MACHINE MODEL * \ HAROLD F. GOSNELL LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY Of ILLINOIS 329 G69ra cop. 2 liUNOIS HISTORY SURVEY LIBRARY SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES DIRECTED BY THE SOCIAL SCI- ENCE RESEARCH COMMITTEE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO NUMBER XXXIII THE SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDIES are an expression of com- munity of interests of the social sciences. The publication of these Studies is one of the results of a comprehensive pro- gram of research which has been undertaken by a group or con- ference of departments. The formation of this conference is an out- growth of the belief that the social sciences should engage more actively and systematically in co-operative consideration of their problems and methodology. This does not imply any diminution of interest in the development of their special fields. The Studies, there- fore, are to include the results of scientific investigations usually associated with the fields of each of the participating departments. But they will also include the results of joint investigations of several or all of these departments as well as studies in related fields. Social Science Reseakch Committee Frank W. Freeman Charles E. Merriam William F. Ogburn Louis Wirth Robert Redfield, Chairman MACHINE POLITICS: CHICAGO MODEL THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS THE BAKER & TAYLOR COMPANY NEW YOBK THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, 8ENDAI THE COMMERCIAL PRESS, LIMITED SHANGHAI Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2012 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/machinepoliticscOOilgosn WHEN A LADY NEEDS A LOT OF FRIENDS •r/F&TWo*' From the "Chicago Tribune," February 7, 1931 MACHINE POLITICS CHICAGO MODEL By HAROLD F. GOSNELL Associate Professor of Political Science University of Chicago Foreword by WILLIAM F. OGBURN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO • ILLINOIS COPYRIGHT 1937 BY THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. PUBLISHED AUGUST 1937 COMPOSED AND PRINTED BT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, U.S.A. 4r r- PREFACE The present study is closely related to a larger study of the theory of democracy which the author has projected and par- tially completed. It happens that most, but not all, of the materials which are used in this book are drawn from the experience of Chicago with democratic institutions; but this does not lessen their value as evidence which can be used to verify or disprove certain hypotheses regarding governmental practices. As far as the number of people studied is concerned, there are many more in the city than in all of ancient Greece, and about as many as in Switzerland today or as in the entire continental United States at the time the federal Constitution was being framed. Thomas Jefferson was afraid of a democracy built upon an urban civilization. He said: "When they [the American people] get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, they will become corrupt as in Europe." If Jefferson were alive today, he would see many things in the city that carry out his prophecy. Some discerning reader may discover in these pages a Jefferson- ian skepticism of urban democracy. However, the writer has tried to be objective, relegating his functions as a citizen, a voter, and a taxpayer to the background, and emphasizing his role as an observer. The present book is based on a careful perusal of the Chicago newspapers for ten years, upon interviews which have been spaced over this period of time, upon personal observation of political meetings and election-day activities, upon participa- tion in court trials, and upon observations made as an active party worker. As a participant observer the writer has aided in the publicity work of several aldermanic campaigns, and in 1935 undertook to manage an aldermanic campaign for an inde- pendent candidate. His success as a campaign manager was not flattering, but he learned a great deal about Chicago politics. o viii PREFACE If time and money had permitted, the present study would have been entirely comparative. Wherever possible, an attempt has been made to show how typical of other cities the patterns of political behavior are in Chicago. Fortunately, in the past ten years a number of studies of the party politics of other cities has appeared; and, in so far as these studies yielded compa- rable data, they have been compared with the findings reached in Chicago. Peel's study of New York City political clubs, Salter's and Kurtzman's quite different analyses of Philadelphia district leaders, and Mosher's research on upstate committee- men in New York State have all furnished the basis of significant comparisons. However, none of these studies of other cities purports to cover as broad a field as the present analysis. The present study not only attempts to examine the party machine and the characteristics of the party workers but also presents an analysis of voting behavior in candidate and proposition elec- tions. Among the influences studied are the circulations of the important daily newspapers in Chicago. To the writer's knowl- edge, in no other city has so exhaustive a study been made of the social and economic background of voting behavior. The present analysis is a highly condensed presentation of the main findings of a number of studies. Preliminary manuscripts on the operation of the referendum in Chicago and on the 1928 committeemen are each longer than this book itself. The case stories of ward and precinct committeemen could be amplified and multiplied. Records were obtained regarding one hundred and seventy -five ward leaders and nine hundred precinct cap- tains. As far as possible, the materials presented are the most representative. Those who are interested in a detailed study of two typical ward leaders in Chicago and the groups they serve should consult the author's Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago. When it was not possible to obtain comparable material for other cities, data concerning Chicago as of two different time periods were used. One of the themes which runs through this book is that the profound economic changes of the period 1928- 36 have left their lasting imprint upon urban politics in the PREFACE ix United States. Certainly Chicago politics was not as corrupt, as violent, as vulgar, and as subservient to vested business interests in 1936 as in 1928. However, there is still vast ground for improvement in the morality of Chicago politics, and one of the antitheses of the thesis presented above is that many out- standing characteristics of the politics of the city are just the same after seven hard years of economic depression as they were in the boom days of the carefree twenties. Economic insecurity and deprivation, while great, were not sufficient to alter funda- mentally the pattern of the party organizations. If the whole seven years had been like the trying last two years of the Hoover administration, when the government was deadlocked and pro- test groups were rampant, perhaps the parties would have had to change their tactics. The city is now showing definite signs of economic recovery, and it appears that the old-line politicians will not be challenged in the immediate future. As far as possible, the materials in the chapters that follow are presented in nontechnical language. Those who are interested in the questionnaire, tabular, correlational, and factorial pro- cedures used as a basis for the theoretical interpretations can consult the appendixes. Portions of two chapters have appeared in slightly different form in various periodicals. I am indebted to the American Political Science Review, the Journalism Quar- terly, the Journal of the American Statistical Society, the Journal of Social Psychology, and the Annals of the American Academy for permission to quote from my published articles. It will soon be apparent to anyone who examines these pages that the writer did not do all the interviewing and tabulating by himself. The Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago very generously supplied him with re- search assistants and an allowance for overhead. The present book would not be possible without the efficient services of David Maynard, Sony a Forthal, Norman N. Gill, and Margaret J. Schmidt. In addition to these research assistants, the Board of Vocational Guidance and Placement of the University of Chicago has referred many other valuable student-assistants to the author. x PREFACE The author is indebted to his colleagues Professors Charles E. Merriam, William F. Ogburn, James Weber Linn, Harold D. Lasswell, T. V. Smith, and to Professor S. McKee Rosen, Mr. Edward M. Martin, and Miss Schmidt for reading the manu- script and offering many valuable suggestions, some of which were not followed for practical reasons. As is customary, the author assumes full responsibility for all statements of fact or judgment. The writer also wishes to acknowledge here the obli- gation he owes to Professor Ogburn for the Foreword and for an inspiring example of pioneering statistical work in the field of American politics. Harold F. Gosnell Chicago March 1937 FOREWORD This book, to which I have the honor of writing a foreword, is something new in the study of politics. It is new because it brings to political science the whole battery of scientific tech- niques of modern social science. The effect is most interesting, as may be indicated by an observation. I once heard of a man who was wonderfully skilled as wool- tester. He could feel a piece of wool with his fingers and tell how durable it would be, how much warmth it would hold, how much shoddy was in it, and could describe many other qualities of the wool and of the sheep that produced it. He could not, though, transmit his art to others, for he scarcely knew how he did it, though his results were good. About the same time I read an account of a method, developed in a laboratory, of measuring the properties of wool with the aid of a microscope, by counting the fibers, by measuring thickness, and by dimensioning air pockets and enumerating them per unit of area. By this means the weight of blankets necessary on a night with a temperature of, say, 30 degrees to keep the air surrounding the body at 98.6 degrees could be determined by anyone who could count and measure. In politics the politicians who are clever are like the wool- tester. They seem to know the job. But it is difficult for anyone to learn from them how they do it. But the scientific methods of Professor Gosnell are well organized and laid out, so that one may readily see just how his conclusions have been reached. Many of them, indeed, are better than those of the so-called "practical" politician, as might have been expected from his superior techniques. An illustration is his proof of the degree of effectiveness in the election of the Chicago newspapers, which were hostile to Roosevelt, despite the widely prevalent view that, because the President won overwhelmingly, the press was without influence. His method also permits deductions that the xii FOREWORD politicians would not be able to make, as, for instance, those regarding the influences of the business cycle in politics. The essence of scientific method is to hold constant all factors except the one whose influence is to be measured. This is what the chemist does in his laboratory and what the psychologist does with his guinea pigs. The author does the same thing with partial correlation. Social science, unlike mathematics, is not an arm-chair science. That the author knows his data, as well as his method, is evident from his apparent wide acquaintance with Chicago political leaders, big and little, with ward bound- aries, locales of operations, and services of precinct captains and ward bosses. This orientation with the realities of everyday politics makes his book more readable than others dealing with less concrete material. The modern scientific methods of trend lines, variance, multiple correlation, and factorial analysis have in recent years made much of economics, sociology, and psychology exact science. But for some reason their advance in political science has been slow. Perhaps Dr. GosnelPs work is a signal for a general forward movement which is surely inevitable some time in the distinguished field of political science. William Fielding Ogburn TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE List of Illustrations xv List of Maps and Charts xvii List of Tables xix CHAPTER J. Changing Party Fortunes 1 II. You Can't Lick a Ward Boss 27 III. Changing Character of Precinct Captains 51 /Tfr. Activities of Precinct Captains 69 V. The Voters' Response 91 VI. Conduct of Proposition Voting .126 VII. Action on Typical Measures 136 VIII. Relation of the Press to Voting 156 - : IX. The Role of Urban Politics 183 APPENDIX A. Tables and Forms 194 B. Factorial Analysis 206 C. Formulas and Equations 210 D. Bibliography 214 Index 221 Xlll LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS "When a Lady Needs a Lot of Friends" Frontispiece PAGE Mayor Edward J. Kelly 1 Committeeman Pat Nash 27 Alderman John J. ("Bathhouse John") Coughlin 51 Judge Edmund K. Jarecki 69 Mayor William Hale ("Big Bill") Thompson 126 Samuel Insull 136 Colonel Frank Knox of the Chicago Daily News 156 Mayor Thompson's Halter Campaign 166 "How To Vote Intelligently in the Primary" 182 LIST OF MAPS AND CHARTS FIGURE PAGE 1. Map of Chicago Showing 1921 and 1931 Ward Lines ... 31 2. Map Showing Percentage of Roosevelt Vote of Total 1932 Vote in Selected Areas in Chicago 96 3. Map Showing Nationality and Racial Groups in Chicago . 103 4. Scatter Diagram Showing Relationship between 1932 Roose- velt Vote and 1928 Smith Vote in 147 Selected Areas in Chi- cago 107 5. Map Showing Percentage of Roosevelt Vote of Total 1936 Vote in Selected Areas in Chicago 121 6. Scatter Diagram Showing Relationship between 1932 and 1936 Roosevelt Votes in 147 Selected Areas in Chicago . . 123 7. Size of Proposition Vote and Position on Ballot . . . .131 8. Specimen Proposition Ballot, November 4, 1930 . . facing 132 9. Map Showing Percentage Voting "Yes" on 1930 Bond Issue in Chicago 141 10. Map Showing Percentage Voting "Wet" on 1930 Repeal Ref- erendum in Chicago 150 11. Map Showing Percentage of Families Interviewed Having Chicago Daily News Home-Coverage, 1933 160 LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 1. Dwelling Units by Monthly Rentals for Chicago, 1930 and 1934: Number and Percentage Distribution 3 2. Interest in Voting for Ward Committeemen: Chicago, 1928-36 35 3. Ward Committeemen by Party, and Governmental Position Held: Chicago and Philadelphia 41 4. Private Occupations of Ward Committeemen in Chicago by Party, 1928 and 1936 47 5. Comparison of Occupations of Chicago and New York Pre- cinct Committeemen 54 6. Comparison of Educational Background of Chicago and New York Precinct Committeemen 57 7. Certain Characteristics of Precinct Captains in Chicago . 62 8. Distribution of Selected Chicago Precinct Captains Accord- ing to Benevolent Services Rendered, 1928 and 1936 ... 71 9. Variables Used in Study of Voting Behavior in Chicago . . 95 10. Correlation Matrix: Intercorrelations of Variables Re- lated to Voting Behavior in Chicago, 1928-36 109 11. Percentage of Vote on Measure of Total Vote at Elec- tion, 1924-35 134 12. Percentage of Vote on Measure of Total Registration, 1924-35 135 13. Action on Measures by Form of Submission, 1924-35 . . . 137 14. Comparison of Returns on Prohibition Referenda . . . 145 15. Number and Percentage of Voters in Chicago Favoring Tax Amendments, 1916, 1926, and 1930 152 16. Total 1931 City Circulation and 1933 Home-Coverage of Five Chicago Dailies 161 17. Column-Inches of Editorials, Cartoons, and Marked Ballots for Candidates, 1930-36 163 18. Percentage of Total Vote Received by Specified Candidates 170 19. Eight Variables Describing 47 Selected Areas in Chicago . 171 xix xx LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 20. IXTERCORRELATIOXS OF VARIABLES RELATED TO NEWSPAPER HoME- Coverage axd Votixg Behavior ix Chicago, 1930-36 . . . 173 21. Votes for Ward Committeemen 194 22. Descriptiox of 147 Units Used ix Study of Votixg Behavior ix Chicago 195 23. Units Used ix the Study of the Relatiox of the Press to Votixg Behavior ix Chicago 200 24. Factorlau Matrix Related to Votixg Behavior ix Chicago, 1928-36 207 CHAPTER I CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES The world-wide economic crisis which struck the United States with full vigor in the fall of 1929 undermined the popu- larity of existing political regimes in many democratic countries. In Canada, the Liberal government was swept from power in 1930; in Great Brit- ain and Australia, Labour governments were overwhelmed in the elections of 1931; and in Germany, the postdepres- sion elections brought about a Fascist revolution. On the other hand, the swing of the pendulum in France, Sweden, and Denmark was toward the left. From the standpoint of political theory it is a matter of prime importance to examine the conditions which are associated with changing political attitudes. In the United States, the economic deprivations which accompanied the downward trend of the bus- iness cycle brought varying responses. The voters in the New England states and the rural sections of the northeastern part of the United States changed their political attitudes least. A comparison of the 1928 and 1936 presidential election returns for the state of Maine shows a shift of only 10 per cent away from the Republican party which dominated the political scene in the prosperous twenties. On the other hand, there has been a 34 per cent shift from Republican-party presidential candi- dates in the state of California. These states are typical, in this respect, of the regions in which they are found. An examination of the changes in state and local politics in the United States during the past nine years shows a similar wide variation. In the state of Louisiana, a consummate dema- l MAYOR EDWARD J. KELLY 2 MACHINE POLITICS gogue, the late Senator Huey Long, was able to emulate the example of European dictators. By clever propaganda tech- niques, force, trickery, and bribery he was able to eliminate all effective opposition to his control of his state; and he was on his way to extend his domain when his life was cut short in 1935 by an assassin's bullet. In the state of California, a former Socialist, Upton Sinclair, was able to win the Democratic nomi- nation for governor in 1934 on the appealing platform, "Elimi- nate Poverty in California." While the state was Democratic in national affairs, the forces of reaction were able to turn back the Sinclair attack upon the status quo. On the other hand, the voters of Wisconsin and Minnesota turned in increasing num- bers to the leaders of new party movements which promised far-reaching changes in the economic order. In some of the great metropolitan centers of the United States the depression brought at least a temporary defeat for the po- litical organizations which had been long intrenched in power. The Tammany machine in New York City and the Republican machine in Philadelphia suffered severe reverses during the period. Economic discontent, plus the damaging disclosures of the Seabury Committee, brought the fiery Mayor La Guardia to office in New York. Philadelphia, corrupt but no longer contented, turned some of the Republican grafters out of power. What was happening in Chicago during these times of far- reaching political changes? Was there a turn to the right or a turn to the left? Did the voters show a disposition to support reform movements, as in New York City? Was there a drift away from the spoils tradition? In large measure none of these things happened in the second largest city in the United States. It is true that there was a shuffling of the political cards. Demo- crats were substituted for Republicans in practically all of the local offices. But these Democrats were not New Deal Demo- crats at heart. They were just like their Republican predeces- sors — spoils politicians. It is the purpose of this book to con- sider why there have been so few fundamental changes in the outlook of Chicago politicians during this period of economic crisis. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES How was Chicago affected by the depression in comparison with other large cities of the United States? Of the ten largest cities in the United States, one of the hardest hit by the de- pression was Chicago. Over half of the employees of the electri- cal industries, and a large proportion of those engaged in the furniture, packing, clothing, printing, and transportation in- dustries, were put out on the streets. Rents declined more TABLE l Dwelling Units by Monthly Rentals for Chicago, 1930 and 1934 Number and Percentage Distribution 1930* 1934f Dwelling Units by Rental Number of Families Percentage Distribution Number of Families Percentage Distribution Total 561,189| 100.0 580, 876 § 100.0 Under $10 . 00 5,100 17,380 33,805 81,194 146,256 186,484 60,500 20,730 4,820 4,920 0.9 3.1 6.0 14.5 26.1 33.2 10.8 3.7 0.8 0.9 16,981 69,272 73,410 143,922 212,687 48,582 8,774 4,651 1,383 1,214 2.9 $10.00-$14.99 11.9 $15.00-$19.99 12.7 $20 . 00-$29 .99 24.8 $30 . 00-$49 .99 36.6 $50 . 00-$74 .99 8.4 $75 . 00-$99 .99 1.5 $100 00-$149 99 8 $150.00-$199.99 0.2 $200.00 and over 0.2 * Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1930. t Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1934. X Cases (10,980) with no information on rental excluded from percentage distribution. § Cases (7,632) with no information on rental excluded from percentage distribution. drastically than in any other large city except Detroit. 1 In 1935, rents were only one -half of what they had been in the period 1923-25. Table 1 shows how precipitous was the fall of higher rentals in the city. Whereas nearly one-half of the dwelling units rented for $50 a month or more in 1930, only 12 per cent rented for this in 1934. New building was practically at a stand- still. As a matter of fact, more buildings were wrecked each year since 1931 than were erected. 2 Certainly all of these economic hardships must have brought Chicago Tribune, The 1936 Chart Book, p. 115. Ibid., p. 113. 4 MACHINE POLITICS their political repercussions. Unemployed persons have plenty of time to think about their woes. Were there no radical agita- tors in the region that produced the Haymarket riot and the Pullman strike? The city of Chicago produced practically no nationally known agitators in the period from 1928 to 1936. While the national government embarked upon tremendous schemes of public spending and governmental regulation, the local officials in Chicago had no program but retrenchment. Expenditures and services were cut, not willingly, but out of necessity and under terrific pressure from the banking interests. What was there about the social and economic structure of the city which made it so impervious to the tensions of the depression? In real estate, in banking, in trade, and in industry the leaders of Chicago during the boom period had been violent, offensive boosters. As one writer has put it, "A want of defer- ence for ceremony and tradition corresponded to a sometimes brutal disregard for the values inherent in human life, a defiance of established moral codes." 3 The possessors of economic power were, for the most part, self-made men who had shown them- selves more ruthless than their rivals. These men were not heir to any tradition which impressed upon them their responsibility to the general public. Instead, they were loud in their praise of business, vigorous in their opposition to any kind of govern- mental control over business, and scornful of the efficiency of governmental enterprises. Perhaps no one illustrated the old Chicago spirit better than Samuel Insull, the former utilities magnate. There is no doubt that he was a man of vision and a great industrial leader. Con- cerning his decision to come to Chicago to head the old Chicago Edison Company, he said: "It seemed to me that this great community must inevitably become the center of manufactur- ing for this populous and rich central valley of the country." 4 As the head of the Chicago electrical power industries, which 3 Louis Wirth, "Chicago: The Land and People," Survey Graphic, XXIII (October, 1934), 522. 4 Lloyd Lewis and Henry Justin Smith, Chicago: The History of Its Reputation (New York, 1929), p. 412. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 5 he soon became, Insull was greatly interested in promoting larger and larger turbines. At a time when others were shaking their heads, he was bold enough to experiment and push for- ward the engineering techniques. Insull's idea of civic pride was to build a newer and bigger opera house for the city by bludgeoning his business associates to make contributions. As for governmental officials, party leaders, educators, lawyers, and the editors of the lesser newspapers, he acted on the prin- ciple that each man had his price. Donald Richberg, his oppo- nent in the gas case, said: Insull was more responsible than any other one man in Chicago's history for the degradation of municipal government to its lowest level of corruption and incompetence. It was this misuse of political power which in the end de- stroyed his economic power. Honest, watchful government would have saved Insull from himself. 5 There is no question that the collapse of the public utility empire constructed by Samuel Insull was typical of the events which greatly aggravated the economic woes of the people in- habiting the Middle West. Not until his empire was crashing around him did he give up his optimism. His fall was all the greater because he tried to hang on too long. Can the politi- cians be held in any way responsible for the magnitude of the losses suffered by the public on account of the Insull debacle? The American system of government was obviously not geared to prevent business men from making mistakes which brought disaster to many innocent persons. In Chicago both the Demo- cratic and the Republican leaders aided and abetted Insull in his savage struggle for economic power. Both had accepted huge campaign-fund contributions from the utility magnate, in return for which they left him relatively unmolested to pursue his economic ends. 6 The responsibility of the politicians, Demo- cratic and Republican, was made doubly emphatic during the depression by the sensational disclosures, made during the In- sull trial, of the lists of insiders in Insull stock issues. 7 It was 5 Donald Richberg, "Gold-plated Anarchy: An Interpretation of the Fall of the Giants," Nation for April o, 1933, CXXXVI, 368-69. 6 C. H. Wooddy, The Case of Frank L. Smith (Chicago, 1931). 7 Chicago Daily News, September 30, 1932, gives the lists. 6 MACHINE POLITICS also revealed that one of the Democratic city hall wheel horses had handled the "junk" of the utility interests for the modest profit of over half a million dollars a year. 8 The reaction of the public to the Insull trial shows one of the reasons why economic adversity has changed political practices and morals in Chicago so little. Insolent, defiant, the white- haired fallen monarch of a far-flung utility empire told the judge, "I'd do it again." 9 The lawyers were sentimental; the case dragged on; the people forgot the millions that they had lost in Insull's holding companies; the jury brought in the ver- dict, "Not guilty." While the blot of Insull's connections marred the records of both the major parties, the Republicans were the worst suf- ferers. A year and a half before the stock market crash the Republican party was torn asunder by a primary election battle during which various Insull "deals" were made principal issues in the press. Such a destructive internal quarrel was not the best preparation for the lean years which were to follow. And the years were lean not only because of the loss of the patron- age offices but also because of the absence of large contributions from the utility interests. A political party which finances itself largely out of the public treasury and out of the pockets of the utility-users is in a deplorable condition when both of these two sources of revenue dry up. The Democrats likewise lost the support of the famous Insull chest, but they still retained the lion's share of the public jobs and the privileges which are attached thereto. The local governments in the Chicago region practically broke down when the depression hit the trough. An antiquated revenue system and a chaotic governmental setup were not equal to the emergency. Without federal aid, misery and want in the city would have reached alarming proportions. W 7 hile 8 The Democratic politician who handled the "junk" was Moe Rosenberg, who died while the United States government was investigating his income-tax returns. Rosen- berg made sensational charges about the sums of money he gave to politicians. See Daily News and Chicago Evening American for March 12, 13, 14, and 15, 1934. 9 Mitchell Dawson, "Insull on Trial," Nation for November 28, 1934, CXXXIX, 611-13. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 7 the credit facilities of all American cities were damaged by the economic crisis, the city of Chicago was in a particularly vul- nerable financial position because of drastic revision in its real estate assessment, which had just been started. This revision was necessary because of the favoritism and corruption discov- ered in the assessment office during the days of expanding real estate values and the political fix. 10 Out of the lessened and disappearing revenues, new and unexpected demands were made upon the local treasuries. For many years the city of Chicago had been noted for its "hobohemias," its havens for transient and homeless men. To these were now added a great army of unemployed. In October, 1933, there were 384,206 persons on the relief rolls, or 12 per cent of the total population of the city. If the tax machinery had been administered honestly and fairly during the period of rising real estate values, the various local governments would have been in a better position to meet the greatly increased demands placed upon them. The tax "racket" had been run by a bipartisan combination which in- cluded the leaders of the Democratic and Republican parties. Conditions grew so bad that the State Tax Commission ordered a reassessment in 1928. This action delayed the levying of taxes for a whole year and added to the financial difficulties which confronted the city when the depression began to pile up tax delinquencies. The governmental problems which confronted the Chicago region during the worst of the economic crisis were solved for the most part by the national government. The federal relief program, the public works program, the works progress pro- gram, the R.F.C. loans to Chicago banks, the loans to home- owners, and the loan to the board of education enabled the citizens to weather the severest of storms. One of the curious characteristics of the American form of government is that the local representatives of the party which put these national policies into effect operated in accordance with an entirely dif- ferent political philosophy from that of the nation-wide leaders. 10 Herbert D. Simpson, Tax Racket and Tax Reform in Chicago (Chicago, 1930). 8 MACHINE POLITICS These local leaders capitalized the popularity of their national leaders to their own political benefit. The national leaders, on the other hand, had very few means of disciplining the city bosses. The net result of the economic crisis, as far as the politics of the city of Chicago is concerned, has been the establishment of a political machine of unprecedented power. At the beginning of 1928 there was a fairly even balance be- tween the two major parties in the city. This balance was a delicate one, which depended in part on the Republican factions knifing each other and dealing with the Democrats. Of course, all factions, Republican and Democratic alike, were the hand- maidens of the business interests, i.e., they were not interested in disturbing existing economic relationships except for their own benefit or the benefit of the leaders of industry and finance. In 1928 the Republicans controlled the city hall, the two United States senatorships, the state government, and many of the county offices. The Democrats of this era were pretty well united, ably led, and not without important key positions. They controlled the county board, a majority of the "non- partisan" aldermen, and a disproportionate share of the state and congressional representatives. A failure to reapportion the city, the state, and the congressional districts worked to the benefit of the Democratic party, which was strong in the poorer residential areas where the population of the city had been declining. In 1936 the Democrats were in complete control of all the governmental agencies selected by, or represented in, the terri- torial limits of the city of Chicago. Only a few judges and five county commissioners from the country towns remained of the once haughty and confident band of Republican office-holders. Not since the formation of the Republican party in the city had the Democrats so completely dominated the political scene. As the depression deepened, the grip of the new Tammany grew tighter and tighter about the various corporate bodies located at the mouth of the Chicago River. That their success was hardly due to their own efforts bothered these new bosses not at all. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 9 While the Democrats were in a position to take advantage of the general swing of public sentiment in their favor after 1929, it took several years for them to reap the full benefits of their new position, since the terms of some of the Republican office- holders did not expire immediately. The first notable Demo- cratic victory was in 1930, when the Republicans lost control of the county treasurer's office, the sanitary district board, the county board, and the board of tax assessors. Each of these victories meant important additions to the patronage which the Democrats already enjoyed. In 1931 the Democrats cap- tured practically all the city hall jobs when they won the posi- tion of mayor in a great civic uprising. After the general elec- tions of 1932, Democrats replaced Republicans in the state's attorney's office and on the board of review (of tax assessments) . The local Republicans likewise lost all state and federal patron- age at the same election, since their candidates for governor, United States senator, and president went down to defeat. Two years later the Democrats again swept all of the county offices and made some gains in their representation in the state legis- lature. It took six years to put the finishing touch upon the job of eliminating the Republicans from governmental posts in Chicago, but the work was practically complete by 1933. In viewing the wreck of his party, one Republican ward commit- teeman said, "In my opinion, the Democrats now have greater power than any party has ever had in Chicago. Before they secured it, they promised open consultation and decision on all matters. Now it is practically impossible to see anyone in the city hall." 11 This Republican boss was not complaining about any changes in governmental policies brought about by the Democrats; he was whining about his loss of patronage. The depression years saw the elimination, one after the other, of the old-time leaders of the Republican party in Chicago. In Wisconsin the La Follettes were nominally Republican at the beginning of the economic crisis. While they suffered some set- backs, in the main they have weathered most of the political 11 Interview, 1936. 10 MACHINE POLITICS storms in the past nine years. The city of Chicago and the state of Illinois had no Republicans of this stripe. One of the first of the elder Republican statesmen to taste defeat was Charles S. Deneen, who failed to secure a renomina- tion as Republican candidate for United States senator in the primary of 1930. Since 1896, when he was first elected as state's attorney for Cook County, Deneen had been the leader of a powerful faction in local politics. While a master at compromise and combination, he was regarded as a cold figure personally; and his faction directed many of its appeals to the so-called respectable elements in the Republican party. As state's at- torney, as governor, as United States senator, he followed in a cool and calculating fashion the general rule of Chicago politics that all racial, linguistic, religious, economic, and neighborhood groups should be recognized on a balanced ticket. A dignified speaker, he never stooped to the arts of demagoguery, and he fell short of ever becoming a popular idol. While he lost his direct control of the federal patronage when his term as senator expired in 1931, his faction held the state's attorney's office and a position on the board of review until 1933. The man who had remained a regular Republican when Theodore Roosevelt was battling for the Lord in 1912 was not the person to lead the bewildered citizens of Chicago out of the morass they found themselves in in the dismal thirties. Deneen was a Hoover Republican — honest, well meaning, sincere — and, like the great humanitarian, he lost in popularity when the storm broke. The depression had likewise made disastrous inroads upon the ranks of his banking and business associates. 12 A second of the older leaders to be relegated to the back- ground was William Hale Thompson, the picturesque and bizarre mayor, who had been a storm center for more than twenty years. Thompson had wealth and social position, and he might have taken a place among the elite of Chicago. How- ever, he was not diligent at his studies, and he was not interested in society. As mayor of the city from 1915 to 1923 and from 12 On the failure of the Bain banks, see People v. John Bain et al., 358 111. 177, and W. H. Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years (Chicago, 1935), p. 532. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 11 1927 to 1931, he was hailed as "Big Bill, the Builder," Chicago's greatest booster, the defender of the weak, the champion of the people, while at the same time in certain newspapers the word "Thompsonism" came to be a symbol for spoils politics, police scandals, school-board scandals, padded pay rolls, gangster alli- ances, betrayal of the public trust, grotesque campaign meth- ods, and buffoonery in public office. He was the clown who distracted the people's attention while his political associates ran the city's business. He was a good clown and a firm be- liever in the principle that bad publicity is better than none. He believed in the campaign rule, "If your opponent calls you a liar, call him a thief." His slight of General Joffre during the war, his expedition to photograph the tree-climbing fish, his rat show at which he tried to discredit two former associates, his slogan "Kick the snoot of King George out of Chicago," and his campaign properties, such as a halter, a burro, and a donkey, started reports that went around the world. The peo- ple laughed and said that "Big Bill" was a "good guy." As one political observer put it, "his genius for the spectacular made him an international figure. He might produce dismay and ridicule, but he was a force to be reckoned with." 13 As he grew older, Thompson grew cynical about the motives of some of his associates. As far as can be ascertained, he personally derived no pecuniary benefit from his activities in politics. He liked the game and the crowds. However, with a World's Fair in the city approaching, the voters grew tired of his antics. Samuel Insull, who had been the financial godfather of many of his campaigns, had troubles of his own. As Thompson had con- tributed to defeat Deneen and his cohorts, so the Deneen fac- tion helped turn some of the voters away from Thompson. During the mayoralty campaign of 1931 the state's attorney's office indicted Thompson's city sealer on the ground that he had conspired with merchants to rob the people of $54,000,000 by 13 Phillip Kinsley, in the obituary which was removed from the Chicago Tribune office and used in Thompson's campaign pamphlet for the 1931 mayoralty election. For further details on Thompson's methods of winning local groups, see H. F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians, chap. iii. 12 MACHINE POLITICS short weights. 14 At a time when incomes were rapidly dropping, these charges did not do Thompson any good. But Thompson was not completely eliminated by his defeat in 1931. His friends and enemies were amazed at his vitality. If he had been younger and if he had not had to carry such a load of unfavorable publicity, he might have been one of the big figures of depression politics. His faction succeeded in nomi- nating Len Small for governor in the Republican primary of 1932. Len Small's platform seemed to recognize the fact that there had been an economic crisis. However, in the fall election Small ran behind the head of the Republican ticket, and the Thompson machine was smashed beyond all recognition. In spite of this, Thompson refused to go into retirement. In the fall of 1936 he came out of seclusion to run for governor on the Lemke ticket in order to make doubly sure the defeat of Brooks, the Republican candidate who had the support of the Chicago Tribune. The effort was needless, and the former great cam- paigner could not muster 100,000 votes in the city that had been the scene of many triumphs. He cut a pitiful figure, in- deed. Insull's money and the city hall patronage had made a tremendous difference. On the ruins of the Republican organization in the city the Democrats have built the most powerful political machine that the city has ever seen. None of the leaders of the Democratic party has been a member of Chicago's Four Hundred in recent years, as far as could be ascertained. One of them, Patrick Nash, was listed among the highest income -receivers in 1925, but his name could not be found in the social register. The Democratic bosses have been recruited, for the most part, from the second-generation immigrant classes in Chicago. They are self-made men and can easily understand the point of view of Chicago self-made business men. The leadership of the Chicago Tammany first fell to Anton J. Cermak, who became one of the important cogs in the Demo- 14 Daniel Serritella, state senator and friend of Alphonse Capone, was city sealer under Mayor Thompson. For an account of his trial, see Chicago Daily News, April 1, 2, 1931; Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1931. On appeal the conviction secured in the lower court was reversed. See People v. Serritella, 272 111. Appellate Ct. (1933), 616. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 13 cratic party when he was elected president of the county board in 1922. Cermak was born in Prague, Bohemia, and brought to the United States when he was very young. In deriding his humble origin, Mayor Thompson said, "Tony, where is your pushcart at? Can you imagine a World's Fair mayor with a name like that?" 15 But Cermak had demonstrated by years of hard work and clever maneuvering that he could hold his own with any of Chicago's professional politicians. As state repre- sentative, as alderman, as bailiff of the Municipal Court, as president of the county board, and as mayor, he was noted for his force, firmness, persistence, and shrewdness. He was charged with profiting from his position on a number of occasions, but he always managed to win over his accusers. In the 1931 cam- paign Thompson bellowed, "Saving Tony .... saved six mil- lion out of a $10,000 salary .... built the county jail without a boiler .... grafts on coal and paving." 16 However, the re- ports about his connection with real estate deals, bootlegging, and gambling were never made matters of court record. Before the days of prohibition he had been the archrepresentative of the liquor-dealers; during the prohibition era, when he was president of the county board, the country towns under his jurisdiction were said to be wetter than Chicago; and as mayor his personal bodyguard was accused of being involved in the shooting of a gangster who furnished no resistance. 17 Hard times and a lack of cash had not decreased the interest in gambling, the most profitable of all the political rackets. The fact remained that Cermak was more willing than Mayor Thompson to meet the demands of the bankers and business groups for reform of the tax machinery and drastic economy in local government. As party boss, Cermak ruled with an iron hand, kept all the patronage under his thumb, and dealt ruthlessly with those who 15 Stenographic record of Thompson s speech. 16 Ibid. 17 Chicago Daily News, September 26, 1933. For a discussion of this case, see M. Mayer, "Corrupt and Discontented?" Survey Graphic, XXIII (October, 1934), 480-81. 14 MACHINE POLITICS furnished any opposition. In the Democratic primary of 1932, things were not as harmonious as they had been under Brennan's leadership; and Cermak did not hesitate to ride his machine rough shod over the Irish contingent under the leadership of Michael Igoe, Democratic leader in the state legislature, who had been bold enough to challenge the machine. On the other hand, Cermak was a master at the art of conciliating business, labor, reform, nationalistic, and neighborhood associations. His 1932 primary slate included representatives of the Jews, the Poles, the Italians, the Czechs, organized labor, organized business, and many other groups. Cermak was destined never to be a World's Fair mayor. While his local victory was complete in 1932, he had backed the wrong horse in the Democratic national convention. Using Senator J. Hamilton Lewis as a favorite -son candidate, he had joined the anti-Roosevelt forces that hoped to renominate Al Smith. Cermak had the social philosophy of a business man and an organization politician. Senator Lewis did not lend himself to this game and abruptly withdrew his name from consideration without consulting the mayor on his move. In order to prevent the federal patronage from being used against him by Senator Lewis, operating under the rule of senatorial courtesy, Cermak tried to make peace with James A. Farley, chairman of the Democratic national committee, and with President-elect Roosevelt. To this end he went to Miami, Florida, in February, 1933, where both Farley and Roosevelt were enjoying a rest. 18 There were a number of federal positions in which Cermak was particularly interested, such as the local postmastership, the district attorney's post, and the federal judgeships which might become vacant. At the climax of his career, at the age of fifty-nine, Cermak's life was cut short by an assassin's bullet which was aimed at Roosevelt. The question as to who would succeed Cermak was not de- cided immediately. When Cermak became mayor in 1931, his lifelong friend, Patrick A. Nash, became the chairman of the Democratic county committee. From the standpoint of age, 18 Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1933. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 15 experience, and financial standing, Nash was logical successor to Cermak. Born in 1863, he inherited with his brothers a prosperous business as sewer contractor. He had been a neigh- bor and close friend of Roger Sullivan, Democratic state leader. It was said that the Nash Brothers firm did more sewer work than any other around Chicago. At any rate, when the federal government made public the income returns for 1925, Nash was among the ten highest income-receivers in the city of Chicago. 19 Although he served nine months by appointment on the board of assessors and in 1918 was elected to the board of review, he usually preferred to remain behind the scenes and manipulate the wires. However, he could not prevent some unfavorable publicity in connection with Insull's lists, his income tax, and the loss of certain federal contracts. His hobby was the breed- ing of thoroughbred horses for racing. Since he was known as the great harmonizer of the organization and since he had met many of the business men as tax-reviewer, he was asked to assume the position of leadership left vacant by Cermak. For the asking, Nash could have been made mayor; but he felt that the work would be too onerous for a man of his age. Legislation was rushed through the general assembly at Spring- field authorizing the city council to choose the new mayor. It was claimed that this would save half-a-million dollars, the cost of a special municipal election. After refusing to take the posi- tion himself, Nash suggested the name of Edward J. Kelly, president of the South Park Board and chief engineer of the sanitary district. The Democratic caucus agreed to this sug- gestion, and since thirty-eight out of the fifty aldermen were Democrats, the election followed as a matter of course. 20 As the sanitary district has control of sewage disposal in the Chicago area, it was natural that Nash and Kelly would be well known to each other. Governor Horner and Kelly had lived in the same ward in Chicago and were acquainted as neighbors and fellow-Democrats. In addition, Colonel Robert R. McCormick, the publisher of the independent Republican Chicago Tribune, 19 Ibid., September 1-30, 1925. 20 Ibid., April 14, 1933; Chicago Daily News, April 13, 1933. 16 MACHINE POLITICS was friendly toward Kelly since the days when McCormick was president of the sanitary district board. The business men who were backing the World's Fair had already made contacts with Kelly in connection with his position on the South Park Board. The press was kindly toward the new mayor at first and did not remind the public that he had been indicted in connection with the sanitary district scandals of the famous "whoopee era." 21 Nor did the papers bring out the fact that he was having trouble with his income tax. Here was another self-made man who was wholly in sympathy with the social philosophy of the business men. At the age of fifty-seven, Edward J. Kelly, without turning a finger, became the mayor of Chicago. The son of a Chicago policeman who had immigrated from Ireland during the Civil AYar, Kelly had become in turn rodman, computer, subinstru- ment, subassistant engineer, assistant engineer, assistant chief engineer, and chief engineer of the sanitary district. His engi- neering training was entirely practical, since his education did not extend beyond high school. Politics became one of his early interests, since he was a member of the senatorial district con- vention which nominated Cermak for the state legislature in 1902. It was said that Kelly was very thrifty and had built up a comfortable income. As Horner put it, in the bitter primary campaign of 1936, in answer to Kelly's charge that he (Horner) was not a politician, "If to amass a huge fortune on a modest salary is to be a politician, I am not a politician." 22 Later Horner said, "And the national administration turned a deaf ear .... to 'Boss' Kelly when he was forced to pay from $105,000 to $110,000 to the federal government on his income of $450,000 during the years 1926, 1927, and 1928. " 23 However, when Kelly was first made mayor, he had the good wishes of the press and the general public. Tall, athletic looking, modest in speech and manner, he made a fine-appearing mayor to wel- 21 At the time of the indictment, the Chicago Tribune ran a story. See issue of May 30, 1930. 22 Chicago Evening American and Chicago Daily Neics, March 3, 1936. 23 Ibid., March 16, 1936. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 17 come the World's Fair guests. Furthermore, he was willing to listen to the suggestions of the bankers, editors, and business men. While the new Kelly-Nash machine had its weak points, it would probably have gone ahead without mishaps had not certain mistakes been made. Shortly after coming into office, Kelly gained control of the school board, which up to that time had been run by Thompson holdovers. Although the school budget for the year had been passed, the new board, made up for the most part of practical business men, held a secret session and adopted a drastic program of economy which was con- demned by educators everywhere. 