i^-.- 
 
 s;^"^ 
 
 ,' \ 
 
 ■m 
 
 I': 
 
 \t^
 
 L I B RAFLY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 U N IVEI^S ITY 
 
 or ILLINOIS 
 
 -4
 
 LORD LYTTELTON'S SPEECH 
 
 IN THE HOUSE OF LOEDS 
 ON THE THIRD READING 
 
 OF THE 
 
 AUSTRALIAN COLONIES 
 GOVERNMENT BILL, 
 
 July 5, 1850. 
 
 PUBLISnED FOR THE SOCIETY FOR THE REFORM OF 
 COLONIAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 LONDON: 
 JOHN W. PARKER, WEST STRAND. 
 
 MDCCCL.
 
 S P E E C H, 
 
 ETC. 
 
 My Lords, 
 
 This Bill has been to some extent altered, and, 
 I suppose, improved, in the Committee. But it is still so far 
 short of what, as it seems to me, a Bill should be for the 
 government of the Australian Colonies, that I am anxious to 
 take this, the last opportunity that will occur, of making some 
 remarks on the general question involved in it. 
 
 My Lords, I have certainly seen the progress of this bill 
 with much disappointment and regret, because I believe that 
 in passing it we are losing the best opportunity that has ever 
 occurred — an opportunity that we may never have again — of 
 introducing a real reform in our Colonial system. I am 
 adverting, and shall advert, mainly to one point in such a 
 reform, because, by universal admission, and particularly by 
 the repeated declarations of the noble Earl (Lord Grey) 
 opposite, it is instar omnium — and this bill, as I will attempt 
 to show, makes no approach to it — the concession to the 
 Colonies of real self-government in their own local affairs. 
 
 My Lords, this principle is not only important in what 
 evidently and directly belongs to it, but because almost all 
 the rest of the question depends upon it. The best illus- 
 tration of this is to be found in that important point of detail 
 which has already been matter of discussion in this House — 
 the question of a second Legislative Chamber in the consti- 
 tution of a Colony. One objection to the establishment of
 
 such a chamber in the Australian Colonies has been, that 
 there are no adequate materials in their societies for its 
 composition. But it is precisely because we have not given 
 them self-government — because our Colonists have not felt, 
 in going out to and settling in the Colonies, that they have 
 taken with them that which is the pride and birthright of 
 Englishmen at home, and admitted to be a main source of 
 the excellence of our institutions- -conti'ol over their own 
 affairs — that the composition of their society has fallen short 
 of what we should wish to see it, and therefore affords (if it 
 be so) no sufficient materials for a Second or Upper Cham- 
 ber. Whereas, if we really gave them self-government, we 
 might hope that all the rest would follow, both as to this 
 particular point, and as to fitness for all other political 
 privileges. 
 
 My Lords, that the Colonies have not this power of self- 
 government, as long as an official department at home has 
 an universal power of disallowance over all their local enact- 
 ments on all subjects, great and small, is to me so self-evi- 
 dent, that I do not know how any argument could make it 
 clearer than it is. It is unaccountable how any one can 
 suppose that it is any answer to this statement to allege, as 
 the noble Earl did the other night, that, in point of fact, of 
 a given number — 100 or 120 — of bills passed by the local 
 legislatures, only a small proportion, five or six, were actually 
 disallowed by the Colonial Office. The point is not that a 
 certain number, more or less, of such bills is or is not dis- 
 allowed, but that the whole number might be disallowed, and 
 the Colonists cannot possibly tell which of them will be so or 
 not. We should endeavour to look at this question in a 
 more comprehensive manner. The question is not whether 
 the Colonists may or may not be living under laws which 
 
 .<'^\
 
 were mostly made by themselves, but what the effect of our 
 political system, as regards the Colonies, is upon the Colonial 
 mind — upon the minds of those at home, who may be think- 
 ing of becoming Colonists — and what is the general impression 
 of that system upon the world. 
 
 The Colonists cannot possibly feel that they have any 
 real self-goyernment, as long as the ultimate control over 
 all their affairs resides in a power at the Antipodes : and, 
 therefore, none of the beneficial effects can be had which 
 would follow from such a feeling. 
 
