THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY 13875 '^iK^fSi Return this book on or before the Latest Date stamped below. University of Illinois L ibrary ./ Si.', HK 2: tiC''.' io IS?! X,1hl_lMl COMMERCIAL BANK OF LONDON. CAPITAL TWO MILLIONS, IN TWO THOUSAND SHARES OF ONE THOUSAND POUNDS EACH. (With a reserved power of enlarging the Capital at a future period if required.) [The Names of the Directors tci/l be communicated confidentially to those Mem- bers of the Legislature, disposed to co-operate in this National Undertaking.] I. The Mercantile Metropolis of the World which might naturally have been expected to take the lead in promoting an improved system of Banking, adequate to the increasing population and expanding commerce of the country, has hitherto derived less benefit from the Joint Stock Principle than some of the remote districts of the Kingdom : but the formation of not less than 120 Provincial Joint Stock Banks, and the progressive merging of so many Private Banks into the same system, render it evident that the example set by the Provinces will be generally followed in the British Metropolis. n. This system combines three important advantages, viz. — a large Capital, permanent Responsibility, and uniformity in the System of Management; thus securing that acknowledged desideratum, a Guarantee that the Capital of a Bank shall not be withdrawn, nor its efficient action impaired by the death or retirement of co-partners. ni. The peculiar impediments which have hitherto obstructed the success- ful establishment of Joint Stock Banks in the Metropolis, are now in progress of removal ; and, responding to the wants and opinions of the Public, — encou- raged by the wide field for its operations and by the profits already derived from well managed institutions of this nature, the " Commercial Bank of London" has been founded as a Bank of Deposit, — for making advances by Loan or otherwise, and more especially as a point of concentration for such Provincial Joint Stock and other Country Banks as conduct their business on sound Banking principles. The difficulties which have so long impeded the formation of this important establishment having been, at length removed, the Directors now throw themselves upon the Public, and especially on the Provincial banking interest, for that encouragement and support which they confidently anticipate from the leading features of their undertaking. IV. Interest on Deposits will be allowed on special Agreement only, no Bafik not having the advantage of issuing its own paper can with safety grant in- terest on floating deposits or on current accounts ; — but while recognizing Security as the legitimate basis of every Banking transaction, the Directors will be desirous at all times, but especially in periods of financial pressure, to meet the just demands of every class of society, Commercial, Manufacturing, and Agricultural. V. By the appointment of three efficient Managing Directors, well ac- quainted with the Banking business, and whose whole time will be devoted to it, the knowledge, decision, and secrecy of a private Bank, will be united to the superior solidity afforded by a rich and numerous Proprietary, controuled by a Board of Directors of the highest respectability. "VI. The division of the Capital of the Company into Shares of ONE THOU- SAND POUNDS EACH,* is founded on the desire to check Speculation in them, whilst it gives to the Establishment the Security of a substantial and permanent Body of Proprietors. In the distribution of the Shares a prefe- rence will be given to Provincial Banks with a view of identifying them with the success of the Institution. VII. Ten per Cent, will be required to be paid on the Allotment of the Shares, and such further calls made as may be necessary, by instalments not exceeding 10 per cent., of which three Months' notice will be given by public advertisement, but not more than 50 per Cent, of the subscribed capital will be called for without the concurrence of three -fourths in value of the Pro- prietors at a General Meeting to be held for that purpose. A discount of 4 per Cent, will be allowed to Subscribers desirous of paying up their Capital. VIII. In order to limit the responsibility of the Subscribers, it is intended to provide by the Deed of Settlement that in the event of one-third of the paid up capital being lost, it shall be compulsory on the Board of Directors to con- vene a Meeting of the Proprietors, and with the concurrence of a majority in value, to dissolve the Company. IX. The Deed of Settlement will be prepared by the Directors, which, upon due notice, the Subscribers will be required to sign ; in default of which their deposits will be forfeited. It is intended to establish a Branch at the West End of the Metropolis, but at no other place. A General Meeting of Proprietors will be held Annually, when a statement of the affairs of the Bank will be laid before them. Applications for Shares to be made to the Solicitor, Samuel Amory, Esq. at 25, Throgmorton Street ; Messrs. Smith and Kinnear, George Street, Edinburgh ; Messrs. Buchanan and Aitkin, Glasgow ; Messrs. Blanshard and Richardson, York ; Wm. Irlam, Esq., Solicitor, Liverpool ; and the Royal Bank of Liver- pool ; " Union Bank," {Percival's) Northampton ; where Prospectuses may be obtained. Applications from the Country to be post-paid, and to be accom- panied by a reference to some party in London. * One of the most recent and decided proofs of the Success to be antici- pated from the Establishment of a Bank with One Thousand Pounds Shares, may be inferred by a reference to the case of the Royal Bank of Liverpool, whose Shares of One Thousand Pounds, on which Five Hundred Pounds have been paid, are now selling at Two Hundred and Twenty-six Pounds Premium, although the Bank has only been established Three Years. REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF LONDON. ADDRESSED TO THE DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS OF ALL JOINT STOCK BANKS, AS WELL AS TO THE PRIVATE BANKERS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM. REASONS FOR ESTABLISHING THE COMMERCIAL BANK OF LONDON. To those who are acquainted with the present depressed state of London Banking, there may perhaps appear no necessity to state the reasons for an Undertaking so universally called for, but as there are many who may be desirous of co- operating in the measure who are not so well informed on the subject, the following statement is submitted, founded on facts, not written with the intention of giving pain to a class, who have been most useful to the country in its humbler days, but who must now necessarily give way to the general desire for a more enlarged and du- rable system, one, more suited to the increased Commerce and Population of the Country. The best proof perhaps that can be furnished of the friendly spirit of the measure, is the avowed inten- tion of the Promoters to endeavour to fill up the Subscription, without having recourse to Public Advertisement for Subscribers. \. The shock given to our whole financial system by the stoppage of the Bank of England in 1797, and the resumption of