10 RAGE GREELEY PI -I RAY FAHRNEY LINCOLN ROOM UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY MEMORIAL the Class of 1901 founded by HARLAN HOYT HORNER and HENRIETTA CALHOUN HORNER Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign http://www.archive.org/details/horacegreeleytriOOfahr Horace Greeley and the Tribune in the Civil War HORACE GREELEY and the Tribune^ in the Civil War BY RALPH RAY FAHRNEY, Ph. D. ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, IOWA STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE % THE TORCH PRESS CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA 1936 Copyright 1936 by The Torch Press PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE TORCH PRESS, CEDAR RAPIDS, IOWA TO Leota FOREWORD Professor R. R. Fahrney has contributed useful information bearing on many points of our terrible Civil War which is now about to be understood by large numbers of people North, South and West. His theme is Horace Greeley and the famous New York Tribune, perhaps the most influential newspa- per of its time. It is very important these critical days of Ameri- can history to have new and unpartisan accounts of the activities of that great and unfortunate struggle for democracy. Few men, after Lincoln himself, were more active or influential than the clever if troubled editor of the Tribune. What he hoped for, fought for and was disappointed in will always in- terest people who really wish to understand our past. I am, therefore, glad Mr. Fahrney is publish- ing his careful study and I hope many readers may follow his pages which I have read with great interest. William E. Dodd Chicago, July 20, 1936 CONTENTS PAGE Foreword vii Introduction i CHAPTER I Seward, Weed, and Greeley .... 7 CHAPTER II Secession, Compromise, or War ... 38 CHAPTER III A Trial at Arms 75 CHAPTER IV Emancipation 109 CHAPTER V From Fredericksburg to Petersburg . . 132 CHAPTER VI The Niagara Peace Episode . . . . 155 CHAPTER VII The Final Struggle 173 Bibliography 211 Index 221 INTRODUCTION In order to appreciate the full significance of any study involving Horace Greeley and the New York Tribune during the Civil War, it is necessary to understand from the outset, the strategic position they occupied in shaping the trend of events during an extremely critical period in the life of the nation. All contemporaries, friends and foes alike, testify that the Tribune exerted the greatest influence upon public opinion of any journal in the country during the period under discussion. At the outbreak of the war, it boasted nearly three hundred thousand sub- scribers — a circulation considerably higher than that of any other paper — and it estimated that readers well in excess of a million habitually perused its columns. Subscription figures only partially indicate the ex- tent of Tribune influence in national affairs. A factor perhaps more important than number of readers concerns their distribution. Strangely enough, the Greeley organ was not primarily a New York paper. There were other dailies, better adapted to the com- mercial atmosphere of the city, that rivaled and even eclipsed its circulation within the metropolis. But through the Weekly and Semi-Weekly editions — condensed replicas of the Daily — the Tribune spoke to a vast rural aggregation distributed 2 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE throughout every state in the Union, preaching a doctrine and expounding a philosophy which its readers could readily understand and appreciate. Instead of being limited to preponderant influence within a particular locality, a widely distributed con- stituency scattered from Maine to California, fur- nished the basis of a power national in scope, and at times enabled the editor to mold public sentiment more effectively than even the President. Furthermore, in so far as Tribune adherents were unevenly distributed throughout the north, they were concentrated in those states occupying the most strategic position in national affairs during the Civil War era. With the exception of New York, more people imbibed Greeley doctrine in Pennsylvania than in any other state of the Union, and the Key- stone State was generally regarded as pivotal in con- nection with the more important political contests of the period. Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana ranked next on the Tribune roster, all more or less doubtful participants in the various controversies which arose in connection with the struggle for preservation of the Union. Any discussion of the famous New York journal would be manifestly incomplete and inadequate with- out paying considerable attention to the eccentric editor, for in all essential respects, Horace Greeley was the Tribune. To be sure, by 1850 the paper possessed a formidable editorial staff, but the press had not yet passed completely out of that stage in INTRODUCTION 3 which the policy of a journal was closely identified in the public mind with the outstanding personality guiding its fortunes. Unquestionably, with a few exceptions, Tribune policy was Greeley policy re- gardless of who wrote the editorials, and for that matter, it would have been difficult to convince the great mass of rural subscribers from western New York to Iowa that the old white-coated philosopher did not pen every line in their political bible. Herein lies the crux of Tribune power and influ- ence. Horace Greeley was more than the editor of a great newspaper. He had acquired an enviable repu- tation as an expounder of political views, and had actively sponsored organization of the Republican party on a national scale. His persistent advocacy of free land and free labor identified him with the idealistic phase of the Republican movement, soon to be compromised by practical considerations, but adhered to tenaciously by a considerable element in the great Northwest. In short, the Tribune made Greeley, and Greeley made the Tribune, and the Civil War provided the setting in which they exerted a tremendous influence on the destinies of the nation. It is the primary purpose of this study to acquire an estimate of Horace Greeley as a political force in the period under discussion, and to determine the effect of Tribune policy in molding public sentiment with regard to the crucial questions of the day. The first chapter traces the rise of the editor to a position of influence during several decades of political and 4 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE journalistic adventure preceding i860, relating him to the principal characters and events of that era, and providing a background for a more intensive study of subsequent developments. Tribune policy is then traced through all the major activities and con- troversies which led to a conflict between sections and, during the war, so disrupted unanimity of pur- pose at the North as to render the Union perilously near permanent and complete disintegration. Many have dipped into the Tribune here and there and have been invariably impressed with its vagaries and glaring inconsistencies. No doubt the criticism is partially justified and is not more than one could expect considering the strange quirks and impetuous perturbations of the editor's mind. And yet, thorough examination of the famous New York journal, carefully avoiding any breaks in various series of editorial pronouncements and relating them to contemporaneous events and influencing factors as well as to the inner workings of Greeley's mind as revealed by his private correspondence, discloses a fairly consistent policy cleverly bent and altered at intervals to meet unexpected developments and shift- ings in public sentiment. The fact that the Tribune not only assisted in molding public opinion but likewise reacted to that opinion, suggests that this study also serves to reveal successive alterations in northern sentiment during the war epoch. Joseph Chamberlain once asserted that the public press provided the most reliable INTRODUCTION 5 medium through which to gage the dictates of the popular will. It is a noteworthy fact that newspapers in a large measure print the material that their con- stituents are most anxious to digest, and people are inclined to read those journals which most nearly conform to the natural pattern of their thinking. While a certain earnestness and fearlessness on the part of Greeley often prevented him from playing the role of a model editor, for the most part he acceded to the outspoken demands of public opinion, and the Tribune to a large extent faithfully mirrors the alternating hope and despair that swept over a North distracted by the perplexities and disappoint- ments of a disheartening struggle. It has been considered advisable to devote some attention to newspapers other than the Tribune, in order to present a clearer view of various passing phases of public sentiment and properly orient Gree- ley and his paper among contemporary editors and journals that shared the confidence of the people. For that purpose, only a few of the more outstand- ing organs have been considered — principally those of New York — which represented different cross sections of public sentiment and were most closely related to the Tribune as friendly or unfriendly rivals in the field of war-time journalism. Chapter I SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY The rise of a new party upon the shoulders of the slavery issue presented new opportunities in the field of American politics during the tempestuous years following the Kansas episode. It attracted the am- bitious with axes to grind and political fortunes to reap, as well as enthusiastic idealists inspired by the visions and hopes of a new day. As convention time approached in i860, these exponents of a new regime were exuberant. The first encounter with Democracy on a national scale had ended dismally, but now, with the enemy camp divided, prospects were bright for landing the Republican standard-bearer in the White House. Such a situation fostered intense political activity and excitement, culminating in the stirring nominating convention at Chicago. Among various possibilities for the nomination, the stars seemed to point toward William H. Se- ward. He enjoyed an unrivaled reputation through- out the country as the exponent of the Republican creed with respect to slavery, and he had the backing of a political machine manned by the most skillful pilot in New York. On the other hand, there were certain factors which jeopardized his selection as 8 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE first choice of the Republican party, and in this category there stood out one important personality — the honest, impetuous, erratic Horace Greeley. How the eccentric editor of an American newspaper, somewhat deficient in political acumen and unsup- ported by influential political alliances, unhorsed the skillful Seward and left the cunning Thurlow Weed biting the dust, forms an interesting episode in the history of the political relations of three distin- guished characters in national affairs. By 1834, Horace Greeley had served the usual apprenticeship and was established in the printing business in New York City. Six years previous, Se- ward and Weed had formed a political alliance, and from then on they had waged an increasingly suc- cessful fight against a coterie of (Democratic) Re- publican politicians entrenched at Albany led by Martin Van Buren and known as the Regency. Even during the years of his apprenticeship, the political inclinations of Greeley had followed closely in the track marked out by the Anti-Regency leaders, and when the opponents of Democracy in New York City marshaled their forces for the local election of April, 1834, adopting the name "Whig," the young printer joined them. 1 The Whigs emerged from the cam- paign with fair success, but in state affairs, where Seward and Weed were the guiding spirits of the new party, they met overwhelming defeat despite the efforts of Greeley and the campaign paper of his 1 Francis N. Zabriskie, Life of Horace Greeley, 188-190. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 9 printing concern, the Constitution. 2 Discouraged and beaten, the New York Whigs generally, relapsed into a torpor of despair. 3 As the disastrous results of Jacksonian finance became evident in the fall of 1837, however, rapidly- ebbing Whig hopes were revived. Greeley entered actively into the local canvass of that year, but the major portion of his attention was devoted to the responsibilities and embarrassments of a journalistic venture, the New Yorker, dedicated primarily to the promulgation of social and economic reform. 4 When the November campaign disclosed the extent of Whig triumph, the paper threatened to go upon the rocks. With fifty-five hundred subscribers, and eight thousand dollars owing to it, the nerve-wracked edi- tor was ready to transfer the whole concern as a gift to anyone who would discharge debts amounting to four thousand dollars. 5 At this juncture there walked into the rude edi- torial attic of Greeley none other than the astute Weed. He introduced himself to the surprised jour- nalist, whom he had known previously only through the columns of the ill-fated New Yorker, and an amiable conversation concerning things political en- sued. 6 When Weed returned to Albany the next day, 2 Bibliography of Horace Greeley, etc., by Nathan Greeley, 11, Miscellaneous Greeley MS Collection. 3 Horace Greeley, Recollections'- of a Busy Life, 112. 4 Ibid., 124. 5 Letter to two friends, S. Mears and B. F. Ransom, January 14, 1838, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 6 Weed explained later that he was attracted to Greeley largely 10 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE it was understood that during the 1838 contest and for the consideration of one thousand dollars, Gree- ley would edit a campaign paper at Albany entitled The Jeffersonian, under the auspices of the Whig Central Committee. 7 The Jeffersonian proved immensely effective, and its articles were extensively copied by Whig journals throughout the state. 8 Seward turned the tables on William L. Marcy, his opponent in 1834, and rode into Albany on a comfortable ten thousand majority. Greeley suddenly emerged as a New York politician of some repute, and Weed, behind the scenes, con- fidently gathered the reins together in his hands. While only a temporary enterprise, The Jeffer- sonian proved to be the medium through which its editor entered as the junior partner into the re- vamped political firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. The new accession had justified the expectations of his more experienced colleagues, and, as he contrib- uted now and then an editorial to the Albany Even- ing Journal — the official journal of the Weed or- ganization — besides conducting the New Yorker and The Jeffersonian in a most commendable fashion, it became increasingly apparent that his editorial ability would prove a valuable adjunct in because a close perusal of the New Yorker marked out its editor as a strong tariff advocate, and in all probability "an equally strong Whig." Thurlow Weed, Autobiography (Harriet A. Weed, ed.), I, 466. 7 James Parton, The Life of Horace Greeley, 140. 8 Greeley, 127. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY II future contests. 9 The new political combination lasted throughout the entire lifetime of the Whig party, operating efficiently and effectively to the satisfaction of its friends and the despair of its enemies. For, with Greeley shaping public opinion, Seward garnering votes, and Weed faithfully tend- ing the political machinery, gratifying results were inevitable. Although Henry Clay of Kentucky commanded a plurality of votes when the Whig convention met at Harrisburg to choose a candidate for the campaign of 1840, Seward and Weed questioned his ability to carry the election and they threw their support to General Harrison of Ohio as the most available candidate. 10 Greeley, less concerned with expediency and strongly attached to one whom he not only ad- mired and trusted but "profoundly loved," X1 wav- ered momentarily, but finally he succumbed to the convincing arguments of Weed, 12 combining his efforts with those of the Albany boss to end the long struggle on the floor of the convention in favor of the hero of Tippecanoe. 13 Again, at the suggestion of Seward, Weed, and other prominent New York Whigs, Greeley edited a campaign paper entitled the Log Cabin, similar in 9 L. D. Ingersoll, The Life of Horace Greeley, 90, 91. 10 Greeley, 130. 11 Ibid., 166. 12 Thurlow Weed, "Recollections of Horace Greeley," The Ga- laxy, XV, 373. 13 Greeley, 131; Ingersoll, 92. 12 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE design to The Jeffersonian, but appealing outside the bounds of New York to every part of the country. 1 * When the hilarious enthusiasm of an unprecedented campaign subsided in favor of the peaceful demeanor of more tranquil days, General Harrison had been given over to a swarm of hungry office seekers, Se- ward had ridden back into office on the crest of Whig success, and Horace Greeley found himself for the first time financially solvent and one of the best known editors in the country. 15 Encouraged by success in the field of political journalism, Greeley resolved upon the establishment of the New York Tribune, a paper which would avoid either eulogizing or condemning solely on the basis of party loyalty and endeavor to remove itself "alike from servile partisanship on the one hand, and from gagged, mincing neutrality on the other." 16 The first issue appeared a few days after the death of President Harrison. 17 When Greeley gave Tyler up as a rogue late in 1841 18 and turned his attention to the next presidential campaign, the Tribune was already a highly influential journal with a circulation credited to the Daily of fifteen thousand, and with 14 Ingersoll, 94. 15 Ibid., 100. 16 Greeley, 137; Frederic Hudson, Journalism in the United States, 523. 17 The New Yorker and the Log Cabin were published alongside the Daily Tribune until the fall of 1841, at which time the Weekly Tribune took their place. William A. Linn, Horace Greeley, 59 ; Ingersoll, 124, 125. 18 Parton, 164. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 1 3 the Weekly running much higher. Consequently, it was able to speak effectively in behalf of Henry Clay for the Whig nomination once Greeley had con- cluded from first-hand observation in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania that party success in 1844 depended upon forcing the tariff issue to the foreground. 19 Seward and Weed concurred in the Clay movement, which stampeded the Whig conven- tion and honored the famous Kentuckian with an almost unanimous endorsement. 20 Greeley entered into the canvass of 1844 with a zest which outrivaled his efforts in behalf of Harri- son. Besides the regular editions of the Tribune, The Clay Tribune — a campaign paper modeled after the Log Cabin — gained a wide circulation. 21 The editor had always exercised moderation in opposing slavery, and in order to steer Clay clear of the ugly Texas question, he at first "deprecated, for reasons of policy, any Northern co-mingling of the questions of annexation and slavery" in the campaign. 22 But the burning question of slavery would not remain in abeyance, and Greeley soon joined the Seward-Weed faction in resisting the further extension of the slave domain. Unwilling to assume such an advanced posi- tion, Clay endeavored unsuccessfully to straddle the 19 Linn, 114. 20 According to Weed, he and Greeley were in constant commu- nication and "concurred heartily in the mode and manner of con- ducting the campaign." Weed, Autobiography, I, 467, 468. 21 Ingersoll, 162. 22 Linn, 145, 146. 14 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE issue, and the Democrats were returned to power. 23 With the annexation of Texas, the Tribune left no room to doubt that henceforth it would assail slavery and the slave power with the utmost vigor and determination. It denounced the Mexican War as "unjust and rapacious," and insisted that so sure as the universe had a ruler, every acre of territory acquired thereby would prove to the nation "a curse and the source of infinite calamities." 24 Despite the "paltering" attitude of Clay with ref- erence to Texas, Greeley turned once more to the ambitious Kentuckian in 1848, anxious to "try over again" the tariff issue. Surely, under ordinary cir- cumstances, no state, not even Pennsylvania, could "again be persuaded that any Democrat was as good a Protectionist as Henry Clay." 25 But Seward and Weed were of another mind. This time their choice fell upon General Zachary Taylor, and the resource- ful Weed proceeded to maneuver the Mexican hero into a position where he might be accepted by the Whig convention. For the first time, the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley, which had functioned for ten years without a hitch, was threatened with partial dissolu- tion. Greeley rejected Taylor on account of the very qualifications which rendered him available and recommended him so highly to Seward and Weed as one who might be properly fashioned once in the 23 Greeley, 165. 24 Ingersoll, 192. 25 Greeley, 211. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY I 5 White House. In short, the General had never voted; "his capacity for civil administration was wholly undemonstrated" ; he had been but slightly identified with the Whig party; and nobody knew his views with respect to the issues before the country. 26 When the Philadelphia convention nominated him, Greeley rushed from the hall in disgust. The Tribune "would take time for reflection." 27 Its editor sulked for three months, and finally capitulated reluctantly only six weeks before election day, agreeing to support the Whig nominee as the only means of avoiding an- other Democratic administration. 28 The same election returns which landed General Taylor in the White House, dispatched Horace Greeley, half-reluctantly, to the United States House of Representatives to serve out "the fag-end" of a term left vacant by the unseating of David S. Jack- son, Democrat, on the ground of fraud. The Speaker of the House assigned the irrepressible journalist to the Committee on Public Lands where he and his colleagues put their heel on some "barefaced rob- beries" originating in the Senate, but were complete- ly duped by others, virtually giving away a consid- erable quantity of the public domain unsuspectingly accepted as swamp lands, some of which, it later became apparent did not have "standing water enough on a square mile of their surface to float a duck in March." 29 On the floor of the House, Gree- 26 Ibid., 211. 27 Linn, 149. 28 Parton, 252. 29 Greeley, 230, 231. I 6 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE ley's persistent efforts for mileage reform elicited feeble response. Seward concluded that he was "try- ing to reform Congress all at once," and he confided to Weed that their obstreperous protege was "doing himself most ungracious service." 30 Doubtless his up-state associates felt relieved when the over-zeal- ous editor returned to the Tribune office. As the struggle over slavery in the Mexican Ces- sion waxed warm, the Tribune would listen to no proposals for compromise in the matter of extending slavery to the territories. 31 It preferred to see "the Union a thousand times shivered," rather than con- sent to assist those who would "plant Slavery on Free Soil." 32 Thus far, the North had "lost by com- promises and gained by struggles" ; now was the time to struggle. 33 Seward doubtless experienced a thrill of inward exultation as he perceived the powerful journal, accepted by tens of thousands of farmers throughout the Adirondacks and the Northwest as their political bible, preaching a doctrine which har- monized so perfectly with his efforts to undo Clay and his compromise through the instrumentality of the pliable occupant of the White House. But the Tribune failed to adhere consistently to the course marked out in the early months of 1850. By June, it would accept the Clay proposals as the 30 .Letter of Seward to Weed, December 7, 1848, Seward at Washington, 1846-1S61 (F. W. Seward, ed.), 92. 31 Weekly Tribune, January 26, 1850. 32 Ibid., February 23, 1850. 33 Ibid., February 9, 1850. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY I 7 only means of satisfying Texas and relinquishing New Mexico from its grip. 34 Back to the original position a month later, it contemplated the time when "the whole fabric of the Compromise at once vanishes into thin air not again to be heard from." 35 It was indeed a difficult and bewildering problem to conserve the largest possible area to freedom with- out paying the price of distasteful and humiliating concessions to the slave power. 36 Another presidential campaign found Weed in Europe, and upon Seward fell the chief responsibil- ity of pre-convention days. The latter, relying upon the efficacy of former tactics, turned again to a military hero. General Winfield Scott was available, and would doubtless submit to manipulation. 