24 The city junior college and the junior high schools were completely abolished; the work in music, manual training, household arts, and physical education was eliminated from the elementary schools; and the kinder- gartens were cut by 50 per cent. Teachers, pupils, parents, and civic leaders protested against the flouting of the superintend- ent and the interests of the school children, but the board was adamant. The callous attitude of the new board was the prod- uct of its ignorance, since it was persuaded, by experience, to reverse itself on many points, the demands of the bankers and business men for economy, and the indifference of the Catholic elements in the city, which had to support schools of their own which served half as many pupils as the public schools served. It is an axiom of wise boss rule in the United States that it is good politics to provide an efficient educational system. The well-intrenched boss of Kansas City, Missouri, Pendergast, has acted to his own advantage on this principle. The Kelly-Nash machine was also brazen in its handling of the liquor question. President Roosevelt's election brought to an end the prohibition era in Chicago politics, with its gangster bootleggers and demoralization of the law-enforcing authorities. The repeal amendment which went into effect in November, 1933, was overwhelmingly indorsed by the voters in the city of Chicago. Here was a golden opportunity to contribute some- thing to the solution of the difficult problem of liquor control. 24 Chicago Evening American, July 13, 1933. 18 MACHINE POLITICS National Democratic leaders had promised in the 1932 platform that there would be no return to the saloon and the evils of the old liquor traffic. Public discussion of the question was wide- spread, and there were many research organizations which publicized the experience of other countries. The Chicago politicians were not interested in liquor control. Their main concern was how much revenue would the city get from this source and who would enjoy the political advantage of con- trolling the licensing of the traffic. This meant that they were interested in promoting, not regulating, the liquor business. As a local newspaper put it : It is true that the 8,000-odd saloons in Chicago now are called taverns, but that does not change the fact that they are saloons, with the appearance and the character of the old saloons that spread corruption and degradation be- fore prohibition. They are, in fact, somewhat worse than the old-time saloons because thou- sands of women frequent them now, many unescorted. That was not per- mitted in the "old days." .... The open saloon is here. Its "attendant evils" are here, too, all of them — drunkenness, brawling, moral deterioration, murder. 25 The extent of the popular reaction to the highly political solution of the liquor question is shown by the number of precincts which voted "dry" in the 1936 general election. Al- though the law was cumbersome, a number of community groups took advantage of it in order to get rid of the taverns in their neighborhoods. In spite of its mistakes and the lukewarm attitude of the national administration, the Kelly-Nash machine functioned in a very effective fashion in the congressional and county elections of 1934 and the mayoralty election of 1935. After the sweeping Democratic county victories of 1934 the Republican organiza- tion was completely bankrupt, financially and morally. Five years earlier, a man with Kelly's record would have been re- garded as an easy mark for the Republican organization. How- ever, in 1935 there was no Republican faction which had the ready cash for a real fight or which had a leader who was willing 25 Ibid., January 6, 1934. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 19 to enter the lists with the odds appearing to be so strong against him. In previous Republican primaries, the Chicago Tribune was willing to give one of the Republican candidates consid- erable publicity, but in this campaign it kept entirely aloof. As a result the Republican nomination went by default to a man who was actually chosen by the Democrats on the basis of a bipartisan deal. 26 The Democratic organization wanted to pile up such a huge vote for Kelly that the national adminis- tration would be impressed and ready to recognize more of the claims of the local leaders. No hitch marred the working of this scheme, and Kelly received 800,000 votes to 167,000 for his Republican rival, who waged a listless "powder-puff" campaign. There were charges that 200,000 of these votes were stolen; but even granting some election irregularities, the vote was a strik- ing indication of popular support. The result might be put in this fashion: About one-half of the registered voters sup- ported Kelly. The other half stayed away from the polls, for the most part, since it did not see any real alternative to Kelly. Shortly after the election Kelly went to Washington in order to talk "turkey" with the federal officials about the Works Progress Administration money to be spent in Chicago. Presi- dent Roosevelt went out of his way to congratulate the mayor on his splendid vote. 27 Following the stunning victory of 1935, the machine met a few setbacks. The first was the famous Sweitzer case. On two occasions the genial "Bob" Sweitzer, popular after-dinner speaker and well-known race-track fan, had been the Demo- cratic nominee for mayor. For twenty -four years he had held the office of county clerk, which meant that he had survived the severest Republican landslides. He had received the in- dorsement of independent Republican newspapers for the posi- tion as well as that of various business groups. In 1934 he was nominated and elected county treasurer. His successor in the 26 This charge was made by the manager for the third-party candidate. See Chicago Daily News and Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1935. The author has substantiated it on the basis of private sources. 27 Chicago Tribune, April 12, 1935. 20 MACHINE POLITICS county clerk's office refused to take over the books until there had been an audit. Early in May, 1935, there were rumors that this audit showed a shortage in the funds of around $400,000. The audit was finally made public; and on the basis of it the county board removed Sweitzer from the office of county treas- urer, to which he had recently been elected. A most extraordi- nary series of events followed. By his own admission, it was obvious that he regarded the tax-redemption fund which had been in his charge, as county clerk, as "nobody's money," to be handled as he pleased — in his vest pocket or even in the stocks of questionable companies which were about to make fortunes manufacturing coal bricks, monkey wrenches, or what not, but never did. It was also obvious that this fund was a kind of "self-service" money reservoir for politicians, who were free to dip into it at any time with no thought of paying any of it back. Throughout the proceedings for his ouster from the county treasuryship, the quo warranto trial which he instituted to regain his office, and the criminal trial which was brought against him by the state's attorney, he maintained an air of injured innocence, always promising to produce the money but never doing so. The significance of this case is what it revealed about the operation of the machine. As one editorial writer put it: It was all too evident that Sweitzer's party associates were not vigilant to protect the public from his weaknesses. They were not diligent to protect Sweitzer from himself. Ever since the famous incident in 1926, when Sweitzer made good a rubber check for $89,050 made out to the gambling king, Col. Edward R. Bradley, winner of the American Derby that year, Nash and his merry men have been on notice that their "good fellow" vote-getter was a playboy entrusted with millions of the people's money. The story reeks of clandestine conspiracy to hoodwink the people and to cheat them of their rights. Sweitzer was only one poor pawn in this game. The whole Xash crowd became moral accessories after the fact. The outfit has shown that it regards public office as a private snap. 28 Economic adversity had made the voters more tax conscious than they had been in the prosperous twenties, and Sweitzer's antics were not viewed with complacency. However, the genial 28 Chicago Daily News, May 23, 1935. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 21 Bob was a good witness for himself and a fine courtroom actor. The jury in the criminal trial brought in the cheering verdict, "Not guilty." The first real test of the Kelly -Nash machine came in the Democratic primary of 1936 in connection with the guberna- torial nomination. Prior to his election as governor, Henry Horner had not had any experience in a large administrative office. During the first part of his governorship he felt it neces- sary to consult with his friends and party advisers very fre- quently. Although he was a great admirer of Mayor Cermak and was under obligations to him for his nomination and elec- tion, Horner did not follow Cermak's suggestions on all oc- casions. Horner had a streak of stubborn idealism in his make- up, which he displayed when he felt the issues were clear. Many of his friends felt that he did not show this side of his character soon enough. After Cermak was replaced by the Kelly-Nash combination, the governor became more and more independent. At the same time the Democratic organization became more shameless in its demands. In the summer of 1935, considerable friction developed between the governor and the Chicago Democratic leaders when the governor vetoed a bill to legalize race-track handbooks in the city. As has already been indi- cated, a number of prominent politicians were interested in race-track betting, and they were out to increase their business. The Citizens Association and a number of other civic groups prevailed upon the governor to veto the legislation. Governor Horner and the Kelly-Nash machine broke openly when the mayor announced that he was going to support Her- man N. Bundesen, city health commissioner, for the governor- ship. Horner had been asked to retire gracefully. He had even been offered a federal judgeship as an inducement to withdraw from the race, 29 but the blandishments of the machine could not remove the implication that he had not made good as governor. Rather than go on the bench, he preferred to take the risk of going down fighting. At any rate, he could turn to a lucrative private practice of the law with the feeling that he had done his 29 Chicago Herald and Examiner, March 4, 1936. 22 MACHINE POLITICS best. It seemed at first as though he was going against hopeless odds. As the primary campaign developed, the Horner forces gained considerable momentum. In addition to the handbook issue, which the organization had a hard time explaining, the governor took advantage of the rivalry between Chicago and downstate, the agitation for a sound system of registration of voters, a bit- ter newspaper war over the question of daylight saving, and the rising resentment of a large body of citizens at the high-handed methods of the Democratic organization leaders. For many years the League of Women Voters and other civic organizations had carried on a campaign for legislation which would lessen fraudulent practices in connection with registra- tion. At first the Republican machine in the state legislature had blocked this legislation; and then, when the Democrats came to power, the tables were reversed. Governor Horner kept the question alive by pressing it in a special message to the state legislature just before the primary. The bill passed the house, being supported by practically all of the Republicans and the downstate Democrats. In the senate the measure lost by a very narrow margin, owing to the absence of some of its potential supporters and the determined opposition of the Kelly-Nash bloc. This action on the part of the machine leaders put them in a position which was difficult to defend. The Chicago Tribune had supported Kelly on practically all of his policies, but it was against him in his opposition to a bill designed to secure honest and more economical administration of elections. When the mayor tried to defend himself, he appeared foolish. He failed to follow Frank Kent's rule of political behavior, "Never handle a hot poker on the front porch." 30 Election manipulation may be a common political technique in the largest American cities, but a wise boss does not try to apologize for it. The democratic symbols are sufficiently sacred to the rank and file that their cheapening and degrading is resented. Mayor Kelly's reference to the possible loss of 200,000 votes in the coming presidential 30 Political Behavior (New York, 1928), chap. xvi. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 23 election because of the disfranchisement of persons who could not sign their names was turned neatly against him. As Horner put it, "Do any of you think President Roosevelt would care to be elected in Illinois by crooked votes? .... They are still trying to vote butterflies, fence rails and ghosts, but it is not going to work this year. The people of Illinois are aroused against bossism and they are going to see that 'Boss' Kelly won't rule Illinois." 31 Governor Horner's fight for votes in Chicago was greatly aided by the jealousy of the newspaper proprietors. It was obvious that the Chicago Tribune was the chief beneficiary of the city ordinance which provided for permanent daylight-sav- ing time. This action cut the afternoon papers out of one of their early financial editions. The dailies affected did every- thing in their power to discredit this action and to undermine confidence in the city administration which was responsible for it. Governor Horner's campaign was a convenient channel into which they could direct their energies, and they gave full pub- licity to his crusading speeches. In the fall election the city hall machine and the Tribune were defeated on the issue of permanent daylight saving by the Horner forces, organized labor, and the afternoon papers. By a popular vote of two to one the electors supported propositions which called for a return to Central Standard Time during the winter months. So rapidly did the sentiment in favor of Governor Horner grow that two of the local leaders of the Kelly -Nash organiza- tion deserted to the Horner camp within the last week of the campaign. Both of them were accused of following their own selfish interests, which bound them close to the state govern- ment; but, be this as it may, it did not lessen their shrewdness in picking a winner. If Horner had been defeated, they would have lost both their state and local contacts. In building up a rival organization Governor Horner did not hesitate to use state patronage freely. The Kelly -Nash group tried to discredit his campaign by sensational charges of pay-roll padding, and the 31 Chicago Evening American, March 28, 1936; Chicago Daily News, March 30, 1936. 24 MACHINE POLITICS state treasurer went to the point of holding up some of the pay rolls. However, this line of attack fell flat, as it was a case of the kettle calling the pot "black." The victory of Horner over Bundesen in the Democratic pri- mary destroyed the myth of the invincibility which had grown up around the Kelly-Nash machine. To be sure, the governor lost the city of Chicago by 150,000 votes; but his margin of 300,000 votes downstate gave him a comfortable lead. The hardest blows to the prestige of the Democratic organization were the large size of the Horner vote in Chicago, the loss of eight wards by the organization candidate, and the loss of con- trol over the governorship. Horner was more in sympathy with the policies of the New Deal than were the Chicago bosses. Three hundred thousand voters in Chicago sensed this. 32 The momentum which Horner gained in the primary and the continued Democratic sweep in the nation were so strong that Horner was re-elected governor by a safe margin in the fall election, even though he ran behind the top of the ticket in Chicago instead of ahead of it, as he had in 1932. In spite of internal dissensions within its ranks, the Democratic party appears to be securely in the saddle in Illinois. Harmony and rigid discipline used to be the order of the day for the minority party of the prosperity days. However, so intense did the struggle for power within this party become when it became a majority group that open factional warfare could not be avoided. The mad scramble for control over the liquor traffic, gambling, contracts, jobs, special favors, and public expenditures split the new machine, as it had broken party machines which held sway before it. Mistakes in judg- ment, lack of adroitness in campaigning techniques, and the rivalry between Chicago and the rest of the state accentuated the centrifugal forces which had been brought into play. Seven years of depression in the city of Chicago have made practically no changes in the fundamental character of party 32 The final returns for the city of Chicago were: Bundesen, 481,966; Horner, 319,927; Robertson, 12,508. Horner needed a big vote in Chicago to make his lead downstate effective. The vote downstate was: Bundesen, 133,105; Horner, 450,210. CHANGING PARTY FORTUNES 25 organization, methods, and leadership. It is true that the for- tunes of individual politicians and parties have been greatly altered, but the party system has remained about the same. The party which controlled only a minority of the local offices when the financial crash came was greatly benefited by its connection with the new national administration, but it did not change its outlook. Jobs and spoils were the currency of Chicago politics in 1936 as well as in 1928, and not issues which concerned the functions of municipal government in times of great economic stresses and strains. The political bosses who found themselves in power in the great metropolis of the Middle West in the thirties were, for the most part, self-made men. Chicago, in contrast to New York, has been a center abounding in self-made men — indus- trialists, grain merchants, large department-store owners, and real estate speculators. Chicago business men and politicians were accustomed to dealing with men and materials directly in their everyday work. In New York City the bankers are more prominent than the industrialists. Investment bankers work largely by means of secondary contacts, established by reports, charts, and graphs. During the economic crisis many of the industrial leaders of the city of Chicago met financial reverses, but there were others who stepped into their places. The economic setup of the city was altered in details but not in its general pattern. The self-made politicians understood the self-made business men, as they talked the same language. While the sources of revenue available for local governmental purposes were greatly reduced, the politicians were able to use what there was to consolidate their positions. They said, in effect, to the business men: "You leave us alone and we will leave you alone." The economic crisis in Chicago was met not by the local governments but by the national government. And what were the other groups doing during this period? What were the demands of organized labor and the organized consumers? The answer to the latter point is simple. There were practically no well-organized groups of consumers who could make articulate demands upon the local party leaders. 26 MACHINE POLITICS But surely Chicago has always been a well-organized labor town? During the depression the leaders of the trade-unions in Chicago were unusually silent. Some of them had been the heroes of the post-World War era of labor insurgence, when they had tried political methods, had failed to leave any lasting impression, and had been rebuked by their national leaders. Disillusionment, advancing age, and troubles with racketeering minorities stilled their voices during a time when many of their rank-and-file members had plenty of grievances. Economic hardships undoubtedly created feelings of discon- tent which might have been used to bring about political changes, but the city lacked the kind of leadership which was necessary to guide the inarticulate demands of the masses. The new Tammany which was created on the ruins of its opponents' machines was led by men who were thoroughly in sympathy with the philosophy of big business. The conservative political outlook of the political, industrial, and financial leaders and a lack of local constitutional powers prevented the city govern- ment from becoming a major instrumentality of the citizens in meeting their problems during the crisis. CHAPTER II YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS Of the economic and political changes which took place in Chicago during the period 1928-36, some were revolutionary in character. A complete new set of political leaders was brought in by the depression. What hap- pened to the lesser political lights and the ward bosses? A comparison of the lists of ward committeemen for 1928 and 1936 shows some marked similarities. Twenty-one of the Democratic ward committeemen were the same in both lists, and eleven in the Re- publican lists. However, these fig- ures do not reveal the real stability of the city committees. Thirteen Republicans and eight Democrats died in office. The proof of the hypothesis that a ward committeeman can't be "licked" is shown by the fact that only nine Republicans and five Demo- crats were "whipped" in straight contests for re-election. In other words, considering the fact that there were fifty Republican and fifty Democratic ward committeemen to be elected five times during the period under discussion, this turnover is amaz- ingly small. Out of a total of five hundred ward contests, only thirteen city committeemen were "licked." Their superiors might change, but the ward bosses clung to their posts in spite of economic and political storms. What is the secret of this longevity of ward bosshood? While economic changes bring about changes of party leaders and bring in entirely new leaders in the national and state fields, they have relatively little effect upon the ward bosses because these key men in the party hierarchy have their roots deeply 27 COMMITTEEMAN PAT NASH 28 MACHINE POLITICS planted in the spoils system which is characteristic of metro- politan regions in the United States. In order to become a ward committeeman in Chicago, the aspirant must begin political work at an early age. Long years of apprenticeship seem to be one of the qualifications. Once elected, a ward boss who shows the ordinary amount of adroit- ness and party regularity is likely to be continued in office. He has the advantage of experience, patronage power, the prestige which is attached to the office itself, and the inertia of the rank- and-file party membership. The outstanding example of such a history in the city of Chicago is the famed Michael ("Hinky Dink") Kenna, who has been the ward boss of the First Ward, containing the central business section of the city, since 1897. The invincibility of ward bosses in metropolitan sections like Chicago is in part due to their legal position. Every important political faction in both the Democratic and Republican parties tries to select the best possible representative for each of the fifty wards. While the legal position of these party officials has been confused during the past twenty years, their de facto func- tions have remained the same. 2 The official duties of the ward 1 For an early description of Kenna, see H. G. Wells, The Future in America (New York, 1906). "Now Alderman Kenna is a straight man, the sort of man one likes and trusts at sight, and he did not invent his profession. He follows his own ideas of right and wrong, and compared with my ideas of right and wrong, they seem tough, compact, decided things. He is very kind to all his crowd. He helps them when they are in trouble, even if it is trouble with the police; he helps them find employment when they are down on their luck; he stands between them and the impacts of an unsympathetic and alto- gether too-careless social structure in a sturdy and almost parental way. I can quite believe what I was told, that in the lives of many of these rough undesirables he's almost the only decent influence. He gets wives well treated, and he has an open heart for children. And he tells them how to vote, a duty of citizenship they might otherwise neglect, and sees that they do it properly. And whenever you want to do things in Chicago you must reckon carefully with him . . . ." (ibid., p. 131). 2 The Primary Law of 1910 failed to specify the term of the ward committeemen and the time of their election. Elections were held in 1914 and 1916 but not in 1918. The Primary Law of 1919 provided for the election of ward committeemen in 1920 for a four-year term. This law was declared unconstitutional in the case of People v. Fox, 294 111. 263, and both the 1916 and 1920 committees claimed to be the lawful com- mittees. In 1921 the number of wards was changed from thirty-five to fifty. The Pri- mary Law of 1927 was upheld by the courts (People v. Kramer, 328 111. 512). It pro- vided for a two-year term, but a 1935 amendment extended the term to four years. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 29 committeeman elected by the voters in his party primary in- clude membership in the judicial circuit convention, which nominates candidates for the Superior and Circuit Court bench ; membership in the county central committee, which sends dele- gates to the state convention, which in turn nominates can- didates for the Illinois Supreme Court, trustees of the Univer- sity of Illinois, and delegates at large to the national nominating conventions; and membership in the congressional district and city committees, which fill vacancies and manage the local campaigns. Even though the Republican party in the city of Chicago has received some very severe reverses during the past seven years, it has still maintained a foothold on the bench. The Democratic bosses have not been so brazen as to try to sweep the bench clean of the sitting Republican judges. In Chicago there is a tradition of long standing that a judge who serves well on the bench should be allowed to remain there regardless of the fortunes of his party. In the past, when political bosses have defied this sentiment by a wholesale attack upon the sit- ting judges, the bosses have come to grief. 3 Besides, judicial patronage has not been large enough to tempt the bosses to make a strenuous fight for it. They have preferred to avoid the trouble of a real contest by bipartisan arrangements. Conse- quently, a ward committeeman of a minority party is in a posi- tion to exercise some influence upon the nomination of judges. In each of the party governing bodies the vote of a ward com- mitteeman is in proportion to the total primary vote cast in his ward by the members of his party. Thus, if in one ward 20,000 voters call for Democratic ballots, and in another ward only 10,000, the successful candidate for ward committeeman in the former ward would have twice the voting strength of the one in the latter on the various Democratic committees. The same rule holds for the Republican committee. Persons inter- ested in the job of ward committeeman, then, try to get the maximum primary vote for their party in their ward. The rela- tive number of persons taking part in the Republican primaries 3 E. M. Martin, The Influence of the Bar upon the Selection of the Bench (Chicago, 1936). 30 MACHINE POLITICS in Chicago has declined enormously during the past eight years, but it still behooves each Republican candidate for ward com- mitteeman to seek to maximize his influence with reference to the other Republican ward committeemen. The geographical boundaries of the wards are drawn largely to suit the wishes of the aldermen and the ward committeemen. According to law, the redistricting of the city into fifty wards after each decennial census is the function of the city council only, but in practice the ward committeemen have a great deal to say about how the ward lines will be drawn. In 1936 it hap- pened that fourteen of the ward committeemen were also alder- men. This contingent in the city council would have been sufficient in itself to control apportionment, since a minority can hold up the entire redistricting ordinance. However, most of the other aldermen were under obligations to the ward com- mitteemen of their particular party. In theory the aldermen were elected on a nonpartisan basis, but all of the members of the city council selected in 1935 had the backing of the Demo- cratic or the Republican organization. The Democratic sweep of that year left only five nominally Republican aldermen out of a council of fifty. All the others were elected by means of Demo- cratic backing. In making a reapportionment, the city council keeps a num- ber of things in mind. According to the city charter, the wards should be as nearly equal in population as possible. However, some wards are declining in population and others are growing very rapidly. A redistricting which was absolutely fair imme- diately after the census was taken would soon be grossly unjust to the outlying sections of the city, which are expanding by leaps and bounds. The 1921 and the 1931 ward lines, which are given in the accompanying chart (Fig. 1), discriminated in favor of the depreciated or blighted areas found near the business center of the city. The most glaring example of a rotten borough is the First Ward, where in 1936 "Hinky Dink" had only 14,119 registered voters, as compared with 52,675 registered voters for the Fifth Ward. In drawing ward lines all the tricks of gerrymandering are MAP OF|CHICAGO SHOWING 1921 AND?193lTWARD LINES •0-I93I □ -I92I Fig. 1 32 MACHINE POLITICS also employed by the alderman. A comparison of Figures 1 and 3 4 show the extent to which nationality and racial groups were cut into small bits by the 1921 and 1931 ward lines. Ward committeemen of Irish extraction have been particularly active in splitting up their bailiwicks so as to prevent their defeat by Italian, Polish, or Jewish rivals. The men who combine the positions of aldermen and ward committeemen take a high and mighty position about their prerogatives with reference to reapportionment. At the time of the 1931 redistricting, the Kiwanis clubs of Chicago were anxious to make a contribution to the solution of this problem. They made a careful study of the subject and recommended that the wards close to the center of the city be made larger in order to allow for a declining population, while the outlying wards should be made a little smaller in population so as to anticipate their more rapid growth. This is the thanks which one Kiwanis Club received from a dictator-boss, "king-pin" alderman ward committeeman : Dear Sir: I am in receipt of a letter which you have forwarded to a member of the Kiwanis Club. In this letter you state that a conference has been arranged with Mr. Cer- mak and Mr. Busch on the proposed plan of redistricting of wards. I am told by the Kiwanis Club of my ward that you have a proposed plan to redistrict my ward, by putting it in a neighboring ward Let me tell you that you have as much chance of doing this as Ford has of being Mayor of Palestine. I am one of the members of a committee of five of the City Council who will redistrict Chicago, and I suggest that if you want anything to say about redistricting my ward or any other ward, you had better run for Alderman and if you are elected you will have the right to redistrict by virtue of the peoples' votes. There is too much of usurping of the rights of the people-elected officials, and I know I voice the sentiments of every Alderman in the City Council when I say to you, Hands Off. Very truly yours, Alderman, Ward 5 4 Figure 3 is given on p. 103. 5 Photostat copy of letter dated May 1, 1931. Slight alterations were made of the original so as to conceal the identity of the writer. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 33 Although the Democratic party was a minority party in Chicago before 1930, nevertheless it dominated the redisricting because of its strength in the so-called "River wards," where population was declining. 6 This control of ward lines by a single party during the entire period was one of the elements which checked change. Ward committeemen are difficult to defeat because practi- cally all the elective office-holders are under obligations to them. In Illinois most of the candidates for elective positions are nomi- nated by party voters in direct primary elections, but the ward committeemen are very influential in making up the pre-pri- mary unofficial slates. 7 No person has much of any chance of winning a nomination in a direct party-primary election unless he has the backing of influential ward leaders. In general the more duly elected ward committeemen a candidate has in back of him, the greater are the chances of success in the primary. The complicated mechanism of the government of the Chicago region requires the voters within the city limits to exercise over one hundred and fifty primary- and election-day choices during a six-year period. 8 The drafting and circulation of petitions for the candidates for these one hundred and fifty different positions is largely in the hands of the ward committeeman. Even in an opposition party without patronage, like the Republican party in 1936, the nominations are controlled by the ward bosses. Ward leaders perpetuate themselves because of the consid- erable control they have over the election machinery. A given political party is entitled to three of the five members of the precinct boards of election in every other precinct, according to the Illinois election law. 9 Even when a party is out of power in the county and city, it still retains the privilege of naming 6 Wards, 1, 11, 20, 21, 28, 33, 42, and 43. 7 C. H. Wooddy, The Chicago Primary of 1926 (Chicago, 1926). At the time this book was written, the legal position of ward committeemen was confused, but the fac- tional representatives in the various wards performed the functions of the office. 8 C. E. Merriam, S. D. Parratt, and A. Lepawsky, The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago (Chicago, 1933), pp. 81-82. 9 Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, General Election Laws (Chicago, 1935), citing city Election Act, sec. 11. 34 MACHINE POLITICS one-half of the precinct judges and clerks of election for the en- tire city. The ward committeeman sends to the board of elec- tion commissioners what are called "submittal lists," and these lists are used in making appointments of precinct election offi- cials. 10 This customary privilege exercised by the ward com- mitteemen is of great importance not only because of the patronage involved but also because of the power over the election process itself. According to the parlance of the poli- ticians, there are some wards which are "dependable," meaning that the wards can be depended upon to deliver the number of notes which are needed to win regardless of how the duly quali- fied voters may mark their ballots. Election frauds are possible only when the precinct election officials themselves are corrupt or so inefficient that they would not be likely to detect corrup- tion. In spite of the importance of the position of ward committee- man, only a portion of the voters take the trouble to indicate their preferences for this position. This situation is not peculiar to Chicago, as Mosher found a great deal of indifference among the voters of cities in upstate New York toward the selection of committeemen. 11 During the eight-year period beginning with 1928 there were five occasions on which ward committeemen were elected by the members of the Democratic and Republican parties. Ac- cording to Table 2, at no primary have as many as two-thirds of the registered voters marked their ballots for ward commit- teemen; and at two of the primaries (1930 and 1934) only slightly more than one -half of the voters performed this func- tion. Most of the registered voters who do not concern them- selves with voting for ward committeemen fail to come to the polls on primary days. Under the Illinois laws the primary voter has to ask for a Republican or Democratic ballot. He may not change his party affiliation in less than a two-year 10 In re Maguire (hearing before the County Court, 1930). 11 William E. Mosher, "Party and Government Control at the Grass Roots," Na- tional Municipal Review, XXIV (January, 1935), 16. He found that only 36 per cent of major party enrolment voted for committeemen in primary elections of 1932. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 35 period. Many persons do not wish to reveal their party affilia- tions for fear that they will be charged with partisan activities, teachers wish to appear impartial before their students, many persons may be awaiting the lapse of the two-year period in order to change their party affiliation, certain business men who may have convictions which draw them to a party which is out of power may not be willing to expose themselves to persecution by the powers that be, and persons who are dissatisfied with both the major parties may wish to be available as signers of TABLE 2 Interest in Voting for Ward Committeemen: Chicago, 1928-36 Aggregate Vote Percent- age of Regis- tered Vote Percentage of Total Primary Vote Percentage of Registered Vote Cast for Republican and Democratic Candidates for Ward Committeemen \ear Cast at April Pri- maries Percent- Percent- Republi- can Demo- cratic Republi- can Pri- mary Demo- cratic Pri- mary age of Total Vote at age of Total Regis- Primary tered Vote 1928 71.0 81.6 18.4 • 57.9 13.0 91.1 64.7 1930 59.5 73.2 26.8 43.6 15.9 90.7 54.0 1932 68.4 52.1 47.9 35.7 32.8 88.9 60.9 1934 58.5 39.1 60.9 22.9 35.7 89.7 52.5 1936 72.8 28.7 71.3 20.9 51.9 87.7 63.9 a third-party petition. These and many other reasons may be offered for not coming to the polls on primary day. Table 2 shows that from 10 to 12 per cent of those who come to the polls on primary election days do not take the trouble to indicate their choice for ward committeeman. One obvious reason for this is that there is no contest for the position in many instances. Thus, for the entire period studied there were no contests in twenty-four Republican and none in ninety-one Democratic ward committeemen elections. Only in the Re- publican committeemen elections of 1932 were there contests in every one of the fifty wards. During the past eight years the 36 MACHINE POLITICS Democratic ward committeemen have been more successful in discouraging opposition to their re-election. Certainly, it is strange that such a valuable post is not more vigorously sought after by aspiring party leaders! A closer examination of the situation reveals the fact that many of the contestants are eliminated by the board of election commis- sioners on the ground of technical deficiencies in their petitions. The names of these hopeful politicians do not appear upon the party ballots in the primary. Some have attempted to run anyway, by waging a "write-in" campaign; but such campaigns are extraordinarily difficult to conduct and require great zeal, money, intelligence, and organizing ability. Each individual voter must be instructed as to the proper spelling of the name to be written in on the ballot, as to the necessity of placing a square in front of the name, and finally as to the usual cross mark. There is no known instance of a candidate for ward committeeman who waged a successful "write-in" campaign against an opponent who had regular party organization sup- port. 12 In other words, the device of raising technical objections to a petition is one which serves the purposes of the incumbent ward committeemen. Many troublesome rivals have been eliminated by the sitting ward committeeman by means of legal technicalities raised in the hearings on the petitions. The objections raised include such trivialities as mistakes in the numbering of the pages of the petition, the failure to bind the petition in acceptable form, the omission of the word "street," the printing of the word "Chicago" where the law requires it to be written by the voters, and the use of ditto marks. These are requirements which can be observed by any candidate who makes an effort to find out the law and practice on such matters. On the other hand, a petition may be thrown out because of the detection of a simi- larity of handwriting. Prior to the fall of 1936 the City Election Act did not require the voter to sign his name when he regis- tered, and the board of election commissioners had no real proof 12 In the 1936 Republican primary in the Nineteenth Ward there were 2,284 "write- ins" for Northrup. Rohn won, with 6,761 votes. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 37 as to the validity of such an objection and the most perfect petition ever presented could have been thrown out in an arbitrary fashion. This meant that the inside ring of a political organization had a strangle hold upon the office of ward com- mitteeman. In the primary of 1936, only one sitting Democratic ward committeeman was defeated for re-election, and his op- ponent was in the good graces of the city hall machine. 13 Since the new permanent registration act went into effect with the signature requirement, it should be possible to check upon the validity of signatures on petitions. But there are many contests for the position of ward com- mitteeman. A rival candidate may be so strong that the ward committeeman who is coming up for re-election may think that it is better to win in a straight fight. Otherwise, the feeling against him might hurt his chances of securing a big primary vote in his ward and a large vote for his party in the final elec- tion. The figures show that, even where there is a contest, from 8 to 10 per cent of the voters fail to mark their ballots for ward committeeman. The names of the contestants for this position appear in the lower right-hand corner of the ballot, which re- quires some forty or more choices to be made. The voters who are not conscious of political affairs are likely to miss completely the significance of the position. They read in the daily paper about the city-wide candidates, but they know nothing about ward politics. In the primary of 1936 many persons asked for Democratic ballots, and then merely voted for Horner for gov- ernor and for Courtney for state's attorney. Not only are ward committeemen elected by a minority of the registered voters, but it appears that those who exercise a choice for the position very frequently defeat their own ends by sup- porting a candidate who belongs to a city-wide faction which they oppose. Thus in the famous Republican "pineapple" primary of 1928, the candidates of Mayor Thompson's faction for county 13 After the hearings on petitions were over, regular Democratic ward committee- men deserted the city hall machine for the Horner forces. It was too late for the city hall machine to use its full weight against these recalcitrants. 38 MACHINE POLITICS and state positions were defeated in the city but the mayor and his friends retained a two-thirds majority of the ward committeemen posts. History repeated itself in the Demo- cratic primary of 1936. Governor Horner was able to carry wards in the city of Chicago which re-elected the ward com- mitteemen who represented the city hall machine. 14 Many party voters do not know that the man who is running for ward committeeman belongs to a faction which they dislike. The incumbent ward committeeman has many advantages over his opponents. If his party controls certain patronage offices, he has his job-holders and their friends who will work for him. In addition the committeeman is likely to have superior financial resources. If his party is in power, there will always be a large fund available to pay canvassers, watchers, and other precinct workers. The committeeman always makes sure that the marked ballots and other literature emphasize the importance of his election. I have attended many political meetings where the ward committeeman told his workers to have the voters vote for him first. In some wards the committeeman may bar- gain with other factions for personal support. He is willing to desert some of the candidates on his faction's slate in return for votes for himself. Reference has already been made to the fact that during the past eight years there have been many more bitter contests for Republican ward committeemen posts than there have been for Democratic. Successful Republican candidates for ward committeeman have never received much more than half of the Republican primary votes in any year, and in 1932 they received less than half. The disharmony in the ranks of the Republican party has been partly caused by the varied com- position of the party. Well-to-do white Protestants, Negroes in less fortunate economic circumstances, and, from time to 14 The results in the Democratic primary of April 14, 1936, in the Fifth Ward illus- trate this clearly: Fob Governor For Ward Committeeman Henry Horner 11,083 H. G. Lindheimer (Kelly-Nash) . . . 13,404 Herman N. Bundesen 10,411 Donahue (Horner) 5,429 Sullivan 571 Nelson 590 YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 39 time, considerable numbers of Jews and Catholics of foreign origin, living in low rental areas, have voted in the Republican primaries. The leaders of these different elements have made appeals which fitted their own constituencies and have, as a result, found it difficult to work together. Discord has further been sponsored by bitter newspaper rivalry. Even prolonged adversity has not brought the Republican factions together. In the Democratic party, on the other hand, harmony has usually been the rule until recently. In 1932 and in 1936 there were contests for ward posts which were encouraged by candi- dates who wished to break the organizational slate for state offices. When the Democratic party fought the Republicans more or less upon even terms, they presented a united front; but since they have controlled all important local offices for several years, they have quarreled among themselves regarding the division of the spoils. During the term that Mayor Cermak controlled the organization, the Irish were jealous of the power exercised by the Slavic elements in the party. Since the coming to power of the Kelly -Nash machine, the German Jews and the native American elements have been struggling for power with- in the organization. Since the ward committeemen constitute the core of the party machine, a closer examination of their characteristics will throw light upon urban politics in a large American metro- politan community. Patronage is the cement which unites the party organization. What have the ward committeemen done for themselves? The drastic changes in the fortunes of the Republican and Democratic parties that took place in Chicago during the years 1928-36 are reflected in the figures given in Table 3. At the beginning of the period, three -fourths of the Republican ward committeemen held elective or appointive positions in the gov- ernment service; and at the end of the period, only one-sixth were directly connected with the public pay roll. Two-thirds of the 1936 Republican ward committeemen were former office- holders, and their continued interest in politics was an indica- tion that they had hopes of future rewards. On the other hand, 40 MACHINE POLITICS the Democratic ward committeemen strengthened a grip on the public pay roll which was already powerful in 1928. Patronage positions were fairly evenly divided between the two major parties in 1928, but eight years later the Democratic ward committeemen had almost a monopoly of the key posts. Of the seven Democratic ward committeemen who were not employed by some governmental agency in 1928, three were in occupa- tions which enabled them to have many dealings with public authorities. One was in the sewer contracting business; the second was in a law firm which had many political ramifications; and the third was in the insurance business. There is an amazing similarity between the distribution of public jobs held by the Chicago Republican committeemen of 1928, the Philadelphia committeemen of 1934, and the Chicago Democratic committeemen of 1936. In Chicago the depression has merely substituted a predominantly Republican for an overwhelmingly Democratic machine control. The main fea- tures of the spoils octopus, with its tentacles squeezing the life out of civic enterprises, is about the same. Labels have been changed. The complete control which the Democrats gained over the governmental offices meant that all persons seeking govern- mental privileges or protection had to come to them. Now, some businesses are much more vulnerable to political pressures than others. Economic enterprises which were national in scope or which did not depend upon public franchises were, to some extent, immune from badgering by local politicians. However, the public utilities, the larger real estate interests, the local bankers, the contracting firms, the hotel and rooming-house proprietors, the small retailers, the liquor dealers, and other similar businesses were susceptible to political pressures. A street-car franchise, a rate structure, road improvements, depos- it of public funds, the soundness of local governmental securi- ties, the awarding of public contracts, the enforcement of the building code and fire regulations, the use of the sidewalks by shops, and the granting or withholding of licenses to do certain types of business were favors which the local machine had to YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 41 hand out; and the political bosses usually stipulated conditions which helped to consolidate their power. If a business man failed to live up to these conditions, if he failed to make a con- TABLE 3 Ward Committeemen by Party, and Governmental Position Held: Chicago and Philadelphia Chicago Philadel- Governmental Body Republican Democratic phia: Re- publican City Com- 1928 1936 1928 1936 mitteeman* 1934 City: Elective Appointive County: Elective 5 7 8 4 4 1 It 5 1 9 2 2 8 3 3 6 13 7 8 5 2 18 1 4 Appointive Sanitary district: Elective 3 15 Appointive State: Elective Appointive Federal: Elective 4 4 3 1 4 2 1 2 Appointive Former office-holder: Elective 2 4 6 3 14 19 9 9 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 Appointive Never held office No information 4 Total 50 50 50 50 50 * D. H. Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1935), App. A. t Held city appointed office as well. tribution to the campaign fund, if he openly opposed the politi- cal machine, he would find the favor withheld, and in some cir- cumstances he would find himself a butt for persecution. His taxes would be raised, the building inspectors would find many 42 MACHINE POLITICS things wrong with his buildings, his desire to be permitted to extend his holdings or his operations would be blocked, and in some cases he would be openly intimidated. Mayor Kelly has been appealed to from time to time by bigger business men to hold off his political wolves. The mayor has complied. But the lesser fry cannot always get access to the big boss. There are many known cases where they knuckle under or go out of business. If legitimate businesses of many sorts may be brought into line by a political machine, how much easier it is for the local bosses to bring the illegitimate enterprises under their influence. In a great metropolitan community like Chicago, the gambling privileges are perhaps the most important of all privileges at the command of the political machine. In the great cities of the United States, where there are many persons with liberal views on gambling, prostitution, drinking, and other human diver- sions, the existence of a powerful underworld, with its alliances with business men and machine politicians, may be taken for granted. Gambling kings, bookmakers, panders, thieves, boot- leggers, racketeers, and other hoodlums enjoy extraordinary immunity from interference on the part of the law-enforcing agencies. These outlaws realize that this freedom from restraint depends upon how useful they can make themselves to the politicians. ^Yhen asked to make campaign contributions or to produce results upon election day, the leaders of the underworld cannot very well refuse. If they do, their places will be promptly raided by the law-enforcing authorities. Not only are the contributions from the underworld interests an important item in the campaign funds of the dominant party, but the services of the underworld personnel are also significant. ^Yhen word is passed down from the gangster chiefs, all pro- prietors of gambling houses and speak-easies, all burglars, pick- pockets, pimps, prostitutes, fences, and their like, are whipped into line. In themselves they constitute a large block of votes, and they frequently augment their value to the machine by corrupt election practices. Chain voters, colonized voters, and crooked election boards are recruited from the ranks of or- YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 43 ganized crime. 