I'M'^^^mi 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF ILLINOIS 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 BST5 
 V.Z8
 
 LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 Mr. COBBETT, 
 
 IF " 
 
 1 IN REFUTATION OF HIS PROMULGATED OPINIONS, RESPECTING 
 
 I THE CONSEQUENCE OF A CONTRACTION OF THE CURRENCY. 
 
 BY 
 
 CAPTAIN FORMAN, R. N. 
 
 Price One Shilling. 
 
 LONDON; 
 
 LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, AND GREEN; 
 
 AND WASON AND FOXWELL, 
 
 SHEPTON-MALLET. 
 
 MDCCCXXX.
 
 SHEPTON-MALLET, 
 
 miNTED BY WASON & FOXWELL, 
 
 HIGH STTREET.
 
 A LETTER, 
 
 "A large influx of gold distributed among the people, in the way 
 of trade, would certainly lower the price of gold ; and so far, as far as 
 a gold coinage was concerned, would raise the price of all other com- 
 modities ; but a mere increase of the circulating medium, whether in 
 bank-paper, or in gold coinage struck at the mint, to ever so great an 
 amount, could not increasa the means of the community to purchase 
 goods in the market; because the total amount of the property, whether 
 in goods or cash, of the whole community would be precisely the same 
 as it was before ; and consequently neither the money, nor the barter 
 price of goods could be aff'^cted by it." 
 
 The present Commercial Distress traced up to its True Cause, Page 8. 
 
 II. "Now, in order to prove still more clearly that a contracted cur- 
 rency (though it may possibly be attended with considerable inconve- 
 nience) cannot materially alter the value of property, let us suppose, 
 for the sake of argument, that there was no currency whatever, and that 
 even promissory notes and bills of exchange were prohibited by act of 
 parliament. In this case, I ask, would not the barter price of all goods, 
 including gold and silver, be precisely the same as it is at present ? 
 and would not a flock of sheep, or a drove of oxen, purchase the same 
 weight of gold and silver ? 
 
 "Thirty years ago when I was in the West Indies, there was no 
 standard currency in several of the Islands, but pieces of gold were 
 weighted, at their market price, in barter for other goods. The incon- 
 venience of this was hardly felt, and no one complained of it as an evil ; 
 and if, in this extreme case, the same plan were to be adopted, the only 
 inconvenience attending it would be the fluctuations in the value of 
 gold bullion, which, instead of amounting to 75 or 50 per cent, could
 
 not exceed five per cent ; and which, in the course of a year's fluctu- 
 ation, would hardly make the loss of any individual amount to more 
 than one per cent. In one word, if the contraction of the currency had 
 any tendency to reduce the price of all other goods, the bullion mer- 
 chants would be eager to take advantage of it; and this, without the least 
 incovenience, would answer all the purposes of an extended currency." 
 
 Idem, Pages 10 & 11. 
 
 III. "Not only since the passing of Mr. Peel's bill, but since the 
 very time in which, according to Mr. Western, there was a money fa- 
 mine in England, millions have been expended in the purchase of Greek 
 bonds and joint-stock bubbles ; and the eagerness of the English, up 
 to this moment, to purchase shares in every plausible speculation, 
 abundantly proves, that whatever may have been the cause of our 
 distress, it has certainly not been occasioned by any lack of capital. 
 
 "Mr. Western may perhaps be disposed to make a distinction be- 
 tween capital and money ; but if a man can dispose of his capital in the 
 purchase of joint-stock speculations, he has the means, as far as his 
 capital extends, of purchasing every thing that is on sale throughout 
 the country ; and this very fact, which no one, I am sure, will venture 
 to dispute, ought to convince every one, who is capable of reflection, 
 that a contraction of the currency, though it may have occasioned trifling 
 inconveniences, is not the cause of a fall of prices." 
 
 Idem, Page 31. 
 
 IV. "So much for the wisdom of Mr. Cobbett's object. Let us 
 now see by vi'hat new mode of logic he jumps to his conclusion 'That 
 the passing of Mr. Peel's bill, by obliging the Bank to contract its 
 issues, has raised the market price of money.' In order to make his 
 argument good for any thing, he must consider money, (whether in gold 
 or promissory notes) not in the light of a circulating medium, 'the re- 
 presentative of that part of the property of a kingdom which is in 
 transitu and vo more,^ but as a marketable commodity, which, like com 
 or any other marketable commodity, will be cheap or dear according as 
 it is scarce or abundant; and, viewing it in this light, he fancies that he 
 has made the wonderful discovery that a contraction of the currency, by 
 rendering it less abundant, must necessarily have increased the value of 
 that which remains, in the same proportion that its quantity has been 
 diminished. Now, taking it in either point of view : as a circulating 
 medium, it represents proportj^ in general ; as a marketable commodity, 
 it represents, not property in g-eneral, but merely gold bullion, with its 
 value stamped upon it, in order to save t,he trouble of assaying it every 
 time that it passes from hand to hand ; and, in either case, it cannot 
 aiipct the value of property, because the total amount of property in 
 gener.il, or of gold in particular, is precisely the same as it was before. 
 An extension of Bank promissory notes which are merely the represen- 
 tatives of gold, cannot diminish the value of gold, because it does not
 
 ) 
 
 increase its quantity; and it cannot, in anyway, increase the means of 
 the bullion merchants, or of any other class of the community, to pur- 
 chase goods at a dearer rate. 
 
 Idem, Pages 33 & 34. 
 
 V. When the trade of a country is in its infancy, capital is scarce ; 
 and, at that time, it must be beneficial, both to the individual and the 
 community, to trade with borrowed capital ; because this %vill tend, at 
 once to reduce the price of goods in the market, and increase the profits 
 of the manufacturer ; but the moment that capital has accumulated to 
 such a degree that the average supply of goods in the market exceeds 
 the demand for them, every additional quantity of capital, employed in 
 the manufacture of these goods, will diminish the per centage of profit 
 in the same degree ; because no one would be induced to purchase more 
 goods than he wanted, unless their prices were proportionably reduced. 
 This is the state in which we are at present. During the war, nearly 
 the whole of our immense loans were laid out, by Govermnent, in the 
 purchase of manufactured goods, a large portion of which were mu- 
 nitions of war ; and consequently, at the close of the war, a demand for 
 goods, to the amount, probably, of more than £50,000,000 annually, 
 suddenly ceased. This, of course, must have thrown many people out 
 of employ — not to mention the multitudes of discharged soldiers, seamen 
 and dock-yard men ; and, to increase the evil, the manufacturers of 
 goods, for war purposes, which were no longer wanted, must have in- 
 vested their otherwise useless capitals in some of the remaining branches 
 of trade, which, by multiplying the quantity of these goods and increas- 
 ing the competition, at the same moment that the demand for them was 
 diminished, must have assisted mainly in bringing about that^?-*^ and 
 greatest depreciation in the value of property, which took place at least 
 three years before the passing of Mr. Peel's bill. 
 
 Ide7n, Pag-es 11 & 12. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 1 . About the beginning of last February, I published a pam- 
 phlet, which had for its title " I'he present Commercial Distress traced 
 up to the True Cause, " in which, in mi/ own opinion, I clearly proved 
 that a contraction of the currency can have had little, or nothing, 
 to do with the fall of prices. 
 
 2. For reasons stated in the preface, one of the numbers of this 
 pamphlet was sent to you : and, as it contained an attack ui»on your 
 opinions, your passing it over in silence must have proceeded from a 
 C(mviction, on your part, that my arguments were unanswerable. 
 
 3. Asa writer. Sir, in the Bath Journal, under the fictitious sig- 
 nature of Candidas ; it was easy to say that, "this pamphlet is, without 
 exception, the most flimscy, falacious, and silly production, that ever
 
 emanated from the press " ; but, as Mr. Cohbet, you could not have 
 ventured to make such an assertion, in the Political Register, without 
 producing evidence of the fact ; and the extracts from it, with 
 which I have headed this letter, must be sufflicient to convince every 
 impartial reader, that, whoever may have been the author of it, the 
 assertion is a groundless calumny. 
 
 4. Had you been the advocate of truth, instead of the Champion 
 ofa])artyyou would have noticed tlie pamphlet for the sake of truth ; 
 and as the champion of a party, if you had not been afraid of the result, 
 you wDuld still have noticed it, as you did the ivri tings of Mr. Western 
 on the sitmp subject, in order to prove, in the face of the world, that 
 your own opinions were irrefragable, 
 
 5. Like the satyr in the fable, it appears that you can blow hot 
 and cold with the same breath ; for, if you will take the trouble to refer 
 to your own Register, you will find that, in a great many instances, the 
 principle reason which you assigned for noticing those ])amphlets, 
 that were opposed to your opinions, was the worthlessness of their con- 
 tents ; or, to borrow a phrase of your own, the opjtortunities they afford- 
 ed you "of showinjii up the authors" ; and yet, in the present instance, 
 where a direct attack has been made upon your favorite theory, you 
 tamely submit to my animadversions, and would have the world believe 
 that your refusal to accept my challenge does not proceed from any ap- 
 prehension you have for the result, but because my arguments are 
 unworthy of notice. 
 
