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 THE DEVELOPMENT : 
 
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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
 AMERICAN LABOR 
 
 By ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Michigan State University 
 
 Publication Number 48 
 
 ^ SERVICE CENTER FOR TEACHERS OF HISTORY 
 
 A Service of the American Historical Association 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 
 60 Fifth Avenue, New York 
 
The American Historical Association, because of its continuing inter- 
 est in the teaching of history in the schools of the United States, has 
 established the Service Center for Teachers of History in an effort to 
 offer constructive assistance in solving some of the problems which today 
 beset the classroom teacher. One of the programs being sponsored by the 
 Service Center is the preparation of a series of pamphlets, each contain- 
 ing a concise summary of publications reflecting recent research and 
 new interpretations in a particular field of history. 
 
 Since many secondary school teachers have neither the time nor oppor- 
 tunity to read widely in monographic literature, these pamphlets have 
 been specifically designed to meet classroom teachers' needs. Each pam- 
 phlet purports to bring the reader abreast of current interpretations 
 and significant writings in a specific field of historical study. Our aim 
 is, in short, to help the teachers help themselves by keeping up to date 
 in their fields of interest. It is- our sincere hope that this will materially 
 benefit the teacher and thereby contribute to the enrichment of class- 
 room instruction. The extent to which the project is successful will be 
 measured by the degree to which the regrettable gap between the teacher 
 of history in the school and the specialist in historical research is 
 narrowed. 
 
 Walter Rundell, Jr. 
 
THE 
 
 DEVELOPMENT 
 
 OF AMERICAN 
 
 LABOR 
 
 By ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Michigan State University 
 
 A Publication of the American Historical Association's 
 
 SERVICE CENTER FOR TEACHERS OF HISTORY 
 
 400 A Street, S. E., Washington 3, D. C. 
 
 THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, NEW YORK 
 COLLIER-MACMILLAN LIMITED, LONDON 
 
© THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 1963 
 
 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be repro- 
 duced in any form without permission in writing from the 
 publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief 
 passages in connection with a review written for inclusion 
 in a magazine or newspaper. The American Historical 
 Association does not adopt official views on any field of 
 history. The Service Center, following the tradition of the 
 Association, does not necessarily agree or disagree with 
 the views expressed in this book. 
 
 First Printing 
 
 Library of Congress catalog card number: 63-8298 
 
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 COMMITTEE ON TEACHING OF THE 
 
 AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
 
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 Princeton University 
 
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 Executive Secretary, 
 
 American Historical Association 
 
 Frank Freidel 
 Harvard University 
 
 Stanley J. Idzerda 
 Michigan State University 
 
 William H. Cartwright 
 Duke University 
 
 Robert R. Coon 
 Alameda High School 
 Jefferson County R-l 
 Lakewood, Colorado 
 
 Miss Margareta Faissler 
 Roland Park Country School, 
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 Mrs. Eugene Meyer 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Jim B. Pearson 
 University of Texas 
 
 Walker D. Wyman 
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331.87 
 
 C570 . 3 
 
 TA<? Development of 
 American Labor* 
 
 By ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 "More, more, more, now" has been the persistent demand of labor 
 unions since their beginnings at the turn of the nineteenth century. But 
 the meaning of the term "more" and from whom it was to be sought has 
 been a subject of constant dispute within the labor movement. Higher 
 wages, shorter hours, improved working conditions, and job security have 
 been perennial demands, but the specific content of these demands differed 
 depending upon the period in which it was sought — a demand for a ten- 
 hour day changed to one for an eight-hour day and by the 1960's has be- 
 come one for less than eight hours. Moreover, labor has regularly 
 disagreed over where to secure this higher standard of living. Should it 
 be in the economic market place through collective bargaining (the 
 process by which managements and unions negotiate a settlement which 
 both parties will accept) ? Or should it be through political action, either 
 by a radical reform of society such as socialism or by relatively pale plans 
 of social reform? Forces within labor have argued over which of these 
 courses to take and as a result have staked out on American soil a unique 
 path for our industrial relations. 1 
 
 * Adapted from the author's "The American Industrial Relations System" and 
 "Labor-Management Prospects in the 1960's," in Problems of Competition and Eco- 
 nomic Organization, Vol. 5, Social Science Series (Michigan State University Press, 
 1962). 
 
 1 There are three one-volume histories of American labor that are helpful. The 
 shortest is Henry Pelling, American Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
 1960). This is also in a paperback edition. The most detailed is Joseph G. Rayback, 
 A History of American Labor (New York: Macmillan, 1959). The best written is 
 Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1960). John 
 R. Commons, et al., History of Labour in the United States (New York: Macmillan, 
 1935), 4 vols., is still extremely valuable. Two bibliographies offer further guides to 
 the literature in the field: Maurice F. Neufeld, A Bibliography of American Labor 
 Union History (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 
 
 1 
 
I ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Responses to the Industrial Revolution 
 
 Labor was not alone in searching for a path to follow. The industrial 
 revolution had brought forth great opportunities for progress — more 
 production, more profit, more work. It also carried in its wake frequent 
 loss of skills, monotony of mass production, long hours of toil, dismal 
 working conditions, and the stench of industrial slums. The farm had had 
 horrible conditions too but not in such concentrated doses. What to do 
 perplexed many sensitive individuals early in the nineteenth century as 
 in the years following. Must poverty go hand in hand with progress? To 
 some, the answer was in the affirmative. To many members of the laissez- 
 faire school of economics, it was a dismal but nonetheless clear fact that 
 there was only a fixed amount of money available for wages for workers; 
 to give them more would only permit them to propagate more, which 
 in turn would inevitably create greater pressure on the already limited 
 amount of funds available. Consequently, one would only pay them 
 enough to subsist. Other members of the laissez-faire school of economics 
 painted a more optimistic picture of the lot of the worker — that the law 
 of supply and demand working freely in the market place would, in the 
 long run, all other things being equal, help the worker. In the latter part 
 of the nineteenth century, this approach took on a Darwinian flavor. The 
 Social Darwinists, as this group was called, argued that the best rise to 
 the top and that the dregs settle on the bottom. Therefore, do not help 
 those at the bottom. If they are good, they will rise. If not, they are getting 
 what they deserve. Do not send to know for whom the bell tolls, 
 preached the Social Darwinist. It tolled for whom it should. 
 
 Neither the dismal school of economists nor the biological rational- 
 izations of the Social Darwinists satisfied all. Many, including labor 
 leaders, sought other answers to the persistent and perplexing problems 
 that faced industrial society. To some the answer was the creation of 
 Utopian societies. Children of enlightenment, these people believed that 
 human beings were perfectible. All one had to do was to develop 
 
 1958), and Gene B. Stroud and Gilbert E. Donahue, Labor History in the United 
 States: A General Bibliography, (University of Illinois: Institute of Labor and Indus- 
 trial Relations, 1961). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 6 
 
 little communities, co-operatively run, and these would become the pied 
 pipers of the future. But nearly all these lonely islands were to be flooded 
 by the surrounding capitalist society and eventually destroyed. But the 
 goal of co-operation did not die. Union leaders, as others, believed that 
 if workers would organize producer or consumer co-operatives, they 
 would reap the benefits of capitalism, without the disadvantages. The 
 profit motive and a relatively unsympathetic society helped cause this 
 dream nearly to vanish. Somewhat like the Cheshire cat, only the smile, 
 not the body, of co-operatives still remains. Another dream, land reform, 
 also sparked labor's enthusiasm for a time. The redistribution of land so 
 that everyone would have a piece of earth to till when he lost his job 
 in the factory attracted many as a solution to the worker's plight. But first 
 of all this policy was not carried out; and secondly, if it had been, it is 
 doubtful that a worker in a major city, who had lived all his life in an 
 urban community, upon losing his job (assuming he had the money to 
 take a trip) would march out to Kansas to start farming. And anyway, 
 by 1890 the frontier had officially disappeared and the safety valve of the 
 farm, if it ever had been open, was now closed. 
 