15 In connection with a proved case of ballot alteration, it was discovered that the election judge responsible for handling the ballots was a card shark in the local gambling dens. 16 Because the laws against gambling are very difficult to enforce, owing to the ease of concealing violations and the spas- modic interest of the public in such matters, the politicians and gambling kings unite their interests in the perpetuation of the political machine. In Chicago a number of the ward committee- men have been proprietors of gambling houses. During the time that the Republicans were in power a few of the Republican ward committeemen met violent ends in gang warfare. The Republican ward committeemen who managed to sur- vive the disasters that wrecked their party and to cling on to some public position in spite of the depression fall into two categories: those who were elected from districts which con- tained a concentration of Republican voters, and those who were appointed to administrative posts by one of the Republi- can judges. Two of these committeemen were state senators from districts which contained a large proportion of Negro voters, and two were state representatives from districts where at least one-third of the voters were Republicans. The cumula- tive system of voting used in Illinois for the election of state representatives insured minority representation in any district in which the minority party had at least one -third of the votes and the senatorial committee nominated only one candidate. Such action on the part of the Republican senatorial committee resulted in the "plumping" or accumulation of three votes for the Republican representative for every straight Republican vote cast. The other Republican committeemen who were known to have governmental jobs in 1936 were the appointees of Republican judges who remained on the bench because of bipartisan or nonpartisan backing. Thus, two of the committee- men were court bailiffs, and a third was a master in chancery. 15 John Landesco, "Organized Crime in Chicago," Part III of Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago, 1929). 16 H. F. Gosnell, "Fighting Corruption in Chicago," Polity, July-August, 1935, p. 138. 44 MACHINE POLITICS The remaining Republican office-holder was an alderman elect- ed from a ward which had strong Republican leanings. There is no question that other Republican committeemen received favors from Democratic officials. With the investigat- ing facilities and time available, it was not possible to track down all of these relationships. About a half-dozen of the Re- publican committeemen were engaged in the wholesale or retail liquor business. Since the licensing of the sale of alcoholic bev- erages was completely in the control of the Democrats, these committeemen were in a vulnerable position. In addition, it appeared that a few of the committeemen had some connection with gambling in one form or another. With the Democrats controlling all the law-enforcing machinery, these Republican committeemen were under obligations to the Democratic party, which made it difficult for them to perform all of their duties as Republicans. They were paid in jobs or favors not to get out the Republican vote. These bipartisan dealers, although trai- tors to their party, were hard to dislodge upon primary days, since they could command the services of job-holders who were loyal to them personally on such occasions. These job-holders, of course, could not be used to help the Republican party on election days. Some Democratic committeemen found it easier to buy off the Republican committeemen in this fashion than to engage in genuine party warfare. When the Democrats were a minority group in the city, some of their committeemen were bribed in this fashion. Hard times reversed the roles of the Republican and Democratic committeemen in these bipartisan deals, but they did not lessen the effectiveness of these prac- tices as means of self -perpetuation. Ward committeemen held tenaciously to their positions dur- ing the period under discussion because, in the main, they were representatives of different racial, linguistic, and social groups found in the city. In the areas where there is a concentration of Negro population, both the Republican and Democratic parties had Negro committeemen. 17 In the areas where persons of Polish descent are found, the parties kept a Zintak, a Kon- 17 See Gosnell, Negro Politicians, pp. 139, 153 ff. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 45 kowski, a Rosenkowski, a Kucharski, a Golusinski, and a Peska as committeemen; and in areas where many persons of Italian extraction are located, the committeemen bore such names as Serritella, Pacelli, Vignola, and Porcaro. Some of these com- mitteemen were members of the famous Unione Sicilione, which obtained much unfavorable publicity during the Al Capone- prohibition era of Chicago politics. The same principle that the dominant group should be represented by a member was fol- lowed in the sections populated largely by Jews. However, persons of Irish Catholic extraction were far in the lead in both committees. In the Democratic committee the lead was over- whelming, as over one-half of the committeemen were descend- ants of Irish parents, three having been born in Ireland them- selves. As far as the Republican party city committee was concerned, there was a close race between the Irish and the native Protestants of older American stocks, each constituting about one-fourth of all of the committeemen, with the Irish slightly in the lead. The Republicans likewise had a greater contingent of persons of Swedish, German, and Italian extrac- tion; but the Democrats led in their representation of the Polish elements. In 1936, one-fifth of the Democratic committeemen and only one-sixteenth of the Republican committeemen were born abroad. The second generation of the foreign born were the ones that made the greatest headway in Chicago politics. While representative of the different nationalistic groups, the ward committeemen were at the same time thoroughly accli- mated to the city. As compared with the general population of the city, a larger proportion of the committeemen were born in Chicago. In 1928, over two-thirds of the Democratic com- mitteemen were born in Chicago, as compared with slightly over one-half of the Republican committeemen. Eight years later the ratio of native Chicagoans among the committeemen was about the same, both being in excess of 65 per cent. It appears that those who grow up in the atmosphere of Chicago politics are more likely to become attracted to party organization work than those who are brought up elsewhere. Although the personnel of the ward committees changes 46 MACHINE POLITICS slowly, there are some replacements. In addition to the re- movals by death and by that rare event, defeat at the polls, there were thirty-three voluntary retirements during the period under discussion. What effect has the depression had upon the type of new committeemen recruited? Economic deprivations have increased the competition for party posts, and this has resulted in the attraction of persons of superior economic status. An analysis of the schooling of the committeemen at the beginning and the end of the period studied, shows an increase in the level of formal education achieved. In 1928, about one-half of the Republicans and one- fifth of the Democrats had gone beyond high school. Eight years later the proportion of Republican committeemen with more than secondary education had increased slightly and the proportion of Democratic committeemen had jumped to over one -third. Has the competition for ward posts during the lean years of the early thirties brought to the city committees men of higher occupational status? It is very difficult to answer this question because of the variety and changing character of the occupa- tions pursued by ward committeemen. At any given time a ward boss may have several ostensible occupations and a num- ber of secret callings as well. With these qualifications in mind, Table 4 is presented for what it is worth. During the depres- sion the number of Republican committeemen who were nothing but professional public-job-holders has fallen from six to one, and the number of contractors from six to three. On the other hand, the number of Republican ward bosses who held minor clerical positions has increased from one to four. In some parts of the city the Republican party is not getting committee- men of as high economic status now as it did in 1928. On the other hand, the 1936 Democratic committeemen show some gains in economic status over their 1928 predecessors. The number of those engaged in insurance increased from three to seven, and those in law from four to six. The number of pro- fessional public-job-holders has remained the same for this party — ten in 1928 and eleven in 1936. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 47 Of the 1928 committeemen, fourteen Republicans and only four Democrats were lawyers. (Every ward committeeman who is not a lawyer himself must have some legal talent in his organization to handle the many legal matters that come to a ward headquarters.) Eight years later there were six Demo- cratic and fifteen Republican ward committeemen who were lawyers. Since the legal profession is very closely related to business, finance, and commerce, and since the business leaders tend to be Republican, it is likely that a majority of the lawyers TABLE 4 Private Occupations of Ward Committeemen in Chicago by Party, 1928 and 1936 Republican Democratic Occupation 1928 1936 1928 1936 None in addition to po- litical job 6 14 5 7 3 6 1 2 2 1 3 1 15 6 5 5 3 4 3 2 10 4 9 8 3 5 2 11 Lawyer Real estate 6 7 Trade 6 Insurance 7 Contractor Clerical 3 Liquor trade 1 Manufacturing Other professions No information 1 3 6 8 6 Total 50 50 50 50 are likewise Republican. Furthermore, the Republican vote is concentrated in areas where there is a large number of persons engaged in professional and commercial pursuits. Consequent- ly, it is natural that there would be more lawyers among the Republican than among the Democratic committeemen. Some of the Republican ward committeemen who are lawyers do not make a profession out of politics. Their main interest is in the law, and politics is a side line for them. On the other hand, a number of Democratic committeemen who started as clerks or saloonkeepers make politics their profession. Many of these 48 MACHINE POLITICS men lack the necessary educational background to go into law. A few of the Democratic ward bosses who are lawyers belong to firms which are notorious for their connections with the big tax-dodgers and the leading figures of the underworld. Several ward committeemen were members of a law firm which had a large criminal practice with prominent gangsters as clients and also a large tax-receivership practice. Ward committeemen who were interviewed gave a variety of explanations as to why they entered politics. In quite a few cases the ward committeemen were urged to run for party office by some relative. A number had fathers, fathers-in-law, uncles, or brothers who were aldermen or ward committeemen. As one of them put it, "My father was a ward committeeman and one of the original nominators of Carter H. Harrison as mayor of Chicago. My grandfather was a supreme court judge in Switzerland. Politics seems to be an inherited trait in our family." 18 A few entered ward organization politics in order to promote or protect their business activities. In a Northwest Side ward, the publisher of several neighborhood newspapers said, "I entered politics in order to promote the communities where my business is located." 19 A West Side ward leader made the comment: "I became a precinct captain in 1915, and I was selected as a ward leader by the committeemen in 1924. My interest in politics may be traced to my trade -union connec- tions, as I was an organizer of an electrical union." 20 On the South Side a veteran committeeman gave a very interesting account of his entrance into politics: "I started in politics in 1895. I was a member of a group of young men who were greatly displeased to see all of the offices go to the relatives of the mayor and the ward committeemen. We organized to change this; and while unsuccessful for a long time, we finally won out." 21 There were also committeemen who went into politics because they thought it would be a help to their legal practice, their real estate business, or their liquor business. 18 Report of interview. 20 Report of interview. 19 Letter. 21 Report of interview. YOU CAN'T LICK A WARD BOSS 49 Some were practically forced to go into politics by their business and political sponsors. Thus, a judge would force his bailiff to run for ward committeeman, or a gambling operator would give orders to his lieutenant to file for the position. Finally, there were the committeemen who claimed that they sought their positions because of their love of the game of politics. While the position of ward committeemen carries no salary, it has perquisites. A man who becomes a ward boss expects to improve his economic status. Some of them expect to get rich. It is significant to note the changes that have taken place in the occupations of the 1936 committeemen since they entered poli- tics. To take a few examples, a dentist became a contractor, a professional athlete became a tobacco merchant, a saloonkeeper became an insurance and real estate agent, a machinist became the president of a roofing company, a newsboy became an insurance agent, a trade-union leader became a high-pressure beer salesman, a coal-miner became a barber and then a clerk. Of the 1936 Democratic committeemen, six deserted clerical occupations and six left jobs as liquor-dealers in order to make more money and to enjoy greater prestige as insurance agents, professional public -job-holders, or real estate operators. Men- tion has already been made of the many secret callings of a highly lucrative nature which ward bosses may have. Ward leaders, in general, cling to their jobs because they find it pays to do so. Of course, there are striking exceptions. In a North Side ward there is a Republican ward committeeman with a private for- tune of his own who has found ward politics a drain upon his income. 22 This committeeman has entered politics with the highest ideals, and he has concentrated his private philanthro- pies in his home community. If there were more of such com- mitteemen, the history of Chicago politics would be different. The theme of this chapter has been that it is practically impossible to defeat a ward boss in a metropolitan community where the spoils tradition is deeply rooted and where the single- member district system of local representation is employed. 22 See Mary Hartley, James Breckinridge Waller (Chicago, 1931). 50 MACHINE POLITICS Whether a ward committeeman's party wins or loses in general elections, he finds various and sundry devious ways to insure his own re-election on primary days. Tidal waves of public opinion may sweep the city-wide leaders from their posts, but the ward leaders are safe on their little islands. The economic depression may be accompanied by an enormous shift in the party preferences of the voters; but in spite of everything, few changes are registered in the personnel of the city committees of the parties. CHAPTER III CHANGING CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 1 While ward bosses seem to be able to stick by their jobs through thick and thin, the same cannot be said of the precinct captains or ward healers. Ward committeemen are tested at primary elections coming every two years, but a precinct captain has to prove his merit at each election. If a precinct captain belongs to the party in power, he will find the competition very keen. On the other hand, the precinct captains of the losing party are likely to be- come discouraged and drop out or desert to the opposition. Precinct captains are the back- bone of any metropolitan political organization, since upon them rests the responsibility for seeing and winning the voters. Political ma- chines keep their grip upon the voters because they take pains to establish and maintain face-to-face contacts with individual citizens. An enterprising ward committeeman has to be con- stantly on the alert to weed out inefficient precinct captains and to discover new ones who will carry their precincts. Conse- quently, the turnover among precinct captains is usually high. There are some who can hold their positions year after year just as ward bosses do, but they are comparatively rare. 1 The author is indebted to Miss Sonya Forthal for aid in collecting material regard- ing the 1928 precinct committeemen and to a number of students for assistance in con- nection with the 1936 committeemen. Since precinct committeemen had no legal status in the period under discussion, it was difficult to locate them. The private lists of the central headquarters were guarded as trade secrets. 51 ALDERMAN JOHN J. ("BATHHOUSE JOHN") COUGHLIN 1>N!V£RSITY OF ILLINOIS LICRAR* 52 MACHINE POLITICS Ward boundaries are changed only once in ten years, but pre- cinct lines are altered after each election. One of the peculiari- ties of American politics is the smallness of the units reporting election returns. 2 This may be in part the result of the pioneer days, when the number of voters in a rural precinct had to be small because of the difficulties of travel. For the entire country the present average number of voters per precinct is about 400. In the state of Illinois the election precincts are required by law to contain as near as practicable 400 and not more than 600 voters. Thus, a precinct might contain two city blocks or many more, depending upon the density of the population. When the number of voters in a precinct exceeds 600, that precinct is supposed to be subdivided before the next election. In 1934 the average precinct in Chicago had 466 voters, but there were 104 precincts with more than 600 voters and 539 precincts which had under 400 voters. 3 The smallest precinct had only 143 registered votes; and the largest, 1,039. Because of the high mobility of the city population and because of the political pressure for precinct gerrymandering, the law is a difficult one to enforce. Although the city did not grow as rapidly in the years 1928- 36 as it did in the years 1920-28, the number of precincts kept on increasing at a fairly rapid rate. At the time of President Roosevelt's re-election in 1936 the number of precincts was 22 per cent greater than in 1928. 4 The increase was largely the result of a greater interest in voting among all elements of the eligible voting population in 1936. Whereas 76 per cent of the estimated eligible voters in Chicago took part in the Hoover- Smith election, 88 per cent took part in the Roosevelt-Landon 2 In Great Britain the Parliamentary election returns are compiled by constituencies (average number of voters, 51,000) and not by polling districts. 3 Figures were obtained from Public Service Leader, November 20, 1934. The stand- ard deviation (a) for the distribution was 71, which may be interpreted as follows: two- thirds of the cases should lie within the distance of cr on either side of the mean, or, in other words, between 395 and 537 registered voters. 4 The increase in the number of precincts from 1920 to 1928 was 32 per cent. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 53 electoral contest. 5 Precinct captains played an important role in the huge participation of 1936. Nonvoting is no longer as serious a problem as it was in the early twenties. So burdensome has political work become in the metropolitan communities of the United States that it is not usually under- taken unless some concrete reward in the form of money or a political job is in the offing. These jobs are usually distributed by the party committeemen who have been successful in putting over their candidates at primary elections or in the party con- ventions. Whenever there is a shift in the fortunes of the two major parties, many precinct committeemen belonging to the losing party desert their party as rats scramble from a sinking ship. The roster of precinct captains of a typical ward organization in an American city is made up of persons who in some way have demonstrated their ability to win votes. If a man can win votes for one party, then it is reasonable, under American conditions, where the two major parties have not presented widely divergent platforms in local politics, to imagine that he could win votes for the opposing party provided that satisfac- tory arrangements were made. In England a party agent would not think of changing his party affiliation, no matter how attractive such a change might be. But Chicago is not London or Manchester. In order to analyze the extent of the changes that have taken place in the character of persons doing precinct work for the parties since 1928, some 300 precinct captains were interviewed 5 An estimate for the number of adult citizens in Chicago in 1928 was made by inter- polation between the 1920 and 1930 census figures. The 1936 estimate was made by ex- trapolation from the 1930 and 1934 figures, assuming a straight-line trend. The figures were: Year Estimated Number of Adult Citizens in Chicago Number of Registered Voters Percentage Registered 1928 1936 1,827,000 2,000,000 1,386,631 1,770,451 75.9 88 5 54 MACHINE POLITICS in 1936 along the same lines of the study of 600 precinct cap- tains made in 1928. Table 5 shows the distribution of Chicago precinct captains by occupation for 1928 and 1936 with some comparative data for New York upstate city committeemen collected by Mosher in 1932. 6 Mosher's figures are based upon a survey of 4,000 party committeemen in eighteen selected cities in the state of New York (not including New York City) . TABLE 5 Comparison of Occupations of Chicago and New York Precinct Committeemen Chicago Eighteen New York Cities* Occupations 1928 1936 1932 Number Per Cent Nu mber Per Cent Number Per Cent Government employees .... Attorneys Other professions Merchants Business executives Clerks, salesmen, laborers, etc. . . 346 22 35 73 10 98 59 2 3.8 6.0 12.5 1.7 16.8 96 12 10 43 13 25 48.3 6.0 5.0 21.6 6.5 12.6 697 186 145 219 219 2,152 19.3 5.2 4.0 6.0 6.0 59.5 Total 584 100.0 199 100.0 3,618 100.0 * William E. Mosher, "Partv and Government Control at the Grass Roots," yational Municipal Re- view, XXIV (January, 1935), 15-18, 38. In Chicago there has been a decrease in the proportion of precinct captains who were government employees. During the eight -year period the ratio of precinct captains who were public- job-holders dropped from about three-fourths to slightly less than one-half. This decrease does not mean that patronage is on the decline in the city. It merely reflects the fact that pat- ronage has been concentrated in the hands of one of the major party organizations. Whereas in 1928 both the Republican and Democratic precinct executives had their hands in the public 6 W. E. Mosher, "Party and Government Control at the Grass Roots," National Municipal Renew, XXIV (January, 1935), 16-18. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 55 treasury in large numbers, in 1936 the Democrats had shoved most of their Republican compatriots out of reach of the public monies. In fact, less than one-fifth of the 1936 Republican pre- cinct captains were governmental employees, and these were mostly bipartisan dealers who were very lukewarm about the success of their party. There was also an increase in the number of precinct captains who classified themselves as merchants and a trend away from what Mosher calls the lesser employments — the clerical, the semiskilled, and the unskilled. While there are no trend figures for the New York cities, it is interesting to note that Chicago committeemen are much more likely to be public- job-holders and they are less likely to be in the "lesser employments" than are the New York committeemen. From the proportions he found in government service and lesser employment classes, Mosher concluded that a majority of the New York committeemen were docile followers who could be counted on by those in control of the party. He further stated that the party leader, confident of his backing in the official party organization and realizing the average voter's in- difference to, if not ignorance of, the function played by primary elections, felt free to ignore the demands of his constituency for long overdue reforms and improvements in government. Be- cause of the great increase in the number of Chicago precinct captains who could be classified as merchants, there has been a trend toward a reduction of the proportion of captains in the docile classes; but the ratio is still about two-thirds. Comparable data regarding the Philadelphia Republican precinct committeemen (divisional leaders) has been collected by Kurtzman for 1932. 7 Since Kurtzman was dealing with a party organization which at the time held all the local patron- age, he found a larger proportion of committeemen on the public pay rolls than did Mosher. In all, 58 per cent of the 3,132 Philadelphia Republican precinct captains studied were holding down public jobs, involving an annual pay roll of over $4,000,- 000. Most of the positions were under the county government, 7 D. H. Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1935). 56 MACHINE POLITICS but there were many court jobs and a few important elective state and city posts. In order to obtain a fair basis of compari- son, it will be necessary to consider for Chicago the 1936 Demo- cratic precinct committeemen only. Nearly three-fourths of these were public-job-holders, as contrasted with three-fifths of the Republicans in Philadelphia. About one-third of the positions held by Chicago Democratic precinct executives were furnished by the city hall, one-fourth by the county, one-sixth by the courts, one -sixth by the state government, one-twelfth by the sanitary district, and the remaining by miscellaneous governmental bodies. Only two of the Democratic precinct captains in Chicago said that they held federal positions. The depression has brought a great increase in the functions of the federal government, but the patronage basis of the party ma- chines has remained local. It is also interesting to note that at a time when it is hard to raise revenues locally to meet the legitimate expenses of municipal government there is an in- crease in the amount of prostitution of the public services for partisan purposes. The materials on the occupations of Chicago precinct com- mitteemen have been somewhat more elaborately classified than those of either Kurtzman or Mosher. A subdivision of the so- called "lesser employments" in Chicago shows that in 1936 there was an increase in the proportion of clerical workers, housewives, and unemployed persons who entered precinct work. There were relatively fewer skilled or unskilled laborers who became precinct captains at the end of the period. In a very rough manner the roster of precinct captains reflected employment conditions. There were fewer employed manual workers to draw upon in 1936 than there had been in 1928. In his study of New York committeemen Mosher urged that those who have enjoyed educational advantages are better equipped to determine the increasingly complex policies of a modern community than those who have not gone beyond the grammar-school level. 8 He found that the balance between the two groups was, in his sample, too heavily weighted in favor 8 Op. cit, p. 17. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 57 of the latter. Table 6 indicates that in 1928 the situation in Chicago was almost the same as Mosher found it in upstate New York. While 4 per cent more of the Chicago committee- men had had college or professional education than of the New York committeemen, nearly 3 per cent less had gone beyond grammar school. In 1936, however, the balance had tipped in Chicago in favor of the group with more than grade-school edu- TABLE 6 comparison of educational background of chicago and New York Precinct Committeemen Chicago Eighteen New York Cities* Education Party Committeemen Total Males Eighteen Years of Age and Overf Party Committeemen 1928 1936 1934 1932 Num- ber Per Cent Num- ber Per Cent Number Per Cent Num- ber Per Cent Grammar school or less High school College and profession- al Foreign education 328 147 93 2 57.6 25.8 16.3 0.3 85 84 43 40.1 39.6 20.3 722,630 325,554 119,056 61.9 27.9 10.2 2,212 1,320 467 55.3 33.0 11.7 Total 570 100.0 212 100.0 1,167,240 100.0 3,999 100.0 * William E. Mosher, "Party and Government Control at the Grass Roots," National Municipal Re- view, XXIV (January, 1935), 15-18, 38. t Table 6, Summary Tables for Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1931f. cation. In fact, the proportion of college or professional gradu- ates was almost twice that found in New York and 4 per cent greater than the Chicago ratio in 1928. Apparently, the de- pression resulted in raising the educational level of the Chicago precinct captains. What do the Chicago materials show about Mosher's thesis that an increase in the educational level of precinct committee- men would result in raising the tone of city politics? Unfortu- nately, training in political ethics does not seem to be a major 58 MACHINE POLITICS objective of our institutions of higher learning. While there are some differences between the methods of educated and rela- tively illiterate committeemen, there are also many striking similarities. The relation between education and political morality in cer- tain parts of Chicago may be illustrated by the case of Precinct Committeeman John Grady. 9 Grady started out as a party worker at the age of fourteen, when he ran errands for the Re- publican committeeman of his ward. In 1932, when he saw the drift was toward the Democratic party, he attached himself to a candidate for Democratic ward committeeman who had city hall backing. Grady was a graduate of a private high school and also of one of the universities in the metropolitan com- munity. At the time of the 1936 election Grady was one of the prize precinct captains of his ward. He was going to one of the larger law schools in the city, working his way through by means of a pay-roll job, i.e., a position which did not make great inroads upon the time which he needed for his studies and his political work. It happened that there was a very large gambling place in his bailiwick, and in accordance with prevailing custom he was able to place several of his political workers as employees of this outlawed business. He also claimed that he was able to place some of his constituents in public utility jobs, in city hall jobs, and in hotels, theaters, and business establishments within the precinct that "worked with the organization." One of the hotels had a questionable reputation. Pressure was brought to bear upon the taverns to contribute to all the poli- tical benefits. In his canvassing work Grady was a master at adjusting himself to the peculiarities of the persons addressed. A tall, handsome young man with a glib tongue, he could fall into the lingo of the tavern, the dance hall, the gambling den, the church festival, or the political backroom at wilk As far as could be ascertained, Grady never attempted any direct bribery of voters by means of money, nor did he engage in any stealing of votes. With his persuasive manner and thorough canvassing 9 The name is fictitious. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 59 work, he did not need to stoop to these lowest of all political devices. However, his record is hardly such that one would expect him to take that broad view of the complex community problems to which Mosher refers. It should not be assumed that all the college-bred precinct captains in Chicago were like Grady. In a neighboring ward, John Jones, a banner Republican precinct committeeman, pre- sented a striking contrast to Grady. Jones was also a graduate of a local university and law school, but he was well established in the practice of law before he entered politics. He has never used his political connections to help his legal business. In fact, his start in politics came in connection with his work in a judicial campaign for the Chicago Bar Association. He did such fine work in this nonpartisan campaign that the secretary of the Republican ward organization introduced him to the ward committeeman. Since Jones was in sympathy with the general position of the Republican party, he was persuaded to become a precinct cap- tain. In winning votes he never handled or promised any polit- ical patronage, he never used any of the indirect methods of bribery such as the furnishing of goods or the securing of special concessions from governmental officials. For the most part, his appeals were of a rational sort. He criticized the policies and acts of the opposition, discussed the relative merits of the can- didates, appealed to civic-mindedness, praised the policies and record of his own party, and, where he was known and re- spected, relied upon friendship and personal influence. He did just as thorough a job of canvassing as Grady and against much greater odds, as his Democratic rival was a job-holder and had many patronage positions to hand out to his workers. Instead of receiving money or favors for his activities, Jones had to make great sacrifices of his own time and money. In connection with the presidential campaign of 1936 he paid $75 out of his own pocket for canvassers and watchers. This, he held, was necessary, as he had to make four complete canvasses of his precinct, which was a very large one. In the rooming-houses in his bailiwick he had to hire special resident canvassers. He 60 MACHINE POLITICS would have preferred to use volunteer workers entirely; but he argued that, as one pays a postman for ringing doorbells, why could he not use his own money to pay for similar services. The case of Joe Czech shows that it is not necessary for a pre- cinct committeeman to have an extensive formal education in order to acquire a social point of view. Joe was a short, stout, rugged, well-spoken Hussite who was born in Bohemia fifty- two years ago. He had very little schooling and spent many of his early years roaming about in Germany and central Europe, where he learned to love the out-of-doors. When he was twenty- one he came to the United States and settled in Chicago as a merchant. Now he is well read, and on his desk appeared the latest copy of the Atlantic Monthly and Papini's Life of Christ. Joe longed for an out-of-door life, and he went into politics in 1928 in order to get on the forest-preserve staff. Through his friend, Anton J. Cermak, he was able to secure a job as forest- preserve laborer, and he is now the superintendent of a tract of some nine thousand acres. He has a real pride in his work and tries to hire young men or family men who have no other work. In his precinct Joe's main interest was in seeing what he could do to make life easier for the poor. He started on this topic by saying that in this country we think we have freedom and strength and wealth, but in actuality there is no such thing as freedom except for a favored few. "For the vast majority of work- ingmen," he added, "the constitutional guaranties of freedom are a mere mockery in the hands of exploiting capitalists. Rufus Dawes is a friend of mine, a damned capitalist, but a nice fellow personally, who might be made into a good Democrat some day." He went on to indicate his bitterness at the existing economic system. His fear was not for the older people, who, he said, no longer really mattered, but for the younger people, who were now coming up without anything to do or any way of earning a living. When "kids" were caught stealing as a result of sheer idleness, he always tried to get them off because he felt they were not really to blame. He worked hard for the Demo- cratic party because he thought that it was doing something to alleviate the youth problem. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 61 Joe's precinct had a large number of relief cases, as nearly one-half of the able-bodied men were unemployed. Rents aver- aged about $25 a month per family. The persons on relief were the main strength of the party, as they knew they could depend on the Democrats for aid when they were in trouble. His prob- lem was difficult because of the heterogeneous character of the precinct. Over one -half of the inhabitants were foreign-born, with the nationalities ranging in the following order: Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, and Hollanders. 10 Because each group held together closely, it was necessary for him to work with them separately, for the most part through the churches. But so long as he could help them in their troubles, they were with him. Joe passed out food, money for rent, coal, advice on getting hospital care, legal advice, adjusted taxes, and placed men in forest-preserve jobs. Needless to say, Joe carries his precinct by a comfortable margin. There is no question that many of his constituents felt under obligations to him and may have voted the Democratic ticket on that account. However, as compared with John Grady, whose educational opportunities were vastly superior, Joe was less of an exploiter, and he did not depend upon any underworld connections. In Chicago much more information was obtained regarding the characteristics of the precinct executives than is yet avail- able regarding New York and Philadelphia party committee- men. 11 Table 7 presents some of these data for the precinct captains of 1928 and those of 1936. There has undoubtedly been a slight increase in the number of women precinct captains during the past eight years. In the Democratic organization for the Third Ward, a ward inhabited largely by colored people, the complete roster of precinct cap- tains showed that one-fourth were women. 12 This is a much higher ratio than was found in other parts of the city. The methods of woman precinct captains may be illustrated 10 Census Data of Chicago, 1934. 11 R. V. Peel has collected materials regarding New York City party committeemen. 12 See Gosnell, Negro Politicians, p. 139. 62 MACHINE POLITICS by the case of Mrs. Smith, an official co-captain of a precinct in the Fifteenth Ward and a veteran of many political battles. 13 This neat, elderly, garrulous woman was responsible for the women's votes only, and left the rest of the work to the male TABLE 7 Certain Characteristics of Precinct Captains in Chicago Characteristic 1928 Total Num- ber Answer- ing Ques- tion Percentage Having Charac- teristic 1936 Total Num- ber Answer- ing Ques- tion Percentage Having Charac- teristic Sex Women Color Negro Number under thirty years of age Birthplace Chicago Other native American Foreign Father's birthplace Chicago Other native American Foreign Church affiliation Protestant Catholic Jewish None Married Fraternal affiliation Military experience Thirty years or more in Chicago Ten years or more in precinct Ten years or more in political work . . . Political reason for moving into pre- cinct 600 600* 582 563 550 573 572 552 568 5 1 3 8 15 52.9 24 4 22.7 5 9 19 7 74 4 33.6 51.1 13.3 73.6 58.4 58.5 7.6 300 300 218 202 214 273 192 194 211 280 284 251 11.0 11.0 12.2 66.4 15 9 17.7 19.1 16.2 64.7 34.6 42.0 16.4 3.3 74.0 47.4 22.2 66.7 59.3 50.4 9.6 captain. For many years she had been an active feminist. In fact, she took part in the agitation for woman suffrage in Illinois before 1913. When partial suffrage was granted after that date, she helped to organize the women and get them out to vote. In those early days, when a woman pleaded she could not vote be- 13 For a Philadelphia case study of a woman precinct captain, see J. T. Salter, Boss Rule (New York, 1935), pp. 193 ff. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 63 cause she was washing or had to look after the baby, Mrs. Smith would help finish the washing or mind the baby. In that way the women became accustomed to vote, and now they do it as a matter of course. Mrs. Smith was a native of Chicago and so was her father, but there was a heavy concentration of Lithuanians in her precinct. She belonged to the Catholic church, which was influential in her neighborhood. Rents averaged about $40 a month, and there were no relief cases. It was a typical lower-middle-class neighborhood in which the women were not weighted down either by poverty or by a heavy burden of employment outside the home. A separate women's organization was set up because Mrs. Smith found that a woman could do a lot more to get other women to vote than a man could. Some men even did not like to have the male precinct captain talking to their wives. The women organized card parties and dances. One dance was held at a downtown hotel at which the attendance reached seven hundred. The men always contributed to the expenses of such functions. Mrs. Smith was soon interested in political work for its own sake. She enjoyed getting out and talking to people and thought that many more women would like it if only they once tried it. Women were somewhat limited in what they know about such things because they spent so much time at home and heard of developments only through their men folks. At the card parties the women started to gossip about politics among themselves and thus acquired a desire to have something to say about how things are run. Once women got used to taking an active part, there was no difficulty whatsoever in keeping them interested in seeking ways to be of service. An examination of the registration figures shows that the ratio of women registered has jumped from 43 per cent of the total in 1928 to 46 per cent in 1936. Undoubtedly, the women party workers are in part responsible for this increased interest in voting on the part of the women in Chicago. While the ratio of precinct captains born in Chicago was over one-half in 1928 and has been increasing since then, it has al- 64 MACHINE POLITICS ways been the practice of ward committeemen to choose cap- tains who were representative of the predominant nationalistic groups in their precincts. A consideration of the birthplace of the fathers of the precinct executives brings out clearly that these party officials come largely from the second-generation for- eign stocks found in the city. In many parts of Chicago there are still isolated Polish, Italian, Czech, or German communities where foreign tongues are used extensively. 14 Among the party workers of foreign stock, those of Irish ancestry made up nearly one-quarter; those of German parentage, one-seventh; those of Polish origin, one-seventh; those of Russian ancestry, one- eighth; while the British, Scandinavian, Italian, and Czech stocks lagged behind the others in the order given. While in the entire population the Irish come after the Germans and Poles in numbers, their political aggressiveness in Chicago has already been pointed out in connection with the analysis of ward com- mitteemen. Precinct committeemen are fairly representative of the differ- ent religious groups in the city. 15 If anything, they are probably a little more likely to belong to some church organization than are some of their constituents. The church furnishes a place for the party worker to make contacts and to gain respectability. In some communities the church plays a very important role in the social life of the inhabitants. A South Chicago Polish neighborhood was run almost completely by the Catholic priest, who carried on all the social service activities that in some other sections would be in the hands of the party workers. Some of the reasons for the grip of the Irish upon precinct captaincies in communities where they are no longer the pre- dominant group are illustrated by the case of James Murphy, a Democratic committeeman in a West Side river ward. Mur- phy lived in a run-down neighborhood which was overwhelm- ingly Polish. A steel plant was only a block away, and from the general character of the district one would expect to find a pre- 14 See map of nationality groups in the city on p. 103. 15 For a discussion of the Negro churches in politics, see my Negro Politicians, pp. 94-100. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 65 cinct captain who was in rather poor circumstances like the rest of his constituents. It was a great surprise that Murphy turned out to be a most distinguished-looking gentleman, such as one might ex- pect to find in a country club. It was soon clear from his con- versation that he had had advantages far superior to those of the people who lived around him. He had traveled widely and was semi-independent. After graduating from high school, he went into the railroad business ; but on the advice of his father, who was a precinct captain before him, he got into politics and started a real estate and brokerage business. He was born in the same house where he was then living; and he said that he had no intention of moving in spite of the depreciated character of the neighborhood, because, when he bought a house out in Beverly Hills, his wife refused to move, on the ground that all their friends were in the neighborhood where he had lived all his life. Murphy was more than willing to talk about his work in politics and about the neighborhood. While he sat on the front steps, people stopped and talked about their difficulties, little and big. The broken English of the Poles presented a sharp contrast to Murphy's cultured voice and accent. But in spite of this difference, the people seemed to like him and to have confidence in what he could do to make their troubles a little easier. One stout Pole had a lot to say about the people who wouldn't give him a job when he needed it, but he admitted that he was on his way to a tavern to spend his bonus check. Murphy handled him with unusual tact, and the man went on his way without the job but satisfied that some one understood his plight. Although the neighborhood was not very well-to-do, many of the inhabitants owned their own homes. Rentals averaged less than $20 a month per family. Naturally, there had been a relief problem in this area, but it had abated considerably in 1935 and 1936. Murphy said that politics played no part in the granting of relief in his district. The only way to get aid was to go down personally and file an application. He might give 66 MACHINE POLITICS some assistance in the form of helping with the directions; but as far as being of any value in actually getting relief, he never pretended that he could do anything. Murphy had rigged up a small precinct club room in the base- ment of his house where the people could gather at any hour of the day just for a social time. He had found it a most effica- cious method of preserving a semblance of unity in the neigh- borhood. He liked to work with people and to help them when they were in trouble, but he discouraged his son from going into politics because he felt that it was too insecure as a profession. It could only be a matter of time when the party would go out of power, and any man who had been in politics for a number of years would be fitted for nothing else. Although Murphy was an organization man in good standing, he did not always urge his constituents to vote the organization slate in primaries or the straight ticket in general elections. In the dramatic primary of 1936 he was passive on the guberna- torial issue because he thought Horner was the better man. While he felt he had some influence, he said that the radio and the press had made people much less susceptible to arguments by local politicians. All the general services that are expected of precinct captains were performed by Murphy. He was not replaced by a Pole in his area because he had the advantage of seniority in the neigh- borhood, long experience in political work, superior abilities as a talker, and a certain amount of economic independence which enabled him to serve his constituents without exploiting them. A fairly long period of apprenticeship seems to be necessary for appointment as precinct captain. At least one-half of the 1936 committeemen had been engaged in political work for more than ten years. This means that most of the captains began their duties before the financial crash came in 1929. Nearly two-thirds of the precinct executives had lived in the city for more than thirty years. It appears that one has to become well acclimated to Chicago politics before taking part in it. How- ever, in recent years there has been a slight decrease in the em- phasis upon seniority in the selection of minor party executives. CHARACTER OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 67 The most common motive for entering politics given by the precinct captains interviewed was that they hoped to obtain some concrete economic reward. The possibility of obtaining a political job by means of precinct work was appealing to those who were in ill health, whose work was seasonal, who had lost their jobs, who wished to escape from heavy manual labor, or who were just starting out in life and found other avenues closed. Persons engaged in certain occupations found that political connections would help them. Thus, many lawyers, tavern-keepers, insurance agents, trucking contractors, plumb- ing contractors, and real estate agents found that they could mix politics and business. Since the repeal of prohibition, tav- ern-owners and bartenders have been swarming into politics, particularly in those areas where there has been considerable dry sentiment in the past and where there is some likelihood of a precinct wet-and-dry vote under the local-option provision of the state liquor law. In a few cases precinct captains were bound to their ward committeemen by personal ties of loyalty which grew out of crisis situations. When a ward boss could dramatically come to the rescue of some man who was in trouble with the police, he could count on that man for steady precinct work from that time on. In one of the roughest wards in the city, Bat Dolan, former hobo, bartender, racketeer union official, and gunman, swore his undying loyalty to his ward committeeman. On two occasions the ward boss had saved him from the clutches of the law-enforcing authorities. The first time he was merely an innocent bystander when a rumpus occurred on ^Yest Madison Street, but the police arrested him as a suspect. On this occasion the ward boss saw to his release and spoke to him about securing some political pull in the town. The second charge brought against him was much more serious. In a saloon brawl he shot and killed a man who owed him money and who showed an insolent disregard for his creditors. In fact, his bullying debtor called Bat a "yellow stool pigeon." As in the first case, Bat's political superior saw to his release. The only law that Bat 68 MACHINE POLITICS knows or cares about is the law that is laid down by his ward committeeman. Not all the precinct captains are attracted to political work by considerations which have little place for general interests of the city. We have already cited the case of John Jones, who got into precinct work through his excellent performance in a nonpartisan Bar Association campaign. Scattered throughout the city there are many committeemen, like Jones, who have real political convictions for which they are willing to make per- sonal sacrifices. Some of these precinct captains may have personal ambitions, but their ideals are set higher than those of Grady or Dolan. The responsibility for the selection of precinct captains is in the hands of the ward committeeman. Successful ward bosses are always looking around for promising assistants. The ideal precinct captain is one who can make friends easily, who works hard and steadily, who gives absolute obedience, who is intelli- gent but satisfied with a subordinate role, who is not too de- manding for himself, and who does not ask too many questions. A precinct captain may be superior in education and economic status to his constituents if he has sufficient tact, but a captain whose education and background is inferior to that of his con- stituents is likely to cause resentment. During the upward trend of the business cycle the turnover of the precinct captains is always higher than that of ward committeemen. The precinct lines are far less stable than ward lines, and the selection of precinct committeemen is entirely in the hands of the ward bosses. When a decline in prosperity brings about a shift in the balance of political power, the turn- over of the precinct executives is accelerated. The competition for posts in the winning party organization becomes much keen- er and the ranks of the losing party machine are decimated by desertions. The changes tend to increase the educational level and occupational status of the precinct captains. However, these party officials are still, as a rule, docile followers of the ward bosses. Only an occasional precinct captain has sufficient economic independence and intellectual integrity to choose his own course and to hold to it by conviction. CHAPTER IV ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS The precinct captains who constitute the rank and file of a party machine try in every way possible to perform concrete services for the voters which will be remembered on election day. When a precinct captain is unable by himself to perform a given task, he gets in touch with some one in his party organization who can. In other words, the precinct committeeman is an agent or broker for a great variety of services which are used to cement voters to the party machine. Whether or not the benevolent serv- ices performed by party workers are of real value to the community is a ques- JUDGE EDMUND K. JAEECKI ^ wh j ch hag interested sodal sc i e ntistS for some time. 1 The party philanthropist acts in a direct and human fashion which appeals to the individual in distress, but the ultimate effect of the acceptance of the service may be detrimental to the person who receives it. Thus, a voter re- ceives some immediate concrete service in return for which he is willing to support the candidates sponsored by his bene- factor. These candidates, however, may be racketeer union- ists or gangster-politicians who prey upon the community and who oppose constructive social welfare legislation. The politicians have great scorn for the so-called "civic mind- ed" and the "pure-souled" reformers. They have no use for 1 Robert Archey Woods, The City Wilderness (Boston, 1898), chap, vi; Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (New York, 1902) ; Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens (New York, 1931); Frank R. Kent, The Great Game of Politics (Garden City, New York, 1923), and Political Behavior (New York, 1928); S. Forthal, "Relief and Friendly Service by Political Precinct Lenders," Social Service Review, VII (De- cember, 1933), 608-18. 