Cash Payments in 1819, have so completely interwoven the two subjects of Banking and Currency, that it is impossible to in- troduce the one without a glance at the other. although such has been the apathy or prejudice of some of the London Bankers, that not appreciating this intimate connection themselves, they have even condemned those of their fraternity, whose superior knowledge enabled them to foresee the important consequences that would necessarily result from it. To this blindness may be attributed in some mea- sure the failure of twenty-seven London Banking Houses within the brief period of the last 25 years. Confining themselves, according to the custom of their predecessors, to the mere routine of their individual offices, they have been as little aware of the causes of the gradual extinction of their"Orc?er," and as inattentive to the signs of the times, as if such matters did not concern them ; but not so their Country brethren, many of whom have wisely conformed themselves to altered circumstances, and disposed of their business (whilst it was worth a purchasers notice) to the active promoters of Joint Stock Companies. Hence the formation of 120 Joint Stock Banks, now in operation. 2. The public however are not such inattentive observers of passing events as bankers imagine ; to them, it has long been a matter of surprize, as to the source from whence the bankers derived the means of supporting their unavoidably expensive public and private Establishments, together with their or- dinary Losses, their Panic Sacrifices, and other painful contingencies, inseparable from their busi- ness. People witness the accumulation of Deposits at the Bank of England, paying no interest, but placed there merely for security, and with a Body which affords no kind of accommodation or facili- ties to the depositors, and who in fact make it a favor to allow an ordinary account to be opened ; people witness this, we repeat, and the question naturally occurs to every sound and reflecting mind, in what manner is this evil to be remedied ? No blame can justly be attributed to the Bankers, from whom these Deposits are taken, the whole being the result of circumstances which they could not controul, and the consequent astonishment of the Public is not at the failure of so many, but that so many of them should have been enabled to maintain their position. 3. The unfortunate winding up of the affairs of a late Banker's firm has however led to reflections of a deeper and more important nature. That 28 Bankers should have risked so large a sum as j£ 150,000. to enable one of their body to pay the debts of its Establishment in full, afibrds ground for deep and serious regret. That this was done to prevent the calamitous consequences of a general run on the body of Bankers, is well known; but what other inference can the Public draw from it but this, that the system of Joint Stock Banking which has proved so beneficial to Scot- land for the space of 150 years, must sooner or later be introduced in the Metropolis of the British Empire ? 4. Who are the Opponents of this great Finan- cial Reform ? A small number of persons who are " Proprietors of Bank of England Stock ;" and are these com- paratively few individuals to be permitted to stand in the way of a Nation's Prosperity r certainly not. 8 Let us look at the question fully and fairly. It is simply this : — An Act of Parliament was passed in the year 1694 — nearly a century and a half ago — giving a Monopoly to the Bank of England of the valuable privilege of issuing Notes, but no other exclusive advantage whatever, was granted by that Act or by any subsequent Acts, each being a mere re- newal of the^r*^ Act from time to time. The legal and technical meaning of these Acts is couched in the following terms : — " That no body politic or corporate whatsoever, " exceeding the number of Six Persons shall bor- " row — owe, or take up money on their bills or " notes payable on demand, or at a less time than " six months from the borrowing thereof." 5. Now what is the precise and common sense construction of these words ? Simply to prevent any other Bank in London, having more them six Partners, from issuing Notes ; in fact to confine the issue to the Bank of Eng- land ; — be it so — 150 years ago this might have been very proper ; but there are certainly two opi- nions on this point, now. But in what manner do the Directors construe the meaning of these words ? Why into the mon- strous absurdity of preventing the acceptance of Bills of Exchange, by Joint Stock Banks ; in other terms, to prevent Security from being obtained in this great commercial country, in transactions where Security is most needed, and this interpre- tation has been actually sanctioned by the Courts of Law, in the Case of the London and West- minster Bank. But ought such a constructive blun- der to remain longer uncorrected by the legis- lature? it surely needs only be stated, to be rec- tified by Parliament. 6. The Bank of England itself would be but too happy to put an end to public clamour in this case, especially were the rectification accompanied by a distinct recognition of its sole privilege of issue and a Clause to limit the acceptance of Bills by Public Companies to a sum to be named. 7. It might be shewn too, that another advan- tage would accrue to the Bank of England l)y the establishment of sound and efficient Joint Stock Banks in the Metropolis. I allude to the removal of the mass of deposits (amounting to Ten mil- lions) by which the Bank itself, (as stated in Mr. Samuel Jones Loyd's pamphlet) is not only placed in constant jeopardy, but rendered unable, (as be correctly asserts), of affording, in times of pressure and emergency, the requisite circulation to the country without endangering its own safety. 8. The folly of bringing in an Act of Parlia- ment to permit the formation of Joint Stock Banks in the Metropolis, and yet to deny them the power of accepting Bills, is too palpable to remain long unremedied, while such remedy can easily be effected by an union of the several Joint Stock Banks for that purpose. 9. By such a measure a silent and important re- formation would take place in the Banking System of the Empire, on a plan more suited to its increased population and extended commerce, and the esta- 10 blishment of the Commercial Bank of London would doubtless be followed by many others, and a gradual absorption of most of the private Bank- ing Houses thus take place in London, in the same manner as has already taken place both in Scot- land and Ireland. 10. In fact the great diminution of expence that will be effected by this system of Banking will alone lead to its accomplishment, since it is clearly ascertained that by an union of the business of 10 private Banking Houses, under one roof, a sav- ing would be effected of more than <£20,000 an- nually, a fact which no Banker disputes ; but this is not the whole of the advantage to be derived from the measure ; for on a moderate calculation of the amount paid to London Bankers, by the English and Scotch Joint Stock and Country Banks, for transacting their London agency, it is computed to be equal to ,£300,000 a year, the whole of which may he divided hy the proprietors of the several new Banks. 