consisting of two regi- ments of cavalry, was met and driven back by Marmaduke. The retreating cavalry were brought to a halt by the second division, which was under Gen- eral Totten, the Confederate attack being not only resisted but repelled. Herron, at this moment, had a good po- sition ; and he might have been able, if he had known the actual state of things, to make a bold, defensive stand. But he was ignorant of his real danger, and in- tent'only on the relief of Blunt. He, therefore, pressed forward, driving the Confederates back over Illinois Creek, on the heights beyond which the Con- federate army was posted. The ground on which Herron now found himself was known by the name of Prairie Grove. It was an extensive, natural clearing in the midst of woods and thickets, with which the surround- ing hills were covered. The ground was irregular; there were also some clumps of trees; and, here and there, cultivated patches had taken the place of the tall grasses, with which the prairie generally was covered. On its eastern extremity, this open ground was watered by the creek above mentioned. It was traversed, also, by two roads — one leading from Fayetteville to Cane Hill, and passing at Rhea’s Mills; an- other leading from Van Buren, and crossing a ford at Illinois Creek, near the church of Prairie Grove. Beyond this stream, and about three-quarters of a mile to the east, the Van Buren Road ascends a hill which is well covered with woods. On these heights, so soon as he became aware of the approach of Herron, Hindman had taken position with all his army. Hindman’s troops were well concealed in the woods. Herron did not know, and he had no means of discovering, the actual strength of the enemy in his front. On these heights, hidden by the trees, but admirably posted for defense, was an army of some 20,000 men, well supplied with cavalry and artillery. Herron had found it necessary to leave 364 THE GUERRILLAS. certain detachments behind him. His entire available force, therefore,* did not exceed 5000 men; and these were not yet all on the ground. It was, so far as numbers were concerned, destined to be a most unequal contest. Had Herron been aware of the facts, he might well have hesitated, before ven- turing upon an attack. In this case, however, as not unfrequently happens, pluck and daring, guided by a clear head and steady nerve, fully compen- sated for lack of numbers. Herron had not heard from Blunt since the 2d, Avhen he received instructions to come to his aid. Blunt was aware of the difficulties which lay in Herron’s way ; but such was the activity of Marma- duke’s skirmishers, that he found it impossible to open communications with his lieutenant, or send to him any words of warning. Blunt, in fact, had for some days been misled by the tactics of his antagonist. He was under the im- pression that he had been skirmishing with the advance of Hindman’s main army, when, in truth, Hindman, having turned his left, was making for his trains, and actually interposing between him and Herron. It was not until the arrival of Wickersham, with his four cavalry regiments, that Blunt became fully alive to the true character of the situation. As soon as his third division came up, Herron resolved to assume the of- fensive. It was yet early morning. An attempt was made to force the passage of the ford near the church, a light bat- tery having been sent forward to feel the foe. The attempt was unsuccess- ful, the battery being driven back. Another attempt was made about a mile and a half further down the creek. Murphy’s battery was successfully trans- ported to the other side of the creek ; and, as soon as it was got into position, it openeci fire upon the flank of the enemy. The attack from this quarter had all the effect of a surprise. It not only engaged the attention of the Con- federate officers — it created the impres- sion that the National troops were more numerous than they actually were. Herron did not lose his opportunity. Three batteries, accompanied by three full regiments, were pushed across the ford in his front ; and about ten o’clock the whole of the National artillery were pouring grape-shot and canister on the Confederate positions. The result was soon visible. Within sixty min- utes most of the Confederate guns were silenced. The Nationals contin- ued to advance, the artilleiy belching forth destruction until they were with- in a hundred yards of the ridge. It was now evident that Hindman, whose force had already suffered severely, was massing his men on the right with a view to crush the National left. This movement was supported by a powerful battery in front. This battery must be captured. The perilous task was assigned to the Nineteenth Iowa, and the Twentieth Wisconsin. The task was speedily accomplished. It was the work of only a few minutes. The summit of the hill was reached; the enemy was driven back ; and the guns were seized. It was impossible, however, for those gallant regiments to PRAIRIE GROVE. 365 hold the position which they had so nobly won. The Confederates rallied and returned to the charge. Largely outnumbered, the two National regi-. merits were compelled to fall back, and the battery was again in possession of the enemy. The Confederates contrived to press forward ; and, gatheriifg cour- age as they advanced, they made a bold dash towards the National guns. It was a vain effort. Their ranks were jiloiighed by gr’ape-shot ; they were torn in pieces by canister. It was a rush to destruction. They soon fell back, leaving the ground covered with the dead and wounded. At this criti- cal moment, and seeing the determina- tion with which Hindman was menacing his left, Herron summoned up two fresh regiments — the Twenty-Sixth In- diana and the Thirty-Seventh Illinois — and hurled them against the enemy’s right. This fresh attack was, in the first instance, completely successful. Colonel Houston, who was in charge, led his men forward right gallantly. The Confederate battery was again cap- tured ; but, as in the former case, so in this, the National regiments were out- numbered, and compelled to fall back. It was now half-j)ast two. The bat- tle had raged fiercely since eleven. Herron’s men had all been put under fire. Further aggressive effort, on his part, was out of the question. It was doubtful whether he could much longer hold the ground he occupied ; for the Confederates had evidently begun to feel their strength, and to realize the value of superior numbers. Fortu- nately, just at this time, the noise of heavy guns was heard on the extreme right; and some stray shot fell in the midst of the National skirmishers. It was Blunt. He had arrived on the field just in time. The news quickly spread along the lines, reviving the sinking spirits of the Union soldiers. Hindman was in the act of massing his forces, for the purpose of flanking Her- ron’s right wing. While thus engaged, he came into contact with the heads of Blunt’s advancing columns. The bat- tle was thus renewed with tremendous energy. Blunt pushed forward three batteries, which soon drove the Con- federates back into the woods. While the cavalry was crossing his right, he pushed forward Colonel Weir, with a heavy force, to the woods, where the Confederates were forming for the at- tack. Weir accomplished his task with skill and energy. The Confederates were driven from their shelter, and their onward movement was completely arrested. During the struggle, an at- tempt was made by the Confederates to capture the batteries of Bobb and Hopkins. The assailants, however, were severely punished for their temerity. Another attack, in which the Confed- erate general, Stein, of Missouri, fell, was successfully repelled by Lieutenant Tenney and his six^ ten-pounder Par- rotts. After the arrival of Blunt, his own lines and those of Herron were speedily joined ; and a daring attempt made by the Confederates, to penetrate between Herron’s second and third di- vision, was completely frustrated by the stubborn resistance of Dye’s bri- gade. Musketry-fire and cannonading 366 THE GUERRILLAS. continued until dark ; but the Confed- erates did not renew the attack, nor did the Nationals retire from the posi- tion they had won. Night ended the conflict. The National troops slept on their arms, in the expectation that the battle would be resumed in the morn- ing. When morning dawned, the Con- federates were in full flight along the Van Buren Road. The Nationals, how- ever, were in no condition to pursue. Such was the famous and bloody battle of Prairie Grove. The estimated Na- tional loss in this day’s fighting was 1148 men, of whom 167 were killed, 798 wounded, and 183 made prisoners — but of the total, 953 belonged to Herron’s foi’ce. If Hindman had been more daring, the battle at Prairie Grove might have resulted very differently. He had two good opportunities, both of which he recklessly flung away. He might have crushed Blunt on the 4th or 5th, on both of which days he had him alone in his front ; and a more dashing effort might have led to the discomfiture of Herron, when he met him alone on the borders of Illinois Creek. After the battle of Prairie Grove, the ‘‘army of the frontier” remained quiet in the Ozark Mountains. As late as the 28thj^ of December Blunt, having been informed that Hindman was collecting troops and preparing for another attack, made a rapid march with some light cavalry and artillery, as far as the borders of the Arkansas, taking possession of Van Buren with- out any opposition, burning several steamers, destroying the Confederate depots, and then returning to the main army, which had gone into winter quarters. At the close of 1862, quiet . reigned both in Missouri and Arkansas, Missouri had been completely relieved, and at least one half of Arkansas had been occupied. The^e guerrilla bands were not con- fined to Missouri and Arkansas alone, nor indeed to Kentucky and Tennessee, where we have already found them. They were scattered in large numbers over Texas — the extreme southwestern State of the Republic. In the western part of that State there were but few slaveholders. There was, therefore, but little sympathy with the Southern cause. The people, who were truly loyal and devoted to the Union, w^ere at once feared and hated by the guer- rilla bands which infested the country, and whose acts were characterized by great wastefulness and horrible bru- tality. As they were far removed from the National armies, and but little lia- ble to be called to account, they seemed to deem it their privilege to indulge in all kinds of excess, and to riot in the destruction of life and property. Early in the summer of 1862, after the Con- federates had been defeated and driven out of Tennessee, Texas was placed by the Richmond government under martial law, and a rigid and merciless conscription was enforced. The State was overrun by guerrilla bands, whose lawlessness knew no bounds. They robbed and murdered at will ; and other crimes of the most heinous and shocking character have been laid to their charge. Some of the loyalists at- THE TEXAN MARTYRS. 307 tempted to escape into Mexico. Of these, many were captured and mur- dered ; and the boast was proudly made by the San Antonio Herald^ that their bones were bleaching on the soil of every county, from Red River to the Rio Grande ; and in the counties of Wise and Denton, their bodies were suspended by scores from the “black jacks.” On the night of the 9th of August, 1862, a company of young Germans, about sixty in all, and be- longing to the best families in Western Texas, who were on their way to New Orleans, by way of Mexico, in order to join the Union army, had reached the Nueces River, about forty miles from the Rio Grande. They lay encamped on the edge of a cedar brake ; their movements had been conducted with great secrecy; and they were hopeful that they might escape the vigilance of the guerrillas. By treachery or other- wise, their character and their where- abouts became known to the freeboot- ers; and Duff, the girerrilla chief in those parts, sent one hundred men to surprise and destroy them. Early on the morning of the 8th, one of the party, who happened to be up and about, was captured. As he refused to lead the gang to the exact spot where his companions were still sleep- ing, he was immediately hanged. The guerrillas found out the encampment, and at night fell upon the young men in their sleep. A terrible hand-to-hand fight ensued. Not less than two-thirds of the brave young Unionists perished, some of them having been cruelly put to death after they were wounded and } helpless. Only a few of them escaped to tell the horrid tale. One of the butchers afterwards boasted that he killed several of the wounded with his own hands. In the performance of this brutal work he emptied two revolvers. Such was his own confession. His name will be infamous forever. It was Lieutenant Lily. Three years after- wards, a monument was erected over all that could be collected of the re- mains of the Texan martyrs. The Western territory, during the year 1862, experienced not a little dis- turbance from the peculiar combina- tions and conflicts of the Indian tribes. The withdrawal of the volunteers raised in Northern Missouri, and in the young States of Iowa and Minnesota, had left some portions of the country on the western slope of the Rocky Mountains very much at the mercy of the indigenous race. The Indians had wrongs to right, revenges to gratify, both as regarded their white conquerors and the rival native tribes; and, in the absence of the troops of the regular army, they believed they had found their opportunity. In the circumstances, it was natural that they should make some efforts to multiply the scalps with which they delighted to adorn their wigwams. Some of those tribes, more- over, had been induced to take sides in the great struggle. On both sides, con- siderable armies had been raised. They were generally commanded by whites, and were, for the most part, employed in guarding the frontier. The frontier was designated by several posts which, before the war, had served as provision 368 THE GUERRILLAS. depots. All those to the south of Kan- sas had been abandoned by the Na- tionals. These posts, separated from each other by vast intervals, and placed en echelon through the vast region then known as Indian Territory, were di- vided among several tribes, the most powerful of which were the Creeks and the Cherokees. The latter tribe had experienced somewhat of the benefits of civilization. Scattered over the rich prairie, which extends from Pea Ridge to the borders of the Neosho, were to be seen not a few Cherokee villages, surrounded and adorned by patches of cultivated land. The principal chief of this tribe was John Ross, who resided in a beautiful villa at Park Hill, on the Fayetteville Road. The chief town or capital of this tribe was called Tah-le- Quah, a place which though not yet old, was giving some evidence of premature decay. The Cherokees were no great favorites with their more war-like neigh- bors, who were located a little more to the south and west. As a rule, the semi-civilized Indian is despised by his rougher and ruder brethern, who ad- here to their primitive modes of life. Such was the feeling entertained to- wards the Cherokees by the other Indian tribes all along the borders of the Arkansas. The war-like ardor of these latter was stimulated by Southern emissaries ; and in the neighborhood of Fort Davis — a new fort built by the Confederates — and also at Fort Gibson — an old fort near the village of the same name — quite a little army of redskins had assembled. Officered by white men, they undertook to conquer the whole Indian Territory, and even threatened the invasion of Arkansas and Missouri. In the absence of the regular army, this whole region depended for protec- tion on three regiments of Indians, all mounted, and officered by white men of the Natibnal army. It was not long before these National officers became aware of the hostile intentions of the rival tribes enlisted in the interest of the Sv)uth. It was resolved to make an immediate attack — to surprise and disperse them, before they could have time to carry out their meditated pur- pose. With this end in view. Colonel Phillipps, with 1200 mounted men and two field pieces, was detached, and sent forward in the direction of the enemy. We have already seen that the hostile Indians were congregated in strength in and about the village of Gibson. They, too, consisted of three mounted resriments, and were under the com- mand of Colonel Taylor. Phillipps di- vided his forces into two columns of equal strength. The one column, under Major Forman, was to cross the Neosho, and descend the right bank of the river: the other column, under Phillipps himself, was to march towards Gibson, through Park Hill and Tah-le-Quah. It was Phillipps’ intention to advance and surprise the enemy on the morning of July, the 24th. Taylor, however, was not to be so easily caught. He had been apprised of the intended movement, and had made preparations accordingly. Sending forward some 300 men to meet and delay the ad- vance of Forman, he advanced himself with about 800 men to meet Phillipps. THE INDIANS. 369 July On the 28th, about two o’clock 28. in the afternoon, Taylor came into contact with the National advance, between Gibson and Tah-le-Quah ; and falling upon them with tremendous fury, he drove them back in confu- sion. Their retreat, however, was soon arrested by the main body, which had found time to deploy, dismount, and occupy a strong position along the edge of a wood. As Taylor’s Indians were rushing forward in the full tri- umph of victory,- they were received by a murderous hre, the Nationals, with fierce yells, rushing out upon them, and driving them back in disorder. On a ridge which commanded the little val- ley of Bayou Barnard, they rallied and renewed the attack. It was, however, only for an instant. After the first fire, they fell back again and dispersed. In this last encounter. Colonel Taylor was killed. His body and the body of twm Choctaw captains were found on the field. Phillipps crossed the Neosho and joined Forman.; but the detach- ment of Indians which Taylor had sent against the latter, contrived to escape, and succeeded in making its way to the south of the Arkansas. On the 19th of August, a savage at- Au». tack was made by the Sioux on two Indian agencies and on the village of New Ulm, not far from Fort Bidgely, on the Minnesota River. At the agencies, all the employes were massacred ; and at the village, over 100 women and children were ruthlessly put to death. After their bloody woi*k, the Indians retired to their camp, near Yellow Medicine Creek. It was abso- lutely necessary, for the safety of the set- tlers, that so horrible an outrage should be promptly and adequately avenged. Colonel Sibley was entrusted with this duty. On the 19th of Sep- sep. tember, taking with him about 1000 men in all, composed of detach- ments from the Third, Sixth and Sev- enth regiments of Minnesota, with some militia, Sibley proceeded from Fort Ridgely towards the Indian encamp- ment. As soon as it became known that he was approaching. Little Crow, the chief of the tribe, called a council of war, and advised that an attack should be made on the National camps at night. His counsel was not ap- proved of by the Sioux warriors; and it was agreed that, to give proof of their courage, they should fight the white men openly in the broad light of day. On the 23d of September, gep# they approached the National en- 23. campment from two different points; and rushing forward in their usual man- ner, uttering savage yells, they made a vigorous attack. The Nationals prompt- ly put themselves in line to receive them. For two hours the battle raged, the In- dians trying to break their ranks in front, to turn their right, and to strike them in the rear. It w^as all in vain. The Nationals were more numerous, and their artillery enabled them to keep the Indians at a distance. Peace was thus established on the frontier of Minnesota. Before the close of 1862, all those guer- rilla bands, both whites and redskins, were broken and dispersed ; and between the Mississippi and the Rocky Moun- tains, the National power w'as supreme. 370 CHICKASAW. « CHAPTEK XXIII. Alter Corinth — Grant’s Army. — The Great Western Plan. — The Missipippi. — Grant’s Inaction. — The Keason.— Vicksburg. — Farragut at Vicksburg. — Williams and the Canal. — Reinforcements for Grant. — Grant’s Army in Motion. — The Confederate Position. — John C. Pemberton. — The Yallabusha and Tallahatchie. — The Yazoo. — Grant at La Grange. — Feeling his Way. — McPherson at Lamar. — Washburne and Hovey. — Grant at Holly Springs and Oxford. — Sherman at College Hill. — Grant’s New Plan. — The Expedition to the Yazoo. — Sher- man and Porter. — Grant to Move Against Pemberton. — McClernand's Intrigue. — Holly Springs. — Van Dorn’s Raid. — Holly Springs Captured. — Murphy’s Cowardice. — Forrest’s Raid. — Grant's Supplies Cut Off. — His Re- treat. — Failure of his Plan. — Murphy Dismissed the Army. — Grant at La Grange and Grand Junction. — Sherman * and Porter on their Way Down the Mississippi. — Friar’s Point. — Lincoln's Weakness. — McClernand’s Appoint- ment. — Sherman and Porter at the Mouth of the Yazoo. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Plan of Attack. — The Disembarkation. — The Ground. — Vicksburg. — Walnut Hills. — Haines’ Bluff. — Chickasaw Bayou. — The Slough. — Dangerous Battle Ground. — The Preparations of the Confederates. — The Nationals Prepared for the Attack. — Barfield’s Plantation. — Movements of General Steele. — General Frank P. Blair. — The Morning of the 29th of November. — The Attack. — The Reception. — Blair and Thayer. — Their Bravery. — Morgan’s Failure. — Inactivity of Stuart and A. J. Smith. — Morgan L. Smith Wounded. — A Critical Moment. — Blair, Thayer and De Courcy Compelled to Fall Back. — The Sixth Missouri. — “Shoot Higher.” — “Shoot Lower.” — A Complete Failure. — Morgan to Blame. — Sherman Mortified. — A Flag of Truce. — Burying the Dead. — A Sad Sight. — Another Attack Resolved Upon. — The Fog. — The New Enterprise Abandoned. — End of the Second Campaign Against Vicksburg. — Disappointment in the North. — Rejoicing in the South. — Reflections. — Sherman’s Mistake. — Blair the Hero of Chickasaw Bayou. — Back at the Mouth of the Yazoo. — Arrival of McClernand. — Sherman Superseded. — His Nobility of Conduct. — Army Corps. — McClernand’s General Order No. 1. — Sherman’s Order. — Arkansas Post. — The New Expedition. — Up the Mississippi. — At the Mouth ot the White River —The “Cut-Off.” — The Arkansas River. — Notrib’s Farm. — Fort Hindman. — The Ground. — Strength of the Fortress. — The Gandson. — Landing of the Troops. — A Detour. — Porter and his Gunboats. — The Morning of the 11th of December — The Signal for Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Sherman on the Right. — Morgan on the Left. — A Hard Struggle. — The Edge of the Woods. — The Guns of the Fort Silenced. — Steele's Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. — Morgan’s Advance Interrupted by the Ravine. — Bravery of Burbridge. — The Surrender. — The Prize of Victory. — Sherman Dissatisfied, but Patiently Submissive. — McClernand’s Report. — Petty Jealousy. — Sherman’s Memoirs. — Porter’s Report. — Grant’s In- fluence. — The Day After the Battle. — Burial of the Dead. — The Transportation of Prisoners. — Little Rock. — Another Joint Expedition. — Des Arc and Duval’s Bluff Captured. — Fort Hindman Dismantled and Blown XJp — On the Way Down the Arkansas. — The Army and the Flotilla at Napoleon. — Instructions from Grant. — Back at Milliken’s Bend. — Estimate of the Whole Expedition. After the battle of Corinth, which 1862 fought on the 4th of Octo- ber, the army, under General Grant, fell back to the position which it formerly occupied, and remained in comparative inactivity until the begin- ning of November. It was stationed , from Memphis to Bridgeport, Tennes- see, along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Its strong points were Mem- phis, Grand Junction and Corinth. The army was arranged in four divisions. General Sherman, with the first divi- sion, was at Memphis; General Hurl- but, with the second, was at Jackson; General C. S. Hamilton, with the third, was at Corinth ; and General T. A. Davies, with the fourth, was at Colum- bus. Grant’s headquarters were at Jackson, Tennessee, a point in the West where the Central Mississippi Railroad unites with the Mobile and Ohio. That FARRAGUT AND WILLIAMS. 371 general had not abandoned the plan which was inaugurated at Henry and Donelson. His whole soul was bent on the capture of Vicksburg, A variety of circumstances, however, had necessi- tated delay. The removal of Halleck to Washington had devolved upon him the entire care of the Department of the Tennessee — a department which included, in addition to Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, the whole of Northern Mississippi, and those por- tions of Tennessee and Kentucky west of the Tennessee River. This, how- ever, was not the only or even the most important reason. The army which had fought and won at Shiloh, at Corinth and at luka, had been great- ly weakened, a large pioportion of its strength having been sent to Kentucky to resist the invasion of Bragg. It was necessary, therefore, for Grant, while perfecting his plans and rearranging his troops, to wait for reinforcements. As soon as the reinforcements arrived, he was ready to move. The reader has already been made familiar with the general plan to be pursued in the opening of the Missis- sippi ; and he has learned that a con- sidei-able portion of that plan had been successfully carried out. The National gunboats had swept the Mississippi, from Cairo to Memphis ; and, between those two points, every Confederate stronghold had been deserted or de- stroyed. Farragut, with a portion of his fleet, had pushed his way up to Vicks- burg, after the capture of New Orleans. He was accompanied by General F. Williams, with an infantry force of four regiments. While Farragut bom- barded the city, Williams was cutting a canal, with the view of diverting the waters of the Mississippi from their proper channel, thus leaving Vicksburg high and dry on all sides. The siege lasted some seventy days. It was all to no purpose. Farragut, who failed to make any serious impression on the Confederate works, began to fear for his own safety. The canal, also, proved a complete failure. The fleet and the land force both found it necessary to retire ; and Vicksburg remained to ob- struct the navigation of the great river. On the 4th of November, Grant began to move. He transferred ]^ov, his headquarters from Jackson to La Grange, some few miles to the west of Grand Junction. He soon discovered that the Confederates, under General John C. Pemberton, a Pennsylvanian, who had superseded Van Dorn, were in considerable strength immediately in his front. Pemberton, in fact, had taken a strong position behind two lines of defenses, the outer being the Yalla- busha, and the inner bemg the Talla- hatchie — two streams which, after their junction, form the Yazoo River. Both of these streams cross the Mississippi Central Railroad, between Grand Junc- tion and Grenada. The banks of the Tallahatchie were strongly fortified. Grant’s first intention was to offer Pemberton battle, defeat him, and force his way to Vicksburg. On the 8th, he sent out McPherson with 10,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, with instructions to drive from Lamar a body of Confederates 572 CHICKASAW. who were holding the railroad. Mc- Pherson accomplished his task in the most effectual manner, the Confederates having been driven back as far as Holly Springs. About the 17th of November, Grant summoned Sherman to meet him at Columbus ; and at the interview which there took place, the views of the two generals were freely exchanged. Grant explaining to Sherman his plan, and giving him his orders. It was at Sher- man’s suggestion that a portion of Curtis’ army, which, as we have seen in a previous chapter, was stationed at Helena, should be brought over to Delta, with a view to co-operate with Grant in his general movement towards Vicksburg. Tliese troops which, in the absence of General Curtis, who was at St. Paul, being under the temporary command of General Frederick Steele, were promptly at the place appointed, on the eastern banks of the Mississippi. They numbered some 7000 men, and were under the joint command of Gen- erals A. P. Hovey and C. C. Wash- burne. Ordered to scour the country to the south and east, in the rear of the Confederate army, to destroy the rail- ]*oads and bridges, so as to cut off sup- plies, and generally to prepare the way for Grant’s advance, they accomplished their task in the most effectual manner, and then returned to the Mississippi. Pemberton, on discovering that the rail- roads were badly damaged, and that the rolling-stock was destroyed, Grant meanwhile pressing on his front, deemed it prudent to fall back on Grenada. On the 1st of December, Grant was at Holly Springs. On the 5th, he was at Oxford, where he established his headquarters. It now became a seilous question with General Grant, how far he was wise in allowing himself to be tempted to advance into the enemy’s country. ‘ The State of Mississippi was but sparsely peopled; and he had no means of knowing whether its resources were equal to the wants of a large army, possibly cut off from its base of supplies. Had he known what he knew afterwards, the caution would have been unnecessary ; and he would doubtless have continued his onward march. On the 5th of December^ Sherman on his way to join Grant, and Dec. bnnging with him from Memphis some 16,000 men, arrived at College Hill, about ten miles from Oxford, whence he reported to his chief. On the 8th, he received from Grant a let- ter, requesting his immediate presence at Oxford, and enclosing a message from Halleck to Grant, authorizing the latter to prosecute the new plan he had just submitted to him, to move his troops as he thought best, to retain till further orders all Curtis’ troops now in his department, to telegraph to General Allen, in St. Louis, for all the steam- boats he might need, and to ask Porter to co-operate with his gunboats. On his arrival at. Oxford, Sherman found Grant surrounded by his staff. The new plan was discussed and approved. It will be seen that Grant had made up his mind that, for the safety of his men as well as for the final success of the expedition, it was necessary to take DISASTER AT HOLLY SPRINGS. 373 full advantage of the river communica- tion with Vicksburg. It was agreed that a large force on transports should proceed down the Mississippi, under convoy of Porter’s gunboats, that on reaching the mouth of the Yazoo, they should open up that water line, and, by a joint attack of the land and naval forces, attempt to capture Vicksburg in the rear. Grant, meanwhile, was to press forward towards Jackson, which is only some forty-six miles to the west of Vicksburg, offering Pemberton battle, and following him up close in the event of his retreat, in the hope of finding Sherman on the Yazoo with supplies, or in possession of Vicksburg. Happily, Grant had been left com- plete control of the whole movement, Halleck having offered no special ad- vice, and imposed no conditions. He could move at will, and he could place in prominent command the men of his own choice. Sherman, who commanded the right wing of Grant’s army, was appointed to the command of the river expedition, and received his instruc- tions. Grant had the greater pleasure in appointing Sherman to this com- mand that McClernand, who had great influence with the president, was known to be intriguing for an independent command on the Mississippi. Sherman was, therefore, ordered to take com- mand of the forces at Memphis, and those also at Helena and Delta, under General Steele, to descend the river by transports, with the gunboat fleet as a convoy, commanded by Admiral Porter, and to attack Vicksburg by the 29 th of November. McClernand was to take the forces at Cairo, and to pro- ceed to Vicksburg, so as to be in time to lend Sherman effective aid as soon as he made the attack. Grant himself, as we have said, was to move rapidly on the Confederates to the north and east of Vicksburg, to follow them if they should retreat towards the city, and to take part with Sherman, if necessary, in the reduction of the place. It was a well-conceived plan. Its suc- cess, however, depended on the prompt and faithful execution of all its parts. Grant knew that it was unsafe to trust for supplies solely to the enemy’s coun- try. He had, therefore, repaired the Central Mississippi Railroad as far as Oxford, where, for the present, he had established his headquarters ; and Holly Springs, which was entrusted to the care of Colonel R. C. Murphy, was re- tained as a grand depot and hospital. Let us see how this plan was carried out. Grant had taken great care that no misfortune should befall him in his rear. He had left small but adequate garrisons at Columbus, at Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, Holly Springs, Coldwater, Davis’ Mills and Middlebury. He had taken par- ticular care of Holly Springs ; for he knew that the treasures at that place presented a powerful temptation to Van Dorn. On the night of the 19th, he warned Murphy of his danger, and informed him that he had sent 4000 men to enable him to repel any attack which might be made upon him. Mur- phy, it would seem, paid little heed to the instructions given him. He made no extra preparations to resist the enemy. 249 374 CHICKASAW. On the morning of the 20th, at day- Dec. break, Van Dorn, executing a 20. brilliant cavalry operation, rushed upon the place with tremendous fury. Murphy offered no resistance. The Second Illinois, however, refused to surrender, and gallantly fought their way out, with a loss of only seven men. Murphy, with the rest of his men, ac- cepted a parole. Van Dorn seized all the property, valued at over $1,500,000, taking with him what he could carry, and destroying the remainder. He set fire to the buildings, not even sparing the hospital, which was filled with sick and wounded soldiers. This was the second time that Murphy had been guilty of such conduct. He did the same thing at luka. General Grant was wild with rage. It was his opinion that with all the cotton, public stores and substantial buildings about the depot,” Murphy ought to have been able to keep the assailants at bay until relief arrived. It was only four hours after the catastrophe, when the 4000 men sent to his aid arrived on the spot. Grant was particularly incensed at Mur- phy for accepting a parole for himself and his men. A cartel had been agreed to by the rival commanders ; and it had been stipulated that each party should take care of his own prisoners. . If Murphy had refused parole for himself and men, V an Dorn would have been “compelled to release them uncon- ditionally, or to have abandoned all further aggressive movements for the time being.” In a severe order, on the 9th of January, General Grant dis- missed Murphy from the army, the order to take effect “from December 20th, the date of his cowardly and dis* graceful conduct.” The disaster at Holly Springs was ruinous to Grant’s plan. It robbed him of supplies, which, it w'as intended, should sustain the army for several weeks. To replace them, it would be necessary to put in operation all the capacity and force of the Columbus Railroad ; but this railroad had been destroyed, and weeks would be ex- hausted before it could be put in work- ing order. Ignorant of the resources of the country, and not knowing whether, in the event of his pressing forward, he should find Sherman in the vicinity of Vicksburg, he deemed it his duty to fall back. He immediately re- crossed the Tallahatchie. Having no other means of subsisting his army, he made requisitions on the inhabitants as he moved along. On the 23d of De- cember, he w^as at Holly Springs, now a scene of wreck and ruin ; and a few days later, he re-entered La Grange and Grand Junction, where he was once more in communication with Corinth and Memphis. Pemberton made no at- tempt to pursue. On the contrary, taking advantage of the retreat of his antagonist, he withdrew the greater portion of his forces from Grenada, and concentrated towards Vicksburg. On the same day that Van Dorn made his raid on Holly Springs, nn at- tack was made by a Confederate force on Davis’ Mills, a little further to the north. In the neighborhood of Jack- son, Tennessee, a vital point in Grant’s line of communications, an attack was THE JOINT EXPEDITION. 375 made by a body of cavalry under For- rest, on the 19th. The telegraph wires were cut, and the railroad was destroyed. On the following day Forrest presented himself before Humboldt and Trenton. These and other stations along the rail- road, such as Dyer’s, Rutherford and Kenton, fell an easy prey to the enemy. It seemed to be the purpose of the Confederates to destroy every railroad bridge from Columbus to Corinth, and thus to cut Grant off from all his com- munications and supplies. So far, they had carried out their purpose with determination, and with not a little success. Never was campaign opened under apparently happier auspices. The rich bud of promise, however, was cruelly blasted. Grant’s plan of the campaign had failed. Meanwhile, what of Sherman ? On the 20th, the very day on which Van Dorn and Forrest struck the blow which compelled Grant to fall back and abandon his part of the joint un- dertaking, Sherman took his departure from Memphis. Taking with him over 20,000 troops in transports, he left, as a guard to the city, a strong force of infantry and cavalry, and the siege guns in position, with a complement of gunners. On the following day, at Friar’s Point, he was joined by Admi- ral Porter, in his flag-ship Black Hawk, with the Marmora, Captain Getty, and the Conestoga, Captain Selfridge, which were to act as a convoy. The remain- der of Porter’s fleet were at the mouth of the Yazoo. On the same even in the 21st, the troops at Helena embark- ed in transports, and came to Friar’s Point. Sherman’s force was now at least 30,000 strong. All the arrange- ments were completed ; and the joint • expedition was moving down the river the following morning. Sherman got away just in time to se- cure for himself the glory or dishonor of the expedition. Had he lingered a day longer, he would have been super- seded in his command by General McClernand. It is a strange story, and one which, for the sake of all the parties concerned, it would be well if the world could forget. We will not enter into details. It has already been stated that General McClernand was a warm personal friend of President Lin- coln, and that he was ambitious of an independent command on the Missis- sippi. It is not necessary to say that Sherman was a man according to Grant’s own heart. Since that great day at Shiloh, their fates had been linked to- gether, and they had been to each other like David and Jonathan. Sherman was also a great favorite with Halleck, the commander-in-chief at Washing- ton. But for the personal wishes of Grant and Halleck, both of whom knew well that Sherman was the man for the position, McClernand would have been appointed by Lincoln in the first instance to the command of the river expedition. McClernand, however, was not to be put off ; and Lincoln, who was always unwilling to disoblige a friend, was weak enough to yield to his entreaties. On the 18th of December, an order from the president reached Grant, directing him to divide all his forces into four 376 CHICKASAW. army corps, to assign one corps to McClernand, and to place him at the head of the troops destined for the attack upon Vicksburg. Grant could hardly fail to see in this order a blow- aimed at himself. It was a most a-^vk- ward circumstance, and reflected little credit on the wisdom and good sense of the president. Good and great as he was, Lincoln was not without his weak- nesses. He was vain enough to imagine that he knew quite as much as his gen- erals in the field ; and he was disposed to deal with military officers, as he was in the habit of dealing with politicians. It is not much to be wondered at if Grant was staggered by this order, and if he was slow to put it in execution. It was not difficult for him to find an ex- cuse. He was in the midst of his pre- parations for an onward march. The reconstruction of his army, according to the instructions received, occupied him the whole of the 19th. The disaster at Holly Springs, compelling a back- ward movement, occurred on the 20th ; and the raids of Forrest on the same day deprived him of the use of the telegraph. As it was, Sherman had proceeded down the river before any counter-instructions reached Memphis. If Sherman had any reason to fear a counter-order, his haste to get ready and his prompt departure but revealed the soldierly spirit and true character of the man. As the result proved, it was well for Sherman, well for General Grant, and well for the nation at large, that Lincoln’s order did not take effect before the 20th of December. On Christmas Day, the expedition under Sherman and Porter had i>ec, reached Milliken’s Bend, when 25. Sherman detached Burbridge’s brigade, of A. J. Smith’s division, to break up the railroad leading from Vicksburg to Shrevepo^’t, Louisiana. Leaving A. J. Smith’s division to await the arrival, the remaining divisions proceeded, on the 26th, to the mouth of the Yazoo, and up that river to Johnson’s planta- tion, some thirteen miles, and there dis- embarked. The disembarkation was conducted without any opposition. Steele’s division landed furthest up the river, above what is called Chickasaw Bayou; Morgan’s division a little lower down, at the house of Johnson, which had been burned by the gunboats on a former occasion ; Morgan L. Smith’s division below that of Morgan ; and A. J. Smith’s, which arrived next night, below that of M. L. Smith. The ground on which Sherman now found himself presented obstacles of which formerly he had but a very imperfect conception. Vicksburg is built on a range of bluffs, known as the W alnut Hills. These hills, which take their rise a lit- tle below the city, extend for the most part in a northeasterly direction, ter- minating in Haines’ Bluff, a distance of some thirteen or fourteen miles. The configuration of these hills has been compared to the ridge at Inkerman, to which, it is said, they bear, in some par- ticulars, a striking resemblance. Their average height is about two hundred feet. Where the Mississippi touches their base at Vicksburg, and for some miles both above and below, they are THE YAZOO. 377 precipitous. Along their entire length, indeed, from Vicksburg to Haines’ Bluff, their face is very abrupt, and cut up by numerous valleys and ravines. The only approach to the city by land, from up the river, is by climbing their al- most perpendicular front. The ground beyond is high, broken, and somewhat rolling, gradually descending to the Big Black River. The Yazoo, which skirts the ridge at Haines’ Bluff, about nine miles above Vicksburg by the road, along the foot of the bluffs, flows in a southwestern direction, and before discharging its waters into the Missis- sippi, crosses an old arm of the river, which now forms a semicircular lake. The Yazoo evidently, in times gone by, clung to the foot of the hills ; and traces of its former whereabouts are to be seen in the numerous bayous and channels by which the intervening ground is cut up. One of these bayous puts off from the Yazoo, about one third of the distance below Haines’ Bluff, running at right angles with the river until it approaches the bluffs, when it turns and follows their base until it empties itself into the Missis- sippi. It is called Chickasaw Bayou. Between the bayou and the hills there was an irregular strip of land, on which the trees had been filled to form an abatis. It was dotted also with rifle- pits. Rifle-trenches abounded, too, along the front of the bluffs ; and the heights above were crowned with bat- teries. About a mile to the northeast of the bayou, and parallel with it, there is a deep slough, which makes a sharp turn as it approaches the bluffs, and enters Chickasaw Bayou at the point where the latter is checked in its course, and turns to flow along the base of the hills. There was thus a fortified line some twelve or thirteen miles in length formed of abatis and rifle-pits, with an impassable ditch in front, and terminat- ing in the powerful fixed batteries at Haines’ Bluff, on the one hand, and in the heavy batteries and field works above Vicksburg, on the other. The land lying between the Yazoo and the Chickasaw was not only low and swampy : it was, except in one or two places, where there were plantations, densely wooded. The distance from Johnson’s Landing to the Chickasaw was about six miles. Such was the ground over which Sherman proposed to march his men. Such were the ob- stacles to be overcome before he could enter Vicksburg. To the National com- mander, how^ever, and to his officers, these obstacles were, as yet, but imper- fectly known. General Sherman’s army was organ- ized in four divisions. The first divi- sion, comprising three brigades, was under Brigadier-General George W. Morgan ; second division, three bri- gades, under Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith ; third division, three brigades, under Brigadier-General A. J. Smith; fourth division, four brigades, under Brigadier-General Frederick Steele. The brigade commanders of the fourth division were Generals Frank P. Blair, John M. Thayer, C. E. Hovey, and Colonel Hassendurbel. According to Sherman’s plan of attack, Genei-al Steele was to hold the extreme left, 378 CHICKASAW. General Morgan the left centre, Gen- eral M. L. Smith the right centre, and General A. J. Smith the extreme right. As the latter general had not yet ar- rived from Milliken’s Bend, where we left him waiting for Burbridge, Gen- eral Frank P. Blair, with his brigade, was detached from Steele’s division, and placed on Morgan’s right. The object of this arrangement was to distract the enemy’s attention, leading him to ex- pect an attack at a number of different points. Instructions, however, had been given to each of the commanders to converge toward the point of attack, at or near Barfield’s plantation. There it had been discovered the bayou could be crossed at two points — at a sand bar, and at a narrow levee. On the 27th, the army began to Dec, move. General Steele, who had 27. been ordered to take position on the further side of the slough above this bayou, experienced great difficulty in landing his troops. So soft and slushy was the ground, and so dense was the brushwood, that he found it necessary to construct roads for moving his wagons and artillery. When night came he had only advanced some two miles from the shore. During the greater portion of next day he pushed forward his command; but he was com- pelled to report to Sherman that he found it physically impossible to reach the bluffs from his position, and that to persist in the attempt, would inevit- ably lead to the ruin of his troops, and the loss of his field equipage. He was, therefore, ordered to leave some of his troops behind him as a show of force. to hasten to the west side of the Chick- asaw Bayou, and take a position on Morgan’s left. On the 27th, Blair moved slowly towards the bluffs, his desire being to give Steele time to come into position on the left. He succeeded in silencing one of the ene- my’s batteries at the point where he expected Steele would be able to join him, and held his ground. On the 28th, the various divisions pressed forward; and the Na- Dec. tional troops were in full posses- 28. sion on the Yazoo side of the bayou, with one bridge thrown across, and with two bridges partially constructed. During the course of the day, while re- connoitering. General M. L. Smith was severely wounded in the hip, and com- pelled to retire to his steamboat. His command devolved on General Stuart ; but Sherman, feeling convinced that A. J. Smith could accomplish nothing on the extreme right, because of the heavy fire of the forts immediately in his front, ordered him to leave Bur- bridge in position at that point, and to come up with a portion of his forces to the point selected for crossing the bayou, and entrusted him with the execution of the task. Such was the state of things on the night of the 28th. General Morgan was in position on the west or rather southwest side of the Chickasaw; General Blair was a little to his right, near the angle of the bayou ; General M. L. Smith’s division, under General Stuart, was on the right centre; General A. J.' Smith’s, which was further to the right, had taken posi- tion near the place where the bayou THE ATTACK. 379 was to be crossed ; and General Steele was moving up on the left, to act as a reserve to Morgan. On the morning of the 29th, all Dec, things were in readiness for the 2^* attack. It was Sherman’s object, as he himself has told us, to make a lodgment on the foot-hills and blutfs abreast of his position, while diver- sions M^ere being made by the navy at Haines’ Blulf, and by the first division, directly towards Vicksburg. We have already mentioned that there were two crossings — one in front of Morgan, and another a little further to the south- west, in front of M. L. Smith. An attempt was made by A. J. Smith to throw a light-flying bridge over the bayou, more to the right. On the ex- treme left, a little above the angle of the Chickasaw, near the house of Mrs. Lake, Blair’s men had succeeded in constructing a bridge, but not without great difficulty, and with very consider- able loss. Sherman expected great things from General Morgan, who, as we have seen, commanded the first di- vision, and was to lead the attack in person. Sherman pointed out to him the place where he could pass the bayou, and received for answer: “Gen- eral, in ten minutes after you give the signal. I’ll be on those hills.” His po- sition was one of considerable difficulty. The crossing was narrow ; and immedi- ately opposite, at the base of the hills, there was a Confederate battery, sup- ported by infantry, posted on the spurs of the hills in the rear. This was the real point of attack; but to distract the attention of the enemy, Sherman’s in- structions were that the initial move- ments should be made at the flanks. It was about noon before the siornal O w^as given for a general forward move- ment across the bayou and towards the enemy’s position. A heavy artillery fire was opened all along the National line. It recalled the memory of luka and Corinth. T he Conf ed erate batteries made a prompt reply, and were soon followed by the infantry, which opened a perfect tempest of lead on the ad- vance ranks of Morgan and A. J. Smith. In the midst of this fierce storm of cam non-shot and musketry, De Courcy’s brigade, of Morgan’s division, succeeded in crossing the bayou; but so terrific was the fire that they took to cover be- hind the bank, and could not be moved forward. General Blair, meanwhile, had crossed the bayou by the bridge above the angle, and had reached the slough, the bottom of which was quick- sand, and the banks of which were cov- ered with felled trees. With great difficulty, and not until his ranks were thrown into some disorder, was the crossing of the slough accomplished. This done, it was necessary, before reaching the enemy’s works, to traverse a sloping plateau, raked by a direct and enfilading fire from heavy artillery, and swept by a storm of bullets from the rifle-pits. Nothing daunted, Blair and his brave brigade — his own and his officers’ horses having been left be- hind, some of them floundering in the mire and vainly seeking a foothold in the c^uicksand — went bounding across th>e plateau. Rushing upon the rifle- pits, they captured the first line and 380 CHICKASAW. then the second, and made a despei*ate effort to gain the crest of the hill on which the batteries were planted. Colonel Thayer, of Steele’s division, had followed Blair, with his brigade, over the same bridge. Entering the abatis at the same point, he turned somewhat to the right, and emerged upon the plateau almost simultaneously with Blair, and about two hundred yards to his right. Unfortunately, however, Thayer found that he was fol- lowed by only one regiment ; his second regiment, after his movement had com- menced, having been ordered to the support of Morgan, and the other two regiments having followed this one by mistake. It was a sad blunder, and one w^hich contributed not a little to the disaster of the day. Thayer dis- covered the mistake before he had fair- ly brought his troops into action ; but he was too brave a man to halt or hesitate in the circumstances. On he pushed to the right of Blair, and ren- dered effective aid in the capture of the second line of rihe-pits. Leaving his regiment to hold the position it had won, he hurried back, with Blair’s con- sent, to obtain reinforcements. It was a trying interval. The moments seemed hours. ‘‘It was a struggle,” as has been well said, “between three thou- sand in the open ground below and ten thousand behind entrenchments above.” The hill sides bristled with bayonets and blazed with the lire of musketry, while, from the angry mouths of huge cannon, destruction was poured forth upon the shattered and rapidly thinning ranks of the assailants. Blair, impa- tient for the return of Thayer, rushed back himself to persuade the advance of more troops. It W'as all in vain. Both Thayer and himself failed in obtaining reinfoi-cements. No help reached them; no diversion was made in their favor. They had no choice but to order a retreat. Blair and Thayer fell back, with a loss of at least one third of their men; and De Courcy, who had been attacked on the flank by the Seventeenth and Twenty-Sixth Lou- isiana, lost four flags, 332 men made prisoners, and about 500 small arms. The attack was a complete failure. Somehow, the signal for attack was im- perfectly understood. Either that, or it was not heard at all on the right. Two divisions had remained immovable, w'hile a handful of men were being crushed in a desperate attempt on the left. A. J. Smith had done nothing. Stuart had managed to push across one regiment — the Sixth Missouri — which had orders to undermine the bluff. The position of those men was one which severely tried their faith and patience. They were exposed to the vertical Are of the Confederate sharpshooters who occupied the ridge ; and a battalion of the Thirteenth Begulars, who were stationed opposite, and wflio attempted to protect them from the Confederate Are, proved equally dangerous with the enemy above. “ Shoot higher !” shouted the Nationals below the bluff. “Shoot lower!” cried the Confederates. After dark, this regiment was brought back over the bayou. The remainder of Steele’s division did not get up in time to be of any assistance to Blair. Mor- SAD SCENES. 381 gan failed to make good his promise. He did not even obey his orders. Gen- eral Sherman was particularly severe on Morgan. To him, and to his conduct, he attributed the failure of the attack. ‘‘ This attack failed,” he has since told us in his memoirs, and I have always felt that it was due to the failure of Gen- eral G. W. Morgan to obey his orders, or to fulfil his promises made in person. Had he used with skill and boldness one of his brigades, in addition to that of Blair, he could have made a lodg- ment on the blutf, which would have opened the door for our whole force to follow.” Sherman was naturally mortified at the “ lame and impotent conclusion ” of a movement which, he had fondly and confidently believed, would result in a great and decisive victory. Baffled, and. even humiliated, he was not dis- mayed. He resolved to make another attack; and arrangements were made to push forward General Hovey to the position from which Blair had been driven ; Morgan’s division, with the brigades of Blair and Thayer, to follow and support. For some reason it was not done ; and next morning it was found to be impossible, because of the increased strength of the Confederates at the menaced point. Firing was con- tinued on both sides during Tuesday ; Dec. Wednesday, the 31st, a 31* flag of truce was sent in; and the dead were buried, and the wounded cared for. An eye-witness has given us a* sad picture of the battle field on that day of burial. “All across the plain, scattered among the abatis^ .and hid away in little entanglements of bogs, or tufts of bushes, they lay. Con- federates and Federal s side by side, showing how the battle had rolled and surged with the alternate charges of either party. But the saddest sight of all was that of the unfortunate wound- ed who had lain through all these weary hours, since the battle, uncared for, many of them, because the nature of their wounds prevented them from moving; others were held fast by a little knot of corpses which chance had thrown upon them; and still others, perhaps not wounded at all at first, but being caught beneath the horses they rode, as they fell, were pinned to the earth. The frantic appeals for water, for food, or other succor, of such of these miserable victims of war as could speak at all, were most heart- rending.” Sherman was still dissatisfied, and resolved to make another attack. After consulting with Admiral Porter, it was agreed that a combined naval and land assault should be ' made on Haines’ Bluff, the key of the Confederate posi- tion. Porter was to proceed up the Yazoo with his gunboats, and open fire on the bluffs, while General Steele was to land his division out of range of the enemy’s guns, then to push forward and take the position by storm. The attack was to be made during the dark hours. By two o’clock on the morn- ing of Thursday, the 1st of Jan- nary, the necessary arrangements were completed. A heavy fog, how- ever, had enveloped the entire district; and so dense was it that Porter found it 382 CHICKASAW. impossible to steer the boats. It was utterly out of the question to make any further efforts. On the night of the 29th December, there had been a tremendous rain-storm ; all the low ground was flooded ; and the men who had been bivouacking for five successive days in those wretched swamps, with- out fire, were suffering cruelly from Jan. damp and cold. On the 2d of January, Sherman placed his troops on board the transports; and the fleet sailed down to the mouth of the Yazoo. Thus ended, somewhat in- gloriously, the second campaign against Y icksburg. Sherman had accomplished nothing. He had, however, made great sacrifices ; his loss in killed and wound- ed and prisoners amounting to nearly 2000 men. Such was the battle of Chickasaw Bayou, or, as it is sometimes but less correctly named, the battle of Haines’ Bluff. It was a sad disappointment to the people of the North ; and Sherman, from whom great things were expected, came in for a large share ' of abuse. Several of the correspondents on the spot, ignorant of some of the causes of the failure, and not knowing as yet the fate which had befallen Grant, were unnecessarily severe in their condemna- tion of Sherman. That he meant well, that he was resolved to win, and that his plan was well-conceived, there can be no doubt. But somehow the execu- tion was not equal to the conception. There was some mistake in giving the signal ; and the real assault was made by only 3000 men. If Blair had been sustained in his attack, as he ought to have been sustained, the Na- tional army would most undoubtedly have effected a lodgment on the heights ; and, although hard fighting must have followed with doubtful suc- cess, it is not at all impossible that Shermail might have reaped all the glory due to the capture of Vicksburg. Blair will be remembered as the hero of Chickasaw Bayou. He fought like a warrior of old, face to face and hand to hand with the foe. After Blair, praise is due to Thayer, who gallantly sustained his companion in arms. The battle ground, no doubt, had much to do with the defeat. To any one of less daring than Sherman, familiar with the district, and well-informed as to the strength of the enemy’s position, the undertaking might have seemed impracticable from the outset ; and it is questionable whether even he, had he possessed a fuller knowledge of the difficulties which beset him, would have imperilled his fame and risked the lives of his soldiers in a task so apparently hopeless. It was doubtless a mistake not to have more thoroughly and officially reconnoitered the ground before choosing it as the field of action. After all, however, it was an experi- ment which might have been successful ; and it was not the only unsuccessful experiment which was made before Vicksburg was captured. As it was, everything might have been well, if Grant had been able to carry out his part of the plan. The retreat of the latter from Oxford, leaving, as it did, Pemberton free to concentrate his troops for the defense of Vicksburg, McCLERNAND IN COMMAND. 383 largely diminished Sherman’s chances of success. The Confederates were jubilant after this first victory. It was undoubtedly a great triumph. General Pemberton, not without reason, felt proud that he had baffled Grant in person, compelling him to retreat, and that he had tem- porarily, at least, saved Vicksburg by the defeat of the greatest of Grant’s lieutenants. These rejoicings in the South were not un mixed with sorrow. The more thoughtful of the Confed- erates knew that defeat only intensi- fied the purpose of the North. Vicks- burg had not yet fallen ; but Vicksburg, they felt, was doomed. We left the transports and the fleet on their way down the Yazoo. At the mouth of that river. General McCler- nand was waiting with orders from the War Department to take command of the entire expedition. That general, it will be remembered, was appointed to this command by the direct influence of President Lincoln. It was a severe blow to Sherman, who felt it keenly. It was some consolation, however, to him to know that the appointment — which had been made weeks ahead, and which had no connection with the recent disaster — was not intended as a disgrace. With a modesty which be- came a man of his high spirit, he ac- cepted the situation, and explained to McClernand what had been done, ac- cepting the entire responsibility of the failure. Keferring to the trains of cars which could be heard coming in to Vicksburg almost every hour, and the fresb troops seen on the bluffs, he gave it as his opinion that Pemberton’s army must have been pressed back, and that Grant must be at hand. He then learned, for the first time, what bad befallen Grant ; McClernand stating that Grant was not coming at all, that the depot at Holly Springs had been captured by Van Dorn, that Grant had fallen back from Coffeeville and Ox- ford to Holly Springs and La Grange, and that when he passed down, Quim- by’s division, of Grant’s army, was ac- tually at Memphis for stores. By common consent, all further attempts against Vicksburg, for the present, were abandoned ; and the entire force left the Yazoo, and retired to Milli- ken’s Bend on the Mississippi. On the 4th of January, McClernand issued his General Order No. 1, assum- ing command of what was to be called the army of the Mississippi, and, fol- lowing the plan which had been agreed upon at Washington, and which had been adopted in the armies of the East, dividing his forces into two corps. The first 'was to be commanded by General Morgan, and was to be com- posed of his own and A. J. Smith’s divisions; and the second, to consist of Steele’s and Stuart’s divisions, was to be commanded by General Sherman. The rest of the army of the Tennessee was similarly divided, General Hurl- but being placed in command of one corps, and General McPherson in com- mand of the other. The supreme com- mand of these four corps was retained by General Grant. On the same day. General Sherman issued the following order : 384 CHICKASAW. “ Headquarters Right Wing Army of Tennessee, \ Steamer Forest Queen, Milliken’s Bend, > January 4, 1863. ) “ Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the army of the Mississippi, composed of two ‘ anny corps one to be com- manded by General G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relimpiishing the command of the army of the Ten- nessee, and restricting my authority to my own corps, I desire to express to all commanders, to soldiei’s and officers re- cently operating before Vicksburg, my liearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all oc- casions. We failed in accomplishing one great piu’pose of our movement — the capture of Vicksburg ; but we were ])art of a whole. Ours was but pai’t of a combined movement in which others w’ere to assist. We were on time; un- foreseen contingencies must have de- layed the others. We have destroyed the Shreveport Hoad, wm have attacked the defenses of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would jus- tify ; and, having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn otf in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the president of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to main- tain and defend it, and he has the un- doubted ri^ht to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and sol- diers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough, too. Let each do his ap- propriate part, and our nation must, in the end, emerge from the dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity. All officers of the general staff not attached to my person will hereafter report in person and by letter to Major-General McClernand, commanding the army of the Mississippi, on board the steamer Tigress at our rendezvous at Haines’ Landing and at Montgomery Point. “By order of “Major-General W. T. Sherman. “J. H. Hammond, “Assistant-Adjutant General.” Befoie the arrival of McClernand, Sherman and Porter had agreed upon a plan for the reduction of Fort Hind- man, or-, as it was called, Arkansas Post. About forty or forty-five miles from the mouth of the Arkansas, there is a piece of elevated gi’ound, the first high land on the banks of the river, after leaving the Mississippi. At ’ this point, the river makes a sharp bend. Here the French had a trading post and a settle- ment as far back as 1685. The Con- federates had taken advantage of the place to erect some fortifications, the principal work being named Fort Hind- man, after the famous guerrilla chief. Behind these works, they kept several steamboats, which were wont to sweep down the river and intercept supplies. Sherman had experienced some incon- venience from the existence of this stronghold. He had left Memphis in such hade that he had not been able to WHITE RIYER. 385 take with him a sufficient supply of ammunition for his guns. The Blue Wing, a small steamer carrying a mail, towing some coal barges, and having with her the necessary supplies, had been sent after him. This boat had been pounced upon at the mouth of the Arkansas, captured, and, with all her supplies, taken up to Fort Hindman. It was Sherman’s conviction, from the moment he learned of the fate of the Blue Wing, that before any operation could be successfully conducted against Vicksburg by way of the Mississippi, it would be necessary to reduce Fort Hindman, and make an end of the Ar- kansas pirates. Sherman communicated his purpose to McClernand, and asked permission to go up the Arkansas, and clear out the post. McClernand, who had not as yet, so far as appearances indicated, formed any plan of his own, went with Sherman on board the Black Hawk to consult with Porter. Porter, who had the hig^hest esteem for Sher- man, not only approved of the enter- prise, but expressed a desire to go up the river himself, in place of trusting the expedition to any of his subordi- nates. It was Sherman’s expectation that he would be sent, with his own corps, alone on this business ; but Mc- Clernand concluded to go himself, and to take with him his whole force. The troops, which had not yet dis- embarked from the transpoils, were ordered to remain on board. Sher- man’s corps was in two divisions. The first, which consisted of three brigades, commanded respectively by Blair, Hovey and Thayer, was under Briga- dier-General Frederick ^teele. The second, which consisted of two bri- gades, commanded by Colonels G. A, Smith and T. Kilby Smith, was under Brigadier-General Stuart. The trans- ports with the troops on board, con- voyed by the gun boats, of which three were iron-clads, proceeded up the Mississippi. The force under McCler- nand amounted to some 26,000 or 27,000 men, comprising 40 regiments of infantry, 10 batteries with several guns of heavy calibre, and about 1500 horse. On the 8th of January, the expedition was at the mouth of the White River. This river, which is one of the principal streams in Arkansas, rises a few miles east of Fayetteville, flows northeast into Missouri, then re- turns into Arkansas, and, pursuing a southeasterly course, enters the Missis- sippi about fifteen miles above the mouth of the Arkansas River, It is navigable by steamboats for about three hundred and fifty miles. About fifteen miles from its mouth, there is a channel or ‘^cut-off,” through which it discharges a portion of its waters into the Arkansas. If, as sometimes hap- pens, the Arkansas should be higher than the White River, the state of things is reversed, and the waters of the Arkansas seek the Mississippi throug:h the channel of the White River. The ‘‘cut-off” at this season of the year is always well filled and easily navigable. On the morning of the 9th, the expedition having jan, ascended the White River, had reached the mouth of the “cut-off.” There was no delay in making the 386 CHICKASAW. passage through to the Arkansas, a dis- tance of about eight miles. Steaming up the Arkansas, the boats reached Notrib’s Farm, about four miles below Fort Hindman, shortly after four o’clock in the afternoon. Here they halted ; and during the night the artillery and wagons were got on shore, the troops disembarking in the morning. Arkan- sas Post is on the north side or left bank of the Arkansas, at a point where the river makes a sharp elbow, by flowing north, then east, then again ab- ruptly to the south. The principal work, as we have said, was Fort Hind- man. Its guns commanded the river, as it stretched to the east, and, after it bent toward the south. This fort was a regular square bastioned work, one hundred yards each exterior side, with a deep ditch about fifteen feet wide, and a parapet eighteen feet high. It was armed vdth twelve guns, two of which were eight-inch, and one nine-inch. The garrison, which numbered only 5000 men, was under the command of General T. J. Churchill, who was under the direction of General T. H. Holmes, then commandiniy at Little Pock. O Churchill had received instructions to ^^hold on until help should arrive or all were dead.” The disparity of forces was great. It 'was 26,000 or 27,000 against 5000. The strong position held by the Con- federates, however, did much to com- pensate for inferiority of numbers. The fort itself was strong ; and its ap- proaches were of the most difficult de- scription. Fronting on the river, it was protected on the west by a bayou, on the east by a swamp which did not quite reach the edge of the water. Between the fort and the swamp, there was a ravine which stretched down to the river; and the front of this ravine was well fortified. The position had thus to be approached through the ele- vated ground which lay between the bayou and the swamp. The encamp- ments of the Confederates were estab- lished in front of the fort, in the centre of the plateau dotted with clumps of trees. There was an outer line of en- trenchments which stretched across the entire ground. On the 10th, the army was kept busy endeavoring to get a posi- jan, tion in rear of the fort, Sher- man on the right and Morgan on the left. Some mistakes were made, in con- sequence of a want of knowledge of the ground. In the afternoon, and while the land forces were still seeking position. Porter was making good use of his flotilla. As he moved up the river, he shelled the rifle-pits along the levee, and drove the Confederates in- side the fort. When about four hun- dred yards from Fort Hindman, he brought into action his three iron-clads — the Baron de Kalb, the Louisville and the Cincinnati; and for half an hour the firing was kept up, the guns of the fort replying vigorously. On the morning of the 11th McCler- nand, who had his quarters still jan. on board the Tigress, had come H. up and taken a position in the woods to the rear. Early in the forenoon, he sent a message to Sherman, asking him why the attack was not begun. It had FORT HINDMAN CAPTURED. 387 been understood beforehand that the opening of fire by the gunboats on the fort should be the signal for a general attack. Sherman, therefore, replied that all was ready ; that he was within five or six hundred yards of the enemy’s works; that the next movement must be a direct assault along the whole line; and that he was waiting to hear from- the gunboats. Half an hour or there- about afterwards was heard the clear, ringing sound of the navy guns, the firing becoming louder and more rapid as they neared the fort. The National field pieces opened fire along the whole line. The thunder was terrific. The Confederates, most of whom were Texan volunteers, made a gallant resistance. A regiment of cavalry, abandoning their horses, fought on foot, and rendered, for a time, effective service in resisting the advance of the Nationals. It was impossible for them to resist the fierce onset made by overwhelming numbers. Sherman pressed forward on the right, Morgan on the left, each driving the Confederates back, and gradually ob- taining possession of the wooded ground in front of the newly-erected parapet, but not without considerable loss. The Confederate firing was heavy ; but the National soldiers took advantage of the clumps of trees, and felled logs to shield themselves from the storm of bullets. Gradually the edge of the woods was reached; the ground was clear; and there was nothing to protect them from the decimating fire of the enemy. Meanwhile, the gunboats were pour- ing a murderous fire upon the fort, and sweeping the adjoining ground above and below with grape and shrapnell. Porter had brought into action not only the iron-clads, but the ram Monarch, Commander Ellet, and even the frailer vessels, as he tells us, that amid the clouds of smoke they might “do the best they could.” It was not long until the effects of this terrific firing began to be visible. All the adjoining ground was cleared of the foe; nearly all the artilleiy horses in the fort were killed ; and one by one the guns were being silenced. Shortly after three o’clock, the firing from the fort altogether ceased. The cannonading, however, was kept up by the gunboats. Porter, who had taken a regiment on board, was proceeding with the Black Hawk to attempt a landing, and to take pos- session, when a white flag was raised in token of surrender. He immediately ordered the firing to cease. We left the troops in the clearing at the edge of the woods, fully exposed to the enemy’s fire from the parapet out- side the fort. This line had three sec- tions of ^ field guns; and they were handled, according to the testimony of Sherman himself, with great skill and energy. Hovey was wounded ; Thayer had his horse shot under him ; and so thick and fast was the round-shot fall- ing about Sherman and his staff, that they felt it necessary to scatter, Sher- man himself dismounting. Morgan, at this crisis, unfortunately found himself in front of the ravine, beyond which it was impossible to pass. Sherman was now well engaged on the right; and Morgan, finding himself thus hindered, sent a few regiments to his aid. The 383 CHICKASAW. burden of the fight, as at Chickasaw, had fallen on the brigades which now composed the division of General Steele. Blair and Thayer and Hovey performed prodigies of valor. On the right, the Confederate bat- teries had been all but silenced. Mor- gan’s men, on the left, had done splen- did work before they were brought to a standstill at the ravine. A. J. Smith’s brigades had pressed the Confederates back, step by step, until they were within two hundred yards of the fort. Burbridge expressly distinguished him- self. But for the ravine, an attempt would have been made by the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio to scale, and carry by assault, the eastern side of the fort. Almost at this moment, how- ever, Sherman, as his attention was arrested by the flags of the gunboats visible above the parapet of Fort Hind- man, saw a man jump on the nearer parapet at the point where entered the road which divided the peninsula. Cease tiring !” he ordered ; and the words were passed along the line with amazing rapidity. The firing soon ceased. In a few seconds the fort was invaded on every side by the National troops. Colonel Dayton was ordered forward to the place where was hung out the large white flag; and as soon as his horse was seen on the parapet, Sherman advanced with his staff. It appeared afterwards that the white flag was hung out without even the knowl- edge of Churchill. It made little dif- ference. The battle had really been won on the land as well as on the river side of the fort. Tha surrender was subsequently made in due form — Col- onel Diinnington, the commander of the fort, surrendering to Admiral Porter, and Colonel Churchill surrendering to the military authorities. The National loss in killed, wounded and missing amounted to 977 men. On the Con- federate side there were only 60 killed and 80 wounded. Five thousand sol- diers, with their officers, made prison- ers, and all the property of the place, including some seventeen guns, consti- tuted the prize of victor}^ General Burbridge was singled out for the honor of planting the National stand- ard on Fort Hindman. Such was the battle of Arkansas Post. General Sherman was dissatisfied with the arrangements made by Gen- eral McClernand immediately after the surrender. The post of honor — the oc- cupation of Fort Hindman — was given to A. J. Smith, of Morgan’s division, Sherman being ordered to hold the lines outside, and go on securing the prisoners and stores. McClernand’s reason for so doing was that he did not wish to interfere with the actual state of facts — the status quo at the time of surrender. It is undeniable that it was Sherman’s plan throughout; that his corps bore the burden of the fight ; that, after the surrender, his troops were in possession of two of the three brigades which constituted the opposing force; and that he was in possession of all the ground outside the ‘Hort proper.” Mc- Clernand was proud of his success, and manifested not a little vanity. His star, he said, was ever in the ascendant. In his memoirs, Sherman tells us that JEALOUSY. 389 McClernand was extremely jealous of the navy, and that, in his report, he ig- nored altogether the action of Porter’s fleet. This was the less to be regretted that Porter told his own story in a very handsome and effective way. It is only simple truth to say that the battle was fought and won by the fleet before the land troops had any certainty of success. There was, in fact, a feeling of jealousy among the commanders — a feeling which was not wholly to disappear until the arrival of Grant, in whose presence, and under the* influence of whose more com- manding genius, jealousy and selfish- ness gave place to a spirit of honorable rivalry and dutiful obedience. The day after the battle was devoted to burying the dead. The prisoners were all collected and sent to St. Louis. The victory at Arkansas Post opened the way for a successful expedition to Little Pock, the capital of the State of Arkansas. Sherman expressed a desire to be sent on this expedition. McCler- nand, however, did not deem it advis- able. A combined expedition, was, therefore, sent up the White River, as far as St. Charles, Des Arc and Duval’s Bluff, under General Gorman and Lieutenant-Commanding J. G. Walker. The expedition was completely success- ful. Meanwhile, the works at Fort Hindman were dismantled and blown up; and, on the loth, the troops were re-embarked, and ^n*oceeded down the Arkansas to Napoleon. There, instruc- tions were received from General Grant, who ordered McClernand to take the entire expedition down the river to Milliken’s Bend, and await his arrivah This place was reached on the 21st of January. In itself, the movement against Ar- kansas Post was a small affair ; it was so regarded by General Grant ; it ought to have been successfully accomplished by one corps, and by a portion of the; fleet — instead of the combined strength of both — and that was Sherman’s idea ; but resulting, as it did, in victoiy, it served the double purpose of era- ploying troops which would otherwise have been idle, and of cheering thj hearts of a people who were some^ what despondent. 390 VICKSBURG. CHAPTER .XXI‘V. The Proclamation of Emancipation. — Divided Sentiments. — A Turning Point in History. — The Cry of the Slave. — Prayers Heard and Answered. — Colored Troops. — “Vicksburg Must Be Taken.” — Grant at Young’s Point. — The Walnut Hills. — The Yazoo. — Haines’ Bluff. — An Apparently Impregnable City. — How to Get to the East of the Mississippi. — Five Different Schemes. — The Williams Canal Experiment. — Almost a Suc- cess. — A Failure. — A Bold and Daring Experiment. — The Flood. — Koundabout Bayou. — Another Failure. — — Lake Providence.— Moon Lake. — The Yallabusha.— The Tallahatchie. — Greenwood. — Fort Pemberton. — Another Failure.— Steele’s Bayou. — Admiral Porter. — Failure Again. — A Five-Fold Failure. — Grant Disap- pointed, but Not Discouraged —Sherman’s Opinion. — Grant's Besolve. — The New Movement Commenced. — New Carthage. — A Tedious and Difficult March. — The Fleet. — Passing the Batteries. — A Midnight Scene. — Grierson’s Raid.— The Importance of Cavalry. — A Brilliant Exploit. — Grand Gulf. — The Gunboats Open Fire. — The Place too Strong. — Rodney.— Bruinsburg. — A Landing Effected. — A Useful Diversion. — Sherman at Haines’ Bluff.— Safe on the East Side. — Grant’s Self-Reliance. — Port Gibson. — The Battle. — The Confederates Fall Back. — Hankinson’s Ferry. — “ The City of an Hundred Hills.” — Bayou Pierre. — Big Black. — The Natural Barriers. — Reconnoitering Parties. — Raymond.— A Tremendous Rush for the Guns. — A National Victory. — Johnston at Jackson. — His Instructions to Pemberton. — Jackson Evacuated. — An Easy Victory. — Torrents of Rain. — The Three Generals, Grant, McPherson and Sherman. — Grant Now Marches Against Pemberton. — Edward’s Station the Point of Rendezvous. — Champion Hills. — A Strong Position. — Pemberton Prepares for Battle. — Arrival of the National Advance. — The Battle of Champion Hills Begun. — Hovey Sorely Pressed. — Reinforced. — Logan's Success.— The Battle Won After a Terrible Struggle. — McClernand too Late. — McCler- nand and Osterhaus Ordered in Pursuit. — The Big Black River. — The Railway Bridge. — A Successful Re- treat.— Preparations for Assault.— Lawler’s Discovery. —The Assault Made. — A Terrible Struggle. — Heavy Loss of Life. — The Burning of the Bridges. — The Bridges Reconstructed. — On to Vicksburg. — Porter on the Yazoo.— Sherman at Haines’ Bluff. — The Fall of Vick.sburg Secured. — Preparing to Make the Assault. — Pemberton’s Situation.— The Assault of the lOth of May. — A Failure. — The Assault of the 22d. — Grant’s Reasons for Avoiding Further Delay. — Terrible Fighting. — The “Works too Strong, Naturally and Arti ficially, to be Taken by Assault.” — McClernand’s Mistake. — Sergeant Griffiths. — A Usele.ss Slaughter. — The Troops Recalled. — The Troops Complimented. — The- Bravery of the Defenders. — A Confederate Picture. — McCleruand’s Congratulatory Order. — His Removal from the Command of the Thirteenth Corps. — The Appointment of Ord. — Grant R; solves to Take the Place by a‘ Regular Siege. — Reinforcements. — The In- vestment Completed. — Siege Operations Commenced. — Pemberton’s Situation Becoming Desperate. — His Complaints. — The Want of Cavalry.— What Johnston Proposed. — Johnston Preparing to Attack the Na- tional Rear. — Pemberton’s Vacillation.— Distress of the Garrison. — The Mining Operations Well Advanced. — The 2r)th of June. — The First Mine Fired. — The Storming Columns. — The As.sault on Fort Hill. — A Terrific Cannonade. — A Repulse. — The 1st of July. — The Destruction of the Redan. — An Intercepted Letter. — Promised Aid to Pemberton. — Grant’s Instructions to Sherman. — The 3d of July. — The White Flag. — General Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. — A Letter from Pemberton. — He Asks for an Armistice and the Appoint- ment of Commissioners. — Grant Refuses. — “Unconditional Surrender.” — The Interview Between Grant and Pemberton. — An Imposing Scene. — Under the Old Oak, in View of Both Armies.— A Striking Contrast. — Can’t Agree. — Consideration on the Part of Grant. — Terms in Writing.— The Agreement. — The Surrender. — The Fourth of July.— Light at Last. — A Great Day for the National Cause. — A National Triumph.— A Great Triumph for Grant. — The First Soldier of the Republic. — The Results of the Campaign. — Pursuit of Johnston. — Evacuation of Jackson. — Johnston, the “Hero of Retreats.” — The End of a Great and Glorious Campaign. The opening of the year 18G3 was 1863 memorable by the Procla-' mation of Emancipation. It was by slow degrees that Abraham Lincoln rose to the full dignity of his mission, and arrived at the conclusion that the CIVIL WAR.] THE CRY OP THE OPPRESSED. 391 will of God, as well as the rights of man and the preservation of the Union, called for the immediate and unquali- fied abolition of slavery. What to do with the slaves of the South had, in- deed, been a vexed question since the commencement of the war. It was a fruitful source of controversy in the cabinet; and it puzzled alike the legis- lators in Congress and the generals in the held. Among the last named, par- ticularly from whom direct action was frequently demanded, the greatest ,di- versity of sentiment prevailed. Butler looked upon the slaves as contraband. In his own department, Fremont gave them liberty. McClellan would put them down with an iron hand.” Pat- terson would repress all servile insur- rections. Mansfield would allow them no harbor in his camps. Halleck would drive them out of his lines. Burnside would not interfere with slavery. Cam- eron would not surrender any that might chance to come within the army lines. Dix was unwilling to interfere between the slave and his master. Wool was willing to give them employ- ment, and to regulate their pay and al- lowances. Hooker and Buell actually went so far as to authorize slave-owners to search the National camps for fugi- tives, and to carry them off. Lincoln c unplained of the conduct of Fremont; and he issued a counter-order when Hunter, at Hilton Head, proclaimed the slaves in his department free. It is not necessary to trace the suc- cessive steps by which, ultimately, eman- cipation was reached. Reference has already been made, in these pages, to the history of the proclamation itself. It was the work of Lincoln’s own hand ; and, in its every sentence, it bears the impress of his genius. Evidently it took shape during the unfortunate cam- paign of General Pope in Virginia — a campaign, the disastrous results of which were all the more severely felt that it followed so close upon McClel- lan’s retreat from the peninsula. But for the advice of Secretary Seward, the proclamation would have been pub- lished while the nation was yet smart- ing under defeat, while Pope and his shattered legions were sheltered behind the fortifications at Washington, and while Lee had marched in triumph into Maryland. It was wisely concluded to wait until the first returning sunshine of victory should rest on the National cause. The opportunity arrived after the battle of Antietam, and when Lee, on the night of the 19th of September, 1862, retired into Virginia. Three .days after that date, on the 2 2d of Sep- tember, Lincoln — remembering the vow he had made before God, that, if Gen- eral Lee were driven back fi*om Mary- land, he would crown the result by a declaration of freedom to the slaves — is- sued that famous proclamation which marked a turning-point, not only in the history of the United States, but in the history of the world. In one of the finest passages of his excellent history of the Civil War, Dr. Draper, when describing the condition of the negroes, and the hopes which the proclamation inspired in their breasts, says : “ From the rivers of Virginia to the Mexican confines of the Republic 392 VICKSBURG. ai-ose a mournful wail : ‘ How long, O Lord, how long !’ It came from the weary laborer, leaning on his hoe in the cotton field under the noontide sun ; it came through the moaning midnight forests, solemn and clear above their multitudinous inarticulate sounds; it came from children torn from their parents, from wives and husbands part- ed at the auction block, from mothers in despair, from strong men fainting under the lash, from the aged, whose heads were frosted by time. In their quaint prayers, the Africans talk to (.Tod as a man talks face to face with his friend. Slavery had made Him their friend. By the flickering fires of their cabins, they stealthily spelt out the Bible, to see what He had promised to them. It was their dreadful lot that had caused Jefferson, himself a slave- owner, to expostulate solemnly with his countrymen, and to deprecate the wrath of God. For who shall escape when, from the hand of Eternal Justice, her. scales have dropped as useless; when from her brow the bandage has been raised, that her uncovered and angry eyes may gaze upon unutterable wrong; when her uplifted arm, quivering with indignation, is ready to strike a blow that shall make a whole continent tremble !” On the evening of the last day of the year 1862 , these poor, down-trodden ones, wherever they could gather to- gether — in their humble meeting-houses, in their lowlier cabins, or in the lone woods — met in solemn assembly, and lifted their eyes and their hearts to heaven, calling upon Almighty God to strengthen the hands of Abraham Lin- coln on the coming day. When that day arrived, the purpose which had been declared in September, was made good ; and the stain of slavery was wiped out from the escutcheon of the Republic. The emancipation proclamation did not give satisfaction to all. It greatly enraged, as a matter of course, the Southern leaders ; and there were many in the North who, although they had no sympathy with the Southern Con- federacy, regarded the abolition of slavery as an interference with the rights of property, and a violation of one of the fundamental principles of the constitution. Immediate and un- qualified abolition may not have been an unmixed good; but it was a neces- sity — a necessity growing out of the war. It was a weapon which the North had a perfect right to use in putting down the rebellion; and not to have used it would have implied both weak- ness and folly. Slavery, besides, lay at the very root of the evil out of which, cancer-like, the war arose ; and, if it was “the paramount object” of the North “ to save the Union, and not to save or to destroy slavery,” it was to preserve the institution of slavery that the war was undertaken and continued by the South. It was not a rash act, done in hot haste, the offspring of re- venge or despair. It was the result of much anxious and prayerful thought, the ripe fruit of calm, patient and pro- tracted study. It was the noblest act of Lincoln’s brief and chequered but withal noble life. EMANCIPATION. 393 One of the immediate results of this proclamation of emancipation was the organization of colored troops. Towards the close of 1863, there were some fifty thousand colored men in actual ser- vice ; and this number was tripled be- fore the close of 1864. It was not, however, for some time to come that their influence on the field began to be felt. During the year 1863, although colored troops, as we shall see, took part at the siege of Port Hudson, and in other engagements, their effect was comparatively unimportant. The intro- duction of colored men into the army was regarded by many in the light of a fresh revolution. It gave birth in some quarters to a perfect howl of dis- satisfaction ; several of the newspapers went beyond all bounds in their fierce denunciation of the government; and the swords of some prominent generals relaxed in their grasp. General Grant, not troubling himself with politics, but regarding himself simply as the servant of the Republic, heartily approved of the emancipation policy, and enforced the measures of the government. It is expected,” he said, “that all com- manders will especially exert them- selves in carrying out the policy of the administration, not only in organizing colored troops, and rendering them effi- cient, but also in removing prejudices against them.” The situation was now ripe for the vigorous prosecution of the siege of Vicksburg. Sherman’s non-success at Chickasaw had not dismayed Grant, while the comparatively unimportant victory at Arkansas Post had greatly cheered the people. The popular cry was “On to Vicksburg!” and Grant’s emphatic dictum was “ Vicksburg must be taken.” The army under General Grant had been greatly reinforced ; and the general feeling was that if the “ Queen City of the Bluff ” was to be reduced, it was to be done by the hero of Donelson and Shiloh, of. luka and Corinth. As we stated at the close of the last chapter. Grant was to meet McClernand and Porter, with the fleet and trans- ports, at Milliken’s Bend. On the 18th of January, that meeting took jan, place. There was a general con- 18. sulfation ; and the views of the general- in-chief, and of all the leading officers, were freely exchanged. After con- sultation, Grant made arrangements for future movements, and gave some spe- cial instructions. McClernand and Sher- man made immediate preparations to go down the Mississippi to Young’s Point ; and Grant, without delay, re- turned to Memphis, in order to hasten the transportation of his troops to the neighborhood of Vicksburg. McCler- nand, it will be remembered, assumed command of what was named the army of the Mississippi, after the bat- tle of the Chickasaw, by virtue of a confidential .order from the War De- partment. In this capacity, however, he was subject to orders from General Grant, who was at the head of the de- partment of the Tennessee. At the time of which we write, all things were changed. By an order (No. 210) of De- cember 18th, 1862, from the War De- partment, the Western armies had been 394 VICKSBURG. 1 grouped into five corps, viz. : the Thir- teenth, Major-General McClernand ; the Fourteenth, Major-General George H. Thomas, in Middle Tennessee ; the Fif- teenth, Major-General W. T. Sherman ; the Sixteenth, Major-General Hurlbut, at Memphis; and the Seventeenth, Major-General McPherson, back of Memphis. This entire force was placed under the control of General. Grant. Pel), On the 2d of February, the 2* greater number of the troops in- tended to be used in the operations against Vicksburg having already reached their destination. Grant arrived at Young’s Point, and took command. Now that General Grant was on the spot, the question which he had to set- tle was — How could Vicksburg be most easily and effectually approached ? The National army was lying on the west side of the Mississippi. Vicks- burg stood on the Walnut Hills, high and impregnable ground on the oppo- site shore. The city must be ap- proached by way of the river. To give any effect to the siege, troops must be landed either above or below the city. To land troops above the city, implied steaming up the Yazoo and passing the formidable batteries at Haines’ Bluff, which completely com- manded that river. This, as the latest attempt had proved, was in the last de- gree dangerous, if not absolutely im- possible. It could only succeed by a sacrifice of life which would be but im- perfectly rewarded by the result. To land troops below the city, implied steaming down the Mississippi and pass- ing the Vicksburg defenses throughout their entire length. This seemed even a more perilous undertaking than the other. How were these obstacles to be overcome ? That was the question which General Grant had now to an- swer. !pive different solutions were suggested. There were, first, the Will- iams’ Canal; second, the route from Milliken’s Bend ; third, the Lake Provi- dence route; fourth, the Yazoo Pass; and fifth, the route by Steele’s Bayou. Let us consider these in the order in which we have named them. A glance at the map will show the reader what was meant by the canal, and how practicable at first it seemed. In front of Vicksburg the Mississippi makes a sharp bend, forming the penin- sula on which stands the town of De Soto. A canal cut across this tongue of land, giving a more direct passage to the current of the river, would leave Vicksburg without any water de- fenses — the place would, for all mili- tary purposes, be neutralized. It will be remembered that, in the summer of 1862, General Williams, who came up the river with Farragut, undertook to cut such a canal, and, for that purpose, gathered some twelve hundred negroes from the plantations in the immediate neighborhood. It has already been narrated how, from an error committed in the location of its mouth, the canal proved a failure. The waters stub- bornly refused to leave their ancient channel. This canal or “ cut-off,” which was one mile in length, was located across the peninsula, at right angles, about six miles below Vicksburg. Grant perceived that if it could effect- EXPERIMENTS. 395 ively be turned to account, it would not only isolate Vicksburg, but make a channel for the transportation of troops and supplies to the south of the city. To the completion of this work, he gave much of his personal attention, as soon as he returned from Memphis. Meantime, the work had been prose- cuted with great vigor by McClernand and Sherman. The men continued to work day and night; and, to secure their protection, good use was made of Porter’s fleet, strengthened now by the addition of several armed vessels, such as the Chillicothe, Indianola, Lafayette, Eastport and others. It was a bold and daring experiment to attempt to divert the course of a great river like the Mississippi — all the more so that the former attempt, undertaken in more favorable circumstances, had pi*oved a complete failure. But it was not an impossible task; and, in the circum- stances, nothing but the absolutely im- possible was to be left untried. The work progressed favorably. The camps were on the west side of the canal ; and the earth was thrown up on that side as a sort of levee. During February, the river continued to rise. By the end of the month, it had risen to a great height ; and the work was carried on with very great difficulty, McCler- nand’s corps being removed to higher ground at Milliken’s Bend. Sherman remained at Young’s Point, and con- tinued to direct operations at the canal. For days the waters, rolling past in their fury, and ever rising higher and higher, had been threatening instant and sweeping destruction to the entire scheme. It was now the 8th of March. The harrier at the mouth of the “ cut ” could no longer resist the pressure of the great river. Suddenly, this barrier gave way ; and the waters rushing through, swept all before them, filling the cut, submerging thousands of im- plements, and driving the soldiers to the levee. The canal experiment was a second time a failure. It was not to be tried again. General Grant was no doubt disappointed; but he was not discouraged. There were a series of bayous con- necting Milliken’s Bend with the Ten- sas River, which again connects with the Mississippi, at New Carthage, some distance below Vicksburg. The prin- cipal of these bayous was that of Roundabout or Roundaway, which at one of its extremities unites with the Tensas. In this case, canal-cutting was less necessary than dredging. It so happened that some dredge boats were on hand ; and with these boats. Captain F. E. Prime and Colonel G. G. Piide, went earnestly to work. In a short time, a clear passage was effected ; and some vessels of li^ht tonnasre were able to pass through. The Mississippi, however, began to fall in April; and as the roads between Milliken’s Bend and New Carthage became more ser- viceable, this water-way was of com- paratively little value. It was, in fact, another useless experiment. General Grant’s attention was not devoted exclusively to any one of those possible avenues by which Vicksburg might be approached. His object was to discover a route which should be at 396 VICKSBURG. once practicable and efficient. With this end in view, he was feeling his way all around and in every direction. To the north of Vicksburg about sev- enty-five miles, and about one mile from the Mississippi, on the Louisiana shore, there is a large body of water about six miles in length, formed evi- dently in an old bed of the river, and known as Lake Providence. This lake, by a couple of bayous, unites its waters with the Tensas and Washita Rivers, Avhich form the Black River. Through the Black River, it connects Avith the Red River, and then with the Missis- sippi, some little distance north of Port Hudson. At the point where the Mis- sissippi is reached, that river receives jilso the waters of the Atchafalaya. By following this latter river, which is also naAngable, it would be possible to form a connection with General Banks, who was in command at New Orleans, and come up on the east side of the river. General Grant, having more troops on hand than could be advan- tageously employed at Young’s Point, ordered a portion of them to cut a canal between Lake Providence and the Mississippi. The canal was suc- us road being discovered, the murcli was PASSING THE BATTERIES. 401 resumed around Bayou Vidal to a point some twelve miles further to the south. The distance travelled from Milliken’s Bend was about thirty-five miles. It was a most laborious and tedious march. In the meantime, preparations were being pushed forward for running the transports and gunboats past the heavy batteries at Vicksburg. These batteries extended eio^ht miles along the river. April On the night of the 16th of April, the attempt was made by seven iron-clads, one unarmed gunboat, and three transports, the vulnerable pai’ts of which, above the water, were all well protected with hay and cotton. It was arranged that the gunboats should pass down in single hie, with intervals between of a few hundred yards, and that when they opened their broadsides upon the batteries, the transports, under cover of the smoke, should endeavor to pass unseen. It was a starlit night; but there was a haze on the river which dimmed the lights on the Vicksburg heights. The Benton led the way. It seemed as if the city was wrapped in sleep, and as if the fleet would pass undetected. But no. ‘‘At just a quarter before eleven o’clock,” an eye-witness tells us, “ two bright, sharp lines of flame flashed through the darkness, at the extreme right of the Vicksburg batteries; and in an instant the whole length of the line of the bluffs was ablaze with fire.” The gunboats, wdiich had just rounded the point and lay squarely before the city, opened their broadsides at once. The firing was terrific. In an hour and a half the Vicksburg batteries were passed. The batteries of Warrenton, a little further down the river, had still to be encountered. As these w’ere approached, the fleet took the initiative, and so continuous and effective was the fire, that the enemy made but a feeble re- sponse. The work was now done, and done effectively. The gunboats were comparatively uninjured. Of the three transports, the Forest Queen, which was in the advance, received one shot in her hull and another in her steam- drum, and was instantly disabled. Taken in tow by a gunboat, she was carried down the river without further damage. The Henry Clay, which was next, having been hit by a shell, was soon a blazing mass, and beyond all hope of being saved. The Silver W ave had passed through the fiery ordeal un- scathed. On board the gunboats, one man was killed and two men wounded. Not a man was injured on board the transports. The affair had been suc- ceesful beyond all expectation. Em- boldened by what had happened. Grant had other six transports prepared and sent down the river on the night of the 2 2d of April. One of them, the Louis- iana, which was struck below water- mark, was sunk. The other five were all more or less injured, but they were soon repaired, and ready for use again. Simultaneously with these move- ments, a magnificent cavalry exploit was being performed by Colonel Ben- jamin H. Grierson. Grant was anxious to ascertain the strength of the Con- federacy, and to find out by a practical 402 VICKSBURG. test what resistance it could make to an invading force well organized and well equipped. He wished to do more : he wished to cut off the Con- federate forces who were protecting Vicksburg from their base of supplies and their lines of communication. Col- onel Grierson was a dashing but able and skilful cavalry officer ; and to him was entrusted this somewhat hazardous April task. On the morning of the 17th of April, while the National troops were still busy seeking a route by which to attack Vicksburg from above, Grierson, taking with him his own regi- ment, the Sixth Illinois, the Seventh Ill- inois, and the Second Iowa, some 1700 horsemen in all, and a battery of artille- ry, started from La Grange, Tennessee, and proceeded on his southward march, ill the rear of the Confederate forces. These mounted men, now breaking up into detached parties, and diverging in different directions, and now reuniting, swept the country like a tornado, break- ing up railroad tracks, cutting the tele- graph wires, and burning bridges, depots, cars, manufactories, magazines and stores of every kind. The work was not performed without some hard experience. On the fith day after their departure from La Grange, Grierson’s men rode eight miles through a swamp in which the water was from three to four feet deep, losing twenty of their horses. Much of the country through which they passed was utterly desti- tute of forage and jirovisions; and it was rarely that they could obtain more than one meal a day. In less than six- teen days they had travelled over six I hundred miles. During the last thirty hours they had accomplished at least eighty miles, fought the enemy four times, swum the Comite River and de- stroyed a Confederate camp. At nqon, on the 2d day of May, they entered Baton Rouge, amid May the plaudits of Banks’ men, horses 2. and men half-famished, and some three fourths of the latter more than half- asleep in their saddles. During the expedition, they had killed and wound- ed one hundred of the enemy, captured and paroled five hundred prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed be- tween fifty and sixty miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over thi-ee thousand stand of arms, and seized and carried with them over a thousand horses and mules. It was not without reason that General Grant pronounced this one of the most brill- iant exploits of the war, and one which would be handed down in his- tory as an example to be imitated. Grierson had demonstrated the rotten- ness of the Confederacy. It w^as a ‘‘shell,” and nothing more. We left General Grant, with the two army corps — McClernand’s in advance, McPherson’s following close behind — at a point some few miles below New Carthage. Under Grant’s own superin- tendence, the necessary preparations were being hurried forward for the transportation of his troops from the west to the east side of the Mississippi. It was his intention to cross the river from this point, and to attempt a land- ing at Grand Gulf. It was found, however, that his means of transporta- BRUINSBURG. 403 lion were insufficient; and he deemed it necessary to extend his line of move- ment as far south as Hard Times, mak- ing the entire distance from Milliken’s Bend some seventy or seventy-hve miles. On the 29th March, all things were in readiness. McClernand’s troops were all forward; and McPherson’s were well on their way. Sherman, as we have seen, was left behind to bring up the rear. As many of the Thirteenth corps (McClernand’s) as could be put on board the transports and barges, were embarked, and moved to the front of Grand Gulf. This was a strong for- tified position on the east bank of the Mississippi, below the mouth of the Big Black River — the last of the forti- fications which guarded the approach to Vicksburg from the south. Grant’s plan was to silence the batteries by the gunboats, and, under cover of the fire, to land the troops, and carry the place by storm. At eight o’clock in the morning. Porter moved his fleet towards the enemy’s works, and opened a tre- mendous fire. The response was quick and hearty. For five hours and a half the firing on both sides continued. At the end of that time the lower batteries were silenced ; but the upper ones could not be reached. From a tugboat on the river. General Grant contemplated the scene. Many times,” he tells us, “it seemed to me that the gunboats were within pistol shot of the enemy’s batteries. It soon became evident that the guns of the enemy were too elevated and their for- tifications too strong to be taken from tile water side. The whole ran^re of hills on that side were known to be lined with rifle-pits. Besides, the field artillery could be moved to any position where it might be useful, in case of an attempt at landing.” He wisely concluded, therefore, to discontinue the firing, and to abandon the attempt to effect a landing at Grand Gulf. Porter was ordered to run past the batteries, with the gunboats and transports, as he had done at Vicksburg and Warrenton, and move down to a point opposite Rodney, where the river might be crossed with less difficulty. At six o’clock that evening, accordingly, Poiter renewed the attack ; and, under cover of the fire, the transports passed with- out injury. In the double effort thus made, three of the gunboats sustained some damage ; but they were soon re- paired. Porter had 2d men killed and 56 wounded. During the coui'se of the night, infor- mation was obtained from a negro who had been selling home-made beer at Grand Gulf, that there was a good road from Bruinsburg to Port Gibson, on the Bayou Pierre, in the rear of Grand Gulf. Bruinsburg lies between Grand Gulf and Rodney. At Bruinsburg, ac- cordingly, General Grant resolved to effect a landing. At daylight, on jyjjir, the morning of the 30th, the gun- boats and transports were again in mo- tion. The landing was effected with- out any great inconvenience. McCler- iiand’s corps (the Thirteenth) was fer- ried across first. McPherson’s (the Fourteenth), which had arrived from Lake Providence, followed. Without delay, both corps, having been supplied VICKSBUKG. 4(M with rations for three days, were on their way to Port Gibson. The east side of the Mississippi, be- low V icksburg, had at last been reached with compai‘ative ease. The crossing might have been attended with greater difficulty, but for the use which was made of Sherman and his corps. While waitinof for orders to follow the other two corps, Sherman received from Grant a letter, couched in very friendly terms, requesting him, while McCler- nand and McPherson were attempting to cross the river below, ^‘to make a demonstration on Haines’ Bluff, and to make all the show possible.” He did not like, he said, to order him to do it, because it might be reported at the North as another failure. Sherman an- swered that he would do as required, without any regard to public clamor at a distance ; and he did it most effec- tually. On the 29th, at an early hour ill the morning, he embarked ten regi- ments, of Blair’s division, on ten steam- ers, and, preceded by several iron-clads and gunboats, he ascended the Yazoo, and lay for the night at the mouth of Chickasaw Bayou. Towards evening, he caused the troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, although, as he has himself told us, he ‘‘knew full well that there was no road across the sub- merged field that lay between the river and the blufP.” This movement had the desired ef- fect. Pemberton had just sent off a large force to assist General Bowen to resist the threatened attack on the river below. Seeing this movement in his front, and dreading an immediate assault in great force, he recalled his men, and ordered them to take position at Haines’ Bluff. The feint resulted advantageously in a double sense. It withdrew opposition from the point at which the troops were to be pushed across the river ; and the marching and counter-marching so fatigued Pember- ton’s troops, that they were unfit for serious work when the real encounter took place. For two days, Sherman preserved this threatening attitude. As the other two corps had crossed the river seventy-five miles below, and gained a firm footing on the “ high pla- teau in rear of Vicksburg,” further de- monstration in the direction of Haines’ Bluff was unnecessary. Sherman was accordingly ordered to hasten forward and join the main army. It had been General Grant’s inten- tion, up to the time of his crossing the Mississippi, to collect all his forces at Grand Gulf, to get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and, in the meantime, to detach an army corps to co-operate with Gen- eral Banks against Port Hudson, in the hope that thereby he might be able to effect a junction of the two armies. A letter from General Banks informed him that it would be impossible for him to return to Baton Bouge before the 10th of May, but that by the re- duction of Port Hudson, he would be able to join him with 12,000 men. About the same time, information reached him that troops were expected at Jackson from the Southern cities, with General Beauregard in command. Grant wisely concluded that delay in PORT GIBSON. 405 in the circumstances was dangerous — all the more so that on the 10th of May, with the addition of 12,000 men, his strength relatively would not be so great as it now was. He resolved, therefore, to act at once. This decisive step was taken on his own responsi- bility. He did not consult the authori- ties at Washington; for he knew that he would encounter opposition alike from Lincoln and from Halleck, both of whom were in favor of his effecting a union with Banks. As soon as the troops had been landed on the other side of the river, the onward movement was commenced, ^lay On the morning of the 1st of L May, about two o’clock, when some eight miles from Bruinsburg, the advance, under McClernand, came into contact with the enemy. The Confede- rates retired ; and no attempt at pursuit was made until daylight. Early in the morning, General Grant rode forward, with his staff, and found McClernand engaged with a strong force of the enemy, about four miles from Port Gibson. At this point the road forked off in two opposite directions, both branches, however, leading to Port Gibson. These roads which, for the most part, ran along narrow ridges, were Hanked on either side by deep and impenetrable ravines. The Con- federates had taken position on both roads. It was a position which offered }>eculiar advantages to the resisting party, as in falling back, they necessa- rily divided the pursuing forces. It was held by General Bowen, with not more than 6000 men. McClernand’s troops were divided so as to suit the require- ments of the ground. The divisions of Hovey, Carr and Smith were on the right; the division of Osterhaus was on the left. McClernand advanced with the three divisions. The Confed- erates offered a stubborn resistance, contesting point after point with great bravery. The National forces on the right made steady advances on the enemy, driving him from position to position ; but Osterhaus on the left was making no impression on his stubborn antagonist. On the arrival of Logan’s division, of McPherson’s corps, Grant sent one brigade to the assistance of McClernand and another to the assist- ance of Osterhaus. Effective resistance was no longer possible. At both points the Confederates gave way, but fell back in good order towards Port Gibson. Night closing in, the Nationals halted, and rested on their arms in the expecta- tion of renewing the conflict in the morn- ing. When morning came, it was found that the Confederates had abandoned Port Gibson, had crossed both forks of the Bayou Pierre, and burned the bridges in their rear. In this engagement, the Confederates sustained a heavy loss. The Nationals captured three guns, four flags and 580 prisoners. Their loss was 130 killed and 780 wounded. This encounter is generally spoken of as the battle of Port Gibson. No time was lost in the reconstruc- tion of the bridges; and on the jifay 3d of May, the Confederates were 3. pursued as far as Hankinson’s Ferry. On the same day. Grant having discov- ered that Grand Gulf had been evac- •J44 406 VICKSBURG. uated, resolved to transfer his base of supplies from Bruinsbiirg to that place. At Hankinson’s Ferry, he halted his forces, and waited for wagons and sup- plies, as well as for the arrival of Sher- 3[ay man. On the 7th of May, that general succeeded in carrying across the river his entii-e command, with the exception of Blair’s division, which was left at Milliken’s Bend to protect the depots there, until i*elieved by troops from Memphis. On the same day, General Grant gave orders for a general forward movement of the whole army. In a previous chapter, we endeavored to present a clear and intelligible view of Vicksburg, as looked at from the river side. Built on one side of a sharp bend in the river, on a high line of bluffs, which extend some fifteen miles from Haines’ Bluff, touching the Yazoo on the north to a point below Warren- ton on the south, the heights being for- tified thi'oughout their entire length, and the ground on the triangle in front of the Northern defenses being all but impassable, it is no abuse of language to say that on the river front Vicks- burg was impregnable. We have al- ready seen how all the attempts on that side had failed. We have now to look at Vicksburg from a different stand- point. Another and formidable effort was about to be made to reduce the “city of an hundred hills but this time the attack was to be made on the land side — not from the river. It is but truth to say that, at the time of Grant’s ap- proach, the obstacles to be encountered and overcome on the land side were, in many respects, as great as those on the side of the river. There was first the Bayou Pierre, with its steep banks, forming an outer line. Then came the Big Black, with its tributaries. Big Sandy, Five Mile, Fourteen Mile and Baker’s Creeks. This, however, was not all. The roads were narrow, and not unfrequently, as we have just seen, flanked on both sides by deep ravines. The whole country was broken and ir- regular, presenting serious obstacles to an invading army. Nearer the city, the surrounding heights were crowned with fortifications — bastioned forts, re- doubts, redans, detached batteries with- out number, and countless lines of con- necting rifle-pits. It was not without reason that the South was proud of Vicksburg. After Richmond, it was the strongest place within the limits of the Confederate States. Such was the place which Grant had resolved to cap- ture. Such were the obstacles which lay in the way of the accomplishment of his purpose. It was General Grant’s design to se- cure his rear by a rapid march on Jack- son, the capital of the State of Missis- sippi, to destroy the public property there, to break up the railroad which connects that capital with Vicksburg, and then to concentrate his forces around the doomed city. In order the more effectually to accomplish his pur- pose, he deemed it prudent to distract the attention of the enemy, and to con- ceal, as far as possible, his real inten- tion. Reconnoitering parties to the west side of the Big Black felt their way, unmolested, to within six miles of RAYMOND. 407 Warrenton. The main body of the army advanced by two parallel roads on the southeast bank of the same river — Mc- Pherson on the road to the left; Mc- Clernand on the ridge road, a little more to the right; Sherman, whose corps was divided, following on both roads. On the 11th, and while these movements were being carried out, Grant telegraphed to General Halleck that he would communicate no more with Grand Gulf, and that several weeks might elapse before he would again hear from him. That night Mc- Clernand’s corps was on and near the Baldwin’s Ferry Road ; Sherman’s corps was at and beyond Auburn ; and Mc- Pherson, with his corps, was eight miles to the right, a little in advance of Utica, in the direction of Raymond. On the morning of the 12th, Sherman ]>Iay and McClernand crossed Fourteen 12 . Mile Creek, the former at Dillon’s Plantation, the latter a little further to the west. At both crossings the enemy was encountered, and there was severe skirmishing. Grant had been with Sherman from the time the latter ar- rived at Auburn. McPherson, wdio, as w^e have seen, w^as moving northward some seven or eight miles to the west, when within tw^o or three miles of Ray- mond, encountered the Confederates in much greater force. Two brigades of the enemy, some six thousand strong, under Generals Gregg and Walker, the former being in command, were well posted near Farnden’s Creek. The troops were for the most part concealed in the thickly- wooded and irregular ground which bordered the stream. Two powerful batteries, planted on an eminence, commanded the two roads by which the Nationals were approaching. Logan, who was in the advance, was the first to feel the weight of the ene- my’s arm. His second brigade, which advanced to the edge of the woods, called forth a vigorous and well-direct- ed volley. De Golyer’s artillery was ordered forward, when for the first time the Confederates opened their bat- teries. The firing was kept up with great vigor on both sides. Finding it impossible to silence the National ar- tillery, the Confederates made a tre- mendous rush for the guns. The Na- tional gunners stuck to their posts. They were not to be intimidated. Waiting till the Confederates were fairly within range, they opened upon them a well-directed fire of shot and shell. The Confederates, their ranks torn in pieces by exploding shells, halt- ed, broke, and retired in confusion be- yond the creek. There, however, they rallied, and re-formed. McPherson fol- lowed them up, and ordered a fresh at- tack on their new position. This time the movement was led by the brigade of General Dennis. The struggle at this point was protracted and severe, the Twentieth Ohio, the Twentieth Illinois and the Twenty-Third Indiana being badly cut up. Offering a most stubborn resistance, the Confederates, although compelled to yield some of their ground, still maintained an un- broken front. Roused to the highest pitch of excitement, the Eighth Illinois, Colonel Sturgis, at the supreme moment of the fight, rushed with tremendous 408 VICKSBURG. fury, and with fixed bayonets, on this unbroken and apparently invincible phalanx. The attack was irresistible. The Confederate line broke in frag- ments, and, in disordered masses, fled from the creek. Such was the battle of Raymond. It lasted three hours. The Confederate loss in this engagement w’as 103 killed and 720 wounded. The National loss was 69 killed, 341 wounded and 32 missing. The battle of Raymond added to the already great reputation of McPherson, and to Logan’s growing fame. McClernand and Sherman had been ordered to move towards the Vicks- burg and Jackson Railroad by parallel roads, the former in the direction of Edward’s Station, the latter to a point between Edward’s Station and Bolton. This order was countermanded, and both were ordered to march towards Raymond. This change had been ren- dered necessary by the battle which had just been fought, the defeated Confederates having retreated in the direction of Jackson, where it was known General Joe Johnston was hourly expected, with large reinforce- ments. General Grant resolved to make sure of Raymond, so as to have no enemy in his rear. Determined to anticipate Johnston, and to prevent by all possible means a junction between him and Pemberton, Grant hurried for- ]^ay ward his troops. On the 13th, McPherson pushed on towards Clinton, entering the town unopposed about two o’clock in the afternoon, and immediately destroyed a section of the railroad, thus cutting off supplies from Vicksburg. This was a victory in it- self. Losing no time, McPherson has- tened towards Jackson. Sherman was marching to the same point by the di- rect road from Raymond. McCler- nand, meanwhile, was taking a position near Raymond. Johnston had anived at Jackson on the 13th. There he found the brigades of Gregg and Walker which, on the preceding day had fallen back before McPherson from Raymond. He knew that Grant was approaching ; and re- cognizing the military genius mani- fested in the conception of the cam- paign, as well as impressed by the terrible energy with which it was being executed, he felt convinced that he had to deal Math a formidable antagonist. He, therefore, ordered Pemberton to move up to Clinton, in rear of the Na- tional force, which he imagined to be only a detachment. He was to move that night. To beat such a detach- ment,” he said, “ would be of immense value. The troops could here co-ope- rate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important.” It was sound advice. It indicated a course which Pemberton ought to have followed at an earlier date. Thei-e was a bare probability, however, that if Johnston’s advice had been taken, the movements of General Grant might have been seriously em- barrassed. Pemberton, who held posi- tion at Edward’s Station, might at least have been able to effect a junction Math Johnston. What did he do? He called a council of war. It was the opinion of the majority of the officers JACKSON. 409 that J ohnston’s order should be obeyed. It was the opinion of not a few of them that, in place of following out Johnston’s instructions, a movement should be made to cut off Grant’s supplies from the Mississippi — a very unnecessary move- ment, as Grant had, five days before this time, notified the government that he ‘‘would communicate no more with Grand Gulf.” “My own views,” says Pemberton, “ were expressed as un- favorable to any movement which would remove me from my base, which was and is Vicksburg. I did not, how- ever, see fit to place my own judgment and opinions so far in opposition as to prevent the movement altogether ; but believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan proposed, of cutting off the enemy’s supplies, I directed all my disposable force — say seventeen thousand five hundred — toward Ray- mond.” On the morning of the 14th, therefore, when Johnston was momen- tarily expecting the arrival of the Na- tionals, his expected reinforcements not having come up, he was depending en- tirely on the two brigades of Walker and Gregg. McPherson moved on Jack- son by the Clinton Road. Sherman advanced by the road which leads from Raymond. Both encountered some slight opposition ; and both entered the place at the same time. It was an easy victory. The Confederates made good their retreat, moving northward, in the direction of Canton. It was found that the State and city officials had fled, carrying with them the State papers and funds. Seventeen guns had been captured; but the commissary and quartermaster’s stores were in flames. Grant entered the city with Sherman’s head of column. His soldiers patrolled the streets, and brought the prisoners to the State House. In the hotel, in front of the State House, the three generals met, when arrangements were made for the immediate future of the campaign. During the night of the 13th and the morning of the 14th, up until noon, the rain fell in torrents; but the rank and file of the army of the West were inured to the hardships of a soldier’s life; and, while excellent work was done and the most perfect order preserved, there was neither mur- mur nor complaint. On the morning of the 14th, General Grant learned that Johnston had ]vray ordered Pemberton to move im- H. mediately out of Vicksburg, cross the Big Black, and fall upon the National rear. Grant saw at once what was meant, and he gave his corps command- ers to understand that “ time was all- important.” All his and their energies must now be bent to prevent the junc- tion of the Confederate forces. Action was taken at once. Pemberton must receive the lesson which had just been given to Johnston. Orders were given for a concentration of the entire Na- tional army in the direction of Edward’s Station. McClernand was ordered to gather together his scattered divisions, and move towards Bolton. Blair, with his division, was detached from Sher- man’s corps, and ordered to move in the same direction. Similar instruc- tions were given to McPherson. Sher- man, with the bulk of his troops, was 410 VICKSBURG. ordered to remain for the present at Jackson, the special duty assigned him being the destruction of the railroads, bridges, factories, workshops, arsenals, and everything which might be of any value or service to the enemy. This duty was faithfully performed, and with a rapidity and completeness which characterized all the doings of that great soldier. Bolton was favor- ably situated for the conveyance of the troops. It was a convenient point from which to move on Edward’s Station. May On the morning of the 15th the movement began. Grant had been particularly careful that there should be no mistake ; and, as McCler- nand was at some distance from his headquarters, he sent Lieutenant-Colo- nel Wilson, of his stalf, to explain to him the situation, and to urge imme- diate action. Grant himself hastened to the front. Meanwhile, what was Pemberton do- ing ? He had received a despatch from Johnston on the 14th, “suggesting, not ordering,” as he afterwards said, a com- bined attack on McPherson at Clinton. It was not until the next morning that he began to move towards Raymond. He did not know that his chief had fled from Jackson, and that Grant, with the bulk of his army, was making forced marches westward. He had been de- layed for some hours in passing a branch of Baker’s Creek, which was greatly swollen by the heavy rains. He had, thei’efoi*e, only reached Cham- pion Hills, a strong place, some four or five miles fi*om Baker’s Creek, when he received a note from Johnston, directing? him to move northward, so that they might be able to unite their forces. Pemberton halted, sent back his wagon trains to the Big Black, and was pre- paring to follow, when he learned that Grant was close at hand. It was too late to return. It was perilous to ad- vance. He, therefore, took position, and remained to fight. The ground was well adapted for offering resistance. To the left of the road, as it approaches Vicksburg, there was a high, undulat- ing hill, covered by a dense forest and undergrowth. To the right, the timber extended a little way down the hill, and then opened into cultivated fields, and a valley which stretched out for a considerable distance. On the right, the slope was gentle. Pemberton had posted his army right across the road, his left wing resting on a height where the road made a sharp turn to the left. General W. W. Loring commanded his right ; General John Bowen his centre ; and General Carter L. Stevenson his left. It was the morning of the 16th of May. Grant was already at the yjay front. There he found Hovey, of McClernand’s corps, getting into line, and nearly ready for battle. Hovey, who had moved up the road, occupied the centre ; McPherson, with two of his divisions, was stationed on the right ; and Smith and Blair were to take posi- tion on the left. The enemy was not only well posted : he was strong in numbers. Grant, unwilling to run any unnecessary risks, forbade an attack un- til the arriv^al of McClernand, who was coming up with four divisions. Mcst CHAMPION HILLS. 411 sages were sent to McClernand, urging him forward with all possible haste. In vain did Grant listen for the sound of McClernand’s guns. Every minute made it more difficult to postpone the conflict. The troops were already in close contact. Hovey’s advance was developing the enemy’s skirmishing line. The firing became more and more rapid ; and by eleven o’clock the battle had fairly begun. Hovey’s division was soon fully engaged. This division, indeed, which was composed of Ohio, Indiana and Wisconsin troops, bore the brunt of the battle. General Mc- Ginnis gallantly led the attack. A vigorous charge was made upon two Confederate batteries, which were post- ed upon a ridge; and one of them, was captured. The battle raged with great fury for an hour and a half. Pember- ton, however, continued to mass his men in the centre and towards the National right; and Hovey’s troops, pressed by superior numbers, unable to hold their position or to retain possession of the captured guns, reluctantly fell back nearly half a mile. Hovey called for help. Help could not be given without weakening McPherson on the right ; but help could not be refused, except at the risk of losing the fight. Knowing that McClernand would soon be up, and having no fear of the result. Grant sent first one and then another brigade, of Croker’s division, of McPher- son’s corps, to the aid of Hovey, who gallantly renewed the conflict. Mean- while, Logan’s division was operating with great effect on the enemy’s left and rear. When Hovey called for more troops, Logan rode up to General Grant, and told him that if Hovey could make another dash at the ene- my, he could come up where he then was, and capture the greater part of the opposing army. Grant rode for- ward, and cheered the troops who had been so gallantly engaged, urging them again to the attack, and explaining the position of Logan’s division. Logan continued to press heavily on Pember- ton’s left. General C. L. Stevenson, Hovey holding his ground in the cen- tre. About five o’clock in the after- noon, Stevenson’s line, which for some time had been yielding under Logan's pressure, broke, and fell back in dis- order. The battle was lost. Loring, who commanded on the Confederate right, had already left the field, leaving his cannon behind him. When his left gave out, Pemberton’s heart sank within him; and he ordered a retreat of his whole army. McClernand, with Carr’s division, followed by that of Osterhaus, arrived on the field only in time to pursue the retreating foe. The battle of Champion Hills was fought and won by Hovey’s division, of McClernand’s corps, and by Logan’s and Quimby’s, commanded by Croker, of McPher- son’s corps. It was a bloody and most unequal strife, the Nationals from the outset being greatly outnumbered. The National loss amounted to nearly 2500, of whom some 430 were killed. The loss sustained by the Confederates must have been even more severe ; for in addition to killed and wounded, 2000 were made prisoners. After the battle was ended, it was 412 VICKSBURG. discovered that the Vicksburg Road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, turns almost to the west, across the valley in which Logan was operating. One of Logan’s brigades had nearly reached this road. Consciously or unconsciously to himself, Logan’s manoeuvre was thus threatening the Confederate rear and the capture of the greater portion of Pemberton’s army. There is no evidence that the existence of this road was known to Grant, or any of his commanders, at the commence- ment of or during the contest. Its ex- istence was, of course, known to the Confederates. This circumstance goes far to explain the panic which seized Loring on the right, and Stevenson on the left, and which at last demoralized the centre, making flight a necessity. The non-arrival of McClernand in time was unfortunate, and threatened to be dangerous; and, most undoubtedly, if the result had been different, he would have been called to account. General Grant evidently felt the delicacy of Mc- Clernand’s position, and the necessity for some explanation of his conduct; and it redounds to his credit that, in his report, he takes some pains and goes som.ewhat out of his way to throw over his lieutenant the mantle of his protec- tion. ‘‘The delay,” he says, “in the advance of the troops immediately with McClernand was caused, no doubt, by the enemy presenting a front of artillery and infantry where it was impossible, from the nature of the ground and the density of the forest, to discover his numbers.” If any blame was attachable to Mc- Clernand for his delay in coming up on the IGth, he nobly atoned for it by his conduct of the pursuit on the day fol- lowing. The pursuit, as we have seen, was commenced on the afternoon of the 16 th. It was continued until after dark, with great loss to the Confede- rates. A train of cars, loaded with a large quantity of commissary and ord- nance stores, fell into the hands of the pursuers; and the Confederates them- selves destroyed much valuaVde proper- ty, which they found it impossible to carry with them. McClernand biv- ouacked for the night on the hill which overlooks Edward’s Station. It was Saturday night. On Sunday morning the pursuit was resumed ; but it was not long continued. The Nationals were soon brought to a standstill by the strong works which the Confederates had con- structed on both sides of the Big Black, in the neighborhood of the Railroad Bridge. On the west side, the bluffs extend to the water’s edge. On the eastern side, there is an open, cultivated plain, nearly a mile in width, surround- ed by a bayou of stagnant water, from two to three feet in depth, and from ten to twenty in width, reaching from the river above the railroad to the river below. Following the line of this bayou, which served as a ditch in front, was a well-constructed line of rifle-pits. Behind the defenses on the eastern side of the river were the brigades of Gi’een, Villepigue and Cockrell. A little above the Railroad Bridge, was a passage-way for troops, constructed of steamboat hulks. On the western side which, as we have said, was steep, the bluffs running THE BIG BLACK. 413 down to the water’s edge, there were strong fortifications, mounted with heavy guns. Such was the new posi- tion which obstructed the triumphant Nationals in their onward march to Vicksburg. Of the pursuing party, Carr’s division occupied the extreme advance. Of this division, Lawler com- manded the right brigade. After seve- ral hours ineffectual skirmishing, Lawler discovered that, by moving under cover of the river bank, he could gain a point from which a successful assault might be made. It was a hazardous opera- tion, because of the level ground over which a portion of the troops would have to pass without cover, and because of the ditch in front of the works. Lawler gave the order ; the charge was gallantly made ; and in spite of the obstacles which lay in their way, and the tempest of bullets which decimated their ranks, the brave fellows, whose comrades were falling at every step by their side, nobly and successfully ac- complished their task. Not a shot did they fire until they had crossed the ditch ; then they poured forth one simultaneous and terrific volley, and, rushing forward without reloading, they carried the works at the point of the bayonet. Almost the entire garrison, and seventeen pieces of artillery, several thousand stand of arms, and a large quantity of commissary stores, were the trophies of this daring and brilliant exploit. Only a few of the garrison, some 1500 strong, had found their way across the river, when the Confederates on the western bank set fire to both bridges — th? railroad bridge and the bridge of boats — thus shutting olf their comrades from all means of escape, and checking the progress of the National troops. It was a cruel measure, and as the result proved, a useless piece of incendiarism; but such things are not unlawful in war. Such was the battle of the Big Black. It briglitened the fame of McClernand ; but Lawler, and his brave brigade, carried off the honors of the day. In the engagement, Oster- haus was wounded. With as little delay as possible, float- ing bridges were thrown across the river. On the afternoon of the 17th, McCler- nand came up ; and all the neces- ]>iay sary preparations were completed *7. for continuing the pursuit. On the following morning his corps, and that of McPherson, which had also arrived, crossed to the western side of the Big Black. After the battle of Champion Hills, Sherman had been ordered to advance to Bridgeport, some miles to the north of the railroad bridge. By crossing the river at that point, it was expected he would be able effectually to fall on the enemy’s flank, in the event of his making a stand at the bridge on the western shore. On the 17th, Sherman had reached his destina- tion, and been joined by Grant. Sher- man had with him a pontoon tiaiii, the only one with the army. On the even- ing of that day, the bridge having been thrown across, the troops began the passage. After dark, the scene was lit up with fires of pitch-pine. Grant and Sherman having crossed, seated themselves on a log, and, by the light of the blazing pine fires, wit- 414 VICKSBURG. nessed the passage of the Fifteenth j corps, Sherman’s own. Having made j known his purpose, and explained his plans for the morrow, Grant returned through the forest to his headquarters in the cane-brake. Next day Sher- man, in his onward march to Vicks- burg, and when about three and a half miles from the city, turned to the right, in the direction of the Yazoo and the northern extremity of the Walnut Hills. That night, Haines’ Bluff was in his possession ; and he had opened communication with Admiral Porter on the Yazoo. Porter, who left his ii*on-clads below Vicksburg, had entered the Yazoo on the 16th, to be ready to co-operate wdth the army. On the 18th he heard, in the rear of Vicks- burg, the sound of cannon ; and soon afterwards, by the use of his glass, he discovered Sherman’s division on the left of Snyder’s Bluff, and knew that the Confederates at that place had been cut off from joining the forces in the city. With the view of opening communication with the army, he des- patched, up the Yazoo, the De Kalb, the Choctaw, the Borneo and the For- est Bose, under Lieutenant-Commander Breeze. Tlie task was easily accom- plished. Menaced by the land forces on the adjoining heights, the Confed- erates made a precipitate retreat, leav- ing everything behind them — stores of all kinds, guns, gun-cainiages, ammu- nition, tents, and an admirably con- structed camp. The Yazoo was now open. A base of supplies had thus been secured for the National army; and if Vicksburg could not be taken by assault. Grant could afford to wait, and force submission by the slower process of a siege. It was a proud satisfaction to both Porter and Sherman, to find themselves masters of this important position at last. The works at Haines’ Bluff had been abandoned on the 17th. They %j were found to have been very strong. Such a network of forts,” says Porter, “I never saw.” Writing to M. L. Smith, some time afterwards, Sherman says, ‘‘As soon as we had fixed things in Jackson, I made good time in reach- ing the very point above Vicksburg that we had worked so hard and thank- lessly for last January. It has fulfilled all my expectations, and we now have high and commanding ground, and haul all our stores from our old landing, at Chickasaw Bayou. The very roads made by the enemy, which enabled him to mass his troops so promptly before us, are now ours, and answer an ad- mirable purpose. I ride often to the very hill from which all our movements were telegraphed, and enjoy an inter- nal satisfaction that, after five months’ patient labor and fighting, I can now reciprocate the compliment. We are close upon the enemy ; our artillery reaches every part of the city, which, I am told, has become like a prairie-dog village, all burrowed in the earth.” At this stage. Grant must have felt well-satisfied. He had now marched two hundred miles since he ci’ossed the river at Bruinsburg, had fought four battles, had taken ninety guns, had captured six thousand prisoner^, had cut off Pemberton’s retreat; and THE FIRST ASSAULT. 415 he knew that Vicksburg was already May his grasp. On the 19th, the in- 19* vestment of Vicksburg was com- pleted. Porter commanded the city from tlie river, cutting off all communi- cations on that side. McPherson took position at the front, when Sherman turned oft' to the right. McClernand came up the Jackson Road to Mount Alban’s, and then turned to the left to get to the 'Baldwin Road. Sherman was thus on the right; McPherson in the centre; and McClernand on the left. The situation now looked gloomy enough for Pemberton. He had locked himself in a cage with his own hands. He had done it deliberately, and against the advice of his chief. Vicksburg had ceased to be of any value as a strategic point from the moment that the National troops crossed the river Vjelow the city. After the battle at Port Gibson, it was patent to all reflecting minds that the capture of Vicksburg was merely a question of time. The city was doomed. Pemberton refused to open his eyes to facts ; and, in place of saving his army and making it his chief business to effect a junction with Johnston, he clung to Vicksburg with what seemed the tenacity of despair, rather than the tenacity cf hope. He had received a letter from Johnston, written on the 17th. “If Haines’ Bluff,” said John- ston in that despatch, “ be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value ; it cannot be held. If you are invested in it, you must ultimately surrender. Instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its de- pendencies forthwith, and march north- east.” It was too late. Pemberton had been blind to his duty in a higher sense than he understood it ; he had lost his opportunity, whether he knew it or not; and he must now reap the fruit of his folly. As escape was now impossible, and as he was not yet in a mood to surrender, he must needs do as he best can with his shattered and dispirited forces. His position, as we have shown already, was one of great strength. His line of works was ex- tensive, but it was protected by one hundred and two guns; and, as there were within the lines from twenty-flve to thirty thousand men, the forts were well manned. In the arrangement of his troops, he placed Brigadier-General Stevenson in command on the right, Major-General Forney in the centre, and Major-General Martin L. Smith on the extreme left. On the 19th, Grant, believing that the Confederate troops were demoral- ized by the repeated defeats sustained outside of Vicksburg, ordered a gen- eral assault to be made at two o’clock in the afternoon. This attack was made mainly by Sherman’s corps ou the right, Blair’s division taking the lead, followed by Tuttle’s as a support. There were two forts which guarded the entrance to the city by the old Jackson Road — Fort Hill to the right and Fort Beauregard to the left. The attack was directed as^ainst the former of those works. It was gallantly made, the Thirteenth regulars, the Eighty- Third Indiana, and the One Hundred and Twenty-Seventh Illinois, winning 416 VICKSBURa. special distinction. It was a perilous operation, rendered all the more so by the rugged character of the ground, intersected by deep chasms and covered by felled trees, which, with the remain- ing stum]:)s, made a powerful abatis. The ground was really almost impassa- ble. Sherman’s men reached the para- pet, but they could not cross over. At dark they were recalled. But little fighting was done by the other two army corps. The result of the attempt on the 19th was that the Nationals along the whole line drew nearer the Con- federate works, and secured more ad- vantageous positions. A Confederate writer gives the following account of that day’s fighting : ‘‘ On Tuesday, the enemy made their first assault on the line of works held by Brigadier-General Shoup’s brigade of Louisianians. They marched up in one solid column, our men withholding their fire urftil the enemy had ap- proached within thirty yards of the lines, when they opened a terrific vol- ley of musketry. The enemy wavered a moment, and then marched forward. They were again met by another vol- ' ley, when they broke and fled under cover of the hills. This was the only attempt made on that day to force our lines, and the attempt was evidently made more with the intention of ^ feel- ing’ our lines than with any serious idea of storming them.” Two days were allowed to pass with- out any further attempt being made against the enemy’s works. Grant, however, was not idle ; nor was any idleness permitted in the National lines. Supplies were hurried forward from the Yazoo ; rations were served to the men ; roads were constructed ; and can- non were planted on every available spot which offered any advantage. On the 21st, Grant was ready to make another assault. He has himself given us the I’easons which induced him to make tins second attempt without further delay. It was his belief that an assault made from the position which he had now gained would be attended with success. He knew that Johnston was at Canton, with the forces taken from Jackson, that he was continually re- ceiving reinforcements, and that it was his intention to make an attack on his rear, with the view of relieving Pem- berton. His own forces, not exceeding^ at the time 30,000 men, did not justify him in courting any such attack from a general of Johnston’s skill and expe- lience. Possessed of Vicksburg, he would be able to tui*n upon Johnston, drive him from the State, and make himself master of the entire territory west of the Tombigbee, before the season for campaigning was over. Nor was this all. A successful assault, by enabling him to secure all this country, would render it unnecessary for the gov- ernment to send him reinforcements which were needed elsewhere. In ad- dition to all this, the troops were impa- tient to be led to the attack, and detested trench-work, because they be- lieved it to be unnecessary. Such were his reasons; and even in view of the failure of the attack and the terrible loss of life which it entailed, they must be admitted to be satisfactory. 417 THE SECOND ASSAULT. On the 21st, Grant’s arrangements were completed ; and orders were given for an assault along his whole line, at ten o’clock on the following moi’ning. That there might be no blundering or irregularity in the movement, he or- dered all his corps commanders to set their watches by his. On the morning May of the 2 2d, promptly at the hour 22. designated, the three army corps simultaneously advanced to the assault. Grant had taken a commanding posi- tion near the centre, from which he could see all McPherson’s corps, a part of Sherman’s and a portion also of McClernand’s. Meanwhile, Admiral Porter, according to instructions re- ceived from General Grant, had opened a heavy tire from his mortars and gun- boats, on the water and hill batteries. On both the one side and the other, the enemy’s woiks were found to be invulnerable. “The works,” said Por- ter, “ are stronger than any of us dreamed oP” Sherman, whose advance, as on the 19th, was led by Blair’s divi- sion, encountered a vigorous resistance from the brigades of Baldwin and Shoup, of the division of General Smith ; Hurlbiit’s brigade, of Forney’s division, met the attack in the centre; while on the National left, McClernand, putting forth his whole strength, made but little impression on the stubborn brigades of Moore and Lee, of the di- vision of General Stevenson, who, as we have mentioned, commanded on the Confederate right. The assault was gallantly made by each of the three cor})s. It was not all at once that the Confederates revealed themselves. Con- cealed behind the parapets, they waited until their assailants were close to the works ; and then springing, as if from the bosom of the earth, they poured their destructive fire on the advancing columns, literally mowing down the first line. In spite of this withering fire, a portion of the commands of each succeeded in planting the National flag- on the outer slopes of the enemy’s bas- tions. For two hours the battle raged with great fierceness. No real advan- tage, however, was being gained by the assailants at any point. Under cover of their guns, the Nationals made repeated attempts to carry the works in their front. It was all in vain. No permanent lodgment could be secured. The experience of the three different corps, and along the entire line, was very much the same. In one instance, only, was an entrance effected into any of the Confederate works ; but it was only a brief triumph, and'proved to be barren of good results. In the first fierce onset made by the brigades of Lawler and Landrum, of McClernand’s corps, upon the fortifications to the southeast of the city, Sergeant Griffiths, a youth of eighteen years, with eleven privates of the Twenty-First Iowa Vol- unteers, rushed across the ditch, up the slope, over the bastion, and leaped into one of the redoubts. The privates were all prostrated inside the work. Griffiths, however, contrived to escape, carrying Avith him several prisoners. Mc- Clernand’s men succeeded in planting the National colors on the bastion of this redoubt, and on the bastion of another strong earth-work in their 418 VICKSBURG. front ; but Griffiths’ was the only case of actual occupation. It was now about twelve o’clock. Grant, but little satisfied with the suc- cess of the undertaking, and, having left his horse in a place of safety in the rear, came up on foot to Sherman’s headquarters. Sherman pointed out to him the Confederate works, and admit- ted that his assault had failed. Grant, whose position had given him a full view of the National centre and also of the right of the National left, admitted that it was about the same with both McPherson and McClernand. At this moment, a messenger arrived from Mc- Clernand, bearing a despatch to Grant, ‘‘ stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of, and still held, two of the enemy’s forts, and that the American hag was waving over them,” requesting, at the same time, that Sherman and McPherson should be ordered to make a diversion in his favor. This was the second despatch which General Grant had received from McClernand to the same effect. He doubted its accuracy. He did not be- lieve it to be a faithful presentation of the facts of the case. He had just left a commanding position where he had a full view of the woiks referred to, and he had witnessed no signs of successful attack or occupation. His first impulse was to disregard the message altogether. But he was reminded by Sherman that the note was official. With great re- luctance, Grant consented to give orders for a renewal of the attack. He or- dered Quimby’s division, of McPher- son’s corps, to the aid of McClernand, and authorized that general to call to his assistance also the division of Mc- Arthur, of the same corps. At three o’clock, the general-in-chief having re- sumed his position, with McPherson in the centre, the attack was renewed with great vigor. This other assault was but a repetition of the former — deter- mined, bloody, but unsuccessful. It resulted in the useless slaughter of 3000 men, including many veteran sol- diers, who could ill be spared, and not a few first-class officers. General Grant bitterly regretted yielding to McCler- nand’s importunate calls for assistance. It was, in fact, a great blunder. Mc- Clernand was either greatly deceived as to the value of the position occupied by his troops, or his better reason was overpowered by an extreme desire to connect his name in some prominent way with the capture of Vicksburg. It was no doubt unfortunate that Mc- Arthur was so far distant when he re- ceived Grant’s orders, and that Quimby, who had been hurried to McClernand’s relief, did not arrive until twilight. It is doubtful, however, whether any as- sistance which might have been sent Mc- Clernand could have altered the situa- tion. It does not appear that he had gained any real advantage. Subsequent revelations justified the doubts which General Grant expressed as to the cor- rectness of McClernand’s statement; and General Sherman has told us that “ in- stead of having taken any single point of the rebel main parapet, McClernand had only taken one or two small outlying lunettes, open to the rear, where his men were at the mercy of the enemy. ANOTHER FAILURE. 419 behind the main parapet,” most of his men, in fact, being thus actually cap- tured. As it was, the fighting con- tinued until dark. During the whole day, Porter’s mortars kept up an in- cessant fire on the city, greatly adding to the horrors of the imprisoned inhab- itants. It was, however, a useless struggle. The diversion requested by McClernand had been promptly and vigorously made ; but while it had in- creased the mortality list of the Na- tional troops full hfty per cent., it had brought about no compensating advan- tao^es. About eisrht o’clock in the even- ing, therefore, the troops were recalled from the more advanced positions, pickets being left to hold the ground which had been won. In his report. General Grant paid a well-merited compliment to his men. ‘^The assault of this day,” he said, ‘^proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no mur- muring or complaining, no falling back, or other evidence of demoralization.” It is but just to say that the gallantry exhibited by the assailants was equalled by the bravery of the troops defending the works, and by the heroic self-en- durance of the unfortunate people who were shut up inside the city. Every part of Vicksburg was within range of the Federal guns — of Poi*ter’s mor- tars as of the attacking batteries. The scene presented is described by those who were inside the fortifications as having been sublime and terrific in the extreme, and requiring the ‘‘ pen of the poet” to do it justice. The following report is from a Confederate source. While doing substantial justice to the National troops, it gives us an inside vievi of the day’s fighting : ^^On the mornino: of the 22d, the enemy opened a terrific fire with their Parrott guns, and continued it till about eleven o’clock, when the bom- bardment ceased, and heavy columns of the enemy could be seen forming in line of battle. Our forces were all ready for them, and eager for their advance. At about a quarter to twelve, the col- umn of the Federal army advanced all along the lines in splendid order, and, with a loud cheer, dashed up to the works. They w^ere gallantly responded to by our brave boys, and the first charge repulsed. On the extreme ]*ight of our lines, the nature of the ground prevented the enemy from making any heavy attack ; but on the right of the centre, the centre and the left of the centre, the assault was desperately made and gallantly met. But once did our lines break, and that was in Lee’s bri- gade. The enemy gained a temporary footing on the rifle-pits, but Lee quickly rallied his men, and, after a desperate hand-to-hand fight, drove them out and reoccupied the lines. The engagement at this point, and at the right of the line, held by Brigadier-General L. Her- bert, was of a terrible nature, the Fed- erals having thrown their best troops on these works. Five times did they charge, and each time were repulsed. The last charge on the right of Brig- adier-General Herbert’s lines was made by an Irish regiment (the Seventeenth Wisconsin), carrying the green flag of 420 VICKSBUEG. Erin. They came at a double quick up the hill, each man in the front rank fur- nished with ladders to reach the works. Three times they essayed to plant their ladders, but were prevented by the obstinate resistance offered by the con- solidated Twenty-First and Twenty- Third Louisiana regiments. At the third charge, they came within ten yards of the line ; but two volleys of buckshot from the shot-guns of our foi*ces com- pelled them to make a precipitate re- treat from the front of our works. At about two o’clock they made their last charge, and were again repulsed, when they retired, and did not at- tempt any further demonstration that day.” The Confederates not unnaturally ex- aggerated the National loss, by putting it down at from 8000 to 10,000 men. They admitted a loss of 1000 in killed and wounded. The difficulty between McClernand and the general-in-chief was not to be easily removed. Grant naturally felt sore because of the useless waste of life which McClernand had brought about. This, however, might have been got over, had not McClernand, in a congrat- ulatory order addressed to his troops, and first published in St. Louis, re- flected on General Grant and the dis- position which he made of his troops, and attributed his own failure to a want of support which, he asserted, could have been given him. On the 15th of June, Grant deemed it pru- dent, for the sake of preserving disci- pline in his army, to remove Mc- Clernand from the command of the Thirteenth corps. The command was given to Major-General Ord. After the failure of the 22d of May, Grant, already convinced that the po- sition of the enemy was too strong, “ both naturally and artificially ” to be taken by direct assault, determined upon a regular siege. The troops now j at his command were not sufficient, ab- I solutely to complete the investment — • such was the extent of the enemy’s works. He sent, therefore, to West Tennessee for all the troops which could be spared. Keinforcements were ordered also from West Virginia, Ken- tucky and Missouri. Lanman’s division, and four regiments from Memphis, with the divisions of Generals Smith and Kimball, of the Sixteenth corps, soon arrived, and were placed under the command of General C. C. Washburn. On the 11th of June, General Herron arrived, with his division, from the de- partment of the Missouri; and on the 14th came General Parke, with two divisions of the Ninth army corps. The National force was thus increased to some 70,000 men, in sixteen divisions. The investment was now made abso- lute. Parke’s corps and the divisions of Smith and Kimball were sent to Haines’ Bluff. In front of the works which protected the city, Sherman was posted to the right; McPherson’s corps came next, and extended so as to guard the railroad ; Ord’s corps lay to the left of McPherson’s ; the investment in that dii-ection being completed by the divi- sions of Herron and Lanman which, stretching across Stout’s Bayou, touched the bluffs on the river. The ground THE BOMBARDMENT. 421 was, in a Ligli degree, favorable to a besieging army. Springs of excellent water abounded in the ravines ; and the sheltering woods protected the troops from the rays of the hot summer sun. On the river side, Porter had made ample preparations; and throughout the siege, as he had already done in the different assaults, he continued to render very effective assistance. In addition to gunboats, which were sta- tioned both above and below the city, he had six 13-inch mortars, and two 200-pound Parrott guns mounted on rafts. Siege operations were commenced at once, and were conducted with great vigor. Along the entire front, forts, batteries and rifle-pits were rapidly con- structed ; and the irregularities of the gi'ound admitted of the construction of covered roads, by which the men could move from point to point without being exposed to the fire of the sharp- shooters behind the Confederate works. Up until the 25th of May, the firing on the city was made only during the day. After that date, it was continued both day and night. Porter opened fire on May the 26th, and on his part there 26. was no interruption until the surrender. It was estimated that as many as 6000 mortar-shells were flung into the city every twenty-four hours, and that, in the same space of time, not fewer than 4000 shells were flung from the land batteries in the rear. It was not long until Pemberton was in a sufficiently sorrowful plight. His relations with Johnston were tlie reverse of agreeable ; and he had been worried by delusive hopes held out by the authorities at Pichmond. To the one and the other, however, he was bound to look for succor. There was no other source of relief. He com- plained bitterly of the want of cavalry. With a sufficient force of mounted men, he might have been able to protect his communications — he would certainly have been able to watch, if not to thwart, the movements of Grierson, who gave him so much annoyance. He might even have prevented Grant from reaching Jackson. As it was, he had to submit to great inconvenience, and not a little mortification. One of his greatest sorrows was that he had found it impossible — such was the rapidity of Grant’s advance — to withdraw his heavy guns from Grand Gulf. This, however,’ was not all. He had, for some reasons, lost the confidence of his troops ; and he was no longer a favor- ite with the people of Vicksburg. There were, in addition, troubles of a more pressing and immediate character. His ammunition which, since the com- mencement of the siege, he had been using with the utmost economy, was well-nigh exhausted. Provisions, also,, were scarce. For the first five days of the siege, full rations were allowed to- the troops ; but, afterwards, the daily allowance was gradually reduced to four ounces of flour, four ounces of bacon, one and a half ounce of rice, two ounces of peas, and three ounces- of sugar — fourteen and a half ounces, of food in all. Add to all this the- small number of men, and the conse- ii-te 422 VICKSBURG. qiient heavy duties which, day and night, devolved upon them, and an idea may be formed of Pemberton’s position. Pemberton’s hope of relief was now centred in Johnston. The latter was not without reason for being angry wdth his lieutenant; but it was his duty to do all that lay within the reach of his ability to extricate the be- leaguered garrison. It was no longer possible to save the city ; but something might be attempted to save Pember- ton’s soldiers. Pemberton had written to Johnston in despair. On the 14th, Johnston sent word to Pemberton that he would make an attempt to come to his relief, suggested that while he made an attack on Grant’s line at a given j)oint, an attack should be made simul- taneously on the same point from within the lines, and requested that Pember- ton should designate the point of attack somewhere north of the railroad. The desires of Pemberton and the purposes ^of Johnston were no secret to the Na- tional commander. Haines’ Bluff was carefully guarded ; so, also, was the entire peninsula on the river side of the city ; Porter’s boats w'ere keeping watch above and below ; and vigilant recon- noissances were being made in the neighborhood of Milliken’s Bend. It was from the land side, however, that an attack was most to be dreaded. It was well known that Johnston was col- lecting troops on the line of the Big Slack, that his army was rapidly in- creasing in numbers, that his deficien- cies in artillery, in ammunition for all arms, and in means of transport, were gradually being supplied, and that his object was to attack the National army in the rear, with a view to the relief of Pemberton. Happily Grant, had now a sufficient number of troops to enable him to hold Pemberton with the one hand, and to strike, if necessary, John- ston with the other. Parke’s corps, which was stationed at Haines’ Bluff with one division of each of three corps d'armee investing Vicksburg, was placed under the command of General Sher- man, who was ordered to watch John- ston, and counteract any movement he might make in the direction of Vicks- burg. It was General Grant’s inten- tion, as he wrote to General Parke on the 27th of June, “to whip Johnston fifteen miles off.” Sherman faced about, his line extending from Haines’ Bluff eastward to the railroad crossing of the Big Black, where Osterhaus held a strong position. It was Sher- man’s conviction that if Johnston should cross the Big Black, it would not be difficult, from the nature of the country, to hold him in check, until a concentration could be effect- ed. Johnston did not venture to make any attempt to penetrate Sher- man’s line, nor did he cross the Big Black. It was now towards the end of June. Pemberton’s situation was ^vell-nigh desperate. In his agony, his mind va- cillated from one resolution to another. The one day he writes to Johnston, suggesting that if he could divert the attention of the assailants by attacking them to the north of the city, he might succeed in making his escape by break- THE FIRST MINE EXPLODED. 423 ing the investing lines to the south, and by forcing his way across the Big Black, at Hankinson’s Ferry. The next day, as if despairing of the success of his plan, he thinks it might be better to abandon Vicksburg, and to propose to Grant that he allow all the troops to pass out “ with their arms and equi- page.” Success would have been as little likely to result from the one course as from the other. Meanwhile, famine was doing its terrible work. After the thirty-fifth day of the siege, mule meat had become the common fare of all alike ; and even dog’s meat was in request for the table. Bean- meal was made into bread, and corn- meal into colfee. ‘‘In these straits,” says a Confederate oflGicer, “the garri- son dragged on the weary length of one day after another, under a scorch- ing sun, the stench from the unburied corpses all around alone causing the strongest -minded, firmest -nerved to grow impatient for the day of deliver- ance.” In the last week of June, the mining operations which were being carried on in front of McPherson’s line, and under his immediate direction, were well ad- Jiine vanced. On the 25th, between 25. four and five o’clock in the after- noon, the first mine was fired. The explosion was fearful. The air was filled to the height of one hundred feet with earth, broken timber, and the shattered fragments of gabions, stock- ades and gun-carriages. A great breach was made, a part of the face of Fort Hill having been thrown down. Two columns of storming parties, consisting each of 100 picked men, taken respec- tively from the Forty-Fifth Illinois and from the Twenty-Third Indiana, were held in readiness to make the assault. As soon as the breach was made, in rushed the brave fellows, in their shirt- sleeves, and carrying nothing with them save their muskets and their cartridge- boxes. A fearful struggle ensued, the Confederates offering a most stubborn resistance. Supports were pressed for- ward ; and ultimately, amid wild cheers, heard amid the roaring din of battle, the flag of the Forty-Fifth was planted on the summit of Fort Hill. As soon as the storming columns entered the breach, the batteries opened fire along the whole line. Porter following the example with his gunboats and mortars on the river front. It was one of the most terrific cannonades heard during the whole war. While shot and shell were falling thick and fast upon the Confederate works and upon the doomed city, “ the classic thunders of the Roman poet were being realized across the whole heavens, and from pole to pole.” Nobly as was this assault on Fort Hill, and proud as was the temporary tri- umph, it ended in a repulse. On the 28th, there was another mine explo- sion, which did further damage to Fort Hill. On the 1st of July, a mine was sprung to the right of the Jack- son Road. The result was the com- plete demolition of the redan situated at that point, the living burial of nine men who were counter-mining, and the killing and wounding of a large number who were manning the works 424 VICKSBURG. On the 1st of July, Johnston had July taken position between Browns- b ville and the Big Black, having with him from 30,000 to 40,000 men, with all the necessary munition of war. With as little delay as possible, he sent a note to Pemberton, informing him that a diversion W'ould be made on or about the 7th, to enable him to cut his way out. This message, which was inter- cepted by General Ewing, fell into the hands of General Grant. The latter had already made up his mind as to what he should do. He had deter- mined to make an assault on Vicksburg on the morning of the 6th, and, if the assault should prove successful, to move Sherman with all possible haste, and with all the forces that could be spared, against Johnston. All needful prepa- rations for the final assault were com- pleted. Further delay might prove as dangerous as it was unnecessary. Sher- man was notified of his intention, and ordered to hold himself in readiness. Grant was confirmed in his purpose by intercepted documents, which informed him of the wretched condition to which the city and garrison had been reduced. The assault, however, was not to be necessary. In addition to all the other misfortunes of the situation, 6000 sick and wounded crowded the hospitals of Vicksburg; and the number was daily increasing. Convinced that Grant was about to make a final and fatal assault, despairing of any aid from Johnston, and knowing how helpless he was to offer either a vigorous or protracted re- sistance, Pemberton’s heart sunk within him, and he determined to surrender. On the 3d of July, about eight o’clock in the morning, a white jn’y flag was seen displayed on the parapet in front of the division of Gen- eral A. J. Smith, of Ord’s (late Mc- ClernancJ’s) corps. An officer having been sent forward to learn its meaning, it was found that General Bowen, com- mander of one of the Confederate di- visions, and Colonel Montgomery, of Pemberton’s staff, were the bearers of a messat^e to General Grant. Havino: been blind-folded, these officers were led to the headquarters of General Smith, to await the reply of the Na- tional commander. It must have been a proud moment in the life of General Grant, when the sealed message was put into his hands. After more than seven months of planning, hard fight- ing and weary waiting, his great task was on the point of accomplishment. But the bystander looked on those firm features in vain for any sign of unusual emotion. At that moment, when weaker men would have given way, the con- queror gave proof that, if he knew how to subdue great armies, he knew also how to restrain himself. The message proved to be a proposal from the Con- federate commander for an armistice, during a time not specified, and for the appointment, on each side, of three com- missioners, whose duty it should be to arrange terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. “ I make this proposition,” said Pemberton, “to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling my- self fully able to maintain my position a yet indefinite period.” Grant's reply THE SURRENDER. 425 was characteristic. “The effusion of blood, which you propose stopping by this course, can be ended at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endu- rance and courage, as those now in Vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and, I can assure you, will be treated with all the respect due to them as prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange terms of capitulation, because I have no other terms than those indicated above.” Declining to see General Bowen, General Grant expressed a willingness, if it were so desired, to meet General Pemberton, any time that afternoon, between the lines, in Mc- Pherson’s front. Three o’clock was appointed. At that hour the meeting was held. Grant was accompanied by Generals McPherson, Ord, Logan and A. J. Smith. Pemberton was attended by General Bowen and Colonel Mont- gomery. After shaking hands, and in- troducing the officers, the two chiefs retired, and sat down on the grass be- neath the shade of an old oak tree. The position was on the southern slope of Fort Hill, and in full view of thou- sands of the opposing armies. The oak tree has disappeared ; biit a handsome monument now commemorates the event. Pemberton renewed his proposition for the appointment of commissioners. This was the course followed at Vera Cruz, at the surrender of which, he said, he was present. Grant was not to be moved from his purpose. He had no terms to offer but “unconditional surren- der,” and he would consent to no other. Pemberton thought the terms unrea- sonable. He would never submit to them — never, w'hile he had a man left — he would fight, rather. Unable to re- strain himself, he was showing signs of great irritation. “Then, sir,” said Grant, coolly puffing his cigar, “you can continue the defense. My army has never been in a better condition for the prosecution of the siege.” Pem- berton had much to say in regard to details. Finding it impossible to come to an agreement, Grant, with an evident desire not to wound unnecessarily the feelings of his baffled and defeated oppo- nent, brought the interview to a close by promising to send his ultimatum in writing. It was finally agreed that the en- tire garrison — officers and men — should be paroled not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by proper authority; that the officers should be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each; that the rank and file be allowed all their clothing, but no other property ; that they should take rations from their own stores suffi- cient to last them until beyond the Na- tional lines ; that they should be allowed to take with them the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and that they should have thirty wagons for the transport of such articles as could not well be carried. The same conditions were to be granted to all sick and wounded officers and privates as soon as they should be able to travel. 426 VICKSBUEG. The next day was tlie Fourth of July July — a day sacred to American liberty. On the morning of that day, white flags were displayed along the whole length of the Confederate woi’ks, in token of surrender. In the afternoon, General Grant, accompanied by General McPherson, with their staffs, entered the city in triumph. Pemberton was greatly blamed for sur- rendering the city on the 4 th. It was a lame excuse to say that, knowing the vanity of his enemies, he hoped to obtain better terms by giving them an opportunity to triumph on that day. The Fourth of July, 1863, was indeed a proud ’day for the friends of the Union. On that same day, victory, which smiled so propitiously at Vicks- biug, crowned the National arms at Gettysburg. The star of the Union was again in the ascendant; and the hearts of a dispirited people w’ere once more filled with joy. The fall of Vicks- burg was a great triumph to the nation. It settled the question of the free navi- gation of the Mississippi, and it deter- mined the fate of the rebellion. It was a great triumph for General Grant, be- cause it stamped him as the first soldier of the Kepublic. His praises were in every mouth ; and the country rang with applause. Congratulatory letters came to him from all quarters; but those most })rized were from Commander-in- Cliief Halleck and from President Lin- coln, both of whom, it was known, had had at one time doubts as to the wis- dom shown in his movements. Halleck was lavish of praise ; and Lincoln con- cluded his noble letter by saying, “I now wish to make the personal acknow- ledgment that you were right and I was wrong.” * The result of the campaign, as summed up by Grant himself, was “ the de- feat of the enemy in five battles out- side of Vicksburg; the occupation of Jackson, Mississippi, and the capture of Vicksburg, its garrison and muni- tions of war; a loss to the enemy of 37,000 prisoners, among whom were fifteen general officers ; at least 10,000 killed and wounded, and among the killed Generals Tracy, Tilghman, and Green ; and hundreds, perhaps thou- sands, of stragglers who can never be collected and recognized. Arms and munitions of war for an army of 60,000 men have fallen into our hands, be- sides a large amount of other public property, consisting of railroads, loco- * General Grant, like all other men who have risen to fame and fortune, has had his detractors. His own grand career which, from first to last, needs no com- mentary, is his best advocate. In this connection, however, we cannot refrain from reproducing one paragraph from the elegantly written and thoughtful Memoirs of General Sherman. In his chapter on Vicksburg, General Sherman says : “The campaign of Vicksburg, in its conception and execution, belonged exclusively to General Grant, not only in the great whole, but in the thousands of its details. I still retain many of his letters and notes, all in his own hand- writing, prescribing the routes of march for divisions and detachments, specifying even the amount of food and tools to be carried along. Many persons gave his adjutant-general, Eawlins, the credit for these things, but they were in error ; for no commanding general of an army ever gave more of his personal attention to details, or wrote so many of his own orders, reports and letters, as General Grant. His success at Vicksburg justly gave him great fame at home and abroad. The president conferred on him the rank of major-general in the regular army, the highest grade then existing by law ; and General McPherson and I shared in his suc- cess by receiving similar commissions as brigadier- generals in the regular army.” — Shermafi's Memoir vol. 1, page 334. KETREAT OF JOHNSTON. 427 motives, cars, steamboats, cotton, and turn it into the plank road. Cap- tain Wilbourn, of his staff, now rushed to his aid. Bleeding and fainting, the general was taken from his horse, car- ] ied to the road side and laid under a tree. It was at this moment the guns of Best opened tire ; and the National troops, coming up in great force, charged over Jackson’s body. The Na- tionals again falling back, he was placed upon a litter ; but Berry’s guns were now sweeping the road ; and, one of the litter-bearers being shot down, the wounded general fell to the ground, receiving a severe contusion on his right side. As the tiring continued, the whole party lay flat on the ground, till the storm of grape and canister was turned in another direction. He was soon afterwards conveyed safely to the hospital in the rear. It was found necessary to amputate the arm. Jack- son died on Sunday, the 10th of May. He lived to see the fruit of this day’s work. His death was a great blow to the Confederate cause. It was equal to a National victory. General Stone- wall Jackson will live in history as the hero of C/iancellorsville."^ Hill came to the front just as Jackson was wounded, and prepared to assume the command. Scarcely, however, had he issued his first instructions, when he too was disabled, having received a severe contusion from a piece of shell. General J. E. B. Stuart was the ofilcer next in rank ; but he had moved off in the direction of Ely’s Ford, his inten- * In an ably-written paragraph, which is evidently intended to be eulogistic of General Stonewall Jackson, Swinton, yielding to a spirit of detraction, which is too common a characteristic of Northern writers, makes some remarks which are scarcely just to the Confederate soldier. He speaks of Jackson as “devoid of high mental parts, and destitute of that power of planning and combination, and of that calm, broad, military intellect which distinguished General Lee.” He has just described him as “ essentially an executive officer.” Without referring to General Jackson’s entire military career, we have no hesitation in saying that such remarks were singularly inapplicable to the man, after the first day’s fighting at Chancellorsville. The Chancellorsville plan of battle was Jackson’s through- out. It was his conception ; and it was he who gave it development, and determined its success. It is not too much to say that but for the death of Jackson, the National army might have been cap- tured or cut to pieces. It would certainly have been placed in great peril. Such was Jackson’s own opinion. ‘‘ If I had not been wounded,” he said, “ I would have cut the enemy off from the road to United States Ford ; we would have had them entirely surrounded; and they would have been obliged to surrender or cut their way out — they had no other alternative.” Nor do we think it fair to characterize Jackson as a “fanatic in religion.” The word “fanatic” has come to have an offensive meaning. In the sense in which it is now generally used, it certainly cannot be applied to Jack- son. In the sense in which Jackson was a fanatic, so was Oliver Cromwell ; so, too, in a milder sense, was George Washington. Thus applied, the epithet is not opprobrious ; but, in this latter sense, it is now rarely used. He was certainly a religious enthusiast; but a fanatic, in the offensive sense, he was not. JACKSON MORTALLY WOUNDED. 465 tion being to seize that place and occupy it. Such was part of General Jackson’s plan. In the circumstances, and until the arrival of Stuart, who was at once recalled, the command of the Confede- rate left devolved upon Brigadier-Gen- eral Bodes. It was a trying moment. Jackson had fallen, mortally wounded ; Hill had been disabled; and Stuart was some miles distant. This, how- ever, was not all. Berry was repeating his tremendous assaults ; and his artil- leiy, under the direction of Best, was maintaining a fierce cannonad e. It is not wonderful that Bodes should have hes- itated to make any attack or run any serious risk until the morning. In this view of the case Stuart, on his arrival, concurred. It had the approval, also, of Hill who, although disabled and placed on a litter, had not been removed from the held. Stuart sent a messenger to Jackson, asking for instructions. Jack- son was so feeble and suffering so much, that he could only give for answer: Tell General Stuart that he must use his own judgment.” The night was spent by the new commander and his staff in visiting the different parts of his line, in locating his troops, and in making the other necessary arrangements for the coming day. It had already become apparent to the different officers of the National army — it must have been apparent to General Hooker himself — that a great blunder had been committed on the Thursday, when no effort was made to bring up the three corps under Sedg- wick at Fredericksburg, so as to make the army a unit, and that, if possible, a still greater blunder was committed on the Friday, when the entire right wing, having advanced towards Fredericks- burg by three different roads, and hav- ing gained advantageous positions in the clear, open country beyond the woods, was compelled by the mere will of its chief to fall back, and wait for the onset of the enemy in the tangled jungles of the wilderness. These blun- ders— one or other or both— had brought about all the sorrows of Saturday ; and superior as were the Nationals in numbers, and excellent as was the spirit of the troops, it was a doubtful ques- tion with many whether greater sorrows were not in store for them. The dis- ^ cipline of the army, however, was well preserved. Hooker, showing no indeci- sion, adopted his course with firmness, and after the disasters of the afternoon and evening: made his arranD:ements for the morrow. On the evening of that day, Beynolds, with his corps of some 1 7,000 men, having come up from before Fredericksburg and crossed the United States Ford, joined the forces immediate- ly under Hooker, and by their presence more than compensated for the losses sustained by the Eleventh corps. Sedg- wick was still below Fredericksburg with his own entire corps, which num- bered some 24,000 men. Late on Sat- urday night. Hooker sent instructions to Sedgwick to put himself in motion immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, to seize the heights in the rear, to gain the plank road leading thence to Chan- cellorsville, and to move out, fighting his way, as best he might, with the view of joining the main body by daylight 466 CHANCELLORSVILLE. on Sunday morning. It was, beyond all question, of the utmost importance, that Sedgwick should be able to accom- plish the task thus assigned him. The best results might naturally enough be expected to flow from it. But it was an almost impossible task. Hooker made little account of the more than possible difficulties to be encountered in seizing the heights in the rear of Fredericks- burg — difficulties of which he himself had had so bitter an experience in the Burnside campaign. It would have been more wise, if the order had been given at an earlier hour, or on an earlier day. It was not unwise to give it now ; but most certainly it was the duty of the general-in-chief to think of the obstacles which might hinder the pro- gress of his lieutenant, and by every conceivable means to facilitate his ad- vance. During the night, the National com- mander succeeded in rearranging his lines, and taking a new position. His new line resembled somewhat the letter V, or rather a triangle slightly prolonged at the apex, the left leg being consider- aVjly larger than the right, and both ex- tremities reaching close to the river, thus covering United States Ford. His lines were contracted, as compared with those c f the previous day, and he had drawn nearer the river. He held possession of the heights between Melzi Chancel- lor’s and Fairview, including Hazel Grove — an eminence which commanded the apex, and the holding of which was essential to the safety of the new posi- tion. Beynolds was on the extreme right, at the upper end of the left limb of the triangle. Meade’a forces came next; then those of Sickles, command- ing the line on the left of the apex; then those of Slocum on the right of the apex ; and then,,connecting wdth Slocum, but more to the north on the right limb of the tri'angle, came Howard’s corps, which, with marvellous rapidity, had been brought together, and restored to something like order. On the left limb of the triangle, the National forces were heavily massed. In the centre of the triangle or V , and almost behind Meade, was stationed Couch, that he might be able to act in either direction, as occasion might require. Reynolds and Meade were some distance on the north of the turnpike. Sickles covered the road ; Berry, with Whipple in his rear, being on the north side; and Birney, with Williams, of Slocum’s corps, in his rear. Slocum, with his other division, that of Geary, guarded the apex. Hancock’s division of Couch was on Slocum’s left, and stretched out towards Howard. Sickles’ artillery, under Best, was massed on the ridge in the centre of the open ground, all the guns pointing west, so as to command the approaches to the turnpike. Hooker had 60,000 infantry immediately available at Chancellors- ville. The combined forces of Lee and Jackson were far short of that num- ber, not much exceeding 40,000 men. Hooker had, besides, the prospect of being joined by Sedgwick, whose corps, some 24,000 strong, was e(pial to a large army. Sedgwick was only ten miles distant. He had, it is true, some difficulties in his way; but these might be overcome. If Sedgwick THE COKFEDERATE BATTLE-CRY. 46.7 should come up in time, might not Hooker yet be able to destroy first the Confederate right, and then fall back with all his force and deal a deadly blow to the Confederate left ? If such is to be the result, the National com- mander must exhibit at once more skill and nerve than he has revealed since the lighting commenced. The Confederate commander had been equally active during the night. He had drawn up his men in three lines of battle. Hill’s division was in ad- vance. Its different brigades were ar- ranged across the road in the following order : Archer’s, McGowan’s, and Lane’s were on the right of the road ; Pender’s and Thomas’s were on the left. Hill’s brigade was in reserve, supporting Lane and Pender ; Archer and McGowan were thrown back, somewhat obliquely, so as to confront Sickles. The rest of the line was perpendicular to the road. Colston’s division formed the second line, and that of Kodes the third. The ridge, occupied by the right of the corps, was covered by artillery. Such was the disposition of the left wing of the Confederate army, on the morning of May Sunday, the 3d of May. Lee, meanwhile, had concluded to ef- fect a junction, if at all possible, of his right and left wings; and instructions were given to Stuart, McLaws and An- derson, that they should direct their movements accordingly. It will be re- membered that Sickles held a command- ing position at Hazel Grove It was the key-point of the battle ground, and advantageous, not only because it com- manded the enemy’s flank, but because if occupied by the enemy, it would imperil the safety of Slocum’s entire line. Sickles, who was naturally proud of the position, had been at great pains to strengthen and turn it to the best account. It was not, therefore, without mingled surprise and pain that he received orders from Hooker, before daylight on Sunday morning, to the effect that the ground, the holding of which he deemed of so much importance, should be immediately abandoned. It was another of those inexplicable blun- ders which Hooker had been making since the moment he first felt the pres- sure of his antagonist. Quick as light- ning, and with the earliest dawn, Stuart saw the advantage which the blundering mismanagement of his opponent had given him, and immediately occupied the abandoned position. In so doing, he became engaged with Sickles’ rear. The crest, however, was seized ; thirty pieces of artillery were got into position ; and a heavy fire was opened at once on the open ground around Chancellorsville House. The battle of the 3d of May was begun. In a few seconds, it was raging along the whole line. “ Charge, and remember Jackson ! ” was the Con- federate battle-cry ; and never was battle-cry more effective in evoking mili- tary enthusiasm. With a fury which seemed to be blind, with an energy which was irresistible, and with a pur- pose and determination which death only could restrain, on came the brave Confederates. Jackson was not with them; but, it was evident, his spirit was there. Brave as they were, how- ever, they were about to encounter foe- 468 CHANCELLORSVILLK men worthy of their steel — men who feared no foe, who knew how to resist and how to attack. Sickles was on hand with his well- trained and war- hardened veterans — Berry on the right, Birney on the left, Whipple and Will- iams supporting — ready to receive the onslaught. Best’s forty pieces of artil- lery were all pointed to the road along which the attacking column w^as ap- proaching. As the Confederates came forward, they were received with a perfect tempest of lead, which burst upon them, tornado-like, from the firm lines of Berry and Birney, and also, from Whipple and Williams, who had already been pushed to the front. Reckless of this tempest of lead, and reckless, also, of the more destruct- ive tempest, of grape and canister, which bursts upon them from the batteries on the hill, the column still advances. It is cut up and gashed, as if ‘^pierced, scarred, ploughed by invisible light- ning.” Companies, whole regiments even, seem to melt away; but still they com:'. No such bravery, in assault, has been exhibited by the Confederates since the famous battle of Corinth, when they advanced against the storm of bullets with faces averted, like men striving to protect themselves from a driving storm of hail.” Will nothing check their forward rush ? Beriy and Birney, now massing their troops, rush upon them with the weight and impetus of an avalanche. The shock is terrific. Like waves driven by contrary winds, the opposing hosts, dash and roil against each other, but dash and roll apparently in vain. Neither prevails : neither yields. It seems an endless, wasteful struggle. Now the Nationals fall back ; and it seems as if the Confederates are about to win the victory. It is only, however, for a moment. The Nationals charge agajn ; the batteries pour forth their destructive fire ; and Jackson’s men, their ranks literally torn to pieces, their dead and wounded lying in groups on the field, are driven back to their original position. Again there is a Confederate charge; again a teirific shock and stub- born resistance ; again victory oscillates, yielding now to the one side, and now to the other ; and so the battle rages until about eight o’clock, when Stuart, putting forth all his disposable strength on that point, drives the Nationals back and back, and captures the works in Sickles’ front. The struggle, however, is not yet abandoned. The Confederates have undoubtedly gained an important ad- vantage. They have pressed the Na- tionals back from their first line of works. It is, in a qualified sense, a Con- federate victory. But Sickles, if dis- couraged, is not yet dismayed. He has already sent for reinforcements. If these should arrive in time, he may yet turn the tide of battle. He, therefore, boldly holds his ground. The battle rages again with tremendous fury. The works are repeatedly taken and retaken. The Confederates, becoming more con- fident, press upon the National columns with increasing energy. As it has be- come dangerous or impossible to make any very effective use of the National artillery in his front. Sickles is com- pelled to depend on the resisting power LEE’S TWO WINGS UNITED. 469 of the bayonet. As yet, no response is inadeL to his repeated calls for assistance. In obedience to orders fj-om headquar- ters, French has sent out some regi- ments, under Carroll ; but these, instead of moving to the aid of Sickles, have moved to the south of Meade, and struck the enemy’s flank. These regi- ments are quickly repulsed ; and Stuart, again massing his troops, falls upon Sickles with his entire weight and with undivided strength. Sickles had done his utmost. He had used his men wisely ; and they had nobly re- sponded to his every call. Berry’s division, formerly Hooker’s own, had sustained its high character. The men fought like heroes of the olden time. The same was true, also, of Birney’s division. But they were confronted by a body of men who, for discipline, dash and endurance, were perhaps never surpassed in the whole history of war; and they were overpowered by superior numbers. And so it came to pass that while the corps of Eey- nolds and Meade and Howard, number- ing together some 40,000 men, were doing nothing, Sickles, after having re- sisted for hours the persistent attacks of Jackson’s battalions, and after having held at bay, successively, his first, his second and his third lines, was com- pelled, at last, to fall back in the di- rection of Chancellorsville, only, how- ever, to offer a fresh resistance under cover of the guns at Fairview. While these things were taking place on Hooker’s right, the Confed- erates were not idle on his front, or at the apex of the triangle. Slocum, as we have seen, was holding the apex on the eastern side, with Geary’s di- vision, Hancock, of Couch’s, being on his left. On this point, Lee, from an early hour, had been directing all his disposable strength. We have already mentioned that instructions had been sent to Anderson and McLaws to direct their movements so as to form a junc- tion with Stuart’s right, and thus unite the Confederate line. The Confederate guns at Hazel Grove had made Slocum’s position almost untenable from the com- mencement of the fight in the early morning. Anderson, having been pushed along the plank road, which connects Chancellorsville with Freder- icksburg, fell with tremendous weight on Slocum. McLaws, moving in a direction a little further north, pressed heavily upon Hancock. After repeated attacks and repeated failures, McLaws not only found it impossible to make any impression on Hancock, but was. handsomely repulsed. Anderson’s ef- fort was attended with better success.. Pressing with great stubbornness on. Slocum at the point of the triangle, he; contrived to throw around his left, and thus, by a thin line, to form a junction with Stuart. The object, so ardently desired by Lee, was at last effected.. His army, which had been divided^ since the morning of the 2l1, was again united. His two wings thus brought together, Lee bore in upon the Nationals, with his whole line. Sickles and Slo- cum were forced back ; and the National, line seemed to melt away, Hancock, alone holding his position, and resisting,, with great firmness and determination,, 259 470 CHANCELLORSVILLE. the fierce and persistent onslaughts of the already triumphant Confederates. Hooker ordered the troops to fall back upon Chancellorsville ; and here again, at the angle of the woods, the battle for a time raged with great fury, the artil- lery on both sides doing terrible execu- tion. The Chancellorsville House, which was still General Hooker’s headquarters Avas now discovered to be on fire, and laid to be abandoned. The National line, in this new position, began to waver ; and the Confederates, already flushed with success, seeing their oppor- tunity, made a tremendous dash, and, springing forward with wild yells, captured Chancellorsville, with a con- sidei-able number of prisoners. It was now a few minutes past ten o’clock. The battle had lasted, almost without intermission, for more than five hours. Tlie Nationals, although pressed vigor- ously by the triumphant Confederates, whose guns were sweeping the open ground around Chancellorsville, fell back in good order, and took a new and well-fortified position about a mile nearer the river. The new line was still in the form of a triangle, or V, but shorter and somewhat flatter than be- fore. The apex was at Bullock's House. The left limb extended along the Ely’s Ford road, towards the mouth of Hunt- ing Run. The right extended along Mineral Spring road, towards what is known as Scott’s Dam. Thus ended the second great battle at Chancellorsville, fought on the 3d of May, 1863. x\mong the many brave men who per- ished that day was General Berry. At an early stage of the contest, a severe misfortune befell the National army. While the conflict was at its height. General Hooker was standing on the balcony of the Chancellorsville House, leaning against one of the pillars. The pillar was struck by a cannon-ball ; and the general was thrown down by the violence of the concussion. He was stunned and stupefied, and rendered incapable of command. This misfortune goes far to explain some of the mys- teries of that mysterious day, when Sickles and Fi-ench and Slocum were struggling against the superior numbers of the enemy, and vainly calling for reinforcements, while 40,000 men, com- posing the corps of Reynolds and Meade and Howard, were doing nothing. Hooker was still insensible, and unlit for duty. The responsibilities of gen- eral-in-chief, at this supreme crisis, and in these peculiar circumstances, devolved upon General Couch, who, from some as yet unexplained cause, did not prove himself equal to the requirements of the situation. Had these 40,000 men, who were unused, and, therefore, useless in the fight, been hurled against the foe at the different points of attack, there can be no reasonable doubt that the tide of victoiy would have rolled in an opposite direction. The Nationals, in such a case, would certainly have fully engaged Lee’s attention, and occupied his army. The plank road would have been preserved ; and Sedgwick, if his arrival at the point of destination must still have been a little late, would at least have been able to march compara- tively unmolested from Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. The mystery of HOOKER STUNNED. 