 6. In general. Sir, you are ready enough to "run a muck" a- 
 gainst all ])arties that will not succumb to your o])inions ; but here you 
 decline a challenge that lias been jji'offered you ; and yet you persist 
 in runninii: about the country promulgating the very doctrines which 
 you are afraid to have discussed. You solaced yourself, no doubt, in the 
 hope, that, because the critics, who, like all other men, can shiittheir un- 
 derstandings against those arguments that are opposed to their profes- 
 sed opinions, that, because the critics had taken no notice of my pamjjhlet, 
 you would never be called u])on to reply to it ; and if you had not an- 
 nounced your intention of favouring the City of Bath Avith a course of 
 lectures on Political Economy, your expectation, in all probabilitj, 
 would have been realized. 
 
 7. On seeing this announcement in one of the Bath papers, I 
 very gladly embraced the opportunity of calling your attention to my 
 pamphlet ; and you must allow, Sir,thatthe conduct which I pursued,on 
 that occasion, the very reverse of yours was at once open and manly. I 
 immediately, inmy oumnnme, addressed a letter to you, in the * Bath 
 Journal, in which I called upon you to rejjly to my strictures upon 
 
 * At first I did not suspect that my opponent Candidus was Cobbett in disguise ; and 
 thcretbre, for fear, my challenge should escape your notice, I expressly ordered one 
 of these papers to be sent to you.
 
 your former lectures; and informed you, that, though I should not be 
 present at those lectures, I should read the report of them ; and 
 make whatever comments upon them I should think necessary in this 
 same paper. 
 
 8. Here then, Sir, you received a second challeng-e, from a 
 person whom you affect to despise, and yet, rather than meet him in an 
 arena where both parties would be sure to have fair ])lay, you volun- 
 tarily forfeit all the golden prospects of emolument which you had 
 expected to derive from this visit to tlie city of Bath. You announced 
 your intention of visiting Bath, immediately after the funeral, and 
 that promise has not yet been fulfilled, though no reason has been as- 
 signed for the breach of it. You cannot surely entertain any doubts 
 with respect to the pecuniary advantages which you would derive from 
 the fulfilment of this promise ; for those very letters which have passed 
 between me and yo« — I beg pardon, I should have said between me 
 and Candidus, these very letters must have excited public curiosity in 
 a great degree ; and you may depend upon it that even now, at least, if 
 you could make out a good case in favour of your theory, that you will 
 cram the theatre every night, and be rewarded both with money and 
 applause ; for what honest man would not be delighted at the prosj)ect 
 of being able conscientiously to relieve his own burdens, by throwing 
 a large portion of them on the shoulders of his neighbour? As your 
 friend Candidus has pronounced my pamphlet to be a flimsy, fallacious 
 and silly production, you ought to have no fear upon that score ; and 
 why then do you allow me to enjoy a fancied triumph at your expense? 
 why do you suffer me to repeat that it is soleli/ from the fear of sub- 
 jecting yourself to the lashes of my criticism, that you at once deprivr. 
 yourself of a golden harvest, and disappoint the citizens of Bath of the 
 mental treat which you had led them to expect? 
 
 9. Though, Sir, as Mr. Cobbett, the editor of the Political Re- 
 gister, you have taken especial care to avoid entering into a contro- 
 versy with me upon this subject, you were nevertheless aware that 
 something in the shape of a justification, would be expected for this, 
 on your part, most extraordinary forbearance; and, accordingly an 
 anonymous scribbler, who is ashamed to give his name, has addressed 
 several letters to the Editor of the Bath Journal, on your behalf, in the 
 hope of inducing the public to believe that my j)roduction is altogether 
 too trifling to merit any notice from so great a man as the author of 
 Paper against Gold. This writer. Sir, who without one particle of 
 candour, has assumed the signature of Candidus, and who, if you are 
 not the person, must have been miraculousiy inspired with a perfect 
 knowledge of your intentions; this champion, this advocate of a man, 
 who is afraid — at least in his own name — to defend his own cause, has 
 had the assurance to inform the public, through the medium of that 
 paper, that I am not destined, by Mr. Cobbett, to have the honour of
 
 8' 
 
 occupying a niche in his Register ; hecavise, forsooth, as I had never read 
 your highly vaunted Essay on 'Paper against Gold', I must be utterly 
 incompetent to discuss so intricate and difficult a question. As if it were 
 impossible to derive iniforniation, upon this important subject from any 
 other source than your writings; or as if Adam Smith's 'Wealth of 
 Nations,' in whicb a similar fall of prices, after a war, is more ration- 
 ally ascribed to a different cause, as if his most meritorious work did 
 not contain all, and more than all the information that is to be found 
 in your book : with the exception of a history of events, that took 
 place long after that work was published. 
 
 10. As Candidus however has laid so much stress upon the know- 
 ledge I might have derived from a perusal of your book, I have taken 
 the trouble of reading it all through ; and though, as a system of sophis- 
 try, it undoubted!) does credit to the ingenuity of its author, I am at 
 a loss to conceive for what purpose I was called upon by Candidus, to 
 read it, except as it answered the purpose of affording you a decent pre- 
 text for shuffling out of this discussion. As a record of facts, it may 
 possibly be useful ; but I cannot discover a single argument in it, that 
 has any relation to the consequences to be apprehended from a contrac- 
 tion of the currency, but what is amply refuted in the extracts, from 
 my pamphlet, with which ( have headed this pa])er. 
 
 11. This Sir, you, of course, will deny ; but if I have done you 
 wrong you have the means of revenging yourself in your own power ; 
 and if you can produce a single passage from that work, that will stand 
 this test, I will forfeit all pretentions to the character of arational being. 
 
 Your friend Candidus attempted to do this for you ; he culled out of 
 it the best argument he could find for that purpose; and, had he been a 
 schoolboy, his master, in all probability, would have decorated him with 
 the dunce's cap, for advancing so silly a proposition. This, as I shall 
 show presently, was a complete failure ; and now, I suppose, I shall be, 
 told that it will be necessary for me to wade through all the pages of the 
 Political Register, before I can be, in any way, competent to discuss 
 this question with the great Mr. Cobbett ; and, after that if, it 
 will answer the purpose of further evasion, I shall ])robably be sent to 
 the Porcupine ; in which, by your own acknowledgement, you opposed 
 the principles which you are now advocating, and supported, most stre- 
 nously, those very measures of Government, which you are now re- 
 probating. 
 
 12. In my pamphlet, without any sophistry, or paltry evasion, I 
 fully and fairly canvassed all the arguments I could find, in Mr. Sad- 
 ler's celebrated speech to the merchants and ship-owners of Whitby, 
 in Mr. Western's two letters, to his constituents on the Currency, and 
 in your first three lectures on the same subject, as they loere reported 
 in the Morning Herald. In neither of these documents could I dis- 
 cover the slightest allusion to a contraction of the currency prior to
 
 9 
 
 tlie passing of Sir Robt. Peel's 'Cash payment bill ;'ancltlieretorejasI did 
 not suspect either of you of entertaining such an idea, I very naturally 
 charged you all with being guilty of the absurdity of making an effect 
 precede a cause ; because whatever may have been your mental reser- 
 vations, you all attributed the fall of prices to the passing of Peel's bill,* 
 though tlie greatest depression in the prices of goods, or at least of 
 farm produce, was prior, and not subsequent, to that event. The ob- 
 servations, in my pamphlet as I expressly stated, were pointed at your 
 lectures which I had seen, and not at your writings which I had not 
 seen; and as, in those lectures, you attributed «/^ the distress to the 
 operations of Peel's bill, and made no mention of any previous con- 
 traction of the currency, it never once occured to me that you did not 
 mean to be Zi7(?r«//y understood. On tliis point, however, it seems I 
 was mistaken ; and Candidus (after producing a number of extracts, 
 from your writings, in order to prove that, before the passing of that bill, 
 you had attributedthe distress of the times, to a previous contraction 
 of the currency,) has made the following remarks: 
 
 "The laws from 1814 to 1819 inclusive, were of ru erperimetital 
 nature ; they were severaltimes changed" (Qneri/) "and high and low 
 })rices were the result, as thepafjer money was contracted or extended, 
 and the markets, whether for raw j)roduce or manufacture, rose and fell 
 tolt/i the precision nf a p'Jiid Ilium ; — but when Peel's bill passed, which 
 was intended to be a permanent eiuictment, and embraced all the evils 
 of the antecedent measures, it became unnecessary to go furtner back", 
 
 13. After what has been stated by Candidus on this subject, and 
 after having rea.d yoiiv introdnctoi-i/ Letteron Paper against Gold, which 
 was dated in 1817, I can no longerentertain any doubt that, prior to 
 Peel's bill, you did actually attribute a ])receding fall of prices to a 
 preceding contraction ; but you have only yourself to blame for ray 
 mistake. Your lectures on the currency ou<i:ht to liave been complete 
 in themselves; for it was hardly fair to make j)e(ipie pay six or eight 
 shillings, for attending your lectures, and then refer them to your wri- 
 tings, in order that they might comprehend what the lectuies were about. 
 If you had been candid at the commsncement of these lectures, and 
 had explained to your auditors, that for the sake ofavoiding unnecessary 
 circumlocution, whenever you spoke of Peel's bill, you meant to include 
 ail those preceding- laws that had any thing to do with a contraction 
 of the currency, you would have prevewted a great deal of misconception; 
 but at the same time you would have subjected yourself to some very 
 awkward questions ; and, after all, you could not, with propriety, in that 
 
 *^Ir. Western evidently meant to be so understood ; for, iu order to make it appear 
 that all this staij-nation "of trade was occiisioned by that bill, he expressly obsei-vedt 
 that the Manchester riots had their vommcnccmcni towards the latter enrl of the year 
 liJlOj thou;4-h, by the way, they comnienced at leut-t fonr years before that period.
 
