THE EQUALITY OF ALL, THE BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
 
 / 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 HON, JOHN A. BINGHAM 
 
 OF OHIO, 
 
 ON THE PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OP REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 18, 1857. 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 BUELL & BLANCHARD, PRINTERS. 
 
 1857. 
 

 
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SPEECH OF ME. BINGHAM. 
 
 The President’s Annual Message being under consid¬ 
 eration, on a motion to refer and print— 
 
 Mr. BINGHAM said: 
 
 Mr. Speaker: The President’s message, now 
 under consideration, abounds in sentiments 
 subversive of the Constitution, and sanctions 
 and defends a policy destructive of the public 
 peace, and injurious to the public interests. 
 And yet the President complains of agitation. 
 His friend and advocate, the gentleman from 
 Georgia, [Mr. Stephens,] repeats this com¬ 
 plaint, and cries, “ Agitation ! ” “ Agitation I ” 
 There has been agitation, general and uni¬ 
 versal, amongst the people. It still continues, 
 and not without cause. The President, in my 
 judgment, has abused the high trusts commit¬ 
 ted to him ; hence the agitation , and that “cry 
 of alarm ” among the people, of which he com¬ 
 plains. It is right, sir, that the people raise 
 the “ cry of alarm; ” it is right that they 
 agitate for the correction of abuses committed 
 by their agents and representatives. I believe, 
 with Burke, “where there is abuse , there ought 
 ‘ to be clamor ; because it is better to have our 
 ‘ slumber broken by the fire-bell, than to per- 
 ‘ iah amidst the flames.” 
 
 The President in this message, under cover 
 of a cunning device of words, advances the 
 monstrous proposition that the several States 
 of tbis Union, as States, have a constitutional 
 and imprescriptible right to traffic in slaves, 
 not only within their respective limits, but 
 throughout the national Territories. Having 
 inaugurated this policy in Kansas, by which 
 that ill-fated Territory has been subjected to 
 an absolute tyranny, by which its soil has 
 been cursed with the manacled foot of the 
 bondman, and stained with the blood of mur¬ 
 der and assassination; the President, with an 
 audacity unparalleled, deprecates agitation , 
 and demands acquiescence in this policy as 
 the test of fidelity to the Constitution and the 
 Union. To enforce this acquiescence as a 
 duty, the President undertakes a defence of 
 
 the repeal of what he terms “the statute re¬ 
 striction upon the institution of new States,” 
 and an exposition of the principles of the Con¬ 
 stitution and of the rights of the States under 
 it. Of the repeal of the “ statute restriction,” 
 by the Kansas-Nebraska act of 1854, he says : 
 
 “ Congress legislated upon the subject in 
 1 such terms as were most consonant with the 
 ‘ principle of popular sovereignty which un- 
 1 derlies our Government. It could not have 
 ‘ legislated otherwise, without doing violence 
 ‘ to another great principle of our institutions, 
 1 the imprescriptible right of equality of the 
 1 several States .” 
 
 This “ statute restriction upon the institution 
 of new States,” which was repealed, the Presi¬ 
 dent tells us was violative of the imprescripti¬ 
 ble right of equality of the several States. It is 
 not the right of the new States that this statute 
 restriction invaded, for they were r.ot in being, 
 but the imprescriptible right of equality of the 
 several States. 
 
 What was this statute restriction, the repeal 
 of which the President thus attempts to defend, 
 and why was it originally enacted? It was 
 the restriction imposed upon the extension of 
 Slavery, by the eighth section of the act of 
 1820, commonly called the Missouri Compro¬ 
 mise; and which forever excluded Slavery 
 (otherwise than in punishment of crime) from 
 all that part of the Louisiana Territory lying 
 west of the western boundary of the State of 
 Missouri, and north of 3G° 30 / north latitude. 
 This prohibition was in its terms perpetual. 
 The motives which prompted its enactment are 
 apparent. The Congress which enacted it 
 doubtless felt, and knew, that Slavery was sub¬ 
 versive of the ends of all free government, a 
 violation of justice and of the rights of the en¬ 
 slaved, and contrary to the spirit of our free 
 Constitution ; they also knew that, in the wrong 
 in which this institution has its inception, there 
 was no law to restrain the enslavement of all 
 
4 
 
 classes and races of men; that the brute force, j 
 by which the inherent rights of the black race 
 had for centuries been cloven down, was not 
 likely to be restrained from inflicting like cru- . 
 elties and oppressions upon the white race— j 
 that the violence in which this system lives 
 and has its being, is deaf alike to the voice of 
 justice and the cry of the oppressed, whether 
 that cry bursts from the crushed heart of an ! 
 African or an American. Hence the origin 
 of that enactment. It was humane, politic, 
 and juat. 
 
 But, sir, it was repealed, we are told, in or¬ 
 der to maintain inviolate “the imprescriptible 
 right of equality of the several States.” An 
 imprescriptible right of equality in what? In 
 the bones and sinews and souls of men I And 
 this right, the President tells us, is imprescript- j 
 ible—not to be forfeited by non-user, nor to be 
 restrained by Congressional enactment, and co- 1 
 extensive with the national Territories. The ; 
 President further tells us that this right “ is a j 
 ‘ great principle cf our institutions—a consii■ j 
 1 tvtional right of each and all of the States of I 
 ‘ the Union, as States, which the people, by 1 
 ‘ their recent political action, have sanctioned , 
 1 and announced.” 
 
 If all this be true, what a mockery for the 
 President to tell us, as he does tell us, in the 
 very next line of this message, that the people 
 have thus “ proclaimed their unalterable and 
 ‘ devoted attachment to the Constitution, as 
 1 the safeguard of the rights of all , and as the 
 1 spirit of the liberty of the Republic.” The 
 spirit of the liberty of the Republic! to enslave 
 men throughout the national jurisdiction! to 
 cast a fetter upon the human soul! to inter¬ 
 pose the dark shadow of oppression between 
 man and his Maker! Sir, this is not the spirit 
 of that liberty which God gave to man, when 
 He breathed into him the breath of life. This 
 is not the spirit of that liberty, one hour of 
 which, “is worth a whole eternity of bond¬ 
 age.” This is not the spirit of that liberty, for 
 which Hampden and Sidney died, and for de¬ 
 fending which, Milton was hunted and perse 
 cuted in his blindness. This is not the spirit 
 of that liberty, for which the great apo3tles of 
 our race—men cf whom the world was not 
 worthy—suffered hunger and thurst, cold and 
 nakedness, and endured, without fear and with¬ 
 out reproach, the jeer3 of hate, the scowl of 
 power, the gloom of the dungeon, the torture 
 of the wheel, the agony of the fagot, the 
 ignominy cf the scafibid and the cross. 
 
 " I shall not stop to inquire, whether the Pres- 1 
 ideat has not uttered a flagitious libel upon i 
 the American people by his announcement, ! 
 that they have sanctioned this alleged right to j 
 enslave men as the “ constitutional right of | 
 each and all of the States, as States, as the j 
 spirit of the liberty of the Republic.” They j 
 will answer to that charge themselves, and 
 with more potency than any man can answer 
 for them. 
 
 Is it true, that this alleged imprescriptible 
 right of the several States is a great principle 
 of our institutions, sanctioned by the Constitu¬ 
 tion, and upheld by the national arm? If this 
 be true, it affords the reason of the President’s 
 assertion, in his message of last year, that the 
 attempt by Congressional enactment to pro¬ 
 hibit Slavery in the Territories recently ac¬ 
 quired from Mexico, was “ the endeavor to 
 ‘ force the ideas of internal policy entertained 
 i in particular States, upon allied independent 
 ‘ States.” 
 