471 Chancellorsville will, perhaps, never be explained. It is certainly but little likely to be explained during the lives of the principal actors in the great and tragic drama. The accident which be- fell Hooker was undoubtedly a misfor- tune to the National army. It explains much ; but it does not explain all. Sunday, the 3d of May, was yet young. Sacred as was this day, and severe as had been the work already accomplished, there was no disposition to rest on either side. Hooker, now partially re- covered, busied himself in strengthen- ing his line, and preparing for another attack, as well as securing his lines of communication with the United States and Ely’s Fords, in the event of further retreat being j udged necessary. Howard and Slocum were stationed on his left ; Meade and Reynolds were on the right ; and, at Bullock’s House — a commanding plateau, the vertex and key of the pos- sition — Sickles and Couch were massed with a large number of pieces of artil- lery. Lee had not been less active. He had already displayed his army on the pla- teau at Chancellorsville. The scattered regiments, brigades and divisions which had been broken in the confusion of battle, were again brought together. A line of battle was formed along: the plank road to the west of Chancellors- ville, and extending down the old turn- pike, to the east of that place. Rodes, with his right on Chancellorsville, ex- tended up the plank road. On his left was Pender, with half of the division of A. P. Hill. To the ea>t of Chan- cellorsville was Colston, with Ander- son and McLaws in order, on his right. There was quiet on the battle field, but everything indicated preparation and readiness for a resumption of the fight. While the armies were in this ex- pectant condition, a fire broke out in the forest, on the north side of the plank road, where the battle had raged in the morning. In consequence of the dry- ness of the leaves and the brushwood, it spread with great rapidity. The wood was filled with the dead and wounded of both armies ; the wounded were most the objects of anxiety and care; but it was found impossible to remove them in time to save them from the flames. The smoke arising from the burning material had a strange, offensive odor. It was a sad sio:ht. It revealed the demon of war in one of his most horrid aspects. In spite of all this, however, Lee, resolved to push his advantage, was hurrying forward his preparations for a fresh attack on the National army behind its rear line of works. His troops and artillery were ordered into position, ar^d recon- noissances were made of the National line. It was evidently Lee’s intention to strike at Hooker a deadly blow be- fore Sedgwick could have time to come up from Fredericksburg, If he could drive Hooker from behind his new line of fortifications, force ' him towards the river, he might, in the confusion which must result from any attempt at crossing, succeed in capturing or destroying the g I eater portion of the National army. Success was not to attend him from such calculations. His arrangements were 472 CHANCELLORSVILLE. all but completed ; his arm was, so to speak, uplifted and ready to strike, when the blow was arrested, and his purpose changed by a despatch, which informed him of the capture of Marye’s Hill, and of the advance of Sedgwick. Leaving the army of Hooker and the amiy of Lee in the positions which we •have described, let us now turn our at- tention to certain important movements which have been made, or which are just about to be made, in the immediate neigh- borhood of Fredericksburg. In an ear- lier part of this chapter, we have shown how, and for what purpose, Sedgwick was left behind at Falmouth, with his own corps — the Sixth — and also with the First and Third. We have seen how, after the demonsti*ation successfully made on the 29th of April, the Third corps, under Sickles, advanced by the north bank of the river, crossed at L^nited States Ford, and joined Hooker at Chancellorsville. We have seen how the First corps, under Reynolds, follow- ing the same path, joined the main army on the night of the 2d of May. We have also seen how, on the same nio’ht after the fatal surprise by Jackson, Sedgwick, who had already crossed the Rappabannock below Fredericksburg, was ordered to put his troops in motion immediately, to occupy Fredericksburg, by Gibbon’s division, of Couch, which had been left behind at Falmouth, to seize the heights in the rear of the city, to gain the plank road leading to Chan- cellorsville, to move along that road towards the main body of Hooker’s army, and to be at the place assigned by daylight the following morning. It remains to be seen how this order was executed. It was past eleven o’clock, on the night of Saturday, the 2d, when the order was received. The officers and men had already gone to sleep ; and it was midnio^ht before the instructions to advance were fully communicated. Sedgwick was lying on the south bank of the river, about three miles below Fredericksburg. Without delay, he put his corps in motion by the flank, proceeding towards the town. It was a critical march. On the right was the river, about a mile distant ; on the left was the range of heights on which the watch-fires of the enemy could be dis- tinctly seen. The column was long, and exposed along its whole flank to the enemy on the heights. It was moonlight; but a heavy fog had settled over the low ground and the river. Newton led the advance; and his instructions were that, in the event of any attack being made, the regiments attacked should face the hills and charge without further instructions. The head of the column had advanced but a short distance, when it encoun- tered the Confederate pickets. There was some slow marching, and some little delay was experienced ; but the Confede- rates fell back. On the outskirts of the town, on the banks of a small creek, the Confederate skirmishers were again encountered ; but they were driven back without much difficulty. The column was now within a short distance of Marye’s Heights. At two o’clock. General Warren arrived from Hooker’s headquarters, his object being to hasten ATTACK ON MARYE’S HILL. 473 forward the movement. It was near dawn when the head of the column entered Fredericksburg. Here Sedg- wick was joined by Gibbon, with his division of the Second corps. We have already mentioned w'hat provision Jackson made for the protec- tion of Fredericksburg and the heights, when he set out to meet Hooker at Chancellorsville. He left behind him Early’s division of four brigades, with Barksdale’s brigade, of McLaws’ divi- sion. Barksdale was charged with the protection of the heights immediately in the rear of the town, including Marye’s Hill and the stone wall, made famous by the Burnside campaign. His bri- gade consisted of some 1400 men. It was disposed as follows : seven compa- nies of the Twenty-First Mississippi were posted between the Marye House and the plank road ; the three remaining companies of the Twenty-First were posted on the telegraph road, at the foot of Marye’s Hill; his other two regiments were on the hills further to the right. Batteries were set up at Lee’s Hill, and at the Harrison House; while four pieces of General Pendleton’s artillery were stationed at the Marye House, two on the right and two on the left. As soon as Early was made aware of Sedgwick’s movement, he sent Hays’ brigade to reinforce Barksdale. The Confederates, it is manifest from the small number of troops left at this point, had perfect confidence in their ability to hold the heights. As soon as the opening dawn per- mitted it, Sedgwick moved forward four regiments from the town in the direction of the heights. As they ad- vanced stealthily over the ground, so sadly memorable, not a sound disturbed the death-like stillness of that dull, dark Sabbath morning. The stillness, how- ever, is not to be of long duration. A few paces more, and the regiments will have reached the fatal stone wall. Sud- denly, and simultaneously, light flashes . from the summit of the hill and from the rifle-pits at the base. The Con- federates have opened upon them with both artillery and musketry. The regi- ments fall back under cover of the fog, but not without considerable loss. This attempt having failed, Sedgwick now resolved to turn the Confederate posi- tion. Howe was ordered to advance on the left of Hazel Bun, and to attack the Confederate right, while Gibbon was ordered to move up the river and make a vigorous attack on the Confede- rate left. Howe found his progress barred by the strength of the works in his front; and the stream deterred him from moving to the right and attacking in flank the works at Marye’s Hill. Gibbon, who attempted to carry out Sedgwick’s instructions on the extreme right, had no better success. Having advanced by the river road, he found the canal impassable ; and the vigorous fire which was opened upon him from Taylor’s Hill, where Wilcox, who had hurried up from Banks’ Ford, had planted two pieces of artillery, com- pelled his men to seek shelter in the cuts of the road. These experiments were so far unsuccessful ; and yet it would be unjust to pronounce them failures; for it is oftentimes only by 474 CHANCELLORSVILLE. such experiments that a knowledge of what it is right to do can be arrived at. It was by such experiments that Gen- eral Grant was, at last, to make himself master of V icksburg. Benefiting by th e experience thus acquired, and knowing at least what could not be done, Sedg- wick felt that he was left no alternative but to make a powerful, concentrated effort, and take the works by storm. It was now near ten o’clock. Precious time had unavoidably been lost. If this work was to be done, it must be done without further delay. Newton was ordered to send foi’ward two storm- ing columns against Ma rye’s Hill and the adjoining works. Howe, who was moi'e to the left, was ordered to repeat his attack up Hazel Bun, on the second line of heights. Newton’s right-hand column was composed of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania, and Forty-Third New York, supported by the Sixty-Seventh New York and the Eighty-Second Penn- sylvania, and was commanded by Colonel Spear, of the Sixty-First Pennsylvania. His left was composed of the Seventh Massachusetts, and Thirty-Ninth New York, and was commanded by Colonel Johns, of the Seventh Massachusetts. These columns moved up the plank road, and to the right. Colonel Burn- ham, with four regiments, at the same time moved to the left of the plank road, and directly against the rifle-pits at the base of Marye’s Hill. The Na- tional columns meet with but little re- sistance, until they are within three hundred yards of the Confederate works. At this point, the guns on the hill pour from their murderous throats a tre- mendous shower of canister. Nothing dismayed, the columns push on, until within close musket range. Here the Confederate infantry, nsing from behind the stone wall, open upon them a ter- rific fire, j The Nationals reel and stag- ger, and threaten to break. Quickly rallied, they rush again to the attack. The storm of lead abates not. The volleys are swifter and more sure. Nothing, however, can damp the cour- age, check the enthusiasm, or arrest the progress of these heroic men. Bight, left and centre, each emulous of the other, nerved by the same purpose, and inspired by the same hope, press eagerly forward. Spear falls; but Shaler is at hand. The right is rallied ; and the attack is resumed. Johns is wounded ; but Colonel Walsh, of the Thirty-Ninth New York, takes the brave fellows in charge; and the left, in the rivalry and onward rush, resumes and maintains its proud position. The supporting column vies with the other two; and Burnham, of the Sixth Maine, performs deeds of daring, which command at once admir- ation and envy. It is a race for a prize ; and the prize is on the summit of the hill. The stone wall has been cleared ; the rifle-pits have been seized and silenced; but the artillery on the hill still thunders and belches forth its mur- derous shell and canister. Ploughed through and through, and torn to pieces, their comrades falling in dozens by their side, these gallant fellows rush fearlessly on. There is a lull in the thunderstorm of artillery. There is a loud-resound- ing cheer. It is the shout of victory. The race is run ; the task is accom- MAEYE’S HILL CAPTURED. 475 plisRed; and the Union flag waves proudly on the crest of Marye’s Hill. While Newton has been carrying the National standard to victory in the centre, success not dissimilar has been attending Howe on the left. When pressing forward on the left of Hazel Run, he was vigorously confronted by the Confederate skirmishers, who were intrenched in rifle-pits behind the em- bankment of the Richmond, Fredericks- burg and Potomac Railroad. Lee’s Hill and the adjacent heights, ' which constituted Howe’s objective point, were occupied by the Confederate ar- tillery, and by their main line of infan- try. Howe advanced with two col- umns — six regiments composing that on the right, three that on the left. There was a third column, which moved still further to the left, and which was instructed to strike the Confederate position in the rear, and then co-operate with the others when they should have carried the works in front. Three res:- iments of the principal column to the right, getting separated from the others, crossed the Run, and took part in the attack on Marye’s Hill. The remain- der pushed forward, and soon obtained a Arm footing on Lee’s Hill. Here, for a time, the struggle was vigorously maintained. After the capture of Marye’s Hill, Lee’s Hill and the ad- joining heights were no longer tenable. The Confederates, therefore, abandoned the works, and fell back by the tele- graph road. In addition to the actual gain of the position, five guns and a considerable number of prisoners re- warded this brilliant feat of arms. Early hurried up from Hamilton’s Crossing, and the pursuit of the retreat- ing Confederates was discontinued ; but the entire range of hills in the rear, and to the south of Fredericksburg, was in Sedgwick’s possession. It was as yet only eleven o’clock. In this brief struggle, there had been a fearful loss of life. In the space of ten minutes, when the conflict raged most fiercely at the base of Marye’s Hill, nearly 1000 men were killed or wounded. The Confederates suffered as severely, as they bravely fought. The rifle-pits were full of dead and dying men, who fell, many of them, in a hand- to-hand struggle. In addition to the loss of the rank and file, the Nationals lost some of their ablest officers, among whom was the gallant Colonel Spear, and Majors Bassett, Faxon and Haycock. But the sacrifice had not been made in vain. The heights had been carried ; the Confederate forces were divided ; and the plank road which led direct to Chancellorsville was open. Sedgwick was now free to advance to the assistance of Hooker. He did not know that the latter had already been driven behind his last line of intrenchments. It was this alarming state of things which was reported to Lee when, elated with success, he was about to strike a final blow at Chancellorsville. Lee found himself in a most critical situa- tion. There were several courses open to him ; but every one of them was be- set with difficulty. He might carry out his original purpose, and fall on Hooker with all his might, cripple or destroy 476 CHANCELLORSVILLE. •him, and then give his attention to Sedgwick ; but in that case, he would expose himself to the risk of being at- tacked by Sedgwick in flank and rear. He might fall back towards Fredericks- burg, meet and demolish Sedgwick, and being relieved from all danger in this direction, face about and press matters to a flnal issue with Hooker; but in that case, he would be exposing him- self to a similar and even greater risk ; for Hooker might sally forth from his intrenchments and fall with crushing effect on his rear. He might remain in his present position, defer his meditated attack on Hooker, detach a sufiicient number to check or destroy Sedgwflck, leaving events themselves to determine in which direction the first crushing blow should be dealt ; but in that case, he would run the risk of being com- pelled to fight two battles at once, if in- deed, he was not caught as in a vice, between two powerful armies. The last course, perilous as it was, was the one he adopted. It was a course justi- fied by the highest principles of the military art, and sanctioned by some of the greatest examples of the past. Never over-bold, Lee had an advantage over most of the generals, either in the Confederate or National armies, in cool- ness of head and clearness of vision. He had, also, great steadiness of pur- pose. In some of these qualities he was approached by McClellan ; but the un- questionably great talents of that gen- eral were ruined by his excess of caution. In all that made Lee a great general, he was equalled only by Grant ; but Grant surpassed him in self-reliance, in strength of will, in deep intensity of purpose, and in a certain bull-dog tena- city of grip. In the present instance, as the result proved, Lee’s judgment stood him in good stead. He had wisely measured Hooker. He believed that with a reasonable show of force, he could keep him behind his intrench- ments. Without delay, therefore, he detached McLaws, with his own three brigades — those of Wofford, Semmes and Kershaw — together with Mahone’s brigade, of Anderson’s division, with instructions to advance towards Fred- ericksburg, to co-operate with Wilcox and Barksdale, and the other troops under Early, with a view to the inter- ception or destruction of Sedgwick. After the capture of the heights, Sedgwick pursued the retreating Con- federates about two miles along the tele- graph road ; but at that point. Early, who had come up from Hamilton’s Crossing, halted the commands of Barks- dale and Hays, and reinforced them with three regiments of Gordon’s bri- gade. Sedgwick had no motive in pushing along the telegraph road. His destination was Chancellorsville. He, therefore, discontinued the pursuit, and turned towards the plank road. He had advanced but a little way when he found the Confederates in some strength on the ridge, which stretches along the road from Guest’s to Stansbury. It was Wilcox’s brigade. Wilcox, it will be remembered, was at Taylor’s Hill, when the attempt was made by Gibbon to cross the canal and turn the Confederate left. Hays was at Stans- burv’s Hill. When the combined attack THE TOLLGATE. 477 was made on Marye’s Hill and to the left, they had been ordered to come up, but they had not had time ; and so rapid was the advance of Sedgwick, that they found themselves — Wilcox with his whole brigade, and Hays with a portion of his — cut off from the main body of the Confederates, and left on the north side of the plank road. Hays, by retreating parallel to the road, succeeded in getting round the head of the National advance, and re- joining Early. Wilcox remained be- hind; and, yielding to the instincts of a true soldier, as well as resolved to make the best use possible of the means at his disposal, drew up his brigade in line on the ridge above referred to, and placed in position four pieces of artil- lery. Sedgwick was now advancing slowly, and with great caution. Wil- cox, for a time, offered a spirited resist- ance, and greatly annoyed the National advance. The Nationals coming up in greater force, Wilcox, fearing lest he should be surrounded, fell back to the river road, about half a mile in rear of Taylor’s House. Sedgwick was still ad- vancing with slow and cautious steps. Taking courage from the leisurely move- ment of the National troops, and deter- mined to retard their progress as much as possible, Wilcox again pushed for- ward his brigade, with the artillery, this time taking position in the neigh- borhood of Salem Church, some five miles distant from Fredericksburo:. The heights in the vicinity of the church, extending on both sides of the road, and about two hundred and fifty yards to the east, were thickly wooded. Be- yond the wood, and on slightly lower ground, there were cleared fields spread- ing out on both sides of the road, and reaching as far as and beyond the toll- gate, which was distant from the church about one thousand yards. Advancing his troops to the toll-gate, and placing two rifled pieces on the road, Wilcox awaited the approach of Sedgwick. He had not long to wait ; for Collins and the cavalry skirmishers came up almost immediately. The artillery on both sides opened fire at once. Meanwhile, McLaw^s, who had come up with his three brigades, was taking position on the high ground in the rear of Wilcox, and to the right and left. As soon as McLaws came up, he ordered Wilcox to fall back on Salem Church. It was now four o’clock. The Con- federates were well posted. The ground was high, and, as we have seen, well wooded. McLaws had drawn up his line of battle perpendicular to the road. Mahone was on his extreme left, then Semmes, tben Wilcox — who, having fallen back, crossed the road, having three regiments on the right or south of it, and two on the left — and then Kershaw. Wofford came up later, and took position on Kershaw's right. The artillery was so disposed as to command the road, and to cover both flanks. On the road, in the front of his centre, Wilcox had four guns. Troops were posted in the church, and also in the school-house, some sixty yards in ad- vance. Scarcely had these ari-ange- ments been completed, when the Na- tionals came up in force. Sedgwick threw forward Brooks’ division, which 478 CHANCELLORSVILLE. had moved up the road and on both sides of it. Brooks was followed by Newton, in support. Bartlett’s brigade was on the National left, and the First New Jersey on the right. Getting his guns into position at the toll-gate, Sedgwick opened a terrific fire, shell- ing the woods to the right and to the left. The Confederate artillery for some minutes replied with great spirit. Gradually, however, the fire slackens; and the skirmishers fall back, first to the wood and then to their line of battle. The Nationals, having passed on to the edge of the road, uttered a loud and triumphant cheer, and then rushed for- ward to the charge. When within about eighty yards of the opposing line, the Confederates, who had re- served their fire, opened upon them a tremendous volley. The effect was dreadful. The National line wavered, but it was only for a moment. Bartlett dashed forward ; and, in a second, the school-house was surrounded, and the garrison captured. A few minutes more, and he has fallen with crushing weight on the line in the rear, and nearly de- molished a whole regiment. The Con- federates waver and break, yielding the ground to the advancing and triumph- ant Nationals. The crest has been won. At this point, however, the tide of vic- tory turned. Wilcox had still in re- serve the Ninth Alabama regiment. At this supreme moment, when all seemed lost, he hurled this regiment upon the advancing Nationals. Firing at close quarters, the Alabamians charged with great fury. The shock was irresistible. The Nationals yield- ed, and fell back in terror. In vain did Bartlett strive to hold the advantage he had won. At this point the strug- gle was most fierce. Sedgwick hurried forward his second line ; but it was to little puwpose. The fury of the Con- federate onset, the weight of the pres- sure, was irresistible. Step by step the Nationals were driven back — back be- hind the school-house, which was recap- tured and reoccupied by the Confed- erates — back through the open fields, in which it was found impossible to make a fresh stand — back to the toll-gate, where the retreating columns were sheltered, and the enemy’s advance was checked by the well-directed fire of Tompkins’ batteries. It was now night ; and neither the one side nor the other seemed anxious to prolong the contest. Sedgwick had not been defeated ; but he had met with a bloody repulse. Sunday, the 3d of May, in spite of the ray of promise revealed on the heights of Fredericksburg, was a day of disaster to the National cause. All the plans of the morning had been frustrated. Lee, in place of being crushed between the two wings of the National army, had whipped first the one and then the other ; and while Hooker, with his splendid army, was shut up, prisoner-like, behind his own intrench men ts, Sedgwick was being effectually hindered from coming to his relief. On Monday, the 4th, the opposing ar- mies found themselves in a pecu- j>iay liar plight. The final upshot of the campaign was revealing itself more and more clearly. But it could not be / SALEM said that on either side the danger was past; nor could it be predicted with confidence which should win the vic- tory. Lee, so far, had been successful in wooing or forcing the favors of for- tune. But his hands w'ere full. Hooker was evincing no signs of a disposition to resume the offensive, and was, to all appearance, contented to remain inac- tive behind his lines at Chancellors- ville ; but he had under him a mighty army, whole divisions of which had taken no part in the contest. Sedg- wick had been checked ; but his num- bers were considerably greater than those by which he was opposed ; and any attempt made by Lee to strengthen his right wing would necessarily weaken his left, already too w^eak to resist a vigorous sortie, if Hooker should make up his mind to rush from behind his iutrenchments. Lee, however, was not slow to decide. His final success seemed to him to depend on his first crushing Sedgwick, or driving him across the Rappahannock, and then falling back with his whole weight and dealing a decisive blow on Hooker. Early was, therefore, ordered up from below Fred- ericksburg, with instructions to retake the heights in the rear of the town, and to press on against Sedgwick’s right. At the same time, leaving three of Jackson’s divisions to hold Hooker in check, Lee pushed forward the three remaining brigades of Anderson in the direction of Salem Church. Thus strengthened, the Confederate force in front of Sedgwick amounted to 23,000 men. The rival forces in this direction were now about equal. CHURCH. m Anderson was to take position on McLaws’ right, with the view of forming a connection with Early. Lee went for- ward in person to direct operations. On Monday morning, Sedgwick found himself confronted by McLaws, and threatened in the rear by Early. The latter had experienced little difficulty in recapturing the heights. Sedgwick, although not yet aware of the approach of Anderson and Lee in person, tele- graphed to General Hooker that large masses of the enemy were moving from his right to his left, and asking whether the main army could support him. The answer was that no support must be expected. Sedgwick, cut off from Fred- ericksburg by the advance of Early, formed his line so as to cover Banks’ Ford and the pontoon bridge near that point. Howe was upon his left ; Brooks was upon the right of Howe, and at right angles to him on the plank road; and Newton was on the right of the line, perpendicular to the road, much as he had been the previous evening. It was noon before Anderson arrived at Salem Church. Preparations for the attack were not completed until about six o’clock, although there had been skirmishing, both on the National right and left, from an early hour. Sedgwick, perceiving that he was about to be attacked both in front and rear, had notified Hooker that his position was untenable, and that the bridges might be sacrificed, and had received for answer that he must not cross the river ‘‘unless compelled to do so.” At the appointed time — it was close upon six o’clock — the signal was given^ 480 CHANCELLORSVILLE. and tlie Confederates moved to the at tack along the whole line. It was made with great impetuosity. The Na- tionals resisted with great stubborn- ness ; but they were compelled to fall back towards the river, Sedgwick still holding possession of Banks’ Ford. The fighting was severe, both armies suffering terribly. Darkness ensued ; and the nature of the country was such that the Confederates were prevented from following up their advantage. Under cover of the night, having re- ceived permission to withdraw, Sedg- wick recrossed the river at Banks’ Ford with his whole force.'^f The last bri- gade had crossed before day-break. In the three engagements — the storming of the heights, the battle of Sunday, and the battle of Monday — Sedgwick had lost 5000 men. It was, no doubt, a great misfortune * At one o’clock, A. M., on the 5th, in reply to a des- patch sent to Hooker at 11.45 on the night of the 4th, General Butterfield wrote to Sedgwick to “withdraw under cover.” The movement to recross was at once commenced, and by five o’clock on the following morn- ing, the troops were all on the other side, and the bridges taken up. When the last brigade was crossing, an order was received from Hooker countermanding the withdrawal. This latter order was based on a despatch of Sedgwick, sent in the afternoon, stating that he could hold a position south of the Kappahan- nock — a despatch which reached Hooker subsequent to the one which called forth the permission to withdraw. We subjoin the last order and the reply. 5, 18G3— 1.20 A. M. “ Genekal Sedgwick : “Yours received one A. M., saying that you should hold position. Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge both. “Joseph Hooker, “Major-General Commanding.” To this Sedgwick replied, at 5 A. M. : “ The bridges at Banks’ Ford are swung, and in pro- cess of being taken up. The troops are much exhaust- ed. The despatch contermanding my movement over the river was received after the troops had crossed.” that Sedgwick did not succeed in form- ing a junction with Hooker. That he did his best to accomplish this object, no impartial mind, in view of all the facts, can refuse to admit. It is greatly to be regr,etted that General Hooker, in his testimony before the Committee of Congress on the conduct of the war, should have so far forgotten himself as attribute his defeat at Chancellorsville to the failure of Sedgwick to join him on Sunday morning. The reader of these pages, unless we greatly mistake, must have come to another and very different conclusion; and we do not see how the cruel and most unjust charge of Hooker can ever be endorsed by the impartial historian. ‘Hn my judgment,” says Hooker, “ General Sedgwick did not obey the spirit of my order, and made no sufi&cient effort to obey it. His movement was delayed so long that the enemy discovered his intentions; and when that was done, he was neces- sarily delayed in the further execution of the order.” It is unnecessary to re- peat what we have already said, believ- ing, as we do, that our narrative is suf- ficient disproof of these assertions. We ajxree with Swinton — whose observa- tions, at the close of his account of the battle of Chancellorsville, reveal the keen sense of the military critic, and whose arguments are unanswerable — in pronouncing this statement of Hooker to be ‘‘ a cruel charge to bring against a commander, now beyond the reach of detraction ; whose brilliant exploit in carrying the Fredericksburg Heights, and his subsecpient fortitude in a try- incr situation, shine out as the one re- RETREAT ACROSS THE RAPPAHANNOCK. 481 lieving brightness, amid the gloom of that hapless battle.” It was felt by both parties that the struggle and defeat of Sedgwick on Monday had decided the contest. Some of the National generals were willing, and even anxious, to make another ef- fort. All fight, however, seemed to have passed out of Hooker ; and he re- solved to retire his troops to the north bank of the river. Preparations for }Iay fiiis movement wei’e begun on the morning of Tuesday, May 5th. The engineers were ordered to prepare a new line near the river, so as to cover the crossing. The roads and bridges were, in consequence, repaired ; and an interior line of works was constructed from Scott’s Dam to the mouth of Hunting Run, on the Rapidan, a dis- tance of three miles. Lee, eager to | push the advantage he had gained, and impatient to deal a deadly blow before his antagonist should have time to es- cape, left Early’s division and Barks- dale’s brigade to guard the river from Banks’ Ford to Fredericksburg and the crossings below, and ordered Anderson and McLaws to hurry back to Chancel- lorsville. Early in the afternoon, a vio- lent rain-storm broke out. It continued during the remainder of the day, deluging the spongy soil, swelling the streams to overflow, and covering the low flats with water. It was late, in consequence, when the Confederate troops had reached their destination at Chancellorsville. As the storm con- tinued to rage, nothing could be done till the following morning. The ele- ments on this occasion, while they de- layed the Confederates, and made an attack impossible on the National posh tion, were scarcely less unkind to the Nationals. The river was rising rapid- ly, and the bridges were in peril. The National generals were divided as to the course which should be pursued. Some of them were in favor of an ad- vance. Others deemed it more prudent to withdraw. The attempt was made. Straw and branches were laid on the bridges, to deaden the noise of the trains, which were sent over first. The trains having been safely transported, the troops followed in order; and so, during a night in which nature seemed strangely in sympathy with the situa- tion, fretting and fuming, and as if scowling upon defeat, the great army of the Potomac, which was to put the I enemy to inglorious flight, found itself, after a feeble campaign of six days, in- gloriously transported to the northern banks of the Rappahannock. In the morning, when Lee advanced to attack, he found that his enemy was gone. The losses in the battle of Chancel- lorsville were heavy. The Confederate loss, according to General Lee, amount- ed to 13,000, of whom 1581 were killed, 8700 wounded, and nearly 3000 prison- ers. Hooker’s loss was 1 7, 1 9 7, of whom 5000 were unwounded prisoners. He had lost, also, 14 pieces of artillery and 20,000 stand of arms. It will be remembered that it was Hooker’s intention that the cavalry force of his army should play an im- portant part in this campaign. We mentioned in the earlier portion of this chapter that the entire cavalry force of CHANCELLORSVILLE. m the army of the Potomac had been or- ganized in four divisions, making one distinct and separate corps, under the command of General Stoneman. His four division officers were Pleasonton, Buford, Averill and Gregg. The corps numbered from 10,000 to 13,000 sabres. Neither at Chancellorsville nor at Fred- ericksburg nor at Salem have we seen much of this branch of Hooker’s army. Some account of the operations of this corps is necessary, to complete the story of the Chancellorsville cam- paign. As early as the 12th of April, Stone- man went forth on his expedition, the principal object of which was to de- stroy the railroads, bridges and other means of communication in Lee’s rear, and so cut him off from Richmond. He rode up the Rappahannock, and attempted to effect a crossing. On the 14th, he had succeeded in throwing over one division ; but a violent storm coming on, and the low grounds becom- ing flooded, the division was recalled, the horses taking to the water, and bravely swimming to the opposite bank. As the weather did not improve, and the upper Rappahannock was still flooded, Stoneman remained inactive until the general advance movement of the whole army was commenced on the 27th. On the 28th, he crossed the Rappahannock at Kelley’s Ford, at the same time with the main body. On the following day, he crossed at Mor- ton’s Ford and at Racoon Ford. In the meantime, by order of General Hooker, Stoneman had divided his troops into two columns. ^ One column. which consisted of about 4000 men, under .General Averill, was ordered to move on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, the main body, under Stone- man in person, being charged with the destructiop of the Richmond and Fred- ericksburg Railroad. Averill encoun- tered a cavalry force, under W. H. F. Lee, on the Ist of May, near Rapidan Station. Lee, after burning the bridge over the river, retired to Gordonsville. Averill moved to the north along the railroad as far as Culpepper, dispersing some Confederate troops who were there assembled, and destroying a large quantity of the enemy’s stores. On the 2d, he was recalled, and ordered to join Hooker at Chancellorsville. At 10.30 that night he reached Ely’s Ford. Later the same night, he was sur- prised by the Confederate cavalry ; and it is more than probable that he would have suffered severely, had it not been that the fall of Jackson and the acci- dent which befell Hill almost imme- diately afterwards, compelled Stuart to return with all haste, and take com- mand of the Confederate troops near Chancellorsville. Finding it difficult, or, as he thought, impossible, from the character of the country, to operate cavalry on the Confederate left, he re- mained inactive in camp, taking no part in the engagements of Sunday, the 3d of May. Hooker, on account of this, displaced him, and turned over his command to General Pleasonton. It was the 3d of May before Stone- man reached Louisa Court House, and before the important line of communi- cation by the Richmond and Fred- CAVALRY MOVEMENTS. 483 ericksburg Railroad was struck. The troops were divided into six bodies, and, having received special instruc- tions, were sent out in all directions. Colonel Wyndham, with his party, proceeded to Columbia, on the James River. Here the river is crossed by the Lynchburg and Richmond Canal. An attempt was made to destroy the aqueduct. It was not successful; but the canal was greatly damaged, and much public property destroyed. Fitz- Lee, hearing of what was being done in that direction, made a rush towards Columbia. Wyndham retired down the river, and then, changing his course, re- joined Stoneman at Thompson’s Cross- Roads at ten o’clock the same night. Colonel Kilpatrick, who was ordered to move in the direction of the Chicka- hominy, having travelled all day and all night Sunday, reached Hungary Station, on the Fredericksburg Rail- road, at daylight on Monday. At this point, he destroyed the depots and tore up the railroads. Crossing to Brook Turnpike, he advanced to within two miles of Richmond. He then moved to Meadow Bridge, where the Central Railroad crosses the Chickahominy. Having destroyed this bridge, and an engine which he intercepted, he crossed the Pamunkey at Harristown, to avoid pursuit. On the 7th, after having crossed the Mattapony, and having raided through Essex and the neighbor- ing counties, he reached Gloucester Point, having encc^untered by the way but little opposition. Colonel Davis, who was sent down the South Anna, struck the Fredericksburg Railroad at Ashland on Sunday evening. He first captured an ambulance, filled with the wounded from Chancellors ville. Hav- ing destroyed the engines and torn up a portion of the railroad, he pushed on towards Hanover Court House, on the Central Railroad. Here he burned the depot and tore up the rails. At Tun- stall’s, near the White House, he en- countered a small body of infantry, with some artillery, and fell back upon Gloucester Point, reaching it without much further difficulty. Colonel Gregg destroyed the bridge across the South A.nna, on the road from Columbia to Spottsylvania ; thence he moved east, and destroyed the road to Beaver Dam Station. On Tuesday, the 5th, the whole command, except Davis and Kil- patrick, was concentrated at Yancey- ville, on the South Anna ; and, on the evening of that day, the retrogade movement commenced. On the Sth, the whole force recrossed Kelley’s Ford, on the Rappahannock. This raid must be pronounced a fail- ure. No doubt it did much damage to Confederate property; audit must have struck terror into the hearts of the peaceful inhabitants. But it failed of its object. It did not seriously inter- fere with General Lee’s operations. It did not affect his commissariat to any appreciable extent. It did not cut him off for any length of time from his communications with Richmond ; for in three or four days the railroad was re- paired and in excellent running order, and navigation on the canal was resumed. This was all that was accomplished by that splendid army of mounted troops — ' 484 CHANCELLORSYILLE. in appearance one of the most magnifi- cent bodies of cavalry that ever went forth to battle. Employed as they were, they contributed nothing towards the possible success of the campaign; they won no glory, for they found no foe; and, when General Hooker most needed them, they were not available. On Wednesday, the 6th of May, the army of the Potomac — with the excep- ]^ay tion of the cavalry, which, as we have seen, did not cross the river till two days later — resumed its old quarters at Falmouth. On that day — and with a bad taste which was only in keeping with his blundering con- duct since the moment he first felt the enemy, in the advance towards the open ground in the rear of the heights at Fredericksburg — Hooker issued the fol- lowing address to his army : “ Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) May 6, 1863. j The major-general commanding ten- ders to this army his congratulations on its achievements of the last seven days. If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army. It is sufficient to say, they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resource. “In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock, before de- livering a general battle to our adver- saries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it repre- sents. On fighting at a disadvantage, we would have been recreant to our trust, to ourselves, our cause, and our country. Profoundly loyal, and con- scious of its strength, the army of the Potomac will give or decline battle whenever its interest or honor may de- mand. It will also be the guai-dian of its own history and its own arm. By your celerity and secrecy of movement, our advance and passage of the rivers was undisputed ; and, on our with- drawal, not a rebel ventured to follow. “The events of last week may swell with pride the heart of every officer and soldier of this army. We have added new lustre to its former renown. We have made long marches, crossed rivers, surprised the enemy in his en- trenchments, and, wherever we have fought, have infiicted heavier blows than we have received. We have taken from the enemy 5000 prisoners; 15 colors; captured and brought off 7 pieces of artillery ; placed hors de com- bat 18,000 of his chosen troops; de- stroyed his depots, filled with vast amounts of stores ;* deranged his com- munications ; captured prisoners within the fortifications of his capital, and filled his country with fear and con- sternation. We have no other regret than that caused by the loss of our brave companions, and in this we are consoled by the conviction that they have fallen in the holiest cause ever submitted to the arbitrament of battle. “ By command of “Major-Gexeral Hooker. “S. Williams, “Assistant Adj utant-General. ” General Lee, who had certainly more reason to use boastful language, is- sued an address to his soldiers on the LEE’S ADDRESS TO HIS ARMY. 4«0 7th ; but he writes with a dignity and modesty becoming the occasion. “Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, ) May 7, 1863. f With heartfelt gratification, the general commanding expresses to the army his sense of the heroic conduct displayed by officers and men, during the arduous operations in which they have just been engaged. Under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, you attacked the enemy, strongly entrenched in the depths of a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg, fifteen miles distant, and, by the valor that has triumphed on so many fields, forced him once more to seek safety beyond the Happahannock. While this glori- ous victory entitles you to the praise and gratitude of the nation, we are es- pecially called upon to return our grate- ful thanks to the only Giver of vic- tory, for the signal deliverance He has wrought. It is, therefore, earnestly recommended that the troops unite, on Sunday next, in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name. Let us not forget, in our rejoicings, the brave soldiers who have fallen in defense of their country; and, while we moutn their loss, lat us resolve to emulate their noble example. The army and the country alike lament the absence, for a time, of one to whose bravery, energy and skill they are so much indebted for success. “ The following letter from the pres- ident of the Confederate States, is communicated to the aiany as an ex- pression of his appreciation of its success : ‘ I have received your despatch, and rever- ently unite with you in giving praise to God for the success with which He has crowned our arms. ‘ In the name of the people, I offer my cor- dial thanks to yourself, and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unpre- cedented series of great victories which your army has achieved. ‘The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and wounded.’ “H. E. Lee, General.” On the 8th, the following des- patch was sent by the secretary of war to the governors of the Northern States : “Washington, May 8, 1863. ‘‘The president and general-in-chief have just returned from the army of the Potomac. The principal opera- tions of General Hooker failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its former position on the Happahannock, having recrossed the river without any loss in the movement. Not more than one third of General Hooker’s force was en- gaged. General Stoneman’s operations have been a Vjrilliant success. Part of his force advanced to within two miles of Hlchmond, and the enemy’s communi- cations have been cut in every direction. The army of the Potomac will speedily resume offensive operations. “E. M. Stanton, “Secretary of War.” 486 CHANOELLORSVILLE. On the same day, President Lincoln issued the famous proclamation, an- nouncing his intention to enforce the law of enrolment and draft, which had been passed by Congress at its previous session. All able-bodied male citizens, and persons of foreign birth, who, al- though not yet citizens, had declared their intention to become such, were proclaimed to constitute the National forces, and to be liable to perform mili- tary duty in the service of the United States, when called out by the presi- dent for that purpose. It was evident that, if the Confederates had acquired fresh courage and fresh hope from this latest triumph, the government at Washington had become more resolved Generat4 George Hiram Berry. — This brave and talented officer was killed, as has been mentioned in the test, during the second day’s fighting at Chancellorsville. It was his division, formerly Hooker’s own, which, on the first day, saved the National army from destruction. The situation was already desperate when Hooker or- dered forward this choice division. “Go in, general,” said IIo(iker; “throw your men into the breach ; don’t fire a shot — they can’t see you — but charge home wuth the bayonet. ” Never was a charge more nobly made or more gallantly sustained. For three hours, almost alone, this division resisted, and even repelled, the fierce onslaughts of the already triumphant enemy. On the ground which he had won. Berry resumed the battle early the following morning. Determined to drive the Confed- erates back, he thrust his brigades forward, making several successful charges. In one of these, while at the head of his men, and cheering them on, he was in- stantly killed. Berry w'as a native of Kockland, Maine, where he was born on the 27th of August, 1824. Bred a carpenter, he subsequently devoted himself to navi- than ever to put down the rebellion and to restore the Union. The spirit which prevailed at Washington was the same spirit which, except among certain classes who had never been in favor of the war, . pervaded and ani- mated the whole people. Such, then, is the story of the great but, to the National forces, disastrous battle of Chancellorsville — a battle in which, as has been well said, the rank and hie had been foiled without being fought, and caused to retreat without the consciousness of having been beaten.” After the battle. Gen- eral Hooker’s reputation suffered an eclipse from which it has not yet fully recovered. gation. Later, he cultivated a taste for military affairs, and was the originator of the Bockland Guard — a vol- unteer company which, before the war, had attained a high state of efficiency. He was several times elected to the State legislature by his fellow-townsmen, and Mas once mayor of Bockland. When the war broke out, he entered the volunteer service as colonel of the Fourth Maine regiment. He fought at Bull Bun. He M as raised to the rank of brigadier-general in April, 18(i2. He M'as in the peninsula Muth McClellan, and, as commander of the Third brigade of the Third divi- sion, of Heintzelman’s corps, took part in most of the engagements. He followed the fortunes of Pope in Virginia, and those of Burnside at Fredericksburg. At the latter battle, he greatly distinguished himself. In March, 18G3, his nomination as major-general of volunteers M'as confirmed by the Senate; and he w^as placed in command of the Second division of the Third army corps, then under Sickles. In this capacity he fought at Chancellorsville. Berry M-as greatly lamented by the army and by the nation at large. THE HOPES OP THE SOUTH. 487 CHAPTER XXVII. Dark Days. — After Chancellorsville. — The Army of Lee and the Southern People. — High Hopes. — The Inva- sion Mania. — Hooker Watchful. — Lee’s Array in Motion. — Longstreet at Culpepper. — A. P. Hill at Fred- ericksburg. — Hooker and Sedgwick Deceived. — Pleasonton Reconnoitres. — The Discovery. — Both Armies Moving North. — Hooker Protects Washington. — At Fairfax and Manassas. — The Confederates at Winches- ter. — Milroy Abandons the Place. — A Blunder. — Berryville and Martinsburg. — Harper’s Ferry. — The Valley Cleared of National Troops. — Hooker’s Mistake. — Too Much Advice. — Excitement in the North. — Maryland and Pennsylvania Aroused. — Confederate Raids.— Chambersburg Open to the Invader. — Hooker No Longer Doubtful. — Crosses the Potomac at Harper’s Ferry. — At Frederick. — Hooker Removed. — Meade in Com- mand. — Sketch of Meade. — Modest, but Firm. — His Request. — Lee Moving on Harrisburg. — Stuart’s De- tour. — Lee's Ignorance of the Whereabouts of the National Army. — The Cumberland Valley. — Lee’s Dis- cpvery. — His Change of Purpose. — Moving Towards Gettysburg. —Meade’s Purpose. — Gettysburg. — Its Position and Surroundings. — Buford at Gettysburg. — The B.ittle Begun. — Arrival of Reynolds. — The Iron Brigade. — Reynolds Killed. — Doubleday in Command. — Arrival of Howard. — Cemetery Ridge Occupied. — The Tide Turns. — Ewell on the Field. — The Stonewall Brigade. — Howard's Mistake. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Terrific Fighting. — Arrival of Hancock. — Buford, the Good Angel of Gettysburg. — The Nationals Again in Position. — The Confederate Skirmishers Recalled. — End of the Fir.st Day’s Fighting. —Meade Coming up from Taney town. — The Whole Army Moving towards Gettj’-sburg. — Arrivals of the Different Corps. — Disposition of the Troops. — The Confederate Prospect. — The Relative Strength of the Two Armies. — Lee’s Original Intention. — Necessity. — One Opportunity Lost. — The Morning of the 2d of July. — A Peaceful Scene. — Lee's Order of Battle. — Waiting for the Attack. — Sickles’ Mistaken Position. — The Round Tops. — Longstreet’s Fierce Attack on the National Left. — Severe Fighting. — Hood’s Texans — Gen- eral Warren on Hand. — Terrible Slaughter. — Little Round Top Secured. — Birney’s Left. — The Salient. — Peach Orchard. — Terrible Pressure. — The Orchard Captured. — Birney’s New Position. — Birney’s Brigades. — Caldwell’s Division. — The Battle Boils and Bubbles. — The Nationals Again Driven Back. — The Confederate Advance Checked. — Crawford’s Splendid Charge. — Humphrey’s Peculiar Position. — His Successful Retreat. — Hancock to the Rescue. — The National Position in Danger. — Slaughtered Heaps. — The Ridge Secured. — The National Right Weakened. — The Confederate Attack on the Left a Failure. — Ewell's Attack on the National Right. — The Bravery of Greene. — Cemetery Hill. — The Ravine. — Benner’s Hill. — A Tremendous Onset. — A Terrible Reception.— Culp’s Hill. — Johnston’s Attack. — Seizure of the Vacant Breast-Works. — The Darkness. — The Breast- Works Held. — End of the Second Day’s Fight. — Heavy Losses on Both Sides. — Lee Not Dissatisfied. — Meade Still Confident. — The Troops Restored to the National Right. — Ewell’s At- tack Resumed. — General Geary on Hand. — A Terrible Morning’s Fighting. — The Confederates Driven Back. — The Position on the National Right Secured. — A Lull in the Fight. — Arrival of the Cavalry. — Lee Preparing for Another and Final Attack. — A Terrific Cannonade. — The Advancing Columns. — Mowed Down by the National Artillery. — Pickett’s Brave Virginians. — Stannard’s Brave Vermonters. — Caught on Flank. — In Front of Hancock. — A Terrific Musketry Fire. — Pettigrew’s Lines Broken and Routed. — Pickett’s Men Stand Firm.-— 'A Tremendous Charge. — The National Line Penetrated. — Doubleday’s Men to the Rescue. — The Lines Re-formed. — The Confederates Repulsed. — Havoc and Victory. — Wilcox’s Vain Attempt.— Cav- alry Charges on the Left and Right. — Driven Back at all Points. — The Battle Ended.— Lincoln’s An- nouncement of the Victory. — Lee’s Disappointment. — Imboden and Lee. — “We Must Return to Virginia.” — Burying the Dead. — The Retreat. — The Pursuit. — Williamsport.— Crossing the Potomac. — On to the Rapi- dan. — End of the Campaign. — Reflections. The months of May and June, 1863, 1SS3 remembered as a period of great darkness in the history of the Civil War. The year, so far. had been marked by no great National triumph. On the contrary, reverse had followed reverse in rapid and alarming succession, until it seemed as if the last 488 GETTYSBURG. ray of hope were about to be extin- guished, and until the hearts of many brave men were failing them for fear. Galveston, which had been restored to the Union at the close of 1862, was again in the hands of the Confederates ; Beauregard, at Charleston Harbor, was successfully resisting all the skill and energy of Dupont ; Rosecranz, who had accomplished nothing since the famous encounter at Murfreesboro, was effec- tually held in check by Bragg at Chat- tanooga; Banks was vainly courting victory on the lower Mississippi ; Vicks- burg had not yet yielded to the stub- born pertinacity of General Grant ; and in two great battles — at Fredericksburg and at Chancellorsville — the army of the Potomac had sustained inglorious defeat. It was of all things most natural that, in such circumstances, there should be sorrow in the North, and contrasted joy and hope in the South. The state of things which existed after the battle of Chancellorsville was not unlike that which supervened upon the defeat of Pope, in August of the previous year. Now, as then, it seemed as if fortune were smiling on the South, and as if a favorable opportunity had arisen for abandoning the defensive, and striking a final and decisive blow. The Confederate troops were in excel- lent spirits ; and General Lee was not to be blamed if he shared their feelings. In two great battles, although con- fronted by superior numbers, they had come off victorious, and inflicted terri- ble punishment on the National forces. If victory was so easily won on their own territory, might not similar success attend them on the territory of their enemy ? They had twice over repelled an invading army, which was supposed to be invincible: were they not justi- fied in playing the part of invaders in turn ? The morale of Lee’s army could never again be higher. If, therefore, a bold and vigorous effort were not made now, the opportunity might be lost forever. It was well known to General Lee, and to the authorities at Richmond, that Hooker’s army had been largely reduced, because of the extensive out-mustering of short-term troops. Lee’s army, on the other hand, had gained in strength. Longstreet had come up from the south of the James, where he had been operating at the time of the battle of Chancellors- ville ; and a rigidly enforced conscrip- tion had brought up the total of the army to over 70,000 men. The resources of arbitrary power had been exhausted to clothe, equip and otherwise put the array in a condition to undertake what some were sanguine enough to hope might prove a successful and final cam- paign. The army of Northern Virginia had never before been so well provided with all the essentials of war. It was, in the words of Longstreet, “ in condition to undertake anything.” If there was de- ficiency anywhere, it was in the commis- sariat; but this was the less an inconven- ience that, in the rich granaries of Penn- sylvania, which awaited their approach, there was enough and to spare. In ad- dition to these various reasons, which prompted the Southern leaders to im- mediate and vigorous action, there was THE ARMIES IN MOTION. 489 unquestionably this other : there was the inspiring hope that a successful campaign in the free Suites of the North would take fj*om foreign govern- ments their last excuse for refusing to recognize the independence of the Confederation. By the end of May, Lee’s army, reorganized into three sepa- rate army corps, commanded respective- ly by Longstreet, Hill and Ewell, was ready to launch forth on what seemed a promising but in reality, as the result proved, an ill-starred expedition. The two armies, since the battle of Chancellorsville — the one paralyzed, and unable to strike, the other in seeming idleness, and apparently without plan or purpose — lay encamped on the op- posite sides of the Bappahannock. Hooker was at Falmouth, his left ex- tending several miles down the river. Lee, on the south and west of the river, occupied that line of impregnable earth- works which, from one extreme to the other, dotted the country for thirty miles. On neither side had any de- monstration been made. Behind this mask of idleness, there was real ac- tivity in the Confederate ranks. Lee was busy perfecting his arrangements for his projected movement toward the North. Hooker was io^norant of the plans of his antagonist; but he was watchful and not unprepared to act, as soon as the movements of the enemy should reveal his purpose. It was now the 3d of June. On that June began to move his troops, McLaws’ and Hood’s divisions, of Longstreet’s corps, being pushed for- ward in the direction of Culpepper Court House. On the 4th and 5th, Ewell’s corps was marched in the same direction. In order to disguise his movement, and to keep the National commander otf his guard, Lee left the corps of A. P. Hill to occupy the lines of Fredericksburg. It was not possible, however, that so gigantic a movement, as that which Lee contemplated, could be conducted for any length of time in secrecy. Discovering signs of more than ordinary activity in the camp of the enemy, and suspecting its cause. Hooker sent instructions to Sedg- June wick, on the 6th, to throw a por- tion of his troops across the Bappahan- nock at Franklin’s Crossing, and make a close reconnoissance of the enemy’s position. The reconnoissance was made accordingly. Hill held his position with such tenacity, and made such a display of strength, that Sedgwick and Hooker were, for the time, deceived. It was the conviction of both that, whatever might be Lee’s immediate purpose, the Confederate forces had not, as yet, in any very large numbers, been removed from their old encamp- ments. It soon became manifest, how- ever, that Lee was bent on a movement to the North. On Tuesday, the June 9th, General Pleasonton, taking with him two divisions of cavalry, under Buford and Gregg, with two picked brigades of infantry, under Bus- sel and Ames, crossed the Bappahan- nock at Kelley’s and Beverley’s Fords, his intention being to move by converg- ing roads on Culpepper. It was known that Stuart was already at Culpepper; and it was Hooker’s expectation that. 490 GETTYSBURG. by sending his whole cavalry corps for- ward, he might succeed in breaking up Stuart’s camp. Stuart, meanwhile, had moved on from Culpepper to Brandy Station, his object being to form the advance, and to cover the flank of the main movement. Having crossed at Beverley’s Ford, Buford came imme- diately into contact with a Confederate brigade, under General Jones. This brigade he drove back for a couple of miles, when he found himself checked by the brigades of W. H. F. Lee and Wade Hampton, who had come to the suppoi't of their companion in arms. At this point, some severe fighting en- sued. Meanwhile, Gregg had crossed at Kelley’s Ford ; and, having pushed on toward Brandy Station, he was about to fall with effect on Stuart’s rear. Stuart was compelled to draw off from Buford’s fi*ont, so as to face this new foe. Getting into position, Stuart fell wuth tremendous force upon Gregg. A spirited contest at once took place for the possession of the heiglits. For a time, the battle raged with great fierceness. It was one of the very few genuine cavalry engagements during the whole war, and possessed additional interest from the fact that it was be- tween the entire mounted force of both armies. Gregg carried the heights; but finding: that the other column was not able to come up and form a junction with him, he fell back toward his right and rear, and united with Buford. Pleasonton then retired his whole com- mand across the Kappahannoek, but not until he had discovered, through captured correspondence, that Lee was present in force at Culpepper, and that the object of the Confederate leaders was the invasion of the North. In this engagement, the loss on each side was about 600. Among the wounded on the Confederate side was W. H. F. Lee. There was now no longer any doubt as to the intention of the enemy. His object was invasion. It was still un- certain, however, whether Lee meant to move on Washington or to push his way into Maryland and Pennsylvania. It was known that the Confederates felt sore because of the raids of Grier- son in Mississippi, and of Davis and Kilpatrick in Virginia ; and threats had been made against both the States above named. At the same time, Washington w^ould be a rich prize to the Confederates; and it was not im- probable that an attempt would be made to capture the National capital. Hook- er’s first move was to throw his army along the line of the Kappahannoek, his right being advanced so as to cover the fords of that river. While Hooker was thus occupied, Lee had actually turned his right, and thrown the head of a column into the Shenandoah Val- ley. Hill was left in his old position at Fredericksburg ; Longs treet remained at Culpepper; while Ewell, on the 1 Oth, was pushed forward to the west and north. Striking the Blue Kidge, he moved along the eastern side of that range until he reached Chester’s Gap. Passing through the gap, he crossed the Shenandoah at Front Koyal. Burst- ing into the valley, he advanced by forced marches toward Winchester, at which place he arrived on the evening MILROY’S DISASTROUS RETREAT 491 June the 13th, having accomplished the distance from Culpepper, some seventy miles, in three days. While Ewell was making this rush towards Winchester, Hooker was still guarding the fords of the Eappahan- nock. It was not until the 13th that he was made aware of the march which his antagonist had stolen upon him. The intelligence fell upon him like a thunderbolt. Abandoning his camp on the Rappahannock, he fell back to- wards Washington, taking positions which would enable him, if necessary, to defend the capital, while at the same time he could watch the develop- ment of Lee’s plan of operations. On the 15th and 16th, he had fallen back as far as Fairfax and Manassas. Here, for some days, he remained. As soon as Hill, who had been left behind at Fredericksburg, observed the disappear- ance of the Union army, he marched towards Culpepper, where Longstreet still held position. Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, was ordered forward to Winchester to co-operate with Ewell. Irnboden, with his troops, was sent out in the direction of Romney, his instruc- tions being to cover Winchester, and to prevent reinforcements arriving by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Ewell had detached Rodes’ division to Berryville, with the view of cutting off communications between Winches- ter and the Potomac. General Milroy, then in command at Winchester, had under him a force of 7000 men, with three pieces of field-artillery, and six siege pieces in a fort. Milroy held out against the vigorous and persistent at- tacks of the rapidly increasing forces of the enemy during the 13th and June 14th, repelling some of the as-*^>H, saults with great spirit; but, on the night of the 14th, discovering that the whole corps of Ewell and of Long- street were at hand, he attempted to retreat. It was too late. He was al- most surrounded. Only a small por- tion of his troops managed to effect their escape, some finding their way to Harper’s Ferry, and some to Pennsyl- vania. His losses were 4000 taken prisoners, 29 guns, 277 wagons and 400 horses. General Milroy was severely taken to task by some for his conduct at Winchester: he was vindicated by others. President Lincoln, pronouncing on the evidence laid before him by the judge -advocate -general, declared that neither Milroy nor Schenck, his imme- diate superior, and between whom the blame must be divided, were seriously to blame, and that a court-martial was not necessary in the case. The mistake was in not abandoning the place at an earlier day. It is doubtful whether Milroy could have held out until succor reached him; but certainly defeat and surrender could not have been more disastrous than was the retreat. Berryville and Martinsburg, at the same time, yielded to the attacks of General Rodes; and the garrison at Harper’s Ferry withdrew to Maryland 'Heights. The valley was thus cleared of National troops. Judged from a high military stand- point, General Hooker’s line of action, after he was made aware of the surprise at Winchester, is open to severe criti- m GETTYSBURG. cism. It was clearly the duty required by the situation to interpose between Hill at Fredericksburg and Longstreet at Culpepper. A blow vigorously dealt ought to have resulted in the capture or destruction of Hill. Even if neither of these results followed, the presump- tion is that such a movement would have brou 2 :ht Lee back to the assistance of his lieutenant, and so made an end of the invasion. It is only just to Hooker to say that, if we are to judge from the correspondence which took place between him and Halleck and President Lincoln, a short time before Lee began his Northern movement, the course which Hooker did adopt was opposed to his own better judgment. The course which we have indicated as the right course to follow in the circum- stances was the course which he actual- ly suggested, in the event of Lee moving as he did. It was condemned by Hal- leck, and, in the most emphatic and characteristic manner, discouraged by Lincoln. If Lee,” said the president, “ should leave a rear force at Freder- icksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, he would fight you in entrenchments, and have you at disadvantage ; and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would, in some way, be getting an advantage of you northward. In a word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence^ and liable to he torn by dogs front and rear^ without a fair chance to gore one way or to kick the other y ^ * Despatch from President Lincoln to General Hooker, Jime 5th. The disaster at Winchester, and the appearance of Confederate troops on their borders, created the wildest excite- ment in Maryland and Pennsylvania. The excitement was shared, in fact, by the who],e of the Northern States. Ap- peals to the people were published by the governors of Maryland and Pennsyl- vania; and, on the 15th of June, jun® a proclamation was issued by the president, calling for 120,000 militia. Pennsylvania was to furnish 50,000 ; Ohio, 30,000 ; Maryland, 10,000 ; West Virginia, 10,000 ; New York, 20,000. These calls were promptly and heartily responded to. Meanwhile, lively scenes were being witnessed in the larger towns, threatened by the invading troops. Of some of those scenes stir- ring descriptions have been preserved. The 16th, in Harrisburg, is thus June described by an eye-witness : The morning broke,” he tells us, “ up- on a populace all astir, who had been called out of bed by the ‘ beat of the alarming drum,’ the blast of the bugle, and the clanging of bells. The streets were lively with men, who were either returning from a night’s work on the fortifications, or going over to relieve those who were toiling there. As the sun rose higher, the excitement gath- ered head. All along the streets were omnibuses, wagons and wheelbarrows taking in trunks and valuables, and rushing them down to the depot, to be shipped out of rebel range. The stores, the female seminaries and almost every private residence were busy all of the forenoon in swelling the mountain of freight that lay at the depot. Every THREATENED INVASION. 493 horse was impressed into service, and every porter groaned beneath his weight of responsibilities. The scene at noon at the depots was indescrib- able, if not disgraceful. A sweltering mass of humanity thronged the plat- form, all furious to escape from the doomed city. At the bridge, and across the river, the scene was equally excit- ing. All through the day a steady stream of people, on foot and in wagons, young and old, black and white, was pouring across it fi*om the Cumberland Valley, bearing along with it house- hold gods and all manner of goods and stock. Endless trains, laden with flour, grain and merchandise, hourly emerged from the valley, and thundered across the bridge and through the city. Miles of retreating baggage wagons, filled with calves and sheep tied together, and great, old-fashioned furnace wagons, loaded with tons of trunks and boxes, deflled in continuous procession down the pike and across the river, raising a dust that marked the outline of the road as far as the eye could see.” Pittsburg, on the 19 th, presented a Jiijic scene of great activity. “Work 19* on the city defenses is still pro- gressing vigorously, and some of the more important works are now ready to receive the guns. The number of men employed on the fortifications yes- terday was 4605. The works are on Herron’s Hill, on Harrison’s Hill, on Mount Washington, on Squirrel Hill, and on Negley’s Hill. There are up- ward of 5000 men in the trenches to- day; and, with such a large working force, it cannot take many days to finish the works now in hand. General Ber- nard,with a competent staff of engineers, was engaged in laying out new works yesterday on the outer side of the Alle- ghany, so as to render the city secure against an advance from that direction. Works have also been laid out near Tur- tle Creek and other important points.” In Baltimore, similar preparations were made for the approach of tbe inva- ders. “The work of erecting barricades progressed rapidly on Friday and Satur- day, and, on Sunday morning, the entire circle of the city was completed, and ready for military occupation at any moment that the scouts should an- nounce the approach of the enemy. The erection of lines of entrenchments and fortifications on all the approaches to the city have also progressed rapidly. On Saturday, about 1000 colored men were gathered by the police from dif- ferent sections of the city, causing muck excitement among that portion of our population, as they were marched out to the different locations for the defen- sive works. At night another force was secured, to relieve those who had been at work throughout the day, and an- other relief gang was provided on Sun- day morning and evening, so that rapid progress has been made, and the works are now ready for immediate use.” While Hooker remained at Fairfax and Manassas, there were occasional cavalry skirmishes in the neighbor- hood of Ashby Gap. In some of these the fighting was severe ; in all of them the National troops distinguished them- selves for dash and daring, not only holding their own, but driving the 494 GETTYSBURG. enemy before them. These encounters, however, exercised no jDerceptible influ- ence on the campaign. Lee was not hin- dered from posting himself in strength in the Shenandoah Valley, where he was ready to meet Hooker, if he should deem it prudent to attack him, and where also he could send foraging par- ties into Maryland and Pennsylvania. Jenkins’ troopers had already pene- trated as far as Chambersburg, and ravaged the country for miles around, frightening the peaceful inhabitants, and carrying off much booty, particu- larly in cattle and horses. On the June 22d, Hill and Longstreet having 22* come up and relieved him in the valley, Ewell, at the head of the in- vading columns, passed into Maryland, Imboden moving to the west, and breaking up the lines of communication by the Baltimore and Ohio Bail road and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. The whole region of Western Pennsyl- vania, up to the Susquehanna, was now open to the invaders. On the 24tli and the 25th, Longstreet and Hill followed Ewell. The objective point of the Confederates was Cham- June bersburg. On the 26th, the entire 26. Confederate army had crossed at Williamsport and Shepherdstown. On the same day. Hooker, no longer in doubt as to Lee’s plan, led his army across the Potomac at Edward’s Ferry, and moved towards Frederick. This, as we shall see, was a wise and politic movement on the part of the National commander. It led to the happiest results, although Hooker himself was not to reap the glory. At this conjuncture there occurred an unlooked-for circumstance, which June might have had a most disastrous 27 . effect on the campaign and on the prospects of the North. On the 27th, when Hooker had marched upon Fred- erick, and when it became manifest that a great battle was imminent, the public were astounded by the intelli- gence that General Hooker had resigned the command of the army of the Poto- mac, and that the important and some- what perilous trust had been committed to General Meade. What was it that brought about this sudden, unexpected, and, to all appearance, untimely change? The story can be briefly told. At the time Lee began his movement north- ward, the National forces in the east were divided into several separate and independent commands. General Heint- zelman commanded the department of Washington, with a force of 36,000 men; General Schenck had charge of the middle department, including the garrisons at Harper’s Ferry, Winches- ter, and other contiguous places; and General Dix, with a considei’able force, lay idle on the peninsula. Hookei*, who had expressed a strong desire that the troops of Heintzelman and Schenck should be placed under his control, had at length so far overcome the scruples of Commander-in-Chief Halleck, that he obtained a reluctant consent. Hooker had sent General Slocum to Harper’s Ferry, with the understanding that he should be joined by the 10,000 or 11,000 troops stationed there under French, and that the united force should make a demonstration on Lee’s RESIGNATION OF HOOKER. 495 rear by a movement up the Cumberland Valley. .Such an arrangement implied the evacuation of Harper’s Ferry, but to this Halleck would not consent. It was in vain that Hooker reasoned, showing that the place was compara- tively of no importance, that it com- manded no ford of the Potomac, that the removal of the troops would not affect the fortifications, that it was without public stores, and that there was only a very small likelihood that the enemy would think of taking pos- session. He was met by the reply, Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, ex- cept in case of absolute necessity.” Hooker requested to be relieved from the command of the army. His request was at once complied with. Hooker has been severely blamed for deserting his post at this critical juncture. It was a perilous experiment to change the commander-in-the-field, on the eve of what, it was evident, must prove a great and decisive battle. It does seem, on the surface, as if Hooker al- lowed personal considerations to tri- umph over what he ought to have regarded as the welfare of the nation. But, undoubtedly. Hooker had other reasons for the course he took than that which he openly assigned. His relations with the government had not been cordial from the first. His claims, after the removal of McClellan, had been passed over in favor of Burnside; and when, after the battle of Fred- ericksburg, it was found impossible longer to ignore him, the command of the army of the Potomac was grudg- ingly given him. He had scarcely en- tered upon his duties, when the presi- dent wrote him, informing him of strange charges which were rumored against him, such as ambition to play the role of dictator, reminding him that the most effective method of se- curing the gratification of desires so ambitious was to overthrow the insur- gents, and make an end of the rebel- lion, and assuring him that, if he allowed disaster to befall the army of the Po- tomac, he would never be at the head of the American or any other govern- ment. Hooker’s relations with the government were not improved by his failure at Chancellorsville. On the 14th of May, Lincoln wrote him: ‘‘I must tell you that I have some fearful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true.” These things being known, it is not much to be wondered at either that, in the circumstances. Hooker should have resigned, or that his resig- nation should have been so promptly accepted. On the morning of the June 28th of J une, an order arrived from 28. Washington, transferring the command of the army to Major-General Meade, of the Fifth army corps. On the same day appeared the two following orders : “ Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) Frederick, Md.. June 28, 1863. ) “In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the 496 GETTYSBURG. army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Major-General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well- fonght held. Impressed with the be- lief that my usefulness as the com- mander of the army of the Potomac is in]|)aired, I part from it, ^^et not with- out the deepest emotion. The sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the convic- tion that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail ; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumph of its arms may bring successes worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell. ‘‘Joseph Hooker, “ Major-General.” Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) June 28, 1863. f “ By direction of the president of the United States, I hereby assume command of the army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order — an order totally unexpected and unsolicit- ed — I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. What- ever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man de- termine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve, in the command of this army, an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever aj)pear conspicuous in the history of its achieve- ments; but I rely upon the hearty sup- port of my companions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust wffiich has been confided to me. George G. Meade, “ Major-General Commanding.” The change produced some surprise in the army ; but the appointment of General Meade was generally well received. The report of the change soon extended to the several corps, and their coinmandei’S hastened to bid farewell to General Hooker. By three o’clock, a large number of officers had assembled, and, soon after, the gen- eral appeared in the avenue before his tent. Some time was spent in social intercourse, and, to the last, all formali- ties were dispensed with. The parting was painful to every one, particularly to those who had become endeared to the general by old associations. General Hooker was deeply grieved. He had been identified with the army of the Potomac, he said, since its organization, and had hoped to continue with it to the end. It was the best army of the country, w^orthy of the confidence of the nation, and could not fail of success in the approaching struggle. He spoke of his successor as a glorious soldier, and urged all to give him their earnest support. Major-General George G. Meade, to whom the destinies of the army of the Potomac were now entrusted, Avas born in Spain, in 1815, his parents residing, at the time of his birth, in Barcelona, ©EfJL. ®E®. ©. MEAEIE GENERAL MEADE IN COMMAND. 497 He graduated at West Point, June 30th, 1835, and entered the regular army of the United States as second lieutenant of artillery. In 1836 he resigned his commission, and lived in retirement for six years. On the 19th of May, 1842, he resumed his connection with the army, and took part in the Mexican War, winning special distinction in the battles of Palo Alto and Monterey. When the call was made by the pre- sident for 300,000 volunteers, and McCall’s division Mms organized at Tenallytown, Meade was appointed to the command of the second brigade. At Mechanicsville, at Gaines’ Mill, at Charles City Cross Roads, at the second battle of Bull Run, at South Mountain, at Antietam, at Fredericksburg, and at Chancellors ville, General Meade had given evidence of soldierly abilities of the very highest order ; and the manner in which he conducted the retreat from .Chancellorsville marked him out as the probable future commander of the army of the Potomac. The appointment of General Meade to the chief command of the army of the Potomac, a surprise to many, was per- haps the greatest surprise to General Meade himself. He had been disgusted with the conduct of Hooker at Chancel- lorsville ; and his conviction of Hooker’s incapacity, as revealed in that campaign, he had had the courage frankly to ex- press. It was known to some that Meade’s conduct at Chancellorsville had attracted the attention of the president, and commanded his admiration. “I tell you,” said Lincoln a few days after the Chancellorsville retreat, “I think a great deal of that fine fellow, Meade.” It is doubtful, however, whether Meade was aware that he stood so high in the good graces of the president. One thing is certain. He knew that he had given offense to Hooker; and when, on the night of the 27th, he was awak- ened from sleep in his tent, by the mes- senger from Washington, his first ques- tion was whether he had come with an order for his arrest. General Hardie evaded the question, told him to strike a light, and then put in his hand a paper, which he found appointed him to the command of the army of the Po- tomac, with almost absolute power to conduct the war according to his own judgment. Meade was not what might be called a popular officer, but yet he was held in high esteem by all his com- rades in arms. Some forty-eight years of age, tall and slim in person, long vis- aged and thoughtful, he had the aspect of a scholar rather than that of a sol- dier. He was an excellent tactician, and imbued with sound military ideas. The well-known character of the man, and his long and intimate connection with the army of the Potomac, secured for him the confidence of both officers and men. They knew that in his case, at least, performance would be equal to promise. To Meade was granted a large amount of authority — much larger than had been enjoyed by Hooker. The presi- dent waived in his favor all the powers of the Executive and the Constitution. Meade, in fact, was untrammelled. But he made a wise and cautious use of the power entrusted to him. lie made as 498 GETTYSBURG. few changes as possible, and only those which were absolutely necessary. He retained the officers who had formed General Hooker’s military family — General Butterfield, chief of staff; Gen- eral W arren, chief of engineers ; Gen- eral Hunt, chief of artillery ; and Gen- eral Williams, adjutant-general. His desire was to understand and give effect to the plans and purposes of his late chief. In his telegram, accepting the chief command of the army of the Potomac, he said: ‘‘Totally unexpect- ed as it has been, and in ignorance of the exact condition of the troops, and position of the enemy, I can only now say that, it appears to me I must move towards the Susquehanna, keep- ing Washington and Baltimore well covered, and, if the enemy is checked in his attempt to cross the Susquehanna, or, if he turns towards Baltimore, to give him battle. I would say that I trust every available man that can be spared will be sent to me, as, from all accounts, the enemy is in strong force.” In response to this request, the garri- son at Harper’s Ferry was placed at his disposal; so, also, was the entire force of militia, under Couch, at Har- risburg; and, in addition, such forces as could be spared from W est Virginia, Baltimore, Washington and Fortress Monroe, with the returning troops from North Carolina, were hurried to his support. Sykes was placed in com- mand of the Fifth corps, which had been Meade’s ; Hancock had charge of the Second, since the assignment of Couch to the department of the Sus- quehanna; Reynolds commanded the First ; Sickles the Third ; Sedgwick the Sixth ; Howard the Eleventh ; Slocum the Twelfth. The entire effective force was about 100,000 men. The opposing armies, at this time, were nearly equal in point of numbers. Lee’s force, as it passed through Hagers- town, Avas estimated at 97,000, with 280 guns. This, hoAvever, did not in- clude the strong cavalry force Avhich, as we shall see, was moving by a route different from that followed by the main army. When General Meade took the place of General Hooker, the army of the Potomac was lying at Frederick. General Lee had his head- quarters at Chambersburg, with the corps of Longstreet and Hill. Ewell had advanced as far as York and Car- lisle. On the 27th, Lee issued the fol- lowing order to his army : “Headquarters Army of Northern Yirgini a.. ) Chambersburg, Pa., tTMTid 27, 1863. j “The commanding general has ob- served, with marked satisfaction, the conduct of the troops on the march, and confidently anticipates results com- mensurate with the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could have displayed greater fortitude, or better performed the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their conduct, in other respects, has, with few excep- tions, been in keeping with their charac- ter as soldiers, and entitles them to approbation and praise. “There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness, on the part of some, that they have in keeping the yet unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties exacted of us by civili- MEADE ADVANCES NORTHWARD. 499 zation and Christianity are not less ob- ligatory in the country of the enemy than in our own. The commanding general considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenseless, and the wanton de- struction of private property that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators, and all connected with them, but are subver- sive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movement. It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our peo- ple have suffered, without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose ab- horrence has been excited by the atroci- ties of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in vain. “The commanding general, therefore, earnestly exhorts the troops to abstain, with most scrupulous care, from un- necessary or wanton injury to private property ; and he enjoins upon all offi- cers to arrest and bring to summary punishment all who shall in any way offend against the orders on this subject. “R. E. Lee, General.” The actual conduct of the Confed- erates was in striking contrast with the spirit of these instructions. They were living on the country, making requisi- tions on the farmers and tradesmen, and exacting ransoms from the towns. The severity of these exactions may be illustrated by one example. On the 28th of June, the little town of York alone was ordered to furnish 165 barrels of flour, or 28,000 pounds of baked bread; 3500 pounds of sugar; 1650 pounds of coffee ; 300 gallons of molasses ; 1200 pounds of salt ; 32,000 pounds of fresh beef, or 21,000 pounds of bacon or pork ; 2000 pairs of shoes or boots ; 1000 pairs of socks; 1000 felt hats, and $100,000 in money. Such was the comfort which the invasion brought to Maryland and Pennsylvania. On the morning of the 29th, Meade put his army in motion. Giving June up the idea of moving to the 29. west of the South Mountain, he took a course due north, ascending the course of the Monocacy towards the Susque- hanna. The army moved in three col- umns, covering, as it advanced, the lines of approach to Baltimore and Washington. The First and Eleventh corps were directed on Emmettsburg ; the Third and Twelfth on Taneytown; the Second on Frizzleburg; the Fifth to Union; and the Sixth to Windsor. On the evening of the 29th, the Na- tional army was in position — its left at Emmettsburg and its right at Windsor. The same day on which Meade put his army in motion. General Lee had completed all the necessary preparations for an advance on Harrisburg. On that day, however, he learned for the flrst time, by means of a scout, that the Na- tional army, having crossed the Poto- mac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached 500 GETTYSBURG. the South Mountain. Lee’s ignorance of the whereabouts of the National army is explained by the fact that Stuart, on whom he depended for in- formation, had been left behind to guard the passes of the mountains, and to obstruct, as much as possible, the progress of the enemy. In the event of the Nationals succeeding in crossing the Potomac, his instructions were to follow, crossing the river to the east or west of the Blue Kidge, as he deemed the more convenient, and take position on the Confederate right. Unable to hinder the Nationals from crossing the river, and anxious to execute the re- maining portion of his instructions, Stuart was compelled to make a wide detour to the east by way of Fairfax Court House. When, on the evening of the 27th, he reached the Potomac at the mouth of Seneca Creek, he found the river greatly swollen by recent rains ; and it was only by tremendous exertions he gained the Maryland shore. He then learned that the Nationals, having crossed the day before, were on their way to Frederick. The National army thus lay between him and Lee ; and he was compelled to march north- ward, through Westminster, to Han- over, in Pennsylvania, where he arrived on the 30th of June. It was Hookers misfortune to fight without his cavalry, at Chancellors ville. A similar misfor- tune had now befallen Lee. Without those eyes of the army, he had been moving about in ignoi*ance of the where- abouts of his antagonist. The intelligence of the near approach of the National army fell upon Lee like a thunderbolt. Dreading an irrup- tion of the National forces into the Cumberland Valley, and foreseeing the peril which thus threatened his com- munications, Lee resolved to concen- trate on the east side of South Moun- tain, and ‘prevent, if possible, the fur- ther progress of the opposing army. The movement on Harrisburg was, in consequence, countermanded. Long- street and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg, defiling through the South Mountain range towards Gettysburg ; and Ewell was ordered to countermarch from York and Carlisle, on the same point. On the 30th, Meade was still ignor- ant of the change of purpose on June the part of Lee. It was his be- lief that the Confederates were pressing northward to the Susquehanna. He had little doubt, however, that a col- lision was imminent. On that day, he pushed his right forward to Manches- ter, his left still remaining at Emmetts- burg, where three corps — the First, Eleventh and Third — were under or- ders of Major-General Peynolds. Ke- alizing the gravity of the situation, he issued to the army the following order : Headquarters Army of the Potomac, ) June 30 , 1863 . ) “The commanding general requests that, previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers address their troops, explaining to them the immense issue involved in the struggle. The enemy is on our soil. The whole coun- try looks anxiously to this army to de- liver it from the pi-esence of the foe. THE BATTLE GROUND. 501 Our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of mill- ions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier of the army. Homes, firesides and do- mestic altars are involved. The army has fought well heretofore. It is be- lieved that it will fight more desperate- ly and bravely than ever, if it is ad- dressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are authorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails to do his duty at this hour. By command of “ Major-General Meade. Williams, “Assistant Adjutant-General.” It was not until the night of the 30th that Meade became satisfied that Lee was concentrating his forces on the east side of South Mountain. He at once proceeded to select a position on which he might make a rapid concen- tration of his troops, and so receive battle on advantageous terms. The general line of Pipe Creek seemed to offer the advantage sought ; but its final adoption was left to be determined by the necessities which might arise. Orders were issued for an immediate advance of the different corps. The Sixth corps, Sedgwick’s, forming the right wing of the army, was ordered to Manchester, in rear of Pipe Creek ; headquarters and Second corps, Han- cock’s, were directed to Taneytown ; the Twelfth corps, Slocum’s, and the Fifth corps, Sykes’, forming the centre, were to move on Two Taverns and Hanover ; and the left wing, consisting of the First, Reynolds’, Third, Sickles’, and Eleventh, Howard’s, all under General Reynolds, was ordered to Gettysburg. The movement of the left wing was in- tended only as a mask, behind which the army could take position at Pipe Creek. It was not the intention of either Lee or Meade to make Gettys- burg the battle field ; but, unconscious- ly to both, a collision was becoming more and more inevitable in the im- mediate neighborhood. The little town of Gettysburg, which was soon to be rendered immortal as the theatre not only of the greatest battle of the Civil War, but of one of the greatest battles of modern times, is about ten miles east of the South Mountain range. The topographical features of the neighborhood are pe- culiar, presenting a series of ridges which, for the most pai't, run parallel with South Mountain, and give to the landscape a rolling and diversified character. Some of the streams flow to the northeast, and empty themselves into the Susquehanna ; others flow southward, and find an outlet into the Potomac. The town is built at the' base of one of the ridsres, and is the centre from which radiate a large number of roads. There is the Cham- bersburg road, leading to the north- west ; the Carlisle road to the north the Harrisburg road to the northeast the Baltimore road to the southeast;, and others, which lead in the direction of the Potomac to the southwest. To' the immediate south of Gettysburg,, and extending some four or five miles,, is a ridge which bears a close resem- blance to a fish-hook. The point of the* 502 GETTYSBURG. hook is known as Wolf’s Hill; the barb is known as Culp’s Hill ; while the stem — a succession of ridges — end- ing in Little Round Top and Round Top, bears the general name of Ceme- tery Ridge. Little Round Top is about two hundred and eighty feet high. Round Top, which shoots up from the former, reaches a height of some four hundred feet. These two elevations constitute the military keys of Ceme- tery Ridge. At their base runs a marshy stream, called Plum Run. Be- tween Wolf’s and Culp’s Hills flows what is called Rock Creek. The nearer part of the bend, which fronts the town, had been used as a Cemetery — hence the generic name of the ridge. The broken character of the ground, abound- ing with rocky ledges and covered with huge boulders, make it a sort of natural fortification. It is an admirable posi- tion for defensive operations. On the west side, the ground falls off into a cultivated valley, which it commands, and then gradually rises until, nearly a mile distant, it forms another and a parallel crest, called Seminary Ridge — from a theological school which crowns one of its heights and forms a conspic- uous feature of the landscape. This ridge is covered with oaks, and is local- ly known as Oak Ridge. In the valley between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges is the Emmettsburg road. Such was the ground on which, for three consec- utive days, the contending hosts of North and South were about to strive, in bloody and merciless contest, for the imstery of the Republic. On the morning of Wednesday, the 1st of July, General Buford, who jn|y had been occupying Gettysburg !• for the two days previous, passed through the town with his cavalry, and, advanc- ing beyond Seminary Ridge to the next ridge, more to the west, about two miles distant, took position on the near side of Willoughby Run. His line was drawn up across the Chambersburg road, along which Longstreet and Hill were advancing. It was about nine o’clock. All of a sudden, he found himself in collision with the Jeadinoj division of Hill, under Heth. It was the commencement of the battle of Gettysburg. Knowing that Reynolds, who had bivouacked the night before at Marsh Creek, only four miles off, was within striking distance, Buford resolved to hold the Confederates in check until the arrival of his chief. It was a perilous undertaking; but by skilful deployments, he accomplished his task. He had fallen back some- what; but his ranks were unbroken, and his men were offering a spirited resistance when, at about ten o’clock, Reynolds arrived with Wadsworth’s division. Reynolds had no instructions to bring on a battle ; but the necessi- ties of the situation supplied the place of instructions. Buford was sorely pressed, and he must support him. Swinton suggests that, probably, his fine military eye took in at a glance the features of the rocky ridge of Get- tysburg as an eminent vantage ground for a defensive battle, and that his ob- ject in bringing on the battle was to hold the enemy in check beyond the town, and thus give the army time to DEATH OF REYNOLDS. 503 concentrate on the fastness of hills. This, of course, is mere conjecture ; and whether he had such thoughts, and was influenced by such motives, we shall never know. But for his own untimely loss, there would be little cause for regret that he acted as he did. Wadsworth’s troops were immediately deployed; and Reynolds sent instruc- tions to Howard to advance as prompt- ly as possible. W adsworth was ordered to place his only battery — that of Hall — in position by the side of the road leading to Cashtown. Cutler’s brigade was thrown into position on the right, while Doubleday, who had just come up with the van of the infantry, was ordered to move Meredith’s Iron Bri- gade, as it was called, to the left of the road, into a piece of wooded ground v hich skirted Willoughby Run. De- termined to bring matters to an imme- diate issue, Reynolds, with animating words, gave the regiments in the skirt of the woods the command to charge. The order was being gallantly obeyed, Avhen, shot through the neck, he fell mortally wounded, dying before he could be removed from the field. The command now devolved on Doubleday. There was no pause in the battle. The Iron Brigade fell with tremendous force on the flank of Archer’s brigade, which was pushing its way across Willough- by Run, capturing Archer himself and several hundreds of his men. While tliese events were taking place, there was desperate fighting on the right. Hall’s battery, left for a time unsup- ported, was in imminent danger of being 'aptured, when the Fourteenth Brook- lyn and the Ninety-Fifth New York, joined by the Sixth Wisconsin, having made a change of front, charged td the relief of the guns. Such was the im- petuosity of the onset that Davis’ two Mississippi regiments were driven for shelter into the cut of an unfinished railroad, surrounded, and captured with their battle-flags. So far, success had been with the Nationals. The tide of battle was destined soon to turn. Reinforcements, in increasinor numbers, were coming up and joining both of the contending parties. The Nationals were strengthened by the arrival of the two remaining divisions of the First corps, under Rowley and Robinson, the former having taken command of Doubleday’s men. Robin- son’s division remained for a time in reserve on Seminary Ridge; but the other division was pushed forw-ard at once to the assistance of the sorely pressed left. These fresh troops were in excellent spirits. One of the brigades of Rowley’s division, commanded by Colonel Roy Stone, having been as- signed to a position dangerously ex- posed to the fire of the enemy’s artil- lery, Stone remarked to his men, ‘‘We have come here to stay.” The saying was promptly taken up. “We have come here to stay !” resounded through- out the ranks. The words were too truly prophetic ; for a very large number of the brave fellows never left the ground. The battle continued to rage with great fierceness, the Nationals still firmly maintaining their position. Meanwhile, Hill w^as reinforced by another division, under General Pender. It w^as now 504 GETTYSBURG. past noon. The sun bad been blazing since early morning. The heat was in- tense. About one o’clock, General Howard arrived on the battle ground, and took command of the held. He had brought with him the divisions of Schui*z and Barlow, the former now commanded by Schimmelpfenig, Schui-z being in charge of the corps. These divisions Howard posted to the right of the First corps, and in such a manner as to prolong the general lines and cover the approaches to Gettysburg from the north and northwest. The other division, under Von Stein wehr — an experienced and skilful officer, who had been bred in the service of Prussia, and who had done good work on that fatal first day at Chancellorsville, when Jackson fell on Howard’s corps with the force of an avalanche — he had left as a reserve on Cemetery Eidge. It was a wise and prudent step, as the result proved, and was taken, it is un- derstood, in obedience to the instruc- tions of Eeynolds. It was now about two o’clock. Howard had had little more than time to get his men in position, when the spectator on Cemetery Hill might have seen a long, gray line, serpent-like, creeping down the pike, and near the railroad on the northeast side of the town. They were “ Stonewall ” Jack- son’s men — led now by General Ewell, Jackson’s most trusted and loved lieu- tenant — who were hurrying from Y^ork and Carlisle to decide the issues of that day. Their march seems to quicken as they approach the battle- ground. Before three o’clock, they have come up from the Y^ork road, de- bouched into the woods, and, with their old, wild battle-yell, fallen with crushing effect on Howard’s right. Early’s division, of Ewell, was thrown upon the right face of the Eleventh, commanded by Barlow. Bodes’ divi- sion, of the same corps, moved further round and formed a connection with the left of the corps of General Hill. There was a commanding height, called Oak Hill, opposite the National line, where the left of the Eleventh and the rio-ht O of the First corps approached each other, but did not meet. With the eye of a skilful general, Eodes perceived that this was the key-point of the field, and seized it immediately. The Elev- enth, confronted by their old antagon- ists, seemed resolved to redeem the honor lost at Chancellorsville. They fought with the utmost bravery. But the battle had now become unequal — it was 50,000 men against 21,000; and Howard had fallen into an eiror not uncommon during the war. He had attempted to cover too much. It was impossible for his extended line, atten- uated almost to feebleness, to resist the persistent attacks and now overwhelm- ing numbers of the enemy. From his high vantage ground, where he had planted artillery, Eodes poured an ob- lique and destructive fire on the left of the Eleventh. A general advance was ordered about three o’clock. Eodes, having massed his infantry, came sweep ing down through the opening of the National line in his front, breaking and cramping the left of the Eleventh, and turning and forcing back the right THE FIKST HAY— SEMINARY RIDGE. 505 of the First. Early, at the same mo- ment, fell with equal energy on the right of the Eleventh. The gallant Barlow made a stubborn resistance near the almshouse; but, in the midst of the struggle at this point, he was wound- ed, and fell helpless into the hands of the enemy. Schimmelpfenig was also taken prisoner, but he subsequently contrived to escape and rejoin his regi- ment. The National right was thus driven back in confusion into Gettys- burg. The troops on the right of the First, or National left, were in a simi- lar plight. They, too, were driven into the town, where they became entangled with Howard’s corps. Ewell pursued the disordered mass into and through the streets of Gettysburg, capturing some five thousand prisoners and occu- pying the place. Such was the state of things on the National right, and on the right of the National left, at a comparatively early hour in the afternoon of July 1st. How was it on the extreme left of the National line ? These troops had been under fire from the commencement of the fight — some of them for five, some for six hours. At the same moment that Ewell, with the two divisions of Rodes and Early, came thundering down upon the Eleventh, A. P. Hill, strengthened by Ewell, renewed the attack upon the heroic and not yet completely exhausted First. Robinson and Doubleday and Wadsworth did their best to keep their men in position, and to hold the enemy at bay ; but they, too, began to feel themselves weak under the fierce and persistent pressure of superior numbers. “We have come to stay,” was still the watch- word and battle-cry of many of the men. They were willing to wait and fight to the bitter end. But when it became known that the right of their corps had been turned, and that the Eleventh had been routed, the convic- tion of danger in their present position was forced upon them. It was with a stubborn reluctance they began to retire, and not until they had suffered most severely. They had saved and moved to the rear all their artillery, with the exception of one piece, and all their ambulances, before they let go their hold on Seminary Ridge. When they fell back behind the town, they did so in something like order. Double- day handled his men during this crisis with marvellous ability. In managing affairs on the National left, he had re- ceived little or no assistance from Howard, wliose attention was engrossed from the first with his own corps and the general state of things on his right. The fighting, as we have seen, was severe on the left during the whole day. There were special moments, however, when the firing was terrific. Some of the men had been through all the great battles of the East. They had been in the Peninsula, and under fire at Mal- vern Hills; with Pope, and under fire at Cedar Mountain, at Manassas, and at Centreville; with Burnside, and under fire at Fredericksburg; with Hooker, and under fire at Chancellors- ville ; and they gave it as their opinion that the firing of that day was the most terrific they had ever experienced. In 506 GETTYSBURG. one brigade alone — that of Cutler — in the brief space of twenty minutes, every staff-officer had his horse shot under him. Some of them lost two, some three horses. In thirty minutes, not a horse was left to the general or his staff, but one, and that one was wounded. The remnants of the two shattered corps, reduced to one half of their original strength, found a refuge and a resting-place on Cemetery Hill. The wisdom of leaving Steinwehr behind to strengthen and fortify the position was now apparent to all. Steinwehr ha(J made excellent use of his time. His guns were admirably posted, so as to guard the approaches to the heights ; and behind every ledge of rock, every stone wall, every building, there was a living barrier — an abatis of bayonets. When the disordered masses were pouring through Gettysburg and to- wards the ridge, Hancock had arrived on the ground. Meade was still at Taneytown, some thirteen miles distant. So soon as he was made aware of the battle, and of the death of Keynolds, he sent Hancock forward to take com- mand. He was to use his own judg- ment as to whether the forces should be retained at Gettysburg, or retire to the line of Pipe Creek. If he found the ground advantageous, he was so to advise the commander, and the troops would be ordered up at once. Hurry- ing forward in an ambulance, and studying the map by the way, Hancock arrived on the field at about half-past three o’clock. “ I found,” he says, 'Hhat practically the fight was over. The rear of our column, with the ene- my, was then coming through the town of Gettysburg. General Howard was on Cemetery Hill, and there had evi- dently been an attempt on his part to stop an(i form some troops there.” Hancock was a great favorite with the rank and file of the army of the Po- tomac. His fine personal presence, and the magnetism of his manner, did much towards restoring the confidence of the men and reestablishing order. There was a nucleus of order in Stein- wehr’s division, and in the cavalry of Buford, which having been deployed in the plain to the left of the town, and in front of the ridge, presented a bold and firm front. Buford has been described as the good angel of Gettys- burg. He certainly performed heroic services on the morning of that first day, and also at this supreme moment, when weakness or hesitation would have been ruin. Never were cavalry more superbly handled. Never did mounted men more heartily or more effectively obey the behests of their chief. As the routed Nationals came up, Hancock quickly formed them into line. He was soon able to present what seemed a formidable front to the enemy. The National army, however, w^as really in great peril. The day was yet young ; several hours had to elapse before sunset. If Lee had made a vigorous attack with all the forces at his command, it is scarcely possible that Hancock could have offered an effective resistance. To his surprise, and, no doubt, to his delight, the Con- federate skirmishers, who were already 4 J-R.R ICE SC. P H I L ^ THE SECOND DAY— READY FOR BATTLE. 507 breasting the hill, were recalled ; and thus ended the first day’s fighting at Gettysburg. General Lee made a mis- take in not j)ressing the advantage he had won. But he acted up to the best of his knowledge. “ The attack was not made that afternoon,” he tells us, ‘‘because the enemy’s force was un- known, and because it was considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops.” It was a fatal pause — fatal to the hopes of Lee him- self, and to the plans and purposes of the Confederate rulers. Hancock lost no time in reporting to Meade. Soon after arriving, he sent a message informing him that he could hold the ground till dark. Shortly after five o’clock, he sent the following despatch: “When I arrived here, an hour since, I found that our troops had given up the front of Gettysburg and the town. We have now taken up a position in the cemetery, which cannot well be taken; it is a position, how- ever, easily turned. Slocum is now coming on the ground, and is taking position on the right. But we have, as yet, no troops on the left, the Thiixl corps not having yet reported ; but I suppose that it is marching up. If so, his flank march will, in a degree, pro- tect our left flank. In the meantime. Gibbon [who had been left in com- mand of the Second] had better marcli so as to take . position on our right or left to our rear, as may be necessary, in some commanding position. ^ The battle is quiet now. I think we shall be all right until night. I have sent all the trains back. When night comes on, it can be told better what had best be done. I think we can re- tire ; if not, we can fight here, as the ground appears not unfavorable, with good troops.” Having completed his dispositions, and having turned over the command to Slocum, who out- ranked him, and who had just arrived, he went back to Taney town to see Meade personally. Meade had already made up his mind ; and he set his army in motion at once. The Twelfth corps, Slocum’s, which had been urgently summoned by Gen- eral Howard during the afternoon, and which had been pushed forward with as little delay as possible, arrived be- fore six o’clock. It was immediately put into position. The Third corps. Sickles’, which had also been sum- moned up by Howard, arrived some of them that night at sunset, and the re- mainder duriim the nio:ht and follow- ing morning. The Second corps, Han- cock’s, which had only to travel from Taneytown, a distance of thirteen miles, came up shortly after midnight. The Fifth corps, Sykes’, was at Union Mills, twenty-three miles distant, when the order was given , but it was on the ground at an early hour in the morn- ing. The Sixth, Sedgwick’s, was at Manchester, thirty-two miles distant. It was known that its commander would hurry forward with all possible despatch ; and it was confidently ex- pected that he would reach the field in time to take part in the fight of the following day. Meade, himself, as soon as he had received Hancock’s rep- resentations, broke up his headquarters 508 GETTYSBURG. at Taneytown, sent his trains to West- minster, and hastened to Gettysburg, which he reached at one o’clock on the morning of the 2d. Soon after he arrived on the ground, he fixed his headquarters at a little frame house on the Taneytown road, in rear of and to the south of Zeigler’s Gi’ove. It was sheltered from infantry fire by a swell in the ground; but there was nothing to prevent it from becoming a target for the enemy’s artillery. With the^earliest light Meade was July inspecting the ground, and making arrangements for the dis- position of his troops. Some of the corps were already in position. The others were placed as they came up. The Elev- enth retained its position on Cemetery Hill, and was supported by Robinson’s and Doubleday’s divisions, of the First, now commanded by General Newton. On the extreme right was the Twelfth, which, with the division of Wadsworth, also of the First, held Culp’s Hill. The Second and Third were ordered to occupy the continuation of Cemetery Ridge, to the left of the Eleventh. The Fifth was held in reserve. When Sedgwick came up, he was to be placed on the extreme left, behind the Round Tops. The order, from right to left, was, therefore, as follows : Slocum, Newton, Howard, Hancock, Sickles. The entire army was concentrated on an area of about three square miles. The reserve forces were within thirty minutes’ march of any part of the line. Batteries were posted along the crest ; and rock-ledges, improvised earth-works and stone walls in the rear gave shelter to the soldiers. On the morning of Thursday, the Confederate prospect was not quite so bright as it had been the night before. True, Longstreet had arrived; but it was manifest at a glance that the Na- tional army had been largely reinforced, that it occupied a position of formid- able strength, and that to attempt to dislodge it meant a tremendous expen- diture of force, as well as a fearful sac- rifice of life. At early dawn, Lee, Longstreet and Hill were in eager con- sultation on Seminary Ridge. The summits of the ridge were covered with oak and pine trees ; so, also, was its western slope, thus affording excellent concealment for the troops. Along this ridge, and round to the east of Gettys- burg, in the form of a vast crescent, over five miles in length, its concavity facing the National line, the Confede- rate army was arranged. The eastern slope was dotted thickly with artillery, which looked frowningly over the in- tervening valley. Longstreet was on the right. Hill in the centre, and Ewell on the left. Between Ewell and Hill there was a gap of nearly a mile. The army was about 80,000 strong, numer- ically equal to that on the opposite heights, even if Sedgwick should get up in time. Lee’s one inconvenience was the extent of his line, and the con- sequent difificulty of communication. Meade had the advantage of compact- ness ; and communication was easy. It was evident already that the at- tack, if there was to be an attack, would come from the Confederates. THE ABOVE DIAGRAM SHOWS THE POSITIONS DURING THE FIRST DAV’s FIGHT. THIS DIAGRAM SHOWS POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES I)URIN(} THE SECOND AND THIRD DAYS. f W’f^fy- ■ I ■'■- xvls®^ K.#'' - T*^*iHFT**^ ■'^- ^-‘ ' -' ^ Vi 'iji^^V.^''.- «'^:p'^‘'Kji’if'^' ■•' ' ■ f -S et I -'■' 1 ^Mx¥. JJ. J'ayiri'* < W > t!^r' ^ ^. .. -.► > '■»S r/^'' fc- 1 , „ - ' f’i' :4!i'''-'??*s-':wf:^ r'j ■ . ■ "ri ; ■ ' ■ ? R ' ' ' •' V t‘,s1K0C^^ ’‘ ■ vl SB^I^aKI:. :. « • ^ :- iS.'sWplWP^' ■' ■ K ff>h - ;p. I';.:- iS li- ~~ 1 ^11 ]’ ' ^ -tf^A ^ •• ' ■ ^ • . ‘* ^ , r : \ '*.'5^^ ' 'Tl'^ I -i fi -^i; J* .o. . -r % 7 :. i-‘ 7 ’ •gf:. 4- v^tv ■' /--’A ‘■'''*J» ■■' ■^■i?ik. 'i-arM/ '■ w^Sjh'iHw c firt .t^V»Vj uf ■*? ,■ > V ■' ;.' ■ ’kiSiWj J ^ r'i' ■ :. Ahafi# ' ;is *> 5i V .- .| 4 i' »t r. *^ i».. a'fiL . v THE THIRD DAY’S FIGHTING. 5^ seen, had been sorely tried in the fighting of the 2d; and it was part of the arrangement of Longstreet, who this day again was to play the part of the aggressor, that these divisions should cover his right fiank, while he made the attack. The fresh division of Pickett, composed mostly of veteran Virginians, was, therefore, singled out, and appointed to lead the van. Pick- ett’s men were formed, arranged in double line of battle, the brigades of Kemper and Garnett being placed in front, and that of Armistead slightly in the rear. On Pickett’s advanced right was one brigade, of Hill’s corps, under General Wilcox, formed in col- umn by battalions ; and on his left, but somewhat in the rear, was Heth’s divi- sion, also of Hill’s corps, commanded by Pettigrew. The attacking force numbered about 18,000 men. On came the Confederates in the order which we have described. The distance be- tween the two lines of battle was about a mile. For the attacking party, there was a hill to descend and a hill to climb, and a valley between. It was matter of observation that, as the columns advanced, the Confederate guns were silent. “ Why ?” was the question put by the men who were rushing into the jaws of death. “ Why ?” said the men on the heights behind. ‘‘Why?” said the Nationals on the heights in front. The reason was not known till after- wards. It was not then known to Lee himself. His ammunition was already exhausted. The silence of the guns in their rear did not affect the firm and steady step of the advancing columns. It did not encourage the Nationals to slacken their artillery fire. On came Longstreet's men, in face of the wither- ing tempest of bullet and canister and shell which, at each successive step, deci- mated their front. On, on they came ; and it was already a question in the National ranks whether their own thin line of defense could resist the fierce onset of those firm and compact battalions who seemed to fear no fire, to dread no foe. The Nationals, however, were not ill-prepared for the attack. Doubleday was on the left, with Stannard’s bri- gade, of V ermont troops, well advanced in a little grove on his own right, and at an angle with the main line. Han- cock was more to the right, with his two divisions, of Gibbon and Hays, in front. From the direction in which the assaulting columns were moving, it seemed for a time as if the first heavy blow would fall upon Doubleday. Such, however, was the severity of the artillery fire from Little Round Top, that they were forced to bend more to their own left. Still they moved on, their line of march now bringing them more directly in front of Hancock’s position. Now came the opportunity for Stannard’s brave Vermonters. In tlie original line of march, the direction was such that Pickett’s centre would have struck the grove in which Stan- nard’s men were sheltered. The doub- lim? in towards their own left carried the attacking columns somewhat to the north of the grove, but only so far north as to leave their exposed light flank within easy range of Stannard’s muskets. The Vermonters were in no 526 GETTYSBURG. haste to waste their ammunition. The Confederate columns were allowed to come so well forward that their right flank was fully exposed. Then, at the signal given, the Vermont men pour forth a well-directed and most destruc- tive fire. Volley succeeds volley in rapid succession ; and the now trem- bling lines, already torn and tattered, are under the oblique fire of eight bat- teries, in charge of Major McGilvray. Not a few of Pickett’s men, unable to endure this terrific fire, were compelled to surrender. The main body, how- ever, presses on; and, inclining still more to his own left, Pickett is moving straight on the divisions of Gibbon and Hays. ‘‘Hold your fire, boys! they are not near enough yet,” was Gib- bon’s injunction, as he moved calmly and composedly along the ranks. The rifled guns of the National artillery, having fired away all their canister, were now withdrawn to await the issue of the struggle between the opposing infantry. The hostile lines are now within two and three hundred yards of the National front. Gibbon and Hays simultaneously open upon the advanc- ing columns a most destructive fire. The response is swift and well-directed, the Confederates using their muskets for the first time since they began to face this terrific storm of artillery and musketiy. All at once the battle be- comes general. The swing made by the advancing columns to their own left, after the terrific blow received by them from Stannard, had the effect of flinging Pettigrew, who commanded Heth’s di- vision, of Hill’s corps, well towards Hays’ right. Pettigrew’s men were, for the most part, Noi'th Carolina ti’oops, and were comparatively raw and unused to battle. They had been deceived into the belief that they would meet only the Pennsylvania mili- tia. They were quickly undeceived. Hays’ men were admirably posted. His right was w'ell advanced; and the nature of the ground was such as to enable him to open a simultaneous fire on Pettigrew’s troops, not only with his right and front, but also with several lines in his rear. Woodruff’s battery was also in position; and the destructive effects of a very tempest of bullets were to be aggravated by showers of grape and canister. All at once, this ti*emendous fire fell upon the already torn and decimated lines on Pickett’s left ; and they knew they were in the presence of the army of the Potomac. There was no more fight in them. Terror-stricken, Pettigrew’s men broke in utter confusion, large numbers of them flinging down their arms, and accepting mercy at the hands of their antagonists. General Pettigrew himself was wounded ; but, being able to retain command, he vainly strove to rally his men. Fifteen colors, and 2000 prisoners rewarded the skill and activity with which Hays met the threatened attack. While disaster was thus befalling the Confederate columns on the right and left, Pickett’s brave Virginians were pressing forward vigorously to- wards Gibbon’s front, and were about to fall with all their weight on Owen’s THE NATIONAL LINE PENETRATED. 527 brigade, now temporarily commanded by General Webb. This brigade com- prised the Sixty-Ninth Pennsylvania — Owen’s own — composed mostly of Irish- men renowned for their gallantry in the Peninsula; the Seventy-First, or- iginally recruited and led by Baker, who perished at Ball’s Bluff, and now commanded by Colonel R. Penn Smith ; and the Seventy-Second, commanded by Colonel Baxter. It was a veteran ^brigade, and was now to be sorely tested. General Gibbon, to allow the artillery to play upon the advancing column with grape-shot, had ordered this brigade to fall back behind the batteries. The Sixty-Ninth and the Seventy-First took position behind a low stone wall, with a slight breast- work in front : the Twenty-Second was behind the crest, some sixty paces in the rear, and was so placed as to be able to fire over the heads of those in front. In spite of the dreadful fire of artillery and musketry which was mowing down their ranks, Pickett’s men rush bravely on. They are now close to the stone wall. The two Na- tional regiments in front yield and fall back to the regiment in the rear. Webb and his officers are at hand ; the retreating regiments are quickly rallied and re-formed ; and the second line is held. But the Confederates have pushed themselves over the breast-works, and planted their battle flags on the wall. The struggle now becomes fierce and terrific in the extreme. It is a hand- to-hand conflict, man facing man, and fighting with the energy of despair. The clothes of the men are actually being burned by the powder of the ex- ploding cartridges; and the National cannoneers, refusing to retire, are clubbed and bayoneted at their guns. Pickett, however, is now left entirely alone. The forces which were intended to cover his left have been defeated, captured or driven from the field. Wilcox, whose duty it was to come up and cover his right, has failed to ad- vance. The right of his own division has been badly cut up and destroyed. Hancock, who this day revealed all the qualities of a great commander in actual conflict, now massed his men on the point which was in danger. Hall and Harrow, who had now no longer an enemy in their front, were brought over with their brigades to reinforce the centre. The Nineteenth Massachu- setts, Colonel Devereux and Mallou’s Forty-Second New York, both of Gate’s brigade, of Doubleday’s division, of the First corps, were moved in the same direction. Stannard, at the same time, moved forward two of his Ver- mont regiments to strike the enemy on the right flank. The situation, Han- cock tells us, had now become very peculiar. “The men of all the bri- gades had, in some measure, lost their regimental organization, but individual- ly, they were firm. The ambition of individual commanders to cover the point penetrated by the enemy, the smoke of the battle and the intensity of the engagement caused this con fin sion. The point, however, was covered. In regular formation, our line would have stood four ranks deep.” Pickett’s men were now pressed on all sides. 528 GETTYSBURG. The colors of the diifereiit National regiments were well advanced. Cheered by the words, and fired by the example of their officers, the men pressed brave- ly forward. It is the climax of the fight ; but the end is at hand. Pickett’s men had done their best and their ut- most — they had fought like true heroes; but now, utterly overpowered, and re- duced to the last stage of desperation, they give up the fight. Flinging their arms from them, many of them raise their hands in token of surrender; others fall upon the ground to escape the destructive fire ; the remainder seek safety in flight. In this last struggle. Gibbon’s divi- sion took 12 colors and 2500 prisoners. So far, Hancock had captured 27 battle flags and 4500 prisoners. It was a magnificent trophy. The losses on both sides were very heavy. The face of the hill and the low ground was literally covered with the dead and wounded. In no previous battle had the officers suffered so severely. On the National side, large numbers had been struck down. Generals Gibbon and Hancock being among the wounded. The Confederates left on the field four- teen of their field-ofiScers, only one of that rank escaping unhurt ; and, of the three bi*igade commanders, of Pickett’s division, Garnett was killed, Armitage fell within the National lines, fatally wounded, and Kemper was carried off the field, dangerously hurt. Substantially, the battle of Gettys- burg was now ended. Another feeble and foolish attempt, however, was made on the National lines. Wilcox’s com- mand, it will be remembered, had origin- ally been placed on Pickett’s right, the intention being that it should cover that flank. Wilcox, however, failed to advance, keeping to the right when Pickett bent towards the left. After the repulse of Pickett, Wilcox ad- vanced to the attack alone. In passing over the plain, and when within a few hundred yards of Hancock’s line, he was met by a tremendous fire of artil- lery ; and Stannard, who was again in position, fell upon his flank and rear, doing terrible damage, and capturing several hundred prisoners. While the battle was raging in Hancock’s front, there was evidence that vigorous move- ments were about to be initiated by Ewell against the extreme National right, and by Longstreet against the extreme National left. The main at- tack, however, was so much of a failure from the commencement that neither of those commanders felt justified in rashly risking the lives of their men, and making what might prove to be a useless and costly sacrifice. Some of Longstreet’s men had remained in the woods beyond the wheat fields, in front of Little Round Top; but, after Pickett and Wilcox had been driven back, Crawford charged through the woods, driving the enemy in confusion before him, and capturing some hundreds of men, with a large quantity of arms. During the day, there had been some severe cavalry engagements, Kilpatrick holding the enemy’s horse in check on the National left, and Gregg having a severe but successful encounter with Hampton on the right. Farnsworth, A NATIONAL VICTORY. 529 while beading a charge on the left against one of Hood’s brigades, sup- ported by Stuart’s cavalry, was killed, with many of his officers. The final charge, made by Giregg on the right, is said to have been one of the most brilliant sabre charges made during the war. It had evidently been Lee’s intention, in the event of success crown- ing his infantry attack, to make a liberal use of his cavalry force, and, if he found himself unable to surround and destroy the National army, at least to harass its retreat. Happily, success was denied him ; and the execution of this contingent purpose was rendered unnecessary. What remained of the broken and shattered Confederate columns, after having been driven across the lower ground and terribly punished by the National artillery, was at length cov- ered by Wright’s brigade, which had been moved forward by Lee for that purpose, and was thus finally brought back within the lines on Seminary Ridge. Lee did not choose to resume the attack; and Meade did not follow up the victory. The armies, when night came, had resumed their respec- tive positions on the opposing heights. Thus was fought, for three weary days, and thus was ended, the famous battle of Gettysburg — ‘‘the greatest in respect of its proportions, and the weightiest in respect of the issues involved, of all the actions waged during four years, between the mighty rival armies of the East.” The losses alone entitle it to rank with the first-class battles of his- tory. The Confederate loss reached the enormous aggregate of 36,000 men, of whom 5000 were killed, and 23,000 wounded. The National loss was 23,000, of whom 2834 were killed, 13,733 wounded, and 6643 missing. On the evening of the 3d, at 8.30 o’clock. General Meade wrote to General Halleck: “The enemy opened at one o’clock P. M., from about 150 guns. He concentrated upon my left centre, continuing without intermission for about three hours, at the expiration of which time he assaulted my left centre twice, being, upon both occasions, handsomely repulsed with severe loss to him, leaving in our hands nearly three thousand prisoners. Among the prisoners are Major-General Armistead, and many colonels and officers of lesser note. The enemy left many dead upon the field, and a large number of wound- ed in our hands. The loss upon our side has been considerable. Major- General Hancock and Brigadier-Gen- eral Gibbon were wounded. After the repelling of the assault, indications leading to the belief that the enemy might be withdrawing, an armed ] econ- noissance was pushed forward from the left, and the enemy found to be in force. At the present hour, all is quiet. Brigades of our cavalry have been en- gaged all day on both flanks of the enemy, harassing and vigorously attack- ing him with great success, notwith- standing they encountered superior numbers, both of cavalry and artillery. The army is in fine spirits.” On the following day, he issued an address to the army of the Potomac, in which, in behalf of the country, he expressed his 530 GETTYSBURG. thanks to officers and men for the glorious result of the recent operations. ‘‘Our enemy,” he said, “superior in numbers, and flushed with the pride of a successful invasion, attempted to over- come or destroy this army. Utterly baffied and defeated, he has now with- drawn from the contest. The priva- tions and fatigues the army has en- dured, and the heroic courage and gal- lantry it has displayed, will be matters of history, to be ever remembered Our task is not yet accomplished ; and the commanding general looks to the army for greater efforts, to drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of the invader. It is right and proper that we should, on suitable occasions, return our grateful thanks to the Al- mighty Disposer of events that, in the goodness of His providence, He has thought fit to give victory to the cause of the just.” On the same day, the following suitable announcement was issued by the president : “ Washington, D. C., July 4, 1863 — 10 A. M. “The president of the United States announces to the country that the news from the army of the Potomac, up to ten o’clock P. M., of the 3d, is such as to cover the army with the highest honor, to promise great success to the cause of the Union, and to claim the condolence of all for the many gallant fallen ; and that for this he especially desires that on this day, ‘ He whose will, not ours, should ever be done,’ be everywhere remembered and rev- ej*enced with the profoundest gratitude. “Abraham Lincoln.” Lee’s disappointment, by the complete failure of his attack on the 3d, must indeed have been great. His dream of invasion was at an end. A second time he had entered the Northern States in triumph. A second time he had bedn compelled to abandon his purpose, and to fall back towards Pich- mond. This time, he had confidently believed that victory was within his grasp. After an effort so mighty and so persistent, and after a failure so de- cided, he could hardly hope for another opportunity. One of his colonels, who was present at his headquarters when, on the third day, the attacking columns broke and fell back in wild disorder, says, speaking of Lee : “ If Longstreet’s behavior was admirable, that of Gen- eral Lee was perfectly sublime. He was engaged in rallying and encourag- ing the broken troops, and was riding about, a little in front of the wood, quite alone — his staff being engaged in a similar manner, further to the rear. His face, which is alwmys placid and cheerful, did not show signs of the slightest disappointment, care or an- noyance; and he was addressing to every soldier a few words of encourage- ment, such as, ‘All this will come out right in the end : we will talk it over afterwards; but, meanwhile, all good men must rally.’ He had words of kindness for the wounded, many of whom, as they were carried past, took off their hats and cheered him. ‘ W e cannot expect,’ he said, ‘always to win victories.’ To Wilcox, when he came up with his shattered division, he said, ‘ All this has been my fault ; it is I GENERAL LEE AFTER THE BATTLE. 531 who have lost this battle.’” Imboden has preserved for us a touching picture of the general, as he saw him about one o’clock on the morning of the 4th of July. He had been sent for by Lee, who directed him to wait for him at his own headquarters. When Lee joined him, there was not even a sentinel on duty, and no one of his staff was about. “The moon was high in the heavens, shedding a flood of silvery light, al- most as bright as day, upon the scene. When he approached and saw us, he spoke, reined up his horse, and essayed to dismount. The effort to do so be- trayed so much physical exhaustion that I stepped forward to assist him ; but before I reached the saddle, he had alighted. He threw his arm across his saddle to rest himself, and, fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence on his equally weary horse, the two forming a striking group, as motionless as a statue. The moon shone full upon his massive features, and revealed an expression of sadness I had never seen upon that fine face before, in any of the vicissitudes of the war through which he had (passed. I waited for him to speak until the silence became painful and embarrassing, when, to break it and change the current of his thoughts, I remarked, in a sympa- thetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue : ‘ General, this has been a hard day on you.’ This attracted his atten- tion. He looked up and replied, mourn- fully : ‘ Yes, it has been a sad, sad day to us,’ and immediately relapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude.” A little later, he turned to Imboden, and. straightening himself to his full height, with energy and excitement in his manner, and in a voice tremulous with emotion, said : General, I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett’s division of Virginians did to- day in their grand charge upon the enemy. And if they had been sup- ported, as they ought to have been^ — but, for some reason unknown to me, they were not — we would have held the position they so gloriously won, at such a fearful loss of noble lives, and the day would have been ours.” After a moment, he added, in a tone almost of agony : “Too bad ! too bad ! 1 oh, too bad ! ! ! ” Into the inner agonies of that noble soul, at that trying moment, it is not for us to penetrate. “We must go back to Virginia,” he soon afterwards exclaimed ; and Imboden received his instructions to guard the trains in their backward course. It was Lee’s conviction that another attack would be beset with serious danger. He puts it mildly, in his re- port, when he says : “ The severe loss sustained by the army, and the reduc- tion of its ammunition, rendered an- other attempt to dislodge the enemy unadvisable.” He, therefore, made im- mediate preparations for a retreat. Ewell was drawn back, on the morning of the 4th, from the base of Culp’s Hill and from Gettysburg ; and a strong line of works was thrown from the seminary towards the northwest ; while another line was formed on the right flank, perpendicular with the general front, and extending back as far as Marsh Creek. In this position, he re- 533 GETTYSBURG, mainecl over the 4th, burying his dead, sending off the wounded, not disposed to resume the aggressive, but, accord- ing to good and reliable authority, not unwilling to be attacked. The day was similarly spent by the National army. It had been Lee’s intention to retire his whole army on the night of the 4th. But a severe storm had come on shortly after midday ; and the rain fell in torrents during the afternoon, and continued far into the night. The condition of the roads made a rapid retreat impossible. It was not, there- fore, until the forenoon of Sunday, the 5th, that Ewell’s corps, which brought up the rear, left its position near Get- tysburg. After a difficult and toilsome march, by the Chambersburg and Fair- field roads, through South Mountain, the Confederate army reach Hagerston bn the afternoon of the 6th and the morning of the 7th of July. As soon as the Confederates had abandoned their position at Gettysburg, General Meade made preparations to follow up the retreat. There were two courses open : he might make a direct pursuit, pass through the South Moun- tain in their rear, and press them down the Cumberland Valley ; or he might make a flank movement by the east side of South Mountaifi, defile through the Boonsboro’ Passes, and either head off the enemy or take him in flank. Sedgwick’s corps, the freshest in the army, was ordered to follow the enemy by the Fairfield road, and harass his real*. On the evening of the 6th, Sedg- wick overtook the Confederates at the Fairfield Pass ; but they were so strong- ly posted that he deemed it unadvis- able to attack. Meanwhile, Meade had made up his mind to pursue the other route ; and Sedgwick was recalled. General French, who since the evacua- tion of Harper’s Ferry had been occupy- ing Frederick, was thereupon ordered to seize the lower passes of South Mountain in advance, and also to re- possess himself of Harper’s Ferry. All this he did; and, in addition, by push- ing forward a cavalry force, he succeed- ed in destroying a Confederate pontoon bridge which, at that point, had been thrown across the Potomac. When Lee’s army reached Williamsport, the river was still greatly swollen, and the pontoon bridge had been destroyed. On the 12th, when Meade came up with his whole army, Lee had taken a strong position on the Potomac, ex- tending from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and had thrown up entrench- ments along his whole line. Meade had once more an opportunity of strik- ing the enemy in what seemed advan- tageous circumstances. But the reasons wffiich prevailed and prevented an at- tack after the battle of the 3d, pre- vailed again, -and prevented an attack on the 12th. On the 13th, Lee’s engineers had succeeded in throwing over another pontoon bridge ; and the waters had fallen so much that, at a certain point, they were fordable. By the aid of the bridge and the ford, the Confederate army was safely pushed across to the southern side of the Po- tomac. Meade crossed the river im- mediately afterwards ; but Lee, still refusing battle, fell back to the banks 41 MEADE AND SICKLES. 533 of the Rapidan, where the opposing armies took position. This was the end of the Gettysburg campaign. This campaign, from first to last, has been a fruitful theme of discussion among military critics. Military criti- cism, in any high sense, is not the pur- pose of this work. Our aim, rather, is to give a clear, intelligible and interest- ing account of what actually took place, leaving the reader to come to his own conclusions. There are, however, con- nected with this campaign, questions which are still discussed, and some of which will never be settled. These it is impossible to pass over in absolute silence. There is the unsettled ques- tion between Meade and Sickles. It is undeniable that the advanced position which Sickles took on the 2d en- couraged the Confederate attack on that day, and very nearly ruined the National prospect. It is as little to be denied that Sickles, in assuming the responsibility of taking such a position, made a mistake. A more perfect mili- tary training, a more practised military eye would have made such a choice of ground impossible. But Sickles was not alone to blame. It was Meade’s business to attend not to one part of his line, but to the whole of it ; and it is notorious that, on his first arrival on the field, his anxiety for his right made him neglectful of his left. It is true that he gave Sickles instructions to continue the line on the ridge between Hancock and the Round Tops. But it is also true that Sickles notified him of the peculiarity of the ground in the position assigned him, and of his desire and intention to occupy the elevated ground in front. Then, again, it was only at the last moment, when the first thundering discharge of the enemy’s artillery was about to fall upon the doomed position, that Meade came to inspect the ground. If Sickles erred in judgment, it does seem as if Meade was neglectful of duty. It is impor- tant also to bear in mind that, but for the accidental presence of General War- ren at a most critical moment. Little Round Top, the key of the National position, would have been at the mercy of the enemy. Meade was, no doubt, justified in believing that his orders would be obeyed ; but it was clearly his duty to see in time that they were strictly carried out. There is the other question on which so much difference of opinion exists, and which probably ever will exist. Meade has been blamed by many — he has been justified by not a few — for his excessive caution in following up the victory of the 3d. It does seem, at first sight, as if he ought to have pur- sued his advantage at once, and made a vigorous onset on the Confederate lines, when they were throAvn into confusion by the rout of Pettigrew, Pickett and Wilcox. This was the opinion of Gen- eral Hancock ; and it was his belief that, if Meade had advanced at once, he would have won a great victory. It was Meade’s own intention to make an immediate assault; and he has given us his reasons why it was not done. ‘‘The great length of the line,” he says, “and the time required to carry these orders out to the front, and the move- 2CO 534 GETTYSBURG. ment subsequently made, before the re- ports given to me of the condition of the forces in the front and left, caused it to be so late in the evening as to induce me to abandon the assault which I had contemplated.” Possibly, it was just as well that the assault was not made. Mr. Swinton tells us that, in a conver- sation had with Longstreet, in regard to the proposed attack, the latter said to him : “I had the divisions of Hood and McLaws, that had not been en- gaged during the day ; I had a heavy force of artillery; and I have no doubt that I should have given the Federals as severe a repulse as that received by Pickett.” Meade was, perhaps, more to blame for the manner in which he conducted the pursuit when the enemy abandoned his position and fell back towards the Potomac. He chose the longer route for a questionable advan- tage ; and his movements were so slow that Lee reached the Potomac six days before him. When he came up in force, on the 12th, he had certainly a splendid opportunity to strike his an- tagonist; and it will ever partake of the character of a mystery why Lee, with the National army in his front, was able, with so much ease and so little molestation, to retire his whole army across the Potomac. There was a sting in what Lincoln said to Meade shortly afterwards : The fruit seemed so ripe, so ready for plucking, that it was very hard to lose it.” The commanding generals on both sides had causes for regret and causes for joy and rejoicing. General Lee made some mistakes during the three \ days’ fighting at Gettysburg. He at- tenuated, and therefore weakened, his lines by too much extension, in order to cover the entire front of the National position ; his assault on the 2d ought to have been more concentrated, and, where cdncentrated, more forcefully sustained, or made along the whole length of his line; and “the attack” on Hancock’s front, on the 3d, to quote the words of Longstreet, “should have been made with 30,000, instead of 15,000 men.” But, if General Lee had reason to regret the result at Get- tysburg, he was not without reason for being proud of his retreat. Gen- eral Meade was in a position not whol- ly dissimilar. His conduct of the pur- suit reflected on him but little credit. The victory at Gettysburg was due more, perhaps, to the intelligence, the skill, the pride, the pluck of the individ- ual soldier, than to the superior genius, the tactical skill, or the wise ar- rangements of the commander-in-chief. But the army of the Potomac, after a series of painful and even shameful reverses, had at last won a splendid victory ; and to General Meade, as its chief, legitimately and fairly belonged the glory. This great National victory marked a turning-point in the history of the Civil War. A Confederate success at Gettys- burg would have had a most damag- ing influence on the National cause. It might, as we have already hinted, have had the effect of permanently di- viding the Union. It would certainly have greatly encouraged that growing dislike of the war which was finding REYNOLDS, 535 powerful expression in the large centres of population ; and there is reason to fear that it would have given foreign governments a pretext for recognizing the South. Meade’s great victory, oc- curring as it did simultaneously with Grant’s equally glorious victory at Vicksburg, and followed so quickly by Among the illustrious men who perished at Gettys- burg, there was no greater or more honored name than that of Major-General John Fulton Reynolds. He was bom in Lancaster, Pa., in 1820. He graduated at West Point on the 30th of June, 1841, and, on the 23d of October following, received his commission as second lieutenant in the Third artillery. He attained the rank of first lieutenant in June, 1846, and served through the Mexican War ; and, for his gallant and meritorious conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista, was bre vetted captain and major. After having been engaged in military service in California, and against the Indians on the Pacific Coast, he was appointed aide to General Wool; and, on the 3d of March, 18.55, he was promoted to a captaincy in the Third artillery. In May, 1861, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the Fourteenth U. S. Infantry. On the 20th of August, 1861, he was commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and ap- pointed to the command of the First brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserve corps, then under General Mc- Call. In June, 1862, the reserves joined the army of the Potomac ; and General Reynolds took part in the the surrender of Port Hudson, turned the tide of popular sentiment. The Confederacy was doomed. Its com- plete collapse was now merely a ques- tion of time. After two years of darkness and sorrow, the rainbow of promise was revealed; and the Na- tional heart was glad. battles of Mechanicsville and Gaines’ Mill. He was also engaged at Savage’s Station, and at Charles City Cross Roads, where he took command of the division, when McCall was made prisoner. Later on the same day, he himself was captured, and sent to Richmond. After his release, he returned and took command of his division on the 26th of September, soon afterwards tak- ing command of the First army corps by virtue of seni- ority of rank. He commanded this corps at the battle of Fredericksburg. In January, 18G3, he was nominated major-general of volunteers. At Chancellorsville, he was in the reserve, and took no active part. On the 12th of June, he was appointed to the command of the right wing of Hooker s army, having charge of three corps. How he brought on the engagement at Gettysburg, and how he came by his sudden and untimely end, has j ust been shown. In General Reynolds, the National army lost one of its ablest soldiers, and the Union one of its noblest defenders. But for him, the National army might have failed to occupy Cemetery Ridge and the adjoining heights ; and the non-occupation of those heights might have led to defeat at Gettysburg. 536 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. CHAPTER XXVIII. The Army of the Cumberland. — Bragg and Rosecranz. — Positions of t\i0 Rival Armies. — Attempt to Recapture Fort Donelson. — Raid by Davis. — Spring Hill. — Thompson’s Station. — Van Dorn and Forrest. — Franklin. — Defeat of Van Dorn. — Minty’s Expedition. — Streight’s Expedition. — Drivers’ Gap. — Duck River. — The Army of the Cumberland Still Inactive. — The Government Impatient. — Chattanooga. — The National Army in Mo- tion. — Rosecranz Fully Prepared. — His Plan of Battle. — Hoover’s Gap. — Tullahoma. — Bragg Falls Back to Bridgeport. — Burnside Ordered to Co-operate with Rosecranz. — Gillmore Defeats Pegram. — Sanders’ Raid. — Buckner at Knoxville. — Knoxville Relieved. — Great Rejoicing. — Cumberland Gap Occupied by the Na- tionals. — Wild Rumors. — Bragg and Rosecranz Preparing for Action. — Bragg Abandons Chattanooga. — Victory Without a Battle. — A Grand Opportunity Lost. — Rosecranz’ Mistake. — Chickamauga. — The Armies Confronting Each Other. — Disposition of the Forces. — Opening of the Fight. — Thomas in Peril. — Hazen Comes to the Rescue.— Fighting all Along the Line. — Close of the First Day. — The Advantage with the Nationals. — The Second Day’s Fighting. — A Terrific Cannonade. — Breckenridge’s Fierce Onset. — Thomas Calls for Help. — A Sad Mishap. — The National Centre Pierced. — The Right Driven Back. — Thomas Stands Firm, like a Wall of Iron. — The Rock of Chickamauga. — Gerieral Gordon Granger. — Longstreet’s Impetu- ous Attacks. — Thomas Holds His Ground. — The Nationals Fall Back to Chattanooga. — Thomas the Hero of Chickamauga. — Chattanooga Invested. — The National Communications Cut. — The Army of the Cumber- land an Object of National Anxiety. — Grant Summoned to Chattanooga. — Rosecranz Removed From Com- mand. — Grant at Louisville. — In Command. — Instructions to Thomas. — Reinforcements. — Arrival of Hooker. — Smith’s Movement. — Grant at Nashville. — Brown’s Ferry. — Lookout Valley. — Wauhatchie. — Severe Fight- ing. — Geary’s Men Performing Prodigies of Valor. — Hooker Victorious. — Commendations. — Sherman’s Ap- proach. — His Arrival at Bridgeport. — Grant’s Plans Working Admirably. — Bragg’s Mistake. — He Detaches Longstreet. — Preparations for the Attack. — Disposition of the Troops. — Deception. — Bragg Supposed to be About to Retreat. — Sherman at Brown’s Ferry. — Grant Impatient of Delay. — Thomas Ordered to Advance. — A Splendid Sight. — Orchard Knob Captured. — An Important Position Gained. — Hooker at Lookout Moun- tain. — Sherman Crosses the Tennessee, and Takes Position on the North of Missionary Ridge. — Lookout Creek Swmllen and Impassable. — Geary’s Movement to Wauhatchie. — Across the Creek. — A Heavy Mist. — Geary’s Success. — A Firm Foothold on the Mountain. — Lookout Mountain Abandoned by the Confede- rates. — Another Point Gained. — A Battle Above the Clouds. — Chattanooga Valley Abandoned. — The Con- federates Concentrate on Missionary Ridge. — The Blockade of the Tennessee Ended. — The National Line United. — Grant’s Headquarters. — Preparations for the Final Blow. — The Battle Plan. — Hooker’s Delay. — Sherman’s Advance. — Hooker on Missionary Ridge. — Great Success. — Sherman Fiercely Resisted. — Bragg Concentrates on His Own Right. — Sherman Sorely Pressed. — Repeated and Persistent Attacks on Sher- man’s Front. — Grant Remembers Shiloh. — Hooker’s Victory. — Bragg Outgeneralled. — Thomas Ordered to Advance. — The Thunderbolt Launched. — A Terrific Struggle. — The Thunder of Artillery. — Scrambling Up the Heights. — The Advancing Colors. — Fighting in Groups. — The Crest Scaled. — The Confederates Driven from the Hill. — Flight of Bragg and Breckenridge. — Sherman at the Railroad Tunnel. — The Battle Still Raging. — The Confederates Driven Back at All Points. — A Great and Glorious Victory. — Grant’s Modesty. — The Pursuit. — Knoxville. — Burnside Besieged. — Longstreet’s Fierce Assaults. — Burnside on His Last Day's Provisions. — A Gallant Defense. — Advance of Sherman to Knoxville. — Granger’s Cavalry. — Longstreet’s Last Assault. — A Terrible Repulse. — Dead and Wounded Piled Up in the Ditch. — Longstreet’s Retreat. — End of the Siege. — Sherman’s Brave Army. — Burnside Thanks Sherman. — End of the Campaign. — Honors to Grant. — Congratulations. — Universal Rejoicing. — Grant the National Hero. — Bragg Removed from Command. — The Confederates Discouraged. OuR attention must no'W be given to the army of the Cumberland. In a previous chapter, we have de- scribed the famous battles of Perry ville and Murfreesboro, in both of which engagements the Nationals were vio FORT DOKELSON'. 537 torious. On the night of the 3d of January, 1863, Bragg withdrew from Murfreesboro ; and Kosecranz at last grasped his blood-clotted prize. The army of the Cumberland, in these two battles, had really covered itself with glory ; and the gallantry and skill ex- hibited by its brave commander had drawn towards him the affections and hopes of the nation. After the occupation of Murfrees- boro by Eosecranz, Bragg took a strong position to the north of the Duck Eiver, his infantry extending from Shelby ville to Wartrace, his cav- alry stretching out on his right to Mc- Minnville, and on his left to Columbia and Spring Hill. He had outposts at Hoover’s and Liberty Gaps, about ten miles from Murfreesboro. His main base of supplies was at Chattanooga. He had also a large depot at Tulla- homa. From January until June, the two armies thus confronting each other lay in comparative idleness, neither making any serious attempt to provoke battle. Although there had not, during those six months, been any general engage- ment, there had been some severe skirmishing, and several important side encounters. Early in February, an at- tempt was made by General Wheeler, Bragg’s chief of artillery, with 4500 mounted men, to recapture Fort Donel- son. The garrison was small, consist- ing only of some 600 men, mostly of the Eighty-Third Illinois, with a sec- tion of Flood’s battery, and a 32-pound siege gun — the whole under the com- mand of Colonel A. C. Harding. The object of the Confederates was, by re- occupying Fort Donelson, to interrupt the navigation of the Cumberland, and so prevent the transportation of sup- plies to Nashville for the use of the National army. On the 3d of pefe, February, a little after mid-day, a demand was made for the surrender of Fort Donelson and the garrison. Weak in numbers, Harding was strong at heart. He defied the foe, and sent a small steamer down the river to sum- mon to his aid some gunboats, which he knew were not far off. Meanwhile, Wheeler and his men had approached within cannon range. Harding opened upon them with his 32-pounder and his four smaller guns. The fight con- tinued till dark, Harding holding his position, although he had lost 45 of his 60 artillery horses. At eight o’clock in the evening came up the gunboat Fair Play, Lieutenant -Commanding Fitch, and opened upon the Confede- rates a raking fire. Wheeler and his men were dismayed ; and, as other gun boats were seen coming up to take part in the contest, they fled precipitately, leaving behind them, dead on the field, some 150 men, and about the same number of prisoners. Harding lost 126 men, of whom 50 had been made prisoners. Fort Donelson was hence- forth left undisturbed. While Wheeler was on the Cumberland, General J. C. Davis, with two brigades of cavalry, under Colonel Minty, was operating in his rear. Moving westward from Mur- freesboro, Davis scoured the country, and, at the end of thirteen days, he re- turned to camp, with 141 of Wheeler’s 538 CHICKAMAUGA AOT) CHATTANOOGA. men as prisoners, among whom were two colonels and several officers of rank. There was a period of repose. Early in March, however, it became known that General Van Dorn, with a large mounted force, was in the vicinity of Franklin. General John Colburn, who was stationed at Franklin, and General Sheridan, who was with the main army at Murfreesboro, were ordered, with their respective commands, to move simultaneously against Van Dorn. Col- Mar. burn, on the 4th of March, with some 2700 men, some 600 of whom were mounted, set out in the direction of Spring Hill. He had ad- vanced but a little way when he came into contact with the Confederate skirmishers. These, however, were easily repulsed. Colburn experienced no further resistance during the remain- der of that day; but, as evening ap- proached, the enemy appeared in his front, in very considerable force. Halt- ing, and encamping for the night, Col- burn resumed his forward movement early next morning. Soon after start- ing, he found himself attacked by a vastly superior force, under Van Dorn and Forrest. The Nationals made a bold resistance ; but, being greatly out- numbered, and his ammunition being exhausted, Colburn was compelled to fall back and seek safety in flight, leav- ing some 1300 of his men in the hands of the enemy. Sheridan, with his di- vision, and some 1800 cavalry, under Colonel Minty, moved flrst towards Shelbyville and then round in the di- rection of Franklin. After various skirmishes, he encountered Van Dorn and Forrest at Thompson’s Sta- jjar. tion, on the 14th of March. There H. was a sharp flght; but the Confede- rates were ultimately driven back be- hind the Duck Kiver. Sheridan re- turned to Murfreesboro, after a ten days’ ride, having lost only 5 men killed and 5 wounded. He brought with him 100 prisoners. In the beginning of April, Van Dorn again appeared in force in the neigh- borhood of Franklin. General Gordon Granger was in command of the Na- tional troops at that station. Granger had timely warning of the approach of the enemy, and made every preparation to give him a warm reception. Granger had all but completed a new fort — which afterwards bore his name — on the north- ern side of the Harpeth River, and on a commanding eminence about fifty feet above the stream. The fort, on which already were in position two siege guns and two rifled cannon, completely com- manded the approaches to Franklin. Granger’s infantry and artillery were under the immediate command of Gen- erals Baird and Gilbert. Generals G. C. Smith and Stanley had charge of the cavalry. Baird was posted so as to guard the ford below Franklin ; Gilbert was placed so as to meet an attack in front ; Stanley was pushed out four miles on the road towards Murfreesboro; while Smith was held in reserve, to be ready, if occasion should call for it, to rush to Stanley’s assistance. On the 10th of April, April Van Dorn, with a mounted force of about 9000 men and two regiments RAIDING PARTIES. 539 of foot, came up the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell heavily on Granger’s front. Granger, how- ever, was ready to receive him. The National troops stood firm; and the guns from the new fort opened upon the assailants a most destructive fire. Stanley, seizing his opportunity, rushed forward and struck Van Dorn a tre- mendous blow on the fiank. Smith’s troops were already in motion, to sup- port Stanley; and Baird’s men were already across the river and taking part in the fight. For a time, it seemed as if the Confederates would be over- whelmed, and driven ingloriously from the field. In Granger’s front, they were completely defeated; they had sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded ; and some 500 men had been made prisoners. Van Dorn, however, ^vas a daring and capable ofiicer, and not easily induced to believe in defeat. Gathering up his whole strength, he fiung himself upon Stanley, before Smith had found time to come to his aid ; and such was the vigor and weight of the onset, that Stanley was compelled to fall back, thus permitting Van Dorn to recover most of his cap- tured men, and, at the same time, to make good his escape. The Confede- rate commander retired to Spring Hill, v^dth a loss of about 300 men in killed, wounded and prisoners. Granger’s loss was comparatively trifling, amounting in all to about 37 killed, wounded and missing. During the month of April, there were many such skirmishes, not all of equal importance, and some of them resulting advantageously, some of them disastrously to the National cause. Prominent among the expeditions sent out at that date was that of Colonel Minty, who, starting from Murfrees- boro, with a powerful force, scoured the country in the direction of Mc- Minnville, and destroyed a large amount of property, making many prisoners, and capturing large numbers of mules and horses. About the mid- dle of that month, an expedition, com- posed of the Fifty-First Indiana, Eigh- teenth Illinois, and a part of two Ohio regiments — some 1800 men in all — and commanded by Colonel A. D. Streight, set out from Nashville, on a mission from which great things were expected. This force was called ^‘an independent provisional brigade,” and was created for temporary purposes.” Streight’s instructions were that he should de- stroy the railroads, the stores, the manufactories, in the rear of the Con- federate army, and in every way make retreat difficult, if not impossi- ble. With his command on board steamers, Streight left Nashville on the 11th of April. On reaching Dover, he disembarked his troops, and marched them across the country to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee Fiver. There he waited for the boats which had gone around b}^ the Ohio. Embarking again, he went up the Tennessee to Eastport, where he landed ; then, moving south- ward, he joined General Dodge, who was moving towards Tuscumbia, on the Memphis and Charleston Failroad. It was not intended that he should remain in conjunction with Dodge, but only 540 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. that he should march with him long enough to create the impression that his troops formed a part of that leader’s command, and at the proper time to strike off from Tuscumbia towards Husselville or Moulton. On their de- parture from Nashville, Streight’s men were not provided with horses. It was expected that they would be able to pick them up by the way. When they joined Dodge, one half of the command was still on foot. At Tuscumbia, the joint forces encountered and defeated a strong body of Confederates ; and, as his men were well mounted, Streight, without delay, set out for Kusselville. Having reached that place, he turned to the east, his object being to strike the important cities of Rome and At- lanta, in Northern Georgia. At Rome there were extensive iron-works ; and Atlanta was a great railroad centre. Streight was not to be allowed to pro- ceed on his mission unmolested. He had scarcely commenced his march, when he was pursued by a powerful cavalry force, under the Confederate leaders, Forrest and Roddy. The Na- tionals were overtaken in the neighbor- hood of Moulton, Lawrence County, Alabama. At Drivers’ Gap, of the Sand Mountain, there was a severe en- counter, which lasted the greater part of a day. Then commenced a running fight, which continued for four days, and during which there were two severe battles and several spirited skirmishes. In a circuit of about one hundred miles, the Nationals destroyed a laige quan- tity of corn, collected for the use of the Confederate army, burned several bridges and one cannon foundry, and captured many animals. When about fifteen miles from Rome, a detachment, which had been sent forward to that place, fell back on the main body ; and, at the same time, the pursuers, now 4000 stibng, under Forrest, fell with great force on the National rear. His ammunition being now exhausted, and his men overpowered by fatigue, Streight had no choice but surrender. The cap- tives were sent to Libby Prison, M^here they were held until February, 1864, when they effected their escape by dig- ging under the foundations of the building. Meanwhile, Dodge had had better success. When Streight set out for Rome and Atlanta, he struck off to the south ; and having made a sweeping raid in Northern Alabama and Missis- sippi, he returned to his headquarters at Corinth. During the month of May and the greater portion of June, the armies of Rosecranz and Bragg remained in their old positions, the former at Murfrees- boro, the latter along the general line of the Duck River, neither evincing any signs of a disposition to attack. In this month, there was a prevailing feel- ing of disappointment, because of the long-continued inaction of the army of the Cumberland. In some quarters, this sentiment found free and full ex- pression. By his victory at Murfrees- boro, Rosecranz had won the affections and confidence of the people. What he had done, it was thought, was but a ])roof of what he could do, and an earn- est of greater things yet to be accom- plished by the army of the Cumber- MAP ILLUSTKATING THE CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGNS. I THE BATTLE GROUND. 541 land, under its skilful and accomplished leader. One half year of inaction, after a victory so splendid, had been sufli- cient to give an entirely altered tone to the sentiment of the North. Rose- cranz, however, was not without good reasons for his delay. His army, after Murfreesboro, was in a dreadfully shat- tered condition; and when gradually, through rest and reinforcements, he became strong enough to justify an offensive movement, he felt restrained, by military considerations, from resum- ing the conflict. It was the opinion of Rosecranz that it would be unwise for him to hazard a battle until the fate of Vicksburg should have been deter- mined. Considering the relative posi- tions of his own army and that of Grant, he deemed it impolitic “ to risk two great and decisive battles at the same time.” Such, however, were not the views entertained at headquarters at Washington. It was the opinion of Halleck that the time was opportune for Rosecranz to put his army in mo- tion, and, by falling heavily on his antagonist, driving him into Georgia, and relieving East Tennessee, to pierce the very heart of the Confederacy. Orders were given accordingly. In a former chapter we have pointed out the importance of this natural stronghold. Its strategic worth was seen and ad- mitted alike by the National and Confederate leaders from the com- mencement of operations in the West. Buell, it will be remembered, was de- tached from the army of the West, after the battle of Corinth, and ordered by Halleck to advance and take pos- session of Chattanooga. Bragg, how- ever, was intent on the same purpose ; and, pushing forward with the utmost rapidity, he outstripped Buell and se- cured the stronghold. In spite of the defeat at Perryville, and the more crushing blow received at Murfrees- boro, Bragg remained master of Chat- tanooga and the mountain fastnesses around. The possession of the place, however, had not ceased to be an object of ambition with the National govern- ment ; and the. contest, suspended since the battle of Murfreesboro, was about to be resumed. The majestic folds of the earth’s surface, known as the Appalachian Ranges, separate the Atlantic portion of the Southern States from the Mis- sissippi Valley. These folds, for the most part, run parallel to each other, and are crossed at intervals by trans- verse depressions or gaps. Such pas- sages, it can readily be understood, are of great commercial, political, and mili- tary importance. From the region of Chattanooga, the earth-folds range in a southwesterly direction, the more ele- vated ridges being named respectively Chickamauga Hills, Pigeon Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, and Racoon or Sand Mountain. The name Chattanooga signifies, in the Che- rokee language, “ Hawk’s Nest.” The town of that name is built in one of those transverse depressions, on the south bank of the Tennessee River, and at the mouth of Chattanooga Val- ley. This valley, through which runs a stream of the same name, is flanked on the west by Lookout Mountain, 542 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. which rises to the height of 2400 feet, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so named, because it was an early and influential seat of Catholic missions among the Cherokee Indians. The de- pression between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain is called Chickamauga Valley. The two valleys, Chattanooga and Chickamauga, spring from a com- mon centre, McLemore’s Cove, which is shut in by Lookout on the west and Pigeon on the east. Such was the re- gion now about to become the theatre of a series of desperate and bloody contests. On the 24th of June, Rosecranz, in June obedience to instructions from 24* headquarters, set his army in mo- tion. He had under him some 60,000 effective men. General Burnside, who was in Kentucky, was ordered to ad- vance through the mountain passes into East Tennessee, and connect his right with Rosecranz’s left. Bragg’s army, which consisted of some 40,000 men, was strongly posted at Shelbyville and at Wartrace, with out- posts at Hoover’s and Liberty Gaps. He held a strong position also at Tul- lahoma. Rosecranz was well aware of the strength of Bragg’s position; and it was his purpose, from the outset, so to manoeuvre as to tempt him to take less advantageous ground. His real object was to turn the Confederate right. His ostensible object, as he wished it to be regarded, was to fall heavily on the Confederate left and centre. In the midst of a rain-storm of almost unpre- cedented severity, the National army began its forward movement. The right, which was under McCook, moved towards Shelbyville. The centre, under Thomas, moved towards Manchester. The left, under Crittenden, marched in the direction of McMinnville. Gen- eral G6rdon Granger’s reserve corps moved forward in support of McCook and Thomas. The orders were sti’ictly obeyed and successfully executed. Sher- idan’s division, of McCook’s command, led the advance on the right. This was followed, at the distance of a few miles, by the divisions of Johnson and Davis. While Sheridan kept moving towards Shelbyville, those latter divisions turned oflt to the left, and moved in the dii^ec- tion of Liberty Gap. Wilder, with his mounted infantry, led Thomas’ advance. General Reynolds followed, with the remainder of the division. Wilder was instructed to halt at Hoover’s Gap until the arrival of Reynolds. This h(‘, intended to do, but finding the place unoccupied, he pushed through, cap- turing a wagon-train and a drove of beeves. At the other extremity of the gap he was met by the Confederates in great force. He was able, however, to hold the gap until the arrival of Reynolds, when it was secured. In the meantime, McCook had been equally successful at Liberty Gap. Near the entrance. General Willich, whose bri- gade led the column, encountered the enemy in very considerable force. At the command of General Johnson, Wil- lich fell upon the Confederates with tremendous energy, driving them be fore him, and capturing them tents, baggage, and supplies. Johnson sent TULLAHOMA ABANDONED. 543 Colonel Baldwin forward to clear the upper end of the gap. The order was promptly executed ; and, after a sharp encounter, the position was occupied. These were important gains. But suc- cess was attending Rosecranz in other directions Granger had started from Triune, on the extreme right of the National army, on the morning of the 23d, and, having pushed rapidly for- ward, he reached Christiana without difficulty. At that place he was joined by Stanley and his cavalry. The com- bined forces pressed on to Guy’s Gap, securing it after a struggle of about two hours. The Confederates fled, but were closely pursued for about seven miles. About three miles from Shel- byville, they halted, taking position in their rifle-pits. A vigorous charge was made by Stanley’s horsemen. The Con- federates were driven from the rifle- pits, and compelled to fall back on the near defenses of the town. It was now six o’clock in the evening. Granger came up with his infantry ; Stanley charged again ; and before seven o’clock Shelbyville was in the possession of the National troops Wheeler and his troopers escaped by swimming Duck River. In addition to the possession of Shelbyville, three guns, a quantity of corn, and 500 prisoners rewarded the daring and enterprise of Granger and Stanley. Not slow to perceive the advantages which he had gained, Rosecranz pressed through the mountain passes; and on the 27th he had established his head- quarters at Manchester. Two days later, McCook and Thomas had also arrived, with all their forces. Prepara- tions were at once made to flank Tulla- homa, whither Bragg had now retii'ed. Wilder was ordered to move around and strike the railroad in the Confeder- ate rear at Decherd, and to destroy the bridge over the Elk River. Wilder had little difficulty in reaching De- cherd; the railroad was injured, but the bridge defied all his efforts and all his skill. Convinced that the National army was about to move upon him in force, and believing that his position was untenable, Bragg, on the night of the 30th of June, abandoned his en- trenched camp at Tullahoma, and fell back to Bridgeport, Alabama. The extensive works which had been con- structed during a period of several months, between Shelbyville, Wartrace, Tullahoma and Decherd, were thus abandoned, without any serious blow having been struck in their defense. “Thus ended,” says Rosecranz in his report, “ the nine days’ campaign, which drove the enemy from two forti- fied positions, and gained possession of Middle Tennessee. Conducted during one of the most extraordinary rains ever known in that country, at that period of the year, and over a soil that seemed almost a quicksand, our opera- tions were retarded thirty-six hours at Hoover’s Gap, and sixty hours at and in front of Manchester, which alone prevented us from getting posses- sion of his communications, and forcing the enemy to a very disastrous battle.” The National loss in these various operations was about 560 killed, woun- ded and missing. The Confederate 544 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. loss was about 6000, large numbers of these having deserted during the re- treat. Bragg managed to carry with him all his guns and supplies along the railroad, which he destroyed as he went on. He pushed on through the Cuniberland Mountains, crossed the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, where he burned the railroad bridge behind him, and made his way to Chattanooga. If it must be said of Bragg that he showed lack of generalship in offering so little resistance to the National ad- vance, it must also be admitted that he conducted his retreat with marked ability and with signal success. So complete was the destruction which he worked, as he moved along, that it was not until the 16th of August that the National forces commenced to cross the Cumberland Mountains. We have already stated that General Burnside, who had been assigned to the command of the army of the Ohio, was ordered to co-operate with the army of the Cumberland. Burnside assumed his new command in March. He had had several small encounters with the enemy before he was ordered to act in conjunction with Rosecranz. By one detachment, under Gillmore, he had defeated the Confederate general, Pegram, at Somerset, and thus pre- vented a dangerous incursion into Southeastern Kentucky. By another detachment, under Sanders, he had made a successful raid against the Con- federates, in the direction of Knoxville. Sanders passed through the Cumber- land Mountains from Kentucky, struck the East Tennessee and Georgia Rail- road at Lenoir Station, destroyed a large portion of the road which led to Knoxville, passed round that city, struck the road again at Strawberry Plain, and burned two bridges. After destroying a large quantity of war ma- terial, iSanders made his way back to Kentucky, having sustained but little loss, and bringing with him thiee of the enemy’s guns, 10,000 small arms, and 500 prisoners. At the time this call was made upon Burnside to co- operate with Rosecranz, his command had been considerably diminished, num- bering not more than 20,000 men, the Ninth army corps having been de- tached, some time before, to assist Grant before Vicksburg. When Burn- side began his march to form a connec- tion with the army of the Cumberland, General Simon B. Buckner, acting un- der instructions from Bragg, was in com- mand of about 20,000 men in East Ten- nessee, with his headquarters at Knox- ville. Buckner might have been able, had he been allowed, to interpose serious obstacles to Burnside’s advance. Buck- ner, however, was elsewhere needed. It was all-important to the Confederacy that Chattanooga should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Nationals. As soon, therefore, as Bragg found that he was in peril, he ordered Buck- ner to evacuate the valley and hasten to his assistance at Chattanooga. On the approach of Burnside, Buckner fled; and Knoxville was occupied by the National troops, after a long and fa- tiguing march, during which the Con- federates offered little other resistance than that of burning the bridges in BURNSIDE AT KNOXVILLE. 545 their rear. It was on the 3d day of Sep# September that Burnside entered Knoxville. By the citizens and by the people of the neighborhood, he was hailed as a great deliverer. As we neared Knoxville,” says one who was present, the evidences of the in- tense devotion to the Union, dwelling in the hearts of the people, became more and more apparent. Along the entire route, especially the last ten or fifteen miles, the whole population seemed gathered on the roadside to give welcome to the Yankees. On the appearance of General Burnside on the outskirts of the town, the news of his arrival spread, and everybody, rich and poor, the lame and the halt, rushed out to greet him. It was no vulgar curi- osity to see a man famous in the world’s history — it was the greeting of an op- pressed people to their deliverer. Un- covered, and at a slow pace, the general rode through the streets to his head- quarters. His progress was constantly impeded by the rushing of men to his horse’s side, to seize him by the hand and say, ^ God bless you.’ On arrival at headquarters, a large crowd assem- bled in the yard, and were clamorous for speeches. Brigadier-General S. P. Carter, a native of East Tennessee, came forward, and in a few words con- gratulated them on their deliverance. In response to repeated calls. General Burnside then appeared, and said that although his profession was arms, and not speaking, yet he would take the occasion to say that, from the moment he took command of the department of Ohio, it had been his fervent wish to lead an army into East Tennessee to their deliverance ; and he took great pleasure in saying that he had come with means sufficient, with their assist- ance, to hold the country permanently and securely.” The same witness tells us that, when the speaking was ended, the wildest enthusiasm was manifested by the people. “ The garrison flag of the United States was flung from the portico, and the crowd rushed up and seized it in their hands, many of them pressing it to their lips. While this was taking place at headquarters, the troops' had been waylaid all over the city, and carried off by violence, to be feasted, without money and without price, on the best which the land af- forded.” Nor did this bounteous hos- pitality find expression towards the officers alone ; it extended to the rank and file, all of whom, without any dis- tinction, were regarded as deliverers. At Knoxville, the Nationals took possession of a large amount of Con- federate property — such as locomotives, cars, and machine shops. On the 4th, a movement, under the immediate di- rection of General Shackelford, was made upon Cumberland Gap. On the 7th, the gap was invested; and a call was made for surrender. This, General Frazier, who w^as in command of the Confederate force at that point, refused to do, believing, as he said, that he was able to hold out. It was not until the arrival of Burnside himself, on the 9th, that Frazier would listen to any pro- posals. On that day tei*ms were agreed upon; and a surrender was made uncon- ditionally. The officers retained their 546 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. side-arms. About 40 wagons, 200 mules, 4000 pounds of bacon, 2000 bushels of wheat, a large quantity of other stores, and ten pieces of artillery, were sur- rendered. Some 2000 men were made prisoners. Cumberland Gap was thus again in the possession of the National troops; and the great valley between the Alleghany and the Cumberland Mountains, from Cleveland to Bristol — of which Knoxville may be regarded as the chief city — was, for the time at least, rid of armed Confederates. Chattanooga now became the object of universal attention. It was felt that in that region the next great struggle for supremacy was to be made. It might not be final and decisive; but, however it might result, it would be certain to exercise a determining influ- ence on the ultimate issue of the con- test. Both armies were the objects of anxious care to their respective govern- ments. The Richmond authorities, trembling for the safety of the At- lantic States, exerted themselves to the very utmost to strengthen Bragg, so that he might turn on Rosecranz and deal him a crushing blow, or force him towards the Cumberland. Buckner, as we have seen, was ordered to join him. Johnson sent him a strong bri- gade from Mississippi, under General Walker. Polk had come up in force from Alabama. Longstreet’s corps, detached from the army of General Lee, was hurrying forward from Vir- ginia. A merciless conscription was enforced in Georgia and Alabama ; and every available man was pushed forward in the direction of Chatta- nooga. Nor was this all. In shameful violation of the terms of the surrender, and contrary to the usages of civilized warfare, Bragg’s ranks were swelled by thousands of prisoners who had been paroled at Vicksburg and Port Hud- son. Altogether, the Confederate gen- eral was able to count on an effective force, under his own immediate direc- tion, of fully 80,000 men. Rosecranz was not less the object of solicitude on the part of the National government. It was found difiScult, if not impossible, to penetrate the designs of the enemy. It was rumored that Bragg was sending reinforcements to Lee, and that preparations were being made for another and more successful invasion of Maryland and Pennsyl- vania. This rumor received encourage- ment from the slight resistance which had been offered, as yet, either to the advance of Rosecranz or to the advance of Burnside. It was soon discovered that the rumor had no foundation in fact. Trains were heard running night and day, for thirty-six hours, on the Peters- burg and Richmond Railroad ; and Meade was able to report that, in his judgment, Lee’s army had been re- duced by the whole of Longstreet’s corps, and by some regiments from Generals Ewell and Hill. Halleck took immediate steps to reinforce Rosecranz. Burnside received fresh instructions to make the required con- nections with the army of the Cumber- land. General Hurlbut, who was at Memphis, was ordered to send all his available forces to Corinth andTuscum- bia, so as to be ready to check any EOSECRANZ IN CHATTANOOGA. 547 flank movement which might be at- tempted by the enemy. He was au- thorized to call upon Grant or Sherman for reinforcements, if such were needed. A telegraphic communication was sent to the commander at Vicksburg, to send all his available forces to the line of the Tennessee River. Instructions of like import were sent to Schofield in Missouri, and to Pope in the North- western Department. It was the deter- mination of the National government that Kentucky and Tennessee, once more reclaimed, should not again fall under the domination of the Confed- eracy ; and now that both Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen, and the great armies of the West and South were so far liberated, and able to lend a helping hand, there seemed to be no good reason why this determination, if expressed with sufficient vigor, should not be attended with practical and sat- isfactory results. Eosecranz reached the Tennessee on the evening of the 20th of August. He made arrangements at once for the crossing of the river. Crittenden, with the left wing, was to cross at Battle Creek, and move on Chattanooga ; Thomas, with the centre, was to pass his corps over the river — one division at Caperton’s Ferry, one at Battle Creek, and one at Shell Mound. He was to concentrate at Trenton, and then to move by way of Stevens’ and Cooper’s Gaps, through Lookout Moun- tain, into McLemore’s Cove. McCook was to push two of his divisions across at Caperton’s Ferry, while his other division, that of Sheridan, was to cross at Bridgeport. He was to concentrate at Winston’s Gap. Bridges were thrown across the river at the points indicated; and by the 8th of September, the troops had crossed and taken the positions assigned them. Thomas was at Tren- ton, and in possession of Stev^ens’ and Cooper’s Gaps, on Lookout Mountain. McCook having reached Valley Head, was in possession of Winston’s Gap. Crittenden having crossed to Wauhat- chie, was communicating with Thomas’ right, and threatening Chattanooga by the pass over the point of Lookout Mountain. It was the expectation of Eosecranz that these combinations would have the effect of inducing Bragg to abandon Chattanooga. In this expecta- tion he was not to be disappointed. The National generals had conducted their operations with great expedition and with wonderful secrecy. It was not until the cavalry of Eosecranz, hav- ing advanced up the Will’s Valley Rail- road, were already at Wauhatchie, that Bragg was convinced that his antago- nist had crossed or was crossing the river ; and, supposing that he was about to be flanked on his left, he made pre- parations for the abandonment of Chat- tanooga. It was now the 7th of Sep- tember. Bragg left Chattanooga on the 8th, and concentrated strongly at Lafayette. On the following day, sep, Crittenden, from the summit of Lookout Mountain, discovered that the place was abandoned. His corps quickly entered in and took possession. Thus, without any fighting, was accom- plished the first great object of the campaign. 548 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANCX)GA. Aifairs now looked hopeful in the extreme for the National arms. There was great joy all over the North, when it became known that Chattanooga was occupied. There was corresponding de- pression of spirit in the South. From the Confederate standpoint, the outlook now seemed gloomy enough. Pember- ton had quite recently surrendered a lai'ge army at Vicksburg. Gardner had surrendered another army at Port Hud- son. Lee had been compelled to fall back from Pennsylvania, after sustain- ing heavy losses. And now Bragg, without striking a blow for its defense, had abandoned Chattanooga. To the army of the Cumberland there had now arrived a great opportunity. A concentrated effort and a well-di- rected blow might be sufficient to crush, or drive into helpless retreat, the Con- federate army. The star of Rosecranz was still in the ascendant. Nothing had yet happened to tarnish the glory which he had won at Murfreesboro. It w^as not doubted — there was no reason why it should be doubted — that the conqueror at Murfreesboro M^ould add to his laui*els by a greater and more decisive victory at Chattanooga. Let us see how matters turned out. It was the conviction of Rosecranz that Bragg was in full retreat towards Rome. Impressed with this belief, and not yet informed of the fact that Long- street was rapidly coming up to swell the forces of his antagonist, Rosecranz, instead of concentrating his army at Chattanooga, scattered them over a wide surface of rough, broken country. Crittenden was ordered to leave one brigade at Chattanooga, as a garrison, and to move with the rest as far as Ringgold; Thomas was to march on Lafayette ; while McCook was to move in the direction of Alpine and Summer Creek. These movements were prompt- ly made; and when, on the 12th, sep. it became positively known that *2. Bragg was not retreating but, on the contrary, concentrating in great force at Lafayette, and preparing to strike a decisive blow, the National army was scattered over an immense space of rough, broken country, the line extend- ing from the east side of Chickamauga Creek to Alpine — a distance of fifty- seven miles from flank to flank. Rose- cranz, in truth, was completely deceived as to the movements and intentions of his antagonist. While, on the 9th, he was giving orders for pursuit, Bragg was actually preparing to assail Thomas in McLemore’s Cove ; and but for mis- understandings among the Confederate officers, the battle might have been pre- cipitated, and serious detriment might have resulted to the National army. It is difficult to acquit Rosecranz of blame in this matter. He was certainly found wanting in vigilance. Before attempting the hazardous experiment of so extending his line, and thus ren- dering himself incapable, at any one point, of resisting a vigorous attack, he ought, by a more thorough reconnois- sance, to have been more accurately in- formed of the whereabouts of the ene- my. The truth seems to be that, in his excessive desire to win renown by capturing his foe, or driving him in confusion to the gulf, the National watkps-smMJL DIAGRAIVl 1. DIAGRAMS SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES AT THE BATTLES OF CHICKAMAUGA AND MISSIONARY RIDGE. '‘THE RIVER OF DEATH,” 549 commander partially lost his head. It was the opinion of more than one of his officers that the general-in-chief was in error. As early as the 11th, a negi*o had reported to Wood that ^Hhe balk of the rebel army, under Bragg in per- son, was at Lee and Gordon’s Mills.” Subsequent developments, according to Wood, proved that report to be singu- larly correct. In a letter to Thomas, Negley remarks that he is “confident that Bosecranz is totally misinformed as to the character of the country,' and the position, force and intentions of the enemy.” If Rosecranz was to blame for the disposition he made of his troops, Bragg was even more to blame for not seizing the opportunity which Rosecranz had created for him. With the forces at his disposal, he might easily have crushed Thomas, Crittenden and Mc- Cook in rapid succession ; and, having done so, he could then have moved along the Cumberland, and fallen, like a destroying angel, on Burnside’s rear’ The opportunity presented to Bragg was similar to that which Napoleon, by protracted and skilful manoeuvring, secured at Marengo. Had Bragg been a. Napoleon, he would have destroyed the army of the Cumberland. Fully alive to the peril of the situation, Rosecranz ordered a concentration of his forces. For six days, Bragg remained compara- tively inactive. W hen the six days were ended, his opportunity was gone for- ever ; for Rosecranz had already brought his scattered forces within supporting Sep. distance of each other; and on 18. the night of Friday, the 18th, the concentration was completed, and the army well in hand. The two armies were now confronting each other on the opposite banks of the Chickamauga — a stream which, rising at the junction of Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain, at the southern ex- tremity of McLemore’s Cove, flows in a northern direction down the cove by Crawfish Spring. At Lee and Gordon’s Mills, it reaches the Lafayette and Chat- tanooga Road Further on, it joins the main creek, and empties into the beau- tiful Tennessee, a little above Chatta- nooga. Chickamauga, in the Indian tongue, means “The River of Death” — a name which was soon to be literally and terribly appropriate. Rosecranz was on the west bank of the stream. His right was no longer at Mc- Lemore’s Cove, but where his left had been, at Lee and Gordon’s Mills. His left was near the road across from Ross- ville. His reserves were in the rear of the right. In this position, as will be seen by a reference to the map, he covered Chattanooga. It was Bragg’s inten- tion, by a flanking movement, to inter- pose between the National left and Chat- tanooga. In order, however, to deceive his antagonist, he had sent Wheeler, with his cavalry, to press the National right. It deserves to be borne in mind, at this stage, that Bragg had been great- ly reinforced. Buckner had come up from East Tennessee, with the rem- nants of the army of the Mississippi ; and the advance of Longstreet’s corps, under Hood, was already on the field. The morning of the 19th was gep, bright and beautiful. A crisp, •J62 .50 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. white frost had collected on the grass, but it soon disappeared, under the genial heat of the September sun. Soon as the morning mist was dispersed, the rival hosts were ready for battle. McCook was in command on the National right; Crittenden was in the centre; Thomas was on the left. During the night, Bragg had contrived to push across the creek some 30,000 men. His army was arranged in two corps, the right com- manded by Polk and the left by Hood, Longstreet not yet having arrived in person. It was Bragg’s intention to strike and bring on a battle. It was Thomas, however, who had the honor of striking the first blow. It was now about ten o’clock. Thomas, on being Informed by Colonel D. McCook that a Confederate brigade was on the west side of the Chickamauga, and appa- rently alone, and that as Reed’s Bridge behind them was destroyed, he thought they might be easily captured. Thomas ordered General Brannan to advance, with his brigades, on the road to Reed’s Bridge, while Baird was to throw for- ward the right of his division on the road to Alexander’s Bridge. It was expected that, by this double move- ment, the isolated brigade would be cap- tured. The battle commenced at once. It was soon discovered that w^hat seemed a solitary brigade was really the advance of the opposing army. Brannan soon became engaged with Forrest’s cav- ed ry, which was strongly supported by two infantry brigades, from Walker’s column. Baird, having come to the aid of Brannan,, the Confederates, after a terrible struggle^ were driven back with great loss. Riddle’s division w^as now thrown into the fight ; and the Nation- als, in their turn, were driven back, losing two batteries and over 500 pris- oners. In this charge. Lieutenant Van Pelt, who commanded one of the bat- teries, died gloriously by the side of his guns, resisting the enemy to the last. Thomas now threw into the fight the division of Reynolds; McCook pushed forward the division of John- son ; and Crittenden came to the res- cue, with Palmer’s division, which took position on Baird’s right. The Nation- als, tlius strengthened, and outnumber- ing and outflanking the Confederates, fell upon them with great fury, driving them back in disorder for a full mile and a half, on their reserves near the creek. By this charge, one of the lost batteries was recovered. It was now^ near four o’clock in the afternoon. There was a lull in the battle for about an hour. In the interval, Brannan and Baird re-formed their shattered col- umns, and took a commanding position between McDaniel’s House and Reed’s Bridge. The battle was resumed at five o’clock. The divisions of Liddle and Gist fell with great weight and with more than ordinary fury on Rey- nolds’ right; and, while Thomas was endeavoring to concentrate his forces, they fell with equal weight and fury on Johnson, Baird and Van Cleve. Thomas, at this crisis, was in great peril. His men were falling back in the wildest confusion. At this critical moment, Hazen, who covered himself with glory, and saved the day at Mur- freesboro, came gallantly to the rescue. ORDER OF BATTLE— SECOND DAY. 551 He had been sent back to the Rossville Road to take charge of a park of artil- lery, consisting of four batteries, twenty- one guns in all. These, it appears, had l)een left without guards. Hazen had arrived in time, not only to save the guns, blit to turn them to good account. They were already in position, on a commanding ridge, and manned with such infantry supports as he could has- tily collect, when the Nationals fell back, closely pursued by the victorious Confederates. Hazen made no haste to use his guns until the pursuers were within easy range. As soon, however, as they came fully up, he opened upon them a tremendous fire. The effect was terrific. Checked in full career, and torn to pieces by the merciless missiles, the Confederates, leaving their com- i-ades in slaughtered heaps on the ground behind them, fell back towards the creek in confusion and despair. Thanks to Hazen’s prompt interference, the day was saved on the left. A charge was made, also, by General Cleburne, fall on Johnson’s front, about the hour of sunset; but he failed to make any impression on the National lines. Although the fighting had been main- ly on the left, the right had not re- mained wholly unattacked. From • an early hour, there had been lively artil- lery firing on both sides. While the day was yet young, a vigorous attack was made by three Confederate brigades, in rapid succession ; and one of the Na- tional batteries was captured. Tlie as- sailants, however, were in turn driven back, and the guns recoverei Later in the day, about three o’clock. Hood threw two of his divisions heavily on Davis, of McCook’s corps. So irresist- ible was the attack that Davis was driven back; and his Indiana battery fell into the hands of the enemy. The triumph of Hood’s men, however, was but short-lived ; for Bradley’s brigade, of Sheridan’s division, immediately came up and joined Davis. A countercharge was made, and with complete success. The Confederates were driven back in disorder ; a large number of them were made prisoners ; and the lost battery was recovered. When night came the bat- tle ceased, with apparent advantage to the National army. The night was spent by both armies in vigorous preparations for a renewal of the conflict in the morning. As soon as the engagement closed, Bragg sum- moned his generals around him ; and, under the light of the blazing camp- fire, he gave them their instructions. At midnight, Longstreet arrived in per- son at headquarters, and the remainder of his troops was fast coming up. Bragg divided his army, as he had done on the previous day, into two wings. The right, as before, remained under the command of General Polk ; but General Longstreet assumed command on the left. The right wing was composed of Hill’s corps of two divisions, under Cleburne and Breckenridge ; with the division of Cheatham, of Polk’s c )ips, and the division of W. H. T. Walker. The left was composed of the divisions of Stewart, Preston and Johnston, of Buckner’s corps; with Hindman’s, of Polk’s corps; and Benning’s and Lane’s and Robertson’s brigades, of Hood’s di- 552 CHICKAMAtJGA AND CHATTANOOGA. vision; and Kershaw’s and Humphrey’s, of McLaws’ division. The front line of the right wing consisted of three di- visions — Breckenridge’s, Cleburne’s, and Cheatham’s — which were posted from right to left, in the order named. Walk- er’s division was in reserve. The line of the left wing was composed of Stew- art’s, Hood’s, Hindman’s, and Preston’s divisions, from right to left, in the order named. Rosecranz had also gath- ered his corps commanders around him. After hearing their reports, he ordered General Negley, who had come down from the extreme right, to report to General Thomas early in the morning. McCook was ordered to replace Negley’s troops by one of his own divisions, and to close up well on Thomas. Critten- den was to hold his two divisions in reserve, and in the rear of the centre. Thomas remained on the left, reinforced by the two divisions of Johnson and Palmer, with Brannan and Negley in I'eserve. On Sunday, the 20th of Septeinbei*, 8ep. the blood-red sun rose on the 20. valley of the Chickamauga, gild- ing with roseate hues the summits of the suri-ounding hills, an impenetrable mist hovered low on the ground be- tween the two armies ; and in the air there was a breathless stillness which well became the day of sacred rest, but which contrasted strangely with the approaching din and tumult and carnage of war. It had been Bragg’s intention to resume the battle at earliest dawn ; and instructions to that effect had been given accordingly. Polk was to strike the National left; and the attack was to be followed up in rapid succession all along the line. “The left wing,” says Bragg in his report, “ was to await the attack by the right, and take it up promptly when made, and the whole line was then to be pushed vigorously and persistently against the enemy throughout its extent.” Bragg was in the saddle before daybreak — waiting anxiously for the sound of Polk’s guns. But one hour and another passed ; and the battle was not yet commenced. This delay has been variously explained. It had been arranged that Hill should make the first onset ; but that general, it is said, was so far in the rear at Ted- ford’s Ford, that Polk’s order did not reach him until long after sunrise. An- other explanation is that, owing to a want of precaution, a portion of the Confederate left wing, amounting to a whole division, had been formed in front of Polk’s line, iind that if the at- tack had been made at the time ap- pointed, that division must have been slaughtered. Whatever the cause, the delay was a grievoiis disappointment to General Bragg. His indignation knew no bounds, when he learned of the coolness and indifference manifested by Polk. Bragg’s staff-officer, who had beyn sent to ascertain the cause of the delay, found Polk and his officers brilliantly attired and seated at a comfortable breakfast. “I have ordered Hill to open the action,” said Polk, “and I am waiting to hear the sound of his guns. Ho tell General Bragg,” he added, with great emotion, “that my heart is overflowing with anxiety for the 1 attack — overflowing with anxiety, sir.” A TEKRIFIC STRUGGLE. 