37 The Tribune favored Scott as against Fillmore, refused to accept the finality of the Compromise, and heart- ily supported the unsuccessful effort, in which Seward concurred, to prevent Whig endorsement of the obnoxious settlement. 38 During the subsequent cam- paign, the Tribune supported the Whig candidates but spat upon the platform, invoking repeated ana- themas upon the fugitive slave law and refusing u to keep silence about slavery" for "any five thousand Whig votes." 39 The defeat of Scott sounded the death-knell of 34 Ibid., June 22, 1850. 35 Ibid., July 13, 1850. 36 See Greeley, 256. 37 Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, I, 300 ff. 38 Daily Tribune, May 21, June 4, 12, 22, 1852. 39 Linn, 163. I 8 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE the party. The attitude of the Tribune and many northern free soilers in failing to subscribe to the Baltimore platform offended southern co-laborers. Robert Toombs wrote to Crittenden of Kentucky: "We can never have peace and security with Seward, Greeley and Co. in the ascendant in our national counsels, and we had better purchase them by the destruction of the Whig party than of the Union." 40 The Tribune accepted the decree of Toombs com- placently, spoke of "the late Whig party," and an- nounced an independence of all party organizations in the future while adhering faithfully to the politi- cal tenets for which it had formerly battled under the Whig banner. 41 When Douglas and his Kansas-Nebraska bill re- opened the issue concerning slavery in the territories, the Tribune entered vigorously into the fray. 42 It cursed Douglas as an untrustworthy, contemptible bidder for the Presidency, and received subscriptions for Kansas relief. The twenty-two thousand dollars which poured into the Tribune coffers, mostly com- posed of one-dollar offerings, was converted into "Beecher Bibles" and arrived in Kansas via shoe- boxes, to be used effectively in the hands of free- dom's front line defenders in avenging the ashes of 40 Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb (Ulrich B. Phillips, ed.), A. H. A. Report, 191 1, 11, 322. 41 Parton, 343. 42 Daily Tribune, July 18, 1854; Henry Wilson, History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America, II, 407, 408. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 1 9 Lawrence and the blood of fallen martyrs to the cause. 43 Meanwhile, there were ominous signs of dis- satisfaction in the political firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. No doubt the senior partners partially distrusted one who had manifested an increasingly recalcitrant attitude ever since the disagreement over Taylor in 1848. Also, there was a feeling on the part of Greeley that someone else was displacing him in the high estimation of his up-state allies. Early in 1853, ne complained that another paper had been able to copy Seward speeches ahead of the Tribune. The protest drew a rebuke from the New York Senator, to which Greeley complained: "I don't want to outline your Speeches before you make them . . . (but) Simonson's telegraphic outline is copied in the Albany Journal and other papers ahead of your speech, giving the impression that The Times is your special organ and its filibustering edi- torials and general negation of principle especially agreeable to you." 44 Greeley saw the drift. The New York Times was the audacious offender, and its editor was none other than the young, aspiring Henry J. Raymond, a form- er assistant on the Tribune editorial staff who had severed the none too genial relation with his chief 43 Don C. Seitz, Life of Horace Greeley, 149 ; W. H. Isely, "The Sharps Rifle Episode in Kansas History," American Historical Review, XII, 560, 561. 44 Letter to Seward, February 6, 1853, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 20 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE in 1843. 45 With the founding of the Times in 185 1, Raymond commenced editing a journal decidedly political in scope and in some respects better adapted to the requirements of Seward and Weed than the Tribune. 46 Added to the mortification of being supplanted by a younger rival, Greeley nursed the grievance that he had not been accorded all the recognition his ser- vices merited. He had hinted to Weed on different occasions that he might be useful in some official position. 47 And in the summer of 1854, after having received frequent mention as a possibility in the gubernatorial race, 48 he approached the Albany boss with the suggestion that the time and circumstances were favorable to his nomination. Weed conceded that his aspiring ally could be elected if put forth as a candidate, but professed to have lost control of the state nominating convention. The temperance issue would enter strongly into the campaign, the New York journalist was apprised, and, while the Tribune had educated the people to the point of ac- cepting a prohibition candidate, another aspirant, Myron H. Clark, had stolen the editor's thunder. With the backing of numerous Know Nothing lodges secretly organized throughout the state, Clark would secure the nomination. 45 Augustus Maverick, Henry J. Raymond and the New York Press, 35. 46 Bancroft, I, 367, 368. 47 Memoir of Thurlow Weed (Thurlow Weed Barnes, ed.), II, 286 ; Linn, 171, 172. 48 Parton, 353. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 21 According to Weed, Greeley cheerfully surrend- ered and repaired to his editorial den, but in a few days returned and abruptly inquired if there was any objection to his running as Lieutenant-Governor. Not fully appreciating the disgruntled state of his mind, Weed discouraged the proposal, apparently satisfying him of the inadvisability of prohibition "at both ends of the ticket." 4p When the state con- vention ended its deliberations, however, to the sur- prise and chagrin of Greeley the name of Henry J. Raymond appeared on the ticket as Clark's running mate. Convinced that Weed had double crossed him, the editor of the Tribune was in an ugly mood. 50 Meanwhile, the Republican movement, originat- ing in the Northwest and gathering into its folds the opponents of Douglas and the Kansas outrage, swept eastward. Alvan E. Bovay, the guiding spirit at Ripon, Wisconsin, after considerable nagging, at last persuaded his friend Greeley, to display the Republican flag in the Tribune columns. 51 Two months later the latter actively participated in an Anti-Nebraska convention at Saratoga, serving on the Business Committee, which reported resolutions heartily approving the western movement and ex- pressing a determination to abandon every party which failed to oppose the extension of slavery in the territories. 52 49 Memoir of Thurloiv fVeed, II, 225, 226. 50 Ibid., II, 227. 51 On June 24, 1854; Seitz, 157. 52 Daily Tribune, August 17, 18, 1854. 22 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE Without taking action on the resolutions, the convention adjourned to meet at Auburn September 26, where an attempt to found a new party proved abortive, since the regular Whig convention had nominated a ticket in decided opposition to the Nebraska policy and adopted a platform in sub- stantial agreement with Anti-Nebraska views. 53 The delegates at Auburn adopted the Whig ticket, and Republicanism in New York had to await a more convenient season. Had Greeley succeeded in his designs at Saratoga and Auburn, the Whig party would have been dis- rupted, and a new alignment would have offered the possibility of securing less obnoxious candidates. As it was, the Tribune felt compelled to render grudg- ing support to the nominees, now and then inter- jecting a poorly disguised thrust at Raymond by suggesting that perhaps his record on prohibition was not quite as disreputable as former Times edi- torials indicated. 54 Apologizing thus to the prohibi- tion element for a candidate with an admittedly shaky past, and lamenting the failure to unite with anti-slavery Democrats, the independently inclined journal cast party loyalty aside and called upon all true lovers of freedom to embrace the movement which it earnestly trusted would soon triumphantly sweep the entire North under the Republican ban- 53 Wilson, II, 413, 414. 54 Daily Tribune, September 21, 27, 1854. 55 Ibid., October 3, 1854. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 23 But the editorial column of the Tribune did not reveal the storm that had been brewing for months in the mind of Greeley. As the campaign drew to a close, he informed Seward that he had held in as long as possible and after the election they must talk over the situation. If Seward had "any plans for the future," he wanted to know them, and if not, it was time to form some of his own. 56 Shortly after the election, the New York Senator was greeted with a long letter from his disgruntled associate filled with bitter complaints at having failed to receive justly earned recognition from the hands of ungrateful partners, and formally dissolving the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. 57 The recipient of the letter informed Weed in a general way of "a long letter . . . full of sharp, pricking thorns," otherwise failing to reveal its full significance, and he enquired concerning a vacancy in the Board of Regents. 58 No doubt Seward offered the long deferred recognition, but by now poor Greeley had sunk to the depths of despair. He re- plied: "My political life is ended. Do not regard 56 Letter to Seward, October 25, 1854, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 57 The entire letter dissolving the partnership, dated November 11, 1854, may be found in Greeley, 315 ff. 58 Seward at Washington, 1846-1861, 239. Weed professed to have known nothing of Greeley's letter to Seward until after the Chi- cago convention of i860, but, in view of the intimate relation which existed between Seward and Weed, it is hardly possible that the latter had not been informed of the main purport of the missive which threatened to affect in no small measure the future political activity of all concerned. See Memoir of Thurloiv Weed, II, 272. 24 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE me as dissatisfied with what has been. There was a time when it would have been precious to me to have had some public recognition. . ." Now, he would sell out his interest in the Tribune and "glide out of the arena as quietly and as speedily as may be," trusting the party would be benefited thereby. Bitterly he averred that "with Myron H. Clark, the bogus Know-Nothing for Governor and H. J. Ray- mond for Lieut," the Times would be "the proper state organ" in New York City. As for himself, he only wanted public recognition that he had been "es- teemed a faithful and useful coadjutor." 59 But Greeley did not sell the Tribune, and he did not "glide out of the arena." Instead, the winter of 1855-56 found him busily engaged at Washington keeping an eye on "those who hate the Tribune much, (but) fear it yet more," while the battle raged over the Speakership. 60 He constantly advised with members of the House, while the Tribune, under the immediate supervision of Charles A. Dana, the man- aging editor, thundered as never before. Greeley stuck to Nathaniel Banks through thick and thin, hoping that his election would pave the way for a successful national organization of the Republican party and the rapid extinction of Know-Nothing- ism. 61 Meanwhile, New York politics had experienced a 59 Letter to Seward, November 24, 1854, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 60 Letter from Greeley to Charles A. Dana, December 1, 1855, Greeley MSS. 61 Ingersoll, 300, 301. 25 partial metamorphosis. The Times was now voicing the aspirations of the new firm of Seward, Weed, and Raymond. In the fall of 1855, tne Whigs of New York fused with the Republicans and looked forward expectantly to the first national nominating convention of a new party. Seward, Salmon P. Chase of Ohio, and Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, loomed as the most promising presidential timber. Greeley was as pessimistic as Weed about electing any candidate with decided Republican propensities. In January, 1856, he confided to his friend Beman Brockway that he did not believe there were "repub- lican votes today wherewith to elect anybody." 62 By the end of April, the Tribune had not yet named a first choice for the nomination, but it insisted upon one u around whom Whigs, Democrats, Abolitionists . . . may rally without embarrassment or mutual repugnance." 63 On the eve of the convention, it drew a question mark after the names of Seward, Chase, and Sumner, citing Colonel Fremont as its ruling favorite. Conforming to Tribune policy, the convention passed over all the greater lights of Republican fame and rendered a verdict for Fremont, whose previous exploits engendered few antagonisms and inspired tremendous enthusiasm in the new crusade for free- dom. Greeley was pleased and felt no inclination now to "glide out of the arena." 64 62 Letter to Beman Brockway, January 8, 1856, Greeley MSS. 63 Daily Tribune, April 29, 1856. 64 For Greeley's activities at the convention, see George W. 26 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE The year 1858 opened upon a confused political situation portending important party re-alignments. By repudiating the Lecompton Constitution, Doug- las had not only driven a wedge into the ranks of his own party, but he had provided the basis for dissen- sion between western and eastern opponents. In Illi- nois, Republican leaders immediately directed their energy towards widening the breach in the local Democracy by encouraging a faction of Administra- tion Lecomptonites, 65 and ere long they were mar- shaling their forces behind Abraham Lincoln in hopeful anticipation of success in a Senatorial tussle with the "Little Giant." In the East, such outstand- ing Republican leaders as Seward, Henry Wilson, Anson Burlingame, and Nathaniel Banks were in- clined to forget the past and accept Douglas as their own. 66 The "Little Giant" gave out the impression that he could no longer operate with his party, and having "taken a through ticket, and checked his bag- gage," was in the fight to stay. 67 Disgruntled Le- comptonites scowled and muttered foul execrations as- Seward and Douglas bowed to each other in the Senate Chamber, seated themselves complacently, Julian, "The First Republican National Convention," American Historical Review, IV, 316. 65 W. H. Herndon to Lyman Trumbull, February 19, 1858, Ly- man Trumbull Papers. 66 John T. Morse, Jr., Abraham Lincoln, I, 116, 117. Henry Wil- son was certain that Douglas was with the Republicans as shown by a letter to Theodore Parker, February 28, 1858. See J. F. Newton, Lincoln and Herndon, 148. 67 Newton, 147. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 27 and conversed amiably concerning the architectural beauties of the new hall. 68 Greeley likewise turned to the exponent of popu- lar sovereignty in a spirit of engaging friendliness. Now and then he paid a visit to the Douglas resi- dence in Minnesota block, and an inside rumor had it that the Tribune favored the Illinois Senator for the Presidency. 69 In fact, one report generally ac- cepted at Lincoln headquarters during the latter part of the Illinois Senatorial contest, had it that Greeley, Seward, and Weed met Douglas in Chicago during October, 1857, an d agreed upon plans for i860. 70 The Illinois Republicans observed the trend of events with alarm as the contagion of amalgamation spread to the Northwest and threatened to undo their champion, the Illinois rail splitter. 71 W. H. Herndon, Lincoln's law partner, hurried east to con- fer with Greeley, and to look Douglas "in the eye." But the trip accomplished little, for the Tribune lauded Douglas throughout the early part of the Senatorial campaign, and in general, threw cold 68 H. B. Stanton, Random Recollections, 64. 69 Newton, 147. 70 According to the agreement as related by W. H. Herndon to Theodore Parker in a letter of September 20, 1858, Douglas was to have the support of Seward, Weed, and Greeley in the Senatorial campaign, in return for which the Illinoisan would support Seward for the Presidency in i860, and forego his own presidential aspira- tions until a later date. See Newton, 217. 71 Amos Babcock to Trumbull, May 26, 1858, Lyman Trumbull Papers ; James S. Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, 403 ; see also letter of Lincoln to Henry Wilson, June 1, 1858, J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, II, 140, 141. 2 8 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE water on the Republican cause. 72 The Chicago Tri- bune launched a counter attack upon the schismatic eastern journal, 73 and the Chicago Daily Journal, thoroughly aroused, warned "No Interference!" It wanted "no dictation from any source whatever," and furthermore, "would not suffer it"; the Illinois Republicans would tend to their own business in their own way. To this, the Tribune replied lamely, that of course the western brethren had a "right to desig- nate their own candidates," but the Republicans of other states reserved the equal right to express approbation of one "who separates himself from a triumphant majority to fight on the side of a minor- ity." 74 Such an attitude on the part of the Tribune and other eastern Republican journals with large circula- tions in the Northwest, compelled the Lincolnites to struggle through a desperate uphill fight. In mid- summer, Lyman Trumbull was urged to return to Illinois at once by way of the Empire State, where, if possible, he was to straighten out the New York papers. 75 Greeley finally promised "to do all I rea- sonably can to elect Lincoln," from which Herndon concluded "that Horace is with us and soon will be heart and hand" 76 but the Tribune continued to dis- 72 Newton, 151, 152, 240; see also Weekly Tribune, July 3, 1858. 73 See letter, Greeley to Joseph Medill, July 24, 1858, Nicolay and Hay, II, 140, 141. 74 Weekly Tribune, May 15, 1858. 75 N. B. Judd to Trumbull, Lyman Trumbull Papers, July n, 1858. 76 W. H. Herndon to Trumbull, July 22, 1858, Lyman Trumbull Papers. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 29 course in much the same compromising tone until election day. By September, the Lincoln managers viewed the prospects despairingly, attributing their "downward slide" to Greeley's "cowardly editor- ials," 77 and election day justified their pessimism. In the words of Herndon, "so wags this great polit- ical world." As the convention of i860 approached, Seward enjoyed an enviable reputation in Republican circles, and with the backing of the powerful Weed machine in New York, his chances for the nomination ap- peared excellent. Nevertheless, he had to reckon with the aspirations of Simon Cameron, the popularity of Chase, the conservative appeal of Edward Bates, the availability of Judge McLean of Ohio, and the rising tide of public approval throughout the North- west in favor of Abraham Lincoln. Doubtless Seward had reason to expect that his vast popularity would carry him safely past all op- ponents on the first ballot. But the "higher law" doctrine and other radical utterances, which had contributed greatly to his prominence, were unac- ceptable to a large conservative element within the party. And doubtful states such as Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, and Illinois, in which victory at the polls depended upon the fusion of more or less discordant elements in support of a candidate quali- fying on the basis of availability, hesitated to accept 77 W. H. Herndon to Theodore Parker, September 25, 1858, New- ton, 219. 30 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE one who represented the most advanced position of anti-slavery Republicanism. 78 Furthermore, Seward's connection with Weed had its weaknesses as well as its advantages, identifying him as it did with an offensive lobby combination in New York. 79 H. B. Stanton, a Seward delegate, ad- mitted that New York Republicanism had been made "a reproach, a byword, by the rascally conduct of our state legislature, under the lead of Weed," and even Chase confessed: "if Albany is to be trans- ferred to Washington, the party cannot succeed." 80 And then there was Greeley. From the very incep- tion of the Republican party, he had been convinced that success in a national contest depended in no small measure upon a candidate orthodox on the slavery issue, but otherwise of conservative antece- dents and tendencies. In the spring of 1856, he de- clared: "The Republican movement is defensive, not aggressive, conservative of Freedom, rather than destructive of Slavery. . . This country ought to be and yet will be cleared of Slavery, but the first prac- ticable step is to stop the progress and extension of the evil. In this step all true conservatives . . . ought to unite." He appealed for a platform "so broad and liberal that all who stand for Public Faith may come to the aid of those whose animating purpose T8 See A. K. McClure, Our Presidents and Hoiv We Make Them, x 56, 157; also A. K. McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times, Fourth edition, 33 ; Ida M. Tarbell, The Life of Abraham Lincoln, II, 141. 79 Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, 27. 80 Albert B. Hart, Salmon Portland Chase, 184, 185. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 3 1 is the extension of Freedom." "And let us," he cau- tioned, "by proving our capacity to win one victory, open the way for winning many more." 81 In April, 1859, Greeley still lacked faith that the anti-slavery men of the country had "either the numbers or the sagacity required to make a Presi- dent." If Seward or Chase should be nominated on the platform of 1856, he would "go to work for him with a will," but with perfect certainty of being "horribly beaten." 82 About the same time, he con- fided to a friend: "An Anti-Slavery man per se can- not be elected; but a tariff, River and Harbor, Paci- fic Railroad, Free Homestead man may succeed. . . I wish the country were more anti-slavery than it is; as it is, I hope to have as good a candidate as the majority will elect." 83 And finally, there was the letter "full of sharp and pricking thorns" dissolving the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. Strangely enough the caustic missive had for six long years quietly reposed in the possession of its recipient. Had Seward and Weed forgotten it? Such a version fails to do justice to their political acumen and foresight. There is every reason to believe that they had purposely resolved to keep the whole matter in the dark. Neither Se- 81 Letter to William M. Chase, Samuel W. Peckham and Win- gate Hayes, May 9, 1856, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. The italics are Greeley's. 82 Letter to G. E. Baker, April 28, 1859, Memoir of Thurlow Weed, II, 255. 83 Letter to Mrs. R. M. Whipple (not dated), Greeley MSS. Italics are Greeley's. 32 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE ward nor his New York associates could afford to have the powerful Tribune on their back, and an open break rendered such a result inevitable. Golden silence promised better than reproachful words, and in time the impetuous Greeley might forget and for- give. The future seemed to justify the procedure. The Tribune failed to render any real support to Seward in 1856, but it evidenced a friendly disposition and appealed for Fremont entirely on the ground of availability. The strange hobnobbing with Douglas two years later may have been designed to ruin Seward prospects for i860, but after all, even the Weed faction acquiesced in that movement. As the campaign of i860 approached, Weed called more frequently at the Tribune office. Seward now and then received an invitation to visit the little farm at Chappaqua where Greeley spent odd hours in agricultural experiments. The Greeley family paid more than one friendly visit to the Weed home in Albany. 84 And ere long Weed reported the Tribune mentor "right at last, politically." 85 But the Albany boss miscalculated. It is doubtful if Horace Greeley had forgotten or forgiven, and certainly he was not "right at last politically." He reciprocated the friendly solicitations of Seward and Weed with an outward show of enthusiasm, but kept his own counsel. As a matter of fact, ever since he 84 Memoir of Thurloiv Weed, II, 268. 85 Seii-ard at Washington, 1846-1861, 360; letter of Seward home during April, 1859, dispatched from New York City. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 33 turned upon Douglas early in 1859 and pronounced him "a low and dangerous demagogue," 86 Edward Bates had occupied a prominent place in his think- ing. A slaveholder of Whig antecedents and conser- vative inclinations who looked upon slavery as "an evil to be restricted" rather than "a good to be diffused," the Missouri judge seemed to fulfill all the requirements of a candidate not likely "to load the team heavier" than it would "pull through." 