11. If, during this important change in our financial and Banking System, the Directors of the Bank of England consult the true interest of their Proprietors and that of the country, they will sagaciously hend to forthcoming events, and by prudently forbearing to grasp, what they have no longer power to retain, prevent a collision with the mercantile interest, which would in all proba- bility terminate in the total abrogation of an inju- diciously exercised monopoly. By the adoption, however, of a judicious and conciliatorv course of conduct, the Bank Directors 11 may still be enabled to maintain their privilege of issue, as well as the payment of the public divi- dends, whereas by an ill-judged opposition they may endanger both, and induce the Legislature to ac- quiesce in the growing conviction, that, however useful that Corporation may have been to the country during the first 80 years of its establish- ment, the altered circumstances of the kingdom imperatively require the formation of Banks, whose capital shall neither he icithdrawn or lessened by deaths or retirement, and whose funds shall be ex- clusively devoted to commercial purposes, and ?iot locked up in advances to Government, in times of pressure and difficulty. The four serious warnings of 1797, 1825, 182!), and 1837*, ought surely to convince the most sceptical of the necessity of separating the functions of receiver of deposits and issuer of notes. 12. The struggle between the various Banks of the United States and the Bank of England to maintain the Gold currency in each country, though ending in the stoppage of all the Ameri- can Banks, nearly endangered the solvency of both countries. A majority of one vote in the Bank of England Direction saved the nation from a most awful catastrophe — the danger was not less imminent because it was accidentally averted. But ought a great commercial nation to permit its fate to hang upon such a slender thread ? The fault, however, was not with the Bank Di- rectors, but with THE SYSTEM. * See Appendix I. 12 Ought this system then to remain unaltered a single session ? 13. If we cast our eyes upon the banking plan of our Indian Empire, still further light will be thrown upon this vicious system. During the last 20 years, more than Fifteen Mil- lions Sterling* have been lost by the failure of the various Indian houses of agency and banking, yet no remedy is applied, although there is scarcely a family in the kingdom, that has connections in that country, which has not participated in those disasters. It may possibly be asked what con- nection have the tremendous losses in Calcutta with the present undertaking? Simply to point out the calamitous consequences of our whole financial and banking system, as well abroad as at home, and to shew that the same delusive sys- tem of holding out temptations of a high rate of interest on deposits, and risking the principal, which has proved so fatal in Calcutta, is now taking place here.-f- 14. The Directors of the " Commercial Bank of London' would found their claim to support, on public grou7ids only, disclaiming all desire to in- crease the circulation of the country, but simply wishing to bring into active and useful operation a portion of the large mass of deposits now lying unproductive to the Capitalist, and equally useless to the country. A more striking proof of the beneficial effects of the contemplated measure cannot be given than * See Appendix 2. t S^^ Appendix 3. 13 by a reference to the increased amount of exports from Ireland, which from the year 1825, (when the Provincial Bank was first formed) to 1835, have increased from seven millions and a half to eleven millions and a half* 15. The Directors do not contemplate the for- mation of a single provincial establishment, dis tinctly disclaiming all competition with other in- stitutions, and purposing to confine themselves strictly to the law, imperfect as it is, though they of course will avail themselves of its power and privilege to the fullest extent— their sole desire is, to restore the business of banking to its ori- ginal soundness and respectability, and to ren- der their establishment the head quarters of Joint Stock and Private Banks : — the very in- judicious and reckless manner in which some of the Joint Stock Banks have been conducted, ren- ders it, in fact, necessary that a line should be drawn between all sound and unsound Institutions, lest the misconduct of the few should bring down reflections on the whole body, and the si/stem itself be condemned for the acts of a few mex- perienced persons. 16. But in stating the wish of the Directors only to connect themselves with respectable and powerful Joint Stock Banks it must not be under- stood as reflecting on those Banks in Manufac- turing districts which have full and lucrative em- ployment for all their Capital and Deposits, for this would be at direct variance with the prin- * See Appendix 4. 14 ciples, and secret of the prosperity of the Provincial Bank of Ireland, and of many others, which like this bank, make the deposits of the Agricultural Counties and of Capitalists applicable to the uses of the Manufacturing- Districts, since in this con- sists the main prosperity of all Banking Institu- tions — this observation simply points to the neces- sity of checking that reckless spirit of speculation and enterprise so destructive to the morals and happiness of the whole community. 17. The gross mismanagement of the Northern and Central Bank of England and of the Agricul- tural Bank of Ireland, and of many others, whose affairs may have not attracted so much public Sitten- tion, but whose conduct has been equally injudi- cious, have been quoted as proofs of the impolicy of the system, whereas their example clearly ex- hibits the decided necessity of employing none as Managers of such great and important concerns but those whose long practical experience fully qualify them for the undertaking.* For what has been the actual fact ? that out of One Hundred and Twenty Joint Stock Banks, more than One-third of the Managers have been brought up to commercial pursuits only, or if they have received any Bank- ing experience at all, it has been in such subor- dinate capacities as to have precluded the possi- bility of their attaining a perfect qualification for the office. As there is no business that requires greater knowledge and experience, astonishment tnay rather be expressed at the general prudence and skill of the Managers, and at the small number * See, Appendix 5. 15 of failures, than erroneous inferences drawn from the few that have occurred. 18. One of the surest means of estimating the value of a Manager s qualifications for his situation is to regard him during a financial crisis, for which a good nmiYdgev icill (iltv(ii/s be prepared. It is not by administering to the cupidity of a Proprietary and paying them a large Dividend, or by flattering the vanity of Directors by pompous statements, calling debts doubtful which he knows to be bad, that a sound Bank is to be successfully conducted, but by a steady and judicious adherence to principles, which long experience can r//o??e prove the value of, and which has enabled private as well as public Banks to stand for 150 years.