553 What. was a disappointment and a posi- tive. loss to Bragg was a gain — a great gain to Bosecranz. His men bad been working like beavers all night through. The lines had been drawn closer together than on the previous day. Breast-works and abatis had been constructed in their front. Rosecranz, however, was not fully prepared to receive the onset of the enemy. His troops were not sufficiently concentra- ted ; and Thomas, on whom it was all but certain the weight of the battle would fall, not yet joined by Negley, was comparatively weak. The delay gave the National commander time to perfect his arrangements. When the fog lifted, and the enemy commenced his advance, Rosecranz was ready. It was now between nine and ten o’clock. All of a sudden, the thunder of artillery was heard on the extreme left. With their usual tactics, the Con- federates did not feel their way towards the National position, but, with concen- trated strength, fell with overwhelming weight on the left which, as we have seen, was held by Thomas. The attack was made by Breckenridge’s division, of Hill’s corps, which moved forward in splendid style, in order as perfect as if on dress parade, and was followed closely by a magnificent battery of ar- tillery. Breckenridge was accompanied by Cleburne, who advanced on his left, and more towards the National centre. Scarcely had the onward movement of the Confederates commenced, when the din of battle became terrific. The sharp rattle of musketry, mingling with the joar of artillery, gaye intensity to the ; war thunder which echoed through the forest. Breckenridge swung around so as to flank Thomas’ left. Cleburne moved directly against the breast- works in Thomas’ front. As the first lines of the enemy approached the works, they were received by a withering fire. The breast-works literally blazed. It was one continuous, incessant flame, out of which rushed death-dealing volleys on the advancing foe. The Confederates, however, seemed rather to court death than to fear danger. On and up against the tempest of lead and iron they moved with desperate valor. Line after line was mowed down, as it advanced. Still, the tide rolled on. The broken heads of columns were continually re- formed from the ranks in the rear; and the brave Confederates, as if heedless of death, trampling on the bodies of their dead or dying companions, pressed on towards the breast-works. It seemed as if they were determined to quench that volcano with human blood, and to choke it with living victims.” For a time it seemed as if nothing could check their advance. Cleburne was gaining ground in front ; and Breckenridge was making visible progress against the National left. So overwhelming was the strength, and so vis^orous were the onsets of the enemy, that Thomas was under the ne- cessity of making repeated calls to Rose- cranz for help. It was now about noon. Repeat- edly held in check, and sometimes even driven back, the Confederates contrived again and again to re-form and renew the attack. . Despite the terrific Are to which they were exposed, and the awful 554 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. i.'arnage which they witnessed as they advanced, the dark gray masses were gradually closing on the National left. It was Bragg’s determination that that wing should be turned — it was the key of the position; and, to give effect to that determination, Breckenridge, rein- forced by division after division, exer- cised all his skill, and strained to the utmost all his energies. Reinforcements coming up on both sides, the battle raged with tremendous fury. "Victory leaned now to the one side and now to the other. It was doubtful with whom the palm should remain. In one of those fierce encounters, when Vande- ver’s brigade, of Brannan’s division, and a portion of Stanley’s, of Wood’s division, came up and strengthened the wavering line on the extreme left, Breckenridge, in what seemed a mo- ment of triumph, was thrown back in great confusion, with the loss of Gen- eral Helmond Desher, killed ; General D. Adams, at the same time, being se- verely, and Major Graves, chief of artil- lery, mortally wounded. Breckenridge rallied again on a commanding ridge ; and having got his guns into position, and been reinforced by Walker and Cheatham, as well as by Cleburne, he resumed and maintained the fight with the energy of despair. Thomas’ left showed signs of yielding ; but, aided by his gallant lieutenants, he got his men well together again in a new position — his right on Missionary Ridge, his left on an eminence by the Lafayette Road — where they stdbd like a wall of iron. At this supreme crisis in the progress of the fight, occurred one of those mis- haps, which are all the more liable to prove disastrous, because they cannot be foreseen or provided against, and which, when they do occur, sometimes more than neutralize all the skill of the general and all the bravery of the troops. Thomas, hard pressed, was still asking for reinforcements. Negley had been ordered forward to his aid. So, too, had Van Cleve. Rosecranz, see- ing that the left centre was in peril, ordered Wood to move towards the left and close in upon Reynolds ; Davis and Sheridan were to move in the same direction, so as to prevent a break in the line. It so happened, however, that Brannan w*as en echelon^ slightly in the rear of Reynolds’ right; and Wood, in carrying out the orders, as he understood them, moved by Bran- nan’s rear, so as to reach Reynolds. It was a grievous, and, as it proved, irre- parable blunder. A gap was thus cre- ated ; quick as lightning, Longstreet, with his experienced eye, discovered his opportunity. With the swiftness of thought, and with the fury of a thun- derbolt, Hood’s division was thrown into the fatal opening; and, striking right and left, it cut the National army in two. It was in vain that Davis, of McCook’s corps, tried to close in and resist the advance of the enemy. His division was literally cut to pieces. Palmer and Van Cleve, of Crittenden’s corps, shared a similar fate. Sheridan, whose position was to the right of Davis, was left alone, and, for a time, made a gallant fight. Brave as he was, how: ever, Sheridan could not peilorm im- possibilities. He, too, was compelled «THE ROCK OF CHICKAMAUGA.^ 555 to give way. The National right and centre, shattered to fragments, were soon flying in wild confusion towards Rossville, and onwards to Chattanooga. It seemed a total rout. To some who were present, it recalled the memory of the first battle of Bull Bun. The road to Bossville and Chattanooga presented a picture not unlike that which, on that fatal 21st of July, was witnessed on the road to Centreville and Washington. The field was covered with thousands of dead and dying men ; and all along the line of retreat, artillery, caissons, wagons, horses, mules, and a motley multitude of fugitives were mingled to- gether in inextricable confusion. Pow- erless to resist the refluent tide, Bose- cranz, Crittenden, McCook, and most of their ofiicers were borne backwards towards Bossville. In front of the gap in Missionary Bidge, through which passes the road to Bossville — Sheridan and Davis having come up by the Dry Valley Boad — McCook rallied his shat- tered corps, and presented a change of front, determined, at all hazai’ds, to re- sist the further advance of the enemy. Meanwhile, Thomas and his glorious left wing, alone and unaided on the bat- tle field, were resisting the accumulated weight and fierce onsets of the enemy. Never, perhaps, in the history of war, did more depend on the firmness of one individual will, than now depended on the will of General Thomas. Weak- ness, or want of decision on his part, at this trying crisis, would most cer- tainly have brought about a terrible National disaster; and Chickamauga would have been remembered with | shame, regret and sorrow. Thomas, however, was not found wanting. His clear vision, his caution, his decisive purpose, his strong will, were all to find admirable illustration. It was a fortunate circumstance that there was a perfect rapport between him and his men, from the division and bri^ade-ofii- cers down to the humblest soldier in the ranks. Thomas could trust them ; they had perfect faith and confidence in him. It was not till towards the close of the day’s fighting, that the commander of the left wing of the National army was made aware of the disaster which had befallen the centre and right. Fully alive, however, to the difficulties of his own position,. he was waiting anxiously for the arrival of Sheridan, whose sup- port had been promised him, when Wood came up and took position on the left of Bran nan. Thomas now with- drew from his breast- works, and con- centrated his command on a slope of Missionary Bidge, his line assuming the form of a crescent, the flanks resting on the lower spurs of the mountain. This new position was a little to the west of the Bossville Boad, and was well forti- fied with ai’tillery. Wood had scarcely had time to arrange his troops in the position assigned them, when the Con- federates fell upon Thomas’ line with redoubled energy, Polk on his centre and left, and Longstreet on his right. Thomas, however, was not to be driven from his position, nor was his line to be broken. Like a rock he stood, firm and invincible, the forces of the enemy, like surging billows, dashing themselves to pieces at his feet. 556 CHIOKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. It was now about half-past three o’clock. Longstreet, impatient of resist- ance, and eager for an opportunity to precipitate the final issue, had discov- ered an opening in the hills, on Thomas’ right, communicating with a gorge di- rectly in his rear. Into this opening he was already pouring his massive col- umns. It was, indeed, a critical moment. It seemed as if all were lost. Fully turned in front and flank, the National line was now to be attacked heavily in the rear. Destruction or surrender seemed to be the only alternatives. In the moment of agony, relief came. Gen- eral Gordon Granger, who had heard the roar of artillery in the direction in which he knew Thomas to be posted, hurried forward from Rossville, with- out orders, at the head of Steadman’s di- vision. As soon as he arrived on the held, Thomas directed him to the point of danger. Steadman was quickly on the crest of the hill, with a battery of six guns, and in perfect command of the gorge. It was not a moment too soon. Two divisions, of Longstreet’s corps, were pressing forward with all their might. They were already ascending the southern slope of the ridge, and only a few yards distant from the newly- erected battery. Opening a well-di- I'ected Are, and at the same time hurling against them the brigades of Whitta- ker and Mitchell, himself heading the charge, Steadman drove the too-daring Confederates down the ridge and back into the gorge, with terrible slaughter. Steadman had his horse killed under him; and he was himself badly injured by a fall. But he had saved Thomas from destruction. It was now sunset; and the attack in this direction was not repeated. While this was going on in the rear, Thomas was hotly engaged by the Con- federates, both on front and flank. In vain did Polk dash against his centre and left. In vain did Longstreet hurl his well-tried and war-hardened vet- erans on his right. “ The Bock of Chick- amauga” — the name which Thomas that day won — was not to be moved. When night fell, and the battle was ended, his line was unbroken, his posi- tion unmoved. Leaving his dead and wounded in the field, Thomas, in obe- dience to orders from Rosecranz, who was at Chattanooga, fell back to Ross- ville, and took command of all the forces. His ammunition was all but exhausted. Bi*agg did not pursue. On the night of the following da}^ the entire National army was withdrawn into the defenses, in front of Chatta- noosra. o Such was the battle of Chickamauga. It was a Confederate victory; but it was barren of results. Chattanooga had not been recovered. The losses on both sides were heavy. The Na- tionals lost about 16,350 men, and 51 guns. The Confederate loss was about 18,000. Chickamauga was a battle almost without a plan. It resulted to the credit of neither of the generals-in- chief. It made an end of General Rose- cranz ; and it nearly ruined Bragg. It had but one hero ; and that was Gen- eral Thomas. “ The Rock of Chicka- mauga ” will live forever in American history. GRANT IN COMMAND. 557 After the battle of Chickamanga, Rosecranz proceeded to throw up forti- fications around Chattanooga. In this work, he found an able and efficient assistant in General James St. Clair Morton. Within twenty-four hours after falling back from Rossville, he was strongly entrenched — so strongly that Bragg could not, with safety, venture upon an offensive movement. Bragg, in truth, was in great trouble. He felt bitter disappointment because the late battle had not resulted in more complete success. He was dissatisfied with the conduct of several of his offi- cers. He had not lost the confidence of Jefferson Davis; but with the authori- ties at Richmond generally, he was in bad odor. He was expected by them to perform impossibilities. The sug- gestions offered him were as numerous as they were absurd. Bragg, however, had will enough to abide by his own counsel, and sense enough to attempt the one thing which was practicable. If he could not force his way into Chat- tanooga, he might at least starve the army of the Cumberland into submis- sion or retreat. With this end in view, the Confed- erate general drew a cordon around the city, and interrupted or cut off the va- rious lines of communication. He made himself master of the south bank of the Tennessee, opposite Mocassin Point, and then broke the line of communica- tion between Chattanooga and Bridge- port. He destroyed the bridge at the latter place, and thus severed the com- munication with Nashville, the base of supplies. He had, also, entire command of the river. Winter was rapidly ap- proaching; and heavy rains had already deluged the country, making the roads impassable. There was left but one way by which the wagon-trains, which supplied Rosecranz’ army, could move ; and that was a circuitous route along the bottom-land of the Tennessee and Sequatchie Valleys, and over the Wal- dron Ridge. On this route, the supply- trains were almost entirely at the mercy of the Confederate cavalry. In one day, Bragg’s troopers destroyed about 300 wagons, and killed or captured some 1800 mules. It was not long until dis- tress began to reveal itself in the Na- tional army. The animals died in large numbers from sheer starvation. Their dead bodies lined the roadsides; and the soldiers, unable to work their way through the deep mud, used them as they would have used stepping-stones. It was calculated that at least 10,000 horses and mules had perished in sup- plying half rations to the men. Such a state of things, it was manifest, could not long continue. The army of the Cumberland became a cause of great anxiety to the authori- ties at Washington. It was felt that if something were not done to relieve it, and that quickly, the army ran the risk of being utterly destroyed; and Chattanooga and East Tennessee would again be brought under Confederate rule. In these circumstances, the gov- ernment fell back on the conqueror of Vicksburg. Grant was ordered to Chat- tanooga, to take sole command. He was then at New Orleans, confined bv an injury sustained in falling from his 558 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. horse. As soon as he was able, he has- tened to Indianapolis, where he met Stanton, the Secretary of War, and re- ceived from his hands the order ap- pointing him to the command of the new military division of the Mississippi, comprising the three departments and armies of the Ohio, the Cumberland and the Tennessee. By the same order. General Kosecranz was relieved of the command of the department and army of the Tennessee. At the request of General Grant, the department of the Cumberland was given to Thomas, and that of the Tennessee to Sherman. On Oct. fhe 18th of October, Grant, hav- ing arrived at Louisville, formally assumed the command, and issued his first order. Bosecranz, on the 19th, after issuing a touching farewell ad- dress to the troops, left for Cincinnati. Thither, also, were ordered Generals McCook and Crittenden, whose corps were now consolidated into one. From Louisville, Grant telegraphed to Thomas, ‘‘ Hold Chattanooga at all hazards.” “ I will hold the town until we starve,” was the prompt and charac- teristic reply. It was not enough, however, to bring Grant to Chattanooga. It was neces- sary that he should have under him a competent army. Arrangements had already been made for increasing the strength of the National army at Chat- tanooga. As soon as it became known that General Longstreet had gone to Tennessee, instructions were sent to Grant, and other commanders in the south and west, to send Bosecranz all possible assistance. Grant was yet at New Orleans; and as Sherman, who represented him at Vicksburg, did not receive the despatch until several days had elapsed, there was some unavoid- able delay in sending reinforcements from the neighborhood of Vicksburg. As early as the 27th of September, Sherman, with the Fifteenth corps, in obedience to orders from Grant, had set out for Memphis, on his way to Chattanooga. Meanwhile, fearful of the consequences which must result if Bosecranz should be tempted to abandon his position, and attempt a retreat, the government had detached the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the army of the Potomac, and placing them in charge of General Hooker, hurried them along by rail to Chattanooga. Never before — not even at Solferino and Magenta — had railroads been more effectively used for transporting troops and all the necessary material of war, than on this occasion. It was Stanton’s project ; and in giving it effect, he bent upon it all the energies of his powerful mind and will. His purposes were admirably carried out by General Meigs, the quartermaster-general, and by Colonel D. C. McCallum, the government super- intendent of military railroads. Me- Callum, who alone was responsible for the conveyance of the troops, was ably assisted by W. Prescott Smith, master of transportation on the Baltimore and Ohio Bailroad. In seven days the two corps, some 23,000 strong, with artillery- trains, baggage and animals, were trans- ferred from the Bapidan to Stevenson, Alabama — a distance of 1192 milea Grant reached Nashville on the WAUHATCHIE. 559 Oct, 21st of October. He there met and 21* had an interview with Rosecranz and Hooker. On the 23d, he arrived at Chattanooga. Next morning he made a reconnoissance of the ground, and de- termined on his plan of action. He found that Rosecranz had allowed the enemy to occupy all the heights around his position, and that neither the river nor the railroad could be used. Un- less the river or the roads could be opened, there was no choice but retreat ; and retreat, in the present condition of the army, would be certain ruin. Thomas, and his chief engineer, General William F. Smith, had decided upon a plan by which they hoped to be able to regain possession of Lookout Val- ley, and to re-establish communications with Bridgeport by way of Brown’s Ferry. Hooker, by order -of Thomas, had already concentrated at the latter place. This plan met the hearty ap- proval of General Grant, who proceed- ed immediately to put it in execution. Hooker was to cross the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and push on by the main wagon-road to Wauhatchie, in Look- out Valley. Palmer, who was now opposite Chattanooga, was to move down the north side of the river to a point opposite Whiteside, where he was to cross the river and hold the road passed over by Hooker. W. F. Smith was to go down the river from Chattanooga, under cover of the dark- ness, with about 4000 troops, to cross at Brown’s Ferry, and to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout Valley. A pontoon bridge was to be thrown over the river at Brown’s Ferry, so as to open communications between Hooker and Thomas. The movements of Hooker and Palmer might be made in open day ; but Smith’s success de- pended largely on secrecy. ' These mov^ements were promptly and successfully executed. On the morn- ing of the 26th, Hooker crossed Or*t, at Bridgeport on pontoon bridges. 26, He effected a landing on the south side without any opposition, and pushed on to Wauhatchie, which he reached on the 28th. Palmer followed, according to instructions, and took position at Whiteside, in his rear. Smith’s part of the plan, although beset with greater difficulty, because he was within reach of the enemy’s sharp-shooters during his whole course, was carried out with equal success. His force consisted of about 4000 men. Of these, 1800, under General Hazen, embarked on pontoon boats at Chattanooga; and during the dark hours of the night of the 26th and the morning of the 27th, they floated noiselessly down the river, without oars, passing the point of Lookout Mountain, and, unnoticed by seven miles of the enemy’s pickets, reached Brown’s Ferry just about dawn. The material for the construction of the pontoon bridge was thus at the point desired. Landing without difficulty. Smith drove in and scattered the Con- federate pickets, and seized a low i*ange of hills, which commanded Lookout Valley. A Ann foothold having been secured, skirmishers were thrown for- ward ; and by means of felled trees, wffiich the axe-men soon laid low, an impassable abatis was thrown up in 560 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. front of Hazen’s troops. The Confed- erates, unwilling to abandon the posi- tion, returned and made a fierce at- tack ; but finding their efforts useless, they withdrew up the valley towards Chattanooga. The remainder of Smith’s force, some T200 strong, under General Turchin, having moved, meanwhile, down the north bank of the stream, across Mocassin Point, reached Brown’s Ferry before daylight. They were rap- idly ferried across ; and, by ten o’clock, a pontoon bridge connected the north and south banks of the Tennessee. On the morning of the 28th, as has been stated. Hooker, with the Elev- enth corps, Major-General Howard, and Geary’s division, of the Twelfth corps, appeared in Lookout Valley, at Wauhatchie, his left connecting with Smith at the pontoon bridge. These movements secured for the Nationals the possession of the roads and the river; and all fears of starvation in Chattanooga were now abandoned. ‘^General Thomas’ plan,” said Grant, in his telegram to Halleck, “for se- curing the river and southside road to Bridgeport, has proved eminently suc- cessful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled.” Bragg was not willing that his antagonist should retain the great advantage he had won, without mak- ing another attempt to dislodge him. Lookout Valley, which lies between Racoon and Lookout Mountains, and which has an average width of about two miles, is divided towards its centre by a series of wood-crowned heights, some of them risin<2: to an elevation of 200 and 300 feet. These heights, as well as the more commanding positions on Racoon and Lookout Mountains, were in the hands of the Confederates. From these eminences, the position and movements of the National army could be easily ‘seen. McLaws, of Long- street’s corps, was on Lookout Moun- tain, eagerly watching Hooker. It was his determination to fall upon and crush that branch of the National army, so soon as he should see a favor- able opportunity. On the night of the 28th, Geary’s division, on Hooker’s right, was lying at Wauhatchie, How- arcTs corps, as has been mentioned, having been thrown out in the direc- tion of Brown’s Ferry. McLaws, de- sirous to take Geary by surprise, de- scended at midnight, and with fierce energy, his men uttering wild screams as they advanced, fell upon Geary’s pickets, driving them in. The batteries on Lookout Mountain now opened fire ; and while Geary’s camp was furiously attacked on three different sides by the on-rushing Confederates, his men were exposed to a very tempest of shot and shell. Geary, however, was not unpre- pared. Knowing that he was liable to be attacked at any moment, he had been holding himself in a state of readiness. When, therefore, McLaws’ men came up, they were warmly re- ceived. Full in the faces of the too- confident Confederates, Geary’s Jirav^e fellows poured a deadly fire of mus- ketry. Such a reception had not been expected. The advancing columns re- coiled. Geary, however, was greatly outnumbered; and the battle continued. OELAN SMITH. 561 Hooker was ai-onsed by the boom- ing of cannon and the shrill rattling of musketry. He knew, from the di- rection whence these sounds issued, that Geary had been attacked. How- ard was ordered to double-quick his nearest division — that of Schurz — to the aid of Geary. Forward to their re- lief, boys ! ” shouted Hooker, as Schurz’s men streamed past him through the darkness. They had advanced but a short distance, when, suddenly, there came a blaze of musketry from the hills, showing that the Confederates were close at hand, as well as in force in the neighborhood of Geary’s posi- tion. Tyndale’s brigade was detached, and ordered to charge the heights, while Schurz, with the remainder of his troops, moved on towards Geary. A thin brisrade of Steinwehr’s division, commanded by Colonel Orlan Smith, of the Seventy-Third Ohio, now came up; and it was found that the hill to the rear of Schurz was occupied by the enemy. This hill Smith was ordered to carry with the bayonet. The moon was shining bright and clear ; but the hill was precipitous, seamed with ra- vines, covered with thick brushwood, and rose to the height of 200 feet. It was a daring — it seemed almost a fool- hardy — expei’iment ; but the order had been given, and it must be obeyed. On and up the slope rushed the brave fellows of the Seventy-Third Ohio and of the Thirty-Third Massachusetts un- til they had almost reached the rifle- pits, when they were received by a volley from some 2000 muskets, and driven back in confusion to the foot of the hill. There, however, they re- formed; and, although now fully aware of the nature of the ground and of the difficulties to be encountered, those noble regiments again breasted the hill; and in spite of the destructive volleys which tore througli their ranks, and the shouting and yelling and taunt- ing sneers of the men on the summit, they pressed on, without firing a shot, towards the blazing rifle-pits, and then, with one bound, bayonet in hand, swejit the enemy before them. It was not until the enemy was in full retreat, and until shouts of victory were rend- ing the midnight air, that the first vol- ley was fired. It was a sort of parting salute, given in a species of wild glee by the Nationals, but not particularly agreeable to the retreating foe, and not likely soon to be forgotten by any of the Confederates who survived that moonlight struggle. Geary, meanwhile, although contending with vastly supe- rior numbers, and sometimes nearly overborne, held his ground with char- acteristic tenacity ; and at length, after three hours’ fighting, he hurled his as- sailants back towards Lookout Moun- tain. Thither they retired for refuge, leaving on the field 150 of their num- ber dead, and in Geary’s hands over* 100 prisoners, with several hundred * small arms. It was now a little after four o’clock in the morning; and the battle of Wauhatchie was ended. The charge made by Orlan Smith has been singled out as one of the most brilliant charges of the war. It de- lighted and astonished Hooker. “No troops,” he said, “ ever rendered more .562 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. brilliant service.” It won special com- mendation from so reserved a man as TIiomas. The bayonet charge of Howard’s troops,” said he, in his letter of congratulation to Hooker, ‘’made lip the side of a steep and difficult hill, over 200 feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from his barricades on its top, and the re- pulse, by Geary’s division, of greatly superior numbers, who attempted to surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats of arms in this war.” The victory at Wauhatchie secured the possession of the communications which Smith had opened up two days before. Bragg’s plans were defeated. Soon afterwards, two little steamboats were put upon the river; by means of these, the railroad, and the other roads on the south of the Tennessee, supplies were conveyed to Chattanooga ; and the army was saved from actual famine. Fortune was smiling again on the Na- tional arms; and the star of General Grant was still in the ascendant. While these events were taking place at Chattanooga, Sherman was pressing forward from* Memphis. He had left Vicksburg for Memphis, on his way to Chattanooga, on the 27th of September. • His own corps followed him up the river in steamboats. He had been pi*e- ceded b}^ the divisions of Osterhaus and John E. Smith. Arriving at Mem- phis on the 2d of October, he received a letter from Halleck, instructing him to move by the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to Athens, and to report thence to Rosecranz, at Chattanooga. He was to i-epair the railroads as he advanced, and to de- pend on his own line for supplies. On his way to Corinth, on Sunday, the 11th, having with him, as an escort, a battalion of the Thirteenth regulars, he arrived at Colliersville about noon, just in time to save the Sixty-Sixth Indiana, Colonel D. C. Anthony, from being overwhelmed and probably destroyed by a body of Confedeiate cavalry, some 3000 strong, with eight guns, under the command of General Chalmers. He reached Corinth that Sunday even- ing. Without delay, he pushed on to luka. At Tuscumbia, on the 27th, his advance, under General Frank Blair, came into contact with a Confederate force, some 5000 strong, under General S. D. Lee. The Confederate cavalry were severely punished ; and Lee gave no further annoyance to the troops on their march. The National troops had been i*epairing the roads, as they moved along, in obedience to instructions I'e- ceived from Halleck. On the same day on which Blair chastised Lee, Sherman received a despatch from Grant, urging him to discontinue his work on the i*ailroad, and hasten for- ward with all possible despatch, with his entire force, to Bridgeport. Hap- pily, he had made arrangements with Admiral Porter to have boats waiting for him at Eastpo. t. By means of these, he passed his troops across the Tennessee and hurried eastward, Blair covering his rear, and reached Bridge- port on the 14th. On the day follow- ing, he joined Grant at Chattanooga; and the two together reconnoitered the I ground. Grant explaining his proposed GRANT’S BATTLE PLAN. 563 plan of attack, so soon as the army of the Tennessee was forward and ready for action. Sherman arrived at Chattanooga at a most opportune moment. It seemed as if the fates were working in the in- terest of General Grant and the army under his command. The plans of the general commanding had worked to perfection ; they had been admirably carried out ; and they had been attend- ed, so far, with complete success. And now, when Sherman, his trusted right arm, came up with his well-trained veterans, Bragg had invited attack by committing a huge and irreparable blunder. It was known to the Con- federate commander that Burnside, at an earlier date, had general instructions to push forward from Knoxville, and form a connection with Bosecranz. Be- lieving that if such a connection were now formed, it would be fatal to his prospects, and in the vain hope of cut- ting his rival off, and beating him in detail, he detached Longstreet from the army in front of Chattanooga, and or- dered him to attack Burnside, and take possession of Knoxville. A more fatal blunder he could not have committed. He could not, had such been his object, have played more completely into the hands of his antagonist. Grant saw his opportunity; but he resolved to wait until the arrival of Sherman, so as to be able to turn it to full and sat- isfactory account. He was now ready. Grant was not insensible to the peril- ous position in which Burnside was now placed; nor was he indifferent to hjs calls for help. But he knew that Burnside would be relieved most effect- ually by the plan which he, himself proposed to carry out — that the threat- ened catastrophe at Knoxville would be best avei’ted by a decisive victory at Chattanooga. Colonel Wilson, of his staff, accompanied by Assistant-Secre- tary of War, Charles A. Dana, was, therefore, sent to Knoxville to explain to Burnside the situation. He was to make the best show possible in the presence of the enemy, to allow him- self to be besieged, but to hold Knox- ville at all hazards. Grant, meanwhile, hurried forward his plans, and made all the necessary arrangements for the attack. The great battle of Chattanooga — by far the most picturesque battle in the war, and the one in which General Grant most conspicuously showed that he was not only the fortunate winner of battles, but the possessor of military abilities of the very highest and rarest order of excellence — was now about to be fought. Grant’s plans, as we have seen, were matured and ready for exe- cution. It was now the middle of No- vember. Sherman’s corps had arrived at Bridgeport on the 14th. Grant made up his mind to make the general attack on the 21st. He had discovered that the north end of the Missionary Bidge was imperfectly guai'ded, as, also, the western bank of the river, from the mouth of the South Chick- amauga, down towards Chattanooga. This point invited attack. This, how- ever, was not all. A successful blow given in that direction would make a junction impossible between Bragg and m CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. Longstreet. The northern end of Mis- sionary Ridge, therefore, he singled out as the special point of attack. While the attack should seem to be general, and beai’ing heavily on the Confed- erate left, he proposed to mass his con- verging forces on the point thus indi- cated. Sherman, with his own troops and one of Thomas’ divisions, was to cross the Tennessee just below the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and secure the heights, as far as the rail- road tunnel. Thomas was to co-operate with Sherman, by concentrating his troops on his own left, leaving a thin line to guard the works on the light and centre. Hooker was to assail the Confederate left, and drive it from Lookout Mountain. Grant was the more anxious to make the attack on the 21st that, on the day before, ho received from Bragg a letter, suggest- ing the removal of non-combatants from Chattanooga — a letter intended to con- vey the idea that an attack on that place was meditated, but which really confirmed the report brought by a de- serter, and confirmed Grant in the be- lief that Bragg was about to retreat. The general attack which was to be made on the 21st was countermanded. Sherman had experienced unexpected difficulty in passing his troops across Brown’s Ferry, in consequence of the heavy rains. The pontoon bridge at last gave way. Osterhaus, whose divi- sion was still on the southern side of the river, and without the means of crossing, was ordered to i-eport to General Hooker, with whom he re- mained. Howard was, at the same time, called to Chattanooga, and tem- porarily attached to the command of General Thomas. On the afternoon of the 23d, the Fifteenth cor])S, under the immediate command of General Blair, having flung pontoon bridges across the Tennessee at the point indicated above, and also across the Chicka- inauga, were advancing to their posi- tion on the extreme left of the National army. Grant, now impatient of delay, and determined that if Bragg really meant to retii-e, he should not retire unin- jured and in good order, had instructed Thomas, on the morning of the j^ov. 23d, to advance and give the en- 23. emy an opportunity of developing his lines. The day was unusually beauti- ful. The men, now that they were relieved from their pi*ison-house in Chattanooga, and well fed, were in excellent spirits. They were dressed in their best uniforms, and accompanied by new bands of music. The neighbor- ing heights were crowded with specta- tors. The magnificent array, the steady step, the splendid uniforms, the burn- ished bayonets, glittering in the clear November sunlight — it was a holiday picture. It seemed a dress-parade or re- view, and was so regarded for a time by the Confederates, who witnessed the spectacle from the side and summit of Missionary Ridge. Wood’s division, of Gi*anger’s corps, moved in advance on the left ; Sheridan’s division of the same corps, being on the right. Palmer, of the Fourteenth corps, supported Granger’s right, with Baird’s division refused ; Johnson’s division, of, Palmer’s, remain- ORCHAKD KNOB. 565 ing under arms in the entrenchments, to be ready to reinforce at any point. Howard’s corps was formed in mass behind that of Granger. As soon as Thomas’ men began to move forward, the heavy guns of Fort Wood opened upon the enemy’s first position. Upon the ramparts of the fort. Grant, Thomas, Granger and Howard stood watching the advance. It was a splendid sight. On moved the mighty mass, as if it had been one solid unit. Cheers were heard to arise from the ranks of the advancing columns. The pickets of the enemy were seen to break and fly in confusion before them. In spite of the well-directed fire from its summit, Wood had already reached the base of Orchard Knob — a steep, craggy hill, rising above the general level of the valley, midway between the river and the ridge, and about a mile from Fort Wood. Without halting. Wood or- dered his men to charge. It was done in gallant style, the rifle-pits on the summit being carried, and 200 men made prisoners. A heavy battery was advanced to the captured position from Fort Wood, and the place was held. This was an important gain to the Nationals. Simultaneously with this movement of General Thomas against Orchard Knob, a cavalry brigade, by order of General Grant, was operating on Bragg’s extreme right and rear. This movement was scarcely less successful than the other, resulting as it did in the burning of Tyner’s Station, the cut- ting of the railroad leading to Cleve- land, the capture of 100 wagons, with 200 prisoners, and the destruction of a large quantity of stores. No other movement of any conse- quence took place on the 23d. Thomas held his advanced position. On Or- chard Knob, and the low range of hills to the south, his troops entrenched themselves; and every available point was covered with artillery. Hooker had general instructions from Grant to take Lookout Mountain, to cross the Chattanooga Valley to Rossville, and thence, by the Rossville Gap, to advance upon Missionary Ridge. His immedi- ate instructions were that he should take a position so as at least to be able to make a strong demonstration, but that if he felt himself equal to the task, he was not to hesitate to make the attack and drive the enemy from the mountain. Sherman, all night through, was pushing his troops across the river. As early as daylight, on the morning of the 24th, he had 8000 jvov, men, with artillery and horses, 24. on the south side of the Tennessee. At one o’clock, P. M., the march was taken up by three columns en echelon^ each head of column covered by a line of skirmishers, with supports. It was a dull, drizzly day. The clouds were low ; and the movements of the troops could not be easily seen by the enemy. At half-past three o’clock, Sherman had possession of the whole northern ex- tremity of Missionary Ridge, as far almost as the railroad tunnel. In the afternoon and during the night, he threw up entrenchments, and estab- lished himself in a really strong posi- tion. Sherman had thus, so far, car- 566 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. ried out his part of the general plan. Such was the state of things on the National left, at the close of Tuesday, the 24th. On the National right, matters were, if possible, even more favorable. Hooker had performed a brilliant feat of arms on Lookout Mountain. At four o’clock, on the morning of the 24th, he had re- ported that his troops were in position, and ready to advance. Soon after- wards the movement commenced. It had been Hooker’s intention to push his men across Lookout Creek, and strike the enemy in front. It was a hazard- ous undertaking; for Lookout Moun- tain, with its high, palisaded crest, its steep, rugged slopes, its numerous rifle- pits, its encircling lines of earth-works and redans, was deemed by Bragg im- pregnable. It so happened, however, that Lookout Creek was so swollen by the recent heavy rains, that it was im- passable. A direct movement by the main road could not be attempted until temporary bridges were constructed. Hooker, therefore, ordered Geary, with his own division, and Whittaker’s bri- gade, of Cruft’s division, to march to Wauhatchie, to cross the creek there, and move down on the right bank, while he employed the remainder of his forces in throwing bridges across on the main road. The day v^as favor- able for conducting such operations. A heavy mist enveloped the mountain, and spread itself over the adjoining valleys. The attention of the enemy had been drawn to the bridge-builders, of whom an occasional glimpse could be had, as the mist drifted with the breeze ; but no notice had been taken of Geary, who reached his appointed place at Wauhatchie, unobserved. It was about eight o’clock when he began to cross the creek. Passing over with- out molestation, he surprised and cap- tured the picket-guard; and immedi- ately facing to the north, he extended his line on the right to the base of the mountain. The Confederates, caught at once on both flank and rear, offered a stubborn resistance. Meanwhile, the bridges M^ere constructed; and Oster- haus’ division, having been brought up from Brown’s Ferry, the Nationals were soon in great force on the right bank of the creek. Under cover of the two batteries — the Ohio, on Bald Hill, and the New York, on the hill in the rear — Hooker’s men went dashing down the valley, sweeping everything before them, capturing the rifle-pits, and mak- ing a large number of prisoners. At the same time the troops to the right, passing directly under the muzzles of the Confederate guns, were rushing up the rugged sides of the hill, leaping over boulders and ledges of rock, cut- ting their way through the abatis^ and gradually forcing position after posi- tion until the plateau was cleared, and the retreating Confederates were seen plunging themselves down the jagged and pi'ecipitous face of the mountain, and flying in confusion and utter rout towards Chattanooga Valley. Hooker had not expected to accomplish so much in the same space of time. Nay, he had been unwilling that his men should attempt so much. Not know- ing to what extent the enemy might LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. 567 be reinforced, and fearing disaster from the rough character of the ground, he had given directions that the men should halt when they reached the high ground. But aroused to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and with a flying foe before them, a halt was impossible. It was now about two o’clock in the afternoon ; and such was the density of the mist which shrouded the mountain and hung heavily over the valley, that it was found necessary, temporarily at least, to suspend oj^erations. Hooker, not deeming it advisable to descend into the valley in pursuit, established his line on the east side of the moun- tain, his right resting on the palisades, his left near the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. The battle had literally been fought above the clouds. • It was not until nightfall that the sky cleared, and revealed to thousands, in the val- ley below, the actual progress which Hooker had made. As soon as it be- came known that behind that veil of clouds a great battle had been fought and won, and that the National arms had been victorious, the soldiers gave way to the wildest enthusiasm; and loud cheers for “ Old Hooker ” coming up, resounding from the valley, were echoed and re-echoed among the blood- stained hills. The night which fol- lowed was beautiful in the extreme. The mist disappeared ; and a full moon shed her mellow light over a scene of matchless magnificence.. It was Hook- er’s conviction that the enemy would withdraw from the summit of the mountain before daylight. In antici- pation of such a movement, he de- tached parties from several regiments, with instructions to scale the palisades. When morning came, the Confederates were gone. In their haste, they had left behind them 20,000 rations, the camp and garrison equipage of their brigades, and a large quantity of other war material. The Eighth Kentuck- ians were the first to reach the crest; and at sunrise, in the clear, crisp No- vember air, amid echoing cheers from the troops below, they had the honor of unfurling the National banner from Pulpit Kock. The importance of this victory at Lookout Mountain, it is hardly possible to over-estimate. It enabled Grant greatly to contract his line of battle, and by so much to con- centrate his strength. It made an end of the blockade of the Tennessee ; and from that day there was no more diffi- culty about supplies for the National army. Such was the condition of things on the night of the 24th and the morning of the 25th of November. The Na- tional army maintained an unbroken line, with open communications from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of Missionary Bidge. Car- lin had taken position so as to connect Hooker with the centre ; and Howard, with the Eleventh corps, having been moved up from the right, connected the centre with Sherman. The Con- federates, having abandoned Chatta- nooga Valley, concentrated on Mission- ary Ridge. Their line extended from Tunnel Hill to Rossville. Bragg’s m CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. right, consisting of the divisions of Cleburne, Walker, Cheatham, and Ste- venson, was commanded by Hardee; his left was commanded by Brecken- ridge, and was composed of that gen- eral’s own division, now under Lewis, and those of Stewart and Andei'son. General Grant’s headquarters had been removed from Fort Wood to Orchard Knob, or as it was also named, “ Indian Hill” — a commanding eminence which Thomas had now strongly fortified, and from which could be seen the embattled hosts spread out, as in a vast amphi- theatre. The morning of the 25th rose in NoVi beauty. Far almost as the eye 25. could reach, the sun fell upon the compact lines of polished steel. In front, towering up, the huge form of Missionary Bidge, its precipitous sides defying attack, its summit swarming with armed men, and crowned with artillery ; away to the right, and stand- ing out clear and well-defined, the bold outlines of Lookout Mountain ; Hook- er’s men spread out in the valley below to the right, Sheiman’s massed in com- pact phalanx above to the left, while Thomas’ well-trained bands, eager and ready for the fray, ai*e gathered together in close array around the headquarters of the chief — such was the sight which met the eye of the beholder, as he stood on Orchard Knob, on the morning of the day which was to witness the final struggle and the crowning National victory at Chattanooga. It was a mag- nificent spectacle, and one which it rarely falls to the lot of mortals to witness. At an early hour the preparations were complete. The sun had arisen, however, before the bugle sounded ‘‘ Forward ! ” Hooker had received orders to mov^e on the Confederate left ; Sherman was to move against the right; while the centre, under the im- mediate eye of General Grant, was to advance later in the day, and whenever the developments made on either wing should justify the attack. Shortly after sunrise. Hooker, who has left a small force on Lookout Mountain, is seen, with the mass of his troops, moving down the eastern slope of the moun- tain, and sweeping across the valley. Sherman moves at the same time on the Confederate right ; and it soon be- gins to be evident that Bragg, believ- ing that the main attack is to be made on his right, is massing his troops on Sherman’s front. A fierce artillery duel at once commenced between Or- chard Knob and Missionary Ridge. Hooker, pressing on towards Rossville Gap, encountered an unexpected obsta- cle at Chattanooga Creek. The bridge had been destroyed by the Confederates as they retired from the valley in the early morning. It was an unfortunate circumstance, necessitating as it did a delay of three hours. As soon as the bridge was completed, the troops were pushed over. Rossville Gap was quickly occupied ; and Hooker, moving Osterhaus along the east side of the ridge, Geary at its base, with the bat- teries, on the west side, and Cruft on the ridge itself, marched northward, driving the enemy before him. The Confederates did not yield without MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN MURFREESBORO’ AND CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE. MI3SI0:N'AEY ridge. 569 offering a stubborn resistance. It was found impossible, however, to with- stand the energy and dash of the Na- tional troops. The skirmishers were speedily driven in and pressed back upon the main body. Cruft, now form- ing his column in battle-line, fell with all his weight on the front line of the enemy, Geary and Osterhaus, on both flanks, opening a murderous fire. The fighting continued till sunset, when the Confederates, having been driven stead- ily backward from one strong position to another, although they resisted nobly, broke and fled in wild confusion. The fugitives who sought safety by running down the eastern slope, fell into the hands of Osterhaus ; those who tried to escape by the western slope, fell into the hands of Geary ; while those who retreated along the ridge ran helplessly into the ranks of Johnson’s division of the Fourteenth corps, and were cap- tured. Shortly after sunset, the victory on the National right was complete. Breckenridge had proved himself no match for Hooker. Let us now see what was going on towards the left and at the centre. On the morning of the 25th, Sherman was in the saddle before it was light. During the night he had strongly en- trenched his position. His order of battle was similar to that of Hooker. General Corse, with three of his own regiments and one of Lightburn’s, moved forward on the crest of the hill; General Morgan L. Smith, with his command, advanced along the eastern base ; while Colonel Loomis, supported by the two reserve brigades of General i John E. Smith, advanced along the western base. The brigades of Cock- erell and Alexander, and a portion of Lightburn’s, remained behind, holding the position first occupied. Almost from the commencement of the forward movement, the advancing columns were exposed to the guns of the enemy. Without experiencing any very great inconvenience, Sherman’s troops de- scended the hill on which they had been drawn up in battle order, crossed the valley in their front, and rushed up the opposite hill, which they seized and held. At this point, it was dis- covered that the ground to be traversed was not so free from obstructions as had been supposed. It was not a con- tinuous ridge, but rather a chain of hills, each well wooded and fortified. This secondary crest, on which Corse had obtained a foothold, was com- manded by a higher hill, and thus exposed to a plunging fire. Between these hills was a deep gorge, through which passed the railroad tunnel, and in which the Confederate commander sheltered his masses until they could be brought into action. Corse called forward his reserves, and asked for re- inforcements. The ridge, however, was narrow; and as the enemy, from his superior position, could bring to bear upon the assaulting columns a destructive, enfilading fire of artillery and musketry, it was not well to crowd the men. A severe hand-to-hand con- test ensued, and continued for more than an hour. The tide of battle ebbed and flowed, victory now leaning to the one side and now to the other. 570 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. It was a desperate grapple, and the loss of life was terrible. No decided progress was being made on either side. Corse found it impossible to carry the works in his front ; the Con- federates were equally unable to drive him from the position he had won. The columns which, under Loomis and Smith, moved along the sides of the ridge, encountering fewer difficulties, were attended with better success. . Smith kept gaining ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, while Loomis on his side got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment. The fire of the one and the other, striking the Confederates on both flanks, and slight- ly in rear of their front, had the effect of withdrawing attention, and thus to a certain extent of relieving the as- saulting party on the crest of the hill. It was now about three o’clock. The battle was raging with tremen- dous fury. Column after column of the enemy came streaming down upon Sherman’s men, gun upon gun pouring upon them its concentrated shot from every hill and spur, as they vainly struggled in the valley and attempted to force their way to the further height. Neither, however, was gaining any ad- vantage. Almost at the crisis of the fight, it seemed to the anxious watch- ers at Chattanooga as if Sherman M^as losing ground. There was, indeed, a backward movement. It had seemed to General J. E. Smith that Colonel Wolcott, who now commanded on the crest — Corse having been wounded early in the day — was sorely pressed, and in ‘ danger of being overpowered. He, therefore, sent to his aid the two re- serve brigades of Runion and Mathias. Having crossed the intervening fields and climbed the hillside, in spite of a most destructive fire of artillery and musketry,^ they effected a junction with Wolcott. The ridge, however, being narrow, they were forced to take posi- tion on the western face of the hill, where, being exposed to attack on right and rear, the enemy, rushing from the tunnel gorge, fell upon them in over- whelming numbers, driving them down the hill and back to the lower end of the field. There they were re-formed ; and the Confederates, who had ventured to pursue, were struck heavily on their flank, and compelled to retire to the shelter of their works on the wooded hills. It was this backward movement of Smith’s brigades which, being seen at Chattanooga, created the impression that a repulse had been sustained by the National left. Sherman has taken some pains to correct this false impression, and informs us that the “real attack- ing columns of General Corse, General Loomis and General Morgan L. Smith, were not repulsed,” but, on the con- trary, held their ground, and struggled “ all day persistently, stubbornly and well.” Long and wearily had Sherman waited for the attack in the centre. An occasional shot from Orchard Knob, and some artillery and musket- ry fire, away in the direction of Look- out, were the only signs of activity in the National ranks on his right. It was not until shortly after three o’clock, that he saw a white line of THE THUNDERBOLT HURLED. 571 smoke in front of Orchard Knob — the line extending further and further to the right. It was evident that some- thing decisive was happening. He had faith in the result ; for he knew that, by his repeated and persistent attacks, he had compelled Bragg to concentrate large masses of his troops on his own right. He had thus weakened the Confederate centre, and created the opportunity for Grant and Thomas. During these hours of sore trial and deep anxiety, Grant’s attention was quite as much directed to the left as was that of Sherman to the centre. Grant’s headquarters, as we have seen, were at Orchard Knob. He had a commanding view of the entire battle- ground. He knew that Bragg was concentrating on his own right, and, determined to penetrate the National left and force his way to Chattanooga, was hurling against Sherman his well- disciplined legions in overwhelming masses. He feared lest his trusted lieutenant, sorely pressed, should be yielding to impatience, because of the continued inaction at the centre. But it was necessary to wait for Hooker, who, as has been stated, had been de- layed three hours in reconstructing the bridge across Chattanooga Creek. It was desirable, at least, that the Con- federate left should be well engaged, as well as the Confederate right, be- fore the decisive blow was dealt at the centre. With any other commander on his left. Grant might have risked too much by leaving him so long, unaided or unrelieved, to struggle against the strong position and the ever-increasing numbers of the enemy. Grant, how- ever, had not forgotten Shiloh. He remembered how, on that day, at the foot t)f the bridge, over Snake Creek, Sherman had stood like a wall of ada- mant, his men massed around him, and presenting to the almost triumphant foe what seemed a huge and solid shield of shining steel, effectually re- sisting, and ultimately turning the tide of battle. What he had done then, he had, on many a battle field since, proved his ability and willingness to do again. Grant was asking much from his lieutenant; but he felt con- vinced that Sherman would not be found wanting. Meanwhile, he had the satisfaction of perceiving that his plan was working admirably. Bragg, completely out-generalled, w^as weak- ening his own centre, and preparing for him his opportunity. It was now half-past three o’clock. Grant was pacing to and fro on Orchard Knob. Concerned for the welfare of Sherman, seeing his oppor- tunity rapidly ripening, and impatient to strike, yet unwilling by premature action to imperil the hoped-for and what seemed now the inevitable re- sult, he kept turning his eyes wistfully in the direction in which Hooker should make his appearance. Still there were no signs of his coming. Hooker, as the reader knows, was suc- cessfully moving along the ridge and driving the enemy before him. But Grant was, as yet, ignorant at once of the cause of his delay, and of the pro- gress he had made. The opportune moment, however, had come. He saw CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. that Bragg had greatly weakened his centre to support his right ; and having faith that Hooker must be close at hand, he gave Thomas the order to advance. The thunderbolt was hurled. The signal guns were fired — one — two three — four — five — six ; and the divi- sions of Wood, Baird, Sheridan and Johnson, long since impatient of delay, advanced with firm and steady step. These were preceded by a double line of skirmishers, drawn mostly from the divisions of Wood and Sheridan. The orders were to carry the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge, and then to re-form and push their way to the summit. The whole movement was conducted with the regularity and precision of clock-work. The skirmishers dashed forward, the main body following within easy supporting distance. Mis- sionary Bidge all at once seems ablaze. On all the forts and batteries the heavy guns open fire ; and, from their hollow mouths they bellow harsh thunder, and vomit forth their missiles of destruction. Full thirty guns are pouring shot and shell into the advanc- ing columns. Nothing, however, can cool the ardor or restrain the impetu- osity of the National soldiers. “Roll- ing on the foe,” on moves this “fiery mass of living valor.” The picture of the poet becomes here a living reality. The brigades of Hazen and Willich are already at the base of the mountain. Like “bees out of a hive,” to use the expressive words of General Grant, the gray-coated Confederates are seen swarming out of the rifle-pits and rush- ing up the hillside. Fired now with the wildest enthusiasm, the brave Na- tionals, scarcely taking time to re-form, push their way up the steep and rug- ged sides of the mountain. They are fully exposed now to a terrific fire from the enemy’s guns, on the heights above them. Shell, canister, shrapnel, bullets are falling upon them with deadly ef- fect. Nothing daunted, however, on they press ; and, from Orchard Knob, the National colors are seen fluttering higher and still higher, and gradually nearing the summit. Order now be- gins to disappear. The brigades, partly because of the nature of the ground, and partly because of the severity of the fire, break up into groups. There is, however, neither lack of purpose, nor lack of enthusiasm. Every group has its flag, and, in wedge-like foi'm, each eager to be first and emulous of the other, is seen pressing onward and upward. It seems as if the color-bearers are running a race. To plant the flrst color on the summit appears to be the ambition of every brigade, of every group, of every soldier. Now they are clambering over the rugged ledges, now they are seeking momentary shelter in the ravines or behind the overhang- ing rocks ; but they are ever, in spite of the heavy guns and the murderous volleys of musketry from the rifle-pits, nearing the summit. Meanwhile, the work of destruction had been terrible. The color-bearers had suffered fearfully. The first to reach the summit was a group of men from the First Ohio, and a few others from other regiments, under the lead of Lieutenant-Colonel Langdon. Six CAPTURE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN. VICTORY. 573 color-bearers of this party had fallen, when Langdon, waving forward his men, and leaping over the crest, was instantly shot down. The breach, how- ever, had been made ; and the brigades of Hazen and Willich were soon on the summit. These were quickly fol- lowed by the brigades of Sheridan’s di- vision — Sheridan himself taking an ac- tive part, and specially commanding the attention of General Grant. The National advance was within a few hundred yards of Bragg’s headquar- ters. There were still desperate hand- to-hand struggles after the Nationals had reached the summit. But, as the shouting victors came pouring into the works, bayoneting the cannoneers at their guns, the bold and resolute front gave way. It was now sunset. The Confederates were in full retreat, their own guns turned upon them by the triumphant Nationals. It was only with difficulty that Bragg was able to make good his escape, along with Breckenridge, who by this time had joined him. Missionary Ridge was now occupied and held by the National troops. Hooker, as we have seen, had been victorious on the right ; Sherman had held his ground, and, after a gal- lant and protracted struggle, against su- perior numbers, had driven the enemy from his front ; and now the brave and well-trusted soldiers of the army of the Cumberland had pierced and routed the Confederate centre. The battle of Chattanooga had been fought and won. It was another great victory for Gen- eral Grant. Bragg was one of the most trusted leaders in the Confed- erate army, and a special favorite of Jefferson Davis. He was defeated not I by superior numbers, not by superior bravery, but by superior tactics. He was defeated, because he was out-gen- eralled. He committed his first mis- take when he detached Longstreet, with his command, and sent him to operate against Burnside, at Knox- ville. He committed his second mis- take when he weakened his centre, and moved his troops to the right to ope- rate against Shei-man. Both were se- rious blunders. It is surprising how a general of Bragg’s experience could have committed the one or the other, in the presence of such a commander as Grant. The first blunder encour- aged immediate action, concentration, and aggressive effort against Missionary Ridge. The second blunder provoked the attack on the Confederate centre, wffiich decided the battle. In the glory resulting from the victory, Sher- man and Hooker and Thomas were fully entitled to share. Each had ac- complished the task assigned him, nobly and with complete success. It was a victory of which the whole army, from the general in command down to the humblest of the rank and file, had reason to be proud. “ Im- partial history,” says Coppee, whose description of Chattanooga sometimes rises to the grandeur of an epic, “ will be just to all the acts and the actors, but above them all will shine, in golden characters, the name of the great commander, who, upon the heels of one great conquest, transformed a beleaguered army of starving soldiers 574 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. into fiery columns of attack, and snatched an immortal victory out of the jaws of disaster and anticipated ruin. That man was Grant.’' The modesty of the man — the utter absence of vain-glory — is strikingly revealed in the despatch which he sent to General Halleck immediately after the battle. “Although the battle lasted,” he says, “from early dawn till dark this even- ing, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout Mountain top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga Valley, and Missionary Bidge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us.” The final struggle of the day was in the neighborhood of the tunnel on Thomas’ left and in Sherman’s front. At that point the Confederates made a most obstinate resistance. This resist- ance, and the darkness which intervened, prevented an immediate pursuit. Dur- ing the night. Missionary Ridge blazed with Union camp fires, the Confede- rates having fallen back in the direction of Ringgold, by way of Chickamauga Station. Bragg left behind him some 600 prisoners, besides a large number of stragglers, 40 guns, upwards of 7000 small arms, and a large quantity of ammunition. Next morning Sherman, Palmer and Hooker were in eager pursuit. 26. Sherman pushed on towards Greysville, passing Chickamauga Sta- tion, where he found everything in flames. Palmer and Hooker advanced by the Rossville road, intending to strike the railroad between Greysville and Ringgold. At the latter place. Hooker came into contact with the Con- federate rear, under Cleburne, who was covering Bragg’s retreat. A severe encounter took place, Cleburne turning and offering a most stubborn resistance. The battle lasted the greater part oi the day, both sides suffering severely. Cleburne did not retreat until he had inflicted on the Nationals a loss of 432 men, of whom 65 were killed, some of them being most valuable officers. The Confederates left on the field 130 in killed and wounded. The pursuit was now discontinued, as Grant felt it to be his first and most important duty to relieve Burnside, who was at that time closely besieged in Knoxville by the Confederate forces, under Longstreet. Bragg’s army continued the retreat to Dalton, where it established a fortified camp. The Nationals fell back towards Chattanooga ; and the campaign against Bragg ended. The immediate result of the victory at Chattanooga was the relief of Knox- ville. With a brief account of the operations which took place in that direction, we shall close this chapter. Burnside, it will be remembered, after having been relieved of the com- mand of the army of the Potomac, was assigned, on the 26th of March, to the command of the department of the Ohio. His headquarters were at Cincinnati ; and his army, about 20,000 strong, was at Camp Nelson, near Richmond, Ken- tuck}^ When Rosecranz commenced his onward movement towards Chatta- nooga, Burnside, who had been ordered to co-operate with him, and to effect a junction between his own right and KNOXVILLE. 575 the left of Rosecranz, commenced, on the 16th of August, his march for East Tennessee. That district of country was then held by the Confederate general, Buckner, whose headquarters were at Knoxville. Burnside, more intent on restoring the authority of the National government in East Tennessee, moved in the direction of Knoxville. We have already shown how Buckner re- tired at his approach, and with what enthusiasm Burnside and the National troops were received in that town. Burnside remained in Knoxville, al- though repeatedly ordered to rein- force Rosecranz, believing it to be all-important that the place should be permanently occupied by National troops. Early in November, as we have seen, Bragg detached Longstreet, with 12,000 men, and a heavy body of cav- alry, with instructions to move against Burnside. Longstreet’s march was less rapid, and, in consequence, less successful than it might have been. His troops were in wretched condition ; and reinforcements and supplies did not arrive as he expected. It was not until the 14th of the month that he was able to cross the Tennessee at Hough’s Ferry, six miles below Lou- don. Burnside’s advance, which was at Loudon, fell back as far as Camp- bell’s Station, where, on the 16th, they turned upon their pursuers. A severe encounter took place, Burnside holding his own against superior numbers. Ul- timately, however, he was compelled to PfoT. fall back within the defenses at 17, 18. Knoxville ; and, on the 17th and 18th, he was surrounded by Long- street. Attempts were made to storm the beleaguered town; but Burnside being vigilant, and having made excel- lent arrangements for defense, these attempts failed. Longstreet, already fearing that Bragg might not be able to cope successfully with his skilful adversary, and knowing that in the event of a Confederate defeat at Chat- tanooga, Grant would hasten to the aid of Burnside, pressed forward the siege with the utmost vigor. On the ]Vov, 25th, he threw a considerable 25. force across the Holston. His object was to seize the heights which com- mand Knoxville from the south side of the river. Vigorously opposed by the National forces, he was not quite successful. He was unable to seize the desired position; but he obtained possession of a knob a little lower down, from which, at an elevation of one hundred and fifty feet above the level of the river, he had complete command of Fort Sanders, some five hundred yards to the north. This advantage had just been gained, to the immense delight of the Con- federates, when information reached Longstreet of the defeat of Bragg at Chattanooga. It had been Longstreet’s hope that, if he could not take the place by assault, he would reduce it by famine. Relief was now at hand. Famine was out of the question. If Knoxville was to be taken, it must be taken by storm. Preparations for a final effort were accordingly hurried forward. The point chosen for attack was Fort Sanders, on the northwest 576 CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA. angle of the fortifications, and com- manding an approach by the river. It was a work of great strength, the ditch being ten feet deep, and the parapet of more than ordinary height. Around and in front of it, several acres of thick pine timber had been slashed ; and a perfect entanglement of wire-work had been formed by con- necting stump with stump. There were, besides, numerous rifie-pits and abatis. The fort was occupied by the Seventy-Ninth New York; the Twenty- Ninth Massachusetts; two companies of the Second and one of the Twentieth Michigan. The armament consisted of four 20-pounder Parrott guns. Lieu- tenant Benjamin, Burnside’s chief of artillery; four light 12-pounders, com- manded by Buckley; and two 3-inch guns. The assaulting party was com- posed of three brigades of McLaws’ division, with those of Wolford, Hum- phreys, Anderson and Bogart. They were picked men, the fiower of Long- street’s army. In the gray of the morning of the ]^ov. 29th, the assault was made, with 29* a vigor and determination not surpassed in the previous history of the war. What with the fierce yells of the Confederates, the rattle of mus- ketry, the screaming of shells, the thunder of artillery, the tumult for a time was awful. The Confederates, as they approached, were received with a deadly fire from the batteries of the fort. Nothing daunted, however, by the destructive missiles which flew thick and fast around them, or by the sight of their fallen comrades, on they pressed, through the abatis^ across the ditch and up the parapet, some of them forcing their way through the embra- sures. The obstacles encountered, the wire net-work particularly, made their progress slow, and consequently kept them long exposed to the double-shot- ted guns which Ferrero, the commander of the fort, kept in active play. When the assailants reached the parapet, their ranks were greatly thinned, but their spirits were not subdued. One oflScer actually reached the summit, and, plant- ing upon it the flag of the Thirteenth Mississippi, called for surrender. It was a vain call ; for the next moment his body, piei*ced by a dozen bullets, the flag still in his hand, was rolling into the ditch. Hand grenades were freely used by the defenders ; and they had a terrible effect. The as- sault, gallant as it was, proved a com- plete failure. It was tried a second time by another column ; but the re- sult was the same. The fighting was discontinued. A truce was granted to the Confederates to carry away their wounded and to bury their dead. Longstreet, still hoping against hope, and unwilling to retire, maintained the siege.* Meanwhile, relief was coming from Grant to Burnside. Why was this re- * The ground in front of the fort was strewn with the dead and wounded. In the ditch alone, were over 200 dead and wounded. ‘*In this terrible ditch,' says Pollard, “the dead were piled eight or ten feet deep. In comparatively an instant of time, we lost 700 men in killed and wounded and prisoners. Never, excepting at Gettysburg, was there, in the history of the war, a disaster adorned with the glory of such devout courage, as Longstreet's repulse at Knoxville. ' — Third Year of the TFar, p. 1G3. THE SIEGE RAISED. 577 lief so long delayed ? On the evening of the 25th, as soon as success at Chat- tanooga had been assured, Grant had ordered General Gordon Granger to start for the relief of Knoxville, with his own Fourth corps, and detachments from others — 20,000 in all. Granger was to move with four days’ rations, ar- rangements having been made to send after him a steamer with supplies. When Grant returned from the front on the 28th he found, much to his aston- ishment, that Granger had not yet got off, and that he was preparing to move “with reluctance and complaints.” Grant fell back upon Sherman, who was ever willing and ever ready. “ I am inclined to think,” said Grant, in a letter to Sherman, “I shall have to send you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee.” When he received the letter from Grant, Sherman was at Calhoun, at the railroad cross- ing of the Hiawassee. If he had been less of a soldier, he might easily have found cause of complaint. It was only seven days since he had marched his troops from the west side of the Ten- nessee, with only two days’ rations, without change of clothing, with but a single blanket- or coat to a man, from himself to the private soldier. What provisions they had were picked up by the way. Murmur or complaint, how- ever, with Sherman, there was none. To hear was to obey. It was enough for him that 12,000 of his fellow-sol- diers were beleaguered at Knoxville, eighty-four miles away, and that, if not relieved within three days, they might be at the mercy of the enemy. With his hardy and untiring veterans, Sher- man was quickly on his way. The roads were bad; and, as the pontoon bridge at Loudon had been destroyed, there was unexpected difficulty and consequent delay. After considerable progress had been made, the troops were compelled to turn to the east, and to trust to General Burnside’s bridge at Knoxville. A bridge was flung across the Little Tennessee, at Morgan- town ; and by daybreak on the Dec# 5th of December, the entire Fif- teenth corps was over. Meanwhile the cavalry command, which had moved forward in advance, had reached Knox- ville on the 3d of December, the very day on which Burnside expected his supplies would give out. On the night of the 5th, a messenger from Burnside arrived at Sherman’s headquarters, an- nouncing that Longstreet was in full retreat towards Virginia, and that the National cavalry were in pursuit. As soon as Sherman’s cavalry appeared, Longstreet, discovering that his flank was turned, raised the siege, and re- treated towards K-ussellville in the di- rection of Virginia. The National cavalry followed for some distance in close pursuit. Thus ended the siege of Knoxville. Burnside had offered a noble resist- ance, and had retrieved some of the laurels lost at Fredericksburg. He was not without obligations to Sher- man; nor was he ungrateful. In a letter to that general, he fully acknowl- edged those obligations, and thanked both him and his command for so 078 CHICKAMAUGA AXD CHATTANOOGA. promptly coming to bis relief. “ I am satisfied,” he said, “that your approach served to raise the siege.” Sherman, too, had great reason to be proud of himself and his command. They had been constantly in motion since they le t the Big Black in Mississippi. For long periods they had been without regular rations; and the men had marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a mur- mur and without a moment’s delay. After a march of over 400 miles, with- out sleep for three successive nights, they crossed the Tennessee, fought their part in the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than 120 miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville. After the siege was raised, Sherman, with consent of Burnside, leaving only Gran- ger’s command, fell back to the line of the Hiawassee. The victories at Chattanooga and Knoxville produced very different states of feeling in the North and the South. There was great indig- Foet Sanders. — This place was named after Briga- dier-General William P. Sanders, who received his death- wound while gallantly resisting the attack made on the 18th of November. Sanders was a native of Kentucky, and a graduate of West Point. He had al- ready made himself conspicuous by l.is deeds of daring, and had secured the confidence both of his superior officers and of the rank and file ; but, by his gallantry during the famous and, to him, fatal encounter on the ISth, he won for himself imperishable renown. In his General Field Orders No. 31, and bearing date Novem- ber 24th, Burnside says: “In memory of the honored dead, the fort in front of which he received his fatal wound will be known hereafter as Fort Sanders.” The nation among the Confederates; and Bragg, at his own request, was relieved of his command. In the North, joy beamed on every countenance, and gratitude welled up and oveiflowed from every heart. At the recommen- dation of the president, the people assembled in their places of worship and rendered thanks to Almighty God “for His great adv^ancement of the National cause.” Honors flowed in upon Grant. He received a letter of congratulation from the president. Congress, on the 17th of Decern- pec, ber, voted him thanks, also a H. gold medal, which was to be struck “ with suitable emblems, devices and inscriptions.” In doing him honor, town vied with town, city with city. State with State, over the length and breadth of the Union. He had be- come ti e National hero. The Confederates never recovered from the blow received at Chattanooga. The tide continued to rise and swell and roll against them. It wms evident now to all thinking men that the end was i*apid]y approaching. final struggle, for the possession of this work, on the 29th, although comparatively on a small scale, was, as has been shown in the text, one of the fiercest in the whole history of the war. The highest valor was dis- played on both sides. If victory on that day carried with it glorj’, defeat was attended with no dishonor. The National troops, one and all, behaved nobly, and won special commendations from their chief ; but it is no disparagement to the other troops engaged, to say that the heroic defen.so of Fort Sanders added fresh laurels to the gallant Seventy-Ninth New York High- landers, who had already won distinction at Bull Run, at Port Royal Ferry, at James’ Island and at Chantilly, where the brave Stevens, nobly fighting, fell. SECESSIONVILLE. 579 CHAPTER XXIX. Operations in 1862. T. W. Sherman and Dupont. — James’ Island. — Secession ville. — Colonel Lamar.— General Stevens. — The Gallant Seventy-Ninth. — Pocotaligo. — Battle of Secessionville. — Great Bravery of the High- landers and the Michiganers. — General Mitchell in Command of the Department of the South. — Mitchell- Yille. — Death of Mitchell. — General Brannan and Mitchell’s Plans. — General Hunter in Command. — Fort Mc- Allister.— Three Attempts. — Destruction of the Nashville. — A Terrific Fire. — The Fort Invulnerable. — The At- tempt Abandoned. — The Case of the Princess Royal. — The Confederate Fleet. — The Mercedita and Keystone State Badly Damaged. — Proclamation of Beauregard and Ingraham.— Judah P. Benjamin. — The Confederate Claim. — The National Government Aroused. — Misunderstanding Between Hunter and Foster. — Preparations for the Attack on Charleston. — The Fortifications. — Their Number and Strength. —Impregnable. — The Na- tional Fleet. — Advance of the Fleet. — An Ominous Silence. — Thunders of Artillery. — The Wissahickon. — The New Ironsides. — The Keokuk. — The Montauk and Catskill. — “The Wars of the Titans.” — The Fleet Overmatched. — The Keokuk Destroyed. — The Retreat. — Hunter Blamed. — “ I Could do Nothing but Pray for You.” — Bravery of Dupont. — Fort Sumter the Great Obstacle. — “It Must be got out of the Way.” — Quincy A. Gillmore. — The Atlanta. — Great Hopes. —Dupont Prepared for Her Approach. —Great Expectations of the Confederates. — The Weehawken. — Captain Rodgers. — The Atlanta a Prisoner. — Gillmore ’s Plans. — Dahlgren Succeeds Dupont. — Movements on Land and Water. — Higginson and Terry. — Fort Wagner Attacked.— Na- tional Batteries on Folly Island. — Dahlgren’s Monitors. — The Confederates Driven From Morris’ Island. — Assault on Fort Wagner. — In Vain. — Not to be Taken but by Regular Approaches. — Work Resumed. — Another Assault. — Another Failure. — The Jaws of Death. — The Beach Covered with the Dead and Dying. — Parallels. — Closer and Closer. — Gillmore’s Preparations Completed. — Twelve Batteries. — Twenty-Eight Heavy Guns and Twelve Mortars. — An Artillery Duel. — Fort Sumter Demolished. — The Fourth Parallel.— Calcium Lights. — Preparations for the Final Assault on Fort Wagner. — Forts Wagner and Gregg Abandoned. — Fearful Expenditure of Shot and Shell. — Attempt to Occupy Fort Sumter. — A Disastrous Enterprise. — Two Hundred Men Killed, Wounded or Captured. —Operations Discontinued. — The Position Held.— Not a Victory, but a Gain. — The Blockade Made Secure. In previous chapters of this work, 1862 described at some length the more important naval and coast operations which were conducted in 1861, and in the earlier months of 1862, special attention being given to the expedition under Butler and Far- ragut, to that under T. W. Sherman and Dupont, and to that under Burnside and Goldsborough. Success more or less brilliant attended them all ; and, as early as the 12th of April, 1862, the first anniversary of the attack on Fort Sumter, the entire Atlantic and Gulf coasts, from Cape Hattei»as to Perdido Bay, excepting only the harbor of Charleston and its immediate surround- ings, had been abandoned by the Con- federates. Along that whole line, the National power was supreme. Early in 1862, Hunter had succeeded T. W. Sherman in command of the department of the South. Hunter was bent on doing something which might pave the way to the reduction of Charleston. It would have been vain for Dupont, with the fleet at his com- mand, to make any direct attempt to pass the forts. It was deemed advisable, however, to take possession of Wad- melaw Island, also John’s and James’ Islands, and to advance on Charleston 580 CHARLESTON HARBOR. May by land. On the 20th of May, 20* the gunboats Unadilla, Pembina and Ottawa crossed the bar at the mouth of the Stono Kiver, and proceed- ed up that stream as far as its junction with W appoo Creek, only a few miles from Charleston. This expedition might have been attended with some success if the gunboats had been supported by land troops. It was nearly a fortnight, however, after the gunboats had reached Wappoo, when a portion of the troops, commanded by General Benham, ac- companied by General Hunter himself, landed on James’ Island. It was a week later when General Wright ar- rived with the remainder. Simulta- neously with these movements, General Stevens made a successful raid in the direction of Pocotaligo, destroying sev- eral miles of the Charleston and Savan- nah Bailroad. The appearance of the gunboats at Wappoo, without a supporting land force, was a benefit rather than an in- convenience to the Confederates. It served to warn them of the intention of the National commander. They were already in a strong position at Secessionville, a delightful little village, about two miles from the Stono, almost surounded by water, and accessible by land only on its western side. At this place, the Confederates, under Colonel J. G. Lamar, taking advantage of the time afforded them by the non-arrival of the land forces, constructed a for- midable battery. Benham, as soon as he got his troops in order, resolved to carry the battery by assault. It was now June; and the morning of the 11th was fixed for the attack. Lamar, however, commenced offensive opera- tions the evening before. Some skirm- ishing followed; and the meditated attack was postponed. After having made a vain attempt to silence the Con- federate guns by a battery which he hurriedly constructed, Benham fell back on his original plan of assault. By this time Stevens had returned, with his troops, from Pocotaligo. On the morning of the 16th, Stevens, June with about 3000 men, supported by General Wright, with about the same number, advanced to the attack. The Eighth Michigan led the way, fol- lowed close by the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders. It was a perilous movement. The Confederate battery could only be reached by pressing along a narrow strip of land. The Confederate pickets were easily cap- tured ; and it was hoped that the garrison, also, might be surprised and made prisoners. Lamar, however, was watchful and well prepared. As soon as the National troops began to press along the narrow strip of land which led to the battery, he opened upon them a murderous fire of grape and canister from six masked guns. The brave Michigan men and the undaunted Highlanders essayed to advance; but, in addition to this pitiless stoi*m of de- structive missiles in their front, they found themselves exposed to a severe musketry fire on their right fiank. Progress was impossible. General Wright’s troops came up; and, in the struggle which ensued, they took an active part It was soon discovered. THE HIGHLANDERS. 581 however, that the works were too strong to be taken by assault, and that to prolong the struggle was only to make a useless sacrifice of human life. The Nationals, therefore, fell back, having lost in the brief encounter about 600 men. Such was the battle of Secession ville.* Soon afterwards James’ Island was abandoned by the * In no battle during the whole war was greater bravery displayed than was witnessed that morning at Secessionville. A graphic picture of the affair was given at the time by a correspondent of the New York Herald. It was the 16th of June, and about half-past two o’clock in the morning, when General Stevens moved to the attack. When about four hundred yards from the fort, the Confederate guns, as has been men- tioned in the text, opened a tremendous fire. The at- tacking column was terribly cut up, the Eighth Michi- gan suffering most severely. Nothing daunted, what remained of the Eighth Michigan, the Seventy-Ninth New York Highlanders, the One Hundreth Pennsylva- nia, the Twenty-Eighth Massachusetts, with portions of the Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Sixth New York, pressed forward. Captains Ely and Doyle, and Lieuten- ant-Colonel Morrison, mounting the parapet of the work. ‘ ‘ Here, ” says the Herald correspondent, ‘ ‘ lasted for a few moments the most exciting scene my pen has ever attempted to describe. When the Highlanders heard of the terrible slaughter of the Eighth Michigan, with whom they had for many months been brigaded, they could not be restrained, but advanced with the utmost promptness to the support of their old com- rades. Colonel Morrison, whose horse was shot early in the action, led up his men on foot, shouting, ‘ Come on, Highlanders ! ’ and with Lieutenant Lyons, of Gen- eral Stevens’ staff, was the first to scale the walls and mount the parapet of the fort. Both were wounded — Colonel Morrison in the head, the bullet entering at the temple and coming out behind the right ear, and Lieutenant Lyons severely in the arm. Captain Doyle was severely wounded ; and Captains Guild, Pratt and Church were killed. It was while endeavoring to scale these works that Captain Hitchcock, of the Seventh Connecticut, was shot down. Nevertheless, the men went up, walking unflinchingly into the jaws of death. But very few escaped, and those only with garments riddled with balls. Colonel Morrison, even after he was wounded, discharged the entire contents of his revol- ver at the force within, and had the satisfaction of kill- ing one rebel as he was endeavoring to screen himself in one of the numerous ‘ rat-holes, ’ with which the in- terior of the work abounded. ” Nationals ; and, for a period, no further efforts were made against Charleston. In the fall of 1862, General O. M. Mitchell, who had been called to Wash- ington City from Tennessee, took com- mand of the department of the South, thus superseding Hunter. On the 16th of September he reached Hilton Head, and established his headquarters in the house occupied by his predeces- sor. The place was swarming with negroes who had escaped from their owners; and Mitchell, with his usual vigor, at once took measures to make the disorganized, idle crowd more com- fortable and more useful. The little town of Mitchellville soon gave evi- dence of the taste and humanity as well as the energy of the new com- mander. Mitchell was actively pre- paring for a decisive campaign against Charleston, when he was cut short in his work by an attack of yellow fever. He was removed to the more healthful locality of Beaufort; but he died on the 30th of October, having been in his new command only some six weeks. Late in October, an attempt was made, under the direction of General Brannan, to carry out one of Mitchell’s plans. Brannan set out with an effec- tive force of about 4500 men. His final objective was Charleston. His immediate purpose was to reach Poco- taligo, and at that place destroy the Charleston and Savannah Bailroad. Embarking at 'Hilton Head on gun- boats and transports, he proceeded up the Broad River to the Coosawhatchie,. and pushed on to Pocotaligo with biit- little difficulty. There he encountered 2GG 582 CHAr^LESTOX HARBOIl. the Confederate pickets ; and, although he managed to drive them before him, lie was unable to prevent them from burning the bridges in their rear, and thus interposing serious obstacles to his further advance. A heavy fire having h;een opened upon him by General W. 1 ]. Walker’s artillery, which was sup- ])orted by a powerful infantry force, Brannan, taking counsel from prudence, fell back to Mackay’s Landing, where he re-embarked for Hilton Head. This c xpedition, which proved utterly fruit- less, cost the Nationals at least 300 men. On the death of Mitchell, Hunter resumed command of the department of the South. Charleston Harbor was still the great object of attention. Its continued and successful resistance to the National forces was a fruitful source of annoyance to the authorities at Wash- ington. It was one of the original cradles of the rebellion ; its precipitate action had plunged the nation into all the calamities of the Civil War; and, so long as it remained an integral part of the Confederacy, it involved the neutralization of an army of 30,000 men. It was of the utmost importance that the forts in the harbor should be reduced, and the National authority restored in the city and neighborhood. It was not until the spring of 1S63, that any vigorous operations were made in the direction of Charles- ton. Several attempts, however, were made early, in the year, to reduce Fort McAllister. This was a strong work, which 'was constructed at Genesis Point, on the Great Ogeechee River ; i and, under its cover lay the steamer Nashville, which was waiting to run the blockade and play the part of a privateer. On the morning of jan, the 27th of January, in obe- 27 . dience to instructions from Admiral Dupont, Commander Worden, of Hamp- - ton Roads renown, pushed up the riv^er with the monitor Montauk, supported by several small gunboats, and a mortar schooner, and opened fire upon the fort. The work was found to be stronor be- o yond expectation. It was a casemated earth-work, with bomb proofs, and mounting nine guns. Owing to obstruc- tions in the river, the Montauk was un- able to advance within effective range. The sruns of the fort were well handled. The Montauk was struck thirteen times, but received no injury. Having ex- pended her shells, she retired. A second attempt was made by Worden on the 1st of February. On this occasion, the Montauk engaged b the fort at the distance of 1400 yards. Her well-directed fire did some damage to the parapets of the fort. She was herself struck some sixty-one times, without being materially injured, On the 27th of February a third 27 . attempt was made, and was attended with more success. A reconnoissance having been made, it was discovered that the Nashville was grounded a short distance above the fort; and Worden, with the Montauk, followed by the Seneca, Wissahickon and Dawn, moved up the river as far as the ob- structions would permit, and opened fire upon the Nashville. His 12 and 15-inch shells fell with destructive FORT McAllister. 583 effect upon the doomed ship; and in less than twenty minntes she was in flames. One by one her heavy guns exploded with the heat ; her magazine blew up; and in less than an hour, the dreaded privateer was almost invisible. The Montauk was struck five times by the heavy shot from the fort, and when beyond the range of the guns a torpedo exploded under her; but she sustained compara- tively little injury. In this effort, 3Iar, Worden did not lose a man. On the 3d of March, another and even more formidable attempt was made against the fort. Dupont was greatly encouraged by the success which bad attended Worden; and, as his fleet had been reinforced by the arrival of additional iron-clads, he resolved to subject their mechanical appliances to the full test of active service before entering upon more im- portant operations. The expedition, v/hich consisted of four monitors and Several mortar schooners, was placed under the direction of Commander Drayton. The Passaic led the way, with Drayton on board, being closely followed by the Patapsco, Commander Ammen, and by the Nahant, Com- mander Downes. By means of skil- ful pilotage, the Passaic was brought u]> to within 1000 yards of the fort. It was not found possible to bring the other boats so near. The firing com- menced shortly after eight o’clock, and was continued all day and during the night of the 3d. About 250 shot and shell were thrown into the fort ; and the fire of the fort fell heavily on the Passaic, the other vessels being some- what out of easy range. But little im- pression, however, was made on either side. Drayton was making but little impression on Fort McAllister ; and the shot from the fort was rattling harmlessly on the turret and iron-bound sides of the Passaic. On the second day the attack was abandoned. The Pas- saic bore away with her some traces of the struggle. Where she was struck by the bullets of the fort, there were some deep indentations, and some of the bolts had been started by the vio- lence of the concussion. It was Dray- ton’s opinion that the fort could not be made untenable by any number of iron- clads, because the shallow water and narrow space would not permit them to be brought into position against it. There were other operations con- nected with the blockade of the Southern ports, some of which were of greater, some of lesser importance. On the 29tli of January, an En- jan, glish blockade-runner, the Prin- 29. cess Boyal, attempted to run into Charleston Harbor. She had come from Bermuda with a valuable cargo, having on board two marine engines, several rifled guns, and large quantities of arms, munitions and medicines. She fell an easy prey to the blockading fleet. The loss of this vessel was a severe blow to the Confederates. It greatly enraged them ; and efforts were at once made for its recapture. On the morning of the 31st, the jan, rams. Palmetto State, Lieuten- 31. ant Rutledge, and Chicora, Commander Tucker, ran out from Cliirleston by 584 CHARLESTON HARBOR. the mam ship -channel, and under a thick haze, surprised the blockading fleet. That fleet then consisted of the steamers Housatonic, Mercedita, Ottawa, Unadilla, Keystone State, Quaker City, Memphis, Augusta, Stet- tin and Flag. The Mercedita was the first to suffer. The Palmetto State ran into her with great force, at the moment of contact, sending into her a 7-inch shell, which made a hole in her side from four to five feet square, and penetrated her steam-di’um. Most of those on board were scalded by the steam, and several were killed outright. The officers and crew of the Mercedita had no choice but surrender. The Palmetto State then rushed upon the Keystone State, which was at the same time attacked by the Chicora. The Keystone State made a vigorous resistance ; but when in the act of bear- ing down upon the nearest ram, with the intention of striking and at the same moment opening a plunging fire, she was hit by a heavy shot, which passed through her steam-chest. Neither the Mercedita nor the Keystone State was lost to the Union. The former, un- aided, succeeded in making her way to Port Royal ; the latter was taken in tow by the Memphis, and moved to the same place in a very crippled condition. It was at this time that a joint proclamation was issued by General Beauregard, then in charge of Charles- ton, and Flag-Officer Ingraham, then commanding the naval forces of South Carolina, declaring the blockade of Charleston ’ “ to be raised by a supe- rior force of the Confederate States.” Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, at the same time issued a circular to the foreign consule in the Confederacy, reiterating the claim of Beauregard and Ingraham “This,” added Benjamin, “is for the information of such vessels of youi nation, as may choo.se to carry on commerce with the now open porl of Charleston.” Such a claim, made at such a time, had a poweiful effect in i-ousing uj) the government at Washington. Gen- eral Hunter and Admiral Dupont re- ceived instructions to make an attack on Charleston without further delay; and General Foster, with the greater portion of the Eighteenth corps, was ordered from North Carolina to the assistance of the naval comm inder. Halleck had, unfortunately, neglected to write to Hunter, informing him of the instructions which he had given to Foster; and the result was that when Foster arrived. Hunter regarded him as an intruder. Foster, at his own re- quest, was ultimately allowed to return to his department, his troops remain- ing as reinforcements to Hunter. While these events w^ere occurring, Dupont was making vigorous pi*eparations for the attack. It was now Sunday, the 5th day of April. On the night of that April day, under the light of a full moon, the National fleet, consisting of fourteen vessels, anchored off Charles- ton bar. There were seven Ericsson monitors, another iron-clad, called the Keokuk, constructed on a new priu' 585 THE FORTS IH ciple, and tlie frigate Ironsides. Du- pont was on board the James Adger. The National fleet had 32 guns in all. Such a fleet, as the result proved, was totally inadequate to the task which it was called upon to perform. Charleston Harbor was fortified almost to perfection. It was well fortified at the commencement of the war, as the reader has already learned ; but it had now been long under the special care of General Beauregard, and his genius had made it, if not absolutely impreg- nable, at least proof against any attack which could be made against it by the National forces. The forts which guarded the harbor were numerous and strong. There was one on the outward extremity of Sullivan’s Island and guarding Mafiit’s Channel. There was another strong sand battery on the same island, near the Moultrie House, called Fort Beauregard. A little further to the westward was Fort Moultrie; and still on Sullivan’s Island, but yet more to the west, was a strong earth-work, called Battery Bee. On the mainland, at Mount Pleasant, was another strong battery; and in front of Charleston, about a mile from the city, was old Castle Pinckney. In the channel, be- tween Sullivan’s and Morris’ Islands, stood Fort Sumter, the most formid- able of all the works. On the southern side of the harbor, and near the city, was the Wappoo battery, on James’ Island, commanding the mouth of the Ashley Biver. To the right of this, and on the same island, was Fort John- son', and about half way between the THE HARBOR. last-named fort and. Castle Pinckney, on a submerged sand bank, which was called the “Middle Ground,” stood Fort Ripley. In addition to these, there were Battery Gregg, on Morris’ Island, at what is called Cummings’ Point; Fort Wagner, about a mile to the south, and another powerful bat- tery at Lighthouse Inlet. The forts mounted, in all, some 300 guns. The channels, too, were blocked with heavy chains made of railroad iron; a rope, buoyed up by empty casks, extended from Fort Ripley to Fort Sumter; and the entire waters were filled with tor- pedoes. Such were the contrivances which barred the entrance to Charles- ton Harbor in the spring of 1863. That the harbor was well guarded, Dupont was well aware; but of the nature and extent of the works he had no exact knowledge. On the morning of the 7th of April, the April fleet, well brought together, lay 7# within the bar in the main channel. It was noon on that day, before the signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, Captain John Rodgers, led the way. The other monitors fol- lowed in the order here given : Passaic, Captain Percival Drayton ; Montauk, Commander John L. Worden; Pataps- co. Commander Daniel Ammen ; New Ironsides, Commander Thomas Turner; Catskill, Commander G. W. Rodgers; Nantucket, Commander Donald M. Fairfax; Nahant, Commander John Downes; Keokuk, Lieutenant- Com- mander A. C. Rhind. The gunboats were the Canandaigua, Captain J. H. Green; Housatonic, Captain W. R. Tay- 586 CHARLESTON HARBOR. lor; Unadilla, Lieutenaiit-Comraander S. P. Quackenbush ; Wissahickon, Lieu- tenant-Commander J. G. Davis ; Huron, Lieutenant-Commander G. A. Stevens. It was Dupont’s intention to disregard the batteries on Morris’ Island, to at- tack the northwest face of Fort Sumter, and to force his way up to the city. He was as yet ignorant of the great hawser, and its dreadful appendages, which lay in the path he had pre- scribed. The Weehawken had a raft- like contrivance attached to her bows, for the purpose of removing obstruc- tions and exploding torpedoes. Scarce- ly had the vessels commenced to move, when the Weehawken, hindered in her movements by the raft at her bow, was brought to a standstill. The other vessels were obstructed by the Wee- hawken ; and nearly an hour elapsed before they were all again under way. As they steered towards the entrance of the inner harbor, an ominous silence prevailed, not a shot being fired either from the forts or from the fleet. At about fifty minutes past two, just as the leading vessel was becoming entangled in the horrid net-work of obstructions, the silence was broken ; and Fort Moultrie began to thunder. A few moments afterw’ards the batteries on Sullivan’s Island, Morris’ Island and Fort Sumter also opened Are. The Weehawken, in the midst of the ob- structions, could not advance ; and to remain under this concentric fire would be fatal. Hodgers, therefore, withdrew his vessel ; and, followed by the others, he attempted to pass by Fort Sumter, on the southern side. He soon found his way blocked by the rows of piles which extended be- tween the fort and Cummings’ Point. At this stage the New Ironsides, in attempting to turn, was caught in the tide-way, and refused to obey her rud- der. The Catskill and Nantucket, who were in her wake, fell foul of her; and, for some fifteen minutes, they re- mained in this helpless condition, ex- posed to the enemy’s fire. Dupont, before he commenced the action, had transferred his headquarters from the James Adger to the New Ironsides. Finding himself thus en- tangled, and compelled to come to anchor, he signalled to the other ves- sels to disregard the flag-ship, and take such positions as might seem best suited for effective work. This was done at once ; and, shortly before four o’clock, the remaining eight vessels were ranged on the northeast of Fort Sumter, at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards. In this position, they were fully commanded by Forts Beauregard, Moultrie and Sumter, Battery Bee and Fort Wagner — a concentrated fire of at least 76 guns. The eight iron-clads could oppose to this fire not more than 16 guns. It seemed already a hope- less struggle. The iron-clads, how- ever, went resolutely to work, bring- ing their fire to bear chiefly on Fort Sumter. Bhind ran the little Keokuk ahead of all the others, and came within 500 yards of the fort, hurling against it her immense projectiles. The Mon- tauk and Catskill were close in her wake. It was impossible, however, for the fleet long to maintain the un- THE ATTACK OK THE FORTS. 587 equal struggle. The forts and earth- works were armed with guns of the largest calibre, and of the very best construction. “ There was something almost pathetic,” wrote an eye-wit- ness, ‘‘in the spectacle of those little floating circular towers, exposed to the crushing weight of those tons of metal, hurled asrainst them with the terrific force of modern projectiles, and with such charges of powder as were never before dreamed of in artillery firing.” It recalled the pictures of the wars of the Titans, in the old myth- ologies. The contest lasted about forty min- utes, not one of the guns having been under fire for a longer period. In that brief space of time, five of the iron- clads were wholly or partially disabled. The Keokuk, which was of a peculiar construction, and had two turrets, was struck ninety-nine times, nineteen shots piercing her at and below the water- line. Her turrets were riddled, and both her guns disabled. She had only been able to return three shots. This vessel, which was with difficulty kept afloat during the night by means of her pumps, sank next morning. The Pas- saic was struck twenty-seven times; and her turret was, for a time, so jammed that it could not be turned. The Nahant was also terribly pun- ished, her turret being effectually jammed, and her pilot-house shattered. The Patapsco lost the use of her rifle- gun after the fifth fire. The Nantucket had her 15-inch gun permanently dis- abled after the third fire. The casual- ties were few. There was but one man killed — the quartermaster of the Na- hant. In all, there were 29 wounded. It was the conviction of all the officers that any further attempt would be folly. It was Dupont’s belief that if the attack had been prolonged one half hour, the fleet would have been dis- abled, and some of them at least left in the hands of the enemy. Worden was of the same opinion. “Charleston,” he said, “cannot be taken by the naval force now present.” The contest was, therefore, abandoned; and, on the 12th, the entire fleet, with the *2. exception of the New Ironsides, which anchored outside Charleston bar, re- turned to Port Koyal for repairs. Dur- ing the brief struggle the forts, from 76 guns, fired 2209 times; the iron- clads, from 14 guns, fired 139 times. It was the opinion of some, at the time, that this attack might have re- sulted differently if Dupont had been vigorously supported by Hunter with a land force on Morris Island. Hunter, it was thought, might have given the garrisons of Battery Gregg and Fort Wagner occupation, while the fleet was attacking Fort Sumter. It is doubtful whether such a diversion would have materially affected the result. Certain it is that the land troops did nothing. “I could do nothing but pray for you,” wrote Hunter to Dupont the day after the fight, “which, believe me, I did most heartily.” It had now become apparent to the authorities at Washington, that it was vain to attempt to force a passage to Charleston so long as Fort Sumter guarded the channel. The reduction 588 CHARLESTON HARBOR. of that fort, therefore, became with them a fixed purpose. A change was made in the commanders. General Q. A. Gillmore, who had distinguished himself the year before by the cap- ture of Fort Pulaski, replacing Gen- eral Hunter, assumed command of the department of the South ; and Admiral Dahlgren took the place of Dupont. Before the arrival of the new com- manders, Dupont had the good for- tune to capture the dreaded Confede- rate warrior ship, the Atlanta. That vessel had originally been a blockade- runner, bearing the name of Fingal, and had been built on the Clyde. She had managed to run up the Savannah River, about eighteen months before, with a valuable cargo, but had found it impossible again to get out to sea. The Confederates had converted her into a war ship, arming her with a thick coat of oak and pine, and cover- ing her with heavy bars of iron. She carried four guns of large calibre, and was furnished with a powerful beak. Commanded by Lieutenant A. Webb, formerly of the National navy, who had under him a crew of 160 men, it was believed by the Confederates that the Atlanta would be a match for at least any two monitors then afloat. It was reported to Dupont that the alter- ations on this vessel had been complet- ed, and that she was about to force her way out to sea. Dupont resolved to watch her movements; and, with this end in view, he sent the Weehawken, Captain Rodgers, and the Nahant, Com- mander Downes, to Warsaw Sound. On the morning of the 17th of jone June, the Atlanta was discovered to be moving down the Savannah River, her intention evidently being to fall, with all her force, on the two moni- tors. She was accompanied by two wooden gunboats of Tattnall’s Mos- quito fleet, which were crowded with people who had come down from Sa- vannah, expecting to see their favorite vessel win an easy victory over the “Yankee” monitors. Their expecta- tions were not to be realized. The Weehawken was singled out for the first blow. The ram is pushing swiftly forward. The Weehawken reserves her fire. Rodgers himself is sighting one of her heavy guns. Her powerful an- tagonist is now within easy range. The Weehawken opens fire. Rodgers has aimed well The first shot — a 15- inch solid — has carried away the top of the Atlanta’s pilot-house, wounded two of her pilots, and sent the vessel aground. In less than fifteen minutes, the Atlanta is prisoner to the Wee- hawken, Rodgers having fired only five shots in all. The Atlanta was badly damaged, the last shot having struck her point-blank. So terrific was the impact that it bent in the iron armor, shivering the twelve inches of live oak and the five inches of Georgia pine. The Atlanta was afterwards taken to Philadelphia and exhibited. On his arrival at Hilton Head, Gill- more found that he had an available force of near 18,000 men. After picket- in^r a line alons^ the coast, about 250 miles in length, and establishing posts at different points, he could still count ONV7S/ SA/NOr CHARLESTON HARBOR AND ITS APPROACHES, SHOWING FORTS SUMTER AND WAGNER, JAMES ISLAND, Etc., Etc. f ASSAULT ON FORT WAGNER. 589 on an effective force of 11,000 men, mostly veterans. He had 66 guns and 30 mortars. Dahlgren had at his dis- posal the frigate Ironsides and six monitors, three of which were being repaired at Port Royal With these means of offensive warfare, it was re- solved to renew the attempt on Fort Sumter. Gillmore proposed to seize the south- ern end of Morris’ Island, and, with the aid of the fleet, to capture Fort Wagner, a strong work near the north end, and afterwards Fort Gregg, which was beyond. These captured, it was his belief that he would be able to accomplish the destruction of Fort Sumter by shore batteries. His first movement was to erect strong batteries on the northern end of Folly Island. General Vogdes, whom he found there with a considerable body of troops, had already constructed, on the south end of the island, a battery which commanded the mouth of the Stono River. The new batteries were com- pleted by the beginning of July. They were made of sand and marsh sod, and were very strong, being embrasured and rivetted, and provided with maga- zines and bomb and splinter proofs. Forty-eight heavy guns were quick- ly got into position ; and each was furnished with 200 rounds of ammuni- tion. It was necessary for Gillmore to dis- guise, as much as possible, his real intention. With this end in view, and in the hope that he might be able to distract the attention of the Confeder- ates^ he ordered General A. H. Terry to take with him 6000 troops, to pro- ceed up the Stono River, and make a demonstration on James’ Island. Colonel Higginson was, at the same time, sent up the Edisto with a body of negro troops, with instructions to cut the Charleston and Savannah Rail- road. Higginson was compelled to fall back, without having accomplished his purpose. Terry had better suc- cess. His troops were placed on the island without difficulty; and, on the night of the 9th of July, 2000 jHiy of them, under General Strong, were transferred in boats down Folly River, to the junction of that stream with Lighthou'^e Inlet. At daylight on the 10th, the batteries which had been erected on the north end of Folly Island, and Dahlgren’s monitors, simul- taneously opened fire on Fort Wagner. Every shot from the 15-inch guns of the monitors sent a mass of rubbish into the air. Clouds of dust and smoke hung over the fort. Up to this time, Strong and his men had been lying in concealment. After a two hours’ cannonade, and while the attention of the Confederates was still occupied by the firing from the batteries on the north of Folly Island, and from the monitors. Strong threw his men rapid- ly ashore ; and, by nine o’clock in the morning, he was in full possession of the Confederate works on the south- ern end of Morris’ Island, with 1 1 guns and much camp ecpiipage. The Con- federates fled to Fort Wagner, the Nationals pursuing as far as the Beacon House, where they were within range of the guns of the fort There they 590 CHARLESTON HARBOR. halted, Strong resolving not to attack Fort Wagner until the next day. Short- JuJy ly after daylight, on July 11th, Ih the assault was gallantly made. It seemed for a time as if success was about to attend the effort. Some of the brave fellows had actually reached the parapet. There, however, they were met by a fire so withering that they were compelled to fall back. It was now evident to the National commander that Fort Wagner was not to be easily taken. Gillmore commenced at once to make preparations to assail it by regular approaches. The island was narrow; and, while he had no reason to dread any flank movements, he could rely on the effective co-opera- july tion of the fleet. On the 16th, 16* General Terry was vigorously attacked by a Confederate force, under General Hazard ; but, being assisted by the gunboats in Stono and Folly Rivers, he successfully resisted and ulti- mately repelled his assailants. Terry’s operations on James’ Island were, as has been mentioned, originally intended as a feint. His object having been ac- complished, he withdrew his troops, ac- cording to previous arrangement, and joined the main force on Morris’ Island, under Gillmore, who was about to re- jnly peat the attack on Fort Wagner. 18. It was now the 18th of July. About noon of that day, the batteries, which Gillmore had constructed across the island, opened fire upon the fort. At the same time, Dahlgren moved up his monitors, and opened fire on both Fort Sumter and Fort Wagner. Both forts replied — the latter feebly, and only from two guns. The garrison, fully persuaded that the bombardment was only a preliminary to another assault by troops, had taken shelter in their bomb-proofs. To the Nationals, it seemed as if the garrison must be de- moral iz(jd. An assault was therefore resolved upon. Darkness was now approaching; and, as the cannonade ceased, there burst forth a tremendoui thunderstorm. Whatever might be the condition of the garrison, it was observed that the flag was flying over the fort. The twilight was deepening, and the thunderstorm still raging, when the storming party commenced to move forward. Strong’s brigade moved first, and was followed by that of Putnam. Strong’s brigade consisted of the Fifty- Fourth Massachusetts, a colored regi- ment, commanded by Colonel Robert G. Shaw; the Sixth Connecticut; the Forty-Eighth New York; the Third New Hampshire ; the Seventy-Sixth Pennsylvania and the Ninth Maine. The distance to be passed was about 1800 yards. When the head of the column was within 200 yai-ds of the fort, the Confederates opened fire. With undaunted courage, their com- rades falling at every step, the Nationals pressed forward. They had almost reached the ditch when the parapet blazed with musketry. The secoml parapet was reached, and the National standard was planted. One second more, and both standard and standard- bearer had disappeared. Shaw was killed; Strong was mortally wounded. The brigade was torn to pieces, the colored regiment being almost annthi- “THE SWAMP ANGEL” 591 lated. Putnam, with the Seventh New Hampshire, the Sixty-Second and Six- ty-Seventh Ohio, and the One Hun- dredth New York, rushed forward and renewed the assault. It was a vain effort — a rush into the jaws of death. Putnam fell at the head of his troops ; and nearly all his subordinates were killed or wounded. The remains of the shattered brigades fell back into the sheltering darkness ; and the contest ceased. The ocean beach was covered with the dead and dying. The National loss fell little short of 1500; the Con- federates did not lose in the struggle more than 100 men. Abandoning the idea of assault, Gill- more pushed forward the works with great energy. The first parallel was opened at 1300 yards from Fort Wag- ner. Soon afterwards was completed the second at 600 yards. The guns of this parallel were trained not only on Wagner, but on Sumter and Battery Gregg. On the 9th of August, a third parallel was commenced about 330 yards in advance of the right of the second. In addition to the works on the parallels, Gillmore had, after great difificulty, constructed a battery on the marsh, on the west of Morris’ Island. On this battery he had placed an 8-inch rified Parrott gun, called by the sol- diers, “The Swamp Angel.” From this gun, shells could be thrown into Charleston, some five miles distant. Beauregard, however, was better sup- plied with the means of resistance than Gillmore was with the means of attack. He had, perhaps, double the number of men, and five times as much artillery. By this time, the firing from all the Confederate works — from the batteries on James’ Island, from Wagner, Gregg and Sumter — had become continuous and severe. Gillmore’s preparations, however, were now completed. He had in readiness 12 batteries, mounting 28 heavy guns, and 12 mortars. On the 17th, aided by Dahlgren’s H. gunboats, he opened fire upon Sumter, Wagner and Gregg. Sumter was the chief object of attention. The firing was renewed every morning until the 24th. The total number of shots fired against Sumter up to that date was 5750, of which 1336 missed. On aus*. that day, Gillmore sent a des- 24. patch to Halleck, informing him of the result. “Fort Sumter,” he said “is, to-day, a shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.” This was the opinion of the Confederates themselves. The artil- lerists were, therefore, withdrawn from the work ; and it was garrisoned by a body of infantry. Gillmore’s attention was now given to Fort Wagner. While his heavy shot was battering down the walls of Fort Sumter, he had been busy constructing his fourth parallel. It was now com- pleted; and he was able to plant his guns within 300 yards of the fort on his front. About 100 yards in front of him was a ridge of sand dunes, from behind which the Confederate sharp- shooters kept up an incessant fire, greatly to the annoyance of the men engaged in the advance parallel. The ridge, however, was easily cleared ; and a fifth parallel was established at its base. At this point, the island is only 592 CHARLESTON HARBOR, twenty-five yards wide, and barely two feet high. In rough weather, this part of the island is swept by the sea. It was becoming more and more difficult for the men to push forward the sap, ex- posed, as they were, to the converging fire from Fort Wagner and to the flank fire from James’ Island. Gillmore had become fully convinced that another assault was necessary. His prepara- tions were already completed. The light mortars were moved to the front and placed in battery ; the advanced trenches were enlarged ; the rifled guns in the left breaching batteries were trained upon the fort ; and calcium lights were prepared, for the double purpose of giving aid to the cannoneers and sharpshooters and of dazzling the Sept, enemy. At dawn, on the 5th of September, the New Ironsides, Captain Rowan, moved up to within 1000 yards of the sea face of the fort; and simultaneously his broad- sides of eight guns, carrying 11-inch shells, and the land batteries, opened upon the parapet. For forty-two con- secutive hours the bombardment was continued. In a few hours after the firing commenced, the garrison aban- doned their guns and took refuge in the bomb-proof. The final assault M^as to be made on the morning of the 9th. All things were in readiness, when it became known that the fort was evac- uated. Fort Gregg, it was afterwards discovered, was also abandoned. There were left in Wagner eighteen guns; in Gregg, seven. During the two days, 122,300 pounds of metal in the shape of shot and shell had rained upon the fort ; yet the bomb-proof was substan- tially uninjured. The forts were im- mediately occupied by the National troops ; ^ and General Gillmore was able to congratulate his men, by telling them that the whole of Morris’ Island was in their hands, and that the city and harbor of Charleston were at the mercy of their artillery. On the night of the 8th of Septem- ber, an expedition of thirty boats gep, was sent from the fleet to take possession of Fort Sumter. It was under the command of Commander Stephens, of the Patapsco. It was a disastrous enterprise. Three of the boats’ crews had landed. In the belief that the garrison had abandoned the fort, they were attempting to run up the steep ruins to the parapet, when they were greeted with a tremendous fire. Two hundred of the assailants were killed, wounded or captured. In their hurried retreat, the Nationals left behind them four boats and three colors. Gillmore maintained and strengthened his position ; but no further active etforts were made against Charleston during the remain- der of the year. Gillmore’s work had not been wholly fruitless. He had not captured Charleston ; he had not made himself complete master of the harbor; but he had made the blockade secure. SIEGE OE SUFFOLK. 593 CHAPTER XXX. Minor Engagements.— General John J. Peck.— Suffolk. -Defenses of Suffolk.— General Longstreet.— Little Washington and New Berne.— General Foster.— Siege of Suffolk.— Vigorous Assaults.— A Gallant Defense.— The Siege Discontinued.— Longstreet Ketires.— What Might Have Been.— Morgan in Kentucky.— His De- predations.— At Green Biver.— At Springfield.— At Bardstown.— At Brandenburg.— Seizure of the Alice Dean and McCombs.— At Corydon.— General Hobson in Pursuit.— The Alice Dean in Flames. —Burning the Wharf at Brandenburg. —General Judah.— Vandalism at Corydon and Salem.— Morgan in a Tight Place.— Sweeping Around Cincinnati.— Parkersburg.— At Buffington Ford.— Morgan Hemmed In.— Eight Hundred Surrender.— Morgan Attempts to Escape with the Remainder.— Captured at New Lisbon.— Taken to Columbus, Ohio.— Escape from Prison. —After Knoxville.— Bean Station.— Shackleford in Pursuit of Longstreet.— A Vigorous Encounter.— The Nationals Fall Back.— Foster Succeeds Burnside.- The Depart- ment of the Gulf.— General Dick Taylor Again.— The Occupation by the Confederates of Alexandria, Opelousas and Fort de Russy. — Brashear City also Abandoned.— General Banks and General Grant.— Pro- posal to Move on Mobile. —Movement upon Texas.— Sabine City.— General Franklin.— Lieutenant Crocker.— A Disastrous Failure. — Atchafalaya. —Another Movement upon Texas.— General C. C. Washburne Attacked by Taylor and Green. — Brazos, Santiago.— Brownsville. — Point Izabel. — Banks at Brownsville. — His Return to New Orleans.— Arkansas and Missouri. —The Guerrillas.— Marmaduke Falls upon Springfield, Missouri.— A Brave Resistance. — Marmaduke Falls Back. — General Brown Wounded. — Marmaduke Attacked by Colonel Merrill. His Defeat. — The Julia Roan. — Little Rock. — The Guerrilla Leaders in Council. — General Sterling Price. — General McNeil. — Cape Girardeau Attacked by Marmaduke. — McNeil’s Gallant Defense. — Pursuit ol Marmaduke.— Fort Blunt. — Colonel Coffey. — Honey Springs. — Fort Smith. — Attack on Helena. — The Con- federates Repulsed. — McPherson’s Expedition to Canton. — Steele’s Expedition to Little Rock. — At Browns- ville. — Little Rock Captured. — The Massacre at Lawrence. — Attempt on the Life of General Blunt.— Major Curtis Killed.— Marmaduke and Sand watie. —Progress Made. In an earlier portion of this work we jggg found it convenient to group to- gether some minor engagements which, not having direct connection with any of the great battles or campaigns, and not of sufficient consequence to be treated in separate chapters, were yet too important to be altogether overlooked. In order to cover some such engage- ments which took place at different times in the year 1863, that example will, in this chapter, be followed. At the close of 1862, Major-General John J. Peck was in command of 9000 men at Suffolk. The Confederate gen- erals, Pettigrew and French, with about 15,000 men, were at the same time on the line of the Blackwater, threatening Peck’s position. Peck took such pains to construct defenses for Suffolk, that the authorities at Richmond believed he was preparing a base of operations for a movement against that city, in co-operation with the army of the Potomac. Counter- vailing measures, in consequence, were immediately adopted. A series of for- tifications were thrown up from the line of the Blackwater to Port Pow- hattan, on the James River; and in February, 1863, General Long- street was placed in command of all 594 MINOn ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. the Confederate troops in that region. He had under him a force of about 30.000 men. The better to conceal Lis purpose, and in order to distract the attention and divide 'the forces of tlie National commanders at Suffolk and at Fortress Monroe, where General . Dix was in command, Longstreet, * early in April, caused it to be reported that he had gone to South Carolina, while D. H. Hill was ordered to attack Little Washington, and me- nace New Berne. Longstreet, having been informed by spies that General Foster, who had succeeded Burnside in command in that department, had or- dered Peck to send 3000 men to oppose Hill, deemed it a fitting opportunity to carry out his purpose in Suffolk. F^eck, however, was prepared ; he had penetrated Longstreet’s designs, and notified Foster accordingly. Having Leen reinforced by a division under General Getty, he was about to send ihe required number of troops, when he learned from General Viele, who had captured a Confederate mail at Norfolk, that Hill’s movement was only intended as a feint. The detach- ment was, therefore, detained ; and Admiral Lee, in obedience to orders, sent several gunboats up the Nanse- mond, to co-operate with the land forces in the defense of Suffolk. Longstreet resolved to concentrate his strength and carry the place by assault; Hill was recalled from North Carolina, the besiegers now numbering about 40.000 men. Batteries were thrown up under cover of the darkness; and fire was opened upon the boats in the river. The gunboats, however, were bravely handled ; the land forces, with equal gallantry, performed their part; and, by the resistance thus offered, the assailants, although overwhelmingly su- perior in numbers, were successfully held in check. For twenty-four days the siege continued, deeds of great daring being performed on both sides. Longstreet put forth his best efforts, and taxed his skill to the utmost to accomplish his object ; but it was all in vain. Finding it impossible to give effect to his purpose, he turned his back upon Peck and retreated. It w’as now the 3d of May — the day on jjay which Hooker and Lee had their severe battle at Chancellorsville. The Confederates were pursued as far as the Blackwater. Thus ended the sie^e of Suffolk, “ which had for its object the recovery of the whole country south of the James Biver, extending to Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, the ports of Norfolk and Portsmouth, eighty miles of new railroad iron, the equipment of two roads, and the cap- ture of all the United States forces and property, with some thousands of contrabands.” It is hardly possible to overestimate the great services ren- dered by Peck and his brave gaiTison at Suffolk. If the resistance had been less stubborn, Longstreet might have been able to rejoin Lee at Chancellors- ville in time to accomplish the destruc- tion of the army of the Potomac. His appearance at Chancellorsville on the 2d or on the 3d of May would cer- tainly have proved a calamity to the National cause. MORGAN’S RAID. 595 No account has yet been given in June pages of the famous raid made by the Confederate parti- san ranger, General Morgan, into the States of Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio. In the month of Jane, and before the armies of Rosecranz and Bragg came into collision at Chickamauga, Morgan, with about 3000 mounted men and six guns, pushed across the Cumberland River, at Barksville, and advanced to- wards Columbia. At that place, he was encountered and held in check for some three hours by a small body of cavalry, under Captain Custer. After the death of Custer, who was unfor- tunately killed in the afPray, the Na- tionals fell back, leaving Morgan to pursue his devastating march. At Green River, Morgan came into con- tact with Colonel Moore, who was at the head of 200 Michiganers, and well entrenched. A severe encounter en- sued, the raiders being repulsed, with a loss of more than 200 killed and wounded. Morgan now moved in the direction of Lebanon, which was held by Colonel Hanson and the Twentieth Kentucky. The regiment was small in numbers ; but Hanson, for some hours, was able to make a brave resist- ance. The raiders tired the town, and Hanson and his men were captured. Pushing on through Springfield and Bardstown, Morgan’s advance reached jQ]y Brandenburg on the 7th of July. 7* There he seized two steamers, the Alice Dean and McCombs, and, getting his men on board, proceeded across the river. His force had now in- creased to eleven regiments, numbering over 4000 men, with ten pieces of artil- lery, including two howitzers. After burning the Alice Dean and the wharf at Brandenburg, the raiders pushed on towards the north, in the direction of Corydon, a small place in Indiana. Meanwhile, General Hobson, with a force equal in numbers to that of Morgan, was following in close pur- suit. Hobson arrived in time to see the blazing wreck in the stream. Mor- gan had crossed on the 8th. On the day following, Hobson, with his little band, was on the soil of Indiana. A considerable portion of General Judah’s division, which had been stationed in Kentucky, between the Cumberland and Barren Rivers, was also concen- trated and put in motion for the cap- ture of Morgan. At Corydon, which he reached on the 9th, he encountered some re- jniy sistance from the Home Guards. These, however, were overpowered , and a wholesale system of plunder, combined with vandalism and bru- tality, was inaugurated. Having done their work at Corydon, the raiders proceeded to Salem, the capital of Washington County, where they cap- tured between 300 and 400 militia- men, pillaged the place, destroyed the railroads, and exacted $1000 each from three mill-owners. At each town and village, it is the same story — murder, plunder, cruel exactions, and wholesale destruction of property. The pursuers were still behind; but the people, alarmed, were now rising in their own defense. At Vernon, on the 12th, juiy Morgan was brought to a halt 12. 596 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. by a powei*ful body of militia, under Colonel Lowe. Stealing away from the presence of Lowe under cover of the daikness, bis men, in scattered de- tachments, and plundering as they ad- vanced, moved towards Harrison, whei*e they concentrated, preparatory to re- turning as quickly as possible to Ken- tucky. Morgan was already in a tight place. Hobson was in his rear; Judah was on his flank ; and thousands of armed citizens were blocking eveiy way by which he might attempt a re- trograde movement. Sweeping around Cincinnati about a dozen miles to the north, still plundering and destroying, Morgan pushed on through the rich counties of Southern Ohio, in the di- rection of Buffington Ford, a short distance south of Parkersburg. He July reached the ford on the 18th of July, and attempted to cross under cover of an artillery Are. Next morning, he found himself completely hemmed in. Judah’s cavalry had fallen on his flank ; the head of Hobson’s col- umn, under General Shackleford, struck liis rear ; and two armed vessels in the river opened on his front. In this ex- tremity, about 800 of the raiders sur- rendered ; but the remainder, headed by Morgan, attempted to cross to Belleville, by swimming their horses. Only about 300 managed thus to es- ca})e. Morgan, thus foiled, fell back, at the head of a considerable force, to- wards McArthur, and then pushed to the northeast, in the direction of New July Lisbon, where, on the 26th, being 26. closely pressed by Shackleford’s cavalry, he was compelled to suri’ender. Morgan and several of his officers were taken to Columbus, Ohio, where they were confined in felons’ cells, in the penitentiary. The partisan chief, with six of his captains, by undermining the walls of their prison, and thus opening a passage into the yard, effected their escape in the following November, Morgan was spared to make another famous raid, but it was to be his last. We have already given an account of the siege of Knoxville. It was not deemed necessary at the time to follow up Lengstreet in his retreat from that place. In this chapter, space must be found for a brief reference to the struggle which took place at Bean Sta- tion. After his unsuccessful assault at Knoxville, and the withdrawal of his troops towards Virginia, he was pur- sued by cavalry, under Shackleford, Wolford, Graham and Foster, into Jef- ferson County. At the above-named station, on the Morristown and Cum- berland Gap Hoad, Longstreet turned sharply on his pursuers. It was about two o’clock in the afternoon of Mon- day, December 14th, when the Dec, National skirmishers felt the H. touch of the enemy, and were com- pelled to fall back. Shackleford was immediately on hand. His men, dis- mounting, the horses being sent to the rear, were soon got into position on the further side of the road. Colvin’s battery was posted on a knoll, in rear of the troops, and three howitzers were located on a spur of the adjoining mountain, to the left of the National line. About four o’clock, the fighting became general. The Confederates SABINE PASS. 597 fell with great force on the divisions of Wolford and Foster. The enemy was well provided with artillery, which was splendidly served. The Nationals held their ground with great firmness; but the}^ were compelled, from time to time, to give way, and at nightfall, when the battle ceased, they had fallen back about a mile. Shackleford, who was in chief command, confessed to the loss of nearly 200 men. Longstreet’s loss must have been greater. Dui*ing the struggle, an attempt was made to strike Shackleford’s rear, by passing a force across the Holston, at Kelley’s Ford ; but this movement was skilfully prevented by General Ferrero, who took the precaution to guard the ford by a strong force under General Hum- phrey. Longstreet held possession of Bean Station ; but he was unable, in consequence of the severity of the weather, to turn it to any practical ac- count. He, therefore, withdrew his forces to the neighborhood of Bull’s Gap, a point at which the Eogersville branch joins the main road. It was about this time that General Burnside retired from the command of the army of the Ohio. Here, again, as in North Carolina, he was succeeded by General John G. Foster. After the battle at Bean Station, and before the close of the year, there was some skirmishing between the rival forces in this department. This petty warfare was continued through the spring of 1864 ; but no event of high importance occurred in this region until Morgan’s famous and final Kentucky raid, in May of that year. | I Among the minor operations, of which as yet no notice has been taken, mention must be made of those which were conducted in the Gulf Depart- ment, and in the region west of the Mississippi, after the fall of Port Hud- son. It will 1)6 remembered that when General Banks withdrew from Alexan- dria, on the Bed Biver, and pi'oceeded to Port Hudson, he took with him the greater portion of his troops, thus leav- ing the entire region, from which he had driven the Confederates, once again at their mercy. General Dick Taylor immediately reappeared. Alexandria was soon reoccupied ; so was Ope- lousas ; and a Confederate garrison took possession of Fort de Bussy. Taylor’s followers, indeed, found but little difficulty in overrunning the whole country. The National outposts were withdrawn into Brashear City. This, ho\yever, was soon abandoned; and the way to Algiers being left open. New Orleans would have been in peril but for the presence of Farragut and his fleet. After the fall of Port Hud- son, Banks again directed his thoughts to a^o^ressive measures. He was visit- ed by General Grant in September; and it was the opinion and desire of both commanders that a joint move- ment should be made against Mobile — the one place of importance on the Southern coast then held by the Con- federates. Considerations of foreign policy, however, determined the gov- ernment to take steps for the recovery and reoccupation of Texas. Banks, ac- cordingly, was oi’dered to move for the conquest of that State. He was per- •J6fi 598 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. mitted to use his own judgment as to the course he should follow ; but it was suggested that the most feasible route might be found to be hy the Red River to Natchitoches and Shreveport. Believing that route to be impractica- ble, at that season of the year, he de- termined to secure Sabine City, at the mouth of the Sabine Pass. To give effect to this purpose, an expedi- tion of 4000 well-disciplined troops were placed under the command of General Franklin. The troops were to be landed a few miles below Sabine Pass. Farragut detached a naval force of four gunboats, under Lieutenant Frederick Crocker, to join the expedi- tion. The gunboats were the Clifton, Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City. The Clifton was the flag-ship. The expedition proved a complete and dis- astrous failure. In the forenoon of the Sep, 8th of September, the gunboats 8* and transports crossed the bar at Sabine Pass. In the afternoon, the Clifton, Sachem, and Arizona moved towards the fort, the Granite City being left behind to cover the landing of a division of troops, when the proper time should arrive. The fort mounted eight heavy guns, three of which were rifled. It was evident that the garri- son was well prepai’ed. As the ves- sels drew near, the whole eight guns opened at once. The boilers of the Clifton and Arizona were immediately penetrated by shells; the white flags were raised ; and twenty minutes after the attack, the two vessels were in tow of Confederate steamers. Franklin re- fused to land his troops, and, with his transports, hastened over the bar, and returned to New Orleans. He left be- hind him 200 men as prisoners, 50 killed and wounded, 2 gunboats and 15 heavy-rifled guns. Fi’anklin was blamed for not landing his troops ; but it is douVjtful whether, in the circum- stances,' he could have acted more wisely than he did. Banks now concentrated his forces at Atchafalaya, his intention being to march directly on Shreveport. He soon found, however, that the difficul- ties which lay in his way were almost, if not entirely, insurmountable. Aban- doning the attempt, therefore, he re- solved to secui'e a lodgment in Texas, by moving upon and taking possession of the harbors on its coast. At this time, the position of General Banks was the very I’everse of com- fortable. The Confederates seemed irrepressible. Driven from one place, they quickly reappeared in another. Towards the end of September, Gen- ei*al Dick Taylor, of the Confederate ai'iny, became more than usually active. He was still west of the Atchafalaya. General Green, his most efficient lieu- tenant, with his bushwhackers, was con- stantly depredating in the neighborhood of Port Hudson. It had become neces- sary to make a bold effort to suppress those bands of marauders. With this end in view. General Herron was sent with a body of men to Morgansia. Deemins: it advisable to establish an out- post some miles in the interior, Herron sent Colonel Lake with the Nineteenth Iowa and Twenty-Sixth Indiana, also 6 guns and a support of 150 cavalry, GRAND COTEAU. 599 under Colonel Montgomery. The en- tire force was under 1000. The exist- ence of this post became known to Sep. Green. On the night of the 30th of September, he advanced stealthily across an adjoining bayou, surrounded and surprised the camp, and captured Lake and about 400 of liis men. The cavalry escaped with the loss of 5 men. There were 54 killed and wounded. In this connection may be related ^vith propriety the unfortunate affair which happened at Grand Coteau. When General Banks was about to set out on his expedition to Texas, he thought it proper to make a demon- stration in the direction of Opelousas, so as to create the impression that a movement which had Alexandria or Slireveport for its objective was reallj^ commenced. Four divisions of the army of the Gulf, consisting of two divisions of the Nineteenth army corps and two divisions of the Thirteenth army corps, the whole under the com- mand of Major-General Franklin, were ordered to Opelousas. The march was completed without difficulty; and the army encamped at Opelousas and Barre’s Landing, remaining about eight Oct. days. On the 27th of Octo- 27* ber, the backward movement com- menced, the First division, of the Thir- teenth corps, falling back upon New Iberia. On the 1st of November, the other two divisions — the Third and Fourth — commanded respectiv^ely by Washburne and Burbridge, fell back, in obedience to orders, as far as Car- rion Crow Bayou and Grand Coteau. On the same day, the Nineteenth corps fell back in the same direction. Wash- burne and Burbridge were ordered to encamp at the places just mentioned, while the rest of the army continued to fall back. Washburne assumed su- preme control of the two divisions of the Thirteenth corps, who were thus left to guard the rear. On the morn- ing of the 3d, the Confederates pjov, showed themselves in considera- ble strenofth in the neierhborhood of Burbridge’s position, which was about three miles in advance of that of Mc- Ginnis, with whom Washburne had his headquarters. Burbridge, with one brigade of the Fourth division, about 1200 strong, with one 6-gun battery of 10-pounder Parrott, and with about 500 mounted infantry, under Colonel Fonda, and a section of Nim’s battery, was on the north side of what is called Muddy Bayou. McGinnis, with the Third di- vision, 3000 strong, and one battery, was at Carrion Crow Bayou. The two bayous run in parallel lines to the east, the banks being fringed with wood. The intervening ground was a smooth, level prairie. Burbridge’s right rear rested on a dense thicket ; his left stretched out about twenty rods into the open ground ; the* whole fronted to the northwest, in the direction of Ope- lousas. Later in the day, the Confed- erates fell with tremendous fury on Burbridge’s position, attacking him with an overwhelming force in front and on both flanks. The shock was irresistible; and for a time it seemed as if the entire force would be cap- 600 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. tured or destroyed. Washburne, who had reached the front in time to see the commencement of the struggle, had already ordered up the Third di- vision. McGinnis was ill, and unable to command in person ; but his troops were hurried forward, at the double- quick, by Bi'igadier-General Cameron, of the First, and Colonel Slack, of the Second brigade. They did not arrive a moment too soon. Burbridge’s com- mand had been driven entirely out of the woods; and the Confederate cav- alry were charging on his left, and coming down with force upon his rear. As soon as it came up, the Third di- vision formed in line ; and the guns, already within range, poured shot and shell on the almost triumphant foe, and checked his advance. In the heat of the fight, and before the arrival of the Third division, a tre- mendous struggle took place for the possession of Nim’s battery. Exposed to charge after charge of the enemy, the gunners were ultimately overpow- ered. An infantry regiment — the Twen- ty-Third Wisconsin — was sent to their support ; but it was soon overwhelmed and compelled to surrender. One sec- tion of this battery was commanded by Lieutenant Marian d. In spite of the strength and fury of the enemy, that gallant officer, after an almost unparal- leled display of coolness and audacity, succeeded in carrying off his own sec- tion of the battery. But for the lu’avery of Marland, those guns would have been lost. As it was, Burbridge, idthough compelled to fall back, man- aged to take with him every wagon and all the guns, with the exception of a 10-pounder Parrott. As soon as McGinnis’ division came up, Burbridge got his guns again into position, and opened upon the Confed- erates, now just checked in theii* ad- vance, a raking cross-fire, which tore their ranks in pieces. The tide of battle was now turned. What was a pursuit, became a retreat. The Confederates sought shelter in the woods. Thence, however, they were quickly driven, the infantry pursuing for about a mile and a half, the cavaliy for about three miles. The loss of life was not so great as the severity of the fight might have seemed to imply. The number of killed was 26; of the wounded, 124; of the missing, 566. The Confederate loss was about 60 killed. The wounded were carried off with them in their retreat ; 65 were made prisoners. Such was the battle of Grand Coteau. It cannot be called great or decisive ; but it was one of the most severely contested battles of the war. The Nationals lost heavily in offi- cers. Among the oflScers who won dis- tinction that day was Captain Guppy, of the Twenty-Third Wisconsin. After having displayed great gallantry, he was wounded and made prisoner, with the greater portion of his regiment. Burbridge, Guppy, Fonda and Robin- son received the special commendation of General Washburne. The Nation- als marched back in safety to Brasheai City. Meanwhile, General Banks, at the head of an expedition consisting of 6000 troops and some war vessels, had THE GUERILLAS. m sailed from New Orleans directly for the Rio Grande. Banks, although he accompanied the expedition, had placed in immediate command General Napo- leon J. T. Dana, an accomplished and skilful officer, and supposed to be well acquainted with the country about to be visited. This expedition was at- tended with very considerable success. But little opposition, in truth was en- countered, the enemy always retreating as the Nationals advanced. On the 2d of November, the troops debarked at Brazos Santiago, and advanced in the direction of Brownsville, some thirty miles up the river. Point Isabel was reached on the 8th. Banks having established his headquarters at Browns- ville, sent as many troops as he could spare, further up, to seize and occupy the. water-passes between the Rio Grande and Galveston. Some steam- ers were obtained on the Rio Grande ; and troops were transported to Mus- tang Island, off Corpus Christi Bay. From that port. General Ransom ad- jjqv, vanced to the Aransas Pass ; and, 18. on the 1 8th of November, he car- ried the place by assault, capturing 100 prisoners. On the same day, the National troops entered and occupied Corpus Christi. About the end of the month. General Washburne, now in command of the Thirteenth corps, moved upon Pass Cavallo, at the en- trance to Matagorda Bay, where thei’e was a strong fort called Esperanza, garrisoned by 2000 men. The place was invested; but the Confederates blew up the magazine and fled. Banks had reason to be proud of the success which attended this expedition. In one month he had made himself mas- ter of every important position on the coast between the Rio Grande and Galveston, except the works at the nK)uth of the Brazos, and those on Galveston Island. He was anxious to pi’osecute the work, especially towards the east; but he knew that Magruder was there in great force, and that with the troops now at his disposal, it would be hazardous to risk a battle with an antagonist of so much daring and so much skill. Had it been pos- sible for him to obtain sufficient rein- forcements, he might have been able to sweep the territory clear of the Confederate troops. As reinforcements could not be found. Banks, leaving Dana in command on the Rio Grande, returned to New Orleans. We have already, in an earlier chap- ter, recorded the military events which took place in Missouri and Arkansas in 1862. In the chapter devoted to the guerrillas, the record is brought down as far as the battle of Prairie Grove, in which the Nationals were completely vic- torious. It seemed for a time as if, in the entire region west of the Mississippi, the National authority was firmly estab- lished. It was not long, however, until, as has already been related, the Confede- rates appeared in force in Texas, recap- turing Galveston, and establishing their authority over the entire State. Early in 1863, the guerrillas again made their presence felt in Missouri and Arkansas, to the great inconvenience of the loyal inhabitants of those States. About the beginning of January, Marmaduke, 602 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. with some 4000 men, for the most part mounted, burst suddenly out of Northern Arkansas and fell upon Springfield, Missouri, with great fury. The place was well fortified with earth- works; but the National forces were scattered over the country ; and it was with some difiiculty that Generals Brown and Holland, who were in com- mand there, were able to bring together about 1000 militia-men to resist the onslaught of the guerrilla chief. It Jan. was about one o’clock, on the afternoon of the 8th, when the Confederate force, some 3000 strong, appeared before the town. Firing was commenced at once ; and severe but somewhat desultory fighting was main- tained during the remainder of the day. The National troops, although raw and inexperienced, fought with great bravery; and, as evening approached, they had compelled the Confederates to abandon one position after another, until the latter were glad to retreat under cover of the darkness. The battle had lasted five hours. The Na- tionals sustained a loss of 164 men, of whom 14 were killed. General Brown was severely wounded, and lost the use of his right arm. Marmaduke lost about 200 men, of whom 41 were killed and 80 were left in the town as prisoners. Marmaduke now marched eastward ; Jau. dawn on the 10th, his advance encountered the Twenty- First Iowa, under Colonel Merrill. After a sharp skirmish, he succeeded in flanking the National troops, and pushed on towards Huntsville. Mer- rill, however, was there before him, and was reinforced by the Ninety- Ninth Illinois, and portions of the Third Iowa and the Third Missouri cavaliy, with a supporting battery, under Lieutenant Wald Schmidt. The engagepfient which followed on the 11th was sharp but brief, Marmaduke being compelled to retreat, after sus- taining a loss of 300 men, including a brigadier-general and three colonels. The Nationals lost 71 men, of whom 7 were killed. Marmaduke was glad to abandon Missouri. Moving south- ward, he took position, with a portion of his forces, at Batesville, Arkansas, on the White River. At this point he was attacked, on February 4th, peb. by the Fourth Missouri cavalry, 4. under Colonel G. E. Waring, and driven across the stream, with a con- siderable loss in killed and wounded, one colonel and a number of privates having been made prisoners. After the battle at Huntsville, a portion of Marmaduke’s men made their way to Van Buren Creek; and 300 of them were captured on the Julia Roan, on the 28th of January. His men dis- persed or fell into the hands of the enemy. Marmaduke, greatly discour- aged, repaired to the headquarters of the Confederate army corps at Little Rock. During the next two months there was comparative quiet in those regions, although the guerrilla leaders at Little Rock were busy increasing and dis- ciplining their forces and preparing foi future efforts. The guerrilla bands, during this period, wei*e not, howevt^r, CAPE GIRARDEAU. 603 wholly inactive. At this time occurred the Sam Gatty affair — an affair which, being characterized by great brutality, rev^ealed the true spirit of the guer- rillas, and brought much discredit on the Confederate cause. It was the middle of April before the Confederate commanders assembled at Little Rock felt emboldened to re- sume active operations. Fayetteville, since the early spring, had been occu- pied by some Union cavaliy and in- fantry, under Colonel Harrison. On j^pril the 18th of April, shortly after sunrise, Harrison and Ins little band were attacked by General W. L. Cabell, who had come by forced marches over the Boston Mountains from Ozark. Although Harrison’s men were greatly outnumbered, they not only resisted the attack, l:)ut, after six hours’ fighting, compelled the enemy to fall back, with considerable loss, in the direction from which he came. Harrison had lost 71 men, of whom 4 were killed; but Cabell had left be- hind him 55 prisoners, 50 horses, and 100 shot-guns. A little later, Marmaduke himself was again in motion. With the full consent and approval of his superior officer, Major-General Sterling Price, he set out at the head of a large force of infantry and cavalry, with the in- tention of moving on Cape Girardeau, which was at that time the depot of sup- plies for a portion of General Grant’s army. Cape Girardeau, with its stores, was in charge of General John McNiel. When Marmaduke reached Frederick- ton, on the 2 2d, McNiel was at Bloom- field, in Stoddard County; but hearing of the presence of Marmaduke in that neighborhood, and divining his object, he hurried to the menaced point, and, arriving at Cape Girardeau on the 23d, calmly awaited the approach of the guerrilla chief. Marmaduke came up on the 25th, two days after the arrival of McNiel. It was not without reason that the Confederates counted on an easy victory; for while Marmaduke had under him a choice corps of 8003 men, known as “ Price’s First Corps of the Trans-Mississippi Department,” McNiel could only muster some 1700 men, and these, for the most part, be- longed to the militia. But McNiel, who was a brave and indefatigable officer, had made good use of the two days of grace. A powerful force was immediately transported into Illi- nois ; four guns, rudely mounted, were placed in advantageous positions; and the entire ranks were considerably strengthened. On the 25th, after April a slight skirmish, Marmaduke 25. called upon McNiel to surrender, giv- ing him only thirty minutes to decide and return his answer. McNiel’s an- swer was prompt and decided. He believed he was able to defend the place, and he meant to do so. He would not surrender. At ten o’clock next morning, after a slight artillery display, the call was again made for immediate surrender. This time Mc- Niel answered with his guns. After five hours’ fighting, during which the National guns were admirably handled, Marmaduke, on seeing some armed ves- sels in the Mississippi coming to the C04 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1SG3. aid of the besieged, beat a hasty re- treat across the St. Francis Fiver, and hurried into Arkansas, burning the bridges behind him. At this time, McNiel was ranked by General Yan- dever ; and the pursuit of Marmaduke was conducted by, perhaps, overmuch caution. The Confederate loss at Cape Girardeau was some 60 killed and about 300 wounded, many of whom were left behind in the retreat. This defeat of Marmaduke did not put an end to the Confederate raids in those regions. The guerrilla bands seemed almost ubiquitous. On the ]^fay 20th of May, the Confederate 20. colonel, Colfey, acting as briga- dier-general, at the head of five regi- ments, fell upon Fort Blunt, not far from Fort Gibson. The attack was made with great energy and determi- nation. But Colonel William A. Phil- lips, with his garrison of about 1200 men, some of them Indians, who could not be relied upon, made a stubborn and successful resistance. Coffey, after the loss of a considerable number of men, was driven back in disorder, and compelled to seek safety on the other side of the Arkansas Fiver. On the July 16th of July, a bold but unsuc- 16* cessful attempt was made by a mixed Confederate force, composed of Texans and Creek Indians, to capture a train of wagons, laden with supplies for Fort Blunt The assailants were I’epelled with loss ; and the train was saved. About the same time, another attack was meditated on Fort Blunt. General Cooper, with a body of Con- federates, some 6000 atrong, was lying at Honey Spiings, behind Elk Creek, and about twenty-five miles south of Fort Blunt, waiting for the arrival of General Cabell, with three regimente from Texas. It was Cooper’s inten- tion, so soon as Cabell came up, to move on Fort Blunt. Happily, Gen- eral Blunt had been made aware of the danger which threatened the post; and, by forced marches, he pushed on from Fort Scott, arriving at the menaced point in time to save it from the threatened peril. In five days he had accomplished a journey of 175 miles. Blunt did not wait for the attack, but moved at once on Cooper’s camp, with 3000 troops, infantry and cavalry, and 12 cannon of light calibre. He left Fort Blunt at midnight on the 1 6th ; and at ten o’clock next day he had, with his columns, led respectively by Colonels Phillips and Judson, fallen heavily on Cooper. The battle lasted for two hours; but Cooper, although he had superior numbers, never recov- ered from the suddenness and severity of the attack. The Confederates were completely routed. They fled, in wild disorder, through the woods into the open prairie, leaving on the field 150 killed, 400 wounded, with a large number of prisoners, one disabled gun and nearly 200 small arms. Blunt lost 77 men, of whom 17 were killed. When Cabell came up with his Texans, 3000 strong, the battle was ended. Not deeming it prudent to attack the victorious Nationals, he moved towards the South, and disappeared beyond the Canadian Fiver. The Nationals re- turned to Fort Blunt. After several LITTLE KOCK. 605 other skirmishes, of greater or lesser importance, General Blunt descended the Arkansas River, and occupied Fort Smith. At that time, the army of the fron- tier, as it was called, was greatly de- pleted, by furnishing reinforcements to General Grant, at Vicksburg; and the Confederate generals, in the Trans- Mississippi Department, seized the op- portunity to make an attack on He- lena. The attack was made on the July 4th of July, with a force of about 16,000 men, and was under the special direction of Price and Mar- maduke. It was made about daybreak, and with great fury. At hrst, the Con- fedei*ates were successful in carrying a small fort which formed part of the outworks ; but the gunboat Tyler com- ing up and opening with its heavy guns, the fort was reclaimed, and the assailants were driven back with a se- vere loss in killed and wounded. Their purpose, however, to carry the place by storm was not all at once aban- doned. The assault was repeated with great bravery, Marmaduke’s men fall- ing in heavy masses on the defenses of the town, attacking now the north and now the south, but everywhere meeting with the most stubborn resist- ance, and being terribly cut up by the National fire, at short range, and by the heavy missiles from the gunboat. Foiled at every point, the Confederates were compelled to fall back, having sustained a loss of over 1000 men in killed and wounded, and more than 1000 prisoners. Seeing that the Na- tioi^als were being reinforced, they re- treated, after a day or two, into the interior of Arkansas. After the surrender of Vicksburg, the pressure on General Grant’s army was relieved, and expeditions were sent out in different directions, either to repel or to check the movements of the Con- federates, who were still committing depredations on both sides of the Great River. One of these expeditions was under the care of General McPherson, who, with the divisions of Logan and Tuttle, pushed out in the direction of Canton, where the Confederates were known to be assembled in force. McPherson, not having sufficient num- bers at his disposal to warrant a vigor- ous or persistent attack, deemed it prudent to withdraw, and fell back to Vicksburg by way of Clinton. An- other and more successful expedition was entrusted to the care of General Frederick Steele, who was sent to Helena with instructions to organize a body of troops, and to proceed to the capture of Little Rock, the headcpiar- ters of the guerrillas. At the begin- ning of August, he had collected and equipped about GOOD men ; he had also secured 22 guns. He was soon joined by General Davidson, who had been operating in Arkansas, under the com- m^^nd of General Hurl but, and whose force consisted of about the same num- ber of men, with 18 guns. Davidson’s men were mostly mounted. The united foi;ce, numbering in all some 12,000 men and 40 guns, set out from Helena on the 10th of August, Davidson and his horsemen taking the lead. The White River was 606 MINOR ENGAGEMENTS IN 1863. crossed at Clarendon ; and a reconnois- sance was made as far as Brownsville. The details of this movement are nu- merous; but as there was compara- tively little fighting, it is unnecessary to enumerate them. Marmaduke had been sent out to Brownsville to offer Davidson i*esistance. Brownsville was abandoned without a battle, Marma- duke falling back to Little Bock, and burning the bridges in his rear. The National forces were again concen- trated at Brownsville, Steele having been reinforced by True’s brigade, sent from Memphis. After a series of suc- cessful encounters, and having marched over a most difficult country, forcing their way across rivers and bayous, the Nationals reached the outer defenses Sep, of Little Bock on the 10th of September. The final struggle was protracted and severe ; but on the evening of that day the place was sur- rendered to General Davidson. Much of the public property had been de- stroyed ; eight steamers were found in flames, and beyond recovery, when the National troops entered the city; but the arsenal was uninjured. About 1000 men were made prisoners. The entire National loss did not exceed 100 in killed, wounded and prisoners. It was a campaign of which Steele had just cause to be proud. Only forty days had elapsed since he arrived at Helena. With the capture of Little Bock perished one of the most impor- tant centres and nurseries of I’ebeldom in the western country. The Confed- erates ultimately fell back to Bed Bi ver; and the National troops, on the 28th of October, occupied Arka- delphia. On the 20th of August, one of the guerrilla leaders, named Quan- trell, at the head of a body of 20. 800 men, entered the city of Lawrence, Kansas, and murdered, in cold blood, 175 of fits citizens, and destroyed by fire property to the value of- over $2,000,000. He was pursued as soon as troops could be raised, and some 40 or 50 of his men were killed, oct, On the 12th of October, a vigor- ^2. ous encounter took place about eight miles southwest of Arrow Bock, be- tween the Nationals, under General E. B. Brown, and a powerful band of guerrillas and Indians, under Generals Shelby and Coffey. The Confederates were broken and routed after a sharp contest, and pursued as far as the Ai*- kansas line. Early in this month, a desperate attempt was made to murder General Blunt and his staff, who were marching towards Fort Scott, Kansas. About 300 Confederates had dressed themselves as Union soldiers, and by this means surprised and captured 78 of the 100 men under Blunt, all of whom, including Major Curtis, son of General Curtis, were wounded. Blunt and 15 of his men made a vigorous resistance, and contrived to escape. It was believed by the Confederates that General Blunt was among the killed ; and they I’ejoiced accordingly. On tlie 20th of October, Blunt was relieved of the command of the army of the Fron- tier, General McNiel taking his place. Towards the end of October, Marma- duke, at the head of 2000 men, marchcAl THE INDIANS. G07 from Princeton upon Pine Bluff, a post on the south side of the Arkansas Kiver, and about fifty miles below Little Bock, then in command of Colo- nel Powell Clayton. That officer was not unprepared for the attack ; and after a vigorous fight, which lasted about five hours, Marmaduke was forced to retire, having lost in the struggle 150 men killed and wounded, and 33 prisoners. Clayton’s loss was Oct. whom 17 were killed. On the 18th of October, Quantrell and the Creek chief, Sandwatie, made an attack on Fort Gibson, in the In- dian country. Fort Gibson was one of Colonel Phillips’ outposts. After a contest of four hours, the assailants were dispersed, and driven across the Arkansas Biver. Peace now reigned for a time between the Bed and Mis- souri Bivers. In the late winter months and early spring of 1863, further trouble was given by the Sioux Indians, under Little Crow, whose brutalities at Yel- low Medicine, at New Ulm, and at Cedar City, in Minnesota, have al- ready been described. The spirit of those warriors was greatly broken by the execution of thirty of their num- ber at Markato, towards the end Note. — After the fall of Vicksburg, General Herron, with a force of troops numbering 5000, was ordered to Port Hudson. He had already embarked, when the news arrived announcing Banks’ victory. Transfer- ring his troops to lighter-draught vessels, he proceeded, on the 12th of July, in obedience to orders, up the Yazoo River, as far as Yazoo City, under the convoy of the De Kalb and two tin-clad vessels, under the com- mand of Captain Walker. A combined attack of the of February. It was not, however, until the following summer, when General Pope took command of the department, that the Sioux War” was brought to a close. Vigorous- ly attacked and pursued from place to place, the savage bands were brok- en and dispersed among the wilds of the eastern slopes of the Bocky Mountains. Little Crow himself, “ the foremost hunter and orator,” was finally shot near Hutchinson, in Minnesota, by a Mr. Lamson. The skeleton of the chief is preserved in the collection of the Minnesota His- torical Society. At the close of the year, practical progress had been made in reducing to subjection the entire western country. Vicksburg and Port Hudson had fallen ; and the Mississippi, throughout its en- tire length, was under the control of the National government. Missouii was placed beyond the danger of inva- sion. The military power of the ene- my was broken in Arkansas and Kansas. A firm foothold had been secured in Texas. Much work had yet to be done ; but it was now evident that the end of the great struggle was approach- ing, and that the Union was to be saved. army and navy on the enemy’s works resulted in the flight of the garrison. Unfortunately, the De Kalb was sunk by a torpedo, opposite the city. Herron won an easy victory, capturing and destroying a Confede- rate vessel, formerly a gunboat, which was sheltered there. He returned to Vicksburg on the 21st July, bringing back with him 300 prisoners, 6 heavy guns, 250 small arms, 800 horses and 2000 bales of Confede- rate cotton. THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. COS CHAPTER XXXI. t The Opening of 18G4. — Promise of Success. — Much Work yet to he Done. — The Confederacy Crippled, hut Kot Subdued. — Three Important Strongholds. — Meridian. — Shreveport. — Mobile. — Sherman’s Purpose, — Delay. — After Chattanooga and Knoxville. — Preparations for the Meridian Expedition. — Instructions to McPherson and Hurlbut. — Sooy Smith. — Pontotoc. — Okolona. — Sherman’s Army in Motion. — The Big Black. — The Positions held by the Confederates. — Polk in Command. — Stephen E. Lee. — The Pearl Liver. — Brandon. — Tallahatta. — Oktibbeha. — Meridian. — Demopolis. — A Burning Train. — An Easy Vic- tory. — Terrible Destruction of Property. — “ Jeff. Davis’ Neckties.” — Quitman. — Lauderdale Springs; — Non-Arrival of Smith. — Cause of His Delay. — Struck bv Forrest. — A Panic. — A Stampede. — Smith’s Re- treat. — Colliersville. — The Negroes. — Strange Scenes. — Devastation. — Report of an Eye-Witness. — A Great Work Done. — Sherman Returns to Vicksburg. — Dissatisfied with Smith. — Forrest in Favor. — The Yazoo Expedition. — A Rush into Kentucky and Tennessee. — At Jackson. — Union City. — Colonel Hawkins. — Surrender. — Forrest Moves on Paducah. — Fort Anderson. — Bravery of Colonel S. G. Hicks. — The Confede- rate General, A. P. Thompson, Killed. — Fort Pillow. — The Garrison. — Booth and Bradford. — Description of the Fort. — A Savage Assault. — A Heroic Resistance. — Booth Killed. — Bradford in Command. — The New Era. — A Flag of Truce. — A Call for Unconditional Surrender. — A Treacherous Game. — Brutal Massacre. — No Quarter. — Horrible Scenes. — Report of the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War. — Cniel Treatment of Major Bradford. — Infamous Notoriety. — Buford at Columbus. — In Imitation of Forrest. — A Brutal Threat. — Forrest Retreats. — Sturgis’ Order to Pursue. — Escape of Forrest. — Gum Town. — A Se- vere Engagement. — Defeat of the Nationals. — General Smith in Command. — Another Expedition Against Forrest. — A Series of Encounters. — Smith at the Tallahatchie. — Forrest in Memphis. — His Mission so far Accomplished. — Reflections, The year 1864 opened with promise of final success to the National cause. The outlook, however, was not without a shadow of gloom. Richmond still engaged the attention and baffled the efforts of the army of the Potomac ; Charleston held out against the genius and energy of Gillmore and Dahlgren ; Mobile and Wilmington continued to invite and reward the daring but unprincipled enterprise of foreign traders; and pow- erful Confederate armies, zealous and eager for the fight, were yet in the field. But great battles, involving great issues, had been won by the Northern armies during the previous year; and nothing had happened to undo the results, or to prevent the Nationals from reaping the full benefit of the victories at Vicksburg, at Port Hudson, at Gettysburg, and at Chatta- nooga. The waters of the Mississippi now rolled unchecked from Cairo to the Gulf, thus cutting the Confederacy in twain ; Chattanooga being lield by the Nationals, the Bichmond govern- ment was shut out fi*om the valley of the Mississippi, and exposed also to attack in the rear; while the victory at Gettysburg had effectually delivered the Northern mind from all fear of further invasion. On neitlier side, however, had the SOURCES OF STRENGTH. 609 war spirit died out. In the North, there was a more vigorous determina- tion than ever to force the contest to an early and a final issue. In the South, although signs of distress were apparent, there was no disposition to abandon the struggle. Great ar- mies, as has been stated, were yet in the field. There were, besides, in every Confederate State, organized bodies of armed men ; and the States in which the National authority had been re- stored were exposed to frequent and dangerous incursions by those military freebooters. The loss of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson had terribly crippled the Con- federacy in the west and southwest. Existence, however, was still possible. There were several important points from which the means of subsistence could be obtained. Of these, the most important were Meridian, Shreveport and Mobile. In the present chapter, we shall confine our attention to Meri- dian. A glance at the map will show the importance of this position. Situ- ated at the intersection of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, which runs north and south, and the South Mississippi, which runs east and west, it was a j)lace of the highest advantage to the Confederates, and greatly aided them in prolonging the struggle. It was in easy communication with Selma, the great iron centre of the Confederacy, and also with Mobile, the one port, besides that of Wilmington, which was now open to the blockade runners. After the fall of Vicksburg, it was in- tended to move a strong force on Meri- dian ; but the weather being intensely hot, a drought prevailing, and the men already greatly exhausted, the move- ment was deferred. It became impos- sible when Sherman was ordered to Chattanooga, to the assistance of Rose- cranz. After Chattanooga, and the re- lief of Burnside, at Knoxville, Sher- man was again in a condition to direct his thoughts to Meridian. Having re- turned to Mississippi, his command was stationed, for a time, along the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. Towards the end of Janu- ary, he received instructions to proceed to Vicksburg, and place himself at the head of an expedition which should move eastward from that city, and per- form such service for the National cause as circumstances might allow. With as little delay as possible, the necessary arrangements were completed. Hurlbut, whose headquarters were at Memphis, was ordered to draw in all public property to Cairo and Memphis, to evacuate all places of minor import- ance, and especially to abandon Corinth and Fort Pillow. He was at the same time ordered to provide two divi- sions, of 5000 each, and to have them ready for embarkation not later than the 25th of January. McPherson, who was in command at Vicksburg, re- ceived somewhat similar instructions. He also was to provide two divisions, of 5000 each. General W. Sooy Smith, chief of cavalry, in the division of the Mississippi, was at Memphis, with a mounted force of about 2500. This force was increased to about 10,000 strong, by additions from Hurlbut’s corps. 610 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION.’ The objective point was Meridian. Smith was to move direct on that place from Memphis. Hurlbut was to join Sherman and McPherson at Vicksburg, Avhence the united forces should move on Meridian, and there form a junction with the cavalry under Smith. Meri- dian was distant from Memphis 250 miles; from Vicksburg, 150. What Sherman proposed to accomplish by this expedition, he himself tells us. In a letter to General Banks, he says : “I propose to avail myself of the short time allowed me in this depart- ment here to strike a blow at Meri- dian and Demopolis. I think I can do it ; and the destruction of the railroads, east and west, north, and south of Me- ridian, wdll close the door of rapid travel and conveyance of stores from the Mississippi and the Confederacy east, and so make us less liable to the incursions of the enemy toward the Mississippi. I intend to leave Vicks- burg about the 25th instant, and hope to be near Meridian about February 8th and 10th.” He requested Banks to make a feint on Mobile, so as to prevent the enemy at that place from sending reinforcements to Meridian. It was his conviction that if he were not resisted by superior numbers, he would be able to cut off Mobile from all connection with the interior, except by way of the Alabama River. Suc- cess at Meridian, and a similar success afterwards at Shreveport would, he thought, settle the main (piestion in the southwest. To give effect to the purposes thus indicated, Sherman ordered Sooy Smith to move from Memphis on or before February 1st, taking with him an ef- fective force of 7000 cavalry, lightly equipped. He was to march on Pon- totoc, Okolona and Meridian, making it an object to reach Meridian on or about the 10th. His instructions were “to disregard all minor objects; to de- stroy railroad bridges and corn not wanted ; to break the enemy’s com- munications from Okolona to Meridian, and thence eastward to Selma ; if con- venient, to send to Columbus, Mis- sissippi, and destroy all machinery there, and the bridge across the Tom- bigbee, which enabled the enemy to draw resources to the east side of the valley.” With the understanding that Smith was already on his way, Sher- man set out from Vicksburg, on the 3d of February, at the head of peb, an army of about 23,000 effective men. A considerable proportion of this force was mounted. The four divi- sions of which the army was composed were arranged in two columns, which were commanded, the one by McPher- son, the other by Hurlbut. Sherman marched in the advance with McPher- son’s column. McPherson crossed the Big Black, at the railroad bridge ; Hurl- but crossed at Messencrer’s. The sol- O diers were provided with twenty days’ rations. All unnecessary baggage was left behind. No tents were taken ; and, throughout the march, .all, from the commanding-general to the private, bi- vouacked by camp-fires in the open air. The weather was all that could be de* sired, the days being beautiful and the i nights cool, with a slight frost. The TERRIBLE DESTRUCTION. eii roads, fortunately, were in excellent condition. Sherman was not ignorant of the position and strength of the ene- my. By means of a spy, who had brought from Meridian an official re- port, it was learned that Polk was in chief command there. Scattered all over the State, there were companies of infantry and cavalry collecting taxes and forcing conscripts. Loring was at Canton with his infantry divi- sion, some 7000 strong, and 18 guns. French was at Brandon, with 3000 men and 10 guns. This force was increased to 5000 men, by reinforce- ments from Mobile. Forrest command- (‘d the cavalry in the district of North Mississippi ; the South cavalry district was in charge of Stephen E. Lee. Each of these latter commanders had under him a mounted force of 4000 men. Unless Polk was largely reinforced, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the expedition would result in com- plete success. For the first two days, Sherman was allowed to march unopposed. On the Pel), 5th, the enemy was encountered ; and, for eighteen miles, there was continual skirmishing. That night Sher- man’s advance reached Jackson, and found that the Confederates had just made a precipitate retreat. It was evident that the appearance of the Na- tionals had been a complete surprise. A pontoon bridge across the Pearl River was left comparatively unin- jured. The bridge h iving been quick- ly repaired, Sherman pushed forward, passing rapidly through Brandon, and reaching Morton on the 9th. At this place, McPherson, who led the ad- vance, was halted to break up and destroy the railroads. Hurlbut now took the lead, and kept it until he reached Meridian. At Tallahatta, some twenty miles from Meridian, ob- structions were encountered in the shape of felled timber. Suspecting that the Confederates were trying to gain time, in order to cover the move- ment of railroad property from Meri- dian, Sherman dropped his trains, leav- ing them in charge of strong escorts, and hastened to the Oktibbeha. The bridge was found in flames and beyond recovery. With material obtained from an old cotton-gin close at hand, a new bridge was speedily constructed; and on the 14th, at 3.30 o’clock in the pe|), afternoon. Meridian was entered and occupied, the Confederates having already retired. Polk had gone to De- mopolis that morning at 10.30. One entire train was found burning at the depot. With this exception, all the rolling-stock had been removed to Mobile or Selma. It was only eleven days since the expedition had left Vicksburg. Meridian, as we have seen already, was in the very heart of the enemy’s country, yet the Nationals, in their eleven days’ march, ‘ encountered almost no opposition. This expedition did much to reveal the inherent weak- ness of the Confederacy. It was a preliminary to the march to the sea; and there can be no doubt that his ex- perience on this occasion encouraged Sherman to undertake that later and more daring enterprise. 612 THE MEKIDIAN EXPEDITION. As General Smith had not arrived, it was not deemed prudent to pursue the Confederates. Sherman’s object was to destroy this stronghold of the Confederacy. The work of destruction was commenced at once. Ten thousand men, armed with axes, sledges, crow- bars and clawbars, went to work with a will; and, at the end of five days. Meridian, with its depots, w’arehouses, arsenal, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments, was utterly destroyed. Fire completed the terrible work of de- struction. The inhabited houses alone were spared. Hurlbut had charge to the north and east of the town. Mc- Pherson was entrusted with the south and west. They did their work thor- oughly. Hurlbut reported the destruc- tion of 60 miles of ties and iron burned and bent, one locomotive de- stroyed, and 8 bridges burned. Mc- Pherson reported 55 miles of railroad destroyed, 53 bridges, 6075 feet of trestle-work below Quitman, 19 loco- motives, 28 cars and 3 steam saw-mills burned or ruined. To make the work of restoration more difficult, the rails, in large quantities, when torn up, were placed on the blazing piles of timber, brought to a red-heat, and then twist- ed round a tree or other object into wffiat the men playfully called Jeff. Davis’ neck-ties.” A twisted rail was henceforth useless. In addition to the destruction wrought in the town itself, the railroads were ruined as far south as below Quitman ; east as far as Cuba Station ; north to Lauderdale Springs, and west the whole way to Jackson; and among the places which shared the fate of Meridian were Jackson, Enterprise, Marion, Quitman, Hills- boro, Canton, Lake Station, Decatur, Bolton and Lauderdale Springs. It was rough work, which will not soon be wholly forgiven or forgotten ; but it was rendered necessary by the exi- gencies pf the situation ; and, rough as it was, it was not a violation of tlie principles of civilized warfare. Sherman remained at Meridian for several days, impatiently waiting for Smith and his cavalry. But he waited in vain. Smith, it will be remem- bered, who was at the head of 7000 mounted troops, a brigade of infantiy, and a respectable artillery force, was ordered to leave Memphis on the 1st of February, and so to regulate his movements as to be able to effect a junction with Sherman on or about the 10th. Sherman did not arrive until the 14th. Smith, according to the ar- rangements made, ought to have been forward. Day after day passes by ; cavalry are sent out in all directions; but tidings of Smith or of his troops are nowhere to be found. What has become of this force ? Let us see. Smith, it appears, had from some cause delayed his departure from Memphis. His second in command was Brigadier- General Grierson, who had w^on so much distinction by his famous raid from La Grange to Baton Bouge in the spring of the previous year. The troops were gathered in from Middle Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and concentrated at Colliersville, some twenty-four miles east of Memphis. It was not until- the 11th of the month SMITHES RETREAT. 613 that they commenced their march from Colliers ville, a day later than that fixed for their arrival at Meridian. Pushing on as rapidly as possible, they crossed the Tallahatchie, at New Albany, at noon, and encamped four miles south of that place. Continuing their march, they pressed on in the direction of Okolona, passing through Pontotoc at one o’clock in the afternoon of the 17th, and reaching Okolona on the 18th. On the 20th, they encountered the enemy for the first time, in the neighborhood of West Point. They were now joined by large bodies of ne- groes, who, for the first time, saw the National troops. There was some hard fighting on the 20th. It was resumed on the 21st; and, on the 22d, Forrest fell with tremendous force on the Na- tional rear and flank at Okolona. A scene of the wildest confusion fol- lowed, the Second Iowa becoming panic- stricken, and stampeding the whole of Colonel McCrellis’ brigade. Order was speedily restored ; the Seventh Indiana and the Second brigade rallying, hold- ing the enemy in check, and doing splendid work. As twilight approached, a magnificent charge was made by the Seventh Indiana, under the eye of General Smith himself, driving the enemy back with terrible slaughter It was now dark ; and Smith, ignorant of the strength of the enemy, and bf^lieving that he was greatly outnumbered, or- dered a retreat. The dead and wounded were left on the field. The mules, pris- oners and negroes were placed in the advance. At ten o’clock, a halt was made until four in the morning, when the march was resumed. The Confed- ' erates continued to follow. The National rear was incessantly engaged, but was successful in holding the enemy in check. On the afternoon of the 23d, the Talla- hatchie, at New Albany, was recrossed, and the bridge destroyed. Colliers- ville was reached on the 27th, and the wearied and dispirited troops, the regi- ments torn and tattered, were a^ain in camp. It was an unfortunate affair, and resulted in the loss of at least 200 men. A little more bravery on the part of the National troops, and the re- sult must have been altogether differ- ent; for the entire force under Forrest did not exceed 3000 men. As it was. Smith had the satisfaction of knowing that he had burned about 3000 bales of cotton and over 1,000,000 bushels of corn, and that he had captured over 100 prisoners, about 1000 mules, and a large number of negroes, up to that date held in bondage. Sherman, meanwhile, had left Meri- dian on the 20th, making his return march thi'ough Canton, 20i north of the line of the advance. At Canton, 15 locomotives were captured, but the train was spared. All along his line of march, crowds of fugitive slaves flocked to the army for protec- tion. An eye-witness has given us a vivid picture of this strange scene. ’“From 4000 to 7000 slaves accompa- nied the return of the expedition. I defy any human being to look on the scene unmoved. Old men, with the frosts of seventy years upon their heads; men in the prime of manhood; youths, and children that could barely 970 .14 THE MEEIDIAN EXPEDITION. run ; women with their babes at their breasts. They came, some of them it is true, with shouts and careless laughter, but silent tears coursed down many a cheek — tears of thankfulness for their great deliverance. There were faces in that crowd which shone with a joy al- most inspired. Smile who will, but the story of the coming of the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt can never recall to my mind a more pro- found emotion than the remembrance of that scene. When I looked upon the long line of National soldiers filing throuerh roads in which our slaughtered brothers lie thicker than sheaves in a harvest held, and reflected on the hor- rors to which this lace has been sub- jected by the foes whom we are fight- ing, I felt faith in a God of justice renewed in my heart.” From Canton, the fugitive negroes were sent forward In an advance train to Vicksburg. Sherman had again won for himself fresh laurels. He had done a great work. If he had not accomplished the great object of the expedition, and, by moving upon and destroying Selma, by wheeling around and taking posses- sion of Mobile, and thus rendering un- necessary the future march to the sea, he had, at least, severely punished and greatly crippled the Confederacy. He had destroyed 150 miles of railroad, 10,000 bales of cotton, 2,000,000 bush- ds of corn, 20 locomotives, 28 cars, 67 bridges and 7000 feet of trestle-work. Te had captured 200 pilsoners, several thousand horses and mules and 300 vagons. He had done what was still more noble — he had liberated not fewer than 8000 negroes. His own loss scarcely exceeded 170 men. Sherman left the expedition in care of General Hurlbut on the 27th, pgij, and proceeded to Vicksburg, 27# whence he started, on the 28th, on a hurried visit to New Orleans, to confer with Banks and Porter regarding the projected campaign against Shreveport It was not until his return from New Orleans to Vicksburg that he learned the result of Smith’s attempt to co-ope- rate with him at Meridian. He was ill- satisfied with Smith’s own account of the affair. His reports to me,” he says, “ are unsatisfactory. He delayed his start until the 11th, when his orders were to be at Meridian on the 10th, and when he knew that I was march- ing from Vicksburg. The mode of his return to Memphis was not what I had expected ; he had nothing to deal with but Forrest and the militia. I hope he will make these points more clear to the general-in-chief.” When Sherman set out for Meridian, two important diversions were made in his favor — one by Farragut against Mobile Harbor, another by a portion of Porter’s fleet and a body of armed men, up the Yazoo. The Mobile diver- sion was completely successful ; for, although no fighting was done, the ap- pearance of the National fleet led the Confederates to expect an attack, and prevented them from sending reinforce- ments to Polk. The expedition up the Yazoo was attended with considerable success. The boats, four in number — Petrel, Marmora, Echange and Romeo --.-were commanded by Lieutenant E YAZOO CITY. G15 K. Owen. The land troops, which con- sisted of the Eleventh Illinois infantry, Eighth Louisiana infantry and First Tvlississippi cavalry — the two latter col- ored — were commanded by Colonel James H. Coates. This expedition pushed its way as far as Fort Pember- ton. After spending some days in loading cotton, Coates re-embarked his men ; and the vessels returned to Yazoo City, with 1600 bales of cotton. Hav- ing established his headquaiters here, a Confederate force soon appeared in considerable strength, under Ross and Richardson. On the morning of Mar. March, a severe en- counter took place; and Coates’ headquarters were literally riddled with shot and shell. The fight lasted the greater part of the day. It ]*aged most fiercely at an earth- work, in the form of a redoubt, about half a mile from the town. Into this work Coates had thrown Major McKee, with three companies of his own regiment, the Eleventh Illinois. While Ross was engaged with the troops in the town, Richardson fell with great fury on Mc- Kee, flinging into the redoubt shot and shell with terrible j)recision. Richard- son made a call for surrender, under the pretense that all the Nationals had been taken prisoners. McKee returned an indignant refusal, telling him if he wanted them, to come and take them.” Another call for surrender was made — this time, in the name of God and hu- manity, and coupled with the threat that, in case of I’efusal, the place would be stormed and reduced in ten minutes. The answer was the same. Richardson might come and take it McKee ex- pressed his regret that he should have coupled his demand with a threat, and assured him that if the fight was to go on with that understanding, he should kill every man he captured. At this juncture, the Confederates in the toAvn were yielding to the steady pressure of the Nationals. At five o’clock in the afternoon, the route became general, Coates and McKee remaining masters of their respective positions. It was a spirited contest, and reflected the high- est credit on Colonel Coates and his entire command. His fighting force, including the negroes, scarcely exceed- ed 1000 men, while that of the ene- my was scarcely under 2300. The negroes, it was observed, fought with great bravery. In this engagement, the Nationals lost 18 killed, 85 Avound- ed and 19 missing — the larger propor- tion of the killed and wounded being colored. AYith the results of the expedition up the Yazoo, Sherman was but little satisfied. It was his opinion, at the time, that Coates would have done bet- ter if he had retained the boats and pushed up the river. Coates, however, was best qualified how to judge. He had, by means of a reconnoissance, made by Colonel Osband and the First Missouri cavalry, ascertained that For- rest was in force in Grenada. As it was, the expedition drove the guerrillas from the banks of the Mississippi, and, no doubt, occupied troops which otherwise might have given Sherman annoyance. The unsuccessful effort of General Smith to reach Meridian, and unite his THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. forces with those of Sherman, i-edoiind- ed somewhat to the glory of General Forrest. He was not unwilling to take some praise to himself ; and the Confederate authorities, fully aware that but for him the disasters which had befallen them, through the Meri- dian Expedition, might have been much more serious, were pleased to enlarge his sphere of duty and to increase his authority. Although still subordinate to Stephen D. Lee, commander-in-chief of the mounted men in that region, he was granted a so]’t of roving commis- sion. It was evident that a great struggle was impending, and must soon take place between the opposing forces in Northern Georgia. Forrest was charged with the special duty of keep- ing well employed the National forces then on the line of the Mississippi, from Vicksburg to Cairo, and so pre- vent them from reinforcing the army opposed to Johnston. The arrange- ments which were being made for the Shreveport or Red River Expedition had the immediate effect of withdraw- ing large numbers of troops from Vicksburg, and thus of weakening the National line in the direction just men- tioned. Forrest at once took full ad- vantage of his opportunity. At the head of a band of about 5000 men, all imbued with his own fierce and trucu- lent spirit, he made a rush up from Northern Mississippi into West Ten- nessee. He rested for a time at Jack- son, and then pushed on towards Ken- tucky. At that time, LTnion City, a fortified place in the northwestern part of Tennessee, was garrisoned by 450 of the Eleventh Tennessee caval- ry, under Colonel Hawkins. Against Union City, Forrest sent a detachment, under Colonel Faulkner. That officer appeared before the place on the 24th of March, and demanded its surrender. Hawkins refused, 24. and was* attacked. He succeeded, how- ever, in driving the enemy back. A second attack was made ; and Hawkins, against the wishes of his men, suiTen^ dered the garrison, with about 200 horses and 500 small arms. A little more stubborn determination on the part of the National commander, and Union City and the garrison might have been saved; ’for, at the moment of surrender. General Brayman, who had hurried from Cairo to Hawkins’ relief, was only six miles distant. Hickman, on the Mississippi, after the fall of Union City, fell an easy prey to the Confederates. Forrest, embold- ened by success, accompanied by Bu- ford and General A. P. Thompson, moved directly from Jackson on Pa- ducah. This latter place was then oc- cupied by a force not exceeding 700 men, under Colonel S. G. Hicks. Made aware of the approach of Forrest, Hicks threw his troops into Fort An- derson, in the lower suburbs of the town. Having made a furious but un- successful assault on the fort, Forrest made a demand for its suiTender, threatening, in the event of refusal, to carry the works by storm and massacre the garrison. The threat was unheed- ed; and the garrison, obtaining some effective assistance from the gunboats Peosta and Paw-Paw, the Confederate FORT PILLOW. 