87 In February, i860, the Tribune began to discuss presidential timber. Studiously avoiding any indica- tion of personal repugnance toward Seward, and pro- fessing no desire to influence the convention on the question of his availability, it adroitly suggested that in case the Republican party possessed insufficient strength to elect whomsoever it willed, the logical man of the hour was Bates. 88 Subsequent editorials during March and April continued in the same strain, endorsing Seward's anti-slavery position, but urging first consideration for such doubtful states as Penn- sylvania and Indiana, in selecting a candidate. 89 Weed must have read the handwriting on the wall. Greeley had been identified in the public mind as a Seward supporter for over twenty years, and to all appearances he spoke dispassionately with the 86 Letter to F. Newhall, January 8, 1859, Greeley Letters, Li- brary of Congress Transcripts. 87 December 4, 1858, in answer to an enquiry, Greeley expressed preference for Bates; William H. Herndon and Jesse W. Weik, Herndon's Lincoln, II, 413; Greeley, 389. 88 Daily Tribune, February 20, i860. 89 Ibid., March 24, i860. 34 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE larger interests of the party at heart. If he went to Chicago and preached such a doctrine, the damage might be irreparable. Intentionally or otherwise, the versatile editor had maneuvered himself into a posi- tion from which he might undo the plans of the Albany "Dictator" and crush his ambitious protege. And upon just such a course he had resolved. Convention day approached and a vast concourse of Republican zealots flocked to Chicago amid boundless enthusiasm. The New Yorkers made up an extremely large aggregation, including a rough element from New York City presumably imported by Weed to overcome the numerical advantage of the Illinoisans. They crowded into the Richmond House, champagne and whiskey flowing freely and adding zest to the fervor and excitement of an affair which assumed all the aspects of a gigantic celebra- tion. 90 A thousand people packed the Tremont House, the headquarters of Seward opposition, Greeley scintillating among the number as a substitute dele- gate from Oregon. 91 Some merely stood and stared at the New York sage as he shuffled about in the proverbial long, white coat; others pressed close, hopeful of catching some of the words of wisdom which were supposed to fall from his lips. 92 90 Don Piatt, Memories of Men Who Saved the Union, 154; Reminiscences of Carl Schurz, II, 184. 91 On this substitution, see Parton, 442 ; Robert H. Browne, Abraham Lincoln and the Men of His Time, II, 399. 92 Murat Halstead, A History of the National Political Conven- tions of 1860, 121. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 35 The convention opened May 16, and the fight was on between the "irrepressibles" backing the candi- dacy of Seward, and the "conservatives" hopeful of uniting on Bates, Cameron, Lincoln, or McLean. The "irrepressibles" scored first in connection with the platform, 93 as well as in defeating an effort to require a majority of all electoral votes for nomina- tion. 94 Flushed with victory, and cognizant of the inability of their opponents to cooperate, they urged the immediate selection of candidates, and only the lack of tally sheets prevented a procedure likely to have chosen the New York favorite on the first ballot. As the convention adjourned at the end of the second day, Greeley was "terrified" and he tele- graphed the Tribune that Seward would be nom- inated. 95 But, although "conservative" stock had fallen to a low ebb, all was not lost. The influence of Greeley had done a great deal to pave the way for an anti- Seward combine. He had spoken with most telling effect among those naturally inclined toward the New York candidate, who were impressed by the willingness of a supposed friend and admirer to sacrifice personal attachments in the interest of Re- publican success. 96 He had visited caucus after caucus insisting that to nominate Seward spelled party de- 93 Proceedings of the First Three Republican Conventions, 135- 142. 94 Ibid., 129. 95 Ibid., 143; Halstead, 130, 140; Daily Tribune, May 18, i860. 96 Memoir of Thurloiv Weed, II, 274. $6 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE feat, now and then bringing forward Lane of Indi- ana, Curtin of Pennsylvania, or Kirkwood of Iowa to substantiate the contention. 97 And there was much activity that night at the Tremont House. The effort to form a successful coalition upon some one acceptable to the pivotal states of Pennsylvania and Indiana succeeded. After hesitating between Lincoln and Bates for a time, Indiana's delegation finally went over to the Illi- noisan, 98 and the promise of a cabinet position for Cameron virtually swung the Keystone State into the Lincoln column. 99 Although the Tribune had endorsed Lincoln as "a man of the People, a champion of Free Labor," 100 and had spoken enthusiastically of the Cooper In- stitute Speech, Greeley distrusted his lack of expe- rience in national affairs, and in all the early maneuvers he clung to Bates tenaciously "as a safer man." 101 Either ignorant of the new trend of affairs on the eventful night of May 17, or lacking confi- dence in its final fruition, he still anticipated no con- centration of the anti-Seward forces the next day. But, although his part in the Lincoln movement had been largely negative in character, "old Greeley" had performed effectively, and John Defrees later 97 Addison G. Proctor, Lincoln and the Convention of i860, 9. 98 James F. Rhodes, History of the United States, II, 471. 99 Ibid., II, 467; Daily Tribune, May 17, i860. 100 Daily Tribune, February 25, i860. 101 Proctor, 10. SEWARD, WEED, AND GREELEY 37 assigned him the credit for having "slaughtered Seward and saved the party." 102 When the Convention finished balloting the next morning, Abraham Lincoln had been selected the Re- publican standard-bearer. Thurlow Weed said some bad words and returned to more friendly soil. Ho- race Greeley inwardly exulted, and remarked lacon- ically: "The past is dead." 102 Rhodes, II, 471. Chapter II SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR With the nomination of a "Black" Republican at Chicago on a platform distinctly opposed to the extension of slavery in the National domain, threats of disunion immediately issued from the South. Many sincerely believed that the election of Lincoln would inevitably split the Union asunder, and North- ern Democrats utilized the situation to enlist the cooperation of some wavering Republican adherents. On the other hand, such threats had been voiced repeatedly during the preceding decade, and for the most part, supporters of the Lincoln ticket were inclined to treat them as little more than the usual bold gasconade. The right of secession had not been a doctrine peculiar to the South. Ever since the formation of the Constitution, more or less doubt pervaded the minds of prominent leaders as to whether or not the Union should or would remain intact in case of seri- ous conflict between national and sectional interests. As early as the winter of 1803-4, plans were on foot for a separate northern confederacy, emanating from important political circles in Massachusetts as a result of the Louisiana Cession. 1 A few years later 1 Correspondence Between John Qulncy Adams and Several Citi- zens of Massachusetts, Second edition, 18. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 39 a movement gained headway for a convention of delegates from the New England states to consider a similar project. 2 In 181 1, Josiah Quincy, a distinguished member of the House of Representatives, declared it the duty of the states to prepare for a separation in case Louisiana was admitted to the Union — "amicably if they can, violently if they must." 3 At the time of the Missouri Compromise, even John Quincy Adams was thinking in terms of a "new union of thirteen or fourteen states unpolluted with slavery," and he wrote in his diary: "If the Union must be dissolved, slavery is precisely the question upon which it ought to break." 4 And in 1843, tne same Adams collab- orated with Joshua R. Giddings and several others in warning the country that the annexation of Texas "would be identical with dissolution" of the Union. 5 During the two decades preceding the Civil War, the number of secession threats increased somewhat in proportion to the growing bitterness of sectional controversy. An extreme abolitionist group, led by William Lloyd Garrison and his Liberator, placed the cause of freedom above the love of Union. 6 In 1856, New Hampshire opened the hall of the House of Representatives to an abolition convention and listened without protest to addresses by Garrison 2 ibid., 24. 3 Edmund Quincy, Life of Josiah Quincy, 206. 4 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Charles F. Adams, ed.), IV, 531 ; V, 12. 5 Niles National Register, May 13, 1843. 6 Liberator, 24:106. 40 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE and his rabid counterpart, Wendell Phillips. A union with slaveholders became increasingly detestable to those outraged by the pro-slavery advance in Kansas, and the extent to which secession sentiment was fostered in the North is evidenced by the willingness of such a prominent character as Nathaniel Banks, shortly before he was elected Speaker of the House, to "let the Union slide" whenever the South gained control of the National administration. 7 Finally, in 1857, at the call of ninety citizens of Worcester, Massachusetts, a convention gathered "to consider the practicability and expediency of a separation between Free and Slave States," and it pronounced the existing Union a failure. 8 A subse- quent call was issued for a similar convention to meet in Cleveland, bearing some seven thousand signatures representative of seventeen different states but chiefly emanating from New York and Massachusetts. 9 The disunion movement in the South proved to be no idle boast. South Carolina seceded in December, i860, and six other members of the Union soon pledged their allegiance to the "Confederate States of America." Surprise, confusion, and doubt reigned in the loyal states, augmented by the distraction of conflicting views. Men hardly knew their own minds as they faced the alarming contingency of seven 7 Wendell P. and Francis J. Garrison, William Lloyd Garrison, The Story of His Life Told by His Children, III, 415. 8 Liberator, 27:2; Proceedings of the State Disunion Convention of 1857 (Reported by J. M. W. Yerrinton), 11. 9 Liberator, 27: 158. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 4 1 rebellious states in arms. Neither resolved upon coercion, nor reconciled to peaceable secession, the North succumbed to a period of irresolution border- ing on despair. 10 In the midst of such vacillation, however, the sen- timent generally prevailed that some form of peace- ful reconciliation should be utilized to quiet southern disaffection. On every side the general impulse pre- dominated to do nothing and say nothing in any manner likely to fan the flame of disunion. 11 Business interests of the East, represented by such prominent financiers as August Belmont, Hamilton Fish, and Moses H. Grinnell, were thoroughly alarmed by the anticipated loss of an extremely profitable Southern market. Abolitionism, now held in a large measure responsible for the calamity which threatened the nation, experienced a decidedly reactionary opposi- tion, and Wendell Phillips once more suffered rough treatment at the hands of an irate mob while at- tempting an anti-slavery discourse in Boston. 12 Breckinridge and Bell supporters quite generally turned toward compromise and conciliation in an effort to calm the South and save the Union. Even Republicans, staggered by a full realization of south- ern determination, wondered why they had voted the Lincoln ticket. It was soon evident that all Northerners, irrespec- 10 G. S. Merriam, The Life and Times of Samuel Bowles, I, 274. 11 Addison G. Proctor, Lincoln and the Convention of i860, 18, 19- 12 Ibid., 19, 20. 42 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE tive of party or opinion, faced the three alternatives of peaceable secession, compromise, or war as solu- tions of the ugly situation, and during the remaining months of i860 a very strong disposition was mani- fest to accept the first alternative and let the erring ones depart in peace. Of course, the Garrisonians welcomed southern disaffection as a simple and effi- cient means of ridding the Union and the Constitu- tion of an obnoxious institution. 13 The Liberator said complacently: "If the South . . . decides to try the experiment of an independent existence, let it go with our good will." 14 The expression of such sentiment was by no means confined to abolitionist organs, however. The New York Sun, now under the control of several young religious enthusiasts and read by a constitu- ency largely Democratic, bluntly advocated a consti- tutional amendment legalizing secession, as a diplo- matic means of removing henceforth, the desire for disunion. 15 The New York Journal of Commerce^ with the veteran Gerard Hallock still at the helm, would willingly acquiesce in disunion as the first step in the reconstruction of a government which "must be reviewed and revised to adapt it to the times and the altered condition of our population." 16 The New 13 Elbert J. Benton, The Movement for Peace Without Victory During the Civil War, (Western Historical Society Publication, No. 99), 3. 14 Liberator, 31:4. 15 New York Sun, December 8, i860, quoted in Frank M. O'Brien, The Story of the Sun, New edition, 129. 16 New York Journal of Commerce, January 12, 1861, quoted in William H. Hallock, Life of Gerard Hallock, 98. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 43 York Herald, boasting a larger circulation than any newspaper in the metropolis, upheld secession as the right of revolution wisely utilized by the Fathers against the tyranny of England and handed down to later generations as a legitimate instrument for the expression of public opinion. 17 Even in Republican circles, a considerable element preferred peaceable disunion to either compromise or civil war. 18 The Springfield Republican minimized the importance of continuing the Union, while the New York Times, the New York Courier and En- quirer, and Albany Evening Journal, all substantial representatives of the free soil and Republican press, more or less openly counseled reconciliation to the recent estrangement. 19 But the most influential exponent of southern alienation was Horace Greeley. The Tribune ad- mitted shortly after the election, that although the right of secession "may be a revolutionary one ... it exists nevertheless." A state had no right to remain in the Union and defy the laws, but to withdraw was "quite another matter." 20 It maintained that the Union should be preserved only so long as it was "beneficial and satisfactory to all parties concerned," and should not be held together by force whenever it had "ceased to cohere by the mutual attraction of 17 New York Herald, November 9, i860. 18 A. K. McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times, 317, 3i8. 19 Wallace McCamant, Lincoln in the Winter of 1860-61, 4. 20 Daily Tribune, November 9, i860. 44 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE its parts." 21 If the southern people after calm and deliberate consideration demanded separation, they should "be permitted to go in peace." Undesirable as it might be u to see a single star erased from . . . (the) Federal flag," subjugation of South Carolina and the cotton states inhabited by five million people with at least half a million "able and willing to shoulder muskets," was not only impossible, but was clearly inconsistent with the genius of institutions "essentially republican, and averse to the employ- ment of military force to fasten one section of the confederacy to the other." 22 Such was the Tribune doctrine as expounded to a wide circle of adherents during November. The forces which prompted it are fairly discernible. Greeley also faced the three alternatives of peace- able secession, compromise, or war. Firmly in- trenched upon the Chicago Platform — in part the product of his own effort and convictions — he re- fused to grant the least concession on the question of slavery extension. Human bondage had stamped itself upon his conscience as a stupendous social evil, the total extinction of which he fondly contemplated at no distant day. 23 A southern slaveholding con- federacy at least promised "an effectual quietus to all the plans and projects hitherto so ardently cher- ished for . . . (its) territorial expansion." 24 Dis- 21 Ibid. , November 19, i860. 22 Ibid., November 16, 24, 30, i860. 23 Letter to Mrs. R. M. Whipple, April 2, 1856, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 24 Daily Tribune, November 20, i860; March 26, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 45 union, he asserted later, might have been a "calam- ity," but "complicity in Slavery extension" would have been "guilt." 25 Rather than compromise, he would pay the price of disunion for curtailment of the cursed institution, "try to thank God and take Courage." 26 Inclined by natural disposition and temperament toward pacifism and non-resistance, Greeley also shrank from the alternative of war. For that matter, the North generally, manifested no disposition to deal with secession by the employment of armed force, and the advocacy of such a method for calming the troubled waters during the closing months of i860 promised no results beyond adding to the general confusion of public opinion and incurring upon the author a charge of ill-timed jingoism. 27 Turning then to acquiescence in peaceable separa- tion as the only remaining alternative, the Tribune professed to believe that the South would ultimately cling to the Union if freely offered the alternative of secession. Such reasoning rested upon the assump- tion that the southern people were loyal at heart, and thus far had been duped by a small minority of "Fire Eaters," who deliberately preferred the elec- tion of Lincoln in order to secure a plausible excuse for secession. The methods pursued by this slave- holding minority in attempting "to carry things by a 25 Horace Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life, 397. 26 Letter to B. Brockway, August 14, 1861, Greeley MSS. 27 Daily Tribune, August 16, 1861 ; E. C. Kirkland, The Peace- makers of 1864, 61. ( 46 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE sudden rush," without allowing the people a delib- erate expression of opinion, indicated an inherent weakness in their movement. 28 In time, however, the southern populace would realize the odius position in which it had been placed. Secession in the abstract had offered certain illusory advantages, but the actual problems of a separate existence would soon bring disillusionment. For ex- ample, every seceded state would face the problem of taxation, a problem on which South Carolina had already manifested a certain ''hesitancy and squeam- ishness." The taxing of people who owned no slaves for the benefit of the minority, presented a delicate issue. 29 Then, how would "Secessia" secure the re- turn of fugitive slaves, once a recognition of inde- pendence placed the recalcitrant states in the same relation to the Union as any foreign power? 30 The difficulties of attempting to operate free from inter- ference, a "peculiar social, economical, and political system" would eventually prove insurmountable. 31 Illinois and the Northwest had been increasing rapidly in wealth and population under free institu- tions; if any cotton state hoped to rival that pros- perity, she must cling to the Union as her great "reliance" and diminish the supply of negroes instead of increasing it through a reopening of the slave trade. 32 Any interference with the trade of southern 28 Daily Tribune, November 12, i860. 29 Ibid., November 14, i860. 30 Ibid., December 3, i860. 31 Ibid., November 13, i860; March 25, 1861. 32 Ibid., March 7, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 47 ports manned by Federal fortifications would result in a material advantage to New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, and a two hundred million dollar Ameri- can cotton trade would be threatened by Indian and African competitors. 33 Finally the very principle of voluntary secession upon which the Southerners pro- posed to build a new confederacy promised a counter revolution in the near future, certain to "undo what the first accomplished." 34 Once these facts were forced upon the attention of the southern people through the unyielding performance of natural social and economic laws, the secession movement would tend to succumb beneath the weight of its own load and disappear eventually, as u a mere bubble" sim- ilar to that of 1832. 35 In order to realize the program of peaceably breaking down southern resistance, the North mere- ly needed to pursue a Fabian policy of "masterly inactivity." 36 The Tribune would be patient, "neith- er speaking daggers, or using them." Threats of coercion would only irritate the Unionist element and drive them into the hands of the "Fire Eat- ers." 37 But "a little time to cool, a little time for reflection" and the population would soon return to their senses. If the North would only "give them rope," the loyal supporters of the Union would 33 Ibid., January 22, March 16, 1861. 34 Ibid., February 14, 1861. 35 Ibid., November 12, i860. 36 Ibid., November 21, i860. 37 Ibid., November 30, i860. 48 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE speedily fulfill their destiny, and the leaders of the secession movement would "yet dangle at every cross road in the South." 38 But sincere as Greeley may have been in his ef- forts, the Tribune policy of "masterly inactivity" failed to elicit a favorable response below the Mason and Dixon line. Instead, the South quite generally accepted any manifestation of kindness and forbear- ance on the part of the North as a sign of weakness and concession. The Governor of South Carolina, in urging the adoption of a secession ordinance, cited the declarations of the Tribune to the effect that sepa- ration from the Federal Union was justified as surely as the American colonies rightfully rebelled against the authority of George the Third and his govern- ment, and added that "in this emergency our worst enemies have become our best friends." 39 On the eve of secession in Alabama, two former Congress- men wrote the President of the convention: "Possi- bly the most important fact we can communicate is the opinion generally obtained in Washington that the secession of five or more States would prevent or put an end to coercion, and the New York Tri- bune, the most influential of Republican journals, concedes that the secession of so many States would make coercion impracticable." 40 38 Ibid., February 9, March 27, 1861. 39 Memoir of Thurlov: Weed (Thurlow Weed Barnes, ed.), II, 49°- 40 Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series IV, vol. I, 47; quotation is taken from a letter of J. L. Pugh and SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 49 The Tribune policy not only encouraged the furth- er alienation of Southern loyalty, but it discouraged the formation of public sentiment in the North fav- orable to the maintenance of the Union. The Greeley organ claimed a total circulation in April, i860, of almost three hundred thousand — the largest of any newspaper in the world. 41 At least three-fourths of that number represented subscribers to the Weekly and Semi-Weekly living outside the metropolis in rural districts, particularly in the Adirondack region of northern New York and the Western Reserve of Ohio where New Englanders largely predominated. Considering the fact that one copy generally sufficed for one or more families, the Tribune influence prob- ably extended among not less than a million readers. Such an enormous circulation, coupled with the ready acceptance of Greeley editorials by the farmers of the Northwest as their political gospel, entitled the paper to the distinction of being the most influential organ of public opinion in the country. 42 J. L. M. Curry to the President of the Alabama convention, dated January 10, 1861. Alexander Stephens, in his War Between the States, quotes from the American Conflict, a two volume history of the Civil War by Greeley, to substantiate the right of secession by the "pointed, strong and unmistakable language" of an influential Northern leader. See Alexander H. Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States, I, 518. 41 Daily Tribune, April 10, i860. The circulation figures for 1861 were practically the same; see April 10, 1861, issue. 