 To a few Americans, including a number of labor leaders, none of 
 these answers to the evils of industrial society proposed during the nine- 
 teenth century was satisfactory because it did not get rid of what they 
 believed was the main problem — namely, government. These anarchists 
 argued that while man was basically good, government was evil. Get rid 
 of government and society would improve. To many anarchists, the way 
 of achieving this goal was persuasion. To the remainder, "the anarchists 
 of the deed," one killed those who governed, since government was evil. 
 These bomb-throwing anarchists, though few in number, revolted the 
 general public and prejudiced many against unions, since some anarchists 
 were associated with labor. In the first decades of the twentieth century, 
 some of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) tried to move the 
 lumberjacks, copper miners, and others into syndicalism, the labor union 
 version of anarchism. The Wobblies, as they were called, sang their songs 
 about the one big union that would call a general strike, end government 
 as we know it, and then the workers would dominate a new industrial 
 society. They led some bitter strikes but the union collapsed as a result 
 of their weak organizational structure when the government hit hard at 
 them during the First World War and when some of their leaders moved 
 
4- ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 over to communism. A remnant remains today still singing about pie in 
 the sky by and by — and doing little else. 
 
 Anarchism, land reform, Utopian socialism, and co-operatives played 
 their role on the labor stage and then disappeared behind the curtain 
 never to appear again. But Marxism, or scientific socialism, and social 
 reform were to struggle for the allegiance of the workers along with pure 
 and simple trade unionism (that is, solely collective bargaining with man- 
 agement and very little, if any, political activity). To the scientific social- 
 ist in America, be he of the democratic socialist school of a Eugene V. 
 Debs and Norman Thomas or of the communist school of Earl Browder 
 or William Z. Foster, it was the worker who was to be the instrument of 
 change in society. Thus the democratic socialist openly tried to convince 
 labor unions to take more radical positions and to move towards social- 
 ism. Thus the Communists openly and/or furtively infiltrated the labor 
 movement and tried to have it follow policies in accord with the interna- 
 tional communist line which was synonomous with the Soviet Union's 
 party line. Though both wings of the socialist movement played impor- 
 tant roles in the labor movement, because of the pragmatic nature of 
 American workingmen, they failed. The Communists eventually were cut 
 out as a cancerous growth on the body of labor and today lead a lonely 
 existence in some unions that, with one possible exception, are quite un- 
 important; and none of these unions belongs to the federation of labor 
 unions, the AFL— CIO. The old democratic socialists still play an impor- 
 tant role in labor except that most of them are no longer socialists and 
 instead have moved over to that much larger group in American labor 
 that has emphasized social reform. 
 
 Social reform is in many respects a feeling which as such defies 
 definition. Its critics believe they demean it by calling it "do-goodism," 
 but it is essentially that — namely, the desire to use society, and partic- 
 ularly government, to do good. Its critics would claim this is impossible; 
 its supporters argue that the problems of the aged, the unemployed, the 
 sick, the weak cannot be left to the laws of chance or to the laws of 
 economics but should be left to the laws of men, enacted by their 
 representatives in city councils, state legislatures, and in the federal gov- 
 ernment. Though by the 1930's, the American labor movement was to 
 be committed to social reform, this had not always been true before. The 
 struggle over alternative courses had taken place until the advent of the 
 New Deal with collective bargaining, as opposed to political action, 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR D 
 
 generally winning out until the 1930's, when both approaches merged 
 into one. 2 
 
 Labor Unions and the Industrial Revolution 
 
 Although the attitudes of unions to all these alternative reactions to 
 the industrial revolution have been emphasized, it must be remembered 
 that labor was only one of the many groups who considered each of 
 these different courses. In fact, another reaction to the industrial revolu- 
 tion was unions themselves — organizations in which workers tried to 
 solve the many problems they had to face in the increasingly complex 
 society of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The colonial shoemaker, 
 for example, proud of his skills at the awl, and working on a bespoke 
 basis (that is, producing shoes on order) had no need for union. But 
 the American market expanded and the methods of production changed. 
 Shoes began to be produced for a wholesale market, and eventually in 
 the factory for a national or international market. The intimate ties be- 
 tween the master workingman and his journeymen or employees began 
 to disappear as the masters pushed for lower wages for items produced for 
 wholesale distribution. This forced the workingmen to band together to 
 fight not necessarily for more, but so that they would not be paid less. 
 They struck. One case came to court in Philadelphia; the decision, in 
 1806, was that whenever two or more workers combined together to 
 secure such things as better wages, this was a conspiracy in restraint of 
 trade and consequently illegal. Under such a decision, all unions that 
 practiced collective bargaining would be considered illegal. 3 
 
 The tiny labor movement reeled under such a decision. As is true 
 in nearly all depressions, the depression after the War of 1812 further 
 
 2 For a more detailed discussion of these various alternatives see the author's 
 "The Political Alternatives of Labor," Labor Law Journal, September 1959, pp. 623- 
 631. In addition, see Paul F. Brissenden, The I.W.W.: A Study of American Syndical- 
 ism (New York: Russell and Russell, 1957); David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party 
 of America (New York: Macmillan, 1955); and Donald Drew Egbert and Stow 
 Persons, eds., Socialism and American Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
 1952). 
 
 3 The best treatment of labor during the colonial period is Richard B. Morris, 
 Government and Labor in Early America (New York: Columbia University Press, 
 1946). An extremely provocative essay by one of the great names in labor history, John 
 R. Commons, might be read: "The American Shoemakers, 1648-1895," Chapter 14 in 
 his Labor and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1913). 
 
D ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 weakened an already undernourished, and from the court's point of 
 view, illegitimate baby. Labor then began to look away from economic 
 techniques towards political activity. During the years from 1828 to 
 1832, they became active in Workingmen's parties and began to play a 
 role in the politics of the Jacksonian period. 
 
 The exact role played by labor in the Workingmen's parties and in 
 the Jacksonian period is still subject to dispute among scholars. There 
 has never been a sharp boundary between working and other classes in 
 America and the dividing line was probably even hazier around the 
 1830's. Thus, it is clear that many workers were active in the Working- 
 men's parties but so were many members of the middle class. The social 
 reforms sought by these parties, such as free public education, end of 
 imprisonment for debt, abolition of militia duty, and a mechanic's hen 
 law, were also advocated by others. And the issue of whether labor voted 
 for Jackson and his followers in the Democratic Party, or, instead, gave 
 its support to the Whigs has not as yet been resolved. But it is interest- 
 ing to note that what happened then to the workers' relationship to the 
 independent labor parties and to the two regular parties has continued 
 throughout American history and reflects one major difference in Amer- 
 ican labor development as compared with foreign labor movements. 
 Unions in the United States have only given sporadic allegiance to 
 separate labor parties; instead, their political attention has normally 
 focused on working within the two major parties. One reason is that the 
 workers were early given the right to vote, and American unions, unlike 
 those in Europe, did not have to fight for this political right and instead 
 struggled for economic goals. 4 
 
 During the first half of the nineteenth century, when the impact of 
 the industrial revolution was still slight, workers fought the economic 
 fight in small locals, active in communities. These local unions sometimes 
 joined together into city centrals as in Philadelphia. As the industrial 
 revolution exerted a greater impact on the American economy during 
 the nineteenth century, national markets developed. Local trade unions, 
 as a result, clasped hands to form such national trade unions as Typog- 
 
 4 For the different views concerning labor during the Jacksonian period, see 
 Walter Hugins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class (Stanford: Stanford 
 University Press, 1960); William A. Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania 
 1800-1840 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1955) ; 
 and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR / 
 
 raphers, Stonecutters, Molders, and Cigarmakers. A New York cigar- 
 maker had to become concerned that a Chicago cigarmaker be paid no 
 less than he; otherwise cigars produced in Chicago would sell for less. 
 Since cigars could be sold anywhere because of our expanded transporta- 
 tion system, they would force the New Yorker out of his job. Moreover, 
 he wanted to have the right to move to Chicago, and still keep his union 
 membership. National unions provided workers with national member- 
 ship, some centralized influence over collective bargaining, and a more 
 disciplined union organization. These organizations also strove for job 
 security for their members. The best way to achieve this basic goal, many 
 of them believed, was through craft organization whereby skilled workers 
 in all industries belonged to the same union. Thus, all machinists would 
 join a machinist union whether (to use a twentieth-century example) 
 they worked in an automobile plant in Detroit, Michigan or one in 
 Rahway, New Jersey or whether they worked in an airplane plant or a 
 small machine shop. These horizontal unions, as they were called, could 
 exert a stranglehold on a company since, though they might number 
 only a few workers, they held key positions and could close down the 
 plant. These national unions, committed generally to craft organization, 
 were able to withstand depressions far better than the small local unions 
 had in the past. 5 
 