617 general was compelled to content him- self with what plunder he could find. Hearing of the approach of rein- forcements from Cairo, he decamped on the 27th, having lost, it was es- timated, over 300 men killed and wounded. Among the killed was Gen- eral Thompson, who was torn in pieces by a shell. The National loss was 14 killed and 46 wounded. Forrest’s attention was next turned to Fort Pillow. Hurlbiit, it will be remembered, was instructed by Sher- man to evacuate that post, before he joined him at Vicksburg to take part in the expedition to Meridian. These instructions, for some reason or other, were not fully carried out. The place was still garrisoned by about 550 men, excluding officers. Of the soldiers, 200 were colored, and under the immediate command of Major L. F. Booth. The i*emainder were under the command of Major W. F. Bradford. Booth had April chief command. On the morning of the 13th of April, Forrest ap- proached the fort, drove in the pickets, and commenced the assault. The situation of the fort was pecu- liar. It stood on a high bluff, which descended precipitately towards the river, that side being covered with trees, bushes and fallen timber. Above and below the fort, and extending back from the river, was a ravine or hollow. The ravine above the fort, known as Cold Creek, was covered with trees and bushes. The ravine below was covered, for the most part, with government buildings. The ar- mament of the place consisted of 2 six- pounder and 2 twelve-pounder howitz- ers, and 2 ten-pounder Parrotts. The assault was savagely made. The garri- son, however, fought with great brav- ery, fiercely resisting the attempts made by the Confederates to force their way into the outworks. Both officers and men fearlessly exposed themselves. The gunboat New Era, Captain Mar- shall, was at hand, and attempted to render the garrison some assistance; but the nature of the ground enabled the Confederates to elude the fire of its guns. About nine o’clock, Major Booth was killed. Bradford immedi- ately took command ; and, having called the whole force within the fort, he made a gallant resistance, until it was past the hour of noon. About this time, to allow the guns to cool, the fire of both parties slackened. The New Era withdrew for a similar purpose, having fired 282 rounds of shell, shrap- nel and canister, which nearly ex- hausted her ammunition. At this stage, Forrest sent a flag of truce, with a (iemand for unconditional surrender Bradford asked time to consult with his brother-officers and with the cap- tain of the New Era. Another flag of truce, and another demand more per- emptory than before. Bradford must surrender within twenty minutes or the assault will be renewed. Bradford declined, and prepared to renew the struggle. It was not long until it be- came apparent that Forrest had been playing a most treacherous and cow- ardly game. During the progress of the negotiations, he had been pushing his men stealthily forward into the ra- 618 THE METIIDIAX EXPEDITIOX. vines, and, under cover of the trees and bushes, securing advantageous po- sitions, from which, at the word of command, they could effectually spring upon the fort. This shameful viola- tion of one of the most sacred princi- ples of civilized warfare was noticed by Captain Marshall, but he refrained from firing on the foe lest, in the event of defeat, it should be made a pretext for a cruel and barbarous re- venge. Pretext for brutality, it was soon discovered, was not necessary. A bi*u- tal massacre had already been resolved upon. As soon as Bradford’s answer was received, the signal was given ; Forrest’s men rushed fi’om the posi- tions which they had so treacherously obtained ; and, with fierce yells, and such cries as “No quarter,” “Kill the damned niggers,” “ Shoot them down,” they went bounding over the parapet and into the fort. But little opportu- nity was allowed for resistance. Panic- stricken, the troops, black and white, threw down their arms, madly rush- ing to places of shelter, and vainly and piteously calling for mercy. The scenes which followed were harrowing beyond all description. An indisci-im- inate slaughter was at once commenced. No work of the tomahawk or scalping- knife ever surpassed in j)ure savagery what then took place. No respect was paid to age or sex, to white or black, to soldier or civilian. It was a ruth- less butchery. Some, in pure despair, rushed down the steep bluff, seeking shelter in vain under cover of the trees. Some flung themselves into the watei*. only to become targets for the Confed- erate rifles. The massacre was as de- liberate as it was brutal. The hosj)’- tals were entered, and the sick and wounded were either butchered where they lay, or dragged out to be shot. Men, in some instances, were gathered together in groups, and shot down where they stood. The instances of special and wanton cruelty were nu- merous. One poor soldier, who was wounded and unable to stand, was com- pelled to get to his feet, that his tor- mentors might have a fair shot at him. A negro boy was seen holding a horse which a Confederate was mountins:. As soon as the savage was in the sad- dle, the boy was shot dead for his pains. The murderous work went on until the darkness. It was resumed, however, with the return of day. A Committee of Congress subse- quently took evidence on the affair. The facts brought to light were horid- ble beyond description. Men, it was proved, were not only shot in cold blood, and drowned, but were even crucified, buried alive, nailed to the floors of houses which were then set on fire. “ No cruelty,” says the report of this committee, “ which the most fiendish malignity could devise, was omitted by these murderers. From 300 to 400 men are known to have been killed at Fort Pillow, of whom at least 300 were murdered in cold blood, after the post was in possession of the rebels, and our men had thrown down their arms and ceased to offer resistance.” The case of Major Brad- ford deserves special mention. He GUM TOWN. 619 was being conveyed under guard to Jackson, Tennessee, when he was sud- denly led aside about fifty yards from the line of march, and deliberately murdered. After having pled in vain for his life, on the ground that he had made a fair and honorable fight, he fell, pierced by three musket balls. Bradford was a Southern man by birth. He had chosen to remain loyal to the Federal government. This was his one offense; but it was unpardonable in the eyes of Forrest and his myrmidons. The moral effect of the Fort Pillow massacre was highly detrimental to the Southern cause. It revealed a spirit which ^was offensive to the entire Christian world ; and from that day the number of Confederate sympa- thizers was sensibly diminished. For- rest won for himself an infamous noto- riety; and the odor of his iniquity attached more or less to every member of the Confederate government. On the day after the capture of Fort Pillow, Buford appeared before Co- lumbus, and, imitating the example just set him by Forrest, demanded an un- conditional surrender. “ Should you surrender,” he said, “ the negroes now in arms will be returned to their mas- ters. Should I be compelled to take the place by force, no quarter icill he shmvn negro troops whatever. '''' The de- mand was refused ; and Buford, not deeming it advisable to attack, retired and joined Forrest, when both made a rapid retreat out of Tennessee. Gen- eral Sturgis, at the head of 12,000 men, then at Memphis, was ordered to follow in pursuit. Forrest, however. had a good start; and by the time Sturgis reached Bolivar, the Confede- rate I’aiders had crossed Wolf Biver, and cari-ied their plunder safely into Northern Tennessee. A few weeks later it became known that Forrest was gathering together a powerful force, much lai’ger than he had ever yet commanded; and the supposition was that he meditated another raid into Tennessee and Kentucky. Stur- gis, who had now been reinforced by General A. J. Smith, who had just re- turned from the Bed Biver region, was again sent after the bold and dashing Confederate. The National commander had under him a force of 9000 infantry and artillery, with some 3000 cavalry, under General Grierson. At Gum Town, on the Mobile and Ohio Bailroad, Grierson, who led the advance, came into contact with some of Forrest’s horsemen. The Confede- rates were well p(jsted on a command- ing ridge. The battle soon became furious ; and Grierson notified Sturgis, who, with the infantry and artilleiy, was some six miles in the rear. Sturgis hurried forward at the double- quick. The day was intensely hot ; and the inconveniences of the march were increased by a train of about 200 wagons. When Sturgis came up, he found that Grierson was being sorely pressed ; and, without resting his men, or taking time to consider the propriety of a flank movement on the enemy, he hurried his men into the very thick of the fight. It was a rash act; and it resulted most disastrously. The Con- federates, flushed with success in their C20 THE MERIDIAN EXPEDITION. encounter with Grierson and his cavalry, fell with tremendous fury on Sturgis’ infantry; and, in a brief space, the entire National force, utterly defeated, and hopelessly cut off from the wagon train, was driven back in confusion. But for the gallant resistance made by the Second brigade, under Colonel Winslow, the retreat would have been most disastrous. As it was, when Sturgis reached Memphis, he found that he had left behind 3500 men, with everything in the shape of stores. This happened in June. Early in July, another expedition was sent against Forrest. It was placed in charge of General A. J. Smith. For- rest, it was known, was in the neigh- borhood of Tupelo, where he had established his headquarters. It was estimated that he had under him a force of about 14,000 men. General Smith, proceeding from Salisbury, about fifty miles east of Memphis, marched in the direction of Tupelo, with an estimated force of 1 2,000. At Pontotoc, on the July 12th of July, Smith felt the 12i presence of the enemy. A vig- orous encounter having ensued, the Confederates were repulsed. At Tu- pelo, on the 13th, the enemy was en- countered in still greater force, and again repulsed, after a sharp battle. On the same day, the attack Was re- peated, the Confederates, this time, being severely punished, and driven from the field with heavy loss. Smith now retraced his steps towards Mem- phis, and, for the space of three weeks, l^ug, rested his men. On the 4th of I* August he again set out, at the head of 10,000 men, and, entering Mis- sissippi, he advanced as far as the Tal- lahatchie. He could find no trace of Forrest or of his men. The Confede- rate chief, however, was not idle. In the absence of Smith from Memphis, he made a dash upon that city, enter- ing it on the morning of the Aug, 21st, and making directly for the 21, Gayoso House, where he expected to find Generals Hurlbut, Washburne and Buckland. He failed of his intended purpose ; but he made some prison- ers, and carried off considerable booty. It was thus that Forrest, during the spring and summer of 1864, gave occupation to the National troops in those regions, and prevented rein- forcements from being sent to operate against Johnston’s army in Northern Georgia. In this chapter, it has been our duty to present war in one of its least attrac- tive aspects. Of the pomp, the splendor, the magnificence of the battle field we have had nothing to record. We have seen the war fiend rioting in destruc- tiveness and savagery. We have had no occasion to admire the generous impulse, or to applaud the noble motive. The fearful destruction of property accom- plished by Sherman was well fitted to aggravate the South, and to arouse the spirit of revenge ; but his conduct was justified by all the higher necessities of war. The brutality of Forrest at Fort Pillow was not only without excuse- — it was in open violation of every princi- ple of honor, of every high and gener- ous motive; and the infamy of the deed must ever attach to his name. PKEPARATIONS. G21 CIIAPTEH XXXII. rreparations for the Campaign. — Sherman and Banks. — Seasons for the Campaign. — Mistaken Opinions. — Banks and Porter. — A. J. Smith. — The Plan of Operations. — The Confederate Forces. — Banks and Frank- lin. — Smith Beconnoitering. — Fort da Russy. — A Brisk Cannonade. — The Gunboats. — Destruction of Fort de Russy. — The Way to Alexandria Opened. — At Alexandria. — Porter’s Letter. — Arrival of Banks. — Off for Shreveijort. — The Fleet at the Rapids. — Low Water. — Discouraging Circumstances. — The Fleet Above the Rapids. — Banks at Natchitoches. — Porter at Grand Ecore. — Obstructions in the River. — The New Falls City; — The Fleet at Springfield Landing. — Unpleasant News. — Battle at Natchitoches. — General A. L. Lee in Pursuit of the Enemy. — Crump’s Hill. — Arrival of Franklin at Natchitoches. — The Enemy at Bay. — AViLson’s Farm^ — Patrick’s Bayou. — Sabine Cross Roads. — The Confederates in Force. — Kirby Smith. — Banks at the Front and Taking Personal Control. — Order of Battle. — The Battle Begun. — The Confederate Attack. — The Nationals Driven Back. — Arrival of Franklin and Cameron. — A New Line Formed. — A Disastrous Onslaught. — A PaniOi — A Rout. — “Bull Run Nothing in Comparison.” — Pleasant Grove. — Emory’s Division Checks the Retreat. — An- other Fierce Encounter. — The Nationals Victorious. — The Retreat Resumed. — Pleasant Hill. — Emory Again Attacked. — A Fierce Onslaught. — Arrival of A. J. Smith. — The Confederates Resisted and Routed. — A Coun- cil of War. — The Retreat Continued. — Banks as a General. — His Management Defective. — The Fleet on its Backward Course. — The Osage Aground. — Gallantry of Kilby Smith. — General Green Killed. — The Eastport Aground. — Attempts to Save Her. — Blown Up. — The Battery at the Mouth of the Cane River. — The Cricket Under the Fire of the Battery. — A Narrow Escape. — The Army at Cane River. — Battle of Cane River. — A National Victory. — Battle at Clouterville. — The Army at Alexandria. — The Fleet at the Rapids. — The Red River Dammed. — A Great Engineering Feat. — Exciting Scenes. — The Rapids Passed. — Honors to Colonel Bailey. — The Army Reinforced. — The Signal, Covington and City Belle Captured. — Alexandria in Flames.- — Departure of the Army and Fleet. — A Terror-Stricken People. — The Army and Navy at Simmsport. — Gen- eral Canby in Command of the Army. — Porter Resumes his Station on the Mississippi. — The Army at New Orleans. — Smith Proceeds to Memphis. — Steele’s Movements in Arkansas. — Steele at Camden. — His Retreatv — Battle at Jenkins Ferry. — The Nationals Victorious. — Steele’s Army Safe in Little Rock. — End of an Ex- pedition which was Disastrous in All its Parts. General Banks, as has already been mentioned, was making active pre- a grand movement up the Bed Biver, at the time Sherman was engaged on bis Meridian campaign. As soon as Sherman returned from that expedition, he proceeded to New Or- leans, and had an interview with Banks. A plan of campaign up the Bed Biver was agreed upon ; and all necessary ar- rangements were completed with the utmost despatch. There were many reasons why it was deemed desirable by the Washington parations f or government, and particularly by the military authorities, to obtain a firm hold on the Bed Biver, and to convert Shreveport into a National stronghold. The operations of the French in Mexico had occasioned some disquietude in Washington;* and the possession of Shreveport, it was thought, with the .necessary communications, would make it more easy to re-establish the National authority in Texas. It was the opin- ion of the president that the possession of Shreveport would make it less diffi- cult to establish a loyal government jn 622 SHREVEPORT. Louisiana. Banks, it is understood, althougli not greatly in favor of the expedition, on account of the difficulties to be encountered and overcome, was yet not unwilling to run the risk, be- cause of the advantages which success w^ould ensure. There were immense supplies of cotton in Texas. If these could be secured, it would be a pecun- iary benefit to the National govern- ment. Halleck had long been in favor of some sucli movement as that which was about to be made. As early as November, 1862, in his letter of instruc- tions to Banks, he says: “Having the Red River in our possession, it would form the best base for operations in Texas.” Grant, with a clearer insight into the situation, never expected much from the expedition, believing it to be greatly more important to win victories in Virginia or Georgia, than in Louisiana; and Sherman, al- though disposed to lend it encourage- ment, was of the opinion that if it could not be accomplished with the utmost rapidity, say in thirty days, it had better not be undertaken at all. Shreveport, before the war, was a place of considerable importance and wealth. At its port there were annu- ally shipped over 40,000 bales of cot- ton, besides large numbers of cattle for the supply of the New Orleans market. The capital of Caddo Parish, Louisiana, 150 miles west of Vicksburg, and 155. miles northwest of the mouth of the Red River, as the crow flies, it is at the head of navigation for large steamers, and the only accessible point on the west side of the river, for more than 100 miles. By the beginning of March, the ar- rangements were completed; and the expedition was ready to start. Banks was to move from New Orleans, by railroad, to Brashear City, and thence by the Bayou Teche and Opelousas to Alexandria. Admiral Porter was to move ffom Vicksburg, with a powerful fleet of armed steamers, and proceed to the mouth of the Red River. Smith, with some 10,000 of Sherman’s veterans, was to embark at Vicksburg, to join Porter and his fleet at the mouth of the Red River ; thence to proceed up the river, and, after capturing Fort de Russy, to form a junction with Banks, at Alex- andria. It was distinctly understood that General Steele, who was at Little Rock with a force of some 15,000 men, would co-operate in the general move- ment, and form a junction with Banks and Smith at or near Shreveport. The Confederate forces, it was known, were strong in that region, and favor- ably posted for offering resistance to an invading army. Magruder was in Texas, in the neighborhood of Galves- ton and Houston, with about 15,000 men; Walker, with 7000 men, guarded a line which stretched from Opelousas to Fort de Russy; Mouton, with 6000 men, lay between the Black and Washita Rivers, from Red River to Monroe ; while Price, with about 5000 infantry, and from 7000 to 10,000 cav- alry, occupied a line extending from Monroe to Camden and Arkadelphia. This entire force was under the direc- tion of General Kirby Smith. After leaving a sufficient number of men to guard the Texan coast, and providing FORT DE RUSSY. 623 for the wants of Arkansas more to the north, it would not be difficult for that general so to concentrate his forces as to have a serviceable army of, at least, 30,000 men on the line of the E.ed Kiver, and so disposed as to be able to give serious annoyance to an invading army. General Banks, in consequence of other and important duties, which re- quired his presence temporarily at New Orleans, entrusted his part of the ex- pedition to General Franklin, formerly of the army of the Potomac. Frank- lin had instructions to move on the Mar. 7th of March, and to be at Alex- andria, if at all possible, on the 17th. It was the 13th before he was able to reach the Teche region. Ad- miral Porter was at the mouth of the Red River on the 7th, with a fleet of 15 iron-clads and 4 light steamers; and there, four days later, he was joined by the transports, with four divisions of Sherman’s army, under General A. J. Smith, and the marine brigade, some 3000 strong, under General Al- fred Ellet. On the morning of the l^far, 12th, the entire fleet began to 12 . move up the Old River, the Eastport leading the way. The Old River is an arm of the Red River, and connects with the Atchafalaya. On the same evening, the fleet anchored off the ruins of Simmsport, that place hav- ing been destroyed during the siege of Port Hudson. Next morning, there being as yet no signs of Banks or his troops, Smith disembarked a small force for the pui’pose of reconnoitering. It was soon discovered that the Confede- rates had been present in considerable numbers at Simmsport, also Bayou Glace and Yellow Bayou, but that they had fallen back to Fort de Russy, some thirty miles distant. Smith de- cided to land the whole column and march it overland to Fort de Russy. At daybreak, on the morning of ]>iar. the 14th, the landing was effect- H* ed ; and the entire column moved for- ward in light marching order, Moore’s brigade in advance. Fort de Russy, situated at Gordon’s Landing, on the south bank of the Red River, and some seventy miles from its mouth, was a formidable quadrangular work, with bastions and bomb-proofs, covered with railroad iron, connected with a water battery, the casemates of which seemed capable of withstanding the heaviest shot and shell. The ar- mament, as was afterwards discovered, consisted of eight heavy guns and two field-pieces. About three o’clock on the afternoon of the 14th, after a harassing march, during which they had frequent and severe encounters with the enemy’s cavalry, the Nationals reached the inner edge of the woods which skirt the open ground in front of the fort. Under cover of the woods, two batter- ies were hastily thrown up. The pres- ence of the Nationals had already been discovered ; and four guns on the fort were pouring forth shot and shell on their position. The batteries soon opened fire in reply. A brisk cannon- ade was kept up for the space of two hours, when there was a heavy f usilade, and then a vigorous charge, led by the 624 SHREVEPORT. Fifty-Eighth Illinois and the Eighth Wisconsin. At this critical moment, the obstructions in the river having been removed, two of the gunboats — the Eastport and the Neosho — came up within range of the fort and fired a few shots. It was not deemed safe to continue the fire from the gunboats, so close now’ were the land troops to the fort. A few minutes later and the ditch w^as reached ; the garrison sur- lendered ; and the flag of the Union, planted by the color-sergeant of the Fifty-Eighth Illinois, was fioating over th(3 works of Fort de Russy. The Confederate loss was 250 men made prisoners, ten guns, 1000 muskets, and all the munitions of war. It appeared that General Walker, having left 300 men to protect the fort, had retired some hours before, with the expectation of meeting the National troops and offering them battle. Hav- ing taken a different road from that by which they were approaching, he failed to meet them. His presence might have given a different complexion to the fight ; there might have been a larger loss of life ; but the final result could hardly have been other than it was. A small force was left in the fort, with instructions to blow it up. The work of destruction was hastened and com- pleted by an accident on the 17th. The way to Alexandria, on the Red River, about 150 miles above, was now open. As soon as Fort de Russy bad been captured, Admii’al Poi'ter, determined to obtain possession of Alexandria before the arrivah of the fugitives, hurried forward his two fast- est vessels, the Ouachita and Lexing- ton, follow^ed by the Eastport. Gen- eral Smith’s troops were at the same time put on board the transports and sent up the river, the remainder of the fleet following. Alexandria was occupied without opposition on the 16th, tl}e Confederates, after burning two steamboats and a considerable (piantity of cotton, having made their escape up the river, taking with them some of their own gunboats. At Alex- andria were found several thousand bales of cotton ; and food of every kind existed in abundance. “ There is,” said Admiral Porter, in a letter to the secretary of the navy, “ a surpris- ing abundance of every kind of food in this country, and no suffering among the people, except for luxuries. It would be folly to suppose they could all be starved out. The only way is to take possession of this rich region, hold it with a strong military and naval force, and enforce the laws. There are some good Union men here who have sufft^i^ed much. I hope the day of their deliverance has come.” It has already been mentioned that General Franklin had not been able to leave the Teche region, with Banks’ column, until the 13th. On his way he met with little opposition ; ^jar. and, on the 19th, Banks’ cavalry, under General A. L. Lee, began to pour into Alexandria. On the follow- ing day, Lee was joined by General Charles P. Stone, Banks’ chief of staff, and other members of that officer’s military famil}^ Banks, himself, ar- rived and established his headquartei*s DISCOURAGEMENTS. 625 at Alexandria on the 24th ; but his whole column, composed of the Nine- teenth and a portion of the Thirteenth army corps, was not fully forward until the 26th. It was the earnest desire of General Banks that Porter should accompany him as far as Shreveport, so that in any encounter with the enemy, he should have the full benefit of the gunboats. Porter, although brave and ever will- ing, could not be expected to perform impossibilities ; and difificulties almost insuperable lay in his way. Immedi- ately above Alexandria there are rapids in the Red River. At this time the water in the river was very low — so low that, in the deeper water below the rapids, it was with difficulty Porter could move along his heavier iron- clads. By main force, the Eastport was dragged over the rocks ; other ves- sels followed ; and, after more than a week’s incessant toil, one half of the fieet was in the deeper waters above. The hospital ship, Woodford, was wrecked in the rapids. The transports could not be got over; and, as they were desired by McPherson at Vicks- burg, they were permitted to return to the Mississippi. • This was a great loss to General Banks. It robbed him direct- ly of 3000 men, and indirectly of 3000 more, who were now needed to guard the depot of supplies at Alexandria, and the wagon-trains which conveyed the supplies from vessels below to vessels above the rapids. Banks, indeed, at this particular juncture, had much to discourage him. He had not counted on any hindrances from low water in the river. It was his belief that the troops under Smith might be spared from the expedition within, at least, thirty days after their arrival at Alex- andria; and he had so told Sherman. On the 15th of March, General Grant wrote Banks, informing him that on no account could the troops detached from Sherman’s army be allowed to remain with him more than ten or fifteen days longer than the time origin- ally specified, and that, unless he felt satisfied that the object of the expedi- tion could be accomplished within that period, he was to return the troops on the day at first agreed upon, even if the expedition should be abandoned. “I had much rather,” said Grant in another despatch, “ that the Red River Expedition had never been begun, than that you should be detained one day beyond the 1st of May in commencing the movement east of the Mississippi.” It had already become apparent to many that the expedition was to prove a failure. Banks must already have had his own misgivings as to the wis- dom of proceeding further up the river. It was now known that it would V^e impossible to move the heavier gun- boats beyond Grand Ecore. The sup- plies from that point would have to be conveyed partly, at least, in wagon- trains. These, of course, would have to be guarded; and to do this effec- tually would imply a further diminu- tion of his already unduly diminished army. Then, again, information had reached him that large bodies of Con- federates were arriving from Texas and Arkansas, and that Taylor and Price SHREVEPORT. C2G and Green were concentrating in great strength in his front. It was estimated that the combined forces of these gen- erals amounted to 25,000 men, with over 70 guns. Add to all this that he had heard nothing of Steele, and that he en- tertained only a doubtful hope of receiv- ing from him any efficient assistance. Banks, however, was anxious to pro- ceed, and accomplish, if possible, the chief object of the expedition — the capture of Shreveport. In this desire he was seconded by Smith. The men in both commands seemed as eager as their respective chiefs to complete the task they had undertaken. Banks was now at Natchitoches. /\pni He arrived at that place on the 4th of April, Franklin, his sec- ond in command, having come up with the main body of the army the day before. On the 6th the march was re- sumed in the direction of Shreveport, by the Mansfield road. A. L, Lee, with the cavalry, led the advance. Ransom followed with two thin divi- sions, of the Thirteenth army corps. Emory brought up the rear with the First division, of the Nineteenth army corps, and a brigade of colored troops which had just come up from Port Hudson. A. J. Smith, with his two divisions, of the Sixteenth army corps, followed two days later. Some 2500 of Smith’s men, under T. Kilby Smith, had been sent up the river on trans- ports to act as a guard to the fleet. Banks’ available force at this time was estimated to be about 20,000 or 25,000 men. Porter had reached Grand Ecore about the same time that the army arrived at Natchitoches. It was at this place he was joined by the trans- ports, some 20 in number, filled with supplies, and having Smith’s troops on board. Porter, without delay, com- pleted his arrangements for a further movement up the river. The river was vevy shallow, much to his annoy- ance. He had, therefore, to content himself with his lighter vessels. The others were left behind. On the 7th, taking with him the Cricket, Fort Hindman, Lexington, Osage, Neosho and Chillicothe, and 20 transports, with General Smith’s troops on board, and abundance of supplies. Porter started for Shreveport. It had been arranged that on the third day the fleet should be opposite Springfield, and should there come to anchor and communicate with the army, a portion of which, it was expected, would be in the immediate neighborhood. In his upward course. Porter tells us, he experienced very great difficul- ties. He, nevertheless, reached the appointed place within an hour of the time specified. At that point he met his first serious obstruction. The Con- federates, determined to bar the navi- gation of the river, had sunk a large steamer, called the New Falls City. It was lying right across the current, her ends resting on each bank, and her hull, which was broken in the middle, resting on the muddy bottom. Porter had not had time to commence opera- tions to remove this obstruction, when a messenger arrived from Banks, bring- ing the unwelcome and unexpected in- telligence that the army had met with PORTER AT SPRINGFIELD LANDING. 621 a reverse, and at the same time order- ing General Smith to return to Grand Ecore with the transports and the troops. It was a painful surprise to both Porter and Smith. Porter felt that a most abrupt end had come to the expedition, at least for the present. ‘‘We reluctantly turned back,” he says, “ after having nearly reached the object we aimed at.” His own posi- tion now was one of great peril and of serious responsibility. What had happened to Banks ? Let us see. It has already been stated that General Lee, with his cavalry, led the National advance. On the 3 1st of March, he encountered a small force of the enemy at Natchitoches, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove them before him. He encountered the same force again on the 2d of April, a few miles to the west, put them to flight, and maintained the pursuit as far as Crump’s Hill, a distance of twenty miles. Lee now waited for the arrival of Franklin with the main body of the National army. Franklin forwarded instructions to Lee to attack the enemy wherever he could find him, but to be careful to avoid a general engagement. On the 7th — the same day on which Porter left Grand Ecore — the whole army being now in motion, and the cavalry force being largely increased, Lee skirmished with great activity and energy, driving the enemy before him, until he had advanced some two or three miles beyond Pleasant Hill, about thirty miles west-northwest of Natchitoches. At this point he found Iximself confronted by the main body of the Confederate cavalry, some 2500 strong, and under the skilful and daring leadership of General T. Green. They were drawn up in line at the edge of a wood, with open fields in front. The place bore the name of Wilson’s Farm. Active skirmishing commenced at once, and continued for at least two hours, when the Confede- rates were driven back into the woods near Patrick’s Bayou, about nine miles from Pleasant Hill. Here Lee halted for the day. He had lost 92 men. He had, however, inflicted heavy loss on the enemy. Lee was now in a somewhat critical and even dangerous position. So, in- deed, as the result proved, was the entire National army. Lee was push- ing forward too much in advance. Between him and the main body were the wagon trains. If attacked by a force superior in strength to his own, it would be difficult to fall back ; and he ran the risk of being overpowered before relief could reach him. This was precisely the difficulty of the situa- tion, and the source of all the trouble which followed. Franklin had not yet reached Pleasant Hill ; Banks, who had been detained at Grand Ecore, superintending the departure of the transports, had not yet reached Frank- lin’s headquarters ; and A. J. Smith was still far in the rear. Lee, realizing his difiiculty, called at once for a sup- port of infantry, and asked permission to leave his wagon train behind. Lan- drum’s brigade, of the Fourth division, of the Thirteenth corps, was hurried forward. Hansom following with what 628 SHREVEPORT. remained of the division. On the morning of the 8th,* Landrum having come up, Lee, who was accompanied by four batteries — Nim’s, the Chicago Mercantile, the First Indiana, and Bat- tery G, of the regular array — pushed forward, making a liberal use of his artillery. The Confederates steadily fell back beyond the clearing at Sabine Cross Roads, until they had reached a clump of trees, about three or four miles from Mansfield. At this point, the Confederates were found to be assembled in great force. It was now manifest to all that the advance had been made too rapidly. Lee hesitated to attack, and so force a battle in the circumstances. He was disposed to wait until the main body was well for- ward. He was no longer, however, master of the situation. The Confed- erate generals, in truth, saw that their opportunity was ripening ; and they were already preparing to change the curi'ent of battle, and to turn retreat into ao: 2 :ressive action and victory. Ransom had come up about noon with the remainder of the Fourth division, of the Thirteenth corps; and Banks arrived at the front a little later. Banks had already assumed entire control of the held. The cavalry were in the centre. Landrum was on the right ; Ransom was on the left. The skirmishing became gradually more ac- tive. The Confederates, having ceased to fall back, were already offering a stubborn resistance. It was becoming more and more apparent that they were assembled in strength, and that they were about to abandon the merely defensive, and make a bold aoreressive effort. Banks sent orders to Franklin to huiTy forward the infantry, instruct- ing Lee meanwhile to hold his ground until the arrival of reinforcements. It was now about four o’clock. The skirm- ishing became more active and more general and about half-past four, the entire Confederate foi’ce, some 8000 foot and 12,000 horse, fell like a thun- dei'bolt on the whole National line, but beai’ing most heavily on the right Rank. The shock was irresistible. The Na- tional troops, still fighting bravely, fell back over the open space at the Cross Roads to the woods in the rear. In this struggle, three pieces of Nim’s battery were lost ; and but for the bravery of Lee’s cavalry, the National right would have been turned. The battle was raging furiously when Fiainklin came up, about five o’clock, with the Third division of the Thir- teenth corps, under General Cameron. A new line w*as formed. It was of no avail. The Confedei'ates, resolute to win — determined not to be balked of their prize — having gathered themselves up for a Rnal effort, came rushing for- ward with redoubled fury. The on- slaught was terrific. Cameron’s line was broken, as Ransom’s had been befoi‘e it. The National ranks were now thrown into confusion ; and large num- bers of the troops, flinging down their arras, began to rush, panic-stricken, from the held. The rout soon became general. The narrow road, by which alone escape was possible, was quickly blocked up by wagon trains, by artil- lery, by footmen and horsemen, all SABINE CROSS ROADS. 629 mingled together in inextricable confu- sion. It was such a scene as baffles all description ; and it seemed as if no- thins: could save the National advance from complete destruction. Such was the state of things in the front about five o’clock on the afternoon of the 8th. ‘‘Bull Bun,” said Bansom, afterwards, “ was nothing in comparison.” Lee lost about 150 baggage wagons filled with supplies. Bansom lost his guns ; and about 1000 of his men were captured. The National officers suffered severely. Several of them were killed, among whom were Colonel Webb, of the Seventy-Seventh Ohio; Colonel Vance, of the Ninety-Sixth Ohio ; and Captain Dickey, of Bansom’s staff. Among the wounded were Franklin, Bansom, and Colonel Bobinson, who, with his cav- alry, was protecting the wagon train. Such was the disastrous battle of Sa- bine Cross Boads. The day, however, was not yet ended ; nor was it doomed to close wholly in disaster and gloom for the National cause. At Pleasant Grove, some three miles in the rear, the pursu- ers and the pursued were both brought to a halt. General Emory with his splendid divisions, pressing forward, had just reached Pleasant Grove, when he learned of the disaster which had taken place in the front. With the in- stincts of a true soldier, he prepared to arrest the tide of retreat. Forming his men in line of battle at the edge of a wood, with open ground sloping down to the front, he awaited the approach of the triumphant foe. Making way for the flying columns, and allowing them to pass through to the rear, he caused his men to reserve their fire until the pursuers were close at hand. His orders were faithfully obeyed. The Confederates came up with a tre- mendous rush, their ranks somewhat disordered by success. Full in their faces Emory’s men poured, in rapid succession, murderous volleys of mus- ketry. Loth to yield in the hour of victory, the Confederates endeavored to press on. A fierce and sanguinary struggle ensued. It was in vain, how- ever, that they dashed themselves on the solid front which Emory presented. They were mowed down in heaps, and compelled to retire. Night now fell upon the scene ; and the National army was saved. In this struggle. General Dwight, General McMillan, Colonel Kinsey and Colonel Benedict greatly distinguished themselves — the last-named officer, with great gallantry, having resisted and repelled repeated efforts made by the Confederates to turn the National right. During the night. Banks retired his shattered army to Pleasant Hill, some fifteen miles in the rear, General Emory covering the retreat. Pleasant Hill, the position held by General Franklin at the commencement of the fight, was reached between eight and nine o’clock on the following morning. Happily, General A. J. Smith, who had not as yet taken any part in the strife, had arrived the night before with a portion of the Sixteenth corps. Preparations were immediately made to receive an- othei* attack. Pleasant Hill is a clear- 272 630 SHTIEVEPORT. ing in the midst of the vast pine woods with which the adjoining country is covered. It is about thirty-five miles from Red River, on the road leading from Natchitoches, and forms a sort of plateau, which rises to a perceptible height above the surrounding country. Two lines of battle were formed — one in front by the division of General Em- ory, another behind the crest of the hill, and as a reserve, by the troops of Gen- eral Smith. In tlie first line, Dwight was on the right; McMillan in the centre; Benedict on the left. The Twenty-Fifth New York battery was placed on a knoll between the rio;ht ’’.nd the centre. The day was bcau- :iful, and reminded many of a May lay in the North. For the greater oart of the day, as the Nationals, in aattle array, awaited the attack of the 3nemy, the field resembled a parade- irround rather than a battle held. Noon came and went; and, although it was manifest that an attack was meditated, nothing but the slow shelling of the woods, or a stray shot from some im- petuous or impatient picket, gave any indication of battle. So the day passed until about four in the afternoon. The skirmishing at that time became more active, as well as more general. There was again a lull. The storm, however, was brewing. It was now hortly after five o’clock. Suddenly, lie Confederate artillery began to liunder. Under cover of this fire, the ;ray coats came rushing foi*th from the .voods. In overwhelming numbers, and inarching at the double-quick, they 'ame, rolling forward in solid mass against the whole National line. The National skirmishers fell back as they approached. A tremendous onslaught was made on Emory’s left, held, as we have said, by Benedict’s brigade. Bene- dict was wounded in the arm ; an3, a few moments afterwards, he was shot through, the head. His men fell back, fighting gallantly, and, reaching the lines of General Smith, filed behind Shaw’s brigade. Sweitzer, with his Texan cavalry, in a brave but vain endeavor to penetrate the covering line, had his regiment literally cut to pieces. Emory, for a brief space, stood firm in the centre and on the right; but, pressed at all points by overwhelming numbers, he was compelled to fall back to the shelter of the Sixteenth corps, behind the crest of the hill. The Confederates were already con- cluding that they were about to win an easy victory. They were in grievous error. General Smith was all readiness. His men were well trained to his peculiar mode of warfare. He did not believe in the useless waste of powder and shot, or in the useless waste of strength. The Confederates, flushed with what seems success, have pushed their way up the hill, almost to its sum- mit. The muzzles of the National guns are almost reached. As yet, how- ever, the guns are silent. The second line of Confederate troops is seen ad- vancing up the hill. The opportune moment has come. The signal is given. There is a loud, deafening roar, mingled with the sharp rattle of musketry. Seven thousand rifles, and several bat- teries of artillery, every gun loaded to PLEASANT HILL. G31 the muzzle with grape and canister, have poured their deadly contents on the serried ranks of the advancing foe. Like a held of grain, over which a tor- nado has passed, the entire Confederate centre has been swept to destruction. Scarcely fewer than 1000 men lie dead or dying on the sloping ground. The word Charge ! ” is heard resounding along the National lines; and 7000 brave men rush upon the shattered ranks of the enemy. Emory’s division, now re-formed, joins the Sixteenth, and takes part in the hnal struggle. The struggle is brief; for, in a few minutes, the entire Confederate host is ' /■ driven from the slope, through and be- yond the woods, in broken and con- fused masses. The pursuit was con- tinued until dark. In the final charge. General Mower, distinguished throughout all this cam- paign, surpassed all his previous efforts. Emory, too, the hero of Pleasant Grove, proved himself worthy of the name he had already won. To General A. J. Smith, however, belongs the chief glory. It w’as his veteran Sixteenth corps which determined the day. It is not to be forgotten that Smith handled his own men in his own way. If Hansom had been allowed to do the same on the 8th, the result of the first day’s fighting might have been different. In their flight, the Confederates left be- hind all their dead and wounded, 500 prisoners, three battle-standards, and a large number of small arms. Taylor’s battery, which had been lost in the earlier part of the action, was recap- tured. So, also, was a portion of Nim’s battery, which had been lost on the 8th. A Parrott gun, which the Nationals had lost, the previous fall, at Carrion Crow, was also retaken. It was at first intended to face again to the north, and resume the march to Shreveport. The idea was pleasing to the rank and file. It was particularly agreeable to General Smith, who was dissatisfied with the manairement and result of the campaign. Franklin, how- ever, and some of the officers of the Nineteenth corps, for a variety of rea- sons, deemed it unwise. A council of officers was held on the evenins^ of the 9th, when it was agreed to fall back to Grand Ecore. Banks’ management of the expedition, and particularly the want of generalship exhibited by him in the first day’s fighting, had lost him the confidence of his officers. As an administrg,tor or organizer in a civil capacity. Banks, at that time, had few equals’; but he was not at home on the battle field ; nor was he possessed of those qualities, or that special kind of experience, which fit one for the suc- cessful management and control of a great military movement, conducted at different and possibly distant points, and by detached bodies of men. HiS’ military career acquired some lustre from Port Hudson ; but the glory thus acquired came to him rather as an acci- dent, incidental to his position, than as a necessity brought about by his great or shining military abilities. His mili- tary position was due to his political- influence — an influence, however, which was fairly and hon stly won. He had always under him oflicers greatly more 632 SHREVEPORT. capable than himself ; and he showed his wisdom most when he consulted their opinions and followed their guid- ance. The Shreveport Expedition ought to have been a success. As it was, the National army had lost already 18 guns, small arms in large numbers, 5000 men, 130 wagons and 1200 horses and mules, and had accomplished nothing. While arrangements are being made for the backward movement, let us turn our attention to the fleet and trans- ports. Porter and Kilby Smith, it will be remembered, had reached Spring- field Landing, when they were made aware of the reverses which had at- tended the army on the 8th at Sabine Cross Loads, and that it would be necessary for them to ]*eturn to Grand Ecore. It was no easy task which now devolved on Admiral Porter. Not without gi’eat difficulty had be suc- ceeded in getting the vessels up over the rapids. Greater difficulty, he had reason to fear, would attend the return. The water in the river had not risen — it had rather fallen — in the interval ; and he had the certain prospect of being seriously annoyed by the now diseno:aored Confederates, who were swarmino^ alonor the banks of the river. The backward movement, however, was commenced at once. At a place called Coushatta, the boats first came under the enemy’s fire. The Confederate col- onel, Harrison, was at that point, with nearly 2000 cavalry and 4 guns. The progress made by the boats was neces- sarily slow. The river was narrow and snaggy ; and, at night, it was deemed safest to halt, and wait for the returning light. Hamson had no diffi- culty in keeping- up with the fleet. As he moved down the river, his numbers increased. Smith, meanwhile, was ac- tive on board the transports. In order to protect his men, he threw up barri- cades with boxes, barrels, bales of hay, mattresses, and everything else he could lay hold of. The water being so low, the gunboats could do little execution upon the high banks at short range; and Smith knew that the safety of the fleet depended largely on his own men. On the hurricane-deck of the Emerald, he mounted two Rodman guns, which did excellent service. On the 12th, near Pleasant Hill Landing, a fierce attack was made on the rear portion of the fleet. At this point, the Osage lay aground, a heavy transport, named the Black Hawk, being alongside of her, and attempting to pull her off. The Confederates, under General Thomas Green, opened with 2000 muskets. The gunboats and the transports re^ plied with promptitude and effect. Smith brought his two Rodman guns to bear upon the banks of the river, wffiere the enemy was massed in great force. The destruction of life was fearful. It seemed to be the determi- nation of Gi’een to capture this portion of the fleet. Again and again he pushed his men to the edge of the bank, till, in one of these encounters, a shot from one of the Rodman guns blew off his head. The Confederates again rallied, only, however, to be cut and torn to pieces by the raking canis- ter-shot from the gunboats and the transports. While this struggle was CANE RIVER. 633 in progress, Harrison appeared on the opposite side of the river; but so. de- structive was the tire which was brought to bear upon him that he was compelled to fall back and remain at a distance. In this eno:a 2 :ement, excellent service was rendered by Lieutenant Bache, with his gunboat, Lexington ; also, by Lieutenant T. O. Self ridge, of the Osage. Although ultimately compelled to seek shelter in the casemates of the Osage, too much praise cannot be given to Smith’s men, who, on the transport, so nobly handled the Eodman guns. These vessels, without encountering other serious difficulties, proceeded down the river as far as Campti, where they rejoined the advance portion of the fleet, which was grounded, and exposed to the enemy’s fire from the banks. From this point. Porter, on board the Cricket, which had just narrowly es- caped capture at the hands of the guer- rillas, hurried down to Grand Ecore, where he found Banks, who had arrived with the land troops. At Porter’s re- quest, Banks sent a strong force up the river to protect the transports and the gunboats. Soon after the arrival of the troops, the entire fleet began to move towards Grand Ecore, which was reached without further trouble. The retreat was resumed with as lit- tle delay as possible. Porter started with his fleet on the 17th. Banks set out with the army on the 21st. Alex- andria was the next point of destina- tion. Porter’s difficulties now began. Eight miles below Grand Ecore, the Eastport, struck by a torpedo under her bottom and near her bow, was sunk. This proved a great hindrance. It was not until the 21st she was got afloat — the day on which Banks re- commenced his backward march. Day after day, for six days, the Eastport passed through the same ordeal ; and the same laboilous process of hauling her over the bars had to be repeated. It was wearisome work, and could hardly fail, were we to enter into all the details, to prove an equally wearisome recital. On the 25th, when about sixty miles below Grand Ecore, she again ground- ed. So much time had been wasted, and so apparently inextricable she seemed in her present position, that all further attempts to save her were aban- doned. 1 About half-past one o’clock, on the 26th of April, she was blown April into fragments, having been pre- 26. viously charged with one ton of pow- der and other combustibles. The East- port was one of Porter’s best vessels ; and both he and her commander, Phelps, did their utmost to carry her off in safety. Almost at the moment appointed for the blowing up of the Eastport, the Confederates made a daring but unsuccessful attempt to capture the Cricket. The guerrillas were quickly routed. The vessels which were accompanying the East- port, as soon as she was blown up, proceeded down the river, encountering no opposition until they had reached a point at the mouth of Cane Eiver. The Cricket led the way, with Admi- ral Porter on board, followed close by the Juliet, the Champion, and the Fort Hindman. As they neared the point, they discovered that the Confederates C34 SHREVEPORT. were present in considerable strength. Hounding the point, the Cricket still in front, and opening with their bow- guns, they found themselves exposed to the fire of a powerful battery of 18 guns, which the Confederates had quickly got into position. When the Cricket came fully up, each of the 18 guns poured forth its deadly and de- structive missile. Every shot took ef- fect on the little vessel, most of them penetrating through and through. The shock was terrific, and the destruction almost complete One gun wac dis- abled. Every gunner was killed or wounded. The chief engineer and one of the pilots were killed at their re- spective posts. In the fire-room, only one man escaped — all the others being either killed or wounded. Strange to say. Admiral Porter escaped unhurt, and the machinery was comparatively uninjured. Making use of some ne- groes, who were on board. Porter manned the guns, and ran the vessel past the battery. A few miles down the river, he found the Osage and the Lexington engaged fighting a field-bat- tery. It was his intention to take these vessels back to the assistance of those he had left behind ; but darkness com- ing on, this was found to be impossi- ble. Lieutenant Phelps brought the Juliet and the Fort Hindman past the battery during the evening gloom. Both, however, were severely pun- ished. The pumpboat. Champion, hav- ing been disabled, was set on fire, and left behind. “ In five minutes,” says Porter, in his graphic report of this ac- tion, “the Cricket was struck thirty- eight times with solid shot and shell, with a loss of 25 killed and wounded ; the Juliet about the same, with 15 killed. The Fort Hindman lost 3 killed and 4 or 5 wounded.” No fur- ther interruption was experienced until the fleet reached the rapids. While Admiral Porter was thus pushing his way down the river, Gen- eral Banks, with the land forces, had made a successful march to Alexandria. His advance, under General Emory, left Grand Ecore on the 22d of April. General A. J. Smith followed wdth his column, his rear being covered by a command under General Kilby Smith. On the first day, the National army marched forty miles. It had reached Cane Hiver, on the east side of which, and near a ferry, on an elevation called Monet’s Bluff, the Confederates, to the number of 8000, with 16 guns, had taken a strong position. This bluff was flanked by the unfordable river on one side and by an almost impassable swamp on the other. It was the inten- tion of General Banks to force a pas- sage across the river at this place, by making a vigorous attack early on the morning of the 23d. It was the deter- mination of the Confederates to offer a stubborn resistance ; and it was their hope and belief that, by drawing the National advance into a sharp engage- ment, they w’oiild be able, with the i e- mainder of their forces, then not far distant, to fall with destructive effect on the National flank and rear. Emory, however, had moved with such celerity that he antici[)ated their plans. The Confederates were not ready. Their BAILEY^S DAM. 635 pickets on the west side of the stream were easily driven in; but the main portion was found to be too strong to be taken by direct assault. A flank movement was resolved upon. Gen- ei*al Birge, taking with him his own brigade — that of Colonel Fessenden — and General Cameron’s division, of the Thirteenth corps, crossed the river three miles above the ferry, and, late in the afternoon, after weary marching, reached the desired position, in the rear of the enemy’s stronghold. Mean- while, the advance of the main body of the jS^ational army was moved towards the Cane River, and within range of the guns on the bluff, on the opposite side. The Confedei*ates immediately opened Are ; and a spirited artillery duel was maintained for some hours. It had been arranged that as soon as Birge commenced the assault in the Confederate rear, the National reserves should force the passage of the river. The plan worked admirably. The as- sault on the rear of the Confederate position was made by Colonel Fessen- den’s brigade, the colonel leading his men. It was made with great gal- lantry and with signal success. When darkness set in, the Confederates were flying in confusion along the Fort Jes- sup road; and the bluff was occupied by the Nationals. In this attack, the Nationals lost about 200 men in killed and wounded. Among the wounded was Colonel Fessenden. On the inorn- April 23d, the Confederates 23 . fell with great force on the rear of General A. J. Smith’s column, which was covered by the command of Gen- eral Kilby Smith. The last-named general turned upon the enemy at Clouterville, on the Cane River ; and, after a three-hours’ encrasrement, Gen- eral Mower fighting wdth great brav- ery on his right. Smith repulsed the Confederates at every point, and com- pelled them to withdraw. The march towards Alexandria was resumed on the afternoon of the following day ; and, on the 27th, after an absence of twenty-four days. Banks and his army were back in Alexandria. The back ward march from ®rrand Ecore was successfully managed ; and while it did honor to General Banks, it redounded, also, to the credit of Generals Emory, A. J. Smith and T. Kilby Smith, who, by their skill, bravery and promptitude of action, greatly added to the laurels they had already won. At Alexandria, all hopes of resum- ing the Shreveport Expedition van- ished. General Hunter had arrived with orders from General Grant, in- structing Banks to close the campaign, as Sherman’s troops w’ere now all needed to the east of the Mississippi. Those orders were final. It was im- possible, however, to abandon Porter and his fleet to the tender mercies of the enemy. Hunter, therefore, returned to Grant with a letter from Banks, ex- plaining the situation, and claiming such time as might be needed to make a fair effort to save the fleet. We left Porter at the rapids, above Alexandria. The water had become so low that he had no hope of getting his vessels over the falls. ‘‘ I saw nothing before me,” he says, “but the 636 SHREVEPORT. destruction of the best part of the Mississippi squadron.” The difficulty, however, had not been unforeseen ; and its solution had already, for some time, l)een engaging the attention and tax- ing the genius of Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, Banks’ chief engineer. It was Bailey’s conviction that by a system of damming, which he explained to both Banks and Porter, he could bring the fleet safely over the rapids. Banks shared in the belief of his lieutenant. Porter doubted. Banks gave the ne- cessary orders; aicd, on Sunday, the May. 1 st of May, Bailey went to work. L On condition that he should be allowed the use of as many men as he might deem necessary, he promised to complete the proposed dam within ten days. It was a perilous and, appa- rently, an impossible task. The falls were a mile in length ; the water was exceedingly low ; and, in proportion as the dam approached completion, the woi’k and the workmen would be in- creasingly at the mercy of a powerful current. Three thousand men, with from two to three hundred wagons, were soon busily engaged. The entire country around was ransacked for the necessary material. The neighboring steam-mills were demolished for their stone and brick and wood and iron ; the adjoining forests echoed with the sound of the axe, and, yielding to the persuasive blows of the sturdy men from Maine, gave^ up their stalwart giants of oak and pine; the qiiariies resounded with the stroke of the ham- mer, and lent their weight and strength to the daring enterprise ; wagons rum- bled to the river; and flatboats con- veyed the stone and wood to their destined places. Bailey commenced by running out from the left bank of the river a tree-dam made of the bodies of very large trees, brush, brick and stone, cross-tied with heavy timber and strengthened in every way which inge- nuity could devise. This tree-dam was run out about 300 feet, at which point were sunk four large coal barges filled with brick. From the right bank, cribs, filled with stone, were built out to meet the barges. At all points the work went merrily on, the soldiers lightening their toil by singing favor- ite army songs and certain plantation melodies. In eight days the dam was all but completed ; and the water on the upper falls had risen so high as to allow the Fort Hindman, the Osao^e and the Neosho to move down and be in a state to pass through the dam. In another day, it was calculated, all the vessels would be got down and over the falls. Early on ■ the 9th, how- ]>jay ever, when the above-named ves- sels were about to pass through, the pressure of the water, which had i*isen rapidly, and was flowing at the rate of nine miles an hour, swept away two of the stone barges. Porter galloped to the upper falls, and ordered the Lex- ington to move down and endeavor to pass through the gap in the dam. The attempt was made. The vessel got over the upper falls in safety, but not a moment too j‘Oon, as the water was already falling rapidly. She then made for the opening in the dam, through w’iich the water was now rushing with PASSING THE RAPIDS. 637 tremendous fury. To the thousands who lined the banks, and who looked on tremblingly and in silence, it seemed a foolhardy experiment — a certain rush to destruction. The Lexington had on a full head of steam, as she went bound- ing down the roaring torrent. Rolling spasmodically, ailmost like a thing of life, she hung for a moment on the rocks below ; and then, yielding to the force of the current, she made one grand leap into the lower deep waters. A loud and long-resounding cheer an- nounced the success of the undertaking and the delight of over twenty thou- sand men. The Neosho followed; but she made the passage with less success than the Lexington. Her pilot became frightened as she approached the abyss, and shut off the steam. It was a serious blunder, and well-nigh brought the vessel to destruction. Her hull disap- peared under the water ; and it seemed as if she were lost. It was, however, only for a moment. Having risen again above the surface, she was caught by the current, and swept over the rocks, fortunately reaching the deep water below with only one hole in her bot- tom — a damage which was promptly repaired. The Fort Hindman and the Osage passed over “beautifully,” Por- ter tells us, and without sustaining any injury. It was not deemed safe to make the experiment with the heavier vessels. Bailey, meanwhile, was busy repairing his dam. The soldiers, now fully con- vinced that they were not working to- wards an impossible end, resumed their toilsome task with renewed enei'gv. The dam was speedily repaired ; and the remaining six vessels — the Mound City, Caron delet, Pittsburg, Ozark, Louisville and Chillicothe — with two tugs, passed safely through, in the presence and amid the loud, hearty and prolonged cheers of the entire army. The success of this undertaking gave Porter a new idea of the possible. “Words,” says he, “are inadequate to express the admiration I feel for the abilities of Lieutenant Colonel Bailey. The highest honors the government can bestow on him can never repay him for the service he has rendered the coun- try.” The government was not un- grateful. Bailey was honored by Con- gress with a vote of thanks and a medal ; and he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. During the time the army remained at Alexandria, waiting for the fleet, it was reinforced by a large body of troops, which had come up from Mata- gorda Bay, under General John A. Mc- Clernand. A serious misfortune, during the same interval, had befallen two of the vessels of the fleet — the Signal and Covington — which had been sent down the river in advance as a convoy to the transport Warner. On the 5th of May, at Dunn’s Bayou, about thirty miles below Alexandria, they were at- tacked and overpowered by a strong Confederate force. The Covington was set on Are, and then abandoned. The Signal and the transport were cap- tured. It was a very unequal strug- gle. Of the soldiers on board the transport, about 100 were killed, and 150 made prisoners. The remainder 638 SHREVEPOET. took to the shore and escaped. Not long afterwards the City Belle was captured, having on board 400 Ohio troops. These isolated cases seem to | Simmsport, the troops were vigorously reflect on the management at head- | attacked by a body of the enemy at Mississippi, which caused a back water in the Bed Biver. On the morninof of the 16th, while pressing on towards quarters. In such a country, it is the fii'st duty of the naval commander to keep his vessels well together, as it is the first duty of the general in the field to move his men in masses. The principle involved is fundamental, and ought never to be departed from, ex- cept in extraordinary circumstances. On the 13th of May, Alexandria, May some unknown hands, was set 13. on fire. In spite of the efforts of Generals Banks and Smith, a large portion of the place was destroyed. On the following day, the town was evacuated; and both the army and navy were moving in the direction of Simmsport. It was a day of great sor- row in Alexandria. General Banks had declared his determination that the oc- cupation should be permanent. In con- sequence of this assurance, the citizens in large numbers had given their al- legiance to the National cause. Not a few of them had joined the army and been sent forward to Simmsport. Know- ing the fate which awaited them, the women and children became frantic with grief, and, terror-stricken, begged, but begged in vain, to be taken on board the transports and conveyed to New Orleans. It was one of those sad and sorrowful circumstances which are un- avoidable in war. On the 16th, the army and the fleet had both reached Simmsport, Porter’s progress having been greatly facilitated by a rise in the Mansura. On the 20th they had crossed the Atchafalaya, when General E. B. S. Can by assumed command, and Banks hastened on to New Orleans. In obe- dience to counter-orders which had come from Halleck, with consent of Grant, per- mitting'that portion of Sherman’s troops to remain in the West, A. J. Smith pro- ceeded up the Mississippi, halting on the way at Columbia, and dispersing a body of Confederates, under Marma- duke. Porter resumed his station on the Mississippi ; and, in due time, the remainder of the army, under General Canby, reached New Orleans. Thus ended the Shreveport Expedition — an expedition which was conducted with- out capacity or discipline, and which, as we have said already, revealed the lack of true military genius on the part of General Banks. This chapter would be incomplete without a brief allusion to the expedi- tion which was conducted under Gen- eral Steele. That general, it will be remembered, had been instructed to move southward and co-operate with Banks in the movement against Shreve- poi't. When Banks set out on his northward march, Steele was at Little Bock. He left there on March ]>|ar, 23d, with 12,000 infantry, and 23. 3000 cavalry, under Carr. Camden was Steele’s first objective ; but he expect- ed to be joined by General Thayer at Arkadelpliia,^ with about 5000 men. PRAIRIE D’ANN. 039 At Camden, if no serious difficulty in- terposed, he was to be joined by a small force under General Clayton. Thayer left Fort Smith on the 22d ; and, about the same time, Clayton marched from Pine Bluff. The roads were bad; and the junction of the forces according to instructions could hardly be relied upon. When Steele reached Arkadelphia, Thayer was not forward. After waiting for the latter in vain for two days, Steele pushed on in the direction of Washington, with the view of flanking Camden. General Sterling Price, it was known, was in tb^ neighborhood, with 12,000 Con- federates. After a toilsome march, and being constantly harassed by the cavalry under Marmaduke and Ca- bell, Steele reached Prairie D’Ann on April the 10th of April, where he was 10. joined by Thayer. Price was understood to be here in great force ; and Steele at once resolved to offer battle. By a series of dexterous move- ments, which succeeded in misleading Price as to the real objective of his antagonist, and after some desperate skirmishing, Steele wheeled around and pushed his way to Camden, taking possession of the place on the night of the 15th, in spite of the most persistent efforts of the enemy. Here he learned of the disaster which he had befallen Banks at Sabine Cross Boads ; and, feel- ing convinced that the enemy, already at least 25,000 strong, would soon be reinforced by the army of General Kirby Smith, he gave up all thoughts of moving further in the direction of Shreveport. His position at Camden soon became the reverse of comfortable. His supplies were intercepted ; his for- aging parties were cut off; Clayton could hardly be expected now to join him ; and he began to fear for the safety of Little Bock. In these cii- cumstances, he resolved to retreat to his former stronghold. On the April night of the 26th, he threw ‘26. his army across the Washita Biver ; and, at daylight on the 27th, he be- gan to fall back, by way of Princeton and Jenkins’ Ferry, on the Sabine Biver. The roads were in the most wretched condition ; and the rain fell in torrents. At Jenkins’ Ferry, he was attacked by an overwhelming force, led by Kirby Smith in person. Steele' got his men quickly into position ; and the battle at once became general. The Confederates fell on the National lines with tremendous energy. Again and again they came up in full force, now on the left, and now on the right, and finally making a desperate effort to crush the left and centre. More than once the National lines yielded to the tremendous pressure and fierce onsets of the enemy ; but nothing could cool the courage or relax the energies of those brave Western regiments. Every charge of the enemy was successfully repelled. The battle had commenced at early dawn. It was now near noon. The critical moment of the fight had arrived. The National left, which was held by the Thirty-Third Iowa, whose ammunition was exhausted, was yield- ing to the pressure of the heavy masses of the enemy. Four companies of the Fortieth Iowa hastened to its support, MOBILE HARBOR. UO formed under a terrible fire, and re- stored the line. The tide of battle now turned. The Confederates, not pre- pared for this fresh advent of strength and heroism, began to fall back. For one whole hour, the Nationals pressed on their front, the Confederates slowly, but steadily, yielding up the ground. At noon, the victory was complete; and the Nationals remained masters of the held. In this fierce struggle, Steele lost 700 men in killed and wounded. The Confederate loss must have ex- ceeded 3000 men, including 3 gen- eral officers. Leaving a burial party behind, Steele crossed the Saline Eiver and continued his retreat. He was not further molested. On the 2d ]^ay of May, after a weary march, over 2. a swampy country, his half-famished troops, broken and dispirited, were safe in Little Rock. The battle at Jenkins’ Ferry did credit to Steele and to his brave soldiers ; but the expedition, like that of which it was intended to form a paid, was ill-omened and disastrous. CHAPTER XXXIII. One of the Sources of Nourishment and Strength. — Sherman’s Plan. — Farragut Keconnoitres. — The Obstruc- tions Visible. — Need for Caution. — The Defenses. — Forts Morgan, Gaines and Powell. — The Confederate Fleet. — The Tennessee, the Selma, the Gaines, the Morgan. — Farragufs Fleet. — Reinforcements. — The Mon- itors. — A Consultation on Board the Hartford. — Farragut, Canby and Granger. — A Land Force Promised. — Description of Mobile Harbor. — The City of Mobile. — Mobile Point. —Dauphin Island. — Sand Island. — Grant’s Pass. — Swash Channel. — Middle Channel. — The Position of the Forts. — Description of the Ten- nessee. — Preparations for the Attack. — Arrival of Granger with 2500 Men. — Investment of Fort Gaines. — The Fleet in Motion. — August 5th. — The Tecumseh. — The First Shot. — Fort Morgan Thunders. — The Tecumseh Disappears. — Torpedoes. — The Brooklyn Pauses, and Falls Back. — A Critical Moment. — The Fleet in Dan- ger. — Farragufs Decision and Promptitude. — A Perilous Position. — Fearful Broadsides. — The Hartford Ahead. — Past Fort Morgan. — The Tennessee About to Strike. — Missed her Mark. — The Gunboats. — Their Raking Fire. — The Metacomet in Pursuit of the Selma. — The Selma Captured. — The Gaines and the Mor- gan Under the Shelter of the Port. — At Anchor. — Piped for Breakfast. — Reappearance of the Tennessee. — Buchanan's Evident Intention. — Too Much Confidence. — Wooden Ships and Iron-Clads. — Monster Rams and Monitors. — The Tennessee and the National Fleet. — Magnificent Fighting. — Hard Blows. — The Tennessee Apparently Invulnerable. — A Tremendous Shot from the Manhattan. — Closing in Upon the Monster. — Ad- miral Buchanan Wounded. — The Crew Demoralized. — The White Flag. — The Surrender. — Traces of Pun- ishment.— Joy in the Land. — Praise of Farragut. — The American Nelson. — Two Historical Pictui'es. — The Work not yet Completed. — The Forts Passed, but not Taken. — Fort Powell Abandoned. — Attack on Fort Gaines. — The Fort Surrendered. — Investment of Fort Morgan. — Siege Batteries and Engineers from New Orleans. — General Richard Arnold. — Ready for the Attack. — The Bombardment Commenced. — The Fortin Flames. — Darkness. — The Firing Discontinued. — The Bombardment Resumed. — The Morning of the 23d of August. — The White Flag. — Immediate and Unconditional Surrender. — General Page. — Unsoldierly Con- duct. — Joy and Hope. Although the great battle in Mobile Harbor did not take place until August, 1864, and, therefore, sub- sequent to other naval engagements of the very first importance, this seems to be the fitting time and place to tell the story. It was, as we have seen, one of the three great sources from which. THE RIVAL FORGES. 641 in the southwest, the Confederacy drew nutriment and strength. The reduction of Mobile had long since been con- templated by the National government ; and when, at the beginning of 1864, it was resolved to strike at the very heart of the Confederacy, by a movement up- on Meridian and Selma, and also to cut off all communication with Shreveport, Mobile was included in the general plan. If General Sooy Smith had suc- ceeded in joining General Sherman at Meridian, according to arrangement, Selma, not improbably, would have shared the fate of Meridian, and the final struggle in Mobile Harbor would have been antedated by several months. Simultaneously with the movement up- on Meridian, a diversion, it will be re- membered, was made in the direction of Mobile. Even before that date, the defenses of that harbor were occupying Farragut’s attention. As early as the 20th of January, he made a personal recon noissance of Forts Morgan and Gaines. The day was fine, and the air clear. Although he could not approach within a distance of three or four miles from the forts, he could distinctly see the guns and the men who stood by them. He could see, also, the piles and other obstructions which, running out from Fort Gaines, blocked the channel, leaving only a narrow passage-way im- mediately in front of Fort Morgan. The Admiral was not encouraged by what he saw to make any rash or im- ' mediate attack; but he did not the less feel that the reduction of the defenses in Mobile Harbor was the next task to which he must devote all the energies of his will and all the resources of his daring and fertile genius. As soon as the army of General Banks returned from the Bed Biver country, and General Canby took com- mand of the Western military division, preparations began to be vigorously made for a movement upon Mobile. Farragut was not disposed to break through his policy of caution, until he should feel that the force at his dispo- sal justified him in assuming the offen- sive ; but he held his fleet in a state of readiness for any emergency, and was prepared to resist any aggressive move- ment which might be made by the enemy. He had need to be on his guard. The Confederate authorities had not been inattentive to the require- ments of the harbor. Not contented with the forts, torpedoes, piles and other obstructions which they had placed in the channel, they had con^ structed several powerful iron-clads, by means of which they hoped not only to repel invasion, but to destroy the Na- tional fleet and raise the blockade. The largest of these vessels — the Tennessee — constructed on the same principle as the famous Merrimac of Hampton Boads renown, appeared in the bay on the 17th of March. Having been brought down Dog Biver, she was floated over the bar with camels. Be. ferring to the circumstance, Farragut, writing to the secretary of the navy, says : “ Thus you perceive, I am in hourly expectation of being attacked by an almost equal number of vessels — ii*on-clad against wooden vessels — and a most unequal contest it will be, as the 642 MOBILE HARBOR. Tennessee is represented as impervious to all their experiments at Mobile ; so that our only hope is to run her down, which we shall certainly do all in our power to accomplish; but should we be unsuccessful, the panic in this part of the country wdll be beyond all con- trol. They will imagine that New Orleans and Pensacola must fall.” On the 24th of May, he ran in shore, and, getting a good view of the monster, which was flying the blue flag of Ad- miral Buchanan, he satisfied himself of her dangerous character. Farragut’s fleet consisted of fourteen wooden ships — the Brooklyn, Hartford, Bichmond, Lackawanna, Monongahela, Ossipee, Oneida, Octorara, Metacomet, Port Boyal, Seminole, Kennebec, Itasca, Galena. Four monitors — the Tecumseh , Winnebago, Manhattan and Chickasaw — were promised in addition to these ; but it was not until the latter end of July that these vessels arrived. As soon as they reached him, Farragut felt that if he was only adequately support- ed by a land force, he might venture to assume an offensive attitude. Admiral Farragut, Generals Canby and Granger * held a consultation on board the Hart- ford. It was Farragut’s desire that the two principal forts — Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines — should both be invested, and that, when the attack was made bv the fleet, the land forces should co- operate and create a diversion in their favor. General Canby agreed to send all the troops at his disposal. It was soon discovered, however, that he could not spare a sufficient mitnber of men to invest both forts ; and, at Farragut’s suggestion, it was finally resolved that the troops who were under the com- mand of General Gordon Granger should give their attention first to Fort Gaines. A general description of the city of Mobile, of the bay of the same name, and of ifs means of defense, will enable the reader to understand the events about to be detailed. The city of Mobile is situated at the head of the bay, about thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico, and at the mouth of the Alabama River. At the commencement of the war, it had a population of about 20,000, and was the most important place in Alabama. It was used for a time by the Confederates as a naval depot ; but latterly, fearing for its safe- ty, they had the stores removed up the river to Selma. Mobile Bay, wffiich is large and commodious, is well land- locked, a narrow peninsula, about fif- teen miles in length and terminating in Mobile Point, shutting it in on the east and southeast. On the west, it is closed in by a chain of low sand banks and by Dauphin Island, which separate Mississippi Sound from the Gulf of Mexico. Dauphin Island is about twelve miles long from east to west, narrow at its western extremity, about a mile in width towards the east, and having a narrow, projecting peninsula towards the south, terminating in what is called Pelican Point. To the north of Little Dauphin Island, there is a channel, called Gi*ant’s Pass, wliich con- nects the bay with Mississippi Sound. Th is channel, however, is narrow, and never has a depth of water over seven THE TENNESSEE. 643 feet. The mouth of the bay, there- fore, is between Mobile Point and the eastern extremity of Dauphin Island. About three quarters of a mile to the southwest of Mobile Point is Sand Island, about half a mile long from east to west, with an attached reef run- ning west for about three miles. This little island, with its chain of sand banks, covers the principal mouth of the harbor. The entrance from the southeast, between Mobile Point and Sand Island, is called Swash Channel. The entrance from the southwest is known as Middle Channel. The bay was well guarded. At its mouth, to the east and west, stood Forts Morgan and Gaines. These were old works, built by the United States government, before the war, at great ex- pense, and on the most approved prin- ciples of modern construction. They v/ere fully garrisoned, and well supplied with stores of all kinds. Fort Morgan was built on the western end of Mobile Point, and had an armament of 48 guns. Fort Gaines was built on the eastern end of Dauphin Island, and mounted 21 guns. Grant’s Pass was guarded by Fort Powell, a pentagonal work without ditches, but surrounded by piles which served also as a break- water. Across the Swash and Middle channels were placed rows of piles; piles and other obstructions were run across from Fort Gaines, so as to com- pel the vessels attacking to come fully under the guns of Fort Morgan ; and the channel was filled with torpedoes, the location of which Farras^ut had no means of knowing. In addition to all this, there were three gunboats — the Gaines, Selma and Morgan — and the iron-clad ranf, Tennessee. The gun- boats were of superior construction, and were well armed. The Tennessee was of gigantic proportions, and of im- mense strength. She was 209 feet in length, 48 feet in breadth, and drew 14 feet of water. Her sides, 8 feet thick, had a covering of two layers of iron, each 2 inches thick. Her deck was covered with a 2-inch iron plating. Her casemates, which projected and overhung so as to protect the hull, were shielded with 6 inches of iron. She was fitted with tower and turret ; and she carried six rifles — two pivots, 7^ inches bore, and four 6-inch broadsides, capable of flinging projectiles weighing, respectively, 110 and 95 pounds. She was propelled by two powerful high- pressure engines. Such were the ob- structions; and such were the actual means of resistance which had to be encountered and overcome, before the harbor of Mobile could be said to be restored to the National government. A consultation, as has already been stated, was held on the 8th of July July, on board the flag-ship Hart- ford, by Farragut, Canby and Granger. At this consultation, it was agreed that Canby should send from New Orleans 10,000 men, under General Granger, and that the troops should invest both Fort Gaines and Fort Mor- gan, while the fleet was pressing into the harbor. It was subsequently found that so many troops could not be spared; and, about the 1st of August, Granger arrived with 2500 men. It 644 MOBILE HARBOR. was concluded, therefore, only to invest Fort Gaines. Preparations were now made for an immediate attack. On the 5th of August, as early as half-past five o’clock, the fleet was 5* in motion. The vessels proceed- ed two abreast, and were lashed together in the following order : The Brooklyn, with the Octorara on the port side ; the Hartford with the Metacomet ; the Rich- mond with the Port Royal ; the Lacka- wanna with the Seminole ; the Monon- gahelawith the Kennebec; theOssipee with the Itasca ; the Oneida with the Galena. On the starboard side were the monitors, and in order as follows : The Tecumseh, Manhattan, Winnebago and Chickasaw. The monitors were thus between the fleet and Fort Morgan. A slight wind was blowing from the southwest. The Brooklyn was per- mitted to take the lead, because she carried four choice guns and was armed with an ingenious contrivance for pick- ing up torpedoes. Farragut took an elevated position in the main rigging of the Hartford, near the top, from which he could overlook all the vessels of the fleet. At 47 minutes past six o’clock, when the fleet was steaming steadily up the main channel, the Te- ! cumseh fired the first shot. Almost i immediately afterwards, Fort Morgan j began to thunder. The Brooklyn re- plied ; and at once the action became general. In a few moments more, the Tecumseh, which was about 300 yards ahead of the Brooklyn, was seen to disappear below the water, carrying with her her. gallant com- mandei’, T. A. M. Craven, and nearly all her crew.* She had struck a tor- pedo, which exploded, tearing a great hole in her bottom. At this critical moment, when full under the guns of the fort, and when sufPering severely, the Brooklyn, as if appalled by whai had happened, paused and backed, so as to m9ve round out of the way of the torpedoes. This action of the Brooklyn brought the whole fleet to a standstill, and, for a moment, threatened to hud- dle the ships together, and bring about a disaster similar to that which hap- pened in Charleston Harbor, on the occasion of Dupont’s attack. Farragut, however, was found equal to the emer- gency. Calling upon Drayton, he or- dered him to push forward the Hart- ford, heedless of possible consequences, and gave directions for the rest of the vessels to follow. The Brooklyn was soon under headway again, and follow- ing the Hartford. No more torpedoes exploded. A very tempest of shot was now brought to bear upon the fort by the entire fleet. A light wind blew * Captain Tunis Augustus M. Cbaven was a native of New Hampshire. He entered the navy in June, 1829, and served on different vessels till 1837, when, at his own request, he was placed on the Coast Survey. Afcer having filled different commands, and done various service, he was, when the war broke out, placed in command of the Crusader, which was stationed at Key West. In September, 18G1, he was transferred from the Crusader to the now screw-sloop Tuscarora, which was sent across the Atlantic to look after Confederate cruis- ers. Though he failed to overtake the Alabama, he yc^ did good service in blockading the Sumter at Gibrak tar, and in finally compelling the rebels to abandon that vessel. Early in 18G4 he was, at his own request, placed in command of the monitor Tecumseh, aul sailed in that vessel for Hampton Roads, where ha joined the James River flotilla, and arrived among tho first at City Point. After some stay there, be wai ordered, with the Tecumseh, to join the squadron ol Admiral Farragut. MAP SHOWING THE CITY OF MOBILE AND ITS DEFENCES. fr FIGHT WITH THE FLEET. 645 the smoke from the guns of the fleet in the direction of the fort, thus blinding the Confederate gunners. From the time the Hartford turned to the north- west to clear the middle ground, so i*apid and well-directed were her broad- sides, that the batteries on the fort were comparatively silenced. At 10 minutes before eight o’clock, w^hen the Hartford had just passed the fort, the other vessels following, Far- ragut saw the Tennessee, with a full head of steam on, bearing down, the evident intention being to strike the flag-ship. Happily, the monster missed her aim. Her guns opened on the Hartford as she passed ; but Farragut made a vigorous response, and kept moving along. The Confederate gun- boats Morgan, Selma and Gaines were ahead, and were greatly annoying Far- ragut by a raking fire, which he was unable to return. “ The shots from the gunboats,” Drayton tells us, “were delivered with great deliberation and consequent effect, a single one having killed ten men and wounded five.” He could only direct his fire on one of the gunboats at a time. Irritated by this persistent and destructive fire, Farragut detached the Metacomet, ordering Cap- tain Jouett to go off in pursuit of the Selma. Jouett executed his appointed task nobly, and with complete success. The Confederate gunboats were each armed with three powerful guns at their stern. Although exposed for a time to the concentrated fire of each of them, Jouett gained on his antagonist; and, within an hour, he had cnptured the Selma, with her captain and the entire crew, and driven the Morgan and the Gaines — the latter in a crippled condition — under cover of the fort. When night fell, the Morgan escaped and made her way to Mobile. The Gaines was run ashore and burned. It was now 45 minutes past eight o’clock. The forts were passed ; and, the vessels having for the most part been brought to anchor, the men were piped to breakfast. The repast was not to be long or quietly enjoyed. Farragut, from his commanding position, espied the Tennessee again making directly for the National fleet, with a full head of steam on, and making splendid time. It was his opinion that whatever might be her ultimate purpose, she had sin- gled out the flag-ship as the first object of her attention. The result proved that he had rightly divined. Without a moment’s delay, he made preparations for the reception of the monster iron- clad. The monitors, and such other vessels of the fleet as he thoimht best adapted for the purpose, w^ere imme- diately ordered to attack the ram, as soon as she came forward, not only with their guns, but with their “ bows on at full speed.” Buchanan, the Con- federate admiral, who was on board the Tennessee, had evidently made up his mind that he was more than a match for the whole fleet. He had, how'ever, underestimated the power of the National fleet quite as much as he had overestimated the fighting qualities of his own iron-clad. Of the fourteen wooden vessels which constituted the main portion of Farragut’s fleet, three of them were sloops of 2000 tons 1iV4, 646 MOBILE burden, carrying heavy armaments of 9-inch Dahlgrens and 100-pounder rifles. Even the smaller vessels were heavily armed. Of the monitors, two had 11-inch guns, and one — the Man- hattan — was supplied with guns of 15-iuch bore. Powerful as Buchanan’s vessel was, it revealed a vast amount of both daring and confidence to at- tack, single-handed, such a fleet as that which obeyed the behests of a com- mander having the skill and experience of Admiral Farragut. Yet Buchanan was not wholly without reason for trusting his own ship and distrusting the ships of the enemy. The Merri- mac, it was true, had been defeated by the Monitor ; but competent critics had declared that the Merrimac had not been injured by 11 -inch shot. The Atlanta, a vessel of the same class as the Merrimac, had been captured ; but her armor was only four inches thick ; and, then, as will be shown in a sub- sequent chapter, the Albemarle had already beaten off a whole fleet. If he could get a fair blow at each of the ships in succession, it was Buchanan’s opinion he might destroy the whole National fleet, without himself being seriously injured. Buchanan’s calcula- tions might have turned out to be more correct, if the National fleet had been commanded by another than Far- ragut. The merits of the respective antagonists were now, however, soon to be tested. The ram was close at hand. A wai*m reception awaited her. The Monongahela, a vessel of 1400 tons, carrying thirty pounds of steam, her HABBOR. screw working sixty revolutions, was the first to hit her. Moving in at full speed, she struck the monster a fair blow full in the side. The Mo- nongahela punished herself more than she punished her huge antagonist. She lost her iron prow and her cutwater. On retiijing, she swung around, and fired into the iron-clad her 11-inch guns. The Tennessee was yet apparently un- harmed. The next blow was struck by the Lackawanna: She, too, suf- fered sevei'ely. Her stern was cut and crushed to the plank ends, from three feet above to five feet below the water’s edge. The ram was still, to all appearance, uninjured. The Hart- ford was the next to move against the apparently invulnerable iron-clad. As the Tennessee shifted her helm and shied, so to speak, the blow was a glancing one. The Hartford, as she rasped along, gave her a whole port broadside of 9-inch solid shot. The Tennessee did not as yet show any signs of distress. The vessels were now moving in a sort of circle around the giant, the monitors more slowly than the others, but hitting hard blows as opportunity offered. The Chicka- saw now got under the stern of the Tennessee; and a 15-inch shot from the Manhattan went tearing through the iron plating and heavy wooden backing of the casemate of the monster. Farragut, now determined to force the fighting, ordered Drayton to strike again. At this moment, unhappily, the Hartford and the Lackawanna came in- to awkward collision, the former being struck ‘just forward of the mizzen-mast,. SURRENDER OF THE TENNESSEE. 64? and cut down to witbin two feet of the water’s edge. The two vessels soon got disentangled, and were mak- ing again for the Tennessee. Mean- while, the Chickasaw was pounding away at the monster’s stern ; the Os- si pee was about to deal a deadly blow; and the Monongahela, as well as the Lackawanna and the Hartford, was bearing down upon her at full speed. The end had now come. The Tennessee had been sorely punished. Her smoke-stack had been shot away ; her steering-chains were gone; and several of her poi‘t-sh utters had been so jammed that they could not be opened. Admiral Buchanan had been severely wounded in the leg ; and the entire crew had become demoralized. Further resistance w^as felt to be vain. Before, therefore, the threatened blow could be struck, the white flag was hoisted. In a few moments more, the captain of the Tennessee came on board the Hart- ford, and surrendered his own sword and that of Admiral Buchanan. Such was the end of the famous naval en- counter in Mobile Harbor. This great victory had not been won without some loss. Farragut had 165 killed and drowned. Of these, 113 went down in the Tecumseh. There were 25 killed and 28 wounded on board the Hartford. The Oneida had 8 killed and 30 wounded. Among the latter was her commander, I. B. M. Mullany. It is a fact worthy of notice that, on board the monitors, no one was either killed or wounded. The ships bore signs of severe punishment, having suffered more severely at Mobile than at New Orleans. A 7-inch shell penetrated the boiler of the Oneida. The Chickasaw received one plunging shot through her deck. The turrets of all the monitors were more or less injured. All the wounded of both fleets, including Admiral Buchanan, were sent to Pensacola. Buchanan’s leg had to be amputated. The victory in Mobile Bay caused great joy throughout the entire North, and among all, everywhere, who were friendly to the National cause. Far- ragut became the National idol. His name resounded throughout the length and breadth of the land. Men spoke of him as the American Nelson; and, although there was a marked contrast, in many particulars, between the mod- est American and his brilliant English prototype, the picturesque grandeur of Farragut’s two great battles — that at New Orleans and that in Mobile Bay — fully justified the comparison. Far- ragut in the shrouds of the Hartford, with the tempest of war raging below him, is a grand historic picture, not un- worthy to hang side by side with the “Death of Nelson.” Farragut’s work was not ended with the defeat of the Confederate fleet. The forts had been passed; but they had not yet been taken. On the night of the 5th, however. Fort Powell was abandoned and blown up. This was a positive gain to Farragut, as it opened up Grant’s Pass, and so relieved him of all anxiety in regard to supplies. Fort Gaines and Fort Morgan remained, the latter as yet com{)aratively uninjured. We have G48 MOBILE HARBOR. already seen that Granger, with 2500 troops, proceeded to invest Fort Gaines simultaneously with the advance of the fleet, A battery of Rodman guns had been planted on a sand hill, with- in three quarters of a mile from the fort. This battery was well served, under the direction of Captain Classen. The best gun in the fort was soon disabled ; and so completely swept were the works that Colonel Ander- son, who was in command, could render no assistance to Buchanan and his fleet. On the morning of the flth, Farragut sent the Chickasaw to the assistance of Aug. Granger. On the 7th, deeming farther resistance useless, Ander- son made an unconditional surrender of the fort, with 800 men. The Western channel was now under the control of the National fleet. Fort Morgan, the older and the stronger work, still held out. Built on the mainland, it had a better chance than Fort Gaines of receiving supplies and reinforcements. It was commanded by General Richard L. Page, a Vir- ginian. Page had signalled to Ander- son, Hold on ” ; and, when that officer surrendered, he cried, ‘‘Coward!” — a dander which was echoed throughout die entire Confederacy. An opportu- iiity was now to be given Page to display his heroism. Granger’s troops vere transferred from Dauphin Island lO the rear of Fort Morgan. Granger oon discovered that regular siege oper- ations would be necessary. He sent, therefore, to New Orleans for heavy siege artillery and a body of engineers. These were speedily at hand, under the care and command of General Richard Arnold. Batteries were rapidly con- structed behind some sand hills, within 800 yards of the fort; and, by Ang. the afternoon of the 20th, all 20* the guns were in position. On this line of batteries there were four 9-inch Dahlgrei^s, on naval gun carriages, eight 30-pounder Parrotts, and sixteen mortars, of which twelve were 10- inch, and four 8-inch. Another line of batteries was established about 400 yards nearer the fort. On the inner line there were four Napoleon guns and two 3-inch rifles. On the even- ing of the 2ist, General Granger notifled Farragut that he would be ready to open Are next morning at daylight. Farragut took position that night; and, on the morning of the 2 2d, at flve o’clock, the bom- 22. bardment commenced. It was contin- ued with great vigor and accuracy during the whole day. It was discov- ered in the afternoon that a fire had broken out inside the fort. At dark the bombardment ceased. The flames were still visible ; and it seemed as if the fire was gathering strength. About nine o’clock, it began to be manifest that attempts were being made to gain the mastery of the devouring element; It was not the desire of either of the National commanders that the fire should be extinguished. It was doing their work. The bombardment was, therefore, resumed, and maintained for two hours, when it was discontinued for the night. At five o’clock next morning, the bombardment was again resumed. Two hours later, an officer SURRENDER OF FORT MORGAN. 649 with a white flag, accompanied by about 40 men, carrying a boat, were seen marching out at the main sally- port. It was evidently their intention to proceed to the flag-ship with a letter from General Page. General Bailey, of the land forces, advanced towards them, obtained the letter, and handed it to General Granger. This latter officer promised to communicate its contents to the admiral, and to dic- tate the terms of surrender when his answer should be received. Soon afterwards. General Arnold and Cap- tain Drayton appeared at the fort, and demanded its immediate and uncondi- tional surrender, with the garrison and all the public property. Page wished to stipulate for the removal of the sick and wounded to Mobile. This, however, could not be allowed. At two o’clock the formal surrender was made. Out from the main sally-port marched 600 men, and stacked arms. The National flag again waved over the battered and smoking walls of Fort Morgan. It was found, on entering, that the fire had worked terrible destruction, and no doubt hastened the surrender. Dreading an explosion of the magazine, some 90,000 pounds of gunpowder had been thrown into the cisterns. Page, whose conduct was severely animad- verted on by Farragut, in his letter to the secretary of the navy, was charged with throwing bis sword into a well, and with spiking the guns after the surrender. With the defenses of Mo- bile, there were taken 104 guns and 1464 men. Farragut’s victory was now complete. The National banner floated supreme in the harbor of Mo- bile ; and blockade-running in that quarter was ended. The joy which was occasioned by the victory over the fleet, was increased and intensified when it became known that the forts had fallen ; and the conviction gath- ered strength all over the land, and found free and full expression, that the hour of final triumph was close at hand. 650 THE WILDERNESS. CHAPTER XXXIV. • / After Chattanooga. — Divided Counsels. — Grant the Popular Hero. — General Halleck. — “Like a Baulky Team.” — . A Change for the Better. — Grant in Command of All the Armies. — Heavy Besponsibilities. — His Plan for Reducing the Confederacy. — Letters to Sherman. — Instructions to Banks. — Sherman’s Command. — The Army of the Potomac. — Meade Retained in Command. — Grant at Meade’s Headquarters. — Wistar’s Raid. — Kilpatrick's Raid. — Custer and Dahlgren. — Death of Dahlgren. — The Army of the Potomac Re- organized. — The Corps, Division and Brigade Commanders. — Co-operative Arrangements. — Butler andSigel. — Burnside and the Ninth Corps. — Culpepper Court House. — The General Movement Begun. — The Army of the Potomac in Motion. — Crossing the Rapidan. — In the Wilderness. — Lee Watchful and Ready. — Descrip- ; tion of the Wilderness. — A Blood-Red Sun. — Old Wilderness Church. — The Four Roads. — Both Armies in Motion. — The Battle Begun. — Terrific Fighting. — Warren’s Corps. — Wadsworth and Crawford — Warren Falls Back. — Sedgwick and Getty. — A Lull in the Fight. — A Loud-Resounding Cheer. — Arrival of Hancock. — The Battle Resumed. — A Drawn Battle. — The End of the First Day. — The Second Day. — A Great Battle Imminent. — The Opposing Armies. — The Order of Battle. — The Attack. — Hancock's Tremendous Onset. — An Unfortunate Halt. — Hancock Driven Back. — Longstreet Shot by His own Men. — The Battle Suspended. — Fighting Begun Again. — A Fire in the Woods. — Hancock’s Men Driven from Their Works. — Carroll’s Splendid Charge. — The Nationals Saved. — End of the Second Day. — The Rival Armies Bleeding and Exhausted. — Grant’s New Movement. — Spottsylvania Court House. — Alsop’s Farm. — A Warm Reception. — Fortune Favoring the Confederates. — An Unfortunate Day for the Nationals. — Vigorous Preparations for Battle. — Death of Sedgwick. — Hancock’s Advance. — Sheridan’s Raid. — Yellowstone Tavern. — Death of J. E. B. Stuart. — Co-operative Movements. — Butler’s Movements. — Bermuda Hundred. — Gillmore and Beauregard. — Kautz. — Butler Bottled Up. — Sigel’s Movements. — Sigel Superseded by Hunter. — Hunter at Piedmont. — At Lynchburg. — At Meadow Bridge. — The Army of the Potomac Again in Motion. — At the North Anna. — Lee Again Ahead. — The Fords. — The Positions of the Different Corps. — Warren’s Corps at Jericho Ford. — Warren Severely Attacked on the South Side of the River. — The Confederates Repulsed — Hancock at Taylor's Bridge. — Preparations to Take it by Storm — The Assault. — Capture of the Bridge. — Burnside’s Difficulty. — Lee’s Peculiar Position. — His Projecting Centre. — The Anna Recrossed. — Another Flank Move- ment. — Across the Pamunkey. — Another Race for Richmond. — -Lee again Ahead. — The New Base of Supplies. — The Old Battle-Ground of the Peninsula. — A Contrast. — Both Armies Reinforced. — The Chicka- hominy. — Sheridan Pushed Forward. — A Cavalry Encounter at Hawe’s Store. — Hanover Court House. — Tolopotomy Creek. — Shady Grove. — Lee’s Position. — Movement on Cold Harbor. — Cold Harbor Secured — Torbert Sorely Pressed. — Concentrating at Cold Harbor. — Arrival of Smith from Bermuda Hundred. — Line of Battle. — The Attack. — The First Confederate Line Penetrated. — The Second Line Impregnable. — A Heavy National Loss, but Cold Harbor Held. — A Day of Preparations — The Second Day’s Fighting. — A Shock of Battle Unparalleled. — Piles of Dead and Wounded. — The Battle Brief, but Decisive. — An Emphatic Protest. — The American Soldier. — The Battle of Cold Harbor Ended. — Terrific Slaughter. — Coffee and Tobacco. — Another Flank Movement. — Sheridan at Trevillian and Louisa Court House. — The Army in Motion. — Across the Chickahominy. — On to the James. — South of the James. — The Success of the Movement. — The Campaign. — The Losses. — Reflections. The victory at Cbattaiiooga, although its far-reaching results were not immediately visible, marked a new departure in the progress of the war. There 'w^as, as we have seen, great joy throughout the land, when it became known that Grant had not only released the imprisoned and famishing army, but that he had again plucked glorious victory out of disastrous dt^- GRANT, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL. mi feat, and snatched fresh laurels from the ambitious grasp of one of the most daring as well as most trusted generals of the Confederacy. General Grant r.ow commanded the confidence of the government : he had become, also, the favorite, popular hero. The crisis de- manded such a man. It had long been apparent that much of the National strength had been wasted, because of divided counsels and disunited action. The army, as a whole, had been badly managed. Gen- eral Halleck was, it is true, the nomi- nal head of the army. His office, how- ever, was more a name than a reality. Military operations were directed some- times by the president himself, without the consent of any of his counsellors, sometimes by Halleck or Stanton, with- out the consent of the president, and not unfrequently by the generals in the field at their own volition, and on their own responsibility. ‘‘ The armies of the East and West,” to use Grant’s pithy language, “acted independently, and without concert, like a haulky team^ no two ever pulling together.” A step was taken in the u'ight direction, when General Grant was placed at the head of the military division of the Missis- sippi— a command which virtually in- cluded the entire west and southwest. The victory at Chattanooga did much to justify the wisdom of the arrange- U^ent. Concentration of authority in the management of the armies of the Republic had become more and more a necessity. Grant was already singled out as the man who should take the reins in hapd, and give^ unity and direc- tion to all the troops in the field. Early in 1864, the rank of lieutenant- general was revived in his favor ; and, on the 9th of March, Grant, who had been summoned to Washing- ton, was received in the Executive Chamber, and presented to the cabinet. In handing him his commission. Presi- dent Lincoln said : General Grant — The nation’s apprecia- tion of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented with this commission, constituting you lieutenant- general in the army of the United States. With this high honor devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so. under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence.” •Grant’s reply was as modest as it was brief. He said : Mr. President — I accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the fuU weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me ; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies,, and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.” On the 10th, he made a rapid visit, with Meade, to the army of the Mar, Potomac. On the same day, a special order of the president assigned him to the command of all the armies. The next day, he hurried westward to Nashville, where he had made arrange- ments to meet Sherman for consulta- tion. r: , V . 652 THE WILDERNESS. Grant had great reason to be proud of the position to which he had attained. Success had attended his efforts on the field of battle ; and a grateful people, lavish of their favors, had showered upon him their choicest gifts. His, however, was not a head to be easily turned. Vanity or vainglory found no place in his character. He bore his honors meekly; and, soldier-like, he thought of his companions-in-arms — those who had shared with him the hardships and perils of the battle field, and who were now fully entitled to participate in his honors. When first made aware of the intentions of the government, he wrote to Sherman a characteristic letter. ‘‘While I have been eminently successful in the war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy and skill of those whom it has been my good for- tune to have occupying subordinate positions under me. There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable, in a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success. How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I. I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flatter- ing construction.” In bis new position, heavy responsi- bilities devolved on General Grant. He was entrusted with the care of all the armies of the Republic. It w'as necessary for him to take into consider- ation not one army only, or one section of the country, but the entire field of actual and possible operations. The theatre was large. The National navy had succeeded in blockading almost the entire sea-coast. There were garri- sons at Plymouth, Washington and New Berne, in North Carolina. Foot- holds had been secured at Beaufort, Folly Island, Morris’ Island, Hilton Head and Port Royal, in South Caro- lina. The same was true of Fernan- dina, St. Augustine, Key West and Pensacola, in Florida. New Orleans, with its river approaches, was in the hands of the Nationals; and a small garrison had been established at the mouth of the Rio Grande. The Mis- sissippi was garrisoned at various points from St. Louis to its mouth. Posts were established along the entire line of the Arkansas. The line of the Ten- nessee and the Holston was guarded by National troops ; and a small but firm foothold had been secured in Georgia, south of Chattanooga. Although Vir- ginia was still debatable territory, the Nationals were in possession of Nor- folk, Fortress Monroe and some adjoin- ing territory. It was necessary to maintain all these garrisons, to pre- serve these various footholds, to protect their communications, and to provide them with needed supplies. This, how- ever, was not all. The Confederates were yet strong in the field. One powerful army, under Lee, lay along the south bank of the Rappahannock, confronting the army of the Potomac. Another poweHul army, under Johns- ton, was securely encamped at Dalton, guarding the approaches to Atlanta, © le L. y„ s„ e i M T. AS HE APPEARED DDPJN; 'HE WAR, f GRANT^S PLANS. the second capital and stronghold of the Confedei’acy. A third powerful army, under Kirby Smith, held sway in Texas and Southern Arkansas. In Northeastern Mississippi, Forrest, with a strong body of cavalry, was scouring the country at will. After three years of hard fighting, during which there had been an almost unparalleled ex- penditure of blood and treasure, such was still the situation. In order to re- store the Union, it was necessary to crush out those armies, and so break the military power of the Confederacy. Such were the onerous duties and re- sponsibilities which now devolved upon General Grant. Success had hitherto attended his movements and crowned his efforts. It remained to be seen whether, in his new position, he would be as faithfully accompanied by the smiles and favors of fortune. Let us now see how Grant proposed to accomplish these herculean labors. Sherman, it is to be remembered, simul- taneously with the elevation of Grant, was placed in command of the military division of the Mississippi, composed of the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee and the Arkansas. General J. B. McPherson was, at the same time, assigned to the command of the department and army of the Tennessee. General Halleck, having been relieved from duty as general-in-chief, was appointed chief of staff at Washington, under the di- rection of the secretary of war and the lieutenant-general commanding. Grant, as we have seen, had gone to Nashville on the 11th of March, to consult with Sherman. On the 17th, and juar, while still with Sherman, he is- U. sued General Orders No. 1. In obedi- ence to the order of the president, he assumed command of the armies of the United States; and his headquarters were to be in the field and, until further orders, with the army of the Potomac. On the 19th, he left Nashville for Washington, and proceeded thence, with as little delay as possible, to the headquarters of General Meade, at Cul- pepper Court House. Steps were im- mediately taken for reconstructing the army, and getting it ready for battle. Meanwhile, Grant’s plans were assum- ing somewhat of a definite shape. He had discussed with Sherman, at Nash- ville, the course which ought to be pursued all over the battle area. In a letter written to Sherman on April 4th, Grant stated his views with great freedom and with considerable fulness. It was his intention, if the enemy did not anticipate him, to take the initia- tive in the spring campaign. With this end in view, he had sent a special mes^ senger to Banks — at that time, as hag already been related, on his way to Shreveport — instructing him to finish up the expedition, to send back to Sherman the men he had borrowed, and to hurry forward preparations for an attack on Mobile. For himself, he had decided to stay with the army of the Potomac; and he was making ready to attack Lee’s army wherever it might be found. In a few days he would be strengthened by the addition of 25,000 effective men, under General Burnside. Co-operative movements were to ];)« 654 THE WILDERNESS. conducted by General Butler and by General Sigel. Butler was to be joined by Gillmore, with 10,000 men from the department of the South. His ’force would thus be increased to 30,000 men. With W. F. Smith commanding Lis right wing and Gillmore his left, Butler was to move on Bichmond, from Foi'tress Monroe, by the south side of t he James River. Sigel, who had been chai'ged with the protection of West Vii'ginia and the frontiers of Pennsyl- vania and Maryland, was to collect all his available forces, to arrange them in two columns, and to move them — one from Beverley, Virginia, and the other from Charlestown, on the Kanawha — against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Advancing from opposite points, and converging towards a com- mon centre, it was expected that these co-operative movements would distract Lee’s attention, and compel him to send detachments from his main force to protect his westward lines of supplies. For Sherman, Grant had no instruc- tions other than those already given. He did not propose to lay down for him a plan of campaign. He was to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, to advance into the ene- my’s country, and to inflict what dam- age he could. Some ten days later, writing to Sherman, Grant was more explicit : “What I now want more particularly to say is that, if the two main attacks — yours and the one from here — should promise great suc- cess, the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their line of defense and throw their whole strength upon a single army, believing a defeat with one victory to sustain them better than a defeat all along their whole line, and hoping, too, at the same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest perfectly satisfied with its laurels, having penetrated to a given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their whole force first upon one and then on the other. With the majority of military commanders, they might do this ; but you have had too much experience, travelling light, and subsist- ing upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would be, if the enemy in your front shows signs of join- ing Lee, follow him up to the extent of your ability. I will prevent the concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this army to do it.” Such was the general plan of cam- paign for the armies generally for the spring of 1864. It is evident, from the tenor of these instructions, that Grant’s thoughts were becoming more and more occupied with two main centres of action. There was the army of Lee guarding Richmond ; and there was the army of Johnston, who had suc- ceeded Bragg, covering the approaches to Atlanta. If these two armies could be broken and scattered, or destroyed, the Confederacy would be at an end. Richmond and Atlanta, with their rival armies — these were now to become the absorbing centres of attraction. It was part of Grant’s plan that when the proper hour arrived, the blow should be struck simultaneously in the west and in the east. Leaving Sherman for the present, let us now turn our faces eastward, and contemplate the mighty hosts who are preparing for battle on the banks of the Rapidan. During the winter of 1863-4, the army of the Potomac and the army of WISTAR^S RAID. 656 Northern Virginia lay, the former on the northern, the latter on the south- ern bank of the Rapidan. Meade’s headquarters were at Culpepper Court House, on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, about seventy -five miles northwest of Richmond in a direct line. Lee’s headquarters were at Orange Court House, on the same line of railroad. The battle of Gettysburg had been fought and won on the 3d of July, 1863. On the 5th, Lee com- menced his retreat back towards Vir- ginia. The pursuit was continued as far as Williamsport, where, on the 12th, the Confederate chief succeeded in retiring his whole army across the Potomac. Meade followed into Vir- ginia; and, after a series of daring, sometimes perilous, but withal ineffect- ual manoeuvres, made on both sides, the rival armies went into winter quar- ters, as above indicated. In the earlier months of the year, and before the commencement of the great campaign, there were several de- sultory and unimportant movements, which, although not destined to exer- cise any perceptible infiuence on the war, were yet sufficient to break up the dull monotony of camp life in win- ter time. The first of these movements occurred early in February, and originated with General Butler, then commanding in Virginia and North Carolina. Public feeling was greatly excited all over the North because of the cruel treatment of the National prisoners of war at Rich- mond. Butler resolved to make a bold effort to effect the deliverance of the prisoners. His suggestions found favor at headquarters; and arrangements were made by which he was to have a species of co-operative aid from the army peb. of the Potomac. On the 5th of February, General Wistar, with a col- umn of cavalry and infantry, about 1500 strong, set out from New Kent Court House, and pushed rapidly to the north. Suitable demonstration was made by the army of the Potomac, General Sedgwick pushing portions of the army across at three different fords — Ely’s, Barnett’s and Germania. Wis- tar reached Bottom Bridge at half-past two on the morning of the 6th, having marched forty -seven miles in sixteen and a half hours. His presence there became known in Richmond, and cre- ated the wildest excitement. A large portion of the garrison had been with- drawn to reinforce Pickett in North Carolina. It was feared that the city might be successfully invaded, and that the National prisoners would be liber- ated. The alarm bells were, therefore, rung, and the Home Guard assembled. The raid, however, proved a failure. Such were the obstructions at Bottom Bridge, and so well guarded was the whole line of the Chickahominy, that Wistar found it impossible to cross the stream. The attempt was finally aban- doned about noon ; and the return march was made to New Kent with great rapidity and without loss. Later in the same month, there was another and more formidable move- ment, similar in its origin and general character, and having the same end in view— the liberation of the National 656 THE WILDERNESS. prisoners in Richmond. It was spoken of at the time, and afterwards, as Kil- patrick’s raid. The movement was PfI), manifold. On the 27th, a body 27. of infantry, under General Sedg- wick, left camp near Culpepper Court House, and moved in the direction of Madison Court House, some fifteen miles to the southwest. The day fol- lowing, General Birney advanced, with a division, in the same direction. Sedg- wick occupied Madison Court House and the heic^hts along Robertson’s River. Birney occupied James Cit}^, somewhat to the west of Culpepper Court House. On the 28th, a body of cavalry, under General Custer, was pushed forward in the direction of Charlottesville, where the railroad fi*om Lynch bui’g forms a junction with that of the Orange and Alexandria. The capture of this place would have been most damaging to Lee’s communications with the west. In ten hours, Custer was within four miles of Charlottesville, where he sur- prised a camp of Stuart’s cavalry, with horse batteries. The camp equipage was destroyed ; and six caissons were blown up. For the want of the neces- sary material, it was found to be im- possible to spike the guns. The enemy rallied rapidly and in great force ; and Custer found it necessary to retreat. On his backward course, however, he worked considerable damage, destroy- ing mills and other property. Night coming on, he lost his way, and was compelled to bivouack in the woods. ,Next morning, about nine o’clock, hav- ing discovered his way, he found his passage completely blocked by Stuart’s cavalry. He was near Stannardsville. Ordering a charge, he cut his way through in the most gallant manner, and returned to Madison Court House, without the loss of a single man, and bringing with him about 50 prisoners, a large number of negroes and some 300 horses. General Kilpatrick, on the 28th, left Culpepper, at the head of some peb. 5000 or 6000 cavalry and horse 28. artillery. Crossing the Rapidan at Ger- mania and Ely’s fords, and sweeping around Lee’s right fiank, he reached Spottsylvania Court House on the even- ing of the 29th. At this point, he des- patched Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, with about 500 of his picked men, with in- structions to move in a southwesterly direction towards Frederickshall, where it was known a large number of Con- federate guns were stored. It was Kilpatrick’s hope that Dahlgren, after making a successful raid through Louisa and Goochland counties, would be able to strike Richmond on the south, Mobile he himself was entering it from the north or northwest. Kilpatrick, mean- while, pushed rapidly forward, leaving evidence of his desolating visit every- where behind him. At Beaver Dam Station, he encountered and defeated the Confederates, under Bradley T. Johnson. He then struck across the South Anna, and cut the Fredericks- burg and Richmond Railroad, at Kilby Station. On the 1st of March, he was close upon the Confederate capital. He advanced within the first and within the second lines of defense; but he looked in vain for any signs of the KILPATRICK^S RAID. ^37 . presence of Dahlgren. When within half a mile of the city, he was effectual- ly resisted, and compelled to fall back. Sv*eking safety in flight, he moved in the. direction of Mechanicsville, the enemy following in vigorous pursuit. Ilaving succeeded in crossing the Chick- ahominy, he pushed towards the Pa- miinkey. This latter, however, he found it impossible to ford. Crossing the Richmond and York River Railroad, he moved in the direction of White House, where he met a relief party, which Butler had sent up from New Kent Court House. At this point the pursuit ceased, the retreat being con- tinued down the peninsula. Kilpatrick had failed in his main purpose, and he had lost 150 men; but, by the de- struction of stores and railroad prop- erty, and by the capture of 500 prison- ers and a large number of horses, he had inflicted a damaging blow on the Confederacy. What, meanwhile, had become of Dahlgren ? He had faithfully, as far at least as was possible, carried out the instructions given him. Following the prescribed route, he had reached Frederickshall, and destroyed the rail- road. Had he been an hour earlier, he would have intercepted Lee, who had just passed over. Pushing forward, he would have been on the outskirts of Richmond in sufllcient time to co-oper- ate with Kilpatrick, but for the treach- ery of a negro guide, who led him out of his way. As it was, he did not reach the outer lines until late in the afternoon of the 2d of March. Flurry- ing down the north bank, he passed the outer works without difficulty, and was pressing forward with great energy towards the inner, when the enemy fell upon him with overwhelming force. Observing no signs of Kilpatrick, and soon learning that his attempt had failed, Dahlgren deemed it prudent to retrace his steps. It was his only chance of safety. The situation, how- ever, was desperate. The Confederate militia, aroused by the unwelcome visit of Kilpatrick, swarmed around him, panting for revenge. He had to flght his way at every turn and bend. In one of his encounters he, with Major Cook and about 100 men, became sep- arated from the main body of his com- mand. Thus isolated, he had, on the night of the 3d, fought his way to the Mattapony, and crossed at Dabney’s Ferry. Here, however, he fell into an ambush, and was completely surround- ed. Dahlgren and several of his com- panions were killed. The remainder of his little band were made prisoners. The fate of this unfortunate young leader created great excitement in the North. He was the son of Admiral Dahlgren ; and, although only twenty- one years of age, he had given proof not only of great daring, but of singu- lar ability as a cavalry officer. He had already lost a foot in the service of his country ; and, at the time of his death, he was still suffering from the unhealed wound. These expeditions, although inspired by the noblest and best of motives, and in every sense praiseworthy, all proved more or less abortive. Richmond was not to be taken ; the prisoners were C58 THE WILDER^^ESS. not to be delivered by sucli means. The work, however, was now to be done in a different and more effective style. March was drawing to a close when General Grant arrived at Culpepper Court House, and established his head- quarters with the army of the Potomac. His first attention was given to the re- organization of that army. Consoli- dation had become a necessity, from the reduced numbers of some of the divisions. Preliminary to all other ar- rangements, Grant had wisely conclud- ed to retain in chief command Major- General Meade. By his victory at Gettysburg, Meade had won the re- spect and confidence of the army, the approbation of the public, as well as a world-wdde renown. He had proved himself to be a skilful tactician; and he had the advantage of possessing a thorough knowledge of the army in all its departments. Under the new arrangement, he sustained to Grant the same relations that the corps command- ers sustained to himself. Meade and Sherman stood on the same level. They were Grant’s first-lieutenants. Grant gave his instructions to Meade, who had the handling of the army and the working out of all the details. The arrangement proved to be agree- able to both parties ; and it was, doubt- less, the best possible in the circum- stances. Grant said, afterwards : “Commanding all the armies, as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command .of the army of the Potomac. ]\Iy instructions for that army were all througli him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank has drawn from him much of that public attention which his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which he would otherwise have received.” In its new form the army of the Po- tomac was consolidated into three corps — the Second, Fifth and Sixth — which were commanded respectively^ by Han- cock, AVarren and Sedgwick. These were men of high character and of proved ability, although their excel- lences were naturally not all of the same kind. Major-General Winfield Scott Hancock had long been a prom- inent leader in the army of the Poto- mac. His magnifient personal presence won for him, at Williamsburg, the title of ‘‘superb”; and he was possessed of those magnetic qualities which, on the field of battle, attract and inspire the soldier. At Gettysburg he shone like a star of the first magnitude ; and, while he saved the National army and con- verted defeat into victory, he covered himself with glory^ Major-General Governeur K. AVarren, placed in com- mand of the Fifth corps, an officer of engineers, and comparatively a ymung man, had, on several important occa- sions, revealed not only dash and daring, but the higher qualities of gen- eralship, such as quickness of percep- tion of danger or of opportunity^ pres- ence of mind, promptitude of action, and skill in combination. But for his (piick discernment and prompt and de- termined action, at Little Bound Top, on the second daygat Getty^sburg, the National left might have been turned, REORGANIZATION. 659 and the whole army thrown into con- fusion, and probably routed. His ad- vancement had been rapid, but it had not been beyond his deserts. The com- mander of the Sixth corps was Major- General John Sedgwick, of Freder- icksburg renown, the man who, more than any other, sustained the reputa- tion of the army of the Potomac and the dignity of the National cause, at Chancellorsvdlle. Sedgwick was as brave as he was modest, as able as he was unpretentious. The high honor of commanding the army of the Poto- mac he had more than once declined. Such were the three men on whom Meade depended for the execution of his orders and the directions of the general-in-chief. A better choice could hardly have been made. The division commanders had been chosen with equal care. Those of the Second corps were respectively Barlow, of the First division ; Gibbon, of the Second ; Birney, of the Thii-d ; Carr, of the Fourth. Those of the Fifth corps were, in the same order, Griffin, Robin- son, Crawford, Wadsworth. Those of the Sixth corps were Wright, Getty and Prince. The brigade commanders, also, were men of known capacity and tried abili- ty. They were, of the Second corps. Miles, Smyth, Frank and Brooke, of the First division ; Webb, Owens and CaiToll, of the Second; Ward and Hays, of the Third ; Mott and Brewster, of the Fourth. Of the Fifth corps, they were Barnes, Bartlett and Ayres, of the First division ; Leonard, Baxter and Dennison, of the Second; McCand- | less and Fisher, of the Third ; Cutler, Bice and Stone, of the Fourth. Of the Sixth corps, they were Torbert, Upton, Burnham and Shaler, of the First; Wheaton, Grant, Neill, Eustis, of the Second; Morris and Russell, of the Third. The inspectors-general were respec- tively Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Mrr- gan, of the Second ; Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Bankhead, of the Fifth ; Lieuten- ant-Colonel M. T. McMahon, of the Sixth. The chiefs of artillery, taking them in the same order, were Colonel J. C. Tidball, Colonel C. S. Wainright and Colonel C. H. Tompkins. The cav- alry were entrusted to the able hands of Major-General Philip H. Sheridan. Brigadier-General Henry J. Hunt re- mained in charge of the artillery. Col- onel H. S. Burton being second in command. The onerous duties of the quartermaster’s department still de- volved on the able shoulders of Briga- dier-General Rufus Imyalls."^ O * General Grant's staff was composed as follows : Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, chief of staff; Lieutenant-Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant- general ; Lieutenant-Colonel C. B, Comstock, senior aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel O. E. B. Babcock, aide-de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel F. T. Dent, aide- de-camp ; Lieutenant-Colonel Horace Porter, aide-de- camp; Lieutenant-Colonel W. L. Duff, assistant in- spector-general ; Lieutenant-Colonel W. R. Rowley, secretary ; Lieutenant-Colonel Adam Badeau, secretary ; Captain E. S. Parker, assistant adjutant-general ; Cap- tain George K. Leet, assistant adjutant-genei'a!, in charge of office at Washington ; Captain P. T. Hudson, aide-de-camp; Captain H. W. Jones, assistant quarter- master, on duty at headquarters ; First-Lieutenant William Dunn, junior, Eighty-Third Indiana Volun- teers, acting aide-de-camp. General Meade’s chief of staff was Major-General A. A. Humphrey, a field-officer of engineers, who, as a di- vision commander, had won distinction at Gettysburg. His adjutant-general was General Seth Williams, an offi- cer admirably qualified for the special duties of his post. 6G0 THE WILDERNESS. Such, under its new organization, was the army of the Potomac. This, however^ was not the only force on which General Grant could rely. On its way from East Tennessee, the Ninth army corps, under General Burnside, had rendezvoused at Annapolis, where it had recruited and added a whole di- vision of colored troops. On the 23d of April April, Burnside’s troops were re- 23. viewed in Washington by Presi- dent Lincoln, and marched at once to Culpepper to join the army of the Poto- mac. Burnside remained for a time in separate command, receiving his orders not through Meade, but directly from Grant. The united strength of the four corps gave Grant a movable column of about 140,000 men of all arms. These figures, however, did not fully represent his eifective strength. There \vere, in addition, the co-operative forces — those under Butler, 33,000 strong, and those under Sigel, some 20,000 strong; and Grant could count with confidence on a portion, at least, of the 100,000 men promised for one hundred days by the governors of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Iowa. The army of Northern Virginia, as General Lee’s army was called, was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Potomac. It had, for the time, been much reduced by furloughs. At the beginning of May, the entire force at Lee’s disposal — foot, horse and artil- lery — did not exceed 60,000. It was divided into three corps, commanded respectively by Ewell, Hill and Long- street. The three corps lay en echelon. Ewell was on the left and somewhat in advance, his own right resting on the river ; Hill was in the centre, at Orange Court House ; Longstreet was further to the south, at Gordonsville. By the end of April, General Grant’s arrangements were completed ; and everything was in readiness for a gen- eral forward movement. Sherman, ‘ ’ whose operations will be detailed in a subsequent chapter, was awaiting the signal to march from Chattanooga. Meade was ready to march the army of the Potomac across the Rapidan, his instructions being to turn, if possible, the Confederate right, and interpose between Lee and Richmond. Butler, who had been fully instructed as to the pa]*t he should take in the cam- paign, was ready to move up the James, in the direction of City Point. Sigel, having arranged his army in two columns — the one under General Crook, to opei*ate on the Kanawha, the other under his own care, to opei’ate on the Shenandoah — was prepared to move whenever the signal should be given. On the night of the 3d of May, the army of the Potomac broke up ^jay its encampments; and, in two col- 3. limns, it began to move toward the Rapidan, the right from Culpepper, and the left from Stevensburg. On the same day, Butler moved from Fortress Monroe. Sigel had already set out as directed, two days before. For the present, ’we shall remain with and follow the fortunes of the army of the Potomac. The right col- umn of that army, made up of the corps of Warren and Sedgwick, moved in the direction of Germania Ford. The ACROSS THE RAPIDAN. 661 left, which consisted of Hancock’s corps, moved in the direction of Ely’s Ford. All during the night and the greater part of the following day, the banks of the river presented a lively scene. It was such a scene as even the eye of the war-hardened veteran rarely looks up- on. One hundred and forty thousand men, including some 10,000 cavalry, with artillery in proportion, and an army-train of 4000 wagons, were press- ing towards the river, or crossing the bridges, or spreading thetnselves out in huge masses on the banks beyond. Be- fore nio^ht, Meade had taken his entire army across the river. Warren’s corps, forming the advance of the right col- umn, with Wilson’s cavalry division in front, reached Germania Ford at six May o’clock on the morning of Thurs- 4* day, the 4th , and, as soon as the bridge was laid, began the passage, w’hich was completed by one o’clock. Sedgwick’s column followed immediate- ly afterwards. Hancock, with the left column, Gregg’s cavalry division pre- ceding, crossed at an early hour; and by nine o’clock he was at Chancellors- ville, where he rested for the remainder of the day. Warren, after crossing the river, had pushed on to Old Wil- derness Tavern, where he bivouacked. Sedgwick, who was the last to cross, remained for the night near the river. The cavalry were well thrown out towards Orange Court House, Fred- ericksburg and Todd’s Tavern. Burn- side, with the Ninth corps, was still at Culpepper Court House, where he had been ordered to remain for twenty- four hours, when, it was supposed. the first and second columns would be safely on the southern banks of the Bapidan. The wagon-trains, also, for the present, were left on the northern banks. Such was the general posi- tion of General Grant’s forces on the night of the 4th and the morning of the 5th. Lee had not been ignorant of Gi*ant’s movements. ^rom the signal-station on the summit of Clark’s Mountain, he had a wide and commanding view of the entire country; and the beacon-fires which blazed throughout the night, rendered conspicuous by' the all-sur- rounding gloom, showed that he was concentrating his scattered forces, and preparing for the onset of the foe. It was evident that Lee had concluded that it was best for him to allow Grant to cross the river unopposed, and to offer him battle afterwards. He might have acted differently. He might have allowed a portion of the opposing army to pass, and then, by destroying the means of passage, attempted to destroy the isolated fraction. He might have directly opposed the passage of the river, and, by occupying advantageous positions, prevented them from deploy- ing. Neither of those courses, however, commended themselves ; and following the example which he had set at Fred- ericksburg, he gave his antagonist full oppoi’tunity to cross the river, to take position, and more fully to develop his plans. His position behind Mine Run was strong ; and for a whole winter it had defied the skill of Meade, and all the valor of the army of the Po- tomac. Even if Grant did attempt 276 662 THE WILDERNESS. to turn his right, he could rely on his well-trained legions for support; and the country, with which he was thor- oughly familiar, was better adapted for purposes of resistance than for purposes of attack. W e are now fairly in the Wilderness. It is a wild and desolate region of worn- out tobacco-fields, covered with scraggy oaks and pines, sassafras and hazel, and intersected with narrow roads and deep ravines. It is a strange battle-ground ; yet it is here, amid these jungles, on these narrow wood roads, and in these deep ravines, that is about to be fought one of the mightiest and most bloody, if not most decisive, battles of the war. Manifestly, Grant had not intended that the battle should take place in the forest. He felt proud because of the success which had attended the crossing of the Rapidan. It was confessedly a perilous operation ; and the fact that it had been accomplished “in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army,” was well fitted to relieve his mind of the most “ serious apprehensions.” It was his hope, if not his conviction, that another day’s march would enable him to push the M’my beyond the Wilderness, and, using it m a mask, to advance rapidly on Gor- ionsville, and take a position between Lee’s army and the Confederate capital. It was Grant’s expectation, in fact, that Lee, as soon as he was made aware of the movements of the National army, vould fall back towards Richmond. With this end in view, Sheridan was instructed to move, with Gregg’s and Torbert’s divisions, against the Confed- erate cavalry in the direction of Hamil- ton’s Crossing; Wilson, with the Third cavalry division, was to move to Craig’s Meeting House on the Catharpin Road, and thence to send out detachments along the different avenues by which the enemy might approach; Hancock, with hi^ Second corps, was to ad- vance to Shady Grove Church, and thence to extend his right towards the Fifth corps, at Parker’s Store; Warren, with his Fifth corps, was to move to Parker’s Store, and to extend his right towards the Old Wilderness Tavern, where Sedgwick was ordered to take position. On the morning of Thursday, the 5th, these orders w^ere put in ex- j^ay ecution. As early as five o’clock, 5. the different columns were in motion, and pushing towards the positions respectively assigned them. A blood- red sun, as if ominous of the dread- ful slaughter which was soon to fol- low, was pouring his slanting beams through the openings in the woods, al- ready beautiful and richly clad with the green robes of early summer. It soon became apparent that Lee was neither ignorant of the plans of his antagonist, nor willing to allow him to execute his purpose without offering at least a stubborn resistance. From the Con- federate centre at Orange Court House, about twenty miles from Grant’s pre- sci*ibed line of march, two roads run, in a northeasterly direction, towards Fredericksburg. That to the north is an old turnpike ; the other is a plank- road. There is another road, called the Stevensburg plank road, which, run- THE FOE FELT. 663 ning from Culpepper Court House in a southeasterly, direction, crosses the turnpike before mentioned, and termi- nates in the plank road. At the junc- tion of the Stevensburg plank road ^vith the turnpike is the Old Wilder- ness Tavern. Five miles more to the southeast, where the two plank roads meet, is the Old Wilderness Church. Before the Stevensburg road unites with the plank road, there branches off another road, called the Brock road, which runs first almost due south, crossing the plank road, and then more to the southeast to Spottsylvania Court House. The two almost parallel roads running northeast from Orange Court House are generally spoken of as the Orange turnpike and the Orange plank road. Along these two roads, Lee, having already rightly divined the purpose of Grant, had pushed the larger portion of his army. It was his intention to strike the National army in the flank, and force a battle in the Wilderness. He had left behind him the strong defenses of Mine Run ; but he could fall back upon them, as a })lace of refuge, in the event of disaster. 0;i the morning of the 5th, Ewell, who had moved by the Orange turn- ].-ike, and Hill, who had moved by the Oiange plank road, were both in the near neighborhood of Old Wilderness Tavern ; but the Nationals knew it not. Thus it happened that Warren, almost as soon as he commenced his forward movement, found himself in collision with the enemy. Warren’s orders, it will be remem- bered, were that he should resume his march by the earliest dawn, on the morning of the 5th, and that he should take position at Parker’s Store on the Orange plank road, his right extending to Old Wilderness Tavern. By way of precaution, and in order to secure the route for Sedgwick’s corps, he threw the division of Griflin out on the Orange turnpike ; and, taking advantage of a wood road which led in a southwester- ly direction towards Parker’s Store, he pushed forward the division of Craw- ford, followed by that of Wadsworth and that of Robinson, to the point in- dicated. These movements were scarce- ly begun when the foe was felt. All of a sudden, Griffin’s skirmishers on the turnpike fell back; and, at the same moment almost, Crawford’s advance, which was now near Parker’s Store, was surprised to see the troops in front galloping back. Griffin had touched Ewell ; and Crawford had come into contact with the van of Hill’s column. Further advance was deemed perilous. The prescribed movements were, there- fore, temporarily suspended. Such was the condition of affairs when, about eight o’clock. Grant and Meade arrived at Old Wilderness Tavern. It was not the opinion of either of those com- manders that the Confederates were present in any great force. On the contrary, it was the belief of both that Lee had fallen back, that he was con- centrating his forces further to the south, and that the troops with which Griffin and Crawford had come into contact were portions of the Confed- erate right, which had been left as a rear-guard to cover the retreat. To 664 THE WILDERNESS. capture or brush away this force, and to obtain possession of the defenses at Mine Run, now became their object; and orders were given accordingly. As the strength of the Confederates had been developed mainly on the turnpike and in Griffin’s front, it was resolved to make the attack at that point. Crawford was, accordingly, or- dered to suspend operations on the plank road, while Wadsworth’s divi- sion was disposed in line on Griffin’s left, with the sister division of Robin- son in support. Wadsworth, having ordered McCandless’ brigade to take position on Wadsworth’s left, with- drew wdth the remainder of his divi- sion, but not without experiencing some sharp treatment at the hands of the enemy, who followed and fired into the rear of his column. Meanwhile, Hancock, who, as we have seen, had that morning marched southward from Chancellorsville in the direction of Shady Grove Church, and who was therefore quite out of position for a battle at Chancellorsville, was recalled, and was ordered to unite with the main body, by a movement up the Brock road. The ground on which the struggle was about to begin, — a struggle greatly more severe than was anticipated by the National leaders — was a sort of clearance in the forest. As seen from Warren’s headquarters, near the Old Wilderness Tavern, there was a little brook fiowing in a northeasterly direc- tion. The brook is bridged at the turnpike, wffiich soon afterwards rises to a ridge, on the southern slope of which is Major Lacy’s house, in the midst of a lawn and green meadows. Beyond, the hills were covered with pines and cedars. On the^right of the turnpike the thicket was very dense. A little more to the right was a ravine which divided the forces of Griffin and Ewell. On this strange battle field were soon to meet, in the deadly shock of battle, nearly a quarter of a million of civilized troops. At noon the pre- parations were completed; and War- ren, with the divisions of Griffin and Wadsworth, advanced to the attack. It was made with tremendous energy, and at first with complete success. The Confederate advance, which con- sisted of Johnson’s division alone, was easily driven back; and if the brigades of Ayres and Bartlett had been more vigorously supported,* Ewell’s corps might have been involved in hopeless disaster. As it was the Nationals, in what seemed the moment of victory, were speedily brought to a standstill. Johnson had been driven back to the main body of Ewell’s command. Rodes, with his fresh division, rushed to the rescue, when the shattered column quickly re-formed. At this moment the battle raged with tremendous fury. It had been intended that Warren’s right should be sustained by Wright’s division, of the Sixth corps ; but owing to the denseness of the woods, and the total absence of roads, Wright was un- able to get up in time. On Warren’s ex- posed fiank, therefore, the Confederates fell with fearful energy. The tide of battle was now turned. Griffin’s bri- gades, overwhelmed by the force of the ARRIVAL OF HANCOCK. 665 enemy, were driven back with the loss of two guns and several prisoners. Wads- worth’s division, on the left, had been equally unfortunate. In striving to form a connection with that of Griffin, it had moved in a wrong direction, completely exposing its left flank. On this the Confederates opened a murder- ous fire, compelling the entire division to fall back in disorder. McCandless’ brigade, of Crawford’s division, which, as we have seen, was stationed to the left of Wadsworth, fared even worse. Occupying an isolated position, and exposed at all points, it offered pecu- liar temptation for attack. Not slow to take advantage of the opportunity, the Confederates rushed upon it with great fury and in overwhelming num- bers. For a moment, it seemed as if the entire brigade was doomed to cap- ture or destruction. After severe fight- ing, during which were performed deeds of great valor, McCandless suc- ceeded in cutting his way through, but not without the loss of two whole regiments. Warren, having thus lost all he had gained by the first suc- cessful onset, and having sacrificed at least 3000 men, fell back and formed a new line of battle more to the rear, but still in front of the Old Wil- derness Tavern, and across the turn- pike. While Warren was thus engaged in the centre, Sedgwick, with the Sixth corps, having come up, was ready to take position on his right. Hancock, however, had not had time to return, as ordered, and take position on his left. Some four miles east of Parker’s Store, as has already been indicated, the plank road is intersected by the Brock road. Hill, it will be remembered, was pressing along the plank road. Hancock, by the Brock road, was pushing forward to the point of inter- section. It was all-important that this strategic point should not fall into the hands of the enemy. As there was danger that Hill might reach that point before the arrival of Hancock, Meade ordered General Getty, with his division of the Sixth corps, to ad- vance and hold the position. The order was promptly obeyed. It was not, however, a moment too soon, for Hill’s divisions were already well forward; and Getty, long before the arrival of Hancock, felt the presence and pressure of the foe. In spite of the rapidly increasing weight of his antagonist, Getty stoutly held his position. The situation, however, was becoming every moment more critical. It was now near three o’clock in the afternoon. There was a lull in the fight. Sud- denly there was heard a loud-resound- ing cheer. It came from Hancock’s men, who, with almost incredible ra- pidity, were pushing through the de- files of the forest. On his arrival, Hancock took posi- tion along the Brock road, facing west- ward. He immediately commenced to throw up breast-works. These, how- ever, were not yet completed, when he was ordered to attack with his whole corps, Getty supporting the advance. Birney, with his own command and that of Mott, was thrown forward on Getty’s right and left, on both sides of C66 THE WILDERNESS. the plank road. A section of Hicketts’ battery, and a company of the First Penns^dvania artillery, followed close in the rear of the infantry. It soon became manifest that the enemy was present in great force, although such was the density of the forest that nei- ther army could see the other. Getty, strengthened as he was by Birney and Mott, was making no headway. Han- cock, now pushing forward the bri- gades of Carroll and Owen, of Gib- bon’s division, and the Irish brigade, of the Second Delaware, under Colonel Smythe, made, to use the language of General Lee, “ repeated and desperate assaults but it was all in vain. Hill’s corps, which consisted of the divisions of Anderson, Heth and Wilcox, all of them West Point men, not only suc- cessfully resisted but repelled every attack. The afternoon was wearing away. The battle continued to rage with great fury, the tide of victory inclininof now to this side, now to that, but remaining with neither. Dur- ing the heat of the light, and when the Confederates made one of their desperate and apparently successful onslaughts, the section of Eicketts’ battery, which was moved along the plank road, was actually captured, the men and horses suffering terri- bly. It was soon, however, recap- tured by Carroll’s brigade. It was afterwards withdrawn and replaced by a section of Dow’s Sixth Maine bat- tery. Hancock had done his best, but apparently in vain. Mott’s command had already given way; and Hays, while attempting to fill up the break in the line, was shot dead, at the head of his brigade."^ The heavy and long-continued firing towards the junction of the plank and Brock roads, had already attracted the attention of Grant and Meade. It was evident that the battle was fierce- — that th6 Confederates were present in great force, and that Getty and Han- cock were being taxed to the very ut- most. By way of furnishing relief to these two commanders, Wadsworth, with his own division and Baxter’s brigade, of Robinson’s division, was * Alexander Hays, brigadier-general of United States volunteers and brevet lieutenant-colonel in the United States army, was born at Pittsfield, Pa,, in 1820. He graduated at West Point in 1844. Among his classmates were Grant, Hancock and Pleasonton. He entered the army as brevet second-lieutenant of the Fourth United States infantry. As a second-lieiiten- ant of the Eighth infantry, he entered upon the Mexi- can campaign, daring which he greatly distinguished himself and rose in his profession. Soon afterwards, he was appointed acting-assistant adjutant-general to Bri- gadier-General Lane, and won distinction in the battle near Atlixo. In April, 1 848, he resigned his position in the army, and engaged in the manufacture of iron, in Venango county, Pa. On the outbreak of the Civil War, he entered the service as colonel of the Sixty- Third Pennsylvania volunteers, and was appointed captain in the Sixteenth regiment of infantry, to date from May 14, 1801, In the Peninsula he was attached, with his regiment, to the First brigade of Kearney’s division, of Heintzelman’s corps. At the close of the seven days’ contest, he was nominated for a brevet of lieutenant-colonel. He took part in the Maryland campaign, and was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers. He m-hs wounded at Chancellorsville, while at the head of the Second brigade, of the Third division. Second army corps. At the battle of Gettj’sburg, he commanded the Third division of his corps, and, after the wounding of Hancock, was temporarily in ci)m- j mand. When the army of the Potomac was reorgan- ized, Hays was placed in command of the Second brigade, Bimey’s Third division, of the Second corps. In this capacity he fought, and gallantly met his death, in the Wilderness. Hays was frank, brave, quick and energetic, and greatly beloved by his men. Although not in the highest position, his death was a serious los.s to the army of the Potomac. PREPARING FOR THE SECOND DAY. 667 ordered to move southward through the forest, and strike Hill on the flank and rear. It was a most difficult ope- ration. Such was the density of the forest, and so great were the obstacles encountered in the face of skirmishers who were evidently familiar with every inch of the ground, that darkness had set in before Wadsworth was in a po- sition to strike as directed. His troops rested on their arms for the night, ready to take advantage of their fa- vored position in the morning. To- wards midnight, all was silent in the Wilderness. Hancock had failed to drive Hill back on the plank road. Hill had been equally unsuccessful in his attempt to dislodge Hancock. All along the line the Nationals and Con- federates lay so close to each other that the soldiers of both armies drew water from the same brook. As in the earlier part of the day, a ravine divided both the opposing armies in two. Hancock was separated from Warren and Sedg- wick. Ewell was unable to form a con- nection with Hill. The battle-ground was thickly strewn with dead and dy- ing men. Such was the end of the first day in the Wilderness. It was evident to all that a great battle would be fought on the morrow. The ground was ill adapted for civil- ized warfare. Other ground, however, could not now be chosen. The incon- veniences, it was felt, were common. On both sides the commanders were hopeful, if not confident ; and the rank and file were in excellent spirits. If neither had been successful, neither had any reason to be ashamed of defeat. Lee had failed to defeat Grant by striking him on his flank. Grant had failed to carry out his purpose of turn- ing Lee’s right. Each had failed in his original purpose ; but both were now face to face, with the Inevitable of battle before them. Night was spent by both command- ers in preparing for the conflict of the coming day. Burnside, it will be re- membered, had been left at Culpepper Court House with the Ninth corps, his instructions being to hold that place for at least twenty-four hours after the departure of the main body of the army. He had already been ordered forward ; and shortly after day-break, on the morninof of the 6th, he was on the field, and taking position between the troops of Warren and Hancock. He had marched with great rapidity a distance of thirty miles, and crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rapi- dan. Grant’s line of battle was five miles long, and was facing westward. It lay in the following order : Sedg- wick on the right; Warren in the cen- tre ; then Burnside ; then Hancock on the extreme left. Hancock, in addition to his own powerful corps, had Getty’s division, of the Sixth corps, and Wads- worth’s division, of the Fifth, both on his own right. On the Confederate side, Ewell was on the left ; Hill on the right; and Longstreet, who had been left at Gordons ville, was hurrying forward to reinforce Hill. The point of convergence of both armies embraced the turnpike and plank road, and the space between. It had become evident to both commanders that the real con- 668 THE WILDERNESS. flict would take place in the neighbor- hood of the plank road, on Grant’s left. It was to be the same battle field as on the previous day — ground on which it would be impossible to use either artil- lery or cavalry, and on which manoeu- vring of any kind would be totally out of the question. The 300 guns of the combatants were to remain idle ; and of the 200,000 men about to meet in a great death struggle, not more than 1000 would be visible at any one mo- ment to any one man. Grant’s order was given as soon as he heard the re- ports of the different commanders. It was simple. Attack along the whole line at five in the morning.” Lee had decided to deliver an overwhelming blow on Grant’s left ; but as it would be impossible to do so before the arri- val of Longstreet, he resolved to dis- tract attention, and so gain time by making a demonstration on the Na- tional right. Just fifteen minutes be- fore the time appointed by Grant for the general attack, a sudden discharge of musketry in the direction of Sedg- wick announced the fact that Lee was as ready for battle as his antagonist. This attack, however, was not of seri- ous moment. It was not pushed with vigor. Sedgwick was able to hold his own, and even to push his front forward a few hundred yards. The general plan of battle, as Grant had arranged it, was, therefore, undis- turbed. At five o’clock precisely, Warren and Hancock advanced to the attack. Han- cock, however, was doomed to bear the principal burden of the fight. With him, therefore, we must remain and witness the tide of battle, as it ebbs and flows in his front. Dreading an attack in great force, he had taken the precaution to throw up earth-works on the Brock road. Holding these works with his left, he threw forward his right ^nd centre, consisting of two divisions, under Birney, Getty’s com- mand, and the brigades of Owen and Carroll, of Gibbon’s division. Half and half work formed no part of Han- cock’s calculations. He meant to strike a firm and decisive blovv^ While Bir- ney and Getty made the direct attack along the plank road and on both sides of the same, Wadsworth, having worked his way across that part of the Second corps which was advancing along the right of the plank road, was ready to strike Hill clean on the left flank. The direct and flank move- ments were made almost simultane- ously ; and so furious was the onset that, after an hour’s severe fighting, the ground along Hill’s entire front was carried, and the line driven back through the woods for about a mile and a half. Hill’s troops, in fact, could not be halted until they had overrun the trains, artillery, and even the head- quarters of the Confederate commander. The rifle-pits had ])een captured, with many prisoners, and five stands of colors. It seemed as if the battle were already won. Another vigorous onset, and the presumption is that Lee’s army will be cut in two. The divisions of Heth and Wilcox, of Hill’s corps, have been litei*ally shattered to pieces. At this supreme moment, from som^ DEATH OF WADSWORTH. m cause not yet sufficiently explained — most probably because of the disen- tegration of Hancock’s line, brought about by the rough and tangled ground over which it had passed — the victors paused in their triumphant progress. The pause was fatal. It was now about seven o’clock. Hancock set about rearranging his troops, and get- ttni^ them into battle order. He had been reinforced by Stevenson’s divi- sion, of Burnside’s corps; and Wads- worth’s division was now brought into proper line of battle. Getty’s divi- sion, now completely exhausted, was replaced by Webb’s brigade, from Gibbon’s command on the left; and Frank’s brigade, of Barlow’s division, was pushed forward from the same flank. In making these arrangements, however, two precious hours were wast- ed. These hours of inaction proved a great gain to the Confederates. Hill’s remaaining divisions found time to come up. Longstreet, too, was already close at hand. Hancock was as yet ignorant of the near presence of Longstreet. He had looked for him in another di- rection. It was known the night pre- vious that he was marching up from Orange Court House ; and the unavoid- able conviction was that his object was to strike Hancock in the left flank and rear. It was because of this conviction that Hancock had only advanced his right divisions, leaving his left, under Gibbon, in charge of the works on the Brock road. Hancock had correctly judged. Longstreet had really been making such a movement. So Sudden, however, and so overwhelming had been the attack on his front, that Lee, fear- ing for the safety of his whole army, ordered Longstreet to discontinue his flank movement, and to come to the assistance of Hill. His arrangements completed, Hancock resumed the ad- vance with great energy. The line in his front no longer yielded to his touch. Again and again he attempted to press back the enemy; but it was all in vain. The battle now rasfed aorain with great fury, deeds of daring being performed on both sides. Lee had ex- hibited great personal bravery. When Gregg’s Texans came up, he put him- self at their head, and was with diffi- culty dissuaded from leading them to the attack. For two hours the tide of battle ebbed and flowed. It soon began to be evident that Longstreet was pre- sent in force, and that he was directing the movements of the Confederates in Hancock’s immediate front. Finding it impossible to make any headway, nay, feeling more and more the irre^ sistible pressure of the foe, Hancock ultimately falls back, and re-forms on the original line along the Brock road. It is now about eleven o’clock. The situation is becoming more critical every moment. Wadsworth, after ex- hibiting great gallantry, has just fallen, pierced through the head with a bullet; and his command is in utter rout.'^ It * James Samuel Wadsworth, brigadior-general of volunteers, was born in Geneseo, Livingston county, N. Y., October 30th, 1807. He was the son of James Wadsworth, extensive landowner }md philan- thropist of Geneseo. He studied at Hartford and afterwards at Yale, where he graduated. Choosing law as a profession, he spent some time in the office of the great lawyer and statesman, Daniel Webster. He took an active part in the Free-Soil movement, which divided 670 THE WILDERNESS. seems as if no force can check the fierce, onward rush of the now triumphant Confederates. A few moments more and Hancock may be driven from his works, and the National left doubled up. At this supreme moment, when the Confederates seem about to reap the rewards of victory, there is a sud- den pause in the battle. Why, no one could tell. It afterwards appeared that, when about to deal a decisive blow both on Hancock’s front and left flank, Longstreet was shot, by mistake, by his own men. He had been riding with his staff at the head of his col- umn, when the cavalcade suddenly con- fronted a portion of the flanking force, and was mistaken for a party of Na- tional horsemen. It was an unfortunate occurrence for Longstreet, and, indeed, for the whole Confederate army ; but it was the salvation of Hancock, and, probably, of the entire army of the Potomac. Although the fighting had, so far, been mostly done by the National left, the centre and right had not been idle. Sedgwick, who was attacked in the early morning, but who had suc- cessfully maintained his position, had the democracy of the State. He voted for the repub- lican candidates for presidential honors in 1856, and again in 1860. Like his father, he took a deep interest in all educational and philanthropic movements. He was commissioner to the Peace Convention held in Washington, in 1861. When communication with the capital was cut off, he chartered two ships on his own responsibility, loaded them with provisions, and pro- ceeded with them to Annapolis. He commenced his military career as a volunteer aide to General McDowell, and was present at the first battle of Bull Run. On McDowell's recommendation, he was appointed briga- dier-general of volunteers, August, 1861. In March, 1862, he became military governor of the District of labored in vain to cai*ry certain in- trenchraents, behind which Ewell had sheltered his men. His attempts had been frequently repeated; his losses, in consequence, were great. Two of Warren’s divisions had been detached and sent to the assistance of Hancock. The other two divisions — those of Grif- fin and Crawford — held a simply defen- sive attitude. It was part of the plan of the day that Burnside, advancing through the opening between Warren and Hancock, should co-operate in the general advance. It was not, however, until the afternoon that he became en- gaged with the enemy ; and the results were unimportant. It had, in fact, already become apparent that a mistake had been committed, in permitting Burnside to remain in independent command. After the repulse of Hancock by Longstreet, there was an almost un- broken lull along the whole line of battle until about four o’clock. When Longstreet was wounded, Lee took for- mal charge of that part of the field. He was slow, however, in making his dispositions. Hancock had turned to good account the time which had been Columbia. In November of that year, he was the re- publican canditate for governor of New York, but was defeated by Mr. Seymour, the democratic candidate. In December following, he was assigned to the com- mand of a division in the army of the Potomac. At Fredericksburg and at Chancellors vi lie, he revealed some of the first qualities of a military commander; and at Gettysburg, his division saved the first day. When the army of the Potomac was reorganized. Gen- eral Wadsworth was assigned to the command of the Fourth division, of the Fifth corps. At the head of this division, as has been shown in the text, ha bravely met his death. Wadsworth’s career illustrated all the higher and nobler characteristics of the genuine patjdoL CARROLL’S SPLEIS-DID CHARGE. 671 allowed him. Reinforcements had been sent him by Meade ; his position had been greatly strengthened ; and, * his front having been cleared by a well- executed movement made by Colonel Leasiire, he was fully prepared to meet the enemy. He had already received orders from Grant to resume the attack at six o’clock. He was not to be al- lowed to wait so long. Shortly after four o’clock, Lee, who by this time had got the troops of Longstreet and Hill well in hand, hurled them against Han- cock’s lines. It was evidently intended that the blow should be fatal. The Confederate columns, four in number, came rolling forward, firm, solid and resolute, as if they meant destruction. Without halting or firing a shot, they approached the edge of the abatis^ less than a hundred paces from Hancock’s front. Here they paused and opened a furious fire of musketry, which was kept up with great vigor. It had little effect, however, on Hancock’s men, who were safe behind their breast-works, and who replied with be- coming energy to the Confederate mus- keteers. While this was going on, a fire, which had broken out in the woods in the afternoon, communicated with the log breast-works, which soon became a mass of flame. The smoke and flame, which were driven by the wind in the faces of the Nationals, thus preventing them from firing from the parapet, gave an advantage to the Con- federates. Not slow to seize the oppor- tunity, Lee’s men rushed forward, broke through the first line, pressed into the breast-works, and crowded them with their standards. At this critical mo- ment, when some of the Nationals wei e already in full retreat towards Chan- cellorsville, Carroll, of Gibbon’s divi- sion, in obedience to orders from General Birney, rushed forward by the left flank, and, falling with tremendous fury on the triumphant* Confederates, routed them with great slaughter, re- claimed the works, and saved the day. At this point the attack was not re- sumed. Later in the day, and just befoi'e dark, a vigorous attack was made by Ewell on the right and front of Sedg- wick’s corps, on the extreme National right. It was a complete surprise to the Nationals ; and, although Sedgwick quickly got his corps into order, and re- pelled the attack, it was not until Gen- erals Seymour and Shaler, of Ricketts’ division, had been captured, with about 4000 of their oflicers and men. It was now dark. The sound of battle ceased. The wearied soldiers, lying in many cases beside dead or wounded com- rades, fell asleep on their arms. The piteous moanings of the wounded alone disturbed the surrounding solitude. The battle of the Wilderness, proper- ly so called, was ended. The two days’ fighting had result- ed in serious loss to both armies. The loss on the National side reached the high figure of 20,000 men, of whom probably 5000 were made pris- oners. On the part of the Con- federates the loss was proportionate- ly great, the lowest estimate being 10,000, of whom but few were cap- tured. Among the killed on the 672 THE WILDERNESS. National side were Generals Wads- worth, Hays and Webb; and Han- cock, Getty, Gregg, Owen, Bartlett and Carroll were wounded, some of them severely. Of the Confederate ( fficers. Generals Jones, Jenkins and Stafford were killed ; and Generals Longstreet, P^grain, Pickett and Hun- ter were wounded. Such a bush-fight had never been fought before. The 7th was Saturday. On the jljay moi*ning of that day, the rival 7* armies still confronted each other in the Wilderness. Both were bleed- ing and exhausted; and on neither the one side nor the other was there any disposition to renew the contest. In the National ranks, there were not a few who were of the opinion that a backward march across the Rapidan would soon be ordered. Such thoughts, however, found no place in the mind of General Grant. His eye was fixed on Richmond ; and, although seas of blood might lie between him and the Confederate capital, he was not to be driven from his purpose, or turned aside from the object of his ambition. Dur- ing the course of the day, it became more and more apparent that Lee was falling back in the direction of Richmond. It was Grant’s belief that Lee, convinced of his inability to maintain the contest in the open field, had decided to retire and await an attack behind his own works. His own mind was quickly made up ; and he resolved, by a flank movement on the Confederate right, to interpose his whole force between Lee and Richmond. Orders were given accordingly ; and, shortly after night- fall, the entire National army was on its way to Spottsylvania Court House, some thirteen miles further to the southeast. Warren led the way, fol- lowed by Hancock, both on the Brock road. Sedgwick and Burnside moved on an exterior route, by way of Chan- cellors ville, where, during the coui'se of the afternoon, the army trains had been parked. By this movement, it will be perceived. Grant abandoned Germania Ford, and gave Lee an opportunity to cut off his communica- tions. This, however, was of the less consequence, that the latter general was now under the necessity of taking care of his own communications, his right flank being already seriously threatened. Germania Ford, in fact, was now of little use to Grant; and Lee might take possession, or not, as he thought fit. Lee was not slow to dis- cover the real object of his antagonist, and to take measures accordingly. Anderson, who now commanded Long- street’s corps, received orders to move from the breast-works and take a posi- tion from which he would be able to advance on Spottsylvania Court House in the early morning. Not finding a suitable place for bivouacking, in con- sequence of the fire in the woods, An- derson kept moving on all night in the direction of the Court House. It thus happened that AVarren and An- derson, the former by the Brock road, the latter by a parallel road a little further to the west, were simultane- ously marching to the same point. It W’as about nine o’clock in the morninoj when Warren bei^an to move ALSOFS FARM. 673 his column. His desire was to reach Spottsylvania Court House before the enemy could have time to be there in anything like force. Unfortunately, howevei’, his course was greatly ob- structed, and his progress hindered. At Todd’s Tavern he was delayed for two hours, the road being blocked by Meade’s cavalry escort. About two miles further on, and near one of the tributaries of the Po, he was again brought to a standstill by the cavalry division of General Merritt, who, the day before, and up to a late hour of the night, had been engaged fighting Stuart. At this point he lost three hours. It was already daylight and when he resumed the advance, the road was obstructed with barricades of heavy trees. Considerable time was consumed in removing these; and it lyfay was not until eight o’clock on Sunday morning that the head of Warren’s column, composed of two brigades, under Robinson, emerged from the woods, and took position on the open ground at what was called Alsop’s Farm. This open ground or clearing covei*ed a space of about 150 acres, and was distant from Spott- sylvania Court House some two miles. At this point, the road from Todd’s Tavern forks — one branch leading to the Court blouse, and the other to Laurel Hill. The open space was traversed by an inconsiderable stream called the Ny; and the ground be- yond, which ascended towards Spottsyl- vania, was again covered with woods. Warren’s advance was half way across the clearing, and on the point of commencing the ascent of the crest, when, all of a sudden, the ridge blazed with cannon, and a murder- ous musketry fij’e burst forth from the woods. It was an unlooked-for reception. The National line stag- gered, and fell back. A stampede seemed to be imminent. Robinson exerted himself to the utmost to hold his men to their work. Getting his batteries into position on the right, he returned the enemy’s fire promptly and with vigor. He was soon, however, severely wounded in the knee; and his men, thus left without their leader, and retaining a lively recollection of their bitter experience in the Wilder- ness, fell back in some confusion to the woods, where, through the personal exertions of General Warren himself, they were, after some difficulty, rallied and re-formed. Soon afterwards came up Griffin’s division, which met with a similar reception, with a like result. Meanwhile, Crawford’s division and that of Wadsworth, now commanded by Cutler, had reached the battle- ground. Crawford advanced on Grif- fin’s left ; Cutler advanced on his right; and, in a brief space, the woods on both flanks wei*e cleared of the enemy. Warren’s entire corps was now drawn up in battle line; and the troops, as if convinced that another fierce and bloody battle was about to be fought, proceeded of their own accord to throw up intrenchments. Such was the com- mencement of the great struggle at Spottsylvania Court House. The fight- ing had been severe. The losses were ' heavy. On the National side, about 674 THE WILDERNESS. 1300 men were put hors de combat. Some of the regiments were almost cut to pieces. The First Michigan, which went into the fight 200 strong, came out with only 23 men uninjured. The heat was most intense ; and large numbers of the men suffered from sun- stroke, The engagement of Sunday morning, the 8th of May, is known as the battle of Alsop’s Farm. It was the head of Longstreet’s corps, commanded, as we have already seen, by Anderson, with which Warren had come in collision. It was an unex- pected collision ; and, resulting as it did, it was in the last degree unfortu- nate to the National cause. If Ander- son had not been at Spottsylvania Court House ahead of Warren, there can be no doubt that the story of that morning’s fight would have been altogether different. How mysterious- ly the fates seemed to be working in the interest of the Confederates ! How much had been done for them by that fire in the woods! It had given them their opportunity, and almost a victory, the day before. It had prevented Anderson from bivouacking, and, by compelling him to march all night, had enabled him, without any knowledge or purpose of his own, to anticipate the arrival of Warren, and so to inter- pose an obstacle to the advance of Grant’s army. And how strange that Meade’s own cavalry should have blocked the way of his own infantry ! Every obstruction put in Warren’s way was a benefit to Lee. Every moment Warren was delayed was a double gain to the Confederates. But for the fire in the woods, which hastened Ander- son’s onward march, and but for the unfortunate obstructions which hin- dered Warren’s progress, the National advance, it is reasonable to presume, would first have reached the clearing at Alsop’s Farm. In such a case, the first great purpose of General Grant would have been accomplished — Gen- eral Lee’s ris^ht would have been turned. As it was, Lee had succeeded in plant- ing his army right across Grant’s line of march, and in establishing a powerful bulwark of defense on the Spottsyl- vania Bidge. This movement upon Spottsylvania brought prominently in- to view, and shed fresh lustre on, the great abilities of the two rival com- manders. The hand of Lee and the hand of Grant were distinctly visible. Skill in combination, promptitude of action and rapidity of movement en- titled the one to the victory ; and tem- porary failure only served to bring into more conspicuous relief the military science which characterized the general plan of the other. After the experience of the morning, Warren did not feel himself strong enough to renew the attack. He awaited, therefore, the arrival of Sedg- wick, who came up in the afternoon, and, in the absence of Meade, assumed command. Meade, with the whole of Hancock’s corps, except the division of Gibbon, had remained at Todd’s Tavern, where, it was feared, the Con- federates were about to make an attack in force. With the two corps, Sedg- wick believed himself strong enough ! to attempt to drive the enemy from DEATH OF SEDGWICK. 675 his favored position on the ridge; but it was nearly sundown before his dis- positions were completed. Towards evening, a fruitless assault was made by a New Jersey brigade, under Gen- eral Neill ; and General Crawford, who again attempted to advance, was vigorously encountered by Ewell, and driven back a full mile, with the loss of about 100 men made prisoners. On the whole, Sunday, the 8th, was an unfortunate day for the Nationals. In the race for Spottsylvania, the Confed- erates were clearly the winners ; and the prize was of almost inestimable value. On the night of the above- mentioned day, Lee’s army was well forw^ard, and firmly entrenched on the liigh ground on the Spottsylvania side of the clearing. On the morning of Monday, the ]»Iay 9th, Meade’s entire army, having arrived, was formed in order of battle in front of the Confederate lines. Sedgwick took position on the left of W arren. Burnside was posted on the left of Sedgwick. Hancock, who had come up from Todd’s Tavern at an early hour, formed in line on Warren’s right, on high ground which over- looked the valley of the River Po. The disposition was, therefore, as fol- lows : Burnside on the left; then Sedg- wick; then Warren, with Hancock on the right. The wings were thrown forward, so as to encircle the Confede- rate position. A small creek, a branch of the Ny, lay between the position of the enemy and that of Warren and Sedg- wick ; it also separated Hancock from Warren. Sheridan, with a strong cav- alry force, set out, in the morning, on a grand raid, his object being to cut Lee’s railroad communications with Richmond. The day w^as spent chiefly in throwing up iutrenchments, and otherwise preparing for battle. There were frequent skirmishes ; and, all day long, the Confederate sharpshooters, taking advantage of their peculiarly favored position, were unusually active. While the day was yet young, not a few of the Nationals had fallen vic- tims to their unerring and deadly aim. Among these was General Sedgwick. He had been standing in the breast- works, on the extreme right of his own corps, and giving instructions as to the posting of some guns. He was at- tended by certain members of his staff. The balls of the sharpshooters were whistling past them, some of them dangerously near. One or two of those present showed signs of nervousness. “Pooh! pooh! men,” said Sedgwick, “they could not hit an elephant at that distance.” He had scarcely uttered the words, when he fell dead on the ground, the blood streaming from his nostrils. A bullet had pierced his face just below the left eye. Death was instantaneous. A serene smile rested on his features, as if connected with his last words. The death of Sedg- wick was a severe blow to the National cause. He was one of the most com- petent and most trusted soldiers in the army of the Potomac. He was sincere- ly lamented by the entire army; and, as soon as the fact of his death became known, the nation mourned the loss of a true patriot, a brave soldier and a 678 THE WILDERNESS. true nian.^' General Wright succeeded to the command of the Sixth corps. On the morning of Tuesday, the Iffay 10th, everything indicated com- plete preparation for battle. Grant occupied substantially the same position as on the previous day. His line stretched about six miles on the north bank of the Po, in the form of a crescent, the wings thrown for- ward. The Second corps, across the Po, held a line on the right, nearly parallel to the road from Shady Grove Church to the Court House ; the Fifth held the centre, on the east side of the Po ; the Sixth held the left, facing ^the Court House ; the Ninth was still further to the left; and in front of all was a dense forest. Lee held Spottsyl- * Majok-Genekal John Sedgwick was born in Con- necticut about 1815. He graduated at West Point in 1837. Among his classmates were Benham, Hooker, Arnold and French, of the National army, and Bragg, Eaily and Pemberton, of the Confederate service. He took part in the Mexican War, and distinguished him- self in the attack on the San Cosmo Gate, which re- sulted in the capture of the city of Mexico. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he held the position of lieu- tenant-colonel of the Second United States cavalry. On the 31st of August, 1861, he was commissioned a brigadier-general of volunteers, and placed in command of a brigade of the army of the Potomac. We soon after find him commanding the Third division, of the Second corps, under General Sumner. He fought, and won distinction, in the Peninsular campaign. At An- tietam he bore himself like a very hero of romance, being twice wounded. With his record at the battle of Chancellorsville and at Gettysburg, the reader has already been made familiar. On the reorganization of the army of the Potomac, he was one of three corps commanders whom Meade wished to see retained in high command. Meade loved and trusted him, and, on more than one occasion, left him in command of the entire army. His career in the Wilderness, with its untimely end, has been related in the text. Kind and gentle in his bearing, he was yet firm of character, and a strict disciplinarian. His corps was, in conse- quence, one of the best in discipline and morale in the whole army. vania and the ground to the north of the Court House. His left rested on Glady Pun, bending to the north, and was sheltered by strong works; his right, curving also to the north, rested on the Ny; his centre, slightly thrown forward, w^as posted on commanding ground., The entire position was well supported by breast- works. Not much fighting had been done on the Monday. Towards the evening, Hancock made a movement across the Po, his object being to capture a wagon train which was seen moving along the road lead- ing to Spottsylvania. The river was crossed without difficulty; but night came on before the operation could be completed. When morning dawned, the original object of the movement no longer existed ; for the Confederate train was already safe behind the lines at the Court House. Hancock, how- ever, was bent on giving effect to his purpose, to the extent, at least, of se- curing a lodgment nearer the enemy’s position. In developing his movement, he found it necessary again to cross the Po, which runs first almost due, east, and then, as it nears the Court House, makes a sharp bend to the south. Two miles west of the Court House, it is spanned by a wooden bridge. The approaches to the bridge, however, were all so completely com- manded by the enemy, that a passage at that point was deemed impractica- ble. Not to be hindered in his pur- pose, Hancock had just succeeded in thromng across the brigade of Brooke, a short distance above, when, by order of General Meade, the whole movement BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE. LAUREL HILL. er? was suspended. It had been decided at headquarters to make an attack on Laurel Hill, a strong position in front of Warren and Wright; and Hancock was ordered to send two divisions to assist in the proposed assault. The divisions of Gibbon and Birney were at once retired, the enemy taking advan- tage of the backward movement, and falling heavily on Birney’s rear. Bar- low’s division, of Hancock’s corps, was left alone on the south side of the Po. As the enemy showed a disposition to attack, this, too, was quickly with- drawn. It was already almost too late ; for Barlow’s skirmishers were already yielding to the vigorous pres- sure of the enemy. Two brigades of the division were got off without seri- ous difficulty ; but the brigades of Brooke and Brown were fiercely at- tacked, and compelled to hold off the foe at every step of their backward progress. The difficulties of their po- sition were aggravated by a fire, which broke out in the woods between them and the river. Those five brigades, however, were not to be dismayed. They succeeded at once in repelling the assailants and in recrossing the stream. The remarkaVde coolness and self-pos- session of the men alone saved them from great disaster. As it was, they sustained the loss of many men in killed and wounded, and one gun — the first gun ever lost by the Second corps. Not a few of the wounded were left to perish in the flames. This movement of Hancock was as un- fortunate in its result, as it was ill- judged in its inception. It revealed the metal of the men, and the pluck and endurance of the chiefs of brigades and divisions; but it reflected no glory on the corps commander. Meanwhile, the Nationals had made two unsuccessful attempts on Laurel Hill. This was, perhaps, the most for- midable point along the entire front of the enemy’s position. It had been attacked in the forenoon by the bri- gades of Webb and Carroll. It was attacked more fiercely in the after- noon by the divisions of Crawford and Cutler. These attempts but revealed the enormous strength of the position. When Hancock arrived and joined Warren, arrangements were made for a united assault by the entire strength of the Fifth and Sixth corps. It was now five o’clock in the afternoon. The assault was made in splendid style. In the face of a most withering fire, the Nationals in thousands — now in steady line, now as if in broken groups, their standard-bearers always conspicu- ous — were seen struggling up the slopes, and, at one or two points, even pene- trating the breast-works. It was found impossible, however, to effect a lodg- ment or to press on against the decimating fire. The Nationals were compelled to fall back, and not with- out dreadful loss. An hour later, notwithstanding the fearful loss of life in the previous encounter, the assault w^as repeated. It was made, if possi- ble, with even greater bravery : it was repulsed with a still more dreadful slaughter. The army of the Potomac had already witnessed much dreadful work. It had never before witnessed C78 THE WILDERNESS. such work as this. Not once, since the commencement of the war, had such masses of men, in obedience to orders, marched to destruction. In these two assaults alone, the Nationals lost nearly 6000 men. Among the killed were Generals J. C. Hice"^' and T. G. Stevenson. It was not, however, a day of dis- aster along the whole line. To the left of Warren, a vigorous assault was made on what seemed a weak point in the Confederate line by two brigades of the Sixth corps — twelve picked regi- ments, under Colonel Upton. The at- tack was a complete success. The first line of intrenchments was carried ; and several guns, with over 900 prisoners, were captured. Upton expected assist- ance from Mott ; but the latter failed to come to the rescue. Unable, with- out support, to maintain the advantage he had won, Upton fell back to the * James Clay Eice, a brigadier-general of volun- teers, was born at Worthington, Mass., December 27th, 1829. His early life was spent in a struggle to obtain an education ; and, in 1854, he graduated with high honors at Yale College. After some experience as a teacher and editor, he studied law in Natchez, Miss., and was admitted to the bar in that State. He was in New York and practising law when the Civil War broke out. He entered the service as a private in the Gari- baldi Guard. He soon rose to be colonel of the Forty- Fourth New York volunteers, which he led through the Peninsular campaign, under McClellan, and at Manassas, under Pope. He was sick and unable to be present at Antietam ; but he fought at Fredericksburg, at the head of his regiment, also at Chancellorsville, A'here he was temporarily in command of a brigade, and again at Gettysburg, where he greatly distinguished himself. After Gettysburg, on the recommendation of Meade, he was made brigadier-general of volunteers, In which capacity he fought in the Wilderness and on the banks of the Po, where he gallantly met his death. His last words were, “Turn me over, that I may die with my face to the enemy.” Eice was a man of deep religious principle. National lines, carrying with him his prisoners, but leaving the captured guns behind. Such was the terrible 10th of May at Spottsylvania Court House. The losses on both sides, for the wdiole day, were heavy. The National loss was estimated at 10,000. The Confederate loss, including killed, wounded and missing, was probably not under 9,000. On neither side, however, was there any disposition to yield. On the con- trary, both commanders were resolved to renew the conflict on the morrow; and preparations were made accord- ingly. On the morning of the 11th, Gen- eral Grant sent a characteristic despatch to the secretary of war. H. ^‘We have now,” he wrote, “ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result to this time is much in our favor. Our losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater. We have taken over 5000 prisoners in battle, while he has taken from us but few, except stragglers. I 'propof^e to fight it out on this line^ if it takes all summer y As to the wisdom of the determination expressed in this final sentence, different opinions have been entertained and expressed. General Grant had certainly another course open to him. He might have executed an effective turning operation, by moving southward and crossing the James River; and many competent critics have declared that by adopting such a course at this stage, the success which ultimately rewarded his efforts would THE SALIENT. 679 have been secured with at least equal expedition, and certainly at a less costly sacrifice of human life. It is always more easy to say what might have been done, and what could have been done, when the past is looked at in the light of the present. General Grant knew he was confronted by a powerful, wily, skilful antagonist — a commander in every respect his equal, and in some senses his superior. He knew that he could count on superior numbers; but he was aware also that he was opposed by an army which, in discipline and morale^ had never been surpassed in the history of human warfare. What diffi- culties might be attendant on a change of base he could neither foretell nor foresee. . In this overland campaign, in ti’uth, as at Vicksburg, General Gi*ant, while holding tenaciously to his pur- pose, was climbing the ladder of expe- rience. His success had not yet been gi-eat; but it had been encouraging. Each successive day was giving force to his determination and strength to his grasp; and out of the darkness, if darkness it could be called, he was gradually working his 'way to a clearer light — to a fuller knowledge of the necessities and possibilities of his sit- uation. He would fight it out on this line if it took all summer — such was his determination ; but it did not by any means follow that, if another and more advantageous course offered, he would close his eyes to the opportu- nity. Whatever might be the inherent value of the determination, the declara- tion of the same gladdened the Na- tional heart, and filled it Muth hope; and the words in which it was couched have assumed permanent form, and added a fresh phrase to English speech. The 11th was Wednesday. The morning rose bright and clear. The two opposing armies lay in close prox- imity to each other. As the day ad- vanced there was some skirmishing ; but on neither side was any attempt made to provoke a general engage- ment. Both commanders, it was evi- dent, were preparing for battle; nor could doubt remain in any mind that, whatever might be the result, another and even more fearful encounter at Spottsylvania was imminent. Grant was still bent on carrying out his policy of continuous hammering. His success, however, on the Tuesday, in his repeated attacks on the enemy’s left and left centre, had not been en- couraging. There was no reason to hope that another attack, made in the same direction, 'would be attended with any better results. It was resolved, therefore, to strike a bold and effective blow on the enemy’s right centre. At that point, and near the Landrum House, Lee’s lines formed a salient. It was Grant’s conviction that the point was vulnerable. Arrangements for the attack were made forthwith. Hancock, who was chosen to strike the blow, was ordered to leave his en- trenchments in front of A. P. Hill, and, by moving to the left, to take position between the Sixth and Ninth corps. The movement was to have the sup- port of the entire army. Wright was to extend his left, and to concentrate 680 THE WILDERNESS. on that wing. Warren was to make a diversionaiy movement on the Confed- erate left, in his own front, the object being to give the enemy sufficient em- ployment in that direction, and so pre- vent the withdrawal of his troops for the relief of the menaced point. Burn- side, for a similar reason, was to make a vigorous assault on the extreme left. Rain fell heavily in the afternoon. When night came the rain-storm had not abated ; and, as the moon was in its first quarter, the night was dark and dismal. Soon after midnight, un- der cover of the darkness and the storm, Hancock moved out from his intrenchments, and, guided by the compass, passed in rear of Warren and Wright, and took position within 1200 yards of the enemy’s front, at the point to be attacked. Barlow’s division, in two lines of masses, was placed on the left; Birney’s division, in two deployed lines, was placed on the right; Mott’s division, Hancock’s Fourth, supported Birney; and Gib- bon’s division was held in reserve. Of the actual strength of the position about to be attacked, the Nationals knew nothing. It might be weak and defenseless. It might be well forti- fied, and proof again ,t any attack. It mattered not. Hancock was ready, waiting for the first streak of early dawn, to launch forth his brave battal- ions to victory or to death. It is now half-past four o’clock on jlay the morning of Thursday, May *2. the 12th. A heavy fog is rest- ing on the entire surrounding country ; and the feeble light of the rising sun struggles hard to penetrate the gloom. Hancock’s divisions are already in mo- tion. Steadily and silently they move towards the salient — Barlow over open ground, which extends up to the Con- federate lines, Birney through the thickly wooded ground more to the right. Not a shot has yet been fired — not a word uttered. More than half of the intervening distance has already been crossed. Suddenly, there is a loud -resounding cheer, which rings along the whole line. Sponta- neously, the men take the double- quick. On they roll, like a resistless wave. Nothing can now restrain their fierce impetuosity. They have reached the ahatis^ torn it up, and tossed it aside. With wild cries, timy rush bounding over the intrenchments, Bar- low and Birney’s men entering almost simultaneously. Inside the intrench- ments there is a terrible hand-to-hand struggle, the bayonet and the clubbed- musket being freely used. Nothing, however, can save the doomed Confed- erates. Some 4000 men, including General Johnson, of Ewell’s corps, and General George H. Stewart, are sur- rounded and captured ; and with them thirty pieces of artillery and as many colors. Meanwhile, the remainder of the Confederate force, stricken with terror and thrown into the wildest con- fusion, have fallen back, seeking safety in the rear. This attack of Hancock’s was justly regarded as the most brilliant feat of arms yet accomplished in the cam- paign. Never was surprise more com- plete or more successful. The officers A GREAT BATTLE. 