69 70 MACHINE POLITICS social workers, and they look upon their own party organiza- tions as the real charitable agencies. As a rough and vigorous precinct captain in one of the slum areas put it: ^Yhen anyone gets into trouble with the law — petty thieving, trouble with a relief investigator — or when he loses his job or is about to be evicted, or when a kid gets in with a bad gang and starts staying out all night, in cases like this it is not the relief agency or social welfare agency that the harassed voter first goes to, but rather to the precinct captain who stands in with the law, who will not talk down to him but will treat him as a friend in need, and who is waiting for him in the local tavern or in the ward headquarters, where there is a full-time secretary who knows just who can handle the situation. When the interviewer ventured to slip in a word for a near-by settlement house, the precinct captain interrupted bitterly: Oh, forget that bunk. You innocent, well-meaning middle-class people who have never seen a hungry and moneyless family in your life, who have only a vague idea of how the political and legal and business racket is run, who don't know the right people to talk to in evictions, or tort cases, you think you can come in here and help the poor. You can't even talk to them on their own level, because you're better, you're from the University. I never graduated from high school, and I'm one of them. 2 RELIEF AND FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES In order to investigate the relief and friendly activities of the party organizations in Chicago, the nine hundred precinct cap- tains interviewed were classified by date of interview and type of benevolent activity. A number of theories will be put for- ward as to the effect of the depression upon benevolent activi- ties of the parties. The 1928 and 1936 proportions of precinct captains who rendered various types of service are indicated in Table 8. As in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia, so in Chicago the precinct captains were ready to distribute material goods to those of their constituents who were in need. 3 One-half of the precinct committeemen interviewed in 1928 said that they handed out food. These party workers were found in the de- 2 Manuscript report of interview. 3 Woods, op. cit.; Roy V. Peel, The Political Clubs of New York City (New York, 1935); John T. Salter, Boss Rule (New York, 1935); David Harold Kurtzman, Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1935). ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 71 predated residential areas of the city, where even in the pros- perous twenties employment was irregular. At the beginning TABLE 8 Distribution of Selected Chicago Precinct Captains According to Benevolent Services Rendered, 1928 and 1936 Types of Benevolent Sebvices 1928 Total Num- ber Answer- ing Ques- tion Percentage Rendering Service 1936 Total Num- ber Answer- ing Ques- tion Percentage Rendering Service Goods: Food Coal Rent Christmas baskets Advice: Juvenile guidance Adjusted domestic difficulties Brokerage agency for — Local governments: Governmental jobs Governmental jobs formerly . . . Miscellaneous jobs Streets and alleys Taxes adjusted Permits secured Scholarships provided Building and zoning regulations . Contact with social agency Medical aid of some sort Public medical agencies Relief agencies Courts: Legal aid Trouble with law Traffic violations National government: Aid in naturalization Veteran's bonus H.O.L.C Deference: Funerals. . Weddings 473 469 466 506 460 450 548 542 451 550 532 533 442 439 549 542 449 455 455 49.4 42.8 38.4 55.7 40.4 30.2 54.7 69.1 63.9 70.4 44.0 33.2 59.2 47.4 64.6 38.5 52.8 70.9 77.3 51.4 222 277 219 288 276 276 211 179 269 274 266 265 272 254 279 278 275 284 278 274 271 231 235 279 274 69.5 31.8 37.4 39.2 35.1 24.6 50.7 43.0 46.5 74.1 36.1 43.0 9.6 20.1 67.4 56.6 44.2 65.8 62.3 53.2 26.6 69.4 37.7 51.9 62.0 52.2 of the depression some of the ward organizations in the poorer sections of the city made valiant efforts to maintain soup kitch- ens. For a while some of the Italian committeemen bulldozed 72 MACHINE POLITICS grocers and butchers into making contributions to Al Capone's famous free-lunch center. In return the merchants' short- weight scales were overlooked by the city sealer. 4 As the eco- nomic crisis continued, it became impossible for the political organizations to continue elaborate food-dispensing facilities. In 1936 more of the precinct captains handed out food than in 1928; but they did it, for the most part, in emergency cases. One boss of a slum ward shrewdly remarked that he did not believe in giving food because it was finished off in fifteen min- utes and then where was he. Instead he took the six dollars and bought the "kids" outfits, and the parents were always grateful. A smaller proportion of the party officials distributed coal in 1936 than in 1928. One ward committeeman maintained a coal yard in a blighted area at the beginning of the depression, but he found that he could not continue this part of his business. The demands for free coal were so overwhelming and difficulties in making collections were so great that he had to close his retail business. Coal was distributed by party workers when there was some temporary breakdown in the regular adminis- tration of relief. Since the public welfare agencies did not follow a very con- sistent policy with reference to the payment of rents, the pre- cinct captains in the most depressed areas were able to provide temporary shelter from time to time for those who were home- less or who were about to be evicted. The depression apparently had no effect upon the proportion of party workers giving this type of aid. However, there is no question that the relation of the party organizations to those who were unable to pay rent had changed. In the boom days of the twenties one prominent politician who was a heavy owner of real estate in a working- class area was accustomed to a lenient policy of collections for those who voted right. After a few of the lean years of the early thirties, this party boss was compelled to bring five hundred eviction suits all at the same time. After the Democrats came to power in the various local governments, some of the Demo- cratic precinct captains became more active than Republicans 4 Chicago Daily Xeivs, May 21, 1932; Chicago Tribune, May 10, 21, 1932. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 73 in preventing or postponing evictions. Some of the minor par- ties used the plight of those who had been evicted as a means of gaining an entree into districts where they had never before made any headway. 5 If the regular relief agencies had not begun to pay rent, there might have been more serious eviction riots than occurred in the early thirties. The practice of distributing Christmas or Passover baskets has continued during the depression period, although to a lessened extent because of the depleted state of the Republican ward treasuries. Democratic ward organizations which were formerly not concerned with this custom have taken it up in recent years. In fact, every ward in the city now has some families which are in a receptive mood for party charity around the holiday season. The Democrats have recently organized their Christmas giving on a grand scale. Teachers of the public and private schools are urged to sell tickets to a championship high-school football game, the proceeds of which are used for the mayor's Christmas fund, which is administered by the ward organizations. 6 In the foreign-born neighborhoods there are frequently many families in which the relations between the parents and children are strained. The new generation tends to discard the old-world cultural patterns, and the parents have many discipline prob- lems. In an Italian settlement a precinct captain said that one part of his work was the solving of the problem of the "dago kids" who cut school and hung out all night with bad gangs. On the day that I saw him he said that he had placed such a child in a boarding school for a working mother. This same unit official said that he regarded it as very bad policy to inter- fere in domestic disputes. His comments on this subject were spicy but not printable. One-quarter to one-third of the pre- cinct captains interviewed in 1936 said that they gave advice on domestic and family matters when asked. This was a slightly smaller ratio than was obtained in 1928. 5 For a description of the South Side eviction riots, see Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago, 1935), pp. 329 ff. 6 Interviews. 74 MACHINE POLITICS Since the political parties in the United States have very- limited financial resources of their own, it is necessary for them to rely upon the governmental agencies to supply most of the needs of their constituents who are in want. They act as brok- ers for the various governmental services filling the gaps left by the red-tape provisions of the bureaucrats. Party workers refer their voters to the proper authorities and try to claim as much credit for themselves as possible. During a period of large-scale unemployment, precinct com- mitteemen try to function as job brokers. All the different gov- ernmental offices — federal, state, county, sanitary district, city, school, and park — the principal public utility concerns, and various private companies are approached for jobs. In com- paring his work with that of a relief agency, one Democratic precinct captain said: Do you think the relief agencies can get jobs for their people with a word to the local A. & P. or the National or a restaurant or a tavern? We get jobs for some with the city and for others with the utilities. But we can't get as many jobs on the public pay roll as you think. We can't touch the fire and police services. However, we fill lifeguard jobs at the parks, and there are always personal matters that naturally come to a precinct captain in connec- tion with a setup like W.P.A. 7 The voters in the poorer residential areas, many of them of foreign extraction, take a realistic view of political patronage. The spoils system was well intrenched in American cities before the immigrants became important as voters. Political ap- pointments furnished one of the forms of recognition which came to successful groups in the United States. Furthermore, the lesser jobs furnished a livelihood to many. In the city alone, there were one thousand positions exempt from the Civil Serv- ice Law, and in addition five times that many temporary ap- pointments available for political distribution. These positions, and also the state, county, sanitary district, park, school, and court jobs not filled by competitive examinations, were the practical monopoly of the Democrats in 1936. In all, there were over 60,000 employees of the older established governmental 'Interview, May 26, 1936. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 75 units located in Chicago, to say nothing of the 75,000 W.P.A. workers. 8 The selection of perhaps a quarter of these was the prerogative of the winning political machine. Precinct captains who rolled up huge votes for the organization candidates were in line for jobs for themselves and their constituents. Political job-holders were assessed 2 per cent of their salaries for the campaign war chest, and in addition they were expected to rally their friends and relatives to the support of the organization slate. When the machine "put the screws" on job-holders and their friends, it was said to be using its "muscle." Republican precinct captains of the old school have woefully felt the lack of "muscle" in recent years. The repeated Demo- cratic victories have meant that Republican precinct captains have little to offer their constituents in the way of patronage. Only a sprinkling who had made some bipartisan arrangement were able to cling desperately on to a few paltry jobs. The state of mind of those voters who were formerly won over to the Republican cause by means of patronage is illustrated by the case of Leo Posen, a Republican precinct captain of Polish birth who lived in a Polish neighborhood. When he was inter- viewed, Leo was in a very sour mood. He had been out of work for several years, and not even when the Republicans were in power did they do anything more than promise him a job. To make matters worse, his wife had worked all through the de- pression. Everybody turned to the Democratic precinct cap- tain, who had worked the precinct ever since Leo was there. Nobody asked Leo whether he could do anything or not. It was just as well, as he was powerless. The Democratic captain wouldn't do any favors for him because he had things so well tied down that he didn't even have to go out and work before election time. He paid others to do his work. Leo complained because the Republicans would not even give him any money to try. They just ignored him; so he decided to ignore them. He hadn't been to the headquarters for several months. There wasn't any use in spending the carfare. In short, Leo was dis- 8 For a listing of public employees located in Chicago, see my Negro Politicians, pp. 239, 300, 304, 377-79. 76 MACHINE POLITICS gusted with politics and would have thrown up his job if he hadn't thought that the Democrats might be turned out. Even so, he was not going to work his head off and then get nothing in return. He still had a sneaking suspicion that if he only were given some money he might do something. All that the people were interested in was what they could get out of it. The votes went to the highest bidder. With this, Leo, a disappointed office-seeker himself, not having anything better to do, went down to the corner saloon in order to talk matters over with the boys. 9 Many of the old-line Republicans of Leo's stamp have gone over to the Democratic party. Party bosses in Chicago have been unscrupulous in the use of public office to build up their political organizations ; but from time to time they have been compelled to recognize the larger community interests. When gross inefficiency on the part of the political appointees led to grave scandals, the city bosses were compelled, by the pressure of public opinion, to ignore the recommendations of the ward committeemen and to sacrifice certain political appointees. Thus, after a storm of criticism in the daily press regarding a bad water-tank accident, the ma- chine took more care in the selection of building inspectors. 10 The man who had just inspected the tank which crashed and killed several people was a beer salesman who had no qualifica- tions for the job whatsoever but had been appointed in return for his political activities. In many sections of the city, precinct committeemen acted as local community agents. About three-quarters of the pre- cinct captains interviewed in 1936 said that they handled com- plaints regarding rubbish in the streets and alleys. The re- sponsibility for keeping the streets clean lies in the department of public works, but the commissioner in charge of the depart- ment is hampered by a ward setup. A ward boss of the party in power will virtually control the superintendent in charge of refuse removal in his district. The local political control of this impor- tant function has resulted in inefficiency and waste. What the citizens have a right to demand in return for taxes paid, is 9 June 24, 1936. 10 Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1934. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 77 meted out to them as a special political favor from the powers that be. The administration of the tax machinery has presented a dilemma to the political bosses. If taxes are lowered or adjusted too generally, then the total revenues may be inadequate to meet the governmental pay rolls. While the depression has cut the tax-fixing activities of the precinct captains in two, nearly one-half of the Democratic precinct captains interviewed in 1936 said that they still engaged in such practices. Reforms in methods of assessing real estate have greatly reduced the possi- bilities of political manipulation in this field, 11 but the personal property tax still lends itself to the precinct tax-fixer. Since 1934, when the assessor became an elective officer and his ap- pointees became largely political, precinct captains have again been going the rounds collecting personal-property tax bills and promising to take care of them. In some cases the party agent may merely give advice on the making-out of the schedules; in others, he may encourage his constituents to ignore the sched- ules or he may take the forms and hand them to an official, who conveniently buries them in his files. The assessor, the board of tax appeals, the county judge, the county treasurer, and the state's attorney all have some responsibility in connection with the assessment and payment of taxes; and it is very easy for a slip to be made somewhere along the line. As long as the state has such an antequated and unworkable tax system as at pres- ent, it will be difficult to put tax administration upon a sound basis. The many city ordinances regulating particular trades may be used by the party workers for political purposes. Since 1928 there has apparently been no change in the proportion of pre- cinct captains who said they were instrumental in securing permits of one sort or another for their constituents. The list would include peddler's, garage, building, milk, and other types of permits. In some cases the zoning regulations present prob- 11 J. L. Jacobs, Assessments of Real Estate and Personal Property in Cook County, Illinois (Chicago, 1934); O. L. Altman, "Chicago's Experiment in Personal Property Taxation, 1931-1936" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1936). 78 MACHINE POLITICS lems that may be solved by recourse to political manipulation. Naturally, in recent years the Democrats have been much more active in securing favors of this sort than the Republicans. Following the downward trend in the business cycle which started in 1929, party workers have been greatly concerned with the administration of relief. As one prominent public official put it: "Because of the precinct captain's interest in the difficulties of his community and because of his knowledge of the sources of public relief, he is inevitably the means through which a great many needy individuals are brought in contact with the public relief agencies." 12 An efficient, smooth-running ward organization has its own social work secretary, who knows exactly how to cut official red tape and get results from the relief agencies. The number of contacts that precinct captains of both parties make with the organized social service agencies has greatly increased during the past eight years. Whereas only one-half of the precinct captains maintained such contacts in 1928, two-thirds did so in 1936. As compared with New York, the administration of relief in Chicago has been relatively free from direct political inter- ference. 13 Trained social workers have been employed by the county relief agencies, and the politicians have tried in vain to introduce the spoils system. However, precinct captains have made every effort to claim credit for the services which have been rendered. They have also been highly critical of the pro- fessional social workers. One party worker who was a deputy bailiff said that he often came in contact with the social workers and that he opposed them in many things. He declared that much of the trouble came from too much red tape and too per- sonal and inquisitive investigations of the social service agents, most of whom were girls from the University of Chicago who did not "know a damn thing about politics, or relief either." In an area where juvenile delinquency and crime rates are high, party committeemen are particularly active in helping their constituents who have fallen into the clutches of the law. 12 Forthal, op. cit., p. 617. 13 Peel, op. cit. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 79 Over one-half of the precinct captains interviewed in 1936 said that they gave aid in connection with trouble with the law- enforcing authorities. This was a larger proportion than was found in 1928. Some raised bail or signed bonds; while others merely put in a friendly word to the police, the assistant state's attorney, the court clerk, the bailiff, or the judge himself. The division of responsibility for the enforcement of the criminal law makes it possible for the "fixer" to do his work at a number of different stages during a trial. The police may fail to secure convincing evidence, the state's attorney may fail to prosecute, the court clerk may change the charge, the bailiff may fail to apprehend the defendant who has jumped his bail, and the judge has a variety of ways of mitigating the rigors of the law. In general the methods used for fixing cases in Chicago have been similar to those employed in Philadelphia and New York. 14 As long as judges are nominated and elected by party machines, as long as a considerable portion of the public is educated in the belief that "anything can be fixed," and as long as archaic rules of judicial procedure are retained, the political fixer will be busy at his work. During the course of a year many precinct captains are called upon to investigate a long list of charges brought against various of their constituents by the law-enforcing authorities. The list furnished by the precinct captains interviewed included dis- orderly conduct, larceny, gambling, assault with a dangerous weapon, carrying concealed weapons, election offenses, man- slaughter, murder, and other charges. The persistency of the political fixers is well illustrated by a larceny case summarized by Martin as follows : Altogether this defendant achieved nine continuances, two changes of venue, and three bond forfeitures. During the pendency of the case there appeared before Mr. Austin (the person robbed) in behalf of the defendant, whose guilt was unquestioned, two state senators, a member of the lower house (the defendant's attorney, who later was a Democratic candidate for judge of the Municipal Court), a chief clerk of the Appellate Court, two deputy clerks of the Municipal Court, the club president and party committee 14 Kurtzman, op. cit.; Peel, op. cit.; V. O. Key, "Techniques of Political Graft in the United States" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, 1934). 80 MACHINE POLITICS chairman, and six others, citizens of more or less prominence, all of whom urged Mr. Austin to drop the case. In addition, Mr. Austin's principal wit- ness, a youth of fifteen years, was threatened with kidnapping by gangsters, resulting in policemen being assigned to guard his home. 15 A very common type of fixing, which involves many persons in the better residential areas, is the fixing of traffic slips. In 1928, over one-half of the precinct captains interviewed ad- mitted that they took care of traffic slips for their constituents. Violations of the speeding or parking rules were the most com- mon offenses. In those days a deputy bailiff who was a pre- cinct captain related that he received a handsome sum of money for getting the judge in a good humor to sign a list of discharges without reviewing the cases. The increasing toll of traffic acci- dents called attention to lax handling of traffic cases. As a result of safety drives and considerable newspaper publicity, the courts have been compelled to tighten up on their procedures. Only one-quarter of the precinct captains interviewed in 1936 said that they had anything to do with traffic cases. One of them said: "Regarding traffic violations, the judges are at present conducting very effective campaigns against fixing, and it is absolutely impossible to have traffic violation cases fixed." 16 However, in a well-to-do precinct a suave party committeeman said: "In cases of smash-ups, where it is very important for the wealthy defendant to have the right court connections be- fore the case should come to trial, the organization has its special lawyers who know the ropes." 17 Thus, a friend in court may be of use to the mighty as well as to the lowly. It is the business of precinct captains to act on this. The depression has brought the local party agent in closer touch with the federal government. Mention has already been made of the activity of precinct captains as employment brokers for federal-made work jobs. Party committeemen were also active in aiding foreign-born persons who wished to become naturalized, veterans who wished to take advantage of the 15 E. M. Martin, The Role of the Bar in Electing the Bench in Chicago (Chicago, 1936), p. 300. 16 Interview, May 19, 1936. " Interview, May 26, 1936. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 81 bonus legislation and other laws which gave them a privileged status, and home-owners who wished to avail themselves of the facilities offered by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. So political did the administration of the latter authority be- come that the federal authorities in Washington, D.C., were compelled to intervene and clean up the local situation. 18 About one-half of the precinct captains said that they gave advice to their constituents regarding federal loans on homes. It was inevitable that the Democratic party workers would be more active in seeing federal authorities than the Republicans, who were out of power. In some cases the precinct captains worked together in friendly fashion which did not involve bipartisan commitments. The impression left with many voters, however, was that federal activities were more likely to be continued under the Democrats than under the Republicans. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES Precinct captains who have put themselves out in many ways to serve their constituents do not have many difficulties in try- ing to get a hearing when they canvass their districts for votes. Practically all of the committeemen interviewed said that per- sonal house-to-house canvassing was the principal method that they relied upon to reach the voters. Some were well enough off financially to delegate part of the canvassing to assistants, but in the main the precinct captains preferred to do most of the canvassing themselves. About one-half of the captains said that they also sent personal letters to the voters. Efficient precinct captains saw that a thorough canvass was made before each general or intermediate registration, so that they could be sure that the names of all of their potential sup- porters were on the books. Considering the high mobility of the population in many areas of the city, this was not an easy task. During a period of economic depression many citizens move in order to find lower rents or to escape paying rent for a while. It is also necessary to guard against attempts of the opposition to pad the registration lists. 18 Chicago Evening American, April 3, 1934. A Democratic ward committeeman was involved. 82 MACHINE POLITICS Canvassing techniques must necessarily vary with the type of district. In some of the exclusive high rental areas it is not possible for a political canvasser to get past the doorman or the butler without a proper introduction. A Democratic precinct captain living in an expensive hotel on the "Gold Coast" of Chicago, whom we will call "Tom Collins," said that he spent a good deal of his time every evening hanging around the hotel bar, talking to old acquaintances and making new ones. He was a cynical young bachelor who claimed that he was "too happy to be married." Making contacts was much more im- portant to him than work. "No one," he said, "gets anywhere in politics or business on his merits. He has to have the 'clout' from behind. That is how I got my job." He thought that the main thing was to meet and talk to the voters on a man-to-man basis, e.g., on the prospects of the club and preferably over a Tom Collins. It did not matter where the voters were met — in the ball park, on the rinks, at dances, or at the bar. The main thing was to meet them. Tom did not argue with them on the New Deal. He did not have to, since he was primarily inter- ested in getting them to vote "right" locally. When I men- tioned the fact that a Republican precinct captain who lived near by had said that he was against the New Deal because it was ruining the United States, Tom laughed loud and long. "That rich is as smooth as a billiard ball. How the hell do you think he gets his local favors? Our boss sees to that." In this summary fashion Tom disposed of all who vowed that they had political convictions. 19 About one-half of the precinct captains frankly used the serv- ice argument in trying to win votes. They performed favors for their constituents which they hoped would be remembered en election day. Some presented this argument in its baldest form, the so-called "bread-and-butter" plea. The canvasser's job de- pended upon how many votes he could deliver on primary or election day. "In hard times like the present," one captain said, "you would not vote against my candidates and cause me to lose my job." In Philadelphia this kind of pleading is called 19 Interview, May 26, 1936. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 83 the "crying-towel" argument. 20 About one-quarter of the party committeemen discussed the merits of the candidates whom they were backing, and the remaining quarter talked about the policies advocated by their party. In addition to the canvass the politicians employ various social devices in order to establish and maintain contacts with the voters. As in Boston and New York, boys' gangs have been encouraged and fostered by party leaders in the poorest dis- organized communities. 21 Out of these gangs the ward bosses hope to develop effective political clubs. In Chicago gangland it has become a tradition that the first source of possible finan- cial aid is the local ward committeeman, who will pay for the headquarters of an athletic club and buy uniforms in the hope that the boys will soon be of use to him on election days. A number of precinct captains and ward bosses have been re- cruited from political clubs which started as boys' gangs, some of which had semicriminal tendencies. The street corner, the poolroom, or the tavern has been the congregating point for these gangs. In the more stable, middle-income neighborhoods the politi- cians were not so likely to encourage the formation of political clubs. To be sure, there were party headquarters of a more or less permanent character in all of the wards; and many of the ward organizations held field days, picnics, boxing shows, bene- fits, beer parties, card parties, smokers, and dances. However, there were frequently no clubs of a social or athletic character. The attitude of a ward boss in a middle-class area toward politi- cal clubs is illustrated by the case of Steve Brody. Steve was a college man who adjusted himself easily to the atmosphere of ward politics. When I asked him about the subject of clubs, he exclaimed : A political club in this area? Not on your life! It is easier for the big bosses to keep the voters under control when there isn't anything like a club. If the voters got together and formed a club they might begin to get all sorts of 20 Salter, op. cit, p. 124. 21 "Woods, op. cit., and Peel, op. cit. The political activities of boys' gangs in Chicago are discussed by F. M. Thrasher, The Gang (Chicago, 1927). 84 MACHINE POLITICS funny ideas. That's one of the first rules of politics. The old politicians don't want the young ones to organize because they always want to change the party. These Young Republican clubs are only a front to keep the young fellows satisfied. 22 He added that he had parties for his voters from time to time. The ward organization had a party every summer in the forest preserves, and in the fall there was a boxing match in the Armory to raise funds for Christmas baskets. Among the voters of foreign extraction, the device of the political club was found to be a common one. Thus, the voters of Swedish descent have founded a Swedish-American Republi- can club, the John Ericsson League, and the Svenska Klubben. 23 Each of these clubs was active in promoting the political recog- nition of Swedish candidates and in rallying the Swedish vote. The political club was also used as a medium for political educa- tion among the Italians. There were at least twenty such clubs organized along the lines of pleasure clubs with monthly dues of fifty cents or a dollar. 24 Such clubs may be paralleled among the numerous other immigrant groups in the city. For the city as a whole, there is no social organization analo- gous to Tammany Hall in New York City. In 1936 the chief Democratic club was the Iroquois Club, which had no quarters of its own and which made no point at all of social activities. On the other hand, the Hamilton Club of Chicago has been very active in Republican circles in the past, and it has been a success as a social organization. Many nationally prominent Republicans have addressed the members of this Club from time to time. During the 1936 campaign a huge sunflower ban- ner was hung over the front of the building. On election night a gang of enthusiastic and hilarious Democrats insisted that this sign be removed. Strange to say, the Club itself shortly afterward deleted the word "Republican" from its member- ship requirements in order to attract a larger clientele. 22 Interview, June 9, 1936. 23 Reuel G. Hemdahl, "The Swedes in Illinois Politics" (manuscript, Northwestern University, Evanston, 1932). 24 Giovanni E. Schiavo, The Italians in Chicago (Chicago, 1928), p. 104. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 85 ELECTION ACTIVITIES Since a precinct captain's success is measured by the votes which he secures for the candidates of his organization, all of his benevolent, political, and social activities are centered to- ward the day of reckoning, namely, election day. A party committeeman who has canvassed his bailiwick well, who has used rational appeals in so far as possible, and who has ren- dered legitimate services to his constituents may find all of his work ruined by an opponent who stoops to election trickery and chicanery. On the other hand, the precinct captain who wants to win the prize for having the best precinct in the ward may use all possible honest methods to win votes and also employ ballot thieves to give him the additional boost that he needs to have the highest vote. Under both circumstances, and es- pecially under the latter, it is absolutely necessary for the unit executive of the party to have control over the election ma- chinery in his district. In connection with the discussion of ward bosses it has al- ready been indicated that the election machinery is practically in the hands of the party organization. At the beginning of the depression the Republican party was the leading party in the city; so its precinct captains were entitled to two of the three judges of election in the odd-numbered precincts and to one in the even-numbered precincts. Eight years later the Demo- cratic party held this position. On both occasions the two major parties divided about evenly the total number of precinct elec- tion officials. All through the period, the precinct captain was the one who sent in names for the positions to be filled to his ward committeeman, who in turn transmitted them to the board of election commissioners. When criticisms have appeared in the daily press regarding the character of judges and clerks of election chosen on the basis of the party submittal lists, Judge Edmund K. Jarecki, who has held the office of county judge since 1922, has always replied that under the present law, which requires partisanship and residence within the precinct, he is not able to get honest 86 MACHINE POLITICS and efficient election officials in some parts of the city. 25 The Maguire case showed that many persons with criminal records, some of whom had been convicted of election frauds, were again and again appointed as precinct election officials. 26 Ballot thieves are recruited from the ranks of the pickpockets, card sharks, confidence-game men, and gambling-house operators. These persons have defied the law in other matters and know the sleight-of-hand tricks that are needed to put over ballot- box stuffing, alteration of tally sheets, and ballot erasures. In a game where winning is the main objective, some precinct cap- tains do not hesitate to name election crooks as their candidates for positions on the precinct boards. In 1928 the Republican party had its share of criminals in key electoral positions; but by 1936 many of these underworld characters had drifted over to the Democratic party, which had complete control of the law-enforcing machinery. Have the number of fraudulent votes increased as the politi- cal battles have waxed hotter and hotter in Chicago? Since the depression has not greatly altered the stakes of politics in the city, has the political struggle remained a battle of dollars, bul- lets, and deceit? As far as certain types of election frauds are concerned, it must be said that the economic crisis has hastened the cleansing of the election process. In the first chapter the background of the fight for permanent registration of voters in Chicago was discussed. This scheme promised a reduction of election expenses and the elimination of the worst abuses in connection with registration. A factional quarrel in the Demo- cratic party plus a contrite spirit in the Republican party as the result of several lean years made it possible for the measure to pass the state legislature. A long period of educational work by various civic organizations, including the League of Women Voters, stamped the measure as one which would be likely to accomplish the purposes of the Horner Democrats and the hun- 25 New Election Law Needed, Citizens' Association of Chicago, Bulletin, No. 75 (1928). 26 People v. Maguire, Proceedings of the County Court of Cook County, June 21, 1930 ff. See also review of the case by Professor K. C. Sears (1933), manuscript, University of Chicago Law School. ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 87 gry Republicans. There is no question that the new system which went into effect in connection with the November, 1936, general election has greatly reduced such frauds as repeating, impersonation, and false entries on poll lists. After the new law went into operation, it was still possible for election crooks to sign fictitious names in various precincts; but this required the collusion of landlords and of those opposing precinct captains and election clerks who knew their jobs and made complete canvasses. It is significant to note that the October registration fell off, as compared with the March, in the First, Twentieth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-seventh wards, indicating very clearly that in these wards under the old registration system padded lists were very common. The greatest discrepancy was found in the Twentieth Ward, where the March registration was over 2,100 in excess of the October registration. 27 The wards in question were inhabited by large numbers of transients, unem- ployed men, persons on relief, except the Twenty-fourth Ward, which is a center of Russian- Jewish population. The new system of permanent central registration, with the signature as a means of identification on election day, has marked a great improvement in election administration in the city of Chicago, but it has not solved all the problems in con- nection with fraudulent voting. Ballots can still be miscounted, altered, or not counted at all. In the Heller-Hasten 1932 elec- tion contest for a seat on the municipal court bench 29 per cent of the ballot boxes opened and counted showed evidence of definite or intended fraud. 28 Reports regarding the 1936 pri- mary show that the election crooks have many tricks which they can play during the casting and counting of the ballots. 29 The "endless-chain" fraud may still be used, ballots may be "spilled," and the tally sheets may be changed. Election con- victions are most likely to involve irregularities of this sort, since registration frauds were hard to prove before the new sys- 27 Chicago Evening American, March 23, 1936; Chicago Daily News, October 11, 1936. 28 Chicago Daily News, January 2, 1934. 29 Chicago Evening American, July 9, 1936; Chicago Daily News, July 22, 30, and August 18, 1936. 88 MACHINE POLITICS tern came in. An analysis of the election cases before the County Court in the period 1922-34 shows that vote frauds have been most common in the Fourth, Twentieth, Twenty- fourth, Twenty-seventh, and Forty-second wards. 30 For some reason the henchmen of "Hinky Dink" and the "Bath" in the First Ward have enjoyed an extraordinary immunity from prosecution in connection with election affairs, although evi- dence of fraud is overwhelming. 31 In addition to the wards where registration irregularities were common, this list includes the Forty-second Ward, Botchy Connors' bailiwick. 32 Like the other River wards, this Gold Coast and slum area includes many transients and relief cases. In a district where votes are stolen, it is also possible to in- timidate the voters by a display or threat of violence. It is not surprising, then, to find that election murders, kidnapings, sluggings, and terrorizings are found in the Twentieth, Twenty- seventh, and Forty-second wards. The famous or infamous "pineapple" primary of 1928 brought an assassination in the "bloody" Twentieth and other strong-arm methods in adjoin- ing River wards. While the passing of prohibition has elimi- nated the gangs which derived their chief source of revenue from bootlegging, it cannot be said that by 1937 there were no crimi- nal gangs in Chicago who mixed business and politics. In 1936 political killings took place in the Twentieth and Twenty-sev- enth wards. However, the general police administration of the city was superior in 1936 to what it had been eight years before, and election intimidation was less flagrant. The cynical ward heeler may say that the votes which he cannot steal or seize by force, he buys. Money plays a very important role in Chicago elections as well as in the elections in other large centers of population in the United States. 33 In 30 Dishonest Elections and Why We Have Them, edited from the records of the County Court (December, 1922 — June, 1934) with notes by Women's Civic Council of the Chicago Area (Mrs. Harriet M. Robertson, editor). 31 On the Serritella recount, see Chicago Daily News, JulylO, 1936. 32 "The Kelly-Nash Political Machine," Fortune, XIV (August, 1936), 47 ff. 33 L. Overacker, Money in Elections (New York, 1932); C. H. Wooddy, The Case of Frank L. Smith (Chicago, 1931). ACTIVITIES OF PRECINCT CAPTAINS 89 the heyday of his power Samuel Insull threatened to buy the entire Democratic organization from Boss Brennan for some- thing over half a million dollars. 34 In 1936 it was estimated that it took just about that much money to oil the regular Demo- cratic machine in the primary election. Together the two major parties spent well over a million dollars for the final general election in the fall of that year. How is the money spent? Are votes still purchased directly? In some parts of Chicago where poverty and insecurity have robbed men of hope, an election bribe of anywhere from $0.50 to $5.00 or $10.00 looks large and the vote itself, when lost in a sea of 1,700,000 other votes in the city, looks small. Of course, in the long run the bribe -receiver gets the small end of the bar- gain. He pays in inefficient city administration at points that affect him most; but on election day the breakdown of local relief, of local police protection, and of local sanitation do not seem to be very directly connected with the smiling face and the cheery word of the precinct captain who slips him the coin or the bill. The voter is paid for his "time," and not for his vote. He spends an hour or so standing on the street corner wearing a party badge and passing out a little literature. In some wards even these formalities may not be necessary. Money is needed for many other persons in addition to "cur- rent expenses" and the manning of the polls. The organization which is well supplied with funds can buy newspaper advertis- ing, radio time, literature, cigars, drinks, hotel space for head- quarters, halls for meeting places, posters, postage, sound trucks, banners, buttons, tire covers, and the services of clerks, stenographers, radio announcers, canvassers, watchers, bill post- ers, spellbinders, and advertisers. The amount of money available for precinct use varies con- siderably with the election and with the precinct. In the presi- dential primary of 1936 the precinct captains interviewed said that they received anywhere from less than $25 to over $100 to carry their precincts. The average amount of money spent 34 Donald Richberg, "Gold-plated Anarchy, An Interpretation of the Fall of the Giants," Nation, CXXXVI (April 5, 1933), 368-69. 90 MACHINE POLITICS by the Democratic precinct captains was $60 per precinct; and that by the Republican captains, $38. Do precinct captains in Chicago do their jobs so thoroughly that they can predict the results in their bailiwicks with a fair degree of accuracy? While we asked the precinct captains be- fore the election whether or not they could carry their precincts, not all gave us definite answers. Only one -tenth of the Demo- cratic precinct captains who claimed that they could carry their districts failed to do so, while over four-fifths of the Republican precinct captains made false claims about their prowess. One- quarter of the Republican captains were frank to admit that their cause was a hopeless one. In looking at the record of the national committees of the two major parties, one might expect the local committees to come out just about as the national do. 35 Big Jim Farley was a better predictor than John Hamilton. Hamilton was not the only one in his organization who did a lot of wishful thinking before November 2, 1936. As compared with his 1928 predecessor, the 1936 precinct committeeman in the city of Chicago was less of an employment broker, less of a tax-fixer, less of a traffic-slip-adjuster, but more of a go-between for the relief agencies and the various branches of the federal government. The 1936 precinct captain was much more interested in national issues than his brother of the pros- perity era. Permanent registration spoiled certain of his elec- tion tricks, but it left him free to try other well-known devices. Money was still essential for his work, but there was a new crop of Republican party workers who had to volunteer their services, since the chances of their party's local success seemed remote. Of course, there were also the bipartisan dealers who posed as Republicans but worked for the Democratic party. The depression has brought some improvement in the ethical standards of the party workers of the city, but these standards are still pitched at a very low level. 35 H. F. Gosnell, "How Accurate Were the Polls," Public Opinion Quarterly, I (Jan- uary, 1937), 100. CHAPTER V THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 1 Considering the fact that the city-wide bosses, the ward bosses, and the precinct captains did not change their methods and their philosophy under the impact of the economic crises, we cannot expect to find the voters in the city evincing much originality. There was a big shift from one of the major parties to another; but there were no important third-party move- ments, as in Wisconsin, no disturbing upheavals in a primary election, as in California, and no city-wide reform movements, as in New York. The voters of Chicago stuck to the old party labels, and throughout the entire period the combined vote of the minor party candidates in the city never exceeded 3.5 per cent of the total vote cast. The realistic politicians in the city were not concerned with third-party movements. They were interested in the shifts from one major party to another. If our theories regarding the nature of the major party organizations have been correct, then we might expect these shifts to be relatively large. The Demo- cratic party, which was relatively weak in national elections at the beginning of the period, gained one advantage after an- other. A strong presidential candidate, a powerful organization based on spoils, and an ever weakening opposition swept the voters into the Democratic fold and kept minor party revolts in abeyance. On the basis of the evidence presented by party workers, it is possible to present a few hypotheses as to the motivation of voters. The appeals made to party history and party heroes in any election campaign clearly indicate that the politicians re- gard party tradition as an important control. Boss Kelly wants to know how many people he can count on to be loyal to his 1 The author is indebted to Norman N. Gill and Margaret J. Schmidt for assistance in preparing this chapter. 91 92 MACHINE POLITICS party year after year. The Republican bosses want to know who will stick to their party in spite of the disastrous reverses in recent elections. If the precinct captain is an efficient one, he will know pretty well who the traditional voters are in his bailiwick. While the findings of precinct workers are not pub- lished and the vote itself is secret, the consistency of the voting behavior of individuals can be studied in territorial groups. It is possible to study how nearly alike the responses of the voters in a given area are at different elections. The mobility of the citizens in some areas is much greater than in others, but it is amazing how fixed the general character of a neighborhood may be. It has already been pointed out that new construction was at a standstill during the period under discussion. This means that there were not great changes in the physical makeup of the various communities studied. Local community research in the city has indicated how close the relationship is between the physical and social elements in city life. If the time elapsed between the elections is not too long, it can be assumed that to some extent the voting responses of the same people are being examined and that to a great extent the behavior of the same type of people is being studied. Besides this, it has been indi- cated that there have been few changes in the characteristics and activities of the party workers. In order to study the extent to which the voters in certain areas clung to given parties, it was decided to compare the re- sults of five biennial elections beginning with 1928. The next step in the analysis was to divide the city into units which would be numerous enough to justify the use of statistical techniques and which would not be so minute as to cut across the precinct or census tract lines. 