 We say, then, that the first and only effectual step to- 
 wards a real reform is the abolition and destruction, as to 
 the local affairs of the Colonies, of this disallowing power 
 of the Colonial Office. My Lords, this general disallowing 
 power, vested in a department at home, is a new power. 
 It was provided by a special clause in the New South Wales 
 Constitutional Act a few years ago. How long before that 
 time it was practically in force T shall not inquire: but I 
 say it is not a part of the old and famous constitution of 
 our first American Colonies. I am not speaking of that 
 ancient provision, repeated in this Bill, that no local legisla- 
 tion shall be contrary to the laws of England. I have no 
 great objection to that, which is an ancient and respectable 
 provision, supposing it to be executed in the way in which 
 it was originally intended.. Her Majesty's Ministers are 
 probably acquainted with an able work by one of their 
 colleagues, Mr. George Lewis, on the " Government 
 of Dependencies." In that work will be found a careful 
 examination of the manner in which that provision has 
 opei'ated : and it will be seen how indefinite and inde- 
 terminate it was. But at all events it depended — not, as I 
 apprehend it does now, on the dixit of the Colonial Office,
 
 or the mere opinion of the law-officers of the Crown, but, 
 as being a question of the construction of a statute, on the 
 ordinary course of law ; and this makes the whole difference 
 as to the confidence of the Colonists in the system, which is 
 the main point, and to which I shall further advert pre- 
 sently. 
 
 But the disallowing power exercised by the authority of 
 the Crown at home is not to be found in the chaitered 
 constitution I refer to. I shall not attempt to prove this in 
 detail. It is admitted not to have existed in one of them, 
 and that the best of all — Lord Baltimore's Charter for the 
 government of Maryland. But I will take the Charter the 
 most different from that of Maryland, and the case being 
 proved with respect to that, I should submit that, a fortiori^ it 
 is proved with regard to the earlier ones. I take the Charter 
 of Pennsylvania. That Charter was passed in 1681 — a 
 period of arbitrary power— a comparatively late period.; and 
 it is a Charter which undoubtedly is a very restrictive Charter, 
 compared with the former ones, and which is said by 
 Grahame, and other writers of authority, to differ from them 
 in this very respect, that it contains this general disal- 
 lowing power of the Crown. My Lords, this is an inaccu- 
 rate statement. The Charter undoubtedly contains a pro- 
 vision, that all Bills passed by the Colonial Legislature 
 should be sent home to England for consideration. But for 
 what purpose, and with what limitations ? The following is 
 the substance of the words : — ' To the end the said Wm. 
 Penn, &c., may not hereafter by misconstruction of the 
 powers aforesaid depart from that faith and allegiance, &c., 
 which they owe unto us, &c., by colour of any extent or 
 largeness of powers hereby given, or of any laws to be made 
 in such province by virtue of such powers: our will is that a
 
 transcript of such laws shall within five years after the 
 making thereof be transmitted to the Privy Council, &c.: 
 And if any of the said laws be declared by us inconsistent with 
 the sovereignty or lawful prerogative of us, &c., or contrary to 
 the faith and allegiance due to the legal government of this 
 realm from the said William Penn, &c.: then such laws shall 
 become void : otherwise the said laws shall remain and stand 
 in full force," &c.* 
 
 Now, this is distinctly not a general disallowing power. 
 It is a provision for doing that which we also propose to do 
 in another way — namely, to distinguish between subjects of 
 Imperial and those of merely Colonial concern ; and to 
 reserve to the Crown, as there ought to be reserved, control 
 over the former, while it is relinquished over the latter class 
 of subjects. I say, then, that this very Charter is the best 
 proof of the position I advance. 
 
 Now, the first objection made to the removal of this dis- 
 allowing power is founded upon the alleged prerogative of 
 the Crown : that favourite bugbear, which her Majesty's 
 Government, being such a very Whig Government, are 
 perpetually thrusting in our faces. My Lords, we do not 
 touch the prerogative of the Crown. That prerogative, as 
 has so often been said, is not exercised by the Crown 
 directly, but through its ministers and delegates ; and we 
 say, in this case, it should be exercised as fully as now, but 
 not through the minister at home, but through the minister 
 of the Crown on the spot, the Governor of the Colony. The 
 power of the Crown over the Governor is absolute, both of ap- 
 pointment and dismissal ; and I should propose that the con- 
 nexion should be even more close than it now is, for that he 
 should be paid, not as now, from the Colonial funds, but by 
 * Lucas's Charters of the Old English Colonies, p. 103.
 
 8 
 
 the mother-country; and he should have the full powers of 
 suspension and veto over all the local legislation. 
 