681 were taken at their breakfast. The captured generals were greatly morti- fied. When brought into his presence, Hancock received them courteously, extending his hand. Johnson took it, but, with tears in his eyes, declared that he would rather have died than been made a prisoner. Stewart be- haved with less gallantry. Hancock had known him before. ‘‘How are you, Stewart ? ” said Hancock, as he offered him his hand. The reply was haughty and indignant. “ I am Gen- eral Stewart, of the Confederate army ; and, under present circumstances, I de- cline to take your hand.” “And un- der any other circumstances, general,” said Hancock, with great coolness, “I should not have offered it.” An hour only had elapsed since the column of attack was formed. Along with the prisoners, which he sent to Grant, Hancock sent a note hastily written in pencil, saying; “I have finished up Johnson, and am now going into Early.” This second task, as we shall soon see, he found to be less easy of accomplishment than the former. Early, like Johnson, com- manded a division of Ewell’s corps. At the point penetrated, Lee’s army, as we have seen, formed a salient. Hancock had, therefore, by his first success, thrust a wedge between the Confederate right and centre. It was his hope that he would be able to cut Lee’s army in two ; and there can be no doubt that if sufficient provision had been made, promptly and in force, to follow up the advantage Hancock had won by his first brilliant assault, the desired end would have been ac- complished. As it was, Hancock’s ti’oops, flushed with success, and incap- able of being restrained after the cap- ture of the intrench men ts, pressed on through the forest in the direction of Spottsylvania, driving the flying enemy before them. At the distance of half a mile, they were suddenly brought to a halt in their triumphant career. They had reached a fresh line of breast-works. Behind these works Ewell had taken shelter; and rein- forcements had reached him from the corps of Anderson and Hill. The National advance was now effectually checked. It was not only impossible to make headway — it was impossible to remain in the position in which they found themselves. The tide of battle was now turned. Gathering them- selves up for a supreme effort, the Confederates, in overwhelming num- bers and in magnificent array, rushed fi’oni the breast-works, and, falling with crushing weight on Hancock’s men, now slightly disordered by their fear- less rush through the woods, drove them back to the line which they had captured in the early morning. Here, however, Hancock managed to rally his troops; and, getting them into line on the right and left of the angle of the works, he stoutly resisted the fierce and repeated onsets of the enemy, and firml}^ held his position. His situation, however, was becoming every moment more critical. Lee was resolved, if possible, to recover the lost line of works ; and, with this end in view, he was putting forth the most Herculean 682 THE WILDERIS'ESS. efforts, and bringing his entire strength to bear on the one point. It was now six o’clock — one hour and a half since the first onset. Hancock was still holding his position ; but relief was sorely needed. At this opportune mo- ment, when most needed, relief came. Wriglit, who had been hurried forward with his Sixth corps, arrived on the ground, and took position on the right of the salient. Hancock, thus relieved, concentrated his troops on the left of the angle. A little later, about eight o’clock, and with a view to relieve the pressure on Hancock and Wright, Burnside and Warren were ordered to attack along their whole fronts. The battle now raged furiously at every point. No evidence was given that Lee had changed his purpose. The last line at the salient was still the object of his ambition. On Hancock and Wright he dealt his heaviest and most terrific blows. Again and again, and in rapid succession, he rolled against them his heavy masses. He seemed resolved to dislodge them. Seeing this, and becoming convinced that Burnside and Warren were pro- ducing no impression on their re- spective fronts. Grant detached two divisions from the Fifth corps — those of Cutler and Griffin — and sent them to the aid of the Second and Sixth corps at the angle which was still regarded as the prize of battle, and where was the focus of the fight. Five times did Lee hurl his heavy columns against the National lines entrusted with the de- fense of this position. Five times, after severe hand-to-hand fighting, in which the slaughter on both sides was dreadful, were the attacking columns repulsed. It was not until after mid- night that Lee withdrew his shattered and bleeding lines and re-formed them in his interior position. Hancock held the works he had captured in the morn- ing. The battle had lasted twenty hours. The losses on either side were about 10,000 men. Such was the great battle of Spott- sylvania Court House. Although not a decisive victory, it was a positive gain to the National cause. Its moral effect w^as great. It was one of the bloodiest battles of the war. The sight presented at the angle where the tide of battle surged and roared from earliest dawn till past midnight of that summer day, as described by eye-wit- nesses, was something shocking to wit- ness. The bodies of the dead and wounded were piled in heaps, aiM min- gled together in wild confusion. It was, as one has said, ‘‘an angle of death — one hideous Golgotha.” The severity of the musketry fire was evi- denced by the condition of the forest after the battle. The trees were not only pierced by the bullets, but literally cut down. At Washington, as a relic of this fight, there is preserved the trunk of an oak tree which was cut through and through by bullets. The trunk is about twenty inches in diameter. On the morning of the 13th, the two armies confronted each other, ]^|ay Hancock holding his advanced position, and the Confederates firmly intrenched behind an inner and shorter line. Lee’s position, in truth, was a* MEADE’S ADDRESS TO THE TROOPS. 083 invulnerable as ever. The troops on both sides, as well they might be, were sorely exhausted. The rain which set in on the 11th continued to fall. The ground, in consequence, was soaked, and the roads were heavy. On this day there was some manoeuvring; and a severe engagement, which lasted several hours, took place between the forces of Burnside and those of A. P. Hill. Nothing was gained on either side. It was now the ninth day since the army of the Potomac crossed the Eapidan. In that brief space of time, it had lost nearly 30,000 men, includ- ing a large number of officers. It was a fearful sacrifice of human life, suffi- cient to appal the stoutest heart. There were, indeed, throughout the land not a few, who, looking only at the sacri- fice, and heedless of the results, pro- nounced the battles in the Wilderness and at Spottsylvania useless butcheries. Such was not the opinion of the gen- erals in the field. It was not the opinion of Secretary of War Stanton, who nobly sustained Grant, and who, by his daily bulletins, cheered and buoyed up the hopes of the people. Taking advantage of the lull on the 13th, General Meade addressed the following stirring, congratulatory epis- tle to his troops : Soldiers : The moment has arrived when your commanding general feels authorized to address you in terms of gratulation. ‘‘For eight days and nights, almost without intermission, in rain and sunshine, you have been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in po- sitions naturally strong, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments. ^You have compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire and attempt to stop your onward progress; and now he has abandoned the last intrenched po- sition so tenaciously held, suffering a loss in all of 18 guns, 22 colors, and 8000 prisoners, including two general officers. “ Your heroic deeds and noble endurance of fatigue and privations will ever be memor- able. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for its continuation. “Soldiers! your work is not yet over. The enemy must be pursued, and, if possible, over- come. The courage and fortitude you have displayed renders your commanding general confident your future efforts will result in success. “ While we mourn the loss of many gallant comrades, let us remember the enemy must have suffered equal, if not greater losses. “We shall soon receive reinforcements, which he cannot expect. Let us determine to continue vigorously the work, so well begun, and, under God’s blessing, in a short time the object of our labors will be accom- plished.” For five days more, from the 1 3th to the 18th, the armies remained rela- tively in the same position — Grant con- tinually throwing out towards the left, in the hope of overlapping and break- ing the Confederate right, the enemy ever bristling out in breast-works, and successfully repelling every assault. The result of this continual manoeu- vring was that Grant’s army, which on its arrival occupied a position four or five miles to the northwest of Spottsyl- vania Court House, was, at the end of ten days, occupying a position almost due east of that place, the left resting at Massaponax Church, some four miles distant. Grant having gradually be- come convinced of the impossibility of making any impression on Lee’s front 684 THE WILDERNESS. or flank, at last resolved upon a turn- ing operation, by which he hoped to bring him out of his intrenchments. On the 19th, he received from Wash- ington reinforcements sufficient to make up for all his losses ; and in the afternoon of that day, much to the de- light of the soldiers, who were glad to turn their backs on the bloody lines at Spottsylvania, orders were given for a movement, to be made at midnight, towards the North Anna. Lee, quick to discern the purpose of his antago- nist, and sleeplessly vigilant, from some cause or other suspected Grant’s desi^. Eesolved to hinder the in- O tended movement, and so gain time for the transference of his own troops to a new base, he ordered Ewell to make a vigorous demonstration on the extreme National right. Late in the after- noon, Ewell executed the movement as directed. He crossed the Ny, above the right flank, seized the road leading to Fredericksburg, and captured the ammunition-train coming up from that place. The National right flank was guarded by a body of foot artillerists who had just come up from the de- fenses at Washington, and who had never before been in battle. They v/ere under the command of General R. O. Tyler. Ewell’s attack was promptly met, the artillerists, ignorant of the Indian devices to which the veterans were accustomed to resort while fighting in the woods, fearlessly exposing themselves, firing furiously, and ultimately compelling the enemy to fall back from the road and into the woods beyond. Tyler’s men suffered severely; but the honor of repulsing the enemy belongs to them. Soon afterwards, some of the veterans of the Second and Fifth corps came up, and, continuing the pursuit, captured sev- eral hundred prisoners. In conse- quence of this attack, the movement to the North Anna was delayed until the following night. Grant’s losses, which we have already enumerated up to the 13th, had been gi’eatly increased in the interval, probably by not less than 10,000 men, making the fearful aggre- gate, since the crossing of the Rapidan, over 40,000 men in killed, wounded and missing; yet it was not without hope and confidence he turned his face to- wards Richmond. Fi*edericksburg had been ^ the base of supplies since the army entered the Wilderness. Thither, also, had been conveyed the sick and wounded. As the army moved in the direction of Richmond, new bases were opened at Port Royal and afterwai’ds at White House. The management of this department continued to reflect the highest credit on Chief-Quarter- master Ingalls. It is time now that our attention should be given to certain outside movements which were being carried on simultaneously with those events con- nected with the main army in the Wil- derness and at Spottsylvania. These were Sheridan’s raid and the co-opera- tiv^e movements of Burnside and Sigel. Sheridan, it will be remembered, in obedience to orders, set out on the morning of the 9th with por- tions of the three divisions of his corps, commanded respectively by SHERIDAN^S RAID. 685 Merrit, Wilson and Gregg. His instruc- tions were to engage the enemy’s cav- alry, to destroy the Fredericksburg and Virginia Central railroads, to threaten Richmond, and finally to communicate with, and draw supplies from Butler’s force on the James River. Cutting loose from the main army, he swept over the Po and the Ta; and crossing the North Anna, he struck the Vir- ginia Central, and captured Beaver Dam Station. Sending out his men, he destroyed about ten miles of the track, also two locomotives, three trains of. cars, and 1,500,000 rations. Thei*e, too, he recaptured 400 Na- tionals, who had been made prisoners in tbe Wilderness, and who were on their way to Richmond. At Beaver Dam Station he was overtaken by a body of Confederate cavalry, under General J. E. B. Stuart, who had fol- lowed him from the Rapidan. Stuart fell upon him heavily, both on flank and rear; but Sheridan, although he sustained some losses, was not hin- dered in his onward progress. He crossed the South Anna at Ground- squiri’el Bridge; and by daylight on the morning of the 11th, he had captured Ashland Station, on the Fred- ericksburg road. After destroying six miles of the road, a train, and a large quantity of stores, he proceeded to- wards Richmond. On the same day, at Yellowstone Tavern, a few miles north of Richmond, he again came into collision with Stuart. A severe con- contest ensued, Sheridan finally obtain- ing possession of the turnpike, and driving the Confederate cavalry back towards Ashland and across the north fork of the Chickahominy. In this en- counter, General Stuart was mortally wounded ; and thus passed out of sight one of the most conspicuous figures of the war.* Sheridan pushed on, his men greatly emboldened by their success at Yellowstone Tavern ; and approach- ing Richmond, he made a bold dash on the outer line of works. This he easily carried — Custer’s brigade capturing a section of artillery and 100 men. t'ind- ing the second line too strong to be assailed with any prospect of success, Sheridan retraced his steps, and retired rapidly to the crossing of the Chicka- hominy, at Meadow Bridge. There he found the bridge partially destroyed, with the enemy in some force in his front and pressing also on his i*ear. Repulsing the enemy in his rear, he rebuilt the bridge, under a most gall- ing fire, and crossed a portion of his troops. The remainder made a detour by way of Cold Harbor, and crossed * Jaraes E. B. Stuart, a major-general in the Confed- erate service, was born in Patrick County, Virginia, about 1832. He graduated at West Point in 1854, and w'as commissioned a cavalry officer. He had reached the rank of first-lieutenant when he resigned. May 14th, 1861. He had seen some active service in the Indian country, and had come to be known as a brave soldier and a dashing, fearless rider. He was present and fought at Bull Run, became brigadier-general in September, 1861, and afterwards organized the Con- federate cavalry in Virginia. He became conspicuous by his celebrated raid on McClellan’s rear on the 13th and 14th of June, 1862. When Lee entered Maryland, in August of that year, Stuart, in the midst of a terrific thunderstorm, fell upon Pope’s headquarters, and cap- tured many private papers and some plans of campaign. In all the subsequent movements, up until his death, of the army of Northern Virginia, Stuart played a promi- nent part. After being wounded at Yellowstone Tav- ern, he was conveyed to Richmond, where he died a day or two afterwards. 686 THE WILDERNESS. the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge — ground rendered forever memoraV)le by the Peninsular campaign. Haxall’s Landing was reached on the 14th. Communication from that point was opened with General Butler; supplies were received ; and the wearied troops were allowed three days to rest and refit. Sheridan then returned leisurely, by way of Baltimore Store, White House and Hanover Court House; and, on the 25th of May, he rejoined the army of the Potomac. Let us now see what success had attended the co-operative movements. Butler, as has been stated, moved from ]^ay Fortress Monroe on the 4th of May, and concentrated at York- town and Gloucester. He had already been joined by Gillmore, with the Tenth corps, and W. F. Smith, with a portion of the Eighteenth. He had, also, a division of horse at Noi*folk and Portsmouth, under General Kautz. His entire force amounted to over 30,000 men. Gillmore had built up a great reputation by his approaches on Morris Island, and by his splendid artillery practice against the city of Charleston. Smith had won distinction under McClellan in the peninsula, and under Giant at Chattanooga, where his skilful engineering greatly contri- buted to the success of the Nationals. Kautz, too, was a daring and capable officer. At first, it seemed as if Butler proposed to move upon Richmond by the old route of McClellan. This view of the case received some encoura 2 :e- o ment from the fact that he had already, on the 1st of May, sent to West Point a brigade of infantry and a body of cavaliy, some 1800 strong — the former by water, the latter by land. The real object of this movement was to mask his main design. It was his belief that the presence of these troops at West Point would attract the enemy towards , Richmond, and that in the meantime he would be able to execute the principal part of his programme. As soon as this was accomplished, and he had reached the point intended, the troops at West Point were to march across the peninsula, and join the main body. On the night of the 4th, Butler embarked his troops on transports, dropped down the York, passed* For- tress Monroe, turned into the James, and advanced up that river, preceded by a fleet of gunboats. On the fol- lowing day, and without encountering any opposition, he put on shore, on the south side of the James, at Wilson’s wharf, one brigade of colored troops under General Wild, at Fort Powhat- tan two regiments, at City PoiiJ, Hinks’ division, and landed the main body a mile or two above, at Ber- muda Hundred — a neck of land formed by the James and the Appo mattox, and capable of being strongly fortified. Butler immediately pro- ceeded to throw up intrenchments; and the gunboats were disposed so us to protect the flanks. Simultaneously with this movement of the main body, Kautz, with 3000 cavalry, started from Suffolk, forced a passage over the Blackwater, and, push- ing westward, struck the Weldon Riiil- THE ARMY OP THE JAMES. road at Stony Creek, and burned the bridge. Butler’s advance had not been made a moment too soon. After the depar- ture of Gillmore for the north — Beau- regard, having no foe in his immedi- ate neighborhood, hastened to follow. Gathering together what troops could be obtained from Charleston, Savan- nah and Florida, he hurried towards the James. By the time Butler reached Bermuda Hundred, the van of Beaure^ gard’s army had reached Petersburg. The cutting of the railroad by Kautz, and the destruction of the bridge, re- tarded for a time the arrival of the main body; but Butler was soon to have in his front a powerful and skil- ful antagonist, one who would test his strength and fully tax his ingenuity. At Bermuda Hundred, the 6th was spent in strengthening the defenses, and in making reconnoissances. Early on May 7th, General Brooks was sent, 7* with five brigades, to destroy the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad. The enemy was found in a strong position, covering the i*oad from Wal- thal Junction to Chester Station. The cavalry at first fell back to the line of the infantry. A line of battle was immediately formed; and Brooks ad- vanced to the attack, driving the Con- federates from their vantage ground back upon the railroad. There, how- ever, a determined stand was made. After some severe fighting, during which a bridge which crossed one of the tributaries of the Appomattox was destroyed, the National right was pushed back in turn ; and, finally, both es7 parties withdrew. On the 9th, May another and more vigorous ad- vance was made upon the railroad. The great object was to hinder or pre- vent the arrival of the troops from the South. Beauregard’s men, however, were already well forward ; as Kautz, unable to hold the road, or to advance* to Petersburg, had returned to City Point, and left the Confederates free to push their way to Petersburg. The attack on the 9th was made by three divisions of the Tenth corps, under Terry, Ames and Turner, with two di- visions of the Eighteenth, under Weit- zel and Wistar — Gillmore and Smith commanding their respective corps. They marched from camp at daylight, and reached the I’ailroad at four ditfer- ent points. By noon, not less than four miles of i*ail were torn up and destroyed. The Confederates were en- countered in force near Snake Creek, where they occupied a strong line of earth-works. A severe battle ensued, the Nationals finally driving the enemy across the creek, and destroying the railroad. Elated by his successes on the 9th, General Butler sent to Stanton a des- patch in which, taking too hopeful a view of his own position, he unwisely belittled the resources and ability of his antagonist. Ignorant as yet of the fate which had befallen Kautz, he en- larged on the successes of that general as well as of his own. He had ob- tained a position, he said, in which, with proper supplies, he could hold out against the whole of Lee’s army; he had cut Beauregard’s army hope- 688 THE WILDERNESS. lessly in two ; he Lad whipp*ed D. H. Hill, after a severe and well-contest- ed figLt; and he assured the war secretary that Grant would not be troubled with any further reinforce- ments to Lee from the army of Beau- regard. A few days more will show^ how greatly General Butler was de- ceived. He had made up his mind to effect a passage across Snake Creek on the morrow, and crowd the enemy to- wards Petersburg. That night, how- ever, he received information to the efPect that Lee was in full retreat to- wards Bichrnond, with’ Grant in pur- suit; and fearing that he might soon have the army of Northern Virginia on his hands, he recalled his troops from Snake Creek, strengthened his lines, and prepared to march north to take part in the investment of the Confed- erate capital. During the 10th, there was some fighting at Snake Creek, some charges and counter-charges — nei- ther party gaining on the other. On the 11th, both armies rested. How much General Butler had de- ceived himself, and what precious op- portunities had already been lost, was soon to be made apparent. It ought to have been possible for the army of the James to capture Petersburg. It might even have succeeded in captur- ing Bichrnond. The capture of the one or the other would certainly have had the effect of placing the Confed- erates at a serious disadvantage ; and it could hardly have failed to hasten the inevitable end. With the arrival of the army of Beauregard, the opportu- nity offered to the army of the James was hopelessly gone. Petersburg was secured to the Confederates; and Bich- mond was not to be taken from them except by the destruction of the army of General Lee. It would be unjust, perhaps, to blame either General But- ler or General Grant, because richer fruit was j not already plucked by the army of the James; but it is not to be denied that the clockwork-like accu- racy of motion which characterized the army of General Grant at luka and Corinth, which was a prominent and striking feature at Vicksburg, which was, if possible, even a more promi- nent and still more striking feature at Chattanooga, was wanting to that huge and complicated machine which was set in motion on the 4th of May, when the army of the Potomac advanced from Culpepper Court House to the fords of the Bapidan. There is a limit, after all, to the ability of mor- tals. General Grant’s instructions to Butler may have been imperfect or they may have been indefinite; Gen- eral Butler may, on the other hand, have been wanting in discretion; but it surely implied a condition of mind at once over-exacting and unrea- sonable, to expect that the original plan of campaign for the entire army would be carried out according to the strict letter of the instructions given, or that success would attend its every movement, and at every point. After the rest on the 11th, there were signs of life and activity again inside the lines of the army of the James. On the 12th, a general advance was made in the direction of Bich- CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 68t l^lay mond. General Butler ordered 12. a heavy column northward — the right under General Smith, who moved on the turnpike, leading to Fort Darling; the left under General Gillmore, who followed the line of railroad further to the west. The Confederates fell back before them ; and Generals Butler and Smith estab- lished their headquarters that night at the mansion of Dr. Friend, about nine miles from Richmond. Gillmore was equally well advanced on the National left. It was ari*anged that a general attack should be made next morning on the enemy’s position at Proctor’s Creek. When morning dawned, it was discovered that he had retired to a strong line of intrenchments in his rear. General Gillmore succeeded in turning the right of this new position ; but such was the strength of the works, and so formidable seemed the interior lines of defense, that the as- sault was delayed until the 16th. The night of the 15th was calm and beautiful. A lovely moon, but slightly obscured by a few fleecy clouds which floated across the heavens, lit up the scene. In the National camp all was quiet; but everything indicated pre- paredness for the proposed assault in the early morning. As the morning hours advanced, but before it was yet dawn, a thick fog arose from the river and enwrapped the surrounding coun- try in gloom. As yet there were no signs of life in the National camp. All of a sudden the stillness of the early morning hours was disturbed, and the lone echoes were aroused by a fierce outburst of musketry and the loud thundering of artillery. ]^ay Beauregard, taking advantage of the fog, had fallen upon the National army with his entire force. It was a complete surprise to Butler, who was ill-prepared to resist such an attack. Beauregard had evidently made him- self familiar with Butler’s position. He knew the ground ; and he had made his arrangements with admirable skill. The National line, although unduly extended, failed to reach the river on the right. There was a nyle and a half of open, undulating country between Smith’s right and the James. Beauregard’s object was to turn Butler’s right flank and get to his rear; but the more effectually to accomplish his purpose, he resolved to strike heavily in front, while he had given instruc- tions to General Whiting — who had been left behind on the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, in the rear of Gill- more — to make a simultaneous onset, and so cut off the National retreat. Such a plan, if fully carried out, could hardly have failed to prove disastrous to Butler’s army. It seemed for a time as if Beaure- gard’s expectations would be fully re- alized. The first fierce blow fell upon Smith’s right, which was held by Heck- man’s brigade, of Weitzel’s division. The blow was as overwhelming as it was sudden. Heckman made a gallant fitrht : but he was soon surrounded and made prisoner. The much-coveted po- sition was already all but won. The right flank had been turned ; and the Confederates were pressing on to seize 690 THE WILDERNESS. the road which leads to Bermuda Hun- dred. It seemed as if all were lost. Plappily, deliverance was at hand. The night before, General Butler had or- dered three regiments of Ames’ divi- sion, of Gillmore’s corps, to pass over and reinforce Smith on the right. During the darkness they had been pressing forward to their appointed ])osition. The advance regiment — the One Hundred and Twelfth New York — was just coming up. It was almost im- mediately joined by the Ninth Maine, when the two met the Confederates at the point where the transverse road, along which they were moving, crosses the road wdiich leads to Bermuda Hun- dred. At the moment of what seemed victory — when about to seize the road on which his hopes were so ardently bent, and on the possession of which so much depended — the triumphant foe was brought to a standstill ; and, per- plexed by this sudden and unexpected manifestation of strength, he (piickly withdrew. The line of retreat, if re- treat should, be necessary, was so far safe. Meanwhile, a fierce attack had been made on Smith’s front. It was at- tended with less success than the attack on his flank. A device which had proved a means of salvation to a portion of Burnside’s army in front of Fort Sanders, at Knoxville, was here again adopted wdth success. Tele- graph wire, it appears, was found plen- tifully in the neighborhood. Smith, a day or two before, had < aused a large amount of this wire to be wound around the tree-stumps which were abundant in the front of his lines. The wire was carried from stump to stump, and formed a species of wire net-work. When, therefore, the Con- federates, unconscious of the danger which awaited them, came rushing forward through the dense fog, they tripped ,and stumbled, becoming inex- tricably entangled in the meshes of wire, and falling an easy pre}" to the bayonet or rifle of the National soldier. Discovering that no impression could be made on the front of the National right, and apparently indifferent to the National left, Beauregard massed his forces again, in larger numbers, against Smith’s right, this time taking fuller advantage of the opening between him and the rivei*. Smith fell back and formed a new line, his right now more close to the James. Gillmore, also, yielded to the movement and fell back. Beauregard pressed closer and closer, with increasing numbers; he evident- ly expected Whiting to strike, as di- rected, in the rear of the National army, and cut off its retreat. Whit- ing, however, for some reason or other, failed to obey the behests of his chief ; and General Butler, trembling for the safety of his trains, his communica- tions, and the depot on the James, or- dered the withdrawal of the whole army within the lines at Bermuda Hun- dred. Beauregard followed him up, and, as he could not penetrate the lines, proceeded to cast up intrenchments In Butler’^ front. In these operations of the 16tn, the Nationals lost over 4000 men. The Confederate loss exceeded 3000. Butler was now in a position in BUTLER !^ND SIGEL. 691 which he had no reason to dread the enemy ; but he was literally locked in on the land side. On both flanks, however, he had the rivers at his com- mand ; and it was still possible for him, taking advantage of his water communications, to strike a vigorous blow for the capture of Petersburg. He was, indeed, making preparations for some such elfort, when he received orders from Grant to send two thirds of his effective force to the assistance of the army of the Potomac, then in the vicinity of the Chickahominy. Thus it was that Butler came to be “ bottled up at Bermuda Hundred.” General Kautz, meanwhile, made another successful raid ; but it had no practical bearing on General Butler’s plans. We have seen already that, after his raid on the Weldon Railroad, Kautz, finding it impossible to hold the road, returned to City Point. This was on the 8th. On the 12th, he ven- tured forth again. Moving from rail- road to railroad, over a wide extent of country, he struck a large number of stations, among which were Coalfield, Powhattan, Chula, Wilson’s, Welville, White and Black, Jarrett’s and others, and then returned to City Point on the 17th. At most of these points, he burned the depots, tore up the tracks, destroyed the stores, and made havoc generally with freight-trains and loco- motives wherever he found them. It is true that this raid was not of any di- rect or immediate benefit to General Butler; but it nevertheless brought forth precious fruit, and, like all the other raids of a similai* kind, had a most important bearing on the final issue. It weakened the South generally; and it tended to isolate Richmond, and hasten the end. So much for the co-oper- ative movement under General Butler, It is time now to turn to Slorel, and see how he carried out his part of the general plan. It will be re- membered that he was ordered to divide his troops and make a con- joint movement up the Shenandoah and up the Kanawha. Sigel himself, with one portion, was to move up the Shenandoah. Crook, with another por- tion, accompanied by a division of cav- alry, under Averill, was to move up the Kanawha. The objectives were respectively Staunton and Lynchburg. These • movements, which commenced on the 1st of May, were less produc- tive of good results than those of But- ler and Kautz. Crook advanced from Charleston, with Averill’s cavalry in advance. On the 10th of May, Ave- rill, who, with 2000 cavalry, had been ordered to move towards Wytheville, for the purpose of destroying the lead mines at that place, was met by a cav- alry force, under Morgan, and was de- feated. Crook himself, with GOOO, moved towards Dublin Station, where he was met by a Confederate force, under McCausland ; and although he proved himself the victor, after a se- vere fight, it was not until he had lost 700 men, of wLom some 125 were killed. He destroyed some miles of railroad; but on Morgan coming up with a strong force, he withdrew, fall- ing back to Meadow Bridge. Sigel had no better luck than his subordi- 692 THE WILDERNESS. nates. When near New Market, on the 15th, he was met by General Breckenridge, whom Lee had sent to resist the invasion. Breckenridge fell upon Sigel with tremendous fury, driv- ing him down the valley to the shel- ter of Cedar Creek, near Strasburg, with a loss of 700 men, 6 guns and 1000 small arms. Sigel’s expedition, in all its departments, whatever the cause, had proved a complete failure. It is not wonderful that, in the circum- stances, General Grant should have thought fit to relieve him. General Hunter, who had already made a figure in the war, particularly on the southern coast, was placed in command. Hunter, according to instructions received from Grant, at the head of about 9000 men, moved upon Staunton with the view of destroying the rail-^ road leading thence towards Charlotte- ville. He had instructions, also, to move upon Lynchburg. At Piedmont, near Middle Eiver, a tributary of the Shenandoah, in Augusta County, and not far from Staunton, on June 5th, he encountered a Confederate force of about the same number of men, under Generals Jones and McCausland. These were all the concentrated forces in that region, Breckenridge having been re- called, with the greater part of his command, to assist in the defense of Richmond. Hunter had a complete success. After a severe and obstinate battle, which ended only with the day- light, he was master of the field, hav- ing routed his antagonist, and captured 1500 prisoners, with 3 pieces of artil- lery. The Confederate general, Jones, was killed. On the 8th, he was joined by Crook and Averill, when he moved from Staunton towards Lynchburg, by way of Lexington. By taking this course, it appears, he disappointed Grant, who expected him to appear at Gordonsville, whither he had sent Sheridap to meet him. Arrived be- fore Lynchburg, Hunter found the place too strong to justify any serious attempts at its reduction ; and as re- inforcements were coming by railroad from Lee’s army, while his own sup- plies of ammunition were all but ex- hausted, he deemed it prudent to retire. Not considering it safe to fall back by the road he had come, he retreated by way of Salem, hotly pursued by the enemy. At Meadow Bridge, he ex- pected to find abundant supplies; for only a few days before. Crook and Ave- rill had left at that place 1,500,000 rations, in charge of two Ohio regi- ments. The place had been set upon by a band of guerrillas ; and rations and men had equally disappeared. It was not until the 27th, nine days after his retreat from Lynchburg, five days after he had visited Meadow Bridge, that Hunter obtained rations for his troops. They had sutfered terribly ; but they had inflicted vast injury on the Con- federates, by the destruction of foun- dries, factories, mills and other prop- erty. Such were the results of the co-operative movements under Butler on the one hand, and under Sigel and Hunter on the other. They weakened the South ; but they were not other- wise of any immediate practical benefit to General Grant. PRISON CAMP AT ANDERSONVILLE. GRANT AT THE NORTH ANNA. 693 We now retui'n to the army of the Potomac. We left it at Spottsylvania Court House, about to resume its march towards Richmond. The move- ment was commenced about midnight, ]^ay on the 20th. Hancock led the way, with Torbert’s cavalry in advance. Moving first eastward as far as Mattaponax Church, under cover of the remaining corps, he then turned to the south and pushed his way to Mil- ford Station, on the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad, some seventeen miles south of his point of starting. He crossed the Mattapony at Milford Bridge, from which the enemy had been dislodged by Torbert’s cavalry, and about a mile from the river, on a ridge of hills, formed his column in line of battle. Lee, no doubt, antici- pated some such movement; and, al- though unwilling to run any risk by striking his antagonist while executing his flank march, he was not prepared to be outstripped in the race for Rich- mond. As soon as he was made aware of Hancock’s advance. Long- street’s corps was headed southward, and set in motion. Warren followed Hancock on the morning of the 21st, when Ewell was pushed after Long- street. Wright and Burnside, with the Sixth and Ninth corps, were still within the lines at Spottsylvania, where they were confronted by Hill. Burn- side left on the afternoon of the 21st, having first made a demonstration with Ledlie’s brigade, of Crittenden’s divi- sion, so as to deceive the enemy and detain him in his position. Later, Wright was preparing to follow, when Hill, deeming the opportunity favor- able for a deadly blow, fell upon his retiring column with great weight. The assault, however, was repulsed without difficulty; and Wright pro- ceeded on his southward march. Hill at the same time following in the wake of Longstreet and Ewell, On the morning of the 23d, the National army, having marched over a country which, for beauty and fertility, presented a striking contrast to the Wilderness and the region around Spottsylvania, arrived on the northern bank of the North Anna. Lee, having the inside track, had won the race. He was already well posted on the south side of that stream. Grant’s position was now one of con- siderable difficulty. In pursuing his flank movement, it was necessary for him to cross the river. It was natural to conclude that Lee would offer a stubborn resistance. To accomplish his purpose Grant must needs hold his troops well together, and handle them with caution and with delicate skill. The Grand Army, as we have said, had reached the banks of the North Anna — the right, under Warren, at Jericho Mills; the left leaning upon the Rich- mond and Fredericksburg railroad, and covering Taylor’s Bridge. In front of the army there were three fords, known respectively as Jericho, Island, Chester- field or Taylor’s Bridge. Gi-ant, who had already reached the railroad cross- ing, was resolved to push across the river with as little delay as possible. Warren, with the Fifth corps, was or- dered to cross at Jericho Ford; Ham »80 694 THE WILDERNESS. cock, with the Second corps, was to cross at Taylor’s Bridge. These cross- ings were about four miles apart. Warren was allowed to cross with- out opposition. Lee’s attention had been so fully occupied with M^hat he considered the necessities of the lower ford, that he had wholly neglected the foi'd above. Warren, however, was not to be allowed to have things entirely his own way. He had just got his corps into position — Cutler on the right, Grif- fin in the centre, and Crawford on the left — when he was set upon in the most savage manner by a sti’ong body of Confederates, under Colonel Brown. Brown, whose force did not prove so strong as at first it seemed — being only one brigade of Wilson’s division of Hill’s coi'ps — vras easily repulsed. This brigade was quickly joined by the three other brigades of the divi- sion ; and as Heth’s division, also of Hill’s corps, at the same time came up, the Confederates resumed the attack with great energy. The attack fell chiefly on GriflSn, who held his ground with great firmness. While fully en- gaging GriflSn’s attention in front, the Confederate commander detached Brown, with his brigade, for the pur- pose of assaulting Warren on his right flank. Brown was at first completely successful. Cutler, who, as we have seen, held Warren’s right, was just getting into position when he was struck heavily, his whole division thrown into confusion, and Griffin’s right flank exposed. Griffin saved himself by refusing the exposed flank, and by hunying forward Bartlett’s brigade to the menaced point, thus re- storing the line. It was while exe- cuting this movement that one of Bartlett’s regiments — the Eighty-Third Pennsylvania — ran full against Brown’s column, and, by securing the first fire, completely turned the tide of battle. I One of McCoy’s men caught Brown, and dragged him inside the National lines. The hostile brigade turned and fled in utter confusion, the gallant Eighty-Third pouring a volley of musketry into its flank and rear. At all points, in front of the National right, the repulse of the enemy w^as complete. Warren had lost 350 men; but he had inflicted a much heavier loss on the enemy. He held 1000 prisoners ; and he had secured the position. Hancock, on the left, had a much more difficult task to perform. At Taylor’s Bridge, the Confederates had constructed works of great strength. The ground was peculiarly favorable for defense. On the north side there is a tongue of land, formed by the North Anna and Long Creek, which for some distance runs parallel with the river. On this piece of ground, Hancock had established himself. In his front, and guarding the northern approach to the bridge, was an extended redan, with a wet ditch in front and rifle-trenches in the rear. On the southern bank, which commands the northern, there was another work of similar construction. These works were held by McLaws’ division, of Longstreet’s corps, the larger number of troops being, of course, on the south side. Several BURNSIDE REPULSED. 695 luindred yards intervened between Hancock’s lines and the bridge-head. The ground was bare, and gradually ascended as it neared the bridge. It was necessary, in order to gain a foot- ing on the other side, to carry the bridge and the defenses. To Birney’s \vell-tried division, Hancock assigned the perilous duty. Birney selected for the work the two brigades of Pierce and Egan. In order to afford some protection to the storming party. Col- onel Tidball got into advantageous po- sition three sections of artillery. It was now within an hour of sundown. All things were ready for the attack. At a given signal, the storming bri- gades begin to advance. At the same instant, the guns of the enemy open upon them a most murderous fire. The wisdom of Tidball’s arrangement is now brought prominently to light. His batteries reply to those of the enemy with excellent effect. Over the open ground, and up the incline, the brave fellows rush at the double- quick. In a few seconds, they are seen clambering over the parapet. A second more, and the National and i*egimental colors are floating over the redan. It was, indeed, a perilous un- d r taking; it was a brave, even heroic effort; but it was an easy victory. In 'that brief, rapid rush over the open ground, 150 brave men had perished; but the garrison had fled precipitately over the bridge, leaving behind some 30 men, who, unable to escape, were captured in the ditch. During the night, several unsuccessful attempts were made to regain what had been lost, and even to burn the bridge. On the following morning it was discov- ered that the advanced works on the south side of the river were also aban- doned ; and Hancock, without expe- riencing any further resistance, pushed across the bridge his entire corps; Wright, at the same time, effected a crossing at Jericho Ford, and took po- sition on Warren’s right. Three of the army corps — the Second, Fifth and Sixth — were thus on the south side of the North Anna Biver. The Ninth corps — that of Burnside — forming the National centre, alone re- mained on the north side. It was ne- cessary that this corps should be got across before any further advance was made by the other troops. This, it was soon found, was a difficult, nay, in the circumstances, an impossible task. Lee, as we have seen, when Warren crossed the river, flung back his left w’ing, resting it on Little Fiver; and when Hancock crossed, he flung back his right, resting it on the Hanover marshes. With his centre, he still clung to the river. Thus it vras that his line assumed the form of an obtuse- angled triangle, the vertex thrust out towards the North Anna. It followed from this arrangement that, while he could easily move from wing to wing by interior lines, his strongest point was his centre. By a singular coinci- dehce, resulting also from the peculiar form his line had assumed. Grant’s centre was his weakest point. When, therefore, Burnside, on the 24th, jyfay attempted to cross, his advance 24. division, under Crittenden, was quickly 606 THE WILDERXESS. met and repulsed, with heavy loss. An attempt was made by Warren to connect with Burnside, by sending Crawford’s division in that direction. This attempt also^ failed, Crawford being attacked by an overwhelming force, and only after much difficulty and great loss regaining his position. Grant was thus completely check- mated. After a pause of two days, he came to the conclusion that Lee was too firmly intrenched to be dislodged by any further movement on his front. He had recourse again to his flanking tactics. Ordering Warren and Wright to make demonstrations in their front, and sending Wilson, with a cavalry force, to destroy the Central Railroad, he recrossed the North Anna on the May night of the 26th; and heading 26. first well to the east, then to the south, he resumed his march towards Richmond. His immediate objective was the Pamunkey, which is formed by the junction of the North and South Anna rivers. The Sixth corps, pre- ceded by two divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, who had rejoined the main army, led the van. It was fol- lowed by the Fifth and Ninth. Han- cock, with the Second, held position till the morning of the 27th, when he covered the rear. On the same morn- ing, about nine o’clock, Sheridan took possession of Hanover Ferry and Han- overtown, the latter on the south side of the Pamunkey, and distant from Richmond about fifteen miles, from White House about sixteen. On the following morning, Saturday, the 28th, the entire army was south of the Pa- munkey, and in communication with its new base at White House. Lee was already in motion by a shorter route, and was intrenching himself in a strong position, prepared to dispute the passage of the Chickahominy be- fore the army of the Potomac had reached the Pamunkey; but Grant had really made a great gain by establish- ing a new base of supplies at White House, on the York River, and in easy communication with the waters of Chesapeake Bay. We are now back on the old bat- tle-ground of the peninsula — ground which, if not sacred, has at least been rendered famous by a campaign which, in spite of some noble examples of he- roism and self-sacrifice, in spite of cer- tain splendid exhibitions of military skill, in spite even of a magnificent and memorable retreat, must ever be regarded as a National disaster, and, to a certain extent, also, as a National disgrace. The great army of the Po- tomac is again here ; but, happily, it is now in different hands. Now, as then, the public is interested and excited by frequent reports of changes of base; but the reported changes of base imply victory, not defeat. They imply that the enemy is being driven closer and closer to his last stronghold, nearer and nearer to his final harbor of hope. Lee never handled his men with more consummate skill ; his war-hardened veterans were never more enduring, more active or more subservient to his will ; but he is now opposed to an an- tagonist who is single of purpose, in- flexible of will, tenacious of his grasp. AT THE TOLOPOTOMY. G97 and who uses his armies to win battles, rather than to win political distinction or the praises of men. At this stage, both armies were being considerably strengthened by reinforcements. The bottling np of Butler at Bermuda Hundred allowed Beauregard to send the greater portion of his troops to the assistance of Lee; and Breckenridge, relieved from any severe pressure in Western Virginia, was reported to be already in the neighborhood of Hanover Court House, with 5000 infantry and two brigades of cavalry, under Wickham and Lomax. Grant was also receiving reinforce- ments, W. F. Smith being now on his way from Bermuda Hundred, with about two thirds of Butler’s best troops. Convinced that a crisis was at hand, both parties had been vigor- ously concentrating. Now that the Nationals were on the southwestern bank of the Pamunkey, the direct road to Richmond was across the Chicka- hominy. Grant immediately made ar- rangements to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy. Sheridan, j^Iay on the 28th, was pushed forward 28. on the Hanover road, with three brigades of cavalry, under Davis, Gregg and Custer. At Hawe’s Store they encountered the Confederate cavalry, under Fitz-Hugh Lee and Hampton. A severe battle ensued, the troopers dismounting, and fighting for several hours with great obstinacy. The Con- federates finally retired across the To- lopotomy, leaving Sheridan in posses- sion of the position which commanded aa important junction of roads. Re- connoissances were now made by the army in force. Wright moved on Han- over Court House ; Hancock moved on the road leading from Hawe’s Store, in the same direction; Warren advanced towards Shady Grove Church ; while Burnside’s troops were so disposed as to be in readiness to go to the support of either the Second or Fifth corps. Wilson’s cavalry covered the right and rear of the National army; while Torbert and Gregg were moving in front of the left. These movements were not completed without some hard experience. Wright reached Hanover Court House without much opposi- tion. It was otherwise, however, with Hancock and Warren, both of whom encountered' stubborn ^ opposition, and wei’e temporarily held in check. Han- cock’s progress was arrested at Tolo- potomy Creek; and, in spite of the most vigorous efforts, he found it im- possible to make any headway. War- ren was brought to a standstill not far from Shady Grove Church, at a point where the road is crossed by the main branch of the Tolopotomy. At this point, it was found, Ewell was posted in great strength. It soon began to be apparent that the enemy was bent on turning Warren’s left, by moving along the Mechanicsville pike. Crawford quickly covered that road by a brigade of his reserves, under Colonel Hardin. This brigade was fu- riously assailed by Rodes, at Beth- esda Church, and compelled to fall back to the Shady Grove road, the enemy pressing closely. At this point, i Crawford brought up the remainder of 698 THE WILDERNESS. the reserves, and, with the aid of a powerful battery, effectually repelled the assailants. At dusk, the National left was extended so as to cover the Mechanicsville road. When Meade was made aware of the assault made on Warren, he ordered an attack along the whole line. Only Hancock, of the other corps commanders, received the order in time to act before dark. With characteristic promptitude, he pressed forward Barlow’s division, drove in the Confederate pickets, and captured the rifle-pits. These move- ments had the effect of developing the enemy’s position. Lee, it was found, was posted in great strength in advance of the Chickahominy ; his left at Hanover Court House, and covering the* railroad; his centre in front of Atlee’s Station ; his right at Mechan- icsville, and covering, as we have seen. Shady Grove. Such was the general condition of affairs on the night of the 30th. Grant, bent upon his purpose, impa- tient of delay, but realizing the diffi- culty, if not impossibility, of forcing his army across the Chickahominy by a direct attack on Lee’s front, fell back on his old tactics — a flank movement by Lee’s right. A movement was, therefore, made upon Cold Harbor — a point which commanded all the roads, leading on the one hand to White House, and on the other to Bichmond. May It was now the 31st of May. 3 b On that day, a division of Sheri- dan’s cavalry, under General Torbert, captured and held the place, in spite of the efforts of a strong conjoint force of Confederate cavalry and infantry. On the following day, Wednesday, the 1st of June, an effort was made June by a body of Confederates, under b General Hoke, to regain possession of Cold Harbor. The Confederates were repulsed. Hoke, however, was quickly reinforchd ; and about noon he returned to the attack. It was now evident that the Confederate commander had divined the object of his antagonist, and that he was also fully aware of the value of the position. Sheridan sent word back that Torbert was sore- ly pressed. He was immediately di- rected to hold on at all hazards, until he was relieved by the infantry. Mean- while, Wright, with the Sixth corps, after marching all night from the ex- treme right of the National army, was approaching the scene of conflict. So, too, w^as W. F. Smith, with the Eighteenth corps, which had been strengthened by four divisions of the Tenth, making an aggregate of 16,000 men. Smith, his command on board transports, had left Bermuda Hundred on the 29th May. After passing down the James, and ascending the York and Pamunkey, he reached White House on the following day. There he received orders to move upon New Castle. It was not until he had reached that place, and when he had gone out of his way some twelve or fifteen miles, that he was informed that a mistake had been committed, and that he must make a counter-march im- mediately on Cold Harbor. Without a moment’s delay, the ordered move- ment was commenced ; and about three COLD HARBOR. 699 o’clock in the afternoon of the 1st of June, shortly after the arrival of W right, Smith, with his command, reached Cold Harbor. His men sorely needed rest, after a continuous march of twenty- five miles; but no rest was yet to be granted them. Orders here awaited him from General Meade to take posi- tion on the right of the Sixth corps, and to co-operate with Wright in an immediate attack on the enemy. Pre- parations for attack were made accord- ingly. Wright, with the Sixth corps, took post in front of Cold Harbor — Ricketts on his right, Russell in the centre, and Neill on the left. Smith, w’ith his command, took part on the right of the Sixth — Martin dale on his right, W. H. T. Brooks in the centre^ and Devens on the left. It was now past five o’clock, and the day was fast speeding to its close. Be- tween the two armies there was a broad, open, undulating field, about two thirds of a mile in width. Beyond this open ground, there was a thin strip of woods; and a little further be- yond there was somewhat of a forest. In the interval, and immediately in the rear of the first woods, the Confed- erates had constructed lines of rifle- trenches. At a given signal, the Na- tionals rushed over the open space; and, in spite of a murderous fire, they caiTied the first line of rifle-trenches. The success was most complete in front of Smith’s left and the right of the Sixth corps. Vigorous efforts were made to capture the second line. Several desperate struggles ensued. The second line was found to be impregnable. The first line, however, was held; and in the thin wood, under the shelter of the trees, and under hurriedly-constructed bullet-proofs, which the last few weeks’ experience had taught them to make, the men went to sleep on their arms. In this encounter. Grant had lost 2000 men ; but the sacrifice had not been made in vain ; for he had laid his hands firmly on Cold Harbor. Thursday, the 2d of June, was spent in making preparations for an- jung other vigorous assault. With not 2. a little difiniculty, and with some sacri- fice, Grant and Meade succeeded in completing their arrangements. In at- tempting to take the positions assigned them, both Burnside and Warren were vigorously assailed and severely pun- ished. The new disposition of the dif- ferent corps, from left to right, was as follows: — Hancock, Wright, Smith, Warren, Burnside. The line of battle extended from Tolopotomy Creek, cov- ering Bethesda Church, across the road from Cold Harbor to the Chickahom- iny. Sheridan, with a large body of cavalry, was guarding the left flank, all the lower fords of the Chicka- hominy, and as far east as White House. Wilson, with another cavalry force, was guarding the right flank. During the 2d, Lee had been quite as active as his antagonist. He kept him- self well informed of all the move- ments of the opposing forces; and he greatly strengthened his position, which was naturally very strong, by means of slashings and rifle-trenches. Longstreet was in the centre, A. P. Hill on the right, Ewell on the left. Reference to TOO THE WILDERNESS. the map will show that we are here on what may be called classic or historic ground. It was here that was fought, some two years before, the battle of Gaines’ Mill. The positions of the combatants, however, happened to be reversed — Lee occupying that formerly held by McClellan, and Grant occupy- ing that formerly held by Lee. Such was the situation of the rival armies on the night of the 2d of June. But for a severe thunderstorm which broke out, accompanied by heavy rains, the assault would have been made that evening. As it was, orders were given by Grant for a general attack along the whole line, at half-past four, on the’ following morning. Lee was equally prepared ; and, if not equally sanguine of ultimate success, he was equally reso- lute to win, if he could. At earliest dawn, on the morning of June Friday, the 3d, the National army was in motion. A driz- zling rain was falling, as the troops ad- vanced silently, but swiftly, over the open ground towards the Confederate intrenchments, in which could already be seen, through the dim morning light, the well-known gre}" uniform and the rows of glittering steel. The onset was terrific, and on a scale of magni- tude surpassing anything yet witnessed in the war. The resistance was equal- ly grand, and on a scale of proportion- ate magnitude. Never, perhaps, in the history of previous warfare was such a shock of battle experienced. In a space of time which has been various- ly estimated from ten minutes to half an hour, the battle was fought and won, and some 15,000 men were killed or wounded. It took hardly more than ten minutes of the figment men call time,” says Swinton, “to decide the battle. There was along the whole line a rush — the spectacle of impreg- nable w^orks — a bloody loss — then a sullen falling back, and the action was decided. Conceive of this in the large, and we shall then be able to descend to some of the points of action, as they individualize themselves along the line.” Of such a battle it may safely be said that no one, during the actual minutes it covered, could think of it, far less witness it, as a whole. Unlike most of the other great battles, such as An- tietam, Fredericksburg, Chancellors- ville, Gettysburg, and the assaults on Vicksburg, which w^ere of some dura- tion, and could be contemplated as a whole, this could be seen and known only in fragmentary detail; and so brief was the struggle that it was a memory almost as soon as it became an experience. Some facts, however, have been pre- served, and with the help of these, we are enabled to glance along the lines at the moment of attack, and while the struggle lasted. Hancock, who held the National left, pushed forward at the hour appointed the divisions of Barlow and Gibbon, with Birney sup- porting. Barlow, with his division formed in two lines, encountered the enemy in a piece of hollow ground, in front of his works. Driving him from it, he pi’essed into the works them- selves, capturing several hundred pris- oners, a battle-flag and three guns, turn- THE NATIONALS REPULSED. 701 ing the guns upon their owners, and forcing them back in confusion. It was only a brief victory; for before Barlow’s second line had time to come up, Hill’s men rallied in stronger force, and, returning with tremendous en- ergy, reclaimed the captured works. Barlow was driven back some fifty or sixty yards. Here, however, in an ad- vantageous position, far in advance of his original line, he halted ; and quick- ly covering his front, he held his ground so firmly that he could not be dislodged. Gibbon advanced at the same time with Barlow; but his pro- gress being checked by a swamp, which widened as he neared the enemy’s works, his command was separated, and, consequently, weakened. With great bravery, however, the troops pressed forward; and in spite of the destructive fire which fell full in their faces, some of them actually gained the works. Colonel McMahon, with a portion of his brigade, reached the parapet, and planted upon it his colors. The next moment he fell mortally wounded, and died in the hands of the enemy. Among the officei’s of Gib- bon’s command who met a similar fate were Colonels Porter, Morris, McKeen and Haskell. General Tyler was wounded. Gibbon was unable to hold any part of the Confederate works; but some of his troops gained an ad- vanced position in which they could not be reached, and from which they could not with safety escape. Han- cock had already lost 3000 men. The National centre, under Wright and Smith, was not more fortunate. They made the assault with great gal- lantry, and were rewarded with a tem- porary success. They were soon, how- ever, repulsed, and with tremendous loss of life. The most they could do was to hold a position somewhat in advance of their original lines. The fighting in front of Warren and Burn- side was unimportant. Warren’s line was too thin and too extended to justify a concentrated effort. Except with his artillery, of which he made good and effective use, he remained si- lently on the defensive. Burnside did not advance at the hour designated; and when, later in the day, he claimed to have gained an advantageous position from which, with two of his divisions, he could fall effectively on Lee’s right fiank, the attack on the Confederate right had failed. Meade, therefore, countermanded the attack on the left. General Wilson, it will be remem- bered, was posted with his cavalry on the extreme right of the Nation^al army. During the course of the morn- ing he had a severe but unsuccessful encounter with the Confederate caval- ry, under Wade Hampton. Later, he fell upon an infantry brigade, of Heth’s division, which had been sent to en- velop Burnside, and routed it, taking a number of prisoners. The unsuccessful effort made in the early morning by the National left, and also by the National centre, had really determined the issue of the bat- tle. It was the feeling of the officers, as well as of the men themselves, that more could not be done — that any fur- ther attempt to force the Confederate 702 THE WILDERNESS. lines would be a useless waste of life. That such was the general judgment, received a striking confirmation, during the course of the forenoon, from a cir- cumstance which is, perhaps, without a parallel on any battle field. Some hours after the first attack. General Meade, yielding, no doubt, to the stub- born and unconquerable will of Grant, sent ordei’s to each corps commandei’ to renew the attack, without any re- gard to the troops on his right or left. The order was communicated in the usual way by the commanders to their subordinate officers, by these again to their subordinates, and so on through the accustomed channels, until it reached the men. By a singular unan- imity of sentiment and will, not a man stirred. It was a silent but emphatic “No!” — an unexampled manifestation of unanimous conviction, and a striking proof of the intelligence of the Ameri- can soldier. By one o’clock, the bloody battle of Cold • Harbor was ended. The Na- tional loss in this engagement and in the preliminaiy skirmishes, was re- ported at over 13,000 men in killed, wounded and missing. The Confed- erate loss was trifling in comparison. For ten days the two armies con- fronted each other, each endeavoring to strengthen its position. There was severe but partial fighting on the 4th, 5th and 6th, the Confederate assaults in every instance being vigorously re- pelled. During those days, so close were the opposing lines that friendly salutations were exchanged, and much kindly, good-natured feeling manifest- ed. The National soldier had plenty of coffee, but he was not so well sup- plied with tobacco. The Confedei'ate soldier had plenty of tobacco, but he was ill-supplied with coffee. The com modities were freely exchanged, to the gratification of both parties. On the 7tb, thiere was a brief truce of two hours, during which the dead were buried and the wounded removed. Meanwhile, Grant had become con- vinced of the impossibility of accom- plishing more by direct assault on the enemy’s lines. It had been his hope that he would be able to beat Lee north of Richmond ; and then, after destroying his communications north of the James, to besiege Richmond or follow his antao^onist south, if he should retreat. It was still possible for Gran t to move by Lee’s left flank, and to in- vest Richmond from the north ; but while, by adopting that course, Iw. would still be easily able to cover the approaches to Washington, he would be exposed to other and serious incon- veniences. Abiding by the example which he had followed throughout the campaign hitherto, he resolved to exe- cute another flank movement by his own left, and, forcing his way across the Chickahominy, to press towards the James. It was all-important that Washington should be rendered as safe as possible against any incursions of the enemy. It was important, also, that while pushing his way across the Chickahominy, Lee’s cavalry should be engaged in some other direction. To accomplish this double purpose, Sheri- dan was despatched, with two divisions ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY. 703 of his cavalry, to destroy more effect- ually all the railroads in Lee’s rear. On the 7th, Sheridan started with June divisions of Torbert and 7* Gregg. He accomplished his work with promptitude and success. He struck and desti-oyed the Rich- mond and Fredericksburg Road, at Chesterville Station. He struck and destro^^ed the Virginia Central, at Trevillian Station, where he encoun- tered and routed some of Hampton’s horsemen. The work of destruction was carried on as far as Louisa Court House, where a stronger force was en- countered. Sheridan then fell back upon Trevillian, at which place the Confed- erate cavalry had concentrated in great strength. After a severe and bloody battle, Sheridan withdrew; and, sweep- ing around by way of Spottsylvania Court House and Gurney’s Station, he reached White House, and rejoined the army of Grant. Preparations, meanwhile, had been steadily going on, with a view to a rapid movement on the James. Still maintaining the appearance of a desire to strike some of the bridges of the Chickahominy, in the neighborhood of Cold Harbor, Grant was steadily mov- ing more and more in the direction of his own left. By gradually refusing his right and developing his left, he had put a large portion of his army within easy distance of the lower crossings of that river. There was no evidence, as yet, that Lee had any suspicion of his real motive ; although it is difficult to believe he was ignorant of some of the operations^ which were being carried on. On the 10th and the llth. Grant had caused to be destroyed the railroad from Despatch Station to White House, and had shipped on barges all the rails, sleepers and ties to the latter place for use below. The work, it is true, had been done with the utmost quietness ; but still the doubt remains whether Lee did not close his eyes to a move- ment which, probably, he did not wish to hinder. On the night of Sunday, the 12th, the movement to the jmie James was commenced. Warren, who took the lead, preceded by Wil- son’s division of cavalry, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge ; and, taking position on the Long Bridge road where it crosses White Oak Swamp, he made certain dispositions calculated to mislead the enemy as to the purpose of the National com- mander. Hancock followed Warren, and marched at once to Wilcox Land- ing, on the James. Wright and Burn- side, taking an exterior route, crossed at Jones’ Bridge, lower down, and marched to Charles City Court House. Smith, with his command, marched at the same time to White House, where he took transports, and returned to Bermuda Hundred by water. The trains crossed the Chickahominy at Cole’s Ferry. Lee discovered the withdrawal of the National army on the morning of the 13th ; but in place of following it up, he retired at once to Richmond. Some delay was experienced in cross- ing the James, in consequence of the absence of sufficient pontoon material. On the night of the 14th, a pontoon 704 THE WILDERNESS. bridge, over two thousand feet in length, was thrown across the river at Douthard’s; and by noon of the June 16th, the entire army of the Po- tomac was south of the James. On all concerned, the crossing of the Chickahoininy, tlie march to and cross- ing of the James, reflected the highest credit. The success of the whole movement was complete. Thus ended a campaign of forty-three days — one of the most momentous and certainly one of the most interesting in the war. It had, on the whole, been well con- ducted; in some respects, indeed, the management was perfect. During that lengthened period, in that tangled wil- derness, where wagon travel was next to impossible, and where the base was so often changing, the vast National army, of more than 100,000 men, never suffered for want of food. It had been, however, a bloody and ruinous campaign, and fearfully destructive of human life. The losses on the one side and on the other have been vari- ously estimated. Swinton, who in these matters is generally both careful and accurate, gives the enormous ag- gregate of the National loss at 60,000 men — a number greater than the entire strength of Lee’s army at the opening of the campaign. Lee’s loss, accord- ing to the same authority, M^as about 18.000 or 20,000, the ratio being one to three. Dr. Draper, who has written more recently, but who is evidently disposed to lessen the disproportion, estimates the National loss at over 54.000 and the Confederate loss at 32,000. The truth, it is possible, lies between. The presumption is that in Draper’s columns, the Confederate loss is greatly exaggerated. When we re- member that the Confederates fought, for the most part, behind their de- fenses, and that the Nationals, after the first two days’ fighting in the Wil- deiTiess^ were always the aggressors, the estimate of Swinton seems to be the moi’e reasonable. Swinton’s esti- mate, of course, includes Burnside’s losses; but neither he nor Draper in- cludes in his estimate the losses sus- tained by Butler’s command and by that of Sigel and Hunter. The story told in this chapter — the story of the Overland Campaign, as it has properly been named — will ever be read with pride, if not with pleasure, by the American people. The justice or the injustice, the right or the wrong attaching to the contending parties, will ultimately be forgotten; but to latest generations, men will proudly speak of the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia — of Grant and Lee ; of Meade and Hancock, and Sedgwick and Warren, and Wright and Burnside ; of Longstreet and Hill and Ewell ; and of the glorious rank and file of both armies. It was one of those grand, protracted contests of which no section of the American people have, or will ever have, any just cause to be ashamed. On the merits of the campaign, as a whole, much has been said and written ; and not a little difference of opinion exists. Harsh things have been said of General Grant; and by not a few the policy jDursued in this campaign, from first to SOUTH OF THE JAMES. 705 last, has been severely condemned. He fought, we are told, when he might have flanked; he dashed his men to death against the invulnerable lines of the enemy, when he might have accom- plished all he actually did accomplish with comparative ease and with but lit- tle loss of life. His tactics have been contrasted with those of his great rival Lee, on the one hand, and with those of his great lieutenant, Sherman, on the other; and the National commander has been exhibited in the unfavora- ble light of being unnecessarily and recklessly wasteful of the lives of his men^ These judgments, based on too narrow a view of the entire situation, have had no eflPect on the masses of The Overland Campaign was, as has been mention- »ed in the text, largely destructive of human life. The ofl&cers suffered severely. Among those already named, but of whom no notice has yet been given, was Briga- dier-General Thomas G. Stevenson. He was killed at Spottsylvania on the 10th of May, 1864. Stevenson was a Bostonian by birth. At an early age he mani- fested a predilection for military life. He rose from the ranks, and was major of the 4th battalion of Mas- sachusetts infantry at the commencement of the war. As a drill-master, he acquired a great reputation. He was colonel of the 24th regiment of Massachusetts infantry, and served under Foster in Burnside’s North the American people, who choose to see in General Grant the hero who proved himself the saviour of his country, and who at this stage of his career was, by hard blows and contin- uous hammering, crushing out the life of the rebellious Confederacy. It is not claimed that the conduct of the campaign was perfect. It would not be diflicult to exhibit defects — defects in the general plans themselves, de- fects in the mode of execution — to show where opportunities were lost and blunders committed ; but in view of so much heroism, so much unex- ampled courage, such splendid work, we have a voice only for praise ; none for censure or complaint. Carolina Expedition, in 1862. He took part in the capture of Roanoke Island and New Berne. He was appointed brigadier-general in December, 1862. He afterwards took part in the operations in Charleston Harbor, assisting in the reduction of Morris Island, and commanding the reserves at the assault on Fort Wagner. Having returned to the North to recruit his health, in the fall of 1863, Burnside, who had a high opinion of his ability, placed him in command of the First division of the Ninth corps. In this capacity he took part in the battle of the 10th of May at Spottsylvania. He was cut down at the early age of twenty-eight. L 706 ATLANTA. CHAPTER XXXV. Bherman’s Atlanta Campaign. — Strength of his Army. — General Johnston’s Army. — Description of Atlanta. — Operations against Dalton. — Buzzard Roost. — Snake Creek Gap.j-Kilpatrick wounded. — Johnston evacuates Dalton, — Operations against Resaca — Johnston crosses the Etowah. — Occupation of Rome. — Johnston falls back on Allatoona Pass. — The March upon Dallas. — Battles of Pumpkin Vine Creek and New Hope Church. — Allatoona Pass turned. — General Blair joins Sherman with the Seventeenth Corps. — Garrisons left. -March to Big Shanty. — Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost Mountains. — Confederate Defe,nses. — Georgia Militia. — Operations against Pine Mountain, — Death of General Polk. — Lost Mountain taken, — Continuous rain. — Battle of Kulp House. — Assault on Kenesaw Mountain. — Death of General Harker. — Johnston abandons Kenesaw Mountain. — Occupation of Marietta. — Nickajack Creek. — Advance to the Chattahoochee — John- ston’s Position again turned. — His Defenses on the Chattahoochee. — Mills destroyed at Roswell. — Sherman crosses the Chattahoochee. — Johnston retires upon Atlanta. — Approach to Atlanta. — General Rousseau’s Raid. — Johnston superseded by Hood. — Battle of Peach Tree Creek. — Hood Abandons his Outer Line of Defenses — Battle of July 22d. — Death of General McPherson. — Wheeler’s Attack on Decatur. — Attack on the Fifteenth Corps. — Biographical Sketch of General McPherson. — General Garrard’s Operations at Cov- ington. — Expeditions against the Macon and Western Railroad. — General Stoneman’s Raid. — Destruction effected at Gordon. — Defeat and Capture of Stoneman. — General McCook’s Raid — General Howard succeeds General McPherson. — Sherman’s Lines extended southward. — Attack on the Fifteenth Corps. — Resignation of General Hooker. — Change in important Commands, — Hood’s Defenses. — The City shelled. — New Plans of General Sherman. — Wheeler’s Raid. — Kilpatrick’s Attempt on the West Point and Macon Railroads. — Movement of Sherman’s Entire Army towards the Railroads — Battle of Jonesboro. — Hood evacuates and General Slocum enters the City. — Repulse of General Wheeler at Dalton, — Defeat of General Sturgis — Depopulation of Atlanta. It has already been made plain to 18'T the reader that General Grant’s * entire attention was not given to the army of the Potomac. His battle- plan contemplated the dealing of two deadly blows — one on Richmond the otlier on Atlanta. To effect this double ]:>urpose, he had concentrated at t^vo separate points, two powerful armies. The one was on the northern bank of the Rapidan, its right at Culpepper Court House, and was under the immediate direction of General Meade. The other ^vas in the neighborhood of Chatta- nooo^a, and was entrusted to the care of General Sherman. We have already traced the progress of Meade’s army .from the Rapidan to the James. Let us now give our attention to the army of General Sherman. The total force under Sherman was over 98,000 men of all arms, with 254 guns. It was composed of three separ- ate organizations, the army of the Cum- berland, Major-General Thomas ; the army of the Tennessee, Major-General McPherson ; and the army of the Ohio, Major-General Schofield. The army of the Cumberland comprised the Fourth corps, Howard; the Fourteenth coip>s. Palmer; and the Twentieth corps, Hooker — in all 60,773, including 3828 cavalry. The army of the Tennessee comprised the Fifteenth corps, Logan: the Sixteenth coips. Dodge; and after- wards the Seven teentli corps, Blair — ir DESCRIPTION OF ATLANTA. 707 all 24,465 men, including 624 cavalry. The army of the Ohio consisted of the Twenty-third corps; in all 13,559, in- cluding 1679 cavalry. As soon as Grant had crossed the Kapidan, he telegraphed Sherman to advance from Chattanooga. On the morning of the 6th of May, and ^vllen about to move, the position of the three armies was as follows: the army of the Cumberland was at Ring- gold, on the Western and Atlantic Rail- road, twenty-three miles southeast of Chattanooga; the army of the Tennessee was at Gordon’s Mill, on the Chicka- mauga, eight miles west of Ringgold; and the army of the Ohio near Red Clay, about ten miles northeast of Ringgold. The Confederate army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Joseph E. John- ston, lay in and about Dalton, fifteen miles south of Ringgold, on the railroad, his advance at Tunnel Hill, about mid- way between Ringgold and Dalton. The force under Johnston, consisting mostly of veteran troops, comprised the corps of Generals Hardee, Hood, and Polk, and General Wheeler’s division of about 10,000 cavalry, numbering in all not more than 60,000 men. In some respects the campaign before General Sherman resembled that of General Grant from the Rapidan against Richmond. Its objective point was Atlanta, the possession of which it was believed was hardly of less importance bo the Confederacy than the capital of Virginia. Atlanta had been before the war an important centre of railroad communication for the Western, Atlan- tic, and Gulf States, and a principal manufacturing town of the South, with a population of about 15,000. Laid out in a circle two miles in diameter, in its centre was the passenger depot of four railroads, radiating to Chattanooga, Augusta, Macon and Montgomery. Here also were railroad machine-shops, an extensive rolling mill, foundries, man ufactories of gun-carriages, pistols, tents, caps, cartridges, shot and shell, shoes, clothing, and other military supplies, under the direction of the Confederate government. The population had risen during the war, by the accession of per- sons employed under the government and the amval of refugees, to not less than 20,000. It was supposed that the capture of Atlanta, with its vast military stores and costly machinery, would be a blow to the resources of the Confed- eracy hardly less fatal than the capture of Richmond. The utmost efforts were put forth by the Confederate authorities to make Atlanta secure. The line of approach was made as difficult for Sherman as the nature of the country — in itself easy of defense — and the resources of Johnston would admit. Should Sherman succeed in making his way over the mountain region and in crossing the rivers, both of which afforded many strong defensible positions for Johnston’s army, he would still have his hardest task before him in the formidable works around Atlanta, with an army depleted by many battles and the necessity for leaving garrisons at various points. Sherman’s line of communication would, at the same time, be lengthened and exposed, while John- ston in falling back upon Atlanta would be approaching his base and his supplies. 708 ATLANTA. A reconnoissance of General John- May ston’s position at Dalton satisfied fi« General Sherman that it could not be carried by an attack in front, even should the enemy abandon his works at Tunnel Hill. Immediately south of Tunnel Hill is a valley about three miles long and about three-quar- ters of a mile wide, bounded by Rocky Face Ridge, a thickly wooded, steep, and rugged mountain, which com- inands the railroad and other approaches to Dalton, and extends southward many miles on the west side of the railroad and of the Oostanaula. A narrow moun- tain pass called Buzzard Roost, about midway between Tunnel Hill and Dal- ton, is the outlet to the valley, ' and through this pass runs the railroad to Dalton. By means of formidable batteries, and a line of rifle-pits at its northern entrance, this pass had been rendered impregnable, so that Dalton was absolutely secure against attack from the northwest; on its northeast side the town was protected by strong works on Mile Creek. General McPher- son was therefore directed to move rapidly southward with the army of the Tennessee from his position at Gor- don’s Mill, by way of Ship’s Gap, Vil- lano w, and through Snake Creek Gap — a pass in Rocky Face Ridge further south — ^upon Resaca, a station about eighteen miles south of Dalton, where the rail- road from that place crosses the Oosta- naula. The object of this movement was to compel General Johnston to evacuate his position at Daltonfwhen McPherson would be in a position to harass his flank, while the main body of the National army pushed him south- ward. While McPherson’s flanking movement was in progress. General Thomas was to make a show of attack- ing in force in front of Buzzard Roost, and Schofield with the aiTny of the Ohio was to close up with Thomas’ left. Accordingly on 7. the 7th, General Thomas advanced from Ringgold to Tunnel Hill, which was easily carried by the Fourteenth corps under General Palmer, the enemy retir- ing to his stronger position at Buzzard Roost. The same evening the National line was established about a mile south of Tunnel Hill. A demonstration iu force was made on the 8th against Rocky Face Ridge and Buzzard Roost. The Fourth corps under Howard suc- ceeded in carrying the lidge, but its crest was found too narrow to permit of an attack being made from it on the pass with any prospect of success. General Schofield in the mean time brought up the army of the Ohio and closed with the left of Thomas, which was held by How^ard. On the same day McPherson suc- ceeded in passing through Snake Creek Gap, suiq)rising a force of Confederate cavalry there, and approached within a mile of Resaca, which, however, proved too strong to be carried by assault. He therefore fell back to a strong position at the west end of Snake Creek Gap. General Sherman finding that McPherson’s flank demonstration had failed of its intended effect, set the whole of his army in motion for Snake Creek Gap, with the exception of two divisions of Howard’s corps and some © E M L. W. T. § in E K M A f < :'.’M, *' f« iiKi, • * rvrtf.ij. - A»r^ ■ , 4 ^#. . ^ .> ■-^•^' ■ • • - . , ^;- /. ^ ■' Jt! . . • ■ . I. /.r:> 4 - .;^‘.V:'t? ;; - 7 ^ . -U*. ':»*'iil ii^'irkj<» '• i- .; ^; . ) ; ; '4 , ■ WU' >v J ^ . : • ’>^>i i,:..-.t -I. ■• * .?- f i ■ •>/^'4- ■ - ’ V > . '■ ,, > 4 / . '*^ . «> .. >* S' V '. <«•'■.. :t= ^r' 'v-^'-**^-^ ? ••^•itV. ■‘flit. J ■■/ ■'.(, :V ■:;Av ■‘t'l. ;' ' ■ NV ..i- v.'” ■ ^■. ^ • ■ j 9 / »>; ^ >- .rr. t -4 • f '■ '.O •" '■ft'JV EVACUATION OF DALTON. 709 cavalry, left to threaten the front of Buzzard Boost. The National loss on the 8th and 9th was about 750 killed, wounded, and missing, the greater number being only slightly wounded. Besaca is situated on a peninsula formed by the junction of the Conasauga ^vith the Oostanaula, across which, from river to river, the Confederates had con- structed a continuous line of rifle-pits with strong field-works, their flanks being protected by the two rivers. A line of retreat southward was left open across the Oostanaula. On the 13th of May the army of May Oeneral Sherman passed through 13. Snake Creek Gap and' got into position in Sugar Valley, -a tract on the east side of the ridge much broken by hills covered with a dense undergrowth. In covering the movement, while press- ing the enemy toward Besaca, General Kilpatrick received a flesh-wound, which unfitted him for active duty for several months. The National lines were advanced during the day toward Besaca, so that the right, under McPher- son, rested on the Oostanaula about two piiles below the town, and extended north to the centre under Thomas — the left, under Schofield, extending from Thomas’ left to the Conasauga, near Tilton, a railroad station about midway between Besaca and Dalton. In the mean time General Johnston had observed Sherman’s movement and detected its object ; and considering his position at Dalton no longer tenable, he had moved southward on the 12th, and having the shorter line of march, reached Besaca with his entire force before the army of Shennan had got through Snake Creek Gap. Dalton was immedi- ately occupied by the divisions of Howard’s corps left before Buzzard Boost, which following in the rear of Johnston joined the National left on the 1 4th near Tilton. Sherman, in thus com- pelling Johnston to evacuate a position of such extraordinary strength as that of Dalton, demonstrated his ability to make his way to Atlanta, between which and Dalton no position was likely to be held by the Confederates which might not be as easily turned. On the morning of the 14th the Confederates were in complete readiness to receive an attack, 14. having spent the previous night in strengthening their already formidable earth-works. General Hardee held their right. General Hood their centre, and General Polk their left. At an early hour skirmishing commenced. A body of infantry with cavalry was sent across the Oostanaula to threaten Cal- houn in the rear, further south on the railroad, by which movement General Sherman hoped to turn Johnston’s left, and thus cut off his retreat, but this the nature of the ground rendered impossible. At noon there was heavy firing along the whole line. About one o’clock an attempt was made by Palmer’s corps from the left centre to break the enemy’s line and force him from an elevated position in the immedi- ate front. To reach the point aimed at, it was necessary to descend the slope of a hill commanded by the enemy’s artil- leiy, to ford a stream bordered with a thick growth of bushes and vines, and 283 710 ATLANTA. then to cross a space intersected by- ditches and otherwise obstructed. Under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery the hill was descended and the stream crossed; but the troops becoming confused among the ditches and obstructions, and finding no shelter from which the plunging fire of the enemy might be returned, were forced to retire, after losing 1000 of their number. Further to the left, about the same time. General Judah’s division of the Twenty-Third corps and Newton’s division of the Fourth, drove the enemy from an important position on their outer line. By this means, although the position taken was not held, the National line was advanced. Artillery was also got into a position which pre- vented the enemy from occupying the works. At both extremities of the line heavy skirmishing took place, the den- sity of the woods and undergrowth preventing the use of artillery. About three in the afternoon. General Johnston massed a heavy force on the road to Tilton with the view of turning the National left flank, held by Stanley’s division of the Fourth corps. The attack was made with overwhelming numbers, who rushed on with loud yells, and with such impetuosity that Stanley’s troops were forced in confusion from the hill on which they were posted. The movement ordered by Johnston had been detected early enough to per- mit of Hooker’s corps being moved from the centre to reinforce the National left. The enemy’s advance was soon checked; and Stanley’s troops having been rallied, the Confederates were. about dusk, driven back to their lines with severe loss. While this movement was going on. General McPherson sent the Fifteenth corps with a portion of the Sixteenth across Camp Creek, to carry a hill and rifle-pits on the enemy’s left in front of Kesaca, This was effected, and -vdth little loss. As this position commanded the w^orks, the railroad, and the trestle bridges across the Oostanaula, desperat-e efforts were made by the enemy after dark to retake it, but in vain. Heavy columns with fixed bayonets moved up to the very crest of the hill, but were compelled to retire in confusion before the steady fire of the National troops. At ten o’clock fighting was over for the day. Both armies strengthened their posi- tions during the night; and on the morning of the 15th, under 15. cover of severe skirmishing, prepara- tions were made by General Sherman for an assault upon two fortified hills, on the enemy’s extreme right, the key of the whole position. General Hook- er’s corps was moved to the extreme left, Howard’s, Schofield’s, and Palm- er’s to the right. Soon after one o’clock. Hooker sent Butterfield’s divi- sion forward as the assaulting column, supported by the divisions of Geary and Williams. After several attacks the Confederates were driven from a portion of their lines ; and a lodgment was secured under the projecting works of a lunette mounting 4 guns. Further advance, however, was found impossi- ble, owing to a severe fire from neigh- boring rifle-pits, and the troops seeking JOHNSTON RETREATS. 711 such shelter as was available, contented themselves with holding the position gained. Towards the close of the after- noon General Hood’s corps made an unavailing effort to dislodge them. Later, under cover of night, and in spite of a sharp fire from the Confeder- ates, the ends were dug out of the works and the guns hauled out with ropes. As soon as a breach was made the troops rushed in, and after a fierce struggle made themselves masters of the lunette. General Johnston abandoned his position during the night, leaving Ijehind another four-gun battery and a (piantity of stores, and retreated toward Kingston, thirty-two miles south of Resaca on the railroad. Resaca was im- mediately occupied by the troops of General Thomas, who succeeded in saving the wagon road bridge. The railroad bridge, however, had been burnt. J ohn- ston’s army owed its escape from Sher- man at Resaca to the impracticable 11 ature of the valley between the town and Snake Creek Gap, which greatly retarded the passage of troops, and afforded the Confederate army time to march from Dalton by comparatively good roads, wdiich Johnston with wise foresight had kept in order. Had the National army arrived first at Resaca, nothing could have saved the army of the Confederates. Once in their strong position at Resaca, it cost much severe fighting to make them abandon it. The total National loss in the two days’ fighting was not less than 4000 killed and wounded, while that of the Confederates probably did not exceed 2500, as they fought for the most part behind earth- works. The Confederate loss included about 1000 prisoners. The whole army started in pursuit of Johnston, General Thomas, directly on his rear, crossing the Oostanaula at Resaca, General McPherson at Lay’s Ferry, a few miles to the southwest, while General Schofield, making a wide detour to the left of Thomas, marched by obscure roads across the Conasauga and Coosawattee rivers, which unite near Resaca to form the Oostanaula. On the 1 7th the march was contin- ued southward by as many roads 17. as could be found, in a direction parallel with the railroad, but no enemy was seen till wfithin the vicinity of Adairs- ville, thirteen miles south-southwest of Resaca, between the railroad and the Oostanaula. There, about sunset, the advance division under General Newton had a shaip) skirmish with the enemy’s rear-guard. Next morning the Confed- erates had disappeared, but were found again in force four miles beyond King- ston, on ground comparatively open and well adapted for a grand battle. They held strong works at Cassville, five miles east of Kingston, and on the 19th dispositions were made for a general engagement. While, however, Sherman was converging on the Confederate posi- tion, Johnston retreated in the night across the Etowah, burning the bridges at Cartefsville, thus leaving the country north of the Etowah in the possession of General Sherman. It had, however, been completely stripped of supplies. Sherman now gave his troops a few days’ rest, the army of Thomas lying near Cassville, McPherson’s about King- 712 ATLANTA. ston, and Schofield’s at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah Bridge. In the mean time the railroad, which had received but little injury, was restored to runnino; order. Trains laden with sipplies arrived at Kingston on the 20th, and the wounded were sent back to Chattanooga, with which place tele- graphic communication also was kept up as the army advanced. General Jefferson C. Davis had on the I7th marched towards Home, at the confiuence of the Oostanaula and Etowah, fifteen miles west of Kingston. After a sharp fight on the 19th he got possession of the town, several forts, eight or ten large guns, and large quan- tities of stores, as well as valuable mills and foundries. General Johnston retired upon Alla- toona Pass, an almost impregnable position on the railroad, about five miles south of the Etowah Kiver. General Sherman determined not even to attempt the pass in front, but to turn it. Accordingly, on the 23d, leaving garrisons at Borne and Kingston, and carrying with him in wagons supplies for twenty days, he put the army in motion for Dallas, a town about fifteen miles south-southwest of Allatoona Pass, and eighteen miles directly west of Marietta, hoping by thus threatening Marietta to compel Johnston to evacu- ate the pass. The roads through the rugged and densely wooded region to be traversed were few and bad, and the march was necessarily slow. The movement and its objects were soon detected by Johnston, who also set his troops in motion toward Dallas, to pro- tect the approaches to Marietta. In the march upon Dallas, McPherson, holding the National right, made a detour south- westward by Van Wert, about fourteen miles west of Dallas, while Thomas moved nearly due south, wdth Schofield on his left. On the 25th, Hooker’s corps, th^e advance of General Thomas, moving on the main road to Dallas, when near Pumpkin Vine Creek, met portions of Hood’s and Hardee’s corps; and a severe contest took place for a position at New Plope 25. Church, where three roads meet, from Ack worth. Marietta, and Dallas. The enemy, however, having hastily throA\T] up earth-works, and night coming on ac- companied by heavy rain, he retained possession of the roads. Hooker lost 600 men in this affair. Next morning the Confederates were found well intrenched, substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. It was necessary, therefore, to make dispositions on a larger scale. McPher- son was moved up to Dallas, Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and Schofield moved toward the left so as to strike and turn the enemy’s right. Owing to the difficult nature of the country, these movements occupied two days, and were attended with heavy skirmishing ; but as the vicinity wsls for the most part densely wooded, artillery could not be used, and the casualties were comparatively few. On the 28th, just as McPherson was closing up to Thomas in front of New Hope Church, he was repeatedly and desperately attacked by a large Confederate force, and the contemplated BIG SHANTY AND MARIETTA. 713 movement was temporarily checked, but the enemy was finally driven back with a loss of 2000 killed and wounded. After the delay of a few days the movement toward the left was resumed, McPherson taking up the position in front of New Hope Church which Thomas had previously occupied, Thom- as and Schofield taking positions still further to the left. This movement was June ^ff^cted on the 1st of June. All 1 . the roads leading back to Alla- toona and Ackworth were occupied. General Stoneman’s cavalry pushed into the east end of Allatoona Pass, and General Garrard’s marched around by the rear to its west entrance. These movements being effected without opposition, the pass fell into Sherman’s possession. He found it admirably adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defense and garrison, and for the recon- struction of the railroad bridge over the Etowah, thus restoring his commun- ications by railroad, by which stores were again brought to his camps. Still working toward the left. General Sherman determined on the 4th to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and moved towards the railroad above Ackworth, which was reached on the 6th of June. Here the army remained several days; and here on the 8th General Blair arrived, with two divisions of the Seventeenth coi’ps, and Colonel Long’s brigade of cavalry of General Garrard’s division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This addition to Sherman’s forces made up for his losses in battle and for the diminution of his numbers by garrisons left at Besaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona Pass. On the 9th, communications in the rear beino* 9. O secure and supplies abundant, the movement was resumed and the march continued to Big Shanty, the next station on the railroad east of Allatoona Pass. Between Big Shanty and Marietta intervenes a mountainous district full of defensible positions, covering per- fectly the town of Manetta, and the railroad as far as the Chattahoochee. Three conical peaks in this region, links in a continuous forest-covered chain, form prominent features in the landscape. These are Kenesaw Moun- tain, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain. Kenesaw Mountain, a double peaked em- inence, and hence sometimes called the Twin Mountain, 1200 feet high, lies immediately northwest of Marietta and west of the railroad. Lost Mountain lies west of Marietta. Pine Mountain, a rugged cone-shaped peak, half a mile to the north of these and opposite the space between them, foims the apex of a triangle of which the others form the base. On each of these moun- tains the enemy had signal stations from which the movements of Sherman’s army could be easily noted. The hill- tops were covered with batteries; and on the spurs leading from them might be seen large numbers of men felling trees, digging rifle-pits, and in other ways preparing for a desperate defense. The Confederate lines extended about two miles westward from the railroad, on which their right rested. Their works, which compilsed several ru ATLANTA. successive lines of intrenchments, con- sisted of log barricades with earth thro^vn against them, and a formidable abatis^ to which was added in many places a chevaux-de-frise of pointed fence-rails. The parapet thus formed was from six to eight feet thick at the top, for the infantry, and, where field- guns were posted, from twelve to fifteen feet thick. The force at the disposal of General Johnston at this time was, according to the reports of prisoners, deserters, and scouts, nine divisions of 7000 men each, in addition to which Governor Brown had sent to his assis- tance an auxiliary force of 15,000 Geor- gia militia, who, though undisciplined, were capable of good service behind earth-works and as laborers in the con- struction of fortifications. Hardee’s corps held the Confederate right, Polk’s the centre, Hood’s the left. Their cavalry, to the number of about 15,000, operated on the right and left flanks and on the National rear. The National lines were gradually advanced toward the Confederate posi- tions. McPherson’s command, now transferred to the extreme left, moved towards Marietta, his right on the rail- road ; Schofield, shifted to the right, moved on Lost Mountain ; Thomas, remaining in the centre, moved on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Garrard’s cavalry covered the left wing, and General Stoneman’s the right. General McCook guarded the rear, the railroad communications, and the depot at Big Shanty. By the 11 th the lines were close up; and dispositions were then made to break the enemy’s line of defense between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. On the 1 4th, during j|,n 0 a heavy cannonade by the Fourth 14 . corps. General Polk, who commanded on Pine Mountain, was struck by the fragment of a shell and killed ; and the same night. Hooker’s corps, moving round ijts base to cut ofi their retreat, the Confederates abandoned their works on Pine Mountain, carrying off, how- ever, their guns and war material. On the morning of the 15th, Stanley’s division of the Fourth corps quietly occupied the position. After the abandonment of Pine Mountain, General Johnston drew back his centre to a strong line of intrench- ments connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. The 15th, 16th, and 17th were occupied with incessant skir- mishing. On the afternoon of the 15th, General Schofield carried the first line of the Confederate works at the foot of Lost Mountain. During the 17th, the left and centre, which were so far advanced that a general engagement would otherwise have resulted, remained quiet. The right and left centre were advanced more than a mile, to a line of defensive works which the enemy had evacuated. Towards evening, after heavy skirmishing, the enemy’s left was dislodged from the intrenchments at Lost Mountain and the long line of breast-works connecting it with Kene- saw Mountain. The Confederates were pressed at all points, and skirmishing continued in dense forests and across difficult ravines, until they were again found strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw Mountain as a salient, ASSAULT ON KENESAW. 715 their right wing thro^vn back to cover Marietta, and their left behind Nose’s Creek, covering the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. They were thus enabled to contract and strengthen their lines. During these operations the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, making the narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys and a general movement impossible. But every opportunity was taken to advance the National lines closer and closer to the enemy ; and the men kept up incessant picket firing. On the 2 2d the enemy made a sudden J line attack on portions of Hooker’s and Schofield’s corps on the National right near the Kulp House. The blow fell mostly on the divisions of Generals Williams and Hascall. The ground was comparatively open; but though the skirmish lines and an advanced regiment of General Schofield’s — sent out to hold the enemy in check until preparations for his reception could be completed — were driven in, yet when the enemy reached the National line of battle he received a terrible repulse. Many prisoners were taken, and the Confederates were compelled to aban- don their dead and wounded. The National centre was now established in front of Kenesaw Mountain ; but so man}" men were required to hold the railroad and the line along the base of the mountain, that only a small force was left with which to attempt a flank movement to the right. There was, however, now no alternative but to assault the enemy’s lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficul- ties and dangers. Both the enemy and his own officers expected Sherman to outflank.” General Sherman deter- mined to assault. His reason for a departure from the course which had hitherto been so successful was, that an army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan likely to result in success. The part of the enemy’s lines selected to be assault- ed was the left centre. A strong column, if thrust through at that poinf , and pushed on boldly two and a half miles, would reach the railroad below Marietta and cut off the enemy’s right and centre from the line of retreat which could then be overwhelmed and de- stroyed. On the 24th of June, there- fore, General Sherman ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th, thus affording three days foi* preparation and reconnoissance. One of these assaults was to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson’s troops, the other about a mile further south by those of General Thomas. On the morning of the 27th, at the hour and in the manner prescribed, the assaults were made ; but both failed, and many valuable lives were June lost, including that of General 27. Plarker. At six in the morning, Blair’s corps, holding the extreme left of Mc- Pherson’s line, moved on the east side of the mountain, while the corps of Dodge and Logan assaulted the adjoin ing northern slope. The brunt of the attack was borne by three brigades of Logan’s corps, which, pushing impetu- ously up the hill scattered the Confed- 716 ATLANTA. erate skirmishers and captured some of theii* rifle-pits, making also some pris- oners. These troops pressed forward till they arrived at the foot of a pre- cipitous cliff thirty feet high, from which the enemy poured a plunging Are and rolled down huge stones. Here the line retired and fortifled on the extreme right. For the second and more important attack, portions of the divisions of Newton and Davis were selected. When the signal was given, the troops charged up the slope of the mountain in face of a murderous fire from a battery on the summit, pene- trated two lines of abatis^ carried a line of rifle-pits beyond, and reached the works ; but a destructive fire of mus- ketry and artillery from the enemy soon made it necessary to recall the men. General Newton’s troops returned to their original line, while the brigade of Davis threw up breast-works between those they had carried and the main line of the enemy. The entire contest lasted little more than an hour; but it cost General Sherman 3000 men in killed and wounded, while the enemy, fighting behind breast-works, suffered little. During the day there had been some sharp skirmishing with the enemy’s left wing; and General Cox’s divi- sion pushed forward to a point nine miles south of Marietta and not more than three from the Chattahoochee. From his elevated position on Kenesaw Mountain, General Johnston had been able to watch Sherman’s movements and to judge correctly at what point the main attack would fall, and had been ready to receive it with his main force. Though Sheiman admitted that this attempt was a complete and costly failure, he yet took upon himself the entire responsibility, claiming that it was not altogether without good fruits, inasmuch as it satisfied Johnston that he would assault, and that boldly, when an assault appeared to be the surest means of success. General Sherman could not rest long under the imputation of defeat or failure. He almost immediately com- menced preparations to turn the enemy’s left. On the 1st of July, Generals Hooker and Schofield advanced 1 . about two miles to the right, and McPherson was ordered to shift rapidly his whole force from the extreme left to the extreme right of the National lines and push on to Nickajack Creek, which falls into the Chattahoochee four miles below the railroad bridge. Gen eral Garrard with his cavalry was sent to occupy McPherson’s place in front of Kenesaw, while General Stoneman moved on his flanks to strike the river near Turner’s Ferry, two and a half miles below the railroad bridge. ]\Ic- Pherson commenced his movement on the night of the 2d. The effect was instantaneous. The object of the move- ment was at once detected by General Johnston, who without further delay prepared to evacuate Kenesaw Mountain and fall back to the Chattahoochee. Simultaneously with McPherson’s move- ment, Johnston’s rear-guard abandoned the works which for three weeks had been so resolutely defended; and before dawn on the morning of the 3d the National pickets occupied the 3. THE CHATTAHOOCHEE. 717 crest of Kenesaw. General Thomas’ whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and thence southward to the Chattahoochee; and General Sher- man entered Marietta at half-past eight in the morning, just as the enemy’s cavalry left the town. General Logan’s corps, which had not moved far, was ordered back to Marietta by the main road; and McPherson and Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack Creek, attack the enemy in flank ' and rear, and, if possible, harass him while crossing the Chattahoochee. Johnston was too good a general to be thus caught ; and he had covered his movement well. He had constructed a strong tete-du-pont at the Chattahoochee 'svith an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta where General Thomas found him, his flanks protected by Mckajack and Eotten- wood Creeks. In his retreat, Johnston left behind about 2000 men, principally stragglers, who were made prisoners. General Johnston was obliged to leave his new position by another flank movement ; and on the night of the 4th he fell back to the Chattahoochee, which he crossed with the main body of his army, leaving Hardee’s corps on the right bank. General Sherman left a garrison in Marietta and moved up to the Chattahoochee. On the evening of the 5th, the troops of Thomas and McPherson occupied a line extending from a short distance above the railroad bridge to the mouth of Nickajack Creek, while those of Schofield were posted in the rear of Smyrna as a reserve. The enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering his pontoon bridges and the railroad, and beyond the river. Heavy skirmishing during the 5th along the entire front demonstrated the strength of the enemy’s position, which it became apparent could be turned only by crossing the river, a deep and rapid stream, passable only by means of bridges, except at one or two difficult fords. General Sherman judged that it would be easier to cross the river at once, before the enemy had time to make a more thorough preparation and regain confidence. Accordingly, Scho- field was ordered to move eastward from his position near Smyrna, to cross near the moutb of Soap’s Creek, eight miles north of the railroad bridge, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, j^jy General Schofield completely 7. surprising the guard and capturing a gun, and immediately afterwards laying pontoon and trestle bridges, and taking up a strong position on high and com- manding ground from which good roads led eastward. At the same time Gen- eral Garrard moved rapidly on Eosewell, a town near the Chattahoochee, nearly due north of Atlanta, and about seven miles above the point where Schofield crossed, and destroyed there some woollen and cotton mills, from which the Confederate armies had been long supplied. Garrard was then ordered to secure the ford at Eosewell and hold it till relieved by infantry. As General Sherman intended transferring the army 718 ATLANTA. of tlie Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, he ordered Thomas to send his nearest division of infantry to Kosewell to hold the ford till McPher- son could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack Creek. General Newton’s division was sent, and held the ford till the arrival of Dodge’s corps, which was soon followed by McPherson’s whole army. On th^ 9th a crossing was effected at Kosewell and a good bridge constructed, while the enemy was amused by feints, extending from Power’s Ferry, four miles above the railroad bridge, to Turner’s Ferry, three miles below it. Under cover of the same demonstrations General Howard also built a bridge at Power’s Ferry. Thus during the 9th three good points of crossing were secured above the position of the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta. General Johnston then took the alarm; and on the night of the 9th withdrew Hardee’s corps to the left bank, aban- doned his tete-du-pont^ burnt his bridges, and left Sherman, on the morning of July master of all 10 . the country north and west of the Chattahoochee. The Confederate army then fell back to the outer fortified lines around Atlanta, abandoning the whole line of the river, except the left wing, which remained a short time in the neighborhood of Turner’s Ferry, expecting an attack in that quarter. General Sherman, however, rapidly and quietly moved the remainder of the army of the Tennessee to its old position on the extreme left. One of the objects of General Sher- man’s campaign, the advancement of the National lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee, had now been attained ; and Atlanta was only eight miles distant. The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoo- chee from the 10th of July to the 16th. In the mean time stores were collected at Allatoona, Marietta, and Mining’s Station ; the railroad guards and garil- sons were strengthened, and the bridges and roads leading across the river were improved. The railroad was in com- plete order ; and stores had been brought by it as early as the 8th within a mih; of the bridge. A sufficient force Avas detailed to go to the left bank of the river to occupy the works of the enemy. These were found to be of the most formidable character, extending more than five miles along the river, with almost impenetrable lines of abatis. In anticipation of the present jiosition of affairs, General Sherman had collected a well-appointed cavalry force, about 2000 strong, at Decatur, Ala., Avith orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly soutliAvard, cross the Coosa at the railroad brids^e or the Ten Islands, and to push on thence by tlm most direct route to Opelika, Avith the object of destroying effectually the railroad running westAvard from that place, and thus cutting off from J ohn- ston’s army an important source of supplies and reinforcement. The com- mand of this expedition Avas given to General Kousseau, commanding the district of Tennessee. As soon as Johnston was Avell across the Chatta- hoochee, and Sherman had commenced JOHNSTON REMOVED FROM COMMAND. 719 manoeuvring on Atlanta, the requisite notice was given; and, on the 10th of July, General Rousseau commenced his march. He passed through Talladega, reached the railroad on the 16th about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it up all the way back to that place, as well as several miles of the branch railroads leading towards West Point and Columbus. Then turning northward he arrived at Marietta on the 2 2d, his loss not having exceeded 30 men. The sudden abandonment of his formidable line of defenses on the left bank of the river, by General Johnston, occasioned the utmost dissatisfaction with his conduct of the campaign, especially in Atlanta, where it was expected he would make a stand on the Chattahoochee, which it was argued he could easily do, being in the immediate neighborhood of his supplies. His retreat from the Chattahoochee was the crowning offence with the enemies of this able general, whose inferiority of force had made it impossible to avoid Sherman’s outflanking movements, but who had nevertheless kept his army in a compact body, with insignificant losses of guns or material of war. His removal was loudly demanded ; and on the 17th, in accordance v^dth orders from the Confederate War Department, he turned over his command to General Hood. With this change in commanders commenced a change in the character of the campaign in accordance with the difference in the genius of the two gen- erals, which it was hoped would have an important influence on the morale of the troops, discouraged by a long succession of retreats from fortified positions. The whole of General Sherman’s aimy crossed the Chattahoochee j||]y on the 17th, with the exception 11. of Davis’ division of the Fourteenth corps, left to watch the railroad bridge and protect the rear, and preparations were made to move upon Atlanta. The aimy of the Cumberland, now occujjying the right and right centre, rested on the river just above the railroad bridge. The left centre was occupied by the army of the Ohio, the left by the army of the Tennessee. The line thus formed made a grand right- wheel march, of which the army of the Cumberland was the pivot ; and on the evening of the 17th came into a position along the Old Peach Tree road, about northeast of the railroad bridge. On the 18th, the left wing, swinging round rapidly, struck the Georgia Railroad about two miles west of Stone Mountain, a huge mass of granite fifteen miles northeast of Atlanta. General McPherson, with the aid of Garrard’s cavalry, which moved on his flank, broke up about four miles of this road, while General Schofield occupied Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, and General Thomas moved his troops up towards Peach Tree Creek, a small stream flowing southwestward to the Chattahoochee, a little above the railroad bridge. The Confederates believing that their left was the real point of attack, and that Sherman would approach Atlanta from the southwest, and oppose these movements with an inadequate force of infantry and a few 720 ATLANTA. cavalry. Thus McPherson and Schofield were able on the 19th to pass eastward of Decatur within the naturally strong defensive lines of Nance’s and Peach Tree Creeks ; and on the same day Thomas, moving more directly from the north, though meeting mth more oppo- sition, succeeded in crossing Peach Tree Creek in front of the enemy’s intrenched lines. The National armies then lay in a curved line north and northeast of Atlanta, extending from the railroad which runs between Atlanta and the river to the Georgia Railroad and some distance south of it. On the 20th, the National lines moved still nearer Atlanta ; but as a gap existed between the lines of Scho- field and Thomas, two divisions of Howard’s corps of Thomas’ army were moved to the left to connect with Schofield. By this movement Newton’s division of Howard’s corps was left alone to hold an important position on the road leading from Atlanta to Buck- head. General Hood soon detected the weak point, and was not slow in taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded him. He was soon, therefore, in a position in which he was ready to strike a blow which might go far towards retrieving many disasters. General Sherman had, however, sent orders to Newton and the rest of the army of the Cumberland to close up rapidly towards the left. Newton accordingly moved to a prominent ridge, where his troops stacked arms and made a temporary lialt, but, beyond throwing up piles of logs and rails, made no defensive preparations, no attack being appre- hended, prisoners just brought in having reported that there was no considerable force of the enemy within a mile and a half. Hood had in the mean time been massing his forces in the woods immediately in front of the position of General Newton and of General Hook- er’s forc^e, which was approaching from the right, hoping to fall upon his adver- saries while in motion and cut the National army in two. At four j^iy o’clock in the afternoon he ad- 20. vanced suddenly from the woods, ^vith- out skirmishers, directly on the position of Newton. His appearance was alto- gether imexpected ; nevertheless the National troops instantly sprang to arms, and from behind their log and rail breast- works poured a deadly fire into the dense masses of the enemy. Well-served batteries also, which New- ton had posted on his banks, aided to keep the Confederates in check. General Hooker’s whole corps was uncovered ; and it had to fight on compa- ratively open ground. Geary’s division was thrown back in some confusion. Rallying quickly it recovered its ground and kept the enemy in check till Ward’s division came up. Ward met the enemy’s charge by a counter-charge, and after a brief but fierce struggle drove him back. The division of Williams, further to the right and next to that of Geary, though desperately attacked, repulsed every onset with heavy loss. The battle had lasted four hours, when Hood drew his forces rapidly back to their intrenchments, leaving on the field 600 dead, and 1000 severely wounded, a number of prisoners, GENERAL McPHERSON. 721 and seven regimental flags — liis total loss being estimated by General Sherman at not less than 5000. The National loss was 1900, sustained principally by the corps of General Hooker, upon which fell the brunt of the battle. General Johnston’s division of Palmer’s corps had also been engaged, but being well defended its loss was comparatively light. The Confederates kept within their intrenched position during the 21st, their right beyond the Georgia Railroad and their left extended towards Turner’s Ferry, at a general distance of four miles from Atlanta. In the course of the day a strongly fortified hill in front of the extreme National left, which completely commanded Atlanta and the two principal roads leading north and isouth from the city, was carried by General Leggett’s division of the Seven- teenth corps, though with a loss of 750 men. Two desperate but unsuccessful attempts to regain this position were made by the Confederates, who when they finally retired left their dead and wounded on the slope of the hill. On the morning of the 2 2d, the whole of the advanced line of the enemy was found abandoned, which led Sherman to suppose that Hood was about to give up Atlanta mthout further contest. He was, however, only preparing to repeat on a larger scale the experiment the 20th. Pretending to be falling back upon the city, he hoped to decoy General Sherman into a rapid advance, and then suddenly, with all his force, strike the National army while in motion, at such weak points as should offer. Unsuspectingly Sherman pushed his troops beyond the abandoned works. He found the enemy occupying a line of finished redoubts completely covering the approaches to the city, and actively engaged in connecting these redoubts with curtains, strengthened by rifle- trenches, abatis and chevaux-de-frise. Satisfied that Hood meant to fight, Sherman immediately resumed the dis- positions for pressing towards the city on its east and northeast fronts. The National line by these movements be- came so contracted, that the Sixteenth corps, under General Dodge, which formed the right of the army of the Tennessee, was crowded out of its posi- tion, and was directed to march to the extreme left of the line, to aid in the defense of the hill which had been car- ried by the Seventeenth corps the day before, and which was still held by Leggett’s division. At ten in the morning, and about the time the movement was j^jy commenced. General Sherman, in company with General Schofield, was examining the enemy’s lines, when he was joined by General McPherson, who described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. Sherman explained to him that if seri- ous resistance were met in Atlanta, as seemed probable, he should extend to the right, and did not want much dis- tance gained on the left. McPherson then described the hill occupied by Leggett’s division as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta Railroad. Sheiman therefore ratified McPherson’s 723 ATLANTA. disposition of his troops, and modified a previous order sent him in writing to employ Dodge’s corps in breaking np the railroad, and sanctioned its going, as already ordered by McPherson, to Ins left, to hold and fortify the*position there. McPherson remained with Gen- eral Sherman till noon, when reports arrived indicatino^ a movement of the enemy towards the left fiank. He then mounted his horse and rode away with his staff. General Sherman had the day before sent Garrard’s cavalry to Covington, on the Augusta Railroad, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, with instructions to send out detachments from that point to destroy the two bridges across the Yellow and Ulcofanhatchee rivers, trib- utaries of the Ocmnlo^ee. McPherson liad also left his wagon train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments com- manded by Colonel Sprague. Soon after the departure of McPher- son, sounds of musketry to the left and rear, rapidly growing into volume and accompanied by the roar of artillery^ were heard, and about the same time the reports of guns in the direction of Decatur. There could be no doubt now as to what the enemy was about. Hood was throwing a superior force on the National left flank while he held the National forces with his forts in front, the only question being as to the amount of force at his disposal. Orders were immediately sent to all parts of the right and left centre to give full employment to the enemy along the whole line, and for Schofield to hold as large a force as possible in reserve awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour had elapsed after McPherson had parted from Sherman, when his adjutant-general. Colonel Clarke, rode up and reported him killed or a prisoner. He had ridden to General Dodge's column, moving as before described, and had sent off nearly all his stafit' and orderlies on various errands, and taken a narrow road that led through the woods to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith’s divi- sion, which was on General Blair’s extreme left. A few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard from the direction in which he had gone, and his horse had come out riderless, with two wounds. Sherman immediately despatched a staff officer to General Logan, commanding the Fifteenth Corps, directing him to assume command of the army of the Tennesee and hold the ground already chosen, especially the hill occupied by General Leggett’s division. Already the whole line was engaged in battle. McPherson upon reaching the left had found the Sixteenth coiq)s going into position to prolong the flank, and at that time facing to the left in a direction perpendicular to the main line. Between the right of the Six- teenth coiqis and the left of the Seven- teenth was a wooded space of about half a mile. Shortly after twelve j^iy o’clock the enemy emerged from 22 , the woods in front of these corps m three columns, and attacked the Six- teenth corps. Tliree desperate assaults were repulsed by Dodge, in the last of w^hich the enemy suffered severely from ATTACK ON DECATUR. 723 the National batteries. It was during the hill in the battle which now occurred that McPherson had attempted to ride through the woods to G. A. Smith’s division on the left of the Seventeenth corps, it having been reported that the enemy was about attempting to push a force through the gap above mentioned between the two corps. After sending the only remaining member of his staff with orders to obtain a brigade from Logan’s command and throw it across the gap, with a single orderly he struck into the road before mentioned. The enemy’s skirmish line, however, had already advanced close up to the road, and before he was aw\are he was within fifty feet of it. A volley brought him to the ground, mortally wounded. Wangelin’s brigade, the one ordered up from Logan’s command, arrived in time to partially check the Confed- erates, but not soon enough to prevent a portion of their force getting in the rear of the Seventeenth corps, while other masses of troops were pushed against the hill held by Leggett, whose division, as well as that of G. A. Smith, was attacked in front and rear, and obliged to fire alternately from behind their own breast- works and an aban- doned parapet of the enemy. Leggett’s troops held firmly a fortified angle at the top of the hill, against which the Confederates threw their columns with desperate but fruitless energy. In the mean time Smith, who had been com- pelled to draw back his more exposed lines, and in doing so to abandon two guns, took up a new line, whose right c.onnected with the division of Leggett, his left drawn back and facing south- east. The Confederates could make no impression on this new formation of the corps, whose deadly fire compelled them to recoil again and again, mowing down whole ranks at a time and cover- ing the ground and ditches with dead and w^ounded men. A portion of the force that had penetrated the gap before mentioned, renewed the attack on the right flank of the Sixteenth corps, and captured on its first advance a 6-gun battery which was moving unsupported along a narrow road through the woods. They w'ere soon checked, how^ever, by tlie divisions of Sw^eeney and Fuller, and driven back with the loss of many prisoners. Several of Sweeney’s regi- ments had expended their ammunition, but charged with the bayonet, when the enemy broke and fled. At about half- past three the Confederates desisted from their attack on the left flank, having sustained very heavy loss and gained no ground. In the mean time two divisions of Wheeler’s cavalry, wdth a section of artillery, had taken a wide circuit to the eastw^ard and fallen upon Decatur un- opposed — Sherman having sent Gar- rard’s cavalry to Covington, as before stated — and attempted to capture the wagon trains ; but Colonel Sprague cov- ered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Schofield and Thomas, and not withdrawing from Decatur till every wagon was safe, except three which the teamsters had abandoned. A pause in the battle occurred about four o’clock. Hood was massing troops ru ATLANTA. for an attack on the Fifteenth corps, now commanded by General M. L. Smith, which, immeSiately adjoining the Seventeenth corps, held the right of the army of the Tennessee, behind strong breast- works. At half -past four, while fche attention of the extreme left was occupied by a pretended attack, a heavy force of the enemy, two lines deep, inarched directly on the left of the Fifteenth corps, driving in two regi- ments of skirmishers and capturing two i guns. Lightburn’s brigade, which held this part of the line protected by breast- U'orks, kept the enemy at bay by well- directed discharges of 20 pounder Par- rott guns. Presently a second strong column of the enemy appeared, and rapidly and steadily approached, heed- less of the fearful furrows made in its ranks by well-directed artillery. The attack had now become sufficiently for- midable ; but when a third column of the Confederates was seen pouring in on the rear through a deep cut in the Georgia Railroad, Lightburn’s troops, to avoid certain capture, retired in confu- sion to the second line of breast- works 500 yards from the main line; and the abandoned works with two batteries fell into the hands of the enemy. The position lost was one of the utmost importance, and Sherman sent orders to Schofield — which, however, he had an- ticipated — to make the Fifteenth corps regain its ground at any cost. To aid the movement, batteries from Schofield’s corps were so posted that by means of them the enemy and his works beyond miglit be shelled, and the approach of reinforcements prevented. The Con- federates were on the point of turning the captured Parrott guns upon the inner National line, when the Fifteenth corps, supported by some of Schofield’s troops, advanced with loud cheers to the attack. After a fierce struggle, in which the fight was sometimes hand to hand acj'oss the narrow parapet, the ene- my was driven out of the works and the guns retaken. Repeated discharges of grape and canister into the retreating masses caused fearful carnag^e. Thus ended the battle, by far the bloodiest that had yet been fought in Georgia. The Confederates were defeated at all points. Their dead left in front of the National lines numbered 2200 from actual count, of which 800 were deliv- ered to them under flag of truce. Their total loss in killed was computed by General Logan at 3240 ; in addition to which they lost 3000 prisoners, includ- ing 1000 wounded and many commis- sioned officers. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the conflict, the pro- portion of killed was unusually large. Hood could ill afford these heavy losses, as his force was originally smaller than Shennan’s. The total National loss was 3722, the greater part being killed and wounded. Sherman’s army, however, had sustained an irrepai’a- ble loss in the death of General Mc- Pherson. “ He was ” said Sherman : a noble youth, of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a hearf abounding in kindness that drew to him the affec- tions of all men.” His body was recov- ered and carried in the heat of battle to General Sherman, who sent it, in MAP OF THE COUNTRY BETWEEN CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, AND ATLANTA, GEORGIA. I / CAVALRY EXPEDITIONS. 725 charge of his personal staff, back to Marietta, on its way to his Northern home.* Garrard, with his cavalry, returned jQly from Covington on the 24th, 24 . having tlioroughly accomplished his mission to destroy the bridges over the Yellow and Ulcofauhatchee rivers, besides burning a train of cars, 2000 bales of cotton, and the depots at Cov- ington and Conger’s Station. He also broke up the railroad between those two places for seven miles, and brought in 200 prisoners and some good horses, having lost in the expedition only two * General James Birdseye McPherson was born in Sandusky Co,, Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, and entered the Military Academy at West Point in 1849. He graduated at the head of his class on the 30th of June, 1853, and was then appointed brevet second lieutenant of engineers and assistant instructor of practical engineering at the Academy. He remained in this position till 1854, when he was appointed assistant engineer on the defenses of New York harbor. In 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort Delaware, and subsequently of the fortifications on Alcatras Island, in San Francisco Bay, In 1861 he was placed in charge of the fortifications in Boston harbor. In the same year he was made captain, and in November became aide-de-camp to General Halleck in the Western Department, with the rank of lieuten- ant colonel. He was chief engineer of the army of the Tennessee in the expeditions against Forts Henry and Donelson, and he was also at the siege of Corinth. In May, 1862, he was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, and in the following month general super- intendent of military roads in West Tennessee. In September of the same year he was on the staff of General Grant, with the rank of major-general of volunteers. Subsequently, he was appointed brigadier- general of the regular army, his rank dating from August, 1st, 1863. Two months later he led a column into Mississippi, and defeated the enemy at Canton. In Sherman’s expedition to Meridian he was second in command, and in the Atlanta campaign commanded the army of the Tennessee. McPherson was distin- guished for bravery, industry, and indefatigable energy. In the language of General Grant, he was “one of the ablest engineers and most skilful gener- als ” men. The Georgia Eailroad being now unavailable to the enemy, Sherman turned his attention to the railroad connecting Atlanta with Macon, the only avenue left by which supplies could be brought to the enemy. For this purpose he organized his cavalry into two large bodies, to move in concert from each wing of the army, while the army of the Tennessee was to be shifted at the same time by the right to East Point, a station six miles southwest of Atlanta, at the junction of the Macon and West Point roads. Stoneman was transferred to the left flank, and Gar- rard’s cavalry added to his own, making an effective force of 5000 men. On the right flank McCook, to whose command was added the cavalry brought by Gen- eral Kousseau, had an aggregate force of 4000 men. These two well-appoin ted bodies of cavalry, which Sherman considered more than a match foi Wheeler, were directed to move in con cert, Stoneman’s by the left around McDonough, McCook’s by the right on Fayetteville. On the night of the 28tb they were to meet on the Macon Eailroad, near Love joy’s, thirty miles south of Atlanta, and break up the track thor- oughly. The enemy’s communications would then be all destroyed, and it was hoped the speedy evacuation of Atlanta would follow. Just before starting on the expedition Stoneman requested permission to pro ceed, after accomplishing the proposed destruction of the railroad, to Macon and Anderson ville, and release the Union prisoners there. To this, as there was a possibility of success, and, to use 984 726 ATLANTA. Sherman’s words, “something captiva- ting in the idea,” consent was given by General Sherman, on the condition, however, that Wheeler’s cavalry should first be defeated, and that Stoneman should make the attempt with his own cavalry only, that of Garrard to return immediately to his ovui flank of the National army. The two expeditions set out on the July Stoneman marching as pro- 27. posed towards McDonough, and sending Garrard to Flat Kock to cover his movement. McCook moved down the west bank of the Chattahoochee. But Stoneman, instead of proceeding to Lovejoy’s, turned off almost immediately towards the Georgia Railroad, following it as far as CovinsTton. He then struck due south to the east of the Ocmulgee, for Macon, sixty miles distant, and ar- rived in the vicinity of that place on the 30th. A detachment was sent eastward to Gordon, on the Georgia Central Rail- road, where 11 locomotives and several trains loaded with stores were destroyed, and several bridges between that place and Macon. But having learned that on the previous day the prisoners in Macon had been sent away to Charles- ton, Stoneman decid ed to return at once, without attempting to reach either Macon or Anderson ville. He accord- ingly turned northward in the evening July following morning, 31. when about twenty miles from Macon, encountered a heavy force. Dismounting a portion of his command, as the country was unfavorable for cav- alry operations, he threw them forward as skirmishers. He soon, however. found himself surrounded by a superior force. He then gave directions to the greater part of his troops to cut their way as well as they could through the enemy’s lines, while he with several hundred men and a section of artillery occupied their attention. He was finally compelled to surrender. One of his three brigades was captured with him; one, under Colonel Capron, was sur- prised and scattered on its way back, and the third, under Colonel Adams, arrived almost intact within the Nation- al lines. Garrard remained at Flat Rock till the 29th, awaiting orders from Stoneman, when he marched to- wards Covington; but learning there that he had gone southward, returned to his position on the left flank of the army. McCook, who marched along the west side of the Chattahoochee, on arriving at Rivertown, crossed on pontoons and marched to Palmetto Station, on the West Point Railroad, twenty-five miles south of Atlanta, and destroyed the track there. He then moved eastward upon Fayetteville, and burnt 500 army wagons, killed 800 mules, and made prisoners of several hundred quarter- masters’ men. He reached the appoint- ed rendezvous at Lovejoy’s on the night of the 28th, burnt the depot and tore up a section of the railroad; but his work of destruction being interfered with by an accumulating force of the enemy, and hearing nothing of Stone- man, he turned off towards the south- west and marched to Newman, a station on the West Point Railroad. Here he encountered an infantiy force of the MAGNIFICENT ADVANCE REPULSED. 727 enemy on its way from Mississippi to Atlanta, wMcli had been delayed by the break he had effected on the road at Palmetto. This force, with the pursu- ing cavalry, hemmed him in, and he was compelled to drop his prisoners and cut his way out, in doing which he lost some 500 officers and men. The total losses of Stoneman’s and McCook’s (commands amounted to not less than 1500 men. Owing to Stoneman’s failure to co-operate with McCook at Lovejoy’s, the damage done to the Macon Eailroad Avas not effectual, and the communica- tions of Hood in the direction of Macon were soon restored. Atlanta obtained a respite of at least a month. While these raids against the South- ern railroad communications of Atlanta liad been going on, the army of the Tennessee, now under the command of ]Maj or- General Howard — appointed by the president to succeed General Mc- Pherson — ^had, in accordance with the plans of Sherman, been drawn out of its intrenchments on the left flank, and moved during the 27th, behind the rest of the army, to a position on the extreme right, the right flank being held by the corps of General Logan. The line of the army was thus prolonged southward beyond Proctor’s Creek, and facing eastward. About ten in the morning all the army was in position, and the men were busily engaged in throwing up the usual defense of logs and rails. Davis’ division of the Fourteenth corps liad been ordered by Sherman, on the day before, to move down to Turner’s Ferry, and thence towards Whitehall or East Point, and if possible to reach the flank of Howard’s new line, so that in case Hood should attempt to repeat the experiment of the 2 2d, and attack any part of the army while in motion, his force might be taken in flank at an un- expected moment. Hood was not long in finding out that the army of Sherman was swinging round towards the Macon Eailroad, and massed troops in the same direction to oppose the movement. At noon July on the 28th, the Confederates 28. moved out of Atlanta by the Bell’s Ferry road, formed in the open fields behind a rising ground, and advanced in paral- lel lines directly against the Fifteenth corps, expecting to find it detached and unsupported. Fortunately Logan’s troops had thrown up breast-works, and though the advance of the Confederate columns was magnificent,” as Sherman, who witnessed it, said, it was only to be followed by a recoil before steady volleys of musketry and incessant dis- charges of grape and canister. In spite of the efforts of their officers the men broke and fled, and though rallied again and again, at some parts of the line as often as -six times, they were, about four o’clock in the afternoon, compelled to retire, with a loss of not less than 5000. Logan’s loss was reported at less than 600. Had Davis’ division come up at any time before four o’clock, this complete repulse of the enemy might have been made a disastrous rout. Owing to the difficult nature of the country through which his march lay, and the absence of roads, Davis was un- fortunately delayed. This was the last attempt of - the enemy to check the ATLANTA. r28 extension of Sherman’s lines by the flank ; and though the extensions south- ward were met by well constructed forts and rifle-pits between the National army and the railroad to and below East Point, the defensive was strictly adhered to. The National line was prolonged on the 1st of August still further southward be- yond East Point, by transferring Scho. field’s army and Palmer’s corps to the right. About this time several changes in important commands took place. Hook- er, offended because of the appointment of General Howard as the successor of McPherson, resigned his command of the Twentieth corps, and General Slo- cum was appointed in his place. Slocum was at Vicksburg, and until he arrived the command devolved on General S. H. Williams. Palmer at the same time resigned his command of the Fourteenth corps, and was succeeded by General Jefferson C. Davis. The command of the Fourth corps, vacated by the pro- motion of General Howard, was given to General D. S. Stanley. From the 2d to the 15th of August, the National line was extended still further to the right, in the hope of flanking Hood in that direction. The Twenty-Third corps, supported by the Fourteenth, was transferred from the left to a position below Utoy Creek — a small stream flowing westward to the Chattahoochee — where it joined on Logan’s right and formed the right flank. Peilley’s brigade of Cox’s divi- Ang. made an attempt on the 5th 5. to break through the enemy’s line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed, losing about 400 men. On the next day, however, the position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he could get no foothold on either the West Point or Macon Kailro^d. The enemy’s line, in which was now a large body of Georgia militia, at this time was about fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to East Point and beyond, and his positions were so masked by the hills and woods that the weak parts of the line could not be discovered. Along the west side of the railroad from Atlanta to East Point, a distance of six miles, the enemy had an admira- bly constructed line of defenses, within which was a second line, consisting of a series of redoubts of great . thickness of parapet connected throughout by a continuous infantry parapet, covered by abatis^ chevaux-de-frise, and other im- pediments. The inner line of works completely surrounded the city, and extended southwestward as far as and around East Point, thus covering the point of junction of the West Point and Macon Railroads. The National army had been so shifted by successive movements from its first position, in which it had threatened the city on the north and northeast, that now, while the northern approaches were covered by its extreme left, the extreme right lay southwest of Atlanta, and in a line parallel with the railroad, at an average distance of two and a half miles, the intervening space being a narrow belt of rough wooded countiy, the scene of THE GRAND MOVEMENT POSTPONED. 729 constant skirmisliing. Hood’s position seemed to be impregnable ; and altbougb his numbers were inferior to those of Sherman — yet his advantage in holding the interior lines made up in a great measure for his want of men, and the contest seemed likely to be indefinitely protracted. Sherman became satisfied that the enemy’s lines could be carried by assault only at a fearful sacrifice of life, and determined to adopt another plan of operations. His object now was to get possession of the Macon Railroad, the only line left by which Hood’s army could be reinforced, and on which it was wholly dependent for supplies. This effected. Hood might be compelled to evacuate the city or sur- render. To gain this end Sherman determined to move his entire army. But before moving, he had a battery of four 44-inch rified guns put in position, and a steady fire opened upon the city — the object being to impress the enemy with the conviction that regular siege operations were commenced. Several extensive fires were also thus caused in the city, and the running.of trains on the Macon Railroad was interrupted; but the enemy resolutely held the forts, mlling, apparently to see the city laid in ashes rather than abandon them. Sher- man therefore commenced his new move- ment, which amounted to nothing less than raising the siege of Atlanta and taking the field with his main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrench- ments. By the 16th of August, Sherman had completed his plans, according to which the Twentieth corps, under Wil- Aug. liams, was to be moved back to the ^ ^ • intrenched position at the Chattahoo- chee Bridge, and the main army was to march to the West Point Railroad, near Fairborn, and afterwards to the Macon road at Jonesboro, the wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. But before putting these plans in execution^ Sherman learned that Wheeler, with a force of cavalry, variously estimated at from 6000 to 10,000 men, had passed around by the east and north. Making his appearance on the Nation- al lines of communication, he captured 900 head of cattle, and made a break on the railroad near Calhoun. Sher- man, therefore, thinking that in the absence of Wheeler’s cavalry, the 'task he had marked out for the whole army might be accomplished by a strong mounted force, suspended his orders for the grand movement by the right flank, and dispatched Kilpatrick — who had now recovered from the wound he re- ceived at Resaca — with a force of 5000 well-appointed cavalry to tear up the railroads. Kilpatrick left his camp near Sandtown on the 18th and struck the West Point Railroad at Fairborn, the Macon Railroad at Love joy’s; but being much harrassed by a body of in- fantry and by Ross’s cavalry, was not able to effect any permanent damage on the roads — not enough to interrupt their use for more than ten days. He then returned northward and eastward, and reached Decatur on the 2 2d. It now became apparent to Sherman that his original plan must be carried out. All the army commanders were 730 ATLANTA. at once notified to send their surplus wagons, the sick and wounded, and in- cumbrances of all kinds, back to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee Railroad Bridge, and that the movement must commence on the night of the 25th. The Twentieth corps marched back to the bridge. The Fourth corps, under General Stanley, was dra^vn out of its line on the extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor’s Creek. The movement was continued on the night of the 26th, the army of the Tennessee being drawn out and moved rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown and across Camp Creek ; the army of the Cumberland south of Utoy Creek. The army of the Ohio remained in its position. A third movement placed the army of the Tennessee on the West Point Railroad above Fairborn, the army of the Cumberland above Red Oak, and the army of the Ohio near Diggs and Mims. The whole front of the city was thus uncovered, much to the astonishment of the Confederates, who, for a short time, not being able in any other way to account for these strange operations, supposed that Sher. man had begun a retreat. The 28th of August was devoted by Aug. Sherman to the destruction of the West Point Railroad, between Fairborn and Red Oak, and for some distance above. The work was thor- oughly done. The road was destroyed for twelve and a half miles, the ties being burnt, and the rails twisted. Sev- eral cuts were made across the road and filled up with logs, trunks of trees, fragments of rock, and earth, among •/ which were placed shells prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Sherman, after having personally inspected this work, and seen that the destruction was so complete that it would be very difficult to restore the road to working condition, ordered the whole army to move next day eastward by several roads — Howard, on the right, towards Jonesboro ; Thomas, in the centre, by Shoal Creek Church to Couch’s, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road ; and Schofield, on the left, about Morrow’s Mills. Hood now began to understand the object of these movements ; but still unaware that Sherman’s whole army was marching on his communications, he contented himself with sending only a part of his force, the corps of Hardee and S. D. Lee, to Jonesboro, remaining himself in Atlanta with Stewart’s coi*ps and the Georgia militia. The several columns of Sherman’s army were again in motion in a south- easterly direction on the 30th. Aug. Thomas, in the centre, encounter- 30, ing little opposition, attained his posi- tion at Couch’s early in the afternoon ; Schofield being near the enemy, moved cautiously on a circle around East Point, and came into position towards Rough and Ready ; Howard, who had the outer circle, and therefore a greater distance to move, met with some opposi- tion, which, however, he easily overcame, passed Renfrew, .the point indicated for him in the orders of the day, and at night halted within half a mile of Jonesboro. Next morning, finding MOVEMENT ON JONESBORO, 731 himself in the presence of the heavy force under Generals Hardee and Lee, Howard deployed the Fifteenth corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and Seven- teenth on its flank. Sherman had in the meantime, as soon as he learned that Howard had passed Renfrew, directed Thomas to send to that place a division of Davis’ corps, also to move Stanley’s corps in connection with Schofield’s force, to wards Rough and Ready, and then to send for^vard a strong detachment to feel for the railroad. Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough and Ready. These Aug. movements were progressing on 31 . the 31st, when the Confederates moved out of their works at Jonesboro, and attacked the position of HoVard, but were steadily and repeatedly re- pulsed. After a contest of two hours’ duration, they withdrew, losing in killed, wounded, and captured, 3000 men, besides general officers, including Major- General Anderson, mortally w^ounded. Howard’s loss was slight, as his men fought behind breast-works. It was observed on this occasion that the Con- federate troo]3s had begun to lose the enthusiasm and dash which had hitherto characterized their attacks. Hearing the sounds of battle about noon, Sherman renewed his orders to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about four o’clock received reports that Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro ; that Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough and Ready and was busy breaking it up ; that Stanley was on the road below Schofield, and was also breaking it up, and that General Davis’ corps had struck the road within four miles of Jonesboro. Orders were then given for the whole army to move on Jonesboro ; Thomas from the north, with Schofield on his left. Howard was to hold the Confederates in their fortifications till the rest of the army could close in upon them. The troops were also ordered to continue the des truction of the railroad as they moved along it. Garrard was charged to w^atch the roads northward, and Kil- patrick was sent southward along the west bank of the Flint River, to threaten or attack the railroad below Jonesboro. It was expected that the whole army would be able to close in on Jonesboro by noon on the 1st of September; but the corps of Davis alone, having a com paratively short distance to travel, w^as up in time, and was deployed facing southwai’d, its right in connection with the corps of Howard, its left on the railroad. Stanley and Schofield were moving along the Rough and Ready road, breaking it up at the same time, and Sherman fearing that night would come on before their arrival, and that the enemy would then be able to escape him without a fight, ordered the corps of Davis to assault the enemy’s works at once. The troops advanced to the attack across open fields under a wither- ing artillery and musketry fire. After a desperate fight, which lasted two hours, they drove the Confederates from their works, capturing two 4-gun batter- ies — one of them Loomis’, lost at Chick- amauga — some battle-flags, and a large 732 ATLANTA. number of prisoners, including the greater part of Govan’s brigade, ^Yitb its commander, which had formed part of the celebrated fighting division ” of Cleburne. Repeated orders were sent, urging the rapid advance of Stanley and Schofield, but the want of roads and the difficult nature of the country pre- vented their coming up and getting into position for attack before further oper- ations were rendered impracticable by the approach of night. Had they been able to close in upon Hardee a few hours earlier, his entire force would in all probability have been captured. As it was, Hardee had to evacuate the place during the night and fall back seven miles to Lovejoy’s, where he intrenched in a naturally strong position. About two o’clock in the morning the watchers in Sherman’s camp heard in the direction of Atlanta, about twenty miles distant, the sounds of heavy explosions, followed by a succession of minor ^reports re- sembling the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. About four o’clock similar sounds were heard, indicating a night attack on the city by Slocum, or that Hood was blowing up his magazines and preparing to evacuate. Never- theless, when the approach of day made It clear that Hardee had abandoned his works at Jonesboro, Sherman moved his army in pursuit. Hardee was found in his intrenched position at Lovejoy’s, liis fianks protected by a branch of W alnut Creek to the right and a small confluent of the Flint River to his left. In the mean time, in Atlanta the utmost consternation and excitement had arisen when it became known that the main army of Sherman had got between Hardee’s force and the city. Hood immediately gave orders for the evacuation of his works and the remov- al of as much of the ammunition and stores as was possible with his limited means of transportation, and for the destrucijion of the rest. Large quanti- ties of provisions in the public store- houses were distributed to the inhabi- tants and to the troops. The I’olling stock of the railroads, consisting of about 100 cars and 6 locomotives, were gathered together near the rolling-mill in the evening, by which time all the troops except the rear-guard had got away. The cars were then laden with the surplus ammunition, and, together with the depots, storehouses, and all that could be of use to the National army, set on fire about midnight. This occasioned the series of explosions that had been heard in Sherman’s camp. Slocum, at the Chattahoochee Bridge, also hearing these sounds, sent out early in the morning of the 2d of Sep- gept, tember a strong reconnoitring 2. column, which pushing forward with- 'out meeting any opposition, arrived at Atlanta about nine o’clock, when the mayor made a formal surrender of the city, only requesting the security of private property and protection for non- combatants, which were readily guaran- teed. Ward’s division then marched into the city with drums beating and colors flying, and the National banner was raised over the court-house amid hearty cheers from the troops. Eleven heavy guns were found in the fortifica- tions, and a number which had been REMOVAL OF CIVILIANS.. 733 buried were subsequently dug up. There were also found 3 locomotives uninjured, 3000 muskets in good order, and a quantity of tobacco and other stores. Of the valuable machinery in the Confederate Government work- shops, part had been removed to Augus- ta and Macon, and part destroyed. The object of Sherman’s movement against the Macon Railroad having been attained, by the surrender of Atlanfa, he gave up the pursuit of Hardee’s force. To follow it, through a country covered wdth forests, would have been useless. He therefore issued orders on the 4th for the return of the army by slow marches towards Atlanta. On the 5th it was back at Jonesboro ; on the 7th it moved to Rough and Ready, and on the 8th camps were selected — for the army of the Cumberland around Atlanta, for the army of the Tennessee about East Point, and for the army of the Ohio at Decatur. Sherman’s final success in compelling the evacuation of Atlanta was owing in a great degree to the mistake made by Hood in sending ofi his cavalry under Wheeler to operate against the National communications far beyond the reach of recall, thus enabling Sherman’s cav- alry, followed quickly by his main army, to fall upon the railroads south of At- lanta. Up to the time of Wheeler’s raid, Sherman’s railroad communications between Atlanta and Chattanooga had, owing to his skilful dispositions, been scarcely interrupted. In Chattanooga had been accumulated a sufficient quan- tity of stores to render the army indepen- dent of Nashville; and when Sherman heard of Wheeler’s departure, which took place soon after the unfortunate raid of Stoneman, he felt no uneasiness, as it left him superior in cavalry to his adversary. Wheeler struck the railroad at Adairsville, midway between Atlanta and Chattanooga, and captured there 900 head of beef cattle ; proceeding then northward, he did some damage at Calhoun. On the 14th he made his appearance at Dalton, and demanded, in order ^Ho prevent the effusion of blood,” an immediate and unconditional surrender. Colonel Siebold, who was in command of the garrison of 500 or 600 men, replied in the negative ; and sending word to General Steedman, commanding at Chattanooga, he held out against the Confederates till the following day, when reinforcements arrived. Wheeler then went to East Tennessee; and the railroad between Atlanta and Chattanooga was immedi- ately restored to running order. Sub- sequently he destroyed a large part of the railroad between Chattanooga and Knoxville ; and during the latter part of August and the first week in September he endeavored to break up the railroad and interrupt telegraphic communica- tions between Chattanooga and Nash- ville. He was, however, compelled to i*etire southward pursued by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger, to wards Florence, in northern Alabama. Having determined to remove all civilians from Atlanta and to retain the town for military purposes exclusively, Sherman issued an order dated gept. 5th September ordering all fami- 5. lies living in Atlanta whose male 734 ATLANTA. representatives were in the Confederate service, or had gone south, to leave the city within five days. All northern citizens not connected with the army, unless they obtained from him or from General Thomas permission to remain, were also to leave the city in five days or to be liable to imprisonment. To facil- itate the removal of the inhabitants, the number of whom had greatly diminished during the progress of the siege, Sherman proposed to Hood, still remaining at Love joy’s, a truce of ten days. Hood agreed to the proposal, although he protested against the measure as one of unnecessary cruelty. Sherman replied in a characteristic let- ter to Hood, showing that the conduct of Johnston and other Confederate commanders afforded sufficient prece- dent for his action. The inhabitants who still remained in Atlanta were very miwilling to be sent away, and the mayor, James M. Calhoun, addressed a letter to Sherman, asking a reconsider- ation of the order to which the latter re- plied, showing in clear and forcible language the propriety of the measiu-e he had determined on, at the same time dem- onstrating that the hardships of war so much complained of had been brought upon the Southern people by their own action. The truce agreed upon extended from the 12th of September to the 2 2d and wa^ subsequently prolonged. The National Government furnished trans- portation as far as Kough and Ready, for such of the inhabitants as wishexl to move southward, and for those desir- ing to move northward, as far as Chat- tanooga. They were permitted to take with them their movable property, for which also transportation was furnished. Negroes who chose to do so were allowed to go with their masters. Of those who remained, the men were put in govern- ment employ, and the women and children were sent outside the lines. During the truce there were removed to Rough and Ready 446 families, com- prising 705 adults, 860 children, and 470 servants. The amount of house- hold goods removed was an average of 1,651 pounds to each family. PETERSBURG. 735 CHAPTER XXXVI. The Army of the Potomac, — Description of Petersburg. — Movement on Petersburg under Gillmore and Kautz. — The Eighteenth Corps at Bermuda Hundred. — The Outer Defenses of Petersburg taken, — Movement of Terry against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, — Army of the Potomac before Petersburg. — Four Days of Unsuccessful Assaulting. — The Confederate Troops reoccupy their Lines in Front of Butler’s Position. — Attack on Sheridan’s Wagon Train at White House. — Movement against the Weldon Railroad. — Skirmish at Davis’ Farm.— Fire directed against the Appomattox Bridges.- -Deep Bottom occupied by Foster. — The Movement against the Weldon Railroad resumed. --The National Line broken through.— Disastrous Consequences. — Heavy Losses in Prisoners. — Advance of Wright towards th.e Weldon Railroad. — The Vermont Brigade driven back. — Attack on the Tenth Corps. — Sheridan’s Cavalry attacked while on the March from White House. — Friendly intercourse between Pickets. — Petersburg Bombarded. — March of the Sixth Corps to the Relief of Wilson’s Cavalry. — Raid of Wilson and Kautz against the Weldon and Danville Railroads. — The Weldon Railroad cut — Railroad Destruction at Burkes- ville and on the Danville Road. — Battle at Staunton Bridge. — Fight at Stony Creek and Reams’ Station — Disastrous Rout of Wilson’s Column. — Escape of Kautz’s Command. — Long Route taken by Wilson, — The Weldon Railroad cut by the Sixth Corps — A Demonstration frustrated. — Confederate Assault on a National Earth work. — The Fourth of July in the Lines before Petersburg. — A sudden Attack reiDulsed'. — A Dead Lock. — Effect of incessant hard Fighting. — Grant retains Butler in his Command. — Change in Corps Commanders. — Occupation of Strawberry Plains. — The Mine at Petersburg — The Feint at Deep Bottom. — Demonstrations towards Richmond. — Lee hurries large numbers of Troops to the North Side of the James. — Explosion of the Mine. — Advance of the Storming Column. — Delay. — The Repulse. — Rout of Ferrero’s Colored Division. — The Fort recaptured by the Confederates. — Delay in burying the Dead. — Causes of Failure. — Explosion of a Confederate Mine. — Deserters. — Terrific Explosion at City Point. — Perseverance of Grant. — Gradual Exhaustion of the Southern Fighting Element. — The Dvitch Gap Canal. — Movements North of the James. — Fight at Strawberry Plains — Demonstrations at Deep Bottom. — Battle of Deep Run. — Ludlow’s Movement from Dutch Gap. — Operations against the Weldon Railroad. — Battle at Davis’ Farm. — Battles for the Weldon Railroad. — Destruction of the Track. — Battle of Reams’ Station. — Pickett attacks Butler’s Position. — HeaA^y Bombardment of Petersburg. — Gregg’s Recconnois- sance towards Stony Creek. — A tacit Truce broken. — Redoubt captured by De Trobriand. — Extension of the City Point Railroad. — General Hampton’s great Cattle Raid, — Movement from Deep Bottom towards Richmond. — Battle of Chapin’s Farm. — Capture of Battery Harrison. — Capture of New Market Heights. — Repulse at Fort Gilmer. — Reconnoissance by Kautz and Terry towards Richmond. — Attack on Battery Harrison repulsed. — Movement towards the South Side Railroad. — Capture of Fort McRae. — Repulse of Potter’s Division. — Kautz’s Cavalry surprised and routed. — Repulse of the Enemy by Terry. — Reconnois- sances. — Simultaneous Movements North of the James toAvards Hatcher’s Run — Battle of Hatcher’s Run. — Gregg’s Raid to Stony Creek Station. — Warren’s Operations on the Weldon Railroad towards Hicksford. Without tlie loss of a wagon or a single piece of artillery, the army *of the Potomac had been trans- ferred from the north bank of the Chickahominy to the south side of the James. The Confederates were aware that some such movement was intended ; but they had not counted on its being executed with so much celerity. As the wearied soldiers marched along the dusty roads, they met with little annoyance save from the heated atmosphere and the burning sun. The column which moved from Long Bridge to Wilcox’s Wharf, it is true, had a sharp engage- ment with the enemy near White Oak Bridge, on the borders of the swamps ; but Wilson’s cavalry and Crawford’s 736 PETERSBURG. advanced division of tlie Fifth corps, with a loss of not more than 200 men, drove them back. Making allowance for stragglers, and for a skirmishing line cut off at Cold Harbor, the entire loss attending the movement did not exceed 400 men. It had been Grant’s first intention to fall upon Lee’s army again and again from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, and by a succession of heavy blows to break it up, or so ^veaken it, that when it should at last fall back upon Richmond, that city would prove an easy conquest for his victor- ious legions. His scheme failed. The numerical strength of the enemy proved greater than had been supposed; and General Lee was careful in his retro- grade movements never to fight except in impregnable positions. Petersburg was now the immediate object of Grant’s attention. In any attempt to approach Richmond from the south, the occupation of Petersburg must be an important preliminary step. The holding of that city would sever the enemy’s communications southward, and afford many material advantages in the investment of Richmond. Grant had wished to gain possession of it in the outset; and in his grand plan of campaign he had arranged that it should be taken and held by the army of the James, which, however, had proved inadequate to the task. Situated on the right or south bank of the Appo- mattox, at a distance of 22 miles south of Richmond, and 10 miles southwest of the James at City Point, and having a population at the beginning of the war of o\'er 18,000, Petersburg ranked as the third town in Virginia. It was the focus of convergence of five rail- roads: the Richmond road running north ; the Weldon road running south to the Carolinas ; the South Side road running west to Lynchburg ; the Norfolk road running southeast and the short road running northeast to City Point. The town was defended by a series of skil- fully constructed earth-works, consisting not only of square redoubts, but also of well-established rifle-trenches, extending around it in a semicircle, both ends resting on the river, the north- ern extremity being strengthened by batteries on the opposite side of the stream. General Butler, it will be remembered, had already made a demonstration against Petersburg. Having been frequently informed by deserters that the garrison was much weakened by the withdrawal of troops to reinforce Lee, he, early in the month of June, made preparations for sending a force in that direction. A pontoon bridge was constructed, to be thrown across the Appomattox, and gun-boats were sent up the river to reconnoitre. The expedition was placed under the charge of General Gillmore, who led the infantry column, about 3500 men, consisting of Hawley’s brig- ade of the Tenth corps, and a brigade of colored troops under General Hinks. The cavalry 1400 strong, was com- manded by Kautz. It was arranged that Gillmore, having crossed to the east bank of the Appomattox by the pontoon bridge, should proceed by the turnpike road towards the town, and attack it from that direction, Avhile THE OUTER DEFENSES. 73: Kautz, also crossing the river, should fetch a wide circuit and make his attack on the south or southwest side of the town ; the movements of the two bodies of troops to be so timed that they should enter the place simultaneously at differ- ent points. It was hoped that the town might thus be captured, and that if not held, at least all its supplies and stores of ammunition might be destroyed. Butler was to make a demonstration in the mean time as'ainst Fort Clifton. On the 8th of June, shortly after dusk, the pontoon bridge was laid down near Point of Eocks, and about mid- night Kautz’s cavalry crossed by it, quickly followed by Hawley’s brigade, which was soon afterwards joined by the colored brigade of Hinks. Before eight o’clock in the morning, Follett’s battery was brought up in front of the woods near Point of Eocks, and began to shell the' Confederate lines near Fort Clifton. The gun-boats Commodore Perry and General Putnam also opened fire on the same position. A brisk fire was kept up thus till noon. A battery which the enemy brought down, and which threw 30-pounder shells at Gen- eral Weitzel’s signal station, was soon silenced. In the mean time Gillmore June Kautz had pressed on, mak- 9. ing a detour so as to avoid the fire of Fort Clifton, and were rapidly ap- proaching Petersburg. The infantry met with no serious opposition till vdthin about two miles of the town, when the Confederate skirmish lines were encountered, but quickly driven back. Arrived in front of the town, and sufficiently near to be able to examine the fortifications critically, Gillmore came to the conclusion that they were too strong to be attempted by the force under his command. He, therefore, withdrew his troops about noon, and got back to camp the same evening. In the mean time Kautz on his side had forced the intrenchments and actually engaged the enemy in the streets. But the Confederates concen- trated against him what force they had ; and he was compelled to retire, although he carried off with him 40 prisoners. His loss was only about 20 killed and wounded. At one o’clock on the morning of the 1 5th, the Eighteenth corps which had arrived at Bermuda Hundred 1 5 . on the previous evening, in transports, by way of Fortress Monroe, set out for Petersburg. Kautz’s cavalry in the advance crossed the Appomattox by the pontoon bridge near Point of Eocks. Brooks’ and Martindale’s divisions fol- lowed together with Hinks’ two brigades of colored troops. The route taken was the same as that pursued a week pre- vious by Gillmore and Kautz. Soon after daylight Kautz, advancing along the City Point road, encountered skir- mishers, and drove them out of a small earth-work. The troops of Hinks and Brooks followed rapidly, and soon after- wards, near Harrison’s Ci*eek, a line of rifle-trenches with two 12-pounders was discovered, from which solid shot flew over the head of the column. Hinks deployed skirmishers, scattered the ene- my through some neighboring woods and finally secured a position near Bavlor’s Farm, from which the Fifth 738 PE TERSBURG. and Twenty-Fifth colored regiments car- ]’ied the enemy’s works, capturing one of the guns and turning it on the i-etreating Confederates. The division of Brooks now moved up, with Burn- ham’s brigade in the advance and entered a strip of woods which con- cealed the main outer line of the defenses of Petersburg, about two miles from the town. Hinks then moved his divi- sion towards the left, on the Jourdan Point road, while Martindale, with Stannard in the advance, moved on by the river road. A line was thus formed in front of the Petersburg intrench- ments, in which Martindale held the light. Brooks the centre, and Hinks the left. Active skirmishing went on while these positions were being taken, and the lire of the sharpshooters told severely on the troops. Just before sunset, the ui'der was given to carry the enemy’s works by assault ; and the whole line rushed forward, swept the entire range of rifle-pits in spite of a heavy artillery Are, and drove the enemy from the intrenchments. Sixteen guns, a battle- flag, and 300 prisoners were taken. Had an adequate supporting force been at hand, the second line of works might have been taken with comparative ease. The National Joss was about 500 men. The Second corps began to arrive in the evening, and before morning the whole of it had reached the scene of action. During the night Birney’s division held the captured earth- works, against which the enemy knowing their value, made demonstrations, but in vain. While the infantry were thus operating towards Petersburo^ from the northeast, Kautz, on the extreme left, with Spear’s brigade in the advance, moved against the enemy’s works near the Norfolk Bailroad and on the Baxter road. After a brisk cannonade on the position, which was well fortified with arfillery, a charge was made by Kautz’s men armed \vith carbines ; but the work proved too strong to be carried, and Kautz was compelled to retire. So far Petersburg had been defended by its local garrison, but the Confederate troops in the neighborhood were rapidly concentrating to its aid. On the morning of the 16th, General Butler having learned that a por- j^ne tion of the Confederate forces in 16. front of his intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred had been hurried olf to Peters- burg, sent out General Terry with a part of the Tenth corps to reconnoitre. The Confederates gave way before them ; and the reserves coming up, their line was broken through, and finally the railroad was reached near Walthal Junction. While a working party tore up the track and pulled down the tele- graph for about two miles, the main body of General Terry’s force moved along the road by which it w^as sup- posed Lee’s advance was approaching. But the Confederates at length came dowm upon them in force and compelled a retreat. The result of the movement was, that travel by the railroad was interrupted for about a day. In 'the mean time the National troops were gathering around Petersburg. Early on the morning of the 16th, Bir- ney sent Colonel Egan’s brigade against a redoubt on his left, which was carried CONFEDERATE POSITION CARRIED. 739 and held^ with the loss of about 100 men. An attempt was made to push forward the picket lines, when skir- mi sh i ng and artillery firing ensued. But reinforcements for the Confederates were now rapidly aniving from various (quarters, and in such numbers that it ^vas thought advisable not to push the troops forward till the arrival of Burn- side’s corps. Kautz, however, had moved out with his cavalry to the left across the Norfolk Kailroad, to occupy ground for the Ninth and Fifth corps. In the afternoon Burnside, having crossed the James by the pontoon bridge, came up with the Ninth corps, after a severe forced march from Charles City Court House. Line of battle was then formed, with the Second corps in the centre, the Eighteenth corps on the right, and the Ninth corps on the left. Birney’s division held the right of the Second coip)s. General Barlow’s the left. To the left of Barlow was General Pot- ter’s division of the Ninth corps. The ground between the opposing lines, though broken and rugged, was rather open, with here and there fields of grain. At six o’clock the attack was commenced and kept up for three hours. Bimey’s division carried the crest in its front, and held it. Barlow’s advanced brig- ade found more difficulty, the enemy being somewhat concentrated in its front. At length Miles’ brigade of Barlow’s dNision and Griffin’s of Pot- ter’s division, charging in face of a de- structive artillery fire, succeeded in gaining a foothold in the rifle-pits out- side of the stronger works. The troops V>eing here annoved by the enemy’s fire. Barlow detennined to make an assault on his main works ; and Burnside prepared a column to make the attempt in connection with him. But the enemy haying opened a severe fire upon Burn- side’s troops, cutting off a skinnish line of 300 men in Barlow’s front ; the assault was deferred/ till morning. Birney’s loss during the three hours’ fighting was about 500 men. Potter’s division in its charge on the rifle-pits lost about the same number. The right had not taken an important part in the contest and had suffered but little. The total National loss since the begin- ning of the action was between 1500 and 2000, Avhile that of the Confederates owing to their advantage of position, was comparatively small. On the morning of the 17th, at four o’clock, Burnside ordered Potter’s division to take the works in its 17. front ; and Griffin’s brigade, supported by Curtin’s, carried it with a rush, cap- turing 6 guns, 16 officers, 400 men, and a stand of colors. A pause then oc- curred in the assault ; but sharp skir mishing was carried on by the picket lines, and the artillery on both sides kept up a steady fire. In the afternoon Potter’s division was relieved by the divisions of Wilcox and Ledlie. An advance by Ledlie’s division was then ordered ; and the charge was gallantly made, covered by a brisk artillery fire. The intrenchments were reached ; after a short but bloody contest over the breast- works, the Confederates were driven out of them and the position was carried; and although several at- tempts were made by the enemy to 710 PETERSBURG. recover the lost ground, it was firmly held. Burnside, now so near was actually able to throw shot into the town. The other portions of the line had, during the day, been engaged in skirmishing,* but without attempting any decisive assault. The enemy’s jiosition, opposite the Second corps — temporarily commanded by Birney, in the absence of Hancock, who was suf- fering from an old wound — was deemed too strong to be attacked with any hope of success. Barlow’s division, on the left of the Second corps, had taken part in Burnside’s charge in the morning, and rendered efficient service. On the right, the greater part of the Eighteenth corps, under General Smith, was relieved from the position it had carried ; and recrossing the pontoon bridge over the Appomattox at night, it regained the intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred in the morning. The divisions of Hinks and Martindale, on the extreme right, remained, as they could not be vdth- drawn to advantage. The Fifth corps, under Warren, came up on the left, and was massed there in the rear of Burn- side. About nine o’clock at night the enemy appeared in force on Birney’s front, but was driven back. Somewhat later, under cover of a vigorous shelling from the Confederate batteries, the enemy suddenly reappeared in two columns, one in front, the other in flank, and made a desperate and finally suc- cessful effort to recover the works taken by Burnside during the afternoon. Leaping the defenses in the dark, the Confederates succeeded in drivins: out the National troops. On the same day, eaj'ly in the mom- in g, a body of the enemy, consisting of parts of the divisions of Pickett and Fields, attacked the National lines near the James. Foster’s division of the Tenth corps, which held a line extend- ing from near Ware Bottom Church towards the Appomattox, was pushed back some little distance. It was now the morning of the 18 th. The National line in front of Petersburg was disposed as fob 18 . lows, from right to left : two divisions of the Eighteenth corps, under Martin- dale and Hinks ; the Sixth under W right ; the Second under Birney; the Ninth under Burnside, and the Fifth undei Warren. It had been intended to make another assault at four o’clock in the morning ; but skirmishers having been sent out, it was found that the enemy had abandoned the works immediately in front for an inner series of defenses. New combinations, therefore, became necessary. Skirmishing and artillery firing went on while the enemy’s new defensive line was being reconnoitred. A general advance of the three corps on the left was ordered at noon. Gibbon’s division of the Second corps was pushed forward, while the rest of the corps threw out double lines of skir- mishers to divert the enemy’s attention. Gibbon’s troops moved promptly up towards the works, which were near the railroad to City Point ; but when they got out from under cover they wei*e suddenly struck by a murderous enfilad- ing fire on the left. For a time the men pressed vigorously forward ; but their ranks were so swept by incessant THE WELDON RAILROAD, 741 volleys, that at last even the veterans recoiled. The breast-works were not even reached when the men began to retire, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. At four o’clock in the afternoon another storming party was organized. It consisted of Mott’s divi- sion, with detachments from the two other divisions, all of the Second corps. Shortly before five in the afternoon, Mott moved out his force in two col- umns, and the two leading brigades burst upon the enemy in gallant style ; but in spite of an exhibition of the most resolute bravery, they were forced back with terrible loss, by a concentrated artillery and musketry fire. The Sixth and Ninth corps were little more suc- cessful than the Second; Martindale’s division of the Eighteenth corps, al- though at first attended with some suc- cess, shared the same experience as the others. The fighting was continued into the night, but gradually died away in picket firing. The losses during the day had been very heavy, especially on the part of the Second corps. During the whole operations from the 15th to the 18th of June, the estimated loss in killed, wounded and missing was not under 9000 men. The four days’ assaults had had no other result than the decimation of the storming columns. During the 19th, arrangements were made under a flag of truce for burying the dead, and carrying off the wounded between the lines. The Sixth corps, which had been on the north side of the Appomattox, near Port Waltlial, was relieved by the Eighteenth coi’ps, and moved into line 'on the right. General Ferrero’s division of the Ninth coi-ps, also arrived, and was posted in the front. Three Confederate rams descended the James, nearly as far as Dutch Gap, but were soon driven back by the fleet. The Confederates contin- ued to intrench on the west side of the Appomattox as industriously as the National troops did on the east side ; and having no apprehensions of imme- diately losing Petersburg, they made some movements in other directions. Beauregard in his huiTy to reinforce Petersburg had hastily deserted his old lines in front of Bermuda Hundred ; and the Tenth corps, as has been stated, made use of the opportunity to cut the Petersburg and Bichmond Eailroad ; but when they were driven back, the Confederates reoccupied their works, and from these lines made a slight demonstration in front and some raiding: movements in the neighborhood of the James. On the night of the 19th, they succeeded in destroying the wharves at Wilcox’s and Westover Landings, and sent small bodies of troops along the river to do whatever other mischief they could. They also threw up earth- works near Turkey Bend ; but they were easily shelled out of them by the gun-boats. On the 21st, active movements were again commenced by the main June army, and once more by the left 21. flank, with the object of severing the communications to the south of Peters- burg by the Weldon Eailroad. On the previous night the Second corps had been moved from its position in the right centre of the line to the left, the gap thus formed being closed up by the 742 PETERSBURG. extension of tRe Ninth corps and part of the Eighteenth. It then struck across the Norfolk Kailroad, and marched rapidly southward, though under an intensely hot sun and through clouds of stifling and blinding dust, with the steadiness which had so often charac- terized it during flank marches in pres- ence of the enemy. Grriflin’s division of the Fifth corps was detached to follow ; the Sixth corps was also moved out in support. Before noon the main column halted ; but in the afternoon Barlow’s division of the Second corps, with sharp- shooters skirmishing in advance, was sent forward, and struck the enemy’s lines in the neighborhood of the Jerusalem road which runs southward from Peters- burg, about midway between the Nor- folk and W eldon railroads. The division was then halted and put into position, and skirmishers were advanced. These met a stout resistance from dismounted cavalry pickets; and almost immedi- ately, infantry were discovered in force with artillery planted in earth-works. It was evident that the enemy under- stood the value of the Weldon Railroad, and was prepared as well as determined to defend it. After a severe skirmish Barlow’s advanced line withdrew and rejoined the main column. Gibbon had in the mean time reconnoitred towards Petersburg, but without result. On the extreme left the enemy’s movements were so threatening that a squadron of cavalry was sent round to protect that flank. The Second corps was then retired to form in position for the night, with Barlow’s division on the left, Mott’s in the centre, and Gibbon’s on the right. Beyond Gibbon’s division was Griffin’s of the Fifth corps. The Sixth corps was intended to be posted between the Second corps and the Weldon Railroad. Ricketts’ division came up and took a position on Barlow’s left, and the othei division followed. There was a little cavalry skirmishing on the extreme left, and the Confederate scouts made a slight dash in the evening towards the National position; but the day closed Avithout any more important movement. The fight in the afternoon took place on what was known as Davis’ Farm, about 3 miles from the city and within a mile of the railroad. The day was comparatively quiet in the lines east of Petersburg. The Con- federates early in the morning opened fire towards the headquarters of the Sixth corps, which had not at that time moved out ; and there was more or less firing during the day, especially towards the right. The bridges over the Appo- mattox connecting Petersburg and Pocahontas now underwent a daily shelling from the National batteries. The fire directed on the railroad bridge caused great annoyance to the enemy, as it tended materially to obstruct the passage of cars. Some important movements took place during the day, to the north of Peters- burg. Early in the morning Foster’s division of the Tenth corps, crossed to the north side of the James River by a pontoon bridge laid by General Weitzel on the previous evening, to a point between Aiken’s Landing and Four Mile Creek. Foster advanced towards the Kingsland road, drove in the enemy’s FOSTER AT DEEP BOTTOM. 748 pickets and intrenclied at Deep Bottom, about 10 miles from Bicbmond. On the opposite side of the river was the bat- tery of the enemy known as Howlett’s. Near this point a fight between the moni- tors and Confederate rams took place ; but though the latter were aided by the battery, they were driven back to their usual position on the west side of Dutch Gap. The heavy Dahlgren guns soon silenced the battery; and in the evening they were opened on the enemy manoeuvring in front of Foster. Foster was thus enabled to hold his own for some time without molestation. Meanwhile the Eighteenth corps again left its camp near Bermuda Hundred, once more crossed the pontoon bridge, marched to the lines in front of Peters- burg, and took the position vacated l)y the Sixth corps. The result of the ^’arious army movements on the 21st was, that at night the different com* niands lay as follows : Foster’s division was north of the James at Deep Bottom ; the remainder of the Tenth corps being with Butler at Bermuda Hundred. In the intrenchments east of Petersburg, the right was held by Smith, the centre by Burnside, the left by W arren. Three or four miles to the south, threatening the Weldon Bailroad, were the corps of Hancock and Wright, with Griffin’s division of Warren. The movement against the Weldon Bailroad was resumed early on the 2 2d. Now that the capture of Petersburg had June considered out of the 22. question for the present, the sev- erance of the Weldon Bailroad became a primary object. The Sixth corps, the whole of which had come up during the night, prepared to move, in conjunction with the Second corps, directly against the railroad. The position of the Second corps was near the Jemsalem road. Gibbon’s right resting on the left of the road, with Griffin’s division of the Fifth on the further side. Gibbon’s troops were already well up to the enemy’s works and needed only to go into position and intrench, as any further advance on their part might bring on a general engagement before the line was properly established. The left of the line, therefore, consisting of the Sixth corps with the divisions of Barlow and Mott of the Second was ordered to ad- vance, the movement to commence at daybreak. By some misunderstanding the march was delayed. At last the two corps began to move, at the same time, though independently of each other, each commander having been cautioned to protect his fiank well in case connection were not made with the other corps. The line had been deploy- ed in rather an open style, and covered a wide extent of ground, which being difficult and intricate, and the movement made in presence of the enemy, it was thought desirable to mass more closely. Accordingly Barlow, who held Hancock’s left, pressed well in to the right and threw two brigades into reserve, the remainder of his troops forming the advance line. But on entering the woods a gap began to form between his left and the right of the Sixth corps, and he placed some regi- ments to guard his flank. Meanwhile, Mott had, without difficulty, obtained 744 PETERSBURG. the position indicated for him and had begun to intrench ; Gibbon was already in position ; and Barlow having moved forward sufficiently was also about to intrench, when the startling sound of musketry was heard on his flank, and soon afterwards in his rear. With a view of checking the movement against the railroad, the Confederate force under Hill was approaching in several col- umns, preceded by a dense cloud of skirmishers. The Sixth corps was far distant on the left and i*ear. A wide gap was thus left in the National line ; but it was happily filled up in time to prevent fatal results. Quick to take advantage of the mistake committed. Hill pushed on an entire division, with Mahone’s brigade in the advance, into the intervening space. The attack was made with tremendous energy. Barlow was the first to feel the weight of the onset. His division bending under the blow was quickly rolled up, thus ex- posing Mott’s left flank. Mott in turn was struck heavily and fell back, leaving exposed the left of Gibbon. Gibbon shared the fate of Mott and Barlow. The intrenchments of each of the three divisions were captured. Such was the suddenness and impetuosity of the attack, and so great was the confusion resulting from it, that several whole regiments were swept off and captured almost without a fight. McKnight’s battery, which had been ably handled, was surrounded and captured entire. The career of the enemy, however, was now checked by the firmness of the Twentieth Massachusetts under Captain Patten, who executed a change of front with remarkable coolness, courage and skill. The broken corps was at length rallied. Miles’ reserve biigade of Bar- low’s division was brought up; Clark’s New Jersey battery on the right of the Jerusalem road withstood successfully the concentrated fire of the enemy ; Gibbon’^ division, or rather what was left of it, was also rallied, and the beginning of a new line was soon formed. It was now towards evening. After an unsuccessful effort made by Gibbon to capture the lost battery, Meade came to the front. Observing that the enemy’s troops were not in sufficient number to cope with his own if well handled, Meade again sent forward the Second and Sixth corps. The Sixth met with little oppo- sition, and attained the position aimed at earlier in the day. The Second corps went through the woods in strong skirmishing lines, and succeeded, though not without some effort, in regaining a parjj of the ground from which it had beeni driven. It then went into intrench- ments, and passed the night in throwing up works and placing batteries for the protection of the line. The division of Griffin also came up and covered the right. The loss sustained in this un- fortunate and unskilfully managed affair was principally in prisoners, some 2000 having been taken by the enemy, including 50 or 60 officers; the numbei of killed and wounded was only about 500. Four guns also were lost and several colors. Picket firing was kepi up all night, as tlie last advance had placed the opposing lines in close prox- imity. A reconnoissance and advance SKIRMISHING AND CANNONADING. 745 made at daylight, disclosed the fact that the Confederates were strongly in- trenched along the east side of the Weldon Railroad. To the east of Pe- tersburg a sharp artillery and musketry fire was kept up all night; but on neither side was an advance attempted. On the 23d, Wright moving out to the extreme left, found that the enemy’s lines did not extend far in that direction. June ^ reconnoitring force to 23. the railroad, which was reached mthout opposition, and the telegraph wires were cut. The Vermont brigade, consisting of three regiments, was at once pushed forward with instructions to hold the road ; but the troops had hardly reached their destination when a division of the enemy under Anderson came down upon their flank and drove them back, capturing several hundred prisoners, and then, flushed with success, after pushing back the Vermont brigade to the main body, commenced a general attack. The result w^as that Wright withdrew his line towards evening to the cover of breast- works. Little else of importance occurred during the day. On the 24th the enemy opened a furious artillery fire in front of the Eighteenth corps. At its close, a charge June made by Hoke’s brigade 24, on Stannard’s division of the Tenth corps. The attack fell chiefly on the brigade of Colonel Henry, who, ob- serving that the attacking force was not large, drew in his skirmishers; and Avhen the enemy commenced to run over his lifie-pits, he caused the For- tieth Massachusetts, armed vdth the iSpencer repeating- rifle, to open fire upon them. This, with artillery in flank, easily separated the enemy’s skirmishing line from his reserve; and about 150 prisoners fell into Henry’s hands. On the evening of the same day, Sheridan’s cavaliy was attacked while on the inarch from White House to rejoin the main army. A brigade of infantry was sent to his relief; but the affair was very bloody, and the rear-guard suffered severely. The enemy was beaten off at length ; and the wagon train, several miles in length, was saved, but not before a loss of 500 or 600 had been sus- tained. Sheridan’s force crossed the James in safety on the 25th, four or five miles above Fort Powhatan, at a point where the pontoon bridges could be guarded by gun-boats. During the 25 th the enemy was busily engaged in repairing the Weldon Rail- road, and the National forces in strength- ening them positions. All along the line, owing to the proximity of the opposing pickets, there was skirmishing, with occasional artillery firing, but no serious fighting. About ten o’clock at night a sharp attack was made on the right of the Fifth corps and on the left of the Ninth. It was commenced by a heavy artillery fire, which lasted about an hour, followed by the advance of a strong skirmish line up to the National breast-works ; but the enemy was easily repulsed, and the loss was not great on either side. From the 26th to the 29th, compara- tive quiet prevailed in the camps, broken occasionally by picket firing, skirmishing near the working parties, and desultoiy cannonading. From the front of Smith’s 746 PETERSBURG. corps a 30-pouiider Parrott shell was thrown into the city every five minutes, and with such regularity that it came to be called the Petersburg express.” The earth- works along the National lines underwent constant improvement until they became almost impregnable. About eleven o’clock on the morning of the 27th, the Confederates, much annoyed by the regular fire of the 30- j)Ounder Parrott on the city, opened from their heavy guns on the west side of the Appomattox. The batteries in Smith’s front, where many guns were now in position, opened in reply, and shelled the city, as well as the enemy’s batteries beyond the river, till noon. The opposing pickets along some parts of the line entered into an agreement not to fire u]Don each other, and- the result was an unusual degree of quiet for a little while ; but Birney found it necessary to prohibit the more intimate intercourse which this state of things had a tendency to bring about. By the Second corps on the left, some move- ments were made with the view of guarding against hostile demonstrations on the fiank. Hancock, now convales- cent, resumed command of this corps in the evenino-. At one o’clock in the O morning of the 28th there was a false alarm ; and the Eighteenth corps got under arms. About this time some very heavy siege guns were got into position, and a bombardment of the city was com- menced by bursting a shell over it every quarter of an hour during the night. This fire was continued for some time ; and on the night of the 30th it caused a confiagration in the town The weather. which for many days and nights had been intensely hot, causing great suffering to the men, whether on the march or in camp, now grew a little cooler. The excessive heat had been severely trying to the wounded. The agents of the Sanitary and Christian Commissions availedf themselves of the opportunity afforded by these days of comparative quiet to distribute vegetables and luxu- ries among the troops, and in other ways to contribute to their comfort. In the movement against the Weldon Eailroad, it had been arranged that Wilson and Kautz should co-operate with a strong cavalry force. About two o’clock in the morning of the 2 2d of June, Wilson and Kautz set out from Blackwater Creek, a little south of Prince George Court House. Wilson was in command. The united force numbered 6000 to 8000 men, with 3 batteries of four guns each, half rifled ordinance, and half light 12-pounders, besides a battery of four small mountain howitzers. The col- umn struck the Weldon Eailroad at Eeams’ Station, tore up and burnt the track for several hundi’ed yards, and de- stroyed the water tank, depot and public buildings, as well as a saw’-mill at Dutch Cross Eoads. Moving westward as far as Dinwiddie Court House, the command proceeded northward to the Petersburg and Lynchburg Eailroad, striking it at Sutherland Station, and marching thence westward to Ford’s Station,' about 22 miles from Petersburg, the brigade of Kautz being in the advance. At this point, which was reached before even- ing, several miles of the track were destroyed as well as 2 locomotives and THE BRIDGE AT STAUNTON RIVER. 