 Yfith these instructions of the President 
 upon the “ theory of our Government,” we 
 can understand why it is that the Southern 
 Slates deny the right or power of Congress to 
 exclude Slavery from the Territories ; while 
 distinguished Representatives of the South de¬ 
 mand of Congress the repeal of all restrictions 
 upon the traffic in slaves throughout the nation¬ 
 al jurisdiction, whether upon the land or the 
 the sea. To be sure, the Constitution provides, 
 that Congress shall have power to regulate 
 commerce; and the power to regulate, implies 
 the power to prohibit; but the Constitution 
 also provides that “ Congress shall have power 
 to make all needful rules and regulations 
 respecting the Territory cf the United Srates.” 
 The power of Congress to legislate in respect 
 of each of these subjects, commerce and the 
 Territories, is the same, general and exclusive. 
 The word needful , expressed in the one grant 
 of power, is implied in the other. Only that 
 legislation which is needful , is contemplated by 
 the Constitution in either or any case; only that 
 legislation which is needful should be tolerated 
 by the people. 
 
 If the President be correct, it follows that 
 these powers in Congress are but trust powers, 
 to be so exercised as not to infringe, but main¬ 
 tain, this alleged imprescriptible right of each 
 and all of the States, as States. This was the 
 opinion of Mr. Calhoun, from whom manifestly 
 the President has taken his political faith. 
 That illustrious Senator [Mr. Calhoun] said, 
 “It was they (the several States) who ccnstitn- 
 ‘ ted the Government as their representative or 
 ‘ trustee , and intrusted it with powers to be ex- 
 ‘ ercisedfortheircommonbenefit.”—( Calhomis 
 Works , vol. 4, p. 497.) If it be true, then, that 
 the States, as States, have each this imprescript¬ 
 ible right to traffic in slaves, not only zoithin, 
 but also without , their respective limits, and 
 that the National Government is but their 
 trustee to enforce it, in my judgment, South 
 Carolina has the same constitutional right to 
 demand the repeal of your statute which pro¬ 
 hibits the slave trade upon the seas, and pun¬ 
 ishes it with death, as Virginia had to demand 
 the repeal of your statute of 1S20, which pro¬ 
 hibited the slave traffic in the Territories. 
 Both these enactments rest for their validity 
 upou the same general power in Congress; and 
 the extra-territorial right of the several States 
 to traffic in slaves, if it exist, is as sacred upon 
 
0 
 
 the sea as noon the land. It logically results, j its spirit; they each and all, under the Constitu- 
 therefore, upon the President’s showing, that tion, have the right to do whatever a u free 
 the statute restriction upon the slave trade up- i State may of right do” except that they may 
 on the seas is violative of a great principle of not exercise any of the powers granted by the 
 our institutions, the imprescriptible right of | Constitution exclusively to the General Gov- 
 
 equality of the several States. 
 
 How comes it that the President does not at 
 once denounce this unequal exercise of the 
 trust power of the Government over the foreign 
 commerce of the States, as “an endeavor to 
 1 force the ideas of commercial policy enter- 
 
 ^ t o l r', fi •! , iv.rln- 
 
 1 eminent. But I have yet to learn that any State, 
 formed under and by virtue of the Constitu¬ 
 tion, may of right enslave its own children, 
 and sell them like cattle I The Constitution 
 doe3 not provide for the erection and admis¬ 
 sion into the Union of such States, nor does 
 rained in particular States upon allied inde- ; it admit the existence of such a tyranny 
 
 4 pendent States? 7 ’ One would infer, from this 
 language of the President, that we had no consti¬ 
 tutional Government; that we still lived under 
 the Confederation; that the commerce of this 
 great country upon the land and the sea was 
 not under the exclusive control of a National 
 
 within the Territories, where its iurisdictioa 
 is exclusive. The States, I say, are equal un¬ 
 der the Constitution, in the right, within their 
 respective limits, to establish justice, to pro¬ 
 mote the general welfare, and to secure to each 
 and every person therein the absolute enjoy- 
 
 Government, but was subject to the sovereignty i ment of the rights of human nature, which are 
 and co' dieting regulations of thirty-one allied ! as imperishable as the human soul, and as uni- 
 independent States. j versal as the human race. But the States are 
 
 I scout all such dogmas. I rejoice, to-dav, | unequal in the right to do wrong, if I may he 
 in the assurance that, despite the President’s 1 allowed the paradox—in the privilege to tram- 
 false statements and. false logic, we have a I pie upon the inborn rights of humanity, and to 
 National Government, fully empowered by the 1 violate that principle of eternal justice, which 
 Constitution to regulate exclusively the com- requires that every man shall receive his due. 
 merce of the country with all foreign States, 1 The original States, not under the Constitution, 
 between the several States of the Union, and nor “by force of the Constitution,” but inde- 
 th rough out the National Territories. Every : pendent of it, retained to themselves a monopc- 
 Ameviean citizen knows that the commercial iy in the horrid crime of Slavery within their 
 embarrassments of the country, after the es- respective limits, and also in the slave traffic 
 tablishment of independence, arising out of the for twenty years upon the high seas, 
 conflicting com mercial regulations of the States This reservation of privileges by the original 
 under the Confederation, contributed more than j States—this inequality between them and the 
 
 new States formed under, and only by force of 
 the Constitution—is written upon the face of 
 that instrument, and declared by the national 
 
 any other cause to the formation of the Con¬ 
 stitution. 
 
 W no will forget the noble action of Virginia in 
 
 1786? Virginia, the mother of dead heroes,! legislation in the erection and admission 
 and dead patriots, and dead statesmen, but, 
 thank God! the mother also of a living Republic three-fifth repress 
 a r d a living Constitution. When Virginia, in population, and als 
 
 of 
 
 new States. The constitutional provision for a 
 entation, based upon slave 
 o the provision for the reeap- 
 
 1783, appointed her commissioners, instructing 1 Jure of slaves escaping from one State into an¬ 
 them to meet such commissioners as the other other, implied an exclusion of the General Gov- 
 States of the Union should appoint, “to take ernment from any interference for the abolition 
 into consideration the trade and commerce of of Slavery within the original States. These 
 the United States,” she took the first great step two provisions are, in fact, implied limitations 
 towards the formation of that more perfect upon the power of the General Government, 
 Union and free written Constitution under for the exclusive benefit of the original States, 
 which we live. Sir, that Constitution was or- So, also, the ninth section of the first article of 
 duined and established by the people of the the Constitution was an express limitation of 
 United States, to establish justice; to provide the general power of Congress over the foreign 
 for the common defence; to promote the gen- | commerce in slaves, for the exclusive benefit 
 eral welfare; to insure domestic tranquillity; to j of the then existing States. That section is in 
 protect industry; to regulate commerce, and to these words : 
 
 secure the blessings of liberty, and not to form ! “The migration or importation of such per- 
 a mere alliance of “independent States,” with 1 1 sons as any of the States now existing shall 
 an equality of right, as States, to enslave 4 think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited 
 men within and without their respective juris- 4 by Congress, prior to the year 1808, but a 
 di ctious. I ‘ tax or duty may be imposed on such importa- 
 
 Bat, says the President, the Spates are equal, 4 tion, not exceeding ten dollars for each per- 
 and have each and all, as S ates, equality of , 4 son.” 
 
 rights. The several States are equal in respect This express limitation in favor of the orig - 
 of oil the great and essential rights of a free ! inal States was absolutely necessary, if they 
 Commonwealth, in respect of all rights sane- would continue the foreign slave trade after 
 tinned by the Constitution, and consonant with the adoption of the Constitution, for the reason 
 