2 Since it was desired to preserve both political and community boundaries, it was finally decided to take the 75 local communities as defined by the census, and 2 Election returns were obtained from the Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook, the Public Service Leader, and the records of the board of election commissioners of Chicago; census data, from E. W. Burgess and C. Newcomb (eds.), Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1930 (Chicago, 1933), and C. Newcomb and R. O. Lang (eds.), Census Data of Chicago, 1934- (Chicago, 1934). THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 93 superimpose them upon the 1921 ward lines for the city. 3 Prior to the 1932 presidential election the 1931 ward boundaries were so new that any changes in ward bosses had little time to be felt. This method produced 166 subdivisions for the entire city, containing, on the average, about 10,000 adult citizens. For reasons to be explained later, 19 of these units were dropped, leaving a total of 147. For purposes of studying the traditional vote in national elections it was decided to select the percentage of the total vote that the key Democratic candidate received at each elec- tion. A start was made with the presidential election of 1928; and the question was asked: "How many votes for each one hundred votes cast did Boss Cermak and his cohorts secure for the 'wet' Alfred E. Smith, a candidate whom they could support with great enthusiasm?" On the Republican side the question was: "How many votes could be kept in line for 'dry' Herbert Hoover?" Two years later the most important election was the senatorial contest in which Boss Cermak and his organi- zation supported James Hamilton Lewis, in the latter's struggle against the "lady," Mrs. Ruth Hanna McCormick. Boss Cer- mak's last general election was the presidential election of 1932, when he held the boys in line for Franklin D. Roosevelt and made considerable inroads on Herbert Hoover's Chicago strong- holds of 1928. In 1934 Bosses Kelly and Nash backed Michael L. Igoe for congressman-at -large against the Republican candi- date, C. Wayland Brooks, who two years later won the guber- natorial nomination. The vote for each of the Democratic candidates was expressed as a percentage of the combined Democratic and Republican vote at the particular election. Since the votes received by minor candidates were small, they were neglected. Consequently, the ratios in each area give a picture of the Republican vote as well as the Democratic vote. 4 The relative success of the party bosses in the elections under consideration is given in Table 9. In the city as a whole, Boss 3 An attempt was made also to include the 1931 ward lines, but it was discovered that these lines cut across many of the census tracts. 4 The Republican percentage for any given area can be calculated by subtracting the Democratic percentage from 100. 94 MACHINE POLITICS Cermak fell just short of achieving a majority for Al Smith, as he had bragged he would. However, the Democratic percentage jumped from 49.2 per cent for Smith in 1928 to 59.2 per cent for Roosevelt in 1932. In the nonpresidential years the achieve- ments of the Democratic bosses were even more remarkable. After the New Deal had been in operation over a year and a half, the Democratic vote in the city jumped to 64 per cent, as shown by the Igoe vote in 1934. The figures fail to reveal a steady trend to the Democratic party since the peak of the Democratic popularity appears to have been reached in 1930, when Lewis received 72.1 per cent of the total vote. However, the vote which Lewis received does not represent the true strength of the Democratic party at this election. He ran far ahead of his ticket because his opponent, Mrs. McCormick, the first woman to receive a major party nomination for the office, had incurred the enmity of the Thompson faction of the Re- publican party and had received unfavorable publicity in con- nection with the Senate investigation of campaign funds. Mrs. McCormick's slight of well-known Republican leaders, her ex- penditure of half a million dollars to win the nomination, and the fact that she was a woman made her a vulnerable candidate. A comparison of the votes for congressman-at-large at the four elections shows a more uniform development of the Democratic strength. Starting with 45.4 per cent of the total in 1928, the successive Democratic percentages for the office were 59.3, 57.1, and 64. 9. 5 The first eight years of the depression in Chicago 5 Two congressmen are elected at large from Illinois. The city of Chicago has about one-half of the voters in Illinois. The average vote for this office was found by adding the votes for all Democratic and Republican candidates and dividing by two. The re- sults are given below: Year Total Average Vote Cast for Congressmen Total Average Vote for Democratic Candidates Percentage Democratic 1924 847,927 670,350 1,173,425 827,751 1,269,698 1,099,974 1,544,069 257,240 293,697 532,036 490,954 725,456 712,612 977,857 30.3 1926 43.8 1928 45.4 1930 59.3 1932 57.1 1934 64.8 1936 63.3 THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 95 resulted in the Democrats receiving 15-20 per cent more of the total vote than they received in 1928. This would indicate that the percentage of the voters who did not change their party affiliation during the period could not exceed 80. TABLE 9 Variables Used in Study of Voting Behavior in Chicago* (V=147) Variable Letter Percent- Sym- bol Date age for City Mean Item a 1928 49.2 51.7 23.5 b 1930 72.1 76.0 42.9 c 1932 59.2 63.4 29.6 n 1934 64.0 66.4 34 4 V 1936 66.9 70.0 30.6 d 1930 41.8 40.4 8.5 e 1932 58.4 58.4 28.1 f 1930 58.0 56.6 43.8 9 1930 78.6 78.4 59.7 h 1930 66.3 66.8 34.2 i 1930 26.9 31.2 13.2 J 1930 32.4 34 1 4.2 k 1930 ($49.56) ($47.50) ($15.22) I 1930 31.1 35.8 0.7 m 1931 22.7 28.3 3.7 s 1934 27.6 25.0 11.5 t 1934 8.0 6.9 1.8 u 1934 26.1 24.8 5.5 w 1933 11.8 10.6 0.9 Highest Item Stand- ard De- viation Smith vote Lewis vote Roosevelt vote . . Igoe vote Roosevelt vote . . Women voters . . Party vote Bond issue Wet vote Voting interest. . Foreign birth . . . Catholic origins . Median rental . . Home-ownership Unemployment . Mobility Doubling-up ... Education Relief 88.1 91.5 90.0 92.2 96.1 52.5 87.3 85.6 93.3 104.1 67.3 84.6 ($129.40) 82.5 69.4 49.0 14.5 66.7 30.2 15.0 8.6 13.1 12 5 12.6 6.8 12 7.7 5.7 11.0 10.9 21.0 18.5 19.1 12 5 6.9 2.2 15.6 6.2 * All figures are expressed in terms of percentages except median rental, which is given in dollars. For variables a, b, c, n, and r, the totals used to calculate the percentages were the sums of the Democratic and Republican votes in each of the 147 areas. For the other variables the bases were: for d, the total number of registered voters in October, 1930; for e, the total vote cast in November, 1932; for /and g, the total vote cast on the particular measures; for h and i, the total number of adult citizens; for j, the total population; for /, the total number of homes; for m, the total number of workers ten years of age and over gainfully em- ployed in 1930; for s and t, the total number of families; for u, the total population eighteen years of age and over; and for w, the total population, January, 1934. Election returns were obtained from the Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook, the Public Service Leader, and the records of the board of election commissioners of Chicago. Census data from Burgess and Newcomb (eds.), Census Data of the City of Chicago, 1930 (Chicago, 1933), and Newcomb and Lang (eds.), Census Data of Chicago, 1934 (Chicago, 1934). Relief data through the courtesy of Professor Ernest W. Burgess. Since a new era in American politics was definitely started by the election of 1932, which brought to an end the Republican dominance of our national government, it was decided to study the results of this election intensely. To that end Figure 2, a map, was prepared, giving the proportion of the total vote received by Roosevelt in 1932 in each of the units selected for the present study. Those who are familiar with the city can COMMUNITY AREAS OF CHICAGO AS ADOPTED BY CENSUS BUREAU, 1930 SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF ROOSEVELT VOTE TO TOTAL VOTE 1932 (Source: Public Service Leader) | PER CENT 15.0 -24j9 US STM£T ue sraar S S * u Fig. 2 THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 97 see at once that the Roosevelt vote was strongest in the areas where rents were lowest, where the proportion of foreign born was highest, where the Catholics were most numerous, where there were more men than women, and where unemployment was most prevalent. Roosevelt's popularity was greatest in the center portions of the city, in and immediately surrounding the business heart of the city, on the banks of the two branches of the Chicago River, and also in two outlying industrial areas — one in South Chicago and the other on the Southwest Side. The most outstanding exception to this generalization is to be found in the areas inhabited largely by Negroes, where the Roosevelt vote was lower than in any other part of the city. Because the distribution of Negroes over the entire city was so uneven and because the behavior of the Negro voters was so atypical, it was decided to consider them separately. 6 Consequently, the areas in which the Negro population was 20 per cent or over were excluded from the general analysis. Table 9 also gives the means, the extreme cases, and the standard deviations for Democratic percentages in the 147 areas. 7 It is apparent that the exclusion of the districts in which the Negroes were relatively populous results in mean average Democratic percentages which are larger than the Democratic percentages for the city. The relatively small range and stand- ard deviation of the Lewis vote reinforce our comments about the landslide character of this election. All over the city many Republican voters moved away from their candidate toward Lewis. Since our units were kept the same for all five elections, it is possible to use them to trace the shifts in party strength during the period. 6 See Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago, 1935). 7 The standard formulas were used for the calculation of these items. Let us take, for instance, variable c, the Roosevelt vote. The mean, M c , was calculated by adding the Roosevelt percentages and dividing by 147 (N = the number of cas es). M c = 2X c /iV. The standard deviation (»8 8 % * *» Fig. 3 104 MACHINE POLITICS It has already been indicated that in Chicago politics religious affiliations have played an important role, particularly in the Democratic party. Unfortunately, it is impossible to get any direct information regarding the religious affiliations of voters. According to the Census of Religious Bodies for 1926, there were about 1,000,000 church members thirteen years of age and over in the city, of whom the Roman Catholics constituted slightly over one -half, the Jews about one -fifth, and the Protestants (both white and colored) the remainder. 19 In the total popula- tion the number of nonchurch members is slightly less than the number of members. While these figures underestimate the influence of the Protestant churches, they clearly indicate the superior organization of the Roman Catholics. Unfortunately, the census does not furnish church-membership figures for any subdivisions of the city. It was necessary to devise a measure, called "Catholic origins," which was obtained by finding the percentage of the total population composed of those who were born, or whose parents were born, in Catholic countries. It was assumed that immigrants from the following countries were likely to be Catholics: Irish Free State, Belgium, France, Po- land, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Lithu- ania, Italy, and French Canada. 20 This measure did not include the native white Roman Catholics of native parentage, of whom there was a goodly number. However, the proportion of per- sons of Catholic origins for the city was about one-third, which was slightly larger than the proportion of Catholic church mem- bers of all ages to the total population. As a measure of economic status it was decided to calculate the median rental, expressed in dollars, for each of the areas studied. 21 This index does not divide the population of the districts into two mutually exclusive categories, as do the other variables. While the median rental values may conceal the fact that there were wide differences in rents paid by families living within a given district, such as the Gold Coast and slum area on the Near North Side, such sharp contrasts were not 19 I, 389-91. 20 Census Data, 1930, pp. 191-233, 245-98. 21 Ibid., pp. 567-94. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 105 common all over the city. It has also been shown that median rents are fairly closely related to incomes. 22 A comparison of the map showing median rentals with the map of the 1932 Roosevelt vote indicates that, in general, Roosevelt got his highest vote in the low-rental areas and his lowest vote in the high-rental areas. 23 Five other social measures were taken from census data on the theory that they would show some relationship to party preferences and to changes in voting behavior. These were: home-ownership, as shown by the percentage that the owned homes were of the total number of homes; unemployment, as shown by the percentage unemployed in 1931 of the gainful workers ten years of age and over as listed in 1930 ; 24 mobility, as indicated by the percentage of the total families that had lived less than one year at present address; doubling-up, as shown by the percentage of total families with one or more subheads, and education, as indicated by the percentage of the population, eighteen years of age and over, which had com- pleted more than ten grades in school. 25 In a large metropolitan community like Chicago, home -ownership is not a good index to economic status, as some of the wealthiest people live in high-class apartments and many working class people with very limited incomes own their own cheap frame houses, but it does select the elements which are tax conscious. The unemployment index was far from perfect; but it picked out the areas of great- est concentration of unemployed, thus indicating where the depression was hitting hardest and where the relief problem was most serious. Doubling-up was not as useful a measure as 22 William F. Ogburn, "A Study of Rents in Various Cities," Monthly Labor Review, VIII (September, 1919), 617-38. 23 Census Data, 1930, Map 2. 24 The unemployment figures for 1931 were secured through the courtesy of Joseph F. Veseley. 25 A number of different indexes could have been selected from the 1934 educational data. The median grade completed or the proportion of the population that had com- pleted less than five grades could have been used. For a discussion of these various indexes, see R. O. Lang, "The Relation of Educational Status to Economic Status in the City of Chicago by Census Tracts, 1934" (University of Chicago doctoral disserta- tion, 1936). 106 MACHINE POLITICS unemployment, because it affected a smaller proportion of the population and the variations were slight. Because of the resi- dence requirements for voting and the interest in literacy tests for voting in some states, the measures of mobility and educa- tion were of particular interest. The last three variables were taken from the 1934 Census of Chicago, which furnished, for the first time, information on these topics. 1932 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE A comparison of the map of the 1932 Roosevelt vote with the maps showing the geographical distribution of the other vari- ables will show the general character of the relationships but not in a precise fashion, because large class intervals must be used. In a scatter diagram or dot chart the exact values for paired observations of two variables may be plotted and examined. Figure 4 gives values of the 1932 Roosevelt vote on the F-axis plotted against the corresponding values for the 1928 Smith vote on the X-axis. Thus, the dot in the lower left-hand corner of the chart represents census community 72 (Beverly Hills), where the Smith vote was 23.7 per cent and the Roosevelt vote 29.6 per cent. The dot in the upper right-hand corner of the chart stands for a section of census community 60 (a Polish area), in which the Smith vote was 88.1 per cent and the Roose- velt vote 90.0 per cent. In similar fashion each of the points plotted represents the paired values of the Democratic per- centages at the two presidential elections for a given area. It is clear that the points tend to follow a straight-line pathway which is almost at a 45° angle to the horizontal axis. By the method of least squares a straight line may be fitted to these points which expresses the Roosevelt vote as a function of the Smith vote. This line is called the regression line of X c on X a , and it is expressed in algebraic form by the equation, X c = 20.92 + 0.8221 X a . The equation shows that, on the average, Roosevelt got a high vote in the area where Smith received a high vote (82 per cent of Smith's votes) plus a diminishing num- ber of other voters as one passes from those areas where Smith's vote was small to those where it was large. Where the Smith THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 107 vote was relatively low, the average gains made by Roosevelt over the Smith vote were greatest; and where the Smith vote was high, Roosevelt's average gains were least. It was found 100 90 80 5 70 50 40 ^ 30 20 • *. • • • A-. » • • • *• •< • • •• • :* > • • • • • • • ■ X= 20.92+ r=.936± 01 10 30 40 50 60 70 PER CENT SMITH VOTE OF TOTAL V0TE-I928=X„ 80 90 Fig. 4. — Scatter diagram showing relationship between 1932 Roosevelt vote and 1928 Smith vote in 147 selected areas in Chicago. that the areas where the Roosevelt vote was about the same as the Smith vote (those below the regression line) contained a large Catholic population, which was already strongly Demo- cratic in 1928. A few of these areas also contained a strong Republican machine which was more active in 1932 for the 108 MACHINE POLITICS Republican candidate for governor than it was in 1928. The areas in which the shift to Roosevelt was most marked (those above the line) were territories in which the Republican organi- zation depended largely upon local spoils. After the Demo- cratic victory of 1930, there were wholesale desertions of the Republican ship in these districts. The next step in the analysis of the 1932 election returns was to express the relationships between the 1932 Roosevelt vote and the remaining variables in a more abstract fashion which is less space-consuming. This was done by calculating product moment coefficients of correlation for all the possible combina- tions with the Roosevelt vote. 26 Column c, or row c, of Table 10 gives these values. Without regard to signs, the coefficients arranged the variables in the following order of degree of close- ness to the 1932 Roosevelt vote: Smith vote, Lewis vote, party voting, Catholic origins, unemployment, education, foreign birth, median rental, woman vote, wet vote, bond issue, mo- bility, interest in voting, doubling-up, and home-ownership. The high value for the first of these coefficients means that the variations in the Roosevelt vote closely paralleled the variations in the Smith vote. While the mean of the Roosevelt vote was nearly 12 per cent higher than the mean of the Smith vote, Roosevelt's highest votes were obtained mainly in the same areas where Smith obtained his highest votes. Similarly, Roose- velt was generally least popular in the areas where Smith had been least popular. Another method of interpreting this co- efficient is to say that roughly 88 per cent of the variations of the Roosevelt vote is directly associated with variations of the Smith vote. The association of the Roosevelt vote with the next five variables is close, but not as close as in the case of the Smith vote. The negative sign for the correlation between the Roose- velt vote and median rental means that the relationship is inverse. In other words, the Roosevelt vote was generally high in those areas where the rents were low, and vice versa. The 26 For a discussion of correlation, see M. Ezekiel, Methods of Correlation Analysis (New York, 1930). See Appendix C, p. 210, for a discussion of the methods used to check all calculations for the present study. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 109 o o < rj £ o o S3 K PQ o g H O > o H Q W H < © tf > fa o O «! iJ 1 o u w H Edu- ca- tion ^ l' 1 1 l' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Doub- ling- up £ 1 i-ii-<©©i-<©©C»*f-ii-ii-H©'*©^H -* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ■ 2? «B ^KiOC'f^^O^CiX^^'XX CSX 1 1 1 l' 1 ' l' ' l' l' l' ' \ \ \ Unem- ploy- ment f at>(DM*oooHiot>Moaooiq x ^ •* ®»5l>M>!OXO»XXt»NXS< «5 © X 1 III Home- Own- ers s or:'-':»oi>i>xi>xx^»c»o «5 9*o*o i-Hooooootosoi-Hi-Hi-HOi o* i> <* oo i' iii i' i' i r \ Medi- an Rent- al « ^xx^xxosf^we^ *oo^^x 0«J©«»«5l>H(5<^CiJ> (X X © © X 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 Cath- olic Ori- gins (i) Xl>X©X'*»0©' r: 1 \ \ 1 1 For- eign Birth •e» ^OMHrHH(OTfl^!» O* © tO © X ^ "* 1 III In- terest in Vot- ing iO>-'t't>©>-iXXl> «9<«X'5 © X X X © "*"f"«J<©i>l>©X»0©X 1 1 1 1 1 h "S t> »o © «o ^ xt-osHH^xt'X^'f^ »C «5 ?0 SO <© OX-*(5)iO«5«JOffi^HO 1 1 1 l' l' l' l' I* l' \ 1 " 1 1 Roose- velt 1936 ;» X X OS OS (0M«<091Xt'OOt«mOt' 1 1 1 1 1 1 a to s ^0« *0-*^Ht-H©-*»0(«CO»0 C5XO) C!«X'fe^t'l>'OOt'XON 1 1 1 1 1 1 Roose- velt 1932 2 OS X 00!©Xf«5)t»t'-OOt-nHf s X xxx*o©>-i«ocn©v5»o©»05':>-'cc 1 1 1 1 1 "a aa 9 X <*HXt»CiCX"Q^XS)«5C!HX5i aoxtoo^snc^eHettr-tt 1 Mill Letter Sym- bol 8*o 8 »"tj «v 1 5l <> , ^ ,> * ^ *= "•» S — 'i K OS 1— 1 1 © oo OS -i-T CJD • >.2 c Interest in voting . Foreign birth .... Catholic origins . . Median rental .... Home-owners. . . . Unemployment . . Mohilitv ... •Jj 3 I 110 MACHINE POLITICS relationships between the Roosevelt vote and the woman vote and between the Roosevelt vote and educational level may be interpreted in the same fashion. Much smaller in size are the coefficients involving the covariation of the Roosevelt vote and the last five measures, namely, bond issue, mobility, interest in voting, doubling-up, and home -ownership. We can say that the Roosevelt vote has no apparent relationship to the presence or absence of home-owners, and that it has a loose positive asso- ciation with the affirmative votes on the bond issue and an even looser association with interest in voting. An examination of the scatter diagrams throws some light on the question of why certain variables were not more closely re- lated to the Roosevelt vote. 26a While the association of the Roosevelt vote with the measure of Catholic origins was close, there were certain non-Catholic areas which voted overwhelm- ingly for Roosevelt. A sampling of some of these areas showed that many of them had a large Jewish population. The Demo- cratic candidate for governor was a Jew and undoubtedly helped all his running-mates in areas where the people of his group were numerous. 27 In a few of the areas where the ratio of per- sons of Catholic origins was high, the Roosevelt vote was not quite as high as one might expect. It was found that one of the Republican factions was particularly strong in these areas. The Republican candidate for governor was a member of this fac- tion, and he ran ahead of his ticket in these districts. A priori, one might have expected to find a closer correlation between the Roosevelt vote and the measures of economic status. What were some of the influences which were reducing the closeness of this association? The scatter diagram, a map of the Roosevelt vote, and the interviews with ward committee- men indicated that in the outlying residential areas of the city there were voters who were paying modest rentals who still adhered to the Republican party. As one ward committeeman put it, "This ward is strongly conservative and Republican. 26a Unpublished charts. 27 This was especially true in the Twenty-fourth Ward, which roughly coincides with census community 30. It was true also in the Fifth and Forty-sixth wards. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 111 It is made up of Yankee, Protestant, dry home-owners. Re- gardless of the depression, they supported Hoover." 28 Since there were a large number of home-owners in these areas, the median rental figures were somewhat misleading. The most prosperous residents of these areas did not pay rent; and those who paid, did not live in the most attractive dwelling places. On the other hand, there were parts of the city where the rentals were high and the Roosevelt vote was also higher than might have been expected. For the most part, these districts were found in those hotel areas where the Democrats were fairly well organized. In his study of the 1928 presidential election in certain north- ern counties of the United States, Ogburn found that the pro- hibition issue was of primary importance. 29 In the present study the zero-order coefficients place the wet vote below many other measures. While most of the wets in Chicago were Democrats, it was found that in a number of bright-light areas, such as the North Side, Uptown, and Lake View communities, there were clusters of wet Republicans. 29a It is surprising that there were not more of these clusters, considering the fact that the Chicago Tribune had waged a vigorous campaign to get the Republican party to adopt a wet stand. There were also some relatively dry areas which showed a higher Democratic vote in 1932 than one might expect. Included in this group were the areas where there were persons owning their own homes, or paying modest rentals, who were hit particularly hard by the economic de- pression. Before 1930 most of the voters in these districts had voted dry and for the Republican party, but in 1932 they shifted over to the Democratic party without changing their stand on the prohibition issue. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the Roosevelt vote was closely related to a number of variables. How can a more complete picture of the total situation be presented? One 28 Report of interview. 29 W. F. Ogburn and N. S. Talbot, "A Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," Social Forces, VIII (December, 1929), 175-83. 29a See Fig. 5 for location of areas. 112 MACHINE POLITICS method is to analyze the ratios in small and more or less homo- geneous communities. In a Polish community where Roose- velt's vote was 20 per cent above his city average, there were relatively more unemployed, more persons of Catholic origins, more foreign-born, and more straight -ticket voters than in the city at large. 30 In a section where the Roosevelt vote was less than his city average, the opposite conditions were found, i.e., relatively speaking, unemployment was less, rents were higher, the ratio of women registered was higher, and there was a greater proportion of native white Protestants. 31 The following general view of the situation was given by a Republican ward committeeman: The vote was due to Roosevelt's personal popularity; to a strong Demo- cratic organization with plenty of patronage; a grudge vote against Hoover; and to a demand for a new deal and some Messiah to lead the way out of the depression. Unemployment was by far the most important factor in the 1932 election. The wet issue also played a role. The Democratic party was only the instrument for the people to express their grudge vote against the previous Administration, not the cause of victory as such. 32 The close association of the Roosevelt vote with so many variables raises a number of questions. Are not some of these variables measuring the same thing? What are the intercorre- lations of these measures? Do the coefficients tend to group themselves in clusters? What is the net effect of changes in one variable upon the Roosevelt vote when the influence of other variables is kept constant? The statistical device of partial correlation is useful in answering some of these questions. In order to solve the equations involved in this technique, it is necessary to have all of the intercorrelations. These are pre- sented in Table 10. Since the calculations involved in partial correlation become increasingly complicated as new variables are added, it was decided to select five independent variables for this step in the analysis. Which variables should be eliminated? It was de- cided to eliminate those which we believed had the least bearing 30 Census community 24. 31 Census communities 1, 39, 41, 75. 32 In a near West Side ward. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 113 on the problem. In this group came the bond issue, interest in voting, and home-ownership. It was decided also to eliminate one of every set of variables that appeared to be measuring the same thing. Since the resemblance between the Smith vote and the Lewis vote was close, it was decided to drop the Lewis vote. The relationships of two variables, foreign birth and Catholic origins, with all of the other variables tended to be very similar; so foreign birth was not included in the calculations of the par- tial coefficients. According to the zero-order coefficients, the higher the level of education, the lower was the Roosevelt vote. This would seem to indicate that the illiterates voted for Roose- velt while the college graduates largely supported Hoover. However, a closer examination of these figures shows that edu- cation is very closely related to economic status. The same observation applied to women, median rental, and unemploy- ment. While unemployment had signs which were opposite to the other two variables, all three are measures of economic status. Of the three, unemployment was chosen because it is more closely related to the Roosevelt vote. Keeping religion, unemployment, the wet-vote, and the party-vote variables constant, the partial correlation between the Roosevelt vote and the Smith vote remains high. 32a In other words, after making allowances for the other influences men- tioned, the traditional Democratic vote still remains close to the Roosevelt vote in Chicago. The partials between the other variables and the Roosevelt vote are much lower. Although the zero-order coefficient be- tween the Roosevelt vote and Catholic origins is fairly high, when the Smith vote, unemployment, the wet vote, and the party vote are kept constant, the partial becomes insignificant. This is largely because the Smith vote and Catholic origins are so closely related to each other. Another way of expressing this relationship would be to say that, if areas could be found where the Smith vote, the unemployment ratio, the wet vote, and the party vote did not change, such variations as occurred in the ratio of persons of Catholic origins would show no marked asso- 32a See Appendix C, equations for chap, v, p. 211. 114 MACHINE POLITICS ciation with the Roosevelt vote. To take an extreme illustra- tion, imagine a group of areas where the Smith vote was very low, most of the men were employed in 1931, a relatively large proportion of the voters were dry, and comparatively few straight ballots were cast in 1932. In these areas, the ratios of persons of Catholic origins would be low, and such slight variations as took place in them would show no definite relation- ship to the Roosevelt vote. Another surprising relationship revealed by the coefficients of partial correlation is the fact that the unemployment variable is not close to the Roosevelt vote when the Smith vote, Catho- lic origins, the wet vote, and straight party voting are held constant. Certainly the average increase of 12 per cent in the Democratic vote over the entire city between 1928 and 1932 can be attributed largely to economic considerations. However, when we come to examine a map of the city we find that the greatest increases did not always occur in the areas where un- employment was greatest. In the areas where employment was still high, the voters were suffering various deprivations. Bank failures and the collapse of security values involved radical changes in the standard of living of many. The resultant ten- sions fomented a reaction against the Republican regime. Re- gardless of the social and economic characteristics of a given ward, every political expert interviewed was firmly of the belief that the most significant "cause" of the election turnover was the economic one. 33 The net correlations of the Roosevelt vote with the wet vote and with party voting were not as close as might have been expected. According to one study, the net correlation of the Smith vote with the wet vote was high in 1928. 34 In Chi- cago, however, the relation of the Smith vote and the wet vote was not high. The second highest of all the partials is that between the Roosevelt vote and party voting, keeping constant the Smith vote, Catholic origins, unemployment, and the wet 33 Economic influences were referred to as "depression psychology," "anti-Hoover" sentiment, a "craze "to throw out the "ins." 34 Ogburn and Talbot, op. cit. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 115 vote. This means that party organization came second after party tradition in explaining the variations in the Roosevelt vote as between the different districts in Chicago. It is also of interest to examine the way in which the Roose- velt vote changes when these five other variables change. This can be done by means of an equation of net regression which describes the relationship between the Roosevelt vote as a dependent variable and the others as independent variables. This equation may be interpreted as meaning that the average change in the Roosevelt vote for a unit change in the Smith vote, keeping the other variables constant, was of first impor- tance; the average change in the Roosevelt vote for unit change in straight party voting was of much less importance, keeping the other variables constant; the same held true for the wet vote; and the average change in the Roosevelt vote for unit changes in Catholic origins and unemployment, keeping the remaining variables constant, was insignificant. In other words, this equation places the variables in the same order of impor- tance in determining the 1932 Roosevelt vote as do the coef- ficients of partial correlation. On the basis of the statistical method employed, it has been shown that the net relationship between variations in the Roose- velt vote and variations in economic status was not very close in Chicago. This is a rather surprising result in view of the fact that it is obvious that economic insecurity resulted in a large turnover of the votes. One of the reasons for this lack of rela- tionship is to be found in the nature of the measures employed. The areas where unemployment hit the hardest were those which were already strongly Democratic in 1928. To increase the Democratic vote in these areas was a difficult task, since there were some Republicans who could not be moved from their party allegiance even by economic adversity. If the dif- ference between the 1928 and the 1932 votes (expressed by per cents) is given as a ratio of the percentage of non-Democratic in 1928, the resulting measure makes some allowance for this situation. The correlation of this measure with unemployment was .40. In other words, there were many exceptions to the 116 MACHINE POLITICS general tendency for poor people to swing more decidedly than the rich in the direction of the Democratic party in 1932. All economic groups were affected adversely by the economic crisis which started in 1929. The higher income groups were injured by bank failures, loss of interest, loss of equities; where- as the lowest income groups were hit by unemployment and actual want. All levels relieved some of their tensions by voting against the party in power. 1934 CONGRESSIONAL VOTE IN CHICAGO The 1934 election returns give the first clear indication as to what the new Tammany machine was doing to the voting be- havior of the citizens of Chicago. In the twentieth century one of the "laws" of American politics has been that a president loses some of his House support in the congressional elections which come in the middle of his term. This principle did not hold for the congressional elections of 1934, however. President Franklin Roosevelt increased his grip on Congress following these elections. How did he do it? As far as the state of Illinois is concerned, he was able to do it because of the strength of the Kelly-Nash machine. Downstate there was a falling-off in the percentage of the Democratic vote for congressman-at-large. This was offset by an increased Democratic percentage in the city of Chicago. 35 Whereas in 1932 there was not much differ- ence between the voting behavior of the citizens of Chicago and those of downstate, in 1934 there was a spread of some 15 per cent. The downstaters reacted to the mid-term congres- sional elections in the normal American fashion; the citizens of Chicago did not. Let us now turn to a closer examination of the Igoe vote in the city. 35 The relevant percentages are: Percentage of Major Party Vote Received by Democratic Candidates for Congressmen-at-large Year Chicago Country Towns in Cook County Outside of Chicago Downstate 1932 57.1 64.8 45.8 49.3 52.9 1931 50.2 THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 117 What elements of the voting population of the city were attracted or repelled by the experiments of the first part of the Roosevelt administration? The Literary Digest poll of 1934 indicated clearly that there was a shift in the party preference of many voters after the character of the New Deal policies became generally known. An analysis was next made of the traits of the voters who shifted from one party to the other after one and a half year's experience with a Democratic admin- istration. This was done by using the Igoe vote as a starting- point. While the Igoe vote was, on the average, 3 per cent higher than the Roosevelt vote in the various sections of the city, the coefficients show that there was a close relationship between votes for the two candidates. In fact, the Igoe vote was most highly associated with the Roosevelt vote, as the coefficient of .960 indicates. In other words, party tradition and party organization appeared to account for most of the variations in the Igoe vote. Where Roosevelt has been strong, Igoe was also strong; and vice versa. However, it is also clear that there were some shifts in the Democratic support. Most of these can be accounted for on the theory that in 1932 the Republican sup- port came largely from the Protestant, employed, well-edu- cated, native-born, relatively prosperous groups that tended to be drier than other groups and which had a larger proportion of women registered as voters. The Democratic gains of 1934 were made among people who had been formerly Republican. Consequently, the relation between the Igoe vote and political, social, and economic variables should logically be slightly less close than the relationship between the Roosevelt vote and these variables. This was the case for every variable except the following: party voting, women, bond issue, and mobility. The differences between the Igoe and the Roosevelt votes are so slight as to be of little significance; but if an explanation is wanted, it would emphasize the fact that all of these variables were closely related to the measure of party voting. Since the Democrats had more patronage in 1934 than in 1932, we might expect the Igoe vote to be more highly correlated with organi- 118 MACHINE POLITICS zational influences than the Roosevelt vote. A relatively large difference was found between the coefficients involving the wet vote and the Igoe and Roosevelt votes. This may be due to the fact that the repeal of prohibition had become a dead issue. As in the case of the Roosevelt vote, the Igoe vote has no apparent relationship to the variables of doubling-up and home-owner- ship. The fact that the variations of the Igoe vote as between the different areas so nearly paralleled the variations of many other measures raises a number of questions. If some of the variables are closely related to each other, does not this mean that they are measuring the same thing? A detailed comparison could be made between the intercor- relations of the Igoe vote and those of each of the other vari- ables. However, such a procedure would leave a confused im- pression. The correlation matrix may be subjected to a more minute examination by means of the net regression technique which has already been applied to the Roosevelt vote. 36 A logi- cal starting-point is the Roosevelt vote, since it is so highly correlated with the Igoe vote, which should now be regarded as the dependent variable. 363 The regression equation for the Igoe vote as a function of the Roosevelt vote shows that, on the average, Igoe got a high percentage of the Roosevelt vote plus a diminishing number of other voters as the Roosevelt vote increased. Where the Roose- velt vote was relatively low, the average gains made by Igoe over the Roosevelt vote were greatest; and where the Roosevelt vote was high, Igoe's average gains were least. In fact, in the areas where the Roosevelt vote equaled or excelled 88 per cent, one might expect to find an Igoe vote which was equal to or less than the Roosevelt vote. Actually, the scatter diagram shows that there were no such cases. The points which are not close to the regression line indicate some of the influences which 36 See H. F. Gosnell and M. J. Schmidt, "Factorial and Correlational Analysis of the 1934 Vote in Chicago," Journal of American Statistical Association, XXXI (Sep- tember, 1936), 507-18. 36a See Appendix C. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 119 account for the 1934 shifts in the Democratic vote. In certain Republican areas which were relatively dry in 1932 there were marked shifts to the Democratic side two years later. Other areas which were strongly Democratic in 1932 did not show any increases in Democratic strength two years later. Would the addition of other variables to the equation ma- terially increase the closeness of the fit to the Igoe vote? In order to answer this question, the following variables were selected: the wet vote, percentage foreign born, and median rental. An examination of Table 10 will show that these vari- ables are not highly intercorrelated with each other. The equa- tion of regression which describes the relationship between the Igoe vote as a dependent variable and the others as independent variables may be interpreted as meaning that the average change in the Igoe vote for a unit change in the Roosevelt vote, keeping the other variables constant, was very high, whereas the average change in the Igoe vote for a unit change in each of the other variables, keeping the Roosevelt vote and the re- maining variables constant, was relatively insignificant. It is interesting to note that there is reversal of signs for the wet vote, meaning that, keeping the Roosevelt vote, foreign birth, and median rental constant, the net relationship between the Igoe vote and the wet vote was low and inverse. As we have already seen, Igoe won votes among dry Republicans, and he did not run quite as well as expected in certain wet Democratic areas. Since the Igoe vote and the Roosevelt vote are so closely related, the question may be raised as to how the Igoe vote may be explained without reference to party tradition, as measured by previous voting behavior. In other words, what sort of people have acquired the habit of voting Democratic in Chi- cago? Leaving out the Roosevelt vote, the equation indicates that the average change in the Igoe vote for a unit change in the wet vote, keeping the other variables constant, was fairly high. The coefficient of net regression for the percentage of foreign born was lower but significant. On the other hand, economic status as measured by median rental did not add greatly to the 120 MACHINE POLITICS accuracy of the estimated Igoe vote, when the other variables were held constant. It is interesting to note that signs for the coefficients of net regression in this equation are the same as those for the original zero-order coefficients. This means that, when the Roosevelt vote is eliminated, we cannot perceive the slight shift of voters in relatively dry areas to Igoe. When viewed closely, the Igoe vote does not appear to have introduced many new elements into the pattern of voting be- havior in Chicago. The greatest shift toward the Democratic party was found in the wards inhabited largely by Negroes, which were not made the subject for special analysis in this study. The important thing to remember regarding the Igoe vote is that there was an increase in the Democratic ratio; whereas in other parts of the state there was a decrease, and at other mid-term elections in Chicago, when the balance between the parties in the city was more even, there had been decreases in the percentage of the vote received by the candidates be- longing to the same party as the occupant of the White House. 1936 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE The 1934 congressional vote foreshadowed what would hap- pen in the presidential election of 1936. As compared with the 1932 election, President Roosevelt's popularity fell off down state, but in the city of Chicago it increased. During the cam- paign, the Literary Digest poll, the Crossley poll, and the Gallup poll failed to catch this trend in Chicago; but the Chicago Daily Times poll indicated that Roosevelt would pile up a bigger vote against Landon than he did against Hoover. 37 The Times poll evidently reached, better than the other polls, those ele- ments which go to make up the popular basis of the Kelly-Nash machine. A comparison of Figures 2 and 5, maps which give the 1932 and the 1936 Roosevelt votes for the different areas of the city of Chicago, shows that there has been a general shift away from the Republican party. Particularly in the so-called "Black Belt" there has been an enormous decline in the popularity of 37 See H. F. Gosnell, "How Accurate Were the Polls?" Public Opinion Quarterly, I (January, 1937), 97-105. COMMUNITY AREAS OF CHICAGO AS ADOPTED BY CENSUS BUREAU, 1930 SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF ROOSEVELT VOTE TO TOTAL VOTE 1936 (Source: Public Service Leader) 65.0-74.9 75.0-84.9 85 AND OVER i Fig. 5 >«S S « 5 i 1 1 * i 1 122 MACHINE POLITICS Republican candidates. The areas inhabited largely by Negroes are rapidly being whipped into line with other areas inhabited by persons of similar economic status. The only sections of the city that seemed to resist the charms of Roosevelt's personality and the assaults of the Democratic machine were those units which were inhabited largely by native white Protestants of native parentage who were comfortably well off, owned their own homes, and who read regularly the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Daily News. Beverly Hills, West Ridge, Edison Park, and Avalon Park were such areas. 38 Figure 6 gives a scatter diagram showing the relationship be- tween the 1932 and the 1936 Roosevelt votes by the 147 units into which the city of Chicago was divided. This dot chart indi- cates that President Roosevelt lost only 6 of these units, where- as he lost 26 in 1932. On the average, the Roosevelt vote was 6.6 points higher in 1936 than it was in 1932. The two Roose- velt votes were closer to each other in all respects than the first Roosevelt vote was to the Al Smith vote. This is shown by the greater steepness of the regression line and the lower value for the constant (the regression line intercepts the F-axis at 12.08) than was found in Figure 4. Political alignments under the New Deal have tended to crystallize. The Democratic machine strengthened its grip on the electorate in every unit with the exception of three, two of which were in the First ^Yard. In the Loop area there were two districts where Roosevelt did better in 1932 than he did in 1936. Since there were many hotels and exclusive clubs in these units, it is probable that the decline in the Roosevelt percentage was the result of a huge turn-out on the part of the Republican residents. Furthermore, "Hinky Dink's" methods were somewhat cramped by the new regis- tration law, which made the padding of lists much more risky and onerous. Taking the 1936 Roosevelt vote and using the same variables that were employed in the analysis of the Igoe vote, we find that the equations of net regression tend to resemble each other; but the prediction of the second Roosevelt vote relies somewhat 38 See Figure 5 for location of areas. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE less upon the 1932 vote and somewhat more upon the ratio of foreign born. 39 The new equation may be interpreted as mean- ing that the average change in the 1936 Roosevelt vote for a unit change in the 1932 vote, keeping the other variables con- \KAJ :X 90 > x nn • • •' ••If* <4 00 i W -7T\ ■J- * • • • - • fe 70 > tea • • * o 60 H O • ■ ou o > b ^r • /t " Id § f • Z UJ o ft ?0 CL 10 *„= 1208* r ve = .957 1 •9l39X e ±.01 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 PER CENT ROOSEVELT VOTE OF TOTAL VOTE - I932=X, 90 100 Fig. 6. — Scatter diagram showing relationship between 1932 and 1933 Roosevelt votes in 147 selected areas in Chicago. stant, was high; whereas the average change in the 1936 vote for unit change in each of the other variables, keeping the 1932 vote and the remaining variables constant, was insignificant except in the case of the percentage of foreign born. In order to test certain hypotheses regarding the influence of 39 See Appendix C. 124 MACHINE POLITICS the relief vote upon the 1936 election results, it was decided to add to the foregoing equation variable w, which is the per- centage of total persons who were on relief in October, 1933. 40 Before discussing the effect that this addition had upon the parameters, a word or two about the zero-order coefficients might be in order. The ratio of persons on relief was most highly associated with the measure of economic status, namely, median rental. As might be expected, the relation was inverse. In those areas where there was a high percentage on relief, rents were low. There is no question that the relief-rollers were supporters of Roosevelt. However, the relationship was not very close, as relationships go in the present study; and the 1936 Roosevelt vote was not appreciably closer to the proportion on relief than the 1932 vote, which means that the persons who were benefited by the liberal relief policies of the New Deal administration were Democratic before the depression began. 41 The addition of variable w to the equation does not change it very much. 42 In other words, the net contribution of the relief vote to Roose- velt's success in 1936 was not large when the 1932 vote, the wet vote, the ratio of foreign born, and median rentals are held constant. The elections held in Chicago during the New Deal adminis- tration show that party tradition, as measured by previous voting behavior, is the most important variable explaining political attitudes. The main characteristics of party lines in Chicago, a typical American metropolitan community, were set long before the depression. The persons who first joined the ranks of the unemployed and who were the first to go on the relief rolls were, for the most part, members of the party which the economic crisis swept into power nationally. Looking at the Chicago figures from a broader point of view, we can say that, if the city electorate is in any way typical of 40 This information by census tracts was furnished by the courtesy of Professor Ernest W. Burgess, of the University of Chicago, who supervised the sorting of the 385,000 original cases. 41 Using the same notation as in Table 10, the zero-order coefficients are: r cw = .536; r gw = .314; ri w = .516; r kw = —.795; r vw = .558. 