747 16 cars ; tlie depot and some stores were also burnt. All this was accomplished before midnight, when the command bivouacked. In the morning, about two o’clock, Kautz again set out in advance, and by rapid marching soon left a wide gap between his portion of the column and that under Wilson. His course lay along the railroad in the direction of Burkesville, the point of intersection of the Lynchburg and Danville railroads. He reached Wilson’s Station about four o’clock. Black and White about seven o’clock, and Nottaway at noon, whence he hurried on to Burkesville. At this place the depots, cars, and similar prop- erty were destroyed, as well as sev- eral miles of the track eastward and westward. The railroad here was con- structed of strap rails laid on longitu- dinal stringers of dry yellow pine. While the the rear was engaged in burning and otherwise destroying the depots and other buildings along the road, advanced parties collected dry rails, piled them up against the stringers and set the whole on fire. This was done with so much method and celerity that miles of the railroad were burning at once. The main part of the column, some miles in the rear, near Nottaway Court House, encountered about three o’clock in the afternoon a Confederate force on its right flank, consisting of two regi- ments under Colonel Barringer and General Hearing. The Second brigade, under Colonel Chapman, was formed in June ^ sharp fight ensued, 23. which lasted till nightfall, when the enemy withdrew, carrying off 34 prisoners. The loss on each side was about 60. Wilson’s troops bivouacked at Nottaway ; Kautz bivouacked not far from Burkesville. Both commands marched t(^wards Meherrin in the morn- ing — Wilson’s across the country, Kautz’s along the railroad — formed a junction there, and moved on to Keys- ville, where the column bivouacked for the night, Kautz’s men having worked hard all day on the railroad, of which they destroyed 18 miles of the track besides other railroad property. The march and the work of destruction were resumed early on the 25th ; and the whole column pressed rapidly forward till about three o’clock in the afternoon, when the advance came up to the cov- ered bridge over the Staunton Biver. From Burkesville to this bridge, a dis- tance of about 35 miles, the railroad track had been thoroughly destroyed Eastward of Burkesville the track had also been torn up, making an aggre- gate of 50 miles of railroad put out of running order. It was very desir- able that the bridge also should be destroyed, as it would consume much time to replace it. But the Confederates were well aware of its value ; and while Wilson and Kautz had been destroying the track, they had collected in the neighborhood of the brids^e a consider- able force of Virginia and North Carolina militia, some of whom had been brought up from Danville. They had also made such good use of their time as to throw up intrenchments in front of the bridge, and construct earth- works, in which they had placed some artillery. They had besides, placed a 748 PETERSBURG. piece of ordnance on an armored car, ^ 7 hicll could be moved on the railroad. On tbe approach of the National troops June the enemy opened fire with grape and canister. Kautz’s four regi- ments at once deployed on the right and left of the main road. Sharp skirmish- ing, with considerable loss on the side of Kautz, was kept up for some time ; but it soon became evident that under the circumstances the National troops could accomplish nothing without suf- fering .disastrously; and they were compelled to withdraw, after having burnt The railroad depot. The chief object of the raid had, however, been now accomplished ; and at night the column moved eastward reaching Weylsburg, about daylight on the 26th. After an hour’s halt the line of march was again taken up, the route chosen for the return lying through Christianville and across Meherrin Creek, and thence to Double Bridges on the No tt a way. The enemy’s cavalry brigade again appeared, this time on the left flank, and some unimportant skirmishing followed. The Nottaway River was reached about noon on the 28th at Double Bridges ; and the pickets stationed there were easily driven across the bridge by McIntosh’s second bri- gade, which was in the advance. It had been intended to cross the Weldon Railroad at Jarrett’s Station ; but infor- mation having been received that a large force composed of militia and reg- ulars from Weldon had been collected there, the route was changed to Stony Creek, about midway between Jarrett’s and Reams’ stations. McIntosh’s bri- gade wdth the Second Ohio and Third Indiana, dashing across the biidge, met at once a spirited resistance. Never- theless the men all got over, and Mc- Intosh formed line of battle ; but a considerable Confederate force was found lying on the road to the station. After spme skirmishing, the National troops found it necessary to act on the defensive ; and they got together as rapidly as possible a breast- work of rails, logs, and eai-th, in the usual manner. It was not long before they had to repel several charges. Wilson, now fearing that if he remained long in that vicinity the ene- my might gather about him a force from which he could not escape, deter- mined to withdraw ; and about eleven at night he sent off the command of Kautz with the wagons and ammunition trains, and between 1000 and 200) negroes, collected on the march, towards Reams’ Station. Wilson himself fol- lowed before daylight with the remain- der of his force, with the exception of 3 regiments left in the intrenchments to do what they could towards detain- ing the enemy. Kautz, on approaching Reams’ Station, found the Confederates posted in great strength, and was at once pressed in front and rear by both cavalry and artillery. When Wilson came up with the bulk of 29. his force, he attempted to form line of battle ; but he was very soon attacked and defeated, and his entire force thrown into confusion. Of course the detach- ment left at Stony Point could not long hold out ; it was flanked and pai*tly cut off. The situation of Wilson’s column RETURN OF WILSON’S CAVALRY. 749 now became extremely critical; it was almost entirely surrounded by a greatly superior force; and it soon became a question, not wbetber tbe National cav- alry could bold their ground, but whether they could not be captured in a body. The plan finally adopted, per- haps the best under the circumstances, was for each regiment or squadron to make its escape separately as it best could. Kautz turned otf nearly due south with his command. Detachments moved in various directions ; and a general stampede was made for the lines near Petersburg, over ditches and fences, through swamps and woods, and along concealed by-paths, to escape the fiercely pursuing foe, who chased the fugitives close up to the National lines. On the night of the 28th, the main part of Kautz’s command reached the picket reserve in a state of terrible exhaustion and excitement, and remained there through the night. They did not reach their old camp till the evening of the 30th. Squads and solitary horsemen continued to straggle back within the lines for two or three days. Badly as Kautz’s troops had fared, they might have had much worse fortune had it not been for their commander’s intimate knowledge of the country, which en- abled him to get his men through rapid- ly. But they were all thoroughly used up, some of the men coming in asleep in their saddles. Wilson was so long without being heard from, that it was feared he had been captured with all his men. The main part of his force did not ride in till the 1st of July. He had retreated in the night by the road leading south- eastward towards Suffolk, and making a wide circuit, secured safety at the ex- pense of a long route. He crossed the Nottaway about 30 miles from Peters- burg, and the Blackwater at the County Boad bridge; turning then northward he made his way to Cabin Point, and rode thence into the Union lines about 5 miles from Fort Powhatan. His entire force was in wretched plight when it returned. Both men and horses were worn out and jaded to the last degree. Their clothing and accoutrements were torn and spoiled, and their horses hardly able to walk. They had lost their all. The enemy had got possession of the entire wagon train — 16 guns, nearly all their caissons, and many horses. The total loss in men was about 1500. Of the large number of negroes collected, the greater part were recaptured. The ambulances, filled with sick and wound- ed, had been left on the field at Beams’ Station, under a hospital flag. Notwith- standing the unfortunate termination of the expedition. Grant expressed himself satisfied with the result, inasmuch as the Danville Bailroad had received so much damage that considerable time must elapse before it could be restored to working order. The Sixth corps, which had set out for Beams’ Station in the hope of relieving General Wilson’s force, did not arrive until all was over. The Confederates had disappeared from that point; and the troops took advantage of their absence to destroy the railroad and telegraph for some miles. Many fugitive negroes, who had followed 750 PETERSBURG. Wilson’s cavalry, took refuge with the Sixth corps. It was now the 1st of July. Little of moment occurred during the day in the lines before Petersburg. About ten July o’clock, however, a heavy musket- 1. ry fire from the Confederates broke out in front of the Ninth corps, followed presently by a charge upon an earth-work which General Ledlie had for some days been engaged in throwing up. After a sharp but short conflict the Confederates were driven back with considerable loss, as the posi- tion was well defended by flanking batteries. The firing continued at in- tervals through the night. About three o’clock in tlie afternoon of the 2d of July a sharp artillery fire was opened by the enemy on the line of the Eight- eenth corps, and was warmly responded to by the National batteries. This con- tinued for about two hours, without any important result. On the evening of the 3d there was some firing on the rio:ht centre. The Fourth of July was celebrated in the lines before Petersburg by a national salute of 34 shots from a 30- pounder Parrott in front of Smith’s position, followed by a general play of artillery on the steeples of Petersburg. The military bands also played national airs all along the line. Comparative quiet reigned until the 7th, when a battery of heavy guns in front of the Fifth corps opened fire upon a body of Confederates who were observed to be throwing up a new work. A general cannonading and afire of sharp- shooters followed. In the morning and early part of the 8th there was little firing. About four 8. o’clock in the afternoon however, the Confederates springing suddenly to their feet, with their accustomed battle- yell, poured a volley of musketry into the intrenchments in front of Turner’s division, on the left of the Eighteenth corps. They then quickly deployed a skirmishing line, and moved raj)idly on the works along the front of Martindale and Stannard. The entire space be- tween^the opposing lines was soon cov- ered with a dense cloud of mingled smoke and dust ; and the musketry fir- ing was very sharp for a time ; but the enemy was driven back without having reached the breast- works. In the mean time the batteries all along the front of the three corps on the right were open- ed; and shot and shell were thrown not only into the space which the Con- federates had attempted to ci-oss, but into the city and over the Appomattox. The superior weight of metal of the National batteries soon overpowered those of the enemy. The' loss in this affair was not very great on either side, although the Confederates got the worst of it, as they were uncovered in their unsuccessful charge, while their oppo- nents were well protected. The cannon- ading was all over at dusk. After this, there was again for some days a pause in the fight. It ^\as not until the 18th, that hostilities took again any very active shape. On that day, a 13 -inch mortar, which after some difficulty had been got into posi- tion in front of the Eighteenth coi-ps, began to throw its huge shells into the THE MINE. 751 enemy's works. On the following day there was steady artillery firing in front of the Ninth and Eighteenth corps as well as from the batteries of the Fifth. A heavy rain, the first of any account since the army left Spottsylvania Court House, began to fall early in the morn- ing, and continued all day and into the night. Its cheering influence on the army was of great value. There was enough of it to lay and thoroughly penetrate the dust, which owing to the long-continued drought and the ceaseless tread of many feet, had become several inches deep in the camps. On the same day General Grant rescinded an order of the War Depart- ment by which General Butler was relieved of his command. Grant not only restored Butler, but in addition to the Tenth and Eighteenth corps, he gave him command of the Nineteenth corps, just arrived at Fortress Monroe from the South, and of which General Emory’s division had gone to aid in the defense of Washington. Not long after this, General Smith was relieved of the command of the Eighteenth corps, and was succeeded temporarily by General Martindale, and then permanently by General Ord. General Gillmore also, who had been relieved of the command of the Tenth corps, was succeeded temporarily by Generals Brooks and Terry, and permanently by General Birney, formerly of the Second corps. About ten o’clock in the forenoon of the 20th, the fire of the 13-inch mortar was directed across the river. This was responded to by a concentrated artillery fire from the enemy, which in its turn was replied to by the National 30- pounders and 8-inch mortars, togetht*!* with the light batteries. This lasted four hours without any important result. The Confederates had estab- lished a battery of Whitworth guns at Strawberry Plains, about a mile from the pontoon bridge over the James, from which they were able to deliver an enfilading fire on the gun-boats, and had disabled the Mendota. A Maine regi- ment was moved out to occupy the position, which it succeeded in doing on the 21st, but was driven out of it again at night. With the help of the gun-boats, the Nationals quickly recov- ered the position. Cannonading was kept up for the next four or five days ; but there was no general engagement. At this date there was completed an important work which had been commenced by Burnside just a 26. month before, and when the conviction had been forced upon the National commanders by the disastrous repulse of several storming columns, that the defenses around Petersburg were im- pregnable against direct assault. This was nothing less than a great mine which had been constructed under one of the most important of the enemy’s works. The idea of this mine originated with Lieutenant-Colonel Pleasants, of the Forty-Eighth Pennsylvania, who, as well as many men of his regiment, had been familiar with mining operations before the war. To the men of this regiment the construction of the mine was intrusted and by them completed. The work of excavation was begun on the 25th of June, with the utmost 752 PETERS BUEG. precautions as to secrecy, in the side of a ravine surmounted by an earth- work in front of the position of the Ninth corps, and was perseveringly pushed on towards the doomed fort, situated about 2000 yards from the city. The distance to be mined was about 500 feet. The mine was .constructed in the usual manner, the surface having been first carefully measured by tri angulation. As the excavation went on, the earth was brought out and thrown on works, so as not to give rise to inquiries by being allowed to accumulate in great heaps. The gallery was made in the usual shape, about 4 feet wide at the bottom and sloping upwards so as to be narrower at the top. The height was about 4i feet. The ground rose towards the fort, and the tunnel was so cut as to slope in an up- ward direction. Difficulties in the shape of water and quicksands were encounter- ed and overcome, th ough the mine remain- ed very damp. When the locality of the foi*t was reached, there was only about 20 feet of the earth intervening; and the sound could be distinctly heard overhead of the nailing of planks and timbers, indicating that the occupants of the fort were making a floor for their artillery. Wings were then extended to the right and left, in which 8 magazines were formed, 4 in each gallery, carefully tamped ” or separated by packings of sand-bags and wood. Wooden pipes were laid along the tunnel to within 100 feet of the magazines. The ventila- tion of the mine was effected by sinking, just within the exterior line of works to the side of the tunnel, a shaft, at the bottom of which a fireplace was built with a grating opening into the gallery, and by means of a fire kept burning at this point a current of air was caused. The smoke issuing from the top of the shaft of course could not be concealed, but attention was diverted from it by keeping fires at various places along the line. Finally, when all was complete, the chanj3ers were charged with about four tons of gunpowder. To keep the enemy from obtaining a knowledge of what was going on, intercourse between the opposing picket lines was strictly prohibited; and an incessant skirmishing and artillery fire was kept up in front of the Ninth corps, even while all along the rest of the line there was compara- tive inaction. The plan of assault w^as, to explode the mine and immediately afterwards open a cannonade from all the guns along the line, numbering nearly 100. Then, before the enemy could recover from the confusion and dismay which would be naturally created by the explosion and sudden burst of a tremendous artillery fire, a strong storming party was to rush through the gap which it was supposed would be made in the line of the enemy’s works, and endeavor to carry the position beyond — a very strongly fortified crest, called Cemetery Hill, completely com- manding the city, and the key of the enemy’s position. The National lines had for a long time been gradually pushed forward till they were now not more than 150 yards distant from those of the enemy, the nearest point being the undermined fort. The inter- vening space was swept by the enemy’s THE FEIN^T AT DEEP BOTTOM. 753 artillery; and near the fort itself abatis and various other entanglements had been placed. To add to the probability of success, Grant determined, before exploding the mine and commencing the assault, to induce Lee to draw off a large propor- tion of his troops from Petersburg by making a feint in another direction. With this end in view he began a series of movements which indicated a design to transfer operations to the neighbor- hood of Richmond. Grant’s line at this time was not less than 20 miles long. On its extreme right, across the James at Deep Bottom, just above Four Mile Creek, Foster, with his division of the Tenth corps, had been for a long time in possession of an intrenched camp — a position of considerable im- portance, since, so long as it was held, the enemy could neither make a demon- stration on the National right flank from Malvern Plills, which they still occupied, nor any successful attempt to obtain on the James a position from which it would be possible to blockade the river. It also constituted an excel- lent base for an advance on Richmond from the southeast, by three parallel roads, and thus served admirably for the feint now about to be made in that di- rection. A pontoon bridge, thoroughly protected by gun-boats, lay across the James in the rear of Foster’s position ; but in his front was a large force of the enemy, effectually barring any advance on his part. About a mile and a half below the position of Foster, at Straw- berry Plains, also held by a small National force, a second pontoon bridge was thrown across the river on the 21st of July, and on the following day a bri- gade of the Nineteenth corps crossed by it and secured the bridge head. The Confederates made a large addition to their force in front of Foster’s posi- tion ; and on the 26th there was in that direction rapid and heavy artillery and musketry firing, in which the gun-boats took part. Skirmishing also was con- tinued through the day by Foster’s infantry, with a loss of about 50 men. In the the mean time, at four o’clock in the afternoon of the 26th, the Second corps quietly began to march from its position on the extreme left of the line before Petersburg, soon followed by Sheridan’s cavalry, which had been lying in camps around its flank and rear The column moved very rapidly with out straggling — Barlow’s division first, Mott’s and Gibbon’s next, to Point of Rocks on the Appomattox — and crossed the river early in the evening. The march was then continued to the James, which was reached by midnight at Jones’ Neck, and before daylight the crossing began by the pontoon bridge, which had been covered with grass and hay, to prevent noise. The cavalry followed soon after daybreak, and passed the infantry on the New Market road. A line of battle was then formed, in which the cavalry of Sheridan and Kautz held the right. The Second corps lay at Strawberry Plains, the brigade of the Nineteenth corps on its left, with Foster in his old position at Deep Bottom on the extreme left. In front of the Second corps lay a body of the enemy under General 754 PETERSBURG. Kershaw, along a road skirting a pine forest, and in rifle-pits, with a battery of four 20-pounder Parrott guns. Up to this position from near the bridge ran a road, by which the Second corps, about July seven o’clock, began to advance, 27. the skirmishers spreading out across the open space in front of the enemy, while the gun-boat Mendota in the stream opened fire with her 100- pounder Parrotts. A rapid fire was opened at the same time from the en- emy’s batteiy. In the mean time, how- ever, Miles with his brigade of Barlow’s division, having made a rapid movement under cover, got on the flank of the enemy’s position and made a brisk charge. Kershaw immediately retreat- ed, abandoning his battery, which proved to be one taken from Butler at Drury’s Bluff two months before. On the 28th, the troops north of the James continued to make demonstra- tions; and the gun-boats occasionally shelled the woods. At nine o’clock in the morning a general advance of the cavalry was ordered ; and after a march of three miles, Sheridan came upon a strong infantry force. His command then quickly dismounted and formed j„iy in a belt of woods, Greggs’ divi- 28. sion on the right, Torbert’s on the left. Torbert’s division on being attacked fell back into the woods, but was soon rallied; and the brigades of Merritt and Davies making a charge, the enemy broke and left the field, after losing about 150 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides the colors of two North Carolina regiments. Gregg’s division, losing a gun and many men. was steadily forced back until about five o’clock in the afternoon, when it was relieved by the arrival of Gibbon’s di- vision of the Second corjps. The demon- strations were continued on the 29th; and a train of about 400 empty wagons was sent over one of the pontoon bridges to the north side of the James, as if an advance in great force towards Malvern Hills were intended. Nearly 20,(500 men and 20 cannon had now actually been sent over; and the suspicions of the enemy were aroused at last to such an extent as to produce the effect desired by Grant. Lee hurried off from Peters- burg a large force to the Bichmond side of the James; and as early as the even- ing of the 28th, Mott’s division of the Second corps was secretly moved back to Petersburg. After dark the remain- der of that corps and all the cavalry recrossed the river, and marching all night arrived before daybreak in the lines before Petersburg. The time for the explosion of the mine had now come. Soon aftei* mid- night of the 29th all the troops were got into position. The Ninth corps, which was to head the assault, was drawn up in front of the mine, Ledlie’s division in the advance, Willcox’s and Pottei^’s next, in support, and Ferrero’s consisting of colored troops, in the rear. The Eighteenth corjjs, had been with- drawn from its position on the light of the Ninth corps and posted in its rear. Mott’s division of the Second corps, just returned from the north side of the James, was moved into the position vacated by the Eighteenth coiqis ; and the other divisions of the Second coiqis INSIDE THE CRATER. 755 as they arrived were placed in adjoin- ing positions. The whole force was closely massed, only the necessary gar- risons being left in the more distant iiitrenchments. Thus the assaulting force consisted of the Ninth corps sup- ])orted by the Eighteenth, with the Second corps in reserve on the right and the Fifth on the left. The cavalry were to operate on the left if opportun- ity should offer. The time for lighting the fuse was fixed at half-past three in the morning of the 30th ; and the troops at that hour were in entire readiness, impatiently awaiting orders. At the appointed moment the fuse was lit; but the mine did not explode. The fuse was imperfect. It had been spliced in two places ; and at one of the splices, the fire had stopped. Two brave men who had faith in the mine, and who had toiled at it night and day under Pleasants, volunteered to go in and apply the match afresh. Grant and Meade were at the front. It is now ten minutes to five o’clock. The earth ill the neighborhood trembles ; and then ^vith a tremendous explosion, what seems a conical mountain rises in the air, streaked and serried with lightning. For a moment, it hangs poised; and then the beholder sees in mid air, tim- ber, stone, earth, bodies and limbs of men, and some of the heavy guns of the work. Two hundred men, many of them still asleep, had been blown into fragments. It was a horrible, shocking ' alYair. So soon as the mass fell to earth, 100 guns opened fire upon that living Golgotha. liCt us now see what advantage was gained by the desperate but not wholly unjustifiable experiment. Success de- pended entirely upon rapidity of action. A huge gateway had been opened to Cemetery Ridge, and thence into Peters- burg. But where is the storming col- umn? Ledlie’s division which had been selected by lot was slow to move. When it did move, it halted in the centre for at least an hour. Ferrero who with his colored troops was to follow Ledlie, could not advance, as the crater was choked. Burnside was ordered to move forward all his troops ; but still there was delay. Ord, now in command of the Eighteenth corps, was peremptorily ord- ered by Meade to press into the gap ; but he declared it to be impracticable ; and no doubt, he spoke the truth. There was no other way by which the troops could advance, except by the crater, and that was now crowded, literally blocked. The scene inside the crater, when first entered by the Nationals, is not to be described. It was a Pandemonium of horror. In the huge chasm, some 200 feet long, 60 feet wide, and 30 feet deep, were scattered the debris of the work, with the torn and tattered frag- ments of human beings. Some of the more fortunate victims were half -buried and piteously calling for help. Not a few were calling for water ; and the cry was general “Yanks, for God’s sake, take me out ; I’ll do as much for you some time.” In such a scene of chaos and agony, it is not to be wondered at if the National soldiers, left for the most part without competent leaders, should have halted, and yielded to the claims of humanity. The halting PETERSBURG. 75 >3 however, was ruinous ; for it gave the Confederates time to recover from the alarm and stupor occasioned by the explo- sion ; ^nd the well directed fire of the guns on Cemetery Kidge falling upon the now unfortunate Nationals aggravated the horrors of that scene of agony and death. It was impossible to advance ; it was impossible to retire ; and the officers who were present had no longer any control. The carnage was frightful. It was not a valley of the Shadow^ of Death. It was a valley of Death itself. As early as nine o’clock, Burnside was directed to withdraw his troops at pleasure. It was two o’clock before the order was carried out and not until General Bartlett who led the attack, had been captured with the greater portion of his staff. The mine had proved a great and sorrowful failure. Although no new thing in war, it was a barbarous conception ; and success through such a channel would hardly have been glory. The National loss was about 5000, while that of the Confederates, includ- ing 200 prisoners, did not much exceed July 10^^* On Sunday, the 31st, a 31 . flag of truce was sent to the ene- my with a request for permission to bury the dead and care for the wounded ; but owing to an informality this was not obtained till Monday, when an armistice took place in the morning from five till nine. In the mean time many of the severely wounded died from exposure, in great suffering, much aggravated by the extremely hot weather ; and the bodies of the slain had become so discolored and swollen from lying in the sun, that the remains of the white men could scarcely bf distinguished from those of the negroes The failure of the mine w^as a great disappointment. It was expected by many that Petersburg w^as about to fall. Grant, himself, shared the disappoint- ment ; but he was not discouraged. As soon’ as the truce was concluded, the firing was resumed. On the 4th of August, Grant left for Washington. On this day also a short engage- ment took place on the James I. between the gun-boats and a battery on the north bank. For five days previous, intercourse between pickets had been prohibited by the enemy. This circum- stance, and the report of deserters that mining was going on, led to suspicions that an attack might be expected. These suspicions proved to be well- founded. About five o’clock on the evening of the 5th, a mine was Aug. fired by the enemy in front of the 5 • Eighteenth corps, and followed up by rapid and continuous musketry firing. But the mine failed, having been exploded several rods outside of the head of a sap it was intended to reach. A considerable mass of earth was throwm into the air; but the dust and smoke had hardly subsided when the National troops were busily engaged pouring volleys into the enemy’s works, from which no charge was made. There was considerable artillery firing for a time ; but the loss was not heavy on either side. On the 9th, about noon, a terrific accidental explosion took place at City Point. An ordnance boat lying at the MAP SHOWING THE POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES NEAR PETERSBURG, VA. DUTCH GAP CANAL. 757 wharf suddenly blew up with a contin- uous roar that was heard in all direc- Aug. for many miles. The cause 9. of the explosion is unknown, but it is supposed to have been the dropping of a case of fixed ammunition. Its effect was most disastrous, in the loss of life, in the number of persons frightfully mutilated, and in the destruction of property. The boat and another near it were blown to fragments. The bluff close by was penetrated by a vast quan- tity of shells, balls, bullets, and frag- ments of various ammunition, and a number of buildings were thrown down. Parts of vessels and houses mingled with limbs and pieces of human bodies were scattered around in all directions; and even the boats on the river did not escape. Between 60 and 70 persons were killed and about 130 were wound- ed. The majority of the sufferers were laborers, many of them colored. The repulse of the National forces in the attack on Cemetery Hill, led to the belief that operations at Petersburg would cease for some time. Grant, however, was not a man to be so easily discouraged. The Confederates had, it is true, constructed near the side of the fort destroyed by means of the mine, a new work, from which they opened fire on the National lines on the 12th of August ; and the defenses of Petersburg were apparently as strong and as perti- naciously defended as they had been two months before. But the war was sustained on the part of the Confederacy only by the most strenuous efforts ; and its armies were kept up to a point at which the defensive could be success- fully maintained only by a conscription of the most ruthless character. The best part of the Southern fighting ele- ment had long been consumed ; and old men and boys now constituted almost the only recruits that could be obtained. None knew this better than General Grant ; and upon this fact he seems to have placed much reliance, and drawn from it encouragement to persevere. He knew that, although the soldiers of the Confederates had no superiors, every battle and skirmish diminished their numbers. He knew also that, although the Confederate government controlled almost the entire resources of the South, they were rapidly wasting away, and that finally the States in rebellion must succumb from sheer exhaustion. A work, which it was supposed would prove of great value, was commenced by Butler about the middle of August. This was the construction of a canal at Hutch Gap, on the James, where a bend in the river, 11 miles south-south east of Bichmond in a direct line, forms a peninsula called Farrar’s Island, con- nected with the north bank by a neck of land about 175 yards wide. A navi- gable channel cut across this neck would save a circuit of not less than 6 miles around the bend. The preliminary survey was made on the 7 th of August, and a large number of workmen com- menced digging soon afterwards. It was Butler’s expectation that this canal, when completed, would prove of im- mense service to the National army. It would, he conceived, be deep enough to allow the passage of large war vessels ; and he felt confident that the iron-clads 758 PETERSBURG. would then be able to ascend to the upper part of the river, without passing by the circuitous channel around the peninsula, which was full of torpe- does, and other obstructions, besides being guarded by Confederate gun-boats, whose usual station was at Dutch Gap. When completed and occupied it would also flank the enemy’s strong and impor- tant position at Howlett’s, opposite the southwestern extremity of Farrar’s Island, from which the jiver was swept at this point with heavy batteries. It would be a long step in the approach to Fort Darling, and would make necessary on the part of the enemy a new and more extended line of defense, and thus find occupation for a large number of their troops. On the 10. 1 0th of August a force was thrown across the river at this point ; and the work was prosecuted with impunity un- til the 12th, when, soon after daybreak, the enemy collected in the vicinity in such force that the National gun-boats opened fire upon him and kept it up several hours. On the following morn- ing two Confederate rams ap^ared, and taking a position under the lee of Farrar’s Island, where they were shel- tered from the fire of the National gun- boats, began to shell the negro troops engaged in digging the canal. The battery at Hewlett’s also opened fire, and was replied to by the National battery at Crow’s Nest, near Dutch Gap. The river being full of obstructions at the extremity of Farrar’s Island, the National gun -boats could not get near enough to take paii; in the engagement. The troops on the isthmus had already thrown up intrenchments along a portion of the line of the proposed canal ; and, though exposed to a fire from Howlett’s battery on the west, and from 2 gun-boats on the north, which contin- ued till noon, they were able to remain at work. A gun at Howlett’s battery was disabled by a shot from that at Crow’s Nest. The enemy showed signs of a determinatio]! to dispute energet- ically the National advance in this di- rection. On the 13th, operations on the canal were covered by another move- ment on the part of Grant, to the north of the James, made in the hope of again inducing Lee to send away a portion of his forces from Petersburg to favor a new movement against the Weldon Railroad. The Second corps, which had been moved up from Petersburg, was put on board of a fleet of transports at City Point; and on the 13th the ves- Aug. sels went down the river, with the bands playing, as if bound for For- tress Monroe. The movement was pur- posely made in an ostentatious manner, in order that it might be noted by the enemy, and cause him to believe that Grant was sending a portion of his forces to Washington. When night fell, the transports were headed up the river, and ascending at full speed soon reached Deep Bottom, where the troops were all put on shore by noon on the following day. On the same night, two divisions of the Tenth corps crossed the James by the pontoon bridge to the same point, as did also Gregg’s cavalry division, and joined Foster in his old position there. Early on the morning STRAWBERRY PLAINS. 759 of the 14tli, Foster’s brigade was moved out towards Strawberry Plains, where the enemy was found strongly posted in intrenchments situated on command- ing ridges covering the Kingsland road, with a line of rifle-pits in front. As the advance pressed forward, considerable skirmishing took place ; but the enemy gradually fell back to the rifle-pits, which at length were charged and easily taken by the Tenth Connecticut and Twenty - Fourth Massachusetts, with about 100 prisoners. The enemy was in the mean time hurrying troops over from his right to the region of Malvern Hills; and it became essential that the National force should form in order of battle, and push forward as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, Gregg’s cavalry swept out to the National right, clearing the roads of the enemy’s pickets, and opening the way for the Second corps. Aug. Most of the day was consumed in 14. getting the troops into position. When the line was formed, the cavalry covered the right flank of the Second corps, which stretched towards the left as far as Four Mile Creek. On the other side was the Tenth corps, its right resting on the creek, its left on the intrenched bluff at Deep Bottom. The gun-boats in the river took such posi- tions that they were able to shell the Confederate works occasionally. An attempt was made to push the whole line forward in the evening. The Tenth corps charging the enemy’s outer works in a line of woods about a mile from the pontoon bridge, after a sharp engage- ment succeeded in carrying them, at the same time capturing four 8-inch brass howitzers and a number of piisoners. In the centre of the line. Gibbon’s and Barlow’s divisions of the Second corps moved out towards the Confederate works, and succeeded in establishing themselves some distance in advance of the position which they had carried in the feint made two weeks before. The assault was now made by Gibbon’s divi- sion, Colonel Macy’s brigade in the advance. Crossing a cornfield and going over a hill, they descended into a ravine, where a stream, flowing through swampy land and thick brush, formed an impene- trable barrier. The charge was made under a severe artillery fire of the enemy, which also raked the ravine. Natural obstacles rendering any further progress impossible, the men availed themselves of what shelter they could find, and after a short time were with- drawn. The entire loss sustained by the Tenth and Second corps was about 1000 men. Skirmishing was kept up all day on the 15th, the object being to extend the line to the right and secure a stronger position. The Tenth corps was moved across Four Mile Creek and placed on the right of the Second, the 15 . cavalry in the mean time covering the right flank and skirmishing. Holding a position on the Charles City Boad, they confronted there detachments of the enemy’s cavalry, which with other reinforcements had been hurried over from Petersburg during the preceding day and night. Supposing that Grant was threatening Malvern Hills, the enemy’s infantry was pushed as rapidly as possible in that direction, while his PETERSBURG. :60 cavalry was kept on the roads lead- ing northwestward towards Kichmond. There was constant manoeuvring and heavy skirmishing during the day, in the course of which about 300 men were killed or wounded on the part of the Nationals, without any important advantage having been gained. The intense and debilitating heat during this and the preceding day not only had a very depressing effect on the troops, but caused some loss by sunstroke and exhaustion. More decided efforts were made to Aug. advance on the 16th. Gregg’s 16. cavalry stretching out on the Charles City Road, on the extreme right, covered that flank. On his left was Colonel Craig’s brigade of Mott’s divi- sion of the Second corps ; then came the Tenth corps and the remainder of the Second. The extreme left at Deep Run was held by colored troops. The region in which the movements were about to take place was covered with dense forest and undergrowth, with only here and there a small cleared space. To the difficulties thus presented to the man- oeuvres of troops was added the intense heat of the day, which was one of the most sultry and oppressive of the season. The earliest movement was made by the cavalry of Gregg; along the Charles City Road as far as Deep Bottom Creek or Deep Run, where he was joined by a brigade of Barlow^’s division under Miles. Further progress was disputed by a brigade of Fitz Hugh Lee’s cavalry, which, how^ever, was quickly driven back wdth the loss of its commander, who w^as killed while attempting to rally his men. The column then pushed forward on the same road near to White’s Tavern, not more than 7 miles from Richmond, where the enemy was found intrenched in a position too strong to justify attack. Miles then withdrew his brigade towards the right of the main lin^ under Birney, marching back by the route which he had taken in advancing. On seeing this, the enemy, collecting from various quarters a con- siderable force at White’s Tavern, moved rapidly down upon Gregg’s command in the afternoon, and drove it back to Deep Run, where Gregg made a stand, and easily maintained himself for some time. Meanwhile there had been some very sharp fighting on the centre of the line. Terry’s division of the Tenth corps pushed forward into the wooded region between the Central and Charles City roads, Foster’s brigade in front. Pond’s and Hawley’s in support, with Craig’s brigade of the Second corps on the right. After a toilsome march under a burning sun, over ground much broken with ravine and jungle, the en- emy’s picket line was at last found and driven in. Artillery firing followed, and some slight works and a few pris- oners were captured. The main works were then charged upon by Pond’s brigade, supported by Hawley’s and some colored troops ; and after an hour’s hard and close fighting at short range in the dense woods, in which the loss on both sides was severe, the intrench- ments were carried, 200 prisoners being taken and some colors. The National troops then occupied the intrenchments and prepared to hold them against the DEEP BOTTOM. 761 Confederates should they return in force. About this time Colonel Craig with his brigade was despatched to the assistance of Gregg’s cavalry, which the enemy, having received reinforcements, was driving back rapidly. In the en- gagement which followed, Craig was killed ; and his brigade, partly in con- sequence of this, being throAvn into con- fusion, fell back, losing many prisoners. The cavalry and infantry on the right having now given way, the Confederates concentrated their efforts against the infantry in the centre, upon which they made a series of desperate assaults, and at length got possession of the works which had been won from them with such hard fighting ; and notwithstanding that Birney, about six o’clock, made an effort to regain them, they held the position. Having succeeded in forcing back the right, the enemy was now able to direct an enfilading fire on the centre ; and the whole National line w'-as with- drawn at dark, having sustained during the day a loss of some 1500 men, that of the enemy being nearly as great. The line at night was substantially the same as it had been in the morning. While these events were taking place on the right, Major Ludlow, at Dutch Gap, moved out about 1000 men on trans- ports to Aiken’s Landing, and marched thence to Cox’s Ferry, two or three miles above Dutch' Gap, where he in- trenched. On the afternoon of the following day, Howlett’s battery and a Confederate ram opened fire on the men engaged in digging the canal, which was replied to by the battery at Crow’s Nest and by the monitors. After dark, Ludlow seeing that he would not be able to maintain himself in his advanced position at Cox’s Ferry, withdrew his troops and returned to his old position at Dutch Gap. On the 17th, there was little or no fighting on the right. Between four and six in the afternoon, the killed of the day before were buried under a fiag of truce, each party taking charge of its own dead. The 18th also was quiet in the immediate neighborhood of Deep Bottom ; but at night a fierce assault was made on the intrenchments of the Tenth corps, by a division of the enemy, who charged in column on a portion of the line held by Terry’s division and Aug. W. Birney’s colored brigade. 18. The firing was very close and very heavy for an hour, but the Confederates were repulsed with a loss of not less than 1000 men. On the 19th, there was some skirmishing, but no general engagement. The aggregate National loss in this second demonstration, at Deep Bottom, was estimated at not less than 5000 ; that of the enemy at 3000. But the movement had answered its purpose; and the troops were rapidly marched back to the lines before Peters- burg, a division of the Second corps arriving there by the morning of the 20 th. Little of importance occurred at Petersburg while the bloody struggle was going on in the neighborhood of Deep Bottom. Artillery and picket firing went on till the evening of the 15th, when it was suspended for a short time by an extraordinary rain storm, which swept away many tents and 762 PETERSBURG. sutlers' booths and flooded the trenches. On the morning of the 18th, at one o’clock, the enemy opened a tremendous fire all along the line, and continued it for two hours ; but no assault followed. About an hour after the cannonading ceased, operations against the Weldon Railroad were commenced by the move- ment of the Fifth corps in that direction. Leaving camp with four day’s rations, the march was directed towards Reams’ Station; and between seven and eight, the advance arrived at Six Mile Station, near which a mile of the track was torn up, and the rails destroyed. Little opposition was experienced during this movement, which was quite unexpected by the enemy; and while the first divi- sion under Griffin was engaged in destroying the railroad track, the other divisions advanced two or three miles towards Petersburg, driving in the skir- mishers. At Yellow Tavern, about ten o’clock, the column encountered a bri- gade of cavalry, which was driven back as far as Davis’ Farm, two and a half miles from Petersburg. But at this point a force of the enemy, consisting of two divisions of Hill’s coiq)s under Heth and Mahone, came hurrying down the railroad. The National line was immediately formed in the open field, the Third division under Crawford on the right of the railroad, and the Second Aug. under Ayres on the left. About 18. two o’clock the enemy emerged from the woods in front and made an impetuous charge. For a time the two divisions under Crawford and Ayres got the worst of it, and were driven half a mile down the railroad ; but the Fourth division under Cutler and some other troops coming up, the Nationals were enabled to stretch out around and were successful in flanking the enemy’s left. This turned the tide of battle ; and the Confederates were finally repulsed. The contest was over before dark ; and the National troops immediately went to work throwing up breast-works. Although heavy rain fell at night, and the enemy, fearing another attack, thi’ew shells into the lines from midnight till daybreak, the National troops were found strongly intrenched on the rail- road 2i miles south of Petersburg. The loss on the part of the Nationals, inclu- ding 160 prisoners, was somewhat over 1000; that of the Confederates, in- cluding 30 prisoners, was, by their own account, only about 500. The Fifth corps had thus secured an intrenched position on the Weldon Rail- road. It was not likely, however, that the Confederates would allow it to be quietly retained. If left isolated, the troops would very soon be driven off or surrounded and captured. It was thus of the utmost importance, that this new position on the extreme left should be connected with the main line before Petersburg; and reinforcements were accordingly set in motion. The enemy having withdrawn nearer to the city during the night, leaving only a picket line in front, the National skirmishers were pushed forward early, on the morn- ing of the 19th. The whole line fol- lowed, throwing up breast-works as they proceeded, and planting batteries to strengthen the advanced position. This went on without opposition till about THE WELDON RAILROAD. 763 ten o’clock, when a short skirmish occurred in front of the picket lines on the right, at which point the enemy was reconnoitring. The troops had all got into line about noon ; but a portion of the gap between the right of the Fifth coi-ps and the old line of intrenchments near the Jerusalem road still remained unoccupied. The new line when ar- ranged stood as follows : Willcox’s diWs- ion of the Ninth corps having just arrived held the extreme right; then came a brigade of Cutler of the Fifth corps; then Crawford; then Ayres; then on the extreme left Griffin’s division and the remainder of Cutler’s. The railroad ran between the divisions of Ayres and Aug, Crawford. About four o’clock, 11b heavy rain falling at the time. General A. P. Hill broke suddenly upon the line, with both divisions of his corps, under Mahone and Heth. Mahone, having with him the brigades of Cling- man and Colquitt as well as his own, attacked the right with great fury, first striking the picket line, which consisted of Bragg’s brigade. The advanced regi- ment was quickly driven back from the cornfield where it had been posted, to the National breast-works, losing many men. The enemy had discovered the gap at this part of the line, and rushed through it like a torrent, thus getting between the divisions of Willcox and Crawford. Desperate artillery and musketry fighting ensued. But Will- cox’s brigades were kept closely massed, Hartranft on the right, Humphrey on the left ; and they remained unbroken. Hill then, while keeping Willcox and Crawford occupied in front with Cling- man’s and Mahone’s brigades, des- patched part of Colquitt’s brigade to drive in that under Bragg. After des- perate fighting this was accomplished, and the right of Crawford’s division, where Lyle was posted, was completely flanked. Colquitt, joined by other forces, succeeded in getting a front, flank, and rear fire on a part of Craw- ford’s division, the consequence of which was that more than 1500 men, compris ing nearly the whole of Hartshorn’s bri- gade and part of Lyle’s and Wheelock’s, were cut off and captured. While this was occurring on the right of the railroad, the divisions on the left under Ayres, Griffin, and Cutler were attacked by the troops under Heth. The advance of the Confederates was made with great impetuosity; the Na- tional picket line was driven in, and the advanced intrenchments were soon taken; but at the second and main line the Confederates received a bloody repulse, not, however, before Hayes’ brigade of regulars, who had held their post with great firmness, were badly cut up. The line on their right and left having been forced back; they became exposed to an enfilading fire, and sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded, besides 500 or 600 captured. Among the captured and wounded was General Hayes. Very opportunately, just at the time when the right centre had become broken and the centre was giving way, the First and Second divisions of the Ninth coip)s under Potter and White came up. Although they had made a long and toilsome forced march over roads now reduced to mud by the late 704 PETERSBURG. heavy rains, they were immediately formed and sent in on the charge ; and the enemy was overlapped and turned. In the meantime the battle had become so confused on Crawford’s right that the combatants could not be distin- guished ; and the artillery now directed on that point, swept down friend and foe alike. The result was, that the contest, was decided against the Confed- erates ; and the disordered lines of the National troops were soon rallied. Night, however, had fallen before the battle was entirely over. The National loss in killed and wounded was esti- mated at 1500. The Confederates had lost about the same number. In pris- oners they lost not more than 250, while they captured, mostly from the divisions of Ayres and Crawford, not less than 2700, including 9 field officers and 60 or 70 line officers. On the following day, the 20th, there was some cannonading, but no general fighting. On the 21st the enemy made another effort to recover the W eldon Kail- 21. road. The National line lay sub- stantially as it did on the 19th, the first three divisions of the Ninth corps holding the right and the Fifth corps the left. Cutler’s division lay across the railroad, Crawford’s being on its right, Griffin’s and Ayres’ on its left. At four o’clock in the morning the Confederates opened a heavy artillery fire along the whole line, from the left to the Appomattox, and about seven o’clock made a feint towards the Ninth corps. At nine the attack commenced in earnest, with a terrific fire of both solid shot and shell from all their bat- teries, which was replied to with at least equal power. Shortly afterwards the enemy’s column emerged from -the woods and dashed in fine style across the open space in front of the National breast- works. It was intended that the attack should be made in two columns, one in front, the other in flank ; but the flanking column on the left of the rail- road, instead of striking the extreme left, under Griffin, fell upon the right of Ayres’ division and the left of Cutler’s. The National skirmishers were soon driven in, and their pits taken ; but on approaching the works, the Confederates were received with a steady fire of musketry, and although they again and again advanced to the charge, they were always repulsed. On the right, they did not succeed in reaching the main works, and suffered much frori both artillery and musketry. On tie left, a column which approached by the Vaughan road was caught with a cross fire; large numbers threw down their arms and surrendered, and the remain- der exposed to a hot fire, hastily with- drew. An effort to flank the extreme left also failed. The main force of the attack, however, fell on the divisions of Ayres and Cutler. The battle was brief — lasting only two hours. It was nevertheless one of the most desperate contests of the campaign. In the struggle the Confederate generals, Saunders and Lamar were killed. On the morning of the 2 2d it was discovered that the enemy, had retired and intrenched himself about 3 miles from Petersburg. Skirmishers were then thrown out, and both armies went REAMS’ STATION. 765 to work industriously with the spade. The picket lines were busily engaged in skirmishing all day ; but there was no general engagement. During the pre- vious week, one division of the Second corps had been withdrawn from Deep Bottom and hurried back to Petersburg. It took possession of the intrenchments vacated by the Fifth corps when it marched for the W eldon Railroad. The other two divisions, with Gregg’s caval- ry and the Tenth corps, also left Deep Bottom on the night of the 20th, where Foster’s brigade remained alone. March- ing rapidly all night, the two divisions of the Second corps reached the lines of the Ninth on the morning of the 21st, and on the 2 2d Barlow’s division, tem- porarily commanded by Miles, was set to tearing up the track of the Weldon Railroad in the rear of the Fifth corps towards Reams’ Station, in which it was joined by Gibbon’s division on the fol- lowing day The Fifth corps also tore up a portion of the track towards Peters- burg, so that by the night of the 24th the railroad was thoroughly destroyed from a point four miles below Peters- burg down to two miles below Reams’ Station. The cavalry under Gregg covered the work of the infantry during these operations, and had several skirm- ishes with the enemy. On the morning of the 25th, Gibbon’s division of the Second corps moved Aug. railroad below Reams’ 25. to continue the work of destruc- tion; but when about a mile below the station, its advance, consisting of caval- ly, was suddenly checked and driven back by the enemy’s picket line. Smyth e’s brigade of infantry was at once pushed forward and deployed as skirmishers, the cavalry retiring behind them. Smythe drove back the enemy’s skirmish line some distance, but pres- ently meeting a stronger force, was himself compelled to fall back to the main body of the division, which was now in line of battle, the Third brigade on the right of the track, the First on the left, the other troops in support. Before noon the enemy had appeared in some force on Gibbon’s left, making towards his rear; but this movement was checked by a party of Gregg’s cav- alry, and the Confederates were driven off. A little later some cavalry of the enemy appeared in front, in the direction of Dinwiddie Court House, but were checked by Chapman’s cavalry brigade. While this desultory lighting was going on in the neighborhood of Gibbon’s division. General Hill was making pre- parations to attack that under Miles at Reams’ Station. It occupied the old intrenchments constructed by the Sixth corps, which in a semicircular form par- tially surrounded the station, and cov- ered the railroad both above and below that point. The enemy appeared in front of Miles soon after twelve o’clock, and Hancock immediately ordered Gib- bon to fall back and form a junction with the left of Miles. The cavalry followed, and was disposed so as to cover the left flank and rear. Gibbon arranged his line so that it faced the south and southeast, looking down the railroad. About two o’clock the enemy’s skirmish line advanced and swept forward with the accustcfmed battle yell; but it soon 766 PETERSBURG. tell back in confusion under a sharp fire from infantry and artillery, suffering severely. Skirmishing followed till aboui; half-past three, when the enemy’s column emerged from the woods in close hue of battle, and with bayonets fixed 1 ‘ushed towards the National works. At the distance of twenty paces it was met by a murderous fire of musketry and of artillery from 4 batteries, when it re- coiled, broke, and hastened back under cover, having suffered friglitful loss. Another assault, made an hour later, had a similar result. The Confederates now began to fell trees for the purpose of planting batter- ies; and notwithstanding shells were thrown among them, they succeeded at length in getting a very heavy concen- tric fire upon the National lines, into which they poured shell and shot with- out an instant’s cessation for twenty minutes, and with a most destructive effect. The result was that the Nation- al troop-s became to a certain extent demoralized ; and when at last the shelling ceased and the enemy’s storm- ing column again advanced with renewed fury, the fire with which it was received was less vigorous than before. The left and centre of Miles’ division, upon which the blow fell, allowed the enemy to gain the breast-works, and after a bloody hand-to-hand contest, the Nation- al lines were broken through, and a general rout followed, although some regiments and companies remained fighting with heroic determination. Of the 12 guns which had been used with such destructive effect during the day, 9 were lost. At this crisis a part of Gibbon’s division was hurried across the rear from the left, under a heavy fire, to the support of Miles, a distance of more than half a mile, and arrived in time to drive back the enemy in that quarter, though at a fearful cost in killed and wounded. Thus aided. Miles was enabled to rally his division and partially restore his lines. But whih3 a portion of Gibbon’s troops were thus employed, a fierce attack was being made on the left by a large force of the enemy, consisting of Heth’s division of infantry and Hampton’s division of cav- alry, equalling in impetus that which had been made on the centre. Gibbon’s troops, already exhausted by their exei*- tions, were hurried back to the left, where the enemy was in great force. Although desperately resisted by some brave regiments, who allowed them- selves to be cut to pieces rather than give way, the Confederates overpowei-ed all opposition ; and Hancock was finally compelled to withdraw his corps from Beams’ Station and retire towards the lines of the Fifth coi-ps. Gregg had in the mean time brought his dismounted cavalry to the assistance of the infantry and the enemy, who had suffered very severely, did not pursue. Thus ended the battle of Beams’ Station — one of the most obstinately contested battles of the war. The National loss was very heavy, amounting to not less than 3000 of which 2000 were prisoners. Seven stands of colors and 9 cannon were alsc lost. The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded was about 1 500. The Nation al forces continued to hold the Weldon Bailroad at Yellow Tavern. FRIENDLY FEELING. 767 Od the 25th the Eighteenth corps, on the right of the National line before Petersburg, and the Tenth corps at Deep Bottom and Bermuda Hundred, had begun exchanging positions. These movements produced a demonstration on the part of General Pickett in front of Butler’s position. Opening fire from the long silent artillery, the enemy reinforced his skirmish line and ad- vanced it against that of General Butler. A sharp fight ensued ; but the enemy soon withdrew, losing 60 prisoners. The killed and wounded were few on either ^ side. The movement of the troops was then continued, and was completed during the night of the 26th. The shelling of Petersburg was re- sumed with great vigor on the 29th, and was continued for some time all along the line with a fury unparalleled for many weeks, but the casualties re- sulting from it were few. There was at the same time considerable artil- lery firing between batteries and gun- boats. on the James in the vicinity of the Dutch Gap Canal, the work on which, was being vigorously prosecuted. Since the destruction of a portion of the Weldon Bailroad the enemy had had recourse to wagons, to convey their supplies from Stoney Creek, eight miles south of Beams’ Station, around by the Boyd ton plank road to Petersburg ; Sept. September, 2 . Gregg made an important recon- noissance in that direction. At daylight his cavalry, supported by Crawford’s division of the Fifth corps, moved out some distance; and Smith’s brigade marched up the Vaughan road towards the plank road and in the direction of Petersburg. The plank road was dis- covered to be well fortified Beturning, Smith was attacked by some of the enemy’s cavalry, but escaped without much loss. The whole force then re- turned to camp. As usual during periods of compara- tive inaction, friendly intercourse be- tween pickets and the exchange of newspapers began to take place aloug a part of the lines. When such a tacit truce existed, the men were accustomed to walk about at their ease in front of the works, trusting fully in the honor of their antagonists. But, on the 1st of September, while a large number were thus promenading outside the trenches, the -National batteries com- menced playing on the town, and a volley of musketry was fired in reply from the Confederate works, on the exposed troops, of whom some 200 were killed or wounded. This put an end to amicable relations for some time. On the night of the 4th, about eleven o’clock, news of the fall of Atlanta having arrived in camp, a salute was ordered of 100 shotted guns all along the line from the extreme right to the extreme left. To the roar of the artil lery the troops added their enthusiastic cheers, and the enemy, apprehending a general attack, replied briskly, but the firing was discontinued about one o’clock. For several days along Grant’s now extended lines, little of importance occurred beyond the usual desultory cannonading at intervals. On the left, near the Jerusalem plank road, the 768 PE L’ERSBURG. National and Confederate lines had been for some time in such close prox- imity, that at one point the opposing })ickets could converse without diffi- culty. Hancock determined to drive the enemy out of this advanced posi- tion, as being too commanding and dangerous, and gave orders to Mott, whose division lay opposite to the point in question, to direct a movement against it. Accordingly, at one o’clock Sept. morning of the 10th, the 10 , Ninety-Ninth Pennsylvania and the Twentieth Indiana were sent under General He Trobriand to carry the work. The approach was made silently, the enemy’s picket line was surprised, and the position was flanked and taken, with very little flring. The affair was a perfect success. The enemy opened an artillery fire, and, somewhat later, made a vigorous but unsuccessful effort to recover the lost ground. Ninety prisoners were taken, while the Nation- al loss was less than 20. On the 14th the long continued de- sultory flring was followed by a fierce cannonade directed on Petersburg, shells being thrown into the city for two hours at the rate of 20 a minute. This the enemy replied to, by bombarding the single towers which had been erected on the Appomattox, and by shelling the working party on the Hutch Gap Canal. Very early on the morn- ing of the 15th, movements of the ene- my’s cavalry on the left having been reported, a brigade of the Fifteenth corps, preceded by several regiments of cavalry, was sent out towards the Vaughan road. The enemy’s lines at Poplar Spring Church were broken through, and reconnoissances made in various directions ; but although Hearing’s cavalry was encountered and a little skirmishing took place, the troops finally returned to camp without having discovered the character of the enemy’^ movement, which proved to be the most daring and successful raid of the campaign. Setting out from Kearns’ Station on the morning of the 15th, Hampton, with a body of cavalry, con- sisting of 4 brigades, and 2 batteries, marched rapidly around the National left, and appeared suddenly on the morning of the 16th, in the rear of the centre. His object was to seize a herd of 2500 cattle at Sycamore Church, about a mile south of Coggin’s Point on the James, and nine miles northeast of Prince George Court House. Spear’s cavalry brigade was picketed around the point to be attacked ; but the ene- my rushed in so unexpectedly, gept, that it was taken completely by 16 . surprise. The pickets were quickly driven in ; and two regiments, the Thirteenth Pennsylvania and the First Histrict of Columbia, were entirely broken and stampeded, the latter being captured entire with all its horses, arms, equipments, wagons, and camp. The enemy, by making a wide detour around the National left, had succeeded com- pletely in concealing his movements. As soon as the cattle were secured, they were driven off. Hampton’s troopers then set out on their return, pursued by the divisions of Gregg and Kautz, as far as Belcher’s Mill on the Jerusa- lem plank road. At this point the CHAPIN’S FARM. 769 Confederates under Rosser and Bearing made a stand and repulsed an attack made on them by the brigades of Smith and Stedman. The other portions of Hampton’s column moved off with the cattle at their leisure. By this daring and skilful operation, Hampton se- cured an abundant supply of meat for Lee’s army. Besides the cattle, he carried off 300 prisoners, 200 mules, and 32 wagons. Among the captures was also a telegraphic construction corps of 40 men, with their train and 20 miles of wire. The entire loss of the enemy did not exceed 50. While Hampton’s raid was in progress, the* entire skirmish line of the Fifth corps was driven into the intrenchments, with the loss of 90 men made prisoners. From the 16th to the 23d, sharp picket firing was kept up along the line, re- sulting in many casualties. On the night of the 28th, the army Sept. James, under Butler, con- 28. sisting of the Tenth corps under Birney, holding the right of the main line before Petersburg ; the Eighteenth corps, under Ord, at Bermuda Hun- dred, and Kautz’s division of cavalry, were quietly but rapidly moved from their positions, in light marching order, to the James, over which they crossed, on muffled pontoon bridges, the Tenth corps to Beep Bottom, and the Eight- eenth to Aiken’s Landing, about mid- way between Beep Bottom and Butch Gap. At daylight on the morning of the 29th, the Eighteenth corps advanced by the Varina road, which runs in a northwesterly direction to the New Market road. Having proceeded about a mile the enemy’s pickets were met, and skirmishing began, Stannard’s di- vision in the advance. Two or three miles from Aiken’s Landing, a long line of intrenchments was found running westward from the road to the James, and ending there in a well-constructed foi-t. The region traversed by these intrenchments is in the neighborhood of Chapin’s and Ball’s bluff's, and was known as Chapin’s Farm. In front of the fortifications was an open plain. Line of battle was formed in the woods on the edge of this plain, Stannard’s division on the left near the river, Heckman’s on the right. The third division under Paine was operating with the Tenth corps on a different road. In front of Stannard were strong con- nected forts, including the works known as Battery Harrison. The latter was well provided with artillery and sur- rounded by a wide and deep ditch. In front of Heckman was a line of rifle- pits defended by infantry. The troops having been formed under cover of the woods, dashed across the plain under a heavy fire from the forts and rifle-pits and from the gun-boats in the river, and carried the entire line of works, including Battery Harrison, capturing 16 pieces of artillery and 200 prisoners. The attack was, in fact, a surprise. Fortunately there were but few troops in the works, and these mostly inex- perienced, or the affair would have been much more bloody. As it was, the success was purchased at a heavy cost, the National loss being about 800. The fighting was all over by ten o’clock ; and the men were set to work throwing 770 PETERSBURG. up breast- works and strengthening their position. The Confederate gun-boats and batteries on the other side of the James, however, kept up such an annoy- ing fire that it was found impossible to liold the portion of the works on the left near the river. They were there- fore abandoned. The Tenth corps had in the mean time marched from Deep Bottom towards New Market, crossing Four Mile Creek. The enemy was found at the junction of that road with the New Market road, where strong breast-works had been constructed in a commanding position called New Market Heights, a marshy tract of ground in front, covered with stunted trees and a dense under- growth besides being obstructed by an ahatis. Over this piece of difficult ground Paine’s colored troops were directed to charge. In spite of the formidable obstacles in their path, and under a very destructive musketry hre, they rushed to the works and carried them at the point of the bayonet with- out firing a shot. This position being the key-point of the line of defenses, was stoutly defended by the Confeder- ates ; but nothing could withstand the impetuous onset of the colored troops. Terry’s division of the Tenth corps pushed in on the right and flanked the enemy, who fell back from the heights, and Terry immediately occupied them. The National loss was about 1500, sus- tained chiefly by the colored division; tliat of the enemy was much less. Bir- ney then pushed on in the direction of Richmond, along the New Market road, to the point where the Mill road enters it, three miles west of New Market. After carrying some feebly defended earth -works here, the advance drove the enemy as far as the junction of the Varina and New Market roads, six miles southeast of Richmond. Here, on Laurel Hill, was found a substantial foT*tifica,tion called Fort Gilmer, consist- ing of a semicircular main work with other works on each side, a wide and deep ditch extending in front of the intrenchments. The advance was im- mediately deployed on the right, and W. Birney’s colored brigade on the left. About two o’clock an assault was ordered, and several charges were made ; but each time the troo^^s were compelled to retire with great loss, a severe artillery and musketry fire from both flank and front comj)letely sweeping the open space over which the storming parties had to move. The colored troops on the left succeeded in reaching the ditch ; but the few men who mounted the parapet never return- ed. It soon became evident that the position was too strong to be taken, and before dusk the troops were called off. The enemy was left in secure possession of Laurel Hill, having suffered but little loss, while that of the Nationals was not less than 500. Kautz having early in the morning reconnoitred the roads before the ad- vance of the infantry columns, turned off about nine o’clock to the right and moved up the Central road towards Richmond, in which direction he met no opposition till within two or three miles of the city, when a fort near the tollgate opened upon him. Terry also, BATTERY HARRISON. 771^ whose division had been sent to the support of Kautz, marched across from the New Market to the Central road, and pressing on rapidly came within sight of the spires of Richmond. But both withdrew about sundown. The ':ountry had been found full of fortifi- cations, and the enemy everywhere showed a disposition to resist. The line of the army at night was formed with the Tenth corps in the centre, the cav- alry on the right, and the Eighteenth corps on the left. About two in the afternoon of the 30th, the Confederates, having been largely reinforced from Petersburg during the night and morning, appeared in great force in front of Battery Har- lison and the line of captured works now held by the Eighteenth corps. Their plan of attack was, to break through these and separate the Eight- eenth and Tenth corps. The blow fell, therefore, on the right of the Eighteenth and the left of the Tenth. The action ^vas commenced by a cannonade from Sept. enemy of fifteen or twenty 30. minute.^’ duration, followed by a charge on Paine’s colored division, now getting position on the right of the Eighteenth corps, and on W. Birney’s colored brigade, on the left of the Tenth. But Paine and Birney held their ground wdl, delivering a withering fire of musketry, while the batteries made great devastation in the charging col- umn. The weight of the attack fell, however, on Stannard’s division. Form- ing in three strong lines on the edge of the woods, the Confederates charged upon it with great fury under cover of a hot shelling from their gun-boats and an enfilading fire from the batteries on the other side of the river. Stannard’s men had been instructed to lower their pieces ; and their fire was incessant and murderous. Three times the Confed- .erates charged; but each time, although they got near the works, they were driven back with great slaughter to their cover in the woods. They lost in this affair, including 200 prisoners, of whom 20 were ofiicers, nearly 800 men. The National loss did not exceed 200. At night heavy rain fell, continu- ing through the following day and night; and the surface of the country was soon covered with deep mud, ren- dering the movement of artillery and wagons, and even the march of troops, exceedingly difficult. These movements on the north side of the James having, as was intended, induced Lee to send off a great part of his forces i^n that direction, Grant, who had for several days been making pre- parations for the movement, despatched on the 30th a column from the left fiank. The National force remaining near Petersburg while the army of the James was operating towards Richmond, con- sisted of three corps and the second division of cavalry. Of these the Second corps and parts of the Fifth and Ninth were now left to hold the long line of the Weldon Railroad and Peters- burg intrenchments, while two divisions of the Ninth corps with two divisions and a brigade of the Fifth were consti- tuted a column of advance under Warren. On the 29th, a reconnoissance had been made by Gregg’s cavalry 772 PETERSBURG. supported by two brigades of infantry, towards the Poplar Spring Cburcb road beyond tlie Vaughan turnpike. On reaching the Weldon Kailroad Gregg struck off to the south of Yellow Tavern, but after sending the different brigades in various directions fell back again. About five o’clock the enemy, who had followed Gregg on his return, attacked him with two pieces of artillery; and skirmishing, resulting in little loss to either side, continued till dark, when Gregg returned to his former lines. On the following morning the column under Warren set out from Four Mile Station on the Weldon Kailroad, the headquarters of the Fifth corps, the cavalry under Gregg on the extreme left, while the divisions of Griffin and Ayres, with Hoffman’s brigade of the Fifth corps, followed by the divisions of Willcox and Potter and several batter- ies, moved out in the direction of Poplar Grove, on the South Side Kailroad, 15 miles west of Four Mile Station. The march was made in a northwesterly direction ; and soon after twelve o’clock, having struck the Squirrel Level road, Peebles’ Farm was reached, about three miles from the railroad and four or five southwest of Petersburg. Here was discovered a redoubt, called Fort McKae, in which were several small rifled guns, and connected with it a strons: line of intrenchments on com- manding ridges. In front was an open space of ground swept by the guns of the redoubt. The task of charging over this and capturing the crest was assigned to Griffin’s division, which- advanced in three lines, one behind another, and carried the works, driving the enemy out at every point and taking about 50 prisoners and one gun. The National loss was about 150. The column then re-formed ; and the march being resumed the enemy was found occupying a strong work on a hill half a mile further on. At five o’clock Potter’s division, attempting to press up the acclivity on which the Confed- erates were posted, sustained a severe repulse, and being in its turn charged, was thrown into confusion. A flanking column of the enemy now appeared in great force, broke in between the divis ions of the Fifth and Ninth corps, and swept off more than 1500 prisonei*s^ chiefly from Potter’s division. The further progress of the enemy, how^ever, was checked by the rapid approach of Griffin’s division. The National loss was over 2500, of which 1600 belonged to Potter’s division. The Confederate loss did not exceed 500. On the 1st of October the enemy made two attacks on the division under Ayres, but both were easily 1 . repulsed. Another was made, in the pouring rain, by Hampton’s cavalry division, upon Gregg, who covered the left flank beyond the Vaughan road. Hampton succeeded in driving him back from one line of intrenchments to another, but finally retired taking with him 100 prisoners. The National force continued to hold intrenchments four miles from the South Side Kailroad, connecting on the right with the old line of works at Petersburg ; but the enemy retained and used the railroad. On the 2d, General Mott moved out ATTACK ON THE NATIONAL EIGHT. 773 towards the Boydton plank-road, over which supplies were now conveyed in wagons to Petersburg ; but the enemy was found strongly intrenched in front of the road, and Mott was compelled to r tire, with a loss of 100 men. Meanwhile, there had been some activity on the north side of the J ames. On the morning of the 1st of October, General Terry, preceded by Kautz’s cavalry, made a reconnoissance towards Richmond on the Central or Darbytown and Charles City roads. When within 3 miles of the city the Confederate skir- ‘ mishers were encountered and driven in, and Terry continued to advance until he approached the main line of defenses, which ran across both roads ; but fur- ther progress was prevented by vigor- ous shelling on the part of the enemy. After reconnoitring carefully, Terry and Kautz returned at night, having suffered but little loss. The rain and mud caused a suspension of operations, beyond reconnoitring and intrenching. Nothing of importance occurred till the 7th, when the enemy made a sudden and partially successful attempt to turn the right flank of the army of the James. This flank lay in a line running to the northeast of Battery Harrison, where the Eighteenth corps was firmly in- trenched, about 7 miles south of Rich- mond. To the right of the Eighteenth corps lay the Tenth, across the New Market and Central roads ; and on the extreme right was the cavalry of General Kautz, consisting of only two brigades under Spear and West, with t^vo batteries, each of four 3-inch rifled guns, resting on the Charles City road. at a distance of 5 miles southeast of Richmond. At an early hour in the morning a large force of the enemy under General Anderson, consist- ing of two full divisions of in- 7. fantry and a brigade of cavalry, ap- proached by the Darbytown and Charles City roads, and fell unexpectedly upon Kautz’s cavalry. Taken completely by surprise Kautz’s troops broke into a perfect rout and scattered over the country in the rear, followed by the batteries, which being left without sup- port could not remain in safety. They were soon imbedded in mud, and cap- tured with all the caissons and most ()f the horses. Kautz lost 300 of his men in captured, killed and wounded. The Confederates having now stampeded the National cavalry and got possession of the Central road, advanced towards the Tenth coi*ps, which lay in a strongly intrenched line, its right held by Terry, who with the first division covered the New Market road, — the troops being disposed in rifle-pits in the thick woods. On the left of the line of the Tenth corps the ground was open ; and on this side was posted the artillery, consisting of four 6-gun batteries, so planted as not only to sweep the ground in front, but to some extent that over which the right must be approached by the enemy. Of Terry’s division, upon which the attack fell. Pond’s brigade held the left, Abbott’s the centre, and Plaisted’s the right. Curtis’ brigade of Foster’s divis- ion was also brought up and placed in line with these. When the Confeder- ates approached, between nine and ten o’clock, they found themselves under a 290 774 PETERSBURG. cross fire of artillery from the National left. An attempt was^ made to reply by two batteries; but these were soon overpowered. In the meantime Field’s infantry division dashed over the open space at the double-quick, and in spite of the felled trees, succeeded in gaining the woods on the National right. The National troops in the woods remained quiet till the enemy got very close, in front of the centre under Abbott, when the four brigades above mentioned rose from their places of concealment and poured into the advancing column a most destructive fire — that of Abbott’s brigade, which was partially armed with tlie Spencer repeating rifle, proving very deadly, as the fighting took place within short range. The Confederates, how- ever, continued the struggle for some time. At length, after a vain though desperate rush on Pond’s brigade, they were compelled to withdraw. Terry’s division was then put bi motion to follow and, if possible, to fiank the enemy, causing him to fall back to the Charles City road, leaving the Central road to the National troops. While the struggle was proceeding on the right of the army of the James, a demonstration was made by the enemy on the left, at Battery Harrison, but without result. The National loss during the day did not exceed 500. There was another breathing spell, whick lasted for several days. The Nationals continued to intrench busily along the lines they held. The enemy’s iron-clads near Cox’s Ferry annoyed to some extent the picket line on the left fiank of the Eighteenth corps with an enfilading fire ; but comparatively few casualties occurred. The work on the Dutch Gap Canal was prosecuted indus- triously, subject to an artillery fire from Howlett’s battery, which, however, the National gun-boats and batteries suc- ceeded in temporarily silencing on the 11th. j On the 13th, General Butler put 87 prisoners at labor under the enemy’s fire at the canal, in retaliation for Con- federate ill-treatment of National color- ed soldiers at Fort Gilmer. On the 12th, General Terry, tempora- rily commanding the Tenth corps, made a reconnoissance in force towards the right, taking with him the first 12 . division under Ames, the colored divis- ion under W. Birney, and a part of Kautz’s cavalry division. The column set out in the evening, but halted during the night. In the morning it moved again, and struck the Central road near the point from which Kautz’s command was driven on the 7th. The cavalry then stretched out to the Charles City road, dismounted and deployed as skir- mishers, thus covering the extreme right between that road and the Central road ; while W. Birney deployed on the left of the Central road, and Ames on the right towards the left of the cavalry. About seven o’clock the Confederate videttes were encountered on the Charles City road, and driven back over a mile, towards a series of intrenchments which blocked the way. There they halted ; and as soon as the Nationals were within easy range, they opened a sharp and merciless fire. This was quickly returned ; but Terry’s object being to discover the length and strength of this CHARLES CITY ROAD. 775 new line of the enemy, he kept his troops as much as possible under the shelter of a strip of woods in front of the works. Continuing to push out brigades in reconnoitring charges, at various points, he soon felt the whole series of intrenchments ; but made no serious demonstrations, except on the enemy’s extreme left, which, it was sup- posed, was overlapped by the National light, and which Pond’s brigade was ordered to turn. The works at this point were, however, found to be re- fused ; and as the National troops rushed forward they were caught by an enfilading fire and suffered severely. This encouraged the Confederates to sally from their breast- works on other parts of the line, and charge with all their available force. It was not, how- ever, attended with much success ; and soon after four in the afternoon the National troops were withdrawn un- broken. Before darkness fell, they were back within their own intrenchments. The losses were unimportant. On the left, to the west of the Wel- don Bailroad, a reconnoissance was made on the 8th, somewhat similar to that made by Terry and Kautz. It was a general advance of the Fifth and Ninth corps, the object being to feel the ene- my’s position, to push forward the lines, and to occupy if possible all the series of works connected with Fort McRae which had been taken. The Fifth corps, temporarily under Crawford, moved out on the West Halifax, Vaughan, and Squirrel Level roads ; and of the Ninth coiq)s, temporarily under •Parke, Pot- ter’s division pushed out near the Pe- gram House, and Will cox’s took the Church road, Ferrero’s division being left in reserve. Willcox got as far as the Boydton plank road, but found it strongly defended by lines of intrench- ments. After a day spent in skirmish- ing and hard marching, both corps re- turned to camp. In front of the Second corps at Pe- tersburg a great deal of skirmishing and mortar firing occurred from time to time, especially at the redoubt where the picket lines were closest — a work which had been captured by De Trob- riand about a month before, and since named Fort Sedgwick. The soldiers gave it the name of “ Fort Hell” On the 8th this firing was very severe, and on the 11th the enemy’s cannonading was so vigorous and prolonged that it was thought a general attack on the National lines was intended. There was comparative quiet again until the 26th. In the meantime, Grant had been completing his plans for an- other movement against the stubborn defenses of Richmond. He proposed to make a strong feint on the right by the army of the James, which was to move as if aiming to get round the left flank of the enemy, and at the same time to execute a series of operations of a more determined character by the army of the Potomac, with the object of turning the enemy’s right flank near the South Side Railroad. On the even- ing of the 26th the whole army was ordered to be in readiness to move at daybreak, on the following morning. Up to this time the proposed movement had been kept, as was supposed, pro- ?76 PETERSBURG. ioundly secret; and nothing was done which could give rise to a suspicion, on the part of the enemy, that an advance would be made for some days. On this evening, however, all disguise was aban- doned ; and such arrangements were made that if the contemplated move- ment proved successful, it would be possible without inconvenience perma- nently to leave the old camp. The sick, the baggage, the commissary stores, camp equipage, and other property, were sent to City Point; the sutlers also took their goods thither. Rations for three days were issued to the cav- alry, and for four days to the infantry. The intrenchments at Petersburg were to be held by the artillery, with only such infantry support as was absolutely necessary. The great movement of the army of the Potomac commenced on the 27th. Before dawn the entire army, with the exception of the detachments from each corps left in the trenches, was on 27. the march — Gregg’s cavalry on the extreme left moving towards Reams’ Station and then in a westerly direc- tion ; next on the right Egan’s second and Mott’s third division of the Second corps, with three batteries under Major Hazard, moving southwesterly down the Vaughan road ; then Warren’s Fifth corps on the Squirrel Level road ; and last of all, on the extreme right, the Ninth corps under Parke, moving as did all the columns in a southwesterly direction towards Hatcher’s Run a small stream rising near Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, and flowing in a southeasterly direction to Rowanty Creek, a tributary of the Not- taway. It was intended that the two divisions of the Second corps and Gregg’s cavalry should march as se- cretly and as rapidly as possible by a wide detour around the enemy’s right flank, and should then seize the line of defenses on Hatcher’s Rim at the point where tlie Boydton road crosses it, from which to the South Side Railroad it was supposed little opposition would be met. The Fifth and Ninth corps were at the same time to demonstrate against the works at Hatcher’s Run, directly in front; and the Fifth was to form con- nection with the Second corps there, the Ninth remaining on the right of the Fifth. Hancock and Gregg reached Hatcher’s Run by the Vaughan road at half-past seven. The road, at this point, was found much obstructed with felled trees ; and the banks of the stream, par- tially cleared so as to give range from a line of rifle-pits on the opposite bank, were held by a small force of dismounted cavalry. Egan’s division rapidly de- deployed; and Smyth’s brigade, form, ing the flrst line, quickly forded the stream, carried the slight defenses, took about 20 prisoners, and dispersed the remainder of the small force. About noon Hancock and Gregg reached the Boydton road. The enemy was found fully on the alert ; and Gregg’s troops, covering the left, were opened upon from artillery and the carbines of Young’s dismounted cavalry. Grant and Meade were both on the ground at this time ; and although it was evident that the eilemy had received informa- tion of the movement in time to de- BOYDTON ROAD. 777 pri’s e it of the character of a surprise, it was thought that an advance might yet be attended with success. Accord- ingly Egan’s division was deployed on the right of the Boydton plank road, facing towards the bridge over Hatch- er’s Run, Mott’s division on the left of the road, De Trobriand’s brigade con- necting with Grregg on the extreme left ; while McAllister’s brigade of Mott’s division was placed in the rear to watch the enemy, who had a battery at some distance down the plank road. The bridge was then seized by a skirmish line in the advance of Egan’s division and the stream crossed. The next thing to be done was to carry the enemy’s works beyond ; and in order to prepare for this, Egan’s division was, about one o’clock, disposed with Price’s brigade in the centre, Rugg’s on the left, and Smyth’s on the right. Beck’s battery co-operating on the latter flank. McAl- lister’s brigade was withdrawn from watching the enemy in the rear and de- ployed in support of Egan. The Fifth corps being now heard flring rapidly on the right, the attack on the works was delayed till it should approach and co- operate. Owing however, to the difficult nature of the thickly wooded country in which the operations were being conducted, and the intricacy of the roads, the Fifth corps failed to connect; and after waiting until four o’clock, Hancock prepared to make the assault. The enemy, in the mean time, having discovered that while the left flank of Hancock’s force was covered by Gregg’s cavalry, his right was entirely unprotected, took the offensive. Ma- hone’s strong division of Hill’s corps burst suddenly upon Hancock’s right and partially turned it, sweeping off at the same time a section of Beck’s bat tery ; then getting across the plank road, it bore down upon Egan in the rear. Egan promptly changed front with his own and McAllister’s bng- ades ; and with the aid of three bat- teries, after a severe and prolonged fight, he succeeded in repulsing Ma- hone. Egan was now in turn able to attack the Confederates in flank, com- pelling them to abandon the guns they had captured, as well as three of their own flags, besides taking nearly 1000 prisoners and one gun. The loss of the Second corps in this affair was esti- mated at 1000 in killed, wounded and prisoners. After this attack by Mahone had been repulsed, and just before dark, the enemy, with a force of five brigades, made a vigorous demonstration on the left against Gregg’s cavalry. Gregg, at first, fell back; but, soon rallying, he drove back the enemy and re-established his lines. Rain had fallen in the afternoon, tending to make manoeuvres difficult ; the ammunition was nearly exhausted ; and so far the Confederates had shown themselves not only vigilant but strong, and had inflicted a loss about as great as they had sustained. There was need for great caution ; and as there was reason to believe that the enemy would soon gather in greater force, it was deemed imprudent to prosecute the movement by the left flank. Soon after dusk, therefore, the retrograde march 778 PE TERSBURG. was commenced by the route taken in the morning. It occupied the entire night and part of the next day. The old camps were regained by the Second corps with comparatively little loss. Many of the wounded, however, had been left on the field, the column not being provided with the means of trans- portation. The task of the Fifth and Ninth coi’ps had been to demonstrate against the enemy’s works at Hatcher’s Eun in front, so as to cover the movement of the Second corps by the left and finally to co-operate with it; but this they had only partially succeeded in accom- plishing. Having only a short distance to march, they had indeed soon made their appearance in front of the works and got into position, the Ninth on the right, the Fifth on the left. Skirmishing was carried on during the greater part of the day by the infantry ; but the use of artillery was made extremely .difficult in that region by the almost impenetra- ble woods, which rendered military ma- noeuvres almost impossible. The enemy })eing familiar with every inch of the ground had in this respect greatly the advantage. Although the commands of Hancock and Warren were durino: a great part of the day not very far apart, a junction was rendered altogether im- practicable by the natural obstacles presented in the shape of dark, dense woods and swampy ground. The ob- scurity of the few miserable roads was such that troops got into the opposing lines, and staff officers lost their way in the forest gloom. The two corps found the enemy’s defenses in front, too strong to be pierced, and had to content them- selves with maintaining their position, which they retained all day and through the night until orders arrived from Grant to fall back. The loss thus sus- tained in manoeuvring and skirmishing was about 500. The aggregate losses attendii^g the entire movement by the left flank were not much short of 1500 men. The enemy suffered less in killed and wounded, but lost many more in prisoners. Thus ended what is known as the battle of Boydton Eoad. The demonstrations made by Butler and his Tenth corps were comparatively barren of any good results. On the Williamsburg road he was attacked and defeated. On the York Kiver Eailroad he captured a fort which he afterwards abandoned. His loss was about 1500 men. The Confederates lost about 200. At dusk in the evening of the 27th, General Miles, who had been left in the Petersburg lines with the first division of the Second corps, under cover of a terrific cannonade, sent a small stomiing party, consisting of 100 volunteers, un- der Captain Price, against a fort which was situated near the spot where the mine had been exploded in July. This small party, having moved quickly, and as silently as possible across the inter vening space, clambered over the para pet ; and although Price who led the assault was killed, they actually drove the enemy out of the works. Had the attack been made by a larger force it might have resulted disastrously for the enemy ; but as it was impossible for so small a body of men to hold an impor- tant fort against the overwhelming ATTEMPTED SUlirRISES. 779 force which was immediately thrown upon them from right and left, they promptly retreated, losing 10 of their number, but carrying off 30 prisoners, among whom were several officers. About ten o’clock on the night of the 30th, the Confederates having ob- tained information as to the strength and position of a portion of the Na- tional picket lines in front of Fort Davis, undertook, and successfully car- ried out, one of those little surprises which, as practised against themselves, they had had frequent and painful Qct. experience. A body of Confed- erates getting in the rear of the National pickets called to them to ‘‘fall in.” These troops, being mostly raw recruits, and believing themselves to be among friends, promptly obeyed the call, and the entire line, consisting of 380 men, was captured. The immedi- ate result of this surprise was to uncover the National intrenchments at the point of junction of the corps of Warren and Hancock. On this unprotected point, the enemy advanced. Fortunately, the National officers had been put on their guard by a sentinel who had escaped his captors ; and when the Confederates came within range they found them- selves under a heavy musketry fire, to which was soon added that of artillery. After about an hour’s fighting, in which the loss did not exceed 100 on either side, the enemy withdrew. On the 4th of November there was sharp skirmishing in the neighborhood of Fort Sedgwick; and, on the night of the 5th the enemy succeeded, by a sud- den attack, in getting possession of a considerable portion of the National picket line in that vicinity, and immedi- ately began to reverse the works Nov. and to intrench. At the same time another body of the Confederates car- ried the picket line opposite the crater The skirmishing was attended with little loss on either side. It was nec- essary, however, that the enemy should be promptly dislodged ; and a furious cannonade having been opened upon them from the forts and batteries to the right and left, the whole line was aroused. At daybreak, after some desperate fighting, the captured works were recovered ; and the line was re- established from Fort Sedgwick to the crater. On the 6th, a similar attack was made by the enemy on the left, but was quickly repulsed. This desul- tory fighting, with little result beyond its tendency to wear out both the com- batants, had become constant, and in fact, almost monotonous. The men about this time began to build log- huts, the weather having become uncom- fortably cold. On the 1st of December a raid was undertaken by Gregg’s cavalry against the Weldon Failroad, at Stony Creek Station, 18 miles south of Petersburg. At half-past three in the morning Dec, Gregg broke camp and set out in a southerly direction, his second brig- ade in the advance, the first brigade next, the third in the rear. The enemy’s pickets were met before daybreak ; but no serious opposition was encountered until the column arrived at Eowanty Creek, where a cavalry force dis- puted the advance, but was quickly 780 PETERSBURG. dispersed. The third brigade was then left to cover the rear; and the column passed on to Duvall’s Station, where the first brigade also was dropped, to destroy certain manufacturing establish- ments and to protect the flanks. The second brigade then went on to Stony Creek Station, two miles further on. There they found a well-built fort, which they captured and destroyed, spiking the guns and carrying off the greater portion of the garrison as pris- oners. While this work of destruction was going on, a brigade of Hampton’s cavalry came upon the scene. Cregg deemed it convenient to retreat. The Confederates followed, harassing his rear as far as Rowanty Creek. At that point the pursuit was discontinued. The entire loss sustained by Gregg was not over 40, all of whom he managed to carry off, together with 175 prisoners and about 100 negroes. A few days afterwards another move- ment, on a much larger scale, was made against the Weldon Railroad, which it was of the utmost importance that the enemy should not be allowed to re- cover. On the 6th of December a heavy column, consisting of the Fifth corps, Mott’s division of the Second corps, and Gregg’s division of cavalry, Dec. in all about 20,000 men, with 22 pieces of artillery, under General Warren, was massed on both sides of the W eldon Railroad between the Hali- fax and Jerusalem roads. There the troops bivouacked for the night. Heavy rain extinguished the camp-fires; but before daybreak the troops were on the march, the cavalry starting at four o’clock. The column took the Jerusalem road, and struck the Not t away at the point where Freeman’s Bridge had for- merly been, about 18 miles south-south- east of Petersburg. The cavalry crossed the river, which was about three feet deep, by fording ; the infantry crossed ' by a pontoon bridge ; and the whole column was on the south side of the stream before daylight on the morning of the 8th. The cavalry bivouacked at Sussex Court House ; the infantry be- tween that place and the river. At three o’clock the cavalry set off in a southwesterly direction towards Jar- rett’s, a station on the railroad about 30 miles south of Petersburg, the infantry following rapidly. About twelve o’clock the cavalry advance reached the point where the railroad crosses the Notta- way, seized and burned the bridge, and then began to tear up the track. The infantry arrived soon after and com- pleted the work of destruction by burn- ing the sleepers and twisting the rails. This work was continued for 5 miles, as far as Jarre tt’s Station, where the depot and water tank were destroyed. The following day the column, still moving southward, destroyed the track as far as BellfieM, on the Meher- rin, 37 miles south of Petersburg. At Three Creek, 3 miles north of Bellfield, the enemy burned the bridge and dis- puted the passage of the cavalry; but Dennison’s battery having opened upon them, and the Tenth New York having foi-ded the stream on the National left, and flanked the position, the Confeder^ ates fell back to Bellfield. Hicksford, opposite Bellfield, was found protected RETURN OF WARREN. 781 on botli sides of tlie river by strong intrencbments, within which were some of Hampton’s cavalry and a body of militia ; and when the National troops got within range, a hot fire was directed on them. Several charges were made on the enemy’s works; but Warren finally drew the troops off, and most of the cav- alry bivouacked that night north of Three Creek. Up to this time during the march a cold rain had poured down, mak- ing the roads almost impassable ; but now the increasing cold was accompanied with a storm of hail and snow, and the situation of the troops became one of extreme discomfort. It was determined, therefore, not to prosecute operations against Hicksford, the strategic value of which was not sufficiently great to At this period in the History of the War the rail- road had become not only a useful but a most potent military factor. It had been, as we have seen, of signal service at Chattanooga. It had rendered possi- ble Sherman’s movement on Atlanta, and had greatly facilitated his March to the Sea. Without the railroad, Thomas would have found it impossible not only to resist the fierce onsets of Hood, but even to maintain himself, in Tennessee ; and the advantages which it secured for the army in front of Petersburg and Rich-^ mond were many and invaluable. To the end of the war it continued to be an agent of first class utility and power ; nor is it any disparagement to the rank and file to say that but for the railroad and the admir- able uses to which it was put, the war would have assumed a different character and been attended prob- ably by a different result. The establishment of this branch of the service was due to the active brain and far-reaching vision of Secretary Stanton : its suc- cessful management is to be credited to the skill, experience, activity and untiring energy of General D. C. McCallum. On the 11th of February, 1862, McCallum was appointed military director and superintendent of railroads, in the United States, with authority controllable only by the War Department ; and commanding officers everywhere were directed, on pain of dismissal from the service, not to in- terfere with the working of the new Department. The responsibilities of the head of the Railroad warrant any heavy sacrifice of life. On the morning of the 10th AVarren commenced his march back towards the National lines, the enemy following arkd attempting to harass his rear. His troops got back to camp on the 12th much exhausted, but without having sustained any great loss. With the exception of two reconnois- sauces which were made with a view to direct attention from Warren, this was the last operation of importance in the year. The holiday season came on. The men were allowed some rest ; numbers of them obtained furloucrhs. The festivities proper to the season were not overlooked; and the Christmas of 1864 spent in the lines before Peters- burg will not soon be forgotten. Department were scarcely second to those of the General-in-chief. One of the greatest feats accom- plished by McCallum was when he transferred Hooker with the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, over 23,000 strong, with artillery, trains, baggage and animals from the Rapidan in Virginia, to Stevenson, Alabama, a distance of 1192 miies, within the brief space of seven days. But for the railroad. Hooker could not have been present at Chattanooga ; and few will deny that the success on Lookout Mountain contributed to the final victory at Missionary Ridge. The work done between Chattanooga and Atlanta in repairing 136 miles of railroad, was scarcely less wonderful. In his report. General McCallum gives it as his opinion that but for the railroad, Sherman’s campaign, in place of being a success, “would have resulted in disaster and defeat.” An idea of the De- partment and of the magnitude of its work may be obtained from the following figures. At one time, such was the pressure brought to bear on this branch of the service, McCallum had under him as many as 24,964 men. During the war he operated in all 2105 miles, and made use of 419 engines and 6330 cars. Of bridges he built over 26 miles, and of track he laid or relaid 641 miles. The expenses of the Department amounted to $42,462,145.55. The property when sold realized $12,636,965.83. General McCallum bad several able assistants, among whom were General Anderson, General Devereux and Col. W. W. Wright. 782 THE SHENANDOxVH. CHAPTER XXXVII. The Valley of the Shenandoah — Memory of Jackson — Banks and McDowell — Fremont and Shields— The Co- operative Movement — Sigel and Hunter — Lynchburg — Meado^w Bridge — Burbridge — Pound Gap — The Effect of Morgan’s Retreat — Washington Exposed — The Shenandoah Valley Unguarded — Early’s Invasion — Sigel’s Retreat — A Panic — Lincoln calls for Militia — General Lewis Wallace at Baltimore — He hastens to the Monocacy — At Frederick — Wallace joined by Ricketts — Preparations to relieve Washington — Wright and Emory — Battle of the Monocacy — A Fierce and Protracted Struggle — The Stone Bridge— Ricketts Outflanked — The Confederate Force — Wallace orders a Retreat — Wallace by his heroic resistance saves the Capital — Great Excitement in Baltimore and Washington — Approach of Early towards Wash- ington — Near Forts Stevens and De Russey — Augur’s Reconnoisance — Early’s Retreat — Wright in Pursuit — Snicker’s Ferry — Island Ford — Kernstown — Bunker Hill Road — Death of Colonel Mulligan — McCaus- land at Cliambersburg — Burning of ( hambersburg — McCausland’s Retreat — Pursued by Averill — Panic in Maryland and Pennsylvania — Consolidation — The Middle Military Division — Hunter Relieved — Sheridan ^ in Command — Force and Composition of Sheridan’s and Early’s Armies — Advance of Sheridan up the Shenandoah Valley to Cedar Creek — Mosby attacks Sheridan’s Wagon Train — Retreat of Sheridan from Cedar Creek — Destruction of Stock, Grain, etc. — Penrose’s Brigade — Massacre near Snicker’s Gap — Panic in Maryland —Sheridan at Bolivar Heights — Sheridan at Berryville — Offensive Movements resumc^i — Battle of Winchester — Advance to Cedar Creek — Battle of Fisher’s Hill — Advance to Staunton — Early at Brown s Gap — Murder of Lieutenant Meigs — Retreat of Sheridan towards Cedar Creek — Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley — Rosser’s Cavalry Stampeded — Position of the Army at Cedar Creek — Early’s Noctur- nal Flank Movement — A Daring and Successful Attack — A complete Surprise — Wright compelled to Retreat — At Mr’dletown — Wright again Driven Back — Order Restored — Sheridan still Absent — Sheridan’s Ride from Winchester — The Tide of Battle Turned — A complete Victory — End of the Battle at Cedar Creek- Honors to Sheridan. On more than one occasion already, 1864 been our duly to linger with the reader in the valley of the Shenandoah. Almost from the commencement of the war, the tide of battle surged in or around this now famous valley. It was already memora- ble as the scene of Jackson’s first great campaign — -the scene of the humiliation, if not defeat, of Banks and McDowell, of Fremont and Shields. In connection with the investment of Petersburg and the approach to Richmond, it has again become the scene of impoifant opera- tions. In a previous chapter, and in their proper place, some of these opera- tions have been described in detail. At the commencement of the Wilder- ness campaign. General Grant entrusted certain co-operative movements which 'were to be conducted in the Shenan- doah and Kanawha Valleys, to the cai'e of General Sigel. It will be remem- bered that Sigel was singularly unfor- tunate in a series of encounters which he had w ith Breckenridge ; and about the middle of May he was superseded by General Hunter. Hunter, it will also be remembered, although he won a battle and inflicted heavy loss on the enemy, found it necessary to fall back from Lynchburg, which he was invest- ing; and, much to the annoyance and disappointment of General Grant, lie EARLY’S INVASION. 783 made an unfortunate, even disastrous retreat by way of Meadow Bridge to- wards the Kanawha. It had been arranged that General Burbridge, who was commanding in Kentucky, should co-operate with Hun- ter in the movement against Lynch- burg. While Hunter, with the com- bined forces of Crook and Averill, was to move direct on Lynchburg, Bur- •bridge was to enter Virginia on the extreme southwest, with the view of engaging the attention of the enemy, and preventing any movement on Hunter’s rear. It was not doubted at the time that this two-fold movement would be attended with complete suc- cess ; for, as General Breckenridge, with his command, had been with- drawn to the assistance of General Lee, there was no Confederate force of any importance to the immediate west of the Blue Bidge. We have already seen that Hunter failed in carrying out his part of the programme. It remains to be seen that Burbridge, in all that regarded the general plan, was equally unsuccessful. The object of Burbridge’s movement was discovered by the Con- federates ; and as they could not hope to defeat it by a direct attack in front, they resolved to thwart it by detaining the general and his command in Ken- tucky. With this end in view, the ever- vigilant and the ever-ready Morgan made a dash into that State. Dividing his troops, he sent them out in different directions. Encountering almost no opposition, they moved through Pound Gap, and struck successively Paintville, Hazel Green, Owingsville, Flemings- burg, Maysville, and other places, seiz ing property, breaking up i-ailroads, burning bridges, and capturing a body of National troops under General Hob- son, some 1600 strong. On the 12th of June, in the vicinity of Cynthiana, Burbridge, who had xeturnedfrom June south-western Vbginia and also 12* had been working his way back with great rapidity-, fell upon Morgan with his whole force, routing him utterly, with a loss of 300 killed and wounded and as many prisoners. Of Hobson’s command 1000 horses and 100 men were recaptured. Burbridge’s loss was 150. Morgan’s men, utterly demoral- alized and flinging down their arms, fled in all directions ; but they havl, nevertheless, accomplished their pui' pose. They had brought Burbridge back to Kentucky, where his wearied troops remained until they were re quired by Sherman. The failure of this conjoint move- ment, coupled as it was with the retreat of Hunter across the mountains, left Washington exposed and the Shenan- doah Valley practically unguarded. Lee, quick to seize his opportunity, resolved to make a demonstration in the direction of Harper’s Ferry. His object seems to have been three-fold — to induce Grant to withdraw some of the troops from before Petersburg, to procure supplies, and to make an attempt on the National Capital. Early, who, during the disability of Ewell, was in command of the upj^er part of the valley, having been rein- forced by a body of Brecken ridge’s troops, was quickly in motion at the 784 THE SHENANDOAH. head of some 20,000 or 25,000 men. In spite of the hot weather, he marched at the rate of about 20 miles a day. As soon as Grant became aware of this new movement of the enemy, he ordered Hunter, who was then on the Kanawha in Western Virginia, to trans- port his troops, with all possible haste, by river and rail, to Harper’s Ferry. Insuperable obstacles, however, lay in Hunter’s way. The river was low, and the railroad was broken in several places. As Hunter was not able to be forward in time, other arrangements had to be made to meet the emergency. The Sixth corps was taken from its lines in front of Petersburg, and sent to cover Washington. The Nineteenth corps, under General W. H. Emory, A\diich had just arrived in Hampton Eoads from the Gulf Department, was, without being allowed to disembark, pushed after the Sixth. Meanwhile, Early was advancing. On the 3d of July he was at Martins- burg, where Sigel was in command. July unafie to offer any effec- 3* tive resistance, retired across the river, and took possession of Maryland Heights, leaving to the enemy the roll- ing stock, heavy trains laden with sup- plies for General Hunter, and other valuable stores. A panic seized the entire surrounding country. It recalled the memory of the two former inva- sions, that which preceded Antietam and that which preceded Gettysburg. Pj*eparations were everywhere made to leave the menaced region. At Fred- erick, on the 5th, the railroad trains were loaded with government stores ; and arrangements were made .for the evacuation of the city. On the same day, Hagerstown was occupied by the cav- alry of the enemy ; the stores were jy]y plundered, and a requisition was 5. made on the inhabitants for $20,000. The money was paid, and the raiders left. President Lincoln, yielding to the excitement, and realizing the presence of danger, at the same time issued a call for militia — 12,000 from New York, 12,000 from Pennsylvania, and 5000 from Massachusetts. The call was promptly responded to by each of the different States. General Lewis Wallace was at that time in command of the Middle De- partment, having his head-quarters at Baltimore. Wallace had heard some vague rumors regarding the disasters which had befallen Sigel. More posi- tive information soon reached him ; and he became aware that the enemy having crossed the Potomac was alreading in Couch’s Department. Convinced that a movement was intended against Balti- more and Washington, Wallace with all haste possible, adopted measures for checking the progress of the invaders. On the 5th of July, with the few avail- able troops at his command, he took a strong position on the Monocacy Biver. There he concentrated his forces ; and the ground chosen was such as enabled him to cover the Baltimore and Ohio crossing, and the principal roads leading to the cities now supposed to be in danger. On the 6th all the men, who could be spared from watcliing the railroads, were gathered together at the appointed rendezvous. There was some THE MONOCACY. 785 skirmishing on the 7th with varying success. On the evening of that day, however, the Confederates who had assembled in some force in front of Frederick were charged by Colonel Charles Gilpin at the head of his regi- ment, and driven back to the woods. The situation was now becoming serious not only for Wallace but for Baltimore and Washington. Happily, however, relief was at hand. Kicketts’ division, the advance of the Sixth corps, reached Washington late on the night of the 6th of July. Kicketts with his division was sent to Baltimore the same night, with orders to push on towards the Monocacy as quickly as possible. On the 8th Wallace was joined by Kick- etts, and made aware that Wright with the remainder of the corps, and Emory with the Nineteenth corps, were on their way to Washington. Becoming more and more satisfied that the Con- federates were bent on marching to the Capital, he withdrew what troops he had sent for the defense of Frederick to his chosen position on the Monocacy. There on the morning of the. 9th he made dispositions for battle. His right July under E. B. Tyler, and cov. 9. ered the railroad at the Baltimore pike. His left was under Kicketts and held the Washington pike. On the left wing the main attack was expected. Each wing had 3 guns — Colonel Brown, with his own command and a body of mounted infantry guarded a stone bridge on Tyler’s extreme right ; and the lower fords were protected by a body of cav- alry under Clendennin. Near the rail- road at a block-house, was a rude earth- work, mounted with a 24-pounder howitzer. Of Kicketts’ division, three regiments were yet behind. It was expected, however, that they would arrive by rail at one o’clock. Wallace’s entire force was about 8000. Early was already in his front with 16 Napoleon guns, a strong body of cav- alry, and some 16,000 infantry. It was near nine o’clock when Early opened the fight. The attack was made vdth tremendous fury. The shock was felt almost instantaneously on both wings of the National army. Brown soon found it difficult to main- tain his position on the National right. At the same time, a bold and, as it proved, successful movement was exe- cuted against the National left. A large body of Confederates having moved by their own right, succeeded in crossing the Monocacy out of range of Kicketts’ guns. Kicketts, finding himself outflanked, wheeled around so as to face the foe ; but in his new posi- tion he found himself exposed to an overwhelming force in his front, as well as to an enfilading fire from Early’s guns across the stream. The battle lasted for many weary hours, the Na- tionals offering a stout and stubborn resistance to the repeated onsets of vastly superior numbers. Tyler while holding his own position, sent all the assistance he could to Kicketts. It was confidently expected that Kicketts’ three regiments would be forward by one o’clock. It was now, however, far in the afternoon ; and as yet there were no signs of coming relief. Towards four o’clock, Wallace, despairing of as- 786 THE SHENANDOAH. sistance and seeing the Confederates issuing from the woods in two strong columns to deliver a crushing and per- il aps final blow, ordered Kicketts to retreat by the Baltimore road. Brown still held the stone bridge. Fighting desperately he continued to hold it until Bicketts’ column was safe. At five o’clock Brown was compelled to give ^vay. He fell back by the Baltimore ])ike. Tyler, with his remaining force, had no choice but follow. It was only by the narrowest chance that he and his staff, cut off from the rest of the troops, contrived to make good their escape. At New Market, the fugitives were joined by the three absent regi- ments of Eicketts’ division ; and the retreat towards Ellicott’s Mills was covered. The wearied troops bi- vouacked some 12 miles from the field of strife. The battle of the Monocacy '\v\as a defeat to the small body of Na- tional troops engaged ; but it was a gain to the National cause. Wallace had lost nearly 2000 men, of whom over 1200 were missing; but he had given Wright and Emory time to reach Washington. He had, in truth, saved the Capital. It was not denied that Early, if he had advanced immediately after the battle, might have captured Washington. His troops, however, had been severely tried ; and they needed rest. He halted for a day. That pause made the Capital secure. Wright and Emory were forward in force ; and the former at Grant’s urgent request was placed in command of all the troops which could be made available for the defense of Washington. For some days the wildest excitement prevailed ; and it was feared that both Baltimore and Washins^ton were in danger. Johnson, with his cavalry, moved towards Baltimore ; but finding all the approaches to the city so well guarded that success was not to be expected from any attack which he could hope to make, he contented him- self with a general destruction of the railroads. He burned the bridges and tore up the tracks ; and in the work of vandalism he was exceeded by his lieu- tenant the notorious Gilmore, who stopped the trains, plundered the pas- sengers and the mails, and burned the cars. Early moved on Washington, advancing with great caution. On the 12th he was within 4 miles of the July city, on the north side, and in 12. front of Forts Stevens and de Eussey His skirmishers and sharpshooters be- gan to be a source of some annoyance ; and with the view of developing, his strength General Augur sent out from Fort Stevens a brigade of veterans. These had not advanced far before they felt the. foe in very considerable force. A severe struggle ensued, each party losing about 300 men. Made aware of the concentration of - troops in Wash- ington, and deeming success impossible, if not trembling for his own safety, Early now beat a hasty retreat. On the night of the 12 th he crossed the Potomac at Edward’s Ferry, carr}dng with him a large amount of booty, in- cluding some 2000 head of cattle and some 5000 horses. On the 13th Wright commenced the pursuit, taking with him the two divi- AVERILL DEFEATS EARLY. 787 sions of the Sixth corps, and the Nine- teenth corps under Emory. Moving northwestward ^from Washington to Poolesville, he crossed the Potomac just ])elow Edward’s Ferry, and marched to Leesburg, where he was joined by Ricketts. On the 17th Duffie’s cavalry, of Crook’s command, had overtaken and captured a portion of the enemy’s train at Snicker’s Gap, near the She- nandoah, and Crook himself coming up soon afterwards, the Confederates were dnven through the gap after a sharp tight. They held the ferry, however, on the west side of the river, where they planted two guns and put a stop to the pursuit for a while. On the 18th the whole of Wright’s and Crook’s forces had passed through Snicker’s Gap, except Duffie’s cavalry, sent north- vard to Ashby’s Gap to guard against ■m attempt of the enemy to flank the National right. Shortly after mid-day the infantry crossed at Island Ford, two and a half miles below Snicker’s Ferry, the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts in the advance and driving the enemy. Crook’s force also was soon over the liver; and line of battle was formed. Colonel Wells with the Thirty-Fourth Massachusetts being on the left and Colonel Thorburn’s brigade on the right. A sharp engagement ensued. The Sixth corps also had commenced crossing, when the enemy, under Breck- eniidge, finding the rear attacked, re- turned quickly, and charged and drove back Colonel Thorburn’s brigade, com- pelling it to recross the river. Colonel Wells then mthdrew his force in good (U-der; and the enemy retained posses- sion of the west bank. Duffie had no better fortune at Ashby’s Gap. He had driven Imboden through the gap and across the river; but the enemy having returned in force, he was him self compelled to retreat. A loss of about 500 was sustained in these two fights ; and some of the wounded were left in the hands of the enemy, who was then allowed to pursue his way leisurely towards Winchester and Strasburg. The column under Wright crossed the river. It soon, however, returned and marched back to Leesburg, where it was divided. Crook with his portion of the force going to Harper’s Ferry, and Wright with the Sixth corps to Wash- ington. On the 19th, Averill, moving up the Shenandoah Valley from Martinsburg, encountered and drove back a body of cavalry at Darks ville. Next morning he continued his march in the same direction. As he approached Win- chester, General Early came out of his old intrenchments to meet him. The battle which ensued lasted three hours, when the Confederates, after losing about 400 men in killed and wounded, retired to their intrenchments, leaving Averill master of the field, with 4 can- non, several hundred small arms, and about 200 prisoners. Averill’s loss was about 250. Soon afterwards General Averill was rejoined by General Crook with his in- fantry, just returned from the unfor- tunate affair at Island Ford. The force under Crook was now about 10,000 men, consisting of Averill’s and Duffie’s cavalry and two divisions of infantry. ^88 THE SHENANDOAH. On the 23d, after some skirmishing at Kernstown, four miles south of Win- chester, the National cavalry was forced back, by the enemy, on the main body ; and on the following day they were driven through Winchester in confu- sion towards Bunker Hill, thus com- pletely uncovering the flanks of the infantry. General Crook had draAvn up his force in line of battle ; but when his cavalry broke he was compelled to beat a retreat. The Confederates, who had received reinforcements, and who were in much superior force, were able completely to outflank Crook’s line. The retreat continued on the Bunker Hill road till night. The Na- tional loss was under 1200, including prisoners. Among the killed was Col- onel Mulligan, whose brigade covered the retreat. On the 25th, Crook halted at Mar- tinsburg, to gain time for getting off his trains; but after a sharp artillery engagement he again fell back, and on the following day crossed the Potomac into Maryland, leaving the Confeder- ates in possession of the west bank of the river from Williamsport to Shep- herdstown. Another panic seized the people of Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. On the 28th, General Kelley crossed the Potomac and re- occupied Martinsburg, which the Con- federates had already evacuated. On the morning of the 30th a force of 200 or 300 cavalry, under McCausland, crossed the Potomac and marched to- wards Chambersburg. McCausland, on his arrival, offered to spare the place for the sum of $500,000; but as this was not forthcoming, he set fire to the town ; and two-thirds of it were laid in ashes. McCausland withdrew about eleven o’clock ; and immediately after- wards Averill, who, with his cavalry, had just arrived at Chambersburg, set out in pursuit. Averill followed Mc- Causland as far as Hancock, at which place the raiders, who were well mounted, succeeded in crossing the Po- tomac. At the beginning of August, great excitement was produced in the' border regions of Maryland and Pennsylvania by the reported reappearance of the Confederate raiders. Mosby had crossed the Potomac at Cheat’s Ferry, wdth a small body of cavalry ; but he quickly retired, carrying with him considerable plunder. Early, it was rumored, had entered Pennsylvania, at the head of 40,000 men ; but General Wright, with the Sixth and a portion of the Nine- teenth corps, scoured the country and failed to And him or any trace of his presence. Pennsylvania, however, was now thoroughly aroused. It was known that the Confederate general, Johnson, was raiding and working destruction in Maryland. On the 7th of August, Averill fell upon this force on the Komney road, as they were 7. retiring tow^ards Moorefleld, and routed them, capturing all their artillery, with many wagons and small-arms, and 500 prisoners. These successive raids had convinced General Grant that a powerful force, under a competent leader, was now needed in the valley of the Shenan- doah. Without delay he consolidated BEREYVILLE. 789 the Washington, Middle, Susquehanna, and Southwest Virginia Departments into what he called the Middle Military Division, and placed it under the com- mand of General Hunter. Grant visited Hunter, who was concentrated on the Monocacy, and gave him his instruc- tions. These raids must be ended ; and to prevent their repetition every- thing which can not be consumed must be destroyed. Hunter expressed a willingness to be relieved ; and on the 7th of August, the command was given to Sheridan, who promptly en- tered upon his duties. The force under the command of Sheridan consisted of the Sixth corps under Wright, and the Nineteenth under Emory, the old army of Western Vir- ginia, comprising the Eighth corps, un- der Crook; the entire first division of Potomac cavalry ; Averill’s division ; Lowell’s brigade, which had been usu- ally kept near Washington, and Kel- ley’s command ; to which was soon after- wards added Wilson’s second division — ^in all about 40,000 men, of which 10,000 were cavalry, with about twenty 6-gun batteries. The force under Early, including the two infantry corps of Rodes and Breckenridge, consisted of about 30,000 men, of which 10,000 were cavalry, with fourteen 6-gun bat- teries, and at this time was at Winches- ter, 27 miles west-southwest of Harper’s Ferry. At sunrise on the morning of the 10th of August, Sheridan began the movement of his forces from Halltown, about 4 miles west of Harper’s Ferry. Marching at first westward, he reached Charlestown in two hours, from which point the Nineteenth corps, preceded by the cavalry brigades of Custer Aug. and Gibbs, struck off to the left 10 - for Berry ville, 15 miles southwest. Further to the left marched the com- mand of Crook, while on the right the Sixth corps, preceded by the brigades of Devin and Lowell, moved along the Winchester road, turning off a few miles towards Berry ville to join the Nineteenth. The weather during the march was oppressively hot ; and the roads, in rainy seasons almost impassa- ble from deep mud, were now covered with a thick layer of dust, which the rapid tread of many thousand feet, with horses, artillery and wagon trains raised in stifling clouds. About noon the several cavalry brigades of Custer, De- vin, Gibbs, and Lov/ell formed a junc- tion at Berry ville. Four miles west of this place, on the road to Winchester, a body of the enemy’s skirmishers was found and driven off. The infantry bivouacked in the neighborhood of Berryville, on the different roads by which they had approached, the Sixtli corps on the right, the Nineteenth in the centre, the Eighth on the left. The cavalry, posted in the advance, held the roads leading to Winchester and Millwood, the latter place being occupied by Colonel Cesnola’s regi- ment. On the 11th the army took the road leading to Winchester, the cavalry in the advance. Custer’s brigade, on arriving at Sulphur Springs Biidge, about 4 miles east of Winchester, en- countered a body of the enemy. A sharp skirmish took place, lasting two 299 790 THE SHENANDOAH. hours, Custer being flanked and driven back. Meanwhile Devin’s brigade, fol- lowed by Gibbs’, had moved towards White Post, aiming to arrive by a cir- cuitous route at Ne^vtown, with the design of flanking the enemy, who, it was now ascertained, had begun to withdraw southward, along the road leading to Strasburg. This object, however, was not attained. The ad- vance under Cesnola encountered the enemy’s skirmishers near White Post, and drove them back on the road lead- ing to Newtown. On amving at the road leading south to Front Royal, a brigade of Confederate infantry was discovered, with three field pieces, in a very strong position. The advance waited till the remainder of Devin’s brigade arrived, when a severe fight ensued, lasting from eleven o’clock till twelve, but without any decisive result. At four o’clock Crook came up with his infantry and relieved Devin. The latter then marched on to the assistance of Gibbs, who had got nearly to New- town and engaged the enemy, and was now falling back. Devin arrived just in time to check the Confederates, who then retreated to the woods, unpur- sued, the National troops also retiring about a mile and bivouacking with a strong picket guard in front. The Con- federates by hard fighting succeeded in holding Newtown, and in covering their trains, which passed down safely towards Strasburg. The total National loss was about 300, chiefly in cavalry. The infantry, although not much engaged, suffered severely in marching, and lost many men from sunstroke. On the morning of the 12th, it hav- ing been ascertained that the enemy had retreated, Sheridan’s army Aug. moved forward again. The cav- 12. airy advanced, skirmishing most of the way, to Cedar Creek. About noon they found a force of the enemy on a hill in front of Strasburg. The Con- federates shelled and drove back the cavalry skirmishers, till they were re- lieved by the Eighth corps, which had now arrived. The remainder of the army in passing through Newtowm and Middletown met with no opposition, and on amving at Cedar Creek bivou- acked on the east bank, on the west side of which the enemy held a position in some old breast-works. There was active skirmishing during the remainder of the day, and in the evening some shelling across the creek, but no gen- eral engagement. On the follomng day, the enemy having fallen back in the night, the National skirmishers got into Strasburg, but were compelled to retire again. On the evening of the 14th the heights in front of the town were captured ; and on the following morning the small force of the enemy which had held Strasburg for two days withdrew. The works on Fisher’s Hill, however, still commanded the place. News, however, had now arrived which caused Sheridan with his whole army to commence a rapid retreat to- wards Harper’s Ferry. On the 13th, while the National army was lying in front of Strasburg, Mosby with a few light troops dashed through Snicker’s Gap, crossed the Shenandoah, and fell suddenly on the rear of Sheridan’s CROOKED RUN. 791 supply train near Berry ville on its way to Winchester, about 4 miles from the gap. The guard, consisting of Kenly’s brigade of hundred days’ men, became panic-stricken when Mosby made his charge. A few brave men fought well for a while, but the rest made olf as rapidly as possible. Mosby captured and destroyed 75 wagons, chiefly laden with cavalry baggage, besides securing 200 prisoners, 600 horses and mules, and 200 head of cattle. He then re- tired, having lost only two men killed and 3 wounded. The National loss was not much greater. But this dis- aster in the rear, though not fatal in itself, caused it to be reported that Longstreet with his entire corps was getting into a position across Sheridan’s line of communications, and was cutting off his whole army. The consequence was that on the 15th Sheridan got his Aug. ^ corps and the various cavalry 15. brigades in readiness to retreat. The movement commenced about eleven at night, the Nineteenth corps taking the lead towards Winchester, followed the next day by Crook’s com- mand, the Sixth corps bringing up the rear. To prevent flanking operations on the part of the enemy from the gaps in the Blue Bidge, and to cover the retreat in that direction, Devin’s cavalry brigade had been sent a few miles to the southeast towards Front Royal. In the meantime a body of the enemy, forming a part of Kershaw’s division, which had taken part in the recent actions near Malvern Hills, had come by railroad to Mitchell Station; and marched thence to Front Royal ; and on the morning of the 16th Cus- ter’s brigade, followed not long after- wards by that under Gibbs, was sent to the support of Devin. Custer arrived soon after noon and took posi- tion on the left of Devin. The line had not been long formed, however, before the enemy suddenly appeared, marching in two columns, one of infan- try, the other of cavalry, along the road leading northward from Front Royal to the Shenandoah. A brisk artillery fight then took place, the Con- federates using 8 pieces, though with- out much effect. Their cavalry having crossed by the bridge and their infantry by the ford, they advanced to carry the National batteries, but were re- pulsed on the right by a charge from two regiments of Devin’s brigade, each of which captured a flag. The Confed- erates were thus ao:ain driven over the river. Meanwhile, having secui-ed a good position for their artillery, they attempted to turn the National left. At this time' a brigade of Kershaw’s divi- sion crossed the river, when a series of charges and counter-charges took place with the brigade of Custer. The fight- ing continued till after dark ; and when the Confederates fell back to recross the river 150 of them were made pris- oners at the ford. The killed and wounded did not exceed 100 on either side. This affair took place near Crooked Run, a small tributary of the Shenandoah, a little below the conflu- ence of the north and south forks. Early the next morning Custer’s and Devin’s brigades fell back on the road leading iiorthward to Winchester to 702 THE SHENANDOAH. follow the infantry column, carrying out as they went orders which had been given for the capture or destruc- tion of all the stock, grain, hay, and everything else which could con- Libute to the sustenance of man or beast. Fields and gardens were rav- aged and swept clean. The enemy followed closely upon the heels of Sheridan. The Sixth corps, which brought up the rear of the in- fantry column, had left Winchester on the morning of the 17th, Colonel Pen- rose’s brigade, consisting of only about 500 men, having been left behind as a support to Torbert’s cavalry. About Aug. o’clock the advance of the 17. enemy, approaching by the New- town and Winchester turnpike, attacked Penrose, who had deployed his small brigade in skirmishing order, with the cavalry on his flank, about a mile out of the town on the road leading to Kernstown. The cavalry, however, gave way, leaving Penrose to make the best fight he could behind fences, trees, and walls. Just before dark, the enemy having received large acces- sions of numbers, was able to flank Penrose’s little force ; and it was soon broken, losing 300 prisoners, the re- mainder, with Penrose and a few officers, making their way through Winchester, escaped towards Clifton and Martins- burg. That night the enemy occupied Winchester. The National cavalry bivouacked at Berry ville, next day taking up the line of retreat towards Harper’s Ferry, being much harassed on their flanks and rear by the Confed- erate cavalry. On the 18th, some men in citizens, dress, killed a coi-poral and two men belonging to an advanced post of the Fifth Michigan Cavalry, picketing at Snicker’s Gap, and hastily made off. Several other similar occurrences took place; and on the 19th, General Custer ordered sqme houses of disloyal citizens to be destroyed in retaliation. While a squad of men from the Fifth Michi- gan were engaged in carrying out this order, they were set upon by Mosby’s men and compelled to fly in confusion : 18 of them were overtaken ; and of these 15 were killed. This affair which took place near Snicker’s Gap turnpike, was followed by another retaliatory order for the destruction of more houses of disloyal citizens. During the retreat of Sheridan’s army, Averill, who commanded at Mar- tinsburg, continued to hold the place ; but the alarm had become so- great on the 18th, that he abandoned it with his main force, leaving only one com- pany, which was driven out on the fol- lowing day. Another panic then arose in that neighborhood and spread into Maryland. In Hagerstown, merchants packed their goods and sent them north- ward ; the quartermasters’ stores were loaded on railroad trains in readiness to be rapidly transported to Frederick ; the sick and wounded were sent to Harrisburg. In the mean while Averill took possession of the fords of the Potomac from Shepherdstown to Wil- liamspoii;. Once more preparations were made to resist an attempt on the part of the enemy to cross over to Maiy- land ; and on the 19th Shendan’s wagon BOLIVAR HEIGHTS. 793 train was reported to be safe ” back at Hagerstown. The panic soon died out; and the enemy, a few of whose advanced cavalry had actually got near the Potomac, began to retire. On the 20th some of the National cavalry again entered Martinsburg. On the 21st, Sheridan had disposed his army advantageously about two miles out from Charlestown towards Summit Point. It extended in a line from the Smithsfield to the Berryville road, the Sixth corps on the right, the Eighth in the centre, and the Nine- Aug, leenth on the left. About eight in 2 1 . the morning Early came up, and A^dth a part of his force attacked the advanced cavalry skirmishers on the right and left, easily driving them in. The main body of his army moved off iicross the National right ; but with a small force he drove back Wilson’s division of cavalry from a good position on Summit Point with severe loss. He then threw a few brigades against the Sixth corps and the right of the Eighth ; and fighting ensued, which lasted from ten o’clock till the close of the day, in the course of which the Sixth corps steadily advanced till it came upon the enemy’s line of battle ; but it sustained heavy losses in the continuous heavy skirmishing, and retired to its original position at dark. Cannonading was kept up for some time ; but the result of the battle was, that Sheridan’s army again fell back and took a position on Bolivar Heights, his right resting on the Potomac, his left on the Shenan- doah, his head quarters at Hall town. The position of the army here was ex- ceedingly strong, far outnumbering the enemy ; and reinforcements with sup- plies were being sent to it daily. In the mean time the enemy’s cavalry ranged the country in all directions at will. On the 24th, a reconnoitring force of 3 brigades sent out towards Charlestown discovered that Early was there in force, with, his pickets out towards Bunker Hill. On the 25th, Torbert’s cavalry was seid to reconnoitre in full force in the direction of Leetown, Wilson’s division moving out from Halltown and uniting with Merritt’s at Kearneys- ville, from which point the enemy’s skirmishers retired. The National troops had the advantage for a little while ; but the face of affairs soon changed, and the Confederates drove back the divisions of Wilson and Mer- ritt, which were very badly handled, and compelled to abandon Kearneys- ville, and make the best of their way towards Harper’s Ferry. A running fight ensued, lasting from eleven in the forenoon till dark, by which time Mer- ritt’s division was safe in camp at Bolivar Heights ; but Custer’s brigade, which had the rear in the retreat, did not fare so well. At Shepherdstown Custer found himself cut off from the Halltown road, by which he intended to march, and was finally compelled to seek safety by crossing the Potomac. The enemy did not venture to follow, but held the river from Shepherdstown to Williamsport, and on the following day made demonstrations as if designing to .cross at the fords. In the afternoon Thorburn’s division of Crook’s corps and Lowell’s cavalry pushed out on a 794 THE SHENANDOAH. reconnoissance towards Halltown. The infantry soon encountered the Con- federates, and after a contest, which lasted only twenty minutes, drove them to the cover of their artillery. Lowell with his cavalry then dashed in on the flank and cut off 69 prisoners, including 6 officers. The result of this reconnois- sance was that the enemy was found to have left Sheridan’s front ; and about seven o’clock in the moi'nino: of the 28th he was again on the march in the direction of Charlestown, his cavalry in the advance carefully reconnoitring in various directions. By ten o’clock the Nineteenth corps reached Charlestown ; and the entire army pushed on to the old line of battle held duriitg the en- gagement a week before, about 2 miles beyond the town, the Sixth corps hold- ing the right, the Nineteenth the cen- tre, and the Eighth the left. Then having formed line of battle, the army awaited the result of the cavalry ad- vance. On the morning of the 29th Aug. Confederates were found near 29, Smithsfield ; and General Merritt making a vigorous attack upon their cavalry drove it back through the town and over Opequan Creek. A reconnois- sance was then made beyond the creek by General Custer’s cavalry with Ean- som’s battery ; but encountering the Confederate skirmishing line he retired again across the stream in the direction of Smithsfield, followed by the enemy’s infantry, which, however, on the ad- vance of General Ricketts’ division fell back again rapidly. Sheridan’s army then again retired upon Charlestown, and remained quiet till the morning of the 3d of September, when it was again put in motion in a southwesterly di- rection, Crook’s command occupying the left, the Nineteenth corps the cen- tre, and the Sixth the right. Between ten and eleven the second cavaliy gept. division on the extreme right was 3. attacked, by Lomax’s cavalry about 7 miles south of Martinsburg. Lomax’s troops, however, were driven from the field. About noon Crook’s command reached the vicinity of Berry ville, where it was attacked by a large Con- federate force, approaching from the direction of Winchester. Crook hastily formed his men ; and a battle ensued, which lasted till dark, when the enemy retired, having suffered severely. The remainder of the army then coming up, got into position in the neighborhood of Berryville, and threw up substantial breast- works. Here Sheridan remained about two weeks, content to hold his own in the valley, without attempting any venturesome expedition, but keep- ing his force well in hand, so as to check any movement on the part of Early. During this time frequent re- connoissances were made both by the Confederate and the National cavalry. Sheridan had now been considerably over a month in the valley, with an army decidedly superior to that of Early; and his marches and counter- marches had been a source of much perplexity and some dissatisfaction with the Northern public. His campaign so far had been one of manceuvres, in which decisive fighting was avoided. The enemy, however, had been kept constantly occupied ; and a force which WINCHESTER. 795 Lee could ill spare had been kept away from Petersburg, or from reinforcing Hood at Atlanta. When Atlanta fell, it ceased to be a part of Grant’s policy to keep Early with a large force idle in the valley; and about the middle of September he paid a hasty visit to the upper Potomac, had an interview with Sheridan, and gave him permission to change the character of the campaign by commencing a series of offensive operations. A reconnoissance made on the 13th by the first cavalry division supported by Getty’s division of the Sixth corps, to Lock’s Ford on the Opequan, showed that the Confederates were on the west bank in some force. Three days later it was discovered that they had disap- peared entirely from the neighborhood of the left wing of the National army on the Winchester and Berryville turn- pike, and that they had but a weak line on the right. On the 18th the Confederate general, Gordon, with his division of infantry, occupied Martins- burg, but was speedily driven out of it again by Averill. Sheridan now hav- ing become satisfied that the main body of the Confederates had moved to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Stephen- son’s Depot, resolved by a rapid move- - ment westward towards Winchester, to get into their rear. On the afternoon of the 18th, therefore, the troops were placed under arms and held in readi- ness to march at a moment’s notice. At three o’clock on the morning of the Sept, tile Sixth and Nineteenth 19. corps were set in motion, the Sixth being directed to march in par- allel columns on each side of the Win- chester and Berryville turnpike with the artillery, ammunition, and supply trains between them on the road, the Nineteenth corps following by the same road in similar order. Crook with the Eighth corps was ordered to move at five o’clock from his position in the vicinity of Summit Point, across the country in a southw'esterly direc- tion, and form a junction with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps at the point where the Winchester and Berry- ville turnpike crosses the Opequan, 5 miles east of Winchester. Torbert and Averill, with their large cavalry force, were directed to occupy the enemy’s attention by demonstrating on his left. Shortly after daylight Wilson’s division of cavalry crossed the Opequan and skirmished with the enemy, who were discovered to be in force on the west bank. The march of the Nineteentli corps was by some means so delayed that it did not cross the Opequan till about noon, and thus Early had time to draw in his left from its advanced position near Bunker Hill. Such was the resistance offered that the first and second lines were thrown into some confusion, and forced to retire behind the third ; but as soon as Sheridan got his batteries into a position from which they were able to silence the enemy’s guns, order was restored, and they again advanced, retaking the position from which they had been driven, and holding it until reinforced by Crook, whose troops had been kept in reserve on the east side of the creek. Then followed one of the most fiercely con- 796 THE SHENANDOAH. tested battles of the war, the opposing lines being at some points not more than 200 yards apart. About three in the afternoon Crook’s first division got into position on the right and his second in the rear, supporting a divi- sion of the Nineteenth corps. About this time, also, Torbert, with Averill’s and Merritt’s cavalry divisions, arrived on the extreme right. Sheridan then ordered an advance along the entire line. The Confederates stubbornly maintained their ground against the National infantry, but gave way finally before a most brilliant and successful charge of the cavalry, made at a critical moment. The battle lasted till five in the evening. The victory, however, Avas of the most decisive character. Early’s troops were driven from the field in confusion ; and, according to a despatch of Sheridan’s, they were sent whirling through Winchester,” whence they retreated rapidly to Fisher’s Hill, 3 miles south of Strasburg. Night prevented Sheridan from continuing tlie pursuit. Such was the battle of Winchester. Sheridan captured 2500 prisoners, on the field and in the pur- suit. In the hospitals at Winchester he found nearly 3000 wounded. The Confederates left behind them, also, 5 guns and 9 battle fiags. Early’s entire loss must have amounted to 6000. Sheridan’s entire loss could hardly have been much under 5000. On both sides several prominent officers were killed, among them General David Russell and the Confederate general, Rodes. The position of Early at Fisher’s Hill was one of extraordinary natural strength. His line extended in a west- erly direction across the Strasburg val- ley, the right resting on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, the left on Little North Mountain. From this position Sheridan soon made prepara- tions to drive him ; and after a good deal of manceuvring, his army about noon on the 2 2d lay as follows: gept. Crook’s coi^s on the right, the Sixth in the centre, and the Nineteenth on the left. While Wright and Emory made demonstrations on the left and centre, and Averill drove in the ene- my’s skirmishers. Crook moved out to the extreme right. After a long and arduous march, he got round and flanked Early’s left between four and five in the afternoon, and made a furi- ous attack, sweeping down behind the enemy’s breast-works, and driving the Confederates out of them in the greatest confusion. While Crook was thus carrying everything before him on the enemy’s left, Wright attacked the Con- federate centre, separating the two wings. The enemy broke and fled towards Woodstock, leaving behind him 16 guns and 1100 prisoners. The victory at Fisher’s Hill was the moi*e easily won from the fact that Early dreaded an attack from Torbert, who, it was known, was coming through the Luray Valley with his cavalry. Tor- bert, however, had been effectively held in check by an inferior force near Mel- ford. Sheridan marched, the night after the battle, to Woodstock, but halted there in the morning to give his troops rest and to await the arrival of rations. DEVASTATION OF THE VALLEY. 797 Averill pushed on in advance, drove the Confederates to Mount Jackson, where they made a stand and resisted his further progress. Sheridan soon after- wards advanced to Mount Jackson and thence to New Market ; and on the 25th his headquarters were at Harri- sonburg, his cavalry moving towards Staunton. On the 24th, Torbert had a sharp engagement near Luray with the enemy’s cavalry, who were trying to operate in Sheridan’s rear; but he succeeded in driving them up the valley; and on the 26th he rejoined the main army. Early retreated to Port Kepublic, and thence to Brown’s Gap, a depression in the Blue Bidge 15 miles southeast of Harrisonburg, which he held in force, and retained, in spite of several attempts to drive him from it. Torbert, with Wilson’s division of cavalry and a brigade of Merritt's, entered Staunton on the morning of the 26th and destroyed a quantity of the enemy’s property ; then marching along the railroad to Waynes- boro, he tore up the track for the entire distance, as well as the bridges over Christian’s Creek and the South Biver, finally retiring to Harrisonburg by way of Staunton, destroying or carrying oft* lai-ge supplies of forage and grain. Several reconnoissances made to- wards Early’s position at Brown’s Gap showed that he enjoyed unusual facili- ties for defense. He had thrown up intrenchments and prepared to make a determined stand. An advance on Lynchburg on the part of Sheridan, with Early in his rear now receiving reinforcements, would have been ex- tremely hazardous. His communications would have been at once interrupted. As it was, numerous guerrilla bands, under the lead of Mosby, White, and other partisan chieftains, kept up an annoying warfare between Strasburg and the Potomac ; and ever since the army left Harper’s Ferry, every small party and every straggler had been “ bushwhacked ” by the people of the valley, many of whom had obtained protection passes from earlier com- manders. Lieutenant John Meigs, of the engineer corps, was overtaken and murdered in a narrow wooded road between Harrisonburg and Dayton ; but in retaliation for this, all the houses within five miles were burned by order of Sheridan. Nothing was to be gained by staying any longer in the neighborhood of Port Bepublic and Cross Keys; and it remained only to fall back down the valley to some point which could be easily and firmly held, and to which the winter supplies for the army might be conducted in safety. On the 6th of October, therefore, Sheridan withdrew his forces from the various advance points which they had occupied, and marched northward, destroying on his way, in accordance with orders from Govern- ment, all the hay, grain, and forage to be found, beyond what was necessary for the use of his own army. In a des- patch dated October 7th, Sheridan says: “ The whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountain has been made unten- able for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements, over 70 mills filled with wheat and flour Four herds of cattle have been 708 THE SHENANDOAH. driven before the army, and not less than 3000 sheep have been killed and issued to the troops. This destruction embraces the Luray and Little Fork valleys as well as the main valley.’’ As Sheridan returned down the valley towards Cedar Creek, he was closely followed by the Confederate cavalry under Rosser, supported by the main body of Early’s army. On the Oct. head of Sheridan’s in- fan try column having entered Strasburg by the east road, while the lear was still some miles further south, the enemy following the cavalry on the west road had advanced so far as to get on the left flank of the infantry column. Custer and Merritt then turned and attacked with their cavalry, vvhen a report having spread among Rosser’s men that the National infantry were at the same time flanking them, they immediately gave way and broke into a stampede. The pursuit was continued 7 miles. The loss of the enemy was not great, being only about 300 men, including prisoners ; but he abandoned 11 guns, 4 caissons, and an ammunition train. Thino^s remained quiet for several days after this affair ; but on the 12th the Confederates again appeared in the neighborhood of Strasburg and opened an artillery fire on Emory’s and Crook’s corps. These troops were then partially with- drawn and Crook pushed out a recon- noissance, which brought on a smart enoraccement of three hours’ duration. Night, however, closed upon the scene without any advantage and with little loss to either side. On the 15th, Sheridan went to Washington on important business, leaving the ai-my under the command of General Wright, whose corps was, in the meantime, intrusted to 15. General Ricketts. Fisher’s Hill had been abandoned as not affording any good defensible line on its southern slope, on which side Early would be likely to approach ; and the army had now lain for several days in froiit of Strasburg, behind breast-works thrown up on rising and rolling ground, mostly along the east side of Cedar Creek — Crook with the Eighth corps on the left, the Nineteenth corps in the centre, the Sixth on the right. On the right of the Sixth, a little in the rear and in reserve, were the two cavalry divisions of Custer and Merritt. The line was 4 or 5 miles long, and following the course of the creek, nearly north and south. Crook’s corps rested its left flank on the North Fork of the Shenan- doah and its right on the Winchester and Strasburg turnpike, the principal highway in that region. Behind Crook’s left and at right angles to it, with a view to guard against any turning movement on that flank, lay a force about equivalent to a brigade, known as Kitching’s provisional division. North of the turnpike came the Nineteenth corps, Grover’s division holding its left and resting on the turnpike, where it joined Thorburn’s division of Crook’s command. The Sixth corps on the right, and the second cavalry division, were not strongly protected with works, as was all the rest of the line, but were well posted on high ridges, and held firmly the Middle road, or that which EARLY’S NOOTURN-AL FLANK MOVEMENT. 700 runs next north of the turnpike. A small stream called Meadow Kun flows into the creek between the two roads mentioned. In front the National po- sition was considered impregnable, ex- cept by surprise, and to turn it would be, it was believed, an undertaking of extreme temerity. To guard against surprise on the left, the North Fork was picketed by Powell’s cavalry divi- sion from Cedar Creek all the way to Front Koyal. Weir’s battery com- manded the fords, supported by cavalry, which were so posted as to prevent surprise from the direction of the Luray Valley. Artillery was posted in front of the positions of Crook and Emory, so as to command the ford and the bridge over Cedar Creek, as well as the rising ground on the west side. The wagon trains and reserve artillery lay in the rear on the turnpike. On the 17th the cavalry on the right under CMster was attacked by Confederate cavalry and infantry ; and a severe skirmish ensued, resulting in the re- pulse of the enemy. Next day a care- ful reconnoissance was made from the left towards Strasburg and Fisher’s Hill ; but no sign of movement on the part of the enemy was discovered. Despatches, however, were captured ; and it was thus ascertained that re- inforcements had been sent to Early, for the purpose of enabling him to attack and defeat Sheridan. Early, in fact, had just received a reinforcement of some 12,000 men. His actual strength was thus increased to 27,000. His army was still smaller than that of Sheridan. Encouraged, however, by so large an accession of strength. Early prepared to put in exe- cution one of the most audacious movements of the war. Before break of day on the 19th, he arranged his troops at Fisher’s Hill and began to move against Sheridan’s lines. His cav airy and light artillery were directed, to advance against the National right, so as to occupy the attention of Torbert and the Sixth corps. His infan tiy marched in five columns, of which Gor- don’s, Kamseur’s, and Pegram’s were ordered to place themselves by daybreak on the left rear of the lA* whole National position, while Ker- shaw’s and Wharton’s Were to endeavor to get, about the same time, close under the intrenched rising ground on which lay Crook’s command. To turn the National left, it was necessary that Early’s columns should descend into the gorge at the base of the Massanub ten Mountain, ford the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and skirt Crook’s en- campment for some distance, in some places within 400 yards of his pickets. It was a hazardous as well as audacious experiment ; but it was executed with wonderful skill and, as the result proved, with complete success. The movement was conducted quietly, and with great caution. The result was that before daybreak the Confederate infantry, formed and ready for battle, lay within 600 yards of the National camps. Gordon’s column was diagon- ally in the rear of the Nineteenth corps; on the left of Crook, facing Kitching’s provisional division, was Ramseur supported by Pegram; in soo TIIK SIIEXANDOAII. front of Crook was Kershaw supported by Wharton. Under eover of the morning mist, Kershaw’s column moved rapidly through Crook’s picket line, and with tremendous fury rushed upon the intrenchments. The onslaught was fearful. The surprise was complete. In a quarter of an hour Crook’s gallant army of Western Virginia be- came a disorganized mass of fugitives in rapid rout towards the position of the Nineteenth corps. Crook lost sev- eral batteries, some 7 00 men made prisoners, and about 100 in killed and ^vounded. The Sixth corps was at the same time menaced ; and its attention (Kicupied by the enemy’s cavalry and light artillery. It fell to the lot of the Nineteenth corps to resist unaided the shock of Gordon’s column, now advanc- ing solidly massed up the slope of a broad bare hill which commanded Em- ory’s camp. The Confederate force, including the divisions of Kamseur and Pegram, was as strong as Emory’s, and was supported by another column com- ing up through the woods on the left, and along the turnpike in front. The Nineteenth corps was thus not only taken in the rear, but outnumbered. Still it held out for about an hour; and then its left gave way, leaving a part of the artillery in the enemy’s hands. The left and centre of the National army had now fallen into complete confusion ; and all the trains that could be got away were sent off in haste along the turnpike towards Winchester. The sun was now high in the heavens; and the extent of the disaster was rendered visibla The Confederates had succeeded in rolling up the left of the line, and in severing Powell’s cavalry division on the ex treme left from the rest of the army , and they were now forcing back the entire centre, and occupying the in- trenchments of the Nineteenth corps as they had those of Crook’s command. They had also captured 18 pieces of artillery, thus not only lessening the National power for defense, but in- creasing their own power for attack. The captured cannon were turned with terrible effect on their late possessors. The Sixth corps was now ordered over from the right ; and these troops, exe- cuting quickly a change of front which brought them at right angles to their former line, were soon engaged in des- perate battle. The resistance made by the Sixth corps in covering the retreat afforded opportunity for re-forming the fugitives to some extent; but the Con- federates increased their artillery and musketry fire to the utmost, and still pressed the National left flank, with the view, apparently, of getting full possession of the turnpike, that they might seize the trains and get between the National army and Winchester. The enemy pressed the left much more vigorously than the right. Merritt’s and Custer’s cavalry were transferred from the right to the left ; and a severe con- test took place in the thickly wooded country near Middletown, in which the left had been placed by its rapid re- treat. About nine o’clock Sheridan’s army had got into line of battle again, and made desperate efforts to check the enemy. Both sides used artillery ; SHERIDAN’S FAMOUS RIDE. 801 bat the Confederates had greatly the advantage in this arm, having not only their own batteries, but the captured . guns of their antagonists besides. The Sixth corps held its ground well ; but Crook’s corps on the* left was forced back, and the whole line gradually gave way, the enemy again getting past the National left flank, and finally gaining the village of • Middletown, about 3 miles northeast of the posi- tion from which Sheridan’s army had been driven. The principal aim of the National commanders now was to cover the trains and draw off the army with as little loss as possible to Newton, where they hoped to be able to re-form and offer an effective resistance. The battle had been completely lost. Camps, earth-works, some 24 guns and 1800 prisoners — all were left in the hands of the enemy. The routed Nationals were fl}dng in all directions, large numbers of them making their way to Win- chester. The National army fell back, as we have seen, first towards Middletown, and afterwards in the direction of Newton. About a mile or so in the rear of Middletown, Wright succeeded in restoring something like order. Sheridan was still absent. He had been, as we have mentioned, on a visit to Washington. On his return, he spent the night at Winchester. It was not until his army had been defeated that he was made aware of Early’s attack. He was in his saddle in a minute. He had scarcely left Win- chester when he beheld sad evidences of the disaster which had befallen his army. The road was covered with wagon trains and crowds of weary fugitives. As he rode along on his splendid charger, the air was rent with cheers. The fugitives felt abashed and halted ; and the wounded by the way- side feebly waved a joyful salute. He did not slacken his pace to rebuke or encourage. Waving his hat to the cheering crowds, his horse still at full gallop, he shouted, “Face the other way, boys ! Face the other way ! We are going back to our camps. We are going to lick them out of their boots.” The words were electric. The tide of fugitives began to turn. As he neared the main body, the enthusiasm became unbounded. Officers and men tossed their hats and cheered to the echo. He repeated his fiery words, “ Boys, if I had been here this would never have happened. We are going back. We’ll have all these camps and cannon back again.” What Sheridan said, he meant ; and the men believed him. He was in the field shortly after ten o’clock. There was a lull in the fight, which lasted several hours. Wright, as has been mentioned, had already restored order, and made dispositions, if not for attack, at least for effective resistance. Sheridan approved of the arrange- ments ; and amid the most enthusiastic cheers, he rode along the lines, study- ing the ground and encouraging the men. About one o’clock Early made a charge, which was vigorously repulsed by Emory. * About three o’clock Shen- dan gave the order, “The entire line will advance. The Nineteenth corps will move in connection with the Sixth. 802 THE SHENANDOAH. The right of the Nineteenth will swing to the left, so as to drive the enemy upon the pike.” The order was promptly obeyed. The entire line moved forward — Getty’s division leading the charge. MeiTitt’s cavalry covered the left flank; and Custer’s cavalry was thrown out on the right. As the Nationals advanced tliey were checked for a moment by a tremendous fire of artillery and mus- ketry. The check, however, was but momentary ; for Emory swung around upon the foe and by two gallant charges greatly disordered his lines. Almost at the same moment, the National cav- alry fell upon Early’s flank. The tide of battle had already turned. The Confederates fought with bravery and determination ; but Sheridan’s boys now fighting in the presence of their favorite chief were not to be resisted. The battle, in fact, was already won ; and what was so recently a retreat, was now changed into a pursuit. It was a perfect rout. On his arrival, Sheridan said we’ll have all those camps and cannon back again.” His word was made good. That night, the National infantry halted within their old camps ; but the cavalry pursued, hanging upon the flanks and rear of the retreating foe, until he was beyond Strasburg, and night fell upon the scene. Early halted for the night at Fisher’s Hill, and in the morning resumed his retreat south wai-d. In the pursuit, all the captured guns were recovered. The Nationals cap- tured not only their own guns, but 23 of those of the enemy, together with 1500 prisoners, -and any quantity of horses, mules, ambulances, wagons and stores of various kinds. Such was the Battle of Cedar Creek ; and such was the end of the great campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. It was one of the most brilliant cam- paigns of the war. It was character- ized by vigor and skill ; and it was crowned with success. Sheridan had captured during the campaign 13,000 prisoners and killed and wounded 10.000 men. His own loss, however, was great — reaching the high figure of 16.000 men. He had now taken his place among the great captains of the age. His praise was in every mouth. His famous ride from Winchester has been immortalized by the combined influences of poetry and song. It was a proud honor which was conferred upon him when some three weeks afterwards on the occasion of the resignation of General McClellan, he was promoted to the rank of Major-General in tlie regu- lar army ; but it was an honor to which he had entitled himself by daring, by energy, by unwearied activity and by success. THE MARCH TO THE SEA. 803 CHAPTER XXXVIII. Sherman at Atlanta — ^How the Men were Occupied — ^Position of the National Forces — Hood Rallies ar Jonesboro — Speech of Jefferson Davis at Macon — New Confederate Policy — Thomas sent to Nashville — Movements of Hood — Allatoona Pass — Arrival of General Corse — General French demands its Surrender —Corse’s Reply — Ready for the “Useless Effusion of Blood” — The Assault — Corse Wounded — Sherman at Kenesaw Mountain — The Confederates Retreat towards Dallas — Sherman at Kingston — Sherman at Rome — Hood Before Resaca — Demands its Surrender — Colonel Weaver's Reply — The National Post at Dalton Captured — Sherman at Resaca — Communications with Rome Re-opened — Affairs at Snake Creek Gap and Ship’s Gap — Rapid Retreat of Hood to Gadsden — Beauregard Assumes Command — Sherman at Gaylesville— New Plan of Campaign — Sherman’s Proposal to Grant — The March to the Sea Suggested — Grant Consents — Sherman Prepares for the March — He Sends some of his Troops to Thomas — Sherman’s Army Re-organized — Atlanta in Flames — The Railroad Routes to the Sea — Order of March — Troops to Live on the Country — “ Uncle Billy” and the Troops — The Men in Fine Spirits — Feint on Macon — Battle of Griswoldville — Occupation of Milledgeville — Flight of the Legislators — Howard Crosses the Oconee — Occupation of Sandersville — Sherman at Tennille Station — Kilpatrick Defeats Wheeler — Crossing the Ogeechee — Approach to Savannah — The Savannah and Ogeechee RiverS; — Captain Duncan and two Scouts Reach the Fleet — Rejoicing in the North — Foster’s Co-operative Movement — Fort McAllister — Preparing to Assault — The Port Reduced — Arrival of Foster and Dahlgren — Sherman on board the Nemaha — The Surrender of Savannah Demanded — Hardee Refuses — Kilpatrick Cuts the Gulf Railroad — Savannah Invested — Union Causeway — Corduroy Road — Vigorous Preparations for the Assault — Hardee’s Position Desperate — After Destroying all the Confederate Property, he Retreats during the Night — Sherman Enters the City — His Christmas Present to President Lincoln — Halleck and Grant’s Congratulations — A Compli- ment from Grant — A Successful Campaign — The Inherent Weakness of the Confederacy Demonstrated — Fearful Destruction of Property — General Geary Appointed Military Governor of Savannah — Resolution of Submission to the Laws of the United States — Sherman Perfecting his Plan for the March through the Carolinas. After the fall of Atlanta, there was a lull in the campaign. The * wearied armies on both sides were permitted to enjoy a brief period of repose. They were not, however, allowed to be wholly idle. Hood col- lected and recruited his forces at Love- joy’s Station. Sherman’s head-quarters were at Atlanta. Some of his men obtained leave of absence. Those who remained were employed in the con- struction of huts and barracks, in strengthening the defenses of the city, and in repairing the railroads. Supplies and recruits were hurried forward from Chattanooga. It seemed as if Sherman intended to hold Atlanta with a strong garrison, and to make it the base for further operations towards the South. Before the end of September the place was so strengthened and filled with supplies that, with a small garrison, it would have been able to resist the attacks of vastly superior numbers. The city was held by the army of the Cumberland under Thomas. The army of the Tennessee, under Howard, was grouped about East Point, and the army of the Ohio, under Schofield, held Decatur. The cavalry consisted of two B04 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. divisions : one stationed at Decatur, under Garrard; the other, under Kil- patrick, was posted near Sandtown, with a pontoon bridge over the Chatta- hoochee, from which position any movement of the enemy towards the west could be watched. Numerous changes occurred in the composition of the armies. The term of service of many of the regiments had expired, and the temporary suspension of active operations afforded an opportunity to consolidate and reorganize, to reclothe and equip the men, and to make prep- arations for another campaign. The garrisons in the rear also, and at points along the railroad, were strengthened to make the communications more se- cure. Wat^ner’s division of the Fourth corps and Morgan’s division of the Fourteenth corps were sent back to Chattanooga. General Hood, recovering with sur- pi’ising elasticity from the stunning blow which he received in the loss of Atlanta, rallied and reorganized his forces at Jonesboro, receiving his sup- plies by the Macon Railroad. His army numbered about 40,000 men, ex- clusive of the Georgia militia, which, as if to give the impression that no immediate offensive movement was con- templated, were withdrawn by Gov- ernor Brown soon after the evacuation of Atlanta. The governor expressed a hope, however, that he should be able to return the militia force to Hood’s command in greater numbers and with equal efficiency when the interests of the public service should require it. It was not the intention of the Con- federate authorities, however, to allow their principal Southern army to remain inactive. Whatever declarations they might make to the public in the hoj>e to belittle Sherman’s successes, they were well aware that the capture of Atlanta was a blow at the heart of the Confederacy, and that it would be so considered by the Southern people. It was evident that if Georgia and the Gulf States were to be saved to the Confederacy, something must be done, and that without delay, to arrest the victorious progress of the National army. While affairs were in this posi- tion, Jefferson Davis set out on a tour of inspection through the South ; and at Macon, on the 23d of Septem- gepl. ber, he delivered an address on 23. the crisis, marked by so many indiscreet admissions that some of the Confederate journals refused to believe the reports to be genuine. In this address he spoke with undisguised vexation of the depletion of Hood’s ranks by desertion and absenteeism ; and he promised that if all the men away without leave would return to their duty, Sherman’s army should meet the fate that befell that of the French empire in its retreat from Moscow. The new policy to be inaugurated in the South by the Confederates was in a measure foreshadowed by the speech of Davis at Macon. It was borrowed from that which Sherman had himself so successfully earned out in his cap- ture of Atlanta, and had the merit of boldness if not of originality and far- sightedness. In accordance with this new plan of the Confederates, Hood’s HOOD AT DALLAS. 805 whole army was to move rapidly in a compact body to the north of Atlanta, and after breaking up the railroad between the Chattahoochee and Chat- tanooga, push on to Bridgeport and there destroy the great railroad bridge over the Tennessee Kiver. Atlanta would then be cut off from Chat- tanooofa and the latter from Nashville. Sherman thus separated from his prim- ary and secondary bases, would find Atlanta but a barren conquest. It would, indeed, have been difficult for him to hold it ; for he would soon have found himself in perplexity from the want of provisions and supplies, which would be intercepted in all directions by the Georgia militia. Forrest, un- doubtedly the best of the Confederate (cavalry officers, was already operating in southern Tennessee, where the Na- tional force was barely adequate to the task of protecting the communications between Nashville and Chattanooga. It was anticipated, also, that the re- sumption of offensive movements on the part of Hood would restore the morale of his army, which had become dispirited by its long series of retreats and reverses ; and that the opposite effect would be produced on the army of Sherman if compelled to abandon conquests effected at the cost of so many severe battles and painful marches. Such was the plan devised by the Confederate authorities — a plan which if vigorously carried out, and against a less able general than Sher- man, might have been productive of the most disastrous consequences to the National arms. It will be seen that Sherman was fully equal to the emer- gency, and that the prophecies of the Southern press, that the “ great flanker ” was about to be ^^out flanked,” were not to be fulfilled. On the 28th of September, as soon as he be- -S. came convinced that the enemy intend- ed to assume the offensive, Sherman sent Thomas, his second in command, to Nashville, to organize the new troops expected to arrive there, to make pre- liminary preparations, and to look after Forrest. In spite of strenuous opposition, Hood was retained at the head of the Confederate army, with Cheatham, S. D. Lee, and Stewart, commanding his three corps. Wheeler remained in command of the cavalry, which had been largely reinforced. Hood soon moved westward towards the Chatta- hoochee, taking a position facing Sher- man and covering the West Point Eailroad about Palmetto Station. He also threw a pontoon bridge over the Chattahoochee, and sent cavalry de- tachments beyond it in the direction of Carrollton and Powder Springs. About the 2d of October his whole army was over the Chattahoochee, 2 • and on the march towards Dallas, where his three corps were directed to concentrate. At this point he was able to threaten Kome and Kingston, as well as the fortified places on the railroad to Chattanooga, while there remained open to him in case of defeat, a line of retreat southwestward into Alabama. Advancing eastward from Dallas to the railroad, he captured Big Shanty and Ackworth Stations, broke the tele- 994 806 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. graph wires, and destroyed the railroad between those places. He also sent an infantry division under General French against the National post at Allatoona Pass through which lay the railroad and Sherman’s line of commun- ications. Here were stored more than 1,000,000 rations for the National army, the capture of which would prove an important acquisition to Hood’s impoverished commissariat. The natural strength of the position at Allatoona Pass was such, that 1000 men could hold it against ten times their number so long as supplies held out. Its redoubts were at this time garrisoned by only three small regiments under Colonel Tourtellotte. In the possession of the Confederates it would have effectually interrupted the National communica- tions between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and might have necessitated the evacua- tion of the latter city. It will be seen, therefore, that Hood had excellent rea- sons for striking suddenly and with a large force at this point. Well aware that his seat at Atlanta was insecure while his long line of com- munications lay exposed to interrup- tion, Sherman, on hearing that Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee, des- patched General Corse with a division of the Fifteenth corps to Pome. Slocum was ordered to hold Atlanta and the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee with the Twentieth corps. A freshet of the river having carried away the bridges, three pontoons were laid on the 4th of October, and the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Third corps were put in motion towards Smyrna camp-ground. The following day they .were moved to the strong position about Kenesaw Moun- tain. Anticipating the enemy’s move- ment against Allatoona Pass, Sherman had already signalled and telegraphed to Corse to reinforce that post from Pome, and hold it until the main body of the National army could come to his assistance. On receiving the message, Corse immediately placed a brigade of 900 men on the cars and reached Alla- toona on the night of the 4th, just in time to be ready to meet the attack of French’s division. With this addition the garrison numbered 1600 men, with 6 guns. Early on the morning of the 5th, French with 6000 men, and sup- ported by two other divisions, 5. approached Allatoona, and sent a letter to Corse demanding an immediate sur- render, in order to avoid “a useless effusion of blood,” giving only five minutes for an answer. Corse was ready ^vithin the time specified. His re- ply was that he and his command were ready for the “ useless effusion of blood ” as soon as it was agreeable to French. This was immediately followed by a Confederate attack which commenced at eight o’clock and continued till two in the afternoon. Driven by the des- perate assaults of overwhelming num- bers, Code’s troops contested the ground foot by foot, from their intrenchments to the hill, and from the hill to the fort. Corse, although bleeding and at times insensible, having been wounded early in the action, still fought on with an obstinacy and desperation worthy of SHERMAN AT ROME. S07 tlie great stake for which he contended. During the heat of the contest, about ten o’clock, Sherman reached the Kene- saw Mountain, 18 miles distant from iVllatoona, and from its summit saw the smoke of battle and heard faintly the sounds of artillery. The distance being too great to send troops to take part in the battle, Sherman directed General Cox with the Twenty-Third corps to move rapidly westward from the base of Kenesaw, strike the road from Allatoona to Dallas, and threaten the rear of the attacking force. He also succeeded in getting a signal message to Corse notifying him of his presence. Sherman had great confi- dence in that general and in the result of the battle, and said while reviewing it from his remote stand-point : I know Corse ; so long as he lives, the Alla- toona Pass is safe.” The assaulting columns of the enemy, thrown back again and again, were finally compelled to retire towards Dallas. Their retreat was hastened by apprehensions of the co-operating movement of Cox towards the only road by which they could escape. Unfortunate delays, arising from rain and mud, prevented Cox from intercepting the Confederates on the road back to Dallas ; but they left 800 killed, wounded, and prisoners, in the hands of Corse. The garrison lost nearly half its number, in killed and \vounded. The little town of Alla- toona was reduced to a mere wreck by the severe fire of the Confederates. All the artillery and cavalry horses were killed. The valuable stores, however, •were saved, and the fort and pass were held. This battle was the decisive event in the pursuit of Hood. Corse, notwithstanding his severe wounds, was able to return the same ni^ht to Pome with the remainder of his com- mand. The only important injury done by the Confederates in this vicinity was the destruction of 6 or 7 miles of railroad between Big Shanty and Alla- toona, which was immediately put in course of restoration. Sherman re- mained several days in the vicinity of Allatoona, watching the movements of Hood, suspecting he would march for Pome, and thence towards Bridgeport, or else to Kingston. On the 6th and 7th, Sherman pushed out his cavalry towards Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and disco v- 6. ered that the enemy had moved west- ward. Inferring from this that Hood would attempt to break the i*ailroad again in the neighborhood of Kingston, he put his army in motion on the morning of the 8th through Allatoona Pass and arrived at Kingston on the 10th. There he learned that Hood had threatened but passed by Pome, and that he was crossing the Coosa by a pontoon bridge 11 miles below. He therefore, on the 11th, moved his army to Pome, and sent Gar- 11 . rard’s cavalry and the Twenty-Third corps under Cox across the Oostanaula to threaten the flanks of the enemy as he passed northward. Garrard drove a Confederate cavalry brigade beyond the Narrows leading into the valley of the Chattooga, and captured 2 field- pieces. Hood, however, moved with great 808 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. rapidity on his northward march, and on the 12 th appeared with Stewart’s Oct. corps in front of Resaca, and de- 12 . manded its immediate and un- conditional surrender. He promised that all the white officers and soldiers should be parolled in a few days, but he threatened that if the place should be captured by assault, no prisoners would be taken. To this demand Colonel Weaver, who held the defenses of the place with 600 men and 3 pieces of artillery, replied : “ If you want it, come and take it.” The garrison manned the rifle-pits surrounding the works, and kept the enemy’s skir- mishers at bay. During the day masses of Confederate troops continued to pass the fort ; but no serious attack was made on them, the enemy being more intent on destroying the railroad towards Dalton. Sherman had at first intended to move his army into the Chattooga Valley, to interpose between the enemy and his line of retreat down the Coosa, but fearing that Hood would then move eastward by Spring Place and down the Federal road, he determined to move against him at Resaca. Although repulsed at that place by Colonel Weaver, Hood had succeeded in breaking up the railroad from Tilton to Dalton. At Tilton, during the night of the 12th, he cap- tured a blockhouse garrisoned by a part of the Seventeenth Iowa, after a gallant defense. At Dalton, owing to the negligence of the National scouts, the Confederates were able to surround the fort garrisoned by the Forty-Fourth colored regiment, under Colonel John- ston, before adequate preparations for defense could be made. A summons to surrender, signed by Hood, similar to that sent Colonel Weaver being sent in. Colonel Johnston, finding that Buz- zard Roost and other important points commanding his position were already in the^ enemy’s hands, complied with the demand. During the 14th and 15th the enemy was occupied in com- pleting the destruction of the railroad as far as Tunnel Hill. The rolling stock had been mostly removed ; and of this kind of property only a few box cars were destroyed. With the main body of his army, Sherman arrived at Resaca on the 14th, where he encamped for the night. Determining to strike Hood in flank or force him to battle, he dmected the army of the Tennessee, under Howard, to move to Snake Creek Gap, where a portion of the enemy’s forces held the old National lines, and General Stanley with the Fourth and Fourteenth corps to march by way of Tilton across the mountains to the rear of the gap in the neighborhood of Villanow. Howard skirmished with the Confederates dur- ing the forenoon of the 15th^ with the view of detaining them 15. till Stanley should have time to get in their rear ; but they gave way about noon, and though followed through the gap, escaped before Stanley had been able to reach the fuidher end of the pass. The approach of the National columns now warned Hood to move olf west- ward; and the 16th of October found him in full retreat for Lafayette. GAYLESVILLE. 809 Towards that place also Sherman moved his army, with the view of cut- ting off Hood’s retreat. At Ship’s Gap, Hood left some tr 9 ops intrenched, to detain his pursuers; but Wood’s division of the Fifteenth corps rapidly carried the advanced posts held by two companies of a South Carolina regi- ment, making the men prisoners. The remainder of the regiment escaped to the main body near Lafayette. Next morning Sherman’s force passed over into the valley of the Chattooga, the army of the Tennessee moving in pur- suit, by way of Lafayette and Alpine, towards Blue Pond; the army of the Cumberland by Summerville and Mel- ville Post Office to Gaylesville, and the army of the Ohio and Garrard’s cavalry from Villanow, Dirt-town, and Goover’s Gap to Gaylesville. Hood, however, was little encumbered with trains ; and as he marched with great rapidity in a southwesterly direction, through a broken and mountainous country, he succeeded in getting into the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout range abutting against the Coosa River in the neighborhood of Gadsden. During this retreat of Hood into northern Alabama, he had frequent opportunities to join battle with his pursuers. Of these, however, he de- clined to take advantage. He remained at Gadsden till near the end of October, receiving a few reinforcements brought Oct. Beauregard, who on the 17. 17th assumed command of the (.-onfederate Military Division of the West, Hood still retaining his special command; though subject to the super- vision or direction of Beauregard. The latter published an address appealing to his countrymen of all classes and sections for their support and confi- dence, and urging soldiers absent with- out leave to return to the army. The address seems to have had little effect. On the 19th the National armies lay grouped about Gaylesville, in the rich valley of the Chattooga, a 19. region abounding in corn and cattle. Here Sherman resolved to let his men live on the country for a while, content for the present to watch his enemy without wearing out his troops in a use- less pursuit. Hoping that Hood would turn towards Huntersville and Bridge- port, he posted the army of the Ten- nessee near Little River, with orders to keep within supporting distance of the cavalry, which was directed to watch Hood in the neighborhood of Hill’s Valley, and give the earliest notice pos- sible of his turning northward. The army of the Ohio was posted at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon bridge across the Coosa and reconnoitre towm’ds Center and in the direction of Blue Mountain. The army of the Cumberland w^as kept in reserve at Gaylesville. In the mean time com- munications were opened to Rome, and a large force was engaged in repairing the railroads. The injuries done to these were confined to two sections, one 7 miles long betw^een Big Shanty and Allatoona, and the other 21 miles long, between Resaca and Tunnel Hill. By the 20th the road was in running order again from Resaca to Atlanta. On the 28th, trains left Chattanooga for the 810 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. latter place. Atlanta was abundantly supplied with provisions ; but forage was scarce; and Slocum was instructed to send strong detachments in the direc- tion of South Eiver, for the purpose of collectinor corn and fodder. He was O also to put his wagon trains in good condition for further service. Hood had not succeeded in interrupt- ing the National communications to such a degree as would compel the evacuation of Atlanta. Having failed permanently to disable the railroad, he had been driven into nothern Alabama, where he was now separated from that admirable railroad system by means of which his army had been so well and so long supplied. Georgia and the whole southeast was left exposed to the inva- ders; but on the other hand there seemed open to Hood the opportunity of caiTying the war into Middle Ten- nessee and Kentucky, where the richly stored cities and farms afforded tempting chances for plunder. His experience during the retreat had been such as to satisfy him that he was able, with the army at his command, to endanger at any moment, Sherman’s communications. It was his conviction that Sherman would not be able to follow him, and that even then, he would have but little chance of overtaking his army. Sherman, however, had resolved upon a bolder course, and one promising greater and more important results. He had previously submitted to General Grant the outlines of a plan for the de- struction of Atlanta and the railroad back to Chattanooga, to be followed by a march through the heart of Georgia to one of the Atlantic seaports. This ■proposition he now renewed from Gayles ville, and it received the sanction of the commander-in-chief. On the 2d of November, Grant wrote to Shennan : “with the force you have left with General Thomas he must be able to take care o^ General Hood, and destroy him. I do not see that you can withdraw from where you are to follow Hood, without giving up all we have gained in territory. I say then, go on as you propose.” On the 8th, in a letter dated the 7th, came Grant’s adieu. “Great, good fortune attend you.” The original plan of the campaign had been, after capturing Atlanta, to hold it, and, using that city as a secondary base, to move an army eastward through Georgia, leaving garnsons at points along the railroads across the State, and thus cut the Confederacy in two from west to east, as had been done from north to south by the opening of the Mississippi. The execution of this plan would have required large details of troops, and it was willingly aban- doned. Sherman’s - plan, which was substituted for this, effectually secured the same advantages. When Hood crossed the Chattahoochee on his flank- ing march upon the National communi- cations, he was moving in the veiy direction in which Sherman wished him to go ; and it was with feelings not unmixed wdth anxiety that the National commander watched the movements of his antagonist until, instead of returning to Jonesboro, he moved off from Gads- den to the neighborhood of Decatur. The ill-advised strategy of Hood gave PKEPARATIONS FOR THE MARCH. 