 10 
 
 ojise, have laid auy part of the blame on Pt'el's bill ; because, as yon well 
 know, the prices were lower before the passing of that bill, than they 
 have ever been since ; and therefore, to make the arpument good for 
 anything, it must be necessary to shew that there hasbet-n no contraction 
 of the currency since that bill was ])assed, which would effectually over- 
 throw all your preceding arguments on this subject. In short. Sir, 
 writhe and twist as you will, you cannot extricate yourself from this di- 
 lemma ; for either the great fall of juices, which took ])lace shortly 
 after the war was over, was occasioned by a contraction of the curren- 
 cy, or it was not : if it was not, we can have no ground to suj)pose that 
 the prices have been mate rutlli/ affected hy a contraction of the currency; 
 and if it was, the contraction of the currency has certainly not been 
 increased by a return to cash payments ; so that in either case, all that 
 you have written upon this subject, all your jiredictions, and all your 
 arguments are just worth so much waste paper. 
 
 14. If, as Candidus affirms, these etVperimental laws hud actually 
 been made, and prices had risen and fallen, vifh the precision of a 
 pendulum, as the paper money was extended or contracted, there could 
 
 have been no dispute about the real cause of distress, or the best means 
 ot alleviating it ; and nothing but absolute madness, on the part of the 
 ministry and the majority of both Houses of Parliament, could have 
 induced these members to pass a bill, which, otherwise, they could not 
 but have known would be so pernicious. For my own part, with all 
 due deference to so great an authority, I must confess that I am more 
 inclined to sus| ec^t, that Candidus has made a mad assertion, than that 
 both Houses of Parli.ament, thut a body of men, whose best interests 
 are undoubtedly wrapped up in the pros]}erity of the naiion, could have 
 acted so madly ; and as it does not ap])ear that either Sir Robert Peel, 
 Avho proposed the bill, or the majority of Parliament, who supported 
 him, were convinced by these experiments, it is pretty evident that 
 they were either not made at all, or, if they were, could not be de- 
 pended upon. 
 
 15, Candidus, in the above quotation, says that these experimen- 
 tallaws were seyera/ times changed ; and I suppose 1 shallsubjectmyself, 
 a second time, to the charge of ignorance and incompetency, if 1 ask 
 you to make this appear. As I have no documents to refer to, and 
 only my memory to depend upon, it is very j)ossible that I may be mis- 
 taken ; hut I certainly have no recollection of atiy law, that had the 
 slightest tendency to contract the currency, prior to the Cash payment 
 bill which took place in 1819. The object of the law that was passed 
 in J814, was merely to accommodate the \\n\\]\hy putting off x\\^ return 
 to cash payments to a more distant day ; and the Cash payment bill 
 in 1819, unless m>/ memory deceives me, allowed the Hank tiro t/ears to 
 
 prepare for the event before it could be compelled to pay in gold ; 
 which makes it almost evident, that there had been no material contrac-
 
 11 
 
 tioii of the currency uj) to tlr.it period ; for why should the Bank re- 
 quire two years to jjrepare for that event, if it had already commenced 
 ])aying-iu gold? 
 
 16. Up to the year 1819, the liank was not called upon to pay 
 in gold, and, appareHtli/, had no wish to do it ; for the dividends were 
 still paid in paper, the small notes ivcre not called in, and the gold 
 sovereigns, / believe, did not appear till after the end of that year. 
 
 The amount of Bank issues might possihly have been in some mea- 
 sure diminished prior to the passing of Peels bill ; but it does not ne- 
 cessarily follow, from thence, that X\\i% partial contraction i)roceeded 
 from any desire, on the part of the Bank Directors, to make experi- 
 ments for the sake of ascertaining what effect they would have upon price-. 
 For reasons which are stated in the fifth extract at the head of this 
 letter, the Bank, at the return of peace, must necessarily have become 
 less liberal of its credit, even if there had been no immediate prospect 
 of a return to cash payments, and this, of course, must have reduced 
 the amount of its issues ; but if the profits of trade, and the securities 
 depi'nding thereon, had not previnns'i/ fallen off, it is not reasonable to 
 sup])ose that the Hank would have, wilfully deprived itself of a very 
 considerable profit by reducing its loans, and thereby coiuracting its 
 issues, before it was compelled to do so by act of Parliament ; and 
 this reasonable presumption unless it can be contradicted, affords suffici- 
 ent grounds to justify niN conclusion that the contraction, prior to the 
 j>(ssin<f of Peel's ';///, mu-;t have bt'en in consequence of the distress, 
 and not the cause of it. But at all events, the onus of proving this 
 lies with you, and not with me. It is very easy to ascertain, bj/ a 
 proper ujiplicalion to the Bink Directors, whether the contraction of 
 Bank issues was previous to the_^;-s/ sym])tom of distress, or subse- 
 quent to it ; and until you can make it evident that the contraction, 
 at least to any considerable Rmonnt, preceded the distress, you have 
 no right to assume tliat the distress was occasioned by it. 
 
 1/. Before 1 proceed to notice your arguments on 'Pajier against 
 Gold', I shall make a few more observations on the letters of Candidus ; 
 partly Sir, because I am fully persuaded that you are the author ofthem, 
 and partly because, as I have spoken slightingly of the production, I 
 will not \nit it in his power to retort upon m:?, that, for the sake of ex- 
 citing a prejudice against my 0|)ponent, I have made a charge which I 
 know myself to be incapable of substantiating. 
 
 18. In my letter to you, which appeared in the Bath Jonrnal, I 
 called upon you to explain the process by which a contraction of the 
 currency produces a fall of ])rices ; and (landidus, knowing before 
 hand that you, at least in t/our own name, would not favour me with a 
 reply, undertook to ijerform the task for you ; and his three uniuu'ce.ss- 
 ful attempts to penetrate your "palpable ob:icai:e", jurhciently proves 
 that such an explanation is impojbible.
 
 12 
 
 19. The first :itteiii]«t of (.Jiiiiclidus to explain in what May a 
 contraction of the currency can j)ro(lucc a fall of prices is copied, 
 almost verbatim, from your essay on Paper against (lold ; and conse- 
 quently, whoever may have been the author of the letter, thearj;ument, 
 if it is not a iirofanation of the word to call it an ar<;-unient, must claim 
 ■you for its father. "If," he ohserves — "the contraction or extension of 
 the currency have nothincr to do Avith the regulation of prices, why not 
 refer to a medium of exchange which is to be found every where in 
 abundance ; such as iron, tin lead &c. ? They are surely as good as 
 hits of paper, which can be issued ad libitum". The inference, which 
 Candidus deducesfrom the above passage, is notgood ; and is completely 
 overturned hy the first vlwA fourth extracts at the head of this letter. 
 
 To make the c(»mparison good for any thing, he should have stamped 
 these bits of tin and lead?c//;^ an indellhle impression, which would have 
 bound the issuer, at the end of a given time, to pay to the holder the 
 full amount of their nominal value in sterling gold ; and then they could 
 only be issued, ad liliititm, by those persons who made themselves le- 
 gally responsible for the payment of their nominal value. 
 
 The answer tlieu is sufficiently oltvious : the value of a Bank promisso- 
 ry note, during the time that the Restriction bill was in force, de- 
 pended upon the credit of the establishment, and not on the amount of 
 the issues. If the solvency of the Bank had been sus|)ected, no con- 
 traction of its issues would have raised their value ; and if, as fortunate- 
 ly was the case, its credit stood high, no extension could have depre- 
 ciated them. For thirteen years after that bill was ])assed, that is until 
 you un<lertook to open the eyes of the public, by your essay on Paper 
 against Gold, there was scarcely one man in ten thousand that was at 
 ail aware that the amount of Bank issues was increased ; or whose 
 propertv could sensibly have been affected, either one way or the other, 
 by an extension of the currency ; and how, in the name of common 
 sense, could a rise of ]irices have been produced hy an occurrence, 
 ■which was not generally known, and which could not, at least percep- 
 tibly, have had any effect upon the value of property ? 
 
 20. I dare say Sir, you will affect to smile at this question ; but, 
 if you will seriously eiuleavour to answer it you willfindtbat 1 am right. 
 By your own account, there are but two ways by M'hich the a- 
 mount of Bank paper can be materially increased : one is by the pay- 
 ment of the dividends in Bank paj)er ; and the other by an extension 
 of credit ; and how, I ask, can an increase of these issues in any way 
 affect the property of those perscms who receive no part of them? 
 
 Those persons wlio borrow nioney from the Bank, know very well 
 tiiat they will have to pay interest for it up to the time of payment ; and 
 to be enabled to effect this, they will naturally endeavour to keep doirn, 
 but not raise the prices ; or, if they should he so foolishly thoughtless
 
 13 
 
 ',< to ItoMOvv Jiioney aiid injure theniselvi-s. for tlie sole pur])Ose of 
 raisiii'jT the prices, these high ])rices could only be kept up as long as 
 their borrowed money lasted; and. by the end of the year, the quan- 
 tify nf c'fpital in the market, which is the rea I fi' I crum upon which the 
 rise and fall of prices depend, would be as low as it was the preceding 
 year. Ati extension of credit cannot materirilli/ affect the prices, be- 
 cause it cannot be for the interest of the borrowers to raise the prices; 
 and, if it were otherwise, it wonld not be iu their power to do it. 
 
 The persons, who are accommodated with loans from the Hank, do not 
 nmount to more than one man in ten thousand of thewhole community; 
 and if you had consulted Adam Smith, instead of your own vain fancies, 
 he would have taught you that the prices of, at least, the common ne- 
 cessaries of life depend upon the means of the whole bodi/ of consumers, 
 and not upon the more fortunate circumstances of a. Jew individuals. 
 