6 
 
 that the Constitution was declared “ to be the [ ded for the erection of new States therein, and 
 ‘ supreme law of the land—the Constitution ! for their admission into the Union of the Con- 
 1 and laws of any State to the contrary not- | federation “ on an equal footing with the orig- 
 ‘ withstanding ;” and by its terms the ex- inal States/’ [in respect of all rights sanction * 
 elusive power was granted to Congress to reg- j ed by the Articles of Confederation.] but sub¬ 
 ulate foreign commerce, even to prohibition, , jeet, nevertheless, to certain terms, conditions, 
 which included navigation and intercourse as and restrictions, which were not imposed upon 
 well as trade, the importation or commerce in the original States. These terms, conditions, and 
 slaves as well as the importation or commerce restrictions, were, that Slavery, otherwise than 
 in goods. That all of these limitations upon in punishment of crime, upon due conviction, 
 the power of the General Government, whether should be forever prohibited within said new 
 implied or expressed, were for the exclusive States; that no man should be therein deprived 
 benefit of the. States then existing, cannot be of his liberty or property but by the j udgment 
 gainsayed, and therefore the power of Congress of his peers or the law of the land; that the in - 
 was not thereby restrained in legislating for habitants thereof (all the inhabitants) should 
 the Government of the Territories, or for the be always entitled to the benefits of the writ 
 institution and admission into the Union of habeas corpus and of the trial by jury; tbat 
 new States. private property should not be taken, even for 
 
 The attempt was made in the Constitutional public use, without full compensation therefor ; 
 Convention to secure to the new States which j and that the Constitutions and Governments of 
 might be thereafter admitted into the Union such new States should be republican, and in 
 the same privileges thus retained by the orig- conformity to the principles of the Ordinance*, 
 inal States ; but it failed. On the 29th of These were previsions of the six articles of the 
 August, 17S7, a proposition was made in that Ordinance, which were declared to be unalter- 
 Convention, to provide by the Constitution for able but by the common consent, not of the new 
 the admission of new States “on the same Siates merely, but of all the States. Upon the 
 terms with the original States.”—(5 Elliot's adoption of the Constitution, the Ordinance 
 Debates, p. 493.) This proposition was reject- was superseded, and ceased to be law, for the 
 ed, and the provision adopted and inserted in reason that the Government to which it owed 
 the Constitution as it now stands, that “ new its origin and validity had ceased to be. I have 
 States may be admitted by the Congress into the authority of the President himself for that, 
 this Union.” Why were the words, “ upon the He s ays in his last annual message, page 20 : 
 same terms with the original States,” reject- “The Ordinance for tbs government of the 
 ed by the Convention, and excluded from ‘ Territory northwest of the river Ohio had con- 
 tke Constitution ? Manifestly, to declare plain- j 1 tained a provision which prohibited the use 
 ly and distinctly the intention of the framers ‘ of servile labor therein.” * * * u Sub- 
 
 cf the Constitution, that new States should not 1 sequent to f he adoption of the Constitution, 
 come into the Union of right , and upon the '• ‘ this provision ceased to remain as lav/, for its 
 same terms with the original States ; but only ‘ operation , as such, ioas absolutely superseded 
 by the consent of Congress, upon such terms, j 1 by the Constitution .” 
 
 and under such restrictions as would subject! But, sir, I rely not merely upon the Presi- 
 them to the spirit of the Constitution, not only 1 deni’s assertion lor the authority for saying that 
 as it was 
 also as i 
 
 This construction, sir, of the Constitution, 
 that Congress, in the organization and admis¬ 
 sion of new States, might impose conditions 
 upon them to which the original States were 
 not subjected, by requiring them to conform 
 their domestic institutions to the Constitution 
 in all respects, has been affirmed aud sanction¬ 
 ed by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
 departments of our Government, from the day 
 of its organization. 
 
 as originally framed and adopted, but this Ordinance ceased to he law upon the adop- 
 it might be thereafter amended. tion of the Constitution. The Supreme Court 
 
 of the United States has so ruled and declared, 
 in the case of S:rader et al. vs. Graham, (10 
 Howard , p. 82.) In that case, Chief Justice 
 Taney says : 
 
 “ It has been settled by judicial decision in 
 1 ‘ this court, that this Ordinance [of 1787 [ is not 
 1 in force. As we have already said, it ceased 
 1 to be law upon the adoption of the Constitu- 
 ; 1 tion.” 
 
 It is significant that the court in this case 
 Let it be borne in mind, sir, tbat on the 29 Ji further decided that— 
 day of August, 1787, when the Constitutional 11 Most of the material provisions and princi- 
 
 mi Vi n n FAnA.f a/ ifro Anm ^ rJpc fit Pi Y fl.rt 1 (4 1 of t *1 e Oi'dlTiaUCe Of 
 
 Convention had the report of its committee 
 providing fer the admission of new States under 
 
 pies of the six articles, [of the Ordinance ef 
 1 1787.] not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
 
 consideration, and rejected the provision for ‘ the United Spates, [ever since the 7th day u 
 their admission “ on the same terms with the ‘ August, 1789,] have been established law with- 
 original States,” the Ordinance passed on the | 4 in that Territory. But these provisions owed 
 13th of July, 1787, by the Congress of the Con- ‘ their legal validity and force after the Constitu- 
 federation, for the government of the North- 4 tion was adopted, aud wnfie the territorial G jy- 
 west Territory, was in full force ; that it was * ernment continued, to the act ot Congress of 
 the law of all the national territory, and provi- 4 7 th August, 1*39, \\Wcn. adopted and continued 
 
1 the Ordinance of 1787, and carried its provis- 
 4 ions into execution, with some modifications, 
 4 which were necessary to adapt its form of 
 4 Government to the new Constitution. And 
 4 in the States since formed in the Territories, 
 4 these provisions, so far as they have been 
 4 preserved, owe their validity and authority to 
 ‘ the Constitution of the United States, and 
 4 the Constitutions and laws of the respective 
 4 States, [therein established,] and not to the 
 4 authority of the Ordinance of the old Confed- 
 4 eration.” 
 
 What were the 44 most material provisions 
 and principles of these six articles” of the Or¬ 
 dinance ? They are those which I have already 
 enumerated. Not one of those principles and 
 provisions enumerated are inconsistent with the 
 Constitution ; on the contrary, they were each 
 and all incorporated in the Constitution, not as 
 the Constitution was originally adopted, but as 
 it was thereafter amended by the action of the 
 First Congress in 1789, and the subsequent ac¬ 
 tion of the people of the several States. The 
 Constitution, as originally adopted, provided 
 for the government of the territory of the United 
 States by Congressional enactment, and for the 
 admission of new States into the Union; but it 
 did not, like the articles of the Ordinance, de¬ 
 clare that no man should be deprived of liberty 
 or property but by the judgment of his peers 
 and the law of the land ; that the inhabitants— 
 all the inhabitants—should be entitled, in all 
 cases involving liberty or life, to the trial by 
 jury, and that private property should not be 
 taken, even for public use, without full compen¬ 
 sation therefor. To the honor of the First Con- 
 ress under the Constitution—the Congress of 
 789—be it said, that the first ten articles of 
 amendment to the Constitution were reported 
 to the several States for adoption; and were, 
 by the people of the States, ratified and incor¬ 
 porated in the Constitution. 
 
 The fifth and sixth of these amendments con¬ 
 tain substantially , and almost literally , the pro¬ 
 visions of the articles of the Ordinance, and, 
 like them, declared that 4i no person shall be 
 deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
 due process ot law; ” that the people shall have 
 the trial by j ury in all cases involving life or 
 liberty; and that private property shall not be 
 taken for public use without just compensa¬ 
 tion. 
 
 The articles of the Ordinance had been adopt¬ 
 ed by the First Congress under the Constitution; 
 and as the Constitution was to be the supreme 
 law of the land, it was but just that the First 
 Congress should have those great principles in¬ 
 corporated by the consent of the whole people 
 of the Union in the Constitution. That was 
 done. Why did the First Congress adopt these 
 provisions and principles of the Ordinance, and 
 procure their incorporation into the Constitu¬ 
 tion ? 1 hat can be most fitly answered in the 
 
 words of the Ordinance itself: 
 
 “ h or extending the fundamental principles 
 
 4 of civil and religious liberty,” * * 44 and to 
 
 4 fix and establish those principles as the basis 
 4 of all Laws, Constitutions, and Governments, 
 4 which, forever hereafter, shall be formed with- 
 4 in the Territories .” 
 