811 Sherman the very ojiportunity he de- sired ; and he prepared at once to avail himself of it. On the 26th of October, considering his army unnecessarily large for his Oct. pui’pose, and having ascertained 26. that Hood had moved westward across Sand Mountain, Sherman de- tached the Fourth corps under General Stanley, with orders to proceed to Chattanooga and report to General Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th, the Twenty-Third corps, commanded by Schofield, was also sent to Thomas, to whom Sherman delegated full power over all the troops subject to his com- mand, except the four corps with which he designed to move into Georgia. This gave to General Thomas the Fourth and Twenty-Third corps, the two divi- sions under General A. J. Smith — then en route for Tennessee from Missouri — all the garrisons in Tennessee, as well as all the cavalry of Sherman’s Military Division, except one division under Kil- patrick, which was ordered to rendez- vous at Marietta. General Wilson, who had arrived from the army of the Poto- mac to take command of the cavalry of Sherman’s army, was sent * back to Nashville, with all dismounted detach- ments, and with directions to collect as rapidly as possible the -cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and report to Thomas for duty. These forces it was hoped would enable Thomas to defend the railroad from Chattanooga to Nash- ville, and, at the same time, leave him an army which would be a match for that of Hood, should he cross the Ten- nessee and move northward. Thomas was also fully informed of Sherman’s plans, and at the same time assured that until he felt fully confident of being able to cope with Hood, the east- ward movement on the part of Sherman would not be commenced. By the 1st of November Hood had moved his army from Gadsden and appeared in the neighborhood of Decatur. Sherman then began 1 . preparations for his march through Georgia. The army of the Tennessee returned by slow and easy marches to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp- ground. The Fourteenth corps was moved to Kingston, from which point all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for the contemplated movement, and all the sick and wounded, and the refugees, were directed to be sent back to Chattanooga. The troops were at the same time put in the most efficient condition for a long and difficult march. From the 2d to the 11th of November every locomotive and car on the Chat- tanooga and Atlanta Railroad was put in requisition. The vast supplies of provisions, forage, stores, and machinery, which had been accumulated at Atlanta, Rome and other points, and everything likely to impede the movements of the army, were sent safely to Chattanooga. On the night of the 11th the last train left Atlanta for the north. Everything being now ready Corse, who still re- mained in Rome, was ordered to destroy the bridges there, as well as all the foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, or other property that could be useful to the enemy, and move on Kingston. At 812 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. the same time the railroad near Atlanta and between the Etowah and the Chat- tahoochee was directed to be effectually destroyed. The garrisons north of Kingston were ordered to withdraw to Chattanooga, taking with them all pub- lic property and railroad stock, and to take up the rails north of Eesaca and preserve them for future use. The railroad between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, as it might be necessary to reoccupy the country as far as the line of the Etowah. On the 12th of November the message “ All is well ” was telegraphed to Thomas; the wire was then cut, and Sherman’s army stood alone, ^vithout any communication in the rear. By the 14th, all the troops had arrived at or near Atlanta, and by orders of Sherman was grouped into two wings ; the right and left, commanded respect- ively by Generals O. O. Howard and H. W. Slocum. The right wing was composed of the Fifteenth corps, Gen- P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth corps. General Frank P. Blair com- manding. The left wing was com- posed of the Fourteenth corps. General Jeff. C. Davis and the Twentieth corps, General Slocum. The Fifteenth corps had four divisions, those of Woods, Hazen, S^nith and Corse. The Seven- teenth had three divisions, those of Mower, Leggett and Smith. The Fourteenth corps had three divisions, those of Carlin, Morgan and Baird. Tlie Twentieth corps had also three divisions, those of Jackson, Geary and Ward. The cavalry division was held separate, and was subject to orders from Sherman only. It was commanded by Judson Kilpatiick, and was com- posed of two brigades, commanded re- spectively by Colonels Eli H. Murray of Kentucky, and Smith D. Atkins of Illinois. The total strength of the army was about 60,000 : — infantry about 54,000, cavalry nearly 5000, artillery nearly 2000. General Barry, in fitting out the artiller}^, which was reduced to the minimum, withdrew every doubtful or suspicious horse. Each artillery carriage had eight horses, and each battery a reserve of twelve. Sherman issued orders to regulate the conduct of the troops on the march. The whole force moved rapidly south- ward, and on the 14th of November lay agai)i around Atlanta. On the 15th all the buildings in the city, except the dwelling-houses and churches, were destroyed 15. under the direction of Captain Poe, the chief of engineers. The several corps having been supplied with clothing and such equipments as were necessary, from the depots, and everything valu- able to the Government removed, the torch was applied in the evening to the various buildings, the most substantial of which had been previously mined. For many hours the heavens were lighted up by the flames of this vast conflagration, which was rendered moi’e awful by the explosion of shells and magazines. By the dawn of the 16th all that was valuable of the city lay in ashes. The property destroyed in- cluded all the buildings connected with the railroads, the passenger de})ots, freight houses, a number of locomotives^ SHERMAN LEAVES ATLANTA. 813 cars, and every description of rolling stock; the machine shops, mills, arse- nals ; the laboratory, the armory, many business houses, the institutions of learning, and all the hotels except the Gate City; in all about 1800 buildings, exclusive of woodsheds and outhouses, the whole valued at about $2,000,000. As far as possible private property was spared, the object being merely to render the city useless to the enemy when he should reoccupy it. Connecting Atlanta with the sea- board are two great lines of railroad, nearly parallel and having a general southeasterly direction, one terminating at Charleston, 308 miles distant, the other at Savannah, 293 miles distant. The former line is composed of the Georgia Railroad, 171 miles long, ex- tending from Atlanta to Augusta, and of the South Carolina Railroad, 137 miles long, extending from Augusta to Charleston; the' latter consists of the Western and Macon road, 103 miles long, connecting Atlanta and Macon, and of the Georgia Central Railroad, 190 miles long, connecting Macon with Savannah. From Augusta there runs a cross railroad due south to Millen, on the Georgia Central Railroad, 53 miles long, affording a second route to Savan- nah from Atlanta, 10 miles longer than that through Macon. The belt of country between the two main lines of railroad, as far east as Augusta and Millen, is of an average breadth of 40 miles ; east of these points the country between the roads gradually expands to a width of nearly 100 miles. The Georgia road, after the capture of Atlanta, had lost much of its import- ance. All the others, however, includ- ing that between Augusta and Millen, were important links in the chain of communications between the northern and southern portions of the Confeder- acy. The feeling was prevalent, there- fore, that* the destruction of these links would be a severe blow to the enemy. The region included within these rail- roads was probably the richest and most populous of Georgia, containing Milledgeville, the capital of the State, and other important towns. It was reported to be rich in all kinds of agri- cultural produce and abundantly able to supply the wants of a large invading army. While Atlanta was yet in flames, Sherman’s army began its march east- ward in four columns. The two consti- tuting the left wing under Slocum, followed the railroad towards Augusta, while the two composing the right wing under Howard, accompanied by Kilpatrick’s cavalry, marched in the direction of J onesboro and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planter’s Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days. Slocum moved by way of Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Mad- ison, to burn the important railroad bridge across the Oconee, east of Madi- son, and then to turn southward and rendezvous at Milledgeville on the seventh day. Sherman himself left Atlanta on the 16th in company with the Fourteenth corps, which marched 814 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. by way of Litbonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, also towards Milledgeville. All the coi-ps were provided with good wagon trains, in which the supplies of ammunition were abundant, but with only twenty days’ bread, forty days’ sugar and coffee, beef cattle equal to forty days’ supplies, and k double allowance of salt. Three days’ forage in grain was also taken. The instructions were that the army should live, during the march, chiefly if not altogether on the country, which abounded in corn, sweet potatoes, and cattle. It was not at first known to the men whither they were marching. The opinion prevailed that they were off for Richmond. The day was unusually fine ; and a feeling of exhilaration seemed to per- vade all minds. As he moved about, Sherman was frequently greeted with the words Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting for you at Richmond.” At what point, on the seaboard, Sher- man would come out could not be definitely fixed. It was not impossible, as he would be obliged to subsist at least partially on the country, that a force inferior to his own might compel him to abandon his plans and seek a point different from that intended. The blindness of the Confederate au- thorities, however, allowed them to send Hood’s army — the only considerable force they had between Richmond and the Mississippi — northward on an offen- sive campaign, thus leaving the whole southeast open, with little opposition to be dreaded by the National forces on any route they might take. Sher- man’s first object was to place his army in the heart of Georgia, interj^osing it between Macon and Augusta, and thus obliging the Confederates to scatter their forces in order to defend not only those points, but Millen, Savannah, and Charleston. It was his opinion that by means of pretended demonstra- tions on^ places widely separated, leav- ing it doubtful whether the immediate objective was Augusta or Macon, or both, he would be able to perplex the enemy and insure a speedy and unin- terrupted march to the coast. Howard’s command, of which the Fifteenth corps formed the right, fol- lowing the railroad southward as far as Jonesboro, encountered the mounted troops of Iverson ; but these were quickly dispersed by Kilpatrick’s cav- alry. The column then moved east- ward through McDonough and Jackson to the Ocmulgee, crossed it at Planter’s Mills and passing southward through Monticell o and Hillsboro, and between Milledgeville and Clinton, struck the Georgia Central Railroad on the 2 2d, the left at Gordon, 20 miles east of Macon, the right extending 22. westward towards Griswoldville. In conjunction with the operations of Howard’s column, the greater part of the National cavalry under Kilpatrick made a circuit by the right, through Grifi&n and Forsyth, towards Macon. At first the Confederates supposed this to be only a raid on a grand scale ; but on the approach of Howard’s column — and still remaining ignorant pf Slocum’s movement in the direction of Augusta — they began to think that Sherman was aiming at the capture of Macon. GRISWOLDVILLB. 815 They, therefore, concentrated at that place all their available force, consisting of some cavalry under Wheeler, a small body of veterans, and several brigades' of militia. On the 20th, 800 of Kil- patrick’s cavalry with 4 cannon, made a pretended attack on East Macon, two miles east of the city, and drove the enemy within his intrenchments. Lit- tle loss was sustained on either side ; but the movement very effectually ac- complished its purpose of confirming the Confederates in the belief that Macon was Sherman’s objective. The National cavalry then, after destroying several miles of railroad east of Wal- nut Creek, withdrew to Griswoldville. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps having struck the Georgia Central Railroad on the 2 2d, as already stated, immediately commenced to destroy the track and the road-bed between Gordon and Griswoldville. While this work was going on, one of the severest battles of the campaign took place. Walcott’s brigade of in- fantry, with a section of artillery and some cavalry, forming the extreme right of the Fifteenth corps, had been thrown forward to Griswoldville to cover that flank, and also to continue the demonstration on Macon commenc- ed by Kilpatrick. At the same time Howard’s trains were closing up, and his men were destroying the railroads. Walcott, after burning the principal buildings in Griswoldville, posted his troops in a wood protected in front by an open morass, and threw up a rail breast- work. About two in the after- noon a force of the enemy, about 5000 strong, moved out of Macon and ap- proached the National position. Fall- ing back slowly, the National cavaliy placed themselves in connection with the infantry so as to protect them in flank and rear, and leave the enemy no alternative but to make a direct front attack. The Confederate force, con- sisting of a part of Hardee’s old com- mand brought up from Savannah and several brigades of militia, advanced boldly ; and, being mostly inexperienced troops, and ignorant of the strength of the National position, they attempted to carry it by storm. They made six desperate assaults, which Walcott’s vet- erans, well protected by their breast- works, repelled with ease, and with little loss, while the Confederates mov- ing with difficulty through the morass, were exposed to a steady fire from men conscious of security, and suffered se- verely. When they retired, they left 300 dead upon the field. The Confeder- ate loss, according to their own account, was 614, including General Anderson severely wounded. It was probably 'nearer 2000. After this battle, Macon might easily have been taken by Howard, but now that the railroad connections were destroyed, its posses- sion was no longer an important object. In the mean time, the left wing of Sherman’s army continued its march along the Augusta and Macon Railroad in two parallel columns, the Twentieth corps on the left, the Fourteenth, accom- panied, by Sherman, on the right. The latter corps having thoroughly de- stroyed the railroad as far as Covington, turned south, on the 19th, towards 816 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. Milledgeville ; while the Twentieth corps, which had previously marched on the north side of the railroad, con- tinued the work of destroying the track and the bridges as far as Madison 30 miles north of Milledgeville and 90 miles west of x\uo:usta. To strensrthen the conviction that this 'movement was intended to threaten Augusta, the cav- alry, moving on the left wing, was sent as far east as Union Point, 70 miles Avest of that city. From Madison the Twentieth corps turned off nearly due south, and passing through Eatonton, its advance arrived at Milledge- 21 . ville on the 21st, followed, next- day, by the Fourteenth corps, which passed through Shady Dale and Eaton- ton, neither corps having encountered any opposition during its march. When Sherman’s army set out from Atlanta, the Georgia legislature was in session at Milledgeville, but the ap- proach of Kilpatrick’s cavalry caused no alarm there, as the movement was supposed to be only a raid, and that its object was Macon. When, however, on the 18th, it was discovered that How- ard with the right wing was moving through McDonough in a southeasterly direction, and that Slocum was also approaching from the north, a panic seized the whole body of legislators, Avho fled with all possible haste to Augusta. After this exodus, several days of quiet passed, when On a bright sunshiny morning an advanced regi- ment of the Twentieth corps entered the capital of Georgia, wdth the band playing the national airs. Only a few of the National troops entered Milledgeville. Two or three regiments were detailed under the orders of engineers to destroy govern- ment and certain other property. The magazines, arsenals, depot buildings, factories of various kinds, with store- houses containing large amounts of government property, and about 1700 bales of cotton, were burned. Private houses, even those of noted Confeder- ates, were left uninjured, as well as the Capitol ; and the inhabitants were protected as far as possible from pil- lage or insult from the soldiery. The hospital surgeons, the principal of the Insane Asylum, and others, expressed their thankfulness for the excellent order preserved during the National occupation. _ Some stores and about 2500 small-arms fell into the possession of the National troops ; and a number of Union prisoners were liberated from the penitentiary. While Sherman’s left wing was en- joying a temporally rest at Milledge- ville, the right, under Howard, moved eastward along the Georgia Central Kailroad, with orders to destroy it thoroughly as they went, as far as Ten- nille Station. The Confederates now became aware that Macon was not to be seriously attacked ; and Wheeler, march- ing with all speed, got across the Oconee near the railroad bridge, and, aided by a body of militia under Gen- eral Wayne, prepared to dispute the passage. When Howard arrived on the 23d, he found the guard there so strong that a crossing could be effected only at considerable loss. After skir. mishing near the river a day or two to WAYNESBORO. 817 occupy the enemy’s attention, the Fif- teenth corps was moved to a ford 8 miles below, and a pontoon bridge was laid without much difficulty. The Confederates then retreated ; and by the 26th the whole right wing had crossed the river, and moving eastward was engaged in destroying the railroad. The left wing crossed the Oconee near Milledgeville on the 24th, and moved by two roads in a southeasterly direc- tion towards Sanders vill^ a small town 33 miles from Milledgeville, and a little north of the railroad. The Fourteenth corps now took position on the left of Slocum’s column, and Sherman accom- panied the Twentieth corps towards Sandersville. On approaching this Nov. 25th, the bridges 2b. across Buffalo Creek were found to have been burned. Next day the two corps, marching by parallel roads, entered the town almost at the same moment, skirmishing with and driving out Wheeler’s cavalry, which had at- tempted to impede their progress. On the 27th and 28th both wings lay encamped between Sandersville and Irmn’s Cross-Roads, a few miles south of the railroad. About this time also Sherman shifted his quarters from the left wing to the Seventeenth corps, then at Tennille Station, opposite San- dersville. Kilpatrick, after the demonstration at Macon which ended with the action at Gris wold ville, shifted his cavalry force to the left wing, and remaining a day at Milledgeville to recruit, was directed to move rapidly eastward and break the railroad between Millen and Augusta, thus threatening Augusta and covering the passage of the main body of the army across the Ogeechee, the next great river on Sherman’s route east of the Oconee. After breaking the railroad, Kilpatrick was ordered to turn southward and move rapidly upon Millen, to rescue the National prisoners supposed to be confined there. On the 27th, a few hundred of his cav- airy, under Captains Hays and 27. Estes, dashed into Waynesboro, on the railroad, 30 miles south of Augusta, where they did some damage ; but it having been ascertained that the prison- ers had for several weeks previous been in the course of removal from Millen to some less exposed point in southern Georgia, no demonstration was made on that town. The advanced cavalry detachment now fell back to its main body, which lay east of the Ogeechee near Louisville. Kilpatrick had re- tired thence to meet the infantry, with instructions from Sherman not to risk a battle unless circumstances should greatly give him the advantage. But the appearance of the cavalry on the left flank of the National army, led the Confederates to suppose that Au- gusta was the real objective of the campaign. Sherman, therefore, ordered Kilpatrick to leave all his wagons and other incumbrances with the left wing and to move towards Wheeler’s cav- alry, which was hovering around in the direction of Augusta ; and if Wheeler desired fighting to give him all he wanted. Accordingly, Kilpatrick, sup- ported by Baird’s division of infantry of the Fourteenth corps, again mover] S18 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. in tlie direction of Waynesboro. En- countering Wheeler in the neighbor- hood of Thomas’ Station, on the 'E 8d of December, Kilpatrick at- tacked him in position, driving him from three successive lines of barri- cades, through Waynesboro and across Brier Creek, the bridges over which he burned. Marching rapidly south- ward from Waynesboro, he rejoined the left wing at Jacksonboro, 20 miles east of Millen, on the 5th. On the 28th of November the Four- teenth corps struck the Ogeechee at Fenn’s bridge, 15 miles north of Sand- ersville. The river was crossed by pon- toons; and marching along its north bank, the corps arrived at Louisville on the 29th. Upon reaching Buckhead Ci*eek, it then turned eastward to Lump- kin’s Station, on the Augusta and Millen Bailroad, 10 miles south of Waynes- boro. On the 3d and 4th of December it destroyed a considerable portion of the track, and then marched in a south- easterly direction for Jacksonboro. At the same time the Twentieth corps moved along the railroad, which from Davisboro Station runs parallel with the Ogeechee for about 20 miles. The Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps moved along the south side of the railroad, the Fifteenth, with which was General Howard in person, keeping on the right flank* and about a day’s march ahead, so as to be ready to turn against the flank of any force of the enemy that should attempt to oppose the progress of the main body. The Twentieth and Seventeenth corps had been some days engaged in destroying the railroad be- tween Tennille Station and the Ogee- chee. This river, being here about sixty yards wide, and naturally a strong defensive line to the enemy, might have been rendered a serious obstacle. On the 30th, however, a crossing was effected with little difficulty, the Twentieth at the railroad bridge 30 . and the Seventeenth near Barton Sta- tion, a few miles further east. These two corps advanced steadily along the railroad, and^on the 2d of December the Seventeenth reached Millen; the Twentieth, passing a little north of that town through Birdsville, moved in a southeasterly direction, while the Fifteenth in two columns, still a day’s march in advance of the main body, kept along the west bank of the Ogeechee. The whole army then turn ing slowly round from its easterl] course, moved directly southward in parallel columns, all except the Fif- teenth corps — which was directed to cross to the east bank on arriving at Eden Station — between the Ogeechee and Savannah Eivers, the Seventeenth corps following the railroad and tear- ing it up while advancing, the Four- teenth keeping along the Savannah Biver road, and the Twentieth march- ing down the middle road by way of Springfield. Kilpatrick covered the rear, and kept at bay such scattered bodies of the enemy’s cavalry as attempted to harass the columns while in motion. The advantage of the feint which had been made towards Augusta now became apparent. A considerable number of Confederate troops had THE GULF RAILROAD CUT. 819 been concentrated at that place. Had Sherman’s true object been known, these might have been used to obstruct his march to Savannah, towards which he was now moving. The weather which had been for the most part favorable during the first half of the r-ampaign, became rainy after the col- umns passed Millen. As the army approached Savannah, the country was foiiud more marshy and difficult. Grreat obstructions were met in the shape of felled trees where the roads crossed the creek swamps or narrow causeways ; but these the well-organized pioneer companies rapidly removed. No im- portant opposition was encountered till the heads of the columns were within about 15 miles of Savannah. Here all the roads leading to the city were again found obstructed with felled timber ; but the imperfect defenses thus formed were easily turned and the enemy driven away. By the lOtb of December the Con- federates had retired within their 10 . lines at Savannah. These follow- ed a swampy creek which falls into the Savannak River about 3 miles above the city and extended thence to ,the head of a corresponding creek which falls into the Little Ogeechee. These streams formed excellent cover for the enemy, flowing through marshes and rice fields, which could be flooded either by the tide-water or from inland ponds, the gates of which were covered by heavy artillery. To prevent an attack on the Gulf Railroad, at that time employed to its utmost capacity in bringing supplies and reinforcements to the city, the Con- federates sent a force across the Ogee- chee, which they supposed would be able to check the advance of the Fif- teenth corps. The greater part of this corps had, however, passed over to the east bank of the river on the 7th near Eden Station ; and the next day Corse’s division was pushed forward between the Little and Great Ogeechee, in ad- vance of the main column, to the canal connecting the Ogeechee with the Savannah. A position was taken up on the south side of the canal and in- trenched ; the Confederates abandoning the portion of their advanced line there and retiring within the fortifications of Savannah. . Reinforcements from the Fifteenth corps were sent to Corse; and on the 9th a detachment moved forward to the Gulf Railroad, tore up the track for several miles, and ca];- tured a train of 18 cars with many prisoners, thus cutting off communica- tions between Savannah and the south. No supplies could reach the city by the accustomed channels ; while the investing forces had large herds of cattle, brought with the army or gathered from the country on the march ; and although still without communication with the fleet, they had yet remaining in the army wagons a considerable supply of breadstuffs and other necessaries. The fine rice crops, along the Savannah and Ogee- chee rivers, afforded abundance of fodder for the cattle, as well as food for the men. The country south of the Ogeechee was also open as foraging ground. 820 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. The only approaches to Savannah were the tAVO railroads, and the Au- gusta, Louisville, and Ogeechee dirt roads, all narrow causeways and com- manded by heavy ordnance, against which it would have been useless to oppose the light field guns with which Sherman’s army Avas provided. The strength of the enemy at that time was also unknown to the National com- mander, and he determined not to as- sault immediately, trusting that the operation of time would bring about the desired result. Sherman, therefore, instructed his army commanders to invest the city as closely as possible from the north and west, and to re- connoitre the ground well in their front. The 11th and 12th of December Avere passed in putting the troops in position, erecting breast-Avorks, and establishing batteries. The army lay in a semicir- Dec. about ten miles long — 12 . the left resting on the SaA^annah River at a point 3 miles distant from the city, the right on the Gulf Railroad at a distance of 11 miles — every\A^here confronted by the enemy’s strong line of earth-AVorks, which constituted the exterior fortificatioiis of the city. In the mean time, in order to facili- tate communications with the fleet. Captain Duncan, with two scouts, Avas sent down the Ogeechee in a small skiff, on the night of the 9th. Con- cealing themselves in the rice SAvamps during the following day, they resumed the perilous voyage at night, and suc- ceeded in getting past Fort McAllister and the Confederate picket-boats dur- ing a rain-storm. They then made their way into Ossabaw Sound, where on the morning of the 11th they were picked up by the National gun-boat Flag, and immediately conveyed to Hilton Head. General Foster was at that time operat- ing against the Charleston and Savan- nah Railroad AAdth the vieAV of destroy- ing the communications of Savannah with the’ north. He was immediately sent for, and received HoAvard’s dis- patch of the 9th : “We have had per- fect success, and the army is in fine spirits.” This Avas the first direct intellisrence from Sherman’s armv since its departure from Atlanta,^ and its reception caused universal rejoicing in the North. The co-operative movement of Foster against the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, the object of which Avas to effect a lodgment at Pocotaligo or at GrahamAulle, had only partially suc- ceeded. The expedition dispatched for this purpose, consisting of 5500 men under General Hatch, together with a naval brigade under Commander Preble, and gun-boats from Admiral Dahlgren's squadron, arrived soon after daylight at Boyd’s Point; where the troops were landed. They advanced skirmishing some miles ; but not being acquainted Avith the country did not succeed in reaching the railroad, and at night were compelled to withdraAV. Next day, hoAvever, the march Avas resumed ; and the troops were puslied on toAvards the enemy’s position near Grahamville. Strong works, consist- ing of a fort and battery, Avith rifle-pits, Avere found at Honey Hill, 3 miles from GrahamAulle. The garrison, howe\^er MAP SHOWING THE EOUTE TAKEN BY SHERMAN IN HIS MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA. I FORT McAllister. 821 was slim, there being only 1500 men un- der General G. W. Smith, with 7 pieces of artillery. The position was imme- diately attacked. An engagement en- sued, lasting six hours, and the National troops were on the point of carrying the works, when reinforcements arrived for the enemy. These consisted of a regiment of infantry and some cavalry, under General Robertson, who brought also another battery. It being found impossible now to contend against the increased force of the enemy, protected as they were by their defenses, the National force was withdrawn to a good position on the Savannah road, having sustained a loss of 740 men. The operations on the part of Foster, in which there was a good deal of desul- tory fighting, were continued for several days; and, although he did not succeed in getting possession of the railroad, in guarding which the Confederates dis- played great tenacity, his troops under Hatch secured a position on the penin- sula or neck between the Coosawatchie and Tullafinney Creek, about three- quarters of a mile from the railroad. From this point, the intervening woods having been cut down for the purpose, they could direct the fire of their artil- lery on the passing trains. As the greater part of the fleet was already in or at the entrance of the Savannah River, nothing remained to be done but to send a few vessels to Warsaw and Ossabaw Sounds to open communications with the army. The latter sound, the estuary of the Ogee- chee, affording the most practicable mode of accomplishing this object. Sherman took measures to reduce Fort McAllister, a strong redoubt on the right bank of the river, which its guns commanded. This fort, situated 6 miles from the sound and about 18 miles southwest of Savannah, was highly im- portant to the security of the city in the rear. It was one of the strongest of its class in the South ; and it had suc- cessfully resisted the attacks of a small fleet of iron-clads in the early part of the year 1863. It mounted 23 guns en harhette and one mortar, including several 8-inch and 10-inch pieces. Every line of approach to the fort ^vas commanded by howitzers and field pieces placed on the bastions. A deep ditch 40 feet wide, into the bottom of which were driven palisades, extended along its front ; and a formidable line of abatis ran along the outer edge of the ditch, beyond which the approaches were thickly planted with torpedoes. Fortunately the garrison was not strong, consisting of only two companies of artillery and three of infantry, in all about 200 men, in command of Major Anderson. It would doubtless have been reinforced in a few days. On the evening of the 12th, Hazen’s division of the Fifteenth corps was marched from its position on the Gulf Railroad to the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Canoochie, where the bridge, known as King’s Bridge, having been destroyed was rapidly reconstructed in a substantial manner. At daybreak of thi! 1 3th Hazen crossed to the west j)0c^ bank and pushed on towards Fort HR McAllister, his orders being to carry it by assault. Hazen reached the 296 S22 THE MARCH TO THE SEA. vicinity of the fort about one o’clock, and deployed his division in such a iiianner that both flanks rested on the river. His skirmishers were posted behind the trunks of trees whose branches had been used by the enemy in constructing the ahatis. About live o’clock the assault was made, with 9 regiments, at three points. In a very short time, the intervening space of 600 yards was crossed, the ahatis sur- mounted, and the ditch reached. A few minutes sufficed to tear down enough of the palisades to permit the passage of the troops, who with loud cheers and great entbusiasm rushed in swarms over the parapet and planted their colors on the rampart. In twenty minuted from the time the assault was commenced the fort was won. Tiie struggle was brief. The losses were not great on either side. The victory, however, was complete. Sherman, him- self, was an eye-witness of the opera- tions from a. rice-mill on the opposite bank of the liver. No communication had yet been effected with the fleet. From a signal station at the rice-mill, Sherman’s offi- cers had been for two days gazing anxiously over the rice fields and salt marsh, in the direction of Ossabaw Sound, but no vessel came in sight. While the preparations for assaulting Fort McAllister had been going on, the smoke-stack of a small steamer evi- dently approaching became visible on the horizon. Just before the assault was made, the steamer was signalled. Answer was given ; and, as soon as he saw the colors fairly planted on the fort, Sherman, in company with How- ard, proceeded in a small boat to meet Hazen; but finding that he had not yet been able to communicate with the steamer, which was hid from him by some intervening woods, he took another small boat with a crew, and pulled down the river to it. It proved to be ‘the tug Dandelion, Captain Wil- liamson, who announced that Admiral Dahlgren and General Foster were on their way and might be hourly expected in the sound. Sherman, after writing a despatch to the War Department, his first since leaving Atlanta, returned immediately to Fort McAllister. Be- fore daylight on the 14th he received intelligence that Foster had actu- ally arrived in the steamer Ne- 14. maha and was anxious for an interview. Sherman immediately went on board the Nemaha, and after a consultation proceeded in that steamer to meet Dahlgren, whose flag-ship, the Harvest Moon, was in Warsaw Sound. Meas- ui'es were at once concerted for opening permanent communication between the army and the fleet ; and Dahlgren, having agreed to engage the attention of the forts at Wilmins^ton and Kose- dew, Sherman returned to Fort Mc- Allister the following day, confident of being able to carry the defenses of Savannah as soon as his heavy ordnance from Hilton Head should arrive. On the 17th a number of 32-pounder Parrott guns were landed from 17. transports, at King’s bridge, on the Ogeechee, where the new base was established, the obstructions in the river below having been removed ; and HARDEE RETIRES FROM SAVANNAH. Slierman despatched from Slocum’s headquarters, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the city. This was refused by General Hardee, Avho was in command there with about 15,000 men. Hardee expressed a de- termination to hold the city to the last, saying that his communications were yet open, that he was fully supplied Avith subsistence stores, and was able tu withstand a long siege. On the same day, a large body of cavalry under Kilpatrick, with infantry supports, were sent down the Gulf Railroad as far as the Altamaha River, for the purpose of destroying the track. This work was thoroughly accomplished for the entire distance, including 4 miles of trestle- ^vork immediately adjoining the river. The city was now invested on every side except along the Savannah River. That river, which was filled with ob- structions and commanded by the guns of Forts Jackson, Lee, and Lawton, was in possession of the enemy nearly as far towards the sea as Fort Pulaski. Opposite the city is Hutchinson’s Island, several miles long, the west end of which was in possession of Slo- cum’s troops; but the lower end still remained in the hands of the enemy. A little below the island, on the South Carolina side, the Union Causeway ^vhich runs north through the swamps intervening between Savannah and Charleston, afforded a way of escape to Hardee. Reconnoissances from the left flank had shown that it was impracticable to push a considerable force across the Savannah River with a view to occupy the causeway, as the enemy holding the river opposite the city with iron- clad gun-boats, would be able to destroy any pontoons laid down between Hut- chinson’s Island and the South Carolina shore. Sherman, therefore, ordered Slo- cum to get his siege guns into position, and prepare for an assault; while he, himself, proceeded to Port Ro}^! and made arrangements to have the Union Causeway occupied from the north by the troops of Foster. In the meantime a substantial corduroy road had been constructed across the swamps and rice fields from the Ogeechee, at King’s Bridge, to the vicinity of the city. Along this road the heavy siege guns were transported to their position, as well as supplies for the army. Hardee seeing this, and well aware that the avenue of escape northward would not be allowed long to remain open to him, immediately made prepar- ations for evacuating the city. On the afternoon of the 20th he caused his troops to destroy the navy ‘^0. yard and the Confederate Government property ; while the two iron-clad s Georgia and Savannah moved up the river, and, supported by several bat- teries, opened on the National left a furious fire, which was continued all night, with a view to cover the retreat. The Confederate troops were conveyed across the river, during the night, in steamboats and row-boats and on rafts ; and on the morning of the 21st, having blown up the iron-clads and the forts below the city, they were well on their way towards Charleston. Hardee’s retirement was discovered THE MARCH TO THE SEA. SM by the National pickets at dawn on tbe 21st; and several regiments were sent forward to occupy the deserted intrench- ments. A few hours later Sherman, who had just returned from Hilton Head, entered the city at the head 21. of his body-guard and received the formal surrender from the muni- cipal authorities. On the same day Foster communicated with the city by steamers, taking up what torpedoes could be found and passing safely over others. Measures were also taken for clearinsr the channel of all obstructions. O The captures included 800 prisoners, 150 guns, 13 locomotives in good order, 190 cars, a large supply of ammunition and material of war, 4 steamboats, be- sides the iron-clads and transports blown up by the enemy, and 33,000 bales of cotton safely stored. Writing to President Lincoln on the 2 2d of December, Sherman said : “ I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with 150 heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about 25,000 bales of cotton.” Lincoln replied, thanking Sherman for his gift. Halleck and Grant both wrote letters of congratulation to the victorious gen- eral. “ I never ” wrote Grant “ had a doubt of the result. When appre- hensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him that with the army you had, and with you in command of it, there was no danger but that you would reach salt water in some place. But I should not have felt the same security — in fact I would not have entrusted the expedition to any other living commander.” Thus ended the great march to the sea — a march which, while it command- ed the attention of the world, and estab lished on solid foundations the military reputation of General Sherman, dem- onstrated, in the most striking man- ner, the inherent weakness of the Confederacy. The campaign had lasted over five weeks ; and, during that time, an army 65,000 strong, with 10.000 horses, over a tract varying from 20 to 60 miles in width, traversed a distance of 300 miles. Sherman had lost only 567 men, of whom 63 were killed, 245 wounded, the remainder missing. A track of desolation marked the progress of the army. Over 20,000 bales of cotton had been destroyed, and probably over 25,000 bales cap- tured. There were captured besides some 10,000,000 pounds of corn, and an equal amount of fodder ; nearly 1.500.000 rations of meat ; about 1,000,- 000 rations of bread ; 483,000 rations of coffee, 581,000 of sugar, about 1,150,- 000 of soap, and 137,000 of salt. This, however, was not all. Over 320 miles of railroad were destroyed ; and so complete was the work of destruction that communications between the Con- federate armies in Virginia and those in the west were finally and effectually severed. Sherman had, during his march, forced into his service some 5000 horses and 4000 mules, and captured 1328 prisoners, with 167 guns. His army entered Savannah, accompanied by more than 10,000 negroes, who everywhere hailed the National troops as deliverers. According to Sherman’s own estimate, damage was done to the SAVANNAH SUBMISSIVE. 825 State of Georgia to the extent of $100,000,000, of which $20,000,000 at least inured to the advantage of the National government. General Geary was appointed mili- tary commander of Savannah, immedi- ately after the surrender. On the 26th from his head-quarters in the field. General Sherman issued special orders, giving instructions as to the course of conduct to be pursued by the military authorities towards the inhabitants of the captured city. The orders were strict; but they were not unjust, nor could they even be called severe. The property of the peaceful citizens was to be respected. Industry of all kinds was to be encouraged. Assistance was to be tendered to all deserving families or individuals who, from whatever cause were in necessitous circumstances. The Mayor was instructed to give public notice that the time had come when all must choose their course, and decide ^vhether they w^ere willing to remain within the National lines, and conduct themselves as good citizens, or depart in peace. Those who preferred to leave were to report their names to the Chief-Quartermaster ; and measures would be taken to secure them safe transport beyond the lines. Sherman deemed it his duty to lay his hand somewhat heavily on the press. Only two newspapers were to be published in the city ; and their editors and pro- prietors were to be held to the strictest accountability. In the grave emergency in which they now found themselves, the inhab- itants of Savannah conducted them- selves with the utmost propriety. Their behavior, indeed, was in striking contrast with that of the inhabitants of other Confederate cities. No ill feeling was manifested towards their captors by word or deed. On the contrary there was evidence that the occupation of the city by the Nationals, was felt to be a deliverance. A latent Union sentiment soon began to reveal itself ; and as early as the 28th of December, a meeting of infiuential citizens was held at the call and under the presi- dency of Mayor Arnold, and resolu- tions were passed — acknowledging the duty of submission to the laws of the United States, and asking protection accordingly, respectfully requesting his Excellency, the Governor of Georgia, to call a convention of the people of that State, and thus afford an oppor- tunity of voting upon the question whether the war between the two sec- tions of the country should continue, and finally tendering thanks to the military commander for his “ urbanity ” and his “ uniform kindness.” The year 1864 was all but ended. Before the close, however, Sherman had perfected his plans for the projec- ted march through the Carolinas. 836 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. CHAPTER XXXIX. Thomas at Nashville — Sherman’s Instructions — Sherman Divides his Army — Troops sent to Thomas — What the Confederates thought of Sherman’s Movements — Grant’s Opinion of Hood’s Conduct — Hood playing into the hands of his Antagonist — Appearance of Forrest in ‘Tennessee — At Waterloo — Forrest Attacks Athens — Campbell Compelled to Surrender — Forrest Advances to Pulaski — Held in Check by Rousseau — Forrest Divides his Command — Buford at Huntsville — Pursued by Granger’s Cavalry — Forrest destroys the Railroad between Carter’s Creek and Spring Hill — Buford and Forrest Pursued by Rousseau, Wash burne and Morgan — The Confederates Escape to the South Side of the Tennessee— Thomas Re-arranging and Re-distributing his Troops — The Confederates Attack the Garrison at Decatur — Granger makes a Stubborn Resistance — The Confederates Compelled to Retire — The Confederates at Cypress Creek — Held in Check by General Croxton — Hood’s Purpose — Thomas Divines his Plans — Rosecranz in Missouri — The Condition in which he Found the State — The Confederates Encouraged by the Failure of the Red River Expedition— General Sterling Price — “Knights of the Golden Circle” — “Sons of Liberty” — Threatened Rising in Missouri — Rosecranz Communicates with the Government at Washington — Arrest of the Belgian Consul — The Government Incredulous — Rosecranz Resolute — Shelby at Batesville — Rosecranz joined by A. J. Smith — Shelby at Bloomfield — Pilot Knob — General Ewing at Rolla — Price before Jefferson City — Compelled to Move off in a Westerly Direction— Price already a Disappointed Man — Danville and High Hill — Price Retreats followed by Pleasonton- -Fagan at Independence — Routed by Pleasonton — At the Big Blue— Curtis at Westport — Severe Engagement — The Confederates Routed — At Marais des Cygnes — Price Surprised — Falls Back to Little Osage Crossing — Marmaduke and Cabell Captured — The Confederates Retreat into Arkansas— Pleasonton Resting his Men at Fort Scott— Price at Newtonia — Engagement at Fayetteville — The Confederates driven off with Heavy Loss — Price’s Invasion a Failure — Grant Displeased with Rosecranz— Minor Operations in Southwestern Virginia and East Tennessee — Morgan’s Last Raid — Death of the GuerrOla Chief — Generals Gillem and Burbridge — Breckenridge to Command ihEast Tennessee — Stoneman’s Raid — Strawberry Plains— Saltville — Bean Station — Burbridge at Bristol — At Abingdon — Marion — Hood and Thomas Confronting each other— Preparing for the Conflict — Re-appearance of Forrest — Thomas Waiting for Reinforcements— Schofield at Columbia — At Franklin— Schofield Forms his Line of Battle — The Battle Ground — The West Bank of theHarpeth River— Hood Resolves to Attack Schofield’s Centre — The Battle Begun — The Confederates Attack with Great Fierceness — The National Line Penetrated — Almost a Confederate Victory — Stanley to the Rescue — Opdyke’s brave “First Brigade” — The Tide of Battle Turned — The National Line Restored — Repeated Onsets — Midnight — Sounds of Battle Hushed — A National Victory — Opdyke Complimented — Losses on both sides Heavy — Position of Thomas’ Troops before Nashville — Montgomery Hill — Murfreesboro — Overall’s Creek — Fort Rosecranz — Thomas’ Delay Misunderstood at Washington — Grant Dissatisfied — Hurries from City Point — Explanations — Intense Cold — The Ground Impassable — The Weather Moderates — Immense Activity in Both Camps — Thomas’ Plan of Battle— Montgomery Hill Carried — The Confederates Forced Back at all Points — Nolensville Turnpike — The Night of the 15th of December — Preparing to Resume the Conflict — Second Day of the Battle — Overton’s Hill— Tremendous Firing— The Confederates Routed — Vigorous Pursuit — Rutherford’s Creek — Waiting for the Pontoon Train — Duck River — Severe Weather — Thomas Resolves to Continue the Pur- suit — Wilson’s Cavalry — Lamb’s Ferry — The Confederates Across the Tennessee River — Thomas Orders the Main Army to Discontinue the Pursuit — Cavalry Skirmishing — “ Thomas has Done Magnificently” — Hood’s Army Ruined beyond Recovery — Estimate of Hood — Osband’s Expedition — Davidson’s Expedition — Grierson’s Expedition — Great Destruction of Property. In the chapter immediately preced- 1864 have seen that Genei’al ‘Shei’man about the end of Sep- tember, and while his head-quarters were still at Atlanta, sent General Thomas, his second in command, to Nashville, with instructions to organize such troops as might be placed at his SHERMAN DIVIDES HIS ARMY. disposal, and to keep a watchful eye on the movements of the great Confed- erate raider, General Forrest. Later, towards the end of October, and while the main body of the National army was halting at Gaylesville, Sherman, who had now obtained Grant’s consent to advance to the coast, divided his army into two parts. Under his own personal command, and for the purpose of pushing his way through Georgia, he retained four corps. The other two corps — the Fourth, under General Stan- ley, and the Twenty-Third, under Gen- eral Schofield — he sent to Thomas. General Wilson, who had quite recently arrived from the army of the Potomac and taken command of Sherman’s cav- alry, was also sent to Nashville to report to Thomas for duty. He took wdth him some dismounted detach- ments, and had instructions to collect, mount, organize, and equip all the cav- alry serving in Kentucky and Ten- nessee. It was Sherman’s conviction that thus reinforced, Thomas would be quite able to cope with any forces which Hood might succeed in bringing against him. It is now generally understood that the Confederate authorities were com- pletely taken by surprise at Sherman’s audacious movement. His lines of defense were of enormous extent. The distance from Atlanta to Louisville is 474 miles; from Atlanta to Nashville, 289. The railroads connecting the army with these lines, it was necessary to protect. It was the belief of Davis and his associates that, as soon as the National lines were seriously threat- 827 ened, Sherman would abandon Georgia. They had no conception that he would of his own accord sunder his communi- cations and boldly march to the sea. When Sherman did march, one reads with surprise that Hood did not follow him. Hood,” says General Grant in his report, instead of following Sher- man, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders, under which he seemed to be actino^.” Sherman, before his departure, made Thomas fully acquainted with his plans, dele 2 :ated to him the command of all troops and garrisons, not absolutely in the presence of the commander- in- chief, and instructed him to pursue Hood, if he should attempt to follow the main army, but, by all means, to keep a firm hold on Tennessee. Long before Sherman divided his army, attempts were made by the Con- federates, to destroy the communica- tions of Nashville with the southeast. On the 23d of September, Forrest Sept, at the head of 7000 cavalry, after 23. having crossed the Tennessee, near Waterloo, made his appearance before Athens, a small town on the railroad from Decatur, and about 90 miles south of Nashville. The place was held by Colonel Campbell, mth 3 colored regi- ments and about 150 men fi'om the Third Tennessee cavalry. Campbell, on the approach of Forrest, retired to the fort. On the morning of the 24th the town was completely invested ; and a vigorous fire was opened upon the 8^8 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. garrison from a 12-pounder battery. The guns of the fort replied. Camp- bell, however, was unequally matched ; and after an artillery contest of two hours’ duration, he yielded to the demands of his antagonist and surrend- ered. Had he held out about half an hour longer, he might have been rein- forced by the Nineteenth Michigan, and the One Hundred and Second Ohio I’egiments. As it was, these regiments were overpowered and captured. For- rest then advanced to Pulaski. That place, however, had been well cared for by General Rousseau ; and the Confederate general moved eastward, cutting the railroads as he advanced. Meanwhile, it began to be seen that Forrest was bent on serious work ; and National troops were pushed forward from all directions to resist his pro- gress. Rousseau at the head of a body of troops moved by rail to Tullahoma. Steedman advanced from the Etowah district to the north side of Tennessee. Newton’s division of the Fourth corps arrived from Atlanta on the 28th and replaced Steedman’s command at Chat- tanooga. Morgan’s division of the Fourteenth corps, also from Atlanta, and accompanied by General Thomas, arrived at Nashville on the 3d of October. Fori-est had by this time divided his forces. One column consisting of 4000 men, under Buford, he sent south^ towards Huntsville. The other col- umn, consisting of 3000 men, he led, himself, in the direction of Columbia. Buford, as early as the 30th of Sep- tember, appeared before Huntsville, and in vain summoned the garrison to surrender. Moving off, he appeared before Athens on the afternoon of the 2d of October. That 2. place had, in the meantime been re- garrisoned by the Seventy-Third Indi- ana, Lieutenant-Colonel Slade. After a useless attack made almost immedi- ately after his arrival, and another equally useless attack on the following morning, Buford, pursued by some of Granger’s cavalry, was compelled to retreat towards the Elk River. For- rest had little better success than his lieutenant. He did not venture to make an attack on Columbia ; but on the 3d he destroyed about 5 miles of railroad between Carter’s Creek and Spring Hill. He then parolled his prisoners and moved off in the direc- tion of Mount Pleasant Hill. It now became apparent that both Buford ani Forrest Avere aiming to make good their escape to the south side of the Tennessee ; and the various National commands, particularly those under Rousseau, Washburne and Morgan closed in upon them, with a view to prevent their crossing the river, and if possible to effect their capture. The Confederates, however, kneAV every inch of the ground ; and in spite of a most vigorous pursuit, both accomplished their purpose, Buford crossing the Tennessee on the 3d and Forrest on the 6tli. The ferry-boats and other means of crossing were destroyed ; but the pursuit was not continued. Thomas now spent some time in re-arranging and re-distributing his troops. His great object Avas to guard KOSECRANZ IN MISSOURI. 82 y well all the avenues of approach, and yet to have his troops so in hand that he could concentrate with ease and mpidity in the event of the enemy attackins: him in force. It was not until the 26th that Hood made 26. any further demonstrations. On that day, a large force of Confederate infantry appeared before Decatur, and attacked the garrison, but without effect. Granger held the place ; and on the 27 th reinforcements were sent him with instructions to hold out to the bitter end. It seemed as if the enemy was bent on serious business ; for he proceeded at once to establish a line of rifle-pits within 500 yards of the town. On the 29th, however, after having had on the previous day some bitter experience of the daring and energy of Granger’s men, who made two separate and successful sorties, the Confederates retired in the direction of Courtland. On the same day, it was i*eported to Thomas that a body of the enemy was crossing the river, near the mouth of Cypress Creek, about 2 miles below Florence. General Croxton was in command at that point ; and on re- ceipt of the intelligence, Thomas imme- diately sent to his aid a division of cavalry under General Hatch, with in- structions to guard the passage of the liver until the arrival of the Fourth corps, now on its way from Georgia. It now became evident that Hood intended to invade Middle Tennessee ; and Thomas hurried forward prepara- tions accordingly. Before, however, we enter upon a detailed account of tho events which led to the great battles of Franklin and Nashville, and the subsequent pursuit and destruction of Hood’s army, it is fitting to refer to certain events which were taking place, or were about to take place, in Mis- souri and Eastern Tennessee. After the battle of Chickamauga, Bosecranz, who was superseded by Thomas, was assigned to the command of the Department of the Missouri. He reached St. Louis in the beginning of January, when he found the State of Missouri in a very troubled condi- tion. It was menaced by foes without, and by hidden but not less dangerous foes within. The failure of the Red River expedition, and the expulsion of Steele from the country below the Arkansas River, had a most disastrous effect upon the National cause, to the west of the Mississippi. At least two- thirds of the State of Arkansas was left in undisturbed possession of the Confederates. It was well known that General Sterling Price, the great guer- rilla chief in that region, was making active prepa^-ations for another raid into Missouri. Missouri was still under the authority of the National Govern- ment ; but the inhabitants of the State were largely in sympathy with the Confederacy. The loyal people of the State were over-awed and compelled to conceal their sentiments. Secret asso- ciations — such as the “ Knights of the Golden Circle,” the Order of Ameri- can Knights,” and the Sons of Lib- erty ” — abounded ; and it was reported to Rosecranz that when Price should in- vade Missouri, the members of these societies would join him in numbers to 830 HOOD AXD THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. the extent of at least 23,000 men. Rosecranz had good reason to believe that the reports regarding these secret societies and their purposes were not without foundation. He accordingly communicated his information to the government, and asked for reinforce- ments. The government was at first incredulous, believing the danger to be more imaginary than real, and was encouraged in this belief by the report of General Hunt, who had been sent to make a tour of observation throughout the State. On being informed that arrangements had been made to initiate the revolution in St. Louis by murder- ing the Provost-Marshal, and seizing the State government, Rosecranz arrested the Belgian consul, who was the State commander, with his deputy, secretary, lecturer, and about 40 members. The government, still incredulous, ordered their release ; but Rosecranz was reso- lute ; and the government, on receiving fuller information, justified his course, and countermanded the order. There can now be no doubt that the prompti- tude and vigilance of Rosecranz at this crisis did much to prevent the threat- ened risinor. The arrest of the State O commander struck terror into the hearts of the conspirators. Pi •ice and his friends, meanwhile, were preparing to carry out their part of the programme. It was now the first week in September. Rosecranz received information from Washburne who kept a keen eye on the movements of the Confederates in Arkansas, that Shelby was at Batesville, in Northern Ai^- kansas, and that, as soon as he was joined by Price, the invasion would be commenced. Rosecranz communicated the intelligence to Washington ; and Halleck without a moment’s delay telegraj)hed to Cairo, directing A. J. Smith, who was then on his way, with 6000 troops to join Sherman in North- ern Georgia, to halt and proceed to St. Louis, where he was to report tn Rosecranz. On the 23d of September, the ad- vance of Price’s force, under Shelby, occupied Bloomfield, in Stoddard Coun- ty, which had been evacuated by the National troops on the night of the 21s-t. On the 26th the Confederates moved on Pilot Knob, which 26. fortunately had been occupied the day before by General Hugh S. Ewing with a brigade of A. J. Smith’s com- mand. With this force, and the garri- son of Pilot Knob and some outlying posts, Ewing undertook to make a stand against the Confederates, w^ho without delay made preparations to carry the place by assault. The fort occupied by the National forces was a strong one, mounting four 24-pounders, four 32-pounders, and four 6-pounder Parrotts, besides two 6-pounder Par- rotts mounted outside. The enemy advanced against it on the 27th, in full confidence of being able to carry it by assault ; but he was driven back with a loss of about 1000 men, by a w'ell- directed artillery and musketry fii'e. The fort, however, was commanded by a neighboring height called Shepherd Mountain, and the enemy having occu- pied this position Ewing determined to abandon the w'ork. He had previously PILOT KNOB. 831 sent away his stores to St. Louis. Blowing up his magazine, ho fell back, keeping up a running fight with the enemy as far as Harrison Station, on the Southwest Branch Railroad. Here he prepared to make another stand, behind breast-works left by a party of militia who had previously occupied the place. Ewing in his defense of Pilot Knob rendered important service by detaining the entire force of Price, and affording time to put St. Louis in a state of defense, then covered only by a portion' of A. J. Smith’s infantry and some regiments of cavalry thrown out as far as practicable towards the enemy. The Confederates followed him up closely, and cut the railroad on both sides of him, thus severing his communications with both Rolla and St. Louis. He was only saved from another assault by the opportune arrival of Colonel Beveridge, of the Seven- teenth Illinois cavalry, with 500 men. The enemy taking these to be only the advance of large reinforcements, de- layed the intended attack ; and Bever- idge, in the night, with the main body of the troops, succeeded in reaching Rolla. In the mean time, Springfield being 9 onsidered secure. General Sanborn moved with all his available cavalry to reinforce Rolla, where General McNeil was in command and preparing to pro- tect the depots and great supply trains. A. J. Smith’s infantry, aided by the militia and the citizens, the whole under the command of General Pleason- ton, made St. Louis secure. General B. Gratz Brown was placed by Rose- cranz in charge of the militia. Brown concentrated at Jefferson City, the troops of the Central District ; and being reinforced by General Fisk with all the available troops north of tlie Missouri, as well as aided by the enthusiastic exertions of the citizens, he made thorough preparations to drive back the invaders from the State ca})i- tal. Towards this point Price, who had remained a day or two at Rich- wood’s, threatening St. Louis, was rap- idly marching. On the 7th of October he had crossed the Osage not far from the city. But McNeil and Sanborn, moving with all their available cavalry succeeded by forced marches in reach- ing the city first ; and having united their commands with those of Fisk and Brown, they so increased the defensive force within the city, that Price deem- ing it prudent not to attack, moved off in a westerly direction. Pleasonton arrived at Jefferson City on the morning of the 8th, and assumed 8. chief command. Sanborn with all his mounted troops, about 4000, was or- dered to follow and harass the enemy, but not to attack until the remaining cavalry and infantry supports could come up. On the afternoon of the 9th, the Con- federates entered California, 25 miles west of Jefferson City, on the Pacific Railroad, and burnt the depots and a train of cars. From California, after tearing up the railroad track some distance on each side of the town, they moved on to Booneville, in Cooper County. Price was already a sorely disappointed man. He had, it is true, 832 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. obtained a few recruits ; but tbe Sons of Liberty,” tbe “ Knigbts of the Gold- en Circle,” had sadly failed him at the critical moment, when at least a tem- porary success was possible. On the 13th the Confederate chief withdrew from Boone ville, and, contin- uing his march westward, occupied Lexington, in Lafayette County, on the 17th. For the purpose of forag- 17. ino- and obtain in or recruits and O O conscripts, detached bodies of his force were sent in various directions, some as far as the borders of Kansas, some as far east as Danville and High Hill, Montgomery County. Wherever they made their appearance they worked terrible destruction. The militia were driven out of Sedalia, in Pettis County, \vdth severe loss ; and at Glasgow, in Howard County, 6 companies of the Forty-Third Missouri were compelled to surrender. The National troops did not pursue actively until Pleasonton came up, when they advanced towards Boone ville and harassed Price’s rear. Most of the National cavalry were concentrated at the Black Water, awaiting the arrival of Colonel Winslow from Washburne’s command. He came up, on the 19th, bringing with him 1500 troopers, with Avhom he had followed the enemy from Arkansas. Pleasonton, having now at least 6500 mounted men, exclusive of escort guards, moved from Sedalia in [)ursuit of Price. At Independence, on the 22d, he came up with and routed the Confederate general, Fagan, cap- turing 2 guns. On the morning of the 23d, Pleason- ton approached the Big Blue. At West port where General Curtis, then in charge of the Department of Kansas, had been vigorously but 23. unsuccessfully attacked, the day before, he found the main body of the Confed- erates. Pleasonton fell upon them with tremendous energy at the early hour of seven, 'the battle raged with great fury, until about one in the afternoon, when the Confederates gave way and fled towards Little Santa Fe. Pleason- ton and Curtis who had now united their forces followed in close pursuit. At Marais des Cygnes, at four o’clock on the morning of the 25th, the National troops came up with the fugitives, when Pleasonton surprised and aroused the camp by a heavy fire of artillery. Price arose and fled leaving behind him his camp equipage, one cannon, several hundred head of cattle, and 20 wagons full of plunder. The Confederates, keeping up a running fight, fell back to Little Osage Cross- ing, where two advanced brigades under Benteen and Phillips charged upon and broke their lines, capturing Generals Marmaduke and Cabell, 4 field officers, about 1000 prisoners, 8 pieces of artillery, and some 1500 stand of arms. The pursuit was continued, Sanborn’s brigade again leading the way. The Confederates were over- taken ; and after a brief but stubborn resistance, they crossed the Marmiton, and fled under cover of the night, into Arkansas. In six days 204 miles had been traversed. Price was falling back at panic speed. The line of his retreat was strewn with the 'wi’ecks of wagons DISSATISFACTION WITH ROSECRANZ. 833 and other necessaries and accompani- ments of the' battle-field. Pleasonton had retired to Fort Scott to rest his jaded men and horses. Sanborn, how- ever, was still in close pursuit. At Newtonia, Price made another and a final stand ; and but for the timely arrival of Sanborn, he would have won a decided victory over the National troops under Blunt. As it was. Price made his escape into Western Arkansas follovred by Curtis. The last struggle in connection with this Missouri inva- sion was at Fayetteville. The place was held by Colonel La Hue, with the First Arkansas cavalry — a body of men who, amid great trial and hard- ship, remained true to the Union. Colonel Brooks had surrounded Fay- etteville with some 2000 Confederates. He had been joined by Fagan’s division of Price’s flying army. La Hue might have held out against Brooks ; but it would be a hopeless struggle against the combined forces of Brooks and Fagan. At the critical moment Curtis came up ; the Confederates were driven off with heavy loss, and La Rue was saved. Such was the end of the inva- sion ; and no further attempt was made on Missouri. Sterling Price’s name had long been a tower of strength to the Confederate cause in the West. His prestige was gone forever. Missouri was no longer — and, indeed, had no reason to be — in sympathy with seces- sion. The State, which had suffered much, now began to enjoy some degree of tranquility. Price had accomplished little by his raid, beyond the destruction of about $5,000,000 of property, and laying waste the country through which he passed. He obtained 5000 or 6000 recruits or conscripts, took 1500 stand of arms, one cannon, many horses, and large herds of cattle, with a vast amount of plunder, in the shape of clothing, forage, and provisions ; but of this he lost nearly all in his precipi- tate retreat, besides 10 guns and 1958 prisoners. In his flight from Newtonia, he abandoned or destroyed most of his w^agon- trains ; and his men and horses suffered severely. Large numbers of his followers left him ; and when he recrossed the Arkansas, his force had been reduced by desertion and losses to less than 5000 men, only partially armed and mounted. His artillery had dwindled down to 3 Parrott guns and one 12-pounder mountain howitzer; and of his train, which originally consisted of 200 wagons, but 53 remained. The entire National loss, according to the ofiicial report of General Rosecranz, was, in killed, wounded and missing, only 346 officers and men. General Grant was ill-satisfied with the whole affair. In his judgment, the invasion ought to have been nipped in the bud. In his report he says : “ the impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri foi a long time, shows to how little pur pose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rose- cranz should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and di-iven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.” Rosecranz could hardly, in truth, have made a more wretched use than he did 834 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. of a large portion of liis troops. He was slow to act ; and when he did act, he did not act with wisdom. During tlie entire pursuit, the troops of A. J. Smith were practically neutralized. If instead of ordering him to follow Pleas- onton in the direct pursuit of Piice, he had ordered him to continue his move- ment westward. Price ought to have been captured. As it was. Price ob- tained time, and when pressed, he had to deal with Pleasonton and the cavalry alone. It was the 23d of October when Smith arrived at Independence ; but it was too late, for Pleasonton was already engaged with the enemy and the loud tliimders of artillery were heard in the direction of the Big Blue River. His troops were weary and footsore ; and ])elievino: that his services were no longer needed, he marched them to Har- rison ville, where they enjoyed a brief niterval of rest. The fame of Rosecranz was clouded at Chickamauga. It was permanently injured by his conduct of itfairs in Missouri. Loss immmediately connected with ohe Geoigia and Tennessee campaigns, but still having a most important bear- ing on the general issue, were some minor operations which took place in Southwestern Virginia and East Ten- nessee in the fall of the year. It had been a favorite theory with some experi- enced military men that in the event of Lee sustaining any great disaster in the East, he would retire with his army to Southwestern Virginia, and passing thence into East and Middle Tennessee, there concentrate the remaining forces >f the Confederacy. He would then be in a position to threaten Nashville Chattanooga, or Louisville ; and it was predicted that the decisive battle of the war would be fought somewhere in the Southwest. Eor this reason, a consid- erable National force was retained in East Tennessee. Knoxville was well fortified^; and outlying bodies of in- fantry and cavalry were pushed well up the railroad and the Holston River Valley towards the Virginia line. But after the commencement of the great Atlanta and Richmond campaigns, in May, affairs in East Tennessee lost much of their interest, the forces on both sides being concentrated, as much as possible, on the more important scenes of operations. The presence of scattered bodies of irregular Confeder- ate cavalry in Southwestern Virginia proved a source of constant alarm in Eastern Kentucky. These rough riders, dashing through the gaps of the Cum- berland Mountains, would fall upon iso- lated posts, capture their garrisons, and after plundering in the adjacent country would get back again to their mountain retreats before they could be overtaken. It was on one of these plundering ex- peditions that Morgan, in the month of June, and after the burning of Cynthi- ana, as has already been mentioned, was overtaken and badly defeated by General Burbridge. For some time afterwards, Morgan did not venture to take the offensive. He was of too rest- less a nature, however, to remain long inactive ; and by the beginning of Sep- tember he had again set his band of guerrillas' in motion. He occupied Greenville, East Tennessee on the 3d ; GILLEM DEFEATED. 835 but his command was surprised the same night by General Gillem; who had made a forced march from 3. Bull’s Gap. The Confederate chief with a portion of his staff' was in the house of a Mrs. Williams. The liouse was surrounded ; and Morgan while attempting to escape was shot dead. The death of Morgan was fol- lowed by another short season of com- parative inaction, both parties being content to remain on the watch, await- ing the development of events around Atlanta. About the beginning of October, Gen- e;ral Burbridge with 2500 men set out on an expedition from Kentucky against the salt-works in Southwestern Virginia, Avhich were of great importance to the (siemy. After heavy skirmishing he succeeded in driving the Confederates from Clinch Mountain and Laurel Gap. Oct. Coming up with them again on 2 . the 2d of October, about 4 miles from Saltville, he drove them back within their defenses in the immediate neighborhood of the salt-works. Here, hoAvever, they bade defiance to the National troops; and Burbridge, his ammunition being exhausted, found it necessary to retire. He had sustained a loss of 350 men. General Gillem having fallen back after General Bnrbridge’s withdrawal into Kentucky, from Greenville to Bull’s Gap, and thence to MorristoAvn, 42 miles from Knoxville, was followed by a Confederate force, under Vaughan. On the 26th of October, Vaughan ven- tured to attack Gillem but was repulsed. Tav'o days afterwards Vaughan attacked again, but, receiving a still more severe repulse, retreated, pursued by Gillem as far as Limestone, 98 miles east of Knoxville. After remaining in that advanced position until the 7th of November, Gillem, whose force w^as only 1500 men, consisting of 3 regi- ments of Tennessee cavalry, retired to Bull’s Gap, where Breckenridge, now at the head of the Confederate forces ir East Tennessee, some 3000 strong, at tacked him on the 11th. He too was repulsed. On the 12th, Gillem with- drew his forces from Bull’s Gap, and began to retreat in the direction of Knoxville. In the evening Brecken- ridge got his force on Gillem’s flank and rear by moving through Laurel Gap. His cavalry, under Vaughan and Duke were in front. Soon after mid- night Breckenridge attacked Gil- lem’s retreatino; column near Mor- 13, ristown, charging upon both flanks and at the same time breaking his centre. The National force was routed, one regiment after another giving way till men and horses became mixed up together in inextricable confusion. A panic ensued. Owing to the darkness feAV casualties occurred ; but the men threAV away their arms and sought safety in flight. All the artillery and the baggage were left in the hands of the enemy. The Confederate general claimed to have captured 70 wagons, six 11-pounder Parrott guns with their horses and ammunition, 18 stand of colors, 316 prisoners, and about 200 horses and mules. The remainder of Gillem’s command, about 1000 in num- ber, escaped to Strawberry Plains and 836 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. thence to Knoxville. Breckenridge assumed the ^ir of a conqueror in East Tennessee, and issued a proclamation promising protection to all who should lay down their arms and become peace- able citizens. He continued to advance, by way of Strawberry Plains, in the direction of Knoxville. On the. 18 . 18th he withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced; and on that day General Ammen, reinforced by 1500 troops from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains. On the 23d of November the main force of the enemy was reported to be at New' Market, 8 miles to the north. About this time General Stoneman was ordered from the West to take general direction of affairs in East Tennessee. As soon as he arrived he instructed Burbridge to march, with all his available force in Kentucky, by way of Cumberland Gap, to the relief of Gillem. Stoneman w^as dmected by Thomas to concentrate as large a force as he could, and move against Brecken- ridge, with the object of either destroy- ing his force or driving it into Virginia. He was also directed to destroy, if possible, the salt-works at Saltville, and the East Tennessee and Virginia Eail- road from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command. Learning on the 6th of December that Brecken- ridge was falling back towards Vir- ginia, Stoneman made preparations to follow him; and having concentrated Dec commands of Burbridge and 12 . Gillem at Bean’s Station, he set out on the 12th for Bristol. The ad- vance under Gillem reached Jonesboro the -same day, and drove the rear-guard of Vaughan’s cavalry through the towu. Gillem then turned northward to Kingsport, on the North Fork of the Holston, crossed the river, scaled the bluff, on which Duke w’'as posted, defeated him, and killed, captured, or dispersed the whole command. The Confederates left in his possession 8 wagons and the entire camp equi- page. Burbridge moved upon Bristol, where he struck Vaughan, and skir mished with him until Gillem’s column came up. Vaughan was also com pletely defeated, with the loss of some 300 prisoners and much property. Burbridge then pushed on to Abing- don, cut the railroad between SaltviUe and Wytheville, to prevent reinforce- ments coming from Lynchburg to the force defending the salt-works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the 15th. The enemy under Vaughan had in the mean time reached Marion, having marched by a road parallel with that by which Stoneman’s force had ad- vanced, and had begun to intrench. But Gillem pushed on after Vaughan; and after a hard march of 29 miles he came up with him, early on the 16th. He attacked him instantly, and after completely routing him, 16 . drove him to Wytheville, 30 miles further, capturing the place, with 200 prisoners, 7 pieces of artillery, and a large wagon train. All the enemy’s stores and supplies were destroyed, as well as the extensive lead- works near the town, and the railroad bridges over Eeedy Creek. Stoneman now turned FORREST AT JOHNSONVILLE. 837 his attention towards Saltville. His troops entered that place on the 20th, Dec. capturing 8 pieces of artillery and -0. a large quantity of ammunition of all kinds. They also destroyed the buildings belonging to the Confederate government, as well as nearly all the machinery, kettles, vats, engines, and boilers of the salt-works, said to be among the most extensive in the world, and an immense quantity of salt. In this great raid, besides the dam- age done to the salt-works and lead- mines, there were captured 20 pieces of artillery, 900 prisoners, 200 negroes, 8000 hogs, many cattle, and 200 mules. Eleven foundries, 90 flour and saw mills, 30 bridges, and the depots at Glade Spring, Marion, and Wytheville, were destroyed, as well as 13 locomo- tives, about 100 cars, and many miles of railroad track. It was estimated that the loss to the Confederates in stores alone amounted to $2,000,000. The rapidity, with which Stoneman moved, enabled him to take the entire region he traversed by surprise, so that the citizens had not time to run off their stock. After these disasters, Breckenridge made no further attempts to threaten East Tennessee. Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by Gillem’s command ; Burbridge marched back to Kentucky by way of Cumber- land Gap. W e now return to Hood and Thomas. Hood, we have already said, had made such movements as left Thomas in no doubt that he intended to invade Mid- dle Tennessee. He had been for some time repairing the Mobile and Ohio Kailroad for the purpose of supplying his army; and trains were running as far north as Corinth and thence east- ward to Cherokee Station, transporting supplies from Selma and Montgomery. Wood’s division of the Fourth corps reached Athens on the 31st of October,and the other two divis- 31 . ions rapidly followed. The Twenty- Third corps under Schofield, awaiting at Besaca the orders of Thomas, as soon as it was known that Hood had appeared in force along the south side of the Tennessee Biver, was directed to concentrate at Pulaski, and was now also on its way in the rear of the Fourth corps. The Confederates hav- ing on the 31st effected a lodgment for their infantry on the north side of the Tennessee Biver about 3 miles above Florence, and driven Croxton above Shoal Creek, General Stanley was di- rected also to concentrate the Fourth corps at Pulaski. In the mean time Forrest, with 17 regiments of cavalry and 9 pieces of artillery, had commenced moving north- ward from Corinth, and from Paris, Tennessee. On the 28th of October he appeared before Fort Heiman, an earth- work on the west bank of the Tennessee about 75 miles from Paducah, where he captured a gun-boat and 3 transports, having previously burned the steamer Express. On the 2d of November he had succeeded in planting batteries both above and below John- son ville, an important base of supplies, and the terminus of the Northwestern Bailroad. He thus completely block- aded tiie river and prevented the 998 83S HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE, escape in either direction of 3 gun-boats, 8 transports, and about a dozen barges. The garrison consisted of about 1000 men under the command of Colonel Thompson. The naval forces under Lieutenant King attacked the enemy’s batteries below Johnsonville. They were repulsed, however, after a severe contest, but not until they had recap- tured a transport, with two 20-pounder Parrotts and a quantity of ammunition and stores on board, and compelled the enemy to destroy one of the captured Nov. gun-boats. On the 4th the Con- 4. federates opened fire on the town, as well as on the gun-boats and trans- ports, from batteries on the west bank, [n the artillery contest which ensued the gun-boats were soon disabled ; and, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy they were set on fire, with the transports. Unfortunately the flames spread to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster’s de- partments, which together with a large amount of stores on the levee, were totally destroyed, involving a loss to the Government of about $1,500,000. On the 5th, after directing upon the garrison a furious cannonade of an hour’s duration, the enemy withdrew, crossed to the east bank above the town, and marched off in the direction of Clifton. On the same day Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-Third corps, arrived at Nashville ; and being sent immediately b}^ railroad to John- sonville, he arrived there at night, only to find that the enemy had disap- peared. Schofield was directed to leave a body of troops at Johnsonville sufficiently numerous for its defense. With the rest of his force he was ordered to join the Fourth corps at Pulaski, assume command of all the troops in that vicinity, and, watching the movements of Hood, retard his advance into Tennessee as much as possible. He was not, however, to risk a general engagement till A. J. Smith should arrive from Missouri, and until Wilson had remounted the cavalry regiments whose horses had been taken for the use of Kilpatrick’s division in Georgia. General Thomas, now found himself confronted by that army of vet era] troops which, under General Johnston had made such persistent opposition to the advance of Sherman’s largely super- ior force from Dalton to the Chatta- hoochee, reinforced by 12,000 well- equipped cavalry under Forrest — per- haps the boldest and ablest, as well as the most unscrupulous of the Confed- erate cavalry officers. Hood’s army now consisted of about 45,000 infantry and from 1 2,000 to 1 5,000 cavalry. The available force of Thomas at this time was less than half . that of Hood, com- prising only about 12,000 men under Stanley, 10,000 under Schofield, about 4000 cavalry under Hatch, Croxton’s brigade of 2500 men, and Capron’s of 1200, in all about 30,000 men. The remainder of his force was stationed along the railroad to keep open com- munications at Chattanooga, Decatur, Huntsville, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Mur- freesboro, and intermediate posts. It was necessary that all these points should be well guarded. HOOD’S DEI.AY. 839 Hood remained inactive in the neigli- })orhood of Florence from the 1st to the 17th of November, influenced doubtless by his uncertainty respecting the movements of Sherman. He had laid a pontoon bridge over the Tennes- see River in place of the destroyed railroad bridge, and had sent over to the north side S. D. Lee’s infantry corps and two cavalry divisions, which skirmished continually with the com- mands of Hatch and Croxton along the line of Shoal Creek. His other two corps remained on the south side of the Tennessee till the l7th of Novein- 1 7 . ber, when Cheatham’s corps also crossed to the north side, and Stewart’s [) repared to follow. On the same day a portion of Lee’s corps moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough’s Mill on Shoal Creek, skirmishing a little with Hatch’s cavalry, and then retiring to some neighboring blufl^s, went into camp. This delay, on the part of Hood was a great gain to the National command- er. Thomas was anxiously awaiting the arrival of promised reinforcements. In a few days or weeks at most, the teim of service of a large number of his troops would have expired ; but 20 one year regiments were on their way to take their place. A. J. Smith, with tw'o veteran divisions, already well advanced on his journey, was approach- ing from Missouri. Wilson, having all Ijiit completed his arrangements, would soon join him with 12,000 effective cavalry. In addition to these which could be confidently counted upon, there had been collected at Chattanooga, some 7000 convalescents which, if not available for marching, would at least be serviceable for garrison duty. These forces, when all concentrated, would increase Thomas’ available force to an army almost as large as that of the enemy. Had Hood delayed his advance one week or ten days longer, Thomas would have been able to meet him at some point south of the Duck River. Hood, however, began 19 . his advance on the 19th, moving by parallel roads from Florence toward? Waynesboro, and driving Hatch’s cav airy out of Lawrenceburg, on the 2 2d. It then became the policy of Thomas to retire in the direction in which his reinforcements were approaching, and at the same time to delay the enemy as much as possible. Schofield began to remove the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back towards Columbia — two divisions of Stanley’s corps having been sent to Lynnville, 15 miles north, to protect Rie railroad and secure the passage of the wagon -trains. Capron’s brigade of cavalry was stationed at Mount Pleas- ant to cover the approaches from the south ’west to Columbia, where was held, in position, a brigade of Ruger’s divi- sion of the Twenty-Third corps. Of the other two divisions of that corps, one was directed to move to Columbia, and the other by way of Waverly to Centerville, to occupy the crossings of the Duck River, near Columbia, Wil- liamsport, and Gordon’s Ferry. On the 23d Granger withdrew by rail, without any opposition, on the part of the enemy, the garrisons at Athens, 840 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. Decatur, and Huntsville to Stevenson, sending 5 new regiments from that place to Murfreesboro, and retaining the original troops of his command. On the same night, Schofield evacu- ated Pulaski and retired towards Columbia, where he arrived on the 24th. The officer, commandino^ at Johnsonville, was ordered to remove all public property and retire to Fold Donelson and thence to Clarksville. On the 24th and 25th some dismount- ed cavalry of the Confederates skir- mished with Schofield’s troops at Col- umbia; and, during the 26th and 27th, the infantry having come up, they made more decided demonstrations, but did not assault. Their movements, how- ever, indicated an intention to cross the Duck Piver, above or below the town. Schofield, therefore, withdrew to the north bank on the night of the 27th, and took up a new position, in which he remained undisturbed during the 28th. In front of the town, two divi- sions of the Twenty-Third corps were placed in line, holding all the neigh- boring crossings, while Stanley’s corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin turn- pike, was held in readiness to repel any attempt, on the part of the enemy, to force a passage. General Wilson, with a body of cavalry, held the cross- ings above those guarded by the in- fantry ; but, about two o’clock 29. on the morning of the 29th, the Confederates drove him back and pushed over the river at the Lewisburg turnpike, and, a little later, a body of their infantry crossed at Huey’s Mills, 6 miles above Columbia. Schofield now finding his communication with the cavalry internipted, and his line of retreat towards Franklin threatened, prepared again to fall back. Stanley, with a division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill to protect the passage of the trains, and keep open the road for the retreat of the main force in that direction. He arrived just in time to drive off the enemy’s cavalry, and to save the trains. Soon afterwards, he was attacked by both infantry and cavalry, and had considerable difficulty in maintaining his position till dark. Schofield, though not attacked at Huey’s Mills, was actively engaged all day, resisting the enemy who attempted a crossing at Columbia. Late in the afternoon, and, after giving directions for the retreat of all the troops north- ward at dark, he took with him Kuger’s division and hastened to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill. Leav- ing a brigade to hold the turnpike, at this point, he pushed on to the cross- roads, near Thompson’s Station, whence a body of the enemy’s cavalry hastily made off at his approach, leaving their camp-fires burning. The main body of Schofield’s command withdrew safely from Columbia after dark, on the 29th, passed Spring Hill without molestation, at midnight, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg turnpike, on the right of the infantry line of march. The whole command got into position, at Franklin, 18 miles south of Nash- 30. ville, early on the morning of the 30th. Line of battle was formed at once on the south side of the town in expecta tion of the enemy’s immediate approach FRANKLIN. 841 The battle-ground was well chosen. Franklin is situated on the west bank of the Harpeth River, a bend of which incloses more than half of the town on the east and north, leaving only a part (»f the west and south sides exposed. The National troops were disposed in a line running southeast, b#th flanks resting on the river — the Fourth corps on the right, the Twenty-Third on the left. The cavalry were posted on both sides of the town on the north bank, where also was a fort on the hill com- manding the town and the railroad, besides earth- works and some artillery. From the outset the troops worked energetically in the erection of breast- ^vorks of logs and earth, while the skirmishers in front endeavored to check the enemy’s advance. Between the lines of the two armies extended a broad plain, broken by slight undula- tions and little hills, interspersed by clumps of bushes and groves of trees. The object of Schofleld in making a stand at Franklin was to detain Hood until the trains could be got off safely over the Harpeth Bridge and well on their way to Nashville. To refuse battle would have been to expose his command to certain attack from superior forces while on the march, the result of which would, doubtless, have been the destruction of the wagon-trains and the greater part of the artillery. Such ft calamity might have been followed by the fall of Nashville, and the aban- donment of a large part of Tennessee. Hood’s object was to overwhelm Scho- field at once, or at least compel him to sacrifice his artillery and stores. He therefore hurried up his troops and massed them behind a screen of thick woods, in a line parallel with that of Schofield, Stewart’s corps being on the right, Cheatham’s on the left, and Lee’s in reserve in the rear. These move ments were made with such celerity that Hood very nearly took Schofield by surprise. The Confederate chief rode alons: his front, telling his men that the National lines were weak, and that when these were once broken, Thomas would be compelled to leave Tennessee. His own army was in excellent condition. With bis usual boldness and confidence of success. Hood determined to attack the centre of Schofield’s line, hoping to pierce it, and then to push in through the town to the bridges, when he would capture the trains, and at the same time cut the opposing army in two. At four o’clock in the afternoon he advanced to the attack. The National skirmishers slowly retreated to their works, ex- changing a sharp fire with those of the enemy; and then a tremendous can- nonade was opened from the artillery along Schofield’s line. The cloud of hostile skirmishers was quickly fol- lowed by the long and massive lines, four deep, of Cheatham and Stewart. As the Confederates approached, they were received by a tremendous mus- ketry, as well as, artillery fire. On they came, however, with fierce energy. A terrific struggle ensued. At length one of Cheatham’s divisions gained the outworks held by Wagner, and forced him back on the stronger lines held by Cox and Ruger. The Confedei*ates 842 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. then re-forming tlieir lines, again rushed on, and after a most desperate and bloody contest, penetrated the second line of defenses, and captured two guns. The situation had already become critical in the last degree. It seemed as if Hood had already victory in his grasp. At this supreme moment, Stan- ley rode forward to the head of Opdyke’s brigade, of Warren’s division, which was posted behind the works, and ordered it forward with Conrad’s brigade in support. Opdyke’s voice was immediately heard ringing loud and clear above the tumult. “ First brigade, forward to the works,” he cried, himself leading the way. His brave men promptly responded to the call. On they went with firm and steady step. With crushing weight they fell upon the exultant columns of the foe. The Confederates, at the very moment when victory seemed secure, were not only checked in their trium- phant career; they were driven back with fearful slaughter. The gap was closed — the National line restored. By this gallant charge the works and guns were recovered ; and 300 prisoners with 10 battle-flags were captured. Hood, however, was unvdlling to give up the contest. Again and again, in four successive assaults, he flung his men, as if with the energy of despair, on the now compact National lines ; but it was all in vain. After dark the Confederates, moving to their own left, made a visrorous attack on the National O right ; but this too was repulsed by Hanley’s first division, under Kimball. It was midnight when the sounds of musketry and artillery ceased. Hood, bitterly mortified at the result of the contest, had withdrawn his men. Such was the battle of Franklin — a battle which did honor to the genius of Scho- field, but which, according to the con- current testimony of Wood, Stanley and Thprafts himself, was won by Op- dyke and his gallant brigade. It was the voluntary testimony of each of these generals, that but for Opdyke and his men, their skill, promptitude and gallantry, disaster instead of vic- tory would have befallen the National arms at Franklin.” Opdyke had al- ready figured at Shiloh, where he was twice wounded, at Chickamauga, at Missionary Kidge, at Bocky Face, and at Peach Tree Creek. He was spared at Franklin to perform equally noble deeds at Nashville. On both sides the losses were severe. Hood’s loss was about 6000, some of his best generals had perished ; and many of them were severely wounded. Schofield’s loss was not so heavy — 2326 • in all, of whom 189 were killed, 1033 wounded, and 1104 missing. Among the wounded were Generals Stanley and Bradley. It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of the victory at Frank- lin. It checked Hood’s advance ; it gave Schofield time to remove his troops and his property to Nashville ; and what was of equal value, from a National point of view, it greatly dis- couraged and bowed down the spirits of the Confederate rank and file. After the battle, Schofield in com- pliance with orders from Thomas, fell OVERALL’^) CREEK. back to Nashville, in front of which, by noon on the 1st of December, a line of battle was formed. The 1 . army of Thomas was now about 56,000 strong. Steedman had come up from Chattanooga with 5000 men. A. J. Smith with his command had arrived from Missouri on the 30th. Other reinforcements were rapidly ar- riving. Thomas had taken every care to strengthen his position. Forts Negley, Morton, Confiscation, Houston and Gillem, situated on commanding heights, guarded the approaches from the south. Behind these, and in front of Nashville, lay Thomas’ army ; A. J. Smith on the right, resting on the river ; the Fourth corps commanded by Wood in the absence of the wounded Stanley, in the centre ; and the Twenty- Third corps, under Schofield on the left. Wilson with the cavalry, was stationed, to secure ' the interval be- tween Schofield and the Cumberland above the city. Steedman arrived in the evening, and took up a position about a* mile in advance of the left centre of the main line and on the left of the Nolensville turnpike. This position, however, was considered to be too much exposed, and the cavalry were directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, Steed- man’s troops taking their place in the line between Schofield and the river. On the afternoon of the 2d of Decem- .ber small parties of the enemy’s cavalry engaged the National skirmishers ; but their infantry did not appear in force till the latter part of the following day, when Hood began to establish his main 84[i line. Early on the 4th he occupied the high ground on the southeast sid^* of Brown’s Creek, extending from the Nolensville turnpike 4. — ^his extreme right in a westerly direc- tion across the Franklin and Granny White turnpikes to the hills south and southwest of Bichland Creek, and along that stream to the Hillsboro turnpike. Both fianks were covered by the cav- alry. The enemy’s salient was on Montgomery Hill, within 600 yards of the National centre. An artillery fire was opened on his lines from several points, but brought no reply. In this position Hood’s army remained till the 15th of December. During this interval, there occurred some operations of a minor character. Murfreesboro was then held by General Eousseau. The garrison at Murfrees- boro had been considerably strength- ened by the arrival of a body of troops under General Milroy, who had been ordered up from Tullahoma. Thomas was particularly anxious that nothing should be allowed to disturb his communication with Chattanooga. He kept, therefore, a watchful eye on the railroad. Hood was not ignorant of the importance of this line of commu- nication ; and on the same day on which the latter took position in front of Thomas, Bates’ division of Cheat- ham’s corps appeared at Overall’s Creek, and made an attack on the block-house at the railroad crossing. The little garrison made a stout re- sistance ; and on the arrival of Milroy, who was sent with 3 regiments from Fort Rosecranz, Bates was compelled su HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. to retire. During the three following (lays, Bates was largely reinforced with both cavalry and infantry ; and it seemed as if he were bent on making an assault on the fort. On the 8th, Buford Dec. head of a body of cavalry dashed into Murfreesboro. At- tacked by a regiment of National in- fantry, Buford found it necessary to retire from the town. Determined that his day’s labor should not be altogether fruitless, he swept around by way of Lebanon, and along the Cumberland, with the evident intention of cutting Thomas’ communication with Louis- vWle ; but the gun-boats on the river made it impossible for him to carry out his designs. On the same day, Milroy encountered the Confederates in some force on the Wilkeson turnpike, and after a severe struggle, routed them, inflicting a loss of 30 killed, and 175 wounded, and capturing over 200 pris- oners and 2 guns. Milroy’s loss was about 205 men killed and wounded. Thomas’ protracted delay was misun- derstood and misinterpreted at Wash- ington. Grant, himself, who had great faith in Thomas, was dissatisfied. Hood, it was thought, was having matters too much his own way. Grant, resolved to have the mystery of the delay ex- plained, hurried from City Point for Nashville. He had only proceeded as far as Washington, when he received from the West, telegraphic messages fully explaining the situation, and con- vimnng him that he had not mistrusted liis man, and that all was well in Ten- nessee. Grant did not pursue his journey. Thomas was really making the best possible use of his time. His numbers were superior to those of Hood, but he was deficient in cavalry. Time was of the utmost importance to Wilson, who was organizing with all the rapidity possible in the circum- stances. The weather, besides, had been unfavorable. On the morning of the 9th, ‘there was a heavy sleet-storm, which covered the ground with ice. For a week the ground was such, that' it was impossible to move ; and the cold was most intense. On the 14th, the weather moderated considerably. In both camps the ut- most activity prevailed. It was evident that both armies were fully prepared for a great test struggle. Thomas con- vened his corps-commanders ; and a plan of battle was discussed and agreed upon. The left flank of the enemy was his weak point. It was the gei- eral conviction that the point was vul- nerable — that it could be turned. It was resolved, therefore, to make a feigned attack against Hood’s right, and to follow it by an effective blow against the left. The morning of the 15th was gloomy. A dense fog overhung the entire country 15. around. It was not until the morning was far advanced, that it was possible to move the troops to their assigned positions. Steedman had received in- structions, the night before, to advance against the enemy’s right, east of the Nolensville turnpike. As soon as the light permitted, he proceeded to carry out his instructions. Immediately after the completion of Steedman’s movement. Smith and MAP SHOWING THE COUNTRY FROM NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, TO DECATUR, ALABAMA. 1 NASHVILLE. 845 Wilson pushed out along the Harding turnpike, and, wheeling to the left, ad- vanced against Hood’s position, across the Harding and Hillsboro turnpikes. At the same time, Johnson’s division of cavalry was sent to operate against a battery of the enemy at Ball’s Landing, on the Cumberland, 8 miles below Nashville ; and, late in the afternoon, in conjunction with some gun-boats, he en- gaged it, continuing the firing till dark, and with such effect that the Confed- ei-ates disappeared from that vicinity diirins: the nicrht. The remainder of Wilson’s cavalry, moving on the right flank of A. J. Smith’s troops, Hatch’s division leading and Knipe’s in reserve, struck the enemy at Richland Creek, near Harding’s House, di*ove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prison- ers and wagons. Continuing to ad- vance, and still swinging a little towards the left, they came upon a redoubt containing 4 guns. The redoubt was carried by assault ; and the captured guns were turned upon the enemy. The same troops then advanced against another and stronger 4-gun redoubt, (\npturing it with 300 prisoners. At this stage it was discovered that Smith liad not advanced sufficiently to the nght. Schofield, therefore, with the Twenty-Third corps, was directed to leave his position in reserve, and ad- vance to Smith’s right. This move- ment Schofield rapidly accomplished ; and the cavalry were thus enabled to operate more freely on the enemy’s rear. The Fourth corps, under Wood, formed on the left of Smith’s command, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy’s fiank, assaulted Mont- gomery Hill. This position, the most advanced in Hood’s line, was carried, at one o’clock, by a brigade of the second division. The Fourth corps, still connecting with Smith’s left, con- tinued to advance, carrying by assault all that portion of Hood’s line in its immediate front, and capturing several pieces of artillery, with 500 prisoners, and some colors. The Confederates were driven out of their original line of works, and forced back to a position along the base of the Harpeth Hills, still holding their line of retreat by the Franklin and Granny White turnpikes. The National line was readjusted at nightfall so as to run along the east side of the Hillsboro turnpike — Scho- field on the right. Smith in the centre, and Wood on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield. Steed man continued to hold the position he had gained in the morning, east of the Nolensville turnpike. The day’s oper- ations resulted in the forcing back of the enemy at all points, with a loss of 16 pieces of artillery, 1200 prisoners, several hundred stand of arms, and 40 wagons. The National loss was slight. The original plan of battle had been strictly adhered to, and, with but few alterations, fully carried out. The entire army bivouacked in the line of battle formed at dark ; and prepara- tions were made to renew the contest on the following day at an early hour. On the 16th, at six in the morn- ing, the struggle was resumed. 16 . Wood pressed back the Confederate skirmishers across the Franklin turn- 846 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. pike ; and then swinging a little to the right he advanced in a southerly dii*ec- tion, driving the Confederates before him until he came upon their new main line of works, at Overton’s Hill, about 5 miles south of the city, and on the east side of the Franklin turnpike. Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolens ville turnpike, and formed his command on the left of Wood, whose left flank he thus effectually secured. Smith moved on the right of Wood’s corps and established con- nection with it, thus completing a new line of battle. Schofield’s corps re- mained in the position taken up at dark on the 15th, in which his troops faced eastward and towards the enemy’s left flank, while those of Smith and Wood faced towards the south. Wil- son’s cavalry was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield. These dispositions having been com- pleted, it was determined to continue the movement against the enemy’s left flank ; and the entire National line moved to within 600 yards of that of the enemy at all points. About three in the afternoon an assault on Overton’s Hill was ordered to be made by two brigades of Wood’s corps, aided by a colored brigade from Steedman’s com- mand. But as the ground on which the assaulting columns were formed was open and exposed to the view of the Confederates, they anticipated the movement, and drew reinforcements from their left and centre to strengthen the menaced position ; and, when the assault was made, they directed a tre- mendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry upon the National troops. Wood’s men, however, moved steadily onward up the hill until near its crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose suddenly and opened upon their assail- ants a most destructive fire, wFicli caused them to waver and ultimately to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded lying among the felled trees. The troops were immediately re-formed in their old position by Wood, in readi- ness for a renewal of the assault. Smith and Schofield then moved against the works in their respective fronts, and carried all before them, breaking the enemy’s lines in a dozen places, capturing all his artillery with thousands of prisoners, including four general officers. Wilson’s cavalry dis- mounted, attacked the enemy at the same moment, gained firm possession of the Granny White turnpike, and thus closed one of the routes which had remained open to the Confederate^ for retreat in the direction of Franklin. Wood’s and Steedman’s troops, now hearing the shouts of their victorious comrades on the right, again rushed impetuously forward to renew the as- sault on Overton’s Hill. Although received with a very heavy fire, their onset proved irresistible. The Confe^l- erates broke, and, leaving their artillery and a large number of prisoners, fled in confusion to the Brentwood pass, through which runs the Franklin turn- pike, closely followed till dark by the Fourth corps. Wilson, at the same time, hastily mounted Knipe’s and Hatch’s divisions of his command, ami sent them in pursuit along the Granny THE PURSTJIT. 847 White turnpike, with directions to reach Franklin, if possible, in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon a body of Con- federate cavalry under Chalmers, behind barricades constructed across the road. The position was charged, at once, by the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, under Colonel Spalding, wlien the Confeder- ates broke and scattered in all direc- tions, leaving a number of prisoners, among whom was General Rucker. Such was the battle of Nashville. During the two day’s operations 4462 prisoners were taken, including 287 officers, from the grade of major- general downward, besides 53 pieces of artillery and thousands of small-ai*ms. The Confederates left 3000 of their dead and wounded on the field of bat- tle. The total National loss did not exceed 3000, and of this number very few were killed. Next morning, the pursuit was con- tinued, the Fourth corps pushing 17. towards Franklin by the direct turnpike, and the cavalry by the Granny White turnpike to its intersection with that road, beyond which point they moved in advance of the infantry. Johnson’s cavalry division was sent by Wilson direct to the Harpeth River by the Hillsboro turnpike, with instruc- tions to cross and move rapidly towards Franklin. The main cavaliy column, Knipe’s division in the advance, over- took the enemy’s rear-guard 4 miles north of Franklin, at Hollow Tree Gap, and carried the position by simultane- ous charges in both front and flank, capturing 413 prisoners and 3 stand of colors. The Confederates then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeav- ored to defend the crossins^s of the Harpeth; but, Johnson’s division com ing up from below on the south side of the stream, they were compelled to retii’e. The National forces took pos- session of the town, in which were the enemy’s hospitals, containing over 200(> wounded, of whom about 200 were Union soldiers. Wilson continued the pursuit towards Columbia, the Confe<]- erate rear-guard slowly retiring before him to about 5 miles south of Franklin, where it halted in some open fields on the north side of the West Harpeth River, apparently disposed to make a stand. Wilson at once deployed Knipe’s division as skirmishers, with Hatch’s division in support, and ordered his body- guard, the Fourth United States caval- ry commanded by Lieutenant Hedges, to attack the Confederates. Form- ing on the turnpike in column of fours, the gallant little band charged with drawn sabres, and succeeded in break ing their centre, while Knipe’s and Hatch’s men drove back their flanks, scattering the entire command and cap- turing their artillery. Night came on ; and the fugitives escaped. The Fourth corps had followed, in the rear of the cavalry, as far as the Harpeth River. There, however, their progress was stayed. The bridges were destroyed, and there was too much water in the sti-eam to permit the crossing of infan tiy. The construction of a trestle bridge was commenced ; but it was not completed before night-fall. Steedman’s command followed the Fourth corps and encamped 848 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. near it on the banks of the Harpeth. Smith and Schofield, with their corps, also joined in the pursuit, marching along the Granny White turnpike to its intersection with the direct road to Franklin. At that point they encamped for the night. The pursuit was resumed by the ctivalry, and pushed the next day as far as Rutherford’s Creek, 3 miles 18. from Columbia. The Fourth corps crossed to the south side of the Harpeth and closed up with the cavalry, the enemy offering no opposition during the day. Heavy rains having succeeded to the cold which had delayed Thomas’ operations at Nashville, not only made the roads almost impassable, but swelled the streams and rivers to such an extent that the pursuit became extremely diffi- cult. Rutherford’s Creek had swollen so rapidly, that it was found to be unford- able soon after the enemy had crossed. The splendid pontoon train with its experienced pontoniers, belonging to the army of Thomas, had been taken by Sherman for his Georgia campaign. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville, was on its way; but the vTetched state of the roads retarded its arrival. During the 19th, 19. efforts were made by the ad- vanced troops to get across Rutherford’s Creek. They were only partially suc- cessful, only a few skirmishers effecting a lodgment on the south bank. Smith’s and Schofield’s commands crossed to the south side of the Harpeth, the form- er advancing to Spring Hill, the latter to Franklin. On the morning of the 20th, Hatch having succeeded in throw- ing a fioating bridge over Rutherford’s Creek, got his entire division over, and pushed on for Columbia; but on reach- ing Duck River he found that the Con- federates had got everything across the night before by a pontoon bridge, which they had caiHed off, and that the river was impassable. In the course of the day Wood constructed a foot bridge over Rutherford’s Creek; and by night- fall having crossed all his infantry, as well as one or two of his batteries, he pushed on to Duck River. The pontoon train came up about noon, on the 21st; and, in spite of the severe cold which had now set in, the bridge was completed before night fall, and Smith’s command pushed across. Materials for the construction of another bridge were hurried forward to Duck River. This bridge was finished in time to permit Wood’s command to cross to the south side, late in the afternoon of the 2 2d, and to get into position on the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia. Notwithstanding the severity of the weather and the vexatious delays which he had experienced, Thomas resolved to continue the pursuit. This duty he assigned to Wilson’s cavalry and the Fourth corps. The infantry was to move along the turnpike — the cavalry was to march on its flanks, across the fields. Smith’s and Schofield’s corps were to follow more leisurely, and to be used as occasion demanded. Hood had now formed a powerful rear-guard, composed of Forrest’s cavalry and about 4000 infantry under General Walthall, made up of detachments from all his organized DEFEAT OF HOOD. 849 force. This rear- guard, undaunted and firm, did its duty to the last. All the rest of- Hood’s once noble army became a disheartened rabble of ragged, barefooted, and half-armed men, whose privations and discouragement led them to take every opportunity of escape from the Confederate service. Wilson crossed the Duck Kiver on the 23d ; and on the following day, supported by Wood, he came up with the enemy at Lynnville and at Buford’s Station. A stand was made at both these places ; but the Confederates were quickly dislodged with considerable loss, and followed up so rapidly that they had not time to destroy the bridges over Bichland Creek. On the morning of the 25th they evacuated Pulaski, and were pursued in the direction 25. of Lamb’s Ferry, over an almost impracticable road and through a coun- try devoid of sustenance for men or horses. During the afternoon Colonel Harrison’s brigade found them strongly intrenched, at the head of a deep and heavily wooded ravine, through which the road ran. Their skirmishers were driven in ; but the attack was delayed until the remainder of the cavalry should come up. The enemy then, recovering some of its old audacity, took the opportunity to sally from his breast-works, driving back Harrison’s skirmishers, and capturing one gun. The Confederates were ultimately driven back, with a loss of some 50 prisoners ; but the gun was not recov- ered. The cavalry, in pursuit, moved so rapidly that their supply trains were left far in the rear; and both men and animals suffered much in consequence. Wood’s corps following the cavalry on the night of the 26th encamped 6 miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb’s Ferry road, and reached Lexington, Alabama, 30 miles from Pulaski, on the 28th. The Confederates, by this time, j)ec. had made good their escape 28, across the Tennessee Biver at Bain- bridge ; and Thomas ordered the pur- suit to cease. At Pulaski 200 of the enemy’s wounded and sick were found in the hospital ; and 4 guns were taken out of Richland Creek. The road, all the way from Nashville to Bainbridge, Avas strewn with wagons, limbers, small-arms, and blankets, affording con- clusive evidence that the retreat of Hood’s troops had been of the most disorderly character. Although the pursuit of Hood, by the main army, had been discontinued, a force of 600 cavalry under Colonel Palmer, made up from various regiments, set out from Decatur, in the direction of Hood’s line of retreat. Palmer as- certained at Leighton that Hood had passed through that place on the 28th, and marched in the direction of Colum- bus, Mississippi. Avoiding the cavalry of the Confederates, and moving rapidly by way of LaGrange, Russellville and the Cotton-Gin road. Palmer overtook their pontoon train, consisting of 200 wagons and 78 pontoon boats, about 10 miles from Russellville, the whole of whicli he destroyed. Then, having ascertained that a large supply train was on its way to Tuscaloosa, he set out on the 1st of January towards Aberdeen, Mis- sissippi, and succeeded in surprising it m HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. about ten o’clock the same night, just beyond the Mississippi boundary line. This train, consisted of over 100 wagons and 500 mules. The wagons he burned ; tlie mules he sabred or shot. After encountering and pressing back Eoddy’s ciivalry, near Leighton, Alabama, and (tapturing and destroying Hood’s pon- toon train, about 10 miles from Eussell- ville he pushed on for Moulton. ’ Meet- ing a body of Confederates at Thorn Hill, he attacked and routed them. He ai’rived safe at Decatur on the 6th of January. While Hood was before Nashville, he sent into Kentucky a force of about 800 cavalry with 2 guns, under General Lyon, with instructions to operate against the railroad communications 'with Louisville. To protect these, McCook’s division of cavalry was on the 14th of December sent to Bowling Green and Franklin. Lyon captured IJopkinsville, but was soon afterwards met and routed by Lagrange’s brigade near Greenburg. Then, making a wide detour by way of Elizabethtown and Glasgow, he succeeded in getting to the Cumberland Eiver, at Burkville, where he crossed. Proceeding thence, byway of McMinnville and Winchester, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Mem- phis and Charleston Eailroad, he at- tacked the little garrison, at Scottsboro on the 10th of January, but was again repulsed. This time, however, his com- mand scattered and was pursued to the Tennessee Biver, beyond which he managed to escape with about 200 men, the rest of his force dispersing in squads among the mountains. Palmer with 150 men crossed the Tennessee Biver and went in pursuit of Lyon; and on the 14th of January, he surprised him in camp at Bed Hill, on the road from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, cap- turing Lyon with 100 of his men, and his one remaining piece of artillery. Lyon, however, shooting a sentinel, effected ‘his escape. The total National losses in the vari- ous operations of the campaign in Ten- nessee, including killed, wounded, and missing, did not exceed 10,000 men; while that of the enemy in prisoners alone was 13,189, including nearly 1000 officers of all ranks, 72 serviceable pieces of artillery, and a large number of battle-flags. More than 2000 deserters also came within the National lines and took the oath of allegiance. The success which attended General Thomas, in this campaign, was in some respects without parallel in tlie entire history of the war. In many of the campaigns larger numbers were en- gaged, and the fighting was more severe ; but in none of the campaigns was an opposing army so thoroughly demol- ished. It was the first time that a Confederate army had been annihilated. Thomas had reason to be proud of his victory. With an army hastily made up of fragments of three se^^arate com- mands, numerically eaker, and greatly inferior in dicipline to that to which he was opposed, he not only held his o^vn, not only repelled successive attacks, but won a signal, even a cro\'vning victory. It has already been mentioned that Grant was impatient of what he called Thomas’ ^‘unnecessary delay’ CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS. 851 before the battle of Nashville. Al- though not abandoning the opinion that the delay was perilous and to a eertain extent unnecessary, the Lieu- tenant-General afterwards declared that Thomas’ success would be accepted as ;i vindication of that distinguished (officer’s judgment. In his letter to Sherman on the 18th of December, Grant says “Thomas has done magnifi- cently.” Thomas was slow but he was sure. He was already renowned as the “ Rock of Chickamauga.” As the con- queror of Hood, the hero of the great Tennessee campaign, he was henceforth to take a foremost place, with Grant and Sherman and Meade and Sheridan. The government evinced its appreciation (xf his great services by appointing him major-general in the regular army, his rank to date from the 15th of Decem- ber — the day on which he won his crowning victory at Nashville. On the 30th of December, Thomas proclaimed the campaign at an end, and gave orders for the distribution of his troops in winter-quarters, at East- port, in Northern Mississippi, at Athens and Huntsville, in Alabama, and at Dalton, in Georgia. This arrangement, liowever, was not satisfactory to Gen- eral Grant and the War Department. The Secession cause must now be crushed — such was the determination (d‘ General Grant; and in this deter- mination he was fully supported by the government. Until this result should be achieved, there was to be no rest for the National armies. Thomas was, therefore, instructed to countermand tlie orders given, and to make a new disposition of his troops. Wood with the Fourth coiq)s was to go to Hunts- ville. ■ Smith, Schofield and Wilson were to concentrate at Eastport, and to hold themselves in readiness for further orders. Hood with a shattered frasrment of O his army had made his way to Tupelo, Mississippi. There, on the 28d of Janu- ary, he was relieved of his command, at his own request ; but it would be use- less to deny that his resignation had become a necessity. A capable and dashins: officer, he was Lonsrstreet’s tower of strength at Gettysburg, where he lost an arm. He fought ^vith equal energy and daring, at Chickamauga, where he lost a leg. He held him- self responsible for the conception of the Tennessee campaign ; and he strove hard, he tells us, to do his duty in its execution ; but his plan and mode of battle would have been more per- fect, if he had awaited, not made, the assaults. As it was, he acted precisely as his antagonist wished him to act. Hood added another name to that list of capable men, who had figured on both sides — men who as corps or divis- ion commanders were equal to any emergency; but who, being unequal to the responsibilities of uncontrolled authority, were found wanting, when entrusted with supreme command. Simultaneous with these operations in Tennessee, and having for their object the occupation of the Confeder- ate forces to the west of both Sherman and Thomas, there were some minor and co-operative movements of which it is necessary to give a brief account. 853 HOOD AND THOMAS IN TENNESSEE. One of these was sent out from Vicks- burg, in the latter part of November, against Hood’s communications with Mobile. The force employed, consisting of about 2000 cavalry, with 8 pieces of artillery, under Colonel Osband, after a well executed flank movement on Jackson on the 24th, started northward for the Mississippi Central Eailroad Bridge over the Big Black. The bridge Nov. reached on the 27th, captured 27. after a sharp flght and destroyed. The wagon-road bridge and 30 miles of railroad track were also destroyed, with all the intermediate depots and build- ings, besides 2600 bales of cotton, sev- eral locomotives and cars, and a large amount of stores at Vaughan Station. Hood’s army was thus cut oft* from the supplies accumulated for its use at Jackson; and the railroad was rendered unavailable for months. The expedition, although considerably harassed on its return by bodies of the enemy, got back to Vicksburg on the 4th of December, without having suffered any material losses. Another expedition, under General Davidson, set out from Baton Bouge, with a similar object, on the 27th of November, comprising a force of 4200 men in two divisions, commanded by General Baily and Colonel Davis, with 96 wagons and 8 guns, and reached Tangipaha, on the Jackson Eailroad, on the 1st of December. Five miles of the track were torn up and the railroad buildings and bridges burned. Unfor- tunately, some dwelling houses caught fire ; and a part of the town was con- sumed. The column then proceeded to Franklin ville; and there, also, the track was torn up. Columbia and Augusta were also visited. The enemy’s cavalry, under Scott, now made its appearance ; and a sharp skirmish occurred, on the Yazoo City and Vicksburg road on the 2d. After a weary march, over roads rendered almost impassable 2. by heavy rains, the command arrived at West Pascagoula, on the 12th. On the 16th, the Mobile and Great North- ern Eailroad was cut at Pollard’s, 72 miles northeast of Mobile, by a column of infantry and cavalry, under Colonel Eobinson. A few miles of the track were torn up, and the depot, 8 cars, and a large amount of stores, including 2000 stand of arms, were destroyed. Another co-operative movement, from Memphis, had greater success. On the 21st of December, General Dana sent General Grierson, with some 2 1 . 3000 cavalry, to cut the Mobile and Ohio Eailroad. The column moved directly eastward, threatening Corinth. Detachments, sent for the purpose, cut the telegraph wire between Grand Junction and Corinth, as well as that between Booneville and Gumtown, on the Mobile and Ohio road. On the latter road they also destroyed 4 bridges between the same points. The main column, moving rapidly on Tupelo, surprised and captured or dispersed Forrest’s camp of dismounted men at Verona. At this place, were destroyed 32 cars, loaded wdth new wagons, pon- toons, and supplies, 300 army ^vagons, most of which had been captui*ed from General Sturgis at Gumtown, 4000 new English-made carbines intended for the GRIERSON’S EXPEDITION. 853 use of Forrest’s troops, also large amounts of ordnance stores, quarter- masters’ and commissary stores for Hood’s army. On leaving Verona the column moved southward along the line of railroad, which was thoroughly destroyed, to a point between Egypt and Prairie Stations. Telegrams were taken from the wires at Okalona from Generals Taylor and Gardner, ordering Egypt to be held at all hazards, and promising reinforcements from Mobile and elsewhere. Eygpt was held by a garrison of about 1200 infantry and cavalry, with 4 guns on platform cars. Grierson attacked the place on 28. the 28.th. While the attack was going on, two trains loaded with infantry, under Gardner, came in sight. Grierson sent a force to meet them and to hinder their approach. The expected aid not coming up, the garri- son, after a fight of about two hours, was dispersed with a loss of 500 pris- oners and General Gholson killed. At Egypt the Nationals destroyed a train of 14 cars and 1000 stand of arms. The further prosecution of the raid was now given up, the hostile force in front and the great number of prisoners and captured animals making rapid move- ment impossible. The column, accord- ingly, turned to the southwest, and marching through Houston and Belle- fontaine, struck the Mississippi Central Eailroad at Winona. A detachment, sent to Bankston, destroyed the large and valuable factories which supplied the Confederate army with clothing and shoes, as well as large quantities of wool, cloth, and leather. Another de- tachment destroyed the new machine- shops and all the Confederate govern- ment property at Granada. A brigade, sent southward from this place, tore up the railroad track and pulled down the telegraph wire for 35 miles, and meet- ing a brigade of Confederate troops under Wirt Adams at Franklin, charged and drove it from the field with a loss of 25 killed. The column, after destroy- ing an immense amount of property, arrived safely at Vicksburg, on the 5th of Januaiy, •bringing in 550 pris- oners, 1000 negroes and 800 horses and mules. 300 <54 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. CHAPTER XL. no Necessity of the Blockade — The Blockade Banners — The Temptation — The EjBforts of the Government — Growing Strength of the Naval Service — Gillmore’s Expedition to Florida — Seymour Placed in Immediate Command — On St. John’s River — At Jacksonville — At Baldwin — Gillmore Returns to Hilton Head — Seymour’s Blunder — Suwannee River — Barber’s Station — Olustee Station — Battle of Olustee — Bravery of the Negroes— Seymour Falls Back on Jacksonville — Destruction of Property — The Expedition a Failure^ — North Carolina — New Berne — Plymouth — Washington — Pickett’s Unsuccessful Attempt on New Berne — Confederate Attack on Plymouth — Forts Warren, W’'essels and Comfort — The Albemarle — Capture of Plymouth — Hoke Demands the Surrender of New Berne— Melancthon’s Blockading Squadron — The Sassacus Buts the Albemarle — The Albemarle Retires — Hoke Abandons the Siege of New Berne — Quiet in Albemarle Sound and along the Coast of North Carolina — Burnside’s Conquests in 1862 for the most part recovered by the Confederates — Cushing and the Albemarle — Cushing’s Bravery — Destruction of the Albemarle — Plymouth Recaptured— Wilmington the one Open Port — Its Defenses — Arrangements Made to Reduce it — A Joint Expedition — Porter and Butler — Grant’s Instructions to Butler — The Troops on board Transports — A Formidable Fleet — A Storm at Sea — Cape Fear — The Transports Seek Shelter at Beaufort — Fort Fisher — The Powder Ship — The Experiment a Failure — The First Attack on Fort Fisher — A Magnificent Bombardment — The Second Day — The Troops Landed — “Yankee Doodle” — Bravery of Curtis — Difference of Opinion — The Troops Re-embarked — The Assault a Failure — A National Disap- pointment — Grant Offended — Preparations for Another Assault — Grant Sends an Increased Land Force — Terry in Command — The Combined Forces at New Inlet — The Strength of Fort Fisher — The Armament of the Fleet — A Terrific Bombardment — Terry Resolves to Assault — Porter Concurs — The Signal Given — The Marines Driven Back — The Palisades — Curtis’ Brigade — A Terrible Struggle — Curtis Joined by Pennybacker and Bell— Hand-to-hand Fighting — Fighting over the Traverses — Arrival of Blackman and Abbott— Fort Fisher Captured — Hoke’s Attack on the National Line — His Retreat-^The Struggle at Fort Fisher one of the most gallant in the War — A Brave Assault — A Heroic Defense — A Fearful Explosion — The Confederates Blow Up Fort Caswell — All the other Works Deserted — The Blockade of Wilmington Secured— A Pause — General Schofield Ordered to the Coast of North Carolina — His Arrival at Fort Fisher — The Department of Noith Carolina— Schofield in Command — Ordered to Co-operate with Sherman — Capture of Fort Anderson — Wilmington Abandoned by the Confederates— Occupied by the Nationals — A Severe Blow to the Confederates— Mobile — A Co-operative Movement — Canby, Wilson and Thatcher — Mobile a place of Great Strength— Canby and Thatcher Move Against It — On the East Side — Spanish Fort —The Siege— The Assault — The Work Abandoned— Occupied by the Nationals— vFort Blakely — A place of Great Strength — Canby Resolves to Assault — A Rush into the Jaws of Death — A Desperate Struggle — “Remember Fort Pillow” — A National Victory — Surrender of Mobile — Wilson’s Co-operative Movement — At Ely ton — At Monte vallo — Ebenezer Church — Selma Captured — Great Destruction of Property — At Montgomery — The Place Surrrendered — At Macon — A Most Successful and Most Destructive Raid — The Privateers — The Savannah— The Petrel— The Juda — The Nashville' — The Sumter — The Later Privateers — The Florida — Her Depredations — Captured at Bahia — Sunk in Hampton Roads — The Tallahassee and Chickamauga — Destroyed at Wilmington — The Georgia — Captured near Lisbon — The Olustee — The Shenandoah — Surrendered to the British Government — The Stonewall — Surrendered to the Spaniards at Havana — The Alabama — Her Mission of Destruction — Captain Semmes — At Cherbourg — The Kearsarge and the Alabama — The Great Battle — Captain Winslow — The Deerhound — The Courronne — Winslow’s Skilful Fighting— The Kearsarge Victorious — The Alabama Sunk — Her Record. Naval and coast operations have 1864 already, at different times, occu- pied our attention, in the course of this work. These operations had for their primaiy object, the establishment and maintenance of an effective block- ade of all the ports on the coast, through which the Confederacy might EXPEDITION TO FLORIDA. 855 obtain succor, or supplies. It can well be understood that tbe maintenance of such a blockade was a severe strain on the energies of the North. It implied the presence of armed vessels, all along the extended seaboard, gun-boats in the rivers and bayous, and large bodies of armed men at suitable points, and at convenient distances all along the coast. Blockade-running, which offered pecu- liar temptations to the foreign trader, ^\"as at first beset with little difficulty. The reward was great; and the risk was small. Time, however, and the progress of the war worked a great change. The Navy grew in strength ; and the perils and risks of the blockade- runner multiplied. At the close of 1863, there were of iron-clad steamers 75 ; of side-wheels 203 ; of screws 198; of sailing vessels 112 — in all 588. The number of guns was 4443, and the aggregate tonnage 467,967. On the 1st of July in that year, there were 34,000 seamen; and during the year enlistments for the naval service aver- aged over 2000 per month. In 1864 the number of vessels had increased to 671 ; the number of guns to 4610 ; and the tonnage to 510,396. At the begin- ning of the war, there were in the ser- vice 7600 men; at its close the figures were 51,500. In the spring of 1864, the naval forces were divided into four separate R([uadrons, of which one was stationed ill the James River, one in the Sounds of North Carolina, the other two lying off Cape Fear and the adjacent inlets. Each of these squadrons was placed under a competent officer ; and the head-quarters were established at Beau- fort, North Carolina. Port after port had gradually been wrested from the Confederacy, until in almost every har- bor and along the banks of the Missis- sippi, the National flag floated supreme. After the destruction of the forts in Charleston Harbor, and in Mobile Bay, Wilmington was the only port of first- class importance, which continued to invite the enterprise and to tempt the the cupidity of the blockade-runners. As we have already brought down the story of the naval and coast engage- ments to the year 1864, and as separate chapters have been devoted to Charles- ton Harbor and to Mobile Bay, we pro- pose to make this chapter exhaustive of all the remaining naval and coast operations, for whatever purpose, cov- ering, of course, those connected with the blockade and the privateering inter- ests of the South. Although not in any direct way con- nected with the blockade, yet having all the essential characteristics of a coast operation, place must be found at the outset here for a brief record of the ill-starred expedition which was sent to Florida, in the early months of 1864. Towards the close of 1863, reports were freely circulated, to the effect, that Florida, tired of the war, was sighing for amnesty and restoration to the Union. Gillmore, since the demolition of Fort Sumter, his troops compara- tively unemployed, had remained ar, Hilton Head. It was the opinion, of that officer, that such being the state ol feeling in Florida, his men might be used to some advantage in an expeditiou THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. 85 ^) to that State. In January, Lincoln gave his consent to the proposed exped- ition — at the same time commissionins: as major, Mr. John Hay, one of his private secretaries, and sending him to Hilton Head, to join Gillmore and pro- ceed Avith him as the representative of the Executive. Gillmore hurried for- ward the necessary preparations ; and the expedition, under the immediate command of General Trumau Seymour, consisting of 4500 infantry and 400 cavalry, on board 20 steamers and 8 Feb. schooners, left Hilton Head, on 6. the 6th of February. On the following day, they entered the St. John’s Kiver, and proceeding upwards, landed at and occupied Jacksonville, in the afternoon. Jacksonville was found to be ill ruins, and, Avith the exception of a few women and children, aban- doned by the inhabitants. On the 8th, the army in three columns — commanded respectively by C. C. Barton, Forty- Eighth 'New York, J. B. Hawley, Seventh Connecticut, and Guy V. Henry, Fortieth Massachusetts, set out from Jacksonville in the direction of Baldwin. Henry, who commanded the cavalry, led the advance. On the way, Henry found the Confederates in some force, at Camp Vinegar. Passing the camp, he surprised and captured, some- what in the rear of the Confederates, 4 guns, and a large amount of commis- sary stores. Baldwin was reached about sunrise, on the morning of the 9th, Avhen another gun was captured, together with 3 cars, a large quantity of cotton, and stores of all kinds, to the value of about $500,000. Henry pushed forward in the ^ direction of l4ake City ; but discovering tliat the Confederate general, Finnegan, was in the neighborhood, and not knoAving the exact strength of his command, he fell back about 4 miles, and telegraphed to Seymour for orders and supplies. Gillmore had accompanied the ex- pedition as far as Bakhvin. It was not his intention to penetrate further into the interior. GiAung Seymour instruc- tions to that effect, he returned to Hil- ton Head, which he reached, on the 15th. Seymour, hoAvever, having been informed that Finnegan had fallen back from Lake City, gave way to his own strong impulses and assumed the respon- sibility of pushing forward his troops, bare almost of supplies, in the direc- tion of the Suwannee Biver. Thence he telegraphed to Gillmore, notifying him of the fact and asking him to make a demonstration against Savannah, Avith one of the iron-clads, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent to Finnegan. Gillmore Avas astounded. He saw, at a glance, the peril to which Seymour was exposing himself and his 6000 troops. There was no reason why Finnegan should not receive reinforcements from both Georgia and Alabama. In such a case, Seymour’s force Avould be over- whelmed and probably destroyed. Gill more, without a moment’s delay, sent a message to his lieutenant remonstra ting against the folly of such conduct. It was too late, Seymour was already caught in a trap. On the morn- ing of the 20th, he had pressed 20. foi-Avard, from Barber’s Station, along the road which runs parallel with the rail- OLUSTEE. 857 road. He was within three miles of Olustee Station. At this point there was a ftwamp and a heavy pine forest. Under cover of these, Finnegan had disposed his men. It was now near two o’clock in the afternoon. The head of Seymour’s column had no sooner come up, than the woods blazed with the fire of musketry and artillery. Henry’s cavalry with Stevens’ battalion and Hawley’s Seventh Connecticut were the first to suffer. Hawley hurried forward the Seventh New Hampshire, Colonel Abbott, with the batteries of Hamilton, Elder, and Langdon. The National artillery suffered terribly. In the brief space of twenty minutes 40 out of 50 horses were killed, and 45 out of 82 men. What remained of the artillery force fell back, leaving behind t^vo guns. The battle, however, continued to rage with great fury. Seymour almost atoned for the blunder he had commit- ted, by his activity and daring. He was everywhere present, and the bullets of the enemy whistled around him in vain. Hawley’s brigade having suffered terribly, the Eighth United States, a negro regiment from Montgomery’s bri- gade, was sent to its support. This regiment, which had never before been under fire, behaved with the utmost gallantry. For two hours it held an exposed position in front ; and its losses — including its brave commander and amounting in all to 350 men — attested the severity of the fighting. Barton’s brigade, composed of the Forty-Eighth, Forty-Ninth, and One Hundred and Fif- teenth New York, was brought up in turn. On the part of this brigade nothing was wanting in the matter of bravery ; but it proved of no avail. It advanced only to repeat the experience and to share the fate of that which had gone before. For a while the struggle was prolonged. Barton’s men, already severely punished, were showing signs of weakness. The Confederates seemed to think that their opportunity had come for a final and crushing charge. Gathering up their strength, and as if resolved to make short, sharp work with their antagonists, they came rolling for- ward in overwhelming numbers and with resistless energy. It was a critica.. moment. Montgomery, with his twG remaining negro regiments, the Fifty- Fourth Massachusetts and the First North Carolina, rushed forward to the rescue, and received the full weight of the Confederate onset. This was the turning point in the fight. The negroes fought with the energy of despair, and although their comrades were falling on every side, they firmly held their ground. Although ultimately overpowered and driven back, it was not until Seymour had found time to rally and re-adjust his lines and get his guns in position. Four vollies of grapeshot from the National batteries compelled the Confederates to halt. It was now about four o’clock. Seymour ordered a retreat. The Con- federates attempted to pursue ; but the National guns, handled with skill and fired with great rapidity, made such havoc in their lines that they were com- pelled to desist. Seymour fell back with the wreck of his command to Jacksonville; and finally the whole 858 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. command returned to Hilton Head. The estimated loss of the Nationals in this campaign was nearly 2,000 men. At Jacksonville, Seymour destroyed stores valued at $1,000,000. The Con- federate loss was under 1000 men. Such was the battle of Olustee, and such was the result of the test applied to the loyal sentiment of Florida. From the date of Seymour’s unsuc- cessful experiment, Florida no longer commanded attention until the close of the war. Early in the year 1864, how- ever, the east coast of North Carolina became the theatre of some important operations. Since 1862, when they were captured by General Burnside, New Berne, Plymouth, and Washing- ton had been held by National garri- sons. In February 1864, an unsuccess- ful attempt was made by a body of Confederates, under General Pickett, to recapture New Berne. After setting on fire the gun-boat Underwriter, Pickett claimed a victory and retired. It was, however, a barren victory ; for he had left the defenses of New Berne untouched. About the middle of April, a more daring as well as more successful effort was made against Plymouth, at the head of Albemarle Sound, and at the mouth of the Boanoke Kiver. The place was well fortified, and was held by General Wessels, with a force of some 2400 men, consisting of the Eighty- Fifth New York, One Hundred and First and One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania, Sixteenth Connecticut, and 6 companies from other regiments. In the river, in front of the town, were the gun-boats Southfield, Miami, and Bombshell. In the immediate nemh- O borhood, and guarding the approaches to the town were four forts — Fort War- ren, Fort Williams, Fold Wessels, and Fort Comfort. On the 17th of ^p^ii April, General Hoke, \\dth about 17. 7000 Confederates, appeared in the vicinity of Plymouth ; and, on the same day, he made an attack on Fold War- ren, which was about a mile above the town. On the morning of the 18th, the attack was resumed with greater energy ; and powerful assistance was rendered by the Confederate ram Albemarle which came down the Boanoke Biver. The National gun-boat Bombshell came to the aid of the garrison, but was soon disabled and captured. Hoke then fell upon Fort Wessels, a mile nearer the town ; and, although a vigorous resist- ance was offered, the fort was at length captured. Plymouth was now closely invested. Hoke pressed the siege with great energy ; he brought his batteries closer upon the town; and the Albe- marle, having run past Fold Warren, fell upon the unarmed gun-boats. The Southfield was first struck. The blow was fatal ; for she speedily went down. The Miami was next attacked; and although she managed to escape down the river, it was not until her command- er was killed, and many of her guns were disabled. The Albemarle then turned her guns upon the town, pour- ing upon it a perfect storm of shot and shell. On the follomng day, Hoke, having pushed his batteries within 1100 yards of the town, opened upon it a tremendous fire. He tlien made a DESTEUCTIOX OF THE ALBEMARLE. 859 general assault. Wessels made an ob- stinate defense ; but he was ultimately compelled to surrender the place with 1600 prisoners, 25 guns, and 2000 small arms. The fall of Plymouth rendered necessary the evacuation of Washington, a little town at the mouth of the Tar Kiver, some 32 miles north of New Berne. Pursuing his victorious career, Hoke then pushed towards New Berne. Ar- rived in front of the place he demanded its surrender, which was refused. He then commenced a siege. Captain Cooke of the Albemarle somewhat over-elated by his success at Plymouth, and feeling confident that a similar success would attend him in the broader waters further down, pushed on again to the assistance of Hoke. He was ignorant of the fate which awaited him. Captain Melancthon, with his blockad- ing squadron, was then guarding the waters of Albemarle Sound. His prin- cipal vessels were the Mattahesset, the Miami, the Wyalusing, the Whitehead, ]jlay and the Sassacus. It was now 5. the 5th of May. The Albemarle was accompanied by the captured boat Bombshell. The Sassacus gave the Bombshell a broadside which compelled her to strike her flag. She then butted the Albemarle, forcing her hull under the water. The Sassacus, however, was severely punished for her temerity, a 100-pound Brooks bolt passing through one of her boilers, killing 3 men, and wounding 6, and filling the vessel with scalding steam. When the cloud of steam passed away, the Albe- marle was seen moving o£E in the direc- tion of Plymouth, firing as she fled. The Bombshell was left behind. Hoke was compelled to abandon the siege of New Berne. It was a National victory. For some months there was quiet in Albemarle Sound, and all along the coast of North Carolina. The conquests made by Burnside, in 1862, had for the most part been recovered by the Con- federates ; but Boanoke Island and New Berne remained in the hands of the Nationals. The Albemarle continued to be a source of annoyance and even terror to the blockading vessels. To- wards the end of October, Lieutenant W. B. Cushing, one of the bravest of the young officers in the naval service, undertook to destroy the monster. It was lying at the time in the harbor of Plymouth, behind a raft of logs, some 30 feet in width. A small steam launch, fitted up as a toi-pedo boat, was placed in Cushing’s charge. On the night of the 27th of October, with a crew Q^t. of 13 officers and men, he moved 27. up the Roanoke, and an^ived, before he was perceived by the enemy, within twenty yards of the Albemarle. The torpedo was under the ram and explod- ed before the enemy had time to fire a shot. Cushing’s own account best tells the story: “The torpedo,” he says “was exploded at the same time that the Albemarle’s gun was fired. A shot seemed to go crashing through my boat and a dense mass of water rushed in from the torpedo, filling and completely disabling her. The enemy then con- tinued to fire at fifteen feet range, and demanded our surrender, which I twice refused.” Cushing escaped into the 8o0 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. water, and, in spite of the bullets of the enemy, managed to reach the shore. Most of his crew were captured or drowned. In the morning, he learned that his work had been effectually ac- complished. The Confederate ram was completely destroyed. A few days later, Plymouth was recaptured by Commodore Macomb, and the National flag was unfurled over the sunken Albemarle. It has already been stated in this chapter that Wilmington, North Caro- lina, was the one seaport remaining to the Confederacy through which foreign supplies could be obtained. Charleston had not yet fallen; and Mobile was still a stronghold of the Confederates ; but the blockade of both harbors was complete, and there were few who deemed it possible to run the gauntlet of either the one or the other. Of all the Confederate ports Wilmington was the most difficult to close against the blockade-runners. It was peculiarly and favorably situated, some thirty miles up Cape Fear River. It could not be approached without passing certain formidable works which, at the mouth of the river and on the borders of the sea, the Confederates had erected for purposes of defense. There are two channels admitting to Cape Fear River. The southwest or main channel is about miles wide, with a depth of from 10 to 14 feet of water on the bar. It was protected by Fort Caswell on Oak Island, and by the Light-house battery on Smith’s Island. The northwest channel, called New Inlet, less than 2 miles wide and the water less deep than in the other, was protected by Fort Fisher — a first-class casemated earth- work, on the mainland, near Federal Point. The interior of the peninsula which lies between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic Ocean is for the most part sandy and low, in few places rising higher than 15 feet above high tide. To reach Wilmington it was necessary to pass through one or other of these inlets. So long as the Confederates held the works, ingress was easy to a friend, perilous to a foe. As early as the beginning of 1864, the government at Washington, had made arrangements for the capture of Wilmington. General Burnside, who was intrusted with the expedition, was collecting troops for the purpose, at Annapolis, when he was summoned by General Grant to join the army of the Potomac. Later, in the summer of the same year and simultaneously with the preparations for the attacks on the forts in Mobile Bay, arrangements were made for reducino* the works at the O mouth of Cape Fear River. With this end in view, gun-boats armored and unarmored were assembled in Hampton Roads ; and in October, Admiral Por- ter, charged with the execution of the naval portion of the task, found him- self at the head of a fleet of 50 war vessels, including the New Ironsides and several monitors. The plan which had been first suggested to Burnside by Mr. Kidder, a Boston gentleman, and which had been approved of by the government was again accepted ; and Grant agreed to send the bulk of Sher idan’s force to co-operate with Portei FORT FISHER. 861 in tlie intended movement. Sheridan’s men, however, it was soon found, could not be spared from the Shenandoah Valley ; and the expedition against Wilmington once more fell through. It was now resolved to make a direct attack on Fort Fisher and its depend- encies. Preparations were hurried for- ward; and a reconnoissance of Fort Fisher was made, with the help of the blockading squadron, by Generals God- frey Weitzel and Charles K. Graham. Rumors of the projected movement against Wilmington reached the ears of the Confederates. General W. H. C. Whiting, an accomplished and skilful engineer was then in charge of that region. Under his direction, new works were thrown up to strengthen Fort Fisher ; and the garrison was increased. Another delay took place ; and it was not until December that the expedition actually set out. Grant having de- tached 6500 troops from the forces under Butler, placed them under the immediate command of Weitzel. The object of the expedition, as stated in Grant’s instructions to Butler, was, first, the closing of the port of Wil- mington, and, second, the capture 'of that city. It was not intended that Butler should accompany the expedi- tion. On the 8th of December, the troops destined to take part in the pro- 8. posed movement — Ames’ division of the Twenty-Fourth corps, and Paine’s division of the Twenty-Fifth (colored) corps — left Bermuda Hun- dred in transports. On the following day they were at Fortress Monroe ; and Butler notified Porter that his troops were ready to proceed. On the 14th, at noon, when off Cape Henry, Butler joined the transports in his flag-ship, the Ben Deford. The transport fleet then put to sea. Porter’s formidable fleet had preceded it by 36 hours. On the evening of the 15th the transports, with the troops on board, arrived at the appointed rendezvous, about 25 miles east of Fort Fisher. The weather had been beautiful, since the 13th. For three days more, while the army waited for the navy, the ocean was perfectly calm. It was not until the evening of Sunday, that the fleet made its . appearance. Then, however, the weather which had been so propitious, had become gloomy and threatening. A strong wind was coming up from the southeast ; and the sea was covered with white-caps. The wind increased in violence until, on the 20th, it blew a perfect hurricane. It was one of those storms which are common on that ' coast, and which have given its name to Cape Fear. By advice of Porter, the transports returned to Beaufort, some 7 0 miles up the coast. There they found shelter and took in coal and water. The storm lasted for 3 days, and was one of the severest experi- enced in 30 years. Porter’s fleet, while it lasted, rode at anchor. On Friday the 23d, Butler, who had 23, accompanied the expedition, and, con- trary to Grant’s expectation, had taken personal command, sent Captain Clarke, one of his aids, in the armed tug Cham- berlain to inform Porter that the fleet would be at the rendezvous by sunset, 862 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. next day. Clarke returned to Butler on Saturday at suniise, with tlie report that Porter could not wait the arrival of the troops, and that his purpose was to fire the powder-ship at one o’clock that morning. Butler was indignant, because he considered the presence of the troops essential to the success of the experiment. The powder-ship was exploded as Porter declared it would be ; but the experiment was fruitless. What was the experiment ? It ap- pears that on the first of October 1864, an accideiftal explosion of 150,000 pounds of gunpowder took place at Erith, in England ; and such was the force of the concussion that 100 yards of embankment was blown away, and a large number of houses destroyed. Butler taking a hint from this fact, conceived the idea that a similar ex- plosion in the near neighborhood of Fort Fisher would have a similar result. It was his expectation that it would shake down, at least, a portion of the walls and demoralize the garrison. He had grievously miscalculated. The experiment was fairly made. Two hun- dred and fifteen tons of gunpowder were exploded, without any apprecia- ble result. Porter, not discouraged by the failure of the gunpowder experiment, resolved to proceed ^vithout delay to the attack. The squadron selected for that purpose consisted of 33 vessels, carrying over 400 guns, with a reserve of 17 small gun-boats, carrying about 100 guns. The first line was composed of the New Ironsides, the Monadnock, Canonicus and Mahopac — all iron- clads. The sec- ond line was com j)osed of the heavy fn- gates Minnesota, Colorado, Wabash and other vessels of similar weight and con- struction. There was yet another line in rear of the second ; and two divisions took side positions, to the north and east, and to the south and southeast, so as to be able to direct an enfiladins: fii^e on the ' works. The bombard- j)^ ^ ment was “magnificent for its *^4, power and accuracy.” Clouds of dust arose from the fort, and conceal6^'l eveiything from view. It was impossi- ble for the garrison to make any show of resistance. The gunners retired behind their bomb-proofs ; and in less than an hour and a quarter the fort was silenced. For five hours, the bombardment continued ; and at sun- set when Butler arrived in his fiag-ship with some of the transports. Porter sig- nalled his fleet to retire for the night. Arrangements were made, early on the morning of the 25th, for a joint attack by the troops and the fleet. It was agreed between Porter and Weitzel that, as soon as the transports arrived, the troops should attempt to effect a landing under cover of the fire fi*om the ships, and proceed to take the place by storm. It was an hour past noon before the transports were fully forward. Tiie fleet had already for some hours been firing upon the works. Without delay, and by the help of launches, a landing was effected about 3 miles above Fort Fisher. Gen- eral Curtis with about 550 men, was the first to reach the shore. The Na- tional flag was quickly planted on a deserted battery. As soon as it was FAILURE OF THE FIRST ATTACK. 803 seen, tlie air was rent by cheers from the men still on board the transports ; and the bands struck up Yankee Doodle.” Curtis pushed along the shore, until his skirmish line was within 50 yards of Fort Fisher. It was Por- ter’s belief that there was “ not a rebel within five miles of the fort.” Weitzel had a very dift'erent opinion. He had landed with Curtis, and advanced to within 800 yards of the work. It would be butchery ” he thought, to make an assault under the circumstances ; and returning to Butler on board tlie gun-boat Chamberlain, he so reported. Butler after some consideration came to the same conclusion ; and about five o’clock in the afternoon, when about one-half of his troops were landed, he ordered them to re-embark. In the meantime Curtis, still pressing forward, had captured the half-moon battery with 220 men. He had notified Gen- eral Ames of the fact, calling for assist- ance, and declaring his belief that he could take the fort. Ames, ignorant of the order which had been given to re-embark, sent Colonel Bell’s brigade to the support of Curtis. It was now after sunset ; and before Cuidis could make a further advance, the firing of tbe fleet ceased, and night closed in upon the scene. As soon as Ames became aware of the order to withdraw his troops, he put them on board the launches and returned to the transports. The attack on Fort Fisher from which so much was expected, thus resulted in total failure. On the following day, the transports, with the troops on board, left for Hampton Roads. The result of the experiment on Foi t Fisher was a source of deep and gen- eral disappointment. Ho one was more disappointed than General Grant himself. He was greatly displeased. It was his opinion, as it was that of Admiral Porter, that the place might have been taken, if the land forces had acted with sufficient determination, and if the advance had been adequately sustained. Several of the officers vol- untarily reported to Grant that, when recalled, they had nearly reached tlie fort, and that, in their judgment, it could have been taken without much loss. Which was right in this instance. General Weitzel, who landed and in- spected the works, or Admiral Porter, who saw them only from his flag-ship, will possibly always be a divided ques- tion. It does not seem fair, however, to blame Qeneral Butler for acting on the advice of Weitzel who, according to Porter’s own confession, was a thorough soldier and an able engineer, whose busi- ness it was to know more about assault- ing than he did. Whatever may have been the fact, in the circumstances, it was Grant’s determination that the fort should be taken and the blockade of Wilmington reduced. While therefore the South was rejoicing over what they claimed to be a victory, the Lieutenant- General was making arrangements for dealing a more effective, and, as it proved to be, a decisive blow. For some days after the departure of the transports. Porter, with his fleet, was still off New Inlet, in the neighborhood of Fort Fisher. Here he received instructions from Grant. 804 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. ordering him to remain, and promising to send him an effective land force, with a proper leader. It was still his belief that the fort could be taken. In addition to the troops which had gone back in the transports to Hampton Hoads, he sent a brigade of 1500 men, and a small siege train. General Terry was to command. The new expedition Jan. Hampton Koads on the 6th 6. of January, and on the 8th ren- dezvoused off Beaufort, where Porter was taking in coal, ammunition and other needed supplies. The weather ^vas boisterous ; and it was not until late on the night of the 12th that the combined forces arrived off New Inlet. It had been arranged that the troops should be landed some distance above the fort, and that they should then in- trench across the point to Cape Fear Biver, so as to prevent reinforcements being sent from Wilmington. The land- ing effected, and the position secured, the assault was to be made simultane- ously by the troops and by the fleet. Fort Fisher, as we have seen already, was a place of wonderful strength. Admiral Porter, who was at Sebastopol during the siege, pronounced it much stronger than the famous Malakoff. With the immediately connected works, it mounted 75 guns. The armament of the whole works guarding the ap- proaches to Wilmington was about 160 guns, among which were some 150- pounder Armstrongs. The attacking squadron carried 500 guns, some of them the largest in the world. It was a concentration of destructive machin- ery unparalleled in the world’s history. On the morning of the 13th, at an early hour, the landing of the troops commenced. Some 200 boats and a large number of steam-tugs 13. were employed in the operation. The fleet, divided into 3 columns, covered and protected the boats and the land- ing ; and as early as three o’clock in the afternooh 8000 troops were on shoi^ Each man carried with him 3 days’ rations and 40 rounds of ammunition. There was put on shore also an abun- dant supply of intrenching tools. Dur- ing the entire process of landing, the fleet was pouring shot and shell into the fort. The bombardment had been terrific. It was calculated that, while it lasted, four shots were fired from the fleet every second, and that during the course of the day, the iron-clads alone — the New Ironsides, Saugus, Mahopac and Canonicus — fired upwards of 2000 shells. It is not wonderful that under such a fire, the Confederates should have been compelled to take shelter under their bomb-proofs. At dark, about an hour after the landing of the troops had been effected, the wooden vessels were drawn off for the night. The iron-clads remained at their an- chorage, firing slowly at intervals, dui*- ing the darkness. As soon as the troops were landed, they were set to work, throwing up intrenchments ; and as early as eight o’clock on the morning of the 14th, they had constructed a good j^n. breast-work stretching from the 14 . river to the sea, and partially covered by ahatis. During the course of the day, a reconnoissance was made to SECOND ATTACK ON FORT FISHER. 8Gc wathin 500 yards of tlie fort. The principal result of this reconnoissance was that General Terry, in view of the difficulty of conducting a regular siege on the narrow and exposed peninsula, came to the conclusion that the wiser course would be to make an immediate assault. In this Admiral Porter con- curred ; and it was decided that the assault should be made at three o’clock, on the afternoon of the 1 5th. Arrange- ments were made for the army to as- sault the western half of the land face, while a co-operating force of sailors and marines should attack the northeast bastion. The troops were kept busy strengthening the line of breast-works, and getting the guns into position as soon as they were landed ; and, all day long and all night through, a slow and deliberate fire was maintained by the fleet. Fort Fisher, before the sun went down on the 14th, was badly pounded. Most of the guns were injured ; not a few of them were silenced ; and what with the slow but continuous fire of shot and shell during the night, suffi- cient openings were made to warrant an assault, in the morning. On the morning of the 15th, every- Jan. ready for the attack. 15 . The ships were in position ; and the soldiers and marines were prepared to move at the word of command. At eleven o’clock, the fleet opened a fire which was unparalleled in the history of naval warfare. Under its cover 1000 sailors and 400 marines, com- manded by Fleet-Captain K. R. Breese, were landed on the beach ; and by digging rifle-trenches, they worked their way to a point within 200 yards of the sea-front of the fort, where they lay awaiting the final signal for. attack. The troops selected for the attack wei^ the brigades of Curtis, Pennybacker, and Bell, of Ames’ Division. Paine’s division of colored troops and Abbott’s brigade were left in charge of the in- trenchments facing Wilmington. It was now three o’clock. All this time the fleet continued to thunder against the fort, working terrible destruction. At half-past three o’clock the signal Avas given. All the steam whistles screamed and roared. The ships di- rected their fire to the upper bat- teries. The sailors, led by Captain Breese, eager to win the laurels of the day, rushed forward, with reckless energy, towards the parapet of the fort, already swarming with Confederate soldiers and blazing with the fire of musketry. It was intended that the marines should cover the assaulting par- ty ; but for some unknown reason they failed to fire upon the Confederates who exposed themselves on the parapet. It was Porter’s opinion that if the marines had made a proper use of their guns, the first assault would have been a complete success. I saw ” he says “how recklessly the rebels exposed themselves, and what an advantage they gave our sharpshooters whose guns were scarcely fired, or fired with no precision.” In spite, however, of the murderous fire to which they were ex- posed, the sailors pressed forward, some of them actually reaching the parapet The advance was swept away like chafl before a mighty rushing wind. The 866 THE BLOCKADE AKD THE PRIVATEERS. men in tlie rear seeing the slaughter in front, were seized with a panic and fell back in. some confusion. The attack on this part of the fort was a failure, except in so far as it diverted attention from the action of the troops. Before the sisrnal for assault was O given, the soldiers had, under cover of hastily constructed breast-works, ap- ])roached within a few hundred yards of the fort. At the word of command, they sprang forward and went bounding toAvards the palisades. These, already much damaged by the fire from the fleet, soon yielded to the vigorous blows of the axemen. Curtis’ brigade, which led the attacking force, pushed on in the face of a severe enfilading fire. A lodgment was quickly effected on the west end of the land front. Here a terrible hand-to-hand struggle commenced. The cannoniers rushed to their guns ; and the parapet bristled with bayonets. Curtis, one of the bravest of the brave, was sore beset. He was soon, however, joined by Penny- backer, who took position on his right, and by Bell, who occupied the space between the fort and the river. Hand-to-hand fighting ” says General Terry, “ of the most desperate charac- ter ensued, the huge traverses of the land face being used successively by the enemy as breast- works, over the tops of which the contending parties fired in each other’s faces.” Nine of these traverses were carried one after the other by the National troops. It was now about five o’clock. The battle had lasted a full hour and a half. It be- came apparent that more troops were needed to suppoH the assaulting col- umn. Terry, therefore, ordered up Abbott’s brigade from the line of in- trenchments facing Wilmington. Breese being, at the same time, ordered to oc- cupy that 2)osition with his sailors and marines. Paine, also, being ordered to send down one of his best regiments, forwarded the Twenty-Seventh, a negro regiment, under Brigadier- General A. M. Blackman. Meanwhile, the combat waxed fiercer and fiercer. There was no lull — no interruption. Amid the ruins of barracks and storehouses, in the deep sand-hollows, and over the bodies of dead and dying comrades, the terrible struggle was prolonged. While this desperate fight was going on, inside the work, the fleet was not idle ; and by means of signals, which were ex- changed with great accuracy, such of the ships as were in position wei’e enabled to pour upon the fort a well- directed and most destructive fire, mth- out in any way interfering with the action of the troops. Some of the ships, from the moment the action com- menced, continued to sweep the ground more to the south, so as to make it impossible for any reinforcements to reach the fort fi*om that direction. The battle commenced at half past three o’clock. It was now dusk. Nine of the traverses which had been used as breast-works, one after the other, had been carried. It was about this time that Blackman reported to Ames, and that Abbott, with his little band, entered the work. The arrival of these reinforcements gave intensity to the struggle. Blackman’s troops, after FORT CASWELL BLOWN UP. 867 having been under the heavy fire for a Jittle while, were mthdrawn. It was now near nine o’clock. The fighting still continued for the possession of the traverses. At length two more of them were carried ; and the Confederates fell back, Abbott pressing them with great vigor, and finally driving them from their last stronghold. The entire work was now in the hands of the Nationals. Some of the garrison had fied down the Point to Battery Buchanan. Thither tiiey were hotly pursued by Abbott and by Blackman ; and about midnight, Colonel Lamb, the commandant of the fort, and Major-General Whiting, and such of the garrison as were not in the hands of General Terry, were made prisoners. Hemmed in between the water and their antagonists, they had no choice but to surrender. About four o’clock in the afternoon. General Hoke approached the line of intrenchments which had been thrown up across the peninsula, so as to guard iigainst any surprise from the north ; and it seemed for a time as if he meant to make a vigorous attack. Paine was in readiness to receive him. Hoke, however, after a slight skirmish with the National pickets, retired. His de- parture was a relief to General Terry. A vigorous and well-sustained attack in that direction, might have changed the fortunes of the day. Such, then, was the great struggle for the possession of Fort Fisher ; and such was the result. No more gallant assault was ever made. No more glori- ous resistance was ever offered. To I With North and South, Fort Fisher will ever be a source of common pride. On both sides were revealed the intelli- gent purpose and indomitable spirit of the American soldier. The garrison originally numbered over 2300 men, of whom 1971 with 112 officers were captured. General Whitney and Colonel Lamb were both severely wounded. The National loss in killed, wounded and missing was about 690. Ames’ brigade command- ers, Curtis, Pennybacker and Bell, were each of them wounded, the two former severely. Bell mortally. On the part of the fieet, there was a loss of about 250 or 300 men ; and two 15-inch guns were exploded on board the monitors. On the morning of the 16th a fearful accident occurred. From some un- known cause, the principal maga- zine of the fort exploded, scatter- 16 . ing death and ruin all around. Sonie 200 men were killed ; and about 100 were wounded. On the 16th and 17th the Confeder- ates blew up Fort Caswell on the right bank of the river. They abandoned also Battery Holmes, on Smith’s Island, together with all the works at Smith s- ville and Beeve’s Point. The Nationals were thus left in entire and absolute control of all the works which com- manded the mouth of Cape FearKiver. In the different works were found 169 pieces of artillery, most of them of heavy calibre and some of them of the best English make ; over 2000 stand of small arms, with stores and ammunition in large (Quantities. The blockade of Wilmington was thus effectually se- cured ; and Wilmington itself was now 868 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. to command tlie attention of General Terry and Admiral Porter. Some weeks were allowed to elapse before active operations were resumed, in the direction of Wilmington. It was not deemed advisable to make an advance, until the land troops were considerably reinforced. It w’as known that Hoke, with a strong force of Con- federates, was occupying an intrenched line which extended across the penin- sula, from the sea, at Masonboro Inlet to Sugar Loaf Battery, on the east bank of Cape Fear River, and almost to Fort Anderson, a strong work which stood on the west bank of ‘the river. General Terry having supplied the requisite number of men to guard the different works, strengthened his line of intrenchments, which, as we have seen, extended across the peninsula, some two or three miles to the north of Fort Fisher. Meanwhile, Admiral Por- ter had pushed some of his lighter vessels through Hew Inlet into Cape Fear River ; and Cushing, in obedience to the orders of the Admiral, had raised the National flag over Fort Cas- well, and the works at Smithsville. General Grant had not been unmind- ful of the difficulties, as well as oppor- tunities, which might follow upon the capture of Fort Fisher. Occupied as he was, with the work immediately before Petersburg and Richmond, his mental eye continued to survey the whole vast field of war operations. Sherman was already, with the consent of the Lieutenant-General, .making pre- parations for his return march through the Carolinas. Thomas' success had been such that he was left almost without a rival in Tennessee. He had about him more men than he could use ; and he had already ordered Schofield with the Twenty-Third corps, to go into winter-quarters at Eastport, Missis- sippi. Grant, however, had work for Schofield and his men. It was his determination to hasten matters to a close ; and with this end in view, he had resolved to concentrate the armies of the republic. When about to carry out the orders of Thomas and retire to Eastport, Schofield received instruc- tions, from Grant, to proceed to the coast of North Carolina. The instructions of the Lieutenant-General were promptly obeyed. Proceeding by steamers down the Tennessee and up the Ohio to Cin- cinnati, and thence by rail, he reached Washington and Alexandria on the 23d of January. His troops were again embarked; and on the 9th of February, Schofield, with Cox’s 9. division arrived at Fort Fisher. The remainder of the troops followed, some of them goiug to New Berne. After the capture of Fort Fisher, Butler had been superseded by Ord, in the com- mand of fte Department of Virginia and North Carolina. A separate De- partment was now made of North Carolina, and intrusted to Schofield. Schofield, however, was to act under orders from General Sherman and to co-operate with him. Sherman was expected to be in the neighborhood of Goldsboro, between the 2 2d and the 28th of Febiniary ; and Schofield, march- ing from Wilmington or New Berne was to join him at that place. There MAP SHOWING THE ENTRANCES TO CAPE FEAR RIVER AND THE APPROACHES TO WILMINGTON, N. C. MOVEMENT AGAINST MOBILE. 869 were now in tlie immediate neighbor- hood of Fort Fisher some 20,000 men. No time was now lost in moving towards Wilmington. Two days after the arrival of Schofield, Terry advanced against Hoke. Driving in the pickets, he threw up a fresh line of intrench- ments close to those of his antagonist. An unsuccessful attempt was made to turn Hoke’s left. The attempt to turn his right was more successful ; and Fort Anderson was speedily enveloped by the divisions of Ames and Cox. It Feb. February. On l^. the same evening,' the garrison, convinced of their danger, abandoned the fort, taking with them 6 guns and some valuable property, but leaving behind them 10 heavy guns and a large quantity of ammunition. The work was occupied next morning ; and over it waved the National flag. After the capture of Fort Anderson, Ames crossed to the east side of Cape Fear River to assist Terry. Hoke abandoned his in- trenchments and fell back towards Wilmington. The National troops pressed forward on both sides of the river. Fort Strong and Fort St. Philip were successively deserted by the Con- federates. On the 21st, Cox was on Eagle Island and flinging shells into Wilmington. Feeling his situation to be desperate, Hoke ordered a general destruction of property. Several steam- ships, including the Chickamauga and Tallahassee were destroyed by fire, Feb. together with large quantities of 22 . military and naval stores. On the morning of the 22d, it was discovered that the Confederates had abandoned the town ; and Schofield and his vic- torious troops entered unopposed. The fall of Wilmington was a serious blow to the Confederate cause. It had long been a fruitful source of supplies ; and it could ill be dispensed with. Lee, it was known, had manifested much anxiety regarding Wilmington ; and after the capture of Fort Fisher, there was found in the work a letter, in which he informed the officer command- ing that if Wilmington should be taken, Richmond could not much longer hold out. Grant’s plans were working ad- mirably ; and the end, day after day, was more visibly drawing nigh. Tn a separate chapter, we have already given a detailed account of the operations in Mobile Bay — operations which, in August, 1864, resulted in the capture of the forts which commanded the entrance. In the upper portions of the bay, the waters are shallow. It was found impossible, in consequence, to move the fleet sufficiently near the town to make bombardment possible ; and as the land force was too small to attack without the aid of the fleet, operations were suspended until the spring of 1865. Mobile, however, still commanded Grant’s attention ; and when Sherman had completed his triumphal march through Georgia to the sea, and Thomas had cut to pieces Hood’s army in Mid- dle Tennessee, fresh arrangements were made for the reduction of this Confed- erate stronghold. The conduct of the movement against Mobile was intrusted to General Canby, then commanding the West Mississippi army with head- 309 370 THE BLOCKADE AND THE PRIVATEERS. quarters at New Orleans. A co-opera- tive movement was placed in charge of the famous cavaliy leader, General J. H. Wilson, who was to act under or- ders from General Thomas. Admiral Thatcher, then in command of the West Gulf Squadron, was also ordered to proceed to New Orleans and confer wdth General Canby. It was believed that by using vessels of light draught, the fleet would be able to co-operate with the army. Canby .proceeded at once to collect his forces ; and he soon had around him, or acting under his orders, and towards a common end, an army of about 45,000 men. It consisted of Granger’s newly organized corps, the Thirteenth, 13,200 strong; A. J. Smith’s corps, the Sixteenth, 16,000 strong; Steele’s column, which came up from Pensacola, 13,200 strong ; with artillery, cavalry and engineers to the number of 3000. The Confederate forces in the Department, were under the command of General Richard Taylor, who was at Meridian. General D. H. Maury, with 9000 men was immediately in charge of Mobile, and its defenses. About the middle of March, every- thing was in readiness for the forward movement. Wilson, who as Ave have seen, was to co-operate with his cavalry, was also ready to swoop from the north, down through Alabama. During the course of the three years of the war. Mobile had been made a place of great strength. On the Avestern side particu- larly, it was considered impregnable. A direct attack on that side Avas deemed too hazardous. It was, therefore, de- termined to make a flank movement. up the eastern shore, and, in concert with the fleet, which Thatcher had con- trived to bring up, to seize the fortifica- tions on the islands and the mainland at the head of the bay. On the 24th of March, the Thirteenth 24 . corps, having marched along the penin- sula from Fort Morgan, reached Dan- ley’s, oh Fish River. The Sixteenth corps which had crossed the bay in transports, and had landed under coA^er of the fleet, was already at the appoint- ed rendezA^ous. On the 25th, the Thir- teenth and Sixteenth corps advanced from Fish River, up the east side of the bay, along the Belle Rose and Blakely Roads. The roads were strewn with torpedoes, some of Avhich exploded, killing men and horses. On the 26th, having encountered only a feAV skir mishers by the way, the National ad- vance Avas in the neighborhood of Span- ish Fort, some 7 miles east from Mobile. The reduction of this fort Avas deemed a preliminary necessity; and, on the following day, it was completely in vested on the land side. Smith being on the right, and Granger on the left. This fort Avas of great strength, the Avorks extending about two miles. Tt was garrisoned by nearly 3000 men, under General R. Gibson. The siege of Spanish Fort lasted for tAvo Aveeks On the 27th, as the day advanced, and all duiing the night, the firing Avas on a scale of unusual mag- nificence. Besiegers and besieged vied with each other, the bombardment and the response being equally terrific ; and a spectacle unique in its character, as grand and imposing as it was fitted to BLAKELY. 871 alarm, was furnished to the citizens of Mobile. Canby, day after day, drew his lines closer and closer, the lire tell- ing more and more effectually on the ^vorks. Excellent work was done by the vessels of the fleet. They not only neutralized the vessels of the enemy, but succeeded, from time to time, in throwing 100-pound shells into April April 8. an assault was made by Colonel Bell’s Eighth Iowa regiment, of Gedde’s brigade of Carr’s division. The garri- son was composed mainly of Texans, ^vho fought with tremendous energy. The Texans received the advancing (‘olumn with a tremendous musketry Are. Bell, however, pushed his men forward in greater force, cheering them by his words and sustaining them by his example. The Iowa men charged over the works in the most gallant manner ; and after a desperate hand- to- ll and struggle, they found themselves in possession of about 300 yards of the intrenchments, with several colors, and a bout 3 5 0 prisoners. Gibson, con vinced that the position was no longer tenable, })roceeded to withdraw his troops. About midnight, the firing from the fort ceased ; and, shortly after two o’clock on the morning of the 9th, Ber- tram’s brigade entered and took posses- sion of the place, without encountering any opposition. The immediate fruits of victory were 600 prisoners, the en- tire works, with 30 heavy guns, and military stores in abundance. On the night of the 11th, Forts Hu- ger and Tracy, which commanded the mouth of the Blakely Biver, were also abandoned ; and the key to Mobile was now in the hands of the Nationals The fleet moved up the Tensas April Biver towards Mobile, picking 11 . up, as it advanced, some 35 tor- pedoes, and coming to anchor within shelling distance of the city. In cross- ing Blakely Bar, two of the vessels were sunk. The army moved along the east bank of the river towards Blakely, where the Confederates had constructed a strong line of works, about three miles in length, both extremities resting on high ground, and extending to the river. These works comprised nine redoubts, or lunettes, and were armed with forty guns. The garrison, which was under the command of General St. John Lidell, was e was moving slowly. Winslow was now in a position to use grapeshot witli effect. A few more guns were fired ; and the flag of the Alabama disap- peared. A white flag was then dis- played over her stern ; and Win- slow, respecting the signal of disti^ss, THE ALABAMA SUNK. 879 discontinued filing. Within two min- utes, the Alabama again opened fire from her two guns on the port side. The Kearsarge quickly responded ; and then steaming ahead, Winslow placed his vessel risrht across the bow of the Ala- o bama, and was about to open a raking fire. .The white flag, however, was still floating ; and Winslow again re- served his fire. Almost immediately afterwards, the boats of the Alabama were lowered ; and in one of them came an officer who informed Winslow that the Confederate vessel had sur- rendered, and that she was fast sinking. Twenty minutes after the surrender, the Alabama went down in the deep waters of The English Channel. She went down stern foremost, her bow rising high in the air, and her main- mast breaking off, as she disappeared. Semmes flung his sword into the sea. He and his officers, and some of the crew, were picked up by the Deerhound, and carried to England. Some 65 or 70 men, a number of them wounded, were rescued by the boats of the Kear sarge. Several others were got on board by two French pilot boats, and taken to France. Althouo-h the Ala- o bama had fired some 370 shot and shell, the Kearsarge was but little injured ; and the casualties on board amounted to only 3 wounded. This great naval duel, the greatest perhaps in the century, was witnessed by thous- ands of people on the French shu]*e. Such was the end of the Alabama — a privateer which, during her career, had captured and for the most part burned 65 vessels, which had destroyed pro- perty estimated at $10,000,000, and which, more than any ship of her class, had driven American commerce from the sea. On sea, as well as on land, the National cause was now gaining the ascendency. Time was working steadily in favor of the right. 880 THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. CHAPTER XLI. Sherman still at Savannah — Ordered to Transport his Troops to the James — Sherman Presses the Marcn Overland — Correspondence with Grant — Earnest Entreaties — Grant Consents to the Overland March — Preparations — Foster left in Command of Savannah — Howard’s Troops Embarked for Beaufort — Slocum Ordered to the Coosawhatchie— Sherman at Hilton Head — The Floods — The Troops Detained — Slocum at the Salkahatchie — Blair at Orangeburg Bridge — Sherman Sets Out for Columbia — Little Congaree Bridge — Shells Flung into Columbia — The Army before Columbia — Surrender of Columbia — The City in Flames — Wade Hampton’s Orders — Charleston — The City Threatened — General Hardee in Command — The Place Evacuated- -Formal Surrender of Charleston and all the Harbor Defenses — Gillmore Takes Possession — A Grand Demonstration — A Distinguished Assemblage— General Anderson Restores the Old Flag to Fort Sumter — Address by Henry Ward Beecher — Great Rejoicing — Slocum at Rocky Mount — Kilpatrick at Lancaster — The Catawba Greatly Swollen — On to Cheraw — Kilpatrick Surprised — Almost a Defeat — The Confederates Concentrating — Sherman Sets Out from Fayetteville — Pushing on to Goldsboro — Hardee Attempts to Hinder the Advance — Pretence of Moving on Raleigh --Sherman Resolves to Dislodge Hardee — A Strong Position — Severe Fighting — A Dismal Night — A Confederate Retreat — The Battle of Averysboro — A National Victory — The Goldsboro Road — Howard at Lee’s Store — Sherman Starts for Goldsboro — Overtaken by the Way — Bad News — Compelled to Return — Slocum in Danger — The Con- federates in Force under Johnston — In a Strong Position — The Confederate Attack — The^ Battle of Benton ville — Fearing’s Brave Brigade — The Confederates Surprised — Terrible Fighting — The Confederates Driven Back — The Day Saved — Morgan’s Division Covered with Glory — A National Victory — Arrival of Howard and the Right Wing — Result of the Three Day’s Fighting — A Great National Gain — Sherman’s Purpose — In Communication with Schofield and Terry — Schofield’s Advance on Goldsboro — The Country Flooded — The Confederates in Force under Bragg — The March to Kinston — The Importance of the Rail- road — Jackson’s Mills — Severe Encounter on the Trent and Upper Trent Roads — Bragg Compelled to Retire across the Neuse— ^Schofield at Kinston — The Three Armies United — The Object of the Campaign Practi- cally Accomplished — The Railroads Repaired — Sherman at City Point — He Meets Lincoln, Grant and Porter — Lincoln’s Conversation — “ Stop this Blood-shed ” — The Grand Result of the Campaign — Stoneman’s Raid — His Instructions — Collecting his Troops — A Demonstration in the direction of Bristol — Movement Across Stone Mountain — Stoneman at Boone — At Wilkesboro — Crossing the Yadkin River — On Cranberry Plain — At Jacksonville — General Destruction of the Railroads — No Rest for the Troopers — Stoneman on the North Carolina Railroad, between Danville and Greensboro— Burning the Factories at Salem — On the Road to Salisbury — Encounter with Pemberton — The Confederates Defeated — Fearful destruction of Property — Motherwell on the Catawba River — Burning of the Railroad Bridge — The End of a most Destructive Raid, From the moment that General Sher- man had demonstrated the hol- * lowness of the Confederacy, by his almost unopposed march to the sea, General Grant, impatient of delay and determined to force matters to a final issue, was anxious that his lieutenant should return northward, and bring his army into conjunction with the army of the Potomac and the army of the James, then confronting General Lee at Petersburg and Rich- mond. The question was, how was this transfer of so large an army to be ac- complished ? There were two modes which at once suggested themselves. The army could be transferred by sea It could also be transferi*ed by a land march through the Carolinas. Both modes of transfer would be attended with difficulty! It was mid- winter. THE MARCH COMMENCED. 8■• ■ 7 y^U.' -A ‘ . *. , •>. i VrH\ - v*t'- 1 , - • ■ -»•- *,,*<•. '*<*( .'6»1 •: .,■ A,,/ " ■ y • lUittKffl ,- ■■• '>M ; J ' ‘ h 4'’ ‘ v’J ' > ^ A. . ••■»; ■ i>\,} \^.'u‘’ ' y' /.'I ' I • • .,:« »lnv.- I :>r 'V‘ '-^.l . ;t .'A ' j ; i<^k’ ? .'• ^v- \ i'- AT KINSTON. «93 Jolinston was put on the defensive, with Mill Creek, and only a single bridge in his rear. Sherman, however, having little to gain by a battle, was in no haste to strike. Skirmishing was kept up all day ; and there was some heavy artillery filing. On the 21st, skirmishing and artillery firing were kept up.. Some bold and Mar. dasliing efforts were made to dis- 21. cover a weak point in the ene- my’s lines. On one occasion, General Mower, with his division of the Seven- teenth corps, pushed his way around the Confederate fiank, almost to the bridge at Mill Creek. He was glad, however, to return to the defenses of his own lines. During the night, John- ston retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets behind him, his dead un- buried, and his wounded in field hos- pitals. He was pursued some 2 miles beyond Mill Creek. Such was the battle of Benton ville. It cannot be called one of the greatest ; but it was certainly one of the most important battles of the war. If Sher- man’s army had been defeated at Ben- ton ville, and Johnston thus set free to join Lee at Petersburg and Bichmond, the result mic>:ht have been disastrous in the extreme. As it was, the country was brought one stage nearer the de- sired end. In the three days’ fighting, tlie Nationals lost 1646. The Confed- erate loss was probably not under 3000. Sherman had now accomplished his purpose. He had already, to all in- tents and purposes, effected a junction with Schofield and Terry. Schofield had entered Goldsboro on the 21st. Terry was in possession of the Neuse Biver at Cox’s Bridge. As soon as Wilmington fell into his hands, Schofield took measures to carry out Grant’s orders, with regard to the movement on Goldsboro. General Palmer, then commanding the New Berne district, was sent from Wilming- ton, with instructions to march from New Berne, with bOOO men, to occupy Kinston — a small town on the Neuse Biver and on the railroad to Golds- boro, about 22 miles from that place and 32 from New Berne. Buger’s divi- sion, of the Twenty-Third corps, was sent from Fort Fishei* to reinforce him. The immediate object of this move- ment Avas to get possession of and hold the railroad, in order to establish a depot of supplies at Kinston, and so facilitate the subsequent movement upon Goldsboro, when Sherman should arrive. Palmer was not able to com- plete his preparations for an adA^ance so soon as was expected ; and, on the 6th of March, General Cox arrived at ]jfar. NeAv Berne, assumed command, fi* and commenced the forAvard move- ment The Confederates, after being driven out of Wilmington, had re- treated northward to Goldsboro ; and having determined to defend that place, they decided to make their first stand at Kinston, at Avhich point about 1200 troops were concentrated under General Bragg. The’ march to Kington was one of extreme difficulty. The morasses were impassable ; and the Neuse Biver Avas too shalloAV to admit the heavy gun-boats. It became, there- fore, a matter of the last importance, that 894 THE MARCH THROUGH THE CAROLINAS. the line of railroad to Kinston should come under the control of the National army. Tlie 6th, was spent in clearing the roads and in building bridges. On the morning of the Vth, the enemy was found in some force, at the point where the Dover and Jackson roads meet the Trent road. Classon drove him back to Jackson’s Mills, 4i miles from Kins- ton. On the 8th, there was some sharp fighting, the Confederates, in course of the day, rushing from their works at Jackson’s Mills, falling upon Curtis’ division with great force, and over- whelming the Twenty -Seventh Massa- chusetts and the Fifteenth Connecticut. The Nationals were compelled to fall back, and form a new line of battle. During the whole of the 9th, there was lively skirmishing, but without any Mar. decisive result. On the 10th, how- 10 . ever, the enemy, who had received large reinforcements, attacked in a bold and determined manner, hoping to defeat Schofield, before Couch, who was now on his way from Wilmington, could come up. The National forces were well intrenched at the junction of the Trent and Upper Trent roads. Schofield and Cox were both on the field, as were also Bragg, Hill, and Hoke on the side of the Confederates. The enemy made two fierce attacks — one falling on Carter’s division on the left, the other on Buger’s division in the centre. Both assaults were decisively repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy. Bragg withdrew his troops, leaving behind him his dead and wounded with several hundred prisoners. His total loss was about 1500 in killed, wounded, and missing. Couch came up from Wilmington, on the morning of the 11th; and Bragg fell back across the Neuse to Kinston, where he burnt the bridge and, for a short time, held the noi-th bank of the river. Schofield, having no pontoon train, could i;iot cross the Neuse until the 14th. On that day, Bragg abandone1:! • / ,. ^■.• : :;ri^ ;ifr‘:;H.)o' knil ‘.^r* iu ;ii; . li' yrZ «J ^V, '''^' ' 'iv : , Yy ^ ^h'Vjv* ’■■■.'■ , .t. .. Jf ' I : ■■:U vr^^ '»' . .;. ... ^ " ■•■*!; .:*• J,('? 'Yv ‘’■•;r-’» ^:( ; 7 ' .,'■^0'; i t' ■ ‘ ^■■■'?’ ^. 'Ya-Jtii-* : • ' '• ’ .' t •■IHr ytt ’'v -'■ ■^‘ . j> ' V Y ■; it < riV' »t,^/’\, • '■■'"■ • .v.^ " ■*, .y*t - I'.'l ' • ^■,'4^ : • —j? !>'>«■'' >4^ v/rt t ^ - ' • 3 W. .‘ .^i i -y ^ ^ I • ' ,‘ ; /ir. >ff I ■ ' 'l.:Si^^ 'j| • • --,TM. -•V ■ ■■ ■•-:Yi.’ ; Yj/ , . ,v'7 .•'■4'^- Yf'/f. ip*;' U ‘i; '•■; ' ■ ‘ '' ' J,.. ' : tr -• , ■ .■ ■ '■ -. . . - .. .. .. - -> ' ■ U Y'*..-/ tij.4 u. it';i, ' Y.';.7>' ^■■■- ^ ; ,Y*^- ,ii i'Ui- r‘ ■' V'y ' ■ ■ '■ ■ '''■*’• '■} ■•^ ■! ■■ 3 ^ V7i;:- iA>.-.r /v-'' ;■ - _ i" '. 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SE:^ ■ >t Kminf'f’ ■ "Y ' ■ , YY./' ,■,,, ..si', ),f\ . .,: . . .-iui / • v^, .dryr -•■ ■ - ' ;'i'’ ' • . i n ^ T' «,: • » :iru)n , ' 0 '.^ i .y r " ... ;, ; .'.;!■ !.;’ ' .-.sifinlf .1 f f ■■•';,• vi'V.. •■ (,;■' .".viK‘iyi',> I < ' < i iH it ihj )(. 1 "■v’7|S^(Yii . ' . . . .V :7V.... ' fm&a ■I « ’.rX: FARMVILLE. 925 Biirkesville Junction. In this opinion we do not concur. Sheridan had with him an excellent force, about 18,000 strong, including infantry and cavalry ; and he had already found time to throw up in his front a powerful line of bi-east- Avorks. Lee’s entire force, weary, dis- pirited and hungry, did not exceed 20,000 ; and on the 5th, as on the 4th, it Avas broken up into foraging parties. At all events, no such experiment Avas made ; and noAV it AA^as questionable Avhether the other alternative could be adopted Avith any prospect of suc- cess. On the afternoon of the 5th, Brigadier-General Davies, whom Sheri- dan had sent out early in the day, Avith a mounted foi*ce, to operate to the left aud in front of Jettersville, struck a train of 180 wagons, escorted by a body of Confederate cavalry at Paine’s Cross- Roads. Davies fell heavily upon the cavalry and routed them, capturing 5 pieces of artillery and a number of prisoners. The Avagons, he destroyed. Almost immediately afterAvards, Davies w-as beset with a considerable body of Confederate infantry ; and it might liaA^e gone hard with him and his men, had he not, at the opportune moment, )>een reinforced by the brigades of Gregg and Smith, of the Second cavalry division. As it was, the fighting was severe ; but the National troops found their way back to Jettersville. On the morning of the 6th, the entire m^my of the Potomac, which, the night previous, had concentrated at Jetters- ville, moved noi’thward, in the direc- tion of Amelia Court House. Meade had resumed control of the Fifth corps ; and Sheridan thenceforward operated Avith the cavalry alone. It Avas soon discovered that Lee, who had, at night- fall, on the previous day, moved out from Amelia Court House, had slipped past the left flank of the National army, and that, AAuth all his forces, he aa as uoav moving rapidly westAvard, in the direc- tion of Deaton sville. The order of march was immediately changed. The Sixth corps Avas moved from the right to the left. The Second corps Avas then ordered to push forAvard by the Dea- tonsville route; the Fifth corps Avas tc move by a parallel route on the right and the Sixth corps was to move by another parallel route to the left There Avere thus three pursuing col umns — one close on the enemy’s rear, one on a parallel line to the north, and another on a parallel line to the south. Sheridan, Avith the cavalry, led the van of the left or southern column. While the army of the Potomac was thus pressing hai*d upon the retreating foe, the army of the James, under the skilful direction of General Ord, Avas pushing its way rapidly from Burkes- ville Junction, in the direction of Farm ville. Ord, as we have seen, had reach- ed Burkesville, with the advance of the ai*my of the James, on the night of the 5th. On the morning of the 6th, his troops being well forward, he set out, at an early hour for Farm ville, as above mentioned, his object being to antici- pate the arrival of the van of the Confederate army, and to destroy the bridges which at that place cross the Appomattox. Eager to accomplish his purpose, Ord pushed forward A light 926 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. column, consisting of two regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas Bead. On the way, and when just approaching Farmville, Bead en- countered the van of Lee’s army. There was an immediate collision. The Con- federates, who were greatly superior in numbers, fought with the energy of men who knew that their last hopes, if not gone, wei*e at least trembling in the balance. Bead, however, presented a bold and determined front. Fighting at the head of his men, he held the Confederates at bay, until Ord had time to come up with the main body. It was a noble service, nobly done. In the struggle Bead'^ was shot and killed, in a hand-to-hand contest with General Fearing ; and his command was overwhelmed. The Confederates had saved the bridges ; and when Ord arrived they intrenched themselves. Meanwhile the three columns of the army of the Potomac were pressing forward with all possible haste. Sher- idan with his cavalry, as we have seen, moved at the head, and in advance of the left column. He was already close upon Deatonsville, when he espied the whole Confederate army struggling to- wards the west. It was evident, at a glance, that Lee’s men were greatly *Brigadie» -General S. T. Read, was a native of Massachusetts He entered the Service in January, 1862, as captain of unattached cavalry from his native State, At Gettysburg, where he distinguished him- self, and was severely wounded, he held a staff ap- pointment. He held command under Grant from the Rapidan to the James, and before Richmond and Petersburg. When Ord was appointed to the com- mand of the army of the James, he made Read his staff officer. exhausted. In this terrible march the splendid training and high morale of the army of Northern Virginia were conspicuously revealed. Never was army in so severe a plight. It was marvellous, indeed, that, in the circum- stances, the troops could be held, to- gether. They knew that the entire army of the Potomac was pressing close upon their heels ; and it was scarcely a surprise when the van was struck by the army of the James. Escape was hardly to be hoped for ; but strong nerve and high purpose amply supply the place of hope. Sheridan was not slow to see his opportunity; nor was he dilatory in turning it to account. He made his arrangements with admir- able .skill. Bight in front of him was a Confederate wagon-train escorted by a powerful force of infantry and cav- alry. Crook was ordered to attack the train. Custer was ordered at the same time to press forward and attack a point further in advance. If Crook should not succeed in his attack, he was to move on again, ahead of Cus- ter ; and this mode of action was to be kept up, until finally a weak point should be discovered. The experiment was attended with almost immediate success. Crook, unable to make any impression in his front, was compelled to fall back. Custer, however, was more successful. Gaining the road at Sailor’s Creek, a small tributary of the Appomattox, he immediately engaged the enemy. Crook and Devin with their respective divisions, having hur- ried to his aid, the Confederate line was pierced ; and there were >aptiired, SAILOirS CREEK. 