* 19. It cannot be too strongly expressed, or too often repeated, that the main principle on which the'' Commercial Ba?ik" intends to rest for support, — is the protection and assistance it will afford to all Joint Stock Batiks and private Bankers doing busi- ness with it, if they conduct their affairs on sound and recognised principles of Banking — with none others in fact does it seek a connection. To these Banks an allowance of interest will be made on Deposits beyond the stipulated amount agreed upon for transacting their business* (as is customary with London Bankers) but not to private persons except in special instances, neither will it hold out tempta- tions of a higher rate of Interest on small sums, to induce private persons to place Deposits with them, for this would be striking at the very root of the * See Appendix 6. 16 Banking Business itself, which the " Commercial Bank of London'' is pledged to support. 21. It must be evident to every one that the pre- sent connection between the Provincial Joint Stock Banks and the London Bankers is unnatural and at variance in fact with their respective interests, and that many of the London Bankers, so far from being in a situation to afford them assistance in times of pressure and emergency, are enabled with great dif- ficulty to maintain their own position. If, as has been before observed, not less than 27 London Banking Houses have suspended their payments during the last 25 years, what security can be af- forded to the Provincial Banks, that twenty-seven more may not follow their example in the next quarter of a century ? in fact, the painful confession of weakness as evinced by the risk of c£150,000 last year to save one House renders it imperative on the part of the Joint Stock Directors to avoid a similar risk ; and equally necessary is it on the part of the Legislature to amend the Law, that this risk may be avoided. 22. Were further argument necessary to prove the insecurity of the present system, let the Propri- etors and Directors of every Joint Stock Bank in the Kingdom only contemplate, for a moment, the calamity they would have sustained last year du- ring the great American Crisis, if the Bank of En- gland had not, by its accidental majority of one, saved one half of Lombard Street from stopping. This is no imaginary idea, but the decided convic- tion of one of the most powerful Bill Brokers in IT Loudon, as well as of many others ; in fact, the very painful state of dependence in which almost every London Banker is placed by his connection with the J5ank of England, ahme incapacitates him from protecting any Joint Stock Bank, more espec'ialli/ if it presumes to issue its own notes, as in the case of the Bank of Manchester,* and the Manchester and Liverpool District Bank. 23. By the selection of a rich and respectable Proprietary, which £1000. Shares necessarily give, the possibility of any serious loss occurring to Individuals is prevented, from having none but wealthy Proprietors to share it with, as in the case of the Banks of England and Ireland,-}- whilst at the same time it enables the Directors to avail themselves on important occasions, of calling up more Capital with confidence. 24. It may be lastly observed, that as the main object in forming the " Commercial Bank'"' istorescue the country from a spurious and dangerous system of Banking, artfully founded on appeals to the cu- pidity of the public, so on the other hand, are the Directors desirous of rendering it the head quarters and rallying point of every sound and efficient Bank in the Kingdom. If a Bank claiming to be termed National^ so far deviates from the original object of its institution, as to lock up three-fourths * See Appendix 7. t The Bank of Ireland commenced in 1783, with a Capital of only e^'eoOjOOO., which is now increased to Three MiUions, after paying 1 2^ per cent, to its Original Subscribers and trebling the value of their Stock. B 18 of its Capital with the Government, instead of ad- vancing it for the benefit of the People, or for the assistance of commerce, it becomes imperatively ne- cessary to form such a concern as the Commercial Bank of London; — in fact, the Joint Stock Banks, equally with the private Bankers, have now the power in their own hands and will necessarily use but not abuse it. COMMERCIAL BANK OF LONDON. CAPITAL, TW^O MILLIONS. IN £2000 SHARES OF £1000 EACH. Having in the preceding sheets, stated the rea- sons for tlie Establishment of the Bank, I now proceed to explain the principles on which it is proposed to be conducted, together with the duties to devolve on the Directors and Managers, subject to such alterations as may be deemed expedient, by the Directors and Pioprietors. The necessity for such a statement must be evi- dent to every one, who reflects on the wide spread- ing mischief that a faulty and imperfect system of Banking is calculated to produce, and which it has in fact already 'produced^ as evidenced by the example of the Northern and Central Bank, the Agricultural Bank of Ireland, and many others. Independent of this consideration, the Public will naturally ask in what respect the Commercial Bank of London is intended to differ from the four or five Stock Banks already established in the Me- tropolis ? and they will further enquire what greater claim to public confidence can the Directors of the New Bank have, than those now in existence r The answer is simple, the Commercial Bank will avoid all dangerous rivalry, all excitements to 2 reckless speculation for the purpose of fostering individual cupidity. It will make practical ex- perience the great guide and groundwork of its proceedings, and thus endeavour to restore the bu- siness of a Banker to the respectable rank and po- sition it once held in the Commercial World. The readiness with which every enemy of the Joint Stock Banks, construes individual misma- nagement into a fault of the System, renders it ne- cesssary briefly to advert to the causes which have produced these calamities; the first, was the decided want of practical knowledge of the trade of Bank- ing by many Managers, and the second, the palpa- ble, but too common error committed in other businesses besides Banking, that of giving unlimited credit to one or two individual Houses, or, as bet- ter expressed by the trite adage, of " having too many eggs in one basket," to this may be princi- pally attributed the losses sustained by most Banks, and to this cause was owing the ruin of the Bank- ing houses of Kensingtons, Brickwoods, Sir Peter Pole, and many others. With respect to the first cause, " the want of prac- tical experience in the Management," there is not in the present day an error so prevalent as that of imagining that the Trade of Banking can be learnt by instinct. The commonest business now prac- tised, presumes the necessity of an Apprentice- ship of Seven years, and yet forsooth, a business which requires a more extensive knowledge of mankind, of credit, and in fact of every thing, is often