 21. With respect to the increase of the dividends, your inference 
 is equally untenable; because they are nothing more than interest mo- 
 ney, which is paid for bona fide property that has been lent to the 
 (lovernment. If these dividends had never been paid to the public, the 
 public creditor would not have parted with his pro[)erty, byway of loan 
 to the Government, and the same money wonld, in all probability, have 
 been laid out in some other way. This increase of dividends, after all, 
 only keeps pace with the increase of jiroperty, for these enormous 
 loans could not i)ossibly have been procured in the first American war ; 
 and we certainly have no reason to conclude, from any thing that has 
 appeared in your writings, that the extension of the currency, d\iring 
 the war, exceeded the wants of the nation ; or did not bear a fair pro- 
 portion to the increase of the capital of the whole community. 
 
 22. In his second letter, Candidus, I suppose for the sake of 
 emendation, most sapiently observes — "that I appear to be unaware 
 that, as the quantity of medium is large or small, so will prices be ; 
 because f/tej/ must be high or low, according' to the qnantit)/ of medium 
 hi/ which their nnminal value is estimated;^' — which, in plain English, 
 signifies that it is so because it is so. 
 
 I surely. Sir, cannot be expected to give a serious answer to snch a 
 childish proposition. One of Shakespear"s clowns, in the Comedy of 
 'As you like it,' is made to affirm that ^'that that is, /s'"; and this 
 wonderful discovery of t'andidus will, at least, bear a com])arison with 
 the philosophy of 'J ouchstone. Motley, after all, is your only Avear 
 and it would certainly puzzle a philosopher to decide which, of these 
 two worthies, is best qualified to assume that enviable distinction. 
 
 23. In his third letter, Candidas repeated his first j)roposition, 
 about bits of tin and lead, in order to correct an unintentional misquo- 
 tation of mine, which did not, in the slightest degree, affect the sense 
 
 of the whole passage ; and after this, he subjoined wliat follows 
 
 "If gold and silver mines were to be found in this country, to the
 
 14 
 
 extent ot tliose of lend, iron, or tin, is it not uianilest as the sun atnoon 
 day, that the depreciation of the precions metals would be the result, 
 and like the baser metals, no longer suited for a medium of exchange, 
 and that some other medium must be resorted to, seeinjj that this abun- 
 dance would render them even less valuable than the baser metals". 
 
 This tiien, it seems, is the uliimaMim, the ne plus ultra of all that 
 can be advanced in support of your theory ; this is the consummation of 
 a six weeks deliberation ; and yet Sir, if you will take the trouble to re- 
 fer to the first extract at the head of this letter, you will find that I had 
 both anticipated aiul refuted this very argument, in the pamphlet which 
 Candidu'i pronounced to be a falacious and flimsy production. 
 
 A large influx of gold, or the opening of a newly discovered mine, 
 would uiuloul)tedly lower the value of the gold coinage, or, what would 
 amount to the same thing, would raise the money price of ail other 
 goods ; but an extension of Bank promissory notes, which are 
 nothing more than Icu'ftl instruments binding the issuer to pay on de- 
 mand their nominal value in gold, cannot I presume aff'ect the value of 
 gold, either as bullion or in coinage ; because the demand for gold bul- 
 lion, the quantity on sale in the market, and the means of purchasing 
 it must be precisely the same as they were before. An extension of 
 gold coinage if it should be re(nured, would raise (not lower) the value 
 of gold in a small degree, because it would diminish the quantity on 
 sale, and so far increase its value ; but an extension of promissory 
 notes, whether public or private, can have no tendency to alter the va- 
 lue of gold, because it does not chanire the amount, and therefore cannot 
 affect the gold prices of goods ; though the value of the notes them- 
 selves must of course depend upon the credit that is attached to them. 
 
 The French national assignats were not depreciated on account of 
 their enormous amount, but because tliey were not bottomed upon any 
 real, or discoverable property ; and because no confidence could be placed 
 either in the integrity or the stability of the Government, which was 
 continually changing ; and this suspicion was abundantly justified by 
 the well known fact, that, to this day, they have never been re- 
 deemed. The liank of England [)aper on the contrary was bottomed 
 upon real, or, at, all events upon substantial property ; and, when the 
 restriction bill passed, a committee of the House of Commons (which, 
 for state-purposes, I presinne, was a secret one) was perfectly satis- 
 fied that the fund, belonging to the Bank for redeeming its debt, though 
 not available perhaps at the moment, was very considerably more than 
 sufficient to cover the whole of its amount. 
 
 24. All promissory notes, as they legally bind the issuers to 
 pay for them in gold, are, strictlyspeaking, the representatives of gold; 
 but, in a more general sense, they may properly be considered as the 
 representatives of property of every description ; and it is possible thnt 
 the nominal value, of all the promissory notes in circulation in a
 
 15 
 
 kingdom, may very far exceed the total amount of its gold bullion, 
 without producing the slightest inconvenience. A man, for instance, 
 who posesses an estate of ten or twelve thousand a year value, may 
 commence banking, and issue promissory notes to the full extent of 
 his property, without keeping more gold in reserve than will answer the 
 ordinary wants of his establishment ; because if he should be unfortu- 
 nate and fail in his speculations, he will only have to sell his estate to 
 pay off his debts. Supposing all the promissory notes in the king- 
 dom to be presented for payment at the same time, there would not, in 
 alllikelihood, be gold, enough in the kingdom to take uponehalfof them; 
 but if all those notes were bottomed upon real, or substantial pi-operty, 
 the holders of them, that could not obtain payment in gold, would sus- 
 tain no loss from the failure ; because they would receive the full value 
 of the gold in property of some description ; which would answer every 
 commercial purpose quite as well, 
 
 25. Gold bullion, that is gold separated from the currency, is 
 an article of barter, a marketable commodity, as well as beef or mut- 
 ton ; and why an extension of promissory notes, which are evidenthf 
 hottomed upon jyropertif of ever if description^ should raise the value of 
 farm produce, and yet lower the value of gold, is far beyond my limited 
 conception. I have sought in vain for a solution of this problem, in 
 the elegant, but certainly not argumentative sj)eech of Mr. Sadler ; 
 in the Letters, on the currency, of Mr. Western ; in your Lectures ; 
 and finally in your essay on Paper and Gold ; but I can meet Avitii no 
 answer, to satisfy my mind, in any one of these productions. 
 
 There is plenty of bold assertion in all of them, but no argument ; 
 at least no argument that rises above tile level of Candidus's v/ise pro- 
 position, that it is so because it is. Because goods, ivhich have an 
 intrinsic value, are cheap or dear according as they are scarce or abun- 
 dant, you maintain that Bank promissory notes, which have nn intrin- 
 sic value, and which, in fact, are nothing more than the acknowledge- 
 ment of a debt; you maintain that these must be reduced in value in the 
 same proportion that their nominal amount is increased; M'ithout once ta- 
 king into consideration, that, as the law now stands, the h'aiik is obligtxi 
 to pay gold for them on demand ; and that the value of this gold must 
 depend upon the amount that is on sale, not only in the English mar- 
 ket, hut in ever]/ market with ivhich ire have an i/ dealings. 
 
 Upon this one premiss the whole of your theory is grounded, and, 
 when J ask for a more satisfactory explanation of it, I am either an- 
 swered Avith a repetitwn differentia/ worded, of the. same argument ; 
 orain told, that, "though this appears to mystify me, it is clear enough 
 to all others who have examined the question ; that there are not now tv,o 
 opinions upon it; and that I am manifestly too much of a novitiate to discuss 
 it" : a mode of arguing which, by the way, is the last resort of iinbe- 
 cility ; and is, indirectly, an acknowledgement, onthe part of the pcrsosj
 
 16 
 
 who had recourse to it, that the uphiions yuu ailvuciite have no solid 
 ground to stand upon. 
 
 26. As I have stated iu the former paragrapli, the whole of your 
 theory rests upon a sin<jle premiss, which you are not able to substan- 
 tiate ; while the ar<!cuments, on my side of the question, are so nume- 
 rous that the only difficulty lies in makini^ the selection. The French 
 national assignats, as was before observed, were depreciated sofe/j/ from 
 want of confidence ; but their enormous extension did not, in the least 
 degree, diminish the value of the gold coinage, which made a part of the 
 currency, as is evident from your own showing ; for you expressly say 
 that an enactment to equalize these two species of currency, drove all 
 the gold coinage out of that country ; which evidently proves that an 
 extension of paper money cannot depreciate the Value of the gold 
 part of the currency. 
 
 27. Whatever may be the amount of Bank paper issues, the val- 
 ue of a gold sovereign must depend upon the price of gold bullion ; 
 and the price of bullion is regulated, not by the amoimf, of Bank issues 
 hut by the demand for it in the market. In order to make this more 
 evident, let us suppose a case, which might really have happened for- 
 merly in England, and which, at all events is within the bounds of pro- 
 bability. Let us su|)|iose a country in which there is no paper money; 
 and that in consequence of tiie very rapid improvements in trade, it is 
 found necessary to double the amount of the whole coinage, aiul issue 
 the same as fast as it can he struck at the mint. Supposing this laige 
 increase to be gradually and slowly brought about, the effects would be 
 hardly perceptible ; but if it were done at once, this extraordinary de- 
 mand for gold bullion, to convert it into coin, would necessarily raise the 
 price of it, and the value of the coinage would be regulated accordingly ; 
 so that, in opposition to your dogmas, an ea,'teiisionoi the cuvreucy, suppos- 
 ing it to be in gold, would lower the money price of goods and not raise it. 
 