 The act of 1789 adopting this Ordinance, as 
 also the amendment incorporating its great 
 principles in the Constitution, were “statute re¬ 
 strictions upon the institution of new States,” 
 of perpetual obligation; and if those restrictions 
 violated the alleged 44 imprescriptible right of 
 equality of the several States/’ the First Con¬ 
 gress, and Washington, and the people of the 
 United States, were guilty of that violation. 
 Perchance they had not learned that the several 
 States, as States, had an imprescriptible right 
 to enslave men throughout the National Terri¬ 
 tory, or that new States, under the Constitution, 
 might assert any such right. 
 
 That Congress had the power to exclude Sla¬ 
 very from the Territories, and thereby impose 
 statute restrictions upon new States, is clearly 
 implied in the deed of cession made by North 
 Carolina, and accepted by the Congress of 1790, 
 of the Territory out of which Tennessee has 
 since become a State. That deed of cession con¬ 
 tains these words: 
 
 “ Provided, That no regulations made, or to 
 4 be made, by Congress, shall tend to emanci- 
 4 pate slaves therein.” 
 
 Why this proviso, if Congress had no power 
 by statute regulations to exclude Slavery from 
 the Territories, and even to emancipate slaves 
 therein ? 
 
 The act of 1798, for the government of the 
 Mississippi Territory, contained one Gf those 
 statute restrictions, which we are told violate 
 the imprescriptible right of equality of the sev¬ 
 eral States, in these words: 
 
 44 It shall not be lawful for any person or 
 4 persons to 'import or bring into the said Mis- 
 4 sissippi Territory, from any port or place with- 
 4 out the limits of the United States, any slave 
 4 or slaves.” * * * “And that every slave 
 4 so imported or brought shall thereupon be 
 4 entitled to receive his or her freedom.”—(1 
 United Slates Statutes, p. 550.) 
 
 The act of 1804, for the government of the 
 Territory of Orleans, in addition to the same 
 restriction imposed upon the Mississippi Terri¬ 
 tory, contains another restriction upon the sev¬ 
 eral States and the people, in these words : 
 
 No slave or slaves shall, directly or indi- 
 4 rectly, be introduced into said Territory, ex- 
 4 cept by a citizen of the United States remov- 
 4 ing into said Territory for actual settlement, 
 
 4 and being, at the same time of such removal, 
 
 4 bona fide owner of such slave or slaves.”— 
 (2 United States Statutes, p. 28G, sec. 10.) 
 
 In 1798 and 1804, the original States were 
 engaged in the foreign slave traffic. The lim¬ 
 itation of the ninth section of the first article 
 of the Constitution had not expired, and Con¬ 
 gress was thereby restrained from prohibiting 
 the importation of slaves, and the retention of 
 
8 
 
 them as slaves within the original States ; but 
 Congress did, nevertheless, claim and exercise 
 the power by these two enactments to exclude 
 this foreign traffic in slaves from the Territo¬ 
 ries of Mississippi and Orleans; and from the 
 latter, the domestic slave trade also. 
 
 That the power thus exercised by Congress 
 over the Territories is constitutional and unre¬ 
 strained, either by popular sovereignty or State 
 sovereignty, has been solemnly adjudged by 
 the Supreme Court; yet we are asked, with 
 mock gravity, “ Will you abide by the decision 
 1 of the Supreme Court, if it shall hereafter de- 
 ‘ cide that Congress has not the power thus to 
 1 legislate?” To those who put this question, I 
 reply, why did you not abide the decision of 
 that tribunal, made m the purer and better 
 days of the Republic, when Marshall’s splendid 
 and brilliant intellect, full-orbed, illumed its de¬ 
 cisions ? 
 
 The great question before the court, in the 
 case to which l refer, was the power of Congress 
 to legislate over the Territories, and the extent 
 of that power. This will become manifest by 
 the statement of the case, as set forth in the 
 opinion of the court. 
 
 The plaintiffs brought their action to recover 
 certain goods whcli had been sold pursuant to 
 a decree of a Territorial court of Florida. The 
 competency of this Territorial court to make 
 the decree was denied. This court had been 
 established pursuant to the act of Congress of 
 1823, which authorized its erection, and which 
 also conferred and defined its jurisdiction. The 
 validity of this Congressional act was denied, 
 and upon its validity the whole case depended. 
 The court, in the opinion pronounced by Mar¬ 
 shall, C. J., says: 
 
 “ The course which the argument has taken 
 1 will require that, in deciding this question, 
 
 1 the court shall take into view the relation in 
 1 which Florida stands to the United States.” 
 
 After reciting the treaty of purchase, the 
 court proceeds to say that the people of the 
 Florida Territory “ do not participaie in politi- 
 4 cal power; they do not share in the Govern- 
 1 ment till Florida shall become a State. In 
 ‘ the mean time, Florida continues to be a 
 i Territory of the United States, governed by 
 1 virtue of that clause in the Constitution which 
 1 empowers Congress 1 to make all needful rules 
 ‘ and regulations respecting the Territory or 
 1 other property belongingtotheUnited States.’ ” 
 The Court adds, that “ the right to govern may 
 1 be the inevitable consequence of the right to 
 ‘ acquire territory. Whichever may be the 
 1 source whence the power is derived, the posses- 
 1 sion of it is unquestioned /’ 
 
 The Court finally decides the very point 
 made, as to the competency of the Territorial 
 courts, in these words: 
 
 “ They are legislative courts, created in vir- 
 ‘ tue of the general right of sovereignty which 
 ‘ exists in the Government, or in virtue of 
 1 that clause which enables Congress to make 
 
 ( all needful rules and regulations respecting 
 ‘ the territory belonging to the United States.” 
 “In legislating for them, [the Territories,] 
 4 Congress exercises the combined powers of the 
 ‘ General and of a State Government/’ 
 
 The competency of the Territorial court was 
 therefore sustained, and the rule made pur¬ 
 suant to its decree held valid. It is a little 
 amusing to hear partisans say that this is mere 
 dictum , so far as it affirms the power of Con¬ 
 gress over the Territories; or that other evasion, 
 that the court only decides that u Congress, 
 ‘ when providing Territorial couris, employs the 
 1 combined power of a General and State Gov- 
 1 ernment,” because of the unlimited and exclu¬ 
 sive jurisdiction of the United States in admi¬ 
 ralty. The plain words of Chief Justice Mar¬ 
 shall leave no room for this evasion, and ex¬ 
 clude any such conclusion. He says : 
 
 “ These courts [the Territorial courts] are 
 1 not constitutional courts, in which the judi- 
 i cial power conferred by the Constitution can 
 1 be deposited. They are incapable of receiv- 
 1 ing it.” 
 
 He decides that “ they are legislative courts., 
 created in virtue of the general right of sover¬ 
 eignty ” in Congress to govern the Territories. 
 Whatever special pleading may be set up to 
 evade the force of this decision, one thing is 
 clear, that in the judgment of the Supreme 
 Court the people of the Territories, during the 
 Territorial organization, “ do not share in the 
 1 Government; that the exclusive right to govern 
 1 them is in Congress; and that Congress, in 
 1 legislating for them, for all purposes, exercises 
 i the combined power of the General and of a 
 1 State Government.”—(American Insurance 
 Co. ei al . vs. Canter, 7 Curtis , p. 687.) 
 
 Is not the combined power of the “ General 
 and of a State Government” competent to ex¬ 
 clude Slavery from and emancipate slaves 
 within a Territory ? North Carolina and the 
 Congress of 1790 were of that opinion ; hence 
 the limitation ci the power of Congress in the 
 deed of cession to which I have referred. 
 
 Beyond all question, the sovereignty over the 
 Territories is vested in Congress ; every act for 
 their government, from the act of 1789 to the 
 act of 1854, proves this: legislation is sover¬ 
 eignty. 
 