undertaken by men who have had no train- ing at all. The opinion of one of the most talented 3 Bankers in London (Mr. Lewis Loyd,) is that Bank- ing requires three Apprenticeships, and yet in the three Joint Stock Banks that have proved unsuc- cessful, not one Manager or Director was brought up to the business. Ought we then to be surprised at their want of success ? Those who imagine that to form a sound Bank it is only necessary to assemble eighteen or twenty respectable Gentlemen in a room, to frame a Pros- pectus, and get a Capital subscribed, must have a very imperfect idea indeed of the difficulties at- tendant on such an nndertaking. It is true. Banks HAVE BEEN thus formed, viz. the Northern and Central ; and the Agricultural Bank of L-eland ; and what have been their success ? that, w^iich must sooner or later be the fate of every Bank, if not founded on sound and practical principles. To imagine that any Amount of Capital, however large, is sufficient to ensure success is absurd, for all these Banks had a large paid up Capital, of which a few years sufficed to prove the inutility. No apprehensions need be entertained that the Capital called up will prove insufficient, the amount contemplated being double that of the Provincial Bank of Ireland, which, after 14 years' experience, lias been found quite adequate to meet the severest runs on tliat Establishment, and enable the Direc- tors to pay a dividend of 8 per cent, to tiieir Proprietors, besides adding considerably to the reserved fund. I will now proceed to state a few simple but ne- cessary rules for the government of the intended Bank, being urged so to do, but distinctly disclaim- ing the possibility of forming any settled or pre- scribedcourse of conduct suitable to all circumstances, since almost every case may, more or less, differ and events may occur, (only to be comprehended by a practical Banker), which may compel him one day to act in direct opposition to the rule he perhaps felt necessary to lay down the day before. In fact to fix many settled rules for Banking- adapted to every occasion, would not only be impossible but would betray a species of presumption, that would justly subject me to the derision of every man at all acquainted with the business. The best course I can suggest, is to endeavour in all cases of Discount to procure two good Se- curities, each so totally unconnected that the failure of one will not affect the solvency of the other. Secondly, to avoid having such extensive transactions with any one Jirm, that if mistaken in the opinion of its solidity, you may avoid becom- ing a severe sufferer. Independent of the increased risk incurred by a too liberal application of your Funds to any one house, a Bank founded on public grounds and correct principles, and looking to the Public for support, should extend its assis- tance as widely as possible amongst its connec- tions. Thirdly I would recommend the half of the Bank's Funds being kept in a state of immedi- ate convert ibiliti/ ; this, I know to be difficult, but as every Banker is aware that with all the prudence he can possibly exercise, so many occasions will OCCUR to compel him to lock up his Funds whether he is willing or not, I should constantly recom- mend as a general rule, never vohmtarily to lock 5 up, a portion of them, beyond a limited amount. A rigid adherence to this rule saved the Provincial Bank of Ireland on three different occasions; on two of wliich the Directors were compelled to send upwards of ^600,000 in Gold to Dublin from Lon- don. A fourth rule I would recommend, is to avoid a bigotted preference to what is termed " first rate Paper," — a mistaken partiality for this description of Paper in 1837, nearly occasioned disasters to an extent exceeding in their probable effects the Panic of 1S25. I allude to the enor- mous amount of American Paper then floating in the London Market, amounting at one period to Sixteen Millions Sterling ; (from this catastrophe we were only relieved by a miracle.) Now the description of Paper, I have found to be the safest and most lucrative to discount, after a practical experience of twenty-four years as a Dis- count Broker, and seventeen years as a Banker, is that originating in bond Jide transactions between the Buyer and Seller amongst the middle classes ; the principal cause of the preference being given to Paper of the first class, is its ready convertibility at the Bank of England, but a Bank like that of the Commercial, if desirous of amending the evils of the present system will make security the main feature of its proceedings, and so obtain the highest market rate of interest by discounting the Paper of the middle Classes of Society, when their Bills are based on real transactions ; lastly, I would recommend a considerable bulk of the Company's Funds to be invested in Government Securities of the most ready convertibility ; and never to mix up the character of a Merchant with that of a Ranker. Beyond these essential points, I would observe that, no rules can be laid down that are not sub- ject to constant deviation, — and therefore now proceed to the duties of the Managers and Di- rectors. Although most of the Scotch Banking Com- panies as well as the English, have but one Mana- ger, I conceive the responsibility too great to be entrusted to any one person, however talented and trustworthy, — such a man has only to administer to the several wishes of each individual Director, to become in a short time a kind of Dictator to the whole Board ; and this is known to be the case in very many Joint Stock Banks, whose Di- rectors having' no sufficient pecuniary inducement to attend the Board, leave the management en- tirely to the Manager and the few Directors who do attend, and thus sanction proceedings to which they are utter strangers. I am perfectly aware of the practical incon- venience, if not impossibility, of a large Board of Directors, daily carrying on a Banking business, I know that even in a private Bank, more than two Acting Partners are found seriously incon- venient, the one often counteracting the actions or intentions of the other ; but in a Public Bank, accountable as its Directors are (and justly so) to a numerous body of Proprietors, I hold it to be essential to the Security of the Property entrusted to them, to exercise such a vigilant and almost jealous controul over the power of the Managers, that as little facility of injuring the Bank shall be given them as possible ; it should be rendered imperative, I conceive, that two Managers, out of the three, shall act together on every occasion, and that the Director in attendance be at all times con- sulted, and even be armed with the power of a temporary Veto, for the exercise of which he will of course be responsible to his colleagues on the following Board day. It may naturally be asked what claim I can have to be deemed an authority on Banking Matters beyond that of others? In reply, I would observ^e, that of seventeen years' service in two Banking Mouses, — twenty-four years' practical ex- perience as one of the largest Bill Brokers in London, and closing this concern with a compara- tively trifling