 But there were those workers who believed that all who are em- 
 ployed should join into one union no matter what their skills. One 
 example of this was the Knights of Labor, started in 1869. All workers, 
 with some exceptions such as lawyers and liquor salesmen, could join 
 into this mass industrial union. The Knights of Labor, led by Terence 
 Powderly, was mainly concerned with reform — land and bank reform 
 and co-operatives. It did not favor collective bargaining or strikes, yet 
 one successful strike helped the Knights to skyrocket in 1886 to a mem- 
 bership of about 700,000 members. But the Knights declined nearly as 
 rapidly because of the failure of several strikes, the vagueness of its 
 leaders' philosophy, and the inaccurate label of radicalism attached to 
 it. Another major cause of its decline and eventual disappearance was 
 the beginning of the American Federation of Labor in 1886. 6 
 
 5 A thorough study of the national trade union can be found in Lloyd Ulman's 
 The Rise of the National Trade Union (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955). 
 
 6 The Knights of Labor has never received the study it deserves. Terence V. 
 Powderly's The Path I Trod (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), is a story 
 
« ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 The American Federation of Labor 
 
 The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was an association of 
 autonomous national unions, whose leaders believed that the main func- 
 tion of unions was to improve the well-being of their members through 
 collective bargaining rather than through the ballot box. The AFL had 
 little authority over its autonomous member unions. The national unions 
 did the collective bargaining, not the Federation itself. Why then did 
 such national unions as the Carpenters, Machinists, Ladies Garment 
 Workers, and Mine Workers belong to the AFL? A major reason was 
 that the AFL spelled out the exclusive jurisdictions of each member 
 union. In the charter issued by the AFL, a national union was given a 
 slice of the American work force to organize — a slice not given to any 
 other national union belonging to the AFL. When disagreements arose 
 over jurisdiction, the AFL was supposed to help settle these disputes 
 and thus prevent one of the most hated things in labor, dual unions, or 
 two or more unions trying to organize the same group of workers — 
 hated because it weakened the organizational power of some of the 
 unions involved. The AFL served other important functions. It helped 
 organize new workers. When a national union needed money, for ex- 
 ample during a strike, the AFL helped raise those funds. Moreover, it 
 acted as the spokesman for labor on political issues. AFL leaders had 
 restricted goals for themselves in the political sphere. Thus, they opposed 
 any law that hampered labor's right to organize or strike, or any law 
 that did for workers what they thought could be done better through 
 collective bargaining. On the other hand, they did not object to pro- 
 tective legislation for women and children since they felt these individuals 
 were relatively unorganizable. 
 
 Basically, these men feared government — an old American tradition. They 
 feared it for the reasons already mentioned. They feared it because they 
 believed that laws passed by a legislature favorably disposed towards the 
 wage earners would become the maximum — not the minimum that the 
 workers could gain. This helps explain the early opposition of the American 
 Federation of Labor to a minimum-wage and maximum-hour law. . . . 
 
 of the organization written by its head. Norman J. Ware's The Labor Movement in 
 the United States, 1860-1895 (New York: Appleton, 1929) and Gerald N. Grob, 
 Workers and Utopia (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961) discuss it at 
 length. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 
 
 However, the philosophy of the [AFL] unionist was not only one of fear, but 
 also one of faith — a faith in the strength of unions and the benefits they 
 would bring. Union activity was the only action which could really improve 
 the workers' conditions; politics would only dissipate their energies. In 
 unions — these laborers paraphrased an old adage — there was strength. 7 
 
 The Growth of Unions 
 
 The AFL slowly grew during the years following its organization. 
 There were those outside the AFL, such as the IWW, that challenged its 
 philosophy, and failed. There were those within the AFL, such as the 
 socialists and those who favored social legislation, who tried to wrest 
 away the leadership from the conservatives led by its president, Samuel 
 Gompers, but they also failed. The First World War saw the federation 
 grow and its leader, Gompers, hold important positions in the govern- 
 ment. But with the war's end, the AFL began to decline in strength. 
 Generally speaking, unions had grown during prosperous periods and 
 declined during depressions. The years from 1921 were relatively pros- 
 perous years and yet the labor movement declined (see Table 1). Why 
 did this occur? There were many reasons for this but only two will be 
 discussed here. One involved the attitude of management; the other the 
 attitude of government. 8 
 
 Attitude of Management 
 
 Management's attitude towards labor during the years prior to the 
 passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 (and perhaps after except insofar as 
 certain actions became illegal) took generally two forms: one was "to 
 fight unionism with every weapon that management could command"; 
 the second was to try to improve workers' conditions themselves. Many 
 companies followed both policies and surely one of the reasons for 
 raising the standard of conditions for workers was to increase their 
 
 7 Blum, op. cit., p. 624. 
 
 8 The best record of the AFL's activities from its beginning until its merger with 
 the CIO can be found in Philip Taft's The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New 
 York: Harper, 1957) and The A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger 
 (New York: Harper, 1959). For an extremely well-written account of labor from 1920 
 to 1933, see Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the Worker 1920-1933 
 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960). 
 
10 
 
 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 loyalty to the firm vis a vis the union. Individual companies or trade 
 associations hit hard at labor organizations through a vast public rela- 
 tions program; blacklists; yellow-dog contracts (a worker signed an 
 agreement not to join a union in order to secure and keep a job) ; strike- 
 
 UNION MEMBERSHIP 
 
 1870-1960 
 
 
 
 U.S. and Can- 
 
 
 U.S. Workers in 
 
 
 
 adian Mem- 
 
 Total Union 
 
 N on- Agricultural 
 
 
 Total U.S. 
 
 bership as a 
 
 Membership 
 
 Establishments t 
 
 
 and Canadian 
 
 percentage of 
 
 Exclusive of 
 
 Number of 
 
 
 
 Membership * 
 
 U.S. Civilian 
 
 Canada t 
 
 Employees 
 
 Per Cent 
 
 Year 
 
 (000's) 
 
 Labor Force * 
 
 (000's) 
 
 (000's) 
 