 28. I will now put another case. Let us suppose that about this 
 time, a bank company had just been established ; and that instead of 
 increasing the metal coinage, tlie currency was doubled by an issue of 
 promissory notes, jyai/ahle on demand, iu gold. Now, supposing 
 the public confidence in the stability of this bank company to be so great 
 that its notes were seldom, if ever, presented for payment : ami that in 
 the full assurance of this confidence continuing, it was not thought 
 necessary to be prepared, with cash or bullion to meet any sudden de- 
 mand ; supposing this to be the case, it follows, of course that the (juan- 
 tity of biiUion on sale, and the demand for it, would be precisely tiie 
 same as they were before ; and if, as would probably bw tlie case, the 
 bank should think it necessary to keep a certain quantity of bullion in 
 store in order to be prepared to meet any extraordinary demand, that 
 quantity must undoubtedly be purchased in the bullion markpl, and, so 
 far, would diminish the quantity on sale ; and thereby, i" - -nail degree,
 
 17 
 
 would lower and not raise the money price of goods. Stripping the 
 question then of all the mystery in which you and your coadjutors have 
 enveloped it, it follows that a mere extension of paper money produces 
 no effect on prices ; but an extension of gold currency must raise the 
 price of gold bullion, in a small degree, by increasing the demand for 
 it ; and, so far, the Cash payment bill may have contributed to lower 
 the prices of other goods by raising the value of gold ; but this effect 
 must have been occasioned solely by an extension in the amount of gold 
 sovereigns, and not by a contraction of Bank paper ; and, after all, it 
 is too trifling to deserve any serious notice; because, in the first 
 place, the quantity of bullion, that was purchased on this account, bears 
 but a small proportion to that which is on sale throughout the world ; 
 and, secondly, because it prodiicecl no sensible alteration in the price 
 oj' gold on the continent* . 
 
 29. I have expatiated so largely, upon this subject, in my obser- 
 vations upon Candidus letters, that it will hardly be required of me to 
 tire the reader's patience with a minute investigation of tlie same argu- 
 ments, though perhaps a little varied in the xcordhig oj'thetn^that are 
 spread over a work of more than three hundred pages. I have already 
 replied to your argument about bits of tin, lead, &c. in the 19th. para- 
 graph ; and shall content myself with discussing only one more, which 
 appears to me to be, at least, as good as any in your book ; and which 
 is grounded on the report of the Bullion Committee, which was ap- 
 pomted in 1810, to inquire into the cause of the high price of gold bullion. 
 
 30. The following is extracted from your essay on Paper against 
 Gold ; and, in case you should be disposed to insinuate that I have 
 made an unfair selection, I repeat, that if you will produce one argument, 
 from this book, that has any reference to the question at issue, which is 
 not completely refuted, both in the heading of this letter, and in the bo- 
 dy of the work, I will forfeit all claim to the character of a rational 
 being. 
 
 31. You observe that "the result of this committee's inquiries is 
 in substance, this : that the high price of gold is occasioned by the low 
 value of the paper money ; that the low value of the paper money has 
 been occasioned (as you know the low value of apples is) by the great 
 abundance of it ; that the onli/ way to lower the price of the gold is 
 to raise the value of the paper money, and the only way to raise the 
 value of the jiaper money is to make the quantity of it less than it now 
 is.'''' 
 
 32. These propositions are, I siippose, indebted, for their origin, 
 to the Bullion Committee ; but, whoever may have been the authors of 
 
 * I have mimbered the paragraphs in order that they may be spperately referred to ; 
 and ii'tlie iwpnrtial reader will do me the favour of reading' these two paragraphs 
 (-27 and -2^) uith atteydion, I am persuaded that he will find in them a full refutation 
 oi all the arguments, on the opposite sifle of the question, that have been or can be 
 ad sauced, either by Mr, Cobbett. or ai)y otlier writer or speaker.
 
 18 
 
 fh«*in, yoii have made yourself responsible for their correctness, by ob- 
 serving, in the same paraj^raph, that, "these propositions contain well 
 known, and almost self-evident facts ;" and I shall now show that they 
 not only do not contain self-evident facts, but are directly opposed to 
 the principles of common sense. Apples, as you very justly observe, 
 are cheap or dear, according- as they are scarce or abundant; but it 
 does not follow, from thence, that the value of promissory notes must 
 depend upon the quantity that is issued, and not upon their nominal a- 
 mount. The proprietor of an orchard, for instance, in the course of his 
 commercial speculations, gives a cider manufacturer, an order on his 
 steAvard, or bailiff, for the payment or transfer, of a thousand bushels of 
 apples, as soon as they shall become ripe. This cider manufacturer 
 very naturally expects to be paid the ciuantity of apples which is stated 
 in the bill ; but he is told in reply, that he is to receive no more than 
 one hundred bushels of these apples, not because there is any deficiency 
 in the crop, but because other promissory notes, of the same character, 
 have since been issued, and possibly by other people ; and that the 
 value of tliese notes is necessarily depreciated in the same proportion as 
 their numbers are increased. Is it possible, I ask, to conceive a more 
 absurd idea ? and yet this proposition is the foundation stone, the very 
 essence of all that has been advanced in favour of your theory. Sup- 
 posing that these notes were put in circulation, before the apples were 
 ripe for gathering, what would be the question conceriiirg them ? Would 
 not their values depend upon the credit of the issuer, and not upon the 
 quantity of notes which different people may have put in circulation ? If 
 the means of the issuer should not generally be supposed sufficient to 
 meet all his engagements, his notes would undoubtedly become depreci- 
 ated ; but this most certainly would not be occasioned by any increase 
 in the amoimt of issues, but simply by a wantof credit. Convei't the word 
 apples into gold bullion, and what makes the difference ? Gold, as well 
 as beef and bread, is an article of barter ; and men of all classes, in this 
 commercial kingdom, are almost momentarily giving notes of hand, for 
 the payment of certain sums in gold, in exchange for other goods. These 
 notes, which are inconceivably numerous, are continually circulating 
 from hand to hand, but their seporate values depend solely upon the 
 credit of the issuers, and not upon the quantity which is issued. The 
 value of the standard currency of the kingv'.om, whether in gold or pa- 
 per, cannot be at all aflected by an increase or diminution of promis- 
 sory notes of any other description, because the issuers of these 
 notes are alone responsible for their own failures ; and yet the scope of 
 your essay is to cn^ate a belief that the value of the Bank of England 
 paper must depend, in great measure, upon theamovmt of country bank 
 notes: and, by a necessary consequence, of notes of every other de- 
 scription, as well. The quantity of gold bullion on sale in the market, 
 and its value as an article of barter, cannot be increased or diminished
 
 19 
 
 by any alteration in tlie amount of promissory notes ; and tlie value of 
 j the currency, whether in i^old, or paper payable in gold, must depend 
 I upon the price of gold bullion. The value of the Bank paper issues, mow 
 i they are payable in gold, must depend upon the price of gold, and not 
 I upon the quantity in circulation ; and the value of the Bank paperissues, 
 I during the time that the restriction bill was in force, depended solely 
 \ upon the confidence which was placed in them. In one case, no in- 
 t crease of Bank pa])er issues can lower the price of gold, because it does 
 i not increase its quantity; in tlie other, the value of these issues must 
 I have depended upon the credit of the establishment, and not upon the 
 i quantity in circulation ; ami, as it does not appear, that, at any one 
 I time, during the war, there was any doubt entertained of the solvencif 
 \ of the Bank, I maintain, in opposition, both to your dogmas, and the 
 ] report of the Bullion Committee, that the Bank of Kngland paper never 
 I was depreciated; and that a contraction of its amount, under these cir- 
 cumstances , could not have raised its value. 
 
 33. I have read your book once through, with attention, and 
 marked those pages I might have occasion to refer to ; but I cannot 
 discover in it a single argument, that goes to ])rove that the Bank paper 
 was depreciated, but what a child ought to be ashamed of. 
 
 Itappears, by your own report, that the bullion Committee was appoin- 
 ted to inquire into the cause of the Idgli price of i^old bullion ; and that these 
 gentlemen reported that it was not a rise in the price of bullion, but a 
 fall in the value of the Bank paper, that occasioned the inconvenience 
 which the country complained of. Now, as this unexpected report was 
 -made by the committee, in manifest opposition to tiie opinion of those 
 who appointed it, the onus of finding proof certainly belouijedto them ; 
 but, according to your statement, these gentlemen contrived to shuffle 
 the burden from off their own shoulders, and very dexterously placed 
 it upon the backs of their opponents. AVhen the ministry denied that 
 the Bank paper was depreciated, t!iey were asked in what way they ac- 
 counted for the great differences in the values of gold and paper ? and 
 when they replied — 'by a rise in the value of geld', they were again asked 
 "how it had come to pass at this time, above all others"'? 
 
 This last question seems to have satisfied you, for you carry on 
 the argument no further ; and yet the ministry might reasonably have re- 
 torted upon the Committee, by asking in return how the fall in the 
 value of Bank paper, came to pass at this time above all others ?. 
 