927 400 wagons, 16 pieces of artillery, with a large number of prisoners. One of the most immediate as well as most important effects, produced by this onslaught, was the cutting off from the main body of Lee’s army, the entire corps of General Ewell, with a portion of Pickett’s division. It was all-im- portant that this force should not be allowed to escape. With the view of detaining them, until Wright, with the Sixth corps, should have time to come up, Sheridan ordered a mounted charge, which was made in a most spirited manner by Colonel Stagg, and his brave brigade. It was not long until the advance division of the Sixth corps, under General Seymour, made its ap- pearance. Seymour was ordered to carry the road on which the Confeder- ates were posted. Pushing his men forward with great energy, Seymour compelled the Confederates to fall back. This, however, they did slowly, con- testing every inch of the ground, and turning and striking heavily at almost every step. So vigorous, in truth, be- came the resistance, that Seymour found it necessary to Balt his men and await the arrival of Wheaton’s division, also of the Sixth corps. Wheaton was speedily on the ground, and in position on Seymour’s left. The advance was then renewed. The Confederates, no longer able to resist the tremendous pressure on their front, fell back, until the lines of the Sixth corps had reached Sailor’s Creek. Sheridan’s cavalry could now be seen on the high ground to the south of the creek ; and the long lines of smoke, arising from the burning wagons, gave sad evidence of the de- structive work which had been going on. It would be difficult to imagine a situation more critical than that in which Ewell and his brave followers now found themselves. Encompassed on every side, and barred from every pos- sibility of escape, they still gave blow for blow; and, almost at the last mo- ment, they poured so deadly a volley into the ranks of their assailants, that a portion of Wright’s veteran line bent and gave way. It was impossible, however, to maintain the struggle against the vastly superior numbers of the Nationals. Pressed in front by the Sixth corps, and charged in flank and rear by Sheridan’s cavalry, Ewell’s vet- erans threw down their arms in token of surrender. Over 6000 men were made prisoners ; and among the captured were General Ewell himself, and four other general officers. The National loss in this encounter at Sailor’s Creek, was about 1000, in killed and wounded. The National victory at Sailor’s Creek, might have been less easily won — it would certainly have been less decisive — if the movements of the Second corps had been conducted with less energy. Following, as we have seen, right in the rear of the retreating Con- federates, Humphreys never gave them a moment’s rest, until, at evening, he crowded them together, at Sailor’s Creek. In the confusion which prevailed, when the Confederates thus found them- selves pressed on all sides, Humphreys’ men captured a large train, and many hundreds of prisoners, together with 13 flags and several pieces of artillery. THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. ^28 During the night of the 6th, and the morning of the 7th, Lee with the shat- tered remains of his once magnificent April crossed the Appomattox, 7 . by the bridges, a few miles east of Farmville. Resolved, if possible, to make the Appomattox an impassable barrier between himself and his pur- suers, he ordered the bridges to be destroyed. Humphreys, however, with the Second corps, was close upon his lieels. The second span of the railroad bridge was already burning ; it was left to the mercy of the fiames. The wagon- road bridge was just fired ; it was saved. Humphreys’ troops were pushed across ^vithout much difficulty. Barton’s divis- ion leading. The Confederates, who seemed to be posted in considerable force, on the heights on the opposite side, disappeared as the Nationals ap- proached, leaving behind them several pieces of artilleiy. Ten guns had also been left on the south of the river. Signs were already abundant that Lee, and his whole army, brave and indomit- able as they all were, could not much longer hold out. Men and horses were sinking by the wayside from pure ex- haustion ; and thousands had let fall their muskets from sheer inability to carry them. Without food and sleep, more could not be expected from man or beast; but neither food nor sleep ^vas to be granted them until the bitter end. The horrors of that march have not, perhaps, been equalled since the famous Moscow retreat. The impossibility of continuing the march westward began to be .apparent to all. On the night of the 6th, when the army of Northern Virginia was well across the Appomattox, several of the chief ofiScers of that army met around the bivouac fire, and consulted as to what it was best to do, in the cir- cumstances. General Lee was not present. Three lines of conduct were suggested : — to disband, allowing the troops to make their way, as best they might, to some fixed rallying point ; to abandon the trains and cut their way through the opposing lines ; or to sur- render. After a short consultation, it was agreed that two of the suggested lines of conduct were impracticable ; and the voice of the council was in favor of surrender. General Pendleton was commissioned to communicate the result of their deliberations to General Lee. The probability is that Lee’s private opinion did not differ from that of his officers ; but, refusing to regard the situation as so des23erate, he lent an apparently unwilling ear to their advice. It would be time enough, he thought, to surrender when he had abso- lutely no other choice. He was not yet reduced to that extremity. Pendleton was still with his chief, when the con- versation was broken short by the loud thunders of artillery — sounds which too plainly told that the relentless and un- tiring pursuer was again upon the track. In his determination not to surrender, Lee was, no doubt, encour- aged by the fact that Davis and his colleagues were at Danville, and mak- ing strenuous efforts to reorganize the government. Lee was still aware that the Confederate authorities — if such authorities could be said now to exist — PRINCE EDWARD COURT HOUSE. 9:i9 had no intention as yet of giving up the contest ; and he was hardly to be blamed — especially when we remember that he was the most trusted and hon- ored man in the Confederacy — if he was unwilling to incur the odium of aban- doning the sinking vessel, while a sin- gle ray of hope remained. The army of Northern Virginia, or rather what remained of that once mag- nificent organization, was now concen- trated, in a strong position, some four or five miles north of Farmville, and covering both the stage and plank roads. The ground in front, which was open, and gently sloping downwards in the direction of Appomattox, was cov- ered with intrenchments and batteries. Humphreys, as soon as he had crossed the river with the Second corps, re- newed the^ pursuit. Barlow, with the first division, moved in the direction of Farmville, which the Confederates, on his approach, abandoned, after firing the bridges, and destroying 130 wagons. Humphreys, himself, with the divisions of Miles and De Trobriand, making a more direct pursuit, soon found himself confronted by Lee’s army in its in- trenched position. He saw at a glance how vain it would be to make any at- tempt in front. Having sent instruc- tions to Barlow to come up without delay, he proceeded to execute a flank movement, in the hope of dislodging his antagonist. He soon discovered that his own lines were outflanked by those of the Confederates, both on the right and on the left ; nor was he any longer in doubt that he had in front of him all that remained of the army of North- ern Virginia. Extending his right the length of one division, Humphreys ordered Miles to make an attack with three regiments. Miles made a bold and vigorous attempt ; but he was com- jDelled to fall back, with a loss of over 600 men in killed and wounded. Among the former were General Smyth* and Major Mills. Among the latter were Generals Mott, Madill and McDougall, as also Colonel Starbird, of the Nine- teenth Maine. It was night before Bar- low came up ; and it was agreed not to repeat the assault until the morning. On the morning of the 7th, Sheridan had despatched two mounted divisions under Merritt, to Prince Edward Court House. The remaining division of his cavalry, commanded by Crook, he sent to Farmville. The bridges having been destroyed at Farmville, Crook’s troop- ers were compelled to wade the stream — a task which was not accomplished without considerable difiiculty. On the north side of the Appomattox, they fell upon a body of Confederate infan- try who were guarding a wagon-train. A sharp skirmish ensued. The Con- federates, however, were greatly in the * Brigadier-General Thomas A. Smyth was born in Ireland. At an early age he came to the United States, and settled at Wilmington, Del., be- coming engaged in course of time in the coach-build- ing business. When the war broke out, he recruited a company in Wilmington. Proceeding thence ro Philadelphia, he joined a three months’ regiment, then leaving for the Shenandoah Valley. On his return home, a Delaware regiment was just about to proceed to the seat of war. Smyth accepted the post of major. He rose gradually, becoming successively lieutenant colonel, and colonel, until finally he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, for his bravery at Cold Harbor. In the engagement near Farmville, where he received his death wound, he com- manded the second division of the Second army corps 930 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAD. majority ; and Crook, after an effectual effort to dislodge the enemy, found it necessary to fall back. In tliis strug- gle, General Gregg, one of his brigade commanders, was surrounded and cap- tured. On his arrival at Prince Edward Court House, Sheridan, who marched with the command of Merritt, found General McKenzie, with his division of cavalry from the army of the James, and ordered him to cross the bridge on the Buffalo Biver, and make a recon- noissance in the direction of Prospect Station, on the Lynchburg Railroad. Information had, in the meantime, been received from Crook, that the Confed- erate army had crossed to the north bank of the Appomattox. Resolved to outrun Lee, and to interpose between his army and Lynchburg, Sheridan ordered Merritt to push forward and encamp at Buffalo River, and, at the same time, sent instructions to Crook to ]-ecross the Appomattox and encamp at Prospect Station. Such was the general situation, at nightfall on the 7th. On that same evening, and immediately after the re- pulse of Miles, as before described, Lee received the following letter : — April 7fh, 1865. “General: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of fur- ther resistance on the part of the Army of [N orthern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. “ U. S. Grant, Lieut-General. “ General R. E. Lee.” To this letter Lee wrote an immedi- ate answer; but it was not until the following morning that it 8. reached Grant at Farmville. It was couched in these words : — “ April 7th, 1865. “General: I have received your note of Tliis date. Though n >t entertaining the opin- ion you express of the hopelessness of furtlier resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virgin iii, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and, therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer, on condition of its surrender. . “ R. E. Lee, General. “ Lieut.-General U. S. Grant.” On the instant Grant replied as follows : — “ April 8lh, 1865. “General: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condi- tion on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just re- ceived. In reply, I would say that peace being my first desire, there is but one condition that I insist upon, viz, : That the men surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or des- ignate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agree- able to you, for the purpose of arranging defi- nitely, the terms upon which the surrender of tlie Army of Northern Virginia will be received. “ U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General. “ General R. E. Lee.” VVe left Lee in a strongly intrenched position, a few miles to the north of the Appomattox. As soon as he in- dited his reply to Grant’s first message, he resumed his retreat under cover of the darkness ; and so quietly was it con- ducted that Humphreys was ignorant of the fact, until morning, when he was prepared to renew the attack. Lee’s GRANT SUGGESTS TERMS OF SURRENDER. 931 skilful generalship was again conspicu- ously revealed. Ever vigilant, ever fer- tile in resource, and ever active, he had again put miles between himself and liis pursuers. The fact that Lee had i-etreated during the night was at once ^made known to Grant, who immediate- ly gave orders for the renewal of the pursuit. The Second and Sixth corps, under the immediate direction of Meade, who was accompanied by the General- in-chief, were pushed forward with all possible haste along the north bank of the Appomattox. Sheridan, mean- while, had made excellent use both of his troopers and of his time. Lee was pressing along that gradually narrow- ins: neck of land which lies between the head waters of the Appomattox and the affluents of the James. It was of the utmost importance that Sheridan should be able to interpose his troops between Lee’s army and Lynchburg. If he could close the outlet in the direction of that city, it would be all over with Lee, pursued closely as he was by the Second and Sixth corps, under the direc- tion of Meade and the General-in-chief. This was precisely what Sheridan was aiming at, anvd what, within a few hours, he actually did accomplish. Hav- ing learned from one of his scouts, early on the morning of the 8th, that four trains of cars, with supplies for Lee’s army, were at Appomattox Sta- tion, he at once notified Merritt and Crook, and briskly pushed the whole (command towards that point. Lee was not ignorant of the extreme peril of his situation ; but he kept pressing eagerly forward, still clinging to the skirts of hope, and, in spite of almost irresistible evidence to the contrary, indulging the thought that he might yet find refuge among the ranges of the Blue Bidge, beyond Lynchburg. In these circum stances he received Grant’s second let ter, and replied as follows : April 8th, 1865. ‘‘Gen'ERAL: I received at a late liour yoii7 note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restora* tion of peace should be the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would tend to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but so far as your proposition may affect the (Jonfedei’ate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten, a.m., to-morrow, on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. “ R. E. Lee, General. “ Lieut. -General U. S. Gran^” This note was received by Grant about midnight ; and he replied next morn- ing in the following terms : “ April 9th, 1865. “General: Your note of yesterday is re- ceived. As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M„ to-day, could lead to no good. I will state, however. General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself; and the whole North entertain the same feeling. The terms up- on which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, “U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. “ General R. E. Lee.” 932 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. As soon as lie had finished this let- ter, Grant left Meade in charge of the Second and Sixth corps and hurried on to join Sheridan and Grifiin. While the letter was on its way, and before the General-in-chief had joined the one or the other, further parley had become unnecessary. Sheridan had already settled the question. On the morning of the 8th, after a forced march of about 30 miles, his advance, under Custer, had reached Appomattox Sta- tion, about four miles to the south of Appomattox Court House. Lee’s van- guard had just arrived with four trains of cars, laden with supplies. Custer, with lightning-like rapidity dashed up- on the rear of the trains, and captured them. Supported by Devin, who had come up, he then rushed with fierce energy on the vanguard, and drove it back to Appomattox Court House, near which was the main body of Lee’s army. Twenty-five guns, a hospital train, a large number of additional wagons, with many prisoners, were captured by the National cavalry. Sheridan, hurrying forward with the remainder of his command, flung him- self across the line of Lee’s retreat, with the determination of holding his ground at any and every risk until the morning, when, he knew, he would be joined by Ord, and the army of the James, and by Griffin with the Fifth corps. He knew also that by that time, Meade, with the Second and Sixth corps, would be well forward and able to fall with effect on the Confederate rear. Such was the situation of affairs on the night of the 8th. Lee was completely cut off from his own line of retreat. Brave and resolute to the last, and be- lieving that he had nothing but cavalry in front of him, he decided to make an attempt, at least, to cut through Sheri- dan’s lines. Early on the morning of the 9th, Lee was ready to carry out his purpose. His h^art, however, must have April bled within him, when he looked 9 . around him, and beheld the wretched remnant of what was once the proud and invincible army of Northern Vir- ginia. It consisted of two thin lines — the one composed of what was left of Plill’s, now Gordon’s command, the other of the wreck of Longstreet’s corps. Between these lines were the debris of the wagon-train, and some thousands of miserable creatures who were too weak to carry arms. Lee gave orders to Gordon to cut his way through, at all hazards. The charge was made with tremendous energy. Such, in truth, was the violence of the shock, and so persistent was the pres- sure, that Sheridan’s men who had dis- mounted to resist the attack, wei*e forced back. At this critical moment, Sheridan, who had been to Appomattox Station for the purpose of hurrying for- ward Ord, arrived on the scene of action. Knowing well the purpose of the en- emy, and keenly alive to the value of time, he directed his troopers to fall back gradually, but to continue to offer a firm and steady resistance, so as to allow Ord, with his infantry, to come up and form his lines. This done, they were to move to the right and mount. Sheridan’s orders wei*e admirably GRANT AND LEE AT McLEAN^S HOUSE. 933 executed. As soon as the cavalry moved towards their own right, the Confed- erates beheld to their amazement, the glittering arms and serried ranks of the infantry. The unlooked for vision had all the effect of a stunning and unex- pected blow. The Confederates imme- . diately discontinued their pressure, and began to give way. The National in- fantry were now pressing upon the confused and bewildered multitude. Sheridan had ridden round to the Con- federate left flank ; his bugles had sounded the order to remount ; and he was just about to fall with all his weight on the already disordered mass, when a flag of truce was presented to Custer who led the advance. Sheridan rode to Appomattox Court House, where lie was met by General Gordon and General Wilcox. Gordon asked for a suspension of hostilities, and informed Sheridan that Grant and Lee were, even now, making arrangements for the surrender of the army of Northern Vir- ginia. There was no more fighting between the two great rival armies — the army of the Potomac and the army of Northern Virginia. On the morning of the 9th, a heavy fog enveloped the entire country around Appomattox Court House. Long be- fore that fog dispersed, Lee, clad in a new gray uniform, might have been seen at a camp-fire with Mahone and Longstreet. Care and anxiety were written on each of their countenances. Longstreet, his. arm in a sling, and a cigar in his mouth, sat on the trunk of a felled tree. Gordon had been sent on his mission. It was agreed that if success were denied him there was no longer any chance of escape. Of Gor- don’s failure to penetrate the National lines, they were soon made aware. Lee mounted his horse. General Long- street,” he said, “ I leave you in charge ; I am going to hold a conference with General Grant.” He then rode off. On his way he received Grant’s letter, be- fore quoted. He replied immediatelj" : April 9, 1865. ‘•General: I received your note of tiiis morning, on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposition of yesterday, with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview, in accord- ance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. “ R. E. Lee, General. “ Lieut-General U. S. Grant.” . To this Grant replied as follows : “ April 9th, 1865. ‘‘General: Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received. In conse- quence of my having passed from the Rich- mond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road, I am at this writing, about four miles west of Walter’s Church, and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me on this road, where you wish the interview to take place, will meet me. “ U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. “ General R. E. Lee.” The scene and the main features of the interview have been preserved for us by an eye-witness. It took place at the house of Mr. Wilmer McLean — a square brick building surrounded with roses, violets, and daffodils. Grant — with his slouched hat, dark blue frock-coat un- buttoned and covered with mud, gray 810 934. THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. pantaloons tucked in his soiled boots, and a dark waistcoat, and with nothing to indicate his rank, except the double row of brass buttons and the three silver stars — walked up to the house, accom- panied by Ord, Sheridan, and their re- s2Jective staffs. Lee had already ar- rived; and his blooded iron-gray horse, in charge *of an orderly, was nibbling at the grass. Grant and two aids entered the house ; the others who accompanied him, sat down on the porch. Lee was standing beside a table, wearing a bright bluish-gray uniform, a military hat, with a gold cord, buckskin gauntlets, high riding-boots, and the splendid dress- sword which had been presented to him by the State of Virginia. Tall and erect, he had a fine soldierly bear- inof. It was noticed that his hair was O long and gray. He was attended only by Colonel Marshall, his chief of staff. On Grant’s entrance the two shook hands, sat down and proceeded to busi- ness. As Lee made no special request. Grant at once wrote out his terms : Appomattox Court House, ) April 9, 1865. j “General: In accordance with the sub- stance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be re- tained by such officers as you may designate. Idle officers to give their individual puroles, not to take up arms against the government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of his command. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers ap- pointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. “ U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. “ General R. E. Lee.” The following is Lee’s letter of ac- ceptance : “Headquarters Army of Northern ) Virginia, April 9 , 1865 . \ ‘^General: I have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. “ R. E. Lee, General. “ Lieut.-General U. S. Grant.” The signatures had just been at- tached, when Lee, after a moment’s reflection, said that he had forgotten one thing. Many of the cavalry and artillery horses belonged to the men who had chars^e of them. It was too late, however, to speak of that now. Grant replied, “ I will instruct my pa- rolling officers that all the enlisted men of your cavalry and artillery, who own horses are to retain them, just as the officers do theirs. They will need them for their spring ploughing, and other farm work.” Lee seemed greatly pleased with Grant’s prompt com- pliance with his only half-expressed wish. General,” he said earnestly, there is nothing which you could have accomplished more for the good of the people or of the government.” Grant’s terms were in the last de- gree magnanimous and liberal. They THE UNION SAVED. 935 revealed nobility of soul and delicacy of sentiment on tbe part of the conqueror who granted them, on the part of the government which sanctioned them, and on the part of the people who gave them their approval. The agree- ment was such as sufficiently sustained the dignity of those who had triumphed ^vithout unnecessarily wounding the feelings of those who had been van- quished. It was one of the grandest examples yet given to the world of the refining and softening influences of modern civilization — an example which contrasted strangely and strikingly with the barbarous habits of the past. Gen- eral Grant will live in history as a great soldier ; he will be remembered also as a hiofh-souled hero in the hour of vie- tory. If battles must still be fought, blood be shed, and valuable lives sacri- ficed, it is gratifying to think that cruelty, under the guise of justice, is no longer to be a necessary adjunct of party, sectional, or national triumph. After the surrender, Lee rode back to his troops to bid them farewell. His reception was a something unparalleled, in such circumstances “ Whole lines of battle,” says an eye-witness, “ rushed up to their beloved old chief, and choking with emotion, struggled with each other, to wring him once more by the hand. Men who had fought throughout the war, and knew what the agony and hu- miliation of the moment must be to him, strove with a refinement of un- selfishness and tenderness, which he alone could fully appreciate, to lighten his burden and mitigate his pain. With tears pouring down both cheeks, Gen- eral Lee, at length, commanded voice enough to say : ^ Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best that I could for you.’ Not an eye that looked on that scene was dry.” On the 12th of April, three days after the surrender, the Confederates march- ed by divisions to an appointed place in the neighborhood of Appomattox Court House, and stacked their arms and de- posited their accoutrements. Of nearly 28,000 men, only about 8000 had mus- kets in their hands. Among the sur- rendered property there were 30 cannon and 350 wagons. Paroles were distri- buted to the men ; and the army of Northern Virginia passed out of exist- ence. The war was now practically ended. It was impossible for the other armies for any length of time to jDrolong the struggle. The army of Northern Virginia — as Swinton, at the close of his masterly history of the army of the Potomac, puts it — was the “ keystone ” of the Confederate structure. The key- stone removed, the structure fell with ‘^a resounding crash.” A year, all but three weeks, had elapsed since Grant crossed the Papidan. It had been one of the severest and most protracted campaigns on record. When it commenced, Lee had under him 65,000 men. We have seen what a miserable remnant was left. Between the Rapid an and Appomattox Court House, Grant lost, as nearly as possible, in killed, wounded and missing 100,000 men — an enormous sacrifice ; but it saved the Union, and perpetuated the Republic. It was natural, that, in the circum- 936 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. stances, there should be great joy all over the North. The secretary of war issued the following order : “ That a salute of two hundred guns be fired, at the head-quarters of every army, and at erery post and arsenal in the United States, and at the Military Academy at West Point, on the day of the receipt of this order, in com- memoration of the surrender of General R. E. Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, to Lieutenant-General Grant and the army under his command — report of the receipt and exe- cution of this order to be made to the Adju- tant-General at Washington/’ These orders were gladly obeyed ; and in addition to the demonstrations thus brought about, there were public and voluntary rejoicings in every town- ship and every city thi’oughout the Northern States. On the day of the surrender of Gen- e^ al Lee, President Lincoln returned to Washino:ton. He had been for some days at City^ Point, where, as -has been mentioned in a previous chapter, he had a conference with Generals Grant and Sherman, and Admiral Porter. After the occupation of Richmond, by the National troops, Lincoln, on board the Malvern, Porter’s flag-ship, moved up the James. Leaving the Malvern near Rocketts, the president and the admiral proceeded to Richmond in the commander’s gig. Lincoln’s reception was most cordial, the emancipated slaves crowding around him to such an ex- tent, that a file of soldiers had to be called in, to clear the way. Halting for a time, and resting at Weitzel’s quarters, he entered an open carriage and rode rapidly through the principal streets, and was soon again on board. and on his way back to City Point. He visited Richmond again on the 6th of April, two days later, and granted per- mission to the Virginia Legislature to assemble, on the understand ini? that the members would adopt measures for the withdrawal of the Virginia troops and all other obstructions, which might tend to l^inder the action of the general government. In a few days, however, it was discovered that the gentlemen of the State Legislature of Virginia were abusing their privilege ; and almost im- mediately after his return to Washing- ton, Lincoln directed W eitzel to revoke the safeguard which he had granted them, and to allow said gentlemen to return to private life. The return of the president to the National capital, associated as that return was, with a crowning National victory, was made the occasion of great rejoicing and fes- tivity. Each successive day had its special excitement. On the 11th, Lin- coln issued two proclamations — one declaring that certain ports in the Southern States would be closed until further notice, and another, demanding for vessels of the United States, in foreign ports, those privileges and im- munities which, during the war, had been denied, on the plea that equal rights had to be accorded to each belli- gerent. In the evening the city was illuminated. At the Executive Man- sion, which was especially brilliant with light, the president addressed a large assemblage of citizens. He spoke hope- fully and encouragingly regarding the future, and set forth his views regard- ing the reconstruction of the South. It ASSASSINATION OF LINCOLN. 937 was noticed there was nothing like bit- terness or ill-feeling towards the, now all but subjugated, foe. There were 110 suggestions of vengeance, retaliation, or punishment of any kind. It was a speech ^vhich revealed a heart full of joy and satisfaction, because a great and destructive war was all but ended, and because the sunshine of peace was about to rest upon the entire country and people. All this joy, however, was soon to be clouded. The last sad act of the protracted drama had yet to be ^vitnessed. The 14th day of April, 1865, is des- tined to immortal memory in the history of the United States. On that day, with imposing solemnities. General Anderson hoisted over Fort Sumter the same old flag which, four years before, he had taken down and stowed away in hope of its future usefulness. This story, however, has already been told in its proper place. It was a gladsome day throughout the republic ; and pre- parations were being made over the length and breadth of the land for a day of National thanksgiving. On the morning of the 14th, General Grant arrived in Washington. He was ac- companied by Captain Kobert Lincoln, the president’s son, one of his staff officers. A Cabinet council was held at eleven o’clock. General Grant was present. Lincoln, it was observed, was 111 excellent spirits. Although not ig- uormt of the reports which were in circulation as to the existence of a con- spiracy, which threatened not only his own life, but the lives of all the princi- pal members of the government, as well as those of Grant and Sherman, he seemed to have no forebodings of evil. Delighted at the course events had taken, and pleased with the prospect of peace, his conversation turned chiefly on the policy of conciliation to be pur- sued towards the South. At the close of the Cabinet meeting, he made an ar- rangement with General Grant to visit Ford’s Theatre in the evening ; and a box was immediately engaged. The news spread like wild-flre ; and when the doors were opened, the theatre was speedily crowded in every part. The play for the night was “ Our American Cousin.” Between eight and nine o’clock the presidential party arrived. It consisted of Lincoln himself, Mrs. Lincoln, Miss Clara Harris, daughter of Senator Ira Harris, and Major H. E. Eathbone. General Grant, it was ob- served, was not with them. He had, it was afterwards learned, been summoned to New York on important and press- ing business. The box, prepared for and occupied by the party, was in the second tier. Along its spacious front was draped the American flag. It was now a few minutes after ten o’clock. The performance was drawing to a close. The attention of the audience was completely absorbed. All of a sudden, there was heard the sharp crack of a pistol. The sound came from the president’s box. At the same instant, there appeared, in front of that box, a man, who, brandishing a gleam- ing dagger, exclaimed “ Sic semper tyrannis ^^ — so may it be always with tyrants — the motto engraven on the seal of the State of Virginia. Placing 938 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR, his hand on the rail, he sprang from the box towards the stage. In his descent, one of his spurs — for he was booted and spurred on the occasion — becomino: entansfled in the folds of the National flag, his leap was broken ; and he fell heavily on the floor. Quickly spiinging to his feet, but showing that he was severely injured, especially in one of his legs, he again brandished his weapon in the face of the excited and bewildered audience, and shouted “ The South is avenged.” Rushing to the rear of the stage he disappeared, before either actors or audience could recover themselves or realize what had hap- pened. So sudden was tlie whole affair, that it almost seemed as if it formed an incident in the play. It was far other- wise. The play had become a real tragedy. A foul murder had been com- mitted. The murdered man was Pres- ident Lincoln. The assassin was John AVilkes Booth. Booth was an actor by profession, and well acquainted with the building. He was well known, also, to all the em- ployes, and had no difliculty in gaining admission to any part of the house. It appeared that immediately before the tragedy occurred, he passed near the box in which were seated the president and his fiiends. Presenting a card to Mr. Lincoln’s messenger he looked, for a minute, upon the orchestra and the audience. Then, enterins; the vestibule of the box, he fastened the door with a piece of plank, which had evidently been pi-ovided previously for the pur- pose, the object being to make it impossible to open the door from with- out. Pulling a Derringer pistol from one pocket with his right hand, and a dagger from another pocket with his left, he moved, into the box, quietly and unobserved. The entire party were absorbed in the performance. The president was leaning forward, holding aside the curtain with his left hand, his head being turned slightly towards the audience. Holding his pistol over the back of the president’s chair. Booth fired. The ball entered behind Mr. Lincoln’s left ear, passed throuD;h the brain and lodged behind the right eye. The head fell forward ; and the eyes closed. He lived for nine hours afterwards ; but he was never again conscious. Major Rathbone, startled by the sound of the pistol^ and seeing what had happened, sprang upon the assassin ; but Booth, dropping his pistol, swung his dagger, inflicting a severe wound on the major’s left arm, and then leaped over the rail. Such was the end of Abraham Lincoln — the beloved of the people, the emancipator of the slave, the man who, of all othei*s, was best fitted for the high but delicate and difficult position which he held during the stormiest period of his country’s history. His four years of unceasing toil and agony saved the Union. His life-blood, thus ruthlessly shed, sealed it and made it perpetual. His name will ever remain one of the greatest in American history ; and while A\^ashington, to latest ages, will be spoken of as the Father, Lincoln will be remembered as the Saviour of his country. The death of Lincoln filled the nation ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF SEWARD. 939 with woe, and covered it with sack- cloth. Every one felt as if he had lost a personal friend. No one felt the blow more than Stanton, the stern and unbending secretary-of-war. Leaning over the body of the dead president, and overwlielmed with grief, he mouin- fully said, “No one will ever know the anxious hours that you and I have spent together. You were my only witness. Now, you are gone, and I am left alone.” Lincoln’s funeral in many particulars was, perhaps, unprecedented in modern times. The body having been embalmed lay, in state, in the East Room of the White House. On the 19th of April, after the funeral services, the remains were removed thence by way .of Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and Albany, to Springfield, Illi- nois, where they were interred. In each of those cities multitudes crowded to look on the face of the dead president; and it is but truth to say, that the entire people of the North were mourn- ei*s on the occasion. No chief-ruler of any people — no monarch in all the past — was ever more loved in life, or more lionored in death. Ilis grave is now, and ever will be, a point of attraction, not onl}^ to the American people, in whose service he lost his life, but to liberty-loving pilgrims from all lands. He died a martyr to liberty. His mur- der made his name immortal. On the same evening on which Lincoln was shot, a murderous assault was made on Mr. Seward, the secretary, of-state. Although the assassin, in this case, was less successful in the accomplishment of his purpose, the enterprise was quite as daring, and revealed, equally with the other, the foul character of the conspiracy, and the villainous methods, as well as des- perate energy, of its agents. Mr. Seward, a few days before, had been thrown from his carilage, and was, in consequence, confined to his bed-_ room. About the same time that the tragedy occurred in the theatre, a man called at Mr. Seward’s house. On being refused admittance, he rushed past the porter and flew up two flights of stairs straio:ht to Mr. Seward’s room. At the door of that room, he was met and resisted by the secretary’s son, Mr. Frederick William Seward. With the butt-end of his pistol, he struck the younger Se^vard to the floor, fracturing his skull. Then, pushing aside Miss Seward, who had been attracted by the noise, he rushed into the sick-room, sprang upon the bed, and inflicted some fearful wounds on Mr. Seward’s face and neck. An invalid soldier named Robinson, who was in attendance on Mr. Seward, seized the assassin from behind, and struggled with him ; while Mr. Seward himself, his arm in a sling, and the blood streaming from his gaping wounds, resisted with what energy he could command. Meanwhile the cry of “ Murder ! ” rang through the house ; and the assassin becoming alaiuied, and shaking himself free of Robinson, made his way down stairs and into the open street. Mounting a horse which was there waiting for him, he was soon out of sight. The assassin, in this case, was Lewis Payne Powell. He was the son of a Florida clergyman ; and he had THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. 1^40 served in tlie war. He belonged to the same gang witb Booth. The principal agents of the conspiracy were afterwards captured and brought to trial. Summary justice was dealt out to Booth. He was shot and killed by his pursuers in a tobacco-barn, at Garrett’s Farm, some 20 miles below Fredericksburg. Harold, who was ^vith Booth when he was shot ; Mrs. Surratt, who had harbored the con- spirators ; Atzerott, who had been appointed to kill Vice-President John- son ; and Payne who made the attack on Mr. Seward — all these were found guilty and executed on the 6th of July. Several other conspirators — among them Dr. Mudd, who set Booth’s broken limb — were sentenced to imprisonment for longer or shorter terms. It was suspected, at the time, that the conspir- acy had the encouragement of some of the Confederate leaders. This suspi- cion has not been justified by any facts, hitherto made public. The assassination of the president, painful as the blow was felt to be by the whole people, did not, in any seri- ous way, disorganize the government machine or impede its working. Within six hours after Lincoln’s death, Andrew Johnson, the vice-president, ^vas sworn into office as president. Mr. Jolinson on taking the chair of Washington, and assuming tlie reins of government, requested tlie members of the cabinet to retain their offices. The tide of affairs thus rolled on, neither cdiecked nor diverted by what had happened. The reader must now return with us to Goldsboro, where we left the army of General Sherman, resting, and pre- paring for anotlier march which, it was hoped, would result in the destruc- tion or capture of the Confederate army under General J ohnston. In a pi*evious chapter, we have given an account of the visit made to City Point by Gen- eral Sherman, and of the interview which he there had with President Lincoln and with General Grant. While at City Point, Sherman obtained permission from Grant to make some radical changes in the organization of his forces. On his return to Goldsboro, he proceeded at once to the work of reconstruction. His left wing he con- stituted a distinct army, under the title of “the Army of Georgia,” and entrusted it to the command of General Slocum. This army consisted of two corps, which were commanded respectively by Jeff. C. Davis and Jos. A. Mower. The Tenth and Twenty- Third corps he named “ the Army of the Ohio,” and placed it under the com- mand of General Schofield. The corps commanders of General Schofield’s army were J. D. Cox and A. H. Terry. These changes were considered neces- saiy for various reasons, but mainly for the purpose of discipline and efficiency in the entire command ; and they were made, as we have seen, with the con- sent and approval of General Gi*ant. Sherman had thus, under his direct command, three separate armies — the army of the Tennessee, under Howard ; the army of Georgia, under Slocum ; and the army of the Ohio, under Scho- field. Howard was on the right ; Slocnm SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON— CORRESPONDENCE. 941 was on the left ; Schofield was in the centre. The cavalry force was under the immediate direction of Kilpatrick. The efi'ective strength of the entire command was 88,948. Of this force 2443 belonged to the artillery, and 5537 to the cavalry. Sherman’s preparations were not completed when, on the 6th of April, he learned of the victory which had been won at Five Forks, and of the subsequent evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg. Wisely judging that Lee would attempt to effect a junction with Johnston, he countermanded the orders which had already been given, and made arrangements to march di- rectly on Johnston’s army, which was at Smithfield, some 35,000 strong. On the 10th, Sherman’s entire army was in motion, towards the point indicat- ed. The left wing, supported by the centre, moved on the two direct roads, leading to Smithfield and Raleigh. Howard moved more to the right, feigning the Weldon road. Terry and Ealpatrick pushed along the west bank of the Nense River, in the same general direction. Smithfield was reached on the 11th, when it was found that John- ston had retreated with his whole army towards Raleigh, and that he had burned the bridges in his rear. The bridges, of course, had to be rebuilt — a task which consumed the remainder of that day. During the night, Sherman received a message from Grant, inform- iug him of the surrender of Lee and the army of Northern Virginia, at Appo- mattox Court House. On the morning of the 12th, the joyful intelligence was communicated to the army, amid the wildest demonstrations of delight. It was felt by all, that the war was April all but over. Glory to God,” 12 . said Sherman, “and our country, and all honor to our comrades in arms, towards whom we are marching. A little more labor, a little more toil on our part, the great race is won, and om government stands regenerated afte’ four long years of war.” The pursuit was resumed on thf 12th. On the evening of that day. Sherman was at Gulley’s, with the head of Slocum’s column. On the 13th, he entered Raleigh, and ordered the sever- al heads of column towards Ashville, in the direction of Salisbury or Char- lotte. It was feared by Sherman and, indeed, by all the ofiicers, that Johnston would retreat into the hill country of South Carolina and Georgia, break up his army into small bands, and thus indefinitely 23rol()ng the war. They were all desirous that the surrender of that army should be secured on any reasonable terms. It was not, there- foi’e, without a feeling of grateful relief that Sherman, on the morning of the 14th, and while still at Raleigh, April received from Johnston a note, 14. inquiiing whether “ in order to stop the further effusion of blood and devastation of property,” he was Avilling to make a temporaiy suspension of active operations, and to communicate to General Grant the request that he would take like action in regard to other armies, the object being to per- Init the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate 042 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. tlie existing war. To this note, Sher- man replied as follows : April 14th, 1865. “General: I have this moment received your communication of this date. I am fully empowered to arrange with you any terms for the suspension of further hostilities between the armies commanded by you and those com- manded by myself, and will be willing to con- fer with you to that end. I will limit the advance of my main column, to-morrow, to Morrisville, and the cavalry to the University, and expect that you will also maintain tlie present position of your forces until each has notice of a failure to agree. That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions as were made by Generals Grant and Lee, at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th inst., relative to our two armies ; and furthermore, to obtain from General Grant an order to suspend the move- ments of any troops from the direction of Virginia. General Stoueman is under my command, and my order will suspend any devastation or destruction contemplated by him. I will add that I really desire to save the people of North Carolina the damage they would sustain by the march of this army through the central or western parts of the State. “ W. T. Sherman, Major-General.” On the 16 th, an answer was received from Johiivston, agreeing to a meeting to be held, on the following day, at a point midway between the National advance at Durham’s, and the Confed- erate rear at II illsboro. At eight o’clock on the morning of the 17 th, a car and a April locomotive were waiting to con- 17 . vey Sherman and his attendants to Durham’s Station. The general was just entering the car when the tele- graph operator approached him in great haste, and informed him that he was just now receiving in cipher from Morehead City, a most important des- patch, ^vhich, he thought, it might be well for him to see. Sherman delayed the train, until the message was ti'ans- lated and written out. It was from the secretary-of-war ; and it conveyed the sad intelligence of the fate which had befallen President Lincoln, of the attack which had been made on Mr. Seward and his son, and of the suspi- cions that were entertained, that the conspirators had intended to assassin- ate General Grant and all the princi- pal officers of the government. The operator alone, hitherto, had seen the message. Assured of this, Sherman enjoined him to preserve the utmost secrecy, until he should return. The train was then permitted to stall. About ten o’clock, the party reach e^<- i^' . t 4 ^ -• ■>m^ f^' __ ^ :% ;iwM| ,..;iv, 4 ^^.yi-^_x 5 ^vw iV^r^Vr.\'^^^ ^aun -i^-^ feiivj!uj'r4.<:^%tacf^;'^^^^ m\! :>iW''< "' •‘■’^'^^'i'*'’ ■^■f''!'c-^:«-''K -‘i iuuvir ^^’7*''-' .•^‘iv■■.il.-^^V^iir•^,# Uii^i ■-‘'•y=iii#|'i!t.(i ii6j^ ud^.4±:ri3iiSl>^9r ^^A, .ft vlfij^.';- ^*:K' a ;. ^Et• ,f.ai'j&id,;, ^tll Sa I?. R,/kV S'^'S*' *?P-i‘'-'l;~ ' Tvt -frf .vynn.rtfc .t^imrifi jiy»niu,i.. - '•’ ‘ . ]>^!^^<>^•■■^'^^ ^flirU'. ^ ■M*'«^‘>iyi>'‘?|^-:.v ■ ■■■" '-‘^’ 4 “ '«■:'■ jr-^, f ? ■",' M Wildlb %.•»',=» t'j -AuiHclito '.rt stqfMI i) ' L v,JM<>(OKi ■’f.'inh.lil i^^P|| ■ .T.^ ^ i»d of 1 * ic W m>rt ? ow a btijs -.,w ^ ' -• ^ tjf '.*■ \.-,V;'i:,:ifl&i; THE MEMORANDUM. 945 so as to include all the officers, General Lee, himself, not excepted. At tliis stage Johnston informed Sherman that Mr. Breckenridge was near at hand, and asked whether he might not be per- mitted to take part in the conference. Sherman, at first, objected, on the irround that ne 2 :otiations should be confined strictly to belligerents. It was finally agreed, however, that Breck- enridge might be allowed to be present in the capacity of a major-general, but not as the Confederate secretary-of-wai\ Breckenridoce confirmed all that Jolin- ston had said regarding the state of feeling which j^i’^^ailed among officers and men concerning their political rights, in case of surrender. After the lapse of some hours, Sherman, recalling the conversation he had with Mr. Lin- C )ln, at City Point, and anxious to em- body the views there presented to him, as well as to conform somewhat to the wishes of his opponents, sat down and drew up a “ memorandum ” or basis of agreement. This document, which will be found below,* was signed by both Memorandum or Basis of agreement, made this 18^^ day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham's Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between Oen- Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confed- erate army, and Major-General William T. Sher- man, commanding the army of the United States in North Carolina, both present : 1. The contending armies now in the field to main- tain the statu quo, until notice is given hj the Com- manding general of either one to its opponent, and reasonable time — say forty-eight hours — allowed. 2. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenals ; and each oflScer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and abide the action of both State and Federal authority. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported parties, and sent to Washington for the approval of President Johnson. Mean- while, it was agreed that both armies should remain in statu quo, until an answer should be received from Wash- ington. Major Henry Hitchcock reached Washington, with the memorandum, on the 21st of April. The public April mind was still intensely excited 21. over the assassination of Lincoln, and over the brutal, although less successful, attack which had been made upon the life of Secretary Seward. The terms which Sherman proposed to grant to the South accorded ill with the tone of public feeling. The blood of Lincoln was calling loudly for vengeance ; yet, one of the most trusted and honored generals of the Union was proposing to grant, to the now conquered South, terms which implied an utter forgetful- ness of all the events of the war. The memorandum, in fact, was universally condemned. It was disapproved by the president, by the secretary-of-war, by the Lieutenant-general, and, indeed, by to the Chief of Ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time, to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively 3. The recognition, by the Executive of the United States, of the several State governments, on their officers and Legislatures taking the oaths prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, and where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States. 4. The re-establishment of all the Federal Courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States re- spectively. 5. The people and inhabitants of all the States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, theii 946 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. every member of tbe cabinet ; and, later, when it found its way into the news- papers, it called forth against Sherman a perfect howl of indignation. Time, however, has set this whole matter forth in its true light ; and General Sherman’s patriotism shines not the less brightly that it, temporarily and most unjustly, suffered an eclipse. General Grant set out immediately for Ealeigh, with instructions from the secretary-of-war to declare the rejection of the memorandum, and to assume direction of military affairs. From Morehead City, he telegraphed to Sher- man the decision of the government ; April morning of the 24th, 24. he reached the head-quarters of the army at Ealeigh. Grant directed Sherman to communicate the decision of the government to Johnston, to notify him that the truce would expire political rights and franchises, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the Constitution of the United States and of the States respectively. 6. The Executive authority of the Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their resi- dence. 7. In general terms — the war to cease ; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by the officers and the men hitherto composing said armies. Not being fully empowered by our respective prin- dpals to fulfill these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves to promptly obtain the necessary authority, and to carry out the above pro- gramme. W. T. Sherman, Major-General, Commanding Army of the United States in North Carolina. J. E. Johnston, General, Commanding Confederate States Army in North Carolina. ’ within forty-eight hours after the receipt of the message, and to demand, at the same time, the immediate sur- render of his army. This was the full extent of Grant’s interference. Sher man was permitted to carry on and conclude the negotiations with Jolmston. On receiving Sherman’s message announ cing the decision of the government at Washington, Johnston requested an- other interview. It was promptly granted; and on the following day, the 26th of April, the two commanders met again, at the same place, when articles of agreement were signed. The follow- ing is the document as approved and signed by General Grant. I “ Termsi of a Military Convention^ entered into this 2Qth day of April, 1865, at Bennett’s House^ near Durham's Station, North Caro- lina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, Commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, Command- ing the United States Army, in North Carolina. 1. All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston’s command to cease from this date. 2. All arms and public prop- erty to be deposited at Greensboro, and de- livered to an ordnance-officer of the United States Army. 3. Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate; one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be desig- nated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation, in w’riting, not to take up arms against the Government of the United States, until properly released from his obligation. 4. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage to be retained by them. 5. This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities, so long as they DAVIS AT IRWINSVILLE. 947 observe their obligation, and the laws in force where they may reside.” W. T. Sherman, Major-General, Commanding United States Forces in North Carolina. J. E. Johnston, General, Commanding Confederate States Forces in North Carolina. Approved: U. S. Grant, Lient.-General.” Wade Hampton, who refused to abide by the terms of the capitulation, dashed off with a body of cavalry in the direction of Charlotte, where were -Davis and the other members of the Confederate government. The remain- der of Johnston’s army, some 30,000 strong, after having formally surren- dered arms, were permitted to retui*n to their homes. So passed out of exist- ence the second great army of the Confederacy. Surrenders and captures now fol- lowed in rapid succession. On the 4th of May, at Citronella, Ala., General Richard Taylor, who commanded the Confederate forces on the east of the Mississippi, surrendered with his entire command. At the same time and place Commander Farrand surrendered to Rear-Admiral Thatcher, that portion of the Confederate navy which was in the Tombigbee. On the 10th of May, the head and front of the offending cause was cap- tured in the person of Jefferson Davis. After the fall of Richmond, Davis had attempted to maintain the semblance of a government at Danville. On the 10th of April, on hearing of the surren- der of Lee, he proceeded to Greensboro, accompanied by the different members of his cabinet. At Greensboro, where he met Johnston and Beauregard, and vainly endeavored to induce them to attack Sherman, Davis was coldly re- ceived. For three days he and his party were compelled to content them selves with what accommodations could be obtained in a railroad car. From Greensboro they proceeded to Charlotte, where they remained until they were informed of the surrender of Johnston. Davis was anxious, if possible, to reach Taylor, who was beyond the Chatta- hoochee ; and it was his hope that a vigorous resistance might yet be made, if the forces of that general could be united with those of Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi. All such hopes were soon blasted. At Washington, Ga., there was a scramble among Davis’ ministers for what gold they had been able to carry with them. Well aware that they were being pursued, and alarmed by the rumors which were reaching them of the near presence of the National troopers, they now scatter- ed — Postmaster-general Reagan alone, of all the members of the cabinet, re- maining with Davis. At this stage, Mrs. Davis, her children, and her sister, Mrs. Howell, were pushing towards the Gulf in wagons, on a nearly parallel route, about 18 miles distant. Learning that they were in danger of being attacked and robbed by a band of Con- federate soldiers, who imagined that Mrs. Davis and her party were carrying off a large amount of specie, Davis hastened to their assistance. He joined them as they were approaching Irwins- ville, the capital of Irwin County, Ga., nearly due south of Macon. There the weary fugitives encamped for the nigl)4. THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. Meanwhile two detachments of General •Wilson’s cavalry — one under Colonel Pritchard, the other under Colonel Hamden — who for some days had been in hot pursuit, were rapidly closing in upon them. A prize of $100,000, which was to reward the successful captor, was, no doubt, lending some intensity to the purpose of the pursuers. At day-break, on the 10th of May, the camp was surrounded, and the entire party were made prisoners. Pritchard’s men had the honor of the capture. Conveyed first to Wilson’s headquarters at Macon, the prisoners were sent thence by way of Savannah to Fortress Monroe. Alexander H. Stephens, who was captured about the same time, was sent to the same prison. He and Reagan were afterwards transferred to Fort Warren, in Boston harbor. On the 11th of May, General Jeff. Thompson, who commanded in Arkan- sas, surrendered at Chalk Bluff, with about 7500 men. One Confederate army still continued to hold out. It .vas that of General Kirby Smith. Long after the surrender of Lee, Smith professed, at least, to be sanguine and hopeful. Towards the very last days of April he addressed his soldiers as the hope of the nation,” and exhorted them to fight on for their liberties and their homes. You possess,” he said, the means of long resistance ; you liave hopes of succor from abroad. Protract the struggle, and you will surely receive the aid of nations who already deeply sympathize with you.” Smith was encouraged in his attitude of resistance by the sentiments which prevailed among the people of the South-west. In Louisiana and in Texas, in several of their more populous cen- tres, public meetings were held and resolutions adopted in favor of continu- ing the contest. Of the existence- of this feeling in those ‘States, and of the stubborn energy of Kirby Smith, the authorities at Washini^ton were not ignorant. Preparations were made for a vigorous campaign in Texas ; measures were adopted for the collection of a large force at New Orleans ; and Gen- eral Sheridan received instructions to hold himself in readiness to assume the command. These arrans^ements, be- coming unnecessary, were never fully car- ried out. The end, for which all were impatiently longing, was rapidly ap- proaching. It was not to be deferred by the stubbornness of any general, or by the wishes of any section of the people. Meanwhile, collisions were • taking place between po]*tions of the rival forces on the borders of the Rio Grande. One of these, which happened near Brazos Santiago, and which resulted somewhat unfavorably for the Nationals, proved to be the last battle of the war. Colonel Theodore H. Barrett, who was in command of the National troops at Brazos Santiago, was short of horses for his men. In order to supply this want, he sent Colonel Bronson, on the evening of the 11th of May, with some 300 men, to surprise and capture a Confederate camp on the Rio Grande. The surprise was complete. Bronson drove the foe before him, captured a number of hoi’ses and made some prisoners. Having FRONT VIEW OF THE CAPITOL AT WASHINGTON. PORTKAITS OF SOME OF THE GENEEALS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. y '.-t :o: PORTRAITS OF SHERMAN AND SOME OF HIS COMMANDERS. *- - y / \ s . V / -t 4 «* s - . t*i f. sJ V ■t 1 4 ■I » PORTRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. POKTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. PORTE AITS OF THE PRINCIPAL NAVAL COMMANDERS DURING THE WAR. PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. Ur A ' t ■ ( % ■ V. I ' \ POETRAITS OF UNION CAVALRY COMMANDERS. PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT UNION GENERALS. PORTRAITS OF PROMINENT CONFEDERATE GENERALS. /' ^ 1 ' * / ■i:r ,v.*/ ; '//• 1 ^. : X ■^; .■'A'" f''. n 1 J i c : , .V'}: f ■ ■-' i.i '' ') , i ( ] - ^ PORTRAITS OF PROMINP^NT CONFEDERATE GENERALS. V f /, ! ' ' ■ '"v s , ■ > • •( \ V J . ■5 - .k 1 /'l J liHHHk PORTRAITS OF SOME OF THE LEADERS OF THE SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY. THE COST OF THE WAR. 949 fallen back, lie was joined on the morn- ing of the 13t]r by Colonel Morrison, at the head of some 200 men. Barrett now assumed command in person. The Confederates, it was discovered, were collected in considerable force in the vicinity of what was known as Palmetto Hay Banche. Kesolved to disperse 13 . them, Barrett ordered another attack. After some skirmishing which lasted during the greater part of the forenoon, the Confederates were driven back some miles, when the Nationals halted on a piece of rising ground about a. mile from the ranche. The National left rested on the Bio Grande. In this position, about four o’clock in the after- noon, Barrett was fiercely attacked by a strong Confederate force, under the command of General Slaughter. Bar- rett was without guns. Slaughter was well supplied with both cavalry and artillery. Barrett was compelled to fall back. This, however, he did with great skill and with very considerable success. For three hours the running fight was kept up. The Confederates made repeated and savage onsets on Barrett’s front and right fiank. The recoiling force, however, was admirably covered by a body of colored troops belonging to the Sixty-Second regiment, who boldly and firmly maintained their line and successfully repelled every attack of the enemy. In the struggle some 48 men of the Thirty-Fourth Indiana, who had been thrown out as skirmishers to protect the flank of their regiment, were cut off and captured by Slaughter’s cavalry. About sunset, the pressure ceased, and the fighting was discontinued. Such was the battle of Palmetto Banche, famous as being the last in the Civil W ar. A few days later came the last sur- render. Kirby Smith had, at length, discovered the hopelessness of his cause. He had heard of the surrenders of John- ston and Taylor and Thompson. He had heard also of the arrival of Sheridan at New Orleans. The expected foreign aid had not yet arrived. Further resist- ance, he saw, was useless. He sent mes- sengers to General Canby, who was at Baton Bouge, to ascertain the terms of surrender ; but, before the negotiations were completed, Smitja had abandoned his post and made his escape into Texas. General Buckner, who it will be remembered, was left in a similar plight at Fort Donelson, assumed com- mand ; and on the 26th of May, jjay all that remained of the Confed- 26. erate army in the Trans-Mississippi De- partment, was surrendered to Canby, at New Orleans. The Civil War was ended. The struggle which extended over four weary years, was as severe as it was protracted. To the entire people, north and south, it was a long-continued bap- tism of fire. The whole nation, so to speak, passed through the burning fiery furnace. On both sides the war had been conducted at a fearful cost of blood and treasure. The total number of troops called for by the National government, was 2,942,748. The total number obtained was 2,690,401. Mak- ing allowance for the terms of service, which varied from six months to four years, it is safe to conclude that there were in actual service about 1,500,000 950 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. men. Of these some 60,000 were killed m battle, 35,000 were mortally wound- ed, and 184,000 died in the hospitals of diseasa It is scarcely an exaggeration to say, that, on the part of the Nation- als alone, 300,000 men died on the battle-field or in the hospitals, and that as many more were crippled or other- wise disabled for life. The Confeder- ate armies in point of actual numbers, were not equal to the National armies ; but their losses could hardly be less. It would certainly not be an over-esti- mate to say that, through the war, the entire country sustained an actual loss of l,000,000able-bodied men. An idea of the pecuniary cost of the war may be obtained from the fact that the National debt, which in June, 1861, was only $90,867,828, had, at the be- ginning of Januar}^, 1866, reached the high figure of $2,749,491,745. On a fair calculation, it is estimated that the expenditures of the government, during the last year of the war, exceeded the whole expenditures of the government from the inauguration of Wasliino^ton to the inauguration of Buchanan. Th^se figures do not cover the enor- mous sums paid out by individual States, and by local bodies, in fitting out their several contingents ; they do not include the millions voluntarily contributed by the people to the Sani- tary and Christian Commissions; nor do they make any account of the fact that the once blooming and wealthy South was literally exhausted, prostrat- ed, and laid waste. It was a fearful sacrifice — one of the greatest ever made by any people. Whether it was a necessary sacrifice will probably for- ever remain a debatable question. One thing, however, is certain : it was not made in vain. Out of the fiery ordeal came forth a regenerated America — a grander and more glorious Union. Great questions, involving ever-recur- ring, never-ending trouble, were finally settled. The Southern Confederacy was crushed, and, with it, the spirit of rebel- lion. Slavery was abolished ; and free- dom was proclaimed to be the birthright of man, irrespective of race or color. And, what will be found to be of equal importance to the future of America, and, indeed, to the future of mankind, the original National Union was saved. The end which had, at last, come had been foreseen ; and, even before the assassination of President lancoln, arrangements had been made to discon- tinue all draftino- and recruitins:, to curtail purchases of army supplies, to reduce the number of general and staff officers, and to remove whatever mil- itary restrictions had been laid on ti*ade and commerce. Preparations were made, at Washington, for the re- ception of the victorious legions which had followed the leadership of Grant and Sherman. On the 22d and 23d of May, the grand review took place. In the presence of multitudes of their re- joicing fellow - citizens, over 200,000 veterans, victors in many a hard-won fight, marched before the president and his cabinet. On those two days, in Washington, an element of sadness mingled wdth the general joy. One prominent figure was missed. Lincoln, the beloved of all, was in every man's DISBANDMENT OF THE ARMIES. 951 tliouglits ; but lie was not tliere. His work, however,, bad been nobly done ; and amid the imposing grandeur and magnificence of the spectacle, men’s minds were impressed with the old truths, that the good which men do lives after them,” and that when the blessed rest from their labors their ‘works do follow them.” A difficult task had yet to be per- formed by the government, before it could be said that the nation had fairly entered upon the enjoyment of peace. In crushing out the rebellious elements of the States recently in revolt, and in bringing back those States to their allegiance and restoring them to the Union, it had been necessary, as we have seen, to call into existence and to sustain large military and naval organ- izations. For the purpose for which they were created, these war forces were no longer necessary. What was to be done with them? They must be re- tained or disbanded ; and each alter- native was beset with difficulty. If retained, how were they to be em- ployed ? If disbanded, might they not be provoked into open resistance ? The problem' to be solved was not entirely new; but there was somewhat of nov- elty in the circumstances ; and the entire civilized world was interested in the mode and character of its solu- tion. It was not the first time that huge armies, after having saved, had proved the ruin of the commonwealth. Thoughtful men remembered the ex- perience and fate of Eome, and, later, the experience and fate of France. Once more the crucial test was about to be applied. What was to be the result? The test was applied; and the result was in the last degree satis- factory. The problem was solved in a manner which did honor to the Ameri can soldier, to American institutions^ and, indeed, to the general intelligence of the nineteenth century. It had never, in truth, been a seiious question with the government or Avith the people, what should be done Avith the soldier, when the Avar Avas over. It was taken for granted by all, the soldier himself included, that he should return to his home, and resume the duties of peaceful citizenship. Accord- ingly, before the end of May, arrange ments Avere made for disbanding the armies. Sherman, in a touching ad dress, bade fareAvell to his command, on tlie 30th of May ; and, on tlie June 2d of June, General Grant issued, to all the armies, the following order “Soldiers of the Araiies of the Exited States : — By your patriotic (le\'otioii to youi country, in the hour of danger and alarm, your magnificent fighting, bravery, and eodur- ance, you have maintained the supremacy of the Union and the Constitution, overthrown all armed opposition to the enforcement of the laws and of the proclamation forever abolish- ing slavery — the cause and pretext of the rebellion — and opened the way to the rightful authorities to restore order and inaugurate peace, on a permanent and enduring basis, on every foot of American soil. Your mai’ches, sieges, and battles, in distance, duration, resolution, and brilliancy of results, dim the lustre of the world’s past military achieve- ments, and will be the patriots’ precedent, in defense of liberty and right, in all time to come. In obedience to your country’s call, you left your homes and families, and volun- teered in her defense. Victory has crowned. 952 THE LAST DAYS OF THE WAR. your valor, and secured the purpose of your patriotic hearts ; and with the gratitude of your countrymen, and the highest honors a great and free nation can accord, you will soon be per- mitted to return to your homes and families, conscious of having discharged the highest duty of American citizens. To achieve these glorious triumphs, and secure to yourselves, your fellow-countrymen, and posterity, the blessings of free institutions, tens of thousands of your gallant comrades have fallen, and sealed the priceless legacy with their blood. The graves of these a grateful nation bedews with tears, honors their memories, and will ever cherish and support their stricken families.” The ^vork of disbandment, which had been already commenced, was car- ried on steadily, the government giv- ing to it a large share of its atten- tion ; and, as early as the 15th of November, over 800,000 troops had been transported, mustered out and paid. 'At the beginning of November, 1866, when the mustering process was completed, as many as 1,023,021 sol- diers had been restored to their homes, and to the avocations of peaceful life. There was no jarring, no resistance. It was a grand experiment; and it resulted in a splendid success. Such an experiment, attended by such a result, had never before been wit- nessed. The disbandment, without any serious disturbance to the com- munity, of so many thousands of men, most of them inured to all the habits, as well as hardships of the soldier’s life, was, at the time and not unjustly, regarded as another great victory — a victory, in some respects, even greater than that which had just been won by the sword. It was a real triumph of popular government — another gen- uine proof of the inherent strength of the republic. We have now completed the task we assigned ourselves at the commencement of this volume. We have traced the History of the Great Civil War from its commencement at Fort Sumter, in 1861, to its triumphant close in the dis- bandment of the Armies of the Union, in 1865. We have shown the causes which brought about the struggle, and have traced our troubles to their true source. We have swept the whole horizon of the war, pointing out to the reader the various complex movements of the contending forces, and seeking to separate each, yet so blend all as to enable him to understand not only each separate operation, but its^eneral bearing upon the whole great drama. We have seen the tide of victory roll backward and forward, at times seeming to en- gulf the hopes of those whose prayers were for the triumph of the Union, yet after all sweeping onward in one grand irresistible swell to victory and peace. We have seen the Union preserved, the contending armies quietly returning to their homes, and a new reign of peace and good will inaugurated. Such a story, the most sublime and thrilling that human pen can relate, can point but one moral — that the institu- tions which were worth fighting for so nobly are worth preserving ; that the Union which has cost us so much blood and treasure, which has brought us free- dom and prosperity, must be cherished as the most precious possession we can transmit to future generations. INDEX. 953 INDEX. The Gee at Civil War. A, A.BBOTT, Gen., brigade of, at tbe capture of Fort Fisber, 866, A.bercrombie, Gen., at tlie battle of Fair Oaks, 238. Ackwortb Station, Ga., captured by Gen. Hood, 805. Acquia creek, McClellan’s army moves towards. 279 ; arrival of McClellan at, 280 ; deserted by tbe Na- tionals, 301. Adairs ville, Ga., Gen. Newton skirmishes witb Gen. Johnston’s rear-guard at, 711. Adams, Gen. severely wounded at Cbickamauga, 554. Aiken, skirmish of Kilpatrick with Wheeler at, 883. Alabama, Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 877 ; sunk by the Kearsarge off Cherbourg, 879. Albemarle, Confederate ram, at the siege of Ply- mouth, 858 ; her fight with the Sassacus — sunk in the Roanoke river by Lieut. Cushing, 859. Alexander, Gen., brigade of, at Chattanooga, 569. Alexandria, Va., occupation of, by National troops, 35. Alexandria, La., taken possession of by Admiral Por- ter, 438 ; occupied by the Confederates. 597 ; Na- tional troops occupy, 624 ; evacuation of, 638. Alice Dean and McCombs, steamers, seized by Gen. Morgan at Bradenburg, Ky., 595. Allatoona Pass, Ga., operations of Gen. Sherman’s army at, 713 ; heroic defense of, by Gen. Corse, 806 ; battle of, 807. Allyn, Lieut S., bravery of, at Port Hudson, 443. Alsop’s Farm, surprise of the National troops at, 673 ; battle of, 674. Ames. Gen,, at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866 ; at Fort Anderson, 869. Ammen, Gen., re-occupies Strawberry plains, 836. Anderson, Col., surrender of Fort Gaines by, to the Nationals, 648. Anderson, Gen. G. T., at Santa Rosa, 07 ; at the bat- tle of Shiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 457 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 514 ; at the battle of the Wilderness. 666 ; severely wounded at the battle of Griswoldville, 815. Anderson, Major-Gen., mortally wounded at the bat- tle of Jonesboro, 731. Anderson, Major R., in command of Charleston har- bor — headquarters at Fort Moultrie — letter of, re- lating to Fort Moultrie, 12 ; moves into Fort Sumter, 16 ; his refusal to surrender Fort Sumter, 23 ; sur- render of Fort Sumter by, 31 ; (Gen.) hoists the National flag on Fort Sumter, 888. Andrews, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville,*457. Anthony, Col. D. C., in the affair at Colliersville, 562. Antietam, description of the battle-ground of, 317 ; battle of, 319-327 ; Capt. Noyes’ description of, after the battle, 330 ; President Lincoln’s story of the effect of the battle of {note), 332. Antietam creek, bridges on, 319. Appomattox court house, Gen. Lee’s surrender at, 934. Archer, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460 ; captured at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. Arkadelphia, occupied by the Nationals, 606. Arkansas, joins the Confederacy. 33 ; compulsory retreat of Gen. Price into — the flag of the Union floating in, 97 ; operations of Gen. Curtis in, 97, 98 ; march of Gen. Curtis through, 355-357 ; opera- tions against guerrillas in, 359-366 ; operations of Gens. Steele and Davidson in, 605, 606. Arkansas, Confederate ram, description of, 429 ; action of, with Caron delet, Tyler, and Ellet’s ram Queen of the West, 430 ; destruction of {note), 431. Arkansas Post, battle of, 387. Arlington heights, occupied by the Nationals, 35. Armistead, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 525 ; taken prisoner at Gettysburg, 529. Armitage, Gen., fatally wounded at Gettysburg, 528. Armstrong, Gen., raids made by, 159. Army of the Potomac, effective strength of, under Gen. McClellan, 191 ; address of Gen. McClellan to, 270 ; Gen. McClellan takes leave of, 336 : ad- dress of Gen Burnside to, 337 ; reorganization of. 338 ; distrust occasioned in, by Gen. Burnside’s failure at Fredericksburg, 354 ; address of Gen. Hooker to — demoralization in, 451 ; addresses of Gen. Hooker to, 484, 495 ; addresses of Gen. Meade to, 496, 50J ; consolidation of, by Gen. Meade, 954 I X D E X . G5S-GG0 ; corps commanders of, 658 ; movements of from the Rapidan to Spottsylvania court house, CGO-678 ; address of Gen. Meade to, 683 ; move- ments of, from Spottsylvania court house to the Chickahominy, 683-704; operations of, against Petersburg, 735-780. Army of the United States, condition of, in 1861, 25. Army of Virginia, under Gen. Pope, how constituted, 277 ; address of Pope to, 278 ; Pope asks to be relieved of command of. 279 ; orders issued by Pope to, 281, 282 ; retreat of, to the north fork of the Rappahannock, 287, 288 ; great exhaustion of, 298 ; effective force of, after retreating to Centreville, 301 ; losses of, 304. Aimold, Gen. Rich., at the siege of Fort Morgan, 648. Arnold, Major, at the battle of Santa Rosa, 68. Asboth, Gen., at the battle of Pea Ridge. 97. Asiiby, Gen. T., killed at the battle of Cross Keys, 251. Ashby’s Gap, Va,, skirmishes at, 493 ; battle at, 787. Ashland Station, captured by Gen. Sheridan, 685. Assassination of President Lincoln, 937-940. Atchafalaya, Gen. A. J. Smith’s operations on the, 623. Athens, Tenn., surrender of, to Gen Forrest, 828. Atlanta, Ga., description of, 707 ; account of Sher- man’s march to, from Chattanooga, 708 ; occupation of, by Sherman’s forces, 732 ; civilians removed from, 733 ; depopulation of, 734 ; disposition of Sherman’s forces in and around, 803 ; extensive de- struction of buildings in, by order of Sherman, 812. Atlanta, iron-clad, captured by Capt. Rodgers, 588. Augur, Gen., operations of, between Port Hudson and Clinton, 438 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; sends a brigade to check Early’s advance on Washington, 786. Augusta, Ga., Sherman’s feint in the direction of, 817. Averill, Gen., expedition of, on the Rappahannock — displaced by Gen Hooker, 482 ; defeat of, by Gen. Morgan, 691 ; defeats Gen. Early near Winchester, 787 ; defeats Johnson, on the Romney road, 788. Averysboro, N. C., battle of, 891. Ayres, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. B. Bache, Lieut., services of, at Pleasant Hill landing. Red river, in the gunboat Lexington, 633. Bailey, Capt. T., commands a division of the fleet at the capture of Xew Orleans, 150. Bailey, Col., batteries of, at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235. Bailey, Lieut. -Col., dam constructed by, on the Red river, near Alexandria, 636. Baird, Gen., operations of, 538 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga. 572. Baker, Col. E. D., killed at Ball’s Bluff, Va., 54. Baldwin, Col., operations of, at Liberty gap, 543. Baldwin, Fla., destruction of property at, 856. Ball’s Bluff Va., battle of, 54. Baltic, steamer, sent from New York with reinforce- ments to Fort Sumter, 26. Baltimore, preparations made at, to resist the threat- ened invasion of the Confederates, 493. Banks, Gen. N. P., in command on the Maryland side of the Potomac, 52 ; commands a corps of the army of the Potomac, 193 ; in command at Har per’s ferry, 242 ; retreat of, 247 ; at the battle of Cedar mountain. 285 ; in command at Washington, 310 ; expedition of, arrives at New Orleans. 431 ; sends an expedition to Galveston. 432 ; operations of, in Lousiana, 434 ; sends an expedition to Bayou Teche, 435 ; operations of, against Port Hudson, 436 : second expedition of, to Bayou Teche, 437 ; attacks Port Hudson, 441, 443 ; failure of his attacks on Port Hudson, 444 ; lays siege to Port Hudson, 445 ; Port Hudson surrenders to, 446, 447 ; ordered to the conquest of Texas, 597 ; sends an expedition to Sabine city, 598 ; expedition of, to Texas, 600 ; expedition of, to Shreveport, 621 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628 ; ordered to close the cam- paign, 635. Barksdale, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 457 ; in charge of Marye’s hill, 473 ; killed at the battle of Gettysburg. 518. Barlow, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chancel lorsville, 459 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; wounded and taken prisoner, 505. Barnes, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 512 ; Bartlett, Gen., at the battle* of the Wilderness, 672 , brigade of, at the battle of Jericho ford, 694. Bari^n, Commodore, surrender of at Fort Hatteras, 65. Bassett, Major, killed at capture of Marye’s hill. 475. Baton Rouge, occupied by Gen. Williams, 430 ; fleet of Admiral Farragut at, 437. Battery Harrison, capture of, 769 ; unsuccessful at- tempt of the Confederates to regain, 771. Battery Holmes, abandoned by the Confederates, 867. Battle of — Allatoona Pass. 807. Alsop’s Farm, 674. Antietam. 319-327. Arkansas Post, 387. Ashby’s Gap, 787. Atlanta,720, 723-727 Averysboro, 891. Ball’s BluS, 54. Baylor’s Farm, 737. Bean Station, 596. Belmont, 61. Bentonville, 893. Bermuda Hundred, 687. Big Bethel, 62. Big Black, 413. Blackburn’s Ford, 37. Blakely, 873. Boston Mountains, 362. Boydton Road, 778. Bristow Station. 291 INDEX. 95 ? Battle of — Battle of — Bull Bun, 40 ; 2d battle, 301. Malvern Hills, 267-269. Cane Hill. 362. Manassas, 299. Cane River, 635. Marais des Cygnes, 832. Carnifex Ferry, 52. Mechanicsville, 258, 259. Carrack’s Ford, 50. Middletown, 800. Cedar Creek. 802 Mill Spring, 81. Champion Hills, 111. Miss'onary Ridge, 568. Chancellorsville, 461-470. Monocacy. 786. Chantilly, 302. Morristown, Tenn,, 835. Chapin’s Farm, 769. Murfreesboro, 180-186. Chattanooga, 568-573. Nashville, 847. Chicamacomico, 66. New Hope Church, 712. Chickamauga, 550-556. New Market, 691. Chickasaw Bayou, 379. Ny River, 684. Cold Harbor, 698-702. Olustee, 858. Corinth. 163-167. Pea Ridge, 97, 98. Crooked Run, 791 Peach Tree Creek, 720. Cross Keys, 251. Perryville, 177. Dalton, 708. Pittsburg Landing, 105. Davis’ Farm, 742. Pleasant Hill, 630. Deep Run, 760. Port Gibson, 405. Dug Springs, 55. Prairie Grove, 363, Elk Horn, 97. Raymond, 407. Fair Oaks, 230-241. Reams’ Station, 766. Fisher’s Hill, 796. Resaca, 710. Five Forks, 916. Rich Mountain, 49. Fort Darling, 689. Sabine Cross Roads, 629. Franklin, 842. Sabine Pass, 598. Fredericksburg, 343-351. Sailors’ Creek, 927. Gaines’ Mill, 259-261. Salem Heights, 478. Gettysburg, 502-533. Salisbury, 896. Glendale, 265. Santa Rosa, 67. Grand Coteau, 599. Savage Station, 263. Gravelly Run, 913. Secession ville, 580, 581. Griswoldville, 815. Seven Pines, 230-241. Groveton, 295. Shiloh, 105-111. Gumto^vn, 620. South Mountain, 315. Hampton Roads, 207-211. Spottsylvania Court House, 675-682. Hanover Court House, 231. Springfield, 602. Hatcher’s Run, 777 ; 2d battle, 903. Trevillian, 703. Hatchie, 167. Warrenton Turnpike, 293. Huntsville, 602. Wauhatchie, 561. Island Ford, 787. Waynesboro, 904. lulia, 161. Weidon Railroad, 742, 762-766. Jenkins’ Ferry. 640. West Point, 613. Jericho Ford, 604. Westport. 832. Jonesboro, 731. White Oak Swamp 264. Kenesaw Mountain, 715. Wilderness. 662-671. Kinston, 894. Williamsburg, 214-225. Kernstown, 243. Wilson’s Creek, 56. Kirksville, 358. Winchester, 796. Knoxville, 575. Baxter, Col , at Gettysburg, 527. Kulp House, 715. Baylor’s Farm, battle of, 737. Lavergne, 180. Bayou Sara, forces of Gen. Banks at, 440. Little Osage Crossing, 832. Bayou Teche, operations of Banks on the, 435, 437 Lookout Mountain, 566, 567. Bean Station, Tenn., battle of, 596. 056 INDEX. Beaufort, S. C., condition of, 75 ; naval force at, 76. Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., in command at Charles- ton, 26 ; at Manassas junction, 35 ; in command at Shiloh, 108; retreats to Corinth, 114; flight of, from Corinth, 119 ; at Tupelo, 120 ; relieved by Gen. Bragg. 121 ; proclamation of, 584 ; at Bermuda Hundred, 687 ; placed in command of the Confed- erate military division of the west, 809. Bee, Gen., at the battle of Bull Run, 41. Beenher, Rev. H. W., powerful address given by, at Fort Sumter, 888. Bell, Capt., commands a division* of the fleet at the capture of New Orleans, 150. Bell, Gen. , at the capture of Fort Fisher 866 ; mortally wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. Belgian Consul, arrest of the, at St. Louis, 830. Belmont, Mo., battle of, 61. Beltzhoover, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60, Benedict, Col,, at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630. Benham, Gen., at the battle of Secessionville, 580. Benjamin, Judah P., circular of, 584. Bentonville, battle of, 893. Bermuda Hundred, battle of 687. Berry, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg. 217. Berry, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 458, 462 ; death of, 470. Berry ville, Gen. Sheridan’s forces at, 789, 794. Best, Capt., battery of, at Chancellorsville, 462. Bethesda Church, attack of Gen. Rodes at, 697. Big Bethel. Gen. Pierce’s attempt on, 62. Big Black, battle of, 413. Big Shanty Station, Ga., captured by Gen. Hood, 805. Big Tybee Island, seized by the Nationals, 75 ; descrip- tion of, 139. Birge, Gen., operations of, 635. Birney, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 218 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Chan- tilly, 303 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville, 459 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; division of, at Taylor's bridge, 695. ITackburn’s Ford, battle at, 37. Blackman, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, 866. B aisdell. Col., at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. Blair, Gen. Frank P , at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; in contact with Gen. S. D. Lee at Tuscumbia, 562 ; in command of the seventeenth corps under Sherman, 713. Blakely, battle of, 873. Blockade of the Southern ports by the Nationals. 61, 62. Blockade of Charleston, declared raised by Beaure- gard and Ingraham, 584. Blooming Gap, Gen. Jackson surprised at, 242. Blue Wing, steamer captured by the Confederates, 385. Blunt, Gen. J. G., defeat of Cooper at Fort Wayne, Mo. , by, 361 ; defeat of Marmaduke by, 362 ; at the battle of Prairie grove, 365 ; takes possession of Van Buren, Ark. 366 ; defeat of Gen. Cooper by. 604 ; relieved of his command, 606. Boggs, Capt. C. S.. his report of the exploits of the gun-boat Varuna, 152. Bolivar Heights, affair at, 314 ; Shericlan at, 793. Boomer, Col. , at the battle of luka, 161. Bombshell, gun-boat, capture of, by the Confederates, 858 ; deserted by the Confederates, 859. Booth, Major L F.. killed at Fort Pillow, 617. Booth, J. Wilkes, assassinates President Lincoln, 938 ; death of, 940. Border States, condition of the, 47. Boswell, Capt. , killed at the battle of Chancellorsville, 464. I Boston Mountains, Mo., battle of, 362. Bowling Green, Ky , headquarters of A. S. Johnston’s army, 83 ; evacuation of, 94. Bowen, Gen. J., at the battle of ( 'hampion Hills, 410 Boyd’s Creek, batteries erected at, 76. Boydton Road, battle of, 778. Bradford, Major W. F., at Fort Pillow, 617 ; murder of. by the Confederates, 619. Bradley, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Chicka- mauga, 551 ; wounded at the battle of Franldin. 842. Bragg, Gen. B., forts at Pensacola held by. 68 ; at Shiloh, 106 ; succeeds Beauregard in the command of the army of the Mississippi, 120 ; at Chattanooga. 171 ; proclamation of, to the Kentuckians, 172 ; inaugurates a provisional governor of Kentucky, 173 ; battle of Perryville or Chaplin’s hills fough by. 177 ; retreat of, to Chattanooga. 178 ; cavalry raids of, into West Tennessee and Kentucky. 180 ; battle of Murfreesboro fought by, 180 ; retreat of. 187 ; at Shelbyville. 542 ; retreat of, 544 ; retires from Chattanooga 547 ; at the battle of Chicka- mauga, 549 ; report of, 552 ; victory of, at Chicka- mauga, 555 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; defeat of, by Gen. Grant 573 ; retreat of, to Dalton. 574 ; relieved of his command. 578 ; driven over tlie Neuse to Kinston by Schofield, 894. Bramhall, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 215. Branch, Gen., killed at the battle of Antietam, 327. Brannan. Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 550; operations of, at Pocotaligo, 581. Brashear City, Weitzel’s expedition to, 435 ; Gen. Banks at, 437 ; capture of. by the Confederates. 445. Breckenridge, Gen. J. C., at the battle of Shiloh, 107 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro. 180 ; at the battle of Chickamauga. 551 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568; defeats Gen. Sigel near New Market, 69 . 2 : defeats Gen. Gillem near Morristown, Tenn., 836. Breese, Capt. K R., in command of the sailors and marines at the capture of Fort Fisher, 865. Bristow Station, battle of, 291 ; Gen. Banks destroys property at, 301. Brooke, Gen , at the battle of Savage station, 263 ; at the battle of Gettvsburg, 515. INDEX 957 Brooks, Gen., operations of, from Bermuda hun- dred, 687. Brown, Col. , at Chicamacomico, 66. Brown, Col. Harvey, at Fort Pickens, 68. Brown, Col. , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 459. Brown, Col., at the battle of Jericho ford, 694. Brown, Col. , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. Brown, Gen., severely wounded at the battle of Springfield, Mo., 602. Brown, Gen., in charge of militia at St. Louis, 831. Brown, Gen. E. B., his encounter with guerrillas and Indians, 606 Brown, Gov., sends the Georgia militia to Gen. Jos. E Johnston’s army, 714. Brown’s Gap, strength of Early’s position at, 797. Bruinsburg, Miss., expedition of Gen. Grant at, 403. Brunswick, Ga., taken possession of, by Nationals, 141, Buchanan, Commodore McKean, death of, in the Calhoun, at Carney’s bridge, 435. Buchanan, Franklin, in command of the Confederate iron clad Merrimac, 202 ; (Admiral; in command of iron- clad Tennessee, 642 ; severely wounded in ac- tion in Mobile bay, 647. Buchanan, President James, reply of, to the South Carolina commissioners, 19. Buckner, Gen. S. B , at Fort Donelson, 85 ; surrender of 94 ; retreats from Knoxville, Tenn., 544. Buell, Gen. D. C., in charge of the department of the Ohio, 80 ; in command of the army of the Cumber- land, 83 ; ordered to join Grant at Shiloh, 103 ; his interview with Grant, 105 ; his arrival at Shiloh, 110 ; at Corinth, 117 ; army of, sent to Chattanooga, 120 ; approaching Chattanooga, 171 ; moves from Louisville, 174 ; at Perryville, 175-177 ; supplanted by Gen. Rosecrans, 178. Buford, Col., at the battle of Belmont, 60. Buford, Gen., operations Of, 616 ; at Columbus, 619 ; cavalry attack of, against Murfreesboro, 844 Ball Run, battle of, 40 ; second battle of, 301. Bur bridge, Gen., at tlie battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; National standard planted by, on Fort Hind- man, Ark., 388 ; at the battle of Grand Coteau, 599 ; his pursuit of Morgan to Cynthiana, 783 ; his expedition against the Virginia salt works, 835. Burns, Gen , at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238 ; at the battle of Savage station, 263. Burnside, Gen., A E. , at the battle of Bull Run, 40, 4i, 43 ; biographical sketch of — commands the ex pedition to Pamlico Sound, 123 ; proclamation by. and Goldsboro ugh. to the people of North Carolina, lol ; at New Berne, 132, 135 ; at Fort Macon. 136 ; capture of Fort Macon by — summoned to Fortress Monroe, 137 ; at the battle of Antietam, 325 ; or- dered to take command of the army of the Potomac, 836 ; order of, on assuming command, 337 ; plan of, to attack Fredericksburg, 338 ; mortification of, and his division commanders, 340 ; losses of, at the battle of Fredericksburg, 351 ; entire army of, withdraws to Falmouth, 352 ; letter of, assuming the entire responsibility for the disaster at Fred- ericksburg, 354 ; relieved of his command at liis own request. 354 ; appointed to the command of the department of the Ohio {note), 449 ; ordered to join Rosecrans, 542 ; enters Knoxville, 545 ; Cum- be.land gap surrenders to, 545, 540 ; encounter of, with Longstreet, 575 ; his defense of Knoxville, 576 ; in command of the ninth army corps at Cul- pepper, 660, repulse of, at the North Anna, 695. Burton’s Georgia brigade, at Bull Run, 41. Butler, Gen. B. F., at Fortress Monroe, 35 ; declares slaves contraband of war. 47 ; ordered to take command at Fortress Monroe, 62 ; relieved of his command at Fortress Monroe, 63 ; success of, at Hatteras, 65 ; departure of, from Hampton Roads with troops for New Orleans. 157 ; moves up the James river from Fortress Monroe, 686 ; despatch of, to Stanton, 687 ; operations of, against Peters- burg 736 ; additional corps placed under, by Gen. Grant, 751 ; joins the expedition against Fort Fisher, 861-863 ; superseded by Ord, 868. Butterfield’s brigade at the battle of Gaines’Mill, 260. C. CaBELL, Gen. W. L., defeat of, at Fayetteville, 603 ; operations of, 639. Caldwell, Commander, C. H. B., at the attack on Port Hudson, 441. Caldwell, Gen,, at the battle of Antietam, 324 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 514. Calhoun, J. M., letter of, to Gen. Sherman in relation to the removal of civilians from Atlanta, 734. Cameron, Brig-Gen. , at the battle of Grand Coteau, 600 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. Cameron, Col,, lulled at the battle of Bull Run, 44. Cameron, Secretary, resigns the war department, 79. Campbell, Col., surrender of Athens, Tenn. by, to Gen. Forrest, 828. Canby, Gen., commands the Shreveport expedition, 638 , in command of the western military division, 641; operations of, against Mobile, 869-873. Cane Hill, battle of, 362. Cane River, battle of, 635. Carlin's brigade at the battle of Perryville, 177. Carnifex Ferry, battle of, 52. Curolinas, Gen. Sherman’s march through the, 880- 807 ; waste and destruction effected in the, by Sherman’s troops, 895. Carr, Gen., at Pea Ridge, 97 ; at the battle of Big Black, 413 ; at Little Rock, 638. Carrack’s Ford, Va. , battle of, 50. Carroll. Gen , brigade of, at the battle of Gettysburg, 520 ; splendid charge of, at the battle of the Wilder- ness, 671 ; wounded. 672. Carter, Gen S. P., at Knoxville, 545. 958 INDEX. Casey, Gen., division of, at the battle of Williamsburgh, 230 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 334. C’ass, Gen. Lewis, conduct of, prior to hostilities, 15. Catlett’s Station, Pope’s army-train surprised at, 288. Cedar Creek, Gen. Sheridan’s army at, 790 ; Early’s temporary victory at, 799 ; battle of, 8 '3. Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run, Va., battle of, 386. Cemetery Ridge, near Petersburg, unsuccessful as- saults upon, from the “crater,” 755, 756. Centreville, Va., Union army under Gen. Pope at, 301. (’esnola, Col., drives the Confederates back from their position at White Post, 790. Chalmette, Confederate regiment, unconditional sur- render of, to Capt. Bailey, 154. Chalmers, Gen , at Shiloh, 109 ; at Colliersville, 562. Chamberlain, Col., at the battle of Gettysburg, 513. Chambers, Col., at the battle of luka, 161. Chambersburg, Pa , capture of, by Gen. Stuart, 333 ; burnt by Gen. McCausland, 788. Champion Hills, Miss., described, 410 ; battle of, 411. Chancellorsville House, Va., headquarters of Gen. Hooker, 454 ; takes fire and is abandoned, 470. Chancellorsville, Va., first battle of, 461 ; second bat- tle of, 467 ; captured by the Confederates, 470, 471. Chantilly, Va.^ battle of, 302. Chapin’s Farm, Va., battle of, 769. Chaplin’s Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. Charleston, excitement in, 16 ; attempt of Beaure- gard and Ingraham to raise the blockade of, 583, 584 ; circular-of J. P. Benjamin in relation to the blockade of, 581 ; Dupont’s attack on the fortifica- tions of, 584-587 ; operations of Gen. Gillmore against the defenses of, 588-593 ; evacuation of, by Gen. Hardee, 886 ; surrender of, to Gen. Gillmore, by the mayor, 887 ; explosion with loss of life and great fire in, 886 ; remarks of Gen. Sherman on the ruin- ous condition of — Gen. Anderson sent thither to raise the Stars and Stripes again on Fort Sumter, 887. Charleston and Savannah Railroad, movements of Gen. Foster against, 830. Charleston Forts, paper respecting, addressed to President Buchanan by South Carolina representa- tives, 19. Charleston Harbor, condition of, prior to the war, 11 ; description of the forts in, 585. Chase, Secretary, visit of, to Fortress Monroe, 238. Chattahoochee River, Ga., Gen Johnston driven across the, by Gen. Sherman, 717, Chattanooga, Tenn., strategic importance of, 171 ; its position and surroundings, 541 ; battle of, 568-573. Cheatham, Gen., at Belmont, 60; at the battle of Shiloh, 109 ; at the battle of Perry ville, 176 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. Cheraw, destruction of property at, by Sherman, 889. Cliesapeake and Albemarle Canal, operations of Lieut. Jeffers on the, 130. Chicamacomico, battle of, 66. Chickahominy, crossed by Gen. Grant's army, 703. Chickamauga, position of, 549 ; battle of, 550-556.' Chickamauga, steamship, destroyed by the Confeder- ates, 869 ; depredation^ of, 876. Chickasaw Bayou or Haines’ Bluff, battle of, 379 . sad scenes after the battle of, 381. Churchhill, Gen. T. J., in command of Fort Hind- man, Ark., 386 ; surrenders the fort to the military authorities, 388. City Belle, steamer, captured by the Confederates, 038. City of New York, steamer, lost at Hatteras, 124. City Point, terrific explosion with loss of life at, 758 ; meeting^ of Gens. Grant and Sherman, Admiral Porter, and President Lincoln at, 895. Clark, Gov. H. T., counter-proclamation of, to the people of North Carolina, 131. Classen, Capt., operations of, at Fort Gaines, 648. Clayton, Col. P., repulses the attack of Marmaduke, at Pine Bluff, Ark. , 607. Cleburne, Gen , at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 : at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. Clendennin, Gen. , at the battle of Monocacy, 785. Clifton and Arizona, gun-boats, captured by the Con- federates, 598. Coates, Col. J. H , operations of, at Yazoo city, 615. Cobb. Gen., at the battle of Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344. Cobb, guerrilla leader, defeated by Col. Merrill, 3.58. Cockerell, Gen., captured at Fort Blakely, 893. Cockerell’s brigade at Missionary Ridge, 569. Coggswell, Col., at the battle of Ball’s Bluff, 54. Colburn. Gen., defeated by Van Dorn and Forrest, 538. Cold Harbor, Va., battle of, 699-702. Colquitt, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460. Colston, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460. Columbia, Tenn., retreat of Gen. Schofield from, 840. Columbia, S. C., surrender of, by the mayor to Col. Stone, 884 ; disorderly conduct of drunken soldiers in, 884 ; great fire in, 885. Columbus, Ga., captured by Gen. Wilson, 874. Columbus, Ky., seized by Gen. Polk, 58 ; Confederate post at, 80 ; evacuation of, 94. Commissioners, South Carolina, correspondence of with President Buchanan, 19 Congress, destroyed by the iron-clad Merrimac, 204. Congress, Southern, assembled at Montgomery. 23. Cook, Major, isolated with Col. U. Dahlgren, from their command, in the Virginia raid, 657. Cooke, Capt., his operations with the ram Albe marie at the siege of Plymouth, 859. Cooke, Gen. St. G., at the battle of Gaines’ mill, 261. Cool Arbor, Va., headquarters of Gen. McClellan, 230 Cooper, Adjt.-Gen , iniquity of, 13. Cooper, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Blunt, 604. Coosaw River, obstructions placed on, 76. Coosawhatchie River, Gen. Slocum at the, 883. INDEX. 950 Corintli, description of, 114 ; evacuation of, by Beau- regard, 119 ; battle of. 1G3-167. Cornyn, Dr., at the battle of Shiloh, 109. Corse, Gen., at the battle of Chattanooga, 569 ; wound- ed at Chattanooga, 570 ; his defense of Allatoona pass, 806 ; services of, near Savannah, Ga., 819. Coste, N. L . surrenders the cutter William Aiken, 18. Cotton, J. A., Confederate steamer, destruction of, 435. Couch, Gen. D. N , at the battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235 ; at the battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; at the battle of Fredericks- burg, 348 ; at the battle of Chancellors ville, 454. Courronne, French iron clad, at the fight between the Kearsarge and the Alabama, 878. Covington, steamer, set on fire and abandoned, 637. Cox, Gen., at Kanawha valley, 51 ; at the battle of South mountain, 315 ; his capture of Fort Ander- son, 869. Craft, Col., in the attack on Fort Donelson, 91. Craig, Col., killed at Deep bottom, 761. Crampton’s Gap, skirmish at, 316. Crater of Petersburg mine, scene inside the, 755. Craven, Capt., in the attack on Fort St. Philip, 152. Craven, Capt. T. A. M., lost in the Tecumseh in Mobile bay — biographical sketch of {aote), 644. Crawford, Gen. , wounded at the battle of Antietam, 322 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 513 ; at the bat- tle of the Wilderness, 663 ; repulse of the Confed- erates by, at Shady grove road, 697. Cricket, steamer. Confederate attack on the, 633. Crist, Col., at Port Royal ferry, 76. Crittenden, U. S. Senator, devotion of, to the Union, 57. Crittenden, Gen. T., at Shiloh, 110 ; at the battle of Perryville, 174 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; takes possession of Lafayette, Tenn., 547 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 550. Crocker, Lieut. F., failure of the naval expedition in charge of, to Sabine city, 598. Croker, Gen., at the battle of Champion hills, 411. Crook, Gen., defeats Gen. McCausland at Dublin sta- tion, 691 ; drives the Confederates through Snick- er’s gap — at Island ford, 787. Crooked Run, Va., battle of, 791. Cross, Col., at the battle of Antietam, 324. Cross, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 515. Cross Keys, Va., battle of, 251. Crowen and Wheeler, batteries of, at the battle of Williamsburg, 218. Croxton, Gen., in command at Cypress creek, 829. Crufts, Gen., division of, at Wauhatchie, 566 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568. Crutchfield, Col., wounded at Chancellorsville, 462. Culpepper Court House, arrival of Gen. Pope at, 285 ; Gen. Grant’s headquarters at, 658. Cumberland, suuk by the iron-clad Merrimac, 203. Curtin. Gov., of Pennsylvania, orders all able bodied men to organize for the defense of the State. 309. Curtis, Gen , brigade of, in the attack on Fort Fisher. 866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. Curtis, Gen. S. R., operations of, against Gen. Price. 97 ; victory of, at the battle of Pea ridge, 98 ; at Batesville, Ark., 355 ; arrives at Helena, 357 ; defeat of the Confederates at Fayetteville, Mo., by, 833. Cushing, Lieut. W. B., destroys the Confederate ram Albemarle, in Plymouth harbor, N. C., 860. Custer, Capt , death of, at Columbia, Ky. , 595. (Juster, Gen. G. A., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; repulse of, by the Confederates at Sulphur springs bridge, 789 ; at Crooked run, 791. Cutler, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 503 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 694. Cynthiana, Ky., Morgan routed by Gen. Burbridge near, 783. p. Dabney’s Mills, battle of, 777 ; second battle of, 003. Dahlgren, Admiral, his bombardment of Fort Sumter and Fort Wagner, 589, 590. Dahlgren, Col., raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; death of, 657. Dallas, Ga., Sherman’s movement upon, 712. Dalton, Ga., battle of, 708 ; Gen. Johnston evacuates, 709 ; surrender of the garrison at, to Gen Hood, 808. Dam constructed on the Red river by Col. Bailey to facilitate the escape of Porter’s vessels, 636. Dana, Gen , at York river, 227 ; wounded at the bat- tle of Antietam, 322. Dana, Gen. N. J. T., in command of expedition to the Rio Grande, Tex., 601. Danville Railroad, destruction effected on, by Gens. Wilson and Kautz, 746. Davidson, Gen., surrender of Little Rock, Ark., to, 606 ; expedition of, from Baton Rouge against Hood’s communications, 852 Davis, Gen. A. , killed at the battle of Fair Oaks, 238. Davis, Cajit. C. H., his naval engagement near Mem- phis, 144 ; Memphis surrenders to, 146. Davis, Col. , cavalry exploits of, 483. Davis, Gen., at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth, 163 , at Murfreesboro, 180. Davis, Gen. Jeff. C., operations of, 537 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 551 ; capture of Rome, Ga. by, 712 ; appointed to succeed Gen. Palmer in command of the fourteenth corps, 728. Davis, Jefferson, cunning of, 12 ; inaugurated Presi- dent of the Confederacy, 23 ; his despatch from Bull Run, 45 ; justifies the seizure of Hickman and Columbus, 58 ; note to Gen. Polk by, 61 ; telegraph message of, to Gen. Bragg, 120 ; visit of. to Gen. Bragg, at Murfreesboro, 179 ; visit of, to the army, at the battle of White Oak Swamp, 265 ; address of, to the army in Eastern Virginia, 271 ; speech of, at Macon, on desertion and absenteeism, 804 ; cap ture of, near Irwinsville, Ga., 947 ; imprisoned in Fortress Monroe, 948. 900 INDEX I hi vis’ two Mississippi regiments captured at Gettys- burg, 503. Davis’ Farm, battle of, 742. D^i'catar, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. Decatur, Tenn., Gen. Hood’s demonstration against the garrison of, 829. De Courcy’s, Gen., brigade at Chickasaw bayou, 379. Deep Bottom, Va., severe fighting near, 758-761. Deep Run, Va. , battle of, 760. Deerhound, steam yacht picks up the men and officers of the Alabama, ofi; Cherbourg, 879. De nnis, Gen , at the battle of Raymond, 407. Denver, Gen., at Corinth, 118. De Trobriaiid, Gen , at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; Confederate position carried by, at Petersburg, 768. Desher, Gen. H. , killed at Chickamauga. 554. Deve s, Col. Chas., at the battle of Ball’s bluff, 53 ; (Gen.) at the battle of Williamsburg, 220 ; wounded at the battle of Chancellors ville, 461. Devereux, Col , at Gettysburg, 527. Devin, Gen., occupies Staunton, 904; cavalry under, at Five forks, 910, 912 ; at Sailor’s creek, 926. Dickey, Capt., killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. Dix, Gen. , in command at Fortress Monroe, 594. Dodge, Gr'ii., operations of, 539 ; in command of the sixteenth corps under Sherman, 706. Doherty, private, bravery and death of, at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. Doles, Gen , at the battle of Chancellorsville, 460. Donaldson ville, occupied by the National troops, named Fort Butler, 430 ; attempt by the Confeder- ates to recapture, 445. Doubleday, Gen., brigade of, at the battle of Warren- ton turnpike, 293 ; at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 345 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 503. Douglass, Col., killed at the battle of Antietam, 320. Dowdall’s Tavern, rout of the National right at, 462. Draft proclamation for 300,000 militia, 283. Draper’s Dr., opinion of the Emancipation proclama- tion, 391, 392 ; his opinion of the losses in the Over- land campaign. 704. Drayton, Gen. T. F., in command of Fort Walker, 73. Drayton, Commander, operations of, at Fort McAllis- ter, 583 ; at Mobile bay, 644. Drewry, steamer, destroyed on the James river, 899. Duff, guerrilla chief, brutal action of, towards Ger- man Unionists, 367. Duifie, Gen., captures a portion of Gen. Early’s train at Snicker’s gap, Va., 787. Dug Springs, battle of,- 55. Duncan, Gen. J.'K., in command of the Confederate defenses below New Orleans, 148. Dunker Church, focus of the battle of Antietam, 319. Dunnington. Col. , surrenders Fort Hindman, Ark., 388. Dunovant, Col. R. G. M , at Bay point, 73. Dupont, Commodore, in command of fleet at Hampton roads, 70 ; fleet of, enters Port Royal, 73 ; unsuc- cessful attempt of, to reach the Savannah river, 76 ; expedition of, along the coast of Florida, 141 ; order of, to Worden, to attack Fort McAllister, 582 ; ordered to attack Charleston, 584 ; his order of battle for an attack on the Charleston forts, 585 ; superseded by Admiral Dahlgren, 588. Dutch Gap Canal, construction of, commenced by Gen. Butler, 757 ; Major Ludlow’s movement from, 761 ; failure of, 899. Dwight Col , at the battle of Williamsburg, 216. Dwight, Gen. W., enters Alexandria, La., 438; at the attack on Port Hudson, 443, 444 ; at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630. E. Early, Gen. Jubal A., at the battle of Bull Run. 43 ; at the battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 347 ; at Marye’shill, 473 ; at Salem church, 479 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at the salient, 681 ; his invasion of Maryland, 784 ; defeats Gen. Lewis Wallace at the battle of Mono- cacy, 785, 786 ; defeat of, by Gen. Averill, 787 ; attacks Sheridan’s force at Summit point, 793 ; de- feated by Sheridan at Winchester and Fisher’s hill, 796 ; retreats to Woodstock and Brown’s gap, 797 ; his victory over Sheridan’s troops at Cedar creek, 801 ; Sheridan turns his victory into defeat, 802 ; routed by Sheridan at Waynesboro, 904. Eastport, steamer, blown up by the Nationals, 633. Eddy, Col., mortally wounded at luka, 161. Edentown, N. C., taken possession of by Lieut. A. Maury. 130. Egan, Col., at the battle of Chantilly, 303. Egypt, Miss , capture of by Gen. Grierson, 853. Elizabeth City, N. C., description of — expedition of Commander Rowan against, 129. Elk Horn, Confederate name for battle of Pea ridge, 97. Ellet, Jr., Col. C., ram squadron of, joins flotilla of Davis, 144 ; operations of, before Memphis, 145. Ellet, Gen. A., in command of marine brigade, in th€ Red river expedition, 623. Elliott, Capt. S., in command of Fort Beauregard, 73. Emancipation proclamation issued by President Lin- coln, 391 ; diversity of opinion regarding, 392. Emory, Gen,, division of, at Berwick, La., 437 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 629 ; at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630 ; at Washington, 786. Ericsson, Capt John, biographical sketch of, 205. Evans, Col., holds the Stone bridge at Bull Run, 40 ; Confederate force under, on Goose creek, 53. Ewell, Gen. R. S., at Bull Run, 43; pursues Gen. Banks to Strasburg, 246 ; at the battle of (Toss keys, 251 ; defeated by Gen. Hooker near Bristow station, 291 ; at the battle of Warrenton turnpike, 293 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 347 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504 ; at the battle of the W il INDEX 9G1 derness, 664 ; captured at the battle of Sailor’s creek, 927. Ewing, Gen. II. S., liis defense of Pilot Knob, 830. Explosion, of the Petersburg mine, 754 ; of ordnance stores at City point, 756 ; of the principal magazine at Fort Fislier, 867 ; at Charleston, 887. F. Fagan, Gen., defeat of, at Independence, Mo.. 833. Fair Oaks, Va. battle of, 230-341 Falmouth, Va., station and bridges at, destroyed by fire, 801 ; description of, 339 ; pontoons at, 340. Fanny, steam-tug, captured by Confederates, 66. Farnsworth, Col., killed at Gettysburg, 528. Farragut, Admiral D. G., biographical sketch of, 146 ; in command of the western gulf squadron, 147 ; fleet of, attacks the Mississippi forts. 151 ; oMicial report of, of his operations at New Orleans, 155 ; operations of, against Vicksburg, 371 ; attack of, on the Arkansas ram — bombardment of Donaldson- Tille by, 430 ; sends a naval force to Sabine pass. 593 ; fleet of, at Mobile, 614 ; reconnoissance of Forts Morgan and Gaines made by, 641 ; operations of, against the Mobile bay forts, 644. Farrand, Commander, surrenders the Confederate navy to Admiral Thatcher, 947. Faulkner, Col., surrender of Union city to, 616. Faxon, Major, killed at the capture of Marye’s hill, 475. Fayetteville, Mo., Confederates driven from 833. Fayetteville, N. C., destruction effected at, by Sher- man’s forces, 889. Fernandina, Fla., surrender of, to Dupont, 141. Ferrero, Gen., his defense of Knoxville, 576; at the battle of Bean station, 597. Fessenden, Col , wounded at Cane river, 635. Fessenden, Senator, action of. prior to the war, 13. Finnegan, Gen., defeats Seymour at Olustee, 856, 857. Fishers Hill, Va., battle of, 796. Fitch, Lieut., operations of, on the Cumberland, 537. Five Forks, Va., battle of, 916. Flag, of the Union, floating in Arkansas, 97 ; United States, hoisted at Memphis, 146 ; hoisted at New Orleans, 156 ; the old, restored to Fort Sumter, 887. Florida, Confederate cruiser, operations of the, 876. Floyd, J. B., strange conduct of, while secretary of war, 12 ; implication of, in the Indian trust fund defalcation, 19 ; (Gen.) assumes command of the Confederate forces, 51 ; outnumbered at Carnifex ferry, 52 ; at Fort Donelson, 85 ; flight of, 93. Foote, Admiral A. H., leaves Cairo, 83 ; capture of Fort Henry by, 84 ; moves up the Cumberland, 86 ; at Fort Donelson. 88 ; fleet of, returns to Cairo, 89 ; expedition of, to Fort Pillow, 143 ; retires from Fort Pillow, 144. Ford, CM. T. H., in command of forces on Maryland heights, 313 ; retires to Harper’s ferry— dismissed from the service, 314 Forrest, Gen. N. B., cava'ry of, at Fort Donelson, 90 ; raids by, in Kentucky and Tennessee. 170 ; plunder- ing expeditions of, 188 ; raid by, on Davis’ mills, 374 ; operations of, 538 ; exploit of, 540 ; at the battle of Chick amauga, 550 ; in command of the cavalry of North Mississippi, 611 ; his attack on Gen. W. S. Smith, 613 ; his capture of Fort Pillow, 618 ; defeats Gen Sturgis, at Gum town, 619 : his raid upon Memphis, 620 ; operations of, in Middle Tennessee, 827, 828, 837, 838 ; routed by Gen. Wil- son, near Boyle’s creek, 874. Forman, Major, affair of, with Indians, 368. Fort Alexander, Va , capture of. 918. Fort Anderson, N. C., siege and capture of, 869. Fort Blakely, Mobile, fall of, 873. Fort Barrancas, Pensacola, burned and abandoned by the Confederates, 141. Fort Barton, N. C., bombardment of, by Goldsborough, 120 ; capture of, 128. * Fort Beauregard, S. C., abandoned by the Confeder- ates and the National flag raised over, 74. Fort Caswell, N. C. , blown up by the Confederates, 867. Fort Clark, N. C., abandoned, 64. Fort Clinch, Fla., surrender of, 141. Fort Darling, Va. , battle of, 689. Fort de Russy, La., in possession of the Confederates, 597 ; capture of. by Gen. A. J. Smith, 624. Fort Donelson, Tenn., description of, 85 ; operations against, 88 ; surrender of, 94 Fort Esperanza, Tex , taken by Gen. Washburne, 601. Fort Fisher, N. C., unsuccessful expedition of Gens. Butler and Weitzel and Admiral Porter against, 861-863 ; capture of, by Gen, Terry and Admiral Porter, 864-867. Fort Forrest, N. C., (Tirlew steamer beached and blown up at, 136, 128. Fort Gaines, Ala., surrender of. by Col. Anderson. 648. Fort Gilmer, Va , repulse of colored brigade at, 770, Fort Gregg, S. C., abandoned by the (’onfederates, 593. Fort Gregg, Va., assault and capture of, 918. Fort Hatteras, N C. , surrender of, 65. Fort Heiman, on the Tennessee river, steamboats cap- tured at, by Forrest, 837. Fort Henry, Tenn., in charge of Gen. Tilghman, 83 ; capture of, 84. Fort Hindman, Ark., commanded by Gen, T. J. Church- hill — surrender of, to Admiral Porter, 388, Fort Huger, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates, 871. Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip, La. description of, 149, surrender of, to Capt. Porter, 15). Fort McAllister, Ga., unsuccessful attacks on, 583, 583 ; capture of by Gen., Hazen. 822. Fort' Macon, N. C., description of, 135 ; capture of, 137. Fort McRae, Pensacola, silenced, 68 ; burned and abandoned by the Confederates, 141. Fort McRae, Va., capture of, 772. Fort Magruder, Va., occupied by the Nationals, 221. 962 INDEX. Fort Marion, Fla. , surrender of, to commander C. R. P. Rodgers, 141. Fort Morgan, N. C., destroyed, 66. Fort Morgan, Ala., surrender of, to the Nationals, 649. Fort Moultrie, S. C., abandoned by Major Ander- son, 16. Fort Ocracoke, N. C. , destroyed, 66. Fort Pemberton. Miss., unsuccessful attack on, 397. Fort Pickens, in charge of Col. Harvey Brown, 08. Fort Pillow, Tenn. , abandoned by the Confederates, 114 ; again deserted by the Confederates, 144; de- scription of, 617 ; capture of, by assault and mas- sacre of the garrison by Gen. Forrest, 618. Fort Powell, Ala., abandoned and blown up. 647. Fort Powell, Miss , captured by the Confederates, 165 ; retaken by the Nationals, 166. Fort Pulaski, Ga., in the hands of the Confederates, 76 ; capture of, 140. Fort RandoljMi, Tenn., surrender of, 145. ' Fort Richardson, Miss., constructed by sappers and miners at the battle of Corinth, 164, Fort Robinett, Miss., Van Dorn under fire from the guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 166. Fort St. Philip, La., see Fort Jackson. Fort St, Philip, N. C., abandoned, 869. Fort Sanders, Tenn , attacked by the Confederates, 576 ; death of Gen. W. P. Sanders at {note), 578. Fort Sedgwick, Va., operations in the neighborhood of, 779. Fort Steadman, Petersburg, capture and recapture of, 907. Fort Strong. Ala., deserted by the Confederates, 869 Fort Sumter, description of — occupied by Major An- derson, 12 ; Gen. Beauregard’s demand for the sur- render of, 26 ; surrendered, 31 ; a shapeless mass of ruins, 591 ; abortive attempt of the Nationals to take possession of, 592. Fort Thompson, N. C., attack of Gen. Foster on, 132 ; Confederates driven from, 134. Fort Tracy, Ala., abandoned by the Confederates. 871. Fort Wagner, S. C., operations of Gen. Gillmore against, 589 ; bombardment of, by Admiral Dahl- gren, 590 ; evacuation of, by the Confederates, 592. Fort Walker, S. C., abandoned, 74. Fort Warren, N. C., captured by Gen. Hoke 858. Fort Wessels, N. C., captured by Gen Hoke, 859. Fort William, Miss., Van Dorn under fire from the guns of, at the battle of Corinth, 166. Fortress Monroe, headquarters of Gen. Butler, 35 ; armaments sent to, 194. Foster, Gen. J. G., part taken by, in capture of Roa- noke, 126 ; at New Berne, 132 ; appointed military governor of New Berne, 135 ; operations of, 594 ; division of, at Deep Bottom, 742 ; his movement against the Charleston and Savannah railroad. 820 ; city and forts of Savannah transferred to. by Gen. Sherman, 881. Foster, Major, defeat of, Ijy Coffee and Hughes ai Lone Jack, Mo.' 359 Fouke, Col. . at the battle of Belmont 60. Fox, Gustavus G., plan of, to relieve Fort Sumter, 26. Franklin, Gen. W. B , at Bull Run, 43 ; operations on the York river, 226 ; at the battle of White Oak Swamp, 265 ; at Crampton’s gap, 316 ; at the battle of Antietam, 322 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 345 ; relieved of his command, 354 ; at Sabine pass, 598; ordered^ to Opelousas 599; expedition to Shreveport in charge of, 623 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. Franklin, Tenn., Gen. Schofield at, 840 ; battle of, 842 ; losses at, 842. Frazier, Gen., surrender of (’umberland gap by, 545. Frederick, Md., Gen. Lee’s army encamped near, 308 ; ('onfederates driven from, 785 Fredericksburg, Va., evacuation of, by Gen. Burnside, 301 ; absence of pontoons prevents the capture of, 339 ; demand by Summer for the surrender of, 340 ; bombardment of, by order of Gen. Burnside — de- scription of. 342 ; battle of, 343-351. Fremont, Gen. John C. , appointed to the command of the Western department, 55 ; relieved of his com- mand, 56 ; in command of the Mountain depart- ment, 193 ; advance of, attacked by Gen. Jackson, 251 ; relieved of his command, 277. French, Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239; at the battle of Gaines’ mill. 260 ; at Antietam, 324 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 348 ; at the battle of t hancellorsville. 470 ; pursuit of Gen Lee by, 532. French, Gen., at Black water, 593 ; at Brandon, 611 ; demands the surrender of Allatoona pass, 806. Front Royal, movement of Gen. Jackson against, 248 ; engagement near, 790. G. Gadsden, Ala., army of Gen. Hood at, 809. Gaines’ Mill, battle of, 259-261. Gainesville, (or Groveton,) battle of 295 ; culpable absence of Gen. Porter from, 296. Galveston, in charge of Commodore Renshaw', 432 ; recapture of, by Gen. Magruder, 432-434 Gardiner, ( ol., in command of Charleston harbor, 12. Gardner, Gen. F. in command at Port Hudson, 441 : entreated to surrender by Gen. Banks, 443 ; sur- render of Port Hudson by, 440-447. Garesche, Col , killed at Murfreesboro, 186. Garnett, Gen , at Laurel hill, 49 ; killed at the battle of Carrack’s ford, 50. Garnett, Gen. , killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 528. Gay, < apt., operations of, near Perry ville, 174. Gaylesville. Ala., (ien. Sherman’s forces at, 809. (Jeary, Col. J. W. , skirmish of, at Harper’s ferry, 52 ; occupies Harper’s ferry, 242 ; (Gen.) at the battle of Gettysburg. 522 ; at Wauhatchie, 560-566 ; at the INDEX. 963 battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; appointed military commander of Savannah, 825. Georgetown, S. C., evacuated by the Confederates — taken possession of by Admiral Dahlgren, 888. Georgia, Confederate cruiser, captured by the Na- tional frigate Niagara, off, Lisbon, 876. Getty, Gen., at Suffolk, 594 ; wounded at the battle of the Wilderness, 672. Gettysburg, Pa., description of, 501 ; battle of 502-533. Gholson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 217 ; killed at Egypt, Miss., 853. Gibbon, Gen., at the battle of Warrenton turnpike, 293 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 345 ; at the attack on Marye’s hill, 473 ; at the battle of Gettys- burg, 525 ; wounded. 528. Gibson, Gen. R. , in command of the t^onfederates at Spanish fort, Mobile, 870 ; evacuates the fort, 871. Gilbert Gen., at the battle of Perry ville, 174 ; at the battle of Franklin, 538. Gillem, Gen., surprise and capture of Morgan at Greenville by, 835 ; defeat of, by Breckeuridge 836. Gill more, Gen. Q. A., services of, at the siege of Fort Pulaski, 138, 139 ; his. defeat of Pegram. 544 ; su- persedes Gen. Hunter at Charleston 588 ; opera- tions of, against the defenses of Charleston, 589 ; opens fire on Charleston, 591 ; secures the blockade of Charleston, 592 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687 ; his movements against Petersburg, 736 ; authorized to undertake operations in Florida, 855 ; operations of, against Charleston, 886 ; surrender of the city of Charleston, with all the harbor forts to, 887. Gilmore, Lieut., raid of. into Maryland, 786. Gilpin, Col. C , drives the Confederates from Freder- ick, Md., 785. Gist. Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 550. Gladden, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. Glendale, or Frazier’s Farm, battle of, 265. Goldsboro, N. C.. junction of Schofield’s and Sherman’s forces at, 894. Goldsborough, flag officer, biographical sketch of — intrusted with the expedition to Pamlico sound, 123 ; operations of, at Sewall’s point. 228. Gooding, Col., at the battle of Perry ville, 177. Gordon’s Landing, operations of Farragut at, 439. Gorman, Gen. , expedition of, on the White river, 389. Graham, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 511. (rrand Coteau. La., battle of, 599. Grand Gulf, Miss , operations of Gen. Grant at, 403 ; telegram of Gen. Grant to Gen Halleck from, 407 ; batteries at, engaged by Farragut, 439. Granger, Gen. G., at Corinth, 119; operations of, 538, 543 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 556 ; re- luctance of, to relieve Burnside, 577 ; at Mobile harbor, 642 ; surrender of Forts Gaines and Morgan to, 648, 649 ; his pursuit of Buford, 828 ; corps of, at the final operations against Mobile, 870. Grant, Gen. U. S., in command at Cairo — takes pos- session of Paducah, and attacks Belmont, 59 ; pre- pares to attack Fort Henry, 83 ; marches on Fort Donelson, 88 ; surrender of Fort Donelson to, 94 ; in command of the district of West Tennessee, 98 ; removed from his commani. 99 ; in command at Savannah, Tenn., 101; at Shiloh, 105; becomes commander-in-chief in the west, 159 ; Jackson, Tenn., headquarters of, 379 ; at La Grange, 371 ; meeting of. and Sherman at Columbus — head- quarters of, at Oxford. Miss.. 372 ; La Grange re- entered by, 374 ; operations of, preparatory to attack on Vicksburg, 394-491 ; at the battle of Champion hills, 410 ; assault ordered by, on Vicks- burg, 415 ; another assault made by, 417 ; report of, 419 ; siege of Vicksburg determined upon by, 420 ; surrender of Vicksburg to. 424-426 ; {note) 426 ; appointed to the command of the new military division of the Mississippi, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 559 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; despatch of, 574 ; visit of, to Gen Banks. 597 ; appointed lieutenant-general 651 ; takes command of the army of the Potomac, 652 ; command of the armies of the United States assumed by, 653 ; staff of, 659 ; operations of, in Virginia, 669-705 ; operations of, against Petersburg, 735-781 ; his final operations against Petersburg and Richmond, 898-921 ; his pursuit of Gen. Lee till the surrender at xlppomat- tox court house, 922-934 , his correspondence with Lee, relative to terms of surrender 930, 931, 933, 934 ; his losses during the campaign, 935 ; order of, on the disbandment of the army. 951, 952. Gravelly Run, Va., battle of, 913. Graves, Major, mortally wounded at the battle of Chickamauga, 554. Green, Gen. T. . depredations of, 598; at Wilson’s farm, 627 ; killed at Pleasant hill landin.g. 632 . Greene, Gen. at the battle of Gettysburg, 519. Gregg, Gen., at Port Reyal ferry, 76 ; mortally wounded at the battle of Fredericksburg, 346. Gregg, Col. , cavalry exploits of 483 ; engagement of, with Gen, Stuart, 490 ; at the battle of Gettys- burg, 528 ; (Gen.) wounded at the battle of the Wilderness, 672; at the battle of Trevillian, 703; his raid to Stony creek station, 779. Gregg. Gen., at the battle of Raymond, Miss, 407. Gregory, acting-master, gallant fight of, with a Con- federate gun-boat, 144. Grierson, Gen. B. H. , cavalry exploit of, 401 ; opera- tions of, near Port Hudson, 438 ; at Memphis, 612 ; at Gum town, 619 ; his expedition from Memphis against the Mobile and Ohio Railroad 852. Gritfin, Gen., reconnoissance of, after the battle of Antietam, 331 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville, 455 ; at the battle of Jericho ford. 694. Griffiths, Serg. T., daring action of, at Vicksburg, 417. Griswoldville,Ga., battle of, 815. 964 INDEX. Grover, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 215; brigade of, at the battle of Gainesville, 29G ; divi- sion of, moves up the Atchafalaya, 437 ; at the at- tack on Port Hudson, 441, 443, 444. Groveton, Va,, or Gainesville, battle of, 295. Guerrilla warfare, in Missouri, 358 ; in Arkansas, 359 ; in Texas, 366. Guitar, Col., defeats Poindexter, the guerrilla, 358. Gum Town, defeat of Gen. Sturgis by Forrest at, 620. H. Hackelman, Gen., killed at Corinth, Miss., 164. Hagerstown. Md., stores in, plundered by Early, 784. Haines’ Bluff, abandoned by the Confederates, 414. Halleck, Gen. H. W., takes charge of the western de- partment, 56 ; in Missouri 80 ; plan of, to attack the Confederates, 83 ; takes command of the army ocf the Tennessee 116 ; advance of, to Corinth, 119 ; in command of the troops in the valley of the Mis- sissippi, 193 ; general-in-chief of* the entire army of the United States, 273 ; appointed chief of staff at Washington, 653. Hamilton, Gen., division of, at the battle of luka, 161 ; at the battle of Corinth, 163. Hampton, Col. Wade, at the battle of Bull Run, 42 ; (Geti.) at the battle of Gettysburg, 528 ; at Hawe’s store 697 ; cattle carried off by, from Sycamore church, 769 ; compels Gen. Warren to withdraw from Hicksford, 781 ; orders all the cotton in Colum- bia, S. C., to be burned, 885 ; his refusal to abide by the terms of .capitulation of Gen. Johnston, 947. Hampton Roads, land and naval armament in, 70 ; fleet in, proceeds to sea, 71 ; expedition of Burnside and Goldsborough leaves, 124 ; naval engagement between the Merrimac and the Monitor in, 207-211. Hancock, Gen. W. S., at the battle of Williamsburg, 218 ; biographical sketch of {note), 221 ; at the bat- tle of Savage’s station, 263 ; at the battle of Fred- ericksburg, 348 : at the battle of Chancellorsville, 469 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 506 ; wounded, 528 ; takes command of the Second army corps, 658 ; wounded at the Wilderness, 672 ; placed tempo- rarily in charge of the Middle military division, 903. Hanover Court House, battle of, 231. Hardee, Gen., at the battle of Shiloh, 105 ; at Chatta nooga, 171 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; at the battle of Resaca, Ga., 709 ; at the battle of Jonesboro, 732 ; his evacuation of Savannah, 823 ; his evacuation of Charleston, 886 : defeated at Averysboro, 891. Hardie, Gen. , at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344. Harding, Col. A., his defense of Fort Donelson, 537. Harker, Gen., killed at Kenesaw mountain, 715. Harper’s Ferry, Va., seized by the Richmond authori- ties, 48 ; Johnston evacuates, 49 ; description of, 813 ; siege and surrender of, 314 ; Col. Miles mor- tallv wounded at the sieere of, 314 ; fatal effect of the surrender of. 314, 315 ; stores at, in the posses sion of the Confederates, 316 ; Confederates leave, 317 ; recapture of, by the Nationals. 332. Harriet Lane, steamer, sent to the relief of Fort Sum- ter, 26 ; capture of, at Galveston 433.- Harris, Col. I. A., at the battle of Perryville, 177. Harrisburg, Pa., excitement at. 492. Harrison, Col., defeats Cabell, at Fayetteville. 603. Harrison. Col., cavalry operations of. against Porter’s fleet, descending the Red river, 632 Harrow, Gen., at ihe battle of Gettysburg, 527. Hartsiift* Gen., wounded at Antictam, 320, Haskell, Col. , killed at Cold harbor, 701 . Hatch, G^i. John P., expedition of, against the Charleston and Savannah railroad, 829. Hatcher’s Run, battle of, 777 ; second battle of, 903. Hatchie, battle of the, 167. Hatteras, expedition of Butler and Stringham to, 63. Hawkins Col., left in charge at Hatteras, 65. Hawkins, Col., surrender of Union city, Tenn, by, 616. Hawley, Col., at the battle of Olustee, Fla., 857. Hay, Major John, with the expedition to Florida, 856. Haycock, Major, killed at Marye’s hill, 475. Hayes* brigade, at the Weldon railroad, 763. Hayne, Col. , in the attack on Fort Donelson, 86. Hays, Gen. Alex,, at Gettysburg, 519 ; killed at tlie battle of the Wilderness {note), 666. Hazard, Capt., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; mor- tally wounded at White Oak swamp, 265. Hazard, Commander S. G., with expedition of Bum- side and Goldsboro, 123. Hazard, Gen. , repulse of, by Gen. Terry. 590. Hazel Grove. Va., abandoned by Gen. Hooker, 467. Hazen, Col., brigade of, at the battle of Shiloh, 110 ; at the battle of Murfreesboro, 185 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 550 ; (Gen.) at Wauhatchie, 559 ; at Chattanooga, 572 ; captures Fort McAllister, 822. Hazlitt, Capt., killed at Gettysburg, 513. Heckman, Gen., made prisoner at Bermuda hundred, 689. Heintzelman, Gen., at Bull Run, 39 ; in command of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; bands ordered by, to strike up national and martial airs {note), 221 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Sav- age’s station, 263 ; at the battle of Glendale, 265 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 295. Helena, Ark , attack on, by Price and Marmaduke. 605. Henry, Col., repulse by. of Hoke’s brigade, before Petersburg, 745 ; at the battle of Olustee, 857. Herbert, Gen. L., at the battle of Corinth, 184. Herron, Gen. F. I., at the battle of Prairie grove, 362 operations of, 598 ; operations of {note), 607. Heth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 525 ; at the battle of the Wilderness, 666 ; at the battle of Jericho ford, 994 Hickman, Ky. , seized by Gen. Polk, 58. Hickman, Miss., capture of, by the Confederates, 616 INDEX. 965 Hicks, Col. S. G., affair of. at Fort Anderson, 616. Hicksford, Va., Gen. Warren withdraws from, 781. Higgins, Col , in command of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, 148 ; surrenders to Porter, 155. Higginson, Col., at Edisto, S. C., 589. Highlanders, 79th N. T., at Bull Run, 44; at Port Royal, 76 ; at Chantilly, 308 ; at Knoxville {note), 578. Hildebrand’s brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. Hill. Gen. A. P.. at the battle of Mechanicsville, 258 ; at the battle of Gaines’ mill. 259 ; at the battle of Glendale, 265 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 296 ; at the battle of Antietam, 327 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 343 ; wounded at battle of Chan- cellorsville, 464 ; at battle of Gettysburg, 503 ; at battle of the Wilderness, 666 ; killed at the final assault on the lines before Petersburg {note), 919. Hill, Gen. D. H., at the battle of Williamsburg, 219 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; at the battle of Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at battle of Malvern hills, 268 ; at battle of Antietam, 318 ; ordered to attack Little Washington, 594. Hilton Head, S. C., Gen. Thos. W. Sherman makes improvements at, 75 ; Gen. W. T. Sherman at, 882. Hindman, Gen., killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. Hindman, Gen. T. C., guerrillas commanded by, 359 ; at the battle of Prairie grove, 363 ; retreat of, 366. llinks, Gen., division of, at City point, Va., 686 Hobson, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 595 ; his entire command captured by Morgan, 783. Holland, Gen., at battle of Springfield, Mo., 602. Hollins, Capt., boast of, 68 ; at Fort Pillow, 143. Holmes, Gen., at Bull Run, 43. Hood, Gen. J. B. . at the battle of Fredericksburg, 343 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 649 ; at the battle of Resaca , 709 ; supersedes Johnston on Sherman’s approach to Atlanta, 719 ; evacuates Atlanta, 732 ; protests against Sherman’s order for the removal of civilians from Atlanta, 734 ; reorganizes his forces at Jones- boro, 804 ; moves westward on Sherman’s commun- ications, 805 ; retreats into Northern Alabama, 808; his disastrous campaign against Thomas, 837-851 ; his total defeat at Nashville, 843-847 ; pursued by Wilson’s cavalry to the Tennessee river, 847-849 ; pursued by Col. Palmer, 849 ; his losses in the Ten- nessee campaign, 850; relieved of his command, 851. Hoke, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 519 ; attempts to regain possession of Cold harbor, 698 ; his attack upon Forts Warren and Wessels, 858 ; his siege of Plymouth, N. C., 858 ; captures Ply- mouth — abandons the siege of New Berne, 859 ; attempts to relieve Fort Fisher, 867 ; evacuates Wilmington, 869. Hooker, Gen. Jos., at the battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; vain appeal of, to Gen. Sumner for help, 217 ; biographical sketch of {note), ^20 ; division of, sus- tains severe loss, 221 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; at the battle of Glendale, 266 ; defeats Ewell near Bristow station, 291 ; at the battle of Gaines- ville, 295 ; wounded at the battle of Antietam, 321 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 344-349 ; grand charge of, 350 ; assumes command of the army of the Potomac, 354 ; past career and personal appear- ance of, 449, 450 ; address of, to the army of the Potomac, 451 ; army of, takes position at Chancel lorsville, 454 ; boast of {note), 455 ; fatal blunder of, 456 ; struck by a cannon ball, 470 ; retreats across the Rappahannock, 481 ; address of, to the army of the Potomac, 484 ; relieved of his com- mand, 495 ; farewell address of, to the army, 495, 496 ; at Nashville, 559 ; at Wauhatchie, 559 ; at Lookout mountain, 566, 567 ; at the battle of Chat- tanooga, 568 ; in command of the twentieth corps under Sherman, 706 ; resigns his command, 728. Houston, Col , at the battle of Prairie grove, 365. Hovey, Gen A. P , defeats Gen. Rust on the White river, 356 ; at Chickasaw bayou. 381 ; w'ounded at Arkansas post, 387 ; at Champion hills, 410. Howe, Gen., at the attack on Marye’s hill, 473. Howard, Gen. 0. O , brigade of, at the battle of Bull Run. 43 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 239 ; wounded at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 348 ; at the battle of Chancellorsville, 453 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 504; at Wauhatchie, 560; commands the fourth corps under Sherman, 706 ; in command of the army of the Tennessee, 727. Huger, Gen., flight of, from Norfolk, Va,, 229; at Fair Oaks, 234^-239 ; at White Oak swamp, 205. Hughes, guerrilla chief, surprises the garrison of In- dependence, Mo., 359. Humphrey, Gen. Andrew A., at the battle of Chan- cellorsville, 455 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511. Hunter, Gen David, succeeds Gen. T. W. Shetman. 139 ; surrender of Fort Pulaski to, 140 ; at James island, 580 ; superseded by Gen. Mitchell, 581 ; resumes command of the department of the South, 582 ; ordered to attack Charleston, 584 ; unable tc assist Dupont, 587 ; removed from command, 588 defeats Jones and McCausland at Piedmont, 092. Huntsville, Mo., battle of, 602 Huntsville, Tenn., threatened by Gen. Buford, 828. Huntsville, ram, sunk by the Confederates, 873, Hurlbut, Gen. Stephen A., at Pittsburg landing, 101 at Corinth, 118 ; near Pocahontas, 162 ; victory of at the Hatchie, 161; at Memphis, 609 ; left in charge of expedition, at Meridian, 614. I Imboden, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 531. Immel’s battery, at the battle of Corinth, 166. Independence, Mo., captured by guerrillas, 359. Indian Territory, active hostilities in, 367. Ingalls, Chief Quarter master, at Port Royal, S.C. , 684 Ingraham, flag-officer, proclamation of 584. 966 INDEX. Island Ford, Va., battle of, 787. Island No. 10, in charge of Polk, 82 ; surrender of, 96. luka. Miss., description of, 159; abandoned by the Nationals, 160 ; battle of, 161. Iverson, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 4G0. Jackson, Gen. J. S., killed at Perryville, Ky.,176. Jackson, Gen. T. J. (Stonewall), at Bull Run, 42 ; operations of, in the valley of the Shenandoah, 242- 245 ; retreat of, before the forces of Fremont and Shields, 249 ; biographical sketch of {note), 253 ; at Hanover court house, 257 ; at the battle of Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at the battle of White Oak swamp, 265 ; retreat of, after the battle of Cedar mountain, 287 ; at the battle of Antietam, 319 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg. 340* attack of, on Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville, 461 ; mortally wounded, 463 ; re- marks on the character of {note), 464. Jackson, Confederate ram, destruction of, 874. Jackson, Miss., capture of, by Gen. Grant’s forces, 409 ; evacuation of, by Gen. Johnston {note), 427 ; precipitate retreat of the Confederates from, 611. Jacksonville, Fla., taken possession of by the Na- tionals, 141 ; occupied by Gen. Seymour, 856 ; stores at, destroyed by Seymour, 858. James Island, occupied, 580 ; abandoned, 581. James River, Magruder’s forces on the, 195 ; National gun boats on the, 229 ; Butler moves up the, 686 ; crossed by the army of the Potomac, 704. James River Canal, damaged by Col. Wyndham, 483; locks and banks of, destroyed by Sheridan, 905. Jameson, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 218. Jeffers, Lieut , operations of, at the mouth of the Chesapeake and Albemarle canal, 130. Jenkins, Gen. A. G., at Chambersburg, Pa., 494; killed at the battle of the Wilderness, 672. Jenkins’ Ferry, Ark., battle of, 640. Jericho Ford, Va., battle of, 694. Jettersville, Gen. Sheridan at, 924. Johnson, Andrew, sworn into office as president, 940. Johnsonville, Tenn., destruction of stores at, caused by Forrest — arrival of Schofield at, 838. Johnson, Gen. B. T., encounters Kilpatrick at Beaver dam station, 656 ; his raid towards Baltimore, 786. Johnson, Gen E., at the battle of Gettysburg, 519; captured at Spottsylvania, 681. Johnson. Gen R. W , at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180 ; operations of, 542 ; at the battle of Chicka- mauga, 550 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 572. Johnston, Col., surrenders the fort at Dalton, 808. Johnston, Gen. A. S., strong position held by, 80 ; strength of his army, 83 ; his (letter to Jefferson Davis, 95 ; proclamation of, on assuming command of the Confederate army, 103 ; killed at the battle of Shiloh, 108. Johnston, Gen. Jos. E., in the valley of the Shenan- doah, 35 ; in command at Winchester, 36 ; deceives Patterson, 39 ; gains the battle of Bull Run, 45 ; at Harper’s ferry, 48 ; evacuates Harper’s ferry, 49; Manassas evacuated by. 193 ; at the battle of Wil- liamsburg, 217 ; retreat of, 222 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234 ; instructions of, to Pemberton, 408 ; forces of, at Dalton, Ga, , 707 , evacuation of Dalton by, 709 ; retreat of, to Resaca. 711 ; at Alla- tooni pass, 712 ; at Kenesaw mountain, 714 ; at the Chattahoochee river, 717 ; retires to Atlanta, 718 ; removed from his command. 719 ; defeat of, by Slocum near Bentonville— retreats to Smithfield, 893 ; surrenders his army to Sherman, 947. Joinville, PHnce de at Williamsburg, 224. Jones, Gen. Sam., killed in the Wilderness, 672. Jones, Gen. W. E., killed at Piedmont, 692. Jonesboro, Ga , battle of, 731. Jouett, Capt., captures the Selma in Mobile Bay, 645. Juda, schooner, burning of the, at Santa Rosa, 67. Judah, Gen. his pursuit of Gen. Morgan, 595 ; at the battle of Resaca, Ga., 710. K. Kautz, Gen. A. V., operations of, against the Weldon railroad, 686 ; raid of, 69 1 , movement of, against Petersburg, 737; his command surprised and routed on the Charles City road. 773 Kearney, Gen. Phil., at the battle of Williamsburg, 214 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236 ; at the battle of Glendale, 266 ; at the battle of Gainesville, 295 : killed at the battle of Chantilly, 303 ; biographical sketch of {note), 305. Kearsarge, corvette, sinks the Alabama, 879. Kelly, Gen. B. F., valor of, at Philippi, W. Va,, 49 ; reoccupies Martinsburg, Va., 788. Kemper, Gen., at Gettysburg, 525 ; wounded, 528. Kenesaw Mountain, situation of, 713 ; battle of, 715. Kenly, Gen. J. R., defeat of, at Front Royal, 247 ; brigade of, panic stricken at Berryville, 791. Kentucky, coveted by the Confederacy — legislature of, refuses to call a convention, 56 ; loyalty of, 57. Keokuk, iron clad, destruction of the. 587. Kernstown, battle of, '-'43 ; skirmishing at, 788. Kershaw, Gen., defeat of, at Strawberry plains, 754. Keyes, Gen. E D., at Bull Run, 43 ; in command of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at the battle of Fair Oaks, 236. Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson, cavalry exploits of, 483 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 528 ; raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; wounded at Sugar valley, Ga., 709 ; his at- tempt on West Point and Macon railroads, 729 ; defeats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 ; skirmish of, with Wheeler at Aiken, 883 ; narrow escape of, from Wade Hampton, at Fayetteville, 889. King, Gen. Rufus, joins Pope at Culpepper, 284; at Warrenton turnpike, 293 ; at Gainesville, 296. Kinston, N. C., battle of, 894. INDEX 9G7 Kirksville, Mo., battle of, 358. Kleim, Gen., at the battle of Williamsburg, 220. “ Knights of the Golden Circle,” in Missouri, 829. Knoxville, Tenn., occupied by the Nationals, 544 ; siege of, by Longstreet, 575 ; siege raised. 578. Kulp House, near Marietta, Ga., battle of, 715. L. Lamb, Col., captured at Fort Fisher, N. C., 867. Lamar, G. B., purchase of arms by, 14. Lamar, Col. J. G., in command at Secession ville, S. C., 580 ; his repulse of Gen. Benham, 581. Lancaster, ram, destroyed at Vicksburg, 439. Lander, Gen., his surprise of Jackson at Blooming gap— mortally wounded at Balls’ bluff, 242 Landrum’s brigade at Sabine cross roads 627. Lanman’s brigade at Fort Donelson. 86; at Jackson. 427. Laurel Hill, Va., two unsuccessful attempts on, 677. Lawler, Gen., gallant conduct of, at the Big Black, 413. Lawton, Gen., severely wounded at Antietam, 320. Lee, Gen. A. L. , in the expedition to Shreveport, 624; at Wilson’s farm, 627 ; at Sabine cross roads, 628. Lee, Admiral S. P., in the battle below New Orleans, 152 ; sends gun-boats up the Nansemond, 594 Lee, Gen. Fitz Hugh, encounters Gen. Sheridan at Hawe’s store, 697 ; cavalry of, at Deep bottom, 760; Lee, Gen. R. E., his plan of campaign, 51 ; sent to take charge of the coast defenses of South Carolina, 52 ; pursuit of McClellan by, 263 ; at the battle of Glendale, 265 ; at the battle of Malvern hills 268 ; report of, 272 ; biographical sketch of {note), 275 ; report of {note), 301 ; his losses in Virginia. 304 ; his proclamation to the people of Maryland. 308 ; invades Maryland — his plan discovered. 310 ; his losses at Antietam, 327 ; retreats to Virginia, 331 ; at the battle of Fredericksburg, 340 ; army of, near Fredericksburg, 452 ; plans and movements of, 457-459 ; congratulates his army, 485 ; address of, to his army, 498 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 508 ; retreat of, 531 ; his operations in Virginia, 661-705 ; operations of, in defense of Petersburg, 735-781 ; retreats after the fall of Petersburg, 922 ; his cor- respondence with Grant relative to surrender, 930- 934 ; bids his army farewell, 935 ; his losses, 935. Lee, Gen. S. D., in the affair at Tuscumbia, Ala., 562. Lee, Gen. W. H. F., at Rapidan station, Va., 482; wounded at Brandy station, 490. Lee, Lieut. -Commander, mortally wounded, on board the Harriet Lane, at Galveston, 433. Lexington, Mo., surrender of, 56. Liddle, Gen. , division of, at Chickamauga, 550. Lidell, Gen. St. J., captured at Blakely, Ala,, 873. Life of — Burnside, Gen. Ambrose E., 123. Craven, Capt. Tunis A. {note), 644. Dupont, Commodore Samuel F., 70. Goldsborough, Capt. Louis M., 123. Hancock, Gen. Winfield S. (note), 221. Hays, Gen. Alexander {note), 666. Hill, Gen. Ambrose P. {note), 919. Hooker, Gen. Joseph {note), 220. Jackson, Gen. Thomas J. (Stonewall), {note)y 253 Kearney, Gen. Philip {note), 305. Lee, (Jen. Robert E. {note). 275. McPherson, Gen James B. {note), 725. Meade, Gen. George G., 496. Pope, Gen. John, 277. Read, Gen S. T. {note), 926. Reynolds, Gen. John F. {note), 535. Rice, Gen. James C, {7iote), 678. Sanders, Gen. William P. {note), 578. Sedgwick, Gen. John ((note), 676. Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., 70. Shields, Gen. James {note), 245. Smyth, Gen. Thomas A. {note), 929. Stringham, Commodore Silas H., 63. Stuart, Gen. James E, B. {note), 685. Thomas, Gen. George H., 82. Wadsworth, Gen James S. {note), 669. Zollikoffer, Gen. Felix K,, 81, Lincoln, President Abraham, his opinion on the sit- uation, 24 ; calls out the militia, and summons Congress, 33 ; calls for additional troops, 46 ; mes- sage of, to Congress, 47 ; calls for troops from Kentucky, 56 ; letter of, to the governor of Ken- tucky, 57 ; order of, for forward movement of land and naval forces, 80 ; proclamation of, announcing National victories, 157 ; telegram of, to Rosecrans, 188 ; orders the army to move towards Manassas, 193, letter of, to McClellan, 194 ; prophetic words of, 200 ; visits Fortress Monroe. 228 ; visit of, to McClellan at Harrison’s landing, 272 ; visit of, to the army, 332 ; letter of, to the people of Missouri, 357 ; weakness of, 376 ; issues his famous emanci- pation proclamation, 391 ; proclamation of, an- nouncing the enforcement of the law of enrolment and draft, 486 ; calls out the militia, 492 ; announce- ment of, 530 ; a call for militia, 784 ; visits Rich- mond, 936 ; assassination of, 937, 938. Little Bethel, attempt to surprise, 62. Little Crow, shot near Hutchinson, Minn. 607. Little, Gen. L. H., killed at the battle of luka, 162. Little Osage Crossing, Mo., battle of, 832. Little Rock, Ark., head-quarters of the guerrillas, 355 ; Curtis prepares to move against, 356 ; expe- dition against, 389 ; surrendered to Gen. Davidson, 606 ; Steele departs from, to co operate with Banka against Shreveport, 638 ; return of Steele to, 640. Lockwood’s Maryland Brigade, at Gettysburg, 518. Logan.Gen. John A., at Belmont, 60 ; at Fort Donelson, 90; at the battle of Raymond, Miss., 407 ; at the battle of Champion hills, 411 ; in command of the fifteenth corps under Sherman, 706. Lone Jack, Mo., defeat of Major Foster at. 359. 968 INDEX Longstreet, Gen. Jas., at Williamsburg, 216 ; at Fair Oaks, 234 ; at Mechanicsville, 258 ; at Gaines’ mill, 259 ; at Gainesville, 296 : at South mountain, 315 ; at Antietam, 318 ; at Fredericksburg, 348 ; at Gettysburg, 508 , at Chickamauga, 551 ; lays siege to Knoxville, Tenn. 577 ; retreats from Knoxville, 577; invests Suffolk, Va., 594; at Bean station, 590 ; wounded in the Wilderness, 670 ; in the lines before Richmond, 910 ; joins Lee at Petersburg, 918. Lookout Mountain, (ia., battle of, 566. 567. Loriiig, Gen. W. W.. at Champion hills, 410 ; in com- mand at Canton. Miss , 611. Lost Mountain, Ga operations of Schofield at, 714. Louisa Court House. Va , surprise and capture of Confederate cavalry at, 287. Lovell, Gen. M , Confederate troops at New Orleans in command of. 148 ; evacuates New Orleans, 156 ; joins Price and Van Dorn near (’orinth, Miss., 163. Lovell, steamer, sunk by the Nationals, 145. Lowe, Col. J. W,, killed at Carnifex ferry, .52. Lynch, Capt. W. F., in charge of the coast defense of North Carolina, 1 25 ; flies from Elizabeth city, 129 Lyon, Gen. Nat , in command at Springfield, Mo., 55 ; killed at the battle of Wilson’s creek. Mo., 56. Lyon, Gen., cavalry raid of. into Kentucky, 850. Lytle. Col W. H. wounded at Carnifex ferry, 52 ; wounded at the battle of Perry ville, 177. M. McArthuk, Gen. John, brigade of, at Fort Donelson, 86 ; at the battle of Corinth, 164. McCall, Gen. Geo. A., at the battle of Mechanicsville, 258 ; capture of, at the battle of Glendale, 266. McCallum, Col. D. C., superintendent of military railroads, energy of, 558 ; (noie), 781. McCausland, Gen., affair of, with Gen. Crook near Dublin station, 691 ; defeated by Gen. Hunter at Piedmont, 692 ; sets fire to Chambersburg, Pa., 788. McClellan, Gen. Geo. B , in Western Virginia, 35 ; in Northeastern Virginia. 47 ; issues an address to the people and his soldiers, 48 ; head-quarters of, at Washington, 50 ; appointed commander-in-chief, 79 ; inactivity of, 191 ; Lincoln dissatisfied with — his army on the peninsula, 194 ; at Yorktown, 196- 201 ; at Williamsburg, 224 ; at Fair Oaks, 238 ; at Mechanicsville, 258 ; his letter to the secretary of war, 262 ; at Savage’s station, 262 ; at Malvern hills, 264 ; his report of the battle of Malvern hills, 269 ; at Harrison’s landing — his address to the army, 270 ; his correspondence with the government, 272 ; at Acquia creek, 275 ; in command of the reconstructed army of the Potomac, 304 ; at South mountain, 315 ; at Antietam, 313-333 ; superseded by Burnside, 333 ; bids adieu to his troops, 336. McClernand, Gen. John A., at Fort Donelson, 86 ; at Pittsburg landing, 102 ; assumes command of the army of the Mississippi, 383 ; at the battle of Champion hills, 410 ; pursues the Confederates 412 ; conduct of, at the siege of Vicksburg, 417 removed from command of the thirteenth corps, 420 ; at Alexandria, La., 637. McCook, Col. Dan , at Doctor’s creek, 175 ; at Chick- amauga, 550 ; his raid on the railroad south of Atlanta, 726 ; his movement against Lyon, 826. Mcf'ook, Col. R. L,, at Carnifex ferry, 52. McCook, Gen. A. McD. . at the battle of Shiloh, 110 ; at Perryville, 174-177 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Liberty gap, 542 ; at C hickamauga, 550. McCown. (ien., at the battle of Murfreesboro, 180. McCulloch Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ridge, 97 McCullough. Col., murder of, at Kirksville, Mo., 358. McDowell, Gen. Irwin, occupies Arlington heights and Alexandria 35 ; in command of the forces in Virginia, 36 ; ordered to attack the Confed- erate position at Manassas junction, 36 ; his first plan, 37 ; his second plan, 38 ; defeated at Bull Run, 45, 46 ; his removal, 46 ; in command of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; his corps detached and detained to defend the capital, 194; at Fredericksburg, 246 ; at Gainesville, 296 ; at Manassas, 299. McGilvray, Col. F., batteries of, at Gettysburg, 526. McGinnis, Gen., at the battle of Champion hills, 411 ; at the battle of Grand Coteau, 599. McIntosh. Gen., mortally wounded at Pea ridge, 97. McKean, Gen. Thos. J., at the battle of Corinth, 163. McKee, Major, operations of, at Yazoo city, 615. McKeen, Col., killed at Cold harbor, 701. McLaws, Gen. Laf., at Malvern hills, 268; at Fre- dericksburg. 343 ; at Salem church, 479 ; at Gettys- burg, 514 ; division of, at Taylor’s bridge, 694. McMahon, Col., death of, at Cold harbor, 701. McMillan, Gen., at the battle of Pleasant hill 630. McNeil, Gen. John, defeats Porter at Kirksville. Mo., 358 ; defends Cape Girardeau, 603 ; commands the army of the frontier, 606. McPheeters, Gen., defeat of. by Gen. Weitzel, 431. McPherson, Gen. J. B., drives the Confederates from Lamar to Holly springs, 371 ; at the battle of Ray- mond, Miss., 407 ; capture of Clinton by, 408 ; Jackson occupied by, 409 ; at Champion hills, 410 ; at the Big Black, 413 ; at the investment of Vicks- burg, 415 ; in charge of Vicksburg, 427 ; joins the expedition to Meridian, 6' 9 ; at Meridian. 612 ; commands the aimy of the Tennessee under Sher- man, 706 ; death of, 722 ; biographical notice of (note), 725. Macomb, Commodore, recaptures Plymouth, 860. Macon, Ga., surrendered to Gen. Wilson, 874. Magoffin, Gov., cf Kentucky, refuses to raise troops for the Union, 56 ; letter of, to the President, 57. Magruder, Gen. John, on the Peninsula, 35 ; his opin- ions of McClellan’s operations, 199 ; at Williams- burg, 219 ; retreat of, 222 ; attacks Sedgwick at INDEX. 969 Savage station, 263 ; at Glendale, 265 ; at Malvern hills, 268 ; recaptures Galveston, 432-434 Mahone, Gen., at Fair Oaks, 240 ; at Gettysburg, 517. Malvern Hills, battle of, 264-269. Manassas, battle of (second battle of Bull Run). 299. Manassas ram. 69; at NewOrleans. 151 ; destroyed. 153. Mansfield, Gen Joseph K. F , at Ocean view and Norfolk, Va., 228 ; killed at Antietam, 321. ?Jansura, La., attack on the Nationals at. 638. I'iarais des Cygnes, Mo. , battle of, 832. Marland. Lieut., bravery of, at Grand Coteau, 600. Marmaduke, Gen., at Corinth, 118 ; defeated at Bos- ton mountains, 362 ; at Prairie grove, 364 ; at Springfield, Mo., 602 ; at Huntsville, Mo , 602 ; at Cape Girardeau, 603 ; repulsed at Helena, Ark. 605; repulsed at Pine bluff, 607 ; operations of, 639. • Martinsburg, Banks’ forces at. 248 ; panic at, caused by Early’s invasion. 784 ; Averill abandons, 792. Marye’s Hill, Va., capture of, by the Nationals, 472- 475 ; recapture of by the < onfederates, 479. IMaryland, its weakness geographically, 48 ; Lee’s proclamation to the people of. 309 ; all able-bodied men ordered out for the defense of, 309 Massacres, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at Snicker’s gap, 792. Maury, Gen, Dabney, at the battle of < orinth, 164 ; in charge of the defenses of Mobile, 870 ; retreats up the Alabama river, 873. Meade, Gen Geo. G. , severely wounded at Glendale, 266 ; at Antietam, 319 ; at Fredericksburg, 345 ; at Chancellorsville, 453 ; takes command of the army of the Potomac. 495 ; his address to the army, 496 ; biographical sketch of, 496, 497 ; telegraphs to the war department. 498 ; his order to the army, 500 ; at Gettysburg, 507 ; his address to the army, 529, 580 ; consolidates the army of the Potomac, 658 ; his staff, 659 ; epistle of, to his troops, 683. Meagher, Gen T. F. , at Fair Oaks, 239 ; at Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at Glendale, 266 ; his bravery at Antie- tam 324; wounded, 325; at Fredericksburg, 348. Mechanicsville, Va.. battle of, 258 259. Meigs. Lieut. J. .murdered near Harrisonburg Va. , 797. Memphis, Tenn., naval engagement before, 145 ; taken possession of by the National troops, 146. Memphis and Charleston Railroad, plant of, destroyed by Gen. Mitchell, 115. Mercedita, steamer, disabled by the Confederate ram. Palmetto State, off Charleston, 584. Meridian, expedition of Sherman to 610; Confeder- ates retreat from, 611 ; destroyed property at, 612. Merrill, Col., compels Porter and Cobb to retreat, 358 ; skirmish of, with Marmaduke, 602. Merrimac, iron-clad, in Hampton Roads, 201 ; sinks the Cumberland, 203 ; destroys the Congress, 204 ; her contest with the Monitor, 207-211 ; blown up by the Confederates, 213 ; explosion of, 229. Middletown, Va. , battle of, 800. Miles, Col. D. S., at Bull Run, 39 ; remissness of, at Harper’s Ferry, 313 ; mortally wounded, 314. Militia, call of President Lincoln for 75 000, after the fall of Fort Sumter, 33 ; call for 120,000, 492 ; call for 29,000, from the states of New York, Pennsyl- vania and Massachusetts, 784. Milledgeville. Ga., occupied by Gen. Sherman, 816. Mill Spring, Ky., battle of, 81, Milroy, (?en R. IL. at the battle of Cross keys, 251 , at Gainesville, 295 ; retreats from Winchester, 491 ; defeats the C’onfederates on Wilkeson turnpike, 844. Mine at Petersburg, construction of, commenced by Burnside, 751 ; description of, 752; explosion of, 755. Mine at Petersburg, sprung by the Confederates, 756. Missionary Ridge, Ga., battle of, 568. Mississippi River, operations of Foote on the, 143 ; Porter’s services on the, 149 ; Farragut’s operations on the, 151-157. Mississippi, steamer, destroyed at Port Hudson, 437. Missouri, division of sentiment in, 357 ; guerrilla warfare in, 358, 359 ; Price’s invasion of, 829-833. Mitchell, Capt., sets fire to the floating battery Louisiana — sent prisoner to the North 155. Mitchell, Gen. 0. M., operations of, in Tennessee, 115; joins Buell’s army, 171 ; succeeds Gen. Hunter in the department of the South — death of, 581. Mitchell, Gen. R. P., at the battle of Perryville, 177 ; at the battle of Chickamauga, 556. Mobile. Ala., description of, 642 ; operations of Canby and Thatcher against, 869-873 ; surrender of, 873. Mobile and Ohio Railroad, fight by Gen. Smith, with Confederates on the, 118. Mobile Bay, operations of Farragut in, 641-649. Monitor, contest of the, with the Merrimac, 207-211 * founders off Cape Hatteras, 213. Monocacy, Md., battle of, 786. Monroe, Mayor, refuses to surrender the city of New Orleans, or take down the Confederate flag, 156. Montauk, iron-clad, attacks Fort McAllister, 582. Montgomery, Ala., gathering of Southern delegatee at, 23 ; surrender of, to Gen. Wilson, 874. Moorefield, Va. , Confederate force defeated at 788. Morell, Gen., at the battle of Mechanicsville, 258 Morgan, Gen. J. H., raids by, in Kentucky and Ten- nessee, 170 ; marriage of, at Murfreesboro, 179 raids by, in Tennessee and Kentucky, 188 ; raids by, in Kentucky, Indiana and Ohio, 595, 596 ; de feats Gen. Averill, 591 ; his raid in Kentucky to Cynthiana, 783 ; killed at Greenville, Tenn., 835. Morgan, Gen. Geo. W., at Cumberland gap, 171 ; at Fair Oaks. 238 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; at Arkansas post 387 ; his pursuit of Forrest, 828. Morning Light, gun-boat, captured off (ialveston. 434. Morris, Col., killed at the battle of Cold harbor, 701. Morris. Gen., at the battle of Carrack’s ford, 50. Morrison. Major, at Port Royal ferry. S. C., 76 ; at the battle of Secessionville, S. C , 581. Morristown, Tenn , battle of, 835. 970 INDEX Morton, Gen., operations of, at Chattanooga, 557. Mosbj, Capt. J. S., raid of, at Cheat’s ferry, 788; supply train captured by, at Berry ville, 791. Mower, Gen. , distinguished services of, at the battle of Pleasant hill, 631 ; at Clouterville, 635 Mullany, Capt.. killed in action at Mobile bay, 647. Mulligan Col., surrender of Lexington, Mo., by, 56 ; killed at Bunker hill, Va. ; 788. Murfreesboro, Tenn., battle of, 180-186 ; retreat of Bragg from, 187 ; Buford’s cavalry threatens, 844. Murphy, Col. R. C., in charge at luka, 160 ; surrenders Holly springs to Van Dorn, 374. N. Naglee, Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235. Nansemond River, gun-boats sent up the, to co-operate with the land forces. 594. Nashville, Tenn., held by the Confederates, 82 ; abandoned by the Confederates, 95 ; held by Gen. Negley, 179 ; forces of Gen. Thomas concentrated at, 842 ; Hood defeated at, 847. Nashville, Confederate steamer, burning of, 582. Navy, United States, condition of the, 25 ; strength oi the, in 1863 and 1864. 855. Negley, Gen. Jas. S., holds Nashville, 179 ; at Mur- freesboro, 180 ; letter of, to Gen. Thomas, 549 ; at Chickamauga, 552. Negro troops, bravery of, at Port Hudson, 441 ; mas- sacre of, at Fort Pillow, 618 ; at the assault on ( emetery hill, Petersburg, 755 ; gallantry of, at New Market heights, 770 ; heroic conduct of, at Olustee, 857 ; war-cry of, at Blakely, 872, 873. Nelson, Gen., at Shiloh, 105 ; at Richmond, Ky., 170. Newark, Mo., captured by Porter, the guerrilla, 358. New Berne, N. C., expedition to, 131 ; description of, 132 ; capture of, 134 ; flight of the inhabitants of, 135 ; besieged by Gen. Hoke — siege raised, 859. New Falls City, steamer, sunk at Springfield, La., 626. New Hope Church, Ga., battle of. 712. New Madrid, Mo., evacuated by the Confederates, 96. New Market, Va., battle of, 691. New Orleans, description of, 147, 148 ; defenseless condition of, 155 ; capture of, 156. Newton, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at the attack on Marye’s hill, 474 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 508. Newtonia Mo., Confederates driven out of, 833. Nicholls, Gen., brigade of, at Chancellorsville 460. Nim’s battery, at the battle of Grand Coteau, 599 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads, 628. Norfolk, Va., surrendered to Gen. Wool, 229. North Anna, crossed and recrossed by Grant, 693, 696. Noyes, Capt , depicts Antietam after the battle, 330. Ny River, Va., battle of the, 684. O. Oak Gkove, Va., severe fight at, 257. Ocean View, Va., landing of National troops at, 228. Oglesby, Gen. Rich J., in the attack on Fort Donel- SOQ, 86 ; severely wounded at Corinth, 164. Olmstead, Col. C. H., surrenders Fort Pulaski, 140 Olustee, Fla., battle of, 858. Olustee, cruiser, depredations of, 876. 1 “On to Richmond I ” 191, 266. “ On to Vicksburg !” 393. Opdyke, Gen., at the battle of Franklin. 842. Opelousas, La., captured by Gen. Banks, 438; re- occupied by Gen. Richard Tavlor, 445. Orangeburg, S. C., occupation of by Gen. Blair, 888. Orchard Knob, Tenn., itaptured by Gen. Wood, 565 ; Grant’s lu^ad quarters at, 568. I Ord. Gen , ordered to luka. 160 ; victory of, at the Hatchie, 167 ; in command of the thirteenth corps at Vicksburg, 420. “ Order of American Knights,’’ secret association, in Missouri, 829. Osband, Col., reconnoissance of. 615 ; expedition of, fromVicksburg against Hood’s communications. 852. Osterhaus, Gen., wounded at the Big Black, 413; at Wauhatchie, 566 ; at Chattanooga, 568. Overall’s Creek, Tenn., attack on blockhouse at, 843. Owen, Gen. , at (Gettysburg, 526; in the Wilderness, 672. Owen, Lieut., with gun boats at Yazoo city, 615. P. Page, Gen. R. L., surrenders Fort Morgan, Ala. . 649. I Paine, Gen., at Corinth, 118 ; wounded at Port Hud- i son, 444 ; at Fort Fisher, 866. i Palmer, Gen. Innis A , at Corinth, 118 ; at Murfrees- boro 180 ; at Chickamauga, 530; at Wauhatchie, 559 ; commands the fourteenth corps under Sher- man. 706 ; resigns his command, 728. Palmer, Col., cavalry under, captures Hood’s pontoon train after the battle of Nashville, 849 ; captures Gen. Lyon in camp at Red hill, 850, Palmetto Flag, unfurled over Castle Pinckney, 17. Palmetto Ranche, Tex., last battle of the war, 948. Pamlico Sound, expedition to, 125. Paris, (.’omte de, on the battle of Antietam, 328. Parke, Gen. J. G , at Roanoke Island, 126 ; at New Berne, 132 ; expedition of, to Fort Macon, 135 ; invests Moorehead City, 136 ; at Dinwiddie court house, 909 ; penetrates the lines at Petersburg. 918. Parkersburg, Va., occupied by Gen. McClellan, 48. Patten, Capt. , courage of, at the Weldon railroad, 744. Patterson, Gen., posted near Harper’s ferry. 35 ; out- generalled by Johnston, 39 ; blunder of, 46 ; at the battle of Williamsburg, 216 ; at Fair Oaks, 239. Pawnee, sent with reinforcements to Fort Sumter, 26. Peach Tree Creek, Ga.. battle of, 720. Pea Ridge, Mo., battle .of, 97-98. Peck, Gen. J. J., operations of, at Suffolk, Va., 593. Pegram, Gen , surrenders at Rich mountain, 49 ; de feated at Somerset. Ky., 544; wounded in the Wilderness, 672 ; killed at Hatcher’s run, 903. INDEX 971 Pemberton, Gen. J. C., position of, at the Yallabusha and Tallahatchie, 371 ; instructions from Gen John- ston to, 408 ; his views on the situation, 409 ; at Champion hills, 410 ; retreat of, 41 1 ; shut up in Vicksburg' 421-423 ; surrenders Vicksburg, 424- 426 ; defeated at Salisbury, N. C., 896. Pender, Gen., at Gettysburg, 503. Pendleton, Gen., at (’hancellorsville, 457; advises Lee to surrender. 928 Pennsylvania, prepares to resist invasion, 309. Pennybacker, Gen., at the capture of Fort Fisher, N. C., 866 ; severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867. Pensacola, Fla , abandoned by Gen T. N. Jones, 141. Perry ville, or Chaplin’s Hills, Ky., battle of, 177. Petersburg, description of, 736 ; operations of Gen. Grant against, 736-782 , assaults upon the defenses of, 728-741 ; the great mine at, 751 ; explosion of the mine at, 754 ; disastrous assault at 756 ; opera- tions of Grant at. its downfall, 893-921. Pettigrew, Col J. J., landing of , at Castle Pinckney, 17 ; taken prisoner at Fair Oaks, 238 ; (Gen.) at Gettysburg. 525 ; at Black water, 593. Petrel, privateer, destroyed by the St. Lawrence, 875. Phelps, Lieut., on Tennessee river, 85 ; in command of the Eastport when blown up, 633 ; operations of, with the gun-boats Juliet and Fort Hindman, 634. Phillips, Col., defeats Col. Taylor, 369 ; defends Fort Blunt, 604 ; defeats Quantrell at Fort Gibson, 607. Pickett, Gen , at Williamsburg. 216 ; at Fredericks- burg. 343 ; at Gettysburg, 523 ; wounded in the Wilderness, 672. Pillow, Gen. G. J. , plan of, to seize Columbus, Ky., 58 ; at Foi-t Donelson, 85 ; flight from Fort Donelson, 93. Pilot Knob, Mo., defense of. by Gen. H. S. Ewing, 830. Pittsburgh Landing, described, 101 ; battle of, 105. Plaquemine, La., attacked by Gen. Taylor, 445. Pleasant Hill, La., battle of, 630. Pleasonton, Gen., cavalry of, at Chancellorsville. 457 ; his encounter with Gen Stuart, 490 ; his operations against Price in Missouri. 831-834. Plymouth, N. C., expedition against, 131 ; siege of, 858 ; surrender of, to Gen. Hoke, 859 ; recaptured by the Nationals, 860. Polk Gen , Hickman and Columbus, Ky , seized by 58 ; at Belmcnt, 60 ; in command at Columbus, 82 ; evacuates (blumbus, 94 ; at Shiloh, 106 ; at Chat- tanooga, 171 ; at Murfreesboro, 183 ; joins Bragg’s army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; in command at Meridian, 611 ; retreats to Demopolis, Ala., 611 ; at Resaca Ga., 709 ; killed at Pine mountain, 714. Pope, Gen. John, operations of, against Island No. 10, 96 ; at Corinth, 118 ; at Fort Pillow. 143 ; recalled to Corinth, 144 ; ordered to Virginia, 159 ; biographical sketch of, 277 ; address of, to the army of Virginia, 278 ; orders issued by, 281 ; Confederate reply to orders of , 282 ; at Gaines- ville, 295 ; his charges against Gen. Porter, 297 ; report of {note), 3(>1 ; his losses in Virginia, 304; relieved from command, 304 ; operations of, against Sioux Indians, 607. Porter. Admiral David D., in command of mortar boats below New Orleans 147 ; at Haines’ Bluff, 381 ; his attack on Fort Hindman, Ark., 386 ; his fleet in the Mississippi, 395 ; passes the batteries at Vicksburg, 401 ; his services at the siege of Vicks- burg, 417 ; bombards Vicksburg, 421 ; Arkansas ram destroyed by {note) 481 ; on the Yazoo river, 614 ; on the Red river, G22 ; his letter to the secre- tary of the navy, 624 ; at Springfield landing, 627 ; his perilous return down the Red river. 632-637 ; his expeditions against Fort Fisher, N. C., 861-8'‘'7. Porter, Gen. Fitz John, at Bull Run, 41 ; at York river, 226 ; occupies Hanover court house, 232 ; at Mechanisville. 258 ; at Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at Malvern hills, 268; at Manassas, 299; at Antietam, 319 ; pursues Gen. Lee 331, Porterfield, Gen , issues an address at Grafton, 48. Port Gibson, Miss., battle of, 1C5. Port Hudson, the Hartford and Albatross pass the batteries of, 436 ; situation and defenses oi . 440 ; bravery of the garrison of, 445 ; surrender of, 446, Port Republic, bridge at, carried by Gen. Jackson, 253, Port Royal, S. C , operations of expedition to, 72-75. Port Roybal Ferry, fortified camp of Confederates at, 76 ; result of expedition to, 77. Posey, Gen., at the battle of Gettysburg, 517. Potter, Gen., repulse of, near Fort McRae. Va., 772. Powder ship, exploded near Fort Fisher, N. C. , 862. Powell, Lewis Payne, his attempt to assassinate Secretary Seward, 939. Prairie Grove. Mo , battle of, 363. Prentiss, Gen., at Pittsburg landing, 102 ; made pris- oner at Shiloh, 107. Preston, Gen., at the battle of Chickamauga, 551. Price, Gen. Sterling, surrender of Lexington, Mo., to, 56 ; retreat of, 97 ; at Corinth, 118 ; defeat of, at luka. 161 ; retreat of, 162 ; at Corinth, 163 ; re- pulsed at Helena, Ark , 605 ; at Prairie D’Ann, 639. his disastrous invasion of Missouri, 829-833. Prime, Major, constructs redoubts at Corinth, 164. Pryor, Gen. Roger A, conveys proposal to Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, 27 ; at Williamsburg. 217; at Fair Oaks, 239. Pumpkin Vine Greek, Ga., Gen. Hooker’s encounter with Hood and Hardee’s corps at, 712. Putnam, Gen., killed at Fort Wagner, S. C., 591. Q. Quantrell. guerrilla, raid of, on Lawrence, Kan. 606 ; defeat^ by Col. Phillips at Fort Gibson, 607 R. Rains, Gen., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 235. Randolph’s battery at Chancellorsville, 459. 972 INDEX. Ransom, Gen., captures Aransas pass Tex., 601 ; at the battle of Sabine cross roads. 628. Rappahannock, retreat of Pope’s army over the, 288. Raymond, Miss., battle of, 407. Read, Gen. S. T., killed near Farmville {note), 926. Reams’ Station, battle of, 766. Red River expedition, see Shreveport 621-638 Reno, Gen. Jesse L., at Roanoke, 126 ; at New Berne, 132 ; expedition of, to Fort Macon, 13o ; at Gaines ville, 295 ; gallantry of his brigade, 300 ; at Chan- tilly, 303 ; killed at South mountain 316. Renshaw, Commodore W. B. , in command at Galves- ton, 432 ; killed on board the Westfield, 433. Resaca, Ga. , description of, 709 ; battle of, 710 ; Gen. Johnston retreats from, 711 ; Hood repulsed at, 808. Reynolds, Gen., atMechanicsville^ 259 ; at Gainesville, 295 ; at Manassas, 299 ; at Fredericksburg, 345 ; first corps of, below Fredericksburg, 454 ; killed at Get- tysburg, 503 ; biographical sketch of {note), 535. Rice, Gen, James C., at Gettysburg, 513 ; killed at the assault on Laurel hill, Va , {note). 678. Richardson, Gen., at York river, 226 ; at Fair Oaks, 237 ; killed at Antietam, 324, Richardson, Gen., operations of, at Yazoo city, 615. Rich Mountain, Va., battle of, 49. Richmond, Ky., defeat of Gen Nelson at, 170. Richmond Va., capital of the Confederacy, 33 ; Gen. Butler’s scheme for the capture of, 655 ; movement of Gen. Grant against, 753, 754 ; demonstration against, by the second and tenth army corps, 758-761 ; movements of the army of the James, towards, 769-779 ; evacuation of, 919-9-1. Ricketts. Gen. Jas. B , at Antietam, 319 ; at Gettys- burg, 519 ; at the battle of Monocacy, Md., 785. Roanoke Island, surrender of, 128. Robinson, Gen. J. C., at the battle of Gettysburg, 503 ; severely wounded near Alsop’s Farm, Va., 673. Rodes, Gen. R. E. , at Fair Oaks, 235; at Chancel- lorsville, 465 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; in the Wilder- ness, 664 ; killed at Winchester, 796. Rodgers Commander C. R. P., at Port Royal ferry. 76. Rodgers, Commodore John, commands the gun boats on the James river, 264 ; at Malvern hills, 268. Rodman, Gen., mortally wounded at Antietam, 327. Rodney, Miss., attack on the batteries opposite, 403. Rogers, Col , killed at Fort Robinett, Corinth, 166. Rome, Ga., c-apture of, by Gen. Jeff. C. Davis, 712 ; Gen. Corse at, with the fifteenth corps, 806. Romney, Va., occupied by Confederates, 48. iosecranz, Gen. W. S., at Rich mountain, 49; at Carnifex ferry, 52 ; takes charge of the army of the Mississippi, 159 ; defeats Price and Van Dorn at Corinth, 166 ; takes command of the army of the Cumberland, 167 ; at Nashville, 179 ; at Mur freesboro, 180 ; receives the thanks of the presi- dent, 188 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; defeat of, 555 ; withdraws his army to Chattanooga. 556 ; relieved of his command, 558 ; in command of the depart, ment of the Missouri, 829 ; measures taken by, to repel the invasion of Price, 829-834. Ross, Gen L. F., operations of at Yazoo city, 615. Rousseau, Gen. L. H., at Perrjwille. 176 ; at Mur- freesboro, 180 ; his cavalry raid from Decatur to Marietta, 719 ; at Tullahoma, 828. Rowan, Commander Stephen H., destroys a flotilla in the harbor of Elizabeth city, 129. Rowley, Gen , at the battle of Gettysburg. 503. Rucker, (ien., taken prisoner at Nashville, 847. Ruger, tien., at the battle of Gettysburg. 522. Ruggles, G^n., at Santa Rosa, 67 ; at Shiloh, 109 ; at New Orleans, 148. Russel. Lieut. J. H., exploit of. at Santa Rosa, 67. Russell, Gen. D. A., killed at Winchester, 796. S. S^UJiNE Pass, capture of, 434 ; battle of, 598. Sabine Cross Roads, battle of, 629. St. Augustine, Fla., surrender of, 141. St. Helena Bay, occupied by the Nationals, 75. Sailor’s Creek, Va., battle of, 927. Salisbury, N. C., battle at Grant’s creek, near. 896. Salkahatchie River, the passage of, forced 883. Saltworks in Virginia expedition of Burbridge again.^t, 835 ; destroyed by Stoneman’s troops, 837. Sanborn, Gen., his pursuit of Gen. Price, 831-833. Sanders, Gen., operations of . 544 ; death of {note), 578. Santa Rosa Island, night attack on troops at, 67. Saunders Gen., killed at the Weldon railroad, 764. Savage Station, Va., battle of, 263. Savannah. Ga., Sherman’s approach to, on the march from Atlanta, 819 ; investment of, by Sher- man, 823 ; escape of Gen. Hardee from, 823 ; occupation of. by Sherman, 824 ; Sherman’s despatch announcing the fall of, 824 ; Gen. Geary appointed military governor of, 825 ; left in charge of Geu Foster, 881 Savannah, privateer, surrenders to the Perry, 875. Schenck, Gen. R. C., at Bull Run, 43 ; at Cross keys, 251 ; at Gainesville, 295. Schimmelpfenig, Gen., at Gettysburg, 504, 505. Schofield, Gen. J. M., in command of the Missouri military district, 357 ; his report of operations in Missouri and Arkansas, 358 ; defeat of Rains by, 361 ; resignation of, 362 ; commands the army of the Ohio, 706 ; retreats from Pulaski to Frank- lin, 840 ; his repulse of Hood at Franklin, 842 ; falls back to Nashville, 843 ; at the battle of Nash- ville, 845 ; sent to North Carolina with his corps, 868; occupies Wilmington, 869; movements of, from Wilmington to Goldsboro, 893, 894. Schurz, Gen. C., at Gainesville, 295 ; at Chancellors- ville, 461 ; at Gettysburg, 504 ; at Wauhatchie, 561. Scott, Gen. Winfield, statement of, regarding pur- chase of arms by the States, 14 ; advice of, to INDEX. 973 commanders of Southern forts, 15 ; mistake of, at Bull Run, 45 ; resignation of, 79 Seabrook, S. C., batteries erected at, 76. Sears, Lieut. , noble work of, at the battle of luka, 161. Secessionville, S. C., battle of, 580 ; {note), 581. Sedgwick, Gen. John, at York River, 226 ; at Fair Oaks, 237 ; at Savage station, 263 ; wounded at Antietam, 322 ; attack of, on Marye’s hill, 473 ; repulsed at Salem church, 478 ; retreat ot,{not6), 480; at Gettysburg, 510 ; raid of, in Virginia, 656 ; com- mands the sixth corps, 659; death of, 675; {note), 676. Selma, gun-boat, captured by the Metacomet, 645. Selma, Ala., capture of, by Gen. Wilson, 874. Selfridge, Lieut. T. 0., at Pleasant hill landing. 633. Semmes, Capt. Raphael, commands the cruiser Sumter, 875 ; takes command of the Alabama, 877 ; his disastrous encounter with the Kearsarge, 878. Seward, Secretary W. H., advice given by, 391 ; L. Payne Powell’s attempt to assassinate, 939. Seymour, Gen., at Mechanicsville, 259 ; at Glendale, 266 ; captured in the Wilderness, 671 ; his opera- tions in Florida, 856-858 ; defeat of, at Olustee, 858. Shackelford, Gen., at Cumberland gap, 545 ; surrender of Gen. Morgan to, 596 ; at Bean Station, 596. Shaeffer, Gen. J. W., killed at Murfreesboro, 184. Shaler, Gen. , at the capture of Marye’s Hill, 474 ; captured at the battle of the Wilderness, 671. Shaw’s brigade at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630. Shelby ville, Tenn., taken by the Nationals, 543. Shenandoah, cruiser, depredations of, 876. Shenandoah Valley, operations of Gen. Banks in, 243 ; operations of Gen. Jackson in, 247 ; operations of Gen. Sheridan in, 789-802. Sheridan, Gen. P. H., at Perryville, Ky., 177 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 ; operations of, 538 ; at Chatta- nooga, 572 ; raid of, in Virginia, 685, 686 ; encounter of, with Fitz Hugh Lee and Hampton, 697 ; at Trevillian, 703 ; commands the Middle military division, 789 ; operations of, in the Shenandoah val- ley, 789-802; his great raid fromWinchester, 903-906; at Five forks, 910-917 ; pursues Lee to Jetters ville, 923-925 ; at Deatonsville, 926 ; at Appomattox station, 933 ; ordered to proceed to Texas, 948. Sherman, Gen. Thomas W., at Bull Run, 41 ; with the army of the Cumberland, 58 ; commands the land forces in the South Carolina expedition — bio- graphical sketch of, 70 ; occupies and strengthens Hilton head, 75. Sherman, Gen. William T., gallantry of, at Shiloh, 101 ; at College hill, 372 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 376 ; at Milliken’s bend, 383 ; order of, to his army corps, 384 ; at Arkansas post, 387 ; demonstration of, at Haines’ blufE, 404 ; operations of, at Jackson, 409 ; ordered to Bridgeport, 413 ; onward march to Vicks- burg — stakes possession of Haines’ bluff, 414 ; opera- tions of, near Lake Pontchartrain, 438 ; at Port Budt.on 441 ; in command of the department of the Tennessee, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 563 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 568 ; relieves Burnside at Knoxville, 577 ; his expedition to Meridian, 610 ; his return to Vicksburg, 614 ; assumes command of the military division of the Mississippi, 653 ; details of his Atlanta campaign, 706-734 ; turns Johnston’s position at Dalton, 709 ; attacks Johnston at Resaca, 710 ; compels Johnston to evacuate Resaca, 711 ; captures Allatoona pass, 713 ; compels Johnston to evacuate his positions on Kenesaw, Pine and Lost mountains, 714^717 ; his march to the Chattahoochee, 717 ; his series of operations against Atlanta, 718- 734 ; his operations against Hood, 803-809 ; pursues Hood to Resaca, 808 ; his new plan of campaign, 810 ; prepares for the great march through Georgia, 811 ; burns Atlanta, 812 ; his order of march, 813 ; threatens Macon, 815 ; his troops enter Milledge- ville, 81 6 ; crosses the Oconee 817 ; his cavalry defeats Wheeler at Waynesboro, 818 ; cresses the Ogeechee, 818 ; approaches Savannah, 819 ; captures Fort McAllister — communicates with the fleet. 822 ; invests Savannah, 823 ; destruction effected by his army on the march from Atlanta to Savannah, 824, 825 ; his march through the Carolinas, 881- 894 ; detention of, by floods, 882 ; crosses the Sal- kahatchie — moves on Orangeburg — drives the Confederates across the Congaree, 883 ; occupies Columbia, 884, 885 ; advances to Cheraw, 888 ; his cavalry surprised by Wade Hampton — destroys the old arsenal at Fayetteville, 889 ; at Averysboro 891 ; at Bentonville, 893 ; joins Schofield at Golds- boro, 893 ; his final operations against Gen. John- ston in North Carolina, 940-943, his pursuit of Johnston to Smithfield, 941 ; his conferences with Johnston, and basis of agreement for surrender, 943, 944, {note) 945 ; Johnston surrenders to, 947. Shields, Gen. J., takes command of Lander’s troops, 242 ; operations of, in the valley of the Shenan- doah, 243, 244 ; biographical sketch of {note), 245. Shiloh, first battle of, 105 ; second battle of. 111. Sibley, Col., inflicts punishment on the Sioux, 369. Sickles, Gen. Dan. E., at Fair Oaks, 239 ; skirmish of, with Gen. Jackson at the Furnace — at Chancellors- ville, 459 ; at Gettysburg, 507 ; wounded, 514. Sigel, Gen. Franz, at Dug springs. Mo., 55; retreats to Rolla, 56 ; at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Cedar mountain, Va., 286 ; defeated at New market, 691 ; relieved of his command, 692 ; retires from Martinsburg, 784. Sill, Gen. J. W., division of, sent to Frankfort, 176 ; death of, at the battle of Murfreesboro, 183. Simmons, Col., mortally wounded at Glendale, Va. , 265. Sioux Indians, savage attack of. on the village of New Ulm, 369 ; execution of a party of, 607. Slaves, conduct of the, prior to the declaration of emancipation, 392 ; flocking of, to Gen. Sherman’s army, in the Meridian expedition, 613. Slocum, CoL J. S., killed at the battle of Bull Run, 41. 974 INDEX. Slocum, Gen. Henry W., at the battle of Gaines’ mill, 260 ; at Chancellors ville, 455, 469 ; at Gettysburg, 507 ; in command of the twentieth corps, 728 ; enters Atlanta, 732; defeats Hardee near Averysboro, N. C., 891 ; repulses Johnston near Bentonville, 893. Smith, Col. O., gallant charge of, at Wauhatchie, 561. Smith, Gen. A J., at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; post of honor given to, after the capture of Fort Hindman, Ark., 388; at Gumtown, 619; expeditions of, against Gen. Forrest. 620 ; in the Shreveport expedition, 622 ; his capture of Fort de Kussey, 624 ; at the battle of Pleasant hill, 630 ; at Clouterville, 635 ; at the battle of Nashville, 846 ; corps of, at the operations against Mobile 870. Smith, Gen. C. F. , at Belmont, Mo., 60 ; at Fort Don- elson, 86-93 ; supersedes Grant, 99 ; death of, 101. Smith, Gen. G. C., operations of, 538. Smith, Gen. G. W., at the battle of Fair Oaks, 234; brigade of, at the battle of Antietam, 323. Smith, Gen. J. E. , at the battle of Chattanooga, 569. Smith, Gen. Kirby, at Bull Run, 45 ; defeats Gen. Nelson at Richmond, Ky., 170 ; at the battle of Jenkins’ ferry, 639 ; surrender of, 949. Smith, Gen. M. L., division of, at Fort Donelson, 86 ; at Corinth, 118 ; severely wounded at Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; at the battle of Chattanooga, 569. Smith, Gen. T. K., in the Shreveport expedition, 626 ; at Pleasant hill landing, 632 ; at Clouterville, 635. Smith, Gen. W. F., at Williamsburg, 214 ; at Chatta- nooga, 559 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. Smith, Gen. W. S., at Memphis. 609 ; retreat of , 613. Smyth, Gen. T. A., killed near Farmville {note), 929. Snake Creek, Va., affair at, 688. Snake Creek Gap, McPherson’s movement on, 708. Snicker’s Gap, Va., massacre at, 792. “Sons of Liberty,” secret association in Missouri, 829. Southfield, gun-boat, sunk by the Albemarle, 858. South Mountain, Md., battle of, 315. Spanish Fort. Mobile, invested, 870 ; surrenders, 871 . Spear, Col. , killed at the capture of Marye’s hill, 474. Spottsylvania Court House, battles around, 675-682. Springfield, Mo. , battle of, 602. Stafford, Gen., killed in the Wilderness, 672. Stahl, Gen., at the battle of Cross keys, 251. Stanley, Gen. D. S., at luka, 161 ; at Corinth, 165 ; operations of, on the Harpeth river, 538 ; at Chick- amauga, 554 ; in command of the fourth corps under Sherman, 728 ; wounded at Franltlin, 842. Stannard’s, brigade at Gettysburg, 525. Stanton, Edwin M., made secretary of war, 79 ; visits Fortress Monroe, 228 ; his draft orders of 1862, 283 ; his despatch to the governors of the Northern States, 485 ; meets Gen. Grant at Indianapolis, 558 ; his lamentation at the death-bed of Lincoln, 939. Star of the West, attempts to relieve Fort Sumter, 21. Starke, Gen. , killed at the battle of Antietam, 320. Starkweather’s brigade, at Perry ville, Ky., 177. Steadman, Gen., charge of, at Chickamauga, 556. Steedman, Gen. James B., at Nashville, 844, Steele, Gen. F., his operations on the eastern banks of the Mississippi, 372 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 378 ; at Helena, 605 ; captures Little Rock, 606 ; at Cam- den, 639 ; at Jenkins’ ferry, 640 ; at Mobile, 870. Stein, Gen., killed at the battle of Prairie grove, 365. Steinwehr, Gen., at the battle of Gainesville, 295 ; at Chancellorsville, 461 ; at Wauhatchie, 561. Stephens, Commander, disastrous enterprise of, to take possession of Fort Sumter, 592. Stevens, Gen. I. I., occuxnes Fort Beauregard, 75; expedition of, to Port Royal, 76 ; raid of, near Pocotaligo — at Secessionville, 580 ; death of, at Chantilly, 303 ; biographical sketch of {note), 305. Stevens, Gen,, at the battle of Shiloh, 109. Stevens’ Maine battery, at Gettysburg, 519. Stevenson, Ala., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. Stevenson, Gen. Carter L., at Champion hills, 410. Stevenson, Gen. Thomas G., killed near Spotteyl vania, 678 ; biographical sketch of {note), 705. Stewart, Gen. G. H., captured by Gen. Hancock, 681. Stewart’s brigade, at the battle of Shiloh, 106. Stone, Gen. C. P., at Poolesville, Md., at Ball’s Bluff, 53 ; in the Shreveport expedition, 624. Stoneman, Gen. Geo , repulsed at Williamsburg, 214 ; in command of the four divisions of cavalry, 451 ; expedition of, to destroy railroads — taken prisoner, 726 ; his operations against Breckenridge in East Tennessee, 836 ; raid of, into South Carolina, 895-897, Stony Creek Station, Gen Gregg’s raid against, 779. Strasburg, Va, . advance of Sheridan’s army to, 790. Streight, Col. A. D. , expedition of, 539 ; capture of, 540. Stringham, Commodore S. H., commands the fleet in the expedition to Hatteras, 63, Strong, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Wagner, 590. Stuart, Gen,, at the battle of Chickasaw bayou, 378. Stuart, Gen. J. E, B., raid of, at Hanover court house, 257 ; at Catletts station, 288 ; post at Man- assas surprised by, 290 ; raid of, into Pennsylvania, 332 ; at Chancellorsville, 464 ; cavalry engagement with Gregg, 490 ; at Gettysburg, 523 ; surprised by Gen. Custer, 656 ; death of {note), 685. Sturgis, Col., gallantry of, at the battle of Raymond, Miss., 407 ; (Gen.) defeat of, at Gumtown, 620. Suffolk, Va. , siege of, 594. Sumner, Gen. E V., in command of a corps in the army of the Potomac, 193 ; at Williamsburg, 214 ; at Fair Oaks, 237 ; at White Oak swamp, 265 ; at Antietam, 322 ; at Fredericksburg, 347 ; relieved of his command, 354 ; death of {note), 449. Sumter, privateer, blockaded at Gibraltar, 875. Surrender of, Gen. Jeff. Thomson in Arkansas, 948 ; Gen. Joseph Johnston in North Carolina. 947 ; Gen. Kirby Smith in Texas, 949 ; Gen. R. E. Lee in Virginia, 934. “ Swamp Angel.” a huge Parrott gun, so called. 591. INDEX. 975 Sweitzer Gen., at Gettysburg-, 514. Sweitzer’s Texan cavalry at Pleasant hill, 630. Swinton, William, his opinion of the losses in the overland campaign, 704. Sykes, Gen. at Mechanicsville, 258 ; at Gaines’ mill, 259 ; at Chancellorsville, 456 ; at Gettysburg, 507. T. Tallahassee, Confederate cruiser, depredations of, 876 ; destroyed by the Confederates, 869. Taliaferro, Gen. wounded at Warrenton turnpike. 293. Tatnall. Commodore Josiah, at Beaufort, S. C., 73. Taylor, Gen. Richard in command of Confederates in Louisiana, 437 ; defeat of, 438 ; operations of, 597 ; in command of the Confederate department of the South, 870 ; surrender of, at Citronella, Ala., 947. Taylor’s Bridge, Gen. Hancock at, 694. Tecumseh, monitor, strikes a torpedo and sinks, 644. Tennessee, t'onfederate ram, in Mobile bay, 641 ; de- scription of, 643 ; surrenders to Farragut, 647. Terrill, Gen., battery of. at Shiloh. 110 ; at Perry ville, Ky., 178 ; mortally wounded, 177. Terry, Gen. , A. H., at Stono river, 589 ; reconnoissance made by, towards Richmond, 773 ; his capture of Fort Fisher, 864-867 ; joins Sherman’s army near Goldsboro, N. C., 894. Texan Martyrs, 367. Thatcher, Admiral, operates against Mobile, 870. Thayer, Col., at Fort Donelson, 91 ; at Chickasaw bayou, 380 ; (Gen.) at Prairie D’Ann, 639. Thomas, Gen. Geo. H., defeats Zollikotfer at Mill spring, 81 ; antecedents of, 82 ; at Perry ville, 174 ; at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chickamauga, 550 ; firm- ness of, at Chickamauga, 555 ; in charge of the department of the Cumberland, 558 ; at Chattanooga, 565 ; commands the army of the Cumberland under Sherman, 706 ; sent to Nashville by Sherman, 805 ; left to cope with Hood in Tennessee, 811 ; his avail- able force when Hood entered Tennessee, 838 ; his campaign against Hood, 837-851 ; favored by Hood’s delay, 839 ; fights at Spring hill — evacuates Co- lumbia, 840 ; takes the offensive against Hood, 844 ; commands in front of Nashville, 844-847 ; defeats Hood, 847 ; appointed major-general in the regular army, 851 ; his instructions to Gen. Wilson, 873. Thomas, Gen., captured at Blakely, Ala., 872. Thompson, Gen. Jeff., at Fort Pillow, 143 ; retreat of, 146 ; surrenders at Chalk bluff, Ark., 948. Thompson, Gen. A. P , killed at Fort Anderson, 617. tidball. Col., artillery of, at Taylor’s bridge, 695. Tilden, Major, killed at Chantilly, 304. Tilghman, Gen., surrenders Fort Henry to Foote, 84. Tilton, Gen., at Gettysburg, 514 Tilton, Ga., capture of a blockhouse at, 808. Tolopotomy Creek, Va., Gen. Hancock at. 697. Torbert Gen , capture of Cold harbor by, 698 ; at Trevillian, 703 ; engagement of, at Luray, 797. Totten. Gen., at the battle of Prairie grove, 363. Tourtellotte, Col., in charge at Allatoona pass, 806. Towers’ brigade, gallantry of, at Manassas, 300. Trevillian, Va., battle of, 703. Tullahoma, abandoned by the Confederates, 543. Tupelo, Miss., Gen. Hood’s broken army at. 851. Turchin. Gen., at W’auhatchie, 560. Tuscaloosa, Ala., captured by the Nationals, 874. Tuscaloosa, ram, sunk by the Confederates, 873. Tuscumbia, Mo., seized by Gen. Mitchell, 115. Tyler, Gen. E. B., at Blackburn’s ford, 37 ; at Port Republic, 252 ; at Monocacy, 785. Tyler, Gen R. O., in command of artillerists, 684 ; wounded at Cold harbor, 701. Tyner’s Station, Tenn., burned by the Nationals, 565. Tyndall’s brigade at Wauhatchie, 561. U. Union City, Tenn., captured by Gen. Forrest, 616. Underwriter, gun boat, set on fire at New Berne, 858. Upton, Col., at Spottsylvania court house, 678. V. Van Bhren, Ark., captured by Gen. Blunt, 366. Vance, Col. killed at Sabine cross roads, 629. Van Cleve, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Chicka- mauga, 550. Vandever’s brigade at Chickamauga, 554. Van Dorn, Gen. Earl, at Pea ridge, 97 ; at Corinth, 118 ; at Pocahontas, 163 ; defeated at Corinth, 166 ; captures Holly springs, 374 ; operations of, 538. Van Pelt, Lieut., killed at Chickamauga, 550. Vaughan, Gen., defeat of, by Gen. Gillem, 835, 836. Velocity, gun-boat, captured off Galveston, 434. Verona, Miss., destruction of property at, 852. Vicksburg, situation of, 376 ; operations previous to the attack on, 394-401 ; assaults on, 415-419 ; sur- render of, to Gen. Grant, 427. Viele, Gen. Egbert L., at the siege of Fort Pulaski, 139 ; at Ocean view and Norfolk, Va., 228, 229. Villepigue, Gen., at Fort Pillow, 143 ; at Corinth, 164. Vincent, Gen., killed at Gettysburg, 513. W. Wadswokth, Gen., at Gettysburg, 503 ; killed in the Wilderness — biographical sketch of {note), 669. Wainwright, Commander, death of, on board the Har- riet Lane, at Galveston, 433. Walcott, Gen , his victory at Griswold ville, Ga., 815. Walker, Gen., at Raymond, Miss., 407 ; joins Bragg’s army, 546 ; at Chickamauga, 550. Wallace, Gen. W. H. L., at Fort Donelson, 90 ; mor- tally wounded at the battle of Shiloh, 107. Wallace. Col. Lewis, defeats the (’onfederates gt Romney, 49 ; (Gen ) at Fort Donelson, 87 ; noble conduct of, 93 ; in command at Fort Henry, 98 ; at Crump’s landing, 102 ; at Shiloh, 105 ; at Corinth 118 ; defeat of, at the battle of Monocacy, 786. 976 INDEX. Ward, Gen., at the battle of Chancellorsville, 465 ; at the battle of Gettysburg, 511. Warren, Gen. G. K., at Manassas, 300 ; at the attack on Marye’s hill, 472 ; at Gettysburg, 512 ; commands the fifth army corps, 658 ; at Jericho ford, 694 ; at the Weldon railroad, 780 ; at Five forks, 916 ; in command of the department of the Mississippi, 917. Warrenton Turnpike, Va. , battle of, 293 Warrenton, Miss., fleet passes the batteries of, 4')1. ^V’'ar^ington, near Pensacola, burning of, 68. ^Va^saw Sound, occupied by the Nationals, 75. Washburne, Gen. C. C. , at Jacksonport, Ark., 356; at Helena, 357 ; at Grand Coteau, 599 ; captures Fort Esperanza, 601 ; pursues Forrest, 828. Washington, D. C., contemplated seizure of, by the Confederates, 34 ; arrangements for the defense of, 80 ; troops left for the defense of, 192-194 ; measures taken for the safety of, 249 ; Gen. Pope charged with the protection of, 278 ; threatened by Early, 786. Wauhatchie, Ga., battle of, 561. W ayuesboro, Ga , battle of, 904. Webb, Gen., at Gettysburg, 527 ; killed in the Wil- derness, 672. Weber, Gen., at the battle of Antietam, 324. Weed, Gen., killed at the battle of Gettysburg, 513. Weitzel, Gen. G., his victory at Labadieville, La., 431 ; at Berwick, La., 437 ; at Port Hudson, 441 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687 ; at Fort Fisher, 861-863. Weldon Railroad, movements of Grant’s forces against, 741-745 ; series of battles for the possession of, 712, 762-766 ; Warren’s expedition against, 779-781. Wessels, Gen., his defense of Plymouth, N. C., 859. Westfield, gun-boat, at Galveston, 432 ; blown up, 433. West Point, Miss., battle of, 613. Westport, battle of, 832. Wheeler, Gen., attempts to recapture Fort Donelson, 537 ; at Chickamauga, 549 ; his raid against Sher- man’s communications, 729 ; repulsed at Dalton, Ga., 733 ; defeated at Waynesboro, 818. White, Gen. J., surrenders Harper’s ferry, 314 White House, Va., Sheridan’s cavalry attacked at, 745. White Oak Swamp, Va., battle of, 264. White River, expedition of McClernand up, 385. Whiting, Gen. W. H. C., at Gaines’ mill, 260 ; taken prisoner at the capture of Fort Fisher, 867. Whitney, Gen., severely wounded at Fort Fisher, 867 Whipple, Gen., at Chancellorsville, 459. Whittaker, Gen., brigade of, at Chickamauga, 556 ; at Wauhatchie, 566. Wilcox, Gen., repulse of the Nationals at Salem heights by, 476-478 ; at Gettysburg, 617, 525 ; in the Wilderness, 666. Wilcox, Gen. 0. B., brigade of, at Bull Run, 43; at Fredericksburg 348. Wild, Gen., in command of colored troops on the James river, 686. Wilder, Gen., operations of, 542, 543. Wilderness, Va., the battles in the, 664-672. Williams, Gen. A. L., at Chancellorsville, 459 ; at Gettysburg, 518 ; at Averysboro, 890 Williams, Gen. F. , operations of, against Vicksburg, 371 ; death of. defending Baton Rouge, 430. Williamsburg. Va., battle of, 214-225. Willich, Gen., operations of, 542 ; at Chattanooga. 572. W''ilmington, N. C.. occupied by Gen. Schofield, 869. Wilson, Gen. Jas. H., encounters W^ade Hampton’s cavalry and routs Heth’s infantry, 701 ; his expedi- tion ag-ain.st the Weldon and Danville railroads, 746 ; pursues Hood from Nashville, 847-849 ; hia raid in Alabama and Georgia, 873-875. Wilson, Col. William, Zouaves of, on Santa Rosa island, 67. Wilson’s Creek, Mo., battle of, 56. Winchester, Va. . Banks attacked by Jackson at, 247 ; Early defeated near, 787 ; battle of, 796. Winslow, Capt., sinks the cruiser Alabama, 877. Winthrop, Major Theo., killed at Big Bethel, 62. Wistar, Gen .attempts to take Richmond by surprise, 655 ; at Bermuda hundred, 687. Withers, Gen., at Shiloh, 109 ; at Murfreesboro, 180. Wood, Gen., at Murfreesboro, 180 ; at Orchard knob, 563 ; at Chattanooga, 572 ; at Nashville, 845. Wool, Gen. J. E., in command at Fortress Monroe. 63 , at Ocean View and Norfolk, Va, , 228, 229. Wh^rden, Lieut. J. L , in command of the Monitor, 206 ; operations of, at Fort McAllister, 582. Wright, Gen. G H., captures Fort Wa ker, 75 ; his expedition to Florida, 141 ; at Secession ville, 580 ; commands first division of sixth corps, 659 ; suc- ceeds Sedgwick in command of sixth corps, 676 ; at Spottsylvania. 682 ; at Cold harbor, 699 ; moves on the Weldon railroad, 743 ; in command of the troops around W'^ashington and pursues Early. 786 ; his successful attack on the Confederate lines, 918 ; at Sailor’s creek, 927. Wytheville, Va., Stoneman’s great raid on, 836. Y. Yazoo City, Miss., failure of operations at, 615. Yazoo Pass experiment, 396, 397. Yazoo River, situation of 377 ; Porter’s fleet in, 414. York, Pa. , exactions of the Confederates at, 499. Yorktown, Va., operations at, 195-199. Z. ZOLLIKOFFER, Gen. Felix K., enters Kentucky from the east, 58 ; killed at Mill spring, Ky., 81. Zook, Gen., mortally wounded at Gettysburg, 515. r / / s ’. I UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA 3 0112 098989590 3 0112 005608267