 Organized 
 
 1870 
 
 300.0 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 6,190 
 
 4.9 
 
 1880 
 
 200.0 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 8,820 
 
 2.3 
 
 1890 
 
 372.0 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 13,550 
 
 2.7 
 
 1900 
 
 868.5 
 
 3.0 
 
 — 
 
 14,236 
 
 6.1** 
 
 1902 
 
 1,375.9 
 
 4.5 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1904 
 
 2,072.7 
 
 6.4 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1906 
 
 1,907.3 
 
 5.5 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1908 
 
 2,130.6 
 
 5.8 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1910 
 
 2,140.5 
 
 5.6 
 
 2,021.1 
 
 20,397 
 
 9.9** 
 
 1912 
 
 2,452.4 
 
 6.3 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1914 
 
 2,687.1 
 
 6.8 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1916 
 
 2,772.7 
 
 6.9 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1918 
 
 3,467.3 
 
 8.4 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1920 
 
 5,047.8 
 
 12.0 
 
 4,780.6 
 
 25,392 
 
 18.8** 
 
 1922 
 
 4,027.4 
 
 9.4 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1924 
 
 3,536.1 
 
 7.9 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1926 
 
 3,502.4 
 
 7.6 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1928 
 
 3,479.8 
 
 7.3 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 — 
 
 1930 
 
 3,392.8 
 
 6.8 
 
 3,161.8 
 
 29,143 
 
 10.7** 
 
 1932 
 
 3,144.3 
 
 6.2 
 
 2,968.3 
 
 23,377 
 
 12.6 
 
 1934 
 
 3,608.6 
 
 6.9 
 
 3,447.6 
 
 25,699 
 
 13.4 
 
 1936 
 
 4,075.1 
 
 7.6 
 
 3,901.1 
 
 28,802 
 
 13.5 
 
 1938 
 
 7,342.0 
 
 13.4 
 
 7,111.0 
 
 28,902 
 
 24.6 
 
 1940 
 
 8,100.9 
 
 14.6 
 
 7,873.9 
 
 32,058 
 
 24.5** 
 
 1942 
 
 9,523.0 
 
 16.9 
 
 9,141.0 
 
 39,779 
 
 22.9 
 
 1944 
 
 12,538.9 
 
 23.0 
 
 12,063.9 
 
 41,534 
 
 29.0 
 
 1946 
 
 13,648.0 
 
 23.7 
 
 13,069.0 
 
 41,287 
 
 31.6 
 
 1948 
 
 14,916.0 
 
 24.3 
 
 14,235.0 
 
 44,448 
 
 32.0 
 
 1950 
 
 14,751.0 
 
 23.4 
 
 14,018.0 
 
 44,738 
 
 31.3** 
 
 1952 
 
 16,730.0 
 
 26.6 
 
 15,876.0 
 
 48,303 
 
 32.8 
 
 1954 
 
 17,757.0 
 
 27.5 
 
 17,022.0 
 
 48,431 
 
 35.1 
 
 1956 
 
 18,477.0 
 
 27.4 
 
 17,490.0 
 
 51,766 
 
 33.8 
 
 1958 
 
 18,081.0 
 
 26.3 
 
 17,029.0 
 
 50,543 
 
 33.7 
 
 1960 
 
 18,117.0 
 
 25.8 
 
 17,049.0 
 
 53,137 
 
 32.1 
 
 1870-1890: Lloyd Ulman, "The Development of Trades and Labor Unions," in 
 Seymour Harris, ed. American Economic History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
 1961), p. 393. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 11 
 
 breakers or scabs ; and, as the La Follette committee of the United States 
 Senate was to show in the 1930's, the purchase of tear gas and ammuni- 
 tion to be used against workers who attempted to unionize. To many 
 executives, labor was a commodity, like a machine, and to be treated 
 accordingly. 
 
 But perhaps of greater long-run importance was management's 
 growing concern with the well-being of employees. This concern was 
 motivated by many things: anti-unionism, a real desire to help, and a 
 feeling that such programs would increase the productivity of labor. As a 
 result, personnel management programs developed extensively. These 
 programs attempted to emphasize the "human factor in production, as 
 distinguished from engineering and physical factors." One aspect was 
 to become quite popular during the 1940's and after, the human relations 
 approach or the fostering of group feelings that will result in increased 
 production. In the words of two experts in the field, "the human relations 
 movement has profoundly altered the qualities that have traditionally 
 been associated with the successful business leader. No longer is he 
 judged solely on his drive, ambition, decisiveness, or ability to make 
 money. Now he is also expected to develop co-operative, satisfying rela- 
 tionships within the organization." 9 Workers are to participate as far as 
 possible with management in making decisions within the company. 
 
 1900-1944: Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions," The American 
 
 Economic Review, June 1954, pp. 303-304. 
 1946-1958: Irving Bernstein, "The Growth of American Unions, 1945-1960," 
 
 Labor History, Spring 1961, p. 135. 
 1958-1960: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 Civilian labor force refers to those who are ready, willing, and able to work and 
 are fourteen years of age and older, 
 t 1910, 1920: Benjamin Solomon, "Dimensions of Union Growth, 1900-1950," 
 Industrial and Labor Relations Review, July 1956, p. 546. 
 1930-1960: These figures were secured by subtracting Canadian figures by the 
 Bureau of Labor Statistics from the data given in Column 1. 
 t 1870-1890: Ulman, loc. cit. 
 ** 1900-1920: Solomon, loc. cit. Solomon made use of census reports and conse- 
 quently his figures for union potential are probably more accurate than just 
 employment in non-agricultural establishments. He also shows a larger number 
 of workers as union potential than do the figures for non-agricultural employ- 
 ment. This results in his percentages of those organized being smaller than the 
 percentages listed on the table. Solomon's percentage for 1930 is 10.2 per cent; 
 1940, 23.4 per cent; and for 1950, 31.1 per cent. 
 1930-1960: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 9 George Strauss and Leonard R. Sayles, Personnel (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
 Hall, 1960), p. 727. 
 
 Diversity of 
 
12 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 In the early days of the human relations approach, its practitioners 
 paid little attention to unions except to view unions as a foreign, disturb- 
 ing element that creates hostility rather than the co-operation they 
 sought. (This attitude has changed considerably by the 1960's). Surely, 
 to the personnel administrators of the 1920's, the company was viewed 
 as the agency that could provide the worker with what he deserved. If 
 he needed to belong to any group, it ought to be a company union (a 
 union influenced or dominated by management), not one associated with 
 the general labor movement. 10 
 
 Attitude of Government 
 
 If a worker wanted to join a union prior to the 1930's, he would 
 clearly not secure any help from his employers. But would government 
 and the courts help? The answer was a rather consistent "No." Statutory 
 law, or legislation enacted by the Congress or state legislature, dealing 
 with industrial relations was sparse indeed until the passage of the 
 Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 except in one industry, railroads. When 
 no statutory law exists, court decisions are based upon common law, or 
 past practices and previous court decisions. It was common law that was 
 supreme in the industrial relations area until the 1930's. This made the 
 courts, or more specifically any individual judge, supreme, for he deter- 
 mined what the common law was. American common law had its origin 
 in British law, which emphasized the freedom of individuals to make 
 contracts, the inviolability of the law of supply and demand, and the 
 illegality of combinations in restraint of trade. Since the basis for the 
 existence of unions is the desire of groups of individuals to make a con- 
 tract, to restrict the free play of the law of supply and demand, and to 
 restrain trade through picketing and strikes to achieve common goals, 
 it was not difficult for the judge in the Philadelphia Cordwainer Case of 
 1806, mentioned earlier, to rule that workers joining together to demand 
 an agreement on wages had formed a conspiracy against trade and were 
 
 10 For two relatively brief discussions concerning managerial philosophy of indus- 
 trial relations, see Edwin E. Witte, "The Evolution of Managerial Ideas in Industrial 
 Relations," New York State School of Industrial Relations Bulletin 27 Ithaca, 1958, 
 and Henry Landsberger, Hawthorne Revisited (Ithaca: New York State School of 
 Industrial and Labor Relations, 1958). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 13 
 
 consequently illegal. Other courts were to make similar rulings and if this 
 pattern had continued, unions would have remained illegal and they 
 would have been forced to work underground. Fortunately for unions, 
 a series of decisions of which Commonwealth vs. Hunt in 1842 is the 
 most famous, changed the emphasis. Unions were instead no longer 
 considered illegal just because they tried to secure normal union goals. 
 What had to be determined by the courts was whether the ends unions 
 sought were "virtuous" or justifiable and whether the means used also 
 were "virtuous" or justifiable. This determination was often quite diffi- 
 cult. The difficulty was compounded by the fact that each judge could 
 make his own decision. As a result, certain judges, more sympathetic to 
 labor or in an industrial community where there were greater pressures 
 on them, would accept more goals and means as legal. Other judges in 
 other areas would severely limit the activities of unions. Generally speak- 
 ing, however, courts accepted as legal goals a drive for improved wages, 
 hours, or working conditions. But the courts began to hit hard at the 
 means used. The technique employed by the judges was the injunction, 
 or a court order restraining one or more persons from doing some act 
 which they are threatening to commit or are committing. In labor rela- 
 tions, the injunction became a ubiquitous weapon used to prevent or 
 to end the alleged damaging of property and thus to curb union activity. 
 The procedure normally followed was this. Company lawyers would 
 appear before a judge and ask for an injunction to stop a union from 
 striking, or picketing, or from boycotting their products, arguing that 
 these actions were harming property. There was no question as to the 
 appropriate action to be taken by the courts if the property being damaged 
 was tangible — if union members, for example, were throwing rocks at 
 windows or beating up the office help. But courts began to issue injunc- 
 tions to prevent damage to intangible property: loss of production, cus- 
 tomers, business, or profit. Injunctions also stopped unions from what the 
 courts ruled were actions restraining trade, or from breaking employment 
 contracts, such as yellow-dog contracts. Practically any normal union 
 action to convince management to agree to its proposals could be enjoined, 
 and if the union failed to follow the court's orders, the union officials 
 could be jailed or fined for contempt of court. True, labor officials could 
 appeal the decision of any of the local judges but even if the union won 
 the appeal, it was often too late, for the decision might be handed down 
 
14 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 a year after the dispute took place. By that time the strike probably would 
 have been broken. "Government by injunction" was the epithet attached 
 to the courts by labor unions during the years prior to the New Deal. 
 