42 William R. Thayer, Life and Letters of John Hay, 171. The power and influence of the Tribune was highly respected in the South among its bitterest foes. Troup, a southern editor, writing at the outbreak of the war, said with reference to the journal: "Cir- culating amongst the families, men, women, and children, scattered SO HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE The peculiar significance of the Greeley appeal on the secession issue is readily discernible in view of the fact that the Tribune had been identified for years as a staunch opponent of pro-slavery interests, speaking to a constituency Republican in profession and anti-slavery in its antecedents — the very ele- ment which alone could be expected to form the nucleus of a northern movement in behalf of pre- serving the Union and enforcing obedience to the Constitution and laws of the land. No wonder its course caused Lincoln concern during the critical winter of 1860-61 when northern apathy and south- ern perfidy conspired together to break the bonds of loyalty to a common allegiance and a common des- tiny. In spite of Tribune propaganda, however, north- ern opinion gradually assumed a firmer tone toward the South with the beginning of the new year. Once South Carolina had committed the overt act, the real significance of secession slowly impressed itself upon the consciousness of the North, and increasing- ly the sentiment prevailed that whatever the means utilized to solve the national crisis, the house should not be divided. Nothing contributed more to arouse the public from irresolution and doubt to a sense of from Maine to Minnesota, its influence is many times greater than that of any paper in this country. It is, in fact, to a very great extent, the representative of Northern opinion — for it is really the leading organ of the controlling party of that section, which has grown to its present strength by the assistance and through the teachings of that Journal." See Troup, Senator Hammond and the Tribune, 19. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 5 I national obligation than the practical difficulties of peaceable disunion already suggested to the South by the Tribune. Secession in actual practice was indeed proving to be entirely different than secession in the abstract. The Federal government possessed prop- erty in South Carolina and other cotton states pur- chased with funds contributed by the American peo- ple. In spite of South Carolinian estrangement, the Constitution and laws of the United States still re- mained the supreme law of the land, and technically they were still subject to enforcement in every state of the Union, just as customs duties were still subject to collection at all southern ports of entry. Although there had been a strong first impulse on the part of many to allow the erring sisters to depart in peace, the attempt to depart stirred the North to a determination to preserve the Union. In the very nature of things, the South either could not or would not depart peacefully. Northern indifference and sympathy had been interpreted as a sign of weakness, and secession ordinances were passed with a certain boldness and defiance. South Carolinians refused to obey United States law and even threatened to seize Federal fortifications. Every move in that direction strengthened the hopes of Abraham Lincoln for the Union, and peaceable secession of necessity slowly faded into the background. The New York Evening Post observed the trend of events in January, and it recorded with satisfac- tion the change in public opinion which demanded 52 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE obedience to Federal law in decided contrast with the indifference "in which the secession movement found the country." 43 Even the Journal of Com- merce spoke of a public sentiment which would "sus- tain the Government in protecting the property of the United States wherever it may be found." 44 The Times, thoroughly converted, demanded the rein- forcement of Fort Sumter, and declared: "from every state of the mighty West, when the occasion calls for it, will come the same demand, backed by millions of men and of money, that the Union must and shall be preserved." 45 The New York World sounded warnings of a plot to seize Washington, and averred that if such an attempt materialized "you will see around the capital half of the millions of the North in arms." 46 Greeley also observed the changing spirit of the North and began to lose confidence in the Tribune program. The Fabian policy not only faced the ob- stacle of northern determination, but it appeared incapable of breaking down southern disaffection and resistance. The South had been given more rope, but no popular reaction had left the "Fire Eaters" dangling at every cross-road. Instead, the projected slaveholding Confederacy materialized and prom- ised new difficulties and dangers in the form of for- 43 New York Evening Post, January u, 1861. 44 New York Journal of Commerce, January 5, 1861 ; quoted in Hallock, 93. 45 New York Times, January 3, March 6, 1861. * e Ne*v York World, January 5, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 53 eign complications. In spite of the confident predic- tions of Greeley, Louisiana joined the seceders and thereby jeopardized an important outlet for north- ern trade. 47 The Tribune recognized the unwelcome possibility of cutting off communication with the Gulf, or perhaps allowing the mouth of the Missis- sippi to fall into the hands of an unfriendly foreign power. Still other hazards loomed in the distance. What should prevent the new Confederacy from starting a war with Mexico and Central America designed to further extend slave territory? And why should it not be "the harbinger of the reopening of the slave trade?" Finally, what should prevent an "alliance with foreign states, to circumscribe the growth of liberal institutions?" 48 These considerations prompted the Tribune to modify its policy. Had the North remained indif- ferent to southern aggressiveness, and had unfore- seen obstacles not rendered the Fabian policy of in- activity highly impracticable, the seceding states might have either quietly retired or perceived the folly of their ways and returned once more to the fold. In that event, Horace Greeley would doubtless have been recognized by a grateful American people, either as the great pacificator, or the saviour of the Union. But no such good fortune lay in store for him, and the sudden turn of affairs demanded that the Tribune bend to the storm or be caught event- ually in an embarrassing position. 47 Daily Tribune, November 30, i860. 48 Ibid., January 29, 1861. 54 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE Consequently, the versatile journal began sound- ing a new note — sort of an undertone at first during December, but gradually increasing in volume and intensity through the early months of 1861, until, by April the original strain was scarcely perceptible. First, it observed that all Federal fortifications within the confines of South Carolina had been as- signed by her legislature to the Washington govern- ment and that nothing in the National Constitution authorized the state to resume possession; therefore, any failure to effect a satisfactory agreement on that point forestalled peaceable secession. 49 A little later, it concluded that, in order "to make herself really independent," a state proposing disunion must seize and hold all the forts within her borders, thus ren- dering it incumbent upon the President of the United States "to repel force with force." 50 And it advised warning South Carolina of such a contingency, as the most effective manner of discouraging secession. 51 When the state finally passed the disunion ordinance, the Tribune branded the procedure "treason," al- though scarcely more than a month before, it had conceded "the right of peaceful secession at her own pleasure." 52 During subsequent months, Greeley counsel pro- ceeded in a similar strain. Fort Sumter should be reenforced promptly and effectively. In case of delay, 49 Ibid., December 3, 7, i860. 50 Ibid., December 11, i860. 51 Ibid., December 18, i860. 52 Ibid., November 12, December 22, i860. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 55 "a spontaneous rush of volunteers from the North by sea in numbers" might be the answer of an im- patient North to the lack of energy and decision on the part of the Federal government. 53 As for the states identified with the Confederacy, they might "play at being out of the Union"; they might "gov- ern themselves and arm themselves to their heart's content"; but they would not be permitted "to rob the United States, to disobey or evade the revenue laws, or to hold unlawful intercourse with foreign nations." 5 * Congress, the Executive, and the State authorities were urged to make instant preparations "to protect the country from civil war." With a strong force at Washington "to protect the Capital and Congress, and an army to defend the Constitution . . . treason now so rampant . . . (would) roar as gently as a sucking dove." 55 For, concluded the erstwhile paci- fist editor, "though we acknowledge prayer to be indispensable to the saving of individuals and na- tions, we nevertheless consider powder a good thing." 58 Strangely enough, the Tribune continued to ad- vocate, parallel with such utterances, the doctrine of peaceable secession. Enough specifications were attached to its operation, however, to render attain- ment beyond the range of human possibility. The 53 Ibid., January 4, 10, 1861. 54 Ibid., February 13, 1861. 55 Ibid., January 10, 1861. 56 Ibid., January 12, 1861. ^6 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE right of revolution had been cited in the Declaration of Independence by Thomas Jefferson as the right of all men. 57 But, in order that such a right might be "peacefully and constitutionally attained," a fair, deliberate vote had to be polled of all citizens in a State contemplating separation. Thus far, strong arm methods had been used in every case of dis- union according to the Tribune, and there was no reason to believe that the people preferred separa- tion. States should not be coerced into remaining with the Union, but neither should any "be coerced out of it ... by the banded and armed traitors throughout the South." 58 Furthermore, the Union could not be legally dissolved except as it had been formed — "by the free consent of all the parties concerned" 59 — and such procedure necessitated a National conven- tion representing all the states. Only with the consent of a majority of the delegates might any State re- lease itself from the binding effects of a compact to which it had once subscribed. 60 Some of the western farmers who had for years eagerly accepted the Tribune as a weekly addition to their political bible, must have experienced difficulty interpreting the Greeley gospel during that critical period from the election of Lincoln to the firing on 57 Ibid., December 4, i860. 58 Ibid., January 14, 1861. 59 Ibid., January 21, 1861. 60 Ibid., March 12, 1861 ; Horace Greeley, The American Con- flict, I, 405; see also Weekly Tribune, June 1, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 57 Fort Sumter. By declaring that a State had to seize the Federal fortifications within her borders in order to be independent, and insisting at the same time upon the duty of the Federal government to meet such procedure with coercion, the Tribune virtually decreed peaceable secession impossible. It professed a willingness to let the erring ones depart in peace, but insisted upon repression in case they dared to effect their independence. To be sure, one avenue of peaceable escape had been left open, but it offered all the possibilities of a camel passing through the eye of a needle. No one could seriously contemplate a National convention in which a majority of the delegates would deliberately vote to disband the Union. Horace Greeley had turned a sharp corner as smoothly as possible. The doctrine of peaceable secession, so readily accepted in November, but so unpopular in January, had been virtually discarded. But the venerable editor refused to confess the in- consistency, and met the ever recurring charges of disloyalty based on his earlier position with a placid reference to the latest edition of the Tribune gos- pel. 61 In the meantime, with peaceable secession out of the question, many turned toward compromise and 61 The Sentinel, a Democratic paper of Indiana, in the April 15, 1861, issue, noted the change of front on the part of the Tribune with respect to the secession issue, and attributed it to the protective tariff and a desire to serve "the cotton lords of New England and the ironmasters of Pennsylvania." See J. A. Woodburn, Party Politics in Indiana During the Civil War, A. H. A. Report, 1902, I, 237, 238. 55 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE conciliation as the only alternative to a disastrous civil war. Northern Democrats, particularly, urged concessions, but a very considerable number of Re- publicans as well, including some of the most able and trusted leaders, indicated a willingness to forego the Chicago Platform sufficiently to satisfy the pro- slavery malcontents and return the unruly Southern States to their former allegiance. The New York Herald, a Democratic organ of considerable repute still under the guidance of the notorious James Gordon Bennett, immediately after the election urged the Republican nominee to allay the fears of the South by repudiating the Chicago Platform, by announcing a determination to enforce the fugitive slave law, and by pledging support to such constitutional amendments as should guarantee to slavery its every demand. 62 If the Republican party would assume the task of "reconstruction," it might not only save the Union, but retain itself in power for the next twenty years. 63 The Journal of Commerce and National Intelli- gencer (Washington) — the latter a past advocate of Whig conservatism edited by the veteran W. W. Seaton — likewise hoped for a plan of pacification which would meet with universal approval from the loyal conservatives of the nation. 64 Thurlow Weed and the Albany Evening Journal labored incessantly 62 New York Herald, December 17, i860. 63 Ibid., January 9, 1861. 64 New York Journal of Commerce, May 17, 1861, quoted in Hallock, 74; National Intelligencer, January 12, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 59 in behalf of compromise, endeavoring to persuade the Republicans to backwater sufficiently to concede slavery all the common territory below the Missouri Compromise line. 65 And the Times, while more hesi- tant to embrace the movement, finally consented to some arrangement promising maintenance of the Union. 66 Although Greeley had likewise virtually aban- doned the alternative of peaceable secession, he still refused to participate in any move to conciliate the South by further concessions to slavery in the terri- tories. His extreme aversion to compromise was based upon a certain lofty idealism which politicians of the Weed type could never understand. He still lingered on as one of the last representatives of that celebrated school of New England transcendentalists imbued with a philanthropical urge to promote the welfare of the individual and of society. He had subscribed to party platforms, formed political alli- ances, and participated in numerous political cam- paigns, but conditioning all in the last analysis was his unflagging interest in the rights and welfare of the common man. For two decades, Greeley had reflected that ideal- ism through the columns of the Tribune. He had accepted a portion of Fourierism in the hope that it might prove a boon to the workingman. 67 He sup- 65 See New York Times, January 3, 1861. 66 Ibid., February 14, 1861. 67 Whitelaw Reid, Horace Greeley, 11, 12. Greeley was person- ally interested in a Fourierite association — The American Phalanx at Red Bank, N. J. 60 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE ported a protective tariff with untiring devotion — not to serve capital, but to enable the common man to acquire a more just compensation for the fruits of his labor. 68 And finally, free land for the landless as a last refuge for the victims of a poorly adjusted industrial mechanism, had always formed one of the keenest objects of his desires. 69 Although he had striv- en to elevate humanity by preaching temperance, in- telligence, morality, and religion, at the bottom of all reform, he recognized "the Bread problem." 70 Four- ierism and protection to industry had offered partial solutions to that problem, but men would never be completely emancipated from thraldom and misery and enabled to justly appreciate the higher things of life, until the great West offered to every worthy applicant a free farm. 71 And now slavery threatened to spread its blight over the common domain and block the onward march of freedom. No wonder the Tribune spoke of compromise as a national calamity ! Probably no one had followed the trend of public 68 John R. Commons, "Horace Greeley and the Working Class Origins of the Republican Party," Political Science Quarterly, XXIV, 473, 474- 69 Greeley never wavered or relented in his fight for free lands. During his short term in Congress in 1848, he introduced a home- stead bill which received little consideration. In 1854, the Tribune was thoroughly disgusted with the "hybrid Graduation Preemption bill," but favored its passage as at least a step in the direction of a genuine homestead act — a measure finally secured in 1862. See George W. Julian, Political Recollections, 1840-1872, 103 ; Daily Tribune, July 22, 1854. 70 Letter to Mrs. Pauline Davis, September 1, 1852, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 71 Letter to B. Brockway, November 19, 1847, Greeley MSS. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 6 1 opinion with closer scrutiny or greater anxiety than Abraham Lincoln. He also hoped to avert civil war, but rejected either peaceable secession or further concessions to slavery as a solution of the national dilemma. He had observed with grave concern the damaging vagaries of the Tribune on peaceable dis- union immediately after the election. By the middle of December, however, the new note struck by Gree- ley began to reverberate, and the President-elect had reason to suspect that the New York editor might yet throw the weight of his influence on the right side of the scales. An exchange of notes ensued and the result was extremely gratifying. Greeley con- fessed: "if the seceding State or States go to fighting and defying the laws, the Union being yet undis- solved save by their own say-so, I guess they will have to be made to behave themselves." On the mat- ter of concession, his reply was unequivocal. "Let the Union slide," he wailed, "it may be recon- structed; let Presidents be assassinated, we can elect more; let the Republicans be defeated and crushed, we shall rise again. But another nasty compromise . . . will so thoroughly disgrace and humiliate us that we can never again raise our heads." 72 The two uncompromising foes of slavery extension stood upon virtually the same ground. From December to the outbreak of war, the Tri- bune launched repeated onslaughts against the com- 72 J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, III, 258; Greeley to Lincoln, December 22, i860. 62 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE promisers. To make concessions on a vital principle would only incite "constant bullying and menace by proffering rewards for turbulence and giving boun- ties for treason." The Crittenden plan of compro- mise and the efforts of the House Committee of Thirty-three were rejected as implying "timidity and apology on the part of certain supporters of Mr. Lincoln," and the paper exclaimed vociferously: "Let us retract nothing; let us not yield a single inch." 73 From the middle of January on, an increasingly belligerent tone was manifest. "Stand Firm!" it counselled; "let us know once for all whether the slave power is really stronger than the Union. Let us have it decided whether the Mexican system of rebellion can be successfully introduced in this coun- try as a means of carrying an election after it has been fairly lost at the polls." 74 During the latter part of February, there appeared in bold headliners at the top of the editorial columns: "No Compro- mise! No Concessions to Traitors! The Con- stitution As It Is," 75 and a fortnight later the journal doubted if bloodshed could be averted except by the most adequate military preparations. 76 The 73 Daily Tribune, December 12, i860. The Tribune also objected to compromise on the ground that it would present the Republican party to the South as a group of selfish office seekers, who, once in power, had discarded their principles. Daily Tribune, August 23, 1861. 74 Ibid., January 17, 1861. 75 Appeared from February 18 to March 2, 1861. 76 Ibid., March 16, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 63 pacifist editor was preparing his mind and heart for war — the last alternative ! While Greeley was thus traversing the devious path from peaceable secession to war, the New York political kettle had never ceased to boil. The general effect of the Chicago episode was to enhance the political fortunes of the one now credited quite gen- erally with having slaughtered Seward. Greeley was expected to exert considerable influence with the incoming administration at Washington. One car- toon depicted him bearing the new President into the White House on his shoulders, 77 and there were rumors afloat that he would be the next postmaster- general. 78 Such preferment, added to the effective- ness with which the Tribune advocate had cooper- ated with the "conservatives" at Chicago to dispatch Seward, aroused the bitterest hostility on the part of the Weed faction. Raymond, especially, felt mortified at the success of his old time rival. He had revealed the essential contents of the letter dissolving the political partner- ship of Seward, Weed, and Greeley, and Seward sup- porters quite generally accepted them as explaining the defeat of their idol. Greeley retaliated by severe- ly reproaching the recipient of the letter for divulg- ing a confidential communication. The quarrel which 77 Don Seitz, Horace Greeley, 226. 78 Letter of Joshua Leavitt to Chase, November 7, i860, Mis- cellaneous Letters to Chase, 184.2-1870, A. H. A. Report, 1902, II, 484; S. D. Brummer, Political History of New York State During the Period of the Civil War, Columbia University Studies, XXXIX, 129. 64 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE ensued assumed more than ordinary significance. 79 A certain element showed a tendency to revolt from Weed dictation, accept the much discussed letter as their platform, and join the Anti-Weed forces, under the leadership of the notorious Greeley. 80 On the other hand, the Weed machine resolved to retain its domination in spite of the disaffection, and crush the Tribune editor at the first opportunity. Each side prepared for an impending contest, cognizant that the advent of a Republican National administration promised the distribution of a rich Federal patron- age to the dominant faction at Albany. If Greeley ever really coveted office, developments seemed to offer an opportunity to gratify his am- bitions. In all probability Seward would be recog- nized by Lincoln with a Cabinet post or a foreign mission, thus precluding his reelection to the Senate. Immediately following the presidential election, the Tribune mentor confided to friend Brockway that a Cabinet position offered no attraction, since his pres- ence at Washington in that connection would only ex- asperate the "Fire Eaters," and anyway, he detested "official routine with great dull dinners"; but he "would like to go to the Senate." 81 The Anti-Weed 79 Letter to Mrs. H. C. Ingersoll, July 5, i860, Ingersoll MSS. 80 New York Herald, July 3, i860. 81 Letter to B. Brockway, November 11, i860, Greeley MSS. Be- man Brockway was an old acquaintance and political associate, who first came into contact with Greeley in 1836 while the latter was still struggling along with the Neiv Yorker. For a time, he edited the Mayville (N. Y.) Sentinel, and still later, the Daily Palladium at Oswego, finally serving for two years, 1853-55, on the Tribune SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 6$ faction welcomed such a disposition on the part of their leader; the Senatorship was highly prized as a vantage point from which the Lincoln administration might be influenced and the patronage properly handled. With Seward out of the running, and the Weed machine considerably weakened, prospects were bright for placing Greeley in the coveted office. The opposing factions mustered their forces and the battle raged throughout the winter of 1 860-61 on two fronts — Albany, New York, and Spring- field, Illinois. At Albany the immediate objective of the Anti-Weed group was control of the legislature, particularly the Speakership of the Assembly. 82 At Springfield, both Greeley and Weed visited Lincoln in the hope of enlisting his support. As the contest drew to a close the latter part of January, represen- tations were made to the effect that the President- elect favored Greeley in preference to William M. Evarts, the Weed candidate; but Lincoln promptly repudiated such reports and announced a strict neu- trality. 