42 See Appendix C. THE VOTERS' RESPONSE 125 the national electorate, the present study shows that in a demo- cratic country having a two-party system, that party which enjoys the least success nationally over a period of years which are characterized in general by economic prosperity and a laissez faire governmental policy tends to attract to it those elements which have the least social prestige and economic security. In the period from 1860 to 1932, the Republican party was the party which normally held the reins of government at Wash- ington, and the period was one which had no depressions com- parable to the one which started in 1929. The men of wealth, the scions of the older Protestant families, the women with money and leisure, were attracted to the Republican party ex- cept in the South. On the other hand, the foreign born, those who happened to emigrate recently from Catholic countries, those who had difficulty in getting jobs in this country, those who settled in the poorest sections of the great cities, naturally gravitated to the Democratic party, which in the northern cities has usually listened to the pleas of the submerged groups. There is no question that the 1932 election brought in a new era in American politics. As in other parts of the United States, an increase in economic insecurity in the second largest city of the country brought a reaction against the party in power. However, this reaction was more pronounced in the city than in the rural parts of the state of Illinois, and it was much more pronounced in some sections of the metropolis than in others. Greatest shifts were noted in the outlying lower-middle-class areas, where there were many foreclosures or threatened fore- closures; and the smallest shifts were found in high-class hotel areas and in the sections having many Protestant home-owners who weathered the depression with comparatively little diffi- culty. The adjustment of political attitudes to changing eco- nomic conditions depends upon the economic and social status of the individuals concerned, upon their social conditioning, and upon the agencies of mass impression which are active in the situation. CHAPTER VI CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 1 Proposition elections have been the battleground for many economic and political struggles in the city of Chicago. The issues voted upon have reflected the vital interests of important pressure groups and agencies of mass impression. Thus, the follow- ing organizations have been among those which have taken a decided stand for or against particular measures: the Civic Federation, the Chicago Bureau of Public Effi- ciency, the daily newspapers, City Planning Commission, the Wom- an's Club, the Chicago Medical Society, the traction companies, the organized "wets" and "drys," the real estate boards, the labor organi- zations, the Chicago Association of Commerce, and the political par- ties. For many years Insull and the other traction barons waged a bitter fight against the advocates of municipal ownership of local transportation systems. Edward F. Dunne, mayor and later governor, was one of the leaders of the movement for pub- lic ownership. The Democratic bosses, Brennan and Cermak, were in the front of the battle against prohibition, working in close harmony with the liquor-dealers, the Chicago Tribune, and the liberal elements in the city. On all questions involving pub- lic expenditures, the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency has been most alert, studying each question carefully from the 1 The author is indebted to D. M. Maynard's "The Operation of the Referendum in Chicago" (University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, 1930) for part of the materials upon which this chapter is based. See also C. O. Gardner, The Referendum in Chicago (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1920). 126 MAYOR WILLIAM HALE ("BIG BILL") THOMPSON CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 127 standpoint of the taxpayer and spreading its views by means of press releases and circulars. The voters in the city of Chicago have been called upon to pass judgment upon propositions submitted to them since the middle of the nineteenth century. All state and city bond is- sues, all propositions providing for the annexation of territory by the city of Chicago, all modifications of the form of city government, all amendments to the state banking laws, all questions relating to the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and all state constitutional amendments must be submitted to the voters. 2 The state legislature has, from time to time, by special act, submitted other measures to a popular vote. 3 In addition, a Public Policy Act passed by the legislature in 1901 provides for the submission of any question of public policy upon the receipt of a petition signed by 25 per cent of the voters of any city or 10 per cent of the voters of the state. It is thus apparent that the voters of the city are required to act upon a narrow range of municipal and state matters, and they may act upon a much wider range of topics brought up either under the amending clause of the state constitution or under the Public Policy Act. In fact, however, the number of constitutional amendments voted upon has been extremely limited, and the high petition requirements for public-policy measures and their lack of any legal effect have kept the submission of such pro- posals to a minimum. As compared with a city in a state which has the optional referendum and the initiative in full force, the city of Chicago has only a truncated system of popular law- making. 4 Nevertheless, some of the questions voted upon have 2 The Illinois constitution requires the presentation of state bond issues (Art. IV, par. 18), local bond issues, annexation proposals, modifications of city government (Art. IV, sec. 34), amendments to state banking laws (Art. XII, par. 5), laws relating to Illinois and Michigan Canal (separate section 4), and amendments to the state consti- tution (Art. XIV). 3 Examples of such optional legislation are the so-called "Mueller Law" of 1903, which authorized cities to purchase and operate street railways after the law had been accepted by a popular vote, and the Boxing Law of 1925(?). 4 Although the city council does not have the power to submit measures as it wishes, it has, in a few instances, submitted questions without any express authority. On No- vember 2, 1926, the question as to the advisability of retaining daylight saving was pre- 128 MACHINE POLITICS been of considerable importance, and the reaction of various portions of the Chicago electorate on these issues throws light upon the character of urban democracy in the United States. Since the adoption of the constitution of 1848, nearly 400 measures have been submitted to the voters of Chicago. All but 50 of these have been presented since 1900. In the first part of the twentieth century the perfection of the electric railway, the need for better roads as the automobile industry developed, the growing strength of the prohibition movement in the country at large, and the great faith in competency of the electorate which characterized the Progressive era brought the use of the referendum into much more general use in Chicago, as well as in other parts of the country. The high point was reached in 1928 during Mayor Thompson's administration, when 49 meas- ures were presented to the Chicago voters, most of which in- volved the approval of road bonds and bond issues for other public works. Since 1930 there has been a very rapid falling-off in the number of propositions submitted. Except for two emer- gency-relief bond issues, no bond issues whatsoever appeared on the ballot in the years 1932-36. The number of other propo- sitions presented has likewise been very small. The depression has so adversely affected the credit of the various governmental bodies in the city of Chicago that financing of long-term im- provements has been handled largely by loans or gifts from the federal government rather than by local bond issues, which depend upon popular ratification by the voters. The number of public-opinion measures voted upon has been greatly reduced by repeal of the Prohibition Amendment and by stalemate on the traction issue. FRAUD AND ERROR IN REFERENDUM RETURNS While the number of measures voted upon recently has de- clined sharply, the problem of handling the referendum returns has remained a serious one. Particularly with reference to those sented to the voters. Regarding this action, Leon Hornstein, first assistant corporation counsel, said: "The city council has no authority to place such measures on the ballot. The act of the city council was illegal; but as no one challenged it, the measure appeared on the ballot." CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 129 measures where a political party or a powerful economic group has a great deal at stake, it is difficult in Chicago to insure an honest and accurate count of the ballots. Because of the overburdening of the candidate ballot and because of defects in the election procedure, carelessness, and corruption on the part of the election officials, gross errors have crept into the official referendum returns. Since 1900, practically all local measures have been presented on separate proposition ballots. The counting of these ballots by the precinct election officials has been highly inefficient and unsatisfactory, to say the least. 5 A number of bond issues have been challenged on the ground that they did not pass as shown on the face of the returns. 6 "Who gives a d about the referendum ballot?" was the cynical comment of a city hall employee, not the remark of one of the notorious River ward bosses. 7 It was based upon years of practical experience in Chicago politics. An examination of the books at the election commissioners' office for a number of years shows a most extraordinary state of affairs. The following types of suspicious returns in various precincts have been discovered : a larger total cast on the propo- sitions than there were registered voters; a complete failure to record any negative votes, although adjoining precincts showed a considerable body of opinion unfavorable to the measures; an identical number of "y es " and "no" votes on all measures in a much larger number of precincts than would be possible accord- ing to the laws of probability; a large number of precincts with the referendum votes ending in round numbers. An intensive analysis of the official figures for one "little ballot" containing sixteen measures showed that about one -quarter of the returns were questionable. Below are some of the actual figures found on the books. These furnish very clear presumptive evidence of fraud as well as carelessness. An actual recount made of the 5 D. M. Maynard, "Fraud and Error in Chicago Referendum Returns," National Municipal Review, Vol. XIX (March, 1930). 6 Mac Guidwin v. South Park Commissioners, 333 111. (1928), 58; Chicago Daily News, July 25, 1931. 7 Maynard, "Fraud and Error in Chicago Referendum Returns," op. cit. 130 MACHINE POLITICS proposition votes in selected precincts showed that the errors were not compensating but cumulative. In these precincts the ballot thieves had stolen nearly 10 per cent of the total number of votes recorded for their favorite measures. 8 For many years student watchers have been sent to the polls to investigate election practices, and on a number of occasions they were instructed to look out particularly for the way in which the "little ballots" were handled. In every precinct it was reported that many voters leave their proposition ballots on the floor of the voting booths. A party official who has been instructed to turn in a big vote for a given measure runs little risk in picking up and marking these discarded ballots. In a number of places it was discovered that referendum ballots are "weighed," not counted. One official divided the "yes" and "no" ballots on the first question into two piles and estimated the result. Another official carefully counted the marks for the first question and carried over the identical figures for the re- maining questions. The way in which the proposition ballots are marked and counted tends, in many cases, to exaggerate the size of the vote, and in others actually to change the result. POPULAR INTEREST IN VOTING ON REFERENDA Political scientists generally agree that too great a burden has been placed upon the American voter. Part of this burden is in the form of proposition voting. To what extent have the principles of the short ballot been violated by overloading the "little ballot" voted upon in Chicago? What have been the responses of the Chicago electors when they have been called upon to do too much in the way of issue voting? ibid. Percentage in Favob of the Measubes in the 56 Sample Precincts Volstead Modifica- tion Illinois and Michi- gan Canal Constitu- tional Amend- ments Road Bonds Jail Bonds Daylight Saving Official count Recount Difference 72.3 71.7 .6 73.3 74.7 1.4 54 .7 50.8 3 9 59.0 50 5 8.5 61.0 51.9 9.1 65.3 61 3 4.0 CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 131 In the period from 1924 to 1936 the largest number of propo- sitions voted upon at any one time was 32, the number sub- mitted at the primary election of April 10, 1928. On another occasion (November 4, 1930) as many as 20 measures were voted upon, and at a third election (April 13, 1926) 19 measures were presented. In all, there were five occasions when 10 or more measures were brought before the voters at the same election. Figure 7 shows the tendency of the voters to overlook certain measures when the ballot is overweighted. n 90 85 SIZE OF PROPOSITION VOTE ANC > POSITION ON BAL -OT ~T~ ' 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 " F 1 1 1 1 80, 75 s^-APRIL f 1 10,1928 1 ^"^^-^ -^— o o ■•o^Jl''"'! 70 65 1 1 1 \l V~i ^-NOVEMBER 4 J 930 _<_ 1 60 55 50 45 4 /in v^?"" "* / — V APRIL 13,19 26\ I 1 1 1 i \ 1 1 1 | | | I 1 1 1 '12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 II 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2728 29 30 31 32 POSI TION ON BALLOT Fig. 7 It is apparent from Figure 7 that there is considerable varia- tion in the interest of the voter in measures presented on the same ballot. The way in which a measure is submitted and its position on the ballot explain some of these variations. When a "little ballot" contains 18 or more measures, there is some tend- ency for the interest of the voter to decline toward the end. This tendency, which we might call the "fatigue curve of vot- ing," is most evident in the 1928 proposition elections presented in the chart. At this election, nearly 20 per cent of the voters who indicated their choice on the first measure slighted the thirty-second measure. However, there are many notable ex- ceptions to the fatigue rule. Even in 1928 the thirty-first meas- 132 MACHINE POLITICS ure was only 5 per cent under the first. The last measure on this ballot was an amendment to the Municipal Court Act, which was presented in a confusing fashion. 9 The interest curve for November 4, 1930, shows several exceptions to the rule. It is worth while to consider the reasons for the reversal of the rule upon that date. The first measure voted upon at this election was an amendment to the Banking Act, which was worded in a very technical fashion, as the accompanying sample ballot (Fig. 8) shows. It is impossible to tell from the ballot title what this measure was about. There is no excuse for presenting measures to the voters in this form. 10 Propositions 8 and 20 on this ballot were also slighted by many voters. The first of these was a bond issue which was presented in a complicated fashion and not by the simple choice of "y es " an d "no," and the second was an annexation proposition which apparently did not create very much excitement. Apparently, the village of Beverly was not well known. Measures 4, 5, and 6 drew the highest vote of any on this ballot. All three of these were pub- lic-policy measures calling for an expression of opinion on the repeal of prohibition. 11 The votes on all the other issues pre- sented at this election did not vary over 5.6 per cent from each other. The use of a separate ballot to present propositions has meant in Chicago an increased participation on the part of the voters. On April 13, 1926, the measure which received the highest 9 The title read: "For or against consenting to 'An act to add Sec. 2- A' to 'An act in relation to a Municipal court in the city of Chicago,' whereby court procedure would authorize transfer of causes filed in the first class to the fourth class, and vice versa, to avoid dismissal of causes erroneously filed in the wrong class." 10 An extreme case of this type was the annexation proposal submitted on April 5, 1927. It read: "Proposition for annexation of certain property described as follows, to wit: The Northeast Quarter (N.E. j) of Section Twenty-Three (23) Township Forty (40) North, Range Twelve (12) East of the Third Principal Meridian; and all of the Southeast Quarter (S.E. |) of Section Twenty-Three (23), Township Forty (40) North, Range Twelve (12) East of the Third Principal Meridian, lying North of the Indian Boundary line; and all of Section Twenty-Four (24), Township Forty (40) North, Range Twelve (12) East of the Third Principal Meridian; and the North Half (N. i) of the Northeast Quarter (N.E. i) of Section Twenty-Five (25) Township Forty (40) North Range Twelve (12) East of the Third Principal Meridian, all said property situated in Cook County, Illinois." 11 See below, pp. 144-50. RfiW SPECIMEN PROPOSITION BALLOT BANKING LAW BALLOT TO AMEND AN ACT CONCERNING JURORS TO AMEND AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE APPOINTMENT OF JURY COMMISSIONERS AND THE PREPARATION OF JURY LISTS EIGH 4E^ BONDS FOR FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT, $2,500,000.00 BONDS FOR BRIDGE IN NORTH STATE STREET, $3,500,000.00 •1 sssHsSS^HsSSSsaHSxis^^^^^l^H BONDS FOR OGDEN AVENUE IMPROVEMENT, $5,460,000.00 ,0 J::^ : ,^[^f- 1 BONDS FOR BRIDGE IN SOUTH HALSTED STREET, $2,700,000.00 n| J-- :^=i^-^^r^-.r,fesrs, ^|— | BONDS FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF VARIOUS EXISTING BRIDGES, $1,000,000.00 12 : | BONDS FOR TRAFFIC SIGNALS, $500,000.00 13 -: 5rr^-^MAs=a%WB8rs^^tss[^_| BONDS FOR ELECTRIC LIGHTING SYSTEM, $2,000,000.00 14 :2^?rsAcS5tti^^tffli!arJar4ft.xc[=f-| BONDS FOR EAST FORTY-SEVENTH STREET VIADUCT, $300,000.00 15 ■■■•■',•".■"-;••■.:• ■'.■.-'- ■'.-' •.V^-^-H BONDS FOR EXTENDING INDIANAPOLIS AVENUE, $400,000.00 16 ■ i::£K=»e.«:i'SEit.-=i3-aa[^|_j BONOS FOR PLAYGROUNDS AND RAINBOW PARK IMPROVEMENT, $500,000.00 » ;-.-. ..-.■..■■ : .; . ;' ■'"..'. 1 ; :[^|— | 19 | ^- w .^ ^h ANNEXATION PROPOSITION ^__^ CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 133 vote was the proposition to adopt the optional boxing bill, which was placed on a separate ballot. 12 At the November election of 1930 the highest vote was cast for the $14,000,000 state-wide conservation bond issue, which likewise appeared in a little ballot of its own. 13 To put it in other terms, the plac- ing of a measure on the huge candidate ballot leads to its slight- ing by many voters. Before the Separate Ballot Law of 1899 went into effect, all measures were presented on the blanket ballot. In the nineties, one-half or more of the voters who marked their ballots for candidates neglected to indicate their views on the propositions. In the twentieth century, all but a few measures have been presented on separate, or so-called "little," ballots. Recent deviations from this rule have brought an enormous falling-off in the vote. Governor Emmerson was anxious to have passed a constitutional amendment which liberalized the Illinois taxation system. The question of par- ticipation is enormously important in the case of constitutional amendments, as a majority of all those voting at the election is required for the passage of an amendment. A voter who comes to the polls and marks his choices for candidates but fails to vote on a proposed contitutional amendment is in effect voting "no." Governor Emmerson thought that, if the amendment was placed on the candidate ballot, more voters would pay at- tention to it. How mistaken he was in this notion is shown by the fact that the constitutional amendment got 40 per cent less of the total vote cast than a measure which appeared on a sep- arate ballot. The problem of popular indifference to proposition voting may be approached from another angle. What variation in interest is there according to the way in which the measure gets on the ballot? Do bond issues bring a bigger vote than annexa- tion or public -policy proposals? Some light on these questions is thrown by Table 11, which gives the percentage of the vote on measures of the total vote cast at the election for the period 1924-35 by type of submission. 12 Percentage of the vote cast at the election, 77.5. 13 Percentage of the vote cast at the election, 79.2. 134 MACHINE POLITICS According to the measuring-rod presented in this table, the greatest interest has been shown in special local referenda and in occasional bond issues. However, it happens that the special local referenda were presented at special local elections, at which they were major issues. Consequently, it is necessary also to consider the ratio of the total registered vote cast on the measures. These data are presented in Table 12, which gives the percentage of the total registered vote cast on measures by type of submission. In this table it is clear that the special local TABLE 11 Percentage of Vote on Measure of Total Vote at Election, 1924-35 Type of Submission 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-100 Total Bond issues, state 1 41 4 4 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 4 Bond issues, local 6 64 114 Public policv, state 4 Public policv, local 1 1 4 5 Annexation 3 1 2 1 4 6 2 2 10 Modification of city gov- ernment 13 Banking laws Constitutional amend- ments 1 2 4 2 1 4 2 7 Illinois and Michigan Ca- nal 2 Special, local . 3 8 2 Total number of measures 3 7 18 77 58 9 4 173 referenda do not stand out as challenging the greatest attention of the voters. However, selected bond issues are still at the top, as far as popular interest is concerned. These two tables show that the problem of amending the Illinois constitution is a serious one. According to both the criteria presented, it is apparent that many voters are slighting constitutional amendments. Table 12 shows that there is a challenging situation with re- spect to certain bond issues. Important decisions as to the expenditures of money have on eight occasions attracted less than 30 per cent of the registered voters and on thirty-seven occasions less than 40 per cent. The rule of the majority, as far CONDUCT OF PROPOSITION VOTING 135 as propositions are concerned, means the rule of a minority of the registered voters. Changes in banking laws are likewise seriously neglected by many voters. The record of the Chicago electorate on proposition voting has been about the same as in the country at large. 14 This does not mean the efficiency of the Chicago voters has been particu- larly high, as in some sections of the country the lack of inter- est on proposition voting is enormous. The best record ever achieved in Chicago was the vote on the soldier's bonus bonds TABLE 12 Percentage of Vote on Measure of Total Registration, 1924-35 Type of Submission 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 Total Bond issues, state 1 27 3 2 2 2" 1 1 3 4 Bond issues, local Public policy, state 4 4 29 48 114 4 Public policy, local Annexation 3 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 5 3 3 1 5 2 3 10 Modification of city gov- ment 2 1 13 Banking laws 4 Constitutional amend- ments 1 7 Illinois and Michigan Ca- nal 2 2 Special, local 2 2 1 1 2 2 8 Special, state 2 Total number of measures 12 13 41 59 37 9 3 173 presented at the November election of 1922. On this measure 84 per cent of the registered vote was cast and 92 per cent of the vote recorded at the election. In Chicago the handling of proposition voting has been seri- ously defective. Not only have fraud and error crept into the counting of the ballots, but obscure and confusing titles and an overloading of the ballot have led to a large amount of indif- ference on a number of occasions. 14 Considering the some 1,299 state- wide measures voted upon during the period 1924-35, the author found that the mean of the percentage of the total vote on measure of the total vote cast at the election was 60.8 per cent, as compared with 02 per cent for Chicago; and that the mean of the percentage of the total vote on measure of total registration (429 cases) was 48 per cent as compared with 46.7 per cent in Chicago. CHAPTER VII SAMUEL INSULL ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES There have been conflicting theories about the nonrational tendencies of the behavior of the voters in marking proposition ballots. One contention is that the voters are required to pass upon technical questions which are beyond their comprehension and that they follow the precept: when in doubt, vote "no." 1 Another view is that on measures like local bond issues the people can be depended on to vote "yes" indiscriminately because bor- rowing money means shifting burdens to future generations that have the bills to pay. 2 Which of these hypothe- ses is in accordance with the Chicago experience with the referendum? Since the present study has empha- sized the effect of the depression upon the attitudes of the vot- ers, the propositions submitted during the past twelve years are of particular interest. The first half of this period (1924-29) was one of relative prosperity, while the last half (1930-35) was one of economic distress. During the entire period 174 measures were submitted, on 115 of which a majority of the voters voting on the measure voted "yes." The action of the voters on these measures, classified according to the way in which the measures came before them, is given in Table 13. BOND ISSUES As shown in Table 13, local bond issues have far exceeded in numbers any other type of measure voted upon in Chicago. 1 W. Schumaker, "People's Rule in Oregon," Political Science Quarterly, XL VII (June, 1932), 242-58. 2 E. P. Oberholtzer, The Referendum in America (New York, 1912), p. 503. 136 ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 137 When the period as a whole is considered, it is apparent that there is no tendency in Chicago for the voters to approve bond issues indiscriminately on the ground that future generations will bear the burden of the expenditures. The experience of earlier periods shows the same situation. 3 When such agencies as the press, the Bureau of Public Efficiency, the Citizens' Asso- ciation, the Association of Commerce, and the real estate boards conduct a vigorous campaign against a given bond issue or set of bond issues, a large number of voters follow their advice. TABLE 13 Action on Measures by Form of Submission, 1924-35 Measures Majority Voting "Yes" Majority Voting "No" Number of Measures Submitted Bond issues, state Bond issues, local Public policy, state Public policy, local Annexation 4 66 4 5 10 9 4 6 2 2 6 48 4 114 4 5 10 Modification of city gov- ernment Banking laws 4 13 4 State constitutional amendment Illinois and Michigan Ca- nal . 1 7 2 Special, state Special, local 2 2 8 Total 118 55 173 An examination of the number of bond issues that passed each year shows that the voters were favorable to borrowing for public improvements except in 1928 and 1929. The city and county bond issues which were presented in the years 1924-27 included a variety of street improvements suggested by the Chicago Plan Commission, the building of a new county court and jail, the improvement of street-lighting, and the develop- ment of parks. All of the proposals were adopted. In 1928, however, the Chicago Plan Commission, the city government, and the county board overreached themselves. At the April 3 Gardner, The Referendum in Chicago (Philadelphia, 1920), pp. 11-13. 138 MACHINE POLITICS election, 31 bond issues were proposed which aggregated to over $77,000,000. Besides being the largest amount ever sub- mitted to the Chicago voters at any time, the total was greater than the city's entire bonded debt at the time. Mayor Thomp- son, "Mike" Faherty, the head of the board of local improve- ments, and the Democratic city council were responsible for ten of the propositions, which asked for an aggregate of $48,500,000 to complete street improvements already started. James Simp- son, then the head of Marshall Field and Company and the chairman of the Chicago Plan Commission, urged the sub- mission of bonds for new street improvements, and, according to one account, promised that all the newspapers would support the issues. 4 The 1928 primary was a very unfavorable occasion for such staggering financial proposals to be made, since the city administration was then under severe fire. Thompson and Faherty were being sued for money paid to the real estate ex- perts hired by the city in connection with street improvements authorized by bond issues passed during a prior Thompson ad- ministration. In addition the city administration was being vigorously attacked on account of its Insull traction "deals" and its handling of the crime situation. Because of the assassina- tion of one anti-Thompson ward boss and the bombing of the homes of two anti-Thompson leaders, Deneen and Swanson, the primary was called the "pineapple primary." The public was at last aroused. Scare headlines in the press drove home the more sedate recommendations of civic organizations such as the Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency and the Citizens' Association. 5 All of the bond issues were overwhelmingly de- feated. In the fall of 1928 a much more modest attempt was made to 4 William H. Stuart, The 20 Incredible Years (Chicago, 1935), p. 361. 5 Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, The Bond Issues To Be Voted upon April 10, 1928 (pamphlet, 1928), said in part: "Not only is it an excessively long proposition ballot containing 32 measures most of which were bond issues, but it was built up by log- rolling methods and by the offensive use of political and other pressure. The defeat of all the pending city bond issues would help to discourage the unbridled and wasteful expenditure of bond funds and would also have the wholesome effect of making officials more careful and straightforward in presenting future projects to the voters." ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 139 win approval for street-improvement bonds. The proposals aggregated to $24,500,000, about one-third of the amount voted on at the April election. While the Bureau of Public Efficiency recognized that "bond issues furnished a most fruitful source of extravagance, waste, and other abuses during the prior in- cumbency of the present city officials," it recommended the passage of the measures because of the private interests in- volved. 6 However, the public still manifested its lack of confi- dence in the city administration. In the summer the Circuit Court had rendered a judgment of close to $3,000,000 against Thompson, Harding, and Faherty in the expert fee case, a judgment which was immediately appealed to a higher court. All of the newspapers, except the Chicago Evening American, demanded the resignation of Faherty as president of the board of local improvements; but Thompson and his lieutenant stood firm. The unfavorable attitude of the press and the continued distrust of the Thompson machine led to another defeat of the bond issues on the proposition ballot. After the fall election of 1928 a series of investigations of the Sanitary District and the county board were started which re- sulted in discrediting a number of Democratic, as well as Repub- lican, party leaders. Serious charges of graft and extravagance were made in connection with the construction work of the Sanitary District, the building of the new county jail building, and the purchase of lands for the county park system. In addi- tion the reassessment made many voters tax conscious. When the county board, the city council, and the Lincoln Park Dis- trict brought bond issues aggregating to $47,700,000 before the voters at a special election held in the fall of 1929, all three of these governmental bodies were repulsed. Although the vote was closer than it had been the preceding year, the negative, distrusting mood of the electorate persisted. Not until the spring of 1930 was the attitude of the voters changed toward the authorization of bond issues. By this time, unemployment began to be a very serious problem and the pas- 6 Chicago Bureau of Public Efficiency, The Bond Issues To Be Voted upon November 6, 1928 (pamphlet, 1928). 140 MACHINE POLITICS sage of the measures was urged as a means of providing work. In the April election all of the bond issues which concerned the payment of judgments rendered in condemnation proceed- ings passed; but the Ogden Avenue proposition, which called for new construction work, was defeated. Finally, in the fall of 1930, when the third Thompson administration was nearing a close, the Ogden Avenue and other street improvements were supported by the voters. In a preceding chapter, use was made of a November, 1930, bond issue as a measure of the public's willingness to accept governmental expenditures. 7 The measure selected was the $14,000,000 state conservation and forest preserves and public recreation ground bond issue, which was opposed by an evening and a morning paper and by the Bureau of Public Efficiency. In the present connection it is of interest to discuss the rela- tionship of the vote on this bond issue to the other variables studied in the 147 areas into which the city was divided. The closest relationship was an inverse one with the variable indi- cating the percentage of home-owners. 8 In other words, in those sections of the city where there was a large proportion of home- owners, the affirmative vote for this bond issue was usually low; and in those sections of the city where there were few home- owners, the affirmative vote tended to be high. However, there were some exceptions to the latter tendency in the high-class apartment house areas on the North Side, where the ratio of home-owners was low and the proportion of "y es " votes on the bond issue was also relatively low. Affirmative votes on the bond issue tended to be positively associated with affirmative votes on the wet issue, straight -ticket voting, and also with votes for Democratic candidates at different elections. Surpris- ing as it may seem, there was not a very close relationship be- tween economic status, as measured by median rental, and votes on the bond issue. One would expect that those who paid higher rents would tend to vote against the bond issue because of the resulting tax burden, and that those who paid low rents 7 See above, p. 99. *r i=— .57. COMMUNITY AREAS OF CHICAGO AS ADOPTED BY CENSUS BUREAU, 1930 SHOWING PERCENTAGE VOTING "YES" ON 1930 BOND ISSUE (Source: Board of Election Commissioners) 8 u i srntu lit STRCCl Fig. 9 142 MACHINE POLITICS would vote for the issue since it might mean more work for laboring-class people. There was only a slight tendency for the areas to follow this pattern. Persons who pay high rents are not always conscious of their indirect payment of real estate taxes. THE TRANSPORTATION QUESTION At frequent intervals during the past thirty-five years the traction issue has come before the Chicago voters. One solution after another has been indorsed, but the city is still far from any permanent settlement of the problem. In the first decade of the twentieth century the voters expressed their preference for municipal ownership; but when the crucial measure was voted upon in 1906, the three-fifths majority was not attained. Fol- lowing this defeat for the advocates of municipal ownership, the forces in favor of private ownership have gained steadily. The 1907 ordinance which was adopted by the voters provided for a temporary solution of the traction problem, as far as the surface lines were concerned; but it left the consideration of a comprehensive traction scheme for the future. A number of mayors in succession tried their hand at solving the traction problem but met with failure in each case. Mayor Carter Harrison II supported a grandiose plan called the "com- prehensive scheme of 1914." The press was unanimous in con- demning it, and the voters would have none of it. The city council proposed an elaborate plan in 1918 which provided for a municipally constructed, but privately operated, subway sys- tem. This scheme met the opposition of Mayor Thompson and the labor groups and was defeated. Mayor Dever and his Democratic colleagues brought forward a scheme in 1925 which had the approval of Boss Brennan. It provided a novel method of financing by traction certificates which could be acquired by the city. While the surface lines supported it, Samuel Insull, representing the elevated lines, was opposed to it because he felt the valuations were too low. For various and sundry reasons, including complaints regarding the excessively high valuations, three former mayors — Harrison, Dunne, and Thompson — the Hearst newspapers, and the Municipal Ownership League lined ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 143 up against the proposal. It was defeated by a three-to-two vote and marked a serious setback for the Brennan Democratic organization. No other traction ordinance came before the voters until 1930. This plan represented the united efforts of the City Coun- cil Committee on Local Transportation and its subcommittee, aided by the Citizens' Traction Settlement Committee, headed by James Simpson. It provided for a comprehensive, unified local transportation system, operated under a terminable per- mit by one corporate management and subject to the control of a local commission of three members. During the first ten years of its existence the company was to spend $200,000,000 for extensions, equipment, additions, and improvements; and the city was to build a subway system, the cost of which was to be met by use of the city traction fund and by special assess- ments levied upon property especially benefited. Mayor Thompson favored the plan; and in his speech made on the occasion of the signing of the ordinance, he stressed the employment which the extensions would create. Samuel Insull also came out publicly in favor of the plan in a speech at the annual banquet of the Chicago Stock Exchange. 9 The force of the depression was not fully felt as yet; and Insull, apparently at the height of his power, could talk of a coming boom. Blindly optimistic, he had no intimation of the forces which were soon to sweep him off his high pinacle. At the time, business groups, labor organizations, all the daily newspapers except one, and many civic organizations were carried along by the swelling tide in favor of the ordinance. The opposition to the plan was led by such men as Harold Ickes, former Mayor Carter Harrison, Donald Richberg, and William Holly. Quixotic crusaders, voices crying in the wilder- ness, they nevertheless kept up their efforts until the end. Ickes attacked the ordinance on the ground that it failed to include a forfeiture clause, that the valuations fixed were excessive, that the return allowed to the city was inadequate, that it pro- vided no means of enforcing the duty of the transit company 9 Chicago Tribune, May 13, 1930. 144 MACHINE POLITICS with respect to betterments and extensions, and that it was in effect a perpetual franchise. 10 The efforts of the Citizens' Com- mittee against the traction ordinance were futile. However, it is interesting to note that the above-mentioned leaders of the opposition were chosen to fill important positions in President Roosevelt's New Deal administration. Their counsel was re- jected at home but they were looked to for national leadership. The final vote on the measure at the special July election was as follows: 325,837 for the ordinance and 56,690 against it. The people were sick of the traction mess and thought that some- thing might be done. Insull, the bankers, the real estate men, the labor unions, the steel industry, the car manufacturers, and the general public were destined never to reap any benefits from this victory. Before the new company could be organized, Insull found him- self in financial and other difficulties. Legal obstacles were placed in the way of the subway by Loop real estate interests. Extension after extension of the acceptance date was voted by the city council; but finally, in 1934, Mayor Kelly urged the council not to grant another extension and the ordinance passed into history as another futile attempt to solve the traction prob- lem. Mayor Kelly gave as his ostensible reason for scrapping the plan the opinion that the valuations were far too high under the existing circumstances. The view was also expressed that an accounting of the city transit fund might have proved embar- rassing at the time. THE PROHIBITION ISSUE Now that the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution has been repealed, it is of historical interest to trace the steps by which sentiment unfavorable to prohibition was fostered. While the prominent dry leaders scoffed at polls taken of public sentiment on this issue during the prohibition era, the events of the past few years have clearly shown how shortsighted these gentlemen were. The Literary Digest na- tional polls on this issue conducted in the years 1922, 1930, and 10 Ibid., June 5, 1930. ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 145 1932 showed a tremendous increase in wet sentiment. 11 These polls had been boycotted by the drys, and the results were char- acterized as preposterous. Not until the eve of repeal did the dry organizations like the Anti-saloon League and the Women's Christian Temperance Union wake up to the fact that they had been lulled to sleep by the supposed security of a constitutional amendment. In the city of Chicago there were four public-opinion votes on the liquor question during the prohibition era. An analysis of the influences at work at each of these votings throws some light upon what was happening to public sentiment on this TABLE 14 Comparison of Returns on Prohibition Referenda Percent- Percent- Number Number Total Number Total Vote at Elec- tion Total age of Vote on age of Regis- Percent- Year Voting "Wet" Voting "Dry" Voting on Meas- ure Registra- tion Measure of Total Vote at tered Vote Cast on age Voting Wet (1 of 3) Election Measure (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3 of 4) (3 of 5) 1919, April 1, men 276,817 70,165 346,982 440,069 500,064 82.4 69.4 79.8 1919, April 1, women .... 129,373 77,014 206,387 258,851 306,920 61.9 67.3 62 7 1919, April 1, total 406,190 147,179 553,369 698,920 806,984 75.0 68.5 74.5 1922, Nov. 7, total 500,757 110,707 611,464 736,617 804,648 84.0 76.0 81.9 1926, Nov. 2, total 426,966 165,885 592,851 756,652 876,509 78.4 67.6 72.0 1930, Nov. 4, total 535,071 145,401 680,472 937,097 1,264,234 72.6 53.8 78.6 1933, June 5, ratification of Twenty-first Amend- 604,664 52,459 657,123 695,445 1,498,314 94.5 43.8 92.0 much-debated question in a typical metropolitan community. The Literary Digest poll for the state of Illinois showed a steady increase of opinion favorable to repeal, but the public-policy measures show fluctuations in the wet and dry sentiment. Table 14 presents some comparative figures on the issue. The ques- tion was not presented in exactly the same form at each of these elections, but the wording was sufficiently similar to separate the wets from the drys. The wet and dry question appeared for the first time in April, 1919, as a local public -policy measure under the title, "Shall Chicago Become Anti-saloon Territory?" Phillip I. Yarrow, the head of the Chicago Dry Federation, was active in starting 11 C. E. Robinson, Straw Votes (New York, 1932), pp. 147 ff. 146 MACHINE POLITICS the circulation of the petitions for this measure late in 1917. Within a short time a petition with nearly 150,000 names on it was presented; but this was challenged by the wets, and a court order compelling the placing of the question on the ballot was not obtained until 1919. 12 By that time the issue was of no immediate importance, as national wartime prohibition was soon to go into effect. The dry leaders were completely indif- ferent regarding the fate of the measure which they had spon- sored. On the eve of the election Yarrow said, "We haven't spent a cent or wasted a postage stamp in soliciting votes at the coming election." 13 On the other hand, the wets, led by Anton J. Cermak, who was then bailiff of the Municipal Court, were extremely active and spent large sums on newspaper advertis- ing. The Chicago Tribune 1 * advised a negative vote on the ground that prohibition was an infringement of personal lib- erty. Three-fourths of those who voted on the measure voted wet. In 1922 Boss Brennan and his lieutenant Cermak were active in placing on the ballot a public-policy measure calling for an expression of opinion on the modification of the Volstead Pro- hibition Act which defined intoxicating beverages at one-half of 1 per cent. The proposition was backed by the local branch of the National Association Opposed to the Prohibition Amend- ment, which spent money on newspaper advertisements. The dry organizations again felt that it was useless for them to rally a big vote against the measure, and they merely advised their own members to vote "no." Appearing first on the proposition ballot was the soldier's bonus measure, which attracted most of the publicity. However, the Chicago Tribune 1 ^ continued its editorials against prohibition. The fact that the percentage of the registered vote cast on the question was much higher in 1922 than in 1919 was undoubtedly the result of the great interest aroused in the bonus issue. More attention was paid to the 12 Chicago Herald and Examiner, March 30, 1919. 13 Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1919. 14 March 27, 1919. 15 November 3, 1922. ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 147 little ballots than at any previous election. The returns indi- cated a marked increase in wet sentiment. By 1926 the city had been under the prohibition regime for seven years. The Brennan-Cermak wet forces secured the sub- mission of a state-wide public-policy measure at the November election which again raised the question of modifying the Vol- stead Act. While the Women's Christian Temperance Union advised its members to ignore the wet referendum, and the Anti-saloon League characterized the measure as a "fake refer- endum inspired by outlawed liquor interests," a local women's organization vigorously urged the defeat of the proposition. The dry organizations were aware of the movement directed toward the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, but they felt so secure that they scoffed at this movement. "Why should we go out and retake a frontier which we already occupy?" was the question raised in the American Issue, the official organ of the Anti-saloon League. In an editorial replying to this position, the Chicago Evening Post m said, "Don't heed the craven, stupid urging of the Anti-saloon League to ignore the Brennan refer- endum vote number." On the other hand, the wet forces were not quite as active as they had been on previous occasions. "Those who were opposed to Volsteadism will vote 'y es ' on the proposition," was the editorial comment of the Chicago Trib- une, which upheld the measure as a fair test of public sentiment. However, the organized wets were either discouraged or waiting their time. As compared with the 1922 poll, fewer people voted upon the measure; and of those who did vote, 10 per cent more were on the dry side. The 1930 referendum on the repeal of the Eighteenth Amend- ment clearly showed that the 1926 poll gave a false view of the trend of public sentiment in Chicago on the prohibition ques- tion. The city was not becoming drier but, if anything, a little wetter. In the 1928 presidential election campaign, Al Smith, standing on a wet platform, nearly carried the city, which nor- mally gave the Republican candidate for president 70 per cent of the total vote. With reference to the 1930 referendum, Boss 16 October 27, 1926. 148 MACHINE POLITICS Cermak and the Thompson and Harding factions of the Re- publican party found themselves together against the drys. In addition, the Hearst papers came out for repeal in this year. The offensive was clearly in the hands of the wets, who copied the techniques of the drys of the preprohibition era. Before the Eighteenth Amendment was passed, the drys blamed the iniq- uitous "saloon" for a multitude of social ills, such as wayward- ness, prostitution, crime, poverty, and corruption. After a few years' experience under the dry regime, the wets began to blame prohibition for bootlegging, lawlessness, crime corruption, and poison-liquor deaths. 17 One of the editors of a leading daily boasted to the author about the role of his paper in dis- crediting prohibition. When the question came up in 1933 as to the election of wet or dry delegates to the state convention to consider the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, 91 per cent of the Chicago voters who took part in the election voted for the wet delegates. It is now of interest to consider the character of the voters who voted wet in contrast to those who were on the dry side. At the time of the 1919 referendum on the liquor question the votes of the men and the women were kept separate in Illinois. As Table 14 indicates, the men opposed prohibition at this time by a vote of four to one, whereas the women opposed it by less than two to one. In six of the thirty-five wards into which the city was then divided, the women actually voted dry. 18 In all the other wards the women were drier than the men, but there was considerable spread between the differences. The vote of the men and women was nearest alike in the lower West Side, inhabited largely by Czechs, Jews, and Poles; 19 while the great- est spread (about one-quarter of the women voted drier than the men) was found in the communities of Hyde Park, Wood- lawn, Englewood, and Beverly Hills on the South Side and in Rogers Park and Uptown on the North Side. In general, the 17 P. H. Odegard, The American Public Mind (New York, 1930), p. 180. 18 Wards 6, 7, 9, 25, 32, and 33 (1911 ward lines). These roughly correspond to census communities 41, 42, 67-75, 1, and 2. 19 Ward 10, which roughly corresponds to census community 31. ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 149 dry vote was found in the higher rental areas where the native white of native parentage pedominated. Since 1920 the votes of men and women have not been kept separately in Illinois. However, in connection with the 1930 election an attempt was made to study the influence of women's votes indirectly. The methods used and the basic figures have already been presented in a preceding chapter. 20 It was found that in those areas where the ratio of women registered voters to total registered was high, there the ratio of dry votes was also high. 21 It may be inferred from this that in 1930 the women in Chicago were still much drier than the men. The relation of the wet vote to the other variables studied is also of interest. A comparison of Figure 10 showing the wet and dry vote in 1930 with the maps for the Roosevelt vote shows a close resemblance (omitting the areas of Negro concentration). The wet vote was also closely associated with the Smith vote. In those areas where Al Smith polled a large vote, the propor- tion of wet voters was high. However, there was a loosening of the relationship between the wet vote and Democratic vote in 1934, owing no doubt to the fact that the repeal issue had been settled by this time and the attention of the voter was attracted by other considerations. The study also shows that the Catho- lics, the foreign born, the unemployed, the persons who pay the lowest rents, and the non-home-owners tend to be wet. Inversely, the Protestants, the native whites of native parent- age, the employed, the persons paying the highest rents, the home-owners, and the persons with superior educational attain- ments tend to be drier than the average for the city. Persons who vote dry also tend to be more independent of party ties and constitute an important bloc in the body of split-ticket voters who follow the recommendations of the churches, civic organi- zations, and the press. TAX-AMENDMENT VOTES Among the most important questions voted upon by the Chicago electorate are amendments to the Illinois constitution. 20 See above, pp. 98. 21 See Table 10, above, p. 109. COMMUNITY AREAS OF CHICAGO AS ADOPTED BY CENSUS BUREAU, 1930 SHOWING PERCENTAGE VOTING "WET" ON 1930 REPEAL REFERENDUM (Source: Board of Election Commissioners) 1 i it PER CENT UNDER 70 117 STHCCT US STRICT Fig. 10 ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 151 Since the amending clause requires that proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the electors voting at the general election, the size of the vote cast on the measure is a matter of great importance. A person who comes to the polls at a general election and fails to vote on an amendment which is being proposed is in effect voting no. Cook County now has over one-half of the total population of the state, and an amend- ment which did not carry the county would ordinarily have little chance of passing. Of the constitutional questions which have been voted upon in Illinois during the past twenty years, the tax amendments have been of leading significance. There is no division of in- formed opinion that the present system of collecting revenue for state and local governments in Illinois is so fundamentally unsound, obsolete, unfair, and ineffective as to result in an unbearable situation. Rates have been excessively increased, and yet the city and the board of education has been unable to obtain adequate revenue from the general property tax, upon which they must chiefly rely. This tax is inequitable and dis- criminatory as between individuals, localities, and classes of property. Reference has already been made to the corruption which grew out of this system. 