 But the courts not only restricted labor in its activities in the indus- 
 trial relations field, it also attempted to cut down the meager early at- 
 tempts at social reform. These reforms mainly came from the states. And 
 as these reforms were placed on the Supreme Court docket, they were 
 nearly always knocked down. In 1923, for example, the Court ruled 
 against a minimum wage law, arguing that it violated the worker's free- 
 dom of contract to work longer hours. In fact, it has been estimated that 
 the Supreme Court at no earlier time ever "approached the twenties" in 
 the number of labor statutes it invalidated. 
 
 The End of the Old Labor Movement 
 
 As the twenties drew to an end, labor unions were growing steadily 
 weaker in the face of continued management and government opposition. 
 Technological advances were making the situation even more difficult 
 for organized labor. Weak, it still had hopes for the future, but these 
 disappeared during the horrible days of late October 1929 when the 
 Great Depression started, dragged on through weeks, then months, then 
 years, and carried downward the old labor movement. Union member- 
 ship slipped from about three and one-half million in 1929 to about three 
 million in 1933. And even those who belonged could accomplish little 
 in the face of unemployment which by 1933 reached the terrifying rate 
 of one out of every three wage and salary workers completely without 
 work and many of the rest working only part-time. Wages, too, crashed 
 downward. The faith in the American economy, and by trade unionists 
 in the old methods of labor unionism, began to disintegrate in the face 
 of lengthy breadlines, gnawing hunger, and desperate fear. Big business 
 had claimed credit for the success of the 1920's; it was to be condemned 
 for the devastation of the depression. That government had kept out of 
 economic affairs had been one explanation of the progress of the 1920's; 
 this laissez-faire philosophy was to be blamed for the poverty of the 
 1930's. More and more production had been the motto of the 1920's; 
 increased consumption was to be the demand of the 1930's. The old 
 unionism that had claimed success based upon its emphasis on craft 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 15 
 
 unionism, limited membership, de-emphasis upon politics, and restricted 
 labor goals was to give way to a new unionism with an emphasis upon 
 industrial unionism, mass membership, politics, and expansion of labor 
 goals to all aspects of American and world life. 
 
 The New Labor Movement 
 
 "The kind of labor movement we want is not committed to a nickel- 
 in-the-pay-envelope philosophy. We are building a labor movement, not 
 to patch up the old world so men can starve less often and less frequently, 
 but a labor movement that will remake the world so that the working 
 people will get the benefit of their labor." These are the words of a labor 
 leader who was to become prominent after the Great Depression of 1929 
 and eventually to head a union and a federation both of which did 
 not even exist prior to the 1930's, the United Automobile Workers and 
 the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). The labor leader was 
 Walter Reuther. 
 
 The spokesman was new; the unions involved were new; and the 
 words expresed the changing philosophy of labor in the decades following 
 the depression: a concern with all aspects of American life from wage 
 increases to increased education for all; from job rights to civil rights; 
 from organizing workers anywhere to world organizations. The unions 
 (even most of those that existed before) were now to be built on an in- 
 clusive, mass basis rather than on an exclusive, craft basis. Indeed, this 
 was new unionism and the harbinger of its coming was the New 
 Deal. 
 
 By the time Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, the labor move- 
 ment was in the doldrums of despair. The "fear" that Roosevelt described 
 in his inaugural as being the only thing we had to fear soon gave way to 
 hope. Union membership zoomed — a gain of about one and one-half 
 million members was reported by the AFL in one year. Certain unions, 
 such as the United Mine Workers, the International Ladies Garment 
 Workers, and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers quickly added thou- 
 sands of members to their rolls. There still remained millions to be organ- 
 ized, and the labor movement pledged itself to this task. But there re- 
 mained one hurdle to be jumped — in what type of union should these 
 workers be organized. 
 
16 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Craft vs. Industrial Organization 
 
 The belief in craft unionism which dominated the AFL was now 
 challenged by the concept of industrial unionism. Craft unionism had em- 
 phasized organizing a horizontal slice of the labor movement according 
 to skill. Industrial unionism favored organizing all workers no matter 
 what their skills or lack of skill. When a craft local union negotiated, it 
 negotiated only for a small segment of the workers in a company, for 
 example, the electricians. When an industrial union negotiated, it nego- 
 tiated for all the production workers in the firm, including the electricians. 
 Industrial unionism was inclusive; craft unionism was exclusive. The 
 struggle over whether to organize new workers on an industrial or craft 
 basis had been an old one for the AFL. In fact, some of the AFL unions 
 were already organized on an industrial basis. The struggle, however, be- 
 came pronounced in the early 1930's in the face of the large number of 
 unorganized workers, seemingly ready to be unionized. 
 
 Though on the surface the dispute within the AFL seemed to center 
 on how to organize, there were other issues, perhaps more submerged, 
 but nonetheless important. One was a conflict between the progressive 
 and conservative forces in the labor movement — between those who 
 wanted labor involved in politics to promote a welfare state and those 
 who wanted labor mainly involved in collective bargaining with only 
 minimal attention to politics. Another important source of discord was a 
 power struggle. John L. Lewis, who led the industrial unionists in their 
 struggle and was eventually to head the CIO, sought power while his 
 opponents struggled to keep the mantle of authority off his shoulders and 
 on their own. 11 
 
 Whatever the cause, the fact is that a new federation of labor was 
 born in 1935, the CIO (first called the Committee for Industrial Organi- 
 zation and changed to the Congress of Industrial Organizations in 1938 
 when the split with the AFL became final). The differences in structure 
 between the AFL and CIO need not concern us here. The member 
 unions continued autonomous in both, although in fact CIO leaders had 
 more influence over member national unions that was true in the AFL. 
 
 11 See Taft, The A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger; Walter 
 Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the A. F. of L. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
 Press, 1960) ; and James O. Morris, Conflict Within the AFL (Ithaca: New York 
 State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1958). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 17 
 
 The difference between them perhaps rested more in attitude in that 
 the CIO was committed to organizing all workers (the AFL after a slow 
 start was to come around to this viewpoint and eventually outstripped 
 the CIO in membership in part by organizing unions along industrial 
 lines) ; and the CIO was also convinced of the need for full participation 
 in political activity ( another idea which was to be accepted later by most 
 of the AFL leaders if not by all member unions) . 
 
 And the CIO did organize. Such major contemporary unions as the 
 Steelworkers and the Automobile workers did not really exist until the 
 CIO marched in to help organize them and made them two of the most 
 important unions in America. Union membership figures steadily in- 
 creased during the years after the birth of the CIO until the 1950's, from 
 approximately three million in 1933 to fifteen million in 1947, an increase 
 of about 500 per cent. (See Table 1). But the growing size of the labor 
 movement was only one index of its influence. Earlier we mentioned that 
 labor had zigzagged between collective bargaining and political action. 
 From the 1930's onward labor was to be committed more and more to 
 dual action: collective bargaining and political activity were to become 
 two sides of the labor union coin. 
 
 Political Activity 
 
 The help the New Deal gave the labor movement in the 1930's erased 
 the fears many old trade unionists felt concerning government. They now 
 joined with those who had always actively sought help through legislation 
 to make labor an effective political organization. They continued the old 
 Gompers approach of rewarding one's friends and punishing one's enemies 
 but "friends" and "enemies" were classified on grounds unthinkable to 
 Gompers. Politicians now were to be judged not only on what they did 
 for unions, but also on their actions concerning those issues which on the 
 surface seemed barely to touch labor interests, such as segregated schools, 
 foreign aid programs, and banking policies. Moreover, the unions set up 
 organizations to do this job — the Committee for Political Education, to 
 name the present one. These organizations provided the instruments 
 through which labor participated in primary campaigns and in supporting 
 candidates for office. Labor continued to reject the idea, so frequently 
 practiced in other countries, of forming its own party and, instead, 
 worked with the two existing parties, though mainly with the Democratic. 
 