loss (after discounting 200 Millions Sterling). If the formation of two most important Joint Stock Banks (those of the Provincial Bank of Ireland, and the Bank of liritish North America) do not afford me some claim to attention, I know not what will. If I appear to arrogate too much to myself, the task is imposed upon nie by the endeavour of others to deprive me of the merit of having founded those successful Institutions ; the first, in conjunction with Mr. Pierce Mahony of Dublin, the latter unaided by any one, but Mr. Montgomery Martin, the talented Colonial Histo- rian, who suggested and framed the Prospectus. — Some apology may perhaps be deemed necessary for the delay that has taken place in forming the present Bank, but the difficulty of selecting a body of respectable Directors vnconnected with the Bank 8 of Eng-land, or with the private banking interest of London, can only be appreciated by those who have experienced it ; for, no stronger proof can be given of the importance attached by the private Bankers of London to the Establishment of the Commercial Bank, than the strenuous efforts that have been made to impede its Formation, this Opposition not having- been shown to any other Metropolitan Bank, beyond their exclusion from the Clearing House. The circumstance of the Shares being fixed at £1000 to secure wealthy and respectable Pro- prietors — the known determination of the Directors to avoid all reckless competition, and to found their claims to public confidence on a strict adhe- rence to a sound and legitimate system of Banking, —the avowed intention of rendering the Bank the head-quarters of all respectable Provincial Estab- lishments — combined w^ith the decided success of the Royal Bank of Liverpool, which, in the short space of three years has sold its £1000 Shares (on which £500 only hove been required) at the extra- ordinary profit of £220 per share ; these circum- stances, combined with the knowledge that the Commercial Bank is founded on the same principle, naturally begets a confidence that the same success will attend its formation. Never in fact was a powerful and sound Bank more required in the Metropolis than at the present period. If not now formed, a host of ephemeral and injudicious Establishments will start up, whose Directors will be endeavouring to acquire a know- ledge of Banking", at the expense of the Proprietors ; this has proved to have been the case with several Provincial Joint Stock Banks now in difficulties, and has been occasioned by a mistaken system of economy, in tlie non-selection of experienced Managers. If the fate of the Northern and Central Bank of England, and of the Agricultural Bank of Ireland, do not furnish sufficient evidence of the necessity of a reform in our Banking System, nothing I can say, ivill convince ; their fate proves that even a large amount of paid up Capital does not furnish sufficient security to the Proprietors against dis- aster, if the System on which the Bank is founded be unsound. Whilst the Public are weak enough to permit themselves to be deluded by the temptation of a high rate of interest on Deposits, which common sense must tell them, can only be paid by a serious risk of the Principal, it is useless to remind them of the fate of the above Establishments, or of the still more serious disaster that befell the Deposi- tors of Money at the Six Indian Agency (or Bank- ing) Houses at Calcutta, within the last few years, where property was lost to the enormous amount of fifteen Millions Sterling, and numerous Families thereby plunged into utter ruin ; — to what, was the whole of this owing, but to the cupidity of the Depositors; to their being allured by a high rate of interest, and to the viciousness of the System that permitted Merchants to become Bankers ? It is perfect delusion to hold out the temptation 10 of an Interest on casual Deposits, and can only end in disappointment ; — it is attempting to do that which the most experienced and practical Bankers hnow to be illusory; — such unfair com- petition cannot be too strongly reprobated. We see wealth daily accumulating in large masses, — the province of a Banker is to distribute it by discounts in a liberal and judicious manner amongst the middle Classes, where it can be done with safety and on bond Jide security ; — paper of this description at all times commands a higher rate of interest than that of first-rate Merchants, and is equally safe, but not so convertible at the Bank of England ; this, however, will be of little consequence to a Bank formed on the principles of the Commercial Bank of London, and possessing a large paid up Capital. Let, in fact, but a powerful and efficient Estab- lishment be once formed, one that shall obtain the confidence of the intelligent and wealthy classes, such a one as the Provincial Bank of Ireland, or the Royal Bank of Liverpool, or many of the Scotch Banks, and no doubt can exist of its success. The middle Classes of the Metropolis will then be relieved from the griping fangs of a host of Usurers and Extortioners, and be placed with their moderate Capital on a more equal footing with the overgrown Capitalist ; whilst the Bank will at the same time derive a liberal profit from a prudent and judicious use of its Capital and Deposits. 11 The circumstance of the risk to the Shareholders being limited to one-third of their investment, must, when generally known, relieve the most timid from all apprehensions of investment in its Stock, whilst the fact of the Bank being made the head- quarters of the Provincial Banking Interest, cannot fail to secure a considerable extent of business from the mere circumstance of every Bank having its Agency Avith the Establishment, becoming a par- ticipator i?i ifs projit. This alone will be sufficient to ensure success. It must be evident to the most sceptical, that when a Bank is once founded on such sound and correct principles as shall secure the decided confi- dence of the public, a great portion of the 10 Millions of Deposits now lying unemployed at the Bank of England, and with private Banks without interest, will gradually find its way to it, (when a small rate of interest is offered), and thereby relieve the Bank of England from an incumbrance alike injurious to the public welfare, and the mainte- nance of a steady currency. Thus will a complete revolution take place in the business of London Banking, similar to that already effected in Scotland and Ireland. APPENDIX. No. 1. Although the visible effects of the panic of 1S25 were more disastrous than those of 1837j the latter was far more serious and threatening. With a circulation of 18,000,OOOZ. the Bank of England specie was reduced to less than 3,000,000/., principally owing to the exportation of 3,000,000 of sovereigns to America to supply the place of the small dollar circulation, called in by General Jackson. The Legal Tender Clause alone saved the country from a convulsion, in proof of which, reference needs only to be made to the evidence given before the Joint Stock Bank Committee last Session, by which it will be seen that one Bank only, viz. the Provincial Bank of Ireland sent upwards of i.'600,COO in