22 Tax-amendment proposals were brought before the voters in 1916, 1926, and 1930. These amendments were not the same in all three cases, but the differences were minor. The purpose of each proposal was to allow more discretion to the Illinois general assembly regarding taxation. In effect they abrogated the clause of the constitution regarding uniformity and per- mitted the newer forms of taxation, such as the income tax. The votes on these measures are presented in Table 15. This table reveals a remarkable shift in public opinion on this issue. In 1930, when the local governments were never in such desperate need for new sources of revenue, the voters over- whelmingly turned down the possibility of constitutional relief. What were some of the influences which caused the voters to act in such an apparently irrational fashion? 22 See above, pp. 7, 77. 152 MACHINE POLITICS At the election of 1916 the tax-amendment proposal was unanimously indorsed by all of the Chicago newspapers. The Chicago Tribune 2 * declared in an editorial: "Decent opinion is not divided. No fair argument against it has been presented." "There was no opposition to the measure," declared the Chicago Daily News 241 "since the sound arguments are all in its favor." The Hearst papers likewise came out in favor of the amend- ment. In addition the Democratic and Republican parties both gave their workers orders to call attention to the amendment on the little ballot. The measure carried Chicago but lost down- state. TABLE 15 Number and Percentage of Voters in Chicago Favoring Tax Amendments, 1916, 1926, and 1930 Percent- Percent- Percent- age of Percent- age of age of Vote in age of Total Registra- tion Total Vote at Election Total Vote on Vote on Favor Vote in Year Vote For Vote Against Vote on Meas- ure Meas- ure to Total Meas- ure to Total of Meas- ure to Total Favor to Total Voting Vote at Regis- Vote on at Elec- Election tration Meas- tion (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) ( 8) (9) (10) 1916 504,674 876,509 487,210 756,652 244,006 244,708 117,305 201,961 361,311 446,669 74.1 59.0 71.7 51 67.5 54.8 50.2 1926 32.3 1930 1,264,234 937,097 146,044 217,735 363,779 39.8 28.7 40.2 15.6 Ten years later the measure was again proposed at a general congressional election in substantially the same form. However, this time the papers were divided in their support of the meas- ure. The Hearst papers, the Post, and the News were in favor of the amendment; but the Tribune (in true form) reversed itself and found a new definition for "decent" opinion. "We must clean up the state government before we alter the legislature's taxing powers," ran a Tribune 25 editorial. "Those who produce the wealth of the state will vote against the amendment unless they are willing to see their welfare become a pawn in a game of political control" continued the argument of the paper. Here is perhaps a real clue to the situation. In 1916 Joseph Patterson, 23 November 6, 1916. 24 November 2, 1916. 25 October 28, 1926. ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 153 a man with liberal tendencies, had some voice in determining the policies of the paper, while in 1926 he had relinquished the control to his cousin, Colonel Robert R. McCormick, who was opposed to heavy taxation of the higher incomes. 26 The amendment had been drafted by a committee represent- ing the co-operation of numerous state-wide organizations, in- cluding such diverse groups as the bankers, the labor unions, the farmers, the teachers, the real estate operators, and civic organizations. The Illinois Chamber of Commerce and the Illinois Manufacturers' Association worked hard to defeat the measure. While a majority of those Chicagoans voting on the measure were in favor of it, the vote fell far short of reaching a majority of those voting at the election. In 1930 the general assembly, urged on by Governor Emmer- son and various civic groups, again brought a tax amendment before the voters. This time the forces opposing the amend- ment were augmented by several important newspapers. The Hearst papers and the Daily News joined the Tribune in fighting the amendment. For some time Hearst had been losing his earlier liberal ideas, and he was becoming more outspoken in his opposition to taxes which might place a burden on his properties. 27 Victor Lawson, the liberal proprietor of the News, died in 1925; and his paper came more and more under the sway of interests that opposed tax reform. The Chicago papers were opposed to the amendment in part because they felt that it would bring an income tax and other forms of taxation which would be imposed by downstate at the expense of the inhabi- tants of the city. 28 The enormous falling-off in the popular interest in voting on this measure was in part due to mechanical factors. Governor Emmerson thought that by putting the amendment on the general candidate ballot it would get a larger poll. It is appar- ent from column 7 of Table 15 that this was a very much mis- taken conception. The percentage of the vote on the measure 26 "The Chicago Tribune," Fortune, IX (May, 1934), 101-13. 27 F. Lundberg, Imperial Hearst (New York, 1936), pp. 265 ff. 28 Chicago Tribune, May 16, 1930. 154 MACHINE POLITICS to total registration dropped from 51 to 28 per cent by this change in the method of presentation. While in other states the depression seemed to make the voters more willing to accept tax reform, it did not have this effect in Illinois. What has been the nature of the response of various elements of the electorate to the tax amendments? An analysis of the detailed returns shows that the behavior of the voters has not been as consistent on this issue as on the wet and dry issue. Taxation is a technical subject which is difficult for the layman to understand. It seems almost impossible to overcome the indifference of the citizen who cannot visualize what an anti- quated tax system does to him. When such a citizen does happen to glance at newspaper articles on the subject, he is likely to find conflicting views and become more confused. On the eve of one of the tax-amendment elections, 600 regis- tered voters, scattered over 70 precincts, were interviewed by field investigators in order to determine their attitude toward the question. 29 While the proportion of those interviewed who expected to vote in favor of the measure was higher than the actual percentage in the city at large who voted for the meas- ure, the sample showed some interesting variations as between different social groups. The expectancy not to vote on the meas- ure was most pronounced among the younger citizens, the women, the persons with little or no schooling, the foreign born, the Negroes, and those who paid low rentals. Ignorance of the specific question caused many abstentions, although one-half of those who admitted that they knew nothing of the question expected to vote anyway. Those who had read the measure were much more interested in voting on it than those who had not. Those who expected to vote in favor of the measure were relatively more numerous among the young voters, the women, the persons with high-school or college education, the native whites, the Negroes, and those who paid moderate rentals. About one-fifth of those interviewed said that they relied upon the press for information and guidance on such matters. Almost 29 D. M. Maynard, "The Operation of the Referendum in Chicago" (University of Chicago doctoral thesis, 1930). ACTION ON TYPICAL MEASURES 155 one-third trusted their own judgment. The remainder relied upon friends, business associates, and civic organizations. The official returns in general bear out the findings of the field investigation. Affirmative votes on tax-amendment propo- sitions were relatively more numerous in neighborhoods where there were larger numbers of women voters, higher proportions of high-school graduates, a preponderant number of native whites, and where median rentals were slightly above the average. However, there were certain striking exceptions. In the River wards immediately surrounding the Loop, where property was depreciated for residential purposes, there was a relatively large proportion of favorable votes. These wards are among the so-called "controllable wards," and it is likely that the result was the product of intimidation and election cor- ruption. SUMMARY The experience of the voters in Chicago with the referendum shows that there is no general tendency for them to accept or reject measures blindly. In other words, discrimination of some sort has been exercised. Bond issues have been accepted when backed by the press, business, and civic organizations, and they have been rejected when unfavorable publicity has undermined the confidence of the public in the efficiency and honesty of the spending authorities. On such technical questions as the trac- tion issue and the taxation system the voters have sometimes floundered in a sea of conflicting claims and interpretations. Because of the character of the Chicago agencies of mass impression, the voters have been unable, as yet, to solve these problems. Tax reform in particular has been blocked by a hostile press and an indifferent public. CHAPTER VIII RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 1 One of the paradoxes of Chicago politics during the New Deal administration has been the increase in Roosevelt's popularity, as shown by the 1936 vote, in spite of the overwhelming oppo- sition of the press during the pre- ceding two years. The combined city circulation of the opposition newspapers was over a million and a half, while the daily paper which supported Roosevelt had about one-third of a million readers. It is said in a number of places that the city of Chicago was the best illus- tration in 1936 of the declining political power of the press. 2 The present chapter will demon- strate that the situation was not as simple as it appeared to many ob- servers. A closer examination shows that the press has been more powerful during the Roosevelt administration than the superficial commentators think. The application of some well-known statistical techniques reveals this in a striking fashion. Another one of the paradoxes of Chicago politics was the great political vitality of Mayor Thompson during the pros- perous twenties in the face of a highly unfavorable press. It was said that a machine did not need newspaper support and could defy public opinion with impunity for long periods of time. In the pages that follow, an endeavor will be made to show 1 The author is indebted to Miss Margaret Schmidt for assistance in preparing this chapter. 2 "The Press Loses the Election," New Republic, LXXXIX (November 18, 1936), 63. 156 COLONEL FRANK KNOX OF THE CHICAGO DAILY NEWS RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 157 how the press eliminated the strong Thompson machine. The daily newspapers may not be the most powerful of all agencies of mass impression, but they are still to be reckoned with by all realistic politicians. They may be able to swing a section of the electorate which holds the balance of power upon crucial occasions. The present study of the role of the press in a metropolitan community of the United States holds no brief for the Chicago newspapers. It merely endeavors, in as objective and scientific manner as possible, to present the situation and to draw such conclusions and generalizations as seem warranted. There are many difficulties confronting any attempt to esti- mate the role of the press in the democratic process. Are the newspapers molders or followers of public opinion? How can the incidence of the policies of the press be separated from the many other complex variables which are woven together in a complicated pattern? NEWSPAPER HOME COVERAGE At first sight the task looks like an impossible one; but a com- bination of events in Chicago led the author to be bold enough to make an attempt. The breaking-up of census data into small units called "census tracts" makes it possible to relate certain social and economic variables to voting behavior. 3 The taking of a newspaper home -coverage census by the Chicago Daily News in 1933-34 furnished a quantitative index for the different Chicago newspapers which could be fitted to the same electoral and census units. 4 Before discussing the statistical analysis it will be necessary to describe in more detail the character of the different varia- bles involved. The daily-newspaper home-coverage study made by the Chicago Daily News was designed to help the advertising 3 E. W. Burgess and C. Newcomb (eds.), Census Data of the City of Chicago 1930 (Chicago, 1933). Election returns were obtained from the Chicago Daily News Almanac and Yearbook, the Public Service Leader, and the records of the board of election com- missioners of Chicago. 4 Chicago Daily News, Daily Newspaper Home Coverage in Metropolitan Chicago (Chieago, 1934). 158 MACHINE POLITICS department of that paper. The methods employed in conduct- ing this survey were not ideal for our purposes. In the final report of this survey the following definition was given of "home-coverage" : A newspaper was credited as having home coverage if it regularly (at least three times a week) entered and stayed in the home. The test of morning- paper home coverage was whether the paper regularly entered the home dur- ing the morning and remained during the day. A family receiving a morning paper which was taken away by some member of the household (in the morn- ing) was not considered as receiving home coverage in the morning-paper field. The number of such cases was less than 2 per cent of the families inter- viewed. 5 This method does not give the total circulation figures for the daily papers, but it furnishes an index as to the relative popularity of the different newspapers in a given area. There is no special reason to suppose that the underestimation of the circulation of the morning papers which results from this meth- od would be any greater in one area than in another. The procedure gives a useful guide to the variability of newspaper circulation as between different districts. 6 It was found that the ratio of families receiving no regular daily newspaper coverage ranged from 2 per cent in some localities to as high as 57 per cent in others. In the scatter dia- grams which were constructed for the different pairs of varia- bles the areas in which there were large numbers of persons who took no newspapers proved to be atypical. Sometimes these units exaggerated, and at other times they concealed, the character of relationships. The people in Chicago who read no daily paper published in English tended to vote in blocs. Difficulties were also presented by the districts in which Negroes constituted a large proportion of the population. These 5 Ibid., Part VII. 6 In 1931 the Chicago Tribune issued a Book of Facts, which gives a geographical distribution of the Tribune circulation for 48 city districts. The Tribune's figures in- cluded news stand sales as well as home deliveries. Consequently, the figures would not be comparable to the home-coverage data of the News. However, it was assumed that there should be some relationship. The coefficient of correlation between the Tribune's own figures and the figures for the Tribune given in the home-coverage study is .72 (n = 23). RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 159 units had opposite political tendencies to those inhabited by whites of similar economic status. Not until after 1932 was there any indication that the Negroes were affected by the city- wide drift to the Democratic party. The areas in which there were large numbers of colored voters were so far out of line politically that it was thought advisable to omit them alto- gether. 7 The findings of the study apply to a sample of the white population of the city of Chicago. The home-coverage newspaper survey was made under the supervision of Professor James L. Palmer, of the University of Chicago; and a former assistant of his was employed by the Chicago Daily News to supervise the details of field work, edit- ing, and tabulation. The investigators were, for the most part, university-trained men; and at least 10 per cent of the persons interviewed by each man were rechecked by supervisors. For purposes of the present study, 47 areas were selected from all parts of the city. Figure 11, which shows the percentage of home-coverage of the Daily News, gives the geographical dis- tribution of these areas. In these regions there were 195,919 families, of which 94,391 were interviewed in connection with the newspaper home-coverage project. The total number of registered voters in the areas was 279,054, which was 22 per cent of the registration for the entire city. Two morning news- papers — the Tribune and the Herald and Examiner — and three evening papers — the News, the American, and the Times — were chosen because of their size and importance. 8 In the areas taken, the News had the highest average home-coverage and also the greatest amount of variation; next came the Tribune and the American; while the Herald and Examiner and the Times lagged far behind these two. Since the 1929 crash the position of the older Chicago news- papers, as far as their city circulation is concerned, has re- 7 Four units in which the Xegro population was 20 per cent or over were dropped. For an analysis of the voting behavior of Negroes in Chicago, see H. F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago, 1935), pp. 15-92. 8 There is one other daily published in Chicago which is printed in English, the Journal of Commerce, but it was not included in the home-coverage survey. The areas left blank on the map were not covered in the present study. COMMUNITY AREAS OF CHICAGO AS ADOPTED BY CENSUS BUREAU, 1930 SHOWING PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES INTERVIEWED HAVING CHICAGO DAILY NEWS HOME-COVERAGE 1933 (Source: Chicago Daily Xews) PER CENT |//-.'/-| 5.0 19.9 xl20.0 34.9 35.0 49.9 50.0 64.9 65.0 79.9 80 AND OVER US STMtT in jntar § fi I !« I 1 5 ■ Fig. 11 RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 161 mained about constant. The Tribune has lost in circulation to some extent. The high point of its circulation was September, 1929. One of the most striking events in Chicago journalism during the past eight years has been the rise in the circulation of the Chicago Times, sl tabloid sheet which was established in March, 1930, on the remains of the old Chicago Journal. From a struggling sheet of about 100,000 circulation, the Times has TABLE 16* Total 1931 City Circulation and 1933 Home-Coverage of Five Chicago Dallies Total Home- Coverage, 47 Areas of City, 1933J Letter Sym- City Circu- Percent- age for Newspaper bol lation ClTYf Mean Lowest Highest Standard 1931t Item Item Deviation News a 390,000 47 46.5 8.3 82.6 18.6 Tribune b 470,000 56 37.4 14.1 66.1 14.7 American c 450,000 55 37.8 19.9 50.1 7.1 Herald and Examin- er d 280,000 34 11.5 5.4 18.5 3.3 Times X 165,000 20 10.6 4.4 17.3 2.9 * Each variable has been assigned a letter, by which it is identified. For a discussion of the technical terms used, see page 97 above and Appendix C below, page 210. t Information taken from the Chicago Tribune, op. cit., p. 8. X Information from the Daily Newspaper Home Coverage in Metropolitan Chicago (Chicago, 1934). risen steadily, until at the end of 1936 it could boast a circula- tion of 340,000, larger than the morning Hearst paper. CANDIDATES AND THE PRESS The attitude of a newspaper toward a candidate may take several different forms. In accordance with the well-known slogan of politics, "Bad publicity is better than none," 9 an edi- tor may decide to ignore completely a candidate. If this policy is not followed, the opposition to a given candidate may become a great moral crusade in which the editorial columns, the news columns, the photograph department, and the cartoons are devoted to demolishing the undesired candidate. The opposi- tion to a candidate may take much more mild expressions. 9 Frank Kent, Political Behavior (New York, 1928), p. 252. 162 MACHINE POLITICS Comparatively little space may be devoted to defeating the candidate when the editor feels that there is not much real choice between the candidates running. The indorsement of candidates may also be indicated in a variety of ways. The indorsement may appear only on the eve of the election in the shape of a marked ballot. A paper may also run a series of editorials on the merits of the candidate which it supports.The Chicago newspapers have also devoted their news columns to publicity favorable to certain candidates. The influence of a paper upon a given election varies not only with the circulation of that paper but also with the intensity and duration of the campaign the paper has waged for or against the personalities involved in the election. It is extremely difficult to ascertain the intensity of a press campaign concerning a given candidate, since the pulling power of the language used is not known and the election news is always a mixture of materials on candi- dates and issues. Since it is very difficult to isolate the news items that refer to particular candidates in an election where many offices are to be filled, it was decided to study intensively the editorials and cartoons which appeared in the five weeks preceding each elec- tion. An attempt was made to ascertain roughly the column- inches devoted in each paper to editorial and cartoon indorse- ments given candidates. Subjective considerations necessarily entered into the selection of articles that were counted as being for or against a given candidate. The main purpose of Table 17 is to give a rough indication of the approximate position of each newspaper regarding the candidates concerned. Since the newspaper home-coverage study was made in 1933 and 1934, it was thought desirable to select elections as near to these years as possible. No election was considered which ante- dated the primary election of April 8, 1930, and the general election of November 3, 1936, was the last one studied. 10 10 The 1932 primary was not included in the analysis because the newspapers did not take clear-cut positions on any of the candidates involved. Only candidates who were running in the Republican primaries of 1930 and 1931 were selected, because there were no contests in the Democratic primaries of those years. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 163 A brief review of the elections concerned is necessary in order to get the setting of the problem. 11 In the Republican primary of 1930, Senator Charles S. Deneen, a candidate for renomina- tion, was opposed by Mrs. Ruth Hanna McCormick and New- TABLE 17 Column-Inches of Editorials, Cartoons, and Marked Ballots for Candidates, 1930-36 Republican Primary 1930 Elec- tion 1930 Republican Primary 1931 City Elec- tion 1931 General Election 1932 Elec- tion 1934 Elec- tion 1936 Mc- Cor- mick De- neen Lewis Thomp- son Albert Lyle Cer- mak Roose- velt Hor- ner Igoe Roose- velt Newt: oppos. indors. 88 94 00 indors. 88 58 22 oppos. 102 84 45 indors. oppos.* "28l" 154 oppos.* indors. t 8 170 21 incon- sistent§ incon- sistentj iii 133 indors. || 15 238 338 indors. 7 149 181 indors. 22 106 297 oppos. 118 550 372 oppos. sia 235 indors. indors. 118 120 44 indors. 54 146 22 oppos. oppos. 61 10 oppos. 88 134 23 410 344 Tribune: indors. 61 106 14 indors. 13 450 40 indors. oppos. Editorials .... Cartoons American: 275 617 indors. 38 279 983 827 oppos. 40 20 74 708 indors. 300 38 Herald and Ex- aminer: indors. 91 146 31 ** oppos. indors. oppos. 1,552 222 1,604 1,390 indors. 202 319 1,758 25 52 Daily Times: indors. 108 indors. ft 12 11 indors. 570 73 * Total column-inches — against Thompson. t Column-inches favoring Albert. t Editorials against Thompson but not favoring Albert specifically. § Column-inches against Thompson but not favoring Lyle specifically. || Column-inches favoring Lyle. ** Editorial support for Thompson, indirectly. tt New Deal congressman referred to; no specific mention of Igoe. ton Jenkins. Mrs. McCormick was the most serious contender since, as congressman-at-large, she had built up a state-wide organization and had shown a willingness to spend her own money freely for campaign purposes. Deneen had backing him 11 The following summaries are based upon newspaper clippings, accounts of political meetings, and a collection of campaign materials. See chaps, i and v. 164 MACHINE POLITICS the pro-World Court elements, a few labor organizations, his own Republican faction, the Anti-saloon League, and some business groups. Mrs. McCormick's victorious campaign was based on the support of the anti-World Court movement, a large number of trade -unions, the Mayor Thompson city hall machine, a number of prominent World War veterans, and some of the wet groups. 12 The News indorsed Deneen, and the Trib- une indorsed Mrs. McCormick, while both the Hearst papers indorsed Mrs. McCormick. According to the measuring rod used, the Herald and Examiner was the most enthusiastic of all the papers in its support of the primary candidate, since it ran over 1,500 column-inches in editorials backing Mrs. McCor- mick. In the fall election Mrs. McCormick was opposed by James Hamilton Lewis on the Democratic ticket. Lewis had served a term in the United States Senate during the Wilson adminis- tration and had been defeated for re-election in 1918 by Mrs. McCormick's husband. Normally the Republican nomination for United States senator was equivalent to election in Illinois, barring a split such as occurred in 1912. However, the eco- nomic depression caused many voters to shift from the Repub- lican to the Democratic party. Flushed with a brilliant pri- mary victory, Mrs. McCormick failed to notice this change in sentiment. She incurred the enmity of the Thompson organiza- tion by boldly slighting its contribution to her cause. The con- spicuous display of her wealth before the Senate committee investigating campaign funds injured her cause. The vote for Lewis, the successful candidate, was correlated with the regular Democratic vote, the wet vote, the proportion of men regis- tered, and the amount of unemployment. 13 Although the News ordinarily had Republican leanings in national elections, it indorsed Lewis. The Hearst papers also backed the Demo- cratic candidate, but the American did not assert itself on Lewis' behalf. Mrs. McCormick had the support of the Trib- une; but Colonel R. R. McCormick, proprietor of the Tribune 12 For statistical corroboration of this, see Table 20, below, columns e and /. 13 Consult column g of Table 20. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 165 and brother of her late husband, was rather restrained in his indorsement of her candidacy. The 1931 Republican mayoralty primary was a desperate struggle between rival factions. 14 Early in the preceding fall, Mayor Thompson had decided to seek a fourth term. His fac- tional opponents could not unite on a candidate to run against him; and in the meantime Municipal Judge John H. Lyle, who had been much publicized by his attacks on gangsters, an- nounced his intention to run. All of the anti-Thompson Repub- lican leaders flocked to Lyle except Deneen, who entered a candidate of his own, Alderman Arthur F. Albert. Mayor Thompson had the support of the city hall machine, some of the labor groups, and a very efficient publicity staff. In a three- cornered contest which has been rarely equaled in the annals of American politics for bitterness and vulgarity, Thompson won by a plurality vote. His support came largely from the wet elements, the foreign-born neighborhoods, and the poorer resi- dential areas. 15 The press was one of the principal issues of this picturesque campaign. "Big Bill" denounced Lyle, "the nutty judge," as the candidate of the Tribune, and "Li'll Arthur" as the candidate of the News. On the platform he would appear with two halters. He charged Lyle with wearing the Tribune halter and Albert with wearing the News halter. He, "Big Bill," wore no man's halter but was "guided by the will of the peo- ple." Naturally the News and the Tribune were the most vigorous in their opposition to Thompson. The News took a rather inconsistent attitude toward Lyle, since it was more interested in defeating Thompson than in nominating its own candidate. A different situation confronted Thompson in the final elec- tion. All opposing candidates except Anton J. Cermak, the Democratic nominee, withdrew or were eliminated. Thompson could not count upon a united Republican organization; and Cermak was supported by independents, business men's groups, 14 C. H. Wooddy, "Jubilee in Chicago," National Municipal Review, XX (June, 1931), 321-25. 15 Consult column h of Table 20. By Your Ballots You Will Choose The man pictured above, the erratic Judge (as designated by the Appellate and Supreme Courts, State of Illinois, which re* versed his decisions twenty-eight out of rwenty*nine times), who wears the Tribune halter, or — The man pictured below, "Lill Arthur," who wears the Daily News halter, or — The man pictured on the page to the right, who wears ao halter but is guided by the will of the people. MAYOR THOMPSON'S HALTER CAMPAIGN RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 167 women's organizations, the wet interests, foreign-born groups, and a powerful Democratic machine. While Thompson used all of his ballyhoo techniques, he found that he could make little impression upon the discontent arising from the economic crisis, the desire of the business man to improve the reputation of the city, the sulkiness of some of the Republican leaders, the new technique of ridicule which was being used against him, and the confidence of the Democrats. The Tribune and News continued their fight against Thompson and indorsed Cermak. The Hearst papers did not take any stand in this election, al- though the Herald and Examiner ran some cartoons which were critical of Cermak. Cermak was swept into office with the largest majority on record. When the general election came in 1932, the Republicans were still divided into warring camps. At the primary, Len Small, member of the Thompson faction, won the Republican nomination for governor in a divided field. For governor, the Democrats nominated Henry Horner, who had made an ex- cellent record as probate judge. The lines of division in the gubernatorial contest were somewhat similar to those in the mayoralty election of the preceding year. In addition to the regular Democratic organization support, Horner received con- siderable assistance from the independent Republicans. True to their recent stand in national politics, the News and the Tribune opposed Roosevelt and urged the election of Herbert Hoover. On the other hand, the Hearst papers in 1932 in- dorsed Roosevelt. The Times was a consistent supporter of Roosevelt right from the beginning of the campaign. Horner was indorsed by all the Chicago newspapers. The final vote indicated that he ran ahead of the ticket. In 1934 came a test of the popularity of the New Deal policies and the strength of the Democratic organization in the city of Chicago. Unfortunately, this year did not call for the election of a United States senator in the state of Illinois; so it is difficult to get a basis for comparison with the 1930 election. However, the state still selected two congressmen-at-large, and the vote for the candidates for one of these posts was taken as the meas- 168 MACHINE POLITICS ure of Democratic strength. Michael Igoe was the outstanding Democratic candidate for congressman-at-large, and his leading Republican opponent was C. Wayland Brooks. Igoe's vote was expressed as a percentage of the combined vote received by Igoe and Brooks. The line-up of the papers had changed some- what by this time. While the News and the Tribune were still strongly Republican in national affairs, the Hearst papers were no longer active in supporting the New Deal administration. The Times was the sole daily newspaper which was whole- heartedly praising President Roosevelt. In 1936 some of the daily newspaper proprietors in Chicago found themselves in embarrassing positions. Colonel McCor- mick of the Tribune had warmly supported the local Democratic administration headed by Mayor Kelly, but he was one of the most uncompromising of the New Deal critics. Would the local machine cut the national ticket in order to please a metro- politan newspaper proprietor? As the campaign wore on, it became apparent that President Roosevelt had more to offer Mayor Kelly than had Colonel McCormick. The hostility manifested toward the Tribune photographers at the great Roosevelt rally in the Chicago Stadium must have convinced Kelly that his cohorts were with Roosevelt. Secretary Ickes' attack upon Colonel McCormick and the Tribune was well received, even on the North Side, where the Tribune is rela- tively more popular. The News has had a long-standing reputation for independ- ence in politics. It has also rendered signal service in collecting information regarding candidates for the guidance of the voters. With its proprietor, Colonel Frank Knox, as vice-presidential candidate on the Republican ticket, the News could not func- tion as it had in the past. When Colonel Knox took over the paper in 1932, it became more partisan than it had been before. In 1936 it reached the peak of its partisanship. During the 1936 presidential campaign, William Randolph Hearst, reversing his 1932 position, took the lead for the red- baiters, tax-dodgers, calamity-howlers, ultra-nationalists, and the self-appointed defenders of constitutionalism and American RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 169 liberties. His two Chicago newspapers followed his dictates faithfully and printed vigorous editorials, news articles, and cartoons designed to discredit the New Deal. Only the tabloid Daily Times presented the full case of the Democratic party in the campaign. Following the lead of the New York Daily News, the Times presented one -half a page to the two national committees each day. The circulation of the Times increased by leaps and bounds. During the campaign it conducted an Illinois straw poll which came closer to pre- dicting the result in the state than any of the nation-wide polls. 16 When the results came in showing a two-to-one victory for Roosevelt in Chicago, the resentment against the older news- papers took overt form. Some copies of the Tribune were burned, and a window in the Tribune service bureau was smashed. Several commentators have said that the election was an indication of the weakness of the press as a propaganda agen- cy. Although the big circulation newspapers stood four to one against Roosevelt, the election results told quite a different story. Eleven candidates were chosen from the elections which have been mentioned, and their votes were expressed as percentages of the total vote cast in each of the 47 areas. Table 18 gives certain relevant figures regarding the distributions of these per- centages, and it also gives the results in the city at large. It can be seen that the sample is not a perfect one, since it was drawn more heavily from the Republican and independent sections of the city; but this is not serious, for enough strong Democratic areas were included to give the range of variation found in the city. The problem of estimating the influence of the press upon voting behavior in an urban community like Chicago may be impossible to solve with the existing techniques. Reading a newspaper and marking a ballot in a particular way are isolated 16 Illinois poll taken by : Percentage Democratic Chicago Daily Times 58 Crossley 54 Gallup 51 Literary Digest 39 Final returns 59 170 MACHINE POLITICS bits of complicated patterns of social behavior. If either of these acts is removed from its social, political, economic, and psycho- logical context, it becomes a meaningless procedure. Therefore, the relation between voting and newspaper circulation must be considered in the light of the total situation in which these variables are found. It has already been pointed out that varia- tions in voting behavior can be explained in terms of many influences other than the attitude of newspapers. In order to TABLE 18 Percentage of Total Vote Received by Specified Candidates Candidate Election Letter Sym- bol Percent- age of Total Vote in Entire City Percentage of Total Vote in 47 Selected Areas Mean High- est Item Low- est Item Stand- ard De- viation McCormick Deneen. . . . Lewis Thompson . Albert Lyle Cermak. . . . Roosevelt. . Horner Igoe Roosevelt. . April, 1930 April, 1930 November, 1930 February, 1931 February, 1931 February, 1931 April, 1931 November, 1932 November, 1932 November, 1934 November, 1936 J k I m n z 59.5 30.4 72.1 46.6 15.6 35.9 58.5 59.2 64.0 64.0 66.9 56.6 33.3 70.5 36.2 18.3 43.7 63.2 55.3 66.4 57.1 61.8 68.1 52.3 92.0 82.6 27.6 67.5 91.4 90.8 87.0 94.0 92.8 40.7 21.0 46.2 14.2 9.2 6.2 45.3 26.2 47.5 30.0 29.3 5.9 6.6 9.5 15.3 4.4 14.0 8.4 14.1 8.8 14.2 14.3 throw as much light as possible upon the total situation, the variables given in Table 19 were added. Of the variables listed in this table, the following had a more or less political nature: interest in voting, as measured by the percentage of the adult citizens registered in 1930; party voting, as measured by the percentage of all ballots marked straight in 1932; willingness to support public expenditures, as measured by the percentage which voted "y es " on a 1930 bond issue condemned by civic organizations; and wet sentiment, as meas- ured by the percentage which voted "y es " on a 1930 public- policy referendum calling for the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. 17 17 The data for these variables are described above, chap. v. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 171 An examination of the original data and the scatter dia- grams made from them showed that the readers of the News and the Tribune were found in greatest numbers in those areas where straight -party voting, affirmative votes on the bond issue, and wet votes were least prevalent. Except for the fact that the Tribune opposed prohibition, 18 these tendencies agree with the general stand taken by these newspapers. 19 The readers of the Examiner were relatively more numerous in the areas which TABLE 19 Eight Variables Describing 47 Selected Areas in Chicago Variable Date Letter Symbol age for City Mean Lowest Item Highest Item 1930 O 66.3 65.3 41.6 93.4 1932 V 58.4 51.5 27.9 84.3 1930 q 58.0 54.5 41.0 80.0 1930 r 78.6 75.2 56.4 90.4 1930 s 41.8 44.8 31.9 54.0 1930 t 32.4 26.9 7.9 81.5 1931 u 22.7 21.9 4.3 63.5 1930* V 49.6 57.7 20.8 124.7 1933 w 17. 7f 16.0 2.3 56.9 Standard Devia- tion Voting interest Party voting Bond issue Wet vote Women Catholic origins Unemployment Median rental Taking no newspaper 10.4 12.9 8.0 6.7 5.2 20.1 13.1 20.1 14.2 * Expressed in dollars. t Percentage for sample of selected areas. voted wettest and which were most strongly in favor of the bond issue. The Hearst American did not show marked tendencies in either direction, partly because of the disturbing effect of the units in which there were many persons who read no news- papers. 20 Table 19 gives the following variables selected from the vot- ing records, census data, and the home-coverage survey: per- centage of the total registered voters who were women; per- centage of the total population who were born, or whose parents were born, in Catholic countries; percentage unemployed in 18 In October, 1930, the Tribune ran a sample ballot marked for repeal six times, and it ran 91 column-inches of editorials and 17 column-inches of cartoons in favor of repeal. 19 The News ran a marked ballot against repeal and 26 column-inches of editorials. 20 The Hearst papers were emphatically wetter than the Tribune, each running between 450 and 500 column-inches of editorials and cartoons in favor of repeal. 172 MACHINE POLITICS 1931 of gainful workers ten years of age and over; median ren- tal; and percentage of families interviewed that took no daily newspaper printed in English. The circulations of the News and the Tribune tended to vary directly with the ratio of women registered and with median rental, while they varied inversely with the measures of religious affiliation, indifference to the press, and unemployment. Thus, in those areas, like Beverly Hills, where the proportion of women registered was high, the proportion taking no newspapers was low, and where rents were high, the home coverage of these two papers was high; but in a Polish area where there were many Catholics and a large number of unemployed, and many taking no newspapers, it was low. In the case of the Hearst papers, no such marked tenden- cies were apparent. Product-moment coefficients of correlation were then calcu- lated from the ungrouped data for every possible combination of the variables, excepting the Igoe vote. 21 These coefficients are presented in symmetrical form in Table 20, which is com- monly known as a "correlation matrix.'' We are now in a position to consider the relationship of the home-coverages of the different newspapers and the votes of the various candidates, keeping in mind some of the aspects of the total situation in which these relationships are found. In only 2 of the 44 possible combinations (variables a-d correlated with variables e-n with the addition of z) were there high zero- order coefficients (.50 or over) whose signs were just the oppo- site of what one might have expected in view of the recom- mendations and circulations of the newspapers concerned. (Cf . Tables 17 and 20.) 21 The Igoe vote (letter symbol n) was not included because of lack of funds. The coefficients involving the newspapers and this vote were: (News) r a n = — .80, (American) r C n = . 00, (Tribune) r& n =-.76, (Herald-Examiner) rdn= —.24. For a discussion of product-moment coefficients of correlation, see p. 106, above, and p. 210, below. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 173 ^ o w o fc -* O u H a Q u fe < M W O « > m ^ w a -1 w cq r«j Pi fe > H ft a < « a o CG Q o H 3 o Ph 3 OS l> «0 i-i xf< ■* «5 00 O 00 t- 1>CM t» ■* X © CO OS OS J> 00 III III II ei (M CO CO COtSOONc-t-O^rHM-HCSiOXiCOlW iH oo oo cm cm x «o «c i> i-i i> r-i i> >-u> >o oo x <*• oo t- «> oo II II 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 1 S © X © ©Xr**cs-H»0'M CM 50 CO CO tO OmW^®FHtOO«50®Mt"*iOt»t> l> t- i" ii r r if r i - t)iOO (OOMOOXt-iHa^oWM-f-HMt* CM© -F oot--* © ■* ■* co t>© x ^oo so co ■* x «o co oo i> b- © \ \ \ ' \ ' ' i i ' ' \ ' \ * i-i CO © © © CM CO i-l rH CO © 00 -* © X "• X « J> «c »o © ©XX H^ioOOOHMO^OCOnXtO Xt>X © i' im'" ' r i" r i r \ \ 1 1 r «- » ■* © — ©©■*»» t> •* 50 X © (>- © "O -< CM 30 — X l-H co«o^h *ooi-oOf-coiHt.mM»(Ot> ©©»«■* co \ \ ' ' i ' ' r r r r f o »> i> J> rH CO t> © «* CM i-i © © SO © CO CM i— X i-l © «5 — «o SO CM ■* ■* ^- O* J> CN t^ r- io ©< >C SO «Q i> ■* «o ■* so © i \ \ i ' ' ' i j i i i p. 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' \ ' ' \ .-._, X pq S| «** © X «5 © ■* ffl^OHHOH^tOTft.Oi'SCX'X X ■* «0 ^ (MX "OiOOOhiOOiOihiQhOiO'JicCiiO •* ' r r r i ' r r \ \ r f r ' \ \ ' r <» hMS( l> ■* t^X X ■* l> >C •* Xt- -<©©©© »C •« «5 •* X © CM X X >0© ©©"* r- ■"*! i-i ■*■*©■*■* X X ■* r \ f i ' ' ' i ii r i to ft S3 CO a "e xfi CM © t^ © © © ^h i-i© X © CM «0 ■* i-i -^ © © © © X MHH CM CM CM X X X X CM i-H X© J> CM i> CM t^ © © © © © fi CM i-h i-i © ^h CM i-i <-< CM X CM ~ © CM CM CM i-h X f X CM «C ' \ \ ' r * 1 1" r r r i r 1 1 f MO l^ © 00 i-h i-4 X »0 © l> i-i t> CM t- ■— t~ X X X »C X J> © X i> f f * r r r i f f f f r i ' r C3 «> CM •* — © © CM X CM © © »0 «> -h tJ. o i> ^h io © CM © X CM X ■* ■* © X -< X© J> © X X x «o © © X © X © II II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 II 1 a j n « News Tribune A merican Herald and Ex- aminer McCormick Deneen Lewis Thompson Albert Lyle Cermak Roosevelt, 1932 Horner Roosevelt, 1936 Voting interest . Party voting Bond issue Wet vote Women Catholic origins Unemployment Median rental Taking no news- paper Let- ter Sym- bol e-o cj"« v> v^ ci-s-w'^-ja-^ § ni © a. «j. *.' «j ,*; a »' 3 174 MACHINE POLITICS NATIONAL ELECTIONS The home-coverage of the Tribune and the News tended to vary directly with the Republican vote in elections at which national issues were at stake. Both of these papers class them- selves as independent Republican dailies, and in 1932, 1934, and 1936 they gave vigorous editorial support to the Republican candidates. The Republicanism of the readers of these papers was strongly marked at these elections, since the high negative coefficients of correlation indicate that, on the average, the home-coverages of the newspapers tended to vary inversely with the percentage of the total vote cast for Roosevelt. In those areas where the circulation of the News was high, the Democratic vote was low, and vice versa. From the zero-order coefficients it is not possible to say whether the readers were influenced by the newspapers or whether the editors were trying to follow the views of their public. The close association of the home -coverages of the News and the Tribune with some of the other variables raises the question as to the net effect of their variations upon the Roosevelt vote when the influence of other variables is kept constant. 213 The statistical device of partial correlation was used to throw some light upon this problem with reference to the 1932 election. Since the home-coverages of the News and Tribune are so closely related to each other, it was decided to use the News only as an independent variable in the equation of net regression which describes the 1932 Roosevelt vote as a dependent variable. The other independent variables selected were the wet vote, Catho- lic origins, and median rental. The equation shows clearly that the average change in the 1932 Roosevelt vote for a unit change in the home-coverage percentage for the News was practically zero when the other variables were kept constant. This would indicate that the voters in Chicago who supported Hoover in 1932 probably did so because they were drys, because they were Protestants living in good neighborhoods, rather than because they were convinced by the frantic pleadings of the News. At any rate, an increase in the circulation of the News seemed to 21a See Appendix C for equations. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 175 make no difference in the Roosevelt vote where these other influences were taken into account. While the 1932 election does not give much evidence to sup- port the thesis presented at the beginning of the chapter, the 1936 election does. The last two years of the first Roosevelt administration were pounded terrifically by the Chicago news- papers, and yet Roosevelt's popular vote in Chicago was higher in 1936 than in 1932, when he had roughly half of the dailies with him. Was the press without influence during these years? A closer examination of the situation shows that the press was a factor to be reckoned with in many parts of the city. As a matter of fact, Roosevelt made practically no gains in those areas where the home-coverage of the Chicago Tribune and the Daily News was highest. For instance, in the Beverly Hills area, where there were undoubtedly many home-owners who profited from the H.O.L.C. and where there were countless others who benefited from the New Deal administration in other ways, there was no increase in the Roosevelt vote. In this area the cards were stacked two to one against Roosevelt in 1932, and he was up against the same situation in 1936. If the city of Chicago as a whole had been like Beverly Hills, where over 80 per cent of the families habitually read the papers of the morn- ing and the afternoon colonels, Landon would have carried Chicago and he would have carried Illinois. Roosevelt's great vote in Chicago in 1936 came in part from the areas where the daily newspapers printed in English were not habitually taken into the homes. Colonel McCormick and Colonel Knox could not influence persons who did not read their papers. The Democratic machine vote was concentrated in the lower rental areas, where there were large numbers of Catholics, a high proportion of unemployed and persons on relief, and a large ratio of persons without advanced education. As in the case of the 1932 election, we are interested in the equation of net regression which will enable us to estimate how important the press was in relation to the 1936 result as com- pared with some of the other variables studied. Using the same variables as in the equation describing the 1932 vote as de- 176 MACHINE POLITICS pendent variables, we discover a striking change. The new equation shows that the average change in the 1936 Roosevelt vote for a unit change in the home -cove rage of the News was significant, and inverse when the wet vote, the ratio of persons of Catholic origins, and median rental were held constant. 22 In other words, the opposition papers cut into Roosevelt's popularity in 1936 in no mean fashion. Since the newspapers cannot be expected to have any influ- ence in areas where a large proportion of the families take no newspapers into the homes, it was decided to add the variable describing this situation (variable w) to the foregoing equation. This step in the analysis greatly increased the contribution of the News to the equation of prediction. In fact, in many areas in the city the home -coverage of the News was the most im- portant factor in estimating the 1936 Roosevelt vote. In ex- plaining the voting behavior of the inhabitants of Beverly Hills, we can say it was more important that the inhabitants read the News than that they paid high rents or owned their homes or that they were largely Protestant, well educated, and comparatively dry. STATE AND PRIMARY ELECTIONS An analysis of the interrelationships of the variables shown in Table 20 justifies the consideration of state and primary elections together. 23 The record of the newspapers in these elections has not been as clear-cut as in the case of presidential elections. One of the occasions on which a newspaper seemed to be ineffective was the Republican primary of 1930, when the Tribune indorsed Mrs. McCormick and opposed Deneen. The variations in the home -coverage of the Tribune tended to fol- low those of the Deneen primary vote. This situation may be explained by the fact that Mrs. McCormick received some sup- port in the primary from the Thompson faction of the Republi- can party. This faction drew its support from areas where the home-coverage of the Tribune was relatively low. In addition, 22 See Appendix C for equation. 23 H. F. Gosnell and M. J. Schmidt, "Factorial Analysis of the Relation of the Press to Voting in Chicago," Journal of Social Psychology, II (November, 1936), 375-85. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 177 the Tribune was only lukewarm in the support of Mrs. McCor- mick because it did not want to appear to favor too strongly a person who was related by ties of marriage to the owner of the paper. 24 The Tribune's indorsement of Mrs. McCormick probably helped her candidacy, but the situation was too com- plex to disentangle. The other coefficient which had the opposite sign to that expected was the one measuring the relationship between the home-coverage of the News and the vote for Lewis in 1930. The News has been strongly Republican in national elections; but in 1930 it recommended, in its last-minute sample ballot, that its readers support Lewis in preference to Mrs. McCormick. 