 34. You have not informed us what answer the ministry gave to 
 this question, — beyond the mere assertion, that it had been brought a- 
 bout by the extraordinary measures which Buonaparte had latterly * 
 adopted ; but if you will take the trouble to read the following para- 
 graphs with attention, you will see that it is easy to /jroL-e that there 
 
 • Alludiiicr, ofcoursc, tothe B-rliii decrees, wliichpro'iibitel, not only U\z importati- 
 on, but tlic Mveof English manufactures, all over the coatiiicnt.
 
 20 
 
 must have been a ?rry conshlerahle rise In the price of goUl about that 
 time : while it is all but impossible to imagine in what way, rmder the 
 circumstances, there could have been a fall in the value of the Bank 
 of England paper. 
 
 35. Gold bullion, as has been already observed, is an article of com- 
 merce ; and its value, or barter price, depends partly upon the amount 
 which is on sale in the market, and partly on the demand which is made 
 for it. Up to the passing of the Bank restriction bill in 1797» the 
 value of the Bank paper, which was payable in gold, depended upon 
 the price of gold ; but immediately afterwards a separation (though not 
 intended) necessarily took place. The value of the paper then became 
 totally dependent upon the credit which was attached to the establishment; 
 while the value of gold, as before, depended solely upon the state of 
 the market ; and as a very great difference was observed, some years 
 afterwards, in the values of these two species of currency, it became 
 a question whether this difference was occasioned by a rise in the price 
 of gold or a fall in the value of paper. As in this retired spot, I have 
 no other document than your book to refer to, I cannot say preciseh/ 
 what was the price of gold at the time the restriction bill passed ; but 
 I will state it at £3. 17s. 6rf. the ounce; because I believe that that Avas 
 very nearly the amount, and if I have committed any error, oneither side, 
 the reader byreferringto the gazettes, can easily make his own correction. 
 But whatever may Lave been the price of gold in 17975 it appears by Lord 
 King's notice to his tenants, which was alluded to by you, that, in 1802 
 (and probably up to the Berlin decrees in 1805) the price was £4. per 
 ounce; so that, for the first five years after the separation, the difference 
 did not amount to more possibly much less th^n half a crown in £4, 
 or a small fraction more than 3 per cent. Hei-e then we have a do- 
 cumentary proof, that the Bank of England, up to this time, still pos- 
 sessed the confidence of the public, and that its paper issues had not 
 been ma/^ri«//3/ depreciated ; but in 1805 (I believe) ]3uona|)arte passed 
 the Berlin decrees, which prohibited not only the importation but the 
 use of English manufactures, all over the continent, at least as far 
 as it was subject to his dominion ; and consequently, during the re- 
 mainder of the war, we could only carry on a trade Avith a great j)art 
 of the continent, by exporting bullion, which, by increasing the demand for 
 it, must necessarily have raised its price. This alone is quite sufficient 
 to account for a very great increase in the price of gold ; but, subse- 
 quently, about the time that the Bullion Committee was appointed, 
 we had an army to provide for, in the Peninsula, of probably not less 
 than one liinidred tliousand men, all of whom were paid by us in cosh 
 oi some description ; and I now put it to the good sense of the 
 iinpartittl reader, whetlier these two drains upon the bullion of the 
 country must not necessarily have produced a very great rise in 
 its price ?
 
 21 
 
 36. So Ion;; as the Merlin decrees remained in force, and we 
 Isad a iart,''e army on tlie continent, which Avas to he maintained hy the 
 expenditure of IJritisli pold, the whole of which was necessarily spent 
 ahroad, these two incessant drains upon the ^old of the country ought 
 to be considered quite suPiicient to have raised, and afterwards, kept 
 up the price of gold ; but, at the same time I am bound to admit, that, 
 if the high price of gold depended solely upon the existence of these 
 two causes, the effect must naturally have ceased, at the end of the 
 war, when these causes were removed ; and if I could be sure of ob- 
 taining the proper documents, I would very gladly agree to let the me- 
 rits of both sides of the (juestion rest upon this one criterion. That 
 the price of gold fell, at least very nearly, to its old level, immediately 
 after the conclusion of the war, may be proved (I helievej by the 
 gazettes ; but, at all events, it may be proved by the fact, (if it is one) 
 that, in numerous instances, gentlemen, who wished to visit the conti- 
 nent, received, from their bankers, letters of credit, for cash payment 
 on foreign bankers, to the full amount of their Bank paper deposits ; 
 with the exception possibly, of a very small deduction, to make up a 
 trifiing diiFerence in the exchanges. As however, I am not quite 
 sure of the fact, I will not take upon myself to vouch for the correct- 
 ness of this statement, though I believe it to be true; but 1 submit to 
 yourself. Sir, whether the fall in the price of gold was not almost^' si- 
 multaneous with the conclusion of the war ? 
 
 37. Facts, whenever they can be procured, are the most con- 
 vincing of all arguments ; and if you can make it appear that the price 
 of gold kept up, after these two causes were removed, I will no longer 
 contend this ])art of the question ; but if, on the contrary, it should 
 be found that, immediately after the removal of these two supposed 
 causes, the price of gold fell very nearly to \tsJ'o7'mer level, the decision 
 of the impartial reader ou^ht to be on my side ; though I am prepared 
 to be told that you will not sul)mit your opinions to this test. 
 
 38. If the facts should be against me, you will make use of it 
 as an argument in support of your opinions ; and, if it should be in my 
 favour, you will then say that it was the narrowing the discounts in 
 Threadneedle Street that brought down the ])rice of gold : though the 
 object of almost every page in your Essay was to shew that the Bank 
 could not materially diminish its paper issues, until it, first of all, got 
 rid of a large portion of the debt. 
 
 31). That the Bank might, in some measure, have diminished the 
 amount of its paper issues, by discontinuing to discount bills, will hard- 
 ly be disputed : but if, by so doing, it could have reduced the price of 
 gold to its former level, ira the course of a feic months, it is not reasonable 
 
 * It should however be kept in mind, that a large portion of our army remained abroad 
 (cither \\\ America, or the Netherlands,) till some time ailcrwards.
 
 22 
 
 to suppose that it would voluntarily/ deprive itself of a valuable source 
 of profit in the Year 1814, for the sake of producing an effect that 
 would only be wanted in the year 1819. The Bank Directors, it should 
 be remeujbered, were injconstant intercourse with the Government, and 
 must have known that they would not be compelled to pay in pold for 
 some years to come ; and consequently that it would he quite time 
 enough to bpgiu narrowing their discounts when the cash-payment bill 
 was about to be proposed. 
 
 40. The fact however, might easily be ascertained and the ques- 
 tion set at rest for ever, if Mr. Sadler, Mr. Western, or any other 
 member of parliament ivho has commit/ed his opiniim upon this qucstiim, 
 would either ask one of the Bank Directors, for the necessary informa- 
 tion, or move for the return of so much of the Bank accounts, as would 
 show at what times, and in what proportion, the Bank paper issues 
 were contracted, from the year 1814 to the year 1819, both inclusive ; 
 with the price of gold bullion placed immediately oj)posite the proper 
 dates. 
 
 41. A document of this nature, if it could be procured, would 
 place the question in its true light ; and we should see, at once, whe- 
 ther the narrowing of the Bank discounts preceded, or folloAved, the 
 decline in the price of gold bullion ;* and also whether the contraction 
 of Bank paper, in consequence of this narroioing of the discounts, was 
 i7i a sufficient degree to make \t probable that the reduced price of gold 
 was occasioned by it ; but, as I can only recommend, and cannot in- 
 sist upon the production of this document, I must endeavour to supply 
 the deficiency from my own resources ; and I have no doubt tliat I 
 shall still have it in ray power to place you within the two horns of a 
 dilemma, from which you will find it very difficult to extricate yourself. 
 
 42. The following is a quotation, of Candidas, /rom //o?/r own 
 writings. — "The narrowingof the discounts in Threadneedle Street was 
 absolutely necsssary to A-(?e;>(/or(j» the exchange." This passage, taken 
 literally, would lead a man of plain understanding to suppose that the ob- 
 ject, in narrowingthe discounts, must have been to bring downt\\G price 
 ofgold, andnotto r«jse the value of pai)er. You shall have it however 
 which way you will ; for all that 1 want is to get at the precise meaning 
 of your words. If you mean to be understood that the value of Gold 
 was brought down to the level of Bank paper, you forsake your former 
 opinion, and admit, after all, that there has been no depreciation of Bank 
 paper; and if you maintain that the paper, by this contraction, has 
 
 ♦ Candidus, as appears by a quotation from his last Letter, observed that prior to the 
 passing of Peel's bill, the Bank occasionally contracted and extended its issues, for 
 the sake of experiment, and that the rise and fall of prices followed these experiments 
 "with the precision ofa pendulum". Perhaps, Sir, you will be so good as <o inform us, 
 ■whether the price ofgold rose and fell at the same time with equal precision-
 
 23 
 
 been raised to the level of Gold, you have yet to sliew in what way the 
 Bank could have derived any advantage from it. The commercial dis- 
 tress in every part of the kingdom that almost immediately followed the 
 return of peace might possibly have forced the Bank to have heen less 
 liberal of its credit ; but the object of narrowing the discounts, or, in 
 other words, of contracting the amount of Bank paper, us you represent 
 it, must have been to make Bank paper and gold equally valuable. 
 
 Now for the sake of argument, though I do notadmitit, I will suppose 
 this to have been done. I will suppose that by narrowing the discounts, 
 in a very great degree, the value of the remaining quantity of Bank 
 paper was placed upon an equality with gold ; and I ask you to shew, 
 in what way the Bank could have derived any advantage from it? By your 
 own arguments, it a]>pears that the Bank had raised the value of its 
 paper money, by contracting its amount ; and yet, after all, the ob- 
 ject of the Bank must have been completely defeated ; for, in that case 
 it could only have purchased gold, with paper, by again extending its 
 issues ; and then the value of the paper falls as low as it was before. 
 