 Then, it is said, that by this you would give nothing to 
 the Colonies ; for, if their legislation is to be absolutely con- 
 trolled, it may as well be by the Colonial Office as by the 
 Colonial Governor. And another form of this objection, 
 which has been also applied by the noble Earl to the propo- 
 sition of a Second Chamber, is, that no provision is made 
 against the obstruction of the machine of government, which 
 by this system would be in the power of one branch of the 
 Legislature. Now, in the first place, there is a vast difference 
 between an absolute power on the spot, and one 15,000 
 miles off. But, in the next place : of course, here is a 
 theoretical difficulty, but it is no more than a theoretical 
 difficulty ; for if it is, why does it not apply further ? 
 Why does it not apply to this country ? In this country, it 
 is in the power of any of the branches of the Legislature to 
 stop the progress of the government. Why is it not done ? 
 Of course, we know the reply. It is because of the 
 public opinion and feeling of the country generally, 
 vrhich acts upon the Legislature ; so that, in the long run, 
 the people of this country are really self-governed. So it 
 would be in the Colonies, if we would trust them. The 
 objection is a part of that general notion by which we look 
 upon the Colonists as children, as something inferior to our- 
 selves, and therefore not fit to be trusted with political 
 privileges ; and this idea verifies itself, and they become 
 not fit to be so trusted, because we will not deal with them 
 as if they were. 
 
 How is it then under the actual system ? No doubt, there 
 is a public opinion in the Colonies on these matters, but it 
 cannot act. It can act, more or less, upon the Colonial
 
 9 
 
 Governor ; but he gets out of the way of it ; he declines from 
 it, because he is not the real depositary of power. He 
 shelters himself, whenever he pleases, under the shadow of 
 the Colonial Office, so that the public opinion of the colony 
 passes by him and cannot reach him. Nor can it act — I do 
 not say in a few very great matters, but in the ninety-nine 
 out of a hundred cases which are comparatively small, but 
 which go to make up the ordinary political life of the Colony 
 — upon the Colonial Office, which is the real depositary of 
 power : because it is too weak to act with any effect. Thus, 
 where it could act, it has nothing to act upon ; and when it 
 has something to act upon, it is too weak to do so. 
 
 Again, as to public feeling in this country, which might 
 act upon the Colonial Office, it is simply non-existent. On 
 some few occasions of unusual importance about Colonial 
 matters, a ferment and agitation is created here, proportioned 
 to the magnitude of the subject and the ignorance of those 
 who feel it ; but, as before, I am speaking of the great mass 
 of subjects, and, concerning those, there is and can be no 
 feeling in this country to interfere wdth the Colonial Office. 
 That Office, therefore — and I am speaking of things quce ipse 
 vidi, et quorum pars parva fui — is not only to the Colonies a 
 distant power, with all the inconvenience of that distance, 
 but practically an irresponsible power. 
 
 In order to assign to the Colonies themselves the control 
 over matters of merely local concern, a distinction must be 
 made between such matters and those of Imperial interest, 
 which should be reserved for the home authority. Now^, it 
 seems sufficient to those who oppose this proposition to say, 
 ' Oh, it is quite impossible : you cannot make such a dis- 
 tinction ; and when you had attempted it, you would only 
 give occasion for endless litigation.' On both ])oints the
 
 10 
 
 objection seems to me insufficient. Wliy cannot you try"^ 
 The noble Earl said lately of those to whom I belong, the 
 Colonial Reformers, the members of the Colonial Reform 
 Society, that on this question of the separation between Im- 
 perial and local matters, we are all split into sections, and 
 that each has his crotchet as to how that separation should 
 be made. But what we say is, that, take any of the systems 
 so proposed, any of the crotchets that proceed on such a 
 separation, and you would get a far better system than that 
 which now prevails, and one open to further improvement. 
 Because, after all, as regards the vast majority of cases, no 
 doubt could possibly exist whether or not they are of only 
 local interest. So far the classification could be made 
 without difficulty or dispute ; and the mere attempt to do so, 
 and the knowledge that, at least with respect to the mass of 
 their local subjects, they would be self-governed, would be a 
 greater boon to our Colonies than anything that has lately 
 been done. 
 
 Again I say, why do not you try'^ You have an excellent 
 example by analogy — the relation between the Union and the 
 several states of America. A scheme proceeding upon this 
 separation has been proposed by various persons, chiefly in 
 what I will venture to say is the most able and comprehen- 
 sive plan that has yet been propounded on this subject, the 
 frame of a Bill laid before the House of Commons by Sir 
 William Molesworth. 
 