83 In the end, both sides claimed the victory. To be sure, the Anti-Weed forces did not succeed in sending their candidate to Washington, but the Al- staff. In i860, he purchased a third interest in the New York Re- former, a Republican organ published at Watertown. Although af- filiated throughout the early part of his career with the anti-slavery wing of the Democratic party, Brockway enjoyed the confidence of the Tribune editor. Eventually, he joined the Anti-Weed group of New York Republicans and served as a close political associate of Greeley in the struggle with Weed and his up-state allies. See Beman Brockway, Autobiography, 16-44. 82 B. Brockway to Greeley, November 17, i860, Greeley MSS. 83 Lincoln to Weed, February 4, 1861, Memoir of Thurloiu Weed, II, 324. 66 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE bany "Dictator" had been compelled to desert Evarts and throw his support to a third candidate in order to stave off defeat. 84 One-man power at Albany had suffered a mighty blow. 85 As soon as Lincoln had taken up his abode at the White House, the two New York factions presented their claims to the New York patronage, thereby creating an embarrassing situation for the President, who desired to avoid any semblance of partisanship. Weed and Greeley journeyed to Washington repeat- edly during March and by the end of the month most of the appointments had been made. The Seward- Weed ring succeeded in outdistancing their competi- tors in every branch of the service except the cus- tomhouse in spite of Lincoln's professed neutrality. 86 Greeley felt somewhat discouraged at the outcome, 84 Brummer, 135. Brockway furnishes a brief account of the con- test. He says: "It was a fight between those who regarded slavery as a social curse, and those who were willing that the institution should live if the Republicans could have charge of the federal gov- ernment." See Beman Brockway, Fifty Years of Journalism, 242-246. 85 After the defeat, Greeley was obviously much disappointed. He endeavored to console himself with the thought that, after all, his vote had been so large that the result was not mortifying. But he bemoaned the fact that his name had ever gone before the legis- lative caucus "seeing that success was hopeless from the start." Letter to B. Brockway, February 28, 1861, Greeley MSS. See also letter to Captain Strong, February 20, 1861, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. 86 Brummer, 137. After discussing Cabinet appointments in a let- ter to Beman Brockway, Greeley said: "I tell you the chances are three to one against an honest man getting anything. The thieves hunt in gangs. . . Three quarters of the Post Offices will go into the hands of the conscriptionists. So with most offices. And but for our desperate fight, they would have taken the whole. But we are going to try to do something with the Customhouses." Letter to B. Brockway, March 12, 1861, Greeley MSS. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 67 but he had succeeded at least partially in securing fitting rewards for worthy friends and supporters in the recent Senatorial contest, and all the offices had not fallen into the hands of the "thieves" and "con- scriptionists." 87 Throughout the remainder of the year, it required constant alertness on the part of the Anti-Weed crew to keep "the old man" from putting through "a new deal" to secure all the spoils of war. 88 The quarrel between Weed and Greeley did not confine itself to the Senatorial contest and distribu- tion of the Federal patronage. A sharp personal antagonism arising with the Chicago convention, continued unabated throughout the Civil War. Gree- ley freely accused the Albany boss with corruption and dishonesty, and the latter replied in kind by terming his opponent "a fanatic, dazed, muddle- headed aspirant for office" who profited by illicit trade in southern cotton and intrigued with foreign representatives for a dishonorable peace. 89 Friends 87 Letter to B. Brockway, March 19, i86r, and to Thoman B. Carroll, May 23, 1861, Greeley MSS. 88 Greeley to Beman Brockway, November 17, 1861, Greeley MSS. The alertness and zeal with which Weed and Greeley struggled over appointments is shown by a letter from Lincoln to Chase with reference to a minor position in the Treasury Depart- ment for which a man by the name of Christopher Adams was being considered. "The great point in his favor," explained Lin- coln, "is that Thurlow Weed and Horace Greeley join in recom- mending him. I suppose the like never happened before, and never will again. . ." Lincoln to Chase, May 8, 1861, Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works (J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, eds.), II, 44. 89 Kirkland, 64. Weed repeatedly charged the Tribune associates and correspondents with profiting through government contracts, as well as engaging in cotton speculations, directing his attacks 68 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE were involved in the charges and countercharges of fraud and corruption, and the whole affair produced an atmosphere of distrust and confusion far from conducive to the most efficient prosecution of the war. The selection of a Cabinet to serve under the new Republican regime presented the extremely difficult problem of satisfying various elements in a hetero- geneous political organization, each with its own peculiar traditions and antecedents. The choice of Seward as Secretary of State seemed reasonably cer- tain long before Lincoln left Springfield, and it was generally conceded that Chase, Cameron, and Bates were receiving serious consideration. The jTri bune had few comments to make on Cabinet possibilities. It hailed with great satisfaction the report that Chase had been proffered the Treasury portfolio and predicted his acceptance "by the whole country with unanimous approval." 90 Rumors of Cameron for either the Treasury or the War Department elicited poorly disguised disapproval. As for Seward, it spoke of the "ability, dignity, and tact" with which the New York Senator could be expected to conduct foreign relations. 91 particularly against a certain Mr. Camp and alleging that the latter had confessed connection with Greeley in such enterprises. There is no evidence of any such collusion, but Camp appears to have been involved in the attempt by an S. Pancoast to engage in salt speculation by securing permits to pass the highly prized com- modity across the lines. See Official Records of the Union and Con- federate Armies, Series II, vol. II, 1 534 ff. 90 Daily Tribune, January 5, 1861. 91 Ibid., January 7, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 69 In reality, Greeley had never desired Seward in the State Department, however. A fortnight after the election, he hoped to see Weed's colleague sent off on a foreign mission, and exulted in the firm conviction that he would not be offered a place in the Cabinet. 92 When time dissipated such expectations, he cooperated with Hamlin, the elder Blair, and others to secure for Chase a proffer of the Treasury Department in order that the latter might be in a position to offset Seward's influence. 93 When Seward and Weed utilized every available type of pressure to defeat the purpose of the Chase men, Greeley was thoroughly aroused. With Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, and perhaps another Southerner, looming up as likely Lincoln selections, he feared that Seward would control the Cabinet even though the Chase move succeeded. "Old Abe is honest as the sun, and . . . true and faithful," he confided to Brockway, "but he is in the web of very cunning spiders and cannot creep out if he would. Mrs. Abe is a Ken- tuckian and enjoys flattery. . ." 94 In spite of such dire predictions, however, the Greeley-Blair com- bination landed Montgomery Blair, Gideon Welles of Connecticut, Chase, and Edward Bates in their 92 Letter to B. Brockway, November 17, i860, Greeley MSS. 93 H. B. Stanton, Random Recollections, 70. Chase wrote to Julian, a son-in-law of Joshua R. Giddings, January 16, 1861, that he did not care for a Cabinet position. Although he had canvassed the situation with Lincoln and would do whatever the latter considered best — stay in the Senate or go into the Cabinet — he hoped to remain in the Senate. S. P. Chase to George W. Julian, January 16, 1861. Miscellaneous MS. 94 Letter to B. Brockway, February 28, 1861, Greeley MSS. 70 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE respective berths, thus assuring "four honest and capable men" at the side of the President. 95 The objection to Seward in the administration was based partially on local and partially on national considerations. Greeley anticipated that the Anti- Weed clique would wage an uphill fight for the New York patronage with an influential opponent occupy- ing the good graces of the chief executive. And such fears were well-founded, for the efficiency with which the Weed forces garnered the larger share of the spoils was attributable in no small measure to Seward's appointment. To be sure, Chase, with Welles cooperating, counteracted the influence of the Secretary of State to some extent, but after all, a representative of the state deserved first considera- tion in connection with the New York appoint- ments. 96 And then, in determining the policy of the new administration with respect to slavery and secession, Greeley had reason to believe that Seward would not fight up to the mark. Strangely enough, the two New Yorkers had shifted positions since the Chicago convention in so far as the terms "radical" or "con- servative" were applicable to them. Greeley now classified as a radical since he stood adamant against any concessions to the South, while Seward mani- fested an inclination to concede most anything short of peaceable separation. 97 95 Letter to B. Brockway, March 12, 1861, Greeley MSS. 96 McClure, 315; Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, 71-73. 97 National Intelligencer, January 14, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 7 1 Those journals which urged compromise so ve- hemently during the early months of 1861 indicated a very kindly disposition toward Seward. The New York Herald averred that "If the Premier of Mr. Lincoln perseveres in the course which he has beyond peradventure determined on, he will make for him- self the highest name in the history of the states- men, patriots, and benefactors of the Republic." It referred to the Chicago Platform as "the fossil of a bygone time" and predicted optimistically that Seward would "reconstruct the Union." 98 The New York Journal of Commerce was ready to forgive the popular Republican leader for the past since an altered attitude promised to make amends for "a long course of fanaticism on the slavery question." " The New York Times commented in a similar strain, inferring that the Secretary of State would be the real head of the administration. At first, the Tribune avoided turning Seward over into the hands of its enemies, and it spoke as assur- ingly as possible of his devotion to the Chicago Plat- form, but there were so many indications of an in- clination toward conciliation and concession that the Greeley organ finally abandoned him. It resented the manner in which the new foreign secretary posed "as the center and soul of the incoming administra- tion," 10 ° and condemned him severely for advice 98 Daily Tribune, February 19, 1861, quotes the New York Herald. "See ibid., March 1, 1861. 100 Ibid., February 27, 1861. 72 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE alleged to have been proffered certain Illinoisans "to forget Freedom" and "save the Union." 101 During March, with the exception of the stric- tures on Seward, the Tribune assumed a favorable attitude toward the administration. It commended the inaugural address for its conciseness and deter- mined tone — an evidence that the government still lived "with a Man at the head of it." 102 The inten- tion of the President to act cautiously, provoking no unnecessary hostility and yet evincing no weakness or hesitation, was gratifying. 103 Above all, the laws were to be obeyed and Federal property reclaimed and safeguarded; the South would yet realize "that peaceable dismissal is one thing, and that indepen- dent and arbitrary secession is quite another." 104 In case it should become necessary to evacuate Fort Sumter, as frequently predicted at Washington, the humiliation should not be accorded to any cowardice or negligence on the part of the Lincoln administra- tion. 105 In April, events rapidly converged toward a crisis. Public opinion formed rapidly in the North in sup- port of more determined action in dealing with the 101 Ibid., March 8, n, 1861. Moncure D. Conway records that Greeley once told him that while he felt no ill will towards Seward, he had no confidence in him as a minister. "Seward has and always must have a policy," said Greeley. "A policy is just what we don't want. We want manliness." Autobiography, Memories, and Expe- riences of Moncure Daniel Conivay, I, 331. 102 Daily Tribune, March 5, 1861. 103 Ibid., March 6, 1861. 10 *Ibid., March 7, 1861. 105 Ibid., March 11, 16, 1861. SECESSION, COMPROMISE, OR WAR 73 situation. The war fever began to grip some who at first felt comparatively indifferent toward Southern estrangement. As surely as the Tribune had aided in changing public sentiment, it had been influenced by that altered sentiment and moved along rapidly with the popular current. Although having expressed a willingness only a fortnight before to utilize two years, or even two, three, or four presidential terms, if necessary, in restoring the Union, 106 on April 3, it demanded: "Let this intolerable suspense and uncer- tainty cease ! The Country, with scarcely a show of dissent, cries out — If we are to fight, so be it." 307 The expedition against Fort Sumter momentarily quelled the characteristic Greeley impatience, and the Tribune again spoke in more friendly tones, com- mending the efficiency with which the Lincoln admin- istration had transformed the government from dis- organization and bankruptcy to a condition com- petent to face "a very formidable rebellion." 108 But the war spirit had seized upon the peace-loving edi- tor, and in his eagerness to move instantly upon the South, Lincoln appeared to him to lag far behind. "Who shall deliver us from the body of this Old Abe?" he wailed to Brockway. "I don't feel like going through another four years of such govern- ment. . April 12, a Confederate battery opened fire on 106 Ibid., March 20, 1861. 107 Ibid., April 3, 1861. 108 Ibid., April 6, 8, 1861. 109 Letter to B. Brockway, April 9, 1861, Greeley MSS. 74 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE Fort Sumter, and three days later the Tribune ex- claimed triumphantly "Fort Sumter is lost, but Free- dom is saved." 110 The last alternative had prevailed — the nation was at war ! 110 Daily Tribune, April 15, 1861. Chapter III A TRIAL AT ARMS Firing on Fort Sumter greatly accentuated the rising martial spirit of the North. A people which four months before evinced considerable willingness to sanction peaceable secession, and would unques- tionably have rendered an overwhelming verdict against war as an alternative of disunion had the issue been raised, now made ready to chastise the rebellious South. Peaceable disunion and compro- mise had been discarded as possible solutions of the national dilemma, and the nation stood committed to the ordeal of a trial at arms. 1 The press clearly reflected the alteration in public sentiment. Comparatively few journals dared follow the lead of the Albany Atlas and Argus in denounc- ing the call of Lincoln for seventy-five thousand men as a "usurpation." 2 Some papers submitted grudg- ingly to the war sentiment which swept the free states, however. The Journal of Commerce, notor- ious for the tenacity with which it had clung to com- promise and concession, indicated a willingness to "go as far in defending the Capital or any other part of the country" which desired to remain in the 1 James F. Rhodes, History of the United States, III, 357-59. 2 See the Ne York Journal of Commerce, April 20, 1861. The Journal of Commerce became so belligerent in its attitude that the Federal government finally denied its circulation in the mails on August 22, 1861. William H. Hallock, Life of Gerard Hallock, 156-7. 4 The (New York) Independent, April 4, 11, 18, 1861. 5 Weekly Tribune, May 8, 1858. 6 New York Herald, November 1, i860. A TRIAL AT ARMS 77 and denounced every suggestion of coercion to com- pel obedience to Federal law. On the very day that the news of Fort Sumter reached the ears of an aroused and determined North, a last minute appeal was is- sued to stem the tide of war. 7 In response, a crowd plainly bent on mischief formed in front of the Herald Office, and Bennett found it advisable to dis- play a United States flag for the mollification of the impromptu gathering. The Tribune reported that "old Bennett," clearly misjudging public opinion, had provided himself in advance with the wrong colors, and hence, had been compelled to send out for a sup- ply of the stars and stripes to meet the emergency. 8 Be that as it may, the Herald announced on the following day that the time for public peace meet- ings in the North had ended, and war would hence- forth have the support of Northern Democrats, alienated from the South now by the "indiscriminate tone of hostility" on the part of the "Fire Eaters." 9 From then on, it professed to stand unreservedly for a vigorous prosecution of the war in order that the integrity and unity of the nation might be pre- served, whatever the cost in blood and treasure. 10 Greeley utilized the flag raising affair as a conven- ient means of launching repeated thrusts at Bennett, and throughout the war the two influential New York editors jabbed at each other with a ferocity 7 Ibid., April 15, 1861. 8 Daily Tribune, April 18, 1861. 9 New York Herald, April 16, 1861. 10 Ibid., April 30, 1861. 78 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE and vindictiveness unequalled in the realm of per- sonal controversy. The Tribune denounced "old Bennett," as an ally of traitors. 11 The Herald re- ferred to "Massa Greeley," a denomination designed to cast derisive reflections upon his anti-slavery pro- clivities. It dismissed the Tribune version of the flag raising episode as a "silly fabrication," and coun- tered with the ludicrous incident alleged to have oc- cured in connection with the New York Senatorial contest, over which Greeley and Dana were supposed to have engaged in a violent quarrel which "shook the Tribune office from top to bottom" and created no end of amusement for a crowd of "excited Spec- tators" in the street below. 12 The Tribune entered the war with great fervor and enthusiasm, keenly anticipating the rapid subju- gation of the "traitors." It welcomed Lincoln's first call for troops and for a few days indicated no im- patience with administration preparedness activities, believing that the South rather than the North, faced the necessity of speeding up war operations. But the impetuous and well-meaning Greeley, keenly respon- sive to the increasing war sentiment of the North, was not patient long. The Tribune soon demanded that the administration assure the people of an un- equivocal determination to prosecute the war with the greatest possible rapidity and efficiency. "If good Uncle Abe wants to read the Secessionists another 11 Daily Tribune, November 27, 1861. ™Neiv York Herald, October 5, 1861 ; April 3, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS 79 essay proving that he never meant them any harm, or Gov. Seward has another oration to deliver to them on the glories and blessings of the Union, let the performances come off by all means," remarked the editor ironically, "but this will have to be before Jeff. Davis and Wise capture Washington. . ." 13 The manner in which a small coterie of slavehold- ers forced secession upon an unwilling populace in North Carolina, and the refusal to submit the Con- federate Constitution to a popular vote, all indicated u a rebellion of the Few against the Many" relying upon bullets instead of ballots, Northerners were told. 14 That rebellious minority should be met with their own weapons, and secession "crushed out in blood and fire if necessary," 15 for the North in- tended "not merely to defeat, but to conquer, to subjugate them." After the rebellious traitors had been "overwhelmed in the field, and scattered like leaves before an angry wind," they would find, in- stead of peaceful homes awaiting their return, only "poverty at their firesides" and "privation in the anxious eyes of mothers and the rags of children." 16 When the administration acceded to the appeal of Governor Hicks of Maryland to cease sending troops to the Capital via Baltimore, the Tribune again turned loose a furious protest. "Let troops be poured down upon Baltimore," it thundered, "and if 13 Daily Tribune, April 22, 1861. ^Ibid., April 19, 1861. 15 Weekly Tribune, May 4, 1861. 16 Daily Tribune, May 1, 1861. 80 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE need be, raze it to the ground." Despite such insolent requests from the "snivelling, whiffling traitor" of a Governor, "the plug-ugliest State south of Mason and Dixon's line" could rest assured the North would "go through her and over her, in every direc- tion, through every acre." 17 "The worn-out race of emasculated First Families" in both Maryland and Virginia would then yield "to a sturdier people," the pioneers of whom were already on their way to Washington "in regiments" and in due time would receive an allotment of Southern land as a fitting reward for service rendered in the cause of free- dom. 18 Such boisterous fulminations ran directly counter to the hope entertained by Lincoln that the border states might be sufficiently placated to retain their allegiance to the Union. But the optimistic fervor with which Greeley had launched into the crusade for the Union and freedom knew no bounds. Every border state should be occupied that had not im- mediately responded to the call to arms, the Tribune avowed, and the entire populace treated as traitors. 19 The war should be carried into Virginia without delay. Norfolk should be reduced, the southern coun- ties invaded, and "proud, hypocritical, treacherous Richmond . . . the foul nest of Nullification and Treason," seized. 20 As soon as preparations were 17 Ibid., April 25, 1861. 18 Ibid., April 23, 1861. 19 Ibid., May 14, 1861. 20 Ibid., April 28, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 8 I complete, a couple hundred thousand men would march "right through (not around) Baltimore, Richmond, Raleigh, Charleston, Savannah, and Montgomery," join a similar force from the West, and celebrate Christmas in superb style at New Or- leans. After "one or two considerable battles," the Federal government would accept "the unconditional submission of the traitors," dissolve the Montgom- ery government, retrieve stolen Federal property, and return the seceding states in obedience to the laws of the land. 21 Throughout May and June, the Tribune continued to prod the administration on to greater activity, suggesting here and condemning there, in a tone often highly critical and antagonistic. Convinced that the people had grown "fifty years older" in the twenty days following Lincoln's first call to arms, it insisted that the administration should respond to a thoroughly aroused public opinion bent on vigorous military preparations. 22 "How much longer shall we wait? . . . How much more disgrace shall we suffer?" it wailed despairingly, "before the Government shall seem to begin to suspect that we are involved in a war where desperation of treason on one side is to be met by the desperation of loyalty on the other?" 23 21 Ibid., May i, 1861. The parentheses are Greeley's. The Tri- bune relied confidently on the power of the West to starve the South into submission by cutting off supplies which usually came down the Mississippi. 22 Ibid., May 2, 1861. 23 Ibid., April 26, 1861. Greeley avers in The American Con- flict: "The precious early days of the conflict were surrendered 82 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE All kinds of suggestions and admonitions ap- peared in the Tribune columns concerning war prep- arations, ranging all the way from a warning against bright-colored scarfs and exposed red flannel as troop paraphernalia, 24 to complete diagrams and specifications for the construction of gunboats. The public was apprized that the Navy Department pro- posed to build fifty steam gunboats at an approxi- mate cost of four million dollars constructed accord- ing to a plan which would render them unfit for ac- tion. 25 The merchants of New York City were urged to equip steamers with sufficient fighting traps to cope with lightly armed vessels bent on destroying North- ern commerce. 