specie to that kingdom, where Bank of England Notes were not a legal tender — how awful then would have been our situation had other banks required gold in the same proportion as they did in 1825. Not a doubt can exist as to the calamitous conse- quences that would have ensued. No. 2. To persons having no connections in India, or unable from their position in society to form an idea as to the accuracy of such a statement, the circumstance must no doubt be staggering j but even this amount is considerably underrated — the suf- ferers, however, have no one but themselves to blame for their losses, for most of them have been attracted by alluring tempta- tions of a high rate of interest offered by the various houses of agency, and have thus fallen victims to their cupidity by the loss of their principal. No. 3. No one possessing the slightest pretensions to common sense, can be duped by the absurd statements of interested parties, as to the practicability of allowing a high rate of interest on de- 13 posits without endangering the principal — the very enormous expellees of a banking establishment, and the serious losses to which it is unavoidably subject, prevent the possibility of their making great gains j but when the manner of living of many Bankers is added to it, the difference between the rate of interest they a/Zow; and what they charge is evidently too trifling a profit to admit a doubt upon the subject. No. 4. Better systems for Banking cannot be furnished than those of the Provincial Bank of Ireland and the Royal Bank of Liverpool. The first Establishment has nearly doubled the amount of its Capital in 13 Years, and pays 8 per cent, to its Proprietors j it has reduced the rate of Interest over the whole of Ireland from 9, to 4 and 5 per cent., and established a system of order and re- gularity in the Commercial transactions of that country before unknown. The Royal Bank of Liverpool is following the same judicious course ; its Directors have the advantage of possessing one of the best and most practical Managers, in the Kingdom (Mr. Chaffers) ; it cannot therefore fail of becoming the first Bank in Lancashire ; its shares are judiciously fixed at One Thou- sand Pounds each, one half of which amount is paid up, on which there is a Premium of 220 Pounds per Share. No. 5. A very mistaken idea is abroad with respect to the qualifica- tions necessary for a Manager of a Joint Stock Bank. Persons conversant with Banking are well aware that the mere filling Subordinate Situations in Banking Establishments for a few Years, esp>ecially in Small Branches, by no means qualifies the parties for the important duties of a Manager of a large Concern — every Ensign is not Jit to be a General. No. 6. No better proof can be afforded of the policy of adhering to sound principles, than the respectable rank held by the Houses of Child and Co., Hoares, Goslings, Drummond's, Coutts and Co , and a few others, some of which have been established more than 150 vears. 14 No. 7. The example of these two Banks of Manchester ought to ope- rate as a Warning to all Joint Stock Banks — those Banks having presumed to issue their own Notes, which they were as legally- entitled to do as the Bank of England itself, such offence was taken by the Directors of that Corporation, that they passed a resolution " not to discount the Bills of any Banks so offending," however well drawn or endorsed, so that Security, hitherto deemed the most important qualification of a Bill, was treated as a matter of no moment. \':^ FRINTlI) BY WILI.tAM VITOl,, PAt.L-M Al.t,. LIST OF PRr Place. 1 Abergavenny . 2 Aberystwith . 3 Ashton under line 4 Atherstone . 5 Harnard Castle C Barnstaple 7 Bedale 8 Birmingham 9 Bridg\vater 10 Bristol 11 Ditto 12 Ditto 13 Ditto 14 Bruton 15 Burford 16 Bury . 17 Cardiff . 18 Carlisle 19 Cheltenham 20 Ditto 21 Chepstow . 22 Chippenham 23 Cirencester 24 Colebrook Dale 25 Collumpton 26 Coventry 27 Ditto 28 Crewkeme 29 Darlington 30 Daventry 31 Ditto 32 Denbigh 33 Dewsbury 34 Dobcross 35 Dursley 36 Ditto 37 Ditto 38 Evesham 39 Exeter 40 Falmouth 41 Farringdon 42 Frome 43 Glastonbury 44 Gloucester 45 Ditto 46 Gainsborough 47 Halifax 48 Ditto 49 Hereford 50 Huddersfield 51 Do. and Mirfield 52 Ilfracomb . 53 Ilminster 54 Kingsbridge 55 Knaresborough 56 Langport 57 Leamington . Firm of Private Bank. Jones and Davis Benson, and Co. Buckley, and Co. Chapman, and Co. . Skmner, and Co. Pyke, and Co. . Hutton, and Co. Rotton, and Co. Stuckeys and Woodlands Stuckey, Lean, and Co. Elton, Baiilie, and Co. Cave, Ames, and Co. Haythorne and Wright Stuckey, Nephew, and Co. Pitt, aiid Co. Grundy and Wood Towgood, and Co. Wakefield, and Co. Hartlands, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Jones and BJewit Gundry, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Darby, and Co. Harley, and Co. . Beck and Prime Bunney, and Co. PajTic, and Co. Skinner, and Co. Watkins, and Co. Perceval, and Co. R. Sankey Hagues, and Co. . Buckley, and Co. Vizard, and Co. Wood, Pitt, and Co. Bloxsome, and Co. Hartlands, and Co. Sparkes, and Co. Carne, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Waldron, and Co. Reeves, and Co. . Russell, and Co. T. Turner . Skinner, and Co. Rawdon, Briggs, and Co. Rawson, and Co. Jones, and Co. Rawson, and Co. Wilson, Sons, and Co. Vye, and Co. . Stuckey's, and Co. Nicholson, and Co. Coates, and Co. Stuckey's, and Co. Tomes, and Co. . ^"^"''i.C Monmouthshire an' 1834 North and South V 1835 Saddleworth Bankii 1836 Coventry Union Ba 1836 National Provincial 1836 Ditto . • 1836 Swaledale and Wen 1836 National Provincial 1836 Stuckey's Banking 1836 Ditto . . 1835 Bristol Old Bank 1836 Ditto . .1834 National Provincial 1836 Stuckey's Banking ( 1836 County of Gloucesti 1836 Bury Banking Co. 1836 Monmouthshire and 1836 Carlisle Banking Co 1836 Gloucestershire Ban 1836 County of Gloucestt 1836 Monmouthshire and 1833 Wilts and Dorset Ba 1836 County of Gloucestt 1831 Shropshire Banking 1834 Devon and Cornwall 1836 Coventry and Warw 1836 Ditto 1836 Stuckey's Banking C 1833 National Provincial 1 1836 Northamptonshire B 1826 Northampton Unioa 1836 North and South Wi 1836 West Riding Union 1 1836 Saddles worth Bankir 1833 County of Gloticeste 1836 Ditto . 1829 National Provincial I 1833 Gloucestershire Bank 1834 Devon and Cornwall 1836 Western Dictrict Bar 1836 County of Gloucestei 1826 Stuckey's Banking C 1834 Ditto . . 1831 Gloucestershire Bank 1831 National Provincial E 1834 Ditto . . 1831 Halifax Commercial . 1836 Halifax and HuddersI 1836 Herefordshire Bankin 1834 Halifax and Hudderst 1836 West Riding Union I 1826 National Provincial 1 1826 Stuckey's Banking C< 1834 Devon and Cornwall 1829 Yorkshire District Ba 1831 Stuckey's Banking Cr 1826 Warwick and Leamin LIST OF PRIVATE BANKS MERGED INTO JOINT STOCK COMPANIES. 1 Abergavenny . 2 Aberystwith . 3 Ashton under line 4 Atherstone . 5 Barnard Castle Barnstaple : Bedale . . < Birmingham . . 9 BridgMrater 10 Bristol 11 Ditto 12 Ditto 13 Ditto 14 Bruton 15 Burford 16 Bury . 17 Cardiff . n Carlisle 19 Clieltenhara 20 Ditto 21 Chepstow 22 Chippenham 23 Cirencester 24 Colebrook Dale 25 CoUumpton 26 Coventry 27 Ditto '. 