25 The indorsement of the News may have had some effect, but the election of Lewis was of such landslide proportions that the signs of this effect were drowned. The foundation of the Lewis vote was the normal Democratic vote, since the correlation between the Lewis and the Smith votes was high. The News was relatively scarce in the homes that were strongly Democratic. Where a newspaper followed no consistent policy toward a candidate, it weakened its influence. This was the situation in the primary of 1931, when the News mildly backed Albert for the Republican nomination but did not always oppose Lyle, one of Albert's opponents. The figures indicate that the readers of the News supported Lyle, the candidate backed by the Trib- une, more strongly than they supported Albert. This can be explained by the fact that Albert had comparatively little or- ganization support. Lyle, on the other hand, had important factional support in the very areas where the readers of the News were relatively numerous. Table 20 also shows that there is a close relationship between the constituency of the News and the Tribune. It is probable that many of the readers of the News who also read the Tribune concluded that a vote for Lyle was the surest way to defeat Thompson. The votes that Albert received might be taken as a rough measure of what one news- paper can do almost single handed in a highly unfavorable situation. The small size of the zero-order coefficients involving the two 24 March 27, 1930. 25 November 3, 1930. 178 MACHINE POLITICS Hearst papers indicates that the constituency of these papers was different from that of the Tribune and of the News. The American mildly indorsed Thompson in the mayoralty election of 193 1, 26 and its circulation showed a slight tendency to vary inversely with the Cermak vote. A similar relationship held also for the Herald and Examiner at this election. 27 While the coefficients involving the Herald and Examiner were low in every case, they were always positive for candidates indorsed and negative for candidates opposed, except in the case of the vote for Horner, where the relationship was very low. This might mean that the morning Hearst paper anticipated the political opinions of its readers or that it had some influence upon them. In view of the intense editorial and cartoon cam- paign which this paper carried on for Roosevelt in 1932, its relationship with the Roosevelt vote is low. The American appeared to be working at cross-purposes with the political attitudes of its readers on two occasions. Although it favored Thompson in the mayoralty primary of 1931, the percentage of the homes interviewed that received the American tended slightly to vary inversely with the Thompson primary vote. Likewise in 1932, when it indorsed Roosevelt for Presi- dent, its home-coverage was apparently not closely associated with the Roosevelt vote. An examination of the scatter dia- grams for these two coefficients shows that, if the units where there were many persons who read no newspaper at all were eliminated, the coefficients would be positive. ELIMINATING THOMPSON AND HIS COHORTS Persons who are interested in proving the power of the press in politics would have even less ground to stand on when first glancing at the zero-order coefficients involving the 1932 Horner vote. However, it is highly significant that the vote for Horner did not vary inversely with the home-coverage of the News. Horner's name appeared in the Democratic party col- umn under Roosevelt's. The News urged its readers to split their votes, and presented marked ballots to show how they 26 February 18, 1931. 27 March 18, 1931. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 179 could vote for Hoover and Horner. The equation of net re- gression for the Horner vote as a function of the News, the Cermak vote, and the Roosevelt vote shows that the stand taken by the News for Horner (plus a similar stand taken by the Tribune) was an important influence in the situation. The picture is even more striking when the coefficients of partial correlation are considered. The last one of these shows that, making allowances for the fact that Horner was on the Demo- cratic ticket and that he was supported by the Cermak organi- zation, variations in his vote are quite closely related to varia- tions in the News home-coverage. This situation may also be studied in another fashion. If we subtract the Roosevelt vote from the Horner vote in each one of the areas, we find that the differences are positively related to the percentages for the News circulation. While in parts of the city some conservative Jews might have voted for Hoover and Horner regardless of the recommenda- tions of the papers, there were neighborhoods which had prac- tically no Jews which showed just as wide a spread between the Roosevelt and the Horner percentages. In the areas under dis- cussion, the aggregate vote for Horner was 39,719 greater than the aggregate vote for Roosevelt. By 1932 the overwhelming mass of the Jews in Chicago were Democratic. Furthermore, the sample studied did not include the heaviest concentration of Jewish population in the city. The author has collected sam- ple ballots and attended political meetings during the entire period. We have interviewed hundreds of party workers. No evidence has come to our attention of any party faction which openly advocated tickets to be split for Hoover and Horner. In the Beverly Hills section, where there are few Jews, Roose- velt received 26.2 per cent of the total vote and Horner 61.2 per cent. The alderman of the Nineteenth Ward said that the newspapers and the churches were responsible for this inde- pendent voting. We can thus conclude that in this situation, the News (and the Tribune) probably had some influence. Addi- tional proof of this is found in the zero-order coefficients which show the relationship between home-coverages and straight- 180 MACHINE POLITICS party voting. The home-coverages were high where independ- ent voting was high, and vice versa. The success of the News and the Tribune in getting their readers to cut the Republican candidate for governor in 1932 was related to the bitter hostility which these papers had ex- pressed toward the Thompson faction of the Republican party over a long period of time. Shortly after Thompson's first elec- tion as mayor in 1915, these papers began their campaign of adverse criticism. The animosities which the owners of these papers had harbored against former Senator William Lorimer were focused on a new object, Mayor Thompson, a henchman of the Lorimer faction. The readers of the Tribune and the News were conditioned by constant repetition of publicity which was bitterly unfavorable to Thompson and his cohorts. Len Small was the Thompson candidate who ran against Horner for gov- ernor in 1932. What relationship was there between the votes for Thompson, himself, and the home -coverages of these papers? This problem was studied on the basis of the mayoralty pri- mary of 1931, at which the zero-order coefficients present a prima facie case showing considerable newspaper influence. The equation of net regression shows that for unit average change in the News home-coverage percentage there was a 27/100 average change in the Thompson primary vote in the opposite direction, while holding constant the relationship between the Thompson primary vote and the following variables, Herald and Examiner home-coverage, party voting, and median rental. The relationship is certainly a significant one. 28 In order to counteract the influence of his journalistic oppo- nents, Mayor Thompson denounced them at every platform appearance and sought an alliance with the two Hearst papers, the Evening American and the Herald and Examiner. He was most successful in recruiting supporters in the areas where there were many persons who read no newspapers and where the Hearst papers were relatively more popular. On the basis of the equation referred to in the previous paragraph, it can be said that for an average unit change in the home-coverage of 28 See Appendix C for equation. RELATION OF THE PRESS TO VOTING 181 the Herald and Examiner there was, on the average, two-thirds of a unit change in the Thompson primary vote, while holding constant the News, party voting, and median rental. This rela- tionship seems almost too high. We might reasonably expect a newspaper to influence about 10 or 20 per cent of its readers. The relationship appears more probable when the coefficients of partial correlation are considered and when it is remembered that the home-coverage figures for this paper greatly underesti- mate its circulation. SUMMARY While a number of candidates have carried the second largest city of the United States in the face of a bitter and overwhelm- ing press opposition, this does not mean that the press is with- out influence or that its relative effectiveness is rapidly declin- ing. An examination of newspaper home -coverage and voting responses in different areas of the city shows that there were many cases where the circulation and attitude of a newspaper were closely associated with the success of given candidates. By constant reiteration the newspapers had conditioned their readers to vote for candidates belonging to given parties or factions. One of the reasons why the press has apparently been overshadowed by other influences during the depression years is the fact that it has never reached some of the submerged groups. Many areas were found where a large proportion of the inhabitants took no daily newspaper. There are certain typical situations in which the newspapers are important influences in those sections of the city where their circulations are largest. If they have followed a vigorous policy with reference to factional leaders in primary elections, they may be able to determine the fate of the candidates asso- ciated with these leaders. In general elections, if the papers have followed a consistent policy regarding a given party fac- tion, they may be able to influence their readers to split their tickets in favor of, or in opposition to, that faction. Finally, if the press follows a tenacious policy during an economic crisis, it may be able to retard or prevent shifts from one major party to another. HOW TO VOTE INTELLIGENTLY IN THE PRIMARY From the "Chicago Tribune," April 5, 1932 CHAPTER IX THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS What is the balance sheet of machine politics in an urban center such as Chicago during a period of economic crisis? On the credit side of the ledger should be placed the success of the bosses in softening class conflicts. By granting petty favors to various nationalistic and local groups, by taking advantage of the subsidies offered by the national government, by keeping the attention of the voters distracted by factional quarrels and sham disputes, the party machines have kept minor party movements from gaining any headway. From the standpoint of the business leaders, this function of parties has been very useful. Some of the submerged groups may not be so appre- ciative; but the fact remains that during the years 1930-36 the city was comparatively free from violent labor disputes, hunger riots, and class warfare. The decentralized, chaotic, and inade- quate character of the governmental organization of the city has discouraged far-reaching demands upon local authorities. During the depression the machine has also acted as a kind of buffer for the various governmental agencies which have had to deal with the distressed. Eviction cases, emergency hunger cases, and emergency clothing shortages were sometimes cared for in first instance by the ward and precinct committeemen. The relief activities of the party workers were not systematic and, of course, were not disinterested, but they were devoid of red tape. Ward heelers asked no embarrassing questions, and they supplied at once any material aid they could. The de- mands of the period were such that the party organizations could not hope to meet more than a minute fraction of them, but they did leave the impression that they knew the ropes of the relief game. The stability of the machine was reassuring to various groups that no upsetting innovations would be tried in local govern- ment. Ward leaders in particular showed an amazingly low 183 184 MACHINE POLITICS turnover, considering the stresses and strains that accompanied the economic crisis. Business men, journalists, underworld leaders, bankers, and labor chiefs knew that they could count upon the local machine to do business in the old way in spite of the changes that had taken place in the role of the national government. Inefficiency in local government could be tol- erated if it meant resistance to the extension of the local public services. The largest industrialists, newspaper proprietors, bankers, and gambling kings did not want a state income tax, a modern tax-collection system, or an expansion of municipal services and budgets. Party bosses were a bulwark against such changes. Those citizens who might have benefited from such modifications of the role of local government were indiffer- ent, deficient in promotional skills, misled by the press, and disillusioned by the failure of reform waves to leave many permanent traces. While the depression has not eliminated the influence of the spoils tradition in the city hall, it has drastically purged one of the major party organizations. The economic crisis greatly re- duced national and local incomes and made the burden of taxa- tion relatively much greater than it had been in the prosperous twenties. A city can support more than one political machine when real estate values are rising and incomes are going up. During such times the taxpayers are not so tax conscious as in lean times, and the general public is more indifferent to graft exposures and wasteful expenditure of public funds. In a period of economic depression there is graft enough for only one ma- chine. The law of the pendulum in democratic countries oper- ates against the party which is in power when the economic deprivations are first being felt. Those major party factions which were in power at the time of the stock market crash were swept from the public offices. There has undoubtedly been a decrease in the total amount of political grafting in the city during the past eight years. Relative to the opportunities available, there may not be any great decrease; but there are fewer political mouths to feed out of the public crib, since local political power has been concentrated in a single organization. THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS 185 Under pressure from the financial interests the political bosses have been compelled, in the last few years, to make drastic economies. Tax collections have been insufficient to meet the local governmental expenses, and the unpaid public employee is not a great asset to the political machine. The banks have been unwilling to lend money unless total public expenditures were reduced. While many of the economies have not improved governmental efficiency, and there are still many strongholds of patronage and spoils, there have been some improvements, which have left the political bosses with less patronage. Greater publicity regarding tax assessments and collections has loosened the strangle hold which the corrupt politicians once had over a lucrative source of campaign funds. The demand for economy has aided the movement for the con- solidation of overlapping authorities and the concentration of official responsibility for fiscal affairs. In the field of public administration there have been a num- ber of developments in recent years which have tended to lessen the influence of spoils. There has been a trend toward stricter supervision of the local tax authorities, and the newer forms of taxation are less open to political abuses. The Illinois sales tax, objectionable as it is from the theoretical point of view, is a tax which can be administered with comparatively little leak- age. The advances which have been made in the field of public welfare administration have made the social service activities of the precinct committeemen more and more unnecessary. There have been fewer occasions when the party officials can step in and mitigate the harshness of the law. The growth of such services as parole, probation, community case work, re- habilitation, and public employment bureaus has reduced the importance of the precinct captain as a community agent. These gains have been achieved for the most part through the efforts of the state and national governments. The most that can be said for the local machine is that it has furnished no effective opposition to these innovations. The depression has also brought greater recognition for the merit system in the municipal service. In Chicago the civil 186 MACHINE POLITICS service rules were extended to certain park districts by the new Park District Law, to the Sanitary District by legislation in 1935, to the employees of the county assessor by the new taxa- tion legislation, and to some of the other county employees by administrative action. While the Illinois civil service legislation has been reasonably sound, the practical application of the rules has left much to be desired. The spirit of the merit system has been violated by an excessive number of temporary employees, by a vicious system of waivers which nullifies the function of promotional examinations, by the old-fashioned practice of "framing" efficient employees, by the retention of inefficient political employees by means of legal chicanery, and from time to time by outright bribery and corruption. Leaders of both of the major parties have sinned against the civil service com- mandments. A pre-depression mayor of one party was frankly hostile to the merit system. Post-depression mayors of another party have given lip service to the system but have adminis- tered it as politicians. One might expect that, when hard times brought a great relative increase in the size of the tax burden, the taxpayers would demand greater service and revolt against the perversion of government by spoilsmen. The defeat of established ma- chines in New York and Philadelphia since 1929 might be in- terpreted in such terms. On the other hand, the depression has given to the citizens of Chicago no respite from boss rule. Economic deprivations have failed to break the political sys- tem in Chicago because of an unfavorable press situation, a lack of leadership, and the character of the party division at the beginning of the depression. In New York and Philadelphia there were newspaper pro- prietors who were willing to crusade against political corrup- tion and machine control in municipal government regardless of the personalities who happened to be in power. In times past, Chicago has had such newspaper proprietors, but in recent years local reform movements have been somewhat uncertain as to the possibility of strong press support. While daily news- papers of largest circulation have been unable to check the THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS 187 growing popularity of the New Deal administration except in a few areas where there are many persons of independent means, in local affairs they have had considerable influence in blocking change. Only in a state-wide primary battle, where some of the local newspapers were aided by the rivalry between the urban and rural sections of the state, did the press take part in a bat- tle which involved some setbacks for the local machine. The state of Illinois has furnished some national leaders dur- ing the economic crisis, but none of these has played a major role in city politics during recent times. Labor leaders in Chi- cago, until 1937, were very quiet as compared with their more active role in early post-World War period. Business and social leaders in the city have not cared to mingle in the rough and tumble of urban politics. Private philanthropy has furnished a much safer and more respectable avenue for their civic ener- gies. Besides, Chicago has had no Frank Murphy, no Daniel Hoan, no Fiorello La Guardia. At the beginning of the depression the balance between the two major parties in Chicago was fairly even, with the Republi- cans in possession of the city hall. It was inevitable, under the circumstances, that the Democratic party would be the chief beneficiary of any shifts in political attitudes. Political ma- chines in general draw their chief support from the lower income groups, the persons in the lesser employments, the foreign born, and those who have had relatively few educational opportuni- ties. These persons already belonged to the Democratic party in Chicago at the start of the economic crisis. The national policies of their party during the depression strengthened their party loyalty and made it very easy for the local leaders to build up an organization which was almost impregnable. On the other hand, in Philadelphia the party situation had been one-sided, with the Republicans normally in power; and when the depression came, many of the machine elements taken from the lower income groups were torn from Republican moorings. No such centrifugal forces were operating in the city of Chicago. From the argument so far, the impression might be gained that the spoils system is inevitable in such a city as Chicago. 188 MACHINE POLITICS This is not necessarily so. The experience of such cities as De- troit, Milwaukee, and Cincinnati shows that patronage need not be the price of democracy. It may be that efficiency and expanding municipal services will sharpen class lines and the bitterness of city politics as in Milwaukee, where a socialist mayor has challenged the existing political and economic setup ; but in some of the smaller cities the efficiency movement has frequently been an economy movement started by business men. New leaders, new movements, new attitudes, might arise in the future, just as the city itself rose from its ashes after the famous fire. Assuming a new orientation in the civic organization of the community, there is no part of the political machine which is invulnerable. There are some people who take a defeatist view regarding the strangle hold which the spoilsmen appear to have upon the law-enforcing authorities. It is held that there will always be liberal elements in the great metropolitan communi- ties and that these elements will furnish the basis for an alliance between the underworld leaders and the politicians. The wish to win money without effort, the desire for excitement, and the interest of mortals in the future are among the causes of gam- bling. When existence is precarious, the urge to take a chance is even greater, and it becomes almost impossible to keep gam- bling places from operating. Like bootlegging, protected gam- bling furnishes the basis for criminal gangs which ally them- selves with the dominant party machine. However, it is likely that gambling is a practice which is less widely distributed than drinking was during the prohibition era. In addition, mer- chants generally frown upon the spending habits of persons connected with gambling houses. The experience of Cleveland shows that a determined and skilled public safety director can break up gambling rings and thereby cut away one of the foun- dation stones of a spoils machine. If such an administrator understands the arts of publicity, the party bosses will not be able to touch him. Any city administration would soon find out that an honest, courageous, intelligent, and well-trained director of public safety is a much better political asset than a THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS 189 bunch of thieving, double-crossing, cheating, gambling-house operators. It is true that gambling kings furnish party cam- paign funds, ballot crooks, a few jobs for the machine, and, in the case of the lesser games, a propaganda agency ; but the pow- er of these things melts away in the face of an aroused public which is beginning to take pride in having a safe city and an honest police force. Those concerned with attacking the political machine should be interested in a number of changes in the election laws and their administration. The long ballot, the multiplicity of elec- tions, the small size of the election precincts, and the lack of adequate safeguards against fraud are all factors which play directly into the hands of the political bosses. These trappings of an archaic rural democracy which assumed the existence of omnicompetent citizens function badly in the great metropoli- tan centers such as Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia. Illinois has a jungle ballot; and it is no wonder that the voters get lost trying to mark it, and are willing to be led by the suave representatives of the political bosses who take the time to show them sample ballots and to explain the mysteries of the slate. One of the best illustrations of cultural lag in the field of politics is the slow pace at which positive law is catching up with the unanimous recommendations of political scientists, over several generations, with reference to the short ballot. A shorter ballot in Chicago would make it much more difficult for the political machine to dodge its responsibilities, and the agitation to secure such a change would build up the anti- machine elements. "Divide and rule" is an old saying in politics. It applies with particular emphasis to American municipal politics. The old- fashioned city council elected by wards is based on the prin- ciple that, if spoils are divided into small enough units, a great many individual citizens can be put under personal obliga- tions to the machine. Thousands of citizens will not vote against the dominant machine because the local ward boss has done such favors for them as fixing their curbs, collecting their garbage, fixing the street lights, or aiding them in securing some 190 MACHINE POLITICS governmental service. That ward organization which delivers the most votes is entitled to the biggest share of the spoils. Fraudulent registration in the form of colonization, ballot-box stuffing, alteration of ballots, and falsification of election returns are practices which benefit ward politicians. In order to in- crease the controlled votes they can command, they put all sorts of pressure upon their precinct workers, appoint criminals as members of precinct boards of election, and organize gangs of floaters and ballot tricksters. Electoral corruption and petty graft weaken the faith of the masses in democratic methods, and consequently it is necessary to minimize their use if it is desired to strengthen democratic ideology. If election precincts were made larger, the total num- ber of election officials would be reduced and it would be harder for the political bosses to manipulate each tiny unit of the electorate. In Great Britain there are no precinct captains, in part because the votes are not counted by small districts but by large areas including around fifty thousand voters each. In some parts of the United States fairly large precincts are used, and in a number of cities ballots are centrally counted. The control which the party machines have over the election boards could be reduced by abolishing the requirements of residence within the precinct and of representation of the two dominant parties. For many years the city of Detroit has ap- pointed precinct election officials on the basis of fitness and integrity. Other jurisdictions have been able to keep persons with criminal records off the precinct election boards. In Chi- cago it is very difficult in many areas to get properly qualified persons living within their precincts to serve on the election boards, and the requirement of party representation has not prevented bipartisan conspiracies to perpetrate election frauds. While the positive law remedy is well known, its adoption is difficult because some of the legislators chosen under the pres- ent system have benefited from its defects and do not want to weaken their own chances of re-election. The substitution of a system of proportional representation for the present ward plan would enable the anti-machine groups THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS 191 to combine more effectively. Proportional representation would involve the selection of city councilors-at-large in accordance with a plan which would secure a city council reflecting with mathematical exactness the strength of the groups in the elec- torate. The underlying rationale of this system is the desire to prevent the exclusion of minorities from the benefits of the state — a rationale based on the democratic premise that, in the absence of some means of protection, minorities may be ex- ploited by the majority. Proportional representation would do away with gerrymandering and chicanery in connection with the determination of ward boundaries; and it would auto- matically take care of any shifts in the population, thus elimi- nating such a rotten borough as the First Ward in the city of Chicago. Election at large would minimize organizational ele- ments, since it would lessen the power of the primary relation- ships established by the ward heelers and magnify the impor- tance of secondary contacts. Thus it would be possible for re- form groups to elect candidates of their own by means of press and radio publicity. Such methods are not feasible in ward battles, inasmuch as neither a metropolitan newspaper nor a broadcasting station can give as much attention to fifty local contests as to a city-wide struggle. Cincinnati, Toledo, and Hamilton, Ohio, have shown that proportional representation can be used to defeat machine control. If democracy is to survive in troublesome times like the present, it will have to have a firmer foundation than the co- hesive power of public plunder. Too often the methods em- ployed by party machines to finance their various activities have given rise to the charge that our democracy is a demagogic plutocracy. As long as the parties rely upon contributions from business men who are seeking special favors, criminal elements which are seeking protection against interference on the part of the law-enforcing authorities, and office-holders who regard their loyalty to the party above that to the state, cynicism re- garding the electoral process will be widespread. The power of money in American municipal politics could be regulated to a much greater extent than it is at present. The 192 MACHINE POLITICS floodlight of publicity, before and after elections, regarding the sources of campaign funds and election expenditures, has weak- ened boss rule in a number of states and cities. In addition, the regulation of certain types of expenditures, such as the hiring of party workers and watchers on election day, has reduced the size of the machine vote where it has been tried. Many of the states have inadequate corrupt-practices acts, and Illinois is one of the states which has no law regulating the use of money in elections. Legal regulations are necessary in the fight against the spoils- men, but they are not sufficient. The American constitutional system is such that it has tended to inculcate a legalistic mode of thinking about social problems. We have had a naive faith in the power of legislation — constitutional, statutory, and local — to change our habits and keep us good. The colossal failure of the "noble experiment" with the constitutional prohibition of the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcoholic bever- ages has, to some extent, shattered this faith. Laws which run contrary to the mores of an important element of the population can only be enforced at a social cost which is prohibitive. On the other hand, a legal device designed to purify politics is workable only if someone is concerned with seeing that it does work. If machine candidates are elected to the important appointing offices, they will find methods for circumventing the civil service laws. Even the most perfectly drafted election law can be manipulated by unscrupulous politicians who are not carefully watched. The best that positive law can do is to create a legal framework which makes the perversion of public office for private profit risky and which facilitates the expres- sion of civic points of view. If the struggle against the party machine is to be successful, more democratic methods for financing political campaigns must be devised, local parties dedicated to the ideal of volun- tary precinct work must be organized, and the citizens must be educated to demand services of the government rather than special favors from the politicians. That all of these things are possible to achieve in the present generation has been demon- THE ROLE OF URBAN POLITICS 193 strated by a number of cities, American and European. The will to achieve has been lacking in some places — high places as well as low places. Looking at the problem of urban democracy in the United States from a long-run point of view, the picture does not ap- pear as gloomy in all aspects as Thomas Jefferson painted it one hundred and fifty years ago. In the past seventy-five years or so, machine voters have been recruited for the most part from the ranks of the unadjusted foreign-born groups, the unas- similated migrants from rural areas, the transient workers, and other such elements. The sinews of campaign warfare came from the robber-barons of American industry, particularly the real estate and the utility magnates. With the cutting-off of immigration, the slowing-up of the migration from the farms to the cities, the declining of the birth-rate of the newer immi- grant groups, the maturation of the industrial revolution in the country, the growing socialization of the policies of the govern- ment, particularly the national government, the machines will have fewer and fewer persons to draw upon as the years go by. That section of the electorate which reads no daily newspapers, which depends upon petty handouts from politicians, and which is deficient in formal civic training will grow less and less. It may be that at the end of the next seventy-five years the prob- lem of building up civic morale in the great metropolitan cen- ters will not seem so hopeless as Jefferson thought it was or as some who live in the twentieth century now think it is. APPENDIX A TABLE 21 Votes for Ward Committeemen Registered Voters Total Vote Cast in Primary Election Republican Democratic Year Wards with Contest for Ward Commit- teemen Wards with No Con- test for Ward Commit- teemen Total Wards with Contest for Ward Commit- teemen Wards with No Con- test for Ward Commit- teemen Total Total Pri- mary Vote Both Parties 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936 1,228,283 1,297,055 1,429,774 1,396,151 1,644,198 688,375 545,152 509,841 285,663 302,437 23,406 20,208 33^434 41,468 711,781 565,360 509,841 319,097 343,905 87,806 145,040 390,733 281,316 595,698 72,474 61,826 77,686 216,417 257,390 160,280 206,866 468,419 497,733 853,088 872,061 772,226 978,260 816,830 1,196,993 Total Vote Cast for Ward Committeemen Republican Democratic Combined Vote for Commit- teemen Both Parties Year Wards with Contest Wards with No Con- test Aggre- gate Vote for Suc- cessful Candi- dates Total All Candi- dates Wards with Contest Wards with No Contest Aggre- gate Vote for Suc- cessful Candi- dates Total All Candi- dates 1928... 1930... 1932... 1934... 1936... 630,002 495,283 456,953 259,935 278,275 19,629 16,581 28,516 34,714 373,182 297,838 248,305 184,008 195,196 649,631 511,864 456,953 288,451 312,989 80,303 133,235 347,936 250,927 534,608 64,716 55,557 65,250 193,541 202,602 120,939 148,644 305,945 379,743 561,365 145,019 188,792 413,186 444,468 737,210 794,650 700,656 870,139 732,919 1,050,199 194 APPENDIX 195 TABLE 22 Description of 147 Units Used in Study of Voting Behavior in Chicago Unit Census Community Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Number Registered October, 1930 1 1 1 2 3 1 2-8 9-17 18 50 49 50 47 50 49,50 50 47 1,774 2 3 21,684 14,897 4 5* 1,697 6 7t 3 29-33 50 47,50 7,285 8 9 10 11 12 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 40-42 43-50 51-58, 65 59,64 66-71 72-77 78-79 47 50 47 45 47 45 44 47 47,50 45,47 45 45,47 45,46 44 3,503 17,173 14,374 5,773 8,508 7,347 3,451 13 14 15| 16§ 17 18 19 20 21 22 7 7 7 8 8 9 10 11 12 100-104, part of 105 Part of 105, 106-13 114-19 120-25 126-37 138-40 141-46 147-52 153-54, 155 45 44 43 43 42 41 41 41 41 43, 44, 45 43,44 43 42,43 42 41 41 41 39,41 6,255 15,826 8,026 9,892 16,822 2,598 5,258 23 24 25 26|| 7,021 1,739 27 28 29 30 13 14 14 15 15 16 16 16 17 157-59 160-61 162-67 168-76 177-79 180-82 183-90 191-92 193-94, 199-200 40 41 40 41 39 41 40 39 41 40 39 39,40 38, 39, 41 38 39 39,40 39 38,41 4,141 4,036 15,732 19,870 31 32 6,101 4,691 33 34 35 18,071 2,764 2,821 * Divided into units 173, 174, and 175 below. t Divided into units 176 and 177 below. t Divided into units 178, 179, and 180 below. § Divided into units 181 and 182 below. || Units dropped because of smallness. 196 MACHINE POLITICS TABLE 22— Continued Total Unit Census Community Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Number Registered October, 1930 36 17 18 19 19 20 20 21 21 21 195-98, 201-2 203-5 206-17 218-20 221-23 224-26 227 228-32 233-35 39 39 39 37 39 36 40 39 38 38 36,38 35, 36, 38 36 35,36 34,36 33 33,35 33 3,011 37 2,803 38 14,436 39 4,736 40 3,614 41 4,931 42 1,678 43 10,854 44 4,285 45 22 22 236-38 239-48 39 38 33, 34, 35 33,34 7,390 46 15,175 47 22 22 22 22 23 249-52 253-58 259-60 261-64 265-67 36 35 34 33 36 34 34 32 32,33 34,36 5,432 48 7,809 49 1,496 50 3,072 51 2,956 52 23 268-71 36 31 7,071 53 23 272-76 35 31,34 6,575 54 23 277-79 30 30 5,729 55 23 24 280-82 283-86 28 35 28 31,34 5,951 56 3,777 57 24 289-94 32 26,28 12,238 58 24 295-304 34 26,31,32 13,997 59 24 305-12 33 32 10,370 60 24 313-20 31 26 11,344 61 25 25 26 26 321-39 340-44 345-50 351 37 30 30 28 30, 36, 37 30,37 29,30 28 41,473 62 19,302 63 12,905 64 836 65 26 352-54 29 29 7,210 66 27 27 355, 358-62 356-57, 363-73 28 29 25, 27, 28 25, 27, 29 6,543 67 18,414 68 27 374-75 25 25 701 6911 70 H 71 28 388-409 25 20, 25, 27 12,039 72 28 410-24 27 20, 25, 27 18,974 73 H 74 H 75 29 444-45, 447-49 29 24 3,398 H Units with 20 per cent or more colored; dropped from calculation. APPENDIX TABLE 22— Continued 197 Unit Census Community Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Number Registered October, 1930 76 29 29 29 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 31 446, 450-55 456-57 458-59 460-65 466-70 471-75 476-80 481-94 495-98 499-503 504-10 24 25 21 23 22 21 23 22 26 20 21 22,24 25 25 23,24 22 25 22,23 22 21 21 21,25 17,551 77 1 432 78. . 575 79 11,737 80 3,173 81 3 306 82 11,948 83 12,989 84 5,233 85 4,276 86 11,353 87** 88H 89 34 34 34 523-29 530-33 534 1 11 13 1 11 11 3,465 90 632 91 92H 389. 9311 94H 95H 96 37 37 563-64 565-70 13 14 11 14 809 97 4 159 98|| 99H lOOlf loin 102 39 593-99 4 4 11 610 103H 104H 105H 1061[ 107ft 108 42 623-33 6 5,6 29 038 109H 110 Ill 43 43 44 44 44 45 635-44 645-47 648-55 656 657-58 659 7 8 8 19 10 7 7,8 6,8 8, 17, 19 17,19 8 8 28,621 5 400 112 11 275 113 1 330 114. . 1,447 1 242 115. . ** Divided into units 183 and 184 below, ft Divided into units 185 and 186 below. 198 MACHINE POLITICS TABLE 22— Continued Unit Census Community Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Number Registered October, 1930 116 45 46 46 660-61 662-68 669-71 8 7 10 8 7,10 10 2,510 117 12,298 118 2,716 11911 120 47 673 10 8 460 12111 122|| 123 48 677-80 10 10 2,022 124«[ 125 49 49 50 51 52 687-94 695-96 697-99 700-704 705-10 9 10 9 10 10 9 8 9 10 10 13,235 126 556 127 1,743 128 1,732 129 5,511 13011 131 53 54 55 712-15 716-17 718-19 9 9 10 9 9 10 8,082 132 601 133 1,791 13411 135 56 57 725-33 734-37 15 12 13 13 1,356 136 798 13711 X * J * II 138 58 59 739—51 752-56, 758-59 12 12 12 11,12 12,149 139 7,910 14011 141 60 760-62, 764-78 11 11 13,941 14211 143 60 61 61 61 779-81 782-84, 787-88, 793-95, parts of 789, 790, 791, 792 785-86, 796-805 806-9, parts of 789, 790, 791, 792 13 13 14 15 11 11,12,14 14 14,15 3,055 144 6,671 145 12,024 146 7,874 14711 148|| 149 63 63 815-17 818-26 12 15 12 13,15 791 150 10,935 APPENDIX TABLE 22— Continued 199 Unit Census Community Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Number Registered October, 1930 151 64 65 827-34 835-37 15 15 13 13 1,270 152 1,966 15311 154 66 66 67 67 67 68 68 68 68 69 69 69 839-45 846-47 848-53 854-61 862-70 871-76 877-80 881-83 884 885-94 895-98 899-900 15 18 15 16 18 16 17 18 19 8 17 19 13,15 13 13, 15, 16 16 18, 13, 16 16 17 16,18 17 6, 8, 17 6,17 17 13,107 155. 4,056 156 5,931 157 11,191 158 8,986 159 10,296 160 15,044 161 9,607 162 163 2,725 17,687 164 3,302 165 5,060 16611 167 71 71 72 73 74 903-7 908-14 915-21 922-27 928-29 18 19 19 19 19 18 17, 18, 19 19 19 19 8,897 168 15,761 169 7,045 170 8,286 171 959 172^[ 173 3 3 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 32 32 41 41 19-20, 22, 27 21 28 34-36, 38-39 37 80-85, 88-95 86 87 96-98 99 511-15 516 608-11,613-22 612 48 48 48 49 49 46 46 46 48 48 1 1 5 5 48 48 48 48,49 49 44,46 46 46 46 46 1 1 4,5 5 16,427 174. . 1,044 175 1,627 176 19,247 177 . 1,315 178 179 180 181 182 18,476 1,634 2,257 2,593 1,002 183 3,265 184. . 1,554 185 18,212 186 2,199 Totals for Chi- cago 1,264,234 200 MACHINE POLITICS TABLE 23 Units Used in the Study of the Relation of the Press to Voting Behavior in Chicago Unit Census Commu- nity Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Number Registered October, 1930 1... 2.... 3.... 4.... 5.... 6... 7.... 8.... 9... 10... 11... 12... 13... 14 15. ... 16... 17. ... 18.... 19... 20... 21 ... . 22.... 23... 24.... 25.... 26.... 27-28* 29-30* 31.... 32... 33 ... . 34... 35 ... . 36 ... . 37.... 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 9 10 14 15 16 22 22 22 24 24 25 25 26 28 28 30 38 38 42 42 43 43 49 49 52 1 2,3,5 4 6-8 12. 14. 16 13. 15. 17 34,35 36,37 38,39 44-46 139 143-44 162-63, 165-66 170, 172, 174 183-86, 188 238 239-41, 244 253-56 292-94 309-12 326-27, 330-31 334-35, 338-39 346-47, 349-50 396-402, 404-9 425-31 483-84, 490-91 576-78, 581-83 585-88, 589, 592 623, 624 626, 628, 630, 632 635-39 640-43 648-49 688-91 707-8 50 49 49 49 50 50 49 50 41 41 40 41 40 39 38 35 32 33 37 37 30 25 26 22 3 4 6 6 7 7 8 9 10 50 49 49,50 49 50 50 49 49 49 47,50 41 41 39,40 38,41 39,40 33, 34, 35 33,34 34 26 32 36,37 37 29,30 20, 25, 27 20,27 22 2,3 3,4 6 5 7 7 8, 17, 19 9 10 1,774 10,960 3,079 7,265 4,477 3,227 6,957 5,447 5,865 7,144 1,663 3,424 10,237 7,208 9,471 3,893 7,041 6,339 5,250 8,049 11,497 11,431 9,285 6,930 4,722 6,980 14,157 11,695 4,151 7,557 12,506 11,729 5,147 5,746 2,591 * Units with 20 per cent or more colored population; dropped from calculation. APPENDIX TABLE 23— Continued 201 Unit Census Commu- nity Census Tract Ward Lines 1921 Ward Lines 1931 Total Xu mber Registered October, 1930 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 59 60 60 66 66 67 67 67 68 68 72 72 41 41 752-55 764, 770-78 780, 781 841,843 842 855, 858, 861 856, 859 862-64, 868 881-83 884 916-17 918-19 612, 621, 622 613-14, 619-20 12 11 13 15 15 16 16 18 18 19 19 19 5 5 11,12 11 11 15 15 16 16 16,18 16,17 17 19 19 5 4,5 5,290 5,863 2,391 5,344 2,980 4,091 2,487 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 2,765 9,412 3,210 3,346 2,213 3,996 6,624 202 MACHINE POLITICS FORM FOR INFORMATION REGARDING WARD COMMITTEEMAN Name Party Date first elected Ward. Address Last elected Ward. Elective Office-Holders (Ward Committeemen) 1. Elective positions held 2. Dates holding office..... 3. Occupation at time of first election 4. Other early occupations... _ 5. Later occupations 6. Present occupation... 7. Appointive positions held 8. Military rank and experience. _ 9. Birthplace 10. Date of birth..... 11. Birthplace of father 12. Age at first election 13. Marital status ._ 14. Date of arrival in Chicago 15. Years in Chicago before first election. 16. Places lived in before coming to Chicago.- 17. Education; name and location of elementary school _ 18. High school College or university Professional school Approximate years in school 19. Candidacies for other elective offices (Give dates) 20. Religion (Give church) 21. Membership in fraternal orders and clubs (Give names). 22. Activities in party organizations 23. Factional alignments 24. Connections with the underworld 25. Outstanding accomplishments in office. 26. Reasons for entering politics 27. Other comments Vote for his party in his ward. APPENDIX 203 REPORT ON PRECINCT COMMITTEEMAN Name of prec. capt...- Address of prec. capt. Investigator. Address Date .Ward Precinct CHARACTER OF PRECINCT ..Median rental ..Education ..Most numerous nationality .Percentage foreign born ..Percentage unemployed ..Most numerous occupational group .Last vote for ward committee- Father's birthplace ..Years in Chicago Occupation before entering political work Birthplace: ; Chicago (1); other native Amer. (2); Brit. Empire (3); Ire. (4); Germany or Aus. (5); Scand. (6); Russia or Ru- mania (7) ; Poland (8) ; other. Slavic (9); Italian (X); other (r); no information (0). man. .Vote at last general election for congressman-at-large Dem Rep.. CHARACTERISTICS OF PRECINCT CAPTAIN .Rep. (l);Dem. (2) faction .Sex: male (1); female (2) .Color: white (1); colored (2) .Height .Weight .Appearance: neat (1); un- tidy (2) .Speaking ability : pleasing (1); disagreeable (2) ; an orator (3) -Age .Present occupation : ; govt, employee (1); lawyer (2); other professional (3); merchant (4); business exec. (5); domestic service (6); clerical (7) ; skilled laborer (8) ; unskilled (9) ; unemployed (X); no information (0) .Years in precinct .Ed.: no sch. (1); gr. non-grad. (2); gr. grad. (3); h.s. non- grad. (4); h.s. grad. (5); c. non-grad. (6); c. grad. (7); prof, non-grad. (8); prof. (9); no information (0) .Church:. Prot. (1); Cath. (2); Jewish (3); no religion (4); other re- ligion (5) ; no church affiliation (6); no information (0) .Marital status: single (1); married (2); widowed (3); di- vorced (4); no information (0) .Fraternal affiliations .Early political mentors .Military experience. .Start in politics. .Reasons for moving into pre- cinct 204 MACHINE POLITICS REPORT ON PRECINCT COMMITTEEMAN— Continued .Years in political work .Public employee or office- holder (Exact grade and office) .Salary .Other income from public sources .Former public-job-holder POLITICAL ACTIVITIES .Number of times precinct is canvassed .Arguments used to win votes baskets (3); Passover bas- kets (4) .Rent: none (1); month or so (2); longer period (3); evic- tion postponed (4); eviction prevented (5); helped to put in mun. shelter (6) .Coal: none (1); month or so (2) ; longer period (3) .Medical care: none (1); pri- vate doc. (2) ; county hospital (3); Oak Forest (4); Mun. T.B. San. (5) .Domestic difficulty adjusted: none (1); some (2); explain .Ability to predict result Juvenile guidance _ .Ward headquarters : none (1); none (1); school transfer (2) temporary for primary or elec- advice to delinquent (3) tion (2) ; permanent (3) Scholarships: .Political club none (1); yes (2) .Social affairs in prec: none Weddings:. (1); smoker (2); beer party (3); cards (4); dances (5); picnics (6) .Election-day activities : ap- none attended ed (2) Funerals: none attended (1); points judges and clerks (1); .., . .. .. . , . , . Aid in naturalization (1); attend- attend- no control over judges and clerks (2) .Polling place: nothing to say about (1); selects (2) .Assistance to voters: given (1); not given (2) .Amount of money available for election-day expenses none (1); advice on schooling (2); help with witnesses (3); coaching on examination (4) .Alleys and streets cleaned no attempt to see superintend- ent or alderman (1); situation handled (2) .Personal letters sent to vot- Legal advice ers: no (1); yes (2) none given (1); personal ad- vice given (2); contact made with lawyer (3) Advice re veteran's bonus .Food: none given out (1); oc- none given (1); directions casional gifts (2); Christmas given (2) SOCIAL SERVICE AND FRIENDLY ACTIVITIES APPENDIX 205 REPORT ON PRECINCT COMMITTEEMAN— Continued .Advice on Home Owner's Loan none given (1); directions given (2) .Advice re relief agencies. none given (1); directions given (2) .Adjustment of taxes none adjusted (1); personal property tax adjusted (2) ; real estate (3) ; both (4) .Adjustment of traffic viola- tions none adjusted (1); yes (2) .Aid in connection with trouble with law-enforcing authorities : none given (1); bail raised or bond signed (2) ; friendly word to police, court clerk, coroner, state's attorney's assistant, or judge .Permits secured none (1); yes: specify whether peddler's, milk, garage, build- ing, other - ----- (2) .Adjustment of building or zoning regulation none (1); favor secured (2); use of law as threat (3) .Public jobs secured for voters none (1); city (2); county (3); park (4); Sanitary District (5); courts (6); state (7); fed- eral W.P.A. (8); other federal (9) .Public jobs formerly secured .Employment for constituents in private concerns none (1); public utilities (2); numbers (3) ; other (4) .Contacts with social agencies none (1); friendly (2): tile (3) hos- Use separate sheet for additional comments APPENDIX B FACTORIAL ANALYSIS The correlation matrix (p. 109, Table 10) may be presented in a much simpler form by going through certain transformations devised by Professor L. L. Thurstone under the name of "multiple factor" analysis and described in his book The Vectors of Mind, Multiple-Factor Analysis for the Isolation of Primary Traits (University of Chicago Press, 1935). One purpose of multiple- factor analysis is to determine how many general and independent factors it is necessary to postulate in order to account for a correlation matrix. The word "factor," in the technical sense, means a reference variable in terms of which given variables can be expressed as linear functions. The application of the centroid method to the data at hand brought out the fact that the 306 intercorrelations could be expressed in terms of three general factors. Further computations to see if there was a fourth factor in- dicated that three were sufficient. A three-factor solution means that it is possible to regard the three loadings for each variable as co-ordinates locating that variable as a point with reference to a given sphere. The points inside the sphere were projected to the surface (normalized), and the resulting pat- tern was studied so as to determine where the three planes of reference should pass. According to multiple-factor theory, the best solution out of an infinite number of solutions is the one which maximizes the number of zero loadings for each factor. Eleven of the points { — d, e,j,m, — k, h, —u, — s, —I, — t, and/) tended to fall near a plane which was passed through the center of the sphere, the centroid of — t and — /, and — s. A second plane was passed at right angles to the first and through v and j. Where the third plane of reference should have been passed, could not be determined without adopting an arbitrary rule, since the points did not fall in any definite triangular configuration. For pur- poses of convenience it was decided to make the third plane orthogonal to the other two. This enables an easy transformation from the co-ordinates to the original coefficients. Using the three planes described above, the factor load- ings given in Table 24 were obtained for the eighteen variables. Since the factor loadings are derived from the correlation coefficients, it is possible to calculate the correlation between any two variables by employing only the factor loadings. The process of transformation is given by the equation r = a n a 2 i + ^12^22 + auegjm == .673, Tcj . aegm = .069, Tern • aegj — .175, Teg . aejm = .206, Tce.agjm = .322 . Xc = 2.69 + .5428X a + .2242X e + .2002X a + .0253X/ + .1063X™ . Sc • aegjm = 3 .875 . Pages 118-20: X n = 10.59+ .8790X C . S n .c = 3.667. The second-order coefficients of partial correlation are: Tng • tfc = .442, Tni . gk = .467, Tnk . gi = — .297 . Xn = 6.10 + .6799Xfl + .4675Xi - .1610X* . Rn.gik = .8022 . Sn . gik = 7 . 1825 . The third-order coefficients of partial correlation are : Tnc .gik= . 888, Tng . cik = — . 141, Tni . cgk = . 066, r n fc . get = . 109 . X n = 14.35 + .9164X C - .1076X ff + .0308Xt + .0285X* . The a's of the 6's are .040, .063, .039, .022. Rn.cgik= .962. Sn.cgik = 3.304. X t,= 8.54 + .7079Xc + .0957X,, + .2918Xi - .0007X* . The (r's of the 6's are .0327, .0498, .0293, .0164. Rv . cgik = .971 . Sv.cgik = 2.489. Xv = 7.36 -f- .7126X C + .0795X? + .2960X* + .0238X* + .0825X™ . The as of the 6's are .0328, .0511, .0289, .0226, .0552. Rv • cgikw = .972 . Sv • cgikw = 2.453 . III. EQUATIONS FOR CHAPTER VIII a = News, 1933 p = Party voting, 1932 d = Herald and Examiner, 1933 r = Wet vote, 1930 g = Lewis, 1930 t = Catholic origins, 1930 h = Thompson, 1931 v = Median rental, 1930 k = Cermak, 1931 w = Taking no newspaper, 1933 I = Roosevelt, 1932 z = Roosevelt vote, 1936 m = Horner, 1932 212 MACHINE POLITICS Page 17±: The first- and third-order coefficients of partial correlation are: ria.r = -.568, ria.t = -.261, ria.% = -.496, ria-rtv = .065, rw.atv = .807, rit . arv = .539, and n v .art= — .420 Zi = -16.19 + .0402Z a + .924lZr + .3098Z; - .1431X* . The as of the 6's are .116, .192, .093, .086. Rl.artv = .8981 . Sl.artv = 6.263 . Xi = -27.999 + .0272Z a + .8055Z<, + .3308Zr + .2070Z* - 0902Z*. The as of the &'s are .074, .101, .143, .060, .055. Rl.agrtv = .960 . Si . agrtv = 3 .990 . Pages 175-76: Xz = 22.0 - .3123Za + .7068Zr + .1491Z* - 0500Z„ . The