26 And finally, to render it effective, the army required a great increase in cavalry and artil- lery units, an admonition repeated with dogged per- sistency throughout the entire early part of the war. 27 The Tribune accepted the call in May for addi- tional volunteers, along with the appointment of Fremont and Nathaniel Banks to responsible posi- tions in the Army, as an indication that the govern- because the President did not even yet believe that any serious conflict would be had. He still clung to the delusion that forbear- ance, and patience, and moderation, and soft words would yet obviate all necessity for deadly strife. . . The wanton rout of that black day (Bull Run) cost the President but one night's sleep." See Horace Greeley, The American Conflict, I, 549; Horace Gree- ley, "Greeley's Estimate of Lincoln," The Century, New Series, xx, 377. 24 Daily Tribune, May 12, 1861. 25 Ibid., June 17, 1861. 2Q Ibid., April 30, 1861. 27 Ibid., May 12, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 83 ment at last moved surely, even though slowly, in the right direction. 28 For a short time, customary impatience surrendered to glowing predictions of Union success. During the summer, Federal troops would doubtless confine themselves largely to forti- fying and protecting Washington, conducting opera- tions necessary to retain the allegiance of the border states, re-capturing Harper's Ferry, and seizing Nor- folk and Richmond. 29 In the meantime, the volun- teers might well be content to drill for greater effi- ciency; with autumn and cooler weather, the entire Union aggregation would swoop down and bring the traitorous brigands of Jeffdom to their knees before New Years. 30 When events failed to justify such joyous anticipa- tions, the old-time restiveness again returned to the Greeley establishment. The middle of June arrived and still no advance on Richmond. In the apartments of Fitz Henry Warren, a Greeley associate and just then the Tribune correspondent at Washington, there congregated various critics of the government in- cluding some Congressional radicals who distrusted the ability of General Scott to cope with the military situation. This group accepted the opinion of War- ren — thoroughly acquiesced in by his chief at New York — that the war should be sharp and decisive, and adopted the motto: "On to Richmond." 31 Pres- ently, there appeared at the top of the Tribune edi- 28 Ibid., May 30, 1861. 29 Ibid., May 27, 1861. 30 Ibid., May 28, 1861. 31 L. D. Ingersoll, The Life of Horace Greeley, 394, 395. 84 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE torial columns, the caption in bold italics: "Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July! By that date the place must be held by the National Army!" 32 One editorial after another scoffed at the delay and mismanagement of the Lincoln administration. Instead of overwhelming the Confederates by the magnitude and power of superior forces, the Lin- coln government was allowing the contest to become "an equal one," destined to involve "skirmishes and sieges, and their alternating reverses and triumphs," rather than "a single short, sharp, but thorough and final collision." 33 The struggle had taken on the aspect of "a politician's war." 34 The inactivity of the Union Army enhanced the suspicion that those in charge of military operations still hoped for a "re- construction." General Scott was thoroughly con- versant with the science and technique of war, but "the real question" was whether he really wanted to rout the rebels or preferred "to have them concil- 32 The "Nation's War Cry," as this was called, appeared in the Tribune, June 26 to July 6, 1861. 33 Daily Tribune, June 19, 1861. 34 Ibid., June 27, 1861. With regard to rumors of compromise, the New York paper spoke bluntly. "The public have a right to know, in plain and distinct terms, whether any proposition for peace or compromise has been received by the President or Secretary of State from Jeff. Davis, and what the Administration are doing about it. They want plain English, and no diplomatic tricks." Lin- coln's message to Congress a few days later reassured Greeley that the President still stood pat on the slavery issue, however, and all was well again from that standpoint. Ibid., July 2, 6, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 85 iated?" 35 If the authorities at Washington really wished to convince the public of their honesty and sincerity, they would "see to it that the National Flag Floats over Richmond before the 20th of July." Failure to whip the rebels by the first of January would be conclusive evidence that the Republic had been "betrayed by the folly or incompetence of its trusted leaders" and that disunion had become "a fixed fact." 36 Doubtless the "Forward to Richmond" propa- ganda, disseminated in part by impatient editors and orators outside the Tribune Office, had some effect in speeding up preparations for a contemplated drive into Confederate territory. 37 At any rate, an eager and fretful North, inclined to discount the military prowess of the Southerners and ignorant of the enormity of the task confronting General Scott and his advisers, provided a willing recipient for such doctrine, and within a fortnight, a Northern army under General McDowell moved toward Rich- mond. 38 Then came the first encounter at Bull Run, in which unforeseen developments turned a well- planned battle into an utter rout, sending soldiers, civilians, and expectant Congressmen scurrying back 35 Ibid., June 28, July 1, 1861. 36 Ibid., June 27, July 7, 1861. 37 Memoir of Thurloiv Weed (Thurlow Weed Barnes, ed.), II, 336, 337- 38 Benjamin F. Butler opines that the repetition of the "On to Richmond" slogan by the press exerted a great pressure upon the Cabinet, "to which they more or less reluctantly yielded." Auto- biography of Benjamin F. Butler, 289. 86 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE behind the fortifications of Washington. Shocked and chagrined by the unexpected outcome of the first "considerable battle," a disappointed North obeyed a natural impulse to fix responsibility for the disaster ere rising again with a renewed determination to wipe out the sting of defeat and crush the Confed- eracy. The Tribune saddled all blame upon the authori- ties at Washington for having allowed Union forces to be outmaneuvered and outnumbered, enquired what apology the government had to offer "the humiliated and astounded country," and demanded the immediate appointment of a new group of presi- dential advisers and army generals capable of under- standing the exigencies of the crisis. 39 But the en- emies of Greeley, making the most of a fickle public opinion, rose to the defense of the government and unloaded the blame at the door of the Tribune Office — the source of clamorous "On to Richmond" edi- torials alleged to have forced General Scott to ac- quiesce reluctantly in a movement destined from the start to end in a disastrous and humiliating defeat. Such an explanation gained a wide acceptance in the minds of a despondent public, and no one utilized it with more telling effect than Raymond of the Times and the vindictive Bennett of the Herald, the latter ever alert to point a telling jibe at the "ferocious Jacobins" of Spruce and Nassau Street. 40 39 Daily Tribune, July 23, 1861. *°Ne*v York Herald, July 24, 1861 ; Daily Tribune, July 24, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 87 For Greeley, the failure at Manassas proved a bitter blow, and the veteran editor, cringing under the tide of popular disapproval and condemnation, dropped once more into the abyss of despair, con- vinced that his paper had been ruined and the North- ern cause all but lost. 41 "All but insane," according to his own confession, he "resolved to bend to the storm" in a frantic endeavor to salvage what might remain of the wreckage. 42 In a famous article des- tined to incite an almost continuous round of com- ment from friends and foes, he disavowed any direct responsibility for the "Forward to Richmond" cap- tion, and denied having written or consented to the publication of an attack upon the Cabinet. Hence- forth, he promised, instead of serving the Republic by exposing the dangers which surrounded it, Tri- bune policy would be to sustain the hands of those charged with the duty of piloting the ship of state safely through the storm, now and then withholding some truth for a less troubled season in the hope that the most effective support might be rendered the government. 43 As a matter of fact, the half-insane journalist ex- perienced difficulty in extricating himself from an embarrassing situation without offense to the maxims 41 A letter from B. Brockway to Greeley (no date) indicates the extent of the latter's discouragement which his friend endeavored to counteract. Greeley MSS. 42 Letter to Moncure D. Conway, August 17, 1861. Autobiogra- phy, Memories, and Experiences of Moncure Daniel Coniuay, I, 336. 43 The article alluded to, appeared in the Daily Tribune of July 25, 1861, and was entitled "Just Once." 88 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE of truth and justice. The notorious motto had un- doubtedly originated with Warren and was repeated under the direct supervision of Charles Dana, 44 but the policy of the paper, involving a whole series of supporting editorials, received the tacit consent of Greeley, who later confessed that the offending head- liner "counselled no movement which was not in strict accordance with the emphatic judgment of the responsible Editor." 45 In accordance with the new resolution, the Tri- bune for a time displayed a more friendly attitude towards those in authority, despite the protests of many readers who regretted the exclusion of the cus- tomary fulminations. 46 It confessed that General Scott was right with regard to the advance on Rich- mond, and it termed him "the sheet-anchor of the Republic." "Let every thought of distrust be ban- 44 James H. Wilson, The Life of Charles A. Dana, 166. 45 Daily Tribune, November 16, 1861. On March 27, 1862, Charles Dana, immediately responsible for publishing the "On to Rich- mond" motto, was notified by the stockholders of the Tribune Asso- ciation that Greeley requested his dismissal from the editorial staff. Dana resigned and was appointed almost immediately by Stanton as Assistant Secretary of War. There is some question as to whether or not the Bull Run episode had anything to do with his exit. It appears likely, however, that Greeley and his associate agreed on all matters of general policy, and since, according to Greeley's own confession, the "On to Richmond" propaganda furnished no excep- tion in that respect, publication of the material to which the editor- in-chief offered no protest, could hardly have been a cause for the dismissal. It is more likely that an antagonism of dispositions, ap- parent during Dana's entire sojourn with the Tribune, brought the two newspaper men to the parting of the ways. See Wilson, 169- 171, Ingersoll, 399, and Don C. Seitz, Life of Horace Greeley, 207, 208 for various opinions. 46 Daily Tribune, July 26, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 89 ished," it advised, "while we rally around the glori- ous old Chief and save the Union." The Times re- ceived a stern rebuke for demanding the dismissal of certain members of the Cabinet, and in a spirit of revived optimism, the appeal went forth to forget the past, while all united in attempting "to work the good ship off the breakers." 47 But poor Greeley succumbed to an attack of brain fever brought on by the distress and excitement of the Bull Run episode. Conscious of the rather bun- glesome and not wholly consistent manner of bending to the storm, he believed the journal which had thus far exerted such tremendous influence in shaping the course of events, was broken down "as a power" with the nation hovering on the verge of ruin. 48 Friend Brockway mildly reproved him for not meet- ing the reverse with stoical indifference like the cool and philosophical Weed, but such invidious compari- sons only added to his discomfiture, and for weeks of sleepless days and nights, vexatious thoughts of grievous mistakes and misfortunes passed back and forth through his nerve-racked brain. 49 A week after Manassas, the disconsolate editor wrote Lincoln: "Can the rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late awful disaster? If they 47 Ibid., July 27, 30, 1861. 48 Letter to B. Brockway, August 14, 1861, Greeley MSS. Italics are Greeley's. 49 Ibid., see also, letter to Count Gurowski, September 25, 1861, Miscellaneous Greeley MS Collection. 90 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE can — and it is your business to ascertain and decide — write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And if they can not be beaten — if our recent disaster is fatal — do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. . . If the Union is irrevocably gone, an armistice for thirty, sixty, ninety, one hundred and twenty days — better still for a year — ought at once be proposed. . . Send me word what to do. I will live till I can hear it, at all events. If it is best for the country and for man- kind that we make peace with the rebels at once, and on their own terms do not shrink even from that." 50 Horace Greeley had sunk to the lowest depths of despondency, and in his discouragement, he reflected in some measure the extent to which the Bull Run disaster agitated the public mind of the North. The Tribune labored in an optimistic refrain throughout the remainder of the summer, defending the policy of the administration, and encouraging the North to redoubled efforts in prosecuting the war. Having observed the gratifying operations of General McClellan in West Virginia, 51 it heartily endorsed his appointment as McDowell's successor, and pictured a changed atmosphere at Washington with troops rapidly pouring into the city eager to crush southern resistance under the leadership of the 50 J. G. Nlcolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, IV, 365, 366. 51 Daily Tribune, July 16, 1861. A TRIAL AT ARMS 9 1 talented "young Napoleon." 52 All factions were urged to obliterate party lines and forget political differences, in order that every patriot might rally to defense of the Union. 53 Obstreperous journals should cease their scurrilous attacks upon the admin- istration, for the natural difficulties of initial war preparations had finally yielded to efficient organiza- tion. But, by the middle of October, Greeley, now thor- oughly recovered from his physical and mental de- pression, began to lose confidence in the trim young general with the high, shining boots and the digni- fied, commanding air. McClellan had a trained force of nearly one hundred forty thousand men encamped around Washington, and yet, after almost three months of patient waiting, no advance had been made toward Richmond. The Tribune warned that the nation was engaged in a life and death struggle, and if it should be clearly demonstrated that the North possessed inferior statesmen and generals whose replacement with more efficient leaders ap- peared impracticable, the only alternative was to acknowledge that inferiority and make peace with ^m*'' the Confederacy. 54 Then occurred the incident at Ball's Bluff in which a couple of thousand Union troops were incautiously thrown across the Potomac, surrounded by the en- 52 Ibid., August i, 1861. 53 Ibid., August 14, 1861. **Ibid., October 18, 1861.^ j** K 92 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE emy, and half of them lost. Colonel Baker, a prom- ising officer and Senator from California was killed in the encounter, and the incident added one more disgrace to a succession of disasters which had be- fallen Union arms since Fort Sumter. Greeley was again engulfed in impenetrable gloom. Six months had passed and the North was worse off than when the war began. Assistance rendered in securing the nomination and election of Abraham Lincoln had been the "greatest mistake of his life." Twenty million disunited people fighting on the outside of a circle could not overcome ten million, united and operating on the defensive ! 55 Perhaps even yet, the South should be permitted to depart in peace. At this point, there entered upon the scene, James R. Gilmore, a soldier of fortune who had spent con- siderable time in the South, and boasted first-hand knowledge concerning the curses of slavery. Desiring to convince Northerners of the necessity for emanci- pation, he sponsored a new magazine, designated the Continental Monthly and edited by Charles Godfrey Leland. In it there eventually appeared, alongside other specimens of anti-slavery propaganda, a series of articles entitled: Among the Pines, published un- der the pseudonym of "Edmund Kirke," but actually the handiwork of Gilmore. The contributions pre- sented an over-wrought picture of conditions exist- ing among the poor whites of the South, and they 55 James R. Gilmore, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, 42, 46. A TRIAL AT ARMS 93 were designed to arouse in the North a universal hatred of slavery. 56 In order to insure success to the new project, Gil- more enlisted the support of Robert Walker, former Governor of Kansas and now a confidant of the Lincoln regime. After the disastrous engagement at Ball's Bluff, the intrepid promoter disclosed the pro- ject to Greeley also, hoping to secure timely con- tributions from the inveterate foe of the slavehold- ing aristocracy. Failing to persuade Gilmore to dis- card the scheme and utilize the Tribune for dissem- ination of the emancipation propaganda, Greeley finally consented to write for the magazine. Before the interview terminated, however, he broached the possibility of securing for the Tribune through Walker, an advance line on administration policy. Shortly after, the Tribune dilated at some length upon the proper function of a great newspaper in time of war, insisting that the government should recognize the ability of the press "to serve the Republic by honest and fearless criticism rather than by indiscriminate laudation." 57 Ere long, Gilmore and Walker agreed upon a plan for the Continental, whereby Greeley should be furnished just enough information of government policy to prevent him from "going off on tangents," in return for which, the Tribune would be expected to advertise the new magazine and place its columns 56 The articles were later published in book form, netting the au- thor over $13,000. 57 Daily Tribune, November 20, 1861. y/ 94 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE now and then at the service of the Ex-Governor. Lincoln recognized the extreme importance of ton- ing down Tribune fulminations and approved the plan. 58 In order to inspire the confidence of Greeley, he wrote a letter, ostensibly to Walker, paying due respect to the Tribune editor for his tremendous power and influence, and promising to reveal fully the policy of the government — "its present views and future intentions when formed" — the informa- tion to be communicated by Walker, through Gil- more, to Greeley and held strictly confidential with respect to its source. 59 Gilmore again trekked to New York armed with the persuasive credential. When Greeley read its contents he beamed with delight, and the deal was consummated. 60 58 An incident alleged to have occurred during the war, if true, reveals the respect which the President entertained for the power of the press. According to the recollection of Chauncey M. Depew, Lincoln was asked at one time why he did not publish all the facts concerning an affair which had been distorted by the Tribune in such a way as to present the President in a false light before the country. Lincoln replied: "Yes, all the newspapers will publish my letter, and so will Greeley. The next day he will take a line and comment upon it, and he will keep it up, in that way, until, at the end of three weeks, I will be convicted out of my own mouth of all the things which he charges against me. No man, whether he be private citizen or president of the United States, can successfully carry on a controversy with a great newspaper, and escape destruc- tion, unless he owns a newspaper, equally great, with a circula- tion in the same neighborhood." Reminiscences of Abraham Lin- coln by Distinguished Men of His Times (A. T. Rice, ed.), 436. 59 The letter was dated November 21, 1861, and can be found in An Autobiography of Abraham Lincoln (N. W. Stephenson, ed.), 264, 265 ; it bears out the main features and attending circumstances of the arrangement with Greeley as recorded by Gilmore in his "Recollections." 00 Gilmore, 39 ff, 86-88. One must rely chiefly upon Gilmore for A TRIAL AT ARMS 95 For a time the arrangement promised to justify the expectations of its proponents. The Tribune re- frained from attacking government policy; Greeley contributed to the Continental, and received a cer- tain minimum of advice concerning contemplated moves at Washington. His informers hesitated to disclose anything of real significance, however, which led to dissatisfaction and a tendency to again become recalcitrant. Gilmore soon abandoned any serious attempt to keep the unruly ally in line, confining his end of the bargain merely to answering questions rather than volunteering information, and the Tri- bune soon turned back to the beaten path. 61 information concerning this rather peculiar arrangement between Lincoln and Greeley. Gilmore claims to have compiled his "Rec- ollections" from notes taken, either simultaneously with passing events, or shortly thereafter. With regard to the Lincoln-Greeley affair, he asserts that the original letters and memorandums in- volved in the transaction were available, and form the essential basis of his account. As already noted, the letter from Lincoln to Walker of November 21, 1861, substantiates his story, and the atti- tude of the Tribune during the late fall and winter of 1861 coin- cides, likewise, with the narrative. While one may well question the veracity of propagandists of the Gilmore type, capable of such distortions and exaggerations as appear in Among the Pines, the author of the "Recollections," appears to have rendered an account of the Lincoln-Greeley arrangement, reliable with respect to all its essential features. 61 Gilmore, 81. Sidney H. Gay succeeded Dana as managing editor of the Tribune in April, 1862, and Gilmore seems to have relied chiefly upon transmitting occasional information from Walker to him, trusting that Gay, who had considerable influence in the Tribune Office, would be able to tone Greeley down. Gilmore's opinion that Gay "softened Greeley's wrath" on various occasions, coincides with the testimony of Henry Wilson and others that the managing editor kept his chief loyal to the Union from the spring of 1862 to the end of the war. Gilmore, 81-94. g6 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE It insisted that national finances were on the verge of collapse and the currency situation desperate. 62 The government failed to display energy and vigor which corresponded with "the devotion, the efforts, the sacrifices of the People." No official manifesto had been issued by the President depicting "the causelessness, the perfidy, the baseness, of this in- fernal rebellion," and "no electric word" had gone forth to arouse the masses to greater efforts. Instead the people appeared to push the government for- ward at every stage of the contest. 63 Aroused by a complaint that certain newspapers assumed to direct the operations of the government, the Tribune re- torted "that if the chosen rulers of the country would only govern it, the journals would be content to record and approve." 64 The impatience of Greeley with McClellan in- creased with every week that passed without any sign of offensive operations. A pronounced radical, keenly anticipating emancipation as the logical and desirable outcome of the war, he distrusted the pro- slavery inclinations of the Union commander, and the Tribune set about to secure his removal from the chief command. Although no charge of disloyalty was aimed directly at him, the public was constantly reminded of a military aristocracy, composed of "the regular or West Point element" in the Union service, which had displaced such able leaders as Fremont 62 Daily Tribune, January 3, 1862. 63 Ibid., January 10, 1862. 64 Ibid., February 22, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS 97 and Sigel, thereby acquiring a practical monopoly of the conduct of the war — an aristocracy which appeared to be "far less anxious that the rebels should run than that their slaves should not." 65 The charge, repeatedly reiterated, that many high offi- cers in the Federal Army did not intend that the Confederates should be "too severely whipped," pointed plainly enough to McClellan — the ranking officer in the West Point group, and the one upon whom rested the responsibility of initiating an of- fensive movement against Richmond. 66 The Tribune welcomed the appointment of Edwin M. Stanton to head the War Department as an indi- cation that Lincoln might possibly prove capable, even yet, of effectively dealing with the national crisis. 