18 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Elections have been only one phase of labor's political activity. The 
 federations of labor, as well as the national unions, have tried to act as 
 a pressure group on the executive and legislative arms of the state and 
 federal governments to secure the sympathetic treatment of labor by 
 administrative agencies as well as the passage of pro-labor legislation and 
 the defeat of anti-labor laws. Although it is quite true that trade union 
 representatives now speak on all kinds of legislation, their main interest 
 still remains focused on the kind that affects labor most directly. For our 
 purposes, we will divide this legislation into two types : first, social welfare 
 legislation, and second, the law of labor relations. We will, however, pay 
 more attention to the second. 
 
 Social Welfare Legislation 
 
 Labor unions are not the sole sponsors of social welfare legislation. 
 In fact, the AFL originally opposed many of these laws which it only re- 
 cently staunchly backed. But whoever the sponsors, the facts are that the 
 host of social welfare legislation now on the books plays a vital role in the 
 lives of all our citizens, including our workers, and that labor unions now 
 regularly support the expansion of this type of legislation. 
 
 By the 1930's America, many years after the leading countries in 
 Europe, became convinced that legislation was needed to help the aged, 
 orphaned, unemployed, and injured and to provide certain wage and 
 hour standards. States had passed laws helping one or the other of the 
 above-mentioned groups; sometimes these laws managed to get through 
 a maze of courts, including the Supreme Court, and other times they did 
 not. With the coming of a new administration in 1933, the proponents of 
 social reform began to look towards Washington and proposed legislation 
 covering those who worked in interstate commerce. Their glance was re- 
 turned, for the Social Security Act, a nationwide social insurance system, 
 was passed. It provided, for the first time, for federal unemployment com- 
 pensation, old age pensions, and assistance to the needy such as the blind, 
 crippled, and disabled. In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
 passed in 1938 requiring that those covered by the law not be required 
 to work more than forty hours a week without being paid time-and-one- 
 half for overtime as well as setting a minimum wage of 25 cents an hour 
 (this will be $1.25 in September 1965) . But the passage of these examples 
 of social legislation did not end unions' activities in this area for they have 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 19 
 
 regularly fought for the expansion of these programs. One recent instance 
 is labor's support of medical care for the aged through social security. 
 
 Law of Labor Relations 
 
 Social welfare legislation, many trade unionists believed, was only 
 one way — albeit an important way — to improve the workers' lot. Collec- 
 tive bargaining was another way but the courts had placed many road- 
 blocks in the path. As we discussed earlier, very few laws dealing with 
 labor relations had been passed before 1932. As a result, determination of 
 what was permitted rested on the robed shoulders of the judiciary. But 
 the depression was to change this. More and more Americans became 
 convinced that one of the ways to end the depression and to prevent its 
 recurrence was through an increase in purchasing power. Unions could 
 help achieve this goal by securing raises in wages; therefore, these people 
 argued, unions had to be helped. Moreover, since courts and the common 
 law had generally favored employers, statutory laws should be passed to 
 favor the workers. The first major law, the Norris-La Guardia Act of 
 1932, was passed before Roosevelt became president. It restricted the 
 courts' use of the. injunction and banned yellow-dog contracts. With 
 Roosevelt's election, other steps were taken. Perhaps the most important 
 piece of labor legislation in American history was passed in 1935, the 
 National Labor Relations Act, better known as the Wagner Act, after 
 Senator Robert Wagner who led the fight for its passage. 
 
 The Wagner Act was not meant to be a balanced law but a balancing 
 law. Its supporters believed that the weight had been on management's 
 side of the collective bargaining seesaw. The law's objective was to place 
 some weight on the union's side, at least to balance things, or perhaps to 
 favor unions. Thus, the law stated that it sought to redress the "inequality 
 of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom 
 of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organ- 
 ized in the corporate or other forms of ownership associations." And this 
 inequality, the Act further states, "tends to aggravate recurrent business 
 depressions by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage 
 earners in industry." Within this framework, what was the basic phil- 
 osophy behind the Wagner Act? 
 
 1. It was desirable that collective bargaining between management 
 and unions resolve terms and conditions of employment. The law there- 
 
20 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 fore made it illegal for management to refuse to bargain with legal repre- 
 sentatives of their workers. 
 
 2. Workers should organize into unions and bargain collectively 
 through their own representatives. Employers, if not prevented, would 
 hinder this, so the Act made it illegal for a company to do the following : 
 interfere with or restrain or coerce employees in exercising their rights 
 under the law; dominate or interfere with or financially support a union 
 ( that is, it made company unions illegal ) ; and interfere with the right 
 of a worker to join a union or fire him because he joined one. 
 
 3. Since the supporters of the law did not fear unions but did man- 
 agement, the law focused its attention on unfair practices of management. 
 
 The law set up a procedure to determine who was to be the exclu- 
 sive representative of all the workers in an appropriate bargaining unit. 
 It also set up a National Labor Relations Board to help in the determina- 
 tion of these units, as well as to investigate and make findings on charges 
 of unfair labor practices. 
 
 As soon as the law was passed, it was attacked. Many companies, 
 questioning its legality, refused to obey it. Once its legality was affirmed 
 by the Supreme Court, many industrial leaders and others began to push 
 for a new labor law. They argued that the Wagner Act favored unions 
 over management, that employers had no protection against unions' un- 
 fair labor practices, and that there was a lack of protection in the Wagner 
 Act for individuals and the public in that it focused its attention on com- 
 panies and unions. These critics of the Wagner Act were helped by the 
 Second War and its aftermath. Although most labor unions did not strike 
 during the war, those disputes that did arise were played up in the news- 
 papers — particularly since the most dramatic figure in the labor move- 
 ment, John L. Lewis, consistently led or threatened to lead his men out 
 in a characteristically dramatic fashion during the conflict. The war 
 ended in 1945, but soon thereafter the pent-up demand of workers for 
 higher wages to keep up with rising prices (caused largely by labor's 
 promise not to strike and the wage controls in effect during the war) re- 
 sulted in a tremendous number of strikes. Americans began to feel that 
 unions had become too powerful. And so, in June 1947, the National 
 Labor Relations Act was amended and the Taft-Hartley Act became the 
 law of labor relations. 
 
 The Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act worked under different 
 assumptions. Wagner Act supporters believed that it was essential to 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 21 
 
 strengthen unions in the collective bargaining process and that once this 
 was done government should leave the details of the collective bargaining 
 process generally alone. The Taft-Hartley Act's sponsors, on the other 
 hand, argued that interference to some degree in the procedures and con- 
 tent of collective bargaining was essential in order to protect the rights 
 of individual members of our society, unions, management, and the 
 public. To achieve these goals, the Taft-Hartley Act continued to prohibit, 
 with some minor revisions, management's unfair labor practices but added 
 a series of forbidden unfair practices by unions. Unions could not coerce 
 workers, refuse to bargain collectively with management, and charge 
 excessive dues or membership fees. The law placed other restrictions on 
 unions. For example, closed shops in which a worker has to belong to 
 the union before securing a job became illegal; and union shops where a 
 worker must join the union after thirty days from the time he was hired 
 continued to be legal, except in those states that ruled they were not. In 
 addition, the Taft-Hartley Act attempted to do the following: to limit 
 secondary boycotts- in which the union places pressure on one group of 
 employees so that their employer will exert pressure on another employer 
 with whom the union is really having a dispute ; to end jurisdictional dis- 
 putes in which two or more unions struggle over the right to control a 
 type of work, a group of workers, or a given area ; and to control feather- 
 bedding, or an agreement "to pay or deliver any money or other thing 
 of value in the nature of an exaction for services which are not performed 
 or not to be performed." Actually, what any of these restrictions on labor 
 or management meant depended on the interpretation by the National 
 Labor Relations Board ( and the Courts if the decisions were appealed ) . 
 Since members of the Board are appointed by the President, if for no 
 other reason than this, it is no wonder that labor unions and management 
 organizations had to be concerned with the man who would be President 
 of the United States. 
 