 43. If the price of gold had really remained stationary, ever since 
 the return of peace, and the value of the paper money had been raised 
 to the level of gold by contracting the amount of it, the Bank could only 
 have purchased the gold bullion, that might have been required for the 
 payment of its notes, by bartering real, or substantial property, in ex- 
 change for it ; and this might have been done just as well, if there had 
 been no contraction whatever ; so that, in fact, the Bank could have 
 had no motive for narrowing its discounts, but what originated in the 
 necessity of being less liberal of its credit. 
 
 44. If the value of the paper money had been raised by a con- 
 traction of Bank issues, the Bank could neither have purchased gold 
 with paper, nor have derived any benefit from the transaction ; and if 
 it was simply &fall in the price of gold, after the ws.r, that restored 
 the equality, the preceding rise in the price of fl-r>/(/, during the war, 
 must have been occasioned by a very large demand for it in the mar- 
 kets, and not by an extension of paper currency. 
 
 45. If, as you, and the Bullion Committee, asserted, the Bank 
 of England pajjer, after the passing of the Restriction bill in 1/97, 
 was depreciated by a large extension of issues, this paper could only 
 have been restored to its former value, by reducing the amount of 
 issues as low as it was before ; and this, as you well knotv, has 
 never yet been done. 
 
 46. If an extension of the currency (as you affirm) was the 
 cause of the evil, it could only have been remedied by a contraction? 
 to an equal amount; and therefore when the equilihiium was restored, 
 it was your business to prorethat a contraction, to this amount, had 
 really taken place; hut instead of doing this, you content yourself 
 with merely saying that the Bank must have narrowed its discounts, in
 
 24 
 
 order to bring- clown the exchanges. Why Sir, the grand ohject, in 
 your boasted Kssay, is to prove that the Bank (in spile of itself) was 
 under an absolute necessity, of extending its issues, with the increase 
 of the national debt ; and, as the debt has doubled itself since 1797) 
 the mere narrowing of the discounts, Avithnut a reduction of the debt, 
 could not, even upon your otvn showing, have produced such an ef- 
 fect. By a statement of your own,* it appears that the nominal value 
 of Bank notes in circulation in 1798 amounted to 3613,334,752. 
 and in 1809 to 5621,249,980. and, if we allow, only <3e3,000,000, 
 by the same rule of progression, for the remainder of the tvar, this 
 narrowing of the Bank discounts — a very modest term by the by, 
 this narrowing of the discounts, in nnlif one year, must have amounted 
 to no less a sum thar. ^12,000,000 ! which is very far beyond what can 
 possibly be conceded, upon no other authority than yoiir bare assertion. 
 47. To proceed with the argument. It has already been shown 
 that this depreciation of paper money fif it must be so called) was 
 greatest at that precise period of the war, when (in consequence of the 
 Berlin decrees, and the immense force Avhich w^e had to maintain in 
 the Peninsula) the demand for gold in the foreign market?, must 
 havebeenmuch greater than was ever known before ; and that it ceased 
 exist, (at the end of the Avar) as soon as those two extraordinary de- 
 mands for gold were withdrawn from the market. From 1797 to 
 1802 f (and perhaps to \ 805) the paper money Avas not sensibly de- 
 preciated ; though as is evident, by the documents furnished above, 
 and your own calculations, founded upon the progressive increase 
 of the national debt, the amount of Bank paper issues must have 
 been increased more than twenty five per cent ; and this one fact § a- 
 bundantly /)roy(?s that an extension of paper issues does not necessarily 
 produce a depreciation in the value of paper. In one period of the 
 war, an extension of the currency, to the amount of more than twenty - 
 five per cent, does not produce a sensible rise in the price of gold. In 
 another similar period, and with very nearly the same progressive exten- 
 sion of currency, the price of gold rises from £4 to £4 \4s. per 
 ounce, and the Bullion Committee, J after a years deliberation, Avill 
 
 *Paper£^inst Gold. page. 262. 
 
 f At this period, the price of gold Avas only £4 per ounce, and the A'alue of the paper 
 money, in 1798, could not have been /e** than £3. 17*. 6f/. per ounce. 
 
 § As Mr. Baring, Avhose opinion, on questions of this nature, is very much looked up 
 to, was a member of the Bullion Committee that made this extraordinary report, I 
 recommend this fact to his especial consideration. 
 
 J In all probability, it Avould have been impossible for this country to have continued 
 the war in the Peninsula, if the Bank at that time, had been obliged to pay in cash; 
 and as, I believe, most of the leading members of the Bullion Committee wore in the 
 opposition, it might possibly have been the object of that Committee to /brce the Go- 
 vernment to make peace with Buonaparte.
 
 25 
 
 have it, that it was not an extraordinary demand for gold buHion, in 
 consequence of the Berlin decrees, that produced a rise in the price of 
 gfold, but an extension of Bank issues that produced a depreciation of 
 paper; though it is upon record, that a similar extension of Bank is- 
 sues, to an almost equal amount, but a few years before, did not pi- o- 
 dnce the least depreciation in the value of i\ie, paper money! 
 
 48. Sir, this is not a question tliat depends simply upon mere 
 argumeHt. It is a question of facts ; and might be determined in one 
 moment, if any of those g-entlemen, in the House of Commons, M'Ao*« 
 business it really is, could be prevailed upon to move for the necessary 
 documents. It appears, by your book, that, in 1798, when prices 
 were much higher than they are at present, the nominal valjie of the 
 Bank of England notes in circulation amounted to ^613,334,752 ; and 
 if a contraction of the currency was really the cause of the fall in 
 prices, as you and your disciples maintain, it follows, of course, that 
 the total amount of the Bank of England issues (inchidivg gold iov- 
 ereignsj at any one period since the conclusion of the war, must have 
 been as far short of the above sum, as the average of prices was below 
 what it was in 1798. 
 
 49. The onus of proving this fact lies with you, and your party, 
 and not with me. If you can make it appear that the total amount of 
 the Bank of England issues (including, of course, the gold sovereigns) 
 which are now in circulation, is as much below the sum of a6 13, 334, 752 
 as the average of prices is below what it was in 1798, you will have a 
 plausible foundation upon which to rest your theory; but if you can- 
 not make this evident,* and I am very sure you cannot, I must take 
 the liberty of observing, that all those gentlemen (both in and out of 
 ])arliament) who prefer sound sense to empty declamation, and who 
 ciumot condescend to sacrifice truth, for the s-ake of vilifying the mea- 
 sures of Government ; in a word, every gentleman of upright and 
 honourable principles, whatever may be his party feelings, must see 
 the necessity of for>aking your school, and going back to our old 
 master Adam Smith; whose opinions, instead of being borne up, as 
 yours are, by the wild fancies of a flighty imagination, were firmly 
 grounded in the plain and sober dictates of common sense. 
 
 50. I have nothing further to add respecting the currency ques- 
 ti!)n ; but, bsiore I conclude this letter, I shall take the liberty of 
 making: a few observations, upon your equitable adjustment scheme ; 
 in order that the ])ublic may see what they would really gaiu, by a 
 
 * All thai I waut is to set at the truth •, and if there should be any difficulty of as- 
 certainiurr the number of pold sovereisrns iu circulation, you are at liberty to select any 
 priod prior to the p^Psing: of Peel's bill, when there were no sovereigns in existence; 
 and Im-ther, if it will ^uit your purpose better, you may, if you please, include all the 
 country bank nates in circulation at these two pencils, het us have the truth the 
 whole truth, and nothing but the truth ; and 1 am not afi-aid of the issue.
 
 26 
 
 bona fide transaction of this nature, if they could he prevailed upon, 
 by you, and your partisans, to insist upon having itputinto execution. 
 51* The two following passages are quoted verbatim, from page 
 324 of your Essay on Paper against Gold. "I have, I think, shown you 
 very clearly, that to cause the Bank to pay again in gold is impossible ; 
 and that, let what will happen, let what will take place as to commerce, 
 or as to war, the Bank Paper will never regain any part of what it 
 has lost, as long as the I^ational Debt shall exist ; or, rather as long as 
 the dividends shall be paid upon the interest of that debt". 
 
 "Now, if I have shown this to your satisfaction, the question, and 
 the only question that remains to be discussed, is what would be the * 
 CONSEQUENCES of a cessation in the payment of the dividends; 
 that is to say, the total destruction of the National debt ; the total 
 breaking up of the Funds and the Bank Note System." 
 
 52. The above quotation is quite sufficient to display the real 
 object of the writer in its true colours. Your endeavour was, evi- 
 dently, to impress your readers, with the belief, that in consequence 
 of the great increase of the national debt, the pros|)erity of the king- 
 dom was rapidly declining, and that nothing, short of its absolute an- 
 nihilation, could restore us to our former healthful condition. Your 
 first object was to point out the necessity of getting rid of the debt, by 
 some means or another ; and then you ask what would be the conse- 
 quence, or, in other words, what inconvenience would be experienced 
 by the whole community, with the exception of the fundholders, if 
 this debt were to be wiped oat with a sponge ? You do not indeed, in 
 express words, recommend this public robbery, this breach of national 
 honour, but you, at least, throw out the hint; you ask what would be 
 the consequence of such a measure ; and the eflfect which the question 
 was intended to produce can hardly be mistaken. 
 