67 The new appointee knew "no politics but devotion to the Union," and the country could expect action from one who had earnestly urged "the strik- ing of quick and heavy blows right at the heart of the abominable treason." 68 He would ferret out the pro-slavery military and naval officers — "the Washington correspondents and counsellors of the rebel generals across the Potomac" — and dispose of them in short order. 69 When the first of February arrived and found the Union Armies still encamped about Washington in 65 Weekly Tribune, January 18, 1862; Daily Tribune, April 10, 1862. 66 Daily Tribune, January 13, 1862. 67 Ibid., February 3, 7, 1862. 68 Ibid., January 14, 1862. 69 Ibid., January 21, 1862. 98 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE spite of such optimistic predictions concerning Stan- ton, the Tribune commenced stressing the danger of foreign intervention. It pointed out the customary practice of nations, including the United States, to recognize in the course of time, an insurrection which promised to be successful. The war with the South caused more economic distress and inconven- ience in England and France than in the North, and unless the rebels could be subdued by May or June, they would receive "that monarchical protection and help" which they had "sedulously courted from the start," thereby precluding all hope of a Union vic- tory. 70 The occasion demanded instant and deter- mined action on the part of every branch of the Federal government. Even Congress had contributed to the paralysis of the North by dawdling away with "two full months of words" while the nation was dying. No one should be elected to the next Congress ever known to have made a speech more than fifteen minutes long. The legislature should turn its atten- tion from the construction of ships unavailable until June and the voting of war appropriations for the next fiscal year, as well as "everything else which implies that the struggle is to be prosecuted indefin- itely," and concentrate upon the task immediately at hand. 71 At the same time, the Greeley organ lost no op- portunity to undermine public confidence in the 70 Ibid., February 5, 1862. 71 Ibid., February 6, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS 99 "young Napoleon," sedulously magnifying every rumor concerning curtailment of his authority as Commander-in-chief of the Union Armies, and fin- ally virtually accusing him of hesitating to advance on Richmond upon reflection "that he would be likely to kill several thousand good voters" whose support might be needed when he ran for President in 1864 under the banner of the "Sham Democracy." 72 The bombardment continued well into April, until at last the Tribune confessed the uselessness of prolonging further discussion, since, in spite of a conviction on the part of Stanton, almost every member of the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, and a large majority of both houses of Congress, that a change of command was desirable, the administration had definitely determined upon the favorite of pro-slavery interests to direct oper- ations in Virginia. 73 By April the long expected Union offensive got under way. Leaving his base at Fortress Monroe, McClellan cautiously advanced up the peninsula be- tween the James and York Rivers with a force of approximately one hundred thousand. The Confed- erates, handicapped by inferior numbers, slowly 72 Ibid., February 22, 1862. Seizing upon this charge, the Mc- Clellan advocates maintained that the aversion of the Tribune to the General was dependent almost entirely upon a desire to "spike his guns" at an early date in view of his possibilities as a Demo- cratic candidate for the Presidency. The Tribune replied that it had said less to shatter public confidence in McClellan than had been uttered against Secretary Welles, with whom it agreed in politics, and did not fear as a candidate in 1864. " Ibid., April 23, 1862. 100 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE retreated, so that by the middle of May, the Union pickets were in sight of Richmond. The Northern leader decided to settle down to siege operations, and in connection with various maneuvers on the part of Lee and "Stonewall" Jackson during June, let slip by an opportunity to seize the city, through his extreme cautiousness and inclination to greatly overestimate the strength of the enemy. 74 The en- gagements at Malvern Hill terminated on the first of July in a Union defeat only in the sense that Richmond still remained unmolested. But the confi- dence of the government in McClellan had been so undermined that Lincoln recalled him to Washing- ton and transferred his army to the Potomac. The hesitancy and apparent inefficiency with which the campaign had been managed seemed to bear out oft repeated accusations of the Tribune concerning the Union commander, and thus the young general un- wittingly played into the hands of that organ of public opinion which had desired his downfall. The first impulse of the Tribune, however, was to censure the authorities at Washington for the dismal outcome of the enterprise. The salient feature of the Greeley military creed — adhered to with unfal- tering persistency throughout the entire war — was the efficient utilization by the North of a decided numerical superiority. During the Peninsular cam- paign, the government was urged to reenforce Mc- Clellan so "largely and rapidly ... as to paralyze 74 J. C. Ropes, The Story of the Civil War, II, 167-169, 173, 174. A TRIAL AT ARMS IOI the energies of the Rebel masses by rendering furth- er resistance hopeless." 75 But the administration failed to obey the admonition and again a Union army had been defeated by overwhelming numbers, according to the version of the Tribune. 76 The pro-slavery journals, including the Herald and the Evening Express, likewise maintained that the campaign had failed through lack of reinforce- ments, but focused the blame on Stanton — long the particular object of their attacks — and "the Radi- cal Majority in Congress." The advance on Rich- mond had scarcely begun, when the Herald pro- fessed to have knowledge of an eruption within the Cabinet in connection with the determination of the War Secretary and other "radicals" to interfere with McClellan's plans and refuse him reinforcements. 77 In view of the failure to take Richmond, it demanded the dismissal of Stanton, Welles, and Chase. 78 The Tribune rose to their defense, and a long drawn out controversy raged between the conservative and rad- ical press, which later involved the military record of McClellan and, in the final analysis, amounted to a struggle between those who anticipated emanci- pation as the ultimate goal of the war, and those who would refrain from meddling in any manner with the institution of slavery as established in the seceding states. 79 75 Daily Tribune, June 10, 1862. 76 Ibid., July 4, 5, 1862. 77 New York Herald, April 22, 1862. 78 Daily Tribune, July 21, 1862. 79 Ibid., July 11, 21, September 13, 1862. 102 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE As a phase of the controversy, the Tribune con- tinued the hue and cry during August for the re- placement of army officers of a pro-slavery disposi- tion by efficient leaders devoted wholeheartedly to the Union cause. It would not trust those who were so outspoken for "the Union as it was, the Constitu- tion as it is, and the negroes as they are," of whom it would require as many to put down the rebellion "as of snowballs to boil a teakettle." 80 The country would be benefited if some would resign who ob- jected so strenuously to "an abolition war"; in fact, the Bull Run disaster might have been prevented and the rebellion extinguished long since, had Gen- eral Patterson, a pro-slavery sympathizer, resigned his commission before the commencement of hostili- ties, instead of playing the part of a drunken fool while the outcome of the first battle hung in the balance, the clamorous journal announced. 81 It pro- tested against the retention of Patterson and other officers alleged to have performed in a similar fash- ion at Malvern Hill, 82 and it decreed as equally unexplicable the high commands held by men of comparatively inferior ability, while superior talent, such as Buell and Burnside had to be content with subordinate positions. 83 While these condemnatory strictures fell upon Washington, General Halleck had been recalled 80 Ibid., August 6, 1862. 81 Ibid., August 13, 1862. 82 Ibid., August 21, 1862. 8 3 Ibid., August 15, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS IO3 from the West and installed as Commander-in-chief of all the Union Armies. The various Federal units in the East were consolidated and placed under the command of General Pope. Learning something of the plans of Lee and Jackson to crush his army before reinforcements could arrive from the Pen- insula, Pope retired behind the Rappahannock Riv- er, where McClellan's returning troops gradually collected in his ranks. Then, during the last days of August, completely outmaneuvered by his rivals, he suffered a crushing defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run, and the Union Army headed again toward Washington. Such a catastrophe, following close upon the fail- ure at Richmond, and supplemented by a threatened invasion of Maryland, brought down upon the heads of the government a deluge of criticism. The New York Evening Post, a pronounced anti-slavery advo- cate edited by William Cullen Bryant, questioned the ability of the administration to win the war and welcomed the reappearance of the Democratic party, in the hope that its vigorous opposition might arouse Washington to measures which would save the coun- try. The New York World, founded in i860 as a highly moral and religious sheet and later merged with the Courier and Enquirer, concurred with the Post, and added that "the weak and inefficient ad- ministration at Washington" had "forfeited all right to complain of its loss of public confidence." 84 Even 84 The Post is quoted in the Neiv York World, September 12, 1862. 104 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE Raymond and the Times begged Lincoln to give the country "a responsible cabinet" and instruct it to formulate a policy "clear in its aims and distinct in principles." 85 Only the National Intelligencer was charitable enough to confess that, if the government had committed grave errors, the people were as much at fault as those directly responsible for the conduct of affairs. 86 As for the Tribune, it had relinquished all hope u for any display of genius or decided military ca- pacity" on the part of those in command; if the North won the war it would be only through the sheer force of numbers. 87 Lincoln was reminded in his own phraseology, of the "Augers that won't bore." 88 Had not Union losses been repeatedly sus- tained as the result of disloyal and inefficient leader- ship? "O, Mr. President! Mr. Secretary of War, Mr. Commander-in-Chief Halleck," it moaned, "here is a terrible responsibility resting on some one. . . How many officers whose sympathies are with the South have you today in important posi- tions? How many whom you know to be drunkards are you allowing still to lead our heroes to sure destruction?" 89 Less than a week after the disaster at Manassas, the advance forces of Lee, under Jackson, were 85 New York Times, September 13, 1862. 86 National Intelligencer, September 4, 1862. 87 Daily Tribune, September 5, 1862. 88 Weekly Tribune, September 13, 1862. 89 Ibid., September 20, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS IO5 crossing the Potomac into Maryland. Another de- cisive victory, and that on Union territory, coupled with the successful operation of Kirby Smith and Bragg in Kentucky, the Confederate commander trusted would bring recognition from European powers and pave the way to a speedy victory. Foiled in an attempt to secure adequate supplies from Maryland sympathizers, it became necessary for Lee to open a line of communication through the Shenandoah Valley, and for that purpose he tem- porarily divided his forces, sending Jackson to cap- ture Harper's Ferry. In the meantime, the retreating army of Pope had been assigned to McClellan with orders to enter Maryland and follow Lee. While Jackson was still at Harper's Ferry, a lost dispatch fell into the hands of the Union General revealing Confederate plans, and McClellan proceeded to place himself between the forces of Lee and Jackson. Had he acted with a reasonable degree of vigor and initiative, half the enemy would have been at his mercy, but in conse- quence of the characteristic hesitation and delay, Jackson was well on his way to join Lee before the Battle of Antietam opened. 90 One of the bloodiest engagements of the war ended in a draw on Septem- ber 17, and two days later Lee recrossed the Poto- mac unhindered by his unaggressive adversary. The Tribune had optimistically assured the North that it was best for the rebels to invade Maryland, 90 Ropes, II, 340, 344-56. 106 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE since they would be placed where the Unionists could "beat them to some purpose" — if indeed they could beat them at all. 91 After the retreat, it concluded that the enemy had outwitted McClellan in trans- ferring artillery and supply trains across the river without loss, but for lack of data refused to say whether or not the Union forces were sufficiently strong to justify pursuit into Virginia. 92 In the interval preceding the next major encoun- ter, however, the Tribune continued to wield its cudgels against leaders with pro-slavery inclinations. Halleck had for sometime divided attention with McClellan as the chief object of condemnation. His order in November, 1861, barring fugitive slaves from all army camps, had precipitated an avalanche of criticism from Spruce and Nassau Street. The order was denounced as u a concession to slavery" sure to produce an exactly opposite effect from that which it was professed to effect; it indicated plainly enough that the author was "fishing for the good opinion of the rebel slaveholders." 93 After Antie- tam, Halleck received a warning that should the Grand Army be beaten again for want of reinforce- ments, the country would "hold him to a fearful responsibility," 94 and from then on, he was the vic- tim of vindictive thrusts by the Greeley journal attacking his military record in the West and brand- 91 Daily Tribune, September 9, 1862. 92 Ibid., September 30, 1862. 93 Ibid., November 23, 1861. 9 *Ibid., October 20, 1862. A TRIAL AT ARMS IO7 ing him "a Hunker Democrat of the most case- hardened Pro-Slavery type" — blows which were in no way assuaged by the alleged reference of Halleck to "a — Tribune, Abolition War!" 95 As for McClellan, there could be no question about his conservatism. Shortly after the engage- ments at Malvern Hill, he had informed Lincoln that the war should not look to "the subjugation of the people in any state" ; should involve no confis- cation of property, or "the forcible abolition of slavery." 96 The Tribune attacked his military record from every available angle at every conceivable op- portunity, 97 and persistently warned the public of his bad associates. The General was "petted and praised" by a pro-slavery cabal which had threatened from time to time to overthrow the government and set up a dictator; in fact, "every sycophant of the trait- orous Slave Power in the loyal States, every sym- pathizer with the Rebels" saw fit to swear by him. 98 At last, partly in response to the clamor of radical opinion, partly in consequence of the failure to 95 Ibid., December 15, 1863. Commenting on "General Halleck's Report," the Tribune said: "There is not a single disaster or failure for which the General-in-Chief seems to consider himself respon- sible ; not one for which he is not able to account by the dereliction in duty of some subordinate commander." Daily Tribune, December 14, 1863. 96 Letter to Lincoln, July 7, 1862, published in Daily Tribune, January 7, 1864. 97 The Tribune disposed of McClellan's report issued in de- fense of his military record in the spring of 1863, as a compilation of "errors, suppressions, inconsistencies, misstatements and perver- sions." Ibid., April 4, 1863. Q8 Ibid., October 3, 1862. 108 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE utilize the advantage gained at Antietam, and for other reasons less clearly established, the adminis- tration removed McClellan from command, and the Tribune rejoiced that one more auger had been dis- carded which would not bore." Almost two years of warfare had taken its toll. More than "one or two considerable battles" had been fought. Northern patriots had not yet cele- brated Christmas at New Orleans. And a war-scarred nation prepared for a further trial at arms. 99 Ibid., November 15, 1862. Chapter IV EMANCIPATION The war had not been in progress long, until the question of abolishing slavery forced itself upon the attention of the North. The Republican party came into power recognizing the constitutional guarantees afforded slavery where it already existed under the sanction of state laws, 1 and in his Inaugural address, Lincoln endeavored to quiet Southern indignation at the triumph of "Black Republicanism" by reassur- ing the South that the peculiar institution would not suffer molestation by any act of his administration. 2 Once the war had begun, however, a group of extreme Republicans combined with the ever per- sistent abolitionists in urging that measures be ini- tiated in the direction of freedom. Personally, Lin- coln felt the greatest antipathy toward the institution of slavery, and in the "House Divided" speech in- ferred that ultimately it would be extinguished from the land. But expediency required the consideration of other factors. Any suggestion of emancipation would be viewed with alarm most anywhere in the great Ohio Valley. 1 The Republican platform of i860 stated plainly that there should be no interference with the right of each state to order its own affairs; see The Platform Textbook, 61-63. 2 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, VI, 5. I IO HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE The people north of the Ohio River were influ- enced by a pronounced detestation of free blacks, es- pecially in so far as they entered into competition with free white labor. The population south of the river was composed in a large measure of slaveholders and those who sympathized with them or indirectly derived especial benefit from the slave system. The recognition of emancipation as a major issue of the war would be fairly certain to undermine the North- ern cause in the Northwest and drive the border states into the arms of the secessionists. Further- more, a large number of conservative Democrats in the East as well as the Northwest were willing to lay aside party considerations and cooperate with Republicans in prosecuting the war provided it were placed on the proper basis. In view of all these circumstances, Lincoln judged correctly that Northern success depended upon hold- ing in abeyance the one issue which threatened furth- er disaffection, in order that all might rally around the common objective of preserving the Union. Eschewing any sympathy with radicalism, he pro- ceeded on the simple assumption that secession was an impossibility; that the action of some states in renouncing allegiance to the Union impaired in no way their former status; and that it merely devolved upon the Federal government to compel obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land. Con- gress accepted the view of the President and imme- diately after the First Battle of Manassas, passed EMANCIPATION 1 1 1 resolutions pledging the North to non-interference with slavery and avowing the sole intention of per- petuating the Union. 3 The appeal to nationalism proved immensely effective in counteracting the dis- integrating forces within a North divided by the greatest diversity of economic and social interests. The administration program pleased the conserva- tives, quieted the fears of the border states, and, incidentally, precluded any move toward emancipa- tion except in so far as it might be interpreted as a military exigency. The views of Greeley on slavery were not greatly different from those of Lincoln. He detested the institution, had helped formulate that plank in the Republican platform which denounced its further spread over the territories, and anticipated ultimate emancipation as the only means of extirpating a national disgrace and putting forever at rest a trou- blesome and vexatious question. But he also recog- nized the demands of expediency which slightly modified his attitude toward immediate abolition and prevented collaboration with the most extreme wing of the radicals. Shortly after the call to arms, the Tribune re- jected the program of the extremists who would convert the contest into a war for the extinction of slavery, fearing the alienation of many Democrats pledged to the maintenance of the Union. On the other hand, it deprecated as equally untimely and 3 Congressional Globe, 37th Congress, 1st Session, 222, 223, 265. I 12 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE unreasonable, any pledge to the South that the exist- ence of slavery would not be jeopardized as the result of a Northern victory. The ultimate status of slavery, it warned, would depend largely upon how the slaveholders conducted themselves. If they proved to be merely the dupes of political aspirants and indicated a readiness to overthrow the domina- tion of disloyal demagogues, they would retain their favorite institution. But should they persist in the error of their ways, thereby protracting the war and threatening the life of the nation, all patriots, Democrat as well as Republican, would eventually respond with the decree that "The Republic must live, even though Slavery should have to die!" 4 Between the lines of such a pronouncement it is not difficult to perceive a faint outline of the policy to which the Tribune was to adhere rather consist- ently during the emancipation controversy. Greeley realized the futility of advocating liberation of the slaves as a primary objective of the war. No per- manent ground would be gained for freedom with- out a decisive Union victory — an extremely dubious result if abolition should drive a formidable wedge of dissension into a North already far from a unit in sentiment and purpose. Preservation of the Union, then, should be emphasized as the sole objective of the war. If the government would advance in the direction of emancipation as rapidly as public opin- ion could be educated to accept it as a war measure, 4 Daily Tribune, May 14, 1861. EMANCIPATION 113 the editorial chief would be satisfied; for thus in time, there would be achieved indirectly that which otherwise appeared outside the range of possibility. Would the Government advance rapidly enough ! — that was the question. During the latter part of May, 1861, General Butler, then in command at Fortress Monroe, issued the first pronouncement concerning the status of slavery in so far as it related to war operations, by declaring that fugitive blacks formerly employed on Confederate fortifications were "contraband of war." 5 Northern opinion seemed to approve his course and the administration did not see fit to alter it. The Tribune heartily endorsed the procedure, concluding that surely enough "negro slaves, belong- ing to Secessionists and Rebels, are contraband com- modities." 6 A little later, it spoke optimistically of the "good work of enlightenment" which would eventually permit a still more advanced stand in behalf of the negro without alienating War Demo- crats and other conservatives. 7 Immediately following the first disaster at Ma- nassas, the Tribune evinced such disappointment and impatience with the toleration accorded in official circles to the peculiar institution that it temporarily overstepped the criterion of military necessity and argued that peace would be no peace and treaties 5 James F. Rhodes, History of the United States, III, 466. 6 Daily Tribune, May 29, 1861. 7 Ibid., June 5, 1861. 1 14 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE misnomers if the status of slavery remained un- changed at the close of the war, since the free states would be guaranteed no protection from further southern inroads and all u the weary work of the last thirty years . . . with its agitations, excitements, mobs, lynchings" would be in vain. 8 But the Greeley organ refrained from repeating such extreme radi- calism and soon turned back upon a more moderate course. During August, Congress passed the First Con- fiscation Act, the fourth section of which gave free- dom to all slaves employed on Confederate fortifica- tions or contributing in any direct manner to military or naval operations. 9 The law accomplished little outside of placing the official stamp of approval on the earlier contention of General Butler, and the status of ordinary fugitives who poured into Union camps in large numbers still remained undetermined. Congress and the administration had not moved rapidly enough toward freedom to satisfy the Tri- bune, which again sounded a rather extreme note, strongly inferring that the time had arrived when slavery should die as "an insurgent and an outlaw" plotting to disrupt and overthrow the nation. 