 Unions have steadily attacked the Taft-Hartley Act. Their first hope 
 was to wipe it off the books. When this failed, the second hope was to 
 amend it. Proposal after proposal was thrown into the Congressional 
 hopper, many of them supported by the President, but with the exception 
 of one minor amendment in 1951, these proposals came to naught — until 
 1959. Then, in the wake of findings of corruption in labor unions by a 
 Senate committee headed by Senator McClellan, the Landrum-Grifrin 
 Act was passed. It tried to foster democracy and lessen corruption in the 
 
22 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 labor movement through, for example, protecting the members' right to 
 vote. But attached to this legislation was a series of provisions dealing with 
 labor relations, many of which the unions have opposed, for example, 
 new limitations on union rights in picketing and boycotts. 
 
 After generations of common law generally unsympathetic to labor, 
 the peak of labor relations legislation sympathetic to trade unions was 
 reached in the 1935-1947 period, and has receded ever since. But these 
 more restrictive laws have not been able to wipe away this basic right: 
 labor unions continue to have a legal right to exist and management 
 cannot refuse to bargain with the workers' legal representatives on those 
 issues that are bargainable. 12 
 
 Management and Labor Unions Since the 1930's 
 
 Since 1935, management has had to face the fact that there are 
 laws on the books that protect labor organizations, that the public has 
 become more sympathetic to unions than it had been before, and that 
 unions have been growing steadily more powerful. Professor Lloyd 
 Reynolds has suggested that in its attempt to counter these challenges, 
 management has tried four types of strategy in its dealings with unions, 
 forcible opposition, peaceful competition, defensive endurance, and pos- 
 itive acceptance. 13 
 
 Forcible opposition is the oldest type of management strategy. It has 
 changed somewhat since the passage of the Wagner Act. Certain steps 
 that management used to take are now illegal, such as yellow-dog con- 
 tracts. Still, the history of the labor movement is replete with the use of 
 economic coercion against those active in unions, spies infiltrating into 
 labor organizations, strike-breakers, and often violence to break the back 
 of a union. And these incidents continue to occur though far less fre- 
 quently. Public opinion has made forcible opposition give way to a more 
 subtle technique for fighting unions — peaceful competition. 
 
 Many executives, in fighting unions, have opposed the use of any 
 
 12 For labor during the New Deal period, see Irving Bernstein, The New Deal 
 Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950) ; Frances 
 Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946); H. A. Millis and 
 E. C. Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: University of Chicago 
 Press, 1950). See also Taft and Galenson, op. cit. 
 
 13 Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs: 
 Prentice-Hall, 1954), pp. 169-177. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 23 
 
 force. They believe that management policies, if wise, would convince 
 the workers that tjiey need not join a labor organization to improve their 
 conditions. These firms consequently have often paid high wages, offered 
 good working conditions, employed an extensive personnel administration 
 program with the latest human relations approaches, devised a grievance 
 procedure whereby workers could have their complaints fairly adjusted, 
 and developed an extensive communications system so that company 
 executives could point out to the workers the advantages of working in 
 those firms and the lack of any necessity for unions. If the competition 
 failed, and the workers joined a union, many firms then have practiced 
 defensive endurance. 
 
 When the union has legally been recognized by a firm, competition 
 often continues to exist between union and management. Management 
 then fights for the loyalty of its workers vis a vis the union by pointing out 
 how good the company's offers are in collective bargaining, by striving 
 to keep promotions under its rather than the union's exclusive control, 
 and by carrying out an extensive communications program — in short, by 
 attempting to show that any progress comes from management not the 
 union. This competition often has taken on the form that the union is an 
 "alien growth which is basically hostile to the purposes of management 
 and against which management must protect itself at every turn." This 
 is what Dr. Reynolds specifically refers to as defensive endurance, al- 
 though we have expanded this to include all phases of industrial relations 
 in which management views unions as an opposing and foreign force. 
 Many executives, however, have rejected this concept and positively 
 accepted the labor union with which they bargain. 
 
 Either because these executives believed unions were inevitable and 
 therefore they might as well work in consort with them, or because they 
 thought unions served a worthwhile function by handling some of their 
 personnel duties for them, a large number of firms willingly work with 
 their unions. Communications to the workers are processed through the 
 union; negotiations are often co-operative; management officials consult 
 regularly with union officers about common problems in an attempt to 
 solve them. In short, unions form a right arm, albeit an often independ- 
 ent right arm, for management. 
 
 These then have been and continue to be some of the postures taken 
 by management towards unions. None of these have been fixed, and 
 companies have changed from one to the other. Moreover, these same 
 
24 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 executives take and have taken positions in the legislative field to alter 
 the atmosphere in which these relationships occur. As we have noticed, 
 labor has fought for certain legislative principles, and so has manage- 
 ment or its spokesmen such as the National Association of Manufacturers 
 or the Chamber of Commerce. But whether companies and unions com- 
 pete or co-operate, one of the major areas in which they have contact 
 and the area which forms the basis of their relationship is that of col- 
 lective bargaining. 
 
 Collective Bargaining 
 
 The process by which unions and managements negotiate terms of 
 an agreement which is binding upon both parties, collective bargaining, 
 is one of the most important, if not the most important, aspect of labor 
 relations in America. While in many countries labor unions seek the 
 solution to nearly all their problems from the government, in the United 
 States, labor still focuses its attention on collective bargaining. 
 
 What is it that is settled by a collective bargaining agreement? First 
 are the provisions that state who is covered by the agreement and for how 
 long. Second, a system of internal jurisprudence or a grievance procedure 
 is set up. Third, the contract spells out certain rights of management. 
 These are called management prerogative clauses and they describe those 
 powers of management not subject to union interference, for example, 
 pricing of products. Fourth, union protection clauses are then listed, 
 such as a union shop provision. Fifth, the contract deals directly with 
 bread and butter issues: wages, hours, and, in ever increasing amounts 
 since World War II, such fringe benefits as pensions and health and 
 welfare insurance. Sixth, the contract will define the terms of job security 
 — perhaps to many workers, the most important section of the contract. 
 This will include provisions concerning procedures for hiring, promotions, 
 layoffs, discharge, and re-employment. Lastly, the contract will cover 
 incidental items dealing with working conditions : heating, lighting, sani- 
 tation, and provision for protective clothing for those needing it. 
 
 These then are the broad categories of provisions one finds in a 
 typical union-management agreement. But these agreements are the 
 result of give-and-take negotiations, in which one side gives up one 
 demand in exchange for winning another. Most negotiations are settled 
 peacefully; it is, however, the exceptional breakdowns which end in 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 25 
 
 strikes that throughout American labor history have been given the most 
 attention. 
 
 These breakdowns in relations were most bitter during the fledgling 
 days of unions when labor was striving to be recognized by management. 
 Then, each side regarded "its mission against the other as a holy crusade 
 and, consequently, fought the opponent as if it were the agent of evil." 
 The 1877 railroad strikes, the Haymarket riot in 1886, the Homestead 
 and Pullman disputes during the 1890's, the Wobbly-led struggles of 
 the textile workers in 1912 and of the lumberjacks during World War I, 
 and the organization fights in automobile and steel during the 1930's are 
 just a few examples of bloody and violent battles between labor and man- 
 agement. Strikes, we are told, are now steadily becoming less frequent. 
 This is true, at least in part, because unions have finally become accepted 
 as a fact in industrial life and because both sides generally have agreed to 
 resolve their disputes through collective bargaining, which continues as 
 the main function of our free labor movement — unlike, for example, 
 trade unions in the Soviet Union. For workers who wish to secure an 
 improvement in their standard of living, it provides an alternative to 
 appeals to the government. To the extent that the American labor 
 movement today follows any theory, it is still Gompers' old cry of "more, 
 more, more, now" — if one can call this a theory. Unions are, however, 
 constantly expanding the term "more" to include not only collective 
 bargaining gains but also social welfare gains. It is this wedding of col- 
 lective bargaining to political pressure on the already existing parties to 
 secure social welfare legislation that forms the pragmatic philosophy of 
 the American labor movement. 14 
 
 But while both the AFL and CIO had accepted the wedding of 
 
 14 For a brief description of collective bargaining in America, see the author's 
 "Collective Bargaining — Ritual or Reality?", Harvard Business Review, November- 
 December 1961, pp. 63-69. Samuel Yellen, American Labor Struggles (New York: 
 Harcourt, Brace, 1936) and Louis Adamic, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in 
 America (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1960) give the highlights of the major strikes. 
 Other volumes that deal in more detail with some of these disputes are Brissenden, 
 op. cit.; Henry David, The History of the Haymarket Affair (New York: Russell and 
 Russell, 1958); Henry David, "Upheaval at Homestead," in Daniel Aaron, ed., 
 America in Crisis (New York: Knopf, 1952) ; Almont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike 
 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942) ; and Vernon H. Jensen, Heritage of 
 Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca: 
 Cornell University Press, 1950). Arthur M. Ross and Paul T. Hartman discuss the 
 declining role of strikes in their Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New York: 
 Wiley, 1960). 
 