 I have already shown that the Constitution 
 provides for the admission of new States, and 
 that the prevision was purposely so framed as 
 not to compel their admission upon the same 
 terms with the original States, but to enable 
 Congress to subject them to other terms and 
 conditions, and to admit or reject them at 
 pleasure. Congress has repeatedly exercised 
 this power, and in such a way as to put an ex¬ 
 tinguisher upon the asserted “ imprescriptible 
 right of equality of the several States.” 
 
 The act to enable the people of Ohio to form 
 a Constitution, and for their admission into the 
 Union, passed April 30, 1802, and approved by 
 Jefferson, provides that the people may form a 
 
Q 
 
 Constitution and State Government, “ provided 
 the same shall be republican, and not repug¬ 
 nant to the Ordinance of July 13,1787.—( Uni¬ 
 ted States Statutes , vol. 2, p. 174, sec. 5.) 
 Whence did the Congress of 1802 derive the 
 power to impose this restriction upon the peo¬ 
 ple of Ohio, as a condition precedent to their 
 organization into a State, and their admission 
 into the Union ? Not from the Ordinance of 
 1787; for that was superseded by the Constitu¬ 
 tion, and ceased to be law or the source of au¬ 
 thority upon the adoption of the Constitution. 
 The power wa3 and could be derived only from 
 the Constitution, to impose this restriction. 
 What was the effect of this restriction? Mani¬ 
 festly, to impose upon Ohio, as a State, terms, 
 conditions, and restrictions, to which the origin¬ 
 al States were not subjected. 
 
 Those terms, conditions, and restrictions, 
 were, that, by her Constitution and Govern¬ 
 ment, Ohio should forever exclude Slavery 
 from her territory, except as punishment for 
 crime, on due conviction ; that no man should, 
 within her limits, be deprived of life, liberty, 
 or property, but by the judgment of his peers 
 and the law of the land; and that private prop¬ 
 erty should not be taken for public use, with¬ 
 out just compensation ; and that all the inhab¬ 
 itants should always enjoy the benefits of 
 habeas corpus and the trial by jury. If Ohio 
 had tolerated involuntary slavery by her Con¬ 
 stitution, or had denied to any man protection 
 of life, liberty, or property, or trial by jury, her 
 Constitution would have been repugnant to the 
 Ordinance, contrary to the enabling act of 
 1802, violative of the fifth and sixth amend¬ 
 ments of the Constitution of the United States, 
 and she.could not have become a State, or 
 have been admitted into the Union. Her peo¬ 
 ple so understood it, and framed their Consti¬ 
 tution accordingly. What was the result of 
 this ? Thar, Ohio was admitted, by act of Con¬ 
 gress, into the Union, not “ upon the same 
 terms with the original States,” but upon the 
 express condition, that, a3 a State, she should 
 notengage in the foreign or domestic slave traffic, 
 and, as a necessary consequence, that she should 
 not, like the original States, have or be entitled 
 to a slave representation on this floor. Call you 
 this equality of right? Why was Ohio, for five 
 years after her admission into the Union, prohib¬ 
 ited, by force of Congressional enactment, from 
 engaging in the foreign slave trade, which, all ; 
 that time, was being carried on by the original j 
 States? The ninth section of the first article 
 orf the Constitution did not oblige Congress to 
 deny to Ohio this privilege ; it only restrained 
 Congress from prohibiting this traffic in the 
 original States. Why was Ohio prohibited 
 from importing slaves into her territory from 
 abroad, or engaging in the domestic slave traf- 1 
 fic ; and why were all the States of the Union, ! 
 and the citizens thereof, denied, by force of this ! 
 Congressional “statute restriction upon the in¬ 
 stitution” of that new State, the alleged im- | 
 
 prescriptible right to traffic in slaves therein ? 
 Most certainly because no such right is derived 
 from or sanctioned by the Constitution ; and 
 because new States can only be formed and 
 admitted upon such terms as will require cf 
 them a full and clear recognition of the con¬ 
 stitutional provision, that no person shall be 
 enslaved or deprived of his property or life, 
 but as punishment for crime, upon due convic¬ 
 tion. 
 
 By the act of April 19, 1816, (approved by 
 Madison,) to enable the people of Indiana to 
 form a State Constitution, and for their ad¬ 
 mission into the Union, the same terms, condi¬ 
 tions, and restrictions, which were imposed 
 upon the people of Ohio, were imposed upon 
 that State.—( United Slates Statutes, vol. 3, p. 
 288, sec. 4.) By the* act of April 18, 1818, 
 (approved by Monroe,) providing for the form¬ 
 ation of a Constitution, and the admission of 
 the State of Illinois, the same terms, condi¬ 
 tions, and restrictions, were imposed upon the 
 people of that State.—( United States Statutes, 
 vol. 3, p. 430, sec. 4.) The act organizing the 
 original Territory of Wisconsin, including what 
 is now the States of Iowa and Wisconsin, ap¬ 
 proved by Jackson, and passed April 20, 1833, 
 provides that “ the inhabitants shall be entitled 
 to and enjoy” all the rights secured to the peo¬ 
 ple of the Northwest Territory, “ by the arti- 
 ‘ cles of compact contained in the Ordinance 
 1 passed July 13, 1787, and shall be subject to 
 1 all the conditions and restrictions and prohi- 
 1 bitions in said articles of compact, imposed 
 1 upon the people of said Territory.”—( United 
 States Statutes, vol. 9, p. 15, sec. 12.) The 
 act “ to establish the Territorial Government 
 of Oregon,” passed August 14, 1848, secures 
 the same rights to, and imposes the same con¬ 
 ditions, restrictions, and prohibitions, upon the 
 inhabitants snd future States of that Territo¬ 
 ry, ( United States Statutes, vol. 9, p. 329, sec, 
 14,) with the sanction of President Polk, and 
 with the advice and consent of the great god¬ 
 father of popular sovereignty himself. 
 
 By the joint resolution for annexing Texas 
 to the United States, the same conditions and 
 restrictious, by the approval of Tyler and the 
 vote of the reputed author of the Kansas-Ne- 
 braska act, are imposed upon the future States 
 to be organized within that territory north of 
 36° 30 / north latitude.—( United States Stat¬ 
 utes, vol. 5, p. 798.) The mere fact that Con¬ 
 gress did not, in all instances of the erection 
 and admission of new States, exercise this 
 power of restriction and prohibition, argues 
 nothing against the existence of the power. 
 The mere non-user of a legislative power, in 
 some instances, works no forfeiture of it. There 
 is a record, a very strong record, of restrictions 
 imposed by Congress upon the people of the 
 Territories, and upon the institution of new 
 States. If these restrictions be violative of 
 popular sovereignty and State equality, Wash¬ 
 ington, Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, 
 
10 
 
 Jackson, Tyler, and Polk, are guilty of that 
 violation, and were black—very black—Repub¬ 
 licans. If these statute restrictions were con¬ 
 stitutional, what becomes of this vaunted im¬ 
 prescriptible right of equality of the several j 
 States ? If the General Government doea not | 
 possess this power over the institution of new 
 States—if its power is restrained by popular 
 sovereignty and State sovereignty, as the Pres¬ 
 ident avers—then we are but the instrument to 
 enforce whatever domestic system of govern¬ 
 ment these high powers may establish in the 
 Territories, even though it be a despotism 
 which would make Nero blush, and put Caligula j 
 to shame. 
 
 Can it be that Constitution of the United j 
 States is this weak and picked invention ? All j 
 your territorial legislation disproves it. Every 
 organic act extends the Constitution and laws 
 of the United States over the Territories. Your 
 Kansas-Nebraska act does this. The Con¬ 
 stitution, oeing in force in the Territories, is 
 the supreme law. Whatever legislation, there¬ 
 fore, of the Territorial Government, conflicts 
 with the Constitution or the National statutes, 
 is void, and subject to repeal by Congress. The I 
 Compromise acts of 1850, of which we hear so ; 
 much of late, and on which the gentleman from 
 Georgia [Mr. Stephens] takes his stand, in 
 terms recognises the power of Congress to 
 prevent the taking effect of such acts, by a 
 simple disapproval of them. 
 