10 Before the close of the month, General Fremont, in command of the Union forces in Missouri, de- creed the confiscation of property of all those who 8 Ibid., July 31, 1861. 9 Wood row Wilson, A History of the American People, Docu- mentary Edition, VII, 286. 10 Daily Tribune, August 21, 1861. EMANCIPATION 115 had taken arms against the Union, and provided for the freeing of their slaves. Such drastic action natur- ally pleased the radicals but frightened the Unionists of Kentucky, a border state just then trembling in the balance. After a suggestion of modification had met with a cool reception at Fremont headquarters, Lincoln ordered that the audacious general change his order to conform with the First Confiscation Act. Greeley had for some years been a staunch Fre- mont supporter. He refused to believe the charges of incompetency hurled at the radical idol, and to the very last defended his military record with all the earnestness and enthusiasm with which he had endeavored to besmirch that of McClellan. The Tribune maintained that the Fremont proclamation, while making no direct reference to the First Confis- cation Act, proceeded on the principles set forth therein. "We do not understand the President as at all denying the soundness of the principles upon which General Fremont acted," it explained, "nor the authority of a commanding general to do in ex- treme cases precisely what he did, and when de- manded by the imminence of the Crisis." 1X This version of the Missouri incident was merely a lame effort to soften the rebuff which Fremont had met at the hands of Lincoln, and to minimize the 11 "There is nothing in the history of the present position of the Administration which leads us to suppose that its modification of Gen. Fremont's proclamation is anything more than an indication of its policy toward Kentucky; perhaps its temporary policy there," commented the Tribune of October 19, 1861. I I 6 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE setback which the repudiation of his proclamation administered to the progress of emancipation; for as a matter of fact, the act of Congress and the Fremont order involved entirely different principles, and Lincoln had indicated no sympathy either with the principles or the methods utilized by the pre- sumptuous general. A few days later the Tribune sought a small measure of consolation in the thought that the modified proclamation would at least have full effect during the interval of approximately ten days between its promulgation and subsequent modi- fication. It branded the existing law as "a premium on insurrection" and a reward for aiding the enemy, since it offered emancipation only to those who took up arms against the Union or in some way aided the rebellion, and concluded that the Fremont method of dealing with the situation might be found "after all the wiser." 12 Nevertheless, the Tribune would not "judge the government," but preferred "to follow and support it." Possibly the rebels would yet be conquered with- out decreeing the liberation of their slaves, but if not, and two or three more reverses were necessary "to educate the loyal mind of the country up to the decisive point," it would regret the necessity but humbly acquiesce. 13 A notification to Southern slave- holders that they would "be held legally negroless" unless the rebellion ceased within a specified time, 12 Daily Tribune, September 18, 1861. 13 Ibid., October 2, 1861. EMANCIPATION 117 offered the most effective means of dealing with the conspiracy, 14 the Tribune insisted still later, but if the loyal, Union-loving masses of the North still re- mained unconvinced that slavery and treason were inseparable, it would continue to wait for a more convenient season. 15 The action of Secretary Cameron during the lat- ter part of October, ordering General Sherman to utilize fugitive slaves in any capacity deemed most useful to the service, was accepted at Spruce and Nassau Street as an encouraging indication of steady and unmistakable progress in the proper direction. 16 The annual report of the War Secretary assumed a still more advanced position by urging the use of fugitive slaves u for the defense of the Government, the prosecution of the war, and the suppression of the rebellion," the matter of arming them to be con- sidered only in the light of military exigencies. Al- though the report had already gone out to some of the newspapers, Lincoln modified the pronounce- ment before submitting it with his annual message despite the protests of Cameron, and again the radicals complained. 17 14: Ibid., October 14, 1861. 15 Ibid., October 17, 1861. 16 Ibid., October 29, 1861. 17 Ibid., December 4, 5, 1861. Kentucky was aroused at the atti- tude of Cameron, and demanded that the President oust him from the Cabinet. But the Tribune had no interest in making conces- sions as a matter of policy to a state which it alleged was "mainly rebel''" and was presided over by a Governor "a traitor at heart." Ibid., December 25, 1861. I I 8 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE The Tribune expressed keen disappointment at the modification. It hammered away at the govern- ment for some months, requesting, not that the negroes be invited to fight for the Union, "but that they be invited to cease aiding the Rebellion and supplied with a solid reason for so doing"; 18 plead- ing, not necessarily for an emancipation proclama- tion, but for a guarantee of freedom to those who would desert their masters and ally themselves with the Union cause. 19 In every phase of the emancipation propaganda, whether the government was being urged to a more advanced position concerning the status of slavery, or public opinion was being aroused to the accept- ance and espousal of partial or complete liberation of the slaves, Tribune readers faced the argument of military necessity in all its various ramifications. All "abstract considerations" were put aside. Others might set forth the undeniable facts concerning the wrongfulness of the accursed institution, but slavery "as an element of power" in the tremendous strug- gle which threatened the life of the nation merited first consideration. 20 In order to end the war for the Union speedily and triumphantly, the North should not hesitate to utilize the "readiest and most efficient means" at hand. If the President would see fit to ™Ibid., May i, 1862. 19 Ibid., May 12, 1862. 20 Ibid., May i, 1862. The policy advocated by the opposition was "being defended on Political grounds alone," the people were informed. Ibid., August 26, 1862. EMANCIPATION 119 advise the South that the Federal government would henceforth refuse to recognize slaveholding by rebels, the Union commanders would at once witness "a general stampede of slaves from all the districts within fifty miles of any Union force" directly to their camps. 21 And such an additional array of man power, if properly utilized, would prove of inesti- mable value to the Northern cause. But the government could never hope to convert the negroes into enemies of their masters unless it treated them as friends, Lincoln was forewarned. As long as they were not recognized as allies of the North, the great mass of four million blacks, at the very best, would remain neutrals in the contest. At any time, the Confederate government, in despera- tion might appeal to them for assistance, thus con- verting slavery into "an element of positive and terrible strength" to the enemy. 22 An army of no less than six hundred thousand strong men accustomed to living upon a minimum of food, requiring little cloth- ing, patient of hardship, and above all, "not likely to be over-sentimental about killing white folks," would thereby be placed at the disposal of the Rich- mond government by the simple promise of freedom 21 Ibid., December 16, 1861. 22 Ibid., October 19, 1861. "No act of Confiscation will bring present help to the Union cause," asserted the Tribune. "Confiscate a Rebel's plantation and it remains where it always was — doing you no good ; emancipate his slaves, and they escape to our lines at the earliest moment, to render us such help as they may. Mean- time, they cost as much in watching as they are worth." Ibid., May 29, 1862. 120 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE which the North had thus far grudgingly withheld. 23 The proper pronouncement from Washington would not only weaken the enemy by compelling the retention of half the armed rebels at home to patrol runaway negroes, but it would present the Northern cause before the eyes of the world as a struggle for universal freedom — the only adequate method of nullifying "the ill wishes of European despots and aristocrats." 24 The controversy over emancipation became so acute and occupied such an important place in the public mind during the year 1862, that Northern leaders were oftentimes judged partially or exclu- sively by their attitude toward the all absorbing question of the day. After his removal by Lincoln for incompetency, Fremont still continued to fawn in the adulations of the radicals, who remembered his anti-slavery propensities and insisted that he be reinstated in an important command. According to conservatives of a pro-slavery hue, the military record of McClellan stood above reproach, the "sec- ond Napoleon" having fallen victim to a gigantic political conspiracy; while radicals endeavored to grind him to bits with repeated charges of ineffi- ciency, incompetency, and disloyalty. That the Tribune imbibed such prejudices is per- fectly apparent. The attitude assumed towards Fre- mont, in contrast with McClellan and every other 23 Ibid., January 20, 1862. 2 *Ibid., May 24, 1862. EMANCIPATION 121 general suspected of pro-slavery inclinations, needs no rehearsing. Secretary Cameron was not accepted for the war portfolio with any marked degree of en- thusiasm, but when he stepped out in the direction of emancipation, thenceforth the Tribune vigorous- ly defended him against all critics, 25 charitably over- looked alleged corruptions as the work of "unprofit- able friends," 26 and praised the management of the War Department to the skies. 27 His successor met a similar generous reception, since he was expected to purge the Army of pro-slavery leadership and fall in line with the radical program. Stanton played a prominent role in the McClellan controversy, and in the lively exchange of uncomplimentary epithets, often needed, and could always rely upon, the stout defense and unmitigated commendation of the most influential journal in the country. 28 Secretary Chase, the leading representative of radicalism in the Lin- coln Cabinet and one who fought up to the mark on emancipation, 29 experienced not a single unfavorable criticism from the Tribune, while column after col- umn defended his financial measures and in general sang his praises throughout the entire period of the American conflict. 30 25 Ibid., November 30, 1861. 26 Ibid., January 14, 1862. 27 Ibid., November 5, 1861. 2& Ibid., February 18, May 6, 1862. 29 See letter of Chase to Greeley on the nullification of Hunter's proclamation, Alonzo Rothschild, Lincoln, Master of Men, 179. 30 For typical references see Daily Tribune, November 16, 1861 ; June 12, 1862; December 11, 1863. 122 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE As the war progressed, public opinion in the North shifted gradually in the direction of emanci- pation. Lincoln sensed the trend of events. He favored the abolition of slavery provided it could be accomplished in the proper way. Furthermore, to convert the conflict into a struggle for freedom as well as for preservation of the Union, promised to elicit a favorable response in Europe and perhaps forestall recognition of the Confederacy. March 6, 1862, in a special message to Congress, the Presi- dent proposed a plan of emancipation with compen- sation calling for the payment of four hundred dol- lars to owners of negroes in the loyal slave states for each slave freed. 31 Although distinctly opposing any further con- cessions to the border states, the Tribune welcomed the proposition as an evidence that the government had at last headed in the right direction, and it pre- dicted that the sixth of March would yet be cele- brated "as a day which initiated the Nation's deliv- erance from the most stupendous wrong, curse and shame of the Nineteenth Century." 32 It interpreted the move as an indication that the President realized rebellion could not be permanently suppressed in the South as long as slavery existed, and thanked God that the country had "so wise a ruler." 33 31 The Times opposed the plan of emancipation with compensa- tion on the basis of excessive cost. For Lincoln's correspondence with Raymond on that point, see Selections from Abraham Lincoln (A. S. Draper, ed.), 109, no. 32 Daily Tribune, March 7, 1862. ™Ibid., March 8, 1862. EMANCIPATION 1 23 Representatives in Congress from the states af- fected by Lincoln's proposal did not take so kindly to the measure, however. They professed to have gained the notion that the plan virtually threatened compulsory emancipation as the only alternative of its rejection. In order to clear up the misunderstand- ing and present the proposition in its true light, Lincoln held a conference with several border state men. He discovered that the erroneous impression, whether genuine or feigned, originated in the col- umns of the Tribune, which had held out but slight hope for acceptance of compensated emancipation by those immediately concerned and yet inferred strongly that the President had determined upon the complete abolition of slavery as a necessary adjunct of permanent peace. 34 Upon receiving the assurance of the President that no thought of compulsory emancipation was involved, the border state repre- sentatives requested that the fact be published, but Lincoln refused on the ground that such procedure would force him into a quarrel with the "Greeley faction" and the Tribune — a quarrel which he did not care to encounter "before the proper time" and would avoid altogether if possible. 35 In the end, emancipation with compensation met with little favor either in Congress or among the people of the states concerned, and the matter was dropped. 34 See the preceding reference. 35 Taken from a memorandum of J. W. Crisfield, a border state Congressman, Abraham Lincoln, Complete Works (J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, eds.), II, 135. 124 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE During the first part of May, the Union com- mander in South Carolina, General Hunter, acting on his own initiative but with the approval of Chase and other radicals, issued a proclamation declaring all the slaves free in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida on the ground that slavery and martial law were incompatible. The Tribune hailed the order as "a great fact" pointing "the way to unity and vic- tory," 36 only to be apprized a few days later that the decree had been reversed. Once more the disap- pointed journal consented to bow to the decision of the President, consoling itself with the general tone of Lincoln's proclamation superseding the rescinded order, which it interpreted as clearly establishing the power of the military to utilize emancipation as a war measure. "No doubt," it concluded hopefully, "the single question was, though not avowed, wheth- er the time for exercising that power had arrived, and whether, when exercised, it could not be more appropriately done by the Commander-in-chief, the President himself." 37 In the meantime, it would be patient and trust the cause of liberation to further enlightenment of public opinion. Once the loyal peo- ple of the North were fully convinced that slavery would have to succumb in order that the nation might live, the government would "not be found impeding the course dictated by National integrity and safety." 38 36 Daily Tribune, May 16, 1862. 37 Ibid., May 20, 29, 1862. 38 Ibid., May 29, June 16, 1862. EMANCIPATION 1 25 During July, Congress dealt once more with the disturbing slavery issue by passing the Second Con- fiscation Act, granting freedom to the slaves of all persons resisting the Union wherever such blacks came under the cognizance of the military arm of the government. It also authorized the President to employ as many negroes as he deemed necessary to suppress the rebellion in any capacity most likely to promote the public welfare. 39 Lincoln considered the law of doubtful constitutionality, and he hesitated to utilize its most drastic provisions, especially with respect to arming blacks for military purposes. The act met all the requirements of the Greeley program as related to the factor of military neces- sity, but the Tribune predicted at once u a faithless, insincere, higgling, grudging execution" of the "most righteous and vital measure." 40 A war bulletin is- sued within a few days directing the Union com- manders in disloyal territory to employ negroes as laborers, with no reference to their being freed, seemed to indicate that the administration contem- plated the execution of the Confiscation Act with indifference, and the Tribune immediately launched upon a vigorous campaign designed to compel Lin- coln to fight up to the advanced position marked out by Congress. 41 39 United States Statutes at Large, XII, 591, 592, sections 9, and 11 of the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862. 40 Daily Tribune, July 19, 1862. 41 Ibid., July 23, 1862. The Tribune had expressed the same concern with respect to an act of Congress of the preceding March 126 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE It demanded that the President issue "a brief, frank, stirring Proclamation recognizing the Confis- cation-Emancipation Act as the law of the land, and the basis of the new war policy resolved on by the Nation," and explicitly instructing every military and naval commander to rigorously enforce its pro- visions. 42 The simple fact that half the Army officers were "notoriously in more or less sympathy" with the rebellion and were anxious to have the war "so delicately prosecuted" that slavery would suffer the least possible disturbance, rendered an official pro- mulgation of the law especially necessary. 43 "Mr. President!", the Greeley organ cried, "favor the citizens so soon to be transformed by your call into soldiers with an edifying example of perfect obedi- ence to law." 44 Meanwhile, Lincoln had determined upon a tenta- tive emancipation proclamation applicable to the seceding states, which he presented to the Cabinet on July 22. Although considered more or less favorably by every one with the possible exception of Blair, the suggestion of Seward prevailed that its announce- ment in the face of repeated Northern reverses would be quite generally interpreted as a sign of forbidding the rendition of slaves by any one in the Military or Naval service of the government, alleging that many officers were systematically defying it because it had not been officially pro- claimed and specific orders issued concerning obedience to its provisions. Ibid., April 19, 1862. 42 Ibid., July 25, 1862. 4S Ibid., July 28, 1862. 44 Ibid., August 5, 1862; see also, letter to Mrs. R. M. Whipple, August 6, 1862, Greeley Letters, Library of Congress Transcripts. EMANCIPATION 1 27 weakness. 45 Consequently the momentous document was temporarily pigeon-holed to await a more con- venient season. But these proceedings were not known outside official and semi-official circles. When weeks passed without any response from the White House to the Tribune appeals relative to the confiscation measure, the patience of Greeley approached the breaking point. Convinced that a majority of the people fav- ored his contention, he resolved to focus the entire weight of public opinion upon the unyielding Lincoln through the medium of an open letter addressed to the President setting forth the alleged hopes and desires of the loyal masses in the North. According to Gilmore, advance rumors of the appeal reached the White House, and a conference ensued between Lincoln, Walker, and Gilmore, in which it was finally decided to head off the movement by furnish- ing the exasperated Greeley some information con- cerning the waiting emancipation proclamation. But the effort was tardy, for the next morning there ap- peared in the Tribune columns the famous "Prayer of Twenty Millions." 46 The appeal was not primarily for an emancipation proclamation. To be sure, the letter expressed an opinion that the President might have dealt the re- bellion a staggering blow in its infancy by holding 45 Gideon Welles, Lincoln and Seward, 211, 212; Seward at Washington, 1861-1872 (F. W. Seward, ed.), 118. 46 James R. Gilmore, Personal Recollections of Abraham Lincoln and the Civil War, 75, 76. 128 HORACE GREELEY AND THE TRIBUNE out the threat of emancipation in his Inaugural ad- dress, but the burden of the "prayer" concerned an ungrudging execution of the laws — especially the recently enacted confiscation measure — by "publicly and decisively" instructing all subordinates that such laws existed and were "to be obeyed to the letter." 47 Replying similarly, in a public dispatch, the versa- tile President judiciously avoided the law enforce- ment issue and announced a policy involving the sole objective of saving the Union, relative to which all other issues — including the status of slavery — would be subordinated and considered only with ref- erence to their utility in achieving the ultimate goal. 48 The pronouncement was widely read, and the simple, direct manner of presenting the issue exerted a great influence on the public mind. The Tribune countered with the familiar charge of failure to execute the laws, but to little purpose. 49 The complaint voiced later that Lincoln had side-stepped the problem im- mediately at hand and merely used the "Prayer" as an excuse for expounding public policy, was doubtless not far from the truth, but not so apparent to the 47 Daily Tribune, August 20, 1862. The Times did not consider it very modest of its neighbor to issue the "Prayer" in the name of "twenty millions of people," averring that "it was a bold assump- tion to claim to represent the view of so vast a constituency." "The President, not yet seeing the propriety of abdicating in behalf of our neighbor, consoles him with a letter that assures the country of abundant sanity in the White House," it commented. Ne 99> 10 7> 204; indicts pro- slavery leaders, 96-97, 99, 102, 104, 106-107; welcomes Stan- ton as War Secretary, 97 ; warns of foreign intervention, 98; emancipation policy, 111- 114, 116; endorsement of But- ler's 'Contraband" theory, 113; supports Fremont's con- fiscation order, 115, 116; ap- proves Cameron's fugitive slave order, 117-118; on emancipation as a military necessity, 11 8-120; supports radical leaders, 120-121 ; in- terferes with Lincoln's eman- cipation plans, 123 ; welcomes Hunter's emancipation proc- lamation, 124; demands en- forcement of the Second Con- fiscation Act, 125-126; "Pray- er of Twenty Millions," 127- 129; defends the Emancipation Proclamation, 131, 135-137; defends Burnside, 139; advo- cates Cabinet changes, 140; supports foreign intervention, 143 ; attitude toward the Lee invasion and General Meade, 146-148; war optimism, 150- 151 ; loyalty to Grant, 151-152, INDEX 229 154; criticism of the Niagara peace maneuvers, 167-168; quarrel with Welles, 178-179; favors radical leaders, 179, 187-188; favors postponement of the Republican nomination in 1864, 184-185; applauds the Pomeroy Circular, 186; backs the Fremont nomination, 187- 189 ; refuses to support Lincoln in 1864, 190-191; unique sys- tem for nominating candi- dates, 197; conversion to Lin- coln after the fall of Atlanta, 204-205 ; peace proposals in 1865, 206-208; reconstruction views, 209 Trumbull, Lyman, 28, 199 Tyler, John, 12 Vallandigham, C. L., 141, 192 Van Buren, Martin, 8, 185 Vicksburg, 145, 148, 152, 168 Wade, Benjamin, 136 n., 174, 183, 185, 199 Wade-Davis bill, 174, 177, 179, 197 Walker, Robert, 93-94, 127 War appropriations, 98, 136 n. War Democrats, 113, 174, 191 War Department, 68, 97, 121 Warren, Fitz Henry, 83 War sentiment, 75-76, 78 Weed machine, 29, 32, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70 Weed, Thurlow, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 20, 21, 23 n., 25, 27, 30, 3i, 32, 33, 34, 36, 58, 59, 64, 65, 66, 6y, 69, 89, 141 n., 174, 178, 189, 195 Welles, Gideon, 69, 70, 99 n., 101, 169, 174, 178, 180 n. Western confederacy, 156, 192 Western Reserve, 49, 134 West Point element, 96-97, 188 Whig Central Committee, 10 Whig nomination, 13, 14 Whig party, 8, 15, 18, 22, 25 Wilderness route, 152, 194 Wilson, Henry, 26, 95 n., 136 n., 183 Worcester Disunion Convention, 40 i a r*- if. n •*> ^ It* ^0 •> Qy 171 South Main Avenue Albany 3. 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