26 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 collective bargaining to political activity, the organizations themselves 
 remained divorced until 1955, when they formed the American Federa- 
 tion of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations. For this merger to 
 have occurred, many stumbling blocks had to be overcome. One, the issue 
 of leadership was resolved when within a few weeks of each other the 
 presidents of the AFL and CIO died. Two new leaders, George Meany 
 and Walter Reuther, took over the AFL and CIO respectively and when 
 the federation joined, Meany became its first president. Second, the 
 infiltration of Communists in the CIO ended with the CIO's expulsion 
 of Communist-dominated labor unions. Third, the problem of racketeers 
 in the labor movement — and more particularly within the old AFL 
 unions — proved more difficult to resolve. The McClellan Committee 
 pointed to those few corrupt union officials who frequently acted in 
 consort with corrupt management officials. The AFL-CIO expelled most 
 of those unions that it could not cleanse. This has resulted in some success 
 but one of the expelled unions, the Teamsters, still remains one of the 
 most powerful, and surely the largest, national labor organization. 15 
 
 What besides corruption still plagues the labor movement? First, 
 the merger did not end organizational problems. Old craft unions still 
 fight with the industrial unions over jurisdiction, for example, which 
 union should represent maintenance workers at an industrial plant. 
 Personality conflicts also did not disappear as a result of a hyphen being 
 placed between the AFL and CIO. The merged federation in addition 
 still has internal struggles over many issues, to name just two: civil 
 rights and foreign policy. Added to this is the fact that union membership 
 appears to be no longer growing while the nature of the American 
 workforce is changing from one predominantly working in produc- 
 tion to one that is mainly in the service field, such as white collar 
 workers. The latter group has generally been the most difficult for unions 
 to organize. And technological change with its most recent manifestation, 
 automation, is likewise having profound effects upon the labor move- 
 ment. How unions will solve these problems awaits the future. In the past, 
 however, American labor has attacked the issues facing it without a 
 philosophy or, as one its best students, Philip Taft, has said, with a 
 philosophy of "simple pragmatism." "Such a philosophy," Taft con- 
 cludes, "is not as ostentatious and lacks the architectonic grandeur of 
 
 15 Arthur J. Goldberg describes the struggle surrounding the merger in his 
 AFL-CIO: Labor United (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956). 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LABOR 27 
 
 philosophical systems such as Marxism. . . . However, the absence of 
 these qualities helps to make the American movement more democratic, 
 tolerant, and flexible. Trade unionism in the United States is [and was] 
 a means of protecting the individual against arbitrary rule and raising 
 his standard of living. While it may not rank high for philosophy, it 
 deserves high score on the latter count.' 1 16 
 
 Selected Reading List 
 
 Adamic, Louis, Dynamite: The Story of Class Violence in America (Gloucester, Mass.: 
 
 P. Smith, 1960). 
 Bernstein, Irving, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy (Berkeley: University 
 
 of California Press, 1950). 
 , The Lean Years: A History of the Worker 1920-1933 (Boston: Houghton 
 
 Mifflin, 1960). 
 Blum, Albert, "The Political Alternatives of Labor," Labor Law Journal, September 
 
 1959, pp. 623-631. 
 , "Collective Bargaining — Ritual or Reality?", Harvard Business Review, No- 
 vember-December 1961, pp. 63-69. 
 Brissenden, Paul F., The IWW : A Study of American Syndicalism (New York: Russell 
 
 & Russell, 1957). 
 Commons, John R., et al., History of Labour in the United States (New York: Mac- 
 
 millan, 1935). 
 , "The American Shoemakers, 1648-1895," Chapter 14 in his Labor and Ad- 
 
 ministration (New York: Macmillan, 1913). 
 David, Henry, The History of the Haymarket Affair (New York: Russell & Russell, 
 
 1958). 
 , "Upheaval at Homestead," in Daniel Aaron, ed., American in Crisis (New 
 
 York: Knopf, 1952). 
 Dulles, Foster Rhea, Labor in America (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1960). 
 Egbert, Donald Drew, & Stow Persons, eds., Socialism & American Life (Princeton: 
 
 Princeton University Press, 1952). 
 Galenson, Walter, The CIO Challenge to the A. F. of L. (Cambridge: Harvard Uni- 
 versity Press, 1960). 
 Goldberg, Arthur J., AFL-CIO: Labor United (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956). 
 Grob, Gerald N., Workers and Utopia (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
 
 1961). 
 Hugins, Walter, Jacksonian Democracy and The Working Class (Stanford: Stanford 
 
 University Press, 1960). 
 Jensen, Vernon H., Heritage of Conflict: Labor Relations in the Nonferrous Metals 
 
 Industry up to 1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950). 
 
 16 Philip Taft, "Theories of the Labor Movement," in Industrial Relations Re- 
 search Association, Interpreting the Labor Movement, December 1952, pp. 1-38. For 
 another general discussion of theories of the labor movement, see Mark Perlman's 
 Labor Union Theories: Background and Development (Evanston: Row-Peterson, 
 1958). 
 
28 ALBERT A. BLUM 
 
 Landsberger, Henry, Hawthorne Revisited (Ithaca: New York State School of Indus- 
 trial and Labor Relations, 1958) . 
 
 Lindsey, Almont, The Pullman Strike (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). 
 
 Millis, H. A., & E. C. Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago: Univer- 
 sity of Chicago Press, 1950). 
 
 Morris, James O., Conflict Within the AFL (Ithaca: New York State School of Indus- 
 trial & Labor Relations, 1958). 
 
 Morris, Richard B., Government and Labor in Early America (New York: Columbia 
 University Press, 1946). 
 
 Neufeld, Maurice F., A Bibliography of American Labor Union History (Ithaca: New 
 York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, 1958). 
 
 Pelling, Henry, American Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). 
 
 Perkins, Frances, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946). 
 
 Perlman, Mark, Labor Union Theories: Background & Development (Evanston: Row- 
 Peterson, 1958). 
 
 Powderly, Terence W., The Path I Trod (New York: Columbia University Press, 
 1947). 
 
 Rayback, Joseph, A History of American Labor (New York: Macmillan, 1959). 
 
 Reynolds, Lloyd G., Labor Economics & Labor Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice- 
 Hall. 1954), pp. 169-177. 
 
 Ross, Arthur M., & Paul T. Hartman, Changing Patterns of Industrial Conflict (New 
 York: Wiley, 1960). 
 
 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945). 
 
 Shannon, David A., The Socialist Party of America (New York: Macmillan, 1955). 
 
 Strauss, George, & Leonard R. Sayles, Personnel (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
 1960), p. 727. 
 
 Stroud, Gene B., & Gilbert E. Donahue, Labor History in the United States: A General 
 Bibliography (University of Illinois: Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. 
 1961). 
 
 Sullivan, William A., The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania 1800-1840 (Harrisburg: 
 Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1955). 
 
 Taft, Philip, The A. F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New York: Harper, 1957). 
 
 , The A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger (New York: Har- 
 per, 1959). 
 
 , "Theories of the Labor Movement," in Industrial Relations Research Associa- 
 
 tion, Interpreting the Labor Movement, December 1952, pp. 1-38. 
 
 Ulman, Lloyd, The Rise of the National Trade Union (Cambridge: Harvard Univer- 
 sity Press, 1955). 
 
 Ware, Norman J., The Labor Movement in the United States, 1860-1895 (New York: 
 Appleton, 1929). 
 
 Witte, Edwin E., "The Evolution of Managerial Ideas in Industrial Relations," New 
 York State School of Industrial Relations Bulletin 27, Ithaca, 1958. 
 
 Yellen, Samuel, American Labor Struggles (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936). 
 
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