 The President recognises the force of the 
 Constitution, to restrain the exercise of popular 
 sovereignty in the Territories, and the power 
 of Congress to repeal such laws a3 the sover¬ 
 eigns there may pass in conflict with the Con¬ 
 stitution. He says that he trusts “ Congress 
 will see” that no act shall remain on the 
 statute-book cf Kansas, “ violative of the pro- 
 1 visions of the Constitution, or subversive of 
 1 the great objects for which that was ordained 
 1 and established.” 
 
 Popular sovereignty and State equality can- 1 
 not live in the Territories under this power of 
 repeal in Congress. If this power of repeal 
 exists, what is its limit? Nothing but the judg¬ 
 ment of Congress upon the question, whether j 
 the Territorial acts are violative of the Constitu¬ 
 tion, or subversive of the great objects of its 
 creation? The objects for which the Constitu¬ 
 tion was ordained are written upon its face; and 
 amongst these objects were the establishment 
 of j ustice and the security of liberty. The Kan¬ 
 sas acts are subversive of these objects ; they j 
 legalize injustice, and put liberty in chains ; j 
 they deny the right of trial by jury, the right of 
 habeas corpus, the right of freedom of speech 
 and freedom of the press, and the right of 
 personal security. Are not such denials of 
 right subversive of the Constitution, and viola¬ 
 tive of its spirit ? Let him say no, who can, 
 or who dare. Now, if this repealing power i3 
 in Congress, as the President very clearly ad¬ 
 mits, and if theee Territorial acts be needful to 
 
 support Slavery, and Congress may repeal 
 them, what becomes of Slavery there? And if 
 Congress has this power over the Territories, 
 when does it cease? Of necessity, under the 
 President's own showing, not while the Terri¬ 
 torial organization lasts. When does that ter¬ 
 minate ? Only at the pleasure and by the con¬ 
 sent of Congress. 
 
 J have shown that the Legislative, Executive, 
 and Judical departments of the Government 
 have recognised in the most solemn manner 
 the principle, that the Territories are under the 
 absolute control of the National Government, 
 that by Congressional enactment Slavery may 
 be excluded therefrom, and that new States 
 can only be formed in the Territories, subject 
 to such conditions as Congress may prescribe- 
 The affirmance of this power under the Con¬ 
 stitution, by tbe grs-test names of the Republic, 
 officially expressed in all its departments, has 
 been stamped into the adamant of the past, 
 there to remain forever. 
 
 Under these sanctions I repeat my propo¬ 
 sition, that Slavery may be excluded by this 
 Government from its Territories—that such 
 restriction is constitutional, and may he right¬ 
 fully asserted as a condition precedent, upon 
 the institution of new States, and their admis¬ 
 sion into the Union. 
 
 It results from this legislation of Congress, 
 that neither Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
 Iowa, nor Wisconsin, may lawfully legalize Sla¬ 
 very therein, without a violation of plighted faith, 
 of the express terms of their several enabling 
 and organic acts, and of the plainest principles 
 of the Constitution. They have each so declared 
 by their fundamental law; they each complied 
 with “the statute restriction;” they each prohib¬ 
 ited Slavery; and that the essential principles 
 of Liberty might be “ unalterably established,” 
 they each declared, by their Constitution, that 
 all men are born equally free and independent, 
 and have the natural and inherent rights of 
 enjoying and defending life and liberty, and of 
 acquiring, possessing, and defending property, 
 and that these rights are inalienable. They 
 understood the statute restriction of Congress 
 binding and obligatory upon them as States , 
 and hence their literal compliance with its re¬ 
 quirement. They understood the sublime con¬ 
 ception of the great fathers of the Republic, 
 that the Slavery prohibition was perpetual and 
 unalterable; that the word forever, as used in 
 the Ordinance, and incorporated in their several 
 organic and enabling acts, meant not merely 
 until their State Constitutions should be form¬ 
 ed, but so long as the States thus organized 
 should live. Yes, sir, “ liberty forever to all 
 the inhabitants,” was declared by these Con¬ 
 gressional enactments, and by the Constitutions 
 of these new States, to be the essential con¬ 
 dition of their existence—their very breath of 
 life. And to-dav, over all that vast tract of 
 country, covered by those six free States, 
 comes the stirring, kindling proclamation, 
 
11 
 
 u liberty to all the inhabitants forever ”—ay, 
 forever —until empires and nations perish, till 
 the heavens be no more, and the earth and sea 
 give up their dead ! I would not willingly sur¬ 
 render a power which has worked such benefi¬ 
 cent results. 
 
 There is but one mode of escape from the i 
 conclusion that this “ statute restriction upon 
 the institution” of new States may and should 
 be imposed by Congress, and that is to repudi 
 ate altogether the sovereignty of the General 
 Government over the Territories—to deny that ! 
 the Territories are the property of the United 
 States, and assert, cn t.he contrary, in the words 
 of Mr. Calhoun, whom the President undertakes 
 to follow, but with “unequal step,” that the 
 Territories belong, not to the United States, 
 but to the several States —that “in the States, 
 Beverally, reside the dominion and sovereignty 
 over them.”—( Calhoun’s Works, vol. 4, p. 497.) 
 That was the only position by which that great ! 
 man could make plausible his objection to the 
 Slavery inhibition by Congress. He held that 
 the Territories were the common property of the 
 several States, held jointly for their common 
 use, and therefore he claimed that it was unjust 
 and unequal that “ any portion of the partners 
 outnumbering another portion should oust them 
 of this common property of theirs,” or proscribe 
 them from emigrating thither with their slave 
 property. He did not question the power of 
 Congress to govern the Tertitories, as the trus¬ 
 tee of the States, and for their benefit, but de¬ 
 nied that under the Constitution Slavery could j 
 be prohibited therein. If the States are ten- j 
 ants in common in the Territories—if they be : 
 the partners in this property—how can one 
 portion of these partners outnumber another i 
 portion, and oust them ? Surely not by legis- ! 
 lation, for they do not legislate as States over 
 the Territories. How then ? By entering the 
 Territory, and ousting their copartners by 
 force, or by acts of usurpation. That, sir, has 
 been done already, not by the non-slaveholding 
 partners,but by the slaveholding partners; and 
 that is the inevitable result of Mr. Calhoun’s 
 proposition, adopted by the President, that the 
 Territories are under the dominion and sover¬ 
 eignty of the Slates, severally. That is the 
 result of this “constitutional equality of each 
 and all of the States of the Union, as States ,” 
 asserted by ihe President, for the government 
 of Kansas, instead of the sovereignty of the 
 nation. This attempt to secure equality to the 
 States, as such, within the Territories, cannot 
 he effected. No legislation cau secure it. It 
 i3 impossible, in the nature of things. The 
 8lavehold.ng States assert that men are prop¬ 
 erty ; the non-slaveholding States assert that 
 men are not property, and cannot and shall 
 not be made property I Georgia, by her Con¬ 
 stitution, declares that the Legislature shall 
 have no power to pass laws lor the emancipa 
 tion of slaves, without the previous consent of 
 each of their respective owners. Ohio, by her 
 
 Constitution, declares that there shall be no 
 Slavery, except in punishment of crime, upon 
 due conviction. If the domestic institutions of 
 the several States are to obtain in the Territo¬ 
 ries, as the President asserts, how can they co¬ 
 exist there, when they thus conflict? You 
 might as well expect two separate and distinct 
 substances to occupy the same place at the 
 same time, or life and death to coexist at the 
 moment in the same body. 
 