 The objection as to litigation, in fact, points to one of the 
 advantages of the scheme. No doubt there would be disputes 
 as to whether a given subject belongs to one class or to the 
 other ; but whereas all disputes now are settled in the dark 
 by the Colonial Office, by what we propose all such questions 
 would be settled in due and open course of law, in the face
 
 11 
 
 of day, by a judicial tribunal, such as the Committee of Privy 
 Council, after the analogy of the Supreme Court of the 
 United States. Here, again, it is said, with a singular inad- 
 vertence, that the Colonies would gain nothing ; that the 
 Crown would be only acting through its Privy Council, 
 whereas before it acted through its Colonial Office. But, of 
 course, as before, with reference to the all-important point, 
 the conjidence which the Colonists would feel in the adminis- 
 tration of the system, there is all the difference in the world 
 in the manner in which the thing is done — between a secret 
 and irresponsible authority, and a public tribunal acting with 
 the solemnity of judicial procedure. 
 
 Moreover, such a system would evidently tend more and 
 more to work itself clear, and to become more definite and 
 satisfactory as it proceeds. Because such a tribunal would 
 be guided by its own precedents, so that questions, such as 
 are supposed, when once debated and adjudged, would be 
 settled for ever, and no further litigation need arise upon 
 them. 
 
 We may judge of the trivial nature of the objections made 
 to this proposal, by that which was offered in the very 
 slight and perfunctory reply that was vouchsafed by the 
 Government in the other House to Sir Wm. Molesworth's 
 speech. It was said, What do you do about escheats in the 
 Colonies? Is that an Imperial or a Colonial matter? Why, 
 , what does it matter which it is ? Put it in, into either of 
 the classes, whichever you please ; or let it alone, and let it 
 be decided whenever the question shall arise. No one sup- 
 poses that it is necessary that the classification should be 
 from the first made completely and without fault. 
 
 My Lords, such is the outline of the scheme which we 
 recommend, and which would give to the Colonies the best
 
 12 
 
 security which the nature of things permits, that they shall 
 enjoy self-government. Of course it would, in theory, be 
 open to Parliament to reverse its own course ; but a Parlia- 
 mentary security would be the best that it is practicable 
 to give. 
 
 My Lords, I know very well that these Colonies will 
 eventually obtain self-government, I did not say that such 
 a scheme as I propose is the only way in which they can 
 obtain it; but that it is the only way in which we can give 
 it them. I know that they will obtain it," because I see it 
 has been obtained, without any such concession on our part, 
 by the great Colony of Canada ; and Australia will do the 
 same. Canada has obtained it by its own growth, and by 
 the force of events, so that it practically knows and feels 
 that it has self-government, which is as good a security as 
 any Colony can desire. But here, again, the whole difference 
 lies in the manner in which the end has been reached. 
 Canada has reached it by a process which has brought with 
 it no gratitude, no attachment to this country, and, above 
 all, which brought with it no adequate assimilation of the 
 character of the Colonial mind to the best elements of our 
 society at' home, which, as 1 have said, is what ought to be 
 the main object in our view. We ought to look on our 
 Colonial empire not as a great machinery of export and 
 import trade, and of material benefit to ourselves, but as 
 imposing on us the responsibility of worthily founding great 
 nations, which they will be, throughout the world; and, 
 therefore, the character of the communities we are so found- 
 ing is the one great point for our consideration. 
 
 My Lords, I further regret this Bill when I con- 
 sider the particular character and condition of the Aus- 
 tralian Colonies. Whatever the North American Colonies
 
 13 
 
 may be, they are pretty nearly beyond our reach now, to 
 mould or to influence them. The Australian Colonies are 
 still in their youth : it is still in our power, as I believe, to 
 train them towards what we would wish them to be, by com- 
 municating to them good political institutions. The present 
 bill, while it gives them too little power of self-regulation in 
 some respects, gives them too much in others. We ought 
 to give them the outline of their system ourselves, leaving it 
 to them to fill it up : whereas here we give them an outline 
 which is confessedly not the best, and we leave it to them, if 
 they please to alter that outline ; while at the same time we 
 keep to ourselves an universal power over all the smallest 
 details of their local administration. 
 
 My Lords, it is true that a sort of satisfaction is felt in 
 these Colonies at this measure, compared with the still worse 
 system which they had before ; but this very circumstance 
 makes it the less likely that a really good system will ever 
 be introduced, when we have induced them to acquiesce in 
 the inferior one : and therefore causes me to lament still 
 more the passing of this Bill. 
 
 My Lords, for these reasons, though I cannot think of 
 dividing the House, I shall say — Not Content to the third 
 reading of the Bill.
 
 LONDON: 
 
 SAVILI, AND EDWAUDS, PRINTEB8, CHANDOS STREET, 
 
 COVENT GARDEN.

 
 ti 
 
 «M 
 
 s;. 
 
 P^^^fH- 
 
 W.