 53. But whatever may have been your motive, the question was 
 put, and you shall not go without an answer. You ask what incon- 
 venience the j)ublic would sustain by a transaction, which in private 
 life, would be deemed most infamous? and the answer may be summed 
 up in two words — National Disgrace. We should lose all that could 
 render our existence valuable, either as a nation, or as individuals; 
 for who could endure life, when coupled with a tarnished reputation? 
 
 54. Upon the security of repeated acts of parliament, and, per- 
 haps, in some measure influenced by your writings (ivhen yon edited 
 the Porcupine, and did all in your power to make the irar popular, J 
 the fundholders occasionally accommodated the public, by lending a 
 portion of their capitals to the Government (in order to enable the 
 country to carry on the war with greater vigour) on the understanding 
 
 *■ The finphatic words are marked precisely after the text.
 
 27 
 
 that they were ty receive so much per cent, interest on their loans, 
 until the money Avas repaid. Up to the passing of Peel's bill, the 
 dividends were paid with the same coin in which the loans (subsequent 
 to 17^7J had been contracted, and therefore, up to that period you 
 could not varnish over the iniquity of your design by the hypocritical 
 pretence of making an equitable adjustment ; but immediately after 
 that bill was passed, you took pains to impress the public mind with 
 the belief that the dividends were paid iii a coin of very superior value 
 to that in which the loans had been contracted ; and, therefore, jou 
 urged, it would be but equitable to reduce the amount of the dividends 
 in the same proportion as their value has been increased; which, ac- 
 cording to your statement, though I cannot comprehend hoiv you make 
 it out, would be to blot out, at least three-fourths of the whole amount. 
 Now, with respect to the equity of your scheme, it must have beeu 
 foreseen, at the time that the loans were contracted, that prices would 
 have fallen at the end of the war; because they have invariably done 
 so, at the end of every war, from time immemorial, even when the cur- 
 rency/ was not contracted ; and this fact was moreover expressly pointed 
 out, by Adam Smith, in his 'Wealth of Nations'; but whether tliis ne- 
 cessary consequence was foreseen, or whether it was not, the contract 
 was equally binding, and can only be broken with the consent of buth 
 parties. 
 
 55. Putting this consideration, however, out of the question, 
 your equitable adjustment scheme requires that you should not merely 
 assert but prove tl-at the currency, since the return of peace, has been 
 contracted in as great a degree as the prices have fallen ; and then 
 when you have made this appear, //' j/ou mean to be really equitable, 
 you will have, at least, as much to pay to the subscribers of that part of 
 the debt that was contracted previous to the end of the jear 1797» as 
 you will have to receive from those who have lent money to Govern- 
 ment since that period; so that, after all, the public can derive no 
 benefit whatever from your equitable adjustment scheme. 
 
 56. Equitable adjustment, as I understand the phrase, signifies 
 a determination to do justice to both parties. If the public lias a right, 
 in equity, to claim compensation, from one portion of the fuiidholders 
 for losses, jvhich it has sustained, in consequence of a contraction of 
 the currency, another portion of the fundholders has, at least, an equal 
 right to claim compensation, from the public, for losses, which they 
 have sustained, by an extension of the currency and that too in a 
 much greater degree: and, in that case, if justice h^ done to both par- 
 ties, the advantage will not be on the side of the public. 
 
 57. It appears, by your own book, that the debt, in 1797, a- 
 mounted to 413 millions> more than 350 milHoji: of which remain to
 
 28 
 
 this day, unredecmefl ; and, up to this moment, unless you choose to 
 contradict ynnr own arguments, and falsify your otvn predlctwns, you 
 must admit that the dividends upon this sum have all alonof been paid 
 in a depreciated currency. In fnct, tlie main scope of the arguments 
 in YOur es?!ay is to induce your readers to believe that the currency 
 has neccHHarily trone on extending with the increase of the national 
 debt, and that the value of the currency has been depreciated in the 
 5ame proportion that it has been extended. The narrowing of the 
 discounts, n-Uhmtt a redvctUm (f the debt, was an after-thought of 
 yonrs, invented, most likely, for the sole purpose of getting out of a 
 dilemma; but it will not answer your jmrpose at this turn; because 
 prior to 1707, the Bank paid in gold as Avell as it does now^ and the 
 Bank, at this moment, discounts quite as many bills as it did then. 
 
 As nearly as possible the circumstances of the two periods, with 
 the exception of the extension of the currency, are precisely the same, 
 and whether we refer to the statement that was made in Parliament, 
 by the Duke of Wellington, and substantially corroborated by Mr. 
 Goulbourne, or whether Ave apply for information to your book, the 
 results, respecting the amount of the currency, do not materially 
 differ. The Duke of Wellington states the amount of the currency, at 
 this moment in circulation, to be about* double what it was in 1797; 
 and, according to ymir arguments, as the debt has abmit doubled itself 
 since then, the amount of the currency, and, with it, the depreciation 
 of its value, must have increased in the same proportion. Unless you 
 can produce some better authority than Sir Francis Rurdett's violent 
 philippick f against the Duke of Wellington, in contradiction of his 
 
 * I cannot say prcciec?!y what was the amount of the Duke's statement; but, at all 
 events, it oquallod t^e' total amount of the currency immediately before the Cash 
 payment bill passed. 
 
 t Sir Francis Burdett-, as he is reported to have spoken, admitted that the Duke mipht 
 have been rig^lit with respect to me amount o( gold sovereic^us that wjis issued from 
 the mint ; hut he coutenaed that a larj^e portioQ of this specie must have been carried 
 out of the country, or applied to other purposes, as fast as it was issued. As Sir 
 Francis produced no facts iu t-upport of his opinion, it is fair to conclude that he had 
 none to produce; an^ it his artiumeuts rested solely upon what he conceived to be 
 reasouame pioljahilities, a little caul reflection mif^ht have suggested to him that, 
 ULoder the circanistanccs, it is ouly ou the supposition of a super abundance of cur- 
 ppncv, that we c;i,i reasonably account for the disappearance of any part of it; So 
 that Sir Frauds must have lost sight ofhis premises, when he came to his conclusion. 
 11'^ insisted thit the great fall of prices was solely occasioned by a co7i/rfl'c<»07* of 
 tlie curreucv; and -et imagined that the people could be so foolish as to withdraw the 
 Pij'iA sovereigns from circulation^ when, by his own account, it must have been 
 irrrDoesible to dispose of them, in any other way, to so much advantage! Unfortu- 
 iwtely when gentlemen lose thefr tempers in argument, they are almost sure to run 
 in»0 absurdities. 
 
 Sir Francis Burdett, in one ofhis newspaper letters, complained loudly of having 
 b«en injured, in his estate, by the passing of the Cash pajment bill fincluding,!
 
 29 
 
 Grace's gtatement, 1 do not see in what way it can fulrlif be disputed : 
 for it was, at least, substantially corroborated by Mr. Goulbourue. in 
 his reply to Sir Francis Burdett, and it tallies very nearly 'ffith the 
 only conclusion which can reasonably be deduced from your own arg-ii- 
 ments ; but, at all events, the onus of proving the fact, as I have be- 
 fore observed, lies with you, and not with me. If you can prove, by 
 authenticated documents, that the contraction of the currency, since 
 the return of peace, has been equal in degree to the fall of prices, yon 
 will have the infinite satisfaction of jjiving the death blow to your own 
 arguments; and, if you cannot do this, I have vo?//* ou-n authority for 
 stating, that, upon your equitable adjustu.ent scheme, if equal Justice 
 leere to be done on both sides, the public without materinl/y diminishing 
 the subsequent part of the debt, would have nearly double interest (be- 
 sides a very large arrearj to \){iy on that part of the debt, that was 
 contracted prior to the year 1798. 
 
 58. It cannot be necessary to pursue this argument any further; 
 but before I conclude, I must take the liberty of suggesting — and the 
 hint, ivill not altogether be throicn away upon Mr. Wedern and Mr. 
 Sadler — that if, in the course of your future lectures, or on any other 
 occasion, you should again discuss this question, without noticing what 
 I have written uptm the subject, it may possibly lead to a suspicion 
 that your outward professions do not quite coincide with your iDv>:^Hrd 
 convictions. 
 
 I am. Sir 
 
 Pilton Y'our obedient vServant, 
 
 October 26th. 1830. WALTER FORM.AN. 
 
 P. S. For the ston^ reason that luas stated in the preface to my pre- 
 ceding pamphlet, a copy i>f this letter shall be salt to you, and to every 
 other person whose name is mentioned in it. 
 
 suppose the antecedent measures J but unless he can show that he has reduced his 
 rents in an equal proportion with the average fall of prices, it must be evident tha'. 
 his income (like those of many other coraplafiiauts) though nominally less, is really 
 greater than it was during- the war; and, if that should be the case, Sir Francis, and 
 not Sir Robert Peel, is one of those of whom the farmers have most reason to complain. 
 An expensive war is somethiua: like a la\\ suit, in which, whoever succeeds, botL 
 farties sufter loss. If the fact could be ascertained, I have no doubt that the average. 
 rent of all the laud in the kingdom, would purchase more sroods at this moment, in 
 spite of taxes and poor rates, than it would have done in 1792; and, if .so, our ffreat 
 landed proprietors ouo-ht to tliink themselves very fortunate, on coming out ofa 
 twenty year's expensive and bloody war, to find themselves in as good a condition as 
 they were when they entered it. 
 
 ff'ason Sf Foxwell Printers, Shepton-Mallet.
 
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