 Sir, this proposition of State equality in the 
 Territories is a mere absurdity, except upon 
 the hypothesis that the Territories shall be par¬ 
 titioned. Partition would be a compromise ; 
 and when the South assumed this position, her 
 great leader [Mr. Calhoun] told us, “ Let us 
 be done with compromises ; let us go back and 
 stand upon the Constitution.”—( Calhoun’s 
 Works, vol. 4, p. 347.) I agree to that—the 
 North agrees to that; no more compromises— 
 we stand upon the Constitution. Then, sir, 
 there is to be no partition of these Territo¬ 
 ries—no apportionment of one part as slave 
 Territory, and another part as free Territory. 
 This being so, I say again, the equal dominion 
 of the States, “ as States,” within the Territo¬ 
 ries, is impossible. The privilege to hold slaves 
 in the Territories for a short time, until a Ter¬ 
 ritorial statute or a Constitution excluding it 
 shall have been adopted, will not secure to the 
 States equality, in the sense used by the Presi¬ 
 dent. It would not meet the demands of the 
 South to permit them to go into the Territories 
 with their slaves to-morrow, to be driven back 
 and ousted by superior numbers the next month 
 or the next year. To make good this demand, 
 I say to gentlemen, you must, you will, take 
 another step; and that is, to assert your right 
 to hold slaves within the Territories, after as 
 well as hejore their erection into States. This 
 necessarily results, if within the Territories the 
 equality of each of the States, as States, is to 
 be maintained. 
 
 Why, sir, we were told but a day or two ago, 
 by the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. 
 Orr,] that Territorial statutes were absolutely 
 necessary to protect slave property within the 
 Territories. Enactments to that end have al¬ 
 ready been made in Kansas by usurpers. Re¬ 
 peal these enactments, as I trust you will re>- 
 peal them, and what sanction or protection 
 then have you for slaves in Kansas? None, 
 sir, none. You have a crimes act for the pun¬ 
 ishment of murder, maiming, robbery, larceny, 
 &e., when committed in any place under the 
 exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, &c. 
 This act, with its penalties, by its own terms, 
 as well as by your organic law, is in full force 
 in Kansas; but it furnishes no protection to 
 Slavery or slave property there. If any person 
 should steal a slave within that Territory, held 
 by another as his property, he could not be pun¬ 
 ished under that statute. If a slave should 
 there resist Lis master’s authority over his per¬ 
 son, and take his master’s life in defence of his 
 
12 
 
 own liberty, think you the slave could be 
 held for murier under the National statute? 
 No, sir ! Why would it not be larceny under 
 that statute to steal a slave in Kangas, or mur¬ 
 der for a stave to resist the assault of his master, 
 and take his life in defence of his liberty? Sim 
 ply because larceny can only be committed of 
 property; and by the Constitution of oar com¬ 
 mon country, men are not property, and cannot 
 be made property, and have the right to defend 
 their personal liberty, even to the infliction of 
 death! At common law, larceny can only be 
 committed of property 5 and it is not murder 
 to kill another in defence of your person or 
 liberty. Our penal statute uses the terms, ‘•'lar¬ 
 ceny” and “murder,” only in the sense cf the 
 common law. 
 
 That men are not property, under the Consti¬ 
 tution, has been declared from the Supreme 
 Bench. Tn the case of Groves etal. vs. Slaugh¬ 
 ter, (15 Peters , p. 507.) Justice McLean, speak¬ 
 ing of slaves, says, “The character cf property 
 4 is given them by the local law,” and that “the 
 4 Constitution acts upon slaves as persons, and 
 4 r.ot as property.” It needs no opinion of that 
 distinguished man and eminent jurist to estab¬ 
 lish this. It slaves were property under the 
 Constitution, it would follow that they would 
 continue p operty, wherever the owner might 
 take them within the Union; ar.d hence 
 he might hold his slaves as property within 
 Ohio, notwithstanding her constitutional pro¬ 
 hibition. It has been ruled that, if the 
 owner bring h’s slave within that State, 
 the slave is free. If the Constitution would 
 protect slave property in Ohio, it would protect 
 it in Kansas. The Constitution protects it in 
 neither; and hence it follows that it can be 
 protected only by local law. The gentleman 
 from South Carolina [Mr. Orr] was right, 
 therefore, in saying that, without Territorial 
 laws to protect it, slave property could not be 
 held in the Territories. This concession, sir, 
 while it is manifestly true, is fatal to the Presi¬ 
 dent’s assertion cf the constitutional and im¬ 
 prescriptible right of each and all of the 
 States, as States, to hold slaves in the Territo¬ 
 ries. 
 
 The President’s assertion “of the imprescript¬ 
 ible right of equality cf the several States,” is 
 without meaning, if it does not mean that the 
 several S:ate 3 have extra-territorial power, 
 throughout the national domain, to enforce and 
 maintain property in slaves. What else could 
 he mean by saying that the restriction of the 
 act cf 1820 violated “the imprescriptible right 
 of equality of the several States?” How did 
 this restriction violate any right cf the several 
 States , unless they severally had the right to 
 traffic in slaves, and held slaves as property 
 within the Territories? There was nothing 
 restricted by it but Slavery within the Territory 
 therein described. 
 
 But there is another passage in the message 
 
 before us, so happily expressed, as to leave no 
 douot of the President’s meaning. He says: 
 
 “The several States of the Union are, by 
 1 force of the Constitution, coequal in domestic 
 4 legislative power. Congress cannot change 
 4 a law of domestic relation in the State of 
 4 Maine; no more can it in the State of Mis- 
 4 souri. Any statute which proposes to do this* 
 4 is a mere nullity—it takes away no right—it 
 4 confers none.” * * * “ To repeal it, will 
 
 4 be only to remove imperfection from the 
 4 statutes, without affecting, either in the sense 
 4 of permission or prohibition, the action of ths 
 4 States or their citizens. Still, when the rom- 
 4 inai restriction of this nature , already a dead 
 4 letter in lav/, was in terms repealed by the la3t 
 4 Congress, in a clause cf the act organizing the 
 4 Territories of Kansas and Nebraska, that re- 
 4 peal was made the occasion of a wide spread 
 4 ar d dangerous agitation ” 
 
 Here i 3 the assertion, plainly expressed, that 
 the several States have coequal domestic legis¬ 
 lative power, and that Congress cannot prohibit 
 Slavery in the Territories, because such a re¬ 
 striction, if allowed and enforced, would be a 
 prohibition upon “ the action of the States,” 
 and “ change a law of domestic relation within 
 the States.” Are ihe several States, “by force 
 of the Constitution,” 44 coequal in domestio 
 legislative power?” And does that coequal 
 legislative power extend to the Territories ? 
 
 We have already seen f hat the six Northwest¬ 
 ern States are not coequal with the original 
 States in domestic legislative power ; that they 
 were only permitted to form Constitutions, and 
 to come into the Union upon the condition that 
 Slavery, 44 the dnmest-ic relation ” of some of the 
 other States, should be forever excluded from 
 their territories; that today those six States 
 are in the Union upon that condition, and can¬ 
 not establish the domestic institution of Slavery 
 ■ herein. Does this alleged 44 coequal domestic 
 legislative power of the several States” exteLd 
 to the Territories? The President manifestly 
 so concludes; else, bow could the Territorial 
 prohibition of Slavery, if enforced, affect “ the 
 action of the States,” or change a law of do¬ 
 mestic relation therein? If the several States 
 have this coequal power over rhe domestic in¬ 
 stitutions of the Territories, no necessity exists 
 for local legislation there, to protect the domes¬ 
 tic relation of chattel slavery. Trie law of 
 Georgia, in that case, would follow the slave 
 property of its citizen thither, and make it 
 property there, and, for aught I can see, tho 
 penal laws of Georgia would also operate there 
 lor the protection of that property. 
 
 But it is useless to dwell upon a proposition 
 so absurd; it has no sanction in the Constitu¬ 
 tion or in reason. The extra-territorial legisla¬ 
 tive power of every State is limited to its own 
 citizens and subjects. That i 3 the decision 
 of the Supreme Court, in the great case of 
 Worcester vs. the State cf Georgia.—(G Peters , 
 
13 
 
 542.) A permanent change of domicil deter¬ 
 mines citizenship. 
 