2* Crewkcme 29 Darlington 30 Daventry 31 Ditto . 32 Denbigh 33 Dewsbury 34 Dobcross 35 Dursley 36 Ditto 37 Ditto 3? Evesham 39 Exeter 40 Falmouth 41 Farringdon 42 Frome 43 Glastonbury 44 Gloucester 45 Ditto 46 Gainsborough 47 Halilai 4S Ditto 49 Hereford 50 Huddenfield 51 Do. and Mirfield 52 Ilfracomb . 53 BmiiMter 54 Kingibridge 55 Kninvboroagh M Uneport . 57 l4amii>gtt,n Finn of Private Bank. Jones and Davis Benson, and Co. Buckley, and Co. Chapman, and Co. . Skinner, and Co. Pyke, and Co. . Hutton, and Co. Rotton, and Co. Stuckeys and Woodlands Stuckey, Lean, and Co. EUton, Baillie, and Co. Cave, Ames, and Co. Haythorne and Wright Stuckey, Nephew, and Co Pitt, aiid Co. Grundy and W"ood Towgood, and Co. Wakefield, and Co. Hartlands, and Co. Pitt, and Co. . Jones and Blewit Gundry, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Darby, and Co. Harley, and Co. . Beck and Prime Bunney, and Co. Pa\Tie, and Co. Skinner, and Co. W"atkins, and Co. Perceval, and Co . R. Sankey Hagues, and Co. . Buckley, and Co. Vizard, and Co. Wood, Pitt, and Co Bloxsome, and Co. Hartlands, and Co. Sparkes, and Co. Came, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Waldron, and Co. Reeves, and Co. . Russell, and Co. T. Turner . Skinner, and Co. Rawdon, Briggs, and Rawson, and Co. Jones, and Co. Rawson, and Co. Wilson, Sons, and C< Vye, and Co. . Stuckey'g, and Co. Nicholson, and Co. Coates, and Co. Stuckey's, and Co. Tomes, and Co. . Co. Joint Stuck Bank. When first established. Co Co Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Co North and South Wales Bank Saddleworth Banking Co. Coventry Union Banking Co. National Provincial Bank of England Ditto Swaledale and Wensleydale Banking Co National Provincial Bank of England Stuckey's Banking Co. Ditto Bristol Old Bank Ditto National Provincial Bank of England Stuckey's Banking Co. County of Gloucester Banking Co. Bury Banking Co. Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Bank Carlisle Banking Co. . Gloucestershire Banking Co. County of Gloucester Banking Co. Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Bank Wilts and Dorset Banking Co. County of Gloucester Banking Co. Shropshire Banking Co. Bevon and Cornwall Banking Co. Coventry and Warwickshire Banking Co Ditto Stuckey's Banking Co. National Provincial Bank of England Northamptonshire Banking Co. Northampton Union Banking Co. North and South Wales Bank West Riding Union Banking Co. Saddlesworth Banking Co. County of Globcester Banking Co. Ditto National Provincial Bank of England Gloucestershire Banking Co. Devon and Cornwall Banking Co. Western Dictrict Banking Co. County of Gloucester Banking Co. Stuckey's Banking Co. Ditto Gloucestershire Banking Co. National Provincial Bank of England Ditto Halifax Commercial Bank Halifax and Huddersfield Union Bank Herefordshire Banking Co. Halifax and Huddersfield Union Bank West Riding Union Bank National Provincial Bank of England Stuckey's Banking Co. Devon and Cornwall Banking- Co. Yorkshire District Bank Stuckey's Banking Co. Warwick and Leamington Banking Co, 1836 1836 1833 1836 1833 1S33 1836 1833 1826 1826 1826 1826 1833 1826 1834 1836 1836 1836 1831 1834 1836 1836 1834 1836 1831 1835 1835 1826 1833 1836 1836 1836 1832 1833 1834 1834 1833 1831 1831 1836 1834 1826 1826 1831 1833 1833 1836 1836 1836 1836 1832 1833 1826 1831 1834 1826 1834 58 Leeds . 59 Ditto 60 Ditto . 61 Leicester 62 Leyburn 63 Liverpool 64 Ditto 65 Lymington . 66 Malmesbury 67 Melksham 68 Monmouth . 69 Nantwich 70 Heath 71 Newcastle-upon- 72 Ditto . 73 Newport 74 Ditto (Salop) . 75 Northampton . 76 Ditto . 77 Nottingham . 78 Oldham 79 Penzance 80 Plymouth . 81 Pontefract 82 Pontypool . 83 Richmond (York 84 Rotherham . 85 Saddleworth . 86 Sheffield 87 Shepton Mallet 88 Shields 89 Ditto 90 Shifnall 91 Stokesley 92 St. Coluinh . 93 Stockport 94 Stockton . 95 Stratford- on- Avon 96 Sunderland . 97 Swansea . 98 Taunton 99 Tetbury . 100 Ditto 101 Tewkesbury . 102 Thirsk 103 Totness 104 Truro 105 Usk 106 Warwick . 107 Wellington . 108 Wells 109 Ditto . 110 Whitechurch 111 Whitehaven . 112 Wolverhani))t 113 Yeovil . Firm of Private Bank. Perfects, and Co George Smith, and Co Bywater, and Co. Pares, and Co. Hutton, and Co. Aspinal, and Co. . Hope, and Co. . John West . Robins, and Co. Moule, and Co. . Jones and Davis Mare and Eaton . Rowland, and Co. Backhouse, and Co. Chapman, and Co. Jones, and Blewitt Hordern, and Co. Perceval, and Co. Watkins, and Co. Moore and Robinson Buckley, and Co. Boase, and Co. Hingston and Prideaux Perfect, and Co. . Jones and Blewitt I Hutton, and Co. . ! Walkers, and Co. I Buckley, and Co. . I Walkers, and Co. [ Reeves, and Co. . j Backhouse, and Co, i Chapman, and Co. Biddle, and Co. I Skinner, and Co. . Magor, and Co. Christy, and Co. . Skinner, and Co. Tomes, and Co. Backhouse, and Co. Eaton, and Co. Stuckey's, and Co. Pitt, and Co. Wood, and Co. Hartlands, and Co. Dresser, and Co. Prideaux, and Co. Magor, Turner, and Co Jones and Blewitt Tomes, and Co. Reynolds, and Co. Stuckey's and Co. Reeves, and Co. . Corser, and Co. Hartley, and Co. . Hordern, and Co. Whitmarsh, and Co Joint Stock Bank. When first established. Yorkshire District Bank . . . . . 1834 Leeds and West Riding Bahking Co. . . . 1835 Leeds Commercial Bank ..... 1836 Pares Leicestershire Banking Co. . . . 1836 Swaledale and Wensleydale Banking Co. . . 1836 Liverpool Central Bank 1836 Liverpool Borough Bank 1836 Wilts and Dorset Banking Co 1836 Ditto 1836 North Wilts Banking Co 1835 Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Co. 1836 Northern and Central Bank of England . . 1834 Glamorganshire Bank ..... 1836 Northumberland and Durham Banking Co. . . 1 836 Newcastle Union Banking Co. .... 1836 Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Co. 1836 Shropshire Banking Co. ..... 1836 Northamptonshire Union Banking Co. . . 1836 Ditto 1836 Moore and Robinson's Nottingham Banking Co. . 1836 Saddleworth Banking Co. .... 1833 Western District Banking Co 1836 Devon and Cornwall Banking Co. . . . 1831 Y'orkshire District Bank 1834 Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Co. 1836 Swaledade and Wensleydale Banking Co. . . 1836 Sheffield and Rotherham Bank .... 1836 Saddleworth Banking Co 1833 Sheffield and Rotherham Bank .... 1836 Stuckey's Banking Co 1826 Northumberland and Durham District Bank . 1836 Newcastle Union Banking Co. . . '. . 1836 Shropshire Banking Co 1836 National Provincial Bank of England . . . 1833 Western District Banking Co 1836 Manchester and Diverpool District Bank . . 1829 Ditto 1833 Stourbridge and Kidderminster Banking Co. . 1834 Northumberland and Durham District Bank . 1836 Glamorganshire Banking Co. .... 1836 Stuckey's Banking Co 1826 County of Gloucester Banking Co. . . . 1834 Gloucestershire Banking Co. .... 1831 Ditto 1831 Y'orkshire Disctrict Bank 1834 Devon and Cornwall Banking Co. . . .1831 Western District Bank 1836 Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Co. 1836 Warwick and Leamington Bank .... 1834 Shropshire Banking Co 1836 Stuckey's Banking Co 1826 Ditto 1826 Northern and Central Bank of England . . 1834 Bank of Whitehaven 1829 Wolverhampton arid Staffordshire Banking Co. . 1831 Stuckey's Banking Co 1826