 I conclude, therefore, that the Territories 
 ere not under the dominion and sovereignty of 
 the States, severally ; that the exclusive domin¬ 
 ion and sovereignty over them is in the United 
 States, and can be exercised only by Con¬ 
 gressional enactment; and that new States 
 v/ithin the Territories can only be formed by 
 and with the consent of the National Govern¬ 
 ment. The people of the Territories may form 
 a State Constitution, but unless it be approved 
 by Congress, no State is organized ; the Con¬ 
 stitution so formed is a nullity, and the inhab¬ 
 itants remain subject to Congressional legisla¬ 
 tion. They can never become a State but pur¬ 
 suant to such conditions as the national will 
 may impose, and that will is limited by nothing 
 but the Constitution. The Constitution is based 
 upon the equality of the human race. In the 
 words of Washington, u It is completely free in 
 its principles.” A Stp.te formed under the Con¬ 
 stitution, and pursuant to its spirit, must rest 
 upon this great principle of equality. Its pri¬ 
 mal object must be to protect each human being 
 within its jurisdiction in the free and full enjoy¬ 
 ment of his natural rights. Mere political or 
 conventional rights are subject to the control of 
 the majority; but the lights of human nature 
 belong to each member of the State, and cannot 
 be forfeited but by crime. 
 
 It necessarily follows, that neither slave 
 statutes nor slave constitutions can be made 
 Operative within the Territories, without the 
 sanction and approval, express or implied, of 
 Congress. The President himself concedes 
 this ; the past legislation and the cotemporane- 
 C7U3 construction and history of the Constitution 
 prove it. Disguise it as you may, the question 
 which shakes the Union to day is, not whether 
 Congress may govern the Terri ories, but now 
 Congress may govern them! The question is, 
 whether Congress shall govern the Territories 
 in the spirit of the Constitution, and impose 
 such “statute restrictions ” upon the institution 
 of new States therein as it will require the peo¬ 
 ple thereof to conform their local institutions to 
 the Constitution, and base them upon the broad 
 American, republican principle of absolute 
 equality; or whether, by the sanction of Con¬ 
 gressional enactment, by force of Congression¬ 
 al law , the people of the Territories shall be 
 “ perfectly free ” to organize their local Govern¬ 
 ments upon the narrow, proscriptive, unequal 
 principle of absolute despotism I The ques¬ 
 tion is, whether, by your law, people within the 
 Territories shall be enabled to establish Slavery 
 therein, irrespective of race, sex, age, color, or 
 condition! The question is, whether, in the 
 organization and acimission of new States, the 
 arm of industry—that arm in which slumbers 
 the nation’s strength and the nation’s security— 
 shall be fettered. 
 
 You may call the State which enslaves and 
 eell 3 its own children, and manacles the hand 
 
 ! which feeds and clothes and shelters it, repub¬ 
 lican; but truth, and history, and God’s eternal 
 justice, will call it despotism, equally criminal 
 and equally odious, whether sanctioned by one 
 or many, by a single tyrant or by the million. 
 I deny the constitutional right of any class cf 
 men, from any State cf the Union, or from any 
 quarter cf the globe, to establish such a Gov¬ 
 ern ment within the National Territories, under 
 and by force of the National Constitution, be¬ 
 cause such a Government is subversive of the 
 great objects for which that Constitution was 
 ordained, and violative of its spirit. Who will 
 say that it is within the spirit of the Constitu¬ 
 tion to establish and perpetuate within our Ter¬ 
 ritories the hated rule of tyrants, that might 
 gives right; that the few may govern the many; 
 that the strong may justly rob and oppress the 
 weak? And who, as the representative of the 
 people, and under his oath to the Constitution, 
 will sanction such a tyranny by a solemn act 
 of admission into the Union? 
 
 It must be apparent that the absolute equal¬ 
 ity of all, and the equal protection of each, are 
 principles of our Constitution, which ought to 
 be observed and enforced in the organization 
 and admission of new States. The Constitu¬ 
 tion provides, as we have seen, that no person 
 shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
 without due process of law. It makes no dis¬ 
 tinction either on account of complexion or 
 birth—it secures these rights to all persons 
 within its exclusive jurisdiction. This is equal¬ 
 ity. It protects not only life and liberty, but 
 also property, the product of labor. It con¬ 
 templates that no man shall be wrongfully de¬ 
 prived of the fruit of his toil, any more thau of 
 his life. The Constitution also provides that 
 no title of nobility shall be granted by the Uni¬ 
 ted States, nor by any State of the Union. 
 Why this restriction? Wa3 it not because all 
 are equal under the Constitution ; and that no 
 distinctions should be tolerated, except those 
 which merit originates, and no nobility except 
 that which springs from the practice of virtue, 
 or the houe3t, well directed effort of brain, or 
 heart, or hand ? There is a profound signifi¬ 
 cance in this restriction of the Constitution. 
 It is an announcement of the equality and 
 brotherhood of the human race. 
 
 I do but utter the spirit of the Constitution, 
 when I say that nobility cannot be conferred 
 by the empty titles of a monarch, however 
 august or however debased, bestowed upon his 
 servile parasites, who “ bow at every nod, and 
 3 imper at every word.” That is not nobi'ity, 
 though throned in power and “ clothed in pur¬ 
 ple,” which robs and enslaves the millions, 
 who lift up their haggard faces, and stretch 
 forth their shrivelled hands, asking for leave to 
 eat of the crumb3 which fall from their mas¬ 
 ter’s table. But, sir, there is nobility in that 
 patient, humble toil, which makes a blade of 
 grass to grow where none grew before, thereby 
 giving a drop of nourishing milk to one of 
 
God’s creatures. There is nobility in that 
 cunning handicraft which converts the wool, 
 the cotton, the silk, and the flax, into beautiful 
 fabrics, with which the form of humanity is 
 clothed. There is nobility in that sturdy arm 
 of intelligent industry, which lets in the sun 
 upon the fertile earth, which plows its fields, 
 scatters the seed, gathers in the harvest, and 
 give3 bread to the nations—which hews from 
 the forest and the rock the material, and builds 
 the habitations of man. There is nobility in 
 that imperial exercise of the intellect which 
 enlarges the measure of knowledge, and lessens 
 the ills of life; which subdues the elements of 
 nature, and makes them minister to the wants 
 and comfort of our race; which gifts the light¬ 
 ning with a tongue, and makes it the swift 
 messenger of thought and intelligence; which 
 controls the ocean, engirdling the world with 
 its winds and waves, and makes it the peaceful 
 highway of commerce and civilization. 
 
 There is nobility in that beneficent policy of 
 a State which asserts the equality of all, and 
 defends the inborn rights of each, against the 
 combined power of ail; which establishes jus¬ 
 tice, maintains liberty, rewards labor, and pro¬ 
 tects property; which dots the land all over 
 with public schools, and thereby gives to the 
 people the power of knowledge; which builds 
 
 and fosters those institutions which shelter the 
 poor and houseless, and those other asylums in 
 which the blind are taught to see, the deaf to 
 hear, and the dumb to speak. This is the no¬ 
 bility, the only nobility, which our free Con¬ 
 stitution tolerates and fosters, and which the 
 policy inaugurated by its illustrious founders 
 develops. For evidence of this, I point you to 
 the six free States of the Northwest—the off¬ 
 spring of that policy—with their seven millions 
 of freemen, with their free homes, their free 
 schools, their free thought, their free press, 
 their free labor, and their general and all-per¬ 
 vading intelligence. The President would 
 strike down this policy, under the false pretexts 
 that it is violative of popular sovereignty and 
 State equality. As a Representative of the 
 American People, I cannot consent to that; the 
 people have not sanctioned it; it would be an 
 act of political suicide ; it would disturb the re¬ 
 pose of the dead, and blast the hopes of the 
 living. I would maintain that policy inviolate 
 I would extend it over all the National Terri¬ 
 tories, until that vast belt of the earth’s surface 
 stretching from the confines of Iowa to the 
 golden gates of the Pacific, shall be filled with 
 this new order—this mighty brotherhood of hu¬ 
 man virtue and human industry. 
 

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